Vera Effigies Conradi Reinking Anno Aetatis Suoe. 43. portrait of Conradus Reinking Printed for Thomas Howkins, in George Yard In Lombard street. F. H. van. Hove. Sculp. ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟ'Σ ΜΕ'ΓΑΣ: THE Grand Politician, OR THE SECRET ART OF State-Policy DISCOVERED. IN Evident Demonstrations of unparelleled Prudence, and confirmed with Wonderful and Successful Adventures, Stratagems, and Exploits of Wisdom and Subtilty; both in Peace and War, by the most remarkable Wits of former Ages. BEING A Treatise both useful and necessary for all Nobles, Statesmen, Judges, Lawyers, Justices of Peace, Officers of War, and all such as now are, or may happen to stand at the Helm of Public Affairs, whether in Kingdom or Commonwealth. Written Originally in Latin, by Conradus Reinking Chancellor to his Electoral Highness, the Duke of Brandenburg, and now done into English, by a careful Hand. Golz. Prudentia gubernantur Regiones, quarum limites tyrannide nunquam extenduntur. Licenced and Entered according to Order. London, Printed for Tho. Howkins in George Yard in Lombard street, MDCXCI, TO THE Right Honourable, THE E. of Nottingham, Principal Secretary of State, TO Their Present Majesties Right Honourable, AS there are no Sea-Officers, to whom Gratitude is more due, than Knowing and Careful Pilots; so is there no Minister, either in Kingdom or Commonwealth, to whom the People own greater Obligations. Duty, and Respect, than to a Wise, and Well-deserving Secretary of State; as being one who constantly standeth at the Helm of Public Affairs, to Wether the Common Interest, against all the Storms, and Tempests, of Seditious, Vainglorious, and Aspiring Opposers. For this Cause, I have thrown in the Mite of my Humble Respects, in the Treasury of your public Deservings, as a Token, and Acknowledgement, of the vast Sum of Service and Respects, the Kingdom is indebted to your Lordship's Prudence, Care, and Candour; that if, like the Unthankful Lepers, most should prove forgetful of your Lordship's Favours, some, at least, may Acknowledge the Debt, tho' all be not able to pay the Interest. I Humbly present your Lordship with this small Treatise; Written Originally in Latin, and am sorry it is of no greater Extract than a Translation: However, Non defero Noctuam Athenas, nor proffer it as a Supplement to the full Orb of your Lordship's Qualifications; for the Sun never borrowed a Ray from any Inferior Planet, though, on Rational Grounds, this small Treatise, or little wand'ring Meteor, beggeth a Beam of your Lordship's Favour, that, with Confidence, it may appear in the open World. Thus, may it be said, in this Case, as Ovid, in such another. Atque Ajax Armis, non Ajaci Arma petuntur. So this small Treatise, and Foreign Politician, humbly beggeth the Honour of your Lordship's Patronage and Protection: which, if granted, will effectually Legitimate all the Mistakes, and Oversights, which might have been committed by a Germane Statesman. Thus, humbly begging your Lordship's Acceptance, I make bold to Subscribe myself, Your Lordship's most Humble, and Devoted Servant, PAT. KER. August 27. 1690. THE TRANSLATOR TO THE READER. Courteous Reader, I Here present you with, this little Treatise of Germane Policy: And though perhaps you may repute yourself as Wise as the Author, you may reap here some Ears of Wisdom, Prudence, and Policy, as may relish the Appetite of your Expectation, and keep you from grudging the perusal of so small a Book. It is come of a Germane Pedigree, written Originally in Latin (though never heretofore in Print) by the famous and well known Minister of State, Conradus Reinking, Chancellor to his Electoral Highness, the Duke of Brandenburg, and at the Request of some his Country Men, here at London, now Translated into English, and published to the World's view. I wish the Book may be reputed as famous within the Isle of Great Britain, as the Author was in his own Country. And it is reason that we should be kind to this Stranger, which presenteth to us the first Fruits of a Germane Wit, before it's own Countrymen. The Subject is great, and much to be desired; for as Phocilides saith, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Agros, Navem, urbes sapientia sola gubernat. Et Pythagoras. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Et vis, et telum, et Murus, prudentia vitae est. And as it is great and much , so is it but by few attainable, though every one, for the most part, reputeth himself a Politician, and able to manage Affairs of greatest weight and consequence. Thus Reader, leaving the Censure of this Germane Politician, to your own gentle Nature, and courteous candour, I rest Your Friend and Servant, P. K. THE Contents. THE Art of persuading to a Belief of Things unknown. Intrigue 1. Page 3. The Art of persuading one that you know fewer Secrets. Int. 2 p. 5 The Art of obtaining what you desire from your Enemy. Int. 3 p. 6 The Art of obtaining what one desireth, without ask, but by giving occasion. Int. 4 p. 8 The Art of obtaining hard and difficult Things, Intr. 5 p. 9 How to disarm and weaken an Enemy. Int. 6 p. 12 How to Dissemble. Int. 7 p. 15 How to persuade, and dissuade, Int. 8 p. 17 How to obtain what you desire, without danger of losing the Favour of him whom you desire it of. Int. 9 p. 30 How to obtain what you desire, when the Person whom you desire it of is altogether averse. Int. 10 p. 3 How to force a Confession from one who is obstinate. Int. 11 p. 33 How to force a thing from one by that which he most hateth. Int. 12 p. 34 How to search out fewer Secrets. Int. 13 p. 40 How to find out ones Secrets, by Insinuating with another who is privy to them. Int. 14 p. 41 How to induce one to confess all his secret faults. Int. 15 p. 44 How to find out the Secrets of Drunken Men. Int. 16 p. 45 How to find out the Secrets of Sober Men. Int. 17 p. 46 How one may know what Reputation he is of, and what is his Character in the Eyes of others. Int. 18 p. 47 How one may find out the Judgement of others, in a Case that concerneth himself. Int. 19 p. 48 How to know whether a suspected Person be Guilty or not. Int. 20 p. 51 How to know Secrets from Nature and Custom. Int. 21 p. 53 How to prevent and escape sudden Snares. Int. 22 p. 54 How to answer difficult and dubious Questions, without danger. Int. 23 p. 55 How to shun an Offensive Answer or Sentence. Int. 24 p. 57 How to shun a difficult Sentence. Int. 25 p. 58 How to speak one's Mind freely without danger. Int. 26 p. 62 How to speak what one pleaseth, without any danger. Int. 27 p. 63 How to shun the Reproach of an unhappy Adventure. Int. 28 p. 64 How to speak that which in itself, is dangerous without hurt. Int. 29 p. 66 How to shun that which is hateful to one, by a Jest. Int. 30 p. 67 How to reveal a Secret, without giving Offence to him who did inform you of it. Int. 31 p. 68 How to reprove one without giving Offence. Int. 32 p. 69 How to shun the Inconveniences of Jeers and Satyrs. Int. 33 p. 70 How to induce a Prince to hear one patiently. Int. 34 p. 73 How one ought to behave himself, and what course he should take when he is environed with danger and difficulties on all sides. Int. 35 p. 74 How Princes may conceal their hatred and private displeasure. Int. 36 p. 75 How to assuage the Insolences of a seditions City. Int. 37 p. 76 How to abrogate Privileges. Int. 38. ibid. How a Prince may frustrate an Enemy, with whom he intendeth to wage War. Int. 39 p. 77 How a weak Kingdom or Commonwealth may be delivered from the power of a potent Enemy. Int. 40 p. 78 How to molest Neighbouring Nations. Int. 41 p. 80 How to suppress those who are proud of their honourable Titles and Dignities. Int. 42 p. 81 How to keep under Men of ambitious and aspiring Spirits. Int. 43 p. 82 How to suppress seditious Soldiers. Int. 44 p. 84 How to suppress civil Seditions and Uproars. Int. 45 p. 85 How to know whether an Informer speaketh Truth or not. Int. 46 p. 87 How one ought to behave himself when he receiveth an injury from a person of Quality, far above him. Int. 47 p. 88 How to shun the Envy of Courtiers. Int. 48 p. 89 How one ought to behave himself with offended Princes and Peers. Int. 49 p. 91 How to suppress the Vices and wrong Sentences of partial Judges. Int. 50 p. 92 How to suppress Luxury. Int. 51 p. 93 How to render populous Cities unfit for Seditions and Insurrections, without loss or detriment. Int. 52 p. 94 How to appease an incensed People. Int. 53 p. 95 How to keep the Favour of New Subjects. Int. 54 p. 96 Why Merchandizing is forbidden to the Nobility. Int. 55 p. 98 Concerning the Instruments of Power. Int. 56 p. 99 How Statesmen ought to behave themselves, in assuming the Honour of Memorable Acts. Int. 57 p. 100 How to appease offended Princes. Int. 58 p. 101 How to impose Taxes without the offence of the Subjects. Int. 59 p. 102 How to Collect Taxes without offending the Subjects. Int. 60 p. 103 How Seditions are raised. Int. 61 p. 104 How Rebels and Conspirators are kept close together in one Body. Int. 62 p. 106 The Arts and Tricks of Tyrants. Int. 63 p. 107 How to punish Seditions Peers. Int. 64 p. 108 How to prevent Scarcity of Corn. Int. 65 p. 109 How to behave in time of Dearth. Int. 66. p. 110 How to preserve Corn. Int. 67 p. 113 How a Prince may best confer Honours and Places. Int. 68 p. 114 How to keep what is conquered by Force of Arms. Int. 69 p. 115 How to March an Army through a Foreign Country. Int. 70 p. 116 How a Prince should behave himself with a Contentious Neighbour, more powerful than himself. Int. 71 p. 117 How weaker Persons may prolong time in difficult Matters. Int. 72 p. 118 How to deny a thing without offence. Int. 73. p. 11 How to compose Seditions by Intercessors, Int. 74 p. 121 How to Suppress Sedition by Force. Int. 75 p. 122 How to Suppress Sedition by Force of Arms. Int. 76 p. 123 How to enter in Covenant. Int. 77. p. 125 How to keep up Favour and Authority at Court. Int. 78. p. 126 How a Prince, that is at Peace, should behave when his Neighbours are in War. Int. 79 p. 127 How to Disband Soldiers. Int. 80 p. 128 How Ministers of State may avoid great Dangers. Int. 84 p. 129 How to Aspire to Promotion. Int. 85 p. 130 How to delay an Inevitable War. Int. 86 p. 131 How to Govern New Provinces. Int. 87 p. 132 How to establish and settle New Conquests. Int. 88 p. 134 How to compose the Differences of the Nobility. Int. 89 p. 136 How one must behave that feareth a Repulse. Int. 90 p. 136 What Policy must be used by a General. Int. 91 p. 137 How to crush Reproachful Speeches. Int. 92. p. 138 How to obtain leave to departed from Court. Int. 93 Ibid. How to avoid Envy. Int. 94 p. 140 How to share Dominions among Brothers. Int. 95 p. 141 How to observe the due time of making a Truce. Int. 96 p. 143 How to change Commanders of an Army Int. 97 p. 144 How to draw up an Army. Int. 98 p. 145 How Ambassadors and Mediators may procure Peace. Int. 99 p. Ibid. How to dissemble the desire of Peace. Int. 100 p. 147 The Causes of Animosities and Insurrections. Int. 101 p. 148 What Cautions are to be used in proposing difficult Matters. Int. 102 p. 149 THE Grand Politician: OR, THE SECRET ART OF State-Policy DISCOVERED. PROEM. POLICY, in Word or Deed, whether in persuading Things Incredible, obtaining Things Desirable, forcing a belief of Things Impossible, of diving into Secrets, of shunning Inconveniences, etc. is as useful means, for Prudent and Pious Men, for obtaining a good and lawful end; as dangerous and abuseful to the Impious and Crafty, to prosecute a Mischievous Design: And, although State-Sophisters pervert it, to accomplish their pernicious Projects; the abuse thereof ought not to take away the right use of a Science, so Noble and Necessary in all Kingdoms and Commonwealths. As also, we daily see that that Prudence which is attained without Learning, by mere Experience, in Civil Affairs, is better and surer than that of those, who, from the Wit of Plato, and others, pretend to build Cities for the Benefit of a Commonwealth; in which it is questionable, whether Arrogance or Ignorance hath the upper hand. What I here Writ, I have had Trial of, and proved by Experienee, and long Continuance of Time; that thou, who readest them, mayst, sooner and after a happier and easter way, be made capable of standing at the Helm of Pubiick Affairs, and mayst contribute to thy own, as well as the common Interest. Use then, and intent these Maxims, and Stratagems of Policy to a good and honest end; if thou wouldst do thy Country Service, ●ain thyself Credit, and die in Favour with thy Prince and People. INTRIGUE 1. The Art of persuading things unknown. THAT your Hearer may believe that which he knoweth not, you must, from the Belief of things known, gain ground upon his Belief: First, by telling him things that he knoweth, as if you thought him Ignorant thereof, and that without any Confirmation. Then afterwards you must tell him Things which he doth not know, which you design he should believe; affirming them so confidently as if you had been a Witness thereto; proceeding from the aforesaid Things known, to persuade him unknown: After this Method. First of all (without committing Hyperbolies) faithfully tell him the clearest and likeliest Things, and what stand to Reason, which he cannot suspect or question; but very demurely and shamefastly, with a small Stopping or Hesitation; lest he repute you a precipitant Blab, that speaketh whatever falleth in your Head. But if you suspect that he thinketh that you understand not these things so well as he, avouch them with Confidence, lest you should be thought to dissemble. But if you perceive that he thinketh that you understand them as well as himself, than (as I have said) offer them with a kind of Hesitation, by telling him that you are not come to a full certainty of them, and that you have them but by report, and hear-say, which one ought not, easily, without questioning to believe. Then at last, to persuade him to believe that which he knoweth not, tell him, what you say, with as much Confidence, as if you had seen it. For by telling him at first injenuously these things whereof he is persuaded (after you have declared that you are not a Babbler, nor Credulous, nor Dissembler; but very cautious, and one that regards the true meaning of what is told you, little minding common Reports) you shall likewise lead him to the Belief of those Things which he knoweth not. Thus T. Labienus, after his defeat at the Battle of Pharsalia, making his escape to Pyrrachium, with Pompey's Forces, told Truth and Lies in a breath; Frontin. Lib. 2. and without concealing the event of the Battle, (in which he told downright of Pompey's defeat) but, underhand, told how Fortune was equal on both sides; forasmuch, as Caesar was most grieviously wounded; with as great Confidence as if he had seen the Wounds Bleeding. By which Story, he did put new Life and Courage in his defeated Soldiers. Truly if Labienus (who commanded in chief) had spoke with any sort of doubt, or striven to smuther the event of the Battle (which was so well known to them all) he had not been credited, as to the rest of his Story, concerning Caesar's Wounds. INTRIGUE II. The Art of persuading that you know fewer Secrets. YOU shall persuade others that you have come to the knowledge of Secrets, by one who pretends to have the Art of finding out Mysteries, and understanding Secret Matters, if in their presence, you give him some reward or gratuity, for the discovery thereof; for none will suspect that one should bestow his Gifts for nothing. Thus as Dionysius was very Anxious and Thoughtful, how he might escape all Snares; there came a Stranger to Syracuse, bragging, Potienus 5 Plutarch. Apoph. how he alone could tell the way how all Plotters might be known beforehand. As he was called to the Castle to Dionysius, and every Body else withdrawn. This (saith he) is the way to render you secure from Plots and Snares; make as if you had Learned of me the Art of knowing Conspirators, beforehand; which you shall render more credible, if in the presence of your Life-Gards, you bestow on me a Talon, as the reward of my Teaching. Dionysius being well satisfied with the Fancy, gave him a Talon accordingly; telling his Guards how he was taught an admirable Art of knowing Conspirators; beforehand: And they, believing it to be so, never durst afterwards be so bold as to hear of any Conspiracy against him. INTRIGUE. III. The Art of obtaining what you desire from your Enemy. YOU shall obtain what you desire of your Enemy, if you sergeant that you fear he shall do these things which you mainly wish he would do. Likewise, if you sergeant that you wish those things were done, which you would not at all have to be done. Thus Ventilius, in the Parthian War against King Pacorus, knowing that a certain Slave (a Tyrian by Nation, Frontin. Lib. I. Cap. 1. and one of these who seemed to be of their Allies) did acqu●int, the Parthians with all things that were done among them, did manage the Barbarous Villain's Treachery so, as to serve his own Conveniences; for being grieviously afraid that the Parthians would, without delay, pass over the Euphrates, before the Legions which were in Cappadocia, beyond Mount Taurus, could join him; he so behaved himself, that the Traitor persuaded them, with his wont Treachery, to a long and troublesome March, before they passed the River: For, said he, if the Parthians come over the Mountains, I shall escape all danger of the Archers, by the Advantage of the Hills. But if they meet me on Champaign Ground (my Forces being so few, and theirs so many) I shall be certainly beat. The barbarous People being thus seduced, by his telling them so, they marched their Army along the Valleys, and then finding the Banks of the River become wide, must of Necessity be at more trouble to make Bridges over them, and to get Tools and Materials for their Business. Thus they spent above Forty Days to no purpose, which space of time, Ventilius made use of, to gather his Forces together; and then having got them in a Body, three Days before the Parthians could come, marched, met them, gave them Battle, and gained the Victory. INTRIGUE IU. The Art of obtaining what you desire without ask, but by giving occasion that it may be proffered. IF you would obtain, without ask what you desire of another; you must first insinuate yourself in his Favour, by some familiar Discourse, relating to your purpose; which concerneth both you and him; and then propose what you intent to obtain, as a thing which (if it were granted) would tend much to his Interest. And if this Occasion be Acceptable, and Take, you may ask downright. But if not, you must smooth your Design, and smuther it, with all the Policy you can. But must give some other plausible Reason, why of Necessity it ought to be done; for which, Reason's sake, he may of his own Accord proffer what you desire. Thus upon an honest account, Sertorius used to take and keep Hostages, so as not to be minded by those who gave them. For they who give willingly do hardly mind that they give. For indeed Sertorius (to keep the Spaniards Loyal, and that he might, the more securely, live among them) kept a School in Orca, a very Large City where he lived, and whether the Spanish Grandees sent their Children for education: so that in effect he both received and kept Hostages, and yet did instruct them withal. Thus it may be oft times Lawful to obtain and possess, under a more specious title, what of itself may look more hateful and contemptible. The truth is, if Sertorius had used the Name of Hostages, and required them, he should never have had one. INTRIGUE. V The Art of obtaining hard and Difficult things. A Good Prince can (without any grudge) obtain difficult matters, by imposing moderate Taxes, when the necessity of the Government requireth them, and afterwards, by remitting a great part of them, when his Subjects ask for no Relief or Immunity from them, nor make any Complaint against them: Because the Prince, by so doing, doth sufficiently manifest to them his and Clemency. Thus King Darius, the third from Cyrus, being to impose Taxes upon his Subjects, enquired of the Governors of his Provinces (together with other Questions) whether the Taxes were grievous and burdensome? when they answered, That they were but moderate, he charged them that they should exact but the half thereof. The King's equity was such, that he thought the half of that, which seemed moderate to his Princes, to be enough; yea, over and above. For he had rather win his People by Clemency, and Acts of grace, than by a rigid Superiorty to disarm, weaken, and enslave them. Thus a Tyrant (who is but the Ape of a King) when he intends to demand intolerable Things, and suck the very Blood of his Subjects (because they should never be in capacity to shake off the yoke of their Slavery) first of all imposeth great Burdens, to the end he might afterwards seem to remit and pass off his own Right and Interest, and by that means act with the Clemency of a good King. You shall obtain what you desire from one, by ask not directly, and at first dash (if it be a hard thing, and that your request may be denied;) but by this course you shall obtain it from one who is altogether averse from your purpose. First of all, ask very eagerly, something that is harder to be obtained than what you designed