A SHORT DISCOURSE About our Keeping our MONEY: SHOWING That our MONEY may be kept among Ourselves, and yet our Confederates strongly Assisted, BY A Descent upon FRANCE.  
By E. L.  
LONDON: Printed by B. Motte, and are to be sold by John Whitlock near Stationers-Hall. 1696.   

A SHORT DISCOURSE About our Keeping our MONEY, etc.  
OUR Money is running away by Millions, year after year: which will soon bring us, if it be not done already, to Beggary and Ruin. And now all the Talk is, of Mending our Money. As if a Man had almost bled to death, and were still bleeding; and He, observing his Blood to be bad, should be consulting and contriving how to Mend his Blood. whereas his first Care should be, how to stop his Bleeding. I confess our Money is not so good as it should be: or rather, 'tis as bad as it can be. But yet, upon the whole matter, we should think how to keep it, before we think how to mend it. For as things now go, whether it be mended or not mended, it will be carried all away.  
It is now evident to all men (but some Men saw it long since); that our great Payments abroad, and chief those in Flanders, are the main Cause of the Exportation of our Money. It therefore highly concerns us to put a stop to those Payments at any rate. For we can bear them no longer: We have lost so much Blood already, that 'tis death to lose more. But shall we not assist our Confederates? Yes, by all means, to the utmost of our power. For otherwise all Europe must be enslaved to the French, and We among the rest. It is therefore absolutely necessary that we keep our Money: and 'tis as necessary that we powerfully assist our Confederates. Both which things (though seeming so inconsistent) may at once be done, by our Assailing the French Coast by Sea: or in other words, by a vigorous Descent upon France.  
A Project of such a Defcent I presumed to poolish, in the year Ninety one. which Project was generally approved, and the whole Kingdom was in Expectation that it would be prosecuted. Also the year next after, a Descent was intended: and another the year following. though, as it fell out, those Designs were not put in Execution. And in the third year: was our Attempt at Camaret Bay.  
But as to the Project, it is briefly this. That a good Body of Foot (twenty thousand at least, but the more the better) be Shipped for the Coast of France; there to move to and fro as they see occasion, and to Land where they find it convenient: and further to seize and fortify some open Sea-Town, so as it may contain a great and strong Garrison Which Garrison being put in a State of defence, the Naval Army to proceed to new Adventures, and to seize and fortify other Places in like manner.  
Here I am to make good the two things before mentioned: First, that in so doing we shall keep our Money; and secondly, that we shall effectually assist our Confederates. To which two things I shall add a third; That the Design is very feasable, and hardly possible to miscarry.  
In the first place therefore, while we assail the Sea-Coast of France, and plant Garrisons upon it; though it be a great Expense, we shall still keep our Money amongst ourselves. For whither should it go? The French have good luck, if they get any thing from us in this Affair. And none else have to do with it. At present our Army in Flanders carries our Money thither, (some say a Million and a half yearly); and our Fleet kept upon the Coasts of Spain, stops Money from coming to us from thence: and a great Sum goes yearly to Piedmont. But by a Descent upon France our Money will be no way diminished: and what ever is laid out, will come back and Circulate amongst us. Here will be no carrying out our Coin and Bullion, nor the horrible disadvantage of Remittances.  
