A LETTER From no far COUNTRY, BEING A Judgement upon the present posture of Affairs in ENGLAND, etc.  
WRITTEN TO, And made public at the request of a Worthy Person elected to serve in the approaching PARLIAMENT.  
As worth the serious consideration of his Fellow Members.  
Printed in the Year, 1660.   

A LETTER From no far COUNTRY,  
SIR,  
I thank you for your news and the news-books you sent me, which neither of them by any art of mine are to be reconciled with themselves, for you tell me while a Commonwealth seemeth to be declared for, Commonwealths-men are as it were kicked out of all employment, civil or military. Much hath been said heretofore of a threefold cord, but I like not your Statesmen, that work like Ropers, nor see, how a slippery trick should be the cause of a steady Government. But however your Commonwealthsmen may do, by your news, their principles by your books, I mean the Votes, and Acts of Parliament, will shift well enough for themselves. It is true that the whip and the bell, the scourges of the RUMP, with the sound of a lash, so fatal unto themselves, have influenced this Nation in such manner, that the genius, as some, or the spirit, as others call it, of the same people, who in time of the Court would rather have chosen a Tapster then a Courtier, now under the name of a Commonwealth, but in the dregs of confusion, would rather elect a ballad-singer then a Commonwealth-man; Nevertheless, while the next Parliament is summoned, as it were in the name of the people, and without regal authority, while the full power and free choice of the Government to succeed is wholly devolved upon the Deputies of the people, the present Acts and Votes run in stile, and every way else unto a Commonwealth, nay pitch and settle, (to the best of my understanding) upon no other principles or foundations, than such, whence no other superstructures or frame of Government, (without violence) can arise but that of an equal Commonwealth or perfect democracy, for what clearer testimony of this can be afforded by Art or nature then is expressed in the present act for the Militia? By this Act you have the Earl of Northumberland, where he weighs most, joined with john Hudson Esq. and some thirty more of the Commons of that County, the like respectively for some forty more Earls, Viscounts and Barons, holding fat less proportion unto the Commons with whom they are indifferently joined, without any advantage in Vote or otherwise. Nor, should a man add the whole Peerage of this Nation to the whole Commonalty, were it to be doubted but they would hold yet less: Sir, all the rest is but superstructure, how it is at the root (though perhaps unseen) is avoidable felt. The sword is in the people, and not (without moving propriety) to be wrenched out of their hands. Whereas the people were anciently arrayed by the Nobility, the Nobility (you see) are now arrayed by the people; whereas a King could not anciently be brought in but by the Lords, now the King (you will confess) cannot be brought in but by the Commons. Let them come with you to the next Parliament that may, let them go whether they can; if Government be not to be preserved by any other means then the same by which it was acquired, the King can no more be sustained, as heretofore by the Lords, but must hereafter (whatover in alteration of the form it may cost) be sustained by the Commons.  
Sir I beseech you, was this our old Government? or if (through time as well the innovator as devourer of things) it be of itself become a new one, must it be still (as in the reigns of learned predecessors) an Utopia or Chimaera? There is much daring of Larks, but Sir I am upon good grounds, I go (you see) upon an act of Parliament let them answer to this. Are foundations in England altered or not altered? for such as the Government is in the root or foundation, such of necessity must it be in the branch or superstructure. If the sword in the hand of the Lords made an Aristocracy, than the sword in the hands of the Commons must make a Democracy, or there will be more windfalls, for where foundations come to be altered or stand one way, and superstructures are left hanging another way, it can tend to nothing but ruin. Hence that which hath fallen, hence that (if not prevented) which is falling upon this Nation. And what prevention: what remedy! If the Militia be not in the Commons, what means this Act? if the Militia be in the Commons what power have the Lords? if the Lords have no power where is the old Government? if the old Government be gone, what remains but coufusion or to introduce a new one?  