to ask; till, at Length, you get him to promise that he could rather grant any thing in the World. Then ask what you designed, and you shall obtain it, unless he has a mind to be worse than his promise. Thus Scipio, when he would translate the War into Africa, (to the end he might well accoutre his unarmed men) gave charge to the Nobles of Sicily, to accoutre themselves most gallantly, as if they had been to go along with him. When they met together, the Nobles as earnestly begged of him not to go, as if they had been unarmed Men. Give then (said he) your Arms to my Soldiers; which they very readily did, as Scipio would have had it. But if he, whom you Petition, shall swear he will not grant your Request; Then you shall ask the quite Contrary to that which you resolved to Petition for, at First. Then when he shall turn his Vows and Protestations to the Contrary, you shall either obtain what you would have, else he shall be forsworn. Thus Anaximenes (when he had heard that Alexander the Great had sworn to do the quite Contrary to whatsoever he reqested of him) obtained Liberty to his Lampsacenians, Nicolans Thomae lib. 2. cap. 65. de var, Hist. First, desiring that their City might be plundered, then overthrown, and then that the Citizens themselves might be killed or sold Slaves. By which wicked and cunning Counsel, the Victorious Alexander, was Vanquished, so that fearing the swelling Fury and irreconcilable Revenge, on both sides, and dangerous Consequences of what Anaximenes advised him to, he made up the supposed Breach, Reconcileing them (which was no hard matter to do) and protested, by an Oath, that he would never after, do any thing to the Prejudice of the Lampsacenians. INTRIGUE. VI How to disarm and weaken an Enemy. THE way to disarm and weaken an Enemy, but especially, to deprive him of his Friends, may be contrived several ways, whereof this is one, First, deal very friendly with your Enemy's Friend, and in your Enemy's presence, and also before those who inform your Enemy; and ever now and then, with squinting Eyes (like those who dread that all Things are not safe) gaze upon those timorous Informers, as if you and they did on both sides privately communicate these Secrets, which you would not have your Enemy to know of, so as thereby he may become less cautious; for nothing will move an observing Person, more than a caution counterfeited with great artifice and cunning. Thus Scipio, and the other Roman Ambassadors, dealt with Hannibal, at Antiochus his Court; for, as often as King Antiochus fortuned to come suddenly upon them, Frontin. C. 4. they brought about, with their frequent and familiar Discourses with Hannibal, what they mainly laboured for, viz. that he, who formerly was designed to be General of the Army, against the Romans, might be suspected of Treachery by the King, as favouring the Romans. The Roman Ambassadors made a Show as if they had come into Asia to treat with Antiochus, concerning a Peace whilst the chief intent of their Embassy (which they palliated all along) was no other than to render Hannibal a suspected Person to Antiochus; so that he might not be Trusted with an Army where with totally to overthrow the Romans. Secondly, you shall render your Enemy's Friend a suspected Person, if with Gifts and Presents you send him Letters, written with the greatest Friendship imaginable: advising him, in General Terms, to make good his Promise, which Letters must be intercepted, so as they may come to your Enemy's Hands. Thus when Quintus Metellus' Letters written (with the greatest Familiarity and Affection) to Jugurtha's Friends; Frontin. C. 8. for betraying the King to Metellus, were intercepted: King Jugurtha inflicted a grievous punishment on them all; but afterwards, being (by this means) deprived both of Friends and good Council, he was himself easily destroyed by the Romans. Thirdly, The Suspicion will still move, and more be increased, if the Writing, on the outside, resemble a Hand different from the inside. Thus, when the Syracusians endeavoured, by the Conduct and Assistance of Dion, to disthrone Dionysius, who kept the Wives of a great many in Prison in the Castle, Potienus 4. and amongst the rest, Hyppanio, Dion's youngest Son. It was granted, privately, to some Women (Dionysius conniving) to carry sorrowful Letters, to their bemoaning Husbands. But when he knew that (as suspected Letters) they would be read in the public Council of the Citizens, he privately conveyed in to the Number, his own Letter; the outward Inscription of which did resemble the Hand, and bear the Name of Hippanio, to his Father Dion. But in the inside, Dionysius had written very friendly to Dion, as if they had been Confederate, to betray the Citizens at an appointed time. These, with other things, being publicly read, Dion was looked upon as a perfidious Traitor and Villain by all the Grandees of Syracuse; which was Dionysius' only Design, and that they might not have so brave a General, to work his overthrow. Fourthly, A Person may be rendered hateful to a People, if, by an exact Imitation, you contrive and counterfeit some pernicious project or evil Work (which will be ill taken by all) and then publish it in his Name. Thus Anaxemenes (who could counterfeit Theopompus' Style, published in his Name, Lies, Fables, and Stories; Pausan. l. 6. which disgraced, and made him so infamous, all Greece over, that where ever he went he was still in danger of his Life. INTRIGUE VII. How to dissemble. HE that would speak one thing and think another, must be cautious that his Voice, Countenance, and Behaviour agree to the Sense and Humour of his Discourse, lest his dissembling be discovered, and he betray himself, and be suspected. For, as the Nature of his Discourse changeth, so also ought the Voice and Gesture of the Speaker to be altered too; as he that speaks merrily aught to have one way of speaking, and he that speaks gravely another, etc. what is known to the vulgar hath also the vulgar report; but if you speak of a modest Person, you may say he blushed, and therefore, the matter is sure; if you speak of a fearful Man, then with Virgil Obstupuit; steieruntque comae, vox faucibus haesit. Astonished, his Hair up stood, And could not utter bad or good. So must one humour all Circumstances of his Discourse. Thus Hannibal, when a great many of his Soldiers left his Army, and went in to the Romans; perceiving that the rest, by that means, Frontin. 3.18. might be disencouraged, and that still more Spies did lurk in his Camps, to inform the Romans; and privately betray him, as far as their cowardly power went; that he might encourage his dejected Soldiers, and be revenged on the Deserters or Run-a-ways; in a Public Council, and in the hearing of a great many of his Soldiers, with a Counterfeit, Cheerful, Brazen-Face, he told, That they had not run away, but by the Persuasion of their Officers (as becometh Courageous Soldiers) gone to be Spies, and Discover the Strength and Designs of the Enemy; and that, in Battle, they might Surprise, and Seize them, behind their Backs. By this Fabulous Commendation, he encouraged his own Soldiers, but inflamed the Romans against the Deserters; so that they did cut off their Right Hands, and sent them back to Hannibal. INTRIGUE. VIII. How to Persuade and Dissuade YOU shall persuade one of little Spirit to undertake great and hard Matters; to prosecute that which he taketh to be good and pleasing, and dissuade him from that Evil which he looketh on as less Dangerous; if, by some moving Object, you raise in him a violent Passion, as Wrath, Fear, Hatred, etc. For then the vehement Passion augmenteth the Strength and Vitals of the Mind, to prosecute and perform a Memorable Act; the attempt whereof, might otherways prove but in vain, for want of Vigour, Courage, and Magnanimity. Thus * Horat. 2. Sat. 3. Opimius the Miser, could not, by any Remedy, be cured of his Lethargy, till the Physician (to keep him awake by some Anxious Care, and passionate Apprehension) told him, That his Heirs did contrive how to take away, and rob him of his Money; and therefore, desired him to Cause all his Treasure to be brought to his Chamber, in his Sight, that with a Careful Eye, he might secure it from the Hands of his Covetous Heirs. By which means the Physician obtained his End: For the Miser Opimius, having so Covetous a Desire after his Money, that he could not Sleep, (still keeping his Eye upon his Treasure,) was by his Watchfulness cured of his Lethargy. By this means also the brute Beasts may be induced to obey their Master's Desires. ‖ Comp. l. 7. c. 4. For Brachius, the Perusian General, when, neither by Whip nor Spur, he could cause his weary Horses to take the Mountains, in pursuit of his Enemy; out of the Spoil and Herd which he had taken, chose young lusty Mares, and set them in the Front of his Cavalry, which so animated and stirred up his wearied Horses, that there was more difficulty to keep them back, than drive them forwards. Yet all are not stirred up by the same Excitements, by reason of the variety of Natures, Manners, and Education: Therefore it is carefully to be considered, how, and by what means, such and such Persons ought to be dealt with; and (conform to the Dispositions of those with whom you are to deal;) to change and use Excitements, Arguments and Stratagems of Wit, Policy, and Discretion. Thus † Curt. l. 3. Alexander the Great, when he went out to Battle, against Darius, he stirred up his Soldiers by Excitements of divers Natures: First, The Macedonians, (whom he knew to be Ambitious of Honour,) to give an evident Demonstration of their Valour, for obtaining the prize of an Universal Empire. The Grecians, (desirous of Liberty,) that they would be revenged on the Persians, and make them bear the Yoke of their Slavery, as long as they had done theirs. The Illyrians and Thracians, (who lived by Theft and Rapine) he persuaded to Magnanimity, by setting before them a great Spoil, and Rich Booty. An Honest Mind can be dissuaded from a wicked Design, by setting open the Shame and Infamy of the Action intended. * Thus the Milesian Virgins, who (as Authors writ) were taken with such a strange and unheard of Madness, that almost in every House of the City some hanged themselves, without any known Cause; and could not be cured of their Malady, nor be dissuaded from Self-murder, by the Persuasions and Arguments of the Wise, nor the Tears of their Parents; but were rather made worse, and set more on edge; till the Magistrates ordained, That the First who should hang herself, should be dragged naked (by the Heels) through the Streets of the City, and hung up in the Market Place, as a monument of Shame, Infamy, and Disgrace: Which struck such a Terror in the Minds of the young Virgins, that never one of them afterwards did attempt any violence against herself. Thus also Selenicus, the Lawgiver, made the Women and Ladies of Locris to forbear their gorgeous and gaudy Apparel, and their great Convoys, by these Laws: He ordained, That no Lady or Matron should have above one Attendent, or Page, to attend her, unless she would acknowledge herself first, in face of the Council, a great Drunkard; and that none should wear Ribbons, Topknots, Chains, or Bracelets, etc. but when she went a Whoring, that with her fine Apparel and wanton Dress, she might allure her Gallants to her Bed of Pleasure. Another such Law was in Syracuse, viz. That no Woman should wear any gorgeous and gaudy Apparel, till first she should acknowledge herself a Whore. If you would dissuade an obstinate Person from an Error, you must show it to him in a Parallel, to make him sensible, and convince him of it; for, if he can be brought to a sense thereof, you have done the work: since none will Err willingly, nor persist in an Error, when he knows it to be an Error. Moreover, show him his mistake, with a cheerful counterfeit consent, by bringing him to the first original and rise of his Error; or, more sharply moving him with the bad Consequences and Evils that will follow, if he persist in so pernicious an Opinion and Enterprise. But to dissuade one from a pernicious Design, whom clear Arguments, and evident Demonstrations cannot convince, but make more obstinate, these Measures must be taken. After a wheedling manner, condescend to his Designs, as if they were very pleasing and rational, and as you were altogether of his Mind. Then take a full Information of all the draught and drift of his Intentions, as if you were in Love with his Fancies, and intended them for a Rule to practise by, or use them as Arguments to satisfy and convince another, who strove to dissuade you from such a Project. Then explain to him all his plausible Arguments, as you highly approved of them; but in such a plain manner, and such terms, as may make the weakness of them appear, and he may begin to suspect his Substantial Fabric to be but a perverted Maggot of imaginary Fancies. Then start some Arguments, which may be objected against his Conclusions, and make for a contrary Opinion, confuting them at such a slight rate, as he may easily perceive them to be stronger than any he can bring for the Confirmation of the contrary Opinion, which he so much dandleth and approveth of. Thus Bacovius the Portuguese, hunting after greater Preferment, and aspiring to higher Dignity, (though he was the chief Magistrate in Capua,) took these Measures, to ingratiate himself in the Favour of the Senators, Hermog. Lib. 4. de invent. 13. Plin. Lib. 23. and save them alive, when the common People had concluded to cut them off, and commit the Rule of the Government wholly to him: First, having given the Senators a Secret Oath of Fidelity, he imprisoried them in the Senate-House. Then called up the Commons to a Common-Council, where he made a show of giving up the Senators to them, in these Words. That which you have so often desired and wished for, ye Men of Capua, that it might be in your Power to be avenged of this wicked Senate, now you have; and them all (and that without tumult or danger) shut up in Prison, by my means, in the Senate-House. Take them unarmed, severally by themselves, and dispose of them according to your Pleasure. Yet lest we should do any thing rashly, through spite or malice, be persuaded that, by all means, it is necessary, before ye cut off this mischievous Senate, to choose a new one, that is far better for your purpose, unless you have a mind to enslave yourselves to the Arbitrary Government of one single Person: Go on therefore, and let us not delay, but put this Course in Execution, with speed: Let every Senator be severally brought before you, and pass Sentence on every one of them; and then nominate, and bring in a better, in the room of each one that is to die: For it is in your Power to execute Justice, and condemn those you find Guilty; and to choose better in their room. Therefore go on deliberately, and with all speed, reward these wicked Senators according to their Deservings. This Design pleased them well; but when they proceeded to the Examination of the Senators apart, and had compared them with those they had newly elected, (which were to be put in their rooms,) they perceived the meanness and ignoble Circumstances of those ill-bred startups: Forasmuch as they were, for the most part, poor, beggarly, and unskilful in the management of public Affairs. Whereupon they judged it more advised to continue the Old Senate. Then (says Bacovius) seeing you cannot be without a Senate, nor can find a better than what at present you have, you had better restore the imprisoned Senators to their former Dignities, and be reconciled to them; to the end they may be more serviceable to you for the future, than bring the City to Confusion and Ruin, by depriving it of all Government. And so forthwith they agreed thereto, and by this did Bacovius gain to himself great Favour, and Pre-eminence without stroke of Sword. If Bacovius had, at first, imperiously contended, that the People must have boar with the Senate, because a new one would have been more mean and ignoble than what they had; without all peradventure, he would have begotten in the People a greater rancour and dislike to the Senators; they being so much already incensed against them. Thus, according to Bacovius' Method, the incensed Vulgar, or Rabble of Common-People, (when they are in an Error of Judging all others, and cannot be convinced by rational Arguments, without danger of making the matter worse,) ought to be humoured and wrought upon, by what is more pleasing and acceptable, to rectify their mistake. Thus Machiavelli argueth, If the wicked Old Senate must be cut off, and a better New One Chose from among the People; Lib. 6: Disp. Cap. 43. let the People, first, argue thus with themselves: Either this or that, or some Third Fellow of the Rabble, is better and fit for Government than he who is to be cast off: But neither this, nor that, nor the third, nor another of the Rabble, can be chosen better and fit for Government, (the People themselves being Judges,) therefore it is not convenient, upon any Account, to alter the Senate, or to change it for a New One. Moreover, there is a twofold Persuasion; one in direct and plain terms, which tells plainly as it means; and there is another which comes by Insinuations, Far-fetches, and some subtle Contrivance of a Man's own Fancy. Thus a certain poor Man had for his sworn Enemy a great and rich Man, who proffered, in a time of great Famine, to keep the City where the poor Man lived, if the Citizens would give him up (the poor Man) to be put to Death. The poor Man suspecting, and fearing the inconstancy of the unstable Multitude, and questioning the Honesty of the Hunger-starved Rabble, durst not hazard directly to dissuade them from consenting to the unjust demand of the Rich Man, nor argue that an Innocent Person should not be put to Death, lest he should the more provoke their Inclinations, to give him up. Therefore, by Insinuations, and a farfetched sober Contrivance, to mollify their Hearts, he made his humble Address to them thus: Verily, for my own part, I refuse not to die for the Good and Preservation of my Country; although nothing worthy or deserving Death be found in me. However, dear and honest Citizens, consider first, whether he hath Corn enough to answer the price of my Blood; and then (if he have) whether or not an honest kind Citizen, who is able, be not bound to assist his Fellow Citizens, without the Effusion of Innocent Blood. And Thirdly, whether or not the Commonwealth can justly, in time of necessity, take all the useless Corn, for the maintenance of starved poor People, paying the just worth, from one who will not part with it, under the satisfying of his undeserved Revenge, and the price of Innocent Blood. Now consider, whether you can more freely seize his Corn, than consent to so horrid a Murder. Thus also, when the Lacedæmonians demanded of the Athenians, (who desired an established Peace,) that Pericles should first be given up to them. Pericles, considering with himself that he would be safer, and more beloved among the People, and could prevail more by counterfeiting and declaring a willing and forward Resolution to die for the safety of the Commonwealth, than by openly contradicting the Senate, advised the Senators to give himself up to the Lacedæmonians, and to hearken to a Lawless Necessity, since the State of Affairs so required; but with such Arguments as did very plainly manifest how Slavish and Reproachful a thing it was, for any Commonwealth to obey such unreasonable and imperious an Enemy. In like manner King Philip, the Father of Alexander the Great, after he had, with a pretence of asserting Liberty, invaded a great part of Greece, at length besieged Athens; but, withal, did cunningly excuse himself, that he did not at first think of waging War against the Senate, and People of Athens, and that they should soon be rescued from war, from the Siege, and from Famine; if they would only deliver him up Ten of the greatest of their Orators; who indeed were his greatest Enemies, and never gave over their barking and bawling against him in their Senate. The People judging it best, that a few of their Orators, for the safety of many, should be given up; Demosthenes persuaded them to the contrary Opinion, by discovering to them King Philip's craft, and double-hand Deal, by this Fable. Of old (says he) the Wolf offered Peace to the Sheep, on Condition, the Dogs should be destroyed, whom he did accuse, as the Authors and Promotors of all their Contentions and Discord. But the Dogs (those watchful and careful Creatures, who still gave notice to the Sheep of the Wolves approaching) being took out of the way, the Treacherous Wolf, as often as he listed, without fear of Punishment, or respect to his former Protestations, made havoc of the poor harmless deluded Sheep: Even so Philip requireth us to be delivered up, who discover his ensnaring Policy, and Treacherous Plots; and withstand his Force, by animating you all to quit yourselves, in your Vindications, as becometh valiant Men; that by this means he may deprive the City of its Keepers and Watchmen, and destroy it unawares without difficulty. Now the whole drift of his Discourse was good and honest, viz. that the Orators should no more be given up to King Philip, than the Dogs to the Wolf. But when you drive