Imprimatur.  
May 16. 1693.  
Gul. Lancaster.   

A DISCOURSE Concerning the Nature of MAN BOTH IN HIS Natural and Political Capacity: Both as he is A Rational Creature, AND Member of a Civil Society.  
With an Examination of some of Mr. Hobbs'sOpinions relating hereunto.  
By JA. LOUD, Rector of Settington in Yorkshire, sometime Fellow of Clare-hall in Cambridge.  
LONDON, Printed by T. Warren, for Walter Kettilby at the Bishop's-head in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1694.   

 
TO THE Most Reverend Father in GOD, JOHN, By Divine Providence, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, Primate of all ENGLAND, and Metropolitan, AND One of Their Majesty's Most Honourable Privy-Council; THIS TREATISE, With all Duty and Gratitude, Is most Humbly Dedicated by His GRACE's Most Obedient, Faithful, and Obliged Servant, ja. Loud.   

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.  
NOtwithstanding the many, tho' undeserved Reproaches cast upon Mankind, as if Man by Nature was a very Wolf or Tiger; yet I shall at present so far presume upon the falseness of these Scandals (hoping hereafter to prove that they really are so) as freely to expose this small Treatise to thy more favourable reception. I would willingly suppose thee, and the rest of Mankind, as good and gentle as possibly I could, so far as with Truth and Prudence I might do it; yet I do not here go about to flatter thee into good nature, or to impose upon thy judgement, by bespeaking thy Affections.  
'Tis true indeed, if we consult the present state of Affairs, if we look into ourselves at home, or consider the Practices of the World abroad, we shall not find such an universal Love and Benignity to prevail therein, as the Poets describe in their Golden Age, or such as we might certainly have experienced, had Man continued in Innocence. But then, to assert Humane Nature in general, as the great Patroness of all Vice and Villainy, because 'tis now fallen from its original perfection, and adulterated with some vicious mixtures, is just as if we should say, that there is no Gold in the mass of Ore, because mixed with greater quantity of Dross or Sand. That which I here design, in reference to Humane Nature, is Likeness, rather than Curiosity: So that I must not so far favour thee, as to represent thee without any Deformity or Imperfection; nor yet be so injurious, as to draw both Mankind in general, and thee in particular, so much like Devils, as some have gone about to do.  
I shall not here make any Apology for the publication of these few Papers, nor trouble thee with those many pretended Reasons, the commonness whereof makes ●●m suspected, even then, when perhaps they may be real: If upon thy perusal thou canst find any tolerable ground of excuse for me, it will be more proper for thee to make, than for me to plead in my own defence. And thus to thy own Candour I submit'em; nor do they go about to enter into compacts for their own security; nor are they so solicitous about their own preservation, as to desire any one common Reader to transfer his Right of judging and condemning too, if he so think fit.  
As for those learned persons, from whom I differ in some particulars, I know that nothing, unless it be their Learning, is greater than their Candour and Ingenuity; therefore, I hope, they will not attribute this my freedom of declaring my own sentiments, to any spirit of contradiction, or to any pleasure I take in opposing theirs: But there can be no greater Friend to Truth and the Commonwealth of Learning than he, who with calmness and unconcernedness, far from Passion and Personal Reflection, seriously debates things of this nature: And though I may err in my Opinions, or mistake in my Reasonings, yet I will not be confident in 'em; so that I shall still reserve a fair opportunity of changing my Mind, when either by any kind notice from others, or by my own maturer thoughts, I shall be better informed: However, I do not pretend to set up for singularity; if I do err, I err with very good company.  
The Argument here handled has already been variously treated of by learned men, yet the Subject seems not so wholly exhausted, but that others yet may, with profit both to themselves and others, employ their Meditations hereupon.  
The knowledge of ourselves, and of Human Nature, was always counted a good Foundation both of Piety towards God, and of justice and Charity towards Men; and 'tis probable, that a great many of the Errors that have crept into Religion itself, have been occasioned by the want either of the true knowledge, or due consideration of our Natures, as rational, and of the Duties and Obligations that lie upon us therefrom; for the Scripture doth every where exhort us to the practice of Moral Duties, but doth not go about to explain the natures of 'em, as supposing that sufficiently known to us already.  
There is nothing of greater force, even if possible to patronise Vice and Error, than those powerful Names of Nature and Reason; thus those that have gone about to disparage the one and oppose the other, have yet done it under the plausible pretences of advancing both. Thus the soics, whose Tenants were the most contrary to Human Nature, rightly understood, yet did they prevail above, and grow more numerous than any other Sect, and that probably for no other reason than that of their constant boasting of living 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, according to Nature. Thus the Atheists of our Age oppose Reason to Religion, and think they may justly reject the one, seeing they are such devout Proselytes, or at least such great Pretenders to the other. So that there seems to be nothing, wherein all sorts of men, tho' otherwise differing both in Principles and Practices, do more agree than in this, That there is a certain due Respect owing to the Dictates of Nature and Reason. Of what great concernment therefore is it, rightly to understand both these, lest the Devil and his Instruments make use of those very Faculties, which GOD implanted in Man, on purpose to promote the Designs of Virtue and Piety, to the carrying on his own base Ends of Vice and Error.  
Thus we may be sure there is some falsity in the Citation, or some Malice in the Design, when the Devil quotes Scripture: And the like may be said, that some fallacy is in the Argument, when Reason and Nature are made use of to patronise Vice and Error.  
My Design then here is, to vindicate the Honour and Innocence of those great and worthy Names, Nature and Reason, from the bad usage they meet withal, when challenged by those unjust Pretenders.  
The nature of the Subject will necessarily engage me in the examination of some of Mr. Hobbs' Opinions, which I shall do with as much fairness and impartiality as possibly I can. He has indeed made several ingenious Observations upon Human Nature in general, but that wherein he seems very often to fail, is, either that he doth not carefully avoid those Faults himself, which he hath justly blamed in others, or that he sometimes draws universal conclusions only from particular observations; and sometimes from the mere Fact he infers the jus of a thing; and from the more general practice of most men, he goes about to justify that which is not in itself lawful.  
'Tis the Observation of a learned man, that a flight and superficial study of Nature and Natural Causes, may incline a man to Atheism; but a full and perfect understanding of 'em fixes him more firmly in the Principles of Religion and Piety. Thus 'tis probable that it was only Mr. Hobbs' superficial observation of Human Nature that betrayed him into those mistakes and false notions of it; if he had, by a profounder study and impartial search, enquired into the inward recesses of it, he would then have found Man not altogether so void of all natural Principles of Virtue and Goodness, as he has represented him.  
His political Principles seem to be founded upon no better or surer grounds than the observation of the vicious Inclinations of some, and the prudent and cautious Practices of others, because some men are violent and injurious, and make no conscience of doing Wrong; others are wary, and accordingly arm themselves, as much as they can, against the receiving of any: From hence he would infer the State of Nature to be a State of War, and all the evil and false consequences that follow thence.  
So that the approbation that his Principles have met withal in the World, was the result of men's vicious Inclinations, and natural proneness to believe such Opinions, rather than any solid Ground or Reason, on which they were founded.  
It might perhaps be some mitigation of his fault herein, if by supposing men worse than they were, he hereby laid the Foundation of Humility and Amendment: But it has been well observed of him, that he supposed Men worse than they are, and made 'em worse than otherwise they would be, thus making 'em more the Children of Wrath, than they were by Nature.  
Mr. Hobbs has well observed, That Arguments seldom work upon Men of Wit and Learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary Opinion; and that, if any thing will do it, it is the showing them the Causes of their Errors. I shall accordingly here intimate some few things in general, and leave them to thy own consideration, whether they might not be some ways influential, either as Causes or Occasions of his Mistakes.  
And first, Has he not digged for Principles out of his own Fancy, without consulting the universal Consent of Mankind, or the more constant received Opinions of the best and wisest both Moralists and Politicians? For the true knowledge of Human Nature doth not consist only in the searching of ourselves, but it also requires a full and perfect understanding both of Men and Books. Thus we ought to consider what the best and wisest Men of all Ages have left upon Record concerning their apprehensions of it, and by our own Observations both of ourselves and others, either more fully confirm, or prudently correct, what they have delivered. And though, 'tis true, there may be, as it were, a mechanical use of Books, an enslaving a Man's Reason to his Reading, without a due examination or just digestion of what we read, into our own Reason and judgement; yet there are some who have fallen into Mistakes, by being more conversant with their own Meditations, than with other men's Writings: Or, if he hath been a great consulter of Authors, yet doth he not seem rather afferre quam auferre sensum, doth he not come to 'em with Prejudice, and with a Resolution rather to elude, than fully to answer their Reasons? How doth he sometimes seem to march boldly into his Enemy's Country, and leave their greatest strength behind him, never regarding to answer the Reasons upon which the contrary Opinion is founded? Doth he not seem also to suit his Principles to the Times wherein he writ, rather than to the Truth of things, yet always in obedience to, and pursuance of his own grand Principle os Self-preservation? Seems he not sometimes to affect Novelty more than Truth, being perhaps more desirous to be the Author of a New Error, than the Asserter of an Old Truth?  
In his Introduction to the Leviathan, he tells us, That there is a Saying much usurped of late, That Wisdom is acquired not by reading Books, but Men; consequently here upon those persons that for the most part can give no other Proof of being Wise, take great delight to show what they think they have read in Man, by uncharitable Censures behind their Backs. But doth not he himself here lie under his own lash? Doth he not seem to please himself in uncharitable censuring of what he thinks (but without just grounds) he hath read, not only in Particular Persons, but in Human Nature in general? Here we may observe how, like the troublesome Fly, he is always busy about the Sores of Human Nature; not with an intent to cure 'em, but to make 'em worse. How much more worthy of a Man, a Philosopher and a Christian too, was M. Antoninus' Advice, lib. 6. Whensoever thou wouldst rejoice thyself, call to mind the several Gifts and Virtues of those whom thou dost daily converse with, viz. the Industry of one, the Modesty of another, the Liberality of a third, etc. for nothing can so much rejoice thee, as the Resemblances and Parallels of several Virtues eminent in those that live with thee, etc.  
Here we may also observe the many Straits and Difficulties he is sometimes put to in defending his Opinions, what inconsistency of Notions and Expressions he is forced to use in making out his Assertions, or answering the Objections that are brought against 'em; so that sometimes his Notions seem to lie across his Brains, as the Cudgels of his natural Statesmen did to each others Heads. Thus, when 'tis objected, That if a Son kill the Father in the state of Nature, he doth him an injury; he answers, That we cannot at any time suppose a Son in the state of Nature, as being under the power and command of those to whom he owes his Protection, as soon as he was born. But seeing we cannot suppose the propagation of Mankind any other way, than by Father and Son, and that there is a natural obligation incumbent on a Son to his Father, may we not with more reason say, That there never was, nor could be, such a state of Nature as he describes, rather than that therein there can be no Son supposed? 2. Tho' Sons be under the power and command of those to whom, under God, they owe their Being's and Preservations, doth this take away their Obligations, as Sons? Do they therefore cease to be Sons, because now they are also become Subjects? This way of reasoning cannot hold good, unless we supposed Men in the state of Nature to spring out of the Earth, like Mushrooms.  
That which at present I would only infer from hence, is a great presumption, at least, of the falseness of such Principles, seeing Truth always lies so plain and easy, especially in things of this nature, so consistent with our natural Apprehensions, and with all other Truths, both natural and revealed, that it stands not in need of such perplexed ways and methods for its own defence.  
Nor is Mr. Hobbs the only man that hath made false representations of Human Nature; there are also some foreign Philosophers, who have been very obnoxious in this Particular. Cuperus, in his Arcana Atheismi, 9 & 10. cb. 2. lib. denies all Natural Knowledge of God, and all Natural Difference betwixt Good and Evil: And in his Proem, p. 2, 3. he makes Natural Reason to be ratiocinatio ex innatis homini affectibus & passionibus legitimè deducta: And this farther account he gives of these Affections, p. 3. Affectus & passiones jesu Christi mandatis contrarias, sive quae nos ad ea, quae ipse prohibuit, sectanda stimulant, per se & suâ naturâ non esse malas, nec expeccato originali maláve consuetudine ortas existimo. These seem but bad Principles for Human Nature to proceed upon: And as for right Reason, Rectam & sanam rationem appello ratiocinationes ex claris & apud neminem controversis sacrae Scripturae sensibus, vel ex expressis verbis in scripturâ contentis vel per legitimam consequentiam elicitas. This indeed is true, but right Reason, in the just and full nature of it, is of larger extent than arguing merely from Scripture. And P. Poiret, in his Cogit. ration. de Deo, lib. 3. cap. 10. makes all the Reasons of Truth and Goodness to depend wholly upon the Divine Decree; and that nothing is in itself either good or evil, but only as God has been pleased to make it so, and might also, if He had so pleased, have made it quite otherwise. These I shall make some short Reflections upon, and leave the fuller examination thereof to some abler Pen.  
I have not had recourse to Scripture, to prove my Assertions, because my design here is to speak of Man, as guided rather by Reason than Revelation; and because those I have here to deal with, do more especially appeal thereto: Yet here I cannot but take notice of the strange Humour of some men, who reject some things for those very Reasons, for which they ought to receive 'em: thus, when they are urged with Scripture, they look upon that only as something that would impose upon their Understanding, and oblige 'em to a blind Obedience, as if it designed only to erect an arbitrary government over the Minds of Men, without giving any reason of its Commands. But though they will not give these Writings the credit and authority justly due to 'em, upon account of their divine Revelation, yet it would be unreasonable to reject 'em, and the things therein contained, before they have enquired into the Reasons, and credibility of 'em; which if they vouchsafe to do, I doubt not but, as our Saviour said in another case, If ye believe not me, yet believe my Works: So here, tho' they believe not the Scriptures for their authority, yet they will at least be convinced by the Reason contained in 'em. Thus a learned Prelate of our Church; Tho' sacred Authors have little authority with Atheists, speaking as mere Witnesses, yet when their Testimony is attended also with the highest Reason, those Reasons must be acknowledged and answered, though the Author be rejected. Nor do I here insist much upon the authorities even of Heathen Authors, being willing so far to comply with the Humours of some of the present Age, as only to appeal to men's unprejudiced Reasons, whether what is here humbly proposed to consideration be true or no; for, if what is writ by any one be not in itself reasonable, I know no authorities great enough to make it so: Only, if any think that the concurrent Testimonies of such Authors may add any strength to the things here handled, I doubt not, but they, who have been but moderately conversant in those Writers, may easily furnish themselves with such authorities from their own reading and observation.  
I shall here advertise the Reader one thing further, That whereas I have frequent occasion of making use of these words, Vice and Virtue, I there take 'em according to the acceptation of our old English Dictionaries, and in the sense wherein the ancient moral Philosophers formerly took 'em, that is, to signify much what the same thing with Good and Evil, Sin and Duty, as supposing 'em founded upon something more sixth and certain than the Custom of Countries, or the Mode and Fashion of those with whom we do converse.  
I should have counted this a needless Advertisement, but that I find the ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding, p. 158, 159, etc. telling us, That the measure of what is every where called and esteemed Virtue and Vice, is his Approbation or Dislike, Praise or Blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several Societies, Tribes and Clubs of Men in the World; so that Virtue is every where that which is thought praiseworthy; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem, is Virtue. And here he quotes Cicero, Tusc. lib. 2. Nihil habet natura praestantius, quam honestatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus: Which he says, are all Names for the same thing. But here we may observe, that he puts Honesty in the first place, then Praise, viz. such as is consequent hereupon; quam dignitatem, that is, that Dignity of Nature, which is the greatest Ornament of a Man. The same Author of that Essay hath much better explained the sense of the old Heathen Philosophers upon this Subject, p. 17. If one of those had been asked, (here, I suppose, the Question should not have been propounded, as before, Why a Man must keep his word; but rather thus, why a Man should not break his word) he would have answered, because it was dishonest, below the Dignity of a Man, and opposite to Virtue, the highest perfection of Human Nature.  
By the Dignity of a Man, I suppose, was here meant the same that Tully meant by his, that is, the Dignity of Human Nature, considered in itself, not with respect to the accidentally good or bad Opinion that Men might entertain of it. But he further tells us, p. 159. That the Exhortations of inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common Repute. Whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, etc. Phil. 4. 8. But the Apostle doth not here appeal to common Repute absolutely, but with a certain restriction and limitation, that Men do not confound the notions of Good and Evil, whatever things are of good report, with this Proviso, that there be any Virtue, or any such Praise as is virtutis comes, than we are to think on 'em.  
But then he says, That since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with Esteem and Reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary; 'tis no wonder, that Esteem and Discredit, Virtue and Vice, should in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, etc. But then suppose Men should so far mistake themselves, as to place their Commondation or Blame on that side that really deserves it not, (and such a thing may possibly sometimes happen) would this alter the nature of things, and make Vice Virtue, and Virtue Vice?  
Lastly, Tho' thou dost not find in these Papers that profoundness of Thought, that depth of Reasoning, that may be elsewhere met withal; yet, I hope, what is here offered is free and natural, easy and obvious, and therefore probably not less true, but more useful; for I never looked upon Intricacy and Obscurity either as any certain sign of Truth, or any ways to promote the Benefit and Advantage of the Reader.   

Contents of the Chapters.  

CHAP. I.  
THE Excellency of the Knowledge of a man's self briefly intimated; Mr. Hobbs' Interpretation of Nosce Teipsum examined and confuted. The Knowledge of ourselves in six particulars; the possibility of this Knowledge; the certainty of it; hereby we come to the knowledge, 1. of the Being of God; 2. of the Nature of God; 3. of the Worship of God.   

CHAP. II. Of Man, as compounded of Soul and Body.  
A Physical Account of Man, not here intended. The Question stated betwixt the Stoics and Epicureans. Pride and Ignorance of the true state of Human Nature justly chargeable upon the Stoics; the Epicureans ascribe too much to the Body; Epicurean Tranquillity of Mind not true Peace of Conscience: how far Epicurus chargeable with Atheism: Virtue, according to him, founded upon very uncertain grounds: Happiness, according to him, impossible: Enthusiasts among Christians resemble the Stoics among the Heathens: some short Reflections upon the first and second Chapt. of Tractatus Theol. Posit. concerning Prophets and Prophecy.   

CHAP. III. Of Natural Notions of Truth and Goodness.  
Natural Inscription and Divine Revelation, the two great means of preserving Truth among all the Disadvantages it labours under: Dr. Parker the late Bishop of Oxford's Opinion, concerning Experimental Observation examined and confuted: Our Faculties not false: Des Cartes' opinion concerning Eternal Truths examined: Dr. Cumberland, the present learned Bishop of Peterborough, no direct Enemy to Natural Notions; some Remarks upon his opinion herein: Some short Reflections upon the Ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding: Mr. Norris' opinion examined: That opinion that distinguisheth betwixt the Ideas of the Understanding and the Phantasms of Sense and Imagination, seems no ways to favour Enthusiasm: Some Remarks upon P. Poiret's Cogitationes Rational. de Dco, and upon Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi; the one asserting, That there is nothing good or evil antecedent to the Divine Placitum; the other, that it doth not appear by the light of Nature, that there is any difference betwixt Vice and Virtue.   

CHAP. IU. Of the Being of GOD.  
How an Atheist ought in Prudence to demean himself, seeing he cannot be positively certain, that there is no God: the belief of a God antecedent to all Atheism: not first invented by Statesmen: the two great Arguments to prove the Being of God, the Constitution of the Universe, and the general Consent of Nations: The production of Mankind not the result of blind Chance: No Reason why the Christian Philosopher should willingly give up that Argument drawn from the Consent of Nations: Unseasonable Differences among ourselves, in the choice of our Arguments to prove the Divine Existence, so preferring one, as to invalidate the force of all the rest: Cuperus' opinion herein examined.   

CHAP. V. The state of Nature neither a state of Equality, nor a state of War.  
A fault in Mr. Hobbs, in not first settling the significations of those words Nature, Naturally, and by Nature: His Arguments to prove the equality of Men frivolous and insufficient; those to prove the state of Nature a state of War, the same: Man a sociable Creature by Nature, not only by Education: Me. Hobbs' Principles of Politics a mere Hypothesis; and not a good one neither, as wanting the necessary Qualifications of such a one: Of Self-preservation.   

CHAP. VI Religion the best Foundation of Civil Government.  
The nature of Religion in general, in reference to Government: Two Considerations to prove the consistency of the one with the other: The divine original of Civil Power: Grotius' Opinion examined: Dr. Donn's Opinion of the original of Civil Power asserted: Dominion not founded in Grace: not the Honour or Interest of a Prince to be wicked; against Machiavil: some of his Arguments answered: Christianity doth not depress or effeminate men's Spirits.   

CHAP. VII. Of Moral Virtue.  
Virtue in general natural and essential to Man in Innocence: Moral Virtue distinguished from original Righteousness and Evangelical Holiness; founded in Nature, not by inspiration from God: Plato's Opinion herein examined: natural and original Excellencies of Human Nature, in respect of the Soul: the adventitious Dignities thereof, such as are conferred upon it by Divine Benignity: their Reasons briesly intimated, who would willingly grant a possibility of some Heathens being saved.   

CHAP. VIII. Some short Observations upon Mr. Hobbs' First Chap. of his Kingdom of Darkness.  
Mr. Hobbs inconsistent with himself in his Discourses concerning Phantasms: the Church in a proper sense the Kingdom of Christ: Mr. Hobbs' notion of a Covenant no ways applicable to God Almighty: his Answers to those places of Scripture, which are commonly brought to prove the Immortality of the Soul, no ways sufficient. Appendix to the 7th Chapter.    


CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Excellency of the Knowledge of a Man's Self.  
THE true Worth and Value of a Thing, consists either in its Intrinsic Nature, or in the Relation it bears to us; either that it is in itself Excellent, or to us Useful: Now both these meet together in the Knowledge of a Man's Self; this being that which so nearly concerns us, that no one ought in Honour to be ignorant of it. Thus those whose ancient Families, or personal Merits, have Entitled to a Coat of Arms, do usually think themselves bound, at least, to attain to such a degree of Skill in Heraldry, as to be able to Blazon them. So would it be a Disparagement to a Man, as such, to be owner of so many and great Excellencies of Nature, and not rightly to understand them; not to be able to derive their Descent from their first and divine Original; not fully to know, and duly to consider that nobleness and generosity of Action, which even his Order obliges him to.  
Now since there is no more effectual Way or Method to recommend a Thing truly Excellent, than only fully to explain it; I shall therefore show wherein the Nature of this Knowledge of a Man's Self consists.  
Mr. Hobbs in his Introduction to his Leviathan, hath justly found fault with those, who so understand that saying, Nosce te ipsum, As hereby either to countenance the barbarous State of Men in power towards their Inferiors, or to encourage those of a low Degree, to a saucy Behaviour to their Betters: But then whether he has been as happy in assigning the true meaning of it himself, as he was in observing the false Interpretation thereof in others, may be justly doubted: his Interpretation is this; This, says he, teaches us, that from the Similitudes of Thoughts and Passions of one Man, to the Thoughts and Passions of another, whosoever looks into himself, and considers what he doth, when he thinks, reasons, opines, hopes, fears, etc. and upon what Grounds, he shall hereby read and know, what are the Thoughts and Passions of all other Men upon the like Occasions.  
Now this Explication of his seems liable to this Inconvenience, that it makes each Man in particular the Rule and Measure of Humane Nature in general, by attending to the Grounds and Reasons of his own Thoughts aed Passions, to judge the very same of all others; so that according to this, Humane Nature must appear to the World, according to the false Notions or vicious Affections of those who represent it; according to the accidentally good or bad Dispositions of those who undertake to give an account of it. Thus, because the bloodshot Eye of one Man's mind represents all things in red Colours; therefore must Cruelty be the immediate and universal Dictate of Nature. 'Tis true indeed, in the very next Sentence he adds: I say, The Similitude of Passions which are the same in all Men; Desire, Fear, Hope, etc. Not the Similitude of the Objects of the Passions, which are the Things desiŕed, feared, hoped, etc. For these the Constitution individual and particular Education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our Knowledge, that the Characters of Man's Heart are legible only to him, who searcheth the Heart. But how can we possibly gather the Similitude of other Men's Thoughts and Passions from our own, without any relation they bear to their respective Objects; for from the consideration of our Thoughts and Passions abstracted from their Objects, we could only infer the Similitude of ours with other Men's, merely as bare Acts and Operations of the Soul; that is, that the Soul in its respective exercise of its Thoughts and Passions, acts or suffers after the same manner in all Men: but now this would be nothing to his purpose. But surther, when he says, Whoever looks into himself, and considers what he doth, when he thinks, opines, hopes, fears, etc. and upon what Grounds. Now how can a Man consider upon what Grounds and Reasons he desires, or fears, without respect to the Objects of those several Passions; for Men desire or fear, either because the Things desired or feared, are really good or bad for 'em, or at least apprehended as such: Nor can any just or full Account be given of our Passions abstracted from their Objects. So that Mr. Hobbs, by his seemingly distinct stating of the Question, takes only the greater pains to blunder the whole Matter. But to return:  
This Knowledge of ourselves includes in it these following Particulars:  
1. It includes the Knowledge of ourselves, as consisting of two distinct Principles of Soul and Body, together with a right understanding of the Nature and Properties of both.  
2. A right understanding of the mutual Relations and respective Influences, that each hath upon the other by virtue of their Union: Hence are we taught not to mistake the brisker Motions of the Blood, or a more slorid temper of Body for the Influences of the holy Spirit; nor the more black melancholy temper of Mind, sor a severe and religious Reservedness, with some; or for the Frowns of the Almighty, or the Testimonies of the Divine Displeasure against us, with others.  
3. It includes in it the true Knowledge of our Original Perfections, and how far they are impaired by the Fall, both what God made us at first in the state of Innocence, and what we have now made ourselves by our Sins.  
4. The Knowledge of the right use of our Faculties, as also a due consideration of the Ends, for which God gave us such Souls, and a due care of acting in Conformity thereunto.  
5. It consists in a just and due regard and reverend esteem of ourselves, not such as is the result of Pride, or the 
Thus Simplicius prays, that be may be mindful of this Nobility of Nature.  affectation of Popularity; but in a true virtuous Care of doing nothing unworthy the Dignity of our Natures.  
6. It implies a due consideration of those Relations we stand in to God, ourselves, and Others, so as that we may lead a soberf, righteous and holy life in this present World.  
Now, that which further speaks the Excellency of this Knowledge, is, That it transcends not the ordinary Capacities of a finite Understanding, nor discourages us with the Difficulty, much less with the Impossibility of the Thing; the Knowledge of God, so far as he has any ways made known himself to us, and the Knowledge of ourselves in the utmost extent of it: This God hath made our Duty, and therefore hath not placed it out of the compass of those Powers and Faculties which he hath given us. Not but that there are some Things in this lesser, as well as in that greater World, which are above our Knowledge, viz. The Mode of the Union of our Soul and Body; whether our Souls praeexist, or no, etc. But these few Things which are unknowable, ought not to discourage us in the search of those Things we may know, especially in Things of a more practical Concernment: only here we may consider, That those Natural Mysteries of Humane Nature, if I may so call'em, may be made use of to teach us Modesty and Submission of our Understandings in Things of a more Divine Concern. Thus even Philosophers tell us, That God on purpose constituted some unsolvable Difficulties in Nature, to teach men not over-highly to value their own Understandings.  
2. This Knowledge of ourselves is founded upon surer Principles, than any other Study Men commonly give themselves unto, particularly than those two famous Mistresses of most Men's Courtship, Philosophy and Philology: as for Philosophy, though, I believe, that it has arrived at as high a degree of Perfection in this Age, as in any known Age of the World; (and it is to no purpose to talk of what might possibly be in those other, of which we have no History, no Records remaining;) yet it may be justly questioned, Whether Truth itself was ever yet pulled out of that Pit, in which the Ancients placed it, considering the several Hypotheses now extant in Philosophy, each embraced with equal eagerness, and as their respective Followers think, with equal appearance of Reason: And Philology, that labours under these two Disadvantages, that it is commonly founded upon no better Grounds, than mere Conjecture and Probability; so that it must be great good Fortune, if its Archers chance to hit the Mark.  
2. The Subject-matter of those Inquiries are many times of such small Concernment, that it is no great matter whether they do or no: only both these are then best employed, when they are made use of to explain or confirm some moral or divine Truth.  
3. The Knowledge of ourselves doth naturally load us to the Knowledge, 1. Of the Being of God. 2. Of the Nature of God. 3. Of the Worship of God.  
1. Thus we come to the Knowledge of the Being of God, in as much as at first he stamped such lively Characters of Himself upon our Minds, as speak their Author: Thus both Reason and Religion tell us, That God did not leave himself without a Witness either in the greater or lesser World. I know there are some, who deny any such Natural Notions or Ideas at all, and particularly, this of God; but I hope the contrary hereof, in the Sequel of the Discourse, will appear both piously and rationally credible. God at first Created us after His own Image or Similitude; more especially in respect of the intellectual and moral Endowments of the Mind: Now this seems most naturally to suppose something actually existent in the Soul, wherein this Similitude or Resemblance should consist, and not only in a bare capacity or possibility of the Thing afterwards.  
And by reslecting upon these, we come to the Knowledge of him, whose Image and Superscription they bear: Thus do we sometimes more perfectly behold the Sun, by looking downwards into the Water, than we can possibly do with a direct Eye.  
I shall not here enter into a particular examination of that Argument; How far the Idea or Notion of God in our Minds doth prove his real Existence: This being already so excellently done by the Learned Bishop of Worcester, in his Orig. Sacrae, and by Dr. Cudworth in his Systeme, etc.  
Only we may observe, That since Moral Arguments do not, as Mathematical ones do, force Assent; but suppose certain Dispositions of the Subject, upon which their Prevalency doth in a great measure depend: therefore I conceive, the persuasive force of this Argument, is greater to a sober and considerate Person within himself, than perhaps it will appear to others: For that which is very apt to prevail with such an one, is to consider, how agreeable this Notion of a Deity is to all his Faculties, how consistent with all those Principles of Tru●h and Goodness, which he any ways finds lodged in his Soul: So that from the Consonancy of these, how they mutually defend and support each other; nay, how there could scarce be any Notions at all either of Truth or Goodness, without the supposition of a God: Hence a considerate and ingenuous Person is much more confirm'd in the belief of the Thing. Thus D. Cartes was more fully persuaded of the Truth of his Philosophical Principles, because they were so consistent with the present Phaenomena of Nature, and gave such easy Solutions of 'em.  
2. From the Knowledge of ourselves, we come to the Knowledge of the Nature of God, for we are conscious to ourselves of some Actions; viz, Those of Cogitation, beyond the power of Matter to perform, and therefore to be ascribed to some Being of greater Excellencies and Perfections, than mere Matter is capable of, that is, to a Spirit. Hence we infer, first, the Immateriality of our own Souls, and then the Spirituality of the Divine Nature; because what ever real and absolute Perfection we find in ourselves, that in the highest degree must we attribute to God. Here I shall first prove the Immateriality of our own Souls; and then make good the Consequence; when from thence we infer the Spirituality of the Divine Nature. 1. The Immateriality of our own Souls, or what is the same, that Matter cannot think; and this one would almost think a needless undertaking, to prove that which the common sense of Mankind doth generally agree in; that being a thing in a great measure self-evident, it will be the more difficult, by any other Argument, to prove it. The most effectual, if not the only way to do it, is to show the strange and absurd Consequences that would follow from the contrary Assertion. There seems no greater Argument against the possibility of Matters thinking, than the unsuccessfulness of their Attempts, and the improbability of their Ways and Methods, who have gone about to explain it. First, They grant that Matter itself, unless so and so modified, cannot think; and it is altogether unconceivable, how either the tenuity of the Parts, or the most vigorous Motion should add to it any principle of perception, which otherwise of its own nature it was destitute of: nor is it rendered the more intelligible, by placing, as Mr. Hobbs doth, the Nature of it in Re-action, this being only such a particular kind of motion, with respect to the terms à quo, and ad quem; as if Reflection in the Soul, which is an inward consciousness to ourselves of our Thoughts and Actions, was the same with, or could be any ways explained by Re-actoin or Reflection in Matter. I might as well argue thus, That because Angulus reflectionis est aequalis angulo incidentiae: Therefore if Matter cannot think in its direct, neither can it in its reflected motion.  
Nor is it any ways conceivable, how senseless Atoms should grow into greater Wits, only by jumping and running their heads against one another: nor will Organization any whit help the matter: for suppose a Company of plenipotentiary particles sent from the material Universe to the no less material Sovereign the Soul, to treat about some grand astairs of State; these while they rid on briskly in a direct Road, might perhaps have their heads full of Intrigues, and Politics: but then when they came into those many cross Ways, which they must necessarily meet withal in Organised Bodies, they will then probably either lose themselves, or forget their Errand; and when they came to Court, find their heads fraught with nothing, but some certain cross questions, which they picked up by the way.  
Further, It would be very hard, for the Patrons of this Mechanic Hypothesis to assign the respective Modes of action and re-action to the several modes of Cogitation; what kind of Motion it is that causes assent, what dissent; what kind of agitation of the particles is required to cause understanding, and how distinguished from that of the Will: and then supposing that after a great deal of ill placed pains, they compass their designs, and be able to solve all the modes of cogitation, as Des Cartes has all the variety of Colours, only by the various motions, figures and disposition of the particles; besides the improbability of the thing, it can never arrive at greater certainty, but that whatever way they pitch upon, we may, with as good reason, assign the just contrary. Now seeing, according to this Hypothesis, Assent and Dissent, Affirmation and Negation, etc. must consist in such a respective motion and agitation of the particles; how can any one secure himself or others, that a saction of the dissenting Particles (for Example) or such a motion, as causes descent, may not rise up, when the nature of the thing requires the contrary assent; and by this means erect a Babel in Man, and bring all into confusion.  
Further, If Cogitation consist only in the various motion and disposition of the Atoms, than Phaeton might possibly produce a greater and more undoubted Deity out of his flaming Chariot, than that of his Father Phoebus. If this Hypothesis be true, then Ex quovis ligno fiat Mercurius, and the Chair may be as infallible, as he that sits, in it; and this perhaps might gratify some Men in the World, all other methods failing, thus to solve Infallibility by mechanic Principles. Pardon me, if in a ferious argument I thus seem to trifle, seeing, those I have here to deal withal, first taught me the way. For herein they seem rather to give an Essay of their own extravagant Fancies, than to persuade others, that they themselves believe their own Assertions. But to return.  
These Men must either assert, That there neither is, nor can be any such thing as Spirit in the World; or if there be, that it is impossible for such a being to cogitate; neither of which will they be ever able to prove. As for the being of a Spirit, they do indeed, with as much strength of confidence, as weakness of Reason, tell us, that the Notion thereof includes in it a Contradiction; tho' this they do not as much as attempt to prove any other way, than first by supposing a material Universe, and that nothing but matter is contained in it. But this is to beg, not prove the Question.  
But the Essences of things being unknown, the Notion of a Spirit seems as obvious and intelligible, as that of matter: for we may as easily conceive of one thing, to which we attribute cogitation, as its immediate property; as we do of another, to which we ascribe extension and impenetrability. And then supposing a Spirit, Cogitation seems the natural result of such a being; Tho' I do not here go about to explain the particular way and manner, how Spirits think; for it is hard to conceive, how their own Native penetrability, or the reduplication of themselves upon themselves does any ways explain the manner of Cogitation. We must satisfy ourselves with this which is as far as our most exact Searches will extend to, That first and immediate properties are not demonstrable of their Subjects, neither as to the things themselves, nor as to the modes.  
Indeed Sharron, in his Book of Wisdom, lib. 1. ch. 7. tells us that Spirits and Devils, according to the opinion of all Philosophers, and our greatest Divines, are corporeal: Here he citys Tertullian, Origen, St. Basil, Gregory, etc. The Names he mentions, but not their Assertions, or the Places, where they say so: But this being a general accusation, we may as easily deny it, as he assert it. But as for those places which perhaps may seem to favour his assertion, I doubt not but they may, and have already received easy Solutions from one of these general considerations: 1. That either they asserted the opinion of the Platonists, who yet were no favourers of an universal corporeity, viz. That Souls were never in a perfect State of Separation from all Body, but had certain etherial Vehicles; and so in that respect might partake in some Sense, of a Corporeal Nature. Or 2. He doth not rightly interpret those places of the Fathers, where perhaps sometimes body or matter may be ascribed to the Soul or Angels: but then by Body, there, is to be meant nothing but Substance or Essence. So that their Sense was good and orthodox, though their Expressions might be liable to exception: and yet, I think, it is only Tertullian that expresses himself in that manner.  
The said Sharron goes on and tells us, That Whatever is Created, being compared with God, is gross, corporeal, material; and only God incorporeal. I would willingly here be so charitable, as to think that such was his awful respect and veneration of the Divine Essence, that he would not easily grant any thing else to partake of the same generical nature. Far be it from me to speak any thing, that may in the least derogate from the excellency of the Divine Essence; only we may consider, that it is no honour done to that, to depress other things below that just Order wherein God has placed them. This seems but a piece of Will-worship, and something like the Opinion of those, who think they cannot sufficiently magnify God's love to some, unless they absolutely damn all the rest: thus also, as if we could not sufficiently magnify the Spirituality of the Divine Nature, unless we dispose all other beings into the rank and Order of Corporeity. 2. Though I do not assert this, yet I would propound it to consideration, whether it may not be possible for the nature of a Spirit to admit of degrees of excellence, as to the very Essence and Substance thereof: and not only in respect of its more accidental perfections; yet so, as that which we suppose of the lower order, to be perfectly Spiritual, and contain nothing of Corporeity in it: and perhaps the Logicians meant this, when they called God Super-Substantia.  
But he says further, if it appear, That Spirits change their place, the very change shows they are movable, divisible, subject to time, and the successions thereof, etc. Which are all qualities of a Body. But here I would only ask, Whether the existence of a Spirit be possible, or whether God could have created such a being, or no? If he could, than his argument proves nothing: for supposing such a being, it must move, and be in a place just in such a manner, as we now suppose Souls and Angels to be and move: and the argument would have the same force, if we either supposed, or were on all sides assured of the actual being, that it has now. So that it either proves the impossibility of a Spirit, or else nothing at all to the purpose; this being only such an objection or such a difficulty, as would lie against an acknowledged truth.  
I should now Secondly show, how from hence we justly infer the Spirituality of the Divine Nature. But I shall not need to spend any time herein: for though there have been some, who, granting the immateriality of the Divine Nature, have yet asserted the Corporeity of the Soul; yet there never was any, who granting the Soul to be immaterial, ever asserted God to be Corporeal. As for those who assert a material Universe, and a Corporeal Deity, they may perhaps nomine ponere, but indeed they do re tollere Deum. For a Corporeal Deity is inconsistent with the Notion we have of God, uncapable of the Perfections we ascribe to him, and unable to perform such actions as do properly belong to such a being: But however those, who thus suppose a Corporeal God, do also suppose a Corporeal Soul.  
Thus from the Knowledge of ourselves we come to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature.  
3. From hence also we come to the Knowledge of the true Nature of the Divine worship, that seeing we consist of Soul and Body, therefore must we offer both to God, as our reasonable Service for external Solemnity; and outward performances are not to be excluded out of the Divine Worship.  
First, Because those immoderate pretences to Spirituality are either the natural causes, or necessary results of Enthusiasm and Fanaticism.  
Secondly, By excluding those outward decent Testimonies of our inward Devotion towards God, we give occasion of Scandal to Heathens and those that are without; for they would be apt either to entertain low and mean thoughts themselves; or at least think that we did so, of that God, whom we, for aught they perceived, did so rudely worship. But then on the other hand, we must have a more especial regard to the Soul, for without this, all our other performances are nothing but mere formality and hypocrisy.   

