Mr. LESLIE's Answer to the Remarks on his first Dialogue against the Socinians. SInce the First Dialogue was Printed there is come out a Socinian Sheet against it, Entitled, Remarks on Mr. Charles Leslei's first Dialogue on the Socinian Controversy. And I think it Proper to take notice of it here, for it may help to Illustrate more at Large what is there said in short. And because I hear some say, it is well Wrote, and that many lay Stress upon it. (1.) First I Observe that this Remarker has not kept up to that Character the Socinian Writers give themselves (but without much Reason, as I have showed in these Dialogues) of being the fairest Adversaries, and an Example to all others of Managing Controversy without Heat or Passion, or Personal Reflections. For he has treated me in a very Rough Manner, calling the Instances I bring Ridiculous, p. 1. And that I am Paganish in in my Notions, p. 6. And says, p. 1. If such poor Philosophy, such shallow Reasoning, and such gross Divinity, must baffle the Socinians, I confess they ought to be the last who pretend to the Character of Men of Reason. But notwithstanding all this Contempt of what I have said, I cannot but think it has given him some Trouble, because it has made him so Angry. For it is Losers that have leave to Talk at this Rate. And as you shall see him Talk afterwards. (2.) My Argument was, That we cannot Charge any thing to be a Contradiction in one Nature, because it is so in Another, unless we understand both Natures. Because a Nature we understand not cannot be Explained to us but by Allusion to some Nature we do understand. And there is that Difference in Natures that no Allusion will lie betwixt them, that is, none that is Proper, that will come up to the thing, or give a Person who Knows not the Nature a true Idea of it, or even Reconcile it from Contradiction, while he Considers the Nature he does not Understand, by way of Allusion to another Nature which he does Understand. (3.) To Illustrate this I gave several Instances, of which this Remarker has p. 1. picked out two to show his Wit upon. One is, That if a Man could he Supposed to be without Thought, it would be Impossible to make Him Apprehend what it was, or the Progress of it, as from Hence to Rome in an Instant, etc. It is Common to say to a Man that is Museing, Where are you? And to Answer I was at Rome, or such a Place. Now supposing any one (if it were possible) not to know what Thought was, he would Apprehend your Body was Removed to Rome and Back again as soon as you could speak. And by Allusion to the Motion of Body, this could not be Reconciled to him from being a Flat Contradiction, that any thing could move a Thousand Miles as soon as a Yard. In answer to this the Remarker tells you p. 1. That when you think of Rome or any other Place, 'tis only the Idea of it in your Imagination which you Contemplate, and not a Leap or Local Motion of your Thoughts to it. Who knows not this that has any Thought? But upon the Supposition that a Man did not know what Thought was, he could have no Apprehension of it but as of a Local Motion. And what you call Idea he would fancy to be some Horse or Coach that Carried you very Swiftly; which yet would not solve the Contradiction as to him, because the Swiftness of the Motion, suppose it a Cannon Bullet, cannot go two yards so soon as One. (4.) But because it may be too Extravagant to suppose a Man without Thought, tho' some have very Little; and Suppositions are Allowed in Argument even of what never was; yet I Insist not on this, but have given another Instance which is Fact, and daily before us, that is, of a Man Born Blind. And how you could give him any Notion of Sight, or Explain to him how the Eye can Reach a Star as soon as the Top of the Chimney? He can feel his Eye with his Hand, and that it is there Fixed and does not go out of his Head, how then can he Imagine it gets a Thousand Miles off in an Instant, while he Feels it does not Stir at all? He can have no Notion of this but by Allusion to some other of his Senses which he has. And by the word Reach, how the Sight can Reach a Star, he fancies Arms or Legs, that being all the way by which he can Reach to any thing. And then knowing that the Motion of Legs or Arms must go one yard before it goes two, he takes your Description of Sight to be not only some Strange and Wonderful thing, which he will readily Grant; but he will Insist that it is a flat Contradictior. And therefore that he must not Believe it. And it is Impossible to Explain it so to him as to Reconcile it from being a Contradiction to him. To this says the Remarker very Ingeniously, when we see the Stars, our Eyes move not up to them, but their extended Rays strike upon the Eye. But the man Born Blind would say, Nothing Strikes upon my Eye, for than I should Feel it. And he knows nothing what you mean by Rays or by See. Nor could think of any other way but that the Eye must get up 〈◊〉 the Star, or the Star come do●n ●o the Eye. And your talking of Rays will not Solve the Contradiction one bit as to him. Nor can he be any otherwise Convinced