AN ANSWER TO Mr. Hobbs HIS LEVIATHAN: WITH OBSERVATIONS, CENSURES, AND CONFUTATIONS OF Divers Errors, Beginning at the seventeenth Chapter of that BOOK.  
By William Lucy, Bishop of St. David's.  
LONDON, Printed by S. G. and B. G. for Edward Man at the White Swan in St. Paul's Churchyard, 1673.   

To the Reader.  
READER,  
BEfore you go further into this Treatise, I think it fit to premonish you of three things. First, How it is writ. Secondly, Why by me. Thirdly, Why now put out: Concerning the first, expect no other but to read the strongest Discourse in Politics, betwixt Mr. Hobbs and me, that ever was writ; for the Art of Polity (being more properly signified by the name of Prudence) is always, by those who writ of it, from Plato and Aristotle downward, until you come to the very last, is naturally powdered with sentences, and interlarded with Histories; for it being not a Science whose demonstrations come from necessary causes, where posita causa most certainly follows the effect, or grant the effect, you must own the cause from whence it came; but a prudence, which disposeth men to a wise conformity, not by the force of a necessary efficacy, but by the persuasions which fear and love induce to, which are not necessary, but arbitrary; men in the manage of such affairs, do most discreetly, when they produce the sentences of wise men who have gone before, and by great experience, found those sentences effectual in such occasions: and because there is nothing new under the Sun, therefore Histories of our Forefathers, in like conditions, are most excellent Guides for the prudent diposure of our lives, who indeed do but repeat what they have done: but Mr. Hobbs, presuming upon the greatness of his own wit, which indeed is great, (and it is a thousand pities he bestowed it so ill) scorns to tread in beaten paths, and thinks by the strength of his own fancies to make his feet leave such an impression, as all others shall follow him, not he them. I must follow him, for whosoever is to be confuted, must have it done out of his own Principles, and therefore I fall upon him with only downright reasons; therefore if at any time my Pen hath dropped a sentence, or a story unawares, which was opposite to the business, (which I believe is very seldom) I though it not worth the mending, but let it pass: And so having showed the Reader why I writ so unpolitically of Politics, I pass to these and Advertisement.  
The second Premonition is a question why I should write of this piece, and my Answer is short, having spoke to the former part of his Leviathan, it was proper for me not to step over this, but take him in order as he writes: But a man may object, and some have objected that were acquainted with my undertake, that this is not so proper f●r a Bishop (whose time should be taken up with his Profession, which is Divinity) to meddle with such State affairs. I answer, that Mr. Hobbs his writings are so interlined with so much Heterodox (shall I say) or Heretical and Atheistical Divinity, that it befits none so well as a Divine t● meddle with them. And again, I said, that although there is a Generation that think we should be Fools in anything else, yet let them know, that if so, we must be Fools in that likewise, as well as other things: for Theologia Dininity, is not only Scientia, Knowledge, but as many of the Schoolmen, Mr. Hobbs h●s good friends, speak, it is Sapientia, we may render it in English Wisdom, which is the highest knowledge, whose principles are the highest and first Rules which habitually are imprinted in man, and whose conclusions are the premises of other inferior Sciences: And they say moreover, that this which is called Scholastica Theologia, School Divinity, differs from Natural only in this, that it adds one principle to the other, which is the Faith in the revealed Will of God, which I am forced to fight for in this Treatise with Mr Hobbs: And because this is the nature of this great Wisdom of Divinity, it may prescribe the Rules to all Sciences and Prudencies, and all conditions of men, from the King to the Cobbler, how they may live and demean themselves virtuously: But besides this, let those men consider, that there is one piece of a Divines study (without which he will be lame and very deficient) which must needs teach him a great deal more of this Prudence, than I have need to use in this Discourse, unless he be a very dull man, which is Ecclesiastical Story, wherein he shall find such acts and subtleties practised b● Heretics and Schismatics, (whom I have always observed to be more crafty, though not wiser than the Orthodox part) such applications to Emperors, to Empresses, to Favourites at Court, such cloaking evil intentions with pious pretences, such artificial slandering the persons of their Adversaries, that he cannot but know the polity, yea the base crafts of men, and knowing them to be such, may the better learn to avoid those snares which have catched men heretofore, and will (if not prevented) do so again; yea shall find that many times the wisdom of learned and pious Bishops have been the prop and stay of both the Empires, East and West; and which is more, even in the practic peace of Polity, you shall find Bishops execute them in the most excellent manner for wisdom and courage, that ever any men did: I write not this to invite men of that condition to muddle themselves with the trivial affairs of this world, no, as S. Paul to the Philippians 3. 20. Our conversation is in heaven. The word which we render Conversation, is in the Original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which is excellently noted by Beza, that it is that kind of Conversation, which agrees to the Polity, of such as are Citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem: So that although the Apostle affirms this of all men who aspire to Christian perfection, that such men should live and converse in that Polity, which conduceth to the establishment of that spiritual society, which are parts of that Kingdom, yet in a more especial manner, it agrees to them who are exalted to that high dignity in that society, that the Polity of their abilities should be applied to the advance of that Kingdom; and in order to that, when the benefit or ill of a sublunary Kingdom or Commonwealth shall conduce to that Kingdom in heaven, it will become such men to interpose their counsels in a way most proper for them to employ themselves in: But my intent in writing this is to show, that a poor old man, sitting in his Study, and principally applying that study to Divinity, may easily by that study give advice and admonition to greater doubts than are in his Politics, which indeed are gross mistakes, from the first corner stone he laid in the Foundation, to the top-tile in the Roof.   

A SECOND PART OF Observations, Censures, and Confutations OF DIVERS ERRORS IN Mr. Hobbs HIS LEVIATHAN. Beginning at the seventeenth Chapter of that Book.  

CHAP. 1.  
The Introduction to the whole Discourse.  
I Have briefly touched the chief heads of his first Part. And am now arrived at his second, part, which is entitled of Commonwealths, and this part begins at the seventeenth Chapter of the whole Book superscribed of the causes, generation and definition of a Commonwealth.  
He begins with the final cause most rightly, which is causa causarum, and sets the whole at work. And I find no fault with what he writes concerning that.  
Secondly, I approve what he saith at the bottom of the 85. page, That small numbers joined together cannot give them security to live peaceably. Small is a Relative, small in respect of their Neighbours, of whose injury they may justly be afraid, unless they are supported with Natural, or Artificial Fortifications, or their number may be equalled by the weight of the internal virtue, or gallantry of the Inhabitants; some way or other it must be made up.  
Thirdly, I approve what he saith, pag. 86. That be the People never so numerous (I may add or strong) yet if their actions are directed by their own particular Judgements and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no Defence, nor Protection. His Reasons likewise I approve.  
Fourthly, I censure not his Conclusion in the same page; That the Government of their Good, must not be for one Life or Battle, but Perpetual.  
Fifthly, He makes a very Ingenious Discourse upon the difference betwixt those sociable Creatures, as Bees, and Ants, (which Aristotle calls Political) and hath very handsome applications concerning them, to the middle of the 87. page; but then I must begin to examine him with less approbation: In the Margin there is noted, the generation of a Commonwealth, and it begins thus.   


CHAP. II. SECT. I.  
This Generation censured, first from that Word only, which cannot be true.  
THE only way to Erect such a common Power, as may be able to defend them from the Invasion of Foreigners, and the Injuries of one another; and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own Industry, and by the fruits of the Earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their Power and strength upon one man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will, which is as much as to say to appoint one man or Assembly of men to bear their person, and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act or cause to be acted in these things, which concern the common peace, and safety, and therein to submit their wills every one to his will and their Judgement to his Judgement. Thus far he, A bold and strange assertion in that severe Language; (the only way) what? (Mr. Hobbs) no other? Certainly there have been many Commonwealths in the World which have lived peaceably and quietly, and enjoyed the fruits of their Labours, and have abounded with all the comforts of their association; And yet I dare speak it with confidence there was never any thus generated, that is to appoint one man or Assembly to bear their Person, and to allow themselves to be Authors of his Actions, to submit their Wills to his Will, and their Judgements to his Judgement.   

SECT. II.  
A Supreme cannot receive his Authority from the People.  
1. COnsider here (for fear I may forget it hereafter) that the King or Supreme, by him, is but the Person (as he most improperly styles him) and they (the Multitude) the Authors of what he doth; so that he acts only by their Authority (as you may see those words expounded in the 16. Chap. pag. 8●. and 82.) so that by him the People give the Supreme Authority, which is a mighty diminution to all Supreme Authority, and indeed an Encroachment upon the Prerogative of God, by whom (and whom alone) Kings reign, and Princes bear rule; so that as we rightly say, that all Authority in a Kingdom is derived from the King, who is the Fountain of all Authority he makes a circle in it, and saith, the head of this Fountain is derived from the People.   

SECT. III.  
It is impossible they should do it.  
BUT let us examine the possibilities of it, Nihil dat quod non habet, either formaliter, eminenter or Virtualiter. Nothing can give what it hath not Formally, Eminently, or Virtually; Certainly neither of these can be affirmed of the People, if they have it any of these ways it must be Conjunctim or divisim, either as severed or conjoined; either as distinct, or united, but neither of these: if severed, then either every man had this Power, or a few, or one alone; the first branch of this Division will abide the chief Dispute with him, because he hath said before, That every man hath right to every thing, to all things, to all riches, persons, wives, lives, what you will before they are covenanted into a body, this hath been confuted heretofore, yet this very occasion will be able to show the absurdity of it further.   

SECT. IV.  
The Multitude cannot make a Leviathan, because he had all their rights before.  
FOr which let us lay a Foundation, suppose this Kingdom were unsettled, and yet now endeavouring to be settled, and all the People being free and and without Covenant, have right to all the things in the World, these are met together to choose a Leviathan (as he terms him) for settling their beings most securely. In this Election what did they give him? you will say the Authority over them all, that is nothing; he had that before by the Law of Nature: I but he will say he hath upon this Election their Rights; Their Rights are no more than what he had before; he had by nature right to slay, take, make use of any thing conducing to his contentment; though they were a hundred Millions, they can give him no more than what he hath even by Nature. I but he will reply he had Right before, but now he hath Power; I answer, the Question here is not about Power, but Right; Power may be in Rebels, Usurpers, but not Right, that is only in the lawful Sovereign; but suppose we should examine his Power by these preceding directions: I doubt we shall find it most weak and unconstant.   

SECT. V.  
Their Power is most uncertain.  
FOR if from the People they will vary with their unsettled resolutions; for they who made the first, being once taught that the Right of making Kings is in them, will easily be persuaded that the unmaking is in their hands likewise, and reassume that Power again: Take that most abundant instance which that unhappy time, we lately lived in, affords us, when Mr. Hobbs was first undertaken by me, when this Doctrine of his was infused into the Kingdom, they altered and changed the Government four or five times in a moment. A very short space of time, and none of those Leviathans lacked the assents of the People, who at the least pretended with the highest protestations, that men could make, that they would live and die with them, in the maintenance of their Rights; and yet in one six weeks they made likewise such another protestation to the next Usurpers. Here you may discern how weak a Foundation this popular Covenant yields to his Leviathan, nor need he b●ast more of the strength, than the Right of his Authority, for certainly any buzz put into the People's head of misgovernment (which no Government can be free from in the execution) will put Seditious Spirits into them; and men who love to fish in troubled Waters may with ease raise these Rumours: so that it seems to me, to appear that such a tottering and unconstant foundation as the People's universal Covenant, should not be the support of such a mighty structure, as is a Leviathan, which should be perpetual. What I have said of the whole, may more abundantly be affirmed of any part, because they will be as unconstant as the whole, or more.   

SECT. VI  
The People cannot give Power conjunctim.  
AND for what was interposed of the People Conjunctim, is impossible (according to his Principles); for there can be no Conjunction before this Covenant, they are according to his Doctrine at War one with another until that; And it is a strange thing to imagine that so many several heads contending one with another about Superiority, and the engrossing the World to their particular Interests, should concentre with one mind, to the exaltation of the same Person or Persons to whom they would submit themselves, and their conditions by a total desertion of them both. Nay indeed a man cannot do it, for it being Jus naturale a natural Right, as he himself hath expressed before, Chap. 14. pag. (65) and (66) (to which I have spoke already something) he cannot lay down his Natural Right, until he lay down his Nature: and therefore indeed he cannot, by this Doctrine, give away his Right to be King, to any other: but if he can divest himself of his Nature, yet he in express terms, saith, That a man cannot give over his Right to resist by force, wounds, and imprisonments with which he cannot live contentedly: and may not the same be said of a Kingdom? perhaps that man cannot live contentedly without being King; surely then it is not probable to think that men will so put off their Jura naturalia; neither indeed can they do it by his Polity.   

SECT. VII.  
The manner of the Resignation makes it impossible.  
BUT then consider the Resignation itself; it is far more unreasonable to think that reasonable men should do it. Consider the particulars; To own all Leviathans actions as if every particular of the People were Author of it; To submit their Judgements to his Judgement, their Wills to his Will. I thought it had been obedience enough for Subjects to submit their persons to his Government, but to own all his actions which may be wicked was not to be exacted from any Subject; yea, if we will allow his Doctrine, delivered before, it is worse; for than we must be Authors of his actions; he but our person employed in them (as he speaks pag. (82) and therefore not his own. I but saith he, in order to their peace. I cannot assent to that, for many Supreams have done horrid things in order to the public Peace, as Murders, Sacrileges, oppressions, to which although my person may submit, yet neither shall my Judgement approve, nor my will consent; for although when he doth wickedly, I will not do so too, and Rebel; yet neither will I by consent to them justify his Acts by conspiring in his sin: his Virtues shall not save me, and, I am confident, his vices cannot damn me, which yet they would, if I assented to them. I go on with him; This is (saith he) more than consent or Concord, it is a real Union of them all in one and the same person, made by Covenant of every man with every man in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorise and give up my Right of Governing myself to this man, or assembly of men on that Condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his Actions in like manner:) If this be the only way to live in Peace, I choose War, which is the hatefullest thing in the World, but Sin. But this last Phrase of Authorising all his Actions whom I cannot rule nor control, nay perhaps not come at to Petition, is such a forsaking of Humanity, and contempt of the glorious means of Salvation, as no man, with a face of Piety, dare affirm to be fit, I shall handle these things more fully shortly.    


CHAP. III. SECT. I.  
This cannot be the only way to establish a Government.  
THIS done (saith he) the multitude so united in one Person is called a Commonwealth, in Latin Civitas. (Thus he.)  
But if this only make a Commonwealth, or Civitas, there was never any in the World, nor ever will be, as shall be showed more largely hereafter. More true is that which follows, This is the Generation of that great Leviathan: I mean his Book; for to vent this extremely wicked folly he wrote this Book; and except in this Book, a Commonwealth was never called Leviathan: a name from which never man expected good, he proceeds; (or rather to speak more Reverently) of that mortal God to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and safety. I answer we owe him nothing; there was never such a Power Erected: I shall omit what follows in that Chapter, and come to his 18. Chapter which is page 88    


CHAP. IV. SECT. I.  
His definition of a Commonwealth disproved, first because not practicable.  
HE begins with a definition of a Commonwealth by Institution thus, A Commonwealth is then said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and Covenant, eveevery one, with every one, that to whatsoever man or assembly of men, shall be given by the greater part the Right to present the Person of them all (That is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that man, or assembly of men in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.  
This is but a Dream of his, there was never such a thing, nor is it practicable; this Book was writ in English, and therefore proper for English men: suppose than we were in the first State, without a Sovereignty, we are none of the greatest Commonwealths in the World, yet is it possible that here in this Kingdom there should convene such Multitudes of men, such an Universality as by him is required to make this Covenant, which he labours to prove in his second part De Corp●re Politi. Cap. 3. Numb. 2. because saith he, there, Nor can an action be Attributed to the Multitude, unless every man's hand, and every man's will (not so much as one excepted) have concurred thereto. It seems he would have it in writing, that he requires every man's hand to be put to it. And so likewise Num. 3. The first thing therefore they are to do is expressly every man to consent to do something; by which something he understands this project of Leviathan, so that it is evident he means every particular, singula generum, which is an impossible fiction; the very meeting is impossible. And then that all these who meet with so many self-ends; and particular Interests, and so many weak capacities should consent in any thing is most incredible. I will give him all the Scope I can, he may say that they may meet, as they do to elect Knights for the Parliament, they may meet in Shires and choose Representatives which may act for them; I could ask who must divide those Shires? that must be done by a Supreme. Then consider, if that should be granted, they must choose little Leviathans first, which must represent these their particular Shires, before the great one is chosen: And then, consider this hath a great unfitness, if not an impossibility with it, which was fore-seen by our State, and therefore only such men who had forty shillings freehold were adjudged fit to have voices in these Elections: which heretofore was a very considerable Estate; and yet I believe scarce ever half of those met at any Election. But then let us look about and we shall find much the greater company without the lists of that condition, besides Women and Children, which have as great Interests in the Commonwealth as others. So that this fancy of his, was not only not practised, but not practicable in such a Kingdom as this of ours; When men write Romances they should write things possible to be, and then they are useful to the Reader, for they are of such things which a man's life may meet with, at some time or other; but impossible fictions are such as can be profitable to no man, and therefore it was a vain thing for him to deliver such a conceit, and not vain only but ill, to deliver it in such a peremptory Rule as to make it seem the only way of Instituting a Sovereign.   

SECT. II.  
Mr. Hobbs his definition inconsistent with Reason▪  
BUT let us proceed, and we shall find it appear by every word more inconsistent with reason. Can a man think that men, such numbers, would ever consent so fully to forsake themselves and their own reason and wills, as to submit themselves either to man or men in such an ample manner as to esteem his Prince's Judgement or his Will, for his own. In that great height of Infallibillity to which the Pope in many men's Judgements is attained, they put the Pope in Cathedrâ when they say he is Infallible, and afterwards dispute what that Cathedra is: But out of this Cathedra he may err in his Judgement, and they must not approve of that, he may sin with his will and they must not consent to that. But Mr. Hobbs confines his Leviathan to no Chair, but absolutely pronounceth him free from Error both in Judgement and Will. Nay that is not all, but we must allow, yea authorise his Errors in both; and this is the Foundation upon which all his Politics are built; by which let a man endeavour all virtue and Religion in his own person, yet he may perpetrate all the horrid villainies in the World in another's person, whose actions he is bound to Authorise, and then, by them, and for them perish everlastingly, which I am persuaded not only no Christian, but no Turk, Mahemetan, Indian, the most barbarous persons in America, or any unknown Country can be induced to do, and yet this by him is made the groundwork of all Politic Government.   

SECT. III.  
Right not derived by this supposed Institution from the Consent of the People.  
HE proceeds (from this Institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the rights and faculties of him or them on whom Sovereign Power is conferred by the consent of the People Assembled).  
To this I have answered that there was never any such thing, and therefore no right, or faculty can be derived from hence, nor indeed ever will be: Ex nihilo nihil fit, that which hath no being, cannot cause any thing. Nay, I may say further, that there was never any Power conferred by the People (of which I expect an opportunity to speak more fully hereafter) for although we may find Commonwealths altered and set up by the Rebellious force, and violence of great numbers of the people, yet those who got the Sovereignty at such times, had it not by any such Institution, as is here described by the people's authorising that Person to these Actions he is exalted to; but from the People's subserviency obtained by his wit or fraud to his great Ambition. Here I might put an end to his Politics with a little enlargement upon this Subject, for the Foundation being destroyed the building must fall. But I will touch upon his Inferences, which will make this Foundation appear more weak.    


CHAP. V. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his first Inferrence affirmed, the Sovereign absurdly termed the person of the People.  
HE first infers that (because they Covenant, it is to be understood that they are not bound by a former Covenant to any thing repugnant thereunto) This must be most true, not of this Covenant only, but all other Covenants. No man can alienate any Estate twice without his leave to whom he alienated it first; and so where one has disposed his allegiance to one, he cannot take it away and dispose it to another afterward. I like the conclusion that follows also thus. (And consequently they that have already instituted a Commonwealth being thereby bound by Covenant to own the Actions and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new-Covenant amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore they who are Subject to a Monarchy, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their Person from him, that beareth it, to another man, or Assembly of men. This hath truth with it, out of the grounds formerly spoke of. But this senseless name of calling their Sovereign, their pers●n, or to found the Allegience to their Sovereign upon their Covenant, which never was nor could be, is to make it extremely weak; and his reason is most illogical and without force, (for saith he) They are bound every man to every man, to own, and be reputed Auth●r of all, that he that already is their Sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that one man which is injustice) I do not understand the consequence of this Argument, That if one man descent all the rest should break the Covenant made to that man, for his dissenting may break his Covenant, but why it should make them break their Covenant is not vissible to me.   

SECT. II.  
His expression, of giving the Sovereignty to him that bears their person, further censured.  
HIS following discourse is not more reasonable than this (And they have also every man given the Sovereignty to him that heareth their person; And therefore if they desp●se him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is Injustice.) That phrase, (Given him the Sovereignty who bears their person) is not rational, for according to his own Doctrine, it is the same thing to be Soveraigh, and bear their person; if he had spoke logically according to his doctrine, his phrase should be who is their person, for so he makes the Sovereign to be the person of the Commonwealth, not to bear it, which is another thing. But then mark you what a slight thing he makes Rebellion only a little Injustice, for so that word. Injustice may extend itself, to any the least Injustice, He takes that from him that was his; a poor piece of business every little Theft doth so.   

SECT. III.  
The irrationality of Mr. Hobbs his arguing further discovered. Covenants may be made immediately with God.  
HE adds another reason very weakly; Besides saith he, If he that attempteth to depose his Sovereign be killed or punished by him for such attempts, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Sovereign shall do. And because it is Injustice for a man to do any thing for which he may be punished by his own Authority, he is also upon that title unjust). Certainly (Reader) you may wonder at the strange unreasonableness of this Arguing. This proves by his supposed Institution no faultiness in this Treason; for suppose a Sovereign shall punish a Subject for speaking truth, he doth it according to his institution by the Authority given by that Subject, and that Subject is Author (according to his Doctrine) of killing himself for Truth, as well as for Treason, because he is Author of all his Actions, and there is as much injustice in the one as in the other; especially considering another Inference, which he makes, and will be discoursed on hereafter; That a Supreme can do no Injustice. But he adds not another argument, but an answer to another Objection. I will speak to that, his words ●re (And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Sovereign, a new Covenant, not made with men, but God, this is also unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth God's Person, which none doth, but God's Lieutenant, who hath the Sovereignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders own Consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition) Thus Herald This I yield unto so far, that it is sinful and wicked to engage in any Covenant with God against his Sovereign, but his means of obtaining it, I deny. He scarce ever speaks or names God, but with an Error: in particular here; what a false affirmation is this to say, That there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body who representeth God's person, which none doth but God's Lieutenant who hath the Sovereignty under God. Certainly a man may make Covenant with God, betwixt God and his own Soul, in private, in his Chamber; before men, in Company; divers are recorded in Scripture, and pious men often use it, and practise it accordingly, and when these Covenants are holy and devout God blesseth them, and those persons are obliged to those duties. But it is true in the case in which he instanceth all such Covenants are wicked in the making, and most abominable in the performance; for it is a Covenant with God in himself, to destroy him in his deputy; a Covenant with God in Heaven, to oppose him on Earth; the iniquity lieth not in this, That the Sovereign is the people's Person: for then the height of the sin lies in this, that the people are affronted; but in this other way, God; in his way it is but an injury to such as themselves; but in this it is to our politic Father, to whom under God we owe all our obedience; and is the first command of the Second Table with promise in this World. Of this Nature are those contracts betwixt man and woman, concerning Marriage, those promising Oaths which men make one with another, which oblige the contractors in a strong tye; for breach of which they shall answer at the last day. And now, I go on with him; this which follows, and much of that which immediately preceded is pag. (89).   

