THE EXCELLENCY OF Monarchical Government, Especially of the English Monarchy; WHEREIN Is largely Treated of the several BENEFITS of KINGLY GOVERNMENT, and the INCONVENIENCE of COMMONWEALTHS.  
ALSO OF The several Badges of SOVEREIGNTY in General, and particularly according to the CONSTITUTIONS of our LAWS.  
LIKEWISE OF The Duty of SUBJECTS, and the Mischiefs of FACTION, SEDITION and REBELLION.  
In all which The PRINCIPLES and PRACTICES of our late COMMONWEALTHS.  
MEN are Considered.  
By NATHANIEL JOHNSTON Dr. in Physic.  
Decet timeri Caesarem, at plus diligi.  Senec. Octau. 
LONDON, Printed by T. B. for Robert Clavel at the Peacock in St. Paul's Churchyard. MDCLXXXVI.   

TO THE KING.  
SIR,  
WHile every one strives to outdo each other in the Presents they make, as Testimonies of their unbounded Wishes, That Your Majesty may see many and many happy Years: I presume to lay this Treatise, Of the Excellency of the English Monarchy, at Your Sacred Feet, as the best Expression of that Veneration I own to Majesty; at least, the best my small Capacity enables me to render. Which I am the rather emboldened to, seeing that, where Monarchy is the Theme, an humble Recourse for Patronage seems owing to none less than a King; or Application to be made to any less than the Best of Princes, to countenance a Discourse of the Best of Governments. My want of Skill to copy all the Beauties of the English Monarchy, (an Excellency no Hand can pretend to) will not, I hope, lessen the Esteem of the Subject. But the falling short of setting out its Inimitable Perfections, will leave Your Majesty a large Field to exercise that Divine Virtue and Property of a King, to Forgive. All that a Writer can perform in a Subject of this Nature, is, to give an Historical Account of the Rise, Progress, and Constitution of the Government; to show the Admirable Order and Firmness of its Composition; to collect the Real, Solid, and Certain Benefits arising from it; which are best Illustrated, by comparing it with all other Systems of Government, and reflecting, as well upon the weak Foundations, and unfortunate Issue, as the long Series of Inconveniences which ever attend them; especially that which is Antimonarchical and Popular. This is the Province of an Author, and my Aim in this Treatise. But to demonstrate the Practical Excellence of our Monarchy, is the business of the Monarch; and will be the peculiar Advantage of Your Majest'ies Reign, to carry the Honour of this Nation higher, than any thing I could copy from the Records of your most Famous Ancestors, and most Heroic Predecessors. So that it is my greatest comfort (next to the hopes of Your majesty's gracious Acceptance of these my Endeavours) that those more able Pens, who shall undertake to transmit to Posterity, the Memorials of Your majesty's happy Reign, will fall shorter of the Original, than perhaps I have done: For as their Abilities will exceed mine, so will their Subject be incomparably greater. I am conscious to myself that what I have attempted is far below the Dignity of the Matter: But I shall never repent my Labour, if Your Majesty vouchsafe to cast a Gracious Eye upon it, merely as an Instance of my unshaken Loyalty, in Order to Your Service, and the Benefit of Your People; and to accept it, as an Homage, and Offering of my Zeal, and Duty, and an unfeigned Testimony, That I am  
Newyears-day, 1685/86. Your MAJESTIE'S Most Humble, Most Obedient, and Most Devoted Subject, N. JOHNSTON.   

THE Introduction.  
WHEN a Fire happens in any considerable Building (much more in a magnificent Palace) every one runs with his Bucket, works at the Engine, helps to rear the Ladders, or do something to stay the Ravage of the Flames; and when the devouring Element hath reduced all to Cinder, and Embers, then hath he leisure to consider the Proximate Causes of it, the unhappy Accidents that produced it, and the ways and means whereby so wasting a Destruction might have been prevented. After which, he surveys in his Melancholy Thoughts, the former curious Arrchitecture, the rare contrivance, largeness, and beauty of the Rooms, and Stateliness of the whole Pile. And after some time, allowed to his affrightment and astonishment, gins to forecast, how a more durable Structure may be raised again, of less combustible, or perishable Materials. He thinks then of facing it with Jasper Crusting, and flooring of it with Marble, and so securing it, that nothing but the last deflagration shall dissolve it.  
So those of his Majesty's Subjects, who lived before the Calamitous Fire was kindled in his Blessed Father's Dominions, could not without a most anxious Concern, reflect on the ancient Glory of that so well-disposed, and beautiful Monarchy, brought to that sad Catastrophe, by those who at first, may he presumed, designed no such Mischief: but by prosperous success, and fatal Intervening Accidents, devolved the Power into such Hands, as by an implacable Malice, and incredible Barbarity were not satiated even with the sacred Blood of the Blessed Martyr.  
Those erected a most Tyrannical Commonwealth, and Oligarchy (Governments unknown to these Isles, since the Roman Conquest) and with inexpressible Cruelty, and Devastation, for many Years exhausted the Blood and Treasure of the Subjects.  
But when they had filled the measure of their Wickedness, and the Usurped Power rolled from one Hand to another, The miraculous Restauration of His late Majesty, reseated the Monarchy again, and settled us in a most profound Peace, while all the neighbouring Countries were harassed with cruel Hostilities, and most Bloody Wars.  
However though that great Prince, by the Blessing of God, laid the Foundation of a Glorious Temple of Concord, Peace, and Eternity of Empire; yet for some Years before his Death, we saw a strange Propensity, in Malcontents, tumultuous Petitioners, Associators, and daring Promotors of the Bill of Seclusion, to involve the Kingdom again in a Civil War.  
Having a natural Inclination, rather to employ the time I had to spare from the diligent Attendance upon my Profession, in the Study of Antiquities, than in other Divertisements; It was, during these later Revolutions, that I did more immediately employ some of my vacant Hours in revising not only my former Collections, out of our own, and other choice Historians, but in perusing some of the Works of our ablest Masters in the Laws, for the establishing my own Judgement, and digested something suitable to the then State of Affairs.  
Which while I was essaying, some Persons of Honour (to whom I must ever pay a ready Obedience) suggested to me, that some Treatise discovering the Excellency of the English Monarchy, would be useful to the Public.  
This to me was a sufficient Command, and from thenceforward, I began to Plot out something towards it. Which from a design of some few Sheets (by the large extent of the Subject) hath swelled to this Volume; which the considerate will easily judge I could not well comprise in a less Bulk, since almost every Chapter contains what might have required a single Treatise.  
There being also scarce one particular Branch of the Constitution of the Monarchy, the black Parliament did not alter; I have been obliged under all those Heads to examine their Principles, detect their Frauds, sinister designs, and the mischievous Consequences of those alterations or subversions they made, and have treated so much the largelier of those Pests of all Governments, Faction, Sedition, and Rebellion, as I conceived the quiet repose, and tranquillity of the Government required it.  
Yet I flatter myself, that all concerned therein, will take my advice, reasoning and collections in good part: Since I have no other design, but to prevent their Personal Rain, and the Calamities that have been so wastingly brought upon these Kingdoms by them; and may be brought again, if ever the like should be attempted.  
For the effectual prevention of which, I am in hopes, that the right understanding the Constitution of the Government, will be an useful Antidote, and would wish all Malcontents to consider (what the consulting of History, and their own Experience may teach them) that however the English Monarchy for a time, by Faction, Sedition, or Rebellion, may be weakened, or Eclipsed; yet the just Monarohy, like the Sun, ever dissipates all the Mists, hazy Wether, and Clouds; and will at last (though sometimes not without Thunder and Lightning) clear the Air, and shine with more Powerfullness, and Splendour than before.  
The rude shocks of popular Disturbance, do but more securely establish the Throne. It being the Prudence of every Governor to make more defensible that part of the Fortress, which by any Assault, hath been found most weak, and untenable.  
As I have endeavoured on the one hand to keep the Subjects in their Duty, and by all Dehortments, reclaim them from Sedition and Rebellion, and have laid open the ancient State of the Government, and the absoluteness of our Princes, for some Ages after the Conquest: nevertheless I would not be understood to intent the reducing the Subject to their Pristine Bondage. This is far from my Thoughts.  
What I have done in this kind, is not only because the subject matter required the describing the ancient Model of the Government, and that of late the Power of our Monarches hath been endeavoured to be too much restrained, but principally upon three Accounts.  
First, to discover the gradual Relaxations of the absoluteness of our Princes, for the greater case of the Subjects. Secondly, to let all know that our Liberties, Privileges, and Immunities, have proceeded from the Grants, Benevolences, and Gracious Condescensions of our Kings. Thirdly, to induce the Subjects with due thankfulness to acknowledge the bountiful Favour of our Sovereigns, and the Wisdom of our Ancestors, in soliciting for, and obtaining such Liberties as we enjoy, beyond the degree of any Subjects, either to Crowned Heads, or Republics. There being such Barriers set in England, betwixt the Sovereign, and his Subjects, as neither can remove without fatal Inconvenience.  
For as the Prince's greatest Ease, Prosperity, and Glory, is when he Reigns, not so much over the bodies, as in the hearts of his Subjects, and rules by the Laws: So the People's Profit, Plenty and Tranquillity, is the most certain and established, when they are content with the Enfranchisements the Laws allow, and endeavour not to invade the Prerogatives of the Crown; as the Houses of Parliament, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 6. Hist. p. 452. C.  convened 1641. did by their dethroning Propositions and Bills: which if they had been granted, would not only have unsoveraigned the King, but rendered the condition of the Subject more miserable and enslaved, than it had been for many centuries of years bypast.  
I have endeavoured in the whole work, to discover how much the English Monarchy excels other ancient and modern Governments, and even the Utopia and Fictitious Ideas of the Philosophers. The judicious Polybius hath a memorable observation, That every Monarchy is not to be called a Kingdom; but that only, which is yielded to by the willing, [that is, which is freely submitted to, to distinguish it from Tyranny] and which is governed by Counsel, rather than by fear or force. Also that every Government of few, is not to be called the Principality of the Optimacy: but that wherein the just and Prudent by Election have the Power. That, he saith further, is not to be called the Empire of the People, where every multitude hath Power of doing what they will or purpose; but where the Country's Customs flourish, where the Gods are worshipped, Parents honoured, the Elder Persons reverenced, and the Laws obeyed.  
All which I hope I have made apparent, are better provided for in our Hereditary Monarchy, than in any other known Government, especially as to the People's benefit in the rare Constitution of the Legislative, and yet the Sovereign hath retained sufficient Power to secure the Peace of his Countries, and be able to bear the Port of a great and just Monarch.  
In this Treatise I meddle not with the Arcana Imperii, they have too much of Majesty impressed upon them, to be described by such Pencils as I can use; and like the King's Coin, are encircled with a Decus & Tutamen, may neither be clipped, nor adulterated.  
Neither have I meddled with the Religious part of the Government, that not being my Province. I writ abstractedly of the Sovereign, and the Constitution, without regard to the Religion of the Prince: as being well satisfied, that whatever Qualifications the Subjects may wish for in their Prince; yet Religion qua Religion, should neither influence the Succession, nor their Obedience.  
In so great an undertaking, I hope it will be considered, that as in a great Building, all the Rooms are not alike richly furnished, There are some Utensils fit for the Kitchen, which are not for the Dining Room: Some Pictures suit the Hall, others the Staircase: Such as are for Chimney-pieces, are not agreeable to the Great Chamber: The choicest are fit for the withdrawing Room, and the enriched Closets.  
So in this work I am obliged to keep a decorum. In some places I have reason to use a more close and contracted, in others a more free and lose way of Arguing. Sometimes I am forced to use the significant, though obsolete, Saxon, or the crabbed Terms of Law, and Arts, and intermix the less refined Sentences of old Authors, according as the subject matter required; so that I could no ways use that politeness of phrase, or roundness of Period the curious may expect.  
I presume not, that every one will be equally delighted with the researches I have made into the usages of remote Ages: or with the Censures upon some men's later Actions. But most, I hope, will find good use of either; and when they consider I have endeavoured to follow great Authors, and have faithfully quoted them, they will more readily acquit me.  
Therefore I beg that the Ingenious Peruser will not pass his Censure upon parcels; but after he hath perused the whole, will be so charitable to believe, that those Parts, which are less acceptable to him, may be grateful to others; and will allow, that in so great a work (wherein much variety of Reading and Argument was requisite) I cannot expect to adapt things to the Genius of every one.  
Yet as far as I am able, even in this particular, I have endeavoured it; 
Non vero nudas & sparsas sententias dedimus, needy Huerent, & effet quod dicitur Arena sine Calce; sed eas inter se haud indecentervinximus, & interdum velut cemento quodam commitimus nostrorum verborum. Ut Phryg●ones e varii coloris filo unum aliquod Aulaeum formant, sic nos e mille aliquot particulis uniforme hoc & cohaerens corpus. Lipsii Polit. de Concilio & Forma Operis.  by interspersing in every Chapter, either Historical remarks, or the weighty Sentences of Grave Authors: and though I lose some of the Elegancy and Emphasis, in rendering them into English; yet I hope the Reader will have recourse to the Margin, where he will find I have not wittingly falsified any Quotation.  
What Apology Lipsius makes for himself, I must crave the benefit of; That though I have culled out from Learned Authors great variety of Sentences, yet I have not so scatteringly strewed them, that they might seem Sand without Lime; but have with such Cement as I could, not undecently inlaid them. And as the workers of Hang, from threads of divers colours wove one piece of Tapestry: So from a thousand Arguments, and materials I have fashioned the uniform and connected discourse of the English Monarchy: which though in single branches, hath with great Judgement and Arts been composed by others; yet, that I know of, hath not been so digested in one body before.  
This consideration leads me to another necessary Apology for myself; that whereas (by an heedlessness I dare not excuse) I had not in my first draught, noted the Pages in some Modern Authors, nor the Authors themselves, yet have transcribed their whole Sentences. I desire the candid Authors, and Reader, not to Interpret this a studied Plagiarism; but rather impute it to the good Opinion I had, of the vivacity and significancy of their expressions, which made me insert them, and no design to vend stolen Wares undiscovered; for it will be easily found, that I challenge them not as my own: and if the attentive collate such places, he will find, that what ever rich Gems or Metals I have borrowed, I have endeavoured to place them with advantage: and though I cannot say, I have enriched them in the setting; yet have mostly used some workmanship about them, or have added some ancient Authority parallel to them.  
This having been the product of many spare Hours, and my Profession (which no other studies have ever interfered with) having often obliged me, to leave the matter abruptly, in the middle of a Paragraph; whereby I returned not again to it, with the same warmth and train of thoughts; and the sending up my Copy in parcels, at distant times, to the Press, I hope will prevail with the considerate to pardon what inconnexion, broken ends, or some small repetition may be found in it.  
I must here also advertise the Reader that the whole Original was writ, and the most part Printed, before the last Session of Parliament Nou. the 9th. So that what hath fallen out since, he can expect no touches upon: and though at present the Harmony be not the same that was formerly betwixt the King and his two Houses; yet it is to be hoped that, betwixt so Wise and Gracious a King, and so Loyal a Parliament, there can be no long discord, especially when it is considered who will have the greatest advantage by it.  
If this Treatise contribute any thing to it, I shall think myself very happy. However I hope, Gentlemen and Scholars will find it a pleasing divertisement in their Closets and Studies; it being fitted for the hours of such recess, and upon every head (there being variety of matter collected, and great Volumes epitomised, and several Authors noted who treat upon that Subject) it will be a Promptuary or Common-place, out of which many, out of this Ore, upon occasions of moment, may digest for their own use refineder notions, and having a competent store of Observations, from Writers of good esteem, laid before them, may with more ease bring them to the Test of their own Judgements.  
Having dealt thus frankly with all, I hope, Gentlemen will allow me that plea, which most require, that for some Moles, Dimples or Scars, an otherwise tolerable mien is not to be contemned: and though I must expect the fate of all Builders, that most will conclude they could have contrived better; 
In magnis veluse yat est.  yet I hope three things: First, That the wellwishers to English Monarchy will have a favourable opinion of the design, what ever they have of the performance. Secondly, That this may excite some, who have more leisure, greater helps, and more refined Judgements, to undertake this useful subject, with happier Auspexes. And lastly, That none will entertain a worse opinion of the Government by reason of my unskilful describing of it, or despise the whole, because I may (for all my Circumspection) have committed Errors in following the Sentiments of some. Authors, or mistaken the true sense of any of them; which hath not been done wilfully by  
N. Johnston.   

OF THE EXCELLENCY OF Monarchical Government, Especially of the English Monarchy; WHEREIN, Is largely Treated of the several Benefits of KINGLY GOVERNMENT, and the Inconvenience of COMMONWEALTHS, etc.  

CHAP. I. A Comparison of the Body Natural and Politic; with an account of the subject Matter treated of.  
FROM the Contemplation of ourselves, in the Faculties of our Souls, and the Subservience of our Bodies, no doubt wise Men have framed the Ideas of Government; with is agreeable to what the Great and Ancient Philosopher 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. Polit. lib. 1. c. 5.  notes, That every living Creature consists of Body and Soul, whereof the one by Nature commands, and the other obeys: and in another place 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ib.  he distinguisheth the manner of the Soul's Rule; in that it rules the Body by a Masterly and Absolute, and the Mind rules the Affections by a Kingly Command.  
As the Natural Body consists of Head and Members, made stable and erect by the Bones, tied together and curiously interwoven by the Nerves, Ligaments, Tendons, Muscles, and Membranes; 
Comparison of the natural with the Politic body.  pervaded by the nutritious juice, Lympha and Blood; irradiated by Natural, Vital, and Animal spirits; animated and enlivened in all its motions by the Energy of a Rational Soul: So in the Political, the Sovereign the Head, and the People the Members, are held together by the strong Sinews and Nerves of good Laws and Political Constitutions; actuated and enlivened in all their motions by the influence of the Prince and his Government (as the Soul, Archaeus and Celestial fire) whereby every Member performs its Offices in this great Oeconomy, the whole System is kept in regular and orderly Motion, is firmly established, and enabled to exert all those beneficial Powers that are admired in a well composed Body Politic. The Body without the Head, being but a Trunk and inanimate Carcase; and the Head without the Body, as a curious piece of Clockwork without Motion.  
It must be owned to be a noble Enterprise to make researches into the constituent Parts, Harmony and Composure of Government, which is that benign Supreme Power which influenceth vast Societies of men, and combines all tempers, constitutions and interests in one noble Machine, for the benefit of the whole and every part; and makes every Dominion a little World; wherein Beauty, Order, and the Blessings of this Life are inspired into all the Members, how minute soever, with that calmness (when no disturbances are given it) that we scarce hear the motions of the 
(c) Sic orbem Reipubli●e esse conversum, ut vix sonitum audire, vix impressam orbitam vi●ere possumus. Cic. ●● Attic. Ep. 36.  Machine, or see the Springs that move it.  
But as in the Body Natural the 
(*) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Philosopher observes, That by the turbulence of depraved Appetites, by heady Rashness, and seducing Passions in the vicious and illaffected, the Body seems to command the Soul, and Reason is dethroned: So in the Commonweal, when from mistakes and misguided Zeal, Discontent, Ambition, and other vicious Inclinations, People are infected, whereby the Malignant Fever of Sedition, or the Pest of Rebellion rageth in a State; the Sovereign is, for a time, kept from the Exercise of his Royal Power, 
The Scheme of the whole work.  and sometimes dethroned.  
But to leave this pleasing Allegory, which I could pursue in comparing all the Members of the Body, and Faculties of the Soul with the constituent Parts and Offices of Government: I shall, instead of that, draw a short Scheme of my design in this Work, which I had never undertaken, if it had not been that I was invited to it by a Great and Wise Minister of State, 
My Lord Precedent.  whose glorious Service to his Prince and Country will be celebrated in remotest Ages: and having lived to make some Observations on the Causes and Managery of the Rebellion against King Charles the Martyr, and the tendency to another Civil War of later date; and revolving with myself, that though many wise and judicious Persons both know, and have learnedly writ, of the secret Springs and Movements of them, infinitely beyond what I can pretend to: and that both our own Countrymen have, in Parts, writ of all the branches of the English Government, and many Foreigners of Politics in general, or such as were fitted for the Governments under which they lived; yet having met with none that had so particularly writ of the Excellency of the English Monarchy, as to illustrate it so as it might be useful to the preventing Seditions and Rebellions, and to clear the Commodiousness and Necessity of submitting to it; and placing a great Portion of our happiness here in living under it, I conceived it might be a profitable Essay to excite those, who have not leisure and opportunity to peruse great and numerous Volumes, to extract, for their use, such things as had occurred in my poor Reading, to induce them to prise it as they ought, and to furnish them with such Arguments, as my low Reasoning was able, whereby to answer the Objections of our late Republicans against it, and discover their Methods of Proceed towards the overthrowing it, and to caution all the well-meaning Subjects against all the Arts of Factious and Seditious People and Principles.  
And though I cannot promise myself the success I wish; yet I hope I may excite some more knowing, learned and judicious, to furnish our little World with a more Copious and Elaborate Piece, which may supply my defects, and more abundantly satisfy the ingenious and curious Reader, to whom I shall now draw the Curtain, and expose the Model of the designed Work.  
First, Therefore, 
(d) cap. 2.  as a Foundation, I shall treat of the necessity of Government in General; In which Chapter I shall discourse of its Original in Families, etc. 
(e) cap. 3.  Then that the People are not the original of Government. Then 
(f) cap. 4.  of the benefit of Government in instituting Laws; In 
(g) cap. 5.  securing Property and other particulars. From this I proceed to treat of the 
(h) cap. 6.  inconvenience of Democracy, and of the several 
(i) cap. 7.  Forms of Common Wealth Governments, before and in, Aristotle's time. After which 
(k) cap. 8.  of the inconvenience of all kinds of Republic Governments Then of the preference 
(l) cap. 9  of Monarchical Government before all others. In all which Chapters I touch upon the Principles and Practices of our late Republicans, which having dispatched, I give the Character of a good 
(m) cap. 10.  King in general. Then that the care 
(n) cap. 11.  of Religion is incumbent upon Kings. Then of the 
(o) cap. 12.  Clemency, Prudence, 
(p) cap. 13.  Courage 
(q) cap. 14.  and Military Conduct of Kings; of the 
(r) cap. 15.  burden and care of Kings. 
(s) cap. 16.  The Excellency of Hereditary Monarchy. Then I proceed to the King's Authority and 
(t) cap. 17.  Sovereignty in general; and more 
(u) cap. 18.  particularly according to our Laws by the Enumeration of many particulars. 
(w) cap. 19  Then, as a Corollary, that the Sovereign is not accountable to any upon Earth. That the King is not to be 
(x) cap. 20.  Resisted or Rebelled against. In what cases he may 
(y) cap. 21.  dispense with the Execution of the Laws of his Country. Then I treat of the King's Authority 
(z) cap. 22.  in making Laws, and of the Laws of the Romans in Britain, and of the British and Germane Polity. Next of the Saxons 
(a) cap. 23.  great Councils, of whom they consisted, and how the Laws were established by the respective Kings. Then of the great 
(b) cap. 24.  Councils from the Conquest to the beginning of Hen. 3. Then of the great Councils 
(c) cap. 25.  and Parliaments during the Reign of Hen. 3. to the end of Edw. 3. After which of the Parliaments 
(d) cap. 26.  of England during the Reign of Edw. 2. to the 22. of King Charles the 2d. Then of Modern 
(e) cap. 27.  rightly constituted Parliaments, and of the Factious 
(f) cap. 28.  Members of Parliaments; wherein I discourse, at large of the Encroachments of some Parliaments, especially of some Houses of Commons. Then from the great Council I pass to the 
(g) cap. 29.  Right Honourable the Privy Council, their Qualifications, to be at the King's sole appointing. Of Ministers 
(h) cap. 30.  of State, etc. Then of the King's Sovereignty in appointing 
(i) cap. 31.  Magistrates, 
(k) cap. 32.  Judges, Justices 
(l) cap. 33.  of Peace and their Sessions; Of the King's Sovereignty in making 
(m) cap. 34.  War and Peace. Concerning 
(n) cap. 35.  raising Money upon the Subject, and obligation of Subjects to supply the Sovereign.  
Having thus dispatched the particulars, that more immediately relate to the Sovereign, I come to the Subjects, and first discourse 
(o) cap. 36.  of the Nobility; Then of the 
(p) cap. 37.  Gentry, and the 
(q) cap. 38.  Commonalty. Then of the disposition 
(r) cap. 39  of the Common People: Next of the Subjects obedience. 
(s) cap. 40.  Which last leads me naturally to discourse of the contrary, viz. 
(t) cap. 41.  Faction and Sedition, and the causers and causes of them under Ten several heads. Then of the signs 
(u) cap. 42.  of them: Then of the 
(w) cap. 43.  Prognostics of Faction and Sedition; After which I pass to the Remedies 
(x) cap. 44.  of Faction and Sedition. Then of the Preservatives 
(y) cap. 45.  against Sedition and Faction; and Lastly, of Conspiracies 
(z) cap. 46.  and Rebellions.  
In all which I have endeavoured to divert the Reader with variety of History, 
The Author's Apology for himself.  and Quotations out of such most approved Authors as I judged most suitable to my Design, and would be most grateful to the Reader; whom I desire, according to my poor Talon, to please as well as instruct; and have chosen rather to give him the Authorities I use in their own Language, and thereby be just to the Authors, than to follow the way of many Writers in this Age, who though they take the Notions and Hints from such as have writ before them, yet by varying Expressions and new-wording things more Modishly, their Writings pass for Originals.  
Because I design this Work principally for the Nobility and Gentry, as well as the Learned of all Ranks, I have judged it a duty incumbent upon me to give them the Greek and Latin Quotations, whereby they may be excited to peruse such Authors as have been valued in all Ages; and lest some might complain of the interruption by them of the continued discourse, I have mostly placed them in the Margin, upon which they may cast their Eye, only when they please. And though the whole may look more like a piece of Mosaic Work, than a beautiful Picture to be viewed uno intuitu; yet I hope the Ingenious Reader will find, that as I have bestowed some pains in disposing and placing the Gems and Stones; so he will find, in the perusal, some lively Figures and Images, which will bear proportion to the great Leviathan of Government, I design to represent; and though I cannot pretend to heighten and enrich all things with floridness of Language, yet he will find something to commend it, as a Country piece, where it received its first and last hand.  
Mr. Hobbs having adorned the Frontispiece of his Leviathan with the figure of a Giant's Head, on all parts of which are swarms of all Orders, Offices, and Employments of mankind, that are combined in Government, delineated as the Picts are supposed to have painted their Bodies, or Trajan's Column is engraven. 
A Parallel betwixt the Humane Body and Government.   
So I think it not improper to give a rude draught of the Comparison betwixt the Parts and Offices of Humane Bodies and of the great Colossus of Government— Sic parvis componere magna—  
The common People I may not unfitly with their Tillage and Labour, call the common Digestor, like the Stomach that affords nourishment to this great Behemoth; the 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. lib. 2. Polit. c. 2.  Philosopher telling us that the Husbandman's toil is for nourishment. The Mechanical Traders are the Bowels and lacteal Vessels, which transmit the nourishment in the inferior Belly. The Merchants are the Veva Porta. The lower Magistrates and Corporate Towns may be resembled to the Glandules and the Viscera, that promote the secretion and distribution of the nutritive Juices.  
The Gentry and Yeomanry are the Muscles, Ligaments, and Membranes which make up the fleshy and robust Parts. The wealthy are the fat and plumpy Parts. The Learned part of Mankind may be judged the Organs of Sense; The Military the Hands and Feet; The solid and judicious the Bones that give stability and erectness.  
The Bishops and Judges bear some parallel to the Heart and Liver, by whose functions the Religion and Laws are brought to refinedness and a racy Spirit. The Preachers and Pleading Lawyers have some Analogy to the Lungs and Midriff, which if untainted contribute much to the spiritualizing of the blood.  
The Nobility are the Vital Spirits, who, by a liberal Education, give a generous mien to the whole.  
The Counsellors of State may well be compared to the Brain, from whose Spirits the progressive and regular Motions are directed.  
The Laws Spiritual and Temporal, 
Leges a ligando.  by some are compared to the Nerves and Sinews, that bind and fasten together all the Contexture; or may be resembled to the Blood which permeates the whole mass and keeps every part from putrefaction.  
The Sovereign is that Forma Informans, that divinae particula aurae, The Philosopher's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the forming Soul, the Portion of Divine Spirit and Ubiquitary power that presides and governs all.   

CHAP. II. Of the necessity of Government in general, in Families first, and after in Societies.  
HAving represented Government by the energy of the Soul in the combination with the Body in individuals: The next Idea of it illustrated in Families. 
The first Society of Man and Wife.  Therefore the Philosopher saith, 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 1 Polit. c. 1.  There is a necessity to conjoin those, whereof one cannot be without the other, as Male and Female for the cause of Procreation. To which according to Hesiod 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Sit Domusimprimis, uxor & Taurus arator.  he adds a servant: but supposing in the first beginning there were no men servants born, he makes that an Ox, as being the usefullest for all the employments this first joined couple had use of in Tilling the ground, and I doubt not but under that name he includes either all the Creatures serviceable to man, or all that Species, as Bull, Cow, Calf and Ox.  
Therefore the same great Philosopher 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Idem c. 8. The second society of a Family.  makes it his first consideration of Government to discourse of the three constituent parts of a Family; The first Despotic of a Master over his Servants; the second Paternal, of a Father over his Children, and the third Nuptial, which is the Authority of the Husband over the Wife; and from hence we may judge that Polybius considered his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 about which a late Author gives a large account.  
Now the Master of the Family, according to 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pol l. 1. c. 1.  Aristotle, in several places of his Politics was as King; as expressly in one place he saith, Every house is governed by Kingly command, by him that is eminentest in Age. 
The Father's Government.  In which short sentence we may note, that this must relate to an Infancy in the World before Families were embodied, and seems to overthrow the opinion of its Eternity ascribed to the Philosopher, and however is a plain illustration of the Rise and Original of Kingly Government from that of the Paternal.  
In this Family the same Philosopher 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. P. lib. 1. c. 8.  distinguisheth the Husband's rule. That over the Wife is civilly, that over the Children Kingly; both which words are used for a milder sort of Government, than that which was masterly over Servants. So that it is not to give Parents the Power of Saturn to devour their Children; nor was there need for a late Author 
(d) French Monarchy, p. 68  to bewail the state of Children under such a Tyranny (as he accounts it) of Parents. For I shall hereafter I hope make it appear that Kingly Government is of all other the least Arbitrary (as exercised especially in England) and that Kings are justly styled Patres Patriae, Fathers of their Countries, and that it is Kingly as well as Fatherly, to govern without asperity and bitterness, by benevolence and Paternal care, which never was known in Republican Patriots. However all I will infer at present from hence is, that Government is coeval with Families, and shall speak more of it in the Chapter of Monarchy. 
Society of Families.   
From these private Lar and Occonomies sprung up Societies. For man being of all the Creation only endowed with Speech, and that furnishing him with discourse upon things troublesome and pleasant, profitable and unprofitable, just and unjust; For 
(e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 1. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ib.  that before all other Creatures, saith the Philosopher, it is the Property of man that he alone hath the sense of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust; from thence it must follow not only that man is a sociable Creature, or fitted for Political Government, but that Society is founded in Nature.  
For the Tongue cannot be employed reasonably but in Company; none but one crazed in his Sense, will hold Parley with himself, or talk to himself the thoughts of his heart; 
State of France p. 1.  Nature that gave man a Tongue, gave him also Inclination to Society, where he might use it, 
Why Man is Sociable.  as a late Author out of Aristotle words it.  
The same is demonstrated by the Moral Virtues, which are proper and peculiar to mankind. How and to whom shall Justice be administ'red but amongst men? How shall Fortitude appear but upon such occasions as appear amongst men? Where shall Prudence have place unless in debating and resolving the affairs of men? Who can be liberal if he gives not to many? Who shall enjoy the sweets of Friendship, if he have not to whom he may be a Friend, with whom to share his happiness. Nature therefore that hath made Virtue proper to man, hath also made it proper to man to live in Company.  
These praecognita being granted, it will be easy to evince, 
People the Subject of Government.  that no Society can be happy without Government; the body of the People being the Subject matter of it; of which the Philosopher 
(a) Polit. lib. 4. c. 4. lib. 7. c. 4. lib. 6. c. 1.  reckons several kinds, as Fishers at Tarentum and Byzantium, Mariners at Athens, Merchants at Aegina and Chios, Skippers at the Island Tenedos, and in all places are Husbandmen, Artificers, Soldiers, and Nobles; so that Government is most necessary to combine these into Societies for mutual safety and profit. Therefore the same 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 1. cap. 1, & 3.  Philosopher observes that to obey and command (which are the Characteristics of Government) are not only to be numbered among the profitable but the necessary; For as soon as we are born we fall under that discrimination.  
The great 
(c) Sine imperio nec dom●s ulla, nec civit●s, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potuit. Lib. 3. de. L●. initic.  Orator assures us that without Government, 
The necessity of Government.  neither House, City or Nation, nor the Complex of Mankind or Nature, nor the World itself could subsist.  
So the divine Plato 
(d) Tom. 2. p. 391.  tells us that it is a Law established by Nature, that the Inferior should yield to the Superior in Eminence, and that Law would be inverted if we did not yield to them, and live according to the direction of our Governors.  
So the Aborigines in 
(e) Genus hominum agresle sine legibus sine imperio.  Sallust are those only which are reputed a wild sort of men without Laws and Government; and Tacitus 
(f) Incerti nimium solutique megis sine Dominoquamin libertate.  speaking of the Babarous Parthians, calls them lose and unsettled, rather without a Lord than in Liberty: and there may be good reason for it; since, as Justin 
(g) Ab exalibus Seytharum Parthorum Impirium suisse dedudum. lib. 22.  notes, they sprung from the People banished from the Scythians, and so we may suppose them none of the most civilised among them.  
Uncontrolled Liberty may seem sweet and be affected by a set of People led by Appetite only, 
The Evil of Liberty.  and upon the first notion: but when the Wise and Sober reflect upon the inconveniences of it (where lawless and unlimited) there inevitably will appear a necessity of Government and Laws, to rescind the Luxuriousness of our depraved desires, without which we should all run into Spruns and Ramel-wood, and the Capreoli, Suckers, Wi●s, 
Neque sera hominum pectora fr●geseunt, donec vim senserint imperii.  and Brambles would choke up the richest Soil; yea the rude dispositions of men without the force of Government, would not more be broken than those of untamed Beasts.  
Mr. Hobbs 
(h) Levi ●han.  hath introduced, in the condition of Nature, an imaginary State of War, whereby every man, in his pure Naturals, 
The state of Nature, not a state of War.  had right to every thing his brawny Arm, or daring Soul could gripe, covet, or affright his fellows from possessing; and ascribes to his Aborigines such a baseness and villainy in their Nature, as degrades them to that Bestiality rarely found amongst Savages. Allowing them scarce Reason, or such an one as was wholly subordinate to their Appetites; as if he had taken his observation from the Swine-Trough, where he had seen the master Boar pass from Trough to Trough, to drive the weaker from their feeding, till he had been satisfied. 
(a) Earl of Clarendon's Survey, c. 13, 14, 15.  All which (saith a most Judicious Nobleman) he doth for no other end but that he might fit man for those Chains and Fetters he hath provided for him; depriving him of the greatest glory and happiness that can be attributed to him of Gentleness and Benevolence, which is conspicuous in man's Nature; and on the contrary making him the only Creature, that out of the malignity of his own Nature, and the base fear he makes inseparable from it, should be obliged, for his own benefit, and the defence of his Rapine, to worry and destroy all of his own kind, till they all became yoked by Covenant of his own contriving, never yet entered into by any one man, or in Nature possible to be entered into; as in due place I shall make appear.  
Supposing however by the Law of Nature, every man may defend himself and annoy those whom he hath power over; 
(b) Review of observations. p. 20, 21. Whatever the state of Nature was, yet Government is necessary.  yet how much more eligible is it to part with that Right, and yet to do nothing contrary to Nature, when Reason tells us we shall obtain a more excellent good, the benefit of Peace and Prosperity in Society; which together with Safety and Plenty are what Government aims at. The People finding by reason, that the good they wanted was not attainable without a Common Protector, to administer Justice equally amongst them; and the sense of the miseries that would befall them sor want of this made their Routs become Societies: The Salus populi, in the Constitution of Government being the prime end of it, as most agreeable with the joint Interest of Rulers and People.  
The multitude therefore that do not consider the Reason, that made all People commit themselves, 
The reasons why all must. quit the state of Nature, to submit to Government.  their lives and fortunes to the trust of their Rulers, aught to be convinced that their giving up their Right of defending themselves and subjecting them to Government, and restraining their own Arbitrary Wills, and yielding themselves to the Conduct of their lawful Superiors, will conduce most to the obtaining of that most excellent good, the benefit of Peace and Society, every one being in less danger of mischief from the rapacious and bloody minded, living in Society and under the Protection of the Government, than where every one might follow his own Inclinations. This also being the chiefest preservation from that Misery and Confusion which Sedition and Rebellion (generally blanched with the abused names of Salus populi) have brought many Nations to.  
so the Judicious Chancellor 
(c) De laudibus LL. Angliae, c. 14.  Fortescue saith, that no Nation by its own Consent was incorporated into a Kingdom, but that thereby they might, 
Government necessary for Preservation.  with more safety than before, maintain themselves, and enjoy their goods from such misfortunes and losses as they stood in fear of.  
Therefore the old 
(d) Adversus Mathematicos lib. 2. Stobaei Serm. 42.  Persians (saith Sextus Empiricus) for five days together, after the death of their King, permitted the People to live Lawless, that after the Experience of the Slaughter, Rapine, and other Outrages committed in that short interval, they might learn to hold the Government in more esteem.  
Self-preservation and an ardent desire of happiness (saith a 
(w) Nalson Common Interest.  learned Author) are the two Poles upon which all our Natural and Rational desire and aversions move. These are the Tutelars and Inseparable Companions of Mankind through all the vicissitudes of Life. These are the potentest incentments to Society and Government, which not only allure but necessitate the Congress, Combination, and Cement of Confederacies in Societies, for the mutual Preservation and Peaceable Possession of that Happiness all do covet.  
This implanted Love to ourselves made all Mortals exercise their best faculties, to defend and ensure themselves against every thing they could foresee or fear would be capable of disturbing their felicity, the peaceable fruition of which was the upshot of all their desires and appetites; which was no ways so likely to be effected, as by Union in Government. For to be rich and not able to defend our wealth, is to expose ourselves as a prey; and to be safe and poor, is to be securely miserable: both which are avoided by the benefit of Government.  
Furthermore, 
The Common People not to be ordered without Government.  if we consider the nature of the common people which make up the gross body, we shall find an absolute necessity of Government. For as the Orator 
(x) Cicero pro Planeio.  observes, in the multitude is a great variety and change of opinions, they are as unconstant as the weather, nothing being so familiar with them as the change of their affections; being not led by choice and wisdom to judge of things, sed impetu & quadam temeritate, without Council, Reason, Discrimination 
(y) Sallust. ad Casarem.  or Diligence to search the Causes, and forecast the Event of things, by custom rather than judgement, following one another's sentiments, as to their short-sightedness seems most eligible: Their Wills and Appetites being no less various than their features and countenances: Their actions and designs turning to as divers ends, as the desires that guide them are divers; so that it were impossible they should continue long together in society and peace, or enjoy the benefits desired, if there were not some strong tye, which, holding them united together, should draw them all along to the same end.  
When there is no 
(z) Cum nec Imperii majestas ulla nec Magistratuum aut Curatorum est Imperium. Bodinus de Repub. l. 4. c. 1.  Government, 
Against Anarchy.  that which is left is known by the name of Anarchy, which is described by Bodinus, to be where there is no Majesty of Empire, nor power of command in Magistrates, or subordinate Officers; no form of a City, none found to command or obey: Of all Governments (continues he) Tyranny is the worst, but of all Tyrannies, 
Omnium deterrima plebis impotentissima potestas; ex his tamen omnibus nihil Anarchiae magis pestiferum. Idem.  that of Many is most pernicious, and the impotent power of the people is the worst; yet Anarchy is the most pestiferous of all. This indeed dissolves all into the first confused Chaos, where is nothing of order but a jumble of jarring parts, every one justiling other out of its place.  
Imagine a person placed upon such an Hill that he might see below him a confused multitude, various in their Interests and Appetites, let lose to the fiery bent of their wills. He would be amazed to hear the boisterous clamours, and see the strange turmoils and tempestuous toss of that crowd, the desultory actions, and all the pageantry of Garboils, before the last downright counter-scufflle, which the sage wisdom of one man (if he might be heard) would be able to compose.  
Even so it is in Anarchy, or wherever the People's unbridled will governs; 
(a) Xenoph. de Rep. Athenarum. Thucyd. lib. 3.  this is a Mart wherein voices are bought and sold, poverty and ignorance driving the crowds to null that to day, which they have eagerly pursued the day before; scarce forbearing the same day to condemn and absolve, nothing being done amongst them but in tumultuary ferments, and an high boiling fret, or a dead torpidness and irresolution; the Ebb and Flow of the Ocean being more regular than theirs; whereas all Government (according to the 
(b) Polit. l. 4. c. 4.  Philosopher) subsists and is established in firmness and constancy, by every man's knowing what is his right to enjoy, and his duty to do, or as 
(c) Coeius hominum Juris consensu & utibitatis communione sociatus. De Civitate Dei, c. 23.  St. Augustine calls it, a society of Men incorporated for common benefits, by the agreement of Laws.  
It is a grave saying of 
(d) Populus negligit rempublicam, magnitudine nimia communium curarum expers. 1. Hist. Privata cuique stimulatio vile decus publicum. 2. Annal.  Tacitus, That the common People neglect the affairs of the Common-weal, by their over-bulkiness, void of public spirit and care; and in another place, That the incentives to their private profit produce a disregarding neglect of the public.  

(e) Quod omnia aetatis membra, familiasque singulas in unum corpus cogit. De Rep. lib. 1.  Bodinus compares a Commonwealth or Government to a Ship, and well observes, that without the Keel (which unites the Stern, and Forecastle, Ribs, etc.) it would be but inform lignum: So a Community without Government (which unites the members of all Ages, and all Families in one body) can not ways deserve the name of society: Such a People headless, is not worthy to be called a Body Politic; for Government no ways consists in the number of Persons, or the heads of Citizens, but in the combination of them, under one Sovereign Power.  
The unwieldy bulk of numerous Armies, wanting Conduct and Discipline, rarely effect any glorious enterprise. In the Tumults of Naples, the Rascality were forced to set up an Head, though it were but the frothy boisterous Thomas Anello. So were Cade, Ket, Tyler, and others in our popular Rebellions, set up as the Captains, Leaders, and Idols of the Clowns. From whence we may learn, that even such people as rose up (as they pretended) to suppress Magistrates, Monarchy or Tyranny, level Estates, and set all at liberty, yet once embodied, were forced to choose Captains to lead them, to whose Orders there was a necessity of submission.  
If we thoughtfully consider, 
How Superiority and Government founded in Nature.  we shall find that Government is founded in nature, in which state there is no such thing as equality; for the Parent, by priority of natural cause, must be superior to the Children. Yea, if we should believe People to be Juvenes ab Aquilone creati, like Grasshoppers or Locusts, or like Cadmus his men, sprung up at once out of the Earth, underived from any pre-existent Parent, all of them having equal Origin and Power; yet a short converse one with another, would have necessitated them to embody in Societies.  
We Christians believe God made Man after his own Image, 
Dominion given to Man.  and gave him dominion over all the Creatures of our sublunary world; and it is not reasonable to think, that he endowed him not with faculties necessary for the administration of that great Empire, not only over the Brutes, but over his own Species.  
For the Philosopher 
(f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 1. Polit. c. 5.  notes, that nature hath made some fit to command, and others to obey or serve; of which we have many and great Instances: So Julius Caesar and others (whose great actions are recorded in History) manifested more sublime Spirits, than any of those who were subdued by them; 
Some born to Empire.  and when those great Heroes were dead, though their Officers and Soldiers survived (by whose prowess and valour they had effected those wonders) yet we read of a sudden degeneracy, as if the soul had expired, and left the carcase only of an Army.  
The Orator observes, that no Nation was ever so Barbarous, 
No Nation so Savage, wherein some Government hath not been.  as to be wholly void of Religious Worshippers, since every where, some Deity or other hath been acknowledged. Even so we may affirm, that never any People were so rude, wild, and savage, but they found a necessity of Government, of which they had at least, in their first embodying, some unpollished Model, and some sort of Institutes appointed by, and coeval with their Governors, by which their political interests and private concerns were regulated, without the infinite disorder which would happen to all public transactions, which should be the product of tumultuous votes, where every meeting would be a jumble of great and small, 
The Mischiefs of tumultuous voting, and want of Magistrates.  soft and hard sculls, a pudling of business, and putting all things to chance, and blundering in a maze, till at last some men's wisdom form them into order.  
How then is that condition of a People to be wailed, which Tacitus 
(g) Ea demum libertas Romae est, non Senatus, non Magistratus, non Leges, non Mores Majorum, non Instituta Patrum. 1 Annal.  describes to be the Roman State of liberty, wherein there was no Senate, no Magistrates, no Laws, no Ancient Usage, no Institutes of the Fathers.  
From all which we may conclude, that the same nature that ordered societies, gives them prudence to know that to preserve the Society and the peace of it, it was necessary, that there should be one or some, who, laying aside private advantage and particular Interest, should employ their minds, bend all their thoughts, and direct their actions for the public good, and by the sinews of power hold all so fast united, as they should guide them to the same end; and we must determine, that Government is absolutely necessary for the being and well-being of a People, though there be servitude in it, which made Seneca (comparing Augustus' times with the preceding irregular ones) say, 
Salva esse Roma non potuit, nisi benesicio servitutis.  The City could not have been safe without the benefit of servitude.   

CHAP. III. That the People are not the Original of Authority and Government.  
BEfore I proceed to treat of the several forms of Government; I judge it requisite to examine some positions made use of by Republicans; so long at least, as they argue against Monarchical Government, or till they obtain their ends in the subverting of it.  
One of which is, that supreme power is originally and fundamentally in the People, for whose benefit all Government was established. Secondly, That there is a tacit reservation of power in them, to vary the form of Government, and change the Persons when the people finds it convenient for them. The Law of Nature, as they say, justifying any attempt to shake off those Bonds and Fetters imposed on them by their Superiors, or voluntarily yielded to by themselves, if they judge that thereby their common Freedom is impeached; for that, they say, the People never submitted to any Government, but by way of Agreement and Contract, unless in cases of absolute Conquest.  
Therefore one (whom the Commonwealth-men esteem their 
(a) Mr. Algernon Sidney.  Martyr) asserted, That Kings have Usurped over the People a power inconsistent with their natural liberty, and that Kings own their right to prescription, which the greatest Tyrant may maintain by force, and to that consent which they may procure by violence or flattery.  
I am sensible, that I might more orderly have placed what I have to answer to these assertions, in the Chapter of Monarchy; but intending to prove that to be the best of all the known Governments, and that Chapter and the other preceding it, being so large, I judge it not so fit to clog it with this, but make it as a preliminary. For though I oppose Monarchy principally to this sentiment; yet it hath something in it also of use, to the right stating of the Original of Government in general.  
First therefore I shall endeavour to evince, That God Almighty was the Original Donor of the Authoritative Power of Government, 
The Power was given from God to One, and not to Many; there neither was nor is Natural Freedom.  and that not to any collective body of the People; Secondly, that there never was such a state of primitive freedom, or natural liberty, as is challenged; Thirdly, That where ever the People's Election was admitted in constituting a Sovereign, they capitulated not for any reservery of power of resumption; and Lastly, that in the present State of our English Monarchy, no such Power ought to be challenged.  
First then (with a Reverend 
(b) Dr. Hammond's Address to the Lord Fairfax, p. 8, 9 The State of Government in the first Ages Kingly.  Author) it is to be considered, that if Adam had never fallen, and his posterity had remained in the same innocence, yet in order to civil life, they would have been capable of civil precept, and in reason one man, or more, should have had the superiority over all others, as Parents over Children; and the consideration of the divers orders of Angels, that never fell, evidenceth, that even in the state of Innocency, God designed Superiority, not Equality.  
But since from the Fall it is apparent, that the irregular passions of Men, have caused a need both of Rules and Rulers, Laws and Lawmakers: it was but reasonable that God should, and it is most certain that he did design and appoint Government; and so gave not man that freedom which is supposed to be the foundation of this Doctrine. Hence we may note what God says to Eve, 
Gen. 3.16.  That her desire shall be subject to her Husband, and he shall rule over her: so that here is the first Dominion. And the second we find in Scripture, is, 
Gen. 4.7.  where God tells Cain that his Brother Abel's desire shall be subject to him, and he shall rule over him; and this was as he was the firstborn, though after he wickedly slew Abel.  
We have reason to judge, (according to Scripture) that God gave Adam (as an universal Monarch) Dominion over all his Fellow Creatures, and of all Men that should be born into the World as long as he lived, and the like may be said of Noah: so that whatever property (as it is clear Cain and Abel had) and what share of Government over any part of the World, either of their Sons had, they held it all of them originally by gift and Assignment, Allotment and Authority, without awaiting the Election or consent of, or entering into any Articles or Capitulations with the People that were to be governed by them.  
So that in the Infancy of the World all Men were born Subjects, either to him that was naturally their Father, or to him that by Right of Primogeniture was representatively their Father. That this continued for many succeeding Generations is most apparent in the Blessing that Jacob and Esau received from their Father Isaac. For Rebecca knowing that such a Blessing was of the same force, that now the last Will and Testament, or Deed of Gift of a Parent is, and of much more absolute force, contrived that way to obtain the Blessing of Primogeniture for her Son Jacob, that his Brother Esau might serve him.  

(c) Dudley Digs, p. 15.  After the multiplying of Mankind (though I cannot say with a Learned Author, there were so many absolute Princes within the compass of a Parish, that a Man had scarce room to walk in a Territory, when a Commonwealth was lodged in a Cottage) yet it appears from Gen. 10.32. That the Families that sprung from Noah's Sons divided the Earth, and gave distinction to Nations, and the Cadets of the first Houses travelling to distant places, exercised Authority, and gave Laws to their Descendants; and being thus separated to settle new Plantations, every Planter becoming so by himself a Father, increased to a Family, and that into divers Families, those into a City, and thence into divers Cities, and at last into a large Dominion.  

(d) Review of Observations, p. 2.  So that a King in the first Ages of the World was no more than a common Father, either by natural right, as a Parent, or after by a legal Right, as the eldest Descendant of such a Father; and when the pleasantness or profitable commodiousness of one Soil alured several to covet it, than arose Contests, and the Conqueror possessed it, forcing the Conquered to seek other Habitations, or made them his Slaves, and so a Succession of some brave Princes enlarged their Dominions to Empires, establishing them by just Laws, and good Government.  
So upon the overthrow and breaking up of Kingdoms, Instance may be given that some victorious Person obtained the People's Subjection to him; for that being deprived of their natural common Father, and Sovereign, they necessarily entertained such supply of their loss, as their Fortunes could best afford them: and whatever those conquered People did, it was no other but the choosing of one to bear the known Office of the true natural common Father; even as those might do, who either like Swarms and Colonies, voluntarily separated from the main Stock, to more roomy and rich Plantations; or those who escaped from the Conqueror's Sword into a remote unpeopled Land, settled themselves in Society, and under the Government of one. For as hereafter I shall make it appear, the world was grown to a great Age,  any form of Government was known but what was Kingly. Whereas if the People had known of any such Right they had of Government inherent in, and connatural to themselves, we should in the Sacred or Profane Histories have had Instances of it: whereas we find the very Savage Americans (who, if any People, live according to natural Instinct) to be governed by Kings, and not Republics.  
Having thus far Illustrated the Government in the Golden Age of the World, wherein we find no Footsteps, or the least tract of any popular Suffrages, but an entailing of Sovereign Authority; We may farther consider, 
God appointed Kings.  that the Government of the several Kingdoms in this World have been, and are by the appointment of the Sovereign of the whole World, not only by God's appointment of Moses, the several Judges, and Kings of Israel, and Judah; but by the frequent expressions in Scripture, that by God Kings Reign, that Kings are the Ministers of God, that God will give deliverance to his King, to his anointed, etc. By which Expressions we may rationally 
(e) Jus Reg. p. 15. 21.  conclude that God hath reserved to himself the immediate Dependence of the supreme Power, to shut out the restless and extravagant Multitudes from the frequent Revolutions they would make, and the desolations they would occasion, if they had any ground to think the supreme Power depended on theirs, or that they were not bound to obey for Conscience sake their Governors.  
Whence also are they styled Gods, but to denote they were not made by Men? And as it is most clear that inferior Magistrates derive their Power from the King, and not from the People, as supreme: so by that Analogy which runs in a dependence, and chains through the whole Creation, Kings should derive their Power from God alone, who is their King, and, as the 
(f) Rom. 13. v. 13, 14.  Apostle saith, are ordained of God, and so no humane Ordinance: for Supremacy is affixed to the King, but Governors are sent by him; and if the King were the Creature or Creation of the People, it would have been expressed that they were commissioned, or sent by them; whereas it is expressly said, They are of God.  
That Kings or Sovereigns derive their Power from God alone, 
The Testimony of Authors.  and consequently not from the People, is attested by the joint consent of all unbiass'd Learned Men, Fathers and Schoolmen in all Ages, who have unanimously given their Suffrages for the same, as grounded upon solid Reason.  

(g) Contra Gentes.  So Tertullian saith, Let Kings know that from God only they have their Empire, in whose Power they only are. So St. 
(h) De Civitate Dei, lib. 5. cap. 21.  Augustine, Let us not attribute to any other the Power of giving Kingdoms, and Empires, but to the true God.  
So in the Civil Law, 
(i) Cod. de veteri Codice enucleand.  we find Deo anctore, nostrum gubernante Imperium, quod nobis à Coelesti Majestate traditum: God being the Author, governing our Empire, which was delivered to us from the Heavenly Majesty.  

(k) Novel. 6. Instit. Nou. 40, 45, 46, 133. pr.  Justinian acknowledgeth his Obligation to take care of his People, because he received the charge of them from God.  
And certainly the People are happier in such acknowledgements, than if Kings think it only a charge conferred on them by the People, and that they were therefore only answerable to them.  
The Reader that would be further satisfied, may consult Arniseus, Cap. de essentia majestatis. Marca Archbishop of Paris de Concordia Sacerdotum & Imperii, Lib. 2. Cap. 2. Num. 2. Graswinckelius de Jure Majestatis, Cap. 8. Num. 2. The Learned and Loyal King's Advocate of Scotland, and the Authorities I have cited in the Chapter of Monarchy.  
Besides what I have urged hitherto we may (with a 
(l) Dr. Hammond's Address, p. 10, 11.  Reverend Author) consider that the Sovereign hath an higher Power than the People can give, not as representing them; but as representing God himself. For every supreme Magistrate hath a Power that never was in the People to give; for never any Man was by God or Nature invested with Power of his own Life to take it away, or kill himself lawfully. For all Christians generally declare against this Self-murder, as a Crime equally against the sixth Commandment, as the kill of any other Man.  
Now this Power of Life being so essential a part of the Supremacy, and no part of the natural Liberty, cannot be inherent naturally in a Community of Men, which have no more Power so united, than each single Person hath. So that though it cannot be said with some, Nemo est dominus Membrorum suorum (for Man hath the power over his Members, to cause one to be cut off, for the preserving the whole; and the Jew under Gods own Government, had power to make himself a Slave) yet this Jus Gladii, the Right and Power of the Sword (which is really the Sovereign Power) is by the 
(m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Rom. 13.2.  Ordinance of God, not the Donation of the People. For it was not in the Power of the People to dispense with God's Precept, Thou shalt not kill, nor to distinguish shedding of Blood with the Sword of Vengeance, from Murder; and consequently the Power is not derived to Kings and Princes by private Men, who cannot transfer that Power they never had; according to that known Maxim, Nemo plus juris transferre ad alium potest, quam ipse habet: but it's bestowed on them by God Almighty, who is the sole Arbiter of Life and Death, who can only take it away, because he gave it.  
The supreme Magistrate therefore, as God's Deputy, hath the Power communicated to him, as an Endowment necessary to that Power which is designed to protect and govern others. So Agamemnon having received contumelious Language from his Officers in a Council of War, to let them understand his Sovereign Power, tells them 
(n) Homer, Hiad. 6.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. That he had Power of Death.  
When Kings are Elective, though it be the act of the People, and not of God immediately that designs or nominates the Person to that Office; yet doth not this Nomination bestow this Power; but God who alone hath this Power, bestows it on him who is so Elected. Which we may illustrate by the Example of choosing inferior Officers. For though a Corporation by the Grant of a Sovereign, hath Power to choose a Mayor, or chief Officer; yet they give him not the Power of Executing that Office so and so: For that is appointed and limited by the King's especial Grace and Favour. The nominating of the person being granted to them by the Sovereign, but the qualifications of his Office and Power, are by the sole Prescript of the King's Charter and Laws.  
Having hitherto founded my Reasoning upon the History of Moses, and the Authority of Scripture, I might bring in a long Discourse out of profane Historians, Greeks, and Romans, as well as more modern Writers, who give an account of the Foundations of Kingdoms; but since a late 
(o) French Monarchy, p. 16.  Author hath made such a flourish out of Polybius, slily and maliciously endeavouring to represent Monarchy as a Tyrannical Government, wh● the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the three constituent parts, viz. Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy were not so evenly poised, and attempered, ad pondus, as Lycurgus endeavoured it in the Lacedaemonian State: I shall content myself with an Epitome (not a Paraphrase, as the forementioned Author hath made) of what Polybius 
(p) Lib. 6. Histor. p. 197. Edit. Basil.  hath left in his Excellent History; wherein he deducing matters from such an Original as those who knew not, or believed not the Creation could do, delivers us his sense of the mutations and managery of Government to this purpose.  
That when by reason of some great Inundation, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  great Plague or Death, all Institutions and Arts having been lost; In process of time, by the propagation of those that escaped these Devastations, a multitude grew who herded according to their kind, and for the weakness of their Party (in respect of ravenous Creatures as well as their Savage Neighbours, we may suppose) they associated together, it necessarily followed that he who in the Strength of his Body, and confidence of Spirit excelled the rest, obtained the Princedom and Empire, as we see in Bulls, Goats, Cocks, etc. and so the rest obeyed that Man who was properly the Monarch, and in Process of time, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  by familiar Conversation, and living together under this one Head, like a select Flock or Herd, these Mortals began to think of Honest and Just, and their contraries, and by the noble or ignoble actions of some of the Society, the Sense of Honour and Disgrace was impressed in their Minds, and consequently of Profitable and Incommodious. 
(q) Idem, pag. 198.  He that was their Governor excelling in Power, and in the opinion of all endowed with those qualifications, were judged good and profitable, and administering to his Subjects, what was competent to every of them. They now fearing no violence, most willingly submitted themselves to him, and he being venerable to them, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  with unanimous consent they impugn and revenge themselves on those who oppose or conspire against his Government; and so from a Monarch he becomes a King, when reason had obtained the Principality, which before Fierceness and Power possessed.  
So that in all this first settlement of Monarchy or a Kingdom (in the purest state of Nature we can conceive described) we have no mention in this judicious Author, of Compact, with the People, or Election, but of submitting.  
It is true upon the degeneracy of Kings, Factions arising, he speaks of Election, not of those of strong Bodies only, and daring Souls; for such he presumes made themselves Masters; but of such as by their Wills and Reason (experimentally discovered in their Actions) were most agreeable to the People's liking.  
But that this was done by the force of Faction, appears from what he subjoins, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  that those who were thus destined for the Kingdom, selected special places, and encompassed them with Rampires, or Walls, fortifying them for the security of themselves, and to supply their Subjects with necessaries; from whence arose the great Cities which had large Soaks, by which means they possessed the whole Country of the Kingdom.  
I do own that he makes offence and hatred of the People, or envy against the succeeding Princes who were debauched and degenerated, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  to be the causes why in process of time some of the Noblest became the leaders of the People, to repress such Princes, and root out the Monarchy and Kingdom: But still it was because Factions increased, and so Aristocracy was changed into Oligarchy; which set of Rulers oppressing the People, whose discontents being observed by some popular Persons, they animated them to join to subvert the Oligarchy. Hitherto we find nothing of the imaginary delegation of the People's Power to one or more, but prosperous events crowned their Rebellions against their Superiors. What follows is observable, that the People having slain the Optimacy, fearing the Injustice of Superiors, they durst not set a King over themselves, nor trust the Government in the hands of a few, having so late Instances of their Tyranny and Sloth. 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  So the single and sincere Hope which was only left in themselves, induced them to establish a Democracy, and so to themselves receive the Trust and Providence of the Common-weal, which the 
(r) French Monarchy, or Absolute Power, p. 20.  Paraphrast calls their last untainted hope, founded on themselves, that is, in their own Strength.  
So that till the forms of Government by a King or Tyrant, Aristocracy or Oligarchy were wholly subverted, we hear not a Syllable of the People's challenging a power, and then it is no wonder (when they have slain the richest, and divided the spoil, and have entertained an opinion that they shall never be Servants more; but live in an equal Freedom and Wealth) if they be blown up with a popular Pride, and call themselves the supreme Power. But what is this to the natural Freedom pleaded for, when it is nothing but the headstrong unbridledness of the Multitude, that have cast their Riders, and got lose the Reins on their own Neck?  

(s) Idem, pag. 199.  Polybius goes on to tell us how Democracy was soon overturned after, though for a while those who had Experience of the Oppression of the Rich, were delighted with the Equality and Liberty of the present State, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  that seemed sweet to them above all Treasure: yet afterwards some growing Rich, little valued that Equality and Liberty, which custom had made them sleight and nauseate; and so began to contemn the Poor, and excelling the rest in Riches, began to covet Rule; yet knowing they could not by their own Interest or eminence of Virtue obtain it, they began to be lavish of their Wealth, and variously bait the People, and so corrupt them into Tumults and Sedition; and the People being thereby raised to hopes of living upon the Goods of those of contrary Factions, by following some magnanimous and daring Captain (who yet for his Poverty could not Lawfully aspire to the Honours of the Commonwealth) found no better or easier way to rise, but by heightening Factions, whereby Parties being embodied, Murdered, Plundered, and Destroyed one another; till at last, wearied, or one Man getting a greater interest in the People than the rest, and being fortunate to overtop the rest, they submit to such, and after all their miseries return again to Monarchy.  
I cannot dismiss 
(t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Polybius without noting from him how preferable Monarchy is to any of the popular sorts of Government. For he observing that as Iron is wasted by rust, Wood by worms; so that although they might escape exterior defacings, yet they will decay by those inbred devourers. So he observes that all simple Governments are apt to some evil that is peculiar and consequential to their Nature, as he instanceth in a Kingdom changed into Monarchy absolute, by which he means that which we now call Tyranny; Aristocracy into Oligarchy, 
Idem, pag. 200.  and Democracy into Bestial Chirocracy, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  when the Seditious of the people prevail more by Fisticuffs than reason: When he enumerates the causes of the Envy and Hatred of the People against the King that is turned Tyrant, he never mentions that the People challenged any Original Right, or that they conferred any trust upon him, or made any compact with him to govern so and so. But that some young Princes degenerating from their Just, Prudent, Wise and Valorous Ancestors, giving themselves up to Debauchery, and because of their plenty following their Pleasures, committed excess in their Habits, eat more deliciously and luxuriously, indulged themselves in prohibited Lusts, by some necessities or wantonness galling the Necks of their Subjects, or committed some contumelious or outrageous Act against some powerful Person, or committing the managery of affairs to some unfit or envied Person, lost the affections of some popular persons, and by their immersing themselves in Pleasure, neglecting the Inspection into their affairs, or by their sloth and laziness, neglecting the timely redress of Evils, or suppressing of some growing Faction, gave opportunity to some of the most popular and daring of their Subjects to conspire together to put an end to their Lives and Governments.  
But in all this he mentioneth nothing of those miserable devastations, which are brought upon whole Countries, that in popular Governments are torn in pieces by them; as too often I shall have occasion to mention. For certainly, one days misrule by the Rabble, may do more mischief to a Country, than the whole age of a vicious Prince; and the pretences of making Government more easy for the People, and that the end of it is the People's safety, hath ushered in all Tragical Revolutions and Rebellions; and however Philosophers and other Writers of Greece and Rome declaim against Tyranny and absolute Monarchy: yet they conceal not the perpetual intestine, as well as Foreign Wars, betwixt one Commonweal and another; or what Butcheries Countries have undergone, wherever the People got a participation of the executive parts of the Sovereignty.  
It is not unfit to be observed what the great 
(u) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Arist. de Repub. l. 5. c. 10. initio.  Philosopher notes, that a Kingdom is the refuge and defence of the good, against the injury of the People: for, saith he, a King is constituted of the good, and those that excel in virtue and virtuous actions; but a Tyrant is taken out of the People and Multitude, against the Noble and Illustrious; as he instanceth in Phidon at Argos, Phalaris in jonia, Panaetius among the Leontines, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens, and Dionysius at Syracuse, by the cunning leading of the People. So that according to his opinion, and the experience of all ages, the People may be truly said to be the Original of Tyrants, and not of Kings. For wherever an unlawful Government was introduced, which properly might be called Tyranny, it was brought upon the People by their own choice; some ambitious cunning man having wound himself into their good opinion, was by their strongth and assistance able to suppress the Nobility, and establish himself their Executioner, after he had long been their Creature.  
Those who please themselves with the notion of Compact and Agreement, mostly do it for some ill end, to make a plausible Scheme, to decoy the People into an opinion, that Princes can claim no more Power as of right belonging to them, than the People shall intrust them withal; which they may from time to time (as they shall see cause in order to the pretended public weal and safety) either enlarge or restrain at their pleasure.  
These must suppose (saith a most profound 
(w) Bishop of Lincoln, Preface to the Power of Princes.  Scholar) a multitude all free without any sort of dependences on Parents, under no restraint, but every one at full liberty to do what he listeth, with an equality of Power in them, none having authority over other; which surely was never yet found in any People or Country, since the Creation of the World, if these men will own its Creation, or the Scripture-History of it; and if they could in Authentic History, point out some Parallel story they would do well to produce it: for though I have quoted Polybius his conjecture of a state nearest it, yet he makes no such inference from it that I can find. But the forementioned Reverend Bishop hath suggested so many queries to be answered, before any thing can be yielded to in this way of contract, that it will puzzle the ablest of the Patrons of this popular way of constituting Government, to solve any of them; whereby to satisfy any considerate man of the legality of such a way, or the consentaneousness of it to Principles of nature, and the state of Liberty, these men are such pretenders to.  
It would be resolved, whether Women and Children, Madmen and Fools, had the freedom of suffrage, as well as Men of Age, and Fortunes, and understandings? If any were excluded, who did it, and by what authority? If all were admitted, whether with equal right to every one, or with some inequality? Was the Wife's interest towards making up the bargain equal with that of the Husband, and the Child with that of the Parents? and the Servant's (if there were, or could be any such thing as Master and Servant) equal with that of his Master's? If one had not an equal share and interest in the business, whence did the inequality arise? who made the difference among them? and what right had any man? and how came he to have that right to give more or less power to one than another?  
If all were equal, who could summon the rest to convene, or appoint the day and place of meeting? Or when met, take upon him the Authority and Office of regulating their proceed, or presiding or moderating in their Assembly, of determining such doubts and differences as might arise, while matters were under debate, of calculating the voices, and drawing up the Articles of Agreement in case they should agree?  
Supposing all these doubts were cleared, and the Contract made as they would have it; it may be demanded, whether majority of Votes shall conclude all that are present, Dissenters as well as others? Whether by virtue of an Act of those upon the place, an obligation shall lie upon such as are casually, necessarily, or willingly absent, when it was free for them to do so, no man having power to require their appearance? And whether a contract made by such persons as were at liberty before, can debar those that shall succeed them in the next Generation, from the use of that liberty their Ancestors had and enjoyed? If so, by what Law and Right are the said respective persons so concluded, and whence should the obligation spring?  
None of these look like the Dictates of the Laws of Nature, and other Laws besides that (according to the Hypothesis) could be none, when as yet there was no Government, and the Contract itself as a bare contract (without the help of some Law or other to give it force) cannot operate upon any but the Contractors; for it can have no cogency upon those that never gave consent thereto.  
I know no other resolve can be given to most of these queries, but that, as it is fabled of Thebes, that the Stones that composed the Walls, came into their places by the Music of Orpheus, without any Artificer's hand: So some cunning and fluent Orator, learned above the rudeness of such an age, who had signalised himself by many feats of Arms, Arts and Skill, by which he had got an ascendent over the People, and yet so circumspect as to have avoided envy and emulation; such amongst them who was most hardy to encounter dangers, had most bodily strength to overcome any single person, and such as had by degrees worn of the rudeness of his Companions, and taught them something of consideration, and the use of reason to understand justice and honest dealing, and to see the advantages that prudence and a wise head hath over-raw and uncultivated strength, not only in deciding controversies, and administering Justice, but even in providing against, and expelling danger: Such an one as this might have made himself the head of a Colony; but what is this to the Original power of the People?  
Have we not much more reason to judge the rise of Government (as I have hitherto inculcated) was from primogeniture, and by God's appointment, than from any such Chaos, or existence of Praeadamites, or a race of People sprung up none knows when or where.  
To gratify the insatiable Republican as much as may be, let us suppose a Colony, or swarm of younger Brothers, men that lived poorly in their native Country, womans, Children and Servants, not tied by any preceding Allegiance to a Prince, or to have shaken off the yoke, or to be banished, or freely dismissed by those under whose Government they had been born, and to be absolved from all Allegiance, and declared manumitted and restored to that absolute freedom, which they could claim as the birthright of mankind, that privilege of nature equally common to every one as the air and light, and to enjoy this freedom as an unlimited power, to use their abilities as will did prompt; and those to pass into an unpeopled Land, which no Prince or People laid a claim to: Would not every one conclude these were as free to live as they listed, as any people under the Sun; and to be any ways restrained of this, would be very grievous, and an Invasion of that right to freedom every one might challenge?  
Yet can it be conceived, that these could continue long without the consideration, that it was not so delightful to do what every one liked, as it would be miserable to suffer as much as it pleased others to inflict; or that the powerful could take comfort in that hostile estate, wherein he was in continual fears of others mischievous designs against him, who had in this imagined state 
(x) D. Digs Unlawfulness of Resistance, p. 3.  as much right in any thing as the present Possessor.  
The consideration of this surely would oblige every one to transfer his particular power into one or more hands, tying themselves by obligation, not to make use of that natural power of resisting the power set over them, but to aid him or them, when he or they summoned their strength, or required their assistance. In requital of which submission of private strength, the whole Government becomes their Guard, whereby they are secured from the dangers of private injuries.  
But can it be thought that any such Governor or Governors would take upon him or them, the burden of spending his whole time in watchfulness, anxiety and care, for the preserving such a society in peace, and the free enjoyments of what they should acquire, without having a power to execute impartial Justice upon Offenders, in raising forces to suppress any Tumults or Insurrections, in rewarding and promoting the inferior Ministers; or would yield himself to be accountable to any party of that people who should fancy themselves aggrieved.  
But on the other side, to make the Government useful, it must be established, that every one yield his life to Sovereign Justice, to be capitally punished, if he transgress such Laws as they had agreed upon to be so inflicted, or in lesser offences to yield to proportionable punishments.  
Now if it were to be understood as a tacit Covenant, that when ever the Subjects found themselves aggrieved, they might reassume their Power, and depose or change their Sovereign; every Offender that could engage his Relations or Dependants to back him, would be remonstrating, and to avoid the punishment (especially if Capital) would adventure his life in Arms, and so defeat the great end and design of Government.  
But further, supposing that this People oblige themselves and Posterities, by Oaths and other Authentic Bonds, to assist the Government against all Disturbers, Domestic and Foreign; and to be subject, and pay all due obedience to the Government and Laws: By what justice, or reason, or pretence of natural Right, could they or their Posterity claim a power of reassumption of that Original Power they had devested themselves of?  
It is manifest that a People may consent to subject themselves to a Sovereign without limitation, as appears by the famous 
(y) Institut. de Jure naturali Gent. & Civ. 56. Ulpian, lib. 1. sect. De Constitutione Principis.  Lex Regia among the Romans, wherein it is expressed thus, Populus Imperatori, & in Imperatorem, omne Imperium suum, & potestatem transtulit, That they transfer to and upon their Governor all the Power they singly, or in combination had. After which the right of Nature, which remains for them innocently to make use of, is that freedom, not which any Law gives, but which no Law takes away.  
Therefore, if we consider Men once to have been in such an imaginary State of freedom, and after to have yielded up themselves to be subject, and thereto tied themselves and their Posterities, in the strongest obligations that can be invented; What power can such People now have of substracting their obedience, since their Ancestors, many Centuries of Ages since, and in all successive Generations, have either transferred what Power they ever could claim, to their Governors, or by his Laws and their own consents have bound themselves in fidelity to the Sovereign, his Heirs and lawful Successors.  
So that in what Utopia soever this Doctrine of the Original of Power being in the People, and their Power of reassuming it, may be asserted; it can have no place in our happy Islands. For the Government of England is a successive Hereditary Monarchy, declared so by all our Laws: so that with us, allegations of natural Right have no sort of place, our Kings having their Power established by Birthright, by Consent, by Prescription and Law, which are all the ways whereby any right can be legally established.  
Therefore we must look upon all such as cast in such Baits for the People to nibble at, that they intent to make a prey of them; and having fastened the gilded Hook in their Jaws, may draw them out of their own Element to a free air indeed, but such as will stifle them. For when any Subjects (by the instigation of such pretended Patriots) are excited to put in their claim of Original Power, and shake the Government; though their Rebellion be prosperous, it is not without vast effusion of Blood that the Government can be changed. After which, how will it be possible that the Community of the People can be put into that pristin state of freedom, those State-Mountebanks promise? but rather into an Anarchy, which is contrary to the end of all Society, and to quiet and peace, and is the Parent of all confusion, which is much worse than the hardest subjection.  
This truth (by a most chargeable trial) we experimented in the late War, when the Pretended Saviour's of the Nation, and great Promoters of Spiritual and Temporal Liberty, having wheedled the People into a belief of their honest Intentions, and by their prosperous Arms overthrown the most temperate Monarchy, by the effusion of infinite Blood and Treasure; by pretended agreements of the People, they assumed the Government to themselves; enslaving both the Nobility, Gentry, and Commonalty, more than any Foreign Conqueror would do, or ever their Ancestors had been in any Age; and the Golden Sceptre, and that of King Edward with the Dove, was turned into a Rod of Iron and a Flaming Sword, Basilisks and Fiery Serpents.   

CHAP. IU. The Benefit of Government from the Establishing and Instituting of Laws.  
THe 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Rhetor. ad Alex. c. 1.  Philosopher describes Law to be the Promulgation of what by the common consent of the City is defined, which commands upon Terms how every thing is to be done. Which is to be understood after Government is established, where the Lawgivers are agreed upon, and the Subjects known that are to obey them.  
In another place, the same 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ethic. Nicom. c. 5.  Philosopher saith, Laws are to be declared concerning all things that may respect the common Benefit of all, or of the Optimacy, viz. the Nobility or Prime Gentry, or the Sovereign, or be agreeable to Virtue, or to any other Necessity of the People: and these he calls Common Laws.  
The same 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. De Repab. l. 2. c. 6.  Learned and Wise Composer of Politics tells us, That the Law hath no force to compel Obedience, but as it receives it from Usage and Custom; and this springs not from any thing so much as from length of Time, and multitude of Years.  
Of these kind of Laws few Nations make such use as we do in England, under the Title of Common Laws and Customs; and it is no small Credit to them, that so Judicious and Ancient a Writer hath given such a Character of these kind of Laws, by which we have something more than a shadow of ours.  
The same 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  Philosopher likewise, with great Judgement, tells us, That to forego Laws received and long used, and over-easily to substitute new ones, is to make weak and infirm the Laws themselves. Yet he is not for tying Posterity to the Laws of their Progenitors too strictly; for that it is likely (saith he) the first Ancestors of them being such as he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Sons of the Earth, or such as escaped from some great Calamities and Destructions, were rude and illiterate, such as he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: so that it would be 
(e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  absurd to persist in their Decrees; therefore he saith, All seek not their 
(f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  Countries Laws, but those only that are good, as generally such are which have had the Approbation of Ages.  
By what hath been noted from so Ancient and Judicious an Author, I may easily infer, That Laws resulted from Government, and were the necessary Products of such Counsels as the first Leaders or Monarches entertained to order their People by; and since he 
(g) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  makes the Laws of such like validity and force in the Commonwealth, as the Rules and Orders of Parents in private Families, we may well conclude, That as those had their Origination from the Will of the Father of the Family, so the other from the Prince, who is his People's Common Parent.  
Therefore, in Homer Kings are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Givers of Laws, or Judges of the People, as well as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Pastors or Feeders, Conductors, Defenders or Shepherds of the People. So in Sacred Writ, the first Hebrew Captains or Kings were called Judges. Therefore Pomponius Laetus saith, In the ancientest Times, before Laws were agreed upon, the King's Will was a Law: And 
(i) Regis nutus & Arbitrium pro Legibus, lib. 10.  Dionysius is express, That the intimation of their Mind by Signs, and their absolute Wills, were in stead of Laws.  

(k) Romulus' ad libitum imperitaverat, dein Numa Religionibus & Divino Jure Populum devinxit. Sed praecipuus Servius Tullius sanctor Legum fuit, quis etiam R●g ●s obtemperarent. 3 Annal.  Tacitus giving an account of the Roman Laws, saith of Romulus, That he commanded at his own pleasure; and after him Numa bound the People with Religion and Divine Laws. Some were found under Tullus and Ancus; but the principal Institutor of Laws was Servius Tullius, to which even Kings should obey; that is, they thought themselves obliged to observe and keep the Laws they had appointed. He than notes, That after Tarquin was expelled, the People prepared many Laws for the defence of their Liberty, and to strengthen their Concord against the Factions of the Fathers.  
A late Judicious 
(l) Nalson, Common Interest, p. 14, 15.  Author saith, That God and Nature investing Primogeniture with the Right of Kings and Magistrates, they made Laws; and this not being observed, or wilfully disowned by some Popular Patrons (who would possess the People, that the Laws made Kings and Governors) hath created the greatest Mischiefs, by giving an Inlet to the Changes of Governors and Government. For, granting this most enormous Doctrine, and dangerous Principle; Laws being alterable for the Convenience of Prince or People, by consequence the Right of the Sovereign (if it be only from the Laws) must be precarious also.  
The Opinion is in itself most absurd and unreasonable; for there never could be Laws, till there was some Form of Government to establish and enact such Laws, and give them their energy and vigour: For nothing can have the force or power of a Law, or oblige men to Obedience, unless it proceed from such Person or Persons as have a Right to command, and Authority to punish the Disobedience and Neglect of those who ought to be subject to it: So that it is almost impossible to find the least Footsteps of Law, that is by far so ancient as Government.  
If we consider the Infancy of the World, when Nations were divided by the Swarms that made new Colonies; we may easily conceive, that Differences and Quarrels would not only fall out amongst them about Boundaries; but within the District of one Government, the Shares of distinct Families and Persons would be allotted, and these would require the Preservation of those Peculiars, from the Encroachment of Thiefs, Robbers, or other mischievous Persons: From whence must spring a necessity of Laws, to prevent Domestic Quarrels and Injuries, and to ascertain to every man his Right, and effect those good things which would make the Society happy.  
Which Laws (as far as we have any Record of History) were first appointed by those who first led the Colonies, or such as they choose out to assist in such a design of concern, who being supreme over the People, had the only Power of making Laws, and exacting obedience to them: Consentaneous to which the Sergeants at a late Call gave this Motto, A Deo Rex, a Rege Lex. 
The Benefits Societies enjoy by Laws.   
But however we conceive of the first Authors and Institutors of Laws, it no ways lessens the benefit all Societies enjoy by being governed by Laws, adapted to the Constitution of the People and Government. For as 
(m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 1. c. 2.  Aristotle observes, Of all living Creatures man is the best; so he is the worst, if not governed by Laws and Judgement.  
Both 
(n) Lib. 12. de LL.  Plato and 
* Lib. 5. & ult. E●kic.  Aristotle agree, that Men Just and most Eminent in Virtue, being as Gods among Men, are under no Law, living as regularly 
(o) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 3. c. 13.  on their own accord, as others constrained by the Laws; for these good Men are Laws themselves, exciting others to Virtue by their Examples. Yet since this is but the Portion of a few, there is a necessity of enforcing the Laws by Authority upon those that are not obedient to them, nor a Law to themselves.  
As to the use of Laws, 
The Usefulness of Laws.  the 
(p) 1 de Oratore.  Orator tells us that by their Authority we are taught to subdue our Lusts, to circumscribe, and bound our unlawful desires; to defend our own, and restrain our Eyes and Hands from that which belongs to others.  
They were, saith the same Cicero, 
(q) Major hareditas unicuique nesteum a Jure & Legious quam aliis a quibus illa bona relicta surt. Id. pro Caecinna.  invented for the security of every one, a greater and more plentiful Inheritance coming to us by them, than from those that left us our Estates.  
These are fitted for the Diseases of the Commonwealth, ex malis moribus oriuntur bonae leges. They restrain Men from their depraved Appetites, the over-boilings of their Lusts, the debauchery of their Lives, the Injustice of their Rapines, stop the Effusion of Innocent Blood, secure every Man's Interest, instruct and dispose all to do well, and secure them when they do so.  
Hedges are set up (saith Mr. Hobbs 
(r) Civil Wars. ) to stop Travellers, and keep them in the way that is allowed and prescribed, and for hindering them from choosing a way for themselves. So Laws are made to guide, govern, and punish Men, who presume to decline the Rule, and choose another to walk by, that is more agreeable to their own Appetite and Convenience. The poorest necessitated Man (saith a 
(s) Fr. white, Sacred Laws.  Judicious Author) amidst the Calamities of his wretched Life, would yet be more unhappy, were not Laws and Government his Sanctuary. Oppression, the heaviest of all miseries, would crush him to pieces, and break the Repose of his shortest Slumbers. The malice of the Clown, the dark Arts of the City would surround us; and what we most prize (tho' we want the comfort of it) no Man's Life could be safe a minute without them; nothing could be sure, nothing certain, no commerce, no conversation: These protect the Orphan, the Widow, and the Stranger.  
Seneca elegantly calls the Laws, Virtutes Armatas, because they compel evil manners into good order: for without Laws Men are but a more cunning and pernicious sort of Brutes; and where they are instituted and prevail, humane Nature is most civilised, refined and polite.  
It is said of the Liberal Arts, that Emolliunt mores, nec sinunt esse feros: They soften men's minds and manners, they correct that churlishness of temper, and addulce and mellow the austere, sour and crabbed Disposition, tame and make gentle the Savage Natures, file off the Asperities of them: all which is equally true of the force and efficacy of the Laws put in Execution.  
What would this great World we live in, be less than a great Bedlam, were it not for these Political Combinations, civil appointments, and Laws which in all places and Countries not only curb and command that untamed Pride, Fury, and Malice, which too naturally resides in many; But the Laws likewise form and incorporate Men into civil Societies, making those persons capable of Living, conversing, and dwelling together, as Men endowed with rational and religious Faculties; who otherwise would appear no better than a company of wild and Savage Creatures. 
The Honour given to Lawmakers.   
So great Veneration had the Ancients for the Laws, that they esteemed the Lawgivers 
(t) Stephanus Niger Exposit. Carm. Pythag. Leges primo rudibus hominum animis simplices eram. Maximeque fama celebravit Cretensium quas Minos, Spartanorum quas Lycurgus; ac mox Atheniensibus qu●sitiores jam & plures Solon praeseripsit. T●●it. 3 Annal.  Holy, and such as had Correspondence with the Deities they worshipped, and were, while they lived, for these great Blessings to their People, deified. So Minos among the Egyptians makes Mercury the Author of the Laws, and among the Cretians, Jupiter. Lycurgus' among the Lacedæmonians fathered them on Apollo, Numa Pompilius derived them from the whispers of the Goddess Aegeria: the Persians from Zoroaster, Xamolxis among the Goths, deduces them from Vesta; and that Moses received the Jewish Laws from God Almighty we all believe.  
So that as every where we find the Heathens make the Gods descend for their Production, and celestial Wisdom to flow into them (saith the learned Mr. White in his Sacred Laws of the Land; in which little Treatise is comprehended a great deal of curious Learning) and who further adds, That as Livy allows to Antiquity (mixing things humane with divine) to deduce the Original of Cities from Gods or Goddesses, to make their beginnings more majestic; the same may be said of the Laws (saith my learned Author) if it be Lawful to Canonize any, to carry them up to Heaven, or fetch them down from thence, that Glory is alone due to the Laws, yea to the sacred Laws of our Land: And in another place he saith, It was not so much the Charms of the Sibyls Leaves, nor Numa's Shield, or the Palladium that made the Roman Common weal so much to raise its lofty Head, as the just and wholesome Sanction of the Laws obeyed and reverenced.  
On the contrary, Bodin 
(u) De Republica:  observes, that the overthrow of Carthage was without difficulty, and certainly prognosticated, since neither Virtue nor Law had place there.  
Hence the Orator observes, That if the Laws be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, not to say oppressed, there is nothing any man can be sure to receive from his Ancestors, or leave to his Posterity. Which leads me to the second head of the Benefit by Government, which is Propriety.   

CHAP. V Propriety secured by Government.  
WE find that Plato, 
(a) Arist. Polit. lib. 2.  Socrates and Lycurgus, proposed a Community of all things in their Commonwealth, not only in Goods, Chattels and Lands, but also in Wives and Children.  
As to Community of Goods, the Argument that Socrates used was, That if every one might call every thing his own, and not his own, it would be a means whereby a City would be perfectly one.  
On the contrary, Aristotle argues, That this would create endless disputes. For he that took pains would never agree that he who took no pains should have an equal share; and in a little time, one would be coveting a larger dividend than another, and this would destroy the great virtue of Temperance, and would allow it no place: for that consists in abstaining from what is another's. Neither would there be room for Liberality, i● none had of his own to give. Besides, by possessing in common, Sloth, Idleness and Negligence would be encouraged; 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 1. c. 3.  because whatever thing is common to many, hath less care employed about it, or it is not with that sedulousness provided for, because what is every body's work is no bodies work: according to our English Proverb, The mean Pot never boils well. So he concludes, That possessing in common gives more occasions to differences, than where every one knows his own. Therefore it is more conducible to the well-being of a People to unite in one order of Discipline, than in unity of Stock and Community of Goods.  
There was some difference in the modus of this community. For we read that Pericles and Cimo pulled down the Enclosures of their Gardens and Fields, that the meaner sort might have free liberty to take the Fruits. This kind of Community was received at Tarentum, and the Agrarian Law at Rome allowed something of it.  
But I believe this kind of Community was little practised, but rather every one enjoyed his separate share, and some Commons, as we have in England, were best un-enclosed, according to that of 
(c) Sicut coelum Diis, ita terras generi mortalium datas; quaeque sunt vacuae, e●s publicas esse. Annal. l. 13.  Boiocolus in Tacitus, That as the Heavens were given to the Gods, so the Earth was given to Men; and those places that were empty or unpossessed in several, were for the public, or common to all.  
The Anabaptists in Germany, were very earnest to have obtained such a Community, where they were powerful enough to eject the right Owners out of their Estates, pleading the Apostles usage: And in our late Confusions (among the many revivals of obsolete opinions and Heresies) we had some that were very fond of a notion, That the perfectest State of a Commonwealth was not only where there should be no distinction of Dignities and Degrees, but Estates should be leveled; and some that foresaw the People would not easily consent to this (as an Essay) begun to dig and cultivate Commons, enticing the Poor to join with them, of which, as I remember, one Everard was the chief.  
As to Communities of Wives, 
(d) Arist. Polit. lib. 2. c. 3.  Plato would have it so, that because, 
Against Community of Wives.  when every one might call every Man's Wife and Child his own, there would be an amicable concord in the enjoying and providing for them. But the Philosopher argues against this, much what as he did against the Community of Goods; especially, by reason that the Children would be neglected by the Fathers; none being certain whether such or such a Son were his or no; and so all Paternal affection would be abolished, and all Cognations wholly obliterated, and there would be no way to distinguish ones own Issue, but by the similitude, as among the Garamants of the superior afric, and the Pharsalian Mare 
(e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ib.  which was called Just, because the had always her Foals like the Horse that got them. Besides that, Parricide might be committed, and injury done by Children to Parents (which no civil Government ought to allow) and yet the Father not be truly known.  
But to leave this, 
Subjects now very solicitous to preserve their Properties.  because I do not read that any Commonwealth did ever, or not long enjoy the benefit of any such institution; we may note, that as in other things, so in this, the custom of Men is much changed. All being now so jealous of any breach made upon their Property, that Princes are looked upon as Tyrannical and Arbitrary, that shall, for the necessary support of the Government, lay any imposition upon the People, without their consents; which made, in King Charles the First's time, that outcry against Ship-money; though the Legality of it was owned by twelve Judges, and very ancient Records were produced, and much learning and reading shown in the arguments for it. But this point is now adjusted to the satisfaction of the whole.  
The English Subject enjoys many choice peculiar Privileges and advantages, 
The Privileges of the English Subjects in their Property.  far transcending those of the Subjects of most Princes: So that any rougher touch upon that tender part, must needs gall, and the lightest Yoke be uneasy to the neck unaccustomed to it. By his Birthright he hath something he can call his own; he hath not only the protection of his Person, but the inheritance of his Freehold, his Liberty and Property secured to him by Law; he cannot be violently assaulted in the one, or forceably invaded in the other, but the public Justice of the Kingdom will be satisfied for it, and call the Aggressors to a strict account.  
We have such a grand Charter of all just and reasonable Privileges and Immunities, continued and confirmed to us, by the Piety, Munificence and Royal bounty of our Princes, that we may dispute peaceable and happy living with all other Subjects of the World.  
The Government we live under, being settled and supported by known and excellent Laws, such as for their policy and prudence, justice and equity in their composition, challenge all the constitutions of Europe (in which part of the World are (if any where) to be found the greatest perfections of Human Nature) to 〈◊〉 the like. They do so justly and clearly support the Grandeur of Majesty, the Dignity of the Crown, with the Peace, Liberty and Property of the Subject, 
Whether Property was before Government, or not.  that all Nations round about envy us for that felicity they can never hope to enjoy.  
To disturb this blessed condition of the English Subject, there are two Extremes: The one of a People fond of a Notion, of the Primitive fundamental of Government in the People, that they will needs have Property in order of Nature before Government; without considering that nothing is gained to their advantage by the concession of it. For it must also be 
(f) Bishop of Lincoln's Preface to Power of Princes.  proved, that it was before it in order of time; for as one of the principal ends of Government is the preservation of men's acquisitions, of Cattle and Fields, by their industry; so we must suppose some Government first, because the right which any man hath to the acquired stock and lands, must be ascertained to him by some Law, which supposeth Government. So that the dispute (saith the Reverend Bishop) is the Lana Caprina, and when men have crowded themselves into the Circle, they reap nothing but a Brainsick giddiness; and it is like the dispute in Macrobius, Whether the Hen or Egg were first.  
All that believe the Creation, must own, that Adam's Government was before any Man's property, and the like may be said of Noah; so that there is no need to have recourse to Articles, or capitulations with the People (which those make such a noise with) unless they can first evince the World to be Eternal, and Men to have sprung in some rank Soil, as Tubera terrae, Mushrooms after a fruitful shower.  
Another Extreme is what Mr. Hobbs every where in his Leviathan, 
Against Arbitrary Sovereignty.  endeavours to establish, (viz) That the Sovereign should be so absolute and so arbitrary, that he should upon Exigents of State, or at his own pleasure, have the disposal of every Subject's fortune, which how necessary it may be for vast Empires (such as the Ottomans) I dispute not. But the Sovereigns of Christendom, especially of England, take no such measures to the advantages of themselves, or their Subject's slavery.  
The most judicious Earl of Clarendon, in his eleborate Treatise against 
(g) Survey of Leviathan, p. 110.  Mr. Hobbs, hath with great judgement refuted this opinion, from whose Armoury I shall borrow some of the Artillery, though I dare not presume to use them with the same dexterity, and address his Lordship doth.  
This Propriety (saith he) introduceth the beauty of building, and the cultivating of the Earth, by art as well as industry, that they and their Children might dwell in the Houses they were at the charge to build, and reap the Harvest of those lands they had been at the charge to sow: whatsoever is of civility and good manners, all that is of art and beauty, of rule and solid wealth in the world, is the product of this; the Child of beloved property; and they 〈◊〉 at would strangle this Issue, desire to demolish all buildings, eradicate all plantations to make the Earth barren, and live again in Tents, and nourish their Cattle by successive marches into the Fields where the Grass grows. Nothing but joy in propriety redeemed us from this barbarity, and nothing but security in the same can preserve us from returning to it again.  
If there be no Propriety (continueth the great Lord) there is nothing worth defending from foreign Enemies, or from one another, and consequently it is no matter what becomes of the Commonwealth. For the Government can never be so vigorously assisted by a People who have nothing to lose, as by those who defending it, defend their own Goods and Estates; which if they do not believe their own, they will not much care into whose hands they fall.  
To this wise Lord I may add what a great 
(h) Seneca. Jure civili omnia Regis sum, & tamen illa quorum ad Regem pertinet universa possessio, in singulos dominos discerpta sunt, & unaquaeque res habet possessorem suum. Itaque dare Regi domum & mancipia & pecuniam possumus, nec donare illi de suo dicimur. Ad Reges enim po●stas omnium pertinet, ad s●gula proprietas.  Statesman and Scholar hath long since observed. That though by the Civil Law all are the Kings; yet even those things (whereof the Universal possession belongs to the King) have their peculiar Owners: So that we may give the King, House, Freehold or Money, yet are not said to give him his own. For to the King the Power over all appertains, but to every single Person his Property, according to that of Bulgaris to Zeno, Omnia Rex possidet Imperio, singuli dominio.  
If it were thus under the absolute Power of the Roman Emperors in Seneca's time, how much more secure may we judge Propriety in ours, when so guarded by the Royal Sword and Sceptre; that in several cases Actions may be brought in defence of a Man's right, even against the Crown, and the Judges have pronounced Sentence against some claims of the King, and aught to do so.  
Whatever pains Mr. Hobbs takes to render those precious words of Property unvaluable and insignificant, we see that a better Philosopher than He, and who understood the Rules of Government (having lived under just such a Sovereign as Mr. Hobbs would set up) gives his judgement otherwise, where he expressly tells us, that he is 
(i) Errat si quis tutum sibiesse Regem putat, ubi nihil a Rege tutum est. Securitas securita●e paciscenda est.  much deceived that thinks that King is in safety, from whom the Subject is not safe in what he enjoys; the security of the one being from the stipulation of the security of the other.  
That in former ages also the condition of the English Subject hath been happier, in enjoying greater security, as to their Persons and Estates, than the Subjects of Foreign Countries: and that the English Laws and Government have been very tender of them, appears by what another 
(k) De laudibus Legum Ang. c. 37.  Lord Chancellor writes, who lived in a turbulent age, and was forced into exile with the Prince, eldest Son to King Henry the Sixth. He in many places, treats of the miseries of the Peasants in France, and of the generality of the French Subjects, too tedious here to relate, and in his free way of Dialogue with the Prince, he divides Kingly Government into that which is Regal and Absolute, and that which is Political. In which last are condescensions of Princes to bond their Prerogative, and this he commends to his Prince, saying, 
(l) Quis enim potentior liberiorve esse potesi, quam qui non solum alios, sed seipsum sufficit debellare? Ib.  No Prince can be reputed powerfuller or freer than that Prince, who is not only able to master and subdue others, but also his own oppressive and extorting disposition, which he saith, a King that governs Politically, can do, and ever doth.  
Therefore we may look upon all such, as now, or in the late times, have made such terrible outcries, for fear of their Properties being invaded (since we find two such great Men in distant ages so freely and elaborately writing against Arbitrariness) as men that rather design Sedition and Rebellion, by raising in the People's minds, groundless jealousies and fears, than that there can be any umbrages of such fears in the constitution of the Government, especially under such a just Prince as we have, who will make the Laws the Rule, by which he will square his Royal Administration, and hath given such assurance of it in his never to be sufficiently valued Declaration, at his majesty's first sitting in his Council, to the infinite joy of his Subjects of all conditions.  
Therefore since we have our Properties so well secured and provided for, by the gracious Grants of our Sovereigns in Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, and other Acts; let us thankfully acknowledge this great Blessing, and with so much more duty and industry, endeavour to defend, in our several capacities, the Royal Prerogatives of our Kings; which as much appertain to them, and in a more transcendent way, than our Properties are ascertained unto us.  
For it must be owned, that the primary end of all Government, is for the better ordering the People, whereby they may live in accord among themselves, and follow their several employments under the protection of the Sovereign. Therefore whoever endeavour to disjoint and discompose the frame of Government (by the wisdom of our Ancestors and long experience, found so agreeable to the English Genius) are to be reputed, either ignorant of their own happiness, or designers of as horrid mischiefs: Whether they be such, as according to Mr. Hobs' Principles, may lessen the affection and tenderness of Princes to their Subjects, or lessen the duty and obedience of Subjects to their Prince, and make them less love the constitution of Government they live under; or they be such as would cramp the Sovereign Power, and wrap it in soft Ermines and Robes of State, without a Sword or Sceptre.  
Having thus far treated of Government in general, and of the usefulness of it to mankind: I think it necessary to give an account of the several Governments which have been hitherto used in the World; and that I may give a more distinct account of them, I have chosen to represent them as I find they have been practised in the ancientest times: and finding so many in the last age and this so zealous for a Commonwealth-Government, and some yet bewitched with the notions of it, I think it incumbent on me, to be more copious in the representing of the inconveniences of all other Governments besides Monarchy,  as far as my reading may afford me helps, I may disabuse his majesty's Subjects, and represent to them the excellency and beauty of the English Monarchy, which is the whole scope and intendment of this discourse; and I must beg pardon, if either in the words of my Authors (whom I shall endeavour faithfully to quote) or in my own, I use any smarter or sharper expressions than they are willing to hear. For I think it much more advantageous to the persons concerned, that they feel the acrimony of my Ink, and the small punctures of my Pen, than that following such mischievous Principles of our late Republicans, they should have their bloods tainted, or suffer the edge of those severe Laws, which are steeled against Rebels, and think it safer for them to be blackened by my Ink, than that their blood should slain the Scaffolds.   

CHAP. VI Of Democracy, and the Inconveniences of it.  
ALL Ages have allowed of Aristotle's division of Government: where he saith 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 7.  that the Republic and the public Administration are the same, and this public administration is the Lord or Sovereign of the City, and that Sovereign is either one, a few, or the multitude, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. In Democracy the People is the Prince, and in Oligarchy the few.  
To this division 
(c)) 4. Annal.  Tacitus assents, where he saith, Cunctas Nationes, & Vrbes, Populus, aut Primores, aut singuli regunt. That either the People, the principal Citizens, or single Persons govern all Nations and Cities.  
Every one of these are again subdivided. The Government of one is either a 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 7.  King, who rules for the good of his whole Subjects, or a Tyrant, who pretending the Protection of the People against the too severe Rule of a King, or the States, exerciseth Arbitrary Rule over all. The few constitute an 
(e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. li. 4. c. 8.  Aristocracy, wherein a select, and small number of the principal Citizens Rule for the public good; or Oligarchy where the Rich only rule for their particular Profit. As to the Rule of the People, or wherein all the People have by amicable consent an equal right in the Government, and accord to manage it for the common good of the whole, it is called Democracy: If not for the common benefit of Rich and Poor, it is called Oclocracy, or the misrule of the Rabble. All 
(f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  which he includes in that division, that whatever forms of Administration regard the common benefit, they are regular, and such as are consentaneous to Justice; but whoever having the Administration, consult their own Profit only, they are depraved and distorted from the right Forms of Government.  
The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a mixture of all these, or any two of them, is often mentioned by the Philosopher; but of this I have no present occasion to discourse.  
I shall begin with democracy; which is the Clay and Iron Feet of Nebuchadnezzar's Image. It is but one remove from Anarchy, wherein all the People have, or pretend to have equal right to Authority, where all govern and all obey. For the People (saith the Philosopher) is a Monarch or simple Government by aggregation of many, being many Lords, not as single Persons, but as Members of the All; which he thus expresseth, 
(g) Polit. l. 4. c. 4.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Of this sort of Government the 
(h) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  Philosopher makes five Kind's. The first when Rich and Poor are equally capable of Government. 
Subdivisions of Democracy.  The second when a small real Estate is required to capacitate them. A third where all Citizens, not by some Qualifications debarred, are admitted; but so that the 
(i) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Laws govern, or are the Standard. A fourth where only the Inhabitants of the City, not those that live dispersed in the Villages depending on the City, had share in Government, the Law also being the Rule. The fifth when the Multitude rule by majority of Voices, and not the Law; so that their temporary Votes were Law.  
We have resemblance of these kinds of Governments in our Corporations, 
Concerning the Democracies in Corporations.  where in the Elections of Magistrates, in some places all Freemen, in others those only who have Burgages Land, in others a Common-Council solely, have Vote, and the whole Body, or such and such parts have Power to make By-laws.  
If we had no other Argument against Democracy but this, that it is of that narrow capacity that it cannot be adapted to order Regions of large extent, it would be sufficient to discredit it; for we find in those incorporated little Democracies, there are more Factions and divisions than in the whole large adjoining tracts of Land about them, though the Villages contain a much numerouser People.  
It is rarely found but that in all Votes relating to the public, Combinations are made by Kindred's, Companies, or Factions. The inferior sort having equal Vote, often outnumber the Richer and Wiser, and so businesses are aukwardly or tumultuarily determined, and the meaner People must either neglect their domestic affairs, to attend frequent Conventions, or leave the managery to a stirring factious Party, which is 
(k) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. l. 5. c. 5.  contrary to the fundamental equality and freedom they labour for. As these Corporations were first created by the Sovereign's Grace and Favour, for the increase of Trade, and enriching the places, and administration of Justice: so while they keep themselves within the bounds of their Duties, are Loyal to their Prince, and Faithful to the Government, and presume not by their Pragmaticalness to dispose of the Fate of the Empire, or by their factious Elections to make disturbances; It is very necessary they should enjoy all their municipal Privileges. But so many Corporations having of late acted contrary, it is no wonder that the late King, upon solid reason of State, issued out his Quo Warrantoes against them; and in all the new Charters reserved a Power in the Crown of displacing the Evil Magistrates at pleasure.  
But to leave this to another place, I shall note out of the Philosopher such Arguments as he useth against Democracy. 
1. Argument against Democracy, Injustice.  As first that the common People being the greater number, and the Sovereignty being supposed to be in the whole complex Body, whatever they approve must be established as a Right and Law, 
(l) Vbi plebs est domina, necesse est ut quod plurimis visum sit, hoc quoque sit ratum & hoc sit jus. Polit. l. 6. c. 2.  and suppose they vote a Dividend of the richer Citizens Estates among themselves; though this by the force of their Government be just, yet in its own nature it is great Injustice to destroy the rich Man's Propriety, as well as it were for the Rich to do the same to the Poor.  
2dly. 
2. Against the Common People's Liberty of Elections.  Liberty being the principle of all Democratical Government, it consists in two things, either to live 
(m) Plerisque jucundius est licenter vivere quam modeste. Ib. c. 2.  licentiously, which in Athens and other places was very fatal, and as Demosthenes, Isocrates, and Cicero complain that under the specious pretence of Liberty, even Anarchy prevailed. Or Secondly in the free and  Power of choosing their Magistrates, and this occasioned the contest of parties for Victory; hence Crowds, Tumults, Routs, Riots, Frays and Quarrels, and after all, Heart-burnings.  

(n) In Licurg. Vide Giphanii Com. in c. 7. l. 2. Polit. Arist.  Plutarch gives us an account of the manner of some Elections for Senators, that certain Persons being closed in a Room where they might hear the people's Voices, but not see the People, One Competitor after another was proposed, and him who was judged to have most Voices, they carried Crowned to the Temples of the Gods, Women and Children following him with Shouts. This 
(o) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. L. 2. Polit. c. 9  Aristotle calls a Childish action in so grave an affair, it being not fit for any to seek Magistracy in such a way, that by the judgement of the Multitude only, is thought fit to Rule; but 
(p) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  he that is worthy, be he willing or unwilling, should have the place. Therefore we observe where the King hath the sole Power of nominating Judges, Sheriffs, Justices of Peace, etc. though they are of as great advantage to the Peace and order of the Government, as Mayors, Sheriffs, or Common-Council Men of Corporations, there are neither Hubbubs or Quarrels at their Elections, and they are generally better qualified than such as court the people's Favour. Therefore 
(q) Rempublicam perituram in qua viri Principes consultant, Populus vero & imperita plebecula decernit.  Laertius exclaims justly that the Common-weal must perish, in which the Nobility consult, but the People and unskillful common Rabble give Judgement.  
3dly. 
3. Their Faction.  In this Government there is a continual spawning of Faction. So it is 
(r) Giphanii Comment. in lib. 5. c. 5. Polit.  observed that at Athens the Democratical Government mostly obtained, yet in the Attic State there were no less than three Factions, according to the tripartite division of the People: viz. the Diacrii, that inhabited the mountainous Parts, who were for pure Democracy; the Pediaci, who inhabited the lower Grounds, and they were for a mixture of Oligarchy; and the Parulii, or Inhabitants on the Seacoasts, and those were a mixture of both; which Aristotle calls the Politic. Hence Pisistratus appearing an Enemy to the Pediaci, made himself gracious with the People, and so easily got the Government. So he instanceth in the changes of those of Milesia, by the Prytania, which was like a Consulship or Dictatorship at ●●me. So he gives an account of Dionysius feigning himself to be wounded by the Nobility, who hated him for his love to the People, raised a great Envy and Rage of the People against them, and so established himself. So Theagenes by slaying the Cattle of the Nobility, animated the People of Maegara to follow him, till by suppressing the Nobility and Richer, he got himself to be Master of all. The like we may read in 
(s) Lib. 13. c. 9  Diodorus Siculus, that Agathocles did at Syracuse. All which Changes were the Issues of Factions betwixt the Nobility and Common-people, which is as inseparable from this sort of Government, as the Prickle is from the Thistle, or the Husk from the Corn.  
Fourthly, The Philosopher notes, That in this Government the Demagogues were most used. These indeed were the Bell-wethers of Faction, the Conductors of the People's Wills and Affections, by the power of their Popularness. The 
(t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Pol. l. 4. c. 4.  Philosopher tells us, there was no use of them, where the Law commanded; but where Matters were judged by the Decrees of the People only, they were of use, being the Authors that all things might be reduced to the Power of the People, whom they wrought upon by their Suasives, to place or displace Magistrates, or to enlarge or circumscribe their Power. Therefore he scarce allows the 
(u) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Id. l. 5. c. 5.  Name of Government to this kind of Republic, because where the Laws have not Authority, there is no Commonwealth; for that these Demagogues making the Mobile Lord over the Laws, and constantly raising Factions against the Rich, Civitate ex una duas faciant, of one City or Society made two: So that in that Contest mostly an Oligarchy prevailed; and by the petulancy of the Demagogues (who led the People by Herds, pretending, as it was their Office, 
(w) Neminem plebem injuria afficere.  that none should injure the People) they exasperated the Nobility to subvert the Government, or having got a powerful Ascendant, usurped it themselves; as the Philosopher instanceth in the Islands of Chios and Rhodes, in the Cities of Heraclea, of Pontus, in the Colonies of the Athenians at Megaris; the Nobles being abused and banished, righted themselves by Arms, and obtained the Government; and Thrasymachus did the like at Cuma.  
These Demagogues among the Grecians, the Ephori among the Lacedæmonians, and the Tribunes of the People among the Romans, are often compared, as Officers of the same kind, chosen to support the People's Interests. The Philosopher gives us an account how the Demagogues comported themselves at the places beforenamed; of which number, he saith, were Pericles, Cilon, Hyperbolus, Lycurgus, Hyperides, Demosthenes.  
Concerning the Ephori, 
Of the Ephori.  
(x) Saepe valde pauperes accidit esse in hoc Magistratu, qui propter paupertatem sunt venales. Polit. lib. 2. c. 7.  Aristotle saith, That among the Lacedæmonians they had the greatest Power, and being chosen by the People, it often happened that very poor men obtained the Office, who by reason of their poverty were mercenary, as he instanceth in the Andrici, where they being corrupted with Money, lost the City. He further adds, That though these were chosen by the ignorant Populace, and often were men very unfit for their Office; yet they had Judgement in Capital matters, and did not judge in Cases of Death or Ignominy by written Laws, but arbitrarily; so that the very Kings of Sparta were forced to observe, caress, and reverence them.  
As to the Tribunes of Rome, 
The Tribunes of Rome.  they caused many grievous Troubles about the Agrarian Laws. Sp. Cassius being the first (according to Valerius) that raised those Disputes, and was slain by his Father; though Livy and Dionysius say it was Licinius Stolo, and after many years Q. Flaminius put the same in execution, the Senate being against it. So Gracchus, Tiberius, Titius, etc. did upon the same account raise great Commotions.  
This was for the taking the ancient Possessions from the Rich, and distributing them among the Poor, Therefore 
(y) Giphan. Comment. in c. 7. lib. 2. Polit.  Cicero saith, It was a pleasant thing to the People, for that they were thereby supported without Labour; but the good Citizens resisted it, because it would extinguish Industry, and exhaust the Treasury, and inure the People to Sloth.  
From all which, we may conclude, That Democracy in its Constitution is only fitted for small Principalities; and in it neither Industry, or worthy Persons, can have Encouragement: How obnoxious it is to Factions, or must have a mixture of other Governments to support it, in being headed by some few popular Persons; or must have a shadow of Monarchy, in the ruling Demagogues, Ephori, or Tribunes; otherwise it cannot subsist.  
This leads me to the Fifth Argument of the Philosopher against Democracy, 
Democracy least durable.  That it was never found to be of any long continuance: For, 
(z) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 6. c. 4.  he saith, That all Tyrannical Constitutions are Popular: And it is well known, That, of all Governments what is Tyrannical, is the most short-lived. Liberty being the End and Scope pretended, according to the Fundamental Constitution of Democracy, 
(a) Vicissim parere & imperare.  to Obey and Rule by Turns; the sweetness of Command induceth them that have once obtained it, to continue it; and the Slavery of obeying such Fellows and Companions, continually provokes others to cast off the Yoke: So that from hence Jars and Feuds shatter the Government in pieces. Besides, the unwieldy Body of the People seldom continue long in one mind, nor can transact things without delegation of Power to some few; by all which their instability is discovered, and the shortness of their continuance shows the feeble and impotent Principles they are founded upon. For where ever it hath had any duration, it hath not been from its intrinsic adapture, but from the mixture of other Forms in their kinds more durable; Democracy being in itself such a Rolling-ground, that nothing stable can be built upon it.  
It is not to be denied, 
Where Aristotle allows of Democracy.  that Aristotle in some Cases allows of Democracy; but it is where the 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 6. c. 4.  Multitudes live by Husbandry, Pasture, or Feeding of . For these being continually employed, have not much public Business, nor leisure to attend the Assemblies; it being more pleasant and profitable for them to mind their private Affairs, than to bear Office where little Profit is to be had. But he likewise observes, That those that lived upon Tillage and Pasture (being the ancientest sort of People, before Luxury brought in Handicrafts and Artisans) easilier yielded to the Government of a Single Person, or Tyranny, or Oligarchy, so long as they could enjoy their Country Farms in peace. Whereas those in Cities, consisting of Tradesmen, Artificers, the mercenary Multitude, and such as lead an idle Life, having Leisure and Curiosity to carry them to the Assemblies, were more subject to Democracy, or Aristocracy, or any Novelty or Change.  
There are three things which render Democracy most taking with the Vulgar. 
The plausible Pleas for Democracy answered.  First, Pretended impartial Administration of Justice. Secondly, The specious, but empty Name of Liberty. Thirdly, The so much applauded Equality, by which they seem to reduce their Civil Constitutions to the primary Laws of Nature, which gave to all men Common Right.  
Concerning the first, (saith a Judicious 
(c) Dudley Digs of Resistance p. 22. 1. That Justice is not so impartially administered.  Author, whose Discourse on this Head I shall epitomise) Their Hopes that Justice should be more equally administered, are grounded upon this, That though some Rivers may be corrupted, yet the Ocean cannot. A man may satisfy the Interests of some few, and corrupt them into favour and respect of Persons; but it is hard to do the same with a Multitude: for to buy Justice of so many, would be no thriving Trade.  
But this, though plausible, is but a very fallacious Argument: For it is found by experience, that some few more crafty Citizens, who have gained Credit with the People, order Business in their close Committees, and so undiscernably lead the Multitude to whatever they call the Public Good (of which they, having prevailed upon their Affections, are esteemed the most competent Judges) by which any one of the Juncto (for they must gratify each other mutually) is enabled to cross the Course of Law in a Friend's behalf, and to put a sharper Edge upon the Sword of Justice when it strikes an Enemy.  
These kind of men, by frothy Eloquence in set Speeches, cunningly fitted to the Capacity of the Common People, having got the Art of changing the People's Opinion of Just and Unjust, (for Reasons are not weighed, where such Numbers hold the Balance) their Art is to apply their Harangues to that which rules the weaker men, the Affections; and these are easily convinced, and made the Measures of their Judgements, the want of weight in the 
(d) Suaden'o docent, non docendo suadent.  Premises being supplied by an extraordinary love to the Conclusion.  
The Judgements of Right and Wrong (being not like Mathematical Knowledge) are as various as their Interests different, because they concern Meum and Tuum, wherein Profit is the 
(e) Vtilitas Justi prope mater & Aequi est.  Parent of Equitable and Just; and these Ruling men, when they have a mind to do a man a prejudice, can easily transfer his Business to the Common People's Verdict, where they shall be sure to have their Fleece torn off by the Brambles or Briars, or suffer as cruel Death (if they be judged Capital Offenders) as those may be conceived to undergo that are rolled to death in a spiked Barrel. So we find the Grecian Emperor Isacius Angelus, and the two De Wits were torn in pieces, when exposed to be worried by the Rabble.  
Secondly, as to Liberty; 
2. True Liberty is wanting in Democracy.  it is strange Men should so generally fall in love with a bare sound, and court a name of freedom, which duly examined, signifies nothing. They cannot mean by it a looseness from all Laws; they dare not own such pernicious Licence; the true debate is not, Whether they shall admit the Bonds of Laws (for they readily embrace them, being forged and fitted by themselves) but who shall impose them? The question is not, Whether 
(f) Non an servirent, sed an servirent uni vel pluribus.  they should serve, but, Whether they should serve one or more? and with them it is commonly called Liberty, to serve many Masters.  
Now if we rightly consider, the restraint of our Freedom is that which is most valuable amongst the benefits of Government. For this it is preserves Peace among men, by it their hands are tied up from doing injury. Every one, it is true, could wish to retain full and absolute liberty, but not upon condition all others should enjoy the same. For that love to it, and delight in it, is overbalanced by the fears, and the sad consideration arising from the thoughts of others freedom, to make us suffer as much as they may be tempted to inflict.  
Besides, where can true Liberty be, where the unconstant Mobile have the dispensing of it; who have no clear Idea of it, are always catching at the shadow, and the ungrasped Cloud, for Juno. Their Votes are easily corrupted, when a 
(g) Platarc. in Vita Marii.  Marius pours out Bushels of Corn in the Forum, to buy them: They are impelled as we see in crowds, first one way, than another, ebbing and flowing in their actions, like the unconstant Ocean; and this they call their Liberty, which rather is their servile Bondage, being all this while in the shorter or longer Chain of their corrupt affections or weak judgements. For how can we think the common body competent Judges to manage affairs, who besides inconstancy and disorder, do every thing in such a manner as it is very hard to separate Tumults and Multitudes; and amongst Judges, so qualified as they are, it is not enough to give prudent Council, but it must likewise be fortunate; otherwise the judicious giver of it, may probably find a great abridgement of his Liberty, if not worse.  
Thirdly, Concerning Equality, 
Concerning Equality.  while they urge it comes nearer to the Law of Nature; by the same reason they must dissolve Government, since it would take away all Magistrates, Superiors and Inferiors. Besides, it is against Nature itself, that there should be such Equality; as to instance, if in Rewards it had been intended, Nature would have made all men equally deserving: and Reason teacheth us, that since we may excel others by Education and Industry; greater Encouragements should be allotted in consideration of the charges of good breeding, and of the extraordinary studies whereby Men enable themselves to serve the Public. Besides, this Equality, though pretended to conserve, doth in truth destroy Unity; for none are so quarrelsome, none so subject to envy as equals: Every one being Judge in his own case, will yield nothing to common Justice.  
To close this Chapter, We may judge of the thriving of popular States, by what we observe of Commons, which are always poor and bare of good and wholesome Grass, comparatively with Enclosures. If these Wafts be taken into one Man's hand, he causeth the fertile crop of Thistles to be Mowed, stubbs up the Shrubs and Brambles, ploughs up the Brakes, trencheth and cultivates the Whole, and increaseth the profit four fold; whereas, when it lies in common, every one serves his present turn of it, overstocks it, and nothing is bred upon it, but poor Jades and Beasts of Burden.  
Yea, the greater part of Men in a popular State, being bred up to gain, make Profit the rule of their Actions, entertain but little sense of Honour, and thereby the State is soon corrupted by their low affections: so that though some may be rich, yet the State can never be glorious.  
In the standing Pools of popular Government, from the putrilage and mud, spawn swarms of Tadpols. The rankness of such soil brings store of Tares and Goss, Docks and Nettles: Here the Henbane, Nightshade and Aconite grow too luxuriantly; so that the medicinal and fragrant Plants rarely find room or cultivation.   

CHAP. VII. Of the several Forms of Government in Greece, before and in Aristotle's time, and of the Roman Commonwealth.  
THE Philosopher observes, 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 3. c. 15.  that in remote Ages, when there were fewer Persons of the sublimest eminence for Valour, Wisdom, Virtue and public spiritedness to protect by their Courage and Conduct, to institute Laws by their Wisdom, to be a living Law by their just dealing and example, to study the emolument and benefit of the common People, by their good will to them; 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  Kingly Government was solely used. But after that many grew up to be equal in virtue, they endured Kings no longer, but settled Commonwealths, and used an Aristocratical Government, where the eminentest in Virtue only governed: but when these degenerated, and begun to make profit of their public places, Oligarchy began, where respect was not so much had to Virtue, as to Riches and Honours; and these growing Tyrannical, the People revolted from them, and so Democracy was introduced.  
Of Aristocracy the Philosopher makes four kinds: The first and best consisting of men absolutely 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 4. c. 7.  good and virtuous, not in supposition only. 
Several kinds of Aristocracy.  The second, where respect was not only had to Virtue, but also to Riches. The Third, where, besides Virtue, also Respect was had to the People's Liberty, as in Lacedaemonia, where the Ephori were introduced. The fourth, where Respect was had to Virtue, Riches, and the People's liberty, as at Carthage.  
The same Philosopher 
(d) Polit. lib. 4. c. 5. Four kinds of Oligarchy.  makes four kinds of Oligarchy. The first, wherein those of the largest proportion of Estate, according to a certain limit, were capable of Authority, and all under that degree were excluded; so that whoever had acquired such a proportion of Estate, was capable of Rule, without any other qualification. The second was, when the Census was less, whereby the Government was in more hands, and those had power to choose others in the room of such as deceased. As it is usual in our Common-councils. In the third kind great Riches were required, so that there were fewer Governors, and they had greater Authority, and their Children succeeded them. The last kind was, wherein the greatest Estates only were capacitated: But the Governors were not tied to the observance of Laws, but ruled according to their own wills, as they agreed among themselves.  
That form of Government which the 
(e) A●ist. Polit. lib. 4. c. 8.  Philosopher calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Of the Government called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  seems rather an Idea of Government, than that ever (as it is described) it was put in practice. For he instanceth in no State but that of Sparta, that had any resemblance of it, and the Thurians which degenerated into Democracy. However I shall give such an account as I find of it in him, or in such Commentators as I have by me, especially in Giphanius: First, He makes it a 
(f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  commixture of Democracy and Oligarchy; wherein the Poor and Rich had an equal capacity to the Office and Administration of Government, and calls it properly a Republic, because those Governments which incline to Democracy, were so called, because they seemed most fitted for the People's good; but those which inclined more to Oligarchy, were used to be styled Aristocracies, 
(g) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 4. c. 8.  because those that are rich are commonly Persons of good education, and ennobled, which things he saith appertain to Virtue. So that there being three necessary ingredients or terms in a Commonwealth, Virtue, Riches and Liberty, this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 directly includes the two last; and the first also is included, because amongst 
(h) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  most, the Rich are reputed amongst the best deserving. So he makes this kind of Government to be different from Democracy and Oligarchy, because mixed of both; so that in one particular he shows the combinations of these two in Polity, by setting a mulct upon the Rich that absented themselves from the administration of the Government, and reward upon the Poor that should attend it, which in Oligarchy had no place.  
Another sort of Commixture 
(i) Lib. 4. Polit. c. 13.  he makes, that whereas in Oligarchy, there is only respect had to great wealth, and in Democracy, no respect at all had to it; This Polity is mixed of a middle sort of Riches, and such men he judgeth the best tempered, as not covetous and greedy as the Poor, nor being wealthy enough to do mischief, but contenting themselves with their Mediocrity.  
A third kind of their mixture he makes, that whereas in Oligarchy, the Magistrates are chosen by Riches and Suffrage, and in Democracy without these; the Composition is, That the Election be by Suffrage only, without respect had to Wealth.  
As to the Roman Commonwealth; The Sovereignty, after the expulsion of Kings, consisted in the Senate, the Consuls and Tribunes of the People, all of them seeming checks upon others; but at some times one part, especially the Patricii or the Plebs, assumed or exercised more power, one than the other, according to the prevalency of either party.  
As to the Senate of Rome, Romulus elected an Hundred out of the Patricii, 
Of the Roman Senate.  to be his Council, to assist him in determining matters concerning the Commonweal. Tarquinus Priscus added an Hundred more, 
(k) Alexand. ab Alex. Genialium Dierum, lib. 9 c. 2.  and Brutus, according to most Authors, another Hundred; and though at first, only the Patricii were chosen, yet after, the Commoners also were chosen, called Senatores minorum Gentium.  
These had the consulting part under their care, were the great Judicature, to which last Appeals were made, and by their ratifying of things, added the force of the Senatus consultum, by which they decreed honours and punishments.  
Concerning the Consuls, after the expulsion of Tarqvinius Superbus, the Government of the City, which was before in 
(l) Rosini Antiq. Rom. lib. 7. c. 9  one (the King) was now divided betwixt two, who at first were called Praetores quod praeirent Populo, and not long after consuls from consulting for the People. These at first, had the executive parts of most things relating to the Government, under their care; but after, by the consent of the Senate, they chose two Censors, who took an account, not only of the number and riches of the People, but had power to inquire into every man's life.  
They also for administering Justice, 
(m) Pighius.  created two Officers, the Praetor Vrbanus for City-affairs, and Peregrinus for Foreign affairs, like our Mayors. These Consuls had the Government of the Military Force, and other Jurisdictions too long to be here inserted. They were at first but two for a year, after four or more by removable resignation or death. The People got one of the Consuls to be chosen of the Plebeians.  
Concerning the Tribunes of the People, 
Of the Tribunes of the People.  we may note that the Commonalty, finding 
(n) Rosini Epitome rerum Rom. lib. 7. c. 25.  themselves oppressed by the Wealthier sort, departed unto the Aventine Mount, threatening the Nobility they would departed the City, and never again adventure themselves in War for the defence thereof, unless they had some release and easement, and had certain Magistrates chosen, who should be Sacrosancti: that is, such as might not be hurt nor violently used, not so much as in words: and those Magistrates should be the Protectors of the Commonalty, who being at first chosen from the military Tribunes, and they having the name of Tribunes from the distinction of the Romans into Tribes; that they might be distinguished from the military Tribunes, were called the Tribunes of the People. At 
(o) Pighius Tyrannofugio.  first they were only two, but after increased to the number of ten. They had power to hinder any Proceed in the Senate, which they thought might prove prejudicial to the Commons. At 
(p) Stadius in Florum, lib. 3. c. 2. Eorum Autoritas magis in intercedendo, quam jubendo.  first they had not Authority to enact any new Decrees, as afterwards by abusing their Authority, and by Connivance they usurped; for in old time they sat 
(q) Pighius ut supra.  without the door of the Senate, whither whatsoever was determined within the Senate, was sent to them to be perused, and if they approved it, they subscribed a Roman T for Tribunus.  
When any new Laws were to be proposed, the 
(r) Godwyn's Roman Antiqu. lib. 3. sect. 2.  Praetors, Consuls, Dictator's, Interrex, Decemviri, military Tribunes, Triumvirs, and Tribunes of the People only had liberty to propose them, and they were exposed to view of the People for three Market days, and after the Magistrates assembled the People to hear the Law, which by the Proponent was pleaded for by an Oration, and seconded by others, and if not liked, it was opposed in the same manner. The People being assembled according to the triple distinction of them into Tribes, and the division of each Tribe into ten Curiae, or Parishes, and the Centuries or Hundreds, the Assemblies were called Comitia, Tributa Centuriata, or Curiata. Now into a Pitcher were put the names of these several divisions, and that Tribe or Centuries Name which was first drawn, was called Tribus, vel Centuria Praerogativa; because they were first asked their Voices, and commonly the vote of that was followed by the rest, especially in choice of Consuls: the Curia upon which the first Lot did fall, was called Principium. 
(s) Hubert in Lib. 1. Cicer. Epist. Serm. 2.  Now while the People were busy in their Lottery, if any Tribune of the Commons should intercidere, or forbidden the Proceeding, he might be heard, and the whole Assembly was for that time dismissed; or if the Consuls commanded supplications to be offered up in behalf of the Emperor, or if it fell on some forbidding of Feasts, or if any were seized with the Falling-sickness, or the Soothsayers found any unlucky Signs: upon any of these the Assembly was dissolved; otherwise the Law that was approved by the People, was recorded, being graven 
(t) Tacit. Annal. 11.  in Brass, and put in the Treasure house. That which was determined in the 
(v) Sigonius de Jure, lib. 3. cap. 1.  Parish-Assemblies was called Lex Curiata, that in the Centuries, Lex Centuriata, that which was in the Assembly of the Tribes was not called a Law, but Plebiscitum.   

CHAP. VIII. The Inconveniences of all kinds of Republic Governments.  
I Shall now consider all these forms of Commonwealths in gross, and hope to satisfy the ingenuous and unbiass'd Reader, That if a People were in a capacity to choose their own Government, they should have no reason to choose a Commonwealth, rather than Kingly Government: much less that they should endeavour to innovate or introduce it, where already so Geometrically composed as it is in England, both for the glory and benefit of the King and People.  
It is Judiciously noted by a late 
(a) Nalson's Common Interest, c. 3. The Benefits designed in all Societies.  Learned Writer, That the happiness of all Societies principally consists in the securing domestic Peace, or protection from foreign Enemies, securing to every Member of the Society their particular right and property, free from encroachment and oppression; or in the equal distribution of Justice to all, according to their proportion of Reward or Punishment. Through all which heads I shall endeavour to show that in Commonwealths these Particulars cannot or have not so effectually been secured, as in a rightly constituted Monarchy.  
First as to the securing domestic Peace, 
1. Securing Domestic Peace.  the very constitutions of Commonwealths, requiring many Magistrates of equal Authority, subject to the Political Diseases of State; Viz. Covetousness, Ambition, Oppression and Faction, and all the Concomitants of these, make them more subject to Intestine Discords than Monarchy can be.  
First, 
Ibid. Covetousness in Commonwealthsmen causes Discords.  It must be considered that in all Commonwealth Governments, there is a necessity of change of Persons, either annually chosen, or to be for some few Years duration; and all such must at the same time intent the interests of their private affairs separate from the public: and there being most tempting Probabilities of a private and particular advantage to be made of all public Trust, where there is Power; it is a perpetual Spur to ambitious and selfish Spirits, to court such Employments which are like to be serviceable to their Honour or private Fortunes; and the 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit lib. 5. c. 4.  best Men being restrained by their modesty and paucity, those that have designs by direct or indirect ways, wind themselves into those places, and by the rotation knowing they shall not long enjoy them, they will improve the time in enriching themselves, and connive at others that do so, lest they themselves should be called to an account: every one's rapaciousness being likelier to be so much the eagerer, because he knows it may not come again to his turn to have the Quarry to pray upon. Therefore the common interest (if it be regarded) must be only as it is subservient to these By-ends.  
Thus in our late Republic, the great Business (even of the zealousest Pretenders to the Public) was to enrich themselves and their Confederates, as was apparent by the considerable Estates they had, even after they had been forced to disgorge those fat Portions of Crown, Bishops, Dean, and Chapter, and Cathedral Lands.  
By this observation we may conclude that the constituent parts of this Government, being ever like to be such, the miserable People must be continually spunged, to feed so many greedy Worms, and when the Prey grows scarce, these Bloodhounds will be sure to fight who shall get the best Share.  
Besides, there must be continual Heart-Burnings and Part-making, 
Factions among them.  when those that are endowed with 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. l. 5. c. 7.  great Souls, or are equal in Fortitude, or Virtue, have not the eminentest command (at least as they judge) according to their Worth and Merits. By which means some will be carrying things by Arbitrary Power over their Equals, as the Philosopher instanceth in Pausanius in Lacedaemon, Hanno at Carthage, Lysander, and Eniadas, and the Parthenia, who judging themselves equal with those that had rule, and being by them slighted and branded with the title of Bastards, conspired to have slain the Senate and Optimacy.  
To instance in all the Factions in Commonwealths, were to write a voluminous History. I shall touch upon some, and show that the causes either given or taken will always be the same in these kinds of Government; the very Constitution of them, by the purity and equality of Dignity and Power, naturally producing Jealousies, Animosities and Aemulations: whereas the 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 15.  Philosopher well notes, that many may disagree among themselves, but one cannot. The difference of Judgement as to Conduct and Managery among multitudes of Equals embarrassing Debates, the Result must be according to the prevailing of some Faction: Every one Judging most advantageously of his own council and advice; and those whose Councils are rejected, will look upon it as a Diminution of that esteem for Wisdom and Policy, which they think they deserve, and these Discontents will occasion making of Parties, entering into Confederacies, and Combinations of Faction, and frequently end in popular Insurrections, Tumults, and Disorders, to which Republics, by their make are thus propense.  
Since therefore they are the seminaries of Faction, we can expect no wholesome Fruit from such corrupt Seed; for all factions endeavour to suppress their Opposites, and those heats, undermine and jars, are not confined to their Senate-house, but are dispersed, according to the places of their Residence, Estates; Marriages or Alliances, through the whole Dominions, every one strengthening his Interest what he can; and the nature of Mankind being to side with one or other, if the Parties be Proud, Ambitious, Covetous, or Imperious, they will be most absolute and arbitrary in such places where they can prevail; and if Persons admitted to Copartnership of Rule, be not of their own Nature guilty of such Vices, the desires of every one to be reputed the wisest, and to gain the leading of a Party, or obtain the supreme Authority, are apt to taint such, who being exalted, not born to Greatness, would have all to judge that such Promotions are the pure-pute effects of their Merits, and whoever sets that high value upon himself, cannot escape the danger of unsupportable Pride, as well as Vanity, which will hurry them on to over-bear all Opposition.  
I shall now proceed to some few Instances of the Ruins brought upon many by Faction. 
The Athenian Changes and Factions.  At Athens, after the death of Codrus, the race of their Hereditary Kings ceased, and there succeeded Kings for term of Life, like as the Elective Kings of Poland. After twelve such Kings ending in Alcmenon, they constituted Decennial Kings, or Archontes, whereof Erixias was the last; and then they passed to annual Magistrates, like Lord Mayor, or Burgo-Masters: and all these changes were by the prevalence of one Faction after another. Solon was one of these yearly Magistrates, and he compiled their Laws, such as the Romans in aftertimes sent to peruse, and reduced into twelve Tables. These were framed unto the Practice and maintenance of popular Government, which in Solon's own Life-time were violated, and almost extinguished: for Pisistratus the Son of Hypocrates, finding the Citizens distracted betwixt two Factions, whereof Megacles and Lycurgus (two Citizens of noble Families) were become the heads, took occasion by their contention and Insolence, to raise a third Faction more powerful, because more plausible; for that he seemed a Protector of the Citizens in general: and having once got love and credit, he wounded himself, and feigned that by Malice of his Enemies, he had like to have been slain for his love to the good Citizens, and so procured a Guard, and made himself Lord: but he was soon driven out by Megacles and Lycurgus, and then the Emulation began afresh betwixt the former Factions; and Megacles finding himself too weak, called in Pisistratus, but he was once more expelled, and was restored a third time, and governed Athens seventeen Years, and his Son Hippias succeeded him, who was at last forced to fly to Darius.  
I shall under this Head only touch upon one example more in Athens. 
Concerning the 30 Tyrants of Athens.  After the Lacedæmonians had subverted the Walls of Athens, thirty Men were appointed by the People to compile a Body of their Laws, and these had supreme Authority, and were made Judges; and in cases wherein the Laws were defective, had power to give Sentence according to their own pleasures. At first they exercised their Authority upon lewd and wicked Persons, such as were odious to the People. But afterwards all sorts of People (under the notion of Perturbers of the Peace) were Fined, Imprisoned, or put to Death, according as they among themselves judged fit.  
To strengthen their own Tyranny, they associated three Thousand Citizens to them, the rest they disarmed, exercising the greatest Tyranny imaginable upon them, and agreed amongst themselves that every one should name one, whose Goods should be seized on, and the owner put to Death; upon which Theramenes, one of the Thirty discovering his detestation at those proceed (though there had been a Law that none of the three Thousand should suffer Death at the appointment of the Thirty, but have a legal Trial) yet Critias, one of these thirty Tyrants, ordered Theramenes' name to be blotted out of the Number. Theramenes urged the ill consequence to the rest of the Thirty, if without any just reason the names of any might be expunged by the overruling of one or more of the number; but every one thought fit rather to preserve his own Life by Silence, than presently to draw upon himself the danger which as yet he thought concerned him little, and perhaps would never come near him: so the Tyrant's interpreting Silence, Consent; he was forthwith condemned, and compelled to drink Poison.  
These Proceed caused many Citizens to fly, who under the conduct of Thrasybulus made head against them, and at last the Lacedæmonians removed the thirty Tyrants to Sparta; and the Citizens risen against the Captains of the tyrannical Faction, and slew them as they were coming to a Parley, and so put an end to that worst of Miseries they had undergone, since those thirty were constituted. In which sad History we may observe, that these Tyrants were elected by the People, and at last after their outrageous cruelties, were by the People destroyed: and no doubt they at first appeared such to the People as they might confide in for Administration of Impartial Justice; into which belief they had cunningly bewitched them; and they were by the same Hands that raised them, demolished. For as Sir 
(e) History, p. 278.  W. Raleigh well observes in popular States, when any mischief happens, the People take revenge on the Commanders; and where any Judgement is left to them (as in popular States, they will be always pushing on for a Share) there will be very dismal and indirect Proceed: and when their Judgement proves sound, it is by chance rather than otherwise.  
In Carthage, 
Of Factions in Carthage.  Factious and disorderly popular Government was as fatal as in any other place. Hanno and Bomilcar were two famous Captains, but the heads of two several Factions, and such Enemies to one another, that when they were chosen Generals against Agathocles, Bomilcar suffered Hanno to be cut in pieces rather than he would assist him. So Hanno and Amilcar being joined against the Mercenaries, Amilcar could perform nothing by reason of the envy of Hanno, till for the public Service sake they were made Friends.  
The Barchine Family (of which Hannibal was the third in Succession that was General of the Carthaginians) had the greatest Interest both in the Senate, and among the People for some time; none being able either to tax his, or his Family's Virtue, or to perform the like service for the Commonweal. Yet we find, that when Hannibal and his Brother Mago, had so far overrun Italy, that nothing but the supply of Men and Money, to complete the Conquest, was wanting; yet the Faction of Hanno wrought upon the people (not by detracting from the Valour and Conduct of Hannibal and the Family, but by the general reprehension of the War) that when Mago was sent over for Recruits, he had wrought so on the covetousness of those that were loath to lay out their Money before extreme necessity required it, and had more feeling of their own present commodity, than sense of the public need; that he got little encouragement: and when the matter being proposed to the People, they yielded to a supply, yet Hanno and his Party gave so many impediments to the Execution, suggesting the danger, that if Hannibal and his Brother conquered, he would make himself King, that by that means, he cunningly undermined that brave man, and brought at last ruin upon the whole Commonwealth. When Scipio (without the compliance of the Senate, but with the concurrence of the People) translated the War to afric, so that the Carthaginians were forced to recall Hannibal, who not able to master Scipio, the whole Commonwealth was subjected to the Romans, of whose Factions and civil Discords, I shall now give a short account.  
When the Truce betwixt the Romans and Veientes was concluded for Forty years, there arose a Sedition about the Lex 
(f) Livius, lib. 2. An. V.C. 281.  Agraria, which was appeased by the raising a War against the Sabines, Aequi and Volsci: Such new Wars being the only extinguishers of the Domestic Fires, which constantly, in peaceable times, were kindled betwixt the Optimacy, or the Patricii and the Plebs.  
At the instigation of some desperate Bankrupts (who thought themselves wrongfully oppressed by the Senate and Consuls) the People made a dangerous uproar in the Holy Mount, till Menenius Agrippa, by the discreet allusion of the inconvenience of the discord betwixt the Head and the Belly, brought them to some reconciliation, on condition they might have some new Magistrates erected, to whom they might appeal in matters of variance betwixt them and the Consuls; which were therefore called the Tribunes of the People.  
After this the ten 
(g) Idem, lib. 3. An. V.C. 297.  Men, called the Decemvirate, with Appius Claudius, ruled all, and wrested the power from the Senate and Consuls; but he and they were forced to resign to the Senate again, after some few years Tyranny.  
Before the Siege of the Veii, they changed the Government of Consuls to Military Tribunes, who usurped the power for almost Seventy years; so as by civil 
(h) Inter patres plebemque certamina exarsere, modo turbulenti Tribuni, modo Consules praevalidi, & in Vrbe ac Foro tentamenta Civilium bellorum, mox e plebe infima C. Marius & nobilium saevissemus L. Sylla.  differences there was great interruption, that one while Consuls ruled, another while there was an Anarchy, than the Tribunes were restored, and after many years the consular Authority was established, but so as one of the Consuls should be a Plebeian.  
Concerning the Seditions by Tiberius Gracchus and Caius his Brother, and Apuleius Saturninus suppressed by Marius, of Livius Drusus by Philippus, and that betwixt Marius and Cinna against Sylla, and the 
(i) Victam armis libertatem in Dominatione●● verterunt. Tacit. 2. Histor. lib. 3. c. 14, 15, 16.  calamities the People underwent in those Tragical Factions, betwixt Pompey and Caesar, I must refer the curious Reader to Florus and the Roman Historians. Therefore 
(k) Cum dissentionibus omnia centurbari in m●ltorum Imperiis necesse est. Pacis interest omnium potestat●n conserre ad unum.  Tacitus makes a most true remark, That since in the command of many, it is unavoidable, but that all things will be disturbed by Factions; therefore for peace sake, it is behoveful that the Power be devolved on one: as likewise in 
(l) Discordanti sape Pa● i. e non aliud remedium fuisse, quam si ab uno regeretur.  another place, That there is no other remedy, where disagreements are in ones Country, but that one should govern.  
Therefore before the Government was changed at Rome unto that of Emperors, They had no other remedy in great Exigents, 
1. Annal. Livius, lib. 2. Necessity of choosing a Dictator.  than to choose a Dictator, whether it were in imminent danger from Enemies abroad, or Factions at home. So Appius Claudius at a pinch cries, Agedum, Dictatorem, a quo nulla provocatio, creemus, Let us choose a Dictator from whom is no Appeal. For his power was such, as 
(m) Jus vitae penes unum illum esse, nec adversus Dictatoriam vim, aut Tribunus Plebis, aut ipsa Plebs attollere coulos, aut hiscere audebat. Lib. 6.  Livy tells us, That he had the Power of Death, and against whose Authority, neither the Tribunes of the People, nor the People themselves durst lift up their eyes or gape to oppose. By the choosing of this Officer, with such absolute Power, we may infer how necessary it was in a Commonwealth (to avoid the diversity of opinions, the factions of Parties, and the evil consequences that would result from them) to fix the Power in one, who might be a temporary Monarch: by which it is sufficiently evident what deference is to be paid to Monarchy; it being no small addition to the power of Julius Caesar, that he was in vested in the perpetual Dictatorship, That being an authority known, and as far as I can judge, gave him a fuller and vaster extent of Power, than the Title of Imperator, which implied no more than General of an Army.  
That all Republics are subject to Factions, appears farther in the Philosopher in several particulars, as in the use though not the name of Demagogues, as well in them, 
(n) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 5. c. 11. Heinsti.  who were the People's Flatterers, as in Democracy, and that their Magistrates were chosen by tumultuous Elections, as he particularly instanceth at Elis, where the Senatorship being for life, by reason of the longer duration of the Honour and Profit, the contests were so much the more violent.  
But above all the inconveniences of these Commonwealths (which was bottomed upon the securing of one Faction against another) he 
(o) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. l. 5. c. 6.  reckons the keeping up of a standing Army in War and Peace, which, he saith, was by reason of the distrust among themselves, whereby they were obliged to commit themselves to the custody of Soldiers, and the Commander being by that means impowered to be a Judge or Arbiter betwixt them, made himself Lord of both, as he instanceth in the time of the Government of the Family of the Alvidi at Larissa, and at Samos and Abydus, and in Timophanes at Corinth. For this reason, the Romans fearing Camillus, banished him: So Julius Caesar, for ten years, having the command in Gaul, was able to master the Senate with more ease.  
If we had never heard of any such thing in the World before, yet we had the too late calamitous experience of it, in our late Republican Government; which was no longer able to subsist, but while it had an Army (maintained at the charge of the enslaved People) to secure them: yet they falling into Factions themselves, their Army did so likewise, and the Houses and Army at last came to have several Interests, and to have competitions for Sovereignty (which any wise man might have foreseen) and at last, the Army being divided, the happy Restauration of the King was thereby much facilitated.  
Having thus cleared, 
That a Commonwealth cannot so well defend itself against a Foreign Enemy.  I hope, the point, That a Commonwealth Government is less conducible than Monarchy, to prevent intestine Discords; I shall now proceed to discourse how difficult it is in this Form also, to defend their Subjects from Foreign Invasions, especially without the constituting of Dictator's or General's, with unsociable Power, which is in effect, a temporary Monarchy.  
In all Wars nothing is more requisite than Unity of Councils, and Secrecy in the conduct of Affairs, which is most difficult to be obtained, where many are at the Helm. Besides, among so many different judgements (as there must be in such a Body, before they can arrive at a Resolution) favourable opportunities for Action, are by protractions irrecoverably lost; and the fear they have of impowering their General too much (lest he should establish himself in the Sovereignty) makes them limit and restrain him, so as he cannot take advantages, when offered: and thereby Commanders are cautelous and wary not to offend so many Masters; whereby time is lost in procuring new Instructions, and sometimes for the reasons aforesaid more Generals than one are appointed, that one may be a check to the other: So 
(p) Lib 8.  Herodotus observes, That the difference of Generals, when in equal command, hath lost victories, as at Isthmus, by the dissension betwixt Themistocles and Euribias the Persians had almost mastered all: So Thucydides notes, that so long as Pericles, by his own judgement and will, governed the Affairs of Athens, so long all things were prosperous; but after by the Factions of evil-disposed persons, he was opposed, he sped as ill.  
Besides, in the numerous Masters in a Commonwealth, the saving of every ones own Stake, will be the principle of their 
(q) Nalson's Common Interest, c. 3.  care and sedulity; So that if a Foreign Power give them a defeat, they will be easily induced to follow (as they of late used to call it) Providence in all Revolutions; and if they can obtain any assurance of enjoying their private Laws, or obtaining an higher pitch of greatness, under another power, they will not easily resist the temptation of betraying the Liberty of their Country; and so quitting the leaking Vessel of the Commonwealth, will either fairly tack about in their private Shalop, and stand in with the next Shore of safety, or by striking Sail, come under the Lee of the Conqueror, or strike into the assistance of him, in hope to have a share of the Plunder.  
Besides, in the Multitude of Councillors (if there happen any notable miscarriages of State) there is safety to themselves. 
In Miscarriages, the Authors difficultly known.  It being difficult to fix it upon any one single person, every one shrouding himself in the complex Act of the whole: So that though they singly put in for the glory of prosperous Achievements; yet in unfortunate or unlucky Councils and Actions, they screen themselves under the majority of Votes; which because they always may do, it must necessarily make some more Supine, and less Vigilant over the Public. It is in these muddy Pools of Commonwealths, the devouring Otters may safelier lodge; here the gliding slippery Eel finds Covert, the Horseleeches abound, the Water-rats lodge in their Banks, and the Uliginous parts swarm with Frogs and Toads, every one preying upon other. Here the Cockatrice breeds, and the fiery Basilisks, as well as Lizards and Newts. afric is not more fruitful of Monsters than they of Harpies. This is the common Sewer that receives all the sludg and filth of People; the hopes and expectation of Liberty alluring all.  
As to the People's living freer from oppression in a Republic, 
Great Injustice and Oppression in Commonwealths.  than under Monarchy, it is evidently found the contrary; as I shall make it appear in the Chapter of Monarchy: And there is strong reason for it, since in this form, these Lords the States, will be continually striving to enlarge, not only their Power but their Riches; and the more they increase in either, the more must the common and middle ranked Men be oppressed and exhausted.  
It hath been from the insolence, oppressing and engrossing of Estates by the Governing Party, that the Th●rians changed their 
(p) Polit. lib. 5. c. 6.  Aristocracy to Democracy, that the Messeniac War was occasioned, that the Revolutions were at Lygdamus in the Isle of Nexos, Maffilia, Istria, Heraclea and Enidus. So the Philosopher says, That the unjust Judgements, or unusual Severities, exercised by the revengeful temper of the Factions, caused great Convulsions in the State, as he particularly instanceth in Eurition at Heraclea, and Archias at Thebes; who both being justly condemned for Adultery, yet, because in an unusual way of Contumely, they were tied to Stakes in the Market place, they out of revenge, excited their Friends to assist them, and overthrew the Oligarchy.  
Besides, when Men are thus established in Power, few can have Redress for their private injuries and wrongs, being that every complaint would but look like contempt of Authority; because the Party oppressing, being one of the Associates in Power, 
Example in our late Republicans.  and joint Rulers, he would influence the residue to vindicate him. Hence we saw in the late long Parliaments Members (yea their Officers and common Soldiers) that they were such Tyrants in their Residence and Quarters, that none durst question their outrages, lest they should be brought before Committees, for Malignancy or Delinquency. It being a characteristic note of a disaffected Person, not to resign up ones self to an absolute slavery to their imperious Commands.  
The World never knew greater oppression, than those that styled themselves Keepers (indeed Jailers) of the Liberties of England, were guilty of. It would trouble (saith a judicious 
(s) Malson's Common Interest.  Author) a public Accountant to cast up those vast Sums, and incredible Treasures, which in less than twice seven years they raised, and spent, to support the worst of all luxurious Rebellion, and to act upon the public charge and Theatre of the Nation (not Masques and Plays, as they had charged one great part of the Expenses of the Court on) but the most real and inhuman Tragedies, and those infinite in number, one of which was such as the Sun never saw, or any History could parallel.  
It would be endless to recount the Annual Revenue of the Crown, Bishops, Chapter and Cathedral Lands, besides the Money they received for the purchase of them; the constant, heavy and unheard of Assessments, free Quarter, Plunder, Sequestration, Compositions, Decimations, Excise and Customs, voluntary Contributions of Plate, Jewels, etc. Sums borrowed on the Public Faith (which some found to their cost, was but fides Punica) and almost innumerable ways and arts they had to squeeze and drain the Treasure of the Nation into their bottomless Gulf: so that the same Writer is confident, That not any three Kings of England, since William the Conqueror, to this present, were so expensive to England, as that one Tyrannical and Prodigal Parliament.  
The Nation was then, and ever will be: under any Usurping Republic, in worse than Egyptian Bondage. In every County a Committee was placed to seize the Estates and Rents of all the Loyal Subjects, with such a Tyrannical Arbitrariness, as never was known under any King's Reign; and as if that were not enough, there were added to them Bassa Major Generals, and the sucking Vermin in every Town and Hamlet, were either fireside Troopers, or some well affected Person whose Information would be believed before the best in the Parish. Every one that would not worship those Pagods, were proceeded against by some of those, or their Arbitrary High Courts of Justice, or were convened before the House of Commons, where every one of those Parliament Demarches were as absolute as the Laws of their own will could make them.  
No Person could either question their Actions or Authority, but he paid his Life or Fortune, or one of them, for his presumption: so that we saw the whole Kingdom brought into a slavery, far greater than theirs that wear Canvas Cloth and Wooden Shoes, and not only look like Ghosts, but really are so, as they made all which they either suspected, feared, or hated: All which was never to have been altered (as long as their standing Force should be true to them) to the incredible charge, oppression and impoverishment of the Subjects, Friend and Foe; though they had the Policy to lay the heaviest Burden and Load upon the Backs of their Enemies, if possible to break them; keeping the Loyal Nobility and Gentry so poor, that many of them have not been able, or ever will be, to forget the kindness of that Government, which was the ruin of them and their Families.  
I shall now pass to the last head of Rewards and Punishments, 
No just Distribution of rewards or Punishments.  and executing of Justice; none of which can be according to merit, where prevalent Faction shall sway the Balance, and open and shut the Eyes of Justice by the cunning Instruments of Partiality. It being impossible to separate Faction and Interest from this kind of Authority, so that none shall obtain any thing, but according as they shall be judged favourable or advantageous to the Interest of the ruling Faction. So that the Virtuous shall have the least share; since Virtue is not over natural to Mankind, it is like to thrive but poorly in a soil where it is not tenderly cherished, and frequently refreshed with the encouraging Dews of Reward and Benefit. But those shall have the greatest share that can best wheedle, or seem by a well-managed Flattery, to join with the topmost governing Party.  
I shall therefore give some examples of the Ingratitude of Commonwealths to the well-deserving great and brave Men, 
Ingratitude of Commonwealths.  who have served their Country, and been ill rewarded by the governing Part, or been exposed to be baited or worried by the People, instigated by Factions; or suffered base Ignominy, Banishment, or Death.  
I shall begin with Athens, the eye of Greece, and the Seat of the Muses.  
When Xerxes invaded Greece, 
The ill usage of Themistocles.  the Athenians and Peloponnesians were the most considerable States; yet the Athenians were forced to leave their City and get into their Navy, which might carry the whole People and their Power to some remote Country, where they might enjoy more secure Habitations.  
The Spartans' were unwilling to hazard a Sea-Battle near Salamis, but would have weighed Anchor, and gone to Isthmus. Themistocles did all he could to persuade the staying and joining of the Fleets there, to wait the Enemy, who would have less Sea room; whereas if they fought elsewhere, by his numbers, he would have overborne the Confederates: and when he could not prevail, but that they would weigh Anchor the next day, he sent a private message to the Persian Captains, that the Grecian Fleet intended to fly, and in the interim advised the Grecian Fleet to be in a readiness against all Events: By which Stratagem he toiled the Persian Fleet to make the Attacque with that disadvantage he desired; and the Grecians obtained a most memorable Victory. Several other great Services he did, not only in saving of Athens, but the rest of Greece from Xerxes. But when the Athenians were returned to their City, and rebuilt it after the Battle of Mycale, the People were so proud of their Exploits, that they not only endeavoured to get the Command of many Towns and Islands of the Greeks, but within their own Walls would admit no Government but merely Democratical; which being argued against by Themistocles, they laid upon him the Punishment of the Ostracism, banishing him for ten Years; before which time was expired, a new accusation was framed against him by the Lacedæmonians, that he intended to betray 
(t) Sir Walt. Raleigh b, lib. 3. cap. 8. sect. 7.  Greece to Xerxes.  
So that he was forced to fly to Artaxerxes, who afterwards would have employed him against Greece; but he decided the great Conflict betwixt thankfulness to his well-deserving Patron, and natural Affection to his own ill-deserving People, by finishing his Life with a draught of Poison.  
This Ostracism was a Sentence of Banishment writ upon an Oystershell; and the like in Sicily, writ on a Leaf, was called Petalismus. This was so often abused by exterminating Persons, not so much for Crimes, as by factious Envy made use of to remove out of the way Persons that were like to oppose the prevailing Factions, that the 
(u) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 3. c. 13.  Philosopher confesseth it had been better for the Lawgivers at the first so to have attempered the Commonwealth, that they might have had no need of such a Medicine.  
Miltiades had done the Athenians great Service at the Battle of Marathon against Darius, 
Of Ingratitude to Miltiades.  yet after by this ingrateful People, he was cast into Prison, and fined fifty Talents. Where his weak and wounded Body (having broken his Thigh at the assault against Paros) being not able to endure the one, nor his Estate the other, after a few days he ended his Life; and this was occasioned by the Envy of Xantippus, Father of Pericles. This Envy of the better sort against each other by their private Factions assisted by unthankful and witless People, brought the Athenians not many years after from a victorious and famous Commonweal, to a base Subjection and Slavery.  
I might instance in Aristides, Cimon, and many others; but shall pass to Phocyon, 
The ill Treatment of Phocyon.  who had been Forty five times (without ever suing for the place) chosen Governor of Athens. He had been in good esteem with King Philip, and by King Alexander was presented with two Hundred Talents in Silver, and the choice of one of four Cities of Asia; but refused those and other Gifts, howsoever importunately thrust upon him, resting well contented with his honest Poverty. During his Government, having given his Promise for Nicanors' safe coming to the Piraeus, to treat with the Athenians, and his safe return, about their joining with Cassander or Polypserchon, and finding that the Athenians practised with Dercillus to take Nicanor Prisoner, he was nothing pleased with such a trick of politic Dishonesty, and so did quietly permit him to departed: at which the Athenians were so incensed, that he was forced to save himself by Flight with some others, whom Polypserchon sent to Athens, where neither he nor the rest were suffered to speak for themselves, but were condemned to die by the unjust Judgement of wicked Men, by drinking Poison: which, saith Sir Walter Raleigh, 
Lib. 4. c. 3. sect. 15.  by the just Judgement of God, so infected the City of Athens, as from that day forward, it never brought forth any worthy Man resembling the Virtue of their Ancestors.  
It is not to be expressed what Honours the Athenians gave to Antigonus and Demetrius his Son, 
The Ingrati● the Athenians to 〈◊〉 metrius.  when they assisted them in their necessities, and declining Fortune; but when after his Father's defeat, and death at the Battle of Ipsus, Demetrius fled to Athens for succour, they sent their Ambassadors to meet him, with a Decree of the People, that no King should be admitted into their City, Which example I the rather mention, that the difference may be observed betwixt the generousness of Princes, and such Commonweals: for when soon after Demetrius reduced Athens to his Obedience, they being almost Famished and yielding to his Mercy, he did not take away the Lives of these unthankful Men, but gave them Food, and placed such for Magistrates as were acceptable to the People; yet a second time when Demetrius was overcome by Pyrrhus, and Lysimachus, the Athenians were as ungrateful as ever. 
The ill usage of Sophocles and Phthiodorus.   
Sophocles and Phthiodorus the Athenian Generals were condemned to Exile by the People, pretending they had taken Money for making Peace in Sicily; whereas indeed there was not any means of making War. And Alcibiades with Nicias choose rather to banish themselves, than undergo the Judgement of the incensed multitude, and adventure their Estates, Honours and Lives upon the Tongues of shameful Accusers. And though (saith the same excellent 
(w) Idem, Lib. 3. c. 8. sect. 8.  Historian) it is the part of an Honest and Valiant Man, to do what reason willeth, and not what Opinion expecteth, and to measure Honour and Dishonour by the assurance of his Conscience, rather than by the malicious Report and Censure of such; yet they are to be excused, as having before their Eyes the Injustice of the People, knowing that a wicked Sentence is infinitely worse than a wicked Fact, as being held a Precedent and Pattern, whereby Oppression beginning upon one, is extended as warrantable upon all.  
The Insolence of the Athenians having after this expedition wearied some of the principal Men of Athens; 
Ingratitude to Alcibiades.  four Hundred of them got so far the Power into their Hands, that what they had agreed upon in private, was only propounded to the People for their consent: but this lasted not long. For their Fleet and Army (which was then at Samos) revoked Alcibiades from Banishment, who had lived in Sparta (the other famous Commonweal) where in Council and good Performances, he so far excelled all the Lacedæmonians, that all their good success was ascribed to his Wit and Valour: yet there he began to be envied, and so withdrew to Persia. Being now called home, some of those four Hundred would have resigned their Government, yet the most of the Faction laboured to obtain Peace of the Lacedæmonians, desiring chief to maintain their own Authority.  
This Alcibiades won many Victories for the Athenians, and was made high Admiral; yet he was forced afterwards to banish himself, only because his Lieutenant, contrary to the express Command of Alcibiades, fight with the Enemies in his absence, had lost a great part of the Fleet.  
I shall add one Story more, and so pass to the Romans.  
The Athenians having appointed ten Captains over their Fleet, 
The ten Athenian Sea-Captains.  wherewith they beat Callicratidas the Lacedaemonian Admiral; yet six of these Captains were put to Death upon in formation that they had not rescued some Citizens, who were lost by the breaking of their Vessels by a Storm, which happened when those Captains were obliged to follow the Enemy, and two of them had like to have been shipwracked themselves: and besides, they offered in their own defence, that they left a sufficient number of Ships to have succoured those that were wracked. But one that escaped in a Meal-tub, having told the People, that those that were drowned, had charged him to desire the People to revenge their Deaths upon the Captains; this was a sufficient incentive to the People, precipitately to put them them to death. The absent Captains escaped, and when the Fury of the People was over, the Sentence against the rest was revoked too late.  
All these ingrateful usages of such great Commanders is ascribed to the violence of the People. But we may suppose, if it had not been for the Arts of such Magistrates as were Enemies to those Worthies, and envied them the Glory of their great Achievements, the People had been better Instructed. Hour it shows the tendency of such a complex Body of Magistrates and People: and though Athens had as much of the Popular Government called Democratical, as any else in Greece; yet the source of all was from the Texture of the Republic Government in general.  
I shall now pass to the Romans, 
Concerning the Roman Ingratitude.  and only single two or three of the many Examples of their Ingratitude to their deserving Chiestains, to illustrate, That Rewards were not bestowed as they ought to have been, even to such as were the greatest Preservers of their Country, and such as raised the Glory of the Roman Name to the highest pitch of Glory.  
T. Martius, 
Coriolanus.  called Coriolanus, had conquered the Volsci and Aequi; yet, under pretext that he had advised to sell Corn in time of Dearth at an higher Rate than was convenient, he was banished: Yet he took not that Revenge he might have done, in joining with the Volsci.  
Furius Camillus subdued the Falisci, 
Furius Camillus.  but was banished the City, upon a Suggestion of some Inequality of dividing the Spoil, and retired to ARdaea; from whence (when the Gauls under Brennus had got all Rome but the Capitol) he, forgetting the Ingratitude of his Country, drew an Army together, with which he fell upon the dispersed Gauls, and so saved his Country.  
The two Scipio's strangely enlarged the Roman Empire, 
The Two Scipio's  by conquering every place where they were employed. Publius Scipio, the elder Brother, overthrew Hannibal, and subjected the whole State of Carthage; by which he deservedly had the Style of Africanus, as his Brother had that of Asiaticus, by conquering the Kingdom of Macedon, and giving Laws to all Greece, and other Territories in Asia.  
Concerning the elder, the Senate was unwilling he should carry the War into afric: But the People were earnest for it. 
Concerning Publius Scipio, the elder Brother.  Upon which the Learned 
(x) Sir Walter Raleigh, l. 5. c. 3. sect. 18.  Historian and Statesman observes, That it is often found in Councils of State, that the busy and obstinate Heads of a few do carry all the rest, and many times Men make a surrender of their own Judgements to the Wisdom that hath gotten itself a Name, by giving happy Directions in Troubles bypast; therefore he that reposeth himself upon the Advice of many, shall often find himself deceived: The Counsel of the Many being wholly directed by the Empire of a Few, that oversway the rest. For here Q. Fabius was accounted the Oracle of his time; for his wary Nature suited well with the Business that fell out in the chief of his Employment; therefore others adhered to him, that was grown old in following one Course, from which they would not shift as the change of Times required. But the People (who though they could not well advise and deliberate, yet could well apprehend) embraced the needful Motion of Scipio, and furnished him with all Supplies and Furtherance they could.  
From hence I may note the Inconvenience of this Government, wherein sometimes the Senators shall be led by one, or some few, one way, and then by others, and sometimes the People shall overrule the Votes of the Senate: For though this may be fortunate at some times, yet at others it may be as fatal.  
The great Success of Scipio was celebrated with that excess of Joy, and deservedly, as Rome perhaps never showed the like; and his Brother L. Scipio's Triumph was not much less than it. Yet these two so famous Brothers afterwards were called, one after another, by two Tribunes of the People, to Judgement, in probability by the instigation of some of the Faction of the Senate against them.  
The African could not endure that such unworthy Men should question him of purloining from the common Treasure, or of being hired by Antiochus to make an ill Bargain for his Country: When therefore the Day of Answer came, he appeared before the Tribunes, not humbled as one accused, but followed by a great Train of his Friends and Clients, with which he passed through the midst of the Assembly; and having Audience, told the People, That upon the same day of the Year he fought a great Battle against Hannibal, and finished the Punic War by a signal Victory: In memory of which, he thought it no fit Season to brabble at the Law, but intended to visit the Capitol, and there give Thanks to Jupiter, and the rest of the Gods, by whose Grace, both on that day, and at other times, he had well and happily discharged the most weighty Business of the Commonweal; and that if from the seventeenth Year of his Life, until he now grew old, the Honourable Places by them conferred on him, had prevented the Capacity of his Age, and yet his Deserts had exceeded the Greatness of those Honourable Places, that then they would pray, That the Princes and Great ones of the City might still be like to him. So all followed him, except the Tribunes, and their Slaves, and one of the Criers, by whom ridiculously they cited him to Judgement, until for very shame (as not knowing what else to do) they granted him, unrequested, a longer Day.  
But after, when he perceived that the Tribunes would not let fall the Suit, he willingly withdrew from that unthankful Rome, that could suffer him to undergo such Indignities, and so spent the rest of his time at Linternum. 
Concerning Lucius Scipio, the younger Brother.   
The same Tribunes proceeded more sharply with his Brother Lucius Scipio the Asiatic (whose wise Conduct and Valour had subjected Greece and Macedonia to the Roman Yoke, and extended their Empire over those rich Countries). They propounded a Decree unto the People touching Money received of Antiochus, not brought into the Common Treasury; that the Senate should give Charge unto one of the Praetors to inquire and Judicially determine thereof: And Matters were so carried against him, that he was condemned in a Sum of Money far greater than his Ability; and for nonpayment, his Body should have been laid up in Prison; but he was freed from the Rigour of this by Gracchus the Tribune: and his Estate being confiscated, when there neither appeared any Sign of his being beholden to Antiochus, nor there was found so much as he was condemned to pay; then fell his Accusers, and all whose Hands had been against him, into the Indignation of the People.  
It is observed, That Cato the elder (who had been his Treasurer) was a Promoter of this. A Man, saith Sir Walter Raleigh, of great, but not perfect Virtue; Temperate, Valiant, and of singular Industry; Frugal of the Public, and of his own; who though not to be corrupted with Bribes, yet was unmerciful and unconscionable in increasing his own Wealth, by such means as the Laws did permit. Ambition was his Vice, which being joined with Envy, troubled both himself, and the whole City: And some writ, That Fabius Maximus, out of some private displeasure, countenanced these Proceed.  
From these and other Examples it may well be noted, 
Summary of the Reman Discords.  how this famous Commonweal was pestered with Faction; the want of sufficient Employment were Sparks that helped the kindling of the Fire of them, which now began to appear, and first caught hold of those great Worthies, to whose Valour and Conduct Rome was so indebted. But these factious Contentions did not long while contain themselves within heat of Words and cunning Practice: for when the Art of Leading the Multitude into such quarrelsome Business, grew to perfection, they that found themselves overmatched by their Adversaries, at this kind of Weapon, began to make opposition, first with Clubs and Stones, afterward with Swords, and, finally, proceeded from Frays and Murders in the Streets, to Battles in the Fields.  
During the whole time of their Commonwealth, there were Heart-burnings betwixt the Plebs, or ordinary Rank of People, and the Patres Conscripti Patricii, or Senatorian Order: Those never owning themselves to be the Delegates of the People, but an Order of themselves, that endeavoured to keep the Government in themselves, taking State and Authority upon them, using a sort of Arbitrary Government, endeavouring to win a great Power over the People, decreeing, That the Consuls provide that the Commonweal receive no detriment. On the other hand, the People were restless, by Representatives to get a share in the Government, and the Senate as stoutly opposed such Encroachments and Innovations, (these kind of Emulations being the inseparable Diseases of all Commonwealths;) so that in one of the Mutinies the whole Commonalty forsook the City, and 
(y) Liv. lib. 2.  embodied upon Mount Aventine, till they were gratified, as I have before hinted, in the Tribuni Plebis, who were chosen by them to look after their Concerns in all Debates, and who exercised a very imperious Power sometimes. Yet this did not suffice; but afterwards they more violently contended to have the Choice of one of the Consuls: and the Fury of the People was so great, that the Senators durst not come to the House; and this Feud was so durable, that it caused a five-years Anarchy, and at last the Senate was forced to yield to the People's Importunities.  
After the death of C. Gracchus, and Saturnius, a Popular Man, who by the Senate was put out of the way; it was not long  Marius, a famous Captain of theirs, was so condemned, who, by force of Arms, returned to the City, and murdered all the principal Senators; which giving unto Sylla (who prospered therein) opportunity to make himself absolute Lord of Rome, taught Caesar (a Man of higher Spirit) to affect and obtain the like Sovereign Power, who by the like decree of the Senate, was provoked.  
If all that I have hitherto mentioned, be not sufficient to put a People out of love with this way of Government, they may hug their Chains and Fetters as long as they please, for me.  
I know these People magnify the wise contrivances of the State of Venice, 
Concerning three Modern Commonwealths.  the United Provinces, and Switzerland. But they may consider, That the first is an Optimacy mixed with a restrained and elective Monarchy; and they all are more beholden to the Situation of their Countries, and the interest their Neighbours have (lest they should fall into the hands of others) than for any excellency of their Constitution, why they should have any likelihood of duration.  
The Prince of Orange's Statholdership, being Hereditary in the Family, contributes something to the suppressing of any potent Faction; yet none knows, but in process of time, Factions may arise amongst them, and then the World will see them molder, as other such Commonwealths (sometimes as flourishing as they;) and then they will either be made a prey to their Neighbours, or submit to a Monarch of their own. However it is experimentally known, That in no other State, the Subjects pay so much for their protection; and that from their first Revolt, they have been very few years without being engaged in chargeable Wars.   

CHAP. IX. Of Monarchical Government, and the Preference of it before other Forms.  
IN the commendation of Monarchy, all Authors are so copious, that it is more difficult to order and compose with Beauty, the Jewels of the Crown, than to amass and heap them. That it hath been the most Ancient and Primitive Government of the World, we have the Universal suffrage and Testimony of all the preserved Records of remotest Ages; Royal Authority and King's being coaeval with what ever Monuments we find of the Origin of Nations.  
The Writings of Moses (much ancienter than any other Historian, 
The Antiquity of Monarchy illustrated in Adam's Sovereignty.  and of more Authority) evidently prove the Sovereignty of Adam and Noah: Whence St. Chrysostom well observes, That at the Creation, God made one Man, not many; to intimate to us, That he did design Monarchy, not Aristocracy or Democracy. For it cannot be doubted, but that the Posterity of Adam, during his life, were his Subjects, both by the Law of God and Nature: The Charter of God Almighty giving to Adam, Dominion over all the inferior Creation; and to Noah, over every living Creature. Hence the 
(a) Ovid. Metam.  Poet speaking of the Origin of things, owns his Dominion over the Creatures.  
Sanctius his Animal, mentisque capacius altae,  
Deerat adhuc, & quod dominari in caetera posset.  
Natus homo est—  
Indeed it were absurd and irrational to believe, that God who had made the Lion King of the four footed Beasts, the Eagle Sovereign of the feathered Fowl, and the Whale over the Fishes; should leave the most glorious part of the Creation, under the confusion of Anarchy or Parity.  
Therefore 
(b) Natura commenta est Reges, quod ex aliis animantibus, & Apibus praesertim, licet dignoscere.  Seneca elegantly, 
Monarchical Government most natural.  and according to his manner, rightly observes, that Nature itself points out Kings, as we may know in several living Creatures, especially in Bees: and 
(c) Virgil. Georg.  Virgil, before him, hath given us a curious description of the Obedience Bees pay to their King: 
Praeterea Regem non sic Aegyptus, & ingens  
Lydia, nec Populi Parthorum, aut Medus Hydaspes,  
Observant, Rege incolumi, mens omnibus una est;  
Amisso, rupere fidem— Illum admirantur, & omnes  
Circumstant fremitu denso, stipantque frequentes;  
Et saepe attollunt humeris, & corpora bello  
Objectant—   
So there may be observed a Dux ipse Gregis, amongst all brute Creatures.  
It is from Paternal Power, That many Authors deduce the naturalness of Monarchy, which was first exercised in Families, Hordes and Septs, as I have 
(d) Cap. 2.  elsewhere cleared: therefore the Philosopher 
(e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 6. c. 12.  sets it down as a Fundamental Truth, That that which begets commands, by reason of his tender Love and older Age, which is a kind of Kingly Government. The sense of which is, That the Paternal Government hath a resemblance to Monarchical Rule; and that it was according to the order of Nature, that the Elder should Rule, as he confirms by the Oracle and Authority of 
(f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Homer, who making Jupiter Sovereign, calls him Father of Men and Gods; and the great Badge of Sovereignty, to have Power of Life and Death, is owned by the 
(g) Pater vitae necisque potestatem habebat. in filios. Cicero.  Orator, in his time, to remain, when he saith, The Father had the Power of Life and Death over his Children. So that what Brutus, the first Consul, did in beheading his two Sons, in not taken by most to be done qua Consul, but as Parent; for that the Consuls never had any Regal Power without leave of the People.  
If we consider the Scope of 
(h) Numb. 11.  Moses' Expostulation with God Almighty; Why layest thou the burden of all this People upon me? Have I conceived all this People? Have I begotten them?] must from hence infer, That if He had been their common Parent, he ought to have had the Charge and Government of them; so natural seems the Connection betwixt Fatherly Authority and Filial Obedience: and that this was an Original Truth, the Philosopher citys 
(i) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Odyss. 11.  Homer, who saith, That every Father, to his Children and his Wives, giveth Laws.  
This kind of Power seems to be confirmed in Scripture, concerning Cain, Abraham sacrificing Isaac, Thamar and Jephtha. But in after times, when Fathers abused that Authority, it was judged expedient to deprive them of it, and place it in the hands of the more public Father, the King.  
Having thus cleared the point, 
The Antiquity of Monarchy from History and Testimony.  That Monarchy is according to the Institution of Nature. I come now to speak of the Antiquity of it. 
(k) Vide Stillingfleet 's Origines Sacrae.  Sanconiathan, of greater Antiquity than any Greek Historian, gives a large account of the Phoenician Monarchy; the like Manetho gives of the Egyptian, and the true Berosus of the Babylonian. So 
* Polit. lib. 5. c. 11.  Aristotle speaks of the long Duration of the Molossiac Kingdom, which began in Pyrrhus' Son of Achilles, and, according to 
(l) De Antiquis Familiis Regum.  Reinerus, lasted nine Hundred and Fifty years; and the Lacedaemonian, according to Plutarch, Eusebius and others, continued near upon as long.  
The Philosopher 
(m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. L. 1. c. 1.  advanceth the Origin of Kingly Government, as high as the Heathen Religion or Philosophy could carry him, when he saith, That the very Heathen Deities were under this Form and Regimen: So what Herodotus saith of the Egyptians, may as truly be said of all other Nations, That they could not live without Kings. So Isocrates saith, Before Democracy and Oligarchy, the barbarous Nations and Cities of Greece obeyed Kings. Therefore the Philosopher 
(n) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  saith, At first Kings governed Cities, and now Nations. So Sallust 
(o) In terris nomen Imperii primum fuit.  saith, The name of Empire was first known in the World; and Justin 
(p) Principio rerum Nationumque omnium imperium penes Reges erat. Lib. 1.  most expressly, In the beginning of all things and Nations, the Power and Government was solely and absolutely in Kings. So 
(q) Certum est omnes Antiquas Gentes Regibus paruisse. Lib. 3. de LL.  Cicero saith, That it is certain that all Ancient Nations did obey Kings. If we consult Homer, Plato, Lucretius, Diodorus Siculus, lib. 2. Josephus lib. 4. c. 1. or any Historian, Greek or Latin, we shall find no Tract of Time, nor Society of Men, without Kingly Government.  
The first Popular State we read of, 
The first Commonwealths.  is that of Athens, after the Reign of Erixias Anno Mundi 3275. and after that several other Cities of Greece, as Sparta, Corinth, etc. followed their examples, expelling their Kings, and in their Rooms erected little Commonwealths, but great Tyrannies, being in a continual broil, either among themselves, about their Magistrates, or with their Neighbours for Pre-eminence, till the time of Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Monarchy, when the Country returned to their pristin Government, and might so have continued, if the Roman Arms and Ambition had not overthrown it.  
As to Rome itself, it was two Hundred and Fifty Years under Kings; and Kingly Government was found under Lavinius, when the Trojans came from that little Kingdom of Pergamus. Therefore 
(r) Vrbem Romam a principio Reges habucre. 1. Annal.  Tacitus tells us, That the City of Rome, from the beginning, had Kings to govern it. Their Commonwealth began upon the Regifugium: So that (saith a Judicious 
(s) Dr. Nals●n's Common Interest.  Author) for three Thousand Years Monarchy possessed an Universal and Uninterrupted Empire over all the Affairs of the Universe; so that the Sun, the glorious Monarch of the day, does not, in all his Travels round the earthly Globe, behold any spot of Ground inhabited by any thing but Brutes, where Monarchy, either is not at present, or hath not been the Ancient Original and fundamental way of Government.  
From the consideration of this Naturalness of Monarchy, 
Author's deducing Monarchy from a Divine Original.  and the Venerable Antiquity of it, we may conclude the reason why the best and Ancientest Writers have adorned it with such Eulogiums, deducing its Original from the Divine Being. So Hesiod 
(t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Theog. v. 91.  saith, Kings are from Jove; and 
(v) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hymn. in Jovem.  Callimachus adds, that none are so Divine as they: So in Homer 
(w) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ihad. 6. v. 277.  as well as in Hesiod, they are styled, nourished of God, and born of God; not as deriving their Pedigrees, but Kingly Honours from Jove, as Eustachius notes; and from Homer's making the Sceptre of Agamemnon to be the Gift of Jove (though a late 
(x) Absolute Power, p. 63.  Author contemptuously compares it to a Constable's Staff) He 
(y) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Iliad. 4. v. 738.  saith, The King hath both his Sceptre and Jurisdiction from God: Of which the curious Reader may see more Authorities in the learned Tract of Archbishop usher's Power of Princes.  