In the second place, By a Descent upon France we shall give most effectual Assistance to our Confederates. If we did nothing else, but overly the French at Sea, and thereby destroy their Trade and Navigation; even this thing only would be an effectual Assistance. For whereas now the French are rampant, by the immense Riches ('tis their Gazettiers word) which they have taken from us; they would then be impoverished to such a Degree, as to be no way able to carry on the War against the Confederates. And this thing we must do in the first place. For we are ruined unless we powerfully protect our Trade; and the same Force that protects the Trade of England powerfully, will destroy that of France. Which things I hope our Parliament hath done already, by giving a larger Sum than formerly for our Sea-Service. I have said before, that our overlaying our Enemies by Sea, will prove a great Assistance to our Friends. But if beside this, we also Assail the French Coast with Land-Forces, that Assistance will be much greater. For it will make so great a Diversion, that both Flanders and Germany, and likewise Piedmont and Catalonia, will feel an exceeding great Ease and Benefit by it. We are not able to maintain an Army in Flanders: it will bring swift Destruction upon us. But we are able to maintain a Coast War. And our Confederates must and will be content, if we do for them as much as we are able. Suppose we take forty thousand Men out of Flanders, to assail the French Coasts. If these draw away, or keep back, a greater number of Frenchmen, as they will certainly do; 'tis the same thing or better. And we may be making Descents in Normandy and Bretagne, before the Armies in Flanders can take the field. By these Descents we shall touch the Enemy in his most sensible part, (as His Majesty hath been pleased to express it); that is, on his Sea Coast. How tender they are here, we found at our Bombarding of Haure de Grace. When we came before that Town, their Militia's and Regular Troops were commanded thither from all Quarters, with all haste possible: and the Alarm reached Paris itself. From whence that King (as all our Relations agreed) sent away his own Guards to the Sea Coasts. What to do? Not to hinder our Bombardment, for therein they could do no service: but to hinder the Descent of our Land-Forces; who were not above seven thousand in number. It was this handful of Men, that caused all that Terror and Affrightment. We may see therefore, that though the Project here offered should fail in the main; though we should not be able to fortify and make good any Town, nor so much as Land our Men; yet the very Attempting these things in several places (in one place to day, and a hundred Miles off to morrow); would so harass and torment the French, that they would never be able to bear it. But there is no fear that the Project here offered should fail in the main, or not have its full Effect.  
In the third place, the thing proposed is feasable and easy; and hardly possible to miscarry. 'Tis hardly possible that the French should hinder our Landing; 'tis hardly possible they should hinder our Fortifying; or should take from us the Places we fortify. I shall speak first to our Landing. And here I must confess, that if we should resolve to Land at one place precisely; and the French should discover our Design some Months before hand; and should accordingly provide for the defence of that place, with a great Body of Horse and Foot, with Forts and Intrenchments, and with Bombs and Cannon; and we knowing all this, should attempt that place notwithstanding; we might fairly be repulsed and baffled, as we were at Camaret Bay. But if we are at large, to Land where we see convenient, there is no such danger. When we sailed from that Bay towards Flanders, along by the French Shores, the whole Country was in a high Alarm: and they brought down all their Forces to Guard their Coast. But yet, (as I have it from those who saw it with their Eyes), there were a great many places, convenient for Landing, that had no Guard at all, either upon them or near them: we seeing far and wide that the Coast was clear. And both our Landmen and Seamen were most cheerfully desirous to go upon French Ground, if there had been Orders for it. Nor had they in truth found any Opposition. Sir Walter Raleigh doth fully demonstrate, that the Landing upon an Enemy's Coast can by no means be hindered. Provided the Assailants be Masters at Sea, and in case the Coast be large and accessible. Which thing is also confirmed by the Experience of all Ages. For 'tis hardly to be found in History, that ever any Attempt of this kind miscarried, except Ours which I mentioned but now. And Reason tells us, that our Landing upon France (to speak of that in particular) cannot be prevented. Suppose we have forty thousand Men embarked, to assail the French Coast: and the French have fifty thousand to defend it. Their Coast upon Our Channel, (for That must be the Scene of these Actions) is five hundred Miles in length. so that here is a thousand Men for every ten Miles. But how slender a Guard will this be against our Invading Army? Had they a hundred thousand Men, or a thousand for every five Miles of ground, all would be found too few to oppose our Landing.  