CHAP. II. Of Man, as compounded of Soul and Body.  
WHAT was the State and Condition of the Soul before its Union with the Body, whether it enjoyed any State of Praeexistence, or was then first created, when first put into the Body; or if it did praeexist, then in what manner, whether in a pure separation from all matter, or in conjunction with an etherial Vehicle, is not my design here to examine: only 'tis observable, that in things of this Nature, where inclination rather than any cogent Reasons of belief take place; in things where Providence hath not thought fit to give us a certain or determinate truth of things, there Men are usually determined to this or that side of the question, by very accidental considerations (as in this case of Praeexistence) by the more or less favourable apprehensions they may have received of the Platonic or Peripatetic Philosophy; or by those previous notions they have entertained of Providence, to which they think this or that Opinion may seem more agreeable.  
Nor, Secondly, shall I consider Man in his Natural or Physical capacity; that which I here design being an Essay of Moral or Political, rather than of Natural Philosophy: I shall not here inquire into the more explicable modes of Sensation or Intellection; much less shall I attempt to explain those natural Mysteries of Humane Nature, viz. The particular mode of the Souls union with the Body: being discouraged therefrom, by the difficulties of the thing, and the unsuccessful attempts of some who have endeavoured to effect it.  
Claubergius hath a discourse particularly the conjunctione Anime & Corporis; but whether he has left it any whit more plain and intelligible than he found it, I shall submit it to the judgement of those, who will take the pains to peruse it. His way is this, The Soul, says he, is united to the Body by those mutual actions, that pass betwixt 'em; but more especially by those more confused operations of sense, and by the less distinct perceptions of mind. And in his 37th chap. he tells us, that homo alius alio, & idem seipso, diver so tempore, magis minúsve homo censeri debet: For according to him, the denomination of a Man, as such, consists chiefly in such an union of the Soul and Body, which is more especially performed by the operations of Sense. Now I see not, why that especially should denominate us men, wherein we come the nearest to the nature of Brutes: nor is there any reason why a Contemplative Person, one who enjoys a more quick and lively exercise of his higher faculties, why such a one should not be counted as much, yea more a Man, than he that lives more by sense. That the Soul doth make use more especially of the Body and Bodily representations in these actions of sense, is very true; but if we inquire farther how it is joined to the Body even in these more confused operations, the difficulty would perhaps still return.  
Nor shall I here dispute, whether the Soul immediately upon the dissolution of the whole Frame, or of the more principal Parts of the Body, doth thereupon by its own activity quit its station, and launch into those other unknown Regions: or whether besides this, there be not also required (which seems as probable) as immediate an act of God, to take it out, as there was to put it into the Body: only we may observe, that God, both by the light of Nature and his revealed Law, hath made the union of the Soul and Body so sacred, that it now becomes absolutely unlawful for us, by laying violent hands upon ourselves, to separate those, whom God hath thus strictly joined together; that whatever natural tye it is under, as to the Body, 'tis certain it ought not to quit its Station, without a lawful Warrant from its great Commander.  
I shall here rather state the question betwixt the Stoics and Epicureans, and show their several errors and mistakes on either hand: the one by ascribing too little to the Body, and too much to the Soul; the other by attributing too much to the Body, and too little to the Soul, in the Accounts they give of humane Nature. The Stoics would make Man so wholly rational, that they will scarce allow him to be sensible, and would wholly exclude all natural affections and bodily passions out of humane Nature: and the Epicureans on the contrary, make all the most noble Actions of the Soul merely subservient to the designs of such Pleasure, as is really below the true happiness of the Soul. By the Body here I understand all those passions and affections of the mind, which belong to Men more immediately upon account of the Body, all those motions and inclinations of the inferior appetites, so far as they are natural.  
The Design therefore of the Stoics to root these Passions out of Humane Nature, is, First, impossible: Secondly, it would be prejudicial thereunto, were it feisible; for these when duly regulated, become the subject matter of moral Virtue, and also add Vigour and Wings to the Soul in its pursuits of Virtue.  
Among the many charges brought against Stoicism, that of Pride and Arrogance seems the most obvious, and the most unanswerable, it naturally tending to beget such haughty thoughts of one's self, as are indeed inconsistent with the State and Nature of a frail and depending Creature.  
What a prodigious thing do they make their Wise Man, far above any thing that is called Mortal, and in some respects equal to God himself. As for Repentance, they look upon that as a mean thing, far below the height of their attainments. Innocence indeed is better than Repentance, but for them to pretend unto it, argues a great deal of Pride, founded upon a bad understanding of their own State. But this description which they give of a Wise Man, is of some thing which perhaps they may fancy in their minds, but not of any thing really extant in Nature. These were their undoubted opinions and apprehensions herein; but whether their own natural Pride of temper, was the cause of these their extravagant opinions; or whether some other false Scheme of Principles, which they had entertained, had in some sort betrayed 'em into this excess of self-conceit, I shall not here determine.  
Tho' perhaps the ignorance of a future state of Rewards and Punishments after this life, joined with their attempt to give an account of that great question, which so much puzzled the Heathen World, Curio bonis malè, & malis bené. This perhaps might, in some measure, oblige 'em, being not fully assured of a future State, to entertain such false opinions of Man's selfsufficiency; so placing all things within his own power, that he needed not to be beholden to any other assistance, but from himself; or to any future expectations to make him happy.  
As for the calamities that befall Men here in this Life, they no ways alter the case in reference to happiness or unhappiness: for those, they say, only reach the Body, which, according to them, has no nearer relation to the Soul, than their clothes have to it.  
Thus the Stoics placed their happiness, where some sort of fanatics among us place their Holiness, merely in the inward Man, without any regard to the outward: as if we could be either Happy or Holy, without any respect at all to one of the essential Parts of our Constitution; as if the inward Man of the one could be holy in the midst of all outward Debaucheries; and the inward Man of the other happy in the midst of bodily torments. Thus tho' we grant the Soul to be the Sovereign, yet the Body may justly challenge the Liberty of the Subject.  
The other Sect of Philosophers, who have erred in the other extreme, is that of Epicurus, who attributes too much to the Body: But this, may some say, is too favourable an expression; when as indeed he doth destroy both all Soul in Man, and excludes God out of the World. But my charge here doth not rise so high, it is sufficient for my purpose, what is generally granted by all, that in the account he gives of Man, the Body is too predominant; and the indolency of the Body, seems far to surpass the tranquillity of the mind. For it cannot be made appear, That Epicurus by his tranquillity meant that peace of Conscience and Serenity of Soul, which is the result of a Virtuous and Holy Life; but only that quiet of mind, in opposition to the disturbance of business; or those perplexities of mind, which may arise either from Bodily Distempers, or some secret fears and jealousies. Now if that peace and comfort of a good Conscience, in the sense before described, be not meant by tranquillity of mind; then tho' perhaps the word may sound well, yet indeed it falls short of the true and real happiness of the Soul, and rises little higher than the concerns of the Body. We do naturally either make ourselves, in some measure, like him whom we worship; or we fancy him, whom we worship, like ourselves. Thus Epicurus placing the happiness of the Deity in an idle unconcerned freedom from business, did hence probably assert ours to consist in the same; or else being first strongly persuaded of the excellency of the thing, and being mightily pleased with the agreeableness thereof himself, did thence ascribe it also to the Deity, as that wherein all happiness both Humane and Divine did consist.  
It is indeed unreasonable and uncharitable to urge the consequences of an opinion upon the Author, when he does expressly deny those consequences to be his opinion: yet, I think, that he that in words acknowledges a God, and yet his Principles are such, as are generally embraced by real Atheists; such an one is not capable of any just Apology. For there is not the same Reason of all consequences; some are next and immediate, others are distant and remote: these of the last sort ought not to be urged upon the Author of the opinion, but those of the former may.  
That Epicurus did assert the Being of God, and entertained great and honourable thoughts of his Nature, is very certain, as appears out of Diog. Laertius. So that none so charge him with Atheism, as if he did not in words acknowledge a God: that which is here asserted is this, that that opinion of God, which flatters him with high and honourable thoughts concerning himself, his own intrinsic excellencies, his own happiness and immortality, which yet are but irrespective Attributes, such as bear no relation to us; and in the mean time to assert, that he no ways concerns himself at present, nor will hereafter take any notice to punish or reward Humane Actions. This notion of God lays no Obligation on a Man to holiness of Life, or Obedience to that God, whom in words he thus admires; and is such a Notion of God, as even an Atheist, provided he be not a perfect Mad Man, aught to assert: both because perhaps it may some ways tend to still and quiet the clamours of natural Conscience, and also as it is safe and customary in respect of those with whom he lives. For we never yet heard of a Kingdom or Commonwealth of Atheists, such as make it their business positively and openly to assert and defend the Opinion of Atheism.  
But here 'tis replied, That whatever his Principles were in themselves, or what ever bade use others might make of them; yet that he for his part, was a severe practiser of Virtue and Religion. But it may be justly questioned, whether the joint belief of a Corporeal God and a mortal Soul had ever any good influence upon an holy Life. But suppose Epicurus in general to be a very Virtuous and Pious Person, and that those contrary imputations of Vice and Luxury were mere Scandals cast upon him by the Stoics; yet we must consider how far, and upon what grounds, and for what ends he thus led a virtuous life: Now it doth not appear, that it was any further than only in order to a pleasant Life; and tho' 'tis true, that Religion and Virtue are the most proper means in order to this end; yet it is not probable, that he so understood his own principles, nor indeed were they capable of being so understood. For supposing that there lies no obligation upon us to any duty any further than as it promotes a pleasant Life, in that sense wherein he takes it; it is easily conceivable how some degrees of Vice may consist with these Principles, provided that they so partake of this days pleasure, that they do not incapacitate themselves for those of to morrow. And tho' he tells us, that the Gods are delighted with the Virtues of Men: yet this is but cold encouragement to the practice of the more difficult Duties of Religion, seeing tho' they do so far take notice of men's virtuous actions, as therewith to delight themselves; yet not so far, as for the sake thereof, to reward the Men.  
So that if Epicurus was virtuous beyond these degrees, that we must impute to the Man, rather than to the Philosopher; rather to his virtuous temper, than to his principles: So that whatever he was, as to his own person; yet, I believe, his followers made but right consequences from his false principles, when they inserred, Let us eat and drink, for to morrow we die.  
Nor can the particular excellencies of some of that Sect be any just vindication of any false principle or wicked practice in the first Founder of it; any more than Alexander's great Courage and Conduct in War can be made use of, as an argument to prove the truth of his Master Aristotle's opinion, concerning the Eternity of the World. Marcus Antoninus was as great an example of all natural and moral excellencies in the Sect of the Stoics, as any other could possibly be in the Sect of the Epicureans; and yet in respect of any ones particular endowments being able to vindicate an error in his Founder, we may say here, as it was proverbially said of a desperate and ruin'd state, Ne Marcus quidem.—  
And whereas 'tis said, That Epicurus took great satisfaction at his Death, by reflecting upon his Life and his (I suppose Physiological) Inventions; the greatest invention that he seemed remarkable for, was his solving the liberty of the Will merely by the motion of senseless Atoms declining uncertainly from the Perpendicular: now this seems no such pious invention, as to take such solid comfort in at his Death.  
I shall here only add these two general Observations.  
First, That Virtue, according to his principles, must be founded on very weak and uncertain grounds and reasons, especially as to the more difficult duties of an holy Life; they being at present both unpleasant and afterwards unrewardable. So that if the Epicureans did give themselves to the practice of such Virtues, out of an absolute sense of Duty, or from the consideration of the excellency of the thing itself; then were they the most Heroickly Virtuous, not only of any sort of Philosophers, but also of any other People in the world: for than were they virtuous without either hopes of reward, or fear of punishment. Besides, I know not what motions such men can have, according to those principles, to return to the Practice of an holy Life; who, by a constant and habitual course in á well regulated extravagance, have made such a degree of Vice easy and pleasant to 'em.  
Secondly, Happiness, according to Epicurus, is impossible: for he found'st it in an impossible condition, in rooting out all fear of Death and all doubtful suspicions that may succeed it. Now the hopes and fears of future good and evil are anticipations so implanted in us, that the rooting them out, is a thing absolutely impossible: now he tells us, that we cannot attain sincere pleasure without Physiology; that is, I suppose, such an Hypothesis of Natural Philosophy as his own, which excludes all Divine Providence out of the World, and takes away the immortality of the Soul; Neque prodesset aliquid humanam sibi parare securitatem, cum superna, & quae sub terrâ sunt, suspecta essent; Diog. Laert.  
Now what the Stoics were among the Heathens, that, in some resemblance, are the Enthusiasts among Christians: and then as for the Epicureans, we have a sort of Men amongst us, who cannot be said so properly to resemble 'em, as really to be the same.  
Now whereas the great design of the Gospel was to root out sin, and plant the most exemplary Virtue and Piety in the World; the Enthusiasts, instead of this, make the design thereof, to consist in something, pretendedly, above it.  
As First, In a Pompous set of high flown Notions, and speculative Truths, as if the Sun of Righteousness came only to enlighten the understanding; but not either to regulate the Will, or warm the Affections: as if it was enough to be seraphical in our understandings, tho' in the mean time our Wills be vicious and irregular. Though this is not so to be understood, as if it was indifferent for us, what we believe, provided that we be careful and conscientious in the way we are in. For it is impossible for us to lead a truly good and holy Life, without a firm belief of the Christian Articles: but then we must not rest in a bare belief of Truth; for Truth without Practice, becomes not only useless, but of bad consequence to us.  
Secondly, The Enthusiasts place a great deal of Confidence in vain pretences to Divine Revelation; as if their Souls were the only Seats of the Deity, and as if they were the only Ministers of State here below, and Heavens great Privy Councillors: As if God's written Word were only a dead Letter, unless enlivened by their Interpretations: all which, tho' different Comments, must be of greater Authority than the Text itself, not only when they contradict that, but also one another.  
Thirdly, The Enthusiasts entertain such an imaginary Opinion of Perfection, as states 'em, not only above all Humane, but Divine Laws; as if their Wills and Actions were the only Rules of Right and Wrong, and that, what ever they did, was therefore good, because done by them: Thus are they grown such Giants in Religion, as that they have baffled all checks of Conscience and Obedience to Laws, which they look upon, as mean and low dispensations, quite to be laid aside, when once Men arrive at this State of Perfection.  
Fourthly, Enthusiasm consists in an ill-guided Zeal, prodigiously Partial and Indulgent to those of its own persuasion; but Furious and Cruel to those, who differ from 'em.  
Now as the Stoics pretended by their false Opinions of Humane Nature to be more than Men; So the Enthusiasts by the like mistakes concerning true Religion, pretend to be more than Christians: tho' indeed they both come short of what they severally pretended to.  
Having thus briefly stated the Question betwixt the Stoics and Epicureans, I shall here further inquire, how far God makes use of the lower faculties of the Soul in the communications of himself to Mankind. I shall not here go about to explain the manner, how God now under the Gospel works upon the minds of Men by the gracious influences of his Holy Spirit; for these may be more happily experienced, than successfully explained: however I conceive it would be a very preposterous method to do it by beginning at the lower faculties of the Soul; for these are not immediately, and in the first place wrought upon, but by the mediation of an enlightened Understanding, and a rectified Will: and from those Fountains is Grace and Goodness derived into the Soul. Thus our Remedy is applied in a way answerable to our Disease, the Corruption and Depravation of our Nature: Now this consists more especially in these two things, in ignorance of the Understanding, and impotence and irregularity of the Will: answerably hereunto in the Restitution of Man; God first informs his Understanding, then assists and inclines his will by his Grace, and so applies himself to his inferior Appetites in a way suitable to their Natures, in bringing them under the Power and Government of Reason and Religion.  
I shall here rather inquire how far God made use of the Fancy and Imagination in the Communications of himself to his Servants under the Law by way of Prophecy: and this I shall rather do, because of the dangerous Opinions that some Men have of late vented on this Subject, thereby endeavouring to undermine the very Foundation of all Divine Revelation, truly so called, For they think, if they can but once sufficiently disparage the manner of God's revealing himself to the Prophets under the Old Testament, they will be hereby better enabled to reject all Divine Revelation under the New. I shall here therefore make some short reflections upon the Author of Tractatus-Theol. Polit: in his two first Chapters of Prophets and Prophecy. In Order thereunto I shall premise, 1st. God in the Communications of himself to Mankind is not tied to any either Natural or Moral qualifications of the Persons he pleases to make use of; For what ever is wanting, either as to the vigorousness of the Fancy, or strength of understanding, God can supply the defects hereof some other way, or act more immediately by himself in absence of them all. 2dly. Yet notwithstanding, God commonly makes use of Second Causes, and of Instruments duly qualified, in order to the effecting his Designs in the World, particularly in Prophecy. According to the constant Opinion of the jewish Doctors, there were certain previous preparatory dispositions in order to it, and these were of three Sorts, Natural, Acquired and Moral. 1. A good Natural Complexion and Temper of Body, a due mixture of the Humours, without any predominancy of Melancholy, a Mind naturally Calm and Cheerful, a Fancy Active and Vigorous, an Understanding Clear and Strong, without any Crazedness or Inconsistency. 2. All these improved to the highest Degrees of perfection by Study and Industry. 3. To these must also be added a virtuous and well-disposed Temper of Soul, free from all vicious habits and inclinations. Thus the jews had their Schools of the Prophets, for the fitting and preparing Young Scholars, which they called, the Sons of the Prophets, for that employment. Now this sufficiently shows, that something more than mere Fancy was required to the Nature of Prophecy; Yet this is not so to be understood, as if Prophecy was the Natural result of any of these singly, or of all jointly, unless God was pleased to Communicate himself to some, as he saw fit. For all these who were brought up in the Schools of the Prophets, did not presently prophesy: Thus neither the absence of the usual qualifications do incapacitate a Man for Prophecy; nor doth the concurrence of 'em all make one actually a Prophet: Prophecy, in the formal Notion and Nature of it, being no ways in the power of Man, but wholly depends upon the will of God. Hence we see, what little reason the soresaid Author had to say, that tho' God did make use of the Fancy sometimes in the conveyance of his Will to the Prophets; yet that Prophecy, Non nisi ope imaginationis persicitur, & à solâ imaginatione pendet: and this he proves no other ways, than because they prophesied. But this is not to prove, but to beg the Question.  
He first makes an injust Comparison betwixt Natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation, 1. In respect of the Name, and tells us that the one may be called Divine as well as the other, because they are both derived from the same Fountain, viz. God. But thus by the same way of arguing he must, and indeed doth assert, That either there are no Miracles at all: or else that all the effects of Nature are such; because the power of Nature is the Divine Power, as well as that of Miracles. But in order to either of these, he should first make good one or both of these Positions, either that God hath not an immediate Power of Acting by himself, distinct from the ordinary course of Nature; or else, that since the constitution of the Natural Frame of the Universe, he hath not reserved to himself a liberty of Acting according to that Original Power: neither of which will he be ever able to prove.  
2. Suppose Natural Knowledge may also be called Prophecy or Divine Revelation, in respect of its Original; yet how can it be called aequali jure, as he says, Divine: because in other respects, both as to the manner of their conveyance, and largeness of extent, there is a great deal of difference betwixt 'em: however why should Natural Knowledge be called Divine Revelation, since Custom and good Reason have justly affixed them to several things? for he that goes about to unhinge the signification of Words, which Use and Custom has truly appropriated to 'em in Divinity, has probably no better design than he that removes the ancient Landmarks in a common Field, viz. Injury, Disorder, and Confusion: Tho' this must be also granted, that Natural Knowledge doth bring us under an Obligation to those respective Duties which it dictates, even antecedent to that of Divine Revelation. For we are first Men, and then Christians; and by both these ways God hath made known his Will, and claims our Obedience.  
He grants indeed that Humanae Naturae Leges, in se consideratae, non possunt ejus, i. e. Divinae Revelationis esse causa. Why he should thus mince the matter, as to insert these Words, in se consideratae, I know not; whereas 'tis certain, That the Laws of Humane Nature can be no ways the cause of Divine Revelation. I know, his meaning here is suspected by some to be this, that the Laws of Nature, considered in themselves, that is, without the supposal of a God, which is one integral part of the Universe; so indeed they cannot be the cause of Divine Revelation: but then supposing a God so interwoven with the Laws of Nature, as that he shall be either really the same with, or very little different from the Universe and the Laws thereof, under this consideration, how far the Laws of Nature may be the cause of Divine Revelation, that is, of that which he calls such, is the grand mysterious Question.  
The other thing wherein he compares Natural Knowledge with Prophecy, is in respect of certainty, wherein Natural Knowledge, he says, comes no ways short of Prophetical.  
If we consider the certainty the Prophet himself had of those things which were revealed to him, we are now at a loss how certainly to determine this Question; for he only could fully assure us of the truth of these things, they relating to himself: Yet it seems very reasonable to believe, that the certainty of their Knowledge did not any way fall short of, but rather exceed that of Natural Knowledge; seeing we may easily suppose, that God may, by the secret influences of his Spirit, & by the more immediate applications of himself to the minds of Men, as fully assure 'em of the truth of his Revelations, as they can be of any thing by any Natural Principles: and that it really and actually was so, may appear from hence, that those to whom God conveyed these Revelations, have by virtue hereof undertaken the performance of such things, which arguments drawn from mere Sense and Reason, in all probability, could not have persuaded 'em to.  
Cum it aque mens nostra ex hoc solo, quod Dei naturam objectiuè in se continet, & de eadem participate, potestatem habeat ad formandas notiones, etc. Merito mentis naturam, quatenus talis concipitur, primam Divinae Revelationis causam statuere possumus. This seems very strange mystical Divinity: if by Divine Revelation, he mean Revelation truly so called; then it is altogether unconceivable how any impressions of Natural and Moral Truths (and that is all that he ought to understand by those expressions, quod Dei Naturam objective in se continet, & de eâdem participate) How these can any ways be the cause of Divine Revelation; if by Divine Revelation he mean nothing but Natural Knowledge, besides the impropriety of the Expression, I do not see how the Soul can so truly be called the first cause even of that neither, but rather the first and immediate subject of it. Upon the whole matter, one might almost be persuaded from hence to think, That by our Souls containing in it the Nature of God objectively, and partaking of the very same, that hereby he designed, as it were, to melt down God and the Soul of Man into an equal constitution, and both into parts of a material Universe.  
Then he tells us, that Quicquid dici potest, ex Scripturâ solâ peti debet: What ever is said of things relating to Divine Revelation, aught to be fetched from Scripture alone. This in general is a very good Rule, yet it is to be understood with some certain limitations, as he himself acknowledges in the same Paragraph, unless we had rather say, that the latter part thereof contradicts the former: for he tells us, That the jews never took any notice of Second Causes, but did generally recur to God, as the cause of all great and excellent things they had occasion to speak of. And therefore we must only take that for Supernatural Revelation, which Scripture expressly says is such, or what may be gathered to be so, from the circumstances of the Relation.  
First, I grant, that God may declare that again, which a Man either by Natural Principles or some other way knew before.  
Secondly, When God makes any Revelation to a Man, it is necessary, that he should make such a reduplicative Declaration as this, That this which I now speak, is Pure, Simple, unmixed Divine Revelation, such as exceeds the Power of Natural Causes to make known? if so, than it may be questioned, Whether God ever made any supernatural Revelation to Mankind or no; because we no where meet with any such Declaration. And as to the circumstances of the Narration, we can never, according to his Principles, from thence gather any thing to be truly Divine; because, as I intimated before, he makes the Power of God and the Power of Nature the same; or however asserts, that we are very much ignorant how far the Powers of Nature may extend. However we may make use of this assertion, against himself, that if we may argue from the circumstances of the Relation; than it is not necessary, that whatever is said concerning these things, should be fetched from Scripture only. 'Tis easily observable how this Author, by unsettling the significations of Words, and confounding the Notions of things, designs to bring all into confusion: he argues much what at a rate with Mr. Hobbs, that is, weakly, and probably with the same design, that is, Wickedly. But Providence hath so ordered affairs, that a bad Cause should always be a weak one.  
He found'st all Prophecy merely in the imagination: hence, he says, it is that the Prophets conceived all things parabolically, and expressed spiritual things after a Corporeal manner; because this agrees more with the Nature of Imagination. Hence it was, that those that were with Christ, saw the Spirit descending like a Dove; and the Apostles, as it were Tongues of Fire; and S. Paul, when he was Converted, saw a great light: because all these things did suit with the nature of Imagination: As if either there was no Foundation in Nature for any such belief, but only the imagination of Men; or as if these appearances reached no further than the Fancy, without any Divine Influence, making any further impressions upon the minds of those who were concerned herein.  
Si igitur sacra volumina percurramus, videbimus quod omnia quae Deus Prophet is revelavit, iis revelat a fuerunt vel verbis, vel figuris, vel utroque modo. That all the Prophecies we meet withal in Scripture, were conveyed to the Prophets by Words or Figures and sensible Representations, or both. I shall here show First, That this assertion is false. Secondly, If it was true, yet it would not prove what he thereby designs.  
1. It doth not appear that all the Divine Revelations in Scripture were conveyed one of these two ways: There are some instances where there is no mention made of either of these two; and to say, that one of these was made use of, tho' not expressed, this is gratis dictum, and contrary to his own Rule, That whatever is said of these things, must be drawn from Scripture.  
The instances, I mean, are those of Ioseph's interpreting the Dreams of the Butler and the Baker, and of Pharoah's Dream concerning the Seven Years of Dearth, etc. Gen. 40 and 41 chap. Now the Interpretation of Dreams, is as much Prophecy or Divine Revelation as the Dreams themselves; and yet here we do not find either any Voice or sensible Representation.  
Nor are his Reasons any whit more cogent than his Instances: for tho' he grants it possible for God immediately to communicate himself to Men, Attamen ut homo aliquis solâ ment aliqua perciperet, quae in primis nostrae cognitionis fundamentis non continentur, nec ab iis deduci possant, ejus mens praestantior necessariò atque humana longe excellentior esse deberet. But I know no reason, why the Soul of Man is not of capacity enough to perceive and apprehend the Objects of Divine Revelation, when duly communicated to the perceptive Faculties, without the assistance of Fancy or Imagination: For this is certain, and both. Reason and Religion obliges us to believe, That God doth convey his gracious Assistances, by which he both enlightens the Understanding, and reforms the Will, without the mediation of the Fancy: and it is also very reasonable to believe, That God did many times, under the Old Testament, convey the Intimations of his Will to Men, without either Voice or Vision: however this is certainly done by the Communications of Divine Grace to Christians, now under the Gospel.  
2. Suppose that God always made use of these imaginary Representations, in the Conveyance of his Will to the Prophets; will it therefore follow, ad prophetizandum non esse opus perfectiore ment, sed vividiore imaginatione? Will it therefore follow, that they did tantùm per imaginationem percipere? Will it therefore follow, that they did non nisi ope imaginationis percipere? Though God in the wise methods of his Providence, did make use of second Causes, will it therefore follow that the whole Causality must be ascribed to them? Could the Fancy alone, or the Fancy and Understanding together, rightly judge of the sense and meaning of those Representations, without the further assistance of Divine Illumination? to assert either of these, would argue him either a bad Philosopher, or a worse Divine: so that it would be hard to conceive, how these imaginary Representations, without a more immediate interpretation of their sense and meaning, would be any thing better than idle shows and insignificant appearances.   