(z) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Plato, according to Synesius de Regno, makes the Regal Office to be a Divine Good among Men; and a King to be as it were, a God among Men: And 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. In Politico.  Diotogenes the Pythagorean saith, that God hath given him Dominion.  
Others have styled them Gods, which a late 
(b) Absolute Power, p. 66.  Author saith, may be allowed for want of a better in Hobs' State of Ignorance and Atheism, and would have him have the Epithet of Optimus as well as Maximus. Thus some take a Liberty to ridicule all things most Sacred and Venerable: But I shall have occasion to inquire into such men's Principles afterwards, and at present shall only say, That no Man's Hyperbole, or Expression, is further to be understood, than as it makes the Kingly Original from God, and makes Kings his Viceroys upon Earth. Therefore I shall not balk such Authorities.  

(c) 2. de LL.  Plato affirms Monarchy to be the most uncompounded, the Mother of all Governments, and that a King is to be a God amongst Men; and a King is a living Image of God, saith the 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Menander.  Poet. So the Grecian Orator saith, God from Heaven 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, did send the Regal Power unto the Earth.  

(e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Apud Stob. Ser●. 46.  Diotogenes yet raiseth the Character higher, according to the Sovereignties of his Age; That the King, having a Power uncontrollable, and being himself a Living Law, is the Figure or Adumbration of God among Men: And in 
(f) Idem, 121.  another place, Of all things which are most honourable, the Best, indeed, is God; but on Earth, and amongst Men, the King. 
(g) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. c. 37.  So Agapetus observes, That although the King in the Nature of his Body be of the same Mould with every other Man; yet in respect of the Eminence of his Dignity, he is like unto God over all, whose Image he beareth, and by him holdeth that Power which he hath over all Men.  
Hence it was, that the Roman Emperors (not to make Researches further) in their 
(h) Augustin 's Numismata per totum.  Coins used some Emblems and Impressions proper to their Gods, or their Religion; inferring, That they derived their Character from them. So in the Coins of Julius Caesar we find the Image of Venus, from whom he deduced his Extraction. So we find the Goddess Victory, the Image of Mars, and the Caduceus often, and Ensigns of the High Priest; and not only in his, but in many other Emperor's Coins, the Thunderbolt, to denote, they had the same Power upon Earth, that their Jupiter had in Heaven: according to that of the Poet, Jupiter in coelis, Caesar regit omnia terris.  
After that Julius Caesar was in Divos relatus, we find a Star over his Head, or himself sitting in the Habit of a God, holding in his Hand a Cornucopia ascribed to the Genii and Hero's, and in his Lefthand holding the Goddess Victory.  
So in one of Augustus' Coins, we find Victory sitting upon a Celestial Globe, holding a Scarf in a Circular Figure in its Hand, denoting Eternity.  
In Otho's Coin Jupiter is placed in a Chair, with a Spear in his Hand, with the Circumscription, Jovis Custos, Jupiter Custos. For it appears out of the Verses of Ennius, and out of Hyginus and Apuleius, that in the Nominative Case Jovis was used for Jupiter. So in a Coin of Titus the Sella Jovis and Thunderbolt are to be found. And Trajan holds a Thunderbolt and Spear, and is Crowned by the Goddess Victory; and in another, Jupiter with his Thunderbolt in his Hand is shrouding Trajan under his Pallium, according to which, 
(i) Pan●gy.  Pliny saith of him, Te dedit qui erga omne hominum genus vice tua fungeris. So in the same Trajan and Hadrian's Coins, the Head of the Sun is figured with a radiated Crown, as representing them; of which Custom the Tabulae Heliacae may be consulted: and although Chrysologus reprehends it as a proud affectation in the Persian Kings, that with radiated Heads they place themselves in the figure of the Sun, or are effeminate into that of the Moon, or assume the form of Stars; yet we may suppose such Impresses were to testify to the People from whence they derived their Origination, or whose Tutelarship they were under.  
For after Christianity obtained, Constantine wore in his great Ensign called the Labarum, the Figure of the Cross, and the Letters which appeared to him in the Air, with the Circumscription, sub hoc signo vinces. So 
(k) Octavius Strada de Imp. Rom. p. 294, 338.  Theophylact and Manuel Comnenius, in their Medals, have Christ figured putting a Garland upon their Heads.  
Hence a grave 
(l) Principis potestas publi●t est in terris 〈…〉 Majest 〈…〉. Carisburiensis. l. 4. c. 1.  Author saith, The Prince's Public Power in Earth is a kind of Image of the Divine Majesty; in the same sense with that of 
(m) Come in 13. Rom.  St. Ambrose, Princes for the correcting of Vice, and prohibiting of Evil, are erected of God, having his Image, that the People may be under One.  
We Christians have the Authority of Holy Scripture, That by God Kings reign, and that they are his Anointed. So Daniel saith to Nabuchadnezzar, The God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom; and to Cyrus, God gave to Nabuchadnezzar thy father a kingdom.  
So 
(n) Cujus jussu homines nascuntur, hujus jussa & Reges conslimuntur. Lib. 5. c. 24.  Irenaeus affirms, That by whose Command they are born Men, by his Command likewise they are ordained Kings. Agreeable to which, is that of 
(o) Apolog. cap. 31. Ind est Imperator, unde homo antequam Imperator; inde porestas illi, und & spiritus.  Tertullian, Thence is the Emperor, whence he became Man before he was Emperor; thence he hath his Authority, from whence he hath his Breath.  
A late 
(p) Absolute Power, p. 46.  Author scornfully confronts the Sentiments of so many Learned and Judicious Persons, with that of Aratus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, That all men are the Offspring of the Deity. Which if we allow in his sense, then Pierce Ploughman is of as good Divine Authority as any Crowned Heads. Whereas St. Paul's Application makes it to be meant quite another way, viz. of the Creation of Man by God Almighty. But I shall pass to other Remarks.  
The Philosopher makes Four kinds of Kingly Government. 
Aristotle's Division of Kingly Government.  First, That of Sparta, where there were two Kings of two Royal Families, the one a Check upon another: And this was, he saith, 
(q) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 3. c. 14.  a Generalship only of an Army; for they had not the Power of Life and Death, but in Expeditions of War; as he instanceth in Agamemnon, whom Homer makes patiently to endure the Reproaches of the Great Men in the Assemblies. For, he affirms, That in Times of Peace the Power of Life and Death was in the Senate and the Ephori. So in the Roman Common-weal, the General's having the Style of Praetores and Imperatores, when the Republic was changed by Julius Caesar, he retained the Military Name of Imperator, which the Grecians rendered King: And thence it is that Ammianus saith, That Valentinian was the first that changed the Roman Empire from a Principality to a Kingdom. But to return from this Digression: This Laconic Commonwealth had Hereditary Kings, with a Power in War and Divine things, limited by Law: Of which the Curious may read Plutarc. de Lycurgo, and Xenophon de Republica Lacedaemoniae, and 
(r) Pag. 384.  Giphanii Comment. in Arist. Polit.  
The second kind of Kingly Government, he calls that which was amongst the Barbarous (for such the Grecians styled all Nations that were none of their Country); and this, he saith, had a Power equal to the Tyrannical, yet was legitimate, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  and according to the Use of the Country; for that the Barbarous Nations were more prone to Servitude than the Grecians; and the asiatics endured with less trouble than the Europeans, that Command which he calls Absolute, as of Masters over Servants. This he calls in reality, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Tyrannical Government; but Kingly also, in that it is firm, legitimate, and according to the Use of the Country. For that, he 
(s) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 3. cap. 10. H●insii.  saith, Citizens or Subjects defend Kings, but Guards of Strangers are employed by Tyrants: Kings commanding lawfully, over the willing; and Tyrants, over the unwilling, and without Rules of Law.  
The third kind he calls that which among the Grecians was styled the Aesmynetian: And this, he 
(t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Optiva tyrannis, i. suffragio 〈◊〉.  saith, was an Elective Tyranny, either perpetual for Life, or for a time. And this, because it was a Command over the Willing (such Persons being elected) he styles a Kingly Government, and instanceth in the Mitylenians, who chose Pittacus to be their King, against Alcaeus and Antimenides, who were banished. Such 
(u) Halicarnass●us, lib. 5.  Dionysius makes the Roman Dictator's: Such the Cumaeni, by an honester Name styled their Tyrants; and such were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Athens. Such a Kingdom Timolio held at Syracuse, which he, as well as Pittacus, spontaneously resigned, and did not convert into a Tyranny, as Dionysius did; or as Sylla and Julius Caesar did at Rome, and Aratus at Sicyon, according to the 
(w) Lib. 3. de Officiis.  Orator.  
The last kind he calls 
(x) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 3. Polit. c. 10. Heinsii.  Heroic, because it was used in the Heroic Ages, and had three Characteristics of true Kingly Government; That it was a Power exercised over the Willing, Fatherly, and Legitimate. For, he saith, the first Kings, either for the Benefits they conferred on the Multitude, by Invention of Arts, Conduct in War, or leading them out in Colonies, or supplying them with Lands, governing those who lonies, or supplying them with Lands, governing those who freely yielded to obey, were in that esteem, and had that Power and Authority which was requisite.  
These had command in War, and in things sacred, where there were no Priests, and did determine Causes; and all these things, some Kings administered without Oath; others were sworn to the observation of them, by the lifting up the Sceptre: and 
(y) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  concludes that in ancient times Kings had Rule and were Lords over all affairs of the City, and those at home and abroad. From whence and from what the Philosopher delivered in the beginning of this work and elsewhere, 
(z) Comm●nt. in lib. 1. Polit. initic.  Giphanius with Thucydides concludes, That these Hereditary Kings had such a Power as was restrained by certain Laws, and they did not Reign as they listed, and at their Pleasure; but by certain Prescripts of Laws, such, we may presume, as they ordained.  
This was that Monarchy which was known in the first Ages of the World. All People in all Ages, and all places having by constant Experience found it most conducive to their Happiness, and well-being. For had there been any other form, under which Mankind could have rationally promised themselves more, or more certain Happiness than under this; all humane care would long e'er this have hit on it, and there would have been an universal Regifugium.  
But supposing we should quit these Topics of Monarchy, 
Other commendable Qualifications of Monarchy.  being according to the Law of Nature, and that it is venerably for its Antiquity; there are other Commodities wherein it excels other Forms.  
As first that it is freest from the Canker of Faction, which corrodes and consumes all other Governments. Hence the most judicious 
(a) Tacitus, 1. Annal.  Historian tells us what Asinius Gallus replied to Tiberius, That the Body of the Empire is one, and so is to be governed by one Soul; and in 
(b) Arduum sape eodem loci potentiam & concordiam esse. Idem.  another place tells us how difficult it is to find Concord among Equals in Power, especially where not only, (as at Sparta) there were two races of Kings governing at once, but as many of them as there were Senators, or Magistrates, which by Bands and Confederacies, are restlessly making Parties against each other, whereby the Administration rowls from one Faction to another: whereas Kingly Government is uniform and equal in itself; and when by Factions, Commonweals have been brought almost to utter ruin, a 
(c) Omnem potestatem ad unum conferri pacis interfuit. Tacitus, 1. Histor.  single Persons Conduct hath restored all. As 
(d) Perculsum undique ordinavit Imperii corpus, quod ita haud dubie nunquam coire & consentire potuisset, nisi unius Praesidis nutu quasi anima & ment regeretur. Lib. 4. c. 3.  Florus writes of Augustus Caesar, that he ordered the shaken and distracted Body of the Empire, which without doubt could never have been united in one Form again, unless by the Direction of one Precedent, as a Soul and Spirit: Even so we experienced in his late majesty's admirable, yea miraculous Retauration, which effected as great Blessings to these Islands, as that of Augustus to the Roman Empire.  
Besides, it is a strong Argument for the Preference of Monarchical Government to all sorts of Republics, that in all popular States, we find all great affairs managed by some one leading Man, who by the dexterity of his Address, Power of his Eloquence, or the Strength of his Arguments, induceth so many as are necessary to join with him to effect them, unless when by contrary renitency they are dissolved into Faction.  
So when the Senate of Rome was in a most critical Debate, An delenda esset Carthago? Cato showing them the Grapes which a few Years before grew there, illustrated from thence the dangerous vicinity of so potent and opulent a State, as had contended with them for the universal Empire, and wanted only the skill of an uti Victoria, to have effected it. By which he cooled the warm Debates of the Senate, and brought them to an affirmative Determination. So Cicero often prevailed, so Demosthenes, and so the Daemagogues in popular States, who are 
(e) Nalson's Common Interest.  pro tempore Monarches; the very head of every Faction in a Republic being a King in Disguise, or a Tyrant in the dress of a Private Man.  
The single Government being freed from the prime Cause of all intestine decay, viz. Faction: It necessarily follows that it must be of longer Duration, 
Monarchy more durable.  as being built upon stronger and firmer Foundations than any other Model. Ambitions, Aemulations, Hostile Parities, popular Insolences, Senatorian Tyranny, tumultuous Elections, and infinite causes of Discords are the inseparable Associates, and close Conomitants of all other Forms. But in Monarchy, hereditary Succession is as a Golden Chain, that holds fast together and close every part of the Royal Contexture in itself, and leaves no Chasms, Chinks, or Ruptures, whereby any dissolving cause can be admitted entrance to subvert or disjoint the Frame.  
I have before spoke of this Head, and shall only add, that as Kingly Government was the first; so when Commonwealths were introduced with much struggling, they kept Life a while in Greece and Rome; but have been reduced to Monarchy again about one Thousand seven Hundred Years since.  
Tacitus after his short way tells us, 
Vrbem Romam a principio Reges habuere. Libertatem & consulatum L. Brutus instituit. Dictaturae ad tempus sumebantur, neque Decemviralis Potestas ultra biennium, neque Tribunorum militum Consulare jus diu valuit. Non Cinnae, non Syllae longa dominatio; & Pompeii, Crassique potentia cito in Caesarem; Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere, qui cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine Principis sub Imperium accepit. Tacit. l. 1. Annal. Monarchy hath no Private Ends.  that Rome had Kings first; that L. Brutus appointed Liberty and Consulship; Dictatorship was sometimes assumed; the Decemvirate lasted not alive two Years; nor did the Consular right of the Tribunes of the People long continue; nor was the command of Cinna or Sylla durable; and the power of Pompey and Crassus devolved upon Caesar, as the Arms of Anthony did upon Augustus, who received all (being weakened, wearied, tired out, or spent with civil Discords) under the Empire of a Prince. From whose very Name the title of semper Augustus, and Caesar is continued to this day, which duration in no Commonwealth can be found. Therefore every one that desires to live under an uniform, unchangeable, and durable Government, must prise and value Monarchy most.  
It is furthermore the peculiar Excellency of Monarchy, that it hath no separate or distinct Interests, or Designs, from the Good of the Public; the End of all just Empire being the Safety and Profit of the Subjects, saith a 
(f) Finis justi Imperii, utilitas obedientium & salus. Ammianus, lib. 30.  Judicious Historian. For a King, neither in time of Peace or War, can ever have any Good or Evil befall him, wherein his Subjects have not their share. It is only in Monarchy where Paternal and Conjugal Love are in the highest degree and relation, betwixt the Prince and his People; the 
(g) Nalson's Common Interest, p. 111.  Blessings of Happiness, or the Miseries of Infelicity, are stowed in the same Bottom. So that a Monarch consulting the Safety, Honour, Welfare, Peace, and Prosperity of his People, doth at the same time consult his own Interest in every one of them; and this must of necessity oblige him to act strenuously and constantly in all his Endeavours for the attainment of those Ends. This will induce him to exert all his Royal Virtues, of Justice, Fortitude, etc. will cause him to be watchful to suppress the Turbulent and Factious, who would discompose the happy Harmony at home, and be vigilant against the Attempts of Foreign Powers. For the State can neither sink by Intestine Discords, or fall by Foreign force, but he must be ruined with it, and so out of the natural Tenderness, care and concern for the Safety, Peace, and Happiness of himself and People, he must be truly a Father of his Country; whereas the Members or Representatives of a Republic, are at best but Guardians (and greedy ones, as we of late experienced) who generally commit great Wastes. 
Objection, That Monarchy is apt to turn to Tyranny.   
The common objection, perpetually in the Mouths of Democratick Factious People, is that Monarchy is apt to degenerate into Tyranny, according to that of the 
(h) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 5. Polit. c. 10.  Philosopher; who, having recounted the external and intrinsic causes of the decay of other forms of Governments, saith, that the dissolution of Kingdoms happens rarely from external Causes, and so they are more durable; but it may happen from two intrinsic ones, viz. the Dissension of those of the Royal Family, or Princes, or when Kings govern something Tyrannically.  
But this is only true where Monarchy is Absolute, Arbitrary, and Unbounded; which in the English Monarchy is much otherwise. For though the Kings of England (where they have not precluded themselves by their gracious Condescensions and Grants to their People) are not limited by any other Power than their own Royal Pleasure: Yet their Concessions have been so many, and form into Laws (as Measures and Standards of Government) that they are Mounds and Boundaries, which the Monarchy hath no less Prudently than Indulgently been pleased to give itself, thereby to ease the Subject of any just occasion of Fears or Jealousies (which receive their Birth from the formidable redundancy of their absolute Power) and by this means the Government is secured from the falling intoan Arbitrary and Tyrannical way of Rulers, and the Minds of the Subjects freed from the dreadful apprehension of Slavery. And as by this Incomparable method of goodness, and generosity in our Princes, the Subjects of all conditions are the more powerfully obliged to all dutiful Allegiance to their temperate Government; so the Government itself is thereby rendered more capable of effectually answering all the Ends and Intentions of Society.  
When it is debated whether Monarchy or Tyranny be the most convenient Government; the true Sense of it is this, 
Comparison betwixt a King and Tyrant.  Whether the People shall live more happily when the supreme Power is in one, and the Person by the Laws of the Country is known, whereby no Room is left for Division and Faction, concerning that single Sovereign? Or, When one Man, being more active and crafty than his Fellows, who ought to have an equal share in the Authority, raises a Faction upon some plausible pretences, and under the colour of serving his Confederated Party, persuades them to be commanded by him, and so exercises the supreme Power in an Illegal way: which as is compassed by engaging the People in misery, under colour of making them more happy; so it must be kept up by as bad Arts, and an Army must be maintained to make good by force what Law cannot justify.  
In this manner as the question is to be stated betwixt a Lawful King and Tyrant. So if it be enquired whether Monarchy or Aristocracy be better; it is not whether a bad King be better than a good Commonwealth consisting of the Optimacy: but the Comparison ought to be betwixt a good King, and a good Aristocracy, or betwixt them when both bad.  
First, 
Comparison betwixt a King and a Commonwealth.  Therefore it is to be considered, That a People may easilier have a good King, than a good Nobility (taking Good) in a Political Sense, as providing for the People's Happiness;) because the King's Interest is the same with that of the People's, which is a strong State-security: whereas the Commonwealth of Greece, affords us many Examples of Persons selling their Country, and putting their great Councils upon ill attempts, and labouring with their utmost cunning, to frustrate good Designs; because their Dependence upon a Foreign State or Kingdom, was worth much more unto them, than they could hope to gain by honest Service to their Country.  
Supposing both the King and Optimacy be willing to promote the People's Happiness; yet he is more able to compass that End, by reason he hath a more United Power, and the Execution of all Designs depends upon a single resolve; and therefore may be managed with a certain closeness and all convenient swiftness, so that good Councils shall be first discovered in their effects: Whereas a great Body move slowly, and most times the opportunity of Doing is gone by, while they are but half way in their deliberation.  
Besides, 
More Inconveniences under Commonwealths, than under Kings, cateris paribus.  as there are many Advantages peculiar to Monarchy (as in these three Chapters I hope I have evinced) so there is not one Inconvenience, to which a People, living under Aristocracy, are not subject in a much higher Degree than they are under Monarchy. For supposing a King cruel, yet one Man's Cruelty cannot reach so many as that of Multiplied oppressors, when every one takes their peculiar Province to fleece, or exercise their Lordliness over, according as their Estates or Interests are divided.  
The Covetousness likewise of Senators is more devouring, because we may feed one Fire with less Expense of Fuel than five Hundred.  
A Princes profuse Largesses to his Favourites, is infinitely over-balanced, by so many providing for their poor Kindred, and making Friends, and purchasing Dependants. This very thing must likewise be practised by Senators, for underproping their several reputations, hiring Advocates to plead for them in their absence; purchasing of Votes in their private concerns, and obtaining of Offices, Places and Estates for themselves and their Relations: So that these must require more considerable Supplies from the People (who must be squeezed every time any single Grandee wants) than are necessary to nourish the Liberality of a Prince, who hath a large Patrimony, standing Revenue, and places of Honour and Profit to gratify his Servants withal. The wisest States having made ample allowances to their Princes, to enable them to bestow Favours according to Merits or liking.  
Some think that of Ecclesiastes (Woe to thee, O Land, when thy King is a Child!) a strong Argument against Monarchy, 
Another Objection answered.  because this Calamity is not incident to a Senate, because they are not subject to Nonage: But the place rightly understood (saith a learned 
(i) Idem, p. 23.  Writer, whom I have epitomised in the Parallel) is a very full Confirmation of the happy Condition we have reason to expect under Monarchy, and of the Calamities and Woes which probably attend an Aristocracy. For the cause of those Miseries foretold is plainly thus: A King during his Infancy, being not able personally to Rule, the Government is managed by the Nobles; and thence come Factions, and all the Mischiefs that accompany them.  
To close therefore this Chapter, we may consider, that Kings have no Rivals whom they fear, and must keep under, as Governors of Commonwealths have; which is no small Blessing to a People.  
Kings, as Proprietors, take all the care possible (saith a very 
(k) Jus Regin●, p. 58.  Learned Author) to improve their Dominions; whereas Republicans are as Tenants, mind nothing so much as their private Profit: and the very Pretenders to Liberty and Property, in this and the last Age, have been the great Cheats of the Nation. They, when raised to govern, grew insolent; whereas Princes are still the same, and their Passions rise not, because their Fortunes do not.  
The Prevailing Factions in Commonweals, spare none that oppose them, having no consideration of them, but as Enemies: whereas Kings pity even Rebels, as considering them still as their Subjects; and though I cannot say with my 
(l) Idem.  Author, of one Year, yet I may say of the whole time of the Usurpation, That more were murdered and ruined in that Reforming Age, than suffered by the Great Mogul, and King of France, in that space of time; and more Severity was exercised by those Reformers, than by all the Race of our Kings these Six hundred years. And whatever Evil Ministers Kings are said to have, yet what that Judicious Author notes of Scotland, we may say the like of England, That after they had taken from the Blessed King his Prerogative of choosing Judges and Councillors; the Parliament did the next year put in (I will not say with him, the greatest Blockheads and Idiots in the Nation but) men of much meaner Parts, and more corrupt and unfit, either for knowledge, or the upright dispensing of the Laws, Justice and Equity, than any Age had known.  
I have discoursed of this Head before, and so shall say no more, but that as well as in Ancient times, the unequal Distribution of Justice hath been noted; so the Severity of the State of Venice against their Nobles, and the executing Men without Citing or Hearing, upon mere Jealousies, induced a wise Spaniard (who hath collected the Arbitrary Courses practised and allowed in that State) to say, That there is less of Liberty there, than under the worst of Monarchies. And for the State of Holland, it hath been more than once observed, how ingrateful they have been to all their Neighbours, who have assisted them in their greatest need (and with what a Jealousy they treat the Prince of Orange, whose Ancestors settled them in the Possession of what they have) as well as to the Crown of England, is obvious to common Observation. By them their Allies have been unworthily deserted; In the matter of Trade no Pact or Faith hath been kept. In their Country, Mint and Cummin, Coleworts and Herbs are excised; nothing worn, nothing fed upon or necessary for Humane Life, but pays something to their Exchequer: You pay a Tribute for the Ground you walk on, for the Rivulets you pass on; only they have not yet found out a Tax upon their Foggy Air.   

CHAP. X. The Character of a good King in general.  
BEfore I come to treat of the Sovereignty, I think it convenient to discourse of the usefullest Qualifications of Monarches, and the benefits that will redound to themselves and their Subjects thereby.  
The 
(a) Ethic. 8. c. 10. Polit. lib. 3. & 5. c. 4.  Philosopher, in several places, compares a King to a Parent and Shepherd, but a Tyrant to a Lord over Slaves, and a Wolf. 
Difference of a King and a Tyrant.  The One in his Government having a special Regard to the People's Benefit: the Other governing without or against Law, pro nutu & arbitrio; reducing all things under their absolute will and Power, in such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as is unhappy to their People, and in the Conclusion to themselves. 
The ancient Author's Description of a Good King.   
More particularly the same 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.  Philosopher describes a good King to be one, that no ways governs Tyrannically, but as the Master of a Family with a Royal mind, not challenging or appropriating all to himself, but procuring good for, and defending, his People and Subjects, in the course of his Life, using Moderation in all things: Affable to his Nobles, and in Company desirous to show himself of easy Access, sweetening his Government to his People, by his gracious Declarations. By these, saith he, 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  his Empire will not only be more Beautiful, more Esteemed, and more Fortunate, but more Durable; being not dreaded or envied of his Subjects, but commanding over the good, and not over broken and depressed Spirits.  
Such Princes use a moderate just Government according to the Laws, (more Majorum) contented with Power sufficient to support the Government; no ways injurious to their People, but willing that some things should not be in their Power, that they may the more securely perpetuate, what they enjoy. For 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  they that are Lords over fewer things, necessarily subsist the longer.  
So it is recorded of 
(e) Lamprid. in vita. Molliorem sibi potestatem & contemptibiliorem, sed securiorem & diuturniorem.  Alex. Severus, that when his Wife Menemia, Daughter of the Consul Sulpitius, and Niece of Catulus, told him, That he had made his Power gentler and more despicable, by not taking State enough upon him, and Governing more gently. He gravely answered, That it was more secure and durable. The very same, Aristotle relates of Theopompus.  
Therefore, saith a grave 
(f) Ille Reipublicae status optabilis & firmus est, in quo & privatim sancte innoxieque vivitur, & publica Justitia & Clementia vig●m. Polyb. lib. 6. Histor.  Author, That State of a Commonweal is to be desired, and is most firm, in which private Persons live Holily and unoppressed, or Inoffensive, and Justice and Clemency are in full Vigour by the Prince's care.  
Therefore 
(g) Verendus potius subditis est, quam metuendus. Stobaeus.  Musonius in Stobaeus saith, a Prince should so deport himself in his Government, That he should rather be revered and honoured, than feared by his Subjects.  
The excellent 
(h) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polyb. Hist. lib. 5.  Greek Historian tells us, That the Practice of Tyrants is to Lord it over the Unwilling, by Terror and vicious Exorbitance, being always engaged in mutual hatreds betwixt him and his Vassals: But on the contrary, Kings doing good to all, with Liberality and Clemency, govern those that freely are subject to them, living in a mutual Benevolence and Charity with his People.  
It is by such a Deportment of a Prince to his Subjects, that a Prince receives much inward Contentment. For as the Painter delights when he hath finished a curious Piece, and every Artist when he hath showed great Mastership in his work; so a Prince, when he hath, by his prudent, wise and merciful Government, made his Reign Prosperous and Happy to his Subjects, 
The Satisfaction and content a good King takes in his Administration.  cannot but receive the greatest satisfaction to himself, and will thereby acquire a most glorious and durable name.  
It was a Kingly saying of 
(i) Cum omnia possumus, sola credimus licere nobis laudanda. Variarum lib. 50.  Theodahad in Cassiodorus, That whereas Kings can do all things, they think, and believe those things only to be lawful for them to do, which are Praiseworthy.  
As the Pilot (saith the Orator) designs a prosperous Voyage, 
The Subject's Benefit the End of good Kings.  the Physician Health to his Patient; so the Supreme Magistrate should have care of his Subjects, the 
(k) Beata civium vita praeposita. Attic. l. 8. c. 11. & 5. de Repub.  Lives of them, and their Fortunes, for that End being committed to them.  
Hence Tacitus commends that Prince, who lives with his People as a Parent with his Children; when neither to his own Breast, Closet, or 
(l) Nihil in penatibus ejus vaenale aut Ambitioni pervium. 13. Annal. initio.  Family, any Access is made by Ambition, or in which any thing is Mercenary. So we find in the same Judicious Historian, the advice of Galba to Piso, when he had adopted him, was, That the surest and shortest Rule to sort good from evil, was to weigh with himself 
(m) Cogitare quid aut nolue 〈…〉 Principe, 〈◊〉 ●olueris, 1 Histor.  what under another Prince he would have allowed or blamed. Therefore Nerva gloried most, That he had done nothing in his Government, whereby he might not safely live, although he should lay down his Empire, and live again a private Life. So Trajan said, He would approve himself such an Emperor over his Subjects, as He, being a private Man, would have wished the Emperor to have been. Therefore 
(n) Panegy.  Pliny so highly commends the People's Vows for him, quod bene Rempublicam & ex utilitate civium, rexerit. Thence the same 
(o) Non minus hominem se, quam hominibus praesse 〈◊〉. Ib.  Panegyrist commends him, That he did not only consider himself to be mortal Man, but that he was appointed to govern Men, not Brutes.  
It was to the  Nerva that Fronto said, 
(p) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dio. in Nerva.  It was a great Evil to have such a Prince under whom none can have Liberty; but it is worse when every one hath Liberty to do as he list, the one discovering a very Tyrannical Disposition, and the other a great remissness and negligence in Government. Therefore 
(q) Nec tihi, quod rarissimum, aut facilitas Auctoritatem, aut severitas Amorem diminuat. Vita Agricolae.  Tacitus adviseth that a Prince's Easiness, and too much Lenity weaken not his Authority, or his too great Severity lessen the Love of his Subjects.  
Lipsius 
(r) O vere justum & legitimum illum Principem! qui in summo fastigio non minus magnus quam bonus audire desiderat, & duas res diversissimas, potentiam ac modestiam miscet! quem prodeuntem certatim velut beneficum quoddam Numen aspi●nt inter amorem timoremque medium. Praefat. ad Imperator. Reg. etc.  gives us this noble Character of a good Prince, That being raised to the highest Eminence, desires not to be accounted more great than good, and mingles two the most different things, Power and Moderation; whom his Subjects in his Progress look upon as a beneficial and comfortable Divinity, so that the People attempered with Fear and Love, with interchangeable Sentiments, doubt whether they shall salute him as their Lord or Parent.  
All Princes must necessarily be most dear to their People (saith the 
(s) MS. Speech, 1571. Such Princes dear to their People.  Chancellor to the Parliament, Anno 1571.) dearer than their own Lives, when they by their Actions demonstrate that they make the whole Scope and design of their Government the Prosperity of their People. Among the chiefest of which Benefits, that of Peace is to be most valued, as being the end and mark that all good Governors direct their Actions to. In another place he makes it a sure sign of good Princes, when they wish themselves all the good qualifications and fittedness for Government, and all the Virtues of the greatest Princes for their Subjects good; this being a full Demonstration how precious and valuable the safety and quietness of their Subjects are to them.  
The learned Lord Chancellor Bacon marshals the degrees of Sovereign Honours under five Heads, 
Degrees of Sovereign Honour.  every one of which are as so many Characteristics of great and good Kings. First the 
(t) Essays of Honour and Reputation. 1. Conditores Imperiorum.  Layers of the foundations of Empires, as Romulus, Cyrus, Caesar, & ●. 
(u) 2. Legislatores perpetui Principes.  Secondly the Founders of their Laws, or Lawmakers; who by constituting good Laws, are as second Founders, perpetual Princes, because they govern by their Ordinances after they are translated from this World. Such were Solon, Lycurgus, Justinian, and others. 
(w) 3. Liberatores & Salvatores.  Thirdly, such as have freed their People, and delivered their Country from Servitude, or have put an end to, and composed long civil Wars, as Augustus, Vespasian, our King Henry the Seventh, and the Fourth of France, and most eminently our late Royal Sovereign. 
(x) 4. Propagatores vel propugnatores.  Fourthly such as by honourable ways enlarge their Territories, or make a noble Defence against Invaders. Lastly, such who reign justly, and make the Age good wherein they live, therefore styled Fathers of their Country; such both was and is our late and present Gracious Sovereigns.  
So that such a Prince as others describe according to their Wish, or as an Exemplar, the English Nation, 
Character of King Charl●s the Second.  and all his majesty's Subjects, above all other Kingdoms in the World, have been and are Blessed with, under the Reigns of two such unparallelled Royal Brothers. We may justly give our late Sovevereign of immortal memory, that Character which we find in Arnisaeas as the Idea of a good Prince, That leaving entirely to his Subjects their Properties, governed according to God's, Nature's and his own Laws founded upon Equity and Justice; or that of 
(y) Rem pepuli esse, non suam privatam. Dio. vita Hadriani.  Hadrian's, that so managed his Government, That all might know that he studied the People's, not his own private Profit.  
Surely we may hope for great happiness under our present Sovereign; 
Character of King Jar● the Second.  who hath not only been a Copartner in his Royal Brother's sufferings, but a Co-adjutor in the management of his great Empire; and hath so signalised himself in the hazard of his Life and glorious Achievements for his Country, and is endowed with all the Heroic Accomplishments that ennoble Princes in the Records of Fame: so that we have the greatest Moral assurances (if we disturb not his Reign by Sedition and Rebellion) that he will outgo most of his Ancestors in the prosperous Government of his People, as well for their Glory, as their Peace and Tranquillity. 
Religion in a Prince, his Duty and Advantage.    

CHAP. XI. The Care of Religion a duty incumbent upon Kings.  
IT is not enough to give a Character of a good King in general; but we must descend to Particulars, and first of his Care of Religion, according to that of 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit lib. 7. c. 8.  Aristotle, That in all Government the first and principal Concern of a Prince, is to take care of things Divine. For according to the 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Diog. ●pud. Stohae●m.  Stoic, It becomes him that is the Best, to be worshipped by the Best; and that the great Sovereign of the Universe be worshipped by his Earthly Vicegerents.  
For of old it hath been noted, That many advantages both accrued to the Sovereign and People, when the Prince was truly Religious.  
Therefore the 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.  Philosopher tells us, That it is the duty of the supreme Governor principally to take care of those things which appertain to the Deity: for thereby the People are more obedient to their Princes, as not fearing injustice from them. For that it is to be supposed, that he that is Pious and Just, will not do an Unjust and Impious Action; and by it he is more secure in the assurance of Protection from the Deity, whereby he may hope for its Defence and Patrociny, from the Seditions and Treacheries of his Subjects, having the Deity to fight for him.  
Consentaneous to which, is what 
(d) Omnia prospere eveniunt sequentibus deos, Adversa autem spernentibus. Lib. 5.  Livy observes, That all things happen to them prosperously that follow the Gods, and as unprosperously to them that despise them.  
Upon the same Ground it is that the Orator saith, The Romans had not conquered the Spaniards by their Numbers, or the French by their Strength, the Carthaginians by their Stratagems, or Grecians by their Arts, nor the Italians and Latins, and their Nation and Land, by their Native and Inbred Wisdom; but by Piety and Religion, and 
(e) Atque hac una sapientia, quod Deorum Immortalium numine omnia regi, gubernarique perspeximus, gentes nationesque superavimus. De Aruspic.  by that Wisdom alone, that they understood all things to be governed by the Deity, they had overcome People and Nations.  
Agreeable to this Affirmation, is what we find recorded of Numa, That his care of Religion was the chief cause of the succeeding Felicity of Rome. For as the 
(f) Machiavel's Disc. lib. 1. c. 12.  Florentine Secretary observes, That Romulus exercising his People wholly in Military Affairs, his Successor Numa, finding he had to deal with a Fierce, 
Usefulness of Religion to civilize Subjects.  Rude, Cruel and Ungovernable people, thought the way to attemper and soften their minds, was to devise some Religious Institutions; which being once given credit to, might make them more pliable to Government. Therefore 
(g) Omnium primum ut rem ad multitudinem imperitam & illis seculis rudem essicacissimam, deorum metum inji●iendum ratus est. Lib. 1.  Livy saith, That of all things, he thought the fear of the Gods to be the most efficacious means for the ordering the unskilful Multitude, rude in that Age. And 
(h) Numa Religionibus & divino jure populum devinxit. 3. Annal.  Tacitus tells us, That with Religions and Divine Laws he yoked them in obedience: and so intent he was in the Observance of the Service to the Gods he had introduced, that Plutarch tells us, That he being one time Sacrificing, was told that the Enemies were advancing against him, but he would not desist, but returned 
(i) At ego rem divinam facio. Plutarch. in vita Numae. Numa 's Fiction.  Answer, That he was performing a Divine Work, and he would not leave till he had finished it.  
It is by 
(k) Qui cum descendere ad animos sine aliquo commento miraculi non posset, simulat sibi cum Dea Aegeria cungressus nocturnos esse, ejus se monitu quae acceptissima diis essent sacra instituere. Lib. 1.  Livy noted of this Numa, That he was forced to use some little Arts to possess the People with some Awe and Reverence to the Religious Worship he appointed. For he saith, that finding, that without some show of a Miracle, these new Religious Institutions would be difficultly embraced by such a sort of Rude People, He pretended he received them from the Inspiration of the Nymph Aegeria. In the like manner it is reported, that Sertorius (to establish his manner of Religious Worship, and to obtain the firmer Obedience to his Command) pretended he conversed with an Hart inspired. It is notoriously known, 
Mahomet's Fictions, to gain Credit to his Imposture.  how the greatest of Impostors Mahomet palliated his Natural Infirmity of the Falling-sickness, with the subtle Fiction that he was transported at such times to Heaven, and received the Instructions for his Alcoran there: and having taught a Pigeon to pick Corn out of his Ear, he made use of that to delude the wild Arabs, telling them, It was the Holy Ghost, which at such Seasons revealed to him certain hidden Mysteries.  
From hence we may learn how great Deference hath been paid to Princes, who have pretended Obedience to the Supreme Being, or had Conversation with Celestial Ministers, Spirits or Angels; and how useful, true and untainted Religion in a Prince must be, when the Umbrage of it is owned to make so pleasant and beneficial a shade.  
Before I leave this Head, I cannot but observe what Respect some Heathens paid to the Religious Worship of the Gods, 
The Heathens Zeal for Religion.  and what Punishments have been recorded to be inflicted on those who have profaned their Rites.  
When the Gauls besieged the Capital, 
(l) Valerius Maxim. lib. 1. c. 1.  Caius Fabius Druso would not omit the Customary Sacrifices, but carrying with him in his Hands, the consecrated Vessels (contemning the Danger) passed to the Quirinal Hill, and the Barbarians permitted him to solemnize his Worship, and to return safely to the Capitol.  
So 
(m) Herodotus, lib. 9  Pausanias, at the famous Battle of Platea, though the Enemy pressed sore, would not fight till he had a lucky Omen by his Sacrificing.  

(n) Antiq. Judaic. lib. 14. c. 8.  Josephus tells us, That Pompey the Great, when he had taken Jerusalem, and entered the Sanctum Sanctorum, although he found a Table of Gold, a Sacred Candlestick, and many other Vessels, and two Thousand Talents of Silver; yet he touched nothing thereof, but caused the Temple to be purged, and the Sacrifices to be offered according to Law.  
The Christians being about to build a Chapel at Rome, wherein to perform Service to Almighty God, were hindered by some claiming the Ground. The matter was brought before Alex. Severus the Emperor, who determined, That the things which concern the Gods, should be preferred before things that concern Men; and so allowed the building the Chapel, saying, That though their God was unknown to them at Rome, yet he ought to have Honour done him, if but for that Respect alone, that he bore the Name of a God.  
All which, and many more Instances which may be given, aught to teach Christian Princes to perform a greater Veneration to the true God, than the Heathens did to their false and imaginary Idols. 
Disasters happening to such as contemned the Heathen Gods.  As to the Examples of Signal Disasters that have happened to Princes and others, who have sacrilegiously rob the Shrines of the very Heathen Gods, or used those feigned Deities contumeliously, discovering thereby an Atheistical Temper; there are many Instances recorded in such Writers, as in other things are generally credited.  
It is reported of 
(o) Diodorus Siculus, lib. 20. p. 698.  Agathocles, that exacting fifty Talents of Silver of the Liparenses (which they could not pay without taking something consecrated to Aeolus and Vulcan) in his return, the ten Ships which carried the Money, were dashed in Pieces by Storm: by which it was said Aeolus had his revenge, and Vulcan's followed after, for that Agathocles was burnt alive.  

(p) Herodor. lib. 3. p. 887.  Cambyses King of Persia, having conquered Egypt, smote the Ox that was consecrated to Apis, in the Hip, that he died; but mounting his Horse to go against the Counterfeit Smerdis, the same Sword he had slain the Ox with, fell out of the Scabbard, by the prancing of the Horse, and he falling upon the point of it, was wounded in the same place of the Hip, whereof he died shortly after.  
I might instance in Nero's contempt of the Roman Gods, and his sprinkling the Face of the Syrian Goddess with Wine: and what an Exit he had we know: as also, how 
(q) Lampridi●s. Heredian.  Heliogabalus extinguished the Vestal Fire, would needs marry one of the Vestal Virgins, and violated indifferently all the Rites and Ceremonies of Religion in Rome; his End was violent, being slain by his own Soldiers. But I shall only remember what is reported of Philomelus, Onomarchus and Phaillon; who having spoiled the Temple of Delphos, one of them was burnt alive, another drowned, a third thrown headlong from an high Place; being the three sorts of Death, the Grecian Laws appointed them to undergo that were Sacrilegious. But I will refer the Inquisitive Reader to Lipsius his Monita, Fulgosius, Dinoths memorabilia, and others; and only mark, That it seems not safe out of an Atheistical Humour, to contemn even  Deities; for that is seldom done without some Suspicion that the Persons who do so, scarce reverence any Divinity. The sense of which ought to make us resent the public stabbing, rending and burning of the Prints, Pictures or Images of our Saviour, and Saints; which some too scornfully have done.  
From these Remarks, I shall now come to consider some of Machiavel's Positions about Religion: First he 
(r) Of the Prince, cap. 18.  owns, That it is necessary that a Prince appear careful of Religion, and appear himself Religious and Devout.  
But he thinks, 
Machiavelli would have his Prince only pretend Religion.  for a Prince to be truly conscientious, is not conducible, but rather disadvantageous to their Designs if great, or the Art of Government. This Principle must be owned to have been practised to the highest Improvement by Cromwell, whose Masterpiece lay in pretending extraordinary Sanctity, whereby he won more to his Party, than by any other of his Arts, and outdid Machiavel's Original Caesar Borgia.  
In Answer to which, 
Answer to it.  I shall oppose first the Philosopher, who, in the place before cited by me in the beginning of the Chapter, in commendation of the Prince's taking Care of Religion, 
(s) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 5. c. 11.  saith, It is not foolishly and impertinently to be pretended: whereby we may infer, it is to be sincere and Cordial. So Pomponius 
(t) In Philipp●.  Laetus tells us, That Philippus Arabs covered his Wickedness and Cruelties, by feigning himself a Christian, and relaxing their Persecutions, and he reigned but five Years, and He and his Sons were massacred by his Soldiers at Verona. Indeed it cannot be expected otherwise, but that the Judgement of God, and the Indignation of Men, should fall upon such Dissimulation and Hypocrisy: For however Princes or private Persons may lacker over their specious Religiousness, yet in some times or places it will appear so thin, that it will be discovered, and at best it will bear no resemblance with pure Gold Foil.  
It must not be denied, That Princes have a larger Latitude than others, to conceal their Sentiments of Religion, or to set the fairest Gloss upon it, as being to guide their Actions in this matter, as well as in secular Affairs, suitable to the Interests of State. But every one will likewise acknowledge, that a Prince, 
The Credit a Prince gains that is truly Religious.  who useth in this as well as other matters, a generous plain dealing, is valued more by this Standard Coin without Alloy, than those are, who make, as the States of Holland do their Third in Silver, mixed with four parts of adulterate Metal, pass for currant Sterling Coyn. Among just Men, such a Prince that deals candidly with God and the World, will find infinite more credit than any Tinsel heart will do.  
But I must pass to another of the Florentine's Paradoxes; 
(u) Discourse, lib. 1. cap. 12. 〈◊〉 's Opinion of the Bencht of the Heathen Religion.  he saith, The Pagan World was kept principally in Obedience by the belief they had in the Responses of Oracles, as that of Jupiter Ammon at Delos, or Apollo's at Delphos, etc. or by the Prognostics of the Augurs; and that, when once Men began to slight these, they neither believed God nor the Devil, but became as ungovernable as unchained Slaves: and in another 
(w) Id. lib. 2. c. 5.  place adds, That the cause why the Force and Power of Christians is less than that of the Grecians and Romans, was in the difference of their Religion: For that the Christian Religion makes the Honour of the World contemptible, and of little Estimation, whereas the Gentiles esteemed Honour to be the Sovereign good, which to obtain, they had an exceeding great Fierceness and Hardiness in all their Deeds and Erterprises; and that the Heathen Religion promiseth no Happiness, but to such as having fought for their Prince, Country and Commonweal, were loaded with Glory and worldly Honour: whereas the Christian Religion promiseth blessings to such as are humble and contemplative, and to those which despise most the Goods and Honours of this World: and further adds, That the Christian Religion hath conducted and brought the World into that Weakness and Feebleness we see it in, delivering it as a Prey to the wicked and barbarous People; because all Christians, to take the way to Paradise, dispose and arm themselves, rather to receive Blows, than to give or take Vengeance. So that to him it seems, That the thing which makes Christians so effeminate and cowardly, proceeds only from this, That they esteem more of an Idle and Contemplative, than an Active Life.  
In answer to all which I do own, 
The Answer.  That the Oracles and Augurs had some Influence upon the People; but we must likewise yield, That they were often Instruments and Tools fitted by Princes to carry on some designs, to give Courage to their Soldiers, and disheartening to their Enemies; and that God in the Machine was oftentimes a Prince's Spring that lay there.  
As to the Rites and Ceremonies, whatever Power they had to influence men's Minds to Obedience and Duty to Governors, and to stimulate and excite them to great and glorious Actions; the same Motives and Inducements we may find in the Christian Religion, and better bottomed.  
That there is something else besides bare Forms, Modes, and Schemes of Religion, that aught to be countenanced and cherished by Princes, and which is very conducive (not to make any Comparisons) to the support of Government, I will now endeavour to prove.  
First therefore let us consider what is related of Numa. 
Concerning Numa Pompilius.  It is said he appointed divers Ordinances concerning Priests, and several Ceremonies, whereof several Rolls were found in his 
(x) Livius, lib. 40. Decad. 4.  Sepulchre Anno V. C. 574. in the Consulship of Lucius Manilius in a Stone Coffin, one part Latin and the other Greek. These Books being seven in all, by order from the Consuls and Senate, were perused by Quintus Petilius, who made such a Report of them, that according to Livy, they were decreed to be burnt, as of no great account; and besides, judged pernicious and damageable to the Commonwealth, by bringing that Religion into Use, which was like to bring great 
(y) Cum animadvertisset pleraque dissolvendam Religionem esse. Ibid.  alterations in the present Rites.  
Valerius Maximus gives something a different account; for he saith the Greek Books only 
(z) De disciplina sapientiae, quia aliqua ex parte ad solvendam Religionem pertinere existimabantur: noluerunt enim prisei viri quicquam in hac asservari civitate, quo animi hominum a deorum cultu avocarentur. Lib. 5. de Religione, num. 12.  of the Discipline of Wisdom were burnt, for that they were judged in some respects to dissolve Religion. For, saith my Author, the Ancients would preserve nothing in this City by which the Minds of Men might be withdrawn or led aside from the Worship of the Gods.  
From this Story I shall first mark, obiter, that it seems for want of the engraving these Institutions of Numa concerning Religion, in Brass, as the Roman Laws were, though the successive Priests had the ordering them ever since; yet there was that alteration made in that long interval of time in the Rites and Ceremonies, from what he had instituted, that to have reduced them to their practice was like to un-hinge all their present Ecclesiastical Polity; and so the Senate, Consuls and Priests thought it more adviseable to burn and annihilate them, than to disorder the present Establishment.  
Secondly, We may note, that the Senate and Consuls took care that nothing should be exposed to the People (how sacred a Relic soever) that might enervate or debilitate Religion.  
Now we may further note out of a judicious 
(a) Dionys. Halicarnassaeus, lib. 11.  Historian, That Numa built a Temple to Faith, where he established many Ceremonies to induce People to reverence Faith, 
The good things Numa established in order to Government.  and to fear Perjury; and ordained likewise upon Controversies happening among Parties, they should be bound to go to the same Temple, and there with certain great Ceremonies swear the points of their Contests. He also further declared that those who usurped upon the Limits of others Possessions, were not only to be punished here, but were doomed to Torments in Hell; to the end that every Man might be afraid to seize on the Goods of another Mans.  
These therefore I look upon as the Fundamentals of civil Religion, in the rendering so venerable the Faith by Oaths, whereby not only Allegiance to the Prince, but Society was established upon that firm Basis of mutual Confidence: and by the securing Propriety, the whole Compages of Government was preserved.  
We ought likewise to consider that there are moral Virtues which conciliate such a Reverence to the Practisers of them, 
Moral Virtues very useful to Government.  that they are great helps to preserve and make flourishing every Kingdom and Commonweal, and which constitute a considerable Religious Portion of civil Government; and when Princes and People exercise them, both live happilier, than when without them, great Sanctity and Devotion are only pretended.  
The Virtues I put in the Balance against Bigotry in Religion, 
Better than Hypocritical Holiness.  are Justice, Temperance, Charity, Fortitude, Magnanimity, which are branched out into many flourishing Boughs, that bear the Golden Fruit upon them; such as these, Not to do to another that which we would not have done to ourselves; To live contentedly in our Station; To be obedient to our Magistrates and Superiors; To live in Charity with all Men; To be Compassionate to the Poor and Needy; To give no evil Example in any sort of Debauchery; To consider that we come into this World to live according to the rules of Life, the Sovereign Being of all hath pleased to reveal; That we do nothing here which may forfeit our more durable Inheritance in the other World.  
These were the Buttresses of Government in the Heathen World, when the whole train of Moral Virtues without Hypocrisy and Dissimulation were practised: and can Machiavelli or any of his Disciples find that the same things are not pressed as a duty upon all in the Christian Religion; there seeming to me this only advantageous difference, That the Foundation and Basis upon which these Moral Virtue's rest in the Christian Religion, is more firm, more regular, and more curiously hewn and polished, and more consentaneous to the Dictates of right Reason, in that they are implanted and promulged as standing Laws by one God Omnipotent; than in the multiform, jarring Polytheism of the Heathens, who for every different Species of things, or qualifications of Being's, introduced a presiding Spirit.  
In answer to the second Plea of the Secretary, 
That Religion doth not dis-spirit Men.  That our Religion hath dis-spirited Christians; I think every one will be furnished (out of the Armoury of his own Experience, or the perusing of ancient and modern Histories) with Shield and Buckler against such false Thrusts, and will own that there have been as considerable and glorious Achievements performed by Christians, as by Heathens: as may be instanced in Constantine the Great, Theodosius, Valentinian, Justin, Charlemagne, Scanderbag, and infinite more modern Christian Princes, who neither yield for Manhood, Valour, or Conduct, to Turks or Pagans: and how Patient and Meek soever Christianity teacheth Men to be; yet it no ways hinders Subjects from using offensive or defensive Arms, when commissioned by Lawful Authroity; nor discourageth adventuring of Life for the defence of Kings, or their Countries; nor is it an Extinguisher of Endeavours to serve God the Sovereign, or his People, in the Honourablest Employments.  
It must be confessed, 
True Piety lessened by subtle Disputes.  that since Religion hath been reduced from Precepts and Axioms to Systems, and that the practical part of Justice, Moral Virtues and Honesty, were no longer in Esteem, than as they were found subservient to the promoting Speculations; there hath been a way found out to render these fundamental and substantial Qualifications of less value in very good Men, unless withal they added some acquaint Notions that might sublime their Heathenish Moralities (as they call them) into Elixirs and quintessences of Religion: as in our late Times, If one could not give a certain Diagnostic when Grace was wrought in him, he was not fit for reforming Employment; Men being more distinguished by Tests and Oaths, than by good Manners.  
By which we forgo the Substance of Moral Piety for a fleeting Shadow; and many are so  in their several Sentiments, that it is a more arduous task of late, than formerly, for Princes to comport themselves in this particular, so as to keep in one Uniformity, Subjects of so different Persuasions, whereby they may command that obedience Subjects ought to pay to their Sovereigns.  
To find Expedients, or offer any directions to Princes in this Case, were to involve one's self in an endless Labyrinth, and discover an unpardonable Presumption; the Difficulties being very great, if not insuperable, how to frame Laws that should combine such varieties and diversities of Opinions in one Yoke, Order or Rule, without such an universal and absolute Monarch, as scarce in Idea, much less in Practice can ever be.  
I shall therefore concern myself no way in tugging at the end of that Saw of Controversies, which (how pleasant soever it may be to such as have an overweening Opinion of their Knowledge in such Subtleties) is very harsh and ungrateful to my Temper.  
This one Hypothesis or Postulatum, however, I hope few will deny, That since Monarchy is the Established Government in his majesty's Dominions, and however maliciously and potently assaulted in our Memories; yet never can be altered here. 
The Government of the Church of England agreeable to the English Monarchy.  Princes by small searches into the aptitude of the several Schemes of religious Worship and Government, may soon find which is most agreeable to the Constitution of the Monarchy, and will be most subservient to it. In which particular, the Church of England, as established by Law, in its Doctrine and Discipline, and all the true Members of it, and the Subjects of all Conditions, who act according to the Principles of it; have obtained a Royal and Gracious Character, founded upon the constant Experience the Kings of England have had, That upon all the most critical trials, the Members of it have stood firm to the Crown, even when worn by Princes of different Religion.  
Therefore till other Forms, practised in the late times, can give as undeniable Proofs of their unconditionate Loyalties; I think it but reasonable they should allow His Majesty liberty to consult his own, and the interest of his Government, rather than their inconsistent Models.  
One of the Principles of the Church of England (conformable to that of the Christian Religion.) is, That it teacheth Obedience to the Sovereign, not for Fear only, but for Conscience sake; and all considerate (as well as Pious Men) where they are convinced, That it is better to obey God than Man (if any thing should be commanded that would put them upon that Dilemma) will choose to suffer (if they cannot fly) rather than rebel.  
Therefore since it pleased his Majesty at his first Step to the Royal Throne (which was like that of the rising Sun dispensing innumerable Blessings to his People) to express his Royal Favour to the Church of England, 
The King's Commendation of the Principles of the Church of England, as to Monarchy.  with such an Encomium of its Members, in that most refreshing Declaration at his first Council (which from so just a Prince carries the Force and Energy of an Act of Parliament as well as of State in it) it ought to bow the Hearts of all Men that design not to be Rebels, as one Man to him.  
Since which, by the repeated solemnity of it to his two Houses of Parliament, all suspicion of his majesty's ever acting to the contrary, so long as the Subjects keep their dutiful Station, is totally removed. His Majesty also hath laid a solid Foundation for true Piety in the discountenancing and discrediting all forts of Vice and Debauchery: by which none can doubt, but himself as well as his Subjects, will in short time reap happy Benefit according to that so the excellent 
(b) Diutius durant exempla quam mores. Tacitus, 4. Histor.  Historian, Examples have a more durable force than Laws.  
I shall conclude this particular with the famous Story of the Zealots in 
(c) Josephus de Bello Judaico, lib. 4. c. 5. & lib. 7.  Judaea: Those being told by Vespasian (which Messages Josephus himself carried to them) that he would change nothing of their Religion, but maintain them therein, 
The Evils by Rebelling upon pretence of Religion.  and in all their Liberties and Franchises; yet under colour, that they were bound to sacrifice their Lives in the defence of the Temple, would never hearken to Peace upon any condition what ever: but living upon Foraging, Rapines, Free-booty, and committing most cruel Butcheries; Vespasian found himself obliged to arm against them, and use them with all Extremity. In fine, Those who pretended so much the Preservation of their Religion, committed a Thousand sort of Impieties and Cruelties, and themselves set the Temple of Jerusalem on Fire, and at last brought utter Ruin to their Country.  
I shall make no further Application, but that from hence we may learn, First, That it was agreeable to Principles of Government, that Vespasian (though a Prince of a different Religion to the Jews) should not alter their Civil or Religious Government: And, Secondly, That the utter Extermination of a People and their Religion there, was the Consequence of the Zelots Rebellion, as to the apparent procuring cause; for I inquire not here into the Original cause of that Nations Destruction, viz. The crucifying of our Lord and Saviour.  
I come now to consider wherein a Sovereign's care of Religion consists, 
Wherein the Sovereign's Care of Religion consists.  which would carry me into a dangerous Ocean, if I should survey all the Rocks, Creeks and Quicksands to be avoided in this matter. At the best I shall find an high rolling Sea, as that in the Bay of Biscay, if I escape the difficult and dangerous passage betwixt Scylla and Charybdis.  
First therefore, I shall consider the Obligation the Pagan Romans thought they had, not to make any Innovation in matters of their Religion, with some Reflections upon it. Secondly, Consider the Condition of People under Diversity of Religions: Thirdly, 
The Roman Heathens not for change of Religion.  Speak something of the Diversities of Religion sprung up in the time of the late War: And Lastly, Something concerning Toleration. But I must praemonish the Reader, that I intent not to treat of these, either as Divine or Statesman, but only as a Layman that loves Order and Peace, in transitu, as a Parergon.  
First then as to the Heathens, we find that remarkable Advice of 
(*) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dio Cassius, lib. 52.  Maecenas to Augustus, That he ought to worship the Deity in all Methods, and at all times himself, according to his Country's Laws, and cause others to do so: and further adds, That he should restrain those that would innovate in Divine things, not for the cause only of the Gods; but because those that bring in new Deities, do drive men to make other dangerous Changes: and from thence, Conspiracies, Sedition, Conventicles, Cabals, etc. which are things no ways conducible to the benefit of Government.  
In which we may consider Maecenas to advise like a Statesman, considering, that Augustus had but newly extricated himself from a great and dangerous War, for no less than the Empire: Therefore it behoved him to make no Alterations in Matters that might endanger the Settlement of his present Estate. Therefore we find, That Augustus laid aside the name of Triumvir, contented with the Consulship, and for defence of the People with the Tribunitian Authority; which were old Offices the People were acquainted with: and that he attracted the Soldiers good Will to him by Gifts, the People's by Provision of Food; and all with the sweetness of Peace: arising by 
(d) Paulatim insurgere, munia Senatus, Magistratuum, 〈◊〉 in se trabere, aullo adversante. Tacit. 1. Annal.  degrees, to draw to himself the Employment and Authority of the Senate, the Magistrates and the Laws, none opposing him.  
How far this is to be imitated by Princes, in the Circumstances of Augustus, I leave to others to determine.  
As to the general Sentiment, that the Heathen Roman Religion was not to be changed: I shall content myself with two Authorities of the great Orator, who in one place 
(e) Majorum instituta tueri sacris caeremoniisque retinendis sapientis est. Patrios ritus migrare aut violare, ubique gentium nefarium sir. Cic. de Divinatione.  saith, That it is the part of a wise Man to defend the Institutions of their Ancestors, in retaining sacred Ceremonies; and that in all Nations, it is reputed wicked to violate and banish our Country's Rites.  
In another place 
(f) Omnes Religione moventur, & deos patrios quos a majoribus acceperunt, colendos sibi diligenter & retinendos arbitrantur. Cic. in Verrem.  he pronounceth it absolutely, That all are moved with Religion, and judge their Country Gods which they have received from their Ancestors, to be worshipped and retained.  
I am sensible, that if this were yielded to, Christianity would not have been propagated in the World. For if it had not been lawful to alter the so long established Idol Worship and Polytheism, the Doctrine of Christianity had been shut out. But on the other side, when I consider how Christianity was propagated by the working of Miracles, and by the Force and Energy of Conviction upon the Minds of such as would admit the Explanation and Dilucidation of the Doctrine, and the Christians patiented sufferings under the Heathen Persecutions, and peaceable awaiting till God Almighty disposed the Emperor Constantine's Heart to embrace the saving Doctrine of our Lord Jesus Christ; I cannot but conceive it fit (as a Primitive, so an imitable Example) to follow the Method of persuading and convincing Reason and Judgement, before Changes in Religion are to be attempted; especially since the Conversion is not to be from Paganism, but concerns Modes of explaining Doctrines, Jurisdiction of some Orders and Churches, and such Rites and Usages, as possibly enough Men may be saved without arriving at the knowledge of the Essentialness of them.  
The Religions of Mankind are extremely various, 
Concerning Diversity of Religions.  diversified according to the Genius of the People, their Education and Interests. For as Dominions are circumscribed, and bear one against another, for the preserving of their respective Limits and Bounds, so that a kind of Hereditary Hostility is continued betwixt them: So we find together with that Native civil Enmity, there is also some disagreeing in such Points of Religion, as is sufficient to keep up the Feud betwixt the Learned Part, as well as the Common People; and the Earth is not more diversified by the large Tracts of Sands in Arabia, Chains of Hills at Caucasus, the Alps, etc. or with the Ribs of vast Rocks, or the Fertile Plains, Pools, Morasses and Seas, than it is variegated with Religions; so that what is sacred in one Country, is even piacular in another.  
— cum solos credit habendos  
Esse Deos quos ipsa colit—  
What Application is to be made of God almighty's Methods of Providence in this I leave to Divines, whose Province it is: Only we may observe, since the Roman Church is obeyed in a large Portion of the World, and Ethnicism and Turcism possess as great Territories, and the different Modes in all these (some insisting on old Usage, others on Reformations and Refinings) are so considerable, it is not to be hoped, there can be any Uniformity or Harmony of Religions in the Universe.  
Therefore it seems to be the great concern of Princes in their several Dominions, to use their utmost Endeavours, that the great Fundamentals of Religion (which consist in solid Piety, Justice, Temperance, etc.) should be strictly observed, and the particular Forms, which, by the Wisdom of foregoing Ages, have been adapted to the Genius of their People, should be protected and defended, and no Innovations made in them upon private men's Fancies of Reformation, without a public Sanction.  
As to the third Particular concerning the Diversities of Notions in Religion, 
Fanaticalness in Religion dangerous to Government.  which have been spawned in our late Wars, during the Rebellion, when every one pretended, that the Liberty of propagating their several new found Opinions, was what they had fought for, and purchased with the expense of their Blood and Treasure, we may consider these things following.  
First, That when Religion is only seated in the Brain, it strangely infatuates, and renders the possessed difficult to be cured: for it either produceth downright Hypocrisy (which hath Millions of Subservient Wheedles to accompany it) or the Imagination is heightened, That (as a learned 
(g) Mr. Fr. White's Sacred Laws.  Writer observes) they think Salvation is only ordained for those of their fine Sculls; the very mossy Notions of which they think sufficient cure for the falling Evil: Judging Mankind, till within a Century or so, to have been dull indigested Masses of unthinking Animals; whereas in Truth and Reality, they are the tubera Terrae, Insipid or Poisonous Fungs, which sprung up by the Showers of Blood.  
Under this Ecstasy of new Beams of Light, they are ravished with the Opinion of their own Saintship, and they indulge themselves in all the sweet Appetites of Spiritual Pride, affected Sanctity, and singularity of Persuasion; for without some odd Notion (more subtle than others have or a Revelation, as if dropped from St. Paul's third Heaven, they have no Hearts-ease; and having the Maggot turned into a Butterfly, O how it flutters and mutes its Eggs upon every fresh Colewort!  
This kind of Brainsick Religion, is no sooner born, 
Idem.  but presently like Cadmus' issue, it falls to war under the Banner of Reformation, which is that Fort Spiritual, that Palladium, they must defend; and thereby promise to themselves Laurels and Palms, which shall cover and protect them from all the bruta Fulmina, as they repute them, of the National Church; thinking themselves above the Jurisdiction of any Ecclesiastical Court, their Dominion being founded in Grace.  
The pretence of maintaining Religion, or the sham-affrights such People divulge they have of it, being altering, or taken from them, may, with the least danger to the Designers of any Revolution, be used as a blind to carry on any Intriegue; and the pretence of refining Religion, hath powerful Philtres and Fascinations, to bewitch the Unwary, and tickle the Hypocrite.  
While such like Religious People, as I have been describing, in the late miserable times (when there was neither Lawful, Civil, or Ecclesiastical Authority) obtained Power, these Glow-worm's were as plentiful as Locusts, filling every place with new, but not uniform Light; nothing was more common in their Mouths, than that the Dispensation or Gospel of the Holy Ghost was to be expected, that of God Almighty being passed away, at the coming of our Saviour, and His Sacred Establishments being to cease at the approach of this.  
What wild fancies, What Heresies revived, were then in Vogue, I had rather were forgot than shown upon the Stage: and only shall observe, that since Religion is like the Heart in the Body, full of Vital Spirits, it increaseth the care of a Sovereign, That neither the Divine Fire be sufflaminated or extinguished by Irreligion or Atheism; nor by Enthusiasm so sublimed, as it cause a Calenture.  
As to the last Particular, it is so nice a point (now especially) that I had once designed not to have touched upon it; 
Concerning Toleration of Religion.  but that I may not wholly frustrate Expectation in saying nothing, I shall Content myself with summing up some few Authorities from Lipsius, and others upon this Subject.  

(h) Polit. lib. 4. c. 3.  Lipsius saith, it is his firm Opinion, That one Religion should be preferred in one Kingdom, and bemoans the Condition of Europe, wherein Religion hath kindled such disagreeing Flambeaus, and endeavours to pour Water on that Sacred Fire.  

(i) Publice peccare dico, qui & ipsi de deo receptisque sacris sentiunt, & alios ad sentiendum per turbas impellum: Priva●im, qui pariter male sentiunt, sed sibi. Ibid.  He makes two kinds of those that sin in Religion; First, Those who have ill Sentiments of God, and the received Holy Rites, and do endeavour to force others by Riots and Tumults, to be of the same persuasion. Secondly, Those who have as depraved opinions, but keep them to themselves, keeping this Fire on their own Hearths, only to dress their own Viands with.  
Concerning the first of these, he concludes, they ought to be punished; lest, as St. Cyprian saith, The Prince be punished for them; for with St. Austin 
(k) Melius est ut pereat unus quam ut pereat unitas.  he affirms, That it is better that one Scabbed Sheep be removed, than the whole Flock be infected. Agreeable to which is that which 
(l) Violatarum Religionum aliubi atque aliubi diversa poena est, sed ubique aliqua. De Benef. l. 3. c. 6.  Seneca affirms, That in divers places, the punishment may be divers, of Religions violated, but every where some Punishment is enjoined.  

(m) Quod in Religionem divinam committitur, in omnium fertur injuriam. Lib. 4. Cod. de Haereticis.  Justinian gives the Reason, why some Punishment in such cases should be inflicted; because the concern of Religion being of a great extent, the Injuries committed against Divine Religion in some sort affects all.  
There being so many Hotspurs and Bigots in Religion, that are always busily and pragmatically perplexing themselves and others with subtle Inquiries of things under the Earth, and above the Heavens (as 
(n) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Apol.  Plato phraseth it) that is, of things beyond the Ken of judicious Mortals; either poring in St. Faith's under Pawles, or fluttering on the Fanes of some Spires or Cupalo's, to the Disturbance of those that would be at their public Devotion in the Quire. Such Turbones (as Lipsius calls them) should be suppressed, if it can be without a greater Disturbance. So 
(o) In morhis ni●il est magis periculosum quam immatura medicina. Sen. Consol. ad Hill.  that the Application of the Remedy be rightly timed, that by unseasonable Remedies the Distemper be not fired, as the Judicious 
(p) Tacitus, 12. Annal.  Historian saith, Intempestivis remediis delicta accendere.  
As to those who have Souls tainted with Errors, yet endeavour to infect none, but keep the Contagion within Doors, and propagate not their Errors: Lipsius applies that of 
(q) Quis impon it mibi necessitatem vel credendi quod nolim, vel quod velim non credendi? Lib. 5. c. 4.  Lactantius, Who can impose a necessity upon me, either of believing or disbelieving? And that of 
(r) Docendo magis quam jubendo, monendo quam minando. Epist. 65.  St. Austin, That such be wrought upon rather by Instruction than Injunction, by admonishing than menacing. As when Strings are out of Tune, they are leisurely to be screwed up to Concord, not hastily, lest they break; since they desire 
(s) Tacere liceat; nulla libertas minor a Rege petitur. Sen. Oedip.  no greater Liberty than to be silent. For as Curtius saith, lib. 7. Nemo Rex perinde animis imperare potest ac linguis: None can so well command the Mind as the Tongue. So in matters of Faith, he commends 
(t) Peccata sic compescas, ut sint quos peccasse poenitea●. Ad Africanum Proconsulem.  St. Austin's Rule, so to suppress Errors, that there may remain such as may repent they have sinned. Therefore he is not for using severity to such, whereby some may be made Hypocrites, and few Converts, according to that of Themistius, Purpurae tuae Cultores aliquos efficies, non Dei.  
It is for such as these the Act of Uniformity provides, when it allows five besides the Family; and those that cannot be content with that Indulgence, may thank themselves, if they occasion severer Laws against them.   

CHAP. XII. Of the Clemency of a Prince, and how far Beneficial.  
THIS is the soft Ermine that lines the Royal Robes of Princes, this is the orient Pearl which studs their Diadems. None ever wore a finer or gentler Fur within his Imperial Vest; nor ever had more conspicuous, valuable, or more genuine Jewels of this sort in his Crowns, than our late most Gracious and Merciful Sovereign of Blessed Memory. Who, as a Learned Person most truly observed long 
(a) Character of King Charles the Second. Anno 1660. His Clemency.  since, had goodness of Nature, Humanity, and Charity (or by what divine Attribute you will call it) as the master Ingredient in his Composition: of whom most truly was verified, what out of Herodian, Pareus notes in his Aphorisms of Pertinax succeeding Commodus, (as that most Gracious King did to the Senate of Tyrants, and the wickedest Usurper Cromwell) 
(b) Tyrannorum 〈◊〉 & dementis Principis saccedent is Imperio, ni●il ju●undius, nihil utilius subditis accidere potuit.  That nothing more pleasant and profitable could happen to Subjects, than the Death of Tyrants, and the Empire of a Clement or Merciful Prince succeeding. So that whatever I can write in commendation mendation of this Royal Qualification, and much more, is but a Dawbney, and no Varnish to his Statue, who in all our Annals will be styled the Clement, Merciful, and Restorer. But I design not here his Apotheosis, yet could do no less than strew some Lilies on his Grave upon this occasion. 
The Benefit of Moderate Government. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   
Therefore to pass to the subject matter. The 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 5. Polit. c. 11.  Philosopher observes, That the moderation of Theopompus much settled the Spartan Government; and adds, that what lessens a Kingdom in Power, augments it in Length and Duration. By which he can mean nothing else, but that mild, and not austere or violent severe Government, is what gives a long continuance to Principalities. However we may be sure a Prince's Mercifulness is one of those Virtues which are echoed through the longest and loudest Speaking-Trumpet.  

(d) Qui benignitate a● 〈◊〉 Imperium temperavere, 〈◊〉 candida & lata omnia suisse: etiam ●ostes aquiores quam aliis cites. Ad Caesarem.  Sallust saith, That those who have tempered their Empire with Benignity and Clemency, have had all things Prosperous unto them, their very Enemies being more just to them that use it, than some Subjects are to others who less practise it. Therefore the Orator 
(e) Nec ulla re propius homines ad deum accedunt, quam salute hominibus danda. Cic. pro Ligat.  saith, That Men (much more Princes) in nothing, make nearer approaches to the Deity, than in giving that to Men which he calls Salus; Health, Prosperity, and Benefit to a People: to produce all which a Prince's Clemency must concur.  
The Divine 
(f) Se●ales civibus prabeant, quales sibi dens esse volunt. 1. de Clem. c. 5.  Seneca gives an excellent Rule for Princes to observe that they deport themselves so to their People, as they would wish the Gods would do to them.  
Such a Prince, the other 
(g) In Octa●.  Seneca the Poet elegantly describes, which (if any other) our late King deserves to have writ on his Tomb: 
Pulchrum eminere est inter illustres Viros:  
Consulere Patriae, parcere afflictis, fera  
Caede abstinere, tempus atque Irae dare,  
Orbi quietem, saeculo pacem suo:  
Haec summa Virtus, petitur hac Coelum Via.   
Another famous 
(h) Vim temperatam Dii provehunt in majut. Horat. Od. 3.  Poet tells us, That divine Power enlargeth temperate Government; and a grave 
(i) Potentia mediocrit● exer●ita omnia quaesi●a conservat. D. Cass. lib. 43.  Historian tells us, That moderately exercised Power conserveses all that it hath acquired; for Mildness in all Affairs, and 
(k) Remissius imperanti melius paretur. Sen. de Clem.  Obedience, is better paid to gentler Commands, than to the more rigid and austere.  
A Prince, saith 
* Amorem apud populares, m●tum apud h●sies quara●. Annal. 11.  Tacitus, should endeavour to obtain Love among his Subjects, and fear among his Enemies. For as the 
‖ Claudianus ad Ho●or.  Poet saith, 
Non sic excubiae, non circumstantia tela,  
Quam tutatur Amor.—   
That Love is a better defence than Halberds, Battleaxes, and common Guards. 
A Prince having the Love of his Subjects, yet must have Guards.  Yet we have known a Prince (who for this Virtue of Clemency, deserved as much Love as any) designed to be assassinated, when wicked Conspirators hoped his small Guards would be too weak to defend his Royal Person against their Force.  
Therefore however commendable Clemency be in a Prince, yet it should not be his constant wear; some Scarlet, with the fine Linen, makes not only a more splendid, but an usefuller show. Though the 
(l) Senec. Trag. Overmuch Clemency dangerous.  Poet say true, 
Hoc Reges habent magnificum,  
Et ingens, nullus quod capiet Dies,  
Prodesse Miseris, supplices fido lare  
Protegere.—  Yet the Rule of the Prince of 
(m) Omnia s●ir●, non omnia prosequi, parvis pe●cat●s veniam, magnis ●●●eritatem commodare. Tacitus vita Agric.  Historians, is to be observed, That a Sovereign know all the Stratagems of his Enemies, but not to prosecute all; to pardon small faults, and accommodate Severity to great Crimes. For as another Judicious 
(n) Salutaris severitas vincere inanem speciem clementix. Ci●ero ad Cl●●ent.  Author saith, Healthful Severity should sometimes overcome the unprofitable and ineffectual kind of Clemency; for it often happens, 
(o) 〈◊〉 ager crudelem facit medicum. Publius.  That the unruly Patient makes the crueler Physician.  
So 
(p) Meus hic suror subditos sanos reddit. Stobaeus de Regno.  Cotys the Thracian King, answered some that taxed him with Severity in a necessary Case, that it was to make his Subjects Healthful; for sometimes there is no other way to save the sound Parts, but to separate the gangrene by a total Abscission, though a gentler Hand is desired by ignorant Spectators.  

(q) Ingenia nostra, ut ●obiles & generesi equi, melius 〈…〉. Sen. 1. de ●●em.  In some Cases it is true, generous Souls as tender-mouthed Horses, are governed by a gentler Bit; and out of 
(r) 〈…〉 de 〈◊〉.  Pity to such as wander, ignorantly missing, rather than wilfully passing out of the way, it is better with a gentle Hand to lead them into right Paths, than to expel them.  
All this Method our late King followed too long, till the cunning Designing of the Achitophel's, the Pride and Lust of pampered Men, the contempt of his forgiving Temper, and the wilful Deviations from their Allegiance, of others, had almost put it out of his Power to let the Dutiful and Just see that he had a Care for himself and them.  
I cannot here omit what King 
(s) Basilicon Doron.  James the First, his Royal Grandfather, saith of such a People; That he was the Phrygian that too late, and at too great a price, was wise: For whereas by all gentle means he endeavoured to allure them to Obedience, the contrary happened to him; so that all the return was, he lost his Endeavours upon an ungrateful People, and unloosened the Government by his Lenity. This Age hath found this Remark too true; and though I should be loath to excite his Royal Grandson to any sort of Severity, yet I suppose it is a general Belief, That His present Majesty will not suffer Himself to be imposed upon by a Party that have so grossly abused the Lenity of His Royal Grandfather, Father, and Brother. 
Who deserve not Clemency.   
Nor can it be judged Severity in a Prince (who hath seen so great and durable Clemency contemned, and disposing men rather to the most cruel and wicked Rebellions) to oblige these by the terror of his Laws to be kind to themselves, as well as the Public, by creating no Disturbances, or publicly affronting his Authority, as they did too lately in His Royal Brother's time. If there be any such, who for sinister Ends are at this time of day pressing him with what was urged to 
(t) Plut, in Lacon.  Cleomenes, That it becomes good Magistrates to be mild to all: It is to be presumed they may receive the like Answer, That it must not be to that degree, as to bring Himself into contempt. Much less ought a Prince to use it to those who have at any time heretofore joined in those Tumultuous Petitions in His Royal Brother's Time, or in countenancing the Bill of Seclusion against His Royal Person.  
For although His Majesty may follow the Example of 
(u) Panormitanus in vita Alphonsi.  Alphonsus, who said, That private Offences to his Person he could forgive; yet he ought to be severe against those Offences which concerned the Commonweal: 
(x) Phil. de Comines.  Or as Lewis the Twelfth of France, who being advised (after he came to the Crown) to take some Revenge against that Great General Lewis de Tremoulie, that had fought against him, replied, He would not punish the Affronts done to the Duke of Orleans. 
King's may forgive Offences against them before they were Kings.  And so His present Majesty may forgive the Injuries done to Him as Duke of York; yet it is not reasonable to think, but that he will strenuously assert and defend the Rights and Prerogatives of the Crown. So that it will be His Majesty's Interest to trust none of those that would (contrary to the Laws of God and Man) so wickedly have precluded him from his Right to the Crown: And it will be adviseable for all them to repent them of that unjust Act, and transmit it as a Caution to their Posterity, never to attempt the like: Which will be more honourable and advantageous for them to do, than the striving to set up a spurious Title.   

CHAP. XIII. Of Prudence requisite in a Prince.  
IT is Prudence directs all the great Affairs of a Monarch to that Scope and Terminus, 
The●se of Prudence in Government.  to which all must aim, who design an happy Reign over good Subjects. By it they know when to relax, and when to straiten the Reins; where to place their Favours, and whom to employ in every Administration; and by it they are guarded from all the Vicious and Malevolent: For none dare disturb the Prudent, who have no unarmed Parts, being all Head, all Eyes, all Hands: Inaccessible by the Flatterers, inaccessible by the Vainglorious, the Ambitious, and Debauched. Such a Prince is served by the Just, the Wise, the Prudent, and Skilful. Nullum Numen abest, si sit Prudentia. Such a Prince is never ; he foresees every thing in its Original Cause, fits every thing to its End. 
Author's commending Prudence.   
The 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Po'●●. lib. 3.  Philosopher tells us, That it is the proper and peculiar Virtue of a King: For, more things, saith the Sententious 
(b) Plura in summa fortuna auspi●●is & consiliis quam telis & manibus geri. 13. Annal.  Historian, are done in great Empires, by Conduct and Counsels, than by Weapons and Hands: Hence Flaccus in his Argonauticks 
— non solis viribus aequum  
Credere, semper acri potior prudentia dextra.   
Hence it is that the great 
(c) Proprium est prudentiae conci●are sibi animos homi●um, & ad usus suns adjungere, cum virtutes spec●● dispares prudentia junguntur. 2. de Officiis ad Brutum.  Orator saith, It is the Property of Prudence to attract and allure men's Minds, and render them useful. For, Virtues of different Classes by it are united; there being nothing that destroyeth Authority, so much as the unequal and untimely Interchange of Power, pressed too far, and relaxed too much; and Hatred, Timorousness, and Temerity, Profuseness, and Parsimony: all which are balanced, timed, and seasonably applied by Prudence.  
What the Eye is to the Body, in discovering the various Figures, Dimensions, and Distances of Bodies, whereby we may direct our Course to or from them; that Light of the Soul (but much more pure) is Prudence, which sees not before only, and one Hemisphere singly, but every where round; whereby the Soul forms (saith a subtle 
(d) Jamblichus Epis●. ad Aphalum.  Philosopher) a most beautiful Model and Exemplar of all its Actions.  
It is this Virtue (saith another sage 
(e) Damippus lib. 1. de Prudentia.  Author) which designs and disposeth infinite Things, and so is the Parent and Conductor of all other Virtues, by whose Prescript and Reason all things are ordered.  
To Exercise this useful Virtue, requires a Man not only of Ingenuity, 
The Particulars wherein Prudence useful to a Prince consists.  Wisdom, Memory, disquisitive and speculative; but also conversant in great and various Affairs, in Histories Ancient and Modern, whereby he may be able to collate Matters, and adjust them to their proper Scope and Designs.  
By this all Men (as well as Princes) take mature Counsel, consider things good and evil, commodious and incommodious, examine all Instruments, as to their fitness and unfitness, compare Circumstances, revise Examples, consider of timing of Business, Places and Persons, natural tendencies, and where Authority is to be used, and where Suasives; how to countermine, how to penetrate into hidden Counsels of others, and to unmask their Disguises; to ruminate upon things bypast, to order the present, and provide for the future.  
It is Prudence teacheth how to be skilful in knowing the Causes, Symptoms, speediest and most effectual Cures of the Diseases of a State. For, as Prudence is the very healthful constitution of a Soul, exerting no sickly or distempered Actions; 
The Diseases of a State 〈…〉 by a Prudent Prince.  so a prudent Prince endeavoureth with all his Skill and Might to keep the State in a most perfect temper of Health, vigour, beauty, and firmness: So that under an old experienced Prince, there are no Symptoms of old and decrepit Age in his Kingdom.  
Archytas the Pythagorean saith, As a General leads his Army, 
(f) Sic●ipsam soelicitatem, prasens vitae temperate regitque prudentia. Stobaeus.  the Admiral orders his Fleet, the Pilot his Ship, or God governs the World, and the Soul the Body; so presentness of Prudence order the Happiness of Life.  
It were endless to remember all the Benefits that accrue to a Prince and his People by this only Virtue, Prudence. Be the Body of the Commonwealth in a Calenture by Factions and Seditions, a prudent Prince knows how to extinguish the Fire, by substracting the Feeders, or breaking the Force of it, by subdividing the complication of Causes, or diverting of it some other way. Doth it bleed by a Civil War? He can bind up the Wound. Does it suffer by want of Nourishment? He can supply it with suitable Food, that will neither pamper it to an unwieldy Sloth, or luxurious Licentiousness: He can by Bleeding or Drenching clear it of all its superfluous Humours: He can assuage its Pains by removing Grievances or Oppressions: He can invigorate every languid part, by cordial Privileges and wholesome Laws; can set straight its dislocated or distorted Joints, when any of the great Officers or Magistrates falter, limp, or halt in their Duties. Medea never knew so many Balsamic Herbs to renew the old Age of Jason, as a prudent Prince doth Rules and Methods to cure all the Distempers of his Kingdom, preserve it in a perfect Health, or restore it when declining.  
The Consideration of all which, made 
(g) Quam multis virtutibus opus est, quibus velut anchoris 〈◊〉 navis firmatur? quam varia prudentia, qua velut clavo gubernetur? Ep. ad Imp. Reg. etc.  Lipsius say, How many Virtues are necessary as Anchors to fasten the Ship of the Commonwealth? how various Prudence, as a Rudder to govern it?   

CHAP. XIV. Of a Prince's Courage and Conduct in Military Affairs.  
IT is not only necessary that a Prince should know and exercise all those Royal Virtues that make him adorable on the Throne, and in his Cabinet-Council, when he is clothed with the Robes of Majesty: 
The Benefits to the Subjects under a Martial Prince.  But he must likewise, for the preservation of his People from Foreign Invasions, enlarging of his Empire, and keeping his Subjects in a profound Peace at home, free from intestine Seditions and Rebellions, put on his Armour, and act the Part of a Generalissimo.  
This requires, according to the 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pol. lib. 2. c. 7.  Philosopher, many Virtues to establish it. Therefore in another place 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Id. l. 7. Pol. c. 2. Laws for encouraging Soldiers.  he saith, In some Countries the Laws were framed towards the attaining of particular Ends to the Governors and People: and in some the End of the Laws were, that they might rule over their Neighbours; as he instanceth in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan Government, where the greatest part of their Laws were accommodated to Warfare; and concludes, That in all Nations which can hope to be Superior to others, such Laws are in honour; as he instanceth in the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celtae. So in Carthage, to encourage Military Service, so many Rings were given to the Soldiery, as they had served in several Expeditions. In Macedonia it had been a Law, that he that had killed no Enemy, was girt with an Halter: And among the Scythians, That such an one should not drink of a Cup which at a certain Solemn Feast was to pass round. Among the Spaniards there were as many Obelisks, or pointed Pillars, set about their Graves, as they had killed Enemies. All which, and infinite more Places in 
(c) The necessity of having a Standing Force, is for preventing Rebellion, and defending against Foreigners; as appears in Aristotle. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 7. c. 8.  him, and other Authors produceable, sufficiently clear the necessity of a Prince's both having and encouraging Military Force: and all are as so many Arguments, That it is very necessary, and conducible to the Prince's Glory and Safety, as well as his Peoples, that he be not only valiant and courageous in his own Person, but that he understand the Office of a great General. There are none more famous in the World, than such Princes as have themselves led and headed their own Armies; as is most eminently proved in Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. So in our King Richard the First, and Edward the First.  
Hence it is that 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Di●. l. 13.  Caesar was wont to say, There are two things which obtain, keep, and increase the Princedom, viz. Soldiers and Money. For, as the great 
(e) Non ignavia magna imperia contin●ri, sed virorum armorumque faciendum certamen.  Historian observes, By Sloth no great Empires are held together, but it must be done by Force of Men and Arms: It being 
(f) Sua retinere, privatae domus; de alienis certare, regi●m 〈…〉. 15. Annal.  the part of a Private Family to retain its own; but to carry Arms abroad, is a Kingly Praise.  
Such a Prince who hath (when a Subject) hazarded his Life for his King and Country, shown his great skill in ordering and providing for his Army, in disciplining it, 
How a Military Prince prevents Rebellious of his Subjects.  hath been fortunate and successful, hath a Genius to military Employment, a brisk and vigorous Soul, not only (when he comes to be Sovereign himself) puts a fresh Spirit into his People by raising their Hopes and Confidence that he will increase the Glory of his Nation; but it makes him secure at home from Seditions and Rebellions. For he is very foolhardy, or desperately Revengeful, that will challenge a single Man who is experimented to have Valour and Skill at his Weapon: much more is he who knowing his Prince such an one, and who hath the Power of his Kingdom to assist and defend him, will offer to molest his peaceable Reign, unless he find some advantageous opportunity strangely favourable to his Design, or take some Season before such a Prince be well settled in his Throne (as despairing ever after to effect any thing) and be in that desperate Condition, that if he than cannot push forward his Designs, he must for ever live inglorious and miserable. Such was the Case of the rash, ingrateful, and aspiring Duke of Monmouth, who to the eternal discredit of the name of Protestant, so unpolitickly as well as maliciously raised the late Rebellion against his Lawful Sovereign, pretending a Legitimacy, which his Father (that the best of all Men living knew the falsehood of) disowned, and more than once made public Declaration of it. How he prospered in this attempt, the World knows; and if He and his Advisers had not been besotted, they might have easily foreseen.  
Besides this great and happy advantage to a valorous and Military Prince, 
How a courageous Prince secures his Subjects from Foreign Enemies.  in the securing his own Country in Peace within themselves, the Benefit is likewise great in the preventing of any affronts, injuries, or Indignities to him or his People, from any of his Neighbours; for none dare 
(g) N●m● provocare au let aut facere in juriam ei Regno aut populo, quem intelligit expeditum atque promptum ad vindicandum. Vita Alex.  provoke or do Injury to a King, his Kingdom, or People, saith Lampridius, that knows the Prince prepared, forward, and ready to vindicate his People.  
This military Genius in a Prince being supperadded to his other Royal Virtues and Qualifications, furbisheth all their Arms, sets a fresh Gloss and Lustre upon them; and such a Prince being generally successful in his Attempts, (for that commonly gives the first notice of his Courage and Conduct) will have every one readily flock to his Standard, to 
(h) Objicient se mucronibus insidiantium, & se suaque jactabunt, quocun que desideraverit Imperantis salus. Sen. 1. de Clem  expose themselves betwixt him and the points of Traitors Swords, will have them throw themselves and their Fortunes wherever the safety of their King requires it. So Cicero notes, that Fabius Maximus, Marcellus, Scipio, Marius and other great Generals, had the Emperor's Office and Armies committed to them not only for their Virtues, but also by reason of their fortunateness, to whom 
(i) Cic. pro Manilio. Quibus etiam venti tempeslatesque obsecundant.  the Winds and Tempests have been favourable. It greatly 
(k) Vehementer enim pertinet ad bella administranda, quid hosts, quid socii, de Imperatoribus existiment. Idem.  conducing to the management of War, what opinion the Enemies and Allies have of such Generals, as the same Orator notes: and the like may be said of Warlike Kings.  
What immortal Glory is it to England, that it hath had King Richard the First, 
Of King Richard the First.  who carried his victorious Ensigns to the Holy Land! What a Memorial of his Name, and of the Prowess of his People hath King Edward the First left to all Posterity, by the advancing his conquering Arms into the very Highlands of Scotland! 
Of King Edward the Third, and the Black Prince.  What renown did King Edward the Third, and the Black Prince his Son win in France, when they not only won so great Victories, but brought the King Prisoner, and (what no Nation else can boast of) had at the same time the King of Scotland also Prisoner! It may be easily conceived that these two valiant Princes, and the Sons of that great King, spirited the whole English Nation; and in that Age the Renown of it equalled, what now the French ascribe to their great King.  
The Annals swell with the Achievements of Henry the Fifth, who in so few Years, 
Of Henry the Fifth.  upon the matter, subdued all France. So that his Infant Son was Crowned King at Paris.  
It is not to be expected that many Ages can produce such Examples; but every Reader of History may observe, That in every Age some one or two Crowned Heads carry the Trophies from all the rest, fill their Countries with Triumphal Arches, and raise pyramids of Glory to their own, and their Country's high Renown.  
A strange Factiousness in the Reigns of our three last Kings, and the dreadful Rebellion, 
Why our three last Kings could not appear so Formidable abroad.  have deprived them of the opportunity of showing the English Prowess on the public Theatre, as it had been before. Yet when they were employed, they showed they still retained the old English Valour; and now that God hath sent us a King who hath aided both the French and Spanish Armies, 
What we may expect under King James the Second.  more signally Triumphed at Sea over the Dutch, than any Admiral did before or since: Who hath a Soul and Genius inclined to Warlike and Heroic Actions, and hath with himself resolved, and publicly to his two Houses declared, by the Assistance and Blessing of God, He will adventure his Person as far as any Man in his Dominions for the Good of his People, and their safety; and endeavour to raise the renown and repute of England as high as any of his Royal Predecessors. I cannot see (if God prolong his Reign) why we should not hope to reap all the advantages either England or any other Nation have enjoyed under their most Victorious Princes: and though by so early a Rebellion he hath been necessitated to enter the Field so soon, to suppress his ungrateful Subjects; it was but the giving him occasion to whet that Sword, and scour his Armour, which had long been unexposed to the Sun; and by this Specimen of his Courage, Conduct, and good Fortune, and his Subjects Valour, show to the World, that he is able to secure his People from any Foreign Hostile Attacques: And if any of his Neighbours be found to have furnished these Rebels with Arms and Money; no doubt his Loyal Subjects will be very pressing to be employed to repay their kindness: 
Character of a Martial Prince.  and they will find, that 
(l) Tanti esse exercitum, quanti Imperatorem. Florus, l. 2. c. 18.  according to the King's Warlike Spirit, so will his Armies be; it being true of himself, what 
(m) Nullum genus belli sit in quo illum non exercuerit fortuna. Cicero pro lege Manil.  Cicero saith of another, That there hath been no kind of War in which Fortune hath not exercised him; so that his Armies may be secure both in his Discipline and Example. The Qualifications of an Emperor (as 
(n) Labour in negotio, industria 〈◊〉 agendo, celeritas 〈◊〉 consiciendo, etc. Ibid.  Cicero describes them) all concurring in his Royal Person, (viz.) Labour in Business, Fortitude in Danger, Industry in Action, and Swiftness in Execution, joined with great Temperance, Faith and Humanity; to which I may adjoin that of Claudian, 
— Ductorque placebit,  
Qui non praecipiti rapiet simul omnia casu;  
Sed qui maturo vel laeta, vel aspera rerum  
Consilio momenta regens, nec tristibus impar,  
Nec pro successu tumidus: spaciumque norandi,  
Vincendique modum, mutatis noscet habenis.    

CHAP. XV. Of the Burden and Care of Kings in Governing.  
THere are as many other Virtues requisite in a good King, as there are in a good Man; but I have only treated of those that are the Orientest of the Crown Jewels.  
I shall now consider two great advantages, that accrue to People by Kingly Government: The first is the Burden and Care that Kings undergo in the Government of their People; and the second, the benefit to the People in the Hereditariness of Monarchy: and then pass to the King's Sovereignty, and the principal Branches of it.  

(a) Nihil aliud est Imperium, nisi cura salutis alienae. Lib. 29.  Ammianus tells us, That Empire is nothing else but the Care of the safety of others, which, according to the extent of their Dominions, the well or ill Temperedness of their Subjects, are greater or less, as will be obvious to all that will consider the continual Consultations and Directions, 
The Benefit of Subjects by their Prince's Care.  necessary to be sedulously undergone and issued forth, the Dispatches, Intelligences and regular ordering such an immense Body: Which made the great 
(b) Omnium otium illius labour, omnium delicias illius industria, omnium vacationem illius occupatio.  remissam aliquando animam ●abe●it, nunquar● solute 〈◊〉 Senec. Consol. ad Polyb.  Moralist and Courtier experimentally to assert, That the Sovereign's Watchfulness makes our Sleep secure, his Labour procures our holidays, his Industry our Delight, his continual Employment our Vacation; and that he may enjoy sometimes a Relaxation, but never a Freedom from Cares. Which indeed can be no otherwise, when we consider what he elsewhere 
(c) Vnius curam excubare pro sdute singulorum atque universorum.  saith, That the Care of this one Sovereign watcheth for the Health of the whole, and every particular. So that the immense 
(d) Hae● immensa multitudo, unius Anima circundata, illius spiritu regitur, illius ratione flectitur. Id. de Clem. c. 3.  Multitude (whether we take it for Men or Business) is encompassed with the Soul of one, by his Spirit is governed, and by his Reason is bowed or inclined.  
I find it reported of Pericles, That so often as he was made Commander in Chief, he used at the putting on the Military Cloak, to excite himself to the consideration of the Weight of his Employment, by observing that he was to command over Freemen, 
(e) Plut. in Apop.  Grecians and Athenians; upon which Reflection he was induced to approve himself more Diligent, Careful and Industrious, 
The Weight of Government.  having the Burden of all their concerns upon him.  
So a great and learned 
(f) Non licet do●mitabundum esse qui clavo asside●●emper itaque assidue Principi vigilandum est, ne quid erret, quia non nisi plurimorum p●rnicie delinquit. Lipsius' Epist.  Author tells us, He ought not to sleep who sits at the Helm, to pilot the Ship, since no Sea hath so great Tempests, as every Kingdom hath. Therefore a Prince is assiduously and constantly to watch, lest he err; because he cannot do so, but it is with Mischief to many.  
So the 
(g) Alia ex aliis cura fatigat, Vexatque animos nov● tempestas: Non sic Libycis Syrtibus furit alternos volvere fluctus, Non curarum somnos domitor p●ctora solvit.  Tragedian, not unelegantly according to his wont, describes the Cares of Kings thus,— One Care adds Fatigues to another, and new Tempests unquiet their minds; so that the successive rolling Waves of the Sea, rage's not so on the Libyan Shelves or Quicksands, nor doth sleep, the Subduer of Cares, unload their Breasts.  

(h) Aelian. Variar. Histor. lib. 2. Lampridius in vita. Who not fit for Government.  Alexander Severus having Information, That Ovinius Camillus (a Senator of an Ancient Family, but withal delicately effeminate) intended a Rebellion, affecting the Government; sent for him to the Palace, and gave him thanks, that he, when other good Men refused, did spontaneously offer himself to take care of the Republic; carried him to the Senate, and called him his Companion in the Empire; took him home, and made him wear the Imperial Robes; took him to walk with him a five Miles march, allowing him, when tired, an Horse; and when he was wearied of riding (being one not used to bodily Labour) he ordered him a Chariot, and by other ways, letting him understand, that the weight of Government was not to be sustained by such Shoulders as his, so wearied and discouraged him, that he desired to be freed from the toylsomeness of it: and when he understood the Emperor's drift, and expected his severity, he only recommended him to those Soldiers that were forward to elect him, and sent him to his Village.  
If therefore such little Trials discouraged Camillus, what must we think it will do any Prince that hath untractable Subjects, who force him to make Essays of various Methods to reclaim them, and of a constant standing upon his Guard to secure himself and the Government? Such are they who make many Princes Reigns Calamitous, that might have been calm and peaceable.  
Kingdoms, saith my Lord St. Alban, represent our Bodies, 
Many Particulars wherein the Burden of Government is discovered.  have their times of Health and Sickness, Seasons of Prosperity and Adversity, flourish with Wealth, and languish in Poverty and Want, suffer Distempers, Alterations and Changes. If therefore the Care and Concern of the Physician be great, that hath the Health of many Patients under his Cure: How much more must this great Aesculapius' be, who hath the superintending of infinite Numbers of Subjects of all Degrees, to preserve them in their perfect State of Felicity and Happiness, to watch over the growth of depraved Humours, and hinder their Ferments from boiling into the Fevers and Calentures of Rebellion, to remove all the Obstructions that may hinder the equal distribution of Nourishment in Trade, Commerce, and the free Energy and Force of the Laws; so to order the infinite Varieties of Tempers and Dispositions, that the very lucta and jarring of them, may produce an Harmony in the whole. Besides these, there is a Necessity to cherish the Virtuous and the Brave, to discountenance the Vicious and Debauched, and keep them from infecting others; and finally so to manage all things, as not only the present Age, but remote Posterity, may find the happy Effects of his Reign. This is to undergo the nobilem Servitutem, as Antigonus told his Son, Kingship was. 
Governors to be endowed with various Qualifications.   
Therefore Philo observes, That as the Pilot must change his Sails and Rudder; and as the Physician useth not one kind of Remedy for all Diseases, but observing the Increase or Remissness of Symptoms, the plenty or want of Humours, and according to the changes of Causes, tries various Experiments: So a Supreme Governor ought to be multiform, or endowed with variety of Qualifications; to act one way in times of Peace, and another in War: being opposed by few, to act resolutely and courageously; if by many, to add to these Authoritative Suasives; in public Dangers to act himself, and to commit those Ministeries to others which require Labour more than Conduct: In his Councils to be a Judge, in his Exchequer an Accountant, in his Armies a General, in his Navies Admiral; in his whole Dominions the prime Gentleman, Patriot, and Peer, in Virtue as well as Place.  
Besides all these foregoing Considerations, though a Prince by his own Justice, Prudence and other Regal Virtues, and the well disposedness of his People may keep his own Domimions in Peace: and though there were no Whirlwinds, Earthquakes or Trepidations of Faction and Sedition in his own Kingdom; yet a King's Care is no less in making diligent Observations upon the Designs and Actions of all his Neighbour-Princes and States; to shelter his own Subjects from Tempests and Hurricanes from abroad, to divert Storms, 
A Prince's Care in preserving his People at home and abroad.  to mingle Interests, or divide, as shall be most for the advantage of his Subjects; to assist his Allies, to countermine the Clandestine Designs of his Enemies abroad.  
These require an Atlas to support this immense Structure of Government: 
The Employment of many under a Prince.  These require many Hands of the roughest, delicatest and strongest; many Feet of the swiftest and steadiest; many strong Shoulders and brawny Arms; many severe commanding or charming Eyes; many wise, subtle and toiling Brains; infinite Varieties of Tempers and Dispositions, which must be directed, ordered and employed by that presiding Soul, that every where, in every part, and in all seasons, must give Life and Energy to all its Members, Faculties and Employments.  
Furthermore, 
A Prince much concerned fo● his Fame.  the Actions of Princes after their deaths, will be judged 
(i) Suum cuique decus pos●●● it is rependit. Tacit. 4. Annal.  without Flattery and Varnish. As after Death and Corruption of parts, the Virtues of Kings perfume their Graves, ennoble, and by Examples, refine Posterity, and leave a taste of immortality behind, out-living their Marble. So if they rule ill, they cannot think by their 
(k) Praesenti potentia extingui posse sequertis avi m●moriam. Id.  present Power, to extinguish the memory of the next Age, saith the judicious Historian. Therefore Lipsius saith, 
‖ Post fata nullus est locus, nullum tempus quo funestorum Principum manes a posteris exe●rationibus conquiescent.  After their Deaths, there is no place then, or time, wherein the Ghosts of detested Princes will be free from Execration.  
Since therefore Kings are like heavenly bodies, cause good or evil times, have much Veneration, but no rest; since their Examples are constantly imitated; so that, as 
* A● virtutem ille praeit? sequimur: a● vitia? inclinamus: bene beateque agit? slorem●s: improspere? labimur aut ruimus cum illo. Epist. ad Polit. Flexibiles in quamcunque partem du●imur a Principe & sequaces. Panegyr.  Lipsius saith, If a Prince lead to Virtue, we follow; if to Vice, we easily bend to it; if he live happily, we flourish; if unfortunately, we fall into the precipice with him: Or that of Pliny be true, That Subjects are mostly pliant, and easily handed into whatsoever way the Prince leads; it necessarily follows, That this Consideration must bring a great Addition to their Cares. For such elevated Souls must needs undergo great Anxiety, how to comport themselves so, as being conspicuous in Virtue and Conduct, they may be secure of good Report. For as 
(l) Omnia facta dictaque Principis rumor excipit, nec magis ei quam Soli latere contigit. 1. de Clem  Seneca saith, Fame wafts abroad all the Deeds and Works of Princes, that they cannot more lay hid than the Sun. Hence Possibly we may conclude the Reason of that Inscription on Constantine's and others Coin, Soli invicto Comiti: For as the Sun, not only by his Light and enlivening Heat, brings that unspeakable benefit to the whole Earth and living Creatures, as a King is to do to his Subjects; so by its Diurnal Motion, we discover it never to be at rest.  
Therefore it must be a great Care in a Prince (that is placed in his Kingdom, as the Sun in our Vortex, whereby his Actions can never be long hid) that he act nothing that 
(m) Cordati & magni Principis est nihil committere quod ipsius dignitati aut famae detrahit.  may detract from his Fame, and the Dignity of his Place. All the Actions of Sovereigns, being not only Examples but Precepts; there being no such Incentments to Virtue or Vice, as their Practices.  
Besides, 
A Prince to be Exemplary in Virtue.  what I have hitherto delivered on this Head, there lies still an heavier Burden upon a Prince, That for his Subject's sake, he be not only virtuous himself, but by all his Industry, endeavour to take care that they be so likewise. I know this is much facilitated by his own Example: For as 
(n) Vita 〈…〉 ad 〈…〉, ad 〈…〉 perio nobis 〈…〉 quam exemplo. Pane●●●.  Pliny saith, The Life of the Prince is a standing Law of manners, to it we direct our course, are all Heliotropes turning to it. For Subjects need not so much command as Example: yet we find, that when some in the Senate moved 
(o) 〈…〉 suasurus 〈…〉 quibus 〈…〉 essemus. Lib 3. Annal.  Tiberius, that he would restrain the Roman Luxury; he writes to them, That he knows not whether he should persuade them to pass by the strong and overgrown Vices, rather than to discover how unable they were to suppress them; and so tells them that he would not have the matter of envy to fall upon him, but refers it to the proper Officers: There being 
(p) Majus aliqued & excelsius a 〈…〉. Ibid.  something greater and more sublime, required of a Prince, (viz. the guarding of Italy, the Sea and Provinces.  
By this we may see how arduous a task it is to root out vicious Customs and Habits, which by a short Intermission of Executing the Laws severely, will soon be so overgrown, 
A Prince to 〈◊〉 care that hi● Subjects be Virtuous.  that it will be much Labour to dig up their Roots, and requires a long and frequent weeding, till all the Young Plants, the Evil Plentiful Seed hath produced, be cleansed out of the Ground.  
This Tiberius, that declined this task, was at that time in such esteem, that some Provinces (as particularly the further Spain) would have built Temples to him; and he denying that, yet could tell the Senate, That it was 
(q) Majoribus meis dignum, rerumque vestrarum providum, con ant●●● in periculis, offensionur● pro utilitate publica non pavidum credant. Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.  enough to him that he possessed the Supreme place, and desired them to witness, and Posterity to remember, That they believed he was worthy of his Ancestors, was provident of their Affairs, constant in Danger, not fearful to give Offence to any, for the profit of the Commonwealth. These things, to him, should be Temples and the beautifullest Statues. In this we find a short Description of the Burden of a Prince, and a shorter but comprehensive one in 
(r) Maximo Imperio maximam esse cur 〈◊〉. Ad Caesarem.  Sallust, That the greatest Empires have the greatest Cares.  

(s) Sed 〈◊〉 adstricti moris A●ctor fuit antiquo ipse cultu victuque; 〈◊〉 inde in 〈◊〉 & aemulandi amor validior quam poena ex legibus. & met●●. 3. Annal.  Tacitus tells us of Vespasian. That he was Author of a stricter manner of living than formerly, using the Ancient Frugal Diet, and plainer ; which had that effect, that the study to imitate the Prince, was more efficacious, than the Fear and Punishment of the Laws.  
If then, to be conspicuous in all sorts of Virtue, and the Actions 
(t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 5. Polit. c. 10.  that flow from them, and the whole, higher and lower class of them, in the most Comprehensive Qualifications, be no small Labour, and require no small sedulous Care to effect in ones self; how much more must it be, to make so many Millions more Virtuous by Example, Precept, strict Vigilance and Punishments? Every one that attentively reflects on this, must needs own it an Herculean Labour, and such as exceeds almost the Apprehension of the Subjects.  
Since then, we are happy in such a King as hath laid this as a Corner Stone upon which his Throne is built, 
King James the Second discouraging Vice.  by his own Example, to discountenance all Vice; and since so great and weighty a Burden of the well-ordering and governing so great a People lies with great pressure upon him, (for our ease and tranquillity) let us not be so impolitic, unworthy, or ingrateful by Seditions, Factions, or Rebellions to cause him to undergo more disquiets. For the result will be, Our own Miseries and Calamities will sit close behind us, when we set our Faces against such a Prince, worthy of the most Imperial of Diadems.   

CHAP. XVI. Of the King's Authority and Sovereignty.  
AN awful Reverence, 
The Sublimeness of The Subject.  Qualm, and Trembling, must necessarily surprise every one that considerately raiseth his Thoughts to contemplate so sublime a Subject as the Sovereignty of Princes; lest what he delivers should appear too dis-spirited, and below the dignity of the Theme; or he should be guilty of such Indiscretion, as to think he could enrich the Crown and Sceptre with Lacker of his own Composure.  

(a) Magnum propiusque noscendum id eruditissimo viro visum. Lib. 6. Epist. 16. Jam navibus cinis inciderat, quo prepius accederet, calidior & densior. Jam pumices nigrique & ambusti, fracti igne lapides. Ib.  Pliny the younger tells us, that the great Naturalist, his Uncle, was so desirous to discover the true causes of the burning of Vesuvius, what materials they were that afforded Fuel to so lasting a Fire, and by what imprisoned Spirits, so violent eruptions of Flame and Cinders, were at times belched out of the Caverns of that Mountain (though less stupendious than Aetna, Hecla, or other Vulcano's) that his curiosity led him to climb so near the Eruptions of those Flames, that Posterity lost the Benefit of his Observations, by his untimely Death in the approaches he made.  
We daily see the Pyralis not only sing her Wings, but often lose her Life by her rash approaches to the Flame. It behoves me therefore, with all the Circumspection I can, to endeavour to keep myself from such a Fate, as Temerity, too prying or daring an Attempt, may bring upon me on the one hand; or that I fall not into as unpitied a Destiny of being contemned and despised for too gross and palpable Flattery, in equalling the Throne of Kings with that of the Deity. 
The Flattery of some, especially of Valerius Maxim●●.   
A bold stroke of this kind of Sycophantry we find in 
(b) Penes quem hominum deorumque consensus, maris ac terrae Regimen esse voluit: cujus coeles●i providentia virtutes de quibus dicturus sum benignissime foventur, vitia severissime vindicantur. Prologo.  Valerius Maximus his Epistle Dedicatory to Tiberius; wherein he tells him that he invokes him as Patron of his Work, to whom, by the consent of Men and Gods, the Government of Sea and Land was given; by whose Heavenly Providence, the Virtues he was to treat of were most benignly cherished, and the Vices severely chastised: and in the same stile (though otherwise reputed a grave Author) he goes on, ascribing a Divinity to his Person; telling him, that if from Jove the ancient Orators begun their Speeches, and the Poets invoked some Deity, He more 
(c) Mea parvitas eo justius ad favorem tuum decur●it, quod catera divia●● 〈◊〉 opiaione c●lligitur tu●, prasenti side, paterno avitoque 〈◊〉 par videtur. Idem.  justly courted his Favour; other Divinities being founded upon men's Opinions, but that of Tiberius', by the Testimony of the present Age, was equal to the Deities of Julius or Augustus. Yet this Tiberius was not only a wicked Prince, but one that rejected such Deifying, as we find in Tacitus, that the farther Spain having sent Ambassadors to the Senate, that according to the Example of Asia, they might erect a Temple to Tiberius and his Mother; upon which occasion, (saith my 
(d) Valid●s alioqui 〈◊〉 ●onoribus, & re pond●●dum ratus iis qu●rum rumore 〈…〉. 4. Annal. 〈◊〉 ●enies Temples to be built to his Honour.  Author) being resolved to slight the Honour, and to stifle the Rumour, that he inclined to Ambition, he tells the Senate, That he had not appeared averse to the desires of those of Asia, because Augustus had not prohibited a Temple to be built to him and Rome, at Pergamus; and he was resolved to observe all his deeds and resolutions as a Law, and had yielded to the Erecting that Temple, the rather, because to the Worship of himself, the Veneration 
(e) Quia ●ultui meo veneratio Senatus adj●ngebatur.  of the Senate was joined. But as it was pardonable once to have received that honour. so to be made sacred with the Image of the Deity through all the 
(f) Caeterum ut seme● recepiss● veniam habuerit; Ita per omnes Provinci is effigy numinum sa●●ari, ambitiosum & superbum; & van●scet Augusti honor si promiscuis 〈…〉 vulgatur. Idem.  Provinces, was to be Ambitious and Proud, and the Honour of Augustus would be lessened, if it were made common by promiscuous Adulations. Therefore he tells the Senate that he knew himself to be a mortal Man, and to exercise the offices of Men, and it was enough to him, if he filled the prime place, was worthy of his Ancestors, etc. (as I have touched before.) 
(g) Haemihi in 〈…〉, pro sepu●●●ris ●pernuntur. Idem. Vainglorious Princes.  These in their Minds, should to him be Temples, and the most beautiful Images, which should be durable; for those which are built of Stone, if the judgement of Posterity be turned to Hatred, are despised as their Sepulchers.  
Yet however this subtle Emperor managed this affair, 
Vainglorious Princes.  it must be acknowledged, that some Princes have been so Vainglorious, as to deem themselves above the condition of Mortals; as we have Instances in Amulius 
(h) Zo●aras Annal. Tom. 2. fol. 54.  King of the Latins, and after him in 
(i) Plutare. in Vita.  Heliogabalus, who endeavoured to appear such by imitating Lightning. So it is recorded of 
(k) Se quidem Jovis silium di●i, sed corporis agri vitia sentire. Curtius' lib. 4.  Alexander, that he desired to be reputed the Son of Jupiter Ammon; and when he was wounded at the assault of Mazaga, he said, though he was said to be Jupiter's Son, yet he felt the smart, though his Flatterers told him it was not Blood was spilt, but a more generous Ichor of the Gods that run in his Veins. So 
(l) Coelius Rhodig. lib. 3. c. 5.  Psaphon the Libyan, taught the Birds to style him a great God. So 
(m) Pezell. Mellif. Tom. 1. p. 228.  Lysander had Altars built to him, and Sacrifices appointed in Honour of him, and had his Brass Statue erected at Delphos. Julius 
(n) Suetonius, cap. 22.  Caesar likewise suffered such Honours to be decreed to him, as were the Badges and peculiar Ensigns of a Divinity, as Temples and Altars, a Priest and Couch. Of Augustus and Tiberius I have touched before. Caligula proceeded something higher, for he took off the Heads of the Statues of Jupiter Olympius, and other of their reputed Deities, and placed the figure of his own Head upon them, and had his Temples, Priests and Sacrifices, and was desirous to be worshipped as a Deity. The like Examples might be produced of Domitian, Dioclesian and others.  
It is to be owned, That the longer space of time is measured, since these kind of adorations were affected by these Heathen Emperors, 
How Princes may admit Honours.  the less of esteem and value they obtain; yet it is worth observing likewise, what the most judicious 
(o) Optima quippe mortalium alti●ma cupere: sic Herculem & Liberum apud Gracoes; Quirinum apud nos deum numero additos— unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam: nam contemptu Famae contemni Virtutes. Ibid.  Historian notes, upon the forecited occasion, That some ascribed the refusing of these Divine Honours to Tiberius' modesty; others, to the distrust he might have of the Senate's relishing it well; others interpreted it a Token of a low degenerate Spirit: for, as he observes, The best of all Mortals have coveted the highest Honours; so Hercules and Bacchus, among the Greeks, and among the Romans, Quirinus were added to the Number of the Gods! Therefore he commends Augustus, that hoped for such Honours, and to such Princes all things else are added. For that which he calls a prosperous Memory, he saith is principally to be obtained; and concludes, That Fame being contemned, so likewise are Virtues.  
Although therefore the Vanity of such Emperors, as required this Superfetation of Honour, 
Honour due to Sovereign Princes.  be justly censured; yet when we abstractedly consider the Sovereignty of Princes, from their Personal lessening of their esteem, by unkingly Vices; we must needs pay the greatest deference to it, as that which is a lively Shadow of that Divinity, by which Kings Reign.  
So 
(p) Majestas Imperii salutis est tutela.  Curtius tells us, That the Sovereignty is the Defence of that Salus Populi; which is the very Ground-Work-stone of Government: And Seneca truly observes, That once 
(q) Tolle Majestatem. omnisque 〈◊〉 Imperii contextus in multas parts diss●●iet. 1. de Clem  remove Majesty, that is, Sovereignty) and the whole Contexture of Government flies into Splinters, or is disjointed. For without a Sovereignty (beyond which is no Appeal) be lodged somewhere, no People can be governed: That 
(r) Tot mortalium millibus una anima praesideat. Ille enim vinculum per quod Respublica cobaeret; Ille spiritus vitalis quem haec tot millia trahunt; nihil ipfa per se futura nisi onus & praeda, si mens illa Imperii subtrabatur. De Clem. lib. 1. c. 3.  being that Soul, that Life which enlivens, directs and order all the Subjects in their several Capacities; more sensibly than the Philosopher's Aether, or Anima Mundi, doth the Macrocosm or Sublunary World. Therefore Seneca saith of the Sovereign, That he is the Bond which holds fast the State together; he is that vital Breath which so many Thousands draw in, which otherwise, as a liveless and unwieldy Load, would prove a Booty, if that Soul of the Empire were taken away.  
Of this Sovereignty of Princes it is, that 
(s) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 phant. apud Stobaeum, Serm. 46. Kings called Gods, as deriving Authority from God, or his Vicegerents.  Ecphantas the Pythagorean saith, It is the Privilege first of God, and then of the King, under him, not to be ruled by any: and it may be rationally conceived, that it was from this sense of absolute Sovereignty, flowing from the Divine Being that disposeth of the great and weighty Affair of Government; That Sovereigns are both ●n Scripture, and by Heathen and Christian Writers, called Gods: The import of which Name being a Denomination of a Being, Sovereign over other subjected Being's. In the Chapter of Monarchy I have recited some of the expressions in Scripture; and for Heathen Writers, one can scarce read any Historian, where their Emperors are not called Dii or Divi; 
(t) Contzen de Rep. lib. 7. c. 4.  and in Justinian, Divus Imperator is generally used for Emperor.  
So the Majestic Pavilions, or Cloth of Estate, under which the Emperors usually sat, were called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, little Heavens, for such Gods to sit under: and tho' some 
(u) Sueton. in Domit. c. 13.  affected these too much, or had them given them by their Flatterers (as in Martial of Domitian, — Edictum Domini Deique nostri; and the Persian Monarches, more than any, affected such Titles, as 
(w) A●●mian. Marcel. Hist. 17.  Rex Regum Sapor, particeps Syderum, Frater Solis & Lunae; Sapor King of Kings, partaker of the Stars, or one endowed with the Heavenly Nature of the Stars, Brother of the Sun and Moon;) yet if we take these Expressions in the sense of the Emperor Cantacuzen, it may be allowed: For he saith, 
(x) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Apol. 6. adv. Mah●met.  That absolutely the Name of Lord, and so of God, is only due to God Almighty, and that man hath it, with some Addition of Person or Place. And we may consider, that as the Supremacy of Princes and their Governments is delegate from the highest (their Judgement being also called his) so in a general Name they are titled Gods, even by God himself, 
(y) Sthenid. Pythag●apad Stobaeum. Ser. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  because here on Earth, they should, for their Power, be his Imitators; and we find the Apostle Rom. 13. calls Supreme Governors, Potestates supereminentes.  
In the Codes we frequently read (long after Christianity was received) nostra Divinitas, nostra Perennitas, nostra Aeternitas, Divinae Vocis Oraculum: Yet we find the Christian Fathers refusing to give the Title of God to the Heathen Emperors. So 
(z) Hist. Eccles. lib. 6. in Pr●●●m. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Socrates saith, He doubts he shall be reprehended of some, because he did not style the Emperors most Divine, and Lords, and by other Titles, which the use of times had allowed: And 
(a) 〈…〉 imperatorem qui d●um dici●; nisi homo sit, non est Imperator. Apol. c. 33.  Tertullian saith, That he cannot call the Emperor God, either because he cannot lie, or dare not mock him; or because he will not be so styled, who is a Man: For he denies him (saith he) to be Emperor, who calls him a God; for unless he be a Man, he is no Emperor.  
This stile of God, the Samaritans gave to Antiochus 
(b) Joseph. Archaeol. 12. c. 7.  Epiphanes, styling him in their Epistles, God, who had, to his utmost, defiled the Temple of the true God: So the Jews in their 
(c) Act. Apost. 12. v. 22.  Acclamations, styled Herod Agrippa, no longer Man but a Deity; and 
(d) Cato in Orig. apud Macrob.  Mezentius, commanding his Subjects to offer unto him all such Sacrifices as they had Destinated to the Gods, professing withal, that no Deity was above himself; justly deserved the Title of contemptor Diuûm.  
The obsequious Impiety in the Elder times (saith 
(*) Titles of Honour, part 1. c. 4.  Mr. Selden) of attributing the Name of God to the Emperors, was the Cause, it seems, that, as well in the Christian as Heathenish Times and States, 
Swearing by the Prince.  the Subjects of the Empire continued that ill Custom of swearing by their Princes: So in Antoninus' and Commodus' time, it was usual to swear per Genium Principis, & per Principis Venerationem, as it is in a Rescript of 
(e) Const it. Alex. Seu. c. De rebus creditis.  Alexander Severus; under whom the learned 
(f) Citius per omnes Deos, quam per unum Genium Caesaris pejeratur. Apol. c. 28.  Tertullian upbraids the Romans, that they readilier forswore themselves by all the Gods, than by the one Genius of Caesar. Horace speaking of Augustus, saith, Jurandasque tuum per Nomen ponimus Aras: and 
(g) Nam Imperatori cum Augusti nomen accepit, tanquam praesenti & corporali Deo sidelis prastanda est devotio, & impendendus pervigil samulatus: Deo enim vel privatus, v●l militans servit, cum sideliter eum diligit, qui Deo regnat autore. Veget. de Re milit. c. 5. The Names of Heathen Deities in the Names of Kings.  Vegetius gives the Reason for it, because to the Emperor, when he takes the Name of Augustus upon him, faithful Devotion is to be exhibited, and watchful Service, as to a present and corporal God. For he that is a private, or a military Person, serves God, when he faithfully loves him who governeth by God's Authority: from whence and many other Authorities the great Selden saith it appears, how, both among Christians, Mahometans and Heathens, a certain Sanctitas Regum (as in Suetonius, Julius Caesar calls it) was specially regarded; and he instanceth in many Nations who had a Deities Name in the Kings; as from Baal and Astaroth, Beleastartus, Abdastartus, Ithobaal; so from Nebo a Babylonian Idol, Nebuchodonezar, Nabopollassar; so from Belin or Abellio, a British Deity, Cassebelin, Cynobelin. All which seem not only to be the Affectation of the Princes, but to be intended to denote the Divine Character that Princes bore. 
Titles of first Founders of Empires continued to Successors. Caesar.   
Hence we may Note, 
Titles of first Founders of Empires continued to Successors. Caesar.  That the Name of 〈◊〉 Czar is used by all the German and Muscovite Emperor's: because the Roman Empire was founded by Julius Caesar; and this Custom was of older Date: For in Holy Story, all the Egyptian Kings, till Solomon's time, are called Pharaoh; which was not a proper Name or Surname of a Family, but only a Title which every one had belonging to him, as he was King; which, as Manetho saith, begun in Pharaoh Narecho, and Josephus saith in Menis, much ancienter than Abraham; but Suidas is positive, That it was derived from the first King, or him that first had that called Ptolemy's: So the Parthian Princes, from Arsaces (their first great Monarch) were called Arsaces; according to whose Memory, saith 
(h) Cujus memoriae hunc honorem Parthi tribuerunt, ut omnes exinde Reges suos Arsacis nomine nuncupent. Hist. lib. 41.  Justin, the Parthians attributed that Honour, that all their Kings, from thence forward, were called Arsaces.  
So the Title of Augustus was given to Octavius, next Successor to Julius, by the Senate, as if he had been something more than Human, saith 
(i) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In vita.  Dio: And as 
(k) Non tatum novo, sed etiam ampliore, cognomine, quod 〈◊〉 quaeque Religiosa & in quibus Augurato quid consecratur, Augusta dicuntur.  Suetonius saith, not only by a new, but a more ample Surname, because, that all Religious places, in which any thing Augurly was consecrated, were called Augnsta; for which he citys Ennius, Augusto Augurio, postque inclyta condita Roma est. This came from Augeo, which (besides the common sense of it) is a proper word enough to sacrifice, as augere Hostias; and in Sextus Pompeius Augustus is interpreted Sanctus; the Greeks interpret it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Venerable or most honourable; and it seems to be translated from the holy Use of the Word, whence it was derived: and as 
(l) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In vita.  Dio saith, a Designation of the splendour or greatness of their Dignity, the Emperors after were styled Caesares Augusti; neither of the words denoting any Power in them; but are now, and ever since the first Family ended, honorary. According to this kind of continuance of Names in Succession, are those Patronymics of Achemenidae in the Persian Kings, Alevadae in the Thessalian, Cecropidae in the Athenian; from Achemenes, Alevas, Cecrops: So the Alban Kings in Italy, had every of them the addition of Silvius, most of the Bithynian Kings were called Nicomedes.  
In the latter times, the Constantinopolitan Emperors much affected to give their Children and themselves, the great Name of Constantine. So were the Danish Kings anciently titled Shieldungs from their King Shield: The French had their Meroving, and the old Kentish Kingdom here its Oiscing from Merove and Oisca. Concerning this successive assuming such honorary Names from the first Families, the curious Reader may observe many more in the most disquisitive Mr. Selden.  
The use I make of it is to show, That Sovereign Princes, 
The Reason of such Titles.  as some of them affected to derive their Power and Authority from the Deity; so others from such as had been more Signal and Eminent in their several Reigns, that they might with the Title, seem to derive a Fame, Glory and Authority from them, and in those Attributes, be judged their rightful Successors. 
Of the first Kings from Adam.   
Before I treat of some Attributes that are given to Sovereign Princes, I shall take notice of some things I have either omitted, or less fully explained in the Chapter of Monarchy; especially considering it will give some light to the Authority and Sovereignty, many learned Men have ascribed to Princes in general.  

(m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Cedrenus.  Cedrenus makes Adam the first King and Governor, when he saith he governed or commanded all mankind as long as he lived, and Seth succeeded him in the Empire: and if we may believe the Letter of Alexander the Great to Aristotle, mentioned by 
(n) Lib. 2. c. 11.  Joseph Ben Gorion a Jew, and Rabbi Abraham, Zacuthius and others, Kenan the Son of Enoch, Grandchild of Seth, was Emperor over all the World. In Berosus we find the Kings of Chaldaea, that were before the Flood; were Alorus, Alasparns, Amchon, Amenon, Metalarus, Daorus, Adorachus, Amphis, Ottartes and Xisuther; which according to Cedrenus and others, was Noah: From him the Greek Authors derive the supreme Monarchy of the Earth to Sem.  
The first mention in Holy Writ of a Kingdom, is that of Nimrod's; 
The first Kingdom from Nimrod.  of whom Moses saith, The beginning of his Kingdom was in Babel, Erech, Acad, and Calna, in the Land of Sinaar: and he is by most Writers judged the Founder of the Assyrian Monarchy, which he had begun about the Forty fifth Year of Abraham. Cedrenus saith, The Assyrians made Nimrod a God, and placed him among the Stars of Heaven, and called him Orion. In his Age (saith the Judicious 
(o) Tit. Hon. ●. 1. p. 1●.  Selden) there was so general a Propagation of this Title of King over the Earth, that there is scarce a Nation whereof there is Memory in those Ages, without a King, or Prince, or Monarch assigned to it. So, besides the Division of the Earth among Noah's Posterity, (said in Scripture to be according to their Language, and according to the Families in their Nations) we find in Profane Histories, 
King's first Governors in all Countries.  that the Kingdom of the Sicyonians began in Aegialeus, that of Tanaus in Scythia, and of Vexoris in Egypt; and others are cast in, in the Age of Nimrod. In the Holy Text also are frequent Occurrences of Kings to be referred to that Age; as that of Abraham's Wars with Kedorlaomer King of Elam, and the Kings of divers other Nations are mentioned; whence it is, 
(p) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Cedrenus saith, that about Serug's days (who was born about 170 Years after the Flood) Men arrogating to themselves Power over each other, made themselves Emperors and Kings, and did first use Arms, and made War on each other.  
Afterwards, the Course of the Holy Story shows us the same, not only naming expressly the particular Kings (which had been made either by Sword or by Choice), but saith, The Israelites desired Samuel to give them a King, to judge them, according as all other Nations had.  
Although, saith Mr. Selden, divers of the chiefest States of the old Grecians (and I think (saith he) only of the Grecians in the elder Ages) were in their most flourishing Times Democracies, or Optimacies; yet the more ancient States there, were in every place Monarchies, as is expressly noted by 
(q) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. In Boeoticis.  Pausanias, That every where in Greece, in the ancient Times, their States were Monarchical, and not Popular.  
Having premised this, I come now to the Epithets given to such Sovereign Princes, as Kings, Emperors, Lords, and the Attributes of Majesty, etc. in the Abstract, or in the second or third Person, and other high and lofty Titles given to them, either justly, 
The Title of Kings.  or by Flattery.  
Concerning Kings, 
The Title of Kings.  the Account that I have given of them in the Chapter of Monarchy, may suffice. I shall only add, That in the Assyrian Empire, Nebuchodonosor is styled King of Kings; 
Daniel, c. 2.  and after the translation of this Empire to the Persians, Artaxerxes Mnemon, in his Commission to Ezra for the Restitution of Jerusalem, and the Temple, thus salutes him; Artaxerxes King of Kings, to Ezra the Priest: And on the Great Cyrus his Tomb this Epitaph was written in Persian Characters, (if you believe the Authors that have it), 

(r) Eustach. ad Dionys. & Strab. Geog. 15.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Here I Cyrus' lie, who was King of Kings.  And the bare Name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the King, without addition, is especially used for the Persian; whence the Nation is styled also, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The most Kingly Nation. 
(s) Diodor. bibl. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Sesoosis, the same with Sesostris in Herodotus, King of Egypt, attributed to himself the Title of King of Kings, in his erected Columns of Victory: And 
(t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Earth and Water given as Tokens of Homage.  Plutarch reports, That Tigranes King of Armenia was angry, and would not vouchsafe to answer Lucullus, because in his Letter he had styled him King only, and not King of Kings.  
The Acknowledgement of Regal Supremacy, paid by way of Homage, from Princes or People, under the Subjection of such Kings, was the Acceptance, upon their Demand, of Earth and Water: A special Example of which, is in 
(u) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Her●dot. in Melpom.  Darius' Letters to Indathyrsus King of the Scythians; where he first invites him to the Field: but if he would not, then, bringing to the Sovereign as Gifts, Water and Earth, come to a Parley; as the Words run. So in the Assyrian Empire, the King commands 
(w) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. Judith.  Olophernes, That he should bid all the Western Nations prepare him Earth and Water. By the yielding up of these two Elements, they acknowledged a giving up to those Sovereigns their Jurisdiction over them.  
When William the Conqueror landed at 
(x) Malmesh. de Gestis Reg. lib. 3. Hist. Norman. apud Camd.  Hastings in Sussex, as he came out of his Ship, he fell down; and one of his Knights told him, Sir, you have possession of England, and shall be King: and observing that he had took up Sand and Earth in his Hand, he added, And you have taken Livery and Seisin of the Country. So when Land is sold in England, the way of receiving Possession is by delivering a Clod of the Earth, and a Twig of Wood, if any be growing on it.  
To denote also the Sovereignty of such Princes, kissing of the Feet, or embracing their Knees, or Adoration was used. 
Kissing the Teet, Knees, and Hands of Princes.  
(y) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Herodotus saith, When the old Persians meet, you may know whether they be equal or not: for in Salutation they kiss one another; but if one be something inferior, they kiss only the Cheeks; and if one be far more ignoble, he falls down, adoring the other. The manner of which Adoration is yet observed in the Eastern Empires, as may be seen in the Prints of them in Mr. Ogilby's Asia, especially in Japan. Thence we have Adorari more Persarum, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is expressed by Euripides thus, personating Phrygius to Orestes, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉—  
Falling down, I adore thee, O King, after the Persian manner.  In Alexander's turning the Grecian Liberty into this Servitude, Q. Curtius expresseth it by Venerari, procumbere, & humi corpus prosternere; and thereof Justin saith, the 
(z) Retentus est a Macedonibus mos salutandi Reges, explosa adoratione. Jam coepisset Heliogabalus adorari Regum more Persarum.  Macedonians retained the manner of saluting their Kings, exploding the Adoration. Lampridius, speaking of Alexander Severus, saith, That he forbade himself to be adored; but Heliogabalus began to be adored after the Persian manner.  
As to the Kissing, the Learned 
(a) Tit. Hon. c. 3.  Selden saith, It was usual in Adoration among the Romans, either to kiss the Images of their Gods, or adoring them, to stand somewhat off before them, 
(b) Cicero in Varr. Act. 5. Lucret. lib. 1. Sape salutantum, etc.  solemnly moving the Right-hand to the Lips, and then casting it, as if they had cast Kisses, and turning the Body on the same Hand, (which was the right Form of Adoration): and it grew by Custom, first, that the Emperors (being next to Deities, and by some accounted as Deities) had the like done to them, in acknowledgement of their Greatness. After some of the Roman Emperors would be called Jupiter, be supposed carnally to lie with Venus and the Moon, and (upon their infinite suchlike frantic Conceits) pretended themselves to be Divine, they were not satisfied with Those usual Customs, but thought themselves much wronged, and their Majesty impaired, if they who saluted them 
(c) Dio Cass. Hist 59  presumed to kiss above the Knee. We find Examples of Kissing the Hands and Feet in Caligula: Therefore 
(d) Homo natus in hoc, ut mores liber●● civitatis Persica servitute mutaret. 2. de Benef. c. 5.  Seneca (speaking of his offering his Feet to kiss) says, He was a man born to that, so as to change the Customs of a Free City into Persian Servitude. Maximinus' Junior allowed the kissing the Knees, Feet, and Hands; and Diocletian (according to Pomponius Laetus) published an 
(e) Vbi omnes sine generis discrimine pro●● rati pedes exos●ularentur, exornans calceamenta auro, gemmis & margaritis.  Edict, That all without distinction, being prostrate, should kiss the Feet; therefore he adorned his Shoes with Gold, Gems, and Pearl. Yet this was not allowed by all: For Tiberius (as Suetonius tells us) oscula quotidiana prohibuit edicto; and the elder 
(f) Dii prohibeant ut quisquam ingenuorum pedibus meis osculum figat. Capitolin.  Maximin (although a Tyrannical and most wicked Prince, yet) would suffer none to kiss his Feet, saying, The Gods forbidden that any Freeman kiss my Feet: And Alexander Severus was only saluted by his Name, God save thee, Alexander; as Lampridius tells us, who adds, That if any bowed the Head, or spoke any thing like a Flatterer, if his Quality permitted, he was spurned away; or, if his Dignity allowed not such an Injury to be done him, he was laughed at aloud. And 
(g) Lib. 10. Epig. 72.  Martial, in Trajan's time, rejects those base Flatteries that had been used to Domitian, thus.  
Ad Parthos procul ite Pileatos,  
Inopes, humilesque, supplicesque,  
Pictorum sola basiate Regum.  
Princes use now only the kissing of the Hand (besides a profound Obeisance to them) in stead of these forementioned Adorations; and the kissing of the Hand is offered frequently as a Testimony of serviceable Love to other Great Persons, according to that of 
(h) Inest in aliis partibus quaedam Religio sicut dextra osculis aversa appetitur, fide porrigitur. The Romans, after they were a Commonwealth, hated the Name of King.  Pliny, As the Back of the Right-hand with a kind of Religiousness is desired, so with an assurance of Faith it is stretched out.  
This Name of King was among the Romans (after they settled themselves under the Government of a Commonwealth) reputed so contrary to their Liberty, (as implying in its Office too great an Absoluteness of Power) that in solemn memory of its being cast out by Brutus, they yearly celebrated on the Seventh of the Kalends of March (our Twenty third of February) their Feast Regifugium: And lest the giddy Multitude might desire again to have a King, they prohibited that no Concourse for Merchandise should ever happen upon the Nones of any Month, (King Servius Tullius his Birthday, they knew, was in the Nones, but not of what Month; therefore they provided it) fearing (saith 
(i) Veriti ne quid nun●inis collecta universitas, ob Regis d●siderium, novaret. Saturnal. c. 13.  Macrobius) lest the Multitude, gathered together at such Fairs, should innovate any thing by the desire of a King: And 
(k) Regem Romae posthac nec Dii nec homines esse patientur. De Divinatione, cap. 2.  Cicero, though he acknowledged that Caesar was revera Rex, fully a King in Power, yet (upon hate that continued of that Title) tells us, That hereafter neither Gods nor Men would permit any to be King of Rome. Therefore to palliate (as Mr. 
(l) Tit. Hon. cap. 2. Augustus denies the Title of King.  Selden saith) some part of his Ambitions, Caesar himself, being saluted King by the Multitude, withal perceiving that it was very distasteful to the State, (by the Tribunes pulling of the white Fillet from his Laurel) answered, Caesarem se, non Regem esse; refusing it utterly, and consecrating the Diadem, which Anthony would have often put upon his Head, to Jupiter. Yet the whole People were sensible that his Authority differed only in Name from that of King, as appeared by his Sentiment of it, who subscribed Julius his Statue with, 
Brutus quia Reges ejecit, Consul primo factus est;  
Hic, quia Consules ejecit, Rex postremo factus est.   
Thus much may suffice to show, 
Because the Absoluteness of Kings was against their Liberty.  That the Romans judged a King to have such Absoluteness, as in their Free-State was not to be endured; when as in the Change to Emperors they underwent more (by some of their Arbitrary Ruling) than they did under Kings: And though the Terms were milder, yet the Yoke of them was heavier. But such is the Nature of the Multitude, that if their Governors keep but the old Name of the Magistracy, they readilier yield Obedience to them; such power hath Custom. This Observation made Cromwell content himself with the Name of Protector, under which, by his Arts and Army, he exercised more Arbitrariness than ever had been by any King of England.  
I come now to the Title of Emperor. This at the first only denoted a General, or Leader of an Army. 
Title of Emperor first as General.  So Julius Caesar (having made himself Master of the Roman Free-State) thought it safer to retain than innovate his Title of Supremacy. Therefore having the perpetual Office of 
(m) Honours' nimies recepit, ut continuum consulatum, perpetuam Dictaturam, praefecturamque morum, insuper praenomen Imperatoris. Sueton. de Jul. Caesare.  Dictator and Consulship, with the place of General or Imperator (as the word had Relation to his Military Force) he took that also (being as willingly given as the rest) for a perpetual Title; this Title of Imperator being assumed both by Brutus and Cassius; as appears in their Coins, though they pretended to be the greatest asserters of the Roman Liberty, and the like occurrs in the Coins of Antonius, Lepidus, and the thirty Tyrants, and others.  
This Title of Imperator is said to have been a 
(n) Vita Jul. Cas. 〈◊〉.  Praenomen, by Suetonius, but it was often used after it, which when it was, it denoted either only, or chief, some great performance by Arms, in settling, or increasing the Empire; but when a Surname, in those elder times, it signified only the Emperor's Supremacy in the State; so in the Coin of Augustus, where the Inscription is, IMP. CAES. AUG. IMP. IX. TR. P.U. The Fore-name Imperator, signifies his Supremacy; and the latter signifies he had been General, and as such, it may be, deserved a Triumph nine times. The TR. P. V For Tribunitiae potestatis quintum, shows how often he had been Tribune of the People, which was every Year renewed; therefore in that the number of the Years of their Empire was expressed, as 
(o) Cassius, Hist. 53.  Dio observes. So that what Tacitus relates of Tiberius, was most true, that eadem Magistratuum vocabula, he retained the old Names of the Magistrates; so that the first Emperor's Authority and Sovereignty consisted in the Power of the Consuls, Dictator, Tribunes of the People, and the Title of Prince. 
Title of Prince.   
The Title of Princeps, Principatus and Principium, were proper Names also for these Emperors, and their greatness; therefore 
(p) Augusius cuncta discordiis civilibusfessa, nomine Principis sub Imperium accepit.  Tacitus saith, that Augustus took the Empire under the name of Prince, all being wearied with civil Discords; though Suetonius saith of Caligula, that Title was wanting, but that he should suddenly take the Diadem, and change the show of a Principality to the form of a Kingdom. Now it is to be observed as the Title of Emperor was taken from the Military Employment of a General; so this of Prince signified the Superiority of them in the Senate. For the Title of Princeps Senatus was known familiarly in Rome, and so might upon that Ground be used without Envy.  
Concerning the Grecians using 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for Emperor, the difference betwixt the Eastern and Western Empire, about both their Titles, and the more modern use of both, I must refer the Inquisitive Reader to the often, but never too much to be commended 
(q) Titles of Honour, par. 1. c. 2.  Mr. Selden; and shall only note out of him, that divers Civilians, especially of Italy and Germany, which profess the old Laws of Rome, tell us, That the Emperor is at this day of Right, Lord of the whole World, or Earth, as their Text also 
(r) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 F. ad Leg. Rhod. The Roman Emperors not Lords of all.  affirms: besides divers other flattering Passages in good Authors, of the ancient Empire; as that of Corippus to the Emperor Justin, 
— Deus omnia Regna  
Sub pedibus debit esse suis.   
And Julius Firmicus 
(s) Totius orbis terrarum spacium Imperatoris subjacet potestatibus, etiam ipsum eorum Deorum numero constitutum esse quem ad sacienda & con●ervanda omnia, Divinitas statuit universalis. Mathes. lib. 2. c. 33.  hath this courtly Expression, That the Compass of the whole Globe of the Earth is subject to the Power of the Emperor, and he is constituted in the number of those Deities whom the Principal Divinity hath appointed to do and conserve all things; grounded upon that Coin of 
(t) Adolphus O●●a, p. 552.  Constantius, which hath on the reverse VICTOR OMNIUM GENTIUM. But Mr. Selden hath sufficiently confuted this, by showing that the Roman Empire had its Limits (or as Tacitus calls it its Claustra) in Augustus, Trajan's, and Hadrian's time, and that in the height of the Roman Empire there were Liberi Populi, Regesque. So that after the perusal of the several Instances he produceth, none can be unsatisfied, but that many other Princes enjoy their Supremacy as fully as the Germane Emperors, in acknowledging no Superior but God, as particularly I shall show, in what relates to England, in the next Chapter.  
For the fuller Expression of Majesty, saith 
(u) Tit. Hon. cap. 4.  Mr. Selden, other Attributes have been given to Supreme Princes, which be Names as essential as those of Emperor and King; yet they are not so convertible with them, nor so particularly designing them: These are chief Domini & Dii, Lords and Gods. Of the one I have discoursed before, of the other I shall now speak something.  
This Title of Dominus, or Lord, 
Of the Title of Lord. How odious to the Romans.  (importing properly a Master or Lord over Slaves) was by the wisest of the Roman Emperors rejected; though it be now grown 
(w) Nedum sermo●um stet honos & gratia vivax. Horat. de Art Poet.  so familiar, that we use it to Tradesmen: such a change being wrought by time in the Usage, Emphasis or Signification of many other words.  

(x) Domini Appellationem ut maledictum & opprobrium semper exhorruit.  Suetonius tells us, that Augustus at a Play, hearing himself called Lord, though with the Epithets of Just and Good, and finding the Spectators rejoicingly approve of it as applicable to him; with his Hand and Countenance repressed the unbecoming Flatteries, and the next day by a severe Edict, prohibited it to be given him; neither would he suffer his Children or Nephews to use it in their Compliments, or other Language, to each other. Neither would Tiberius endure this Title so much as in common Salutation: whereupon the great 
(y) Tacitus 2. Annal.  Historian and Statesman observes, Vnde Augusta & lubrica oratio, sub Principe, qui libertatem metuebat & adulationem oderat. To which purpose 
(z) Sylvar. 1.  Statius speaks of Domitian.  
Tollunt Innumeras ad astra Voces  
Saturnalia Principis sonantes,  
Et dulci DOMINUM favore clamant,  
Hoc solum vetuit licere Caesar.  
Yet either the Poet flattered or dissembled, or this was in the Infancy of the Empire; for we find in 
(a) In Domit. c. 13.  Suetonius, that by his express Command, the Titles of his Letters and other matters, were Dominus & Deus noster sic sieri jubet; and Caligula before him, endured it publicly, and Festus 
(b) Act. Apost. c. 25. v. 26.  Lieutenant of Jewry in that of St. Paul's appeal, calls Claudius absolutely Lord, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. Lord Emperor; and the Emperor in his Petition to 
(c) M●●t. F. ad Leg. Rhod.  him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, i. e. Lord Emperor; and the Emperor in his Answer calls himself Lord of the World. 
(d) Diocletianus se primus omnium, Caligulam post Domitianumque Dominum palam ●ici passus, & adorari se, app●●arique uti Deum.  Victor saith that Dioclesian, the first of all the Emperors after Caligula and Domitian, suffered himself openly to be called Lord, to be adored and styled as a God; which may be understood of public Salutations only. For in Claudius and Antonine I have instanced to the contrary. Also in a Gold Coin of the great and Religious Constantine, stamped with his effigies sitting, and his Court of Guard about him; the 
(e) A●olph. O●●a. p. 537.  Inscription is, FELICITAS PERPETVA AUGEAT REM DO MIN. NO ST.  
The reason why some Emperors refused this Name (as Pliny in his Panegyric makes 
(f) Principis sedem obtines, ne sit Domino locus.  Trajan to do, when he saith, Thou obtainest the place of the Prince, that there may be no place for Lord,) was either because it seemed a Relative to Servus, a Bondslave; or in respect that it supposed (if ill interpreted) the Subject, and his Substance to be in the Property of the Emperor: For 
(g) Domini Appellatione continetur qui ●abet proprietatem, e●si usus fructus alienus sit. Ulp. F. de Sc. Silaniano, l. 1. sect. 1.  Ulpian tells us, that in the Laws of the Empire, in the Appellation of Lord, was signified he that had the Propriety, although another was Usufructuary. How considerable a Name of Dominion this was, appears in Lucan (who being one of the Pompeian Party, that stood much upon the ancient Liberty of Rome,) saith that that Age first found those Appellations, by which they lied to the Lords.  

(h) Lucan. Pharsal. lib. 5.  Namque omnes Voces, per quas jam tempore tanto  
Mentimur Dominis, haec primum reperit Aetas.  
That which I observe from hence is, That by this Title of Dominus, the Sovereignty of Princes, and greater absoluteness was understood, than the first Emperors were willing to seem to allow, that they might avoid Envy in the Infancy of their Power: 
Multa renascentur quae jam cecidere, cadentque. Quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula si vole● usus. Horat●de Art Poet. v. 70.  and now so great a Power or Dignity is not so much understood by the Word, either Latin or Greek, in the Person it is applied to, as when our Kings had the Title of Lords only of Ireland, and yet had Kingly Supremacy; and now our Nobility are called Lords, and Domine in the Latin is dwindled to signify any Gentleman.  
There are other Forms of Speech that either have been or are peculiar to Kings, 
The Appellations in the Plural Number.  as the use of the Plural Number, as, We command, We ordain, Our Royal Favour, Our Royal Care, Pleasure, etc. This seems derived from the Jews (saith 
(i) Tit. Hon. par. 1. c. 7.  Mr. Selden) who say that in their Language, by reason of the Plurality of Virtues or Power (being the true Roots of Dignities) which are supposed in a Superior, they use the Plural Number to or of one Man. So with their Elohim Gods, joined to a Word of the Singular Number, is by their Grammarians, made an Enallage of Number, chief to express Excellency in the Persons to whom it is referred. But this hath since been used by single Persons, as particularly by Margaret Countess of Richmond, Mother to Henry the Seventh, thus, Nos Margareta Comitissa Richmondiae, Mater excellentissimi Principis Domini Henrici, etc. Inspeximus, etc.  
Therefore I leave this as communicable to great and eminent Subjects, and shall pass to the abstract of Majestas. 
Title of Majesty.  As Your Majesty, His Majesty, Imperial Majesty. The word itself denoting all kind of special Dignity, as if we should say in English, Greatness, as well in private Persons, as supreme Princes and Deities. Ovid 
(k) Fastorum lib. 5.  elegantly describes Majesty to be born of Honour and Reverence, and he saith Majesty continued among the Gods, until the Rebellion of the Giants against Jupiter, when she so daunted them, that afterwards she was honoured for it with a place next to Jupiter, whose Kingdom she defends by the greatness only of her Presence, and unarmed; and that she came down also among Men, since which, both Supreme and Subordinate Princes, and some also of all Kind's have had their special Dignity from her Presence with them; whence Majestas Pueri, Matronae, Virgins, etc. and, as Valerius Maximus 
(l) Quasi privata 〈…〉, clarerum virorum sine Tribunalium fasiigio. Lib. 3. c. 10.  calls it, a private kind of Magistracy, a Majesty of eminent Men, without the Honour of Tribunalship, or any other Office.  
But it is not of this kind of Majesty I now treat; but as it is applicable to the Sovereign. So in Cicero, Majestas Populi Romani denotes the Supreme Dignity of the State of Rome, as 
(m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. In legatione in Foed. Aetolorum.  Polybius calls it the Empire and Power of the People of Rome. Afterwards this Majesty of the People, or of the whole Empire and State was cast upon the Emperors as a Characteristic of Sovereignty, and then it was Majestas Imperatorum. Whence it grew into frequent use to write 
(n) Gruteri Inscr. p. 246. n. 3.  NUMINI MAJESTATIQVE EJUS DEVOTISS: or DIC ATISSIMUS, as in that Inscription in Tarragona in St. Barbara's Church, of Septimius Acindynus to the Emperor Trajan.  
From the use of Majesty thus applied, came the name of Crimen Majestatis, to denote that offence which was committed against the Dignity of the State of Rome, or against the Emperor. So 
(o) Majestatis crimen illud est, quod adversus Pop. Rom. vel adversus securitatem ejus committitur. P. ad L●g. Jul. Majest. lib. 5.  Ulpian saith, It is that which is committed against the People of Rome, or their Security. 
(p) Majestatem minuisti quod Tribunum Plebis de Templo deduxisti. De Invent. lib. 2.  And Cicero calls it a Diminution of Majesty, to draw a Tribune of the People out of the Temple. And Justinian saith, That the 
(q) Lex Julia Majestatis in eos qui contra Imperatorem vel Rempublicam aliquid moliti sunt, suum vigorem extendit. Instit. Tit. de Publico Judicio.  Julian Law of Majesty, extends its Force against them who attempt any thing against the Emperor, or the Commonwealth. And for this offence the word Majestas is used singly by 
(r) Hujus in metum penitus sustulisti, contentus magnitudine, qua nulli magis caruere, quam qui sibi majestatem vindicabant. Panegyr.  Pliny to Trajan, That he had wholly taken away the fear of too frequent questiou upon that crime, being contented with the greatness of his Power or Office, which none more wanted than those that challenged Majesty to themselves; as if he had said, that his mild Empire and Greatness was better to himself and his People, than theirs who had a more absolute Sovereignty.  
This Expression of the Emperors by the abstract Majestas (wherewith Numen also was commonly joined in Inscriptions) became, it seems, the Example by which the ensuing times brought in the frequency of those other Abstracti, which designed the Emperors, as well in the first as the second and third Person; as Perennitas, Aeternitas, Tranquillitas, Serenitas, etc. which are most obvious in the Rescripts of the old Emperors, that remain in the two Codes of Theodosius and Justinian: And in the Greek Empire, this Attribute of Majesty was denoted by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  which the Emperor had, with the Addition of Sacred, and sometimes with 
(s) Vide Codin. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. M●ursium in Glossar. Gra●o-Barb.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, serenissima jestas.  
There are great Numbers of other Epithets, that have been given to Sovereign Princes; 
Other Attributes given to Princes.  as among the Romans, Pius, Foelix, Clemens, Tranquillus, Sanctissimus, Pater Patriae. In the later times, both in the Empire and Kingdoms, Clementissimus, Excellentissimus, Invictissimus, Illustrissimus, Serenissimus, Gloriosissimus, Potentissimus, Sacratissimus, Celsissimus, Religiosissimus; and some have had peculiar Attributes: The Emperor is styled Semper Augustus; the King of England, Fidei Defensor; the King of France, Christianissimus; of Spain, Catholicus.  
Most of these Attributes were given to denote the Eminence of their place, or the peculiar Virtues such Princes excelled in; and under the Greek Empire, the Epithets agreeable to their Language, and the Attributes of the Eastern Monarches, are to this Day more luxuriant: So we find Emanuel Comnenus, in his Letter to Frederic Barbarossa, writes thus; 
(t) Albertus Stadensis in Chron. Anno 1179.  Manuel in Christo Deo fidelis, Imperator Porphyrogennetus, Divinitus Coronatus, Regnator potens, excelsus, & semper Augustus & Moderator Romanorum magnificus: Nobilissimo & Gloriosissimo Regi Almanorum & Imperatori ac dilecto Fratri Imperii nostri salutem. So 
(u) Canis. Antiq. ●ect. Tom. 5. p. 2.  Isaacus Angelus useth this insolent Title (as Mr. Selden calls it) to the same Barbarossa, Isachius a Deo constitutus, Imperator Sacratissimus, Excellentissimus, Potentissimus, Sublimis, Moderator Romanorum, Angelus totius Orbis; Haeres Coronae magnae Constantini, Dilecto Fratri Imperii sui Maximo Principi Alemaniae, etc. So the Surnamed 
(w) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Camerar. ad aure ●m And●onic. Bullam, p. 9  Emanuel styled himself, Governed by God, Heir of the Crown of Constantine the Great, and observing of his Laws.  
The Grand Signior (besides the Enumeration of all his vast Dominions) particularly styles himself, By the infinite Grace of the just, great, and most puissant Creator, and by the abundance of the Miracles of the chief of his Prophets, Emperor of Victorious Emperors, Distributer of the Crowns of the greatest Princes of the Earth, etc. Lord of Europe, Asia and Africa, conquered by his victorious Sword and powerful Lance, etc. and so after the recital of the several Kingdoms, he saith of many other Countries, Villages and Seigneuries, Conquered by his Imperial Power and Justice, etc. By the Grace of God, the resort of the great Princes of the World, and the refuge of Honourable Emperors: This was from Achmet Son of Mahomet, to Hen. IU. of France.  
A late Author, 
(z) Treatise of Absolute Power, p. 32, 33.  who takes all the Advantages to depress Monarchy, out of a pretence of declaring against the too great absoluteness of Princes; tells us, That as the Majesty and real greatness of the Emperors declined; and as the Empire began to sink, the Froth and Flattery came above: so that though Augustus and Tiberius forbade any to call them by so proud a Title as Dominus; 
Objections against the A●tributes given to Princes.  yet it was lawful to call Domitian Lord and God, and his Successors were not satisfied, till complemented in the Abstract, with Your Everlastingness, Your Eternity, Divinity, etc. and when the wooden Eagle was split in two, that Chip of the Eastern Empire broke out into Blossoms to a Miracle; that with the Porphyrogenneti and Despots, were blown about the Sebasto Cratori, Pan-hypersebasti, protonobilissimi, etc. and that after these Titles among the Romans (so pompous and glorious) had been worn a while at Court, they descended to the City and Country: and further tells us, That in France, the word Sovereign is commonly used for any Superior; as Sovereign of Accounts, Treasure, Forest, Sovereign Judge, Sovereign Bailiff, etc.  
To him we may add, what an older 
(a) Marcus Antonius surgens Neapoli illustrata. Lib. 1. c. 19 sect. 10.  Author objects; That it is an Usurpation of the Attribute only proper to God, to give the Title of Majesty to Emperors or Kings; and another 
(b) Jo. 〈◊〉 de Idololatr●a Politica, c. 1.  saith, It is a piece of Idolatry to assume the Titles of nostra Divinitas, nostrum numen, Coeleste Oraculum, adorandum Rescriptum, etc. Which were used by Theodosius and Valentinian, and other Christian Emperors, in the first and third Person, as I have before largely hinted.  
To the first of these I shall answer, That the reason of Augustus and Tiberius declining the Title of Dominus, was because in that Age it was understood as a Lord over Slaves; 
Answer to the first Objector.  which in the first settling of the Empire, would have caused Heart burn and Rebellions against them, in that State, accustomed to Freedom. But as the usage of the word came afterwards to be liquified, and of a benign and softer signification; so there was no reason to reject it, especially since the Author himself (if no Quaker) would not think it unfit in Latin, to be used to him as a Gentleman: and as to the invidious Expression of the wooden Eagle, he might have known, that the Ancient Vexilla of the Emperors, which had the Eagle upon them, as he may see the Figure of them in Antonius, and many other Coins, were not always of Wood; and if so gilded with Silver or Gold, but of Metal: But it may be he calls it wooden, out of a sleight to the Authority, or the better to pursue his Allegory of a Chip blossoming. However it discovers the mean and low opinion he hath of such Supreme Powers. As to the Hyperbolical Epithets of the Grecian Emperors; something must be yielded to the luxurious exuberance of the Grecian Language, and the usage of the Eastern Countries; and that Sovereign is sunk so low in France, as to be the Epithet of a Baylive, it may be ascribed to the Acceptation of the word, in signifying any Supreme Officer in his kind, as we call Lord High Treasurer, Lord High Steward, to distinguish them from inferior Treasurers and Stewards.  
As to the two following Authors, it may be considered what the judicious Mr. 
Answer to the other Objectors.  Selden observes, That the Title of Majesty may as well be afforded to them, as of Wisdom, Power, Clemency, or any other Quality; because those are, as all else, which is great or good, principally in God: Therefore 
(c) Divi Christiani vocari possunt, eo modo quo Dii, quia Dei sunt vicarii, & Dei voce judicant. Polit. lib. 7. c. 4. sect. 4.  Contzen, in the last Age, Professor of Divinity at Mentz, saith, That Christian Princes may be called Divi, or Gods, because they are Gods Vicars, and do judge by God's Voice: Yet he thinks that Divus Imperator, nostra Divinitas, nostra Aeternitas, and such like, are not altogether so fit for Christian Princes, for fear both of their arrogating more than they should, when they are so magnified; as also lest too much offence be taken by such as may miss in the Reason of the Application of those Titles to them.  
We may further note, from the learned Selden, That when the Lacedæmonians admired a Man, they used proverbially to say, he is a Divine Man; and the Philosopher 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ethic. 7. c. 1.  saith, That Men became to be reputed or called Gods, from the excellence of their Heroic Virtues; and these Virtues and themselves also, were (as he says) called Divine, by way of some similitude, or by reason of Participation with the Deity, being all goodness and excellency, as the contrary quality, that is, Inhumanity or Barbarousness is named 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Feritas, because it is most like to what is Bestial. So that as he who affirms, that a Barbarous or Inhuman Fellow, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Bestial, makes but an high Expression of his ill nature, not at all supposing him to be a Beast; so on the other side, Divinus or Divinitas, or the like expresseth only an Admiration of Excellency, which hath its highest and first Example in the Deity, and is by some Similitude or Participation in the Person to whom it is attributed. Therefore 
(e) Antiquitus Rectores Reipublicae Divini vocabantur, quasi Divinae providentiae ministri 2a. 2ae. Quaest. 99 Art. 1.  Aquinas saith. That anciently, Governors of Commonweals were called Divine, because they were the Ministers of Divine Providence: They being here upon Earth in their Dominions under God Supreme Governors, undisputably in Civils, as Philip le Beau of France to Pope Boniface the Eighth, in his scornful Letter, saith, instead of sciat sanctitas tua, sciat tua maxima fatuitas nos in temporalibus alicui non subesse: That in Temporals he was not subject to any.  
Instead of these lofty Titles, the modern Sovereigns have contented themselves with the Addition of Dei Gratia, 
Concerning the Style of Dei gratia.  which applied to Lay Princes, doth always signify a Supremacy in their own Dominions.  
This Style begun about Charles the 
(f) Vide Capitular. Aqu●●●ranens. p●. 30. Tom. ●. Concil. 〈◊〉.  Great's time, as in several of his Patents appears; neither did it continue in use by his Successors, till about four Hundred years since: F●● Otho the Third titled himself sometimes nothing but 〈◊〉 ●●octolorum; and Mr. Selden hath not observed it to be 〈◊〉 by the Greek Emperors, but that instead of it, they used, 
(g) Tit. Hon. par. 1. c. 7.  Crowned of God; the more ordinary and later Expression of them being trusting 
(h) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vide Eginhard. Annal. Franciae, Anno Anon. vita Car. M.  in Christ, that is God, or in God Emperor of the Romans.  
With us in England, Ine King of the West Saxons, that lived many years before Charles the Great, useth it, IC INE MIDGODES GIFT WEST SEAXNA CYNING: I Ine by the Grace of God, King of the West Saxons, in his preamble to his Laws: But until about our Henry the Third, it was not of so constant use, as that the Style of the King necessarily required it.  
This Style of Dei Gratia is frequently given in old time, 
Given to Spiritual Lords.  and yet in use, to Spiritual Lords, nothing being more common in the Instruments of Bishops and Abbats, in the Chartularies of Monasteries; and it is given from Kings to them in the Summons of Parliament, and Writs to Assemble or Prorogue Convocations in this form, Jacobus, etc. Reverendissimo in Christo ●●tri, praedilectoque & fideli Consiliario nostro, Georgio eadens 〈…〉 Archiepiscopo Cantuariensi, etc. But at this day, though it 〈◊〉 ●●ven to them, they use it not in the first Person, but De● 
(i) Rosula Novella, 〈◊〉. cap. 111.  ●●mentia, or Providentia Divina; and in older times, when they writ to the Pope, Emperor or King, they were not to write Dei Gratia of themselves, but only such or such, licet indignus, vel immerens, Bononiae Episcopus, etc.  
By all these Titles we cannot but observe, that the dignity of Kings and Sovereigns, was looked upon in all Ages, as deriving Authority from God Almighty, and his Vicegerents here upon Earth; having the Attributes of God, that as he was Supreme over all things in Heaven and Earth, so they within their Districts upon Earth.  
I shall end this Chapter with this Observation, That the Attribute of Dei Gratia applied to Sovereigns and Bishops, might probably have Authority from the Constitution of Justinian, 
(k) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. Just. No●. 6. init. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ibid.  which runs thus. The greatest Gifts which Gods goodness from above, hath conferred on Men, are the Priesthood and Empire, both of which proceed from one and the same Principle, and are for the ordering and disposing of the Affairs of Mankind.  
Concerning the peculiar Title of our Kings of England, Defender of the Faith, the learned Spelman having given us th● Copy of the Bull, and discoursed so fully of it, I shall 〈◊〉 the curious Reader to him for satisfaction.   

CHAP. XVII. Of the Sovereignty of the Kings of England, according to our Histories and Laws.  
THE Titles and Attributes which other Sovereign Princes have either assumed, 
The Kings of England have used all the Titles proper to Sovereign Princes.  or have been given to them, our Kings of England have used, as might be made appear by innumerable Examples: But I shall treat but of a few, and show wherein the Sovereignty is discovered, and what ancient Prerogatives they have by their acts of Grace quitted; and lastly, how the long Parliament of 1641. would have cramped the King's Authority.  
First as to the Title of King or Emperor promiscuously. So our Edgar frequently in his Charters, calls himself Albionis & Anglorum Basileus; 
As King, Emperor, Lord.  and I have noted before that the Grecians esteemed the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be of full as eminent Signification as Emperor. So in a Charter 
(a) Cod. Wigorn.  to Oswald, Bishop of Worcester, he is called Anglorum Basileus, omniumque Regum, Insularum, Oceanique Britanniam circumjacentis, cunctarumque Nationum quae infra eam includuntur, Imperator & Dominus. In which we may note that one of our Kings of England writ himself not only Basileus, according to the Grecian usage, which signified King and Emperor; but also Emperor and Lord, three of the fullest Attributes, either the Grecian, or Roman Emperors ever used; as also Lord of the British Sea, as Canutus his Successor challenged. So in a Charter to 
(b) Mon. Ang. par. 1. p. 64.  Peterburg, Ego Edgar sub ipso sidereo Rege praesidens Regno Magnae Britanniae.  
I have seen another 
(c) Lib. MS. Roberti de Swapham, etc. Fundationis Burgensis Coenobii p. 38.  of his Charters prefaced thus, Gratia Domini nostri Jesu Christi omnium seculorum omnia suo Intuitu distribuentis Regna terrarum, & moderantis habenas rerum. Ego Edgar sub ipso eodem Rege praesidens Regno Britanniae, etc.  
So King 
(d) Id. p. 39  Edward in the same Book styles himself, Ego Edwardus Rex Anglorum Monarchiam Regiminis tenens, hoc decretum Patris mei per deprecationem Abbatis Aidulfi, perhenniter affirmavi. In which we may note, that Edgar owns himself subject to Jesus Christ, God. And King Edward saith, he holds the single Command of Government. So King Edward in a 
(e) Coke Praefat. 4. Reports. Rex Anglorum & totius Britanniae Telluris Gubernator & Rector. Angligenum Orcadarum, necnon in Gyro jacentium Monarcha, & Anglorum Induperator.  Charter to Ramsey, styles himself Totius Albionis, Dei moderante Dominatione, Basileus, King of all Albion: and King Edwin in a Charter to Crowland, calls himself King of England, and Governor and Ruler of all the Land of Britain. So Ethelred in his Charter to Canterbury, styles himself Of all the English born, and the Oreades lying in Circuit about it, Monarch, and Emperor of the English. So that by Orcades must be understood all the Isles about Britain.  
So William Rufus dates his Charter to the Monastery of Shaftsbury, secundo Anno Imperii mei. By all which it appears that the Kings of England have justly assumed the Supreme Imperial Command in their own Dominions: and though the Title of Emperor hath been disused, 
Kings of England as much Sovereigns as Emperors.  yet we shall find the substance of it sufficiently challenged in that of 
(f) Ipse omnes liberta●●s 〈◊〉 R●gno habebat suo, quas Imperator vendicabat in Imperio. Matt. Paris in vita Willielmi 2.  William Rufus to Archbishop Anselm, when he told him, That he had all the Liberties in his Kingdom, which the Emperor challenged in the Empire. And in a Constitution 
(g) R●g●um Angliae ab om●i subjectione Imperiali liberrimum. Claus. 13 E. 2. m. 6. dorso.  of King Edward the Second, it is declared, That the Kingdom of England is most free from all Imperial Subjection; which excluded all public Notaries, who were made by the Emperor or Popes, and by this Constitution were utterly rejected. 
The Statutes for it.   
This further appears in the 
(h) Stat. Anno 23 E. 3. c. 1. Vide Coke Instit. 2. 111. 4 part. 6. 8. 3. Instit. 120, 125.  Statute of Praemunire made 23 Ed. 3. which runs thus, That it being shown by the grievous and clamorous Complaints of the great Men and Commons, how that divers of the People be, and been drawn out of the Realm to answer of things whereof the Cognizance pertaineth to the King's Court; and also that the Judgements given in the same Court be impeached in another Court in prejudice and dis-inherison of our Lord the King, and of his Crown, etc. Therefore it was enacted, That none of the King's Liege-People, of what condition soever, shall draw any out of the Realm in Plea, whereof the Cognizance appertaineth to the King's Court, or of things whereof Judgements be given in the King's Court, etc.  
This Statute as well as that of Provisors 25 Ed. 3. was made to hinder the Subjects Appeals to Rome, or to any other Court in such things whereby the King's Sovereignty might be diminished, and this Statute relates to one made by King Edward the First. Also in the Statute of Provisors, 25 Ed. 3. reference is made to the 
(i) Anno 35 Regni.  Statute made at Carlisle, by King Edward the First.  
The Statute of 
(k) 16 R. 2. c. 5.  Praemunire for purchasing Bulls from Rome, gives an account of the preceding Statutes, and further saith, Whereas our Lord the King, and all his Liege-People ought of right, and of long time were wont to sue in the King's Court, to receive their Presentments to Churches, prebend's, and other Benefices of Holy Church, which they had right to present to, the Conisance of Plea, of which Presentment belongeth unto the King's Court, of the old right of his Crown used and approved, etc. then particularly enumerates the Encroachments of the Bishop of Rome, by Processes, Excommunications of Bishops, for executing Judgements given in the King's Courts, and the translating of Prelates out of the Realm, or from one spiritual Living to another, against the King's Laws and Regality, etc. The Statute expressly declares, That the Crown of England hath ever been so free, that it is in no Earthly Subjection, but immediately subject to God in all things, touching the Regality of the Crown, and to no other.  
Under King Henry the Eighth, 
(l) 24 H. 8. c. 12.  the whole Parliament say, that by sundry old and authentic Histories and Chronicles it is manifesty declared and expressed, that this Realm of England is an Empire, and so hath been accepted in the World, governed by one Supreme Head, and King, having the Dignity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same; unto whom a Body Politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of People, divided in Terms by names of Spirituality, and Temporalty have bounden and owen to bear, next to God, a natural and humble Obedience.  
The next 
(m) 25 H. 8. c. 21.  Year in another Statute, it is styled the Imperial Crown and Royal Authority, recognising no Superior, but only Your Grace: and in the Chapter following, the Kings of England are styled Kings and Emperors of this Realm: and in 
(n) 28 H. 8. c. 7.  another of the same King, it is called, The most Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of this Realm. So in the same 
(o) Stat. Hil●●●. 〈…〉 8. c. 2.  Year (before the Title of Lord of Ireland was altered into King) the Style is Kings and Emperors of the Realm of England, and of the Land of Ireland; and in several other Statutes it is called the Imperial Crown.  
I have inserted these to clear that by our Laws the Kings of England are under no Subjectjon to any foreign Prince or Potentate whatsoever. And Mr. 
(p) Tit. H●●. p. 21, 22.  Selden saith, that the Supremacy is not only used by the English Sovereigns, but hath been challenged by the Kings of Spain, Denmark, Poland, the Czars of Muscovy and other free Princes; over all within their own Dominions, exclusive of all foreign Powers: and upon the like ground of Supremacy was that Law made by King James the Third of Scotland, in these words,— Our Sovereign Lord has full Jurisdiction, and free Empire within this Realm, etc.  
A Confirmation of this Supremacy of our Kings appears in what is reported of our King Edward the Third, That when Lewis 
(q) Quod R●x Anglix non se submisit ad os●ula pedum suorum.  of Bavier the Emperor, had an Interview with him, the Emperor stomached that the King of England submitted not himself to kiss his Feet. But the King answered, That he was 
(r) Rex inunctus & habet vitam & membrum in potes●ate sua, & ideir●● non debet se submittere tantum sicut Rex alius.  an anointed King, and had Life and Member in his Power, therefore he ought not to submit himself to him as other Kings.  
Whence it was that Alsonso the ninth King of Castille defining what Kings were, (after he had dispatched the Particulars that belonged to the Emperor) says, That they are every one in their Kingdoms, the Vicars or Vicegerents of God, placed over the People to govern them, 
(s) Bien assi come el Emperador en su Imperio. Partid. 2. tit. 1. Ley 5. & 8.  no otherwise than as the Emperor is in his Empire. Whoever desires further Satisfaction in this Point, may have recourse to the voluminous Collections of Mr. Pryn, and other Authors that have treated of the King's Supremacy.  
Most of what I have hitherto discoursed, relates to the King's Supremacy, ab extra, that he hath no foreign Superior, that aught to impose any thing upon him or his Subjects, contrary to his Pleasure and his Laws in his Dominions.  
I shall now give a short Abridgement of what I find our learned Lawyers have writ concerning the King's Authority and Sovereignty, in his Kingdom of England, and how, 
Wherein the King's Sovereignty consists according to our Laws.  in former Ages, Kings have quitted some of their Royal Prerogatives. In our Laws the King is styled in Ecclesiastical matters, the Supreme Ordinary; 
(t) Coke 11. 86. Calvin's Case, 215.  in Civil matters, caput Reipublicae, Pater Patriae, totius Regni Pater-Familias, Chief Justice, etc. being furnished with plenary Power, to render Justice and Right to every Member and part of the whole Body, 
(u) Co●● 2 part. 1, 2. 24 H. 8. c. 1. 24 Eliz. c. 1.  without the help of Foreign Jurisdiction. Some Attributes of God in a similitudinary way (say 
(w) 〈◊〉 8●. 〈◊〉 177. 2●8, 212 〈…〉  the great Lawyers) are aseribed to him for the Excellency of his Person, and the greatness of his Office, as Sovereignty and Power, Omnipresence, Majesty, Immortality, etc. In his Political 
(x) 〈…〉 Grand Abridgement, part. 3. p. 44.  Capacity, not subject to the Infirmities of others, as Nonage, Death, Attainder, etc. So no Laches, Negligences, Defects, or Stops of Blood, can be imputed to, or fastened upon him, as is well known in the case of King Henry the Seventh, 
(y) St. Alban vita ●en. 7. p. 29.  wherein it was unanimously resolved by the Judges, That his Natural Capacity doth so far participate with the Politic (which is superadded to the Body natural of the King) that these become consolidate, consubstantiate and indivisible in one and the same Royal Person, and the Body Politic (which is the more worthy, and of a sublimer Nature) is in no ways obnoxious to the Humane Imbecility of Death, Infamy, Crime, or the like, but doth draw from the Natural Body, all Imperfections and Incapacities whatsoever.  
So that there is, by the Law, said to be in the King, 
(z) Sheppard ut supra.  a threefold greatness of Perfection; First of being freed from Infamy and all kind of Imperfections common to Man: Secondly, of Power, in having the command of all his People: Thirdly, of Majesty, being the Fountain of Honour, Justice, and Mercy.  
The King is God's immediate Viceroy 
(a) Cek 2.44.5.29.  within his Dominions Vicarius Dei: As his Protection and Government reacheth to all his People as Subjects; so the Allegiance and Obedience of them all, is due to him as their Sovereign, whether Ecclesiastical or Civil, and so he is Persona mixta; his Prerogatives are called Jura Regalia, Insignia Coronae, Ancient Prerogatives and Royal Flowers of the Crown, so inseparably annexed to the Crown, that none but the King may have them, nor can they be communicated to, or taken by any Subject.  

