ENGLAND'S APPEAL FROM THE Private Cabal AT WHITEHALL TO The Great Council of the Nation, THE LORDS and COMMONS IN Parliament ASSEMBLED. By a true Lover of his Country. Anno 1673. Phaedrus Lib. 1. Fab. V. Nunquam est fidelis cum potente societas. Testatur hac fabeulla Propositum meum. VAcca & Capella & patiens Ovis injurice, Sosij 〈◊〉 cum Leone in saltibus. Hi cum copiss●●● Cervum vasti corporis. Sic est Locutus, partibus factis, Leo: Ego primam tollo, nominor quia Leo: Secundam, quia sum fortis tribuetis mihi. Tum quia plus valeo, me sequetur tertia, Malo adficietur, si quis quartam tatigerit. Sic toram preedam Sola Improbitas abstulit. Anglice, ENgland this fable plainly Shows, A strong Alliano Partner knows. THe BULL the GOAT, and Patiented SHEEP one day, Leagued with the LYON, sought a Common prey; A Prey they took an high and mighty Hart; Of which each thought to have his equal part: Soft, quoth thy LYON, I the first share claim, 'Cause LYON King o'th' Forest is my name; The second you shall give me as my due, 'Cause I am valiant, able to subdue: The third I take by force, and for the rest Touch is who dares; yield it all, you had best. THis is an Age of wonders: And if with a considering eye we take a careful view of Europe, we shall find that some years last passed have presented us with as many things worthy of admiration as any former age hath afforded to our forefathers. The Revolution of Portugal, and the wonderful secrecy with which it was carried on, is not to be matched in any Age. The Tragicomedy of Massavello looks more like a Poetical fiction than a real truth. The Deposing of Kings, and (which is much more strange) their Voluntary resignation (of which the Annals of Ancient times furnish us, but with very few Examples) are become the common Theme of our Journals, and if from the rest of Europe we turn our eyes toward this Island, our surprisal will increase, and we shall find that this little British World is a small Enchiridon or Epitome of all the stupendious events that ever happened in the great one. We have all seen or had a share in those passages which Posterity will hardly give more credit to, than we do to what is said of King Arthur's Round Table. And 'tis not improbable that some hundred years hence the History of our late revolutions will be ranked among the fabulous Romances of Gildas, and such other Writers. But it may be among all our unexpected changes, revolutions and Counsels, there is scarce any more justly to be wondered at, than the present alliance with France, and the war we have undertaken, and do still persist to prosecute against Holland, in so dangerous an association with the French. It was undoubtedly above the reach of an ordinary understanding to imagine or suspect (in the least) that a Protestant Kingdom, without being compelled to it by some urgent and unavoidable necessity, should ever fight with so much fierceness for the destruction of the Protestant interest: or that English Counsellors should advise his Majesty to run the fortune of a French King without a rational prospest of advantage to himself. Would any man that judgeth of things according to the ordinary rules of prudence, have thought that in order to the making good our Title to the Kingdom of France, we should able their present King to invade all Christendom, and to extend his Empire without bounds, or that to secure to ourselves the sovereignty of the Seas, we should with so much industry endeavour to force all the Dutch Ships, with all their Naval Power into the French Arms, and rejoice at their Victories, as if by conquering the Land, they did not Master at the same time their Havens, their Rivers, and their Fleets? We have been often told of brisk messages sent formerly to the French Kings, as soon as they did but lay the Carcase of some pitiful Ship upon the stocks. But we did never so much as dream that Vice Admirals, and other considerable Sea Officers should be sent to the French Court to encourage and promote the setting out of their Fleets: That pitying their want of experience in Sea Affairs, we would out of Compassionate and Brotherly love lead their raw Seamen by the hand, Train them up in our Fleets, and amongst the best of our Seamen, teach them what Skill we have learned in a long and dear bought experience. And to Crown all, even fight for them, and interpose between them and danger with so good success (as it proved) that the French Squadron (as if the engagement had been only designed for an entertainment and diversion to them) came off as fresh and as whole as when they first sailed out of their Ports. The surprising novelty and strangeness of these unexpected Councils hath occasioned the following reflections. And all men being equally concerned in the preservation of the Ship they sail in, though all do not sit at the Helm, it is every one's duty as well as their undoubted right to prevent as much as they are able, a fatal running upon Rocks, which may chance not to be discerned by others, upon this just and well grounded confidence, I presume to direct these papers to the real Counsel of the Nation, humbly begging that they be read with an mind, and truth weighed in the balance of the Sanctuary. Before all I must premise I do not intent to write an Apology for the Dutch, nor to justify all their proceed, much less to increase the number of the scurrilous Pamphlets against them, which I am confident will affect no sober man in the Nation, and need only to be read to be confuted. I'll only say that since all Christians should above all things inquire into the justice of their Arms before they either take them up, or refuse to lay them down. It will become the wisdom and prudence of both houses to hear what the Dutch may say for themselves, and to take into their serious consideration the protestations they make both in public and in private, of their unfeigned desires as well as readiness to give England all possible satisfaction, and buy his Majesty's Friendship at a more than ordinary Rate. But my present design being not to enter further into these particulars, not to examine the Justice or Injustice of this War, but rather to consider and quere (supposing it had heen never so just at first) how far it may be advisable to continue it, I will with as much clearness as I am able, and in as few words as the matter will bear, confine myself to these following heads. 1. A Short account of the Crown with which his Majesty is entered into League. 2. The necessity and unavoidable Consequences of this War. 3. Some general reflections upon the whole, with some Account of the manner and steps by which this War was both promoted and begun. 1. All those who are not altogether Strangers to the World will easily grant that of all the Kingdoms of Europe there are none but may be said inferior to France in some respect or other, and to want some advantages which France enjoyeth in a very eminent degree. The greatness of its Territories, the Populousness of it, the number of their Gentry and Nobility. Their natural courage; together with the advantage of being trained up either to Military Actions or to Warlike Exercises, ever since the Foundation of their Monarchy, the situation of their Country, and the opportunities they have by it to annoy their Neighbours upon all occasions. The fruitfulness and riches of the Soil, together with the prodigious quantity of all sorts of Commodities manufactured & unmanifactured with which they supply their neighbours. And lastly the great Revenues of their Kings, who governing of late without control or check, are so much the more able to oppress their Neighbours; All these Advantages meeting together, they have in all Ages had aspiring thoughts, and under Charlemagne had erected a new Western Empire, which in all likelihood would have proved of longer continuation, had not those great Dominions been shared and divided between the said Charlemains Children, which in the succeeding Ages proved an occasion of many great and bloody Wars. 2. A Second and memorable stop to the increase of the French war, when by the ambition of Hugh Capett, who aimed at the Crown, to usurp it with less opposition, and to draw the Grandees into his party, he made all their governments hereditary, & erected them into a kind of Principalitys held in Capite, from thence sprang so many great Famylies able afterwards to wage War against the French King. And whilst they were thus in a kind of Minority, the House of Burgundy having joined with England, brought that Kingdom to the Low condition, every one knows. Lewis the 11th. was the first who after the English had lost not only their new Conquest, but also what they had possessed of old in France, raised the French Crown to a greater height, and his Son Charles the 8th. besides the acquisition of Britain, frighted all Europe by his surprising conquest of the Kingdom of Naples. This occasioned a general confederacy of all neighbouring Princes against him, whereby he soon lost what he had gotten. But still the ambitious thoughts of his Successors would have much endangred the liberty of Europe, if the Austrian family (raised on a sudden to a vast Grandeur by the occasion of an innumerable number of Provinces united in Charles the 5th.) had not carried the Imperial Crown from Francis the 1st. who stood with much Eagerness for it, and had already engaged several of the Electors. This having over balanced the French power, the said Francis the 1. though helped several times by the great Solyman Emperor of the Turk, was at last forced to yield to the victorious Arms of Charles the 5th. who took him prisoner and forced him to buy his liberty with a very disadvantageous peace. But his Son Henry the second had better success, and amongst other advantages he added to his Dominions three very fair Imperial and Episcopal Towns, and was likely to have gone further had he not been prevented by a sudden death, England all this while (true at that time to their own interest) with a skilful hand holding the balance and keeping the contesting parties in as great an equality as their own occasions would permit. Under the minority of his Children, the bloody Massacres and civil Wars, begin, which lasted forty years, and would have put an end to that Monarchy if the Ambition of Philip the second would have given way to the dividing of it into the several Principalities, which the respective Grandees aimed at. But Henry the 4th. strengthened by the divisions which grew between the Spaniards and the holy League, having won many Battles, made his Title to the Crown good, by the success of his Arms, and not long after concluded peace with Spain to gain time to breath, and to recover new strength. No sooner was he at rest, but he bent all his thoughts upon a project as vast in the design of it as Extraordinary in its nature, intending no less than to cast Europe into a new Mould, & to reduce all the Kingdoms and Common Wealths, that were in his time to a certain number, and to bring them within such bounds as he should prescribe to them, being sure however in this Marshalling to take such shoot to himself as would have enabled him (or or lest his Successors) to grow into an universal Monarch. To effect this he had already made choice of his Generals and other great Officers, and was preparing both Arms and money when a sudden and unexpected death puts an end as well to his undertaking as to his life. The beginning, and in truth the greatest part of the Reign of Lewis the 13th. his Son was much disquieted by intestine broils and Civil Wars, during which the house of Austria was very near bringing all Germany under their subjection, and after the Battle of Prague stood very fair for the universal Empire. But France having at last quieted all at home, did (under pretence of opposing the Austrian Family, and whilst they were courted by several Princes to assist and protect them against the Emperor) vastly increased their own power, and conquered new Provinces, and considerable Towns in Spain, Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries, which raising new jealousy in their own Allies occasioned the peace of Munster to frevent their further progress. About the same time the new Civil wars which broke out in France under the minority of the present King, gave opportunity to Spain to recover part of their Losses, till the (sat) Protector of England joining with the French (for the advancement of some private ends of his own, and by a policy from which the destruction of Europe may chance to take its date before we are much older) brought them into a decaying condition, and made the Pyrenean Peace (after the death of Cromwell) most welcome to them. Before we go further and come to give a more particular account of the present French Court, I will beg leave to stop here a while, and desire the Reader to take along the following inferences, from what hath already been hinted, a more full knowledge thereof being left to the perusal of their Histories. 1. That no greater proofs can be given of the internal strength of the French Nation, than their overcoming the many dangerous convulsions of state, they have from time to time struggled, with which in all appearance would have destroyed any other Nation. 2. That in all Ages, assoon as their intestine troubles have been over, they have still out of a restlesh Warlike humour endeavoured to encroach upon their neighbours, and to increase their own Dominions, laying hold of all opportunities to disturb mankind, and having never able as yet to set bounds to their Ambition. 