CHAP. III. Of natural Notions of Truth and Goodness.  
THere is nothing that affords us more noble or more useful matter, whereon to exercise our Speculations, than a serious Enquiry into the respective natures of Truth & Goodness, which are things of so great Excellency in themselves, and of such near relation to us, that it doth not become a Man, a Philosopher, or a Christian, to be ignorant of either. 'Tis observed by some, that Pilate immediately upon his propounding that Question to our Saviour, What is Truth? He went forth, not staying sor an Answer: yet Providence hath not left us in the dark in things of this nature; we have the certain Guides of Reason and Revelation, as much as God thought fit to impart to us, sufficient to satisfy all sober, though not overcurious Inquiries, sufficient to all the ends and purposes of this humane State. Truth, indeed both natural and revealed, hath ever since its first appearance in the World, variously suffered by the Ignorance of some, and the Malice of others; by the contrary and eager pretences of opposite Parties, by the weaknesses and follies of Men, and by the power and subtlety of the Devil; and especially by that universal deluge of Sin and Wickedness, which both upon a natural and moral account, is very prejudicial to the concerns of Truth, both as Vice is naturally destructive of good Principles, and also as wicked Men are ready to believe (though never so false) what they think would be their Interest to be true.  
Thus if we consider the state of the Gentile World in the first Ages, we shall there find a very bad face of things. For not to speak of the grossness of popular Errors, and the no less impious, than false apprehensions of the generality of the common sort; the most exact Inquiries of their Philosophers were often false, but always mixed with a great deal of uncertainty in their Discourses, having commonly a contrary Sect and Company of Men, that whatever was asserted by one, was many times with as much vigour and equal probability of reason contradicted by another. So that a sober and serious Enquirer after Truth, though he might have reason enough not to profess himself a Sceptic, but to believe that there was such a thing, as truth; yet he might then see too much cause to despair of ever finding the certain way that led to it, among so many By-paths of error and uncertainty.  
And even now in the Christian World, the many errors in Opinions, and the more fatal Heresies, of wicked practices, do sufficiently-testify, that Truth doth not enjoy such an undisturbed Empire, as might have been hoped and wished, since Christ's appearance in the Flesh. Now among all these disadvantages, under which Truth always laboured, and even still labours, Providence hath more especially provided these two ways for the preservation of it. 1. By natural inscription upon the minds of men. 2. By after revelation for the further illustration and confirmation of it. And these two are, as it were, the two Pillars, that have preserved it, both from the deluge of Sin, and the violence of all other opposition.  
1. Natural Inscription. I hope, I shall not need to desire the Reader, not to impose any such gross sense upon this word, as is inconsistent with the nature of an Immaterial Soul.  
I shall here therefore first briefly explain, what I mean by truth of first Inscription, or natural Notions: For the Defendant has always leave to state his own Question, and to declare in what sense he undertakes the defence of it: this I the rather intimate, because some Men will put such a Sense upon these words, innate, imprinted or impressed, frequently made use of in this Question, as none that I know of, go about to defend.  
First, I do not here assert the Opinion of the Platonists, concerning innate Ideas, in all its circumstances: I do not here suppose the Soul to praexist; nor do I make all the knowledge we have in this state, to be nothing but reminiscence or recollection of what we knew in the other.  
Secondly, These natural Notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul, as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in Children and Idiots) without any assistance from the outward Senses, or without the help of some previous Cultivation. For thus reason itself, which yet, we say, is natural to a Man, is not so born with him, but that it requires some supervenient assistances, before it arrive at the true exercise of itself: and it is as much as I here contend for, if these notions be in the same sense connatural to the Soul, as reason itself is.  
But Thirdly, The use of our Understandings being first supposed; that is, our faculties labouring of no natural defect, nor deprived of those other advantages, that God and Nature have made necessary thereunto, than our Souls have a native power of finding or framing such Principles or Propositions, the Truth or Knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the evidence of sense or observation: thus knowing what is meant by a whole, and what by a part, hence naturally results the truth of this Proposition, totum est majus sui parte, without being any ways obliged to sense for it. Of this nature are those universal Propositions, the truth whereof doth not depend upon the actual Existence of any thing; as quicquid agit, est, etc. Now, I suppose, we may easily discern a difference betwixt the Truth of such Propositions, as these, and those others, which are brought by some to vie with those natural Notions, viz. White is not black, Fellowness is not sweetness, etc.  
I shall here 1. inquire into the grounds and reasons upon which Dr. Parker, late Bishop of Oxford, in his account of the Platonic Philosophy, asserts Experimental Observation to be the great Rule and Measure of Truth: And first he blames the Platonic Theology for resolving Knowledge into its first and fundamental Principles. But Knowledge is of a larger extent than that which relates strictly to natural Philosophy, or what is the object of sensible Experiment. There is also a Metaphysical Knowledge, a truth of Propositions, which no ways depends upon Observation; so that, I suppose, when the Platonists spoke of resolving Science into its first Principles, they only meant such Knowledge as was capable of such Resolutions: They did not suppose us born with innate notions of such things, the Knowledge whereof depends upon Experience: and therefore we ought not to measure the Truth or Falsehood of many late Inventions, by searching for the respective Ideas of 'em in our Minds. Indeed as to matters of natural Philosophy, it is a much more certain way of resolving such Knowledge, so far as can be done, into the testimony of Sense and Experience, than into any imaginary Principles of Speculation.  
But he tells us, That the Mind from particular Observations doth make general Rules, which after an exact Scrutiny, and comparing of every Individual, are justly admitted for proleptick and fundamental Verities, and that general Axioms are only the results and abridgements of a multitude of single Experiments, and that from the plain experience of several Instances, that we cannot look abroad, but we see the parts always less than the whole. Hence we gather this Maxim, totum est majus suâ parte: this indeed is plausible popular Discourse, but not severely Philosophical. For what if one should come and tell us, that in a certain place in the East-Indies, he found the contrary to his observation to be true, viz. That the parts there were bigger than the whole: I know not what we could Answer, in this Case, upon the former Principles; for according to them, this Proposition, totum est, etc. is true, only, with this his Proviso, so far as hath been yet observed. But now we find in things of mere Observation, some particulars to contradict what has been before generally received for true. Besides, I never heard of any general Council or Company of Men appointed to declare, when particular observations had undergone a sufficient trial and probation, so that they then might be admitted into proleptick and fundamental verities; and I conceive, no Man's private authority is enough to do it. It is very difficult, if it all possible, to convince a Sceptic; yet are there more strong and probable ways of arguing with him, than this, which found'st all truth upon experimental observation: for thus the truth and certainty of any proposition can arrive no higher than this, That so far as is yet observed, 'tis true. Now this seems only a more ingenuous and well-natured piece of Scepticism; for the more moderate of 'em will grant truth of appearance, and tell you, That Snow seems white, but whether it be so or no, they know not.  
But to what purpose, says he, should God imprint such obvious and evident Notions upon men's minds? To this I answer, 1. That it must be granted, that it is at least possible for God to imprint truths upon the minds of Men: and if so, than it cannot be done any other way, than by making 'em thus plain and self evident; for we cannot suppose any other way, than by making 'em such, as do suâ luce patere. So that supposing this possible, and supposing God to reduce this possibility into act, and really and actually imprint 'em; yet the objection would lie still as strong against 'em, as formerly: So that this is only such an objection as would lie against an acknowledged truth, which we commonly say, upon that account, is none at all.  
2. He must give us leave to suppose these natural Notions, till such time as he has evinced the contrary. Now in strictness of Argument, we ought not to urge the needlessness of imprinting such obvious and evident Notions, against those, who say that these truths do in a great measure, owe their clearness and evidence to their being thus imprinted: they are indeed evident from the Nature of the Thing, and to us evident from the Nature and Constitution of our Faculties, that we cannot apprehend 'em otherwise.  
And as for Observation, that only claims in the Third place— sic à Iove tertius haeres. So that the needlessness of imprinting such evident Notions cannot be argued from their present clearness; because it is their being thus imprinted or thus connatural to our minds, that makes 'em so.  
If it be here replied, That however they would be sufficiently evident merely by observation; It is not certain, that they would be thus sufficiently so, as was before intimated. However we have no reason to find fault, if God has given us more and clearer evidences, than perhaps were absolutely necessary.  
But suppose, says he, that we were born with these innate Notions, how shall we be assured, but that error may be the natural Result of our Faculties?  
Here indeed is such a doubt raised, as I see not, how he either gives, or can give a satisfactory Answer to, according to his Principles. For supposing that the seeds of error may be the natural results of our Faculties; that is, Supposing our Faculties may be false, I do not see, how their truth can be evinced by the most wary and discreet experience: and this, he says, is the only way, by which to do it. For if error may be the natural result of my Faculties, that is, If my superior Faculties be false, I may then justly suspect my lower: If I may be deceived in what, by the most clear and distinct methods of reasoning, I conceive to be true; I have then little reason to trust my Senses.  
Here I shall further do these two things, 1. Show that the Seeds of Error are not the natural results of our Faculties. 2. If they were, the most wary and discreet experience would not at all help us, in our searches after truth and certainty.  
1. It is not possible, that the seeds of error should, etc. in those things, that we clearly and distinctly perceive to be true; and this will appear,  
First, From the nature of Man, as he is a rational Creature: now rationality includes in it one or both of these two things.  
1. Some certain and undoubted Principles, which are to be the Foundations of Truth and Goodness.  
2. However a natural power or faculty of making right consequences, and drawing necessary Conclusions from true premises, which way soever we come by 'em. Now the possibility of our Faculties being false, is not consistent with either of these.  
Secondly, This further appears from the nature of the divine Attributes: for considering the excellency and goodness of the Divine Nature, he could not give us such faculties, as should deceive us in clarè & distinctè perceptis, as D. Cartes has well observed: for this would argue either weakness or malice in God; either that he stood in need of such fallacious methods to bring about his designs, or that he did purposely impose upon his Creatures. All that can be here pretended, is this, that indeed it would have reslected dishonourably upon God to have created us so at first, as that error should be the natural result of our faculties. But then, what if by some offence, either of our own, or of some other in our stead, this be brought upon us as a just punishment, the contrary sat to Cassandra, that as she always spoke true, yet never was believed: so on the contrary, we should always believe our faculties, though they never spoke true. But those that make this objection, do either believe the Scriptures, or they do not: If they do, than it must be the Sin of Adam, that had this malignant influence upon all Mankind. But then by the same Scriptures we are as fully assured, that the punishment hereof did not extend so far; as we are, that it did at all descend upon his Posterity. That our faculties are weakened, and we hereby become more liable to error by Adam's Fall, is certainly true: but that our faculties are so corrupted, that we are become uncapable of perceiving natural truth, is that which the Scriptures deny, and what the assertors of Original Sin, in its greatest latitude, do not affirm.  
If they be such as do not believe the Scriptures, yet the objection itself doth suppose a God, that is, a being infinitely Wise, Just and Good. Now upon this supposal we may easily refute this unreasonable surmise. For this would introduce such disorder and confusion into the World, as would be inconsistent with the nature of God, who is a God of Order, to suffer it. According to this supposal, we could never come to the certain knowledge of our fault, for which this punishment was inflicted: for if our faculties should any ways acquaint us with such a thing, what reason had we to think, that they should rightly inform us in this particular, and be false in all the rest? Nor could we ever come to the certain knowledge of the means and methods of amendment; for according to this we ought to act contrary to our reason, in obedience to our Principles, as supposing the dictates of our faculties to be false: and several other such like absurdities would follow hence, which would be unworthy of a wise and good Man to suffer in the World, if it was in his power to help; much more unworthy of an infinitely wise and good God.  
2. If we should once suppose our faculties to be false; I am afraid we should be condemned to Eternal Scepticism; however beyond the power of the most wary experience to relieve us. Lastly, he tells us, That the only way to be satisfied of the truth of these notions, is to examine them by a wary and discreet Experience: and if so, to what purpose do they serve? for before I have made trial, I cannot use them, because I have no reason to trust 'em; and Experience makes 'em useless, because Experimental Knowledge is of all others the most certain and most indubitable.  
To this I Answer, That suppose these natural Notions were not so certain in themselves, but that they stood in need of some further confirmation by experience: yet would they not be altogether useless, both as they would encourage us in our Trials with fair hopes of success; and then afterwards when we found the experiment fully to answer to, and agree with our former Conceptions, the concurrent testimony of these two Witnesses would more fully assure us in the belief of those things thus variously attested: tho' indeed, it would be very hard to try the truth of some Propositions by Experiment, such as this, Nihili nullae sunt affectiones, etc.  
But here a little more positively to lay down my apprehensions herein, I conceive that God, from all Eternity, did see and know the natures of things, and the several Relations they either did, or possibly could bear to one another: and this is that which some call Ideas in the Divine Intellect, or objects of the Divine Understanding. Thus what God understands to be either true or good, that is necessarily so; as a Learned Man expresses it, the Divine Will and Omnipotence itself has no Dominion over the Divine Understanding. For if the nature of truth and goodness did wholly depend upon the mere positive Command of God, and the arbitrary determination of his Will, then could we not be so fully assured, but that the whole Scheme, both of Truth and Morality, might be changed, and that which is now Virtue, might afterwards become Vice; and so on the contrary: the very possibility whereof is very unworthy of God, and inconsistent with that notion, which we have of him. Thus, I conceive, things are in respect of God. Now in respect of us, he hath communicated something of a Divine Ray, relating both to Intellectual and Moral Notices, into the very constitution of our humane Nature; something that is both a light and a law unto us: and this the very Nature and end of such Creatures (as God designed to make us, that is, Rational and Religious) did require.  
I know I must expect to meet with great opposition in the management of this Argument. I am very conscious to myself of my own inabilities: but I thank God, I am not conscious of having said any thing against, but, as far as in me lies, to promote the designs of truth and holiness. — Veniam petimusque damusque vicissim.  
D. Carls, though he grant Eternal Truths, yet these he only derives from the Divine Will. God, says he, is not only the Author of the Existences, but of the Essences of things: and as it was in his power whether any thing had existed or no; so also their Essences depended upon his free determination, Ep. 37. Part I. He tells us, that it was equally free sore God at first to have made this true, that the Lines drawn from the Centre of a Circle to the Circumference, should not be equal. But doth not this weaken the force of his own Argument, drawn from clear and distinct perception: for we do as clearly and distinctly perceive that the lines in that case should be equal; as we do the truth of this Proposition, Cogito, ergo sum. If it be here replied, That supposing such a Constitution of our Natures, as at present we have, than things cannot be otherwise than now we apprehend them; but if either the srame of our Natures had been otherwise at first, or shall afterwards be changed, than the things also had been, or may be otherwise. But now the only way to confute such an extravagant Supposal, is to appeal to Men's more serious and impartial Thoughts: would not the very possibility of such a thing be very dishonourable to God? would it not introduce such a Fate into the World, as would also introduce a necessity of asserting an immoral Deity? Or should we be ever able to assert and descend the just Rights and Interests of Truth and Goodness upon this Supposal? So that as before I observed of Experimental Observation, That the highest degree of Certainty we can arrive at, by that Principle, is only this, That such or such a Thing, so far as has been yet observed, is true. So here, though such or such a Thing (I speak now of such as we call universal Truths) be at present clearly and distinctly perceived to be true, yet at first it might have been otherwise, and may, for aught we know, be so hereafter: And what he asserts of speculative Truths, the same also he says of moral Notions of Good and Evil.  
Resp. 6. There's nothing, neither matter of actual Existence, nor reason of Truth and Goodness, but what depends upon God: If by depending upon God, he means dependence upon his Will; so that it was free for God to have made these Reason's just contrary to what they now are, which seems to be what he there means, then in this sense they do not depend upon the Divine Will: If by dependence upon God he means this, That there is nothing either of actual existence, or reasons of Truth and Goodness, but what owes its being to some relation it bears to God. This I grant, for even these Rationes veri & boni, do owe their Essences to the relation they bear to the Rectitude and Sanctity of the Divine Nature; these were the proper and necessary Objects of Infinite Wisdom from all Eternity, and do there only originally exist.  
So that perhaps that which seemed harsh to Des Cartes, was this, That there should be any Thing that was absolutely independent of God, which no one here asserts; only we say, those Rationes veri & boni depend upon, or consist in that relation they bear to the Divine Understanding, as the existence of other things of more indifferency, do upon his Will. Not but that these notions of Good and Evil have yet received a further impression of their respective obligations (to perform the one, and avoid the other) from the Divine Will, that though they were not only therefore good, because God willed them; yet he hath made them now more absolutely and indispensibly so, by adding the ratification of the Divine Will to their antecedent Natures. Nor can that place of Genesis, That God saw that all things were good, that is, says he, according to the determination of his Will; yet granting this, this place cannot with any just reason, be extended further than the material Creation: so that though that was therefore good, because God willed so to make it; yet it doth not therefore follow that those Rationes veri & boni were only so upon the same account: or if it be extended further than the material Creation, then why may not things be good, because God knew them to be so, before the determination of his will?  
I do indeed here suppose some kind of distinction betwixt the Divine Understanding and the Divine Will; and if it be here objected, that there is no such distinction of these in God, yet I humbly conceive, that we may, in obedience to our own imperfect modes of conception, conceive of God according to our best and utmost Capacity; provided that we do not wilfully and maliciously derogate from the excellency of his Nature. Now it seems more honourable to God, and more agreeable to those Revelations he hath made of himself in Scripture, to assert, that Good and Evil do not so depend upon his will, as that he can alter the fundamental Grounds and Reasons of them: though our highest conceptions cannot answer the excellency of the Divine Nature; yet certainly we may mediate upon God, without any danger of committing Idolatry, or dishonouring him in our Thoughts, provided that we act according to the best of our possibilities.  
Dr. Camberland also, the present learned Bishop of Peterborough, seems to be no great Favourer of these common or natural Notions; though I humbly conceive, that the design of that great Man, in his Book De legibus Naturae, is not directly to oppose ' erm: as may appear, 1. if we consider the Persons against whom he writ, that is, the Epicureans, as he himself asserts in his 5th Paragraph of his Prolegomena, against whom he thought that way and method would not be so Argumentative, seeing it was wholly rejected and dehyed by 'em. Or, 2dly, The times in which he writ: thus in the 4th Paragraph of his Prolegomena, he chose rather that method there made use of, Hisce saltem temporibus; that is, in an Age more Philosophically curious and inquisitive, in an Age that will-not believe any thing, but what comes fairly attested and sufficiently proved. And lastly, If we consider his own declaration of his Opinion, which he lays down with the greatest Candour; thus, Non impossibile est, ut & nobiscum nascantur hujusmodi notitiae, & ab extra denuò imprimantur: So that we see, he doth not absolutely oppose these natural Notions, only he thought it more convenient, in respect of the Persons against whom, and the times and places in which he writ, rather to pitch upon another method. Thus his design in that Book, was to show, That the universal practice of Virtue and Piety was not only our Duty, but our Interest, and so founded the Obligation of the Laws of Nature in that more universally acknowledged and more generally prevailing principle of real advantage to ourselves. Now this was a design suitable to the profoundness of his Meditations, very agreeable to the Genius of the present Age, and indeed every way so noble and generous, that none that are Friends to Virtue, can with any reason oppose his undertaking; especially considering with what respect he treats that Opinion, which (though he doth not contradict, yet there) seems less to favour: Thus doth he streugthen Virtue there, where it seems the weakest, and not in the mean time to deprive it of any of its former assistances, he fortifies it against the new Assaults of its modern Enemies, and resuses not to join issue with them in a way, wherein they think they have the most advantage. But yet that first part of his own Assertion, Non impossibile est, ut & nobiscum nascantur hujusmodi notitiae:] This I look upon as so great a Truth, that I shall beg leave a little further to illustrate it. As for his Opinion, that these Notices are again imprinted from without, I shall not oppose it; only, I humbly conceive, there are such good Reasons for the former part, that of their being born with us, that it ought not to be excluded: As 1. This seems more agreeable to the plain simplicity of former times, and to the less Philosopical Genius of many of those places, wherein notwithstanding these Laws of Nature were generally received and acknowledged: and seeing they were so, and that by those who had neither opportunity nor capacity to inquire more profoundly into the formal Reasons and Causes of them any further, than as they were conscious to themselves both of their truth and obligation; hence it seems very probable, that there was some other way by which they might and did attain to the Knowledge of 'em, without such Philosophical Disquisitions. And indeed the very attempt to search into the Causes and Reasons of a Thing seems to suppose that we have at least some knowledge of the Thing beforehand, as to matter of fact: for Men would scarce go about to inquire into the Reasons and Causes of the Laws of Nature, if they had not some consciousness to themselves, that there were such Things in Nature; and we cannot, for the reason beforementioned, say, that they then only first came to be known, when the Causes of'em were thus searched into. And though 'tis true, that the whole Order of Nature duly considered, doth generally conspire to the confirmation of this Truth, that the doing our duty is the best way to secure our Interest; yet such is the intricacy many times of Divine Providence, and the visible inequality in the distribution of Rewards and Punishments in this life, that without the Motives and Encouragements of some other Arguments, Men would hardly be persuaded to the practice of that, of which they did not see the present Advantage. And though Vice and Wickedness, especially in any high degree, do naturally tend to the prejudice of our Healths, and ruin of our Estates; yet if there were no other way to attain to the knowledge of our Duty, or of our obligation to it, we might perhaps sometimes with too much reasoes plead ignorance thereof, and might pretend a liberty to be vicious, at least so far, as might be without any considerable prejudice to our Healths or Fortunes: not but that Rewards and Punishments are naturally interwoven in the frame and order of the Universe without us, and the constitution of humane Nature within us; that so, though sometimes there may be an unequal distribution of outward Rewards and Punishments, yet that Virtue might always be sure, at least of a secret recompense, and Vice not altogether go unpunished, even here in this Life. But though our duty be always our real Interest, and Honesty the best Policy; yet such is the disorder and confusion which Sin has introduced into humane Nature, such the general depravation of Mankind, that the truth of these Propositions is not readily many times acknowledged by us: but Men commonly, without any regard, either to the present nature of things, or their future consequences, do make Lust and Passion, and a mistaken Self-Interest, the Rule of all their Actions.  
2. I would here propound it to consideration, whether our now being able to resolve these Laws of Nature into their further Causes, as it is called, and to demonstrate their Obligations from reasons fetched from the Constitution of the Universe: whether, I say, this doth not depend upon that clearer Revelation, which God hath made of those things in Scripture; for hereby we come to a clearer Knowledge of the Nature and End of the Creation, how that the whole Universe acts, in subserviency to the glory of God, and to the promoting those noble ends of Providence, of promoting Virtue, and discouraging Vice in the World: hereby we are also more fully assured of a future state of Rewards and Punishments. And these also must be comprehended in the full and adequate Sanction of the Laws of Nature; for without these, the other of temporal Rewards and Punishments, would be found many times deficient and ineffectual, for what they were there designed. Now these things being more clearly revealed, and sully confirmed to us by holy Scripture, and the belief hereof, made habitual to us, by the long succession of many Ages, hence probably that method becomes now more evident to us, than otherwise it would have been; yet if this should be granted, that, at least, the evidence of that Proposition (studium communis boni totius systematis agentium naturalium conducit ad bonum singularum partium, quo nostra, velut partis unius, continetur foelicitas) doth in some measure depend upon some further Revelations made known to us by the Christian Religion; yet it would be no small or inconsiderable advantage hereby gained to Virtue, if it be proved, that that Proposition is of equal extent with the Christian World, both as to its Truth and Evidence: and both these methods of probation being joined together, seem an undeniable Argument of the Divinity of these Laws; in that the God of Nature hath both made 'em natural to the minds of Men, which is that which I here mean by Impression; and hath also further added the respective Sanctions of rewards and punishments thereunto in the natural frame of the Universe.  
Not as if that other way of resolving these Laws of Nature into those natural Notions and Obligations resulting therefrom, was destitute of its proper Sanctions of rewards and punishments; but then we say, according to this method, they are not resolved only into these penal Sanctions, but that the will of the Lawgiver, being published with an intent to be obeyed, is the intrinsic form of a Law, though it did not come attended with outward force, not but that these penal Sanctions do also further declare and enforce the Law.  
If it be here objected, that it is not easy to conceive the way and manner how these natural Notions are, or can be imprinted upon the minds of Men. I answer, there is no more difficulty in conceiving how these truths and obligations may be the natural results of our Minds rightly qualified at first; than it is to conceive, how those joys and Torments, which ariso from the sense of our Innocence and Gild, should be the natural results of our Consciences afterwards: which yet are acknowledged by those who make the objection.  
That a Virtuous and holy Life doth naturally tend to promote the honour of God, and the good of all Men in general, and of ourselves in particular, is readily granted, especially by those, who believe the Christian Religion: but then this Proposition doth suppose, First, That we know, what it is to be Virtuous. Secondly, That this Virtuous and holy Life is a duty incumbent on us; and both these, in order of nature, before we understand, that these tend to the glory of God, and the good of Men: otherwise the Virtuoso's of our Age, those who pretend to be Philosophically Religious, might perhaps plead this in excuse of their present Wickedness, that they are only at present making an Experiment, whether Vice may not as well tend to the public good, as Virtue: but as soon as they find the contrary by Experience, than they will become devout Proselytes to Virtue.  
But Mr. Tyrrell, p. 199. tells us, That though all Men do not ordinarily reduce the Laws of Nature into that single Proposition of endeavouring the common good of all rational beings, or may not have an explicit Notion of it: yet it a Man be but thoroughly convinced; that he is not made for himself alone, that he doth truly observe the Laws of Nature towards himself, by a temperate and rational Life, towards his Neighbour, by observing the great Rule of doing as he would be done by; such an one, tho' never so ignorant in other things, yet contributes his share to the common good, etc. There is no doubt but he doth, but then may we not rather argue thus, that since Men do not ordinarily reduce the Laws of Nature into that one single Proposition, as indeed having no explicit notion of it, and yet do their Duties, both towards God, their Neighbours, and themselves; that therefore they have some other way of coming to the Knowledge of their Duty, without resolving the Laws of Nature into their proper Causes, as it is called.  
Dr. Lock, the Ingenious Author of the Essay of humane Understanding, has spent the First Part of his Book wholly against these innate Principles, relating either to Speculation or Practice. One great objection that he brings against 'em is this, that Children and Idiots have no apprehension of 'em, and therefore they cannot be any original Impressions upon the minds of Men; because if they were, they would soon appear in such, these being supposed now to be in puris naturalibus, not tinctured with any adventitious prejudices of Art or Education: and upon this account also there cannot be pleaded that universal consent, that is pretended to be given to these original Notions, or common Principles; seeing thus perhaps one third part of Mankind do not assent to 'em. In Answer hereto, 1. I observe that those who make this objection, as I before intimated, will not give the Defendant leave to state his own Question, and explain his own sense and meaning of it, but will put such a sense upon these words, innat●●●r natural, as if a thing could not be thus natural or innate to the Soul, unless it did so immediately and necessarily stare Children and Fools in the Face; that they must necessarily assent thereto, even before, by the common course of nature, they are capable of assenting to any thing: whereas those who defend this Question, make these ●●●●●●l or innate notions more conditional things, depending upon the Concurrence of several other circumstances, in order to the Souls exerting of 'em. Thus the Ingenious Mr. Tyrrell has well observed of Mr. Hobbs, that he only takes the measure of humane nature from those Passions, which precede the use of reason, and as they first and chiefly show themselves in Children and Fools and Persons unexperienced; where as according to the Opinion of the best Philosophers, we suppose the truer nature of man ought rather to be taken from his utmost perfection, viz. his reason, etc. p. 256. So here 'tis thought that the truer judgement of these natural notions ought to be taken rather from the most perfect state of Man, rather than as they either do, or do not show themselves in Children and Idiots. And whereas 'tis asserted, that these general Maxims are assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms rightly understood: to this the Ingenious Author Dr. Lock replies, that then there must be an infinite number of innate notions, even those which no one ever yet pretended to be such, as, an Apple is not an Oyster, black is not white, etc. Now these and such as these, he says, are more readily assented to, than those, quicquid agit, est, contradictories cannot be both true at once, etc. because Children and Fools will readily assent to the former: but these latter require more attentive-thought and consideration for the understanding of 'em. I shall not here mention that distinction, which the Logicians perhaps would make use of in this Case, of some things being more known in themselves, and yet not so to us; because I know not what credit now a-days may be given to Men of that old-fashioned way of thinking. But the Ingenious Author himself doth assert these three ways of acquiring Knowledge. First, By intuition, thus we have the knowledge of our being, p. 318. Man also knows by intuitive certainly, that bore nothing cannot produce any real being, p. 312. The second way of Knowledge is by Reason. Thirdly, By Sensation. Now the Knowledge of these Universal Truths, or general Maxims, I conceive, is by the first way, rather by intuition than by reasoning, or by the consent or descent of the terms. For these Propositions, Cogito, ergo sum, or that upon which this depends, quicquid agit, est, bore nothing cannot produce a real being: the truth of these Propositions doth not so much depend upon any consideration of the terms; but seems rather the summary result of the whole, which that Author seems very well to express by intuition, or intuitive certainly. But then as to those other Propositions, wherein we deny one Idea of another, as, a Man is not an Horse, blue is nor yellow, etc. The truth of these depends upon the actual existence of Things, and the consensus & dissensus terminorum.  
But Mr. Norris, the ingenious Author of the Reflections upon the foresaid Essay, of Humane Understanding, pag. 20. doth not allow any such Things, as Mental Impressions or Characters upon the Mind, what way soever they may pretend to come there: So that though he agrees with Dr. Lock in denying all natural and innate Notions in the Mind of Man; yet it is for other Reasons than those which Dr. Lock goes upon, and upon a far different Hypothesis. So that Mr. Norris his Reflections may be a sufficient Answer to Dr. Lock's Opinion, as it is defended by him, showing the invalidity of the Grounds and Reasons upon which he found'st it: though in the mean time he agrees with him in the conclusion, in denying all Natural and Native Characters upon the Soul. Which thing, says he, in the place above cited, Of Mental Impressions or Characters written upon the Mind, if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor, I take to be mere jargon and unintelligible Cant.  
But here, I humbly conceive, that when we speak of Natural Notions, or Native Impressions of Truth and Goodness made upon the Minds of Men, though perhaps there may be something of Metaphor in it; yet the sense and meaning of it, is generally understood: nor is there any danger, lest any one should hence conclude the Soul to be made of White-paper, and the Knowledge we find there to be written with Pen and Ink, Heb. 10. 26. I will put my laws in their hearts, and in or upon their minds will I write them: That is, says Dr. Taylor, Dust. Dubit. p. 4. You shall be governed by the Law of natural and essential Equity and Reason, by that Law which is put into every Man's Nature; and besides this, whatsoever else shall be super-induced, shall be written in their Minds by the Spirit, who shall write all the Laws of Christianity in the Tables of your Consciences. Now I do not see any need of any such curious Remark either upon the Text or Comment; that if this pretend to any thing more than Figure or Metaphor, than it is mere jargon and unintelligible Cant. 2. Those who assert these Natural Notions, do not suppose them super-induced or imprinted upon the Soul, In esse completo; but suppose them to be native Properties and Qualifications of the Soul, as it is such as God first designed to make it; that is, Rational and Religious. Now it can be no mere jargon to ascribe to a Subject its own natural and essential Properties, such as are the very essential parts of its Constitution. They do also suppose, with Mr. Norris, the ideal World, or Ideas in the Divine Intellect, which are the Archetypal Forms or Patterns of all Truth; these they say, are communicated to the Soul in a way and proportion suitable to such a being; that is, they are made either the natural Properties of its being, as such, or the necessary and immediate result of its Faculties, in the right use and free exercise of'em. But the Author in the forementioned place tells us, That he accounts for the mode of Humane Understànding after a very different way, viz. by the presentialness of the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or ideal World to our Souls, wherein we see and perceive all things. So that denying all mental Impressions, not only innate Notions, but also those, which according to Dr. Lock, derive their Original from Sensation or Reslection; he asserts all sensible, moral, and intellectual Objects are only seen and understood in the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Thus in his Book of Reason and Religion, p. 85. This ideal World, this Essence of God considered, as variously exhibitive and representative of things, is no other than the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the second Person in the ever blessed Trinity; this I think, says he, is highly agreeable to Reason: for I know no Hypothesis that would so intelligibly make out the Eternal Generation of the Son of God.  
Against this Opinion, I shall briefly suggest these few Prejudices, which whether they be real or only imaginary, I shall leave to the Reader to judge. 1. I grant that every good Christian, so far as in him lies, aught to defend against the Socinians, the Mysteries of the Trinity from all palpable and downright Contradictions. But than it is questioned by some, whether it be either modest, or indeed possible to invent Hypotheses, which may, as the Author speaks, Intelligibly make out these Mysteries; or whether the Eternal Generation of the Son of God may not as well remain, as indeed it is, an Incomprehensible Mystery, as thus explained, by making the ideal World and the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be one and the same thing. 2lv, Though the natural parturiency of the Authors own Mind, p. 185. of his Reason and Religion, did early pitch upon this Notion, of seeing and knowing all things in God, as easy and obvious, even before he had consulted any Authors herein; yet other men's Capacities may be so dull, as not easily to apprehend the manner of it, even now after such an exact Elaboration.  
3. According to his Hypothesis, there seems not a sufficient difference and distinction betwixt natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation, seeing God must immediately apply himself to the Souls of Men in both, and there is no natural ground or foundation in Man for one more than for the other.  
4. It seems not so becoming that profound veneration we ought to have of the Majesty of God, thus to make the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it were, the Glass of every trivial perception of sensible objects.  
5. May not his Hypothesis, of seeing and perceiving all things in God, seem to discourage or lessen the diligent use of our Faculties in the search of Truth? or may it not encourage Enthusiasm, by giving Men occasion to think, that the only way to Knowledge is, fantastically to give themselves up to the Impressions of the Ideal World? These things I here propound to Consideration, though withal, I think that it is more easy to oppose the particular manner of any Man's explaining humane Understanding, than it is to lay down a true one of his own.  
But lastly, That which seems of the greatest consequence is, that the Author dangerously forces some places of Scripture only to make 'em favour the peculiarity of his notion. Thus Io. 1. 3. all things were made by him, or according to him, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 89. Reason and Religion, and p. 90. Heb. 1. By him God is said to make the Worlds, that is, says he, according to the eternal exemplars or platforms in this ideal World. Now if the Arrians were justly blamed for putting that interpretation upon those words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, thereby to signify an Instrumental Cause, as if the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was only an Instrument in the hand of God, in creating the World, how much more than ought this interpretation to be rejected, which makes the second Person in the Trinity only an Exemplar or Platform, according to which God made the World: but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a Genitive Case in Scripture, generally signifies the efficient Cause: And however, I believe, he will no where in Scripture find it in that sense, which he there puts upon it: So that this ingenious Author seems not so successful in assigning his own particular way of humane Understanding, as he was in confuting that of Dr. Lock's. And here I would further appeal to the considerate Reader, whether this way of seeing and perceiving all things in the ideal World, if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor, whether it be not as mere jargon, and unintelligible Cant, as the other.  
Anima est abrasa tabula, nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius erat in sensu. These, and such like Opinions, seem to owe that general reception they meet withal, rather to the Authority of their first Founder, than to any strength of reason, that would be found in 'em, did they once undergo a severer Examination: this Opinion seems to tie the Soul to its particular Seat, or at most, gives it leave only to go a begging to the Cinque-Ports of the Senses, not only for all the Notices it receives from abroad, but also for all the knowledge it enjoys at home.  
That the Soul, by the very Laws of Creation, was at first dependant upon the Body, and by the first transgression of the Divine Law, is now more deeply immersed in matter, and a greater Slave thereto than it was by nature, is certainly true: but then the Image of God, wherein Man was at first Created, did first more especially respect the Soul. 2. It consisted in the respective Endowments and Perfections of the Understanding and Will, viz. in Knowledge and Righteousness. And therefore 3. Not in a mere capacity, or bare possibility of having this Pourtraicture drawn afterwards upon the Soul, by the assistance of the outward Senses, but in something at first actually existent in itself. And supposing this to be the true state of the Case before the Fall, it is proportionably the same since: for though the Fall did very much weaken our Facultics; yet it did not wholly alter or invert the method of acquiring, or retaining Knowledge. There are indeed some, who define an Idea to be nothing else, but the similitude or representation of a thing made in the Brain: which definition being so peculiarly appropriated to mere sense and fancy, they cannot conceive any Idea, or Conception to reside any where else; and that we talk mystically and unintelligibly, if we suppose any other Idea, to which that definition doth not, or cannot belong. But tho' it may be justly questioned, whether the mode of sensation be yet fully and clearly explicated, viz. how the fancy can represent outward objects in proportionable similitudes to the superior perceptive faculties, seeing perhaps it would be very difficult to demonstrate, that any thing, besides motion, can be communicated to the Seat of the Soul; yet I shall at present grant, that the Understanding doth make use of the Representations of the Fancy for the apprehending those things, which were there first impressed: and thus I here suppose all material objects are apprehended by such sensible representations.  
But now the Question is, Whether the Understanding cannot frame right Notions or Apprehesions: of those things, which according to our modes of conception, neither are, nor can be represented by the Fancy: Whether there be not some things knowable, both moral and intellectual Objects, relating both to Truth and Goodness, which are not, and cannot be the Objects of Sense. So that whatever it is that terminates the Act of the Understanding, that may be properly called an Idea, Notion, or Conception.  
Nihil est intellectu, quod non, etc. This cannot be universally true, in that latitude wherein some would take it: For Aristotle himself grants a Power of judging, of drawing Consequences from particular Instances, to the Understanding, which doth not belong to the Sense; and this Power, I suppose, will be granted to be something: and indeed it is most probable, that he did not extend that saying any further, than as it relates only to sensible and material Objects.  
One Argument commonly made use of, to prove the Soul distinct from the Body, doth also prove the Operations of Sense and Fancy, distinct from those of the Understanding: That Faculty of the Mind, say they, by which we reason and judge of Objects, is so far from being a Body, that it must withdraw itself from all bodily Representations, when it sets itself to contemplate more speculative and sublime Truths: for if the Soul should always frame its Notions according to the Notices of Sense, this would only betray it into Error; but now when it abstracts from this, and with Reason corrects what may be there justly deemed amiss, this evidently shows the distinction of these two Faculties, and the superiority of the one above the other.  
So that that opinion which makes the Soul so wholly to depend upon the representations of sense in all its operations, seems to have a bad influence upon the belief of its immateriality, or however, upon the excellency of its way of acting, by making it more subject to the Body, than God and Nature ever made it.  
Those therefore who either from the observation of the accidental bad use, that some Men make of the distinction of these two Faculties; or from the difficulty they themselves find in assigning the differences betwixt 'em, are therefore inclined to believe, that there is no difference at all. These Men like unskilful Artists, do rather cut then loose the knot: and like those inconsiderate Men, who from the difficulties and seeming irregularities of Providence; or from their own inabilities or unwillingness to take the pains to solve 'em, do take, as they think, this more compendious way to extricate themselves, viz. to deny that there is any such thing as Providence in the World.  
But it is here objected, that the opinion, which I here assert, lays a Foundation for Fanaticism and Enthusiasm, as it gives occasions for the Enthusiasts to think, that those Men are too much immersed in matter, and too great Slaves to sense and fancy, who do not presently apprehend their pretended illuminations and mysterious nonsense. I shall here therefore briefly show, wherein the nature of Enthusiasm doth properly consist; and that this opinion, which I here assert, is no ways chargeable with giving any occasion or encouragement to it.  
But 1. we may observe, that God in the wise disposals of his Providence has many times placed truth upon the Confines of Error; nor is it any disparagement to it, if sometimes, by reason of this Vicinity, it may accidentally give occasion to it. This should rather teach us the true exercise of our Understandings, to distinguish betwixt the false glosses and plausible appearances of Error, and the realities of Truth.  
2. I shall not here go about to recriminate, for to asperse other Men's Opinions is not to vindicate our own; for though they may be charged with as bad Consequences, as those they cast upon ours, yet this will not make our own innocent, if they be in themselves obnoxious. I might perhaps with as much or more reason charge Aristotle's Opinion, Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius erat in sensu, with giving countenance to Atheism, as the contrary doth to Enthusiasm. Dr. Cudworth's 5th Chap. Intellectual Systeme.  
This being briesly premised, I answer, That according to the most rational account of Enthusiasm, which found'st it only in some irregular and turbulent Motions arising from the Body, and acted more especially upon the Scene of Fancy: according to this, I do not see, how the aforesaid Opinion hath any more influence upon Enthusiasm, than it has upon any other Errors and false Opinions whatever.  
Thus the Enthusiast together with most other erring persons, do take their own mistaken Fancy and false Apprehensions for the Dictates of Reason and Understanding: So that Enthusiasm seems rather sounded in the contrary Opinion, in not distinguishing betwixt these two; and the Enthusiast of all others seems the least chargeable with this Error (if it be one) of distinguishing betwixt the Phantasins of Sense and Imagination, and the Ideas of the Understanding: for, as such, he scarcely acknowledges any higher Faculty in the Soul, than that of Fancy. So that that Opinion of distinguishing betwixt the Representations of Sense and the Ideas of the Understanding, hath not any natural tendency to favour Enthusiasm, unless we make it the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the first grand Foundation of all Errors and mistakes in general; for almost all erring persons do tell those that differ from 'em, that either they are not speculative enough rightly to apprehend their Notions; or that they are too much prejudiced with false Opinions, readily to entertain them.  
As an Appendix to this Chapter, I shall add some short Reflections upon the 10th Chap. 3. lib. of P. Poiret's Cogitat. rationales de Deo, and upon the 9th and 10th Chap. 2. lib. of Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi, concerning Eternal Truths.  
Some Reflections upon P. Poiret's Cogitationes rationales de Deo, lib. 3. Cap. 10. concerning Eternal Truths.  
The Question he thus states, p. 125. That God indeed doth necessarily conceive those Truths which immediately relate to himself, his Nature, Essence, and Attributes: He was never indifferent as to these; but as for all other Truths, Quae ipse Deus non sunt, which are not God himself; these wholly depend upon the most free and arbitrary Determination of his own Will, and are therefore only true because he appointed them to be so: and that there might, if God had so pleased, either have been none of these at all, or else quite different from what they now are; and he extends his Assertion to all Propositions, whether Mathematical or Moral, relating either to Truth or Goodness; and this he mannages with as much subtlety both of Argument and Answers, as perhaps the thing is capable of.  
But before I come more closely to examine his Opinion, I shall premise in general, 1. That it is very strange, that God who created Man after his own Image, in Knowledge and Righteousness, should yet assign the Methods of Knowledge and Understanding in Men, quite different from those of his own; we know the respect and relation that the Actions of the Understanding bear to those of the Will in Men, viz. That the one, those of the Understanding, always precede those of the Will. But now according to his Way and Method, it is quite contrary in God; for according to him God doth not know or understand any thing, but what he first determines to be so. I know not whether I may urge this in strictness of Argumentation, yet it seems at least a great presumption against the truth of his Opinion. 2. It is a plausible pretence of Piety, a seemingly profound Veneration and Respect for the absoluteness of the Divine Perfections, which seems either the chiefest Argument for, or the greatest Motive and Persuasive to his Opinion. This tender care for the Honour of the Divine Nature, is indeed a thing very commendable in itself, and very worthy of a Philosopher and a Christian; yet Men ought to be very careful and considerate herein, lest they lessen and derogate as much from the excellency of the Divine Nature one way, as they seem to advance it another.  
Now in order to a more particular Answer to his Opinion, I shall observe, 1. How in the Progress of his Discourse he relinquishes his own Principle, and limits the general extent of the question, as it was at first stated, so as that in effect he Answers himself; for he either doth himself tacitly, at least, or from his own assertions will be forced to acknowledge, That there is some truth antecedent to the Divine Placitum, or appointment.  
In his Answer to the first Objection, that God knows, what it is that he either will or will not appoint, so that his knowledge must precede his determination; to these Premises he returns no plain positive Answer, but only holds to the Conclusion, and says, that they who assert this, do pre-suppose, that there is something different from God, quod ante Dei arbitrium seu placitum habeat veritatem & possibilitatem à parte sui, which he says is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the grand original mistake: here he asserts, that God knows nothing to be true, nothing to be possible before his own respective determination of both: As to the first, I shall only return what Dr. Cudworth says, p. 646. of his Intellectual Systeme. This is to destroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof to devour and swallow up another, infinite will and power, infinite understanding and reason; for to suppose God to understand, and to be wise only by his will, is all one as to suppose him really to have no understanding at all. As to the other, the possibility of things, I would only ask him, whether or no, there was not a possibility in God of Creating or doing more things, than ever he actually Created or did; now this possibility must be something, and something which God knew he had in his power, antecedent to his determination.  
But notwithstanding he confidently holds to the Conclusion, non datur nec concipitur ullum quid ante Dei placitum: and in the very next words he tells us (and he doth not here suppose any Divine Placitum to intervene) Absurdum est dicere, etc. it is not much material to repeat what he there asserts. But how comes he to call any thing absurd in this Case: the thing perhaps may be so in itself, and may be counted so by others; but, according to his Principles, how can any thing be absurd, antecedent to the Divine Placitum, or appointment? For an absurdity doth suppose Truth and Falsehood, according to the agreeableness or disagreeableness to which rules, a thing is said to be absurd, or not absurd: but it is very hard for a man, who has undertaken such a Province, not sometimes to contradict himself. Res ipse nolunt malè determinari.  
He further grants, that there is a necessary truth in this Proposition, that a thing cannot simul esse & non esse: that it is impossible, that contradictories should be true at the same time: as may be seen at large, p. 133. for this would make God to be Statuens & non statuens, volens & non volens, ponens & non ponens eandem operationem; absurda haec sunt, etc. I am of his Opinion too herein. But than doth not this one concession destroy his former assertion; for why should this truth only be exempted from the common fate of all the rest. I think, Des Cartes acted, at least, more consistently with himself, when he went thorough with what he had undertaken, and tells us, that if God had pleased, contradictories might have been true at once: nor is it sufficient for him to say, that this would be absurd; both for the reason before mentioned, and also because several other of his assertions might be thus answered, That they are absurd. But he tells us, p. 126. That the contrary to his opinion destroys both the unity and absolute perfection of God; for there would not be one, absolutely perfect God, if he did conceive any thing necessarily true and immutable, habens similem secum radicitùs & essentialiter proprietatem, besides himself. But than what will he say to his former privileged Proposition, nihil potest esse, & non esse simul. This will either be a sufficient Answer to his Arguments of this Nature, or else he must make it an addition of another Person to the Trinity, and make it God himself. But why should he be so solicitous, lest, granting these moral and intellectual truths to be necessary and immutable, they should thus derogate from the divine perfection; for it doth not thence follow that these truths have Similem cum Deo radicitùs & essentialiter proprietatem: for these truths are only things of an intellectual nature, such as terminate the act of Divine Wisdom and Understanding; but no body says, that they have any radical or essential propriety univocally equal, or like to God.  
But further, What inconsistency, or what unbecomingness would there be in the Notion, if we thus conceived of God, that he is an infinitely wise and Omnipotent Being, comprehending Himself, and the extent of his own Power, that is, the Ideas of all the possibilities of things, together with all their several, either necessary, or accidental relations one towards another. So that according to this Scheme of things, these truths are but the necessary objects of Omniscience, or infinite Wisdom; so that it is impossible, that these necessary and immutable truths should any ways derogate from the Divine Perfections, seeing we cannot suppose God to be Omniscient, that is, infinitely perfect without 'em: neither would these truths be so absolutely Independent of themselves; for we can scarce suppose any moral good or evil, unless we first suppose a God, in Conformity, or Nonconformity to whose pure and holy nature, and to his Will, acting always according thereunto, consists the nature of both.  
The second thing I shall observe from his management of this Question is this; that as to things which relate to moral goodness, such is the awful power of truth, such is the natural modesty of Mankind, that inward sense they have of, and profound veneration for these things, that many times they are ashamed openly to assert that which yet may be the natural consequence of some false Principles they have entertained. And this seems the Case of this Author in this particular: for it is observable through his whole Discourse, he no where plainly and expressly asserts (which yet according to his Principles will necessarily follow) that God might, if he had so pleased, have appointed a quite contrary Scheme of Morality, or a Set or Systeme of moral truths just contrary to what they now are. Indeed he does say, p. 126. that this Divine Placitum was of its own nature indifferent, vel ad haec statuenda, vel plane omittenda, vel diversa decernenda, and that God might have represented himself to the minds of Men, per alia, nescio quae, quam per naturas rerum quales jam sunt, p. 136. Yet these seem to come short of asserting the quite contrary way and method. But some perhaps will say, that this is too favourable an interpretation put upon his words; but suppose it be, yet I would rather err on this side, than on the other: yet if it be but thus far true, it will be notwithstanding a sufficient confutation of his Opinion. But give me leave only to suggest the reason of that my charitable interpretation, viz. because he often mentions a certain decency, which he seems to make the Rule of Divine Actions, even antecedent to the Divine Will. Thus, p. 131. he says, that the justice of God did appoint things modo ipsum decenti, in a way becoming him, which would seem an impertinent expression, if all the decency that things have arise only from God's appointing 'em to be so: and immediately after speaking of God's liberty and freedom in making things thus or thus, he says, that he was indifferent, vel ad nulla statuenda vel ad alia stabilienda, quae aequè Deum decuissent: which words seem to imply, that there was something truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, worthy of God, antecedent to his positive appointment.  
But then let us see how he answers that Objection, that according to his Principles, the hatred of God might have been good, and the love of him evil, if he had so appointed. Now this might either have been so, or not; if it might, then why did he not plainly say so? if it could not, than his Principles are false, viz. that there is something good or evil, antecedent to the divine positive appointment. But when Men either cannot, or will not return plain Answers to a plain Question, it is a certain Argument, that they lie under either some natural, or some moral defect; that their notions either do not lie smooth and clear in their Heads; or else, upon some worse design, they thus purposely wrap themselves in Clouds. But he tells us, p. 136. amor praesupponit mentis naturam, haec voluntatem sive placitum Dei sese hoc modo adumbrandi. But we must abstract, he says, from all these: but now to comply with him in his own way, I am willing to abstract as far as is possible for us to abstract; only he must not abstract us into nothing, he must suffer us to remain subjects capable of abstracting: and yet I believe after all these, he is not that hardy Man, as in plain words to say, That God might have made the louc of himself a Sin, and the hatred of him a virtue. However it doth not seem any good Argument of the truth, or any great commendation of the goodness of an Opinion, that we must abstract from every thing, that is, (at least at present) either rational or religious, before we can possibly frame any conception of it. And yet this is the opinion, which he is so fond of, and seems to value himself so much upon, that in his Appendix, p. 304. where he makes some reflections upon his former work, he particularly commends this 10th Ch. de Dei dominio, cujus excellentiam, sine jactantiâ, ob ipsam rei veritatem & utilitatem, non satis possum commendare. And yet this seems a truer Character of it, that it is in itself false, unworthy of God, and of dangerous consequence to Men.  
I shall only here clear one place of Scripture, relating hereunto, from a forced and false interpretation, which Cuperus p. 246. Arcana Atheismi, has put upon it, Rom. 2. 14. the Gentiles having not the Law, do by Nature the things contained in the Law; these having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves. The Apostle here designs to assert that natural knowledge, which the Gentiles had of good and evil. But, says he, before this can be made appear, we must prove these two things. 1. That by the Gentiles are here to be understood the Pagan Gentiles, those who had neither heard of the Law of Christ, nor the Law of Moses. 2. That the words by Nature, are not to be joined with those going before, thus, the Gentiles having not the Law by Nature, do the things contained in the Law. But first he has no warrant from any Copy, or good Authority thus to place the Comma, and so to read it; now if Men may take that liberty to place Commas where they please, they may soon make the Scripture quite another thing. But then further, it would not be worthy of the Apostles way of discoursing, to tell us, that the Gentiles had not the Law of Moses by Nature: for who ever imagined they had? Now he does not grant here any other Law, not so much as any Law of Nature: but then he says, that it is false, that the Gentiles not believing in Christ, either did or could perfectly observe the Law; and who ever said they could? The Text only says, That the Gentiles not having the Law, that is, not any revealed Law, did by nature the things of the Law. Now he will needs make doing the things of the Law, to be perfectly to observe the Law: and further, if by Gentiles be understood those that believed in Christ, how can it be said, that these are a Law unto themselves, seeing they had both the Law of Moses, and the Law of Christ to direct 'em? But from hence it will be obvious to observe, what hard shifts Men are commonly forced to make, when once they engage in the defence of a false Opinion.  
Some Reflections upon the Tenth Chapter of the Second Book of Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi.  
THE Position he there endeavours to defend, is this, That by the mere light of Nature, without Divine Revelation, it cannot be made appear, that there is any difference betwixt Vice and Virtue, although we were already assured, that there was a God, etiamsi nobis jam innotuisset esse Deum. Virtue therefore and Vice, in respect of God, can be nothing else, quam religiosus numinis cultus. Virtue indeed may, but how Vice can be a religious worship of the Deity is hard to understand. Some would think such a stumble as this, in the very Threshold, was very ominous. Others, perhaps more agreeably to his Principles, tell us, that Vice and Virtue, in respect of God, are the same as to this particular; and that God, if he had so pleased, might as well have been worshipped by the one, as by the other. Now worship, he says, necessarily requires the certain knowledge of these three things. 1. That he, to whom we pay it, requires any such thing at our hands. 2. What it is that he does require. 3. Upon what conditions, viz. What Rewards he will give in case of observance, and what punishments he will inflict in case of neglect. Now he would seem to infer, that we have no natural knowledge of any of these three. I shall here, once for all, remind the Reader, that in the stating of the question he supposes, not only that there is a God, but also, that we certainly know it: Now as to the first requisite, he grants that there is a worship due to God, when it doth appear that we are his Creatures, p. 250. So that by his own confession, it doth appear, that God requires this worship at our hands, unless we may know, that there is a God, and yet at the same time not know that we are his Creatures: which would be a strange position for a Christian Philosopher to assert. And secondly, if we know that there is a God, than we know in general how and with what actions he will be worshipped. If God be a Spirit, than he is to be worshipped with a pure mind, was a natural and easy consequence made by an honest Heathen. This I say will follow, unless we suppose an Immoral God. But this, though it be both absurd and impious to do, yet I am afraid it will not be counted either by him. As to his third Requisite, we grant, that we owe it only to Divine Revelation, that God will reward our imperfect obedience with such degrees of eternal happiness: yet this even Nature teaches us, that holiness doth either entitle us to happiness, or at least to a freedom from misery. And as for what he says, That it cannot be known among Men, whether, or how they will be served, unless they first openly declare it; the Argument is no ways conclusive, if it be applied to this case, because Men have no other way to make known their Will, but by outward Declarations: butGod has, viz. those natural Notions, which he inwardly inserted into the Minds of Men. But to this he answers, That since Men draw these things from natural reason, they must also by the same reason prove the existence of a God: but since that cannot be done, neither can there be any natural knowledge of good and evil, of Vice and Virtue. But here though I do not grant, That the Being of God, cannot be proved by the light of Nature; yet I must remind him, that he flies here from the Question, as it was by himself first stated, where he supposes the Bing of God to be now known to us. But then, as if he was himself conscious of his Evasion herein, he immediately adds, Vel st aliqua inde petenda esset, scilicet vitii vel virtutis cognitio, etc. if there was any knowledge of Vice and Virtue to be drawn from Nature, than it could be no other, than that that should be counted vicious, from which any Man's Nature doth abhor; and that honest, to which Men are carried by a natural Propension. But this is a strange account of Morality, to make every Man's exorbitant Lusts and Passions the rule and measure of good and evil; nay, according to these Principles there can searce be any thing evil, for p. 254. he tells us, Nihil fere est, nec ullum flagitium, ad quod natura multorum, etc. that there is scarce any wickedness, to which the Nature of many Men is not naturally inclined. I shall not here particularly examine his Opinion concerning Original Sin, only herein he shows himself neither a sound Divine, nor good Philosopher; seeing many of the Heathens themselves did acknowledge the Substance, that is, the general depravation of humane Nature, tho' they were unacquainted with the Name and Nature of it. But he again resumes his former Argument, That if the way how God is to be Worshipped, may be known by the light of Nature, than the reward of eternal Life, might be known also by the same light. But this is no good consequence, as I before showed. 'Tis true, neither the way and method of Divine Worship, nor eternal Life are so clearly known by the Light of Nature, as they are now made manifest to us by Divine Revelation: yet it doth not thence follow, but that Nature hath, in some measure, discovered Both unto us, 2 Tim. 1. 10. Christ hath indeed brought life and immortality to light, through the Gospel; that is, made clearer manifestations of it; but then this hinders not, but that both jews and Gentiles might have some more obscure and imperfect Notions of it before.  
But he goes on and tells us, p. 252. Virtutis & vitii Christiani notitia, etc. That the knowledge of Vice and Virtue, both among jews and Christians, is no otherwise conveyed to either of'em, but by Divine Revelation. And here he urges Rom. 7. 7. I had not known Sin but by the Law; and I had not known Lust, if the Law had not said, Thou shalt not covet. But here first I would ask him, Whether those People, who have no outward Law given 'em, either do or can commit any sin, provided they do but follow their own natural Inclinations? According to him, there is no sin, but when a Man is guilty of such a strange piece of Self-denial, as not to comply with his own natural Appetites, when there is nothing, as in this case, that forbids him so to do. Thus p. 260. he tells us, That no actions, with respect to the Worship of God, by the mere Light of Nature, can be counted sin, Praeter illas à quibus vel omnium hominum natura abhorret, vel in certis hominibus illas, quae ipsorum naturae sunt contrariae. Where by Nature he means nothing but natural Affections, Appetites and Inclinations: But certainly a Man must have a new Nature, and a new Bible given him, before this will pass either for Reason or Religion. But then for the better understanding of that place before cited; some say, That St. Paul there doth not speak in his own Person, but in the Person of a jew, brought up under such Masters, who did not understand coveting, as it includes the inward act only, to be a sin. Others say, That sin was known to be so by the Law of Nature, before the giving of Moses his Law; thus Theophylact, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; etc. How was the Deluge brought upon the World? And why were the Sodomites destroyed by fire, if Lust was not known to be a sin before the Law? So that the Law did not first make Lust to be a sin, but did more expressly declare it to be so. He quotes indeed several other places of Scripture, but to as little purpose, p. 254. Si pietatis officia specialia, etc. if the special Offices of Piety were known by the Light of Nature, than there must be some certain foundation from whence they might be drawn. Here he mentions three.  