(b) Bracton lib. 1. c. 8. Stat. 25 H. 8. c. 21. Nemo terram nisi Authoritate R●gia possi●et. Plowden 136. Jenkins Cent. 7. Case 77. & 2. Case 16.17 E. 2. c. 17. Nevil 101.174.  All Lands are said to be held of him immediately or mediately, he can hold of no Man, or any be equal to him, as to be joint Tenant of Land with him, and his Jurisdiction is over all places within his Dominions, both on the dry Land and on the Sea. The Judges are to observe it as a certain Rule, That whatever may be for the benefit of the King, and his profit, shall be taken most largely for him; and what against him, and for his disprofit, be taken strictly: neither is it only the duty of Judges, but of all other his Subjects in their Stations, to help the King to his Right.  
The Prerogatives are many and great, yet such as are his by the Ancient Law of the Land, and what the Kings of England have, time out of mind, used, and are such as are of absolute 
(c) Co●e 12.8.30.2. part. Instit. 262.496.5. part. 11.2.8.  necessity, for the security of the Government, and the Public weals: As to call and dissolve Parliaments, give his Royal Assent to Laws, command the Militia, coin Moneys, grant Honours, make and dispose of the great Seal, dispense with penal Laws, pardon Felonies and Treasons, make and appoint great Officers, Justices of Eyre and Assize, of the Peace, Gaol-delivery, and Sheriffs, to grant Charters to Corporations and other Persons, or Fraternities: He hath the sole Power of appointing, ratifying and consummating all Treaties with Foreign Princes, making War and Peace, granting Safe-Conduct and Protection; and all these and many other, are firmly ascertained 
(d) Quod Rex est 〈◊〉, Lex est Regi; Rex est Amma 〈◊〉, & Lex est Anima Regi.  by Laws, and have ever been, and still are, in the King alone, and at his own Discretion.  
Although there is no need in describing the Sovereignty of our Kings, to carry it up to that absoluteness of Monarchy, where all things are appointed and reversed by the Sovereign's fiat: yet 
(e) Jus Regium p. 42.  we must on the other side consider, That the Monarchy, which is subject to the impetuous Caprices of the Multitude, when giddy, or to the incorrigible Factiousness of the Nobility, when interested, is, in effect, no Government at all; it must be owned, That in all Governments a Sovereignty must reside some where, and a Monarch can 〈◊〉 no Participants. For than it would cease to be a Monarchy, and in things that relate immediately to Government, the King hath as much right to regulate them (as to instance, to restrain the Licence of the Press or secure Peace) as we have to regulate and dispose of our Property; Government being the King's Property: for with the Monarchy, the King must enjoy all things that are necessary for the Administration of it, according to that just Maxim 
(f) Quando aliquid ●oneditur, omnia concessa videntur sine quibus concessum explicari nequit.  of the Law, When any thing is granted, all things seem to be granted, without which the thing granted cannot be explained: Which warrants the King's Advocate of Scotland, to lay that down as a general 
(g) Jus Regium p. 77.  Rule, That their Kings can do every thing that relates to Government, and is necessary for the Administration thereof, though there be no special Law or Act of Parliament for it, if the same be not contrary to the Law of God, Nature or Nations.  
The Power and Authority of the Kings of England, have been much more unbounded than they are at present. 
(h) Part 1. c. 16. sol. 34.  Bracton speaking of his time, saith, That neither the Justices or private Persons might dispute the King's Charter; but if there were a doubt of it, the Resolution must come from the Kings own Interpretation. If Justice be demanded of the King (saith 
(i) Idem, lib. 1. c. 8. p. 5.  he) seeing no Writ lies against him, one must petition that he would correct and amend what he hath done.  
By the Condescensions of gracious Princes, such Restrictions have been made of their Sovereign Absoluteness, 
By the Grants and Condescensions of our Kings, their Absoluteness lessened.  that they have obliged themselves to govern their Kingdoms (transmitted to them with such Limitations, by their numerous Ancestors) by Rules of Law, Equity, Justice, and right Judgement, in Imitation of their Supreme Head and Omnipotent Monarch.  
That therefore it may demonstratively appear how happily the Government of England is constituted for the Benefit of the Subjects (who under so benign a Monarchy, enjoy more Advantages in the Security of their Persons and Proprieties, than under the most free Commonwealth that ever we read of) I shall lightly touch upon some of those Particulars, which the Kings of England (by reason of several Acts of Parliament, they have given their Royal Assents to) have precluded themselves from the single Disposal of, as in Absolute Monarchies are used; yet I hope to make it clear in several Branches of this Discourse, That there is no such thing as Co-ordinacy of any other Power, or such a mixture as vitiates the Monarchy by a debasing Alloy; much less that the Government can be Arbitrary or Tyrannical; which hath sheathed the Sword of Justice within the Velvet Scabbard of the Laws, and lined the Scarlet Robes of Majesty with the softest Ermine of Indulgence to well deserving Subjects, who by their Obedience and Considerateness, make their Princes and their own Happiness most perfect. For it is equally unhappy to Princes and Subjects, where 
(k) Alii Principes Reges hominum, ipse Rex Regum.  Maximilians Jest is true, That whereas other Princes were Kings of Men, he was King of Kings, because his Subjects would do but only what they list.  
But to come to the Particulars of Royal Abatements and Indulgences. The Kings of England may not rule their People by their Will, or by Proclamation, as the Roman Emperors by their 
(l) 〈◊〉, lib. 2. c. 8. The Particulars of Royal Abatements.  Edicts; or make new Laws, or change any of the old standing Laws, without the mutual Consent of the two Houses of Parliament: He may not oppress the People, or in any Arbitrary way, take from them their Liberties or Estates, under any pretence whatsoever, without due course of Law. Nor can he impose upon their 
(m) Stamford's Pleas of the Crown.  Persons, what Charges or Burdens he pleaseth, but according to, and by the Laws of the Kingdom. He cannot do any thing against the Law of the Nation, or against common Right; cannot change Ancient Customs: for a Legal 
(n) H●ghs 's Reports, 254.263. Cous●uetudo l●galis plus habet quam concessio Regalis.  Custom is more available than a Royal Concession; yet on the other side, that Custom which advanceth against the Prerogative of the King, is void.  
He cannot impose Arbitrary 
(o) Petit. of Right, 3 Car. 1.7 Car. 1. c. 17.  payments, erect new Offices of Charge to the Subject; may not deny or delay Justice, may not compel his People to make Gifts, Loan, Benevolence, or Tax, without consent of the two Houses.  
The King 
(p) 2 Car. 1. c. 1. Coke 12.46.2 part. Brown lib. 2. c. 2. Coke Instit. 2 part. 47, 48. Petition of Right. Dyer 176.  may not imprison without just Cause, nor keep any Man's Cause from Trial; may not send any man out of the Realm without his own Consent; may not, in time of Peace, Billet or Quarter Soldiers or Mariners upon his People, against their Wills; may not grant Commission to try Men by Martial Law in time of Peace, nor to determine any matters of difference betwixt Subjects, other ways than by ordinary 
(q) 21 Jac. c. 31. Coke 11.87. Plowden 497.  course of Law and ordinary Courts; may not, by Patent or Licence, make a grant of a Monopoly, or the benefit of a Penal Law, or give a Power to dispense with Penal Laws in some Cases.  

(r) Coke 11.87.  He may not have, or take, that he hath right to, which is in the Possession of another, but by due course of Laws; and may not make new, or alter old Courts of Justice, unless to be kept after the Course of the Law, and not in Course of Equity; Nor 
(s) Sheppard's Grand Abridgement, part 3. fol. 49.  altar the Courts of Westminster, that have been time out of mind, nor erect new Courts of Chancery, Kings-Bench, Common-pleas, or Exchequer.  

(t) Fleetwood, lib. 1. c. 8.  He may not by his last Will and Testament, under the great Seal, or otherwise, dispose of the Government, or of the Crown itself; nor give and grant away the Crown-Lands or Jewels, which he hath in his Politic Capacity, nor give away any of the incommunicable Prerogatives.  
By these Abatements of Power and gracious Condescensions of the Kings of England, for the Benefit and Security of the Subject; 
No Power  with the King's.  we are not to conclude, that there either is, or can be any Co-ordination or Coaequality of any State, Order or Degree of the Subjects with the Sovereign, nor any Competition of the Subjects Power (in his Concurrence) with the Virtual and Primary Influence of the Sovereign; but a plain Subordination and subjected Ministration of the one, under the Sovereignty of the other. For although there is a Co-operation of the Members with the Head, for the performing some Acts of State, and they may seem Orders or States coaequally Authorized in the Power of Acting with the Sovereign, in Petitioning for, advising, or consulting about, or consenting upon the King's Summons to Laws. And although in judging and determining matters of Private Interest, the King hath not an Arbitrary Judgement, but is restrained to the Judgement, to be administered by the proper sworn Judges in his Courts, whom he appoints to judge according to his Laws; and in the making of Laws, his Power and Judgement is restrained to the Concurrence of the Nobles, and Commons in Parliament: yet in all other things (wherein he is not expressly restricted by any Law of his own or Progenitors granting) he retaineth the absolute Power, as in the particulars before mentioned, and in the Chapters of Parliaments I shall further discourse.  
In the Rebellion under King Charles the First, the 
(u) Observations on His Majesty's Messages, etc. The Rebels in 1641. would have lessened the King's Sovereignty, and placed it in the People, or their Representatives.  Pencombatants for the Party (knowing they had the whole Current of the Laws against them) made a great noise and bustle with Sophisms, and plausible specious Pretences, to captivate the Populace; and nothing was more frequent than the Misapplication of that of the Philosopher, That the King was Singulis major, but Vniversis minor: Inferring from thence, That the Collective Body of the People, and their Representatives, were Greater in Authority than the King.  
In answer to which, it may be observed, That the Aphorism, how true soever in any other sense, is most false, in any sense, of Sovereignty. For, if it be meant, That the King is a better Man only than any of us single, this doth not tell us he is better than Two; and this is no more than possibly he might be before he was King: For we must needs look upon Princes, as Persons of Worth, Honour, and Eminency, when taken from the People; which the superaddition of Royalty did not destroy. Besides, any Lord of the Land may challenge such a Supremacy over all the Knights, and any Knight over all the Esquires. Furthermore, if Princes be Sovereigns to single Persons of Subjects only, and not to the universality of them, than every single Subject by himself is a Body Politic, whereof the King, as King, is Head; and so the Public Community is out of the King's Protection, he being no King as to them in a complex Body. Such impudent Falsities, and many more destructive Consequences, flow from such absurd Principles: And if the Maxim were true, the People have placed a King not over, but under themselves.  
But they enforce the Argument still further, That the Fountain and efficient Cause of Power is the People; and from hence, they say, the Inference is just, That he is less than the Universe. But the 
(w) Answer to Observations, p. 10.  Consequence is rather the contrary: For, suppose the People were the efficient Cause of Power, it can be no otherwise than by translating, or deriving their divided Power, and uniting it in him. Since than they cannot retain what they have parted with, nor have what they gave away, it follows, That he who hath all their Power, and his own particular besides, must needs be greater, and more powerful than they; it being a very great Truth, That he is the only Fountain of Power and Justice.  
Another of their Maxims was, That quicquid efficit tale, illud est magis tale: And they assume, But the King was made by the People, therefore less than the People. In answer to which, it is apparent, the Argument is Sophistical, as being built on a Maxim in itself amphibolous, which is not simply true, but as it is restricted: For it is true before the Effect produced, not after. So a Spark firing a City, was once more Fire than the Houses; but not so after the whole Town is become a Flame. It is true also in those Agents in whom the Quality by which they operate is inherent; not true in those who by ways of Donation divest themselves of Power or Wealth. For a thing cannot retain its Fullness, after it hath emptied itself. If the Objector have an Estate, which he would willingly improve, let him bestow it on another, and he shall make him rich, and, by his own Argument, himself richer: It is to be supposed, rather than such an one will part with his Estate, he will find an Answer to his Objection.  
As to the minor Proposition, I have before cleared, I hope, That the People are not the Original Cause of Government, But the Observer saith, They are the Final Cause; and the End is far more valuable in Nature and Policy, than that which is the Means: therefore the Commons, whose Good is the final End of all Government, are more Honourable than the Sovereign. But the Rule holds in such Means only as are valuable by that relation they bear to their Ends, and have no proper Goodness of their own. A King is not so to his People. If we look back to his first Extraction, when he was first taken from the People to be set over them, we must needs behold him as a Man of some Worth, Honour, and Eminence; which the superaddition of Royalty did not destroy, but increase; and to be a means of his People's Preservation, is very consistent with the Height of Honour. Besides, they that would captivate the unthinking Multitude by such Fallacies, must consider, that the Question is not, Who is Preferable, but, Who is Superior. One good Christian is preferable to a thousand that are not so; yet his Interest in the Commonwealth may not be preferable. A Shepherd is ordained for his Flock; yet a Flock of Brutes is not preferable to any Reasonable Creature. Further, the King's Interest and the People's are inseparable in the Construction of the Law, which presumes, what the King doth, he does for the People. Whether therefore the King's Power be derived from God, or the People, it is preferable. If from God, because his Ordinance: If from the People, because the People have elected him, and consented it 
(x) Jus Regium. p. 68  should be, and have trusted him with the Public Interest, which is still preferable.  
If this way of arguing were sound, Angels being Ministering Spirits for the good of Men, it would follow, That Men should be more Honourable than Angels; and the poor Client should be a better Man than his Learned Counsellor; and the simple Patient, than his Doctor.  
As to Bracton's Authority, Rex habet superiorem Deum, legem item Curiam suam, I must refer the scrupulous Reader to the Book called The Case of our Affairs, p. 14.   

CHAP. XVIII. That the Sovereign is unaccountable to any but God.  
BEfore I come to treat of the several Branches of the Sovereignty of Kings in the Executive parts of them, I shall from the general Idea of their Sovereignty deduce three Corollaries, in this and the two following Chapters, which seem to me to flow naturally from the Being of a Sovereign, viz. That such are accountable to none but the Great Sovereign of the Universe: And secondly, may dispense in some Cases with the Laws: And lastly, must not be resisted or rebelled against. 
The necessary Motive to treat of the Unaccountableness of Kings, the Murder of King Charles the First.   
If there were no other Motive to induce me to treat of this Head, the barbarous Murder of the Blessed Martyr King Charles the First, would have the same power as the sense that Croesus' dumb Son had to see his Father's Life in imminent danger, which made such a violent emotion of the Spirits, as unloosened the stiff Ligaments by which his Tongue was contracted, or forced an Irruption of Powerful Spirits to invigorate the paralytic Muscles of it, so that he cried out, Spare my Father. So certainly the Consideration of such an High Court of Justice, that arraigned and sentenced their Sovereign, should raise an Indignation in any one that hath sense of Allegiance, Duty, or Religion, to defend that as a Fundamental Truth, That Sovereigns are subject to no Tribunal but that of their Heavenly Sovereign.  
In the handling this, I shall pick out some of the Assertions of Learned and Judicious Authors, Heathens and Christians, and annex and intersperse such Reasons as may evince it; and then show, That this doth not leave Princes to a Tyrannical Liberty; and lastly, give some short Remarks upon the unparallelled Sentence of the Regicides of King Charles the First of Immortal Memory.  

(a) usher's Power of Princes, part 4. pag. 196. Edit. Cracovian. Divine and Humane Authorities to prove it.  Rabath bar Nachman, in his great Gloss upon Deuteronomy, saith positively, No Creature may judge the King, but the Holy and Blessed God alone: For the Original Hebrew of which, and the place of Moses from whence he deduceth this Assertion, I must refer the Reader to the Authors cited, having chosen this not only for the fullness of the Expression, but for the Antiquity, though not of the Comment, yet of the Text, before any other.  
All those Places also in Holy Scripture which style Princes and Judges of the Earth 
(b) Psal. 8. 5. with Heb. 2.7. and Psal. 97.7. with Heb. 1.6. Exod. 21.6. & 22.8.  Gods, and the Sons of God, and Psal. 82.6. I have said ye are Gods, and all sons of the most High; which in the Chaldee Paraphrase is thus rendered, Behold, ye are reputed as Angels, and all of you as it were Angels of the most High; 
(c) Job 1.6. & 2.1. & 38.7.  are sufficient Proofs of this Truth: As are likewise those Places that tell us, It is the Will of God that we 
(d) 1 Pet. 2.13, 15.  submit ourselves to these Higher Powers, for his sake. Therefore 
(e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Orat. 3. de Regno.  St. Chrysostom calls Regality such a Government as is not subject to the control of any. Sophocles calls it 
(f) In Antiq. v. 11 27.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Free and Independent Regiment; and 
(g) Xiphilin. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Marcus Aurelius in Dio, an Absolute Kingdom, not subject to the Control of any. To all which, agrees that of Horace, Lib. 3. Carm. Od. 1. 
Regum timendorum, in proprios Greges,  
Reges in ipsos Imperium est Jovis.  By which he fully expresseth, That as Kings have Power over their Subjects, so God hath the Power over Kings.  
All the vast Collections that may be made, of Emperor's asserting, or Subjects owning, that their Authorities are from God, that God gave them their Kingdoms, they were Crowned of God, etc. of which there is a copious Collection in Archbishop 
(h) Power of Princes, a pag. 47 ad pag. 65.  Usher; are so many Arguments to prove this Assertion, That as they derive their Authority from God, so they should only be accountable to him.  
But I shall now proceed to more positive Authorities. Marcus 
(i) Xiphilin. excerpt. ex Dionys. M. Aureli●. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Aurelius saith, Of a Free Monarch none may judge but God alone; and 
(k) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Dion. Hist. Rom. l. 53.  Dion Cassius tells us, That Kings are loosened from the Laws, that is, they are freed from all coactive Obedience to them, and are held by none of the written Ordinances. So 
(l) Ereptumque Principi illud in Principatu beatissimum, quod nihil cogitur. Panaeg.  Pliny tells us, That the happiest thing in a Princedom is, that the Prince may be constrained to nothing. Therefore the most Judicious 
(m) usher's Power of Princes, p. 73.  Primate saith, In regard of themselves, Kings are said to be exempted from Subjection to the Laws, because they are not tied (otherwise than for Convenience, and good Example sake) to the observation of such as are more positive and temporary Laws; and because they are not liable to the Civil Punishment set down for the breach of any Law, as having no Superior upon Earth, that may exercise such Power over them. For, as in another 
(n) Idem, p. 96.  place he saith, If the People may call him to an account for the Breach of the Law, the State is plainly Democratical; if the Peers, it is Aristocratical; and if either, or both, it cannot be accounted Monarchical.  
To which we may add that of the Judicious Lord 
(o) Clarendon's Survey, c. 29. p. 163.  Chancellor, That though a Prince's violating his Faith is against the Law of Nature, yet the Obligation doth not set any Judge over the Sovereign, nor doth any Civil Law pretend there is any Power to punish him. It is enough that in Justice he ought to do it, and that there is a Sovereign in Heaven above him, though not on Earth.  
So 
(p) Comment. in 12. Johannis.  Cyril of Alexandria saith, Who dare violate the Decrees of the Kings o the Earth, unless he himself be one that is invested with Regal Dignity, (and I may add, his Superior:) For in such the Charge of transgressing the Law hath no place at all.  
So 
(q) Quando Rex delinquit, soli Deo reus est, 〈◊〉 hominem non habet qui e●●s facta dijudicet. In Psal. 51.  Cassiodorus saith, If any of the People transgress, he sinneth against God and the King; but when the King offendeth, he standeth guilty to God alone, because he hath no Man to be Judge of his Do. So Nicephorus, Catena, Lyra, Didymus, Arnobius Junior, and all the Commentators on the fifth Verse of the 51. Psalms, on those Words, Against thee only have I offended, concur in the same Assertion, That Kings are subordinate to none but God. Nor do any oppose it, but such as would place a Mufti or Sanhedrim above Kings.  
Consentaneous to which, was the Sentence of the 
(r) Nesas est in dubium deducere ejus potest ●em, cui omnium Gubernatio superno constat del●gata judicio. P. 514.  Council of Toledo, That it is unlawful to call his Power in question, to whom the Government of all is known to be delegated by Judgement from above.  

(s) In cujus solius pctestate sunt, a quo sunt s●cundi, post quem primi. Apolog. c. 3.  Tertullian speaking of the Prerogative of Kings, saith, They are in his Power alone, from whom they are second, and after whom the first; and in another place 
(t) Colimus Imperator●m ut hominem Deo secundum, solo Deo minorem. Ad Scap. c. 2.  We worship the Emperor, as a Man next to God, and who hath obtained of God whatever he is, and is only less than God.  
So 
* Adversus Parm. l. 3.  Optatus saith, Over the Emperor is none but he that made the Emperor. Therefore St. Chrysostom 
(u) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Hom. 2. ad Pop. Antioch.  saith, The King is top and Head of all Men on Earth, having none upon Earth higher than himself So 
(w) V●pote constituti supra l●ges divino examini reservati, seculi l●gibus non cohibentur. Praefat. Chron. Reasons to prove it.  Otto Frisingensis well notes, That Kings alone (as being placed above Laws) are reserved to God's Judgement, and are not restrained by any secular Laws.  
There is good Reason for all this. For if the Sovereign were obliged, ex officio, to give an account of his Administration to his Subjects, or had any Superior upon Earth to exact a reason of his Actions (if he governed not according to the Laws) and for Transgressions to inflict a Punishment upon him, he should cease from being a Sovereign. As in the Chapter of Nonresistance I shall further prove.  
It is a Constitution grounded upon Necessity, to place Impunity somewhere, for the avoiding Confusion: for a Circle in Government would be of most pernicious Consequence; and infinitely absurd it must be (saith a late 
(x) D. Digs against Resistance, p. 39, 40.  Author) that any should challenge a right to rule the Rulers, and be Superior to the Supreme. 
(y) Jus consistens in impunitate delictorum.  This Dernier resort, or last appeal must rest somewhere. It is a right consisting in unpunishableness for Faults, which fences the Person or Persons in whom is Supreme Domination, and secures them as strongly (as Laws can do) from all Violence; and if it were otherwise a most large Inlet would be made to overthrow all Authority: for every malicious Malcontent would be pretending some Arbitrariness, or oppression in the Government; for which, if they had any colour of Authority, they would be calling him to an account. 
This Unaccountableness to Men hinders not their Obligation ●o God's 〈…〉 makes 〈…〉.   
I foresee how solid, Judicious and Religious Authors soever have brought to vouch this Assertion; yet Republican Libertines will be raising up their Crests against me, and more moderate Persons will be pulling me by the Ear, and admonishing me, lest hereby I should make the Sovereign lawless, and give him liberty to do what he listeth. Therefore no ways deserting the Principle of unaccountableness (the Mischief of the contrary of which I think is sufficiently discovered in the Chapter of Commonwealth-Government) I shall endeavour out of good Authors, and the examples of great Princes, to lay down some Rules, which Princes may think prudential for them to imitate.  
First therefore I shall observe what the great 
(z) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 3. Polit. c. 12.  Philosopher notes, That a King that governs by Law, makes no new Species of Government, from that King that makes the Law his Standard. So that governing by Laws, and according to them, in his Opinion, is very agreeable to Kingly Government, and he every where commends it as most acceptable to the People, and most safe for the Prince.  
There is an excellent 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. De Creatione Princ.  Soliloquy that Philo brings in his King to make, and which may become the potentest Monarch to imitate, That he writ the Laws himself into a Book, that he might transcribe them into his Soul, and imprint into his Mind those divine Characters, never to be washed out again: whereas other Kings therefore bear Staves for their Sceptre, the abridgement of the Law should be his Sceptre, his rejoicing and Glory , the Ensign of that unreprovable Government, which is fashioned according to the Pattern of Gods own Kingdom.  
Although according to Harmenopulus, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the King is not to be subject to the Laws; because offending against them, he is not punished: and as St. 
(b) Neque ullis ad poenam legibus vo●antur, tuti Imperii potestate. Apol. pro Davide.  Ambrose speaking of David, saith, He being a King, was tied to no Laws, because Kings are freed from the Bonds or Punishments of Faults, being called to Punishment by no Laws, being protected by the Power of their Empire; yet 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Greg. Naz. Orat. 27.  as a grave Father saith, God's Word, and right Reason must give a Law to the Lawgiver. Therefore that weighty and elegant Expression of 
(d) Temperans Majestatem Caesaris infra Deum, magis illum commendo Deo, cui soli subjicio. Ideo magnus, quia coelo minor est. Apol. c. 35.  Tertullian deserves consideration by all Princes, which is this, While we temper the Majesty of Caesar under God, we commend him the more to God, unto whom alone we do subject him; therefore great, because he is less than Heaven.  
To the voluntary submission of a Prince to his own, or the Laws of his Progenitors, may be referred the memorable saying of Valentinian 
(e) Revera majus Imperio est submittere legibus Princip●tum. Lib. 4. c. de Leg. etc. Licet Lex Imperii solennibus Juris Imperatorem solverit, nihil tamen tam proprium Imperii est, quam legibus vivere. Lib. 3. c. de Testam.  the Younger, It is in truth a greater thing than Empire to submit the Princedom itself to the Laws: and that other equally imitable by Princes, Though the Laws of the Empire have freed the Emperor from the Solemnities of the Laws, yet nothing is so proper for Empire, as to live by the Laws, or according to them. So inthat commendation which Plutarch gives 
(f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Orat. 2. de Fortuna Alex.  Alexander the Great, That he conceived he ought to be thought superior unto all Men, yet subject to Justice.  
Such a Prince we find Pliny fully describe in his 
(g) Nec minus hominem se quam hominibus praeesse meminit.  Panegyric of Trajan, That he thinks himself to be one of us, and so much the more excellent and eminent he is, that he so thinketh, and no less remembreth that he is a Man, than that he is a Ruler of Men. For he who hath nothing left to 
(h) Cui nihil ad augendum fastigium superest, hic uno modo crescere potest, si se ipse submittat securus magnitudinis suae.  increase his height, hath but this one way to grow by, if he submit himself (that is, to the governing by Laws, it may be presumed he means) being secure of greatness: and in another place he calls him equal to all; in this only greater than the rest, That he was better: and more nearly to our present purpose, Thou hast made 
(i) Ipse te legibus subjecisti, Legibus, Caesar, quas 〈◊〉 Principi scrip. 〈◊〉.  thyself subject to the Laws, O Caesar, which were not written to restrain the Prince by.  
So we find both Severus 
(k) Licet legibus soluti simus, attamen legibus 〈…〉. Instit quibus modis Testam. infirment. 8. Vet.  and Antonius often set down in their Rescripts, Although we be loosed from the Laws, yet we live by the Laws.  
These Laws are the Laws of God, of Nature, or those of the Kingdom; concerning the first and last I shall not now discourse: concerning that of Nature the 
(l) Non scripta, sed nata lex, quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus, ad quam non docti sed facti, non instituti sed imbuti sumus. Pro Milone.  Orator saith, It is not writ, but born with us, which we have not learned, received, or read, but from Nature itself have powerfully attracted, drunk in, and extracted; to which we are not taught, but made obedient, not instructed, but imbued.  
Concerning the original of which Law, he saith, 
(m) Vnus erit communis quasi Magister & Imperator omnium Deus, ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator; ●ui qui non p●rebit, ip●e se fugiet, a● naturam hominis spernabitur, atque hoc ips● luet maximas poenas, etiamsi caetera supplicia quae putantur ●ffugerit. Lib. 3. de Repub.  That God our common Master and Ruler of all, is the Inventor, Judge and Lawgiver, which he who will not obey, must fly from himself, (i. e. abandon the Dictates of his own Reason and Conscience) and despise the Nature of Man; and in himself (i. e. in his Conscience) undergo the greatest Pains, although he should escape all those other which commonly are accounted Punishments. It is concerning this Law he saith, That from it neither the Senate no● the People can exempt us, nor is it lawful to abrogate it in the whole, nor derogate from it, 
(n) Ibid.  Neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per Senatum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus.  
The  Archbishop 
(o) Vs●er's Power of Princes. p. 70.  from hence concludes, That to this moral Law of God, whether by Nature, thus written in the Hearts of Men, or more fully delivered by Gods own written word, or by just consequence deduced from the grounds of either of them, the greatest Monarch upon Earth owes as much obedience, as the lowest and meanest of all his Subjects. And however the Prince is obliged to the directive force of the Law, and so ought to be governed by it as his Director; and though it be most true that 
(p) Reges Jolo Dei timore metuque Gehennae coercentur. Isiodorus 3. Sent. c. 31.  Kings are restrained only by the fear of God and Hell, yet we may conclude that these, together with the consideration of their Interests, will be sufficient Incitements to them to govern according to such Laws.  
Yet still it is to be owned, That when a King doth not act according to such Laws, he is not thereby capable of any Punishment for the transgressing of them: and the reason (saith the learned 
(q) Power of the Prince, p. 81.  Primate) is obvious, because the inflicting of a punishment is an Act of a Superior to an Inferior; and to make one upon Earth Superior to the Supreme Governor, would employ an absolute contradiction: though a Father or Master were never so faulty, none would be so absurd as to think, that their Servants or Children might chastise them.  
When I reflect on that dismal Day, when the wicked High Court of Justice arraigned and sentenced the most Innocent, Just and Religious King, that possibly hath worn a Crown since our Saviour's time; I always stand amazed, and read, or meditate on that Tragical Act with a concern next to that of our Saviour's suffering: All that black and bloody Scene was acted by Men, of and upon the Principles successful Rebels made use of, 
The Preamble to the Treasonable Charge against King Charles the First.  That Kings are admitted and trusted with a limited Power to govern by, and according to the Laws of the Land, and not otherwise; and by their Trust, Oath and Office, are obliged to use the Power committed to them, for the Good and Benefit of the People, and for the Preservation of their Rights and Liberties; which they charged that Blessed King to have designedly violated.  
To which I shall give only some (k) short Heads of his Majesty's Answer, 
(r) His Majesty's Speeches and Trial, p. 429.  which if they had been weighed, were enough to confound all their arguing. He demanded by what lawful Authority he was seated there; he had a trust committed to him by God, by old and lawful Descent, that he would not betray, 
Pag. 431.  to answer to a new unlawful Authority; That England was an Hereditary Kingdom: He tells them how great a sin it is to withstand lawful Authority, and submit to a Tyrannical or Unlawful: That Kings can be no Delinquents: That Obedience unto Kings is strictly commanded in the old and new Testament, 
pag. 435.  particularising that one place, Where the word of a King is, there is Power; and who may say unto him, What dost thou? 
Eccl. 8.4.  That no Impeachment can lie against him, all running in his Name: That the King can do no wrong; the House of Commons never being a Court of Judicature, can erect none. He owns an Obligation to God, to defend and maintain the Liberties of his People, against all such Illegal and Arbitrary Proceed. 
Pag. 439.  But 'twas to no purpose to show such Crown-Jewels before such Wolves and Bears, that were gaping for his Blood, and would not admit his only request to them to be heard, for the Welfare of the Kingdom and Liberty of the Subject (before they precipitated Sentence against him) before the Lords and Commons, and pressed it, That it may be it was something he had to say, they had not heard before Hand. But nothing his sacred Majesty could say, would move those, who, under a vile and notorious Lie, in the Name of the People, the Supreme Authority, as they called it, passed that barbarous Sentence against that sacred Head, to the amazement of the whole World, sufficient to raise the utmost Indignation of all good Men, against such barbarous Principles and Proceed.   

CHAP. XIX. That the Sovereign may dispense with the Execution of the Laws of his Country in several Cases.  
HAving discoursed of the Kings being unaccountable to any but God Almighty, when he governs not according to the Laws of God, Nature, or his Dominions; 
The Connexion of this with the foregoing Chapter.  upon that Foundation, That there cannot be two Supremes here upon Earth, in one Kingdom: I come now to discover what Power Kings in general, and our Kings in particular, have to dispense with the Execution of the Laws upon some cases; for it is far from my thoughts, ever to suggest any such dangerous assertion, That Princes in general may dispense with the Execution of the Laws.  
Plutarch 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Compar. Flaminii & Philopaemenis.  setteth this down as a chief point of that natural skill which Philopoemen had in Government, That he did not only rule according to the Laws, but overruled the Laws themselves, when he found it conducing to the Weal public.  
For as the 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Justin. Jun. Imp. praef. Constit. 3.  Emperor saith (whilst the Laws stand in force) it is fit that sometimes the King's Clemency should be mingled with the severity of them; especially when by that means the Subject may be freed from much Detriment and Damage.  
Princes, according to the 
(c) Princeps est supra legem adeo quod secundum conscientiam suam judicare potest. Cyrus' in L. Rescript. etc.  Judgement of great Lawyers, have Power to judge according to their own Conscience, and not according to the Letter of the Law: and no doubt it was such written Laws as these that 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Justinian. Novel 105.  Justinian the Emperor meant, when upon the enacting of a Constitution of this kind, he added thereunto this Limitation, From all these things which have been said by us, let the Emperor's State be excepted, whereunto God hath subjected the very Laws themselves, sending him as a living Law unto Men; who therefore in another place, assumeth to himself the Title of a Father of the Law. Whereupon the 
(e) Nota, Imperatorem vocari patrem Legis, under &c Leges sune ei subject. Gloss. in Novel. 12. c. 4.  Glossator maketh this Observation, Note, That the Emperor is the Father of the Law, whereupon the Laws also are subject to him.  
So the great 
(f) Princeps est supra legem in quantum si expediens est, potest legem mutare, & in ea dispensare pro loco & tempore. Vid. Thom. in 1.2. q. 96. Artic. 5. ad 3.  Schoolman saith, The Prince is above the Law so far, that if it be expedient, he may change the Law, and dispense with Time and Place; as when a Man is condemned to banishment, the Prince, if he see cause, may revoke him from thence; and therein, saith 
(g) Gloss. in lib. 4. de Poenis.  Accursius, his own Will is accounted a great and just cause, Magna & justa Causa est ejus Voluntas.  
The Reason of these Assertions is couched in what Aeneas 
(h) Convenit Imperatori Juris rigorem aequitatis fraeno temperare, cui soli inter aequitatem jusque interpositam interpretationem licet & incumbit inspicere. De Ortu & Authoribus Imperii.  Silvius observes, That there is a certain other thing to which the Emperor is more obnoxious than to the Law, and that is Equity, which is not always found written: Now if the Law doth command one thing, and Equity persuade another. It is fit the Emperor should temper the Rigour of the Law with the Bridle of Equity; as he, who alone may, and aught to look unto that Interpretation, which lieth interposed betwixt Law and Equity; since no Law can sufficiently answer the Varieties and unthought on plottings of Man's Nature, and in Tract of Time, Laws at first, just, or in terrorem, become unprofitable and harsh: and this moderating of Laws (which is called, saith he, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Equity) is so annexed to the Prince, that by no decree of Man it can be pulled from it.  
This Absoluteness I have hitherto mentioned out of such great Authors, 
How far the Kings of England may dispense with their Laws.  is not practised by the English Sovereign; for he challengeth no such Power to make or abrogate Laws, without the Concurrence of the two Hoves: But he hath a sufficient Prerogative by dispensing, conniving or putting some Laws more in Execution than at other times, so to manage the Execution of the, as the Government, and consequently the People's safety be not prejudiced. So though there be a Law for Triennial Parliaments; yet when a Prince finds a Potent Faction that may influence the Electors, so as the meeting of such a Parliament at such a time, may be hazardous to the public, there being no Penalty can be inflicted on a King for the Omission, and the Danger being visible, that such a Factious Parliament was only wanting, to bring to perfection the Design of Traitorous and Seditious Persons: It is very agreeable to Reason, that a Prince, in such a juncture, should prefer the public Peace of his Kingdom, and the security of his Crown (by the omitting such Summons) than to hazard all by convening them. There are other Cases may intervene, wherein the Reason of State, the Salus publica, may require the dispensing with, or suspension of the Execution of some Laws: As in time of open Rebellion, the King's arming of such as he may most surely confide in, though they take not such Oaths, or be so qualified, as the Laws require, and as in several other Particulars, might be instanced in.  
I shall only add two Authorities of our own Country, who were well versed in the matter; the one a great Divine, and the other as great a Lawyer and Statesman: First, the learned 
(i) usher's Power of Princes, p. 76.  Primate saith, Such positive Laws being (as other works of Men are) imperfect, and not free from any Discommodities, if the strict Observation thereof should be pursued in every particular: It is fit the Supreme Governor should not himself only be exempted from Subjection thereunto, but also be so far Lord over them, that where he seethe cause he may abate, or totally remit the penalty incurred by the breach of them; dispense with others for not observing of them at all, yea generally suspend the Execution of them, when by experience he shall find the Inconveniences to be greater than the profit that was expected should redound thereby, to the Commonwealth.  
The Second Authority shall be that of the Earl of Clarendon, 
(k) Survey, p. 127.  who affirms, That by our Laws, the King hath, in many Cases, the Power of dispensing with the Execution of the Law, especially in granting pardon for the transgressing of them, except in those Cases where the Offence is greater to others than the King, as in murder of an Husband or Father: therefore upon an Appeal by them, the Offender may suffer after the King's pardon; which shows how tender our Laws are of protecting the Lives of Subjects.  
This Prerogative of Kings 
(l) 3. Rep.  Bodin avouches among the Rights of Sovereignty, to pardon the Persons, the forfeiture of their Goods; and to restore the attainted Honours of those condemned by righteous or unrightcous Judgement; according to that of St. 
(m) Q. 115. ex Veteri & Novo Testamento.  Hilary in St. Augustine, Imperatori soli licet revocare sententiam, & reum mortis absolvere, & ei ignoscere: That it belongeth only to the Emperor, to revoke the Sentence or Judgement; and to absolve and pardon the guilty. For as Themistius saith, One thing becomes a Judge, and another thing a King; the one is to observe the Law, the other hath power to correct the Laws themselves, and to qualify the severity and harshness of them, as being himself a living Law, and not confined to the unchangeable and unalterable Letter. For that end, saith he, it seemeth, God did send from Heaven the Regal Power into the Earth, that Men might have a refuge from that dead and  Law, to the living one, as he instanceth in Capital Offenders. For we have seen (saith he) Men returned to life from the Gates of Death, whom the Law indeed sent thither, but the Lord of the Law, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, brought back from thence again.  
As to the Power of Equity, claimed by the great Civilians, the Administration of that is vested in the Chancellor or Lord-Keeper of the King's appointment, who is the Keeper of the King's Conscience, or Dispenser of that reserved Power in the King.   

CHAP. XX. That the Sovereign is not to be resisted or rebelled against, upon pretence of ill Government, Irreligion, or any such matter.  
OUR Republicans of 1641. set themselves, with all their skill and cunning, 
The Necessity of this Discourse.  as well as force, to overthrow the Doctrine of Nonresistance; and to establish that of its being lawful, not only to rise in Arms, for the defence of their Liberty, Property and Religion (the gilded pretences of all Rebellions) but to prosecute that blessed King and all his Loyal Subjects, in the highest Degree of Cruelty and Revenge, that they could devise, or their success embolden them to commit. Therefore it is a most necessary Duty of all that wish well to themselves, as well as the Government, to oppose such dangerous Positions and Practices.  
The Authorities I have cited in the two Chapters of Sovereignty, are but the glean of what may be found in learned Men on this Subject; and since I shall have occasion hereafter (when I treat of the Subjects duty) to handle this matter more particularly, I shall be the shorter in this, and refer the curious Reader to the elaborate Treatise of Mr. Dudley Digs, Of the unlawfulness of Subjects taking up Arms against their Sovereign; and to the Glory of his Age, for Learning, Loyalty and Sanctity, the Lord Primate usher's Power of the Prince, and His Second Part of Obedience; to the judicious and learned Sir George Mackenzie his Jus Regium, and 
(a) Arnisaeus. Zeiglar de Jure Majestatis c. 1. n. 12. Salmasii Defensio Regia. Grotius lib. 1. c. 4. de Jure Belli. Dr. More 's Divine Dialogues. Dr. Mouliu 's Philanax Anglicus. Sam. Petit 's Diatriba, etc.  others that treat of this Subject, ex instituto: desiring all those, who have imbibed, or would avoid any of these dangerous Principles, that they will seriously consult those Authors, out of whom I shall only hint some few of their Reasons and Arguments, that may be as Antidotes against the most destructive poison of resisting Sovereign Princes, or allowing any Order of Subjects the Liberty upon any Pretence of Misgovernment, to call their Sovereigns to an account.  
In the first Place it ought to be considered, that by constituting any check upon Sovereign Princes, all Decisions and Controversies must be writ in Blood; and it would lay a fruitful 
(b) Non tanti est civilia bella movere. Arguments against Resisting of Princes.  Seed-Plot of civil Wars, by indulging the most pernicious Freedom of righting ourselves: for though the People, or some ambitious Malcontents, may not be so happy as they could wish; yet to make use of Force, as a Remedy, will certainly increase the Miseries.  
If this Principle be granted, it will make Sovereigns always jealous, 
Would make Princes always jealous.  and consequently studious to secure themselves against such opposition by strong Hand, which will be very galling to the Subject.  
Besides, upon all differences betwixt the King and People, 
No Judges can be betwixt King and People.  no Judge can be found to determine the Matter; and to allow this Power to the People, is to allow a Difference that can have no end, before one half of the Nation have ruined another, as by sad Experience we found in our late Civil Wars.  
Further it ought to be considered, That this not only overthrows Monarchy, but all Government; for who will obey, 
It overthrows all Government.  when they can resist? Under all Governments we should have one Rebellion 
(c) Just Right of Monarchy, p. 92.93.  rising out of the Ashes of another; for only those who prevailed should be satisfied, and all the rest would certainly conclude, that they might more justly oppose those Usurpers, than the first did their lawful Prince: and thus, Government (which is designed for the Security, Peace and Tranquillity of the State) should be perpetually embroiled, and by the cruel Hostilities of emulous Factions, mastering one another; the common People, and those who would desire to live peaceably, should be the continual Prey of Ravenous Harpies and Vultures.  
If we allow Subjects to take Arms against their Prince; 
Not allowed in Families.  we ought to allow Children the like Liberty against their Parents, Servants against their Masters, Soldiers against their Officers, and the common Rabble against their Magistrates: For the King in his Sovereignty, eminently comprehends all these Relations.  
Besides, what reasonable Man can think (much more ought to assert) that it is fit to allow this Principle; when all Ages, 
Mischiess of the People's Liberties.  and daily Experience teach us, That the numerous Party of Mankind is difficultly, by the most rational and strictest Laws, contained in their duty: What might we therefore expect, if every Man should be invested with Power to be his own Judge, and be loosed from all Laws, and encouraged to the Duty (as it must be upon this Doctrine) of transgressing, disobeying, and breaking all Laws that establish a Government uneasy to him.  
It cannot but be observed, and by daily Experience is found, 〈◊〉 in all Popular Congresses, in all Elections, or public Votes of the Body of the People, how violent they are, when opposed by some few: How Insolent when they find their Strength, that nos numeri sumus: And how Cruel when enraged, as in the History of Cardinal Bentivolio (to go no higher) in that of Naples, under Masianello, and that of Amsterdam against the De Wits, and many more might be instanced in. And it will certainly be allowed, that the Multitude (being cajoled by Pretenders to be their Patriots, and the  maintainers of their Liberties, Properties and Religion (the usual sham's and Wheedles, ambitious and contriving Men make of to seduce them) find these very Men more unjust, oppressive, exorbitant and Arbitrary than the worst of Princes.  
Therefore since the multitude is no better qualified to judge, nor juster when led by such Chieftains: Surely all prudent Men, and Lovers of their own and their Country's Happiness, must conclude it much safer, and conducibler to the Public Weal, to obey those whom God hath set over them; and the Laws, their Duties and Oaths oblige them to bear Faith and Allegiance to; than to subject themselves to their fellow-Subjects, who can have no other Title but rebellious Success to warrant them to harass, butcher, and ruin them. Whereas at the worst in Kings, we have but an ill Master; but allowing Subjects to usurp, we may fight ourselves into slavery under hundreds of Tyrants, and those too fight one against another, so that we shall not know even which of those Devils to obey.  
Would we consult the Histories of preceding times, or our own Experiences, we should find the Pretenders to reform 
(d) Idem, p. 92. Pretenders to Reformation greatest Oppressors.  Government, have proved the greatest Cheats to those they have seduced. They in reality neither promoting Liberty or Religion, but under that Vizard-mask, shrouded other black designs; and when they succeeded in their Attempts, they became infinitely more oppressive to the People, than the lawful Powers ever had or could be, they pretended to protect them from the Rigour of. And when 
(e) Idem, p. 90, 91.  others rose against them on the same pretence, they did in the severest manner declare that Rebellion in others, which they contended to be lawful in themselves. Whoever will not be convinced of this (if he by woeful Experience knew it not) may read it in the Histories of our late Miseries; and if he have any Spirit of Ingenuity or Christianity, will totally abandon such Principles, as brought so wasting a Calamity on our Country.  
In the Constitution of our English Government, we have but one Sovereign, 
The Constitution of England's Government Monarchical.  to whom we own Fealty, Homage, Allegiance, and Obedience by Oaths and Laws. Even all the Acts of Parliament that acknowledge this a Monarchy, are so many solid Arguments and Testimonies of the King's Supremacy; and to set up any  Power whatsoever, would be to create Regnum in Regno in Temporals, as the Fanatic Principle, That Dominium fundatur in Gratia, or in Orthodoxa Religione, doth in Spirituals: Than which no Sentiment was ever invented more dangerous to overturn States, and bring all to Confusion.  
If indeed we were to form the Government, under which we were to live, 
No new Government now to be framed.  we might agree upon setting up Ephori, Tribunes of the People, Daemagogues, Calvin's Three Estates, or a  Power in the two Houses, as so many checks upon the Supreme Governor. But we are born under a Monarchy fixed by Law and Consent, time out of Mind; so that we may as well yield to the Levellers reducing us to the pure pute State of Nature, as the forming such an Idea of a Commonwealth, wherein a Sovereign is to be resisted, if any factious Party think themselves aggrieved.  
It is to be well considered, that though William the Conqueror had little or no Title of Right, yet his Conquest, with the Subjects submission, then, and in after Ages to his Successors, and the Obligation of Oaths, and subsequent Acts of Parliament, supplied all Defects; and all the Limitations of that absolute Power which accrued by Conquest, being the free Concession of himself and his Successors (which appears in their Grants by way of Charter, as I shall hereafter have occasion to enlarge upon) it is most evident that the King's Power is absolute, where no Law 
(f) D. Digs Unlawfulness of Resisting.  can be produced to the contrary, and no special Case can be determined by the Subject to the King's disadvantage: and though the Kings succeeding the Conquest (to sweeten Subjection,) quaedam jura pactis minuerunt, and these Acts of Grace were confirmed by Promise and Oath; 
No Contract betwixt King and Subjects, whereby they may exact an Account.  yet we find no Footsteps of any security given, that should endanger the Person or Regal Authority, by giving to their Subjects any legal Power to unking them if they should not perform Covenant. Nor could it be rational to expect such; for they knew full well if they should not break such Promises, yet a Pretence that they did so (as we have known it was alleged concerning the Coronation Oath) might upon the first opportunity create a Civil War.  
Therefore their Subjects had as little reason to accept, as the Kings had to offer so pernicious a Security, as would bring both Parties into such a sad Condition. For if Rebellion were to be allowed in any Case, that Case would be always pretended: and though the Prince were Just, Wise, and Religious; yet ambitious Men (to compass their own Ends) would impute to him Oppression, Weakness, or Irreligion, as the World knows by too sad Experience was verified in King Charles the Martyr; who taking his measures of others Sincerity, by the rule of his own Heart, suffered pretences of public Good to grow up to insolent Tumults, and at last to Rebellion; and notwithstanding his Exemplary Practice in his public Devotions, was traduced to have but handsomely dissembled, and favoured another Religion in his Heart; and at last brought before a crew of Regicides, impeached of breach of Trust, Tyranny, and I know not how many horrid Crimes against his Subjects; who yet died the People's Martyr, and the Royal Asserter of their Liberties and Privileges, which all his Subjects found to expire with him; the greatest Arbitrariness and cruelest Tyranny, being, during their Power, exercised by the new Commonwealth Men, that ever was read of in any History.  
Those who read Books, among those of the Sect of Libertines in Politics, and so much magnify the great name of Liberty of the Subject and  Powers, 
Writers who lived under Commonwealths, no Guides to us.  converse most in Greek and Latin Authors, who lived under Commonwealths, and so were profuse in the commendation of their Country Government, against Usurpers; or else these admired Authors were 
(g) Jus Regium, p. 134.  Stoics, who out of a selfish Pride, equalled themselves not only to their Kings, but to their own Gods; even as our Quakers who pretend a Light within them a more sure guide to them than the Law.  
Now the same reason they had to commend their form of Government, 
We have more reason to comm●nd our Government, than the Romans or Grecians theirs.  (and so much more as Monarchy is preferable to Aristocracy) we in England have reason to commend our Constitution, where our Kings are truly the Fathers of their Country; and if they would balance the convenience or inconvenience of either Government, they would soon discover it. For whereas they say that the Doctrine of Nonresistance is the readiest Motive to establish Tyranny: It is much more certain and experimentally known that the Leaders of the Rabble always prove such, and that the Distractions of a civil War (which ordinarily are occasioned by the pretence of reforming something amiss in the Governors, and Competitions betwixt Persons for Sovereignty) destroy more than the Lusts of any one Tyrant can do; which made Lucan, a Republican, and of the Pompeian Party, conclude, after a sad review of the continual Civil Wars betwixt Sylla and Marius, Caesar and Pompey, without touching upon what followed under the Triumvirs, 
Foelices Arabes, Medique, Eoaque tellus,  
Qui sub perpetuis tenuerunt Regna Tyrannis.   
And if he preferred even the Tyranny or absoluteness of those Kings, before the State of Civil Wars; how much more have we reason to submit, and that cheerfully, to the most easy Yoke of the Sovereignty of our Princes. We need not be solicitous, that their unaccountableness to their Subjects shall prompt them to Tyranny, because we have good Security (as strong as humane Wisdom ever invented) that we shall live happily under that Constitution which our Forefathers enjoyed the Benefit of in an high Degree, 
The Security we have, that no Arbitrary Government can be exercised in England.  never distrusting the sound temper of the Policy.  
For first our Kings swear at their Coronations to preserve the Laws, Liberties, Properties and Religion. Secondly, If they should command illegal things, the Executors of them are responsible to Parliamentary Inquisitions. Lastly, the Interest of the King is the same with that of the Subject, as to their Prosperity and Misery; so that a King will always consult the good of his Subjects: which made 
(h) Praeestis hominibus, sed hominum causa, nec domini modo & Arbitri rerum, sed Tutores & Administratores estis. Collata est in sinum vestrum a deo & hominibus Respublica. sed nempe in sinum & ut foveatur. Epist. Dedicat. ad Imp. Reges & Principes.  Lipsius tell the Sovereigns, That they govern over Men but for their good, and are not only Lords and Judges of Matters, but Tutors and Administrators; That the Government of the Commonweal, by God and Men, is placed in their Bosoms or Laps, but so as to be cherished and protected there.  
To conclude this discourse, We have heard of, or seen, the sad Calamities the Republican Rebellion brought upon all his Majesty's Dominions, when the mild Government of King Charles the First was altered to the most Bloody and Tyrannical one of his rebellious Subjects that any Age could parallel; and we have had Experience of the merciful Government of his Royal Son and Successor, and have lived to see all the Establishments of Usurpers brought to Confusion.  
We have seen a formidable Rebellion burst forth in our Magnanimous King James the Second Reign (which had been forming seven Years before) utterly overthrown in two Months; and we cannot peruse Histories, but we must meet with infinite Examples of the sad devastations such Rebellions bring to their Country, and the unsuccessfulness of them. Therefore I would earnestly advise all Malcontents, never to make their Country's Ruin, and the slain Carcases of their Countrymen, the Steps by which they must ascend the Scaffolds, or the Rounds of the Ladders they must mount the Gallows, which, without a Prince's Clemency, are the sure Rewards of all Rebels, and their certain Fate.   

CHAP. XXI. Of the King's Authority in making Laws.  
HAving treated of the King's Sovereignty, I come now to treat of that Top-branch of it, the Power and Authority of the King in giving Laws to his Subjects. I must be shorter on this Head, because the following Chapters, concerning the Great Councils, and those particularly concerning Parliaments, will more fully illustrate and confirm this Particular.  
In all Government, the Legislative Power must be fixed somewhere; and it is the concurrent Opinion of all 
(a) Ab eo, i. Principe, tanquam a fonte, Leges omnes & Jura emanant. Vinii Epist. Dedicat. Id. Comment. in Inst it. lib. 1. tit. 2. p. 13. a.  Civilians, That all Laws do flow from the Prince, as from a Fountain.  
The Word Lex and Jus, by Cicero, and the Romans, were most-what used promiscuously; though Lex, or Law, did frequently signify what was writ, and enjoined to be observed. Therefore the Plebiscita of the Romans at first were not called Laws, because they obliged only part of the Citizens, till the Hortensian Law gave them the same force as those which were accorded in Comitiis Centuriatis.  
The Plebiscita were among the Romans, 
The Plebiscita of the Romans.  after the expulsion of their Kings, binding Laws; and they were made thus: The Magistrates who had the greater Auspexes in the Commonwealth (such were the Consuls, Dictator's, or Praetors) proposed the Laws to the Assemblies of the People, and asked them by the Name of Quirites, Whether they willed or commanded them? And they writ in the Table either A. for Antiquo, or V R. for Vti Rogas, As thou askest.  
The Tribunes and Plebeian Aediles were the proper Magistrates of the Plebs; but the Aediles were never known to demand the People's Suffrage to the Laws. The Plebiscita at first were made in the Assemblies of the 
(b) Tributis Comitiis, Centuriatis, aut Curiatis.  Tribes, and the Laws in the Hundredary or Curiate Assemblies. But, to be short, L. Valerius and M. Horatius being Consuls, it being a doubt whether the Fathers were obliged by the Plebiscita, they passed a Law in the Centuriata 
(c) Anno v. C. 304, 305. Howel. In the Curiata Comitia, saith Dionys.  Comitia, That whatever the Plebs should enjoin in the Convention of the Tribes, should be binding to the People; which was confirmed by 
(d) Anno v. C. 367. Vinnius.  Q. Hortensius the Dictator, at the third Secession of the People to the Janiculum; therefore 
(e) Inter Legem & Plebiscitum sp●●ies interesset constituendi; potestas autem ead●m esset. Sect. de Origine Juris. Id. p. 14. Senatus consultum, and Power of the Roman Senate.  Pomponius saith, That the manner of constituting a Law and Plebiscitum differed, but the Power was the same.  
That which the Senate commanded and constituted, was called a Senatus consultum. Vinnius proves, That while the Roman Republic stood, the Laws were made by the People alone, and not by the Senate: For they had permitted to them, as the Public Council, to take cognisance and Decrees of things that related to the constituting the Republic; but so, that all Matters of great moment were not established, unless the 
(f) Polyb. lib. 6. Dionys. Halic. lib. 4. & 7. Senatus consulta nullam vim legis babehant nisi plebs ea probaret.  People confirmed them. So that by no Decree of the Senate, either any new Law was introduced, or any old one abrogated. So that neither in Julius Caesar, or Augustus' time, we find mention of their Decrees: And 
(g) 1. de Repub. c. 10.  Bodin affirms, That from the time of the expulsion of the Kings, to the Empire of Tiberius Caesar, the Senate had no power to make Laws, but certain Annual Decrees, which yet did neither bind the People or Plebs.  
During the Civil Wars, there was scarce any Authority but in the Emperors, till Augustus in some measure restored the Power of the Comitia, as Suetonius tells us, who saith, That Julius Caesar 
(h) Jus Comitiorum non in totum populo ademerat, sed cum eo partitus est. Sueton. in Julio.  did not wholly abrogate the Power of the Comitia, but divided the Power betwixt himself and them; and Augustus brought back the ancient Jus of the Comitia: And Tacitus tells us of these times, Ad eam diem, etsi potissima arbitrio Principis, quaedam tamen studiis Tribuum fiebant; That to that day, although most things were done by the Will of the Prince, yet some things were done by the Study of the Tribes.  
Yet it is observed, That from what time the Laws and the 
(i) Ex eo igitur tempore legibus & plebiscitis quiescentibus Senatus jus facere coepit: quanquam non tam propria Auctoritate quam conniventia quadam & indulgentia Principum. Vinnius, p. 14.  Plebiscita were weakened, or less regarded, the Senate began to make Laws; but it was by the Connivance and Indulgence of the Princes, as appears by the Orations the Princes had in the Senates. Therefore 
(k) Solus arbiter rerum Jure & n mine Regio. 1. Annal.  Tacitus makes his Prince sole Arbiter of Affairs by Kingly Right and Name; and gives the Reason for it; Because the nature of Commands consists not otherwise, than that the last resort be to One: Ea est imperandi ratio, ut non aliter constet quam si uni reddatur. So the Judicious 
(l) Reges dom●ni rerum temporumque, trahunt conciliis cuncta, non sequuntur. Lib. 8.  Livy saith, Kings are Lords of Things and Times, attracting all things by their Counsel, not following them. So Mecaenas' Advice was to 
(m) Insurgere paulatim munia legum, & magistratuum ad se trahere. Tacit. 1. Annal.  Augustus, insensibly and gradually to draw to himself the Appointment of Laws and Magistrates. However, by Pliny it is recorded, to the Honour of Trajan, That he would make no Laws without the Senate: as Alexander did nothing in Military Affairs, without his Council of Officers; or in other Matters of moment, without his Council of Prudent Men.  
Thus the Senate had a shadow of Authority, and were something like the Parliaments of France, to ratify the King's Edicts: And it was some advantage to a Senate, that the Prince concurred with 
(n) Senatus Potentiam augendo suae serviebant. Suet. c. 29.  them, & è contra. So we read, That Theoderick the Goth passed that obliging Compliment upon them, 
(o) Judicium vestrum (Patres Conscripti) noster comitatur assensus.  Our Assent (Fathers of the Senate) accompanies your Judgement.  
So Bodin observes, That whenever the Senate had any Authority, it was when it was particula quaedam Majestatis, and had it not vi Senatus, sed quia simul sustinet partem Majestatis: So he would ascribe to the Senate Jus decernendi, & Sententiam pronunciandi; but to want the absolute Legislative Power. For if the Senate had obtained that, the Government must have been Aristocratical.  
How the Equites, by a Law of Caius Gracchus, Tribune of the People, were brought in to be Judges, whereby they had the Lives and Fortunes of the Senators and Nobles in their Power, is fully discoursed of in the Judicious History of 
(p) Lib. 3. c. 9 p. 722.  Dr. Howel, to whom I refer the Reader.  
There were also Praetorian Laws, and the Responsa sapientum; but these seem to be Judgements passed in Courts, rather than Laws, and are like our Precedents and Reports: So I pass them, as also the Laws of the Twelve Tables, only noting, 
Laws of the Twelve Tables.  That in the great Strife betwixt the Tribunes of the People and the Senate, about the 298 of the City, Sp. Posthumius, and others, were sent to Greece, to fetch a Transcript of their Laws; and they were proposed to the view of all Men in Ten Tables, and a Senatus consultum passed for ratifying them; and the Question being put to the People, in the Centuriata Comitia, they were confirmed most religiously, in the presence of the Pontifices, Augurs, and Priests, and were engraven in Brass: By which Account we have the true Method of the Roman making of Laws.  
The Power of the Senate, and all Magistrates Authorities, 
The Power of the Senate and Magistrates were weakened in the Civil Wars.  being weakened in the Wars of Marius and Sylla, and still more in those betwixt Pompey and Caesar, the prevailing Party still made the Senators and Tribunes, Consuls, etc. of their Faction. The like was done in Augustus' time, after the Defeat of Anthony: so that both Julius and Augustus got the Tribunitian Power and Consularships, and Julius got himself made Dictator for ten Years, and had Tribunitian Power for Life: By which means they got all the Powers of the Commonweal, in effect, into their Hands; all which was confirmed by the Lex Regia, of which I shall say something.  
The Emperors, Julius and Augustus, 
Of the Lex Regia.  having as Conquerors (rather than by any other Right) got possession of the Sovereign Power, after a quieter Settlement, obtained the Lex Regia to be established; of which 
(q) Lib. 1. tit. 2. Instit. Quod Principi placuit, legis habet vigorem: quum lege Regia, quae de ejus Imperio lata est, populus ei, & in eum, omne Imperium suum & potestatem concedat.  Justinian saith, That what pleaseth the Prince, hath the vigour of a Law: Forasmuch as by the Lex Regia, which was made concerning his Power, the People to him, and upon him, granted and conferred all its Command and Authority. Therefore whatever the Emperor by his Epistle appoints, or knowing decrees, or commands by Edict, that is a Law. In the Pandects he mentioneth it almost in the same Words; and in 
(r) Tit. De veteri Jure enucleando.  another place, That by an ancient Law, called Lex Regia, all the Right, and all the Power of the Roman People was translated into the Emperor's Authority.  
Some Civilians, that have lived in Commonwealths and mixed Governments, would gladly evade the force of this, by making the Hortensian Law to give the People and Senate equal Power and Authority, and by the Lex Regia the Prince came to be joined to them as a third Party; so that the Powers of neither of the other were by this Law extinguished. But 
(s) Admetus ostenden lamb enixam suam voluntatem, omne Imperium suum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 transferendi. p. 15. a.  Vinnius saith, The Words ei, & in eum, signify the People to have endeavoured to show their Will to transfer all their Power, Authority, or Command, fully and completely on the Emperor. Otherwise, How can it be said they grant omne Imperium & Potestatem, if they retained any of their old Power? Though upon a prudential account, (that the first Emperors might not endanger their own Interest by too universal a Change) they did leave some Shadow of Authority to the Senate and People, which Tacitus elegantly calls, Vestigia morientis Libertatis, some Footsteps of dying Liberty.  

(t) Lib. 4. Hist. c. 1.  Dr. Howel observes, That Justinian declareth, That his Sentence standeth for Law, and bindeth all under his Command; which the very composing of the Body of Law, as from him it is transmitted to us, 
The Roman Emperors absolute Authority in making Laws.  sufficiently demonstrates: Wherein he by his sole Authority repealeth what he pleaseth, and enacteth anew what seemeth good to him, without interposition of any other Authority; which he could not have done (nor his Predecessors) as to the Plebiscita, and Senatus Consulta, if he had wanted that Power which the People and Senate had, and were devested of.  
Juvenal speaking of the People of Rome, how they were fallen from their Power and Authority, and were, under the Emperors, contented to have the Allowances of Corn, and the Pleasure of Shows in the Cirques, expresseth it thus: 
— Qui dabat olim  
Imperium, Fasces, Legiones, omnia, nunc se  
Continet, atque duas tantum res anxius optat,  
Panem & Circenses.   
In stead of all other Authors, 
(u) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 53.  Dio Cassius may serve to clear this Point, whose Discourse on this Subject I shall epitomise. He speaking of Augustus, saith, All the Power of People and Senate was transferred upon him, and that all things were managed merely as the Prince pleased; though all other Magistrates, except the Censors, were preserved: and they had not this Power by Force, but by Law; 
The Power of the Roman Emperors.  taking upon them all things which were of greatest Force (and that by universal consent) as well as the Names; as of Consuls, Imperator (not only as General, but to signify their plenary and absolute Power) in the Room of King and Dictator: They had the Power of raising Men and Money, making War and Peace, commanding all things effectually, both at home and abroad; putting to death Equites and Senators, and doing all other things, which a Consul and other Magistrates, who had absolute Power, might do: They were Censors, admitted Persons into Equestrian and Senatorian Ranks, and removed them at their Pleasure; were inaugurate in all Priesthoods, and had all Religious and Sacred things in their Hands.  
As to the Tribunitian Power, it enabled them to interpose against any thing that might be done contrary to their Pleasure, and thereby they were Sacrosanct, or Inviolable; so that if any injured them in the least, by Word or Deed, they might put him to death, as piacularly criminal.  
They have another Privilege (saith the same Author) which never was universally granted to any Roman; for the Emperors are loosed from the Laws, by which thing alone, Liberty is given them to do those things which he hath related, and all other things. 
(w) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idem.  He concludes thus, The Commonwealth was changed into a better Form and Order; for it was utterly impossible ●●should subsist under the Power of the People.  
From the Consideration of this State of the Empire, and of absolute Sovereign Princes, 
(x) Leges jubere, & universis & singulis civil●s dare. De Repub. lib. 1. c. 10. & lib. 3.  Bodin saith, it is the first and principal part of Majesty, to command Laws, and impose them on all and singular the Subjects: and he saith, That in the Emperor's time, the name of the Senate was inscribed only to testify such Laws were made, and to render them more acceptable to the People, by the opinion they would then have, that they were made with Council and Prudence.  
So 
(y) Polit. c. 11. Law-making the Prerogative of Sovereign Princes.  Anisaeus ranks it among the first of the Jura Majestatis to make Laws: for that the Government, saith he, is for the most part by Laws; therefore they should be in the hand of the Sovereign; for that they have no Power, but as they are enforced by his Authority, who possesseth the Plenitude of Empire.  
I shall only note a few things of the absoluteness of the Roman Emperors, in point of Law-making or abrogating, and so pass to the considerations of our English Monarchy; referring the larger and more explicit treating of it, to the Chapters of Parliaments.  
In the Capitol, now Lateran Palace, is extant a Table of 
(z) Gruteri Inscript. p. 142. A Fragment of the Lex Regia yet extant.  Brass, where is to be seen a fragment of the Lex Regia, renewed as to Vespasian, confirming many things of Sovereign and sole Authority, as descending upon him from his Predecessors; and enacting, That what he had done, decreed, or commanded before his Ratification, should be held and taken for as good Law, as if the People itself had done, decreed, or commanded it: So that tho' he might make use of the Senate or People's Ratification; yet his Right was as strong before.  
So 
(a) Tit. De Legibus, lib. 1.  Constantine challengeth to himself alone, Authority to judge betwixt Law and Equity; and so in point of Repeal of Laws, 
(b) Non ab aliis, sed a seize leges abrogatas suisse. Lib. 3.  Theodosius and Valentinian say, That the Laws were to be abrogated by no other but themselves.  
It is not to be doubted, but that great and vast Empires require for their better Government, a more absolute Power in the Sovereign, to make Laws suitable to Emergencies, for the Preservation of the whole. So the Ottoman Empire, and those of China, Persia, and the Mogul, could not well be conserved entire without it: Yet in these there are established Laws, agreeable to the Laws of Nature and of Nations; whereby the Rights of meum and tuum to Strangers, are adjusted; and the Subjects, though they have no Property like the Europaeans, yet are kept in Order, and under Protection of the Laws; and their Absoluteness consists principally in the ordering the Execution of any Subject, without Juridical Process; in placing and displacing Governors, or depriving Cities, Provinces and Kingdoms of Privileges.  
I have enlarged upon this Head, to show how happy we are in England; 
The happy State of England, in the disposing of the Legislative Power.  that though the Force and Vigour of all our Laws, flow from our Sovereigns Paternal Care, ●●ace and Bounty; yet in the Point of making and abrogating Laws, not only Consultation is had with so venerable a Body, as the two Houses of Parliament are, but nothing is done by the Sovereign, without their own Preparation of Bills, for his Royal Assent: A wise and wealthy part of which are chosen by ourselves, and by the King's Permission, impowered in that particular to act for us, in deliberating upon, and fashioning such Bills as they petition the Sovereign to grant.  
So that what the Judicious 
(c) Preface to the Reader, Comp. History.  Dr. Brady (after many other learned Men) asserts, is most true, That by time and the Concessions of our Kings, the Subjects of this Government have and may enjoy all Freedom and Happiness, that sober rational Men can desire; and such as is no where to be found, but in this Island, and the Dominions to it belonging; nor can any Man that loves his Prince or Country, wish for other than the present Constitution.  
By the whole series of great Councils, in the Saxon times, until 49 Hen. 3. and the Parliaments succeeding, I shall make it clear, That the Royal Assent is that which forms the Preparatory Bills, presented by both Houses, into Laws; and that in ancienter times the Laws were made by the King's sole Grant, by way of Charter.  
I shall here only lay down some Preliminaries, to show in general what the ancient Usage was, referring Particulars to the following Chapters.  
First it appears, That there were no certain 
(d) Sheringham's Supremacy, p. 51. Anciently Kings called whom they pleased to advise them in making Laws.  Persons designed by Law, whose Concurrence was required to constitute a great Council; but the Kings used the Advice only of those whom they pleased to call unto themselves; who were always such as they thought most able to counsel and direct them in the matters that were to be consulted of, and whose assent was most likely to add most Credit and Estimation to the Laws that were to be divulged. So we find in 
(e) Chron. Sax. Anno 670. fol. 516. And than haefde getheal mid his witum, & freondam, & mid heora Teymenysse & fultum & gethafunge, Christ's geleassan onfeng. Bed. Eccl. Hist. lib. 3. c. 22.  Bede, that Segebert or Sigbercht, who was King of the East Saxons, in the time of Oswi King of Northumberland (who persuaded him to become a Christian) held a Council with his Wites, i.e. Nobles and Wisemen, and his Friends; and by their Advice, Aid and Consent, received the Christian Faith.  
We find, that Offa King of the Mercians, made Laws without the Assent of his Great Council; for he being at Rome, 
(f) Mat. Paris vita Offae, p. 171. Hoc autem per totam suam ditionem teneri in perpetuum constituit.  golng into the School of the English which was there; out of his Royal Munificence, He gave to the support of the People of his Kingdom, that should come thither, a Penny to be paid yearly for ever, out of every Family, by all, whose Goods in the Fields exceeded the value of Thirty Pence; and this he made a perpetual Constitution throughout all his Dominions, excepting the Lands conferred upon the Monastery of St. Alban. This Imposition and Law continued a long while in force; though we find it not confirmed by any great Council in his own time, or his Successors; only in the Laws of King Edgar and King Edward, it is enjoined to be paid as the King's Alms; which implies it was the King's Gift solely, not by consent of a great Council.  
So his Son 
(g) Matt. Paris Auct. additam. fol. 239, 240.  Ecgfrid grants Thyreseld to St. Alban, with the Consent and Testimony of his Magnates; which imports it to be granted by Consent of a Great Council, and the Optimates witnessing are Cynedrid the Queen, three Bishops, one Abbot and Brorda, Wiega, Cuthbert, Eobing, Esne, Cydda, Winbert, Heardbert and Brorda Dukes; besides Ethelbeard Archbishop, Forthred Abbot, and Sighore Son of Siger.  
But I shall hereafter more copiously give an Account of the constituent Parts of the great Councils. 
The King the Fountain of Laws.   
The Legislative Power (saith a learned 
(h) Sheringham's Supremacy, p. 34. Leges vero Anglicanae & consuetudines, Regum Authoritate, jubent quandoque, quandoque vetant, & quandoque vindicant, & puniunt transgressores. Bracton, lib. 1. c. 2.  Author) belongs to the King alone by the Common Law; for though the two Houses have Authority granted them by the King to assent or descent; yet the Power that makes it a Law, the Authority that animates it, and makes it differ from a dead Letter, is in the King, who is the Life and Soul of the Law; by whose Authority alone the Laws command, forbidden, vindicate and punish Transgressor's.  
This was resolved by divers Earls and Barons, and by all the Justices in the Reign of King Edward the Third; for one 
(i) Fuit dit que le Roy sist les Leis per assent des Peres, & de la Commune, & non pas les Peres, & le Commune; & qu'il ne avera nul Pere en sa terre demesne, & que le Roy per eux ne doit estre ajuge. 22 E. 3. c. 1.  Haedlow and his Wife, having a Controversy with the King, and desiring to have it decided in Parliament: It was resolved, That the King makes Laws by the Assent of the Lords and Commons; and not the Lords and Commons; and that he could have no Peer in his own Land, and could not be judged by them.  
This is further manifested, that the Laws are primarily and properly made by the King; and the two Houses have a Cooperation, but no Co-ordination of Power: for the breach of any Statute, whether it be by Treason, Murder, Felony, Perjury, or by any other way, is an offence against the 
(k) Encounter la Corone & Dignity le Roy. Stanford 's Pleas of the Crown, lib. 1. c. 1.  King's Authority alone; and Pleas made against such Offences, are called, The Pleas of the Crown; because they are done against the Crown and Dignity of the King. So that it is not the Dignity and Authority of the Lords and Commons, which is violated, but the Dignity and Authority of the King.  
This appears also in the Power the 
(l) Sheringham, p. 35. See Finch lib. 2. fol. 22. Coke 2 II. 7. lib. 7. fol. 14. Stanford lib. 2.101.  King hath in dispensing with such Laws, as forbid a thing which is not malum in se, and in pardoning the Transgression of others; as Treason, Felony, etc. which in Reason he ought no more to do, than to dispense with the Laws of Germany, Spain or France; or pardon the Transgressor's thereof, if they were not made by his Authority.  
Furthermore it is a certain Maxim of the Law, 
(m) Ejusdem est leges interpretari, cujus est condere. The Amendment was sealed by the Great Seal. 2 May, 9 E. 1. commanding the Justices to do and execute all and every thing contained in it, though the same did not accord with the Statute of Gloucester in all things.  None can interpret the Laws, but the same Power that makes them: But the King may do this, as appears by the Statute of Gloucester SIXPENCES. where, immediately after the Statute, are these words; After by the King and his Justices, certain Expositions were made upon some of the Articles above mentioned: So the Judges are appointed by the King, and they have from him a Power to interpret the Law judicialiter; otherwise they could not proceed to Judgement; and being called by the King, with him, and under him, they have a Power to interpret the Law Authoritatiué.  
But the two Houses (besides, that they can do nothing singly or jointly, without the King's Concurrence) in 
(n) Sheringham ut supra.  their make and composition, are unfit to interpret Law: For such Power as interprets Law, must be always existent, or in being, to act according to emergent Occasions; which the two Houses are not: And if they were a permanent Body, yet they having a Negative upon each other, the Interpretation of the Law must be retarded, and all Controversies depending thereupon undecided: And this Disagreement might perhaps endure for ever; and so, a final Determination in such Suits would be impossible. Now these are Inconveniences which ought not to be admitted in any Commonwealth; for it derogates both from the Honour and Wisdom of a Nation, to be so moulded and framed, that Justice cannot have a free Passage in all Contingencies.  
Not only the Legislative Power itself, but the very 
(o) Him, p. 36. The King may provide for all things necessary for Government, where the Law hath not provided, or contradicts not.  Exercise of the Power also (so far as it is essential to Government) is in the King alone; for he can by Edicts and Proclamations provide for all necessary occasions, and special Emergencies, not provided for by fixed Laws, which is one of the most excellent and eminent Acts of the Legislative Power, and a sufficient Remedy against all Mischiefs, in case the two Houses should refuse to concur with him in those things which concern the Benefit of the Kingdoms.  
For as 
(p) Ea quae Jurisdictio●is sunt, & pacis, & ea q●ae sunt Justitiae & paci annexa, ad nullum pertinent nisi ad Coronam & Dignitatem Regi●m. Bracton lib. 2. c. 24.  Bracton saith, those things which belong to Jurisdiction and Peace, and those which are annexed to Justice and Peace, appertain to none but the Crown, neither can they be separated from it, because they make the Crown. If the King should unwarily by Act of Parliament consent to any thing prejudicial and derogatory to His Royal Prerogative, such Acts are void by the Common Law, and the Judges are bound to declare them so; as that of 23. H. 6. about Sheriffs, not to continue longer than one Year, was by the Judges declared void, and all Kings since, might with a Clause of non obstante, against the manifest words of the Statute, have granted that office for Life, in Tail, or in Fee.  
But I need not enlarge upon this, for all the Acts for the King's Supremacy, all the Laws and Statutes that over were made, put this beyond Dispute, that the affirmative Voice is absolutely in the King; that no Laws can be binding, or be Laws at all, without his special Consent: and this being one of the great Rights of Sovereignty, cannot be separated from the Person of the King, although he 
(q) Suprema jurisdictio & potestas Regia etsi Princeps volet, separari non pessunt; sunt enim ipsa sorma & substantialis essentia Majestatis, ergo manente ipso Rege, ab eo abdicari non possunt. Cabedo Pract. Obs. par. 2. decis. 40.  would himself: For it is essential to Majesty and Sovereignty, and cannot be abdicated while he remaineth King, nor separated without the diminution or destruction of Majesty. How both King and People are obliged to defend the Rights of the Crown, will appear in the Laws ascribed to King Edward the Confessor, in the 17.35. and 56.  
As to the Particular, How absolutely necessary the Royal Assent is to all Laws, in the Act of Recognition to King James the First, it is fully expressed thus: Which if Your Majesty shall be pleased (as an Argument of your Gracious acceptation) to adorn with Your majesty's Royal Assent, without which it can neither be Complete, and Perfect, nor remain to all Posterity according to our Desire, as a Memorial of your Princely and tender Affection towards us, etc.  
Against what I have laid down, those who were for  Powers in the two Houses, object many things; 
Answers to some Objections against the King's sole establishing of Laws.  some I have answered in the Chapter of the King's Sovereignty, and I shall meet with others in the Chapters of Parliaments: And shall here only take notice of some omitted, or not fully answered there.  
Against the assertion, That the Liberties granted by King Henry the Third, were by way of Charter; they produce the Preamble 
(r) Coke 2 Instit. fol. 525.  to the Confirmation of King Edward the First, of Magna Charta, 
La Charte des Franchises, & la Charte de la Forest, les queux fuerent faitz per Come de tout Royalm, en le temps le Roy Henry pier, soient tenue, etc.  and Charta de Foresta, wherein he saith that the Charter of Liberties, and the Charter of the Forest, made by the Community of all the Realm, in the time of King Henry our Father, shall be kept, etc.  
To which, with the Judicious Doctor. 
(s) General Preface to Complete History, p. 41. The ancient Kings sealing of Charters of Liberties, reputed Laws.  Brady, may be answered that these were the Petitions and Requests of the Community of the Kingdom, and may be said to be made, that is, digested by them into the form of a Charter. So the Barons offered King John's Magna Charta to him ready drawn in a Schedule, and forced him to grant it, and cause his Seal to be put to it; and the whole strength and validity of the Charter lay in his Grant, and the Confirmation of it under his Seal. This was the only Security they desired, and demanded no other, and the Tenor of all the Charters were accordingly, We grant, We confirm, We give for us and our Heirs, to them and their Heirs, etc. Which Grants and Concessious were always in these times accepted, and acknowledged to be sufficient, without the least doubting or scruple, There was no other Power or Authority that gave them being but the King's; so that it seemed the great Councils or Parliaments of those times, owned the King's Charters under Seal, and the Grants made by them to the People, to be of good force and effect, and that their Petitions, to which he gave his assent, and caused to be put under his Seal, were by them accepted, and from time to time acknowledged as firm and valid Laws.  
The same learned 
(t) Idem, p. 67. The Laws planted by Kings.  Doctor Brady observes that Sir Edward Coke hath a formal way of speaking, The Law doth this, and, The Law doth that, This is Law, That is by Common Law of England, abstracting it from any dependence upon, or Creation by the Government; as if it had been here before there was any, and had grown up with the first Trees, Herbs, and Grass that grew upon English Ground, and had not been of our ancient Kings and their Successors planting, by assistance and advice of their great Councils in all Ages, as it was found expedient either by them, or upon Petition and Request of their People; which is acknowledged by all the Bishops, Earls, Barons, and People present at the 
(u) Claus. 1 E. 2. m. 10. dorso.  Coronation of King Edward the Second, in these words: Sir, Will you grant and keep, and by your Oath confirm to the People of England, the Laws and Customs granted to them by the ancient Kings of England, your Predecessors, true and devout to God, and namely the Laws and Customs and Liberties granted to the Clergy and People, by the glorious King Edward your Predecessor?  
Another Objection some make against the Absoluteness of the King's Power, 
Second Objection.  when it is said in ancient Statutes, The King ordains, The King wills, that it hath been resolved by many of the Judges, 
(w) Coke 8. Report. s. 20. b.  that if these Statutes be entered in the Parliament Rolls, and allowed as acts of Parliament, it shall be intended they were by Authority of Parliament.  
With the Judicious Dr. Brady I shall not inquire how such Entry and such Allowance (without any Words in the Statutes to that purpose) can make them to be by Authority of Parliament. But we may he sure, those Words, The King ordains, The King wills, being pronounced in Parliament, and recorded in the Rolls thereof, do clearly prove the King's Authority and Power in making Laws, to be far greater than many Men would allow him, or have him to enjoy.  

(x) Lib. 3. c. 9  Bracton, and the Author of 
(y) Lib. 1. c. 17.  ●leta, applying the Passage of the Civil Law, Quod Principi placet, Legis habet vigorem, to the King of England, say, That Clause ought not to be understood of every thing that is rashly presumed to be his Will, but of that which is justly determined upon good Advice and Deliberation, by the Counsel of his Magistrates, 
(z) R●ge Authoritatem prastante.  the King giving it Authority, and confirming it for a Law; and from hence 
(a) Cum ipse sit Author Juris, non debet inde Injuriarum nasci occasio, unde Jura nascuntur.  infer, That when he himself is the Author of the Law, Injustice ought not to spring from the same Fountain from whence the Law doth spring.  
It is no diminution of the Sovereignty of a Prince, in the matter of making Laws, or repealing them, to have the Assent of the Nobles, and such a select Body of Great and Wise Men as the House of Commons are. But when (as in the Parliament 1641.) the Two Houses claim a  Power, and would make their Advices be swallowed as Commands, it is this that all Loyal Persons should oppose.  
We generally understand, that the Persian Monarchy was as Absolute as any; yet in it we have a manifest Discovery of the Concurrence of the Nobles in preparing a Decree; 
The Persian manner of making Laws.  yet they wanted the King's establishing the Decree, by his signing it, whereby it might not be changed: and Grotius thinks they signed it also. 
(b) Dan. cap. 6. v. 7, 8, 9  The Words are, The Precedents and Princes assembled together to the King, and told him, That all the Precedents of the Kingdom, the Governors and the Princes, the Counsellors and the Captains, have consulted together to establish a Royal Statute, and to make a firm Decree, etc. Now, O King, establish the Decree, and sign the Writing, that it be not changed, according to the Law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not. Here the Precedents, etc. assembled, consult about the Decree, they propose it as they had framed it; yet they own, it was of no force without the King's establishing and signing it: Which is exactly parallel with the Constitution of the Legislative in England, if we join the Commoners to the Precedents, Princes, etc. 
No radical mixture of Power in the two Houses with the King.   
But the Writers for the Long Parliament, were so desirous to make the Two Houses to have a Radical Mixture of the Legislative Power equal with the King's, that they sought all the specious and plausible Arguments they could, to enforce it, having little regard to what was Law itself, or ancient Usage. Therefore one of them, in his 
(c) Pag. 39  Answer to Dr. Fern, saith, A Legislative Power is not to be satisfied by a bare powerless Consent; 
Third Objection.  and therefore deman● Whether that Consent be causal and authoritative, or merely consiliary and unauthoritative? That the Two Houses have an Enacting Authority, he would prove from that Clause set in the beginning of Acts, Be it Enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, 
This will appear a Form of Words lately made use of, in the Twenty fourth Chapter.  and the Authority of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament: For, he saith, this implies distinct Authorities; for the Addition of the Authority of the Lords and Commons were superfluous, if Laws be enacted by the King's Authority alone.  
To which it may replied, according to 
(d) King's Supremacy, p. 89.  Mr. Sheringham, That though it be granted, that they have an Enacting Authority in this particular of Law-making, (which how step by step it hath been brought to the state it is now in, will be cleared in the following Chapters) yet the Question is, first, Whether that be only a Power of assenting, that such or such a Law shall be established; or a Power that commandeth and giveth life and vigour to the Laws? Secondly, Whether the Power be radically in themselves, or derived from the King?  
As to the first, It is agreed by the Judges, 
(e) 2 H. 7.14.11 H. 7.25. Lambard Archeion, fol. 271.  That the Words Assenteth and Enacteth are equivalent in this Case: For their Power of preparing Materials for a Law, by framing Bills, sufficiently denotes their Assent, because they are Bills of their own framing; and the Wisdom they show in these, and the Care of the Government and People, will always make that August Body of great use to the Government, and valuable by their Fellow-subjects.  
But secondly, 
In this Particular the Writ of Summons is that which gives them all the Power, of which in the Chapter of Parliaments I shall enlarge.  It must be considered from whom they have this Authority. They have the Use and Exercise of the Legislative Power, so far as is necessary for that Act, although it be not radically in them: for although the King's Authority cannot be separated from him privatiuè, so as to deprive him of it; yet cumulatiuè it may be inherent in his own Person, and yet be in others too; as the Light of the Sun is inherent in its own Body, and yet diffused through the whole World: And so we call it Moonshine, and Starlight, when all their Lights are from the Sun. And this Delegate Authority may be called theirs, because for the time of their Sitting they are by the Sovereign and Constitution of Government so capacitated to act: But since they are called by the King's Writ, and dissolved at his Pleasure, they cannot be said to have the Power radically in themselves.  
If this radical Power in the Two Houses were true, How could the 
(f) 24 H. 8. 1 E. 6. c. 2.  Statutes declare the King to have entire, whole, and plenary Power, and to be so Supreme, that all Authority is derived from him, and all Obedience and Allegiance due to him, and him alone? An utmost Chiefty and Primity of Share (as they used to speak in 1641.) will not make out the Force of the Statutes.  
Because the Kings of England desiring to rule their People by Lenity, have out of Princely Clemency condescended so far, as not to impose upon them (as hereafter it will appear they anciently did) any new Law, or alter and repeal the old, without their own Consents, by their Representatives: The Black Parliament of 1641. would have the People believe, 
The Encroachments of the Black Parliament.  that their Authority was equal with the Kings: But when Success had. hardened them, they were not content with a share, they at first challenged, but laid claim to all; wholly excluding the King, and denying him his Negative Voice; usurping and taking upon them the whole Power of making Laws: So that this Serpent of  Power is not to be suffered to wriggle in its Head, lest the whole Body glide easily after.  
But I leave the further discourse of this to its proper Place, 
Preface to the following Chapters.  and shall now proceed to give some Light to the Government the Britan's had among them, by the Comparison is found betwixt them, the Gauls and Germans: Being desirous, as much as I can, to show the Ancientest usages, and under the several Conquests of England; how the Government hath received Growth and Alteration (sometimes the People being under the Slavery of absolute Conquerors, and other times factious Nobles bearding their Kings) how the even Thread of Regular Government hath been carried on or interrupted; how from an absolute Power of giving Law, and ruling in a Military way, by the Feudal Law, and many other particulars, the Government is brought to that Temperament, whereby the Subjects may, if they will be dutiful, live happilier than any other do.  
To illustrate all these, it will be necessary to represent the State of the Britan's under the Romans, and to discourse of the Germans, from whence our Saxon Ancestors came; and of both of their Manners and Laws, and from thence to proceed to illustrate the Legislative Power: In all which, if I carry my Reader out of his Country, to view the State of our Ancient Neighbours; I hope he will think it no ill spent time, to make that pleasing as well as profitable tower: And though I represent him his Ancestors rude and barbarous in Comparison of the Roman civilizedness; yet he will find they had some Religion, some Arts, great and generous Souls, as well as strong Bodies; and their greatest mishap seems to be, that those in Britan, Gaul or Germany, were not under one Monarchy, 
Nec aliud adversus validissimas Gentes pro nobis utilius quam quod in common non consulunt. Vita Agricolae, p. 308.  but divided into Multitudes of little Kingdoms: which made Tacitus observe, That there was nothing more profitable to the Romans, against the most puissant and valiant Nations, than that they advised not in common.   

CHAP. XXII. Of the Government of the Britan's, and the Romans imposing their Laws upon them. 
Antiquity of English Customs.   
CHancellor 
(a) Regnum illud eisdem quibus jam regitur consuetudinibus continue regulatum suit. De laudibus LL. Angliae, c. 17.  Fortescue affirms, That in all the times of the Britan's, Saxons, Danes and Normans, and of their Kings, this Realm was ruled with the self same Customs, that it is now governed withal; which, he saith, if they had not been right good, some of those Kings, moved either with Justice, with Reason or Affection, would have changed them, or else altogether have abolished them, and especially the Romans, who did judge all the rest of the World by their own Laws.  
So Sir Edward Coke 
(b) Epistle to the sixth Book of Reports.  saith, the common Law of England was here before the Entry of the Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans; and it was never altered by any of them; and so he 
(c) Proem to 2. Instit. fol. 1. and 2. Instit. fol. 3.  makes Magna Charta Declaratory of the principal Grounds of the fundamental Laws of England, and for the residue, that it is additional to supply some Defects of the Common Law, and was no new Declaration.  
So Sir John Davis, in his Preface to the 
(d) Leges m●●ibus recept●● majoris sunt Autoritatis quam leges scriptae. Arist. Polit. lib. 3. c. 12.  Irish Reports, magnifies the Common Law as Jus non scriptum, better than all the written Laws in the World; excelling Parliament Laws, which are written; coming nearest to the Law of Nature, which is the Root and Touchstone of all good Laws.  
When I read these Assertions, I think it had been incumbent upon these learned Men to have deduced (as far as they could by History) some Testimonies of Ancient Writers, to have confirmed their Positions: But in none of them do we find the least offer of a Proof for what they say.  
I think it would be a very commendable Work, and very pleasant to all ingenious Persons; 
The Benefit to have our Common Laws and Customs ascertained and compared with all Ancient Laws.  if some of the Long Robe would digest into Heads, that which is owned as the Common Law. For though Sir John Davis calls it unwritten, and which had its beginning beyond the Memory of any Man living; and that a Custom tried and approved, time out of mind, doth become a Law to bind the People; yet nothing can hinder, but whatever is preserved in the Memory of Men living, and owned as custom, may be committed to writing: Now I would not only desire it might be so written and published, but that some judicious Lawyer (who was likewise well versed in History and Antiquities) would search out for some parallel written Laws among the Grecians and Romans, as also compare all the Saxon Laws we have, the Laws of the Lombard's, Boiarian, Ripuarian, and other Laws, and then I doubt not but they would acquire a greater Veneration in the World; and it would be known whether the Opinions of the learned Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice, were to be relied upon as to the Antiquity of them before the Roman time.  
The Glory of his Profession, and of our Nation (as to that learning he was versed in, which was not small) I mean 
(e) Notes upon Fortescue, p. 14. ad 22.  Mr. Selden, hath given the best Solution to this point of the Antiquity of our Customs and Common Law, that I have yet met with; which I shall abstract in as summary a way as I can.  
First he saith, The Opinion of the Antiquity of our Common Law, before the Civil, is founded upon the Story of Brute (of which the Chancellor speaks in his Thirteenth Chapter) and that Story supposing him to be here more than three Hundred Years before Rome was built, makes the Chancellor conclude our Common Law so Ancient; but supposing there were some Truth in that Fiction, how can the Chancellor be certain, that the same kind of Law and Policy hath ever since continued; unless an Oral Tradition may here find as great respect, as it hath with some in spiritual matters. 
The Antiquity of all Laws.   
Therefore with Mr. Selden we may judge all Laws in general, originally to be equally Ancient, as being grounded upon Nature, every Nation taking the grounds of their Laws from it; and Nature being the same in all, the beginning of all Laws must be the same: Even from the first Peopling of the Land, when Men (by Nature, being civil and sociable Creatures) grew to plant common Society and, I may add, when they being under the Government of a Prince, received Laws by his Appointment, extracted out of the Laws of Nature, the Necessity of Government, and the Conveniences of the People, we may date National Laws. Now though the Law of Nature be truly said to be immutable, yet it's as true, that it's limitable, and the limited Law of Nature is that now used in every State; for the divers Opinions of Interpreters, proceeding from the weakness of Man's Reason, and the several conveniences of divers States, have made those different Limitations, which the Law of Nature hath suffered: It falls out, that in several Nations they are so disguised by the various Modifying and Repairs, that as to their first being, they are like 
(f) Vbi nihil ex pristina materia supersit.  Jason's Ship, that had nothing of the old Materials remaining.  
Therefore the learned Selden adds, That little follows in point of Honour or Excellency, specially to be attributed to the Laws of a Nation in general, by any Argument drawn from the difference of Antiquity, which in substance is alike in all: for as soon as Italy was peopled, this beginning of Laws was there; and so when there was first a State in that Land which the Common Law now governs, there were natural Laws limited for the Convenience of civil Society here.  
Notwithstanding the Opinion of the 
(g) De laudibus LL● Angliae, c. 17.  Chancellor, that neither the Roman Civil Laws, nor the Laws of the Venetians, which above all other, he saith, are reported to be of most Antiquity, nor the Laws of any Paynim Nation of the World, are of so old and ancient Years as the Customs or Common-Law of England, and that they have weathered out the changes and overthrow of People by the Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans: Yet I cannot believe but every of those Nations, when they obtained the Power of Government, introduced their own Laws, and abolished what they found not agreeable to their own Polity.  
As to the British Laws, 
Whence to learn the Manners or Government of the Britan's.  before the Romans Arrival, we can find very little of them, but what is related of the Druids. Peter Ramus in his Book de moribus Veterum Gallorum, hath Collected out of the ancientest Authors, a parallel betwixt the Customs of the Gauls, the Germans, and Britan's, there being found in Caesar and Strabo's description of their manner of Living, strength of Body, Temperance, Marriages, Habitations, and many other Particulars, a great affinity, of which I shall touch some Particulars hereafter. At present I shall speak of the original of the Gauls, and of the Druids Discipline, and Government of the Gauls, and Britan's.  
The fabulous Berosus, published by John Annius of Viterbium, a City in Tuscany, saith, that Dis or Pluto was the Founder of the Celtic Colonies. Celto Gallatia comprehended what was within the River Rhine, the Alps, the Mediterranean Sea, the Pyrenean Hills, Gascoign and the British Ocean, and Ptolemy 
(h) 2. Geog. & 2. Qu●drip. & Pausan. l. 1.  comprised all Europe under the name of Celtica. This Berosus calls this This Samothes, and makes him Son of Japhet. Caesar countenanceth that of Dis, from whence he saith they reckon by Nights.  
The best Authority we have for the Samnothei is that of Laertius, 
(i) In vitis Philos.  who saith, that amongst the Celtaes and Gauls the Semnothei (as saith Aristotle in his Book of Magic, and Sotion in his Twenty third Book of Succession) were. But there is no mention of their being skilled in Laws, Divine and Humane, as the fabulous Berosus saith. Here Stephen in his notes upon Laertius thinks them to be called Semnothei, for having the worshipful Gods, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in their Mouths, or that they themselves were accounted amongst Men as a kind of worshipful Gods. 
(k) In Achaicis.  So in Pausanias we meet with the Chapels of the Goddesses, whom the Athenians styled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is Worshipful.  
Ramus 
(l) De moribus veterum Gallorum, p. 71, 72. De Gall. Imp. lib. 1.  out of Berosus, saith, Philosophy proceeded in the beginning from the Semnothei of the Gauls, and that Magus succeeded him, than Sarson their third King, who, saith Stephanus Forcatulus, reduced the Laws of his Grandfather and Father into one Volume, and with severe Threats gave order for the keeping of them: and Ramus saith, he was the first that appointed the Study of Learning. Their fourth King he makes Druis or Druidus, from whence the Druids (of whom I shall hereafter discourse) and their fifth Bardus, whose Glory is celebrated by the Bards, their Poets and Orators.  

(m) Lib. 15. De Oirgine Gallorum.  Marcellinus, out of Timagenes, makes the Aborigines of Gaul to be the Celtaes, and some part of them to be Peopled by the Dorienses, who followed the elder Hercules, and possessed the Ocean Shore. So Marseilles a City of France, was a Greek Colony of the Phocians. The Drasidae were another part of the Indigenae or homebred People, and others, saith he, 
Q. Whether he mean Britain and Ireland.  have flowed hither from the remote Isles, and from the tract of Land beyond the Rhine, and some few after the Destruction of Troy, flying from the Grecians, being every where dispersed, seated themselves in the empty Countries. Where we may note by the by, that then the Opinion of the Trojans settling in several Countries, was believed. But Marcellinus saith, 
Quod etiam nos legimus in monumentis incisum.  the Inhabitants do affirm (which he had also seen cut in their Monuments) that Hercules the Son of Amphitryo, having overcome Geryon the cruel Tyrant of Spain, and Turiscus of the Gauls, begot upon their noble Women several Sons, and called them by the names of the Countries they commanded. Also that some came from Phocaea in Asia, flying the cruelty of Harpalus the Precedent of Cyrus.  
I am larger upon this Matter, because the Britain's had the Doctrine and Discipline of the Druids in Perfection, as hereafter I shall show, and we find in Caesar a great part of Britain, once under the Government of Divitiacus, King of the Soissons, a People of France, and often the customs of the Gauls, Britain's, and Germans are compared, or their Manners are near akin, as appears by Caesar, Tacitus, Strabo, and others.  
Concerning the Laws of Samothes, we find nothing in ancient Authors; for that of Basingstoke, 
(n) Seldeni Janus Ang. c. 3.  Count Pal●●●n is but a very modern Authority, that Samothes defined the Spaces or Intervals of all time, not by the number of Days, but of Nights, and he observed Birth-days, and the Commencements of Months and Years in that order, that the Day should come after the Night. Only I cannot but observe that both Caesar saith the same thing of the Gauls, and Tacitus, of the Germans, and the Britain's do yet observe it: So we call the seventh Night for the seventh Day in our usual Speech, such or such a day Seven-night; which is agreeable to Nature and Scripture, where we find the Evening and the Morning were the first Day: and so Aristotle reckons Privation as the first of the three Principles.  
I pass by the rest of the Story of Phranicus, who about nine hundred years after Samothes (if we will believe Jeofrey of Monmouth) being to reside in Pannonia, entrusts the Druids with the Government of Britain, and how Brutus the Grandchild of Aeneas, got the Kingdom; and about six Hundred Years after, Dunwallo Molmatius being King, made Laws, according to our Jeofery and Ralph Monk of Chester, that their Ploughs, Temples, and Roads, that led to Cities, should have Privilege to be places of Refuge, and many other things which Gildas mentions, and Polydore Virgil hath gathered, and how he was buried in Troynovant, near the Temple of Concord, which 
(o) Britanniae Speculum.  Norden will have to be the Temple of London. All these wanting the Confirmation of sound Authority, as also doth the whole Series of British Kings, and the Title of the Trojan Laws that Brutus brought in; for there is but one specially mentioned, that the Eldest Son should inherit the whole Right and Estate of their deceased Father. This indeed might be taken from Herodotus 
(p) In Euterpe.  that writes it of Hector, Son and Heir of Priamus, and this (if we believe the British Story) was sometimes broken, as when the three Brothers, Locrine, Camber, and Albanactus divided the Land betwixt them, as also the Shares that Fenix, and Porrix, Brennus and Belinus had.  
It is no wonder that we have no better account of those Ages, since we find in 
(q) Neque sas esse exis●●mant ea literis mandare, cum in reliquis sere rebus public is privatisque rationibus Graecis literis utantur.  Caesar, That the Druids committed not their Learning to Writing, but taught a certain number of Verses, and some spent twenty Years in the Discipline: and 
(r) Quamv●● literarum secreta ignoraverint, attamen celebrabant carminibus Antiquos suns Deos & Reges; ●●que unum apud illos memoriae & Annalium genus eral.  Tacitus notes of the Germane Priests, that though they were ignorant of the secret of Letters, yet in ancient Verses, they celebrated their Gods and Kings, and that alone was with them their Memorials and Annals.  
It is true, Caesar 
(s) Lib. 1. De Bello Galli●o.  saith, that though the Gauls did not think meet to commit their Doctrine to Writing, yet generally in all other things, whether public affairs, or private accounts, they made use of Greek Letters: and he saith, That there were Tablets found in the Camp of the Swissers, made up of Greek Letters. Yet it doth not appear that the Greek Language was used by the People: for one and the same Character of Letters may serve to express different Languages; so the Targum or Chaldee Paraphrase, and the new Testament in Syriack are done in Hebrew Letters, yet the Language very different.  
That the Greek Language was not known among them, appears by what 
(t) De Bello Gallico, lib. 5.  Caesar saith, That being to write to Quintus Cicero, who was then besieged in Flanders; by great Rewards prevailed with an Horseman of Gaul, belonging to the Nervians, to carry a Letter to him, which he writ in Greek, lest it being intercepted, the Enemy should discover the design.  
Peter Ramus 
(u) De moribus veterum Gallorum, p. 74.  is so desirous to promote the Glory of his Country, that he offers considerable Authority to prove, that the Grecians learned their Letters from the Gauls, affirming that the Learning of Semnothei, Saronidae, Druids and gaul's flourished in Gaul many Ages before Cadmus came into Greece; and the great 
(w) Janus Angiorum, ●●p. 9  Selden seems to allow it, when he saith, That Learned Men do think the Greeks took the  one's for their Copy, after the Phoenician Letters, which were not altogether unlike the Hebrew, were grown out of use.  
He further adds, That the rude Gothic Characters, which 
(x) In Appendice ad Jornandi Goth.  Bonaventure Vulcanius of Burges published, do very much resemble the Greek one's, as also the present Russian Characters. As to the Latin Letters, they were first brought over into Italy from Arcadia, with Nicostrata the Mother of Evander, who was banished his Country.  
As to the Druids we should have been at a great loss, both concerning their Doctrines, and of the Manners and Customs of the Gauls, Britain's and Germans, if we had lost the Histories of Julius Caesar, Pliny, Strabo, and some more after them, since the Memorials and Epinicia of the Bards, are so totally lost, that we have nothing remains of the, but fuimus Troes, and that of 
(y) 1. Pharsal.  Lucan. 
Laudibus in longum, Vates, demittitis Aevum,  
Plurima securi fudistis Carmina Bardi.  The Welsh Bards glory, that they still retain the Memorials of their great Men, and especially their Kings; but we may easily conceive, that the great Mixture of Poetical fancy (as even in Homer and Virgil is found) must render the whole very Romantic.  
Caesar saith, That in Gaul there are only two sorts of Men, who are in any Honour or Account, viz. The Druids and the Equites, of whom I shall treat, and first of the Druids; and having after occasion to mention several particulars, upon emergent occasions, I shall in a summary way here collect what dispersedly is recorded by him, not only concerning the Druids Doctrine, Religious and Civil, but of the Government or Polity, and lastly of the manner of Living, Customs and Usages of the Gauls, Germans and Britain's: towards the better understanding of which I think fit to note these things.  
First, as to their Name, we may not rely upon the Authority of Berosus from their King Druis: As to the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Oak, which was sacred to them, I shall speak hereafter, only at present noting that Pliny saith, They performed none of their Devotions without Oaken Leaves. Goropius 
(z) In Gall.  Becanus would have it from the Dutch True-wise, or from Trutin a word, which with the Ancient Germans signified God, and sometimes Lord; as 
* Cosmog. par. 2. l. 3.  Merula notes out of the Gospel of Othfred. Now as to their learning I shall say something; Caesar saith, They were Professors of all learning; and 
(a) De moribus vet. Gallorum, p. 81. ad 95.  Ramus divides it into their sacred learning; their Philosophy, Astronomy, Cosmography, Music, etc. who may be consulted by the curious Readers. As to their Religious Doctrine and Concerns, what follows is observable.  
First, They taught the Immortality of the Soul, as 
(b) Hoc volunt persuadere non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem ad alios transire. De Bello Gallico, lib. 6.  Caesar tells us, by which they excited greatly all Persons to Virtue, and to neglect the fear of Death. Since the learned Selden will not undertake to judge, whether the Druids had their Metempsychosis or Transmigration of Souls from Pythagoras, or he from the, as 
(c) Stoic. Physiologia. lib. 3. dissert. 12.  Lipsius also queries, I shall not enter into dispute: for some make 
(d) Vide Laert. lib. 8. Plut. Orat. 2. de esu Carnium. Reuchl. lib. 2. de Arte Cabalistica.  Pythagoras only in Tarquin's time; and those that speak of his greatest Antiquity, place him with Numa; whereas most make the Druids of the Ancientest standing among the Philosophers of the Gentiles.  
Secondly, 
(e) Multa praterea de sideribus atque corum motu, de mundi & terrarum magnitudine, de rerum natura, de Deorum Immortalium vi ac potestate disputant, & in virtute tradunt. Lib. 7. de Bello Gallico.  Caesar further adds, That the Druids dispute many things of the Stars, and of their Motion, and of the greatness of the World and the Earth, of the Nature of things, of the Power of the Immortal Gods, and several things of Virtue: And so Mela saith, Druids motus Coeli & Siderum profitentur, They discoursed of the Motions of Heaven and Stars.  
Thirdly, They excommunicated those that stood not to their Sentence, that is, they 
(f) Sacrisiciis interdicunt; h●●● p●●●● apud 〈◊〉 est gravissima. Id. lib. 6.  forbidden them to come to sacrifice, which among them was the most grievous punishment, and those who are thus excommunicated, are accounted wicked and ungodly Wretches; every Body goes out of their way, and shuns their Company and Conversation, for fear of getting harm by Contagion; neither have they the benefit of the Law when they desire it, nor is any respect shown to them.  
Fourthly, 
(g) Druidibus praeest unus qui summam inter eos habet Authoritatem. Id.  Caesar saith further, That they have one over them, who hath the chiefest Authority amongst them; and when he dies, if there be any one that is eminent above the rest, he succeeds in place; but if there be several of equal merit, one is chosen by Majority of Votes.  
Fifthly, They were wont to be excused from personal Attendance in War, nor did they pay Taxes with the rest. Such Privileges we find the 
(h) Num. 1.48. Ezra 7.24.  levites among the Hebrews enjoyed.  
Sixthly, As to Civil matters, they were in such Honour as they determined almost all public and private Controversies; and, as 
(i) Magno praeterea apud omnes Gali●s in honore sunt, nam fere de omnibus controversiis publicis priva●isque constituunt; & si quod est admissum facinus, si caedes factae, si de Haereditate, de sinibus controversia, iidem decernunt, praemia poenasque constituunt. De Bello Gallico 1.7.  Caesar saith, if any great Wickedness be done, any Murder be committed; if there be any Controversy about Inheritance or Boundaries; they do judge and appoint Rewards and Punishments. I sometimes think Facinus may be interpreted any great or noble Enterprise done, because Caesar saith, They appoint Rewards, whereas to none of the other particulars Rewards are due. But this obiter.  
Seventhly, These, saith the same Caesar, at a certain time of the Year, in the Confines of Carnutum (Chartres according to Ortelius) which is esteemed the middle of France, sit in a consecrated place, and thither, from every part, those who have any Controversies, meet, and they obey their Judgement and Decrees. From whence Ramus thinks, That the Druids were dispersed through France, as the Priests are now; and the Principal of them carried the Controversies of their Citizens to this general Council, where the High Priests of the Druids presided; 
* Pausanias' in Phocicis. Druids in Britain.  and that this was like the Convention of the Amphictyons (f) of Delphos, when Greece was at Freedom; and he thinks this Power of the Druids was Kingly, not only over every private Person, but over the whole People.  
I have enlarged thus far of the French Druids; which some may say, appertains not to the Britan's; but if we will believe 
(g) Gallorum disciplina in Britannia reperta, atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur. Et nunc qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt, plerumque illo discendi causa proficiscuntur. Caesar, lib. 6.  Caesar, we shall find that the Discipline of the Druids came from Britain to the Gauls: for speaking of them he saith, That the French Discipline, i. e. the Arts, etc. taught by the Druids, was found in Britain, and from thence is believed to be transmitted into Gallia; and now, saith he, those that will more diligently know it, for the most part go thither, i. e. to Britain, to learn it. I know Ramus faintly opposeth this, because Caesar speaks elsewhere of the Gauls making a part of Britain; and that of the Britan's, the Gauls are the most civil: all which may be true, and yet the Doctrine have its Original here; and Ramus concludes from this, That the Discipline or Learning of the Britan's and Gauls were both one.  
I shall refer the curious to what Pliny saith of the Misleto, 
The Druids Ceremony in cutting the Misleto from the Oak.  with how great Ceremony it was cut by the Druid Magicians, as he calls them, there being present two white Bulls; the Priest climbing the Tree in a white Garment, and cutting the Misleto from the Oak with a Golden Pruning-knife, and receiving it in a white Cassock, and then the Bulls were sacrificed. Britain being so famous for the best Oaks, and the word Druid coming from the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Oak, we may safely rely upon Caesar's Testimony for the bringing the Learning of the Druids from Britain to France.  
That which I infer from this Discourse is, that there were Laws in Britain, and that the Druids were the Lawyers and Judges; but how the Laws were made, or what they were among the Britain's, is not in my reading to inform the curious; how and for what cause the Druids were extirpated, I shall speak hereafter.  
The other Member of the honourable part of the Gauls, 
Of the Equites, or Nobility.  were the Equites, under which are to be comprehended the Princes and Soldiers. 
(w) Lib. 6. Fa●●ionum Principes sunt qui summam Authoritatem eorum judi●io habere existimantur, quorum ad Arbitrium judiciumque summa omnium rerum conciliorumque redeat.  Caesar tells us, That not only in every City and every Territory (for so I interpret Pagus) but also almost in every Family there were Factions; and they are the Princes of the Factions, who in their Judgement are esteemed to have chief Authority; to whose Arbitrament and Judgement, the Supremacy of all Matters and Councils are remitted. This, he saith, was invented, that the common People might not want some to defend them, for every one would hinder his own People from being oppressed or circumvented; and if in that they failed them, they lost their Authority over them; and this Caesar saith was the manner throughout all Gallia.  
From hence (x) concludes the Government was a Timocratia, or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Aristotle, 
(n) De moribus vet. Gall. p. 116.  which he and Plato so commend, and which was used in Greece and Italy while free, where there was a mixture of Kingly Government in Annual Magistrates, or of longer Duration; and of Aristocracy in the Senate, and Democracy in the Authority of the People, in choosing or abdicating their Authority; all which he concludes from the last Clause, That if the Princes of the Factions did not protect those under them, they lost their Authority.  
I rather judge these Princes of Factions, 
The Prince's Heads of Clans, or of the Pagi.  to be the Heads of such as we call Clans, in the Highlands and Ireland; for I see no shadow of that Polity, Ramus speaks of in this Description, and I believe the Government both of Gaul, Germany and Britain, was rather in several Circles and Destricts, than that any one Monarch was over all; only in time of War one or more were chosen, by common consent, to be their Captain General; or where the Romans could prevail, they established a Commonwealth Government.  
As to the first and second we have the Authority of 
(k) In pace nullus communis Magistratus, sed Principes Regionum atque Pagorum inter suos Jus dicunt, controversiasque minuunt.  Caesar speaking of the Germans (with whom the Gauls are all along compared by Ramus) h● saith, In time of Peace, the Princes of the Country and of the Pagi give Law among their own People, and take order to end their Controversies, and then there is no common Magistrate; but when there is a War either made by, or upon the City, Magistrates are chosen, who have the command of the War, and have Power of Life and Death. Such a like choice we find, by a Common Council of several Kings and Princes in 
(l) Comment. lib. 5.  Britain, was made of Cassivillan, to manage the War against Julius Caesar.  
That the Gauls, by a Common Council at Bibracte, chose Vercingetorix singly for their General against Caesar, is well known; and when he was besieged in Alexia, by another Council of the Princes, the Heduans and Avernois, with their Client Towns or Cities, which were many, were to raise 35000. Men, and so others proportionable, and their Forces were committed to four Generals: Now it is said by Caesar, that when Vercingetorix had the sole command, that he placed his Camp on an Hill, and at certain distances he disposed the forces of every City several, and every day called to him the Princes of those Cities, either to communicate something to them, or order them to do something.  
The like manner of Clans and Families (of which he who was most able for Military Service, at that time commanded) we have a plain proof in 
(a) Quodque praecipuum fortitudinis incitamentum est, non casus, non fortuita conglobatio turmam aut cuneum facit, sed familiae & propinquitates. 1. Annal.  Tacitus, who saith of the Germans, That the principal incitement of valour was, that not chance or fortuitous meeting and embodying made a Wedge or Troop, but Families and Kindred: So he saith, That Ariovistus at equal Intervals, placed the Marcomanni, Triboci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii and Suevae.  
That both the Gauls, Germans and Britain's had several Kings, 
Several Petit Kings in Gaul.  Roylets or absolute Princes, who had some one or more City or Country under his peculiar command, is very clear in Julius Caesar: so Galba the King of the Suessiones, was chosen Commander in Chief against Caesar by the Belgians. The opinion I have also, that such Princes were the Heads of Clans appears in that of Orgetorix; who when the City of the Helvetians (which had under it fourteen Towns, oppida, and forty Hamlets, Vicos, and four Pagi, Burroughs or Places of Judicature, where were Senates) all met in Consultation about burning their Country, and possessing the Empire of Gaul: This Orgetorix being elected; but they having notice of his Conspiracy against them, seize on him, and condemn him to be burnt: but upon the Day, Orgetorix summoned all his Family, or Kindred, or those of his House or Clan, as by Familia must be understood. which consisted of a Thousand Men, and all his Clients and Bonds-men or Debtors, obaeratos, whereof he had a great number, and they rescued him.  
Such as this Orgetorix was, I doubt not Cavarinus was, who and his Ancestors, Caesar saith, were Kings of Agendicum and Villannodunum: So Targetius of the Carnuti, Vertiscus Prince of Rheims, Divitiacus King of the Suessiones, Comius King of the Atrebates or Artoys, and the two Kings of the Eburones, Ambiorix and Cativulcus, Cingetorix of the Triveris: I shall add but one Testimony for all, of 
(b) Regna vulgo in Gallia a petentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates ha●erent, vulgo comparabantur. Several Petit Kings in Britain.  Caesar's, That Kingdoms were acquired in Gallia by those who were the most Powerful, and those that have most Wealth to hire Men.  
As to the affairs of Britain, recorded by Julius Caesar, 
(c) Britanni olim Regibus parebant, nunc per Principes factioni●us & studiis trabuntur. Tacit. vita Agric. c. 12. Therefore he tells us, Their want of agreeing in Common Councils, occasioned their certain Overthrow. Pro nobis nihil utilius quam quod in●commune non consulunt: rarus ad propulsandum commune periculum conventus: it a dum singuli pugnant, omnes vincuntur. Id.  we find Cassibilan, chosen to manage the War. In Kent, no great County, we find Kings, viz. Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus and Sergonax, and it cannot be doubted but there were many other petty Kings in the rest of the Country; for we find that Mandubraces, Son of Imanventius King of the Trinobantes, i.e. Middlesex and Essex, slain by Cassibilan, was restored by Julius Caesar; and after we find in Octavius Caesar's time, Cunobelin King of the same, whose Son Adminius fled to Caius Caligula, where he came to Belgia for Protection; so we read of Caractacus who maintained War for nine Years with the Romans, and whose magnanimous Speech to Claudius is Extant in Tacitus; so of Cartismandua, a Queen of brigants that betrayed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 actacus. I might give an account of Prasulagus, King of the Icenians; the famous Boodicia his Queen, and of the famous Caledonian Galgacus: but it is enough to my purpose, that among the Britan's we find Kings so styled by Julius Caesar, and other Writers, especially by Tacitus, and Dion, 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hist. Rom. lib. 60.  speaking of Aulus Plantius (sent General by order of Claudius Caesar with an Army into Britain) saith, That the Inhabitants at that time were subject to divers Kings of their own.  
I shall now sum up the rest of the Laws, Customs, or Usages we find amongst the Gauls or Britan's; and first what concerns the public, out of Caesar.  
The Magistrates 
(e) Magistrdtus quae visa sunt, occultant, quaeque esse ex usu judicaverint, multitudini produm.  conceal those things they think fit, and what they judge may be of use to the Public, they discover to the Populace.  

(f) De Repub. nisi per 〈◊〉 loqui 〈…〉 ur. De 〈…〉, l. 6.  No Body hath leave to speak of the Commonwealths, or of public affairs, but in Council.  
They 
(g) 〈…〉, ita mos gentis 〈◊〉, in Concilium venerunt.  came Armed into the Council, as Livy saith; and Tacitus speaks the like of the Germans.  

(h) 〈◊〉. lib. 21. Sancitum, si quis quid de Rep. a sinitimis rumore aut sama acceperit uti ad Magistratum deferat, neve cum quo alio commanicet.  It was established, that if any received any Rumours from the Neighbourhood, or any report concerning the Republic, that he relate it to the Magistrate, and none else.  
They had something which our Hue 
(i) Vbi major atque illustrior res incidit, clamore per Agros & Regiones signisicant, banc alii deinceps excipiunt, & proximis tradunt. De Bello Gallico, lib. 7.  and Cry resembles: when any great or famous thing happens, they give notice of it by loud Cry through the Fields and Countries, and this others receive and transmit it to the next, so that in a Day, as he observes, Intelligence is given above an hundred Miles.  
One thing more is remembered by Plutarch de virtutibus Mulierum, that it was grown a Custom amongst them, that they treated of War and Peace with their Women in Company; and if any question arose betwixt them and their Allies, they left it to them to determine. On this Head the famous Selden spends a whole Chapter to reckon up the famous Princesses and Women; and 
(k) Sexum in Imperiis non discernunt. Tacit. vita Agric.  Tacitus saith of the Germans, In Rule they made no difference in Sex: which shows it was Hereditary.  
In now come to the more private Usages in their Families and Servants.  

(l) Suos liberos, nisi cum adolever in't, ut munus militiae sustinere possint, palam ad se adire non patiuntur. De Bello Gallico. l. 6.  Caesar saith, They do not permit their Children to come to them in open Sight, but when they are grown up to that Age, that they may be able to undergo Military Duty, and serve in War: And of the Britan's he 
(m) Vxores habent deni duodenique inter se communes, & maxim fratres cum fratribus, & parents cum liberis: sed si qui sunt ex his nati, eorum habentur liberi, a quthus primum virgines quaeque ductae sunt. Idem.  saith particularly, They have ten or twelve Wives in common amongst them, and especially Brothers, and Fathers with their Children; but what Children were born of such Mothers, were fathered on them by whom they were first lain with when they were Maids.  
This strange Confusion had some thing of the Primaeval Practice of Polygamy, and some think helped to the multiplying of People; where it must be rare for any Woman to be unfruitful, that had so many Gallants.  
The Men (of Gaul 
(n) Viri quantas pecunias ab uxoribus dotis nomine acceperunt, tantas ex suis bonis, aestimatione facta, cum dotibus communicant, etc. Idem.  Caesar now speaks) what Money they receive with their Wives upon account of Portion, they lay downv; much out of their own Estate, upon an Appraisement made, to make a Joint-stock with the Portion. There is an account jointly kept of the Product and the Profits reserved, and the longer Liver enjoys all.  
The Men have Power 
(o) Viri in uxores, sicuti in liberos vitae necisque habent potestatem. Idem.  of Life and Death over their Wives as well as over their Children, saith the same Caesar. Whereupon Bodin 
(p) Bodin. de Repub. lib. 1. c. 2.  chargeth Justinian with a falsehood, for affirming that other People had not the same Fatherly Power as the Romans had.  
When a Master of a Family, who is of higher Birth and Quality, dies, his Kindred meet together, That if the manner of his Death were suspicious, they may by Torture, as Servants were used, examine they Wife concerning the Business, and if she be found Guilty, they 
(q) Caesar de Bello Gallico, lib. 6. Igni atque omnibus tormentis excruciatas intersiciunt.  torment her miserably, and burn her alive.  
To this Sir 
(r) Preface to the Sixth Book of Reports.  Edward Coke refers the Antiquity of that Law, which we at this day use of devoting to the Flames those wicked Baggages who slain their Hands with the nefarious Murder of their Husbands.  
Those Servants 
(s) Servi & Clientes, quos ab iis dile●●os esse constabat, just is funeribus confectis, una ●remabantur. De Bello Gallico, lib. 6.  and Dependants, who were known to have been beloved by their Masters in his Life-time, were when the Funeral Rites were prepared, burnt with him for Company. This was used by many Nations.  
Many when they are 
(t) Plerique cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine Tributorum aut inju●ia potentiorum premuntur, seize in servi●utem dicant Nobilibus. In hos eadem sunt Jura quae dominis in servos. Idem.  oppressed with Debt or great Taxes, or with the injurious Oppression of great Men, put themselves out to Service to the Nobles: over such they have the same Right or Authority, as Masters have over their Servants or Slaves.  
Thus I have extracted the principal Laws, Usages, Customs and Powers of Government, Civil and Religions, used by the Gauls and Britan's, as they are recorded by Julius Caesar and others: in which we find the Druids were their Gownmen, and were the Guardians, and Interpreters of their Laws; the same Caesar telling us positively, That the Discipline of these Druids was first found in Britain.  
I come now to the last Particular, 
That the Romans settled Commonwealths where they conquered.  that where the Romans conquered, they established a form of Commonwealth in such places as they thought most convenient for their Obedience to them, and in other places they allowed Tributary Kings; which will appear by what follows.  

(d) Livius, lib. 61.  The Averni of the Gauls were a great People. Bituitus was their King, and fought two bloody Battles with the Romans, the one against Domitius, and the other against Fabius; he being taken Prisoner, and his Son Congentiatus, were deprived of the Kingdom by the Senate, and the City set free: Afterwards Ciltilus Father of 
(e) Caes. Comment. l. 7.  Vercingetorix, although he had by Battle got the principality of all Gaul; yet aspiring to be King, was slain by the City, who had obtained this freedom from the Roman Senate: So that it was a free City till Caesar's time, and is reckoned so in Pliny's time; yet though there were some made so free by the Romans, and others following the Example of the Romans, had cast off their Princes and Kings; yet I cannot with Ramus, conclude so universally of the Gauls, That every where the Government consisted of an elected or annual Prince and Senate, and People that had free suffrages.  
Having thus far given some short hints of the Government of the Britan's, by comparing them with the manner of the Government of the Gauls and Germans, as supposing it might be made out from good Authority, that there was a great Agreement in their Forms of Government: I come now more directly to prove, that where the Romans conquered, they established their own Laws; and that the unwritten Laws and Customs must be of little force, during the People's Subjection to the Romans; and so by some Hundred of years disuse, were like to be so far forgotten, as it cannot be said (as Chancellor Fortescue doth) that during the Britan's, Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans, the Realm hath been ruled with the self same Customs.  
First therefore we may consider, That the Druids (who if they had not the Law-making Power, yet were the sole Judges, and decided all Controversies) being so wholly abolished; and we finding no account of the Laws they judged by, we may well conclude, That the British Laws (whatever they were) lost their Esteem and Use. 
Where the Romans conquered they established their Laws.  Especially when we consider that the Roman Conquest broke and destroyed all the Princely Families, especially the lineage of their Kings. So that now none had any settled Authority, but as he could court the People, if he intended to make a party against his Neighbour, or oppose the Romans: which might be the true reason why Xiphilin 
(f) Apud Britann●s populus magna ex parte Principatum tener. Vita Severi.  saith, That with the Britan's the People had a great share in the Government, which might very well be after the Subversion of their Monarchies, and the Commixture of the Roman Colonies with them.  

(g) De moribus vet. Gallorum, p. 77. The Romans introduced their Language where they conquered.  Ramus complains, That the Roman Conquest made the Gauls lose their own Native Language, while, not only the Roman Laws, but their Legions settling there, compelled the Gauls to speak their Language; besides, he saith, There were public Stipends allowed by the Roman Emperors, to have the Language taught. Therefore we in Britain may well presume the same befell us.  
But the banishing and utter exterminating the Druids, is to me a strong Argument, that the British Laws were also expunged; which I shall now give a short Account of. 
(h) Idem, p. 95, 96, 97. Why the Druids were abolished, with their wicked Rites.  Diodorus tells us, of the Druids sacrificing Captives to the Gods; and Caesar tells us, They used Human Sacrifices, without which they thought the immortal Gods could not be appeased. Diodorus saith, The Saronidae when they consulted about great matters, they killed a Man with the Sword; and from the manner of his falling, the flowing of his Blood, and other things, they prognosticated future Events; and 
(i) Lib. 5. Comment.  Caesar tells us, That he who comes last to the Council armed, in the view of the Multitude, was put to death by Torments. Strabo saith, That in their Temples, they sometimes shot a Man to death with Arrows, as he hung upon a Cross; and out of Artemidorus, That in Britain Sacrifices were made to Ceres and Proserpina, after the manner of the Samothracians. Caesar and Strabo both speak of their making great Figures, or Colossuses of Twigs and Wands, or Wood covered over with Hay, which they filled with living Men and Beasts of several sorts, and so burnt them together. Although Ramus, in extenuation of these, brings some parallel Sacrifices done by the Romans, and ascribes them rather to the influence the Gentile Devils had over People, in making those atrocia & horrenda Sacrificia, than that it was peculiar to the Druids; yet I think there is no Apology to be made for them: That of Lucan being true of them, 
Et vos Barbaricos ritus, moremque sinistrum  
Sacrorum, Druidae, positis repetistis ab armis,  
Solis nosse Deos, & Coeli numina vobis,  
Aut solis nescire datum—   

(k) Tiberii Caesaris Principatus sustulit Druidas Gallorum. Hist. Nat. l. 30. c. 1.  Pliny tells us, That in the Princedom of Tiberius, the Druids of Gaul were taken away, which Lipsius well notes, That it referred only to Rome, in such sense as Suetonius speaks of forbidding it in the Cities: But in Claudins' time, the Religion of the Druids was wholly abolished among the Gauls, by reason of its cursed cruelty; which in Augustus' time, was only forbid to be practised in Cities: Druidarum 
(l) Sueton. Claud. c. 25.  Religionem apud Gallos', dirae immanitatis, & tantum Civibus sub Augusto interdictam, penitus abolevit. It may well be imagined, that the taking of it away in Gaul, extended also to Britain, as far as the Romans were Masters of it; which was both the Mother and Nursery of it.  
This exterminating the Religion made 
(m) Non jam illustres istas Druidum scholas, sed clandestinas in specu & abditis saltibus efficit.  Mela (who lived under Claudius) say, That it made the Schools of the Druids, not to be public, but secretly kept in Caves and obscure Groves; it being now spoiled of its Honour, and as Lucan agrees with Pomponius, 
— Nemora alta, remotis  
Incolitis Lucos—  No doubt this prohibiting of these Holy Rites of the Druids, made the Nations governed by them in point of Law (as the Gauls and Britan's were) not so respectful of them as before they were, and so they became more prone to receive the Laws of Rome, which had prohibited the Reverence before given to them, and having conquered them, would enjoin them the observance of their Laws.  
That the Romans imposed their Laws in such parts of Britain as they had conquered, is manifest by sundry good Inferences from ancient and approved Authors; 
The Romans imposed their Laws where they conquered.  which 
(n) De magnitudine Romana, lib. 1. c. 6. p. 28. Vid. A. Gellium lib. 16. c. 13.  Lipsius hath gathered, who positively affirm, That wherever the Romans conquered, were it Town or Nation, they used to carry some part of the People to Rome, and leave other parts behind; but so as they mixed the Romans with them, to have the Custody and Government of them; and those so sent they called Coloni, and the places 
(o) Hic denique populus Colonias in omnes Provincias misit; ubicunque vicit, Romanus habitat. Seneca ad Albinum, c. 7.  Colonies. The Triumvirs divided to them their shares of Land, and ordered the Laws and Government of the Town, which was head of the Colony, and the Jurisdiction of it; so 
(p) Sic tamen ut omnia Romam & urbem matrem referrent. Id. Lipsius.  that all might resemble the Mother City Rome, even in Market places, and all places of public Congress, Capitol, Temples, Courts, etc. the Duumviri being in most places instead of Consuls, and the Aediles and Decurions for the Senate.  

(q) Colonia Camalodunum ducitur valida veteranorum manu in agros Captivos, ut esset subsidium versus Rebels, & imbuendis sociis ad officia Legum. Lib. 12. Annal. Dio Hist. lib. 60.  Tacitus tells us, That at Camalodunum (now Maldon in Essex) there was a Colony sent to be a Defence against Rebels, and to cultivate the conquered (admitted now into Confederacy with Rome) in the Offices of the Laws, So that here we find the Socii to be instructed in the Roman Laws, which evidently demonstrates, That the British Laws were not allowed to be used: That Courts of Judicature were also here, Tacitus confirms, when he tells us, that under 
(r) 14. Annal. Externos fremitus in Curia eorum auditos.  Suetonius Paulinus, strange noises were heard in the Courts of Judicature there; 
Gruteri Inser. Lips. ad lib. 12. Tacit. num. 75. So we read of a Temple built to Claudius, which was Art (or, as Lipsius, Arra) aeternae dominationis, an Altar or Earnest eternal Command. The Officers sent abroad by the Remans' into the Provinces and Colonies.  so an old Inscription remembers one Aurelius Bassus Censitor civium Romanorum Coloniae Victricensis, quae est in Britannia Camalodunum. This Censitor or Censor (for they are promiscuously used by Ulpian) was one, who did not only tax all to the public Contributions, but was a Judge in the Courts, corrected all misdemeanours of manners, had Power over Senators, and in many other things acted Juridically.  
We find two alterations made in the Officers, sent abroad into the Provinces and Colonies of the Romans, the one in Augustus his time, and the other by Constantine the Great. Before Augustus his Reign, the greater Provinces were ruled by Proconsul's, the lesser by Praetors and Questors, the Provincial Praetors were Judges, gave Sentence according to Law, and we may be sure that was the Roman Law.  
In Augustus' time those principal Magistrates, sent into the Provinces, bordering on the Enemy, or Frontiers of the Empire, were called Legati, the Magistrates or Officers in Italy were Praetorian and Consular, those abroad, Propraetorian and Proconsular. Whoever desires to see more of this or what was appointed under Constantine, may have recourse to Pancirollus de Magistratibus Municipalibus, Alciatus de Magistratibus, and the Notitia Provinciarum; where all the Officers are described, with the several Provinces, and the Cities contained in them, and the Ensigns or Symbols of the Officers. Then Britain was divided into five parts; viz. Britannia prima, and secunda, Flavia Caesariensis, Maxima Caesariensis, & Valentia, being all under the Vicar, or Deputy of Britain, under the Viceroy or Praetorian Perfect of Gaul; we find in the Roman Coins, exhibited by Camden, a Colony at York, Divana, or Chester, and others. So that it cannot be thought that Britain was not as subject to the Roman Laws, as other Conquered Countries. Whence 
(s) Latias ab eo jurare Leges compulsam. De Gestis Reg. l. 1. c. 1.  Malmsbury saith, That Julius Caesar compelled the Britan's to swear Obedience to the Latin Laws. And Gildas 
* Non Britannia sed Romania censebatur. Excid. Britanniae. The Britan's learn the Roman Arts and Language.  saith, it was reckoned not Britannia, but Romania.  
And more particularly, that Britain was subject to the Roman Law, these Observations following will prove.  

‖ Linguam Romanam abnuere, postea eloquentiam concupiscere; inde etiam habilus neslri honour & frequens toga, paulatimque discessum ad delinimenta vitiorum, Balnea, Porticus & conviviorum elegantiam; idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars esset servitutis. Vita Agric. c. 21.  Tacitus tells us that in his time the Britan's began to learn the Arts, and to exceed the Gauls in Wit and Learning; and though they did at first reject the Roman Speech, yet at length they did covet their Eloquence: from thence they had in Esteem the Roman Habit, and their Gown was frequently worn, and by little and little they descended to the fashionableness of their Vices, in their Porticoes, Baths, and Beauty or sumptuousness of their Banquets; which among the ignorant was called Humanity or good Breeding, whereas it was a part of their Servitude.  
If we add to this the Consideration of what I have noted out of Ramus, of the change of the  Language and Laws, we may conclude that the ancient 
(t) In Catalect. vet. Poet. lib. 1. tit. 7.  Poet spoke Truth; who saith, Cernitis ignotos Latia sub Lege Britannos.  
All these things are to be understood of the natural Britan's, who no doubt were not backward in affecting the Roman Laws as well as the other things mentioned by Tacitus. For which the Language and Rhetoric were most useful; otherwise what need was there of having Lawyers from Gaul, which the Poet calls 
(u) Juvenalis Sat. 7.  Nutricula Causidicorum, and who tells us that 

(x) Satyra 15.  Gallia Causidicos docuit facunda Britannos,  
De conducendo loquitur jam Rhetore Thule.   
So we find, That Severus left his Son 
(y) Herodian. lib. 3. Juri dicendo rebusque civilibus ut praeesset.  Geta (when he made his Northern Expedition) to be as Lord Precedent of the North; and Papinian the famous Civilian sat in the Tribunal at York, and from thence, Severus and Antonius set forth the Imperial Edict, 
(z) Cod. lib. 3. tit. 32. That Laws were not like to be made by the Britan's, while under the Romans.  de rerum Venditione.  
Hitherto we find no probability of any Laws amongst the Conquered Britan's, but such as the Romans imposed or allowed of. After the Britan's embraced Christianity, we have some imperfect accounts of King Lucius sending to Pope Eleutherius to send him the Roman Laws, and of Caesar. But Sir Henry Spelman 
(a) Cum has domi a Roman● Praeside (nec fugien●as quidem) obtineret. Concil. Tom. 1. p. 35.  and others, do justly reject this as spurious, because he could not want those, nor avoid the obedience to them in his own Country; for, as he saith, from the time of the Emperor Claudius, who subdued most of Britain, the Roman Laws were published in Britain, and the brigants (the Inhabitants of Yorkshire, and the Countries beyond Humber) according to Seneca 
(b) In ludo de morte Cl. Caes.  were subject to them, who speaking of Claudius Caesar, writes thus, 
Ille Britannos ultra noti littora Ponti,  
Et Coeruleos 
* Vel Scoto-Brigantas. Senec. in Octau.  scuta Brigantas dare Romuleis  
Colla catenis jussit, & ipsum nova Romanae  
Jura securis tremere Oceanum.   
So in another place, 
Cuique Britanni terga dedêre,  
Ducibus nostris ante ignoti,  
Jurisque sui.   
There being nothing to be found of secular Laws of the Britan's, either before their expulsion by the Saxons into Wales, 
Concerning the Laws of Hoel Dha, and the Britan's in Wales.  or after, (excepting some Ecclesiastical Constitutions in Synods) till the Laws of Hoel Dha, i. e. the Good: I must refer the inquisitive Reader to Sir Henry Spelman's first Volume of Councils, where he will find the first at Verulam, or St. Alban, Anno Christi 446. that by St. German against the Pelagian Heresy, Anno 449. that in Wales near the Mountain Erir, that under Dubritius, and three at Landass, before the year 560. and others at Landass after ann. 887.  
Now as to the Laws of Hoel Dha, the Preface to his Laws saith, That he seeing his Welsh insolently to abuse the Laws, he called out of every Kemut or Hundred of his Kingdom, six 
(c) Laicos viros auctoritate & scientia pollentes & omnes E●clesiasticos dignitate baculosoes. Spelm. Concil. Tom. 1. fol. 408. Twy gwyn are Tass, the White House upon the River Tass.  Laymen, excelling in Authority and Wisdom, and all the Ecclesiastics dignifyed with Pastoral Staves; as Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats and Priors, to a place called Guin sup. Taff yn Deved, which House he would have built with white Wands, for an House to lodge in when he came to hunt in the parts of Demetie; wherefore it was called Tie Gvyn; there they stayed all Lent, praying and fasting, etc. of those the King chose Twelve Laymen, most learned, and one Clergyman called Blangorid, to instruct him in the Laws, that they might come nearest to Truth and Justice, and ordered them to be writ in three parts: 
(d) Prima Lex Curiae 〈◊〉 quotidianae; secunda, Lex patria; tertia, usus utriusque.  One for his daily Court; another to be the Law of the Country; and a third to be of use for both: The Laws printed are all Ecclesiastical; only in 
(e) Cap. 25.  one of them it is said, that it is found in the Roman Laws, That where the number of Witnesses are not determined, there two are sufficient. As to the other Laws, I have not had the good Fortune to meet with any Transcript of them, only in 
(f) Glossar. p. 362. Leges pristinas longa receptas consuetudine abolevit, Britannisque novas dedit.  Sir Henry Spelman's Glossary, I find that the Manuscript saith, That he abolished the old Laws, received by long Custom, and gave to his Britan's new ones; which, from the Maker's Name, are called the Laws of Hoel Dha.  
Who over reads these Laws, saith a judicious 
(g) Sacred Laws, p. 76.  Author, will have little reason to think our Common Law ran from any such Fountain; and it seems the old Laws and Customs of this People were far worse and more rude yet, as the Proem informs us.  
I know some will be displeased that I take no notice of the Mulmutian, or of the Mercian Laws, concerning which the Abbot 
(h) Jo. Bromp. Coll. 956. num. 10.  of Jorval and the Monk 
(i) Lib. 1. c. 50. Concerning the Mercian Laws, not British. See for this, and against it, what the Judicious Selden hath writ in his fourth, fifth, and sixth Chapters of his Janus Anglorum, in which the Story of Brute is judiciously confuted.  of Chester give this account, That Dunwallo Mulmucius, a British King (who lived 430 years before our Saviour) made those Laws which continued in esteem till Edward the Confessors days, by the Name of the Leges Molmucinae, in which he appointed Cities, the Temples of the Gods, and the Ways leading to them, and the Ploughs of the Country Men to be Sanctuaries; and after Mercia (a Queen of the Britan's) Wife of Gwithelin (whom Leland calls Mercia proba) in the Minority of her Son, saith the Monk of Chester, who ruled in the Country of the Mercians, published a Law full of Discretion and Justice, called the Lex Mercia; which two Laws Gildas the Historian translated out of the British Language into Latin; and these in the Saxons time, were called Merchena Laga, or the Law of the Mercians; which Alured the Saxon (saith the Monk of Chester) from the Latin turned into the Saxon Language, and added the West Saxon Law, and Canutus added the Danelga or Danish Law; all which three being joined together by Edward the Confessor, made those we call the Common Law or King Edward's Laws.  
To which I shall only give Sir Henry Spelman's answer in his Glossary, That it is true that King Alfred did write the Mercian Laws into his own West Saxon Laws; but (as appears by the Preface to his Laws) that he collected what ever he found in the Laws of King Ina his Countryman, Offa King of the Mercians, or Ethelbert, who was first baptised; and those that were just, he collected, others being rejected. It is not probable that Offa a Saxon King, the cruelest Enemy to the Britain's, having driven them out of all the Confines of his Kingdom into Wales, should carry back their Laws as his Spoils; especially the Laws being so wicked, that in the next Age they should be expunged, and juster Laws be chosen, as we see in the Preface to those of Hoel Dha.  
I shall offer but one Argument more, and so conclude with Sir Henry Spelman's opinion: When Ethelbert King of Kent made his Laws Anno 613. as in the next Chapter I shall relate; Bede saith, he framed them after the Roman Example, after Romana Bisena; by which we may understand, either according to the Laws then used by the Civil or Ecclesiastic State of the Romans.  
As to Sir Henry Spelman 
(k) Glossar. tit. Lex. Whence most Laws after the breaking of the Roman Empire.  he saith, when the Goths, Saxons, Longobards, Danes, Normans and other Inhabitants about the Baltic Sea, and Northern parts of Germany, had made great Conquests in Europe, they imposed their Laws every where upon the conquered, and their Country Ri●●: hence the Agreement betwixt the Laws of the Germans, French, Italians, Spaniards and Sicilians; and who ever boast of the Antiquity of their Municipal Laws, can deduce them no higher. For 
(l) Quis enim victor populus sub victi legibus conquiniscet?  saith he, What conquering People will bow the neck under the Laws of the conquered, especially when they have ejected a great part of them out of the Country? So that if the Britain's had any Laws of their own, after the Roman Conquest, they must be preserved in the remotest parts of Scotland, and after in Wales: but England had other Laws, as I shall make appear hereafter.   

CHAP. XXIII. Of the Germane Government, and Laws of several Countries; after breaking of the Roman Empire, and an Introduction to understand the Saxon Lawmakers.  
HAving treated of the State of the Britan's under the Romans, I now in order should immediately treat of the Saxons great Councils, and discover by what Authority Laws were made in their time, who made up the great Council, and whose advice was implied in the framing of their Laws: But before I enter upon Particulars, it may be needful to say something of the Germane Polity, a Member of which most famous Country (though we find not them mentioned during the time of the twelve Caesars) no doubt the Saxons were.  
Caesar tells us, 
The Gods the Germans worshipped.  The Germans had no Druids 
* Germani neque Druidas habent qui rebus divinis praesint, neque sacrisiciis student.  which attended Divine Matters, nor did they study Sacrifices, and that they accounted among the Gods those they see, and from whom they are manifestly helped in their works, as the Sun, Vulcan and the Moon; the rest they have not received as much as by report: But Tacitus mentions their God Tuisto, born of the Earth, and his Son Mannus, and that they worshipped Mercury most, to whom they sacrificed Men; but to Hercules and Mars other Animals, 
Although the Germans, Gauls, and Britan's were Barbarous, yet they were Valiant, and capable of great Improvement.  and that some worshipped Isis.  
When I read in Caesar, Tacitus, Diodorus, Strabo and others, of the Barbarousness of the Germans, Gauls and Britan's, their homely Diet, poor Cottages and Clothing, their Habitations dispersed according as there was convenience of Water or Wood, and that uncultivated Disposition they describe; I am ready to think, before the Roman Attacques upon them, they had lived something like the Savage Indians, and had little of Arts or Industry among them: but when I consider on the other side, their great Armies, their Weapons, the Chariots of the Britan's and Gauls, called Esseda, the 
(a) Lanceo ferreo cubitali longitudine, latitudine duorum palmorum, Aerea Galea caput muni●bant paulatim eminentiore, in qua aut cornua impressa essent, aut avium vel quadrupedum essigies sculptae. Caesar. l. 3.  Lances of the Gauls, with Heads of Iron a Cubit long, and two Palms broad, their large Shields and Brass Helmets; the Germane Spears called Fram●●●, and the Ornaments of their Shields and Helmets, with Figures of Birds or fourfooted Beasts in Brass, their orderly raising of such and such numbers of Men, in such and such Circuits and Jurisdiction of Cities, and their training up their Youth in Arms, and the Influence the Druids had in Gaul and Britain, and the Priests in Germany (in all which Particulars I could give a large account, but that Ramus hath saved me the labour:) I say, when I consider this, I look upon them as People of brave and Heroic minds, and such as were capable of great Improvements, and who were People of Courage and Prowess. But I shall leave these things, and only speak of their Polity or Government Ecclesiastic, Military, 
The Religion of the Germans.  and Civil.  
As to their Priests, 
(b) Silentium per Sacerdotes, quibus tum coercendi Jus est imperatum. Tacit. de Moribus Germ. 634.  Tacitus tells us, That in the great Confluxes of the People, they had some kinds of Presidentship, and coercive Power in causing Silence. None were permitted to Correct, Bind, or Punish any with Stripes, but the Priests, not allowing them to be inflicted for Punishment, and at the Command of the Captain, but as it were 
(c) Velut Deo imperante quem adesse bellantibus credunt. Id.  God commanding, whom they believe to be present with their Armies. Therefore he saith, they carry some Effigies or Symbols of their Gods, taken from their Graves, into their Battles. He 
(d) Nec cohibere parietibus Deos, neque in ullam humani oris speciem assimulare ex magnitudine coeles●ium arbitrantur. Id. 633.  saith, the Germans do not confine their Gods to Walls, nor make them after the similitude of Humane Shape, the greatness of Celestial Powers not allowing it: they consecrate Groves and Woods, and call by the names of Gods that Secret, which by Reverence alone they see. Lucos ac nemora Consecrant, Deorumque nominibus appellant Secretum illud quod sola Reverentia vident.  
As to civil affairs, 
Their Civil Government.  In their Councils (which 
(e) Jura per Pagos Vicosque reddunt, centeni singulis ex plebe comites, consilium simul & auctoritas adsunt. Idem  Tacitus before saith, they ordinarily held about the New or Full Moon) their Princes are chosen, who administer Justice by Villages, and Dorps, and Council and Authority was in every Hundred. Such were our ancient Wapentakes, called Hundreds where 
(f) Conventus fiat in omni centena, coram Comite aut suo misso, & coram Centenario ipsum placitum fiat. LL. Alaman.  the Hundredary, and others judged: and in this account we have a description of our Fortnight and Monthly Courts in Wapentakes, and of the Courts of Manors; but of this Sir William Dugdale is to be consulted in his Learned Treatise called Origines Juridiciales.  
I come therefore to their Princely and Military Government: For in so Warlike a Nation, it is described by 
(g) Reges ex Nobilitate, Deuces ex virtute sumunt; nec Regibus infinita & libera Potestas, & Deuces exemplo potius quam Imperio. Si prompti, si conspicui, si ante Aciem agunt, admiratione praesunt. Id. 634.  Tacitus, as fittest for that Service. He saith they take their Kings by their noble Extraction, and their Captains or Leaders by their Virtue or Prowess, nor is the Power of their Kings free and absolute; and their Captains by Example rather than Command, are obeyed. If they be ready handed, of a goodly Presence, and signalise their Prowess in the Head of their Armies, this gives them Command.  
Further he 
(h) Mox Rex vel Princeps, prout aetas cuique, prout Nobilitas, prout decus Bellorum, prout facundia, audiuntur Auctoritate suadendi magis quam jubendi potes●ate: si displicuit sententia, fremitu aspernantar; sin placuit, frameas concutiunt. Honoratissimum assensus genus est armis laudari. Id. 636.  saith, The King or Prince is heard (that is, valued, esteemed and obeyed) according to his Age, his Nobility, his Warlike Achievements or Eloquence, rather by the Authority of persuading, than by the Power of Commanding. If the matter proposed displease, it is rejected with a fretting noise; if it please, they clash together their Spears: the honourablest kind of assent being to commend with their Weapons. All this seems to be fitted for Military Affairs; and Tacitus having had occasion to treat of the Germans as they were engaged in Wars against the Romans, must be thought to make his principal Remarks from the Intelligence he had from the Romans that were employed against them: Therefore little can be expected of their Government in Times of Peace; which, no doubt, they rarely enjoyed after the Roman Ambition of subduing all their Neighbours, and bringing them under their Subjection, was so much endeavoured.  
That the Germans were a Warlike Nation appears in all the accounts given of them; 
(i) Vita Germanorum omnis in venationibus, a●qu● in studiis rei militaris consumitur.  therefore Caesar tells us, That the whole life time of the Germans was spent in Hunting and in Military Employments. So Tacitus relates, That in their Councils, either one of the Princes, 
(k) Scuto Frameaque juvenem ornant; hac apud illos toga, hic primus juventae honos. De Moribus Germ.  or the Father, or Kinsman adorn the Youth with a Shield and Spear: This being among them, as the Gown among the Romans, the first Honour of their Youth. So he saith, They divided the Inhabitants of the Pagi into Hundreds, of which one was the chief, and these were the Footmen in their Armies. 
The Germane Comites.  Their Princes had always a great number of Companions in Arms, whom he calls Comites and Comitatus; 
(l) Magnaque & Comitum aemulatio quibus primus apud Principem suum ●●●us: & Principum, cui plurimi & acerrimi Comites. Haec dignit ●●, 〈◊〉 vires, magno semper electorum juvenum globo circundati, in pace decus, in bello praesidium. Id. p. 637. Cum ventum i● Aciem, turpe Principi virtute vinci, turpe comitatui virtutem Principis non adaequare.  among whom was great Emulation, who should obtain the prime place about the Prince; and so among the Princes, who should have most, and the valiantest Companions: where this number of Clients, Retainers or Companions is not only glorious to them in their own Country, but among their neighbour-Cities where they fight. It is shameful for the Prince, saith he, to be overcome by force, and as shameful for these Companions not to equal the valour of their Prince; and it is an infamous disparagement to them, all their lives, to escape alive out of the Fight, if their Prince be slain: for to defend him, and to ascribe their own valiant Actions to his Glory, is their principal Oath, the Prince fight for Victory, and they for the Prince. If the City from whence they sprung, hath grown sluggish with long Peace and Idleness, the most of the Noble Youth, of their own accord, seek those Nations where Wars are: Idleness being ingrateful to them; and the Princes cannot maintain these numerous Companions, but by Force and War: for these Comites require of the Prince's Liberality, 
(m) Exigunt enim Principis sui liberalitate illum bellatorem equum, illam cruentam victricemque ●rameam. Id. 538. Sir Henry Spelman derives Vassal from the old Germane Gessel, Comes, vel simpliciter, vel qui pro mercede servit. Glossar. Fidelis.  the Warlike Horse, and the bloody and conquering Framea or Spear. For plentiful Food, and Entertainments are to them in stead of Wages. Thus far Tacitus.  
Methinks in this description of the Comites and Comitatus, there appears something like the Feudal dependence of the Milites upon the Prince; they are bound by Oath to defend him, they have Horse, and Lance, or Spear, have liberal entertainment both in constant Food and Banquets for Wages; and that they had also Lands set out for the service, the following words seem to imply, viz. That one cannot so 
(n) Nec arare terram aut expectare Annum tam facile persuaseris, quam locare hosts, & vulnera mereri; pigrum quinimo, & inters videtur sudore acquirere quod possis sanguine parare. Id. P. 538.  easily persuade them to plough land, or expect the Fruits of the Year, as to provoke the Enemy, and to deserve wounds; for it is sluggish to them and dull to acquire that by Sweat, that they may obtain by Blood. Whether this employed a Feudal Tenure or not, I will not determine; but it shows a rudiment of it: And in Scotland not only in the Highlands but the Lowlands, that which they call the Great-back, i.e. to be attended wherever they travel, when they please to command it, with a great train of their Vassals and Tenants, especially in military expeditions; is yet in use; and till the Law of H. 7. against Retainers, this was as much used by the ancient English Nobility. 
Their Princes presented with Gifts.   

(o) M●s est civitatibus ultro ac viritim conferre Principibus vel armentorum vel frugum, quod pro ●●nore acceptum etiam necessitatibus subvenit: publice mitt●●tur electi equi, magna arma, phalerae, torquesque. Idem.  Tacitus further saith, concerning their Princes, That it was a custom for their Cities, of their own accord, and Man by Man, to bestow upon their Princes, Cattle and Corn, which is received as an Honorary Gift, and serves them for their House-keeping; and the Princes most rejoice in the Gifts of the neighbouring Nations, which are not sent by single persons, but as Public Presents: viz. Chosen Horses, great Arms, Horse-trappings, and Collars or Chains, and of late, Money. Here we may note, that where Tacitus mentions Civitates he means some distinct Government or Country under one Government. For he is positive that the Germans had not such places as were called Vrbes, Cities; nor did they endure conjoined Seats of Habitation, but did inhabit severally, as a Fountain, a Field, or Wood pleased them, their Cities being only fenced Woods or Morasses. 
They went always armed.  I might note many other things in which the Saxons agreed with the description 
(p) Nihil neque publi●● neque pr●va●●● r●i nisi armati agunt, tum ad nego●●●, nec minus sape ad convi●ia procedunt armati.  Tacitus gives of the Germans, and some usages we retain still; but I shall only add two particulars more, and so conclude. He saith, that they neither went about public or private Affairs unarmed, not only where business required, but to their Feasts they went armed; and to drink at them a Day and Night was no disgrace: and often at these were quarrels, which seldom passed without reproaches, but often with death and wounds. At these Feasts they consult, saith he, of reconciling Enemies, 
De reconciliandis invicem i●imicis, & jungendis affinitatibus, & adsciscendis Principibus, de pace denique a● b●●●, plerumque in conviviis consulcant, tanquam nullo magis tempore aut ad simplices cogitationes pateat animus aut ad magnas incale cat. Deliberant dum ●ingere ne ciunt: constituunt dum errare non possunt. Id. 642. De minoribus rebus Principes consultant, d● majoribus omnes; ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum p●nes plehem arbitrium est, apud Principes pertrectentur. Id. 636. Their Consultations.  of joining Affinities, and choosing Princes, and for the most part, of Peace and War, as if at no other time, either the Mind is more open to receive simple thoughts, or is more warmed to great ones; yet, however, upon these occasions, they unbosom themselves, the next day they treat again of these matters, deliberating when they know not how to dissemble, and firmly resolve on a thing when they cannot err.  
As to their public Consultations, Tacitus observes further, That of lesser matters (such as I suppose concerned not the Public State of Affairs in War or Peace, but the particular ordering the matters of their private Jurisdictions) the Princes consult: about greater business all, yet so as those things, of which the lowest sort of the People are Judges, are first treated of by the Princes. By which I understand, Tacitus means by greater matters, the Consultations about the defending themselves against their Enemies, especially against the Romans, where the unanimous suffrage of the greatest multitude was requisite.  
By all which, it is apparent that there were several Principalities in Germany, and that the Soldiery made up a great part of the People: and where we read of suffrages, it is to be understood of theirs; and whatever freedom of Votes, etc. we read of, was principally in debating Military Affairs: and that Germany doth yet retain free Princes, and free Cities, though under one Emperor, 
De Moribus Germanorum.  as ancient Germany did, is well known.  
Another of their laudable Customs is thus remembered by Tacitus, Insignis Nobilitas, aut magna Patrum merita, Principis dignationem etiam adolescentulis assignant, which I render, Great Nobility, or, the great merits of their Fathers, gives the dignity of Princes, even to their Youth. In this we may note the propagation of Gentry, through true Virtue deserving Honour, to whose Memory is dedicated that Worship which is often bestowed on unworthy Posterity. 
Haec debeamus virtutibus ut non praesent●s solum illas, sed e●●am ablatas e●conspectu colamus. Senec. lib. 4. de Benef. c. 30. Dotem non uxor marito, sed uxori maritus affert, Idem. Tacitus 〈◊〉 supra. Accisis cri●ibus nudatam Adul●eram coram propinquis expellit d●mo maritus, ac p●r omnem vicum verbera agit. Idem.  This, saith Seneca, we own to Virtues, that we do not only worship them present, but worship them taken out of our sight.  
Another of the Germane Laws or Usages was, as Tacitus mentions, That the Wife doth not bring the Husband a Portion, but the Husband gives the Wife a Dowry.  
Yet we find the Husband's severity in case of abusing his Bed, thus: The Husband, if the Wife prove an Adultress, cuts off her Hair, strips her naked, and turns her out of doors in presence of her Kindred, and drives her through the Streets, lashing or beating her as she goes along. This, as Juvenal saith, was — Ipsis Marti Venerique timendum.  
So Antinous in Homer threatens Irus with the chopping off his Nose, Ears, and Privities; and Ulysses inflicts that very punishment upon his Goatherd Melanthius for his Pimping. So in Canutus his Law, the Wife who took other Passengers aboard her, than her Husband, is doomed, she should have her Nose and Ears cut off. 
J●●us Anglorum.  The curious may see more in Selden.  
Tacitus observes another Law, 
H●●redes successoresque sui cuique liberi, & nullum testamentum. Si liberi non sunt p●●ximus gradus in poss●ss●o●e, sratres, patrui, avunculi. Idem.  that every one's Children were their Heirs and Successors, and there was no Will to be: If there be no Children, than the next of kin shall inherit; Brethren, or Uncles by the Fathers or Mothers. This seems to point out Gavil-kind, otherwise there had been need of a Testament to dispose of something for younger Children. So Selden observes, that till our Grandfather's time it was not lawful to dispose of Land-Estates by Will, unless it were in some Burroughs that had such privileges, but this hindered not but they might dispose by Deeds.  
Another Law he mentions, 
Suscipere inimicitias seu patris seu propi●qui quam amicitias necesse est. Idem. Nec implacabiles durant, luitur enim etiam homicidium certo Arm●ntorum ac pecorum numero, recipitque satisfactionem universa dom●s. Idem.  which shows the use of those are called Deadly Feuds in the North, was that to undertake the enmities rather than the friendships, whether of ones Father or Kinsman, is more necessary.  
Yet he saith, those do not hold on, never to be appeased; for even Murder is expiated by a certain number of Cattle, and the whole Family of the murdered Person receives satisfaction. So we find in our English Saxon Laws, Murders were formerly bought off with Head-money, which was called W●●gild, though one had killed a Nobleman, yea, a King himself, which, as I remember, was valued at 60000 Thrimsas or Groats, and so a Prince 30000, and others Proportionable.  
Another Law we find thus, The Lord imposeth upon his Tenant a certain quantity of Corn, or Cattle, or Clothes. 
Frumenti modum Deminus aut pecoris aut vestis col●no injungit. Idem.  Here we certainly find the usage of Country Farmholders. 
In ●●imitivo Regni s●●tu p●st conquis ●●nem 〈…〉 〈…〉 argenti 〈◊〉, sed sola 〈◊〉 solvebantur. Dialog. Scaccar.  So yet in Scotland, a Gentleman of Quality, or Lords Estate is not computed by Annual Rent, but by so many Bolls of Victual. So we find in Gervase of Tilbury, that the Kings had payments made them out of their Lands, not in Sums of Gold or Silver, but only in Victuals or Provisions, out of which the King's House was supplied with necessaries for daily use, which the King's Officers accounting with the Sheriffs, reduced into many payments, viz. a Measure of Wheat to make Bread for 100 Men 1 s. the body of a Pasture-fed Beef, 1 s. a Ram or Sheep 4 d. for Food for 20 Horses 4 d.  
Thus far I have thought fit to pick out of Tacitus the manners of the Germans, and compare some of them with the English, Saxon, or Norman Customs, to discover their Conformity.  
But since, in this account from Tacitus, we find no satisfactory testimony as to the power of making Laws, but that in general they used to meet in Consultation about the New or Full of the Moon, where 2 
(r) Altar & tertius dies consultatione co●●ntium ab●umitur. Id. 636.  or 3 Days were usally spent, and the Turba, or Common Body of those that met, (which elsewhere he saith, was by hundreds) being Armed, the Priests commanded silence, and had the power of keeping Matters in order, and the Prince's Authority was there, as I have noted before: I say, considering these things, I must seek otherwhere for clearer discovery; before which I will only note, 
Judgements given in their Councils.  that at such Councils as 
(s) Li●●● apud concilium accusare quoque & discrimen capitis intendere.  Tacitus describes, Judgements were given upon offences: for he saith here, Accusations might be presented, and Capital Matters tried, the distinction of punishment 
* Distinctio paenarum ex 〈◊〉, proditores & transfused ar●oribus suspendunt, ignav●● & im●e●●● & ●●pore (Lips. torp●●●) Infames 〈…〉 〈◊〉 insuper crate 〈◊〉. ●acitus de moribus German. In some Places of Germany Drowning is yet a Punishment, as Platerus gives an Account of a Woman tied in a Sack, and cast into the River near Basil, who was found alive after being taken up at the usual place, half a mile below where she was cast in. Observat.  being according to the Crime: Traitors and such as fled to the Enemy were hung upon Trees, but the slothful, unfit for War, and such as are infamous for sluggishness (as Lipsius will have it Torpore not Corpore infames) were drowned in Morasses, an Hurdle being laid upon them, and the reason he gives of the divers punishments, is, that the first which he calls Scelera, are to be shown while punished; but the other, which he calls Flagitia, wicked and heinous crimes, (but particularizeth not what they were) should be hid and punished by Drowning; then follows, Levioribus delictis pro modo poenarum, equorum, pecorumque numero convicti mulct antur, pars mulctae Regi vel Civitati, pars ipsi qui vindicatur, vel propinquis ejus exolvitur; and that for smaller faults, the punishment was a Mulct of Horses or Cattle, whereof a great part was paid to the King, or City, and part to him that was acquitted, or his kindred. By which we may note a Sovereignty in the Kings, or Free Cities, or People to whom these Mulcts were paid.  
But I leave these obscurer times, and proceed to greater light. Therefore, for the better clearing of the Authority of the Saxon Kings in giving Laws to their Subjects, and the discovering who were the constituent parts of the great Councils; I shall first note something of the several Laws made in Germany, France, 
Several Laws made in several King loms after the declining of the Reman Empire.  and the Northern Countries, and so proceed to some general observations of our Saxon Laws; and lastly, to illustrate or expound by a short Glossary, the Saxon Titles of Great Men found mentioned in the Councils.  
First (as the Ancientest I meet with) I will begin with the Gothic Laws: 
Gothick Laws.  These Goths overrun Europe, and did not only cause great Wars and Destructions, but made great alterations in the Laws and Kingdoms. The Goths, according to the custom of other Northern People, used not written Laws, but their Country Customs; till 
(t) Sub Erudi●● Rege, Gothi Legum instituta scriptis bahere c●●perunt; nam antea m●ribus & consuetudine tenebantur. Isidor. Chron. Goth. Aera 504.  Euridicus, Euric or Theodoric (for by those Names he is called) Anno Dom. 466. made them be digested into writing: These Levigild (Aera 608) amended, and they had their fullest Vigour from the King's Chindaswind and Recaswind; and these are used in Spain, and that part of France called Gallia Narbonensis, anciently Braccata, containing Savoy, Dauphin, Province and Languedoc.  
The next Laws for Antiquity are the Burgundian. Gundebald or Gundebaud, 
The Burgundian Laws.  who was made tributary to Clovis King of France, Anno Dom. 501. having settled Burgundy under his Jurisdiction, did appoint (saith 
(u) Lib. 2. c 33.  Gregory Turonensis) milder Laws for the Burgundians, lest he might oppress the Romans: and Lindenbrogius notes, That his Laws agree with the Responses of Papinian; though 
(w) De Impietate Duellici examinis.  Agobard, in his Book to Lewis the Emperor, complains of the unjustness of one branch of them, in admitting Duel, when Proof might otherwise be had: However here it appears they were made by his Authority.  
The next are the Laws of the Alemans', Baiuvarians and Francs, * all which took their beginning from Theoderic the First, 
(x) Spehaan 's Gloss. Lex Baioriorum. Lex Baiuvariorum, Baioriorum, Boiorum, containing Franconia, now Bavaria and Bohemia, according to some.  Son of Clovis the First, who founded the French Kingdom, Anno 511. having triumphed over the Almains, and being converted to Christianity, he took the Name of Lewis; when he was in Catalonia he called to him wise Men, skilled in the Ancient Laws of his Kingdom; and he himself indicting, he commanded the Laws of those Nations, according to every one's Customs, to be written; adding, rescinding and changing them according as Christian Religion required, and those which, for the ancient Pagan Rites, he could not alter himself, Childebert the Second begun, and Clotharius the Second perfected, and Dagobert the great made them better, and to every Nation concerned in them, 
Lex Aalmannorum.  he gave them in writing.  
As to that part which is called the Lex Alamannorum, they were amended by Clotharius the Second, Son of Chilperic, and his Princes, viz. Thirty three Bishops, Thirty four Dukes, Seventy two Earls, and the rest of the People, as appears by the Title; so that this, by an Act of the King and great Council, and the former by the Kings themselves, are recorded to be appointed or made. 
Lex Francorum.   
As to the Law of the Francs (not the Salic Law, which is of later date) we find no more mention of them after they were digested by Theodoric the first, till the time of Charles the Great; who and his Son, published Laws by the Name of Capitularies, which Ann. 840. were writ by Ansegisus Abbas Lobiensis, and Benedictus Levita; so that here is no mention but of the Kings and Emperors sole establishing these Laws. 
Lex Longobardorum.   
The Longobards, now Lombard's, in Italy were a Colony of the Saxons, who were removed into Pannonia or Hungary; and by Narses General to Justinian; about the year 550, were called into Italy to assist the Emperor against Totila King of the Goths; whom Narses totally routed in Italy: and these Longobards 
(y) Warnefridus Hist. Longobard. lib. 4. c. 44.  seated themselves there, and established a Kingdom, and Rotharis their King reduced the Laws which they held only by Use and Memory (being mostly such as the Saxons had used) into writing, and caused the Book of them to●be called an Edict; which was about 70 years after their settling in Italy; the succeeding Princes Grimoald, Luitprandus, Rachis and Aistulphus, and after Charles the Great, Latharius and Pipin added and amended them. Sir Henry Spelman 
(z) Glosser, tit. LL. Longobard.  saith, that betwixt our Laws and those of the Longobards, there is a great Agreement in the Laws, Rites, Words, and other Particulars; but saith, our Ancestors brought out of Germany their Customs not written, but, according to the custom of the Lacedæmonians, and the Ancient Nations of the North, retained them in their memories only.  
In the Laws of Henry the First, 
Lex Ripuariorum.  we find the Ripuarian Laws (which were made for those of Luxenburg, Gelderland and Cleves) not only approved, but some of them are word for word in his Laws, as Sir Henry Spelman notes.  
As to the Salic Law, the Francs, a People of Germany, 
The Salic Law.  passing the Rhine, subdued a great part of Gaul; and in the third year of Pharamont, four of the Nobles of the Nation reviewed all the Originals of Causes, according to the Salic Law: There are two Prologues to these Laws; the first names the four Noblemen that digested them; the second saith names the Anno Dom. 798. The Lord Charles, the Noble 
(a) Anno Dom. 798. Dom. Carolus Rex Francorum incli●●s hunc libellum tractat●s Legis Salicae seribere ordinavit.  King of the Francs, ordained the writing of that Book of the Salic Law.  
In the Laws of King Henry the First, Sir Henry Spelman notes, That many things are taken out of the Salic Laws, as he instanceth in the 87 and 89 Chapters, where the Words are used, and Punishments are appointed secundum Legem Salicam, according to the Salic Law.  
I shall now set down something in general of our Country Law: 
(b) Gl●sser. Lex Anglorum. The English Saxon Laws from Germany.  Sir Henry Spelman observes, That the Laws of the English in Britain, seem to take their Original from the Germane Manners or Customs, but he knows not who first introduced them. It is known, that there came into England upon the Invitation of Vortigern, the Jutes or Goths, 
Angela is a Town near Flemshurg, a City of Sleswick; perhaps our Flamburgh in York●●ire had its Name from some that inhabited that City.  the Angli or English, and the Saxons; though all here obtained the Names of Saxons. The Jutes settled in Kent, and the Isle of Wight: The Saxons in Essex, Middlesex and Sussex, and so on the Sea Coast to Cornwall, and were called the West Saxons: The Angli possessed the East and North parts, which were called Mercia.  
Those of Kent had their Laws, 
The tripartite Division of the Saxon Laws.  but after being swallowed up in the West-Saxon Kingdom, they were subject to their Laws; The Angli used the Mercian Laws, till the Danes overrunning the Provinces of East-England, and of the North Humber's, brought in their Customs, not differing very much from the Laws they had before; from hence sprung the threefold Division of Laws, viz. the 
(c) West-Seaxna Laga, Myrcna Laga, Dene Laga.  West-Saxon Laws, the Mercian Laws, and the Danish Laws.  
The first Laws we have an account of, were made by Ethelbert King of Kent Anno 561. and the next by Ina King of the West- Saxons, who began to Reign Anno 712. and the next by Offa King of the Mercians, of which Laws I have spoke before: The Danish Laws were such as were not only used in Denmark, but in Normandy, 
Danish Laws.  as well as Norway: which was the reason why William the Conqueror understanding that the Danish Law was used in that part where the Danes had settled themselves, he preferred them before other Laws; because his Country of Normandy was sprung from the Danes, and Norwegians: and it was with much difficulty that he was persuaded against imposing them upon the whole Kingdom; saying, the Danes and Norwegians were as sworn Brothers with the Normans. These Danes entered about the year 790. and were at last overcome by King Alfred, and by agreement betwixt him and Guthrun King of the Danes (who governed the Kingdom of the East Angles and Northumbrians,) Guthruns People enjoyed the Danish Laws, which differed from the other in nothing so much as the proportion of the Mulcts: King Edward the Elder, Aethelstan, Edmund, and Edgar made Laws; but from the time of Edgar to Edward the Confessor, the Danes having the principal Command, the Danish Laws mostly prevailed. But Edward the Confessor, of these three Laws, composed one, which, saith the Monk of 
(d) Lib. 1. c. 50. Edward the Confessor 's Laws composed of all.  Chester, are called the Common Laws, and to his Days were called the Laws of King Edward.  
By all I have hitherto noted concerning the Laws either made in Germany, France, Lombardy, Burgundy, Bavaria, or other Countries (after they came to have any established Government of their own) or in England during the Heptarchy; It is apparent, whoever was Sovereign, imposed the Laws, which as to the Saxons in the next Chapter I shall make particularly appear. 
When the Roman Imperial Law began to be disused.   
That the Roman Laws begun to be disused as soon as their Empire declined and was broken, is as manifest; for these several Nations by the appointment of their Sovereigns had their unwritten Customs and Laws revised, and according to the suitableness of them to the Government of their People, had them writ into Books, and enjoined them to be observed by their Subjects.  
To make it evident that the Imperial Roman Law was much disused after Justinian's time, (upon the account of other Sovereignty's being established, which acknowledged not that dependence upon the Empire as formerly) I shall offer something from Mr. 
(e) Notes upon Fortescue, p. 20.  Selden (who, if any other, is to be credited in this kind of reading) after I have said something of Justinian.  
The Emperor Justinian 
(f) Proaem. de Consirmatione Institutionum. Of Justinian 's Laws.  in the year of our Lord 565, by the help of Tribonian, Master, and Exquaestor of the Sacred Palace, and Exconsul, and of Theophilus and Dorotheus Illustrious Men, of whose Skill and Knowledge in the Laws and their Fidelity in observing his Commands, the Emperor had manifold experience of: Although he had commanded them by his Authority and Persuasions to compose those Institutions, that the Subjects might not learn the Law from 
(g) Non ab Antiquis Fabulis discere, sed ab Imperiali splendore appetere. Breviter expositum quod antea obtinebat, & quod postea desuetudine inumbratum, Imperiali remedio illuminatum est. Legimus & recognovimus, & plenissimum nostrarum constitutionum robur eis accommodavimus.  Ancient Fables, but from the Imperial Splendour, as he calls it, desire them: and after fifty Books of Digests or Pandects, and four Books of Institutions were made, in which were expounded whatever before-time was used, and what by disuse was obscured, by the Imperial Remedy was Illuminated; and he had accommodated to them his fullest Authority, and had appointed them to be read and taught at Rome, Berytus, and Constantinople, and no where else: Yet the body of the Civil Law was so neglected, that till Lothar the Second, about the year 1125. took Amalsi, and there found an old Copy of the Pandects or Digests; it was in a manner wholly disused. Under that Lothar the Civil Law began to be professed at Bologna, and one Irner or Werner made the first Glosses upon it, about the beginning of Frederick Barbarossas' time, in Anno 1150. and Bologna was by Lothar constituted to be Legum & Juris Schola una & sola. 
(h) Sigon. de Regno Italiae, lib. 11. & 7.   
This Book Lothar gave to the Pisans (by reason whereof, saith Mr. Selden, it is called Litera Pisana) and from thence it is now removed to Florence, where in the Duke's Palace it is never brought forth but with Torchlight, and other Reverence.  
By this account we may note, That even before Justinian's time, some Laws had been rather by old Traditions, which he calls old Fables, than by certain Authority received; others were by long disuse forgot: and after they were thus established by Imperial Authority, yet the succeeding Barbarity of the Ages, and the new Kingdoms erected, caused other Laws to obtain Force, the first of which we find very rude. All the first Laws, we read of in any Nation, seem either so, comparatively to the refinedness of the Laws in these Ages; or else the Digesters and Authorizers of them complain how obscure, rude, or indigested those were, out of which they extracted theirs. 
The great Subversion the Saxons made by their Conquest.   
The Saxons made so great and universal a Subversion in the State, that scarce any City, Dwelling, River, Hill or Mountain retained its former Roman or British name; so that we have less reason to expect any satisfactory account either of British History, Polity, or Laws, when we only know where they had Camps, Stations, or Cities, Palaces or Fortifications, or Temples, by the Coins, Brick, tessellated Pavements, Glass, Earthen, or Jet Fragments of Cups, and other Householdstuff; or Urns and Sacrificing Dishes, which by chance have been found in the Rubbish of many Towns that have been certainly fired, and totally demolished; which sufficiently dis●●ver the noble Structures and rich Furniture the Romens and Britan's had before the Saxon Invasions: Besides which, we may consider, not only, the continual Wars and Depredations the Saxons made one upon another; but that the Daves, like a fatal Hurricane or Whirlwind, tore up Root and Branch, every where overturning, ransacking, burning, and destroying all that they could not peaceably possess.  
Having thus far treated of the State of the Britan's, and something of the Laws in general; 
A short Glossary of the Names or Titles of the Constituent Parts of Great Councils.  as a Praeliminary to the better understanding, who are meant by the Persons, who we find do constitute the great Councils, I shall out of Sir Henry Spelman, Somner, and Doctor Brady, give a very short Glossary, referring the curious Reader to the Books themselves.  
The most common Words in the Saxon Laws that are used, besides the Bishops, 
The Witan or Wites. Einhard divides the Germans into four sorts of Degrees, the Noble, Freemen, those made free, and Servants: his words are, Quatuor differentiis gens illa consisti●, Nobilium s●ili●et, Liberorum, Libertorum, atque Servorum. Adam Brem. H●●t. Eccles. c. 5.  to express the Persons by, (whose Council and Advice the Kings used in the making Laws) are the Witan, Wites: From Wita, which Womner renders Optimas, Princeps, & Sapiens, a Nobleman, Prince, or Wiseman, from witan to know and understand. So in the Laws of King Ina we read Gethungenes Witan, a famous, noble, or renowned Wite; from Gethungen. So in the version of Bede by King Alfred, Witum is rendered Counsellors; so by Sapientes (when we meet with it in any Authors that render Witan by it,) we are to understand not only Judges, but sometimes Dukes, Earls, Prapositi Provosts, Thegns, the King's Officers or Ministers: So in the Charter 
(i) Histor. & Privileg. Eccl. Eliensis, fol. 117. b.  of King Edgar to the Church of Ely, Anno 970. Alferre, Egelwinc, and Brithnoth are called Dukes, and Hringulph, Thurferth, and Alfric, are called Ministri: The first of which in another Charter, is called Alderman, and the other by the name of Sapientes.  
Upon perusal and collating several Transcripts of Deeds and Councils, I am of opinion, that where Wites or Sapientes are used for Princes, Noblemen, and great Personages, those are to be understood that were called to the King's Council, had command over Countries, as Lord Lieutenants, or were Members of the great Councils: So that they were of the most wise and knowing of the great Princes, Dukes, Earls and Barons; and where it doth not seem to import such great Men of Birth, than it signifies Judges. Which as to the first, seems to be clear, by what is said in the Auctuary 
(k) Lamb. fol. 147. tit. de Heretochiis. Qui Heretoches ●pud Anglo●vo●abantur, se. Barones, Nobiles & insignes sapientes, vocati ductores excercituum, etc.  to the 35 Law of Edward the Confessor, where it is said, There were other Powers and Dignities appointed, through the Provinces, and all the Countries, and several Shires, which are called by the English, Heretoches (in King Ina's Laws, Here Thegne i. e. Noble Ministers or Officers) and when he reckons up those who were to be understood by this name Heretoges, he calls them Barons, Nobles, and famous Wisemen called Generals, or great Officers in the Army; and as to the latter Signification, Doctor Brady hath sufficiently cleared it in Adelnoth's Plea against the Monks of Malmsbury, where it is said, that in the Presence of the King, subtili disceptatione a Sapientibus suis, i. e. Regis, audita, where by Sapientes must be understood the King's Judges. 
Alderman.   
Alderman or Ealderman, was both a general Name 
(l) Spelman 's Glossary.  given to Princes, Dukes, Governors of Provinces, Precedents, Senators, and even to Vice-Roys, as also to particular Officers: hence Aldermannus totius Angliae, like my Lord Chief-Justice; Aldermannus Regis, Comitatus, Civitatis, Burgi, Castelli, Hundredi, etc. of whose Offices it is not easy particularly to define. This being so copiously discoursed of by Sir Henry Spelman, I shall refer the Reader to him.  
The word Thane or Thegen was used by the Saxons in their Books variously, sometimes it signified a stout Man, 
Thane.  Soldier or Knight; other times Thanus 
(m) Cyninges Thegen. Med mera Thegen. Woruld Thegen. Maesse Thegen. Somner. Dial.  Regius signified the King's great Officer, a Nobleman or Peer of the Realm; other times a Thane or Nobleman of lower degree; sometimes we meet with secular or Lay Thanes, other times Spiritual Thanes or Priests. Some Thanes were as the King's Bailiffs, Praefects, Reeves, of which Doctor Brady gives account in his Argum. Antinorm. Page 283.  
In several of the Councils we find no particular orders denominated, but only a division of the whole into the Clergy, 
Clergy and Laity.  and Laity. So in the Council that Sir H. Spelman 
(n) Spelm. 1. Tom. Concil.  tells us, Ethelbert King of Kent, held 685. with Bertha his Queen, and Eadbald his Son, and the Reverend Bishop Austin, 
Communi concilio tam Cleri quam Populi.  and the rest of the Optimates Terrae at Christmas, having called a Common-Council of the Clergy and People: by which it is apparent that both the Clergy (o) and Laity there understood, are comprehended under the name Optimates Terrae, the Nobility of Land. So in King Ina's Laws (as I shall hereafter particularise,) the command is given to Gods Theowas, God's Servant, and eales folces, all People.  
So King Edmund held a great Council at Easter in London, of God's 
(p) Egther ge godcundra hada, ge woruld cundra.  Order, and the Secular Order, or World's Order, which Brompton 
(q) Mandavit omnibus Majoribus Regnorum, & veniunt Wintoniam Clerus, & Populus.  renders Laici, in another part of King Edward's Laws. So the Majores Regnorum of King Edgar are commanded to come, and then it is said, There came to Winchester the Clergy and People: those were the Majores Regnorum.  
The like was frequently used after the Conquest; so at the Coronation of Henry the First, Matthew Paris speaks of the gathering of the Clergy and all the People, and then saith, 
Clero Angliae & Populo universo.  The Clergy answering him, and all the Magnates; and in another place, Clero & Populo favente, the Clergy and People favouring. Further we find in a great Council, held by the King Anno 1102. 2 H. 2. 
(r) Omnes Principes Regni sui Ecclesiastici & secularis ordinis. Flo. Wigor. fol. 651. lin. 21.  all the chief Men of his Kingdom, of the Ecclesiastic and secular Order. So that Plebs, Populus, Vulgus & Incola, where by way of Antithesis or contra-Opposition they are used, do signify the Clergy and Laity, or Lay-Princes, not the common People.  
After the Conquest, we meet with the Word Regnum sometimes, and other times Regnum & Sacerdotium. As to the first, the Sense is to be understood best in the Quadripartite History 
(s) Quadrilog. lib. 1. c. 26.  of the Life of Thomas Becket, where it is said, the King called to Clarendon, Regnum universum, all the Kingdom; and then saith, To whom came the dignified Clergy and the Nobles: which Matt. Paris puts out of all doubt by the enumeration that he makes of all that appertained to the Kingdom, to be the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, Abbats, and Priors Installed, and the Earls and Barons.  
So the meaning is best understood of the words in the last Chapter of Magna Charta, that the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons, Knights, and free Tenants, and all of the Kingdom gave a fifteenth part of their Movables: and in other places, after the Barons, it is said, Omnes alii de Regno nostro qui de nobis tenent in Capite, concerning which the most Learned Doctor Brady hath given plentiful Proofs.  