at one thing, and design another, contrary measures must be taken; as if you intended indirectly, and at a distance, to persuade one to a sober Life; go on thus, Grant me only these few rational Requests; be not mad drunk after Twelve a Clock at Night, lest you disquiet People in their rest; and because you cannot forbear your Old Habits of Drinking, running about, emptying your Belly at both ends, and committing other such base Acts of Indecency, as are not fit to be mentioned; begin your walks about Seven a Clock in the Morning, that you may finish them about Twelve at Night; for by that time you may be wearied, and leave off to molest, and be troublesome to others. But if a Person obstinately still persist in his Opinion, after his Error hath been clearly (and in a friendly way) shown to him, do him some injury, which may more clearly demonstrate his mistake; which injury, according to his own Opinion (that he so confidently affirmeth and maintaineth) can, by clear Consequence, be proved to be no injury at all, though he should bring it to a Trial of Law. Thus the obstinate Opiniator will be forced either to condemn his own false Opinion, or acknowledge that he hath received no injury. After this manner, one, that maintained that all things came by Contingency, overthrew the Opinion of him, who believed that all things came by Fate. He gave him a Blow under the Ear, and when the Cause came to a Trial at Law, he cleared himself thus. Either I struck you this Blow, driven to it by some fatal necessity, or by chance, and of my own . If casually and by chance, then by this I prove there is given and Contingency: Neither in this Case, have I done him any wrong, but have convinced him of his Error, and brought him to an acknowledgement of the Truth, which (perhaps) was my Design, and for which he ought not to accuse, but reward me, and give me thanks. But if I be driven, by some fatal necessity, to do you this injury, and give you so violent a Blow under the Ear, than I am still clear; for who can withstand Fate, when, of necessity, he must submit? INTRIGUE IX. How to obtain what you Desire, without danger of losing the Favour of him whom you desire it of. IF you would ask for any thing of one, whose Favour you fear to lose, and whose Wrath you fear thereby to incur (if your Petition should be ill taken) go on after this Method. First, consider whether you have reason to fear, that you will come off with reproof and repulse, from him whom you petition; and therefore dares not hazard to be so bold, though, otherways, he be both familiar and kind. Then, when you have weighed these things seriously in your Mind, sergeant that another asketh that of you, or of some other Person, which you really design to ask of him. Then take his Advice, whether it be not unworthy and base, to ask such a thing of a Friend; and if he judge it neither base nor irrational, then, without any farther delay, you may downright ask what you design, and you shall obtain it. But if he repute the demand base and irrational, desist from your Intention, if you would continue in his Favour; for what a Man thinketh not unworthy to be asked of another, he will not take ill if asked of himself. This was Eurastritus' Practice, when he designed to know whether Seleucus would countenance the inordinate Love of his Son Antiochus, Plutarch. in Demetrio, Suidas, Plin. Lib. 29. Cap. 1. which he had for his Mother-in-Law, Stratonice, for whom he was fallen Sick, and ready to Die: Which the Physician found out, whilst he could find him troubled with no common Distemper; for, as he felt his Pulse (Stratonice passing by) he observed the motion of his Veins alter, and turn more violent in their Course; and a sudden change, and cold sweat surprise the Face of Antiochus. Whereupon, Eurastritus spoke to his Father thus, Your Son is a dead Man; for, he hath passionately fallen in Love with my Wife, and will never recover, unless he obtain his Desire, which I am resolved never to agree to. Whereupon King Seleucus, with inordinate and compassionate Tears, (as a Favour never to be forgotten,) requested Eurastritus to comply and save his Son's Life, by granting his Desire. Do not you (answered Eurastritus) demand that of me, which no Man in reason can demand? To which the King made answer: I hearty wish he had fallen in love with my Stratonice. Do you say so seriously? (replied Eurastritus.) Yes, truly, (says the King,) as I wish the Fates to favour me. Then (answered Eurastritus) you neither stand in need of me, nor my Wife; for you can cure him yourself: And if you will let him enjoy the company of your Stratonice, he will soon recover. His Father, King Seleucus', gave him his own Wife, and after a while, the young Man recovered. And lest this should have been known, and given offence to the People, Seleucus still spoke to the Young Man's Commendation, which was very profitable to the Commonwealth, though the Thing, in itself, was far contrary both to Custom and Honesty. INTRIGUE. X. How to obtain what you Desire, when the Person whom you desire it of is altogether averse. IF you would obtain what you desire, when the Person of whom you ask it is absolutely averse from granting it, you must make that which you request hateful, or appear hurtful or dangerous in his Eyes, and then afterwards you may cautiously ask and obtain. Thus, a Merchant in Amsterdam, desirous to buy a House of his next Neighbour, which his Neighbour was not willing to sell, caused such a formidable noise to be heard, every Night, in the House, that all the Neighbourhood thought it had been frequented with Evil Spirits, which he brought about after this manner. The House being nearest to his own, he pulled a Stone out of that place of the Wall which was concealed by a Desk, and through it, every Night, he conveyed an Iron Bullet, tied to a string, by which he drew it too and fro, over the Inhabitants; whereat they were so frighted that the Landlord was glad to part with the House, at any rate. INTRIGUE. XI. How to force a Confession from one who is obstinate. HE that would, by Circumvention, induce one to confess that which (downright and directly) he will not, must be accused as guilty of some greater Crime, relating so near to that which you would have him confess, that the acknowledging of the lesser will clear him of the greater. Thus a certain Priest, desirous to bring one to confess his long absence from Church, and receiving the Eucharist, did subornate those that did accuse him, that (in the time of the Priest's absence) when others were at Prayers, he profaned the consecrated Things, and threw Stones at the holy Images. Thus the poor Man, being afraid of a greater Punishment, was forced to acknowledge his long absence from Church. INTRIGUE XII. How to force any thing from One, by that which he most hateth. YOU shall force a thing from One, that is unwilling to grant it, by over persuading him that it is your Right, or by driving him to that which he most abhorreth. Thus a poor, but ingenious young Man, whilst he was put to the utmost point of necessity, and knew not how to live, heard of a certain rich Godly Merchant, that could not endure an Oath, to whom he went, and pretended that he owed him a large Sum of Money; but the Merchant denying, was brought to a Trial of Law, by the young Man, who desired him to clear himself by his Oath. But the Merchant chose rather to pay the Money, which he owed not than swear. The young Man, having gotten the Money, fell a trading, and grew rich; and after a few years, returned to the Merchant, from whom he had forced the Money, and paid him both Stock and Interest; beging his Pat●on, humbly acknowledging his Offence, and that then he was driven to the utmost point of necessity, and knew not how to live. The Merchant, weighing the young Man's Honesty and Ingenuity, did not only forgive him, but also gave him his only Daughter, with a large Portion. This happened well on both sides; but ofttimes, in such Cases, the Effect and Proof makes the Contrivance good or bad, wise or foolish: For had this young Man lost by his Trading, and not improved the Money, (which, very unjustly, he cheated the Merchant of,) he had not been able to restore it again; and consequently, by the result, had been (deservedly) reputed a Rogue to his Grave. Therefore, I say, it is dangerous to take such dubious Courses, unless in Cases of great Necessity: For the worst sometimes may answer Expectation, when at other times, the best will not. I heard a Story, much like this, of an Englishman; which was thus: A broken Goldsmith, in London, observed a rich Grazier receive Two Hundred Pounds, whereof he robbed him, as he was on his way homeward. About Seven Years after, he met the Grazier, by chance, in the Street; whom he, very kindly, invited home to his House; where he proffered to pay him the Two Hundred Pounds, with Interest. But the Grazier, not minding the time when the Money was lent, took the proser for a jeer or some designed trap; till the Gold Smith told him of the time and place, concealing the Person who had committed the Robbery. The Grazier was, at last, persuaded to receive his Money, but was so civil as to take no Interest; but was very curious to know the Person to whom he had so long lent it, protesting that he would do him no diskindness, but rather any Favour that lay in his Power. The Goldsmith, told him, Sir, I have a Child to be Christened to morrow, and if you please to stay and be God Father, the Person that did you this injury will be present, and make his Apology, for detaining your Money so long. The Grazier was well satisfied; and (when all was over) the Goldsmith told him that he was the Person himself, to whom he had so long lent his Money; and that mere necessity, contrary to his Inclination, forced him to it; and that he had kept him out of Prison, and given him whereupon to live honestly in the World. Whereupon, the rich Grazier was so well pleased, and so much taken with the Goldsmith's Wit, Honesty, and Ingenuity, that he gave the 200 pounds to his Godson, as a Confirmation of his durable Respects. The Result was good, though many on such Measures, have gotten a Halter for their Reward. There is no surer way, to obtain what you Desire, than by giving the Person, whom you design to ask, some ground to think that you can do him some great Favour, for many have been so forward, on such an Occasion, as to study how to ingratiate themselves in the favour of the Person, of whom they reckoned to receive a Kindness. Thus a brisk Spark (who had more confidence than Money, and wanted to be treated) came to a rich Goldsmith, and asked him what a Wedge of Gold, of such a length, might be worth, making a Demonstration on his Arm. The Goldsmith suspecting that he himself had such an one to sell, was desirous to see it, telling that he never saw one so large. The young Man, as if he had come by it some unlawful way, to confirm the Goldsmith in his Opinion, and set him more on edge, began to smother the Discourse, as afraid to speak of so rich a Booty, lest it should be inquired, how he came by it. The Goldsmith, desirous to pump him, took him to the Tavern, where, after several Bottles of Wine, the Goldsmith, very seriously, asked if he could let him see the Wedge of Gold. Truly, Sir, (replied the young Spark) I never, hitherto, was Master of a Wedge of Gold, nor ever heard of one so large, as what I spoke to you of, at your Shop. But, I assure you, Sir, if any such come to my Hand, you shall have the first proffer of it, whether you buy it or not. The Goldsmith, who formerly had been transported in Expectation, began to find out where he was; and after he was Master of his right Senses, paid the Reckoning, wished his Chapman a good Market, and so took leave. Another of his Trade, who had some Information of his Neighbour's Apprentice, that the Goldsmith had met with a rich accidental Booty, asked him, as he was a coming in to his Shop, if he should go halfs. You shall have it all (said he) if you will; what is the Matter? (replied the other?) The young Spark, that is at the Tavern (said he) hath the largest Wedge of Gold, to sell, that ever you saw, but we cannot agree. Whereupon, the other Goldsmith hastened to the Tavern, (where the young Gentleman was examining the remainder of the Wine, which his Merchant had left him) and with a Covetous Grace, in a moment, became very familiar and complaisant, with the young Man; telling him what his Neighbour had told him, concerning the Wedge of Gold. The Spark (to Humour the Fancy) made as if he had been afraid to speak of it, in a Tavern: Whereupon, the Goldsmith took him home to his House; and, after Dinner, brought about his Discourse, concerning the Wedge of Gold; but finding the young Blade averse from his purpose, set his Daughter a pumping of him, with her guilded Discourse, and pleasing Compliments. But he, being too cunning for her Sex, told her Father, that he had disposed of his Gold to his Neighbour, before he came, but could save him 1000 pound in his Pocket. The Old Man began to lend an attentive Ear, and called for another Bottle, which they drank out very Cordially; the smiling young Lady, now and then relishing the Glass with the perfume of her Lips; till the impatient Old Man could bear no longer, but would know how to save 1000 pounds. The young Spark told him; Sir, I hear that you have proffered this young handsome Lady, your Daughter, to Wife to Mr. Frontinick, with 3000 pound, and I will take her with Two; and by this means, you may save 1000 pound in your Pocket. Both the Father and Daughter seemed to be well pleased with the Jest; but the Old Man was in a Passion, and went to scold his Neighbour, for helping him to such a Merchant, leaving the young couple in his Chamber; where they made so good use of their time, and became so intimate and loving with one another, that, contrary to the Father's Knowledge, the Lady was forced to go to Church, and Mary the young Spark. But the old Gentleman saved nothing by it. INTRIGUE XIII. How to search out fewer Secrets. IF you would find out the Secrets of another, you must feign to him that one hath informed you of such Things; or rather suborn one to whisper you, seriously, in the Ear, in his presence, as Informers use to do. Then (after you have given him a reward for his Information) say, that you have found out a few things concerning such and such a Matter; and that you are yet Ignorant of some particular Circumstances, which (in time) you may come to know. Then the other being persuaded that the greatest part of his Secrets are found out, (and, therefore, that it is but in vain to conceal the rest) will, of his own accord, discover the whole Intrigue, to keep or gain Favour, and to come the better off. Thus Dionysius served Andron. For, having trusted him with his Affairs, his Kinsman Hermocrates persuaded Andron to deliver him up the Castle and Treasury, Aelianns, Lib. 5. thinking Dionysius' Absence a fit opportunity to throw off the yoke of his Slavery But the Design not taking, Dionysius returned in a short space, knowing nothing of Hermocrates his Project, by Andron, or any other Informer. Notwithstanding, being Jealous, that (in his Absence) the Citizens might have designed some Plot, for the recovery of their former Liberty, he feigned, as if he had been informed of all the Factions, and Conspiracies, which they had been contriving against him, in his absence, and who was the chief Man that laid hold on the opportunity, and carried on the Design. Andron being (by this Fictitious Policy) deceived, (to save his own Bacon,) betrayed Hermocrates, by revealing all the Transactions that had passed betwixt them. INTRIGUE XIV. How to find out One's Secrets, by insinuating with another, who is privy to them. IF you would know a Secret which another will not reveal, you must wheedle him, by himself, to be serious in Discourse; and then learn some other Secret, which he feareth not to make known: Then, without delay, go to his Crony, and intimate Friend (if he have any) who knoweth both the Secrets, and pretend that he hath told you the Secret which you are a fishing for; and, that you may persuade him to believe you, tell him the other Secret which he told you. Then he (hearing this Secret revealed) will be convinced that the other is discovered too; therefore will not think it worth while to conceal that which is already known; but talk to you of it, as if you knew of it as well as himself. Thus (amongst the Turks) a very dark Case in Law, was cleared and discussed by a very just Sentence. A certain Man, named Consio, left a bag of Money in his Friend's Custody; and, when he demanded it again, his Friend denied it, Arod. Decret. lib. 1. Tit. 30. telling him that he had nothing of his, and that he owed him not one Farthing, threatening him, that (if he scandalised, and troubled him with such idle and disgraceful Discourse) he would complain to the Emperor, thinking, thereby, to frighten the poor Man from ask after his Money; but all would not do; and the Action was at last brought before the Grand Signior, who examined both the Parties, and checked him, in whose Hands the Money was left. But he (as he had been honest and clear from so base and wicked a Crime) denied the other's Accusation, with a great deal of counterfeit Grief, and Trouble. But the other stood stiffly to his point, confirming his Assertion, with unfeigned Tears, and Demonstrations of unspeakable Sorrow. The Emperor, desirous to find out the truth of the Matter, delayed his Sentence till another day; and then, underhand, sent one privately, to him who had the Money, and, after a friendly and familiar way, advised him to restore it, and put an end to the Controversy, to save his Credit and Reputation; and said that the Emperor might have bad thoughts of him, and that be might come off at a loss. But he still stood obstinate, and would submit to no Counsel or Arbitration. Wherefore the Emperor was concerned, and commanded the Debate to be discussed by none but himself, and, without delay, unawares, called them both before him. Then taking him who had the Money aside, he asked if he lay with his Wife last Night, and whether he had done something else, and at what Hour of the Night he did it. Then after he had come to a knowledge of these Secrets, he immediately sent one to his Wife, to say, that her Husband desired her to send him the bag of Money, which he gave her to keep; and if she would not believe, to tell her (as Tokens) what her Husband had, secretly, told him. His Wife being convinced by these Secrets, (which none knew but her Husband and she,) sent the Money, and so the Roguery was found out: And the Emperor did not only make him pay double, what he had defrauded Consio of, but also took off his Head, to save himself from trouble, and make him Honest for the future. INTRIGUE. XV. How to induce One to confess all his Secret Faults. IF you would allure one to confess all his Crimes and Secret Faults, you must catch him with an inevitable necessity of confessing; and you yourself must first begin, and confess your own Crimes, whether true or false no matter, for either will serve to show him Example. Thus Nelius, the Son of Codrus, the last King of the Athenians, when beat from his Kingdoms, he was (by Storms and Tempests at Sea) driven to Naxos, Aelian. Lib. 8. Cap. 5. whence he could not lose, till he purged his Army from all profligate Villains, and vile Persons, as the Sooth-Sayers told him. But he, not knowing the good from the bad, appointed a general Confession; and he (to allure the rest, and induce them to a free and resolute confessing of all their Crimes) confessed first a great many Fictitious, Villainous Deeds, whereof he was not guilty, as that he had murdered a Boy, forced so many Women, etc. By which Fiction he did induce all his Men to confess their secret Villainies, taking Example from their Master's Sins. Then, leaving all the great and Bloody Sinners in Naxos, he sailed, with the lesser, to Iönia, where they settled; and first of all, in Miletus. Now from those afterwards, the other Eleven Cities of Iönia (which by that means came to be Athenian Colonies) had their rise. INTRIGUE XVI. How to find out the Secrets of Drunken Men. YOU may know whether the Speeches of a Drunken Man be resolutely spoken, or rashly, without any resolvedness, if you pry into the Constitution, Nature, and Inclinations of the Drunkard; and observe whether he speaks warily, or talketh idly whatever falleth in his Head: If he speaks warily, than he speaks advisedly, and in earnest, and his Discourse ought to be minded: But if his Tongue talk Nonsense, and run beyond Rational Conception, and speak nothing to purpose, his Discourse is rash, and only the effect of his Drunkenness, and not worth taking notice of. Thus Dionysius, when Two young Men were brought before him, (who, in their Cups, had spoke many Treasonable Words against him, Apothegm. Fol. 364. as being a Tyrant, and an unjust Oppressor,) he invited them both to Supper, and observing one of them to be a natural Drunkard, and idle Talker, him he dismissed, and sent him about his Business, as one not worth minding, being only made foul mouthed by Drunkning: But the other, whom he observed very cautious both in drinking and speaking, he put to Death, reputing him his Enemy, because he spoke