1. Natural Instinct.  
2. The Sanctity of God.  
3. Divine Power, or Dominion.   
As for the first, Natural Instinct, this indeed, he says, is not the rule of humane Actions, to them who live under the Gospel; but, according to his Principles, it must be to them who only enjoy the Light of Nature.  
Nor, Secondly, says he, can the Sanctity of God be the rule of our Actions; but the reason he there gives, is a very strange one, and very oddly expressed, viz. because God acts nothing but by instinct of his Nature, nor is there any thing holy in God, but what his Nature desires.  
But to this I Answer: First, That God sometimes acts as an absolute Sovereign of the Universe, and Governor of the World; and in these cases his Actions are not, in all particulars, to be the rule of ours.  
Secondly, It seems an irreverend way of speaking, to say, That God acts out of Instinct of Nature, which is commonly and properly attributed to mere Animals: yet granting the Expression in sano sensu, it cannot be supposed, that God doth daily alter the Determination of his Will concerning the same Object.  
Thirdly, Yet this we may safely say, That the holiness of God is the rule of our Actions, so far as, either by the Light of Nature, or Divine Revelation, it is made known to us to be so.  
But in the Third placo, He resolves all into the absolute Power and Dominion of God, That nothing is just and good, but that only which he commands, and for no other reason, but because he does so: And yet in the very next Sentence, p. 255. (as if something from within had whispered better things to him) he tells us, That God indeed may command any thing, Madò Dei naturae non sit contrarium, ut talia siant, etc. provided it be not contrary to his Nature, that it should be done. This indeed is a very pious and prudent, a true and rational Assertion, but than it contradicts the design of the whole Chapter. Some things indeed may be more evidently and directly contrary to the Nature of God, as not to love, or not to obey him; but then to forbid all due resemblance of himself, all Virtue and Goodness, and to command all filthiness both of Flesh and Spirit in rational Creatures, this certainly is also contrary to the Divine Nature. He than proceeds, as he says, to examine the principal parts both of Natural and Christian Religion, in order to see whether there lies any obligation upon us to 'em, but merely by the Divine Command. And here I grant, That those Truths, and those Duties, viz. the belief of a Trinity and Faith in Christ, that depend merely upon Divine Revelation, cannot be known to be such, by the Light of Nature: But then the reason is not the same in those other Moral Duties, which Christianity did not first reveal, but only further illustrate and confirm to us. Nor shall I here follow him through all the parts of Natural Religion, which he there instances in: I shall only pitch upon one, which yet seems of the greatest weight and moment, that of justice.. This, he says, cannot be recommended to us from the Nature of God, because it doth not appear by Nature, Deum neminem injuriâ afficere, That God does no Body any wrong: For, he says, that if that be injury, when we hurt those who have not deserved any such thing at our hands; Quid infantes in Deum peccaverunt? Wherein have Infants sinned against God, who yet many times are grievously afflicted by him? To this I answer,  
1. That I before premised this, That God sometimes acts, as a Sovereign, or Lord of the World; and in this case some actions may be injurious, or unjust in Men, which are not so in God.  
2. The consideration of original sin, might give easy Solutions to what he there urges: But because he doth not acknowledge any such thing, I shall not therefore here insist upon it.  
3. It is no ways contrary to Divine justice to inflict very high degrees of Afflictions on rational Creatures, provided that the Mercies they enjoy be more than the Miseries they undergo: And he will never prove, that God ever inflicted such Miseries upon Infants, but that, if they had the power of Election, they would rather choose to undergo 'em, than their own Annihilation. But he lays great stress upon that action of the Israelites robbing of the Egyptians, which was done by God's Command, or Allowance, and therefore was no sin: Therefore nothing is just or unjust in itself, but only as God commands, or forbids it.  
In Answer to this some say, That God herein acted as the universal Creator and original Proprietor of all things, and here transferred the Property, as he justly might, from the Egyptians to the Israelites. Others say, That as Sovereign Legislator, he dispensed with the Law in this particular; yet it will not follow hence, that there is nothing good or evil, but with respect to God's positive Command: For I humbly conceive, there are some other rationes boni & mali, more sacred and indispensable, than those of Property.  
If the Reader here Object, That my Style, especially in the latter end of this Chapter, is more than ordinarily rough and uneven; I willingly acknowledge, that I am no Master of it, not in the most even way, where all lies plain before me: But then here in my Reflections upon P. Poiret, and Caperus, I had a mind to keep as near to their words, as I well could, lest some perhaps might say, That I injured their sense; and all Men know, how rough and broken the Style must needs be, when Latin is thus Translated into English.   