SECT. IV.  
Mr. Hobbs his Second Inference examined, and censured. The Sovereign obliged to protect the People from Injuries, and Invasions. His reasons, to attest this Inferrence, refuted.  
HIS Second Inference is because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make their Sovereign, by Covenant, only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; There can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Sovereign, and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture is freed from his Subjection. His conclusion i●again true in the material part, but his inference is faulty; for his conclusion I am persuaded, that none of his Subjects can be freed from their Allegiance to him by any act of his, unless dereliction of his Government, and that may abide a Dispute too. But to raise this conclusion out of that Ground, because he made no Covenant with them is exceeding weak. First, There is the same reason, by his Doctrine, betwixt him and the Subject; for the Subjects (in the very Paragraph which was but now transcribed,) make their Covenant one to another, and not to the Sovereign, so that there must be the same reason out of the Nature of the Covenant, that the Subject should not forfeit his Right to him, as he to the Subject, for the Covenant being only made one to another, the breach of that Covenant is only one with another: but I am bold to affirm it an impossible case, as he imagines it, that there must be mutual approbations betwixt both, and all. For, certainly it cannot be imagined, that such a generality of men, as must convene to do such an Act, should submit to such a total dereliction of themselves, without some promise, or Covenant on his part; that he will protect them from injuries at home, and Invasions from abroad; but he being exalted above all other Earthly Powers is subject only to the King of Kings, which is God, who will Judge him: but the Subjects are examinable, responsible, and condemnable by him. But he labours to infringe this reason in his following discourse thus, That he who is made Sovereign makes no Covenant with his Subjects before hand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole Multitude as one party to the Covenant, or he must make a several Covenant with every man; with the whole as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one person). I will not put down his reason against his second branch, because I shall not need to dispute against that, having showed the possibility of the first. But I will begin with his division, and deny that it is necessary that the Covenant should be made with the whole as one party, or with every particular severally; for there is a Medium participationis, which is more reasonable than either; for without doubt the Fathers of Families were Natural Governors from the beginning of the World, and they had by the Law of Nature Absolute Government over their Families, these when they find themselves not able in little distinct bodies to defend themselves, may treat amongst themselves how by an Union they may make themselves strong, against foreign and domestic dangers, and to that end erect a Supreme over themselves; and this certainly hath a greater show of Reason, than any of his thoughts, that every person who hath no Judgement nor Authority should be introduced to make a Covenant for so high concernments. Therefore that division was not good which did not comprehend the totum divisum. Then for his Argument that he could not Covenant with the whole as one person, because as yet they were not a person. I answer, first that they neither are, nor in truth will ever be one person, but because by his unimaginable conceit they are after their Covenant represented so by him, I will answer to himself; That first this Company meet together, than they consult upon that great work of choosing a Sovereign, the business is concluded upon by both parties, Sovereign and People, first they engage for their Patrs; then he may Covenant for his, and this is no otherwise then is apparent in all contracts, one must speak first, and after another, so in marriage first one speaks and then the other; and in all bargains, which yet are conditional until the second word confirms the contract. Nor is it possible, as I have said, to think that men would so deliver themselves to another's will, from whom they have no promise or the least verbal engagement to govern them justly and prudently. What he speaks against this Covenant with the several persons, I let go, thinking it impossible    


CHAP. VI SECT. I.  
The difference between the Sovereign's making a Covenant, and taking his Authority upon a Covenant; A Sovereign may Covenant to Govern justly, and yet not forfeit his Sovereignty, if he breaks that Covenant  
AND I pass to another Argument by which he would prove, That a Sovereign can make no Covenant, which begins towards the bottom of his 89. pag. thus (besides if any one or more of them pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Sovereign at his Institution, and others or one other of his Subjects or himself alone pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case no Judge to decide the Controversy.) First, I blame him here for putting no difference betwixt Covenanting in raking his Authority, and taking it upon Covenant. The first may be, and, without question, must be, in any Institution of Government: the second cannot be discreetly done by any; for it would leave a mighty gap to l●t in Treasons. Observe it in all contracts, Titius lets Land to Sempr●nius, he hath divers Covenants for to observe, which he may implead Sempr●nius for, and yet never a one to forfeit his Estate; come more closely. The Subject in this Institution of his Contracts is to perform all obedience, yet although he offend in many things, there be few such as exempt him from the just protection of the King, from further injuries then that Legally exacts, how much more must it needs be that the King should lose the total obedience of the Subject; though he should break his Covenant, and unless such a Clause were put into his Covenant, there was no pretence of reason for it; and it were as much against Reason, to put such a Clause into his Covenant. I have delivered my opinion of this before. The King of Heaven will Judge him severely for his breach of Covenant, to whom he must be left. That which follows is true, If there should be such a Covenant, and no Judge to determine, it would return to the Sword again, and every man recovereth the right of Protecting himself by his own shrength contrary to the design of the Institution] This is true, but I do not approve what follows, It is therefore in vain to grant Sovereignty by precedent Covenant] to grant a Covenant in the Institution of Sovereignty is most right, to wit, that he will Govern his People Legally and Justly or the like, without doing of which no person is fit to be Sovereign; but to Covenant, to lose his Sovereignty if he do otherwise, which he seems to understand generally by this word Covenant, is absolutely naught and unfit, because it must needs produce Confusions and Distractions in the Government, for the People upon any hardship they suffer, though never so just, will repine against their Superiors, and blame them, and upon any surmise of faultiness in them, would be ready upon such pretence to desire, and endeavour a Change of Government be it Monarchical or Aristocratical.   

SECT. TWO  
The Impiety of Mr. Hobbs his assertion, that Covenants have no force but from the Vindicative Power of the Sword, Discovered.  
THen what follows is wicked, in my Judgement [The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is, upon Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth, That Covenants being but words and breath have no force to oblige, contain or protect any man, but what it hath from the Public Sword, that is from the united hands of that man or assembly of men that hath the Sovereignty and whose actions are avowed by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united,] This speech hath some semblance of truth with i●, if he had confuted the World into Atheism, who think there is no God, no reward or punishment hereafter; and perhaps it might find some entertainment amongst men given over to base sensuality, sordid worldly people, who have no sense of honour or virtue, because such men value no contract, which consists not with their unhappy Condition, but with men which believe there is a God, who governs heaven and earth, and will judge all one day (which sure the generality of men do) with men that have felt any sting of Conscience, and have felt the happiness of nil conscire tibi, this breath of theirs hath such power with God, that in things of such high nature as this is, what they covenant on earth is confirmed in heaven, and is so esteemed by them; and because it is so esteemed, millions of men do and have thought it better for them to forsake all worldly felicity, then to violate such Covenants, and by preserving them, Kings and their Kingdoms have lived in peace and prosperity, but by the breach of them came to ruin and destruction: so that this which he calls but breath, at the same instant that it comes out of the mouth of man, it is engraved in their hearts, and recorded in Gods Eternal Registry in heaven.   

CHAP. VI SECT. III.  
The Sword hath no power but from the Covenant (according to Mr. Hobbs his Doctrine) it may compel, lut is not properly the obliging cause of obedience.  
What is added, That the breath of the Covenant is an ill foundation of Monarchy, and hath no power of obliging but from the public Sword.] I did wonder why he did use such various and such emphatical expressions against the Authority, which is derived from a Covenant; for this united force of the public Sword, according to his Doctrine, must be derived from that Covenant, which by him is made the sole foundation of Government: And if a Covenant (which by him is but breath) hath no obliging power, neither can the public Sword which is derived from that Covenant have any; it he instead of other Verbs which he used there, had interpreted this one of Compel, that this Covenant without the public Sword had no power to compel any man to obedience, it might have received some credit; because when we lose these virtues of fidelity, and obedience, it is only the public Sword which by force can make them submit, but yet that which the Sword can justly compel any unto, must be by the obliging virtue of the Covenant. But whereas he placeth the obliging power in the Sword, he gives all right of interest to it, than which nothing can be more destructive to Monarchy: Let Kings know that their Swords may rust, or lose their edge, and then he who hath the keenest Sword may plead the best right. This encouraged the late Rebels, who having got a longer Sword than the King, upon that Title, preserved their Usurpation to the utmost they could. And the wickedness is very apparent, for by his Doctrine whosoever can force his Superiority, may justify his exercise in it, which is the greatest encouragement Rebellion can desire: But perhaps that phrase (The Public Sword) may bear him out in it, for by this he understands the National Power in that Man, or Assembly of men, which hath the Sovereignty, all whose actions are acknowledged by them all. What a foolcry is this? Was there ever any Rebellion in which the Rebels did not deny to approve the actions of the Supreme they rebel against? And suppose that impossible Fiction of the universal meeting and assent to that Covenant, yet when the same persons renounce, who made that Covenant, how can the Sword authorise his actions, which pretend his power from the breath of this Covenant? which yet being but a Breath (as Mr. H●bbs terms it) is long since gone and perished, and a new Breach started up in its place: The right of the Sword is given by the breath of the Covenant, with promise to own his actions; that Breath is gone; they breathe contrarily and revoke it, if any man can get the Sword, he will make them blow such an other Breath upon his Sword, as they did upon the first Supreme. The truth is, Mr. Hobbs makes the power of Government to consist immediately in the Sword; but that founded upon a Breath, which i● blown away with any little cross wind; and certainly this makes a most unhappy institution and settlement of any right. That which follows in the top of the ninetieth page, I let pass, as not material to any thing preceding or following after, and I pass to his third Inference, which begins thus.    


CHAP. VII. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his third Inference examined; No man to be destroyed for his dissent to the unjust actions of others. Mr. Hobbs his Political Inquisition more severe than that for Religion.  
THirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Sovereign, he that dissented must now consent with the rest, that is, be contented to own all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. This is a very sad condition, either he must own all the actions his Sovereign doth, or justly be destroyed; I believe never Murder was so justified upon such terms before; own all his actions? No Christian, no honest man will do it; his Sovereign may be Antichristian, a Hobbist, whose actions no Christian man can avouch; he may act foolishly, which no wise man can authorise, he may act wickedly, which no honest man can consent unto, (or else justly be destroyed by his fellow Subjects) which he understands by that word (the rest) destruction is the greatest mischief can come to a man, and is never inflicted but for some mighty crime, which I do not find this man charged with, but only a dissenting or protesting against the general Vote; a thing often done in Parliaments, and yet no such Sentence passeth upon the Dissenter, nor were it just to do it; men are not bound to be all of one mind: Mr. Hobbs would make his Inquisition for Politics more severe than any Inquisition for Religion: But he hath reason for what he writes (for, saith he) If he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently thereby declared his will (and therefore tacitly covenanted to stand to what the major part should ordain.) I thought by what went before he must have declared his assent, but now it seems it is enough if he be amongst them; but what if he be not amongst them, (as I have showed it is impossible all should) what condition is that man in? He proceeds with his proofs, And therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therefore unjustly.) Suppose all this, Shall a man be destroyed for every breach of Covenant, or every unjustice? Certainly Mr. Hobbs, if he were a Lawmaker would outdo Draco, or the bloodiest that ever acted in that kind: This is a foolish consequence, that because he did unjustly he should justly be destroyed. He goes on (And whether he be of the Congregation or not, and whether his consent be asked or not, he must either submit to their Decrees, or be left to the condition of war he was in before, wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.) The madness of this condition of war before this Covenant I have spoke to heretofore, but that he may justly be destroyed by any with whom he will not join in the Covenant is wicked: We have in England I believe, abundance of strangers of Foreign Nations, which neither have nor will enter into such a Covenant, may they be justly killed? Nay, amongst those millions which are the King's Subjects; there was never man entered this or the like Covenant; may we justly kill one another? Nay, I think, few would make such a Covenant; may all these be knocked on the head thus? This hath such a force of injustice, that men with humanity about them cannot consent unto. I leave this therefore and come to his 4th Inference.    


CHAP. VIII. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his fourth Inference censured and refuted from his own conclusions. He that empowers another to do justly, though he make him Pleni-potentiary, is not guilty of his unjust actions; his first reason refuted.  
FOurthly (Because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the actions and judgements of the Sovereign instituted: it follows that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects, nor ought he by any of them be accused of injustice.) Accused, What doth he mean by that? to be convicted, arraigned, condemned? This certainly he cannot, because the power of Judgement supposeth Superiority, which cannot be over the Sovereign in his own Kingdom: But let us observe the consequence of this Argument out of these impossible premises, that because by his fancy of the Institution every subject is Author of all his actions, he can do no injury to any of them; certainly this doth not follow by his own Doctrine; for put the case, that the Supreme doth authorise a Judge to hear and determine such causes, doth the Supreme only do injustice in it, when the Royal Authority gives power to the Judge, who acts unjustly by that Authority, which was given him by the Supreme, or the Judge likewise who abuseth that Authority? I believe no man will affirm it; or if he do, he must destroy Mr. H●bbs his conclusion, which makes the King's acting by the Authority of the people's grant, not to offend in himself; for (which is his reason before spoke to) if the Author do solely perform, not the Actor or the person who immediately operates, which he delivered before, the King not the Judge doth unjustly, when by his Authority the Judge decrees wickedly: But he proceeds with another reason, (for saith he) He that doth any thing by Authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose Authority he acts. This is not true generally, a Judge judgeth by the Authority of the Supreme, but if he Judge unjustly (yea, judgeth a cause against the King perhaps unjustly) he then doth the King an injury by his own Authority. Again, a General with Plenipotency to kill, slay, etc. from the King, he turns now his Army to the King's destruction perhaps, doth not he then do the King an injury by his own power?   

SECT. II.  
Mr. Hobbs his second reason invalid from the falsity of his supposition. Consent or dissent gives not the stamp of Justice or Injustice. He that gives power to do any act, may complain of ill Execution of that power.  
HE goes on. (But by this Institution of a Commonwealth, every particular man is Author of what the Sovereign doth, and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author, and therefore ought not accuse any man but himself, nor himself of injury, because to do an injury to himself is impossible.) It is first observable here, (which runs throughout the whole Politics) that it is built totally upon that foundation which neither is, nor is probable to be in any, but is impossible to be in a great Commonwealth, and therefore must needs fall of itself: But supposing that impossibility, let us consider his inference, every man is Author of what the Sovereign doth; the reason of that is before expressed, because he covenants to avow his actions: Now if he do avow them, it follows not, that therefore they shall be just; many a man owns that act which is unjust, his owning of it makes it neither just, nor unjust: These are qualities inherent in the act, not adherent to others Opinions, or acceptance, or disacceptance of them: I but (saith he) Consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is Author.] I return, that he may do that, and complain that he himself hath done amiss, men do, and it is virtuously done of him who doth it, but much rather of that which he acts by another's hand; that which may be good in the Institution, may be spoiled and hurt in the Execution; and although they did institute him with such a power, yet his mannagement of it may be ill and unjust, and that they may complain of.   

SECT. III.  
A man may do an injury to himself. Mr. Hobbs his distinction between Iniquity, and Injustice, or Injury, disproved and censured.  
UPon this ground will appear the faultiness of what follows, which is [And therefore ought not to accuse, any man but himself, no nor himself of injury, because to do injury to a man's self is impossible.] To the first pi●ce I have showed, that though he were Author of Leviathans Power, yet his evil usage of that power may be complained of. To the second, I think a man may injure himself, when a rich man through niggardliness shall deny his belly or his back those expenses which were necessary for the support of his health, he deals unjustly with himself; when another foolishly desperate shall adventure his life upon idle and frivolous occasions, he deals unjustly with himself, by hazarding so Noble a Creature upon so base and unworthy a prize: These things, and multitudes of more, are unjust dealing towards a man's self: But he hath a nice distinction at the bottom of this Paragraph; It is true, that they that have Sovereign Power may commit Iniquity, but not injustice or injury in the proper signification. I would he had expounded the proper signification: At the first I was amazed at this distinction, and did doubt there was some great and excellent Notion in it, but duly considering the words, I find they were airy, and do signify no more difference, then if I had affirmed Mr. Hobbs, or the Writer of Leviathan, said this, or that, merely nominal: For what is iniquity but unequal dealings? which in him who is bound to deal equally in distribution, or commutation, is injustice; and indeed injustice is nothing else; and injury, what is that? but not just, or right; and I am sure injustice is nothing else: But where some Law directs this or that, he doth otherwise: This is the proper and genuine sense of the words, and unless he had showed us some more proper use of them, there is no reason why we should be forced from this common acceptation. Here now I might justly break off from further discourse of this business, having answered what he objects; but because I would give some satisfaction to the Reader in this Conclusion, I shall a little insist further, and show, that Leriathans, or Suprem●s, may do unjustly.   

SECT. IV.  
A Sovereign may do injustice by himself, and by his Ministers empowered, and not punished by him.  
IT will be a strong foundation for this discourse to produce the Actions of the King of Kings, God himself, which I may do in the eighteenth of Genesis; ye may observe there, that God was pleased to reveal to Abraham his intended destruction of Sodom; Abraham after he had undertaken to plead for them, in the twenty fourth verse, puts the Question, Peradventure there will be fifty righteous within the City, wilt thou also destroy, and not spare the City for the fifty righteous that are therein? Then in the twenty fifth verse, That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous shall be as the wicked, that be far from thee; shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? In which you may observe, that Abraham in a bold manner did dare to intimate, that God himself should have done amiss, not right, but unjustly, in punishing the righteous with the wicked; and shall we be afraid to say that Leviathan can do unjustly, when they shall slay the righteous as the wicked, which many of them have done? If we consider all the Species, and several sorts of injustice, we shall find that they may, and have prepetrated them: They have broke the equity of distributive Justice, in preferring base and unworthy people, and neglecting, yea punishing virtuous men; for Commutative Justice, they have taken against Law and Equity other men's Estates, they have neglected to pay their due debts, and what can be more unjust than those? they may therefore do unjustly, nay what is more, by how much their power is greater, by so much they are enabled to do more injustice; and I may add, other men's injustice may prove theirs, not only out of his vain principles, because all Judges in his Dominion act by his Authority, even in those Causes where they judge wickedly: But because he is the Supreme, and should take care for his inferior Officers that they do their duties, which if he knows they do not, and yet neglect to correct them for amendment, they will prove his wickedness. We know the Judgement upon old Eli, who was a virtuous and good man in himself, and the Leviathan of that Nation then, yet the Judgement of God was upon him for not using severe Justice to his Sons, when he knew their faults; as you may observe in 1 Sam. 2. 27. So that it is apparent, that they may do injustice more than others; and indeed if he cannot be unjust, neither can he be just, for contraries are belonging to the same subject; he who cannot be vicious, cannot be virtuous, and contrary acts in any man will by degrees eat out any vice or virtue, nor can men call it virtue in any who cannot do ill. But I think there is now enough said to this, I will pass to his fifth Inference, which is this.    


CHAP. IX. SECT. 1.  
Mr. Hobbs his fifth Inference. The Proposition asserted. The reason of this Inference weak, and invalid.  
FIfthly, and consequently to that which was said last, No man that hath Sovereign Power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects be punished. ● This conclusion is most true, because he is Supreme; and to put to death, or punish, are acts only of Supremacy: But his reason, and the only means which he useth to obtain this excellent conclusion, is so false, that unless it should be confuted, we may think so excellent a truth had a weak support; his reason follows [For seeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Sovereign, he punisheth another for the actions committed by himself.] I have oft spoke of this; by this consequence a King cannot punish a wicked Judge, a rebellious General, and the like, as I have often said before: And if the Supreme should urge to these instances, that this Judge, or this General, acted implicitly against the Authority granted by the Supreme, the same answer may be returned to him from his Subjects when he doth that which is contrary to their good or peace; so that although this conclusion is most necessary to the establishment of peace and happiness in any Kingdom, yet when it is urged only by such fallacious Inferences, it makes the Readers imagine, that the greatest and most weighty things in Polity are dubious.   

SECT. II.  
He that hath right to the end, hath not right to all the means to attain that end, but only to such mediums as are just and legal.  
HE infers presently upon the bottom of this conclusion, And because the end of this Institution is the peace and defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the end, has right to the means, it belongeth of right to him. Whatsoever man, or Assembly, that hath the Sovereignty to be judge of the means of peace, and defence, to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be●d ne. ● I spare putting down every word: For answer hereunto, know, That as I have oft observed he exceedingly often abuseth this general Rule; he who hath right to the end, hath right to some means, but not to all: A man hath right to his house, in another's possession, right to get it peaceably by Law, and not by force: A Supreme, or under him his Judge, hath right to punish Felons, but he hath no right to butcher any man without a legal Trial, no though the fact were seen by him; so that he hath right to all legal means to obtain this end, but not any other: Let us change the person, and this will appear most manifestly, every man hath right to the peace and good of the whole Kingdom, without which he cannot live contentedly, and happily, and he ought to use his endeavour for the obtaining and preserving it, but it must have this little addition of lawful means; if he have right to pr●cure it by illegal means, it will open a gap, and give countenance to all Rebellion; for there was never any Rebellion which had not that specious pretence of the peace and good of the Public, which otherwise could not be obtained; and therefore although he who hath right to the end, hath right to some means of obtaining it, yet not to all: And this I am confident may fully satisfy the following part of that Paragraph.    


CHAP. X. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his sixth Inference examined and censured. The Sovereign's Commands, in point of Religion, submitted to the Commands of God.  
NOw I am come to the 91 page, where he proceeds: [Sixthly, it is annexed to the Sovereignty to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what are conducing to peace, and consequently on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal in speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall examine the Doctrines of all Books before they be published.] The drift of all this Inference is to place the Government of Religious Doctrine in establishment of Doctrine in Religion, whether by preaching, or printing, to be in the Sovereign▪ I shall have opportunity to enlarge upon this conclusion hereafter, when I shall meddle with his Divinity, but will not let it pass now, but speak a little to make way for that. Consider then first, that a hundred thousand men meet together to institute a Sovereign (for out of his former Institution of a Commonwealth he deduceth these Inferences) these men are either of one Religion, or divers; (for Religion all people have) if of one Religion, it is not possible for men to think, that they should be so careless of the greatest and dearest concernment in the world, as to throw it away to another's dispose, without any Covenant or promise to preserve it for them. Let us in our thoughts run over the universal world, and consider the various judgements in Religion, Christians, Jews, mahometans, and the several sorts of Gentilismes, with their several Subdivisions, we shall find none that hold so mean a price upon their Worship of God, as to part with it upon such ridiculous terms, as to subject themselves so totally to a Levi●than, as not to have any engagement for their duty towards their God; and most of them would rather put themselves upon their protection by his Providence, then to offer up his good pleasure a Sacrifice to their worldly preservation, by an arm of flesh. But if they are of divers Religions (which is a most dangerous Enemy to the peace of any Kingdom) they certainly will either agree for an absolute toleration, or else one being countenanced (which most surely must be the Supreme Religion) the rest may enjoy their own upon certain conditions, and then he deals unjustly when he violates that condition, when he shall command other Opinions to be br●ached, or them to be punished otherways then was agreed upon before. But let the Reader consider here are divers actions intermixed, some of which the Sovereign may act in his own person, and some which he must act by Commissions: Of the first sort are limitation of popular Orators; his meaning is our Preachers, who are the Public Speakers to the People, of whom it is affirmed, that 〈◊〉 must judge on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal in speaking to multitudes of people, that this cannot exact an absolute obedience, and that the Sovereign may offend in all these, will be evident, if we lay the Seen among Turks, and the Moguls, commanding not to preach Christ; and it be granted, that they punish all them who do so, will Mr. Hobbs say this is just? It may be he will; but I am sure the Apostles were of another mind, when (Acts 4. 18.) they were commanded not to preach in the Name of the Lord Jesus; they answered (in the nineteenth verse) Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. The answer was of invincible force, implying thus much, That ye, be ye what you will, Leviatha●, or what can be imagined to have Commanding Authority, ye are Gods Deputies; if when God Commands any thing, you give a cross Command, judge which should be obeyed? If when the King in express terms commands one thing, and his Lieutenant commands another, which should be obeyed? The case is so betwixt the greatest King, Sovereign, or Leviathan in this world, and God; judge ye then: They could reply nothing to this answer of the Apostles, none did endeavour to do it, but immediately went to Club-Law, Threats and Menaces, and let them go; so that it is clearly evident, that Sovereigns in such Commands may do unjustly, and are not to be obeyed in their unjust Commands by virtuous men, who may, and must suffer obediently, though they ought not to act obediently. I must add no more at this time, hereafter will be a greater opportunity.   

SECT. II.  
Books justly examined before published. Such a Commission wanting when Mr. Hobbs his Book was printed. His reason of this Proposition asserted.  
IN the second sort of Acts, he is in the right; they ought and have Authority to grant Commissions to some who shall ●x●●ine the Doctrine in all Books before they are published.] This is most reasonable, for else Libels, scandalous to the Religion, and present Government, would fly abroad, to the disturbance of the Kingdom; and it is impossible for the Supreme to do it himself; and certainly had there been such a Commission here in England when this Book was to be printed, it would never have been allowed, no not in any well-governed Nation in the World. His reason for this is very strong likewise, for the actions of men proceed from their Opinions: And surely, although he hath only enforced this in order to peace, yet it is evident, that the practics of any virtue are best regulated by the Opinions of wise men, as all the actions of a man's life.   

SECT. III.  
Bishops the most competent Judges of Books (especially in Divinity) so also of Doctrines and Public Orators, or Preachers to the people.  
THis therefore hath usually been allotted to such men, whose Function requires the Study of such things from them, I mean Bishops, the Reverence of whose judgements, and the honour of whose persons, may gain a submission to their determinations. This I speak for Preaching, for Books in Divinity; others have their proper spheres to move in according to their Professions. He proceeds▪   

SECT. IV.  
Mr. Hobbs his Assertion affirmed; his expressions of regulating Doctrines by Peace censured; some kind of Peace among Devils.  
ANd although in matter of Doctrine nothing ought to be regarded but the truth, yet this is not repugnant to the regulating the same by peace; for Doctrine repugnant to peace, can be no more true, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature.] I am of his mind, that in matter of Doctrine, the truth, and only truth is to be considered; and I am confident, that truth and peace will certainly meet together. But methinks that is not handsomely spoke, when he saith, that Doctrine should be regulated by peace, without doubt peace is an excellent Box to preserve truth when it is settled, it is a Child, a Daughter, and fruit of truth, for true Doctrine brings peace wheresoever it is; but it cannot so regulate a Doctrine, as to enforce this conclusion, That because these men live in peace amongst one another, therefore they have the truth of Doctrine preserved amongst them: For there may be a peace amongst men who are Rebels, nay amongst the Devils themselves (for aught I know) I am sure it appears to be the force of our Saviour's argument, when they said, He casteth out Devils through Beelzebub the Prince of Devils, that a Kingdom divided against itself cannot stand: Therefore their Kingdom, being a lasting Kingdom, must have peace in it. But yet it is a more probable argument, that because truth naturally tends to peace, therefore where is peace and quiet, it is reasonable to think there is truth.   

SECT. V.  
The former conclusions repugnant to Mr. Hobbs his Doctrine; Peace not consonant to the Law of Nature, according to his assertion; the true reason of the former conclusion.  
BUt the Argument by which he proves it did not become his mouth or pen; for saith he [Doctrine repugnant to peace can be no more true, than peace and concord can be against the Law of Nature.] This I say did not become him, for he hath delivered it for a Maxim in Politics, That by the Law of Nature every man only considers himself, and is at war with all the world besides, and hath right to do what he will with it.] But peace and concord are artificial things introduced by the wit of man for his greater security: So that if truth and peace agree no better, than peace, and the Law of Nature, as he hath stated it, it is little or not at all. But the truth is, that truth of Doctrine bring all peace, peace with God, by subjecting our wills to his Sacred Revelations in the regulation of our actions; peace with men by that blessed Doctrine of Charity, by which we are commanded, as much as in us lies, to have peace with all men, peace in our own souls, by subduing those carnal, sensual, rebellious affections which are in man, to the obedience to reason. So that without doubt truth doth naturally produce peace, but is not therefore regulated by it.   