than by Persuading him that what is a Contradiction in one Nature he understands, must not be Concluded to be so in another Nature he does not understand, and that the Nature of Sight is such as that no Allusion from any other of his Senses can make him Apprehend what it is. Nothing but this can Silence his Murmur about Contradiction. Is it not Reason then that our Murmur about Contradiction in the Nature of God should be Silenced, seeing it can be told us not otherwise than by such Words and Allusions as are Proper to Man; And that the Divine Nature is Infinitely more Distant and Divers from the Nature of Man than one of our Senses is from another? And as the Contradiction the Blindman conceives in the Nature of Sight is Caused by his comparing it with the Motion of his Legs or Arms, and that occasioned by improper Words we must use to him, all others being unintelligible to him but what have Allusion to some of the Senses he has: So in like manner those Contradictions we Conceive in the Nature of God are all Occasioned by the improper Words which must be used to us in Expressing of His Nature, all Words being totally unintelligible to us, which have not Allusion to something we understand. And thus we Conceiving of God after the manner of Men, make all those things to be Contradictions in God which in our Conception of the Words are a Contradiction to Men. As that several Persons should not be several Men, and that the Father should not be before the Son, etc. Whereas these Terms of Father, Son, Persons, etc. are not proper to the Nature of God, (tho' the most Proper we can use or understand) And therefore we are not to Conceive of them in the manner they are used and applied to Men, nor draw Consequences from them as we do when these Words are Applied to Men. Otherwise we shall Run into the like Contradictions as the Blindman about Sight. This will throw off all that the Remarker says of Inferring three Gods from the Term of three Persons, because it is so among Men. He talks like a Blindman of Colours, of things which he must Confess he does not understand; yet will be inferring Contradictions in them. He owns he cannot speak Properly of them, yet finds fault with the Terms we use, because they are not Proper, tho' he can find none more Proper. (5.) He may as well say, That God is not Eternal, because we have no word to Express Duration higher than the word Beginning, and there can be no Beginning in Eternity. He may say it is a Contradiction that all things should be Present with God (which yet he will not Deny to be an undoubted Verity) because it is a Contradiction to Men, that the Past or Future should be Present, because then a thing would be Past and not Past, Future and not Future at the same time. These and other things I mentioned in my first Dialogue, but the Remarker takes no notice of them, nor will own the Absurdity of inferring Contradictions in God from Contradictions in Man, occasioned by the Improper Terms we are Forced to make use of to Express God after the manner of Men. (6.) But he has laid his Stress upon this Instance I brought of the Blind man. And here he thinks he has an Advantage of me. And I am willing to join Issue with him upon it, That if he can find out any Words that are Proper, whereby to Express the Nature of Sight to a Man Born Blind, and that he will give the Blindman leave to draw Consequences and infer Contradictions from such Words according as he understands them; then I will undertake to solve all the Contradictions that he pretends to muster up in the Terms whereby we Express the Holy Trinity. And let him show any Difference betwixt these Cases if he can, only this, That far greater Disparity ought to be Allowed as to the Propriety of Words when Terms belonging to Men are spoke of God, than when what belongs to one of our Senses is Applied to another. (7.) And now let the Reader Judge what occasion he had of thus Insulting me, p. 1. But are you indeed (says he to me) so very weak as to think you move all the way to Rome, and are got thither as soon as you think of it? No, Sir, whatever hast you may be in thither, you go no faster than your Legs can carry you. And should You Challenge all the Philosophy in the World? Who have so little as not to know, that when you think of Rome, or any other Place, 'tis only the Idea of it in your Imagination which you Contemplate, and not a Local Motion of your Thoughts to it. In like manner, when we see the Stars our Eyes move not up to them, but their Extended Rays strike upon the Eye. I see you have a Head much fit for entertaining and coining Mysteries, than for Explaining or Defending 'em. It's a wonder you did not think rather, that Rome or Constantinople shift and come into your Head: And then since in other Cases a lesser Vessel cannot contain a greater, nor a Nutshell hold an House; you might wonder how your little Head should hold such great Cities; And with the same Philosophy infer, that what is a Contradiction to Nutshells is none to Heads, and Challenge all Philosophy to Reconcile it. Now, Reader, has he not fully understood