3. That this Ambitious humour of theirs, supported by the greatness of their power would long before this time have brought all Europe under their Subjection, if their own division and private quarrels had not from time, to time, put back their designs for many years, or their greatest Princes been cut off before they cauld finish their intended work. 4. And Lastly as a consequence of the three former, that it was e-ever, and will be still, the true interest of Europe to oppose the French designs, or if there be any occasion of making use of them against summer other oppossers, not to accept of their assistance, longer or further than public utility requires it, nor to suffer them to proceed after the danger is over, as it was practised in the peace of Passaw, in the the time of Henry the 2. and that of Munster, in both which the French were stopped in their full career by their own Allies, though they still came off with profit. The French having thus in the last Wars, added many fair Provinces and Tows to their Territories, this present Court had no sooner made Peace with Spain, but they thought of laying the foundations of a vaster Empire than ever. And perceiving that since the discovery of the Indies, and increase of Trade, Naval strength was the most important of all others, and Navigation and commerce the greatest (if not the only) supporters of it. They first erected and encouraged several Trading Companies, and in the second place they spared no cost & stuck at no charge or expense, to purchase a considerable Fleet of men of War wherein they have been so successful. That I fear their Fleet (excepting the true courage of our Seamean) is not much inferour to that of his Majesties, as incredible as it may seem at first, considering how few years they have applied themselves to it. But whilst they were thus intent upon the increase of their interest at Sea, they let no opportunity slip, of enlarging their Empire at Land, for during the late War with Holland, they invaded in (1667.) and mastered a considerable part of the Spanish Low Countries in 1669. they hunted the poor Duke of Lorraine out of his Duchy, and to this day possess it all, and now this last year they have conquered the half the United Provinces, much less than all this was more than sufficient to awaken all Europe; and his Majesty above all others being out of his Princely wisdom very sensible that the keeping a true balance between the Princes and other States of Europe, was the only security of all, and that by a timely stop to the French Conquests he would reap an infinite Honour and Profit. Assoon as the French King fell upon Flanders, he begun to think of applying fit Remedies to so dangerous a Disease, and having concluded a Peace at Breda with the Hollanders, he sent them in private in January 1668. Sir William Temple, who was then his Resident at Brussels, to propose a nearer Alliance with them, and to take joint measures against the French. No small Argumet by the way, of his Majesty's aversion to the French designs, and of the fear he had of their increase, since to prevent it, he went so far as to seek the Hollanders first, and to propose stricter Alliances with them after so fierce and Recent a War ended with the unpleasant circumstances of Chatham. Sir William Temples Proposals having been entertained with all ready compliance by the Dutch, he waited on his Majesty to give him an account of his Negociation, and within five days after he was sent back to the Hague with all necessary powers and instructions, by virtue of and in conformity to which he concluded and agreed upon, two several Treaties with the Dutch, the one a defensive and stricter League than before between the two Nations; and the other a joint and reciprocal Engagement, to oppose the conquest of Flanders, and to procure either by way of Mediation or by force of Arms, a speedy peace between France and Spain, upon the Terms therein mentioned, and because Sweden came unto the same Treaty very little after, from the three Parties concerned and engaged, it was called the Triple League. In pursuance of this, the Treaty of Aix la Chapel was forced upon the French, and in some manner upon the Spaniards, who were very unwilling to give away by a solemn Treaty so great a part of their Country. But both his Majesty and the Hollanders thought it a very great and good work, and judged it a great happiness not only for Spain, but for all Europe to come off with a broken Pate, and to have at least for that while kept France from going further. This represented to the Parliament with all the advantages of Language, and nothing omitted in the respective Speeches of his Majesty himself, the Lord Keeper, and many private Members, that could make both Houses (and with them the whole Kingdom) sensible of the great Service done to England, and in a manner to all mankind, by chaining up a devouring Lion, who was never satiated with prey. This Triple League grew so famous that it proved the politic Institute of our Justinian. In the name of the Triple League, and of the Treaty of Aix la Chapel, several subsidies were both demanded and granted, for 2. or 3. Session's together, the Triple League stopped or annulled all Impeachments: for its sake Inquiries into Miscarriages were laid aside. And the Parliament did conceive they could neither give nor forgive too much, if by their compliance they could but contribute some what towards binding the French to their good behaviour. Besides this to tie the Knot faster, and take even the very thoughts from the French King of ever stirring, or being troublesome to his neighbours, his Majesty sent an Extraordinary Envoy to several Princes of Germany, to invite them into a Triple League: His Minister to persuade them to it, laying open with no less heat than plainess, the danger all Europe was in. The insensibility of most Princes, and their carelessness, the watchful ambition of the French, the greatness of their Forces, and the little reason one had to trust them. In fine, omitting nothing that could Alarm all the world, and procure a general confederacy against the common Oppressor. Nay, to evince and demonstrate (besides all we said now) that this Triple League was not entered into out of a particular respect, or personal kindness to the Spaniard (not to speak now of the Misunderstanding and Jarring between England and Spain in the West Indies) the Spaniards being very much wanting to themselves, by their backwardness in the payment of the Subsidies promised to Sweden. His Majesty not to be wanting to Europe, and consequently to his own Kingdoms, out of the deep sense he had of the necessity or preserving the Triple Leagues entire, and being not without fears, the Swedes might fall off, unless the Money agreed upon was paid them, without further delay; he offered in September or October 1668. to advance himself part of it, and had accordingly done it in case the Dutch would have advanced the rest. All this doth abundantly show what opinion his Majesty and his Council were used to have of France as well as both Houses, and the rest of the Nation: And therefore without considering how things came to be altered (which we may take hereafter some notice of) we may lay down as an Undeniable English Pri ciple, and a Maxim never to be swerved from: That France is no ways to be suffered to grow great, much less to have their designs promoted, as it is plain to all man kind they are now. But we must go somewhat further, and there being nothing more dangerous then to join in any ambitious design with a Prince against whom we can no ways secure ourselves, in case he break his word to us, it will not be amiss to consider how far one may rely upon the Candour and in egrity of the French Court, and what may rationally be expected from their generosity. In Order to this, since the heart of man is not known otherwise then by a careful observation of their Act on's, and that we cannot judge of things to come but by Inferances and Arguments drawn from those that are past; the best way to satisfy ourselves is to take a short survey of the carriage and conduct of the French Court for these last 13. Years, during which they have had still the same Ministers, who are not like to Act henceforth upon any other Principles, or by other Methods than they have done hitherto, and they having been brought up in so good a School as that of Cardinal Mazarine whose motto was that an honest man ought not to be a slave to his word, it must not be wondered at, if they do still as much as they are able, influence their present Master and endeavour to persuade him that. Si Violandum est jus, Reguendi causa Violandum est. The first proof of the honesty both of the Cardinal himself, and of his Disciples, is their Carriage in the Pireneam Treaty & their performance of what was most Essential in it, wherein is to be observed that. By the endeavours of the Queen Mother of France, a peace being promoted between the two Crowns, with a Marriage between the French King and the Infanta of Spain, the whole Treaty was grounded upon two considerable points, which till granted by France, had still hindered the conclusion of that great work, the one, was the forsaking of Portugal, and the other a renunciation of the Infanta, (consented to and ratified by the French King) of all her present and future Pretences, Titles or Claims whatsoever to the Spanish Monarchy and Dominions thereof, or to any part of the same: Lest, saith the Treaty, The Glory of their respective Kingdoms should come to decay, and be diminished if by reason and through the said Marriage they came to be united and joined, in any of their Children, and Posterity, which would occasion to the Subjects and Vassals, such troubles and afflictions as might easily be imagined. As to the first, viz. the exclusion and forsaking of Portugal. The words of the Treaty are these, His said Majesty (the French King) will indermedle no further in the said Business, and doth promise and oblige himself upon his honour, and upon the faith and word of a King, both for himself and his successors, not to give neither in common nor to any Person or Persons thereof in Particular of what Dignity, Estate or Condition soever, either at present or for the future, any help or assistance, neither public nor secret, directly nor indirectly, of men, Arms, Munitions, Victualling, Vessels nor money, under any pretence, nor any other thing whatsoever, by Land or by Sea, nor in any other manner, as likewise not to suffer any Levies to be made in any part of his Kingdoms, and Dominions nor to grant a passage to any that might come from other Countries to the Relief of the said Kingdom of Portugal. I suppose all the World will grant, it were hard for the wit of man, to find out, or so much as imagine stronger words, or fuller expressions in a Treaty, to prevent what the Spaniards were so much afraid of, viz. the Assistance of Portugal, Let us now see how it was performed. As soon as this was agreed on, and before the Treaty was signed Cardinal Mazarin (still resolved as well in this as upon all other occasions, not to be (Esclave De sa parelle) sent privately the Marquis the Choupes into Portugal, to assure them that in Order to the conclusion of the Treaty then on foot with Spain, they were forced to leave them out, and to engage not to assist them: but that whatever they promised they would never forsake them, and would still protect them against Spain as much as they had done before. The truth is, they kept their word to Portugal, much better than they did to Spain. And the Peace was no sooner made, but they sent them the usual supplies of Men, Arms and Money, And a while after notwithstanding their former Treaty with Spain, and in the view of the whole world, they entered into an Offensive League with that Kingdom against all their Enemies, whereby, amongst other things, the French were to have all the Sea-Towns that should be taken from Spain delivered to them. All which with many other particulars, too long to be inserted in this short discourse, may be seen more at large, in the incomparable Books of the Baren de Iss●la; entitled the Buckler of State and Justice which to this day could not be answered by the French though often challenged (and so much concerned in honour) to do it. The other security of the Pirenean Treaty as to Spain, and that without which they could never have given their consent to their Marriage of the Infanta, was the Renunciation before mentioned, And whoever read it will be apt to think, a General Council of the Civilians was called, to outdo all former Expressions used in such contracts, and to find out new binding Clauses, to take of all possibility of Evasion. And to make it more sacred yet and more inviolable, There being no greater tie upon Sovereign Princes then that of Public and solemn Treaties, the Act of the Renunciation was incorporated into the very Treaty of Pe ce, to make up of both of them but one body; though digested unto different Instruments as is expressly declared in the 33. Article of the Treaty of Peace, wherein speaking of the Contract of Marriage, to which they refer themselves, these words are added, which though it be separated hath the same force and vigour with the present Treaty of Peace, as being the principal part thereof, and the most precious pawn of its greater security and lasting. But the French Lawyers preferring the little quirks of Law before public faith; And pretending they might bring the Authority of solemn Treaties (which are the true, and indeed the only Law between Sovereign Princes) under the Cavil of Municipal Laws, and Local Customs, endeavouring to persuade the World that their Master was not bound to stand to what he had so solemnly promised and confirmed by sacred Oaths: And the French King after the death of the late King of Spain, claimed (notwithstanding the said Renunciation) a great part of the Spanish Low-Countries, as being devolved to him in right of his Wife, by the Municipal Laws of those Countries; And to back his unexpected Claim with more effectual means, he Invaded the Country with a powerful Army. This Invasion, so contrary to his Engagements, and so destructive to the very essence of the P●renean Treaty, was attended with some circumstances no less surprising than the breach itself. The one was what passed at Paris between the French King himself, and the Marquis De la Fuente Extrordinary Ambassador from Spain; And the other, what the French Ambassador (the Arch Bishop of Ambrun) declared at Madria in his Master's name. As to the First, The said Marquis De la Fuente being upon his Return into Spain, after the Death of the late King his Master, and being not without apprehension and jealousy, the great preparation, made in France were intended against the Queen his Mistress, and the King her Son, was very earnest with His Most Christian Majesty, to give some new and greater Assurances to the Queen of Spain, of the reality and sincerity of his intentions to quiet and settle her mind, against all the contrary advices, she received from all parts; whereupon the most Christian King did, with all possible Asseveration, engage his Faith and his Royal Word, to the said Queen, that he would Religiously keep the Peace, and continue a faithful friendship both to her and to her Son. And the Arch Bishop of Anbrun, after the French Army was already in the Field, and had possessed Charleroy, some four or five days before the News of it came to Madrid; did in Verbi Sacerdotis, and upon all that is most sacred amongst the Roman Catholics, protest and vow to the Q een, that his Master intended nothing less, than what was reported of him: And would never break with the King of Spain, or invade his Dominions as long as he was under Age. But the March of the French Army, and the Hostilities they committed, agreeing so little with their promises, and the same being complained of; They answered, it was no Breach, and that they only went to take possession of what belonged to them. This War, or as the French term it; this friendly possessing themselves of the Spanish Dominions, ended by the Treaty of Aix. After which, contrary to the Treaty itself; they first dismantled all the strong Places and Holds of the County of Bargundy! carried away all the Munitions out of the Country, and would have destroyed the rich Salt Pits of that Province, had not the powerful interposition both of England, and Holland prevented that spoil. Notwithstanding the same Treaty of Aix, they exacted great Contributions from the Dutchyes of Lymbourg, and Luxembourg: They lay a new claim to some Towns, as important as any of those that have been granted to them by the Peace: They have confiscated the Estates of the Subjects of the King of Spain, that would not forswear their Allegiance; and have not spared the very Royal House of Mary Mont: Nay, as if these infractions were not sufficient and still to encroach as far as they were able, they forced their way with great quantities of Merchandise through the Spanish Territories without paying the Customs, and not long after endeavoured to surprise the Town of Hainault. Thus they have dealt with Spain ever since the Pyrenean Treaty. Let us see now how other Princes have fared with them; we'll begin with the Duke of Lorraine. By the Pyrenean Treaty, the said Duke was to be restored to his Duchy of Lorraine, with all the Places and Towns which he had possessed in the Bishoprics of Mentz, Toul, and Verdun. But France after the execution of the other Articles of the said Treaty, deferred as long as they could the performance of that part, which related to the Duke, and refused