deliberately. INTRIGUE XVII. How to find out the Secrets of Sober Men. YOU may find out the Inclinations and Secrets of a Sober Person, by moving his Affections, and setting his Mind on edge, and by obstinate and reproachful Controversies, by which being once moved (in Passion, and of his own accord) he will pass a true Sentence, and discover his Inclination. Or you may try what is, or hath been the Inclination of one, when at School, whether Sober, Patiented, Wrathful, Contentious, or given to Lying and Swearing, etc. INTRIGUE XVIII. How One may know what Reputation he is of, and what is his Character in the Eyes of others. HE that would know his own Character, and the Opinion which others have of him, must praise or dispraise, before ingenious Men, another like himself, both in Life and Manners; or praise or dispraise him, who is (for the most part) given to Qualities quite contrary to his own. And, by this, he may know that they who praise one of his Life and Manners, and dispraise one different in Life and Manners, do certainly commend and approve of him; and that they who dispraise one like him, and praise one who is not like him, cannot have any good esteem, or think well of him. Thus Nero sometimes praised Caligula, (whom he made the pattern of his Life,) and sometimes greatly discommended him, thereby to know what repute he himself had with others, Seneca. and in whom he should put trust. And, at last, finding what he sought for, he put to Death all those, who spoke reproachfully of him. But in such as spoke to his Commendation, he put great Confidence, and made them his nearest, dearest, and most intimate Friends. INTRIGUE XIX. How one may find out the Judgement of others, in a Case that concerns himself. YOU shall know another's Judgement of your own Actions, or of your Friends, or of your Enemies, after this manner, propose to one, an Act of the same Nature, with your own, without mentioning the Actor, and then ask what the Person who hath done such things deserveth, whether praise or dispraise, reward or punishment. Then, after you have heard his Sentence, show the Cases to be of one Nature and Likeness; and the Author of the one to deserve as much as the other. This is the surest way; for on what a Man is Ignorant, and knoweth of no Relation to, he impartially passeth Sentence, freely and without fear. But, in things known, love or hatred blindeth the Eye of Reason, and oft times turneth the Scales of Justice to a partial Sentence: Tho it be just that every Person judge so of themselves and Friends, as they judge of others in the same Cases, and under the same Circumstances. Thus Charles King of France, denounced War against Robert Duke of Aquitain, whom he overthrew, the Duke himself dying in the Battle, Annot. Gal. which slaughter and overthrow, Robert Earl of Vermandy, Nephew to the Duke of Aquitain, took so ill, that he laid Snares, and still waited for an opportunity to be revenged on the King of France; therefore invited him, under pretence of Friendship, to Perona, to a yearly Feast: Whether the King, with a few of the French Nobility, without any Suspicion, willingly came. But, after Dinner, Earl Robert was pleased to seize them all, and keep them Prisoners in the Castle: But, after a whiles Imprisonment, he took an Oath of the Nobility, that they should never rise in Arms, or act any thing against him, and so dismissed them. But still detained the King, who after Two Years, died in Prison. Lewis III. the Son of Charles, durst not at first, when he came to the Crown, bring Robert in Question, or reward him for serving his Father so; he having so many Favourites, Friends, and Relations in the Kingdom. But having invited a great many of the Princes, and Nobility of France, to a sumptuous Banquet; and with the rest, Earl Robert, a counterfeit Messenger, whilst they were merry, made as if be had came from England, and delivered several Letter to King Lewis, which he gave the Chancellor to Read. After the Reading of the Letters, he smiled, and with a shrill Voice, said; This Letter makes the common report good, viz. That English-Men are no Politicians: For my Cousin Writes to me from England, That a Vassal there, an ill bred Country Fellow, invited his Lord to Supper, and after he had compelled him to stay all Night, strangled him in his Bed. Then desired to know the Judgement of the Princes and Noblemen, there present, and what punishment that Rascal deserved; earnestly requesting, that they might freely pass a true Sentence, and speak (as really) as they thought. When; with all the rest, the Earl of Vermandy, said, He deserved to be put to Death. The King took up the Discourse, and said; Earl from your own Mouth I condemn you, as guilty of a Death-deserving Crime; and immediately, commanded him to be strangled. Thus, Earl Robert passed Sentence on himself, and received, for reward, the Parellel-Effect of his own Treachery. INTRIGUE XX. How to know whether a suspected Person be Guilty or not. YOU shall know if a suspected Person be Guilty or not, if a first you accuse him with false and fictitious Crimes; then with that which you suspect him guilty of; and in the contest, in defending and proving, from his careless or careful behaviour, it may be known whether he be clear or guilty. For he sligheth those things whereof he is not guilty, and denyeth them after a careless undervaluing manner. But of those things whereof he is guilty, he striveth to clear himself seriously, and with great care. For a good Conscience scorneth a false Accusation, knowing it's own Innocence. But a true Accusation moves the Passions, and Clogs the Conscience with it's own guilt. Hence may be observed that an Accusation is like the objects of our Senses; for as a real present Object moveth that Faculty, which naturally layeth hold on it, and whose proper Object it is: As Colour moveth the Sight, found the Hearing, etc. So likewise, a real Crime and Accusation moveth the accused to a serious Vindication, whilst he is not concerned at a false and fictitious Forgery. Moreover, sound Sleep, a composed Mind, and a careless behaviour are great presumptions of Innocence. Thus Titus Clodius, when he went to Bed in the same Chamber with his two Sons, was found next Morning Strangled: Whilst no Person, Cic. pro Sext. Rosc Amer. et val. Max 8, 1. that could be suspected, could be found. His Sons (who were of Age) declaring that they knew nothing of it; nor could Conjecture who had committed the Murder. Yet the two young Men were both brought in Question, for their Father's Death. The thing being so strange, unlikely, and incredible, that any should enter the Chamber, whilst the two Sons were present, to disern the least Motion▪ and defend their Father. But when it was made known to the Judges, that they were found Sleeping in the Chamber with the Doo● open; they were acquitted, and cleared from all Suspicion; which was the only ground o● their being brought to Trial. For it was never known, that one after he had polluted himself, by the Violation of all the Laws of God, Men, and Nature, could presently Sleep, and take his quiet Rest. INTRIGUE XXI. How to know Secrets from Nature and Custom. THE Presumption is Great and Rational, which is taken from Custom and Nature. From Nature, Soloman found out the right Mother of a Child; when two Harlots strove for it, as we may read, 2 Kings 3. Joseph. lib. 3. Chap. 2. From Custom Galba (as Suetonius relates) found out who was the right owner of a Horse, when, in Trial of Law, it could not be decided. For the foresaid Galba caused the Horse to be led blindfold to the Well, where he used to drink; and then, being set at Liberty, commanded the Horse to be delivered to him, whose Stable he went to. INTRIGUE XXII. How to prevent and escape hidden Snares. IF you be informed that private Mischiefs, and secret Snares, are laid out for you, (which, openly, and by out ward force, you cannot repel;) you must, by all means, carry yourself, as if you knew nothing of them; for, in so doing, you will have the better opportunity, and may, with the greater ease, prevent and frustrate them. But if your Adversaries suspect, or find out an Informér, they will hasten their Erterprises, and run all hazards, to the utmost. Thus Hanno, a Carthaginian King, had designed, at his Daughter's Marriage, to poison or kill all the Senate, that without Opposition, he might reign absolutely. Whereof the Senate being, privately informed, they concealed their Knowledge of so pernicious a Design. But, before the Marriage came, they made a Law, prohibiting all sumptuous Feasts, and that many should not be invited to a Banquet, as if they had only struck at Vice and Riot; whilst, in the mean time, they saved the Commonwealth by their Law. INTRIGUE XXIII. How to Answer difficult and dubious Questions, without Danger. HE that would shun dangerous Answers, and decline a Necessity of answering a difficult Question, which (however warily it be answered) putteth the Answerer to a loss, must be cautious not to answer directly, but prove it difficult and slippery, by some Parellel; whereby you may come off, with credit, and without loss. Thus a certain Jew, was asked by the Emperor of the Turks, what Religion was best, whether that of the Jews, the Christians, or the Mahometans. The Jew suspecting that he had proposed the Question to ensnare him, to speak Treason, in condemning the Emperor 's Religion; to find an Occasion to forfeit and take away his Estate; and, on the other part, thinking that the Emperor would repute him a dissembling Hypocrite, and Sycophant, if he should condemn his own Religion, answered thus, A Man, on his Death Bede, gave a Ring to his only Son, whom he entirely loved; on that Condition, that his Son would leave it to his Son, whom he most loved; who should likewise leave it to his Son; that, for many Generations, it might so pass (if possible) to the end of the World, or as long as his Race continued. Now, it fell out that one of the Line had Three Sons, whom he equally loved, and the same Three Brothers did mutually love one another, without difference. Therefore, thought, that to give the Ring to One, was a slighting to the Rest, and might prove a means to raise hatred among the Brethren. But, on second Thoughts, gave the Ring to a Goldsmith, to make Two Rings exactly like it, so that one might not be known from the other. And then, on his Deathbed, called for his Sons, severally, and gave every one of them a Ring, as the Hereditary Memorial he had got from his Father, which the Father's dearest Son was to inherit; desiring every one to be silent, and conceal from his Brothers the receiving of the Ring. Every one promised Secrecy, and all, mutually, loved one another, as before: till, after the Father's Death, there fell out a Contest, who was the Father's Dearest Son. Then (that every one might prove himself to be him) they brought out the Rings, which they had long concealed, every one thinking that he and none other had had the Ring. But, when the Rings were brought, they were so like one another that the Hereditary could not be known, and the Contest is not decided till this Day; And what are the Three Religions but these three Rings? By which Simile, the Jew shunned the dangerous Answer to the Emperor 's Question, and came off without loss. INTRIGUE XXIV. How to shun an offensive Answer or Sentence. WHEN a direct and downright Answer would give Offence, (for veritas odium parit,) Answer by some similitude that is witty and pleasing; or that the Question is hard, and far exceedeth your mean Apprehension; and that it would take the Decision of a greater Wit, as never well yet decided; and that therefore you are not bound to do that which lieth not in your Power. But if there be some eminent danger at hand, and the case cannot be brought to Trial without both danger and offence, than some other more memorable Surprise, of greater Importance, must be cast in, to stop the Course and Current of the other. Thus L. Scylla, when the Legions, or Trained Bands, of Rome, were up in Arms, and set on edge, by their own Fancies, and could not be brought to Trial, for their Sedition, without great Offence to the Citizens, and loss to the Commonwealth; made up the Matter with his witty Advice: Fo●, by the sound of Trumpet, and beat of Drum, he surprised them, with the Alarm of the Enemy's Approach; and so the Sedition was at an end, all joining together to oppose the common Enemy. INTRIGUE XXV. How to shun a difficult Sentence. A Hard Question, which hath not been formerly decided, should be given over; and a doubtful Cause delayed to a longer time; rather, than that a Sentence should be passed, which would repeal and destroy itself. Thus, Corax, the First, after the Death of Hieron, taught the Syracusians, the Art of persuading, and Rhetoric, for reward: with whom Tysius made the Agreement, That he should not give him his reward, till he had taught him his Art; and then, when he had learned it, he might demand his Money. Corax, after a competent time, thinking he had taught Tysius sufficiently, demanded his Mony. But, his Scholar denying, to Law they went. And, when the Cause came to Trial, Tysius defended himself by this Dilemma. If I can persuade the Judges that I own you nothing, they will absolve me, and so am bound to pay you nothing, according to the Sentence of the Judges. And if I can not persuade them, then am I less bound to pay you any thing, because you have not taught me the Art of persuading. Thus, whether I persuade the Judges or not, I will pay you nothing. But Corax, retorting his Arguments back on himself, saith, If you persuade the Judges, you are bound to pay me, because I have perfectly taught you the Art of persuading. But if you cannot persuade them that you own me nothing, than I shall be paid, according to the Sentence of the Judges. But the Judges, fearing to involve themselves in so intricate a Case, and Cause, very wisely, declined their passing Sentence; and dismissed them with this Check, Mali Corvi, Malum Ouum, such Master, such Scholar; Rogues both, get you gone. There are, likewise, many Causes brought to a Trial of Law, whom the Statute cannot reach, without granting some wicked Design; because of some particular Circumstances, which a General Act, Statute, or Decree cannot reach, be it never so Just and Rational. Therefore the Judge, out of his own Wit, Judgement, and Discretion, aught to find out some way to pass Sentence, according to the Statute of the Law, which, if it were put in Execution, would bring the Executer under great Danger. As for Example. There were at Venus two rich Men, one Antonio a Christian and Merchant; and another Ben-Ezra a Jew and great Usurer, whom Antonio, in all Companies, did defame as a base, bad, and Covetous Man: But it fell out that Antonio (being put to a straight) was forced to go to Ben-Ezra, to borrow a certain Sum of Mony. The Jew admired that he would have come to him, (upon such an account,) whom he had so much defamed, and abused. However, he agreed to lend him the Money, on Condition, that if he brought it again to him, on, or before the Day appointed, Ben-Ezra was to give it to him freely; but if not, he was to pay him with a pound of his Flesh. Antonio being put to it for Money, and not questioning the Payment, before the Day appointed, took it on these Terms; but things falling out contrary to his Expectation; and having lost several Ships at Sea, could not return the Money, till two Days after the time; and than Ben-Ezra would not take it; but a pound of his Flesh, according to the Agreement. Therefore, to Law they went, and, at Trial, according to the Statute, Antonio was cast; the Case being a clear Contract, Sealed, and with Witness; which the Law of Venus could neither shun nor slight. Ben-Ezra, willing to be revenged on Antonio was glad of the Judge's Determination, so much, that (when the Judge said, Ben-Ezra may choose out of what place soever of his Body he pleaseth, to take his pound of Flesh, since no place was determined) he cried out, a Daniel, a Daniel, meaning a just Judge. Antonio (knowing the irreconcilable Revenge, and insatiable Thirst, which Ben-Ezra had against his Person, and sucking his Blood) reputed himself a dead Man; and after several Sighs, and sad dejected Looks on the Judge, which he presented as Petitions, for a favourable Sentence, (which indeed, the Judge could not pass, contrary to the Statute of the Law,) was taken from the Bar, to pay the Jew a pound of his Flesh. But, as they were a going, the Judge called to the Jew; Ben-Ezra, you term me a just Judge, and I should be sorry if you had Reason to think me otherways; but I perceive that your Action against Antonio is but to be revenged on his Person, and that you are absolutely destitute of all Mercy. Therefore, assure yourself, that if in taking your pound of Flesh, you shed one drop of his Blood, you shall satisfy for it, according to the Law of Venus; for I cannot be less just to Antonio, than to Ben-Ezra. This so stupefied the Bloodthirsty Jew, that he was glad to dismiss Antonio, without paying of his Money. INTRIGUE XXVI. How to speak One's Mind freely, without danger. YOU may, without fear, speak what in itself is dangerous, if you assume, and act under the Person of another, whose Privilege it is to speak freely, without Danger of Punishment. Thus, Labenius, an Old Knight, and Senator of Rome, (when, against the Dignity of his Place and Person, he was compelled by Julius Caesar, to dance on the Theatre, Apoth. Fol. 517. and Act with common Jesters, those witty Plays, which formerly he had Written) revenged himself on Caesar. He took upon him to Act the part of Syrus, the Slave; and as he had been beat, by his Master, fled grumbling, and cried out, we Romans have lost our Liberty, whereby he plainly taxed Caesar for his Tyranny; and then, a little after, added, He must needs fear many, whom many fear. On the hearing of which, the whole People began to stare upon Caesar, and whisper concerning him; knowing that Labenius had spoke these Words to check his Tyranny. INTRIGUE XXVII. How to speak what you please, without any danger. ONE may be driven to speak that which, conveniently, he cannot; because they would be ill taken, as coming from his Mouth. For which Cause, the Figure, in Rhetoric, Prosoposoeia (by which an Orator may speak what he pleaseth, by ascribing it to another Person) was invented. So likewise, he that cannot, without danger, give a wholesome Council, concerning Public Affairs, as being prohibited to be spoke of, must feign himself to be out of his Wits; and then without fear or danger, may proclaim his Council; notwithstanding, of the contrary Decree. Quin. lib. 9.2. This was Solon's Course, when there had been so long a Continuation of War, and such an Universal Slaughter, betwixt the Athenians, and the Magareans, Just. Lib. 2. Laert. lib. 1. in vita Solon. upon the account of his Native Country Salamis, that, on both sides, they were almost quite destroyed; and the Athenians had decreed, that the mentioning a Vindication of the Isle Salamis, should, ever after, be taken as a Capital Crime. Solon, knowing that his Silence could do no Kindness to the Commonwealth, and his giving Council might prove dangerous, he, suddenly, feigned himself mad; under which Veil, he could not only speak, but act what he pleased, for the benefit of the Commonwealth; notwithstanding, of the Athenian Decree. Then, having disguised himself, in the habit of a Fool, ran out to the Marketplace; and when the People had gathered about him, (the better to cover his counterfeit Madness,) in a unusual stile of Rhyme, he began to persuade the People, without delay, to denounce War against the Magareans, and the Isle of Salamis, in a short time would be theirs. INTRIGUE XXVIII. How to shun the Reproach of an unhappy Adventure. LEST any blame you, for a rash undertaking, which proveth bad in the event; you must carry it, as if the result were uncertain, and as it were not known, what might be the event; and take his Advice, whose Business it is, what is best to be done; then, when you both agree in one Judgement, and his Council prove the same with yours, show him the unhappy event; and, by this means, you shall shun his Reproach, and Reproof: For, agreeing to the same Measures, he cannot, in Reason, condemn the event of his own Advice. Thus, when Hannibal, the Elder, the Son of Guiscon, was beat in the First Sea Fight, of the Punic War, he sent, with all speed, a Messenger to Carthage; to know whether or not he should Fight the Romans, on the first opportunity. Val. Max. 7.3. To whom all the People, with one Universal Voice and Consent, answered; Fight them without delay, and let nothing hinder. Then the Messenger added, We have engaged, and are beat. Then they were all silent, who had, otherways (if it had not been for their own Council) damned Hannibal, and his Fight too; and might, perhaps, crucified himself; which was then the Custom of the Carthaginians. INTRIGUE XXIX. How to speak that, which, in itself, is dangerous, without hurt. Word's which one will speak, and are apt to bring both hatred and danger to the Speaker, ought not to be spoke openly; but signified, obscurely, by some witty knack; and this in Rhetoric, is termed Innuitio; by which Figure, one may, covertly, make that known, which he can not conveniently