me, do you think, and answered me smartly? (8.) But will you see him freely Confessing what he thus Ridicules? He says in this same p. 1. Indeed there may be something attributed to one Nature, where there is nothing Inconsistent, or Contradictory to it; while if attributed to another it might meet with something Inconsistent, whence a Contradiction will arise in the one and not in the other. Now this is the whole of what I have been contending for. I desire no more of him. And having granted this, how can he Deny that what is a Contradiction in one Nature, that is, of Man, may not be so in another Nature, that is, of God? Or are there any two Natures more Distant and more Different than the Nature of God and of a Creature? Or do we understand the Nature of God more Perfectly and Clearly than our own Nature? Is it not Reasonable than what I said, as he Quotes my words, p. 2. That we must not object Contradictions in the Incomprehensible Nature of God, from Comparing it with our own. Because we Understand not his Nature. To which the Remarker says, (9) I should grant this, in an object of which we have no knowledge at all: But surely if I have some, tho' a partial knowledge of the Infinite God, I may discern what is Contradictory to that little knowledge of him. Nor is any thing more usual or Just, than to Deny such or such a Doctrine, because Incompatible to the Divine Attributes, to his Spirituality, Eternity, Goodness, etc. To which I reply, That the Nature and Attributes of any thing are Different. We may know the Attributes, when we cannot know the Nature. As we may see the River, but cannot Reach the Spring whence it flows. And this Dispute of the Trinity is not about any of the Attributes of God, but Concerning His very Nature and Essence, and how His Being is Composed, (if I might use that Word) of which I may say we are totally Ignorant, it is a Light Inaccessible to us, we know Nothing of it at all. And therefore cannot Charge Contradiction in the Revelation that is given to us of it. If we look Directly upon the Sun in its Strength, we see Nothing at all, it Strikes us Blind. But if we turn our Backs, we Discern the Light that comes from it. The Attributes of God are the Rays of the Sun, but His Nature is the Sun itself, we cannot Look upon it. It is Utter Darkness to Us, through the Excess of the Light. We can Discern Nothing at all in it, or say it is Thus or Thus, or that This or That is Contradictory to it. Alas, how little do we know of our own Nature; We know it only by the Effects and the Qualities we find in ourselves. But what it is in its self we cannot tell, we are Exceedingly in the Dark. And so as to the Nature of Trees, Flowers, Plants etc. We find by Experience such Effects and Virtues in them, but we know not the Nature or Essence of them, no not of a Pile of Grass, why of that Colour, Shape, or Virtue. How then can we Know what the Nature of God is? Or can we say it is not Rightly Revealed to Us in the Holy Scripture? Do we Know of what Composition our own Souls are made? Or how they Act in Us? Do we Know any thing at all of the Soul but by the Effects? We Know we Think, therefore we Conclude we have a Soul, but what that Soul is in its self, we Know not. Yet we would Know the Nature of God (10.) This brings me to a Criticism of the Remarker upon the Parallel I made use of concerning the three Faculties of the Soul. He says, p. 3. That the Memory is not another Faculty, but only an Act of the Understanding. Now I thought that the Understanding was only Conversant about what was then Present before it. And that the Memonry brought back Past things, and so made them Present to the Understanding. Whence a Man may have a good Understanding, and yet a bad Memory. Do we say of the Understanding that it Forgets? I take Truth or Falsehood to be the Objects of the Understanding. But is Love or Hatred so? A Man may have an Aversion, and not know the Reason of it. Non Amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere Quare, Hoc tantum possum dicere, Non Amo te. Are there Antipathys in the Understanding? I think this is generally Attributed to the Will, and it is Agreed that it is a Distinct Faculty from the Understanding. And if there be Different Faculties in the same Soul, it Answers all the Purpose for which I brought that Parallel. Nay, if it be but so Thought, it does as well for me, to Solve the Objection about Contradiction, That Men should not think a Plurality of Persons in God to be a Contradiction when the same Difficulty arises from a Plurality of Faculties in the Soul. For Three Faculties can no more be One Faculty, than Three Persons can be One Person. And yet these Different Faculties make up but One and the Self same Soul. (11.) But I have Sufficiently Cautioned that I intent not to bring any Proof from these Parallels, Nor lay the stress of the Cause upon them, yet I thought them not altogether Useless, to show Men how far they may Mistake in Charging Contradictions: from one Nature to another. (12) I have likewise told, That no Parallel in Created Natures can Answer Exactly or