still to return him his Country; till they had brought him to make another Treaty with them, whereby he was forced to part with several considerable places over and above what had been granted to them by the general Peace; Then after a year and an half of an unsettled possession, during which under several unjust pretences, new quarrels were picked every day: They forced him with a considerable Army, to give them his Town of Marsal. And not long after, they again compelled him to sign a new Treaty, more disadvantageous yet then the two former; since which he could, as little as before have a quiet enjoyment of that little they had left him. They every day encroached upon his Jurisdiction, the Limits of his Territories, and his Sovereignty itself; They laid enormous Taxes upon his Subjects: They caused him to disband his Forces, and to raise new men again as they thought fit, they kept him from revenging his own quarrels, to take part in that of others, they let lose all his Enemies against him, and stopped the Progress of his Armies, as soon as he had the least advantage: And in few words he was all that while more a Vassal to France, than a Sovereign. But yet all this while would not satisfy the French Court: And taking it ill that his Obedience was not altogether so blind as they would have it, they ordered one of their Generals to seize his Person, and to bring him either dead or alive, as it was very near being effected. A new way of dealing with a Sovereign Prince, not known yet in these parts of the World, and which may give some hopes to Europe of seeing ere long the West Governed by Basshaws as well as the East. The Kingdom of Poland comes next, which hath lain a bleeding ever since they have had a French Queen, & which is at this instant in an eminent danger of being conquered by the Turks, through the means of the French Cabal, who having called into the Kingdom the Enemy of the Christian name merely because they could not have a King either of French blood, or of French interest. The Duke of Newburg was not much better used, and whilst they caused him to engage the greatest part of his Estate almost beyond redemption in hopes of the Polish Crown, which they had promised to raise him to by the help of a strong party they had made in that Kingdom. They underhand contrary both to their Treaties (as well with the Elector of Brandenburg as with himself) and to their reiterated promises and vows both by word of mouth and in writing, did by their Creatures and Agents Oppose the said Duke's pretensions, and endeavoured with all industry to have the Prince of Conde preferred before all his Competitors. A particular deduction whereof will (if ever published) without any other instance be a sufficient warning to all Princes, and give them a perfect Character of the French Court. The Emperor hath as little reason to thank them, and at the very time the most Christian King sent him Forces to join with his Army against the Turks, they begun to settle a Correspondence with the Count Serin, Franchipaeny, Nadasti, and Tottenback, from whence they so well known Conspiracy hath since broken out, as hath appeared by the depositions and confessions of some of the Accomplices who had been instrumental in carrying both Money and Letters, from the French Minister at Vienna to the said Conspirators. Not to speak now of what arts they used to hinder his Election at first, and since that to lessen his Authority and disturb all Germany by their Intrigues and private Treaties, with several Privacies, contrary to the Treaty at Munster. To which may be added, that one of the great Motives of bringing the Turks into Poland was the marriage of the Emperor's Sister with their King. Yet it must be owned also that the French seem to have repent their pernicious intrigues and Caballing in that Kingdom, for when they saw the Emperor preparing in Earnest to assist the Dutch, to dissuade him from that design, and to engage him (if it had been possible) not to concern himself or take part in the Quarrel, they very fairly offered him to put into his hands and deliver him all the Original Letters they had from their Creatures and Friends in Poland. To the end both his Imperial Majesty and the King of Poland, his Brother might take what course they thonght fit with those Rebels: A fair warning to all those that prefer French money before their Loyalty, and the true interest of their Country. Nay I doubt the Swedes, their good Friends have not always been pleased with them: And they cannot to this day forget that some ten Years since, having made a Treaty with the French whereby they were to receive, by way of Gratuity or Pension, Sixteen hundred Thousand Crowns, the French (upon second thoughts) finding their Treaty with Sweden of little use to them refused to ratify it, and sent them Monsieur de Trelon, who without more words told them in short, that the the King his Master declared it to be void. A fine Court style for one Prince to use to another! And a short Majestic way of Rescinding all Treaties. It were both needless and tedious, to examine now how well they have observed their Treaties with Holland, since they cannot so much as assign the least Cause of the War they make now, and in their Declaration tell us only of a Mauvaise satisfaction, of their being ill pleased, which would tend to the Diminution of the glory of a most Christian King, unless to please himself better, he put Europe in a Flame, and endeavour to bring all under his subjection. But it may be thought all other Princes and States have had much cause to complain of the French not to say worse, his Majesty hath been hitherto either more fortunate or more beholding to their generosity and kindness. This must be now inquired into. I will not insist much upon the expressions of their kindness to his Majesty's Person, whilst he was abroad, since they may pretext the interest of their Kingdom, and palliate their duress and inhuman dealing, by a necessity of preserving themselves. But I hope no such necessity compelled them to oppose his Majesty's happy Restauration with so much violence as they did, and to Cabal with his greatest Enemies to keep him out of his Kingdoms, which his Majesty was so sensible of, that upon his coming into England he commanded away the French Ambassador Bourdeaux, and would not suffer him to come into his presence. Since that time they have often endeavoured to ingratiate themselves, & have made great protestations. But after several propositions of Leagues, and many Arts used to raise Jealousies between us and the Hollanders (Dreading nothing more than a durable & firm friendship between two Nations, who if united might easily set what bounds they pleased to their ambition) they at last sided with the Dutch, though with no other intention then to see us destroy each other, or at least so far weaken and exhaust ourselves, that they might with less opposition invade their Neighbours, and increase their Naval strength, nay their policy went further, and in the very heat of the War they still kept Negotiations on foot, and made Overtures and Proposals of Peace by means of the late Queen Mother, whom in the end they deceived so far, as to assure her (and by her his Majesty) that the Dutch would set no Fleet out (that Summer, the Peace was concluded) whilst underhand they pressed the said Dutch with all the Vigour and Earnestness imaginable to fit out their Ships, with a promise of joining theirs to them. Upon this Paroll of the French Court, 'tis too well known we had no Fleet out as well as what followed upon it, when the Dutch meeting with no opposition, entered into the River of Chatham; so that though the French had no other hand in't, they had been still the true cause of that unhappy accident: But withal, it is more than probable they were themselves the Authors of that Counsel, and most certain it is they knew of the design before the attempt was made: As might be proved by several instances if necessary: After this, the Peace being concluded at Breda; the French were by the Treaty, to return us St. Christopher's, in the manner and form therein expressed. But instead of performing it according to the true meaning (and the very Letter of the Article) they have still from time to time, upon several unjust and frivolous pretences, put off his Majesty's Commssioners that went to receive it; till seeing a necessity of complying with us in so a small matter, whilst we were preparing to run so great a danger for their sake; they delivered it at last to Sir Charles Wheeler, somewhat above a year since. But before the delivery of it, they destroyed all the Plantations, plundered and carried away all that was portable; laid the whole Country waste, and left it in a much worse condition, than if it had never been Planted. And as if the detaining of his Majesty's Territories had not been sufficient, they interrupted the Trade of his Subjects in those parts; and assuming to themselves the Sovereignty of those Seas; they would not suffer any Ships but their own, to Sail by, or about their Islands. And in Truth upon no other Ground, have brought in as Prizes, and confiscated several Vessels. Not to speak now of the great discouragement our French Trade hath many years since lain under; through their unjust practices and manifold devices, which have been such, that we do not of late send into France the fourth or fifth part of what Goods and Commodities were formerly sent over. This late carriage of theirs in America brings us to their present Alliance with his Majesty. And as the greatest care of those that have advised the King to this League, have been to keep from the view and from the knowledge of the World, what Articles are agreed upon; it is not to be expected we should instance in the particular Breaches of what we are all Strangers to. For Example, we cannot tell whether it was agreed the French Squadron should fight, and so dare not assure they have broken their Treaty by not fight. But I suppose there are very few, but have heard of the Wager laid by the Spanish Ambassador in the beginning of the War; and how far the French Conduct agreed with his Predictions. I would not neither impeach any man upon general Reports and Rumours, but however it is observable, that the greatest number of the Dutch Commanders are of Opinion, and have often publicly declared, that the French Ships were thus kind-used by theirs out of particular respect De Wits Brother had to them. If from the Sea we come ashore, we'll find (as far at least as they came to our knowledge) most of their promises deceitful; all the Art imaginable used to ensnare his Majesty. And lastly, a perfect and reiterated Breach of tho essence of their Treaty, whatever the words may be; all those that have been never so little conversant at Court, may remembered that one of the great Arguments used and suggested by the French, to make the conquest of Holland appear both safe and easy; was that his most Christian Majesty had assurances from all the great Princes in Europe, they would not ways concern themselves in the Quarrel. Spain would be glad to see their old Rebels Chastised. The Emperor had his hands full, and durst not stir if he would for fear of the Turks. Brandenburg should demand his Towns, and the Northern Crowns, would either sit still or endeavour to have a share in the spoil. And then this was so readily embraced, that even after the Exchange of the Ratifications of the Treaty betwixt Spain and the United Provinces; they would not own there was so much as any agreement. And for a good while we flattered ourselves that the Leagues with the Catholic King and other Princes, were surmises of the Dutch, to raise their Reputation, and quiet the minds of their People. But when this was passed denying, they came off with slighting Discourses of the Forces of the Dutch Allies; and Monsieur de Turenne would cut them all to pieces, if ever their Temerity did brings within his reach. At the Rate the Alliance with France was discoursed of before the War broke out-standers by could not but think (and I believe if Truth were enquired into, it will be found his Majesty intended no more at first, and was engaged no farther) the French should be the Principal in this War, and England join their Forces with them as Auxiliaries, to have in case of need, a safe and honourable Retreat in their Power. But as soon as the French thought his Majesty could not well go back nor take new Counsels; they openly declared it was none of their Quarrel, and that they only engaged in it to assist his Majesty, out of respect to his person. By which means his Majesty was persuaded and induced to declare War first, and to expect afterwards the assistance of the French. I suppose his Majesty will not thank them neither forgiving out in all Roman Catholic Princes Courts, That this is a War of Religion, undertaken merely for the propegation of the Catholic Faith, and as the French Minister at Vienna, expressed it in a solemn Speech to the Emperor's Counsel, which hath been since Printed in French, that the Hollanders being Heriticks, who had forsaken their God; all good Christians are bound to join and unite to extirpate them and to implore God's blessing upon so good a work. Nay to confirm this the more they have lately declared and assured many Princes, that to let Europe see how far they are from any such design as have been laid to their Charge; and to satisfy all the World they entered into this War out of a Religious Zeal; and for the Glory of God, they are ready to part with all their Conquests, and return to the Hollanders all the Towns they have taken from them; if they will but re-establish the true Worship they have banished from their Territories. How far now this may be agreeable to his Majesty's Interest, or to the XXXIX Articles, let any unprejudiced man judge. But an undeniable proof of the uprightness of the French Court, is their carriage in the Negotiations of Peace with the States. In short, the matter of Fact is thus: The passage of the Erench Army over that Branch of the Rhyne, called the Waal; having caused a general consternation all over the Country, and the confusion they were in, being such, that they could hardly resolve whether to yield or defend themselves. The States on the 11th. of June, named several Deputies to be sent, some to his Majesty, and the rest to the French King; to know of them both upon what terms they would be willing to agree and come to a Peace. Those that came to his Majesty, were met upon the way as far as Graves End, to forbid them the Court, and were conveyed to Hampton Court; there to continue in an honourable confinement, till we could hear from the most Christian King, and know of him whether the said Deputies might be admitted; his Majesty being unwilling to give the offence to the French; And not thinking it either lawful or convenient (without their participation) so much as to hear what the Dutch Deputies Errand was. But the other Deputies came no sooner to the French Court, but two Secretaries of State were sent to them, and without further delay, desired to know first if they had full Power to Treat; and in the next place, what the States could propose in order to a speedy Peace. The Deputies answered, they were only sent to know his most Christian Majesties Pleasure, and that their Masters had thought it a greater respect to him to receive his Proposals then to offer any Conditions themselves, with this answer: the French Ministers went to their Masters and came back immediately to the Deputies, to let them know, it was expected the States