CHAP. IU. Of the Being of God.  
IT is the general method of the Atheists of the present Age, to skirmish, as it were, in their Arguings, rather than come to a close Engagement; and think they have got matter enough of Triumph, if they can defeat some of those Arguments, we bring for the Proof of a God, or by some subtle Evasion, lessen, or enervate the force of 'em. They do not much pretend, by positive Arguments to prove the reasonableness of their own Opinions, or the impossibility of ours; both which they ought to do, if they would gain any Credit to their Cause.  
The Heathen Philosophers, and Orators of Old used to invoke the Deity to vouchsafe a Blessing upon their respective Undertake, and taught it as a Duty incumbent upon all, with Prayers to Sanctify their first Entrance upon any work of Importance. But now to desire an Atheist to do thus, would seem a direct contradiction, and a begging of the Cause, to desire him to suppose that, which by the state of the Controversy, he is engaged to deny.  
But yet an Atheist himself in this dispute, wherein the right knowledge of the Truth is of so much concernment to him, aught at least to bring with him a teachable temper, and disposition of Mind and Will, ready to receive what his understanding upon the fairest consideration of things that they are capable of, dictates to be, if not absolutely demonstrated, yet most rationally probable, and most prudentially credible. The Atheist therefore, seeing he cannot be absolutely sure, and positively certain, That there is no God, ought (and that without any Violation to his Principles as a Philosopher, however highly agreeable to his Prudence, as a Man) at least to make such Applications as these to that Supreme Power, whose Existence he very much doubts, or perhaps rather denies; That if there be any such, then that he would vouchsafe to enlighten his Understanding with the true knowledge of the truth, and incline his Will to be Belief of it.  
And here 'tis observable, That Protagoras, who was generally counted an Atheist, and was expelled out of Athens for being so; yet as Diog. Laert. reports of him, he makes Precatio to be the first part of an Oration.  
What was the first occasion of the Platonic Triad, whether the contrary false Opinions of the Atomists concerning the Materiality of the Universe, and the manner of its Formation, according to the way and method laid down by the Learned Bishop of Lincoln in his Treatise of Idol. p. 407, 408. I shall not here dispute: Yet as to the Belief of a God in general, that was never occasioned by any false belief of others to the contrary, because Truth, in order of Nature, is always antecedent to Error. What is said of Idols, Wisd. 14. 13. That they were not from the beginning; the same may be said of Vice, and Error, that they were not so from the beginning, but that Truth and Virtue was still antecedent to them. Primus in Orb Deos fecit timor, is so far from being true, that the Belief of a God was the cause of Fear; and not Fear the cause of the Belief of a God.  
The Opinion of the Existence of a Deity has so much the advantage of the contrary, that of Atheism, that I believe, its very Opposers, when at any time they give themselves seriously to consider, and examine the reasons on both sides, that their dissent is not so much their Opinion that the thing is really so, as their secret desire and Inclination, that it should be so; for if we consider either the weakness of their own Arguments, or the frivolous Answers they return to ours, one would think, that they had not sufficient ground so much as to found an Opinion upon, so much violence do they offer in their Arguings, not only to Religion, but to Reason too. Though the Atheists of the former Ages seem more excusable, than these of ours, for they wanting those Supernatural Arguments drawn from Divine Revelation, and not knowing so well how rightly to manage those natural ones (which yet if rightly used, would have proved a God) they thus argued themselves into Atheism, or into Tenants very like it. Whereas ours, either out of Ignorance or inconsideration, either not willing, or not able impartially and throughly to examine the Arguments, which both Reason and Religion do afford them, they thus run headlong into foolish and false Opinions, satisfying themselves with mere shadows of reasoning instead of Substances.  
Thus a Spirit must be banished out of the World, only because they say the Notion of it implies a Contradiction: And the World must be the result of the Fortuitous Concourse of Atoms, only boccuse it implies no Logical Contradiction that it should be so; thus boldly asserting impossibility, where indeed there is none, and resting in bare Possibilities where there is no reason to do so. And this seems the very Sum and Substance of the Philosophy of our Modern Atheists.  
But 'tis here objected, That the Belief of a Deity was an Opinion at first invented, and afterwards continued in the World by those whose Interest prompted them thereunto, viz. by Kings and Princes, and those of the Ecclesiastical Order, the one to keep their People in awe, the other to maintain and bear up the reputation of their Function; as if the jewish Religion at first was only the Politic Invention of Moses and Aaron; and afterwards for the same reasons carried on by their successive orders: That the Thunderings and Lightnings of Mount Sinai were only the well-ordered Plots of somewhat like Drums and Gunpowder behind the Stage; and that the Miracles of our SAVIOUR were only the deluding and cheating of the outward Senses of some, and the inward Imaginations of others; that his seeming restoring Eyes to the Blind, was only the deceiving the Eyes of the Beholders, and a persuading the Blindman that he saw, what indeed he did not. But it would be too frivolous a design to go about to confute such an extravagant and groundless Assertion; for perhaps it would require as much power to persuade a Blind Man, that he saw, when he did not; as really to restore his Eyes.  
But then as to the Principle, whereon the Objection is founded, I shall do these three things.  
First, Show the weakness and falseness of it in itself.  
Secondly, The Accidentalness of its concluding.  
Thirdly, The Unfitness and Improperness of it, as made by them, and how it may be with as much strength retorted upon themselves.  
1. The Foundation of the Argument is this; That that is justly suspected as false in Religion, the Belief or Practice whereof is joined with either public, or private Advantage to those concerned. Now nothing is more false than this, for this is one main Foundation of our Natural Religion; and part even of the Gentile's Creed, viz. A Belief that God is, and that he is a rewarder of those that diligently seek him; That such is the Goodness of God towards us, that he has joined our Duty and our Interest together, not only as to the future, but also as to the present Life: And God, in so ordering the Frame of our Religion, has but seconded and confirmed the common sense of Mankind, and acted according to the Principles of Humane Nature; for such is the Constitution thereof, that Good and Convenience is the necessary Object of all our Desires. Now if any thing of present or future Advantage be made an Argument of the falseness of things in Matters of Religion, we may then upon the same grounds question the Truth and Reasonableness of all humane Actions; because Men necessarily propound some kind of advantage to themselves in 'em all. But this would lay a Foundation of Scepticism in Humane Nature, and cause us to reject or doubt of things for those very reasons, for which we ought to receive 'em.  
2. This Objection taken from the Advantages that attend Religion is a very contingent and accidental one, such as could be of no force in the first Ages of the Church, when Christianity exposed its Professors to nothing but Persecution, their Names to Sandal and Reproach, their Estates to Ruin, and their Bodies to Martyrdom.  
3. I shall show the unfitness of the Objection, as made by them that urge it; indeed if those Men were so Heroical in their pursuits of Virtue and Holiness, as to embrace 'em merely upon the account of their Intrinsic Excellence; then might there something more be pleaded for 'em: But since they are Men of Debauched Lives, and if possible to justify their own Wickedness, would insinuate into the Minds of others, a secret belief, That Religion is nothing but a mere Cheat: This is the greatest instance not only of Profaneness, but of Folly too, because the Argument may be retorted, with as much strength upon themselves, thus.  
If the Belief of a God and Religion be therefore suspected to be false, because it is the Interest of those that believe 'em, that there should be both:  
Then why may not the Denial of a God be rejected for the same reasons; because it is as much the Interest of wicked Men, that there should be no God, as it is of good Men, that there should be one. So that if there be any force in the Argument, it proves as much against themselves, as it doth against us.  
As for those who tell us, That the Notion of God includes in it a Contradiction, and that it is and ever was impossible that there should be one; these Men indeed take the most effectual way of defending their Cause, in case they could prove their Assertion: For whoever grants the possibility of the Being of God, must either grant that he really is, or else will be forced to contradict himself; for what is possible may be reduced into Act. But if God be not now, and actually was not existent from all Eternity; it is impossible for such a Being, as is included in his notion, ever to begin to be: And this seems to be Bradwardine's Argument, Cap. 1. p. 3. So that an Atheist must prove not only that there is no God, but that it was from Eternity impossible, that there should be one; neither of which, he will ever be able to prove.  
The Being of God is not the less credible, because it is not capable of such proofs as some other things are; all things will not admit of Mathematical Demonstrations, nor indeed is it expected, that they should; nor are they on this account less true and certain than those that do: For sometimes the very possibility of Demonstration argues some degree of uncertainty, or obscurity in the thing to be demonstrated; thus Indemonstrables are always the most certain, therefore the Being of God is not therefore the less certain, because it cannot be demonstrated. Some indeed are so gross in their Reasonings, that they make the Invisibility of Spirits an Argument against their Existence; whereas indeed the very Reasons, upon which we believe their Existence, are inconsistent with their Visibility.  
That some Heathens did worship that one supreme and true God, is certainly evident both from the Testimony of Profane and Sacred History, Act. 17. 23. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you. So that the Athenians, either worshipped the true God, or St. Paul declared to 'em a false one; yet 'tis generally agreed, that such Heathens might be, and were guilty of Idolatry. Nothing therefore hinders, but that the Papists may be guilty of Idolatry, though they do not only acknowledge the true God, but the Christian Trinity; nor do I see, how their Idolatry, as such, that is, such as is consistent with the Belief of the true God, is capable of any mitigation; because no one charges them with any other, than what they are truly guilty of.  
Some Protestants indeed say, That some of the Heathens are capable of the same defence, that the Papists make for themselves, that is, That they only give an Inferior Worship to Saints and other Inferior Daemons, but pay the Supreme Worship to the Supreme God only.  
Now this Plea seems to hold as much for the one, as for the other, and must either acquit both or neither. Nor can the Papists their being more particularly instructed in the Knowledge of the Nature and Will of God, be any Mitigation of their Offence, but rather an Aggravation of it. Falsehood is neither in its own Nature fit, nor was it ever intended by God, as a proper means whereby to defend truth: For this neither stands in need of a Lie, nor can it really be defended by it; nor is it our Interest or Prudence to attempt the defence of a good Cause by weak Arguments; for this will only give occasion to our Adversaries, when they see that they can easily answer these, to think worse of our cause, and that all the rest of our reasonings are of the same nature. Yet granting that some Arguments sometimes made use of to prove the Being of God, are not absolutely cogent and conclusive, yet are they not presently to be rejected, as useless; and that upon these two accounts.  
First, Because they that urge them, do not make use of any single Argument, as if the Cause did wholly depend upon it. Secondly, In things of a Moral Concernment, there may be such a thing as an Accumulative Demonstration, as Bishop Taylor tells us in another Case. (Pag. 124. Lib. 1. Cases of Consc.) Therefore, supposing a Man in his attempt to prove the Being of God, should either through the shortness of his Meditations, or the sublimeness of the Theory, make use of an Argument not perfectly conclusive; yet seeing the success of the Cause depends not upon it, and seeing the Man perhaps has effected as much, as he intended by it; that is, added his Mite to the former Treasury; upon the whole matter, it seems hard if such an one must be prosecuted, as an Atheist, or a Betrayer of the Cause of Religion. Cicer. de Univers. Si fortè de Deorum Naturâ, ortuque Mundi disserentes, minùs id, quod habemus Animo, consequimur, etc. hand sanè erit mirum; contentique esse debebitis, si probabilia dicentur; aequum est enim, meminisse, & me, qui disseram, hominem esse, & vos qui judicetis; ut si probabilia dicentur, nè quid ultra requiratis.  
Among the many Arguments brought to prove the Being of God, these two seem the most considerable.  
First, That comprehensive one which is drawn from the Being of the World; whereby I understand not only the Divine Power of creating or producing something out of nothing, but that admirable Wisdom also that appears in making it such as it is; and in the proper subserviencies of things therein to their respective Ends; That Argument further which is drawn not only from the Material, but the Intellectual Universe, not only from the structure of the Body, but the Nature of the Soul.  
Secondly, That which is drawn from the Consent and universal Acknowledgement of all Nations.  
As for that, which seems Aristotle's Opinion, That the World was from Eternity, and yet that it was in Nature of an Effect, in respect of God, the Cause; it will be impossible to free this Assertion, either from a Contradiction, or from an unworthy reflection upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature. For if God, as a Cause, was in time antecedent to the World, than it is a contradiction to say, it was from Eternity. If it did flow from God, as an Emanative Effect, as the Beams from the Sun; then this destroys the chiefest Perfection of the Divine Nature, viz. its Liberty.  
And this seems one of the best Arguments to prove, That the World neither was, nor could be from Eternity, and it will be very hard, (if once we give our Adversaries leave to suppose it to be Eternal) by any other Argument to force 'em out of their Opinion: For I do not see, that it would be any absurdity to say, That supposing the World to be Eternal, there has been as many Years as Days; that is, an equal Infinite number of both, all Infinites being Equal; for Infinity can no more be exhausted by Years than Days; if it could, than it would not be, what it is in its own nature, inexhaustible: But the truth is, such is the nature of Infinite with respect to our Finite Capacity, that the one is not a Competent judge of the other: and when we enter into disputes of this nature, we are often entangled with unanswerable difficulties on both sides.  
But the Atheist tells us, That all this visible Universe, the Heavens, the Earth, and all Mankind at first were the lucky hits of blind Chance, which after almost infinite successless Trials going before, did at last happen upon these admirable and excellent Structures, particularly those of humane Bodies. But here we must know, that according to these Principles, the same Chance, which first made us, must still continue us. But then how comes it to pass, that Chance is so regular and constant in its Productions since? That whereas it is above ten thousand to one, according to these Principles, but that Mankind long ere this, must have wholly ceased to have been, or else nothing but Monsters have been produced; instead hereof we see a very regular and orderly course of Nature generally observed?  
This is, as if a Man should be a thousand years in casting all sizes upon six Dice, and then for a thousand years after to throw nothing else, if we could suppose a Man's Life to last so long. Whoever can believe such strange things as these, ought never to blame any one for being over credulous.  
As for that other Argument, drawn from the consent of Mankind, there are some who tell us, That those natural Impressions of God upon the minds of Men, upon which this universal consent is founded, are mere imaginary things, and that there is no need of 'em in our disputes against Atheism. But these Men might do well to consider whether they do not too much oblige the Atheists, and go too far towards the betraying the Cause of God, and Religion in the World, who willingly quit and give up that Argument which hath hitherto been managed with such good success by the best and wisest of Men in all Ages: willingly, I say, to give it up gratis: for I verily believe, it can never be forced and wrested out of the hand of a Christian Philosopher, who rightly understands it. And why should we grant any thing to an Atheist, which may tend to the advantage of his, or the prejudice of our own Cause? unless he necessarily force it from us by dint of Argument; always provided, that we readily acknowledge evident Truth wherever we find it.  
First, I conceive, there neither is nor can be any Argument in a true and proper sense, à priore, to prove the Being of God, that taken from the Idea is not such; But it is an arguing from the effect to the Cause, only the effect seems a more immediate one, and such as bears a more particular resemblance to the Cause.  
That somewhat was from Eternity, is evidently demonstrable; for if once there was nothing, it was impossible for any thing ever to begin to be: Now this something must be either Matter or Spirit, a thinking or unthinking Being; it cannot be an unthinking Being, for than it would be impossible, that there should be any such thing, as Knowledge or Cogitation in the World, which yet we are inwardly conscious to ourselves of. For as Dr. Lock, Chap. 10. Book 4. hath well observed; It is as impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing of itself should produce matter.  
Now it must be either Man, that was the first Eternal Being, the Creator of all things, or some other Being. But though the Atheists are not the greatest Wits in the World, yet we must not think 'em such very Atheists neither, as to make mere Man to set up for a Sovereign Creator. Thus we have an Idea, or Conception of a Being infinitely more perfect than ourselves, and therefore we were not the Cause of our own Existence: for if we had, we should then have given ourselves those Perfections, which we find wanting in us, and conceive in another. Therefore we owe our Existence to, and dependence upon that Being without us, which enjoys all Perfections.  
But now the Question is, Whether the Idea be the Cause, or occasion of this Ratiocination, or the Ratiocination the Cause of the Idea. Some think, that these two, Reasoning and the Idea, ought not to be separated, or contradistinguished in this dispute: For the Idea is not such an Engine, as of itself will prove the Being of God, without the Use and Exercise of reasoning thereupon. So that the Idea doth not exclude, but include the use of our Faculties; nor is it any receding from the Argument so to do: Yet it seems more probable, that there is something in Man, Coeval with and connatural to his very Being, that dictates such a thing, and directs our thoughts and reasonings that way; for it is not probable, that Men should, as it were, accidentally, and yet so generally agree in one and the same thing, without some inward suggestions, and intimations at least to employ their Faculties upon such an object, viz. a Supreme Being.  
So that though this Idea be not so full and perfect, but that it may receive further Additions of strength and clearness from Ratiocination; yet this is no more a disparagement to the Works of Nature, that they are sometimes further perfected by Study and Industry, than it is to a Man, that he was not born with all those accomplishments, which he hath afterwards acquired.  
Secondly, Next to a Sceptic, who grants no Principles at all, it is the greatest difficulty to convince an Atheist, who asserts such absurd and unreasonable ones, that he can scarce be urged with any greater, so that he will more easily evade the force of any Argument, if what we urge upon him, as an absurdity, if he make it, as it were the very Foundation of his Discourse. Only 'tis observable, that such Men are more usually prevailed upon by the Convictions of Conscience, which is done, I conceive, by awakening those natural impressions of God, and their obligations to him in their minds) than merely by convincing their Understandings.  
Thirdly, In the managing our thoughts upon this subject, we ought to consider, not only what is in itself possible, and perhaps may imply no contradiction, but what upon a full consideration of things, and all their circumstances, may be counted most reasonable, what is worthy of our rational Faculties to assert, and a prudent Person to believe.  
So that after these inward impressions made upon the minds of Men, and those outward manifestations of himself by the Works of Creation and Providence, it perhaps would be difficult, even for the most Sceptical Person to assign, what further Rational Evidence he could desire for the Belief of a Deity. Nor does that variety of Opinions concerning the Nature of God in different Nations and among different Persons, any whit lessen the credibility of his Being, but rather confirms and strengthens it. For this shows, that it was not the Invention or Contrivance of any single Nation at first, nor of more jointly afterwards; for if they had thus combined together, or borrowed one from another, in all probability they would have agreed better in their Notions and Opinions concerning him: Nor was Religion any humane Invention to restrain the Exorbitances of Mankind, because there was Religion before any such Offences, as a Learned Prelate of our own has well observed; That Oppression, though by Accident, grew rather from Religion, than Religion from Oppression; for before the two Brothers, Cain and Abel, had offered up their Sacrifice, there was no such thing as Oppression.  
There are some, who tell us, that the Being of God cannot be proved by any Internal Arguments, from any natural impressions made upon the minds of Men, dictating any such thing; others, that it cannot be proved by any external ones, drawn from the nature of the Universe, or any thing else without us. Now the Atheists make this advantage of these our unseasonable differences herein, That they bid us first Answer our own Arguments, which we bring against ourselves: and if the Being of God cannot be proved either way, which some among ourselves do with too much eagerness severally assert; then they think they have gained their point. For as for Divine Revelation, they do not much value that, as thinking it not so proper to be urged against them, because they believe nothing of the whole matter. What Cuperus in his Arcana Atheismi, says of Divine Revelation, that we are first convinced by it, That there is a God, and afterwards thereby enabled to prove it by reason, I think, may be better applied, in some proportion, to these two ways of probation here made use of, thus; That from these natural impressions made upon the minds of Men, we have the first grounds of our belief of a God: and then this is further confirmed by those External Arguments drawn from Nature.  
— Quae non prosunt singula, juncta juvant.  
I shall here make some short remarks upon Cuperus his Opinion in this particular; In the beginning of his Proem he tells us, with some kind of Formality and Ostentation, That the only prejudice, that can be done to a good cause, is to endeavour to defend it by weak Arguments. That he had frequent opportunities of hearing Atheists (being bred up amongst'em) discovering the weakness of those Arguments, which the Theists brought against 'em. Hereupon he was forced to think upon some more effectual way of proving the Being of a God, than hitherto had been made use of, which is this, to deny all natural knowledge of God, and utterly to reject, at least at first, all those Arguments drawn from the light of nature, and to prove his Being by Divine Revelation. This indeed is a very firm and sure way of doing it, but I am afraid it will not be altogether so cogent, as to convince an Atheist: for such an one will not believe Moses his History, neither the Creation, nor any Tradition relating to it.  
Now the whole force of his Argument will depend upon this slender hinge, viz. The faithful and uninterrupted conveyance of this Tradition to all succeeding Ages: But the present Learned Archbishop of Canterbury, in that excellent Sermon of his against Atheism, Page 51. tells us, That it is much more likely, that the Belief of God, is a Notion, which was bred in the mind of Man, and born with him, than a Tradition, transmitted from hand to hand, through all Generations; especially if we consider, how many rude and barbarous Nations there are, which consent in the Opinion of a God, and yet have scarce any certain Tradition of any thing that was done amongst'em, but two or three Ages before. If the Knowledge of God, says Cuperus, (Proem. p. penult.) was drawn from the Light of Nature, than it needed not to be proved, That there was a God; because thus we suppose it, and already believe it: But may not his own way of arguing be retorted more justly upon himself? When he tells us, p. 246. That, Postquam per Dei Revelationem edocti sumus esse Deum, tum intelligi posse, etc. When by Divine Revelation we are taught there is a God, than we can find out natural Arguments to prove it. But when we are first taught and convinced by DivineRevelation, That there is a God, How do Arguments drawn from natural reason, afterwards prove it? So that indeed these Arguments will be little more than Illustrations, or further Confirmations of a thing already believed, because revealed. But then he says in the same place, Principia ostendi deberent, ex quibus is, qui nullam unquam Numinis mentionem, vel suspicionem hausisset, sponte in Numinis, Naturae Conditoris, agnitionem paulatim deduceretur. Some Principles must be shown, from whence he that never heard the least mention, nor had the least suspicion of a Deity, might be drawn to the knowledge of him. To this, I Answer,  
First, That according to the Principles of those Men, whom he now opposes, he cannot ordinarily suppose a Man, without some suspicion at least of a Deity; for this, say they, is born with him, and he must not suppose his Adversaries Assertion to be false, but prove it so.  
Secondly, Why may not that conviction of mind, which is the result of our Faculties rightly reasoning hereupon, inferring the Existence of a Supreme Being, together with that inward consciousness of our Obligations to him? Why may not these be Principles sufficient to prove, so far as is requisite for Nature to do it, That there is a God, and that to one who had not heard any other way that there was one? But he seems to lay a great stress upon that of a Man's having, or not having heard the least mention of a God before. But if he suppose a Man so to have heard of a God, by Divine Revelation, as thereupon really to believe his Existence, than those natural Arguments brought to prove the same, may further confirm him in his belief; but tho' he have heard mention made of a God, and yet not believe that there is any such thing, I do not understand, how his bare hearing of him before will any ways make those reasons, drawn from Nature, the more effectual to convince him.  
If Men of late have too frequently run into Atheism, it was not any weakness they found in that Argument drawn from the Light of Nature to prove the Existence of a God, (so far as can in reason be expected from it) that was the cause thereof; but he seems to lay the fault there, where indeed he ought not, and ascribes it to the weak defence that some Men have made of a good Cause, only thereby to magnify and usher in his own new Notion with more pomp, p. 247. He there grants, that Men generally have some Notion, or Idea of God: but then, Nullus alius modus inveniri potest, quo mentes hominum occupavit, quam quòd ab ipso Deo per Revelationem, vel Creationem sit insertus. If by Creation he means that natural constitution of Soul, whereby, by the very Laws or Creation, natural to such a Being, this Notion of God was imprinted on it: then his Assertion would be true, but then he would herein contradict himself. By Creation therefore he must mean only that Tradition of the Being of God, derived down to all Mankind from the Creation: and then we can easily assign another way how this Idea might possess the Minds of Men, viz. that before mentioned natural Inscription. In Chap. 9 Lib. 2. there his chief design is to prove, that the Being of God is not knowable by the Light of Nature. Now I humbly conceive, that in that Dialogue, which he framed betwixt Philalethes and Misalethes, he did not equal justice to Truth in stating the Question so, as to make Philalethes, (whose Province it ought to have been rather to defend than prove the Being of God) the Opponent; whereas he should in strictness, rather have been Respondent: for this advantage accrued to Misalethes, by being on the Defensive part, that mere Evasions might serve instead of solid Answers. For it seems a more easy thing to defend an Error, than to oppose a Truth.  
Though I speak not this as if Truth was not able, not only to defend itself, but to convince its Adversaries, provided that reason would do it. But I do not see, why we should give that advantage to the Atheists, as to give 'em leave to suppose us at once, both out of our Reason and Religion too. p. 264. cum verò omnes ex natur â petitas rationes, quae pro utraque sententiâ proferri possunt, invalidas esse, etc. Seeing, he says, he has proved all the natural Reasons brought either for, or against the Being of God, to be invalid, and the Atheist, he says, has nothing else to rely on: then the most natural consequence hereof will be, That the Atheists must now hang in aequilibrio, and profess themselves Sceptics; and this is the utmost that he can pretend to have effected upon 'em, p. 265. He tells us, That that Notion of a God, which so generally prevails in the World, must be derived from God himself; for si conficta esset, etc. if it were feigned, than it would be necessary, that in every Nation there should be some who first invented it, and persuaded it upon others; Quoth, (p. 266.) sanè impossibile est, nisi homines qui de Deo nihil unquam audiverunt, naturali dispositione ad illam opinionem maximè essent proclives; where he grants, That if there be such a natural Proclivity in the Minds of Men to believe a God, than his Argument fails: he therefore should have bend his utmost force to disprove this Natural Disposition, or Proclivity to believe a God; but the Argument he there brings, will not do it. 'Tis only this, that Rochfortius and some others relate, That there are some Nations in America, who cannot be persuaded that there is a God. To this I Answer,  
First, That it will proportionably prove against himself, and destroy the Universality of his own Tradition, for it will follow hence, either that God had not taken care to make known this Original Tradition to all Nations, or that they which were the first Founders of these Nations, had neglected to teach it to their Posterity; or that in process of time both Parents and Children were grown so rude and barbarous, as to forget it: and indeed, according to this Hypothesis, it is a wonder that half of the Gentile World long e'er this, is not become mere Soldanians, without any knowledge of God, or any Principles of Morality; nor can there be any good account given of those Moral Principles of Honesty, according to this Traditionary way, which were as generally believed among the Gentiles, as the Being of a God, and perhaps with a greater Unisormity.  
Secondly, We do not say, that this Notion of God is so implanted in the Minds of Men, or so connatural to our Faculties, but that by carelessness and Inadvertency, by Vice and Luxury, by habitual Wickedness and Debauchery it may be in a great measure obliterated.  
Others tell us, That the Being of God is not to be proved either by any Original Tradition, or by any Natural Impressions made upon Men's Minds, but only by external Arguments drawn from the Nature of things, and from the Nature of Man; that is, from the consideration of his Soul and Body, not supposing, or including any such Natural Notices: I do not here go about to oppose any Arguments brought to support and defend the Cause of God and Religion in the World. Valeant quantùm valere possunt: Only when their Authors would monopolise all the force of Argument to their own way of arguing, and absolutely reject all the rest; this, I think, is to give our Adversaries advantage over us. Thus that Ingenious Gentleman, Mr. Tyrrell, in his late Book, p. 197. tells us, That the knowledge of the Being of God is clearly, and without difficulty, to be read, from the great Book of the Creation, without any assistance from natural Impressions; and he citys Rom. 1. 19, 20. Because that which is known of God, is manifest in them, for God hath showed it unto them; for the invisible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things, that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead. Where he says, The Apostle appeals to the common reason of Mankind, guided by things without us, for the proof of a Deity: But it doth not appear from hence, that he draws his Argument merely from things without us; for the 19th Verse seems as clearly to relate to those inward Impressions made upon our Minds, as the 20th doth to the outward Creation. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is manifest in them; I know that Preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is sometimes rendered inter; but when the proper and natural signification of words may be kept, why should we look for another? For the invisible things of him from the Creation.] By Creation here is neither meant the things created, nor the Act of Creation, but only it relates to the time thereof. From the Creation] that is, ever since the Creation; by which, says Dr. Hammond, it appears, That there is no necessity of interpreting God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, his Doings, or Actions here, of the Works of Creation, (that is, solely) but of all things, that from time to time, to this inclusively, have been done in the World by him; and so it will be extended to all the Doctrines, and Miracles, and Actions of Christ, the whole business of the Gospel. Nay, I may add, that even those natural Impressions upon the Minds of Men, may be meant by God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here mentioned. Even his Eternal Power and Godhead;] 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. The first may refer to his Omnipotence in Creating the Material World. The other, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to the more Divine Constitution of Spiritual and Intellectual Being's.   