To remove unto a new house, though from a worse unto a better, is one of the most troublesome, one of the impatient affairs, a business in which, how necessary soever, the family to be well ordered must be as it were totally disordered. The case of a people necessitated unto change of government is of like nature. And as the genius or humour of a family may be one thing in itself, and upon this occasion seem another, so the humour or genius of a people, be it that they were never so weary or impatient of the incurable inconveniencies of their last house or Government, yet upon question of removal unto a new one, they conceive a kind of abhorrency, they bemoan themselves as it were of exile from their native soil. Thus it ever was, thus it will ever be in like revolutions, wherein to set much by the Genius of a people, is to comply with them unto their own destruction. Leave them in a form under which they know whom to quarrel with, or what to quarrel for, and this sickly genius, this quarrelsome humour of theirs is incurable, but bring them under a form in which they can never find whom to quarrel with, nor what to quarrel for, (which or none is the proper work) and this sickly genius, this quarrelsome humour of theirs is perfectly cured. There is no looking back for a people advanced by so apparent steps, by so many years travail upon such a journey as the people of England now are; to think by a calm of popular impatience to be at home again, is as if a man near the Indies, should think to be in England again by a turn upon the toe. The foundation of the old government is sunk, it is fallen it is fallen, when an house is fallen it is not grief, not rage, not any obstinacy in the owner can make him live there as he did, it must be new built.  
Nor is newness of Government alone (in which case our felicity were certain) sufficient to make it secure or lasting, without such prudence in formation of the same, as may exactly shape and sit it unto the subject matter. To rise otherwise (as hath been abundantly seen and felt) unto the greatest height, is but to fall lowest. With such as are in power and under a necessity to introduce a new form, there is no mean between the greatest security and the greatest danger, the highest glory, and the basest infamy.  
This by politicians hath been pronounced universally, but now in England is more holding then elsewhere it hath ever been, for whereas other governments which have suffered like changes, for example that of Rome anciently, and that of la●er times in Holland, were such from the very beginning, as to become more perfect Commonwealths, needed but to remove or change their topstones, as a King into Consuls, or a Prince for a Stateholder, in which case an oath of abjuration was sufficient: the ancient Government of England being ruined in the very foundation, that is in the Aristocracy, requires a renovation or reordering of the whole superstructures, in which an oath of abjuration can come but to little, for that whether the King be restored or not restored it is equally necessary the building be such as may stand; and that the building of a Government now in England be such as may stand, engageth unto the greatest prudence in hitting, or the vastest danger in missing. The greatest prudence in hitting, because not a topstone, or some part is to be altered, but the whole frame to be renewed: the vastest danger in missing because to work otherwise is to work against the only foundation which is now the whole people, and for the interest of someparty.  
The parties now in England are three, the Royalist, the Presbiterian, and the Sectary. Nor appears it by what the Sectary hath done, the Presbiterian is doing, or the Royalist prepares to do, that there is any thought amongst them of union or of a Government, but of tyrannising one over another. If the King therefore be restored by some one of these, it amounts, (if unto any Government at all) unto one, as new as any, and cantend neither unto the safety of the King, nor of the people, but must introduce, a Royal, a Presbiterian, or a Sectarian Oligarchy: whereof, which ever reigns must keep down the other two, by unnatural force, in the head of which the King must be perpetually exposed, and if any other than the King be advanced unto the head of any one of these parties it must be with the greatest scandal, and tend but unto the worse effect, the vaster discontent, disunion and danger of the people.  
The Salus Populi, the safety of the people, if ever they attain to it, must consist in such a form of Government, as may apparently and effectually take in and hold them and all parties of them united.  
To attain unto such a form in England, (the Aristocracy being irreparably broken) there is no other way whatsoever but by introduction of a well ordered Democracy, to which end, the game would easily play itself in any hand, but for the parties that are still snatching the cards one out of another's.  
That the Aristocracy is broken the act cited maketh not plain confession, but proof. That it is not to be repaired, as some meditate, by the resumption of such estates, as since the later war have been demolished, is plain in that the war began by the sword in the hand of the people, and ended accordingly; nor, as others, by the recruting of the decayed Nobility with some of the richest of the Gentry, in that, all such as hold above two thousand pound a year in this Nation, are not above three hundred persons, nor, all that which is holden by these three hundred persons, above one tenth of the whole territory. The other nine parts, and so by consequence the whole, being holden by the Democracy, the Government able to hold the whole people united, can be no other than an equal Commonwealth.  