should make the Proposals, and that the most Christian King could not enter upon any Treaty unless they had full Power. Telling them withal (to quicken them and to hasten the conclusion of the work) that they were to consider, That whatever his most Christian Majesty had Conquered, was already his own; and therefore he could no ways part with it, unless they gave him an Equivalent, as well for what he might Conquer farther, before the Conclusion of the Treaty, as for what he possessed at that time: Whereupon Monsieur de Groot (one of the Deputies) being gone to the Hague, he was sent back with all speed, and Authorised in a very ample manner together with his Colleagues to treat and conclude a Peace with the French. Upon the return of the said De Groot, with the Powers after some conferences (part of them with De Groot alone) Monsieur de Louvoy, one of the Secretaries of State) gave the Dutch Deputies a project of a Treaty, or rather the pretensions of the King his Master: Upon the granting of which, he was both willing and ready to return to his former Amity with the States, and conclude a firm Peace with them. Whereupon two things are to be observed; The one that the Conditions were such, that (if granted) would have made the French King as perfectly Master of the Country, as if he had conquered all by the Sword: and the other, that in all the Articles (which are still in being, and may be produced if need be) there was not the least word relating to England; and no more notice taken of his Majesty, or greater care of his interest, then if he had not been concerned in the War, or in no League with the French. So that if by a wonderful providence of God, the said Treaty, had not been unexpectedly broken off, Europe had in one day lost its Liberty; And all we could have expected afterwards, had been the favour Polyphemus shown to his Guests. And to demonstrate further, that the intention of the French Court was not his Majesty should be a gainer by the War, Monsieur de Groot (whose word if he be not very much wronged aught to go a great way when he speaks of the French) declared at his second coming to the Hague, with the before mentioned Articles that the French Ministers had answered him, the States his Masters might deal as they pleased with England, and come off as cheap as they would, because (as they pretended) they were not bound or engaged by their Treaty to procure them any advantages. A happy thing in the mean while to be engaged in such a War, with so Generous an Ally. While this negotiation was on foot, and before the Treaty could be Concluded; the Prince of Orange was miraculously restored to the dignity and Authority of his Ancestors, which having altogether Eclipsed the party that was inclined to treat with France upon almost any Terms, and the rest of the Country being all under Water, the French lost at once both their hopes of carrying the whole matter by a Treaty, and the opportunity of making a further Progress by their Arms. At the same time My Lord Duke of Buckingham and my Lord Arlington went into Holland. And the French who knew already they could neither bring the Dutch to a compliance, nor Swim over to the remaining Towns. And with all being full of Apprehensions and fear that by the Authority of the Prince of Orange, and through the interest he was like to have in his Majesty (chief if their practices and honest deal came to be discovered) a Separate peace might be made between England and the United Provinces, they Acted their part so successfully with our Plenipotentiaries, that they persuaded them to enter (in his Majesty's name) into a new engagement, not to treat or conclude with the Dutch any Peace or Truce without them: For as to their promising the like, it was a perfect mockery on their part, since they had already done their utmost to Treat without England, and that after they had miscarried in the attempt, nothing could secure them but his Majesty's refusing to accept of what conditions the Dutch would be willing to grant Him. After this new Contract made, our Plenipotentiaries together with the French Ministers sent their joint demands, and proposals to the Dutch, to be granted in Ten days or else no Peace to be made, which was the next Masterpiece of the French, for it is to be observed, first that the French Demands were in substance the same as they had made at first in their negotiation with Monsieur de Groot, And since they were so unjust, and so Enormous, that the best friends they had then amongst the States could hardly swallow them themselves, (much less to bring the generality to give their censent) without some Modification. It was not to be expected that the Government being since the late Change, much more avers to the French then before, the same proposals again, should be better entertained, which was rendered the more improbable by the addition of the English demands. Secondly, The French, by the excessive height of their demands, seemed to have encouraged (if not persuaded by some more effectual means) the said plenipotentiaries not to come much short of them, which was attended with Two Fatal consequences, the one, that the War was certainly, by it, entailed upon his Majesty; And the other that it was a means to alienate the minds and affections of the Dutch, who were then inclined to give those advantages to England, which cannot rationally be expected hereafter. Thirdly, Though the respective claims of the Two Kings had been singly tolerable; yet the joining of them together made it impossible for the Dutch to grant either. From whence the French (and very rationally) conceived hopes that the Dutch finding themselves over balanced by the joint power of their Enemies, and seeing no way to come out of so destructive a War, and to have peace (and not a firm nor a durable one neither) without dividing their Country into a hundred pieces, and cutting of all their Sinews, had rather cast themselves into the Arms of their Conqueror, and laying aside all thoughts of Sovereignty, live in an entire Body under the French Domination. At least it were some comfort, if the French Court had but kept to this last agreement, which in so many respects was advantageous to them. But that they have not done neither: And as soon as they saw most Princes in Europe begin to be in Earnest, and that great succours were preparing for the Assistance of the Dutch, besides what forces were already in the Field, They underhand made new overtures of Peace, and have still to this day been sending private Messages to the Dutch, wherein they take no greater care of England than they had done at Vtrecht. And if the Dutch had not persisted in their refusal to Treat without their Allies, the French had long since concluded without theirs, and that upon very moderate Terms, as to the Dutch. I suppose this will seem very strange, and will hardly be credited, but since as long as I am under this disguise, I cannot justify it as fully as otherwise I might do it. All I can say at present is, there are those in the Kingdom that know the truth of it as well as myself, and I hope the world will not be long without a full discovery of it. And thus I end the first part of this discourse which hath swelled unawares into a greater bulk than I intended at first, though the matter would bear a great deal more without being exhausted. II. Let us now come to the Second Head, and examine what the issue of this War may prove, and what may rationally be expected it will come to. Were it either possible in nature, or so much as to be imagined that Holland might be turned into a new Lake, their Towns burnt and depopulated, and their Inhabitants either destroyed or Transported into remote Colonies, or part of them brought into this Kingdom, to increase the Number of our People; I fear no Arguments drawn from either natural Justice or Christian Charity could be forceable enough to put a stop to such a design: And in the case it would be hard for the ingenious and worthy Author of the Interest of England stated (as unanswerable as his Arguments are) to persuade men either Biased, or not very well acquainted with the state of Foreign Affairs, That it must be the chief Interest of England to support the present Government of Holland. But such a destruction being not to be thought on, or expected by any man that is in his Wits; and since the Situation of the Country, and its Commodiousness for trading in many respects, together with the Natural and Laborious Industry of the Inhabitants, will still continue under any change; To satisfy ourselves how far we may be gainers by this War, we must consider in order to the general events that may be looked upon as in any degree of possibility. In order to that I conceive all men will grant one of these four things must be supposed. First, The absolute conquest of the United Provinces by the French. Or, Secondly, Our Conquering of them. Thirdly, A Division and Sharing of the Country between us and the French. Fourthly, and Lastly, The Dutch recovering their losses, and with the help of their Allies, their withstanding both England and France. Of each of them in Order. The absolute Conquest of the United Provinces by the French, and their being brought under their subjection, is a thing of that dreadful consequence, that the very thoughts of it must needs raise the blood of all true English men And there is hardly any remedy too violent for so desperate a cure or means that could be called unjust, if necessary to prevent so great an evil, And therefore instead of losing time to prove what is so manifest and so obvious to the meanest capacities, I only beg of all my dear Countrymen to lay the present state of things to heart, and humbly move both Houses to consider, whether we be not already too near that evil day, and how far it is consistant with that Interest, with which they are entrusted, to hasten it by unseasonable and pernicious compliance. Secondly, As to our Mastering the Low Countries, it can be but one of these two ways: First, Our subduing of them by a Landing; and withal, beating the French out of what they possess already: Or, Secondly, Their voluntary yielding to us, and submiting themselves to his Majesty. The first can hardly be so much as supposed or imagined by any Rational Man: For 1. If in the midst of their late distractions and the unspeakable confusion, which was in every part of the Country, no opportunity of Landing could be found though often attempted: How can it be expected it should be practicable by the next Summer, now they are all United and strengthened by the assistance of their Allies. 2. How can it be thought possible to Land an Army considerable enough to take all their Towns, and Conquer the whole Country; Nay, to Conquer the Conquerors themselves, and beat the French out. 3. Granting that the approach of our Fleet, would occasion a great disorder and consternatian in the Country; and that the Dutch should not prove able to oppose our Landing; and at the same time to keep the French out, and defend themselves to the Landwards', what would the consequence of this be, but only to enable the French to Master the whole Country, whilst the Dutch should divide and draw off their Forces to oppose us? It being much easier for the French who are already in the Country, to Ma ch with all their Forces to Amster am, and to the rest of their Towns, before we can Land; then for us to prevent them by our Landing. 4. Lastly, if the French Ships are to have a share in the Expedition, what Security have we, their men will promote our own ends, and not their Masters; and that they shall not rather turn tail against us, if occasion be? And as to the voluntary yielding of the Dutch, and their giving themselves up to us; I may say it is as irrational and as fond a conceit as the other: And which therefore doth hardly need being confuted. But because some of our great men, have (even in Print) made use of this as of an Argument, both to justify the War in point of prudence, and to persuade the Nation to join and concur with the Cabal in their dark Counsels: It will be necessary, and we own that respect to their quality, as to lay the matter open and unfold it with a little more care. Were the United Provinces still entire, and untouched and they in an election to join with and submit themselves (upon terms) either to France or England, it would be no hard matter to demonstrate and make it to appear that the balance of true policy and reason should weigh down by much on the French side. And that the best part of their Trade would soon, if incorporated with us run out of their Channels into ours; which all understanding men amongst them are so sensible of, that in Case this were in agitation, the interest of Religion (which besides they could secure some other way) should hardly carry it against profit and self preservation. But not to multiply debates, and granting now that in such a Case, the Ducth would prefer our Domination before that of the French; Let us not examine what might have been if our suppositions were true: But what is like to be De facto, & may rationally be expected as the Cause stands .. First it must be observed that though their Maratime Provinces be far the most considerable, and those which have made that Commonwealth so powerful and so famous all over the World, yet their Inland Provinces are of no less importance to the preservation of the whole, and are the Bulwarks and Outworks of the other, without which the main Body would be soon streigtned and brought in a little time to the greatest extremities, For this Reason the Spaniards never offered Peace to the Dutch, nor could they have accepted of it if offered, till being Masters of Seven Provinces, and having withal conquered several Towns in Brabant and Flanders, to be a fence to their out Provinces, their Territories proved of a Competent extent to Lodge and Maintain upon their Frontiers the greatest Armies. And by removing the Seat of the War from their Trading Provinces, be so much the more able to continue it, rather with advantage to them, then with the least inconvenience or trouble. 