CHAP. V. Of the State of Nature, that it is neither a State of Equality, nor a State of War.  
I Shall here by way of Introduction to this Chapter, briefly take notice of what Mr. Hobbs tells us in Chap. 4. of his Leviathan, concerning Speech, and the particular uses of it, viz. that it is for the acquiring of Arts, and the improvement of Knowledge, to convey to others that skill which we have attained to ourselves, and to communicate to them our Counsels and Resolutions, that so we may have the mutual help and advice of one another: but now how can these Uses be applied to that cross-grained state of Nature, which he has described to be nothing but a State of Fraud and Violence? What place is there for Arts and Sciences? What room for friendly counsel, and kind advice in a state where all are Enemies to one another, where what counsel we give to others, ought rather in reason to be suspected, seeing therein we design nothing but our own advantage? Why should we desire, or hope for the assistance of others, seeing there we design nothing, but by force or fraud to supplant all we deal with, and by degrees to draw 'em into their own ruin? Now Speech must be supposed in the State of Nature; for without it, he tells us, there could be no entering into Societies, no Compacts, no transferring of Rights per verba in praesenti.  
In the same Chapter also he tells us how necessary it is for those, who aspire to knowledge, to be strict in fixing the true sense of Words, and framing true Definitions, in examining those of former Authors, and either to correct 'em when deficient, or to make new ones themselves. Therefore, he says, in Geometry, which is the most accurate Science, Men begin with settling the significations of their words; which settling of Significations, they call Definitions, and place 'em at the beginning of their work.  
Now it had been well, if Mr. Hobbs had practised his own rule, and that, in one of the most considerable Instances of his Moral Philosophy; that is, if he had at first given us a perfect definition of that word so oft made use of in his Writings, Nature, and had fixed the Significations of those Expressions, Naturally, and by Nature: Which he could not well have done without distinguishing it into pure and primitive, and into corrupt and depraved Nature: Which he having no where done, it has occasioned a great deal of obscurity and uncertainty in all his Discourses relating thereunto; which if he had done, in all probability it would have put an end to many of those Controversies, which were perhaps at first begun, and afterwards continued by the want of it.  
'Tis true, he has given us several Senses and Acceptations of these words, but yet has been so far from settling and fixing their Significations, as he calls it, that he has rather left them still in greater uncertainty, especially in those other places, where they are mentioned singly, without any intimation at all, in what sense they are to be taken. In his Preface to his Book de Cive, where 'tis objected, that from his Principles it would follow, that Men are wicked by Nature. This, he says, does not follow, for though Men by Nature, that is, from their first Birth, as they are mere sensible Creatures, etc. Here Nature must signify Man, as he comes first into the World, with respect merely to his Animal Qualisications, which he has in common with other Creatures. In the same Preface, forasmuch as God overrules all Rulers by Nature; that is, by the dictates of Natural Reason: here Nature seems to refer rather to the higher, than the lower Faculties of the Soul, Chap. 1. Paragraph 2. if by Nature one Man should love another; that is, as Man; here Nature seems to refer to Man in his largest extent. The Law of Nature he thus defines, that it is the dictate of Natural Reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of our Life and Members, as much as in us lies. Here he makes Natural Reason to truckle under that mean design of self-preservation in the narrowest sense, as if right reason had no other or higher end and design, than that of a Man's private security here in this World. It would be tedious to reckon up all those several Senses, which in several places he gives to those words, accordingly as may best serve the purpose he is then about. Now in the midst of these various Significantions, how must we interpret those places, where he tells us, That the Dispositions of Men are naturally such, that unless they be restrained through fear, every Man will distrust and dread each other: that Men by Nature are in such a state, wherein their Wills are their supremest Law, with respect to their Self-preservation: How shall we know, whether by Nature here be meant the Dictates of right reason, truly so called, or only the irregular motions of Passion and sensitive Appetite. But I shall here leave Mr. Hobbs to the just severity of his own censure, and a little examine Chap. 13. of his Leviathan, wherein he makes the State of Nature a State of Equality, and a State of War: These are the two imaginary Poles, upon which his State of Nature moves.  
First, He tells us, That Men are by Nature equal.  
1. As for strength of Body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest; and to kill is the greatest thing, and they that can do the greatest thing, are equal: quod erat demonstrandum. The Confutation of some kind of errors may give occasion to something worth the Writer's Thoughts, or the Reader's Pains; but the confuting of such insipid stuff, as this, cannot but be tedious to both. By this way of arguing he might prove, that the meanest Creature in Nature is, or may be equal to Man: For did not a Fly once kill a Pope? And may not a Spider poison an Emperor? But then how this should become a Principle of Policy, any other way than as by considering this casual Power, which the weakest Man, or meanest Creature may have over us, thereby to incite our utmost care and circumspection, and to beget in us an inoffensive behaviour towards all Men: how, I say, this should be an Argument to prove the natural equality of all Men, as the Phrase is used in Politics, is hard to understand.  
Then as to the Faculties of the Mind, he says, he finds a greater equality among Men, than that of strength of Body: for Prudence is nothing but Experience, which equal time gives equally to all: but suppose that Men were equal, as to Prudence, which yet is evidently false; yet there are other faculties or habits of the Mind, wherein one Man may excel another. Here it is not material to inquire, whether the Souls of Men were equal, as to their first Creation; we are now to consider 'em in a more complexed capacity, as joined with such and such Bodies, wherein we find as much variety in their several abilities and inclinations now, as if they were really created unequal: but certainly Prudence must be something more than mere Experience: for Prudence is a further habit super-induced upon the Faculty, whereby we are enabled to manage our affairs, according to the Rules of Reason and Equity; thus Experience to Prudence is but as undigested meat to the nourishment of the Body. Experience indeed may collect general Rules for the mannagement of the affairs of Life: but than it is Prudence, which by considering matters of fact in all their Circumstances, by comparing them with the present state of things, and the possibilities of future contingencies, doth as it were digest experience into laudable nourishment: but if we did suppose Men equal in their natural, yet it will not thence follow, that they are so in their Political capacity too. For since Men did not at first spring out of the Earth like Mushrooms, but came into the World, by the ordinary methods of Generation, by way of Father and Son; therefore there must needs be a subordination and inferiority among 'em, a dependence upon one another in respect of Causality, and an Obligation in respect of Duty and Obedience.  
Nor, secondly, is the state of Nature a state of War; if any two men, says Mr. Hobbs, desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become Enemies, and in their way to their end endeavour to destroy or subdue each other. If he speak this in reference to Dominion or Empire, that common Mistress courted by all, as he says, in the state of Nature; it may be justly questioned, whether all do thus inordinately affect superiority, and whether all find themselves thus naturally inclined to destroy those that seem to stand betwixt them and the Throne: or are there not some more modestly virtuous, who out of consciousness of their own inabilities, and out of due respect to other men's Merits above their own, who would quit their pretences to Empire, and willingly live in obedience to others? Is it not inordinate Pride and Ambition, rather than the dictates of nature and right reason in those, who thus unreasonably aim at nothing less than a Crown.  
Secondly, These natural Usurpers do not make use of the most proper means, in order to their own self-preservation. Here I would only apply Mr. H. his own way and method of reasoning against the attempt of obtaining Sovereignty by Rebellion to the present Case, Pa. 73. Leu. 'Tis manifest, says be, that though the event should follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary, and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Now doth not this equally hold good against the attempt, which these natural Usurpers do propound to themselves of an Universal Empire? would not the great hazard of any ones particular design succeeding make the action, in Mr. Hobbs his own account, very unreasonable? So that there is but little reason for Men to betake themselves to that way of anticipation in this state of nature, that is, for a Man to endeavour to Master all before him, so long, till he see no other Power great enough to endanger him: seeing, that very equality, which he supposes, should more effectually persuade 'em to Peace, or some more Friendly way of composing differences, rather than urge 'em to War; seeing no single Person can in reason ever hope to attain to Empire, since he must always have ten thousand as strong and as cunning as himself, to oppose all his designs. Thus that equality which seems to give him right, doth at the same time hinder him from the actual procurement of it. He grants indeed, That this condition of War was never generally over all the World; yet he says, in many places they live so now: for the Savage people in many places of America (except the Government of small Families, the Concord whereof depends upon natural Lust) have no Government at all, etc.  
But how is Government (though of small Families) consistent with that state of absolute independency, before described, where every one hath a right to every thing, and every Man an Enemy each to other? So that this exception of particular Families doth indeed destroy his general Rule: but then he interposes these two things.  
1. That these Families are small.  
2. Their Concord depends upon natural Lust.  
But first he grants, Leu. Pag. 105. that a great Family, if it be not part of a Commonwealth, as to rights of Sovereignty, is a little Monarchy; but he will not grant the same privilege to a little Family, viz. unless it be of that power, as not to be subdued without the hazard of War: but the rights of governing is that, wherein the nature and essence of any Government doth consist, and not in strength and greatness; now these proportionally are as much in a little Family, as in a great one; and we may with the same reason say, that the Essence of a natural, as well as of a Political Body, doth consist in such a proportion of strength and greatness, below which a Man cannot truly be called a Man.  
2. He says, that the Concord of these Families depends upon natural Lust, Solâ cupiditatum similitudine, Lat. Translation. But let the Concord depend upon what it will, 'tis not material, the Government and Constitution of Families is not consistent with such a state of nature as Mr Hobbs describes; and here he might as well say, That Bastards are not Men; because they are gotten for the gratification of unlawful Lust; for the different grounds, or reasons, or ends, Men may have in making a thing, do not alter the nature and essence of it, when once made. The Question here is not, whether the Families be small or great, or upon what their Concord doth depend; but whether the notion and being of a Family, doth not destroy his supposed state of Nature. But how doth he prove, that the Concord of those Families depends only on natural Lust, as his English; for War seems the more genuine result of Lust, than Concord: or on similitude of desires, as his Latin Translation renders it? for this he makes the great Cause of competition and contest, when several desire, and are not able to enjoy the same thing. Thus similitude of desires must be sometimes the cause of War, sometimes of Peace; thus doth he at once, out of the same Mouth, blow both hot and cold. What the meaning of the Author of the device was, when he made two Pitchers floating upon the Waters, with this Inscription, Si collidimur, frangimur, I know not; but it seems very applicable to Mr. Hobbs his methods of reasoning, if they be considered singly, they may perhaps bear some plausible show of Argument: but if they be compared with each other, they will often be found as inconsistent with themselves, as they are singly inconsistent with the truth. But he tells us, that in all times Kings and Princes, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, in a State and posture of Gladiators. Here 'tis observable, how cunningly he joins those two words, State and Posture, seeming thereby to insinuate, that Men could not be in a posture of Defence, unless they were in a state of War: for Kings to put themselves into a condition to repel injuries, when violently offered, is no more, than what reason and Prudence dictates; but this doth not infer Mr. Hobb's his State of War, but rather the contrary, when we see some Kingdoms able, and yet not willing to oppress their Neighbours. That Men may awfully do something in the time of War, which is not lawful to do in the time of Peace, is certainly true: but then we must not think, that the same blast of the Trumpet that Proclaimed the War, did at the same time blow away all those airy Notions of just and unjust, which according to him, have no other being in Nature, but what they received from humane Compacts. justice and Injustice, are none of the faculties, either of the Body or Soul, they are qualities that relate to Man in Society, not in Solitude. Further in this slate of Nature, nothing can be unjust, here Force and Fraud are two Cardinal Pertues: that the practice and external exercise of justice, and many other moral Duties, doth suppose a Society, or at least a state of Friendship, that so Men may have proper objects of those respective Virtues, is certainly true; yet the reasons of their obligation are founded in the nature of each single Man, and so may belong to a Man in Solitude, for the reasons of justice and other Moral Virtues, are not ultimately to be resolved into that natural support and advantage they bring to a Society and Commonwealth, and that they cannot, without great disadvantage, be banished out of it, but into that Conformity they bear to the Divine Nature, and to the participation thereof in ourselves: God indeed in the wise and benign disposals of his Providence, has twisted our duty and our interest together: Goodness and Virtue have a natural tendency to make us as perfectly happy, as 'tis possible, even in our civil and political Capacities; but then they are not therefore only Virtues, because profitable to the public, but upon some other higher grounds and reasons being Virtues, they thus also, as parts of Godliness, become profitable to all things; having the promise of the Life that now is, and of that which is to come.  
But why are justice and Injustice qualities that relate to Men only in Society, and not in Solitude? seeing these may as well be in a Man alone in the World, as some of his Passions, which also necessarily relate to their proper objects.  
Mr. Hobbs some where approves of that definition, which the Schools give of justice, constans & perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi, so that according to this, a Man may be just, if he have a real and sincere desire to give every one his own, though he have not where withal to do it. Thus also why may not a Man be just and charitable, though he want fit objects to exercise these Virtues upon; for why should the want of the object more destroy the nature of the Virtue, than the want of the subject matter, or material part, as in the former Case of the necessitous just Man.  
There were some fatal Philosophers of old, and some such there are still, who make good and evil, just and unjust, mere factitious things, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; such as depend only upon the free and arbitrary determination of the Divine Will, but then to make 'em to depend merely upon the pleasure of the Civil Magistrate, this seems to be a peculiar flight, proper only to Mr. Hobbs, thus to make a God of his Leviathan: This Opinion of his doth either suppose no God at all, or such an one, as doth not much concern himself in the Government of the World, but, leaves all to his Vicegerent here below; obey the King, and you can scarce, according to him, disobey God.  
Some will scarce allow, that granting Mr. Hobbs his Principles, that his Conclusions do ever necessarily (or but seldom) follow, that is, that there is but little strict and severe ratiocination in all his Writings: yet this, I think, we must grant, that his dangerous Errors in Government and Religion, are but necessary deductions from his false Principles first laid in humane Nature.  
That Man is naturally a sociable Creature, fit for Society, is granted by most, and not denied by Mr. Hobbs himself, but then he tells us, that Man is not born fit for it, this he is fitted for, not by Nature, but by Education: and the reason hereof is, because he is not born at Years of discretion, not at Age to Seal a Bond, and without this there is no entering into Compacts, or Civil Society. But he tells us, Pa. 21. Leu. that Children are called reasonable Creatures for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come; and I know not, why we may not by the same reason, grant Men to be born sociable Creatures, or fit for Society, for the like apparent possibility, though they were not actually entered into Covenants, for they are born with all those dispositions and aptitudes to Society, which they have for reason itself: now that Man is thus really a SociableCreature, will appear both from the nature and necessities of Mankind. 1. From the nature of Man, for the very fundamental Laws of Nature suppose either a Society, or something answerable to it, Quod tibi non vis sieri, alteri ne feceris; Do to others, as me desire others should do to us, and we are generally as much obliged to the duties of justice and Honesty to others, as of Prudence and Caution to ourselves; and this necessarily supposes a Society, or something like it, a state of Friendship. 2. The necessities of Mankind seem to argue us to be sociable Creatures, such whose very subsistence necessarily requires the aid and assistance of others, otherwise the very Birth of a Child would be the certain exposing of it to destruction.  
Mr. Hobbs will not grant any Laws of Nature truly so called, in the state of Nature; they are only certain Theorems, or Maxims, tending to Peace, rather than Laws, that bring us under any obligation. But why do not these Laws of Nature, which he grants to be dictates of reason, lay as great an obligation upon us for Obedience, as those inordinate Passions of Nature? Especially if we consider, that obedience to these dictates of reason are more fit and proper means in order to self-preservation, than the prosecution of those mere rights of nature, as he calls them, violence and anticipation. And if we reflect upon matters of fact, and the several instances that History furnishes us withal, we shall find Examples of Mercy and Compassion to others, of a generous condescension and self-denial of ourselves, and of an universal love and good will to Mankind, sufficient to confute the scandals cast upon humane nature upon this account. Though it must also be granted, that there has been too many barbarous and inhuman actions committed, both by Heathens and Christians too, but then those actions were not approved by the more wise and sober Persons of those very Nations that committed 'em. 2. They were universally Condemned by the more civilised part of the World. 3. They were so far from tending to their advantage, that they have many times proved the cause or occasion of many and grievousCalamities brought upon themselves and Nation by the just Providence of God.  
Now Mr. Hobbs his Principles in general seem to be the suiting or fitting the vicious practices of Mankind to an Hypothesis, thereby endeavouring to enact wickedness by a Law, and to prove the lawfulness of all possible violence and injustice, by the Magna Charta of Self-preservation. This bad use has he made of the general viciousness of men's Lives, from thence to gather Principles, which might, if possible, legitimate their actions, like Machiavelli, who from the small respect that Princes generally bore to Leagues and Oaths, taught his Prince, that there was no obligation lay upon him from 'em, but only to consult his own interest and advantage by 'em; and whereas his Compurgator admires the bad fortune of Machiavelli, to see one Man inherit in particular the Mass of reproaches due to all Princes and Statesmen in general, he might have ceased his wonder, if he had considered, that it was one thing to act wickedly, and another to teach Men that they might do so. Personal bad actions are but the failures of particular Men, such as they themselves perhaps may go about some ways to excuse or extenuate, but not to justify: but now Machiavelli his thus becoming an Advocate for Vice, is of more pernicious consequence; it emboldens Sin, and endeavours to confound the notions of good and evil, for he that shall break one of the least Commandments, and teach men so, he shall be called the least in the Kingdom of Heaven. It is further pleaded for Machiavelli, that all his Documents he gives only to a Prince, for had he recommended this practice to a Son, or any else circumscribed in a narrower compass, than a Kingdom, he might have been more justly Condemned. Now this Apology, however weak and insufficient it is for Machiavelli himself, yet is Mr. Hobbs utterly uncapable of any such excuse, because his bad Principles are of a more universal influence, and reach not only to Prince, but People too.  
I called Mr. Hobbs his Principles an Hypothesis, now if any be offended at the word, as a term of diminution, I shall here further do these two things. 1. Show, that it is only so, and no more, being something that is rather supposed than sufficiently proved. 2. That it is not a good Hypothesis, as wanting those conditions and qualifications, which are requisite to any Hypothesis in general, much more to such an one, as the nature of the subject required his to be. 1. It is an Hypothesis and no more, and I have very good Authority so to call it from Mr. Hobbs his own words, 8 Ch. de Cive. Let us return again, says he, to the slate of nature, and consider Man as even now sprang out of the Earth, and suddenly, like Mushromcs come to full maturity, without all kind of Government to each other. Now this, I conceive, the most proper and genuine interpretation that can be put upon the place, to call it an Hypothesis. For I would not willingly think, that Mr. Hobbs did really believe, that once upon a time Men started out of the Earth, like Molehills, especially if we consider, that he himself doth Satirically reflect upon such a supposal, where he compares some kind of ignorant persons to Children, that having no thoughts of Generation, are made believe by the Women, that their Brothers and Sisters are not born, but found in the Garden: here we may observe how little right reason there is in all Mr. Hobbs his Discourses, that depend hereupon, for he himself tells us in his De Cive, 2 Ch. That right reason is that which concludes from true Principles. Now these true Principles in matters of Morality and Policy, must be more than supposedly true: indeed a certain kind of truth may be in favour granted to an Hypothesis of natural Philosophy, if it exactly answer all the Phaenomena of Nature, though itself do not answer the real truth; but this Indulgence cannot be granted to things of a moral or political concern.  
Neither Secondly is it a good Hypothesis, as wanting those qualifications which are required to any Hypothesis in general, which are these three. 1. An Hypothesis must be possible, this is the least that it can pretend to, but it must not be only so according to the utmost extent of possibility, but also fairly possible according to the most easy methods of our Conceptions, that is, probable, so contrived, that we might be thence persuaded, that that was the way, that God and Nature made use of in that particular: that as the Epicureans say of the Universe, that though it was the result of blind chance, yet all things therein have happened as well, as if they had been the result of the greatest wisdom and contrivance: thus an Hypothesis, though perhaps it be not the real truth, yet it should give as full and natural Solutions of things, as if indeed it were. 2. It must be self-consistent, and not contain Principles of Self-dissolution within itself, for it is impossible, that that should be agreeable to the wise and regular methods of Nature, and Providence, which is not agreeable with itself. 3. An Hypothesis ought to employ our Faculties in the search of true and useful Knowledge, and also to promote real Piety in the World, therefore we ought not to fancy to ourselves such an Hypothesis in Philosophy, as excludes God out of the World, and such an one as asserts a mere material Universe. Now here I might easily show, that this of Mr. Hobb's, is neither 1. Possible, much less probable. 2. Not consistent with itself. 3. So far from promoting sound Knowledge and true Piety, that it is really destructive of both.  
Whether such a state of Nature, as Mr. Hobbs describes, be a proper and effectual means, in order to a Man's self-preservation, may be justly questioned, and indeed he himself seems not to be of that Opinion, seeing he makes his natural Statesmen to get out of it as soon as they can, in order to the bettering of their condition; yet this is certain, that he makes private interest the great and ultimate end of all humane actions in general, and of his Levia. in particular, as being that, wherein he thinks he has laid the best and surest foundations of all humane happiness: I shall therefore here, by way of Appendix to this Chapter, speak something in general concerning this great Principle of Self-Preservation.  
It is the natural folly of Mankind to run out of one extreme of Vice and Error into another; thus perhaps the ignorant Zeal and blind Devotion of some who attributed too little, might first give occasion to others to ascribe too much to Sels-preservation; however we must not deny it its due regard, so far as Reason and Religion admit, because others have extended it further, than in either it ought. I shall therefore freely grant, what the greatest Patrons of Self-preservation can with any just ground or reason demand, and hereby I shall gain this double advantage. 1. It will hence appear, that it is not out of any prejudice or heat of opposition, that I contradict any thing, even in that Opinion I do oppose.  
2. Hereby I shall come to a truer stateing of the Question, and so shall be better able to defend it: for this disadvantage there is even to Truth itself, in the false stating of a Question, that we either undertake to oppose that in an adversary which is really true, and so irresragable; or else to defend something that is false, and so not capable of being defended.  
To deny that which is true, is altogether needless, for we need not fear any prejudice to a good Cause from truth elsewhere, because all truths of this nature are consistent with themselves, and no ways contrary to each other, whereas the denial of any thing that is true, tho' in an adversary, may break that continuity of truth, and some way or other weaken our own cause, I shall add two or three general considerations relating hereunto.  
1. That God has imprinted in Man a principle of self preservation is not only true, but very agreeable to the goodness of God, and very subservient for the carrying on the designs of Prudence and Piety in the world, for it would have reflected dishonourably either upon the goodness or wisdom of God, to have made such an excellent creature as Man, and taken no care for his preservation, so far as it should not be in the power of any one upon every slight occasion to throw away himself, and so destroy Gods peculiar Image; or to have exposed him to all the dangers, that either his own inadvertency or the malice of others might have brought upon him, without some innate inclinations of self preservation, and suitable principles of prudence to enable him thereunto. Thus Religion itself doth not only permit, but command us to act with a due respect to those two grand Principles of a Christian Life, Prudence and Innocence, to be wise as Serpents, and innocent as Doves.  
Further, without this we had wanted that most exact and easy rule of Charity to others, Whatsoever you would that Men should do unto you, even so do you unto them, where our love to ourselves is made the rule and measure of our Charity to others.  
But, Mr. Hobbs makes self preservation without any respect to the lawfulness of the means, to be the first and great dictate of Reason and Nature, and charges Christianity with folly, in that in some cases it so little regards its own safety, but exposes its professors to Martyrdom for Religion's sake.  
If, says he, Chap. 42. we be commanded by our lawful Prince, to say that we do not believe in Christ, we must obey him, for words are but external things, and do no more express the assent of the Speaker, than any other external action: and therefore a Christian in such things hath the same liberty, that the Prophet gave to Naaman the Syrian: 2 Kings 5. 18. In this thing the Lord pardon thy Servant, that when my Master goeth into the House of Rimmon, to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand, and I bow myself in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing, and he said unto him, go in peace. Here Mr. Hobbs saith, that Naaman believed the true God in his Heart, but by worshipping would seem not to believe, lest he should offend his King. But here he supposes, but proves not, that Naaman here asks Pardon for what he designed to do for the time to come, whereas the words may be as well rendered so, as to signify his ask Pardon for the time past: but supposing, that he here refers to the time to come, yet this is not so much a denying of the true God, as if he had denied him with his Lips, as Mr. Hobbs would have it, for here he did not deny the true God at all, because he declared before, that by this incurvation he did not design any adoration of the Idol, and this Declaration was as public as his action, viz. that henceforth he would worship no other, but the God of Israel. Now Mr. Hobbs could not well imagine a Man to deny the true God with his Lips before a persecuting Magistrate, and withal suppose him at the same time to declare, as it was in Naaman's Case, that he intended no such thing, as he spoke by his words, for this in all probability would rather incense the Prince, than any ways tend to his own preservation. 2. Though the love of God, and the love of ourselves, rightly understood, are no ways opposite to one another, in as much as God requires nothing of us, that is inconsistent with our real interest, yet we may truly and properly assert, that God is to be loved for himself, for the Excellency and Amiableness of his own Nature, not but that we may, and generally do, love God too with respect to his relative goodness towards us: thus Religion is suited, both to the most generous tempers of some, and provides objects for the most heroic acts of virtue, and takes away all occasion from those, who would, upon this occasion, fix upon it the name of mercenary, and also on the other hand it condescends to the more common and ordinary inclinations of Mankind, in suffering and encouraging them to act with respect to the recompense of reward.  
But though the constitution of humane nature be such, that the considerations of Gods relative goodness to us do generally mingle themselves with all our thoughts of God, and exercises of our love towards him; I doubt not but we may, without any fantastical abstraction, so far distinguish betwixt the mercies received, and the excellency of the Divine Nature, that we may even therein found a reason of our love of him. So that the loving of God for his own sake, though, I believe, it seldom occurs in practice, yet it ought not to be spoke against in Discourse, provided first, that it be not made use of to lead men into unwarrantable extravagancies, either in opinion or practice, Secondly, Provided, as Bishop Tayler says, that what is a great perfection in some be not imposed as a Law upon all.  
3. In extreme necessity, it is lawful for a Man to do, what otherwise he ought not to do: here, I suppose, a Man brought to that exigency, that without timely and suitable supplies, he certainly perisheth; by what means he is here brought into these circumstances, I do not here consider; only I except this, That he be not a Malefactor condemned, and now about to undergo the just and due Punishment of his Offence: but then this necessity must be for the necessary sustentation of Life, not for the gratisication of Humour or sensual Appetite; we must not think with Mr. Hobbs, That we may, not only for Preservation but Delectation also, endeavour to destroy others. He also tells us, That in the State of Nature there is nothing further required to make a thing lawful, but its being necessary to our Preservation; and nothing required to make it necessary, but a strong opinion that it is so; so that, according to him, confidence of Belief, and strength of Fancy may alter the nature of things, and make 'em lawful or unlawful accordingly; so that, according to him, we then principally, if not only offend against the Laws of Nature, when we pretend something necessarily to tend to our Preservation, which indeed either doth not, or what we do not confidently enough believe to do so. Further,  
This necessity must be real, not imaginary; urgent and inevitable, not such as may be supplied or prevented by our own Endeavours. We must not pretend Necessity, when indeed we only indulge our own Laziness, and neglect the use of those means, whereby we might possibly remove, what we now suppose: in these circumstances a Man may lawfully make use of those means, which necessarily tend to his Preservation, and no further. Thus in case of extreme Hunger, he may take so much of other men's Goods, as are necessary to preserve his Life, without incurring the Gild of Theft; and the Reason hereof is, not merely because the Owner, in such a case, is bound to give as much as is sufficient for that purpose; for in many cases others may be bound to do, what we have no power to force in case of denial. Nor, secondly, because at the first Division of things, the Dividers excepted this case of extreme Necessity; wherein they did not design the Right of Dominion and Property to be so strict and severe, but that, in this case, the Ius primaevum should return.  
But, first, it seems not so reasonable to believe, that there ever was that Usus communis of all things, as Grotius asserts, and consequently no such Division, wherein he supposes all Property to be founded.  
Secondly, Suppose the Dividers, either through carelessness or inadvertency had left this as a Casus omissus, without making any Provision about it, and it doth not any ways evidently appear, that they ever made any such; or if through perverseness and ill nature they had determined it otherwise, yet the thing would still have been, as now we apprehend it: so that it is more than probable, that both Property and that lawful Power that a Man hath, to relieve himself in extreme necessity, doth depend upon some antecedent Reason, and some higher Principle, than that barely supposed Agreement of the first Dividers.  
3. The Reasonableness of laying down our Lives for the sake of Religion, will appear from the unreasonableness of the contrary Assertion, which must suppose one of these three things; either that God has not Authority to command his Creatures such instances of Obedience; or not Goodness enough to reward 'em, for what he thus enjoins; or that we have not sufficient evidence, that his Will and Pleasure is, that in some cases he requires it: to deny the two former, is to deny the Dictates of natural Reason; to assert the third, is to deny the plain Words and Commands of God in Scripture.  
And further, if we consider what it is, that we are commanded to part with, only the short and transitory satisfactions of a frail Life, which at best we cannot enjoy long, and which may be otherwise so loaded with Miseries, that the very continuance of it may be the greatest Punishment. Besides, 'tis probable, the Martyrs, notwithstanding the greatness of their Torments, being as great as either the Wit or Malice of their Enemies could invent, yet that they did not feel so much pain, as mere sensual Men might imagine, if we consider the intenseness of their Thoughts, then set on the joys above, and also the more plentiful effusions of the Divine Grace, strengthening and assisting them; so that they seemed rather pleasantly to enjoy, than painfully to undergo the flames.   