In Democracy or in an equal Commonwealth, a Nobility or a Gentry usurping the leading, never hold it, and not usurping the leading, never lose it. The reason whereof, throughout ancient experience is not clearer, then at this present amongst us, where no man can imagine, but the Lords in a distinct house, must follow the Commons, and not in a distinct house, no● otherwise preferred then by election of the people must lead them, to give any peculiar privileges, under the name of well affected or the like, unto some of the Lords in the Senate, were to allow the like claim unto some of the Commons in the popular assembly, either of which, infects the Commonwealth with inequality, and a Commonwealth infected with inequality is so apt to break out into war or discord, that it never failed of this effect, where the people have not been the sole donors of all Magistracies and honours by their votes or elections. Certainly it must be confessed, that elections regularly and freely made, were as easy and efficatious, as confusedly and partially, and elections regularly and freely made, would amount unto an equal Commonwealth. But be it as it will, let the annimosities now broken lose, elect into the Parliament, elect into the Militia, of the most averse unto Democracy, so much the better, it reduceth the whole controversy unto a point; for here it lies, If they can so patch up the Aristocracy, that is, the Lords house as to make it sustain the ancient weight, the old Government is recovered, and they have confuted the Commonwealthsmen; but, let them fail in this one, whatever else they hit, the old Government is irrecoverable, and they have confuted themselves, in which case apparently, there must be a new form.  
For the introduction of a new form, it is not sufficient that Acts or Declarations be exclusive of the old, unless they be positive of some new one thet is practicable, there being no certain way of barring any one form, though such an one as cannot stand, but by introduction of another, and such an one as can stand. If it have been said that a Commonwealth is a Government without a King or Lords, it implies two absurdities; first, that our ancient Government under a King, well balanced by his Lords, the assertors and vindicators of ancient Liberty, was no Commonwealth, and secondly, that our later Governments consisting of some two or three hundred of the Commons sitting as long, and doing whatsoever they pleased was a Commonwealth, whereas in truth the former Government was much more a Commonwealth (though an unequal one) then the latter. From these two absurdities have arisen two like effects, one the mistaken genius of the people, which under the name of a Monarchy, driveth at a Commonwealth; the other the destruction of that form, which under the name of a Commonwealth, being no form of a Commonwealth, nor indeed of a Government, durst take upon itself such weight, as now in England is in no wise to be supported but by the best form of Government even the full and perfect form of an equal Commonwealth.  
To the introducing of the full and perfect form of an equal Commonwealth in England, there goes no more, but, without other qualifications than such as have been anciently in use, to call a free Parliament in the form of an equal Commonwealth. For, (Formis dat esse, dat operari) the form gives the being and the natural or necessary operation or working to every thing.  
To the calling of a free Parliament in form of an equal Commonwealth, there goeth no more of charge, or trouble, then, that the territory, (to the end the Commonwealth may find no rubs in her bowling or rotation) be first more equally divided.  
The territory once equally divided, and the people in every division, electing annually, equally and freely, two assemblies, or (more particularly) into each house of Parliament one third part of the Members for three years to act there, (as they must whether they will or no) according to the nature of their form, they by this means perpetuate, not one assembly in the same men, the certain end whereof is, dividing and subdividing, till it come to nothing, but, two assemblies, changeable in the persons, and duly qualified for the whole matter of Government, as not consisting of any party, but of the wisdom and interest of the whole Nation, and cast not themselves upon trust in men, nor upon the faction incident to a single assembly, but, upon the strongest security in nature, even that whence the operation of each creature proceeds, and which the operation of no creature can exceed, I mean, of form, of such form as transformeth the genius of a people, and rightly ordered, is that only which in a popular State can, and of necessity must hold all parties united.  