SECT. VI  
The former expression of regulating all Doctrines by peace further examined and censured: Divine Truths and Doctrines not regulated by peace. In Politics this expression not improper.  
THat properly regulates another, which directs and shows the way by which that other should walk, or else is the Rule by which it should be drawn: So we say, he is regulated by this Law, who is directed and commanded by it, to do this or that: And this hath the same signification in moral as in natural things. A Square which the Carpenter useth for the direction of his work, regulates that work, and the same doth a Law; but that in the indagation of any Divine Truth, as of Divine Attributes, the nature of Faith, of Prayer, and the like, that a man should square it out by peace, or that he should regulate them by it, is a strange assertion: Nay it is so in Mathematical truths, and Physical also. If a man should inquire, whether the Sun be bigger than the earth, must he regulate his examination by the rule of peace? Or if he inquire in Nature, whether a first matter or Atoms be the foundation, the principle of the World, out of which it is made? must this be compared and guided by the consent it hath with peace? It is true, had he confined his truths to politic truths, it might have good acceptance, because the end of Politics is the governing man in peace and happiness; but he is so far from that, as he points principally at Divine truths (as will appear) in the prosecution, of which it cannot be a rule, much less a sole and only rule, as he seems to make it.   

SECT. VII.  
Mr. Hobbs his expression of new truths censured: Truth always the same; the object of Truth sometimes obscure: New Truths, and new Lights, phrases equally affected.  
IT is true, that in a Commonwealth whereby the negligence and unskilfulness of Governors and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received, the contrary truths may be generally offensive; yet the most sudden and rough bustling in of a truth that can be, do●s never break the peace, but only sometimes awake the war.] I think with him, that it is through the negligence and unskilfulness of Governors and Teachers, that false Doctrines are received: But I do not approve that phrase of a New Truth, there is no such thing, but of particulars, that this fire burns is new, but that fire will burn combustible matter, when applied to it, is an eternal truth, of which sorts of truth he seems to write. This kind of speech seems to concur with that lately affected language of new lights, when there is no new light, but always Divine Graces lighted Spiritual, and Humane Intellect Natural Truths: The truths are the same, and the lights the same by which we discern them, but the objects may lie in darkness, and not be discerned, till their proper light be brought to them.   

SECT. VIII.  
His Assertion of the bustling in of truth awakes the War, examined, and showed to be repugnant to his former Conclusions.  
THe next phrase to be considered is, This bustling in of Truth d●th not break the Peace, but awake the War▪ ●It seems then when men live in peace, they are at war, but only lie asleep, when I should think that the unquiet disposition of war could never let it sleep, and the quiet sweet disposition of peace makes it look like sleep: But he gives reason for it (for saith he) Those men who are so remissly governed, that they dare take up Arms to defend or introduce an Opinion, are still in War, and their condition not Peace, but a cessation of Arms for fear of one another, and they live as it were in the Precincts of Battle continually.] This was wittily expressed by him; but he did not remember, that the Covenant in the institution put them in a state of peace, when now he placeth peace only in the mannagement of that Government, which if it be, there's another reason from hence to be added to what went before, that the Supreme aught to Covenant with his Subjects concerning his Government, which is obstinately denied by him.   

SECT. IX.  
Doctrines among Christians not to be introduced by force. Cessation of Arms not the height of Peace. Remissness, in matter of Opinion, not the only cause of Mutiny or Rebellion.  
COnsider those that are so remissly governed, as they dare take up Arms to defend or introduce an Opinion.] This should not concern Christians, whose Opinions and Doctrines must not be introduced by Arms of Steel and force, but of reason and sufferings; and as our Great Master, our blessed Saviour, planted it with his death, so must we cherish and water it with our own, not others blood: It is not to be sowed or reaped by Swords, but sufferings, and the reason of those sufferings. But be it of what opinion it will, this Argument doth not become him, because he makes war to be the natural state of all mankind, which if it be, it will return, unless you take the very nature away in which it is rooted, otherwise it only suppresses the outward acts of violence or war, but not extinguisheth the being of it. Again, he makes his peace obtained by the Covenant in the Sovereign's Institution, to be nothing else but a cessation of Arms, for fear men should not else enjoy their conveniencies or well being. Now then, if this be the height of any peace, they who are governed thus remissly, as he speaks, are in as good a state of peace as any others are. I grant that remissness of Government, is an occasion that loose people are incited to foster discontents, and malicious people encouraged to take up Arms. But this may be imputed to all remissness, as well as that of Opinions, and ought not to be bounded by it.   

SECT. X.  
Mr. Hobbs his fallacies in arguing discovered. To be Judge, and to constitute Judges, are distinct; the latter more advantageous to the Commonwealth, in point of Doctrines.  
HE thinking that this is clear, deduceth further thus; It belongs therefore to him that hath the Sovereign Power to be Judge, or constitute Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace, thereby to prevent discord and civil wars.] Observe here; Reader, is a fallacy that runs throughout his whole Book, which I have often marked before, and now must again, which is, that he makes his conclusion deduced out of his discourse, another from that which he proposed. His Conclusion proposed is this; Sixthly, it is annexed to the Sovereignly to be Judge of what Opinions are averse, and what conduce to peace.] Observe it is in his own person, now it is to be Judge, or constitute Judges. There is a great difference betwixt the performance of this act in his own person, and by Officers. It is not probable, that a man or men taken up with so many and great thoughts of politic affairs, can have leisure to get abilities for such a purpose, or if he had, can he attend them? Therefore as I said before, so I say again, he ought to employ in that great business, men fitted by their proper Studies and endeavours to such a design. We will go on.    


CHAP. XI. SECT. 1.  
The impossibility of the former imagined Institution of a Leviathan further discovered, from the power given him by Mr. Hobbs in the propriety of Estates, attained before the Institution.  
SEventhly, (saith he) To the Sovereignty is annexed the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby every man knows what good he may enjoy, and what actions he may do without being molested by his fellow Subjects; and this is it men call Propriety.] To understand this we must return back, and consider, that this is spoke of a Commonwealth constituted, after his impossible imagination, by a multitude of people of which there was never any precedent, nor is ever likely to be: The impossibility of which will yet appear more manifest, by the examination of this Paragraph. To that purpose let us conceive a multitude of people met together upon such a design, as he proposeth, of choosing a Leviathan; all these people either had estates, or had none, but only their beings in the world; or else some had estates, some had none. To think that in such a multitude no man should have any thing of his own, were most unreasonable. And again, to imagine that there were no necessitous men amongst such a number of men, were ridiculous, it must needs therefore be, that some had estates, and some none. Let us then proceed according to his own Rule, that the prime and principal Law of Nature is for every man to look to himself, and his own accommodations; and for that reason it is (and the sole reason by him alleged) why men incorporate into a Body Politic. This being supposed (as it is by him) can any man think that such men who had estates, would make themselves in an equal condition with those who had none, and leave them at the disposal of a Leviathan when he is constituted, whereby they should be leveled with them who had no estate; or rather in the constitution of their Commonwealth, provide to have them secured by some Covenant or other, that they might not be worse afterwards, than they were when they covenanted for it, yea loose that which perhaps with great pains and industry they had acquired, which if they do in their constituting a Commonwealth, the Sovereign hath not right to dispose, and give cross Rules to that Covenant afterwards, he having formerly assented to that Covenant. For if we consider his Politics, we shall find the only end, why men imbody themselves into a Commonwealth, to be the securing themselves to live comfortably, enjoying their own without molestation, or to that purpose. Think then how it is possible for a man with such thoughts about him, in that way to throw himself, and all he hath, clearly to another's disposal, without any condition or Covenant. For although all things under the Sun are subject to change, and the strongest Entails find means to be frustrated, yet providence, and careful men, in such a constitution of so high a Nature, would foresee that possibility, and have some forecast, how and by what ways that should be done, which indeed must needs make the multitude of the people unfit men for such a work, who have not wisdom to foresee or provide for such accidents.   

SECT. II.  
Mr. Hobbs his supposition of men met together without a propriety, examined. The impossibility of this Fiction, according to his own grounds, from the contradictions which follow upon it.  
BUt he seems to go another way, and settles this building of his Commonwealth upon the foundation of a sort of men which have no propriety in any thing, or suppose a hundred thousand (a less number will scarce make a good City) all these having no interest in the world, besides their being (which is as unimaginable as any of the rest) which yet is affirmed by him in the following words [For before Constitution of Sovereign Power, as hath already been showed, all men had right to all things, which necessarily causeth war, and therefore this propriety being necessary to peace, and depending on Sovereign Power, is the act of that Power in order to peace.] This is a strange core it, that men in war have right to their Enemy's Country before they have conquered it, and when they have conquered it, shall have right to very little: both which by him are most true. For before the choosing a Sovereign they are at war with all the wo●ld, and have a right to all the world, yet when they have conquered any piece, it must be in the Sovereign's power to give them propriety only in what he pleaseth. I know he may object to this, that he saith, the Supreme may give Rules, that is, make such Laws by which men may know what is their propriety, but not that he shall give the propriety. But for answer to this, let him know, that the Legistlative Power can take away, and alter them, as well as make them; and than it amounts to as much, as if he had given the propriety its self, for he can do it when he will. And let us consider, that those men who by nature have right to all the world, yet by this industriously uniting themselves into a Commonwealth, gain but this, that whereas before they had right to every thing, now they have right only to this little pittance which is allotted them.   

SECT. III.  
Mr. Hobbs his illogical deductions. Propriety in the state of War. What propriety is; it may be without peace, as peace may be without propriety.  
HE proceeds ●And therefore this Propriety being necessary to Peace, and depending on Sovereign Power, is an act of that Power in order to the Public Peace. ● Surely there is no manner of Logical consequences in this, therefore of his; for let us consider to what this therefore relates, can it look forwards to all men's rights to come? and because of that, therefore propriety should be an act of the Sovereign? These have no conjunction one with another, no, nor because they are in war one with another; for Nations that are in war one with another, have right of some; and people that have right to many things, may have right likewise to what they have of some: So that this therefore hath nothing before to build itself upon; and indeed, in Logic, it should have been deduced out of the pr●mises. But let us see if there be any thing in this new sentence that can countenance this Proposition, That propriety is an act of the Sovereign. The first words that may seem to make for it, will be these (That Propriety being necessary to peace) therefore Propriety is an act of Sovereignty.] This follows not. First, because Propriety may be where there is war, therefore it cannot be necessary to peace, I take Propriety for a peculiar right and title which a man hath to any goods.) This a man may have at that instant when he hath war with another. And again, he may live in peace in this Kingdom, both with his Neighbour, and all the rest of the Nation, and have propriety in nothing, but his b●ing in the world: So that if peace can be without propriety, and propriety without peace, it cannot truly be said that propriety is necessary to peace. And then that Proposition which is the foundation of an argument failing, the Argument likewise falls to the ground.   

SECT. IV.  
Propriety not depending only upon Sovereign power. The propriety of the Sovereign independent. His consequence again redargued. Propriety the Act of Law.  
THe second words which may give any semblance of an Argument (if any) are depending upon Sovereign power] and such a Sovereign power as he makes his to be, there is none in the world but men have propriety without it, therefore no necessary dependence upon this, without which it can be, and is. Again consider, the Sovereign himself hath a propriety of his own, and his propriety hath no dependence upon any: but then consider that if it be so, and he will have it understood of Subjects only, or that the Sovereign hath his propriety by right of his Sovereignty, because there is a Sovereign constituted; and that the propriety of all others hath a dependence upon this Sovereign power; yet it doth not follow, that that propriety is an act of Sovereignty. It may well be supposed, that propriety may be settled by Contract before the constitution of the Commonwealth, and then the Sovereign only looks and takes care for the right observation of those Laws, which were consented unto concerning propriety; and propriety is the Act of those Laws, and he the Protector and preserver of them: So that this consequence is not deduced out of any thing which is set down by him. And these few words which are added are of no force (in order to the public peace) for although he may direct, yea enforce them to the public peace, yet propriety itself is an act of those Laws which settles it, not of him which governs.   

SECT. V.  
Many things good or evil in their own Nature, and therefore not alterable by Humane Laws.  
HE goes on; These Rules of Propriety (or meum and tuum) and of good, evil, lawful, and unlawful, in the actions of Subjects, are the Civil Laws, that is to say, the Law of each Commonwealth in particular.] The Rules of Propriety, that is, of the particular estate, are without question the Laws of each particular Commonwealth; but for good or evil, there are many things so framed in their own Nature, that it lies not in the power of Humane Laws to make such things good or evil, contrary to their beings, as to love, fear, and worship God, no Humane Law can make it evil; or to hate or despise him, no Humane Law can make it good. And so for lawful and unlawful things, which either by the Law of God in our hearts, or that communicated to us in his holy Book; these are Laws besides the Civil Law of the Nation, which the Civil Law cannot alter, or make good or evil, otherwise then that goodness or illness which they received from the Law Divine. That which follows in that Paragraph, is nothing but an Exposition of Civil Law; how it is understood by him, which I conceive not to be material to his design, or mine, and therefore I let it alone, and come to a new Inference.    


CHAP. XII. SECT. 1.  
The Sovereign obliged to take care for the decision of Controversies, and accountable to God as for his own, so also for his Officers neglect.  
EIghthly (saith he) ●s annexed to the Sovereign the Rights of Controversies, which may arise ●●●erning Law, either Civil or Natural, or concerning Fact; for without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject from the injuries of another.] That is true which he speaks, so that he understands by it not a natural immediate Agent, but a moral political act by his Deputies and inferior Officers, as Judges; and than it is not only a right which he may, but a duty which he ought to do. And I may go further than Mr. H●bbs, here, and say, that he shall be responsible to the great King of Kings, for not taking care that those his Officers do his duty of Justice in deciding causes. Jethro, M●ses Father-in-law gave him good counsel, not to take that burden (impossible for his shoulders to bear) upon himself alone, but divide it to others, and keep weighty causes only to himself.   

SECT. II.  
Mr. Hobbs ninth Inference affirmed, Sovereigns in ordinary emergencies to use ordinary means. Salus Populi Suprema Lex.  
NInthly, etc. (saith he) (truly Reader I am tired with transcribing his words distinctly.) The drift of this ninth Inference is to say, That the Sovereign hath right to the Militia of his Kingdom, and so of all means to maintain his Army: and he saith right, without this, all others are nothing. The Subjects cannot be protected either from foreign or domestic injuries. This is true, but yet he hath right only to use right means for this. I speak not of cases of necessity, Salus Reipublicae est summa Lex, but in the ordinary manage of affairs, he must reserve himself questionless to the ordinary ways.   

SECT. III.  
The choice of Councillors, etc. in the Sovereign▪ Mr. Hobbs his reason of this Conclusion refuted.  
FOr his tenth Inference, which is his right of choosing Councillors, Officers of his Army, and the like, I agree with him; but not for his oft confuted reason, because he hath right to the end, he must have right to the means; for he cannot have right to get his right ends by crooked means, but because he is Supreme, and is the Fountain of all Power in his Realm. But yet there are in many Kingdom's great Offices belonging to Families, as Generals, Chamberlains, and the like; and those cannot justly be laid aside out of those places that they are born to, and have by Inheritances, without great and just cause of disinheriting be produced.   

SECT. IV.  
The eleventh Inference affirmed, where there is no Law, there is no transgression, and consequently no punishment.  
HIs eleventh is most true, That to the Sovereign is committed the power of punishing, and rewarding according to Law, or if there be no Law (I fear to join with him here) to punish where is no Law, according as he shall judge meet to conduce to the deterring of men from doing disservice to the Commonwealth.] This I like not, sin is the transgression of a Law; where no Law, no sin, therefore no punishment.  
His last Inference is after a long preamble, That it belongs to the Sovereign Power to give Titles of Honour.] I agree with him in this clause; but observe that his twelfth, eleventh, tenth, ninth Inferences, are all page 92.   

SECT. V.  
Mr. Hobbs his Objection and Answer approved. Kings more incommodated than Subjects from the burden of their Crimes, and their account to the King of Kings.  
I Have thus briefly touched upon these particular Inferences, which he calls the right of a Sovereign; and having censured them, any man may easily look through that which follows in that Cap. but in the latter end of that Cap. page 94. he seems to answer an Objection: ● A man may here object, that the condition of Subjects is very miserable, as being obnoxious to the lusts, or other irregular passions of him o● them who have so unlimited a power in their hands; and commonly they who live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy, etc. not considering (saith he) that the estate of man can never be without some incommodity or other.] I think he speaks truth in almost all this whole Paragraph; but as a Christian man who is assured there is a God, a Heaven, and Hell; I may say that as all Subjects must, whilst they are in this world, have incommodities; so Kings have many more, their Crowns are made of Thorns, and their Sceptres too heavy almost for men to bear, because they have a mighty account to make up to their King, the King of Kings, of the good or evil in their Government, with which words I end this Cap. and come to his next, which is Cap. 19 entitled thus, Of the several kinds of Commonwealth by Institution, and of Succession to the Sovereign Power.    


CHAP. XIII. SECT. 1.  
Mr. Hobbs his expression of Representative not proper, and diminutive of Sovereignty. Two Questions raised about the divisions of Commonwealths, left to the judgement of others.  
HE begins this Cap. with an Exposition of that ancient division of a Commonwealth into Monarchical, Aristocratical, and Democratical, which he affirms to be the only forms by which any Commonwealth is governed; and in the hottom of this 94 page, he proves it thus [For the Repr●se●itative must needs be one man, or more; and if more, than it is ●ither the Assembly of all, or but of a part. When the Representative is one man, than it is a Monarchy; when an Assembly of all that will come together, than it is a Democracy, or popular Commonwealth; when an Assembly of a part only, than it is Aristocracy: Other kinds of Commonwealths there can be none, for either one, or more, or all must have the Sovereign Power, which I have showed to be indivisible.] I will not here contend against that word Representative, which I have oft already spoke against, and cannot be a fit word to express a Sovereign, for it makes him to be but an Image or Creature of the people, whose Supreme he is. But for that division of a Commonwealth, which he propo●eth, although it is so honoured by the universality of Writers in Politics, that it were not modesty in any particular man to deny it, yet give me leave to put a Question (I will not be peremptory in it) Why, since a Commonwealth is the whole Body Politic, and consists in the wh●le Regiment, from the King to the Cottager, why there may not be thought of some division in respect of subordination, as well as in respect of the Supreme. But I will leave the answer to some younger head, who may have leisure to examine it, and raise another Question: Since the division is made only out of the quantity or number which constitute a Supreme, why may not some things be thought upon concerning the quality of it, which may give a new and another illustration to that condition of a Supreme? For although this term of the quality of a Supreme is not usually expressed in the notion of the thing, yet the matter and sense of that word is often delivered by them, as Tyranny for Monarchy; by the first of which, they understand a Monarch governing without Law, so Oligarchy for Aristocracy, as Mr. H●bbs expresseth in the following words, page 95.   

SECT. II.  
Tyranny and Monarchy different forms of Government. Miscalling altars not the nature of the thing. Oeconomical Government consistent with Anarchy.  
TH●re be other names of Government in the Histories and B●oks of Policy, as Tyranny; and Oligarchy; but they are not the names of other forms of Government, but of the same forms misliked.] Indeed in the first, they are divers forms to govern by Laws, or without Laws, differing▪ forms, differing in the very essential acts of Government. In the second you may find a great difference in the persons, the one being enabled to his place by his virtue, the other by riches only, or such like accommodations. But let us consider what he adds (for saith he) They who are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny, and they who are displeased with Aristocracy, call it Oligarchy; they who find themselves grieved under a Democracy, cal● it Anarchy (which signifies a want of Government) and yet I th●nk no man believes a want of Government to be any new kind of Government.] I believe what he saith hath truth, they will miscall them so; but yet this proves not, that these miscallings are not founded upon a truth, A virtuous man is branded with calumny, and yet for all that a virtuous man and a vicious man differ, although the virtuous man be abused; so differ these Governments one from another. What he speaks of D●mocracy and Anarchy was ingenious, but unapplicable to any the other. And although in the strictness of that word Anarchy, it is not possible to allow any Government, yet if it be applied to Political Government, it may notwithstanding (granting it there) consist with Oeconomical Government. And when a Democracy is grown loose, that the Authority in relation to the whole Commonwealth is lost, yet Government may be found in Families. What he adds is not of great moment, when he saith, Nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind when they like it, and another when they dislike it, or are oppressed by the Governors.] Where is the parity of reason betwixt any thing that went before, and this, to produce that saying of this (for the same reason?) and there is no reason for this, that the liking, or disliking, which are extremely outward things, to the essence of any thing, should produce a difference in the thing itself.   

SECT. III.  
The Author's Opinion of this division. The denomination of mixed bodies (as in natural, so in political) à principalion. The strange mixture of the Government of Lacedaemon. The Monarchy of Darius mixed with Aristocracy.  
ANd now Reader, having passed some Notes, I will proceed to set down my own judgement and Opinion of this so much honoured division, which although out of the Reverence I bear to the consent of so many learned men in it, I dare not deny that it is a good division; yet methinks in political stories I can observe, that take these in their pure and simple natures, there's scarce one of them purely such, in any one Country of the whole world; and therefore I may say of them, as Philosophers say of the Elements, they are the matter of which this great Globe of this sublunary world is composed; and yet not found distinct in their pure nature, in any creature in the world, but are denominated such ● principalion; as when heat is in any great degree, than it is called fire; when cold and moisture are intense, it is then water; or else (as the Mathematicians speak) Saturn is Lord of this House, because he is predominant; yet the power of his influence is more or less, according to the assistance or detriment he receives from other Planets. So when one is chief or Lord of the House, either a Monarchical chief, or Aristocratical, yea I may add a Democratical or popular Government, it is denominated from that which is principle, although one or both the other may be joined in the influence, and concur in the Government over the whole. I think this appears most true to any man who hath perused stories; nay they are so conjoined and mixed one with the other sometimes, that it is exceeding hard to say which is the predominant, and disputes amongst learned men are raised, what name to give some Supremes. You may find a common instance in Lac●daem●●, where there was a King, a Senate, and in many things the people came in for their shar●s, learned men know not which to call it. Look if you please upon Monarchy; there is none I think so absolute in the world, to which all he speaks may be applied; (I mean all those marks of Sovereignty which have been before touched upon) I will give the Reader one instance in one of the greatest Monarches that ever was, or is in the world, I mean Darius in the sixth of Dani●l, you shall find at the seventh verse, that all the Precedents of the Kingdom, the Governors, and the Princes, the Councillors, and the Captains, consulted together to establish a Royal Statute, and to make a firm Decree, that whosoever shall ask a Petition of any God or man for thirty dai●s, save of Darius himself, should be cast into the Lions Den. I will not descant upon the Decree, being the most abominably wicked that possibly could be made by a m●n who did acknowledge a God as Darius did: For how could he think that God would bless him, acting so cro●●y against his Honour, as to forbid prayers to him? Mr. Hobbs indeed might have concurred with him, that thinks no prayers have prevalence with God, but that all things are governed by immutable necessity. But Darius could not be of that mind, who for● thought that God could, and would deliver him: Neither could Daniel be of that mind, who would not leave praying for all the terrors of the world. Well, the Decree is out, according to the Laws of the Medes and Persians, which is unalterable; when the Law was out, and Daniel found to be a transgressor against it, we shall find in the thirteenth verse, that these Princes presented the crime to the King, and required Justice against him; in the fourteenth verse the King is said to labour until night to deliver Daniel, and was displeased with himself. Surely before he was aware he had consented to such a Law as was mischievous to a person of that great integrity and excellency, as Daniel was; and this Law which he had made, must be Author of so great a Crime, as to shed not only Innocent, but virtuous blood; and therefore he laboured until Sunset with those men who joined with him in the making that Law to deliver Daniel: But they, in the ●●fteenth verse, being fierce against Daniel, urged the immutability of the Decree, that it was a Law confirmed by him according to the Laws of the Medes and Persians, which may not be altered; and indeed the argument is of great force: For if Laws made by any Supreme may be violated before they are repealed, what security can any Subject have of any thing he enjoys? And surely in keeping and preserving the Laws they have made, they do imitate their great Master the King of Kings, and Supreme of Supremes, from whom they have all their Authority, and by whom they reign, who although by his infinite power he can do what he pleaseth, yet out of his infinite goodness he cannot deny himself, or alter the word which is gone out of his mouth, falli non potest, mentiri non potest; so that all his Words, and Covenants, and Promises, are Yea and Amen. Such should Supremes be; such was Darius that just King; no doubt but he could have sent a party of Soldiers, and have taken Daniel out of their power; but having made the Law, which bound him to the execution, he would perform it, although it were never so contrary and averse to his disposition. From all which you may discern, that this great Potentate had his power limited by a Law which he could not justly violate. Now look upon him, and see him in the following part of his story, of a most absolute and unlimited power, where it was not restrained by Law. In the latter end of that Cap. you may observe, that when the King had perceived that God had delivered Daniel from the Lions, and he had taken him out of the D●n. At the 24 verse the King commanded, and they brought those men who had accused Daniel, and cast them, and their Wives, and Children, into the Lion's Den, that is, the Precedents and the Princes, which was the greatest act of power exercised upon the greatest persons which were in that greatest Kingdom, and all this merely arbitrary.   

SECT. IV.  
The result of the former example. No Government de facto purely Monarchical; and therefore not susceptible of all the properties of Monarchical Government required by Mr. Hobbs. Darius' bound to the execution of those Laws which himself had made.  
MY Collection here is, That there is no Supreme upon earth, which hath no commixion of any the other principles in all those particular rights, which Mr. H●bbs requires as properties of Supremacy; for the Legislative is one, and the control of the Execution is another. Here you see at the making of this Decree, there was Aristocracy mixed with Monarchy by the Princes, for they petitioned the King to make this Law, but the King gave life to it with his Fiat. That this was so appears, because if D●rius alone had done, and they had had no interest in this Legislation, he who had mad● it, might have recalled it of himself, when he discovered the mischief which it produced; but it is said that he striven and laboured to have saved him, but those Princes (who it 〈◊〉 had some influence in making the Law) resisted, and would not give way to it: Then mark the second particle, which is next of moment in the Law itself; that is the execution, he could not be spared from that. And although in many polities, the Supreme may, and hath power to dispense with the execution of severe Justice, yet it s●●ms this great King had his hand tied in respect of that, and could not justly do it, when upon their Petition he had established that Law. Let no man censure this conclusion until he hath read the whole, for it is not proper for me to prevent my method in any following discourse, to satisfy every doubt which may interpose in the mean time, but to preserve every particular until I come to its proper place.   