CHAP. VI Religion the best Foundation of Civil Government. With an Examination of some of Machiavel's Opinions relating hereunto.  
IF we consider the Nature of Religion in general: how that it is that Order and Constitution of things in the World, whereby all rational Agents, either do, or at least are bound to act in observation of those mutual Respects they bear to God, themselves and others; how that it is that great instrument of Providence in the World, for the management of the most considerable Affairs thereof. And what some Philosophers have asserted of the Soul of the Universe, may be very well applied to Religion in respect of the rational World, that it ties each part to itself and to one another, and disposes of every thing for the Good and Advantage of the whole, and of every part. This considered, it is impossible, but that Religion should have a very good and benign influence upon all public Societies, these being the most considerable Bodies of the Universe.  
And this the very Enemies of Religion acknowledge in their most malicious scandals and reproaches, that are cast upon it, viz. when they tell us, That Religion is nothing but a mere politic Device and Contrivance of Princes, by which they might better govern their Subjects, and awe them into obedience: but this, as most Errors are, is founded in a certain Truth; and though it be a false scandal cast upon Religion, yet it supposes this undeniable Verity, That Religion is not only consistent with, but also highly promotive of the Ends of Government. Now the consistency of Religion with Government in general will appear, from these following Considerations.  
1. Religion in the true and sincere Exercise of it, is the only Means appointed by God for the attaining of eternal Happiness; now one great end of God's instituting a Government in the World, was to put Men into a better capacity of performing their Duty towards God, themselves and others.  
These things being first granted (which I think also are sufficiently plain and evident in themselves) it is impossible, that Religion should be inconsistent with, or destructive of Government; seeing these two are made joint means in order to one common end of humane Happiness. Thus God sent us into the World, that by Holiness we should arrive at Happiness; and he has appointed a Government over us, that under it we should lead quiet and peaceable Lives in all Godliness and Honesty: therefore these two, Religion and Government, are certainly consistent with each other; otherwise it would charge God with Folly and Imprudence, by designing to bring about an end by incosistent means.  
2. Though Government in general, be subordinate to Religion, in reference to the ultimate End, eternal Happiness; yet the Church (and the Affairs of Religion) in reference to its private Power and Authority, is subordinate, in a great measure, to the State. Thus we say, that the Church is in the State, and not the State in the Church. But now this is not an essential, but only an accidental Subordination; that is, such an one, as depends upon Divine, positive Institution: for if God had so pleased, he might have made the State inferior to the Church in all things, as he hath made the Church subject to the State in most. Now if we may venture to give a Reason of the Divine Institution, it may seem to be this; That God seeing how much it was for the Interest of the State, to provide for and secure the Affairs of Religion, hath therefore subjected the Church in most things (always excepting those spiritual Privileges and Peculiarities belonging to the Church, which I always suppose sacred and inviolable) to the Power of the civil Government; for it is not probable, that God would thus have committed his Church (to which he always bore such a tender regard) to the care and charge of the State, if it were as our Adversaries suppose, so much for the Interest of the State, to violate the Laws of the Church and of Religion.  
But now particularly, Religion lays the best foundation of Government, these four ways.  
1. By asserting the Original of Civil Power to be truly Divine.  
2. By showing the Religious Obligation of an Oath, and founding Obedience neither in Fear, nor Interest, but in Conscience.  
3. By correcting and confuting all those false Opinions and Principles, which are so destructive of all humane Societies and civil Obedience.  
4. By removing all those Lusts and Passions out of the Minds of Men, which are the great Incendiaries of the World, and Fomenters of War and Discord.  
1. Religion does the best secure Government, by asserting the Original of civil Power to be truly Divine. Here I shall not restrain my Assertion to Monarchy only, but extend it also to all regular and well-settled Governments. Though I think, that Monarchy has a great advantage in its Plea, for a more particular Divine Institution, so far as Example and primitive Practice can give any right thereto; nor do I here assert, That all Monarchies, in their original Constitution, were absolute; or however there was no necessity that they should be so. Some indeed say, That whatever Restrictions or Limitations have been since introduced into some Governments, yet from the beginning it was not so; these were the Encroachments of after Ages, and the People's usurping upon the Prerogative; or else the Grants and Concessions of good-natured Princes. But this, I think, is rather barely asserted, than positively proved: yet will it not follow hence, that the People are the original Proprietors of all civil Power. What our Saviour said to Pilate, joh. 19 11. Thou couldst have no power over me, except it were given thee from above; the same we may say of the People, that suppose (but not granting) that they had such a Power, as some imagine, yet they could not have it of themselves; they must either mediately or immediately derive it from God: so that, they giving this Power to the King, the Power will be still truly Divine, though it be conveyed through the People, as through a Conduit. But then to what purpose should we suppose such a needless circuit in the proceedings of Divine Providence: Why might not God give it more immediately himself, seeing this is, as easily conceivable, attended with fewer Inconveniencies, and more promotive of the Ends of Government than the other? Thus Mr. Hobbs no less falsely, than impiously tells us, That God created Man in such an ill-conditioned State of Nature; not that he designed him to continue in it, but that he might mend himself by his own Prudence, by getting out of it, as soon as he could. And Grotius seems to be much what of the same Opinion, in his Book de jure belli & pacis, where, among his many perplexed methods of arguing upon this subject; yet this he seems positively to assert, That civil Power had its Original from the Consent of the People, not taking the least notice of any higher principle: but yet he directly contradicts himself herein, in his Epistle Dedicatory, to Lewis the XIIIth. King of France, (whether only in Compliment or no, I know not) where he tells him, quam gloriosum hoc, etc. ut si quando te Deus ad suum Regnum vocaverit, audacter possis dicere, hunc ego à te gladium pro justitiae tutelâ accepi, hunc ego tibi nullius temerè fusi sanguinis reum, purum insontémque reddo. Here he says that Lewis the XIIIth. received the sword of justice from God, which if he did, it was more than ever any other King, according to his Principles, did before, p. 80. de jure belli; Notandum est primò homines non Dei praecepto sed sponte adductos, experimento infirmitatis familiarum segregum, adversus violentiam in societatem civilem coiisse, unde ortum habet civilis potest as quam ideo humanam ordinationem Petrus vocat, quanquam & alibi divina Ordinatio vocatur, quia hominum salubre institutum Deus probavit, Deus autem humanam legem probans censetur probare at humanam & humano more: where we see, that God was no farther concerned in the constituting this civil Power, but only by way of approbation of what Man had done before: But here first, he supposes, it would be hard for him to prove, That Men lived at first in separate Families, without any common Power over them.  
But, 2. suppose they did; the sense and experience of the Inconveniences that attended this way of living might be a motive or occasion of men's looking out for help: but I do not see, how they are thus any more the radical Cause of Civil Power, than the Patient is the Cause of his own Cure, or of the Physician's Skill, only because he applied himself to him.  
Nor is it here denied, but that the People may, in some cases determine the Person, as in Elective Kingdoms. And further, suppose a mixed company of Men, such as are neither Parents of Children, nor Masters of Families; such as have no relation or dependence upon one another; suppose these by chance cast upon an uninhabited Coast, they may frame themselves into any particular Form of Government; such as they may reasonably believe to be most agreeable to their Circumstances, and most subservient to the great Ends of all Government, viz. Peace and Piety.  
But yet notwithstanding the Power, in this case, is not originally from the People, but, as the Learned and judicious Dr. Donne has determined the Case, God by a secret Compact made with Mankind, in Nature doth infuse the Power, as the Soul, into the Body Politic (as well as Natural) thus duly prepared, and as it were presented to God for that purpose, by a prudent and regular Election and Determination: they who would see this further explained and confirmed, may consult Dr. Donne's Pseudomartyrs, Cap. 6.  
That which seems most liable to Exception in this Account is, that secret Compact which God is here supposed to make with Mankind, etc. so that Learned Man is pleased to call it; but I am not very solicitous either about the name, or the particular way and mode of conveying this Power, only to make the thing appear the more reasonable. We may consider, that it would be very hard, if at all possible, for those, who derive this Power merely from the consent of the People, either to secure the Government at present, or the Succession afterwards upon these Principles. For since, according to them, Men are by Nature born free, and consequently it may be questioned, how far the Act of the Father, in this case, will oblige his Posterity: Why may not the Children plead, that they have as good right to vote and consent for themselves now, as their Fathers had before; and this would soon prove the utter Ruin of all Government.  
But now since the Obligation that lies upon us, is from an higher Principle; this, if any thing, will keep Men in their due Obedience; and this, I conceive, is very agreeable to the Doctrine laid down in Bishop Overall's Convocation-Book.  
Here 'tis further observable, That the Patrons of that Opinion, which found'st Power originally in the People, are like those of the Church of Rome, in their Disputes about Infallibility. Those we have here to deal with, are sure, that the Original of Power is in the People, only they know not where to fix and where to find it; whether in the Body of the People, collectively taken, or only in the Heads and Masters of Families; or in the Men only, in contradiction to Women and Children, or in each particular Man singly, as Mr. Hobbs asserts: for he doth not suppose, that when the People make a Migistrate, that they confer any Power upon him, which he had not before in his private Capacity; only they covenant, that they will not use their Power in opposition to his, but let him alone to rule without a Rival. Now the great incertainty these Men are in, both in respect of Infallibility, and the first and immediate Subject of this Power, is a great presumption at least, that there is no such as either, in that way and manner wherein they assert them: thus, I conceive, this way of stating the Question gives both to God, the King, and the People, what is of right their due; and if the People should challenge more than what is here given them, I think it would be to their disadvantage. As for those other three Particulars beforementioned, I shall refer the Reader to those respective Authors who treat of 'em. But though civil Power be originally from God, yet is it not founded in Grace, which Opinion, as it is now commonly stated, is but the novel Invention of some brainsick People of latter days, founded upon the mistaken sense of some Prophecies of the old Testament, and upon some forced Interpretatious of some Texts of the New; and it has been further promoted by the fantastic Pride nnd Folly of those that entertain it; first, by fancying themselves Saints, and then falsely applying all those Honours and Privileges to themselves, which they think are any where applied to Saints in Scripture, 1 Cor. 6. 2. Know ye not that the Saints shall judge the world; hence they falsely conclude, That those Kings who have not a just right or title to a Crown in Heaven, aught to lay no claim to one on Earth, and therefore those wicked of the World are to be rooted out, only to make room for their Saintships. But for the better understanding of that place, we must know, That Saints in Scripture frequently signify no more, than the called and faithful; such as from judaism or Heathenism were converted to the Christian Religion. Thus know ye not that the Saints shall judge the world? that is, Know ye not, that the World shall become Christian, and that it shall be governed by Christian Magistrates: and why should you deem yourselves unfit to exercise that judgement now in a more private manner among yourselves, without going to Heathen Tribunals, which Christians shall 'ere long do, in a more public and solemn manner upon all.  
If Dominion was so founded in Grace, that all Christian Kings were truly Pious and Religious, then would there be no public Wrongs, or Injuries committed in the Christian World; but this is a thing rather to be wished, than ever rationally hoped for: Besides, God in the Just and Wise Methods of his Providence sometimes makes use of wicked Princes, as Instruments of his justice, to punish the sins of others; which could not be done, if all Kings were truly Religious: Neither doth God make 'em wicked, that so he may thus make use of 'em, as Instruments of his Providence, but finds 'em so; neither doth this any ways lessen the sin in them, because God makes use of it for other Purposes, than they ever intended, their wicked and malicious designs of Injury and Oppression being hereby nothing abated: And indeed that Opinion is so destructive of all public and private Properties, that it would soon dissolve all civil Societies, which our Saviour, both by his Precept and Example made his constant business to uphold: And if any in the World could ever lay claim to Dominion upon this account, certainly he might have done it, and yet we find he always declined the taking of any such thing upon him.  
I shall here now briefly examine that Opinion of Machiavil, which tells us, That a Prince ought indeed to appear Religious, but that there is no necessity of his being so in ●●●●h and reality. Here the Question is not, Whether a Prince that doth not act out of ante Christian Principles, for the Glory of God, and the Good of Men, but is indeed 〈◊〉 and Hypocrite, whether such an one may not yet rule well, and derive all the Blessings of a pious Government upon his People, provided that his Actions, though they be deficient as to the principal, yet that they be good and lawful as to the matter. But Machiavil means not thus much by his seeming Piety, but only a mere pretence of Religion, till a fair opportunity offer itself, and then thereupon to violate all that before he counted sacred, viz. to break Oaths, and all the Laws of justice and Honour, where his private Interest, or public reason of State prompts him thereunto: But here we may consider, that the Advantages that attend real Piety, and unfeigned Religion, what they are, they are constant and perpetual, but those that are the result of Hypocrisy and Persidiousness, they are but for one turn; we can hardly again deceive those whom we have once imposed upon; so that this Counterfeit of Religion will not consist long with Reputation of Piety, his own People at home, and other Princes abroad, are usually quicksighted enough to espy the faults of their Governors, and of those they have to deal withal; and Hypocrisy, when 'tis once discovered, is the most contemptible thing in the World.  
But indeed it is neither the Honour nor Interest of a Prince to be Irreligious.  
First, It is not the Honour of any Man to be Wicked.  
And Princes do not cease to be Men when they take upon 'em the Sovereign, but still remain under all these Obligations that God and Nature had before laid upon 'em. Now that Wickedness is in itself dishonourable, will appear upon these several Accounts.  
1. Though some Men may arrive at that height of Wickedness as to glory in their shame; yet, thanks be to God, they are but few in respect of that greater and better number of Men, which both pity the Persons, and detest the Follies of such poor deluded People: For we never yet heard of a Kingdom, a Commonwealth of Atheists, Providence having so ordered the affairs of the World, that the open and general Profession of Wickedness should be inconsistent with all Humane Constitutions.  
And here we might further appeal to the experience of Wicked Men themselves, whether their sins were not always the most pleasant, when they were most private: For there is something of a secret shame in sin, and something of an awful Veneration owing to Virtuous and Religious Men; so that if Wicked Men at any time boast of their Wickedness, it is commonly before such who are as bad and extravagant as themselves.  
2. Wicked Men may sometimes glory in their sins, not that they take any such real pleasure therein, but that they may thus invite others to mention their Enormities, and so are glad to hear that they have Companions in their Vicious Follies, and others as bad as themselves.  
3. Wicked Men themselves do not seem be in earnest, when they pride themselves in their Wickedness, for when they would effectually reproach a Man, they then upbraid him, not with his Virtues, but with some real or feigned Wickedness, which they falsely attribute to him.  
'Tis true, such may be the Circumstances of time and place (but more frequently in Commonwealths than Kingdoms) that Men shall suffer for their very Virtues and Excellencies, as it happened among the Athenians, who could not endure a Man of extraordinary Virtue and Excellence; hence was made that Law of Ostracism to banish such, whose great Endowments had made terrible, and suspected by the State: But then the execution of this Law upon any one was so far from being a Disreputation to him, that the Banishment itself was counted honourable. Nor  
2. Is it the Interest of Princes to be wicked, for nothing doth more weaken the Nerves of Government at home, nor lose the Reputation of a Prince abroad, than Sin and Wickedness; and Princes as well as Merchants, do in some sense live upon their Credits. And further, Wickedness in a Prince has a Malignant Influence upon his Subjects, and a natural tendency to make them so too, so that there is scarce any Vice in him purely personal, but it commonly extends its influence as far as his Dominions. Now 'tis easily conceivable, how the Viciousness of the Subject tends to the prejudice of the Prince; for by this means they are neither well disposed to keep peace at home, nor so well able to manage a War abroad. Thus Machiavil tells us, That Vanquished Provinces do fully revenge themselves of their Conquerors, by receiving them delicately, and corrupting them by loose manners: For thus the sostness of Pleasures and Delights will cause 'em gradually to degenerate from their former Valour. And whereas Machiavil tells us, That a Prince may as well be hated for his Virtues, as for his Vices, and instances in Pertinax and Alex. Severus, Wise and Virtuous Princes, and therefore hated by their Men of War: Hence he concludes, That if a Prince will preserve himself in his Estate, he must comply with the humours of such as may hurt him, and even imitate their Vices and Corruptions.  
In Answer hereto, I shall not here mention some small Passages of those two Emperors, which some Historians take notice of, as possible occasions of those Disgusts that grew among their Men of War, but shall suppose that these Soldiers did really hate the Virtues of these Emperors, For it will not follow from hence, that Virtue is equally liable to the hatred of Men. Thus Thiefs hate the Magistrates, because they execute justice upon 'em, yet hereby do they get more Love from the public than they contract hatred from the Offenders: Thus, though those two Emperors were hated by some few dissolute and disorderly Bands of Soldiers, yet never did any Emperor's fall more lamented by the generality of the Empire, than they.  
And though sometimes a private Person, as I before intimated, may be the cause of some inconveniences to himself by his Natural Ability, or Moral Virtues: yet this cannot take place in a Prince, because he is already in that Supreme Authority, which others perhaps only aim at: nay, thus by being eminently Virtuous he will present all growing Popularity in the most Ambitious of his Subjects, and eclipse their histre even in the Opinion of those, why would otherwise be their great Admirers. I shall here only add the Apology that the florentines themselves, make the their Countryman Machiavil, viz. That he himself did not really believe his own Assertions in his wicked Maxims of Policy and Religion, only designing hereby, if possible, to ruin the House of the Medici's, who had oppressed the Commonwealth of Florence, he broached these Pestilent Doctrines, in hopes they would embrace 'em, and so ruin themselves by the practice of them. As for that Opinion of Machiavil, That the Christian Religion has so effeminated the Spirits of its Professors, that Christendom is now become an easy prey to all Invaders; this is so false and soolish, so contrary both to Reason and Experience, that it scarce deserves a Confutation. Christianity forbids indeed all private Revenge, and teaches us Meekness and Humility towards all Men, but this is no way destructive of true Valour and ' Generosity: For a firm belief of God, and the Immortality of the Soul, and a due care of engaging in a just Cause, are certainly the best foundations of true Courage: There is nothing that a Christian fears more, than to commit sin; now if the fear of offending God, and violating his Laws, be counted Cowardice, than who would be ashamed of such an Honorary Accusation; but there is no necessity to purchase one Virtue at the expense of another, or to forfeit our Magnanimity, to maintain true Christian Meekness: For the most Stout are always the most Generous, Meek and Merciful; and Cruelty is commonly a certain sign of a Pusillanimous Spirit; and as for Experience, both Ancient and Modern Histories testify, that neither Turks nor any other Infidels have any advantage over Christian Kingdoms upon this Account.   

CHAP. VII. Of Moral Virtue.  
MOral Virtue is a thing so natural, and only proper to Mankind, that a Discourse of Humane Nature without this, would seem defective in one of its most principal parts; the retaining of this Virtuous Innocence, was the Duty of Adam in Paradise; and the regaining of it, as far as this present state of Imperfection will admit, is still ours now. So that this universal rectitude of our Natures, was the first and most absolute Duty incumbent on Man, for Faith and Repentance, those two great Evangelical Duties, though they be absolutely necessary in this lapsed State of Mankind; yet their necessity did only commence with Man's Fall: for in Innocence there had been no need of either, but Virtue and Holiness, Piety towards God, and Honesty and Charity to Men; these were Duties at first, and will be so to all Eternity hereafter, when Faith shall be swallowed up in Vision, and when all sin shall be done away, and so no need of Repentance. Thus Virtue was part of that Divine Image, wherein we were first created, and whoever, in this sense, speaks against it, Blasphemes God. Moral Virtue therefore, as distinguished from original Righteousness, and Evangelical Holiness, may be thus described: It is an habit of the Mind, founded indeed in Nature, but perfected by frequent use and exercise, whereby the Man is enabled by the mere strength of Natural Principles, to do that which is most agreeable to the Duty and Dignity of his Nature, in those three Relations he bears to himself, to others, and to God. I shall give a short Paraphrase upon the Desinition.  
First, It is an Habit, and so distinguished from original Righteousness, which was not an Adventitious Quality, or super-induced upon Man in esse completo; but it was as essential to Man in Innocence, as roundness is to a Globe: Here I call it an Habit, rather than a Power or Energy, because though External Causes, and such is frequent Exercise, by which Virtue is gotten, be not of the Essence of a thing, and so according to the exact Rules of Desining, ought not to enter into the Definition; yet it is very difficult to come to the knowledge of the Essences of things of this Nature, and they are usually defined by their Causes and Effects, by their Ends and Objects, and the manner of their Operations.  
Secondly, Though a Man should be born with this Quality of Virtue, yet notwithstanding he would be truly Virtuous, yet here we speak of things, as they are, not as it is possible for us to suppose and imagine them, because none naturally are born so.  
Thirdly, Habit is not a mere dull in-active thing, but Action is included in the Notion of it, especially in these Habits of Virtue, wherein, besides the general relation they bear to Action; they also include a necessary obligation thereunto in the very Nature and Notion of 'em. Indeed some tell us, That original Righteousness, or that first Grace, by which Adam was enabled to rule his lower Faculties, was only given as a Bridle into his Hand, whereby he was to govern his Unruly Appetites; which, like a Wild Horse, would otherwise easily have cast off their Rider, and that this was only superadded to Man already perfect. But this Opinion seems not so well to vindicate the Goodness of the Divine Providence herein; for though Man had a superadded power of governing his Passions, yet if they were naturally headstrong and exorbitant, he was in much greater probability of falling than standing.  
Founded in Nature, and so neither by Inspiration from God, nor by the Influence, or Influx of the Stars.  
1. Not by Inspiration from God, which either was, or, at least was more generally supposed to be the Opinion of Plato, that Virtue could not be taught, but was more immediately inspired by God: But the later Platonists do either not make this his Opinion, or if they do, they do not then seem much to favour it. Alcinous. Cum igitur virtus res divina sit, etc. upon which the Commentator's words are, Omnis rei, cujuscunque sit, summa excellentia, quae à Deo esse putatur, divina appellatur, quo modo rudiore quâdam Mineruâ intelligi potest, quod hoc loco dicitur, virtutem, quae hominis est perfectio, rem quandam esse divinam: Not but that every good and perfect Gift comes from God, either immediately or mediately; but perhaps this was a way of Expression common to Plato with the jews, of calling any thing that was great and excellent in its kind by the Name of Divine; so that all that was probably meant by this Phrase, was only to express the excellency of the thing, and the great Opinion he had of it; or else that Divine Providence had some more particular concern in the disposing and inclining Men to it, either by giving them a more happy Constitution of Body, or a more Ingenuous Temper of Mind, or by affording more advantageous Circumstances of time and place, yet so as that the most happy Occurrences do not necessitate Men to be Virtuous without their own Industry and Inclination, nor the most Unhappy force 'em to be wicked without their own fault.  
However if this be Plato's Opinion, That Virtue is so from God, that it cannot be gotten by Humane Industry, in conjunction with the ordinary Influences of Divine Providence, this Opinion is neither reasonable in itself, nor is it sufficiently proved by that Argument made use of by Socrates for that purpose: If (says he) Virtue was possible to be taught, then would Good Men more especially teach their Sons, that so they might inherit their Father's Virtues as well as Fortunes; but the contrary frequently appears. To this I Answer,  
First, That nothing can be proved from particular Instances, seeing as many may be brought to the contrary, where Virtue has been, as it were, propagated with the Family, and we may furnish ourselves, even from our own Observation, with Examples of the happy success of a Virtuous Education.  
Secondly, Virtuous Parents, though they may desire their Children may be such too, yet many times such is their Tenderness and Indulgence to 'em, that they do not make use of those Methods which are most proper thereunto, which are commonly joined with some degrees of Severity.  
Thirdly, Virtue, though it may be taught, and is capable of being learned, yet is it a very conditional thing, and depends upon the concurrence of many Circumstances together, for the producing the effect, and that which often defeats all the rest, is the liberty of the Will, which many Men use in opposition to all those Moral means, which are otherwise sufficient in themselves and designed by others to moderate their Passions, and reduce 'em to Virtue. Nor  
2. Doth Virtue proceed from any Natural Influx of the Stars, for if we consider the Nature of the Heavens, and natural Causes, and compare 'em with the Nature of the Soul and the Native Liberty of the Will, it will be impossible to conceive how any sidereal Influences can any ways certainly or necessarily determine the Minds of Men. And the same Arguments that prove the Vanity of judicial Astrology in other respects, do much more evince the folly of their pretences, who go into Heaven to fetch down Virtue from thence, when indeed it is nearer us, even in our Mouths, imprinted upon our very Hearts and Natures: I shall here give you Savanorola's Argument in a case much what to this purpose: If (says he) the Christian Faith and Life proceed from the Stars, than their Faith is either true or false; if it be true, than it cannot proceed from thence, because it condemns that Opinion, and asserts the Vanity of judicial Astrology; if it be false, and proceed from the Stars, than it follows, that the Stars incline Men to falsehood, and the falsehood of the Effect will be no good reason why we should believe the truth of the Cause. Whereby Men by the mere strength of Nature, etc. And thus Virtue is distinguished from Grace; thus the Heathen Moralists have discoursed very well of Virtue in their Writings, and given great Instances thereof in their Practices, who yet were very Strangers to all Supernatural Revelation: And this Notion of it seems fitly to assign the just Limits betwixt the Gentile and the Christian Religion, it deprives not the one of what it may justly challenge, as its right; it allows to men in the state of Nature, some inclinations and abilities too to Virtue, but yet that without supernatural assistance, he can never arrive at Evangelical Perfection: it doth not so far depress humane nature, Modices to make it perfectly stupid; nor on the other hand doth it raise it to a pitch of Pelagianisin; it grants Heathens to be Men, and reminds Christians of their Original Sin, and the present depravation of their Natures. And though the Heathen Moralists do sometimes mention such a thing, as afflatus divinus yet it cannot be in reason extended so far, as to signify that which Christian Writers commonly understand by that expression.  
To perform that which is most agreeable to the duty and dignity of his nature. Thus though virtue in the proper acceptation of it be distinguished from Grace, as to the Principle from whence it flows, the one proceeding from nature, the other from a more divine original; yet do they agree in their end, and Friendly conspire together to carry on the same designs of Providence in the World, viz. the glory of God and the good of Men. Now the dignities or excellencies of humane nature are of two sorts. 1. Natural and original. 2. Such as are the results of the divine benignity afterwards.  
1. Natural and Original, and under this head I shall only consider the excellencies of the Soul in particular. 1. As to the excellency of its nature and essence, that it is a spiritual being, and ray of Divinity; now considering this natural pre-eminence of the Soul above the Body, we act unworthy of the dignity and excellence of the Soul, when we make it only a Slave to the Body, and only as it were the Body's Purveyor to make provision for the flesh to fulfil the Lusts thereof. 2. As to its intellectual Endowments, Man only, of all this lower Creation, is endowed with a power of reasoning: now certainly God never gave us such excellent faculties only to employ 'em upon mean objects, and debase 'em by unworthy Employments, Phil. 4. 8. What soever things are true, what soever things are just, etc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, think on these things. 3. As to its moral Endowments, that is, all those natural Inclinations and Capacities the Soul has to Virtue and Goodness, that inward sense of Honesty, that tactus quidam divinitat is, as jamblicus calls it: now this also obliges us to be true to that inward sense of obligation that lies upon us.  
2. Such dignities as are the result of divine benignity afterwards, and these I shall consider as belonging to humane nature in general: 1. The honour that Christ has put upon humane nature, by taking it upon himself. 2. As Man now is made the Temple of the Holy Ghost, 1 Cor. 3. 16. 1 Cor. 6. 19 3. As humane Nature, by being joined to the Divine, is made capable of enjoying Eternal Happiness in the highest Heavens: but these are things rather of a Divine than Moral Consideration.  
Thus have I more fully explained the definition of Moral Virtue, wherein whilst I endeavoured to do right to Nature, I hope I have not any ways injured Divine Grace: for I count him not worthy to partake of the benefits thereof, who speaks the least word to derogate from the excellency and necessity of Divine Assistance.  
How far Virtue, Reason, or Philosophy (for they meant much what the same thing by them all) was or is available to the Heathens in order to their future Happiness, I shall not here particularly inquire, or positively determine, this being a Question wherein Scripture is much what silent; and Modesty here teaches us not to be wise above what is written, nor curiously inquisitive in things wherein we have no certain Rule to guide us.  
Only here give me leave barely to relate their Reasons, who are willing to entertain as favourable thoughts, as they can, concerning the possibility of the Salvation of some Heathens: and here first to prevent mistakes, they lay down this as an undoubted Principle, and a certain Truth, that there is no name given under Heaven, by which any can be saved, but only the name of jesus. So that none was ever saved, but with a respect to Christ's Death, and by the benefits they receive thereby: nor do they here hold an indifferency of Religions, as if it was equally possible and easy to be saved in any: for tho' some Heathens may be saved, yet the advantage on the Christians part above them is much every way, both in respect of the means in order thereunto, and also in respect of the certainty, that God will certainly accept of such conditions as he has required in the Gospel. So that a Christian, if he be not wanting to himself, is not only sase, but certain, sree not only from danger, but from doubt, which an Heathen cannot be: nor do they frame such notions of God, as if he was composed wholly of Mercy, and that justice was only an empty Title; for they assert, that as mercy appears in the Salvation of a Christian, so likewise the Salvation of Heathens, if any such thing be, will not be in a way or method inconsistent with the Divine justice: they do not here go about to describe the particular way how it is to be done, only they charitably conceive, that it is not any thing contrary to the Divine Nature, nor to any Declaration that he has made in Scripture.   