2. The Second thing we must take notice of is, that the greatest advantage of the Situation of the United Provinces lieth, in that several of the greatest Rivers in Europe not only run through their Country, but disimbogue into the Ocean within their Precincts. This openeth them an easy and an advantageous Trade into most parts of Germany, the Spanish Low Countries, and some Provinces of France, and makes a Reciprocation of commerce, and as it were an Ebb and Flow, between their Rivers and the Ocean, being enabled by the first to carry at a cheap rate to the furthest parts of the world what goods & commodities the above mentioned Countries afford, and to return them by means of the same, the Richest spoils of the East and West. These natural Advantages accrueing to the Inhabitants of these respective Provinces, by their being all United under the same Government, do link and tie them so fast together, that nothing but an external and force can divide them; and who ever comes to be Master of the Rivers, must needs in a short time either be beaten out of his Conquests, or else bring all the Havens and all the Inhabitants Bordering upon the Sea, under the same subjection? The Sea Ports without the Rivers, and the Rivers without the Ports, being altogether useless, and a Foundation for an Endless and Destructive War. This being premised, the Conclusion will easily be drawn, and since the French do already possess half of their Country, and are Masters of their chief Rivers, if the Dutch come either to lose the Ambition of Ruling, and being a Sovereign State, or else are brought to the necessity of choosing a Master: It is plain they'll rather submit themselves to the French King, who hath half conquered them already, and hath in his own hands that part of the Country without which they cannot subsist, than by giving up the remaining part to England to entail a War upon them, which besides their subjection to a Foreiner, as well as if they were under the French, will exhaust what Treasury they may have lest, and from a Flourishing Estate bring them to perfect Beggary. To sum up all: It cannot be supposed the Dutch will ever choose a Master, and submit themselves to the Government of a Foreign Prince, unless they are driven to it by an unavoidable necessity. This necessity cannot proceed but from the sense they may have of their own weakness, and of a desire to live in peace, and free themselves of a War which is so destructive to them. Now if they do submit themselves to England, in opposition to the French, the Peace they seek will be further off them then ever, & their remaining Country will be the seat of an endless War; whereas, if they give themselves up to the French, they will be United again in an entire body, enjoy rest and peace, and live under the Protection of a Prince, who of all Princes in Europe is best able to defend them against all their Enemies, and whose interest will be to give all possible encouragement to their Trade, and to make their Country the Nursery of his Seamen, and in all other respects the support of his Naval Strength. Not to mention that if they must be slaves, first, they might rationally hope to have the satisfaction afterwards, of lending a helping hand to bring their Neighbours, and in truth all Europe into the same condition with them. Thirdly, We come now to the dividing and sharing of the Country with the French, which by what hath already been said will appear either impracticable, or rathor hurtful than advantageous, for this sharing must be either by a Conquest on both sides, as the Duchies of Cleve and Juliers were formerly, when Prince Maurice and the Marquis of Spinola entered at the same time into those Countries with two great Armies, and took each what they could, the one on the behalf of the Elector of Brandenburg, and the other of the Duke of Newburg, or else that the French having Conquered and possessed all, should give us part of their acquisition. The first cannot be supposed as long as we have no Army in though Country. And in truth can bring none able to match that of the French, and to Conquer as fast as they, though they had not a foot of Ground in the United Provinces: But as the case doth now stand, it is plain, they would be Masters of all before our long Boats could come on Shore. And as to their giving us a share, after an absolute Conquest, there are three things to be considered, 1. It is worth the inquiry, how far they are engaged by their Treaty, and what share we are to have: for all appearances are very deceitful, if the French have promised to give any thing more than a fair leave to take what we can. 2. It is apparent by what hath been said before, at what rate their promises and other such engagements are to be valued. 3. The nature and constitution of the Country being such that it cannot stand divided, without not only very great inconvenience to both parties, but the destruction of one of them. The French King, what ever he had promised, cannot be willing to give us such a share as would bring his own under the Enulish subjection. And if his Majesty should have but an inconsiderable part of the Conquest, he could neither reap any benefit by it, nor protect it against the French power without exhausting both his Treasure and his Men. Nay it may be said further, and all that know the Country will grant that unless Amsterdam with the Zuyder Sea were split, and all the shipping divided to have each one half of the whole, no true division can be made: And whoever is Master of that Town will soon or late subdue all the rest. It is true, if we had some Sea Towns, and the French had nothing to do with the rest, it might be for a while a Curb to Holland and procure us some advantages in Trade. But if the French possess all the Country, what proportion can there be between the acquisition and ours? And after the accession of so great a power to their Empire, can any rational man imagine some few places they should give us, would be a balance to their Forces, or a secure Fence against their Ambitious and aspiring thoughts? To clear this further, and to demonstrate how dangerous it is for England to destroy the balance of Europe, in hopes of having a share in the spoil, and of increasing our Dominions. It is to be considered that in the perusal of our English Histories, we find all our Foreign Conquests either unfortunate in the end, or an unprofitable charge to the Kingdom; whilst to maintain them, the Seas must be perpetually crossed, for supplying them with Men, Money, and Necessaries. Nay, after the Conquest of the best part of the Kingdom of France we could not defend it long against the remaining part, and even lost what belonged to his Majesty's Royal Ancestors by right of Inheritance, after a quiet and uninterrupted possession for some hundreds of years. Since that time what new acquisitions hath been made, hath likewise been returned either for considerable Sums of Money, or upon some other considerations relating to the State of Europe in those days. And lest it might be objected, That those former Conquests were either less prudently undertaken, or harder to be kept than these we seem to go upon now: It is observable first that our Forefathers either undertook alone the said Conquests, or else if he joined with any other Prince (as when they were assisted by the House of Burgundy) they still had kept to themselves the greatest and most considerable share. Secondly, That it was ever the interest of some of the Neighbouring Princes; England should preserve some part (at least) of the said Acquisitions, and have still a footing on the main, for the Common safety and for the speedier and easier relief of our Allies. And yet though these two Conditions met together, either the essential difficulty of the thing itself, or our natural unaptness to preserve what we have once gotten, hath made all European Conquests unsuccesful, and in truth prejudicial to us. But the Case being thus, what Judgement can we make, and what can we rationally expect or promise ourselves of our intended joint conquest with the French, where those Conditions before mentioned are are altogether wanting? And where first far from Conquering ourselves we only countenance and promote (by our strieghtning the Dutch by Sea) the Invasion of a Country, which even whilst it was nothing near so considerable as it is now all Europe hath looked upon, not only as a fair step, but as the best part of the way to the Universal Monarchy: And which did once occasion so great a confederacy against the House of Austria to wrest those Provinces out of their hands. 2. It is as plain, it is not the French Kings Interest to give his Majesty a considerable part of the Conquests, nor to let us enjoy long what he might peradventure give us at first for some other ends of his own. And to secure this unknown share to us, I do not see we have now any Talbots or Earls of Bedford at the head of our Victorious Armies to set up his Majesty's Standard in the Conquered Towns, and leave English Garrisons in them. But instead of that whilst the French march on, and do enlarge their Empire, we please ourselves with calling the French Forces our Forces, And endeavour, if not to persuade ourselves, at least to persuade others, All this is done for the honour and glory of the English Nation, for the Advancement of Trade, for the safety of his Majesty's Person, the support of his Royal Authority, and the happiness of his Kingdoms. It is true, we do not well know as yet (what) we are to have, but somewhat we'll have however (say our Great men.) And we will not believe the French King shall let us go without a reward, for the pains we take in raising him, as much as in us lieth, to the Throne of the universal Monarchy. Nay, supposing the worst (saith a great and noble Champion for the French, in a Printed Letter to Sir Thomas Osborn) that we should be so ill advised, as to let the French take all and leave us nothing, yet even in that Case, the French King would rather make their strength at Sea inconsiderable, by their being subject to him, than his own more formidable, by his being their Master. I confess this is a now Demonstration in Poiticks which few men would have dreamt of: and if that be all our safety, I hope no true English man will be swayed by the authority or quality of those who go about thus to argue the Kingdom out of its liberty, and turn England into a French Province. Fourthly. The extreme danger and fatal Consequences of some of the former suppositions, and the impracticableness of the other, being thus (& I hope clearly) demonstrated; we need not lose much time to press that increase (which is the only possible event that remaineth) the Dutch shall recover their losses, and with the help of their Allies be able to deal both with England and France. It cannot be his Majesty's interest to continue a War which will miserably impoverish his Kingdoms, and by the continual Losses the Merchants do and are like to sustain, bring the Trade of the Nation into such a decaying condition, as will not be repaired in many years of Peace. Especially if Spain be further provoked to proceed to an open Breach with us, as it is more than probable, they will ere long be forced to do. But because I see many are apt to look upon this War through a kind of Cloud, and seem to be unwilling to have a distinct Notion of the ill consequences with which it is attended, but reflect only in General and confusedly upon a supposed destruction of the Dutch, & seem imaginary Advantages accrueing to us by it, which yet they cannot instance in; much less demonstrate upon any Rational Grounds: I think it necessary to add what we have said already, some few Considerations relating both to Spain and the Empire. As to Spain, it is first well known what that Crown is to expect from France, as soon as these may have any opportunity of destroying them. And I suppose no body doubts but that the Spanish Court will by all possible meres oppose the Increase, and stop the Progress of the greatest and formidablest Enemies they have. 2. It is as plain, that in Case the French come to be Master, the United Provinces, the Spanish Netherlands will of Course and unavoidably fall into their hands, notwithstanding the famous Triple League which by the way will be Triple no longer, when the Dutch Common wealth is gone. 3. Although the Crown of Spain had no Domions in the Low-Countries, It would be as much their interest to preserve the United Provinces entire. And in true policy, they ought to venture all their Kingdoms: and to the very last of their men to prevent if it be possible so formidable an accession of Naval Power to the French, after which no Plate Fleet or Galleons could ever come safe, nor consequently their Monarchy stand much Longer. 4. The Emperor being already engaged, and hostilities begun between him and the French, Spain can no longer stand out, and they are bound to run the same fortune as well by late and private Treaties as by the joint-interest of their Family. 5. And lastly Spain having already by their Assistance given to the Dutch, whereby all the considerable Towns in Brabant, where preserved, and by the late Attempt upon Charleroy so highly incensed the French against them, they cannot venture nothing more by an open Breach, it is much safer for them to declare whilst the hands of the French are full, then to be exposed to their fury after their Conquest ended. From all this it plainly followeth, that a breach between Spain and France is not to be avoided. But the same Arguments prove likewise, that, in case we do persist in our Alliance with the French, they must break with us as well as with them: And since they are so far concerned in the preservation of the Dutch, they cannot think themselves safe if the others are destroyed. It is their Interest by making this War as destructive to us as they can, to persuade us more effectually, than they could do hitherto into a friendship with their Allies, for to say they dare not proceed to a breach; they are afraid of us, and we know how to Order them in the West Indies: This were good if their All did not lie at stake, and if by their breach with us they could endanger more than the same All, Whereas to the Contrary by venturing all, they may, and will in all likelihood, save both themselves and all Europe. This being Granted (as it must needs be, if truth do in the least prevail with us;) I need not use many words to make all England sensible of the sad consequences of a Spanish War; I'll hint only those that are undeniable: As first, the seizure of all our Merchant's Estates, amounting in the whole to a vast Sum. 2. The loss of our Trade with them, which of all other is the most beneficial to the Kingdom; And without which our goods must lie upon our hands, and half of our Weavers, Spinners, etc. go a begging. 3. The Interruption of our Levant and Plantations Trade, which cannot in case of Breach be secured by ordinary Convoys. And (not to mention the Spanish Men of War which both as to number and strength are sufficient to cruise in the straits) With what either encouragement or safety can our Traders venture abroad; if, besides the Dutch Capers, the Seas come to be infested with Ostenders, Biscayne's, Majorcans, and Minorcans? Who are none of them inferiors to the Flushingers, and are as well Skilled as they are in the Art of Piracy; Nay, did not these very men without any help take above fifteen hundred Ships from us, in the late Spanish War, when Spain was at the lowest; and sought alone against us and France. 4. By the loss or at least the interruption of our Trade, his Majesty's Customs, which is the considerablest Branch of his Revenue, will come to little or nothing; so that to support the War, new Taxes must be raised in lieu of it: And proportionably so much greater Subsidies granted to his Majesty. If from Spain we come to the Empire; we find the Emperor himself and the Elector of Brandenburg, already engaged in the quarrel, and many other Princes upon declaring, so that it is now high time both for the Parliament and all true Englishmen, to look farther than we have done yet, and to examine with more care the consequence of this War. For the Fire, which both we and France have kindled, is like to consume all Europe, if we do not make haste to quench it, and by a timely Retreat give way to safe Counsels. And for a close to this second Part of our Discourse, I desire the following Considerations may be seriously Debated and weighed. First, What horrid spilling of Christian Blood we'll be the occasion of, if by our wilful promoting of the Ambitious designs of the French (even so palpable against our Interest) we force all the rest of Europe to take up Arms in their own defence, and to unite all for their Common safety, and for the preservation of that Liberty which (as though we were led by Witchcraft) we merrily go about to destroy. 