SECT. V.  
The general reasons of the precedent conclusions. That Government best which is suited to the disposition of the people. Some people fit only for subjection.  
BUt to conceive a general reason for what I speak, consider with me, that the people must be governed as best 〈◊〉 with their condition; for the multitude without doubt would be too hard for any Supreme, if they knew how advantageously to dispose of themselves: And it is an easy thing with ambiguous language to sow discontents amongst the multitude against any present Government; and therefore all Politicians, besides Mr. Hobbs, do show that some Nations are fit to be ruled with a severe hand, some with a more remiss one, some fit for Monarchy, some for D●mocracy. The Eastern Nations best agree with those Monarchies under which they live, which are the most absolute in the world, but other Countries would not endure that Yo●k. It is a most ancient observation in this difference of Countries, that some are so dull (I dare not name them for fear of offending, though others have done it) as they are only fit to obey, not to govern.   

SECT. VI  
The former conclusion further asserted. The Ephori amongst the Lacedæmonians first introduced by Theopompus.  
BUt for this conclusion let it suffice what Arist●tle writes of The●pompus, and out of him other later Writers, that he being King of the Lacedæmonians first set up the Eph●ri there; his Wife upbraided him with it, that he should leave his Kingdom with less power to his Successors, than he had received it from his Ancestors, he answered, that he should leave it more lasting. Perhaps he was deceived in it; but yet it meant this truth, that the people being sweetened with the imagination that they have some interest in the Government, they will put their necks more willingly under the Yoke. The story is told in the fifth of his Politics, Cap. 11. which show that it may be, and may be profitable to receive this commixion,   

SECT. VII.  
No Government absolutely pure. Mr. Hobbs his Politics calculated for Utopia.  
BUt then go further and examine the flourishing Commonwealths of the whole world, and you shall find them so mixed, nay that mixture so equally poised, that it will be hard to find the predominant from which it may receive its name, as was the cause of the Lacedæmonians disputed amongst divers Authors, whether Monarchical, Aristocratical, or Democratical, and none so absolutely pure, as that we may say this Element is without commixion, that Planet hath alone influence; and this he seems himself to grant in his 98. page, concerning the practices in the world, although he writes now an Utopia, a pattern which he would have all to follow. He goes on, page 95.    


CHAP. XIV. SECT. 1.  
Mr. Hobbs his conclusions deduced from Principles founded in the Air. Absolute liberty not actually to be found in any people. Several petite Commonwealths raised out of the Ruins of the Roman Empire. None of these without mixture, nor durable. His exposition of Representative again redargued, as an ill foundation of Government, Religion, and Propriety. The formerly mentioned Commonwealths preserved by Laws.  
IT is manifest (saith he) that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please, give Authority to one man to represent them everyone, as well, etc. The first observation which I make here, is an unhappy practice which he useth in this place, and often in this Book, which is to suppose things hard to be found in practics, and by that fallacy to lay a foundation in the Air, and then raise an imaginary structure upon it. This supposal of his, that men are in an absolute liberty, is very rarely to be found; for all men that are in the world, as soon as they are born, are Subjects, unless we may conceive a man born King of that Country he is in. I would fain find out such a possibility, where such a number of men fit to make a Commonwealth may be at liberty; and I have found out one where it hath been practised, I mean that of the Roman Empire, when it was broken and ruined, many people for fear were driven away to shift for themselves, or perhaps overs●en, or neglected by the Conquerors. These men, one or other, being thus left to themselves, their lawful Emperor, and his Posterity, to whom they should obey, being destroyed, or altogether unable to give them any support, these men are left to shift for themselves: A Government they must have, or grow wild; they conspire in that, and then set up many Commonwealths in Italy, and those adjacent parts. But give me leave to tell Mr. Hobbs, that he shall hardly find in any of them existing any pure element of Polity without commixion. And I shall tell him more, that these Commonwealths having no support, but that weak foundation of the people's Constitution, were upon all occasions of tumults (which were very often) diverted from their first settlement, and had new ways of Government established in their place. I will tell him further, that no Supreme in all these was ever called a Representative, or a Leviathan: And therefore Mr. Hobbs did much amiss to lay this as a foundation for all that light stuff which follows, yea of his whole Book, and of all Commonwealths, which can only be founded upon such an extraordinary occasion, neither then in such an absolute manner as he supposeth: For never did any of these submit their Religion, their Estates or Lives, as he would enjoin, but had them preserved by Laws.   

SECT. II.  
The Barbarous Murder of King Charles the First, the direct issue of this Doctrine of Mr. Hobbs, viz. That the Sovereign is but the Representative of the People.  
THat which follows immediately about our Representative in the House of Commons, I let pass, until I come to the middle of that page and paragraph, toward the latter end, which he begins thus: [I know not how this so manifest a truth should of late be so little observed, that in a Monarchy, he that had the Sovereignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called Sovereign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King (I can add to him, was acknowledged so by all the World) was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative.] He saith, he knows not how; I will tell him, because a King in no Language, nor in any Country, is taken for a Representative: And further, that all those injuries which are done to him (for he means ●ing Charles the First) had their pretence from this horrid Doctrine of his, that Kings had their power from the people: And if he will, that they made him their Representative, and not liking his Representation, they deposed him, and would be represented by one more like themselves. In the latter end of that paragraph, he gives most dangerous counsel to him who had the present Government in his power (to instruct him in the nature of that Office.) But God be praised the danger of that intendment is over, and I let it pass. In the following part of that Cap. he very excellently well discourseth of those three Elements ●f Government, and most rationally gives the superiority to Monarchy. Then he enters into a discourse of electing Kings, and Temporary Powers, as Dictator's in Aristocracy, and both Aristocracy and D●mocracy, which I let pass as not so mischievous as other things. And now I come to his 20. Cap. page 101. at the bottom, which is thus entitled, Of Dominion Paternal and Despotical.    


CHAP. XV. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his digression censured. His first Proposition untrue. His supposition of a General Assembly to consent to the Sovereignty of the Conqueror unpracticable.  
A Commonwealth by acquisition is that, where the Sovereign Power is acquired by force; as it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together, by plurality of voices, for fear of death or b●nds, do authorise all the actions of that man; or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his power.] Now I am in the 102. page. This is a strange digression from his Title; What hath this acquisition to do with Dominions Paternal or Despotical? but let it pass, I will examine his definition It is not true, that all acquisition of a Kingdom is by force, sometimes it is got by craft and knavery, we know how Absalon got the Kingdom. There may be other instances, but let that go, acquisition by force is but one species of acquiring Kingdoms. But then see what follows, [It is then acquired by force, when men singly, etc.] as before expressed. I dare boldly say he can show me no considerable Kingdom that either is or was so acquired. I have confuted this in my former discourse, concerning the Institution of a Commonwealth, and those arguments will be of more force against this manner of acquiring. Suppose an Enemy should conquer France or Spain, do you think he could or would assemble all the Nation together to subscribe, or any way express their intentions of this his most unjust request to own all his actions, and make him their person? it is beyond possibility to imagine any such thing. Look upon David, Alexander, Pompey, any of those Concquerors in the world, did they ever act any such thing? I am confident we read of none, and yet they attained Kingdoms, and get Dominions. But let us proceed to the next Paragraph.   

SECT. II.  
Fear not the only motive to consent to obedience in the Institution of Commonwealths. No obligation from fear, when that fear is removed. The fear of God the greatest security of obedience.  
ANd this kind of Dominion or Sovereignty, differeth from Sovereignty by Institution, only in this, that men who choose their Sovereign do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: But in this ease they subject themselves to him they are afraid of.] Mr. Hobbs doth attribute very much to fear; however, in the last case, I think it not amiss: A vanquished Nation seldom subjects themselves to an Enemy, but out of fear of the Conqueror. But concerning the former, the motive is as much the love of their own happy and quiet condition, together with the hope and expectation of many other conveniences which will accrue to them and their Families by it: But (saith he) in both cases they do it for fear; which is to be noted by them that hold all such Covenants as proceed from fear of death, or violence, void; which if it were true, no man in any kind of Commonwealth could be obliged to obedience.] Thus far he, and indeed if there were no other obligation but these fears he speaks of, there were no obligation to bind any man when he may secure himself: For let the Reader observe, that the fear he speaks of are fears of men, one of another in an instituted, and in his acquired Kingdom for fear of the Conqueror. Here is put down no fear of God, which is the obliging fear; for the rest men may have worldly plots to escape, and rid themselves of the dangers of War, but he can have none to acquit himself of God's anger, which is the great weight, and the only one which presseth man to obedience.   

SECT. III.  
Mr. Hobbs his Proposition asserted. His reason of this Proposition censured. Contracts against the moral Law ipso facto void.  
HE proceeds [It is true, that in a Commonwealth once instituted or acquired, promises proceeding either from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the Laws: But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right to the thing promised.] Here is a Proposition, and the reason of it. The Proposition I speak to first, and allow it to be true, not only in a Commonwealth instituted or acquired, but in any estate of mankind: Whosoever promiseth an unlawful thing is not obliged to the performance; and the reason is, that the Moral Law of Nature being written in men's hearts, whatsoever engagement is made against it, is ipso facto invalid, whether he did it by fear or no, being (as he rightly speaks) an act without his ability to perform, and of that which was otherwise disposed of by the Moral Law. But consider, Reader, what this is to his purpose, the sense preceding was, That all Commonwealths were founded upon fear, whether instituted or acquired: From thence he spoke against such as hold Covenants m●de for fear of death, or violence, void.   

SECT. IV.  
Of Covenants arising from fear in things lawful, but against Equity. Of mixed Contracts and Actions, of just, and lighter, or unwarrantable fears in avoidance of Contracts.  
I Looked to have him prove they were not; but instead of that he affirms, they are void in an instituted Commonwealth, when they Covenant for an unlawful thing.] But suppose they covenant to do a thing that is lawful? when it is in its self lawful, although full of many inconveniencies, as that Thiefs should with oaths and imprecations make a man swear to alienate his estate from his Wife and Children, it is lawful for him to do it, but it would be a most wicked act to keep such a Covenant; not because (as his reason is) that he had no power to do it; for he had by all those Laws which he seems to acknowledge, which are the Laws of the Kingdoms wherein he lives; but the reason is that which he will not acknowledge, that Covenants made upon such terms are not free, but mixed actions, which are done with a reluctancy, and not plen● consensu. For although he that throws his goods into the Sea, to save his Ship and his life, doth that act willingly, that is principally so, yet because it is with a reluctancy, and against his love of his riches, which weighs the balance heavier on the other side, it is neither violent, nor willing, but a mixed action, yet willing principally, because it is chosen; and upon this reason it is, that this act done by such considerable fear, is expounded not obligatory: As if a Maid surprised by such means should promise Marriage upon terrors of death if she did not so Covenant; if she finds she should be unhappy in such a Match, without doubt she is not bound to perform it, because it was not fully a willing or rational act, but mixed; but yet if it had been a voluntary act, and with full consent, she ought to keep her Covenant: Which shows, that many times forced acts or obligations made by terror of death, or with strong probabilities of great mischief, if refused, may when that fear or terror is removed, and upon repentance of such Covenant, be lawfully denied, and are not obligatory: But if it be for fear of some little danger, such as may not cadere in c●nstantem virum, it doth excuse no body. And now I let pass the latter end of that Paragraph, and proceed to the next, in the margin of which I find.   

SECT. V.  
The case of a conquered and instituted Kingdom not the same. The best art of a Conqueror is to secure his Victory. By what means such a security may be obtained.  
THe rights and co●secuencies of So●eraignty the same in both. That is, both in an instituted and an acquired Sovereignty, in which his marginal note is the whole pith of that Paragraph; for he only sets down the particulars formerly treated of, and discoursed upon before by me, and offers at no one argument, but at the latter end he saith, [The reason's whereof are th● same which are alleged in the precedent Cap.] He says they are the same, and I say they cannot be the s●me: For if there were such a t●ing as his institution of a Sovereignty, yet the case of a conquered Nation must needs differ from it, for either the Conquest is fully and complete, (which seldom happens) or else the well●igh-conquered Nation comes to a Treaty for their conditions, which may be to enjoy their ancient Laws sometimes, sometimes accept of new, sometimes pay a tribute to the Conqueror, who gives them leave to live under their former Race of Kings; sometimes have Deputies and Viceroys set over them, empowered by the Conqueror; sometimes they accept of Garrisons to bridle them; sometimes their words are taken; and than if there be an absolute Victory, they must be ruled solely by the will of the Conqueror. And in none of these is the condition of a conquered Kingdom the s●me with an Instituted: And surely the more conform their conquered condition is to their former state, the more lasting it will be, and otherwise it is in danger to decay quickly; for there is no discretion more becoming a Conqueror, then to make his Victory certain and durable: Nor is that any way to be achieved so easily, as by discerning the temper of those men which he is to deal with, nor can their temper be so well understood by any thing, as by their customs; for the commonalty of men not being able to choose for themselves, must and will be contented with that Government which they are used to, though perhaps another may be easier in its self. So that it is evident (I think) to be apprehended, that the same rights and consequencies of Sovereignty which belongs to a Supreme by Institution, do not belong to one by Conquest.    


CHAP. XVI. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his method censured, his contradictions noted. Of the right of Dominion from Generation. Paternal Dominion not flowing from the consent of children. Infant's cannot consent. Paternal Dominion flowing from the Laws of God and Nature. Scripture vilified by Mr. Hobbs.  
IN the next Paragraph he comes to treat of Dominion Paternal how attained, as the Margin directs. My first note shall be upon his method. He had treated in the precedent Cap. of Dominion by Institution, than the Title of this Cap. was of Dominion Paternal and Despotical. In all the preceding part of this Cap. he hath handled only Dominion by acquisition, and that (without consideration of what he had writ before) he defined to be such at is got by force. Now he confutes himself in the first words of this Paragraph; which are [Dominion is acquired two ways, either by Generation, or by Conquest.] That by Generation, I am sure, cannot be called by force; therefore either his definition of acquired Dominion is not good, or that Dominion by Generation is not an acquired Dominion. He proceeds [The right of Dominion by Generation, is that which the Parent hath over his Children, and is called Paternal.] A high Mystery expounded; that the Government of Parents should be called Paternal: But his next words confute this immediately, which are [And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child, because he begot him.] How then can Paternal Dominion be acquired by Generation? which he immediately before affirmed, when he said, Dominion is acquired two ways, by Generation, and by Conquest: (but, saith he) from the Child's consent, either express, or by other sufficient Arguments declared. Let us consider this, and examine what consent a Child can give in his Infancy, certainly no otherwise then a Pig, or any Infant Beast; he can wish for a Teat, and cry for it when he lacks it, and be satisfied with any that is offered. If● this Doctrine of his were true, the Child did choose his Nurse who give him suck, not the Mother who gave him being. At the first in his Infancy he cannot distinguish betwixt his Parents, and therefore can have no election nor consent (I mean rational consent) to one more than another to be his Guardian, yet the Parent hath Dominion over that Child, and like other Governors, shall give an account one day of that Stewardship, and of his behaviour towards him. Let us go on, and observe the Child grown up with a smattering of Reason; Can any man think that the Parent should not govern that Child, who hath not prudence enough to govern himself, but much passion to make him, unruly, and therefore needs to have a Governor? Well, let us go further, and bring the Child to one and twenty years of age, when he is generally thought fit to govern his estate, if he have any, yet even then, until his death, he owes obedience to his Parents, and they have Dominion over him, whether he consent or not: And whosoever denies this, denies not only Scripture (which is nothing with Mr. Hobbs) but even Humanity, which hath expressed her tenderness of this duty in all Ages, as will appear ●●ore fully hereafter.   

SECT. II.  
Mr. Hobbs his Chain of contradictions discovered.  
BUt good Reader observe with me how many contradictions are crowded together in one page. First an acquired Dominion is by force, and that contradicted; because that a Dominion is acquired by Generation, which is not a forced, but a most natural act; and that is again contradicted, because not Generation, but consent gives the Dominion; and this which he calls consent, is not such a thing as belonged to an acquired Dominion, for that consent is only a consent to that Government for fear of the Conqueror; but this consent is for love of his own accommodation, or out of that reverential awe which Children have to their Parents; and this is in nothing like the other. And surely if it participated of either, it most resembled the consent which he imagines to be in an instituted Commonwealth, and therefore not to be ranked under the Acquisite.   

SECT. III.  
Mr. Hobbs his constant abuse of Scripture noted. The command of the Mother to be obeyed in subordination to the Father, in whom the obedience of children is terminated. His iterated quarrelling with Scripture. Rules of Government to be proportionable to general emergencies.  
BUt let us go on with him (for saith he) As to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper, and there be always two that are equally Parents: The Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to them both, and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible, for no man can obey two Masters.] To begin where he ends. He doth abuse Scripture wheresoever it crosseth his way, as it doth very often: No man can serve two Masters, but in every Family a man serv●s a Master and a Mistress: There cannot be two Supremes.] But in an Occonomical Dominion the Man is above the Woman, and if the Woman command contrary to the Man, the Man's command is to be obeyed, and the Woman herself is to be obedient to the Man, the Mother to the Father: I but, saith he, they are equally principles of Generation; therefore if the right of Dominion be an appendent to Generation, it must equally belong to them both. I will not dispute the nature of Generation, which Philosophers and Physicians have abundantly done; but suppose that in the case it exacts an obedience to them both, yet with a subordination to the Father, which must clearly appear in this, because the Woman herself must be obedient to the Father, as will appear in the two first principles of Generation, Adam and Evah, God gave them that Law, Thy desire shall be to thy Husband, and he shall rule over thee, Gen. 3. 16. Now than if the man rules the woman, then in the subordination of Government, she cannot equally share in that Dominion with him, who is Governor of her: So that although the Child hath from his Generation two persons to obey; yet this obedience is terminated in one, the Father who is Supreme, to whom the Mother also is subject: He proceeds [And whereas s●me have attributed the Dominion to the man only, as being of the more excellent Sex, they misreckon it; for there is not always that difference of strength and prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without war.] Thus this Author hath a spite to Scripture, and hopes with a flash of wicked wit to divert men from that due observance which they ought to have of those duties which are there required, or at the least to diminish that rational obedience which men should give to it. It may be some do attribute the obedience to the man only, out of this regard, that he is the Nobler Sex, and why not? He is so undoubtedly; for although it may happen out in particulars, that the Woman may be more prudent or strong than her Husband, yet certainly the generality is not so; and the rules of governing and obeying are not to be taken from a few particular instances, but the common condition of the Sexes. Servants may be wiser or stronger than their Masters, Subjects than their Kings, children than their Parents, yet these sacred Laws of governing and obeying must not be varied for such few particular instances.   

SECT. IV.  
The brawling of Man and Wife improperly called war. War only between Nations. Wisdom, not strength, enable to Government. Wives submit to their Husbands, by the Law of God, under the first and second Adam. St. Paul's Argument from the Law of Nature explained.  
WHat he saith that this cause must be determined by war, is ill expressed. For first the contention betwixt man and wife, cannot properly be called war, but brawling or fight at the worst. War is betwixt Nations in the genuine signification. I remember Aelian tells a story of the Sacae, that when a Man and a Maid married, they were to fight at the first, and he or she that conquered, was afterwards served by the other for the term of their lives. This was a pretty gambal, whether true or false it is not much material; I read it only in him; but surely a most unreasonable practice. Is the power of Government proper to strength or wisdom? Can any man think that a Bull or a Horse is fitter to govern a man, than he them, because they are of more strength, though he have more wisdom? But surely for us that are Christians, there is no need to fly to such poor little instances, or customs, or the accidental prudence or strength of the woman; if she have more wit, let her use it to the gaining and winning him to virtue; if she have more strength, let her use it to the assistance of her Husband's weakness: by that means her excellencies will be employed to their right uses; she shall be a helper to him, not a Ruler over him. I need not here repeat what of late I delivered concerning this Doctrine out of Gen. 3. But that God's Command is clear to this purpose, not only in Adam, but those that are descended from the second Adam, consider what S. Paul writes in the fifth to the Eph●sians, v. 22. Wives submit yourselves to your own Husbands, as unto the Lord. But methinks Mr. Hobbs should answer to this, that this is only a positive Law; yet I can reply to that, that it is universal, or what is equivalent, indefinite, and comprehends all wives. But then go further, and read the Apostles Argument in the following verse; For the Husband is the Head of the Wife, even as Christ is the Head of the Church. Thus the Apostle argues from the Law of Nature: First, that by the Law of Nature the rest of the body submits to the Head; so must Wives do to their own Husbands. Then this is exemplified from Christianity in the manner of his Headship, such a Head as Christ is over his Church; which I hope no Christian will say, but that it must submit to, and be governed by him. And I hope, both Nature, God's Law, and Christian duty, may be sufficient to determine this controversy without war: And I may add, that since all Nations have consented to it, sure we ought not now to demur upon the case, because Mr. Hobbs interposeth his Authority with little or no reason.   

SECT. V.  
This Paragraph coutrary to Mr. Hobbs his principles, and the supposed institution of a Commonwealth; but yet most true, not from Mr. Hobbs his reason, but the Law of God. Fathers of Families have the disposition of their Families. The invalidity of Mr. Hobbs his reasons. His example of the Amazons inconcludent.  
HE proceeds: In Commonwealths this controversy is decided by the Civil Law; and for the most part (but n●t always) the sentence is in favour of the Father, because for the m●st part Commonwealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of Families.] Now I am come to page 03. but I would fain know how the Fathers, rather than the Mothers, should come to be Erectors of Commonwealths? Certainly if Commonwealths were instituted (as he feigns) by the general suffrage of all who had interest in the Government, than women as well as men, Mothers as well as Fathers, had the management of that business, for they have their interest in the public constitution as well as men. But he hath let fall an excellent truth which is clear against the whole Body of his Politics, which is, that the Fathers of Families, not the Rabble, were the Erectors of Commonwealths: For if they did (as I am confident with him here they did) than his former discourse which is built upon the institution of a Commonwealth by the universal consent of all who have interest in it must fail, for not the Fathers and Mothers only, but even the meanest child or servant, may challenge their shares in it. And certainly the Fathers of Families could not be the Erectors of Commonwealths, but only out of this regard, that they were the chief in their Families, and by that reason had right to dispose of himself and them. And here let the Reader consider, that Mr. Hobbs never remembers that great Authority given by God to Moses, which regulated him and his Posterity many Generations; nor the confirmation that Law laid from our Saviour in the New Testament, which are obligatory to us in all Ages. He only clouds the truth with this pitiful poor reason, or rather show of reason, only that men were the Lawmakers, and they were partial to their own Sex; No, Master Hobbs, God was the Lawmaker, who is no accepter of persons, or Sexes, but in an infinitely wise manner disposeth all things in the best and surest method that may be, according to his most just Laws, But because he said (but not always) that is, that the Fathers of Families were not always the Erectors of Commonwealths, intimating that some Commonwealths were erected by the Mothers of Families, I should thank him, or any man else, who can show me any such in the world. It may be he will fly to that beggarly instance which he gives presently of the Amazons; but let it suffice for them (if there were any such) that they were Widows, or single Women, not united in Marriage, and so not subject to Husbands, and therefore were free to dispose of themselves as they pleased, and might have made what just Laws they thought fit for their condition; but if they were joined in marriage to Husbands, they must then submit to that yoke, and be governed in their domestic affairs according to his discipline. The dispute is here betwixt Husband and Wife, not betwixt man and woman, Wives must submit to their own Husbands, not every woman to every man.   

SECT. VI  
Mr. Hobbs his contradiction again censured. Antipodial Government introduced. His conclusions not consistent one with another. Contracts (with Mr. Hobbs) but words, and advantaged by power, may lawfully be broken. Lawful Contracts sealed in Heaven.  
HE goes on: But the Question lieth now in the state of mere Nature, where there are supposed no Laws of Matrimony, no Laws for the education of children, but the Law of Nature, and the natural inclination of the Sexes one to another, and to their children.] This is inconsistent with what he hath formerly taught, and I have confuted; viz. That naturally men are at war, every man with ev●●y man: Well then, in this state before they are covenanted into a Commonwealth, all things, all rights are tried by force, and it may happen that the man who conquers this day may fall sick and grow weak, and then the Woman may be Victor, and so the case may be altered; or both may grow old or sick, and their children master them both, and so bring in an Antipodial Government: And then let any man think, whether the wise constitution of Nature can agree with such abominable follies? and how weak, according to his Doctrine, this conclusion is: In this condition of mere nature (saith he) either the Parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the child by contract, or do not dispose thereof at all: If they do dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the contract. This distinction cannot be denied, either they must, or they must not contract: If they dispose (saith he) the right passeth according to the contract. But let him remember the state and condition he speaks of, is in man's nature, before any imbodying themselves into a Commonwealth. Then let him look back to what he hath writ, Cap. 17. page 85. Covenants without the Sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. And again in the same page; Therefore notwithstanding the Law of Nature, if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely upon his own strength, and art for caution against all other men. ● Let us put these together; the right passeth by contract, saith he, in this 20. Cap. Contracts are but words, and have no force to bind, saith he, in his ●7. Cap. unless a Commonwealth be erected; therefore no Covenant gives an active right to any thing, without the Sword in a Magistrate's hand to make it good: So than the Sword rules every man in that state, before a Commonwealth is instituted, may lawfully rely upon his own strength or art for caution. So that although the word be out in that state, and the Contract made, yet if the Husband or the Wife can find strength or art to avoid it, they may lawfully use it, and to defraud and force each other to the breach of this Covenant is lawful. So that according to his principles, there is no considerable strength in the state of Nature to keep a●y to their promises; but according to min● it is not so, who am assured that th●se lawful Contracts made on earth are sealed in heaven; and the God of truth so loves truth, that he approves it in all conditions of men; and therefore these bargains ought to be observed unless it may happen out, that they are contrary to the Divine Law, as that a man should divest himself of all his Oeconomical right which God hath placed in him, and the woman by such power should usurp a Superiority, when God hath commanded her to be subject: So that a man may, as I think, absolutely conclude, where there is no Commonwealth, a veracity is exacted by God in such contracts, which are not against some Divine Law; where there is a Commonwealth these bargains are confirmed as are not contrary to their Civil Laws.   