It must be confessed how unseasonably soever, that Commonwealths-men, such I mean as are principled, cannot be with the forwardest, where it is arbitrary, to advise that in such a form as this, there 〈◊〉 be any Prince or single person: nevertheless it neither hath been nor can be denied by them, but a like form may (regno laconico or veneto) admit of a King with royal dignity, and revenue: Which kind of reign (like that of Evander in Livy, magis authoritate quam imperio) is that which the ancients (particularly Aristotle) call Heroic, and oppose to the Eastern, which they call barbarous. And indeed if you observe the praises and plead that are now in men's mouths for our old Government, they run all upon this that the power of the Kings in that was no more. All which practice and plead are therefore the Stronger arguments against the old Government, in that such being the intention of it, the form was not sufficient to secure that intention, witness the many bloody wars made formerly by the Nobility, and of later times by the Commons, for nothing else but to hold Kings to the true intention of that form; nor is this (were there no other) less than good and sufficient reason, to change that form which never made good the true intention of the Government, for such a Government, as must at all points secure unto us for the future the true and full intention of that form: And to hold the King in fruition of his royal dignity and revenue, from invading the rights and liberties of the people.  
Of the royal dignity there is nothing embezzled; and for the revenue. Putting the case that the public debts amount to three Millions, if the excise and custom amount annually to one, this with the Regalia yet remaining, might in a matter of twelve years pay off the public debts, maintaining the Court in due splendour, and raise a royal revenue in new lands. Whereas resumption of the old, they being for the greater part in the hands of Soldiers, and in themselves but small, would be obstructive and not effectual.  
It is not insinuation but an apparent truth, that the King thus restored would have these not conveniencies, but felicities. He would have the whole honour of the Commonwealth without any of the burden. He would bring in his party, otherwise in danger to be loft out, and by equal participation of such a Government repair them. He would have his hands fairly rid for him of the Scotch Presbytery, a Fanaticisme neither consistent with a Monarchy nor with a Commonwealth, the basest kind of bondage, a Pedantisme, which they who press most to have imposed, by the rod, or by power, are lest able to defend by reason. He would look down upon other Kings, as being armed with, or followed (without Hyperbole) by the most potent Militia in Christendom both at land and Sea. Had Queen Elizabeth or King james been founder of the like Government in England, how little had the Crown lost? How much had the people saved in blood and Treasure? Queen Elizabeth who it is known had good advice, surcesed courting of her Lords, for God bless you my good people: it is true since that, different courses with what success I leave to your judgement, have been taken. But other means of Empire than what have been shown, were they definable, are not now attainable in the present state of England, where, a King henceforth either can have no power at all, or must have such power as cannot be limited; for all the ways whereby any King can have any power are but two, either a potent Nobility, or a standing Army. Where a King is founded upon a Nobility, they are the limits of his power, but where he is founded upon an Army his power can have no limit. Where the Nobility then are gone wholly to decay, there is no limiting the power, by which a King shall reign, seeing it is without a standing Army impossible to give him any such power whereby a King may reign.  
But England seemeth to have a reach, I cannot say beyond, but beside all ages and all Nations. Whether she have an Army or no Army, she is still running upon an invention of her own. A Parliament with a Council in the intervals, this if she have no King must be the Government, this if she have a King, unless he get an Army: and this Parliament must have both the debate and the result too, that is, be a single Counsel without any check at all and so be a Government and no Government, but a tumult as the faction or humour hits, sometimes popular, sometimes Oligarchical, sometimes a Divan. For all the kinds of Government that have been or can be are but three. That is a Counsel with a monarch for the check, in which the Counsel debates as the Senate of Rome after the Commonwealth, or the Turkish Divan, and a Monarch resolves as the Roman Emperor, or the great Turk. Or a counsel with an Aristocracy for the check; in which the people debate as anciently in the house of Commons and the Lords resolve, or are such without which there can be no result, as the ancient house of Peers, in which case the Peers will have a King, and this comes to the Government of King Lords and Commons. Or a council with a Democracy so the check as the Senate of Rome in time of the Commonwealth, debating and the assembly of the people resolving, which the Senate o● popular assembly being rightly ordered, amounts unto an equal Commonwealth. Nor are these cheeks such as may be arbitrary, but to be holding must each of them sufficiently preponderate in riches or territory, that is the King, in the absolute Monarchy, the Lords in the mixed Monarchy, and the people in the equal Commonwealth, must hold the perfect overbalance in wealth or freehold; but if these be all the kinds of Government that are in Art or Nature, than a single assembly as I said before, can be none at all; which were it otherwise to be doubted is sufficiently acknowledged by itself; In that, a single assembly debating and resolving saileth not to fall immediately into faction, and in factions the stronger party kicking out the weaker,. divides and subdivides till the whole come to nothing, as we have had sufficient experience in England, where such an assembly having a King, will be thinking to mend itself by pulling him down, and having no King, by setting one up. Nor can I conceive which way this in our case should be curable, but as hath been shown already, that is, by assembling a free Parliament in the true form of an equal Commonwealth. An equal Commonwealth is the most certain root of the most prudent and righteous Laws, because in this form no law can be passed but by the wisdom of the nation, and the true test of the public interest.  