speak openly; by bringing in an Antecedent, from whence, of necessity, and readily, the Hearer may know his hateful and passionate meaning. Demoniades Lacon, used this Figure in his Vindictive Passion. For when he had lost his Slippers, he earnestly wished, that they might fit the Feet of him that stole them. Now he seemed to pray a very sober and lawful Prayer, whilst, indeed, his Prayer was a wicked Imprecation; for he wished a Mischief upon the Thief, viz. That his Feet might turn a wry, and that he might have crooked Club Feet, such as Demoniades himself had. For he that wisheth that the Slippers might fit the Thief's Feet, concealeth the bad Consequence, viz. That the Thief's Feet might be set a wry, to fit the crooked Club Pattons. INTRIGUE XXX. How to shun that which is hateful to One, by a Jest. IF Necessity force you to speak, that which, otherways, you would not; speak it by way of Jest, as if you did it not Seriously, and with Deliberation. Thus, a certain married Woman, which had made her Husband a Cuckold, went to confess her Sins to a Priest. But, before he would give her a full Pardon, he bond her to acknowledge her oversight to her Husband; and that her Young Son was none of his. The Adulteress was hardly put to it, not knowing how to keep her Credit, her Husband's Fovour, and discharge her Conscience towards the Priest. But, taking advice of a Neighbour, she put on a beggar's Habit, and (as another Person) told her young Son; (as it had been to frighten him;) whilst he was crying, and making a noise, Get you gone squaling Rogue, and then turning her Face to her Husband, (as it had been to make the Boy hold his Peace,) said; You're not the Father of this bawling Boy. And, by this means, she thought she had confessed herself an Adulteress to her Husband, which she had promised to do to her Father Confessor. But this Jest was an impious and wicked cheat, and a Hocus Pocus prank of Popery. INTRIGUE XXXI. How to Reveal a Secret, without giving Offence to him that did reveal it. IF One tell you a Secret, which you willingly would reveal; you must seriously tell him that you knew it before, and that you came to the Knowledge thereof, by such and such Persons, as he cannot conveniently inquire at; and so it would be reputed a piece of impertinent Nonsense, to urge you with an Oath or Promise of Secrecy; or to bind you to conceal that, wherewith your present Informer hath nothing to do; nor are you any ways obliged to him, for telling you no more, than what you knew before. Thus, When Constantinople was taken by the Venetians and French, Anno 1204. The Patriarch there, was forced to condescend that there should never afterwards be chosen any Patriarch, Archbishop, or Clergyman whatsoever of St. Sophia's Church, but a Venetian born; yet privately wrote to the Bishop of Rome Innocent III. Codr. Exact. Innocent 3. that the Venetians did encroach on the Liberties and Privileges of the Roman See. Innocent (because he could not obey the Patriarch's Request, in concealing what he was informed of) presently wrote back to Constantinople, that he had been, before he wrote to him, informed of the Venetians Insolence, Thus, Moreover, Tho you have informed us, by your Letters, of several things, whereof you thought us ignorant, be assured that, before yours came to our hands, we had a clear and certain Information of the most part of what we have received of you. INTRIGUE XXXII. How to reprove one without giving Offence. IF you would reprove another's Vice, or would rather advise or admonish him not to fall into such an Error; do it not directly, for, in so doing, you would seem to accuse him, as guilty of some act of Baseness, and to entertain evil thoughts of him, whereby you may give Offence, and, instead of mending one Error make two. Therefore behave yourself as ignorant of his Faults, and as if you had not the least suspicion of any such thing; but, after an indirect manner, seign to reprove another before him, who hath committed, or is like to commit the same Error; then open to him how base and shameful a thing it is; and, if you can conveniently, persuade your Friend (whom you would reprove but dare not) to check him upon that account, with some reproachful Name, agreeing to the nature of his Error: And so, by this means, he himself may come to know, loath and leave of his Error, and be glad that he was not found guilty of so horrible a Crime, nor was directly reproved for his Fault. INTRIGUE XXXIII. How to shun the Inconveniences of Jeers and Satyrs. YOU shall shun the venom of Scoffing and reproachful Satyrs, if you behave your self as you did not mind them; and this is a sure and Heroic rule, which no wise Man will discommend. This was the advice of Diogenes the Cynic, to a young Man who greatly complained that he was much troubled, Laert Lib. 6. in Decl. at the Scoffing and Satirical Reflections of Zanys, Mimics, and Stall-Jesters, who could never forbear him in public. You (says he) Show yourself too much troubled at their Impertinencies: Meaning that there is no better way to stop the Mouths of such Pedantic Idle Fops, than to slight their foolish Discourse, as not worth the taking Notice of. For by this means, you show yourself unconcerned at their Scoffs, as if you neither valued them nor their foul Mouthed Language either, which will appear by your not retorting such Jeers at them, as they throw at you: Or, in taking no care to free yourself from the vain tattle of so impertinent Persons. And this will gall and perplex the Satirists and Idle Persons, more than if you should make Orations, and Writ Volumes, in spite, against them. Thus, when two Learned Men did passionately and sharply Write one against another, the First and Wiser, to stop the Mouth of his Adversary, did upbraid himself and his Tribe with all the Vices which are incident to Men, and all the Crimes that attend a debauched Life; gathering a cluster of bitter Grapes, and bad Language from Plautus and other such Authors, which none but Scolds and Scoffers use: Whereby his Adversary (having nothing to say against him, but what he himself had said already) was vexed and galled in his Mind, and with shame, put to silence as one slighted, and not worthy to be minded, or his Discourse to be taken Notice of. Neither did any Person think the worse of the other; For all his opprobrious Accusations (whether true or false) coming from his own Mouth, they were believed by None, but he himself was reputed the Wiser and Better Man. N●ro bore nothing with greater Patience than base Language and Calumnies: Neither did he pass any affront with less Punishment than spiteful Satyrs, Sueton. in Neron. 39 whether in Word, or Writ; Verse, or Prose. For when any came to his hand, he neither searched after the Authors, nor Punished those who were brought before him and found Guilty, with any great Punishment. Thus, if a vindictive cruel Tyrant (who fished in all opportunities, to himself in humane Blood, on the least offence,) could pass and slight Jeering, Scoffing, and spiteful Language, as not worth minding; how much more ought a Sober Patiented Man, of a sounder Principle, (who hath not half the Power of the Emperor Nero) slight the babbling of idle Jesters, and Satirical Fools: Who are neither fit for any Business, nor worthy to be kept Company with. INTRIGUE XXXIV. How to induce a Prince to hear one Patiently. THE first and principal Means, whereby a Prince is induced to lend an attentive and patiented Ear, and is made fit for your Intention, is sweet pleasing Words, and Flattery. For most Princes being incident to this infirmity, that they are of Opinion, They are the only Men which are reputed Wise, and capable to Manage great Affairs, and give sound Advice: Say what one will in their Commendation, they think it no more than what they Deserve. Hence it follows, that tho' one procure that good Events be esteemed the Fruit of his good Council, or should accomplish by his Wit and Prudence, some worthy and memorable Act (which might do his Prince a great Favour) all the Applause, which by right is his, and which he should in Justice reap, will be attributed, not so much to his Wisdom and Diligence, as to good Fortune: Yet, by this means one may creep a little further in his Prince's Favour, but no other ways than an Actor in a Play. For, he who ascribeth the Victory to Fortune, carries away the Triumph without the hatred of him who is overcome: but he that attributeth it to his own strength and skill, carries away the Victory with Envy, Hatred, and Revenge. INTRIGUE XXXV. How one ought to behave himself, and what course he should take, when he is environed with Danger and Difficulties on all sides. WHen one is driven to that Condition, that, whether he strive or sit still, his loss, danger, and current of affairs, are still the same, he must move and bestir himself in those Courses, which are most likely to make for his Business. For, when one concealeth the event of his Affairs, which he committed to bare Wishes, and a fretting Mind, his Condition is nothing made better, but rather worse; the Causes and Accidents of the Danger still remaining; whilst, otherways, he who boldly withstandeth difficulties, either findeth out a way how to escape Dangers, or (if he bend his Wits, and spend his Labour in vain) showeth himself to be one of a daring Spirit, and Courageous Mind; for it is oft times found true, that Audentes Fortuna juvat, timidosque repellit. INTRIGUE XXXVI. How Princes may conceal their Hatred, and private Displeasure. A Prince, that would conceal his private grudge and hatred, against another Prince, till the Provocations break out in open War, must (to render him secure, and void of all Suspicion) Accost and Congratulate him, with Gifts, Legates, and Ambassadors, etc. as on his coming to his Dignity, his Kingdom, Crown, Superiority, and Dominion; his Marriage, or Birth of an Heir. And, to Grace all, every thing must be done, and presented with the most plausible Signs of entire Favour, Friendship and Familiarity. Which will prove very profitable, in prosecuting the intended Design. INTRIGUE XXXVII. How to Assuage the Insolences of a Seditious City. SWelling Cities, whose Inhabitants are Subject to the Insolences of Insurrection and Sedition, when they are under a Kingly Government, are kept in order, no better way, than by setting a Senate over them; or committing the Management of Affairs to one Man, chosen and appointed by the King. For the Government of a People, in respect of their Liberty, is better and more agreeable to the Arbitrary Will and Pleasure of a King, when it is committed to the Care and Fidelity of a few, than of many, whose Unconstant and Ambitious Drifts, clash oft times against another. INTRIGUE XXXVIII. How to Abrogate Privileges. IT is a singular piece of Secret Policy, in a King, to connive, at first, with the Insurrections and Seditions of a People, which can neither bear with absolute Liberty, nor absolute Servitude; and (when he can stop the Course of their Sedition, and bring them to Trial,) to give way to the Current of their Crimes, Villainies and Outrages; That, afterwards, he may have a sufficient ground whereby to deprive them of their Privileges and Immunities, which may be termed Briars in the side of the Government, and Thorns in the Eyes of the Prince. And, whereas, such Seditious Subjects, (in using such dangerous and hurtful means, to lose their Liberties and Privileges) have forfeit all that is theirs; they ought to be handled like those, who, being Conscious to their own Crimes, deliver themselves up Prisoners, to be Judged by a Council of War. INTRIGUE XXXIX. How a Prince may frustrate an Enemy, with whom he intendeth to Wage War. A Prince that intendeth to invade another's Territories, and denounce War against any King, Prince, People, or Commonwealth; must keep his Design close, to prevent the violence, and whispering of the Courtiers, (whereof some may be private Informers,) and seem to prize and glory in peace, as the greatest blessing in the World. And, to frustrate his Adversaries Information, Prevention, or Preparation, he must send Subtle and well Accomplished Ambassadorus, in whom he can put Trust, who may slily pump his Enemy's Projects, without discovering his own. And if there be sent any Ambassadors from his Enemy (who, perhaps, may be Jealous of his Design, and would Antidote the poison of War,) they must be detained beyond the appointed time; and, at last, sent away without any positive Answer; by telling them, that he will send their Master an Answer, very speedily; which may be delayed till all things be composed and put in Order, for prosecuting the intended Design. INTRIGUE XL. How a weak Kingdom, or Commonwealth, may be delivered from the Power of a potent Enemy. IT is convenient for a Prince and People, who are not able to engage an Enemy, in open War, to ingratiate themselves in their Adversary's Favour, by confirming a durable Peace; or, to take for their Protection, some King, Prince, or People, more powerful than themselves; or by buying their Peace, though at a dear Rate. But it should be observed, that Kings and potent Princes do not, always, openly, enter in Leagues, offensive and defensive, with inferior Dukes and Commonwealths, but in a private Compact or Agreement; lest the inferior States should seem to aim at great things, and think themselves as good as their Patrons. And it is likewise a sure way, to save Ones Territories from Invasion, subtly and cautiously, to raise Seditious Jealousies, and Insurrections, in the Bowels of that Kingdom or Commonwealth, which most you fear; for by that means there may be some thing to do at home. Or, if that cannot be done, it is needful to raise some quarrel, or stir up a Foreign Enemy, to engage with so troublesome a Neighbour; with Assurance of Assistance, both in Men and Money. INTRIGUE XLI. How to molest Neighbouring Nations. THE fittest way to raise Broils, intestine Wars, Seditions and Insurrections, in the Bowels of your Enemy's Country; is to allure and stir up some of the Offspring of the Prince, to undergo some hard, dangerous, and Seditious Undertaking, in pursuit of some Royal Right and Interest, which he may have, or seem to have to the Crown, Government, or any other Regal Prerogative; only lost by the Power, Wrong and Injustice of Ambitious Usurpers: For there is no fit way to delude the minds of the unstable People than this. Hence it is, that those who have been desirous of change of Government, have still been objecting against the present; pointing at some Branch of the Royal Family, whose Right, the Crown and Government might be, as they Fancy. There is no necessity, here, to bring Examples, for there is neither King nor Subject, Prince nor People, but have heard of, or seen such Transactions and Undertake, in their own Time. INTRIGUE XLII. How to Suppress those who are proud of their Honourable Titles and Dignities. THE surest way to Suppress those ambitious Spirits, who are proud of their honourable Titles and Dignities, is to make these great Titles (which they so esteem and brag of) common; by conferring them on new Startup rich Sparks, who can look as big as they; and so these Titles, which once were courted, as most Honourable, and whereof the great ones were so proud, will be slighted as an ordinary thing. As for Example, if there be any who looketh big, for the Title of Duke, Marquess, Earl, etc. Let the King take one of his Domestic Servants, and confer on him one of these high, vainglorious, airy Titles (which adds nothing to the Man's Accomplishments) as the just Reward of his Deservings and good Service. And, by making him, with several others, of the same order of Chivalry; the high Titles will not make so geat a lustre, and the swelling Peer will lay by his big Looks. INTRIGUE XLIII. How to keep under Men of Ambitious and Aspiring Spirits. ONE whose Wealth doth increase, and elevates his proud Mind above the Sphere of an ordinary Subject, should be sent in Embassies; and put upon expensive Employments, of Ambition, Honour, and Greatness. And those who have the Applause, and look big in the Eyes of the People, should be drawn over by fair Speeches, and a prospect of greater Honour; to be their Princes' Favourite: that thereby the Subjects may owe the greater Allegiance and Loyalty to their Prince, for countenancing such Men. Those who have a great Name, and make a great Figure in the Government, aught to be put upon hard and difficult Exploits and Expeditions: that, when the result of their Undertake doth not answer the Expectation of their Admirers, their Grandeur and great Estimation may be lessened; and that the People may not dote on the Parts and Accomplishments of any Subject, above the Enduments of their Prince. They who, at Court, aspire in Greatness, Pre-eminence, and Superiority, above the Sphere of an humble Subject and Servant, should be sent to some Foreign Country, where they cannot have opportunity to prosecute their ambitious Designs. He who hath the Applause of an excellent Soldier, and is suspected as dangerous in so eminent an Employ, should be sent from the Army, under some pretence, to some other honourable Function at Court: but such as is destitute of all opportunity of molesting the State of Affairs, or doing his Prince any Diskindness. But, in one Word, Men of unsatisfied Minds, who are still fishing after greater Preferment, should be sent to Foreign Nations; about some public Affair, whereby they may gain Honour, but become no more powerful, to work their private and dangerous Designs, of Promotion and Dignity. If of necessity, great Trust in public Affairs, must be committed to a vicious Person of Quality, join with him a Sober, Loyal, and witty Conjunct, and his Vices may be restrained, and he himself prove a good Statesman. But the best course that a Prince can take, in the Administration of State-Affairs, is to make all Places and Offices of Government Temporal; and Durante Regis Beneplacito: lest by continuing too long in one Office, any should begin to repute his Office his Hereditary Right, and look upon himself as a petty Prince. INTRIGUE XLIV. How to Suppress Seditious Soldiers. THERE is no better Antidote to prevent the Sedition of mutinous Soldiers, or a factious Army, than to disperse them to several Places; for it was never known that a great Army could lie idle, without mischievous Plots, Insolences, and Out-breaking. And, if an Army be suspected to contrive private Conspiracies, and villainous Acts of Mischief, not yet Discovered, all means must be used to come to the Knowledge thereof. And when the Intrigue is found out, something must be cast in, to stop the current of their Conventions, Councils, and Contrivances, till there be a full Discovery of the whole Matter; and things be put in a posture of Defence and Safety, to repel the Force of their mischievous Designs. Then, when this is done, a seeming opportunity should be given, that they may hasten to accomplish their Projects: whilst indeed, the opportunity is but a trap, all possibility of their performing their wicked Designs being prevented. But it is a good way to keep an Army from plotting Mischief, to mix together Soldiers of several Nations and different Manners and Languages; for hardly can such agree in one Faction, or live in concord among themselves; much less join with one consent in a Body, against their Prince or Commanders. INTRIGUE XLV. How to Suppress Civil Seditions and Uproars. A Seditious People may be induced to go to Colonies and Foreign Plantations, in expectation of great Estates, and Land for nothing. Where they can have no opportunity of Plotting and Contriving Mischief and Conspiracies, which were occasioned by their Idleness and and want of Employment; but be driven to Till the Ground, and use their diligence for a Livelihood. (2.) If their Insolency be come to an open Out-breaking, the interposing of plausible Men, who have the Favour of the People; and whom they take to be Friends, to whom they will lend a patiented and attentive Ear, is a very effectual Remedy to tame the Fury of a distracted Rabble. (3.) It is likewise a sure way for a good and wise Man, of great Power and Repute, to pretend to espouse the Quarrel of the swelling Multitude, till the tide of their Madness be over; and, under colour, to become their Captain or Ringleader, thereby to save the Government from Rapine, Burning, Slaughter, etc. Who, though perhaps, he cannot stop the current of their malicious Endeavours; yet may he mitigate their Fury, till a surer. Remedy be taken. (4.) For Suppressing public Insolences, a Foreign Force of Soldiers must be used: for, being Strangers of an unknown Tongue, they cannot so easily side with the Seditious, as those of their own Nation, who may be induced to join with their own Countrypeople, upon the account of Friendship and Self-interest; or at least connive at their Insolences, Outrages, and Insurrections, as being their Friends and Countrymen. (5.) If these Remedies do not effectuate, and the Insurrection must be Suppressed by Force of Arms, the Magistrates must go and severely punish the Ringleaders and Promoters of the Insolences, according to the extremity of the Law. Yet the Vulgar are still to be excused; because indeliberately, and by the persuasion of their Superiors, they undertook so villainous an