SECT. VII.  
Mr. Hobbs his example of the Amazons, further showed to be impertinent.  
HE proceeds, and gives an instance; We find (saith he) in History, that the Amazons contracted with the men of Neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for Issues, that the Issue Male should be sent back, but the Female remain with themselves; so that the Dominion of the Females was in the Mother.] Here is an instance from a Lawless Conjunction, where man and woman meet together, like beasts, to enjoy that carnal familiarity, but not like rational creatures to cohabit together in an Oeconomical Discipline. Amongst them there were only the first names, Man and Woman, not Husband and Wife, which began our discourse. It is of Women renouncing men's society, who neither themselves, nor their children, lived in the same Nation, nor under the same Government with these whom they did converse with; and so if they had kept the Male-child, the father could no ways come to lay claim to it, or any thing in the Amazonian Country. And yet consider once more how weak and inconsistent his discourse is, which contradicteth itself in almost every page. He discoursed of men in mere nature just before, and presently after, as his words are, which men which are without all union in a Commonwealth; and here in the middle of his discourse he gives his instance for proof of his Conclusion from the conversation of the Amazonians with their Neighbouring Countries, both which were incorporated into several Commonwealths: For it is evident from what is written of the Amazonians in Histories, that their Commonwealth had many distinct Laws and Customs from other Nations (if there were any such.) But let us go on with him.   

SECT. VIII.  
His supposition of the state of Nature without Matrimony censured. His reasons refuted. The Father of the Family hath dominion of the Child born out of Matrimony.  
HE enters now upon the second part of his distinction: If there be no Contract (saith he) the dominion is in the Mother: For in the condition of mere nature, where there are no Matrimonial Laws, it cannot be known who is the Father, unless it be declared by the Mother; and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth upon the will of the Mother, and is consequently hers.] Here you find the state of nature again, where are no Matrimonial Laws: But stay, there was never such a time or place, for God gave the Law of the Wife's subjection to her Husband in Paradise, Gen. ●. 16. of which I have formerly treated. It was the first Law he gave after their eating the forbidden fruit; therefore there was no such time or state of men, in which there was no Law concerning Matrimony. But if he understand by this word Law, only Humane Politic Laws, he receives his answer, that where no Politic Laws restrain it, there most abundantly Divine Laws are without control. But he hath reason for what he writes (Because no man can tell who is Father of the child, but the Mother on●y; therefore he is at her dispose) I would ask whether the child was born in Marriage or no? if so, than the child is his fathers, and he is bound to maintain him; but if not, he is Filius Populi (unless the Woman produce the Father) and the people must father it, and provide for it. But he will answer in the mere s●ate of nature, without Politic Sanctions, there is no Marriage. I reply there was never such a state, but there were some forms by which men accepted their Wives into that union; or if no Laws, yet custom and constant usage grew into a Law, and they were thus appropriated one to the other. But suppose the Infant (he speaks of) were born without any such conjunction, the Woman either lived in her Father's house, or was herself alone Mistress of a family. If the first, she and the Child were at the Father's dispose; if the second, and the Father unknown, he is hers only. But he and I might have spared the troubling a Reader with this discourse in this question; for the question was raised about man and wife in the same family, who should govern the child, not about such spurious Generations, where the man and woman live in distinct families. He urgeth further; Again (saith he) seeing the Infant is first in the Mother's power, so as she may either nourish ●r expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother, and is therefore obliged to obey her rather than any other, and by consequence the dominion over it is hers.] Let us first examine this little Particle (First) that must be understood of the first instant of the child's birth, because that gives him his first being in the world: But than is not the same power in the Midwife, who may either stifle the child, or preserve it? And then an equal share of duty from this reason will be owing to her as well as the Mother. Then consider that phrase (if she nourish it) what is that? give it suck? But suppose she doth neither expose it, nor give it suck, by reason of some infirmity or weakness which she hath, but put it out to Nurse, shall the Nurse have any interest in the dominion over the child? ay, but (he may answer) that this must be by the Mother's providence, and then she is Author of that child's preservation: No (say I) but the Father who must either direct, or at the least willingly permit the Mother to do it; for the Mother being under the Father's dominion, she cannot act any considerable matter either to herself, or for her child, without the Father's leave.   

SECT. IX.  
No Law impowring the woman to expose her child. The Law of Nature favourable to Infants. Power or ability cannot give the character of Justice to unjust actions. The consequences of Mr. Hobbs his conclusions discovered, and the contrary asserted. The Mother gets no dominion over the Child by not exposing it.  
NExt let us consider what power the Mother hath to expose her child; Id potest, quod jure potest; she hath no power, but by some Law which gives her that power. I am confident he cannot find any National Law which gives the Woman authority to act any such thing, or if he could, what would it avail him? because he disputes of such who are not embodied into a Commonwealth, much less can he pretend to the Law of Nature, which dictates nothing more clearly than the Love of Parents to their children. I but he will say, she hath power, that is, she is able to do it: If such a malicious disposition were discovered, the Husband hath power to restrain it: But suppose such a horrid wickedness may be in the Woman, and a power, yea an opportunity of acting it, doth she gain dominion, because she doth it not? by that reason Wives may have dominion over their Husbands, Children over their Parents, Servants over their Masters, Subjects over their Kings, for all these have or may have power, though no right to murder or slay the other, which is very odious to the consideration of any man who thinks upon either Economics or Politics; nay there is none of those more abhorring to nature, than the Mother's exposing her child. I therefore conclude against that member of his distinction, that although a Mother may be so impious as to expose her child, yet because she hath no right to do it, she gains no right of dominion by not doing it.   

SECT. X.  
Mr. Hobbs his deviation from the matter proposed. Children exposed and nourished by others, owe not filial duties to them that nourish them; preservation not so great a benefit as being. Romulus' his respect to them that nourished him, not filial duty, but gratitude and kindness.  
HE proceeds upon that supposal: [But if she expose it▪ and another find and nourish it, the dominion is in him that nourisheth it.] First (good Reader) consider with me what this is to his purpose? The question raised was betwixt the Father and Mother of a Family, who should have the dominion over their child; now it is betwixt the Mother who brought a child into the world, and a stranger who nourisheth it: If the Wife have it (as I have showed) the Husband hath it, because he hath dominion over the Wife, therefore of whatsoever likewise is subject to her dominion. Now he produceth an instance where neither hath it: Then (saith he) the dominion is in him that nourisheth it. I shall answer it: If there be such Monsters who for fear, or for that Tyrant daughter of fear, shame, shall expose their child, as (sure there are) without doubt they do as much as in them lies put off all their Parental interest, and divest themselves of all filial duties belonging to them, and it is as undoubted a truth, that for that time which they are so nourished and relieved (yea indeed all the days of their life) they owe and aught to pay great kindness and respect to such deliverers (though not filial) because the benefit is exceeding great which they have received from the● Patrons, but not so great as from their Fathers; for the Parent gives him his very being, the other but his preservation. Now as the being of man, or any thing, is the fountain of all the good which can come to that man, so must the gift of that exceed all other, else his Physician may be his Father, his Cook, or his Apothecary, which conduce to his preservation. But suppose he should be exposed not by his Parents, but by any other means, as Romulus, although preserved and educated by Faustulus and Lupa, and owed them a mighty kindness for that preservation, yet this kindness when he came to be a man, ceased to be filial duty towards them, such as was due if proceeding from a Paternal dominion over him, and rather became a great kindness and benignity towards them.   

SECT. XI.  
Mr. Hobbs his reasons of the former assertions weighed, and refuted. Obedience, where it crosses, first due to the Parent. The weaknese of Mr. Hobbs' inferences noted. H●s conclusion censured. Oecominical Laws must be submitted to National.  
HE adds [For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved, because preservation of life being the end for which one becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in wh●se power it is to save or destroy him.] I answer, preservation (as the Philosopher speaks) is continu●t●● creati●●r generatio; so that the very being of any thing is the substance which is preserved, and that must needs be more excellent than such an accident as preservation It is true, a ch●ld aught to obey him who hath nourished him, but not in such a degree as to a Parental relation, when that obedience shall cross the obedience to the Parents: [Preservation of life is the end (saith he) for which one man becomes subject unto another.] But consider what preservation that is, with that which is to come; upon this ground the unvanquished man submits himself to the Conqueror, that he may protect his future being, and preserve him from future danger; but this subjection is not to him who hath preserved him, but to him who will preserve him; or if this subjection be due, yet not such, nor contrary to that of his Parents. But I must not tyre myself nor my Reader with such needless discourses upon errors which fall of themselves without any dispute, only entreat the Reader in perusing them to consider his inferences how they depend one upon another, and that will be light enough to show him the weakness of them. He goes on; If the M●ther be the Father's subject, the Child is in the Father's power, etc.] It is not worth the transcribing; he now runs from Parents barely under the Law of Nature, to such as are in settled Commonwealths; to all which one answer will serve, that they must be according to the National and peculiar Laws belonging to that Commonwealth; for Oeconomical Laws must submit to National. The next learned note of his is, [He that hath dominion over the Child, hath dominion also over the children of that Chi●d.] I must confess a most true and excellent observation, and such as he will hear of hereafter, and so I let it pass for this present. The next conclusion he enters upon, is the right of succession to Paternal dominion, which (he saith) proceedeth in the same manner as doth the right of succession to Monarchy, of which he had spoke in the precedent Chapter.] I will dispute nothing about this. The Customs and Laws of every Nation direct the Inhabitants to what they must obey; every condition fits not every place, yea though they may be better in themselves, yet not to such people which are accustomed to other.   

SECT. XII.  
Mr. Hobbs his immethodical procedure censured. Mancipia quasi manu capta. Servitude introduced by Conquest. The rigbt of servitude abolished amongst Christians. After the heat of war, and a settlement made, commonly meliorated and erected into Tenors. Mr. Hobbs his conclusions contrary to Aristotle's Politics. The horrid consequence of this Doctrine discovered.  
AT the bottom of this page, and the beginning of pag● 100L. he enters into a discourse of Dominion by Conquest: In this he seems very erroneous in his method, as well as his substance: He entitled this Chapter of Dominion Paternal and Despotical. In the first part of this Chap. he disputed about Dominion by acquisition, which he defined to be such as is got by force or conquest, and he showed then that there is no difference betwixt Dominion by institution, and that by acquisition, but only the difference of their fears Then he treated of Dominion Paternal, (I wonder he did not call it Maternal, for that he endeavoured to make it) now again he comes to Dominion acquired by War, which must needs appear to any man an immethodical method. But let us pass on, a●d come to censure divers passages in his Discourse: [Dominion (saith he) acquired by Conquest or Victory in War, is that here which s●me Writers call. Despotical, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which signifieth a Lord or M●●er, a●d is the dominion of the Master over his servants.] He speaks truth when he saith, that dominion acquired by Conquest is such, if it be understood of one that is (Mancipium) taken in War; Mancipium as it were manu captum taken by your hand in War, surely such a person is a servant, or if you will use a more unworthy term, a Slave; the Conqueror may 〈◊〉 him, or do what else he will with him, which is the condition of th●se despotical servants (though this right all Civilians agree 〈…〉 amongst Christians.) But then if after a whil● 〈◊〉 conquered men are left to themselves to Till the 〈◊〉, and live peaceably upon it, and perhaps are governed by Vice-Roys, or such other means as Politics prescribe, they then ●ease to be servants or slaves, and come to be Colonies, and live under a Civil Government. We may observe this in the Conquest that David, Alexander, Pompey, Caesar, all the great Monarches of the World; so that they shall not for ever be under a despotical, but at the last grow into a Civil Government; as Arist. and from him all learned Politicians termed it, until Mr. Hobbs appeared. But Reader, I must here beg leave to look back again upon what he writ at the beginning of this Chap. for the confusedness of his method must needs make my discourse somewhat such, who follow him closely foot by foot. He there affirms, that these two Governments by Institution and Acquisition, differ not but in the manner of fear; that by Institution is obeyed for fear of one another; that by Acquisition is obeyed for fear of the Conqueror; then the condition of all Subjects in the most civil estate is slavery: The Supreme may kill, ruin, destroy, beggar any of them, without Law, other than his own will, nay he may do it rightly, than which never was there a more horrid Proposition uttered in Politics, and if these two Dominions be the same which he affirms there, and Dominion by Acquisition have the power to do so as he affirms here, it must needs be so with all Subjects according to his Doctrine.    


CHAP. XVII. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his fictitious contracts with the Conqueror censured. Women by his conclusion obliged to prostitute themselves to the Conqueror. The horror of this Doctrine, and improbability of this contract.  
I Return now to the place where I left: [And this Dominion (saith he) is then acquired to the Victor, when the vanquished to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure.] It was well he added (or by sufficient signs) for I think few men in any Conquered Nation did ever express such words, nor indeed would half the people in any conquered Nation do it. But consider, Reader, that in a conquered Nation, women must do it as well as men, and then all those women must prostitute their bodies to the lust of the Conqueror by contract, which is most abominable; and indeed that is almost expressed in that sentence, where it is said, That he shall have the use of their bodies at his pleasure. Let us once again look back and consider that formerly repeated conclusion, That the same must be the state of an instituted Commonwealth: Then all their bodies, their Wives (their lives excepted) are at his dispose, yea at the dispose of his pleasure, and that justly, which is most abominable. He proceeds: And after such Covenant made, the vanquished is a servant, and not before.] If he is no servant before he make such expression, I think a conquered Nation will never generally be subdued to that servitude. It is true, some particular persons may stoop so low for fear of death, but the generality of any considerable Nation can never subscribe to it, or surely if they could, would they, for death is more eligible than many accidents which may happen to a man under such a Covenant.   

SECT. II.  
Sense desired in this Paragraph. A Slave more a slave in Fetters then upon his Parol. Mr. Hobbs his inconsistencies censured. Conquest gives no right where the War is not just.  
BUt he offers at reason to prove this assertion: For (saith he) by this word Servant, whether it be derived from servire, to serve, or from the word servare, to save (which I leave to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive which is kept in prison or bonds till the owner of him ●hat took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him.] I shall censure this first for apparent nonsense; (an any man tell who he is that is called here the owner of him that took him? Every man knows that he who takes a Captive is owner of the Captive, but who is owner of that owner no man can tell. At the first I thought it false printed, a●d (of) put for (or) so that then it should have been read, the owner or him that took him; and that (or) might have been an explication or that word owner; but this cannot be so, because he adds this (or) immediately after, or he that bought him ●f him that took him; so that it seems to me a mere irrational Proposition, to say, the owner of him that took him, etc. This I observed, because the Reader should consider how much care is to be used in reading such Paradoxes as this Gentleman writeth. But mark this, although this was introduced with a (for) yet it proves nothing; his Proposition he was to prove was, That the Captive was a servant or slave when he was set at liberty, and not before.] How is that enforced from this discourse? he may say that clause is not before: No, say I; for (whether it be derived from servire or servare) he is more a slave to his owner, when he is compelled to work in fetters, or bonds, then when he is left to his Parol; for I am sure he serves more slavishly, and is saved more securely in that condition than the other. He proceeds; For such men (commonly called slaves) have no obligation at all; (I believe, they are slaves not bound with any thing but fetters) and may break their bonds or prison, and kill or carry away captive their Master justly.] 'Tis true, because he is trusted with nothing by him, not with himself; but one (saith he) that being taken hath corporal liberty allowed him, and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.] This man, if secure, is a Captive by Mr. Hobbs, and a servant, but not the other. I am opposite to him, and put him in mind how little this agrees with his former discourse about the Covenant of him who is vanquished: In this last, it is one that covenants not to run away, and to do no violence; but in the first it was to resign his whole body and being to his pleasure. These are very thwarting discourses to happen in so little distance, and this last hath much more easy terms then the other. He next enters into another Paragraph, It is not therefore the victory that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant.] That covenant giveth no right, when the justness of the cause did not warrant the War; for (as he elsewhere) No man when he hath covenanted to one before, hath right to make the same covenant to another; no man can give that again which he hath first given to another.] Covenant upon Conquest may gain possession, but not right, when the cause of War was not just, Reader, you and I may think ourselves tired with these dull discourses, and therefore I let pass all the rest of that Paragraph, and that which follows, and will only drive at the fundamental, which being shaken, the building will fall of its self. At the bottom of this page he begins a new old business. [In sum, the rights and consequences to both paternal and despotical dominion, are the very same with those of a Sovereign by Institution, and for the same reasons, which reasons o'er set down in the precedent Cap.] which Chapter and reasons have been examined heretofore, and therefore I will not trouble the Reader with unnecessary repetitions.    


CHAP XVIII. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his harsh conditions imposed on the Conqueror's subjects assistants in the war. Subjects newly conquered to be restrained with more severity, than those to whom custom has made their yoke more pleasant and easy. A difference to be made between those that are of a doubtful, and others who are of a known and certain obedience. The difference between Civil and Despotical Government.  
HE proceeds: [So that for a man that is a Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he hath in one the Sovereignty by institution of the people assembled, and in another by Conquest that is by the submission of each particular, to avoid death or bonds.] I am confident (as I have formerly writ) there was never such a Sovereign, either by Institution or Conquest, as he sets down; he hath showed none, nor I believe can show any example of either, or a possibility how either should be composed. But suppose those now (as in his Utopia is imagined) why then (saith he) for such a Monarch who is Monarch of these two Nations, to demand of one more than of another by the title of Conquests, as being a conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance in the rights of Sovereignty.] Now I am at the 105 page, he hath passed a free and liberal censure upon such Sovereigns; but let him know (that if it were possible that there were two such Kingdoms) it were very hard if such as adventured their lives and fortunes with their King, and had a subordinate share in the Conquest, should after the Conquest be no better but in the same condition with those whom they conquered, and by them were conquered. It is true, an easy yoke, and time (the Mother of Experience) may reduce them into one condition, when it shall be observed that they who are conquered, are gained to a liking of the customs and manners of their Conquerors, and that mutually their good is beneficial one to the other; than it is wisdom in a Conqueror to put them in a parity of condition, but at the first subduing any Nation Regni novitas, will enforce some severity, though perhaps afterwards-Tros, Ty●iusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur, they are grown one, and aught to be so governed: I but saith he, that were ignorance of government; I say no, but great wisdom to put a difference betwixt a forced obedience, and that out of duty betwixt them who are of a known, and others of a doubtful fidelity. But he gives a reason for what he writes; for (saith he) he is absolutely over both alike: Let that be granted, yet amongst his true and natural subjects, he may justly and prudently dispense his favours and displeasures variously, according to their differing merits and demerits, or other prudential rules, amougst which this is one, not too far to trust a newly reconciled Enemy, and much less an Enemy newly conquered.   

SECT. II.  
Servitude not equally absolute in a civil or settled Government, as in despotical. The right of servitude antiquated among Christians.  
SEcondly, that supposal may be denied, that he is equally absolute over both; he governs one despotically as servants or captives which are taken in the War, and the other civilly; and this is Aristotle's distinction, and received with applause by all latter Writers, till we come to Mr. Hobbs, the one are governed like slaves, the other like subjects; or else (saith he) there is no Sovereignty at all. Away with such a hateful speech, odious to all Nations; No Sovereignty but arbitrary? No subjection but slavish or servile? Certainly no society of men can abide such language: Look amongst Christian Kingdoms, and we shall find servitude (I think) banished every where by the universal consent of all Nations, who have received the Doctrine of Christianity: Those we call servants, indeed are free, at least not such servants as he and I have discoursed of; yet they are subjects to their Masters, and they have dominion over them, but not such as a Conqueror hath over a vanquished man; nay Kings themselves, nor can any other Supreme, take away by right an innocent man's life, and yet they are Sovereigns, and have not absolute power over them,   

SECT. III.  
Mr. Hobbs his inconsequences further censured. The absurdity and iniquity of his conclusion in this Paragraph, which is yet showed to be other where asserted by him.  
ay But (saith he) And every man may lawfully protect himself, if he can, with his own Sword, which is the condition of war] There was never man writ such disjointed things. How can this follow, if a King cannot kill an honest man lawfully, than he may protect himself lawfully with his own Sword? as if it should be, because a Supreme may do ill unlawfully, therefore I may do ill lawfully? But I am sure he hath said more than once, That no money can so divest himself of his own power and right to defend his own life and happy being in it, as that he may not deliver himself, if he can, by killing or doing any thing to any man.] Against which Propositions I have already spoke heretofore, and showed how men may and have done it; so that that wicked conclusion, which for the absurdity of it, he would have to discountenance the difference betwixt the Government of a conquered and an instituted Nation, though not allowed by me, is yet approved by him elsewhere, which was a main fault in him.   

SECT. IV.  
This Paragraph reserved to its proper place. Scripture honoured even by those who approve it not. Master Hobbs his inconcludent deductions from the 20th of Exodus censured.  
HE begins the next Paragraph, By this i● appears that a great family, if it be not part of so●e Commonwealth, is of its self, as to the rights of Sovereignty, a little Monarchy. ● I will question nothing in this Paragraph at this time, but let the Reader bear in mind, that there is such a thing for which I shall call Mr. Hobbs to an account hereafter. In the following Paragraph he labours to bring Scripture for what he hath taught: It is an honour to Scripture, that it is like Virtue, commended even of those that will not follow it. But it may be Mr. Hobbs objects it against us who do confide in it, and not produceth it to satisfy himself, that his Doctrine is consonant to Scripture, I will examine this therefore; for surely if the Scripture be for him, I am also, although to me it appears never so erroneous, according to mine own reason: He begins; Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point: To Moses, the Children of Israel, say thus, Exod. 20. 19 Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we die. This is absolute obedience to Moses] thus he. A strange deduction out of this Text, where is no one word of obedience, much less of absolute obedience as to a Supreme. But I will help what I can, Deut. 5. 27. there this selfsame business being repeated, it is added, We will hear it, and do it. There obedience is mentioned implicitly: To understand this therefore consider with me, that the Children of Israel having the Law delivered to them by God in such a terrible manner in Mount Sinai, with Thunder, Lightning, Trumpets, and the like, they were terrified and afraid to have such an immediate converse with God, they thought it mortal, it being never before seen in the world; and therefore they entreated Moses to go betwixt God and them, and receive Gods Will from him, and deliver it them, and they would obey. Here is nothing of obedience to Moses, but to God only; they trusted that Moses would relate God's Laws to them truly, which indeed they had great reason to do. If the rest be like this, I shall have little trouble with it.   

SECT. V.  
The first of Sam. the 8. 11, 12. explained. The difference between the right of the King, and the right of a King. Kings of several Kingdoms may have several rights in the same Country. Divers Kings may have different rights, as the same Kings may also at several times. The genuine signification of these words cited by Mr. Hobbs.  
FOr the right of Kings, saith God himself, by the mouth of Samuel, 1 Sam. 8. 11, 12. This shall be the right of the King you will have to reign over you.] I stop here, because I have some things to examine in this particle before I go further. First then consider, that it is not said, this shall be the right of a King, that would have made it Jus Regale; and being indeffinite would have constituted it to belong to every King; but it shall be the right of your King. Many things may be the rights of one Country's King, which are not of another; yea many things may belong to one King of a Country, which did not belong to another King of the same Country, yea to the same King at another time. I urge this only against him, because he urges this place to prove the right of Kings, which it doth not do (if truly quoted) but only the right of a King of Israel, and it may be not that neither, but only the right of the next King; for it is said, of the King that shall reign over you, in the singular number, not in the plural. Nay it is most certain, that God, by whom King's reign, and from whom they have their Authority, may give what Authority he pleaseth to one, and not to another, the Plenipotency of which Commission I shall more fully show hereafter. Well then, let it however be granted, that this Text is truly produced, yet it proves not his conclusion, that this is the right of all Kings And now I must blame Mr. Hobbs, who professeth obedience to the Supreme Magistrate, and the Laws and Customs of this Country; and yet here against the Declaration of the Supreme Magistrate, the Laws and Customs of this same Country, in the urging of this Text, which (as he interprets it) varies from that translation which is approved by the Supreme Magistrate, the Laws and Customs of this Nation, and is only read in the vulgar Latin; our Translation reads it, This will be the manner of the King that shall reign over you. There is a great difference betwixt this shall be the right, and this will be the manner.   