I hope I have made out, that our Landing cannot be hindered by the French. I must now show that they cannot hinder our Fortifying. It would be very strange, if such a Body of Men, having the Sea and a Fleet behind them; and having at least ten days time to Entrench, before a superior or even an equal Force can be brought against them; should not be able so to cover themselves, as not to fear the Insults of any Enemy. The Works we cast up at Landen in one short night, the French Lines in Flanders, and several late Circumvallations, show what great Things great Numbers can do. But we must not think of Pioniers for this Work; our Soldiers must do it themselves. And they will do it cheerfully, if those that labour have some Pay extraordinary. Which was the way of the old Princes of Orange, the Grandfather and great Uncle of our King. Moreover the place where we Entrench, will be the place we intent for a Garrison. And the Line which may be full manned by ten thousand Men, when the Works are completed; may contain the whole Army for a time. For none of these Garrisons should be less than ten thousand: the greater they are, the farther they will command, and the better they will maintain themselves.  
And now I come to the point remaining, which is, That 'tis hardly possible that the French should take these Garrisons from us. And this is evident of itself; if the Places be (as they ought) relievable by Sea, and not commanded by Land. A Place that is completely fortified; that hath a great Garrison, with great store of Cannon, and hath room for great Renforcements; and that lying opposite to England, with a narrow Sea between, may receive these Renforcements (and all manner of Supplies) with every Snatch of Wind; I say such a Place as this, may justly be reputed Impregnable.  
Thus I am come to the End of the Project: which is, the Establishing some Garrisons upon the Coast of France. There is no more to be done: the rest will do itself. And as I have said elsewhere; England will then be glorious, when we have a Range of Garrisons the whole length of the Channel, upon French Ground, and maintained by French Contributions. Every such Garrison, with a thousand or two of Horse and Dragoons put into it, would dismember a whole Province. If Tourville, when he Landed so easily at Torbay, had had an Army on board him, and had settled a rampant Garrison there, would not the whole County of Devon (and Cornwall to boot) have been dismembered by it? And had not Deal (or any place upon the Downs) done the same by Kent; and any place in Sussex, and another in Dorset, dismembered each of those Counties? Especially if the French were still Masters at Sea; and had still an Army on board, to pour in upon us (when they pleased) from any of those places Consider, what a horrible Condition we had then been in. and in the same Condition will France be, in case this Project be duly prosecuted. They will be so distracted and confounded by it, that they will never be able to resist the Confederates, assailing them in all Quarters. We may then hope for a good and speedy End of this War: whereas by keeping our Army in Flanders, there is no hopes of it. For as things go there, though our Forces be never so great, though we overpower the Enemy never so much; we must account it a Glorious Success, if we take one Town in a year. But what doth this signify towards making an end of the War? At this rate we may be twenty years in recovering Flanders: And we, for our parts, shall be ruined in the tenth part of that time. For if our Foreign Payments continue two years longer, they will entirely Ruin us: and I doubt one year will do it.  
If from Flanders we could carry the War into France, there would be some hopes. But 'tis plain we cannot do this, because we do not. Tho 'tis a great wonder that we cannot. Why cannot We March into France, as well as the French have marched so often into Flanders; the Dauphin into Germany two years ago; and the Grand Visier to Vienna, a hundred Miles within the Emperor's Quarters? As for the French Lines, they are a mere Cuckoo Hedge. We might not only fly over it, (as we did at Namur, to besiege that place), but might go beside it: their Quarter's beyoud the Maes lying open. But as I have said elsewhere, The great and swift Conquerors in all Ages, never lay pelting at Frontier Garrisons, but broke into the Countries. We shall never see a good Conclusion of this War, till the War be carried into France: and since that cannot be done by Land, we must do it by Sea. which is the End and Drift of the Design here proposed.  

Some lose things are here added, relating to the Discourse above-written.  
1. No great number of Horse are required for this Service. For they are not useful either in Landing or Fortifying: which are the things to be done. It seems therefore sufficient, that a thousand or two of them be embarked at first, and about twice as many lie ready in England, till there be occasion for them: that is, till some Garrisons be settled to which they may go. For to have them all on Shipboard while the Fleet and Army is upon Wing, and may be plying to and again for several days, would be too chargeable and cumbersome.  