Enterprise. (6.) Seditions and Insurrections, raised by the Cruelty and Covetousness of Courtiers, and Statesmen, may be appeased, by giving up to Justice those first Offenders, who did set the People on edge. (7.) Then let the Prince pass an Act of Grace, proclaiming his free Pardon, of all past Crimes, to all such as will come in to their Prince, and acknowledge their Error; so full, that no Court nor Law can lay hold on them; by which Clemency, all (some for fear of Punishment, some for Shame and Contempt, being destitute of their Leaders and Commanders) will come in, and make an humble Submission. INTRIGUE XLVI. How to know whether an Informer speaketh Truth, or not. WHen the State of Affairs is so dubious and suspected, that private subtle Informers must be used (thereby to know the secret Designs and Intrigues of plodding and discontented Brains) it will be necessary to have several Informers, who have no acquaintance one with another; and when they all agree in one thing, without contradicting one another, than it is credible that they speak Truth. But if they gainsay and contradict one another, there is no credit to be given to what they speak; but diligent search must be made by others, that, without delay, the certain Knowledge may be found out. INTRIGUE XLVII. How one ought to behave himself, when he receiveth an Injury from a Person of Quality, that is far above him. TO serve a Prince, is a very hard and bad Employment, unless the Servant can so bear with Injuries, as if he knew nothing of them. For it is a very foolish thing for a Man to let his Passion be seen, when there is no way to revenge or right himself. Therefore, I say, there is no other Remedy for Injuries, given by great Persons, than to behave so, as if one had not received them. For, if once a Person of Quality understand that their private Arts and Pranks are found out, and that the Person, to whom they own a Spite, knoweth that they hate him, they will, with open Violence, prosecute their Revenge so furiously, that they would be ashamed so to do, did they not perceive that their private Intentions and Secrets were found out. Therefore, when either bad Words, a Mistake, or Fault, depriveth one of his Prince's Favour, he must conceal his Misfortune, that he may not seem guilty. And then, though his offended Master tyrannize over him, by open Reproofs Checks, secret Jeers, and Scoffs, he ought to overcome his Master's Anger (which will in time wear out) by his diligence and constant Obedience. INTRIGUE XLVIII. How to shun the Envy of Courtiers. Nothing hasteneth the overthrow of one ready to fall, whether by his own or another's Error, than Envy or Emulation, the constant Concomitants of Virtue and good Enduments; and the Torments and Murderers of Greatness and Promotion: To which commonly are joined, the Complaints and Murmur of the People, which spiteful Men use, as Witnesses and Evidences, to work their Revenge, and prosecute their pernicious Designs, against those whom they have set up, as the marks of their. Fury and undeserved Malice, which altogether 〈…〉 the Resolution, and stir u● the Mind of a Prince (tho' otherways n●●er so effable and indulgent) no otherways than the stormy Wind tosseth the foaming Billows of the raging Sea. Neither is there any way to escape this Evil, but by Innocence and Modesty. I say Innocence, that he may do his Master's Business carefully and with great honesty, to his Master's best advantage. I say Modesty; for, as Envy is kindled by Pride and Arrogance, so by a gentle Behaviour, Effability, and keeping a House neither too Prodigal, nor any ways Base and Miserable, it is lessened, and at last quite extinguished. Therefore let every Courtier and Statesman, quietly and carefully, look after his Business, without a great Retinue. Yea, if he be Wise, let him not in any ways be subject to those vain Glories, which do not diminish, but augment the Envy of Ambitious Spirits; whose chief Eyesore is another's Greatness. INTRIGUE XLIX. How One ought to behave himself with offended Princes and Peers. IT is an excellent way to deal with offended Princes, not to provoke them by a slighting and froward Indifferency, and unseasonable Contradictions; but to strive, by an humble Submission, to pacify their violent Wrath, thereby to obtain a patiented Hearing. Neither must this be done at first dash, but at a convenient time and opportunity. For when an absolute Power overswayeth a weak and inferior Person's Justice and Right, an obstinate Resistance marreth, but mendeth not the Matter. And when the Person (in whose Hand the Power lieth) is pacified, and pardoneth him who was misrepresented an Offender, he can easily, afterwards, be brought to a right Understanding, and be convinced of his former Mistake, and have greater Respect for him, who did humbly submit himself to his Clemency, though falsely accused. Thus a certain, sober, and wise Person of Quality, being falsely accused by some envious Courtiers, finding them resolute (at any rate) to confirm their false Accusations, notwithstanding of his Innocence, when his incensed Prince inquired, What d● you deserve for so Villainous an Enterprise? Answered, Death; humbly submitting himself to his Prince's Mercy; by which sober Answer, he obtained both his Prince's Pardon, and, in a while, greater Favour; when the Intrigue of the matter was found out, to the perpetual shame and contempt of his Accusers. Though, otherways, had he stood obstinate in his own Defence, he might have undergone the greatest severity of the Law. INTRIGUE L. How to Suppress the Vices, and wrong Sentences of Partial Judges. FIrst of all, great Care must be taken that Courts and Judicatories be not prostitute to a filthy Crew of perverted Judges, who pass Sentence partially for Reward, or at the request of some great Person, or for the Favour they bear to any Party; but that all such Places be freely conferred on such as are knowing, well-deserving, good and honest Men. For whatever a Man buyeth, he looketh upon as hi● Money, whereof he is free to make his best. And thus a Magistrate, who hath bought his Place, with freedom taketh a Bribe, which is the Original, out-most Extent, and non ultra of all Filthiness and Knavery. Hence arise Murders, Slaughters, Robberies, contempt of the Laws, etc. Every one confiding that all Crimes howsoever heinous, can be bought off for Money. Therefore, it is needful that all Judges have their Salaries appointed them from the public; and that they themselves be bound, under a severe penalty, to take no Money, directly or indirectly, upon the Account of their Offices. Moreover, none ought to be appointed a Judge in his own Native Country; neither will a wise Man desire it: For, whether he be an Honest Man, or a Knave, it will still be presumed, that he will pass many partial Sentences; upon the Account of his Friends, Kindred, and Relations. INTRIGUE LI. How to suppress Luxury. THough the violence of inveterate Luxury be such, that it cannot be restrained by moderate Measures; yet the good Example of a sober Prince may avail more than the fear of punishment, appointed by Law. And it is a good Remedy against this Evil, to impose, not only great penalties on the Offenders, but also Custom and Taxes on those Commodities which promote the Vice; far greater than on Corn, and other such Commodities, which no Person can live without. Thus, some will not buy their mad Frolicks at so dear a rate; and though others still continue in their Luxury, yet will it turn to the public good, the King reaping the profit of their prodigality. INTRIGUE LII. How to render populous Cities unfit for Seditions and Insurrections, without loss or detriment. WHereas Merchandizing maketh gain the only Object of its Labour, it turneth Men to be of mean Spirits, and absolutely averse from the expense of War, and any thing of Trouble; and begetteth a natural and dull Inclination to Peace. Whence, Cities become plenty in Handicrafts, and Men, in the exercise of Trading, can be easily kept in good Order, without insolences and out-breaking. And, for the encouragement of such, a well-settled Peace is very expedient: by which, the People's love and respect, and their own unity and profit are more gained and preserved, than by all the charming Allurements and fair Speeches, that either Prince or Magistrate can invent. For, there is nothing that gaineth more ground on the People's Affection, than a peaceable Government, and giving them means and occasion of gathering Wealth. And thus People being busied about their Lawful Employments, they never mind the Revolutions of State-Affairs, so that they be not deprived of the sweetness of their Gain, which they reap by their Trading and Merchandizing. INTRIGUE LIII. How to appease an incensed People. TUmults and Seditions, raised by the Insolences and Miscarriages of Statesmen and perverted Magistrates, can be composed no better way, than by giving up those who were the first Offenders, and the Original Cause of those Insurrections, to Justice; as a Sacrifice, to suffer for the peace of the public, and pacify, by their Death, those whom they had abused and provoked in their Life; and by setting up others in their stead, who are well qualified, of a good Repute and Estimation, among the People. But seldom, or never, is the Prince blamed for any Error in Government, but his Counsellors and Ministers of State, and provoked Subjects, especially Citizens (like the Dog who biteth the Stone, not minding the Hand from whence it came) never consider the Original of their Grievances; but blame those who execute what they are bound to perform, by the command of their Superiors. And, in such Cases, this is the Course and Remedy which both good and bad Princes take. For, the good expiate, the imputed guilt of those Offenders, (who have misbehaved themselves, by committing Crimes ignorantly) by putting them to Death. And the bad impute their own Crimes to others, and charge them with that envy and bad Consequences, which by right is their own. INTRIGUE LIV. How to keep the Favour of new Subjects. THere is one good way to govern a People, who have a hand in choosing Masters of Government, when the People enter Articles with a new Prince, lately come to the Crown, which is this; Let not the Prince alter any thing of the ancient Laws, Manners, and Statutes, that did formerly belong to the People; nor diminish the Goods of his Subjects, by excessive Taxes, Customs, or Fines. But let all, or most things, continue in their former State. And, that the new Kingdom may still keep it's old Face of Affairs; Let all Magistrates, Officers, and others, in public Employment, continue in their places, without encroaching upon the People's Liberties, Immunities, and Privileges. Yet let him know, by the by, that Ambitious, Headstrong Masters of Policy, who commonly eye their own Interest, Greatness, and Pre-eminence, will be but little profitable to the state of Affairs. For such, are commonly blown up with a self Opinion and Confidence, and do both by Nature, Custom, and Education, take a greater freedom in the Government than is fit, for a Subject to do. INTRIGUE LV. Why Merchandizing is forbidden to the Nobility. OUR Ancestors did debar Noble Men from Merchandizing, because they thought it would wrong the common Interest of Towns and Cities; and that it would, by an illimited Liberty, hinder a more noble Commerce. Now it is believed, by all, that Merchandizing is below the Sphere and Grandeur of a Nobleman. And this Opinion was, at first, by the Policy of Princes, infused in the Ears of the Nobility, and is now become a Maxim of undoubted Truth. For when Princes came to understand, that their greatness and security did lie in the Exercise of Arms, nor were ignorant that if the Nobility should once, take to Trading, and taste of the Sweetness, which from thence redoundeth, they would lay by the Exercise of War, and follow the Exercise of Merchandizing. And, therefore, it was necessary to infuse in them this Opinion, as a Paradox in Greatness and Honour, viz. that to buy and sell, for the Desire of Lucre, in a Nobleman, was a base and scandalous thing; though to other Persons the Highway might be reputed Honourable. INTRIGUE LVI. Cancerning the Instruments of Power. CAligula Caesar used to say that there were two things whereby Power was acquired, preserved, and augmented; which were Money, and strength of Arms. For it is impossible that a Kingdom can continue safe, without sometimes War, neither can Soldiers be kept without Money: when there is neither Peace without War, nor War without Money; nor can Money be had without Taxes; How then can Taxes be exacted, securely, without hatred, heartburning, and envy? But this we shall show you hereafter. INTRIGUE LVII. How Statesmen ought to behave themselves, in assuming the Honour of Memorable Acts. THere is one great Evil among Princes, viz. that they cannot endure any to be reputed braver Men than themselves. Therefore they carry on Affairs, which are accomplished with little labour and difficulty, according to their own Measure and Contrivance. But the Management of all hard and more difficult Affairs they commit to the Conduct of others; who (though by their own only Wit and Industry they accomplish the Business) must lay down the Name and Honour, which is properly their own, at the Prince's Feet; who will think himself robbed, if he carry not away the Garland, tho' he never knew how it was gained. Therefore, every one, who would be careful of his own security, aught to shun all hard and difficult Businesses of great weight, as far as possibly he can: But if he cannot, let him be sure to attribute the Name, Honour, and Conduct of all good success, and well-managed Affairs, to the Wisdom and Prudence of the Prince; and by this means he will shun his Prince's Envy, and be in no danger of losing his Favour. INTRIGUE LVIII. How to appease offended Princes. WHen a Nobleman findeth his Prince stirred up against him, by the Reports and Rumours of Envious Persons, and that his fury is is like to tend to his Ruin and Disgrace; first of all, his Wrath must be, timously, mitigated by the sober advice of some great Favourite, in few Words; before he hazard to vindicate himself in his Prince's Presence: lest, unawares, the Prince, by tossing and tormenting, be provoked to greater fury. Neither doth a show of stubborness and obstinacy gain any great credit of Innocence; especially, when one, with a brazen Face, carrieth himself too confidently in his Prince's Presence. For, being Eclipsed by the envy of his Enemies, he is not able, tho' Innocent, to deal with his Prince's Fury; nor represent the Case, as it really is; nor remove the Cloud of bad Consequences which his Enemy's Hatred hath produced. Therefore it is fit to give place both to the King's Wrath, and the false Reports, that both, in time, may wear out; and then when the Prince beholdeth the true face of Affairs, through the right end of the Glass, the matter without difficulty can be soon made up. INTRIGUE LIX. How to impose Taxes, without the offence, and grumbling of the Subject. IF a Prince raise that, as a Tax, which is, in every place, cheap, and may be spared; and impose great Customs on such Commodities as promote the Luxury of great and rich Persons, and great Fines on all Riotous Livers, and such as slight and despise his Acts and Statutes of this Nature, he will gain ground upon the People's Affections, and raise Taxes without offence or grumbling. Moreover, it will be very acceptable, if he use any fiugal industry, upon his own account, and then openly lay out the gained Money for the benefit of the public; with a show of great Care and good Husbandry. For nothing pleaseth Subjects more, than when they see the King carefully look after the management of public Affairs, and the Treasury not wasted in Luxury. INTRIGUE LX. How to collect Taxes without offending the Subject. THE Ancients did not so much burden, with Taxes, the Borders and Limits of their Kingdoms, as those places in the middle of their Territories, and nearer to their Courts and Persons. And, to shun the offence and grumbling of Subjects, this advice must be taken: No public Collectors must be chosen, who go in Person to private Houses, who can be partial, or favourable upon the Account of Bribes, and self Interest; but let, rather, inferior Collectors be appointed, who can neither add to, or diminish from their limited Power; to vex or oppress City or Country, under the veil of a pretended Power or Privilege. But it is absolutely the surest way, to choose for a Collector, one who is a free Citizen; or, if in the Country, one well acquainted in the place, honest and of good report, who may choose, out of his own Corporation, such as can more kindly gain respect of the People, and without giving offence, may bring in the Taxes to the public Treasury. But if any Person refuse payment, it is fit, and will be better taken, that the Magistrate force them to a submissive Obedience; than that a rude Collector should use the illimited Rule of his own insolency, who commonly useth no Discretion, and giveth no delay to the rigid Execution of his Power; but rather maketh his serving the Public a Terror and , to frighten the Subjects, and gather spoil to himself, from poor People, who are scarce able to pay the Taxes themselves. But, last of all, the Charge of the Treasury must be committed to very honest Men, whose Lives and Conversations, are evidently known to be just and good; otherways, let the Taxes be never so great, the public Treasury will always be empty. INTRIGUE LXI. How Seditions are raised. INcendiaries use, by sly, insinuating Counsels, to sow the Seeds of Sedition, in going to the chief Towns and Cities, and under the veil of fair and lawful Pretences, advising the Magistrates, either privately, or at some public Entertainment, when their Hearts are merry, not to betray the public Liberties, nor suffer their Country to be undone, with mischievous Designs; and that they should remember, they live in a free Kingdom, and not under Slavery and Tyranny. Neither must they speak any thing against the Prince, but so intricately, dubiously, and at so great a distance, that they may easily excuse it; and that none can lay hold upon it but rather, seemingly, cover his Imperfections, Whilst, in the mean time, they discover and. whip his Nakedness. And if they find their Discourse minded, and taken more than ordinary notice of by some, they must make as if they would deal more familiarly and plainly with them, knowing their good, just and honest Principle; and that they are good Commonwealth's-Men. And then, with some sighs openly, or whispering the chief Men in the Ear, they tell them of some Flaw or Imperfection in the Government, that they may seem, with a passionate and deeply concerned Gesture and Behaviour, to dread more than they dare discover. Afterwards, you shall find a great many to look on those as very honest Men, brave States Men, and the * The Caterpillars. Pillars of their Country. And thus, at length with a concern somewhat sorrowful, they speak with greater freedom of their Prince; and Subjects begin to be weary of him, especially when it is industriously spread about, among the Rabble, that the Natives are quite slighted, and that Foreigners and Strangers sit, at the Helm of Affairs; who (though they boast of their noble Race, and ancient Families) once got their poor and miserable Live, by sweeping of Ovens, or some such sordid Employment; yet now live high, sucking the very Blood of the Commonwealth. INTRIGUE LXII. How Rebels and Conspirators are kept close together, in one Body. AFter these Incendiaries have, by their Mischievous Speeches, sown the Seeds of Treason and Sedition, the Weeds of Conspiracy and Rebellion begin to appear in open view, and they still proceed further, laying hold on all Occasions, using all means, and fishing for all opportunities, to enlarge the breach betwixt the King and his Subjects; and that all hope of Reconciliation may be cast off, or as Tacitus saith, Quo minore spe Veniae crescat sceleris Vinculum, 4 History. etc. whereby the Bond of their iniquity may increase, with less hope of Pardon, they use to oblige the furious Rabble with some notable outrage; that if any hope of Pardon should appear, they may take it for a Trap, wheedling Snare, or State Sugar-Plumb, which would but set their Teeth on edge; and so may not accept of it, tho' the Prince should freely proffer it; the horrid guilt of their impardonable Crimes, being always before their Eyes. And it is to be observed, that Seditious Persons, for accomplishing their mischievous Designs, take the opportunity of Marriages, Fairs, and public Festivals; very fit times for their purpose, and pernicious Projects. INTRIGUE LXIII. The Arts and Tricks of Tyrants, IT is one of the sweetest Secrets in Tyranny, to bring over to Luxury, them whose fierceness may be suspected to resist the Arbitrary Proceed of Rulers. 2. To forbid all Duels, without Exception. 