SECT. VI  
The former Text further illustrated. The force of the Hebrew word compared with other places of Scripture. Cajetans' interpretation censured. The distinction of ordinary and extraordinary right improperly used for the clearing of this Text. The word right taken for practise. The 17 of Deuteron. 14. 16, 17, 18. verse explained. The King to have two Copies of the Law, and obliged to keep it. Ezek. the 46. 18. explained. The former conclusion asserted from the whole Discourse.  
THere is a great dispute amongst Critics in the Hebrew Tongue, what is the true sense of the word Mishpot, which is rendered by Mr. Hobbs▪ (Right,) and by our Translators (manner, or custom;) but certainly it cannot but be yielded, that it is used in both senses. But our Translators do very often render it as here, so Psalm 19 132. as thou usest to do unto those that love thy name: But it is not material to allege more Quotations; this Text will enforce this interpretation, for in the 18 verse it is said, Ye shall cry out in the day because of your King which ye shall have chosen you, and the Lord will not hear you in that day. Consider here, that men do not clamour and cry out upon Justice, when it is executed but upon injustice. I know there are other Expositions given besides his or mine, as that of Cajetan, that it is not said, the right of the Kingdom, which is a Law, but of the King; as if Kings would esteem this right. But this is scandalous to Kings, to many of whom, I doubt not, but Justice and Mercy are as dear as to any men in the world. There is another Exposition with a distinction, that there is an ordinary and extraordinary right: This Text sets down the extraordinary right; to which I say I allow the distinction; many things may be right and lawful for Kings to do upon extraordinary occasions, which would not be just in his ordinary Government. But how can a man conceive that these things should relate to extraordinary occasions, to make Perfumes, or to run before his Chariot, to gather in his Harvest? as if there should be exigencies of these poor trifles, or the honour of a King's Revenue could not yield such a return as might make every man fit for such an employment, ambitious of his entertainment. I think this may suffice for the exposition of this Text, to show that it was spoke of the practice, not the right of their Kings: but if not, look the seventeenth of Deut. at the fourteenth verse, where you may see the passage foretold, When thou art come into the Land, etc. and shalt say, I will set a King over me like as all the Nations that are about me. The very language which these men used, ver. 15. Thou shalt in ●ny wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose; and so goes on to describe the Laws for their Kings in the following part of that verse, and the 16, 17, and 18. verses: But there is none of these things reckoned there; and in the 18 and 19 verses, he is commanded to get him a Copy, or a double Copy (as some would have it) of this Book, which is Deuteronomy; one Copy to lie by him, and another to carry about with him, as our marginal hath it, and is most consonant (methinks) to the Text, which saith, He shall read therein all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and these statutes to do them. So that a King ought to take care to keep the Law of the Land, which to them was Deuteronomy. And from thence the madness of their Exposition will appear, who think that the Law which was spoken of, was this Law afterwards spoken of by Samuel: But alas! that needs no great study either to know or practise; this therefore must needs be the sense of it. But if this will not serve the turn, you may read in the 46 of Ezek. ver. 18. some part of the King's Law delivered clear opposite, to one clause delivered here; that is, That the Prince shall not take of the people's inheritance by oppression, to thrust them out of their possession, but he shall give his son's inheritance of his own possession, that my people be not scattered every man out of his possession. Now this is clean contrary to that which is said, He will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your Olive-yards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants. This certainly is unjust for a Prince to do by Ezekiel; and therefore these places must be reconciled, which may easily be done by our Translation, understanding the word (Mishpot) for a custom or usage, for so Sam describes what will be done; but the Prophet Ezekiel, from God commands, what is right and just to be done. And thus I think Mr. Hobbs hath got little advantage for his conclusion out of the Scripture.   

SECT. VII.  
The History of Saul quoted by Mr. Hobbs, improved against his Novel Institution, and that other conclusion of his, That a man may kill any man in right of himself. Prayers and tears the weapons of Christians.  
BUt I will try how I can advance this History against divers desperate and horrid Opinions of his. First of his electing a King by the people, which he makes to be the only way by which he is established in his Throne; a thing (as I have said before) never done nor practicable; and here we find it otherwise, for God chose that King Saul; and indeed it was the Law it should be so, Deut. 1●. 15. Nay, to come closer, (as I shall show hereafter) it is impossible, that the people who had no power given them from God, should give it to a King; none sure but the All-powerful God can give men power one over another. And as this story confutes his abominable principles which destroy the foundation of Government, so it doth that horrid and treasonable conclusion of his which plucks down all Government, and hath been the Author of almost all Treasons that ever were; that is, that in defence of a man's life, or himself, from such hardship as may render his life irksome to him, a man may take arms, or kill any man, or do any thing which may rescue him from it. I have spoke to this before, how unchristian a speech it is; but now consider how destructive of peace it is in a settled Commonwealth. There are no Traitors but pretend their Liberties are invaded, they have no safety in their condition: The Tyrant (for so they will term any against whom they rebel) takes away their fields, their children illegally, and the like, he doth without Law. The next (they tell us) is their life, they will provide therefore against that, and kill him: No, saith this History, when your King abuseth you with such oppression, there is no such consequence to be drawn from the whole context, that men should whet their Swords, and be avenged. There is no power above that of the Kings, much less is there any such in his own Subjects: But men in such a case must fly to the King of Kings, who according to his infinite Wisdom, Justice and Mercy, will consider and help them when he thinks fit. There is no appeal from a King, but to his King; and then when your own sins call for his judgements (as it was here) he will not hear your cries; which strongly intimates, we must not fight, but cry in that day when such things are done unto us; prayers and tears are the only weapons allowed Christians in that case: Righteous men must not think to go to heaven with pleasure and delight, by pride and struggling against their Superiors, but with patience, suffering quietly; by Faith, believing God's mercies and promises; by hope, that in his good time he will deliver them when he thinks fit, gently submitting ourselves under the mighty hand of God, who out of his infinite wisdom suffers us justly to be so punished, that in his good time he may exalt us.   

SECT. VIII.  
The former conclusions illustrated from the fact of Ahab. The condition of Subjects, according to Master Hobbs his Doctrine, the same with Slaves taken in War. The people transfer no power to the King besides that which God had given him. samuel's words not positive, but menacing. God himself concerned in the Election of samuel's Government. Exorbitant power, or absolute dominion, not deduceable from this Text. Mr. Hobbs his conclusions fitted to the Rapine of the late Rebels in England, whose actions he seems to approve.  
YEt consider once more, if this had been the right of Kings, what a foolish as well as a wicked King had Ahab been, who when by right he might have taken Naboths Vineyard, would mourn and afflict himself, because Naboth wou●d not let him have it. And indeed you may observe there, that Naboth conceived no such right; for else he would not have denied to yield that upon a good valuable consideration, which was due by Law. Well, this Text being thus examined, and some inferences made upon it, let us now consider his collections out of it: [This (saith he) is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, you shall be his servants] which is the last clause of the seventeenth verse. Let a man consider here what Mr. Hobbs hath writ of servants in the former page, (where he sets down, that men vanquished in war are servants, and what their servitude is) and he shall find all Subjects to be in a miserable condition, such as will little differ from being in war; for what can war do? it can but subject men's estates, their wives, children, and their lives, to a Conquerors will; and that, by this Gentleman, they are in always, even in peace; yea by that very reason, that they are embodied into a Commonwealth. But he proceeds further: ● Again; when the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, We will be as all other Nations, and our King shall judge our causes, and go before us, to conduct our wars.] I looked for these words, but ●●nd them not either in ours or other Translations; but indeed the sense is in the nineteenth and twentieth verses: And so I let it pass: His collection is [Here is confirmed the right that Sovereigns have, both to the Militia, and to all Judicature, in which is contained as absolute power as one man can possibly transfer to another.] But hark you Mr. Hobbs, what is the meaning of that phrase transfer? can it be thought, that the people's assent transferred any Authority which God did not give? Certainly that is a greater Exaltation than ever man dreamt of until now. But I am confident that the people took this as a menace of Samuel, to deter them from having a King, agreeing to the language used in the ninth verse by God to Samuel, Protest solemnly to them, or against t●em (as it is in the margin of our Translations) so they thought it a menace or threat; and that you may conceive from the nineteenth verse, which begins— Nevertheless, that is, for all that menace, or nequaquam, as the vulgar Latin, by no means will we be terrified, but will have a King like other Nations; they would be in this fashion; but where can they find that fashion used in the world? they had lived in Egypt, and Pharaoh oppressed them mightily, mistrusting them to be a dangerous people, and a people that lived apart from the Egyptians, and had no communication with them. But I do not read, that they took the Land of Goshen from them, which had formerly been given them by the King of Egypt; and those horrid oppressions were most wonderfully revenged by God upon Pharaoh and his Egyptians, when the Israelites cried to him for help, because they were undeserved: But saith Samuel; You in this case shall cry, and not be saved, because you provoke these mischiefs, being under a most excellent Government, the immediate protection of God himself; in which regard he saith in the seventh verse to Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. And although there were some miscarriages by samuel's Government, that his Sons did not behave themselves well under him; yet you may find in the twelfth Cap. third ver. when Samuel resigned up his Government to Saul, he could call them to witness, whether he had taken any man's Ox or Ass from him, or defrauded or oppressed any man; and at the fourth verse they acquit him. So that for men thus to reject the Government of God, by such a pious and excellent person as was Samuel, for some discontents and rebellious humours which were in their fancies, and exchange him for they knew not whom, was such an unpardonable fault, that God threatened by Samuel, that he would not hear their cries when they clamoured out for these evils; which not their folly only, but impiety had brought upon them: So that methinks there can be no inference deduced here to show the justness or right of this exorbitant power, which he pretends to in this word absolute. He hath the power of Judicature, but that power is to determine what is right, and to whom the Vineyard belongs, but not to take it to himself. He hath the power of the Militia to fight with the Enemy; nay, he may by it force (and rightly aught to use that power to force) men to render to every man their own; but he cannot rightly take away any man's estate from him, otherwise then the Law directs; and he who saith he can do it to others, if he felt such unjustness done to himself, would quickly learn that Lesson, that it is excellent Justice, that Artifex necis arte periret sua; then he would abhor his own Doctrine. This was well fitted for the sequestrations and seizures which were made of men's estates when he wrote this Book for them.   

SECT. IX.  
Solomon's Prayer (1 Kings 3. 9) explained. Master Hobbs his Logic desired in his deductions from this Text. Judges must govern or determine according to Law.  
BUt Mr Hobbs hath Scripture out of Solomon's Prayer, (1 Kings 3. 9) Give to thy Servant understanding to judge thy people, and to discern betwixt good and evil; (saith he) therefore it belongeth to the Sovereign to be Judge, and to p●●scribe the rules of discerning good and evil, which Rules are Laws; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power.] I could question his place of Scripture if I were given to wrangle, for in terminis he cannot show it there, but there is the sense. I let it therefore alone, but consider his Logic: He saith, Because he is to be Judge, and to prescribe the Rules of discerning betwixt good and evil, which Rules are Laws.] For my part I think this consequence is so far from a necessary deduction out of the premises, as I conceive the contrary is absolutely true; because he is Judge, he must take those rules which are prescribed him, but not make his rule. Consider with me, I beseech you Reader, that every Judge must be a Judge either in a constituted Commonwealth, betwixt men who live in that Polity, or else where there is no Commonwealth, and where men live only according to the dictates of Nature: In the first every Judge hath the National Laws of the Country to be his guide, and he must judge according to them, and not make Laws of his own head to judge the cause is committed to him. For the second, he hath the Law of Nature to guide him to that which shall appear most equal, according to that rule. He who draws a line by a rule, doth not make the rule, the Judge is such, his Decrees are regulated by the Laws according to which he decrees, but doth not make those Laws: So that although I think it true, that a Sovereign is the Supreme Judge, and that he hath likewise the Legislative power, yet not because he is Judge: for these two are distinct faculties appertaining to the same person, as will appear more fully hereafter.   

SECT. X.  
The impertinencies of the remaining part of this Paragraph censured. Matth. 21. 2, 3. not truly cited by Mr. Hobbs. His inferences upon this Text retorted upon him. The true intention of these words mistaken by Mr. Hobbs, and his argument thence invalid.  
THe rest in that Paragraph is such trash as never was read; not fit to foul paper with, 'tis so impertinent. In the latter end of it he comes close to his business thus;— And that the King's word is sufficient to take any thing from any Subject when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that need: for he himself, as King of the Jews, commanded his Disciples to take the Ass, and the Ass' Colt, to carry him into Jerusalem: Read the Text, Mat. 21. 2, 3. The words as he writes them are, Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a She-Ass tied, and her Colt with her, untie them, and bring them to me: And if any man ask you what you mean by it, say the Lord hath need of them, and straightway they will let them go.) Thus he writes that Text most false in many places. But I will consider the matter in hand, and stick to his Inferences. (They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title, nor whether he be Judge of that necessity, but acquiesce in the will of the lord) Thus he. And I could wish he would acquiesce in the will of the Lord, for than he would never have vented so many abominable falsehoods as he hath. But to my business; I first retort this ad hominem, be it true or false; This argument is not proper from his mouth, who (page 262.) denies that our Saviour had any Kingdom in this world whilst he was in it) therefore he did not now send for this Ass by a Kingly right; (I mean to speak to that in its proper place:) but now he who denies his Kingdom, cannot here justly urge this for a precedent to Kings: I (but he will say) he spoke that of our Saviour's Manhood; I reply, if he spoke this of him as God, it is no precedent for Kings; for undoubtedly God hath reserved cases to himself, by which he can and doth dispose of all things in this world how he pleaseth, (as will be showed hereafter) and not only of things in Kingdoms, but of Kingdoms themselves; and therefore this instance is no precedent. But then let us consider the fact: Our Saviour sent for an Ass and her Colt, they were goods belonging to another man; and the upshot of all was, when the right owner questioned why they loosed them, and they told him it was for the use of the Lord, which was the Apostles language concerning Christ, he being a person famous for many Miracles, and much Piety, as that Story will show, the right owner let them go, and let them use them; and it is most reasonably thought, that our Saviour having made use of them in that great Solemnity he was then going about, restored them afterwards, when it was finished. But mark, the owner gave way to his use of them; he did not take Naboths Vineyard from him without his consent: This is a weak way of arguing, from an act by the owner's consent, to prove it lawful against his will; if the right owner gives way to another to use his goods, there is no fault in it, and this proves no more.   

SECT. XI.  
Mr. Hobbs his fallacious arguing from Gen. 3. 5. discovered: The difference of the case stated in respect of Divine and Humane Power. Act. 4. 19 explained. Obedience to Humane Power commanded in licitis & honestis. Mat. 23. verse the 23. illustrated from the former case of S. Peter, and S. John. Mr. Hobbs his argument from Adam's discourse in Paradise not conclusive.  
WE will proceed with him. To these places (saith he) may be added Gen. 3. 5. You shall be like Gods, knowing good and evil.) Let the Reader consider this was the Devil's language: Then ver. 11. Who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the Tree of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat?) A man may justly wonder what he could collect from hence: His discourse is unnecessary, but the sense is this, that our first Parents, by an ill gloss of the Devil, misinterpreted the command of God, which caused God's displeasure; whereby (saith he at the bottom of that page) it is clearly (though Allegorically) signified, that the commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be censured or disputed.) See the fallacy of this arguing, from the infinite power of God's Wisdom, Justice and Equity, to the finite power of man; betwixt which the difference is evident, and so decided in the case of S. Peter, and S. John, Acts 4. 19 Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you, more than unto God, judge ye.) The story is this, (as you may read in the former part of that Chap. ver. the 5.) their Rulers and Elders, Annas and Caiphas, convented the Apostles before them, and after consultation about the business, commanded them in the 18. ver. not to speak at all, nor teach in the name of the Lord Jesus) nay, say the Apostles) whether it be fitter to obey God or you, judge ye.) It is so clear a case, that God who is your Governor more absolutely, than you are ours, must be obeyed before you, that you cannot deny it. This will be opposed to his case; the difference betwixt obedience to God's Commands, and men's, is mighty; the one from an infinite Justice, and known to be so, the other from a finite, and known also to be so; that of Gods from an infinite power, and known to be such; that of man's from a finite, and known to be such. It must not therefore follow, that because God's Commands are obeyed without examining, man's must. This may likewise give the true sense of that place urged by him out of the 23. of S. Mat. 2, 3. The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses Chair; and therefore all that they shall bid you observe, that observe, and do.) This he urged for unquestioned obedience to Superiors, and receives its answer from the passage of the Apostles, who denied their obedience in this point: it must be therefore in linitis & honestis, not in things crossing with Gods Commands in his written word, or his Commands by the Law of Nature: A servant must not obey his Masters Oeconomical Laws, where they are contrary to the National: A Child must not obey his Natural Parents, commanding contrary to his Political: A man is not to obey a Constable commanding against his King, nor a King against God; his argument therefore drawn from this instance of Adam's misconstruction of God's Commands, is not of force: That therefore we may not expound or discourse upon man's commands, is not well collected out of his premises.   

SECT. XII.  
Mr. Hobbs his conclusion not deducible from the premises. The former place of the 23. of S. Mat. further explained out of Petrus Gallatinus. Aristocratical Power not vested in the Scribes and Pharisees.  
HE concludes that page; So that it appeareth plainly to my understanding, both from Reason and Scripture, that the Sovereign Power, whether placed in one man (that which follows is page 107.) as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in popular and Aristocratical Commonwealths, is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it.) My first observation is, that he hath no one place of Scripture, but only from that place of S. Mat. where obedience to the Scribes and Pharisees is mentioned, which can look towards Aristocraty or Democraty, of which I spoke just now: And surely he doth not think that the Scribes and Pharisees had an Aristocratical Government over the Jews, for they were under the Roman Monarchy at that time, and could not put a man to death by their own Law (as they protested at our Saviour's Trial,) in that then there was no Juridical Power amongst them, no Sovereign Authority: Nay, Petrus Gallatinus de arcanis Catholicae veritatis, Lib. 4. Cap. 6. shows at large, how not only the Jews were captivated by the Romans, the Kingdom translated, given from one of their onws Nation to Herod who was an Alien, but likewise their Sanhedrim (which was until then continued from Moses his time) taken away; and when he had slain them all but one Baba, he was not of Authority to erect one more rightly constituted by the Law of Moses, and the Jewish Tradition. At the last he citys this place, Mat. 23. 2. and saith it ought to be read, The Scribes and Pharisees have sat in Moses' Chair. The word in the Original is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which being in the first Aorist, is often (I confess) used in the present tense, but the story (being a matter of fact) seems to oppose it: I know therefore no reason why it should be forced from its genuine sense; yet howsoever let it go, it shall be taken in the present tense, and I will make all agree. He further shows, that after Herod had slain all but this Baba, and put out his eyes, he erected another Sanhedrim of his own, in which it was likely those who were members of it, were allowed to meddle with some matters of small consequence: Amongst these the Scribes and Pharisees were mixed, and by that Authority might, according to their proud nature, possibly usurp the dignity of sitting in Moses his Chair; and yet (he shows) that forty years before the last destruction of the Temple, these also were taken away. Well then, it appears clearly, that here was no Aristocratical Government amongst them, they were governed Monarchically by Caesar, and under him by Herod. This inferior Council had no part of Moses his judicature of life and death; nay, that power which they had was variable, according to the will of the Monarch. But because I am in now, I will add a word or two against his urging this place, for the absoluteness of their Dominion, out of the following words,— Whatsoever they shall bid you observe, that observe, and do it. Now this word whatsoever, must have relation to the former words, whatsoever they teach you out of Moses; let not their vicious lives or hypocrisy make you refuse the wholesome Doctrine which they teach; but if they teach you false Doctrine (as they will) that comes not out of Moses his Chair, but ex Cathedrâ pestilentiae, as the Psalmist phraseth it, Psal. 1. 2. and therefore our Saviour often forewarns them, not only of the life, but doctrine of the Pharisees, in the 16. of Mat. 6. take heed of the leaven of the Pharisees, which in the 12. verse is expounded the doctrine; and in this very Chap. verse 4. They bind heavy burdens, and grievous to be born, and lay them upon men's shoulders; and in the 13. verse, they were said to shut up the Kingdom of Heaven against men; which must be by their doctrine: In the 16th verse, They are called blind guides, which must also be by their ignorance in doctrine or teaching; and if the blind lead the blind, they will both fall into the ditch: So likewise in the same verse he reproves their false doctrine about Oaths; wherefore this (whatsoever) must be understood of whatsoever according to that they pretend: So out of Moses his Chair, what they from his Authority shall appoint to be observed, must be observed; but when they produce doctrine contrary to that, they must be disobeyed; their wicked lives shall not prejudice their godly doctrine, nor shall Moses his Chair countenance their wicked doctrine or commands; for if so, S. Peter, and S. Paul (before spoken of) were to blame, who disobeyed their commands; and the inhuman Murder of our Saviour might be justified, which was acted by their direction. Well, I need speak no more to this, it is apparent, that this neither can prove Aristocraty, nor deliver an infallible unerring rule for them to be regulated by. And as he was to blame to found Aristocraty upon any of these places of Scripture, so surely upon this hyperbolical expression, That the power of every one of these Supremes is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it.) For then all Supremes have a like power, (which certainly is not apparent) and at all times; for if such a greatness belong to a Sovereign as a Sovereign, then in no Sovereign, or at any time, can it be missing: Then the Subject cannot have right to rescue himself from bonds, or such hardship which may render his life odious to him, as he often persuades; for such absolute power may be imagined to be made.   

SECT. XIII.  
Mr. Hobbs his Hyperbolical Power scarce any where to be found, and yet no such state of War, as he imagines, hath followed de facto. His subsequent question answered by another. Mr. Hobbs his Doctrine the foundation of Sedition. Disputes concerning Governments dangerous, but not to be prevented.  
HE proceeds; (And though of so unlimited a power men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it (which is perpetual war of every man against his Neighbour) are much worse.) Thus far he: What a strange wild asseveration is this? Mr. Hobbs (I am persuaded) hath lived in divers Commonwealths, yet did he never find in any this absolute Hyperbolical Power of a Sovereign; nor did he see any where, that every man was at war with his Neighbour. That which follows in that Paragraph I let pass, because confuted by what hath been writ heretofore, there being no new matter in it, and pass to the next, which he thus begins: (The greatest objection is that of the practice, when men ask where and when such power has by Subjects been acknowledged.) Truly a wise question, and shrewdly proposed, and to which he makes an unsatisfactory answer, which 〈◊〉; (But one may ask them again, when and where hath there been a Kingdom long free from Sedition and Civil Wars?) That word long is a word of so large a capacity, a man can hardly find any time which he cannot say is short: But let that pass; he may consider, that Civil War and Tumults arise from divers occasions; sometimes from divers Titles, sometimes from private injuries, sometimes when people are taught, that they may vindicate themselves from oppression by their own private f●rce and strength; sometimes when they shall be taught, that they are the Fountain of all Power; and therefore they may take away, as well as give: which two last are the Fundamental Props of his whole Leviathan, and naturally produce Rebellion towards Superiors. He goes on— And in those Nations, whose Commonwealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed but by Foreign War, the Subjects never did dispute of Sovereign Power.) He should have done a great work if he had instanced in those Nations, and had proved they never disputed that point. In answer to this; The less dispute there is about it, 'tis by so much the safer: But who can hold men that have reason, from disputing the reason of these great affairs which so nearly concern them?   

SECT. XIV.  
Mr. Hobbs his bold censure of those who have written before him. His Principles destructive to Humane Society.  
But (saith he) howsoever an argument from the practice of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the Causes and Nature of Commonwealths, and suffer daily those miseries that proceed from the ignorance thereof, are invalid.) A bold assertion, and censorious of all the world, in a Subject of which hundreds of learned men have discoursed much more safely and rationally then himself, and declared those things which he calls the Causes and Nature of Commonwealths, much more excellently than he, (as may appear to any man who will peruse them.) Which Writers, although they may have infirmities and errors, yet I never read one man, who maintained in Politics, Principles so destructive to Humane Society as himself: But he gives an instance to confirm his answer to that argument; For (saith he) though in all places in the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be.) He saith truth; but his instance is like his conclusion which he would illustrate by it: and when he can show me that all men have built their houses upon the Sand, I will yield, that all Nations in the world have founded themselves upon weak supports; but until then, he shall excuse me from thinking one or the other.   

SECT. XV.  
The Rules in Politics not founded upon Demonstrations. The judgements and humours of men equally various. The Rule of Government must follow the present occurrences.  
HE again: The skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetic and Geometry, n●t (as Tennis- play) upon practise only; which Rules neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity's or the method to find out.) The first clause of this affirmation must be examined; first, where he saith, the skill of making and ruling Commonwealths, consists in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetic and Geometry;) Rules, without doubt, all prudential actions are governed by; but to say like Arithmetic and Geometry, is more than can be justificd, for their Rules are most certain, the demonstrations out of them most undeniable; but the affairs of Politic Government most weak, the subjects (which it treats about) most unconstant, which is men united: and because the judgements of men, their humours, their passions, are all obnoxious to variation, there can be no certain Rules which can meet with all accidents at home, or abroad with other Nations, which are variable one as the other; but much and many designs must be daily changed, according to divers occasions; and indeed they are so many, that no wit of man can foresee all: Let Achitophel himself advise never so cunningly, yet if Absalon do not follow it (which no man can foreknow, but by guesses) his directions can effect nothing; and therefore there is no conformity in the Rules of the Mathematics, and these of Politics; the one like the subject most immutable; the other like its subject most uncertain. The last clause of that Paragraph and Chap. is nothing but a great Rant, and express contempt of all other Writers, and an implicit magnifying his own Politics: To which I may justly say, it would have become other men's mouths or pens better than his own; and what I think of it is this; that if his former expression be true of them, that they have built upon Sand, I may say, his building is upon Quagmire: building upon Sand will support a building until storms fall, but his will not support an Edifice, but fall of its self; the very Foundation sinks, without any other weight upon it, or violence to it. And so I have run over this Chap. and thought to have gone no further in his Politics, but the Title of the next Chap. enticeth me on, which is, Of the Liberty of Subjects.    


CHAP. XIX. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his Comment upon his own Text censured. Libertas coactionis, & necessitatis: the second proper only to men.  
HE begins this Treatise thus: (Liberty, or freedom, signifieth (properly) the absence of opposition (by opposition I mean external impediments of motion;) and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate Creatures, than to rational.) Consider, Reader, what a strange perplexed kind of writing this is, where he is forced to write a Comment upon his own Text. To begin with him: (Liberty, or freedom) What need of freedom here, when the subject he treats of is Liberty? Secondly, What need of that Parenthesis to expound opposition? If he had not affected a deceitful way of writing, he might in fewer words, and much more clearly, have said, Liberty signifies (properly) the absence of external impediments of motion: But if his contempt of such Learning had not made him neglect to read it, he might easily have known there is a liberty à Coactione, from constraint, and a liberty from necessity. The first is that, and that only which he defines; but the second, which is the more noble part of liberty, is left out by him, and that is peculiar to men alone amongst all sublunary Creatures. He proceeds to illustrate his conclusions; (For whatsoever is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we say it hath not liberty to go further.) This I agree to, this is liberty from constraint; and so I agree to his whole discourse, in exemplifying that, which I would say is ingenious, but that it explains what no man denies; therefore I let alone what follows to the bottom of this page, and so come to page 108, which begins thus.   