Magnates & Proceres.  By the words Magnates & Proceres (frequently found in the Councils after the Conquest) are to be understood the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, Abbats, and Priors for the Clergy; and the Earls and Barons for the Laity only; unless afterwards that Dukes were included. However they were used always to contra-distinguish that order from the Inferior Tenants in Capite.  
The Fideles & Liberi homines, 
Fideles & Liberi homines.  are to be understood to signify those which were the King's Tenants in Capite. So we find it in a Precept of H. 3. Rex omnibus 
(t) Cl. 42 H. 3. m. 10. in dorso. So Nithard, lib. 4. speaking of his own time, divides the Germans into Ethelings, i. e. Nobles; Friling, Freemen; and Lazzos, Servants or Slaves. Thence our Lazy Fellow, which we now understand Idle.  Comitibus, Baronibus, Militibus & aliis Fidelibus suis: And when we meet in any Charter or History with Fideles or Liberi homines, the meaning will be best known from the subject Matter where they are used, and the words with which they are joined in Construction, as Doctor Brady observes.  
We meet with Liberi homines frequently in the Laws of the Conqueror, as Liberi homines totius Monarchiae Regni nostri— ut nihil ab iis capiatur nisi servitium suum Liberum, and in another,  omnes Liberi homines totius Regni sint fratres conjurati ad Monarchiam nostram defendendam; that all the Freemen of the Kingdom be sworn Brethren, to defend our Monarchy: and these were to be ready with Horse and Arms to do the King Service according to what they ought by their Fees. And this was called free Service in respect of other base Services; for they were the Tenants in Capite, who were the freest of any other Subjects, though that Tenure was at last most cried out against.  
By the Communitas Regni, 
Communitas Regni.  Vniversitas Regni or totae Terrae, or Regni totius Communitas, 
Communitas Regni.  anciently were only understood the Barons, and Tenants in Capite, or Military Men, though now it is taken for the ordinary People and Freeholders, or at best for Knights and Gentlemen under the degree of Barons: So besides other pregnant proofs brought by Doctor Brady, that one Record of the 30 of E. 1. is sufficient to clear it; where the King saith, That the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and the other Magnates for 
(u) Pro se & tota Communitate ejusdem Regni.  themselves, and the whole Community of the same Kingdom, gave Forty Shillings of every Knight's Fee; so that it is clear, that the tota Communitas Regni were such as paid Scutage, that is, Forty Shillings for a Knight's Fee, and no others. Of these the Tenants in Capite granted and paid it first for themselves and Tenants, and then their Tenants in Military Service, by Virtue of the King's Precept, paid it to them, for so many Fees as they held of them.  
As to the probi & legales Milites, probi & legales Homines; 
Probi & legales homines.  the words did not signify an honest, though inconsiderable Countryman; but the probi Homines were famous, stout noted Men of Renown, of great Report and Integrity. They were the best, chief, most knowing, and of the greatest Integrity of those Orders and Degrees of Men, the word was applied to. In a Precept 7 H 3. Scire facient 12 tam 
(w) Cl. 7 H. 3. m. 14. dorso.  Milites, quam alios liberos & legales Homines; So that these were Tenants in Military Service, otherwise what needed the words to run, Twelve as well Knights as other Free and Legal Men.  
Therefore in the Writs for Elections of Knights for Counties, the Persons to be chosen, are two de discretioribus & legalioribus Militibus, that is, the most discreet, just, knowing and resolute Men in the Country, who (as the Law, by constant usage, then required) served on Inquests and Juries: And the Writ for Citizens and Burgesses, was the discretioribus, legalioribus & probioribus. Whoever desires further Satisfaction, may find it in Doctor Brady's Introduction to the English History, and his Glossary.  
I now come to give an account seriatim, from all the Great Councils before the Conqueror and after, to the 49 of H. 3. who were the Members of them; and what Concurrence in Law-making, those Members had with the Sovereign; and after the Representatives of the People were brought in, what alteration it produced.   

CHAP. XXIV. Of the Saxon Great Councils, of whom they consisted, and how, during their Government, the Laws were established by the respective Kings.  
AeThelbert King of Kent (who died 24 Feb. 
(a) Ann. Christi 613. Of King Aethelberts Laws.  Twenty one years after Augustine the English Apostle was sent to preach the Gospel to the English) is said by venerable 
(b) Eccl. Hist, lib. 2. c. 5. Tha other god the He his Leodum thurh getheaht gefremede, ea● sivylcere rightra doma gesetnesse, mid snotera getheabte geset●e after Romana bysena, & that het on English awritan, than nu oath this gehaldene synd.  Bede, among other good things which he did for this Nation or People throughout, of his counsel or purpose, to have framed, settled or established, Right Judgement or Decrees with the Council of his Wise Men, after the Roman Example, and writ them in the English Tongue, which were holden of his Nation since; which in the Original of Bede is thus expressed: Qui inter caetera bona quae genti suae consulendo conferebat, etiam decreta illa Judiciorum, juxta exempla Romanorum cum consilio sapientum constituit; quae conscripta Anglorum sermone habentur & observantur in eâ, and by K. Alfred, are turned into the Saxon Language, as in the Margin: In which we may observe, That it was the King that gefremede framed or established gesette, with the Council of his wise Men; which word Council, discovers where the Sovereignty lodged; and the words, By the Example of the Romans, do not so much imply that they were according to the Caesarean Law, but that they might be according, or consentaneous to the Ecclesiastical Laws of Rome, or at least may comprehend both.  
The 
(d) Dugdale Orig. Jurid. c. 4.  Textus Roffensis mentions Laws made by Hlothere, Eadric and Withered, all Kings of Kent, which were recorded by Ernulph the Bishop of that place, about Anno 760. but I have not seen the Manuscript, and so can give no account how the Legislative is declared.  
The next Laws we find, are those of Ina King of the West Saxons, 
King In●'s Laws. Lambard's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Editionis Wheeloch, p. 1.  who according to the Saxon Chronology lived Anno 681. and according to Lambard, begun his Reign Anno 712. and ended 727. In the Preface to his Laws we find it expressed, as in the Margin, which I render thus in English, 
(e) I● Ine mid Gods gift West Seaxna Cyning, mid getheaht & mid Laere, Cenredes mines Faeder, & Heads mines Bisceopes, & Ercenwoldes mines Bisceopes, & mid eallum minum Eal●ormanum, & tham Yldes●an Witan minre theode & eac mycelre.  I Ine, by or with God's gift, King of the West Saxons, with the persuasion suasu (as Lambard renders the word Laere, but more properly as Summoner renders it) with the Advice, Counsel, Instruction or Exhortation (as our modern word Lore imports) of Cenred my Father, and Heads my Bishop, and Ercenwold my Bishop; and with all my Aldermen (i. e. Princes, Dukes, Earls, Viceroys, Military Officers, Senators or Ministers of State, as the word then signified) those old Wites (i. e. principal or chief Noble Men, Chieftains, Governors or Wisemen) of my Kingdom, do command, and likewise with mycelre somnug Gods Theowena, The great Assembly, Congregation or Synagogue of God's Servants, i.e. the Clergy, 
(f) Waes' 〈◊〉 thaere he'll 〈…〉 & be th●m st●●h●le ures rices.  meditating or studying the Health of our Souls, and upon the Estate or establishing of our Kingdom.  
That ryht A, 
(g) Not Aew, Nupti●e 〈…〉 observes, and appears in the 〈…〉. Gefas●ined●.  and ryhte cynedomas thurh ure Folc Gefaestenode & getrymmed waeron, That right Laws and right or just Judgement, or Dooms of the King (or Office and Dignity of Magistrates, and Summoner) be fastened or established, and trimmed, perfected or accomplished: That no Alderman, or under our Jurisdiction (or as probably the Compound word may be rendered, any Prince under us; Theoden signifying a Lord, Prince or Ruler; or as in the Saxon Chronology a King) after them, shall turn from, break, corrupt or change, 
Awendan.  these ure domas, these our Decrees, Sentences or Ordinances.  
Then in the First Chapter it follows, We beodaeth, that ealles Folces A & domas thus synd gehealden, We bid or command, that all our People, shall after hold fast, or observe these Laws and Dooms.  
From this Preface the candid Reader may observe, First, 
Observations on this Preface.  That Kings are the gift of God, and that Gods Gyffe signifies the same with Dei Gratia, they are not the Creature of the People. Secondly, That Princes, for the better Government of their People, in the settling of Laws in Church and State, consult, deliberate and advise with their Bishops, noblemans, and eminently Wise men of their Kingdoms, whom for their Wisdom, they honour with public Employments in their Dominions. Thirdly, That after such Consultation, Deliberation and Advice, the Sovereign establisheth● and instituteth the Laws. And Lastly, That such Laws are not to be broken or infringed by the Judges or supremest Officers under the King, much less by the Subjects.  
The next 
(h) Spelman. Council. vol. 1. p. 313. Other Great Councils in the Saxon times of Offa.  Council I find is that of Colchyth in the Kingdom of Mercia, Anno 793. wherein are said to be Nine Kings present, viz. Offa, and Egferd his Son, and seven more numbered by Sir Henry Spelman, Fifteen Bishops and Twenty Dukes; and so in another at 
(i) Id. p. 314.  Verulam, it is said to be under Offa, who called together his Bishops and Optimates; but these are only about Religious matters.  
So 
(k) Id. p. 3●0. Ad A●●um 8●●. Kenulph.  Kenulph King of Mercia, writing to Pope Leo the III. gins, Kenulphus Gratia Dei Rex Merciorum cum Episcopis, Ducibus & omni sub nostra ditione dignitatis gradu.  
So at the Synod at 
(l) Idem, f●●. 328.  Colichyth, 6 Kal. Aug. Ann. Dom. 8●6. Wulfred the Archbishop being President, it is expressed that Caenulf the King of the Mercians was present, cum suis Principibus, Ducibus & Optimatibus.  
So we find a Synodal Council at Clovesho, 
(m) I●em, fol. ●32. 〈…〉 rum.  praesidente Beorn●lpho Rege Merciorum, and Wulfrid the Archbishop, the other Bishops, Abbats, and the Nobility of all Dignities, treating concerning the profit of Ecclesiastical and Secular Persons, and the stability of the Kingdom.  
That which I shall note from these is this, That in these Synodal Councils, sometimes it is said the King presided, other times the Archbishop; but mostly all the Persons that constitute such Councils are, the King, the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, and the Optimates.  
The next Council I find is called 
(n) Idem, pag. 336. Anno 833. Withlasius.  Concilium Pananglicum held at London, 26 May Anno 833. wherein Withlasius King of the Mercians, gives several immunities to the Abbey of Croyland, and more than once he saith, volo & praecipio, and this he saith he doth in the 
(o) In praesentia Dominorum meorum Egberti Regis West-Saxoniae, & Aethelwulphi filii ejus coram Pontificibus, & Proceribus.  presence of his Lords, Egbert King of the West Saxons, and Aethelwulph his Son; and before the Bishops and the greater Noblemen of all England in the City of 
(p) Majoribus totius Angliae in Civitate Londonia, ubi omnes congregati sumus pro consilio capiendo contra Danicos Piratas litora Angliae assidus infesta●tes.  London, where they were all gathered to take Counsel against the Danish Pirates, daily infesting the Coast of England. Therefore Sir Henry Spelman judgeth this Council properly to be called for secular Affairs, and to be such as we now call our Parliaments: The Witnesses to it are the said Withlase the Archbishop of Canterbury, Celnoth, and Eadbald Archbishop of York; and after nine more Bishops and three Abbats, Egbert and his Son Adelwulph sign; and after them Wulhard, Athelm and Herenbrith Dukes, Swithin the King's Presbyter, and Bosa his Secretary.  
But I shall leave these and come to more direct secular great Councils, 
The Laws of King Alfred. 
Regnare 


coepit 871.  
desiit 900.      as that of King Alfred; who in the first part of his Laws recites the Commandments and Laws by God's appointment delivered by Moses to the Children of Israel, to be observed; and some of the New Testament, and from that of our Saviour, quod vobis fieri non velitis, id aliis non faciatis, concludes that J●Plgment of Right aught to be given to every one, and that on 
(q) On thissum anum Dome, mon maege gethencean, that he aeghwel●re on riht gedemeth. LL. Alured, p. 21.  this one Sentence, That Man must bethink him much, that judgeth Right to every one: and he adds, That after the propagating of the Gospel in England, as well as in other places, were gathered (for making of Laws, both for Church and State, it is to be supposed he means) Holy 
(r) Haligra Bisceopa & eac othera gethungenra Witena. Ibid.  Bishops and other famous wise Men or Wites.  
Then in the Conclusion of the Laws about Religion, and Prefatory to the secular Laws, he saith, I Alfred King have gathered 
(s) Thaes togaeder gegaderod & awritan het.  these (Sanctions) together, and caused them to be written, many of them being observed by his Ancestors: Those that he liked 
(t) Tha the me ne licodon Ic awearp mid minra witena getheat, & on other wifan behead to heoldanne. Ib. p. 22.  not, with the Council of his Wites, he rejected; and those he liked, he bid or commanded to be holden; and concludes, Ic that Aelfred West-Seaxna Cyning, eallum minum Witun thaes geeowde, & high tha cwaethon that him that licode eallum to healdenne; which thus I render: I Aelfred King of the Westsaxons, showed these to all my Wites, i.e. Nobility or wise Men; and they said they liked them to be holden.  
In this we may observe, That the King speaks in the single Person, 
Observations on these Laws.  that he collected, chose and rejected, and (as in the same place he adds) since it would be rashness to appoint all his own Laws, it being uncertain what credit those might find with Posterity, which he liked: Therefore whatever in the Laws of Ines his Maeges' i.e. Kinsman, or of Offa King of the Mercians; or of Aethelbyrhtes, who was the 
(u) The aerest fulwiler underfeng on Angel cynne. Ibid.  first King of the English that was baptised: Those that he 
(w) Tha the me rihtost thuhton, Ic that her on gegaderod.  thought righteous, he those here gathered, and the other he rejected, passed by, or pretermitted, forlaete. It may be also noted, That he calls the Noblemen, whose Advice and Assent he used, his Wites, minum Witum.  
The next material Illustration of the Constituent Parts of the Legislative Power, is found in the 
(x) Idem, p. 36.  League betwixt Alfrid and Guthrun, King of the Danes; which, though not properly a great Council, yet at least much resembled it; since it saith, This is the League of Peace which Aelfred and Guthrun Kings, and all the English Wites, and also those which inhabited East England, have declared or 
(y) Ge●weden habbath & mid Athum gefaestnod. p. 36.  established, and with Oath fastened or confirmed; For high self & for heora gingran, for themselves and for their Offspring; ge for geborene, ge for ungeborene, born and unborn, that care (saith he) for God's Mercy or ours. The Gods miltse recce, oththe ure.  
In this it is to be noted, 
Observations on this League.  That Alfred having so beat the Danes, that they gave him Hostages, either to go out of the Kingdom, 
(z) Jo. Pi●us qui vixit temp. H. 1.  or turn Christian: This Guthrun (otherwise Gurmund) with Thirty of his Nobles, and almost all of his People were baptised; and Alfred received him at the Font as his Son, and called him Ethelstan: Also the Subjects of Guthrun are called the East-English Nation, and the Nobility are called the Wites of the English King, Angel cynnes witan: And Lastly, that the Oath or firm Contract was Obligatory to the present Age, and to Posterity; if they expected the Mercy or Compassion of God or the King; by which we may judge what value they had then for an Oath; so that this might be in the nature of a great Council of the King and the Wites, convened for the surer Stability of this Peace, to take the Oath.  
In the Laws of King Edward the Elder, 
The Laws of Edward the Elder. 
Regn. 


coepit 900.  
desiit 924.      after the Charge given to the Judges; the first Law gins, Ic will, I will, and so in others; in the fourth it is thus expressed, That Eadweard the King, with his Wites 
(a) Mid his witan tha high Eaxanceastre waron. Id. p. 39  that were at Exeter, strictly enquiring, by what means it might be better provided for Peace and Tranquillity, which he perceived was less studiously preserved than it ought to be, or it should, which he had before commanded, That no Man 
(b) That he aer beboden haefde. That nan mon othrum rihtes ne wyrne; as Lambard translates it, ne quent injuria affi●iant.  deny, stop or hinder others Rights. In the Second and Third Chapter it is eac we cwaedon, also we declare, pronounce or sentence; and in the Seventh, Eac ic will, and I will.  
In which Laws we have none mentioned with the King but his Wites; and his commanding, willing, or pronouncing in the Imperative Mood, is observable.  
The next Laws I find are those of King Athelstan, 
The Laws of King Athelstan. 
Regn. 


coepit 922.  
desiit 940.     Ibid. p. 45.  which begin thus, Ic Aethelstane cyning mid getheahte Wulshelmes mines Hihbisceopes & othra mina bisceopa bebeode eallum minum Gereafum thurh ealle mine rice; I Athelstan King, with the advice of Wulfelm, my High-Bishop, and other my Bishops, command or bid all my Rieves, i. e. Praefects, of what degrees soever, to pay Tithes, etc. And this he commands 
(c) Et that ●●e g●do ea● tha Bisceop is ●ecra gewhylera & eac mine Ealdormanna & Gereafa. Ibid. p. 45.  his Bishops, his Aldermen, and Praepositi (who were the Judges in the County-Courts) to do the same.  
Although in this Preface there be no mention that he used any advice but of the Bishops, yet the Conclusion of Twenty six Chapters of Laws, is in these words, Ealle this waer gesetted on tham miclan Synoth aet Greatanleage; on tham waer se Aercebisceop Wulfhelme, mid eallum thaem Aethelum mannum & Wiotan de Ethelstan Cyning gegadrian. Which I render thus into English, All these were settled, or done, in the great Synod or Council at Greatanlea, in which was the Archbishop Wulfhelm, with all the Noblemen, 
Summoner Verb.  (Ethelum mannum, must properly signify those of the highest Quality, such as were Princes of the Blood, and Dukes, because it is distinct from Wiotan, or the Wites, by which usually Earls, and those of lower Nobility, and great Officers were understood) which Athelstan the King gathered.  
In these Laws We cwaedon is used, which I suppose is something more than Somner understands by his Cuide, a Saying, Speech, or Sentence; and properly is, we will. But the absoluteness of the King appears most in the Twenty sixth Chapter, wherein it is expressed 
(d) Give minra Gerefena gehwylce this don nylle, etc. Gild min oferhyrnysse & Ic find otherne we will & see Bisceope amanige tha offer oferhyrnyss aet tham Gerefan the on his folgothe sy. P. 53. , That if any of his Graeves do not perform these Commands, or be more remiss in the Execution of those he hath enjoined, he shall be punished for his excess of Contumacy, and the Bishop shall punish the Contumacy of the Graeve or Praepositus; and his Sequel, the Punishment for the first fault shall be five Pounds, and the other fault his were, that is, the value of his Head, and the third the loss of all his Goods, and the King's Friendship, ura ealra Freondscipes. King Edmund was the next of our Kings, 
King Edward's Laws, p. 57 
Regn. 


coepit 940.  
desiit 948.      whose Laws are transmitted to us, and they begin thus, Eadmund cyning gesommnade mycelne synoth to Lundenbyrig, on tha Halgan Easterlicon tid; Edmund the King assembled a great Synod or Council to London, on the Holy Eastertide, and the persons summoned are styled, aegther ge Godcundra hada, ge worulcundra, both Gods-kind, and World-kind, i. e. Clergy and Laics.  
After Six Chapters of Laws, the King signifies to all, old and young, That he had 
(e) That Ic ●meade mid minra Witena getheaht gegodra hada gelaewedra. Id. p. 58.  considered with his Wites, Consultation being had with ecclesiastics and Laics: and in the Laws it is often said, Thonne cwaedon; these we pronounce, or appoint; and sometimes the single person is used, and in other places, us betweonan heoldan, it is holden betwixt us.  
Here we find the Great Council summoned by the King, and the constituent parts of it to be the Clergy and Laity, and that the Laity were only the Princes, Dukes, Earls, great Officers, Military Commanders, the King's Ministers, Graeves, Praepositi, Thanes, sometimes denoted by the general names of Wites translated Sapientes, Magnates, Optimates, etc. as is every where beyond all possible doubt cleared by the most Judicious Dr. Brady, in his Answer to Mr. Petyt, to whose great collection for the proof of this point, before I proceed further, I shall only, in transitu, instance in a few.  
The Title of the Council of Berghamsted 
(f) Spelman. Concil. vol. 1. fol. 194. Anno 697. Withrad.  5 of Withered King of Kent, is, This Synd Wightraedes domas Cantuara Cyninges; 
Saxon Great Councils.  These are the Judgements of Withered King of Kent: and the persons mentioned particularly, are the King that convened them, and Birthwald, Bretone, Heahbisceop, High or Archbishop of Britain, Gibmund Bishop of Rochester, and the rest of the Ecclesiastic 
(g) Aelc had ciricean thaere maegthe acmodlice.  Order of that Nation, mid thy Hersuman Folcy with the Military Persons, such as in after times were called, Here-Thegni in King Ina's Laws, and Heretoches in the Auctuary 
(h) Lamb. tit. Heretoch. fol. 147.  to the 35 Laws of King Edward the Confessor, which are there interpreted Barones, Nobiles, Insignes, Sapientes, Ductores Excercitus.  
So in the Council at Clovesho, 3. Cal. Nou. Anno Dom. 824. under 
(i) Spelm. Conc. vol. 1. fol. 333. Beornwulph.  Beornwulph King of the Mercians, besides the Archbishop Wulfred, and several Bishops and Abbats, are enumerated only Beornoth, Eadberht, Sigered, Egberht, Eadwulf Alheard, Mucel, Vhtred and Ludica, under the stile of Deuces, Bynna Frater Regis, Aldred Thelonius.  
So in the Great Council at London, 
(k) Idem, fol. 336. Egbert.  26, May Anno 833. the Title is, Presidentibus Egberto Rege West-Saxoniae, Withlasio Rege Merciorum, utroque Archiepiscopo, caeterisque Angliae Episcopis, & Magnatibus; and besides the Bishops and Abbats that subscribe, we find these, Adelwulphus filius Regis West-Saxoniae, Wulhardus Dux, Athelmus Dux, Herenbrithus Dux.  
So in the Council at Kingsburie, Anno 851. 
Bertulph. Idem, fol. 344.  under Bertulph King of the Mercians, it is said to be, praesentibus Ceolnotho Dorobernensi Archiepiscopo, caeterisque Regni Merciae Episcopis, & Magnatibus, and the Subscribers are besides the Bishops and Abbats, Ernulphus Dux, Osrithus Dux, Serlo Comes, Elbertus Comes, Huda Comes, Oflat Pincerna Regis.  
I have upon this occasion instanced in these few of the Ancientest, to clear who the Persons were, according to their Orders, Ranks, and Degrees, that constituted these Great Councils, and shall now proceed to other Saxon Councils succeeding.  
Eldred King of all England gave the Monastery 
(l) Ingulphi Hist, fol. 477. King Eldred's Great Council.  of Croyland to Abbot Turketul, and his Monks, by his Charter dated in Festo Nativitatis B. M. Virgins Anno Dom. 948. cum universi Magnates Regni per Regium edictum summoniti, when all the great Men of the Kingdom were summoned by the King's command, and then more particularly he divides them into the two Orders of ecclesiastics and Laics thus: Tam Archiepescopi & Episcopi & Abbates, quam caeteri totius Regni Proceres & Optimates Londoniis convenissent, ad tractandum de negotiis publicis totius Regni.  
Some may object, That Ingulphus giving this account, may rather express the Members, and the occasion of it to treat of the Public Affairs of the whole Kingdom, according to the usage of the Age he lived in, than of the Age the Great Council was held in; which is well to be observed in many cases: But in the Laws of King Edgar I shall show it was then used in such manner, to give account of the great Councils, as both his Laws, and those I have hitherto mentioned of the oldest Date, manifest.  
The Preface to King Edgar's Laws is thus: This is seo geraednysse the Eadgar Cyng mid his Witena getheahte geraed; 
King Edgar's Laws. Lamb. Conc. fol. 62. 
Regn. 


coepit 959.  
desiit 975.      This is the Constitution, Act, or Decree which King Edgar with his Wisemen, or Great-men hath made ready, trimmed or enacted. Then follow the three great Ends for which such Councils are called, viz. God to loaf, to the Love, Glory, or Praise of God in appointing Religious Laws, & him Sylfum to Cynescipe, rendered by Lambard, ad Regiae Majestatis ornamentum, or according to the significancy of the Words, himself to make Kingly, or his own Kingship or Sovereignty to manifest; and thirdly, eallum his leodscip to thearf; all his People or Nation to profit, or according to Lambard, ad totius Reipublicae utilitatem.  
The same King Edgar, 
(m) Spelman● Concil. Tom. 1. fol. 4●5.  in his Charter to Glastonbury, concludes it thus, Hanc privilegii paginam Rex Edgarus XII. Regni sui Sacro Scripto apud Londoniam communi Concilio Optimatum suorum confirmavit. So that it appears, this was in the presence of a great Council, and the Witnesses named are Elfgina Regis mater, Edward Clito filius, Kinedius Rex Albaniae, Mareusius Archiparata, Admiral.  
Then follow both the Archbishops, and several Bishops, and Abbats, after whom the secular Optimates; viz. Elpher, Oslac, Ethelwine, by the Title of Deuces, Oswold, Eufward, Ethelsic, Ellshie, by the Title of Ministri, which were Officers under the King, as Thegns, praepositi.  
In the account given of a Council held at 
(n) Idem 490.  Winchester in this King's Reign, those present at it are reckoned thus, Praesentibus Edgaro Rege cum Conjuge, Dunstano Archiepiscopo, Elfero Principe Merciorum, Ethelwino Duce Orientalium Anglorum; and the same persons called Deuces in the foregoing Charter, Elfwoldo suo Germano, Brithnotho Comiti, cum Nobilitate totius Regni. So that none but the Nobility were present.  
The Witnesses to a Charter of the same King to the Monastery of Hyde, in Winchester, are the King, Archbishop Dunstan, Eadmund Clito, legitimus praefati Regis filius, Edward eodem Rege Clito procreatus, Aelftheyth Regina, Eadgita Regis avia; the present Queen hath the precedence of the Queen Dowager: Then follow several Bishops and Abbats, after whom the Lay-Peers, viz. Odgar, Athelstan, Athelwin, Dukes, Aethelweard, Aelfweard, and Walston, Ministri.  
It is to be noted, That most do make the Laws of King Edward the Confesson, to be principally a revival of King Edgar's Laws, mixing such as Canutus had adjoined to them.  
The Preamble to the Laws of King Ethelred runs thus; 
The Laws of Ethelred, fol. 88 
Regn. 


coepit A. 979.  
desiit 1016.      This is tha geraednyss the Ethelred Cyning & his Witan geraeddon, eallum Folc to fritherbote; These are the Constitutions King Ethelred and his Wites have enacted, all his People to mulct for the breach of Peace. These were enacted at Woodstock in Mercia after the English Laws.  
Tho general Council of 
(o) Sp●lman. Concil. vol. 1. fol. 510. The Council of Aenham under King Aethelred.  Aenham, called Pananglicum, is said to be Hortatu Aelfeagi Dorobernensis & Wulstani Eboracensis Archipraesulum ab Aethelredo Rege edictum, accersitisque Episcopis & universis Anglorum Optimatibus in dic Pentecostes celebratum; and the Saxon Title of it is, Be witena geraednessa, rendered Sapientum decreta; In the conclusion of the Latin Copy of them, this is added, Haec itaque legalia statuta, vel decreta in nostro Synodali Conventu a Rege 
(p) Idem, fol. 529.  magnopere edict a cuncti tunc temporis Optimates se observaturos fideliter spondebant.  
Sir Henry Spelman gives several reasons why this may be called a General Council, because it contains Secular Laws as well as Divine; and here we have expressly said, it was at Pentecost, one of the set times for such Councils; and it was by the King's Summons, and the Clergy and Optimates consented.  
In the Charter of the Privileges, granted by King 
(q) Spelman. Concil. vol. 1. fol. 507, 508. Anno 1006.  Ethelred to the Church of Canterbury, after the Subscription of the King, the Archbishops, Bishops, and Abbats, these are subscribed, Aelfric, Elfhelm, Leoffwin, Leoffig Ealderman, which in the Latin version are styled Deuces. Aethelmer mines Alaffordes discthen, translated Domini mei dapifer, verbatim, Dish Thegne or Thane. Byrhtric Cynges Thegen, Minister Regis, Leofric Hraegel Thein, rei vestiariae Minister, Master of the Wardrobe, 
Aet suman is added, but neither Lambard nor Somner interpret it.  Syward Cynges Thegen aet Raede, Minister Regis & a Conciliis, Secretary or Counsellor, the rest only mentioned Gewitnys, and in the Latin Charter of the same (which we may imagine was the Original) these Thegnes are called Ministri, and so are these following, Ordulf, Eadric, Ethelric, Leofric, Sigeraed, Wulstan Senex, & Juvenis, Lysing, Leof●tan.  
The Preface to the Laws of Canutus is conceived in the same Words, as that of King Edgar's, 
The Laws of Canutus, fol. 97. 
Regn. 


coepit A. 1016  
desiit 1035      only he is styled Cnut Cyning ealles England's Cyninge & Dena Cyning, & Northrigena Cyning; King of all England, King of Denmark, and Norway, they were Established at Winchester on thaem Halgan Midwinter Tide, i. e. at Christmas.  
The Preface to his Laws in Sir Henry 
(r) Concil. Tom. 1.552.  Spelman is conceived in these words. This is thonne seo worldcunde geraedness, the Ic will midminan Witenan roede, the man healed ofer eal Englaland; These are the Worldly Constitutions, that I will with my Wites Advice, that Men hold all over England. In most of the Chapters it is said, we laeroth, we teach, we beodath, we bid or command, we forbeodath, we forbidden; and in the Conclusion, it is in the single Person of the King; nu bid Ic georne & on Gods naman beode manna gehwylcne; Now I command all, and bid every Man in God's Name.  
The Preface to the Latin version of them saith, Haec 
(s) Idem, fol. 562.  sunt Instituta Cnudi Regis Anglorum, Dacorum, Norwegarum, venerando sapientum Concilio ejus, ad laudem & gloriam Dei & suam Regalitatem, & commune commodum habita in sancto natali Domini apud Wintoniam.  
So we find that Anno 1024. When 
(t) Monast. Aug. vol. 1. fol. 295. col. 1. num. 30.  Canutus drove the Clerks living dishonestly from the Church of St. Edmund, and placed Monks there; it is said he did it cum consilio Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum & Optimatum. So in another Council it is thus, Ego Cnut Rex totius Albionis, cum Concilio Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, Abbatum, Comitum, omniumque fidelium elegi sanciendum. By the word fidelium here, is meant the Thegne or lesser Nobility, as Doctor Brady fully proves in his Glossary, and elsewhere, Anno 1032. He grants Privileges to Glastenbury, 
(u) Spelman. vol. 1. Concil. fol. 537.  which he doth consensu Optimatum meorum, with the consent of his Nobles; yet he useth the words concedo & prohibeo in the single Person, to denote from whose single Authority all concessions flowed.  
Of this Canutus, 
(w) Gest. Regum, lib. 2. c. 11.  Malmsbury saith, that he commanded to be observed for ever all the Laws of ancient Kings, especially those made by King Ethelred his Predecessor, under 
(x) Sub interminatione Regiae mulctae perpetuis temporibus observari praecepit.  the penalty of the King's Fine, to the observing of which, he saith in his time it was sworn under the name of King Edward's Laws, not that he had appointed them, but had observed them.  
It is of latter time 
(y) MS. Burgi Sancti Edmundi; Spelman. Conc. vol. 1. fol. 534.  recorded, that Canutus in the fifth Year of his Reign, calling together all the Prelates of his Kingdom, Proceresque ac Magnates, Wulstan & Adelwode, the Archbishops, and other Bishops, seven Dukes, and seven Earls, and divers Abbats of Monasteries, cum quamplurimis gregariis Militibus ac cum populi multitudine copiosa, who were personally present, Votis Regiis unanimiter consentientibus praeceptum & decretum fuit.  
Sir Henry Spelman saith, That this Manuscript must be writ towards the latter end of Henry the Third's Reign, if not after, because it useth the word Parliament, and discourseth of the Constitution of Parliament, as in that Age, not as the great Councils in Canutus' time were; which I note that it may be observed upon how slender Antiquities Sir Edward 
(z) Praefat. 4. Report. King Edward the Confessor 's Laws.  Coke relied.  
From what Malmsbury observes of these Laws of Canutus, we may conclude, that wherever the Laws of King Edward the Confessor are mentioned in after Ages, these Laws of Canutus must be understood; and that it is a fruitless Enquiry to search for any other than those which Hoveden and Ingulphus give us, as confirmed by William the Conqueror: therefore I shall refer the Inquisitive Reader to the Authors, and Sir 
(a) Concil. vol. 1.619, 625.  Henry Spelman, and Mr. Selden.  
I shall therefore only note who were the constituent Parts of the great Councils in his time. That convention at Christmas the Twenty fifth of his Reign, as Sir Henry Spelman 
(b) I●em, fol. 627.  hath published it, was, Praesentibus Edwardo Rege & Conf●ssore, Edgitha Regina, Stigando Archiep. Cant. Eldredo Archiep. Ebor. caeterisque Angliae Aepiscopis, Abbatibus, Capellanis, Regis Comitibus, Ministris (seu Thanis Regis) & Militibus qui in Chartarum sequentium subscriptionibus nominantur. Then follows the second Charter to 
(c) Id. 631.  St. Peter's of Westminster, where after the Bishops and Abbats we find the Subscriptions of Raynbaldus the Chancellor, and Harold, Edwin, Leofdwyn and Guden are titled Dukes. Ergar, Kendus, Wygodus, Robertus, Ednothus are called Ministri, than I suppose according to the Title, the Knights, Agelnodus, Walfricus, Sywardus, Godricus.  
To the third Charter, 
(d) Id. 636.  when he dedicated St. Peter's Church, Anno 1066. there are these more added to the Lay-Nobility, (besides Osbern, Peter, and Robert the King's Chaplain, who are placed next after the Chancellor, 
As to King Edward's Laws and their Confirmation by the Conqueror, and the Additions and Amendments, see Dr. Brady, fol. 254. A●gum. A●tinorm. 296, 298, 299. As to the parallel betwixt the Saxon and Norman Laws, see his Preface to the Norman Story.  before the Dukes) Gud Comes, Marhe●●s Comes, Radulphus Minister, Agelnodus Minister, and besides that, Wulfric, Syward and Godrich in the aforesaid Charter, are called here, Knights, there are added Colo and Wulsward, Knights; and the Conclusion of all is, Omnes consentientes subscripsimus. So that here may be noted the use of the Subscriptions of the Noblemen to the King's Charters, which then were only by the mark of a Cross, and in after times by their Seals, to those we call Acts of Parliament, as hereafter will be shown.  
Having thus treated of the General Councils, and such like Conventions, under the Saxon and Danish Kings, I shall pass to the Norman Kings, and so descending to the present Age, show the constituent Parts of the great Councils and Parliaments, and by what variety of Expressions in the gradual Progress of the respective Kings Reigns, the Sovereign's enacting of Laws was exhibited: only before I enter, I cannot but take notice that Mr. Selden (by what compliance I know not, 
Ab his vix alios, ante saxons, comperio Custodes, sub eye  partitoes, etc. Explent numerum Rex, Con●●●●●ularius, Cancellarius. Thesaurarius, Angliae Aldermannus, Aldermannus Provin●●arum & Gravii. Janus Angl. p. 40.  with the mode of his time) calls those which we make constituent Parts of the great Councils of the Saxon times, Custodes, and saith, he scarce meets with any of these Guardians of the Laws, different from these Lawmakers. Yet he brings no Representatives of the Commons; for he makes them the King, the Lord High-Constable, the Chancellor, the Treasurer, the Alderman of England, the Aldermen of Provinces, and the Graves. I cannot but wonder that he should not at least give some hint what difference there was betwixt the King and his Graeve, in the point of Law-making. Surely he knew the Constitution of the great Councils as well as any, but being a Sitting Member in that long Parliament, was in that Particular tainted, per contagionem uvaque livorem deducet ab uva.   

CHAP. XXV. Of the great Councils of the Norman Kings, till the end of the Reign of King John.  
WHAT Changes William the Conqueror made in the Government, how he brought in the Feudal Laws of Normandy, and many other Alterations, Doctor Brady hath proved at large in his Argumentum Antinormanicum, and the Preface to his Complete History; so that I shall touch very little upon that Subject.  
The Conqueror (saith the learned Sir 
(a) Praef●tio ad LL. Willielmi primi, pag. 155. Edit. Wheeloch. Three things the Conqueror designed.  Roger Twysden) having obtained the Kingdom by dint of Sword, and knowing that no Empire is firmly established by Arms without Justice, applied his mind to three things: First, That he might have a sufficient Military Force: Secondly, That he might gratify his French and Norman Adventurers; yet so as the English might not by over much severity, be instigated to rebel: And Thirdly, That the Husbandmen might live as Servants, and to perform the Drudgery, but not to be wholly extirpated.  
As to the First, He disposed the Militia so as 
(b) Lib. 4. p. 523. About his Militia and Revenue.  Ordericus Vitalis tells us it was reported, That he could expend 1600 l. and 30 s. three Halfpences, Sterling Money, every day, besides the Presents, Fines for remitting of Punishments upon Transgressions of the Laws, and many other ways whereby his Treasury was increased; and he made the Kingdom be surveyed, and all his Tributes or Revenues, 
Piscos.  as in the time of King Edward, he made be truly described: His Lands he so distributed to his Soldiers, 
Disposed the Lands in Military Service.  and disposed them so, that in the Kingdom of England he had 60000 Horsemen, which he could with great readiness call together; therefore in the 58 Law ascribed to him, and which is in the Red Book of the Exchequer, it is thus expressed; We 
(c) Statuimus etiam & sirmiter praecipimus, ut omnes liberi homines totius Regni nostri sint fratres cenjurati ad Monarchi●m nostram & ad Regnum nostrum pro viribus suis & facultatihus contra inimicos pro posse suo defendendum & viriliter servandum, & Pacem & Dignitatem Coronae nostrae integram observand●m & judicium rectum & justitiam constanter & omnibus modis pro posse suo & sine delatione ●aciendam. Fol. 171.  appoint and firmly command, that all the Liberi Homines (such as held in Military Service, to whom he had distributed all the Lands of the English, except what he kept in his own Possession; as in all Authors that treat of such matters is most evident) of his whole Kingdom, should be sworn Brothers to defend and manfully preserve his Monarchy and the Kingdom, according to their Power, against all Enemies, and keeping entire the Peace and Dignity of his Crown, and for the executing of right Judgement and Justice constantly, in all ways according to their Power, without Deceit or Delay. I have inserted this at large, because it seems the Primary Law, upon which his Government was established; and it seemeth to me to be the Substance of the Oath of Fealty, that all the Subjects which held. in Capite, were to take; or that the same Oath was to the same ends and purpose. This Law is said to be made in the City of London.  
But without doubt it was much according to the 
(d) Monsieur Berault. Custom. Norman. fol. 86.  usage of Normandy, established by Rollo; and what had been practised by the Francs, when they conquered the Gauls in the declining of the Roman Empire, who distributed their Lands among their Soldiers, to whom was reserved the Dignity of Gentlemen, and the Management of Arms; and the use of them taken from the Ancient Gauls, who were called Roturiers; and they were only permitted to manage the matters of Husbandry and Merchandise.  
So the Conqueror gave to some of his Followers 
(e) Brady's Preface Norm. History, p. 159.  whole Counties, to some two or three or more Counties, with a great Portion of Land; too others, Hundreds, Manors or Towns; who parceled them out to their Dependants and Friends, till at last (though the Saxons most frequently held their own Estates of those new Lords, and by new Titles from them) some Soldiers and ordinary Men had some proportionable Shares for their Services, though upon hard Conditions; possessing them for the most part, as Feudatories, 
Of the Feudal Law, and its Mitigation. So Matt. Paris saith, Episcopatus & Abbatias omnes quae Baronias tenebant, & eatenus ab omni servitute s●●ulari libertatem habuerant, sub servitute statuit military.  and according to the Rules of the Feudal Law, which, as it was the Law for the most part in Normandy, as to Possession and Tenure; so was it in England, until by the Indulgence of Usurpers, as well as of lawful Sovereigns, to the great Men, and of them to their Tenants and Followers, their Tenors became more easy, and were changed into Inheritances, both Free and Bond. So by Compact or Agreement, betwixt kind and favourable, as well as indigent Lords and serviceable Tenants, as also by the Introduction of the use of the Canon or Imperial Law; the Rigour of the Feudal Law was abated, and received several Alterations and Amendments, by flux of Time, and especially by Acts of great Councils or Parliaments, and the Necessities or Indulgence of Princes: So that instead of more rigid Tenors, the soft ones of Fee-simple, in all its kinds, by Deed, or Feoffment, or inheritable and qualified Copyholds, were introduced.  
As to the second Particular concerning William the Conqueror's settling Laws for the equal Government, 
Of the Conqueror's Laws.  both of the Normans and English; I shall first give an account out of 
(f) Parte posteriori, fol. 346.  Hoveden, what these were and how they were procured: He saith, That the Danish Laws being understood by the Conqueror to be used in Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridg-shire (others 
(g) Chron. Li●●f. See for the Conqueror's Charter and Laws, Dr. Brady, fol. 17, 252, 254, 258, 298, 249.  add the Deirans and the Isles) concerning Forfeitures, he preferred them before the other Laws of the Kingdom, and commanded they should be observed; and gives the reason for it, that his and the Ancestors of most of the Barons of Normandy, were come from Norway, therefore the Laws of the Danes ought to be preferred before those of the Britain's, viz. of the English and Picts: Which, saith my 
(h) Quo audito mox universi compatriota, qui leg●s edixerant, trist●s essec●i, unanimiter deprecati sunt quatenus permit●eret l●ges sibi pr●prias & consue●udines ●●iqua halere. Id. num. 10. Hoveden, fol. 347, num. 1.  Author, being heard by the great Men of the Country (who had, as hereafter I shall show, been appointed to revize the Laws) they all were very sorrowful, and unanimously entreated him, that he would permit them to have the Laws proper to themselves, and their ancient Customs, under which their Fathers lived, and they were born and bred under; for that it would be very hard for them to receive unknown Laws, and to judge of those things they understood not. 
See Brady's Answer to Argum. A●ti●o●●. p. 298, 299.  But finding the King unwilling to be drawn to consent, they follow on their suit, praying for the Soul of King Edward, who bequeathed him his Crown and Kingdom, whose Laws they were, that they might not have the Laws of strange Nations imposed on them; but he would grant them the Continuance of their Country's Laws: To which entreaty of his Barons (after Counsel taken) my Author saith, 
I cannot conceive but here were many of the Saxon Nobility, and Men of best Account; otherwise they could not call them the Laws their Fathers had lived under: and the Normans could not then know much of our Laws or Speech; but this was before he had subdued all fully.  he acquiesced; and from that day the Laws of King Edward were of great Authority and Esteem throughout England, and were confirmed and observed before other Laws of the Country.  
Our Author further notes, That these were not the proper Laws of King Edward, but of Edgar his Grandfather, which had been little observed for 68 years, as in one place, and 48 years in another; he saith, by reason of the Danish Invasions, etc. and being revived, repaired and confirmed by King Edward, were called his Laws.  
The Account the Chronicle 
(i) Anglos Nobiles Sapientes & sua●●ge eruditos. Id. fol. 348. Spelm. Concil. tom. 1. fol. 619.  of Lichfield gives, is this, That King William, in the fourth year of his Reign at London, by the Counsel of his Barons, made to be summoned through all the Counties of England, all the Noble Wisemen, and such as were skilled in their Law, that he might hear their Laws and Customs; and then gives an account how he approved of the Danish Laws used in Norfolk, etc. 
Concerning the Kindness the Conqueror pretended in his first four Years, and his Rigour after, see at large. Dr. Brady, in his Answer to the Argumentum Antinormanicum, especially p. 260. and 299.  But afterwards, at the Entreaty of the Community of the English, he yielded to grant them King Edward's Laws. Before I proceed any further, I cannot but note, that what Hoveden calls Compatriotae here, is called Communitas Anglorum; and in both of them afterwards it is called Concilio Baronum; by which we may know who these Compatriotae and this Communitas were, viz. the Barons or great Men. Our Author proceeds, That by the King's Precept, out of every County of England, Twelve Wisemen were chosen, who were enjoined an Oath before the King, that according to their utmost they should discover the establishments of their Laws and Customs 
(k)  quoad possent recto tramite incedentes, nec ad dextram nec ad sinistram divertentes, nihil addentes, nihil praevarieando mutantes. Omnia quae praedicti ●urati dixerunt.  going in a straight Path, neither declining to the right or left Hand, omitting, adding, or prevaricating nothing; and Aldred Archbishop of York, who crowned King William, and Hugh Bishop of London, by the King's command, writ the Laws which the said sworn Persons did produce: But it is to be noted, that this Chronicle of Lichfield is of a later Date than other Writers; and the Laws in it differ from those in Ingulphus.  
The next Testimony is that of 
(l) Circa sinem Hist. fol. 519. num. 36. Leges aqui●●mi Regis Edwardi quas Dom. meus inclitus Rex W. authenticas esse & perpetuas, etc. proclamarat.  Ingulphus, who tells us, That he brought from London to his Monastery, i.e. Croyland, the Laws of the most just King Edward, which his Lord, the famous King William, willed to be Authentic and Perpetual, and had proclaimed under the severest Penalties, to be inviolably kept through the whole Kingdom of England, and commended them to his Justiciaries, in the same Language they were set forth in, etc. of which I shall say something below.  
The Author of Jus Anglorum ab Antiquo, and the Argumentum Antinormanicum, and Mr. Petyt, in his Rights of the Commons asserted, have writ largely, to prove, That the Conqueror made little Innovation in our Laws; and on the contrary, the profoundly learned 
(m) Answer to Petyt, p. 14. Great Officers Normans.  Doctor Brady hath from undeniable Records proved, that he brought in the Feudal Law of Tenors, and much of the Norman Laws; and that in his time, and for an Hundred years after, the Justiciaries or Chief Justices, the Chancellors, Lawyers, Ministerial Officers, and under-Judges, Earls, Sheriffs, Bailiffs, Hundredaries, etc. were all Normans: likewise the Military Men and Lords of Manors mostly were such; and in his Preface to the Norman History, and his Answers to the forementioned Authors, every where clears it, and proves, That though the Conqueror, 
See for proof of the whole, Eadmer. Hist. Novel. fol. 6. num. 10, 20, 30. Ingulph. fol. 512. a. num. 50. That these Great Barons, as Tenants in Capite, had power to make Laws and Constitutions to bind their Sub-Feudataries, is apparent by what Malmsbury de 〈◊〉 Reg. lib. 3. saith, That the Laws of W. Fitz-Ozborn Earl of Hereford remained still in force, That no Soldier for any Offence should pay above 7 s. The Conqueror's Liberality to the Normans.  in the first beginning of his Reign, promised fair Matters, yet he observed no more of those Laws, than served for his own interest: Yet he also saith, That where any Relaxation of the Rigour of the Feudal Laws was, the benefit principally accrued to the Norman English, who indeed were as active as could be expected, to obtain ease to themselves, and claim the Advantage of all the favourable Laws had been used in the Saxon times; but they themselves were great Oppressors of those under them.  
These Matters therefore being so copiously discoursed of by the learned Doctor, I shall pass that whole matter by, and come to the third Particular, Sir Roger Twysden notes in the Conqueror's Policy, and so directly speak to the Constitutions of his Great Councils, and his Sovereignty in making or confirming Laws.  
As to the third Particular; First it is clear that the Conqueror divided the Land among his great Men, the Officers and Soldiers: for proof of which we need no more, but the Testimony of Gervase of 
(n) Black Book of the Exchequer. Post regni conquisitionem, post justam Rebellium subversionem,— facta est inquisitio diligens qui fuerint qui contra Regem in bello dimicantes per fugam se salvaverint; hiis omnibus & haeredibus eorum qui in bello occubuerunt, spes omnis, etc. praeclusa.  Tilbury, who saith, That after the Conquest of the Kingdom, and just subversion of the Rebels, when the King himself and his great Men had viewed and surveyed their new Acquists, there was a strict enquiry made, who there were, that fight against the King, had saved themselves by flight: From these and the Heirs of such as were slain in Fight, all hopes of possessing either Lands or Rents, were cut off: But such as were called and urged to fight against King William, and did not, if in Process of time they could obtain the favour of their Lords and Masters, by an humble Obedience, and Obsequiousness, they might possess something in their own Persons, without hopes of Succession, their Children only enjoying it afterwards at the will of their Lords, to whom when they became odious, they were every where forced from their Possessions.  
Because some are prejudiced against the judicious Doctor Brady, for asserting the conquerors changes that he made, I hope they will give ear to what the learned Selden affirms thus, 
* Ex quo cis Normannorum adventum praeter ipsum Regem non fuit in Anglia is qui Allodii, ut lequantur, Jure sundum possederit, cum scilicet aliis ad unum omnes siduciarios pro●e dixeris Dominos, superiorem investi●urae Anct●rem interpesita side perpetuo agn●sc●ntes. Lib. 2. Jan. Ang.  That some while since the coming in of the Normans, there was not in England, except the King himself, any one who held Land in right of Freehold (as they term it) since, in truth, one may call all others, to a Man, only Lords in trust of what they had; as those, who by swearing Fealty, and doing Homage, did perpetually own and acknowledge a Superior Lord of whom they held, and by whom they were invested in their Estates. So he. Now this Fealty and Homage is now held no kind of Slavery, but than it was, as I have elsewhere noted. Let us hear what the same Mr. Selden a little below saith, That the Conqueror did not totally change the Constitution of the Laws, 
Probe tametsi dixeris eversum, secundum quod disputant Jurisconsulti, Anglicum Imperium. Id. Gervas'. Til●. c. 23. Oblatis vomeribus in signum desicientis Agriculturae.  although we may truly say, according to what Lawyers dispute, That the English Empire and Government was overthrown by him. Thus far that learned Man.  
Let us now return to the Exchequer-book, where we find, That when a common miserable Complaint of the Natives came to the King, that they thus exposed and spoiled of all things, should be compelled to pass into other Countries: At length, after Consultation upon these things, it was decreed, That what they could by their deserts and lawful Bargain, obtain from their Lords, 
The English compound with their Lords.  they should hold by unviolable Right; but should not claim any thing from the time the Nation was conquered, under the Title of Succession or Descent. Therefore, he saith, they were obliged, by studied Compliance and Obedience, to purchase their Lord's Favour.  
It is true, that in the 55th. Law of 
(o) LL. Gulielm. primi, Edit. Twysden, p. 170.  William the Conqueror, it is said, That he wills and firmly commands and grants, that all Freemen, liberi Homines, of the whole Monarchy of his Kingdom, may have and hold their Lands and Possessions well, and in 
(p) In pace libere ab omni exactione injus●a & ab omni tallagio.  Peace, free from all unjust Exactions and Tallage, that is, extraordinary Impositions and Taxes; so as nothing be exacted or taken, unless their free services, which of Right they ought and are bound to perform to us; and as it was appointed to them, and given and granted to them by us, as a perpetual Right of Inheritance, by the Common Council of the whole Kingdom.  
In which we may observe, 
The English have little Benefit by his Relaxation of the Feudal Law.  that this was not Magna Charta made to English Men; these liberi Homines were such as held in Military Service, as appears by the 58th. Law following; and those than were Normans, and the Relaxations to them were, that these Fees were made Hereditary, which was not frequent among Feudataries in those days; and the Complaints that were made after, and the amendments that Hen. 1. promised, were mostly about the hard Taxes and Exactions.  
Therefore I may conclude, That the ordinary English, tho' many of them might live upon the Lands they and their Ancestors had enjoyed, yet their Tenure was changed, and they were but Vassals to other Lords; till by little and little, by the ways I have mentioned under the first Heads, they acquired a Soccage Tenure, and Fee-simple Estate. Therefore the foresaid 
(q) Praefat. Roger Twysden, fol. 155. The English possess their Lands by ●avour, not otherwise Hereditarily. So Mut. Paris saith, Commilitonibus terras Anglorum & possessiones affluentiori manu contulit; illud parvum quod remans●rat, sub jugo posuit perpetuae servitutis.  Gervase of Tilbury concludes this Observation, thus, Sic igitur quisquis de gente subacta, fundos vel aliquid hujusmodi possidet, non quod ratione successionis debere sibi videatur, adeptus est, sed quod solummodo meritis suis exigentibus vel aliqua pactione interveniente, obtinuit, viz. So every one of the conquered Nation possessed their Lands or any thing else; not that he should seem to get it by way of Succession, but by his deserts, or by some Compact or Covenant made with his Lord: as it must be understood.  
The most industrious Doctor Brady, having on purpose writ so much of this Argument in his Answer to the Argumentum Antinormanicum, and, out of so many Historians, confirmed it in the Answer to the Appendix; 
Brady, p. 313.314.  I must refer the Reader that desires satisfaction, to his Book, being loath to crowd those matters which are not directly to my purpose: Only I cannot but note, that the reason why we so often find the same Lands that have been granted by a Father, for him and his Heirs, required, and had a Confirmation by the Son; was because the Tenure was so fickle, for want of Homage or Omission of Service, whereby they might be forfeited.  
I now proceed to the great Councils that I have found in the Reign of William the Conqueror; and shall begin with that wherein the Laws I have spoken before of, out of Hoveden, were made, which are agreed by all to be in the Fourth year of his Reign.  
In general, we find Gervase of Tilbury telling us, 
The Conqueror makes written Laws.  That when the famous Subduer of England, King William, had subjected to his Empire the utmost parts of the Island, and by terrible examples had brought to perfect obedience the Minds of Rebels; that they might not have liberty to fall into the same errors for the future, he 
(r) Decrevit subjectum sibi populum Juri scripto legibusque sabjicere. Quasdam reprobavit, quasdam autem approbans Transmari●●s Neustriae leges, quae ad Regni p●●●m tuendam effic●teissionae videbantur, adjecit. Geru. Tilb. lib. 1. c. 29.  resolved to govern the People subjected to him by written Right and Law: therefore the English Law being propounded according to their threefold distinction, that is, the Mercian Law, Dane Law, and West-Saxon Law, he rejected some, and approved others, and added such Transmarine Norman Laws, as seemed most efficacious to defend the Peace of the Kingdom.  
In this account we may observe, That the King solely is said to reject and approve, and to add such of the Norman Laws as he thought fit for securing the Peace of the Kingdom; and the Ingenious Dr. Brady thinks the 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64. are those Norman Laws intimated.  
Concerning the Oath which Frederick Abbot of St. Alban, administered to the King on the Holy Gospel, and the Relics of the Church of St. Alban, whereby he swore, That for the good of Peace, he would observe the good and approved ancient Laws of the Kingdom, which the pious Kings of England, and especially King Edward had inviolably observed; I must refer the Reader to 
(s) Fol. 48. num. 20, 30, 40.  Matthew Paris, to understand the occasion of it; and Dr. 
(t) Argum. Antinorm. p. 261.  Brady's Exposition or Commentary upon it, and how little he observed it.  
What the Laws were that King William the First confirmed, Authors agree not about, as may be seen by comparing 
(u) Fol. 343.  Hoveden, 
(w) Fol. 138, 149  Knighton Collect. 2354. N. 61. Lambard of Wheelocks Edition, and Spelman in the First Tome of his Councils, Fol. 624. Selden 
(x) In Eadmerum, fol. 172. num. 20.  in his Notes upon Eadmerus, writes very suspiciously of all the Laws that are attributed to King Edward, except the Crowland Copy; judging neither Hoveden, Knighton, or the Author of the Lichfield Chronicle well versed in Law matters, and who writ long after Ingulphus, of whom he gives this Character, Qui in hac re testium non tam facile Princeps merito dicendus est, quam solus forsan cui ut par fit credamus.  
The Title of the Laws properly ascribed to William the Conqueror, 
The Title of the Conqueror's Laws.  are in the Latin thus,  

(y) Ces sont le Leis & les Custumes que le Reis William grantut tut le peuple de Engleterre ●pres le Conquest de la Terre. Ice les meismes que le Reis Edward sun C●sin tent devant luy. LL. W. fol. 159.  Hae sunt leges & consuetudines quas Will. Rex concessit universo Populo Angliae, post subactam terram. Eaedem sunt quas Edwardus Rex, cognatus ejus, observavit ante eum. In English thus, These are the Laws and Customs 
(z) LL. W. 1. p. 170.  which William the King granted to all his People of England after the subduing of the Land. They are the same which Edward the King his Kinsman before him observed.  
In this Preface we have only to note, that the Laws are expressly said to be the Kings Grant, and the Supplemental Laws (after the 50th. which were found in the Croyland Copy) being writ in the Red Book of 
(z) LL. W. 1. p. 170.  the Exchequer, are by way of Charter or Grant, thus, Will. Rex Anglorum, etc. omnibus hominibus suis Francis & Anglis salutem, and all along the Authoritative parts expressed by statuimus, volumus, interdicimus, prohibemus, praecipimus, decretum est. 
The Terms used by the Conqueror in Law-giving.   
The expressions Authors use concerning his Laws, whereby the absolute Sovereignty of the Conqueror in the point of Law-giving is manifested, are to be found in all those who have writ of his Life; I shall content myself with a few. Ordericus 
(a) Fol. 853.  Vitalis saith, eamque, i. e. England, Gulielmus Rex suis Legibus commode subegit; that he subdued, or rather subjected England profitably to his Laws.  
Eadmer 
(b) Hist, Nou. fol. 6. num. 10, 20, 30. Vsus atque leges quas patres sui & ipse in Normannia solehant, in Anglia scrib●re volens— Cuncta divina simul & humana ejus nutum expectabant. Edit. Gal. de Moulins.  saith, That King William designing to establish in England those Usages, and Laws, which his Ancestors, and he observed in Normandy, etc. all Divine and Humane Things he ordered at his pleasure.  
The Chronology of Roven saith, Leges quas in hunc diem Angli observant, idiomate Normanico promulgavit, The Laws which at this day the English observe, he published in the Norman Language.  
Mr. Camden saith, 
(c) Britan. fol. 109.  That William the Conqueror, as a token of his Victory, laid aside the greatest part of the English Laws, and brought in the customs of Normandy, and commanded Plead to be in French.  
Jo. Brompton Abbot of Jorval gives us an account of the proper Laws of William the Conqueror, 
Brompton's Account of the proper Laws of the Conqueror.  which he recites under four Heads, and they are only concerning Pleas de examine Forensi; and Mr. Selden gives this Character of him, that he was Diligentissimus rerum nostrarum, maxim autem Legum vetustiorum Indagator. These are by way of Mandate, thus, W. Dei gratia Rex Anglorum, omnibus ad quos scriptum hoc perveniat, salutem, Mando, & Praecipio per totam Anglicam Nationem custodiri.  
As to the constituent Parts of the Great Councils in the Conquerour's time, in many of them we have many Bishop's names, 
The Members of the Great Councils in the Conqueror's time.  and no others, not so much as the Principes, Primates, or Magnates in general.  
Anno 1071. 5 W. 1. the Plaint of 
(d) Rad. de Diceto, col. 483. num. 30. Concil. tom. 2. fol. 4.  Wulstan Bishop of Worcester is said to be ended in Concilio celebrato in loco qui vocatur Pedreda coram Rege & Doroberniae Archiepiscopo, & Primatibus totius Regni; before the King, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Nobility or Prime Persons of the whole Kingdom.  
The Election of 
(e) Gervas'. Dorobern. col. 1653. lin. 5.  Lanfranc Archbishop of Canterbury, about this time, or the year before, is said to be thus, the Seniors of the said Church electing him, cum Episcopis ac Principibus, Clero & Populo Angliae, in Curia Regis in Assumptione Sanctae Mariae. Here the Episcopi & Principes, Bishops and Princes, the Cleri & Populus, the Clergy and People or Laity were the same persons, and only expressive of one another.  
In the Charter 
(f) MS. in Bibl. Cotton. sub essigie Vespas. A. 19 e Chron. Rad. de Diceto. Spelm. Concil. Tom. 2. fol. 14.  of William the Conqueror, Anno 1077. 11 Regni, after the Names of several Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, and other Seniors, Robert de Oyley, Hamo dapifer signed it, many illustrious Persons and Princes of divers Orders, saith the Author, being omitted: Then is added, His etiam illo tempore a Regia potestate è diversis Provinciis & Vrbibus, to this Universal Synod at Westminster were called.  
In this the 
(g) Fol. 651. lin. 22.  Principes diversi Ordinis, were the great dignified Clergy, and the Temporal Nobility, which is explained by Florence of Worcester, speaking of such a like Convention. 3 H. 1. Rex fuit apud Westmonasterium & eo omnes Principes Regni Ecclesiastici & secularis Ordinis: and 
(h) Fol. 67. B. 20. Anno 1102. 3 H. 1.  Eadmer, of this very great Council, 3 H. 1. says, Primates Regni utriusque Ordinis huic conventui affuerunt; that is, The Princes or great Men of the Clergy and Laity, which were no other but the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats and Priors of the one Order, and the Dukes, Earls, Barons, and greater Tenants in Capite of the other; and for the expression, è diversis Provinciis & Vrbibus, 
(i) Fol. 302.  Doctor Brady hath sufficiently explained it in his Answer to the Argumentum Antinormanicum.  
In a Charter of this King, for changing the 
(k) Monast. vol. 1. fol. 44. Anno 1084. 18 W. Conqu.  Canons of Duresm into Monks, it is said, Haec Charta confirmata est apud Westmonasterium in Concilio meo, Anno Regni 18. praesentibus omnibus Episcopis & Baronibus meis.  
In the Charter of the same 
(l) Spelm. Concil. tom. 2. fol. 14. e MS. penes Dec. & Capit. B. Pauli Lond. A. fol. 1, 2.  King about separating of Ecclesiastic Pleas from Civil, it is thus expressed, William by the Grace of God, King of England, to R. Bainard, G. de Magnavilla, and P. de Valoines, and all his Fideles of Essex, Hereford-shire and Middlesex: Know they and all other his Fideles which remain in England; that he hath 
(m) Leges quae non bene, etc. Communt Concilio & Concilio Ar●●iepisct porum & Epi coporum, & Abbatum, & omnium Principum R●gni mei emendand is judi●avi, propterea mando & Regia Au●loritate ●racipio, etc.  thought fit, with his Common Council, and the Council of Archbishops, Bishops and Abbats, and of all the Princes of his Kingdom to amend the Episcopal Laws, which were neither well nor according to the command of the Holy Canons before his time, observed in his Kingdom. Therefore he saith, he commands, and by his Royal Authority enjoins, that no Bishop or  hold their Pleas any longer in the Hundred.  
From all which we may observe, 
Remarks upon what before is laid down.  First, That the Conqueror introduced the Feudal Laws of the Normans, and according to them disposed of the Lands of the conquered Saxons, to be held of his Norman Followers, and that he brought in several others of the Laws and Customs of his Country.  
Secondly, That he difficultly granted to his People the Laws of King Edward, and those he amended at his pleasure; and all that he either confirmed or established, he did by his Royal Prerogative, using the single Person in the Sanction of them; and the Imperative in the commanding or forbidding: and those Laws which properly may be called his own, were by way of Charter or Mandate; and in the Councils purely Ecclesiastical, the King summoned them, as is apparent in 
(n) Annal. Binaiae, tom. 3. part. 2. fol. 249.  Hoveden, where he saith, eodem Anno, i. e. 10703 Regni Concilium magnum in Octavis Paschae Wintoniae celebratum est, jubente & praesente Rege W. etc. of which more below. 
The great Selden notes as the Members of the Great Council in the time of the Norman Kings, for the Barons, such as had 13 Knights Fees and a third part: His words are, Interfuere Parliamentis sub Normannorum tempora quotquot 13 Feudis Militaribus & 3 unius parte investiti Barones, ab amplis praediis ita dicti. Jan. Ang. p. 139.   
Thirdly, There are no Members of these great Councils mentioned, but the Archbishops, Bishops and Abbats, for the Clergy, and the Optimates and Principes for the Laity.  
Fourthly, That though the sole Power of enacting Laws was in himself, yet he used the Advice of his Common Council of his Kingdom; as is expressed in the 55th. Law, thus, Prout statutum est eyes & illis a nobis datum & concessum jure haereditario in perpetuum, per Commune Concilium totius Regni nostri praedicti; which Commune Concilium consisted of the Bishops, Abbats, Earls, Barons and principal Tenants in Capite, as is every where clear, no Commons having Vote, or otherwise represented.  
Lastly, 
(o) Hist. Novel. p. 6. num. 30. Non sinebat quicquam statuere ant prohibere nisi quae suae voluntati accommoda & a se primo essent ordinata.  Eadmer tells us, That when the Archbishop of Canterbury presided in a general Council of the Bishops, the King permitted him not to appoint or forbid any thing, but such things as were agreeable to his will, and by himself were first ordained. Also he saith in all his Dominions, he would allow no Bishop of Rome to be accounted Apostolic, but whom he commanded to be received; nor any to receive his Bulls or Breves, unless they were first shown to him.  
I have in the beginning of this Chapter spoken something of the Mutations that William the Conqueror made in the Constitution of the Government of England; concerning which I shall only note, That the Conqueror took all the care (that a great Commander and Conqueror of a great Nation could do) for securing his Conqests 
(p) Pictav. fol. 197. C. Ingulph. 512. a lin. 7. What the Conqueror did to secure his Conquest.  by building Fortresses and Castles within the City of London, and placing Norman Garrisons and French Governors or Castellanes in the Castles in the Country, and giving them great Estates, and carrying the chief of the English Nobility with him as Hostages into Normandy, and imposed his Laws, as Pictavensis relates; 
(q) Id. fol. 2●6 a. 207 c. 2●8 a. b.  and though he, who was Chaplain to the Conqueror, speak of the Conqueror's smooth behaviour to the English, ordering things as he saith, prudently, justly and mildly; some to the Profit and Dignity of the City; some to the advantage of the whole Nation; and other some to the benefit of the Churches of the Land: and whatever Laws he dictated, he established with excellent reason; and adds, That no Frenchman 
(r) Nulli tamen Gallo datum est quod Anglo ●uiquam injuste fuecit ablatum. Idem, fol. 208. c.  had any thing given him, which was unjustly taken from any Englishman, (which last, Ordericus Vitalis omits, though in other things he follows Pictavensis exactly) yet Pictavensis writing but to the Fourth of his Reign, Anno 1070. as is noted by Ordericus, we must look upon them as incompetent Witnesses of the severity the Conqueror after used, when he had secured his Conquest. So that what is urged by some, of the Conqueror's lenity, and his little change of Laws and Government, is to be understood of those times while he was unsafe in his Conquests, and doth not so interfere, as they would make the World believe, 
How he comported himself after he had secured his Conquest.  with the assertion of those, who from credible Authors speak of his treating the English as a Conquered People. For Pictavensis 
(s) Jure Belli possedit. fol. 206. a.  saith, that he possessed the Country by the rights of War. Ordericus 
(t) Adjutoribus suis inclytas Angliae Regiones distribuit, & ex insimis Normannorum Clientibus Tribunos & Centuriones ditissimos erexit. Orderic. Vit. 251.  Vitalis saith, That having circumvented the two great Earls of Mercia, and slain Edwin, and imprisoned Morcas, than he began to show himself, and gave the best Counties of England to his Assistants; and of the lowest of the Norman Clients, or very mean People, he made very rich Colonels and Captains, as he particularizes there; and in another 
(u) Fundos eorum cum omnibus divitiis obtin●imus. Id. fol. 853.  place, That having overthrown by Force and Arms the English Saxons, they obtained their Lands and all their Riches.  
Malmsbury 
(w) Malmsb. fol. 52. a. num. 40. Vix aliquis Princeps de progenie Anglorum esset in Anglia, sed omnes ad servitutem & moerorem redacti essent, ita ut Anglieum vocari opprobrjum.  saith, That there was no Englishman Duke, or Bishop, or Abbot, but Strangers do gnaw the Riches, and very Bowels of England. So 
(x) Hen. Hunt. fol. 210 b. num. 10. About the continuing the English Saxons, but changing their Tenors, Services, etc.  Hen. of Huntingdon saith, there was scarce any Prince of the Progeny of the English, but all are reduced to Servitude and Sorrow; so that it is a disgrace to be called an Englishman: and Gervase of Canterbury saith, That he used both Ecclesiastic and Secular Rights or Laws as he pleased, tam Ecclesiastica Jura quam secularia sibi usurpavit.  
As to King William's displacing of the Saxons, I find in the Transcript of Doomsday-Book that I have for Yorkshire, that very many enjoyed the same Lands they did in Edward the Confessors time; but I remember not where that I do not find them hold of some Norman Lords, which is agreeable to what Dr. Brady writes; but I refer the Discourse of those to my Antiquities of Yorkshire, if God give me life and ability to publish them.  
As to the Conqueror's changing the holding of Lands here, to the 
(y) Spelman. Gloss. Feodam.  Feudal Tenure used in Normandy (begun by the Germans, Longobards, Francs and others, and of which something seems to be hinted in the English Saxon Laws) all Authors do conclude, that the Conqueror brought the exacter use, at least, of them into England, and divided the whole Land into several Knights-fees, whereof there are reckoned 700 Tenants in Capite, besides Bishops, Abbats, Priors and great Churchmen; and the Laws of King Edward that the Conqueror permitted to be used, were either most of them Penal Laws, from which he got profit, or such as are properly his own, and were efficacious for the preservation of the Peace, and establishment of Government, as the 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 64. whereof the 55, 58, and 59 are Feudal.  
How William the Conqueror brought in his other Norman Laws, Dr. Brady in his Preface to the Norman Story, hath at large discoursed; so that in Justice I must refer the Curious Reader to his elaborate work, and to Mr. Selden in his Second Book of his Janus Anglorum.  

Of the Great Councils in William the Second time.  
IN the Reign of William Rufus we find few Great Councils. So that Anselm Archbishop of Canterbury complains 
(a) Eadmer. Hist. Nou. lib. 1. fol. 24. lin. 8.  to him (when he was preparing to pass into Normandy) that since he was King, there had been no General Council of the Bishops, nor of several years before, so that Christianity was much decayed.  
The first great Council I have met with, is that of Winchester. 
(b) Idem, fol. 20. num. 30. Anno D. 1093. 5 W. Rusi. The Contest betwixt William the Second and Anselm.  This Council is only thus expressed, Rex adunato Wintoniae conventu Nobilium, without specifying either ecclesiastics or Laics. In this Council the King declared Anselm Archbishop, and he did Homage to him.  

(c) Idem, p. 26. num. 10.6 Gul. 2.  This Anselm sought leave of the King that he might go to Rome, to receive the Pall from Pope Vrban, whom the King did not own for Pope, but Clement. This and some other Matters occasioned sharp words and unkindness from the King to Anselm; the King absolutely denying him liberty to go, telling him, that he owned not Vrban pro Apostolico, and that it had neither been his, nor his Father's custom, that any should own 
(d) Paternae consuetudinis eatenus extitisse, ut praeter suam licentiam, aut electionem aliquis in Regno Angliae Papam nominaret, & quicunque sibi hujus dignitatis potestatem vellet praeripere, unum foret ac si coronam suam sibi conaretur auferre. Idem num. 50.  any Pope in the Kingdom of England, without his Licence or Election; and whoever would take from him this Power of his Dignity, did the same as if he endeavoured to despoil him of his Crown. But Anselm persisted, that he had declared (before he would consent to be Bishop, while he was Abbot of Becc) that he received urban for Pope, neither that he would in any manner depart from his Obedience and Subjection. At which the King was very angry, protesting, that Anselm could not against the King's good pleasure keep his Faith which he owed to him, and his Obedience to the Apostolic See. So Anselm (saving his Reason or Argument which he declared concerning his Subjection and Obedience to the Roman Church) desired Respite for the examining the Matter in Question, till it might be defined by common consent (the Bishops, Abbats, and all the Princes of the Kingdom meeting together) whether (saving his Reverence and Obedience to the Apostolic See) he could keep his Faith to his Earthly Prince; 
The Question moved, Whether Archbishop Anselm could keep his ●aith to th● King. saving his Obedience to the Apostolic See?  and if it be proved that both of them could not be done, he had rather departed the King's Land, till the Pope was owned, than for an Hour deny Obedience to St. Peter and his Vicar.  
Then it follows, 
Idem, num. 10.  Dantur ergo Induciae, atque ex Regia Sanctione ferme totius Regni Nobilitas 5. Id. Martii pro ventilatione istius causae in unum apud Rochingheham exit.  
The Convention was on Sunday in the Church of the Castle, The King, and those 
(e) Rege & suis secretius in Anselmum Concilium stu●iese texentibus; Anselmus autem, Episcopis, Abbatibus, & Principibus ad se a Regio secreto vocatis.  that were of the King's part, secretly and studiously contriving their Councils against Anselm; then follows a plain description, who they were that constituted this Great Council, Anselmus autem Episcopis, Abbatibus & Principibus ad se a Regio, secreto vocatis, Anselm calling the Bishops, Abbats and Princes to himself from the King's Secret Council, or from the Consultation they had with the King. By these I conceive we may understand the constituent Parts of this Great Council.  
Then follows, eos & assistentem Monachorum, Clericorum, Laicorum numerosam multitudinem hac voce alloquitur; Anselm makes his Speech to those, that is, to the Bishops, Abbats and Princes, and likewise to the numerous multitude of Monks, Clerks and Laics there present, standing or sitting there as Auditors, not Assessors, as the sequel will show.  

(f) Id. num. 30, 40, 50.  He tells them how he was forced to leave his Country, by reason of the King's desire, that Council being taken, it pleased the King and them to choose him, and that then he declared for Pope Vrbane, and then tells them the straits he was in, as before related, and so desired their Counsel, and prays them all, especially, his Brethren and Co-Bishops to give him advice.  
The 
(g) Id. fol. 27. num. 10.  Bishops tell him, They would advise him to submit to the King in all things as they were ready to do; but if he commanded, they would acquaint the King with his Discourse, and return his Answer; and the King 
(h) Anselmus ad hospitium suum, Curiam manere petiturus, reverteretur.  ordered, that all things should be deferred till the next day, because that was Sunday, and Anselm should return to his Lodging, he being about to petition that the Court might remain; unless the words are to be read, curiam mane repetiturus, he to return to the Court in the Morning; because the following words are, Factum est ita, & mane juxta condictum reversi sumus, It was so done, and in the Morning according to agreement we returned.  
Then it follows, Anselmus in medio Procerum & conglobatae multitudinis sedens, ita orsus est, Si juxta quod a vobis Domini Fratres hesterno die consilium de praesenti causa petivi, vel nunc dare velletis, acciperem; Anselm sitting in the midst of the Nobles, and the encompassing multitude, begun thus, If you my Lords and Brothers will give me counsel about the present Cause, as I Yesterday desired or petitioned, I will receive it. In which we may observe, that he applies himself principally to the Clergy, unless we read the words disjunctively, Domini, Fratres, as we shall presently find he doth.  
They give him the same Answer they did the day before, That he should submit to the Pleasure of the King: but if he, according to God, expected Counsel from them, which might in any thing gainsay the Kings Will, it would be labour in vain; for they would not assist him in it.  
Then Anselm lifting up his Eyes aloft, with a lively Countenance, and a reverend Voice, speaks to them thus; Cum nos qui Christianae Plebis pastors, & vos qui Populorum Principes vocamini: When we that are the Pastors of the Christian People, and you that are called the Princes of the People will give me Counsel, not otherwise than according to the Will of one Man, your Prince; I will run to the chief Pastor and Prince of all, to the Angel of the Great Council, etc.  
In which we may observe, to my purpose, 
In this Contest is discovered who were the Members of the Great Councils.  that he divides this Curia, or Great Council, into two parts, the Pastors of the People, or the Bishops and Abbats, and the Princes of the People: so as here are no Commons, as in the acceptance of the word in this and later Ages they are understood. For the Multitudo here mentioned, are to be taken to be Spectators, who flocked to hear the Cause, as in other Courts; and even at this day, upon the hearing of Appeals at the Bar of the House of Lords, it is usual for many to crowd in as far as the Bar.  
That these Great Councils met where the King kept his Court at Christmas, Easter and Whitsuntide, by custom, often is mentioned in our Histories, and needs no further Proof than what Doctor Brady hath produced; therefore upon this occasion of Archbishop Anselm, I shall only relate what Eadmerus saith, 
Great Council at Pentecost de more.  That he attended the King at Pentecost, sometimes at Dinnertime, when he made his great Feasts, and other times during the Holidays, to try if the King's Mind was altered, but found no change. 
(i) Peractis igitur Festivioribus di●bus diversorum negotiorum causae in medium duci ex more coeperunt. Id. p. 37. num. 40. Ann. 1096. vel 1097.  Therefore the Festival-days being passed, the causes of divers affairs according to custom, began to be transacted, saith my Author, among which that that of Anselm's was one.  
But to draw to a Conclusion of this King's Reign, my Author clears who were the Members of the Great Councils, and that they were convened at the King's Pleasure, in the relating that in the following 
(k) Mense Augusto cum de statu Regni acturus Rex, Episcopos, Abbates, & quosque Regni Proceres in unum praecepti sui sanctione egisset, etc. Id. p. 38. num. 10.  Month of August, when the King being to transact things concerning the State of the Kingdom, by his Summons had convened the Bishops, Abbats, and all the Noblemen of his Kingdom. The affairs for which they were assembled being dispatched, and every one prepared to return home; Anselm moves again his Petition, and in October, when the Convention was dissolved, he applied himself again to the King at Winchester.  
Here we may observe that it was the King, 
The King solely summons the Great Councils, and dismisseth them.  who being to transact things about the State of the Kingdom, by the Authority of his Precept or Summons, called together the Members of the Great Council, who are expressly mentioned to be the Bishops, Abbats, and all the Noblemen of the Kingdom. Since therefore we find no other kinds of Great Councils in any Authors that writ of this King, we may conclude, the Commons were no ways represented in any of them.  
Most Authors mention this King with no good Character. One old Writer saith, 
Omnis jam legum sil●it Justitia, causisque sub justitio positis, sola in Principibus imperabat pecunia. Florent. Wigorn.  That all Justice of Laws was in his time hushed in silence, and Causes being put in a Vacation without hearing, Money alone bore sway among the great ones.  
Polydore Virgil will have the right or duty of First-fruits, called Annats, which our Kings claimed for vacant Abbeys, and Bishoprics, to have had their Original from King William Rufus. However that be, it is certainly true, that at his Death the Bishoprics of Canterbury, Winchester, and Salisbury, and twelve Monasteries besides, being without Prelates and Abbats, paid in their Revenues to the Exchequer.  
We may judge likewise of his burdensome Exactions, 
Matt. Paris fol. 74. Edit. penult.  by what we find in his Brother King Henry the First's Charter: Wherein he saith, because the Kingdom was oppressed with unjust Exactions, he makes the Holy Church free; and all evil Customs, wherewith the Kingdom of England was unjustly oppressed, he doth henceforth take away, and they are all in a manner, mitigations of the Severity of the feudal Tenor, as any one may see in Matthew Paris, Mr. Selden, and Dr. Brady, and is plain by the very first concerning the Laity, That if any one of my Barons, Counts, or others that hold of me, shall die, his Heirs shall not redeem his Lands, as he was wont to do in the time of my Father, etc. And in another, 
Praecipio ut homines mei similiter se contineant erga silios, & silias, & uxores hominum suorum.  That according to the relaxation he had made to his Homagers, they should regulate themselves towards the Sons, Daughters, and Wives of their Homagers.   

Of the Great Councils in King Henry the First's time.  
COncerning the Great Councils in King Henry the First's time, as also till Edward the First's time, I must refer the inquisitive Reader to Dr. Brady's answer to Mr. Petyt in the respective Kings Reigns, and to his Appendix, in which he hath amassed out of Eadmerus, Simeon Dunelmensis, Florentius Wigornensis; Hoveden, Gervasius Dorobernensis, Matt. Paris, Malmsbury, and other Authentic Writers, the Emphatical Expressions, by which the constituent Parts of the Great Councils are fully proved to be only the Bishops, Abbats, and Priors for the Clergy: or the great Nobility, or prime Tenants in Capite, such as the King pleased to summon under the names of Magnates, Comites, Proceres, Principes, Optimates, Barones, or Sapientiores Regni, expressly used for Barones.  
Where the Populus is used by way of Antithesis, as contradistinct from the Clerus, and where Regni Communitas, or Ingenuitas is used; the same Doctor Brady by pregnant Proof, puts it beyond dispute, that none of the Commons, as now we understand them, could be meant as Representatives.  
So that though I had collected a considerable number of such Proofs,  I saw the Learned Doctor's Book, I shall now wave them all, and only add in every King's Reign some few that he hath omitted, or wherein something remarkable, relating to the King's Sovereignty, or the manner of constituting Laws, is found by him noted, or as I have met with them in my Reading.  
In the third of Henry the First, in the Feast of St. 
(a) Omnes Princip●s Regni sui Ecclesiastici & Secularis Ordinis. Flor. Wigorn. Anno 1102. 3 H. 1.  Michael (saith the Monk of Worcester) the King was at London, and with him all the Princes of his Kingdom of the Ecclesiastic and Secular Order: and of the same Council Malmsbury saith, The King bidding 
(b) Ipso Rege annuente communi consensu Episcoporum, Abbatum & Principum totius Regni adunatum est Conciltum. De Gest. Pontif. Anno 1102.  or willing with the common Consent of the Bishops, and Abbats, and Princes of the whole Kingdom, the Council was united: and this being mostly about Ecclesiastic affairs, it is added that in this Council the Optimates Regni, at the Petition of Anselm were present; and gives the reason, For that whatever might be decreed by Authority of the Council, might be maintained firmly by the mutual care of both orders. Whereby we may note the Obligation upon Subjects of both Orders, to observe the Laws once enacted by the King and Council. Anno 1107. 7 H. 1. Matth. Paris saith, 
(c) Factus est conventus Episcoporum & Abbatum pariter & Magnatum ad Ann. etc.  there was a convention of the Bishops and Abbats, as likewise of the Magnates, i. e. Noblemen, at London in the King's Palace, Archbishop Anselm being Precedent. To which the King assented, and speaking of what was established, he saith, Rex statuit. To him Hoveden agrees; only what the one calls Magnates, the other calls Proceres.  
The Manuscript of Croyland 
(d) Tum Episcoporum & Abbatum totius Cleri Angliae; by which must be understood the great dignified Clergy. Sub Wifrido Abbate, p. 104.  saith, The same Year the King giving manifold thanks to God for the Victory he had given him over his Brother Robert, and other Adversaries, appointed a famous Council at London, as well of the Bishops and Abbats of the whole Clergy of England, as of the Earls, Barons, Optimatum & Procerum totius Regni. In this Council the King 
(e) Remisit, libere concessit, integre promisi●.  remitted, freely granted, and fully promised, the Investiture by Ring and Staff, and freely left the Election of the Prelates to their respective Churches. By which we may not only note who made up this Great Council, but that the enacting part was solely the King's Grant.  
The Charter 
(f) Lib. rub. Scaccar. Twysden LL. Id. 1. p. 175.  of Henry the First was made before the Eighteenth of his Reign, in which he saith, because his Kingdom was oppressed with unjust Exactions; in 
(g) Ego respectu Dei & amore quem erg● vos habeo. Matt. Paris fol. 292. num. 10. See the Explanation of this Charter, Brady's Argum. fol. 265. and Selden's Epinomis.  respect of God, and the Love which he hath to his Subjects, he makes the Holy Church free, and so proceeds in the rest of his Laws, by way of single Grant, and Prohibition.  
Anno 1127. 28 H. 1. 
(h) Rex— auditis Concilii gestis consensum praebuit. Authoritate Regia & potestate concessit, & consirmavit statuta Concilii. Continuat. Florent. Wigorn. p. 503.  W. Archbishop of Canterbury gathered a General Council of all the Bishops, Abbats, and Religious Persons, and at the close of the Acts it is said, That the King being at London, having heard the Acts of the Council, gave his consent to them, and by his Kingly Authority and Power, granted and confirmed the Statutes of the Council. By which we may see that even the Constitutions of Ecclesiastical Councils required the Sovereign's Confirmation.   

Of the Great Councils in King Stephen's time.  
THat he was an Usurper, is notoriously known. His first great Council is only said by Malmsbury to be gathered at London, 
(a) Coacto magno Episcoporum, Procerum, & Abbatum concilio. Fol. 92. b. num. 4.  consisting of Bishops, Nobles, and Abbats, in which many Ecclesiastical and Secular Matters were ordained. Matthew Paris saith, That he having gathered at London the Magnates Regni, he promised the bettering of the Laws according to the will 
(b) Juxta voluntatem & arbi●rium singulorum. Fol. 62. num. 40.  and pleasure of all. The reason of which compliance of this King was, for that he was set up and Crowned by a Faction, there being reckoned by Authors none of Eminence present at his Coronation, but the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Winchester, and Roger of Salisbury his Brother, no Abbats, and but few of the Nobility, they having all sworn 
(c) Malmsb. Hist. Novel. fol. 101. b. num. 16.  Fealty to Maud the Empress in Henry the first's life time, though he in the following Charter saith, That he was elected King, Assensu Cleri & Populi. But to proceed,  
King Stephen primo Regni at Oxford, Anno 1136. grants the Liberties to his Subjects by way of Charter, 
(d) Ego Stephanus Dei gratia assensu Cleri, etc. omnes exactiones, meschenningas, & injustitias sive per Vicecomites vel per alios quoslibet male inductas funditus extirpo, bonas leges & antiquas & justas consuetudines, etc. observabo, & observari praecipio & constituo. Malmsb. Hist. Novel. p. 101. b. num. 20.  that the Church be free, and he confirms due Reverence to it, and so proceeds to recite many particular Privileges to it: and as to his Lay-Subjects, he doth utterly root out all exactions, misdeeds, and injustices evilly brought in by Sheriffs or any others; That he will observe himself, and appoints and constitutes to be observed the good Laws, and ancient and just Customs in Hundreds Pleas, or other matters. This was by Charter, and my Author saith, he disdains to set to the names of the Witnesses which were many, because he so lightly or foolishly changed all.  
But Richard Prior of Hexham closes the Charter thus, 
(e) Ric. Prior H●gustald. col. 314. num. 6. Anno 1136. 1 Regni. The King grants his Charter with a Salvo.  Haec omnia concedo & confirmo salva Regia & justa Dignitate mea. By which Conclusion it is apparent, the King reserved to himself a Latitude to use his Prerogative, and some are of opinion, Kings cannot by any Concessions divest themselves of that; but I want Mittans' to handle such noli me tangere's of the Crown.  
What I have further to add concerning this Charter is, That the Prior of Hexham makes it granted after the Pope's Confirmation 
(f) Id. 313. num. 30. Note, That all Authors think strange th● Pope should confirm and so countenance King Stephen, an Usurper.  of him (in which, if ever that See consulted its private Interest, it was then; and in my poor Opinion nothing hath more discovered the Personal failures of Popes, than such countenancing of Usurpers) my Author I say makes it to be passed at his Parliament at Oxford, where he saith, he celebrated a general Council, & Episcopos & Proceres sui Regni regali edicto in unum convenire praecepit.  
The Witnesses this Author sets down, makes it 
(g) Id. 315. num. 10.  appear there were none besides the Clergy and Barons present; for after fourteen Bishops named, the rest of the Witnesses are, Roger the Chancellor, Henry Nephew of the King, Robert Earl of Gloucester, William Earl Warren, Ralph Earl of Chester, Roger Earl of Warwick, Rob. de Vere, Miles de Gloucester, Rob. de Olli Briano Filio Comitis Constab. Robert de Martel, Hugh Bigot, Humfrid de Bohun, Simon de Bellocampo, Dapif. Rob. de Ferrer, William Petrus, Simon de Silban●et, William de Albania, Hugh de Sancto Claro, Ilbert de Lecsio. All which were very great Barons, the last of them being Heir to 150 Knights Fees; at least his Grandfather had so many: So that we cannot judge the Commons by any Representation were present.  
The other great Councils of this King are to be found in the Authors 
(h) Flor Wigorn. Anno 1138. fol. 668.  cited in the Margin; That at Northampton had Turstin Archbishop of York precedent, and the rest enumerated are Episcopi, Abbates, Comites, Barones, Nobiles quique per Angliam▪ That of the sixteenth 
(i) Hen. Hunt. Anno 1151. fol. 226.  mentions only the Archbishop of Canterbury, Eustachius the King's Son, & Angliae Proceres; in the 
(k) Chron. Norm. Anno 1152.  Agreement 17 Regni, the Conventus was Episcoporum, Comitum, & aliorum Optimatum; and the last I find Anno 1154. ultimo Regni (e) is cum Episcopis & Optimatibus; 
(l) Jo. Brompton, col. 1000 num. 50.  never any Commons represented being to be met with.   

Of the Great Council in King Henry the Second Reign.  
THE first considerable Act of State that I find Henry the Second did, was Anno 1154. 1 Reg. That he gathered his General Council to London in Lent, 
(a) Spelman. Concil. Tom. 2. fol. 54. Congregavit Concilium generale, & renovavit pacem & leges & consuetudines per Angliam ab antiquis temporibus constitutas.  he renewed Peace and the Laws and Customs of ancient times appointed through England, and by his writing and Seal confirmed to Bishops and Abbats, Charters of Privileges; whose Charter runs thus, Hen. etc. Baronibus & fidelibus suis Francis, & Anglis salutem. Sciatis me ad Honorem Dei & Sanctae Ecclesiae, & pro communi emendatione Regni mei concessisse & reddidisse, & praesenti Charta mea confirmasse, etc. and so confirms the Charter of King Henry the First his Grandfather.  
As to the Council of Clarendon, about 
(b) Answer to Petyt, fol. 31. ult. Edit. See Selden's Correction of Matt. Paris, in his Epinomis.  Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury, after he had once promised, and his after refusing to set to his Seal in Confirmation of the Ancient Laws; I must refer the Reader to what Doctor Brady hath collected, and shall only touch upon that of 
(c) Matt. Paris, fol. 84. num. 20. ult. Edit.  Clarendon Anno 1164. 10 Hen. 2. where those present by the King's Mandate, were the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons and Noblemen of the Kingdom; and there was a Recognition of parts of the Customs and Liberties of King Henry the King's Grandfather, and of other Kings, which were comprised in sixteen Chapters. 
Concerning the Laws of this King, see Selden's Epinomis.  These Matthew Paris calls wicked Customs and Liberties; because they subjected the Clergymen more to the Crown, than he and others would have had them; yet he saith, the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Clergy, with the Earls, Barons and Nobility, swore to them all, 
Proceres.  and promised firmly in the word of Truth, to hold and observe them to the King and his Heirs, in good Faith, and without Evil, and then adds, decrevit etiam Rex: by which it appears, that the Members of the Great Council did not only assent, but did bind themselves by Oath and solemn Promise, obligatory to themselves and their Posterity, to keep and observe them; and upon the whole it is the King that decrees, appoints and constitutes.  
In all the great Councils of this King, it is manifest that the Members were only such as in former Kings Reigns; only in that of the 22 H. 2. 
(d) Ben. Abb. p. 77. Anno Dom. 1176.  it is said, Rex congregatis in urbe Londoniarum, Archipraesulibus, & Episcopis, & Comitibus, & Sapientioribus Regni sui; where Sapientiores are instead of Barones, and for the Kings Summons it is always said, Rex convocat, congregavit, praecepit convenire or mandavit, as is most expressly said in that great Council, Anno 1177. 23 H. 2. 
(e) Ben. Abbas, p. 86.  That the King sent Messengers through the whole Isle of England, and commanded the Archbishops, Bishops, Earls and Barons of all England, that they should be with him at London, the next Sunday after the beginning of Lent.   

Of the Great Councils in King Richard the First's time.  
THere are few great Councils met withal in his short Reign, he being so great a part of it out of the Kingdom: The first I find is in 
(a) Fol. 129. num. 16  Matthew Paris Anno 1189. 1 Reg. That in the day following the Exaltation of the Holy Cross at Pipewel, Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, & aliorum Magnatum suorum fretus Concilio, He supplied the Vacances of several Bishops Sees.  
The Second I find is 
(b) Hoved. fol. 376. a. num. 30.  when he and the King of France agreed to go to the Holy Land, where it is said, that his Earls and Barons, who took the Crusado in the General Council at London, swore, etc. of which it is that 
(c) Fol. 155. num. 50.  Matthew Paris saith, That the King of England, convocatis Episcopis & Regni Proceribus, received the Oath from the Messengers of the King of France.  
In the Fifth of King Richard 
(d) Hoved. fol, 418. b. num. 20.  we have a full Example of the holding a Great Council by Commission; for during the Imprisonment of King Richard, Adam de Sancto Edmundo Clerk, was sent from Earl John the King's Brother, to his Friends in England, to defend his Castles against the King, and dined with Hubert Archbishop of Canterbury, boasting much of the French Kings assisting Earl John: After Dinner the Mayor of London seized on him in his Lodgings, and upon all his Breves and Mandates, who delivered them to the Archbishop.  
This occasioned the Archbishop (being the King's Commissioner) to convene a great Council the next day; 
A Great Council called on a Days warning.  but surely Summons had issued out before, or else it is a great Instance, that the great Councils might be called of such of the Clergy and Nobility as were nearest at Hand; for my Author expressly saith, 
(e) Qui i● crastino convocatis coram co Episcopis, Comitibus, & Baronibus Regni, ostendit eis literas Comitis Johannis & earum tenuras, & statim per commune concilium Regni desinitum est quod Comes Johannes dissaisiretur. Idem.  That the Archbishop the next day, called before him the Bishops, Earls and Barons of the Kingdom, and showed to them the Letters of Earl John, and the Tenor of them; and adds, that instantly by the Common Council of the Kingdom, it was defined that Earl John should be disseised. This Adam, saith Hoveden, came into England not long before King Richard's release from his Imprisonment.  
The next great. 
(f) Idem, 419. ●. 30. A Great Council of four Days.  Council I find, was upon the Thirtieth of March, summoned to meet the King at Nottingham, and at this were present Alienor the Kings Mother, Hubert Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffery Archbishop of York, and seven Bishops more, Earl David brother to the King of Scots, Hamelin Earl Warren, Ralph Earl of Chester, William Earl Ferrer, William Earl of Salisbury, and Roger Bigot, and names no more; but saith the same day, the King disseized 
(g) Rex dissaisivit Gerardum de Canvil de Comitatu Linc. & Hug. Bardolf de Castro & Comitat. Ebor.  Gerard de Canvil, and others. It appears, that this Council sat but four days, on the second day the King required Judgement against Earl John his Brother; on the third day the King 
(h) Rex constituit sibi dari, etc. deinde praecepit— exigit. Concerning the Form of Proceeding in the Pleas of the Crown, the Assize of the Forest, wherein the Laws made in this King's time are set down, see Selden's Epinomis.  appointed to be given him 2 s. of every Carucate of Land through England, and that every one should perform the third part of Military Service, according to their respective Knights Fees, to pass over Sea with him into Normandy, and then exacted of the Cestertian Monks, all their Wool of that year, for which they compounded; and the fourth and last day, Complaints were heard against the Archbishop of York, and further Prosecution of Gerard de Canvil.  
Hoveden gives an account of the King's Progress, till the 11th. of the same Month, to which time the great Council was adjourned to meet at Northampton; where the King of Scots made his demands of the Counties of Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland and Lancashire; 
Id. Hoved.  and my Author saith, That the King having taken advice with the Bishops, Earls and Barons (no orders of Men more are mentioned) he gave answer to the King of Scots: but it seems he had no mind to part with those Frontier Counties, but by Charter, in the presence of his Mother Alienor, the Archbishop and other Bishops and many others, as well Clerks as Laics of either Kingdom, he granted the King and his Heirs certain Allowances, Safe-Conduct, etc. when he should come to the King's Court upon Summons.  
The most remarkable things in these Councils to be considered, 
Remarks upon these Great Councils.  are the quick dispatch of Business in them, the small Numbers they consisted of; and that there appears no Footstep of any Commoners by Representation; and by the Words, Rex praecepit, constituit, etc. it shows, that the King had solely the Authoritative Power of passing the Consultations into binding Laws, even where Money was to be levied of the Subject, and disseisure was to be made, which was then practised, but by an happy ease to the Subject, is since by King Edward the First abrogated; for which as we ought all to be thankful, so to make use of this great Liberty, that we may not abuse it to the damage of the Crown, that bestowed the Largess, and not so much boast ourselves that we are freemen, as to remember gratefully whence our Freedom came.   

Of the Great Councils in King John's time.  
THE first great Council that I have met with in King John's time is that held at Oxford, 
(a) Matt. Paris, fol. 176. num. 30. ult. edit.  Anno Dom. 1204. 6 Regni, the Morrow after the Circumcision, where, as Matthew Paris saith, convenerunt ad colloquium Rex & Magnates, and there were granted to the King two Marks and an half out of every Knights Fee. Yet though all the Members are included under the name of Magnates, yet my Author 
(b) Nec etiam Episcopi et Abbates sive Ecclesiasticae personae sine promissione recesserunt. Idem.  saith, that neither the Bishops, Abbats, or Ecclesiastic Persons passed away without a promise (of supply, I suppose.)  
So that I conceive the Clergy undertook for their Order to contribute something apart, as it hath been since in use for the Convocation, to give a distinct Tax imposed by themselves on the Clergy: some evident Footsteps of which usage we find in that Council of 
(c) Hoveden, fol. 282. b. num. 10. Praecepit Rex Archiepiscopis & Episcopis, ut Si●illa sua appone●en●, & cum cateri proni essent ad id saeciendum, Archiepise. Cant. juravit quod nunquam scripto illi apponeret, nec leges consirmaret.  Clarendon, wherein Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury was required by the King that he and the Bishops should set to their Seals in Confirmation of the ancient Laws the King enjoined to be observed; which when the Bishops were willing to do, the Archbishop swore he would never do.  
The Members of the Great Council, and the absoluteness of King John in imposing Taxes is fully discovered in what Matthew 
(d) Fol. 180. num. 30.  Paris writes, that Anno 1207. 9 Regni, the King kept his Christmas at Winchester, the Magnates Regni being present; and on the Purification of the Virgin Mary, he took through England the Thirteenth of Movables, 
The King imposeth Taxes.  and other things, both of the Laics and Ecclesiastics, all murmuring, 
(e) Cunctis murmurantibus, sed contradicere non audentibus. A Great Council held in the King's absence.  but none daring to contradict him.  
Anno 1213. 15 Joh. the King intending an expedition into Normandy, left Geoffrey Fitz-Peter, and the Bishop of Winchester Commissioners in his absence, who at St. Alban held a Council with the Archbishop, the Bishops, and the Magnates Regni, where on the part of the King it was firmly 
(f) Mat. Paris, fol. 201. num. 30. Ex parte Regis firmiter est praeceptum, sicut vitam & membra sua diligunt, ne a quoquam aliquid violenter extorqueant, vel ali●ui injuriam irrogare praesumant.  enjoined, that the Laws of King Henry his Grandfather should be kept by all in his Kingdom, and all evil Laws should be totally disannulled, and all Sheriffs, Foresters, and other Ministers of the King, under the severest Penalties of Life and Limb, should not violently extort any thing from any Person, or presume to offer Injury to any.  
In which we may observe the Conventions of great Councils in the King's absence, and that the Laws have force only by the King's Authority, as appears by the expressions, ex parte Regis firmiter est praeceptum.  
In the same Year the Eighth of the Calends of September, Stephen, 
A Convention or Conspiracy against the King.  Archbishop of Canterbury, with the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Deans and Barons of the Kingdom, met at London, at St. Paul's, in a Conspiracy against King John; and as 
(g) Fol. 201. num. 50, 60.  Matthew Paris saith, the Fame was, that the Archbishop calling to himself a Club of the Nobles, told them secretly, that they had heard how he had absolved the King, and compelled him to swear that he should destroy evil Laws, and should recall the good Laws, viz, those of King Edward, and make them to be observed in his Kingdom; and that now there was found a Charter of King Henry the First, by which if they would, they might recall to the Pristine State, their long-lost Liberties, which Charter he produced, and it was that made to Hugh de Bocland his Justiciary, and so they made a Confederacy among themselves, and broke up their Assembly.  
We may note, 
Observations on the foregoing Councils.  that this Convention at London was a Conspiracy, yet it had the Face of a great Council, as to the constituent Parts of it, and no Representatives of the People, and they grounded their Confederacy upon the regaining their lost Liberties, and had recourse to King Edward's Laws, and their Confirmation by King Henry the First. So that even such Rebels owned Kings the Fountains, Authors, and Establishers of their Liberties, as well knowing they were born Subjects, and whatever was remitted of the absolute Power of Princes, was by their own Grants; though they might be induced to those Concessions from several causes, but whenever threats, force, or other necessities for supplies, or such like, extorted these, they were very ill kept. Anno 1215. 17 Joh. the Barons pressing the King to confirm the Charter of Privileges, the Archbishop with his Associates read over each Chapter. But the King understanding the Tenor of them, with indignation and scorn said, 
(h) Quare cum istis iniquis exactionibus Barones non postulant Regnum? Nunquam tales illis concederet libertates, unde ipse efficeretur servus. Matt. Paris, fol. 213. num. 60.  Why with these unjust exactions do not the Barons require the Kingdom? and swore he would never grant such Liberties, whereby he should be made a Servant.  
However he was afterwards at Runing-mede, compelled to sign the Charter, there being with him but eight or nine Bishops, four Earls, and some twelve Barons, as Matthew Paris numbers them; but he saith, as to those present on the behalf of the Barons, the Company was innumerable, as being tota Angliae Nobilitas in unum collecta.  
Therefore the King grants them the Liberties by way of Charter 
(i) Idem, fol. 215. num. 13.  per consilium venerabilium Patrum nostrorum, etc. and so recounts those that were present with him, not mentioning any of those that were against him as I remember.  
This was the Charter which Henry the third 
(k) Idem, fol, 216. num. 30.  confirmed, and is called Magna Charta, the principal matter in it, which relates to my purpose, was, that he made some alteration in the manner of Summoning Members to the Great Council, viz. 
The alteration of the Summoning the Members to the Great Council. Note. In this Charter the King grants, he will raise no Money on the Subject, without Consent, but in three Cases; to redeem his Body, make his eldest Son Knight, and marry his eldest Daughter: And the like Power others ● had over their Liberi homines.  That the Archbishop, Bishops, Abbats, Earls, and greater Barons of the Kingdom, should be summoned by special Writs, and that he would cause to be summoned by the Sheriffs and his Bailiffs, those which held in Capite of him, to a certain day by general Summons. So that it is apparent, that the Great Councils heretofore had only consisted of such Earls and great Barons and Tenants in Capite, as the King by special Writ pleased to Summon; and this new way brought in a greater number of the Tenants in Capite: but still here were no Representatives of the Commons.  
In the Charta de Foresta, the King saith, Dei intuitu, etc. ad emendationem Regni nostri, spontanea & bona voluntate nostra dedimus, concessimus pro nobis & haeredibus nostris, has libertates subscriptas.  
The King was sore vexed, 
He reputes his granting the Charter.  that these Liberties had been extorted from him, and sent to Pope 
(m) Idem, 224.  Innocent, who also absolved him from the Obligation, upon the ground that he had given 
(n) Id. 227. num. 20. The Pope absolves him.  the Kingdom to St. Peter, and the Church of Rome, and so could make no such Charter without his leave, and after he Excommunicated the Rebellious Barons.  
In this Charter, as in all the rest of the Charters of Liberties, we 
(o) Animad. on Jan. Augl. fol. 167. The King's Grant by Charter, a good Law then.  may observe, that the Petitions of the People were drawn into the form of a Charter, and passed under the King's Seal, as his mere voluntary free Grants, and Concessions, without any Votes, Suffrages, or Authority of the People. So Matt. Paris saith of this Charter, that when King John saw the Barons too powerful for him 
(p) Fol. 255. num. 30, 50.  gratanter eis concederet Leges & Libertates quas petebant; he willingly granted the Laws and Liberties which they asked, or petitioned for.  
So in the Charter itself, 
(q) Ibid. fol. 256. lin. 18.  Concessimus etiam, & omnibus liberis hominibus nostri Regni Angliae pro nobis & haeredibus nostris in perpetuum omnes libertates subscriptas habendas, & tenendas eye, & haeredibus suis de nobis, & haeredibus nostris: that is, And we have also granted to all our Freemen of the Kingdom of England, for us and our Heirs for ever, 
By Freemen here to be understood the Tenants in Capite.  all the under-written Liberties, to have and to hold to them and their Heirs of us and our Heirs, etc.    

CHAP. XXVI. Of the Great Councils and Parliaments during the Reign of King Henry the Third, to the end of the Reign of King Edward the Third.  
THE first great Council I find in this King's Reign was on the Eighth of the Octaves of 
(a) Matt. Paris fol. 266. num. 60.  Epiphany, Anno 1223. 7 H. 3. The King having kept his Christmas at Oxford, came to London, to have a Colloquium with his Barons, and the Archbishop and other Magnates pressed the King to confirm the Liberties and Free customs, for which Wars had been moved against his Father, and which he had confirmed by Oath, upon the recess of Lewis of France; to which also he said, the 
(b) Juravit & tota Nobilitas cum eo, quod libertates praescriptas omnes observarent, & omnibus traderent observandas. Ibid.  whole Nobility had sworn that they would observe them, and deliver them to all others to observe. To which William Briwere, one of the King's Council, answering for the King, said, The Liberties they desired being violently extorted from the King, they ought not of right to be observed.  
From whence we may observe, 
Liberties violently extorted from the King, not binding.  that whatever claims were made for Liberties, still they were grounded on the Monarch● Concessions, and such as were by any violence wrested from the Kings, were not reputed binding to the Crown.  
In the Octaves of the Holy Trinity, the Eighth of Henry the Third, there met at a Colloquium at Northampton, the King with 
(c) Rex cum Archiepiscopis, Episcopis, Comitibus, Baronibus, & aliis multis de Regni negotiis tractaturus. Idem, fol. 269. num. 60. & 270.  the Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, and Barons, and many other, to treat of the Affairs of the Kingdom. By these, alii multi, the Tenants in Capite are to be understood, which more numerously appeared since King John's Charter. This Great Council was intended for the relief of Poicton; but Falcacius de Brent having seized on Bedford Castle, and taken Henry de Berybroke, one of the King's Itinerant Justices; obliged the King to prosecute him. At this 
(d) Idem, fol. 271. num. 20.  Council, the Prelates and Laics gave the King for his great Labours and Expenses 2 s. upon every Plough, 
The King grants the Tenants in Capite Scutage upon their Tenants.  and the King granted to the Magnates 2 m. out of every Knights Fee. This was to be levied by the Magnates, such as held of the King in Capite, of their Tenants, to reimburse them what they had expended in aiding the King. And so the Council broke up.  
But the King 9 Regni, Anno 1225. 
(e) Idem, fol. 272. num. 20.  keeping his Court at Christmas at Westminster, praesentibus Clero, & Populo, cum Magnatibus Regionis. After the Solemnity was passed, Hubert de Burgo the King's Justiciary, on the part of the King, proposed to the Archbishops, 
Et al●●t universis.  Bishops, Earls, Barons, and all the Universe (that is the Tenent in Capite) the damages and injuries which were brought upon the King beyond Sea; by which, not only the King, but many of the Earls and Barons were disinherited: therefore the King required Counsel and Aid of them of a Fifteenth.  
Upon this the Archbishop, and the whole number of Bishops, 
Magna Charta granted.  Earls, Barons, Abbats and Priors, having had deliberation, answered the King, That they would willingly yield to the King's desire, if he would grant them the long desired Liberties. The King, saith my Author, being led by Covetousness, or as he means, being desirous of a supply, yielded to what the Magnates desired; so he granted that which is called Magna Charta, so deservedly prized by all Englishmen ever since, and the 
(f) Idem, num. 30.  Charta de Foresta, and presently Charters were got drawn, and the King sealed them, and they were sent into all Counties two; one of the Liberties, and the other of the Forests.  
Matth. Paris saith expressly, That they 
(g) Ita quod chartae utrorumque Requm in nullo inv●niuntur dissimiles.  were the same that King John had granted, and so refers the Reader to peruse them in what he had writ on his Reign. It is to me very strange, that since so many Original Grants of the Kings of England, and other ancienter Deeds, being every where to be found among the ancient Evidences of many Noble and gentlemen's Families; yet no where that I can learn, any of these Original Charters are to be found, except one at Lambeth, as Mr. Pryn hath observed; That upon Record being only an Exemplification in King Edward the First's time  
Anno 1232. on the Nones of March, the King called a Great Council to 
(h) Idem, fol. 314. num. 20.17 H. 3.  Westminster, where there met Magnates Angliae tam Laici quam Praelati; The King required an Aid for the payment of his Debts, contracted by his Expeditions beyond Sea. To which Ralph Earl of Chester on behalf of the Nobility, answered, That the Earls, Barons, and Knights that held of the King in Capite, being with the King personally in that Expedition, and having fruitlessly spent their Money, were poor; so that of 
(i) Vnde Regi de Jure auxilium non debebant. Idem, num. 30. The Tenants in Capite having personally served according to the Tenure of their Service, deny the King Aid.  right they owed not Aid to the King. And so my Author saith, the Laics having asked leave, all departed, and the Prelates answered, That many Bishops and Abbats being absent, they desired respite till some other meeting, which was appointed fifteen days after Easter.  
By this we may observe, who they were that had the power of giving consent, or granting aid; for if there had been any other Members of the Lay Order, besides Earls, Barons, and Knights, that held in Capite, the Earls of Chester's Argument had been of no validity.  
In the Statute of Merton, 
(k) Pul●on. Stat. p. 1. In one part it is said, Our Lord the King granted by the Consent of his Magnates.  20 H. 3. it is thus expressed, Before William Archbishop of Canterbury, and other his Bishops and Suffragans, and before the greater part of the Earls and Barons of England there being assembled, for the Coronation of the said King, and Helioner the Queen, about which they were called; thus it was provided and granted, as well of the foresaid Archbishop, Bishops, Earls and Barons, as of the King himself and others.  
I shall only cull out some few of the Great Councils in this King's Reign, wherein most fully are expressed the true Members of them, or such wherein something remarkable was transacted.  
Anno 1237. 21 H. 3. The King keeping his Christmas at Winchester, sent his 
(l) Matt. Paris, fol. 367. num. 30. Misu, etc. scripta Regalia, pracipiens omnibus ad Regnum Angliae spectantibus, etc. ut omnes sine omissi●ne— conveairent Regni negotia tractaturt totum Regnum contingentia.  Royal Writs through all England, commanding all that appertained to the Kingdom of England, that is, all who were to be Members of the great Council, which my Author explains particularly thus, viz. Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors installed, Earls and Barons, that without failure they should meet at London on the Octaves of the Epiphany, to treat of the Affairs of the Kingdom, concerning the whole Kingdom; then he adds, That on the day of St. Hilary, there met at London an 
(m) Insinita Nobilium multitudo, viz. Regni totalis universitas.  infinite Multitude of the Nobles, viz. The whole University of the Kingdom, which were the Persons of those Orders before particularised.  
Anno 1246. 30 H. 3. By the King's 
(n) Edicto Regio convocata convenit ad Parliamentum generali ●●mum ●otius Regni Anglicani totalis Nobilitas. Idem, p. 609. num. 10.  Edict was called to the most general Parliament (saith Matthew Paris) all the Nobility of the whole Kingdom of England, viz. of the Prelates as well Abbats and Priors as Bishops, also Earls and Barons; and a few Pages after, concerning the same Parliament, he saith, All the Magnates of the Kingdom met, and the King himself first spoke to the Bishops apart, then to the Earls and Barons, and last to the Abbats and Priors.  
In this, 
The word Parliament now used.  that which frequently in Matthew Paris is called Colloquium, now he gives the Title of Parliament to, from the French word parlour, to confer or speak together; and we find what is meant also by totalis Nobilitas.  
Anno 1253. 37 H. 3. By the 
(o) Tota edicto Regio convocata Angliae Nobilitas convenit de arduis Regni Negotiis simul cum R●ge tractatura. Idem. fol. 745. num. 40.  King's Edict the Nobility of England being summoned, met at London to treat together with the King, of the arduous Affairs of the Kingdom; and there were present with most of the Earls and Barons, the Archbishop Boniface, and almost all the Bishops of England. In this great Council were the Tenants in Capite, according to King John's Charter. The King in this Parliament or Colloquium, requires Money for an Expedition into the Holy Land; but for fifteen days there were great Contests about it, till the King de novo confirmed King John's Charters, and a solemn Excommunication was agreed upon, to be pronounced against the Infringers of it; and my Author saith, Rex, Magnates, & Communitas Populi protestantur, in the Presence of the Venerable Fathers, etc. That they never consented, or do consent that any thing be added or altered in the Charters, but plainly contradict it; so 3 May 
(p) Pat. 37 H. 3. m. 13. Anno 1253.  in Westminster-Hall, the Exemplification passed the Seal of the King and other great Men.  
But it is principally to be considered what is expressed in the Patent, 
* Praefatus Dominus Rex in prolatione praefatae sententiae, omnes libertates, consuetudines Regni sui Angliae & usitatas dignitates & Jura Coronae suae ●re proprio specialiter sibi & Regno suo salvavit & excepit.  That the King in the Declaration of the said Sentence, did, by his own Mouth specially save and except to himself and his Kingdom, all the Liberties, ancient Customs of his Kingdom, and Usages, Dignities and Rights of his Crown.  
By which it is apparent how cautious the King was in these liberal Concessions, not to prejudice his Prerogative. They are neither few in Number, nor of mean repute for judgement and learning in our Laws, who assert, 
Such like Protestation King Richard the Second made, 10 Reg. Rot. Parl. 10 R. 2. num. 32. See in King Stephen.  that as Acts of Parliament made contrary to Magna Charta, are void; so likewise are all such as diminish the Prerogative in any part of it, which is necessary for the support of the Government: So upon the passing the Petition 
(q) His Majesty's Speeches, fol. 368. of the Basilica.  of Right, King Charles the First, the King said, The King willeth that Right be done according to the Laws and Customs of the Land, and that the Statutes be put in due Execution, that the Subjects may have no cause to complain of any Wrong or Oppression, contrary to their Just, Rights and Liberties, to the Preservation whereof he holdeth himself obliged, as well as of his Prerogative: But this would not please, and so he pronounced, Le droit soit fait comme il est desire, and adds, that, he is sure, is full, but no more than he granted in his first Answer; his meaning in that being to confirm all their Liberties, knowing according to their Protestations, they neither meant nor can hurt his Prerogative. The People's Liberty strengthens the King's Prerogative, and the King's Prerogative is to defend the People's Liberties.  
The rest of the Parliaments of this King's Reign, are said to be called 
(r) Id. 435. num. 10.21 H. 3. Id. 693. num. 20.26 H. 3. Id. fol. 579. num. 40. Id. fol. 696. num. 30. Id. fol. 698. num. 40. Vide Brady's Appendix, fol. 59, 60.  per scripta Regalia, submonitione Regia, or that, scripsit Rex praecipiens, or missis literis convocavit, Anno 1246. 30 H. 3. or Edicto Regio convocat, etc. which denotes the Authority convening them; and for the Members, they are either styled Magnates, omnis Regni Nobilitas, or Clerus & Populus cum Magnatibus, Magnates tam Laici, quam Praelati, Episcopi, & alii Ecclesiarum Praelati, cum Proceribus Regni, or else they are particularly numbered to be Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, for the Clergy, and the Comites & Barones for the Laity. In one I find Archiepiscopus cum Suffraganeis suis for the rest of the Bishops, and 
(s) M. Paris, fol. 397. num. 10.10 H. 3.  another runs thus, Anno 1247. 31 H. 3. fecit Dominus Rex Magnates suos necnon & Angliae Archidiaconos per scripta sua Regia Londinum convocari. Yet though Matt. Paris only mention the Magnates & Archidiaconi; yet he saith, when the prefixed day was come, the Bishops all willingly absented themselves, and he gives the Reason, ne viderentur prop●iis factis eminus adversari, sciebant enim corda omnium, usque ad animae amaritudinem, non immerito sauciari.  
Then when he 
(u) Id. 629. Edit. ult num. 10. Archdeacon's summoned to Parliament.  gives an Account of the business of this great Council, he saith that the Archdeacon's of England, as also not the least part of the whole Clergy of the Kingdom, with the Magnates complained of the Pope's exaction; and so Letters were writ to the Pope and Cardinals.  
It may be noted also, That in those Days the Kings summoned other dignified Clergy besides Bishops, Abbats and Priors.  
I shall insist no longer upon these Matters, 
The new Constitution of Parliament by Representatives.  but pass to the great Mutation which was made in the Constitution of our English Parliaments: It seems to be clear, that before King John's time, the Members of the Great Councils were summoned by special Writ, and they were only the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats and Priors for the Clergy, and the Earls and Barons, and such of the Tenants in Capite as were of greatest quality, as the King pleased: But in King John's Charter, all the Tenants in Capite were convened by a General Summons, which did much increase the number of the Members of these great Councils; and by so much as they were more numerous, it is likely the Popular Barons hoped to make their Party the stronger against the King; for we find it introduced when the Barons were propense to rebel.  
So the Second great Alteration on the Constitution of Parliament was introduced, 
Montfort's Rebellion.  when Simon Montfort Earl of Leicester, and the Rebellious Barons had the King and the Prince Prisoners. Simon Montford, to strengthen his Interest, first, in the King's Name, summons the Earls and Barons which were in Arms against the King; also at other times summoned more Abbats and Priors than had been used, for that the Clergy at that time had a great Opinion of him, and he was their Minion, as is apparent in Matthew Paris, and fully in the judicious 
(w) Answer to Petyt, fol. 137, 138, 139.  Doctor Brady, to whom I must specially refer the curious Reader in this particular.  
The 14th. 
The Form of the Writ of Summons.  of Dec. 48 H. 3. the first Writ issued out thus, Item mandatum est singulis Vicecomitibus per Angliam, quod venire faciant, duos Milites de legalioribus & discretioribus Militibus singulorum Comitatuum, It is commanded to all the Sheriffs of England, that they make, or cause to come, two Knights of the more Legal and Discreet Knights of every County, to be at London on the Octaves of St. Hilary next.  
So in the like manner 
(x) Cl. 49 H. 3. m. 11. dorso schedulae.  Writs were directed to Cities and Burroughs, to send two of the more Discreet, Legal and Honest Citizens and Burgesses. This is without Date; that to the Barons of the Cinque Ports is Jan. 20. It doth not appear by the Writ to the Sheriffs, whether they or the Counties were to elect and send those Knights, or who were Electors.  
It is the Opinion of most learned 
(y) Brady against Petyt, fol. 143. Dugdale's Baronage, fol. 759. col. 3.  Men, that Simon Montfort apprehended (from the Concourse of the Nobility, and their great Retinues, and the Example of his and the Baron's Practices at Oxford) some danger to himself and his Affairs, and so altered the ancient Usage.  
Upon the 5th. of August 49 H. 3. Simon Montfort was slain at Evesham, and all his Party routed; and the 8th. of September following, the King convened his Parliament at Winchester, which according to the old form, 
The old Form again used.  consisted only of the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons and Great Men: nor did he continue Montfort's Method after, as appears by that Parliament he called 50 Regni.  
By the Statute of Marleburgh 52 H. 3. it is evident, 
All the Barons not summoned, but the more discreet, and so of the lesser Barons.  That even all the great Barons were not summoned, but only the more Discreet, and such as the King thought fit to call; and the like is observed of the lesser Barons or Tenants in Capite: For if it had been by General Summons, that Restriction of the more Discreet had been useless; so that it appears, that what 
(z) Britannia, fol. 122. Quibus ip●● Rex digna●us est brevia summonitionis dirigere, venirent, etc. & non alii.  Mr. Camden's ancient Author observes, is true, That after the horrid Confusions and Troubles of the Baron's Wars, those Earls and Barons, whom the King thought worthy to summon by his Writ to meet, came to his Parliaments, and no other.  
The Preamble to this Statute of 
(a) Stat. Edit. 1576. p. 15.  Marlebridge runs thus in Tottel, Providente ipso Domino Rege, ad Regni sui Angliae meliorationem & exhibitionem Justitiae (prout Regalis Officii poscit Vtilitas) pleniorem, convocatis discretioribus ejusdem Regni tam majoribus quam minoribus, provisum est & statutum, ac concordatum & ordinatum.  
According to Pulton the 
(b) Fol. 14.  Preamble is thus, That whereas the Realm of England, of late, had been disquieted, with manifold Troubles and Dissensions, for Reformation whereof Statutes and Laws be right necessary, 
The Use and Benefit of Laws.  whereby the Peace and Tranquillity of the People must be observed; wherein the King intending to devise convenient Remedy, hath made these Acts, Ordinances and Statutes underwritten, which he willeth to be observed for ever firmly and inviolably of all his Subjects, as well high as low.  
Thus we see in the whole Reign of H. 3. (excepting in that Parliament of Montfort's Faction) the Bishops and dignified Clergy, Earls, Barons and Tenants in Capite, were only summoned as Members of the great Councils; and there were no Representatives of the Commons; and the King's Authority in summoning, dissolving and making Laws is most manifest.  

Of Parliaments in King Edward the First 's Reign.  
I Shall now glean out of Tottel and Pulton's Editions of the Statutes, the most material Preambles, which give light to the constituent Parts of Parliaments, to the Legislative Power in the King, with the Concurrence of the two Houses, and how that in the Series of the King's Reign hath been expressed, and such other matters relating to the Parliament, as may show the gradual Progress of their Constitution, to the usage of this present Age; leaving the Reader to make his own remarks from the matters of Fact, and the expressions used by my Authors, and explaining some.  
The Preface to the Statute of 
(a) Ceux sont les establishments le Roy Ed. fitz Roy Hen. fait a Westminst. etc. par son Council, & par Passentments des Archevesques, Evesques, Abbes, Priores, Countess, Barons, & tout le Commonalty de la terre illonques summons. Tottel. Stat. fol. 24. Pulton, p. 19  Westminster gins thus, These are the Establishments of King Edward, Son to King Henry, made at Westminster, at his first General Parliament after his Coronation, etc. by his Council, and by the Assent of the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons, and the whole Commonalty of the Land thither summoned.  
This Parliament was prorogued before it met, and the Writ of Prorogation mentions only, Quia generale Parliamentum nostrum, quod cum Praelatis & Magnatibus Regni nostri proposuimus habere, etc. Therefore having prorogued it, mandamus, etc. Intersitis ad tractandum & ordinandum una cum Praelatis & Magnatibus Regni nostri, 
(b) Brady against Pety●, fol. 147.  etc. So that all the Members are included in the two general Terms of Praelati & Magnates, which great Men very frequently comprehended as well the Barones Majores, as Minores, the Earls, Barons and greater Tenants in Capite, and the less, which then were called the Community of the Kingdom.  
The rest of the Preamble of the Statutes made at 
(c) Pulton's Stat. An. 1275.3 E. 1. f. 19  Westminster runs thus, Because our Lord the King hath great Zeal, and desire to redress the State of the Realm, etc. the King hath ordained and established these Acts under written.  
The Preface to the Statute de Bigamis, 4 Oct. 4 Ed. 1. is thus 
(d) In prasentia venerabilium purum qu●ru●dam Episcoporum Angliae & aliorum de Concilio R●gis ●●citatae s●●erunt constitutiones ●ub ●riptae, & postmod●●m coram Domino Rege & Concilio s●o auditae & publicatae: Quia omnes de consili●●am ●us●●●●arii quam alii concordaverunt, etc. Tottel. p. 39 b.  expressed, In the Presence of certain Reverend Fathers, Bishops of England, and others of the King's Council, the constitutions under written were recited, and after heard and published before the King and his Council; for as much as all the King's Council, as well Justices as others did agree, that they should be put in writing, for a perpetual memory, and that they should be steadfastly observed.  
In the First Chapter it is said, Concordatum est per Justiciarios & alios sapientes de Concilio Regni Domini Regis, It was agreed by the Justices and other wise or sage Men, of the Council of the Kingdom of the Lord the King.  
Perhaps (saith the judicious Doctor Brady) the best understanding of the preamble and first Chapter, may be, that the Laws and Constitutions were prepared by the King and his 
(e) Answer to P●tyt, fol. 148.  Council, with the Assistance of the Justices and Lawyers that were of it, or called to assist in it, and declared afterwards in Parliament: 
(f) Prae●i●●ae autem constitutiones e●i●● suerunt, etc. & ex●une l●●um habean●. Tottel. fol. 40.  for it is said in the close of the Statute, The aforesaid Constitutions were published at Westminster in the Parliament, after the Feast of St. Michael, the 4th. of the King's Reign, and thence forward to take place.  
The Preamble to the Statute of Gloucester, Anno 1278. 6 E. 1. is thus, 
(g) Pour amendment de son Roialm, & pur plus pleinir exhibition de droit si com●●●● pr●sit d● Office deman●, app●lles le plues discretes de son royalme, au●● bien des Granders com● des Meindres, establie est & concordantment ordine. Tottel. fol. 50.  The King, for the amendment of the Realm, and for the more full Exhibition of Justice, according as the benefit of his Office requires, having called the most discreet of his Realm, as well the greater as the smaller; It is established and unanimously ordained, as Pulton adds, after by the King and his Justice's certain Expositions were made.  
The Statute of Mortmain is thus prefaced, Nos pro 
(h) Tottel. p. 48.  Vtilitate Regni volentes providere, Remedium de Concilio Praelatorum, Comitum, Baronum & aliorum fidelium Regni nostri de Concilio nostro existentium, providimus, statuimus & ordinavimus, which 
(i) Pulton, fol. 35. Anno 1279. 14. Nou. 7 E. 1.  Pulton renders by the Advice of our Prelates, Earls, Barons and Subjects of our Kingdom, being of our Council, the King hath provided, made and ordained; whereas by Fideles is to be understood the Tenants in Capite.  
The Statute of Acton Burnel, or Statute Merchant 11 E. 1. according to Tottel, was made by the 
(k) Ce Roy per luy & per tout son Counsel ad ordain & establ●e. Tottel, fol. 49. & 82.  King himself and his whole Council: That this was done in Parliament, appears by the Statute of Merchants, made in the 13th. of the same King, wherein it is said, Our Lord the King, by himself and by his Council, at his 
(l) A son Parliament qu●il ●●●●t a Acton-Burnel, etc.  Parliament, which he held at Acton Burnel, 11 Regni, made and ordained these Establishments; or as 
(m) Pulton, fol. 36.  Pulton hath it, The King caused the Statute made by the King and his Council at Acton Burnel to be rehearsed, and hath ordained and established.  
Since the 49 of H. 3. to the 18 of Ed. 1. we find 
(n) R●t. Pat. 20 E. 1. m. 15.  no Writs for summoning of Knights, Citizens and Burgesses; but the 14 of June 18 Ed. 1. The King issued out the following Summons, Rex, etc. 
The Form of Summons of Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, renewed at the Petition of the Nobles. Two or three Knights to be chosen.  cum per Comites, Barones & quosdam alios de Proceribus Regni nostri nuper fuissemus super quibusdam specialiter requisiti, tam cum ipsis quam cum aliis de communitatibus Regni illius colloquium habere, volumus & tractatum, etc. Tibi praecipimus quod duos vel tres de discretioribus, & ad laborandum potentioribus Militibus de Comitatu praedicto, sine dilatione eligi, & eos ad nos, etc. venire facias, etc. cum plena potestate pro se & communitate Comitatus praedicti, ad consulendum, & consentiendum pro se & communitate illa, hiis quae Comites, Barones & Proceres praedicti, tum duxerint concordanda, vel concorditer ordinaverint in praemissis. The English of which is, Whereas we have been especially petitioned and requested by the Earls, Barons and others of the great Men of our Kingdom, concerning certain matters, upon which we will have Conference and treat, as well with themselves as with others of the Counties of that Kingdom: We command thee, that without delay thou makest to be chosen, two or three of the most discreet and ablest Knights, for dispatch of business of the Counties aforesaid, and cause them to come to us, etc. with full Power for themselves, and the whole Community of the County aforesaid, to consult and consent for themselves and that Community, to such things which the Earls, Barons and great Men aforesaid, shall think fit to agree upon.  
From this we may observe, That by Virtue of this Writ, 
No Citizens and Burgesses, but only Knights for Counties.  no Citizens or Burgesses could be chosen or sent to Parliament; But only Knights for Counties: Secondly, The Scutage was granted in this Parliament, as Doctor Brady hath noted, fourteen days before the Writ for Election of Knights issued out; and it is 
(o) Tottel's Stat. p. 85.  apparent, That the Statute of Westminster the Third was made the Eighth of July, which was a week before they were to appear, and consequently was made without them; for the Preamble runs, Dominus Rex in Parliamento suo apud Westmonasterium post Pascham Anno Regni sui 18. viz. in quindena S. Johannis Baptistae (i.e. 8 July) ad instantium Magnatum Regni sui concessit, providit & statuit.  
From this Writ and the Variation of the following Writs, and other Records, the judicious Doctor Brady 
(p) Answer to Petyt, fol. 151.  notes, That it was from the King's Authority, and at this time, that the House of Commons came to be fixed and established, in the present constant form it now is and hath been for many King's Reigns, and it doth appear that King Edward the First was not altogether confined to any certain number of Knights, Citizens, or Burgesses, nor were several strict forms and usages now practised, ever then thought of, or some legal Niceties or Punctilios now in use, then judged of absolute Necessity.  
The Statute of Quo 
(q) Pulton, An. 1290. fol. 58.  Warranto in the Eighteenth Year of Edward the First, saith that the King of his special Grace, and for the affection he beareth to his Prelates, Earls and Barons, and others of his Realm hath granted, etc.  
The Statute de 
(r) Idem, Anno 1293. fol. 61.  Malefactoribus in Parcis in the Twenty first Year of Edward the First, saith, Our Lord the King at his Parliament, etc. at the instance of the Nobles of the Realm hath granted, etc.  
Anno 1294. the King issues out his 
(s) Cl. 22 E. 1. m. 6. dorso. Four Knights for a County.  Writs to cause two Knights out of every County to be chosen, etc. Dated the Eighteenth of October, and the next day issues out Writs for other two to be chosen to meet at the same time and place.  
Out of Mr. Ryley's 
(t) Fol. 241.  Placita Parliamentorum it is clear, that the Parliament which met on the Octaves of St. 
* Claus. 28 E. 1. m. 3. dorso.  Hilary or the Twentieth of January, in the Twenty eighth Year of Edward the First, sat but eight days, the Writ for the Commons Expenses, bearing date, January the Thirtieth of the same Year; and the Letter to the Pope, signed by the Temporal Lords for themselves, and the whole Community of the Kingdom of England; is dated February the twelfth next following, after the Commons had been dismissed fourteen days: so that the Barons still continued to style themselves the Community of England, 
The Barons stay after the Commons dismissed.  and both Spiritual and Temporal Barons, and others of the King's Council did stay and dispatch much Business after all others were dismissed, as further appears in a 
(u) See Brady's Answer to Petyt, fol. 152.  Proclamation 21 March, 33 Ed. 1. Wherein the King gives the Archbishops, Bishops, and other Prelates, Earls and Barons, Knights of Counties, Citizens and Burgesses, and other Persons of the Commons, which by our Lord the King's Command came to this Parliament, many Thanks for their coming, and willeth that at present they return into their Counties, so as they readily, and without delay do come again at the time when they shall be remanded; except the Bishops, 
(w) Sauve les Evesques, Counts, & Barons, Justices, & autres qui sont du Conseil nostre Seigneur le Roy, que ceux ne sen allient saunz especial congee du Roy. The King's Council prepare Laws.  Earls and Barons, Justices and others, which are of the King's Council, who may not departed without special leave of the King.  
I shall not here enter into the enquiry how far the extent of the Power of the King's Council was in those days; but it is very apparent that the King with advice of his Council, proposed Laws, and that others proposed by the Houses, were considered by the King and Council, as no doubt they are now considered before the King gives his Assent to Bills.  
So in the Statute of the Definition of 
(x) Pulton, An. 1304. fol. 72.  Conspirators in the three and Thirtieth Year of King Edward the First, it is said, This Ordinance was accorded by the King, and his Council in his Parliament.  
Also in the Ordinance of 
(y) Idem, Anno 1305.  Inquests, the Eighteenth of Sept. in the thirty third Year of Ed. the First, It is said it is agreed and ordained by the King and all his Council, that is, his Parliament.  
As to the special Prerogative of the King in giving the ultimate Character and fiat to the Laws, every Act expresseth it; so the Statute of 
(z) 18 Sept. 33 E. 1.  Champerty, the Statutes are called by the King, Our Statutes, and, Our Lord the King hath commanded; and in the Statute de Conjunctim feoffat. it is said, It is no new thing that among divers Establishments of Laws, which we have ordained in our time; so in the Ordinatio Forestae, 34 Ed. 1. 
The King Ordains.  
(a) Id. Anno 1306. fol. 73.  We have ordained for ourselves, and our Heirs. So in the Statute De asportatu Religiosorum, 35 Ed. 1. it is said by the Council of his Earls, Barons, great Men, and other Nobles of his Kingdom, at his Parliament, Our Lord the King hath Ordained and Enacted.  
I shall only note first, That in the Twenty eighth of this King those the 
(b) Cl. 28 E. 1. m. 3. dorso.  King had appointed being ready to give an account of the Perambulation of the Forests, the King put a present stop to their report, and his determination; because the Prelates, Earls, Barons, 
The Reason the King will determine nothing without advice in Parliament.  and the rest of the Magnates of the Kingdom, in whose Presence his own, and others Reasons should be propounded, and heard, and by whose Councils he intended to work (especially seeing they were bound by Oath as well as himself, to observe and maintain the Rights of the Kingdom and Crown) were not then present, and those were not summoned who should propound their Reasons, so far as the matters concerned them, and the King was not willing without their advice to put an end to the matters, therefore he order the Sheriffs to cause the two Knights that came to the last Parliament, by his Precept, now to come, and the like for the Cities and Burroughs, and if any were dead, or infirm, so that he could not come, then to cause another to be chosen.  
By which it appears that it was only from the King's Indulgence, and that he might more deliberately resolve, for the best advantage of his Subjects, and for their satisfaction, that he would have the advice of a fuller Assembly.  
We may also further note from hence, that it was in the King's Power to summon the same Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses without a new Choice, except the Persons were dead or infirm.   

Of the Parliaments in King Edward the Second time.  
IN this King's Reign, these following Particulars are most observable: In the Statute for 
(a) Pulton, An. 1307. fol. 79.  Knights, 1 Regni, it is said Our Lord the King hath granted.  
In the Summons, 5 Ed. 2. the Precept to the Sheriff, 
The same Knights, etc. to come that were before.  is to cause to come to the Parliament, to be held at Westminster, those Knights, Citizens and Burgesses in his Bailiwick, which he caused to come lately to the present Parliament at London, and which for certain causes went from the said Parliament, 
(b) Cl. 5 E. 2. m. 26. dorso. Vel alios ad h●● idoneos loco ipsorum si ad hoc vacare non possunt.  or others fit for the Employment, if they cannot be at leisure. Dated Octob. 11.  
In the sixth of Ed. 2. we have an example of the King's 
(c) Cl. 6 E. 2. m. 27. dorso. A Form of Prorogation.  proroguing the House of Commons in these Words, Dominus Rex praecepit quod Milites, Cives & Burgenses qui ad Parliamentum Regis ibidem summonitum, convenerunt pro Comitatibus, Civitatibus, & Burgis Angliae, ad propria remearent, ita quod reverterentur ibidem in crastino S. Mich. prox. futuro sub poena qua decet. So that as they were commanded to return home, so they were appointed a time to return under the Intimation of a Punishment.  
The Preamble to the 
(d) Pulton, An. 1315. fol. 80. The King with his Council revise Articles after the Parliament ended.  Articuli Cleri runs thus, That by the King's Progrenitors and himself, at the Instance of the Prelates, certain Articles were made, and in the Parliament at Lincoln, 9 Regni, he caused them to be rehearsed before his Council, and made certain answers to be corrected; and to the residue of the Articles, answers were made by him and his Council, and so by way of Charter they are published at York, 24 Nou. 10 Regni.  
The Statute of 
(e) Id. 1316. fol. 83.  Gavelet at London saith, It is provided by our Lord the King, and his Justices.  
In the Statute de Terris 
(f) Id. Anno 1323. 17 E. 2. fol. 91.  Templariorum, it is said, Great conference was had before the King himself, in the presence of the Prelates, Earls, Barons, Nobles, and great Men of the Realm, and others present; whereupon the Greater part of the King's Council, 
The King's Council and Justices affirm.  as well the Justices as other Laymen, being assembled, the Justices affirmed precisely, etc. After the recital of Particulars, the words are, It is ordained and agreed in the same Parliament.  
Anno 1326. the last of Ed. 2. There is a Prorogation of the 
(g) Claus. 20 E. 2. m. 4. dorso. A Prorogation before Meeting.  Parliament, before meeting, which runs thus, That though the King had intended Colloquium & Tractatum, Conference and Treaty in the Quindene of St. Andrew, by Isabel the Queen, and Edward his eldest Son, Custos of the Kingdom (the King then being beyond Sea,) and the Prelates, Proceres, & Magnates Regni, and so had commanded two Knights of the Community of the County, two Burgesses of every Burrow; 
(h) Quia tamen quibusdam de causis necessariis & utilibus praedict. Parliamentum & Tractatum usque in craft inum Epiphaniae prox. jam futur. etc. duximus prorogandum.  yet for certain causes necessary and profitable, he hath prorogued the said Parliament and Treaty unto the day after Epiphany, etc.   

Of the Parliaments in King Edward the Third's time.  
THE Preface to the Statutes at 
(a) Pulton, An. 1327. fol. 93.  Westminster, 1 Ed. 3. is thus: To the Honour of God, etc. King Ed. 3, at his Parliament held at Westminster, etc. 
Petition made by the Commonalty to the King and his Council.  at the request of the Commonalty of his Realm, by the Petition made before him and his Council in the Parliament, by assent of the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and other great Men assembled at the said Parliament, hath granted for him and his Heirs for ever, these Articles.  
The title of the Statute made at 
(b) Idem, Anno 1329. fol. 97.  Westminster, 27 Nou. 4 Ed. 3. is thus. At the request of the Commons these things be Established, and Enacted by our Lord the King, his Prelates, 
Established and enacted by the King, Prelates, etc.  Earls, and Barons, and other of the same Parliament.  
So that at Westminster 
(c) Idem, Anno 1331. fol. 100  5 Ed. 3. Our Lord the King by the Assent of the Prelates, etc. and other Great Men, and at the request of his People, hath granted and established.  
The Preamble to the Statutes at York 
(d) Idem, Anno 1335. fol. 103. showed by the Knights' &c. for the Commons; assented to by the Lords, with the Advice of the King's Council.  9 E. 3. runs thus, It was showed to our Lord the King, by the Knights of the Shires, Citizens of the Cities, and Burgesses of Burroughs which come for the Commons of the said Shires, Cities and Burroughs, Our Lord the King, etc. by the Assent of his Prelates, etc. and other Nobles of this Realm summoned at this Parliament, and by the Advice of his Council, being there; Upon the said things disclosed to him, Ordains, etc.  
So the Statute at 
(e) Idem, Anno 1336. p. 105.  Westminster 10 E. 3. is, Our Lord the King by the Assent of the Prelates, etc. and at the Request of the Knights of Shires, and his Commons by their Petition, hath Ordained, Established, etc.  
The Preamble to the Statute for the Clergy, 16 Apr. 14 E. 3. runs thus, At the Petition of John Archbishop of Canterbury, and other Prelates, upon deliberation had with the Peers of our Realm, and other of our Council, and of the Realm summoned to our said Parliament.  
Thus far we find the King Establishing and Ordaining upon the Petition of the Commons, as also of the Prelates, with the Assent of the Prelates and Nobility and his Council. Before I proceed to those Statutes which mention the assent or advice of the whole Parliament, I think fit to insert at large, the Repeal of an imperfect Statute made 15 E. 3.  
There having been 
(f) Idem, Anno 1541. 15 E. 3. fol. 115.  a Statute made, That Ministers of the Church should not answer before the King's Justices for things done touching the Jurisdiction of the Church: For what reasons, and in what manner this was repealed, 
Repeal of Law unduly procured.  will best appear by the King's Precept to the Sheriff of Lincoln, which runs thus:  
Whereas at our Parliament, summoned at Westminster, in the Quindene of Easter last passed, certain Articles, expressly contrary to the Laws and Customs of our Realm of England, and to our Prerogatives, and Rights Royal, were pretended to be granted by us in the manner of a Statute. And considering, how by the Bond of our Oath we be tied to the observance and defence of such Laws, Customs, Rights, and Prerogatives; and providently willing to revoke such things to their own State which be so improvidently done. Upon Conference and Treatise thereupon, with the Earls, Barons and other Wise Men of our said Realm; and because we never consented to the making of the said Statute, but as it then behoved us, we dissimuled in the Premises, by Protestations of Revocation of the said Statute, if indeed it should proceed, to eschew the danger, which by denying the same we feared to come, for as much as the said Parliament otherwise had been, without dispatching any thing, in discord dissolved, and so our earnest business had likely been ruinated, which God prohibit, and the said pretended Statute we promised then to have sealed.  
It seemed to the said Earls, Barons, and other Wise Men, that since the Statute did not of our Free Will proceed, the same be void, and ought not to have the name or strength of a Statute, and therefore by their counsel and assent we have decreed the said Statute to be void, and the same as much as it proceeded of Dread we have agreed to be anulled.  
Nevertheless, that the Articles contained in the said pretended Statute, which by other of our Statutes, or of our Progenitors Kings of England, have been approved, shall according to the form of the said Statute, in every point, as convenient is, be observed, and the same we do only for the Conservation and Redintegration of the Rights of our Crown, as we be bound, and not that we should in any wise grieve or oppress our Subjects, whom we desire to rule in lenity and gentleness. So the King commands all these things to be openly Proclaimed, 1 Oct. 15. Regni.  
From this Statute we may 1st. 
Observations upon i●●●  observe, That without the King's free and express consent, there can be no Law passed. 2ly. The Bishops are not mentioned in this, it being contrary to some Liberties Churchmen claimed by the Canons. 3ly. The King's assent was not complete, but only a temporary one, like a Salvo Jure, lest his earnest business for which he called them should miscarry for want of a seeming compliance; therefore he is said to promise the Sealing of it (which was in that Age the Characteristic of Confirmation) but never did it, but rather made some kind of Protestation in the presence of some, that what he did was unwillingly. 4ly. That seeing it did not proceed of his Free Will, therefore by the advice and consent of the Earls, Barons, and other Wise Men, it is declared void: Lastly, The principal reason why he gave not his free consent to it, was because it was against his Coronation Oath, whereby he was tied to the observance, and defence of the Laws, Customs, 
Kings not bound to consent to what Bills the Houses propose.  Rights, and Prerogatives: So that upon the whole, they that would advise their Princes to consent to whatever Bills the Houses should tender (as in the Chapter of Factious Members of Parliament I shall have occasion to discourse) may learn from hence, That the King found himself obliged to consent to no Bills contrary to the Law, Customs, Rights and Prerogatives: such were those the unhappy Parliament of 41 in the point of the Militia, and their other dethroning Bills; and of late, another Parliament in the Bill of Seclusion, endeavoured to impose upon their Sovereigns, contrary to the fundamental Laws and Prerogatives of the Crown.  
To proceed, The Preface of the Statute at 
(g) Id. 1346. fol. 118.  Westminster, 7th. May 20 E. 3. runs thus, Because that by divers complaints made to us, we have perceived, that the Law of the Land (which we by our Oath are bound to maintain) is the less well kept, etc. we greatly moved of Conscience in this matter, etc. by the assent of the great Men, and other Wise Men of our Council, We have ordained, etc.  
The Preamble to the Statute of Labourers 
(h) Idem, Anno 1349. fol. 120.  repealed 23 E. 3. was thus, Upon deliberation, and treaty with the Prelates, and the Nobles, and learned Men assisting us, of their mutual assent ordained; and that Statute for Labourers which remains in force, 25 E. 3. saith, Whereas it was ordained by our Lord the King, and by assent of the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and others of his Council, etc.  
It is apparent by several Records, 
So one Knight for a County, when two Burgesses, 27 E. 3. So the King names one Knight, one Citizen, and one Burgess to be sent, 43 E. 3. m. 2.  That the Kings of England have not been tied to the certain number of Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, though for a long while, two only have been chosen of each; but heretofore, sometimes but one, other times two or three, as that 18 E. 1. and 4 Knights 22 E. 1.  
Besides which liberty there is a 
(i) Cl. 24 E. 3. p. 2. m. 3.  memorable Record in this King's Reign, wherein the King appointed the qualifications of such as were to be chosen Members of the House of Commons.  
The Writ is directed to all the Sheriffs of England, Quod de Comitatu tuo duos Milites, etc. de discretioribus & probioribus Militibus, Civibus, & Burgensibus, & ad laborandum potentioribus, qui non sint Placitatores, querelarum manutentores, aut ex hujusmodi quaestu viventes, etc. sed homines valentes, & bonae sidei, & publicum commodum diligentes, eligi. 
Qualification of Members to be elected.   
Pleading Lawyers, Maintainers of Plaints, and such as lived of such like gain were forbid to be chosen upon some particular Reason of State then inducing it, of which I shall write something in the Chapter of Parliaments.  
The other Preambles most 
(k) Pulton, An. 1350. fol. 121.25 E. 3. Idem, Anno 1350. fol. 125. Assent of the Commonalty.  remarkable in this King's Reign, are mostly, By the assent of the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and other great men, and all the Commons, or of all the Commonalty of the King's Realm. The King hath Granted, Ordained, Established, etc.  
The Statute for the Clergy 
(l) Idem, Anno 1350. fol. 122.  25 Regni, saith, Our Lord the King seeing and examining by good deliberation, the Petitions and Articles delivered to him in his Parliament, etc. by Simon Archbishop of Canterbury, and other Bishops of his Province, upon certain Grievances, etc. 
By the Assent of his Parliament.  by the assent of his Parliament, for him and his Heirs, willeth and granteth the Points underwritten.  
The Statute of Provisors, 25 E. 3. is 
(m) Id. 1350. fol. 129.25 E. 3. The King bound by his Oath to remedy Mischiefs and Damage● to his Realm, by accord of his People in Parliament.  singular in its Preamble, That whereas, in the Parliament 15 E. 1. at Carlisle, the Petition heard, put before the said King and his Council in his said Parliament, by the Commonalty of the said Realm, containing, etc. whereupon the said Commons have prayed our Lord the King, that sigh the right of the Crown of England, and the Law of the said Realm, is such, That upon the Mischiefs and Damages which happen to his Realm, he ought, and is bound by his Oath, with the accord of his People in his Parliament, thereof to make Remedy and Law, and remove the Mischiefs and Damages, which thereof ensue, so pray the King thereupon to ordain Remedy.  
The Statute of Provisors 
(n) Id. 135●. fol. 131.  27 E. 3. runs, Our Lord the King, by the Assent, and Prayers of the Great Men, and Commons of this Realm, etc. hath ordained.  
The Statute of 
(o) Idem, Anno 1353. fol. 133.  Staple 27 E. 3. hath a singular Preface whereas good deliberation had with the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons and Great Men of the Counties, that is to say, of every County one, 
One Knight for a County, and so for Cities and Burroughs.  for all the Counties; and so of Cities and Burroughs, etc. by the Council and common consent of the said Prelates, etc. Knights and Commons, the King hath ordained, etc. In the 28. Princes are named after Prelates.  
The Preamble of the Statute at 
(p) Idem, Anno 1362. fol. 152. The Request of the Commons.  Westminster 36 E. 3. runs thus, The King at the request of the Commons, by their Petition delivered to him in the said Parliament, by the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and other Great Men in the Parliament assembled, have granted for him and his Heirs for ever, the Articles underwritten.  
In the Second Chapter, of which it is said, The King of his own Will, without motion of the Great Men, or Commons, hath granted in ease of his People.  
The Statutes made 
(q) Idem, Anno 1368. fol. 159.  42 E. 3. have only, At the Parliament of our Lord the King, it is assented and accorded. So in 
(r) Idem, Anno 1369. fol. 190.  43 E. 3. The Prelates, Great Men, and Commons seeing the Mischiefs, pray the King in this present Parliament thereupon to ordain Remedy.  
The Preamble to the Statutes 
(s) Idem, Anno 1376. fol. 191.  50 E. 3. runs thus, The Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and others assembled at the Parliament, etc. Our Lord the King desiring much, that the Peace of his Land be well kept, and his faithful Subjects in quietness and tranquillity maintained, hath therefore made and ordained certain Ordinances, and also granted certain Graces and Pardons to his Commons of England.  
In all which, it is evident, the Two Houses had no more but an Advising, or Petitioning and Assenting Power. It is every where expressed that the King solely Ordaineth, Establisheth, Granteth. However he owns an obligation by his Coronation Oath to make good Laws for his Subjects.    

CHAP. XXVII. Of the Parliaments of England, during the Reigns of King Richard the Second, to the First Year of King James the Second.  
THE Preface to the Statutes at 
(a) Pulton, An. 1377. fol. 163.  Westminster, 10 R. 2. is thus, Richard by the Grace of God, etc. to the Sheriff of Nottingham, Greeting; Know you, That to the Honour of God, etc. by the whole Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls and Barons of this our Realm, 
Special Instance and Request of the Commons.  at the instance and special Request of the Commons of our Realm, assembled at our Parliament, We have ordained and established certain Statutes in amendment and relief of this our said Realm.  
That at 
(b) Idem, Anno 1378. fol. 165.  Gloucester, 2 R. 2. is thus, Our Lord the King at his Parliament, etc. amongst other things there assented and accorded, hath made certain Statutes and Ordinances.  
The Preface to the Statutes at 
(c) Anno 1379. fol. 167.  Westminster, the same year, runs thus, Our Lord the King, etc. of the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons and other great Men, and of the Commons of this Realm summoned, etc. hath ordained.  
In the first Chapter of the Statutes at 
(d) Idem, Anno 1380. fol. 169.  Northampton, 4 R. 2. it is thus, The Commons of our Parliament have prayed us, by their Petition delivered to us, at our present Parliament, etc. We considering the said Supplication, will and grant by the Assent of the Prelates and Lords aforesaid.  
In the Fourth Chapter of the Statutes at 
(e) Idem, Anno 1382. fol. 175.  Westminster● 5 R. 2. The Members accustomed to be summoned to Parliament, are particularly by their Degree distinguished, viz. Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Dukes, Earls, Barons, Bannerets, Knights of the Shires, Citizens and Burgesses, which last are frequently comprehended by the words Others or Commonalty.  
The Preamble to the Statutes 8 R. 2. at 
(f) Idem, An. 1384. fol. 179.  Westminster, is to the Honour of God, and at the Request of the Commonalty, of the Assent of the Prelates, Great Men and Commons aforesaid, 
Assent of Commons.  Our Lord the King hath caused to be made.  
The Statutes 9 R. 2. at 
(g) Idem, Anno 1385. fol. 179.  Westminster, are thus prefaced, Our Lord the King of the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Barons and Commons, hath ordained and established.  
The 
(h) Idem, Anno 1386. fol. 180.  Preface to the Statute 10 R. 2. is very full in the Expressions of the kindness of the King to his Subjects in this Form, Know ye for the Reverence of God, and to nourish Peace, Unity and good Accord, in all Parties within the Realm, and especially for the common Profit and Ease of our People, and good Government of the same (which we chief desire) of the Assent of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, 
Assent of the Lords and Commons.  we have caused to be made a Statute. So in the 11th. Regni 
(i) Idem, Anno 1387. fol. 181.  the King hearty desiring, That the Peace of the Land, be well holden and kept, and his faithful Subjects nourished and governed in Quietness and Tranquillity; and in that at Westminster 
(k) Idem, Anno 1388. fol. 182.  13 Regni, For the Honour of God and Holy Church, and for the common profit of his Liege People.  
In the First Chapter of the Statute at 
(l) Anno 1389. fol. 189.  Westminster, 13 R. 2. it is thus expressed, That our Lord the King, at his Parliament holden at Westminster, etc. 
Grievous Complaints of the Commons.  hearing the grievous Complaints of his said Commons, etc. the more because Charters of Pardons have been easily granted in such Cases; the Commons requested, that such Charters might not be granted. To whom the King answered, 
The King will save his Liberty and Regality.  That he will save his Liberty and Regality as his Progenitors have done heretofore: But to nourish the more Quietness and Peace within this Realm, by the Assent of the Great Men and Nobles he hath granted, etc.  
In the 
(m) Idem, Anno 1396. fol. 199.  Statute 20 R. 2. By the Assent of the Prelates, Lords and Commons, The Title of the Statutes at 
(n) Idem, Anno 1397. fol. 200.  Westminster 21 R. 2. is thus, It is to be understood, that our Lord the King, etc. of the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons and Commons of his Realm there assembled, hath made certain Statutes and Ordinances. 
Repeal of Statutes made by Threats.  Amongst the rest is a Repeal of the Statutes made 10 R. 2. For that they were made by Threats given to the King, and by constraint.  
So it may be noted, That Henry the Fourth repealed all the Statutes made in the last Parliament, 21 R. 2.  

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Fourth's time.  
THE Preamble to the Statute at 
(a) Idem, Anno 1399. fol. 200.  Westminster 1 H. 4, runs thus, Henry by the Grace of God, etc. to the Laud and Honour of God, and Reverence of Holy Church, for to nourish Unity, Peace and Concord, of all Parties within the Realm of England, and for redress and recovery of the same Realm of England, which now of late hath been dangerously put to great Ruin, Mischief and Desolation, of the Assent of the Prelates, 
Instance and special Request of the Commons.  Dukes, Earls, Barons; and at the Instance and special Request of the Commons of the same Realm assembled, etc. hath made, ordained and established, certain Ordinances and Statutes. Throughout all this King's Reign, most of the Prefaces are much the same, By the Assent, or Advice and Assent of the Prelates, etc. At the Request or special Instance and Request of the Commons.  
Only in the Preface to some, 
Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal.  it is, By the Assent and Advice of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal: this Distinction being mostly brought into use in his time, as may be seen in the 4th. 6th. and 9th. of his Reign.   

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Fifth 's time.  
THE Preamble to the Statutes at 
(a) Idem, Anno 1413. fol. 224.  Westminster 1 H. 5. runs thus, Our Lord the King at his Parliament, etc. by the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the special Instance and Request of the Commons of this Realm, hath ordained, established, etc. and so much like all the rest, except the Statutes 4 H. 5. 
(b) Idem, Anno 1416. fol. 234.  which hath, Our Lord the King, with the Assent of the Prelates, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and at the special Instance and Request of the Commons.   

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Sixth 's time.  
THE Preamble to the First Statute of 
(a) Idem, Anno 1422. fol. 239.  Westminster, 1 H. 6. is thus, At the Parliament held at Westminster, etc. Our Sovereign Lord the King, 
Sovereign Lord the King.  by the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the special Instance and Request of the Commons of the Realm, etc. hath caused to be ordained and established, etc. The 2d. 3d. 4th. and 6th. of H. 6. are the same.  
As the first Statutes, call him Our Sovereign Lord, which was not used formerly; so in that of the 8th. of H. 6. he is styled Our most Noble Christian Lord Henry, etc.  
11 Regni 
(b) Idem, Anno 1433. fol. 261.  part of a new Phrase was used, By Authority of Parliament, which after some while is now familiarly used; that Preface runs thus, By the Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the special Request of the Commons in his said Parliament assembled, 
By Authority of the said Parliament.  by Authority of the same Parliament, Our Sovereign Lord the King hath ordained and established divers Statutes, Declarations and Ordinances.  
The Preface to the Statutes at 
(c) Idem, Anno 1452. fol. 286.  Reading, 31 Regni hath these words, Our Lord the King, by Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, being in the said Parliament, and by Authority of the same Parliament, hath made, ordained and established divers Acts and Statutes. Here the Commons Assent is joined with the Lords, whereas in most others of his Reign it is, At the special request of the Commons.  
So it is in that at Westminster, which is like the first; only it saith, Our Sovereign Lord, etc. the Thirty ninth of his Noble and Gracious Reign.   

Of the Parliaments in King Edward the Fourth 's Reign.  
THE Preamble to the Statutes of 
(a) Idem, Anno 1461. fol. 291. King Edward by the Grace of God.  Westminster, 1 Regni, is Edward by the Grace of God, etc. to the Honour of God and Holy Church, to nourish Peace, Unity and Concord within his Realm (which he much desireth) by the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of the same Realm, and at the special Request of the Commons of his said Realm assembled, by Authority of the same Parliament, hath ordained.  
The rest of the Prefaces vary very little, except that in the 3 E. 4. it is, By the Advice and Assent of his Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, etc.   

Of the Parliament in King Richard the Third's time.  
THE Preamble to the Statutes at 
(a) Idem, Anno 1483. fol. 315.  Westminster, 1 R. 3. runs thus, Richard by the Grace of God, etc. to the Honour of God and of Holy Church, and for the Commonwealth of his Realm of England, 
Advice and Assent of Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Request of the Commons.  etc. By the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the Request of the Commons of the said Realm, summoned to the said Parliament, by the Authority of the same Parliament, hath ordained and established, for the Quietness of his People, certain Statutes.   

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Seventh 's time.  
THE Prefaces to all the Acts in his 
(a) Idem, Anno 1485. fol. 324.  Reign, are much alike, thus, The King our Sovereign Lord Henry, etc. To the Honour of God, etc. By the Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in the said Parliament assembled, and by Authority of the said Parliament, hath done to be made certain Statutes and Ordinances.   

Of the Parliaments in King Henry the Eighth 's time.  
MOST of the Prefaces to the 20th. of his Reign are the same as in King H. the 7th. mutatis mutandis.  
The Title of the 21 H. 8. 
(a) Id. fol. 392.  only is, Statuta ad Rempublicam spectantia edita in 1 Sessione Parliamenti, etc. Anno Regni invictissimi Principis Henrici, etc.  
In the 5th. Chapter of the Acts of the 
(b) Id. fol. 435.  24th. of his Reign, 
The King our Sovereign Lord.  it is thus, Be it enacted by the King our Sovereign Lord, with the Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of this present Parliament assembled, and by Authority of the same: So most of the rest are, excepting that in the second Chapter of the 26. of 
(c) Id. fol. 465.  his Reign, it is said, Therefore be it enacted by Authority of this present Parliament.  
So in the first Chapter of the 
(d) Id. fol. 485.  28 Regni, it is said, For the Remedy whereof, 
May it please the King, etc. it be enacted.  may it please the King our Sovereign Lord, by the Assent, etc. it may be enacted.  
The Title of the Acts 31 H. 8. 
(e) Id. fol. 537. H. 8. Defender of the Faith, and in Earth Supreme Head, etc.  runs thus, Henry the 8th. etc. Defender of the Faith, and in Earth supreme Head immediately under Christ, of the Church of England, to the Honour of Almighty God, Conservation of the true Doctrine of Christian Religion, and for the Concord, Quiet, and Wealth of this his Realm, and Subjects of the same, held his most high Court of Parliament, etc. wherein were established these Acts following: and in the first Chapter it is said, 
Be it enacted, etc.  Be it enacted by the King, our dread Sovereign Lord, and by the assent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and by the Commons of this present Parliament assembled.  
The Thirty second of H. 8. hath these Expressions, which day the said Parliament continued by divers Prorogations, was by His Grace's Authority finished and dissolved, amongst many other the Acts following, By his Highness, with the assent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons assembled in the said Parliament, have been Established, Ordained, and Enacted.   

Of the Parliaments in King Edward the Sixth 's Reign.  
IN the first Chapter of the first 
(a) Id. fol. 687.  Statutes made 1. Regni, it is said, The Kings most Excellent Majesty, 
King's Excellent Majesty— Princely Serenity— Highness.  minding the Governance and Order of his most loving Subjects to be in most perfect Unity and Concord in all things, etc. as his most Princely Serenity and Majesty, hath already declared by evident Proofs. Be it enacted by the King's Highness, with the assent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons of this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.  
In the second and third Year of Ed. 6. they are called 
(b) Id. fol. 712.  Acts in the Session, etc. humbly prayen, That it may be Ordained, and Enacted by His Majesty, with the assent of the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.  
The rest are much, what like these foregoing.   

Of the Parliaments in Queen Mary's Reign.  
IN the Title of her first 
(a) Id. fol. 817.  Acts, she is styled, 
Ordained and enacted by the Queen our Sovereign Lady, and Assent of Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons.  Defender of the Faith, and Supreme Head of the Church etc. Be it therefore ordained and enacted by the Queen our Sovereign Lady, with the assent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.  
After the Marriage of 
(b) Id. fol. 831.  Queen Mary, with King Philip of Spain, the title is only, Acts made in the Reign of our Sovereign Lord and Lady, Philip and Mary, Defenders of the Faith, leaving out Supreme Head, etc.  
In the fourth and 
(c) Id. fol. 863.  fifth of Philip and Mary, in the Body of the Acts, it is thus, Be it Enacted, Ordained, and Established by the King and Queen's Majesty, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.   

Of the Parliaments in Queen Elizabeth's time.  
WE may observe something new in the Acts of this Queen; we have noted once in Henry the Eighth's time, the two Houses pray that it may be enacted, and so in Edward the Sixth: but in the first 
(a) Id. fol. 873.  Chapter of the Acts of this Queen, it is more full thus, 
Most humbly beseech Your most Excellent Majesty.  Most humbly beseech your most excellent Majesty, your faithful and obedient Subjects, the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of this your present Parliament assembled; and in another 
(b) Id. fol. 874.  Paragraph, That it may please your Highness that it may be further enacted; and in another place, If some redress (by Authority of this your High Court of Parliament, 
High Court of Parliament.  with the assent of your Highness) be not had and provided.  
5 Eliz. Cap. 1. it is thus expressed, Be it therefore Enacted, Ordained, and Established by the Queen our Sovereign Lady, and the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by Authority of the same. And in the Eighth, Be it now Declared and Enated by the Authority of this present Parliament.  
Most of all the rest of the Acts of her Reign are expressed after some of these forms.  
The 43 of her Reign, in the First Chapter it is thus, In most humble wise beseechen your most excellent Majesty, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of your Highness' Parliament assembled.   