3. To build Theatres in the chiefest Cities, in which Dancing, Playing, and fine Shows, which delude the Fancy, may be used; with the bewitching sweetness whereof, the People being once taken, it will hinder them from returning to their former stoutness of resisting Tyranny. And by Consequence, they will be less able to do hurt either to Prince or Government, being they are become effeminate. INTRIGUE LXIV. How to punish Seditious Peers. PUnishment on great Persons ought not to be inflicted publicly, but in private, according to the Old Rule of Policy; Magnos sed pravos, vulgò tamen gratos, Ductores, in eodem carcere, Custodiri, puniri, ac Sepeliri debere, Great, but Evil Men, Ringleaders of Sedition, who have the Applause of the Rabble, aught to be kept, punished, and buried, in one and the same Prison. For the punishing of the Vulgar térrifies the Peers, and daunteth their Boldness: But, by the Death of great Men, their Fury is set on edge, and their Hearts enraged. INTRIGUE LXV. How to prevent Scarcety of Corn. TIlling of the Ground is the most useful and necessary of all Employments: for thereby are both Men and Beasts sustained; and without which, both, of necessity, must Perish. Therefore, Surveyors and Overseers, aught to be appointed, to see that every one, carefully look after the managing of his own Ground: Neither is it enough to stir Husbandmen up with fair Words and sweet Persuasions; but, likewise, to assist them both with good Council, and supply them with what else they stand in need of; especially, those whose experience hath not made them perfect in the Art of Agriculture. Next, must all impediments be removed, which may prove stumbling Blocks in the way of good Husbandry; lest Men giving themselves to Hunting, Hawking, Drinking, Gaming, etc. They neglect their more earnest Affairs, and make both themselves and others Miserable: Therefore Farmers and Husbandmen must be prevented from trifling away their time, in going idle Journeys to Cities, from Suits of Laws, and be as great strangers to the Bench and Lawyers, as to the Taverns and Musick-houses. Moreover, great Encouragement and Privileges ought to be given to such as dig up barren Ground, which hath not been formerly Tilled: as that the Farmer should pay little or nothing the first two years. But, what ever course be taken, unless the Civil Magistrate appoint public Granaries and Treasuries of Sustentation (as Officers or War, do Magazines of Ammunition) it will be impossible to prevent Scarcity, in Kingdom of Commonwealth: The unprovident Vulgar looking no further than the present time. INTRIGUE LXVI. How to behave in time of Dearth. WHEN Dearth approaches, or is at hand, great care must be taken to restrain a sort of Forestallers, who taking the advantage of the times, make Corn dear, and Starve those poor People who are destitute of Money, by their wicked Extortion and Covetous Cheats: Whose Wickedness, if it cannot be quite suppressed, it may be at least so far restrained that in the Corn Market, for a certain time, the poorer Citizens may have the privilege to buy first. (2.) Searchers ought to be appointed, who in every corner, shall carefully observe those Forestallers, to apprehend and carry them before the Magistrate, to be punished; for it is a Religious kind of Severity, which, by punishing a few wicked covetous Wretches, preserveth the Lives of a great many. (3.) In such cases, it is a point of Wisdom, to raise high the Customs of such Corn as is carried beyond Sea to Strangers; for when the great Customs diminish the Gain, the Merchant will certainly lay by his Traffic. But if those Courses cannot be taken, because of the prevailing iniquity of the times; or, if taken, they answer not the intended end, in time of Famine, stronger Remedies must be taken. (1.) Overseers must be appointed, to look after every thing belonging to the Buying and Selling of Corn. (2.) It will be expedient to compute the number of Citizens, so that one may exactly know how much will suffice to sustain the People; then a competent Measure must be allowed to every Person, as necessity requireth. (3.) It will be expedient to encourage Merchants and Seamen, with Rewards; as to allow the first Ship that goeth off, so much out off the Public Stock; the next Ship somewhat less, and the third, as is convenient, with immunity of Customs, as long as the Famine lasts; either for Importation of Corn, or carrying, for a Season, those who can pay for their Passage; to some plentiful Colony; or, at least, keep themselves in some other Country, till the Famine be over. (4.) The chief point of Wisdom consists in a frugal Distribution of the Corn; neither is the People only to be regarded, but the Ground is also to be looked after; and Corn for Seed (lest the Ground lie barren) should be given to Husbandmen, who will return it with Usury. (5.) It is a great point of Frugality, to send sturdy Beggars a packing, and not to suffer them in time of Famine, to live upon the Labours of industrious sober Men. (6.) It is proper, in time of Famine, to allow every Person the benefit of Fowling, and Fishing; which was in old times, by the Law of Nations, allowed to all without exception; though great Men now limit both, by an usurped Power and Prerogative. (7.) Let Taverns, Public Houses, and Stews be shut up, and all high Feasting and sumptuous Marriages prohibited. INTRIGUE LXVII. How to preserve Corn. CORN is better preserved in the Ear, than when it is threshed out, and made clean from the Chaff and Straw; for, being deprived of its own natural Cover, it cannot be kept so sound by any thing of Art. (2.) It is advantageous for the Husbandman; for the remembrance of the former Years plenty being still before him, it stirreth him up to follow his Business cheerfully, and without sloth. (3.) That Husbandmen may not be able to cast up, and make an estimate of what Corn they have, which might disencourage them sometimes, whilst the Trouble and Expense exceedeth the Gain. (4.) By this means Straw is preserved for the Cattle, and other uses. INTRIGUE LXVIII. How a Prince may best confer Honours and Places. THE importunity of those, who court and seek Honours and Preferment, is one of the greatest Inconveniences that molesteth a Prince: For aspiring Spirits think it an high injury, that any thing of that nature, should be denied them. Therefore, with repetition of Merits, they make their humble Addresses, with importunate Petitions, which cannot well be contradicted. Thus, when the Prince obligeth one, by granting a Favour, he disobligeth many by repulses; neither is there any remedy for this Evil; the Prince not being able to oblige all, by granting their Requests. Whereupon, Cardinal Cajetan did, deservedly say, that it was one of the principal Qualifications of a prudent Prince, To know how to deny a thing handsomely: maintaining, that he was not fit to govern, who knew not how and what to deny. But, in this case, it is the main and best caution, to prefer the ancientest of Competitors: for balancing the Virtue and Merits of many, breeds Envy and Discord, but the privilege of Age is without controversy. (2.) They who have come of a good Pedigree, and have deserved well of the Commonwealth, have the next place: for upstart Men, though they should excel those, cannot take it ill, if such be preferred to places of Trust, if they be endued with any tolerable Qualifications. (3.) It is usual with some, to join a Colleague and Partner to Officers of State; under some pretence, as Age, Weakness, and other Infirmities: Who, thereupon, being destinated to succeed the place, may exclude the hope and expectation of others. (4.) Others, upon the same account, do advance to Preferment, whom they think most fit for the Employment, in the room of his Predecessor; before too many Competitors have time to put in for it. (5.) It is no small point of prudence, before the Election, to send the more powerful Competitor some where else. INTRIGUE LXIX. How to keep what is Conquered by force of Arms. KIngdoms that are Conquered, by Force of Arms, are best kept by Justice in the King, and Moderation in the Magistrates, by imposing and collecting Taxes deliberately and moderately, by paying of Wages duly, and by using all means conducing to a well settled Peace. For whilst Affairs are embroiled at home, it is a Natural consequence, that there is little Respect or Estimation abroad. Therefore, those Kingdoms and Commonwealths, which maintain Peace and good Order at Home, are hardly conquered or overcome. And, on the contrary, those easily tottered, which are disturbed with intestine Humours and Commotions. INTRIGUE LXX. How to march an Army through a Foreign Country. THat the Treachery of Soldiers may be prevented, in a Foreign Country, care must be taken, that they march in several Bodies, unarmed, and that the Kingdom or Commonwealth, who suffereth them to pass, may have due Information, before they enter his Territories; that Quarters may be provided, and what every one must pay be prescribed. 2. That the second Body march the same way that the first marched; and that, if they be in great Bodies, they march not every Day. (3.) That any Damage, done by the Soldiers, be made good. 4. That the Army do not approach any prohibited place, within a Mile. 5. That they do not quarter in Towns, or Cities, that are Walled or entrenched. 6. That Commissaries and Proveditors go along with the Army, and set a rational price on all Provisions, and curb the Insolences of the Soldiers. INTRIGUE LXXI. How a Prince should behave himself with a Contentions Neighbour more powerful than himself. IT is very safe for a Prince, who is in danger of War with a Prince more potent than himself, to yield up what formerly he hath conquered, to him whose former Right it was, unless he be able to maintain all Quarrels, by force. Neither will it be inconvenient, in time of great danger, to buy a Peace with Money, or the loss of some Cities; for, besides that all the rest are secured, the shunning of a Bloody War, and the Enjoyment of a Happy Peace, make up all the loss. But it is more Honourable for a Prince, if he be able, to beat off an emulous Neighbour, turned to an open Enemy, in open Battle, by force of his own Arms, and the Assistance of his Allies; rather than that an Ambitious, Unsatisfied, Perfidious Prince, become Master of his Dominions. And, that the Enemy may do as little Mischief as possible, it is necessary to hoard up the Provisions in Stores and Granaries. But, if the Event answer not Expectation, it is necessary, that giving over the Care of Villages, and small Towns; the whole power and strength of the Country be brought to some Two or Three strong fortified Places, till the Controversy be composed. For, under such Circumstances, there will not be so much need of an Army, as of Garrisons, to preserve what remaineth of Provisions and Revenues from the Hand of a Powerful and Covetous Enemy. INTRIGUE LXXI. How weaker Persons may prolong Time in difficult Matters. THE prolonging of Time is, commonly, reputed a peculiar knack of the weaker sort, for the more powerful use their craft, in wicked ambitious Designs, born out with a bold Confidence; and so it is folly for the meaner sort to resist them. And in such desperate Cases, length of time bringeth some means of help along with it, especially when the Enemy drives headlong and too furiously, with imprudence. Then, it is a point of Wisdom, in one that is still and quiet, to discover another's Folly and Weakness; and from thence, find some opportunity to help himself. Thus, ofttimes, great Intentions and Preparations of War, which at first were furious, through some Delay, have come to nothing. But withal, this distinction is to be observed, That we must gain time, in those things only, which can be better managed by Procrastination. But in other things, where the dangers will still recur, though one delay and avoid them never so often, it is better to go through stitch and hazard at first, rather than at last. INTRIGUE LXXII. How to deny a thing without Offence. IT is a hard matter for one to deny an earnest Suit without Offence; but there are several courses to be taken in this case: As first, To refer the granting or denying of such and such a thing, to the Arbitration of others. Thus Agamemnon served Ajax and Ulysses, when they strove for Achilles' Armour. Ovid's Metamor. lib. 3. (2.) Others have delayed their Answer to some importunate Request, that could not positively be denied, which may be cunningly put off by saying, I will consider on't, and send you an answer that shall satisfy you, upon all Accounts. (3.) Others have denied what they had no mind to grant, by slighting and delaying the giving access, to such persons as were to ask for great and difficult Matters. (4.) Others have dissuaded their Petitioners from their Suit, and have proffered them somewhat else, more convenient for both. (5.) Others have, to crush the aspiring Spirits of importunate Petitioners, raised up Competitors, who exceed their Deservings, and to whom they must needs give the pre-eminence. (6.) When a Petition is presented, which positively cannot be denied, one may feign himself willing to grant it, but in the mean time, propose such hard and difficult Conditions, with such intricat and troublesome terms of Toil and Labour, that the Petitioner will think his Suit better denied than granted. INTRIGUE LXXIII. How to compose Seditions by Intercessors. IT is the drift of Factions, to stir up one part of the Government to clash against another, affording cause for it, on both sides: and when the Design is brought forth, in process of time, both parties, or one gins to commit Hostilities. Machiavelli hath reduced the Remedies of Factions to three Heads, namely, The Reconciliation, the Death, or the Banishment of the Heads of the Factions. But he hath not, with Subtlety enough, distinguished the matter, which must therefore, be thus explained: First, When the divided Parties, on both sides, are reconciled to the Homage of their Prince, promising that they will stand to his Determination; the Prince must not side with one Party more than the other, but impartially weigh and crush their Feuds and Quarrels with equal Respect; and show himself a common Father to them both; and according to Equity and Justice, compose their Controsies. Then, after all is in Peace and Quiet, the Prince ought to confirm their Unity by Marriages, or some other such obliging Ties, which naturally prompt to Affection and Love. But if the Controversies cannot be composed (the Factions being so inveterate one against another, that they cannot acquiesce to the former Determination) the Prince, by his absolute Authority, should lay his Commands, to make no mention of their old Quarrels, or else send from Court, the Head of the Factions, upon some Embassy, or some such pretence. But in this case, there is one caution to be observed, viz. That the Prince (as I have said) be not more biased to one side than the other, otherways a great many inconveniences will incur. INTRIGUE LXXIV. How to Suppress Sedition by force. IF, of two Factious Parties, one shall dare, with downright Sauciness, or secret Treachery, to control the King's Authority, let the Prince join himself to the other side, and become their Head; and by that means, when it cannot otherwise be, let him be avenged by force of their Treachery and Factions. INTRIGUE LXXV. How to Suppress Sedition by Force of Arms. WHEN two Factions bear not only ill-will to one another, but to the Prince likewise, than the Prince cannot suppress them both at once, neither ought he to side with one Party more than the other; nor to meddle or concern himself with them, in fomenting their Divisions: nor to make himself a promoter of the ambition of others; nor become an instrument to procure his own and the Kingdom's Misery. For in such a case, Money (which is the strength and sinews of public Affairs) cannot be had but with great difficulty. And, when it fails, the Subjects Allegiance faileth with it: Namely, The Allegiance of such Subjects as are biased with favour or fear of a Faction, to which they are related, either by Blood or Affinity, or obnoxious to their Favours on several Accounts. In this case the Prince himself must not take Arms, but, if he can by any means, pull Arms out of the hands of mad Men; so behaving himself, that whilst one Faction is overcome, the other grow not too powerful and insolent, without a Competitor. For the tumults of Faction gain most advantage in time of War, and are weakened in time of Peace. For in time of War, such Subjects, as the guilt and consciousness of their Crimes, or deepness in Debt, stirs up to desire and wish for change and alterations in the Government, do continually run to the Factious, never considering the justness of the Cause and Quarrel, so they can save themselves from Prisons and Gibbets, on the contrary in time of Peace, the Flames of animosity are extinguished, the violence of Warlick Force stopped; the Storms cease; the Waves become calm, and time will wear out the remembrance of all Rancour, Feuds, and Factions. For when they who are the Maintainers of and maintained by those intestine Broils and Discords, are taken out of the way; a new Stock of People arises, who are Strangers to the former Tumults. Moreover, another reason prefers Peace to War, which is, that in time of War the Treasury is exhausted, by laying out vast Sums of Money, which can never be filled again, till there be a well flourishing Peace. The Prince, therefore, must labour, by all means, to reconcile the disagreeing Parties; but if the obstinacy of the Rebels shall reject Peace; what the Prince cannot openly do, he must attempt by some undermining and cunning ways, lest when one Faction is suppressed, the other, that kept balance with it, may too insolently domineer. INTRIGUE LXXVIII. How to enter in Covenant. COvenants do discover a weak, unstable and dubious State of Humane Affairs, And those that are made with a People very remote, never procure help in due time. But the Friendship of two potent Neighbours is often treacherous and dangerous, to their weaker Neighbours; and to stand neuter hath oft proved beneficial, and as oft injurious. For as the Friendship of the weaker Neighbours affords little profit, so may one be weakened by being united to a more powerful Neighbour than himself. When both stand on equal ground, in time of danger, they may be reputed equals; but in time of Peace, the weaker maketh the least Figure. The stronger must reap all the profit of the Victory; but both must equally partake of the danger and loss; because no new Line, according to the manner of the Lion's League, with weaker Beasts (in the Fable) the Booty is always yielded to the strongest; it being the highest wish that that the weaker side can or dare to desire, is to escape utter ruin. Moreover, the stronger oft provoketh the Enemy, and afterwards by a Peace, suddenly patched up, to set themselves free of all danger, leave the weaker in the lurch. Politicians, furthermore, advise to keep and continue in Peace with those, who have formerly been Enemies. But it is not an easy matter to enter in a League with them, or to put any confidence in those who delight in Controversies, and love to entertain Quarrels. How to keep up Favour and Authority at Court. THERE are two ways, very opposite one to another, to keep Authority at King's Courts; the first is to court Favour and Assistance of the Prince, and those who are nearest to him in Blood, and have the chief sway next him, to accompany them often; and to owe to their , the foundation of all one's Power and Preferment. The next is to rely on ones own Strength, and not on another's; and being conscious of no ill Design, to defeat the Artifice of envious Competitors. INTRIGUE LXXVIII. How a Prince that is at Peace, should behave, when his Neighbours are in War. PRINCE'S, who profess least of Ill-will (either through fear, or because whilst others are disputing for Interest by Arms, think it safer to wait for the event of the War) do privately help some daring Party with Money or their Advice. However, when the event falleth out according to their wish, they can be confident enough to declare openly for the Conqueror. INTRIGUE LXXIX. How to confine great Statesmen. THESE are necessary Cautions, in confining Seditious Statesmen. First, To choose for them Prisons, which are not frequented by many Visiters, with Apartments every way strong and fenced with Iron-Bars. (2.) It is very necessary to give them but little Liberty, and whilst they are Prisoners, to suffer them to take the Air but seldom, and never to allow them to ride out or go a Hunting. (3.) To remove from them those who have formerly been their Servants, and put Strangers in their room. (4.) To search all things that are carried into the Prison; nay, their very Provisions, jest, together with other Things, Tools for Breaking the Prison, Ropes, Crows, Pick axes, etc. be conveyed to them. (5.) To change their Keepers often, lest long acquaintance and Familiarity give occasion of corrupting them by Bribes. INTRIGUE LXXX. How to Disband Soldiers. IT is no ways safe to Disband a whole Army, in time of suspected Peace, or in time of a short Truce; and therefore prudent Princes, judging it better to lose their Money than their Army, do not Disband all: But still keep a sufficient Force in Arms, to secure the public Peace. But some who Disband their Army's, discharge only such as conn●● Live without their Pay; and so can be easily brought to take Arms again, upon occasion: Whilst they keep those who might seem to be more unwilling to be Listed again. INTRIGUE