SECT. II.  
M. Hobbs his Freeman not actually to be found in the whole world. His unhandsome censures of those who have used the word Liberty or Freedom, in a sense different from himself. The activity of heat hindered by cold; neither of them bodies. Spirits hindered in their motion. Freedom used in a passive acception.  
ANd according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, A Freeman, is he, that in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to do.] This is freedom and great liberty; but I doubt he will not find any Subject in the world having this liberty. He might have given this Chap. another title, for there are no subjects which are not confined from this liberty. Well, he goes on, and I wait upon him: But (saith he) when the words Freedom and Liberty are applied to any thing but bodies, they are abused.) It was unkindly and unhandsomely said, to affirm it abused, since it hath been the language of all men who have written of any spiritual things; which certainly, having no bodies to hinder them, must needs be free, according to his own conceit. I hope in a fuller manner to handle the nature of Spirits; therefore I will not meddle now with it, only I will mind him of that common Proverb amongst us, denoting a spiritual freedom in that which is no body, and that is, Thought is free; and yet this thought is a spiritual thing, having no dimensions; but because no Humane Laws can restrain, confine, or judge of men's thoughts, they are free. But he produceth a reason for what he had writ (for that which is not subject to motion, is not subject to impediment;) What he means by motion, I know not; but if he means that, which according to the common acceptation of Philosophers it importeth, that is, not only lation or changing of place, but that which makes any change in any thing, which (he knows) are commonly reduced to six species: then he might have observed, that that heat which warms a man's hand is not a body, and yet may be impeded and hindered by cold from its activity, or that motion of calefaction. Well then, some things besides bodies have motion, and may have that liberty (which he speaks of) confined by external things. But because his Philosophy points at a contempt of Spirits, whose motion is not so clearly discerned as that of bodies, especially in that succession in which bodies move; and I think he means only local motion; I dare affirm that Spitits move, in their way, from one place to another, in a spiritual manner, and are at one time in a place, in which they were not before; and many times have spiritual impediments; of which I reserve a fuller discourse hereafter. But at this present, my affirmation is as good as his negation, especially countenanced with such a general consent of Philosophers, as cannot be counterpoised by any thing that can be produced for the contrary opinion. Well then, let us examine that which follows— Therefore (saith he) when 'tis said (for example) the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those who walk in it without stop.) This expression will not serve his turn; that phrase, The way is free, doth not mean a liberty of the men who walk in it without stop; for prisoners in bonds may walk in it without stop, who are far from freedom; nor is it yet used abusively, but passively, which that word freedom doth bear, (though hardly that word liberty, which he applies to it.) So that the meaning is, the way is of an open condition, not appropriated to any particular owner, so as to forbid you legally to pass there; nor is this an abusive speech, but this word liberty is seldom used but (with such addition as may expound it) in a passive sense, for some power to act, although freedom in others.   

SECT. III.  
The instance of a Gift, not at all to Mr. Hobbs his purpose. A double acceptation of the word Gift. The vulgar phrase, of Gift is free, abused in either sense. Metonymies the Elegancies of common Language.  
ANd (saith he) when we say a Gift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the Gift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any Law or Covenant to give it.) Consider, good Reader, how this instance disagrees with his undertaking; which is, first, that freedom applied to any thing but bodies is abused; Secondly, his medium by which he proves that it is, for tha● which is without motion is without impediment. Now his second instance is, because a gift is called a free gift. Let us consider that a gift, is either the thing given (which is often called the gift of such a man) or else the very act of giving it. In the first acceptation he cannot say, it was bodies, nor a body, that hath no motion, like to a high way; (of which before) it may be a horse, a dog, or any living creature. Then secondly, take it for the act of giving, that is, a motion of the mouth, or hand by writing, it is a motion of a man, that therefore cannot be pertinent. But then he expounds right, when he says it signifies the liberty of the giver, who was not bound by any Law or Covenant to give it.) It is true Mr. Hobbs; but yet this is no abusive speech but a Metonymy, the effect for the cause; which figures are so far from being an abuse, as they are the Elegancy of common Language; and indeed have so prevailed upon every man's tongue and pen, that a man can hardly speak or write significantly without them, unless he would tie himself to strict Logical and Metaphysical notions and expressions.   

SECT. IV.  
Mr. Hobbs his third instance censured. Freedom of Speech diversely accepted. His illustrations most uncertain, and deviating from his matter.  
HIs third instance: (So when we speak freely, it is not the liberty of voice or pronunciation, but of the man whom no Law had obliged to speak otherwise then he did.) First, I think he is mistaken much in the sense of this phrase (free speech) for we shall find it two ways used in our common conversation of men with men; sometimes in a virtuous sense, as, he did preach freely, deliver the truth without fear of men, for that bondage of fear is a great captivity; sometimes in a worse sense, when we use to say, such a man is one of a free conversation, he speaks freely; not that he speaks things as no Law hath forbid to speak otherwise, but without consideration; he gives no Law to his own tongue, one (as we otherwise phrase him sometimes) without fear or wit, and it is within an inch of sauciness. Now freedom of spe●ch doth not relate only to the outward Laws, but to the ability sometimes of Language; and yet I may add, he was to blame when he denied the use of it concerning the bodily pronunciation, for we use to say, he is free from stammering; and for stammering, he hath an impediment in his speech. Let the Reader forgive me for meddling with such trifles as these are, which in this place I do, because he may observe how crude and indigested his discourse is, and how uncertain even his illustrations are, which ought to be of a clearer evidence. But now I come to his Lastly; which indeed I guess to be the work he aimed at, and this only a Preamble to the Liberty of Subjects, which indeed it concerns not.   

SECT. V.  
Of freedom and liberty again; These two contrary to his former acception of the words, now distinguished by Mr. Hobbs. The word will taken in a double sense, equally with understanding, by the Philosophers. The common notion justified against Mr. Hobbs. The subjectum quod, and the subjectum quo of liberty in the will. A twofold act of the will (confounded by Mr. Hobbs) explained and asserted. God only can do what ever he has inclination to.  
LAstly, (saith he) from the use of the word freewill, no liberty can be enforced of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.) What? from the use of this word freewill, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination! I wonder why by his discourse, because it is no body, which he conceives to be the only free thing; but that hath been refuted: other things are as free as bodies, according to his conceit of freedom, because other things produce alteration, and may be impeded in their operations. But perhaps he puts a difference here betwixt freedom and liberty, which before he conjoined; and conceives that the freedom of the will, which may not be stopped or hindered in its operations, is a distinct thing from its liberty of doing, or not doing, of electing this, or refusing that: And although he allows the first, that it is free, without stop to operate; but hath no liberty to operate, or not operate, or to refuse one, and choose another; this I apprehend to be his meaning, as will appear presently, his whole discourse pointing at it. To understand which, let the Reader consider with me, that this word will is taken two ways; for a faculty in the Soul, by which it produceth divers acts, as to will, or nill, choose, or refuse. And secondly, for the prime act of this faculty, which is to will, for so Philosophers do with the understanding. Intellectus is the faculty by which a man understands any thing, and the prime act of the understanding, or indeed the chief habit by which it understands any thing. The habitus principiorum, is called Intellectus: Thus sometimes the same name is applied to the faculty, and the chief operation of the faculty: I speak this, because he more than once abuseth this notion with some derision; but however, until we can learn more significant terms to express our notions by, we must be content with such as are in use. Now consider, here he takes will for the act, or the operation of the faculty, not the faculty itself: that is evident, because he expounds it, as if they were one by desire and inclination. Now those two, desire, and inclination, are actual motions, or at the least, tendencies to motions: Now (saith he) of these there is no liberty, but the liberty of the man. It is true, the man is the subjectum quod, or the Soul of man in which the faculty of the will is, but the will is the faculty which is the subjectum quo, the immediate subject by which the man is free; and by this faculty the man is enabled to work this act of willing freely. But yet consider with me a little, that the will being the instrument which man useth to obtain his happiness, hath a twofold act; one respects the end, which is happiness, the other the means, by which this happiness is to be obtained: The first is natural, and necessary; as natural, as for the eye to see colours, for the fire to burn. There cannot be a man who would not be happy, he may be mistaken in the thing so as to count this or that to be happiness, which is not, but he would be happy. The second, which is conversant about the means, is Election, and that act is free for a man to choose, or not choose, to choose one, and refuse another. Now concerning the second there is abundance of liberty; concerning the first, he might confound will, desire, and inclination; but concerning the second, he may will, or rationally desire that which he hath no inclination to, yea is averse to in his natural inclination; and therefore in that regard they were very ill joined together; and it was a Gambal of him, and what follows is most odious to all reason and experience; for explaining himself, what he meant by the liberty of man, which (saith he) consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do. Consider this strange proposition; Was there ever any man of such a liberty, such a power, that he finds no stop in doing what he hath a will to do. The greatest Emperor that ever was, could never say so; they have stops in themselves, their own reasons and consciences forbid them to do many things they would do, their short and weak arms stop them from doing many things they are inclined to do, only God is capable of this liberty, whose infinite wisdom can find out all things, and infinite goodness desires nothing but what is most excellent, and infinite power can do all what he hath an inclination to: It was therefore a most strange speech, and I cannot but wonder how such things can pass amongst reasonable men for Philosophy; and being in, I think it my duty to show such a thing to a heedless Reader.   

SECT. VI  
Of mixed actions, will, desire, and inclination, distinguished; confounded by Mr. Hobbs. Of goods cast into the Sea, for the preservation of the Ship and Passengers. The dictate of Reason often disobeyed, and the will violently carried by the sensual appetite. Denominations are a principaliori.  
SO now we will pass on to the next Paragraph; I expect more of this stuff: It begins (Fear and Liberty are consisting) (I believe they are in a mixture) as (saith he) when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for fear the Ship should sink.) This instance is commonly given to mixed actions, which are compounded of voluntary and involuntary; here is a part of both; he doth throw his goods into the Sea, this makes it voluntary; he doth it grudging, that makes it involuntary, yet it seems the predominancy is in the will. But now consider with me, that these terms (which he handled before, and confounded together) you may now find distinguished, they are will, desire, and inclination: these three (to speak properly) differ, according to a threefold estate in man, Natural, Animal, and Rational: According to the first, he hath inclination to tarry and remain in the world, with the like; agreeing to the second, he desires meat, drink, to walk, to talk, and do all things which are pleasant to him: According to the last, to act such things as reason shall dictate: Nay he may have an inclination to many things which Reason can say are not fit; take the highest instance which can be given, that is, to live; when Reason shall show him, that it is not fit to live upon such dishonest terms as are offered. So likewise he may have an animal desire of pleasure, which being found not fit by Reason, the rational will controls it. Thus we see those three Appetites; and to keep close to his instance, man hath an inclination and a natural appetite to live, and hath a sensual desire of his riches, by which he hopes to live to the satisfaction of his sensual appetite; but Reason prescribes, that life is to be preferred before all the pleasures in the world. So that here he saith right, one may have a will to throw his riches into the Sea, but his sensual desire is against it, and that makes it have a degree of unwillingness. Consider again, that this act of throwing his goods into the Sea, is in its own nature an unwilling act; for no man would desire to cast that away, which with so much hazard and pains he had got; but in the particular, when it comes to be yoked with that greater mischief of losing his life, than it is chosen before the other, and yet it is oft grieved for when it is passed and gone, which is a shrewd objection against the willingness of it; for no man is rationally grieved for doing what he will; but be it as he will, yet the rational will, the sensual desire, and the natural inclination, are not the same; and although the rational will in that act doth command, yet in many it doth not, being violently carried away with the other; So that he saith truth, when he saith,— casting his goods into the Sea was a willing action, although there was an earnest desire to the contrary; and there was, by reason of that, some mixture of unwillingness in it; yet denominatio à principaliori, the predominant part gives the denomination invincibly: So likewise what follows in another instance, of him who pays his debts only to avoid imprisonment:) And what in the conclusion of that Paragraph, he saith, That generally all actions which men do in Commonwealths for fear of the Law, are actions which the doers had liberty to omit) therefore certainly they had liberty in themselves, they might do, or not do them.   

SECT. VII.  
The deficiency of Mr. Hobbs his instance of water passing in its channel. Libertas coactionis, & necessitatis, further explained. Liberty properly ad opposita.  
NOw I come to a new business: Liberty (saith he) and necessity are consistent; as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel.) This instance is not full; for although there is a freedom to run in the channel, yet the banks of the channel so confine it, that the water can run no where else; like a man who hath his shackles knocked off, yet is confined to his chamber still, and is a prisoner there. But to understand this, consider with me, that this liberty which he speaks of concerning the water, is a true liberty, so far as I explained it, according to his definition, which is a liberty to run in the channel without external impediments; but absolute liberty it is not, because both it is impeded from overflowing the channel by the banks, and likewise because it is restrained by its nature, so that it is not absolutely liberty. There is libertas à coactione, a liberty from constraint of outward causes, but there is no liberty à necessitate, from the necessity of its nature, without which there is no proper liberty any otherwise then a prisoner hath to live in Gaol: But liberty is ad opposita, to things of divers nature, where the Internal Principle hath power to do this, or that; or at the least, to do, or not to do, as he speaks at the end of the last Paragraph; — The doer had libert● to omit. Now the water hath freedom to do, it is not hindered from running in the channel; but not so much liberty as School boys take one towards another, when the weaker Boy should choose the b●st, the stronger would give him the worst, and bid him choose that or none; for the water hath not liberty to run, or not to run, but only liberty to run.   

SECT. VIII.  
Mr. Hobbs his former instance to voluntary actions. His liberty to have, or not to have written and dispersed, these impious Doctrines.  
HE procceds: (So likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do.) It is not so in the actions which men voluntarily do; there is no necessity for them to do their voluntary actions; they can choose whether they will do them or not; that man who doth virtuously, can choose, and do viciously: And so contrarily, he could have chosen whether he would have writ these wicked Doctrines which he hath taught: If not, let him confess it, and I will prove him not to be a Man, but a Beast, and fit to be used as a Beast, yea worse than a Beast, to be like a stone which naturally descends, or water which necessarily runs down its Channel, and so ought to be used like it; for indeed there is no one thing more peculiar to man then this liberty.   

SECT. IX.  
Mr. Hobbs his Reason of the former Assertion invalid. Of the first and second causes. Men actively, other creatures passively, capable of commands, Fools and Madmen incapable of commands.  
BUt he gives a reason for what he speaks: (And yet, because every act of man's will, and every desire and inclination proceedeth from some causes, and that from another cause, in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes) proceed from necessity.) The force of this Argument is invisible; for though this will doth proceed from a cause, as he expresseth it, yet if that immediate cause from which it proceeds be not necessary, yea, if any one Link in the Chain of Causes be free, and not necessary, the effect is not necessary; for the arbitrariness of any one will make the effect such: But this liberty of the Agent (he speaks of) looks only upon the immediate cause, which in humane actions is free, and may not be done; yea, very often the Agent may choose the contrary: That the first cause works with all second causes, is as certain as any thing in the Mathematics; for there cannot be a second, or a third, or any number, but it proceeds from a first: And yet because the first hath an influence upon the rest, it follows not that they are Ciphers, but each out of that foundation hath its several operations: So in this, the first cause is Causa generalis, and works with second causes which are derived from it: But they have their several ways and powers of working; Natural, according to their natural inclination; Animal, according to the peculiar disposition of those Souls which inhabit them; only man hath a free nature amongst bodily things, in that resembling the Great Cause of Causes, he is the Principle of those actions which he doth as a man voluntarily; and therefore is capable of Commands actively to do, and the other Creatures passively to be done, or used, and Man is used as a Master, or Owner under God, of them, a Steward who must give an account of such of them as come within the sphere of his Dominion. Let any man tell me, how a man can be capable of commands, if he were like them necessitated: No man commands Fools, Madmen, or Infants; we might account them Fools, or Mad, who should do it; but, if he would have them act any thing, he must work upon their predominant passion, as we would do with Beasts, because there is in them a deficiency of this high Power, to be Master of their own actions. It cannot be then, that all those Precepts, Counsels, Commands of God, should be given to him who hath no power to obey: And from thence we must needs conclude, that they have a liberty to do, or not to do. But let us follow him.   

SECT. X.  
Mr. Hobbs his Supposition impossible, without a Revelation. The force of the word-See. His Hypothesis granted. His Inference would not follow. Causes not otherwise to seem, then as they are in their own Nature.  
SO that (saith he) to him who could see the connexion of th●se Causes, the necessity of all men's voluntary actions would appear manifest.) This conclusion is founded upon an impossible supposal; there is no possibility that a man in this world should see that Chain of Causes, in Heaven hereafter he may, but here he cannot without a mighty strange Revelation. But suppose he could? This word See denotes a clear apprehension; What would follow then, but that he should see such causes necessary which are necessary, and such free which are free; he would see them as they are, not see them in a representation false, and so not agreeing to their condition.   

SECT. XI.  
Of God's concurrence with humane actions. No man a sinner if necessitated to sin. Divine disposure necessitates not to Evil. God not the Author of those actions which are contrary to his commands. He is truly the Author of those actions he adviseth. God's concurrence further illustrated, from the influx of the Sun. Liberal Agents not necessitated by the ordinary concurrence of God.  
HE proceeds: (And therefore God that seeth and disposeth all things, seeth also, that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of d●ing that which God will, and no more, nor less.) Certainly, although I think very many men are too bold to discourse of both God's Knowledge and Will, as they do, which are things too high for the weak sight of man to look clearly into, yet men may confidently say, as his Knowledge cannot be deceived, to judge falsely, so his Will cannot be deceived, in willing that which is not good; and therefore because men are free Agents in what they do, and must give an account of their actions to him, and be judged according to them by him, it is not possible to conceive, that he should know them other then free, which liberty was his own gift. And for his will, since it● hath pleased God in his holy Word to reveal to us Rules by which we may know what is his will for us to do, in doing which we please him, and that he likes us; as also what is against his will, in doing which we shall anger and offend him, and he will punish us, although God be not only a general, but the first cause which works with and in us▪ yet it is not possible for man to think, that God doth in that concurrence determine man's actions to such things which he himself hath declared evil, and against his will, and which he will punish; and therefore it was too bold an Assertion to say, That man doth no more or less, than he is necessitated by God's will, which is to make no man a sinner; for although (as he spoke) God disposeth all things, and that disposure must needs be to infinitely good and wise ends, even the evils and things against his Rules of goodness, yet his disposure order such men, according to their evil actions, to suffer, not makes them do evil that they may suffer. But perhaps he explains this (For though men may do many things which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them.) Nay, I will tell him more, men may do, and many men do many things, not only which God hath not commanded, but which God hath forbidden, and hath commanded they shall not do; and surely than he is less Author of them: But if a man do an act of advice or counsel of Gods without a Command, yet that God's Counsel is Author of. Now these actions which are against God's Command, without doubt he is not Author of; if he were, he could not justly punish them: But I would fain make out his sense, which is this, he doth not do it by Authority given by God, but against it; Well then. God's Authority is against evil, but his power worketh this evil. So he seems to affirm in his following words; (Yet they can have no passion nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause.) True indeed, God is the first general cause, but not the second and particular. The Sun is an universal cause, it shines upon the Earth, Trees, Plants, and is the cause of their fertility, but diversely, according to the diversity of Constitutions it concurs with; so doth God, as he is the first and general cause (meeting with several conditions) operate severally, to the production of those several effects which are produced by them, with things necessary, before he produceth necessary effects. But, as the Sun's concourse doth not determine this thing to this, and that to that effect; so doth not the general concourse of God determine this or that appetite to this or that object, in this or that manner; but when it meets with things so disposed, it concurs in the production of that effect to which it was so disposed; so that God concurring with free Agents, makes them no more necessary, than his concurring with necessary Agents makes them free: It is the same infinite Power of God which constituted both, and his concurrence destroys neither in its ordinate working: (I speak not of his extraordinary operation, whereby he can and doth control all the frame of Nature, when and how he pleaseth, nor doth Mr. Hobbs): Nay, I may say, that God himself being absolutely free, bounded with no limits, having nothing above, or about him, which can stop or hinder his Almighty hand from working, it is much more reasonable to think, that his concourse should make even necessary Agents free, and not to be bounded by their natures which he had given them, rather than that this most free Agent should against himself make those which he had constituted in a free nature to be necessary, because they are by that more like himself, which every Agent endeavours: Nay, in his extraordinary works, he doth often, for the present, shake off those bonds which his former Donation had confined them to; so that by his extraordinary concourse, he makes them cease from their former operations, which by their natures they were necessitated to do; as the fire not to burn, the water not to run down its channel, and the like, which are apparent to every man. So then, though Gods will and concurrence is a cause of those actions, yet not being a terminating cause, but concurring with that nature which he had given them, that concurrence doth not necessitate that operation which he had given to man, viz. freedom to do, or not to do. But he proves the contrary in his following words, which are these.   

SECT. XII.  
The consequence of this Paragraph examined. His meaning conjectured and refuted. Every deviation contradicts not the Power and Omnipotency of God. Voluntas facere & fieri distinguished in God. Men not justly punished with Damnation, if necessitated to sin. Mr. Hobbs censured for obtruding those Doctrines in Divinity amongst his Political Discourses. The actions of the King and Subject alike necessitated by Mr. Hobbs his Chain of Causes.  
ANd did not his will assure the necessity of man's will, and consequently of all that on man's will dependeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction and impediment to the Omnipotency and liberty of God.) I do not observe how this consequence can be deduced out of the premises; for if God endowed man with liberty and free power in his nature, why should it follow, if God do not necessitate his actions, that man's will would cross and impede the power and liberty of God? For the will of God is, that man should act freely: the free actions therefore are according to his will, and the necessitation would be contrary to his will. But, I think, he means, that if man's free power could sin against the will of God, than man should be able to contradict and stop his Omnipotency and Liberty. To understand this therefore, consider with me, that God's Dominion over this World, is like that of a King in a Kingdom; he gives Laws and Rules to the Subjects, which if they observe, they shall live happily under him; but if not, he will punish and afflict, yea perhaps destroy the offending parties: It is an opposition to the King's power, that when men break his Laws, and he shall go about to punish them, they shall then rebel against him, and oppose the power of the County, or of the Kingdom, or that power which he musters up to do Justice upon them▪ then indeed his power is contradicted and impeded. God, whilst men live here with these natures, hath given Rules, and governs them by such Laws as he hath appointed them for their good; if they observe those Laws, happy are they, but he seldom puts in his Omnipotency to make men do the one or the other, never to make men break his Laws; he ordinarily doth not vary the nature of man, or any thing. Men may and may not keep his Commandments, (I do not now dispute of the nature of Grace, or any thing of that kind) they that do not, shall be punished, as the other blessed; and then comes in his Omnipotency; if man could resist or impede that, that were contradicting his power; but these sins only oppose his concourse which inclines, but not necessitates a man's nature; so that there is God's voluntas facere & fieri, his will which we should do; which it is impossible for God to oppose; and there is his voluntas facere, to do himself, which it is not possible for man to oppose: The first appears in this life, the second in the other; nor is it any contradiction to the Divine Power which hath so established it, and without which it were impossible for his Power to join with his Justice in punishing Offenders at the last day; for how can a man justly be punished for what was not in his power to do otherwise, yea much less can he punish him in Justice, who makes him commit that fault which he punisheth, which God must do, if he (with his co-operation in the act) determines man's power to that evil which he punisheth, and for which condemneth him to Hell. Certainly, this is the most abominable impudent Doctrine for sinning that ever was read in any Author that ever writ of this Subject, and the most derogative from that infinite Essential Goodness that should cause, or make men do evil; for no more than fire can cool or act against its nature, no more can God, who is essentially good (goodness itself) act that which is evil. It is in vain for a man to say, it is not evil, God doing it; for it is an evil which God hates and punisheth, and therefore must be evil in his esteem. I do not now speak of that Language used by some, Of God's afflictions working with some men, which comes not in this discourse to be disputed of; but that God doth work these sins which he punisheth, this is abhorrent to the thought of a Religious man. And now, I must censure Mr. Hobbs, not only for ill and false Doctrine, but for having such a delight in it, as in this place unnecessarily to obtrude it, where there was no reason for, nor use of it; for let any man consider what this hath to do with liberty of the Subject, which is the Head he undertook to treat of; the liberty of the Subject is neither more or less for his linking of his actions to God Almighty; nay, if his discourse be true, Subjects have as great liberty as Kings, for all their actions are alike necessitated by this Chain.  
Here Reader, I thought to have ended with his Politics, having, as I think, digged up his Foundation, and then the Building must fall; but meeting so many wicked interpretations of Scripture, and so many abominable conclusions in Divinity intermixed with his Political discourses, I am forced to proceed with some of them, lest the Reader should be unhappily seduced, but not prosecute them word by word, as I have done; but skipping from one hill to another, leaving the lesser work, and Molehills, to be censured by any man who hath more leisure and spare time; and to that purpose remove with me to the next page 109. about the middle, where he begins thus.    