An equal Commonwealth is the mother of the most potent and lest chargeable Militia, because in this form the whole body of the people is one disciplined Army, taking equally and methodically their turns, as there shall be occasion upon the Guard or in Arms.  
An equal Commonwealth is of all other the most proper soil for the plantation and preservation of true Religion. For whereas the causes of corruption in matter of Religion are but two, ambition in a Clergy vying for rule with the state, or ignorance. In this form all hope of propagating any by interest of their own, is entirely cut off from a Clergy, in regard that no Clergy without a co-ercive power in matters of Religion, can betake themselves unto any such design: now civil and spiritual liberty being inseparable, or imperfect, it follows that for the maintenance of civil liberty (without which this Government is none) an equal Commonwealth must also assert and maintain the liberty of conscience, which wholly frustrates a Clergy of co-ercive power in matter of Religion, and yet defends Religion from the other corruption or that which might redound from ignorance, by a known rule and exercise of the same, or by the prudent institution of a National religion.  
National Religion as to the form, is arbitrary, and therefore in different Countries, or different times, according as a people shall grow up in light▪ or increase in knowledge of divine truth, may be different. But in England through the education of the people, and as their judgement now stands, aught, in my mind, to consist of the Articles of the Church, and the Common Prayer Book mutatis mutandis. For if education amount unto matter of confidence, and liberty of conscience be (as the Sectaries now feel) not to be secured unto ourselves, but by giving it unto others, this is that w●y of worship, which the Sectaries (their liberty being safe) had as leif as any, and the people rather. Nay, whereof the people of England are not to be debarred, without conceiving themselves to be under a force, and resolving to revenge it as soon as they are able.  
In sum of all, and for a fuller answer to your main query, whether a Commonwealth taking in all other interests may not be brought to take in that also of the King? I say whether the King be restored or not restored, the form of Government in England must be new and democratical, which that it be also rightly ordered is of great concernment: for there is no firm State of peace or security, save only under a proper form of Government. Absence or imperfection of form produceth a State of War, or of tumult. Whence apparently to restore the King upon security of the form, is to provide for the safety of the King and the people, but to restore him upon any other conditions than security in the form, is to cast both the safety of the King and of the people upon the faith of men, nay upon the faith of men, in matters, wherein men cannot keep that faith, and so a crime against God and man, exposing a Nation unto ruin.  
Sir, you are obeyed, I have given you my judgement upon the point proposed, in order unto the Feast for which you prepare. Never tell me that I observe not the manner of your invitation, or that those proceed which I assert to be from the necessity of things, are therein excused upon the necessity of the times, it moves not me that I reckon without your Host, seeing by his means, you and your Fellow-Members go up resolved to eat Venison, where you will find nothing but Beeve.  
But I am (like the Monkey) at Chests with my Masters, if you make any further use of this Paper, I beseech you to lay a cushion upon my head, by tearing out the name of,  
Sir, Your humble Servant April 6th. 1660.  
FINIS.