2. It is no way necessary, that the Places we fortify should be good Ports. The French have few such upon this Coast: and for these Places, 'tis sufficient if they are relievable by Sea, and can receive and secure small Vessels. For the business of these Garrisons is; that we may harrass and torment the French, from these Garrisons. Perhaps another year, when the French are weakened and humbled, we may think of Attacking their best Ports, and of a Voyage Royal. But at present we should attempt nothing, but what we are sure we can do: for what we are sure we can do, will sufficiently ruin the French King. It will cost us some Labour, but we shall run no Hazard.  
3. A Voyage Royal, or a main Invasion, will not be of that advantage, as the desultory Sea War here proposed. In that way we may perhaps do something, if our Force be throughout superior, and We clearly and for continuance Masters of the Field: But in the otherway, we shall be sure to do something, and to gain our point, though the Enemies Force should be much superior to Ours. By the first way, we shall only divide the Enemies Force by dividing our own, without any further Advantage.  
4. Forty thousand of our Men on Shipboard, will do more Service to Flanders by the Diversion they make, than a much greater number kept there. And 'tis well known, how great benefit the Duke of Savoy received, by our Fleet with a few Land-Men aboard, hover about Provence last Summer. It drew so many French to guard that Coast, that the Duke took Casal the while without Interruption.  
5. That brave-spirited Prince deserves our highest Regards. And the Assistance we have given him may seem well bestowed. But we cannot send more Money to Piedmont, whence it will never return. It were better for us to expend twice or thrice as much in our own Seas: for That Money will return, or rather will never go from us. And this powerful Revulsive will be felt in Piedmont, to its great Ease and Benefit. But let it be as it will, we must send away no more Money.  
6. Our Silver Coin that is left, as Mr. Lowndes computes it, may be about five Millions and a half, (but some think, it cannot be near so much): Whereof four Millions, being Clipped half way, is in effect but two Millions. And so three Millions and a half is the Sum effective. What will become of us, if a full Moiety of this Money be carried to Piedmont and Flanders, this very next year; for the growing Expense, beside great Debts that must be satisfied? And either the Payments must be there made by Money in specie; or they must be made by Bills, with most grievous loss, the Exchange being so high against us. So that 'twere better our Money went at once. And Merchants know that foreign Payments, whether made by Bills or in specie, are the same thing in effect; and carry Money alike out of the Kingdom.  
7. This height of the Exchange against us, occasioned by our great Payments abroad, is an infinite disadvantage to our Merchants: and will continue as long as those Payments do, to the ruin of our Trade, and consequently of our Nation. As for our Clipped Money, That had no effect upon the Exchange, till Guineas did rise: which was less than a year since. And when our Coin is reformed, that Effect will cease. But our foreign Payments are the more durable and substantial Cause. It is these Payments that make Silver more valuable, and better, and dearer, in other Parts than it is in England. We cannot have weight for weight: nor receive so many Ounces there, as we pay here. It is most certain, that our Money never flies from us, but when Silver is more valuable in other places than in England. Now Silver (as all other Commodities) is there most valuable and dearest, where it is most in demand. And 'tis most in demand, where there are greatest Occasions for it, and the most and greatest Payments to be made. They therefore that are to make these Payments, must buy the Convenience of having Money there for that Use, and the Exchange will run high against them. Which is our present case.  
8. I have omitted One Advantage, which we shall have in our Descents upon France: and that is, that we shall never want Men for this Service. Men will be as forward and willing to go for France, provided they have good English Officers; as now they are backward and unwilling to go into Flanders. The Service in Flanders having got a very ill Name, amongst our common Men.  