2. How prejudicial this War will be to us, in case the confederate Princes do overbalance the Power of France; And by raising the Reputation and the Credit of the Dutch (which last is the only thing they want) enable them not only to pay their Land Armies, but likewise to set out as great and considerable Fleets as ever. And I do not see that either of them ought to be looked upon as very improbable; since first it is very certain, and all those that knew the Country will grant, That if the Hollanders had but some prosperous success (either by their own Armies, Or by the help of their Allies) they'll be able to take up without trouble, and in a very short time, as much Money as they may have occasion for. And in the second place it seemeth pretty rational to judge that the house of Austria with the conjunction of many Potent Princes, will struggle a while for their lives, and may be hard enough for the French 3. But how much greater will the danger be if neither Germany nor Spain are able to stop the Progress of the French? And in case they must all yield, and submit themselves to the Victorious Arms of the most Christian King, what will become of Poor England? must his Majesty, (I speak it with due respect to his Royal and sacred person) be Tenant at will? or else Do we presume so far on our own strength as to imagine we may do what the rest of Europe cannot? And that though the French had conquered all, we should not fear them the more? and could still defend ourselves against them? Let those that have Advised his Majesty to this War speak, they must now pull their Vizard off, they must appear in their true shape; & tell us plainly whether they are paid for making the French King the Universal Monarchy, And whether to bring down new Golden showers into their Laps, England must at Least be made Tributary to the French, some few Hackney writers will not serve the Turn now, And twenty silly stories against Holland, cannot make it advisable for us, to join with the French King against the Greatest part of Europe. When this War was entered upon, no Enemies were thought on, at least spoken of, besides the Dutch. This was the only game we followed at first, And we expected no other prey to divide between us and the French. But now, supposing that we had taken never so much care for an equal sharing of the United Provinces, concerning which we refer ourselves to what hath been said before, will our great men assure us further, That the Lines are also fallen to us in the pleasant places of Europe? And that his Majesty is to share the Universal Empire with the most Christian King. I grant the Dutch have offended us, And that our War against them is not unjust. But is it Just therefore to destroy so many Princes who cannot Subsist without them, & who for their own preservation are forced to Venture all to preserve the United Provinces? In few words; the Scene is altered: And though our infinite charity leads us, not to suspect the sincerity of the French or fear the increase of their power, most Princes of Europe are of another mind; And whatever comes of it; they are resolved to stand by and protect the Dutch, as long as they are able to protect themselves; so that to conquer Holland All their Allies must be destroyed first: And the French King must needs be Master of the best part of Europe before we can have to our share either the Briel or Flushing. I might Add several other considerations (And perhaps of no less weight than the former) to evidence the fatal consequences of this War. But by reason they do relate to the safety and preservation of our Laws (as well Ecclesiastical as Civil) I forbear, lest it should be thought I go about (or intent in the least) to raise a Jealousy between his Majesty and his people: leaving it wholly to the care and wisdom of the both Houses to provide against it, by those means, and ways as to them shall seem meet and necessary, and as the Importance of the thing itself requireth. III. So far I hope we have made good what we have said in the beginning of this Discourse; That this was an age of wonders, and that of those wonders the greatest was the present Alliance with France, And our prosecuting the War in so dangerous an Association. But since there are no effects so rare or so wonderful, as well in the Civil Government as in the Course of Nature, but have proper Agents to produce them, it is very fit to inquire into the causes of our Mysterious Councils, the better to judge of their true nature. In order to that, It will not be amiss, to look a little abroad and consider whether the Policy of some other Princes, who are engaged in the same Alliance with the French may not be a Leading case for us And help our discovery at home. Those Princes are the Bishop of Munster and the Elector of Collen, And as to the first, All the world knows and we have had a sufficient experience ourselves how far Money will go with him. Nay he is so far honest in this, that he doth think it no shame to own and profess it openly, He is but a Tenant for life, And whatever fills his Coffers, that he takes to be his true interest. The Universal Monarchy doth not entrench upon the Soverainity of either, his Brothers or Nephews, And a considerable and rich Legacy is the only Principality he can leave them; Whilst his present Subjects are destroyed, he hoards up Treasuries for his Family, And let the worst come. Some rich Abbeys in France will bring him more Revenues than his Bishopric, As lately a Northern King did for the like, exchange his Crown, so that the case is clear with him. And if the States would out bid the French, his Highness would soon forget his Old Querrells, and prove the best of their friends. The next is the Elector of Collen, who (to do him right) is a Religious and a worthy Prince, And one who in his own nature, is a great lover of peace: But how could he be persuaded then to make his Country the Seat of War? To give his strong holds to a Foreigner? And to expose his Subjects to all the Calamities, which the inquartering of an Insolent Army doth bring along with it. To this the answer is plain, The Softness of his nature, and the Easiness of his disposition, hath made him devolve upon his Chief Ministers the whole Government of his Dominions, and the absolute direction of his Counsels. His great favourite (another Bishop) is of the same Religion and Principles which that of Munster and the Debonarity of the Master, is no fence against the corruption of the Servant. Quid vultis mihi dare & tradam eum vobis? Nay if the Bishop of Stratsburg (the said Favourite) doth stick at any hard thing, and is at any time somewhat troubled in his mind; for the undoing of so many thousands of Fam lies, and for betraying his Trust so shamefully, he hath his Brother at his Elbow the late Bishop of Ments a sworn Champion for the French, and of whom they used to say in jest (that he was a dear friend to them) ready to comfort them upon all occasions and to spur him on with more fury. Thus if you ask, where the Interest of the Archbishop of Collen lieth in this Alliance with France, And how comes it he will suffer his Country to be laid as waste, as if the Turks had over run it? Let it not be wondered at, The French Pensioners will have it so, And the two Brothers Furstenburgs are paid for it. The Case being thus abroad, I wish our Island might boast of the same happiness as to corrupt Councillors, Which Ireland enjoyeth in their being free from all Venomous Creatures, And that no politic Vipers might be able to breath in our English Air without soon breathing out their lives, But alas! our Chronicles do furnish us with two many Instances of the contrary, And without looking any further back for Precedents his Majesty himself, and this Very Parliament have (not many years since) sufficiently expressed how far they are of opinion, that Great Ministers may betray their trust. On the other side, because some have been guilty, they must not be all indifferently condemned, And we ought to have a great care not to pass a rash Verdict upon Persons whom his Majesty hath irradiated with so many Illustrious beams of his Princely favour. The safest way than not to wrong neither the Cabel nor the Truth, is to take a short survey of the Carriage of the chief Promoters of this War, Leaving the Judgement of either their Innocency or their Gild to the unprejudiced Reader. 1. I will not insist much upon some whispers (come too loud talking of late) of the wonderful effects the French Kings Liberality had (almost four years since in converting the strongest opposers of his Interest, and though there be many odd passages in it which are come to the Knowledge of several considerable members of both houses) yet being not able myself to lay the whole matter open, and having it only at the second hand, I leave the full discovery of it to the party Concerned, who (I am informed upon the least encouragement, and provided he may do it with safety to his Person) will at any time be ready to trace out (in the view and to the satisfaction of the whole world) the first steps towards our undoing, and to show plainly when the foundation of this Mystery of iniquity was laid. 2. But howsoever whether all that is reported of this be true or not, I suppose it is not usual to see so great a familiarity (as hath been observed long since between Foreign Ambassadors and First Ministers of State, Continual treatings and frequent go to Country Houses, there to stay several days, and weeks, is a new thing in the World. And an Ambassadors using so Noble a House with so much freedom, gave a just cause to all observing men to conclude he had paid dear for it. I am sure his Majesty himself was not very well pleased with it at first, Though they have proved pretty successful, in the Art they have used since to reconcile him to their intrigues. 3. We have seen in the first part of this discourse, how far not only his Majesty, but his Great men likewise thought it necessary to keep a true balance between the respective Princes and States of Europe, and to stop the progress of the French. What Steps where first made in order to it, and how the Dutch were Courted into an Alliance with us; jointly to allay the Storms the disturbers of mankind had raised, and Quench their devouring Flames. Nay, we made it appear the Triple League was not entered into, out of a personal kindness to the Spaniards, but only for self preservation, and to prevent the overrunning of Christendom. Whereupon 'tis worth the while to inquire of the same parties, and desire them to inform both Houses, and the rest of the Nation, which way the balance of Europe came to be so much altered; And what hath made the French since the Treaty of Aix 〈◊〉 formidable than before? hath the House of Austria had any new accession of Power? or did the Invasion of Lorain weaken the most Christian King? Can we value ourselves four or five years since, by raising some few Banks against some few French Waves, and now be as proud again of letting in their whole Ocean? The Jeopardy Europe was supposed to be in was (most certainly) infinitely increased, And the same Hannibal is now much nearer our Gates than ever he was, And yet we never thought ourselves so secure; and whilst the Ship of Europe is near sinking, the Cabballe (which is the Measure of their faith) no not apprehend the least danger. Happy men who can so suddenly be transformed into new Creatures! Who would not wish to have a share in your enlightening Graces? But to the matter of fact, by the Treaty of Aix la Chappelle all Princes in Christendom were invited into the garently for the greater security and strengthening of the Agreement then made between Spain and France. Pursuant to this (as we have said before) his Majesty sent a Minister to the Protestant Princes in Germany to invite them into the Garenty of the said Treaty of Aix, or in other words, into the Triple League. And not long after, upon the same Grounds Proposals were made to several other Princes, to draw them into the same League; To which, the Duke of Lorraine (with some other that had promised to come in) being very much inclined, and the thing being brought very near a conclusion, the most Christian King (who by that time was most manfully working under ground to destroy the Triple League, and who dreaded nothing more than a faster trying of that Gordiun knot) to prevent the Association, did very fairly invade Lorraine, and was near taking the Duke himself Prisoner. In this Invasion, there are three or four things that are observable. 1. Besides the scandal of such an unjust oppression, and the indignation it ought to have raised in all Princes, to see a Sovereign Prince thus granted out of his own Dominion; nothing could ever give a greater insight into the Ambitious Designs of France, nor discover more fully their Intentions; none but an Universal Monarch, can pretend to a right of displacing Princes, and disposing both of their lives and of their Territories, and therefore nothing could deserve a higher resentment, nor a more vigorous opposition from those that had appeared so lately the Asserters of the liberty of Europe. 2. This Violance was an open breach of the Pirenean Treaty, and consequently of the Treaty of Aix la Chappelle, which was a renewing and a further confirming of the other. And so far the Triple League was concerned in it. 3. It was destructive to the very end and scope of the said Treaty of Aix, which was to put a stop to the progress of the French, and to the increase of their Power, the Addition of that fair Dukedom, being as considerable, if not more, than their Conquest in the Spanish Netherlands, and with all part of the Spanish Dominions, either blocked up and Besieged by it (as Luxemburg) or cut off from the rest, and all communication taken from them, as the County of Burgundy. 