LXXXIV. How Minesters of State may avoid great Dangers. THey are a Wicked sort of People, who, without any necessity of their Duty, but through mere Malice, do stir up or cherish animosities betwixt Princes. However, they stand on slippery Ground, and are ready to Totter, who serve an Ancient Prince, or him who is the next Heir: For the Old Prince will take it Ill, that the Rising Son should only be regarded by his Subjects; and the Young Heir commonly takes it as a contempt of himself, to be looked upon as a Subject, and to be courted with no Homage or Respect. But, if such be the danger and offence of neglected Duty, it is an evident consequence, that those Ministers do far more undergo Danger, who discharge Offices, and pay their Duty both to Father and Son; but it is the safest course of steering amidst such Rocks, for one to get the name of an honest Man, and apply himself to all designs, tending to Peace and Reconciliation; to go about the service of his Master carefully, and to Court with obliging Duty and Humour, the apparent Heir; to Writ no Letters but such as are seen of the Prince. Furthermore, to behave so, as to approve Allegience to his Prince, Respect to the Successor, and to both, a peaceable Affection. INTRIGUE LXXXV. How to Aspire to Promotion. IT is no hard matter for them whose Noble Pedigree, their good Character, and great Employment do elevate, to come to be known by their Prince; and to lay out ways for a higher Preferment. But they who have nothing to commend them but their own parts and qualifications, and can show no Coat of Arms of their Ancestors, cannot obtain the favour of their Prince, but by chance, or the Recommendation of some Noble Peer: And yet it commonly falls out, that the Promotion of the latter is more stable than that of the former, which appears, either because the former thinking that all is due upon the score of their Ancient Nobility, never court the favour of any Patron; whilst the latter do, with all industry, strive to obtain the favour of some great Person, which is like to continue their preferment: Or because Princes, in imitation of Nature, love generare & corrumpere, to promote the Inferior, and cast down the Lofty. Therefore, to ward oft pinching necessity and poverty of one's Family, and to catch some high preferment, one must needs screw his Interest among some strong Faction, and procure for himself the favour of some great Patron, with all the duty, humble respects, and artificial shows imaginable: And the getting into the favour of the Female Sex hath often been very profitable in affairs of this Nature. INTRIGUE LXXXVI. How to delay an Inevitable War. IF a Prince meet with such intolerable provocations, that he must of necessity undergo the hazard of a dangerous War, and would delay it, till affairs be put in a Posture; it is necessary that he seem condescending to all the Articles and Overtures which his Enemy proposeth; rather than to undergo the danger of to send counterfeit Plenipotentiary Ministers of State, who on the first Address may seem very complying, but referring some unexpected proposals of great weight to his Master's Determination. Likewise, if by his advice, and at his earnest request, there be sent an Ambassador to his Master, it will be Policy to entangle him in such a Labyrinth of Affairs, out of which he cannot extricat himself, without the help and advice of both Princes. INTRIGUE LXXXVII. How to Govern New Provinces. THE Governor of a New Province, must not caress himself in Pleasures, but aught to understand the nature of Affairs, and learn a true account thereof, from those who can inform him: And what time others do spend in Ostentation, he is to accommodate to his Business. (2.) He must take care that vigorous Beginnings end not in a supine Negligence. (3.) That he be not given to change, by obtruding new Customs on the Province. (4.) He must not find fault with, nor rescind what hath been done by his Ancestors; nay he must behold as in a Looking-glass, all their Virtues and Vices. (5.) Above all things, he must govern his own Family well. (6.) He must give easy Access, and lay out his Business for every occasion, and perform Affairs in due time. (7.) He must shake off Sullenness and Pride. (8.) He must behave himself so, that his easy temper do not diminish his Authority, nor his Severity the Love and Respect of the Subjects. (9) Let him not resolve upon any thing in Passion. (10.) Let him be familiar but with few. (11.) Let every Office of Justice be administered with all care. (12.) Let him have greater Respect for the public Peace, than to rigid Justice. (13.) Let him not be biased by Favour or Hatred, in giving Judgement. (14.) He must, if possible, avoid all Controversies, with the People of the Province: or, if he hath to do with private Quarrels, he had better yield the Cause, and pass from his own Interest. (15.) He must avoid Controversies with the Governors of Neighbouring Provinces. (16.) Let him be very cautious that the breach of Peace, with a neighbouring Prince, be not imputed to him. (17.) He must make smaller Affairs, to represent the Draught and Design of his greater. (18.) He must vindicate the Rights of all Officers and Soldiers, that serve under him. (19) In Dangerous Affairs, he ought so to behave himself, that all may acknowledge that it is not by his, but the Prince's Authority, that all Affairs are managed. (20.) He ought not to disturb the Prince with trifling matters, nor do any thing of greater weight without his Advice. (21.) He must keep up his Friendship at Court, by Gifts and Presents. (22.) He should show himself fit for his Business, but not as he were above it. For as Princes in choosing of their Ministers, hate Vice, so do they not much like of ambitious and aspiring Virtues. (23.) He must never brag too much of his own Feats, but attribute them to his Prince as Author, or to his good Fortune. Thus, by Valour in his Obedience, and by Modesty in telling of his Actions, he shall be beyond Envy, and shall not miss of Honour. INTRIGUE LXXXVIII. How to establish and settle new Conquests. IN settling new Conquests, the chief point of Prudence, consisteth in persuading the Subjects, that they are in a better case under their new Prince, than under the former; according to Tacitus; Clementiam nova imperiainchoantibus, utilem esse, ut prioribus tributis quaedam diminuantur; quo mitius Imperium videatur. Clemency is of great use to them that adventure upon new Conquests, and that some of the former Taxes be remitted, to the end that the Government may seem more easy. (2) People are taken with no bait so much as plenty of Provision, care for the public Peace, administration of impartial Justice. (3) New Conquerors may, very effectually, gain the good will of their Subjects, by Liberality and Munificence, according to Merit, Moderation and Prudence; and then, after, they may promote to Honours and Dignities, such as stick closest to their Interest. (4.) Good use may likewise be made of Schools, and the Education of Youth, for People learn Obedience and Allegiance to their Prince, from none so much as from Schoolmasters and Clergymen. (5.) It is very convenient, to join in Marriage the Ancient and upstart Citizens; for it is an excellent Bond of Friendship and Society, so as those, who formerly were at distance, may make up one People, and agree in the same Manners. (6.) It is Tyrannical to Debauch, with lose Discipline, dissolute Manners, or Luxury, the Valour of the People, which yet is dreaded and suspected by a faint-hearted Prince. (7.) The presence of the Prince, which procures Veneration from the Subjects, prevents, or overthrows Plots and Conspiracies, and conduceth very much to establish the Government. (8.) Great Expenses of the Court, upon their sumptuous Buildings, Fair, and great Pomp doth maintain and enrich a great many of the poorer sort of People, and consequently gaineth the Affection of the Subjects. INTRIGUE LXXXIX. How to Compose the Differences of the Nobility. THE Differences of the Nobility at Court, of Magistrates, or Officers, which threaten no harm or inconveniency to the public good, must not be decided, so as that the Prince should condemn one side, and be for the other; but rather provide for the Honour of both Parties. INTRIGUE XC. How one must behave that feareth a Repulse. THey who fear a Repulse, use to deal by Emissaries and Messengers, who pretend to have no Charge or Commission; but act as they did all freely of their own Head. INTRIGUE XCI. What Policy must be used by a General. IT is a point of great Policy in a General, to make good use of the sudden fear of his Enemy, and increase it by their own Courage and Severity; and afterwards, by being favourable, to gain the Reputation of Clemency. 2. To March against an Enemy, with an Army that seemeth not serious or vindictive, lest they lose all hope of Pardon and Peace. 3. It is convenient to use divers Arts, in showing Clemency to those that submit themselves, to his Mercy. 4. To pursue them that are in flight, with all Expedition, but to be gentle to all but the stubborn. INTRIGUE XCII. How to crush Reproachful Speeches. IT is a Secret belonging to Arbitrary Government, to give full Liberty to the Malice and Envy of the base sort, and to vent themselves in Calumnies and false Reports; so, that when they have spoke very Ill of Brave and Worthy Men, at length, finding their own Reputation and Fortune to lie at Stake; they by their Foolish Revenge, may be brought to forbear. INTRIGUE XCIII. How to obtain leave to departed from Court. HE that is with a Master, from whom he hath a mind to departed, and yet to ask leave of departing is dangerous, (as commonly it is with Tyrannical Masters) must make heavy Complaints; and then beg leave, not as if you were to go away at present, but a great while after; and so he will not take it so very ill; and yet, in the mean time, others gaping for his Place, will take Care that he may have Liberty to go at Pleasure, and will use all endeavours to gain ground upon his Master, to grant him his Desire. During which time, he must act all things rashly, disorderly, and in a Tumult; until, that for ask his leave, and the mismanagement of his Affairs, he shall utterly hate him. Then, when he is assured of this, he may be of him that he would keep him still, and with dejected Sighs, and Groans, and shows of Repentance, make use of Persons, for whom the Prince hath no great liking, to intercede for him; and thus the Prince will think he hath sufficiently punished him, by granting him leave to departed with so much Reluctancy and Unwillingness: Whilst he, in the mean time, shall enjoy his Desire, without any loss or danger: But he must beware that he do not presently brag, or boast of his Wit or Contrivance; otherways he may thereby, incur great danger: Therefore should continue seeming sorrowful, as if he were grieved for his Misfortune. INTRIGUE XCIV. How to avoid Envy. IT is a very safe Course, for all who would live peaceably, with constancy in good Actions, to resist and trample under Foot all Calumnies (which are the chief Weapons that Envy useth) and by Prudent Counsels, Fidelity and Diligence, not only to enjoy, but like-ways to deserve the Favour both of Prince and People. And, last of all, to oblige Competitors with all Civilities, Courtesies, and kind Offices; and, as far as possible, to avoid all appearance of vain Glory, Pride, and Ostentation; and to refrain, or at least not to brag of, any great Retinue, or Train of Attendants; or to Head, as it were, an Army of Servants; to have a neat Dwellinghouse and Furniture, rather than that which is costly. Moreover it will lessen Envy, when it appeareth that one doth not Court Dignities so much as they Court him. INTRIGUE XCV. How to share Dominions among Brothers. MOST Nations do condescend that, for avoiding those Inconveniencies which arise from sharing Estates; the chief Power, Dignity, and Government be given only to the Eldest Child; all the rest of the Children being deprived of all Inheritance, but what serveth for their Subsistance: which Custom, (though it crosses the Law of Nature, by which, the Condition and Right of Brothers standeth in equal terms, and balance) is defended by the public Benefit, whereof all Care must be taken: although, in that Case also the rigour thereof is so far diminished, that the same Custom doth provide that the other Children of both Sexes, be not abdicated like Bastards, but be supplied by the Elder Brother, with Dignities, Wealth, and other Necessaries, becoming the Royal Progeny. But in sharing of Dominions, these Cautions are to be observed. 1. That whatever Manors are allotted to the Children of Princes, they return to the Prince without any Encumbrance, if the Brothers shall die without Male-Issue (unless the Law of the Country provide otherways.) But the Daughters of Princes should only have such Portions, as that the Prerogatives of the Crown be not impaired, but the Dominions kept entire, and in the same Case as they used to be lineally transferred. (2.) It is necessary that what ever lands, or Revenues, are allotted to bring up the young Brothers, be received immediately at the Hands of the Prince: So that, for fear of losing them, the Brothers may be obliged to owe true Allegiance, who otherways, through the default of depraved Nature, or wicked Guardians, may be easily persuaded to turn aside. (3.) Care must be taken that the Charge of the Army be never committed to the Royal Brothers, for nothing is more dangerous than to give the command of the Sword, at home and abroad, to one of the Royal Family; seeing, many times, such as are come of a low Pedigree, and base sort, when they arrive at high preferment, have aimed at great Things, and been much dreaded. (4.) Wise Men do advise, that if necessity force the Sword to be given to one of the Royal Family, a Conjunct or Partner should be added to him, who may observe and curb his Ambitious and Aspiring Hopes. (5.) It is convenient to recommend to the Royal Brothers, such Servants as are Prudent and Faithful to the Prince, and to change them now and then, and to place new ones in their stead, so as to break their Measures, which may be dangerous to the Commonwealth, through a long continued Course of good Liking and Familiarity. INTRIGUE XCVI. How to observe the due Time of making Truce. IT is thought prudent, upon three Accounts, to make a Truce. (1.) When the Truce lays open a way for Peace. (2.) When a Prince findeth himself destitute of Provisions necessary to continue the War. For a Treasury exhausted, and an Army wearied with Fatigues and Accidents of War, cannot be recruited but by a Truce, which makes way for Peace. And as it is the Interest of the strongest Party to pursue strongly their first Designs, and to prosecute the Course of Victory; so it concerns the weaker side, by obtaining time, to gain ground upon the Enemy and to get opportunity to renew their Courage; and, commonly, in this Case, a Truce is profitable to one, and hurtful to the other. (3.) Care must be taken that when Hostilities cease for a while, and the Care, Vigilancy, and Industry of the Enemy is much bend for War, to distract them with intestine Discords, Broils, and Commotions. INTRIGUE XCVII. How to change Commanders of an Army. IT hath been observed by all Politicians, even those of the best Rank, that hardly any business was ever well managed, by the Commanders of an Army, bearing equal Sway and Power: Yet Cardinal Richelieu, according to his Prudence, found out a Remedy for this Evil: When he had set three Commanders over the Army in Italy (as mistrusting the Valour of one single Person to be sufficient for an Office of so great importance) on those Terms; according to the Course of Weeks; he appointed one to lead the Van, another the Main Body, and the third the Rear, and that he who led the Main-Body should for that Week have the highest Command. INTRIGUE XCVIII. How to draw up an Army. AN Army must be drawn up so, as that it cannot be surrounded, either whole, or part, by the Enemy. 2. Room must be left for the Horse, to encounter the Enemy, when they are in Battle. 3. The main Strength of the Army must oppose the main Strength of the Enemy; but especially those Soldiers who have been accustomed to Fight with such an Enemy. 4. The hindermost or Rear Ranks must not march forwards until the foremost, in the same Company or Troop, march before them. INTRIGUE XCIX. How Ambassadors and Mediators may procure Peace. AMongst a great many Precepts which Cardinal Franciscus Barbariny, in his Secret Commands brought along with him from Rome, these are the chief. 1. A Minister of State should not be biased with Affection to either side, but impartial to both; otherways, he shall lose all the Confidence and Authority they may repose in him. 2. That he shall not give leave to his Domestic Servants or Acquaintance to Argue, far less, send Letters about public Affairs, either amongst one another, or the Servants of other Ambassadors. 3. He must not propose any Terms or Conditions of Reconciliation, but what Arguments are offered of one side, he should faithfully Communicate to the other; adding only so many of his own Arguments, as may persuade one side to embrace the other's Proposals, omitting all those which might embroil fortunate beginnings, or the good procedure of Affairs. 4. He must judge it proper to his Quality and Dignity, to propose Peace or Conditions to no side more than the other; and so it will be the part of an Arbitrator, to invite them both, that he may, at the same time, give their Proposals; or that both may send their Demands in Writing to the Arbitrator. 5. He must not become Arbitrator to their Controversies, when the Case cannot consist with the Duty, or be decided by an Arbitrator. 6. He must not take a Pledge or Depositum of a Letigious Matter. 7. He must not send his Expresses or Cou●riers to Kings or Princes, who may extort an Assent or Dissent from them with Reluctancy; but with those Expresses which are sent by Ambassadors, he may send his own Letter. 8. If he must needs write to them apart, let him use the Interest of Merchants, who have Deal in several Foreign Places. INTRIGUE C. How to Dissemble the Desire of Peace. PEace and Concord are often boasted of, under Specious, and yet vain and empty pretences; and that for several Reasons. (1.) That the Enemy being deceived with the hope of Peace, and the care of providing necessary Provisions of War slighted, may at length be surprised and catched unawares. (2.) That, when we ourselves are unprovided, we may gain time to raise an Army. (3.) We pretend to negotiate a Peace with an Enemy, and to have matters of great Concern with him, to the intent we may obtain of our Allies, what we desire through fear, lest we should break off from them. (4.) Sometimes we negotiate a Peace with one of our Enemy's Allies, not for any hope of succeeding, but only to raise Suspicion and Animosities among themselves. INTRIGUE CI. The Causes of Animosities and Insurrections. THE main and most endearing Cause of Associations amongst the People, is a pretence of Respect to the Commonwealth, represented with great Zeal, and pressed home to be much regarded. 2. An Indignation arising from Calumnies, or supposed so to be, and a desire of Revenge thereupon, is a Means Incendiaries much use. 3. They contribute very much to an Insurrection against the Prince and Magistrates, who have but small Fortunes, and are in sorry Circumstances, in time of Peace; and therefore they strive to raise Tumults, because they may go more , when things are in Confusion, and be safer in Troublesome Times. 4. Fear and Danger are not the least Cause of Associations; for obnoxious Men dread the Laws, and the Punishments due to their Crimes; as also, good Men fear Injuries and the Violence of Tyranny, and so both Desire to prevent and ward off their impending danger, by their Associations. 5. Sometimes a vain glorious Name or Renown, may stir up some to an Association. 6. Above all, ●he Prince's Ingratitude, in not rewarding those who have deserved well of him, raiseth Heart-burnings and Animosities among all sorts of Subjects. INTRIGUE CII. What Cautions are to be used in proposing difficult Matters. THE Deceitful Proposals of Incredible things, are to be avoided; and the Artifices of Impostors, wherewith they commonly cheat Princes of their Wealth, aught to be examined before they be believed; for great Pretenders, the more easily to attain their ends, persuade Princes to be at some small cost, to acquire great gains; as to level Mountains, turn the Courses of Rivers, to look out for Treasures, and Mines of Gold, to invent new Engines, to Transubstantiate Metals, to find out the Philosopher's Stone, etc. whereby, with their Deceitful Confidence, they seem to provoke and force Nature herself: Yet, as we must not altogether believe them, so must we not absolutely slight and reject them; but the Author's Sincerity must be observed, and Visitors sent, to find out whether he offereth any feasible Proposal, which must be consulted upon, and tried by competent Judges; so that nothing may be undertaken rashly; for here the Italian Proverb, and Rule taketh place, D●gran parti parti-ti; that is to say, Beware of them who promise too much gain. 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