Of the Parliaments in King James the First's Reign.  
THE Title of his first 
(a) Id. fol. 1085.  Acts is at the Parliament begun, etc. To the pleasure of Almighty God, the Weal public of this Realm, were Enacted, etc.  
In the First Chapter, We therefore, your most Humble and Loyal Subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, 
In most humble and lowly manner do beseech.  in most humble and lowly manner, do beseech your most excellent Majesty, that it may be published and declared in this High Court of Parliament, and Enacted by Authority of the same.  
In the Second Chapter it is said, Be it further 
(b) Id. fol. 1086.  Enacted by the Kings most Excellent Majesty, by, and with the Assent and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by Authority of the same.  
In the Seventh of King James, is only expressed, Be it Enacted by the Authority of this present Parliament, etc. The rest agrees with some of these.   

Of the Parliaments in King Charles the First's Reign.  
THE Preface of his First 
(a) Id. fol. 1226.  Parliament, is, At the Parliament, etc. To the high pleasure of Almighty God, and to the weal public of this Realm were enacted, etc.  
In the First Chapter 
(b) Id. fol. 1227. Be it enacted by the King, etc.  it is said, Be it Enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.  
In the beginning of the Petition 
(c) Id. fol. 1229. Petition of Right.  of Right it is thus worded, Humbly show unto our Sovereign Lord the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament assembled, etc. and the close of it is, All which they most humbly pray your most excellent Majesty, as their Rights and Liberties according to the Laws and Statutes of this Realm, &c and that your Majesty would be graciously pleased.  
In the Seventeenth of the said King, 
(d) Id. fol. 1237.  Chap. 6. it is thus expressed, Therefore the Kings most excellent Majesty, out of his Princely care, etc. by the Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, Ordaineth, Enacteth, and Establisheth.   

Of the Parliaments in King Charles the Seconds Reign.  
THE Preface to the Acts of the two Houses 
(a) Id. fol. 1249.  begun 25 Apr. 1660. not summoned by the King's Writ, is much the same with that of King Charles the First, and King James, mutatis mutandis. In the Third Chapter it is said, Be it Enacted by the Kings most excellent Majesty, and the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament. In the Fourth Chapter, 
(b) Id. fol. 1251.  The Commons do by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords in this present Parliament, and by Authority of the same, give and grant unto you our Supreme Liege Lord and Sovereign one Subsidy, etc. 
Supreme Liege-lord and Sovereign.   
In the First Chapter 13 Car. 2. the 
(c) Id. fol. 1300.  enacting part is thus worded, Do most humbly beseech your most Excellent Majesty, 
Most humbly beseech Your most Excellent Majesty, etc.  that it may be Enacted, and be it Enacted by the Kings most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament Assembled, and by Authority of the same. The rest of the Acts in King Charles the Second Reign, are continued in the same form.  
The Titles of the Acts of Parliament, 1 Jac. 2. our most Gracious Sovereign, are, At the Parliament begun at Westminster the 19th. Day of May, Anno Dom. 1685. in the First Year of the Reign of our most Gracious Sovereign Lord James, etc.  
The Enacting part of the granting an Imposition, etc. thus, Most Gracious Sovereign, We your Majesty's most Dutiful and Loyal Subjects, the Commons Assembled in Parliament, towards a Supply, etc. and with an humble and thankful acknowledgement of your Majesty's favourable and tender regard to us your Commons, have cheerfully and unanimously given and granted unto your Majesty, an Aid and Assistance— and we do humbly beseech your Majesty, that it may be Enacted, and be it Enacted by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same.  
All the other Acts which are not Grants of Aid, Assistance, or Supply, are conceived in the latter words.  
By this full enumeration of the most considerable Expressions, either of Records or Historians, relating to the Great Councils or Parliaments from William the Conqueror's time to this present Age, (which in a continued series of time I have deduced, it appears, that till King John's time, only the Prelates, Earls, and Barons, and such of the great Tenants in Capite as were not Barons, were summoned, and at the King's pleasure by special Writ; and after King John's Charter, the lesser Tenants in Capite by General Summons. Also, that the Charters of Kings wherein they granted Liberties to their Subjects were received as Laws, and gave as ample Satisfaction as now The King willeth, doth to pass a Bill tendered for his Royal Assent by both Houses; and there was good reason, because it passed under his Broad Seal.  
Likewise, when the Constitution of Parliament was altered, 49 H. 3. whereby in place of the Tenants in Capite, which were numerous, two Knights were chosen, probably by the rest of the Tenants in Capite for the Shires, and two Citizens, and two Burgesses for Burroughs, to represent all those that held in Capite, and it is likely all other their Subfeudatary Tenants; yet the number was not constantly observed, there being sometimes Knights, and no Citizens or Burgesses, sometimes one Knight, one Citizen, and one Burgess, other times two or three Knights, left as it seems to the Sheriffs, or the Choosers Election, till after it was fixed as it now is, for two Knights, two Citizens, and two Burgesses, unless in some places of Wales, where to this Day, some two or three Burroughs choose but one or two Burgesses.  
Likewise it is worth the observing how gradually the Advice and Assent hath passed from the Advice of the Bishops and Nobles to the Assent likewise, and sometimes at their request, only the King ordains; and then from the Potition of the Commons to their joining in Advice, and after to their Assent, and many other material progressive alterations, which in this recapitulation I cannot insist upon, till it hath come to that constitution so much to be valued by all wise Englishmen, as it is the product of the generous condescensions of Gracious Kings, and the wise contrivance of our considerate Ancestors. Therefore I shall now pass to consider our present Constitution of Parliaments.    

CHAP. XXVIII. Of the modern rightly constituted Parliaments.  

SECT. 1. Of the General Use of Parliaments.  
I Have before given an account how the Persian Laws, were made by the 
(a) Daniel, cap. 6. v. 7, 8.  King, his Princes, Governors, Nobles, and Captains, as in a great Council of several Orders with the Sovereign; but we have an older example in Scripture, 
Great Councils in Scripture.  that seems to be the Pattern of all great Councils, such as we call Parliaments, under a Monarchy. For it is said, 
(b) Legem praecepit nobis Moyses haereditatem multitudinis Jacob. Erit apud rectiss●●um Rex, congregatis Principibus populi cum Tribubus Israel. De●●. cap. 33. v. 4, 5.  Moses commanded us a Law, even the Inheritance of the Congregation of Jacob, and he was King in Jesurun; when the Heads of the People, and Tribes of Israel were gathered together. Here is the King, Moses, commanding a Law, and the Heads of the People, the Princes, or House of Lords, and the Tribes; that is, some to represent the chief of the Tribes, like our House of Commons.  
The Roman Senate, under the Emperors, resembled our ancient Great Councils that consisted of such as the King convened, and of the Patrician and Equestrian Order. The Comitia bore no resemblance with our Commons, and the Amphictyonican 
(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Assemblies, the Achaean, Boo●●an, and Pan Aetolian, were Assemblies of Deputies, as the State's General of Holland.  
Such Assemblies, in all sorts of Governments are necessary; 
Necessary in all Governments.  for be the Empire never so vast, and the Sovereign's Power never so great and ; yet without Consultation had with the Princes and wise Men, for the constituting Laws, and modelling the frame and methods of his Government, it would soon without such 
(d) Vis consilii expers mole ruit sua. Horat. lib. 3. Od. 4.  Buttresses and Undersetters, sinking in its Foundation by its own weight, with an hideous rush be crushed into an heap of Rubbish.  
In Democracy Great Councils are needful, that thereby the 
(e) Plato de LL. In Democracy. Male cuncta ministrat impetus. Statius.  Precipitancy and fury of the Common-People, by their gravity may be attempered, the common sort being apt to do every thing with a wilful Violence, which never succeeds well, when not directed to a right end. If their public affairs were not committed to a select number of trusties, nothing would be brought to any Issue, since none can be heard, where all speak, nor any good Product be from a jumble of those Atoms.  
Aristocracy itself consists in a select number of the wisest and ablest to govern; 
In Aristocracy.  who in public Consultations have no private ends: Yet in the great Councils, of neither of these forms of Government, is there to be found that stayedness, orderliness, or resolution for the public good, as in Monarchy.  
Why such Assemblies are not only convenient, 
In Monarchy.  but necessary under Monarchy, there are many weighty Reasons. 
(f) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Xenoph. Cyropaed. 8. Satisfactory to the Subject.  Xenophon observes that a single Person sees or hears but little, and Princes must have many Eyes and Ears, which in a special manner these Great Councils are; from all parts of the Dominions bringing notice of what is amiss, and wants redress, as well as what is orderly, and wants encouragement.  
Besides, Princes thereby have the opportunity to give their Subject's satisfaction in their Administration, preventing the surmises and jealousies of the Nobility, Gentry, and common People, that he sleights them in not calling them sometimes to consult about affairs of Moment.  
Furthermore the Prince by such congress, 
The Prince thereby knows the Worthy Subjects.  consults his own Interest, in coming to the Knowledge of the most able, active, and popular Subjects, whereby he may single out such as are most fitted for public Employments, to serve him in the several offices of Government, and all (who thus have a share in the debating, and consulting about Laws) will not only be witnesses of the Prince's Grace and Favour, in granting such as they have desired, and assented to; but will be so many Heralds of his Wisdom, and care of his People's good Government, and so many vigorous enforcers of the Execution of those Laws they have so lately assisted to prepare.  
Likewise, 
The Prince is skreened from Obloquy.  as Privy-Counsellors, and other Officers, are sometime as Skreens to Princes, to ward off the Obloquy of the Mobile, when something is imposed that may be wholesome, though something bitter to their Palates: So especially are these great Conventions necessary, where useful Laws, though severe, are to be enacted, Money to be raised, or other Impositions laid upon the People, who do much more cheerfully, and less repiningly obey, when they know 
(g)— Tum caetera parit, Turba libens subit, propriis quia legibus acta.  the Nobility, and their own Representatives, have judged them convenient. All Men naturally loving that such Impositions may immediately result from themselves, rather than they should be enjoined by the Prince's Arbitrary power, according to that of Claudian, 
— Observantior aequi  
Fit Populus, nec ferre negat, cum viderit ipsum  
Auctorem parere sibi.   
The General use of good Parliaments is summed up in the 
(h) MS. Speech, An. 1562. The general Benefits of Parliaments. . Chancellor's Speech, 2 Eliz. thus: That the principal cause of their Assembly was, that things there proposed, may be orderly, and diligently debated, deeply considered, and thereupon wisely concluded. To examine whether any Law, already made, be too sharp and sore, and so over-burthensome to the Subject, or over-loose and soft, and so over-dangerous to the State: For that acriores sunt morsus intermisseae Libertatis, quam retentae. He further adds, The use of them is to consider the want and superfluities of Laws, whether Graft, Malice or Covetousness hath devised any ways or means to defraud the Benefit and Force of Laws; and in matter of Policy, for the more perfect upholding and establishing the Sovereign's Royal State, and the Preservation of the Common-weal committed to the Prince's care.  
Bodin 
(i) Lib. 3. de Repub● p. 350.  commends the Constitution of the Government in England and Spain, that they have Parliaments once in three Years; whereby Princes upon any imminent danger, may have recourse to their Council and Assistance, to defend their Countries from Hostile Attempts, to raise Money for public Necessity, cure the Diseases of the Commonweal, confirm the State, appoint Laws, hear the Complaints of the grieved, amend Maladministration, by calling ill Managers to account, understand what the Prince otherwise may be ignorant of, and generally to have counsel in all things, which in Prudence are necessary for the happy Government of the Commonweal.  
Sir 
(k) Commonwealth, part 1. c. 2. p. 37.  Tho. Smith saith, As in War, where the King himself is in Person, with the Nobility, Gentry and Yeomanry, the Power and Force of England is: So in Peace and Consultation, where the Prince is to give Life, and the last and highest Commandment, the Nobility for the higher, the Knights, Esquires and Gentlemen for the lower part of the Commonwealth, and the Bishops for the Clergy, be present to advertise and consult, and show what is necessary for the Commonwealth; every thing being advised with mature Deliberation, every Bill being thrice read and disputed upon, in either House apart, and after the Prince himself doth consent thereto, that is the Princes and whole Kingdom's Deed: whereupon no Man can justly complain, but must accommodate himself to find it just, 
See Prynne, part 1. Brief Register, p. 447.  good, and obey it; and concludes, that whatever the People of Rome might do, either in Centuriatis, or Tribunitiis Comitiis, the same may be done by the Parliament of England, which representeth, and hath the Power of the whole Kingdom. Thus far of the general use, now to the Constitution.  
Concerning the word Parliament, it is concluded by most, 
Of the word Parliament.  to come from the French word parlour, to speak; therefore before the word was used by our Historians, as appliable to this great Convention, the Latin word Colloquium was frequently used, to signify a Conference betwixt the King and the great Men summoned to consult, advise, and take Counsel with the King, and among themselves.  
Yet before the word was used to signify these great Assemblies, we find it applied to other Meetings in William Rufus' time; For Ingulphus, Abbot of Croyland (speaking of private Consultations in that Abbey) saith, That Semannus de Lek, 
(a) Veniens coram conventu, in nostro publico Parliamento, etc.  coming before the Convention in their public Parliament, took his Oath of Fidelity to them, as Sergeant of their Church.  
The First that is noted to use this word among all our Historians, is 
(b) Convenit ad Parliamentum Generalissimum totius Regni Angliae, etc. p. 674.  Matthew Paris, Anno 1246. 30 H. 3. where he saith, There came to the most general Parliament to London, the whole Nobility of all the Kingdom of England.  
The first Mention of it on Record, is in the 
(c) Cl. 49 E. 3. d. 11.  Writ of Summons to the Cinque Ports, summoning them ad instans Parliamentum nostrum: and the next is in the Writ of Prorogation of the 
(d) Cl. 3 E. 1.20. dorso.  Parliament, 3 E. 1. where it is twice mentioned in the Writ, generale Parliamentum nostrum, & eodem Parliamento.  
Having premised thus much concerning the Name and first usage, I shall now discourse of it in particular.   

SECT. 2. Of the Summons of the Prelates.  
THAT the King is Caput, Principium, & Finis Parliamenti, as Sir Edward Coke notes, is obvious to all. The Summons have been constantly from the King, 
The Summons only from the King.  or in his Name.  
In the former Chapters I have discoursed out of our Historians, that the Great Councils were always convened by the Kings: Now I come to prove it by Records, and shall note, first the Summons to the Prelates, then of the Nobles, and thirdly, of the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses; only noting some of the remarkablest of them from Mr. Prynn, who hath so fully writ of them in his brief Register of Parliamentary Writs, in four parts, and his Brevia Parliamentaria Rediviva, to whose indefatigable pains in transcribing such an infinite of Records, all Antiquaries, Lawyers, and Statesmen will be always beholding; though in the use he made of such, before the late King's Restauration, or at least, while he sat in the long Parliament, few Loyal Men can follow his Doctrines.  
All the Writs before the Sixth of King John, whereby any were summoned to great Councils, are utterly lost: that runs 
(e) Claus. 6 Joh. m. 3. dorso. The Summons in King John's time.  thus, Mandamus vobis, rogantes, quatenus omni occasione & dilatione postposita, sicut nos, & honorem nostrum diligitis, sitis ad nos apud London, etc. nobiscum tractaturi de magnis & arduis negotiis nostris, & communi Regni Vtilitate— vestrum habere consilium & aliorum Magnatum Terraendstrae— Abbates & Priores conventuales toti Divoecesis citari fa●iatis.  
The second Record is 
(f) Claus. 26 H. 3. m. 13. dorso.  26 H. 3. directed to Walter Archbishop of York; differing from the former in these particulars: Sicut nos & honorem nostrum; here is added, Pariter & vestrum diligitis, in fide qua nobis tenemini.  
Anno 38 H. 3. the Writ is directed to the Archbishop of Canterbury— Paternitatem vestram omni qua possumus affectione rogamus, quaten●s nos, & Jura nostra totaliter inde●ensa non deserentes, cum omni celeritate convocetis coram vobis Capitulum vestrum Cathedrale, Archidiaconos, Viros Religiosos, & Clerum vobis subjectum, inducentes eos omnibus modis quibus poteritis quod nobis in tanta necessitate liberaliter subveniant.  
I do not bring in this as a Writ of Summons to a Parliament, 
These Summons for Military Aid.  out only as a special Writ to excite the Clergy, to a free, voluntary and liberal Contribution for defence of Gascoign, and so to show the Customs of Benevolences in that Age, out of Parliament.  
The next 
(g) Claus. 49 H. 3. dorso 11. in schedula. The first Summons to the Lords, when the Commons also were summoned.  Writ of Summons of the Prelates to a Parliament, was that of 49 H. 3. directed to the Bishop of Duresm, wherein the occasions of summoning are reckoned to be after the great Troubles, being quieted by giving the Prince Hostage, for establishing the Peace; therefore to provide with wholesome Deliberation, and to establish, and totally to complete with full Security a Peace, etc. Et super quibusdam aliis Regni nostri negotiis quae sine consilio vestro & aliorum Praelatorum & Magnatum nostrorum, nolumus expediri, cum eisdem tractatum habere nos oporteat, vobis mandamus, Rogantes in Fide & Dilectione quibus nobis tenemini, etc. 14 Nou.  
The next 
(h) 23 E. 1. m. 9 dorso.  Writ is that of 23 E. 1. to the Archbishop of Canterbury, thus, Quia super quibusdam arduis negotiis, nos & Regnum nostrum, ac vos, caeterosque Praelatos de eodem Regno tangentibus, quae sine vestra aceorum praesentia nolumus expediri, Parliamentum nostrum tenere ac vobiscum super hiis colloquium habere volumus & tractatum, 24 July.  
The same Year 23 E. 1. there was another 
(i) Cl. 24 E. 1. m. 4. dorso.  Parliament summoned by this memorable Writ, directed to the Archbishop of Canterbury: Sicut Lex justissima provida circumspectione sacrorum Principum stabilita hortatur, ut quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur, sic & innuit evidenter, ut communibus periculis per remediae provisa communiter obvietur: Then reciting the King of France his fraud's concerning Gascoign and his Hostile preparations, adds, provisa jaculaminus laedunt; so commands him in fide & dilectione, to be personally present, etc. Praemunientes Priorem & Capitulum vestrae Ecclesiae, Archidiaconos, totumque Clerum vestrae Dioecesis, facientes quod iidem Prior & Archidiaconus in propriis personis & dictum Capitulum per unum, idemque Clerus per duos Procuratores idoneos plenam & sufficientem potestatem ab ipsis Capitulo & Clero habentes, una vobiscum intersint modis omnibus tunc ibidem ad tractandum, ordinandum, & faciendum nobiscum, & cum caeteris Praelatis & Proceribus & aliis Incolis Regni nostri, etc. 30 Sept.  
The Variations of the Writs are mostly these, 
The commanding part of the Summons to appear.  That the cause of the Summons is diversely expressed, according to the present emergence. Sometimes the word is Mandamus rogantes, otherwhile as 27 E. 1. m. 16. Effectuose requirimus, & rogamus, Rogamus specialius, Nihilominus injungendo mandamus, as the same years m. 9 dorso. Injungentes the same year: firmiter injungendo, 30 E. 1. m. 9 dorso: Iterato mandamus, Cl. 33 E. 1. m. 8. dorso, Firmiter injungendo mandamus, Claus. 11 E. 3. part 2. m. 10. dorso, Rogantes mandamus, Cl. 38 H. 6. m. 29. dorso, Rogando mandamus, Cl. 22, 23 E. 4. m. 11 dorso. and so 15 Caroli 1. fol. 20.  
These are the greatest variations in the Mandatory part, which was mostly to be personally present themselves, the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Deans, and Archdeacon's, and one Proctor for the Chapter, and two for the Clergy of the Diocese. Sometimes the word is, Sitis apud nos omnibus praetermissis, as 27 E. 1. m. 16. dorso, or, Personaliter intersitis, the same Year, m. 9 dorso, and 30 E. 1. m. 7, 9 dorso, and several other, or, Sitis in propria persona vestra, vel per sufficientem procuratorem a vobis plenam potestatem habentem, as Cl. 6 E. 2. m. 2. dorso, or, quatenus omni excusatione voluntaria cessante, as 4 E. 3. m. 13. dorso, or, propter arduitatem & magnitudinem negotiorum absentiam vestram n●quimus nec volumus aliqualiter excusare: other times, especially Seed vacant, to send a Proctor, or Proxy, thus, Sufficientem Procuratorem plenam a vobis potestatem habentem, mittatis, as 27 E. 1. m. 9 dorso. But 
(k) Claus. 6 E. 3. m. 36. dorso.  other times thus, Scientes pro certo, quod nisi evidens & manifesta necessitas id exposcat, non intendemus Procuratores se● excusatores pro vobis admittere; and gives the reason why, as they loved the King, and his Honour, and the tranquillity and the quiet of the Kingdom, they would be present, because of the 
(l) Propter ardui●atem negotiorum praed●ctorum.  arduity, or difficultness of the business.  
Another reason is given, Claus. 11 E. 3. part 1. m. 15. lest by their absence the expedition of the King's Affairs should be retarded or deferred; and in another, because of the absence of them, oftentimes 
(m) Fuerunt non absque nostri, & Regni nostri incommodo, saepius retardata.  the great Affairs have been retarded, to the disprofit of the King and his Kingdom.  
In the 12th of E. 3. it is very strict thus, 
(n) Claus. 12 E. 3. part 2. m. 32. dorso. & 13 E. 3. part 2. m. 1. dorso.  Attentis praemissorum arduitate, & imminentibus periculis, quacunque excusatione cessante, personaliter intersitis. And 14 E. 3. after the King had taken upon him the Title of King of France, the charge for their appearance was very strict— Nos sicut honorem nostrum, & salvationem ejusdem Regni nostri Angliae, caeterarumque terrarum, ac jurium nostrorum praedictorum, ac negotiorum expeditionem diligitis, nullatenus omittatis; and so in many others.  
There is a prevalent Argument used in the 
(o) Claus. 16 E. 3. part 1. m. 39 dorso. Scituri quod gratitudinem, & ingratitudin●m, quas nobis in absentia nostra jam os●endi contigerit, plus ponderabimus quam si ●●crant, dum praesentes essemus, & ea curabimus juxta merita, seu demerita compensare.  16 E. 3. when he summoned a Parliament in his absence, to induce the Prelates, and other Members to appear personally, That the King lets them know, that he will more weigh the Gratitude or Ingratitude, which they show him in his absence, than if he were present, and he will take care to reward them according to their merit.  
Another, the Cl. 2 R. 2. m. 3. dorso, That the King would in no wise have them excused, unless they were detained with such an Infirmity as they could not labour. The words are, nisi tanta infirmitate tunc detenti fueritis, quod aliqualiter illuc laborare non poteritis, nullo modo excusatos habere volumus.  
The ends of these Summons were sometimes general, and sometimes special. The general Causes were expressed by the common 
(p) Communi Regni u●ili●at●. Cl. 6 Jo. m. 33. dorso. The Causes of Summoning.  Profit of the Kingdom, the Ardua negotia nos & statum Regni tangentia. Other times, as 25 E. 1. M. 6. dorso, Arduis & urgentibus negotiis nos, & vos, & totum Regnum nostrum tangentibus. Other times, 
(q) Cl. 27 E. 1. m. 9 dorso.  ad salvationem Coronae nostrae Regiae, & communem utilitatem populi Regni nostri.  
The Preamble to the Writ of Summons 4 E. 3. is very 
(r) Cl. 4 E. 3. m. 13. dorso. General Causes of Summons.  remarkable. Rex, etc. Qualiter negotia, nos & statum Regni nostri contingentia, postquam suscepimus gubernacula Regni nostri hucusque in nostri dampnum, & dedecus, ac depauperationem populi nostri deducta erant, vestram credimus prudentiam non latere: propter quod, non volentes hoc, urgente conscientia, ulterius sustinere, ac desiderantes toto cord, statum & Regimen Regni nostri, secundum juris ac rationis exigentiam, ad honorem Dei & tranquillitatem, & pacem Sanctae Ecclesiae, ac totius populi ejusdem Regni reformari; Ordinavimus, etc. Parliamentum, etc.  
The 22 of E. 3. hath a peculiar 
(s) Cl. 22 E. 3. part 2. m. 9 dorso.  Clause, Quod dictum Parliamentum non ad Auxilia seu Tallagia a populo dicti Regni nostri petenda, vel alia onera eidem populo imponenda, sed duntaxat pro justitia ipsi populo nostro, super dampnis & gravaminibus sibi illatis facienda.  
Another considerable 
(t) Cl. 31 E. 3. m. 21. dorso.  Clause is to be found 31 E. 3. Et quum praedicta negotia perquam ardua sine maxima deliberatione tam Praelatorum & Cleri, quam Magnatum, & Communitatis ejusdem Regni, nullo modo expediri poterunt; ad quorum expeditionem Auxilium & Consilium tam a vobis, etc. habere necessario oportet.  
The 
(u) Cl. 3 H. 6. m. 9 dorso.  Preamble 3 H. 6. is to inquire how Justice hath been done, etc. Quia nos jam dum in Annis degimus teneris, an pax & justitia ubilibet inter Ligeos nostros Regni nostri Angliae (sine quarum observatione Regnum aliquod prospicere non potest) debite conserventur, & exhibeantur necne, etc. Therefore he summons a Parliament.  
The cause 
(w) Cl. 22 & 23 E. 4. m. 11. dorso.  of the Summons 22 E. 4. is thus expressed, Quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis, nos, securitatem, & defens●onem Ecclesiae Anglicanae ac pacem, tranquillitatem, bonum publicum, & defensionem Regni nostri, & Subditorum nostrorum ejusdem concernentibus. Therefore he summons them.  
The special causes are mostwhat to have supply against the King's Enemies, 
Special Causes of Summons.  the French or Scotch Kings: and it is to be noted, that in the Summons of King E. 2. mostly the 
(x) S●otis Inimi●is, & Rebellibus nos●ris, Claus. 2. E. 2. m. 20. dorso.  Scots are not only called the King's Enemies but his Rebels, which implies them Subjects by virtue of the Homage done to his Father, and so 8 E. 2. M. 24. dorso, it is called, Terra nostra Scotiae, though he was the most unfortunate of all our Kings in his Expeditions against that Kingdom.  
The first 
(y) Cl. 14 E. 3. part 2. m. 28. dorso. With the Advice of the King's Council.  Writ I have found, wherein it is said, the King called his Parliament with the Advice of his Council, was 14 E. 3. quia de avisamento Concilii nostri ordinavimus, and so in 46 E. 3. and afterwards sometimes used, and often omitted, but in later times generally used.  
The last considerable thing in their Writs, is what the Prelates, etc. summoned, were to do at these Parliaments, which most-what is comprehended in these Words, That it is 
(z) Vestrum expedit habere consilium. Cl. 6 Jo. m. 3. dorso. What the Summoned were to do.  expedient to have their Counsel, or nobiscum super dictis negotiis tractaturi, vestrumque consilium impensuri, 23 E. 1. m. 9 dorso; or, ad tractandum, ordinandum, & faciendum nobiscum, Cl. 24 E. 1. m. 4. dorso; Ad ordinandum de quantitate & modo subsidii, Ibid. m. 7. dorso; habere colloquium & tractatum, Claus. 2 E. 2. m. 20. dorso, & ad tractandum & consentiendum, Cl. 6 E. 2. m. 2. dorso. So in 
(a) Cl. 14 E. 3 par. 1. m. 33. dorso.  another, Ordinabimus quod juxta consilium vestrum, & aliorum Praelatorum, Magnatum, caeterorumque ibidem convocatorum viderimus opportunum. In the 
(b) Cl. 20 E. 3. par. 2. m. 22. dorso.  20 of E. 3. it is thus expressed, Ad consentiendum hiis quae tunc praedictos Praelatos, Comites & alios Proceres ordinari contigerit super negotiis antedictis, and the like. 46 E. 3. m. 11. dorso. In the Writ, 38 H. 6. m. 29. dorso, it is, Ad tractandum, consentiendum & praecludendum super praemissis & aliis, and 23 E. 4. Et concludendum; and so in the 15th. of K. Ch. the First, Ad tractandum, consentiendum, & concludendum.   

SECT. 3. Of the Summons of the Temporal Lords.  
I Have been the longer upon these Writs of Summons to the Clergy, 
Summons to the Lords Temporal like those to the Prelates, excepting in some few Particulars.  because those to the Nobles differed not much, and the material differences will be all I need note in their Writs, and in these we may find the gradual alteration; from giving Counsel and Advice only, it came to Treaty, Ordaining, Consenting, Doing, and Concluding. I shall refer the curious Reader for the remarks that may be made from all these Writs, to Mr. Prynn's 
(c) Part 1. Brief Register, p. 1●2, etc.  Collection of them, and only note some few, most to my purpose, of the Earls, Barons, and the greater Tenants in Capite's Writs, and then proceed to the Writs of the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses.  
The first Writ of Summons to a Parliament, now left upon Record, as 
(d) Ibid. p. 160.  Mr. Prynn notes, is that of 49. H. 3. those of the 
(e) Cl. 45 H. 3. m. 3. dorso.  45th. being only Summons to assist the King, cum Equis & Armis, & cum Posse vestro (as that to W. de Bello Campo de Aumel, and others show) being only to afford him aid against his Enemies and Rebels.  
In most of the Writs to the Princes, Dukes, Earls, Barons, and Peers, 
In Fide & Homagio vel Ligean●ia, proper to Temporal Lords.  we find the Mandamus is, Vobis in fide & homagio quibus nobis tenemini. But sometimes, as to Edmund Earl of 
(f) Cl. 25 E. 1. m. 25. dorso.  Cornwall, it is, Mandamus in homagio, fide & dilectione, and that to Thomas de 
(g) Cl. 36 E. 3. m. 42. dorso.  Furnival 36 E. 3. is fide & ligeancia quibus nobis tenemini. That to Edward, Prince of Wales, 49 E. 3. 6 m. dorso is directed Carissimo primogenito suo Ed. Principi Walliae, and the Mandamus neither hath adjoined to it, fide, homagio, or any other Word, 
See Prynne's Brief Register, part 1. p. 207.  but only commands him to be present, in propria persona, though others have fide & homagio or ligeancea.  
It is to be noted; that the clause in Homagio & Ligeancia quibus nobis tenemini, is peculiar to the Temporal Lords. But that in fide & dilectione is not so peculiar to the Ecclesiastical Lords, but is inserted into the Lay Lords Writs sometimes. The reason why Archbishops, Bishops, Deans, Parsons, prebend's, and other Ecclesiastic Bodies Politic, when they do Homage (saith 
(h) Littleton, Cap. de Homagio, ●ect. 86.  Littleton) do not say Jeo deveign vostre Home, I become your Man (from whence Homagium or Hominium comes) is 
(i) Par estre tant solement le home de Dieu.  because he is solely the Homager of God, and so Glanvil, Lib. 9 c. 1, 2. Bracton, fol. 78. F. Britton, c. 68 lesta, L. 3. c. 16. resolve that no Man, 
(k) Post consecrationem hom ●gium non faciunt, quiequid fecerunt ante, sed tantum ●idelitat●m.  elected Bishop, after Consecration doth Homage, whatever he hath done before, but only Fealty, and no Convent, or Abbot, or Pri●r aught to do Homage, because they hold in another's name, viz. the name of the Churches. But that these Ecclesiastics swore Fealty, appears by many examples produced by Mr. Prynn, 
(l) Brief Register, part 1. fol. 196. to 206. p. 427, 657, 663.  and what Oaths they took, in his abridgement of the Records of the Tower. But this is now of little use, and so I leave it and shall observe some Particulars which Mr. Prynn and others have noted from the several Writs of Summons to Temporal Lords.  
First it may be observed, 
1. Observations upon the Writs to Temporal Lords. That it alone did not ennoble.  that a Summons by Writ, though for two or three Generations, from Father to Son, did not ennoble the Blood to make them Barons. So Ralph de Camois 49 H. 3. was summoned by Writ, and ranked in the Roll above all Barons, and Ralph his Son, Anno 7 E. 2. But 
(m) Claus. 7 R. 2. m. 32. dorso.  Thomas the Grandchild, being chosen one of the Knights for Surry, was discharged by the King's Writ, because he and many of his Ancestors were Bannerets, and King Richard the Second summoned him to that very Parliament, and he was summoned ever after during Life; yet his Posterity, as others, were omitted, which if they had been Barons properly, (as those by Creation and Tenure of Lands) had not been omitted, but might have challenged Summons ex debito Justiciae. But I cannot enter into this long Controversy, 
First and second● Brief Register.  the curious may peruse Mr. Prynn, and Elsyng's ancient method of holding Parliaments, Page 33. who is of opinion that every degree of Baron passed with actual Ceremony, and those Patents some had (whereof the first upon Record he saith, was 11 R. 2. to the Lord John Beauchamp of Rolt) was an entailing of the Honour, rather than the Creation, because the words are, ipsum Johannem in unum Parium & Baronum Regni praeficimus; whereas if he had been then created, the words should have been, per praesentes praefecimus. Besides, we find Henry Bromflet Knight, was created by special Writ, and his Heirs Males, Barons the Vescy, 27 H. 6. 
(n) Claus. 27 H. 6. m. 26. dorso.  ●ntred after the names of the Temporal Lords, in the very Summons in common Form, to which is added, Volumus enim vos & haeredes vestros masculos de Corpore vestro legitime exeuntes Barones de Vescy. Now this special Writ and Clause of Creation had been merely void and nugatory, had the general Writ alone ennobled him and his Posterity. Yet in all the 
(o) Prynne, part 1. Brief Register, p. 228.  subsequent Summons, 28, 29, 31, 33, 38 H. 6. He is only called Dominus, not Baro de Vescy, as also may be noted of Beauchamp.  
Secondly, 
2. The use of Bar● in Writs, how rare.  It may be observed, that the word Baro and Barones are frequently met withal in Histories, the Clause-Rolls of King John, and H. 3. and in the Preface of Magna Charta, and several Statutes applied to all the 
(p) Ibid. p. 218.  Temporal Lords of Parliament; yet in all the Clause-Rolls, and Writs of Summons, Mr. Prynn hat not observed any particular Persons amongst them, summoned by the Title of Barons, but only the Barons of Graystock, and Stafford, from Ed. 1. to H. 6. as Johanni, Willielmo, Rad●●pho Baroni de Graystock, and so in Ed. 1. and 3. Edmundo & Radulpho Baroni de Stafford.  
Thirdly, 
3. Title of Dominus in Writs of Summons.  as to the Title of Dominus, Mr. Prynn saith, It is not to be found given to any but two before the time of H. 6. The first is John de 
(q) Cl. 16 E. 3. par. 2. m. 13. dorso.  Mowbray, styled Dominus Insulae de Axholm, none else having this title till after the Reign of Richard the Second. The next so styled, is 11 H. 4. 
(r) Cl. 11 H. 4. m. 32. dorso.  where a Writ issued, Johanni Talbot Domino de Furnival, which though omitted in some Summons after, was again used in the Summons to him, 
(s) Cl. 4 H. 5. m. 16. dorso.  4 H. 5. and H. 5. after which, none is found styled Dominus till 
(t) Cl. 22 H. 6. m. 21. dorso.  22 H. 6. that Robert Hungerford Chevalier, is styled Dom. de Mollins, as he is in 25 H. 6. which gave the Title of Dom. de Poynings to Henry Percy, and in Cl. 27 H. 6. m. 21. dorso, this Title Dominus is given to Hungerford Percy, and four more, after which it grew more common to them, and others summoned, as may be seen in Sir William Dugdale's Summons lately Printed, who 
(u) Cl. 49 H. 3. m. 5.  49 H. 3. reckons Dom. Hugo, Dom. Humet, and Dom. Stanford.  
Fourthly, 
4. Title of Chevalier.  Another Title given to Barons of the upper House is that of Chevalier, which was not given to any Temporal Lords or Barons, in any Writs, or Lists of Summons to Parliament, before 49 Ed. 3. 
(w) Cl. 49 E. 3. n. 4.6. dorso. 50 E. 3. part 2. m. 6. dorso.  wherein Summons issued, Willielmo de Morle Chevalier, Willielmo de Aldburgh Chevalier, Joh. de Welle Chevalier, Hugoni de Dacre Chevalier. After which it grew more common under King Richard the Second, Henry the Fourth and Fifth.  
After the beginning of H. 6. and during the Reign of H. 6. and Ed. 4. there was scarce any Temporal Lord in the lists of Summons, but was styled Chevalier or Miles, and so it continues to this day, though not as Mr. Prynn saith, because they were all generally Knighted for their greater Honour; for it is apparent in the Lists exhibited by Sir William Dugdale, that most of the Barons by descent, though never Knighted, had the Title.  
Fifthly, 
5. Of Councils that were not Parliaments.  There is great difference betwixt Writs of Summons to general Parliaments, and particular Councils upon emergent occasions, which are not properly Parliaments. All Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Lords, Barons, together with Judges, and King's Council, Citizens, Burgesses of Parliament, and Barons of the Cinque-Ports being usually summoned to the one; but to the other, some few Spiritual and Temporal Lords only, without 
(x) Brief Register, part 1. pag. 187. to 192.  any Judges, Assistants, Knights, Citizens, Burgesses, or Barons of the Cinque-Ports, or some few of them only, and divers who were no usual Lords, or Barons of Parliament, as Mr. Prynn hath made evident, and the Rolls themselves in the Margin notes them by de Concilio summonito, or deveniendo ad Concilium: which some Antiquaries having not noted, have confounded them.   

SECT. 4. Of the Judicature of the House of Lords.  
IT is evident that the Lords in Parliament have ever been the usual Judges, not only in all criminal and civil causes, 
6. The Lord's Judicature.  proper for Parliaments to judge or punish, and Writs of Errors, but likewise in all cases of Precedencies, and Controversies concerning Peers and Peerage, which Power was in them as the King's Supreme Court, before there were any Knights, Citizens, or Burgesses summoned to our Parliaments. So Hoveden 
(y) Annal. pars poster. p. 561. ad 566.  is express in the case of Sanctius, King of Navarre, and Alphonsus, King of Castille: Comites & Barones Regalis Curiae Angliae adjudicaverunt, Anno 1177. 23 H. 2. So Fleta in Ed. the First's time, writes 
(z) Habet enim Rex Curiam suam in Concilio suo in Parliamentis suis, praesentibus Pralatis, Comitibus, Baronibus, Proceribus, & aliis viris peritis, ubi terminatae sunt dubitationes judiciorum. Lib. 2. c. 2. p. 66.  thus; The King hath his Court in his Council, in his Parliaments, there being present the Prelates, Earls, Barons, Nobles, and other skilful Men (viz. the Judge's Assistants) where are ended the doubts of Judgements.  
This Particular of the Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, is so fully in every Branch of it proved by Mr. Prynn in his Plea for the Lords House, that it were an Injury to the inquisitive Reader, not to refer him to that Treatise for full Satisfaction; therefore I shall only pick out a very few out of a Manuscript I have of the Privileges belonging to the Baronage of England, and Mr. Prynn.  
In the fourth of King 
(a) Ro●. Parl. 4 E. 3. m. 7. num 3. Judgement of Lords on John Mautravers.  Edward the Third, the Peers, Earls and Barons assembled at Westminster, saith the Record, have strictly examined, and thereupon assented and agreed, that John Mautravers is guilty of the death of Esmon Earl of Kent, Uncle of our Lord the King that now is: wherefore the said Peers of the Land, and Judges of Parliament, judged and awarded, that he the said John should be drawn, hanged, and beheaded.  
In the first of R. 2. John Lord of 
(b) Rot. Par. 1 R. 2. m. 6. num. 38, 39  Gomenys, and William de Weston, were brought before the Lords, sitting in the white Chamber, 
On John Lord of G●menys, and William Weston, for delivering up Forts to the Enemy.  and were severally charged at the Commandment of the Lords, by Sir Richard Scroop Knight, Steward of the King's House: William Weston being accused for rendering the Castle of Outhrewike, and John Lord of Gomenys for rendering the Castle of Ards. They both made plausible defences, and Sir Rich. Scroop Steward, tells William, that the Lords sitting in full Parliament do adjudge him to death. But because our Lord the King is not yet informed of the manner of this Judgement, the execution thereof shall be respited till the King be informed thereof; and the like Sentence he passed upon John Lord of Gomenies, only adding, that he being a Gentleman, and Banneret should be beheaded.  
There are many more Examples of Judgements given in Capital matters upon Bergo de Bayons, 4 E. 3. m. 7. num. 4. Thomas de Gurny eadem membrana num. 5. and others; and for Offences not Capital, of Richard Lions, 59 E. 3. m. 7. William le Latymer, 42 E. 3. m. 2. William Ellis, ibid. num. 31; John Chichester and Botesha, 1 R. 2. num. 32. Alice Piers, Ibid. num. 41.  
Mr. 
Antiquity of Judgement by Pee●s.  Prynn 
(c) Plea for Lords, p. 203. Hist, lib. 4.  shows this Jurisdiction out of Historians, even from Cassibellan, out of Geoffrey of Monmouth. Also, Anno 924. of Elfred a Nobleman, who opposed King Aethelstan's Title, and had his Lands adjudged by the Peers forfeit to him; the Words of the King are, Et eas accepi 
(d) Malmsb. de Gest is Reg. lib. 2. c. 6. p. 62. Spelman. Conc. Tom. 1. p. 407, 408. Anno 1043.  quemadmodum judicaverunt omnes ●ptimates Regni Anglorum.  
So Earl Godwin having murdered Prince Alfred, Brother to King Edward the Confessor, being fled into Denmark, and hearing of King Edward's Piety and Mercy, returned, and came to London to the King, who then held a Great Council, and denied the Fact, and put himself upon the 
(e) unde super hoc, pono me in consideratione Curiae vestrae. Chron. Brompton. col. 937, 938.  consideration of the King's Court, and the King speaks to the Earls and Barons thus, Volo quod inter nos in illa appellatione rectum judicium decernatis, & debitam justiciam faciatis, and after it is said, Quicquid judicaverint per omnia ratificavit.  
So in the Constitutions of 
(f) An. 1164. M. Paris 94. Sicut Barones caeteri debent interesse judiciis Curiae Regis cum Baronibus quousque perveniatur in judicio ad diminutionem membrorum, vel ad mortem. The House of Lords the King's Court of Barons.  Clarendon, it is appointed, That the Archbishop, Bishops, and those Clergy that held in Capite, as by Barony, should be Parties in the Judgements of the King's Court as other Barons ought, with the other Barons, till it come in Judgement to the loss of Member, or to Death.  
So in the Case of Tho. Becket Archbishop of Canterbury, Anno 1165. 11 H. 2. we find in Hoveden, parte post, p. 494, 495. that, Barones Curiae Regis judicaverunt eum esse in misericordia Regis: and afterwards, when he would not yield to the Kings Will, he 
(g) Dixit Baronibus su●s, Cito facite mihi judicium de illo, qui homo meus Ligeus est, & stare Juri in Curia mea recusat.  saith to his Barons, Quickly make to me Judgement of him who is my Liege Man, and refuseth to stand to the Law in my Court: The Barons going out judged him fit to be seized on, and sent to Prison, and the Historian saith, tunc misit Rex Reginaldum Comitem Cornubiae & Robertum Comitem Leicestriae ad indicandum ei judicium de illo factum.  
Anno 1208. King 
(h) Anno 10 Johan. Mat. Paris, p. 218.  John exacted Pledges of his Subjects; and amongst others of William de Breause, who said, If he had offended the King, he would be ready to answer his Lord, and that without Hostages, secundum judicium Curiae suae & Baronum Parium suorum.  
So Anno 1240. 24 H. 3. 
(i) Graviter accusatus coram Rege, & Curia tota. Lond. Mat. Westm. 153.  Matthew Paris saith, That Hubert de Burgo, Earl of Kent, was grievously accused before the King and his whole Court, and it was adjudged he should resign to the King four of his Castles.  
I cannot omit one memorable passage, that, 
(k) Mat. Westm. Anno 1260. p. 295, 296.  Anno 1260. 44 H. 3. there falling out a difference betwixt King Hen. 3. Prince Edward his Son, Simon Montfort, and other Nobles, the King called his Baronage to St. Paul's, and there it being urged, that Prince Edward had done some injuries to the King, he offered to prove himself innocent before the King and his Uncle, who was King of the Romans; saying, 
Who are Peers of Prince Edward.  That none of 
(l) Omnes alios Barones & Comites, sibi de ●ure non esse Pares, nec s●●s in eum excercer● dis●ussiones.  the rest of the Barons and Earls were by right his Peers, nor aught to exercise upon him their Discussions of the matter. By which it appears, that he judged himself to be something more than a Peer of the Realm, being the Heir apparent of the Crown.  
I might fill a large Volume with the Histories and Records, to prove this; but since Levellers, and the House of Commons that voted the House of Lords dangerous and useless, have received such deadly wounds by Mr. Prynne in his Plea for the Lords, who was once one of their own Champions, I think it needless to whet those Weapons again, since they always will be in readiness for any one to make use of if need require; and shall only obviate one objection that may be urged, That whatever the usage was before the Representatives of the Commons, 
An Objection, That after the House of Commons were admitted, the Jurisdiction of the Lords House was lessened; Answered.  yet the Commons after were often admitted to a share of Judicature in some cases: But I shall give a few Instances, how, after this change of the Constitution of Parliament, still this power of Judicature remained in the King and House of Lords.  
Roger de 
(m) 4 E. 3. num. 11.28 E. 3. num. 9, 10.  Mortimer being accused of High Treason, 4 E. 3. for the Murder of King Edward 2. after his resignation and unlawful deposition; Knighton 
(n) De Event. Angliae, lib. 3. c. 16. col. 1556, 1557.  giving an account of the proceed agreeable to the Parliament Roll, saith, Rex praecepit Comitibus, Baronibus, & caeteris Magnatibus Regni justum judicium ferre super praedicto Rogero de Mortimer: So at the Parliament held at Salisbury, 7 R. 2. W. de Zouch is said to be called to the Parliament, to stand to the Judgement 
(o) Ad standum judicio Regis, & Domincrum. Wal●ingham, p. 334. Hist. Ang. & Hypodig. Neust. p. 141.  of the King, and the Lords: So Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk, and Chancellor of England, 10 R. 2. 
(p) Rot. Parl. 10 R. 2. num. 6. ad 18.  was accused by the Commons in full Parliament, before the King, Bishops and Lords; and at last it is said, The Lords in full Parliament gave judgement against him.  
In the Parliament 11 R. 2. Thomas Duke of Gloucester offered to put himself upon his Trial as the Lords of the Parliament would award, etc. After which the Lords, as well Spiritual as Temporal, claimed their Liberties and Franchises, namely, That all weighty matters in the same Parliament which should be after moved touching the Peers of the Land, should be judged and determined by them by the course of Parliament, and not by the Civil Law, nor yet by the Common Law of the Land, used in other Courts of the Realm.  
Yet this seems a very high Demand; for they have not Juris dandi but dati Jurisdictionem, as they are a Court of Ministerial Jurisdiction, being the Court of the King's Barons in Parliament. And though, when upon Writ of Error 
(q) Egerton, sect. 4.22, 23.  any Judgement in the King's Bench is examined in the House of Lords, and there affirmed or reversed, the Judgement is said to be affirmed or reversed in Parliament; yet we cannot conclude, they have the Power of the High Court of Parliament, that their Decrees (if against the Law) should be as binding as Acts of Parliament. 
How the Lords judge ministerially.  And though the same House, in the same Session, may not have Power to review again their own Judgement, nor to restore again any Judgement they have reversed, because they judge ministerially, and not sovereignly, and so bind their own Hands, as well as their Inferiors; whereas an Absolute Supreme Court is never at the last Period of Jurisdiction: yet we see Attainders in one Parliament reversed in another; and so may their Judgements be. But this obiter.  
I shall but add one proof more, being full and express to the purpose, to prove the House of Lords sole Jurisdiction with the King, (who must always be understood to give Judgement by them:) The Record is 1 H. 4. 
(r) Rot. Par. 1 H. 4. num. 79. Exact Abridgement, p. 392.  where it is said, That 3 Nou. the Commons in this Parliament showed to the King, Come les joggements du Parliament apperteignent soulement au Roy & Seignieurs, & nient aus Communes, etc. That the Judgements of Parliament appertained only to the King, and to the Lords, and not unto the Commons: Thereupon they prayed the King, out of his special Grace, to show unto them the said Judgements, and the cause of them; that so no Record might be made in Parliament against the said Commons, which are or shall be parties to any Judgement given, or hereafter to be given in Parliament, without their Privity. Whereunto the Archbishop of Canterbury gave them this Answer by the King's Commandment, That the Commons themselves are Petitioners and Demanders, and that the King 
(s) Et que le Roy, & les Seigniours de tout temps, ont eves, & averont de droit, les Juggement in Parliament, en manere come mesmes les Communes so●t monsters.  and Lords from all times have had, and shall have of right the Judgements in Parliaments in manner as the Commons have showed.  
How far the King and House of Lords have been Judges of the Privileges of the House of Commons, I shall declare in that part of this Chapter wherein I treat of that House.   

SECT. 5. Of the Assistants to the House of Lords.  
HAving thus far treated of the Constituent Parts of the House of Lords, I come now to the Assistants to this most Honourable House; which were mostly the 
(t) Prynne's Brief Register, part 1. sect. 3. p. 240. The Judges and other Assistants of the House of Lords.  King's Great Officers, as well Clergymen as Secular Persons, who were no Lords or Barons of the Realm, as, namely, his Treasurer, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Judges of his Courts at Westminster, Justices in Eyre, Justice's Assigns, Barons of his Exchequer, Clerks, Secretaries of his Council, and sometimes his Sergeants at Law, with such other Officers and Persons whom our Kings thought meet to summon.  
The first Writ that Mr. Prynne finds extant in our Records, and which Sir William Dugdale mentions, is entered in the Clause-Roll 23 E. 1. dorso 9 directed to Gilbert de Thornton, and thirty eight more, whose Names are in Sir William Dugdale; whereof there are eleven by the name of Magistri, three Deans, and two Archdeacon's: only I find them differently ranked in Mr. Prynne, to what they are in Sir William Dugdale.  
The Writ runs thus: Rex dilecto & fide●i suo Gilberto de Thornton, salutem. Quia super quibusdam arduis negotiis, nos & Regnum nostrum, ac vos caeterosque de Concilio nostro tangentibus, quae sine vestra, & eorum praesentia nolumus expediri, etc. Vobis mandamus in fide & dilectione, etc. as in the usual Summons to the Bishops.  
Sometimes, as 25 E. 1. there 
(u) Cl. 25 E. 1. m. 25. dorso.  was no Writ directed to them; but we find under the Name of Milites, with a Lines space betwixt them and the Barons, thirteen named, which by other Records are known to be the King's Justices.  
The differences in their Writs are mostly these: Sometimes, 
The difference in their Writs.  as in 27 E. 1. it is, Cum caeteris de Concilio nostro habere volumus colloquium & tractatum; or, as in 28 E. 1. 
(w) Cl. 28 E. 1. m. 3. dorso.  showing the special Cause, Quia super Jure & Dominio quae nobis in Regno Scotiae competit, etc. cum Juris peritis, & cum caeteris de Concilio nostro speciale colloquium habere volumus & tractatum, vobis mandamus, etc. cum caeteris de Concilio nostro super praemissis tractaturis vestrumque consilium impensuris.  
At the same time there are Writs to the Chancellor of the University of Oxford, to send four or five, 
Persons skilful in the Law summoned from the Universities.  de discretioribus, & in Jure scripto magis expertis; and to the Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, to send two or three in the like manner qualified: and then follow Writs to several Abbats, Priors, Deans and Chapters; and all these Writs mentioned the Business of the King's Claim to the Jurisdiction of Scotland: and in the Writs of Summons to the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Temporal Lords, Justices, and Sheriffs of Counties, that Particular is not mentioned: which shows, that the King summoned these particular Persons, as most fit to search and ● send their Chronicles to the Parliament: The Occasion and Result whereof, and of sending these Lawyers from the Universities, you may read at large in 
(x) An. 13●2. p. 419. to p. 438.  Matth. Westminster, and 
(y) Hist. Ang. p. 32. to 58.  Walsingham.  
In some Writs, as that of 9 E. 2. 
(z) Cl. 9 E. 2. m. 20. dorso.  the Justices are appointed to expedite their Assizes, that they may not fail to be present at the Parliament, or to leave two to attend the Business of the King's Bench: And the 7 of E. 2. 
(a) Cl. 7 E. 2. m. 25● dorso. Justice's to leave the Assizes to attend the Parliament.  That whereas they had appointed the Assizes at Duresm, and other Parts in the Northern Circuit, at certain days after the time the Parliament was to convene, at which he wondered; he order them to put off the Assizes, and attend. By which two Writs it appears, their Summons by Writ to attend and counsel the King in Parliament, was a Supersedeas to them to take Assizes during the Parliament; and that the Assizes and Suits of private Persons ought to give place to the public Affairs of the King and Kingdom in Parliament. Whoever desires to know who were summoned in this manner, and the further variety of Summons, may consult Mr. Prynne, and Sir William Dugdale's Summons.  
From these Writs we may observe, 
Observations from these Writs.  first, That sometimes the Persons summoned were many in number, sometimes very few, and always 
(b) Brief Register, part 1. a p. 366. ad p. 394.  more or less at the King's Pleasure. Secondly, in latter times the Clergymen were wholly omitted. Thirdly, That they were never licenced to appear by Proxies. Mr. Prynne hath collected a great many Precedents to prove, that these Persons thus summoned, together with the King's ordinary Council, had a very great Hand, Power, and Authority, not only in making Ordinances, Proclamations, deciding all weighty Controversies, regulating most public Abuses, and punishing all exorbitant Offences out of Parliament, in the Star-Chamber, and elsewhere; 
The Employment of these Assistants.  but likewise in receiving and answering all sorts of Petitions, determining and adjudging all weighty doubtful Cases and Pleas, yea, in making or compiling Acts, Ordinances, Statutes, and transacting all weighty Affairs concerning the King or Kingdom, even in Parliaments themselves, when summoned to them. Yet these have no Vote, but only are to speak to such Matters as their Opinions are required in, and sit uncovered, unless the Chancellor or Lord Keeper give leave to the Judges to be covered.   

SECT. 6. Concerning the House of Commons.  
I Now come to consider the Honourable House of Commons, and the Use, 
The Summons of the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses.  Constitution, and Privileges of it, and shall first consider the Summons by which they have their Power to act as an House, and third Estate in Parliament.  
Mr. 
(c) Second Part of Brief Register, a p. 1. ad 29.  Prynn hath cleared, that all the Writs of Summons directed to Sheriffs (in King John, and Henry the Third's time before 49 H. 3.) to send Knights to the King at set times, were either for Information of the Council what voluntary aid each particular County would grant the King in his great necessity, or to assist with Men and Arms, and were not elected as Representatives of the Commons, till 49 H. 3. To whom I shall refer the curious for Satisfaction, as also to Dr. Brady, who hath by his own Inspection, as well as the considerate application of what Mr. Prynn hath amassed (in his Books since his late Majesty's Restauration, and after 1648) composed many most useful Observations for the understanding of the ancient customs, usages, and practices relating to Parliaments. Therefore I shall endeavour to be as short as possibly I can, and without obscurity contract what they and most others that treat of the House of Commons, have at large filled Volumes with.  
The form of the Writ, 49 H. 3. to the Sheriffs is not 
(d) Cl. 49 H. 3. m. 11● dorso.  expressed, but after the recital of the Writ to the Bishop of Duresm and Norwich, and the eodem modo to the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Deans, Earls, Lords, and Barons, there follows this entry in the Record, Item mandatum est sing●lis Vicecomitibus per Angliam quod venire faciant duos Milites delegalioribus, probioribus, & discretioribus Militibus singulorum Comitatuum, ad Regem London, in forma praedicta.  
Item in forma praedicta scribitur Civibus Ebor. Lincoln. & caeteris Burgis Angliae, quod mittant in forma praedicta duos de discretioribus, legalioribus, & probioribus tam Civibus quam Burgensibus suis: and so to the Barons of the Cinque-Ports, which runs thus; Rex Baronibus & Ballivis Portus sui de Sandwico. Cum Praelati & Nobiles Regni nostri tam pro negotio Liberationis Edwardi Primogeniti nostri, quam pro aliis Communitatem Regni nostri tangentibus, ad instans Parliamentum, etc. Vobis mandamus in fide & dilectione quibus nobis tenemini, firmiter injungentes, omnibus aliis praetermissis mittatis ad nos ibidem, 4 de legalioribus & discertioribus Portus vestri, etc. Nobiscum & cum praefatis Magnatibus Regni nostri tractatum & super praemissis consilium impensuri.  
From all which, it is observable, first, 
Observations on the first Writ to the Barons of the Cinque-Ports.  that in all probability the Writs than issued to the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, were the same in form and substance, with those to the Spiritual and Temporal Lords, and in those to the Sheriffs, etc. Secondly, the Qualifications of those to be elected are limited: Thirdly, It doth not appear whether the Counties themselves, or the Sheriffs alone were to elect. Fourthly, The Writs for electing Citizens and Burgesses were directed immediately to the Citizens and Burgesses themselves, not to the Sheriffs of the Counties. Lastly, that no Writ issued to the Citizens of London, their Liberties then being seized into the King's Hand, and that York and Lincoln are the only Cities mentioned particularly in the Roll.  
The first Writs, entered at large in the Rolls, are those 
(e) Cl. 22 E. 1. m. 6. dorso.  22 E. 1. wherein is expressed, that the King intending a Colloquium & Tractatum with his Barons, and great Men, he commands that the Sheriff's cause to be elected two Knights, 
De di●●retioribus & ad laborandum potentioribus— cum plena potestate pro se & tota communitate Com. praedicti, ad consulendum, & cons●ntiendum pro se & communitate illa, Hiis quae Comites, Barones, & Proceres prae●icti concorditer ordinaverint in praemissis, etc.  of the more discreet and more able to take Pains, etc. to come to Westminster, etc. with full Power for themselves, and the whole Community of the said County, to consult and consent each for himself and the said Community, to those things, which the Earls, Barons, and Nobles aforesaid unanimously ordain in the Premises; so that for want of such like Power, the Business remain not undone.  
I shall now insert what Variations I find in the Writs of Summons, promiscuosly, whether to Knights, Citizens, or Burgesses, unless there be some remarkable difference to be observed.  
First, 
The Qualifications in the Writs.  As to their Qualifications, generally, both Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses are to be de legalioribus & discretioribus, & ad laborandum potentioribus. In the Writ 25 E. 1. 
(f) Cl. 25 E. 1. m. 6. dorso.  it is probioribus & legalioribus; and some two, or all of these Epithets are generally used, till 
(g) Cl. 22 E. 3. m. 7. dorso.  22 E. 3. m. 7. dorso, where it is expressed, that the Knights be gladio cinctos & ordinem militarem habentes & non alios, & de qualibet Civitate, & de quolibet Burgo duos Burgos de aptioribus, discretioribus, probioribus, & fide dignis Militibus, Civibus & Burgensibus, 
Cl. 24 E. 3. par. 2. m. 3. dorso.  and in the Twenty fourth of E. 3. there is an addition and limitation, 
No Maintainers of S●its, etc. to be cho●●n.  Qui non sunt Placitorum, aut querelarum manutentores, aut ex hujusmodi quaestu viventes, sed homines valentes, & bonae fidei, & publicum commodum diligentes eligi: and the selfsame Limitations are in the 25, 28, and 29 E. 3. So that it was used so long as the King thought fit. In 
(h) Cl. 26 E. 3. m. 14. dorso.  26 Ed. 3. it is unum Militem de provectioribus, discretioribus, & magis expertis Militibus, and so for Citizens and Burgesses: by which it appears the King desired not any under Age (as now is allowed) to be chosen. In 31 Ed. 3. besides 
(i) Cl. 31 E. 3. m. 2. dorso.  the usual words de discretioribus & probioribus, there is added de elegantioribus personis eligi. Which in no Writ else before or after is to be found. In the 36 E. 3. 
(k) Cl. 36 E. 3. m. 16. dorso.  it is de melioribus & validioribus Militibus, etc. That of the Forty fourth of 
(l) Cl. 44 E. 3. m. 12. dorso.  E. 3. runs, Duos Milites gladiis cinctos & in Armis & Actibus Armorum magis probatos & circumspectos & discretos.  
It appears by the Parliament Roll, 46 
(m) Nul home de Ley pursuont busoignes en la Courte de Roy, ne Viscount pur le Temps que il est Viscount, soient retournez, ne acceptez Chevalers des Countees, neque ves qui sont Gentz de Ley, & Vis●ounts o'er retournez au Parliament eient Gauges. Rot. Parl. 46 E. 3. cum. 13.  E. 3. That it was accorded, and assented to in that Parliament, and an Ordinance made, That no Lawyer pursuing Business in the Court of the King, nor any Sheriff while he was Sheriff, should be returned, or accepted Knights of the Counties; and if any were so returned, they should have no wages. Therefore in the fourteenth Number of the said Roll, it is thus expressed, Mes voyet le Roy, que Chevalers & Serjaunts, (i. e. Esquires, not Sergeants at Law) des meulieur valeurs du paiis soiz retornez desore Chevalers' en Parliament, & quills sount esluz en plein Counts. That Knights and Esquires of greatest value in their Country should be chosen in the full County.  
The very next Writ 47 E. 3. 
(n) Cl. 47 E. 3 m. 13 dorso. To be Knights gi●t with Swords, and skilful in Arms.  runs thus, Duos Milites gladiis cinctos se● Armigeros, (which explains the word Serjaunts before, as in that Age being reputed Servants to Knights, as holding Lands in such a Tenure of them) de dicto Com. digniores & probiores, & in Actibus Armorum magis expertos, & discretos, & non alterius conditionis, & duos Cives & Burgenses, qui in navigo & exercitio mercandisarum notitiam habeant meliorem, eligi; and then in the Close, follows, Nolumus autem quod tu seu aliquis alius Vicecomes Regni praedicti, aut aliquis alteri●s conditionis quam superius specificatur, aliqualiter sit electus; and the last Clause, till the 11 Rich. 2. was used, and from the 12th. to the last of Rich. 2. the words alterius conditionis are omitted, and so in Ed. Fourth's time; but the Clause, that the Sheriff be not chosen, is retained.  
To these we may add, That Bannerets were not to be chosen Members of the House of Commons, 
(o) Cl. 7 R. 2. m. 32. dorso. No Banneret to be chosen.  7 R. 2. in the case of Thomas Camoys thus, Nos advertentes quod hujusmodi Banneretti ante haec tempora Milites Comitatuum ratione alicujus Parliamenti eligi minime consueverunt; ipsum de Officio Militis ad dictum Parliamentum pro Communitate Com. praedicti venturi, exonerari volumus, and so commands the Sheriff to choose another.  
In the 11 R. 2. we find a 
(p) Cl. 11 R. 2. m. 24. dorso.  new qualification in the Writ, That the Knights, etc. should be Gladio cinctos, idoneos & discretos, & in Debatis modernis magis indifferentes; 
A new Clause recalled.  but the King being informed, that this new Clause, indifferent in the modern Debates (which only was to the Knights, not to the Citizens or Burgesses) was contrary to the forms of Elections anciently used, and against the Liberty of the Commons, he superseded, and revoked that Clause by another Writ.  
In the 5 H. 4. an unusual new 
(q) Cl. 5 H. 4. par. 2. m. 4. dorso. No Lawyers to be chosen.  Clause was added to the prohibition of Sheriffs, Nolumus, etc. nec Apprenticius a●t aliquis alius homo ad Legem aliqualiter sit electus: Concerning this and that in the 46 Ed. 3. the curious Reader may peruse Sir Ed. 
(r) 4 Instit. p. 10.  Coke, whose opinion Mr. Prynne 
(s) Second Part of Brief Register, 124. Hist. Ang. p. 414.  from the Roll, and from Walsingham, clearly confutes, however that Parliament is since called indoctum.  
After this, upon making the Statutes 7 H. 4. c. 15.11 H. 4. c. 1. upon the Commons Petition, the ancient form for the Writs was somewhat altered and enlarged, though little as to the qualifications, but as to the manner of Elections, etc. of which I shall discourse by itself.  
23 H. 6. c. 15. 
(t) Cl. 25 H. 6. m. 24. dorso. Only Knights, Esquires, or Gentlemen to be Knights of Shires.  a Statute was made concerning Elections of Knights, therefore in the Writs of Summons 25 H. 6. it runs thus, Milites notabiles, seu saltem notabiles Armigeri, hominesve generosi de natu eorundem Com. qui habiles sunt Milites fieri, & nullus homo de gradu valettae, & gradu inseriori de essendo Milites hujusmodi existant.  
Having thus treated of the Ancient Qualifications, 
The Modern Qualifications.  I shall subjoin the modern, which are comprised in short, To cause 
(u) Du●s milit●s gladiis cinctos m●gis idoneos, & discretos— Cives & Burgen●es●de discretiorthus & magis sufficientibus. The Electors.  two Knights girt with Swords, the most fit and discreet of the County aforesaid, and of every City of that Country two Citizens, of every Burrow two Burgesses of the discreeter and most sufficient to be freely and indifferently chosen, etc.  
Having thus discoursed of the Qualifications of the Persons elected; before I make any remarks upon the whole, it is fit to note the Electors and manner of Election. Some are of opinion, that, as the greater and lesser Tenants in Capite, after King John's Charter, were the only Lay constituent Members of Parliament, so the still smaller Tenants to those that held in Capite, and the smaller Tenants in Capite, if not they only, did elect the Knights of Shires.  
But I shall, as fair as Records will give me light, by particulars clear this, and the power that was given them by the Community of the County to the Knights.  
The first 
(w) Cl. 22 E. 1. m. 6. dorso.  Writ hitherto found, is only, That the Sheriff shall cause to be chosen two Knights, and that they have power, etc. as I have before related in the Writ to the Sheriff of Northumberland; 
See below the Choice in Yorkshire.  it is to cause two Knights to come, chosen by the consent of the County, and to have full power for themselves singly, and the Community of the County; and so likewise, two Citizens and two Burgesses with the Assent of the Community of the City or Burrough. The Knights were elected by the Community of the County, that is, as Dr. Brady makes it clear in his 
(x) P. 33●34.  Glossary, the greater and less Tenants in Capite; and as for Cities and Burroughs, such were the choosers as held Lands in Free Burgages of the King, or some great Lords who held in Capite.  
Ann. 26 E. 1. 
(y) Bundle num. 1.  expresseth no more but the Election in general, and the power to be given the Elected, Ita quod dicti Milites plenam & sufficientem potestatem pro se & Communitate Com. praedict. & dicti Cives & Burgenses pro se & Comunitate Civitatum & Burgorum praedictorum divisim ab ipsis tunc ibidem habeant, etc.  
Before I proceed any further, 
Manucaptors or Pledges, that Knights elected should meet in Parliament.  we must note, that in the Returns made by the Sheriffs to these Writs, there are found 26 E. 1. four Manucaptors for every person elected, and in others two: these did engage themselves, that the Knights, Citizens, or Burgesses so elected should appear at the Parliament according to the time appointed.  
In the County of Bedford, I find Rich. de Rous Knight elected, and no Manucaptors returned, but that the Sheriff distrained eight Oxen, and four Horses of him, that he should come at the Day, etc. This was done by virtue of that Clause in the Writ, & eos ad nos ad praedictos diem & locum venire facias; and this way of having Manucaptors, continued till the 12 E. 4. 
(z) Brief Register, part 2. p. 50.  though many had none in latter times. Mr. Prynne observes, That the Knights in every Shire were elected in the full County, by and for the whole County, and that the Citizens and Burgesses were then also elected per totam Communitatem. In all the Writs of Richard the Second, there is this Clause more fully inserted than in any before, That the Election be in pleno Comitatu tuo de communi assensu ejusdem Comitatus.  
Upon the making the Statutes 7 H. 4. c. 15. and 11 H. 4. c. 1. 
The Statutes for ordering Elections.  for regulating abuses in Elections, the Writs of Summons 8 H. 4. and all his time, and so 
(a) Cl. 1 H. 5. m. 9 & 37.  1 H. 5. were accordingly altered, that Proclamation should be made by the Sheriff, in the next County day after the receipt of the Writ, and the Knights to be chosen libere & indifferenter, 
Free Choice.  free and indifferently by those that were present at the Proclamation; and shall return the names of the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, 
Return of Indentures.  in certain Indentures betwixt the Sheriff, and those that were present at the Election, whether the persons elected were present or not, etc.  
The Returns to the Writs 1 H. 5. 
Who were Choosers of Burgesses.  show the Election to be by common assent and consent of those present, as that for Lestwythiel, where 32 Electors are named, and that for Surry hath only four, but adds, & omnium aliorum fidelium ibidem existentium. The Indenture for Sussex is in French, and saith, Les Gentiles homes & Communes, the Gentlemen and Commons had chosen Richard Sayvile, etc.  
The Sheriff of Bristol saith, Coadunatis discretioribus & magis sufficientibus Burgensibus, ex assensu Johannis Clive Majoris Villae praedictae, & aliorum plurimorum existentium eligimus, etc. The elected were two Burgesses of Bristol, Thomas Norton and John Leycester, both for Knights for the County of Bristol, and Burgesses for the Villa of Bristol; and in another these are called Burgenses and Mercatores.  
The next alteration that I find, is after the Statute of the 
(b) Cl. 23 H. 6. m. 21. dorso. The Knights to be resident in the County, and the Electors to have at least 40 s. a year Lands.  8 H. 6. c. 7. which agrees with that of 23 H. 6. that every Knight to be chosen within the Kingdom of England to come to the Parliament, shall be chosen by such as live in the County; whereof every one have a free Tenement to the value of Forty Shillings per annum, beyond all Reprizes; and that those who are elected be abiding, and resident in the said County, and the Sheriff have power upon Oath to examine the Electors, what yearly Estate they have, and that the Sheriff incur the penalty of 100 Marks for his false return, and the Knights so returned lose their Wages.  
There are several Precepts that command, that at such Elections 
(c) Proclamari & inhiberi facias, ne aliqua persona tunc ibidem armata, seu modo guerrino arraiata, ad electionem illam accedat. Rot. Parl. 8 H. 6. m. 13. num. 18. None to come in an Hostile manner to elect.  no person come there Armed, or arrayed in Warlike manner, or do, nor attempt any thing that may be in disturbance of the King's Peace, or the Election; as particularly is expressed in the Writs, 2 E. 3. m. 31. dorso, and several others to be perused in the first part of Prynne's Brief Register, a p. 27. ad 28, 177, 214. Cl. 5 E. 2. m. 22. dorso, 18 H. 6. and several other places which were prohibited, that Elections thereby might be made free.  
That it may appear, that the Elections in ancient times were not made by such as we now call Freeholders of forty Shillings a Year (which now is established by Statute Law) I think it not amiss to insert what I find of a particular usage in Yorkshire; 
(d) Prynne's Brevia Parliamentaria Rediviva, p. 152, 153, 154. Attorneys of Noblemen and Ladies in Yorkshire Electors.  where●● it appears by the first Indentures of the Elections and Returns of Knights for the County of York, that the Attorneys of the Archbishop of York, and of sundry Earls, Lords, Nobles, and some Ladies, who were annual Suitors to the County Court of Yorkshire, were sole Electors of the Knights, as appears by the Return 13 H. 4. upon the Writ of 12 H. 4. betwixt Edm. Sandford Sheriff on the one part, and Will. Holgate Attorney of Ralph Earl of Westmoreland, Will● de Kyllington Attorney of Lucy Countess of Kent, Will. Hesham Attorney of Pet. Lord de M●lolacu, William de Burton Attorney of William Lord de Roos, Rob. Evedal Attorney of Ralph Baron of Graystock, William do Heston Attorney of Alex. de Metham Knight, Henry de Preston Attorney of Henry de Percy Knight, choose John de Ever Knight, and Robert de Plompton Knight.  
Also 2 H. 5. The Indenture is betwixt William de Harrington Knight, Sheriff of Yorkshire, and Robert Maulevere● Attorney of Henry Archbishop of York, William Fencotes Attorney of Ralph Earl of Westmoreland, William Archer Attorney of John Earl Marshal, and so the Attorneys of Hen. le Scrop Knight Lord of Masham, of Peter de Mulolacu, Alexander de Metham. Robert Roos, of Margaret, which was Wife of Henry Vavasor Knight, and of Henry Percy.  
The like are found in the Eighth and Ninth of H. 5. and the 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 H 6. in all which the Attorneys only of Nobles, Barons, Lords, Ladies, and Knights, who were Suitors, made the Elections of the Knights of Yorkshire, in the County Court, and sealed the Indenture. I have a French Letter of Attorney from the Lady Ross, to that purpose; concerning which, if God give me Life, I shall give an account in my Antiquities of Yorkshire,  
This Method ceased before 25 H. 6. at which time the Return made by Robert Vghtred Sheriff of Yorkshire, hath the Names of Forty two Gentlemen, most of which are of very ancient Families, and such as had great Estates then, and so continue to have; though I doubt not but (as it is the Custom now) the much lesser part of those present were only inserted as Parties to the Indentures. However by the Community we may understand, who elected were not like the Freeholders now.  
The next thing we are to consider in the Writs of Summons to Parliament, 
What the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses were summoned for.  is what the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses so elected, were by the Writ authorized to do.  
The first Writ 
(e) Ad consulendum, & consentiendum, pro se, & communitate illa, hiis quae Comites, Barones, & Proceres praedicti concorditer ordinaverint in praemissis. Cl. 22. E. 1. m. 6. dorso.  that we find for Election of Knights of Shires, expresseth their convening to be, To consult, and consent for themselves, and the Community, to those things which the Earls, Barons, and foresaid Nobles unanimously should ordain in the premises; and the Writ to the Sheriff of Northumberland is ad a●diendum & faciendum quod & tunc ibidem plenius injungemus, to hear and do what we shall then and there fullier enjoin.  
In the Writ 25 
(f) Cl. 25 e. 1. m. 6. dorso.  E. 1. the King intending to confirm the great Charter, and Charter of the Forest; that he might levy the eighth part of all the Goods of his Liege's, for his most urgent necessity against the French; convenes the Parliament before Prince Edward his Son, and the Knights are to meet to receive the said Charters, & facturi ulterius quod per dictum Filium nostrum ibidem fuerit ordinatum; to do further what should be ordained by the Prince.  
The Writ 25 E. 1. 
(g) Bundle. num. 1. Ad faci●ndum, quod tunc de Communi Concili● ordinabitur in praemissis.  expresseth that the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, are to do what then shall be ordained in the Premises by the Common Council; and so the Returns are ad faciendum quod tunc ibidem ordinabitur.  
In 17 E. 2. 
(h) Cl. 17 E. 2. m. 27. dorso.  it is enjoined, that the Knights, etc. be there, ad faciendum & consentiendum hiis quae in dicto Parliamento ordinari contigerit super negotiis antedictis.  
Anno 21 E. 3. 
(i) Cl. 21 E. 3. m. 12. dorso.  there is some more Power granted to the Knights, etc. ad tractandum, consulendum, & consentiendum hiis quae tunc favente divina Clementia contigerit ordinari. Whereas before it was only to hear and do what was ordained by the King, the Prince, or the great Council; here it is to treat, consult and consent to what then should be ordained. But the Writ Anno 36. 
(k) Cl. 36 E. 3. m. 16. dorso.  explains who had the ordaining Power, for it runs, ad consentiendum hiis quae per nos, ac dictos Praelatos, Magnates & Proceres ordinari contigerit. So here the King, the Bishops, and the Nobles ordain, and the House of Commons are to assent. Anno 47 E. 3. 
(l) Cl. 47 E. 3. m. 13. dorso.  the words are, ad faciendum, & consentiendum eis quae tunc de Communi Concilio Regni nostri favente Domino contingant ordinari; which Form is continued to this day: so that according to the import of the Writ, the Commons are to do and assent to what shall be ordained in Parliament; by which two words I suppose they have the full Power to frame Bills, and to assent, which also implies a Power of Dissent to the Bills sent to them by the House of Lords.  
Having thus drawn into one Scheme, the most material Alterations, and variety of Expressions, from all the Writs of Summons, of Mr. Prynne and others, that fill so great Volumes, and truly (as I hope) quoted all the Records, which illustrate these Particulars, and in a very clear Landscape represented the most material Parts of the two so noble and wisely constituted Houses; from whose great Wisdom (with the Sovereign's Authority and Fiat) all those wholesome and necessary Laws are derived, that establish this great Monarchy: I shall now pass to some general remarks, and from thence to the ancient and modern Privileges of the House of Commons.  
First it is very obvious, 
Kings not confined to two Knights, etc.  that the Kings of England formerly were not confined to summon only two Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses as now; for Anno 22 
(m) Cl. 22 E. 1. m. 6. dorso.  E. 1. the King issued out his Writs of Summons for two Knights of every County, after which, follows a second Writ, entered immediately after in the same Dorse, for other two Knights in these words, Praeter illos duos Milites eligi facias alios duos Milites legales, etc. So 28 E. 1. three Knights, or other three de probioribus, legalioribus, & discretioribus Liberis Hominibus, etc. eligi. These probi & legales homines were such as held in Capite. So in the 
(n) Cl. 26 E. 3. m 14. dorso. V● h●mines ab ista occupa●●one autump●alibus quo minus possumus retrahamus.  26 of E. 3. the King considering that it was Harvest time, that he might not withdraw Men from that Employment, unum tantum Militem de quolibet Comitatu ad dictum Concilium mittendum habere volumus ista vice. So 
(o) Cl. 45 E. 3. m. 21. dorso. Ordinavimus ut laboribus par●atur, & expensis.  45 E. 3. the King in his Writ saith, That he might spare the Labours and Expenses, he will have treaty with some only of the Magnates, (by which the Knights of Shires here are to be understood) Citizens and Burgesses, 
One Citizen, and one Burgess.  therefore appoints one Knight for the County of Kent, one Citizen for Canterbury, and one for Rochester, whom he names, if they be alive, otherwise the Companion of him that was before.  
In 18 E. 3. the Writs issued only for two 
(p) Brevia Parl. rediviva, p. 144. ad 147.  Knights in every County, and no Writ for Electing Citizens or Burgesses; and 26 E. 3. the Writs are for one Knight in every County, and no Citizens or Burgesses: yet in 
(q) These things are now reduced to a certainty by the Statutes 5 R. 2. c. 4. and others. Prynne's Brief Regis●. par. 2 p. 32.  this the King issued out particular Writs to Mayors and Bailiffs o● Cities and Burroughs, to elect, and return one Citizen for every City, and one Burgess for every Burrow.  
Secondly, That the Kings of England had a Power to supersede particular Persons being chosen, to resummon those that returned without leave, or appoint others in their places, and omit sending Writs to some Cities and Burroughs that had formerly sent, and to create new Burroughs.  
So the Lord Camoys, 
(r) See Brief Regist. p. 118. ad 123.  as I have instanced before, being elected by the King's first Writ, the King by new Writ declared it null, and ordered to proceed to a new Election, and the King appears in that Age to be the sole Judge of void, and double Elections. So in the 
(s) Cl. 28 E. 1. m. 7. dorso.  28 Ed. 1. Philip de Geyton, being chosen one of the Knights for the County of Northampton, and could not attend, the King order another to be chosen. So 5 
(t) Cl. 5 E. 2. m. 26. dorso.  E. 2. because the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of Yorkshire, went away for certain causes not there expressed (it is probable without the Kings Leave) therefore he sends his Precept to the Sheriff, to cause them to return, vel alios ad hoc idoneos loco eorum si ad hoc vacare non possint. But this more especially is to be taken notice of when I come to discouse of Privileges of Parliament.  
As to the last particular of the King's appointing new Burroughs, 
The King makes new Burroughs.  impowering them by special Charters to send Citizens and Burgesses to all Parliaments to be afterwards held by the King, his Heirs, and Successors, Judge 
(u) Reports, p. 14, 15.  hobart's hath cleared it, and 
(w) Brief Register, par. 2. p. 170.  Mr. Prynne hath reduce them all into Chronological Tables, and he makes it a certain Note, that where the Sheriff makes his Return, nulli sunt Cives nec Burgenses in Com. praedict. or non est alia Civitas vel Burgus, or non sunt alii Burgi, we may certainly conclude that every City or Burrow omitted then out of those ancient Returns, and since returned for Cities or Burroughs, were made Cities and Burroughs since that time, as the curious may see at large in his 
(x) P. 223. ad 297.  Brevia Parliamenta Rediviva.  
But on the other side, 
Old Burroughs discontinued, for what reason.  we find many Burroughs who elected Burgesses in 26 E. 1. (as particularly Pontefract and Malton in Yorkshire) had no Summons that are yet found, from 26 E. 1. to 12 E. 4. Now whether this were by the King's special Directions, the Desire of the Places, (as not being willing to be at the Charge of paying their Burgesses Wages, which were in that Age exacted) or the Carelessness of the Sheriffs, is a Question not easily to be determined; though it is certain, it might be by any of these Causes. That Poverty was a principal Cause, appears in the numerous Returns of the Sheriffs of Lancashire, 
(y) Id. p. 236.  when Lancaster and Preston before 33 E. 3. used to return Burgesses; but from thence, till after the Reign of King Edward the Fourth, we find the Return to be, Non est aliqua Civitas neque Burgus in Balliva mea: And the Reason is given in the Return 38 E. 3. Propter eorum debilitatem seu paupertatem, inopiam & paupertatem, or paupertatem & debilitatem, throughout the whole. For it was anciently really reputed a great Burden for poor and small Burroughs to send Burgesses to Parliament, they being bound to defray their Charges. 
(z) Pat. 42 E. 3. par. 1. m. 8.  So the Bailiffs and Commonalty of Toriton did repute it, and petitioned the King in Parliament to free them from this Burden; as likewise did the Abbot of Leicester, Anno 14 E. 3. the Prior of St. James without Northampton, Anno 12 E. 2. by reason 
(a) Selden's Titles of Honour, p. 730. ad 734. Coke 4. Instit. p. 44, 45.  of their Poverty, and extraordinary Expenses in repairing to Parliaments, to be exempted from all future Parliaments, they not holding by Barony; and obtained their Request. So the Abbot of St. Augustine in Bristol, Pat. 15 E. 3. p. 1. m. 13.  
Mr. Prynne 
(b) Brev. Parl. rediviva, p. 240.  owns, That the King by his Letters Patents may exempt a Burrow unduly charged by the Practice of Sheriffs or others to send Men to Parliament against Right and common Usage; but not 
(c) 15 E. 3. Stat. 2. c. 6.  such as by Duty and Custom ought to send and find Burgesses. Under this Head we may consider the Temporary 
(d) 5 R. 2. c. 4.23 H. 6. c. 15. See more at large for this, Prynne's Animadversions on Sir E. Coke's Instit. p. 32.  Exemption of R. 2. 6 Regni, to the Burgesses of Colchester, for five years, in consideration of the new building and fortifying their Walls: yet this did not exempt them; for it was against the Statute made 5 Ric. 2. 
(e) 5 R. 2. Parl. 2. c. 5.  wherein it is expressly provided, That all Persons and Commonalties which shall from henceforth have Summons to the Parliament, shall come in the manner as they be bound to do, and have been accustomed, within this Realm of England, of old time: And the Sheriffs are punishable who leave out of the said Returns any Cities or Burroughs which be bound, 
Sheriff's punishable that om●t summoning.  and of old times were wont to come to the Parliament. And in 
(f) C. 15.  23 H. 6. it is said, That divers Sheriffs of the Counties have sometimes returned none of the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, lawfully chosen, but such which were never duly chosen, and other Citizens and Burgesses than those which by the Mayors and Bailiffs were to the said Sheriffs returned; and moreover made no Precepts to the Mayors or Bailiffs for the Electing of Citizens and Burgesses to come to Parliament. Which makes Mr. Prynne 
(g) Brev. Parl. rediu. p. 241. Sheriffs formerly took liberty what Places to send Writs to.  infallibly resolve, that Sheriffs did before these Acts, arbitrarily issue out their Precepts to what Cities and Burroughs they pleased, which they might the more freely do, because the Precept to them was indefinite de qualibet Civitate & quolibet Burgo, used in all Writs since the 23 
(h) Membr. 4. dorso.  E. 1. without designing the particular Cities or Burroughs by name. By which means Sheriffs might use a kind of Arbitrary Power according as their Judgement directed them, or their affections of favour, partiality, malice, or the solicitations of any private Burrow to them, or of Competitors for Citizens or Burgesses places within their County, swayed them; which opinion of Mr. Prynn's, as also that no new Burroughs by the King's mere Grant, or the House of Commons Order, can be legally created, or old long discontinued Burroughs be enabled by Vote of the House of Commons to choose and return Burgesses to our English Parliaments, I shall leave to the discussionof those it may concern.  
There was one Custom anciently used (which was taken away by the Statute of the 36 H. 6. 
Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses elected at the County-Court the same day. ) that in many Counties, the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses were elected on the same day in their County Courts, by the Suitors or others resorting to it; or by four or five Citizens and Burgesses only (whereof the Mayor, Bailiffs or chief Officer was usually one) sent from every City and Burrow to the County Court, there to elect their Citizens and Burgesses, so soon as the Knights were chosen, returning them often in one 
(i) Brev. Parl. rediu. p. 176.  Indenture, or the Knights alone, and the Citizens and Burgesses in another, under the Seals of the Citizens and Burgesses electing them, as appears by the Indenture for Cumberland 2 H 5. and that of Kent 12 H. 4. of Wilts 1 H. 5. and Bedford 2 H. 5. Before I dismiss this head, I shall note out of the great 
(k) Ibid. p. 223.  Collections of Mr. Prynne, 
How many Cities and Burroughs anciently.  that the total number of the Cities, Burroughs and Ports, either summoned by the Sheriff's Precepts or Writs to Elect and Return, or actually electing and returning Citizens, Burgesses or Barons of the Cinque Ports, from King Edward the First's Reign, to the end of Edward the Fourth, were but a Hundred and Seventy, and no more, whereof Seven never sent after E. 1st's. time, and Twenty of them but once during these King's Reigns, and Thirteen of our Abbats, and Twenty Seven of our Priors were summoned to our Parliaments but once, and several Burroughs but twice, thrice, four or five or six times, all the whole time else being omitted: and as some were thus neglected, 
New Burroughs erected in several Kings Reigns.  so new ones supplied the number. In Edward the Second time Nineteen new Burroughs being added, and as many in Edward the Third's time. During the Reigns of Richard the Second, Henry the Fourth and Fifth, no new Burroughs created at all; and during the Forty Nine Years Reign of Henry the Sixth, but Five new Burroughs; and in Edward the Fourth's time but one. He saith, that Fourteen new Burroughs have been made in Cornwall since K. Ed. 4. 
(l) Idem, 230.   
By which is discovered the Error of the Compiler of the absurd gross late Imposture, Entitled, Modus tenendi Parliamentum, so magnified by Sir Edward Coke, 
(m) 4. Instit. p. 12.1. Inst. p. 69.2. Inst. 7, 8. Preface to ninth Report.  beyond all bounds of Truth and Modesty; as also the great mistake of our learned judicious Antiquary 
(n) Archaion, p. 257.  Mr. Lambard and 
(o) Doderidge of the Antiquity of Parliaments.  others of great note, who affirm that the true original Title and Right of all our ancient Cities and Burroughs, electing and sending Burgesses and Citizens to our Parliaments, is Prescription time out of mind, long before the Conquest; it being a Privilege they actually, and of right enjoyed in Edward the Confessor's time or before, and exercised ever since: Indeed the whole series of the great Councils in the Saxon, Danish and Norman Kings Reigns to the Forty Ninth of Henry the Third, evince the contrary.  
As to the Wages of the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses, 
The Wages of Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses.  it being a thing now obsolete (though not out of force by those that would claim them) I shall only note, that the first Writ for them, is coeval with our King's first Writs of Summons; and the reason given in the Writ is, That whereas the King had summoned two Knights, etc. and they had stayed 
(p) Ac iidem Milites moram diuturniorem quam credebant traxerint ibidem, propter quod non modicas fecerint expensas. Cl. 49 H. 3. m. 10. dorso.  longer than they believed they should do, by reason of which they had been at no small Expense: therefore the King appoints the Sheriff by the counsel of Four lawful Knights, to provide for the Two Knights of the Shire their reasonable Expenses.  
The Writ of the 28 Ed. 1. 
(q) Rot. Claus. 28 E. 1. m. 12. dorso.  commands that they have rationabiles expensas suas, in veniendo ad nos, ibidem morando, & inde ad propria redeundo; their reasonable Expenses in coming to the King, staying there, and returning to their homes. The like we find for the Citizens and Burgesses in the 1 Ed. 2. there was Four Shillings a day allowed for every Knight, and Two Shillings for every Citizen and Burgess.  
Mr. Prynne 
(r) Brief Parliamentary Writs, part 4. p. 4.  gives many good reasons why these Wages were allowed, some of which I shall recite: As first, that all Laws allow Salaries for Services, and those being public Servants and Representatives or Attorneys for the Counties, Cities, Burroughs, to consult about the great and arduous Affairs, necessary Defence, Preservation and Welfare of the King and Kingdom, and theirs, for and by whom they were entrusted; it is reason (as they receive the benefit of their good Service, in giving their good Advice towards the redressing of Grievances, and making wholesome Laws) that they should have allowed their necessary Expenses. Secondly, It appears in ancient times, there was no such ambition to be Parliament-men as of late, but the Persons elected thought it a burden; therefore lest being elected they should neglect to repair to the Convention, they had Sureties called Manucaptors for their Appearance. Thirdly, This obliged the Counties, Cities and Burroughs to be carefuller in electing the discreetest, ablest, fittest and most laborious persons, who would speediest and best dispatch all Public business, which occasioned the shortness of Sessions. Fourthly, It begat a greater confidence, correspondence and dependence betwixt the Electors and Elected. Fifthly, It kept poor petty Burroughs (unable to defray the Expenses of their Burgesses) from electing or sending Members to our Parliaments, and obliged some to Petition to be eased of the Charge; whereby the number of Burgesses was scarce half so many, and Parliaments were more expeditious in Councils, Aids, Motions and their Acts and Debates, and so the Sessions were much shortened, the Elections were then fairer, and for the most part unquestionable, the Commons House less unwieldy, Privileges of Parliament less enlarged beyond the ancient Standard, abuses in Elections, Returns and Contests about them (by reason of the Mercenary and Precarious Voices) less troublesome: whereas now in every new Parliament a great part of the time is spent in the regulating Elections. But Mr. Prynne hints little upon one great cause of that usage, which was that in Burroughs as well as Cities, most what the persons elected were the Inhabitants in the Cities and Burroughs, Merchants, Tradesmen, or the most popular Burghers; as will appear to whoever peruseth the Chronological Catalogue Mr. Prynne 
(s) P. 900. to 1072.  with no small pains hath collected into his Fourth Part of his Brief Register, where I believe one can pitch upon no City of Burrough from the time of Ed. 1. to the 12 Ed. 4. but he will find by the very names, that they were such as I have mentioned. I am well assured of it for Yorkshire, and particularly for the City of York, they being generally such as we find in the List of their Mayors.  
Beverly hath Four of the Surnames of good Families, and Kingston upon Hull hath 
(t) 8 E. 3.  William a S. Pole, from whom the great Family of Suffolk sprung, but it is well known he was a Merchant there.  
Now since every part of the Country abounds with Gentlemen of Plentiful Fortunes, 
Why wages not now paid to Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses.  Generous Education, such as are versed in Affairs of their Country, as Justices of the Peace, Deputy Lieutenants, and have been Sheriffs, Members of Parliament, and born Public Offices; there can be no expectation or Fear, that those that are Candidates for Parliament Men for Burroughs, will expect any Salary or Reward, so long as they choose them. There being generally Competitors, who instead of expecting Wages, are generally obliged now to vast expenses to purchase the Votes● of the Electors; so that now the Honourable House of Commons is quite another thing, than what it was wont to be in elder Ages, when they were summoned principally to give Assent to what the King and the Lords did, to assent to Aids, and Taxes, and apportion their own Taxes, bring up their Petitions concerning Grievances to be redressed by the King and his Council, or the King and Lords, and draw up Impeachments against great Offenders, and such like.  
Having thus considered the Writs of Summons to the Members of the House of Commons before Henry the Seventh's time in all its branches, 
Copy of Writs of Summons now used to the Sheriffs.  I shall give a Transcript of the Writ of Summons used at this day; whereby may be seen how much of the old form is continued, which I shall insert in Latin and English, that the Emphasis of the Original may not be lost.  

REX Vicecomiti Salutem, etc.  
Quia de advisamento, & assensu Concilii nostri, pro quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis, nos, statum & defensionem Regni nostri Angliae, & Ecclesiae Anglicanae, concernentibus; quoddam Parliamentum nostrum apud, etc. die, etc. proxime futuro, teneri ordinavimus; & ibidem cum Praelatis, Magnatibus & Proceribus dicti Regni nostri colloquium habere & tractatum. Tibi praecipimus, firmiter injungentes, quod facta Proclamatione in proximo Comitatu tuo post receptionem hujus Brevis nostri, tenendo die & loco praedicto, duos Milites gladiis cinctos, magis idoneos, & discretos Comitatus praedicti, & de qualibet Civitate Comitatus illius, duos Cives, & de quolibet Burgo duos Burgenses, de discretioribus & magis sufficientibus, libere & indifferenter per illos qui Proclamationi hujusmodi interfuerint, juxta formam Statutorum inde editorum & provisorum eligi, & nomina eorundem Militum, Civium, & Burgensium, sic electorum, in quibusdam Indenturis inter te & illos qui hujusmodi Electioni interfuerint, inde conficiendis, sive hujusmodi electi praesentes fuerint, vel absentes, inseri; eosque ad dictum diem & locum venire facias; ita quod iidem Milites, plenam & sufficientem potestatem pro se, & Communitate Comitatus praedicti; Cives & Burgenses pro se, & Communitate Civitatum & Burgorum praedictorum, divisim ab ipsis habeant, ad faciendum & consentiendum his quae tunc ibidem de communi Concilio dicti Regni nostri (favente Deo) contigerint ordinari, super negotiis ante dictis: Ita quod pro defectu potestatis hujusmodi, seu propter improvidam Electionem Militum, Civium aut Burgensium praedictorum, dicta negotia infecta non remaneant quovis modo. Nolumus autem quod tu nec aliquis alius Vicecomes dicti Regni nostri aliqualiter sit electus. Et Electionem illam in pleno Comitatu factam distincte & aperte sub Sigillo tuo & Sigillis eorum qui Electioni illae interfuerint, nobis in Cancellariam nostram ad dictum d●em & locum certifices, indilate remittens nobis alteram partem Indenturarum praedictarum praesentibus consutam una cum hoc Brevi. Teste meipso apud Westmonast—   

THE King to the Sheriff, Greeting.  
Whereas by the Advice and Consent of our Council, 
Advice of Privy Council.  for certain difficult and urgent business concerning us and the State and defence of our Kingdom of England, and the English Church, we have ordained a certain Parliament of ours to be held at our City, of etc. the day, etc. next ensuing, and there to have conference, 
Conference with Prelates, etc.  and to treat with the Prelates, Great Men, and Peers of our said Kingdom. We command and straight enjoin you, 
Proclamation at County-Court.  that making Proclamation at the next County Court after receipt of this our Writ, to be holden the day and place aforesaid; 
Two Knights girt with Swords, etc.  you cause two Knights girt with Swords, the most fit and discreet of the County aforesaid; and of every City of that County two Citizens; 
Two Citizens.  and of every Burrow, 
Two Burgesses.  two Burgesses of the discreeter, and most sufficient, 
Indifferently chosen by those present at the Proclamation, according to Statutes.  to be freely and indifferently chosen by them who shall be present at such Proclamation according to the tenure of the Statutes in that case made and provided, 
Their Names inserted in Indentures betwixt the Sheriff and the Electors.  and the names of the said Knights, Citizens and Burgesses so chosen, to be inserted in certain Indentures, to be then made between you and those that shall be present at such Election, whether the parties so elected be present or absent; and shall make them to come at the said day and place; 
To cause them to come at the Day and Place. The Knights from the County, the Citizens and Burgesses from their Cities & Burroughs, to have full power to do and consent.  so that the said Knights for themselves, and for the County aforesaid, and the said Citizens and Burgesses for themselves and the Commonalty of the aforesaid Cities and Burroughs, may have severally for them full and sufficient power to perform and to consent to those things which (by the favour of God) shall there happen to be ordained by the Common Council of our said Kingdom concerning the businesses aforesaid; 
Lest for want of that Power, or improvident Election, the Business be undone.  so that the business may not by any means remain undone for want of such power, 
No Sheriff to be chosen.  or by reason of the improvident Election of the aforesaid Knights, Citizens and Burgesses. 
Election to be in full County.  But we will not in any case, you or any other Sheriff of our said Kingdom shall be elected. 
The Indentures to be sealed by the Sheriff and Electors.  And at the day and the place aforesaid the said Election made in the full County Court, 
A Counterpart tacked to the Writ, returned into the Chancery.  you shall certify without delay to us in our Chancery, under your Seal, and the Seals of them which shall be present at that Election, sending back unto us the other part of the Indenture aforesaid, affiled to these Presents, together with this Writ. Witness ourselves at Westminster—    

SECT. 7. Concerning the Speaker, and the Privileges of the House of Commons.  
IT is not my design to treat of all things relating to the Constitution, 
My Design not to controvert the Privileges of the House of Commons, but to sh●w the gradual Alterations.  Laws, and Customs of the House of Commons: there are several useful Books extant which are fit for the Honourable Members of the House, to consult. What I most aim at, is to show what the Ancient Usage hath been, and how from time to time things have been refined to the Mode and State they are now in: and I hope those great Spirits that honour their Countries with their Service, will pardon one that designs nothing more than to give them a Profile of the whole Model, both in the days of our remotest Ancestors, and what it was in more Modern times, under just and undoubted Sovereigns; as also how much it was transformed when the pretended House of Commons being confederated with a successful Army, murdered their Sovereign, voted away the House of Lords, and assumed the Title of the Supreme Authority of the Nation; of which last I shall treat in the next Chapter.  
The Members being according to the Kings Command come to the place appointed; sometimes the Sovereign with the Lords in their Robes have rid in State to the Parliament, which is generally yet observed in Scotland and Ireland. 
The Solemnity at the Opening of the Parliament.  However at the opening of the Parliament the King is seated on his Throne under the Canopy with his Royal Crown on his Head, the Chancellor standing something backward on his Right-hand, and the great Officers, as Lord Treasurer, Lord Precedent of the King's Council, Lord Privy Seal, Great Chamberlain, the Lord Constable, Marshal, Lord Admiral, Lord Steward and Kings Chamberlain attend on either side the State, or in their Seats with the Ensigns of their Offices, some of the Nobles being appointed to carry the Sword and the Cap of Maintenance. Three great Gilt Maces are carried, 
See for this more fully, Elsyng's Method of holding Parliaments, p. 86.  and all the Heralds attend in their Cloth of Gold Coats. The two Archbishops, and Bishops in their Robes sit upon Benches next the Wall on the Right-hand, and the rest of the Great Officers that stand not by the State, and all the Nobility in order upon the Bench on the Lefthand, or on the Forms that stand in the middle, where also sit the Judges, Master of the Rolls, Secretaries of State, twelve Masters of Chancery, Attorney General, Solicitor General, and Clerk of the Crown, and the other Clerks Assistants; which it is not my business exactly to describe.  
The King being Seated, when it's his pleasure, 
Leave given to the Commons to choose their Speaker.  the House of Commons are sent for, who standing bare at the Lords Bar, attend the King's Speech, and the Chancellor's; and then have leave to choose their Speaker, whom commonly some of the Members of the House that are of the King's Privy-Council, propose; and if any one oppose it, 
(u) Hackwel, p. 127.  he is to name another. But I shall refer the curious to Mr. Elsing, and others that treat of this at large.  
Sir Edward Coke 
(w) 4. Instit. p. 8.  saith, That though the Commons are to choose their Speaker, yet seeing that after their choice, the King may refuse him, for avoiding expense of time, and contestating about it, the use is (as in the Congee de eslier of a Bishop) that the King (by some of his Privy-Council) (as in this present Parliament was done by the Earl of Middleton, on of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries) doth name a discreet and learned Man, whom the Commons elect; for without their Election no Speaker can be appointed for them, because he is their Mouth, and trusted by them, and so necessary, as the House of Commons cannot sit without him: So that if he be totally disabled by grievous Sickness, another must be chosen in his place, as he instanceth in Sir John Cheney, 1 H. 4. and Sir John Tirrel, 
Whether the two Houses sat together.  15 H. 6. But whereas 
(x) 4. Instit. c. 1. sect. 2.  he affirms, that in ancient time the two Houses sat together, and the surest mark of the time of the division of them was, when the House of Commons had a continual Speaker: Mr. Prynne 
(y) P. 8, 9  in his Animadversions hath made the contrary very clear by several Records, wherein it's expressly said, they consulted apart; as particularly in 6 E. 3. 
(z) Et les Chivalers des Countez, & Gents du Communs, par eux mesmes. Rot. Parl. 6 E. 3. num. 6.  at York, the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and great Men by themselves, and the Knights of the Counties, and the People of the Commons by themselves, treated of the Business propounded to them. Another 
(a) Freeholders Grand Inquest, p. 19  saith, That if Sir Edward means the Lords and Commons did sit and vote together in one Body, few will believe it; because the Commons never were wont to lose, or forgo any of their Liberties or Privileges: and for them to stand now bare, where they were used to sit and vote, (upon this Supposal) is an alteration not imaginable to be endured by them: and when we consider the sole Power of Judicature in the Lords, and who the Burgesses were in old times, it still makes it more improbable, and it is to me a very remarkable thing, that neither in History or Record, any thing is to be found that will clear this doubt. However it is certain that 
(b) Rot. Parl. 50 E. 3. num. 8.  50, and 51 E. 3. the Commons had a Speaker, and Sir Edward Coke 
(c) Coke Instit. 4. p. 255.  saith, that the accustomed 
(d) Ancient Place, saith Elsing, p. 84.  place of that thrice worthy Assembly of the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses of Parliament (when held in Westminster) was in the Chapterhouse of the Abbot of Westminster, and it continued so till the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. c. 14. which gave the King Colleges, free Chapels, etc. whereby the King enjoyed the beautiful free Chapel of St. Stephen, founded by King Stephen, (which had Lands and Revenues of the old yearly value of 1089 Pound, ten Shillings five Pence) since which time the Chapel thereof hath served for the House of Commons, when Parliaments have been held at Westminster.  
As Sir Edward Coke (because he believed the two Houses sat together) will not allow them to have had a Speaker before 50 E. 3. so on the other hand Mr. 
(e) Id. p. 123.  Elsing saith, That the Commons ever had a Speaker, none will doubt, for their Consultation apart from the Lords; though, he thinks, they often met, and did sit together in one Room, and then a Speaker was necessary to avoid Confusion of Speech and Argument. But he brings no better Argument for it 
(f) Lib. Sti. Albani Bibl. Cotton. fol. 207.  than that Petrus de Mountfort, 
(g) It should be 42 H. 3. That Peter Mountfort was not Speaker of the Commons House.  44 H. 3. signed the Letter to Pope Alexander, touching the recalling of Adomar elect Bishop of Winchester from Banishment: Wherein they say, if the King, and the Regni Majores hoc volent, Communitas tam●n ipsius, in Angliam jam nullatenus sustineret: and this was sealed by all the Lords, and by Peter de Mountford vice totius Communitatis; which, he saith, showeth plainly they had a Speaker.  
In answer to which, I suppose it a great mistake to say that Petrus de Mountfort signed the Letter vice Communitatis (which either ignorantly, or wilfully, is Printed in Mr. Elsing, Comitatus) for 
(h) Additament. Math. Paris, 1132, 1133. Anno Dom. 1258. 42 H. 3. ult. Edit.  Matthew Paris, who relates the whole Story, saith it was signed by ten Persons, who were all great Barons, vice totius Communitatis, and the Preface of the Letter shows it was Communitas Comitum, Procerum, Magnatum, aliorumque Regni Angliae: and this aliorum can mean only the Milites, which held by Military Service of the great Barons, and the lesser Tenants in Capite, which were no Representatives of the Commons, as our Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses at this day are; and the Inscription of the Pope's Letter shows, who he understood this Communitas to be, when he superscribes it dilectis Filiis Nobilibus viris, Consiliariis clarissimi in Christo Filii nostri illustris Regis Angliae, ac caeteris Proceribus & Magnatibus Regni Angliae.  
Now the Persons that subscribed this, are thus ranked by Matthew Paris, R. de Clare, Gloverniae & Herefordiae, S. de Monteforti Legriae, E. Bigod Marescallus Angliae, H. de Bohun Hertfordiae, & Essex, W. Albemarle, J. de Placeto Warewici Comitis, H. Bigod Justiciarius Angliae, P. de Sabaudia, J. Filius Galfridi, Jacobus de Audel, & Petrus de Monteforti, vice totius Communitatis praesentibus Literis sigilla nostra apposuimus in Testimonium praedictorum. So that it is plain it was not Peter de Montefort that signed vice Communitatis, but they all did it, and he was a great Baron himself, the Head of whose Barony was Beldesent Castle in Warwickshire.  
I think it not amiss here to offer my Opinion concerning this Question, and the great Controversy betwixt Dr. 
Concerning the Commons first summoning to Parliament.  Brady and Mr. Petyt, and those that are so earnest to find the Commons summoned to Parliament before the 49 H. 3. before King John granted his Charter (wherein he grants that he will cause to be summoned the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Earls and greater Barons of his Kingdom singly by his Letters, and besides 
(i) Et Praeterea faciemus submoneri in generali per Vi●ecomites & Ballivos nostros, omnes alios qui in Capite tenent de nobis. Matt. Paris fol. 216. Edit. ult. num. 20.  will cause to be summoned in general by his Sheriffs, 
The Tenants in Capite in stead of the Representative Commons, as now.  and Bailiffs, all others which hold of him in Capite at a certain day) there is no doubt but the Tenants in Capite (such of them at least as were eminent for Parts, or as the King pleased) were summoned to the great Councils; and it being in that Charter said, that the cause of the Meeting should be expressed in the Summons, and that Forty days warning should be given; and in the same Charter, that the City of London should have all its ancient Liberties and free Customs, and that all other Cities, burgh's and Villas (which was of the same import as a Free Burrough, as we find in Pontefract, which is always styled Villa, 
Some summoned from Cities and Burroughs before King John's time, but not as our Citizens and Burgesses now, by Representation.  and the Inhabitants Burgenses, who held a certain Land called Burgages Land) and the Barons of the Cinque Ports, and all the Ports should have all their Liberties and their Free Customs, & ad habendum commune concilium Regni de Auxiliis, etc. that is as I suppose, to have some of their Members at the great Councils, where Aids were to be granted to the King, other ways than in three cases before excepted, that is, to redeem the King's body, to make his Eldest Son a Knight, and to marry once his Eldest Daughter; excepting which three Particulars (reserved before) in his Charter, he had granted that no Scutage nor Aid should be laid on his Kingdom unless by the Common Council of his Kingdom.  
From whence I think may be inferred, that such Cities, Burroughs and Villas, which held in Capite, or the Lord that was principal owner of them, by his Praepositus Ballivus, or some that held immediately under him, and so some for the Dominicae Civitates & Burgi Regis, might be summoned, with the lesser Barons, or the other Tenants inc Capite. But this doth not prove them to come by way of Representatives, nor that they had any more Power than the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses had in aftertimes, which (as I have made it apparent by the several expressions in the Summons) was only to hear, and assent to what the King and Magnates ordained.  
Since there are now extant no Summons in King John's time, or before the 49 H. 3. (except some few that are about the Tenants in Capite aiding the King in his Wars) the subsequent Practices are the best Expounders of ancient Usages.  
Upon the whole I do judge, that before King John's Charter, there were many of the Tenants in Capite summoned to the great Councils, but so as the King had his liberty to summon whom he pleased; and that some from Cities, burgh's, Villas and other Ports did come to the great Council, but still at the King's pleasure, and that in King John's time, the body of the Kingdom siding with the Lords (that so often rebelled against him) the Lords thinking to make their Party stronger, got the Clause for other Tenants in Capite to be summoned by general Summons. 
After King John's Charter, the Tenants in Capite so numerous, as might be reputed an House of Commons.   
Now whatever number were convened, before King John's Charter, this general Summons must greatly increase the House of Commons, as I may call it; and there needs no such strife about the want of Freemen in these Councils; for after this Charter all who were properly Freemen, were capable, the other were generally Tenants to them, and Homagers, (which was a Tenure that though it might free their Persons, yet their Lands were obnoxious to forfeiture upon every breach of Homage; and their Lords had the power of taxing them) so that in some sense they were their Tenants Representatives: and as long as they were Freeholders themselves, and were a more numerous body (if they all appeared, as for any thing I see they might do, if not hindered by Impotence, Nonage, or the King's service) they far exceeded the number of Representatives in the Reigns of King H. 3. E. 1. and E. 2. So that it amounts to the same thing, as to the general Freedom of the Nation, when all these were Members of the Great Councils, 
Who properly Freeholders in K● John's time.  whether the common Freeholder were represented or not, as now (which Dr. Brady hath so nervously confuted every where in his Introduction, that they were not) that I think the Freedom Mr. Petyt, Mr. Pen, and others make so great a coil about, no ways impaired by Dr. Brady; who like a judicious Person, would have us use propriety of Speech, and rather be thankful for the Freedom we now enjoy, and our Ancestors have from time to time obtained, by the grant of Kings, than to make such Claims to native Freedoms and Liberties (as Mr. Pen would have it, that our Ancestors contended for) as if their Ancestors had enjoyed them before we had any Kings, and stipulated with their Kings for them, before they admitted them to Sovereignty; which not considering person that will impartially read ancient History, either of our Country or others, can find any certain footsteps of.  
To return now to the business (which the foregoing observation gives some light to) I conceive as the Thegns (the Kings Prepositi and Reeves, 
As the Thegns in the Saxon-times, so the Praepositi, Reeves, etc. of Burroughs after.  by reason of their Employments about the King's Demesn Lands, governing of Burroughs, Stewards of Hundreds, Wapentakes, and men employed in other civil Affairs of the Kingdom) did meet in the Saxon Councils: so from Cities and Burroughs, where great Lords had Fees (as most, if not all of them may be easily proved to have been held immediately of the King, or of some of the very great Barons) there might come before King John's time, some Members to the great Council, being in the Charter, to my judgement, reckoned as one of their Franchises, or rather something exceeding their municipal Liberties and Free Customs, being coupled to them with an and to have a Privilege to have some of them Members of the great Council of the Kingdom; 
What the Tenants in Capite were summoned for.  for so I think the words & ad habendum commune Concilium Regni de Auxiliis must be understood: But then when it is restricted there with de Auxiliis only; it may very well give a ground to their opinion that think the principal use was to proportion the Aid or Tax, and assent to what the King, the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons and Peers did ordain.  
However this was, 
That such great Numbers sat not with the Lords.  it seems clear to me, that this numerous body of so different an Order from the Barons majores, must have a distinct Place for consulting apart, and must select Committees to transact with the King and Lords, and must for order sake appoint some to speak for them, what they petitioned for or assented to, and could not constantly sit with the Prelates and Lords; and do rather believe that the Prelates had one place where they sat, and the Barons another, and these Tenants in Capite a third, at least for their usual Consultations among their own Order, and met in the public place when there was occasion, or might have access by Committees: which certainly was the practice in aftertimes, as appears in that Parliament of 6 E. 3. 
(k) Rot. Parl. 6 E. 3. num. 2. Cest assavoir, les Prel●●z par eux me●mes, & les ditz Countess, Barouns, & autres Grantz, par eux mesmes, & auxint les Chivalers des Countes par eux mesmes. No mention of Citizens or Burgesses.  the morrow after the Nativity of our Lady, the King requiring the advice of his Parliament, touching his French Affairs, and Voyage thither. It is said they thereupon treated and deliberated, that is to say, the Prelates by themselves, and the said Earls, Barons and other great men by themselves, and also the Knights of the Counties by themselves, and then gave their advice. From whence by the way we may observe the true ground of calling our Parliament Houses, without the King, the three Estates.  
Having dispatched this, I come now to consider the Speakers of the House of Commons. Hackwel 
(l) Mod●● tenendi, p. 200. Method of Parl. 124. The first Speaker upon Record.  and Elsing name the first that is found upon Record, to be Sir William Trussel 13 E. 3. Num. 9 where it is said, Les Chivalers des Countess & les Commons responderent per Monsieur William Trussel, but the Record names him not Speaker, however he performed that Office then. Hackwel names Scroop before him 6 E. 3. and Sir Peter de la Mare after him; but the first that Mr. Elsing or Mr. Prynne 
(m) Prynne's Abridgement, p. 151.  finds upon Record, and by the name of Speaker, is Sir Thomas Hungerford, 51 E. 3. for it is said that the last day of the Parliament, he declared, that during the Parliament he had generally moved the King to pardon all such as were in the last Parliament unjustly convicted: which imports that this was a Petition of the Commons, presented by him their Speaker.  
Anno 1 R. 2. Sir Peter de la Mare, being Speaker, made his Protestation, that what he had to say, was from the whole House, therefore required if he should speak any thing haply without their consents, that the same aught to be amended before his departure from the said place.  
The first Petition we meet with, that a Speaker 
(n) Abridgement of Records, p. 174. Petition for Freedom of Speech.  made to the King from the Commons, was 2 R. 2. by Sir James Pickering their Speaker, that if he should speak any thing that haply might be ill taken, it might be as nothing, so as the Commons might at any time amend the same, and the like he petitioned for himself: which is the first Petition as to Liberty of Speech, we meet with.  
The first Speaker presented to the King in full 
(o) Id. p. 360.  Parliament by the Commons, 20 Ric. 2. was Sir John Bushey the King's great Favourite. In this Parliament the Houses sat together in a long 
(p) Hackwel Mo●us p. 202.  House built of Timber in the Palace-Yard, at the Impeachment of the Duke of Gloucester, the Earls of Arundel and Warwick. Sir Arnold Savage was Speaker, 2 H. 4. who is the first upon Record that the Commons were required by the King to choose as Speaker; and he was again in 5 H. 4. who desired the King in the name of the Commons, that they might freely make complaint of any thing amiss in Government; which was yielded to by the King.  
Anno 7 H. 4. Sir John Tiptost was chosen Speaker, who desired to be discharged, because of his Youth; but he was allowed: he forgot to make the usual Protestation, but came up the next day, and made it with this Addition, 
(q) Rot. Parl. 7 H. 4. num. 6.  That if any Writing were delivered by the Commons in this Parliament, and they should desire to have it again to amend any thing therein, it might be restored to them; which was granted. While he was Speaker, he Signed and Sealed the Deeds of the entailing of the Crown on H. 4. 
(r) 7 H. 4.  with these words, Nomine totius Communitatis. He was a Person of extraordinary Parts, Son of John Lord Tiptost, and for all the Apology for his young Age, he was within three Years after made Lord Treasurer of Enggland, and by H. 6. made Marquis of Worcester.  
Anno 1 H. 5. William Sturton Esquire, was chosen Speaker, who without the assent of his Companions, did agree before the King to deliver in Parliament certain Articles; but three days after the Commons sent Sir John Doreword 
(r) 7 H. 4.  with several of their Members to the House of Lords, to declare to the King, that their Speaker had no Authority from them to yield thereto, and the King was pleased to accept of it.  
There are three Petitions the approved Speaker makes to the King: First, That the Commons may have freedom of Speech, as of 
(s) 25 H. 1. num. 10. The Speakers of latter Times express the particular Privilege of Freedom from Arrest.  right and custom they have had, and all their ancient and just Privileges and Liberties allowed them. In Sir Thomas Moor's Speech 14 H. 8. it was thus worded, That if in communication and reasoning, any man in the Commons House, should speak more largely than of duty they ought to do, that all such offences should be pardoned, and to be entered upon Record; which was granted: only I find that H. 4. 
(t) Rot. Parl. H. 4. num. 10.  said that the hoped, or doubted not, that the Members of Parliament would not speak any unfitting thing, or abuse this Freedom and Privilege.  
The second is, 
Sir Tho. Smith saith, The Speaker used to add a Promise in the Commons Names, That they shall not abuse these Privileges, but have such regard, as most faithful, true, and loving Subjects ought to have to their Prince. Commonwealth, p. 41.  That if he shall commit any Error in any thing he shall deliver in the name of the Commons, no fault may be imputed to the Commons, and that he may resort again to them, for Declaration of his good Intent, and that his Error may be pardoned. The third is, That as often as necessity for his Majesty's Service, and the good of the Commonwealth shall require, he may by direction of the House of Commons have access to His Majesty.   

SECT. 8. Of Privileges of the House of Commons concerning Liberty of Speech.  
HAving thus brought this Honourable Assembly together, and their Speaker placed in his Chair, I shall touch something of their Privileges, which since the days of Sir Edward Coke, and much by his Influence, have been enlarged beyond what was used in ancient times. I shall begin with that of Freedom of Speech in their Debates.  
It cannot be conceived in so great a Body as the House of Commons, 
Why Liberty of Speech necessary to be allowed.  that what is proposed by one, and seconded by others, shall not admit of Debate: Though all may aim at the same end, the good of the King and People; yet they may differ in the ways and methods of attaining it, and whoever would straighten a crooked Rod, must bend it as far on the contrary side. I doubt not but the nemine contradicente was put into the Printed Votes, when Mr. Williams had the Chair, rather ad faciendum populum, than that there was such an Harmonious Concurrence, as then was blazed abroad.  
Anno 4 
(u) Stat. 4 H. 8. c. 8. Strowde's Case.  H. 8. An Act was made concerning Richard Strowde, Esquire, which declareth that all Suits, Accusements, Condemnations, etc. to be put or had upon any Member of that or succeeding Parliaments, for any Bill, speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matter or matters concerning the Parliament, to be communed or treated of, be utterly void and of none effect. This by 
(w) Lords Journal.  the Lords, 11 Decemb. 1667. was declared a declaratory Law of the ancient and necessary Rights and Privileges of Parliament, and so the Judgement against Denzil, late Lord Hollis, was nulled, and against others in King Charles the First's time.  
Yet it is manifest that Queen Elizabeth in two Cases shown how far, even motions in Parliament, contrary to her Laws, Prerogative, and Pleasure expressed, were to be treated. The 
(x) Prynne's Plea for the Lords. Sir Sym. D' Ewe's Journal. How Queen Elizabeth kerbed and punished those that made Motions in the House contrary to her Prohibitions, in Mr. Paul and Mr. Pet. Wentworth's Case.  first was a motion by Mr. Paul Wentworth, 23 Eliz. for a public set Fast, and for a Preaching every Morning at Seven of the Clock, before the House sat, and the Preachers to be appointed by the Privy-Council that were of the House; but the Queen sent them a Message by the Vice-Chamberlain, that she had in great admiration, the rashness of the House, in committing such an apparent contempt of her express Command, and to put in Execution such an Innovation, without her Privity and Pleasure first known; so that by Mr. Vice-Chamberlain they sent their Submission to her. Anno 35 Eliz. Mr. Peter Wentworth, and Sir Henry Bromley delivered a Petition to the Lord-Keeper, desiring the Lords of the upper House to be suppliants with them of the lower House to her Majesty, for entailing the Succession of the Crown, whereof a Bill was ready drawn by them. The Queen was highly displeased, as being against her express Order, and charged the Lords of her Council to call the parties before them, and Mr. Wentworth was by them committed to the Tower, and others, with Sir Hen. Bromley to the Fleet; the Parliament then sitting: and when Mr. Wroth moved, That the House might be humble Suitors to the Queen for their Liberty, it was answered by the Privy Counsellors in the House, that the causes of Commitment were best known to herself, and the House must not call the Queen to account for what she doth of her Royal Authority; for her Majesty liked no such Questions, neither did it become the House to search into those matters. So Mr. 
In Mr. Morrice's Case.  Morrice Attorney of the Court of Wards, was taken out of the House, Feb. 28. and committed to Prison, for delivering in a Bill against the abuses of the Bishops; the Queen sending for Sir Edward Coke then Speaker, and charging him upon his Allegiance, if any such Bill were exhibited, not to read it.  
At another time, long before this, she told the Speaker, and the body of the House of Commons, moving her to Marriage, That if it had been with limitation of place, or person, she must needs have misliked it, and thought it a great presumption in those to take it upon them to bind and limit, whose duty it was to Obey.  
King Charles the First was very infortunate to have so many Firebrands in some, if not all, of his Parliaments; 
Liberty of Speech in King Charles the First's time abused.  which if the rest of the Houses had been pleased to have extinguished by timely and nipping reprehensions, we had never seen the Government of Church and State so reduced into Ashes, that there was nothing remained of the beautiful Pile. In some of his Speeches he calls those evil Members, Vipers; but it was his misfortune to anger and exasperate them rather than suppress them; so that at last, they stung him to Death. It is a very ill condition, when a Prince hath such Wolves by the Ears, that he is in danger whether he hold them or let them go. The Attacque upon the five Members, and letting fall the pursuit, was one of the false thrusts that left him unguarded.  
In the Close of one of the Parliaments of Queen Elizabeth, the 
(y) MS. Speeches, 13 Eliz. 1571. Queen Elizabeth's Reprehension of some Members, for moving things she had forbid.  Chancellor tells them, There be certain of the House of Commons (though not many) who have showed themselves Audacious, Arrogant and Presumptuous, calling her Majesty's Grants, and Prerogatives into question, contrary to the express admonition given in her Majesty's name in the beginning of the Parliament, which it might very well have become them to have regard to; but her Majesty saith, That seeing they thus wilfully forget themselves, they are otherwise to be remembered.  
Indeed there seems good reason, that such, who make advantage of their being Members of Parliament, to sow their Seditious Discourses; and under the Protection of being Members, take the boldness to calumniate the Government, and raise Jealousies betwixt the King and his People, to alienate their Affections, and Allegiance from him, after the expiration of their Protection (if the House will not call them to an account) should not only lose the Favour of their Prince, but should be punished for Sedition as far as by Law is allowed, as well as they are liable to other proceed in Law.  
It becomes therefore all lovers of the excellent Constitution of Parliaments to be very wary in this point, lest, as Mr. Justice Hutton said in another Case, Things being carried disastrously by some Members Ambition, may bring such a distaste against the course of Parliaments, as we, and all that love the Commonwealth, have just cause to be sorry for it.   

SECT. 9 Of the Privilege from Arrests.  
ALthough the Speakers formerly petitioned only, That all their Ancient, and Just Privileges, and Liberties be allowed them; yet we 
(z) Hackwell. Catal. 213, 215. Elsing, p. 137, 138. This Privilege petitioned for by the Speaker.  find that Sir Tho. Gargrave, Sir Tho. Richardson, Sir Thomas Crew, Sir Heneage Finch, and all later Speakers have expressed this Privilege particularly, that for better attending the Public and Importunate Service of the House, themselves, and their necessary Attendants, may be free both in Person and Goods from all Arrests and trouble, according to our Ancient Privileges and Immunities, which Sir Tho. Gargrave 1 Eliz. is said first to make the first of any.  
This indeed is one of the ancientest Privileges the House of Commons may claim, and Mr. Prynne labours to prove it the only Privilege properly so to be called, and Sir Edward 
(a) 4. Instit. p. 24.  Coke mentions no other.  
The first thing that appears upon Record, is, the Petition of 
(b) Petitiones coram Domino Rege ad Parliam. etc. 18 E. 1. Rot. 7. Thesaur. receipt. S●accarii. The first Grant of Freedom from Arrest.  the Master of the Temple, in which he desires, Quod habeat licentiam distringendi tempore Parliamenti; to which the King answers thus, Non videtur honestum quod Rex concedat quod illi de Concilio suo distringantur tempore Parliamenti, set alio tempore distringat per hostia & fenestras, ut moris est; that is, The Master petitions, that he may have power to distrein for Rent in time of Parliament; to which the King answers, That it seems not honest, that the King should grant, that they of his Council should be distrained in time of Parliament, but that he may distrain at another time by the Door and Windows, as the Custom was.  
Mr. 
(c) P. 478 ad 483.625. to 699.817. to 869.989.1213. to 1220. How Mr. Prynne qualifies this Privilege.  Prynne in his Fourth Part of his brief Register would have the Privilege to be Personal, and so to necessary Servants attending, and but to take place the first day he is a Member, after he hath taken the Oath, and not to extend to Chancery Suits, and I know not how many diminutions of this Privilege; so I shall only recommend the Inquisitive Reader to his Collections, and for the full enumeration of all Cases that have been determined by the House of Commons, to 
(d) Memorial, p. 88 ad 116.  Mr. Hackwel, who hath collected all Modern Precedents; it being a Book very useful to understand the modern usage of the House of Commons in passing Bills, and other necessary points, that such as are not versed in the practice of, may find very beneficial to them; and shall add upon this Head, the Summary of King Edward the Second Writ to the Sheriff of Yorkshire, to take Pledges of Walter Fleming of York, and three others, to appear the next Easter Term, to show why they Arrested the Prior Malton, returning from the Parliament at Lincoln to his Priory, 
How the King is obliged to protect the Members from Arrests.  whenas the King ought to protect and defend the Members of Parliament in their coming to, staying there, and returning from the Parliament; the words are, Cum ad Parliamenta in quibus tam nostri, quam Regni nostri negotia debent pertractari, Praelatos, Comites, Barones, & alios tam Clericos quam Laicos, per quorum industriam super negotio hujusmodi, Consilium salubrius poterit adhiberi, ad mandata nostra vocatos, & comparentes, in veniendo ad eadem Parliamenta, ibidem morando, & exinde redeundo, ab omnimodis inju●iis, oppressionibus & gravaminibus nos oportet protegere & tueri. 
How grounded upon Edward the Confessor's Law.   
This Privilege seems to be grounded upon King 
(e) Hoveden. Annal. pars poster. p. 601. Lambard. Archaion. Spelman. Conc. tom. 1. p. 689.  Edward the Confessor's Laws, properly applicable to Liberty, to attend Divine Worship, Synods, and Chapter-meetings: the words are, Si quispiam devote ad celebrationem Sancti, pacem habeat eundo, subsistendo, redeundo, item omnibus ad Ecclesiam causa Orationis euntibus, pax in eundo, & redeundo sit eyes; similiter ad Synodum, ad Capitula venientibus. The curious may see more in the Leges Saxonicae, Sect. 9 and in Frederick 
(f) Cod. ex Legum Antiq. p. 475.  Lindebrogus.  
It is to be noted, that this, as all other Privileges, in from the Kings Grant, 
Fol. 60. This Privilege of the King's Grant.  as Dyer is express in his Argument on this Case, That the person of every such Member ought to be privileged from Arrest at the Suit of any private Person during the time that he is busied about the Affairs of the King and the Realm; and this 
(g) Et ti●l Privilege ad estre touts foits grant per le Roy, a ses Commoners, all Request del Prolocutor del Parliament, le primer jour.  Privilege is always granted by the King to his Commons at the Request of the Speaker of Parliament the first day; and those that had the benefit of this Privilege, obtained it by a Writ of Privilege issuing out of Chancery; but of late, it is done by the Houses verbal Order, Serjeant or Mace, without any Writ of Privilege, Habeas Corpus, previous complaint, Petition to, or Order from the King and Lords, as in former times; against which usage Mr. Prynne makes loud Complaints.  
The first Precedent Mr. Prynne or others can discover, being that of Mr. Ferrer recited at large in 
(h) Hist. p. 1584.33 H. 8. Mr. Ferrer Case the first, when the Commons had liberty to punish the Breakers of this Privilege.  Holingshed, which in short is this: Mr. George Ferrer being the King's Servant and Burgess for Plymouth, was Arrested by a Process out of the King's Bench, carried to the Counter: Byorder of the House the Sergeant of the Parliament was sent to demand delivery, but was forceably resisted, and the Crown of the Mace of Arms was beaten off in defending the Sergeant. This being declared to the House (of whom there were not a few, as well of the King's Privy Council, as also of his Privy Chamber) they would sit no longer without their Burgess, but retired to the Upper House, where the whole Case was declared by Sir Thomas Moil their Speaker, before Sir Thomas Audley Lord Chancellor; and all the Lords and Judges there assembled, judging the contempt to be very great, referred the punishment thereof to the Order of the Commons House. The Lord Chancellor offered to grant them a Writ to the Sheriffs of London to require delivery; which the House refused, being clear in opinion, that all Commandments, and other Acts proceeding from the nether House were to be done and executed by their Sergeant, without Writ, only by show of his Mace which was his Warrant.  
The House applying itself to the Lords, (who were, saith Mr. Prynne, 
(i) Brief Register, part 4. p. 860.  the ancient proper Judges of the Violations and Violators of the Commons Privileges) was the right Parliamentary way for their Members Release; and if they had applied themselves to them at first, they had prevented all Affronts to 
(k) Id. p. 862, 863.  themselves and Officers, and met with no opposition. And Mr. Prynne humbly apprehends that this Precedent will not warrant an absolute Jurisdiction in the House of Commons without any antecedent Complaint or 
(l) See Freeholders Grand Inquest, from p. 50. to 64.  Petition to the King or Lords in Parliament, to punish any breach of their Members Privileges, not first complained of to, 
Application to be made to the King and Lords, for punishment of Violators of this Privilege.  and adjudged by the King or Lords to be an actual breach, or referred to themselves by the Lords or King, to punish, or without their subsequent Ratification; or that it will justify the Enlargement of any of their Members or menial Servants out of Execution by their Mace alone, without an Habeas Corpus, Writ of Privilege, or special Act of Parliament, or matter of Record for the Sheriff or Officers Indemnity against Actions of Escape, or for the Plaintiffs relief to recover his Debt by a second Execution: for the proof of all this I must refer the inquisitive Reader to Mr. Prynne's 
(m) Sect. 10. a p. 622. ad 870.  Fourth Part of his Brief Register, wherein he hath largely examined most of the then claimed Privileges of the House of Commons, and disallows of them, when not judged by the King and Lords. In which Controversy I shall not presume to write any thing, because it will be more pleasant and satisfactory to have recourse to himself.   

SECT. 10. Concerning Regulating Elections.  
THE first thing I find concerning new Elections, in the place of Absents and Defaulters, is in the 5 E. 2. 
Cl. 5 E. 2. m. 26. dorso.  as I have touched before; divers Knights, Citizens and Burgesses departing from the Parliament, the King thereupon issued out Writs to several Sheriffs, to summon them to return to the Parliament, 
Vel alios, ad hoc idoneos, loco ipsorum, s● ad hoc v●care non possunt, eligere.  or to choose other fit persons in their places, if they cannot be at leisure to come up.  
The Commons in this Age meddled not with the re-summoning, or causing new ones to be Elected, in the rooms of those that could not come.  
I have before instanced in several Summons, 
The King anciently only ordered new Elections.  wherein the Kings ordain the Sheriffs to re-summon the Members of former Parliaments, or others, for those who were dead, or unable, and sometimes but one of those: By which it appears, that in those days the King solely Authorized new Elections, where any were dead or disabled.  
The first Petition against an undue Election, 
First Petition against undue Elections. Prynne 's Brevia Parl. r●●iviva, p. 286. A nos●re tres excellent, & tres gracious Signior, nostre Seignior le Roy, & les ●res nobles Signors, & Sages Comuns, etc. pleignont les Major, etc.  that I have met with, is Anno 7 R. 2. from the Mayor, Bailiffs, and Commons of Shaftsbury: To our thrice Excellent and thrice Gracious Lord, our Lord the King, and the thrice noble Lords, and sage Commons of this present Parliament, That whereas they had chosen Walter Henly, and Thomas Steward, the Sheriff of Dorsetshire, for the last had returned Thomas Camel, to the great damage of our Lord the King, and contrary to the Will of the Mayor, etc. So that here the Complaint is to the King, the Lords, and Commons jointly, and the name of this Camel is not endorsed returned in the Writ, but the other two.  
In all the Statutes made for regulating Elections, they run, 
See Freeholders Grand Inquest, p. 15, 16.  The King willeth and commandeth, 5 Ric. 2. c. 4. Our Lord the King at the grievous complaint of the Commons, hath ordained, 7 H. 4. c. 15. and so, Our Lord the King ordained, 11 H. 4. c. 1.5 H. 5. and such like in all the Statutes to 8 H. 6.  
So in the Statute, 5 R. 2. Par. 2. c. 4. All Persons which shall from henceforth receive the Summons of Parliament, 
Prynne's Plea for Lords, p. 393.  and come not at the said Summons (except he may reasonably and honestly excuse himself to our Sovereign Lord the King) shall be amerced, and otherwise punished, as of old time, etc. So that here the Excuse is to be made to the King; so that it was not then in use for the Commons to fine and tax their Members.  
In the Parliament holden at Westminster, 5 H. 4. 
Id. 391. Rot. Parl. 5 H. 4. num. 38.  because. the Writ of Summons of Parliament, returned by the Sheriff of Rutland, was not sufficiently or duly returned, as the Commons conceived, the said Commons prayed our Lord the King, 
The Commons petition the King and Lords to examine and order undue Returns.  and the Lords in Parliament, that this matter may be duly examined in Parliament, etc. Whereupon our Lord the King in full Parliament commanded the Lords in Parliament to examine the said matter, and to do thereupon as to them should seem best in their Discretions. So the Lords called before them the Sheriffs, and Parties, and it was agreed by the said Lords, that the Sheriff should amend his Return, and the Sheriff for his default should be discharged of his Office, and committed Prisoner to the Fleet, and make Fine and Ransom at the King's pleasure.  
Upon this and other Precedents Mr. 
Id. p. 364, 365. Mr. Prynne's Opinion.  Prynne saith, That no Statute doth give the Commons House the least Power or Authority to judge or determine the Legality or Illegality of any Elections, but leaves this to the King and Lords to redress, as at first before their making, and gives the Knights duly chosen, but not returned, a hundred Pound Damages against the Sheriffs, and Citizens and Burgesses forty Pound against Mayors and Bailiffs, who make false Returns, by way of Action of Debt in the King's Courts at Westminster, or in the Star-Chamber, when in being, or before the King, Lords, and Council, as in Bronker's case, 
Dyer, fol. 113, 168. Plowden, fol. 118. to 131. Old Book of Entries, fol. 446, 447.  Trin. 1 Eliz. not in the Commons House, as the Statutes and Precedents in the Law-Books resolve. So that he saith, how the Commons are now become sole Judges of all false Returns, and Elections, and that perlegem & consuetudinem Parliamenti, against all these Acts and Precedents, let Sir Edward Coke and others resolve him, and the Intelligent when they are able; for late and arbitrary Privileges are of no value, but ancient usage, and Law of our Parliaments, and solid Reason, which cannot be produced to justify these late Innovations and Extravagances.  
The Statute of 8 H. 6. 
Rot. Parl. 8 H. 6. num. 391. Petitions from the Commons to the King and Lords, about Elections.  to prevent Tumults, Uproars, and Disorders in the Elections, is grounded upon a Petition from the Commons, that the King by advice and assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, would seclude all but Freeholders of forty Shillings a Year Lands above all Reprizals: which was more than forty Pound a Year now, being the twentieth part of a Knights Fee.  
In 18 H. 6. 
Rot. Parl. 18 H. 6. m. 13. num. 18.  it was showed to the King and the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, That Gilbert Hore, Sheriff of the County of Cambridge, made no Return of Knights upon the King's Writ: Whereupon the King, by Advice and Assent of the Lord Spiritual and Temporal, ordered a new Writ. So that then there were no other but the King that had the Power to cause new Elections, with Advice and Consent of the Lords; and so the King issued out new Writs.  
Anno 29 H. 6. Nicholas Stynecle Knight, Richard Bevel, etc. and other notable Esquires, Gentlemen, and other Men holding Fees, who may expend 40 s. per Annum, beyond Reprizes, chose Robert Stonham and John Stynecle, notable Esquires.  
To this is annexed a Petition to the King our Gracious and Sovereign Lord, 
Petition of Subjects to the King about Elections.  signed by 140 Gentlemen and Freeholders, in behalf of those against one Henry Gimber, who was not of Gentile Birth, chosen by the number of 70. and the Under-Sheriff countenanced him and his Party, and would not suffer these 140 to be examined about their Estates, and give Voice, thoue he might clearly yarely expend 20 Mark, without that we should have offended the Peace of You, our most doutye Sovereign Lord, and so we departed, for dread of the said Inconveniences, that was likely to be done of Manslaughter; and what the Sheriff will return in this behalf we can have no notice. For which Causes, we your true humble Suggets and Liegemen, in our most lowly Wise, beseeching you our most douty Sovereign Lord and King, these Premises may be considered for Your most Aid, and our Freedom; that the said Sheriff may be by Your great Highness straight charged to return the said Robert Stoneham, etc. Thus far the Petition.  
From this memorable Petition Mr. Prynne makes many observations; the principal of which are, that the King himself was to redress and rectify all false and undue Returns. Secondly, That this is the only clear Declaration and Record, he hath met with, complaining against a Sheriff giving of an Oath, 
A Sheriffs denying the Poll, petitioned against.  and Poll to some Freeholders, and denying it to others. Thirdly, That when legal Electors cannot be sworn or polled, without breach of the Peace, or Manslaughter; they may justly departed, and aught to make such a complaint and declaration, under their hands and Seals. Fourthly, That Ignoble persons, who are not of Gentile birth, ought not to be elected Knights of Shires. Whoever desires to peruse more concerning the ancient usage in Elections, may peruse Mr. Prynne's Plea for the Lords, from page 371. to 416. his Second Part of Brief Register, p. 118, 119, 139, 140. and several other places.  
I shall only add what Queen Eliz. 
Freeholders Grand Inquest, p. 60. D' Ewes's Journal, fol. 393.  18 Regni said in this case, That she was sorry the Commons meddled with choosing and returning Knights of the Shire for Norfolk (it is to be presumed, the like she might have said of any other County, if there had been occasion) a thing impertinent for the House to deal with, and only belonging to the Office and Charge of the Lord Chancellor; from whom the Writs issue, and are returned.  
Having thus given a brief account of the ancient Usage, I come to the modern way, which, according to Mr. Hackwell, 
Memorials, c. 6. p. 20. The modern Use of Regulating Elections.  is that a general order hath usually been made in the beginning of the Session, to Authorise the Speaker to give Warrant for new Writs, in case of Death of any Member; or of double Returns, where the Party makes his choice openly in the House, during that Session, as it was ordered in the beginning of the Parliament, 18, and 21 Jacobi primi: and where such general Order is not made, Writs have issued by Warrant of the Speaker, by Virtue of special Order, upon motion in the House; and this Warrant is to be directed to the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, by order of Parliament, 13 Nou. 1601.  
The Committee of Privileges, 24 March, 21 Jacobi making their Report, a question was put, Whether Sir Thomas Holland, and Sir John Corbet, were well elected Knights for Norfolk; the House were divided, and it was overruled by the House, that the No's should go forth. So that now the House of Commons are the sole Judges of the validity or invalidity of Elections; and I suppose the King and Lords, judging the House the competentest Persons to make enquiry, and being willing to be eased of the trouble of such Matters as relate only to the Members of the House of Commons, have rather by connivance, than by any positive Ordinance in the House of Lords, dismissed this to the House of Commons: against which, Mr. Prynne sadly complains, 
Plea for the Lords, p. 413.  saying, That since the Committees of Privileges have interposed in them, their Proceed have been very irregular, and illegal, in respect all the Witnesses they examine touching them, are unsworn, and give their Testimonies without Oath, upon which they ground their Vote; and for the most part very partially, for which cause it is usually styled the Committee of Affection.  
In 35 Eliz. 
Sir Simon D' Ewes's Journal, p. 494. In Queen Elizabeth's time Application made to the Chancellor or L. Keeper.  Sir Edward Coke being then Speaker, he was ordered to attend the Lord Keeper, to move his Lordship to direct a new Writ for choosing a Burgess for Southwark, instead of Richard Hutton, supposed to be unduly elected, and another for allowing Sir George Carew, who was duly elected, but not returned to be Burgess of Gamelsford in Cornwall, and a third for changing the name of John Dudley, returned Burgess for New Town in the County of Southampton, into the name of Thomas Dudley, the Christened Name being mistaken: But the L. Keeper would allow no alteration, but in that of Dudley. Which makes some observe, 
Lawyer outlawed, p. 12.  That if the House of Commons had then known they had any Power to mend the said Returns, or punish the Offenders; or Sir Edward Coke had known it had been Law, he had never been sent on that Message. So that what Authority the House hath, it hath accrued since.   

SECT. 11. Concerning the House of Commons Censuring, Imprisoning, and Expelling their own Members.  
AS to the Commons Imprisoning and Punishing their own Members, 
The Reasons for this Privilege.  for words by them spoken, or Misdemeanours committed in the House, there may be some reason for it: First, 
Stat. 4. H. 8. c. 8. Coke 4. Instit. p. 25. 31 H. 6. c. 26, 27.  because by Law they are not Punishable elsewhere, for any rash, indeliberate, and inordinate Speeches in Parliament, which do not amount to Treason, Felony, or Breach of the Peace; which it is supposed none in that rightly constituted House will protect, though done in the House of Commons, begun in 1641. Secondly, It is to be supposed that the Members upon their entering into that House, unanimously agree for order sake, that the lesser number should always submit to the greater. So by such Consent and original Compact, every single Member submitting himself to the rest, he hath no such reason to complain, although they had no such Authority; for scienti & volenti non fit Injuria; provided that they exceed not the common Rules of Justice, nor the Bounds of Established Laws: for than no private Act can bind a Subject, though made with his own free Consent, as appears in Clark's Case against the Mayor and Burgesses of St. Alban. 
Coke, lib. 5. p. 64.   
The first Precedent I find that any Member of the House of Commons was complained, and Petitioned against for Misdemeanours, and put to answer before the King and Lords in Parliament, 
Rot. Parl. 16. R. 2. num. 6.  and there judged, and fined, was 16 R. 2. the Wednesday after the Parliament began; when Sir Philip Courtney, 
Members of the House of Commons punished for Misdemeanour by the King and Lords.  returned one of the Knights for Devonshire, came before the King in full Parliament, and said that he understood how certain people had accused, and slandered him to the King and Lords; therefore prayed to be discharged of the said Employment, until the accusations, etc. were tried: and because his said Prayer seemed honest to the King and the Lords, the King granted him his Request, and discharged him in full Parliament; 
Exact Abridgement, p. 417.  and the Monday following, at the Instance and Prayer of the Commons, the King granted that he should be restored, and remitted to his Place. In the Parliament, 4 H. 4. the accusations against him being reinforced, the King and Lords adjudged, that he should be bound to his good Behaviour, and committed to the Tower for his Contempt.  
By which, saith Mr. Prynne, it appears, 
Plea for the Lords, p. 386, 387.  That only the King and Lords in full Parliament can suspend or discharge any Knights or Commoners sitting in Parliament, and have Power of restoring and readmitting a suspended Member of the Commons House: and he answers the Precedents that Sir Edward Coke brings, 4 Instit. p. 23, and 3 Inst. p. 22. 
Vide pag. 296, 297, 299, 344, 371, 372, 373.  and many others which would be tedious here to insert.  
The first Precedent he finds, 
The first Precedent of the House of Commons secluding their Members.  that the Commons began to seclude one another, upon Pretence of undue Elections, and Returns, was in Queen Elizabeth's time, when Thomas Lucy, 8 Eliz. was removed out of the House for giving four Pound to the Mayor of Westbury to be chosen a Burgess, and the Mayor fined and imprisoned; and 23 Eliz. Mr. A. H●ll for publishing the Conferences of the House, and writing a Book to the dishonour of the House, was committed to the Tower for six Months, and fined five hundred Mark, and expelled the House; and in King Charles the First's time, this Power over their Fellow-Members was greatly improved; in which how far Mr. Prynne then concurred I know not, but after he was secluded, he every where writes with great earnestness against this usage; but whether with Judgement, Law, and Reason, I shall leave others to judge, only I think fit to insert some of his Invectives against the Proceed of that unparallelled house of Commons.  
First, he saith, There can be no legal Trial or Judgement given in Parliament, in Criminal Causes or others, 
Id. p. 309. Mr. Prynne's Reasons against this Usage.  without Examination of Witnesses upon Oath, as in all other Courts of Justice, which the House of Commons cannot do. 
Littleton, sect. 212. Coke, ibid.  Secondly, That it is a Rule, both of Law and Justice, That no Man can be an Informer, Prosecutor, and Judge too, of the persons prosecuted and informed against: the Commons being in the nature of the Grand Inquest, 
Coke 4. Inst. p. 24.  being summoned from all parts of the Kingdom, to present Public Grievances, and Delinquents to the King and Peers for their Redress. 
Plea for the Lords, p. 373.  Thirdly, That all the objected Precedents are of very puny date within time of memory, therefore unable to create a Law, or Custom of Parliament, or any right of sole Judicature in the House of Commons. Fourthly, 
Id. p. 387.  That all these Precedents were made by the Commons themselves, unfit Judges in their own Cases, much less over one another, being all of equal Authority: so that, in his opinion, they could no more expel or eject any of their Members by their own Authority, without the King and Lords concurrent consent, 
See Legal Vindication, p. 10.  than one Justice of Peace, Committeeman, or Militia-man can unjustice, or remove another; since par in parem non habet potestatem, neither in Ecclesiastical, Civil, 
Id. p. 373.  Military or Domestic Affairs. Fifthly, That they are all against Law, because coram non Judice; he having throughout the whole Discourse, endeavoured to prove, That the Commons have no right or power of Judicature, much less of sole Judicature in our Parliaments, but only the King and Lords. Sixthly, That these Precedents are but few, never judicially argued, and rather connived at, than approved by the King and Lords, taken up with other more public business; therefore passing sub silentio, they can make no Law or Right, as is resolved in Long, 5 E. 4. fol. 110. Cook's four Rep. fol. 93, 94. Slade's Case, and six Rep. fol. 75. Drurie's Case. Seventhly, In the long Parliament of King Charles the First, they began to seclude Projectors, 
Exact Collections of Ordinances, p. 541. to 558.  Monopolists, etc. though duly elected; then suspended and ejected such who were Royalists, and adhered to the King; then they proceeded to imprison and eject those Members, 
Plea for the Lords, p. 414, 415. How the House of Commons of the Parliament 1641. seduded their Members, till there were not above 70 left.  whom the Army-Officers impeached or disliked, as a corrupt Party, or corrupt Majority: and so fifty or sixty, by the power of the Army, secured, secluded, and expelled near 400 Members; and made themselves the Commons House, without them, and so proceeded to vote down, and seclude both King and House of Lords, and voted themselves to be the Parliament of England, and sole Legislators, and Supreme Authority of the Nation. The consequences of all which are too well known to the whole Kingdom, whose Calamity of Civil War, and all the unspeakable Tragedies of it, flowed from the packing of Members in the Commons House, and the Assistance the People (relying upon their Sageness, and Authority) afforded them. 
How this revived against Abhorrers.   
We had of later Years a fresh revival of the same method in the House of Commons, expelling those they called Abhorrers: which is so well known, that I need say nothing of it; yet I would recommend to all interessed Persons, the perusal of two Treatises, which though they pass for Pamphlets, yet have been writ by Judicious Authors, and those are, The Lawyer outlawed, and the Three parts of the Addresses, which are Books very fit for Gentlemen to peruse.  
How full and unquestioned a power the Commons have to represent Grievances to the King, and petition for Redress; 
The unquestioned Rights of the Commons.  to impeach any Person of the highest Quality that is a Subject, for Treason, or high Misdemeanours; to have the sole Power in having all Bills, for Subsidies, Aids and Supplies, to begin, and, I think, be perfected in their House; and the Privileges they petition for by their Speaker] are so well known, that they need no Discourse upon.  
But I find several Judicious Persons will not allow the House of Commons to be a Court; which Sir Edward Coke affirms, 
4. Instit. p. 28. Whether the House of Commons be properly a Court.  and uses this only one Argument for it, Because it is not Prorogued or Adjourned, by the Prorogation or Adjournment of the Lords House; but the Speaker upon signification of the King's Pleasure, by the Assent of the House of Commons, doth say, This Court doth Prorogue or Adjourn itself. But to this it is answered, 
Lawyer outlawed. p. 18.  That if this were sufficient to denominate a Court, every Committee of Lords and Commons, though never so few in number, must upon this account be a distinct Court; because they may thus adjourn and prorogue themselves without their respective Houses. In another place, 
4. Instit. p. 23.  the same Chief Justice offers to prove the House of Commons not only a Court, but a Court of Judicature and Record; for that the Clerks Book of the House of Commons is a Record, and so declared by Act of Parliament 6 H. 8. c. 16. But this House had no such Book as a Journal, much less any Authentic Record, 
When the House of Commons had a Journal first.  before the first Year of Ed. the Sixth; all their material proceed till then, being drawn in Minutes, by a Clerk appointed to attend them, for that purpose; and by him entered of Record in the House of Lords. Therefore the Words of the Statute are, That the Speakers Licence for Members going into the Country, be entered of Record, in the Book of the Clerk of the Parliament, appointed for the Commons House: and this Journal is rather a Register of what passeth, than such a Record as denotes a Court of Judicature, as the Author of The Lawyer outlawed endeavours to prove; 
P. 17, 18, 19 Ploughed. Com. fol. 319. Coke 1. Inst. fol. 260.  because there is no Court but what is established by the King's Patent, by Act of Parliament, or by the Common Law, i. e. the constant immemorial Custom of former Ages: for by that the House of Lords is the sole supreme Court of Judicature; it having never been heard of before Sir Edward Coke's fancy, That there were two distinct Courts in the same Parliament. Also there is no Court without a power of trial; but the House of Commons have no power to try any Crime or Offence, because they cannot examine upon Oath: and there can be no legal Trial without Witnesses, nor are any Witnesses of any force in Law, unless examined upon Oath.  
But I shall not enter into these Controversies, 
Some Observations on the Privileges of the House of Commons in general.  but shall now lay down some general Observations and Rules, which Judicious Persons have noted as worthy the consideration of the Honourable House in point of their claims of Privileges and Judicature.  
First, King James the First in his Declaration, touching his proceed in Parliament, 1621. resolves, That most Privileges of Parliament grew from Precedents, which rather show a Toleration than an Inheritance: therefore he could not allow of the Style; calling it their Ancient and undoubted Right and inheritance; but could rather have wished, that they had said, 
All Privileges from the Crown.  Their Privileges were derived from the Grace and permission of his Ancestors and him; and thereupon concludes, That he cannot with patience endure his Subjects to use such Antimonarchical Words, concerning their Liberties, except they had subjoined, That they were granted unto them by the Grace and Favour of his Predecessors: yet he promiseth to be careful of whatsoever Privileges they enjoy by long Custom, and uncontrolled and lawful Precedents.  
Secondly, 
C. 29. None to be punished but by Legal Trial.  It is to be considered, That by the Great Charter it is declared, That no Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or diseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or his Free Customs, or be Outlawed, or Exiled, or in any manner destroyed, but by the lawful Judgement of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. 
Stat. 28 E. 3. c. 3.  So 28 E. 3. it is Enacted, That no Man, of what estate or condition he be, shall be put out of his Land, or Tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death without being brought to answer by due Process of Law. So 42 E. 3. c. 3. it is assented and accorded for the good Government of the Commons, that no Man be put to answer without presentment before Justices, or matter of Record, or by due course of Law, or Writ Original, according to the Old Laws of the Land. 
Nulla Curia quae Recordum non habet, potest imponere finem, neque aliquem mandare carceri, quia isla tantummodo spectant ad Curias de Recordo. Mar. Sess. 3.  So Sir Edward Coke saith, Courts which are not of Record, cannot impose a Fine, or commit any to Prison, because these only belong to Courts of Record; for which see Beecher's Case, fol. 60. 120. Bonham's Case, and lib. 11 fol. 43. Godfrey's Case: So in the First Parliament of Q. Marry it is declared, That the most Ancient Statutes of this Kingdom do give, assign, and appoint, the correction and punishment of all Offenders against the Regality and Dignity of the Crown, and the Laws of this Realm, unto the King; which manifests, 
P. 23  that all such things are to be tried in his Courts. So that surely the Commons Privileges must be included; for to trouble any (saith the Author of The Lawyer outlawed) that doth not offend against the Crown, or Laws of the Land, is very Illegal and Arbitrary, 
Id. p. 16.  and an high breach of the Liberty of the Subject. It would therefore be considered, how improbable it is, that after our Ancestors have struggled for many Ages, 
Infoeliciter aegrotat, cui plus mali venit a Medico quam a Morbo.  to preserve themselves and posterity, from the unbounded Rule of Arbitrary Pleasure; and having obtained that from their Sovereigns, in so much, that they can neither be fined or imprisoned by their Sovereign (unless for transgressing some known Penal Law of the Land) should leave any Arbitrariness in the House of Commons, who are but the People's honourable Deputies, trusties, and Attorneys.  
Thirdly, 
The Law hath provided where the Breach of the greatest Privileges are to be tried.  It is to be considered that the Law hath expressly provided, where and how Breaches of Privilege ought to be punished, 5 H. 4. c. 6. and 11 H. 6. c. 11. about any Assault upon a Parliament man, or his menial Servant, to be in the King's Bench. Since therefore such Assaults are far more Criminal than Arrests of them, or words spoken against them, or inferior misdemeanours (to argue a majori ad minus) it should seem rational that in the Courts of Justice (being open to redress all sorts of Illegalities) matters should be rather tried, than that persons should be punished by Imprisonments of the House of Commons alone. For if this Arbitrariness were allowed, it would argue a great defect in our Laws, that they are not the entire Rule of the Subjects Civil Obedience; and if the ordinary Courts of Justice can try the greater, they may certainly try the lesser Crime, as they have done in the Case of Done against Welsh, River against Cousin, Shewish against Trewynnard. 
Mich. 12. E. 4. Rot. 20. Excheq. Hil. 14. E. 4. Rot. 7. Dyer, fol. 59  But I have sufficiently showed before, that in old time the determination and knowledge of the Privileges did belong to the Lords.  
How agreeable these ways of Proceed were to the Usage of the House of Commons in 1640. and 1680. 
The Proceeding of the Houses in Anno 1640. and 1680.  are fresh in every one's memory, when not only they ejected and imprisoned their own Members, but by Messengers sent for several Gentlemen, and others, no Members, for acting according to the known Laws, and King's Proclamations; and often for Persons having spoke angrily or slightingly of some Member, as in the Case of Abhorrers.  
It is to be hoped those very Gentlemen now wish it might be forgot, as I hope it will never be put in practice again; when, after a chargeable sending for up by the terrible Messengers, after being detained in Custody during the Pleasure of the House, and brought to receive their Sentence on their Knees at the House of Commons Bar, they were dismissed: So that I knew one who principally to avoid the Charge (his Crime being for speaking Words against a Member, in his Cups) was forced, upon notice of the Messenger's coming for him, to fly into Ireland.  
Fourthly, 
That the Law and Custom of Parliament may be declared.  It is worthy great Consideration by all the Members of the Honourable House of Commons, that it is an undoubted Maxim both in Law and Reason, and is necessary to the Obligation of all positive Constitutions, That they should be published in express Words: The immediate Laws, even of God Almighty, in the Opinion of Learned Men, being not obligatory where they were never promulged. Now since it hath not been hitherto published to the People, what this Lex & Consuetudo Parliamenti is, 
4. Inst it. p. 15. Illa lex ab omnibus quarenda, a multis ignorata, a paucis cognita. Fleta, l. 2. c. 2.  (which Sir Edward Coke saith out of Fleta, is to be enquired into of all, is understood by many, and known to few) it would not only be obliging, but most necessary, that the Honourable House would give a true and full Description of this Law and Custom of Parliament, and an exact Account of their Privileges, that People might in some measure, for the future, eat those dangerous Rocks, and not be surprised or shipwrecked on such hidden Shelves.  
I shall close this long Chapter (wherein, according to my Talon, I have endeavoured to comprise what hath been voluminously treated of by all the Authors I am furnished withal, and digested things into an easy Method) with some Assertions of Mr. Prynne, whose Writings in this Particular are better esteemed than many others.  
He saith, 
Brief Register, part 4. p. 685. Mr. Prynne's Opinion concerning the great Privilege the Commons.  The Parliament being the Supremest Court of Law and Justice, aught to proceed legally, according to the Course of Law, and not to enlarge or extend the Privileges of Parliament beyond their Ancient, Just, and Legal Bounds, nor alter the Law therein by their absolute Power: Much more ought the House of Commons themselves to follow their Precedent, and not to extend their old, or vote up new Privilege, to the delay, 
Ibid. p. 1210.  retarding, or deluding of Common Right and Justice. Therefore he condemns the writing of Letters by the Speaker, 18 Jacobi 1. 
14 Feb. 18 Jac. fol. 24. b.  to stay a Trial betwixt Sir William Cox and Mr. Humphrey Aylworth; as likewise in other Cases, the same Year, 
Ibid. fol. 51. b. & fol. 137.  3 March, and 20 April: which, he saith, is diametrically opposite to the Judge's Oath, and against the Great Charter, which saith, 
See Stat. 2 E. 3. c. 6. 14 E. 3. c. 14.20 E. 3. c. 1, 2.  Nulli negabimus, nulli differemus Justitiam & Rectum: To which I may add the Hardship used to Mr. Sherridon, 
Lawyer outlawed, p. 28.  who being in the Custody of the Sergeant at Arms, the Warrant of Commitment being during the Pleasure of the House of Commons, 
Mr. Sherridon's Case, who was denied the Benefit of the Habeas Corpus Act.  without any Cause shown; now the Habeas Corpus Act is express, That all Persons are Bailable, by what Person soever committed, not excepting the King and Council, much less the House of Commons, unless for Treason or Felony: One of the Judges made application to the House of Commons, to know whether he might grant the Writ of Habeas Corpus to him. The Debate lasted three days, by reason of the Difficulty of the Cause: For if they openly declared against the Habeas Corpus, the Nation would be much alarmed, and suspect these Gentlemen, instead of securing, intended to invade the Subject's Liberties; but if they allowed the Writ, the delicious Power of Imprisoning such as they had a Pique to, was utterly lost, and all Persons referred to the ordinary Courts of Justice, or, upon their failure, to the House of Lords, 
Sir William Jones against any one's Release by Habeas Corpus, if they were imprisoned by the House of Commons.  the Supreme Tribunal of England.  
Sir William Jones insisted much upon the Power of the House, and that they did not intent by that Act to bind themselves, (which yet must bind the King) though it might as well be alleged, That he did not intent to bind himself by it. However, Sir William persisted, urging, 
See Debates of the House, p. 217.  That whatever Reasons may be given for discharging such as are not committed for Breach of Privilege, (if grounded on the Act for the Habeas Corpus) will hold as strong for discharging of Persons for Breach of Privilege, and so consequently deprive the House of all its Power and Dignity, and so make it insignificant; and said, That was so plain and obvious, that all the Judges ought to take notice of it: and so judged it below the House to make any Resolution therein, but rather to leave the Judges to do otherwise at their peril, and let the Debate fall without any Question. But Baron Weston had the Courage to grant the Habeas Corpus, 
Baron Weston grants the Habeas Corpus.  as rather willing to expose himself to the Displeasure of the House, than deny or delay Justice contrary to his Oath.  
I could not omit this remarkable Passage, as a Specimen of the Arbitrariness of the Leading Party in that House; 
Brief Register, part 4. p. 846.  and now shall proceed to Mr. Prynne's Remarks upon the Proceed of the long House of Commons.  
He observes, 
Privilegia omnino amittere meretur qui sibi abutitur concessa penestate. Ejus est interpretari cujus concedere. Summa Rosella. Privilegium 3.  That Privileges may be lost by the abuse of the Power; and that whatever Privilege the House hath, is from the King's Grant, or Toleration. Therefore, according to the Canonists Rule, If the Privilege granted be expressed in general, dubious, or obscure Words, than it is in the power of him to interpret, who hath the power to grant. Now the Petition of the Speaker is, That the Commons in this Parliament may, and shall have all their Ancient and Just Privileges allowed them. Therefore the King, 
Nemini liceat Chartas Regias nisi ipsis Regibus judicare. Placita Parl. 18 E. 1. num. 19 p. 20.  being the sole Granter of these Privileges, must be the only proper Interpreter and Judge of them, as he is of all his other Charters of Privileges, Liberties, Franchises, and Acts of Parliament themselves, after his Regal Assent thereto; not the Commons, or Persons to whom they are granted; and that both in and out of Parliament, by Advice of his Nobles, or Judges of the Common-Law.  
Therefore he saith, first, 
How the Breach of Privilege to be punished, according to Mr. Prynne. See the Authority, Brief Regist. part 2. p. 847.  That if the Commons by Petition to the King and Lords in Parliament, complain of the Breach of their ancient Privileges and Liberties, as they ever did in the Cases of Lark, Thorp, Hyde, Clerk, Atwyll, and others; the King, by Advice of his Lords in Parliament, assisted with his Judges, hath been, and (as he humbly conceives) is the sole proper Judge of them and their violations; not the Commons, who being Parties, Prosecutors, and Complainants, are no legal indifferent Judges in their own or Menial Servants cases, if they will avoid partiality, which is the reason the Law allows Challenges to Jurors in Civil and Criminal causes. Therefore he observes, 
Ibid. p. 1206.  that the House of Commons, taking Informations without Oath, may be easilier abused by misinformation, and sometimes thereby are put upon over hasty Votes, which, upon finding out evil Combinations, they are forced to retract.  
Secondly, 
The Chancellor or Lord Keeper to grant the Writ.  If the complaint of the breach of Privilege be made in the Commons House, and thereupon an Habeas Corpus, Writ of Privilege, or Supersedeas prayed under the great Seal, for the Members or menial Servants release, whose Privilege is infringed; the Lord Chancellor or Keeper of the great Seal, representing the King's person in Chancery (the Court for relief in cases of Privilege) is the properest Judge, and Examiner of the claimed Privilege, and its violations upon Oath, and other sufficient Evidence, assisted by all the King's Judges in cases of difficulty, who thereupon will grant or deny the Writs.  
Thirdly, 
The Judges of the Courts to which the Writ is directed, to judge of the validity of the Privilege.  When these Writs of Privilege, Supersedeas, or Habeas Corpus, are granted to any Member, or menial Servants, and directed to any of the King's Courts to enlarge their restrained Persons, or stay any Arrests, Process or Judgements against them; the Kings own Judges in his respective Courts, to which they are directed, are then the proper Judges of the Privileges of Parliament, and of their breaches suggested in these Writs; who may examine, not only all matters of Law or Fact comprised in them, which are Traversable; but likewise adjudge, allow, or disallow the very Privilege itself, if no real ancient Parliamentary Privilege allowed by the Laws and Customs of the Realm.  
How far he is in the right, I will not undertake to judge; but I remember, somewhere he wisheth an Act of Parliament to pass to adjust these matters: which possibly would prevent many of those chargeable attendances about false Returns, and save much expense of time in the discussing of them, and enable the Subjects to pay a right and due obedience to them.   

SECT. 12. Concerning the Royal Assent to Bills.  
I Have treated so much of this elsewhere, as to the sole Power in the King, the ancient Custom of Sealing the Acts with the King's Seal, and of some of the Prelates and Nobles, as Witnesses of their Assents; that I shall only now speak as to the usual formality of passing the Bills into Acts by the King's last Act. 
See also his Memorials.  For Mr. Hackwell hath given a full account of the manner how Statutes are enacted in Parliament by passing of Bills; to which Book I refer the curious Reader that would understand the order that is used in the debating and passing of them.  
When Bills are passed by both Houses, upon three several Readins in either House, 
Hackwell of Passing of Bills, p. 179. ad 182.  they ought for their last approbation, to have the Royal Assent, whereby every Statute is, as Mr. Hackwell observes, like Silver seven times tried.  
The Royal Assent is usually deferred to the last day of the Session: and because some have been of opinion, that the passing of Bills, 
The Royal Assent determines not the Session.  puts an end to the Sessions, so that what ever Bills are ready, and pass not the Royal Assent, must be again read three times in either House; for the more security, it is usual to insert a Proviso, That the Session is not thereby concluded.  
The Royal Assent is given two ways: First, 
Royal Assent by Patent.  by Commission since the Statute of the 33 H. 8. c. 21. wherein it is expressed, That the Kings Royal Assent by his Letters Patents under the Great Seal, Signed by his hand, and declared and notified in his absence to the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and to the Commons Assembled in the higher House; is and ever was of as good strength and force, as if the King had been there personally present, and assented openly and publicly to the same.  
The manner of the King's giving his Public Assent is in this manner. The King cometh in Person, in his Parliament-Robes, 
Royal Assent when the King present.  and sitteth in his State, and the Upper House sit in their Robes: The Speaker, with all the Commons House, cometh to the Bar of the Lords House; and in Sir Thomas Smith's time, 
Sir Th. Smith's Commonwealth, p. 45. Speeches used to be made there.  the Chancellor for the Lords, and the Speaker for the Commons, in set Speeches, returned the Prince Thanks, for that he hath so great Care of the good Government of his People, and for calling them together to advise of such things as should be for the Reformation, Establishing, and Ornament of the Commonweal. After which, the Chancellor, in the Prince's Name, giveth Thanks to the Lords and Commons, for their Pains and Travel taken, which he saith the Prince will remember, and recompense when Time and Occasion shall serve; and that the Prince is ready to declare his Pleasure concerning their Proceed, whereby the same may have perfect Life and Accomplishment by his Princely Authority.  
I think now, mostly, 
Hackwell of Passing of Bills, p. 181, 182.  the Speaker of the House of Commons makes a Speech, acquainting the King with the purport of the Bills. Then the Clerk of the Crown readeth the Title of the Bills, in such Order as they are in Consequence. After the Title of every Bill is read singly, 
The Clerk of the Crown pronounceth the Royal Assent or Dissent.  the Clerk of the Parliament pronounceth the Royal Assent, according to certain Instructions given from his Majesty in that behalf.  
If it be a Public Bill to which the King assenteth, the Answer is, Le Roy le veult, The King willeth. If a Private Bill, allowed by the King, the Answer is, Soit fait, comme il est desire, Let it be done as it is desired. And upon a Petitionary Bill the like is used.  
If it be a Public Bill (which the King forbeareth to allow) he saith, Le Roy se avisera, The King will advise.  
To a Subsidy Bill the Clerk pronounceth, Le Roy remercie, ses loyaux Subjects, accept leur Benevolence, & aussi le veult, The King thanks his Loyal Subjects, accepts their Benevolence, and also willeth.  
To a general Pardon is pronounced, Les Prelates, Signior, & Communs, en cest Parliament assembles, au nom de touts vous autres Subjects, remercient tres humblement vostre Majesty, & prient Dieu vous donner en sante, bone vie & long: The Prelates, Lords, and Commons, in this Parliament assembled, in the name of all your other Subjects, thrice humbly give thanks to your Majesty, and pray God to give you in health, a good Life, and long.  
These, 
P. 46.  saith Sir Thomas Smith, be taken now as perfect Laws and Ordinances of the Realm of England, and none other, and as shortly as may be, are printed, except it be some Private Acts, made for the Benefit or Prejudice of some Private Man; these be only exemplified under the Seal of the Parliament.    