4. The great Zeal which the Duke of Lorraine had expressed to join with the other Princes engaged in the Triple League, was the true cause why he was thus persecuted; though some other unjust and frivolous pretences were used. Upon all these grounds, the Duke of Lorraine was in good hopes the Triple League would protect his innocency, and not forsake Europe by forsaking him. And to quicken them, he sent some of his Servants to the respective Courts of the Parties Engaged. Whereupon our great Men advised his Majesty not to concern himself in the Quarrel, though his own inclinations and love to Justice, led him not to refuse his Assistance to a Prince who had laid upon him many great and high Obligations, and especially in an occasion wherein the Liberty as well as the Honour of Cristendom was so far concerned. But the Ministers it seemeth, carried it against their Master, and the Duke of Lorrains Envoy was sent back with a Compliment, and many expressions of kindness, but told withal, the French Invasion was a Torrent not to be stopped at that time. A Torrent not to be stopped at that time! And what was then the use of the Triple League? what will become of all the fine Speeches made in its Commendation? and was it harder to oblige the French King to return Lorraine, than to force him to restore the French Count, as he was by the Treaty of Aix; in case we had been still true to our interest, and had been swayed by no other consideration? Idem manens idem, semper facit idem. About the same time, whereas we had sent to several Princes to invite them into the Triple League, the Emperor who might as justly have expected the same Compliment, did by a letter to his Majesty invite himself, and in conformity to one of the Articles of the Treaty of Aix desired to be admitted into the Garanty. Upon the receiving of the Letter (his Majesty upon whose goodness some of our great Men had not had time to work yet) assured the Spanish Ambassador (who had delivered the Letter) he was glad his Imperial Majesty was so ready to come into the League, and told him he would cause an Instrument to be prepared in order to the said Admission. But when the resolution was taken, and Orders given for preparing the said Instrument; It was first moved that Mr. Secretary Trevor (who was not initiated in their holy Mysteries) might not have the drawing of it though it was his proper Province, And then having made themselves the sole Masters of the thing, a tolerable and reasonable honest draught was first brought in, but before it was perfected, they acted their part so ingeniously (with the help of Monsieur Colbert) that in the end they possessed his Majesty with the opinion, that the admitting of the Emperor, would be attended with very dangerous consequences; and that in case he came into the League, his Majesty would be engaged in all his Quarrels, and bound to make his Forces March (as the before mentioned Author of the Letter to Sir Thomas Osborne expresses himself) into the farthest part of Germany, as often as it should happen to be Invaded by the Great Turk. The late Secretary Trevor, opposed this as much as he was able, and endeavoured to satisfy his Majesty, that the Garanty of the Triple League, as well as of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, related only to the Agression and other Hostilities from either France or Spain; Propteria (saith the Treaty) by reason of the said Alliance. But the wary cautious men (as well as of the greater number) carried it, And the Emperor's proffer was rejected. Nay, as soon as some of our Semi Gods, had cut the fatal Triple Knot, with the Diamond Sword of their Alexander, the poor now, but formerly vaunted Triple League, was trampled under foot, turned into Ridicule and less valued than a Ballad: His Majesty and they themselves since the Treaty of Aix, had thought it very rational and very necessary withal, to invite other Princes into the said League, or in other words, into the Garanty of the Treaty of Aix: pursuant to the VII. Article of the said Treaty, whereby all Kings, States, and Princes, are invited into it. But as if they remembered neither his Majesties sending of Envoyes to the Princes of Germany, nor the words of the Treaty itself: They tell us now (in the same Printed Letter) That the necessity of inviting all Princes into the Triple League, is a Maxim much in vogue with some who looking very grave, do therefore take it very ill if for that reason, you will not allow them to be infallible: And afterwards because the Triple League is often mentioned, without mentioning the Garanty of Aix, (which is in truth the thing meant by it) to say (saith the Author) we should invite them into the Triple League— That, if you mark, is such a kind of Figure in discourse, as commonly is called a Bull. Fidem vestram, Dij imortales. 4. We have gone yet farther than all this, And the civil applications of the French, and their kind entreaties, did so prevail with us, that loathing the very thoughts of the Triple League, and hating almost any thing that related unto it; we suffered an Agent of ours, one Marsilly, whom we had sent to the Swissers to invite them into the Garanty of Aix (and who was intercepted and taken Prisoner by the French, whilst he was very busy in the execution of what commands he had received not many Months before from our Great-men) to be broken upon the Wheel at Paris, although one single word from us would have saved his life. Neither did we take it ill (such is our good nature) that upon the very Scaffold, twenty Questions were put to him relating to his Majesty's Person. And (in that public and infamous Place) a strict enquiry made into the particulars of what had passed between him and the King of England, for thus was his Majesty often mentioned and named. 5. But to take off somewhat of the wonder and strangeness of our neglecting, and forsaking our Leagued Friends for the most Christian Kings sake, we soon showed as much self-denial in our own concerns and grew civilised to admiration, by our inward converse with the Monsieurs, whereof we'll give only three Instances. The first is that whilst we stormed against the Dutch, for not promoting as for as they were bound, the coming away of some Families that would leave Suranam. we found no fault with the French, their keeping us above four years out of St. Christopher's, No more than with their destroying, in the mean while, that part of the Island which belonged to his Majesty's Subjects. And we would have thought it a rudeness in us, to have pressed too hard on his most Christian Majesty for a speedy or punctual performance of his Articles. Nay if the French Commanders in those parts are to be believed, there was very good understanding in relation to the said Island, between some of our Grandees and the Erench Court, as doth appear by the Narrative my Lord Willoughby delivered to the Council of Plantations, and which is Entered in their Books. The next is, That by any Ordinance of the French Privy Council, (which is now the Statute Law of that Kingdom) all their Sea and Land Officers, and Commanders in the Islands of America being strictly enjoined and required to secure their Master the Sovereignty of those Seas; the said Ordinances having been brought in by a Person of Quality to the Cabinet Council, it was at first to be declaimed against, but soon buried in oblivion, and put up amongst the useless Papers, though the French Pursuant to it, hath since much interrupted our Trade, and have proved infinitely vexatious in so much (as I am credibly informed) that the present Governor of Jamaica hath sent word since his being there) that notwithstanding their old Quarrel with the Spaniards it would be much easier to keep a good Correspondence with them than with the French our dear Allies. And for a last Instance of our more than ordinary civility to the French several Traders in London have prepared a Petition to his Majesty in Council, to complain of the oppression their Factors and Agents lay under in France, with a true state of their Case, and a short account of their grievances, this came to the knowledge of some of our Great Ministers, and they having had the perusal of them before the delivery of it, stopped by their Authority all further prosecution of the matter, and put off the said Merchants with a promise they would acquaint the French Ambassador with their Complaints, and see it should be redressed through his means. How far they have been encouraged in their Trade since that promise, they are best able to judge, but however it was not fit the Nakedness of our dear Friends should be thus exposed to the whole view of the whole Council-Board. And the foregoing particulars are more than sufficient to satisfy any impartial and understanding Reader, how far the French have influenced our Counsels; and withal they give us a great light, and help us much to discern, whether in truth we have broken the Triple League (or at least let it fall, and dissolve of itself) for no other reason, but because we are constrained to fall out with the Dutch, and to defend ourselves against their oppression as the so often cited noble Author would persuade us, or else if it may not be said rather (and upon much better grounds) that because it was not the French Kings Interest the Triple League should subsist, we have therefore resolved to break with the Dutch, Thus to be subservient to the ends of his most Christian Majesty. But by reason this might seem somewhat harsh at first, and be looked upon as too severe a construction of our Great men's intentions, it is necessary to evidence further, how industrious the Caballe have been in their endeavours to make this War just (or to be thought so at least) after they had once resolved to make War. Thus they first made a great noise of infamous Libels, horrid Pictures, Pillars set up and Medals coined; to the infinite dishonour of his Majesty's Person, and of his Royal Dignity, whereas to this day, none of those Libels or Pictures could be produced, And the Pillars had never any being but in the imagination of those who made it their work to raise a Jealousy between the Two Nations, and set Europe in a Flame. It is true there was a Medal Coined which might have been spared; but as soon as it was known in Holland, some exceptions were taken at it, the Stamp was broken in pieces, and withal, all impartial men that have seen it, could not discern any thing in it which could give so much offence, or that looked like an affront intended to his Majesty. Besides this, thinking it very material to have in this, as well as an the late War, if not the clamour, at least the concurrence of the Traders; they sent for several of them, and endeavoured to draw from them some complaints against the Dutch for the strengthening of the Good Cause. Wherein it is very observable, that the Committee of the East India Company, being (amongst others) desired to bring in their Grievances, they answered and gave it under their hands, they knew of no wrong done to them by the Dutch since the Traty at Breda. (or words to that effect) But it seemeth the Compiler of his Majesty's Declaration was better informed, and knew more of the Companies concerns than their Committee. But all this not serving the turn, the difficulties which did arise in the performance of the Conditions of the Surrender of Suranam, must be improved to the height, And even after Secretary Trevor had adjusted the matter with the States, and had received from them the Orders which were agreed upon, Banisters going was retarded, and Sir John trevor's agreement (as if he had not faithfully discharged his trust in it) submitted to the censure of the Counsel of Plantations, where at last the said Banister pleaded so well his own and Secretary Trevor's cause, that with much a do the one was cleared, and the other dispatched away, though with many devices and tricks (too tedious to be inserted here) which (if not prevented) might have made his Voyage altogether unsuccessful: But we must not forget, that, the very men who found so much fault with what Mr. Secretary Trevor had done, were themselves satisfied with much less, before they had hearkened to new Counsels: And were not a little Angry with Colonel Banister for desiring more than the States were willing to grant. What (was it said at that time) do you think we must make War for you: Or that We are bound to procure you whatsoever may be advantageous, to yourself, and to your fellow Planters? Quantum mutatus ab illo. Their next work and (in truth) Great Master Piece, was the sending the Yacht, with Orders to Sail through the Dutch Fleet, and require striking to his Majesty's Flag. And I am so far from justifying or excusing in the least the refusal which the Dutch Admiral made to pay what respect was due to the English Colours, that the States themselves do not own it, and are ready to enter into any new Engagement for preventing the like for the future. But there are several circumstances in it which are worthy of Observation: as, That the Dutch Fleet was then at Anchor not far from their own Coast, and in a Station which by many Geographers is accounted no part of the British Seas. 2. That the Dutch were out at that time in pursuance of the Triple League, and to be ready upon occasion to relieve the Spanish Nether Lands which were threatened by the French, who were then in March with a considerable Army, and came as far as Dunkirk, which one would think was a very unfit time to send out on purpose to pick a Quarrel with them: And the rather because we had promised the Dutch to set out a Fleet as well as they, to join with theirs, for the common safety. 3. That the Pensionaire De Wit who Governed Holland at that time with a more than Ministerial Authority, took a pride in standing in punctillioes in all things relating to England, which maketh the Common Wealth itself to be less guilty of any disrespect shown, either to his Majesty, or to the Nation, through the haughtiness and private animosity of their Minister. And truly I must needs say, that of all the things that are laid to the said De Wits charge, there is hardly any which would make me apt to believe there was a Private understanding between the French and Him, than his carriage in this business, and his demurring so long upon the satisfaction, which the greatest part of the States were willing to give to England, whilst he knew full well, that it was a Quarrel sought by our Ministers, who wanted some popular pretence to make War, and keep their word to the French King. 4. That we stayed several months before we demanded satisfaction, lest if we had demanded it too early, it had been granted us too soon. 5. That when Sir George Downing was sent over, he was bound by his Instructions not to accept of any satisfaction from the Dutch after a certain number of days which were prescribed to him, which is a very irregular and unusual of proceeding in Embassyes, and much less practicable in Holland than any where else, It being impossible to have the resolutions of their Towns, and afterwards of their Provinces without a considerable time. 6. That this was made so much the more difficult by our demanding not only the usual striking, which (though ever practised and due to England) was first Nationally agreed upon, in 1654. and confirmed by the two Treaties with his Majesty in 1662. and 1667. But also a new kind of acknowledgement of the Sovereignty of the Seas, which is not mentioned in the said Treaties. So that by joining them both in A memorial, if the Dutch did demur upon the second and so delayed the Granting of the first, it was a ready way for us to clamour and possess the whole Nation, the Dutch had broken their Treaty and refused to Strike to the English Flagg. 7. That after the Dutch had given their answer to the said Sir George downing's Memorials, he refused to receive it, and came away without it, against a second Order he had received under his Majesties own hand, for which also he was Committed to the Tower. But not to wrong the Gentleman, we must also own, that though he had a positive and latter Command from his Master, which did so far rescind his Instructions, yet his friends have whispered in his behalf for his Justification, that he had received at the same time Letters from some of our Great Ministers, who conjured him as he tendered his own good to follow his Instructions and keep close to them. 8. Lastly it is very observable that the Dutch having sent an Express, the Answer, Sir George Downing would not receive, we first replied it was dark obscure and insufficient. Upon which they sent an Extraordinary Ambassador who jointly with the Leaguer Ambassador told our Ministers, that his Master's intentions and desire to give his Majesty all possible satisfaction in the business of the Flagg, they both Ordered and Empowered him, to clear what might be obscure or dark in their Answer, and supply what was insufficient, and therefore desired them to instance in what they did not approve of, or did think amiss, or else that they would be pleased to draw up themselves after their own Method and way what Article they thought necessary for the preventing of the like inconvenience. They Answered, the States with their Ministers knew best how to Frame and Word their own Answers, neither could it be expected they should draw up papers for them. Whereupon the Dutch Ambassadors brought them a Project of an Article to be agreed upon concerning the Flagg, and asked them whether it was Worded to their mind, and if that would satisfy them. To which they gravely answered, that when they had signed and delivered it they would tell them their mind concerning it. And the Ambassadors refusing still to design it, unless they knew before hand it was Satisfactory, their conference thus broke off, yet upon second thoughts, the Ambassadors having resolved to sign the said Paper, and to deliver it at a venture, they demanded a New Conference, which was promised them, and Seven of the Clock at night appointed, on the Sunday after the Engagement with the Smyrna Fleet. But on the very same day lest the Dutch might comply further with us than we desired, our Grandees did prevail with his Majesty to call extraordinarily a Counsel and to have without further delay the Declaration of War, read and approved. So that when the Ambassadors came at their appointed time, with their Paper ready signed, they were told in short they came too late. 7. I might Add as many and as considerable instances of what Arts and Policy our great Men have used to deceive his Majesty; And to bring him by degrees into a liking of their War. But this matter being so ticklish and nice, That I fear I should not be able to go through with it (although I took never so much care) without exposing myself to the censure of the World, and having either my intention or some of my expressions misconstrued. I think it much safer and more prudent to draw a Curtain over that part of the Ministry of the Cabal, and leave their Reputation so far untouched, since they have had the fill to wove it (as it were) in more than one place into that of their Master. 