Come up to the Nature of God, only Point Him out at a Great Distance, and with Infinite Disproportion. And therefore that we must not Argue Strictly from the One to the Other. Yet the Remarker will not Observe this, but Argues of the Persons of God as of Human Persons. And says, p. 4. If three Divine Persons be like three Human Persons— And if three Divine Persons should as Properly be accounted three Gods, as three Human Persons can, in Strict Speech, be accounted three Men— Thence he Infers three Gods etc. He cannot I think but see the Fallacy of this Argument, after all that I have said. But he will not see it! He will still Argue Strictly from the Word Person, and Apply it to God in the same manner that it is Used among Men. If he would Apply the word Father so, (which himself gives to God) or God's being said to Repent, to Grieve. etc. What Work would he make, what Contradictions might he Infer? His Brother Socinian Mr. Biddle (as I have showed) turned Anthropomorphit by this sort of Argument, and from Man being said to be made after the Image of God, held God to have a Body, and of Human Shape. And he might as well have made Him a Bird too, because there is Mention made of His Wings and Feathers! Psal. xci. 4. This Savours not of the Sagacity the Socinians think Peculiar to Themselves. (13.) From the like Gross Conceptions the Remarker, p. 7. raises Difficulties how a Begotten Being can be God. Thinking of Begetting after the Manner of Men! And then the Father must be in Time, as well as in Nature, before the Son. And it having been told him that supposing the Sun to be Eternal, its Light would be as Eternal, he Replies, p. 7. That this Parallel will not do, for that the Light which (says he) You call an Effect of the Sun, is indeed the very Sun itself, so may well be as, Old. By which the very Sun we see in the Firmament, and is many times Bigger than the whole Earth, can Creep through a Cranny, and be All of it in this Room, and in a Thousand other Places at the same Time! This will help Transubstantiation not a little! But is it so indeed that this Subtle Socinian can see no Difference betwixt the very Sun itself, and the Light that flows from it? It is then time to have done Disputing with him. And he Runs into as Great Absurdities to get Rid of these Parallels as he Charges upon me for making Use of them. He says (as before Quoted, Sect. 4.) That when we See the Stars, our Eyes move not up to them, but their extended Rays strike upon the Eye. But if the Rays or the Light be the very Star itself, than the very Star itself Strikes upon the Eye. Let him Consider whether there is any thing so very Gross as this in any of the Parallels I have produced. And on whose side lies the poor Philosophy, and Shallow Reasoning. (14.) Therefore leaving this Subject, I will now only Answer an Observation he makes from Scripture, wherein he says, p. 2. God Almighty is Perpetually expressed in the Singular Number, Under One, He, Me, Thou, etc. Now lest the Reader of these Remarks should be Carried away with this, I must mind him, That this Socinian says this, without taking any Notice of the Texts I have given to the Contrary in the 2d Dialogue p. 32, etc. Beginning with the first of Genesis where God is Spoken of in the Plural as well as the Singular Number according to the Hebrew, He is there called Gods, and Us, as well as God, and Me. And is He not spoken of in the Plural Number in the Form of Baptism in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost? The Remarker ought to have Marked this, and not to have put the Objection over again, without saying something to the Answer had been made to it. If this sheet gives him not full Satisfaction, I shall be willing to hear from him again. Contents. 1. HIS Rude Treatment of me. 2. The Argument I made use of, That we ought not to Infer a Contradiction from a Nature we Understand, to Another which we do not Understand. 3. His Answer as to Thought Replied to. 4. And as to a Man Born Blind. 5. Other Instances I brought of which he takes no Notice. 6. I join Issue with him as to the Instance of a Man Born Blind. 7. What little Ground he had to Insult me here. 8. He Expressly owns my Argument to the full. 9 His Distinction of our Partial Knowledge of God will not do, for we know nothing of the Nature or Essence of God. Nor indeed of our own or any other Nature. And our Dispute is concerning the Nature of God, and not of His Attributes. 10. He Confounds the Memory and the Understanding. Different Faculties in the Soul showed against him. And the Parallel Justified. 11. I make this no Proof, nor lay the Stress of the Cause upon it. 12. How grossly he Argues from Human Persons to the Divine. This made Biddle turn Anthropomorphite. 13. He makes no Difference betwixt the Light and the Sun. By which the Sun itself comes in to our Eye. On whose side lies the poor Philosophy and Shallow Reasoning. 14. His Argument that God is Perpetually expressed in Scripture in the Singular Number, showed to be otherwise; And he gives no Answer to what I have said upon it. I invite him to Reply. FINIS.