CHAP. XXIX. Of Factious Combinations in Parliaments.  
I Hope in the foregoing Chapters, I have so explained the Constitution of Parliaments, and the Legislative Power, that  and unprejudiced Persons will no more be misled by the Sophisms, and plausible pretences, which to aggrandise the Power of the two Houses at first, and after of the Commons House only, the Penmen of the long Parliament made use of; yet because many of late were furbishing the rusty Armour of their Demagogues, and trimming their Helmets with fresh Plumes, I conceive it necessary to take notice of some of their chiefest Arguments, and examine those which had greatest Influence upon the People.  
The great and venerable name of Parliament, and its Authority, was constantly used as Shield and Buckler, to ward off all the Force of the Loyal Assaults; and Mr. Prynne writ a large Volume, which he styled, The Sovereign Power of Parliaments: and when the very Lees and Dregs of the Commons House was put in Ferment, that very Kilderkin would admit no lower Style, than the supreme Authority of the Nation to be parched on its Bunghole.  
Therefore to disabuse the less considerate, 
The various Acceptation of the word Parliament.  and to detect the Frauds of those, which under that great Name applied whatever they met with in the Laws, or History, to the House of Commons; I think it necessary in the first place to clear the acceptation of the Word. 
Appropriated to the Lords House.   
Sometimes the word Parliament is used for the House of 
(a) Egerton, sect. 4. 22, 23.  Lords only; as when upon Writ of Error, any Judgement in the King's-Bench is examined in the House of Lords, the Judgement is said to be affirmed or reversed by Parliament.  
The Appellation of Parliament is likewise used for the two Houses, 
To both the Houses.  in regard they are the gross Body, whereof the Parliament consists, there only wanting the Sovereign Head to complete it. But they are so far from being the High Court of Parliament, that they cannot co-unite to be an entire Court, either of Sovereign or Ministerial Justice, but only in concurring in Votes in their several Houses, for preparing of matters, in order to an act of all the Body; which when they have done, their Votes are so far from having any legal Authority in the State, as in Law there is no Style or Form of their joint Acts, further than Bills, nor doth the Law so much as take notice of them, till they have Royal Assent; without which, the Votes of the two Houses die in the Womb, like an Embryo.  
So that the proper use of the word Parliament, 
How properly the High Court of Parliament.  (as Authority of Law-making is annexed to the name) is only when the King and the two Houses concur in one Act, and in that sense only is the Parliament the Supreme Court, the highest Judicatory, and the most Sovereign Power: Not for any Sovereignty in the two Houses, and from them transferred to the King by their joining and consenting with him; but because every complete and perfect Act of it, is the Act of the personal Will and Power of the Sovereign himself, standing in his highest Estate Royal.  
Therefore whoever reads the Authors that writ in defence of the Parliament, must consider this Fallacy they frequently used, that he do not apply the Authoritative Act of the King, with the Consent of the two Houses, to the Houses without the King.  
From the Co-operation of the two Houses in preparing Laws, 
(b) Freeholder's Grand Inquest, p. 34.  the late 〈◊〉 (since King Charles the First's time) of the words, 
The King is not one of the Three Estates.  Be it endued by the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons (as if they were all Fellow-Commissioners) and the unwariness of some of the Penners of the King's Answers to some of the Papers of the two Houses, wherein they styled the King the third Estate; the Commonwealthsmen have taken the advantage to reckon the King but as a third Legislator.  
Therefore I think it necessary to remove this Rub  I proceed further. Although the Author of the Imposture, 
The Modus makes the Parliament to consist of six Parts.  called the modus tenendi Parliamentum, makes six degrees of constituent Members of the Parliament, viz. The King first, than Secondly, the Archbishops; Bishops, Abbats, Priors, and other Clerks, who held Baronies. Thirdly, the Proctors of the Clergy. Fourthly, the Earls, Barons, and other great Men, who held to the value of a County or Barony. Fifthly, the Knights of Shires. Sixthly, the Citizens and Burgesses, to which he might have added the Barons of the Cinque-Ports; yet he saith the King is the Head, Beginning and End of the Parliament, and so hath no 
(c) Ita non habet Parem in suo gradu.  Peer in his degree. Yet it plainly appears, that these we now call the two Houses, were by reason of their distinct Orders, most frequently divided into three. For in 
(d) As queux Prelates, ou la Clargie par eux mesmes; & les Countess & Barons par eux mesmes; Chevalers & Gentz de Countez, & Gentz de la Commune par eux mesmes entreteront. Prynne Animadv. p. 10.  6 E. 3. at his Parliament at York, the Record saith, That on the Friday before the Feast of St. Michael, the Prelates, or the Clergy by themselves; the Earls and Barons by themselves; the Knights of the Counties, and the Commons by themselves treated, etc. Othertimes we find the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and great Men, and the Knights, Citizens and Burgesses, to have separate Consultations by themselves; and to give their several answers to Articles, and business propounded to them in Parliament, as Mr. Prynne out of the Abridgement of the Records of the Tower, hath given us above twenty instances.  
At the making of the Statute of Praemunire, 16 R. 2. the Commons pray, 
The Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, and Commons make the Three Estates.  That the Lords, as well Spiritual as Temporal, severally, and all the Estates of Parliament might be examined, how they thought of that matter; and the Lords Spiritual answered by themselves, and the Lords Temporal by themselves; and the King was Petitioned to make this Examination. So in 40 E. 3. the King ask the Houses, Whether King John could have subjected the Realm, as he did; the Prelates by themselves, and the Dukes, Earls, and Barons by themselves, gave their Answer. Besides, we find (as at large I have before instanced in the last Chapter) the Writs of Summons of the Bishops and Clergy, were only, in side & dilectione; and the Barons generally, 
(e) Stat. 18. ●. 6. c. 1.  in fide & homagio, or Ligeancia; and the Clergy granted their Subsidies apart, and distinct from the Nobles.  
Besides, that the Bishops are to be esteemed the Third Estate, is clear by Act of Parliament: for it being questioned 
(f) 8 Eliz. c. 1. , whether the making Bishops had been duly and orderly done according to Law; the Statute saith, That the questioning of it is much tending to the slander of all the Clergy, being 〈◊〉 of the greatest States of the Realm.  
So Sir 
(g) P. 36.  Thomas Smith (as in the last Chapter I have noted) distinguisheth the two Houses into three Estates, and Sir Edward 
(h) 4. Instr. p. 1.  Coke saith expressly, That the High Court of Parliament consisteth of the King's Majesty sitting in his Royal Politic Capacity, and the three States of the Realm, viz. the Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, and Commons; the like the learned 
(i) Interpreter, tit. Parliament.  Cowel affirms.  
Sir Henry Spelman 
(k) Solenne collequium omnium Ordinum Regni, Authoritate solius Regis, ad consulendum, statuendumque de negotiis Regni indictum. Gloss. p. 449.  calls it a Colloquy of all the Orders of the Kingdom, convened by the sole Authority of the King, to consult and appoint in the Affairs of the Kingdom.  
This was also known to Foreigners, uninteressed Persons; for the Lord Argenton speaking how Subsidies were granted in England, saith 
* Lib. 5. p. 253. , Convocatis primis Ordinibus, Clericis & Laicis, & assentiente Populo: And Bodin 
‖ De Repul. lib. 6.  whenever he speaks of the Constitution of our Parliament, calls it the King and the three Estates of the Realm.  
But to put all out of doubt, in King Charles the Second Reign, it is determined in the Act for the Form of Prayers for the Fifth of November, For the Preservation of the King, and the Three Estates.  
Now the reason why in King Charles the First's answer, 
Why in some of King Charles the First's Writings the King was called the Third Estate.  we meet with the expressions of making the King the third Estate, was, because at that time, the Bishops being voted out of the House of Lords, and the two Houses setting themselves in all the points of Controversy in opposition to the King, the notion of a Triumvirate was more intelligible (as it may be thought) to the People, and those who were so bitter Enemies to the King, and had such a Rebellious force, would have still increased the People's aversion, if the King had asserted his Royal Prerogative otherwise. Whether this were the true reason, or the oversight of the Penners of his Majesty's Answers, I will not undertake to determine; but I am induced to believe the first, because, I find the King, and those that writ in defence of his Cause, using frequently this way of Argument.  
In every State there are three Parts (saith 
(l) Review of Observations.  one, the King ordered to write for him) capable of just or unjust Sovereignty, viz. the Prince, Nobles and People. Now through the Piety of our Lawgiving Princes, a just and regular course of Government being obtained, the stability of which being found to be more concerned in the Power of making Laws, than in any other Power belonging to the Sovereign; for preventing of Innovations, that might subvert that settled regularity, the frame and state of Government was in such a sort established, as that the Prince should be limited from using the legislative Power, without concurrent assent of the Peers and Commons. By which means the constitution of our Parliaments, is so equal and geometrical, and all parts so equally contribute their Offices, that no part can have an extreme predominance over other: Therefore to prevent any evil that might come by the admission of two such Bodies, to a participation of Power, in this particular of making Laws (if they should combine against the Sovereign) the Law gives them an equal Power to assent or descent; 
The Balancing of the Powers in Parliament.  so that opposing the single Power of every one of them, to the Votes of every other two, there might be so secure a balancing of the Power of one against the other, that no practice of any two of them, should do any prejudice and diminution to the third, without the third Party itself did give consent unto it: otherwise the King and Peers might oppress the Commons, the King and Commons oppress the Peers, or the Peers and Commons oppose the King; and the Peers being easily oppressed by the Commons (as we saw in our late calamitous Times) an Appian Decemvirate, or the 30 or 300 Tyrants might get the Power into their own hands.  
In another place he saith, Though properly Laws be the Acts of the King in Parliament, yet are they also truly the Acts of the whole Parliament; because every of the Estates contribute their Power according to the diversity of their Office and Interest, and so as from a sacred Tripos, the civil Oracles of the Law are delivered.  
It is therefore to be considered (saith a Judicious 
(m) King's Supremacy asserted, c. 9 p. 96. where the Reader may find a full Answer to the Deductions they make from the King's way of arguing.  Author, in answer to some other passages of his Majesty that the Parliamentarians wrested) That if his Majesty, out of a desire to save the effusion of Blood, used such gracious Expressions as were most likely to prevail with the People, and consolidate their Minds, they ought not in Equity to prejudice the Rights of the Crown, although he had abdicated therein, some parts of his Authority, and granted things destructive to his own Prerogative. From his Majesty's saying, That the Power, legally placed in both Houses, is more than sufficient to prevent, and restrain the Power of Tyranny, they infer, This cannot be made good without a Power of Resistance; for that Tyranny cannot otherwise be restrained. Which is easily answered. For it cannot be understood, that the King means by this, a forceable resistance or restraint, 
(n) Id possit quisquam quod jure possit.  but a legal one, so far as Humane Prudence can by lawful and just ways provide. The Power they have by Law, being to inflict punishments on evil Instruments, whereby others may be afraid to take upon them such Employments; and they may refuse to give the King Subsidies, and other necessary Assistance, if he refuseth to moderate excesses, which are Powers more efficacious than resistance; the success of the one being more probable and likely than the other.  
However, 
The not asserting of King Charles the First's Prerogative, disadvantageous.  in my poor opinion, it had been more honourable, and probably more efficacious, to have spent less time in this kind of defending the King's Interest by the Pen, and have employed it in asserting the true Prerogative of the King, and his undoubted Rights, to have let the People, as well as the Houses know, what he would reform, and out of Princely Clemency grant, for his People's ease, and at their earnest Petition; but neither to have depreciated, or descended so much below the Majesty and Dignity of his place, to enter into Reply and Duply, Altercation, and Apologies with his Subjects. But that King, composed all of Mercy, Justice, and Tenderness to his Subjects, judging others by his own Royal Standard of Integrity, let the Houses seize his Ships, Magazines, and left them the City of London's Purse, while he retired to the North, and plied the Houses with Declarations and Messages, to have reduced them to their Duties: and though his condescensions were great, and the way of Argument such as before I have instanced in; yet I cannot find (except in that particular of making himself one of the three Estates) that he yielded any part of his Royal Prerogative, till he was made Prisoner; that in his restraint he condescended to a temporary divesting himself of the Militia, and other things, which all sorts of Subjects (except the very chief of those in Rebellion against him) found infinitely more tending to the enslaving, and utter ruin of the People, than ever they could have been, if the King had managed all by his absolute Will, and the direction of those they accounted his worst Instruments.  
I having in several places cleared the King's Sovereignty, shall only on this Head endeavour to answer the principal of those popular Reasons the Writers for the Parliament used, not grounded upon any Law or Constitution of the Government, but only upon the false supposition, That the Wisdom of the two Houses was to be valued above the Wisdom of the King and Council, in proposing matters for the Royal Assent, which were conducible to the Liberty of the Subject, which they pretended was their whole design, and that they would establish the King's Throne in more Glory and Splendour than had ever been in any Ages.  
The first and principal Topick they used, was, 
The Monarchy of England not mixed.  That the Monarchy of England was in its Constitution allayed, and the Power of the two Houses, in making Laws, had such a Copartnership, and radical mixture, that they had something more than a Consultive and Assenting part; and that the King was obliged in the duty of his Office, and by his Coronation Oath, to grant what they desired.  
Mr. Sherringham 
(o) King's Supremacy asserted, p. 74.  hath culled out the prime Arguments of the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, The fuller Answerer, and others upon this Head, and so fully answered them, that I must refer the Reader to him for satisfaction, and shall only select some of the chiefest of these Arguments, more for the orderly continuance of this Discourse, than for any need of repeating them.  
First, They say, That King Charles the First owned the Law 
(p) Declaration from N●wmarket, 9 March 1641.  to be the Measure of his Power, and if so, it is limited. But this concludes no more, than that his Power is of such a size and bigness as the Law hath ordained; and if the Law give the King absolute, full, and entire Power, and limits him only in the exercise of it, this is a restraint, and limitation according to such Laws as the Sovereign hath established in that particular alone, and is the happiness of the English Subject, that King's act not Arbitrarily: but this gives no Power to the two Houses, to be any checks upon the King, who by the same Laws hath the Power of putting in execution, and suspending the execution of the Laws in many Cases; or that Aristocracy, or Democracy have any such mixture with the Monarchy, as they can impose their Laws upon him. For to suppose a mixed Monarchy, consisting of Three Estates, independent for their Authority upon one another, and to have several shares in the Rights of Sovereignty, and to say, The Government of three Estates, is the Government of one Monarch, is perfect nonsense: for when 
(q) Besold. Synopsis Polit. Doct. l. 1. c. 6.  Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy are melted and allayed together, that which resulteth can take its name from none of the simple species, or kinds of Government, but must have some other Appellation.  
Whoever will consider aright of the concurrence of the two Houses, in preparing Bills, will find, 
How the two Houses concur in making Laws.  That though the Houses be as the Causa sine qua non; yet the efficient, procatarctick Cause, and the Authoritative Power in passing these into Laws, is the King only; and what the two Houses do without his Assent, is but as the Counsellor at Law's framing a Deed, and the Clerks Engrossing the Indenture of Conveyance; but till the Seal be set to it, and delivery made, as the Act and Deed of Donor or Conveyor, it is of no force and virtue; neither do we call it the Act and Deed of the Counsellor or Clerk, but of the Person that seals it.  
Another Objection those Champions for the two Houses made great noise with, was, 
(r) King's Supremacy, p. 84. Objection, That the Mixture is in the Supremacy of Power.  That the Power where the Legislative is in all Three, is in the very Root and Essence of it compounded and mixed of those three: so that where this height of Power resideth in a mixed Subject, that is, in three concurrent Estates, the consent and concursus of all being most free, and none depending on the Will of the other, that Monarchy is in the most proper sense, and in the very model of it, a mixed Constitution. And that such is the State of the Monarchy of England, the Objector thinks clear, because the House of Peers are an Aristocracy, and the Commons a Democracy; and this mixture of Interests and Powers being in the very Legislative Power, he concludes the mixture is in the Root and Supremacy of Power, and not in the exercise alone.  
In answer to which it must be considered, 
Answer, That is only in the Exercise of the Power.  That though the concurrence of both the Estates with the Monarch in the making and promulgation of Laws, be such as our Laws describe; yet it is no otherwise than in the precedent Chapters, by undeniable proofs, I have made it out, That what participation soever the two Houses have with the King in the Legislature, it is only derivative from the Crown by the King's Summons, and the restriction of those Summons to do and consent.  
It is known to be the common Assertion of 
(s) Panorm. cap. Gravem de Sent. Excom.  Canonists, 
(t) Bertol. in Lomnes Populi, sect. de Justitia & Jure, q. 2.  Civilians, and 
(u) Suarez, lib. 1. de Leg. c. 8. n. 9  Schoolmen, That the Legislative Power is communicable by the Prince's allowance, and that such a concurrence as our Kings have allowed, is no Argument of Supremacy; such a mixture of the three Estates hath been in other Monarchies, 
* Besold. de Juribus Magist. c. 2.  which every where are owned to be absolute in respect of Power. For as they are summoned by the Prince's single Authority, and dissolved at his own pleasure, they can claim no sort of Right, during their Session, further than to consult about, and prepare Bills for the Royal Assent. Therefore 
(w) De Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa sacra, c. 8. num. 11.  Grotius saith, Istam Legislationem, quae aliis quam Summae Potestati competit, nihil imminuere de jure Summae Potestatis, quod in Scholis dicunt, cumulative datum censeri non privative. So in our Kingdom, every Corporation hath Authority to make Ordinances and Constitutions within their own Liberties, for the good Order and Government of the Body; and the Inhabitants 
(x) Coke 5. part, tit. Cases de By-Laws & Ordinances.  of every Parish, to make By-Laws and Ordinances among themselves for their own profit, where they have Custom for it, and for the Public Good, where they have no Custom: Surely this is a sort of Legislative Power; yet thereby it cannot be inferred, that they have any  Power with the King in the Rights of Sovereignty.  
So that allowing the Power of the two Houses as large as can be proved by the Laws (for the stretch that the Parliamentarians would make, is by the Tenters they only have set up,) the whole latitude of the Nomothetical Power is not jointly in the two Houses; for none but Strangers to our Laws can deny, That the King hath sole Power to dispense with the Statutes, and abate their Rigour, where a mischief would otherwise ensue, he alone hath Power by Edicts and Proclamations, to order all Affairs for which there is no order taken by certain and perpetual Laws.  
The Legislative Power is either 
(y) King's Supremacy, p. 88 Of Architectonical and Preceptive Power.  Architectonical, or Preceptive. The Architectonical is that which layeth Materials of Law, and consisteth in two things; First, in determining what is just, convenient, or necessary: Secondly, in declaring, and promulgating that to be actually made a Law, and Enacted, which upon consultation is thought to be just, convenient, or necessary. The first shows no Jurisdiction in the Persons who have it, but only an Office and Employment to deliberate and consult. But whoever hath the Second Power, hath a Jurisdiction to define Authoritatively what shall be Law; and this Preceptive Power is that which makes the Law sacred and inviolable, and which giveth it force to oblige the Conscience.  
Now it is evident by undeniable Testimony and Authority, that the exercise of the Architectonical Power is only committed to the two Houses, who have votum consultivum & decisivum, but it is derived from the King, who hath only the Preceptive Power. So that the Writers for the two Houses, generally did use a Sophistical way of arguing, not discovering what they could not but know, the difference betwixt the King's, and the two Houses Powers in the making of Laws. For subordinate Agents, that are but Instruments of another, and work by a derived Power, when they concur with the Principal and supreme Agent, have their causality in producing the Effect; yet this doth not prove the Authority to be radically in them. As in an Estate of Lands (saith 
(z) Idem, p. 91.  Mr. Sherringham,) wherein a Man hath a perpetual Right in Fee, his Right is distinguished from the King's Right, of whom he holds; the King having the demean of the Land, and the other the demean of the Fee.  
So it is in an Estate of Power and Authority; If the King granteth an Estate of Power, Authority and Jurisdiction in Fee-simple, or in Fee-tail, for term, longer or shorter, the King hath the demean of Power, and the other the demean of Use; the King hath Dominium directum, the other Dominium utile; which he applies to the two Houses: but it must be likewise considered, that this distinct Authority they have, is wholly derivative, and so much the more depending on the Sovereign, as he can at his Pleasure totally deprive them of the Exercise of it by Prorogation, or totally annihilate it by Dissolution.  
Another Objection they made, 
Objection, The Three Estates to restrain the Excess of each other.  was from the Answer the King authorised a Gentleman to make to the Observer, That the three Estates are constituted to the End that the Power of the one should moderate and restrain the excess of the Power in the other. From which he infers, That this is an Alloy and mixture in the Root and essence of the Constitution.  
To this it may be answered, 
Answer to it.  That there is no such Power in the two Houses; they are called to consult, and to consent. All they can do is, that they have the opportunity of having grievances redressed, because they may otherwise deny the King the assistance he desires. But they have no Authority of themselves, to redress them, or to restrain and moderate his Excesses by Force, nor can they moderate the Excesses of one another by any Act of their own singly, further than the exorbitant Estate shall be willing to be moderated.  
It is a most absurd thing to imagine, that when the Law hath placed the Sovereign Power in the King, it should again for a space of time, during the Session of Parliament, unsovereign Him, and place in the two Houses the same Sovereign Trust, and with a second absurdity, leave in the King's Hands the summoning and dissolving, the Power by which himself should be constrained; and to make up all, should by Authority of that Power constrain all the Heads of the People, and even the Representative Body of that Power, by Solemn Oath, to declare that the King is not only supreme Governor, but that he is only supreme Governor.  
Besides the Arguments they sued upon this Head of a debased Monarch, that was not only to admit some of his Subjects into the Participation of his Burden, but of his Sovereignty (whereby they pleaded for both the Houses being joynt-Sovereigns for the time) they used other Arguments singly for the House of Commons, which they endeavoured to aggrandise, and raise to a strange over-towring height, above both King and Lords; and they grounded all their Arguments upon the immense Power of their being the People's Representatives.  
The Observer saith, 
Objection concerning the Power of Representatives.  That the virtue of Representation, is the great Privilege of Privileges, that unalterable Basis of all Honour and Power, whereby the House of Commons claims the entire Right of all the Gentry and People; and that there can be nothing under Heaven next to renouncing of God, which can be more perfidious, and more pernicious to the People, than the withdrawing from them; and doth acknowledge that the Arbitrary Rule was once most safe for the World: But now, since most Countries have found out an Art, and peaceable Order for public Assemblies (he means by Representatives) whereby the People may assume its own Power, and do itself Right, without the disturbance of itself, or injury to Princes, he is very unjust that will oppose this Art and Order.  
In answer to which it ought to be considered, That the Representative Body deserves the highest Honour and Observance that can be given to the Body Represented; 
Answer, What Honour is due to Representatives of the Subjects.  but this Honour will depend upon two things: First the quality and condition of the Body represented, and Secondly, on the quality of the Representative itself. If therefore the Body at large were an absolute Sovereign (as in Republics,) the true Representative of that Body were to be observed with all Sovereign Honour, and due Subjection: But when the Body at large itself is but a Subject (as it is in Monarchy) the Honour and Authority of the Representative, cannot exceed the Honour and Authority of a Subject; for none can make the Image more than the Original, or, without Adulterating Arts, appear so. Therefore however abhorrent a Crime he makes it, in such as concur not in their Judgement with their Representatives that exceed their Authority and Commission: yet all sober and just Persons ought to consider that the Subjects by giving Authority to some of their own Order, to represent them, and advise, and consent for them, gave them no such Power above that of Subjects; yea so much above the condition of their Sovereigns, that neither breach of Faith, nor the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy (which they never took to them) or any other Duty to their King, was comparable to the withdrawing from the Vote, or Act of their Representators: as if the Rights of the Crown and Kingdom, and the Laws made by the King, with the assent of the three Estates in Parliament, did not so much concern the Commons of the Land; but that against all these they stood solely bound to the Representatives, as the only Sovereign of their Obedience. I shall now offer some Reasons against this dangerous Opinion.  
First, It is to be considered, 
Reasons against the Power of Representatives.  That in our Kingdom the Representors are not equally chosen (as in the united Provinces, and other Commonwealths) but it lies in the Power of the Sovereign here to make a Town equal in number of Burgesses to a County: which doth vehemently demonstrate, That the first Institution and end of such Representatives was rather to minister Information of the State and Condition of that particular place, and advise and assist the Sovereign, and to consent with him, and not to determine Sovereignly.  
Secondly, The cockering the People in that Opinion, that the Sovereignty lies in Materia prima in them, and by their Representatives, that they may exert it, is the certain way to ruin not only Monarchy, but all government: as was evident in the case of the Rebellious House of Commons, in King Charles the First's time, who prided themselves so much with the Title of Representatives; and by pretext of that and the Assistance of their Army, having unyoked themselves from all Subjection to their Lawful King, and disengaged themselves from their dangerous and useless Colleagues, the Lords (as they then voted them) after some while they lost their Honour and Reverence with their own Army, who then would be the People, and pulled them out of their House; justly charging them with a design to perpetuate themselves. And so the Tyrannical Supremacy was exercised by Cromwell, and his Council of Officers a while, and after by himself, and his mock-Representatives, by Councils of State and Safety, and such new Names and Powers, as our Laws never heard of; and all this under pretence that they Acted by the People's Authority and suffrage; and all the sad Devastations of that Age resulted from the confiding so much in the pretended Representatives of the People. Which 
(a) England's Universal Distraction, p. 4.  one some Years before the sad Catastrophe, plainly foretold; tho' like belief was given to him, as of old to Cassandra. His Words are, That the so much exalting the Power of the Representatives, was first to destroy the King by the Parliament, and next the Parliament and Kingdom by the People. Thus ignorant Politicians that build upon such Quicksands, soon live to see their Insanae Structurae ruinously fall about their Ears.  
Thirdly, Whereas the Advocates for the Representatives, would gladly have possessed the People that they could rely upon none so securely and safely, as upon those they had themselves chosen; they being less subject to private ends and affections, than any particular man, such a Body being not likely to counsel or consent to any thing, but what is publicly advantageous.  
It is to be considered, that it is a false Postulatum: Such a Body being but an Aggregate of particulars, may have as many private ends as any other number of Subjects; it being well known, that Communities themselves are subject to dangerous Inclinations from private Incitements; and I the Representatives subject to misleading Factions, and Ambitions of private Men; and by coalition of Parties (when they fall into designs) they are most dangerous and fatally violent: and tho' it may, at first View, seem to be repugnant, that an Universality should have private ends; yet seeing it is not the number of Agents, but the capacity in which they act, and the quality of the Actors, and the coherence or incoherence of what they pursue (with the public end and weal) which makes the Actions of men public or private: It must needs follow, That if without Authority, or out of the way of Public Ordinances, men pursue any thing, though the whole Community concur in the pursuit; yet it is all of the nature of a private Action, and done to a corrupt and private end.  
Because the Author of some Observations upon some of K. Charles the 1st. Messages, was reputed the great Champion of the two Houses, I shall content myself with culling out some of the daringest assertions, 
Why Reason and Law were not harkened to by the Advocates of the Long Parliament.  he and some other of their Triarii used, and apply such of those Answers and Reasonings, as the Learned and Loyal offered then against them, though they could not be heard, while the Torrent bore all down the stream. The hideous noise of Tumults, and after of Drums, Trumpets, Cannons and Fire-Arms hushed and silenced all the still voice of Law and Reason: But now it is to be hoped, when men's Eyes are unsealed, the Mask and Vizard dropped or pulled off, the fatal Consequences of such pernicious Principles throughly manifested, and the loud Thunder of the Two Houses Ordinance allayed, men's Spirits will be better fitted to hear them refuted.  
Besides what I have endeavoured to answer before, concerning the Authority of the Representative, which they would make an Assembly; in which the People, in underived Majesty, are by these Proxies convened to affirm an Imaginary Power, supposed to be theirs originally, and in such a convention to be put in execution: I say besides this, which in several places I have refuted, That filled all their Declarations, Messages and Treatises, when they were contriving the setting up the Commons House Topmost, to prove, That they were a Body that was not easily corrupted, biased, tempted, or prevailed upon, to Act any thing but what was the best for the People's advantage. Therefore I think fit in many particulars to show, how such Bodies may be warped to sinister ends, and especially how that House not only deceived, but tyrannised over, the whole Nation.  
Private 
(b) Answer to Observer, p. 130, 131. How Passions, Affections, Interests, and Factions may sway Representatives.  Quarrels and the memory of former Sufferings may work upon some; discontent and envy at other men's preferment may transport others; the fear of the lash, and desire to secure themselves have forced some to personate a part; great Offices and Honours have been a Pearl in some men's Eyes to hinder their Fight; others have been like Organ Pipes, to whom the wind of popular Applause hath only given a sound; others who have premeditated their Parts before their design was discovered, have upon some pretences or other (suppose of an unlawful Election, being Monopolists, Abhorrers, or such like) got those excluded by Vote, whom they conceived to be likely to oppose their designs. The bewitching Power of Oratory prevails upon many. In others there is a Speechless Humour of following the Drove. 
The Ambition and Covetousness of Representatives.  Can we not easily conceive several of this Body may be ambitious, which would prompt them to alter the old way of bestowing Offices, and collating of Honours? so by disservice as well as service in Parliaments, some Men have obtained Honours, Offices and Estates, finding it a good way to get preferment, by putting the King upon necessity of granting. Good Woodmen say, That some have used Deer-stealing as an Introduction to a Keeper's place. So we have seen a Nonconformist's mouth stopped (I might instance in other Professions) with a good Benefice; whereas, before he was satisfied, he could gape as wide as his Neighbours. Others by more only ways slip into Preferment; for Covetousness and Ambition will sail with any Wind. The Covetousness of the Members of the long Parliament by woeful experience was found insatiable; witness their Voting for one another's Offices, Governments, satisfaction for their losses out of Delinquents Estates, sharing the King's Lands and Revenue, the Bishops, Deans and Chapters Lands, and the Estates of the Royal Party: hence together with the itch of Arbitrary rule, they drew the determination of Causes out of the ordinary Courts of Justice, before their Houses and Committees of them, and in every County had their Sub-committees to Tyrannize over the People and fleece them.  
Their cruelty appeared in their erecting High Courts of Justice, Major Generals, and other Arbitrary Courts, 
The Cruelty of the Long Parliament.  where many a Loyal and brave man, for serving his King, against such Rebels, either lost his Life or his Liberty and Estate; and when they were the gentlest, yet they could show hatred enough, by Imprisoning, upon I know not what suspicion, and at leisure prosecuting such as they had a pique against.  
The partiality of Members in such Conventions are very frequent, 
The Partiality.  in shielding their friends from being questioned, though their Corruptions were notorious to all the World. So in the fatal Parliament of 1641. A Monopolist, if a Loyal man, was sure to be expelled the House; but if a favourer of the Cause, he was never recriminated with that or any other bypast or present ill disposition.  
In such Assemblies there often happen one sort of People, who are always representing grievances, complaining of Maladministration, troubling the Church and State, shaking up the Lees and Dregs in the richest Vessel of Wine, these have learned to catch Eels.  
Tacitus notes the corruptions of the Roman Senate, 
The Corruptness of the Roman Senate.  which necessitated the change of that State into a Monarchy under Augustus, fully, significantly, and concisely after his manner, Suspecto Senatus Populique imperio ob certamen Potentium, avaritiam Magistratuum, invalido legum auxilio, qua vi, ambitu, postremo pecuniaturbabantur. The Provinces observing in this Supremacy of the Senate and People, the contests of the most Powerful, the Covetousness of the Magistrates, the feeble help the Laws afforded (by the Arbitrariness of the Senate, we may presume) by what force and moyen; and lastly, how all things were distracted by Bribery, they were the more easily induced to admit of one Sovereign. These particulars were most obvious in the fatal House of Commons.  
Besides these things I have hinted at, 
Of cunning and designing Men.  in such a body as we are speaking of (where there cannot want men designing some dangerous Revolutions, for the establishing their own greatness) though some few wise men may be apprehensive of their designs, yet we know maxima est pars artis celare artem. Such contrivers will be sure by all imaginable Arts to conceal their intentions, and obtain an Ascendent over the Judgement of the gross Body, who either are not so quicksighted, or aiming at no such things themselves, judge others candour by their own, and so by their helps the designers may carry the Vote against even such as penetrate further into the aims of the Contrivers, than the Majority do; so that those that have good ends may be hood winked by others whose ends are worse, 
Fallit enim vitium specie virturis & umbra.  and private ends will steal upon well affected: for all grand Conspiracies are veiled under the Mask of Reformation, of removing Grievances and evil Counsellors. Gallant and virtuous actions do not more often ingratiate men with such a mixed body, than a rolling Tongue, a precipitate Head, vainglorious profusion, oily insinuations, feigned devotions, sufferings (though deserved) from Superiors, and above all, opposition to the present State.  
So the memorable long Parliament of 1641. by the specious pretences of redressing Grievances, 
The specious Pretences of the Long Parliament.  taking care of the Public, and particularly of the Liberty of the Subject and their Privileges, together with vehement Expressions of their Resolutions of Establishing the King's Throne, upon more firm foundations of the people's Hearts and Affections; by insensible Screws wound themselves into the credit of Patriots, and being thereby able to carry a numerous party with them in all their Votes, by little and little made such encroachments upon the Sovereignty, that having undermined it, past support, they took the advantage of its fall and ruin (out of the same specious pretence, that the Commonwealth might suffer no detriment) to propose their long designed Model of Government, not as by them forethought on, but as a necessary expedient to accomplish the end (as they pretended) they had all this while been aiming at, viz. the People's prosperity, which 〈◊〉 they endeavoured to make the World believe they were most Zealous for: when God knows, the upshot of all was the total dissolution of the best constituted Government, and the Establishing themselves a fattened Commonwealth out of the rich spoils of Monarchy.  
Yet these very men were they who some years before possessed as many as they could delude, with an opinion, 
Their Hypocritical Promises.  that none knew better, nor affected more the sweetness of so well balanced a Monarchy, than they; and that the King's just Authority was Sacred to them that they would make him more rich and glorious than any of his Predecessors. The Observer told the World, That it had been often in the Power of former Parliaments, to load the Government with greater Fetters and Clogs, but they would not; and that change of Government could not be in their desires, because the advantage of the Lords and Commons in the State was so great, that no change of Government could better them, except each one could obtain an hereditary Crown. But these were but vain flourishes and empty airy offers: success altered their Principles, and they were ill troubled to find out excuses and evasions after the Murder of the Blessed King, and change of Government, for these their so hypocritical Declarations. From all which I shall only desire that Posterity may be cautious how they credit the truth of those, who in such Conventions are the most active for any Innovation, if they see that they zealousliest pretend some greater happiness to the People, by lessening the Authority of the Crown. It is reported of Frederick the Emperor, 
(c) Aeneas Silvius de diaetis Fred. Imp.  that in the Speech to the Senators, he desired them before they entered into the House of their Assembly, they would leave two things behind them, and then they would give right Judgement; and being asked what those were, he told them, 
Simulatio & dissimulatio.  Counterfeiting and Dissembling.  
Another of their Arguments, 
How many Counsellors may misled.  for the preference of the Houses Counsel before all other Councils, was, that many Eyes of so many choice Gentlemen from all parts, see more than fewer; which Sophism easily midwived in the conclusion, that then the two Houses judgement of Affairs was to be preferred before the King and his Privy Councils, and the Commons before the Peers; and by a parity of Reason (though they desired not it should be urged so far home) that the body of the People was to be preferred before the Commons House, which might be urged upon as common a Proverb, That Bystanders see more than Gamesters.  
But who are so blind as those that will not see? Those very Seers if they would have made use of their Eyes, to have perused the Histories of former Ages, on what specious pretensions Rebellions had begun, and how the Laws had settled the Government in an unparallelled security of the People's Rights, as well as the Prerogative of the Crown, or by serious consideration foreseen the certain and inevitable miseries that would follow the weakening of the Crown, and the necessitating the King for his defence to take up Arms: these quicksighted Commoners might have prevented all those Calamities that ensued. 
The Elected like the Electors.   
Whoever considers how easy it is to possess a People with prejudices against the Government (of which elsewhere I must enlarge) will soon find that it is no difficult matter to have such Elections of Members as were like to be of the same persuasion with the Electors; So that in such cases, it is not to be wondered at, that a majority of Votes might be opposite to more judicious and foreseeing Members judgements; neither is the Maxim universally true, for it must be caeteris paribus, if all things be alike. For it is not sufficient for an Adviser to see, unless he can let another see by the light of Reason. A man ought not implicitly to ground his Actions upon the Authority of other men's Eyes, whether many or few, but of his own. One Physician may see more into the state of a man's body than many Empirics. One experienced Commander may know more in Military Affairs than ten freshwater Soldiers. One old Statesman in his own Element is worth many new Practitioners. One man upon a Hill may see more than an Hundred in a Valley. And who will deny but among an Hundred, one of them may have a stronger Eye, and see clearer and further than all the Ninety Nine? So one Paphnutius in the Council of Nice, saw more than many greater Clerks. And it is no new thing to find one or two men in the Parliament change the Votes of the House. Therefore nothing is got by this way of arguing, though it be one of the plausiblest, and most improveable of any of the Topics they choose. And if we could be sure that all the Members of such Assemblies were free from all the imperfections such are liable to, much might be yielded to it.  
All these Arguments were used for that sole end, that they might possess their Party with the reasonableness of their desires to the King, that he would implicitly yield up his reason to the guidance of their Councils.  
They were not so frontless at first, 
Concerning the Negative Voice.  as positively to deny the King's negative Vote in Parliament, that had never been doubted, and there is good reason it should be a most sure Fundamental of the Government, since nothing can be Statute-law but that to which the King assents, Le Roy le veult. For who can be said to will that hath not the Power to deny? 
Si vult is scire an velim, efficite us possim nolle. Seneca.  But they affirmed that in Cases extraordinary, when the Kingdom was to be saved from ruin, the King seduced, and preferring dangerous men, it was necessary for them to take care of the Public. And then the Kings denying to pass their Bills, was a deserting of them; 
Objection, That in Cases of Extraordinary necessity, the Houses to have Power to secure the People from Tyranny.  Otherwise they alleged Parliaments had not sufficient Power to restrain Tyranny, and so they boldly affirmed they had an absolute indisputable Power in declaring Law; and (as their Observer words it) they are not bound to Precedents, since Statutes cannot bind them, there being no obligation stronger than the Justice and Honour of Parliaments. And to sum up all, he tells us, if the Parliament (meaning the two Houses) be not virtually the whole Kingdom itself; if it be not the supreme Judicature, as well in matters of State as matters of Law; if it be not the great Council of the Kingdom as well as of the King to whom it belongeth, by the consent of all Nations, to provide in all extraordinary cases, ne quid detrimenti capiat Respublica: let the brand of Treason, saith he, stick upon it. Indeed because by all these most false, and impious assertions, and those horrid Acts built upon them, they brought so great a ruin to the Kingdom, they are and ever will be (unless a Platonic year return again) branded with Rebellion in the highest degree.  
To answer this Accumulation of Treasonable Positions (for such I hope I may call, in some sense, 
Answer.  what is against the King's Crown and Dignity) is no ways difficult from the discourse of right constituted Parliaments: For those of them that carry any show of Reason, are such only as may be understood of Acts of Parliament completed by the Royal Assent; but being spoken of either or both Houses in opposition to the King, they are most false, as I shall show in particular.  
For First, If the two Houses are not bound to keep any Law, no man can accuse them of breach of any: What obligation can Justice lay on them who by a strange virtue of Representation are not capable of doing wrong? But it is well known that Statutes stand in full force to the two Houses, as being not void till repealed by a joint consent of the King and the two Houses. It would be much for the credit of the Observers desperate Cause, if he were able to show one such Precedent of an Ordinance made by Parliament without the King's assent, that was binding to the Kingdom in nature of a Law. Our Kings can repeal no Laws by their own Prerogative, though they may suspend the Execution. It seems the Houses would have Power to do both; and our Author in another place, thinks it strange that the King should assume or challenge such a share in the Legislative Power to himself, as without his concurrence the Lords and Commons should have no right to make Temporary Orders, for putting the Kingdom into a Posture of Defence. These were strange Phrases never heard before by English Ears. Our Laws give this Honour to the King, That he can join or be sharer with no man. The King like Solomon's true Mother, challengeth the whole Child, not a divisible share, but the very life of the Legislative Power. The Commons present and pray, the Lords advise and consent, the King Enacts.  
Secondly, 
The Houses have no Power to declare Law.  As to their claiming an absolute Power in declaring Law, it is as bold and false an Assertion as the other, when spoken of the two Houses. They may vote in order to a new Bill, the explaining or repeal of any Law formerly made, or prepare a Bill for any New Law, and that is all they can do; but authoritatively to declare any Law, is most contrary to the Constitution of the Houses, and never was adjudged one of their Privileges.  
Thirdly, As to the Justice and Honour of a Parliament, when the State is in quiet, and the Conventions only for making wholesome Laws for the Public weal, there are no Factions in Court or Country, no private Intrigues to be managed, the People neither uneasy nor discontented; then it is to be expected, That none but the wisest, and wealthiest of the Gentry will be chosen Members of that August Assembly, and their Justice and Honour will be conspicuous in all their Actions. But have we not known Houses of Commons composed of other kinds of Persons, who have voted their own Justice and Honour to be, to imprison their fellow Members, and fellow Subjects in an Arbitrary way? How 
(d) Address, part 3. p. 121.  could a generous Soul, conscious to himself he had transgressed no Law, kneel at the Bar of such a House with the same submission, as if he believed the Speaker infallible, and every Member an Angel!  
But the Observer, 
Objection, That if the King have a Negative Voice, there will be no need of Parliaments.  and his Pewfellows urge, That if the Houses can do no Act for public good without the King's consent, and if the King may reject their Counsels and Advice; it were needless to put the Country to the charge of choosing Members of Parliament. And if the King may prefer other opinions before Parliamentary Motives, than Parliaments are vain and useless helps, Princes are unlimited, and the People miserable.  
These Objections are of such an odious nature, 
Answer.  That no good Subject can take delight in them, whose duty is to pray for the like consent among the several Orders of the Kingdom, as is supposed to be among the several Orbs of Heaven: The King undoubtedly the Primum movens; the Great and Privy Council the lower Spheres.  
The usual (but not the only) form of the King's Answers to such Bills as they were not willing to pass, Le Roy s'avisera, proves, 
(e) Answer to Observations, p. 56.  That after the advice of this his Great Council, he is yet at liberty to advise further with persons or occasions, as his own Wisdom shall think meet. But these Authors will by no means take notice, That the use of Council is to persuade, not to compel; as if a Man in business of great concernment might not very prudently consult with many Friends, and yet at last follow the advice perhaps of one, if it appear more proportionable to the end he aims at.  
If it were because they are a more numerous body, therefore their Counsel is upon that account to be yielded to; then the liberty of dissenting may be denied to the House of Peers, in comparison of the House of Commons; and to that House too in comparison of the People: and so both King, Lords and Commons are voted out of Parliament.  
Besides Natural Wisdom and Fidelity, there is a thing called Experience, of high concernment in the managery of Public Affairs. He that will steer one Kingdom aright, must know the right Constitution of all others, their Strength, their Affections, their Counsels and Resolutions, that upon each different Face of the Sky, he may alter his Rudder. The best Governments have more Councils than one: One for the Public Interest of the Kingdom, another for the Affairs of State, a Council for War, and a Council for Peace.  
Let them be as wise and faithful Counsellors as the Observer pleaseth, only let them be but Counsellors. 
Necesse est us Lancea in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere.  Let their conlusions have as much credit as the premises deserve; and if they can necessitate the Prince by weight of Reason, and convincing Evidence of experience, let them do it on God's name. But it is not to be done upon the Authority of a bare Vote, as I think all uninterested persons are satisfied in the Votes of the Houses in 1641. about the Militia, Church-Government, and the voted Nineteen Propositions, or the late Votes about the Bill of Seclusion, the Repealing of the branch of the Statute of Queen Elizabeth against Protestant Dissenters, and the Loans upon the King's Revenue. There are other ends besides Counsel, for which Parliaments are called, as consenting to new Laws, furnishing the Public with Moneys, and maintaining the Interest of the Government and liberty of the Subject: from the removing one social end, to infer that an Action is superfluous, deserves no answer but silence and contempt.  
This should teach the Electors Wisdom not to choose such as have Factious Bends, or are not truly qualified in their Allegiance to their Prince; or Malcontents, who render such Conventions useless to the Public Ends of Government, and the Peace, Tranquillity, and Prosperity of both Prince and People.  
Because the Long Parliament Writers would have no Stone unturned, nor any specious Argument uninforced, 
Concerning the Coronation-Oaths of the King of England.  that might bring the King to their Lure, to consent to what they proposed; they endeavoured to make the World believe, that the King was bound by his Coronation Oath to pass all such Bills as they presented, or tendered to him, grounding, as Mr. Prynne, and others alleged, on a promise of the Kings at his Coronation, to grant and keep the Laws and Customs which the Commonalty shall choose. Before I come to give the particular Answer, I think it not unfit to take this opportunity to give a full account of the Coronation Oaths of our Kings, and how the same from Age to Age were varied, by which the Ingenious Reader will find, what the respective Kings by their Oaths did promise.  
That I may deduce, as high as I have yet found, the Original of Sovereign Princes taking Oaths at their Coronations; it may be noted, that the first Emperor that was Crowned, and had any Coronation Oath prescribed, was 
(f) Evagrius His●. Eccles. lib. 3. c. 32. Who first took a Coronation-Oath.  Anastasius the Greek Emperor, who being elected by the Senate and Soldiers about Ann. 486. Euphemius, Patriarch of Constantinople, (suspecting him to be addicted to the Heresy of Eutychius and the Manichees,) would not consent to his Coronation, till he should deliver him a Writing under his Hand, ratified with his Oath, wherein he should plainly declare, That if he were Crowned Emperor, he would maintain the true Faith, and Synod of Chalcedon during his Reign, and bring in no Novelty to the Church of God. This Writing, ratified with his Oath, Macedonius the Treasurer was to keep; and after he was made Patriarch, the Emperor demanded it, and said, It was a great discredit unto his Subjects, that his Handwriting should be kept to testify against him, or that he should be tied to Pen and Paper.  
There is no mention of any Coronation Oath used from thence, to the Year 804. that 
(g) Eutrop. lib. 24. p. 145, 146. Zonar. Annal. tom. 3. fol. 142, 143. Imperatorio Diademate est ornatus, postulato prius scripto quo promitteret se nulla Ecclesiae statuta violaturum.  Stauratius, (Son to Nicephorus, slain in his Wars against the Bulgarians) being declared Emperor by some: Michael Curopolata was adorned by the Patriarch, with the Diadem, a Writing before being desired, in which he promised to violate none of the Statutes of the Church, etc. Which is the first Precedent of a Promise, not an Oath, demanded from, or given by any Roman King for confirming the Laws of the Church, etc.  
The first Emperor Crowned at Rome by any Pope, 
(h) Onuphr.  was Charles the Great, Anno 800. but without an Oath; and Henry the Fifth 
(i) Dicens Imperatorem nemini jurari debere, cum juramentorum sacramenta ab omnibus sint sibi adhibenda. Hermold. Chron. Scl. l. 1. c. 40. Sim. Dunelm. 232, 237.  refused to take any Corporal Oath, saying, That an Emperor ought to Swear to none: for that Oath, i. e. of Fealty, aught to be made to him from all.  
I shall not with Mr. Prynne (in his Epistle Dedicatory to his third Tome of Chronological Vindication,) meddle with the dispute, how the Canonists argue from the Pope's Crowning of Emperors and Kings, that they acquire a Spiritual and Temporal Monarchy over them, as their Sovereign Lords. For that however some may hold the Doctrine, yet it is exploded by most.  
As to the Crowning and Anointing of some British and Saxon Kings, I must refer the Reader to Mr. Selden 
(k) Tit. Hon. part 1. c. 8. fol. 149. , and Mr. Prynne in the forecited Epistle.  
The first of our Kings that is recorded in History to have taken an Oath at his Coronation, was Can●tus; of whom Sim. 
(l) De Gestis Regum Agg. col. 173. Wigorn. Chro. 384.  Dunelmensis, and others give this account, That after the death of Aethelred, the Bishops, Abbats, Dukes, and the Nobles of England, and the most part of the men of the Kingdom, as well of the Clergy as Laity, met together with one consent at Southampton, and chose Canutus for their King, and swore Fealty to him: to whom he also swore, 
Quibus ille juravit, quod & secundum Deum & secundum seculum, fidelis esse vellet eis Dominus. King Canutus his Oath.  that according to God and the World, (that is the Laws of God and the Kingdom) he would be a faithful Lord unto them. Mr. Prynne here no●es, that Usurpers more frequently used to take such Oaths than lawful hereditary Kings. So when the Citizens of London, and some few Noblemen, with unanimous consent, chose 
(m) Clitonem Eadmundum unanimo consensu in Reg●m levavere. Matt. Westm. p. 410. 411.  Edmond, called Ironside, the eldest Son of Aethelred, who was right Heir, there is no mention of an Oath. So when Harold reputed Son of Cnute was Crowned, there is no Oath recorded, nor of any taken by Hardicnute, right Heir of Cnute.  
So, Anno 1041. 
(n) Flor. Wigorn. Chro. p. 404. Edward the Confessor 's Oath.  Edward the Confessor, annuente Cleno & Populo, Londoniis in Regem eligitur, and was Crowned, Anointed, and Consecrated; yet not any of our Historians, besides William of Malmsbury de gestis Regum, Lib. 2. c. 13. p. 80. speaks of an Oath, who saith, that he being sent for by the Nobles, upon terms proposed to him by Earl Godwyn, there was 
(o) Nihil erat quod Edwardus pro necessilate temporis non polliceretur. Ita utrinque fide datae quicquid petebatur, sacramento sirmavit.  nothing that King Edward did not promise, by reason of the necessity of the time; so that Faith was given by either Party, and what was desired, he confirmed by Oath: but this was in their private Consultation. Yet Archbishop 
(p) In Regem Angliae sublimatus prius juravit se Leges Canuti inviolabiliter servaturum. Spelm. Conc. tom. 2. p. 342.  Stratford in his Epistle to King Edward the First, saith, that St. Edward being raised to be King of England, first Swore inviolably to keep the Laws of Canutus.  
We find no Coronation Oath of Harold mentioned. Matt. Westm. Flor. Hist. p. 433 saith, that extorta fide a Majoribus, Capiti proprio imposuit Diadema; that having exacted Fealty of the great Men, he put the Crown on his own Head: and after when Crowned by Archbishop Alfred, 
William the Conqueror 's Oath.  he took no Coronation Oath; but as my Author saith, Leges aequas coepit condere. 
(r) Elo. Wigorn. Chro. p. 412. Hoveden part. Annal. prior. p. 450. Stubs Acta Pontif. col. 1702. Coram Clero & Populo jurando promittere se velle sanctas Ecclesias & Rectores earum defendere, necnon & cunctum populum sibi subjectum justa & Regali providentia regere, rectam Legem statuere & tenere, Rapinas injustaque judicia penitus amovere & interdicere. Sim. Dunelm. col. 195. num. 43.   
As to King (q) William the Conqueror; Aldred Archbishop of York Crowned him, and imposed on him an Oath. The words of the Authors are, Ipsa nativitatis die ab Aldredo Ebor. Archiepiscopo, apud Westmon. in Regem totius Angliae sublimiter Coron●um inunxit, & consecravit honorifice: Having before (as 〈◊〉 Archbishop required from him) before the Altar of St. Peter the Apostle, before the Clergy and People, by Oath promised, That he would defend Holy Church, and the Governors of it (which Clause occurs not before) and likewise govern all the People subjected to him, with a Just and Regal Providence, and appoint and hold right Law, and wholly remove and interdict all Rapines, and unjust Judgements.  
The Oath which he took to observe St. Edward's Laws, was afterwards, Anno 1072. when he entering into a Parley with the English Nobility (who intended to have set up Edgar Atheling, because King William had violated their ancient Laws, and introduced new ones) he, by the Advice of Archbishop 
(r) Man. Paris vita Fritherici Abbatis 13. St. Albani, p. 30.  Lanfrank, Swore that bonas & antiquas Leges Regni, sc. Leges quas Sancti & pii Angliae Reges, & maxim Rex Edwardus statuit, inviolabiliter observare. Only William of Malmsbury 
(s) Modeste erga subjectos ageret, & aequo jur● Anglos quo Francos tractaret. De Gestis Pontif. lib. 3. fol. 154.  saith, that Aldred the Archbishop would not consecrate him, before he had exacted from him, before all the People, this Oath, That he would modestly deport himself towards all his Subjects, and with an equal Law treat the English as he did the French.  
William Rufus promised to Lanfranck, 
(t) Justitiam, aequitatem, & misericordiam se per totum Regnum, si Rex foret, in omni negotio servaturum, pace libertatem & securitatem Ecclesiae contra omnes defensurum. Eadmerus Hist. Novel. lib. 1. p. 13, 14.  If he were King, 
King William Rufus' Oath.  in all his Affairs, through all his Kingdom, to preserve Justice, Equity, and Mercy, and to defend the Liberty and Security of the Church in Peace, against all. H. Huntingdon, Lib. 7. fol. 213. b. and Hoveden, Anno 1088. fol. 264. b. say, That when he needed the help of the English, he promised them such desirable Laws, or better than they would choose. But Malmsbury and others say, he kept them not; for Usurpers (such as he was) rarely observe the Laws, or their Promises, further than they serve their own Interest. Therefore Mr. Prynne notes that the Promise Eadmerus, and 
(u) Col. 214.  Simeom Dunelm. mention, was before he was King; and the other Promise was, when most of the Norman Nobility, except the Archbishop Lanfranck, designed to make Robert his Brother King; and then he called them together, and then told them, If they would be Faithful to him, 
(w) R. Hoveden, part. 1. Annal. p. 264. b. num. 20.  Meliorem Legem quam vellent eligere, eye concederet, & omne injustum Scottum interdixit. 
(x) Lib. 7. fol. 213. b.  Huntingdon saith the promised them exoptabiles leges, and that they should have their Woods and Hunting free.  
It is recorded of Henry the First, 
King Henry the First's Oath.  that having gathered to London the Clergy of England and all the People, he promised them an amendment of the Laws, with which they were oppressed in the time of his Father, and his Brother lately deceased, that he might obtain their 
(y)  animos corum in sui promotionem accenderet.  good Wills to his Promotion, and that they might receive him for their King and Father: to which the Clergy and all the Nobility answered, 
* Si animo volenti ipsis vellet concedere, & charta sua communire illas libertates & antiquas consuetudines quae floruerunt in Regno tempore Sancti Regis Edwardi. Mat. Paris 250. n. 53. Hist. Novel. job. 3. p. 55.  That if with a willing Mind he would grant them, and with his Charter confirm all the Liberties, and ancient Customs, which flourished in the Kingdom, in the time of the Holy King Edward, they would consent to him, and unanimously consecrate him King; and he freely yielding to his, and affirming by his Oath that he would do it, he was consecrated King, the Clergy and People favouring it.  
Eadmerus saith, That in ipso consecrationis die, bonas & Sanctas omni Populo Leges se servaturum, & omnes oppressiones & iniquitates, quae sub fratre suo emerserunt, in omni sua dominatione tam Dei Lege, quam in secularibus negotiis prohibiturum, & subversurum, sposponderat; & haec omnia Jurisjurandi Interjectione formula per totum Regnum divulgata ire praeceperat, and when he was Crowned, he granted the Laws recited by 
(z) Diademate insi●nitas has libertates subscriptas in Regno ad exaltationem Sanctae Ecclesiae & pacem Populo tenendam concelsit. Mat. Paris Hist. p. 46. num. 40. ult. Edit.  Matthew Paris, to be held in his Kingdom, for the exalting of the Holy Church, and Peace of his People: which Laws being at large recited by Matt. Paris, may be perused by the Inquisitive, wherein he will find how far the old Laws were confirmed, and what a Foundation there was laid for Magna Charta.  
Concerning King Stephen, 
(a) Histor. Novel. p. 101. b. num. 40. Vide Mat. Paris. p. 62. num. 35.  Malmsbury saith, 
King Stephen's Oath.  That Henry his Brother, Bishop of Winchester, was a great help to his obtaining the Crown, having great hopes that he would follow his Grandfather, King William's Steps, in the Government of his Kingdom, especially in matters of Ecclesiastical Discipline; therefore he saith, William, Archbishop of Canterbury, 〈◊〉 exacted a solemn Oath from him, of granting and preserving the Liberty of the Church: the Oath itself is long, and the Immunities to the Church many; those to the Laity are conceived in these words, Omnes Exactiones, & Mescheningas, & Injustitias, sive per Vicecomites, vel per alios quoslibet male inductas, funditus extirpo. Bonas Leges, & Antiquas, & justas Consuetudines, in Murdris, & Placitis, & aliis Causis observabo, & observari praecipio & constituo. Malmsbury saith, That the King swore according to the tenor of the Writing he there produceth, Dated at Oxford, Anno Dom. 1136. 1 Regni.  
I find no mention of an Oath taken by K. H. 2. at his Coronation; but 
(b) Chron. col. 1043. num. 67.  Brompton saith, that he confirmed the Charter of his Grandfather King Henry the First, 
King Henry the Second Oath.  and that he was solicitous, ut Lex quae extincta videbatur, paulatim exsurgeret: and Matt. Paris 
(c) Hist. 1080, 1081.  saith, That Anno 1172. he swore before the Cardinals, that he would abrogate all the evil Customs introduced in his time against the Church.  
We find that Pope Alexander 
(d) Gul. Newbrigensis lib. 4. c. 25. Geru. Dorob. Chron. col. 1413. Matt. Paris, p. 117.  the Third Excommunicated several Bishops, and suspended the Archbishop of York, for his rash Presumption in the Coronation of a new King, in contempt of the Archbishop of Canterbury, to whose Office of ancient Right it was known to belong; and for that in the Coronation, according to Custom, there was no sworn Caution offered or exacted by them for the keeping of the Liberties of the Church: but afterwards 
(e)  Regni consuetudines antiquas sub quibus dignitas pericli●bitur Ecclesiae, illibatae debeant omni tempore observari. Hoveden. Annal. pars poster. p. 518, 519.  it is said to be confirmed by Oath, that the ancient Customs of the Kingdom (from which the dignity of the Church was in danger) should inviolably be kept in all time to come.  
The Solemnities of King Richard the First's Coronation are fully described by the Abbot of Jorval: 
(f) Rectam Justitiam exercebit in populo sibi commisso, leges malas & consuetudines perversas si aliqua sint in Regno suo delebit, & bonas custodies. Brompton, col 1158. num. 60.  and as to his Oath, 
King Richard the First's Oath.  he saith that he swore and vowed (the Holy Evangelists, and the Relics of many Saints being set before him) that he would bear Peace, Honour, and Reverence, all his Life, to God and the Holy Church, and its Ministers; and then he swore that he would exercise right Justice to the People committed to him: and after he swore that he would blot out, or abolish evil Laws, and perverse Customs, if any were in his Kingdom, and he would keep good Laws.  
I find that King John took an Oath as Duke of Normandy, 
King John's Oaths.  that he would defend Holy Church and its Dignities in good Faith, without evil Intention, and would honour all the Ordained, and that he would destroy all evil Laws, if any were, and substitute good ones; the words 
(g) Matt. Paris, fol. 165. ult. Edit. num. 27.  are, quod ipse Sanctam Ecclesiam & ejus dignitates bona fide, & sine malo Ingenio defenderet, & ordinatos honoraret, & quod Leges iniquas, si quae essent, destrueret, & bonas surrogaret.  
At his Coronation 
(h) Quod sanctam Ecclesiam & ejus ordinatos diligeret, & eam ab incursione malignantium indemnem conservaret; & quod perversis legibus destructis, bonas substitueret, & rectam Justitiam in Regno Augliae exerceret. Idem, p. 166. num. 4. Promisit se per anxilium Dei bona side ea quae juraverat servaturum.  he took another Oath, that he would love Holy Church, and the ordained of it, and would preserve it indemnified from the Incursions of the Malignant; and that the perverse Laws being destroyed, he would substi● good ones, and would exercise right Justice in England. Besides these, Matth. Paris, p. 189. of the Old Edition, saith, That he was sworn by the said Archbishop ex parte Dei & districte prohibitus, ne honorem hunc accipere praesumeret, nisi in ment habeat opere quod juraverat adimplere; that is, On the part of God, by the Archbishop, he was strictly forbid, that he presume not to take this Honour, unless he had a resolution to fulfil in work, what he had sworn: To which the King promised, That, by the help of God, he would in good faith observe what he had sworn.  
In the Fifteenth of his Reign he was forced by the Barons to take another Oath, 
(i) Mat. Paris, Hist. p. 229, 230.  Quod sanctam Ecclesiam ejusque ordinatos diligeret & manuteneret, contra omnes adversarios suos pro posse suo: quodque bonas Leges Antecessorum suorum, & praecipue Leges Edwardi Regis revocaret, & iniquas destrueret, & omnes homines suos, secundum justa Curiae suae judicia, judicaret: quodque singulis redderet jura sua. Juravit praeterea Innocentio Papae, ejusque Catholicis Successoribus, fidelitatem & obedientiam: And that he would make restitution of those things he had taken away by reason of the Interdict. This Clause of restoring King Edward's Laws (which had been disused from the time of the Conquest) being thus inserted in King John's Oath, was after inserted into the Coronation-Oath of Edward the Third, and so continued.  
The best Account of the Coronation-Oath of King Henry the Third, is in 
(k) Idem, p. 243. num. 26.  Matthew Paris, That he swore before the Clergy and People, 
The Oath of King Henry the Third.  the Holy Evangelists and the Relics of several Saints being laid before him, and Joceline Bishop of Bath reading the Oath, which was very little different from that which King John took, Quod honorem, pacem & reverentiam praestabit Deo, & sanctae Ecclesiae, & ejus ordinatis omnibus diebus vitae suae; and so word for word as in King John's: only for perversas consuetudines, here is iniquas consuetudines.  
It was in relation to the preceding Oaths, that 
(l) 1. IVt Ecclesia Dei, & omni populo Christiano vera pax omni suo tempore observetur. 2.  rapacitatem & omnes iniquitates omnibus gradibus interdicat. 3.  in omnibus judiciis aequitatem praecipiat & misericordiam. Bract. lib. 3. de Actionibus, c. 9 fol. 107.  Bracton saith, The King ought at his Coronation, in the Name of Jesus Christ being sworn, to promise these three things to the People being his Subjects: First, To command, and to his power see it performed, that the Peace shall be kept to the Church, and all Christian People in all his time. Secondly, That all Ravages and all Iniquities, in all degrees, shall be by him forbidden. Thirdly, That in all his Judgements he shall command Equity and Mercy, and that by his Justice all may enjoy firm Peace, & per Justitiam suam firma gaudeant Pace universi.  
None of our Historians mention the Oath of Edward the First, that I have met with, 
King Edward the First's Oath not recorded.  nor Mr. Prynne: Therefore I think it very probable that it was conceived in the same Form, as that of his Fathers and Grandfathers; 
That he took an Oath.  for it is most certain that he took one, by the Expressions in sundry of his Prohibitions, to the Legates of Popes, to Bishops, and others in these Words: Torpescere non possumus, quia exhaeredationem quae statum Coronae nostrae contigit, sicut ex Sacramenti vinculo adstringimur, pro viribus evitemus, ne Coronae & dignitatis nostrae Jura depereant, studiosam 
(m) Prynne's Epist. Dedicat. to the chird Vol. of Legal Vindication.  nos debet operam adbibere; & ad ea manutenenda & conservanda, eo potius debemus esse solliciti, quoad hoc vinculo juramenti teneri dignoscimus & adstringi; that is, We cannot be slothful, because we should avoid to our power, our disinheriting, which appertains to the State of our Crown, as we are tied by the Bond of our Oath; which to maintain and preserve, we ought to afford our studious help, lest the Rights of our Crown and Dignity perish; and we ought the more to be solicitous in this, as that we know ourselves to be held and bound by the bond of the Oath.  
Hitherto we find nothing of the Vulgus elegerit, besides what is mentioned in King William Rufus his promise, That he would grant his Subjects a more desirable Law, and better than they could choose; which is no ways to be interpreted of such a choice as the Republicans would have understood.  
Our Historians are generally silent what the Oath was that Edward the Second took, 
The Oaths of King Edward the Second, and King Edward the Third.  but it is to be found in the Clause Rolls of the Tower 
(n) Cl. 1. E. 2. num. 10. , 1 E. 2. in French thus, which I shall render into English as well as I can. 
Also Cl. 1 E. 3. m. 24. dorso.   

SIRE, Volez vous granter, & garder, & per vestre serement confirmer, au People d' Engleter, les Leys, & les Custumes a eux grants per les Anciens Rois d' Engleter, voz Predecessors droitas, & devotzes a Dieu; & nomement, les Leys, les Custumes, & Franchises grantzes au Clergy, & au People, par le glorieus Roy Seint Edward, votre Predecessure?  

Respons.  
Jeo les grants & prometts.  
Sire, Garderez vous a Dieu & a saint Eglise, & au Clergy, & au people, Piece, & accord en Dieu entirement selons vostre Poair?   

Respons.  
Jeo les garderez.  
Sire, Freeze (or perhaps feres) vous fair, en tous voz Jugements, ovels & droit Justice, & discretion en misericorde, & verity a vostre Poair?   

Respons.  
Jeo les fray.  
Sire, Grantez vous a tenir & garder des Leys & les Custumes droitureles, le quels la Communate de votre Roiaume auras eslu, & les defenderz & inforciers all honeur de Dieu, a votre Poair?   

Respons.  
Jeo les grants & prometts.    

SIR, Will you grant and keep, and by your Oath confirm, to your People of England, the Laws and Customs granted to them by the Ancient Kings of England, your predecessors righteous, and devout to God, and namely, the Laws, and Customs, and Franchises granted to the Clergy, and the People, by the glorious King St. Edward your Predecessor?  

Answer.  
I do grant and promise this.  
Sir, Do you keep to God, and his Holy Church, and to the Clergy, and to the People Peace, and accord in God entirely, according to your Power?   

Answer.  
I shall keep these.  
Sir, Will you suffer to be done in all your Judgements, equal and right Justice, and Discretion, with Mercy and Truth according to your Power?   

Answer.  
I will do it.  
Sir, Do you grant to hold, and keep the Laws, and the Customs that are lawful, which the Community of your Realm shall have chosen, and defend, and enforce these to the Honour of God, to your Power?   

Answer.  
I grant and promise them.    

Several Answers have been given to the Objection raised from this last Clause, 
The Oath of King Richard the Second.  as they found it in the Latin 
(o) Cl. 1. R. 2. m. 44.  Records; therefore, before I apply those, it is needful to note the Latin, which, as we find it 1 R. 2. was this, Capto per Archiepiscopum Cantuar. Sacramento Dom. Regis Corporali, de concedendo, & servando cum sucra confirmatione, Leges & consuetudines ab antiquis, justis, & Deo devotis Regibus Angliae, Progenitoribus, Plebi Regni Angliae concessas, & praesortim leges & consuetudines, & libertates a gloriosissimo & sanctissimo Rege Edwardo, Clero Populoque Regni praedicti concessas, & servando Deo & Ecclesiae Sanctae Domini, Cleroque & Populo pacem, & concordiam integre in Deo juxta vires suas, & de faciendo fieri in omnibus judiciis suis, aequam & rectam Justitiam & discretionem in misericordia, & veritate; & otiam de tenendo & custodiendo justas Leges & Consuetudines Ecclesiae, & de faciendo per ipsum Dom. Regem, eas esse protegendas, & ad honorem Dei corroborandas, quas vulgus just & rationabiliter elegerit juxta vires ejusdem Dom. Regis. 
This is an additional Clause.   
This is verbatim the Latin for the preceding French, except in the additional Clause, and the Conclusion which makes the just Laws and Customs both to relate to those of the Church, and those that the Vulgar shall have justly and reasonably chosen.  
The like we find, 
(q) Rot. Parl. 1 H. 4. num 16, & 17.  1 H. 4. and in the Pontificale of the Archbishops and Bishops; and it is added, after the King hath, 
King Henry the Fourth's Oath.  as before expressed, answered to the Proposals, Pronunciatis omnibus, confirmat Rex se omnia servaturum, Sacramento super Attari praestito coram cunctis; i. e. that the King by his Oath, taken upon the Altar before all present, to observe these, confirms them.  
The Solemnities and Ceremonies used at the Coronation of King Richard the Second, may be perused at large in Tho. 
(r) Hist. Aug. fol. 194, 195. Juravit coraem Archiepiscopo & Proceribus qui ibi aderant, quoniam ipsi solum ejus Juramentum audire potuerunt.  Walsingham, and he saith, he swore before the Bishops and Nobles there present, for they only could hear his Oath, that he would permit the Church to enjoy its Liberties, and would honour it and its Ministers, that he would hold right Faith, and would forbid Rapines, and all Iniquities in all their Degrees. 2ly. That he would make to be kept, every where, the good Laws of the Land, and especially, the Laws of St. Edward King and Confessor, who was buried in that Church, and would make all evil Laws to be abrogated. 3ly. That he would not be an accepter of Persons, but would make right Judgement betwixt man and man, that especially he 
(s) Praecipue misericordiam observaret, sicut sibi suam indulgeat misericordiam clemens & misericors Deus.  would observe Mercy, as the Clement and Merciful God might grant Mercy to him.  
Having thus given an account of these Coronation Oaths, I come to the Objections. First, They 
(t) Prynne's Treachery and Disloyalty. Answer to the Objections about the Words Quas vulgus elegerit.  say, that the word Vulgus doth signify the two Houses, and the word elegerit is to be taken in the Future Tense; so that the King is obliged to consent to such Laws as the two Houses, especially the Commons do choose.  
It is a wonder to me, how men that pretended to any reading or learning in Antiquities, or in the Constitution of the Government, could defend their Cause with such pitiful Reasonings, especially against King Charles the First, who neither had taken such an Oath, nor many of his Predecessors before him.  
The Latin Translation of two French words gave all the occasion of dispute; for that which is called Communate, is rendered Plebs and Vulgus, and aura eslu is translated elegerit; whereas, were it to have been understood in the Future Tense, it should have been eslira: and agreeable to that in all the Authentic Records of the Exchequer, the word elegerit is Englished in the Preterperfect Tense. Thus much may suffice as to the word elegerit. Dr. Brady's Glossary will satisfy the Curious about the import of the word itself.  
Concerning the word Vulgus, one solid 
(u) Freeholders Grand Inquest, b. 46. What meant by Vulgus. according to the Opinion of some.  Author saith, That we may be confident, that neither the Bishops, Privy Council, Parliament, or any other whosoever they were, that framed or penned this Oath, ever intended in this word the Commons in Parliament, much less the Lords: they would never so much disparage the Members of Parliament, as to disgrace them with a Title both base and false. It had been enough, if not too much, to have called them Populus, the People; but Vulgus, the Vulgar, the rude multitude (which hath the Epithet of ignobile vulgus) is a word as dishonourable to the Composers of the Oath to give, or for the King to use, as for the Members of the Parliament to receive; therefore he judgeth, that by Vulgus must be meant the Common People, not the Lords and Commons.  
But then, saith the same Author, the doubt will be, what the Common People, or Vulgus, out of Parliament have to do to choose Laws. In answer to which, the preceding word is to be considered; Consuetudines quas Vulgus elegerit, the Customs which the Common People have chosen. If we observe the nature of Custom, 
Customs chosen by the Vulgar, or Common People.  it is the Vulgus, or Common People only who choose Customs. Common usage, time out of mind, creates a Custom; and the commoner the usage is, the stronger and the better is the Custom. No where can so common an usage be found, as among the Vulgar, who are still the far greatest part of every multitude. If a Custom be common through the whole Kingdom with us, it is all one with the Common Law of England, which is often called Common Custom; so that to protect the Customs which the Vulgar choose, is to swear to protect the Common Laws of England.  
Agreeable to this, is what the learned Dr. Brady 
(w) Glossary, p. 36.  notes, That upon the whole, it signifies no more than that the Community had chosen, that is owned, submitted to, and desired still to use their Old Customs, which by use, time out of mind, they had enjoyed for the better management of Affairs, and Conveniency betwixt Man and Man, all the Nation over, or in any particular County, Hundred, Town, City or Burrow, such long practices being the foundation of all Customs: but these are to be just, which entrench not upon the Government or Laws, and by permission and sufferance only become Laws.  
But the same 
(x) Id. p. 35.  Author judiciously affirms, That the Community here intended was the Community of the Bishops, 
What meant by the Community.  Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons, Great Men, and the whole body of the Tenants in Capite, expressed by those words, in the former Questions, Clergy and People; for by them these demands were made, and no doubt they would first ask for themselves, for the Vulgar or Rabble could not come near to make their Demands at such a Solemnity as this was, so 
(y) Walsingham, fol. 95. num. 20.  great and splendid; there being at it, Charles and Lewis, Earls of Clermont, two of the King of France's Brothers, the D. of Brabant, the Earl of Fens, and the other great Men, both of France and England, with the Countess of Artois.  
Whoever desires further satisfaction, may consult the same learned 
(z) Elossary, p. 24.  Author, who makes it clear, That the word Plebs, Vulgus & Populus in the Writers of that Age was used for the Laity in way of contradistinction from the Clergy.  
I shall at present leave this, and note, that for any thing appears to the contrary, the same Interrogations, Oath, etc. presented to Edward the Second and Third, (without the additions of King Richard's) continued without any alteration to Henry the Eighth's 
(a) Book of Oaths, fol. 1.  time, and in that we find the King promiseth he shall keep and maintain the Liberties of the Holy Church of old time granted by their Righteous Kings of England; 
The Oath of King Henry the Eighth. I find in the Herald's Office the words thus: Do ye grant the rightful Laws and Cusioms to be holden, and permit ye, after your Strength and Power, such Laws as to the Honour of God shall be chosen to the People, by you to be strengthened and desensed? Vid in Coll. Arm. p. 60.  and that he shall keep all the Lands, Honours, and Dignities righteous and free of the Church of England, in all manner Holy, without any manner of minishments; and the rights of the Crown hurt, decay, or loss, to his Power shall call again into the ancient estate; and that he shall keep the Peace of Holy Church, and of the Clergy, and of the People with good accord; and that he shall do in his Judgement, Equity and right Justice, with Discretion and Mercy; and that he shall grant to hold the Laws and Customs of the Realm, and to his Power keep them, and affirm them, which the People and Flock have chosen; and the evil Laws and Customs wholly to put out, and steadfast and stable Peace to the People of this Realm keep, and cause to be kept to his Power. In this Oath King Henry the Eighth interlined, for the right explication of it, instead of People and Flock, these Words, which the Nobles and People have chosen with my Consent.  
The Oath of King Edward the Sixth, 
Oath of Edward the Sixth.  so far as relates to my purpose was this, Do you grant to make no new Laws, but such as shall be to the honour and glory of God, and to the good of the Commonwealth, and that the same shall be made by the consent of the People as hath been accustomed? 
Oaths of Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth not seen by the Author. The Oaths of King James the First, and King Charles the First. The Oath of King Charles the Second, Hist. Coronationis Caroli 2. in Colleg. Arm.   
I have not seen any Transcripts of the Oaths of Queen Mary or Queen Elizabeth, those which King James and King Charles the First took, run thus; Will you grant to hold and keep the Laws and Rightful Customs which the Commonalty of this Kingdom have; and will you defend and uphold them to the Honour of God, so much as in you lieth?  
That Branch of the Oath which relates to my purpose, taken by King Charles the Second, runs thus: Sir, Will you grant to keep the rightful Customs which the Commonalty of your Kingdom have, etc.  
The Oath that our present King James the Second took at his Coronation, 
The Oath of King James the Second.  was in the same Words as that of his Royal Brother; wherein the Word Customs is to be taken in the largest extent, to include Laws also.  
Now upon the whole we must consider First, 
Considerations upon this Discourse of the Coronation Oaths.  That in the Eye of the Law the King never dies, so that he is King before any Solemnity of Coronation. Secondly, The variety of Forms and Precedents, seem to prove that one precise form is not simply necessary; so the interlining of Henry the Eighth upon Record also shows. And if it had been of consequence to have retained the old form, we should have heard of it either then or in some succeeding Parliaments. Lastly, it cannot be denied, that if the King be bound by a lawful Oath to pass all Bills, it is not the form of denying it, but the not doing of it which makes the Perjury. And so when the King is tender of a flat denial, and attributing so much to the judgement of his great Council, that he only useth the words avisera; it would be a strange Doctrine, that all the Kings of England who have given this Answer, have been forsworn, and neither Parliament nor Convocation taken notice of it in so many Ages.  
But when by dint of Argument the Parliament Champions were driven from these Holds, they fled to their last Burrow. So one of them confesses, that in Acts of Grace the King is not bound to assent, nor in Acts wherein he is to departed from the particular right and interest of his Crown; and lastly that if he do not consent (however bound by Oath) yet they are not binding Laws to the Subject. 
How the Long Parliament Writers would have the King part with his Prerogative in Cases of necessity only.  But than comes the handful of Gourds which spoils the Pottage: Except in cases of necessity; If the safety of the People be concerned; If it may prove dangerous or inconvenient to them, than an extraordinary course may be taken.  
This was the plausible Plea of 1641. to get the Militia into their hands: for they urged that in case of apparent and imminent danger, the People's safety was not to be neglected; They might not be exposed as a prey to their Enemies, therefore must be put into a posture of defence. This was grateful to the People, out of that real love they bore to themselves, they must favour that side which pretends to take care of their safety. Give to any Person or Society a Legislative Power without the King in case of necessity, 
(b) Answer to Observe. b. 76.  permit them withal to be sole Judges of necessity, when it is, and how long it lasts: and then it is more than probable, the necessity will not determine, till they have their utmost desires, which is the same in effect as if they had the Legislative Power.  
Further it must be considered that necessity upon that supposition must be very evident, there needs no such great stir who shall be Judge of it; when it comes indeed, it will show itself; when extreme necessity is disputable, it is a sign it is not real. Secondly, The Agent must be proper, otherwise it cuts in sunder the very Sinews of Government, to make two supremes in a Society, and to subject the People to contrary commands.  
But to claim such a Power over the King in extraordinary cases alone, 
That the Houses should be Judges of this Necessity.  doth not much vary the case: for at the same time they voted themselves the proper Judges of such necessities, and the erecting of any superintending Power in the circumstances of those times, and in all parallel cases, would not only unsoveraign the King (by making this Power the Sovereign) but the exercise of it would be subject to more dangerous extravagances than Regal Power is, and yet less capable of Regulation than it. For the Law knowing there is none but God, qui custodiat ipsos custodes, concludes from the weakness and imperfection of every other form of Government, that the Sovereignty of Law-making was better placed in the hands of a sole Prince, than in a Popular or Aristocratical hand; and that a positive known Law without any coercive Superintendent was a sufficient, and the best boundary of Regal Power: For the Law and the Transgression of it, being both at once made manifest and notorious, it will be so sufficient 
(c) Review of Observations.  security of the future observance of the Law, that Princes will not offer to violate it. Now if such a Supreme Power, as these would have in the two Houses, in what case soever, be once enacted, that must either be boundless or circumscribed by a Laws; and if that be circumscribed with a Law, then must that Law also have a Superior Power to enforce it: and so there must be a Superior Power over Superior Power in infinitum, and yet at last leave the most Superior Power in that liberty which the Observer calleth boundless, Arbitrary and Tyrannical.  
If this Principle were true, 
By the Arguments of the Parliamentary Writers, the Sovereignty is not in the King, but in the People.  all is but misleading formality of Law, the Sovereignty is not in the King but in the People; the King is the only Subject and but a common Voucher, whose concurrence is unavoidably implied; his Will, his Understanding and his Power are all subject to the Body of the very Subject that in Parliament doth swear subjection to him: and these pretended Rights being hid ever since the beginning of the Kingdom, the whole generation of the Subject ever since, hath by the injury of our Laws been most impiously mis-sworn in their Allegiance. And whereas the trust is irrevocably committed to the King and his Heirs for ever, how can it be conceived it should sleep during the sitting of a Parliament, unless that jocular saying of King James were to be understood really, That during the Sessions of a House of Commons there were five hundred Kings? And if any such Power were in the Houses, it was a strange oversight to leave it to the King's disposal, when to call the Body together, and when to dissolve it (as before I have touched) whereby the King might solely determine where, and how long he would be overruled, and when King again: whereas by the false suggestion of the Observer (that it was fit the Houses should have a Superintendent Power, in case of extraordinary danger, and they only to be Judges of that danger) he cunningly turns the Tables, and makes the Houses to be Sovereigns as long as they pleased; and when they were weary of reigning, the Kingdom should be out of danger, and then it should be the Kings turn to command again.  
But to draw to a conclusion on this subject, which cost so much Blood and Treasure: There 
(d) Answ. to Observe. p. 72, 73.  neither is nor can be the same necessity of observing an old Law, to which a King is obliged by his Charter and his Oath, and of a new Law to which he hath not given his Royal Assent. If Magna Charta extended to this, it were Charta Maxima, the greatest Charter that ever was granted. To be be denied nothing, is a Privilege indeed as good as Fortunatus his Purse; or as that old Law which one found out for the Kings of Persia, That he might do what he would. 
The King's Negative Voice Necessary.  The taking away the Kings Negative Voice, may indeed secure us against Tyranny, which never can come in upon us, as long as the two Houses 
(e) Idem, p. 136.  Negatives balance it; but it leaves us open and stark naked to all those Popular evils and Epidemical diseases, which flow from Popular Government, as Tumults, Seditions, Civil Wars, and the Ilias of Evils which attends them; the Negative Voice being the Soveraignest remedy against such great Mischiefs.  
One Wheedle I find more they used, since the King was so tender of violating his Coronation Oath, in giving Assent to their new Bills, which were diametrically opposite to the old fundamental Laws, made in defence of Episcopacy, and the King's Prerogative in the Militia, etc. they quit their Title of Parliament men, 
That the King is not bound to consent, where what is desired is more inconvenient to the People than himself.  and would be Casuists to resolve his Conscience, telling him that where the People by Public Authority, will seek inconvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interested as themselves, it was more inconvenience and injustice in the King to deny than to grant it.  
Thus the Houses would have granted the King a Dispensation to have acted against the dictates of his Reason, Conscience, and the fundamental Laws. And because he would not own their Commission for it, they persecuted him to the Scaffold. This was an unheard of Villainy to be offered to so Pious and Religious a Prince, that as Father of his People, would not give them a Stone instead of Bread, or a Scorpion instead of a Fish. The Heathen was much honester, who prayed Jupiter to give him good things, though he never opened his Mouth for them; and to withhold bad and prejudicial things, though he petitioned never so earnestly for them. This was a strange Principle, that the King should be bound by Law to destroy his People, or not preserve their Right, unless he not only violate his own Conscience, but their very Liberties. Can a man imagine those People, of whom Juvenal speaks, 
— evertere domos totas optantibus ipsis  
Dii faciles—  if they had understood their own Prayers, would have accused the Gods for denying them.  
As they thus sought to hush the King's Conscience, so that endeavoured to find a acquaint salvo for their own more brawny ones: For when it was urged, that to deny the King's Negative Voice, was to dissolve the excellent constitution of Parliaments, and was directly against the settlement of it upon the true basis of the Balance, and the mutual stipulation of the King and his People, as they loved to phrase it they answer by their Prolocutor, that those who contract to their own ruin, or esteem such Contracts before their own preservation, are felonious to themselves, and rebellious to Nature. Inferring from thence, That if the legal Constitution of Government, 
The Writers for the Parliament affirm, That where the Houses think the Constitution of the Government is not agreeable to the Liberty of the People, they may alter it.  be not agreeable to the Liberties the House conceives needful for them, they are obliged to contend to alter them: which is no more nor less, than if a Criminal being condemned to be hanged, should be guilty of another Felony and Treason against Nature to yield to the Sentence, but that he ought in his own defence to kill as many as he could, that he might thereby save his life by escape.  
Thus I hope I have made apparent the falsehood of the Positions ranged in defence of that dismal Parliament, 
How the Long Parliament voted all the Power into their own Hands.  who made use of them as Platforms upon which to plant the Artillery of their Acts and Ordinances. For under the pretext of their obligation to preserve the Kingdom, they voted to put it in a posture of defence; and they voted from the King his Navies, Officers, Privy Counsellors, and Revenues, pretending the Navies were still reserved for the King, in better hands than he would put them, and for the other they would furnish him with better principled Ministers. Whereas by the same Precedent, the Subjects were bound to give up their Estates to their ordering, as often as they pretended they could dispose of them more wisely. For they might allege, the State (which they reputed themselves) had an interest paramount in them in case of public extremity: so that as they pretended the Head without the Body was the State before, so now it was fit the Body should be without the Head; whereas the Law hath provided against either exorbitances: and if there was necessity we must fall into one, we ought in reason to choose the former, because being better acquainted with that, we could better digest it; and it would be less burdensome to our Estates to satisfy one than five hundred, nay ten thousand, as it appeared when the greedy Commonwealths men with their Committees, Armies, etc. was that flat Vermin in the Bowels, which (how true soever it is of the lumbricus latus) was certainly true of this Monster, That it was every where Head and Mouth.  
It is to be well weighed, 
When Parliaments beneficial, when not.  that as Parliaments are in the highest degree beneficial, when they keep within the bounds of duty and sobriety; so when they will have their Ordinances to have the force of Laws, and not govern themselves by known Laws, they are the cause of many Distempers in a Kingdom, and the Subjects condition is most unhappy in the Multitude of Physicians: for extraordinary Remedies, such as they always pretend to use, are, saith Sir Henry Wotton, like hot Waters which may help at a pang, but being too often used spoil the Stomach.  
A Complete Parliament is that 
(f) Answer to Observe. p. 150.  Panchreston or Sovereign Salve for all Sores; but some would make the name of Parliament a Medusa's Head to transform reasonable men into Stones, and subordinate Monarchy to the two Houses, who must be denied nothing; but with their good will would claim for them a paramount interest with the Sovereign, whom they would advance only to the height and mighty Dignity of a Doge of Venice, or a Roman Consul, whilst they must be the Tribunes of the People their Supervisors. So that we cannot be content to gather the blessed fruits right constituted Parliaments would afford us, but we must rend away the top Branch, yea stub up the Tree that we may scramble for the Fruit.  
Tacitus 
(g) 10 Annal.  gives a Caution how a Prince may support his Authority, that he do not vim Principatus resolvere, cuncta ad Senatum revocando. 
Kings not to grant away their Prerogatives at the Importunity of Parliaments.  It is fit a Prince should have the Glory of performing those things himself which are his Prerogatives, and not to refer such things to Conventions of Parliament, which properly belong not to their Cognizance. Since therefore by the condescensions of our Wise and Gracious Princes, there are several things in England, the King cannot by Law do alone, it is a most requisite Wisdom in Princes, that as they observe the Laws in securing the People's Liberties and Privileges; so by no Arbitrary Assumption of either or both Houses, to let their Prerogatives be invaded: for those are now no more than are rationally and politically necessary for orderly and established Government.  
The Encroachments of the never to be forgotten long Parliament, (several of which I have in this and the foregoing Chapter hinted) may be sufficient documents to Princes, not to yield such a body too much Power: for if the balance once decline, a little weight will sink it.  
Therefore though Princes are not to enlarge their Prerogatives, nova siti ad alia aliaque properare; yet they ought to preserve those that remain. For any Ravelin once yielded, will make the Royal Citadel defenceless. Testudo ubi collecta est in suum tegmen, tuta est ad omnes ictus; ubi exerit partes aliquas, quodcunque nudavit, obnoxium & infirmum est: The Tortoise as long as it keeps within its shell and coverture is safe; but if it unbare any part, it is obnoxious to danger.  
Above all things a Prince should he careful never to part with the Prerogative of Summoning and Dissolving Parliaments. For we cannot forget that the Houses of 1641. not content with a Bill for Triennial Parliaments, got an Act for perpetuating themselves; and that would not satisfy, but they prepared a Bill for the certainty of future Parliaments, whether the King had occasion for them or not: so that if the King omitted the sending out of Writs and Summons, the Chancellor might, and for failure the Sheriff, and I know not what inferior Officers; of which the Blessed King complains.  
I cannot dismiss this Subject without taking notice of the Fundamental cause of Factious Members of Parliament. 
The fundamental Cause of Factious Members in Parliament.  In England there is no such powerful Engine to make Faction and Sedition formidable and dangerous to Government, as when the Majority of the Freeholders are wrought upon (by the Arts I have in some measure hinted before, and shall more largely in the Chapter of Faction) to choose Members of the House of Commons of their own Temper: for such a Number being embodied in that House, give and receive mutual strength from one another. For when such are met, they do not take care to unite the minds of the Subjects to their Prince, or one to another, or employ their time upon the great concerns of the Nation; but are drawn to promote private Animosities under 
(h) King's Speech, 6 March, 1678.  pretence of the Public; and are so far from proceeding calmly and peaceably to curb the motions of unruly Spirits that endeavour to disturb them, that they expose the King to the Calumny and danger of those worst of men, who endeavour to render him and his Government odious to the People. I shall now touch upon some of the Artifices used to bring in such Members in the Parliament of 1678. and some succeeding one's whereby their Conventions were rendered useless for the King and People, and inglorious to themselves, though they pretended to as much Loyalty and Public good as those in 1641. did at their first sitting.  
The King having dissolved the long Parliament and summoned this to sit the 6th of March, 1678. 
The Artifices used by designing People, to get such as they desired, to be elect ed.  the industry of the Dissenters, Malcontents, and we may suppose Commonwealth's men, was extraordinary great, as now hoping they should be able to choose such Members as would be more favourable to them.  
They had been long instilling into the People's Heads, 
The Characters they gave Men of the Court-party.  that in the former House there had been a Court and Country Party, the former were for Arbitrary Government, fleecing the People, Persecution, and such as gave no great credit to the Tragical representation of the Popish Plot: The latter were moderate men, and not so much for Ceremonies as the purity of Religion, would stand for the People's Liberties and Properties, by riding night and day about the Villages, and trudging about Corporations, and the weekly Conventicles, they spread this Character abroad, and with all the Arts imaginable, endeavoured to proselyte 
(i) Address, part 2. p. 2, 3.  all that were not sharp-sighted enough to pierce into their designs. If any seemed not to believe those Characters, or declared himself for the Government, Civil or Ecclesiastical, established by Law, and neither for Popery or Arbitrary Government, nor yet for a Commonwealth or Dissenters, they run them down with noise, traduced them behind their backs as Papists in Masquerade and men of Arbitrary Principles. 
Papists in Masquerade.  And if any were so bold as to scruple the coherence of the Narratives of the Popish Plot, he was vilified as a Defamer of the King's Evidence, as stifler of the Plot; and from hence they concluded to insinuate into the Populace, that those Loyal Gentlemen who had been Members of the late long Parliament, had joined with the Court to hinder the Discovery of the Plot; and if any gainsaid them, they used such questions, What, Are you for Popery? Will you give your Voice for a Papist? Are you willing to have your Throat cut? Are you for Arbitrary Government? By which means they won over too many to join with them, 
Excluding Loyal and Orthodox Gentlemen.  to exclude many Loyal and Orthodox Gentlemen from being chosen Members of Parliament.  
Their design was advantaged because some were their friends of old, others had come the half way over to gain the reputation of moderate men, others had been disgusted by the Government. The Conventicle Teachers rallied up their Flocks, and they all joined to slander the Clergy as if they had a kindness for Popery in their hearts, though they durst not discover it for the present: And generally blasted all the Loyal Gentry as Popishly affected, the Court-Party Pensioners, etc. So that if any one bore any Public Office Military or Civil, he was eo nomine to be rejected. The Persons they recommended to the People to be chosen, were first all those Gentlemen, who called themselves the Country 
(k) Idem, p. 5.  Party, who had appeared most zealous against his present Majesty, the Queen Dowager, and Ministers of State. To these they added as many as they could of the relics of the old Rebellion, or their Children, and made up the number out of the moderate and discontented Gentlemen, Burgesses and Tradesmen. It was sufficient recommendation if the Government had displaced any, for these were looked upon as not to be corrupted or bought off: and here and there they took in an honest Gentleman, in hopes to win him to their side by this kindness.  
After the dissolution of this Parliament, when his late Majesty issued out his Writs for another to convene, 17 Oct. 1679. they added to their former Arts the loud clamours against French Pensioners, 
French Pensioners.  Popery, Arbitrariness, and all those who voted against the Bill of Exclusion, as Popishly affected, or downright Papists; traducing his Majesty, the Court, the Ministers of State, and almost all the Loyal Gentry and Clergy for endeavouring to have those men chosen. The second advantage they made was the pretended discovery of 
(l) Address, part 3. p. 5.  Sir Stephen Fox of the Pensioners of the late long Parliament: which discovery being hastily made, and no Record of it being entered, 
Pensioners to the King.  they took the confidence to add to it whomsoever they pleased to have so thought; They made the People believe they knew who would be Pensioners likewise, and led the diffidence to that height, as to exclude as far as they could possibly, not only all the Courtiers and other Persons who had any places of profit and advantage under his Majesty, but their Relations too, and wanted not much that they had excluded all those who bore any Honorary Employment. So that nothing recommended a man so effectually for a Parliament man, as that he had not been thought fit to be trusted in the least by his then Majesty, or their Neighbour Gentry, these they cried up as true Friends to the Protestant Religion, and the Country; and he was an hardhearted Man in their Dialect, who called the Sincerity of their Loyal Intentions in question: However by their Actings, many of them have been discovered to be but cold Friends to the Government.  
But Intending to discourse more fully of the several Arts used by designing Men in the Chapter of Factions, I shall at present quit this Subject, and only desire Kings to consider, that they can condescend no lower to gratify Importunities of Parliament or People, in yielding up any of their Privileges.  
The Philosopher of old hath noted, how Kingly Authority was lessened among the Grecians, which was no ways profitable to them. He speaking of Kings. in the Heroic times, 
(m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 14.  That then they had the Government and Administration of Matters in the Cities, and the adjoining Territories within their Dominions, and what extended without the Limits of the Empire (viz. to preserve and protect their Subjects against their Enemies, make War and Peace, etc.) But after, partly by the spontaneous Concessions of the Princes, and partly by the Encroachment of the People, they came to be lessened in Power, and in some Cities had only the Power of Sacrificing left, in others the Command of their Armies. This, as well as other Reasons, must needs demonstrate, That if ever any two Houses of Parliament should by Arts of Insinuation (as that of 1641. did, That unless the King would grant they might not be dissolved without their Consents, 
King's never to yield what the Long Parliament were so earnest for.  they could not have time to settle his Throne, and redress Grievances) or by denying necessary Supplies, force a King to grant them a Power of prolonging their own Sitting, or meeting at stated times without his Writ, or yielding to their Bills implicitly, (as the Black Parliament of 41. endeavoured) and then to have the Power of nominating the Great Ministers of State, and the Officers of the Militia, an end would be soon put to Monarchy.  
Therefore every one that loves their Country, 
The Care to be had in Elections.  the continuance of that most excellent Frame of Government, for the Subjects security, as no other Country enjoys; those who would avoid the sad Ravages of Civil War, who would make their Prince Glorious, their Country Renowned, themselves and their Posterities Happy: let them be careful to elect Loyal and Judicious Members, neither tainted with Faction, Ambition, or Self-ends; and if any such be elected, let the Wise and Loyal, when they meet in that Great Assembly, watch over the Designs of such ill Members, discover their Intrigues, be careful not to be circumvented by their Artifices, stick close to the Fundamentals of Government; and then all things will be prosperous, and they will have the honour of being styled True Patriots of their Country.  
Sir 
(n) 4. Instit. p. 35.  Edward Coke hath noted, That Parliaments succeed not well in five Cases. 
Several Cases where Parliaments succeed not well, when the King is displeased with the Two Houses.  First, when the King hath been in displeasure with his Lords or Commons; therefore it was one of the Petitions of the Commons to Edw. 3. That he would require the Archbishop, and all other of the Clergy, to pray for his Estate, for the Peace and good Government of the Land, and for the continuance of the King's  towards the Commons; to which the 
(o) Rot. Parl. 25 E. 3. num. 15. 43 E. 3. num. 1. 50 E. 3. num. 2.  King replied, The same prayeth the King. The like Petition he saith, many times the Lords have made, and further adds, That the King in all his weighty affairs, had used the advice of his Lords and Commons, always provided, that both Lords and Commons keep within the Circle of the Law, and Custom of Parliament.  
The second is when any of the great Lords are at variance among themselves, as he instanceth in the third 
(p) Rot. Parl. 3 H. 6. num. 18. When Variance among the Lords.  of H. 6. in the Controversy betwixt John Earl Marshal, and Richard Earl of Warwick, and 4 H. 6. betwixt the Duke of Gloucester and Bishop of Winchester, whereby little was done in any Parliamentary Court, and that little of no moment.  
The third, 
When no good Correspondence betwixt the Lords and Commons.  when there is no good Correspondence betwixt the Lords and Commons; which happens, when some People out of design to render the meeting of the two Houses ineffectual, do project some matters, whereby the Houses may clash about Privileges, as was lately in Shirley's Case, about the Mony-Bill from the House of Lords, and many other Particulars might be instanced in; therefore Sir Edward Coke saith, That when it was demanded by the Lords and Commons, what might be a principal Motive for them to have good success in Parliaments, 
Sitis insuperabiles, si fuertis inseparabiles.  it was answered, They should be insuperable, if inseparable, Cum radix & vertex Imperii in Obedientium consensu rata sunt. The very root and top of Government consists in the consent of the Obedient, and the Subjects Happiness is in that Harmony, when it is betwixt the two Houses, and among themselves: but much more happy, when it is likewise betwixt the Sovereign, and the two Houses. It is that which completes their own, and the People's Felicity. But when the two Houses, or one of them, are for wresting the Sovereign's Prerogative from him, as in Forty one, than it is the most fatal and illboding sign of any other.  
The fourth is, 
When Disagreement in the House of Commons.  when there wants Unity in the House of Commons, as we had not long since Experience, when within those Walls (from whence wholesome Counsels are expected, and all things tending to the preservation of the King's Peace, Crown, and Dignity;) such Heats were amongst the Members, that if one Sword, that was half drawn, had been wholly unsheathed, it was thought a very bloody Battle had been fought.  
The last he makes, 
When no Preparation for the Parliament.  is when there is no preparation for the Parliament before it begin; for which purpose the Summons of Parliament is forty Days or more before the Sitting, to the end that Preparations might be had for the considering the arduous and urgent affairs of the Realm. And Sir Edward saith it was an ancient custom in Parliament, in the beginning thereof, to appoint a select Committee to consider of the Bills in the two preceding last Parliaments that passed both Houses, or either of them, and such as had been preferred, read, or committed, and to take out of them such as were most profitable for the Commonwealth.  
To these may be added a most material one, 
When Redress of Grievances are preferred to the Supply of the King.  that makes unfortunate Congresses of Parliaments, viz. When the Members come up, with strong Resolutions to provide Remedies for some Grievances, either real or surmised, and at the same time the Sovereign is in great straits, for supplies for the safety, repute, or necessary occasions of the Government; for then (as in most of the Parliaments of King Charles the First) the Houses are for redress of Grievances, before supply, how pressing and urgent soever, and do not credit the King that he will give them time to redress them, after he is supplied; and they from design, rather than this diffidence, will not suffer supply and grievances to go pari passu, Hand in Hand, as we may remember in those Parliaments, wherein the popular Men made such Harangues, that they would know whether they were Freemen, or Slaves, or had any thing to give before they entered upon the giving part: The like we saw in King Charles the Second Reign, in some of his last Parliaments, whereby all their Consultations were abortive; and both the Kings had no other Expedient but Prorogation, or Dissolution; and disuse of Parliaments for some Years followed.  
How much happier have we been in the last Session of the Parliament, under our most Wise, 
The happy Harmony in the last Session of Parliament, June 1685.  Magnanimous and Gracious King, wherein no strife or contention was, but who should be forwardest to supply the necessities of the Crown, to show all Loyal Dutifulness to their Sovereign, whereby a most dangerous Rebellion in both Kingdoms was the easilier crushed; and which endears them to the King, that there can be no danger, but whatever good and wholesome Laws they shall propose for the general good of the Kingdom, will find a cheerful allowance by him.  
How happy had our Forefathers been if King Charles the First had met with such considerate Parliaments, who by a seasonable supply and compliance, might have had (without that vast effusion of Blood and Treasure) all their Grievances redressed, and the flourishing State of the Kingdom preserved, and the Memories of a great many Noblemen and Gentlemen had been transmitted without stain to their remote Nephews.  
But to draw towards a Conclusion of this Discourse, 
Some not willing to hear of the Miscarriages of Parliaments, think this Discourse needless.  Some that may not be willing to hear of the Miscarriages of some Parliaments, wherein probably they were concerned, may say, what need is there now, to bring again upon the Stage the rigorous Proceed of the two Houses of Parliament, or more properly of the leading and designing Men in the House of Commons, in the Years 1640, and 1680. since we are now happily past these Rocks, Quicksands, and treacherous Shores.  
All the World indeed must acknowledge we have a Royal, wise Pilot, 
Because we have a most wise King, and good Parliament.  who knows full well to steer the Sovereignty of the Commonweal. He hath weathered out high going Seas; so that neither their over-whelming liquid Mountains, nor the terrible Shot from the floating Castles have daunted him; magnanimity, unparallelled Courage, and an Experience beyond most Crowned Heads, have raised him great Trophies of his Victorious toils: He is served with sage Councils, both private and National. So that all must confess we have less cause to fear any more dangers of Hurricanes and Shipwrecks.  
But though we now enjoy Halcyon days, 
Yet we are not secure but that in after-Ages evil Members of Parliament may be.  under a Sovereign, enriched with Royal abilities to the height of our Wishes; though he is blessed with a Parliament, as Loyal as can be desired, betwixt whom there is no other Strife, but who shall out-pass the other in mutual Obligations: Yet are we secure, that no ill Exhalations may be gathered in after-Ages?  
Can we expect always temperate Wether, pleasing Sunshine, and fruitful Showers? No, in small revolutions of Years we find Epidemical Diseases return; excesses of Drought, Rains, or Frosts, are often marked in our Annals, even after promising Configurations of the Celestial Bodies.  
I writ not an Almanac for a Year, 
The Design of the Author in writing against the Exorbitances of some.  or Pamphlet for a time, my Design is not Infandum renovare Dolorem out of any Pique; but as much as in me lies to show from the bypast Irregularities, and Exorbitances of some Men, how Loyal, good, and Just Men may measure things by the Golden Standard of the Laws; how mischievous Practices and Principles may be obviated; how every one may see what the upshot of rebellious Principles will be; how to detect, and how to avoid the same kind of Rocks and Sands in after-Ages.  
I know some Persons recovered from a valitudinary Condition, 
Some love not to hear of their Distempers.  love not to hear of the Torments they have undergone, nor of the Extravagances of their delirious State: Yet this should not hinder but the Healthful, and those that would avoid the Calenture, should patiently endure to hear a Description of the Causes and Symptoms.  
In this Discourse I have only culled out such Particulars, 
The Author's Apology for himself.  as I find Judicious Authors have insisted upon, against the unprecedented Proceed of some late Houses of Commons; which I think all Loyal Persons disapprove; and I believe a great many as well as myself, have heard many of the then sitting Members dislike, when things were carried with an impetuous Torrent, that it was more dangerous to speak against their proceed, or question the unlimited Power assumed by that House, than it was to speak Seditious (I had almost said Treasonable) Words against the King.  
Therefore I hope none of this present Honourable House of Commons (who have so signalised their Loyalty in the last Session) will take offence at what, from such judicious Persons as I have met with, I have delivered the Sentiments of. My intention is no ways to lessen the Rights, or necessary Privileges of that venerable Assembly; which never can be unbeneficial to the King, or People, but when Discontent, Faction, and Sedition hath too spreadingly infected the Electors.  
The continuance of that worst of Parliaments of 1641. 
What evil Principles taught during the Long Parliament.  in their disloyal Practices so long, by the overgrowing of the Tares, which were only suffered to thrive, occasioned so much corrupt seed to be sown, as in twenty years there was no wholesome grain left. We saw too late, how by some evil Seedsmen, a fertile, but dangerous Crop was shooting up apace. It is not a little Labour, nor small diligence, will how and weed out the Briars, Thistles, and destructive Shrubs, and poisonous Weeds, that shoot their spreading Roots so far: But I hope the great Wisdom of this Loyal Parliament, will find out ways and methods to prevent the danger of their thriving in a Soil, worthy of better Plants, than any will be set by Republican Hands.    

CHAP. XXX. Of the Kings most Honourable Privy-Council.  
I Find by several Authors, 
Four kinds of the King's Councils. The First.  that there are reckoned Four Councils of the King. First, The Magnum Concilium, consisting of the Prelates and Nobles in Parliament; of which Bracton 
(a) Lib. 1. c. 2.  may be consulted, and what I have writ in the Chapter of Parliaments.  
Secondly, A Convention of the Peers of the Realm, 
The Second.  Lords of Parliament, yet not meeting as a Parliament, which appears manifestly in the Record, 25 Aug. 5 H. 7. upon an exchange made of some Lands betwixt the King and the Earl of Northumberland; the King promiseth to deliver the Earl Lands to the value, etc. by 
(b) Per advice & assent du Estates de son Realm de son Parliament (parensi que Parliament soit devant le Feast de St. Lucy) ou autrement, per advice de son Grand Council, & autres Estates de son Realm que le Roy serra assemblez, devant le dit Feast, in case que le Parliament ne soit. Coke 1. Instit. lib. 2. c. 10. sect. 164.  the Advice of the Estates of his Realm of his Parliament (if the Parliament be convened before the Feast of St. Lucy) or otherwise, by the Advice of his Great Council, and other Estates of his Realm, which the King shall Assemble before the said Feast, in case the Parliament be not called: which well agreeth with the Act of Parliament, 37 E. 3. c. 18. where it is said, before the Chancellor, Treasurer, and Great Council.  
Thirdly, The King's Privy Council, which appears to be different from the last Great Council, by many Records, and particularly, by that of 
(c) Rot. Claus. 16 E. 2. m. 5. dorso.  16 E. 2. where it is said, Hen. de Bellomont Baron of the King's Great and Private Council was sworn.  
This Council is called Concilium Privatum, secretum & continuum Regis. 
The Privy Council properly so called. Lord Precedent.  The First Member of this Council, is the Lord Precedent, who was anciently called Principalis Consiliarius, and sometimes Capitalis Consiliarius. The first Lord President Sir Edward Coke 
(d) 4. Instit. c. 2. fol. 55. 1. par. Pat. num. 22. John Bishop of Norwich is mentioned 7 Jo. by Matt. Paris, fol. 205.  mentions, was the Earl of Lancaster 50 E. 3. 1 R. 2. then he reckons these in order, the Duke of Bedford, 1 H. 6. the Duke of Gloucester, 10 H. 6. the Duke of York 11 and 22 H. 6. John Russel Bishop of Rochester, and after of Lincoln is called Precedent 13 E. 4. John Fisher Bishop of Rochester 12 H. 7. Charles Brandon Duke of Suffolk from the 25th. to the 37th. of H. 8. the Lord Pawlet 1 E. 6. the Duke of Northumberland 5 and 7 of E. 6. the Earl of Arundel 1 and 2 Ph. and M. in Q. Elizabeth's time we find none; but in this Catalogue Mr. Prynne 
(e) Animadv. p. 45. Pat. 13 E. 4. part 1. m. 3.  hath truly noted, That the Bishop of Rochester was not made Precedent of the King's Council, but of the Prince's, and was his Tutor, as appears by the Patent itself there cited, dated the 10th. of Nou.  
This Office of Lord President was never granted but by Letters Patents under the Great Seal, durante beneplacito. In the Statute of 21 H. 8. c. 2. he is said to be attendant on the Kings most Royal Person; the reason of which, saith Sir Ed. Coke, is, That of latter times he hath used to report to the King the Passages, and the State of the business at the Council Table.  
The Lord Privy Seal is the next Principal Person that hath Precedence in the King's Council, 
Lord Privy-Seal.  concerning whose Office my Lord 
(f) 4. Instit. c. 2. fol. 56.  Coke hath discoursed at large, to whom I must refer the Curious Reader, as also to him for the Acts of Parliament, Orders of the same, and Acts of Council (together with Mr. Prynne's 
(g) P. 45.  Animadversions) whereby the Privy-Council was to be regulated; and concerning the Jurisdiction, and Proceed of the King's Council, Mr. Lambard's 
(h) P. 108. to 116. fol. 29.  Archaion, and Mr. Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts may be consulted; the several Bundles of Petitions to the King and his Council in the Tower of London, and the Answers to them, the Placita Parliamentaria coram Rege & Concilio, in the Tally Office of the Exchequer, and in the Parchment Book of them in the Tower under King Edward the First, printed by Mr. 
(i) In Placit. Parl. & Append. Those summoned to Parliaments as Assistants, called the King's Council and in Parliament-time joined with the King's Council in several Cases.  Ryley.  
Of this Privy Council there seems to me to be two sorts, one constantly attending the King, and his Affairs, the other in Parliament time only; which had their particular Summons, as I have before at full discoursed of: and these two I find so obscurely distinguished, that it is difficult in some places to understand which are meant; but I think in time of Parliament these were joined to the King's Council; for besides that they had a distinct Summons, and in them (as a specifical distinction) the word caeteris was omitted, in that part of the Summons which runs, dictis die & loco personalitor intersitis nobiscum, ac cum caeteris Praelatis, Magnatibus, etc. because they were not Parliamentary Barons, there was also added in proceed and judgements upon them, these words, coram ipso Domino Rege & ejus concilio ad Parliamenta sua, or, ad Parliamentum suum, or coram Concilio nostro in praesenti Parliamento.  
For the particular Instances of which, being they are very numerous, Mr. Prynn's 
(k) A pag. 363. ad pag. 393.  brief Register may be consulted, wherein it seems to me upon the perusal of the several Records, that these Assistants to the House of Lords were likewise joined to the rest of the Kings standing Council in Parliament time: so it is expressed in the Case of 
(l) Idem, pag. 378.  John Sal●eyn and Margaret his Wife, and Isabel her Sister, Daughters and Heirs of Robert de Ross de Work, thus, Habito super praemissis diligenti tractatu, per ipsum Dom. Regem, & totum Concilium: and in the same it is thus also worded, videtur Dom. Regi, & Concilio suo, & concordatum est, & consideratum per ipsum Dom. Regem & Concilium suum. So in others, per Concilium Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, Comitum, & Baronum, caeterorumque 
(m) Idem, pag. 380.  de Concilio suo existentium, & singulis de Concilio suo, & totius Concilii Domini Regis. So in 21 E. 1. the Archbishop of York's Case: videtur Domino Regi in pleno Parliamento praedicto, Comitibus, Baronibus, Justiciariis & similiter toti Concilio ipsius Dom. Regis; and so it is said, Magnates & alios de Concilio ipsius Domini Regis rogavit.  
This is further cleared by sundry 
(n) Idem, pag. 383. The Court of Star-chamber was said to be coram Rege & Concilio suo. See Coke Inst. 4. c. 5.  Prefaces to, and passages in our Printed Statutes, as formerly I have noted; So the Statute of Bigamy 4 Oct. 4 E. 1. saith, In the presence of certain Reverend Fathers, Bishops of England, and others of the King's Council, the constitutions under written were recited, after heard and published before the King and his Council; for as much as all the King's Council, Justices, and others did agree. So the Statute of Quo Warranto, 30 E. 1. Cum apud Westminster, per nos & Concilium nostrum provisum. So 33 E. 1. it is agreed, and ordained by the King, and all his Council. So 42 E. 3. c. 3. the Statute made on Petition of the Commons in Parliament gins, 
(o) Please a nostre Seigneur le Roy, & son bon Counsel, pur droyt Government de son Peuple, ordeigner.  Pleaseth it our Lord the King, and his good Council, for the better Government of his People, to ordain.  
By great store of Records it is apparent, that in old times, the Kings and their Councils gave Judgement in divers Cases of difficulty; and other Common Cases, concerning the Law of the Realm, 
(p) See 11 H. 4. num. 28. & 63. Respectuatur per Dom. Principem & Concilium. Pryn. Animadv. p. 39 264, 265, 267, 296.  calling those who were learned in the Laws, for Assistants therein, as Mich. 53 and 54 H. 3. rot. 37. in the Case of Assize of Mort d'auncester brought by Alexander King of Scots, against John de Burgo. But as hereafter I shall show, much of the Power of the King's Council is now taken away.  
The Fourth Council of the King, 
The King's Council at Law.  are the King's Judges at Law, who are his Council at Law in all Cases wherein he hath occasion to consult them, as appears in the Law Books, and particularly may be found in 
(q) 1. Instit. lib. 2. cap. 10. sect. 164.  Sir Edward Coke, of which I may have occasion to speak in the Chapter of Judges.  
I thought to premise these things for the better understanding of the differences of the King's several Councils, and shall now proceed to discourse of the most Honourable Privy Council in general, as Counsel is necessary for Princes to have, and as they ought to be qualified, what their Office and Employment is, and aught to be, both in Relation to all Princes Secret Councils, and particularly, according to the constitution of England, according to my poor Abilities.  
The most Honourable Privy-Council consists of Noble and Wise Persons, chosen by the Prince to assist him with their sage and faithful Advice, in the weighty Affairs of Government.  
King's cannot by their own personal knowledge comprehend 
(r) Nec unilts me ●●em, tant●e molis esse capacem, Tacit. 1. Annal.  all things, therefore it is needful for them to assume others in participationem curarum; especially great and weighty Affairs need great Coadjutors, as Paterculus 
(s) magna negotia magnis egere adminiculis. Velleius, l. 2.  well notes; and the 
* Principis labores queis orbem terrae capessit, egere adminicu lis, ut domestica cura vacuus, in common consular. Tacitus 12. Annal.  grave Historian tells us, That Labours of Princes, by which they manage their vast Countries, need helps; that being free from Domestic Cares, they may consult for the Public. Whoever looks only upon the Port and Grandeur of Princes, their soft Raiment, and feeding delicately, may think it a pleasing and desirable State; but they never reflect on the anxious Cares, the difficulties of managing Matters, upon which great and momentous events, and ordering of vast bodies, of different Interests, depend. Therefore the 
(t) Rhetor. ad Alex.  Philosopher well noted, That to give give good Counsel is one of the Divinest things among Men. Whereas on the other Hand, when Counsel is supine, Government must be tottering; but a Mind 
(u) Animus qui verum seit, scit tuto aggredi. Thucyd l. 1.  settled in Resolves, safely attempts any thing. That Reason being the soundest, which useth Cunctation and Deliberation, and forefears as well as foresees, what will happen; because in acting, it will produce Confidence. For they must be a great Defect, where Counsel is not taken before Action; It being for Sword-Players, not those that bear the Sword of Magistracy, In arena Consilium capere.  
As to the use of Counsellors, 
(w) Quod fieri debet tractato cum multis: quod facturus es, cum paucissimis & fidelissimis. Lib. 3. de Re militari.  Vegetius tells us it becomes a Prince to treat of those things which ought to be considered with many; but those which are to be executed, with few, or rather by himself: agreeable to which, is what the learned Lord 
(x) St. Alban's Essays, p. 88  Chancellor notes, That some Affairs require extreme Secrecy, which will hardly allow to go beyond one or two Persons, besides the King; neither are those Councils unprosperous: for besides the Secrecy, they commonly go on constantly in one Spirit of Direction, without Distraction; but such are only to be used by a prudent King, who can grind with an Handmill.  
A great part part of the 
(y) Idem, p. 87.  Skill of a Prince is discovered in the choice of wise Counsellors; and the managing of their Counsels, require the greatest Address, Ability, and Dexterity of Sovereigns.  
Therefore the Ancients feigned Jupiter to marry 
(z) Idem. Wisdom of the Ancients. Princes to have the Honour of Councils.  Metis, viz. Counsel, and she being with Child by him, he eat her up, and was delivered of Pallas out of his own Head: The Moral of which is, That Princes refer matters to Council; and when the Council grows ripe, they are not to suffer their Council to go through with the resolution and direction, as if it depended on them; but to take matters back again into their own Hands, and so make them appear to issue from themselves, with Prudence and Power, as from their own Head and Advice, as Pallas came forth armed, fitted for present Action.  
It is in vain for Princes to take Counsel concerning matters, 
Choice of Persons.  if they take not Counsel likewise concerning Persons; for the greatest Errors are committed, and the most Judgement shown in Individuals.  
There was never King bereft of the Benefit of Counsel, except when there hath been an over greatness in one Counsellor, or an over-strict Combination in divers: which are things soon found out, and helped; therefore Principis maxima est virtus nosse suos.  
In Council the King presiding, 
Princes not to open their Inclinations too much.  should not open his own Inclination too much in that which he propoundeth, if he desire sincere delivery of the Counsellors Judgements, lest his Authority sway too much. Therefore Princes should take the Opinion of their Council, both separate, and together; private Opinion being more free, and Opinion before others more reverend.  
It is therefore a Prince's greatest Interest to be unprejudicate, and to keep an open Ear to all wholesome Counsel; for as Capitolinus 
(a) In Gordiano Juniore.  saith, Miser est Imperator apud quem vera reticentur, That prince is in a very bad Condition, from whom the true Estate of his Affairs is concealed.  
Several wise Princes have with an even Hand distributed their regards to Counsellors that have mortally hated one another, 
Making use of Counsellors of different Persuasions or Interests.  as some observed in Louvoy and Colbert; and it is a certain sign of a good Workman, that can work with any Tool. The advantage a Prince hath, is that they are Spies one upon another, and will be both emulous, who can do their Master's Services best; but if they grow to be the Heads of different Factions, they will prove most dangerous.  
Having thus far proceeded as to the Interest of a Prince, in his Counsellors, and their advice, I shall speak to the Qualifications of Counsellors.  
In 
(b) Leo Imp. de Belli apparatu.  secret affairs, faithful, temperate and close Persons, are most fit Counsellors, and who have no private Interest; 
The Qualifications of Counsellors.  for Secrecy is that invisible Clasp that buckles great Affairs, the hidden hinge, upon which they are moved, according to 
(c) Taciturnitas optimum ac tutissimum rerum administrandarum vinculum. Lib. 2. c. 21. 1. Secrecy. 2. Ability.  Valerius. For he can never achieve great matters, to whom it is irksome to retain Secrets. So Aemilius Probus, amongst the praises of Epaminondas, relates, that he was Commissi celans: and Albertus' King of Poland said he would change his Shirt, if he thought it were privy to his Counsels.  
He is a leading eminent Man (saith 
(d) Eum primum esse virum qui ipse consulit quod in rem sit; secundum eum qui bene monenti obediat; qui nec ipse consulere, nec alteri parere scit, eum extremi esse ingenii. Lib. 2.  Livy) who is able to give Counsel; and Second unto him, is he that yields to good Counsel; but he is in the lowest form of Wit, who neither can give good Counsel, nor obey it.  
The true Composition of a Counsellor, 
3. Skill in a Prince's Affairs.  (saith my Lord St. Alban) is rather to be skilled in his Master's Business than his Nature; for than he is like to advise him, and not to flatter him, and find his Humour. For knowledge and Prudence in affairs, are principally requisite in Counsellors, who should be well acquainted with the 
(e) Ad concilium in Republica dandum caput est nosse Rempublicam. Cic. de Orat.  Constitution of the Government, the Laws, Rules, and Policy of it; both to be able to advise in all things relating to his Prince's managment of matters at home and abroad: 
(f) Tacitus vita Agricolae.  Mores animosque Provinciae quaerere, To be curious to dive into the Spirits, manners, and Dispositions of all those his Prince hath to deal with; whereby he may the better suit his Master's occasions, by humouring and timing every thing with a quiet Industry, and making every matter be adapted to his end, without tumultuation, and rude Shocks, but rather by insensible Screws.  
The noblest design and endeavour any Privy-Counsellor can have, 
4. Not to aim at Private Profit.  is to serve his King and Country upon Principles of public advantage; for it is the worst of Poisons to the Judgement, and regards to Truth in all Consultations, to aim at private Profit, according to that Excellent remark of 
(g) Pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum sua cuique utilitas. 1. Hist.  Tacitus, That private design of Profit is the worst Poison of Judgement, and attaining Truth. For when private Prosit holds the Balance, the Prince's Standard is little regarded; there being no weight so deadly heavy, as when a Man's self, and his private Interest are cast into one Scale.  
Uprightness and Faithfulness are two Master Ingredients in all Counsellors. 
5. Uprightness and Faithfulness requisite.  So Pliny 
(h) Optimum eum quemque, sideliss●mum. Panaegyr.  tells Trajan, That he is the best Man that is most faithful to his Trust; for by the Eyes of Counsellors, Princes see, by their Ears they hear, and if those Organs be depraved: the Prince's Apprehensions of things must be adulterated; and the King passing his Judgement according to their Representation, may proceed upon very uncertain or false Grounds. Counsellors indeed are the Speculators of Princes, they have therefore need of the clearest Sight, not to be tainted with false Colours; they are to be quicksighted, to pry into the Consequences of Things while in the obscure Shop of the First Causes: they are the Pilots that are appointed to steer the Ship of the Commonwealth, and so must be skilled in the Chart, to know to veer and change with Emergencies; to know the rolling Sands, and under Sea-Rocks; to know the Coast and Creeks, the Measure of all things relating to the Government, both preceding, bypast, and to come.  
The 
(i) Sapiens Non semper in uno gradu, sed in una via, nec se in aliquibus mutat, sed potius aptat. 3. Histor.  most politic Historian notes, 6. To pursue the Design of the Prince by several ways. That a wise Counsellor, though he may pass in several Tracts, yet must never be out of that Path which will lead him to the accomplishment of his Designs; and in the necessary Traverses he must make, not to be found so much to change, as to suit himself to the Work he is about.  
It is a great piece of selfdenying Wisdom in a Counsellor that desires to keep his Station, 
7. To leave the Prince the Honour of Counsels.  to leave to his Master the Honour of the contrivance of those advantageous things he suggests: 
— Aliis 
(k) Guntherus.  magni reputantibus, ipse  
Negligit, & modico factum metitur honore.   
So Agrippa admonisheth those that would be safe in Courts, to eschew the difficulties of things, and leave the glory of the accomplishment of them to those that have the Supremacy.  
It is too hazardous a curiosity in some Prince's Counsellors to inquire into the hidden sense of their Masters, 
8. Not to be too curious in prying into their Master's Secrets.  or what they reserve in their own dark thoughts: It being difficult to attain the meaning of what they leave doubtful, according to that of the curious Author, 
(l) Abditos Principis sensus, & si quid excultius parat, exquirere inlicitum anceps. Tacit. lib. 6. Annal. c. 2.  It is doubtful and unlawful to inquire into the hidden Sense of a Prince, or what he more curiously designs.  
But this falls out only under a Tiberius, or some Mysterious Prince; though it may happen under a Good and Wise Prince, who to leave the greater liberty of Debate, discovers not his own inclinations: and under such an one Counsellors are safe, especially when by conjectual Inferences they promote the end, though they may differ in the Medium.  
Pliny saith, 
(m) In Consiliario Principis tria maxime requiruntur, libertas, fides, & veritas: libertas consilii est ejus vita, & essentia; qua erepta, consilium evanescit. Panaegyr.  three things are required in a Counsellor, 
9 Liberty, Faith, and Truth requisite in a Privy-Counsellor.  Liberty, Faith, and Truth.  
Liberty is the Life and Essence of Council, which being taken away, all Counsel vanisheth; for as good Counsel is the Soul of the State, so he that hath not a Liberty (being bound by private Interest) is but a Palsied Member; and if Counsellors want Faith and Verity, they hid and disguise the Truth, which is full of danger both to the King and 
(n) Malum consilium consultori pessimum.  themselves.  
Such fear as doth not fall in constantem virum, is a great enemy to good Counsel; for fear is a betraying of such succours as Reason and Counsel should afford.  
King 
(o) Coke 4. Instit. c. 2. Four Properties of Counsellors.  Edward the Third would have his Counsellor to have four Properties: 1. To be Parcus sui, knowing he would never be provident for Him, that would not be a good Husband for himself. 2ly. That he should not be Cupidus rei alienae, no covetous or greedy man; for ei nihil turpe, cui nihil satis. 3ly. That he should be Avarus Rei Publicae, covetous for the King's Treasure and Commonwealth. 4ly. That he super omnia sit expertus, that he be expert in what place the King shall employ him; for great Offices are never well managed by a Deputy, 
When quick, and when deliberate Counsels are best.  where the Officer himself is but a cipher.  
As to Counsels themselves, Livy 
(p) In rebus asperis, & tenuis spei, fortissima quaeque consilia tutissima sunt. Lib. 22.  excellently notes, That in matters that are ground to an edge, or drawn to a sharp point, and where hope is only left in the bottom, the boldest and quickest Counsels are safest; yet it must be with great circumspection well considered, when, and upon what occasions such Counsels must be taken: for the same 
(q) Consilia calida & audacia prima specie laeta sunt, tractatu dura, eventu tristia. Idem, lib. 31.  Author notes elsewhere, That subtle and bold Counsels on the first view may be pleasing, but are difficult in handling, and in the event often Calamitous: therefore rashness can never consist with Counsel; duo adversissima rectae menti (saith 
(a) Lib. 3. Male cuncta ministrat impetus. Statius.  Thucydides) Celeritas & Ira, Haste and Passion are of all things most opposite to Right Counsel: therefore Curtius 
(b) Novan●is quam gerendis rebus aptiora ingenia illa ignca.  speaking of such, saith, Fiery and furious Spirits are more fit to innovate things, and create Factions, than to manage Affairs steadily. 
(c) Praepropera consilia sunt raro prospera.  So hasty Counsels are rarely Prosperous, because Resolution should never go before Deliberation, nor Execution before Resolution.  
When 
(d) Prinsquam incipias consuli o, & ubi consulueris, mature fado opus est. Sallust.  upon Debate and Deliberation it is by the Council-Table well resolved, the change thereof upon some private information, is neither safe nor honourable, nor that after timely Resolution timely Execution be delayed.  
Violent 
(e) Coke Inst. 4. p. 57  courses are like to hot Waters that may do good in an extremity; but the use of them doth spoil the Stomach, and it will require them stronger and stronger, and by little and little they will lessen their own operation.  
To leave this great Theme as too illustrious and sublime a Subject for one to treat of that hath lived in the Shade: I shall now proceed to make some other remarks why our Laws give our Kings the sole power of choosing to themselves a Privy-Council, and how the designers of 41. would have wrested that Power from the King.  
Besides 
(f) Review of Observations, p. 10. The King's Prerogative to choose his Privy-Council  what is common to all men to have a free liberty to whom they will impart their private Affairs, and desire Counsel upon them; our Laws being built upon firm foundations of reason, considering, that in the power of making of Laws, the power of two numerous bodies were opposed against the Person of the single Sovereign: it foresaw, and found, that by the Sovereign's consenting to Laws, for the ease and benefit of the Subject, things might pass to the prejudice, and diminution of the Sovereignty. If his single Person (surcharged with the care of the manifold Affairs of the Kingdom) should be left all alone to advise, and dispute his right, against all the Wisdom and Solicitation of the Representative Body of the Subject. 
See Prynne's Brief Register, sect. 3. from p. 341. to the end, concerning the King's Council in Parliament, and out of it.  Therefore, to prevent that, it ordered, That the King should at his discretion swear to himself a Body of Council (sometimes in our Laws called his Grand Council) to advise him in matters of State, and concernments of his Sovereign Right and safety; and a Body of Council at Law to advise him in matters of Justice, that he might neither do, or suffer contrary to the Rule of Laws; especially sitting the two Houses, when the wrong might be perpetual: and seeing the Government must be continually upon its Guard and Watch, without intermission, moulding, and forming all things for its safety and prosperity, and consequently of the People's; this Council must be constantly attending upon the King's pleasure, and daily and hourly considering the best ways and methods of promoting the Kings and Commonweals advantage.  
As to the 
(g) Pulton, 37, & 56. 72.  first particular, we find it frequently in several Statutes expressed, That the King by himself and by his Council, at his Parliament, made and ordained. 
The necessity of a Privy-Council.  That this was not the great Council of Parliament appears by that of Edward the First, 
(b) Idem, p. 80.  These are the Establishments of the King by his council, and by the Assent of the Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons, and the whole Commonalty of the Land thither summoned: and Edward the Second saith, he caused the Articuli Cleri to be rehearsed before his Council, and Answer given, etc. and much more may be observed in the Acts of the great Councils, not fit here to be repeated. From hence it is that the Law defines, The King can do no wrong; 
Privy-Counsellors responsible.  for if any evil be committed in matter of State, the Privy-Council, and if in matters of Law, the Justices and Judges must answer for it.  
As to the second particular, the Parliament of 1641. cast the odium of most of the management of Affairs of State, 
The Votes of the Long Parliament to traduce the King, under the pretence of using Evil Counsellors.  that were ungrateful to them, upon the King's evil Counsellors, as they called them: which was a great artifice of the designers of that Rebellion; for thereby (being then not hardened enough to caluminate the King openly) they would make the World believe they paid a just deference to his Majesty: yet slily wounded his Reputation through his Counsellors sides, leaving the application to the People. Tacitly insinuating, that the King being misled by such Councils, was not so Just, or Wise, as to be wished: and when afterwards they had got Power, they always made it one of their propositions, That the two Houses should have the nominating, 
That the two Houses should have the nominating of Privy-Counsellors. So in Henry the Third's time we find Mountfort's Model of Twenty four to redress the Kingdom, to choose Counsellors, etc.  or approving and removing the Privy-Council, or great Officers of State; pretending they would set such just and righteous Persons in those places, as would execute them for the public good only: and upon the same score (though on another pretence) they were importunate, that the Judges should hold their places tam diu quam se bene gesserint, rather than be removable at the King's pleasure. Thus by vote, without legal proof of Crimes, they blackened as many of the King's Privy-Council as they foresaw would thwart their designs, as Seducers of the King, and men of Arbitrary Principles; thereby to have them wholly removed from him (as we have had Addresses of a later date from an House of Commons against some great wise and Loyal Lords) by which severing from him such a body of his faithful Advisers, 
Their Design to remove some Privy-Counsellors, that some of their Party might be introduced.  and dangerously depriving him of the constant means (which the Law hath specially ordained him for his support) some of them endeavoured to get into their places, as was notoriously known to have been proposed, that if several of the leading men might have had chief places and honours, they would have let the Earl of Strafford live (as in another Treatise I hope to make clear) and by that mean● not only have enriched themselves, but have had the guidance of Affairs of State, and so by little and little brought about the Promotion of their friends, without regard to the Public.  
If we impartially consider the unreasonableness of this proposal, we shall find, 
The Mischiefs that would follow upon the Parliaments nominating Privy-Counsellors.  that by granting it, we must expect to suffer all the evils which Faction can produce. This were the ready way to kindle a fire in our bowels, which would first break out in our Country Elections, and divide the Families by irreconcilable hatred. For it cannot be imagined but that Power would bandy against Power, and Relations against Relations, 
See Answer to Observations.  to put a Son or Kinsman into the road to preferment; nor could the flames be quenched, but burn more vehemently even in the house: to which the insolence of some (obtaining Offices to which they are not fit) the shame and discontent of others repulsed, and the ambition of all, would be continual fuel; and the greatest misery of all would be, that were the corruption never so great, we could have but slender hopes of redress, since the prevailing Party (jealous of their honour) would constantly maintain their choice; and perhaps it would be necessary for them, one to wink at another, as it was manifestly seen in the long Parliament, when the most known Offenders, and active Instruments of the People's miseries, by striking in with the prevailing Party, were more safe than innocency could make them.  
It is enacted by King 
(i) 17 Car. 1. c. 10. The Limitations of the Power of the Privy-Council.  Charles the First, that neither his Majesty nor his Privy-Council have or aught to have any Jurisdiction by English Bill, Petition, Articles, Libel or any other Arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine or draw into question, determine, or dispose of the Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments, Goods or Chattels of any of the Subjects of this Kingdom; but that the same aught to be tried and determined in the ordinary Courts of Justice, and by the ordinary course of the Law.  
In the Oath of a 
(k) Rot. Pat. 5. H. 4. num. 14. Fleta, lib. 1. c. 17.  Privy-Counsellor, his duty is best manifested. First, That he shall as far forth as cunning and discretion suffereth, 
First Particular of a Privy-Counsellor's Oath.  truly, justly, and evenly counsel and advise the King in all matters to be commoned, treated and demanded in the King's Council, or by him as the King's Counsellor. Therefore Henry the Eighth wished that his Counsellors would commit simulation, dissimulation and partiality to the Porter's Lodge, when they came to sit in Council.  
Secondly, 
Second Branch, uprightness.  That in all things generally which may be to the King's honour and behoof, and to the good of his Realm, Lordships and Subjects (without particularity or exception of persons, not fearing or eschewing so to do for affection, love, meed, doubt or dread of any person or persons) that he shall with all his might and power, help and strengthen the Kings said Council, in all that shall be thought good to the same Council for the ●niversal good of the King and his Land, and for the peace, rest and tranquillity of the same. Therefore my Lord Cook 
(l) Instit. par. 4. fol. 53.  saith, these Counsellors, like good Sentinels, and Watchmen, consult of, and for the public good, and the honour, defence, safety, and profit of the Realm: they are his true Treasurers, and profitable Instruments of the State.  
Thirdly, That he shall keep secret the King's Counsel, 
Third Branch, Secrecy.  and all that shall be commoned by way of Counsel in the same; without, that he shall not common it, publish it or discover it by word, writing, or in any otherwise to any person out of the same Council, or to any of the same Council if it touch him, or if he be party thereof. So Valerius M. 
(m) Nihil magis opt●ndum quam ut rerum ger ●darum consdia, qu〈◊〉 ejus fieri poterit, quam maxim 〈…〉. Lib. 4.  saith, Nothing is more to be desired, than that the Counsels of things to be done, as much as possible, be secret. So Vegetius 
(n) Nulla sunt meliora consilia quam quae ignoraverit ●dversarius antequam facias. Consilia nisi sunt abscondita, exitum raro prospiciunt. Lib. 3. de Re militari.  hath of old pronounced, That no Counsels are better than those which the Adversary is ignorant of before they be executed: for unless Counsel be hidden and secret, they rarely attain their end.  
Fourthly, That 
(o) Rot. Pat. 11 H 4. num. 28.  he shall not for gift, meed, nor good, nor promise of good, by him nor by means of any other person, receive or admit, for any promotion, favouring, nor fordeclaring, letting or hindering of any matter or thing to be treated, or done in the Council. Therefore the part of a Counsellor is, Tu civem patremque geris, tu consule cunctis— Non tibi, nec tua te moveant, sed publica vota.  
Fifthly, That he shall withstand any person or persons, of what condition, estate or degree they be of, that would by way of feat, attempt or intent the contrary to the good of the King, peace of the Land, etc. and generally that he shall observe, keep, and do all that a good and true Counsellor ought to do to his Sovereign Lord.   

CHAP. XXXI. Of Ministers of State.  
I Join to the Privy Council Ministers of State, being they differ from them very little; some in name, others in degrees. For there 
(a) St. Alban's Essays, tit. Honour and Reputation.  are several qualifications of Subjects that serve a Prince. As first, those that are participes curarum, upon whom Princes discharge the greatest weight of their Affairs, 
The several Qualifications of Ministers of Princes.  as Ministers of State, and Privy-Counsellors. Secondly, Deuces Belli, such as Princes employ in their Armies and Militia. Thirdly, Gratiosi, Favourites, such as are a solace to the Prince, and harmless to the People. Fourthly, Negotii pares, such as not only have great places under the Prince, and execute them sufficiently, but also Judges and all sorts of Magistrates. For as Plutarch well observes, As the Master of the Ship chooseth the best Mariners, 
The Prince's Care in choosing his Ministers.  the Architect the best workmen; so a Prince should employ those that are fit to administer the Affairs of the Commonweal 
(b)  Gubernator optimos quaerit Nautas, Architecton doctissimos Ministros; ita Principes eos asciscunt, qui ad Rempublicam administrandam sunt idonei. . Generally it is requisite that Princes choose such as are more sensible of duty than of rising, and such as love business rather on Conscience than upon Bravery: and it is fit to discern a busy nature from a willing mind; for some are impatient of privateness, saith my Lord St. Alban, even in Age or sickness; like old Townsmen, that will be still sitting at the street-doors, though thereby they offer Age to scorn.  
Therefore as it is necessary that Ministers of State should be subservient to the Sovereign; so it is most requisite that a Prince should be careful in his choice of such as may most beneficially serve him and the Public. Some seem fit for Employment, and yet in places disappoint expectation. Omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset, saith 
(c) So Tacitus of Galba, lib. 1. Hist. Alieno Imperio felicior quam suo, vetus in familia nobilitas, magnae opes, ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia quam in virtutibus. P. 197. Edit. 5. Lips. Major privato visus, dum privatus fuit. 1. Hist. c. 11.  Tacitus of Galba; That in the opinion of all he was capable of Empire, if he had not discovered his insufficiency when he was Emperor. Therefore it is noted as a good Character of Piso 
(d) Quo nemo validius otia dilexit, aut facilius suffecit negotia, magisque quae agenda suntegit, sine ulla ostentatione agendi. Velleius Paterc. Actu otioso simillimus. , That none more vehemently loved recess from business, or with more ease underwent employment, or effected those things, which were to be done, more actively and without any ostentation. So 
(e) Annal. 13. Edit. Lips. 5. p. 138. Integre sancteque egit. procax otii, & potessati● temperantior.  Tacitus saith of Otho when he governed Portugal, that he was one loosely given, when he had little to do; but in Office and Rule, more stayed and temperate. Such a person is truly qualified for great Managery; it being an assured sign of a worthy and generous Spirit, whom Honour amends: Virtue in the Ambitious being violent, and in those in Authority, settled and calm. For Honour is, or should be, the place of Virtue; power to do good being the true and lawful end of aspiring, and Conscience of the same is the accomplishment of Man's rest.  
Men in great places (saith one 
(f) St. Alban's Essays, p. 42. How Great Ministers are Servants.  who made a great figure in his time) are thrice Servants: First to their Sovereign or the State. Secondly, Servants of Fame. Thirdly, Of business. So that they have no freedom either in their Persons, Actions or Time: their rising is laborious, their standing slippery, their recess either a Downfall or Eclipse; so that they had need borrow other men's opinions to think themselves happy: for if they judge by their own feeling, they cannot find it; for though Tacitus saith, Sunt plerumque Regum voluntates vehementes, & inter se contrariae; and though they serve a more benign Prince: yet they will find many they deal with, either vehement in their Wills, or irresolved. However the fatigue is so much the greater, when the Port cannot be gained without doubling, and tacking to save the Wind.  
Therefore it is most necessary, 
The necessary Qualifications of Ministers of State.  that great Ministers of State have extraordinary Accomplishments both in dexterity of dispatch, vast comprehension, virtuous resolvedness, and prudent cunctation; 
Nam occultat eorum semina Deus, & plerumque bonorum malorumque causae sub diversa specie latent. Panaegyr.  For as Pliny well notes, In most matters the Deity hides the seeds of things; and mostwhat the causes of good and bad things lie hid under the contrary appearances: So that it requires a great sagacity in a Minister of State, to foresee what the effects will be, of Causes and Councils, when there may intervene so many by-accidents, that can neither be foreseen nor prevented. Therefore not only great wisdom is required, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist ● Ethic. c. 8  but great experience; and when Ministers of State are endowed with these qualifications, whatever the event be, yet they are not to be blamed, and mostly such grounded resolves succeed well: For a wise man 
(i) Sapiens dominabitur 〈◊〉.  overrules the Stars. So a Minister of State, who with sufficient ability, Diligence, Care, Fidelity, Prudence, and Affection, 
Their danger of being supplanted.  serves his Prince and his Country (which are no ways incompatible) needs not fear the Detraction of some, the mining of others, or an inglorious downfall: for the Government loseth more by such an one's laying aside, than he that hath served his Prince Conscientiously, justly and wisely, shall lose. Those whom either their lucky Stars, or conspicuous accomplishments have placed within the Circle of the Court, are subject indeed to the greatest danger of inglorious Exits, if they be not the most circumspect of Mortals. For the envious and ambitious (who torment themselves that they are eclipsed by those who interpose betwixt the Sunshine of the Prince's favour) envy them the Glory of Administration, and by cunning and artificial Insinuations of ill Conduct, false measures and designs, are assiduously heaving them out of their places; which if upon false Suggestions they prevail to effect, by successive Removals (under pretence of reforming matters) all things are disjointed, the Cement of Government dissolved, and greater Errors committed by too frequent fresh Applications, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  whereby the Malady is made incurable by the multitude of Physicians.  
Amongst other Rules, which Princes may find it convenient to observe, in choosing ministers of State; It is one of no small Moment (provided they can be as well sitted) that they 
(k) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  be of ancient Houses, and persons of Fortune. For Tacitus 
(l) Insita mortalibus natura recentem alicrum foelicitatem agris oculis introspicere. 2. Hist.  notes, That it is inbred to men to look asquint on the Advancements, not so much new, as of new Men; who coveting too much Power and Honour, by that means contract Envies. For as he further 
(m) Nunquam satis fida Potentia, ubi nimia est. Ibid.  observes, The Power that is in Excess, is not to be confided in, being mostwhat Treacherous. Therefore 
(n) Vestra vos, non Principis fortur: metiamini. Panegyr. Nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile, & fluxum est, quam potentia non sua vi nixa. Tacit. 13. Annal.  Pliny adviseth, That Ministers of State should take their measures by their own, and not their Prince's Fortune; for it is a certain Truth, That the Power wears best, and is most stable and durable that is founded upon Virtue, and purchased by it, not by any little Arts, Wealth, or Dissimulation, according to that of Claudian, — emitur sola Virtute Potestas.  
When Ministers of State desire to keep their Station, they must studiously endeavour to avoid Envy and Emulation, especially, not to give any occasion by their own Arrogance.  

(o) Tanta illi comitas in socios, mansuetudo in hosts, visuque & auditu venerabilis, cum magnitudinem & gravitatem fortunae retineret, invidiam & arrogantiam essugerat. 2. Annal.  Tacitus describing the qualifications of Germanicus (who had the Command of a great part of the Army, and the management of some Provinces) saith, That he was courteous and affable to his Companions, merciful and mild to his Enemies, venerable in his Aspect and Discourses, and that while he retained the greatness and Port of the highest Fortune, he avoided Envy and Arrogance; which Character will very well become any great Minister of State.  
privy-Counsellors are very well to consider that they are chosen to manage the weighty parts of Government, and ease their Prince: but they are not to make it their Business by little Arts of ingratiating themselves with their Sovereign, to study only to get Honour and Wealth, and serve a Prince's time; but so to act, as not only the present Prince, but his Successors may feel the advantage of their Administration, remembering that of Tiberius, 
(p) Princip●s mortales, Rempublicam aternam esse. Tacit. 3. Annal.  That Princes are Mortal, but the Government Immortal; which is most true in hereditary Monarchy.  
It is an odd account that 
(q) Per cultum & munditias, copiaque & affluentia, luxu propier: Suberat tamin vigour animi ingentil us negotiis par, eo acrior quo somnum & inertiam magis ostentabat. Idem, lib. ●od.  Tacitus gives us of salustius Crispus, that he imitating Maecenas, without Senatorian Dignity, outstripped in Power with the Prince, many of the Consuls, and such as had triumphed, and that by a different way, than had been before used; by richness of Garb, delicateness, living splendidly, even bordering upon Luxury: yet he retained a vigorousness of Mind, fit for great Employments, and so much the smarter, by so much as he seemed more sluggish and unactive. Yea he was next to Maecenas, on whom the Secrets of the Emperors rested. But withal he lets us see what old Ministers of State may expect, and what they must not be troubled at, if they find happen to them, That in their old Age they retain the Countenance rather of the Prince's Friendship, than Power, as he expresseth it, aetate provecta speciem magis, in amicitia Principis, quam vim tenuit.  
The State Mountebanks of 1641. (that they might make the Ulcer seem greater, 
The Arts of the Long Parliament to remove Ministers of State.  and more dangerous for the advantage of larger Application) first aggravated the Grievances the People lay under, by the ill conduct of the prime Ministers of State, and by the representing a plausible Idea of better Government (if they might have the modelling of it) courted by little and little the well meaning, and captivated them with a fair view of its speculative Excellence, whereby their Fancies were raised to the expectation of a golden Age, and the cunning and intrieguing Factors (pretending to have no other design but to take care of the public) gained to themselves the Honourable name of Patriots.  
Having thus tickled their Proselytes, and gained their applause, their next work was to pickeer some great Officers, and Blackening them with the name of Male-Administrators, or corrupt Officers, slily endeavoured to obtain an Opinion of their own incorruptness; whereas their great design was only to displace such, to make Niches for their own Statues; and when they found it was difficult to get such outed of their Preferments, the People were acquainted that such and such were the only Rubs, and close Enemies to the State: and when they could have no particular Evidence against them, than they made the People believe, that such managed their Designs so much more closely and secretly, whereby they could get no public Proof against them; and so they left them to the Precondemnation of the People, which served for Jury and Witnesses: and being thus presented, as ingrateful Monsters to their County, they were baited in every Coffee-house, and Alebench, till at last the loud Cry runs through the Woods and Lawns; and every one was armed to destroy those reputed Wolves and Foxes that were believed would destroy their Flocks; and all the Umbrages of Misgovernment, the real or imaginary Infelicities, were heaped upon the Animals designed for Sacrifice, and they were singled for victims to conciliate better times. And thus such Designers being prosperous in their Undertake against the great Minister of State, the most renowned Earl of Strafford, (whose Fall succeeding Ages will never forget) they singled out others by way of Impeachment, both Bishops and Judges, as was most conspicuous in our late Troubles, imitated by the Slingers of Paris; which is, and ever will be the usual Method of all who design to introduce a change of Government.  
Therefore wise Princes, when they have chosen and had Experience of the Ability and Fidelity of such Ministers of State, are careful to shelter them from the Attacques of the Envious and Ambitious.  
For these of all others should be such as have an humble, dutiful, and diligent Love for their Prince, and his true Service; therefore it is unsafe to abandon them, if such. That of Micipsa 
(r) Non Exercitus, neque Thesauri, praesidia Regni sunt, verum amiei. Sall. Jug.  being most true, That neither Armies or Treasures are so sure Defences of a Kingdom, as true Cordial Friends. So 
(s) Praecipuum Principis opus esse amicos parare. Panaegyr.  Pliny tells Trajan, It is the chief work of a Prince to procure Friends.  
Of such as these it is that 
(t) Ego ita comperi, omnia Regna, Civitates, Nationes, usque eo prosperum Imperium habuisse, dum apud eos vera consilia valuerunt: Vbieunque gratia, timor, voluptas, ea corrupere, post paulo imminutae opes, deinde ademptum Imperium. Sallust. ad Caesarem.  Sallust saith, he hath found that all Kingdoms, Cities and Nations, have had Prosperous Empire, while true Councils have prevailed; but where Favour, Fear, or Pleasures have corrupted them, they have grown poor, and lost their Rule.  
Above all, Princes should avoid Flatteries; for these always give them the wrong end of the Perspective: therefore 
(u) Pleraque ab eo vis, adulationibus abiorum in melius deflexit, nec tamen temperamenti egebat, cum aequabili auctoritate & gratia apud Principem viguerit. 6. Annal.  Tacitus gives that Commendation to Lepidus, That he converted most things to the better, from the cruel Flatteries of others, and yet needed no attemperament, for that he continued in equal Authority and Favour with his Prince: and of Cornelianus Piso 
* 4. Annal.  he saith, Nullins servilis Sententiae sponte Auctor, & quoties necessitas ingrneret, prudenter moderans; He never was willingly Author of any servile Opinion, and as often as there was need, he prudently moderated.  
I shall only annex to this, what may in general serve as a Character of an able and useful Minister of State, faintly drawn from a great Original.  
Whoever designs to serve his Prince and Country, in the Administration of Affairs, 
The Method of attaining to be a Minister of State.  must have had a liberal Education, spent a great portion of his time in diligently perusing Ancient and Modern Histories, Memoires of great men, the Laws and Government of his own and Foreign Countries, and the best Treatises of Politics, and then consider the most judicious and accomplished Persons; and amongst them, such principally, as in their several Stations have the Practical Part of Affairs committed to them, both in Courts of Judicature, the Exchequer, and Admiralty; and in these especially note their dexterity for their Employments, wherein their Eminencies appear, how their Interests are interwoven, or independent; what their dispositions and inclinations are, especially in their obedience to the Government, usefulness to it; their Treatableness, Avarice, Pride, Ambitious or Factious Propensities; as well prying into the Vices they conceal, as the laudable Qualities they make themselves conspicuous by; distinguishing betwixt the natural and constrained tempers of every one.  
If such an one be not Consiliarius natus, he ought to get himself early chosen a Member of the House of Commons, and then diligently read all such Books as treat of that Honourable House, peruse the Journals, note well and weigh, not only what he finds there, but also all the Speeches of the leading men, the force of their Arguments, and the tendencies of them: Mark well who are forwardest to supply the Government, whose Talon lies in contriving wholesome Laws for the benefit of the Subject, who are the best Orators, who the subtlest or solidest, who affect Popularity, who are suggesting suspicions of the increase of the King's Power, who the greatest informers of Grievances, who cut the Thread evenest betwixt the Royal Prerogative and the Subject's Liberties; in all these well pondering the grounds upon which every one bottom their Arguments, contenting himself to be an Auditor and Register for some while; in his Votes following the wisest and least biased by private Interest.  
During the time he is under the Discipline of this Noble School, he must fill up the intervals of his vacant hours, either in perusing such learned Authors as treat of the Subjects have been debated in the House, or in conversation with the eminentest experienced Members, or with such of the Court as he may be best informed from.  
During all which time, he must intermingle the Study of the Laws of those Foreign Countries his Prince hath Correspondence with, and obtain true Characters of their Ministers of State, their regulation of Trade, their Taxes and Gabels, their Military Force, the disposedness of any Parties to Faction; and consider wherein his own Prince, or a Foreigner hath better Laws for the good Government of the Subjects, and for the preserving the Crown in Splendour and Power.  
A Person thus qualified and fitted for his Master's Service, and the public good of his Country, cannot long want an opportunity of being noted; and in peaceable times, some Ministers of State will be desirous to obtain his assistance, and will be ready to befriend him for their own advantages, to alleviate their own burdens, and his Prince will be desirous to be served by a Person of such a Fund.  
If the times be turbulent and factious, it is not amiss for such a Person (during his Noviceship) to mingle himself with the popular, and Malcontent Nobility; whereby he may know the bottom of their designs, and the plausibleness of their Pretences, the strength of their Reasons, as well as of their party, and the tendencies of the distinct Interests, that may be united, in rendering the Government ingrateful to the People, though not in the methods of modelling or subverting it.  
This, I must confess, is a dangerous point, and requires one that hath an Heart and Brain all Amulet against the infection of Disloyalty, and is dexterous enough to cajole such a Party; which he may the easilier do, by appearing only as a rasa Tabula, and desirous of following others conduct, and a well wisher to his Country; and then he shall be sure not to miss a serious courtship from that party.  
How then to extricate himself from those Thickets, Brambles, Coverts, or Earth's, (wherein he hath entered to unkennel the Foxes) will be a great Masterpiece, and requires no common agility, and deliberate forethought. One of the Houses of Parliament is the fittest Theatre for him to unmask himself in, where he may at one great step pass over to the Loyal side: which will be done with more advantage, if he take some Critical time, when the signalizing his Loyalty will be more useful, as well as endearing to his Sovereign; and when Courage and Resolution will best bestead his Affairs.  
Then he is to discover his Talon by demonstratively manifesting his true Zeal for, and justifying the Government in concurring with the faithfulest and ablest Ministers of State; or putting himself in the Van, and without Affectation or Passion, with weighty Reasons, bold and natural utterance, smartness of Judgement, and Learning, fully determine the point in debate; and as often as there is occasion, reinforce his Argument with fresh matter.  
Here he is to set up his rest, being resolved, for his whole life, never to desert the Interest, after he hath upon so good deliberation resolved upon it.  
This Action will soon he discovered to his Prince, of whose Privy-Council (if he were not before) we may suppose he will soon be admitted. Hither he must carry a resolution, fixed and unalterable, to intent solely his Master's Service, and the benefit of his People, that nothing of the Rights of the Crown be diminished, or of the Liberties of the People be invaded. Here no double or sinister dealing must enter his thoughts, he must be the same in his Prince's Cabinet, as at the Council-Board; he must use a true and dutiful diligence above his fellows, in attending his Prince's Person, and his Councils; must be free from unlawful Ambition, Bribery, and By-Ends; all over Oiled, that none may fasten a gripe upon him; be free, debonair and affable to all he converseth with; but withal, wholly reserved as to the discovery of his Master's Designs: Ready to prefer none but such as may be truly serviceable to their King and Country; culling out, and recommending to his Employment, only Sober, Discreet and Useful Persons, in their several Capacities, and never supporting or countenancing any that once falsify expectation.  
By the practising of all the respective qualifications I have (according to my poor Ability) set down in this Chapter, and that of the Privy-Council, and those more excellent Methods and Rules his own great Wisdom will suggest, he shall attain to a great trust with his Master, and a great respect and veneration from all the Wise and Sober, and shall transmit a noble Example, and durable Pattern to Posterity.  
If it so fall out, that such a Minister of State, cannot in some particular Affair conform his Judgement to that of his Colleagues, or the Resolutions of his Prince: It will be glorious in him, (after the laying open, with all modesty and strength of Reason, the grounds of his Opinion) to submit quietly to his Prince's Pleasure, with that resignedness a Servant doth to a great Master, and he will be sure to reap the benefit of it: For if his Prince, in the Sequel, find his Counsel was sound, and not ill timed, he will employ him in greater matters, and with more confidence than before; and if such a Minister of State find that he hath been too partial, or biased in his Opinion, he will soon find his own error, and be less apt for the future to commit the like.  
However, he is, and ever will be, a true Servant to his Prince, and a good Minister of State, who, ex animo, and with all possible sincerity, can take as much pleasure in obeying his Sovereign's Will, when he is laid aside, as he did in serving of him so long as he was employed by him: Tu Marcellus eras.— 
Virg●l, lib. 6. v. 883.    

CHAP. XXXII. Of the King's Sovereignty in appointing Magistrates.  
IF it were possible, saith 
(a) In Orat. The necessity of Magistrates, to supply the Prince's Unubiquitariness.  Libanius, that Princes in their own Bodies could be every where, there would be no need of Magistrates to be sent into the Provinces: they themselves being able to administer Justice unto all, as the Sun is sufficient to give light unto them: but seeing that cannot be (no more than they can fight all their Battles with their own Hands and Swords) therefore they must execute their Authority by others, and determine Justice, and causes of right and wrong, not by their own Tongue and understanding, but by the Sentence of others; so (as the 
(b) Polit. lib. 3. c. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Philosopher observes) making to themselves many Eyes and Ears, Hands and Feet.  
It is incumbent upon the Prince in his safe keeping of his Empire (saith the 
(c) Cicero ad Fratrem.  Orator) that he do not exhibit himself only, but all the Ministers likewise of his power to be useful to the Public; and, as Plutarch 
(d) Precept. Polit.  adds, to place every one according to his capacity in his several employment.  
For one 
(e) Philo de Creatione Principis.  man though he have never such alacrity in body and mind, cannot be sufficient to undergo the greatness, and multitude of business which every day do flow upon the neck of another, unless they choose co-adjutors, out of the best men of known Wisdom, Courage, Prudence, and Piety, who not only are free from Pride (the frequent concomitant of Power) but are abhorrers of it, as an hateful, and exceeding great evil. For such men are most fit helpers and assistants to good and worthy Princes.  
Therefore 
(f) Lib. 1. c. 10.  Bodin, Arnisaeus 
(g) Pag. 27. All Magistracy derived from the Sovereign. , and other Digesters of Politics, make it the third right of Majesty to appoint and constitute Magistrates, who having their Authority flowing from the Prince as the fountain, derive from him all their Power of command. So 
(h) Dio.  Maecenas adviseth Augustus, ut solus sine Plebe, Populo, ac Senatu, Magistratus crearet, that he alone, without the People and Senate create Magistrates: and Zonaras rightly affirms, that creatio Magistratuum maxima pars est muneris Imperatoris, the creation of Magistrates is the greatest part of the Office of an Emperor. The Sovereign possessing his proper Power without a Superior; 
(i) Arnis●us, cap. 11. p. 267.  the Magistrates are Instruments, by which the Sovereign executes his Commands: for it is reason he alone have the power of appointing them, who hath the right 
(k) Intercidere Magistratuum iniquitatem, infectumque reddere qui●quid fieri non eportuerit. Plin. Panaegyr.  to redress the unjust Actions of the Magistrates, and to make void whatsoever ought not to have been done by them. 
(l) Lampridius in Alexandro. Meliorem esse Rempublicam & prope tutiorem, in qua Princeps malus sit, ea in qua mali Princip● Ministri.  Hence it is, a Prince is to be very solicitous in the choice of Magistrates; for it is better for a Commonwealth, and almost safer, when a Prince is evil, than when the Prince's Ministers are so: Therefore in the choice of them, the indoles, aptness and ability of the persons for their respective Offices are principally to be regarded; for 
(m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Plut. Polit. Pracept.  omnia non pariter rerum sunt omnibus apta. Some are fit for 
(n) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Tiut. Polit. Pracept.  Military, and others for Civil commands; 
* Properti●s. lib 3. The use of various Magistrates for vario●; Employments.  some for the Consulting, Contriving part, others for the Executive; some because there is use of their Popularity, others of their Prudence, others of their Justice; some to conciliate the Subjects dutifulness to their Prince, others to represent the Prince gracious to the People; some for the care of the Prince's Revenue, that he never want a Fund against all contingencies; others to see the dispending of it for the Prince's honour, and his own and the People's benefit. So that in 
(o) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Tiut. Polit. Pracept.  whomsoever any, or especially all Virtues, are conspicuous, much is to be attributed to him, and a Prince's Eye should soon discover him to employ him according to his Talon.  
Some Magistrates are absolutely necessary for the Administration of the Government, without whom there cannot be that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Philosopher calls it: such are Lord Chancellors, Lord Treasurers, Lord Lieutenants, Judges, Sheriffs, etc. others for the more splendid part of the Government, which are Officers of the Court rather than Magistrates, as Master of the Horse, Grooms of the Stole, Bedchamber and Privy-Chamber Gentlemen, Master of Ceremonies, Kings of Arms, etc.  
Therefore the Philosopher 
(p) Absque necessariis Magistratibus Civitas ne consistere quidem potest; absque its qui ad ornatum & 〈◊〉 linem pertinent, praclare adminislrari non potest. 6. Polit. c. 8.  rightly observes, That without necessary Magistrates a City cannot subsist; and without those who are for Ornament and Beauty, the City cannot be administered honourably.  
It is of excellent use to the Public, as well as advantageous to themselves, that the young Nobility and Gentry be bred up in Learning, 
Young Nobility and Gentry to be so educated as they may be fitted for Magistracy.  Military Discipline, and all other ways that might accomplish them for the service of their Prince and Country: for where a Prince can be served by the Nobility and ancient Gentry, it much facilitates the execution of their trusts; but in some cases it may be requisite to employ those of great Wisdom, Judgement and Diligence (the Endowments of noble Minds) though not of so noble Extract. So 
(q) 6. Annal.  Maecenas advised Augustus that he should choose the praefectus praetorio, out of the Horsemen, lest if he were one of the Nobility he might attempt something against the Prince: and so it is noted in 
(r) Quod p●r negotiis ●eque ●upra erat.  Tacitus, That the Province was given to Sabinus, not for any excellency, but that he was fit and not above the employment. But this caution is unnecessary where Kingdoms are hereditary, and depend not upon the approbation of Soldiery or Senate. 
Princes not to give too great Powers to any.  Above all things Princes should take care that they commit not any of their Royal Prerogatives to the Magistrates, or their Curators: 'Tis not safe for a Prince to intrust any of these in a Subject's hands; for it is by many Histories apparent, that when by reason of a Prince's Captivity, Minority, his prosecuting some War out of his Country (whereby a Kingdom cannot be governed without a Viceroy or Protector, with the whole Authority of a Prince) the sweetness of this Power hath tempted them to usurp or do ill Offices to their Prince or People. 
(s) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 5. c. 11.  Hence the Philosopher adviseth not to make such great, who in Wit and Manners are bold and daring.  
Therefore it is not safe for Princes to keep Viceroys long in their employments, especially if there be any danger of their Ambitious aims to get the Sovereignty into their own hands; or that they will not be observant of the due Execution of the Laws, or for private ends will suppress the Nobility, 
Great Ministers not to be long continued in the same Station.  or oppress the People; by their Interest pervert the course of Justice, or introduce new Laws, by surprising the Sovereign in gaining his consent. In all such cases the rule of the 
(t) Qui parvo tempore Magistratui praesunt, non tam facile nocere possunt quam qui longo.  Philosopher is most true, They that for a short time obtain the Magistracy, cannot so soon hurt, as they which enjoy it long; as he instanceth in Demagogues in Popular Government, and the Dynastae in Oligarchies, which by that means became Tyrants.  
Julius Caesar 
(u) Clapmarius de Arcanis Imperil, lib. 2. c. 18.  and Augustus made all their Magistrates annually; whereby they gratified all the eminent men of the Commonwealth by rotation: but 
(w) Alii taedio novae curae, semel placita pro aeternis servavisse, quidam invidia, ne plures fruerentur; sunt qui existiment, ut callidum ejus ingenium, ita anxium judicium.  Tiberius did otherwise, giving this reason for it, That Horseleeches having sucked much blood are at quiet, and so the biting of fresh men are most sharp. Some think, saith Tacitus, he did it only to seclude others from enjoying of them, and to prevent his yearly trouble in choosing, which as it would oblige the Elected, so would disoblige the Candidates; but most ascribe it to the subtlety of his Nature, quod nec 
(x) Tacitus 1. Annal. cap. ult.  eminentes virtutes sectabatur, & rursum vitia oderit; ab optimis periculum sibi, à pessimis dedecus publicum metuebat; He did not make great search, or take much care to find men of the most eminent Virtues, and yet he hated the Vicious; fearing from the best danger to himself, and from the worst disgrace to the Commonweal.  
In our constitution of Government, 
The Sovereign's Power to change Magistrates.  a most excellent temper is observed, where by the Prince's Power is reserved to change the prime Ministers of State and Judicature at his pleasure; which obligeth them to great care to act justly in their Places, and prevents Sedition, where any other had the Power of Electing: for it is the Power of choosing in any other than the Sovereign, that is the only cause of Faction; not what the 
(y) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 2. Polit. c. 5.  Philosopher notes against Socrates, That the same continually being Magistrates, is the cause of Sedition, by reason of the Envy of the rejected Candidates, and also among Spirited and Martial People that expect those employment.  
The Kings of England have undoubtedly the sole Power of creating, and appointing Magistrates, 
See more of this in the next Chapter.  and Officers of greatest Authority. So 
(z) Smith de Repub. Angliae, lib. 2.  the grave Author of the Commonwealth of England affirms, That in the appointing all the great Officers and Ministers of the Realm, whether Spiritual, or Temporal, the highest are immediately in the King's Power to nominate, and the inferior by Authority derived from him.  
So the Kings of England appoint the High Commissioner, and all other the great Ministers and Officers in Scotland; the Lord Lieutenant, Lord Justices, and other great Ministers and Officers in Ireland, and by Letters Patents appoint a Prorex, locum tenens, or Guardian of the Realm in their absence, before whom even Parliaments have been held: but it were endless to descend to the particular employments of Magistrates under the Sovereign. Therefore I shall only note what the 
(a) MS. Speech, 1 Eliz. penes Rad. Thoresly de Leedes, Gen.  Chancellor in the Queen's name said to Sir Thomas Gargrave, chosen Speaker of the Commons House, That to the head of every body Politic, b●●ngeth immediately or mediately the assignment, and admitting of every Member of the Body to his Ministry, and Duty; the contrary whereof were monstrous in Nature and Reason.  
It is both a great glory and happiness to a Prince when he is served by Magistrates of great probity: for the skill and watchfulness, 
The necessary Care of a Prince in choosing Magistrates.  as well as indulgent care of a Prince is thereby discovered, and revered in such a choice; and the evil Complexion of the People is chargeable mostly on the Magistrates. Therefore what the Chancellor 
(b) MS. Speech Trim. Term. 1557.  in a Speech in the Star-Chamber, by the Queen's direction told the Justices, is applicable to all sorts of Magistrates, That the not, or remiss doing of Justice, must by the Prince be charged upon their shoulders, as the immediate Executors of the Law.  
The qualifications of Magistrates may be the Subject of a Common place; I shall only hint some more necessary, referring the rest to the succeeding Chapter. First they ought to be Persons undisturbed with Passions; for as they are appointed to correct the Vicious, so they should begin the Reformation at home. Chilon's 
(c) Laertius in vita Chilonis.  Brother desiring to know why he was not chosen at Sparta as well as Chilon, he answered that he knew how to bear an Injury, which his Brother did not; for in Public employments those who are the Censores morum, and chastise the Infringers of the Laws, must expect Calumnies and evil Entreaties from the incorrigible and debauched: and such must be resolved to perform their duty without any other by-end of Revenge, Tyranny and Imperiousness on the one hand; or hasty, razed Cholerickness, Partiality or Corruptness on the other.  
Plato 
(d) Lib. 4. de LL.  adviseth that the wealthiest be chosen for the better support of the Dignity; but withal, that they be such as are exemplary in obeying the Laws. For none are more fit to serve their Prince and profit the Subjects, than such as are obedient to the Laws, which when they make a rule of their own Actions, they will be sure to exact it of others.  
It is great disparagement to a Prince, to choose men of vicious or uncommendable lives, or such as have not worth and honour to commend them. So the Princes of Europe think the Grand Signior not so well served by Slaves, nor was it so commendable in the Roman Emperors to make their Freemen of greater Power with them, in the managery of greater affairs, than Consuls or Senators; which made 
(e) Praecipuum indicium non magni Principis, magni Liberti. Panaegyr.  Pliny say, It was the principal sign of a Prince not great, where the Freemen were great.  
The Prince cannot be presumed to choose his Magistrates by his own knowledge of their abilities, and fitness for their several Employments, but must trust such as are about him: therefore it becomes them well to know the qualifications of such as are to bear Office; for the Rule of Tacitus 
(f) Melius officiis & administrationibus non peccaturos praeficere, quam damnare cum pe●●arint. Vita Agricolae.  is to be observed, That it is better not to prefer to Offices and Administrations such as will transgress, than to condemn them who have transgressed.   

CHAP. XXXIII. Of the Sovereign's appointing Judges, Courts of Justice, and other Officers.  
HAving treated in the last Chapters of such as have a general inspection into, and (by the Sovereign's Election, and placing them) a power of advising, at least, how the whole frame of Government is to be disposed, as both Prince and People may be happy: I come now more particularly to the Ministerial Officers of Justice, such as are the Lord Chancellor or Keeper, Lord Treasurer, the two Lord Chief Justices, and the rest of the Judges, whether they be the Judges at Westminster, or those of Assizes, Oyer and Terminer, to try Causes in their respective Circuits.  
I undertake this Task, Lugduni tanquam Rhetor dicturns ad Aram, 
The Author's Apology.  or one that procul profanus adorat: The Subject being only fit to be handled by such as have read and digested the whole Body of the Laws, and are eminent in the Profession of them: whereas I must own myself to have tasted only so much of that Ornamental and most useful Study, as may quicken a dull and languid Appetite, to praise, or rather admire it; than that I can hope to benefit the judicious Reader, by an imperfect Description of their Calling and Office, who by the Sovereign are appointed to be the Oracles of the Law, and the Ministers of his Justice, whose great Wisdom and Knowledge all aught to reverence. But as they make so great a Figure in the Government, I could not omit them, though it be but to salute the Skirts, and hold up the Train of their Scarlet Robes.  

SECT. 1.  
IN Edward the Elders Days, those that gave Judgement under the King, 
King Edward the Elder's Law about Judges. Gerefa.  had the name Gerefa, under which name, aldermans, Earls, Precedents, Prefects, Governors, etc. were comprehended. From whence with the Germans, the word Grave is used, for an Earl, President, Judge, etc. and our Sheriff is from Scyre gerev, Raeve, or Graeve of the Shire. The Charge in that King's Laws, runs thus, 
(a) Eadweard Cyning vyt thaem Gerefum eallum, that gede man swa ribte domas swa gerihtoste cunnon, & hit on thaere dombec stand; ne wandigeth for nanum thingum folcrihte to gerecanne, etc.  Eadward the King wills, that all his Graeves give so right Judgement as they can most Righteously, as it stands in their Judgement Book, (that is, as we may suppose, in the written Laws) fearing for no thing or cause, to declare or pronounce Right or Justice to the People. The which publishing of Justice, they shall appoint at certain times or Terms when they will perform it, and declare the same. So that in this seems to be comprehended what is more at large in the Oath of a Judge in After-Ages.  
We must principally consider that the King is the Fountain and original of all Justice in his Kingdom; 
The King is the Fountain of Justice.  therefore Bracton 
(b) Lib. 3. cap. 9, 10. Rex & non alius debet judicare, si solas ad id sufficere possit, cum ad hoc per veritatem Sacramenti teneatur astrictus, sicut Dei Vicartus & Minister in terra.  saith, That the King, and not another, aught to judge, if he alone were sufficient to do it, being bound by his Oath to it; therefore the King ought to exercise the Power of the Law, as God's Vicar. But if our Lord the King be not sufficient to determine all Causes, that the Burden may be lighter, divided among several Persons, he ought to choose Men wise, and fearing God, 
See Britton, fol. 1. Coke, 4. Inst. c. 7.  and appoint them Justiciaries.  
Yet this surrogating of Judges in the King's respective Courts, doth not divest the King of his Power; for as the same 
(c) Rex habet ordinariam Jurisdictionem, & omnia Jura manu sua, quae nec ita delegari possunt, quin ordinaria remaneant cum ipso Rege.  Bracton saith, The King hath ordinary Jurisdiction, and all Laws are in his Hands, which cannot be so delegated, but that they remain with the King. From which, and other Authorities, Mr. Lambard saith, 
(d) Archaion.  That the Courts derive their Powers from the Crown, their original; and drawing by one and one (as it were so many Roses) from the Garland of the Prince, leave nevertheless the Garland itself undespoiled of the Sovereign's Virtue in the Administration of Justice.  
Therefore saith Sir Edward 
(e) Tit. Discontinue de Process, part 7. 30.  Coke, By the Common Law all Pleas were discontinued by the Death of the King; and Process awarded, and not returned before his Death, was lost— For by the Death of the King, not only the Justices of both the Benches, and the Barons of the Exchequer, but Sheriffs also, and Escheators, and all Commissions of Oyer and Terminer, Gaol-Delivery, and Justices of Peace, are determined by the Death of the Predecessor that made them.  
Therefore the Statute of 25 Ed. 3. declares it to be Treason, if any man kill the Chancellor, 
The Judges represent the King's Person.  Treasurer, or the King's Justices, of the one Bench or the other, Justices in Eyre or Assize, or any other Justices assigned to hear and determine, being in their places, doing their Offices. The 
(f) Id. 3. Instit. p. 18 & 140.  reason whereof is assigned, because all these represent the King's Royal Person, in his own Courts, by his own Commission under the Great Seal, in the very Execution of the King's Royal Office, viz. Administration of public Justice to his People.  
As therefore the King at his Coronation, 
(g) Fancies fieri in omnibus Justiciis tuis aequam & rectam Justitiam, & discretionem in misericordia & veritate, secundum vires tuas.  taketh an Oath to make to be done, in all his Judgements, equal and right Justice, and Discretion in Mercy and Truth, according to his Power: So he lays the Burden thereof upon the Judges, according to that of E. 3. for the Pleasure of God, and quietness of our Subjects, as to save our Conscience, and keep our Oath, by the assent of our great Men, and other of our Council, we have commanded our Justices, that they shall from henceforth do even Law, and Execution of right to all our Subjects, Rich and Poor, without having regard to any Person, etc. Therefore before this in 
(h) Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus aut differemus Justitiam vel Rectum. c. 29.  Magna Charta we find, that the King will sell, deny or defer Justice to none.  
Yet from hence it doth not follow, that if in the opinion of some, the King doth not do Justice, that therefore any Subject should conclude, as the Master of the Hospitallers of Jerusalem in England, at Clerkenwell, Anno 1252. 37 H. 3. did. The Story is thus told by 
(i) Hist. p. 826, 827. Edit. prioris.  Matthew Paris:  
The Master waiting a time, when he might discourse with the King, he complained of some Injuries done him, 
The King loseth not his Authority, tho' he do not Justice.  and shown the King some Charters of Protection, of himself and his Ancestors. The King answered with an Oath, and in Wrath; You Prelates and Religious, especially Templars and Hospitallers, have so many Liberties and Charters, that they make you proud, etc. Therefore they ought prudently to be revoked, which imprudently have been granted to you; for even the Pope oftentimes revokes his Grants, with a non obstante: and the King told him, so he would do. To all which the 
(k) Cui Magister Hospitalis respondit alac●iter, vultu elevato, Quid est quod dici●, Domine Rex? Absit ut in ore tuo recitetur hoc verbum illepidum & absurdum. Quamdia Justitiam observas, Rex esse poteris: & quam cito bane infregeris, Rex esse desines.  Master (saith Matt. Paris) answered cheerfully, and with a lifted up Countenance, What is this you say, my Lord the King? far be it from you to speak so absurd a thing. As long as you observe Justice you may be a King; and as soon as ever you break this, you cease to be a King. Thus he would make Dominion founded in Justice, as others in Grace. But I need not add many Authorities upon this Head; for by the universal Suffrage of the profound Lawyers, the Kings of England solely nominate, create, and 
(l) Dyer, fol. 56.  appoint all the Judges of the great Courts at Westminister, and may remove them at their Pleasure, and alone make 
(m) Davis. 45.  and appoint Justices of Oyer and Terminer, of Gaol-delivery, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, and the like Officers, and 
(n) Coke 4. Inst. n. 4. 14. 114. 117.  remove them when they see Cause: and the 
(o) Bulstrod. 3. 296. 1 H. 7. c. 25.  Prerogative of making Judges cannot be given or claimed by a Subject.  
The King hath also Power to name, create, make, 
(p) Sheppard's Grand Abridgement, part 3. p. 53.  and remove the great Officers Ecclesiastical and Civil, by Sea and Land, as Archbishops, Bishops, (by way I suppose of Congee deslier, 
The King's placing and displacing all Great Officers.  and Translation) Lord Chancellor or Keeper, Lord Treasurer, Lord Precedent, Lord Privy-Seal, Lord High Steward, Lord Admiral, Lord High Constable, Earl Marshal, Lord Chamberlain, Privy Counsellors, the Marshal or Steward of the King's House, and the rest of the Officers of his Household, Master of the Horse, Officers of the Mint, of the Castles, Port-Towns, and Shipping, Lord Lieutenants, and many more too tedious to be named. So that either mediately or immediately, all Officers are by the King's appointment; which is not only a manifest badge, but a necessary appurtenance of the Sovereignty.   

SECT. 2 The Court of High-Steward.  
THE King's Courts have been various, 
The Court of the High-Steward.  as that of the Privy-Council, called the Council-Board, of which I have spoke before. The Court of the High-Steward of England, entitled, Placita Coronae coram— Seneschallo Angliae, disused since the Reign of Henry the Fourth; and now a Lord High-Steward is only appointed, pro hac vice, with limitations for the Trials of some Peers of the Kingdom upon Indictment. His Power anciently was 
(q) Coke 4 Inst. c. 4.  Supervidere & regulare sub Rege, & immediate post Regem, totum Regnum Angliae & omnes Ministros Legum, infra idem Regnum, temporibus Pacis, & Guerrarum. The next Court which is now totally suppressed, was the Honourable Court of Star-Chamber, 
The Star-chamber Court.  of ancient time styled Coram Rege & Concilio suo, & coram Rege & Concilio suo in Camera stellata, of which I shall have occasion to write something in the Chapter below.   