8. For a farther clearing of this, and to satisfy ourselves, as far as we are able, whether the Construction we do seem to make of the Carriage and Designs of the Cabal, be not to partial. It will not be amiss if we endeavour to discover what their own Opinion was of it at first, and how far they were persuaded themselves, their New Counsels were agreeable to the true Interest of England, which will best appear by the two following particulars. The first is, Their great care of not trusting with their Mysterious Intrigues, persons, whose either quality natural Courage, Honesty, or Experience, made them suspect they would be either too inquisitive, before they would join and concur with them, or else too resty and froward, if they chanced to be of another mind. And upon these fair and honest Grounds, they reform their Cabinet Counsel; and turned at once out of the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Prince Rupert, the Duke of Ormond, the Lord Keeper, and the late Secretary Trevor: This being the first Secretary of State that was ever kept out of a Commission of that Importance. Not to mention several other eminent and considerable Privy Counsellors, who till then had been Commissioners in all Negotiations and Treaties with France. Now in case the Cabal had no Designs but what were for the Honour and the Safety of the Nation, why they should so industriously to conceal it from persons that have deserved so well both from his Majesty, and from the whole Kingdom, is what passeth my poor understanding: and whoever is able to unriddle this, Erit mihi magnous Apollo. But if this be convincing Argument, The next I hope will be somewhat plainer; And both Houses are best able to judge, whether their sitting was so dangerous: or how faithful those Counsellors must be who could advise his Majesty to Prorogue so often upon the French Kings desire; A Parliament whose Loyalty and Zeal for their Sovereign, is not to be matched in no former Age. We do not hear that either the Cecils or Walsingham ever advised the Queen their Mistress not to call her great Counsel, or suffer them to meet, when she was preparing to assist the Protestants in France, or to Protect the United Provinces against Philip the Second. King James had no reason to fear his Parliament, who if they came together, would not oppose the assistance of the Palsgrave. And his Majesty now Reigning, hath in the former War against the very same Enemies, had a sufficient experience of the readiness of both Houses, to promote as far as they are able, any design which they conceived may tend to the honour and safety of his Government, and the prosperity of the Kingdom. Why then should our Great men obstruct the cheerful Compliance of his Majesty's faithful Subjects. 3. Why not to call upon those whose Assistance was so necessary, and who never denied it when demanded? Let us not condemn them before we have all. Parliaments (I speak it with due Reverence) are now and then Peevish things that will not be satisfied with fair Words, and pry too far into Secrets that are not to come to public view. Our Grandees were afraid, if so many clearsighted men came together; some one or other would spy out the Snake that lay in the Grass, and if their mine had once taken vent, the whole Design had miscarried. No, no, we'll do better (saith the Cabal) we'll be wiser than to run that hazard; we are resolved to make War, and will not be crossed in it by any Parliamentary Clamours. If for want of a Parliament, we can have no English Subsidies, we'll make a shift with French Supplies: And if that doth not serve the turn (observe the Gradation,) we'll shut up the Exchequer. In the mean while the Smyrna and East India Fleets, will fall into our hands: And when we have all that Treasure; who shall dare to find fault with us? Having brought the Cabal thus far, we must before we part, wait once more on some of them as far as Holland, and so take our leave of them. We have already given some account in the first Part of this Discourse, of the new Agreement entered into with the French King, by our Plenipotentiaries, and demonstrated the fatal consequences of the same, what followeth will clear it farther. The wonderful Progress of the French having surprised and frighted all Europe; Our Court (who knew what slender provision was made for England in that Conquest) was little less Alarmed than the rest: And our Grand Ministers were dispatched in Post haste, both to the Dutch and to the French, their greatest fear, when they went, being left they should come too late, and find the whole Country under the French Subjection. After their Arrival in the Hague, they begun their first Compliments to the States Commissioners, that were sent to wait upon them with all the Expressions imaginable, both of kindness to Holland, and of concernmant and trouble to see the French so far advanced. There they received an account of Monsieur de Groots Negociation, and of the great care the French took of his Majesty; which raised such an Indignation in them, that nothing would serve their turn, but destroying out of hand, or at least Mastering the French Fleet. And from thence removing to the Prince of Orange his Camp; they renewed their kind Protestations: Assured his Highness, That his Majesty's intention had never been to give way to the Conquest of the United Provinces: The most Christian King himself, having often times declared he only intended to humble their Commonwealth, neither was it fit to suffer the French should go on at that rate. In the end they took upon them, and engaged to do their utmost to bring the French Court to be Satisfied with Maestricht, and the right of keeping Garrisons in the Towns upon the Rhyne, that belong to the Electors of Brandenburg and Collen. And that in Case the French refused to accept of those terms, they would then take new measures with the States, and consider jointly of the best ways, to prevent the destruction of their Common wealth, as well as the dangerous increase of the French. With these fair promises and friendly assurances, they proceeded on their Journey to his most Christian Majesty, who was some few hours riding from thence; having behind them an infinite satisfaction in the minds of all Persons, with great expectation of a happy Change, through their zealous interposition. But what may not the Royal Eloquence of a most Christian King do? What, will not his Golden Word persuade, after our Grand Ministers had been some few days in the French Army, they found they were not mistaken before, and began to have a clearer apprehension of things. The Negotiation of De Groote, with the particulars imparted to them at the Hague, was a mere slander; for so the French Court told them. The increase of the French Power was not to be suspected or feared; they were too generous to abuse it. And therefore after they had left the Prince of Orange, three or four days without News from them, they at last sent him word, The States were to give satisfaction to both Kings jointly: And that neither Crown could or would treat separately. This unexpected Message did infinitely surprise as well the Prince of Orange, as the States. And his Highness (who had full power given him by the States to Treat and conclude with England) not to be held longer in suspense answered the Pl nipotentiaries, he desired to know what would satisfy both Crowns, and what their respective demands were? Whereupon they sent him the joint Proposals before mentioned, together with a Copy of the new agreement they were entered into; concerning which we'll add only to what hath already been said, these following Queries: 1. Whether they were sent only to promote the French Conquest; and if not how they could think it advisable, by making the Peace impossible, to force the Dutch (as far as in them lay to cast themselves into the Arms of the French King, and submit themselves to his Domination? 2. Whether they can deny they knew the joint Proposals tendered to the Dutch should not be granted, since the French demands alone had been unanimously rejected, and in that case, how agreeable it was to the Interest of England to make it impossible for the Dutch to give his Majesty any satisfaction. 3. Whether, they had not received, as well from the Prince of Orange as from the States Commissi ners, all possible Assurances of the infinite desire they had to see his Majesty return to his former Amity with them, and of their readiness to purchase it, at any rate, that the Condition they were in would bear? If so how faithfully the Plenipotentiaries, discharged their trust in neglecting those proffers, and entering into a New Engagement, which was so Prejudicial to England as we have made it appear? 4. How far those that were joined in Commission with them did concur with them in their Judgement, and whether all those considerations, with man other, were not represented to them; And urged by some who had no other end, but to serve their Master faithfully? 5. Whether or no it was for that Reason, they opposed so fiercely, My Lord Viscount Hallifax (who came a day or two after them) his appearing and acting jointly with them, though Commissionated in as full and as ample manner as themselves. 6. Who were those (after my Lord Hallifax could be kept out no longer) who went privately to the French Camp under several pretences, and had still Negotiations of their own on foot? 7. Whether they had Order to call the French King, the King of France, and to name him still before his Master, as well as to set in the first place the French demands before those of their Majesty; As all this was done in the Copies of the Agreement they had made, and of both King's pretensions which they sent together to the Prince of Orange by Sir Gabriel Silvius: And to which we may appeal if the truth of this be doubted? 8. And Lastly, how far their Instructions will justify their standing in the behalf of the French, upon a Public Exercise of the Roman Catholic Religion in the United Provinces, the Churches to be divided, and the Romish Priests maintained out of the Public Revenue? As is set down more at large in the second Head of the French Demands? Having thus in all uprightness of heart stated as clearly as I am able the present Grand case of the Nation, wherein I may truly say before God and his Angels, I have Averred no one thing without Good Vouchers, (and such respectively) as the nature of the thing doth bear, I'll end with a few Summary Hints of what we have discoursed at Large, and laying in all Humility both myself and these reflections, as well at his Majesties as at his Great Councils Feet, I beg of them to take into their Serious considerations. 1. The Natural solid Greatness of the French Monarchy. 2. Their Ambitious and aspiring thoughts in all ages with the consequences of the same. 3. The great Increase of their power under their Present King, both by Sea and Land. 4. How far it was, not long since, thought fit to stop their Progress; And what steps were made in Order to it, as well as the zeal, with which it was carried on. 5. The carriage of the present French Court, and how they have dealt with most Princes of Europe. 6. How kindly they have used both his Majesty in particular, and the whole Nation. 7. How true they have been to their word, and to their reiterated promises and other Engagements. 8. How faithfully they have performed Articles hitherto. And what security we have, they shall be still ready to do worse. 9 The necessity of keeping a true Balance between the European Princes. 10. How dangerous it is to alter that Balance, when once settled on a solid Basis. 11. The dreadful consequences of the Conquest of the United Provinces by the French. 12. The unpossiblity of our Conquering them. 13. The Impracticableness or Disproportion of the supposed sharing and Division of their Country, with the little advantage and benefit which at the best would accrue to us. 14. How prejudicial and hurtful, would to the contrary, any possibility and practicable sharing prove, the same being in truth no other than an absolute French Conquest in a disguise. 15. How destructive the present War must needs be in the end, in Case the Dutch shall be enabled by the assistance of their Allies, to recover what they have lost, and to come out with as considerable a Fleet as ours. 16. How considerable these Allies are, and how much Christian Blood will be shed by our wilful adhering to the French. 17. How unavoidable a breach with Spain will be, in case we persist in our Alliance with France. 18. And how fatal the consequence of a Spanish War. 19 How much greater the danger will prove if the French be able to conquer as well Germany and Spain as the United Provinces, and that no Confederacy of Princes, how great and how powerful soever be a sufficient Balance to their Forces. 20. And lastly, How faithful our Ministers have dischrged their Trust in these great Emergences. How free they have been from dependences upon Foreign Courts. How far they have been Jealous of their reputation in that particular. What great care they have had of keeping up the Credit and the Reputation of the Triple League, and of their own Masters with it. Their Backwardness (not to say worse) in redressing, or at declaring against all the wrongs done by the French, as well to his Majesty himself as to his Subjects. Their industrious endeavours and various Stratagems to engage his Majesty, and the Nation in this War, their Engrossing all business of concernment, and concealing the most Important debates and resolutions from his Majesty's Privy Council. Nay their keeping it unseasonably from his great Council, and putting off their Sessions lest they might cross their designs. Lastly, the carriage of some of them in Holland, and of the care they took of the Interest both of England and of the Protestant Religion. Now I call Heaven and Earth to record this day that I have set before you Life and Death, Blessing and Cursing; Therefore choose Life, that both you and your Seed may Live. FINIS.