9 I have also omitted one Leak of our Money, which is to be well considered. We keep an Army in England, at a great Expense: and most of this Army are Foreigners. Who living very close, and spending little, lay up a good part of their Pay. It deserves an Enquiry, whether it be true that is said of them; That they are continually (even the common Soldiers, and much more the Officers) sending their Money, which they thus save, to their own Countries. If it be so, though the particular Sums be not very great; yet there being many thousands of them, it may amount to a large Sum in the whole. And it may prove as bad to keep Foreigners in England, as to maintain an English Army in Foreign Parts. Some think it no way necessary, to have a Foreign Army in England. For the People of England are so firmly Knit to his Majesty, both by Interest and Affection, that there is little need of Foreigners to force us to Obedience. Aristotle is too severe, when he says in his Politics, (Lib. 5. Cap. 10.), That foreign Guards are Tyrannical: for just and good Princes may have them. But some think that in England, under another King, foreign Guards and a foreign Army might be of dreadful danger to our Liberties. Tho under his Majesty now regnant, (who hath been our Redeemer, and is still our Protector and Preserver) there is no Cause to fear.  
I most humbly submit these things, to the Consideration of our States now Assembled. 'Tis They that must take care, Nequid Respublica detrimenti capiat, That the Kingdom receive no prejudice: or rather, as things go now, That it be not destroyed. Which it must be, if we part with more Money; and which therefore we must not do. No Concerting of Measures, no Treaties or Agreements, can oblige us to Impossibilities; and that which cannot be done without destroying the Kingdom, is morally and honestly impossible. We may say honestly and truly, that for us to part with more Money, is a thing that cannot possibly be done.  
SInce the writing of the foregoing Treatise, the Commons with great Prudence have Addressed the King, that he will be pleased to procure; that the Commodities and Provisions sent from England to our Forces Abroad, may be exempted from Duties and Excises. Which is, we may presume, in order to the supplying our Flanders Army with those Things from England, instead of sending Money for that Use. And this, I confess, will put a great Stop to the carrying out our Money. But no small Quantities of Money must still go to Flanders. For though the common Soldiers may be content with Provisions brought by Sea, yet the Officers will not▪ They must far better, and live like Gentlemen, and spend their Money. Which Money thus spent will amount to a large Sum. And what is spent in Flanders, is lost to England. But in our Descents we shall spend no Money: and all must be content with what they have from England, or can get from the Enemy. Moreover, though our supplying our Flanders Army from England may lessen the Necessity of a Descent, yet the Convenience and Advantage of it continues the same. And we may be confident, the French dread it above all things in the World. According to all humane probability, it will in one Summer give the French Tyranny a mortal Wound, if not break it to pieces. Especially if our whole Quota, our whole eighty seven thousand Men, were employed upon it. And if but forty thousand were thus employed, the rest (if it must be so) being in Flanders and elsewhere, we might well expect great things.  
Some think that a Naval Army might do great things, without the help of Garrisons. But that is a mistake. For they can do nothing, as to ravaging and commanding the Country, without Horse; and these cannot readily disbark and reimbark. Beside, by being long on Shipboard, the Horses will be disabled and spoilt. And in this way, it will be thought a great Adventure, if we go five Miles from the Seaside. But if we have nothing to do, but to cross over to a Garrison or strong Quarter of our own, where we may Land without any possibility of Interruption, and where a good Body of Horse lies ready to join us; we may make a much greater Impression.  
In case we have only one Garrison, the French may perhaps coop it up with Lines, after their Flanders fashion. But in case we have several, backed by our Naval Army, they can never bear up against them. So that though they had no other Enemy, and should oppose us with triple our Force; yet we should be too hard for them, having so great an advantage. And this is the way to put a speedy and victorious End to the War; without sending out, or carrying out our Money. Whereas otherwise; this heavy and destructive War is like to continue, our Money like to be all gone, and the Kingdom to be utterly ruined.  
And thus much hath been said about Keeping our Money. The Mending I leave to Others. But the admirable Resolves of the House of Commons, have made that work short and easy.   
FINIS.