SECT. 3 The Court of King's-Bench.  
AS to the great and standing Courts, 
The King's-Bench.  the first of them that is mentioned in Ancient Writers, is that of the King's Bench, coram Rege. This, 
(r) Rex illarum Curiarum habet unam propriam sicut Aulam Regiam, & Justiciarios Capitales qui proprias Causas Regias terminant.  Bracton saith, was the King's proper Court, called the King's Hall, and had for Judges in it Chief-Justices, which determined the King's proper Causes, etc. The same 
(s) Justiciariorum quidam sunt Capitales, generales, perp●tui, & majores a latere Regis resid●ates, qui emnium aliorum corrigere tenentur injurias & errores. Lib. 3. c. 7. fol. 108 b.  Author speaking of the Justices of this Court, saith, That some of them were Capital, General, perpetual, and the greater sitting by the King's side, which were to correct the injuries and errors of all others.  
Fleta in describing this Court, saith My Lord Coke, gives this account, That the King in this Court hath his Justiciaries, as well Knights as Clergymen, as the King's Lieutenants in England (as the Lords Justices were sometimes I suppose in Ireland) before 
(t) Coram quibus & non alibi nisi coram semetipso, & Concilio suo, vel A●ditoribus specialibus, falsa Judicia & Errores Justiciariorum re●ertuntur & corriguntur.  whom, and no where else, unless before the King himself, and his Council or special Commissioners, false Judgements and Errors of Justices are reversed and corrected: and there are determined Breeves of Appeals, and other Breeves upon Criminal Actions, and Injuries against the Peace of the King. And Bracton saith, That in Criminal Matters, if they touched the King's Person, as Treason, they were tried coram Rege; if concerning private matters, then before the Justices only.  
By many Records it appears, 
The Kings of England used to fit in this Court.  that the King sometimes sat in this Court, and that sometimes the King ordered it to follow his Court, as particularly in 28 E. 1. 
(u) Cap. 5.  it was established in the Statute of Articuli super Chartas.  
Robert de Bruis was the first Capitalis Justiciarius ad placita coram Rege, 8 March 
(w) Pat. 52. H. 3. m. 24.  52 H. 3. the Title of Justiciarius Angliae (of whose great Power the learned 
(x) Glossary.  Spelman and 
(y) Sacred Laws. Sir Henry Spelman about the Office of the Chief-Justice of England.  Mr. White have given an account) having an end in Philip Basset, who was advanced to that place 45 H. 3.— Who desires further satisfaction, may consult Mr. Crompton's Jurisdiction des Courts, c. 4. Sir Ed. Coke, Sir William Dugdale, Mr. Prynne, and the Authors they cite, who are many and learned, and do at large treat of its Jurisdiction and the Practice in it, which are foreign to my Design.   

SECT. 4. The Court of Common-Pleas. 
The Common-Pleas.   
THis Court of Common-Pleas appears to be as ancient as Henry the First's time; for in his Charter to the 
(z) Coke's Reports, part 8.  Abbot of B. he grants Connusance of all Pleas; so that neither the Justices of the one Bench, or of the other, or Justices of Assize should meddle. Bracton 
(a) Cognoscunt de omnibus Placitis de quibus Authoritatem habent cognoscendi, & sine Warranto Jurisdictionem non habent nec Coercionem. Lib. 3. c. 10. fol. 105 b.  saith, This Court had Cognizance of all Pleas, of which Authority is given them, without warrant, they neither having Jurisdiction, or Coercion. Therefore Sir Edward Coke saith, That regularly this Court cannot hold any Common-Plea in any Action, real, personal, or mixed, but by Writ out of Chancery, returnable in this Court. 
This Court proper for Pleas betwixt Party and Party.   
Those that treat of this Court, agree, That it was for hearing and determining all Controversies in matters Civil, betwixt Party and Party; called the Common-Pleas, as contradistinct from Pleas of the Crown, and was anciently kept in the Kings own Palace. 
Not to follow the King's Court.   
In Magna Charta it is granted, That the Common-Pleas shall not follow the King's Court, but shall be held in a certain place. The Exchequer having been the place where these Causes were heard, till 
(b) Articuli super Chartas, cap. 4.  28 E. 1. that by Statute it was provided, that no Common-Plea shall from henceforth be held in the Exchequer, contrary to the form of the Great Charter.  
The first, who had the Appellation of Capitalis Justiciarius in this Court, according to Sir William Dugdale, was Gilbert de Preston, who by that Title had his Livery of Robes, 
(c) Liberat. 1 E. 1. m. 4.  1 E. 1.  
The number of the Justices 
(d) See Sir William Dugdale's Origines Juridiciales, p. 39 b. The number of the Justices varied.  3 E. 2. were Six, 14 E. 3. they were Nine; the latter end of Henry the Fourth, and all the Reign of Henry the Seventh they were but Four. Those that would be satisfied about the Jurisdiction of this Court, may have recourse to Mr. Richard Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts c. 7. fol. 91. the Year-Book quoted in Ash his Promptuary, Sir Henry Spelman's Glossary tit. Bancus, & Capitalis Justiciar. de Banco Communi, p. 417. Sir W. Dugdale's Origines Juridiciales, Prynne's Animadversion, p. 52. and many other good Authors cited by them.   

SECT. 5. Court of Chancery.  
THE Court of Chancery in some Writers is placed the first, 
Co●rt of Chancery.  in others as I have placed it. Although it is true what Sir Edward 
(e) Sir Edw. Coke's Arguments for the Antiquity of the Chancery.  Coke saith, That Kings had their Chancellors in the Saxon times (indeed he adds the British also, of which little can be known;) yet I dare not avouch with him, that the Court of Chancery was then, as now, the only Court out of which Original Writs do issue: it is true, that to the Charter of King 
(f) Spehran. Tom. 1. Concil. p. 631.  Edward the Confessor ma●e to the Abbot of Westminster, amongst the Witnesses it is said, Ego Swardus 
(g) Swyerg trius in Spelman.  Notarius ad vicem Reynbaldi Regiae dignitatis Cancellarii hanc cartam scripsi, & subscripsi: So 
(h) Glossary, fol. 106.  Adulph is accounted Chancellor to King Edgar, and T●rketil to King Edred, and King Edmund, and Wolsine to King Athelstan; and that the Chancellor had a Court, may be presumed from what is found in the Book of Ely (writ as it is supposed about King Stephen's time) that King Aethelred who Reigned about Anno 978. appointed, and granted, 
Answer. Canceliarius qui vel Regum praecepta aut Acta Judicum scribit. Spelm. Gloss. fol. 104.  that the Ch. of Ely, then, and ever after in the King's Court, should have the dignity of the Chancery: which albeit, as Sir Edward Coke saith, it was void in Law, to grant the Chancellourship of England in Succession; yet it proveth, that then there was a Court of Chancery. As to the first, it is apparent, that the Chancellor then had the power of composing the Charters; and before Seals were in use, might also subscribe with the Sign of the Cross, as other of the King's Officers did; but this doth not prove what kind of Court he was made Judge of: for there the Notary in the Chancellor's room signs last, and in the 
(i) Tom. 1. p. 486.  Councils of Sir Henry Spelman's Edition, I find Adulph styled Herefordensis 
(k) Id. p. 489.  Ecclesiae Catascapus, signing last of the Abbats. 
See Spelman. Glossar. p. 106.  As to the Book of Ely, I know not how to understand that the Church should have any dignity of Chancellorship in the King's Court; and if it be meant of the Bishop of that See only, it might possibly be meant to be the principal Chirographer, or drawer of the King's Charters. As to what is found in the Mirror, it is of no great validity, being writ according to the then custom of the Age; wherein the Author saith, That enrolments 
(l) Pur le Enrolments de Pardon de Roy in le Chancery en temps le Roy Alfred.  of Pardons of the King, were in the Chancery in the time of King Alfred; Although Mauricius Regis Cancellarius, by that title subscribes as witness to the Charter of King William the Conqueror, to the Abbey of Westminster; yet none of these prove, that such a Court was in those Ages constituted, as we now call the Chancery. For Sir Henry Spelman 
(m) Gless. p. 107 ●.  proves the Chancery was no Court, but only the Ship (as he calls it) of the King's Writs and Charters in old time, now consisting of three Parts, sc. è Collegio Scribarum Regiorum, è Foro Juris communis, & è Praetorio boni & aqui.  
Mr. Lambard 
(n) Archaion, p. 62, 63.  hath proved that till the Reign of King Edward the First, we find nothing of the Chancellors hearing and determining of Civil causes: for till then the Justiciarius Angliae had the great Power, 
Sir William Dugdale 's Origines Jurid. fol. 36. b.  which being then restrained ad placita coram Rege tenenda, the King, together with the trust and charge of the Great Seals, appointed him to represent his own Royal and extraordinary Pre-eminence of Jurisdiction in Civil Causes: and he gives this particular reason for his opinion, That Britton, a Learned Lawyer in Edward the First's time, writing of all other Courts, from the highest Tribunal to a Court Baron, maketh no mention of this Chancery. Yet towards 
(o) 28 E. 1. c. 5.  the latter end of his Reign we find it enacted, 
The Chancellor and Justices of the King's-Bench to follow the King.  That the Chancellor and Justices of the Bench should follow the King (that is, remove with the King's Court) so that he might have at all times near him some Sages of the Law, which were able to order all such matters as should come unto the Court at all times when need should require.  
Yet this Act did not give an absolute Power to the Chancellor alone, of determining in such Civil Causes; as may seem by that Law, which was made 20 Ed. 3. 
(p) Cap. 6.  where it appears the Treasurer was joined with him, to hear complaints against Sheriffs, Escheators, etc. something like this about Purveyors, and Escheators, that they might not oppress, was enacted 
(q) Cap. 3.  36 Ed. 3.  
Nevertheless Mr. Lambard observes, 
When Causes in Equity determined in Chancery.  that it doth not appear in the Reports of the Common Law, that there is any frequent mention of Causes usually drawn before the Chancellor for help in Equity, till from the time of King Henry the fourth; nor are there found any Bills and Decrees in Chancery before the 20 of H. 6. such Causes as since that time were heard in that Court, having formerly been determined in the Lord's House of Parliament.  
So Sir Edward Coke saith, In the Chancery are two Courts; First, the ordinary coram Domino Rege in Cancellaria, where in the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal proceeds according to the right line 
(r) Secundum Legen & Consuetudinem Angliae.  of the Laws and Statutes of the Realm. Secondly, extraordinary according to the Rule of Equity, Secundum aequum & bonum.  
But it is not my business to enter into particulars. The curious may consult Sir Edward 
(s) 4. Instit. c. 8.  Coke, Mr. Richard Cromptom, cap. 3. Sir Henry Spelman 1. glossar. 1. de Cancellario à pag. 105. ad pag 113. Ryley's Appendix, Ash's Repertory tit. Courts, Sect. 2. rolls Abridgement, p. 374. to 587. Prynne's Animadversions, p. 48.  
Anno 5 Eliz. 
(t) Cap. 18.  it was Enacted that the Lord Keeper for the time being hath always had, used and executed, and so may for the future, 
The Lord Keeper equal to Lord Chancellor.  the like place, Authority, Pre-eminence, Jurisdiction, Execution of Law, etc. as the Lord Chancellor of England for the time being, lawfully used.  
The Oath of the Chancellor or Lord Keeper, is to be found 
(u) Rot. Parl. 10 R. 2. col. 8.  10 R. 2. consisting of six Parts: First, That well and truly he shall serve our Sovereign Lord the King and his People in the Office of Chancellor, 
The Oath of the Lord Chancellor.  or Lord Keeper. Secondly, That he shall do right to all manner of people, Poor and Rich, after the Laws and usages of the Realm. Thirdly, That he shall truly counsel the King, and his Counsel he shall lain, i. e. hid or keep secret. Fourthly, That he shall not know, nor suffer the hurt, or disheriting of the King, or that the Rights of the Crown be decreased by any means, as far as he may let it. Fifthly, That if he may not let it, he shall make it clearly and expressly to be known to the King, with his true Advice and Counsel. Sixthly, That he shall do and purchase the King's profit in all that he reasonably may, as God help him, and by the Contents of this Book.   

SECT. 6. Of the Court of the Exchequer.  
SIR Edward Coke saith, the Authority of this Court is of original Jurisdiction without any Commission. Bracton mentioneth nothing of this Court, and Fleta giveth a very short account, that the King hath his Court and his Justiciaries residing at his Exchequer, but descends to no particulars of the Jurisdiction. 
(w) Fol. 2 b.  But (x) Britton (who lived in Edward the First's Reign, (and all along writes in the name of the King, as if his whole work had been the Kings) gives us an account of the Nature of this Court in several particulars, To hear and determine all Causes which touch the King's Debts, his Fees, and the incident Causes, without which these cannot be tried: So of Purprestures, Rents, Farms, Customs, and generally of whatever appertained to the Revenue of the Crown, the Tenants and Receivers of it; so that the Court is divided into two Parts, viz. Judicial Accounts, called Scaccarium Computorum, and into the Receipt of the Exchequer.  
The principal Officer is the Lord Treasurer of England, who formerly had this great Office, 
The Lord Treasurer principal Officer of the Exchequer.  by delivery of the Golden Keys of the Treasury, and hath the Office this day by delivery of a white Staff at the Kings Will and Pleasure; his Oath is much-what the same as the Chancellors, differing principally in that clause, That the King's Treasure he shall truly keep and dispend.  
The other great Officers are the Treasurer of the Exchequer, the Chancellor and Chief Baron and other Barons of the Exchequer; The rest of the Officers are particularly reckoned in Sir 
(x) 4. Instit. fol. 106 107, 108.  Edward Coke.  
The Oath of the Barons of the Exchequer is to be found in the Statutes 
(y) The Oath of 〈◊〉 Barons of the 〈◊〉 chequer.  20 Ed. 3. cap. 2. whereof the principal parts are, That he shall truly charge and discharge all manner of People, as well Poor as Rich, that for Highness, nor for Riches, nor for Hatred nor Estate of no manner of person or persons, nor for any Deed, Gift, nor Promise of any person, the which is made to him, nor by Craft, nor by Ingen, he shall let the Kings Right, nor none other Persons right he shall disturb, let or respite, contrary to the Laws of the Land, nor the King's Debts he shall put in respite, where that they may goodly be levied; that the Kings need he shall speed above all others; that neither for gift, wages, nor good deed, he shall laid, disturb nor let the profit, or reasonable advantage of the King, in the advantage of any other person, or of himself; that he shall take of no person, for to do wrong or right, to delay or to deliver, or to delay the People that have to do before him, etc. where he may know any wrong or prejudice to be done to the King, he shall put, and do all his power, and diligence that to redress; and if he may not do it, that he tell it to the King, or to them of the Council, that may make relation to the King, if he may not come to him.  
Sir Edward Coke 
(z) 4. Instit. p. 103. & 110, 111.  hath commented on the Mirror, to explain all the Power and particular business of the Court, and further observeth that the Patent of the King to the Chief Baron, the rest of the Barons, Attorney General, and Solicitor, are not so long as the King pleaseth, but quam diu se bene gesserint, which is interpreted a place for life; and there is good reason, being too many changes would give too many an insight into the King's Revenue.  
There is a Manuscript 
(a) Codex niger, c. 1.— Nulli licet statutum Scaccarii infringere vele is quavis temeritate resistere— Habet enim hoc commune cum ipsa Dom. Regis Curia, in qua ipse in propria persona Jura decernit, quod nec Recordationi nec Sententia in eo latae liceat alicui contradicere.  of Gervasius Tilburiensis, writ in the time of Henry the second, which gives an account, how it came to be called the Exchequer, from a checked Covering of the Table, at which the Officers of the Court sat; and saith, That it is lawful for none to infringe the Statutes of the Exchequer, or by any rashness to resist them; it having that common with the Court of the Lord the King, in which he in his proper person gives Judgement, that it is not lawful for any to contradict, either the Record or Sentence. By which it appears that this Court was distinct from the King's Bench, where the King sat in person, and that by the Institution of William the Conqueror, not only the great Barons of this Realm as well Ecclesiastical as Secular, but also the Justice of England, as Precedent thereof, by his Office, were Members of this Court, and so continued to do long after, as the Judicious 
(b) Origines Juris●ic. fol. 50.  Sir William Dugdale hath by Precedent shown: Mr. Prynne hath given us two Records (out of the Exchequer 
(c) Commun. Term. Mich. 35 H. 3. Rot. 2.  34 H. 3. and Rishanger 40 H. 3.) that that King in his proper person sat, and gave judgements in the Court of Exchequer, and gave not only Rules to be observed about the Revenue, Sheriffs and Bailiffs, but also concerning punishing Blasphemy, defending Pupils, Orphans and Widows, and how the Magnates deported themselves to their Tenants: and if 
(d) Inquirant qualiter Magnates se gerunt erga homines suon, si forte non possunt plenarie corrigere, tunc ostendant easdem transgressiones Dom. Regi.  they found them transgressing, that they correct them as they can; and if they cannot fully correct them, they show the same transgressions to the King.  
He hath also given an account how, 54 H. 3. 
(e) Pat. 54 H. 3. m. 22. dorso. & Incep. 55. Rot. 3. dorso.  the accounts of the Sheriffs into the Exchequer were to be digested, and in Michaelmass-Term, the same Year, how the Barons of the Exchequer were to administer the new Oath to the Mayor Elect of the City of London: likewise in the same 
(f) Animadv. fol. 55, 56.  Author there is a large refutation of Sir Edward Coke's Opinion, that the Statute of Rutland, as he calls it, was a Statute made by the King, Lords, and Commons; where it is proved against Sir Edward, that it was made for the ordering of the Exchequer at Rothelan in Wales, by the King and his Council, and not at Rutland: but I shall not enter into such Particulars.  
There are several other Courts, which have peculiar Jurisdictions by the King's Grants, and Prescription, as the Court of Requests, abolished 17 Car. 1. The Court of Chivalry, Court of Marshalsea, of the Admiralty, and that for redress of delays of Justice, which Sir Edward Coke and others have treated of at large, and fall not so necessarily for me to discourse of: So I shall proceed to the Itinerant Justices, and of Assizes, and Gaol-delivery.   

SECT. 7. Of Itinerant Justices, and Justices of Assize, and Nisi Prius.  
SOme Shadow of this we find in the time of the Conqueror, when Geoffrey, 
Itinerant Justices.  Earl of Constance, and some other Barones Regis, did sit at 
(g) Regist. Ecclesiae Eliensis, fol. 24 b.  Kenteford, to hear and determine the Claim touching the Rights and Liberties of the Church of Ely, at that time disputed before them.  
But the settlement of the Constitution of them, was not till 22 H. 2. Anno 1176. as Roger Hoveden 
(h) Annal. pars post. p. 148, 149, 150.  hath related, when the King held his Great Council at Nottingham, & communi omnium Consilio divisit Regnum suum in 6 parts, per quarum singulas, Justiciarios Itinerantes constituit: and the Twenty fifth of his Reign, at his great Council at Windsor, 
(i) Idem, p. 590, 591. Et unicuique partium praefecit viros sapientes ad faciendam Justitiam & ad audiendum clamorem populi.  he divided England into four Parts, and over every Part he appointed Wisemen to do Justice, and hear the Complaints of the People.  
The Form of the special Writ from the King to empower them to act, and of the Writ directed to the Sheriffs, to summon all such Persons as were concerned in this Service, to appear before the Justices, may be seen in Sir William Dugdale's Origines Juridiciales, fol. 52. a.b. In which latter Writ 
(k) Cl. 3 H. 3. m. 13. dorso.  the Persons summoned to appear, were Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Earls, Barons, Knights, & libere tenentes, and in every Village four Legales Homines, & Praepositum, & de quolibet Burgo, 12 Legales. Burgenses.  
Sir Ed. Coke 
(l) 4. Instit. p. 184.  calls these Justices in Eyre, and saith, they had Jurisdiction in all Pleas of the Crown, and of all Actions real, personal, and mixed, and they road from seven Years, to seven Years. These Justices in Eyre continued no longer than till Edward the Third's time; for then as Mr. 
(m) Notes on Hengham, p. 143. Justices of Assize.  Selden notes, Justices of Assizes came in their Places, though it is manifest that Justices of Assize were sooner begun.  
For 
(n) Lib. 3. c. 10.  Bracton mentions these Justices of Assizes in his time in these words, Sunt etiam Justitiarii constituti ad quasdam Assisas, duo, vel tres, vel plures, qui quidem perpetui non sunt, quia expleto negotio Jurisdictionem amittunt. The form of the Writ in 
(o) Cl. 9 H. 3. m. 11. dorso.  9 H. 3. is set down by Sir William Dugdale, in which the King constitutes his Justitiarii to take the Assizes of new disseising, and Delivery of the Gaol; and the Command to the Sheriff, is to cause 
(p) De qualibet Villa quatuor legales homines, & Praepositum, & de quolibet Burgo, vel Villa mercanda duodecim leg●les homines, & omnes Milites & libere Tenentes, etc.  four legal Men, and the Provost out of every Village, and twelve lawful Men out of every Market-Town, and Borough, and all the Knights, and Free-Tenents, that is, all that held in Capite, to do what the Justices should on the King's part appoint.  
In 21 E. 1. 
(q) Placit. Parliam. 21 E. 1. num. 12.  another settlement was made; that either discreet Justices should be assigned to take Assizes, Jurats, and Certificates, throughout the whole Realm, viz. for the Counties of York, Northumberland, Westmoreland, Cumberland, Lancaster, Nottingham, and Derby, two. In the Counties of Lincoln, Leicester, Warwick, Stafford, Salop, Northampton, Rutland, Gloucester, Hereford, and Worcester, other two. In the Counties of Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, Dorset, Wiltshire, Southamptom, Oxford, Berks, Sussex, and Surrey two. For the Counties of Kent, Essex, Hertford, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Huntingdon, Bedford, and Bucks two: and that the Assizes, etc. of Middlesex should be taken before the Justices of the Bench.  

(r) M●ltis vigiliis excegitata & inventa fuit recuperand●e possessionis gratia, ut per summariam cognitionem absque magna Juris solennitate, quasi per compendium negotium terminetur. Lib. 4. sol 164 b.  Bracton speaking of the Writ called Assiza novae disseisinae saith, it was found out and contrived by much Vigilance, for the recovering of Possessions, by a summary or speedy Conusance, without great Solemnity of the Law, that the business might be compendiously determined. For before at Common-Law, Assizes were not taken, but either in the Bank, or before Justices in Eyre, which was a great delay to the Plaintiff, and a great molestation, and vexation of the Recognitors of the Assize; therefore in Magna Charta, the Assizes are appointed to be taken in the respective Counties, and the Patents to Justices of Assize run thus, 
(s) See the Patent Clause and Fine-Rolls from King John to Edw. 4.  Sciatis quod constituimus vos Justiciarios nostros, una cum hiis quos vobis associaverimus, ad omnes Assisas, etc. in Com. etc. arainandas capiendas, etc. facturi inde quod ad Justitiam pertinet, secundum legem & Consuetudinem Regni vostri Angliae. Salvis nobis amerciamentis inde provenientibus.  
The Justices of Nisi Prius 
(t) Ad exonerationem Juratorum, & ad ce● lerem justitiam in ea parte exhibendum. Stat. de Finibus, 27 E. 1. c. 4.  were first instituted by the Statute of Westm. 
Justices of Nisi Prius.  2. and their Authority is annexed to the Justices of Assize. These Justices were instituted for two principal Causes, for the ease of Jurors, and for the speedy exhibiting of Justice.   

SECT. 8. Justices of Oyer and Terminer.  
AS to the Justices of Oyer and Terminer, they are appointed either by 
(u) Coke 4. Inst. fol. 162.  general or special Commission. By general Commission they are to inquire of Treasons, Misprisions of Treason, Insurrections, Rebellions, Murders, Felonies, Manslaughter, 
(w) Interfectionibus.  Killing, Burglaries, Rapes of Women, unlawful Assemblies, Conventicles, 
(x) Verborum prolationibus.  false News, Combinations, Misprision, Confederacies, false Allegations, Riots, Routs, Retaining, Escapes, Contempts, Falsities, Negligences, Concealments, Maintenances, Oppressions, Combinations 
(y) Cambipartiis.  of Parties, Deceits, and other ill Deeds, Offences and Injuries whatever, and to do thereupon what appertains to Justice, according to the Law and Custom of the Kingdom.  
Special Commissions were not granted, unless for enormous 
(z) Nisi pro ●nermi transgressione, ubi necesse apponere festinum remedium. Cl. 14 E. 3. part 1. m. 41. dorso. Hil. 2 H. 4. Rot. 4. Mich. 1 H. 8.  Transgressions, where there was a necessity of speedy Remedy: In some cases we find the Justices of Oyer and Terminer have upon an Indictment found, proceeded the same day against the Party indicted. So Thomas () Marks, Bishop of Carlisle, before Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer, was Indicted, tried, and adjudged all in one day for High-Treason. Likewise Sir Richard Empson was indicted of High-Treason, and tried all in one day. So Robert Bell, 10 Dec. 3 E. 6. and 10 Eliz. 4 Aug. John Felton was before Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer in London, indicted of High-Treason, and tried the same day, by the advice of all the Judges of England.   

SECT. 9 Of the King's Erection of Courts.  
IN some Cases the King may erect new Courts of Justice, 
What new Courts the King may erect.  and grant Conusance of Pleas to a Corporation, to be kept after the Rules of the Law, not in a way of a Court of Equity but may not alter the great Courts at Westminster, that have been time out of mind, nor erect a new Court of Chancery, Kings-Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, etc.  
Although in a proper Court, such as our Chancery, a Judge of Equity be allowed, yet if it were permitted in all other Courts, to expound the Law against the letter, and perhaps the meaning of the Makers, according to Conscience, as we speak, there would soon be introduced absoluteness and Arbitrary Power.  
Therefore great Care is taken by those that understand the Law, that matters be not left to the discretion of any Persons Commissionated by the King to adjudge of any Causes. So the plausible Statute 
(b) 11 H. 7. c. 3.  of H. 7. to put in Execution the Penal Laws, impowering Justices of Assize and of Peace, upon Information for the King, by their Discretion to hear and determine all Offences, and Contempts against any Statute unrepealed, was found to have Authorised Empson and Dudley to commit upon the Subject unsufferable pressures and oppressions. So that 
(c) 1 H. 8. c. 6.  soon after that King's death it was repealed, and those two brought to Trial, and executed for their oppressions. So the Statute 
(d) C. 2.  8 E. 4. of Liveries, etc. by the discretion of the Judges to stand as an Original is deservedly repealed. In the Commission of Sewers by Law 
(e) Discretio est discernere per Legem quid sit justum. Coke Inst. 4. fol. 41.  3 H. 8. allowing the Commissioners to make Orders, etc. according to their Judgements, and Discretions; the word Discretion is interpreted by Lawyers, to discern by Law what is Just; as appears when a Jury do doubt of the Law, and desire to do what is Just, they find the special matter, and the entry is, Et super tota materia petunt advisamentum & discretionem Justiciariorum; that is, they desire that the Judges would discern by Law what is Just, and give Judgement accordingly.  
It was resolved in the Court of Common-Pleas (when a new Court was 
(f) Whyte's Sacred Laws, p. 33.  erected, 31 H. 8. to hear and determine according to Law and Custom, or otherwise to their sound discretion) That the last Clause was against Law. For when Laws are writ and published, Magistrates know what to command, and the People to obey; otherwise the Law must necessarily be errand, wand'ring, uncertain, and unknown; which is a 
(g) Miser servitus ubi jus vagum.  miserable, yea, the most miserable Slavery.  
This was the ground of the taking away the most August and very Ancient Court of the Star-Chamber; 
The Court of Star-chamber dissolved.  though appointed by Act of Parliament, 
(h) 3 H. 7. c. 1. 21 H. 8.  and consisting of very great Personages, as the Lord Chancellor, Lord Precedent of the Council, Lord Privy-Seal, Bishops, Lords, and Justices. For (tho' there were other Reasons that moved the Houses to be so pressing to get that Act pass) the grounds of its Repeal alleged in the 
(i) 17 Car. 1. c. 10.  Preamble of the Act, are, That the Judges have not kept themselves to the points limited by the Statutes, and have undertaken to punish where no Law doth warrant, and to make Decrees for things having no such Authority, and have inflicted heavier punishments than by Law warranted; and that all matters Examinable and Determinable before them, had their proper Remedy, Redress, and Punishment by Common Law, and in the ordinary Courts of Justice elsewhere. In the like manner, and on the same reason were the Court of Request 
(k) Ibid. cap. 9 , before the 
(l) Cap. 48.  Precedent of the Marches of Wales, of the Precedent and Council in 
(m) Cap. 49.  the North, and of the County-Palatine 
(o) Cap. 37.  of Chester, either totally abolished or much eclipsed.  
Having thus far discoursed of the several standing Courts, I think it necessary to give an account of the Oath the Judges of either Bench are enjoined to take; having before spoke of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, and Barons of the Exchequers Oath.   

SECT. 10. Of the Judge's Oath.  
COncerning this Oath, there is a Controversy betwixt Mr. 
(p) Animadv. on Coke's 4. Inst. fol. 38.  Prynne and Sir Edward Coke, the latter affirming it to be in our Printed Statutes, but not upon Record; which Mr. Prynne disproves thus, That the Oath of the Judges, Barons of the Exchequer, and Justices Itinerant, and the Ordinances annexed to the Oath were made by the King (because of divers complaints to him) by the assent of the great men, and other wise men of his Council, and commanded to be openly published by the Sheriffs of every County, by 
(q) 7 May, 20 E. 3.  special Writs issued to them, for the Reasons specified in the beginning and close of the Writs, at least three Months before the Parliament was held that Year; and they are all entered upon Record (as they are Printed in the Statute Books at large) 
(r) Cl. 20 E. 3. part 1. m. 12, 13.  20 E. 3. in the Clause-Rolls, but not in the Parliament or Statute-Rolls of that Year, because not made in, but before the Parliament. From whence I note a good Argument of the King's Prerogative in appointing Judges, and Commissionating them himself, without any Parliamentary concurrence, since he appoints the very Oath which was to direct them in their Office out of Parliament.  
We find the Commons so well pleased with this Oath, that in the 
(s) Rot. Parl. 20 E. 3. num. 25.  Parliament 20 E. 3. they petitioned the King, that the Justices of Assize and Enquiry might be sworn by the same Oath as the Justice of the Bench, 
Abridgement of Records, p. 48.  and that the chief of them might have power to swear the rest: which the King assented to with some Qualifications: but when in the Twenty first of his Reign, they petitioned that his other Ministers might take the Oath, and might be sworn to take nothing from any other; the King answered, that he would advise what other Ministers shall be fit to take the Oath.  
Mr. Prynne refers us to the Cl. 18 H. 3. m. 19 Cl. 35 E. 1. m. 7. Cl. 1 E. 2. m. 19 and Cl. 5 E. 3. m. 27. for some Clauses of the Oaths of Justices, agreeing with those prescribed to the King's Council. But the Oath as it hath been after used, is to this purpose:  
That they shall swear well and lawfully to serve our Lord the King, and his People in the Office of Justice, and lawfully counsel the King in his Business; not counsel or assent to any thing, which may turn him in damage, or disherison, by any manner, way, or colour, and shall not know of any such thing, but cause the King to be warned thereof by themselves, or others; shall do equal Justice, and Execution of Right to all the Subjects, and take neither by themselves nor others, privily, or apertly, Gift or Reward, of Gold or Silver, nor of any thing which may turn to their profit, unless it be Meat or Drink, and that of a small value, of any man that shall have any Plea, or Process hanging before them, etc. shall take no Fee as long as they are Justices, nor Robes of any man great or small, but of the King; give no Advice to any man, great or small, where the King is Party.  
If any, of what condition soever come before them in their Sessions, with force and Arms, or otherwise against the Peace, or against the Statute thereof made, to disturb the execution of the Common Law, or to menace the People, that they may not pursue the Law: That they cause their Bodies to be Arrested, and put in Prison; and if they cannot be Arrested, that the King be certified: That they themselves, nor others maintain no Plea, or Quarrel hanging in the King's Court, or elsewhere in the Country: That they deny to no man Common Right by the King's Letter, nor none other man's, nor for none other Cause; and in case any other Letters come to them contrary to the Law, they do nothing by such Letters, but certify the King thereof, and proceed to execute the Law, notwithstanding any such Letters: That they shall procure the profit of the King, and of his Crown, and if in default, shall be at the Kings Will, of Body, Lands, and Goods, thereof to be done as shall please him.  
There is in this Oath as great Security taken, 
Observations on this Oath.  as morally can be, that the Judges perform their Office uprightly, and judge according to the Law; and if this will not make them wary how they give Judgement contrary to Law, there are other Constraints upon them: As, first, That the King may displace them when he pleases, they holding their Places only durante beneplacito. Secondly, The House of Commons may question them for any false Judgement and Miscarriage in their Office; which must be a great Check and deterring of them from giving any unjust Judgement, either for Lucre-sake by Bribes, or Partiality of Affection.  
There are, besides others, two illustrious Examples of punishment of Corrupt Judges, the one of Sir William Thorp, 
(t) Rot. Parl. 25 E. 3. Rot. 10.  condemned for breach of his Oath in taking Bribes. 
Judges punished for breaking their Oath.  He was Indicted before the Earls of Arundel, Warwick, and Huntingdon, the Lord Grace, and Lord Burghers, 24 E. 3. and the Record saith, Ideo consideratum per dictos Justiciarios assignatos, ad judicandum secundum voluntatem Regis, & secundum Regale posse suum; because he broke the Oath which he took to the King, and so was adjudged to be hanged. The 
(u) Exact Abridgement, p. 74.  Record of this Judgement was brought into the Parliament 25 E. 3. (the King having by a Writ under the Privy-Seal stayed his Execution) and it was read ope● before the Lords and all the Lords affirmed the Judgement to be good, provided this Judgement should not be drawn into example against any other Officers who should break their Oaths, but 
(z) Qui praedictum Sacramentum fecerunt & fregerunt, & habent Leges Regales Augliae ad custodiendas.  only those that took the said Oath of Justices and broke it; such to whom the Royal Laws of England are committed.  
The other is the Famous Sir Francis Bacon Lord St. Alban, who being Lord Chancellor was found guilty of taking Bribes by his Servants; whom though many (for his great Learning) would acquit, as leaving too much to his Servants, yet he fell an illustrious example of Justice against the highest Judges: and in the forecited Record against Sir William Thorp, it is apparent that the Lords (who in those days were the sole Judges in Parliament) thought no persons breach of Oath was capitally to be punished but only the Justices.  
Before I come to speak to some of the long Parliaments writing Champions misapplication of the King's Power in his Courts, I think it expedient to give some Characters I have met withal of the qualifications of Judges.  
In a Speech made to Justice 
(a) MS. Speech, penes Rad. Thoresby de Leedes, Gen.  Manwood, when he was chosen Lord Chief Baron, the Chancellor tells him, There are four things requisite in a Judge: First, His knowledge of the Law, which is presumed every one hath that the King appoints to be his Justiciary. Secondly, Discretion, that though in his Judgement he may vary from the letter of the Law, yet he may never judge contrary to the intention of it, which is Animus Legis. Thirdly, Integrity, for it were better to have a Judge of convenient learning and discretion, that would command and rule his Affection and Judgement, than one of excellent knowledge and discretion, that will submit the same to his corrupt Affections. Fourthly, Care and diligence. For if a judge be furnished with all the preceding qualifications; yet if he be slothful, and do not expedite his Judgement, all the former serve to little purpose, for qui di● distulit, di● noluit.  
My Lord St. Alban 
(b) Essays.  (though he fell, as before I have noted, under great censure) yet in his Essays tells us that a Judge's Office is Jus dicere, non Jus dare, that they ought to be more wise than witty, more reverend than plausible, more advised than confident; and above all things that Integrity was their Portion and proper Virtue; The unjust Judge being a Capital remover of Landmarks: Injustice making Judgement bitter, and delay sour.  
Another famous 
(c) E. of Clarendon's Survey, p. 125.  Chancellor (whose unexpected exile, after he was raised to the happiest Estate of a Subject, may teach all to judge no State of Felicity assured upon Earth) tells us that Judges are presumed by Education to be fitted for the understanding of the Laws, and by their Oaths bound to judge according to Right, and so must be the most competent to explain the difficulties of the Law; which not Sovereign, as Sovereign, can be presumed to understand and comprehend; and that the judgements and decisions, those Judges make, are the Judgement of the Sovereign, who hath not qualified them, but Authoritatively appointed them to judge in his stead, and are to pronounce their Sentence according to the reason of the Law, not the reason, or will rather he means, of the Sovereign. But now I proceed to other matters.  
The Long Parliament impeached all the Judges that had voted the legality of Shipmoney, 
The Long Parliaments Impeachment of Judges.  as also brought to their Bar the Lord Chancellor, that thereby they might strike a greater terror on the King's Loyal Subjects, especially in the House, to make them comply with them: and though they would have had the Power of nominating and removing the Judges, and have rend that branch of his Royal Prerogative from him; yet they not trusting, if they effected this, that it would do them any service (when they had put in such Judges as they liked) if the King might still Commissionate them according to old form pro beneplacito: Therefore they pressed hard, 
They would alter pro beneplacito.  that every Judge should continue quamdiu se bene gesserit; which I only note, to show they were desirous to new model the whole Government.  
As the long Parliament of 1641. by their dissolving of Church-Government, gave birth to varieties of Opinions, 
The Long Parliament endeavours to weaken the King's Prerogative.  Schisms, and Heresies in Religion; so by their design of unloosening men's Obligation to the Monarchy, they were forced to make use of many false Inferences and Judgements, of the known Laws: Amongst which one was, when they were beaten off from the several pretences of having some Paramount Power over the King, whereby he stood obliged to resign his reason to their Votes; they alleged that since the King could not reverse a Judgement given in an inferior Court, a fortiori, he could not frustrate their Votes, being the Supreme Court as well as Council.  
In Answer to which it is to be considered, 
How Judges in their Judgements sustain the Person of the King.  that in other Courts the Judges sustain the Person of the King, the Law is deposited in the hands of the King, and all Justice is administered by him, and in his name: so that his consent is by Law involved in what by Law they do. Authoritas rei indicatae vim legis habet. So that can be no Appeal from the King to himself; the King delegates his Power to them, & quod Rex facit per Officiarios, per se facere videtur, they give Judgement for the King not for themselves; to that the Laws Authorise them and none but them: so that the King's assent or dissent cannot frustrate their Judgement, which they render in invitos, against the will of one of the Parties at least, because expedit Reipublicae ut finis sit datus. Therefore as to the Power of declaring Law, the King is restrained ordinarily to the Mediation of the Judges, who are to give the genuine sense, and Interpretation of the Law, according to Art, and rules of science; and so by their Interpretation and Judgement therein, they bind both King and Subject.  
Yet in some 
(d) Case of our Affairs, p. 4.  cases the Judge do not only consult among themselves, 
Judges to apply themselves to the King.  to determine a doubtful case, but must have recourse to the King as the Fountain of Justice: so 
(e) Postnati.  si disputatio oriatur, & Justiciarii non possunt interpretari, sed in dubiis & obscuris Domini Regis expectanda est Interpretatio, & voluntas, cum ejus est Interpretari cujus est condere.  
It is, saith Sir Thomas Smith, 
(f) Commonwealth, part 2. c. 10.  to be taken for a Principle, that the Life and Member of an English man is in the Power only of the Prince, and his Laws: so that when any of his Subjects is spoiled either of life, or limb, the Prince is endamaged thereby, and hath good cause to ask account how his Subjects should come to that mischief; and forasmuch as the Prince, who governeth the Sceptre, and holdeth the Crown of England, hath this in his care and charge, to see the Realm well governed, the Life, Member, and Possessions of his Subjects kept in peace, and assurance; he that by violence shall attempt to break that Peace, and assurance, hath forfeited against the Sceptre and Crown of England.  
So that from hence it appears how equal and just it is that the King should have the appointment of Judges, Justices of Peace, 
Why the King only to appoint Judges.  etc. that neither his Peace should be broken, his Subjects injured in their Persons, or Estates, nor his Laws be violated. 
What Judges are to observe.  There being sufficient Provision in the Law against the violating of Justice by the Judges who are to observe these following statutes. 1. Magna Charta, That no Freeman shall be taken or Imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, or liberty, or Customs, or be Outlawed, or exiled, or otherwise destroyed: That the King 
(g) Cap. 9  will not pass upon him or condemn him but by lawful Judgement of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land: and by another, 5 E. 3. That no man shall be Attached by any Accusation, nor forejudged of Life or Limb, nor his Lands, Tenements, Goods, nor Chattles seized into the King's hands against the form of the Great Charter, and the Law of the Land: and 25 Ed. 3 
(h) Cap. 4. Stat. 5.  That none shall be taken by Petition, or Suggestion, made to the King, or to his Council, unless by Indictment or Presentment of good and lawful People of the same Neighbourhood, where such deed be done in due manner, or by Process made by writ original at the Common Law: and so by 
(i) 24 E. 3. c. 3.  another, That no man, of what State and Condition soever he be, shall be put out of his Lands or Tenements, nor taken, nor Imprisoned, nor disinherited, without being brought to answer by due Process of Law: and in another, 
(k) 41 E. 5. c. 1.  That no man be put to answer without Presentment before Justices, or matter of Record, or by due Process or Writ original, according to the old Law of the Land.  
But I must leave this to the Learned in our Municipal Laws, and shall note some few things from old Authors that may discover how much just Judgement hath ever been valued.  
The impartiality, and yet the tenderness and compassion in inflicting Punishment, is notorious in Zeleucus, 
Impartiality requisite in a Judge.  who while he governed the Locrians, made a Law, That whoever committed Adultery, should have both his Eyes put out; and his Son being found guilty, he commanded the Law to be put in Execution: and the body of the Citizens interceding, he ordered one of his Sons Eyes to be put out, and likewise one of his own, that the Law might not be broken, and yet that he might not be over rigid to his Son.  
The 
(l) Neque inflecti gratia, neque perfringi potentia, neque adulterari pecunia possit. Pro Cecinna.  Orator tells us, That Justice should neither be warped by Favour, nor broken by Power, nor adulterated by Money; and in another place 
(m) Exuit personam Judicis, quisquis Amici personam induit.  saith, That he puts off the person of a Judge, who assumes that of a friend. He indeed is an upright Judge in whose hand the Balance of Justice neither totters nor falls, by the Authority of any Person. Talis debet esse Juris minister, ut in ejus manu nullius authoritate personae, titubet aut vacillet librae Justitiae.  
Besides the avoiding of Partiality, 
Precipitancy to be avoided.  it is necessary in every Judge, that he fully examine what is brought before him, and not with too great Precipitancy determine matters upon 
(n) Qui statuit aliquid, par●e in●udita altera, 〈…〉 siatuit, 〈◊〉 tamen aequus est. Senec. Medea.  the hearing only of one side: for though he may chance to do Justice in such a Case; yet he doth not do justly, that fully hears not both Parties Allegations.  
It is a very mischievous things, when Judges delay the Executing of Justice. 
(o) Holy Court, Tom. 1. lib. 3. p. 90. Delays in doing Justice mischievous.  Causinus, out of the Chronicles of Alexandria tells us, That Juvenalis a Widow, complaining to Theodorick King of the Goths and Romans, that a Suit of hers in Court, was drawn out for the space of three Years: Theodorick called the Judges before him, and acquainted them with the Complaint, and commanded them to do her speedy Justice, which within two days they did; and being again called by the King, he asked them how it came to pass that they had dispatched that in two days, which had not been done in three Years. They answered, that His majesty's Recommendation had made them finish it so soon. To whom the King replied, That when he put them into Office, he consigned all Pleas to them, and other Proceed; and since they had spun out the Business for three Years, that required but two days dispatch, they should die, and at that Instant commanded their Heads to be smitten off. 
Court to redress Delays.   
We find in Sir Edward Coke 
(p) 14 E. 3. c. 5. Stat. 1. Rot. Parl. 2 ●. 2. num. 63. confirmed by Parliament.  a Court for redress of Delays of Judgement, in the King's Great Courts, raised by Statute, 14 E. 3. whereby one Prelate, two Earls, and two Barons, the Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, the Justices of both the Benches, and other of the King's Council have Power to call before them the Tenor of Records, and Processes of such Judgements so delayed, and to proceed to take a good accord and Judgement, and so remand all to the Justices before whom the Plea did depend.  
He likewise 
(q) 4. Instit. c. 6. fol. 67.  tells us, That by the Common-Law, it is required, that both plena & celeris Justitia fiat, and all Writs of Praecipe quod reddat, are quod just, & sine dilatione reddat, &c, and that there did, and yet doth lie a Writ, de pracedendo ad Judicium, when the Justices or Judges of any Court of Record, or not of Record, delayed the Party, Plaintiff, or Defendant, Justice; and in Case the Prelate, the two Earls, two Barons, the Chancellor, Treasurer, etc. may not for the Difficulty, determine it, then to bring it to the next Parliament, there to have a final accord.  
From this whole Discourse I hope it is apparent, that as our Kings authorise the Justices to do right to every one, according to the Laws and Customs of England; so the Judges cannot well fail of performing it. Before I end this Chapter, I cannot omit the inserting of some of the Expressions that I find in the Saxon Laws, whereby the desire those Kings had that equal Justice, should be administered, is very manifest. The eighth Law of King Ina inflicts a mulct of thirty Shillings upon every 
(r) Hwilcum scirmen oththe othrum d●man.  Shireman or other Judge, that grants not Justice to him that requires it, and besides that, within a Week he afford him right; in Saxon thus, & binnan seoffon nihte gedo hine rihtes writhe.  
The first of the secular Laws of King Edgar, runs thus: That every one enjoy the Benefit of right Judgement (whether he be Poor or Rich) but in exacting of Punishments, let there be that Moderation, that they may be attempered to Divine Clemency, and may be tolerable to Men. The Saxon runs thus, That owl màn sy folc rihtes wyrth. (ge earm geeadig) and him mon right Domas dame. & sy on thaerebote swylec forgyffenysse, swylec hit fore God ge beorglice sy, and for weoruld aberendlic.  
The third Law of the same King is, that the Judge who shall pass false Judgement on any, shall pay the King a Hundred and twenty Shillings, unless he confirm it by Oath, that he did it by Error and Ignorance, not for Malice. However he shall be removed 
(s) Et tholige a his Thegnscipes, butan he aeft all thaem Cyng gebiege: swa he hin gethasian wills.  out of his place, unless he obtain the same again of the King. By which it further appears, that in those days the King removed and placed Judges at his Pleasure.  
The first of the secular Laws of King Canutus runs thus:  
First I will that Man 
(t) That man ribte laga upp araere, & aegh wylec unlaga georne assylle.  set up right Laws, and unjust Laws be suppressed, and that every one according to his Power, pluck up utterly by the Roots, all unrighteousness, and set up Gods Right, i. e. Divine Justice; and for the time to come, the Poor as well as the Rich enjoy right Judgement, and to both of 
(u) Fole rihtes wyrthe & him man ribte domes dame.  them right Dooms be deemed.  
Then the next Law is for exhibiting Mercy in judgement, that even in Capital Matters, such moderation be used in imposing the mulct, that it be 
(w) Swa it for Good sy gebeolice & for woruld aberendlice: As in the Law of King Edgar.  attempered to divine Clemency, and be to be born by Men, and that he that judgeth, think in his Mind what he asks, when he saith in the Lord's Prayer, and forgive us our Debts or Trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us: and he forbids that any Christian be put to Death for any small or contemptible cause; that for a 
(x) Et ne forspille man for litlum, Gods handgeweorce & his agenne ceap the he deorgevobt.  small matter they suffer not to perish, the work of God's Hands, which he hath redeemed with a great price.  
In the Eleventh Law we find that the King saith, That by all help and work it is to be endeavoured by what reason principally he may gain Counsel that may 
(y) His man fyrmest m●g raed aredian Theode to Thearfe & rib●ne Cristendom swy thort araeran & agh wilec unlaga georne assyllan.  confirm such things as are for the profit of the Republic, and may confirm Christian Piety, and may totally overthrow Injustice from hence, that Profit at last coming to the Kingdom, that Iniquity may be suppressed, and Justice may be set up in the Presence of God and Men.  
I could add more, but I shall have occasion in the next Chapter to mention something of this Subject, and shall only close with that Admonition of King James 
(z) Dalton's Justice of Peace, c. 2.  the First to the Judges in the Star-Chamber, 1616. wherein he gave them in Charge to do Justice uprightly and indifferently without delay, without Partiality, Fear, or Bribes, with stout and upright Hearts, with clean and uncorrupt Hands, and not to utter theirown Conceits, but the true meaning of the Law, not making Laws, but interpreting the Law (and that according to the true Sense thereof, and after deliberate Consultation) remembering their Office is Jus dicere, not Jus dare.    

CHAP. XXXIV. Of Justices of Peace, and their Sessions.  
SIR Edward Coke 
(a) 4. Instit. c. 31. fol. 170.  observes, that the Constitution of Justices of Peace is such a form of subordinate Government, for the Tranquillity, and quiet of the Realm, as no part of the Christian World hath the like; which may be true in the particular Limitation of the Power. 
Officers like our Justices of Peace anciently in other Countries.  But that in other Countries such like Officers have been appointed, particularly for the preservation of Peace, is evident in the ancient Laws of the Wisigothes, 
(b) Lib. 2. c. 16.  compiled by Theodoricus their King, about the Year of our Lord, 437. which constituted Pacis Assertores, and appointed them Judges to hear and determine those causes, quas illis Regia deputaverit ordinandi Potestas. So in the Sicilian 
(c) Anno 1221. Ibid. p. 704. to 722. lob. 1. tit. 8.  Laws, compiled by the Emperor Frederick the Second, we find one Title, de cultu pacis, & generali pace in Regno servanda, and another, de 
(d) Ibid. tit. 41.  officio Justiciaratus; where the Title, Office, and Commission of the Justiciarii Regionum is at large recited, almost in Parallel terms, with ours at this Day.  
The Capitularia Caroli 
(e) See Fred. Lindebrogus Codex Legum Antiq.  magnis, the Burgundian, Alman, Bavarian, Saxon, Longobard, Ripuarian, and Frisons Laws, mention such Officers, for preserving the public Peace, and 
(f) See Prynne 's Irenarch. Redivivus, p. 1. ad 5.  punishing all Malefactors, and infringers of the public Peace, as we have.  
At the Common-Law, before Justices of Peace were made, there were sundry Persons, to whose Charge the maintenance of the Peace was recommended, and who with their other 
(g) Dalton's Justice of Peace, c. 1. Conservators of the Peace.  Offices, had (and yet still have) the Conservation of the Peace annexed to their Charge, as incident to, and inseparable from their said Offices: yet they were only styled, and so now are, by their Offices; the Conservation of the Peace being included therein.  
First, the King is the principal 
(h) Idem.  Conservator of the Peace within his Dominions, 
The King the principal Conservator of Peace.  and is properly Capitalis Justiciarius Angliae; in whose Hands at the beginning, the Administration of all Justice, and all Judicature in all Causes, first was, and afterwards by, and from him only was the Authority derived and given to all; yet the Power nevertheless remains still in himself, insomuch that he may himself sit in Judgement, as in ancient times the Kings here have done, and may take Knowledge of all cases and causes.  
Before I leave this Head, I cannot pass by the Act of 
(i) 20 H. 7. c. 11.  H. 7. wherein is so fully declared the King's Care, to have due Administration of Justice, as in the close of the last Chapter I have only hinted. 
The Reasons why Justices of Peace made. The King's Care for right and easy Administration of Justice.  The Preamble saith, The King considereth that a great part of the Wealth and Prosperity of the Land, standeth in that, that his Subjects may live in Surety, under his Peace, in their Bodies, and Goods, and that the Husbandry of this Land may increase, and be upholden, which must be had by due Execution of Laws and Ordinances, and so commandeth the Justices to execute the tenor of their Commission, as they will stand in Love and Favour of his Grace, and in avoiding the pains that he ordained, if they do the contrary. If they be let or hindered, they must show it to the King; which if they do not, and it come to the King's knowledge, they shall be out of his Favour, as Men out of Credence, and put out of Commission for ever.  
Moreover he chargeth and commandeth all manner of Men, as well Poor as Rich (which be to him all one in due Administration of Justice) that is hurt or grieved, (in any thing that the said Justice of Peace may hear, determine, or execute in any wise) that he so grieved make his complaint to the next Justice of Peace, and if he afford no remedy, then to the Justices of the Assize; and if he find no remedy there, then to the King, or Chancellor, etc. and as a further security it is added, And over that his Highness shall not let, for any favour, affection, costs, charge, nor none other cause, but that he shall see his Laws to have plain and true execution, and his Subjects to live in security of their Lands, Bodies and Goods, according to his said Laws.  
Thus we see who is the Principal, 
Other Conservator of the Peace.  and Royal Conservator of the Peace: others are the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper, Lord Treasurer, Lord High Steward of England, Earl Marshal, Lord High Constable of England, every Justice of the King's Bench, and Master of the Rolls, who have the power included in their Office, and over all the Realm, when they are present, may award Precepts, take Recognizances for the Peace; of which and others Lambard in his Eirenarche may be consulted, and how far Justices of Assize, Stewards of the Sheriffs Turn, and Court of Pyepowders, the Sheriffs, Chief Constable, Coroners, and Petty Constables may commit to Ward breakers of the Peace in their view, though they cannot take surety at the request of any man, that being peculiar to the Justices of Peace's Office.  
Sir Edward Coke 
(k) Term. Pasch. fol. 176. 4. Inst. Coram Rege prima fuit Institutio Justiciariorum pro Pace conservanda. Ad Pacem nostram conservandam.  saith, that the first institution of Justices for the preserving the Peace, was 6 Ed. 1. but Mr. Prynne will have it of older date, because he finds that King Henry the Third by several Patents, or Writs from the 17th to the end of his Reign, did constitute and appoint several persons in most Counties of the Realm, to be Guardians and Preservers of the Peace of the Realm; and in the Patent 51 H. 3. m. 10.13. dorso, it is dilectis & fidelibus suis custodibus pacis Com. Linc. North. Ebor. & Vicecom. eorundem Comitat. and the like 54 H. 3. m. 21. d.  
But the first regular settlement of them seems to be Anno 1327. 1 Ed. 3. c. 16. The Authorities afterwards were further explained 4 Ed. 3. c. 2. 18 Ed. 3. c. 2. 34 Ed. 3. c. 1.  
Sir Edward Coke 
(l) Ibid. 171.  tells us that the Commission of Peace stood overburdened, and encumbered with divers Statutes, some whereof were before, and some since repealed, and stuffed with many vain and unnecessary repetitions, and many other corruptions crept into it by mistaking of Clerks, etc. for amendment and correction whereof, 
(m) Mich. 32 & 33 Eliz.  Sir Christopher Wray Chief Justice of England, assembled all the Judges of England, and upon perusal had of the former Commission of Peace, and due consideration had thereupon, and often conferences betwixt themselves, they resolved upon a reformation of the form, with divers additions and alterations, both in matter and method, as it stood in Sir Edward's time; and he saith, It needed another Reformation by reason of Statutes since repealed, and others expired; of which he gives several instances.  
Therefore he saith, It is a good rule for all Judges, and Justices whatsoever, that have Jurisdiction by any Statute, which at the first was Temporary or for a time, to consider well before they give Judgement, Whether that Statute hath been continued or made perpetual; and if at first it was made perpetual, Whether it be not repealed or altered by any later Statute.  
What Commissions, Patents and Writs were issued out by King Edward the First, for preserving the Peace of the Realm, suppressing, seizing and punishing of those who disturbed it, may be found Cl. 9 Ed. 1. m. 10. d. in Rylies' 
(n) P. 443, 451, to 457, 433, 480. Prynne's Animadv. fol. 149.  Appendix, so there is a Patent 14 Ed. 1. m. 15. 15 Ed. 1. m. 13. de militibus constitutis ad Articulos in Statuto de conservatione pacis edito contento● observandos, constituting persons of note in every County to observe them, named in the Record: and so for other King's Reigns, in the Authors in the 
(o) Sir Edw. Coke, 4 Inst. Ryley's Appendix, p. 521, etc. 537, 563.  Margin, the exact Abridgement of the Record of the Tower, Tit. Justices of Peace, and Prynne's Irenarchus Redivivus.  
The constituting, and making of Justices of Peace, is inherent in, and inseparable from the Crown, as appears by the Statute 27 H. 8. c. 24.  

(p) Dalton, c. 3.  Some are Justices by Act of Parliament, as the Archbishop of York, Bishop of Duresm, and Ely, and their Successors: others by the King's Charters, as Mayors and other Officers of Corportion Towns.  
Others are by Commission, which are properly Justices of Peace, to take care not so much of the public Discipline, and correction of manners, as for the Peace, and security of the Highways; they being at their Quarter-Sessions to hear and determine of Felons, Breakers of the Peace, Contempts and Trespasses, to suppress Routs, and Tumults, restore possessions forceably entered, etc.  
They 
(q) Sir Tho. Smith's Commonwealth, part 2. c. 22. Who are chosen to be Justices of Peace.  are elected out of the Nobility, Knights, Esquires, and Gentlemen, and such as be learned in the Laws, such and such number as the Prince shall think meet, and in whom for wisdom and discretion he putteth his trust, being mostly Inhabitants within the County, saving that some of the High Nobility, 
At the King's Pleasure.  and chief Magistrates for honour sake are put in all or most of the Commissions. Those have no time limited but by Commission from his Majesty, alterable at pleasure. 
Much increased in number.  At first they were but four, after eight, and now thirty or forty in a Shire, either by increase of riches, learning, or activity in Policy and Government: more being found than anciently, who have either will or power, or both to do their King and Country service; and they are not too many to handle affairs of the Commonwealth, especially for the benefit of the Subject, 
For the better distributing of Justice.  that they may have in all parts of the County, one or more, not very remote, to apply themselves to. 
The Faults they may punish.  Each of them hath Authority, upon complaint to him made of any Theft, Robbery, Manslaughter, Murder, Violence, Complots, Routs, Riots, unlawful Games, forceable Entries, Excess in Apparel, Conventicles, evil order in Alehouses, and Taverns, of Idle and Vagabond Persons, Masters and Servants not observing the Laws, Rapes, false Moneys, Extortions, or any such Disturbances of the Peace, quiet and good order of the Shire, to commit the Persons supposed to be Offenders to the Prison, and to charge the Constable or sheriff to bring them thither, and the Jailor to neceive them till the next Quarter-Sessions when the Sheriff or his Under-Sheriff with his Bailiffs be to attend him, 
at their Sections.  where Informations are given in to them by Bill, which is shown to the Juries: and if they find just cause for the complaint, they find the Bill, and the Party is Indicted, and Tried by a Jury of twelve men, at the King's Suit; for the King is reckoned the one Party, and the Prisoner the other.  
They are also to order the repair of Bridges, Highways, the Poor, the lame Soldiers pensions, and do many things besides according to the Power given in their Commissions, which particularizeth all things they are to take Cognizance of; sometimes, upon suspicion of War, to take care for the order of the Shire, and sometimes to take Muster of Harness, and able men.  
Once in a year or two the Prince with his Council, 
Instructions given to Justices of the Peace.  saith a Manuscript I have seen, chooseth out certain Articles (out of Penal Laws made to repress the pride and evil rule of the People) and sends them down to the Justices, willing them to meet together, and consult among themselves, how to order the matter most wisely, and circumspectly; whereby the People might be kept in good order and obedience according to Law: and they after a certain space meet, and certify the Prince, or his Privy-Council, how they do find the Shire in rule and order touching those points, and all other disorders.  
There was never, saith Sir Thomas Smith 
(r) Part 2. tit. Juslices of Pearce. , in any Commonwealth devised a more wise, a more dulce and gentle, 
How beneficial the Institution of Justices of Peace.  or more certain way to rule the People, whereby they are kept always as it were in a Bridle of good order, and sooner looked to, that they do not offend, than punished when they have offended: for seeing the chief Persons of Quality and Interest among them, have such charge and Authority given them by the King; and if occasion be, do commit, cause to be Indicted and punished, or sent to Prison for disobedience, Offenders against the Laws; It curbeth and terrifieth Offenders so, that it is a new Furbishing of the good Laws of the Realm, and a continual repressing of Disorders, which the Common sort of People are too prone to, if it were not for this impending lash, which every where is held over Criminals.  
The Law itself, as registered and printed, is but a dumb and dead thing; the Ministers of the Law are those that give life to it: and for that end were Justices of the Peace Constituted, who being Gentlemen of Interest, and parts, are the fittest Instruments to see the Laws duly Executed, 
They are principally concerned in seeing to the Execution of several Laws.  which are Committed to their Charge: and it is greatly advantageous to the Country, that at every Quarter-Sessions, in the face of the Country, one of the Justices of the Peace gives a charge to the Juries; wherein, with learning and Judgement, he acquaints them with the Excellency, Antiquity, and Utility of Monarchical Government, the usefulness of those Laws, Wise and Gracious Princes have granted to their Subjects, the excellent Composure, Contexture and Harmony in the Government, and many other particulars fit for them to know, as good Subjects and good Neighbours.  
Having met with some Speeches made in Queen Elizabeth's time which relate either to Justices of the Peace, or the Execution of Laws in general; I think it may not be unacceptable to the Reader to understand in what manner that Queen caused her Chancellor to quicken the execution of the Laws: Some touches of which follow. 
(s) MS. Speech to the Justice's Itinerant, Anno 1559. The Conservation of Peace their principal Charge.  By the Conservation of Peace and Concord, every Commonweal hath a perfect Foundation to begin, marvellous good course to increase, a strong Pillar to sustain it, and a strong Buckler to defend it. The plain and good order of each County consisteth in the well or evil Executing of Justice: for thereby either every man enjoyeth his own, and the whole Commonweal is in a calm and even Temper; or by remissness in Execution, the Freebooters and Beasts of Prey are let lose to rob and despoil some, and affright the rest, and leave all in unsecurity.  
How can, saith he, Justice banish 
(t) MS. Speech at the end of the Parliament, Anno 1559. Justices of Peace to be active.  Enormities when her Ministers are slothful, making no account of any of the Common Causes of their Country; and under the notion of being accounted quiet men, they seek only ease, profit, and pleasure to themselves, and to be sustained by other men's care and labour: whereas the Horse-Master provideth for the good Government of his Horse, Bits or Brakes, according to the hardness or tenderness of his Mouth.  
If (continues he) in the richest soil, the usefullest and delightfullest Flowers, 
The necessity of punishing evil Men.  Shrubs and Fruits be planted, and no care be taken to weed out what would choke and overgrow them, what pleasure or benefit could be had of all one's cost and labour? a crop of weeds would soon such out all the nourishment from their roots,  them from the cherishing Sun, and smother the curious Plants: so that they would soon die and whither. Therefore is there a great need of choosing able, careful and active gardiner's to how and root out all such rank Weeds.  
In another 
(u) MS. Speech, second Parl. 1562.  Speech (after advising great care in choosing Officers, as Justices of Peace, etc. that have the Execution of the Laws) he tells the noble Assembly, That sharp Laws should be made for banishing sloth and corruption, 
A Visitation of the Justices of Peace proposed.  and adviseth there should be through the Kingdom Biennial or Triennial Visitations of all the Temporal Officers and Ministers, that aught to see to the Execution of the Law by Commission, to try the Offences of those that have not seen to the due Execution of the Laws, according to the Office and charge committed to them; as in Church-Visitations: and that a Roll should be kept, 
See something of this nature 2 H. 5. 8.  wherein all the Justice's names should be set down to every Offence he hath caused to be punished, that it might appear who is diligent; and that those that are negligent might be removed to their perpetual Ignominy, and such pains set upon them as by Law may be. Another time 
(w) MS. Speech, Star-chamber, 1568.  he urgeth, that it ought to be considered whether it be a greater Cruelty, to execute the Penal Laws, so as thereby a few shall be unwhipped, and many hanged; or some shall be whipped, and thereby few hanged.  
In another 
(x) MS. Speech, second Session of Parliament, 1571.  I find this swasive, It would be strange to make Laws to reform manners, and prune away the ill branches, and Members of the Commonweal, and then to ●ye them in boxes and books; it were better to have no Laws, than them not Executed: for besides other inconveniences, it breeds contempt of Laws and Lawmakers.  

(y) Idem.  A Prince, continueth he, that is careful of the discharge of his great Office, leaveth nothing undone, meet for him to do, for the Execution of the Laws, making choice of Persons of most Credit, and best understanding through the Kingdom, to whom for the great trust he reposeth in them, he giveth Authority by Commission to Execute a great part of the Law: Therefore the Burden of all Enormities, Absurdities, and Mischiefs that grow in the Commonwealth, for the not executing of Laws, must needs light upon those Persons that have Authority to execute them: and if remissness be, if the Prince should be driven to commit the Execution of the Laws to those who in respect of Practice, and gain, would see them executed with all severity, what a burden would that bring to the Realm?  
In this manner Queen Elizabeth caused the Execution of her Laws to be recommended both to the Justice of Assize, and to the Members of Parliament, that at their recess they might take care to see them put in Execution. As a close to this Chapter, and an Introduction to the next, I shall give a short account of the Laws in the Saxons time, that were made by several Kings for the preservation of the Peace, and of how great value the due keeping of the Peace was. The Sixth Law of King Ina appoints, that he that fights in the King's 
(z) Cuninges' hus.  Palace, shall lose all his Goods, and it shall be at the King's pleasure whether he shall be Capitally punished, or not: it also ordains several Mulcts of Money for fight in the 
(a) minster.  Church, in an Alderman's House, or the House of a 
(b) Gefolgylden hus.  Countryman. And the next Law is against Theft, and in the 13th. against Thiefs, and Robbers, from the number of Seven, if they be 35 they are counted a 
(c) Klothum.  Troop, if more an 
(d) Herge.  Army; and so in the 26th. Law appoints a Reward for apprehending 
(e) Theoffes' onfeng.  a Thief: So in the 46th. Law, of the Peace violated in 
(f) Burghbryce.  a Town of the Kings, or a Bishops, 120 s. and so proportionable in the Town of an Alderman, of the King's 
(g) Cyninges Thegnes.  Minister, or any Land-holders' 
(h) Land hebbendes.  Town.  
So in the 15th. Law of King Alfred, 150 s. punishment is laid upon his that 
(i) De gefeohtum.  fights in the presence of an Archbishop, and 100 if in the presence of a Bishop or alderman; and in the next against the stealing a Mare or Cow, the price, and 40 s. Mulct, and in the 26th. against 
(k) Mansliht mid blothe.  Man-slaying in Companies, to pay the price of his Head, and all present 30 s. a piece; and in the 35th. against breaking the Peace in a Town as before. fore. The 38th. Chapter is long, That no Man assault his Enemy in his House till he hath 
(l) Ae●hon be him ribtes bid.  demanded right of him, which if he deny he may besiege him seven Days, but not 
(m) Be gefeobte.  assault the House; and if he yield, he must keep him Thirty Days, and then restore him to his Friends. This care was taken to pre\vent Bloodshed. There are many particulars besides, worth observing in this, as well add the 40th. Chapter 
(n) Be wundum.  against wounding.  
I shall speak of that of King Edward hereafter.  
The first Law of King Aethelstan is against Theft, that is manifest, where the 
(o) The of th●at th●ebbendse thing stolen is found in the Thiefs Hand; hand gefangen sy.  and so of other particulars worth reading.  
The Third Law of King Edmund prohibits any Man-killer to come into the Prince's presence, altho' his Servant, till he have made satisfaction 
(p) Aef he on daed●ote ga: swa Bisceop him Tace, & his serift him wisage.  for the Crime, as it is appointed him by the Bishop, and he makes Seven particular Laws together against Man-killing; those that assault other in Towns, holy places, etc. and the several punishments prefacing these Laws thus, That to him, and the Clergy and Laity met, it seemed most profitable, that love and mutual benevolence, through his whole Dominion should be cherished; for it was 
(q) Et us eallum tha unribtlican, & menigfealdan gefroh●e the betwux us sulsum syndon.  irksome to them all that there should be unjust fight among Christians; and gins the Seventh Law thus, It is the part 
(r) Witan seylon faeb. the settan.  of the prudent to extinguish Capital Enmities.  
For the better preservation of Peace, King Aethelred appointed that every 
(s) That aele sreoman getreowne borb bebbe.  Freeman have sureties that if he be called in question for any Crime, these Sureties may do justice to each one, that is satisfy for the offender, the Title of which is, Be Borgum. In the Law, the duty of these Sureties is described at large; and it appears by other Laws in after times, that Nine Men were bound for every Tenth Man.  
Whoever desires further satisfaction in this particular, may consult the 19th. Law of Canutus, wherein he appoints 
(t) Et we willath, that aele freoman beo on hundrede, & on Teothung gebrobt, viz. the Tything security. , that every Freeman enter himself into an Hundred, or into the Collegueship of the Ten. In other matters of preserving Peace, they may consult the Second, the Eighth, and Twelfth Laws of the same Canutus; the which Eighth Law is thus expressed, Peace is so to be considered, as that nothing can be more desirable that it to the Inhabitants, and nothing more contrarily is offensive as Thiefs, which in the Saxon is thus, Swa ymbe frythesbote. Swathan bundan si selost & tham Theoffon sy lathost, & swa ymb Heosbote.  
Having met with a passage in the Laws of King 
(u) LL. Aethelstani, fol. 53.  Ethelstan, which both illustrates the Care of the King, to have the Peace preserved; and likewise shows the readiness (according to their duty) of the Subjects to assist the King with their Persons and Estates: I thought it not amiss to insert it as a Close to this Chapter, and an Introduction to the next.  
The words (as to be rendered from the Saxon, and the Latin Version of Mr. Lambard) run thus, I Aethelstan King, do to all clearly signify [Cyth] that I have diligently enquired the Cause wherefore our 
(w) Vre sryth is wyrs gehealden thonne we list.  Peace was not kept as I desired, and at Grantelee it was appointed; and I received this Answer from 
(a) Et mine witan seig●h.  my Wise Men, that it happened by my 
(b) That le hit to long forboren baebbe.  forbearance; i.e. too much lenity in not punishing now of late, when I stayed at Exeter in the 
(c) Middum wintre.  Feast of the Nativity of our Lord, attended by my Wise Men, I found 
(d) ●t that ealle sin 〈◊〉 mid bire sylfum & midyfre (which I signifying Heritage; and though misplaced in Lambard, is by him translated Children) & mid wife & mideallum thingum (by L●mbard translated properly all their Fortunes) to faerenne thither thither le thonne will.  them ● most ready themselves, with their Heirs, with their Wives and all their Estates, to go thither, whither I will, and will purge out, or expel those Outlaws, i. e. breakers of the Peace, that are against this, in such order, or with such wisdom and consideration, that they never after come on the Earth again, i.e. that they be banished. The Saxon of the latter part is thus, Bretan high offer this geswican willan, on tha gerade the heo naefre aest on sorda ne cumen; which Mr. Lambard translates thus,  isti tandem pacis violatores Regno haud unquam redituri pellerentur.  
Then it further is added, And if these Men 
(e) And give high mon afre af● on thaem eorda gemit, that high sin swa seildig, swa se the at hebbendra banda gefougen sin.  hereafter in these Lands be met with, or found, that they shall be so guilty as they are that are found hand having; that is Stealing; which Mr. Lambard renders, Ac si eorum aliquis postea in Regno deprehenderetur, pariter ac qui est in furto manifeste deprehensus plecteretur.  
From all which we may observe, That the Counsel of the Witan, Nobles, and Wise Men, was at one of the times the King kept them in course: viz. at Christmas, called here Midwinter. Secondly, That the King asks the Members of the Council their advice. Thirdly, They tell him, that it happened, that his Peace was not kept, because of his forbearance in not putting the Laws in Execution, that were established at Grantelee. From whence we may observe, that the King was to put these in Execution, and that his Remissness, Clemency, or Indulgence increased the numbers of the breakers of the Peace. Fourthly, That for the suppressing of these breakers of the Peace, the Nobles who met in Council at Exeter, promise's they will be in readiness provided, themselves and their who●e Families, and all things they have, to faerenne, that is, from fair, to go forth in Expedition Armed, as the King will appoint; the signification of which word I have found in several Letters about the Wars betwixt England and Scotland in Henry the Eighth's and Edward the Sixth's time, where when any considerable party of the Scots made an inroad into England, to seize upon Men, burn Towns, or Houses, or carry away , it was called running a Forray. Fifthly, We may note, that this shows that the Militia of the Subjects was at the King's disposal to go whither then the King will; which saves me a labour in the following Chapter to deduce the King's Power over the Militia higher, though I doubt not but a little looking into the Saxon Laws would afford me more Precedents, as the Fifty ninth Law of William the 
(f) Statuimus etiam & sirmiter praecipimus, ut omnes liberi homines totius Regni noslri praedicli, sint fratres conjurati ad Monarchiam nostram, & ad Regnum nostrum pro viribus suis & facultatibus contra inimicos pro posse suo defendendum, & viriliter servandum; & Facem & Dignitatem Coronae noslrae integram observandam; & ad Judicium rectum, & Justiciam constanter omnibus modis pro posse suo sine dolo & sine dilatiene faciendam. LL. Gul. 1. 59 fol. 171. Edit. Wheeloch.  Conqueror doth expressly; as before I have touched on another occasion, but here think fit to recite it at length, viz. The King appoints, and firmly commands all the Freemen of his Kingdom, that they be sworn Brothers, to their Power to defend, and manfully to keep his Monarchy, and his Kingdom according to their might and Estates against Enemies, and to observe or maintain the Peace and Dignity of his Crown entire; and without delay, without deceit to do right Judgement and Justice constantly, all manner of ways, according to their Power. So that here we find these liberi Homines, Conservators of the Peace also, which I suppose was incumbent on them, as well as they were Lords of Manors, where they had their Courts, as likewise they were Hundredaries, etc.   

CHAP. XXXV. Of the King's Sovereignty in making War and Peace.  
THE great 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3. Polit. c. 7.  Philosopher observes, That in a Commonwealth, that part is most powerful in which the strength of War consists, and which is in possession of Arms; for those, he saith, that have no Arms, are the Servants of the Armed.  
Plato 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 12. de LL. Power of making War and Peace the greatest Badge of Sovereignty.  affirms it as a standing Law, That he, who without Authority, innovates a Peace, or makes War, shall be adjudged to punishment; and gives this reason for it, That he who hath in his Hand the Militia, it is in his Power that the Commonwealth subsist, or be dissolved.  
Bodin makes this one of the greatest badges of Sovereignty; because, without the power of declaring War, and making Peace, no Prince can defend himself or his Subjects, the Establishment, or Destructon of the States depending upon it: therefore it is Capital to do the least thing in that kind without the King's Commission. There being nothing more dangerous in War, than to betray Counsels, it is not fit the ordering of War, and consequently of Peace, should be in any but the Sovereign.  
In the Greek and 
(c) Clapmarius de Jure Maj●statis, lib. 1. c. 10.  Latin Histories it appears, that all Wars were undertaken, and performed by the Counsel, Will, and Pleasure of the Sovereign, whether Senate, or Emperor, and by them solely was decreed, unless in some extraordinary Cases, that the People's consent was required in comitiis Populi centuriatis; and when the Republic was changed by the Julian Law, it was Treason to make War without the Command of the Prince; the words of the Law being, Nulli, nobis insciis, atque inconsultis, quorumlibet armorum movendorum copia tribuetur.  
The reasons why this Power should be in the Sovereign solely, are many, and just; for without it no Prince can provide against intestine Seditions. For if he wanted that Authority, 
Reasons why this Power should be in the Sovereign alone to make War and Peace.  as often as Ambitious or Seditious Men persuade the People they were in danger of Oppression by the Government, or they had a mind to remove great Officers that they might enjoy their places, or that the Rule in Church or State did not please them; They might resort to Arms, to the ruining of their follow Subjects, who would otherwise live peaceably and dutifully. By this liberty, greatest Convulsions would be in the Kingdom upon every predominancy of ill humours, and we should never be without the Plague of War in one place or other, and all the miseries of a torn, disjointed and mangled confusion would be upon us; neither should a Prince be able to defend his Subjects from Foreign Invasions, or perform that great and necessary Work of assisting the Allies to his State, and To formidable to his Enemies.  
Polybius 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polyb. O.  notes, That there are two things which preserve Government, viz. Fortitude against Enemies, and Concor●●● home; but neither of these can be performed, if the Prince have not the disposal of the Militia. This is it which preserves the King's Authority, makes his Laws to be observed, keeps the Factious and Seditious at quiet, gives repute abroad, and Peace at home.  
All the Calamities of War are prevented, when an Armed Prince, that hath the sole disposal of his Military Power, can extinguish the Flame at its first blaze; therefore St. 
(e) Ordo naturalis mortalium paci accommodatus, hoc poscit, ut suscipiendi belli auctoritas, atque consilium penes Principes sit. Augustinus contra Faustum.  Austin saith, That the natural order of Mortals, accommodated to Peace, requires this, That the Authority and Counsel of making War be in the Prince.  
That in the time of the Saxon Kings, the Power of the Militia was in the Crown, doth not obscurely appear in all the Laws for preserving the Peace, and in that particularly I have instanced in of King Aethelstan; besides which, we find the Tenth Law of King Canutus ordained, That Fenced Towns, 
Burghote & Brighote beonon forth & scip forthunga aginne man georne & frythunga eac swa a th'one thearf sy for ●e men licre neode. LL. Canute 10.  or burgh's and Bridges be repaired, and there be preparations for defence both of Land and Sea-Forces, so often as the necessity of the Commonweal requires it.  
The 69th. Chapter of Hereots runs thus, Every Earl to pay Eight Horses, whereof four with Saddles, and four without Saddles; four Helmets, and so many Coats of Mail, eight Spears and eight Shields, four Swords, and twelve Mancusae of Gold: and a principal Thane, half the number, and other Thanes a lesser proportion, as may be there seen: By which there seemeth some beginning of a Feudal Tenure, which in William the Conqueror's time was so settled, that (as elsewhere I have noted) all Persons held of him their Lands in Knight's Service, to be ready at his pleasure with Horse, Men, and Arms; the which was practised in succeeding Ages.  
The Statute 30. Octob. 7 E. 1. saith, That it being accorded of late, that in our next Parliament, Provision should be made, that in all Parliaments, Treaties, and other Assemblies which should be made in the Realm of England for ever, that every man shall come without all Forces, and Armours, peaceably to the Honour of us, and the Peace of us and our Realm. Now all Prelates, Earls, etc. have said, that to us it belongeth, and our part is through our Royal Signiory to 
* i.e. forbidden.  defend force of Arms, and all other force against our Peace at all times, when it shall please us; and to punish them which shall do contrary, according to our Laws, and usages of our Realm: and hereunto they are bound to aid us their Sovereign Lord at all seasons.  
In 3 Ed. 3. 
(f) Cap. 2.  the Commons decline the having Cognizance of such matters, as guarding the Seas, and Marches of England, but refer it wholly to the King; and 25 E. 3. it is High Treason to levy War against the King, or aid them that do it. Also the Statute of 
(g) 11 H. 7. c. 18.  H. 7. saith, Every Subject by duty of his Allegiance is to serve and assist his Prince and Sovereign Lord, at all seasons when need shall require.  
There is nothing more indisputably owned by all that understand the Laws, than that it was High Treason by the Common Law, before the Statute of 25 E. 3. for any Subject to levy War within the Realm, without Authority from the King; it being one of the Rights of Majesty, Badges of Supreme Power, and incommunicable Prerogatives of the Crown, saith my Lord 
* 3 Instit. c. 9  Coke, and with him consent all the long Robe.  
In a Speech in the Star-Chamber to the Justices in Queen Elizabeth's time, the Chancellor tells them that the Queen had levied Forces, and Reason willeth, and the obedience of good Subjects requireth, that all things that the Prince commandeth for defence of the State, should by the Subjects diligently, and obediently be performed for duties sake, either not examining the cause, or presuming the best cause; but at that time she was pleased to signify the cause of her do.  
As to the King of England's making War, and Peace abroad, it hath always been owned as the King's sole Prerogative; and when some Parliaments have addressed to our Kings, to make War or Peace, contrary to what the Sovereign judged convenient, they have been advertised of their Duties: yet when War is to be made in remote Countries, which cannot be performed without great Expense, much time, and the exhausting of the Kingdoms Forces, That the People may more cheerfully serve their Prince and Country, and that the Exchequer may not be too much diminished, whereby the usual Charges of the Government may not be substracted; Kings have upon good Reason, proposed the Matter to their Parliaments, whereby necessary Aids might be sufficiently supplied.  
The Laws now in force concerning the Militia, are, That the 
(k) 13 Car. 2. c. 6. 14 Car. 2. c. 3.  King hath the Prerogative alone, to dispose of the Militia of the Nation, to make War and Peace, Leagues and Truces, to grant Safe-Conduct, without the Parliament; and he may issue out Commissions of Lieutenancy, impowering them to form into Regiments, to lead them, and employ them as well within their own, as other Countries, as the King shall direct, to suppress Insurrections, Rebellions, and Invasions.  
He hath the Command of all the Forts, and places of Strength, and alone to have the keeping and Command of the Magazines of Arms, he alone to give Letters of Mark and Reprisal, in times of War, to give Safe-Conduct for Merchants, to make a stop of Trades as he sees cause. In the time of danger, and for defence of the 
(l) Coke 7. 25.  Realm, may command all his Subjects to Arm, and they are to assist him, and for this the Commission of Array may be made use of, and all the Courts of Officers of War in a time of War, are his Prerogative, and the Subjects are to serve the King within the Kingdom, against Rebels, and Traitors, 
(m) Jenkins Cent. 6. Case 14.26.89.  without Pay or Wages; and this as it seems, in any part of the Nation, especially if the King go himself.  
The Subject (except in an extraordinary 
(n) Coke 7.8.  Case) is not to be forced out of the Realm, unless it be to go with the King's Person; nor in any case, unless upon the sudden Invasion or Assault of an Enemy, to serve the King without wages: and the King in time of War may take any man's 
(o) I e. 3. Stat. 1. 2 Eliz. c. 2.  House to build a Fort, or make a Bulwark upon any man's Land. But the King may not rate the Nation to pay any money towards any War of his.  
It is true in time of Peace the King cannot quarter his Military Forces without the consent of the respective Subjects, nor raise money without Act of Parliament, for the maintenance of any Army: so that the Subject (while they keep dutiful) are in no danger of oppression by such a Power; yet without a competent Standing Force, and Guard, 
Some Standing Forces necessary.  at the King's absolute pleasure, what Livy saith of the Senate, 
(p) Timor inde Patres incessit, ac si dimissus exercitus foret, rursus c●tus, occultaeque conjurationes fierent. Lib. 6. The Long Parliaments Claim of the Militia.  would be most true of all Sovereigns, That if the Forces were dismissed, unlawful Assemblies, and covert Conspiracies would be again set on foot.  
The longest lived mischievous Parliament, that any English History can record, knowing that they could not effect their designs of weakening the King without the Power of the Militia (though they had a numerous Party prepared to espouse their Interest, and as ready for Rebellion as they could desire) yet that they might have some colour for justifying their proceed, pretended necessity of putting the Kingdom into a posture of defence, against foreign Invasions (which by subtle Plots, they possessed the people they had Intelligence of) and for fear of any violence to be offered to themselves, or that the King seduced by evil Counsellors, should set up Arbitrary Power: so having obtained that Fatal Act of not being to be dissolved without their own consent, issued out their Commissions for Levying, training, and Exercising Forces in all Counties, where they had power, by no Law, or colour of Law, but that of pretended imminent danger, wherein the King refused to grant Commissions to such as they could confide in for their aforesaid purposes. All which was but colour and show to wrest the Power out of the King's hands.  
To obviate such like mischievous practices for the future, upon his Majesties happy Restauration, it was enacted, and declared, 
The Claims of any Right of the Two Houses to the Militia, totally vacated.  That the sole supreme Government, Command, and disposition of the Militia, and all Forces by Sea and Land, and of all places of strength, etc. is, and by the Law of England ever was the undoubted right of his Majesty, and his Royal Predecessors Kings and Queens of England, and that both, or either of the Houses of Parliament, cannot, nor aught to pretend to the same, nor can or lawfully may raise, or levy War, offensive or defensive, against his Majesty his Heirs and lawful Successors.  
So that now that great Controversy which wasso violently disputed to the loss of so much English Blood and Treasure; is I hope eternally determined, never again to be revived without an horrid prosperous Rebellion: and this Prerogative of the Crown being thus guarded by Law, will never more be attacked while the Royal line continues; which is to be hoped, and wished, will without interruption, be prolonged while the British Soil exists.   

CHAP. XXXVI. Concerning raising of Money upon the Subject, and the obligation of Subjects to supply the Sovereign.  
AS to the raising of Money for the support of Government, I have discoursed something in the Title of Property, and shall here only treat of the necessity in all Government, That the Sovereign be plentifully supplied with a Revenue suitable to the charge.  
Although Darius the Persian be reckoned by Herodotus one of the first that exacted Tribute; 
The necessity of Tributes and Aids.  yet it cannot be conceived but that ever since there was a Prince who commanded large Countries, and had potent Neighbours, Tribute, Aid, and such like provision was exacted of the people for the defraying the necessary charges of it. So Tacitus 
(a) Nec enim quies gentium sine armis, nec arma sine stipendiis, nec stipendia sine tributis. 4. Hist.  tells us, That we may be preserved in Peace, Arms are necessary, and they cannot be provided for without Taxes.  
The Subjects receive the benefit of protection, and by the care of the Government, peaceable possession of their Houses, Fields and Cattle, Liberty of Trade, dispensation of Justice, and other great Emoluments by its guard and vigilance; which require a numerous retinue of Officers of State, Justice, and War, and Multitude of subordinate Ministers. Something also must be allowed for the grandeur and port is necessary for the regulating it at home and abroad, the maintaining Correspondence by Ambassadors, the providing for defence against foreign Invasions, and preserving Tranquillity at home; in all which the Public is concerned: therefore the reason is very just, and equitable, that besides a standing Revenue for defraying these constant charges, there should be subsidiary supplies upon emergencies, adequate to the occasions. As Cicero justly admonisheth, Da operam ut omnes intelligant si salvi esse volunt, necessitati esse parendum: That the Subjects be made to understand, that if they will be safe, 
As the Subject is protected, so he ought to support the Government.  they must yield to necessity this absolute necessity of parting with a portion of their Estates, for securing the rest. For though it be prudence in a private man, justly, and moderately to enrich himself; yet craftily to withhold from the Public, and to defraud it of such parts of the Wealth, as is by Law required, is no sign of prudence (saith Mr. Hobbs as judiciously as any position he lies down:) but want of knowledge of what is necessary, 
Civil War.  for their own defence, and covetousness to part with nothing they can hold, makes this restive humour in many.  
That the Kings of England have quitted that Sovereign badge of raising money upon the Subject, by their own Impositions, without consent of Parliament, is manifest since Edward the First's time. 
(b) 27 E. 1. c. 5. Anno 1299.  The Act for which runs thus, For so much as divers People of our Realm are in fear, that the Aids and Tasks, which they have given us before time, towards our Wars, and other business, of their own grant and good will (howsoever they were made) might turn to a Bondage to them and their Heirs, because they might be at another time found in the Rolls, and likewise for the prices taken throughout the Realm by our Ministers: We have granted for us and our Heirs, that we shall not draw such Aids, Task nor Prices into a Custom, for any thing that hath been done heretofore, be it by Roll or any other Precedent that may be found. 
(c) Cap. 6.  The next is thus; Moreover we have granted for us and our Heirs, as well to Archbishops, Bishops, Abbats, Priors, and other folk of Holy Church, as also to Earls, Barons, and to all the Commonalty of the Land; that for no business from henceforth, we shall take such manner of Aids, Tasks, nor Prices, but by the common assent of the Realm, and for the common profit thereof, 
See for this the Charter of King John.  saving the ancient Aids and Prices due and accustomed.  
These being not fully enough expressed, the Statute of 34. E. 1. though as short in words as any to be found, yet is of the largest extent, and as liberal a Boon of Royal bounty, as any People can boast of from their Prince. It is thus, No Tallage or Aid shall be taken or levied by Us, or our Heirs in our Realm, without the good will and assent of Archbishops, Bishops, Earls, Barons, Knights, Burgesses, and other Freemen of the Land. Therefore all those who would enjoy the benefit of this Law, must take care they preserve the Succession and the two Houses of Parliament.  

(d) MS. Speech, second Parl. El●z. an. 1562. Inducements to supply the Sovereign.  The Lord Chancellor in Queen Elizabeth's time, thus by the Queen's command discourseth to the Houses, If when any part of the natural Body hap to be in danger, the Head and every part hasteth to the relief; so how inconvenient and unnatural is it, when danger is offered to the whole, that the Head should take the whole care, and bear the whole burden, and the Members remain uncareful and uncharged.  
It is certain 
(e) Coke Instit. 1.90.  the Prince can make no War of any great concernment, without the assistance of his Subjects Purses as well as Bodies, unless all would voluntarily serve upon their own charges: for that neither sudden dangers can be evaded, nor Forces raised, and all things necessary for them provided, nor peace be long preserved, when the Prince hath an empty Exchequer; for Treasure is Firmamentum Belli, & Ornamentum Pacis.  
A late 
(f) States of France. Objection.  French Author, concerning his own Country, makes this objection, That Princes having assigned for their usual charges of the Government, Tribute and other Incomes, they ought to be therewith contented, and not without occasion raise new Taxes to the detriment of the Liege people, and contrary to the intention of the Trust: Yet he owns this aught to be soberly understood; for a wise Physician applies those Remedies necessary without the Patient's leave, and will force him, though by cutting off a Limb, to save his life. So when there may happen a necessity, urgent and unforeseen, that either will suffer no delay, or which ought not for some time to be divulged; in such cases (saith he) the King without the States, and whether they will or no, may lay new Impositions, and make all other necessary provisions, by the absolute Power he hath to rule, and preserve his State and Subjects, he not being able to defend them without necessary Forces: Therefore in such occasions it is to be supposed, that with the Power of Government, there is transferred to the Prince the Power to do that, without which good Government cannot be executed; but when there is not that kind of necessity, the States are called. Thus far my Author.  
Since therefore 
(g) Coke 1. Insiit. p. 161.  qui diruit medium, destruit finem, he that takes away the necessary means, for a King to preserve his people in uncommon events, hazards the ruin of the People; some have inferred that when dangers should be so sudden, that there could not be time to convene a Parliament, or that such a Parliament met, should for some design, deny the Prince Money, than the King's Prerogative might extend to the raising of Money; and they instance in the Loans by Privy Seals, exacted upon the Subjects even in Queen Elizabeth's time.  
This indeed was the Plea for Ship-money, and as the case was stated by King Charles the First, 
Concerning Ship-Money.  all the Judges once subscribed their affirmative opinions (though Mr. Justice Hutton and Crook retracted after) and with great learning the case was argued, and Judgement given in favour of the King: Yet he hoping, by the yielding to the abolishing of it, to have stopped the misery of a War, consented to an Act for that purpose; yet that prevented not the Inundation of blood: and we found those men, that moved Heaven and Earth with their clamours against the King, as governing arbitrarily; when they got the Power, made it their daily practice, to lay what unprecedented illegal Taxes they pleased on their fellow Subjects, to the value, as some compute, of Forty Eight Millions.  
Therefore all Judicious persons, lovers of their King, 
The Advantages to Prince and People, when the Crown is liberally provided for.  Country and Posterity, finding the sad effects those disputes brought to the Blessed King and the whole Kingdom, will think it a necessary prudence in a Prince, to have always such a provision of Money ready, as will enable him in all difficulties, that may occur in the Administration of the Government, without being obliged to part with any of his Royal Prerogatives, when any discontented or designing Factious Members shall be able to take advantage of his Wants, whereby to drive their barter with the Crown; for thereby he shall defeat their ends. On the other side it will be the most prudent and dutiful course both for their own security, and the Prince's honour, for Parliaments upon all just and honourable Wars, or occasions of assisting Allies, preparing Fleets in readiness, upon necessary defence, to assist the Prince liberally, and repay out of the Public, what for public Service he hath expended out of his own Revenue, rather than he should be in disesteem with his Neighbours and Allies; whereby the honour of the Prince, and consequently of his Subjects, should be Eclipsed, or he be necessitated to take any unusual course for raising Money, or be compelled to make any inglorious Peace: for we can never forget, how the want of supplies to King Charles the First, brought not only Ship-money, and Knight-hoodmony, Monopolies, and the long disuse of Parliaments, but at last that most calamitous War upon the whole Nation.  
We cannot forget how zealous an House of Commons was of late to prevent any Arbitrariness, as it was insinuated, 
Decemb. 17.1680. The Care of some Parliaments to keep the King poor.  in the late King, so that they voted a Bill to be brought in against illegal Exaction of Money upon the People, under the Penalty of Treason, not foreseeing that the Charters of the City of London, and many other Corporations, were forfeitable upon that account; which if it had been made Treason, the King had got a good Revenue, against the intentions of those who in all appearance voted for a contrary end: which further appeared in their Vote Jan. the 7th following 
(h) Address, part 3.  That whosoever should lend, or cause to be lent, by way of advance, any Money upon the branches of the King's Revenue, arising by Customs, Excise or Hearth-money, (the three principal branches) should be judged to hinder the sitting of Parliament, and be responsible for the same in Parliament. So that they would give nothing themselves, but as much as in them lay, terrified others from lending, or advancing any Money to him; which was not according to their Writ, to advise, but by duress and force to compel the King to submit to their Judgements: and instead of giving him Assistance to support his Allies, and enable him to preserve Tangier, they tended to the disenabling him from contributing to either by his own Revenue and Credit; not only exposing him to the dangers that might happen either at home or abroad, but endeavouring to deprive him of the Possibility of supporting the Government itself, and reduce him to a more helpless Condition than the meanest of his Subjects, as the King sadly and justly complained; and in that Vote the Subjects Liberty and Property was invaded, in that he could not dispose of his Money to his own Profit, and the Benefit of the Government, if either Insurrection or Rebellion happened in the interval of Parliament, or a foreign Force on a sudden should attack us: yet these Gentlemen would be counted Loyal and Dutiful Subjects.  
It is not to be denied, but that if a Prince's standing Revenue were so great, that by it he might not only support the ordinary expenses of the Government, but lay by a sum sufficient to defray all extraordinary incident Charges, either occasioned by intestine Rebellions, or foreign Invasions; that a King should not have occasion to have so often recourse to Parliaments for Aids.  
Yet when we consider, that there would be many other occasions of frequent convening that great Council, for making wholesome Laws, which is one great Portion of their Business; and that the Subjects never can be happy under a poor Prince, who thereby should be brought into contempt, and how much greater mischiefs accrue to the Subjects, by rendering their Prince impotent, and unable to preserve them from factious disturbers of their Peace and Repose, and the preserving their Properties, as well as the defending them from the designs of foreign Princes who would injure our Merchants, lock us in our Island, and force us to sell our own native Commodities, and receive theirs at what Rates they pleased, if our Sovereign were not able to keep a sufficient Fleet, and infinite other Mischiefs, which would accompany a starved Exchequer; we should too late find that the Expense of many Millions would not again restore us to that condition of Prosperity and Renown, that one, timely bestowed on our Prince, would preserve us in. It is much less Charge to keep in good Repair, a well-built Fort, Castle, or Man of War, than to build a new one, especially if, upon the demolishing of the old, we were to fight for the Ground and Materials, whereupon and wherewith we should build the new.  
It is a singular Security to the English Subject, that no Money can be levied upon him, but by Act of Parliament, to which in his Representatives he gives his Consent: and the House of Commons is generally careful that they understand a great necessity, ere they pass any Money-bill; yet we have known in our Age some, that have stood upon such terms with their Sovereign, that either he hath chosen rather to want Supplies, than have them upon such hard Terms, or their Principals have suffered a thousand times more by such denials, than they had done if they had been granted.  
So was Constantinople lost to the Turks, for want of furnishing the Emperor with the hundredth part of that which the victorious Enemy plundered the Citizens of; and so the Count Palatine, elected King of Bohemia, lost that Kingdom, and all his Hereditary Signories, by unfurnishing his Soldiers with present Pay, when he had it by him. And how many suffer by the want of a liberal and proportionable Supply, to pay off the Debts of the Exchequer, is too sadly felt by many; and if the Parliament of 1639. had furnished King Charles the First with twelve Subsidies (as it appears by the sequel,) the Expense of four times as many Millions, besides the infinite quantity of Christian Blood shed in the ensuing War, had been prevented in all humane probability.  
Therefore it is to be hoped that both Parliaments will be careful to supply the wants of the Crown; and Princes will for the future, be as careful so to employ the moneys given, that they may encourage their Subjects (as often as the urgency of Affairs may require it) to give freely what may be useful, and sufficient for their King's urgent occasions.  

(i) Nec juv●ntam armis civilibus aut domesticis discordiis imbutam, nulla odia, nullas injuri is nec cupidinis ultionem afferre. 13. Annal. c. 1.  It is noted by Tacitus, that Nero coming to the Empire, told the Senate that he being not brought up in Civil Wars, or domestical discords, would bring with him neither hatred nor grudge, nor desire of Revenge, and promised them many good things, which were very acceptable 
(k) An cuncta vectigalia omitti juberet: Idque pulcherrimum donum generl mortalium daret, Sed impetum ejus, multum prius laudata animi magnitudine, attenuere Senatores, dissolutionem Imperii docendo, si fructus quibus Respublica sustineretur; diminuerentur. Lib. 13. c. 12.  to the Senate and People; but doubting with himself whether it were best to command that no more Subsidies or Tributes should be levied, but he should bestow so fair a Donative on the World; though this commended the Bounteousness of his Mind; yet the Lords of the Senate stayed him from such a Resolution, telling him, It would be the Dissolution of the Empire, if the Revenues, by which it was sustained, should be diminished.  
These, and such Considerations, that ever to be Renowned House of Commons, convened 23 May, 1685. have had, and with an unaccustomed speed, supplied the King plentifully; which was a most effectual means to stifle the Rebellion of the late Duke of Monmouth, and the Earl of Argile: and such cheerful Aids will render his Majesty able to pursue his most Princely Design, not only of making the English Name more considered and respected abroad; 
The King's Speech, 30 May, 1685.  but of carrying the Reputation of it yet higher in the World, than it has been in the time of many of his Royal Ancestors.  
Which induced the most wise King to tell them, That the readiness and cheerfulness that attended the dispatch of it, was as acceptable to him as the Bill itself; and that he would not call upon them for Supplies, but when they should be of public use and advantage; and that he would manage what they gave, with good Husbandry, and take care to employ them to the uses for which he asked them.  
So long as such a considerately liberal Mind continueth in the two Houses, and the Money is lodged in the Exchequer of such a Prince, we may presage a most happy time, and neither fear intestine Rebellions, nor foreign Enemies; and besides the unspeakable Benefits to ourselves, the advantage must redound to his Majesty's Allies, and the general Repose of Christendom may depend much upon it: there being little doubt to be made, but if our late Soverereign of Blessed Memory, had been seasonably and effectually supplied, the Lilies of France had not been so rankly planted and secured in Flanders, nor been watered with so much Christian Blood; nor probably had we at home been in so imminent a danger of a Civil War, as we were by the subtle Devices of those who knew that the Royal Eagle could make no extraordinary flight, when his Golden Pinions were shortened.   

CHAP. XXXVII. Of the Nobility.  
HAving hitherto treated of the Excellency of Government, and particularly of that of England, and the just and beneficial Sovereignty of the Prince, under several Heads; Method requires that I speak something of the Subjects, who they are and their Duties; and lastly of the causes of Disturbance, or Dissolution of Government, by Faction, Sedition, Conspiracy and Rebellion: of which in order, and first of the Nobility, as those who justly make the greatest Figure in the Government, next to the Royal Lineage.  
The 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. l 4. c. 4.  Philosopher makes four kinds of Nobility. First, such as have the Possession of great Riches, 
Several kinds of Nobility.  and are abbe to bear a great Port. Secondly, such as have been so from great Antiquity. Thirdly, those that by Virtue, and great Achievements, have acquired Honour and Renown. Lastly, such as in Learning are Eminent. Under these Heads the Nobility may yet be ranked, if we take it in a large Sense, as the fit Subject upon which the Sovereign may impress that Character. But my design is to speak of the second and third Order only.  
How the Word Nobiles hath been used in the Latin and Greek Empire, when it was the addition to Caesar in the Branches of the Emperor's Families, and how in later times, I shall not trouble the Reader with, but refer the curious to the most Learned Selden, and to what I shall note in the Chapter of the Gentry.  
Great Virtues have sublimed their Bloods, 
A Character of the Nobility.  and separated them from the dregs of the Crowds. Others are Vessels of Common Clay; they are all China and Porcelain: others of Lead, Iron, Brass, or Silver; they of pure Gold, or Diamonds of the old Rock. They are Stars of the first Magnitude in the Firmament of Government, yea the Firmament itself, betwixt the upper and the nether Waters; betwixt the pure Aether of Celestial Intelligences (the Sovereign and Princes of the Blood) and the terrestrial Waters of the Commons. The Blessed Medium, the double Trench to defend the Crown and the People.  
That there should be such illustrious Persons is absolutely necessary, for that in a Multitude there must be some, 
Necssity of a Nobility.  who designing to live virtuously, and having Souls of a richer Composition, by their own proper uncommon Achievements, and the transcendency of their Virtues, shall lay the Foundation of that Nobility, which afterwards enriched and augmented by the noble Actions of their Successors, will make their Families splendid, and Illustrious. So that Sovereigns (the Fountains and Disposers of all Honours) justly reward them with the Ensigns of Nobility. The present Nobility, or their noble Ancestors, (by fidelity and their great Capacities to serve the Crown and Commonweal) have been gilded with those Rays, and have Characters impressed upon them undefaceable by any thing but Treason, which taints their Blood; or Degeneracy, which smuts their Esteem. They are the Buttresses of the Throne, the Gold and Silver work of the Regalia.  

(b) St. Alban's Essays, c. 14.  It is a Reverend thing (saith the ingenious Chancellor) to see an ancient Castle, or Building, not in Decay, 
Of Ancient Nobility.  or a fair Timber Tree, firm and sound; how much more to behold a noble ancient Family, which hath stood against the waves, and weather of Time.  
New Nobility is but the Act of Power, the ancient, the Act of Time. Those who are first raised to Nobility, are commonly more virtuous, but less innocent; for there is rarely any rising, without a Commixture of good and bad Acts; but it is reasonable that the Memory of their Virtues remain to Posterity, and their Faults die with themselves.  

(c)— miserum est aliorum incumbere famae, Ne collapsa ruant subduct is tecta columnis, Juv. Sat. 8. v. 77, 78.  It is glorious in the Progeny of the old Nobility, and useful to themselves, their King, and Country, to study to imitate the Perfections, and eschew the Imperfections of their noble Progenitors, who were Founders of their Families and Honours: They no doubt were Learned, Judicious, and able Ministers of State, such as eased their Prince of their otherwise unsupportable Burden of Government; such as were sensible of the true Fountain of Honour, true Patriots of their Country, because zealous for the established Government, and coveted not to make themselves popular in opposition to their Prince.  
Honour is one of the prime Badges of Nobility; 
The Use of Nobility.  the winning of that (saith 
(d) St. Alban's Essays, Of Honour and Reputation.  the learned Chancellor) is the revealing of a man's Virtue without disadvantage. If a man perform that which hath not been attempted before, or attempted and given over, or hath been achieved, but not with so good Circumstances; he hath purchased more Honour, than by effecting a matter of greater difficulty, or Virtue, when he is but a follower.  
Honour that is gained, broken upon another, hath the quickest reflection, like Diamonds cut with Fucets; therefore it's commendable for any to exceed his Competitors in Honour, by outshooting them in their own Bows.  

(e) Idem Essays, c. 14.  A Monarchy, where there is no Nobility at all, (as among the Turks) is ever a pure and absolute Tyranny. For Nobility attempters Sovereignty: a great and potent Nobility addeth Majesty to a Monarch, but diminisheth Power; putteth Life and Spirit into the People, but presseth their Fortunes. It is well when Nobles are not too great for Sovereignty, or Justice, and yet maintained in that height, as the Insolence of Inferiors may be broken upon them, before it come on over fast upon the Majesty of Kings.  
A numerous Nobility causeth Poverty and Inconvenience in a State, 
Concerning numerous Nobility.  brings a surcharge of Expense; and some falling to be weak in Estate, it makes a kind of Dis-proportion betwixt Honour and Means.  
To keep Nobles at some distance is not amiss; but to despise them, 
King's to countenance their Nobility.  may make a King less safe, and less able to perform any thing he desires. This Henry the Seventh did, and though they continued Loyal to him, yet they did not cooperate with him in his Business.  
The reason of State, that we may presume, swayed with so wise a King, was, for that the Wars betwixt the Houses of York and Lancaster had been carried on by the sidings of the Nobility, who had in those Days numerous Retinues; the younger Sons of the Gentry, and sometimes the elder, making a great part of the vast Families of Noblemen, and their Tenants holding their Lands by small Rents, and due Service, enabled them to make great alterations in the State, accordingly as the chief of the Nobility were combined. So that he made Laws against the number of Retainers to lessen such dependences; and likewise bringing in use the making of Leases, made the Tenants less obliged to their Lords, paying their Rents; and by such Tenors for Years, 
Honours not to be too common.  they grew Rich: so that thereby Freeholders exceedingly increased, and all this helped to subduct from the Power of the Nobility.  
Honour's are not rashly to be made common, or prodigally given; otherwise they grow dis-esteemed, and unregarded: rare and few Honours are more glorious (saith 
(f) Honours non ess● remere pervulgandos aut essuse dandos, alioquin eos obsoleseere; raros enim honores & tenues esse gloriosoes, effusos & pervulgatos esse obsoletos & contemptos. Giphanii Com. in cap. 3. lib. 5. olit. Arist.  the judicious Commentator;) diffused, and common, bring Contempt and Sleight. Consentaneous to which is, what the forementioned Chancellor saith, That States which aim at greatness, 
St. Alban's Essays. Of Greatness of Kingdoms.  must take heed how the Nobility and Gentry multiply too fast; for that maketh the common Subject to grow to a Peasant, driven out of Heart, and in effect but a Gentleman's Labourer. As in Copice Wood, if you leave the Stadle too thick, you shall never have clean Underwood, but Shrubs and Bushes; and so you bring, that the Hundred Poll is not fit for the Helmet, especially as to the Infantry, which is the State of France, not of England.  
But in this Particular, the Custom of other Nations, a Prince's Service, and incident conveniences are to be considered. For some will be won as much by Honours, as Offices of Profit; and it is less Expense to a Prince in the gratifying his well-deserving Subjects. Besides, something must be allowed to Aemulations, and a rich Soil will bring a greater Crop than a barren.  
In all Ages likewise some of the ancient Nobility are extinguished, and it is fit to plant new Standards in the room of the decayed: So that what these Learned Men assert concerning spare Distribution of Honours, is to be considered with just Limitations.  
The Splendour, Magnificence, and great Retinues of Noblemen, conduce much to Martial greatness; 
Great Retinues of the Nobility useful.  except in Poland, the State of Free-Servants and Attendants upon Noblemen, and the richer Gentlemen, hath been observed to be no where so peculiar in former times, as in England. Those Retainers and humble Friends are fitted for all gentile Employments, and are a Seminary of the more polite Yeomanry; whereas a close and reserved living of Noblemen, and Gentlemen, causeth a Penury of Military Forces, and well-bred Yeomanry.  
The Nobility may be Eclipsed, by sinking beneath their Orbs in affecting Popularity in opposition to their Prince, 
The Nobility not to Desert the Crown.  or rearing their Heads among the Clouds in Ambition.  
Whenever by Malevolent Aspects of other Planets, their Influence on the State is less benign; or that the putrid Breath of some Malcontents taint their Allegiance, the Contagion is of a large Spread; their Blood being mingled with so many others of Power, takes Fire at once, and can neither be shed or rectified alone.  
Sometimes their Blood may be chilled, when they conceive others interpose betwixt them and the warmer Gleams of the Throne, and they will not want Factious Torpedoes, that will benumb their brisker Souls, 
The old Nobility not to envy the new ones.  if they be not wary to avoid their touch. But when their Lordships consider that as they and their happy Ancestors have had a plentiful Portion of their Princes Regards and Bounty, so they should be content that others share with them in their Prince's Munificence, and should not expect that their Families should be every Age's Darlings: they will have more honourable and contented Thoughts, and own not only the Truth, but yield to the necessity of that of 
(g) Fato quodam aut sorte nascendi, ut caetera, ita Principum inclination in hos, ossensio in illos. Annal. lib 4.  Tacitus, That as our Birth s are ascribed to Fate, or Chance; so the Inclinations of Princes to some, and their dislike to others, as he instanceth in Lepidus, under Tiberius.  
We see in the great Oeconomy of the World (which we must believe is disposed by the Universal Monarch) some noble Families in every Age are Extinct, and other new ones by their Virtues and great Accomplishments are raised, and the Cadets of others like some Rivers are hid for some space under Ground, till when they appear again, they are know by their refined Parts to be of noble Abstract. 
Not to repine at the Prince's Favours bestowed on others.   
The Sun is the same most luminous Body, though some Maculae are observed in it by curious Telescopes; and if Prince's Beams shine not always with the same Serenity upon the district of some Families that it hath done, it is no more than the Sun in the great Vortex doth, and is no more to be repined at. Therefore it becomes those noble Souls to be content with their large allotments, and shake off all those Vipers that would sting them with Envy and Discontent.  
It is well worth such Nobleman's Consideration how their Interests are interwoven with that of the Crown, and if any unhappily have loosened the twine, or frozen the Zeal they have for its support, let them call to Mind the Virtue and Bravery of their Ancestors, and observe what Gems or Gold-work they were of it, and strive to fasten themselves there again, and out of the Embers kindle again that Loyalty they have derived ex traduce from their generous Ancestors: so that 

(a) Lucan, 1.2. v. 557.  Fervidus hac iterum circa praecordia Sanguis  
Inacleat.—   
And as the Crown hath bestowed Honour and Wealth upon their noble Families, so let them never be wanting with their utmost Industry, to support it in all its splendid Prerogatives; and of all the Infamy of Mortals, let not ingratitude be laid to their Charge. 
How the Nobility may honourably acquaint their Prince with Grievances.   
The Nobility are Conciliarii nati, and as their Birth and places give them easy access to the Prince's Privy-Chamber and Cabinet, though they be not of his secret Council; so they have opportunities to present the State of Affairs, and ill managery or grievances of the People, when they conceive them concealed from their Prince, both better and more effectually than others of a lower Rank.  
But than it should be done like Persons of Honour with all Respect and Duty to their Prince, and the ostentation of this sort of Charity, should not lessen the usefulness of it; much less should they blow a Trumpet when they perform it, either to aggrandise the Enterprise, or to raise discontent at the denial.  
In every King's Reign, it hath been a flourishing time, and happy, when the Nobility studied with a refined laudable Contention to emulate one another's Virtue, striving to outdo one another in the Service of their King and Country, uniting in that glorious Testudo, to defend their Prince's Prerogative, and the Laws that adjust their own, and the People's Privileges.  
It is never to be forgot, how in our late Commonwealth, 
How Commonwealths depress the Nobility.  the House of Peers was by the very Posteriors of the Commons, Voted useless and dangerous. No sooner was that sacred Head separated from them, but they were degraded to Commoners (as to any Legislative Power:) and though those Noblemen that were content to fit in the lower House, were highly caressed and applauded; yet a few Years hath changed the note, and their Names will be recorded to Posterity, in far less Lustre than if they had more strenuously espoused the afflicted King's Quarrel: and it is not to be doubted, but the Sense of that will be a most prevalent Antidote against the Defection of any of the Nobility, that will consider the naturalness of such a degrading, if the Commonwealth-Men should ever appear again without their Vizors; and it will be an excellent amulet to keep them from the Infection of such Principles and Practice.  
It is worth noting, that William the Conqueror giving to his Nobility great Fees to be held of him in Capite, 
How the Nobility had greater Power anciently than now.  for some Ages the Nobility had great Interests, and numerous dependences, and had special Jurisdiction over great Baronies; and while they served the Crown according to their Tenors, the inferior Gentry and Commoners being one way or other Tenants to them, could do little in opposition to the Crown. But when in King John and Henry the Third's time, their greatness was dangerous to the Crown, the Commons were brought in to be a part of the Parliament. Yet for some while after they retained their Grandeur, till (as I have hinted) Henry 7. retrenched them, and Queen Elizabeth preferring so many new Men, making less use of the ancient Nobility, studied to gain the common People's Affections by all Arts and Bounties she could use: and in after-Ages the Nobility being less valued by the Freeholders, and increased in Number, and some of them adhering to the two Houses against their Sovereign, their interests both with the Parliament and People grew less.  
But now under a Prince who sets a true value upon the Nobility, if they he not wanting to themselves, they may hope to attain the lustre of their noble Ancestors, and the Commoners be no ways abridged of their Privileges. For then the Government is in the happiest Condition, when the Nobility are great without Ambition, rich without Oppression, eminent in Virtue as in Character. The Gentry so deporting themselves to the Commonalty as they desire the Nobility may to them; and the Commonalty with humble Industry, peaceably enriching themselves, and enjoying that freedom and liberty, which may keep them in Heart and Courage to serve their Prince and Country with cheerful Alacrity, and outdo those of their Rank in all other Dominions; which in the English Soldiery is observed in all Wars to be their peculiar Excellency, ascribable principally to the Benignity of the Government which dispirits them not: and when this liberty is not abused to Licentiousness, but restrained within the Bounds of humble Candour and Modesty, Reverence to their Superiors, and thankfulness to their Prince; all is in an happy Frame.   

CHAP. XXXVIII. Of the Gentry of England.  
I Shall not detain the inquisitive Reader upon the derivation of the Word Gentilhom, or Gentleman, but refer him to 
(a) Titles of Honour, P. 861, 862. Whence the Name.  Mr. Selden, who at large discusseth the point; whether with Velserus and some others, it be derived from Gentilis or Heathen, as introduced when the Goths, Hunns, and Vandals having overrun the Roman Provinces, were in a better Condition, though Gentiles, than the Christians, under the Romans; or that it is derived from Gens.  
I am more inclined to be of the latter Opinion, finding it more agreeable to the common Use. For Cicero 
(b) In Topicis.  calls those Gentiles, qui ex eadem Gente; Ingenui, qui nunquam Capite sunt diminuti. Gens consisting of a multitude which have sprung from one Generation, and of many of these Gentes consists a Nation; to which agrees that of 
(c) Gentilis dicitur ex eodem genere ortus: & is qui simili nomine appellatur. Festus ad Verbum.  Festus, that Gentilis is one born of the same Gens, or Kindred, and who is called by the like Name. So we find the Horatij, the Corvine, Julian, Flavian Family. etc.  
So the Greeks use the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for one nobly descended from great Parentage. So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was Nobility, which 
(d) Polit. lib. 4. c. 8. lib. 5. c. 1.  Aristotle calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Ancient Wealth and Virtue, or the 
(e) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rhetor. ad Theod, lib, 2. c. 5.  Dignity of the Ancestor. The first Authors of it being styled famous Men, and Honourable, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
In the largest acceptation of the Word, as it is now used (saith the judicious 
(f) Tiles of Honour, p. 852.  Selden) it denotes one that either from the Blood of his Ancestors, or the Favour of his Sovereign, or of them that have Power from the Sovereign, or from his own Virtue, Employment, or otherwise, according to the Laws and Customs of Honour in the Country he lives in, is ennobled, made Gentile, or so raised to an eminency above the Multitude, perpetually inherent in his Person.  
These are styled the Nobiles minores, for distinction sake, 
The use of the word Nobilis.  the word Nobiles being now appropriated to those of the higher Rank. The ancient use of Nobilis (especially before the Roman Monarchy) was such, that it was justly given to none but him that had Jus imaginum, or some Ancestor at least that had born some of the great Offices, or their Magistratus Curules; as 
(g) 〈…〉 1. cap. 19  Censorship, Consulship, etc. From whose Image kept he had the Jus Imaginum. Therefore the preceding Ancestor was called novus Homo, or Ignobilis.  
Some Ages after the Romans were under a Monarchy, the Title of Nobilis was given to such as by the Emperor's Patents of Offices, or their Codicilli Honorarii, were first raised out of the lowest Rank. After that, Arms of Ensigns of Distinction, born upon Shields, grew to be in may Families Hereditary, (which was about four hundred Years since, as Sir Edward Bish in his Aspilogia avoucheth) it came into frequent use, that he, who was either formerly ennobled by Blood, or newly by acquisition, either assumed, or had by Grant from his Sovereign, or those deputed by him, some special note of Distinction, by Arms also to be transmitted with his Gentry to his Posterity.  
Yet 
(h) 〈◊〉.  Mr. Selden notes, that in the Proceed in the Court of Chivalry, betwixt Reginald Lord Grey of Ruthin, Plaintiff, and Sir Edward Hastings Defendant, concerning the bearing of a Manch Gules in a● Field Or, in the depositions taken in the Moot Hall at Bedford, it is recorded, that John Botiler of the County of Bedford, and Roger Tenstal, Mayor of Bedford, having been the Plaintiffs Servants, severally deposed, Il est Gentilhom d' Ancestry, mass nad point, d' Arms. 
Gentlemen without coats of Arms.  That he was a Gentlemen of ancient time, but had no Arms. But I shall pass from this.  
That which I desire the Gentry to observe is, 
Advice to the Gentry.  That they are the Seminary of our greater Nobility, and that from Loyal, Wise, Learned, Valiant and Fortunate Persons, of their Order, in all Prince's Reigns, the Nobility have sprung. Therefore as some of them are derived from as numerous Ancestors, as any in other Kingdoms, and have by Hereditary Succession greater Estates than many foreign Counts, and as they desire either to conserve the Repute their Ancestors have honourably entailed on them, or to transmit them to their Posterities; so it will be their Interest and Glory to accomplish themselves in all sorts of useful Learning, whereby they may be Serviceable to their King and Country.  
There are Bodily Exercises they should be well skilled in, as Fencing, Riding the great Horse, and all Military Exercises, to enable them to serve in the Militia of the Nation; and their diligent perusing all sorts of History, and the Laws of the Land, will fit them for the managing of Civil affairs, and dispensing the King's Laws, as Justices of Peace, Sheriffs, Commissioners, Representatives in Parliament, as also for the greater Offices of State.  
Since they are born to large Patrimonies, and thereby have a more generous Education, and derive a more refined Spirit from their Ancestors, they can with infinite more Ease enter into public Employment, having none of those sinking 
(i) Hand facile emergunt, quorum virtutibus obstat Res angust a domi—  weights of Poverty, and mean Education, which enforce others to use extreme Diligence  they can mount the first half Pace, the Gentleman is seated on, by that time he leaves his tutors.  
It is true the Privileges of the Gentry of England, properly so called, are not so great as in some Countries, where they have power of Life and Death over their Servants, or are exempted from Taxes, and enjoy other Immunities which are denied to the Commons; yet they have others as beneficial in that they make up a great share of the Ministerial parts of the Government.  
It is required by God and their Prince, that they should so deport themselves as they may be singular 
(k) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dio, lib. 2.  Examples to their Tenants and Neighbours, of Wisdom, Temperance, Justice, Loyalty, and all the System of Virtues; and by a generous Hospitality, without Debauchery, preserve their Interest in the affection of their Neighbours, and that the Poor may daily and zealously pray for them, being made the Voiders, and receiving the Sportula of their plentiful Tables. By this way of living they will sow among their Neighbours the Seeds of all useful Virtues, and enrich their Countries, and be able in time of need to serve their Prince with their numerous Dependants.  
It is for the use of the blooming Gentlemen I writ this. The more sage and ancient need only such Intimations to refresh their Memories. I have made Observations how fatal it hath been to themselves, and the whole Kingdom, when the Gentry have been seduced to sleight at first, and after, (as they have been wrought upon by Designers) to over-awe or overturn the Government, and either by Piques among themselves, or Aemulations, Envies, and Discontents, have been brought into the Combinations and Conspiracies with those, who under the specious Pretences of enlarging their Privileges, have subjected themselves as well to the slavery of Red-coats, and the Tyranny of a Corpse du guard, or Council of War, as they had their Prince under their Committees and Armies: which considerations I hope will be worth their remembering.  
What I have writ in most of the Chapters of this Treatise, less or more appertains to the Gentry, out of a true and cordial desire, that if any such Critical time should in any Age return, as that of Forty and Forty one, or Eighty and Eighty one; the Gentry may consider the History of former Ages, and be able to distinguish betwixt Realities, and feigned Pretences, and will well weigh what I have writ in the preceding Chapter of the Nobility: for that it is in most particulars applicable to to them, which makes me shorter in this; and that above all things they will seriously consider, that though in every 
(l) M●gis alii 〈◊〉nes qu●m alii mores. Ta●it. 1. Histo●.  Generation new Men do arise, that to carry on their Factious Design, pretend different Causes; yet the ends of all that are Malcontents, and seditiously displeased with the Government, is the same, and commonly their Fate is parallel.  
Therefore above all the Infections, let them study to avoid that of murmuring and repining against the Government, or that of being seduced by those, who cover their dark Thoughts and Designs too close to be discovered by common Eyes.  
The more such pretend Zeal for the common Good, the more they pretend public Spirits, and care of Religion. If they be found to have any the least Tincture of Immorality, Envy, Ambition, Revenge, Cruelty, or aspiring in their Tempers. the more they are to be suspected and avoided.   

CHAP. XXXIX. Of the Commonalty of England, of the lower rank especially.  
THESE are more especially the subject matter of Government. The Employments they are engaged in, 
The Common People's Duty.  makes it more profitable for them to look downwards, and cultivate their Freeholds and Tenements, and reap the golden Fruits of their Toil; than to spend their time in the fruitless inquiries after the managery of States and Empire: for whereover Sovereignty lodgeth, they must still be Subjects.  
Obedience (saith a well observing 
(a) Cornwallis' Es. says, 46.  Author) not Examination, is the destined Function of the Common People, which Laws preserve them in. The Industrious would soon be ruined by the Freebooters in every Hamlet, if the Laws and Government were not their Guard. By the several Rebellions (properly of the Commons) in Richard 2. H. 8. 
The Miseries of Insurrections.  and Edward the Sixth's time, we have sad Examples of the Calamities they brought, not only on their Neighbours, and the disturbance they gave the Government; but likewise the ruins they brought upon themselves: and when they had wearied themselves with Rapine, Murders, and a Hundred cruel Ravages, and Butcheries, they were at last either totally subdued, and their Chieftains Executed, and the rest Fined, or they perished in the Fight; being never able to effect any of their pretended Liberties, they made the Insurrections to have obtained.  
It is for want of Consideration, that they are decoyed into such barbarous Outrages, which in such Rebellions they generally commit. They ought to consider, 
Their Obligations to their Prince.  and that very seriously, that it is from their Princes solicitous Care, that they enjoy Peace and Plenty: to them they own not only Allegiance and Obedience, as they are their Sovereigns; but especially Gratitude, Loyalty, and all dutiful Services. For the good Laws from time to time have been confirmed by their Kings, for their Prosperities; without which, they would be in a continual State of War and Feuds one against another.  
They own to the Paternal Care and Prudence of the Sovereign and his Government, those Methods and Rules, whereby they are so benignly ruled, (in England especially) whereby they are in a freer and more plentiful Estate than any other Commoners in the World. By the virtue of those Privileges granted to them by their Kings, they have Propriety in their Goods, none can out them of their Possessions, imprison, or molest them, while they observe the equitable Laws. 
Their Privileges.   
They have according to their several Capacities and Abilities, a participation of Offices in their particular Hamlets, Parishes, Wapentakes, or Counties, either relating to the assistance to the Justice of the Land in Juries, or conserving of the Peace, in being petty, or chief Constables, or other Officers; and have a peculiar Privilege, many other Commoners want, of choosing their Representatives, whereby they are only subject to such Laws, as they or their Ancestors have given consent to.  
The Government (worthy Countrymen) makes fertile your Enclosures, protects your Flocks and Herds, secures your going out, and coming in, makes your Sleeps undisturbed, guards your homebred Commodities when you send them abroad, secures those are brought home to you, appoints you Markets for buying or selling your Corn and Cattle, and your own Manufactures.  
Let those among you, 
The Calamities they sustained in the late War.  that are not ashamed they were Sequestrators, Membrs of the Parliaments Army, or active Officers, Oppressors, Plundereres, or Informers against their Loyal Neighbours, consider what they reaped in the late unhappy Wars, begun with all the specious Pretences of redressing grievances, securing Propriety, and reforming Religion (precious Names most wickedly abused.) Remember how unsupportable were the Taxes and Sequestrations. What affrightments were you continually in by the Quartering of imperious Soldiers, and their Plunders, where they neither left Food nor Raiment for your Wives and Children; and what they could not devour, or carry away, they destroyed? Consider the effusion of so much Blood in the cruel Battles, and their most unjust High-Courts of Justice how all the Laws either were stifled, or miserably distorted.  
The best Preservatives against the relapse into such miserable times, 
Advice to the Commonalty.  is to reflect upon them often, to live quietly under your Sovereign, to give him no occasion to unsheathe any of his Swords against you, to reduce you to Obedience. Avoid all Factious Whisperers of discontent. You were within these six Years by past, wrought so upon by cunning Designers of a Commonwealth, that you made choice of such Representatives as neither would supply that Prince o immortal Memory, who had preserved them and you in that Peace he had restored them to, when nothing but War, and miserable Devastations were in all the Countries of the Continent; nor admit our present Gracious Sovereign (who had adventured his Life so often for their Safety) to succeed in the Throne of his Royal Ancestors.  
Remember I beseech you (dear Countrymen) these things, and consider how near the Gulf and Pits Brink of inevitable Miseries you were. Be thankful to those Loyal Persons, who by their Counsels and Addresses withheld you from the imminent Ruin. Be misled no more by such as can sow nothing but Darnel, Cockle, Poppy and Tares among your Corn; would consume your Grain, and leave you nothing but the Chaff. Such as by instigating you to Insurrections, under Pretence of Religion, or any other Wheedles, would necessitate the Government for your own Security, to rule you with a Sceptre of Iron; whereas now you are under one of pure Gold, beset with all the Jewels of Heroic Virtue.  
Would you avoid the Slavery of the French Commoners, and be never in danger of being Peasants? Would you enjoy what you and your happy Forefathers have done in peaceable times? Then study your Duty of Obedience to the Laws, banish all Murmur, and Repine, hearty pray for the King's Prosperity, hearty endeavour to serve him with your Lives and Fortunes against his Enemies; live quietly under his careful and merciful Conduct; adore that divine Providence that hath established him peaceably in his Throne, and out of infinite Compassion to these Nations, hath prevented a Civil War.  
Be sincerely and cordially thankful that you are under the Government of such a Prince, who so freely and spontaneously promiseth to defend your Religion, secure your Properties, and adventure his Person for your Defence: Who is justly reverenced abroad, aught to be as entirely honoured, and affectionately loved, and dutifully obeyed at home. So shall the Government be Easy, Beneficial and Merciful to you; so shall you have full Barns and Purses, and all the Blessings of Peace and Security in the long Enjoyment of them.   

CHAP. XL. Of the Temper and Disposition of the Common People of the lowest Rank.  
I IVY 
(a) Vulgus metu aut spe nimium, Lib. 23. Nihil in vulgo modicum. The various Disposition of the Common People.  tells us that the Common People Fear and Hope generally is in excess. They want skill to make Observations of the true Causes of Matters, and conclude Effects from wrong Cause. They are ignorant of their duty to the Public, never meditating any thing (with Reflection) like their particular Profit. If a wet Season happen of continuance, they murmur and repine, as if their whole Tillage were lost, and a long Drought produceth the like effect.  
As to the public, it is their Nature 
(b) Aut servit humiliter aut sup● be domin●●●. 〈…〉 Annal.  slavishly to fear, or proudly to domineer, affrighting the Government, if they be not brought to some degree of Awe; and if they be brought to fear, their Governors may with more safety despise them: for they are wholly Strangers to the Golden mean of Liberty, which they neither know how to enjoy or want; despising and slighting the Freedom they possess, and wrought upon by Seditious Arts of Popular Men, vainly hoping to attain to some Enlargement of that Liberty, which they fond dream of.  
In their own temper (saith 
(c) Vul●●● ingenio 〈…〉 & discordiosum, cupidum novaum rerum, quieti & 〈◊〉 adversum. Sail. in Jugurtha.  Sallust) they are changeable, Seditious, full of Discord, desirous of Novelty, impatient of Peace and Idleness: and if we allow them at some Seasons at least to be a calm Sea, yet as that by Winds, so they are easily swelled by the blasts of Seditious Persons; to receive which, they hoist up all their Sails. According to that of the 
(d) Or●●. pro Cluent.  Orator,  Mare quod sua natura tranquillum, ventorum vi agitari videmus, ac turbari; sic populus sua sponte pacatus, hominum Seditiosorum vocibus violeutissimis tempestatibus concitari solet.  
They are too credulous of Reports, and the Designers to put them into ferment need no more, but to put in practice what 
(e) 〈◊〉 primum & 〈…〉 Hist. P. ●.  Tacitus mentions of the false news of Otho's being slain; That at first a wand'ring and uncertain Rumour, then as in great lies, some say they were present, and saw it; the rejoicers and curious being aptest to believe the Report. So that at last a general belief is given, few being willing to take the pains to make strict Enquiry. And when such Rumours are forbidden, more horrid things are invented than at first, and so are more difficultly suppressed; for there is a wonderful propensity in them, to receive 
(f) 〈…〉 Ta●it. ib. P. 5.  and believe all new Reports, stretching all Rumours vastly beyond the reality of matters: fame being with them as sure a ground of Belief, as Realty.  Res auget cuncta, ut mos est, fama in majus credita. 
If in things they fear the Rumour once be broached, how swift is the Alarm! all the Air is full of Speaking Trumpets, though nothing to be seen.  
— Sic quisque pavendo  
Dat vires famae, nulloque Auctore malorum  
Quae finxere timent.  
This quality of the Vulgar, 
How they were 〈…〉 upon in 〈…〉  the Designers of Forty one well understood, and most industriously improved. The tumult● of the multitude were governed by them, all the great mischiefs were facilitated by the Midwivery of these contrived Reports; Jealousies and Fears preparing People's Minds for every ill Impression.  
The breaking of a Plank by two Corpulent Gentlemen, occasioned a Report that the Parliament-House was undermined; and others were so quick-scented, that they smelled Po●der. This was carried with that swiftness into the City, that the Rabble in excessive manner flocked to Westminster, full of revengeing Fury.  
So they pretended Intelligence of foreign Invasions, to put the Kingdom into a posture of Defence, and the miserable Country armed with great forwardness upon every Alarm, little foreseeing what the ends of those dismal Acts would be. 
How of later thm●.   
We of late had an Experiment of this in the Story of the lsl● of Purbeck, when the report of the landing of the French raised many Thousands of Men, whom the noble Peer said he could have conducted whither he would by a Letter. We cannot forget how the report of the Fireworks, sound in Somerset House, the forty Thousand Pilgrims, and Black Bills alarmed the Credulous. Such Mormos and Spectres ever will be made use of by those who intent to work upon the Mobile.  
If the Multitude could be made Wise, 
Advice to them.  to rely upon their Governors' Wisdom, (that can better foresee Danger than they, and have greater share in the present State, and having more to lose, will more carefully endeavour to prevent Mischiefs,) they would not be so appalled at imaginary Dangers, suggestedly crafty Men, or be so suspicious that they are not so well governed as they should be, or so apprehensive of Oppression; and if they should miscarry under such Conduct (which they can have no reason to suspect) they would perish with a great deal of Discretion.  
But alas there is in all the common People (as 
(g) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 〈…〉  Plutarch hath noted of old) something malignant, and querulous against Government; they yield open Ears to detracting and blackening Speeches against their Governors. They are generally strong in Will, weak in Judgement, their Affections commanding their Belief, and presaging as they believe,  in discovering Consequences of matters, and easy to receive Impressions from their Demagogues.  
Some Birds are whistled into the Snare, others driven: Apes and Dotterels caught by imitation of such Postures as others assume. They are the subject matter of all Seditions, and when they are wrought upon to believe they are like to be oppressed, they can easily find among themselves a Cade, Straw, Tyler, or Masinello to head them.  
The general Temper of the People is well described by 
(h) 1. Histor, Imperaturus es hominibus qui nec totam servitutem pati pessunt, nec totam libertatem.  Tacitus, in that Speech of Galba to Piso, Thou art to command, saith he, over Men, that neither will endure absolute Servitude, nor absolute Liberty. In another place of the same Book, he tells us, Vulgus, ut mos est, cujusque motus novi cupidus: It is the custom of the Common-People to be desirous of Changes. All which is only in hopes that they shall be at more Ease and Liberty, though they are mostly mistaken in the means to attain it.  
It is true, 
(i) Libertas juxta bonis & malis, strenui & ignavis optabilis est. Sallust, ad Caesarem.  Liberty is desirable by the Good as well as the Evil, the Strenuous as well as the Slothful; but the great difference is, that the good and wise know the Extent of it, and know, it no ways is more happily enjoyed, than by Obedience to the Government and the Laws. But the common sort judge it to consist in doing as they list, and being under no Rule or Correction; whereas 
(k) Vires Imperii in consensu obedientium sunt. Lib. 2.  Livy tells us, The Force and Strength of Empire, is in the Consent of the Obedient.  
We find another Character of the Common People's Deportment in dubious times, such as were those in Rome, when Otho was supplanting Galba, 
(l) 1. Histor. p. 193. Edit. 5. Lips. fol.  Mixtis servitiis & dissono clamore, caedem Othonis & Conjuratorum exilium poscentium; ut si non Circo & Theatro ludicrum aliquod postularent, neque illis judicium aut veritas, quip eodem die diversa, pari certamine postulaturis; sed tradito more quemeunque Principem adulandi licentia Acclamationum, & studiis immanibus.   

CHAP. XLI. Of Subject's Obedience.  
CVrtius 
(a) Ingenita quibusdam Gentibus erga Reges suos veneratio. Lib. 3.  saith, That in some Countries there is an inbred Obedience, or Veneration to their Kings. To this day we find the Eastern Monarches, as the Grand Signior, Sophy of Persia, and others, to have a more absolute Power than the Christian Kings, and that their People hold their Race something Divine. Obedience to Authority by 
(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  Aeschylus is rightly termed the Mother of Felicity; for by it we enjoy whatever Benefits the Prince, the Father of his Country, and all the fruitful Blessings of Peace and Plenty, the indulgent Mother of our Happiness here on Earth can bestow upon a People.  

(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In lib●de Josepho.  Philo the Jew styles it the best, and most profitable thing in our whole Life. Therefore 
(d) Plutarch, in Praeceptis.  Theopompus, King of the Lacedæmonians, hearing one attribute the safety of Sparta to the Skill the King had in Government, made answer, That it was rather to be ascribed to the obedience which the People so cheerfully paid to their Governors; for is Sparta above all other places, the most powerful Citizens showed themselves most obsequious to their Magistrates, and by their Example, drew the rest to do the like, as knowing Obedience to be the greatest requisite both in Cities, Armies, and private Families. To which purpose we find the Speech of 
(e) Xenoph. Cyvopaed. lib. 8.  Chrysantas to his Countrymen the Persians, telling them, They can take no Town of their Enemies, nor keep any City of their Friends, if they be disobedient: No Army if they be tumultuous or irregular, can obtain Victory; nor can any good be effected by those that are not obedient to Superiors. By this their Citizens were well governed, their Houses preserved, Ships brought to the Coasts to which they were bound: following their Prince, they carried all things before them, leaving nothing half done; by this they not only purchased good things, but preserved them.  

(f) 3. de LL.  Cicero tells us, That Plato likened disobedient Persons to the Titans; for as those set themselves in Opposition to the Gods, so these to the Magistrates.  
The grave Historian 
(g) Qui tamen jussa Ducum interpretari, quam exequi mallent. 2. Hist.  counts it the Infelicity of Otho, That though his Soldiers under Titian ere full of Spirit, yet withal, they chose rather to interpret the Commands of their Captains, than to obey; and 
(h) Si ubi jubeantur singulis quaerere liceat; pereunte obsequio etiam Imperium intercidit. 1. Hist.  likewise tells us, That if every one might dispute Commands, Obedience ceasing, the Government would be dissolved.  
To govern, and to be governed, are of so near Relation, that from the Composition of them together, 
(i) Apud Stobaeum, Serm. 1.  Crito the Pythagorean well noteth, both the Strength and Concord of the State ariseth.  
Two both wholesome and necessary things (saith the great 
(k) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dio, lib. 41.  Caesar) Nature hath established among Men, to Rule, and be Ruled, without which it is impossible that any thing, for never so little a while, shall hold out.  
Qui imperium libere excipit, Partem servitutis acerbissimam effugit; facere quod nolit non qui jussus aliquid facit, miser est, sed qui invitus facit, saith Seneca: 
(l) Epist. 61.  He that cheerfully and willingly obeys Commands, escapes the bitterest part of Servitude, to do that which he would not; for he is not miserable, who doth what he is commanded, but he that doth it unwillingly.  
All the Office of the chief Magistrate is corrupted and dissolved, if any, with due Obedience, do not that which ought to be done, but instead of cheerful Observance, require time for advice, and Deliberation; for all such as make an hesitation in their Duty, and puts off, have no other inducement to it but Fear, which is an oblation without an Heart, spiritless, and palled.  
M. 
(m) Tibisummum Judicium Dii dedere, nobis obsequii gloria relicta. Tacit. 6. Annal.  Terentius told Tiberius, That to the Emperor the Gods had given the highest Judgement of things, and to the Subjects the Glory of Obedience is left.  

(n) Ea enim quae obsequi non eportet, leniter ac ver●cunde, ac sine derestatione ●imia sineque opp●obration acerba reprehensionis, declinanda sensim, & relinquenda potius ●sse qu●m respuend●. Noctes Atticae, c. 13.  Aulus Gellius gives an excellent Rule how Subjects should behave themselves in Cases, where they are not free to act and obey, viz. That in those things which it behoves us not in our Opinions to obey, we are to decline by little and little, mildly and reverently, without showing of too much Detestation, or bitter reprehension, and opprobry; leaving the things rather undone, than rejecting them.  
These wise Directions of so great and ancient an Author, are worth Imitation by our sturdy Beggars of Liberty, who do or have done it in so imperious a way, as if they were in a condition to command it; and yet when they had the Power, most Tyrannically exacted both Civil and Spiritual Obedience from all others, that were not of the same Mould and Cut with themselves.  
The Excellent Seneca saith, That Disobedience would be the Destruction of the Roman Commonwealth, and so long the People would be out of Danger of it, as they endured the Bridle; which if once they broke, or being by any chance broken, they suffered not to be again sitted on: 
(o) Haec unitas & hic m●ximi Imp●cii contextus in parts multas dissilier. Senec. de Clem. lib. 1. c. 4.  the unity and Contexture of the greatest Empire would fly in Splinters, and the same end there would be of the City's Dominion, that there was in obtaining it. For of old the Commonwealth was so constituted, that the Ligament betwixt the Sovereign and Subject could not be dissolved, without both their Destructions; for as the Prince stands in need of the People's Strength, so the People of the Headship of the Prince.  
To the which, 
(p) Olim enim it ● se induit Reipublicae Caesar, ut diduci alterum non possit sine utriusque pernicie.  Caesar saith, He so embosomed, and inweaved himself into the Commonwealth, that the one could not be disjointed from the other, without the Destruction of them both.  
But every Malcontent will be ready to say they are for Government, and can cheerfully obey good Princes; but such as exercise Arbitrary Government, or are Vicious and Irreligious those they cannot obey. To such I would recommend the Saying of 
(q) Bonos Principes voto excipere, qualescunque tolerare. Tacit. 4. Histor.  Marcellus about Vespasian, We ought to desire good Princes, but to submit to whatever they be. So 
(r) Quomodo sterilitatem aut nimios imbres, & caetera naturae mala, ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerare. Ibid.  Cerealis told his Soldiers, As we endure Barrenness, and orecharging Rains, and the rest of the Evils of Nature, so ought we to undergo even the Luxury, and Covetousness of Princes. For Vices will be while there are Men, but those are not continual, but by the intervening of good Princes are recompensed. Mr. 
(s) Civil Wars, p. 51.  Hobbs truly Observes, That the virtue of a Subject is comprehended wholly in Obedience to the Laws of the Commonwealth; for to obey the Law is Justice and Equity, which is the Law of Nature; and to obey the Laws, is Prudence in a Subject: for without such Obedience, the Commonwealth (which is every Subject's Safety and Protection) cannot subsist. Indeed Mischief more often happens to any Kingdom, from the waywardness, or factious Disobedience of Subjects, than from the ill Government of Princes.  
Therefore 
(t) Plut. Canvio. 7. Sapient.  Cleobulus rightly observed, That the Republic is well composed, where the Subjects fear Infamy more than the Laws; for than it may be presumed; they are Obedient out of a Principle of Virtue, rather than Awe.  
Plutarch 
(u) De Institutione Principis.  saith, That City or Kingdom is famous, where every one performeth his Office. If the Prince do what becomes him, the Magistrates exercise their Places, and the Commonalty obey their Magistrates, and the Laws.  
This is the Blessed Harmony, wherein this sublunary Government imitates the great Oeconomy; the nearer to which every Government comes, the more beautiful and stable it will be.   

CHAP. XLII. Of Faction and Sedition in the State: the Causers and Causes of them.  
IN every Body, whether Natural, Artificial, or Political, the Beauty, Gracefulness, and Use of it consists in its Symmetry, Firmness and Union. The Fragments of the most excellent Statue, the Rubbish of the most magnificent Palaces, the crumbled Dust and Atoms of the Beautifullest Bodies, are the Objects of our Pity and Condoling: even so ought to be the Discords, Factions, and Seditions of a Commonweal; or Kingdom; for by these the whole Compages of the Fabric is dissolved.  
It was the Consideration of this that made the 
(a) Nec priva●os focos, n●c publicas leges, nec libertatis jura, cara habere potest, quem discordie, quem cades civium, quem belium civile delectat: Ideo ex numero hominum ejiciendum, ex sinibus humanae naturae extermin ●ndum puto.  Orator say, That those who delight in Discords, in the slaughter of their Fellow-Citizens, and a Civil War, neither think their private Hearths, i. e. their Properties, the public Laws, or the Rights of Liberty, dear to them; therefore ought they to be spewed out from the Society of rational Men, and to be exterminated out of the Confines of humane Nature.  
Faction and Sedition being a Composition of several mischievous Ingredients, I shall single them out, and give short Characters of them particularly, that the Reader may with more ease know their Tendencies.  
The Persons that are apt to be Seditious, 
1. The debauched Persons apt to be seditious.  are first the Debauched, as Tacitus excellently observes, Privatim degeneres, in Publicum exitiosi, nihil spei nisi per discordias. Such as give themselves to Luxury, degenerate from the Virtue of their Ancestors, are unbridled in their Appetites, live without Rule and Order, have no regard to the Laws that should restrain them, where nothing remains but the instrumenta vitiorum, as the Curious 
(b) Cum raptci●●mo cuique & perditi●mo, non Agri, non Fanus, sed sol I Insirumenta vitiorum manerent. 1. Histor.  Historian elegantly observes of those that in Galba's time were to refund Nero's Donative.  
Such having emancipated and withdrawn themselves from all subjection to the Laws of the Sovereign of the Universe, no wonder they yield obedience to nothing but the Impetus of sensual Appetites; and orderly Government curbing these, makes it uneasy to them.  
Secondly, 
2. Vain and lightheaded Persons.  The vain and light Airy headed Persons are fitted to feather the Seditious Arrows that subtler Heads do fashion: these rush into Action without deliberation, weary of things long used, rather 
(c) Pro certis & ●lim partis, nov●, ambigua, ancipitia malu●. Tacit. 11. Histor.  choosing (for the sake of Novelty) doubtful and uncertain matters, than such as are the issues of stayed Councils. Lampoons, Libels, and Pamphlets are their chief Studies: They traffic most at the Booksellers Stall, they desire no acquaintance with the seriouser Books of his Shop; the Playhouse and Coffeehouses entertain them more than the Church or Westminster-Hall. They are brittle Tools, but sharply edged, where they are to cut Feathers and Chaff: They are not made to work upon Marble, or write Laws in Tables of Stone.  
They are the puffing Whirlwinds that raise the Dust, the Ignes Fatui that misled poor Mortals by a little glaring light. They are the Lapwings that whirl about you, and no sooner stoop at you, as if they would let you know what they meant, but they whisk off again.  
Thirdly, 
3. The Indigent.  The Indigent are fitted in all respects for Sedition and Tumults. They are conscious of their low Estates, and hope to better them in the Scramble, according to that of the Poet 
(d) Lucan, lib. 1. , 
Hinc usura vorax, avidumque in thempora Foenus,  
Et concussa fides, & multis utile Bellum.   
In the Cities, saith 
(e) In Jugurtha. Semper. in civitate, quibus opes nullae sunt, bonis invident: vetera odere, nova expetunt; odio suarum rerum, omnia mutori s●udent.  Sallust, those that have no Riches, envy the Good and Rich; they hate the ancient order of things, and are greedy of change, studying Innovations by th' uneasiness of their present condition, in hopes of bettering themselves.  
According to the excellent 
(f) Afflicts sidei in pace, & rebus turbatis alacres, per incerta tutissimi. Tac. 1. Hist.  Historian, Those who have little credit in Peace, are joyful in disturbance, safest in uncertainties: for they know, in the condition they are in, they are certainly undone; and adventures may chance to be prosperous to them.  
So the Philosopher 
(g) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 5. Polit. c. 6.  observes, That those who live intemperately, sand consume what they have, study Novelties, and either themselves attain to a Tyrannical Government, or impel others to exercise it; as he instanceth in Dionysius among the Syracusans, in the Hi●parians, and the Amphipoli in Aegina: So Cleotimas headed the Chalcedonian Poor against the Rich. So Tacitus ascribes Sylla's boldness and undertake to his Poverty: so of Catiline, Sallust 
(h) Homini potentiam quarenti, egentissimus quisque opportunis●mus; cui neque sua chara, quip quae nalla sunt; omnia cum pretio honesia videntur.  tells us, The Indigent is the most at hand useful to Men that covet Power; and gives the reason, Because their own Fortunes being of small, or no value, the hopes of Reward and Gain makes every thing honest to them.  
So Cicero speaking of Cataline's Conspiracy, tells us, 
(i) Nemo non Roma, sed non in ullo Italiae angulo are aliquo oppressus fuit, quem non ad hoc scelus faedere assumerent, etc. In Catilinam.  That there were none in Rome, or any other corner of Italy, who was in Debt, but he was received into Confederacy, having spent profusely their Patrimony, and debauched their Fortunes; Patrimonia sua profuderunt, fortunas suas abligurierunt.  
So Plato 
(k) Lib. 4. de Rep●.  observes such to be Seditious, in hopes, that if they prevail, they may elude their Creditors; so Pericles is censured that he fomented the Pelepone●sian War against his Country, and Cicero objects the same against Anthony.  
Tacitus 
(l) Compositis rebus nulla spes, omne in turbi● consilium; lux. uria etiam Principi onerosa, incpia vix privuo toleranda. 1. Hist.  saith of Otho, There was no hopes in Matters composed; Hope and Counsel was in the Tumult and Huddle of Affairs; he being luxurious above the State of a Prince, and poor below that of a Private Person.  
To which we may annex what the Blessed King 
(m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  observes, That some Men thirst after Novelties, others despair to relieve the necessities of their Fortunes, or satisfy their Ambitions, in peaceable times (distrusting God's Providence as well as their own Merits) were the secret (but principal) Impulsives to those popular Commotions. These indeed were the Men, who having glutted themselves with the spoils of the Royal Party, by Assessments they drained all the Wealth of the Freeholders, and were never heard to say, Oh● jam satis est.  
These are Tools fitted for all Factious Handles and Hafts; and being always sharp, cut deepest with a forceable Hand. Necessitas ad turpe cogit; nothing is so Villainous, that Reward, and the hopes of bettering their Fortunes, well not tempt them to perpetrate.  
The Fourth Cause of Faction and Sedition, is Ambition. 
4. The Ambitious.  The Philosopher joins them to the Covetous, and Giphanius calls them the Pests & publicae fontes Seditionum, the Plague of a Commonwealth, and the Fountains of Sedition. So Timon in Stobaeus saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 omnium malorum & calamitatum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 elementa sunt.  
Ambitious Persons are the Touchwood and Tinder of Sedition; a little Spark inflames them. Ambition is a prime Ingredient in all Factions, leading Men naturally to change the model of all things Civil and Sacred, that is not the product of their Counsel. This excites them to seek the removal of such, who enjoy more Honorary or Beneficial places than themselves. Those 
(n) Honours quos quieta Republica desperant, perturata consequi se posse arburantur.  Honours which they despair to enjoy in a composed, they judge they may acquire in a disturbed State.  
These (saith a late 
(o) Address, ● 1. P. 30.  Author) are generally the Incendiaries which kindle the Fire of Intestine War. They are the worst pests a People can be Plagued with, having rarely either Religion, Conscience or Honesty. If they rise, they are the worst companions; they caress and flatter the People only for their own advantage. If they miscarry, they leave the poor deluded Vulgar to sink, and they get the Prey. So that nothing is got by these sort of Men, but much may be lost. All the People of the World, that have been free, and are not, have been ruined by these sort of Men, except those conquered by Foreigners.  
It is an high commendation that 
(p) Aut me amor suscepti negotii fallit, aut nulla unquam Respublica, nec major, nec sanctior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit, nec in qua tam sero avaritia, luxuriaque immigraveri●; nec ubi tantus, ac tam diu parsimoniae & paupert vis honos fuerit. Livius Prooemio.  Livy gives to the Roman Commonweal, That unless the love of his undertaken Work might bias him, there was never a Commonweal greater, or holier, or richer in good Examples, nor into which so late, Avarice and Luxury entered, or where Poverty and Parsimony had such a durable Honour.  
But Sallust as truly observes, that after they had destroyed Cauthage, Discordia atque Ambitio, & caetera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala, maxim aucta fuere; Discord and Ambition, and the rest of the Evils that usually attend Prosperity, were increased. These indeed are the Cankers of Peace and Plenty, as it is usual in temperate years, that with the abundance of Fruits, swarms of Locusts, Caterpillars, and other mischievous Infects increase.  
The Character of an Ambitious Man, in a great 
(q) Gregorias in Registro.  Author, is, That he is always searing, always careful lest he say what will displease, counterfeiting Humility, Honesty, Affability, and Bountifulness; cringing to all, frequenting Courts of Princes, visiting the Nobility, obsequious to all, that he may be praised of all: But when he hath attained his ends, he is quite another Man, proud and haughty, not 
(r) Non cura● prodesse, sed gloriatur praesse.  caring to profit others, but to preside over them; not so much caring to do good in his Office, as to be great, 
(s) Senec. Tragaed.  tantum ut noceat cupit esse potens.  
Fifthly, 
5. The envious.  the Envious are cankered Branches in a Commonwealth. Envy (saith my 
(t) Essay, c. 8. fol. 35.  Lord St. Alban) is a gadding Passion, walketh the Streets, seldom is at home. Those that are Gossipers, and spend their time in carrying News 
(u) Non est curiosus, quin idem est malevolus.  betwixt one another, in their Evening Chat, mostly enviously detract from the Fame of others.  
Men of noble Birth, are noted to be Envious towards new Men when they rise; for the distance is altered, and it is like Deceit in the Eye, when others come on, they think themselves go back.  
Envy is a Disease, spreadeth like Infection upon that which is sound, and tainteth it so, that when it is once got into a State, it traduceth the best 
(w) Inviso semel Principe seu bene seu male, facta premunt. Tacit. 1. Histor.  Actions, and hath this addition to its Mischief, that it incessantly is at work. As the Vulture feeds on Carrion rather than fresher Meats, the Flies seek Dung and rotten Matter: so the Envious is always Preying on what is putrid in the Commonweal, of which he is the Scavinger, contaminating the best Administration by his loathsome Blasting; corroding and eating like a Canker, ever detracting from the present 
(x) Virtutem incolumem odimzs, sublatam ex oculis quaerimus invidi. Horat. lib. 3. Od. 14.  management, and admiring what is bypast. Envy is always working, finding new and new matter to work upon. One Man's higher Place troubles him, another's greater Endowments, Offices, or popularity; so that to the Envious there are no 
(y) Invidia festos dies non agit. 6. The discontented.  Holy days.  
Sixthly the Discontented. They are always unquiet, nothing pleaseth them, wherein they have not the Share they covet in the Administration; they are uneasy to themselves, to others, and the whole State.  
Discontents in the Body Politic, are like to ill humours in the Body natural, which are apt to gather into preternatural heat, and inflame, grow dangerous, and ill = boding, when the causes of them are long penned up before they be observed, or are really given to Man of great Spirits, and the Multitude.  
The discontented (saith a 
(a) Address, pars 1. p. 35.  late Author) are the silliest Animals in the World. If the Government hath injured me, I ought to take it as the injuries of the Wether, not to rage and fret at it. Kingdoms and Nations have been ruined by such Fools, who have ever paid dear for such revenge, and been buried in the ruins they plucked down about their own Ears. These Malcontents are under the dominion of the strongest Passions, and are not Masters of their own Reason; which is no part of the Case of others, who furnish them with Brands and Granades, without which these Gentlemen might possibly after a little sullen rage, have come into their Wits again. But when they see their Passions are not only pitied or cherished, but applauded; it is a thousand to one, they never recover out of their distemper, or not to be sure, till they, or the Public have smarted for their folly, and those who have caressed the devilish humour in them.  
Seventhly, Emulous Persons (who can neither endure equals, 
7. The emulous.  or superiors) are great promoters of Factions; for when Men of great or overweening Parts, such as have been great Commanders, or Ministers of State, by the interposing of others, are obstructed in the sole managery of public Affairs, or any other ways disobliged, they are egged on to make the opposite Faction, and so the Commonweal is shaken by them: and though this discontent begin in smaller matters, wherein the State is not so much concerned, or the subverting of Government is to be feared; yet Ambition stepping in, Discontent grows to Revenge, and then calls in all the Auxiliaries of Faction; which being rendezvouzed, they are most difficultly reform, before one side be Conqueror. And so from a few personal Dissatisfactions, proceed those rude Shocks which endanger the whole Government.  
So in Athens we read of the emulous Dissensions betwixt Nicias and Alcibiades, Themistocles and Aristides, and after of Demosthenes and Eschines, and others; and so in Rome betwixt Capio and Metellus, Scipio Asricanus and Metellus, Gracchus and Scipio, Pompey and Caesar: of which I have at large treated in the Chapter of Commonwealths.  
So Tacitus speaking of Cecinna, who having command of a Legion under Galba, being laid aside, upon an Accusation that he had misemployed the Public Money to his own use; 
(b) Aegre p●ssus, miscere cuncta, & privata vulnera Reipublicae malis operi●e statuit. Tacitus 1. Histor.  grew Malcontent, and endured it ill, and in the tumultuous times, having got the Soldiers good will, he was busy to promote all kind of Seditions, designing to cover his own Wounds with the mischiefs to the Commonweal.  
Eighthly, 
8. Popular Men.  The popular Men are Engines fitted for Sedition, if they be not well principled to the Government; for by them the 
(c) Causa a●que origo furoris penes Autores, reliqui contagione insaniunt. Livius. 1.28.  Populace is easily and effectually moved, and they give Beginning to the Rage of the People, the rest being mad by Contagion, and Infection.  
These having by many good and plausible Deeds, gained Credit with the Mobile, and using all their Arts to captivate their affections, can lead and guide them with as much ease, as the small Rider doth the bulky Elephant, or the Keeper doth the Rhinoceros, or the Bearward his Bear, by their Rings and Chains. So Tacitus gives frequent Examples of such men's courting the People, and ingratiating themselves with them, when they needed their Hands to help them to attain their Aims; especially in the Conspiracy 
(d) Nec deerat Otho, protendens m●nus, adorare vulgum, jacere oscula & omnia serviliter pro dominatione. Tacit. 1. Histor.  of Otho against Galba, where he tells us, that Otho besides his Feasting and giving Largesses to his Soldiers, was not wanting (even after he had taken Arms) to stretch out his Embraces to the People, humbly to salute them, give all tokens of intimate affection, and all servility, in hopes of obtaining thereby the Rule.  
Such popular Men are most to be feared, who are like 
(e) Vni Antoni● apertae militum aures, nam & facundia aderat, mulcendique vulgum Artes & Auctorit as. Tacitus 1. Hist.  Antonius, one of Vespasian's great Captains, of whom Tacitus saith, That to him alone the Soldiers Ears were open; for he had Eloquence, and the Arts of making gentle, and pacifying the Multitude, and had Authority with them.  
Ninthly, 
9 Cunning close Men.  The cunning close Men, who can best dissemble their evil Intentions, are dangerous Ingredients of Faction; such as 
(f) Pulckra loquentes, iidem in pectore prava struant. Odyss. 5.  speak fair and plausible things of the Government, but in their Bosom, and to their Confidents, and secret Friends, are framing Mischief. Of such, Livy speaks, that by little Arts they strew their 
(g) Fraus in parvis, fidem sibipraestant, ut cum operae pretium sit, cum m●rcede fallant. Liv. lib. 28.  ways to Credit, that when it is for their purpose, they may deceive with so much more advantage to their public or private Designs.  
These are such as speak not openly against the Government but can afford it some good words; but than you shall be sure they will subjoin some sighing Wish, That such or such a thing were amended, or better managed.  
Tenthly, Innovators in Religion are the most dangerous of all others, to kindle Factions; 
10. Innovators in Religion.  their Fire is pretended to be from Heaven, their zeal warmed with a divine breath from the Altar.  
Diversity of Religions (saith a late grave 
(h) Address, part I p. 10.  Writer) cause the greatest Ferment of the People. From hence the Partaking, and Part-making, ill Will, Hatred, Contentions and Jealousies spring, one Party hoping to rise, another Party fearing it may be so, and striving to pull down or keep down another.  
Presbytery, saith he, is a State-Faction hatched in Rebellion, and a popular State; the whole Scheme of it adapted to those ends, totally inconsistent with Monarchy, and the freedom and liberty of any People that will not be Slaves to the Clergy: and this is not so much the Doctrine, as the necessary effects of its ill Principles.  
Independency sprung out of it, as luxuriant Suckers from the roots of the Tree; every Minister of that persuasion, desiring only to be Head of his own Congregation, advanced the Banner of Toleration, so that some'reckoned one hundred and forty several Factions and Heresies; the Seeds and Relics whereof are still scattered among us, ready upon any benign Vote of an House of Commons (as that was about the taking off the Penal Laws, and the Union of Protestants) to sprout out of the Soil they lay covered in. So that a worse Crop than that of Cadmus' armed men may be expected, when ever any cherishing warmth enlivens them.  
This too manifestly appeared of late, when such as for above twenty years, had lived Separatists from the Church established by Law; yet to be qualified for places of Trust, Authority or Preferment, and to employ them to the ruin of the Church and Monarchy, could take the Sacrament, Test, etc. with all the Formalities required by the Act.  
We find none of those Pamphlets that inveigh against Arbitrary Government, but they generally are against the Church and Monarchy; such as these took advantage at the consternation of the People at the Plague, Fire, and their Plot, to push their designs forward; which they might do with the greater safety, because of the confusion the People were in. So that the Scourge (which as far as any man can judge) was sent for the sins of the former Rebellion, was made by them a means of disposing them to commit the same over again, when time and opportunity serve, as the same Author observes. Thus far my Author.  
Having under these Ten general Heads ranked the several causes of Sedition, I shall refer the Reader to the 
(i) Polit. lib. 5. c. 3. Giphanii Comment.  Philosopher and his Commentators, to consider several others that are less material to my purpose; noting only, that he divides the causes into such as are real causes, and naturally produce such effects in the ill managery of Government, and such as by designing men are the pretended causes, which are Blinds and false Colours to muster the Parties under.  
The pretences that Factious and Seditious persons generally use, are, That the Government invades the Property of the People, by illegal impositions of burdens upon them; That the Laws and Customs are altered, There is Innovation in Religion, Unworthy Persons are advanced, who promote Oppression and Arbitrary Rule.  
Liberty and ease 
(k) Lilert●s 〈…〉 Tacit. 1. Histor.  of the People from some pressures or grievances are pretended. This is the Tabret, and the Hornpipe to the Mobile, this sets them all on gog. The weathercock common-man thinks himself set upon the Spires of Steeples, or the tops of common Halls, though he sees not a span length before him. He is easily 
(l) 〈…〉 & suturi improvid●s spe vana 〈◊〉. Id.  puffed up with vain hopes of liberty, and when the Factious designers have once possessed the People, that such and such Actions of the Magistrates have a tendency to deprive them of their Properties, Privileges and Liberties, their jealousies hurry them into all the acts of Rage and Madness, which prove so fatal to Kingdoms. For when the Rabble (that bellua multorum Capitum) once feels their strength, and finds the reigns lose on their Necks, they are ungovernable, wild and untameable. The hard-mouthed Creature despiseth the Bit, and casts the Rider; though it's the ircertain Fate to be mouthed by a much greater Oppressor that so jade's them, that they are blessed if they may obtain the benefit of their former despised Masters rule.  
The Nurseries of Sedition are great and populous Cities, 
The Nu●●ries of Sedition.  being bodies aggregated of all dispositions. Hence the Philosopher 
(m) Giph●. 〈…〉 in c. 15. lib. 4. 〈◊〉 Arist.  well observes, That if the Citizens be rich, they can spare time to hear the Orations of the. Demagogues, to club in Consultations and Combinations, and bestow some parts of their wealth to carry on their designs. If poor and wanting employments, they are ready for all evil impressions and tumults; they are ready to ascribe the want of their Trade, and their poverty, to the ill administration of the Government.  
All sorts make it a relaxation of their toils and cares in the managing their Trades, to refresh themselves with occurrences of State; here seditious Libels, half whispers, false News, licentious discourses, jealousies, murmur and repine are forged, to be Repast for every Palate; Oglios here of several kinds are cooked by the Seditious; so they such Poison with their very racy Liquors; they grow as wise as Statesmen, by drinking Tea and Coffee, and by telling and hearing shreds of News. Their Ale and Claret makes their Political heads settle affairs of State; and according to their own inclinations, they furnish their Correspondents with News by retail, casking them up with their Wares, and the Plague spreads into the Country by that means.  
Besides, in this vast multitude, it cannot be wondered there should be diversities of Opinions, as well as Interests: Some, and those the wisest, favouring 
(n) Alii Principum partibus, alii Patriciorum & Factionibus student. Tacitus.  their Prince, others the Patriots (as they call them) and study Factions. Yea the very heads of several Companies and Societies, often bandy one against another by emulations first, and after by siding into Parties: so that it is observable, that by their natural proneness to Factions, where nothing but Rivers, low and high grounds, have divided the Inhabitants, those local distinctions have been sufficient to discriminate them into Parties. So it happened betwixt the Inhabitants of the Pyroeus and Athens, also at Syracuse betwixt the City and Citadel; At Rome betwixt the Cis and Trans-Tyberini. So at 
(o) Monstrelate, lib. 1  Paris the Inhabitants on one side the Seyne were for the Faction of Orleans, and the other for Burgundy; The like we have known between London and Southwark, and Westminster and London. A judicious 
(p) Humane Prudence.  Author saith, A great City is the fittest Engine to turn an old Monarchy into a new Commonwealth: and the reason is obvious; for Corporations and Cities are so many Republics within a Monarchy, which when by their Combinations in numerous swarms they attcque, they much endanger: though being composed of the Loyal as well as Factious, after they have found the tyranny of their fellow Citizens, and the difference betwixt the mild Rule of their Princes, and the Arbitrary one of their fellows, they mostly return to their Senses and Allegiance again.   