CHAP. VIII. Some short Observations upon Mr Hobbs his first Chapter of his Kingdom of Darkness.  
HE begins this Part of his Leviathan with a pleasant description of the Kingdom of Satan, which he makes altogether as fantastic as that of Oberon, or the Fairy Land, making the notion of Spirits and Immaterial Substances to be as groundless, as the Dreams of Madmen, and indeed the mere results of the timorous apprehensions of Children or Fools. There is mention made in Scripture of the Principality of Belzebub over Demons, that is to say, over Phantasms, that appear in the air; and since Belzebub is the King of these Phantasms, the Sons of Darkness, Phantasms and the Spirits of illusion signify the same thing: the bare repeating hereof seems a sufficient Answer, it being too sancisul to require a serious consutation.  
And yet he makes this one great instance of the Churches being not yet fully emerged out of the Territories of Darkness, or not yet inserted into the glorious light and liberty of the Sons of God, because it believes Spirits to be Immaterial Being's, subsisting by themselves, and not mere Phantasms; as if the Church could never arrive at a perfect purity of Doctrine, till it became a Company of Men openly professing that, which either immediately borders upon, or naturally tends to Atheism.  
But then in the beginning of his next Chapter, he tells us the manner how Phantasms are produced, which in short is this, by the impression which visible objects make upon the Senses: which motion being continued to the place of perception, doth there beget in the Mind or Soul the Conception or Phantasm of the object thus communicated to the mind. So that a Phantasm according to this way of explaining it, is not, and cannot be any where existent, but in the mind of the Perceiver. But then how will this agree with what he had said before concerning Belzebub's being the Prince of Phantasms, that inhabit the air. But perhaps it would sometimes be as hard a matter to reconcile Mr. Hobbs to himself, as it would be to reconcile his Opinions to Truth. How is Satan Prince of those Phantasms which every Man frames to himself? May not every one rather create his own Subjects, and become himself Prince of his own Phantasms? but when he calls Satan or Belzebub Prince of these Phantasms, he seems to grant a greater reality of Existence to him, than to them: Now I do not see, according to his Principles, but that Belzebub himself is as great a Phantasm, as any of the other. Now the first way he assigns, by which this Kingdom of Darkness is promoted among Men, is by extinguishing the light of Scripture by false Interpretations; and I could wish Mr. Hobbs was not thus guilty himself of promoting this Spiritual Darkness.  
The first instance he gives of this false interpretation of Scripture, is of those, who make the Church, now in the World, the Kingdom of God, so often mentioned in Scripture; whereas, says he, 'tis manifest to the contrary, that the Kingdom of God was instituted by God by the Ministry of Moses over the jews only, who for that reason are called The peculiar People of God: which Kingdom ceased at the Election of Saul, and that there never was any Kingdom of God properly so called, since that, on Earth.  
Two things there are generally required to the founding of an Hypothesis. 1. To show the reasonableness of it in itself. 2. The agreeableness of it to all other Observations, relating to such a matter. Accordingly Mr. Hobbs, in his former part of his Leviathan, had been laying down the reasons and foundations of his Political Hypothesis: and now because he doth not altogether deny the truth of Scripture, but that some respect is owing to it; therefore he thought himself concerned, to suit it, as near as possible, to the Scripture also: hence he endeavours, if he cannot bring his Principles to it, he will, by forced Interpretations, bring the Scripture to them.  
This premised in general, it is easily discernible why Mr. Hobbs would not grant now God any Kingdom upon Earth, truly so called because if he had, it would contradict that notion which he hath framed of a Kingdom, as to its first Constitution, which must be by conferring Rights, by mutual Compacts, and Covenants, being an acquisition of power over their Subjects by their own consent. Now he fancies, though without any good grounds, that the People of the jews, under Abraham and Moses, were such a Kingdom, wherein the People did transfer their Rights, and did mutually Covenant with God for the Constitution of a Kingdom, according to his own Notion; whereas indeed there was no more drawing of Articles, whereby God did acquire any more new right over them then, than there is now under the New Testament. 2. Supposing that this formal transferring of rights was necessary to the constituting of a Kingdom amongst Men; yet it will not follow hence, that God too must acquire his right of Government the same way: for certainly God's right of Commanding doth not depend upon the People's Choice and willingness to obey. 3. Though Christians do not go about to choose God their Sovereign, as they do a King in Elective Kingdoms, by majority of Votes; yet their very taking upon them the profession of Christianity, and expecting Salvation upon its own terms, doth imply a tacitCompact. Thus the New Testament is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a Covenant too. So that the Church on Earth may as properly be called the Kingdom of Christ now, as the People of the jews the Kingdom of God then: and Mr. Hobbs himself tells us, Ch. 31. Levi. that to reign in the proper acceptation of the word, is to rule by commanding, threatening and promising. Now why may not Christ be now said properly to rule by his word and laws? that is, by commanding, threatening and promising. But let us examine the reasons why the Church upon Earth cannot be called the Kingdom of Christ: All that is there offered is, Errori huic, quod Ecclesia, qu. e nunc est in terris, etc. Here he calls it an error, supposing that he had proved it so in his 35 Ch. Where he purposely insists upon this Argument: There he tells us, that the Kingdom of God by Divines is sometimes taken for that Eternal Happiness which the Blessed shall enjoy in the Kingdom of Glory. Sometimes it is taken for the Kingdom of Grace here on Earth. But here he doth not prove, which he ought to have done, that these are false and improper Interpretations of the word, or inconsistent with the true sense of those places, where the Divines so interpret them: only he says, contra in Scriptures Sacris invenio regnum. Dei ubique fere significare regnum proprtè dictum, etc. Now this one word fere, almost, doth quite invalidate the force of all his Argument: for granting that the Kingdom of God is sometimes taken in that sense of his beforementioned (which yet will be very hard for him to prove) yet if there be other places, wherein that word occurs, which cannot so be interpreted; then that is not the necessary and constant sense and meaning of it.  
I shall here briefly examine those places of Scripture, which he draws, rather than leads to the confirming his own Notion, Gen. 17. 7. And I will establish my Covenant between me and thee, and thy Seed after thee, in their Generations for an Everlasting Covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy Seed after thee. Here, he says, Abraham promised to obey God, for himself and his Posterity; but indeed he doth not mention one word to any such purpose: so that there was no transferring of rights, no inducing obligations per verba in praesenti: but all the reason that Mr. Hobbs had to cite this place in favour of his Opinion, seems only this, because there is mention made of a Covenant, and he supposes all Covenants must be made according to his own Model: but I might as well cite jer. 31. 31. where God promises to make a new Covenant with the House of Israel, after those days, etc. Which is to be understood of the coming of the Messias in the Flesh, to prove a Kingdom of God, properly so called, now under the Gospel, as this of Gen. is cited to prove it then. Another place is Exod. 19 5. If ye will hear my Voice, and keep my Covenant, ye shall be to me a peculiar people, etc. these are the words, that thou shalt speak to the People. And Moses called the Elders of the People, and laid before their Faces all these words which the Lord commanded him: and all the People answered together and said, All that the Lord hath spoken, we will do. Here God seems to require the consent of the People, for the ratifying of his Covenant. To this I Answer, 1. That these and such like Covenants, though they have so much of the nature of a Compact, as that the Blessings therein promised are conditional, and to be obtained only by the performance of the Conditions; yet upon the whole, they seem rather conferring of benefits, than severe stipulations: so that the conditions being proposed, no one, that hath the use of reason, will refuse to comply with 'em.  
2. Though God commanded Moses to declare his Covenant to his People, yet it cannot be supposed that the obligation did depend merely upon their acceptance: for God had right to command what he there required, though he had not joined to the observance of his Laws such particular Rewards.  
3. God might have particular Reasons to deal in this more sensible manner with the jews, in compliance with their imperfections, out of tenderness of affection to 'em, to let 'em see that he required their own consent to what he enjoined 'em, hereby to lay a great sense of obligation upon 'em; because if they now rebelled, they would not only break their natural Laws of duty to him, as God, but also violate their own Promises.  
Consequent upon this error, that the Church now on Earth is the Kingdom of Christ, and that there ought to be one Man, or a Company of Men, by whom our Saviour, now in Heaven, speaks to Men on Earth; consequent to this it is, that the Pope challenges an Universal Power, etc. That which I here first observe is, his artificial sliding of these two Propositions together, viz. That the Church on Earth is the Kingdom of Christ, and that there ought to be one Man, or one Company of Men, which should rule the same, as universal head under him, hereby to impose upon the unwary Roader, as if they were Propositions altogether of the same import: whereas the one is only a false consequence drawn from the other; but it is no unusual Artifice with Mr Hobbs, to charge false Inferences upon true Principles, thus, if possible, to disparage what he is not able otherwise solidly to disprove: but by the same way of arguing, he may prove that there is no God, from those Superstitious and Idolatrous Practices, which are accidentally consequent upon, and occasioned by the belief of a Deity; for if there were no Opinion of a God, there would be no Idolatry nor Superstition. But this Argument, as it is deficient in other respects, so also is it in respect of time: for the Church on Earth might have been the Kingdom of Christ for the first four or five hundred Years after his Appearance in the World, notwithstanding the force of this Argument. For it then only began to be an Argument when the Pope began to arrogate so much Power to himself. And indeed Mr. Hobbs had great reason to thank the Church of Rome, for affording him so much Sophistical matter to stuff his Kingdom of Darkness withal. Another Artifice, by which Mr. Hobbs would disparage a truth, that he has a mind to oppose, is, with a Philosophical Gravity, to feign an idle and ridiculous original, to which judiciously to ascribe it: thus he fancies, that Aristotle, from the consideration of this or such like Propositions, Homo est animal; from the Copula in this Proposition he took occasion first to assert separate Essences, Celestial Intelligences, and humane Souls. Leviat. Latin p. 320.  
Another instance he gives of the false interpretation of Scripture, is the asserting the immortality of the Soul, and its being really distinct from the Body; but now one would scarce desire a better Argument for the proof thereof, than the very Answers he gives to those places of Scripture, which are commonly alleged for it, so weak and frivolous many times are they: Eccles. 12. 7. The Spirit returns to God that gave it; which words, says he, may suffer this interpretation, but then they must undergo a great deal of pain, and have a great deal of Patience, if they suffer it: One great defect, which seems to run through all Mr. Hobbs his Interpretations of Scripture, is this, that he supposes himsels on the defensive part, and that all that he had to do, was only to invent some frivolous Evasion, or put some forced Interpretation upon the place, and then all was done: whereas he ought positively to prove, that that of his was the only true and genuine sense and meaning of the place, both from the generally approved concurrent Testimonies of the best and purest Ages, from the just and proper acceptation of the words, by the best and most approved Authors; from the general scope and design of the Context, and from the natural tendency that his Sense and Interpretation has, to promote those noble ends of Virtue and Piety in the World, which God and Christ designed to carry on by the Scriptures. None of which things Mr. Hobbs hath as much as attempted to do: The Spirit returns to God that gave it; that is, says he, God only knows whence it comes, and whither it goes: And I could wish that he had been true to his own Interpretation. But then how comes he so positively to assert its Mortality at present, and at what Periods it must return again to Life, etc.  
Another place, he says, which seems to make for the immortality of the Soul, is Matt. 22. 32. Where our Saviour affirms Abraham, Isaac and jacob to be alive; to which he answers, That they were indeed alive, but not actually, but as by the promise of God they were sure of Eternal Life: but he also tells us, That the wicked are sure of eternal Death; and thus, why may not the wicked be as properly said to be dead, even whiles they are alive, by virtue of the threatening; as the Righteous can be said to be alive, by virtue of the promise, even then, when they are supposed not to be at all.  
The sum of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion herein, is this; he supposes the Soul not to be any thing really distinct from the Body, but that it is composed of the purer parts of the Spirits, and by consequence it dies with the Body; not that it is annihilated, for matter in this sense is immortal; that is, not naturally capable of annihilation, but that upon such grand indispositions of Body, which is called Death, the Soul is rendered uncapable of such agitations, and such reactions, in which the nature of a living Creature doth consist: So that according to this Opinion, a Man can no more properly be said either to be alive or dead, than Quicksilver may; for though it be not so Organised, as Man's Body is, though it hath neither heart nor brain to transmit Spirits to each other, and though it has not the use of Speech, yet may it have a Soul as really intelligent as that of ours. The greatest part of the rest of this Chapter is employed in confuting or exposing some Opinions of the Church of Rome; yet we may observe, that notwithstanding his severe handling that Church in some respects, yet her Authority is then valued by him, when she seems any ways to favour his Opinions: thus he citys her Authority to confirm his assertion, That Spirits are mere Phantasms, because she in her Exorcisms calls 'em so. I shall here only further observe, how he hath transformed all the Subjects of Satan into Phantasms, in the beginning of his Kingdom of Darkness, and in the latter end thereof has allegorized all the Officers and Ministers of the Pope into mere Hobgoblins.  
That which gave the first occasion of employing my thoughts this way, was those false Opinions concerning God, those various modes of Theism, which now prevail in the World, which seem to be nothing but Epicurism and Hobbianism transformed into other (I know not whether I may say into better) shapes. Now if what I here write, may but give occasion to some abler Pen more fully to examine and confute those fatal Principles (and I hope it will, rather than a good Cause should suffer by my ill management.) If these Papers, I say, have this good effect, I shall not then need to make any other Apology, but think my Pains very well bestowed.   
FINIS.   

AN APPENDIX TO THE Seventh Chapter.  
I Would not there be thought in the least to favour that false and foolish, that dangerous and destructive opinion of Theism, an Opinion, which grants indeed the Being of God and natural Religion, but denies all Divine Revelation made to Mankind afterward: and thus it seems a composition of the worst ingredients incident to humane Nature, Pride, Ignorance, and Ingratitude; of Pride, as not duly acknowledging the frailties of humane nature; of Ignorance, as not fully understanding the true state and condition of lapsed Mankind; of Ingratitude, as not thankfully acknowledging the benefits of Divine Grace. But Secondly, besides these, there are others, who granting a Divine Revelation made to Man, do yet so melt it down, as it were, below itself, till it come to an equal temper with, or very little exceed mere natural Religion. 3. Others, who in words acknowledge a God, but denying the common Principles of all Religion, the immortality of the Soul, and a future State, seem perfectly to entertain the Doctrine of Epicurus.— As for the light of Nature, which these Men so much Idolise, I shall grant to it as much, as in reason it can desire, and so satisfy its own just demands. 1. The Law of Nature is a Divine Law, and brings us under the obligation of its Commands, so that whatever is directly contrary hereunto, cannot be made part of any future Revelation, because one Divine Light is not contrary to another. 2. The rational exercise of their Faculties might be, and probably was made use of by the Prophets and Apostles in their revealing the Will of God to Man, yet still under the Influence and Superintendence of the Holy Spirit, guideing and directing them in such a measure, as was necessary in order to such an end. 3. This light of natural Reason, together with the concurrence of those other means, designed by God in order thereunto, may be made use of for the better understanding of God's revealed will in Scripture: now after such fair Concessions made to it, it ought not to exalt itself above, or make itself equal to that of Divine Revelation.  
Theism in a Christian state, where Men have not only all the Opportunities of knowing and understanding the Christian Religion, but also live in the outward profession of it, this of all things is the most unreasonable, for even the best and wisest Asserters of the Light of Nature and Human Reason, do grant, that in those places where Christianity is known, Reason itself will find more, and much stronger, Arguments for the Christian, than for any other Belief what soever.— These Theists must also prove one of these two things; either, 1st, That there never were any such persons as the Prophets, our Blessed Saviour, and his Apostles, in the World; which is contrary to the universal Consent and Confession of all, both Friends and Enemies: Or else, 2ly, That they never made any new revelation of God's Will to Mankind; which they can never be able to do. As for the practical Duties of Religion, we grant they are founded in Nature, and agreeable to Reason; but then withal we say, That Revelation hath both added to the clearness of the Truth, and to the necessity of the Obligation of those Duties.  
But here they tell us, That Natural Reason has discovered enough; and that there is no need of any farther Revelation to be made to Man; but it is a very weak and illogical way of arguing against a Matter of Fact, from a supposed needlesness, that there should be any such thing; we ought rather in this case to argue thus: It doth sufficiently appear, That God hath made such and such Declarations of his Will to Man; therefore it was not needless, because God doth nothing in vain. Farther, It is disingenuous and ungratesul for Natural Reason thus to boast itself upon its own sufficiency, and not acknowledge its Benefactor, seeing it now owes its present improvement, in a great measure, to the Benefits and Advantages it has received from Divine Revelation.— The Author of the Discourse of Human Reason, with relation to matters of Religion, printed 1690. tell us, That the whole Substance of Christianity itself, according to St. John's account of it, is most certainly founded upon that universal light, which enlightens every man that cometh into the World. Pa. 4. of his Presatory Letter. But to this I answer, 1. That St. john there doth not speak of the Light of Nature, but of Christ; and tho' Christ be the Author of that Light, yet his thus enlightening every one that comes into the World, doth not supersede the necessity, or lessen the excellency of Divine Revelation. 2. The whole Substance of Christianity cannot be founded therein, because Christianity contains in it Articles of Faith, above the natural power of Reason to find out, as well as matters of Practice. 3. Tho' the practical part be founded in this universal Light of Nature, yet Christianity may carry on the Superstructure higher than mere Nature was ever able to do. 4. It is not most certain, that that is the right Translation of that place of St. john; it may be also rendered thus, He was that true Light, which coming into the World, enlightens every man; that is, every man that hath the Happiness to hear the glad tidings of the Gospel.  
The said Author, pag. 92. having before made an exact and full enumeration (as he thinks it) of the Principles of all, or rather of mere Natural Religion, In the Belief and Sense, says he, of these general Traths, and in the practice of the Duties that result from 'em, according to their full extent and tendency, consists all true Religion, and whatever else is introduced into any Religion, either notional or practical; I say, what either doth not necessarily flow from some of these Branches, or tend to enforce the observance of 'em; is no essential part of true Religion, but the mere Product of Superstition, Folly, or Design. But according to his Scheme of Principles, what shall we think of those Articles of the Christian Faith the Trinity, the Incarnation and resurrection of the Body, for these are neither included in that Enumeration, nor do they necessarily flow from any Branch thereof. If he say, that these may tend to enforce the observance of those Duties beforementioned; this I grant, but it seems a preposterous way of proving Articles of Faith, to bring 'em in only by the by, because the belief thereof may enforce the practice of Christian Duties; though this also is true, that they do so, yet the true reason of our belief of 'em, is, because they are revealed in Scripture.  
What Monsieur le Clerk's design (or whoever else was the Author of those five Letters concerning the Divine Inspiration of holy Scriptures, lately translated into English) was, I shall not here inquire: Truth indeed forbids me to think him a Deist, in the first sense before mentioned; but Charity itself doth not forbid to think him one in the second; that is, one who would bring Divine Inspiration into as narrow a room as he could, and believe as little of it in Scripture as possible. Yet we ought not to be too severe, in charging the consequences of an Opinion upon its Author, especially when he disowns 'em to be his Opinions; but on the other side we ought to be very watchful over ourselves, that we do not broach or defend any Opinion, that may any ways tend to unhinge the Principles, and undermine the Foundations of Christianity, and we ought the more to suspect and carefully examine such, from whence men generally draw dangerous consequences.  
That a Papist should industriously set himself to lessen the Authority of holy Scripture, and upon all occasions seek advantage against it, is not so much to be wondered at, because hereby he serves a turn, and by this means endeavours to advance the Authority of his own Church, that what is pretended to be wanting in Scripture, may be supplied by Roman Tradition. But then, why they who call themselves Protestant's should join in such a Design, and pick up all the little Arguments of ill-designing Men against Scripture; this is not so easy to give an account of.  
Scripture doth not go about merely to beg a favourable reception in the World, as if it stood in need of such mean methods of proceeding; seeing it may justly challenge a due regard and veneration from all sober and considerate persons, it doth not desire to make use of any precarious Principles in its own defence, nor refuses to join issue with its Adversaries in the most severe method of Raciocination.  
'Tis true indeed, as the Translator tells us in his Preface, that it is unbecoming the dignity of such sacred Truths as the Christian Religion teaches us, to build them upon unsound Principles, or defend them by Sophistical Arguments. If this be applied to the following Letters, designing thereby to reflect upon the contrary Opinion, and to magnify the soundness of the Principles and Cogency of the Arguments contained in these; I doubt not but Mr. Lowth's Answer is sufficient to convince any considerate person to the contrary.  
The sum of the Author's Hypothesis in the five Letters, seems to be this; he absolutely rejects some of the Books of the Old Testament, and very much questions the Authority of others of the new: He doth not allow Scripture in general, either as to the matter, or as to the words, to be inspired by the Holy Ghost, excepting only some few particular Instances: And as for the Difficulties that occur therein, he doth not much concern himself about 'em, but takes this more easy way of solving all, by acknowledging, when any thing of that nature is objected, that the holy Penmen were there mistaken, and contradicted themselves. And as the Translator, in his Preface, p. 6. tells us, the use of all this is, to settle our Christian Religion upon a basis not to be shaken by the Difficulties about the Scripture, which the Learned are forced to acknowledge to be insuperable. But I am apt to believe, that too little reading and considering the best Authors, and too great a Tincture of Prejudice upon the Minds of Men doth sometimes make that seem an insuperable difficulty, which is not so in itself: Or, suppose there were some such in Scripture, must we therefore reject the Divine Authority of the whole, because we do not understand some parts of the Bible. Vid. Letter to a Deist.  
But I do not see what sufficient Answer he returns to that place, 2 Pet. 1. 17. The holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, acted or carried by the Holy Ghost. Here Beza gives this seasonable Caution; Dextrè hoc intelligendum est, ne quis divini spiritûs rectè compositos & verè divinos afflatus comparet profanorum, Vatum furoribus, etc. But the aforesaid Author comes short of the true import of the Phrase, when he makes this Impulse or Influence of the Holy Ghost to be nothing more than the mere result of a pious and well-disposed Mind, acting only by the strength of Memory, and a well-informed Understanding. But for a man to espouse such a dangerous and unwarrantable Opinion, and when he is urged with plain and express places of Scripture (such as seem non sine numine, and, as it were, purposely so worded, as if designed to obviate such a Tenent) for him then to tell us, as this Author doth, p. 146. That no Doctrine which we esteem important, aught to be grounded barely on certain manners of speaking, which we cannot be sure they were exact, because the Sacred Writers, not affecting exactness of Style, may have used that manner of expression without any design. This is only to study Evasions, and to lay a Foundation of something like Sceptism in Religion; for, after this way of arguing, a man may assert or deny any thing, having first thus taken off the edge of the Scripture so, as that he need to fear no danger thence.  
But he tells us, p. 34. That St. Luke confesses himself, in the beginning of his Gospel, That he learned not that which he told us by inspiration, but by information from those that knew it exactly. To this I answer, 1. Divine Grace is very well consistent with the sober and rational use of our Faculties, tho' perhaps it is not very easy to explain the way and method how 'tis done: Nor is such an Inspiration (as is here asserted) any ways contrary to those subordinate means which St. Luke might make use of in that case; Dubitandum non est, quin piam diligentiam Deus direxerit. 2. St. Luke doth not say, that what he there writes he had only by Information; It seemed good also to me, who having had perfect knowledge of all things, ab initio, from the beginning; the word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, supernè, coelitus, from above. Thus ja. 1. 17. Every good and perfect Gift is from above; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Io. 19 11. And this, the Critics say, is the proper and usual signification of the word, Vt sit adverbium loci, à quâ significatione non temerè recedendum, illua autem à principio sensum angustiorem reddit, & includitur, in eo, quòd se omnia consecutum esst & scripturum ordine, dicat.  
The said Author is much offended at those expressions in Psal. 109. which, he says, are all Curses and Imprecations: But he may as well say, that those Woes which our Saviour denounces against impenitent Sinners, Matt. 23. 14. are all Curses too; whereas they are rather tenderhearted Expressions and Commiserations, for those Evils which he foresaw they would bring upon themselves by their wilful Wickedness. And what he says further, in confirmation of his Opinion, is only this; That if all these words were rendered in the future tense, to avoid making the Psalmist pronounce such Curses, there are a great many more places in the Psalms, where the Version would need to be reformed. But what if this were granted, would any thing of absurdity or inconvenience follow thence?  
'Tis further observable, that he boldly advances his own Opinion many times, without ever taking the least notice of those Answers that have been returned to it both by ancient and modern Writers. Thus, 2 Tim. 3. 16. All Scripture is given by inspiration os God, and is profitable, etc. But, p. 189. he says, this may be very well thus translated, All Scripture that is divincly inspired is profitable; but it cannot well be translated thus, unless he can prove, that St. Paul did suppose some of the Books of the jewish Canon not to be inspired: Otherwise Theophylact's Confutation of this very Opinion will still hold good, where in answer to his way of reading the words, Omnis scriptura, que divinitùs inspirata est, illa est etiam utilis, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, etc. oportebat eos novisse, quòd cum suprà dixerit, sacras literas nosti, nunc ait, omnis scriptura qualis? de quâ disserehat, & de quâ dixit, quòd sacra est: omnis igitur hujusmodi divinitùs inspirata est, & utilis.  
He tells us, p. 48. That the Discourses which the Apostles made before their judges did not contain any thing which one might not as well say without inspiration. But to prove the Apostles divinely inspired, we do not only consider what they said, but also what they did upon those occasions. I do not here speak of the Miracles done by the Apostles; but those practical Resolutions and pious Performances consequent upon theirinward Persuasions and Convictions. 2. What the Apostles said and did in those Circumstances then, were greater and stronger Arguments of their being inspired, than any thing of the like nature would be to us now; and the Reason is, because the Gospel was a Religion then newly revealed, and not grown, as it were, habitual to 'em by a long-continued Belief of it; they acted not only against all the Power and Authority of the World, which was then vigorously set against 'em, but also against their own late Principles and Practices of a different Religion, and they successfully attempted and performed such things, which nothing but a Divine Impulse could prevail with a prudent man to undertake.  
Upon the whole, this Author seems very much to resemble Mr. Hobbs in his Arguings; he would have the liberty of putting what Interpretations he pleases upon places of Scripture, and then puts his Adversary to disprove 'em; and this is that wherein the strength of his Plea doth generally consist. But I humbly conceive, that whereas he goes about to advance a novel opinion, he ought first by positive Arguments to confute the former, and prove, that those Interpretations formerly put upon those, places of Scripture, are neither agreeable to the true sense of the Words, nor to the analogy of Faith; and not think it sufficient for him, in this case, to tell us, That such or such a place may be interpreted so or so.  
Thus, p. 177. 'tis remarkable how industriously he labours to put the Proof upon Mons. Simon, it being Mr. n (as this Author is called) usual way, rather to suppose than prove any thing. Thus, in the very next Page, 178. he vigorously supposes these two things; 1. That St. Paul, Acts 23. speaks not there as a Prophet, but as a mere private Person. 2. That he confesses himself to blame, in giving such Language to the Highpriest, but offers not the least thing in proof of either, only makes the one Supposal to prove the other; the latter to prove the former. But if St. Paul spoke as a Prophet, as the generality of Interpreters do assert, and nothing here offered to prove the contrary, than we cannot in reason suppose him to beg Pardon for what he spoke, as such; and therefore some other Interpretation ought to be put upon that place.   

ERRATA.  
PAge 3. line 6. for aed read and; p. 6. l. 22. a comma only; p. 11. l. 22. r. effectual; p. 17. l. 28. for dispose r. depose; p. 18. l. 26. for the r. their; p. 19 l. 28. make a comma at Service, l. 29. deal Semicolon; p. 33. l. 1. for motions r. motives; p. 42. l. 15. for they r. thus; p. 44. l. 25. for it is r. is it; p. 55. l. 26. deal his; p. 86. l. 26. for and r. but; p. 89. l. 14. deal Colon; p. 107. l. 12. after God and says he; p. 145. l. 19 for it r. this; p. 160. l. 28. for awfully r. lawfully; p. 184. l. 20. for now r. more; p. 188. l. 6. add what to the beginning of the line; p. 189. l. 14. r. Martyr; p. 190. l. 26. r. contradistinctions; p. 194. l. 15. for principal r. principle; p. 196. l. 2. after Kingdom add or; p. 103. l. 23. for viz. that r. and p. 196. l. 26. add to in the beginning of the line; p. 57 l. 12. for we r. he; in the running Title of Chap. 8. for of r. upon; p. 141. l. 5. add, For if Arguments drawn from Natural Reason have no force of themselves to prove a God, antecedent to Divine Revelution, I do not see how they can have any afterwards; and if they be such as any ways depend upon Divine Revelation, so far will they be of less force to convince an Atheist.