CHAP. XLIII. Of the Symptoms and Diagnostic signs of Sedition and Faction.  
THE learned 
(a) Apud Japonios' Campana est, quae quoties Regno magnae instant Seditiones Tumultusque, suapte sponte pulsatur. Phonarg. lib. 2. sect. 3. c. 14.  Athanasius Kircher, in his curious Book or Sounds tells us, That in Japan there is a Bell, which toleth of its own accord, so often as great Seditions and Tumults are forming or beginning in the Kingdom. And in Spain in a Town called Vibilla, in the Diocese of Caesar Augusta 
(b) Lib. 2. de Fascinatione, cap. 14.  (Varius tells us) there is a Bell which they call Miraculous, for that some Months before any mischief or calamity befalls Christendom, it sounds by itself without any one that is known to ring it, as in several calamitous periods he mentions.  
As to matter of fact (though attested by grave Authors) I shall not make any enquiry, whether the Relations be true or not. But if God Almighty had vouchsafed such a virtue to every Parish Bell, it might supersede all inquiries into the signs of approaching Sedition and Faction: Yet I question whether it would enable Governors to prevent them; for the most would be apt to conclude, That as they were by a supernatural Power, or from the Deity appointed to be the presages of Factions and Seditions; so they would conclude that God Almighty had destined such Commotions, and would be the more ready to promote and push them forward.  
Shepherds of People (saith the ingenious 
(c) Essays. Descriptions of the Signs particularly.  Chancellor) had need know the Calendars of Tempests in the State. There are certain hollow blasts of winds, and secret swell of Seas that forerun them, and so there are in States.  
First, 
Hatred.  Hatred to the Government is a certain sign of intended Sedition. It is not easy to be conceived, saith Seneca 
(d) Neseis qu●ta rabbiss oriatur, ●hi supra modum olia crev●runt. De Clementia. , how great a Rage may arise when the hatred is overgrown: it is then ready to teem, and the Poison will break forth. Therefore Cicero saith, No Government can be lasting, which is much feared, be it grounded or ungrounded: for 
(e) Quem quisque odit, p●riisse expetit. Cic. de Officiis, 2.  men naturally hate whom they fear, and whomsoever one hates on such an occasion, he wisheth his destruction.  
Secondly, 
Contempt.  This secret hatred acquires an efficaciousness by Contempt; for Fear is slow and undaring, but Contempt puts on the Armour: Fear is an extinguisher of an Attempt, and a Prince is in Sanctuary while his Enemy's fear: but when a Factious man is emboldened to contemn his Prince, he shaketh off fear, and consequently reverence. This happens most to mild Princes and criminally merciful, by which they do themselves and the 
(f) Pleb● Reverentiam omnem excutiunt, & licenti●● pr●bent peccandi, Arist. Polit lib. 6. c. 4.  public great harm; liberty is thereby taken of transgressing, and the Reverence of the People is thereby laid aside. 
(g) Augetur & crescit quicquid in honore est, desi●it & minuit quiequid in contemptu. Dio in Nerva.  While Honour to the Prince lodgeth in the Subject's breasts, the veneration to him daily increaseth; but when he is once contemned, his Authority and Power sinks in the Socket, For Reverence is that wherewith Princes are girt of God, and when Discords, Quarrels and Factions are carried openly and audaciously, it is a sign that reverence to Government is lost.  
In Tiberius' time, 
Greedy after News.  when Julius Fl●rus headed the  Rebellion 
(h) Cuncta in m●jus credita, mul●i prasentium odio & cupidine muationis suis quoque periculis ●atabantur. 3. Annal.  Tacitus gives us an account how the Malcontents at Rome received the news of it, whereby we may learn some Symptoms of Seditions. For all things (saith he) done by Florus were believed to be worse; many for the hatred they bore to the present management, and out of the desire of changes, even rejoiced in their own dangers.  
Thirdly, 
Libels.  Other great signs of Troubles and Factions, are shoals of Libels and licentious discourses against the State, spreading false News to the disadvantage of it, the often running up and down of such, and the greedy embracing them; for Seditious Tumults and Seditious Fame, are but Brothers and Sisters.  
The Presses are pestered with Seditious Pamphlets, deluding, abusing, flatterring, enticing, terrifying, or 
(l) Address, Part. 3.  affrighting, according as they may be serviceable to the Faction they wish for. The Illustrious Saint and Martyr felt the heat, and suffered the scorchings of those Tongues set on fire by Hell, and after of those Pamphlets sparks and flakes which raised that fatal fire in his three Kingdoms: and when the King's Ministers, his Judges, Officers Civil and Military, were represented in the most odious manner that malice could invent, with a thousand false and ridiculous Lies of fear of Popery, and Arbitrary Government (which was, and ever will be, the burden of those Sirens Songs) it was easy to discover the approaching Storm, and an evident Symptom of a distempered People on the Tiptoes of Frenzy.  
The grave 
(m) Occultis primum s●rmonibus, ut vetita solent; mox vago rumore apud imperiti●imi cujusque promptas a●es, aut rursum ap●d tur●idos, eoqu● nova cupientes. Tac●. 2. Anna●.  Historian describes secret murmurers, and spreaders of false News, thus, That they begin with secret Speeches, as is usual in matters forbidden; then with wand'ring Rumours, fitted for the open ears of the most unskilful, and then adapted for the turbulent, and those that are desirous of change. Thus they raise their Trumpets till they sound to Arms, and Onset.  
Fifthly, These are open contagious Airs, 
Clubs and Consults.  Shafts flying by Night and Day, but they arise from the hollow Caverns, where Clubs and Associations sit brewing of them, and feathering those Bolts. So Tacitus 
(n) Per conciliabula & caetus seditiosa disserebant. Lib. 3. Annal.  observes of the Ga●ls, In little Consults they debated Seditious Matters. Where obiter we may note, how congenial the Actions of Seditious Persons are in all Ages; which he further describes in the method of 
(o) Nocturnis colloquiis, aut flexo ad vesp●um die, delapsis melioribus, deterrimum quemque congregantes. Idem, 1. Annal.  Porcennius when he excited the Soldiers of Pannonia to Rebellion, That by Nightly Conferences, and Evening Clubs, when the better sort were retired, he gathered the worst, and such as he could confide in, to work them to his purpose, and confederate them to carry on his Designs.  
Sixthly, The Method 
(p) Studi● militum affectaverat, contubernales appellando, alios agnoscere, quosdam requirere, pecunia aut gratia juvare: inserendo querel●s & ambiguos de Galba sermons, quaeque alia turbamenta vulgi. Lib. 1. Histor.  Otho took to supplant Galba, 
Calumnies.  the same Judicious Historian describes thus: That he had practised before to get the Favour and good will of the Soldiers, calling them Mates, and Companions, relieving, and being bountiful to them, inserting now and then complaints, and glance at Galba, with Speeches of doubtful Construction, or what other way he could bethink him, to stir up, and alter the Vulgar sort by disquieting and affrighting them.  
Thus the Designers of changes in any State, fit their Discourses to the present emergencies of Affairs, and finding any sorts of grievances to complain of, with innuendoes aggravate them, and excite the People to believe that they only are forward to redress them.  
Seventhly, It is a sign of a Seditious Spirit, 
Calculating a Prince's Nativity.  when he is busy in Calculating the Nativity of a Prince. Therefore Firmicus gives it in charge to his ginger, not to answer such Questions. Tertullian 
(q) Cui opus est perscrutari super Caesaris salute nisi a quo aliquid adversus eum cogitatur, vel optatur, aut. Apologia 35. Sueton, in Domitiano.  tells us, That there is no need that any curiously inquire after the health of Caesar, unless it be one that meditateth or wisheth something against him, or hopes for some advantage after him. So Tribonius was sent into Exile, because he enquired of the Chaldaeans the end of the Prince. So Domitian slew Pomposian, because he had the Emperor's Nativity, and carried about him the Speeches of Kings and Captains out of Livy, and called his Servants by the names of Mago and Hannibal.  
Although Prophecies, Prodigies, and Prognostications are like Mercenary Soldiers, that may be listed to fight on any side; yet every Man's Superstition interprets them to his own advantage, or according to his wishes, hopes or fears. So that when the Designers have a mind to make impressions of fear on the People, they bring in some illboding Signs, as Apparitions, raining of Blood, Oxen speaking, Battles in the Air, and such like, to keep the People either in fear of Calamities, or in hopes of more prosperous times by changes: both which would be equal disturbances to Government.  
Tacitus 
(r) Genus hominum p●tentibus insidum, sp●rantibus fallax, quod in Civitate nostra, & vetabitur semper, & retinebitur. 1. Hist.  speaking of Otho's confiding in the predictions of the Astrologers, tells us, They are a sort of men unfaithful to the Great, deceitful to the Hopers, which always will be forbid, and always retained.  
That the Romans judged such as gave credit to the Chaldaean Promises, the Ceremonies of the Magicians, and Interpreters of Dreams, to be practisers against the State, and guilty of Treason; we have a memorable example of Libo 
(s) 2. Annal. ad Chaldaeorum promissa. Magorum sacra, somniorum etiam Interpreres impulit, etc. plenam imaginibus domum ostentat, hortaturque ad luxum & as alienum, etc. Infernas umbr●s carminibus eliceret.  Drusus, of the Scribonian family, whom the Astrologers put in mind, that Pompey was his Great-Grandfather, Scribonia, wife of Augustus, his Great Aunt; the Caesars his Cousin Germane; that his House was full of Images and Monuments of his Predecessors: then they brought him to Licentious Riot and Debaucheries, and to raise Infernal Spirits by Enchantments. And though my Author judge there were some of Tiberius' Arts in his Accusation before the Senate, yet we find he killed himself, to avoid the infamy of a Sentence of the Senate; and upon it a Decree was made to expel Astrologers and Magicians out of Italy. 
Facts & de Mathematicis, Magisque, Italia pellendis Senatus consulta.   
Before I come to treat of the Prognostics of the Mischiefs of Factions, I must take notice of two of the certainest, most demonstrative, and dangerous signs of Faction running up to Seed that can be, and those are Tumultuous Petitioning and Tumults.  
These will the better be illustrated, both separately and in conjunction, 
The Method the Long Parliament used.  by laying open the Methods the Long Parliament took to effect their designs against their Gracious King. First, With great show of Compassion and Commiseration for their fellow Subjects sufferings, they eagerly debate the Grievances, which by a correspondence betwixt the Members of the House of Commons, and their Friends in the Country, by Petitions, many thousands strong, were daily represented to them, every one striving to be foremost in representing, and outstrip his Neighbour in exaggerating the Grievances (as they called them) that they lay under. In these Petitions to the Houses (but mostly to the House of Commons) were Bead-rolls of Complaints against the oppression of the Subject, both by the King's Council, Precedent, and Ecclesiastical Courts, the Star-Chamber, High Commission Court, the Judges countenancing exorbitant Power, that the Property and Liberty of the Subject was invaded by Monopolies, Ship-money, Knight-hood-money, etc. illegal Sentences in the Star-Chamber, the Innovations of the Bishops, their severity against pious Nonconformists, and People of peaceable and tender Consciences, as they called them; and the base sort of the People were permitted, or rather invited to come to the Parliament-House, to back these strong Petitions.  
By this Artifice, they exposed the Government to obloquy and contempt among the People, and raised in them a confident Opinion that their only Redress was to be hoped from the Parliament, and so brought themselves into a popular esteem, by so much more loosening the People's Affections, and Allegiance to the King, by so much as they faster knit the People's Hearts and Hands to their Representatives, using all their industry to make the Subjects believe they were the only Patriots and Liberators.  
They pass Votes conformable to the Petitioners desire, animate them to search for more, and especially to fix them upon Persons they were mindful to remove out of places of trust. Then they begun to impeach several Ministers of State, and the Judges, that they might weaken the King in his Councils, and terrify others into compliance: always taking care to charge the misdeeds upon the King's evil Counsellors, magnifying the King's Natural Goodness, and declaring, That if he would consent to redress those Grievances, and to punish the Authors, they would make him a richer and more glorious King, than any of his Predecessors. Seditious 
(t) Address.  Pamphlets daily came out, and the Printing-Press laboured Night and Day to abuse the King and his Ministers, and bring the Government, Ecclesiastical and Civil, into obloquy. Their Preachers in the mean time, like so many Demagogues, plied their business so effectually, blowing the Trumpet as they phrased it, for the Lord and Gideon, that by them the Houses Interest prevailed every where, especially in the Populous City, which was in a manner wholly at the House's devotion.  
Having removed the Great and Noble Earl of Strafford by great Industry and Art, and the Midwifery of Tumults, and got themselves (by as strange an Art as oversight) perpetuated, they set themselves to Remonstrate; in which they odiously recount all the miscarriages (as they called them) in the Blessed Kings Reign, charging him (though covertly) with them, and all the very Misfortunes of his Reign. They revive the Bill against the Bishops sitting in the House of Lords, which had been rejected, and in a Parliamentary way ought not again to be set on foot that Session; the better to effect which, they cause the Rabble and their Confederates to menace and assault them, and other Loyal Members of the House; they Post up several names of Lords and Commons, who opposed their proceed: and having driven the King, and his whole Family away by most outrageous Tumults; they declare their Ordinances to be binding during their sitting, and assume the Power of interpreting, and declaring what was Law; and by all these Arts they brought the People, not 
(u) Culpae vel gloriae socii. Tacit. 3. Hist.  so much to join with, as to conspire with them.  
Then they pretend a necessity of putting the Kingdom into a posture of defence, to secure it against Popery, and Arbitrary Government, and the Invasion of Foreigners, which they pretend were to be brought in to assist these. They single out the most confiding and daring in every County to be their Commissioners of the Militia; so 
(w) Quanto quis audacia promptior, tanto magis sidus, rebusque motis potior babetur. Idem, 1. Histor.  much as every one was forwarder in boldness, and more hardy, by so much the more he was to be confided in, and sitter to help forward the turbulent work they were about.  
Having first got the People's affections to revere them as their Deliverers, they the more easily obtained their Bodies, Armour, and Moneys, and so prosecuted a Rebellious War openly; yet with that shameful pretence, that they were fight for the King against his Evil-Counsellors, and, amongst hands, court him with most Dethroning Propositions: and success Crowning their arms, they wholly destroyed that Monarchy they had all along pretended to establish upon surer foundations for the Honour of the Crown, and benefit of the People, than former Ages had known. Instead of which, they made themselves Masters of all their Fellow-Subjects, seizing their Estates, Imprisoning and Murdering their Persons; altering the established Ecclesiastical Government, and all the fundamental Laws, enriching themselves, and over-awing the Kingdom by a standing Army.  
Thus I have drawn that in Miniture, which was the Tragedy of many Years, and the Subject of numerous Volumes, and I shall tack to it something parallel in later Years, to let all Posterity see what a Characteristic Mark it is of Turbulent and Factious Inclinations, when Petitions against the Will of the Government are violently promoted.  
The great mischief of tumultuous Petitions being considered by the Loyal Parliament, 
The Act against Tumultuous Petitions.  upon the late Glorious King's happy Restauration, Provision was made, that the number of deliverers of Petitions should not exceed ten; that three of the Justices of Peace in the County, or the major part of a Grand Jury at an Assize, or General Sessions; or in London, the Lord Mayor, aldermans, and Common-Council have the ordering, and consent to such Petitions, which shall be for alteration of things established by Law, in Church or State, by way of Petition, Complaint, Remonstrances, Declaration, or other Address to the King, or either Houses of Parliament.  
It cannot be forgot (in the interval of a later Parliament) how zealous and busy multitudes were to get Petitions with Hundreds and Thousands of Hands, to the late King for the sitting of a Parliament, before the King in his Wisdom thought sit. This occasioned the King to issue forth a Proclamation against tumultuous Petitions, and other Loyal Persons to express an abhorrence of such Petitions, that would press the King to precipitate their Sitting.  
Those that petitioned the King for convening of a Parliament, could not but foresee the ungratefulness of such Petitions to the King; yet the Designers gave it not over: for they had other Ends. As first, to engage Men by their Subscriptions to be more fast to them: Secondly to try whether the People might be brought to Tumults: Thirdly to incense the People more against the Government, if their Petitions were denied: Fourthly to show in terroreon, the number of their Adherents: Fifthly, That through every County the confiding and zealous might be known each to other: and Lastly, that whenever that Parliament should sit, they might have their Thanks, and by their Numbers the Parliament might be encouraged to proceed in such things as they desired, knowing hereby the Strength of the Party.  
When the House of Commons met, nothing was so much clamoured against, as the Proceed upon the late Proclamation; as if all the Liberties of the Subjects of England had consisted in this. Therefore they vote that it ever hath been the undoubted Right of the Subjects of England, 
See the Votes.  to Petition the King, for the Calling, and Sitting of Parliaments, for redressing of Grievances; and to traduce such Petitioning, was a violation of Duty; and to represent it to his Majesty as tumultuous, and Seditious, was to betray the Liberty of the Subject, and contribute to the design of subverting the Legal ancient Constitution of the Kingdom, and introducing Arbitrary Power, and so a Committee (called of Abhorrence) was appointed to inquire of all such Persons as had offended against the Rights of the Subjects.  
This was it that explained their Vote, for all the Controversy was, Whether a sew private Men might agree upon a Petition, then send Emissaries abroad to procure the Subscriptions, and then tender them, as it were by their number to affright the King to a Compliance; or that the King (to whom the Execution of the Laws, or suspension in some measure surely appertains) might not forbid such Petitions.  
They singled out Sir Francis North, than Lord Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas, after Lord Keeper, and Earl of Guildford, Sir George Jefferies, than Recorder of London, now Lord Chancellor, Mr. Justice Withins, and others, as Subjects of their displeasure, for disliking, and abhorring the irregular dangerous way of Petitioning. But they received more Lustre and Regard in the Eyes of their Sovereign, and all Loyal Subjects, by their Censure, than they did discredit by it. It seems worth the while for Persons that have regard to the quiet and repose of the Subject, to the Honour and Establishment of the Government, and for the Tranquillity and Liberty of their Posterity to consider, whether any mortal Man can either produce Precedent or Law to justify the Imprisonment of those Gentlemen Abhorrers; of which I have spoken something before, in the Chapter of Parliaments.  
I shall now conclude with the last and formidablest sign of Sedition, 
Of Tumults.  viz. Tumults, which are but unarmed, and Pen-feathered Rebellion. They have the Mien and Standard of it, only want the Artillery. The fatal black Parliament disciplined them to be ready at any watch word, and whatever they voted against the King or Church, was ushered in by thousands of all sorts, flocking out of the City and Country, braving and threatening all along as they went by White-Hall, and so in Sholes crowding to the Houses, promising to stand by them, and crying out for Justice. They were so insolent and rude, that they forced the Merciful King to withdraw from his Palace, to which he never returned, till they brought him to his Barbarous Trial and Murder.  
That Blessed Kings Sense of them can be expressed by none so emphatically as by himself; therefore I shall extract some of his feeling Expressions.  
I 
(x) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 4.  never thought any thing (except our Sins) more ominously presaging all those mischiefs which have followed, than these Tumults. And this was not a short Fit or two of an Ague, but a quotidian Fever, always increasing to higher Inflammation, impatient of any Mitigation, restraint or remission. Those who had most mind to bring forth Confusion and Ruin, upon Church and State, used the Midwifery of Tumults, by which they ripped up with barbarous Cruelty, and forcibly cut out abortive Votes, to crowd in by force, what reason would not lead. Some men's Petulancy was such, as they joyed to see their Betters shamefully and outrageously abused. So the Blessed King finding they invaded the Honour and Freedom of the two Houses, and used such contemptuous words and Actions against him, thought himself not bound by his Presence to provoke them to higher Contempt and Boldness. For he saith it was an hardiness beyond Valour to set himself against the breaking in of the Sea; being daily baited with Tumults, he knew not whether their Fury and Discontent might not fly so high, as to worry him, and tear him to pieces, whom as yet they played but with in their Paws: Therefore thinks himself not bound to prostitute the Majesty of his Place and Person, etc. to those who insult most when they have Objects, and opportunity most capable of their rudeness and petulancy.  
Our late gracious Sovereign in later times, when some Men were endeavouring to practise the same Methods, found some offers of the like at Windsor (a place of all others, in which one would have thought he should have had the most Honour for the Benefits he did to that Town by his so frequent residence) when first the Boys, and then the Rabble were set on to shout for a Burgess of Parliament, in opposition to a Loyal Person His Majesty favoured, even in his own Presence.  
The Prophetic Observation of the Martyred King is worth noting, That he believes the just Avenger of all Disorders, will in time make these Men, and that City, see their Sin in the Glass of their Punishment: which needs no application, but only to desire they would be so just to themselves and their Posterity, as to follow no such Precedents, and that none will encourage such outrageous do.  
I shall dismiss this ingrateful Subject with the Description 
(y) V●●ibus truculentis strepere, rursum viso Casare trepidare. Murmur incertum, atrox clamour & repent quies, diversis animorum moribus, pavebaret & terreba●●. 1. Annal.  Tacitus gives of the mutinous Tumult of Drusus' Soldiers, That the Ringleaders when they looked to the multitude with outrageous Voices made terrible noises, but viewing Caesar, shrunk again: and of the whole multitude he saith, an uncertain Murmur, an horrible cry, and suddenly a calm, by divers emotions of Mind they feared and did affright.   

CHAP. XLIV. Prognostics of Sedition and Faction.  
BOdinus 
(a) Seditio semel accunsa, quasi scantilla, impetu populari repente agitatur, ac totum prius inflammari solet, quam extingui possit. De Repub. c. 4.  tells us, That Sedition once kindled, is suddenly fanned, and blown by popular fury into a Flame, which is wont to set all on Fire, ere it can be extinguished.  
The danger therefore of Faction is not to be slighted, but the Government should be watchful over the least Sparks, which no Man can forbid, or tell whence they may come, or how far they may ravage, when there is a Propensity to Faction. Therefore Governors should not suffer matter of Trouble to be prepared or hatched, but crush the Cockatrice in the Egg, and the Monster in the Embryo; especially 
(b) Vbi Respublica aegra, quave vix cicatrices, called intestina acceptas, obduxerit. Clapm. de Arcanis dominationis, lib. 3. c. 16. When Danger less.  when the Scars of late Wounds are not healed, or hardened, as after a Civil War, when Factions are most dangerous.  
The danger is less, saith my Lord 
(c) Essays.  St. Alban, when it springs only from the Discontent of the People, being slow of Motion, and the greater sort, of small Strength without the Multitude, can do little; but the danger is greatest, when those of higher Rank wait but for the troubling of the Waters. So Jupiter by Pallas' Advice, when the other Gods would have bound him, sent for Briarous with his Hundred Hands: an Emblem to show how safe it is for Monarches to make sure of the Good Will of their People.  
The motions of the greatest Persons in Government, aught to be as the motion of the Planets, under the Primum Mobile (according to the old Opinion, that every of them is carried swiftly by the highest Motion, and slowly by its own.) Therefore when great Men, in their own particular motion, move violently, Liberi usque ut Imperantium meminissent, as Tacitus speaks, It is a sign the Orbs are out of Frame.  
Where Factions are not Combinations against the Government, 
When Princes not to make themselves Parties.  but only private-Animosities betwixt some of the Nobility, wherein the Government is not much concerned, there may be some allowance for my Lord Verulam's Opinion: That Princes being Common Parents, should not lean to one Party; because a Boat that is overset by the unequal Weight on one side, may carry such Passengers in it, as the Prince would not lose. Therefore to study ways to piece them, and solder up the flaws, is better than to side with one, to the Ruin of the other, and sometimes of themselves also. As we may observe in Henry the third of France, who entered into the League, and it was shortly after turned against himself: which may be a document (saith that wise Lord) to Kings how they make themselves a Party: for by that a Prince makes himself unus ex nobis, which makes an Obligation Paramount to that of Sovereignty. So that a Prince must be very cautelous (when he must side with one Party) which he espouseth, 
(d) In caducam pari●tem ne inclinet.  lest he lean upon a ruinous Wall.  
But if there be a Party, by whose fall the Prince 
(e) Cujus r●ina se quoque tradura est. Tacitus de Moribus Germ.  likewise shall be sure to be ruined, (as in case of Factions against Government, as I mean in this whole Discourse) it is necessary for him strenuously to support it. 
When Princes to support one Party.  Upon this Consideration, it seems to me, that it ever will be the great Interest of the Kings of England to defend and support the Episcopal Government; for that by fatal Experience it was found, that the overthrow of it was the Praeludium to the Destruction of the Blessed King and Monarchy. For although he was a very great Champion of the Church of England, as established by Law; yet he too fatally yielded to take away the Bishop's Votes in Parliament, whereby he lost a considerable Party in the House, that would never have deserted his Interest. So that in this case I may apply that of Galba 
(f) Manifestum est neque perire nos, neque salvos esse nisi una posse. Tacit. 10. Hist. P. 195. Edit. Lips. 5.  to his Soldiers, It is manifest that undivided or alone, they can neither be Saved, or Perish, in times when they are attacked.  
But to return to the Prognostics of dangerous Seditions. I shall mention some that Tacitus hath noted and described: Speaking of the Revolt of the Legions in Germany, under Germanicus at the Beginning of Tiberius' Reign, 
Unanimity a dangerous Sign.  he saith, Those that looked deeply into the Disposition of the Soldiers, judged it a strong Argument of an unappeasable Revolt, 
(g) Id militares animos altius conj●●●antibus, praecipuum indicium magni atque implacabilis motus, quod neque disjecti, nil paucorum instinctu, sed pariter ardescerent, pariter silerent; tanta aequalitate & constantia, ut regi crederes. 1. Annal.  that they were not scattered or divided, nor any attempt given by a few; but grew insolent together, were quiet at once, with such moderation and constancy, that one would have thought they had been governed by one Head. For when any Sedition is carried on with such Unanimity, it is a certain Sign that the Poison hath a large spread, and there are few sound Parts left.  
The Progress 
(h) Ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio Ju●e ●tentum; militem do●is, populum Annena, cun●los dulcedine o●ii pellexit. Insurgere pa●tatim, munia Sena●us, Magistratuum, Legum, in se trahere, nullo adversante. lbid.  Augustus made to establish the Sovereignty in himself, 
The Methods of Designers.  is the usual Method by which such as intent subverting of Government, may proceed; which, according to the same Author, was, That to ingratiate himself with the People, he contented himself with Tribunitian Authority to defend the Common People.; that he wound himself into the Favour of the Soldiers, by Gifts; of the People, by Provision of Sustenance; and of all in general, with the sweetness of Ease and Repose; by little and little taking upon him the affairs of the Senate, the Duty of the Magistrates and Laws: and so without the Contradiction of any, he obtained the Empire.  
This in Augustus was commendable and Politically done, being to alter a Commonweal into a Monarchy, and Wisemen by his method might have foretold his Design. So in Seditious enterprises against Monarchy, the way is to court the People, and insensibly cajole them with the sweetness of Liberty under a Commonwealth, and the heaviness of the Yoke of Monarchy; and having possessed them with this, they have no more to do but to await some critical time or revolution that may suit their Design, as some new Imposition laid, some public Calamity, the displacing some great Officer, or Death of some great Man, or their Prince: such 
(i) Opportunos' magnis conatibus transitus rerum. 1. Histor.  Revolutions being the sittest times for great Attempts, as Tacitus speaks of Otho's Conspiracy, by Galba's Covetousness to the Soldiery, etc.  
Concerning Sejanus the same Judicious 
(k) Primas dominandi spes in arduo, ubi sis ingressus, adesse studia & ministros. Lib. 4. Annal.  Author gives us the Saying of Drusus, That the first hopes of attaining Command, or working themselves into Power by Sedition is difficult; but after the Entrance there will not want aids of Council, and assisting Hands. Therefore it is most necessary, 
Speedy Suppression most necessary.  that Princes diligently watch the motions of all kind of Seditious aspiring Persons, to prevent their first Entrance upon their Designs, lest they prove afterwards too Powerful.  
In such a State of affairs the Council of 
(l) Nibil in civilibus discordiis festinatione tutius, ubi facto magis quam consilio opus. 1. Hist.  Tacitus is to be followed, That nothing is safer in Seditions, and Civil Discords, than quickness of dispatch, when there is more need of Action than Consultation.  
The misfortune is great which happens to the Subjects by Faction and Sedition; 
The Mischiefs of Faction.  for such things once begun, are not in a short time hushed, but the Animosities are durable, and when one 
(m) Inter victores victosque nunquam solida sides coalescit. Idem, 2. Hist.  Party overcomes, yet the Conquered retains his old grudge, and is always catching at opportunities to promote his Interest; and there is rarely (in that Generation at least) a sincere amnesty, and union of Affections. Therefore as Princes by Acts of Pardon endeavour to put all into a State of Unpunishableness, though they cannot into a State of Innocence; so those that have assisted the Seditious Party, aught with a generous Repentance and Fidelity to their Prince, endeavour all their Lives, to be rubbing out those Stains by their Loyalty; For he that 
(n) Quem paenitet peccasse, pene est innocens.  reputes he hath offended, is in the next degree to the Innocent.  
It is one of the dangerousest signs of a strong and prevailing Faction, when a Prince hath notice and apprehension of it; yet either for want of courage, or easiness of temper, to believe better of the Factious than they deserve, quiets his resolution of opposing them at some critical time: whereby they finding their Prince to yield to their importunities, in granting some one thing he hath declared against, readily interpret it a fear in him; and when they have taken him at low water-mark, they flow amain upon him with new and new Floods.  
Such Princes thinking to make themselves easy by complying, embarrass themselves the more with fresh troubles, strengthen the hands of the Factious, and by deserting their best Counsels and Friends, open their own retrenchments, dismount their own Artillery, and give such ground to the Factious, as at last they are either forced to quit their Throne, or with too late rallied resolutions, fight for that Post they have so supinely quitted.   

CHAP. XLV. The Remedies of Faction and Sedition.  
AS no Malady in the natural Body can be cured without the knowledge of the proper causes; so the prevention, of the growth of Faction and Sedition unto Rebellion, is best effected by substracting the matter, and taking away the fundamental causes of it.  
First it is to be observed, 
(a) Omne recens malum facile opprimitur, inveteratum fit plerumque robustius. Cicero Philip.  That all budding evils are sooner stifled, than those that are not only run up to Seed, but suffered to shake in a rank Soil. Therefore the Historian 
(b) Incipiens, & nondum adulta seditio melioribus conciliis flectitur.  saith, That young and not grown up Sedition is bend with easier Councils. So beginning Ulcers are easilier cured, than those that are festered to the Bone, or are Callous Fistulas.  
Sedition is a personal Crime; but because it consists in the several qualifications of the Persons, I shall treat of the Cure in the same method as I have of the Causers and Causes. The signs being as so many Symptoms, which will require also some remarks.  
First as to the debauched, 
1. The Debauched.  they are but the Velites, the light-armed Vancouriers, there is small danger from them. They grow as Tares in every Country and Age, they are the luxuriant branches of a rank Soil and long peace; They are the Sutlors of the Camp: There is a curse of peace that brings such weeds, but the Howes of the Laws and Ecclesiastical discipline will hinder their growth, and eradicate them.  
The best Antidote against the mischiefs these people can bring to the Common-weal, is the Prince's example to put vice out of fashion and countenance; for a Prince's Virtue and Piety influenceth much.  
No doubt his majesty's great care to forbid and discredit all kinds of Vice, will work a greater 
(c) Hac conditio Principum, ut quicquid faciam, pr●ipere 〈◊〉. Quintil. Declam. 2.  reformation among the dissolute, than his Laws, and will engage the hearts and affections of all virtuous, sober and considerate Persons: for as the passage among the Romans to the Temple of Honour was through that of Virtue; so must that be to Loyalty and Christianity through Morality.  
Secondly, The lightheaded airy Persons, 
2. Lightheaded.  as they are something a kin to the debauched (the one pleasing his sensual Appetite, and the other feeding the Chimeras of his Brain, as their peculiar Province) so they are as little dangerous. The suppressing Libels and Pamphlets would starve them. But if they wanted them, it is likely they would be worse employed; Therefore it is necessary in all Governments, to countenance and set on work ingenious Persons, who are well principled to the State, to ridicule the Factious, and feed these flutterers of the Air with Canary-seed; and they will never fly against the wind, or out of their Aviary, but there sport themselves with as much variety of hopes, flights and short Notes, as the Birds do; and yet other mortals be as ignorant of the impulsive causes, as we are of the motives of the frisks and flutters of those Choristers of the Air.  
However these are not to be countenanced and indulged, lest their wild Notes be imitated, or that airiness grow too fashionable, whereby solidity and stayedness be ridiculed; as we have seen it too much in our age, when the Military educacation made the Schools and Universities less frequented, and the licentiousness of those times is not yet forgot. So that whereas in one 
(d) Pontefract. 

Mr. Wakefield  
Mr. Hitchin  
Mr. Skipton   Ald.  Corporation before the War, the Earl of Arundel found three Aldermen, that used their Greek Testaments at Church; it may be there are not three in a County that do so: and Gentlemen have too much disused the reading of Latin Authors, from whence our Language hath received the greatest improvement: and yet to cover their unkilfulness, many are too prone in this Age to decry the use of quotations out of such choice Authors. But this in transitu.  
Thirdly, 
3. The Indigent.  The necessitous and indigent (being the Infantry of Faction, and the gross Body) require the Governments greater circumspection, to prevent their being arrayed by the Factious Chieftains.  
Necessitas ad turpe cogit, Robbing and Stealing are their Master exploits in times of Peace. Those which will adventure to stretch an Halter, will adventure upon Bullets for a small constant Salary; and being Mercenary will pass on either side, where the greatest prospect of gain is: therefore the Government is too take all possible care that Prodigality and Luxury bring not the better sort to want.  
The way to enrich a People in general, is to open and well balance Trade, cherish all sort of Manufacture, banish Idleness, repress wastes and excess, improve and husband the Soil, regulate all things vendable, moderate Taxes and Tributes, to invite the Indigent to people new Plantations, or those that are fit for it, to serve abroad in Military employments.  
These are such Remedies, as being vigorously put in execution, will leave few in want, but such as by their laziness will choose to freeze on Horseback, rather than take the pains to go on foot to get them heat.  
A Prince that would enrich his Subject (saith my 
(e) Essays.  Lord St. Alban) must take care that the Treasure of money in the State, be not gathered into few hands; otherwise a State may have a great stock and yet starve: Money being like Dung, not useful unless spread.  
The best Mine above ground is when a Country affords not only the Commodity, but the Manufacture and carriage; for then triple hands are set on work. Thence in all projects of cutting Rivers, for the transporting of Commodities further within Land, it ought to be well considered, whether it be not more profitable, to have many poor men and their Cattle employed in Land carriage, than by the cheaper way of Water only, to enrich the Tradesmen, and starve a hundred heads for one.  
If the wholesome Laws for setting on work, and relieving the Poor by the labour of their own hands, and forcing sturdy Beggars and idle Vagabonds to work, or be confined to their own Parishes, were strictly put in Execution, we should have less reason to complain of them.  
It is true it is not from the poor and lazy that the Government is so much in danger; for those are not fitted for Soldiers. It is the spirited poor that have spirits above their fortunes, or by living above their income, have wasted their Estates, that are Instruments fit to be made use of by the Factious; yet their numbers are not so great, but vigilant Magistrates may have an eye upon them, and the Government may employ the ablest of them in collecting the Revenue. Others may be made inferior Officers in the Militia, and the rest must be left to better hushand what they have remaining, and kept in hopes that if they pay due respect to the Government, at one time or other they may be provided for: and the Loyal Gentry may find ways to oblige them in their Services; so that every one that is fit to be made good use of, may by one way or other be set to gain a better livelihood, than they are like to get by santring and flandring the Government; which if they do, some severe Animadversion may amend them, or deter others.  
It is not possible that the Government can provide for all the Indigent, without strict execution of the Laws. But the care of the Justices of Peace, enjoined by the Sovereign, may do much good; however they may keep such from molesting the Government.  
Since therefore that of Tacitus is so true, 
L●vissimus quisque & fauri improvidus sp● vana tumet.  That the least provident to prevent future want, build Castles in the air, and are big with vain hopes and expectations; their hopes and desires are to be so directed that they may hope for more advantage from their Prince, than from Factious Oppressors.  
Fourthly, 
4. The Ambitious.  Ambition is so near a kin to Nobleness, that it seems a Nobility and unvulgarness itself, being an Inmate only of Souls elevated above the level of the common sort of mankind.  
Ambitious men are the Field-Officers and Brigadeer of Faction; and by so much as they are commonly persons of Birth and Parts, they the more require a Prince's regard above all other Factious persons.  
If they find (saith my Lord St. Alban) the way open to their rising, they are rather busy than dangerous; but if they be checked and stopped, like ill humours they grow Malignant. These (faith 
(f) St. Alban's E● says, c. 36.  the Chancellor) become first secretly discontented, looking upon men and matters with an evil eye, and are best pleased when things go backward; and so are the worst Servants of Princes or States.  
Therefore it is good for Princes if they use ambitious men, so to handle the matter, as they be still progressive; which because it cannot be without inconvenience, it is good not to use such natures at all: for if they rise not with their Master's service, they will take care to make their service fall with them.  
There is less danger caeteris paribus, of ambitious men, if they be of mean Birth, than if Noble; and if they be new raised, rather than grown cunning, and fortified in their greatness.  
It is less danger (saith the same great Chancellor 
(g) Idem.  whose wise observations on this head I cannot omit) to have an ambitious man stirring in business, than great in dependence. He that seeks to be eminent amongst able men, hath a great task, but such as is ever good for the Public; but he that plots to be the only figure amongst Ciphers, is the decay of a whole Age.  
Prince's may make use of Ambitious men in pulling down the greatness of any Subject that over-tops, as Tiberius used Macro in pulling down Sejanus. Also they make use of them as Screens in matters of danger and envy: But no man will take that office, unless he be a seeled Dove, that mounts and mounts, because he cannot see about him.  
Commanders in Wars, though Ambitious, are useful; for their Service dispenseth with the rest: and to take a Soldier without it, is to pull off his Plumes and his spurs.  
Favourites are remedies against ambitious great ones, and they are well corrected also, by balancing them by others as proud as themselves: but then there must be some middle Counsellors to keep them steady; for without that Ballast the Ship will roll too much.  
These, and such like, may be the cures of Ambitious Men, while they are of the Council of Princes, on Ministers of State. But when they want Employment, and are tainted in their Principles, or entertain designs of altering the State, or by the unboundedness of their aspire, aim at the sole direction of Affairs, and care not what mischiefs befall their Prince, or Country in the pursuit of their Designs; a Prince should look upon them as in the next degree of most dangerous Traitors.  
In this case a Prince hath but two ways, either to set wise men to work, who cambring them to their Service, and make them sensible, that their advantage will be greater by studying the Service of their Prince in consort with other experienced Statesmen, than by heading of any Faction against the Government; and letting them see by the many examples in History, how unprosperous it hath been to all that have striven to wrest Honours and Employments from their Prince, without proportionable Service: That they are not to presume to be wiser than the Government: That Kings have long Hands, can reach Malefactors at a great distance, and unprovided: how unable they are to vie with Majesty; and make them sensible, that never any durable Renown or Wealth was got by courting the People, in opposition to the Prince; and demonstrate the Justness of the Government in such Particulars as they most quarrel at. And if this will not bring them to their right Senses, then either send them abroad, or give them some ticklish Employment at home, wherein, if their Ambition tempt them to outdo their Commission, they may be run into a Praemunire, whereby they may be crushed at once.  
Still a Prince hath a difficult task how to comport himself, to cast off Ministers of State, who having been accustomed to be very leading, and much credited in Councils, have been employed in great and weighty Affairs, got themselves great Estates, and Dependences. If such (upon some Reasons the Prince best knows to himself) be softly to be laid aside, whereby his Partisans may be induced to believe, it was for no Gild, but to make room for others advancement; a Prince is in danger to have his Affairs much obstructed by them.  
For these (upon every ill succeeding Affair of State after their removal) will suggest to the People, the evil tendency of it; and they shall be sure to have their repute for Judgement and forecast much valued by the People, because it was so once by the Prince: and so the vulgar instantly credit his Sentiments as Oracles; so that he having already acquired an easy belief, with the greatest facility in the World, puts a false gloss upon the Princes best designed Actions, and retaining his old dependences, they will whisperingly disperse his sense of things.  
Let him then make himself heads of the Country Party, and the true Protestants (as of late some affected to be called) and he is presently without further labour and industry adored as the People's prime Patriot. Having got Tools enough to work with, still pretending his concern for the Public weal of the People, and at the same time, tacitly insinuating some reflections upon his Quondam-fellow Counfellors, depreciating their Wisdom, and Honesty, and leaves the application to his Admirers: They will be sure to aggravate all appearances of Maladministration (since his laying aside, and insinuate that Affairs have a tendency to oppression of the People, altering Religion, or such like plausible Subjects; and so by little and little the People's affections will be estranged from their Prince, and shall be set upon this new Idol, the fallen Lucifer.  
If the Sovereign upon some emergences by necessitated to call a Parliament, he shall obtain a great, if not a major part of the Members, chosen (according to the Common Peoples by as, he shall put upon them) most opposite to the King's Interest. In such an Assembly he shall be sure to have great Interest, and under some pretences of Grievances of the Subject, render useless to the Affairs of the Sovereign, and upon its necessary dissolution, improve still his Interest, that the succeeding Parliament shall be as wayward; and by promoting Bills, he knows his Sovereign can neither in Honour or Conscience assent to, still more alienate the People's affections from him, till at last he get to be sole Director of such Assemblies; having all this while the Wisdom and cunning to keep himself within the compass, and reserve, that for Words or Actions he be not obnoxious to the Laws.  
Having obtained this height, he is able to influence the Elected of City Magistrates, secure himself by them, and at last to form Conspiracies against his Prince; till which time, he being the Idol of the People, is only feared and suspected: but nothing of Traitorous Designs being yet pregnantly discovered, he runs on his risk till some fortunate discovery of his designs force him to abscond, and then his whole machinations come to light; and if he escape the hand of Justice, he is forced to leave his Country, and ends his life ingloriously abroad.  
This is the common exit of such, who had much better have offered violence to these headstrong Passions, and been content with a quiet retreat, and dieted and physicked their virulent distempers with the applications of sage Counsel, and the Precepts of Judicious Men, finding out the cure for their Diseases in Books, and Solitude; than thus to live in the Pangs and Throes of Ambition, to the disquiet of their Prince, and the emptying of their Country.  
Of such we may not only say with 
(h) Percandam posthac modestiam ut contentius esset. Tacit. 4. Annal.  Drusus, That Modesty must be prayed to, that they be content with their Greatness; but Justice must be invoked to prune such luxuriant Branches, as not only overtop and Shade all the rest, but suck away from them all their Sap and Nourishment.  
In 
(i) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 2.  Dio Cassius I find it, advised, That such Criminals as these, that are above the stroke of Justice, and whom a Prince cannot with security to himself bring to a Public Trial, should not be arraigned, but as open Enemies instantly punished.  
So some Princes, finding such subtle ambitious Men, beyond the reach of their Justice, by way of public Arrest and Trial by the Law, being satisfied in their Consciences that they were hatching great mischiefs to their State, and the subversion of their Government, have commanded by their Sovereign Power, execution of them by private hands.  
So fell Friar 
(k) History of Hungary  George, newly made Cardinal, for tampering with Solyman the magnificent to bring him into Transilvania, and exclude King Ferdinand, by direction from the King to Castald his General there.  
So fell the Duke of Guise, and the Cardinal of Bourbon; but this sort of Justiec brought as great mischiefs afterwards to their Crowns, as they could in probability have sustained by their lives, at least, if the Prince had with watchful oversight so timed the Execution, that they had let them live till they had made their Treasons more manifest.  
So Tacitus 
(l) Inauditi atque indefensi tanquam inno. centes ●erierunt. 1. Histor.  speaking of Galba's putting to death Cingonius Varro, and Petronius Turpillianus, saith, That they being not suffered to be heard, and defend their Causes judicially, perished in the repute of Innocents'.  
Therefore there are other ways more just and safe for Princes to take with so great and subtle Criminals. As to toil them into some great errors, give them opportunities to show their ill Conduct and Council, or to do something ungrateful to the People, that they may go out of their places with such a scar as will stick by them in their retirement, and study to enjoy a quiet recess, lest they be called to an account for what they connived at when they fell; so if they can be rendered unuseful, and of little credit with the People, they will have none to back them in their attempts, but Persons of small Reaches, and Interest; and then for smaller Transgressions they may be called to an account; and if they be conscious to themselves of any guilt, they will quit their undertake, for fear of a suddener Catastrophe than Ostracism.  
If such Ambitious Persons have gained so great Interest, that neither by setting Spies upon them, or by other Arts their secret drift can be sifted out, 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 5. Polit. c. 11.  than Aristotle's Rule is to be observed, by compassings and wind to remove them, and not to taken all their Power away at once, or to remove them to some higher place, where they may have a new Administration to begin, in which they are not so well versed, on wherein they can do nothing without the Prince and his Councils daily inspection, and where no dependences are to be gained.  
Above all, a Prince is to take care to follow the 
(m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Ibid.  Philosopher's Rule, to make no man too great: for as he saith, It is the safeguard of the Principality to make no one Man great. For Tacitus 
(n) Semper periculosum, privati hominis nomen supra nomen Principis attolli. Vita Agricolae.  well observed. It is most inconvenient, and dangerous, to have any one more in vogue than the Prince; for if such have not powerful Principles of Loyalty lodged in their breasts, they have great temptations and opportunities to do Mischiefs, especially, if after the obtaining great Authority and Power, they are sensible of parties-making against them. For then, self-preservation is mixed with their Ambition, and that prompts them to dangerous undertake, as it did the Earl of Essex, in Queen Elizabeth's time.  
For as Dio 
(o) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 2.  Cassius notes, Long and lasting Command lifts up men's Spirits, and induceth them to alter Affairs. So the long continued Favours of the Queen, and the great Employments under her, made that unfortunate Earl impatient to see himself eclipsed, and whether out of pure envy to the present Ministers of State, or upon greater Designs (I inquire not) seek to remove at least those with a violent Hand, that he thought were his Enemies: in which attempt he fell worthily under the Severity of the Law, which will allow no Man to expound the goodness of his Intentions, when he offers force to his Prince.  
When therefore there is any Necessity of State to make any great, 
(p) Magna libertatis (ac Principatus) custodia, si magna imperia, diuturna esse non sinas. Lib. 4.  Livy's Rule is to be observed, That his Authority be short; for that is Safety to the Liberty of the People, as well as to the Sovereignty of the Prince. So the Lord Lieutenants of Ireland, and elsewhere, are not only removable at the King's Pleasure; but they have not been used to be continued long: for more durable Commands too much elevate ambitious men's Genius's, and gain them great Dependences, who will be apt to own their Honour, and places of Profit, rather to such great Ministers, than to the King himself; whereby if they have a mind to make Innovations, they have Opportunities, and Coadjutors.  
Sejanus is a great Example of Ambitious aspiring, and most deserved, violent, and praecipitate Ruin. Tacitus 
(q) Corpus illi laborem tolerans, animus audax, sui obtegens; in alios criminator, juxta adulator & superbus; palam compesitus pudor, intus summa apiscendi libido, & ejusque causa modo largitus, & luxus, saep●us industria ac vigilantia haud minus noxiae, quotiens parando Regno finguntur. 1. Annal.  gives us his Character thus, That he was of Body able to endure Labour, of Mind bold, in his own Actions secret, an Informer against others, as proud as flattering, in show Modest, but inwardly greedy of Aspiring: for which Cause he used sometimes largesses and lavishing, but more often Industry and Diligence; means, saith he, dangerous alike, when they are dissemblingly used to win a Kingdom.  
This Sejanus poisoned Drusus, by corrupting Livia his Wife, and practised to destroy Agrippina and Germanicus' Children, from whom he endeavoured to alienate Tiberius' Mind. He requested Tiberius, that he might Marry Livia, widow of Drusus, by which means he thought to get himself incorporated into the Royal Family; and having destroyed the whole Race of Germanicus and Drusus, the next Heirs of Augustus, he might the easier have usurped the Empire in Tiberius' old Age, whom he had got to retire to Capraea, and commit the management of affairs to himself.  
But for all these gradual and high Steps, when he was almost at the top of his Ambition, snatching the very Diadem, having already got his Image with Tiberius', decreed by the Senate, to be set about the Altars of Clemency and Friendship, he was at last by Tiberius' Authority, and Macro's Diligence, utterly destroyed: 
(r) Tiberium variis artibus devinxit, adeo ut obscurum adversum, alios, sibi uni incautum intectumque assiceret. Id.  Though he had so overcome Tiberius by his Arts, that though he was reserved to all others, yet to him alone he was cautionless and uncovered. For as by his cunning (by which he was also circumvented) saith Tacitus, so by the Anger of the Gods to the affairs of Rome, with equal mischiefs to it, he flourished and fell. So Juvenal 
(s) Satyra 10.  tells us.  
— Sejanus ducitur unco  
Spectandus, gaudent omnes—  
— nam qui nimios optabat honores,  
Et nimias poscebat opes, numerosa parabat  
Excelsae Turris tabulata, unde altior esset  
Casus, & impulsae praeceps immane Ruinae.  
Fifthly, 
5. The Envious.  The Envious are very carefully to be watched over; they secretly sow the Tares that choke the Fruitful Crop of peaceable Government.  
There are some Envies that are less prejudicial to a State, as being against some Ministers of State only, and not against the Government; and these are so natural, that in the calmest times they are practised: and to prevent this, it is only needful for Princes to take care of the choice of such as they commit matters of public Administration to, and that Persons envied so deport themselves, as they may not deserve it.  
Public Envy (saith the Learned 
(t) St. Alban 's Essays, c. 1. p. 33.  Chancellor) is an Ostracism, that Eclipseth Men when they grow too great, and is a Bridle to great ones to keep them within Bounds.  
Those above others are most subject to be envied, 
Id.  who carry the greatness of their Fortunes in an insolent, proud, and imperious manner; whereas wise Men will rather sacrifice to Envy in suffering themselves to be crossed, and overborne in things that do not much concern them. So the carrying greatness in a plain and open manner without Arrogance, and Vainglory, doth demolish Envy. Therefore the wise sort of great Persons ever bring upon the Stage somebody, upon whom to derive the Envy, which otherwise would fall upon themselves.  
Persons of eminent Virtues, 
Id.  when they are advanced, are less envied: for their Fortune seemeth but due to them, especially if they be of noble Blood, being that much is not added to their Fortune; so those advanced by degrees, are less envied than those per saltum.  
Those that have joined with their Honours, 
Id.  great Cares and Perils, are rarely envied; son Men think they earn their Honour dearly, and pity them sometimes, and Pity healeth Envy. There fore the more sober sort of Politic Persons, in their Greatness, are ever bemoaning themselves, quanta patintur! not that they feel it so, (though certainly to discharge great places honourably, is a vast Fatiegue) but to abate the Edge of Envy, as my Lord St. Alban wisely observes.  
Unworthy Persons are most envied at first; 
Id.  whereas Persons of Worth and Merit, are most envied when their Fortunes continue long: for by that time, though their virtue be the same, yet it hath not the same Lustre; for fresh Men grow up to shade it.  
These are not the Envies that are so perilous to States, for that they are terminated on particular Persons only; but that Envy which is dangerous to a State, is when it is great upon the Ministers of State, when the 
(u) Dolendi modus, ti mendi non item.  Causes of it, especially, are small, and the Fear greater than the Feeling; for that shows the Envy raised upon Design, and to be general upon all, or most of the Ministers: and then however it may be disguised, it is upon the State itself.  
It is this kind of Envy that principally forebodes Mischief, and requires greater Skill and Dexterity in the Prince, and his Ministers, to avoid the Malignity of the Blast of these black Souls, and the Sting of such Asps, Vipers, and Scorpions.  
Therefore it is no small Skill to choose out such, for public Negotiations, as will be less subject to be envied; which in Part may be understood by electing those that have Worth, Ability, and Virtue to commend them, and not private Affection or Interest only.  
Sixthly, 
6. The Discontented.  The discontented are File-leaders of Faction, The best foresight and prevention of Mischief from them is, that there be no fit Head, that hath Reputation with the discontented Party, upon whom they may turn their Eyes. Such are either to be won off, or affronted with some other of the same Party, that may oppose them, and so divide the Reputation, and make distinct Interests among them: for Factions generally subdivide, as that of the Optimates and Lucullus did against Pompey and Caesar; and when the Senate's Authority was pulled down, Caesar and Pompey after broke upon one another. So Antonius and Lepidus against Brutus and Cassius; and after they were overthrown, Antonius and Augustus divided. So in the late War, the Presbyterians and Independents clashed, till at last the Contest betwixt them two so weakened both, that it much facilitated the Restauration of the King.  
To give moderate Liberty for Grief and Discontent to evaporate (so it be without too great Insolence, saith a Wise Man) 
(w) St. Alban, tit. Sedition.  is safe, especially if a Prince noting the Causes of Discontent, be removing of them insensibly, during his Connivance, so as he seem aliud agere; to let them see it was not for want of Foresight, or , that he set not on the Work sooner, but that he waited the critical time.  
The neglect of this, some think, was one of the great misfortunes of King Charles the First's Reign: That his Ministers (who could not but be sensible how universal the discontent of the People was from the beginning of his Reign; yet suffered them fifteen years to be fermenting, and the causes not to be insensibly removed, till when it was done at last, all at once, Anno 1640, 1641. the King got no thanks for it, as seeming to be favours rather extorted than freely granted. For by the long lodging of discontent in the bosom of the People, the humour turned back, made the wound bleed inwardly, and engendered dangerous Ulcers and malignant Imposthumes. However it is too apparent (though that was a great oversight) yet the backwardness of the Parliaments to afford Supplies, and the designers of the Civil Wars, who had been at work all along, were the true Cause of those Miseries, together with the blessed King's Clemency.  
Carrying men from hopes to hopes of redress (so as it be not too tiresome) is one of the best Antidotes against the poison of discontentment; and when it ariseth not so much from malice as mistake, 
(x) Da malorum poenitentiae, honorum consensui spacium. Tacit. 1. Histor.  a Prince may respite a while the Prosecution, to give space to the evil to repent, and to the good to consent or be convinced: perhaps a little time will mellow and meliorate humours, diem forsitan tempusque ipsum leniturum iras, sanctitatemque animis allaturam, as Livy judiciously observes.  
Yet this is to be admitted with some restriction: For as Tacitus notes, 
(y) Ipse inutili contatione agendi, tempus consultando consumpsit; mox utrumque concilium aspernatus, quod inter ancipitia deterrimum est, dum media sequitur nec ausus est satis, nec praevidit. Id. 3. Hist.  in another case of Valens Lieutenant to Vitellius, That using delay in prosecuting the Enemy, to the great danger of his cause, he spent the time of Action in Consultation; and then rejecting the extremes of Counsel, he took the middle course, which, saith he, in cases of danger and doubt, of all other is the worst.  
So in punishing Authors of Faction, it is better use severity at first for a terror, than to suffer smaller Symptoms of discontent to pass so long unrectified, that at last they sprout out with Hydra's heads, and grow too numerous to suppress: for in such cases all delays are dangerous, and soft quiet dealing brings more evil, than hazarding rashly; as in another case about 
(a) Nec contatione opus, ubi perniciosior fit quies, quam temeritas. Idem, 1. Hist.  Otho's Conspiracy and the quickness of the execution of it, he relates; which might have been prevented, if Galba or Piso had well observed Otho's popularity, and his ingratiating himself with the Soldiery, whom Galba had discontented about the Donative.  
Seventhly, 
7. The Emulous.  The Emulous being such as think themselves equally capable of their Prince's Trust and Regard, make great ruptures in a State. Therefore Tacitus condemns the Politics of Caius Caesar 
(b) Aequatus inter duos beneficiorum numerus, & mixtis utriusque mandatis, discordia quaesita, auctaque pravo certamine, legatorum jus adolevit, diuturnitate officii, vel quia minoribus major mulandi cura. 4. Hist.  that divided the Proconsulship of afric betwixt the Proconsul and the Legate, giving the latter the Legion: for by parting the Office thus betwixt two, without subordination; their charge and points of Commission lying intermingled, and running jointly together, bred and nourished discord and quarrel; and through sinister emulation the Legate Valerius Festus (who had command of the Legion) murdered Piso the Proconsul of afric. So by the reason of that emulous hatred betwixt Vinius and Lucro, (c) Galba knew not what Council to follow, and was ruined.  
Eighthly, 
8. Popularity.  Popular men are to be noted of what Principles they are, and to which of the qualifications of the Factious Persons they are inclined, or how many of Factious Ingredients are in their composition: It is worth the Prince's care (saith a great 
(d) Operae pretium est 〈◊〉 near litium animos e●sque tanquam suspectos notare, qui nimium populariter student: ●i enim facile plebis animos quaquaversum torquent, adrapiunt quodlib ertatis avidi praesentem Rempublicam contemnua●. Lipsius' Polit. Praefat.  Author) to discover the inclinations of his Subjects, especially those who over much affect popularity, for their wheedles easily twine and hurry the common people's minds whither they please, despising the Government out of a greedy desire of liberty.  
If these (being covetous) cannot be set upon some Collections of Taxes and Duties on the Subject, which may be heavy upon them, though laid on by Authority, whereby they may be rendered ingrateful to the people, who often bestow their ill will upon such; or if they cannot be trapped in some escapes of their words or actions, whereby fear of punishment may make them slacken their Sails, lest they be over-set and cannot ride the storm: Or if they be not guilty of some great immorality, which being discovered, may render them less acceptable; it will be necessary that the Prince choose fit Persons to make applications to them, by such as have some Authority over or with them, and can rectify any mischiefs of the intention of the Government, and by dint of reason make such out of love with the Contagion of popular breath, to suck in the vitabler air of the Court, or by rectifying their Judgements, oblige them to manage the multitude in their duty to their Prince, rather than encourage them in the sullen Malecontentedness of their nature. By such means these popular persons might be made as good Instruments as ever they were evil.  
For certainly were the generality of people once brought to a sense, that established Government is infinitely less oppressive to them, than when Faction giving it a disturbance, forceth it to arm for their suppression, at the common People's charge, they would neither lend an Ear to the pragmatical and idle Persons, who never are in their Element but when they are sowing Dissensions, or making Parties, either in their Parishes, (especially in Corporations), or busying themselves with Officers of State, which is another kind of business than their shallow understandings can apprehend. But the itch of appearing some body in the rout, makes them scrub upon every log and post, rather than lose the pleasure of spending that little Salt in their Blood.  
Ninthly, 
9 Cunning men.  The cunning close men are either such who are no great lovers of the Government, yet dare slily nibble at it, or they are the Achitophel's. As to the first, their strength lies in the Art of wheedling, shrugs and insinuation, they being afraid to show their morphewed. Complexion, never put off their Vizard but when they are among their Confidents: which shows how little courage they have, unless in a Crowd, or Tumult, and then they are no longer assured than the whole body is successful. If it come to dispute and hazard, they are the first that fly to their Burrow. They are Moles indeed: But if their walks be once discovered, they are easily catcht, and are so blind they neither know how to avoid the Trap, or their own destruction, and when uncased are the despicablest of Vermin.  
The Achitophel's are presumed to be of quicker sense, and nimbler parts, and have always some private 
(c) Privati pertinacia in publicum exitium. Tacit. 10. Hist.  end that they eagerly pursue, though it be to the ruin of the Public: yet they have a peculiar short sightedness, In that they neither look back on former Precedents of unsuccessful attempts of that nature; nor forward to consider how many contingences may happen, whereby the whole design may be disappointed; or how many and different Engines are to be employed, to rear that new Frame of Government. So that if any few, that have generousness or honesty, scent the design, the whole machine, by the unloosing of some few pins, falls in confusion, and buries in its rubbish the Architects who 
(d) Imperium cupienribus, nihil medium inter summa aut praecipitia. Tacit. 2. Hist.  have no half paces betwixt height and precipice.  
These are presumed to have plotting heads, and all the wiles of the subtlest Foxes, and not to want courage, resolution, and conduct; rarely undertaking such designs, but when there is some general discontent, or pretensions of redressing Grievances. Therefore wise Princes are to subtract the subject matter of their pretences, and to set on work able Counterminers, whom they are in some public manner to disgrace, or disoblige, whereby they may the easilier be admitted into the inmost Councils of the Achitophel's, and by secret Intelligence on the one hand advertise the Prince of the methods, drift and design of those men; and on the other side push things forward to some overt Acts, in which these Miners may be surprised. During which time the Prince is to encourage, strengthen and empower all who are true to his interest; which done, it will be a strange fatality, if he in a little time triumph not over these cunning Intriguers.  
As to I novators in Religion, it is found by long expetience how difficult it is to suppress them. 
Tenthly, Innovators in Religion. A nulla re majus periculum Imperiis & Sceptris, quam ab innovata, & insidiose simulata Religione. lib. de una Religione.  For though it be true what Lipsius saith, That danger to Empires happens from nothing more, than from Religion innovated, or treacherously dissembled; yet neither he nor any Prince could yet find a sufficient means, either to prevent the Ingress, or stop the spreadings of different Modes of Religious worship, and of Doctrines that are judged conducible to a more Pious living, when they are not too chargeable or too difficult to be performed. Therefore most Princes in Europe (whose Subjects are numerous of different Religions) considering the inconvenience of dispeopling their Countries, or endangering Civil Wars, countenance one form of Discipline, that appears to them the best adapted to the constitution of their Secular Government, by capacitating only such as adhere to it, to enjoy Offices and Preferments, and permitting others in a private way to enjoy the liberty of their Opinions, so as they may not be dangerous to the State. Interdicting public Orations upon controverted Points; or when they find danger of Seditions by them, retrenching some of their privileges to keep them in subordination.  
Having thus gone through these ten particulars, I shall say something of Libels and Corporations, and so close this Chapter.  
As to Libels, we find in Tacitus, 
Of Libels.  That Crematius Cordus being accused that he had commended Brutus and Cassius as the last of the Romans; this was thought to reflect upon Tiberius: and in his defence, Cordus 
(f) Ipse divus Julius, ipse divus Augustus & tulere ista, & reliqu●re, haud facile dixerim moderatione magis an sapientia: namque spreta exolescunt, si irascare agnita videntur.  saith, That Livy had commended Pompey, that Messalla Corvinus had spoken honourably of Cassius, that Catullus and Bibaculus' Verses were read, which were stuffed with Calumnies against Julius and Augustus; yet those Emperors suffered them, and left them unpunished, whether with more moderation or wisdom, he would not determine: For such things being slighted, grew stolen and unregarded; but if the Prince be incensed against them, they take fire faster.  
Such Libels therefore as in a slight manner only make ingenious Reflections upon select Persons, 
In the twenty eighth Law of King Alfred, entitled, Be foal leasungum gewyr●tum, Of false Rumours or Lies done or told to the People, the Punishment was, That his Tongue should be cut out, bim mon accors than Tungan of, unless he redeemed it at the price of his Head.  or attack not the Government enviously, and in such a way as the Government is not in danger, may be connived at. But the Authors of malicious witty Libels are principally to be sought after, as the Trumpets and Kettledrums that call together the whole Array against the Government: And if they cannot be dispossessed of that Evil Spirit by gentler means, they are to undergo the severity of the Laws which are made against Incendiaries of a Kingdom, which is of more dangerous consequence than the firing of a Private Man's Habitation.  
The danger from these Libels are the greater, because 
(g) In civitate discordi, & ob crebras Principum mutationes, inter libertatem & licentiam incerta, parvae quoque res magnis motibus agebantur. Tacit. 2. Hist.  in times of Faction, and the often Changes of Government, the People being unfixed, fluctuating betwixt Liberty and Licentiousness, small Matters are transacted with great Emotions.  
As to Corporations, they have all of them been endowed with their Privileges by the Grace and Bounty of the Sovereign, from whence all Immunities and Honours do flow. The first Institution of them was, no doubt, 
Concerning Corporations.  that Justice might be executed in them, for the better governing their numerous Inhabitants; that they might be the Places of Traffic, where the adjacent Country might be supplied, and their Neighbours might vend their Growth and Manufacture. And thus being enriched by Commerce, separated from their Country-Neighbours by Honours, Offices, and Liberties; something a Gentiler Education might be expected there, whereby they might be Patterns to their adjoining Neighbours of good and virtuous Deportment, being exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Justices of Peace, and attendance upon Assizes, whereby Legal Matters, in order to the necessary Administration of Justice, are executed in their Precincts, by their own Members; and many of them (besides the Privileges to be found at large in the Statutes and Law-Books) have power to choose as many to represent them in Parliament, as the whole County hath. It would fill a large Volume, to recount the particular Powers and Freedoms have been granted to them by the Royal Favour of the successive Kings of England, whereby they are erected into little Commonwealths.  
Therefore there is good reason, as they may do much good or harm, and they have all the enriching Streams and Conduits from the Sovereign Spring and Fountain; so they should have a strict dependence upon the Sovereign, that they may not employ those great Privileges against the Laws and Government; nor the rich pragmatical Magistrates, Citizens, and Freemen, animate Factions and Seditions against it; or presume to obtrude their impertinent Advices upon their Sovereign, or by their clamorous Petitions for Redress of pretended Grievances, and Maladministration, or by their Election of Factious Representatives, dispose of the Fate of the Empire, as they did in 1641. by their general Combinations with the then Parliament, which they so effectually assisted in their Rebellion.  
It is too manifest how little Justice the two last Kings could have in the great Metropolis, the King's Imperial Chamber, or in other Corporations, although they had all, less or more, received great Instances of their Royal Favours and Graces. And tho' the great City, by the late King of Immortal Memory's Royal Munificence, and Princely Care, as much as in him lay, by Act of Parliament, and his own particular Bounty, (after it was so fatally reduced to Ashes) was raised into one entire Palace, so beautiful and splendid, as all People must acknowledge it the Eighth Wonder; yet the grateful Returns were unproportionable.  
This great City enjoyed as ample and beneficial Privileges as any could wish for; and though it be deprived of some of them, yet, by the Munificence of our late and present Sovereign, it enjoys what is needful for its well governing in subordination to the Public.  
Since therefore the Corporations, mostly, were found to have made ill Returns to their Sovereigns, for all their special Graces; by a most wise Council it hath been judged fit to inquire by what Warrant they enjoyed those Privileges, and to recall those Charters, that new ones might be granted, mostly with Additions of Privileges; only that the Magistrates (if they should abuse their Authority) might be displaced at the King's Pleasure: A most necessary Resumption of Power, whereby they might not be in a capacity for the future to give any Disturbance to the Government.  
Elsewhere I have given short Hints of the Practice of former Kings, in vacating the Charters of the great City, and shall only add what I find in the most Judicious Historian was done in a like Case, by the Senate of Rome, in Tiberius his Reign.  
The Licence 
(h) Crebrescebat enim Graecas per urbes licentia atque impunitas asyla statuendi; complebantur ●●mpla pessimis servitia●um, eodem subsidio obaera●i adversus creditores, suspectique capitalium criminum receptabantur: nec ullum satis validum Imperium erat coercendis seditionibus populi; flagitia hominum, ut Caeremonias Deum prot●entes. Igitur placitum ut mitterent civitates Jura, atque Legavos, etc. Magnaque ejus diei species fuit, quo Senatus majorum beneficia, sociorum p●cta, Regum etiam qui ante vim Romanam valuerant, decreta: Ipsorum numinum Religiones introspexit libero ut quondam, quod firmaret mutare●ve, Tacit. 3. Annal.  and Impunities of ordaining Sanctuaries and Privileged Places increased, saith my Author, throughout the Cities of Greece; the Temples were filled with most lewd Bondslaves; in the same were received Debtors against their Creditors, and Men guilty of Capital Crimes were protected; neither was there any powerful Authority able to bridle the Sedition of the People: Villainies were protected no less than the Ceremonies of the Gods. Therefore it was appointed, That the Cities should send their Agents with their Laws. Some, by way of Resignation of their Charters, freely remitted those things they had falsely usurped; many did confide in the Antiquity of their Superstitions, and their Deserts to the People of Rome. The Pomp of that Day (saith the Historian) was great in show: In which the Senate (for Tiberius had left the Senate a Shadow of their ancient Estate, by sending the Requests of the Provinces to be examined by them) considered of the Privileges granted by their Predecessors, the Agreements with their Confederates, the Decrees of the Kings, before the Countries became subject to the Romans, and the Religion of the Gods themselves, to confirm or alter all.  
By which it may appear, to be no new thing, for Sovereigns to inquire into the Privileges of Cities, tho' claimed by Divine Original, as many of those were, from their Gods, or by the Bounties of Princes.  
As to Conventicles, the Nurseries of Seditions, since the Laws are obvious by which they may be suppressed, and that in another Chapter I have treated of them, I shall take no further notice of them here; being as unwilling that truly conscientious misled People (that endanger not the Government) should be severely punished, as I hearty wish they would give no Disturbance to it.   

CHAP. XLVI. The Preservatives against Faction and Sedition.  
THE general Annulets, Preservatives, and Antidotes against the Poison and Infection of Faction and Sedition, are a Prince's innate Virtue, his Prudence, Justice, Providence, Political Capacity, Wealth, Militia, Fortunateness, Fame, and the harmony betwixt him and his Great Councils of which, in order.  
As to a Prince's Genuine Virtues, 
A Prince's Virtue.  they are many, and where they meet in a Constellation, they outshine the Jewels of the Crown. The Majesty and Awfulness of these, commands sometimes where Armies cannot; they win upon all. Nothing 
(a) Nihil virtute amabilior, quam qui adeptus est, ubicunque erit gentium a nobis diligetur. Cicero l. 1. de Natura Deorum.  is more amiable, nothing more universally loved and honoured than Virtue: even the same of it when the Person is unknown, gains an applause; how much more must it be revered in a Crowned head.  
Laws do not preserve all things (saith 
(b) Stobaeus, Serm. 1.  Antisthenes') but the Rule of Virtue teacheth every where what is honest, and unbecoming. So Epictetus compares a Soul, throughly imbued with Virtue, to a Spring of Water, which is always pure, sweet, plentiful, and endued with no evil quality. Therefore 
(c) Plutarc. in Lacon.  Charilaeus being asked, Which was the best Common-weal; answered, That wherein many Citizens strive who shall excel in Virtue without Sedition.  
As in the Opal the colour of several precious Stones are found, the smaller Fire of the Carbuncle, the shining Purple of the Amethyst, the green Sea of the Smaragd: so in a truly Virtuous Prince, all the Sunbeams of Light, Warmth, Beauty, and Celestial Influence, for his People's cherishing, comfort, Glory and Prosperity, are contained.  
So the 
(d) Intaminatis fulget honoribus; Nec sumit nec ponit secures, Arbitrio popularis aurae. Horat. Carm. Lib. 5. Od. 2.  Poet tells us, That it shines with unsullied Honours, neither assuming, or laying down the Ensigns of Sovereignty, at the suffrage of the Populace, having a firmer Basis than the Fleeting Bubbles of their Breath.  
Pliny 
(e) Discimus experimento sidissimam esse custodiam Prineipis ipsius innocentiam. Panaegyr.  tells Trajan, That we learn by experience, That a Prince's own Innocence is his faithfullest Guard. By this word I understand, not only his gentleness in not oppressing his Subjects, but the whole complex of Virtue, whereby he is guilty of no enormous Vices, but hath the Sovereignty over his own passions, as well as over his Subjects.  
As to a Prince's Prudence, 
A Prince's Prudence.  I have elsewhere spoken at large, and shall now add upon so copious a Subject, some glean out of good Authors.  
In these things, saith 
(f) Praeterita cogita, praesentia ordina, futura provide. Senec. de Benefices.  Seneca, Prudence is best discovered, when bypast times are collated, by observing the Annals, and Histories of former Ages, by ordering present Affairs, according to the best Reason, and providently forecasting future effects of present Counsels. 
Tanquam oculus mentis undiquaque lucidissimus.  So a Prince will know how former Seditions have sprung, and what hath been the cure of them, how parallel the present are to bypast, and how for the future to provide, That the Roots and Fangs of them be digged up: for foregon 
(g) Facta praeterita, certa documenta dant futuris.  deeds give certain instructions for the future; former miscarriages teach such a Prince sufficient caution.  
Other Virtuous Qualifications may be common to the Sovereign, and Subject; but Prudence is his peculiar Province: therefore 
(h) Stobaeus de Prudentia.  Jamblichus calleth this, The very Prince of Virtues. So when 
(i) Plut. in Lacon.  Archidamus was commended, that he had overcome the Arcadians in Battle; he answered, That it had been much better if he had overcome them by Prudence. So Antisthenes 
(k) Tutissimum murum esse prudentiam, nec collabitur, nec proditur. Machinis aut suffossionibus, aut vallorum proditione capiuntur; prudentis autem decreta sunt inexpugnabilia. Laert. lib. 6. c. 1.  saith, Prudence is the safest Wall; it neither falls down, or is betrayed: all Walls, Bulwarks, or other defences by Batteries, Mines, or Treacheries, may be taken; but the determination of a Prudent Prince is inexpugnable. The Counsels and Actions of a Prince, endowed with this Virtue, are never like to have the misfortune of those 
(l) Vtque evenit in consiliis infoelicibus, optima viderentur quorum tempus essugerit. Tacitus 1. Hist. A Prince's Justice.  which are never known to be best, till they have passed the season of being put in execution.  
Justice in a Prince's Government, and Faith in the Sacred observance of their Royal Words, are not to be reckoned among the lesser Stars, but are the two great Luminaries, without 
(m) Remota Justitia, quid sunt Regna, nisi magna latrocinia? Aug. 4. de Civ. Dei.  which, there would be nothing but Gloominess, Tempests and Showers: yet, though Justice be that Sun, Faith is not to be reputed that Moon, that is changeable as to us, by the interposition of the Earth, but as it is in itself always enlightened by the Sun.  
Faith is the companion of Justice, and that 
(n) Justitiae consors, tacitumque in pectore Numen. Silius Ital.  secret Divinity lodging in a Prince's Breast, which must needs be reverenced of all: Acts of State, and Power, may alter according to emergencies; but a Prince, that makes the Just Laws, and his Promises the Standard of his Actions, is surely possessed with that Divine 
(o) Sanctissimum humani generis bonum. Senec. Epist.  Wisdom which every where is reputed Sacred: for his Subjects have thereby as sure a foundation to rely upon, as his Laws; for they may be misinterpreted by corrupt Judges, but nothing can vitiate, corrupt, or extinguish that vestal Fire which burns in the Breast of a Prince, who is the Defender of his Laws and his Faith.  
Therefore Cato Censor tells us, That the Romans placed Faith next to Jupiter in the Capitol; for that they both are the defenders of Mankind, nothing so efficaciously preserving Government in its force, stability, and titeness, as Justice and Faith.  
As to a Prince's Providence, it is a sure Rampire; 
A Prince's Providence.  for who will rebel against him, whom they judge to do all things circumspectly, and with cunctation? The opinion conceived of such a Prince, 
(p) In animos hominum illabitur admirationis praetextu velata. Valer. lib. 2. c. 1.  slides into the Souls of Men, shaded with admiration, and the Subjects soon fall from suspecting to admiring his Conduct: for such a Prince is in his own nature wary, and better pleased with cautelous 
(q) Cunctator natura, & cui cauta consilia cum ratione, quam foelicia ex casu placent.  Counsel with reason, than happy ones by chance, as the great Historian observes.  
A Provident Prince passeth vigorously, from the beginning of his Affairs, to the end; and disposeth all things with easy order (having by his forecast removed all difficulties by a fore-plotted Chartley, and fore-ordained Chain of Causes) that certainly will produce their effect. Nothing 
(r) Sapientis nihil esse vovum, aut subitum, ut nunquam dicat non putaram. Laertius, lib. 6. c. 1.  can happen to him new or sudden, or that he is not provided for; so that he is free from the imperfection of those that being surprised, have no excuse, but that they had not thought.  
Seneca saith, Nothing living is so morose as man, none to be treated with greater Arts: and Xenophon 
(s) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Cyropaed. lib. 1.  tells us, It is easier to command all Creatures else, than man: Therefore prudent and provident circumspection is more necessary for Princes, than for all conditions of men besides.  
This it is that makes them confident, and boldly to undertake any Action, when the design is plotted out before, and all Circumstances measured by Scale and Ballance. For as Thucydides 
(t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 1.  observes, When with a negligent confidence any matter is proposed, in the performance it totters of fails.  
Therefore Herodotus 
(u) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. A Prince's Political Capacity.  rightly describes a provident Person, That he is upon that account, the best, if in deliberating he prolong time, and be fearful of what may happen; but in Action be confident.  
As to a Prince's Political Capacity, it is a Theme too bulky for this Treatise: it consists of all the Wisdom, Forecast, Circumspection, Adroitness and Dexterity a Prince can use: not only to obtain a repute of Wisdom, but also to govern his People in difficult times, with such Art, as they may feel they are brought into a state of Tranquillity, when they were wholly despairing of arriving at it. Every ordinary Pilot can steer the Ship in an open Sea, and fresh Gale; it is Tempests, Quicksands, and Rocks that require Skill. King James the First called it Kingcraft. It is indeed the Royalest of all Arts, and they are the happiest Princes, who, with a good Conscience, can best use it: All the observations through this whole Treatise, are but an illustration of this Political Skill; which, though collected by a weak Judgement, yet being the observations of Wise and Learned Men, may I hope not want their use.  
In those dextrous Hits, his late Majesty of Glorious Memory, was very fortunate in the Transactions with some of his Parliaments, and stemming those Troubles, too many endeavoured to involve his Reign with. In which none doubts but his present Majesty, (who was particeps Curarum) had a great Stroke: when every Period in those turbulent times were so ordered, that a Civil War was prevented; so that we now reap the Benefit of them in enjoying a Blessed Calm (which we hope and pray for, it may continue) after so threatening a Storm.  
Another primary Prevention of Sedition is for a Prince to be Wealthy. 
A Prince's Wealth.  Riches 
(w) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Co●icus Vetus.  are not unelegantly called the Life and Blood of Mortals. when a private Man is possessed of them, we observe how many he obligeth, what Respect is paid him, how easily he accomplisheth any thing he undertakes ● How much more therefore must it be advantageous to a Prince, Obedience is not more generally paid to Shrines than to rich Coffers— Te columus Regina pecunia. Thousands of Hands are set on Work, thousands of contriving Heads consult the best for the Prince's affairs, Millions of Weapons are fitted for his use who hath a full Exchequer: Fleets are equipped, 
(x) Quisquis h●bet nummos secura navigat aura, Fortunamque suo temperat arbitrio. Petronius.  and scour the Ocean, defending a Prince's Territories, and carrying his Victorious Ensigns into remotest Lands, when their Admiral is ballasted with Silver. When all Engines of Battery fail, the strongest City may be reduced by an Ass laden with Gold.  
The 
(y) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 2. Polit. c. 7.  Philosopher tells us, It is not only necessary to have Wealth, according to Phaleus' Constitution, suitable to the Extent of the Command; but also for the Uses abroad, to defend the Country against the next Neighbours and Strangers.  
Above all other means to prevent and suppress Sedition, 
The necessity of a Standing Force.  the keeping up a sufficient Force, is the securest, and most efficacious means; for thereby the Person, and the Government of the Prince, are surely defended. Therefore Dio 
(z) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Li. 42.  Cassius saith, There are two things that maintain, keep, and increase any Government, viz. Military Force and Riches.  
So 
(a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Polit. lib. 2. c. 7.  Aristotle tells us, That all forms of Government are so to be ordered, that they may have sufficient Warlike Force. Therefore the keeping in good Discipline a competent Force, and having good Guards, are most necessary for a Prince. So that I think it was but a part of Tiberius' Art of Dissimulation, when Togonius moved, That so often as he came into the Senate, twenty Senators armed, should be appointed for his Guard; and he made reply, 
(b) Neque sibi vitam tauti ut armis tegenda fo●e●. 6. Annal.  That his Life was not of that worth, that it should be sheltered or defended with Arms.  
Sloth never preserves 
(c) Non ignavia magna Imperia contineri, sed virorum armorumque faciendum certamen. Si foris bostem non habet, domi inveniet.  great Empires, but Arms, and Men of Valour; for it is a certain Rule, That in all Countries, where Enemies are wanting abroad, Peace, Riches, and the Factions that they produce, without a Competent Militia, will endanger Civil Wars at home. Therefore a Prince must always keep subsidiary Forces, to prevent such Mischiefs; for at one time or other, Seditious Men will be troubling the State, and such times may happen, 
(d) Is habirus animorum suit, ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur. 1. Histor.  as Tacitus describes in Otho's Insurrection against Galba, That such was the disposition of their Minds, that some few durst commit the greatest Wickedness, more willed it, and the most, or all, did quietly suffer it: whereas by the readiness of standing Forces, the Prince may top the Poppy Heads, and overpower Insurrections at their first Peeping; and so terrify all the rest, that they may keep their Huts and Cabins.  
There is more need for a Prince to have a well disciplined, competent Force, for that new raised Men are not to be relied upon. Besides 
(e) Tumultuari●e. Belgarum Cobortes, Paganorum lixarumque ignava sed procax ante periculum manus. Subito delectu supplet● Legiones augebantur. 4. Hist.  many other Proofs of this, we may find one memorable instance in Tacitus, who tells us, That Herennius having in his Camp, certain tumultuary cohorts of the Belgians, and a great number of Peasants, and followers of the Camp, (brave Men, saith he, before the danger appears, but in danger pitiful Cowards) as soon as Julius' Civilis' Army could advance, they were soon defeated: and he ascribes the cause of it to the hasty choice of Men to supply the Legions.  
Such new 
(f) Ignavissimus quisque & in periculo minimum ausurus, nimii verbis, linguae feroces. Id. 1. Histor.  Men make a glittering show at a Muster, and will brag more than any, of their Courage; but they will sooner unsheathe their Tongues than their Swords: the Slothfullest, and those that dare do least with their Hands, being forwardest to boast of their Exploits.  

(g) Pro Muraena.  Cicero comparing the Soldiery, and the Gownmen, gives Preference to the Military Sagum. For he saith, All the Lawyer's Study, Industry, and Commendation of Pleading, is owing to the safeguard of Warlike Virtue; the one consults for, and defends his Client; the other is exercised in the defence of the City, and propagating the Limits of the Empire: and the arts of the long Robe are silenced upon the very suspicion of Tumults.  
Vegetius 
(h) Nihil neque sirmius, neque felicius, neque laudabilius est Republica in qua abundant milites. Plurimum enim terroris armorum splendor importat. 2. de Re Milit.  tells us, That nothing is more firm, more happy, or more commendable, than that Commonwealth which abounds with Soldiers; the brightness of their Arms, striking Terror into their Enemies: whereas their rustiness tempts them to be assaulted, as being unprepared, and unprovided.  
A standing Force (proportionable to the occasion, and no greater) is as a Nursery to educate the growing Youth in Feats of Arms, to inure them to Labour, Watchfulness, Discipline and Courage; for few Princes live their whole time, without some occasion of War, either at home, or abroad.  
In this Kingdom the standing Force is not so great, as to be oppressive, or formidable to the People, and the Militia, being a Portion of the People themselves, armed by the King's Authority, can never be repined at, by such as are Lovers of their King and Country's Safety. To have them kept in good Discipline, by training twice a Year, more earefully and industriously, would be for the safety and ornament of the Government.  
Only it is requisite that great Care be taken, that the Soldiery be not only skilfully trained, but be tightly 
(i) St. Alban 's Essays.  obedient to their Prince, and the Officers be well assured, and of good repute, not in the least inclinable to Faction, and Sedition, holding also good Correspondence with other great Men in the State; for the most excellent Historian saith, The 
(k) Fluxa militum sides & periculum a singulis.  Faith of Soldiers is unstable, and there wants not danger from them single, much more if they should make any formidable Conjunction.  
There are infinite Examples how the standing Armies have altered the Government, as in the Roman Empire was most usual, the Armies setting up one or other, mostly after Nero's death; so that we find scarce a Succession of three in many Ages.  
As to a Prince's fortunateness, 
A Prince's Fortunateness.  it is an happy thing, and much for his Security, that his Subjects have an Opinion of it, or, as we ought to speak, that he is the care of Heaven, and that Divine Providence is his Tutelar. Therefore the great Orator 
(l) Ad amplitudinem & gloriam & ad res magnas gerendas divinitus adjuncta fortuna— dormientibus dii omnia consiciunt, & in sinum iis de coelo victoria devolat. Pro Leg. Manl. Sed ●e— Nos facimus fortuna deam, coeloque locamus.  saith, That to greatness and Glory, and the achieving great things, Fortune divinely sent, is to be joined; that even to them sleeping and waking, the Deity is Beneficial, and Victory from Heaven descends into their Lap.  

(m) Plut. de Fortuna Rom.  Ancus Martius first built a Temple to Fortune, in a man's habit, and Tullus the King ascribed all his actions to the guidance of Fortune. So Pliny 
(n) Lib. 36. c. 5.  tells us, The Image of good Fortune, made by Praxitiles, was kept in the Capitol. By all which we may note, how advantageous they thought good luck or fortune to be for the preservation of the Government; and lest it should forsake them (according to the opinion of that Age, that the Deities lodged in the Statues, as the Souls in the Bodies) they chained the Image, that it might not remove from them.  
That is only reputed good Fortune among the common sort, when Princes 
(o) Prosperis tuis rebus certaturi ad obsequium; Fortunam advers●m omnes ex aequo detrect abunt. Tacit. 2. Histor. Lib. 1. Od. 35.  affairs succeed well and according to their wishes; and when they are so, all strive to show obedience: and when adverse fortune or evil things happen, all do semblably withdraw their Service from their Prince.  
It is of this, Horace so elegantly writes, under the name of Fortune: 
Te Dacus asper, ●e profugi Scythae,  
Urbesque & gentes, & Latium ferox  
Regumque matres Barbarorum, &  
Purpurei metuunt Tyranni.   
To this fortunateness, as near akin, 
Of a Prince's Fame.  I subjoin the fame and good reputation of a Prince; It fans away the Pestilential air of Factions and Seditions; keeps young even the old age of Princes. So Tacitus 
(p) Magis sama quam vi stare res suas. 6. Annal.  saith of Tiberius when he grew old, and was retired to Capraea, to indulge himself, and had contracted much hatred, His affairs rather subsisted by fame than other force; which, if it were true of such a Prince, how much more may it be advantageous to one that hath acquired a good fame upon the constant practices of laudable and Princely Actions?  
Therefore the same great 
(q) Caeteris mortalium in eo stare consilia quid sibi conducere arbitrentur: Principum diversam esse sortem, quibus, praecipu● rerum ad famam dirigenda. 4. Annal.  Historian saith, That the Counsels of other Mortals consists, in doing what they may judge conducible to their private Affairs; but the lot of Princes is different: for they must direct their principal actions to attain fame, which must necessarily be that which is commendable and of value.  
Yet there lies some difficulty in the make of the speaking Trumpet of a Prince's fame; for sometimes it must be fitted to vulgar conception; for they mostly misinterpret it, as 
(r) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Lib. 3.  Thucydides well notes, That modesty with them, carries a show of Idleness or Cowardice, the circumspect and provident is reputed slothful, and whatever is suddenly undertaken and hasty, is counted vigorous and manly. Therefore a Prince that expects a good fame and report, must sometimes anticipate expectation in his proceed, and by surprise gain a repute of great sagacity, and in some seasons and actions accommodate himself to the inclinations of his People, and gratify them in their desires. So Queen Elizabeth got more money by remitting one Subsidy (thereby gaining the opinion that she would exact no more than was absolutely necessary) than many Princes have got by downright representing the necessities of Supplies.  
Lastly, One of the greatest preservatives against Faction and Sedition, is when there is a blessed Harmony betwixt the Prince and his great Councils; which when it happeneth otherwise, requires great prudence in both: On the Prince's part, so to propose his demands, as the Equity, Convenience and Justice of them may be understood; and when he finds they are unrelished, and heats are like to arise, either to bring some new matter upon the Stage, that the former proposal may insensibly be forgot; or by some while intermission of such great Councils, give respite to his own and their second thoughts: and on the great Convention's part, to entertain a reverend opinion of their Prince's Judgement, and with real assurances of their Loyalty, humbly and dutifully offer their grave Counsels without exasperation; so that the Prince may demonstratively know, that they have no other ends in the noncompliance, but the common good of Prince and People.   

CHAP. XLVII. Of Conspiracies and Treasons.  
I Have hitherto treated of Faction and Sedition, both as they tend to the disquiet of the Government in general, and as they may influence the Court only, or particular persons, and so we may consider them marshaled and distinguished, Faction to be the siding of Parties, Sedition the drawing them into Tumults; and now I come to Conspiracies and Treason, or Rebellion, as Overtacts. The first two are the Root and Plant, the latter the prickly heads, and Seeds of those Thistles.  
Conspiracy differs from Rebellion, because the one may be managed by a few, and primarily aims at the Assassinating the Prince, and secondarily at the overthrow of the Government; whereas the other arms Multitudes against him in hopes to worst him in open Battle.  
Uncovered Hostilities, saith 
(a) A●ma aperta palam vites; fraus, & dolus occulta, eaque in●vitabilia. 2. Hist.  Tacitus, may be openly avoided, but Deceit and Treachery are hidden, shrouded Arms, and by so much the more inevitable. It is not so difficult for a strong well prepared man to master his open Adversary, as it is for a valiant and vigilant man to avoid hidden dangers: The Snake may lie in the Grass he treads on, the Scorpion may sting him to death in his Bed; a Felton or Raviliack lodge a Knife in his Bosom, when he 
(b) Multa pericula neque evitare, neque 〈◊〉 in promptu est. Sallust. ad Caesarem.  neither suspects, nor fears, or can avoid it; of which, the great Caesar is a most eminent Example.  
The condition of Princes, that have Seditious Subjects, is the more hazardous, when guarded, as they think, by their own Innocence, they are too confident of their own Safety. When as 
(c) Quibu● de conju●●tione comperta non creditur, nisi occisis. Lib. 40.  Livy saith, the Conspiracy in part detected, is not believed till perpetrated. A single Arm, or a few Br●t●, who value not their own lives (as Seneca 
(d) Contempsit omnes ille, qui mortem prius. Octau.  elegantly) may be Lord, or Butcher of another's.  
The danger is so much the greater when the Conspirators are many, provided they be equally resolute. 
Quisquis vitam suam contempsit, tui dominus. Epist. 4.  They have many 
(e) Multae illis manus, tibi una cervix.  Hands, and the Prince but one Life to lose; even in the Lifeguard, and among the Halberdiers Conspirators may be listed, if the Officers be not most circumspect to know the Inclinations and Tempers, as well as Faces of the Soldiers.  
The Life of the Prince is so valuable a Blessing, that no care, foresight, and circumspection, can be too much to preserve it; for by such a death, 
(f) Magni fortunam populi in ruinas agate.  the happiest fortune of a great People may be brought into instant ruin.  
Against these kind of Conspirators, the Clemency, Heroic Virtue, obligingest Temper or Piety of a Prince are scarce sufficient Mail. Therefore when such have Factious and Seditious Subjects, it ought to be their special care, and of all their Ministers of State, and all their Subjects, to double and triple their diligence, and use all their probablest means, to prevent, and foreslow it; and generally such rational 
(g) Omnia summa ratione gest●●etiam fortuna sequitur.  diligent caution will have a prosperous event.  
It may be useful to Princes to conceal the first Intelligence of Conspiracies, till more fully discovered; according to that of 
(h) Solum sape insidiarum remedium esse, si non intelligantur. 1. Annal.  Tacitus, That the only remedy against Treachery, often is, That they are not understood: by which, I suppose, he means not only pure ignorance of them, but that they mis-ken, and conceal their knowledge of them. Yet in the interim, it is requisite to have trusty Spies, securely mingled in all suspicious Companies, that as the 
(i) Conari ne te lateat quid quisque subditorum f●cit. 5. Polit. c. 11.  Philosopher saith, It be not concealed from them, whatever his Subjects (especially the Malcontents) say or do. This Cromwell made one of his Masterpieces, 
Fas est ab hoste doceri.  and by it prevented many generous designs against his Person and Usurpation.  
Sallust observes, That of all mischiefs to a Commonwealth, that of Conspiracy is the worst; therefore such 
(k) Impia proditio celeri poena vindicanda est. Valer. Lib. 3. c. 6.  impious and barbarous Treacheries are to be punished with a swift Hand, and Unrelenting Heart; as also with the severest tortures: 
Insidiatori, & latroni, quae potest inferri injusta nex?  for as the Orator saith, No kind of death can be unjust to a Traitor, and a Thief.  
However in the first place, it is convenient, not only that the Prince be secured, but that all the suspected be in arcta & salva custodia, in close and safe custody, before a Prince proceeds to Regular Justice, according to that of the excellent 
(l) Securitati consules antequam vindictae. 12. Annal.  Tacitus, To consult Security before Revenge.  
In detecting Conspirators, and exposing them to the hatred of the People, great future security comes to a Prince; therefore strict examination, bolting out the Truth, undeniable Testimony, and a fair open Trial, render the Conspirators more odious, and the Prince's Justice more conspicuous, as well as his future security more permanent. Otherwise a Prince may b●●alumniated 
(m) Crebro vulgi rumore laceraberis, tanquam viros intontes, ob invidiam aut metum, extinxeris. 15. Annal.  That he destroyed the innocent for envy or fear. However it may be rationally presumed, that whoever clandestinely whispers such things against a Prince, may either be reputed a confederate, or wisher of success to such a Conspiracy.  
It is to be considered, that it is natural to the Common People, to have a Commiseration of those when they suffer, whom they have pursued with the direst imprecations to the Scaffold. It is the custom of the vulgar, changeable on sudden occasions, to be as prone to pity as they were immeasurable in Cruelty, as the excellent 
(n) Est mos vulgo mutabili, subita, & tam prono in misericordiam quam immodicum saevitia fuerit● 1. Hist.  Historian observes in Cossus' appeasing the Soldiers, who were enraged against the Helvetians.  
It were indeed much better (if the safety of the Government would suffer it) to heal the vicious 
(o) Melius sanare vitiosas parts, quam exsecare. 2. ad Attic. Ep. 5.  parts, rather than cut them off; but it's a most certain Rule of the same 
(p) Omnis animadversio, non ad ejus qui punit aliquem, sed ad Reipublicae utilitatem referenda. 2. de Offic.  Orator, That the sentencing of Criminals, should not relate to him that punisheth, but to the profit of the Commonweal; that is, not to be so ordered, as the Prince should be judged to consult only his own Revenge or safety, but the Peace, Tranquillity, and Prosperity of his People.  
Therefore the excellent 
(q) Non tam ut ipsi percant, quam ut alios a pereundo deterreant. 1. de Ira.  Seneca saith, It becomes not Princes to chastise only, that the guilty may perish, but that others may be affrighted from perishing. For it is a ferina rabbiss, saith he, to rejoice in Blood and Wounds. Hence all good Princes unwillingly, and with great torment to themselves, inflict Capital Punishments; nor is execution in most cases performed while the Prince's Wrath, and Rage, (how just soever) is upon him; because that Mediocrity than cannot be observed, which ought to be, betwixt much and little; therefore all Punishments are most kindly that are more patrio, lest that Sarcasm of 
(r) Qui puniendi causam habent, modum non habent. 2. de Clem.  Seneca be verified, Though the cause of punishment be great, yet a Mean or Measure is not observed.  
So Tacitus instructs us, That though it be against the guilty, and such as deserve to be extreme examples; yet a Prince should have mercy, not so much for the profit of the Republic, but that multitudes should not be consumed, for the cruelty of one, as the People in an overglutting revenge will be apt to censure.  
Therefore caution should be used, that the punishment be not overspreading, as to Heads of many Families, lest if they be illustrious, and of great Interest, the Prince attract more Enemies, and as the Latin Philosopher 
(s) Parents liberique eorum qui interfecti sunt, & prepinqui, & ami●i in locum singulorum succedunt. 2. de Clementia.  saith, The Parents, Children, Kinsmen, and Friends of the slain succeed in their places, to meditate revenge, if there be any hopes of success by it. Such an Hydra especially is despairing Rebellion. Yea, though in China, Japan, and other of the Eastern Countries, whole Families are commonly extirpated for the crime of one, yet not Civilised Nations imitate it, no not when Rebellion proves most formidable.  
If an illustrious Person be in Conspiracy, to whom a Prince and his Subjects have been obliged (if it may safely be done) the punishment may be 
(t) Poenam, si tuto poteris, donabis; sin m●nus, temp. rabis. 〈…〉 Clem.  attempered, if the Crime cannot be pardoned. So Livia told Augustus, That the Criminal being secured, cannot hurt, but in his Pardon the Prince might augment his Fame: as King James the First did to the Lord Colha●, and his Companions, when he concealed the discovery of their Pardon, till the Prisoners were upon the Scaffold, and expected nothing but the last stroke of the terrible Axe.  
As Physicians in Blood-letting and purging (if in so great a Theme so low an example may be used) with the bad humours, must necessarily evacuate some of the good: So in Conspiracies and Rebellions, some may not be so maliciously inclined in their own natures, but by their popular 
(u) Facile studia vulgi ad se trabunt, vel inviti.  temper, or easiness to be seduced, be caressed to be partakers in some pretended reformations, the black Arts and Designs being hid from them, and so be made properties. If therefore the Prince can be secured, that either, in their own natures, they are not prone to Rebellion, or while they are alive, they can never expect to head parties again; Banishment may be sufficient punishment for them.  
So when, in Nero's 
(w)  consuleret sibi, & turbis, seque prave defam●tibus subtraberet. Esse illi per Asiam agros, in quibus & tuta & inturbida juventa frueretur. Tacit. 14. Annal.  time, upon the appearing of a Comet, it was bruited that it portended the change of a King, and Rebellious Plautus was celebrated as the Person: Nero writ Letters to Plautus, That he should consult his own good, and withdraw himself from the Rabbles defaming of him to his prejudice; and having Possessions in Asia, he might enjoy his blooming Years, undisturbed, and in safety. Which was most humanly done, for by that he spared Plautus, and yet provided for the quiet of the Commonwealth.  
But as the merciful temper of a Prince in some cases is most Christian and Prudent; so in others, too much Clemency may encourage Sedition; and consequently Treason. For as the Orator 
(x) Maxima illecebra peccandi impunitatis spes. Pro Milone.  saith, The hopes of escaping punishment is the greatest allurement to do evil, a wicked Subject fearing that Prince 
(y) Apud quem conditum, imo constrictum est ferrum. Seneca.  little, who wears a Padlock on his Sword.  
There are few that eschew evil for the Turpitude of it, but for the fear of punishment: therefore in such dangerous matters as Conspiracies, and Rebellion, the edge of the Prince's Sword is always to be sharp: and the Council of Tiberius 
(z) Corruptus simul, & corruptor, aeger & flagrans animus, haud lenioribus remediis restinguendus est, quam libidinibus ardescit. 3. Annal.  in his Epistle to the Senate is to be followed, That the corrupt, and the corruptor, the sick and burning Soul, is scarce to be quenched with milder remedies, than such as bear proportion to the lusts it burns with, of what kind soever it be.  
The punishment of a few wicked Persons restrains the malevolent effects of many, as Cicero 
(a) Vnius improbi supplicio, muliorum improbitates coercere. 3. in Verrem.  notes: Nor, saith 
(b) Neque aliud gliscentis discordiae remedium, quam si unus alterve, maxim prompti, subverterentur. Tacit. 4. Annal.  Tacitus, is there any other remedy of glowing Discord, than that one or other of the most forward be o'erwhelmed, and exemplary Justice be executed upon them. Though the Gangreen begin but in in a Toe or Finger; yet it may require Amputation, lest a Leg or an Arm be in danger: so the skilful Gardener prunes his cankered Branches more speedily than the luxuriant.  
By punishing the Advisers, Fomenters, and Actors of horrid things (as purging Sacrifice 
(c) Rerum atro●ium ministros, veluti placulares publici odii.  of public Hatred) atonement is made to public Justice, and the less crimmal have the greater Obligations to dutiful Repentance; for the Punishment of such Ringleaders and Coryphaei, is not so much the revenge of the Prince as of the Commonwealth. Otherwise the Prince by 
(d) Ne sanguinem nostram largeas, dum P●aucis sceleratis parcis, bonos omnes proditum eas. Sallust. in Catilinam.  sparing a few Wretches, will be Prodigal of his better Subjects Blood, which those Criminals would, as soon as they had obtained Power, more profusely shed.  
Therefore it becomes all good Subjects to bestir themselves for the safety of the Prince, to hasten, saith 
(e) Tanquam ad clarum & beneficum sidus certatim advolare, objicere pro illo mucronibus insidiatorum p●ratiss●mi. De Clem. lib. 1. c. 3.  Seneca, to his Standard, esteeming him as a luminous and beneficial Constellation, and most ready for his safety, to expose themselves betwixt the Traitors unsheathed Swords, and his Royal Person.  
I cannot more emphatically express the clemency of our Princes, and their Laws against Treason, or better discover the Limits and Bounds of Punishments, and the desire that our Princes have had, That none should fall under the guilt of Treason, than by reciting the Preambles to the Statutes, made in King Edward the Sixth's, and Queen mary time, concerning Treasons.  
The words of the Statute of King Edward 
(f) 10 Ed. 6. c. 12.  the Sixth, are, Nothing being more Godly, more sure, move to be wished and desired, betwixt a Prince, the Supreme Head and Ruler; and the Subjects whose Governor and Head he is, than on the Prince's Part great Clemency and Indulgence, and rather too much forgiveness, and remissness of his Royal Power, and just Punishment, than exact Severity and Justice to be showed: and on the Subjects part, That they should obey rather for love, than for fear of his straight and severe Laws: yet such Events sometimes happen in the Commonwealth, that it is necessary and expedient, for the repressing of the Insolence and unruliness of Men, and foreseeing, and providing Remedies against Rebellion, Insurrection, or such mischiefs, that sharper Laws, and an harder Bridle should be made, to stay those Men, that might else be occasion, cause, and Authors of farther Inconvenience.  
That as in Tempest, or Winter, a corpse Garment is convenient; in calm or warm Wether, a more liberal, race, or lighter Garment, both may, and aught to be followed and used: So that sometimes there have been occasion at divers Parliaments, to make and enact certain Laws and Statutes, which might seem and appear to Men of exterior Realms, and the Subject, very straight, sore, extreme and terrible; although they were then, when they were made, not without great Consideration and Policy moved and established, and for the times, to the avoidance of further inconvenience, very expedient and necessary; and when Princes are more indulgent, it is to provoke the Subject, with Clemency shown on the Prince's behalf, to more love and kindness to him, and upon Trust they will not abuse the same, but rather be encouraged thereby, more faithfully, and with more diligence to serve him, etc.  
In the Statute of Queen Mary, 
(g) 1 Mar. c. 8.  of the repeal of certain Treasons, Felonies, and Praemuni●e's, wherein she reduceth all to 25 Ed. 3. the words are; Forasmuch as the State of every King, Ruler, and Governor of every Realm, Dominion, or Commonweal, standeth, and consisteth more assured by the love and favour of the Subject towards their Sovereign Ruler and Governor, than in Dread and Fear of Laws, made with rigorous Pains, and extreme Punishment, for not obeying of their Sovereign Ruler and Governor: and Laws also justly made for the Preservation of the Commonweal, without extreme Penalty, or Punishment, are more often for the most part obeyed and kept, than Laws and Statutes made with great and extreme Punishment, etc. Therefore some are repealed.  
By these the Clemency of the Princes is discovered, and the reason of enacting severe Laws in such Cases, in Terrorem, is cleared.  
I must refer all other Discourses of the Laws against Treason, to the Learned Books writ on that Subject, and only note what a 
(h) Transcendent and multiplied Rebellion, p. 25. See Sir. Tho. Wyat's Speech, at his Execution, in Holinshed, well worth perusing by all concerned.  grave Author saith, That if we peruse all our Books, Records, and Histories, we shall find it a Principle in Law, a Rule in Reason, and truth in Experience, That Treason doth ever produce fatal and final Destruction to the offenders, and never attains the desired End, although infinite mischiefs are effected by it. For Conspirators and Traitors one way or other have generally come to condign Punishment.  
If what I have hitherto laid down, work any good Effect upon the Subjects in general, to keep them in their Duty to their Sovereign, and his Laws, or have afforded them such Rules for Obedience, or dehortments from Faction, Sedition, Conspiracies, and Rebellion, as I wish; I have attained the end for which I writ: which is only to satisfy all sorts of Subjects, how excellently composed the Government is, that our Kings cannot, or have any Interest, to rule Arbitrarily.  
Therefore it will be the duty, advantage, and true Interest of all Subjects, so to comport themselves to the Government, as to consider the excellent Foundations upon which it is built, that neither by the Cunning of unquiet Spirits, the pretenders of Reformation of abuses, the ambition of the aspirers, nor especially by the plausible Charms of the Republicans, they be ever induced to disquiet the Government, or rebel against it; lest in conclusion they bring upon themselves, and Posterity, such a Slavery, as we had too bloody an Example of in the late Calamitous times: and that above all things, they consider that excellent Saying of the best of 
(i) Quip in turb● & discordias pessimo cuique plurima vis: pax & quies bonis Artibus indigent. 4. Hist. initio.  Historians, That to stir up Dissensions, and troubles, the worst Men commonly have the greatest Influence; but Peace and quietness are not established, but by Men of rare gifts, and excellent Virtue.  
FINIS.   

THE Author being at great distance from the Press, and sending up his Copy by Parcels, which (by reason of his Employment in his Profession) he was constrained sometimes to commit to the Care of others; The following Chapter was not sent up till most of the Treatise was Printed. Therefore he chooseth rather to place it at the end, than to disturb the order of the Pages, and desires the Candid Reader will peruse it next immediately after the 15th. Chapter, it being designed to have preceded the 16th. Chapter of The King's Sovereignty.  
CHAP. (XVI.) Of the Benefit and Excellency of Hereditary Monarchy.  
THE 
(a) Arist. Pol. l. 3. c. 10. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Advantage of Hereditary Succession in Private Families. Aristotle's Opinion.  Philosopher dividing Kingly Government into four kinds, as I have before instanced, allows all to be Haereditary, except the Aesymnaetian, which was Elective; and since in many places, he affirms Kingdoms to be more durable than Commonwealths, we may conclude that the fundamental cause of that duration is the Lineal Succession.  
We experience in private Families (where a long Series of Ancestors have transmitted Inheritances to Posterity) how by the settledness, and increase of their Estates, their alliances, and the Employments they have had in their respective Ages, they have acquired Honour, Renown, Interest and Stability; that not only a greater Respect is paid to them, than to others of a later Rise, but they are thereby enabled, upon many accounts to manage public, or private affairs, with more sure success, and repute, than those than have not acquired such a nodosam Aeternitatem.  

(b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 De Repub. l. 3. c. 11.  Aristotle makes that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or natural Love of Parents to their Children, to be one reason of the Succession of Sons to Fathers, in their Kingdoms: thence he makes it improbable, that they who have obtained the Sovereignty, should not deliver it to their Children, because it would discover a Virtue beyond the ordinary Elevation of humane Nature, to prefer the Benefit and good of the People, by leaving them the Liberty of choosing, upon every avoidance, the most worthy, (if such a Prince's Son appeared not so) rather than to establish the Principality in their own Family.  

(c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p●ly. 〈◊〉. lib. 6. p. 455. D. Edit. Wickl. 1509. Several Reasons why Succession is to be preferred before Election.  Polybius speaking of Kings being most eminent for Wisdom, 
Polybius his Opinion.  Justice, and Valour (whereby they drew the People to reverence them, and consequently to submit themselves to their Conduct and Command) saith, That the Son (having his education under such a virtuous wise Father, whereby he had been present with him when affairs of the greatest Importance had been debated) in common presumption was judged to be better capacitated to govern, than any of a strange Family, and so none would envy him his dignity, but all readilier judged him the fittest to succeed. And there is good reason to consider the cause of it; for Government is an Art not easily attained to, and by the unskilfulness in the proper Rules and Maxims, the wrong Applications, the Ignorance in pursuing the right Methods, and choosing fit Instruments, the Factious and Populace get advantages to make unfortunate times. Therefore those Monarches, who from their Infancies are trained up, and accustomed to Instructions in the Rudiments of Government, as they grow up, must more readily comprehend them, must attain the better understanding of the great affairs, and secret reasons of St●●●, be more quick, apprehensive, and sagacious, in perceiving what is conducive to the common good, and what not; and so more ready in all public Dispatches, than such who have not been educated with all these Advantages. Besides, Governors at first must be to seek in understanding the nature of great Affairs; so that one may as well expect 
(c) Dr. Nalson's Common Interest, p. 113.  a Man taken from the Plough should be able to Conn a Ship, and carry her an East-India Voyage, as that a Person (though of the greatest natural and acquired Parts) should at first be fit to Pilot the Government, or skilful and dexterous in the steerage of the important affairs of a public State: and (as in Republics it falls out) by that time he hath arrived at a competent Skill, he must resign his Place and Power to others, as raw and unexperienced as he was. Whereas Succession in Monarchy doth effectually prevent this Inconvenience, and (which is of great moment) it gives them an Interest, and desire of designing well for the public good, safety, and security of the People, and the opportunity of finishing whatever is well begun.  
For though it have happened by the Succession of a weak, or vicious Prince, that damage and infelicity have befallen the People; yet it is very rare in History, that two such succeed one another. So we find in this Kingdom, that Ed. 1. and Ed. 3. brought as great Honour and Renown to their Countries, as their Fathers had Misfortunes; and even in such Prince's Reigns, the Calamities that have befallen their Kingdoms, have rather sprung from the Potency of Factions (that took the advantage by the weakness of the Prince, to bring him to Contempt, that they might obtain the managery of affairs) than from other Causes. For even under such unfortunate Princes, if it were not for factious Disturbances, the Laws and good Order might, during their Reigns, conserve their Kingdoms in Peace.  
Whereas in Kingdoms that are Elective, 
The Inconveniences that happen where Right Succession is not observed.  Competitors and Candidates cause not only great Disturbances and Mischiefs at the Instant (as we have infinite Examples when the Roman Emperors were chosen by the Factions of the Senate or Army, as also in Germany, before the expedient of choosing a King of the Romans, and in the Miseries that have befallen Poland) but Aemulations and Animosities have been continued for Ages among the prime Nobility: and thence it is that the 
(d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 5. Polit. c. 10. Giphanii Comment.  Philosopher so long since hath ascribed it one of the Principal Causes of the Destruction of a Kingdom, when there is Discord in the Royal Family, or, as his Interpreter saith among the participes Regni, as Brethren and Kindred of the Royal Family, as 
(e) In vita Cleomenis & Aegidis.  Plutarch tells us in the Kingdom of Sparta, and as Justin gives us an account of the slaughter of Brethren and Kinsmen in the Kingdom of Syria, and as it occasioned the Destruction of the flourishing Kingdom of Egypt, by the Competition betwixt Ptolemy and Cleopatra, and as our Ancestors sadly experienced in the Civil Wars betwixt the Houses of York and Lanca●●●, and France in the Faction of Orleans and Burgundy, and of later Date in the Kingdom of Hungary, betwixt King John and the Emperor Ferdinand.  
If therefore such Calamities befall Countries, where Factions ruin their Peace; how much more shall we judge the miserable Confusions will be, when any shall challenge a Power to make a Breach in the Royal Chain of Succession, especially when we find even at Rome, upon the Election of the Pope, by custom the People plunder the Palace of the Cardinal who is elected Pope: and since that outrage is committed where such an one is chosen, as is owned by so great a part of Europe to be Christ's Vicar, we are not to wonder, that at the Death of the Ottoman Heir, the Janissaries and Soldiery rifle and plunder Jews and Christians, and cease not to commit all manner of Outrages, till the new Grand Signior, by his Presence, and Bounty, puts an end to them.  
Therefore as a grave 
(f) Nalson's Common Interest, p. 118.  Author observes, He that hath not deposed Reason, the King of his Soul, and elected in its place Prejudice and Passion, to govern there, or dare credit the universal Experience of the World, must be convinced of the great, necessary, and desperate Inconveniences of a long Interregnum, and elective Monarchy; and that a lineal Succession is the best Barrier against assaults from abroad, and is that sacred, perpetual, vital Energy, which preserves Government from internal Putrefaction, and secures us from one most dangerous Inconvenience, of having another Family to provide for. Therefore the 
(g) 10. Annal.  Excellent Historian most wisely observes, That Minoris est discriminis, Principem nasci quam sumi; That Subjects, more naturally submit to an undoubted, unquestionable Title (when the Government descends in the same manner as other Inheritances, with due respect to the singleness of Sovereignty) than to new Princes, the worth of whom, and their Families are untried.  
This leads me to consider, that this right of Succession flows from the Law of 
(h) Right of Succession, p. 149.  Nature, is founded on the Law of God, and Nations.  
First, That is accounted to flow from the Law of Nature, 
Hereditary Succession agreeable to the Law of Nature.  which every Man finds grafted in his own Heart, and which is obeyed without any other Law, and for which Men neither seek, nor can give any other distinct reason: all which holds in this case. For who doubts, when he hears of an hereditary Monarchy, but that the next in Blood must succeed, and for which we need no positive Law? nor does any Man inquire for a further Reason, being satisfied therein, by the Principles of his own Heart. From this ground it is, that though a remoter Kinsman did possess as Heir, he could by no length of time, prescribe a valid right: because no man (as Lawyers conclude) can prescribe a right against the Law of Nature; therefore the Law 
(i) Cum ratio naturalis. ff. de bonis damnati.  saith, Cum ratio naturalis, quasi lex quaedam tacita, liberis, parentum haereditatem adjecerit, veluti ad debitam successionem eos vocando: propter quod suorum haeredum nomen eis indultum est, adeo ut ne a parentibus quidem ab ea Successione amoveri possint. So in the 
(k) Matth. 21.  Parable, the Husbandman (who is presumed to understand nothing but the Law of Nature) is brought in, saying, This is the Heir, let us kill him, and seize on his Inheritance. So the 
(l) Et Sect. emancipati. Institut. de Haered. quae ab Intestato.  Law further saith, Praetor, naturalem aequitatem secutus, iis etiam bonorum possessionem, contra 12 Tabularum leges, & contra jus  permittit. By which it is apparent, that this right of Nature was stronger than the Laws of the twelve Tables; though these were the most ancient, and chief Statutes of Rome.  
This holds also in the Collateral Succession of Brothers, and others, according to that, 
(m) L. hac parte. ff. unde cognati.  Hac parte, Proconsul, naturali aequitate motus, omnibus cognatis permittit bonorum possessionem, quos sanguinis ratio vocat ad haereditatem. For those who are now Brothers to a present Prince, have been Sons to the former; therefore as St. Paul says, If a Son, than an Heir, except he be secluded by the Existence, and Succession of an elder Brother.  
Secondly, 
Agreeable to the law of God.  That the Law of God gives right of Succession to proximity of Blood, is manifest, in that, if a Man hath no 
(n) Numb. 27. v. 9, 10.  Son, or Daughter, his Inheritance shall descend upon his Brother; and so God determines in the case of 
(o) Numb. 36.  Zelophead's Daughters; and so 
(p) 2 Chron. 22.1.  Ahaziah was made King (though the youngest) in his Father's stead, because, says the Text, The Arabians had slain all the eldest: which clearly shows, That by God's Law, he could not have succeeded, if the eldest had been alive. So we see the birthright was owned in Esau, but that he sold it, the privilege of which is there fully discovered, not only in discovering the right of Primogeniture, but likewise in the Donation of Parents to their Children; that Blessing being like the last Will and Testament.  
Thirdly, 
Agreeable to the Law of Nations.  As to the Law of Nations, it might be made clear by the recital of all the Laws of Kingdoms that are Hereditary, and not Elective, That degrees of Succession were exactly observed, according to that of 
(q) De Repub. lib. 6. c. 5.  Bodin, Ordo, non tantum naturae, & divinae legis, sed omnium ubique gentium hoc postulat. So Pope 
(r) In c. grand. de supplenda neglig. Pralat.  Innocent, In regnis haereditariis caveri non potest, ne filius aut frater succedat; and so in all Histories of Hereditary Monarchies, we find it where Potent Usurpation hath not obstructed the free current, or by some violent means derived it into another Channel.  
If Successions of so great importance had not been fixed by immutable Laws of God and Nature, the various and inconstant inclinations of present Governors (saith a very 
(s) Jus Regium p. 158.  Judicious Author) had made the Nations whom they governed very unhappy: If they yielding to the importunities of Mothers, or Stepmothers, or clouded by the Jealousy of Flatterers, or Favourites; or upon some unaccountable aversion, should place the Crown upon what Head they pleased. Therefore God did very justly and wisely settle this Succession, that both King and People might know, That it is by him that King's Reign, and Kingdoms are secured in Peace against Factions.  
To come more particularly to our own Country: The Monarchy of great Britain and Ireland, 
The British Monarchy Hereditary.  is undoubtedly as firmly established hereditarily in his Majesty's Blood and Family, as it is in any Monarch's in Europe.  
A late French 
(t) Of the States and their Powers, p. 68  Author, speaking of the Succession of the Crown of France, saith, That the Election of the Kingdom is not of one Person only, but of the blood, and operates so far, as there is life in that blood; The blood being chosen with the Prerogative of Primogeniture: So that when one Person of the blood is dead (the Power by the same Prerogative being transferred to the blood) remains and rests in the blood still living, and in him of the blood who succeeds by that Prerogative, and in none else.  
The Majesty Royal (saith a 
(u) Majestas Intemerata.  profound Lawyer and Antiquary upon the murder of King Charles the First) expired not, nor was left adhering to the bloody Axe or Block. It wandered not like Adrian's Ghost, nor hovered in an Airy abstraction. For the King, or rather the King's line (saith another 
(w) Finch, p. 83.  great Lawyer) is a name of Continuance, which, as the Law presumes, shall always remain as Head and Governor of the People. For the English Monarchy 
(x) Coke 4. Report. Praef.  knows no Interregnum, being Successive by inherent Birthright, whereby infinite inconveniences are avoided: so that the young Phoenix stays not to arise out of the Spicy ashes of the old, but the Soul of Royalty, by a kind of Transmigration, passeth immediately out of one body into another; and in the same manner, will every right Heir acquire the Royalty after his Predecessor ceaseth to be.  
Therefore the judicious Lord 
(y) Interregnum aut tituli suspensionem ●aeges Regni non permittere. Hist. H. 7. p. 26.  Verulam observes, That H. 7. knowing that the Laws permit not any interim, suspension, or stay of the Title, and having no mind to own his Queen's Title the best, (She being the Heiress of the house of York, as he in some respects was Heir of the House of Lancaster) he ordered the Act so, that it should neither be by recognition, nor his Title be established by a new Law: 
(z) Potius media via institit, simplicis stabilimenti. Ideo verbis tectis & utrinque nutantibus his, ut haereditas Coronae resideres, remaneret & continuaretur in Rege.  but chose a milder way, viz. of simple Establishment in covert words, interpretable several ways, that the inheritance of the Crown should reside, remain, and continue in him.  
So King James in his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, p. 209. tells the Prince, That at the very moment of the expiring of the King Reigning, the nearest and lawful Heir entereth in his place; and so to refuse him, or intrude another, is not to hold out the Successor from coming in, but to expel and put out their Righteous King.  
So Sir 
(a) Report 7, 8, 10, 11. Calvin' s Case, Watson and Clark ' s Case, 1 Jac. 1.  Edward Coke affirms, That it is a known Maxim of the Laws, That in the moment of the descent of the Crown, the person on whom it descends (which is the next immediate Heir only) becomes complete and absolute King, to all intents and purposes. And so he saith, The second Son of the King of England after 
(b) 3. Instit. 8.  the death of the firstborn is eldest Son, within the Statute of 25 E. 3. as it was resolved in the case of Prince Charles, concerning the Duchy of Cornwall.  
It would be a tedious work to recite all the Authorities in this Case may be found in the Statutes and Law-Books. I will content myself, instead of all others, with the Act of 
(c) Cap. 2.  Recognition 1 Jacobi primi, wherein, 
The Recognition of King James the First.  after the two Houses had enumerated the benefits by the Conjunction of the Houses of York and Lancaster, and the uniting of England and Scotland in the King's Person, and that They agnize their constant Faith, Obedience and Loyalty to him, and his Royal Progeny, The worlds of the Act are, In most humble and lowly manner, do beseech your most Excellent Majesty (as a memorial to all posterity among the Records of your High Court of Parliament for ever to endure, of our Loyalty, Obedience, and hearty humble affection) it may be published and declared in the High Court of Parliament, and enacted by Authority of the same, That we (being bound thereunto by the Laws of God and man) do recognize and acknowledge (and thereby express our unspeakable joys) that immediately upon the dissolution and decease of Elizabeth late Queen of England, the Imperial Crown of the Realm of England, etc. did by inherent Birthright, and lawful undoubted Succession, descend and come to your most Excellent Majesty, as being lineally, justly, and lawfully, next and sole Heir of the blood Royal of this Realm, as is aforesaid, etc. and thereunto we most humbly and faithfully do submit and oblige ourselves, our Heirs, and Posterities for ever, until the last drop of our blood be spent; and do beseech your Majesty to accept the same as the first-fruits of this High Court of Parliament, of our Loyalty and Faith to your Majesty, and your Royal Progeny and Posterity for ever.  
By which, it first appears that the Crown of England is an unalterable Entail, and the reversion in him only by whom King's reign, without any Election or consent of the People, otherwise than by acknowledging the lawful Right of the Kings, derived from God by their blood to them.  
Also from this Recognition we may consider, 
How to understand the Act made by Queen Elizabeth against the Claims of Mary Queen of Scots.  Secondly, what to think of that Act of Queen Elizabeth, That if any Person shall affirm that the Parliament of England has not full power to bind, and govern the Crown in point of Succession and descent, that such a Person, during the Queen's life, shall be guilty of High Treason. For we must consider that by the words bind and govern, we may conceive the sense to be, That the Parliament is Judge where there are differences 
(d) Jus Regium, p. 181.  betwixt Competitors in nice and controvertible points, which cannot be otherwise decided. So that such temporary Acts as these, are to be interpreted, and restrained by other uncontroverted Laws.  
We must also look upon it as made to secure the Queen against Mary Queen of Scots, and to let her know it was to no purpose for her to design any thing against the Right or Person of Queen Elizabeth; upon that ground, as may be presumed, the Queen of Scots might claim, for that Queen Elizabeth by Act of Parliament had been declared a Bastard. Therefore to let her know, that it was to no purpose to insist upon any such claim, and that her other Right as next undoubted Heir by blood to the Crown, might be altered or governed, this Act was made: So that we must from hence conclude, That it was to be reckoned only as one of those Statutes which the Law says are made ad terrorem, & ex terrore only; which may appear the more evidently, because it was never made use of. For it is to be mainly considered, that this Law being made to exclude Queen Mary and the Scotish Line, as appears by that clause wherein it is declared, That every Person or Persons of what degree or Nation soever they be, who shall during the Queen's life, declare or publish that they have Right to the Crown of England, shall be disenabled to enjoy the Crown in Succession. Therefore it was never valid: 
(e) Id. p. 183.  For if it had been good, King James might have thereby been excluded by that person who should have succeeded next to the Scotish Race: For it is undeniable, that Queen Mary, did during Queen Elizabeth's life, pretend Right to the Crown, upon the account that Queen Elizabeth was declared Bastard. Therefore the calling in of King James, after this Act, and the acknowledging his Title, do clearly evince, that the Parliament of England knew, they had no Power to make such an Act; and we may conclude, That such Politic and Temporary provisions find no approbation, either by the Laws, or succeeding ages (who in all such cases judge more impartially:) therefore it is much more honourable, for the Legislative Power, to found their Laws upon Justice and Right, rather than upon the humours and Interests of those, who desire but the shadow of a Law to countenance their designs.  
It must be owned that King Edward the Second was deposed, 
The Injustice in deposing Kings.  for making use of Gaveston and the Spencers. But how illegally, all succeeding ages have acknowledged; and it rather shows how extravagant the People, and their Representatives are in their humours, than how just their Powers are: For by the same parity of Reason, the horrid Murder of the blessed Martyr, or the Murder of Edward the Second, may be justified as his deposing may be; and the like may be said of King Richard the Second, against whom the Fourteenth Article was, that he refused to allow the Laws made in Parliament; which had been in effect to consent, that the two Houses should have been the Sovereign, and that he had transferred the Royal Power on them. Whoever desires further satisfaction, may consult Arnisaeus in that Treatise, Quod nulla ex causa subditis fas sit contra legitimum Principem arma sumere.  
Whereas Richard Duke of York in Henry the Sixth's time, after he had been declared Heir Apparent, was by another Act of Parliament declared uncapable of Succession; all that can be inferred from it is, 
When Acts of Parliament to be less esteemed.  That Acts of Parliament (when they are bottomed upon private affections to Parties in times of Faction and civil War) are not to be looked upon with that veneration, as when they regularly pass, in times that are calm, when no potent Persons oppress Justice, or usurping Powers hinder faithful Judges from expounding the Laws sound. Therefore we find, in the claim of the said Duke of York, that it is more consentaneously to Law expressed, That no Act taketh place, or is of force against him, that is right inheritor of the Crown, as accordeth (saith the Record) with God's Laws, and all natural Laws: and we may observe that though there was a Succession of three Kings of the House of Lancaster, who had usurped the Crown for Sixty Years; yet all our Historians, and the Laws call those Kings de facto and not the jure. Such a true sense of just and right the uninterested Ages have had of that Usurpation ever since: although there were Acts of Parliament carefully penned, to corroborate ●he Title of the house of Lancaster during that time, and all ways and means used to have established that Line; yet by virtue of the Right of Lineal Succession, Edward the Fourth, Son to the said Duke of York, came to be owned lawful King of England, though the Right of his Family had been interrupted ever since Henry the Fourth usurped the Crown: which might have been a sufficient document to all Ages, not to have attempted any sort of preterition of the Right Heir.  
Yet we find that unsuccessful attempts were made by H. 8. contrary to the fundamentals of Succession, which, when rightly considered, I hope will convince all, of how little validity, even such Acts are to be reputed. Therefore because these have been made use of for Precedents, I shall speak a little more fully to them.  
In the 25 of H. 8. 
(f) Cap. 22.  the Marriage with Queen Katherine is made void, 
Concerning the several Entailing of the Crown by King Henry the Eighth.  and that with Queen Anne's declared good, and an Entail made on the Issue Male or Female, and the Penalty for hurting the King's Person, disturbing his Title to the Crown, or slandering the present Marriage is judged High Treason; and Anno 26. 
(g) Cap. 2.  a strict Oath is enjoined to observe the Succession there appointed.  
But 28 H. 8. 
(h) Cap. 7.  it is declared that the former Act was made upon a pure, perfect and clear foundation, thinking the Marriage than had between his Majesty and the Lady Anne, (they are the words of the Act) in their Consciences, to have been pure, sincere and perfect, and good, etc. till now of late, that it appeareth that the said Marriage was never good or consonant to the Laws, but utterly void and of none effect; and so both the Marriage with the Princess Katherine and the Lady Anne are declared void, and their Issue made illegitimate; and the perils are enumerated that might ensue to the Realm, for want of a declared lawful Successor to the Crown; and the Act empowers the King (if he die without Issue of his body) that he may limit the Crown to any, by his Letters Patents, or his last Will in Writing: and it is declared Treason to declare either of the Marriages to be good, or to call the Lady Mary or Lady Elizabeth Legitimate, and the former Oath is made void: and this may be judged to be procured when he resolved to settle the Crown on Henry Fitz Roy, Duke of Richmond, his natural Son.  
But after the Birth of Prince Edward, 38 H. 8. 
(i) Cap. 1.  another alteration is made, whereby the Crown is entailed on Prince Edward, and for want of his Issue on the Lady Mary, and for want of her Issue, on the Lady Elizabeth; and for want of Issue of the King, or them, than the King is impowered by his Letters Patents, or last Will, to dispose of the Crown at his free will.  
It is therefore to be considered, that in such a juncture of affairs, when the legality of the King's Marriages were so disputable, by reason that two of the legal Successors (upon niceties not of nature, but of the Pope's 〈◊〉 for Divorcing) were declared Bastards, there was some ●eason 
(k) 25 H. 8. c. 22.  that the Act should express that the Ambiguity of several Titles pretended to the Crown (than not perfectly declared, but that men might expound them to every one's sinister affection and sense, contrary to the right legality of Succession, and Posterity of the lawful Kings and Emperors of the Realm) hath been the cause of that great effusion and destruction of men's blood; and the like cause will produce the like effect, as the words are.  
Upon such grounds it was very plausible to declare by Act of Parliament the Succession. But this does not prove that where the Right of nature is clear, that the Parliament may invert the same: and they teach us how dangerous it is to leave Parliaments to the Impression of Kings (when it is too obvious, the first of these Laws was made to gratify the King's affection to Queen Anne) in the case of naming a Successor; as it is also to expose Kings to the Arbitrariness of Parliaments. And we may well infer (H. 8. taking such care by his Parliaments to legitimate and illegitimate his Issue, according to the present interests of his Affairs and Passions) that such contradictory Acts could not be all true; and though the Responses from Delphos or any Oracles of the Gentile ages, might miss the truth as much, yet by their dubious answers, they forfeited not their reputations so much.  
We may also note 
(l) Jus Regium, p. 178, 179.  that by God Almighty's Providence, and the care of his own Laws, the Duke of Richmond was removed by death, to prevent the unjust Competitors, and Prince Edward was born; and by the same Providence, and the sense the Subjects had of the great Fundamental of Hereditary Succession, contrary to some of these Acts, and what Edward the Sixth did in settling the Crown upon the Lady Jane Grey, proved of no force: for Queen Mary succeeded, though she was a Papist, and Queen Elizabeth succeeded her, though she was declared Bastard. The rights of Blood prevailing over the Formalities of Divorce and the Dispensations of the Popes, and the Laws made to gratify Henry the Eighth's pleasure, as the strength of nature doth often prevail over Poisons; and to evince the greater certainty of their being void, so little notice was taken of those, and the subsequent Acts, Anno 1535. that the Heirs of the Blood succeeded without repealing that Act, as an Act in itself invalid from the beginning: For such Acts are passed by without being repealed, as we find in the Act of Recognition of Queen Elizabeth, no notice was taken of the Act of Parliament against her; and Blackwood 
(m) P. 45.  observes very well, that so conscious were the makers of these Acts, 
Jus Regium, p. 179.  of the illegality of them, and of their being contrary to the immutable Laws of God, Nature, and Nations, that none durst produce that King's Testament, wherein he did nominate a Successor conformable to the power granted by those Acts; but that as soon as they were freed by his Death, from the violent oppressions that had forced them to alter a Successor three several times, and at last to swear implicitly to whomsoever he should nominate, they proclaimed first Queen Mary, and after her decease Queen Elizabeth.  
Therefore all these Acts, both of Henry the Eighth, and Edward the Sixth, are to be looked upon as Politic interims, to serve for some present ends. And as we observe the trepidations, vibrations, and as we may say, uneasiness of things in all that have been displaced, till reseated again (whereby we have a certain Indicium of any thing Natural) so may we note the naturalness of Hereditary Succession by the Tragical Convulsions, and unsetledness of things in any State, where great force and policy have usurped the Crown, till it hath returned to the right owner. So we see after the force was removed by the expiration of Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth, things returned again into their pristin State, according to the Laws of the Crown.  
I shall now pass to consider other Reasons; and First it may be observed, 
Fundamentals in Government not to be altered.  That the Venerable Age of such Fundamental Laws, should have another kind of respect paid to them, than to be made obsolete, because they will not sort with some new-fashioned Intrigue. For it is a most true Maxim, Non magis aliunde floret respublica, quam si legum vigeat Authoritas. So in the first Parliament 
(n) Cap. 2.  of King James the First, it is fully expressed, That to alter and innovate the Fundamental ad Ancient Laws, 
See Commission for Union, 16●4.  Privileges, and good Customs of the Kingdom, (whereby not only the King's Regal Authority, but the People's securities of Lands, Live, and Privileges (both in general and particular) are preserved and maintained, and by the abolishing or alteration of the which, it is impossible but that present confusion will fall upon the whole State and frame of Government) is of most dangerous consequence: whence we may well infer, That to endeavour to alter the right of Succession of the Crown, in the direct line, is one of the most dangerous Innovations of all others, as drawing innumerable mischiefs after it.  
Now there can be no greater fundamental right than the Succession of our Monarch. 
The Hereditary Succession is a Fundamental.  That our Monarchy is Hereditary, is the great Basis upon which most of all the positions of the Laws are established, which every where we meet with in the Writings of Lawyers, viz. That the King never dies, the next Successor in Blood is legally King, from the very moment in which the last King dies; that there needs neither Coronation, or Recognition of the People, to entitle him to the exercise of his Regal Authority; that his Commissions are valid, all Men are liable to do him Homage, and hold their rights of him, and his Heirs; he may call Parliaments, dispose of the Lands belonging to the Crown; and all that oppose him are Rebels: Generally this Principle runs through all the Veins of our Laws, it is that which gives Life and Authority to our Statutes, but receives none from them, which are undeniable marks and Characters of a Fundamental Right in all Nations.  
Secondly, Such further provision hath the Law made, to secure the Succession in the direct line, that if the right Heir of the Blood, or the Father or Mother of the right Heir be attainted of High Treason, by Parliament, the Attainder is no obstruction to the descent. If he, who were to succeed had committed Murder, or were declared Traitor formerly to the Crown, for open Rebellion against the King and Kingdom; yet upon his coming to the Crown he need not to be restored by Act of Parliament: but his very right of Blood would purge all these Imperfections. For tanta est Regii sanguinis praerogativa, & dignitas, ut vitium non admittat, nec se contaminare patiatur; saith a 
(o) Craig.  learned Lawyer: and the Reasons given are, For that no Man can be a Rebel against himself, nor can the King have a Superior; and consequently there can be none whom he can 
(p) Jus Reg. p. 169.  offend: and it would be absurd, that he, who can restore all other Men, should need to be restored himself. Also the Punishments of Crimes, such as Confiscations, etc. are to be inflicted by the King's Authority, or to fall to the King's Treasury; and it would be most absurd, that a Man should exact from himself a Punishment.  
So Richard Plantagenet Duke of York, and Edward the Fourth his Son, were both attainted; yet Edward the Fourth was rightful King, and no impediment in the Succession accrued by it.  
So Charles the Seventh of France (though banished by Sentence of Parliament) did afterwards succeed to the Crown; and though Lewis the Twelfth forfeited for taking up Arms against Charles the Eighth, yet he succeeded: and Alexander Duke of Albany, and his Descendants, being declared Traitors, by his Brother, King James the Fourth; yet his Son John being called home upon his Uncle's Death, was declared Tutor and Governor, without any remission, or being restored; and if his Cousin King James had died without Issue, he had been declared the true Successor of the Crown.  
We have a memorable Instance of this in H. 7. who when he came to the Crown, called his Parliament; and the Judges having determined, that those Members of the House, that had been outlawed by the Parliament in Richard the Third's time, and been declared Rebels, should absent themselves, till a Bill were brought in for their restoring: It was moved among the Judges what should be done about the King, who had been condemned, and declared Traitor, etc. and it was by the unanimous consent of all the Judges (saith the learned 
(q) St. Alban's Hist H. 7. p. 29.  Chancellor) declared, That the Crown removed all the obstructions in the Blood, which might in any manner impede its descent; and from that time the King took the Crown, 
Coronam ipsam omnes sanguinis oppilationes quae descensum Coronae ullatenus impediunt, deobstruere.—  Regi opera Parliamentaria non fuisset opus.  the fountain of his Blood was purged, and all the Corruptions and Impurities taken away: so that he had no need of any Parliamentary help to supply him.  
Thirdly, The Consideration of the Oaths, which the Subjects are bound to take and observe, gives some further Proof of the Obligation of all the Subjects to maintain this lineal Succession.  
The Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy bind the Subjects to bear Faith and true Allegiance to the King's Highness, 
The Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy against altering Succession.  his Heirs, and lawful Successors, and that to their Power they shall assist and defend all Jurisdictions, Privileges, Preeminences and Authorities granted to the King's Highness, his Heirs, and lawful Successors, or united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm, and of those Privileges, etc. I think none will deny, but that Hereditary Succession is one of the principal Prerogatives intended by those Oaths.  
We are not in these only sworn to His Majesty, but his Lawful Successors; which word, Lawful, is inserted, to cut off the Pretences of such as should not succeed by Law, and the insolent Arbitrariness of such, as being but Subjects themselves, think they may choose their King.  
These being promissory Oaths, as well to the Successors, when their Right shall fall, as to the present King; they have every of them in their respective degrees and orders, and indispensible Right confirmed to them by this Oath. So that the Predecessor hath no legal right to deprive his Successor, as hereafter I shall clear, nor to remit the People's Obligation to him as lawful Heir and Successor: 
(r) Address, part 3. p. 64.  much less can the two Houses do it; for they are all within the Obligation of this Oath, and it is unreasonable, that Men should dispense with their own promissory Oaths to others: for this would destroy all Faith and Confidence amongst Men, and pull up the very roots of Society and Government  
Whereas some object out of my Lord 
(s) Coke on Littleton, p. 8.  Coke, 
Objection.  That none is Heir before the death of his Ancestor, but Heir apparent: It is to be considered, 
Answered.  that it must be the Heir presumptive, or apparent, that is here understood; otherwise the inserting the word, Heir, were superfluous, if by the Oaths were not intended, he that is next Heir upon the Death of the King; and if any Person think to evade it by affirming, that if the Parliament declare any Person to be no next Heir, he ceaseth to be so; as also not to be lawful Successor, because by such an Act he is outlawed: Let such Persons consider that this is neither better nor worse than palpable Aequivocation. For we swear in the common Sense of the words, and so by Heir we understand such as by proximity of Blood, have greatest right to succeed in the Inheritance.  
It may be farther considered that the Lord Chancellor, Treasurer, and Judges, 
(t) See 18 E. 3.  all the great Officers of State, the Privy-Council, etc. are all sworn to defend the Rights of the Crown, and that they shall not concur or assent to any thing which may turn to the King in Damage or Dis-herison. How then can any of these, much less the Judges (who are to expound, and interpret the Law) consent without palpable violation of their Oaths, to the changing of the Essence of the Monarchy.  
I shall now endeavour to prove, 
Acts of Parliament cannot alter Lineal Succession.  that no Parliament, by a complete Act, can legally alter the Succession in an Hereditary Monarchy.  
For first all 
(u) Jus Reg. p. 153.  Kings and Parliaments are subordinate to the Laws of God, the Laws of Nature, and Nations. So that unless we give the Inferior Power and Jurisdiction over the Superior, no Act of Parliament can be binding to overturn what those three Laws have have established; and I hope I have proved under all these Heads, in the preceding part of this discourse, that the right of Succession is founded on them. As to the Law of God, it is clear not only from the general dictates of Religion; but 28 H. 8. c. 7. the Parliament uses these words, For no Man can dispense with God's Laws, which we also affirm and think.  
As to the Laws of Nature they are acknowledged to be immutable from the Principles of Reason. So the 
(w) Sect. sed naturale. Institut. de Jure naturali.  Law itself confesseth, Naturalia quaedam Jura, quae apud omnes gentes observantur, divina quadam providentia constituta, semper firma atque immutabilia permanent: Certain natural Laws, which are observed by all Nations) and such is that of Primogeniture) by Divine Providence being constituted, remain always firm and immutable. So when the Law declares that a supreme Prince is free from the obligation of Laws (solutus Legibus) yet Lawyers 
(x) Voet. de Statutis sect. 5. c. 1, Accursius in L. Princeps F. de Leg. Clementina pasturalis de re Judicata.  still acknowledge, that this does not exclude these Supreme Powers from being liable to the Laws of God, Nature, and Nations, as is evident by all that treat of that Point.  
Nor can the Law of Nations be overturned by private municipal Laws; so all Statutes to the prejudice of Ambassadors (who are secured by the Law of Nations,) are confessed by all to be null, and the highest Power whatsoever cannot take off the denouncing of a War, before a War can be lawful.  
Besides, secondly, a Parliament cannot do more than 
(y) Jus Reg. p. 154.  any absolute Monarch in his own Kingdom; for they, when joined, are but in place of the supreme Power sitting in Judgement. We must not think our Parliaments have an unlimited Power de jure, so as they may make a forfeiture, or take away Life without a cause, or pass Sentence against the Subjects, without citing or hearing them. For if they had such Power, we should be the greatest Slaves, and live under the most arbitrary Government imaginable.  
Therefore an absolute Prince cannot, in an Hereditary Kingdom (where the Successor is to succeed Jure Regni, 
(z) Nulla clausula Successori Jus auferri potest, modo succedat ille Jure Regni. Aristaeus c. 7. num. 5.  prejudge the Successors right of Succession; for the same right, the present King hath to the Possession, the next of Blood hath to the Succession. Therefore Hottoman Lib. 2. de Regno Galliae affirms, That ea quae, Jure Regni, primogenito competunt, ne Testamento quidem Patris adimi possunt: That in the absolute Monarchy of France, The Father cannot by his last Will deprive the Firstborn of those things which belong to him by Royal right. So when the King of France designed to break the Salic Law of Succession, as in the Reign of Charles the Fifth, it was found impracticable by the three States. So when Pyrrhus would have preferred his younger Son to the Crown; 
(a) Pausanias, lib. 1.  the Epirots (following the Law of Nations and then own) refused him. So Anno 1649. when Amurat the Grand Signior left the Empire to Han the Tartarian, passing his Brother Ibrahim, the whole Officers of State did unanimously cancel the Testament, and restored Ibrahim the true Heir, though no other than a Fool. So if Kings could have inverted their Succession, Saint Lewis had preferred his own Third Son to Lewis his Eldest; and Alphonsus King of Leon in Spain, had preferred his Daughter to Ferdinand his Eldest Son; and Edward the Sixth of England, had preferred, and did actually prefer the Lady Jane Grey to his Sisters Mary and Elizabeth.  
Thirdly, It is undeniable, in the opinion of all Lawyers, That a King cannot in Law alienate his Crown, but that the Deed is void, nor can he in Law consent to an Act of Parliament declaring that he should be the last King: For if such consents and Acts 
(b) Jus Regium, p. 163.  had been sufficient to bind Successors, then weak Kings by their own simplicity, and gentle Kings by the Rebellion of their Subjects, or being wrought upon by the importunity of their Wives, or Concubines, or the misrepresentation of Favourites, might do great mischiefs to their People, in raising up continual Factions; of the miseries of which I shall speak hereafter.  
This is owned in Subjects, That the Honour and Nobility that is bestowed upon a man and his Heirs, doth so necessarily descend upon those Heirs, that the Father or Predecessor cannot exclude the Successor, or derogate from his Right, by renouncing, resigning, following base, or mean Trades, or such like. For, 
Fab. Cod. 9 ti●. 28.  say the Lawyers, since he derives his Right from his old Progenitors, and owes it not to his Father, his Father's Deed should not prejudge him; so much more in Kings (the ill consequences of such violations of Justice and Right being infinitely more destructive) the Predecessor should not do any Act to prejudice his Successor: For that right of blood which makes the Eldest First, makes the other Second; and all the Statutes that acknowledge the present King's Prerogative, acknowledge that they belong to him and his Heirs. For as a Prince cannot, (even ex plenitudine potestatis) legitimate a Bastard, in prejudice of former Children, though they have only but an hope of Succession; much less can he bastardise or disinherit the Right Heir, who is so made by God, and honoured from him with the Character.  
If therefore Kings (how absolute soever) cannot the jure invert the natural order of Succession, there is no reason that the States of Parliament should have such a Power. For by the known Laws they have no Legislative Power otherwise than by assenting to what the King does, and all that their assent could do, would be no more than that they, and their Successors should not oppose his nomination, because of their consent: but that can never amount to a Power of transferring.  
For if the States of Parliament had this Power originally in themselves to bestow, why might they not reserve it for themselves, and so perpetuate the Government in their own hands? So Judge Jenkin asserts, according to Law, That no King can be named, or in any time made, in this Kingdom, 
(d) Liberty of Subject, p. 25.  by the People, Kings being before there were Parliaments: and there is good reason; for then the Monarchy should not be Hereditary, but Elective: the very Essence of Hereditary Monarchy consisting in the Right of Succession: whereas if the Parliament can prefer the next save one, they may prefer the last of all the Line; and the same reason by which they can choose a Successor (which can only be, that they have Power above him) should likewise (in the opinion of a very 
(e) Jus Regium, p. 167.  learned Person) justify their deposing of Kings; as we saw in the last Age, that such reasons as of late have been urged, to incapacitate the Children of King Charles the First from the hope of Succession, viz. Popery and Arbitrary Government, did embolden men to dethrone and murder the Father, who was actual King. For if it were once yielded that the Houses had a Right in themselves, to take care for the Salus populi, that none but such Princes should succeed, who were approved of by the prevailing Faction in their body, nothing but confusion would follow, one Party having their Votes seconded by force one time, and a quite contrary another; yet all pretending the Public Weal: and so a large breach should be made (by pretending to stop one dangerous Successor) to the inflowing of successive Usurpers, and thereby the Crown should not only by ambulatory, but unstable upon every head that wore it, and always in danger of a bloody surprise; till at last the Regalia being secured from the expectant Heir, the Factious would find a way to pillage them from the present Sovereign, and convert them into a Mace for an House of Commons.  
I writ this Part with greater Enlargements, in answer to the plausiblest Arguments for the Bill of Seclusion, while that matter was in the hottest agitation. But since there will be no need of dilating upon that Subject (now that God Almighty hath so signally determined the Controversy, by the peaceable settlement of his Majesty upon his Throne) I shall close this Chapter, with some few remarks of the miseries have been brought upon Kingdoms, and especially upon this, by the disjointing the Succession.  
So we read what dreadful 
(f) Jus Regium, p. 166.  mischiefs arose from Pelops preferring his younger Son to the Kingdom of Mycenae: 
The Miseries which Kingdoms have sustained where the Succession hath been interrupted.  from Oedipus commanding that Polynices his Youngest Son should reign interchangeably with the Eldest: From Parisatis the Queen of Persia's preferring her Youngest Son Cyrus, to her Eldest Artaxerxes: From Aristodomus admitting his two Sons Proclus and Euristhenes, to an equal share in the Lacedaemonian Throne. The like observations are to be made in the Succession of Ptolomaeus Lagus, and Ptolomaeus Phisco; In the Sons of Severus, in the Succession of Sinesandus, who killed his brother Suintill rightful Heir of Spain, and that of Sforza and Francis Duke of Milan, and thousands more; in all which, either the Usurpers, or the Kingdoms that obeyed them, perished utterly, or were brought to great ruin.  
In Britain the whole nation of the Picts were extirpated, by the endeavour of that People to hinder Keneth Son of Alpinus, from possessing the Kingdom as right Heir of Fergusiana, Sister of Mordred their King. In England the Usurpation of Harold, upon the Right of Edgar, opened the passage to William the Conqueror. The Usurpations of William Rufus, and Henry the First, upon their Brother Robert, and of King Stephen, upon the Empress Maud, were accompanied with great effusion of Blood: So that a great part of the ancient Norman Nobility, (both such as resided there, or were transplanted hither) were slain or grievously harassed. The Usurpation of King John, upon his Nephew Arthur, caused great disquiets, during his Reign, and the effects lasted a great while after. The removal of King Richard the Second by Henry the Fourth, occasioned those lasting Wars, and most miserable devastations, betwixt the Houses of York and Lancaster; during which Usurpation (before the Crown was settled upon Edward the Fourth) Historians reckon no less than seventeen pitched Battles, and eight Kings and Princes of the Blood slain, and put to death; and that forty six Dukes and Earls, besides innumerable Barons and Gentlemen, and above 200000. common People were slain and destroyed, in the space of Sixty Years. To which we may add the cruel death of Edward the Fifth, and his Brother, by their bloody Uncle, and his own miserable end; and the calamitous fall of the Lady Jane Grey, and her Noble Relations.  
All which Princes (although for the supporting their unjust Claims, Invasions and Usurpations of the Crown, they procured Parliamentary concurrence, and popular Establishments yet) after so great effusion of blood, could not, in reality, transfer the Right from the next Heir of the blood, but at last all centred again in the Right Heir.    

ERRATA.  
PAge 7. line 31. for Babarous read Barbarous. for und r. and, & l. 24 for wins r. wires. p. 13. l. 6. for Resumption r. Presumption. p. 17. l. 5. for who r. where. p. 44. l. 45. for removable r. removal. p. 47. l. 27. for purity r. parity. p. 63. l. 26. for Herds r. Hordes. p. 81. l. 18. for third r. fifth. p. 83. l. 46. for than r. not. p. 92. marg. l. 5. for mediocrita r. mediocriter; and below, for ad Clement. r. ad Cluentem. p. 133. l. 48. after before r. l. p. 141. l. 36. deal That. p. 150. l. 28. for Peace r. Grace. p. 152. l. 27. for 68 r. 6. E. 1. p. 160. l. 43. for Sarson. r. Sarron. p. 162. l. 12. for Fenix r. Ferrix. l. 48. after rewards add he. p. 167. l. 18. after find add 4, p. 176. l. 5. for implied r. employed. l. 32. for Frameae r. Framiaes. p. 180. l. 46. for Wargild r. Weregild. p. 181. l. 10. for many r. money. p. 194. marg. l. 17. for King Edward's r. King Edmund's. p. 197. l. 41. for Northrigena r. Northwigena. p. 199. l. 19 for Markesus. r. Markerus. p. 216. l. 11. for Silvanset. r. Silvanect. p. 222. l. 36. for Aubert r. Hubert. p. 245. l. 18. for Bochan r. Boetian. p. 266. l. 3. for whereas r. where. l. 18. for Mauleveren r. Mauleverer. p. 291. l. 36. for Hull r. Hall. p. 321. l. 13. deal having. p. 335. l. 12. for Privileges r. Prerogatives. p. 341. l. 8. for Salteyn r. Salveyn. p. 376. l. 33. for dies twice, r. diu. p. 380. l. 24. for eel r. aelc. and in marg. for up. r. App. p. 387. l. 6. for lie. r. tye. p. 389. l. 5. after finishing add a Period. l. 7. for almost r. all, most. l. 13. for Bretan r. ●●●●an. l. 14. for sorda r, eorda. p. 400. l. 28. for albe r. able. p. 419. l. 2. for Hisparians r. Hipparians. l. 3. for Cleotimac r. Cleotimas. l. 17. for Peleponensian r. Peleponesian. and for Ob r. Obe. p. 427. for Fifthly, Sixthly, and Seventhly, r. Fourthly, Fifthly, Sixthly. p. 430. l. 13. for keep r. help. p. 437. l. 24. for hopes r. hops. p. 446. l. 37. for end r. and. p. 452. l. 31. for Fung r. Fangs. p. 459. l. 1. for Brats r. Brut●. p. 461. l. 7. for Colbar r. Cobbam. l. 25. for Rebellious r. Rubellius. p. 462. l. 43. for rare r. race. p. 467. l. 28. for Praeter r. Praetor. p. 468. l. 1. for discovered r. described. p. 469. l. 11. for milder r. middle.   

A Catalogue of Books, Printed for, and Sold by, Robert Clavel, at the Peacock in St. Paul's Churchyard.  

Books in Folio.  
A Companion to the Temple, or a Help to Devotion, in the Use of the Common Prayer; divided into Four Parts. 1. Of Morning and Evening Prayer. 2. Of the Litany, with the Occasional Prayers and Thanksgivings. 3. Of the Communion-Office, with the Offices of Baptism, Catechism, and Confirmation. 4. Of the Occasional Offices, viz. Matrimony, Visitation of the Sick, etc. The whole being carefully corrected, and now put into one Volume. By Thomas Comber D. D. Preceptor of York.  
A Practical and Polemical Commentary or Exposition upon the Third and Fourth Chapters of the latter Epistle of St. Paul to Timothy. By Thomas Hall B. D.  
A Course of Divinity; or, An Introduction to the Knowledge of the True Catholic Religion, especially as professed by the Church of England: In Two Parts. The one containing the Doctrine of Faith; the other, the Form of Worship. By Matthew Scrivener.  
Etymologicon Linguae Anglicanae, seu Explicatio Vocum Anglicarum Etymologica ex propriis Fontibus, scil. ex Linguis duodecim; Anglo-Saxonica seu Anglica prisca, notata A. S. Runica, Gothica, Cimbrica seu Danica antiqua, notata Run. Dan. Franco-Theotisca, seu Teutonica vetere, notata Fr. Th. Danica recentiori, notata Dan. rec. Belgica, notata Belg. Teutonica recentiori, notata Teut. Cambro-Britannica, notata C. Br. Franco-Gallica, notata Fr. Italica, notata It. Hispanica, notata Hisp. Latina, notata Lat. Graeca, notata Gr. Authore Stephano Skinner M.D.  
The Voyages and Travels of the Ambassadors sent by Frederick Duke of Holstein to the Great Duke of Muscovy, and the King of Persia; begun in the Year 1633. and finished in 1639. Containing a complete History of Muscovy, Tartary, Persia, and other adjacent Countries; with several Public Transactions, reaching near the present Times: In Seven Books. Whereto are added the Travels of John Albert de Manstelslo, a Gentleman belonging to the Embassy from Persia into the East-Indies; containing a particular Description of Indosthan, the mogul's Empire, the Oriental Islands, Japan, China, and the Revolutions which happened in those Countries within these few Years: In Three Books. The Whole illustrated with divers accurate Maps and Figures. Written originally in Italian by Adam Oliarias, Secretary to the Embassy. Rendered into English by John Davies of Kidwelly. The Second Impression.  
The History of the Execrable Irish Rebellion, traced from many preceding Acts, to the Grand Eruption, October 23. 1641. and thence pursued to the Act to Settlement in 1662.  
The Journals of all the Parliaments during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth; both of the House of Lords, and House of Commons. Collected by Sir Simon D' Ewes of Stow-Hall in the County of Suffolk, Knight and Baronet. Revised and published by Paul Bows Esq of the Middle Temple.  
I Ragguagli di Parnassus; or, Advertisements from Parnassus, in Two Centuries: With the Politic Touchstone. Written originally in Italian, by that Famous Roman, Tra●ano Bocalini: And now put into English by the Right Honourable Henry Earl of Monmouth.  
Cosmography and Geography: In Two Parts. The First containing the general and absolute Part of Cosmography, being a Translation from that eminent and much-esteemed Geographer Varenius; wherein are at large handled all such Arts as are necessary to be understood for the true knowledge thereof. To which is added, the much wanted Schemes, omitted by the Author. The Second Part being a Geographical Description of the World, taken from the Notes and Works of the Famous Monsieur Sanson, late Geographer to the French King. To which is added about One hundred Cosmographical, Geographical, and Hydrographical Tables, of several Kingdoms and Isles in the World, with their Chief Cities, Seaports, Bays, etc. Drawn from the Maps of the said Sanson: Illustrated with Maps.  
The Annals of King James and King Charles the First of ever Happy Memory; containing a faithful History and impartial Account of the Great Affairs of State, and Transactions of Parliaments in England, from the Tenth Year of King James, 1612. to the Eighteenth of King Charles, 1642. Wherein several material Passages relating to the late Civil Wars (omitted in former Histories) are made known.  
A perfect Copy of all the Summons of the Nobility to the Great Councils and Parliaments of this Realm, from the Forty ninth of King Henry the Third, until these present Times: With Catalogues of such Noblemen as have been summoned to Parliament in Right of their Wives; and of such other Noblemen as derive their Titles of Honour from the Heirs Female from whom they are descended, and of such Nobleman's Eldest Sons as have been summoned to Parliament by some of their Father's Titles. Extracted from Public Records, by Sir William Dugdale Knight, Garter, Principal King at Arms.  
The History of the Affairs of Europe in this present Age; but more particularly of the Republic of Venice. Written in Italian by Baptista Nani Cavalier, and Procurator of St. Mark. Englished by Sir Robert Honywood Knight.  
The History of Barbadoes, St. Christopher's, Mevis, St. Vincents, Antego, Martinico, Monserrat, and the rest of the Caribby-Islands, in all Twenty eight: In Two Books. The First containing the Natural, the Second the Moral History of those Islands. Illustrated with several Pieces of Sculpture, representing the most considerable Rarities therein described.  
The Works of the Famous Nicolas Machiavelli, Citizen and Secretary of Florence. Written originally in Italian, and now faithfully translated into English.  
A Complete Treatise of Preternatural Tumours, both General and Particular, as they appear in Humane Bodies, from Head to Foot. To which also are added many excellent and Modern Historical Observations, concluding most Chapters in the whole 〈…〉 Discourse.  
The Present State of the Ottoman Empire, from the Year 1623. to the Year 1677. Containing the Reigns of the Three last Emperors, viz. Sultan Morat, or Amurat the Fourth, Sultan Ibrahim, and Sultan Mahomet the Fourth, his Son, the Thirteenth Emperor. By Sir Paul Ricaut late Consul at Smyrna.  
The History of the Cardinals of the Roman Church, from the time of their first Creation, to the Election of Pope Clement the Ninth: With a full Account of his Conclaves. In three Parts. Written in Italian by the Author of the Nepotismo di Roma.  
The World Surveyed; or, The Famous Voyages and Travels of Vincent le Blanc of Marcelles, into the East and West Indies, Persia, Pegu, Fez, Morocco, Guinny, and through all Africa, and the Principal Provinces of Europe.  
A General Collection of Discourses of the Virtuosos of France, upon Questions of all sorts of Philosophy, and other Natural Knowledge. Made in the Assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris, by the most Ingenious Persons of that Nation. Englished by G. haver's. In two Volumes.  
A Treatise of the Sibyls, giving an Account of the Names and Numbers of them, of their Qualities, the Form and Matter of their Verses, and of their Books. Written in French by David blondel. Englished by Jo. Davis of Kidwelly.  
Tracts written by John Selden Esq of the Inner Temple. The first entitled, Ja●● Anglorum Facies altera. Rendered into English, with large Notes thereupon, by Redman Westcoat Gent. The second, England's Epinomis. The third, Of the Original of Ecclesiastical Jurisdictions of Testaments. The fourth, Of the Disposition or Administration of Intestate Estates. Printed for Tho. Basset and R. Chiswell, and sold by R. Clavell.  
Basilica Chymica, & Praxis Chymiatrica: or, Royal and Practical Chemistry augmented and enlarged. By John Hartman. To which is added, His Treatise of Signatures of Internal Things, or a true and lively Anatomy of the Greater and Lesser World; as also the Practice of Chemistry of John Har●man M. D. augmented and enlarged by his Son, with considerable Additions. All faithfully Englished by a Lover of Chemistry.  
The Complete Chemical Dispensatory, in Five Books; treating of all sorts of Metals, Precious Stones, and Minerals; of all Vegetables and Animals, and Things that are taken from them, as Musk, Civet, etc. How rightly to know them, and how they are to be used in Physic, with their several Doses. The like Work never extant before. Being very proper for all Merchants, Druggist's, Surgeons, and Apothecaries, and such Ingenious Persons as study Physic or Philosophy. Written in Latin by Dr. John Scroder, that most Famous and Faithful Chemist; and Englished by William Rowland Doctor of Physic.  
The Royal Pharmacopaea, Galenical and Chemical, according to the Practice of the most Eminent and Learned Physicians of France; and published with their several Approbations. By Moses Charras, the King's Chief Operator in his Royal Garden of Plants. Faithfully Englished, and illustrated with several Copper Plates.  
An Abridgement of divers Cases and Resolutions of the Common Law, Alphabetically digested under several Titles. By Henry Rolls Sergeant at Law. Published by the Lord Chief Baron Hales, and approved by all the Judges.  
The Reports of Sir George Croke Knight. In three Volumes, in English. Allowed of by all the Judges. The second Edition, carefully corrected by the Original.  
Les Reports de Henry roll Sergeant del' Ley, de divers Cases en le Court del' Bank le Roy, en le Temps del' Reign de Roy Jaques, Colligees par luy mesme, & Imprimees par l' Original.  
Brief Animadversions on, Amendments of, and Additional Explanatory Records to the Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts. By William Prynne Esq  
Brevia Judicialia: or, An exact Collection of approved Forms of all sorts of Judicial Writs in the Common Bench, together with their Returns. By Richard Brownlow.  
Thesaurus Brevium: or, A Collection of approved Forms of all sorts of Original and Judicial Writs in the King's Bench, with their special Directions. By J. C.   

Folio stitched.  
The Order of the Installation of Henry Duke of Norfolk, Henry Earl of Peterborough, and Laurence Earl of Rochester, Knights and Companions of the most Noble Order of the Garter, in the Royal, Chappel of St. George at Windsor, July 22. 1685.  
The General Catalogue of Books, English and Latin, continued from the Year 1666. to the end of Michaelmas Term, 1685.  
The late Proposals of Union among Protestants, Review'd and Rectified. Being a Vindication of the most Reverend Father in God, Edwin Lord Archbishop of York; and the Reverend Dr. Tillotson, Dean of Canterbury, from the Misprisions of an Apocryphal Proposer; with a full Answer to his Proposal, presented to the Parliament.   

Books in Quarto.  
An Historical Vindication of the Divine Right of Tithes, from Scripture, Reason, and the Opinion and Practice of Jews, Gentiles, and Christians in all Ages. Designed to supply the Omissions, answer the Objections, and rectify the Mistakes of Mr. Selden's History of Tithes. Part I. The second Edition corrected and amended. By Thomas Comber D. D. Preceptor of York.  
An Historical Vindication of the Divine Right of Tithes; which is further proved by Scripture and Antiquity, and illustrated by the Solemn Consecration and great Convenience of them: With an Answer to the Objections of other Authors against them. Part II. To which is added, A Discourse concerning Excommunication. By Thomas Comber D. D. Preceptor of York.  
Brutum Fulmen: or, The Bull of Pope Pius the Fifth, concerning the Damnation, Excommunication, and Deposition of Queen Elizabeth; as also the Absolution of her Subjects of their Oath of Allegiance; with a peremptory Injunction, upon pain of an Anathema, never to obey any of her Laws or Commands: With some Observations and Animadversions upon it. By Thomas Lord Bishop of Lincoln. Whereunto is annexed the Bull of Pope Paul the Third, containing the Damnation, Excommunication, etc. of King Henry the Eighth.  
The Protestant Peacemaker: or, A seasonable Persuasive to all serious Christians, who call themselves Protestant's, That laying aside Calumnies, and all exasperating Disputes, they would pursue Charity, Peace, and Union, as the only means (now left us) of Safety, and Reformation of the Public Manners: With a Postscript, or Notes on Mr. Baxter, and some other late Writings for Peace. By Edward Lord Bishop of Cork and Ross in Ireland.  
A Treatise of Spousals, and Matrimonial Contracts: Wherein all the Questions relating to that Subject are ingeniously Debated and Resolved. By Mr. Henry Swinburne, Author of the Treatise of Wills and Testaments.  
The Geometrical Key, or the Gate of Equations unlocked: A new Discovery of the Construction of all Equations, howsoever affected, not exceeding the Fourth Degree; viz. of Linears, Quadratics, Cubics, Biquadratics, and the finding of all the Roots, as well false as true, without the Use of Mesolabe, Trisection of Angles, without Reduction, Depression, or any other previous Preparation of Equations by a Circle, and any (and that but one only) Parabole; and this by one only General Rule, and than which, a more Simple, more Perfect, more General, more Easy to be understood, or more fit for Practice, cannot be devised or wished for. Fortified with Demonstrations, illustrated with Figures to each Equation, and exemplified with Numeral Equations (according to all the variety of Cases) adapted to each Figure. By Thomas Baker Fellow of the Royal Society.  
The History of Gavelkind, with the Etymology thereof; containing a Vindication of the Laws of England, together with a short History of William the Conqueror. By Silas Taylor.   

Quarto stitched.  
Bishop of St. David's Answer to Sidney's Speech.  
— A short Way to a lasting Settlement.  
— Billa Vera; or, An Arraignment of Ignoramus.  
— Verbum dici: A Word in season.  
An Admonition to a Deist.  
The Complete Conformist; or, Seasonable Advice concerning strict Conformity, and frequent Colebration of the Holy Communion. By Dennis Grenville D. D. Dean of Durham.  
Religion and Loyalty supporting each other: or, A Rational Account how the Loyal Addressers, maintaining the Lineal Descent of the Crown, is very consistent with their Affection to the established Protestant Religion.  
Dr. Standish's Sermon at the Temple.  
— before the Lord Mayor of London.  
— at the Assize at Hartford.  
Elston's Visitation-Sermon before the Bishop of Exeter.  
Laxton at the Funeral of Christoph. Sherrard Esq  
Warren of Religious Loyalty.  
— of the End of Christ's Advent.  
We●ge of the Excellency of Man's Soul.  
Davison of the Fall of Angels.  
Dr. Morris his Sermon 30 Jan. before the King.  
Bishop of Ely's Sermon 30 Jan.  
— At the Coronation of King James the Second and Queen Mary.  
Dr. Gower's Sermon on Christmas-day, 1684.  
Archbishop of Tuam's Sermon before the King at Windsor.  
Dr. Comber's Sermon of Oaths.   

Plays.  
Andronicus Commenius, a Tragedy. By Jo. Wilson.  
Heracleus Emperor of the East, a Tragedy. By Lodowick Carbel Esq  
Lancashire Witches.   

Books in Octavo large.  
Short Discourses upon the whole Common Prayer, designed to inform the Judgement, and excite the Devotion of such as daily use the same. By Tho. Comber D. D. Preceptor of York.  
The Mystery of Rhetoric unveiled: Wherein above 130 of the Tropes and Figures are severally derived from the Greek into English, together with lively Definitions, and variety of Latin, English, Scriptural Example's, pertinent to each of him apart. Eminently delightful and profitable for young Scholars, and others of all sorts; enabling to discern and imitate and Elegancy in any Author they read, etc. By John Smith Gent.  
The Art of Chemistry, as it is now practised. Written in French by P. Thybault, Chemist to the French King; and Englished by W. A. Doctor in Physic, and Fellow of the Royal Society.  
Aurora Chymica: or, A Rational Way of preparing Animals, Vegetables, and Minerals for a Physical Use; by which Preparation they are made most efficacious, safe, and pleasant Medicines, for the Preservation of the Life of Man. By Edw. Bolnest Med. Reg. Ord.  
A Complete Treatise of Preternatural Tumours, both General and Particular, as they appear in Humane Bodies, from Head to Foot. To which also are added many excellent and Modern Historical Observations, concluding most Chapters in the whole Discourse. Collected from the Learned both of Ancient and Modern Physicians and Surgeons.  
The Surgeons Storehouse, furnished with Forty three Tables cut in Brass; in which are all sorts of Instruments, both Ancient and Modern, useful for the performance of all Manual Operations, with an exact Description of every Instrument; together with 100 choice Observations of Famous Cures performed; with three Indices. 1. Of the Instruments: 2. Of Cures performed: And, 3. Of things Remarkable. Written by Johannes Scultetus, a famous Physician and Chirurgeon of ulme in Suevia. Faithfully translated into English by E. B.  
The Complete Chemist: or, A new Treatise of Chemistry, teaching, by a short and easy Method, all its most necessary Preparations. Written in French by Nicholas Glazier, Apothecary in Ordinary to the French King and the Duke of Orleans; and from the Fourth Edition, revised and augmented by the Author, and now faithfully Englished by a Fellow of the Royal Society.  
Il Nepotismo di Roma: or, The History of the Pope's Nephews, from the time of Sixtus the Fourth, Anno 1471. to the Death of the late Pope Alexander the Seventh, Anno 1667. In two Parts. Written Originally in Italian, and Englished by W. A. fellow of the Royal Society.  
The Present State of Egypt: or, A new Relation of a late Voyage into that Kingdom, performed in the Years 1672. and 1673. by Fr. Vansleb R. D. Wherein you have an Exact and true Account of many rare and wonderful Particulars of that Ancient Kingdom. Englished by M. D. R. D.  
The History of the Government of Venice, wherein the Policies, Counsels, Magistrates, and Laws of that State are fully related, and the Use of the Ballotting Box exactly described. Written in the Year 1675. by the Sieur Amelott de la Houssa●e, Secretary to the French Ambassador at Venice.  
The Present State of the Ottoman Empire: In three Books. Containing the Maxims of the Turkish Policy, their Religion, and Military Discipline. Illustrated with divers Figures. Written by Sir Paul Ricaut, than Secretary to the English Ambassador there, and since Consul at Smyrna.  
The Memoires of Philip de Comines Lord of Argenton: Containing the History of Lewis the Eleventh, and Charles the Eighth, Kings of France; with the most Remarkable Occurrences in their particular Reigns, from the Year 1404. to 1498. Revised and corrected from divers Manuscripts and Ancient Impressions, by Dennis Godfrey Counsellor and Historiographer to the French King; and from his Addition, lately printed at Paris, newly translated into English.  
A Relation of three Embassies from His Majesty Charles the Second, to the Great Duke of Muscovy, the King of Sweden, and the King of Denmark. Performed by the Right Honourable the Earl of Carlisle, in the Year 1663. and 1664. By an Attendant on the Embassies.  
The Secret History of the Court of the Emperor Justinian. Written by Procopius of Caesarea. Faithfully rendered into English.  
The History of the late Revolutions of the Empire of the Great Mogul, together with the most considerable Passages for many Years in that Empire; with a new Map of it. To which is added, An Account of the Extent of Industan, the Circulation of the Gold and Silver of the World to discharge itself there; as also the Riches, Forces, and Justice of the same, and the Principal Cause of the Decay of the States of Asia. By Monsieur F. Bernier, Physician of the Faculty of Montpelier. Englished out of French by H. O. Secretary to the Royal Society.  
The Voyage of Italy: or, A Complete Journey through Italy. In two Parts. With the Character of the People, and the Description of the Chief Towns, Churches, Monasteries, Tombs, Libraries, Palaces, Villas, Gardens, Pictures, Statues, and Antiquities. As also of the Interest, Government, Riches, Force, etc. of all the Princes, with Instructions concerning Travel. By Richard Lassels Gent. who traveled through Italy five times, as Tutor to several of the English Nobility and Gentry.  
The History of France under the Ministry of Cardinal Mazarine; viz. from the Death of King Lewis the Thirteenth, to the Year 1664. Wherein all the Affairs of State to that time are exactly related, by Benjamin Priolo; and faithfully Englished by Chr. Wase Gent.  
The History of the Twelve Caesars, Emperors of Rome. Written in C. Suetonius Tranquillus. Newly translated into English, and illustrated with all the Caesar's Heads in Copper Plates.  
The Complete Gentleman; or, Direction for the Education of Youth, as to their Breeding at home, and Travelling abroad. By J. Gailliard Gent. who hath been Tutor abroad to several of the Nobility and Gentry.  
The Annals of Love, containing Select Histories of the Amours of divers Prince's Courts, pleasantly related.  
Deceptio Pisus: or, Seeing and Believing are two things. A pleasant Spanish History, faithfully translated. In two Books.  
The Loves of sundry Philosophers, and other Great Men. Translated out of French.  
The Novels of Dom Francisco de Quevedo Villegas, Knight of the Order of St. James; faithfully Englished. Whereunto is added, The Marriage of Belphegor, an Italian Novel. Translated from Machiavelli.  
A Relation of the Siege of Candia, from the first Expedition of the French Forces under the Command of M. de la Fuillada Duke of Koannez, to its Surrender Sept. 27. 1669. Written in French by a Gentleman who was a Volunteer in that Service, and faithfully Englished.  
The Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches, Anno Christi 1678. By Sir Paul Ricault late Consul at Smyrna, and Fellow of the Royal Society.  
The Rights of the Bishops to judge in Capital Cases in Parliament, cleared. Being a full Answer to two Books lately published; the first entitled, A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend, etc. the other, A Discourse of the Peerage and Jurisdiction of the Lords Spiritual in Parliament; endeavouring to show the contrary.  
A Resolution of Conscience touching Impositions.  
Suffragium Protestantium: Wherein our Governors are justified in their Impositions and Proceed against Dissenters: Meisner also and the Verdict rescued from the Cavils and Seditious Sophistry of the Protestant Reconciler. By the Right Reverend Father in God, the Lord Bishop of St. David's.  
The Living Temple: or, A designed Improvement of that Notion, That a Good Man is the Temple of God. By John whither M. A. sometimes Fellow of M. Coll. Oxford.  
A Friendly Conference between a Minister and a Parishioner of his inclining unto Quakerism, etc. With the Vindication of it from the Exceptions of Thomas Ellwood, in the pretended Answer to the said Conference.  
Thirteen Sermons preached before King Charles the Second in His Exile, by the late Reverend Henry Byam D. D. Rector of Luckham, Canon of Exeter, and one of His Majesty's Chaplains in Ordinary. With the Testimony given of him at his Funeral by Hamnet Ward D. D.  
Counsel and Directions Divine and Moral, in plain and familiar Letters of Advice from a Divine of the Church of England, to a young Gentleman his Nephew, soon after his Admission into a College in Oxford.  
The Christian's Defence against the Fears of Death, with seasonable Directions how to prepare ourselves to die well. Written originally in French, by the late Reverend Divine of the Protestant Church of Paris, Char. Drelincourt; And translated into English by M. D' Assigny B. D.  
A Discourse of Natural and Moral Impotency. By Joseph Truman B. D.  
Aminta, the famous Italian Pastoral, translated into English.  
Paradise Regained, a Poem, in four Books. To which is added, Samson Agonistes. The Author John Milton.  
The Fables of Aesop, in two Volumes: paraphrased in Verse, adorned with 100 Copper Sculptures, and illustrated with Annotations. By John Ogilby Esq  
Actions upon the Case for Slander: or, A Methodical Collection, under certain Heads, of thousands of Cases, dispersed in the many great Volumes of the Law, of what Words are Actionable, and what not; and of a Conspiracy and Libel. By William Sheppard Esq  
An Exact Abridgement, in English, of the Cases reported by Sir Francis Moor Knight, with the Resolution of the Points of Law therein by the Judges.   

Books in Octavo small, and Twelves.  
Sterometry made easy; or, The Description and Use of a new Gauging Rod, or Sliding Rule; by which the content of any Tun, Copper, Cask, or other Vessel, may be readily found, either the Whole, or any Part thereof, the Area's of Circles in Gallons and Barrels being found, by Inspection only: as also the Extraction of the Square and Cube Root, Questions concerning Interest and Annuities, and many other Arithmetical Problems, are hereby resolved, without Pen or Compasses. To which is added, An Appendix, containing the Description and Use of another New Rule, very useful in Gauging of Words, and resolving Questions in the Mensuration of Solids and Superficies. With a Table of the Area's of Circles, and Contents of Cylinders, in Ale-Gallons. Calculated to every tenth part of an Inch, from 12 to 156 Inches Diameter. By Tho. Everard, Philomath.  
The Policy and Government of the Venetians, both in Civil and Military Affairs. Written in French by the Sieur de la hay, and faithfully Englished.  
An Enquiry whether Oral Tradition, or the Sacred Writings, be the safest Conservatory and Conveyance of Divine Truths, down from their Original Delivery, through all succeeding Ages.  
The Rules of Civility; or, Certain Ways of Deportment observed amongst all Persons of Quality, upon several Occasions. Newly revised, and much enlarged.  
A Breviate of the Proceed of France, from the Pyrenaean Treaty to this time.  
Grammatica Reformata; Or, A general Examination of the Art of Grammar, as it hath been successively delivered by Franciscus Sanchus in Spain, by Gasper Scioppius in France, by Gerardus Joannes Vossius in the Lower Germany, and Methodised by the Oxford Grammarian, in his Observations upon Lilly. By John Twells Schoolmaster.  
Fundamenta Grammatices; or, The Foundation of the Latin Tongue: Being an Explanation of the Eight Parts of Speech, with a more easy Method for the Declining of Nouns, terminating the Declensions, Comparing of Adjectives, Conjugating of Verbs, etc. Also Propria quae maribus, Quae genus, and As in praesenti, examined, and made plain to the meanest Capacity; with the meaning of all the Rules in Syntaxis, with the particular Examples of each Rule applied and parsed, for the Use and Benefit of all those that desire to be instructed in the Latin Tongue.  
A Course of Catechising: Being the Marrow of all Orthodox and Practical Expositions upon the Church-Catechism, and of all Controversies upon the Church-Customs and Observances. Digested into Fifty two Heads, for Fifty two Sundays in the Year. Useful for Ministers and their People, Schoolmasters and their Scholars, Parents and Children, Masters and Servants. Illustrated with many Copper Pieces, fitted to the several Occasions.  
Seneca, with Farnaby's Notes. Printed for R. Scot, Tho. Basset, R. Ch●swell, etc. and sold by R. Clavell.  
Aesop's Fables in Greek and Latin. Printed for Jo. Redmayne, and sold by R. Clavell.  
Midicina Instaurata: or, A brief Account of the true Grounds and Principles of the Art of Physic, with the insufficiency of the Vulgar Way of Preparing Medicines, and the Excellency of such as are made by Chemical Operation. Whereunto is added, A plain Discourse, as a Light to the True Preparation of Animal and Vegetable Animals, with a Discovery of the true Subject of the Philosophical Mineral Mercury; and that from the Authorities of the most Famous Philosophers. By Edw. Bolnest M. D.  
The Temperate Man, or, the right way of preserving Life and Health, together with the soundness of the Senses, Judgement and Memory, unto extreme old Age: in three Treatises, the first written by the learned Leonardus Lessius; the second by Lodowick Cornaro, a Noble Gentleman of Venice; the third by a Famous Italian, faithfully Englished.  
Two plain and profitable Discourses upon the two Sacraments; the first laying open the nature of Baptism, and pressing the serious Consideration, and Religious observation of the second Vow made by all Christians in their Baptism: the other pressing as earnestly the frequent renewing of our Baptismal Vow at the Lords Holy Table, demonstrating the undispensable necessity of receiving, and the great sin and danger of neglecting the Lords Supper.  
The present State of the Princes and Republics of Italy, with observations on them; the second Edition enlarged, with the manner of electing Popes, and a Character of Spain.  
Treason's Masterpiece, or a Conference held at Whitehall between Oliver Cromwell, the late Usurper, and a Committee of the then pretended Parliament, who desired him to take upon him the Title of King of England, etc. with an intent to exclude the Royal Line, wherein many of the Leading Men of those times did by unanswerable Arguments assert, and prove Monarchy to be the only, Legal, Ancient, and Necessary Form of Government in these Kingdoms.  
Usury stated. Whereunto are adjoined some Animadversions on Mr. Bolton's and Mr. Capel's Discourses concerning the same Subject.  
Schematologia Grammatica examplis tam Graecis quam Latinis illustrata, ad defectus Grammatices vulgaris in hac parte supplendos. Autore Michaele Gilberto, A. M.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or, a History of Fevers, composed according to such use of the Parts, circulation of the Blood, and the various Offices both of the Limpid Liquor, and Nervous Juice, as have been the happy Discoveries of Modern Anatomy; together with a more particular description of the uses of the Spleen and Pancreas; as also of the manner of Nature's proceeding in the several motions of Fermentation and Ebullition, than hath been formerly divulged.  
The present state of the United Provinces of the Low-Countries, as to the Government, Laws, Forces, Riches, Manners, Customs, Revenue, and Territory of the Dutch: in three Books; Collected by W. A. Fellow of the Royal Society.  
Accidence Commenced Grammar, and supplied with sufficient Rules; or a new and easy Method for the learning of the Latin Tongue. The Author John Milton.  
The Golden Calf which the World adores and desires; in which is handled the most rare and incomparable wonder of Nature in transmitting Metals. viz. How the entire substance of Lead was in one moment transmitted into Gold Obrison, with an exceeding true Particle of the Philosopher's Stone at the Hague, in the year 1666; written in Latin by John Frederick Helvesius, Doctor and Practitioner of Medicine at the Hague: faithfully Englished.  
Medicina Statica; or Rules of Health, in eight Sections of Aphorisms, Originally written by Sanctorius, chief Professor of Physic at Milan, Englished by J. D.  
Physic for Families, or the new, safe, and powerful way of Physic upon constant proof established, enabling every one at Sea or Land by the Medicines herein mentioned, to cure themselves, their Friends and Relations, in all Distempers and Diseases; without any trouble, hazard, pain, or danger of Purges, Vomits, Bleeding, Issues, Glisters, Blisters, Opium, Antimony and Quicksilver, so full of perplexity in Sickness, by W. Welwyn Physician.  
Compendium Politicum, or the Distempers of Government under these two Heads, The Nobilities desire of Rule, The Commons desire of Liberty, with their proper Remedies in a brief Essay on the long Reign of King Henry III. By J. Y. of Grays-Inn Esquire.    

Books newly Printed.  
Of the Excellency of Monarchical Government, especially of the English Monarchy: Wherein is largely treated of the several Benefits of Kingly Government, and the Inconvenience of Commonwealths. Also of the several Badges of Sovereignty in general, and particularly according to the Constitution of our Laws. Likewise, of the Duty of Subjects, and the Mischiefs of Faction, Sedition, and Rebellion. In all which, the Principles and Practices of our late Commonwealthsmen are considered. By Nathaniel Johnston Doctor in Physic.  
Sir William Dugdale's Summons of the Nobility to the Great Councils and Parliaments of this Kingdom, etc.  
Dr. Combers First and Second Book about Tithes, with a Discourse of Excommunication.  
Dr. Stern Archbishop of York, his Book of Logic. In Octavo.  
Dean of Durham his Counsel and Directions, Moral and Divine to a Young Gent.  
Swinborns Treatise of Spousals and Matrimonial Contracts.  
The Installation of the Duke of Norfolk, Earl of Peterborough, and Earl of Rochester, all newly published.