CHAP. XX. SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his impious Proposition in this Paragraph, discovered and censured. Injustice and iniquity the same. The Subject not Author of the actions of his Sovereign. The Sovereign, granting the former Proposition, cannot kill an Innocent justly. No man hath power to take away his own life justly. Neither Subjects nor Kings have right to any thing but from God, who gives not power to either to shed Innocent Blood. The Law of Nature, deserted by Mr. Hobbs, to the murder of an Innocent. His disapprobation of Scripture censured.  
NEvertheless we are not to understand, that by such liberty, the Sovereign Power of Life and Death is either abolished or limited.) I conceive, by Sovereign Power, he means the power of the Sovereign, and that Authority not limited by any Law, which being violated, he should do unjustly: (for this sense the sequel of this discourse will apparently justify) and then I say it is a wicked Proposition, as will appear by the examination of his reasons, which he enters upon in the following words: (For it hath been already shown, that nothing the Sovereign Representative can do to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury): Yes, he hath shown it with a nice and learned distinction, betwixt Injustice and Iniquity; concerning which, I may justly say they are hardly two words, but not two things, as I have showed. But what doth he mean by a Sovereign Representative here? I think he hath delivered, that all Sovereigns are Representatives of the people; What he can mean by this addition of Representative, I know not; but he explains himself in the words following; Because (saith he) every Subject is Auth●r of every act the Sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth right to anything, otherwise then as he himself is a Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature.) The first part I have spoken to heretofore, and showed, that every Subject is not Author of the Sovereign's acts; where, he saith, he hath shown it: But now I shall go further, and prove, that if they were Authors of his acts, yet by their Authority he cannot kill an Innocent justly; which I do thus,— The people cannot authorise him to act any thing, which they themselves have not just power to do; but the people conjunctim, or divisim, have no just power to take away an innocent man's life; therefore they cannot authorise him. The major is grounded upon that invincible Axiom, No man gives what he hath not; therefore if they have not that power, they cannot give it. The minor will be proved thus;— Before a Commonwealth be instituted, no man hath just power to take away another's life, as is most evident. ay, but they may answer, every man hath power over his own, which every man may yield to the Sovereign 〈◊〉 rejoin; No man hath just power to take away his ow● life, he may give his goods, but not his life; God is the God of life, and hath given no private man Authority to cut off his own life, and therefore undoubtedly he cannot give power to another, which he hath not himself. And if there were no other argument against his popular Constitution of a Supreme, this were enough for confutation of it; for there must be a power of life and death in a Commonwealth upon the emergency of great iniquities, it cannot subsist else. And so I pass to the second part of that conclusion, which is, (Otherwise then as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature:) There is much folly (if not wickedness) in these few words. First, I say, neither Kings, nor any man, hath right to any thing, but as they are Gods Subjects: The earth is the Lords, and all that is in it; and to whom he giveth it, they have right to such pieces, and none else: He is King of Kings, with a much greater Prerogative than they can have over their Subjects: They can have no power therefore or right to act any thing which is not a power delegated from him; and certainly he can never show me any power given to Kings by God to shed innocent blood. Secondly, it is a strange phrase used by him (and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature:) First, because the Law of Nature, in particulars, is to preserve, not to take away life in general; and concerning Commonwealths, to reward Virtue, and punish Vice; when this wicked book would have it the Law of Nature, to kill an Innocent, yea a virtuous person. Secondly, consider (that being bound, because he is God's Subject, to the Law of Nature) and only that he should not be bound to God's positive Laws in Scripture, a distinction which he himself makes use of, and therefore may more powerfully be retorted to him; but he loves not Scripture, and this odious expression of his is most abominable.   

SECT. II.  
Mr. Hobbs his Proposition in this Paragraph examined and censured. His dubious expressions discovered from his former Assertions, and refuted. Scripture seldom cited by Mr. Hobbs, but to give a celour and Authority to Impiety. Jephta's rash Vow examined. The execution of that Vow impious. Jephta's Sacrifice no Precedent for others.  
HE goes on: (And therefore it may, and doth often happen in Commonwealths, that a Subject m●y be put to death by the Command of the Sovereign Power, and yet neither to the other wrong.) There is one shift in this Proposition by which it may be justified, as thus; That a Sovereign may punish a Delinquent, who formally did him no wrong, or an inconsiderable one, that is, to the Prince himself; but for an injury to another of his Fellow Subjects, as for robbing, or burning his Neighbour's house. But (as it seems) by that argumentative word therefore, which must relate to the precedent matter, he may do it, when the murdered Party hath done no wrong to any body, and then it is wickedly false, he gives instances two or three. We will examine them next [As (saith he) when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed in which and the like cases, he that ●o dyeth, had liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless put to death without injury] I could wish he would let Scripture alone, for he loving it not with a due reverence, seldom na●es it, but to countenance some wickedness, as here. This story is recorded Judges the 11. And Mr. Hobbs I am persuaded did know how it is with sharpness disputed by Divines whether he sacrificed her, or made a Votary of her. I will embroile myself in no unnecessary controversies, but will grant all he requires in that dispute, that he did sacrifice her; what follows then? that he did i● justly? certainly no, the actions of bad Kings, yea the bad actions of good Princes cannot be justifiable precedents for following ages. The world and the particular men in it are compounded of good and evil; there is not any man so bad as hath no good, but that he may be worse; nor any man so good, but he may be better; he hath some ill actions falling from him. That is it which I speak of this very gallant person, Jephta, he might have such an ill action out of a foolish mistaken Zeal, that that rash vow of his was to be kept; it was a foolish and a rash vow; for (for my par●) I cannot guess what he could imagine, what he could conceive, should come out of his doors which should be fit for a sacrifice to God; Domestic creatures, as dogs, servants or children, are all of them hated by God for sacrifices. Calves, Rams, Cows, Goats etc. which are the proper things for sacrifices, are not domestic inhabitants; but to shed innocent blood in offering his daughter for a sacrifice was without doubt most impious; and this is reckoned by David in Psalm 106. verse 38. amongst the abominations of the Israelites that they shed blood, in their offering up their Sons and Daughters to Devils. ay, but it may be objected, that he had vowed it to God. A vow made to do evil is ipso facto void; God never confirmed it; he ought not to keep it, but to repent for making it; this was to shed innocent blood which was a sacrifice fit for none but the Devil, from whom the instigation to it proceeded; so that if Jephta did kill her for a sacrifice, he did wickedly. There is a certain humour in many men, who will be peremptory in some point of religion that they may seem godly, who value not much the reality of it: they will keep a rash, or (which amounts to the same) a not well advised oath, although to sin, when they will neglect obedience to do righteously; this was evident in King Saul, you may find 1 Sam. 14. 24. Saul curseth any man who should eat any food until eventide; here was a most rash curse, and the 27. verse, Johnathan who knew nothing of this curse of his Fathers eats a little honey; in the 44. verse, Saul swears again, that he shall surely die: what a horrid injustice had this been in Saul to slay that gallant person, a man of so much honour and worth, for the satisfaction of his rash oath? You shall find in the next Chap. that Samuel gave Saul a commandment from God to do execution upon Amalek, and then he can in the 9 verse spare Agag and the best of their cattle; see the same humour in both, that which God had prohibited, murder, even upon his own son, he would have committed, although against God's law, because it was agreeing with that religion which he had instituted for God, to wit his oath; but then upon the same reason he spared Agag when God commanded his destruction, because it suited better with his fancy that they should make a glorious sacrifice to God of what they had taken: and therefore in the 22. v. Sam. gives him this heavy reproof, Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and sacrifices as in obeying the voice of the Lord? behold to obey is better than sacrifice. When God hath given laws for men's actions it is a disobedience to invent witty ways of our own which cross them, to spare what God would have us destroy, and destroy that which God would have us save. This was the humour of Saul's religion. I dare not censure Jephta, he was a person of as spotless integrity as any I find amongst the Judges, unless Samuel; but if he did kill his daughter, I may justly say it was a most unjust act, and a satisfaction of his fancy in religion (which imagined what he had sworn in re illicita, must be performed although against God's law, which forbids killing which in sacrifice required no such thing) but not a religious act; nor can this be a precedent for others, nor a justification of others in doing the like, although a better man than he be joined with him, which is David; and so I come to his second instance.   

CHAP. XX. SECT. III.  
The murder of Uriah discussed. Mr Hobbs his distinction censured. Killing of an innocent contrary not only to the equitable part, but the very letter of the law of nature. The law not the executioner kills a Criminal. No power given by Uriah to David to kill him being an innocent. Mr. Hobbs his errors multiplied from his fictitious institution of Sovereigns by popular election. Uriah not impowered to dispose of his own life.  
HIs words are, [In which and the like cases he that so dyeth, had liberty to do the action, for which he is nevertheless, without injury put to death.] I have showed the contrary: it is an injury to put any man to death for that which he had liberty (that is) was not bound by law, not to do, and such a law which enjoined such a penalty for the breach of it. Again he [And the same holdeth also in a Sovereign Prince, that putteth to death an innocent Subject.] What a Tautology is this? I thought he had discoursed of a Sovereign Prince all this while; if not, it is more abominable. ay, but he hath reason for what he hath delivered, for (saith he) Though the action be against the law of nature as being contrary to equity (as was the kill of Uriah by David) yet it was not an injury to Uriah; but to God. A very fine and delicate distinction, of which I have spoke before. But now concerning this language, as it is used here, though the action (saith he) be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equity.] First, Reader, consider, if he take equity (as many times it is) for a mitigation or a gentle exposition which moderates the extreme rigour of the law, this surely may be deduced out of the law of nature, than (saith he) it is against the law of nature, because against the kind and charitable exposition of the law of nature only; but without question killing an innocent is most directly contrary to the very letter of the law of nature and the full sense of it, for although he makes nothing of the positive law of God in this discourse, yet the ten commandments being by all understood to be an illustration or explication of that law writ in our hearts (as he himself seems to allow hereafter) therefore that law being clear, Thou shalt not kill, and this killing an innocent being the most detestable of all other, it is most clearly not only against the equity but the letter, that is that sense which the law intends; for the law of nature directs and commands that virtue and virtuous men should be rewarded and encouraged, and vice punished. Thou shalt not kill for the satisfaction of thy passion, whom the law doth not direct; but if the law command killing, lest the Commonwealth be hurt by so wicked a person, lest vice may be nourished, than the law kills, not thou who art an executioner of the law. And therefore to kill an innocent is a monstrous crime, whom no law kills; he gives an instance again, as was the kill of Uriah by David, yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God: yes, the greatest injury could be done to him. No saith he, not to Uriah, because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself. Show that concession or gift from Vriah and it will go a great way to my satisfaction, nay certainly there was never such a concession from Uriah or any Subject, that the King shall kill him being an innocent. It is not good for the Commonwealth that any have such a power, because by such a wicked act the Commonwealth loseth a worthy member as was uriah; but that abominable false foundation of the only way of instituting a Commonwealth by the popular election, that impossible error leads him into many more; but suppose uriah yielded such a power, yea if it had been done by such a consent as he expressed, yet they had no power over their own lives; and therefore could not empower him over them; especially when embodied into a Commonwealth; for his country hath a share in every Subject's life, and good subjects well-being, by which it is amended and bettered; so that he must needs do an injury to others by such an act; for it is wrong and again all justice, that man should suffer by welldoing. This may suffice for the first piece of that sentence, now we will examine the second.   

CHAP. XX. SECT. IV.  
David's sin in murdering Uriah, a sin against God, because an injury to man. St. Ambrose explained. David his sovereignty freed from the punishment of sin, but not from the guilt of it. Rom. 13. 4. the first epistle of St. Peter 2. 14. explained. The former assertions proved against Mr. Hobbs, by the authority of St. Basil, St. chrysostom, St. Hierom, and St. Augustin▪ The authors sense of these words, tibi soli peccavi. Mr. Hobbs his variation from the authority and reading of England. The former conclusions recapitulated and asserted against Mr. Hobbs from the meaning of this text.  
A And yet to God; because David was God's Subject, and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature.] Well, now let us consider, why this was iniquity; for no other reason certainly but because it was injustice done to another man. The law of nature prescribes all, (and nothing but) in justice: if it be towards God it is called religion, which pays to God the duty which we owe him, and is set down in the four first commandments of the Decalogue; but all the justice which is due to man, is set down in the six latter. I must then tell him, that that act of Murder in David was not a sin against God, but only out of regard that it was an injury to man; for, therefore the law of nature written in men's hearts, and the positive law of God was against it, because it was unjust for man to do it; so that the reason why it was an offence against God, being only, because it was an injury to man, it must follow that it cannot be an injury to God, but it must likewise be an injury to man. ay, but (saith he) it was against God, because King David was God's subject. Yet give me leave, although King David was God's subject, yet it doth not follow that in murdering his fellow subjects he did no injury to them, no more than the King's subjects, officers or Judges under him may be said in condemning innocent blood to injure only the King, and not the person whom he so murdered: it is most evident therefore, that that sin was against both God and man. But he brings scripture for what he writes: which distinction, David himself when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, To thee only have I sinned. Which text you may read Psalm. 51. 4. and to ●nderstand the sense of it, let us reflect upon the story of this Psalm, as it is recorded, with 2 Sam. 12. where we may observe, that after he had committed these heinous sins of adultery and murder, God sent Nathan the Prophet to him, and he told David his own story, under a Parable of a Rich man, who took a poor man's lamb from him to entertain his friend with it. This was a picture of David's crime; was not this injustice? Consider then in the 9 verse, where he acquaints the King with God's sentence against him, he doth not lay to his charge only that he had offended God, but that he had killed uriah the Hittite with the sword, and had taken his wife to be his wife, and had slain him with the sword of the Children of Ammon: so that the sins of David were against men; for though all sin is against God, even the trespass against men is therefore a sin, because against God's law; yet it is a sin against men, and therefore prohibited by God's law because unjust to men. I speak of all such sins, which are suâ naturâ in their own nature sins, of which kind murder is; then let us look to the 14. verse of this Psalm. Deliver me from bloodguiltiness O God. Bloodguiltiness, what is that? Nothing but the guilt of that sin which he had committed by that murderous act of kill Vriah, and therefore as a murderer is guilty of the crime, until he is absolved of his Judge, and his only Judge God Almighty had acquitted him; he until then was guilty of blood, of murdering Vriah. Well then undoubtedly that was an unjust act, let Mr. Hobbs say what he will or can. But I will do him right, he goes not alone in this opinion; but hath St. Ambrose, a person of great honour both for judgement and integrity, along with him; and because I will urge this argument to the full, I will say he was no Court parasite; one who would flatter Kings into sin, as was evident in that contest he had with the Emperor Theodosius, in which was apparent both an incomparable Emperor, and a pious and zealous Prelate. This St. Ambrose utters some things in his book called Apologia David like Mr. Hobbs, where in his tenth Chap. at the beginning he expounds these words [tibi soli peccavi] Rex utique erat, nullis ipse legibus tenebatur, I have sinned only to thee, for he was a King, he was held or confined by no laws; because (saith he) Kings are free from the bonds of laws, neither by any laws are they called to punishment, being safe by the power of Empire. This a man would think abundantly full, but yet he never used Mr. Hobbs his Phrase, to say he did not unjustly. But his first speech must be understood that he was not with held by any humane laws: for Mr. Hobbs confesseth that he is responsable for the breach of divine laws, by the law of nature. Secondly, that speech of his, that Kings are freed from the bonds of their faults; that must be understood of such bonds, as imprisonments, or such punishments which by humane laws are enjoined offenders; and that is clearly expounded by his last sentence, that they are by no laws called to punishment, being safe in the power of Empire, that i●, safe from the questioning of their subjects; so that his wh●le sense is this, That David as a King was not responsable for his subjects to any man, nor liable to any punishment for them. I could speak more to this, and show how that S●. Ambrose produced another exposition presently after: but certainly neither he nor any man but Mr. Hobbs will say it was not injustice; it is suâ naturâ ●●just, to punish with the greatest punishment, death, an innocent person. Nor doth his being a King, make it less injustice, ●ut rather aggravate it; because his chief office under God, and for which he is constituted by God, is, to distribute justice equally, and reward the virtuous, and punish the evil, as St. Paul excellently and clearly speaks, Rom. 13. 4. He is the minister of God to thee for Good (that is, to thee who dost that w●ich is good, as he speaks in the 3. verse) but if thou dost evil be afraid, for he beareth not the sword in vain, for he is the minister of God; a Revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. So likewise St. Peter 1. Epist. 2. 14. makes it their business to punish evil doers, and the praise of them who do well. Now if these be the contents of the commission from God to these his Deputies, they must needs be guilty of injustice who punish citra condignum, where there was no desert of it; and they who a●e Kings, so much the more, by how much it is their particular duty to take care of the contrary. I have now cleared the sense of S●. Ambrose as I guess, but lest any scruple might remain from his authority, with any man, who might mistake his sense, I will therefore weigh▪ down the Scales with the weights of others, his near contemporaries, of no less honour in Christendom than himself. And the first I shall present you with, is St. Basil, the great, (so he is called) in his scholia upon this verse of this Psalm: Tibi soli peccavi cum multis & magnis donis tuis sum positus: Since I enjoy many and great gifts of thine, but have returned contrary things: he doth not say here that he had not sinned against Uriah; he had indeed offended against him, and against his wife, but the greatest prevarication was committed against God himself, who had c●o●en him, and constituted him King, and therefore he rightly added, and done this evil in thy sight; thus far St. Basil. The next which I shall produce, shall be S●. Chrysostom upon this Psalm, and this verse, and he agrees very much with St. Basil. To thee only have I sinned, Many (saith he) and great benefits have I received from thee, but I have returned them with contrary things, for these things which by thy law are interdicted, I have not doubted to commit: neither doth he say, that I have not hurt Uriah, for he had both hurt him and his wife, but the greatest iniquity was against God. Thus far St. Chrysostum. Next consider St. Hierom; Tibi solùm peccavi, to thee only have I sinned, for to thee every man sins when he sins, because thou art only without sin, as the Apostle speaks. Rom. 3. 4. God is true but every man a liar; or else David saith, I have sinned and thou only art without sin, as saith the Prophet Isaiah 53. Who did no sin nor was guile found in his mouth. St. Augustin likewise harps upon the same string. To thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight, what is this, saith that heavenly man? Had not he adulterated another's wife and slain her husband? Did not all men know what David had done? What is that he saith then, to thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight? (He answers) because thou only art without sin; he is a just punisher who h●th nothing in himself to be punished; he is a just reprehender who hath nothing in himself to be reprehended. Here you may see how holy and learned men (living near together about one time with St. Ambrose, men famous in their generations, and to whom the Church of Christ owes exceeding much for the propagation of the Gospel) gave their sense of this text of scripture as well as he; and St. Augustin was one who honoured St. Ambrose living and dead: yet you see varies from him in his judgement in this point. Give me leave to show my sense of these words and then conclude. And first I will allow Mr. Hobbs his reading, to thee, which is not according to our translation, which is against thee; and certainly by men learned in the Hebrew both amongst the ancient and modern writers, with a great con●ent 〈◊〉 is acknowledged to be true; yet it profits his cause nothing to read it as he doth; insomuch that Bellarmine in his Comment upon this Psalm, saith, To thee only have I sinned, he doth not say, against thee only; he had offended against uriah, against Bathsheba, he had scandalised the people; but to thee only, as Judge, and none else can judge and condemn me, as he illustrates it. So that although Mr. Hobbs varies from his own rule of scripture, yet he gets nothing to his cause by it. But to proceed in expounding; I ask leave and beg pardon of such eminent men from whom I may seem to differ; for my part, I do not think that David here acts the part of a King, or so much as thinks of his great Regality (if he did, it was to aggravate not to extenuate his sin) but of a penitent; and in his penitence is a pattern to other men, as well as Kings, how they should demean themselves; even Kings in those duties are reconciling themselves to their King, in respect of whom they are poor and mean people; and if they should consider themselves Kings, they should by this increase their humility, considering that he who o●es so much to God should be so ungrateful and unmindful of him, The Prophet therefore now considering his offence to God cries out. To thee only have I sinned; before, Nathan the Prophet had visited him, and told him of his ●aults, he thought he had sinned only to man, and therefore to hide his first sin with Bathsheba, he added another of murder, by which he thought his shame of the other might be hid from men, which was possible; but now clean contrary when he is acquainted with the wrath of God for his sin, now he cares not for his sin to men, so he may be right with God, and to that end penned this Psalm, to be sung in Churches; and to God utters those lamentable complaints; that he is besmeared with blood; that his bones are broken; that he hath need of God's great and many mercies; that his heart is broke, yea contrite; that he is all unclean and must be washed, and washed again; that he begs God to purge and make him clean, although with hyssop and sharp medicines. Here is the perfect character of a true penitent; many a ●●an is sorry for his sin, because it breeds him shame and worldly evil; but this doth him no good: ●ut King David is grieved for sin because sin; because against God's law which he hath transgressed; he car●s not what this world thinks of him, so God be appeased and reconciled to him; and therefore that this may be done, he only begs his pardon and thinks only of him, To thee only etc. do ●hou acquit me, I care for nothing else. And surely, this is the most certain test of a true repentance, when a man grieves that he hath offended God, and values nothing but that offence; not that Bathsheba was a woman which he injured, but that he took the members of God and made them the members of an ●arlot; not that uriah was a man, and that a gallant person, but that he was the I●age of God, which he destroyed: those and the like meditations are the issues of true and hearty repentance; but yet consider, (as I have said before) the●e things were sins to God, and God is therefore offended with them because they are breaches of his laws concerning men with man in particular●; you may find this most emphatically expressed by Nathan in the pronouncing God's sentence against David, where the punishment is proportioned to the offence, 2 Sam. 12. 10. Now therefore because thou hast killed Vriah the Hittite with the sword of the Ammonites, as it was expressed in the 9 verse, therefore the sword shall never depart from thy house: then for his sin with Bathsheba, verse 11. and 12. I will take thy wives before thine eyes and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lie with them in the sight of the sun, for thou didst it secretly, but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun. Then, because by this deed he had given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, his child by her was adjudged to death, as it is in the 14. verse. So that it is evident by his punishments that he sinned against men; and it is a most vain thing to collect from hence that a King can do no injustice to his subjects, for certainly it is injustice in a King to butcher barbarously any man, which without danger he may save, how much more his own subjects which he is bound to preserve, and his virtuous subjects whom he ought to reward. I have been long in this: Mr. Hobbs hath another instance for the lawfulness or supremes to do any thing without injustice.   

CHAP. XX. SECT. V.  
Mr. Hobbs his instance of the Commonwealth of Athens examined.  
IN the same manner the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their Commonwealth for ten years, thought they committed no injustice. The Athenians thought so; but doth Mr. Hobbs think so? For although he brings this for an argument to prove the arbitrary power which Supremes have over their Subjects lives, yet the scorn he puts upon i● within few lines (which I shall speedily mention) shows his contempt of it; and no doubt, but the Athenians themselves, although in the doing of it were delighted with such acts of power, yet when it was done, and the lack of such a worthy person to assist at the helm of the State, did make them sensible of the unhappiness of that act; they would repent of it and detest it, and find it is most unjust and imprudent; unjust, because distributive justice ought with all caresses and politic blessings to reward virtuous men; but to banish them is a heavy punishment due to evil doers; and it is imprudent to b●nish such, for by that means the Commonwealth loseth his assistance and perhaps finds that man an unhappy enemy, who would have been a steadfast friend. He goes on. And yet they never questioned what crime he had done, but what hurt he would do, No, they never questioned what he had done, or what he would do; for how could Aristides (whose glory consisted in justice not in arms) be mist●●sted to endeavour hurt to the state? for that virtue (which he was so honoured for,) is so far from destroying, that it is the very soul and life of a Commonwealth, or rather I may term it, the spirits, wh●ch under the soul act with every part in the performance of their several duties, and where that is lacking, the inhabitants of a Commonwealth will be like wal●s built with loose stones without mortar, which with ordinary storms will fall asunder and perish. I will not trouble myself with the words which follow; briefly he instanceth in Ostracism which was used there, by which sometimes an Aristides was banished for his virtue and justice; sometimes a scurrilous Jester as Hyperbotus. Let us consider this Ostracism, that is a legal act proper to that government, not a mere arbitrary, but a legal privilege granted the people, that when there was an occasion of any such danger, they had their votes in it. Now the proposition by him to be proved was tha● such an act as this might justly be done by the supreme only by his will, which can never by any Logic be enforced hence; and yet I can say further, that even the laws of foreign nations may be censured by such as are not subject to them, and have been in all ages without breach of duty or civility. I join this therefore with that other Grecian city famous for its polity, that of Lacedaemon, in which it was one of the arcana imperii, that when their country Tenants grew too numerous, that they feared they might endanger the City, they would in a night go out, and slay thousands of them; this was a most barbarous thing, for subject's lives should be tender to Magistrates, and the lives of virtuous subjects precious; and therefore I fear this Athenian custom of Ostracism is the worse, because an Aristides was worth thousands of common people, and therefore think such a law was most unworthy a wise state, and not fit to be acted in any, where there is no law for i●.   

CHAP. XX. SECT. VI  
This paragraph, giving liberty to a person justly condemned, to resist the execution of the sentence given against him, the grand incitement to rebellion; contrary to the dictate of St. Paul, and practice of eminent Martyrs.  
I Pass from this to page (11●.) In the midst of that page having discoursed of the liberty of subjects, how that they have right to any such thing which they have not passed away by covenant, he at the end of that page seems to give instances thus. If the Sovereign command a man (though justly condemned) to ●ill, ●wound, or maim himself▪ or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey. Truly in my judgement some pieces of this are great encouragements to Treason; as that particle, to resist them who assault him. Certainly if a man may do it for his own defence, he may do it for others, who are men of a like condition in their humanity, and it may be, in their sin; and than it must follow where are many guilty persons they may lawfully combine and stand to each other in their defence; and in order to that, do what mischief they can for their safety. Now St. Paul seemed to be of another mind when Act. 25. 11. he told Festus, if I have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die; it is a sign of a rebellious spirit to resist authority, to which he should be subject; and for aught I know, the pretence of most rebellious in the world, is their own defence, against imagined personal dangers. Had his doctrine be true, the Cro●n of Martyrdom had lost those thousands who filled the Roman Army, and could by this pretence have defended themselves; they chose rather to water and fructi●ie the ●eed of God's word by their blood; they thought it an injust war, to defend their just lives; how much more in an unjust cause should men less dare to do it?   

CHAP. XX. SECT. VII.  
Mr. Hobbs his institution of a Commonwealth again examined and censured. The absurdity and evil consequences of his doctrine.  
WE pass now to his page 112. in the 7. line. Again, the consent of a Subject to Sovereign power, is contained in these words, I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions. I have already and I think fully treated of the follies, weakness and wickedness of this imagination of his heretofore, which he makes the foundation of his whole Politics. He proceeds; in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty. What an impious proposition is this? that he who had before affirmed, that man by nature had right to any goods, any life, any thing which conduced to his own contented life before a Commonwealth was instituted, hath now, by these words which institute and give form and being to his doctrine of a Commonwealth; these, not liberties only, but licenses, but abominations must not be abridged or restrained. But mark his reason— for (saith he) by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. So that it seems, the authorising he speaks of is of the supremes actions, not his commands; and then surely his former proposition is not good, men are restrained by nothing of the Sovereign commands, where his own interest is personally opposed to it. If this be not insufferable doctrine in any well governed Commonwealth, I know not what is: for by this any man may act any thing which may conduce to his contented living; nay, what is more, he hath right to do it: and if so, what a condition would a Commonwealth be in? a King according to his doctrine may without injustice kill any man which he thinks fit, and a subject hath right to kill him when he thinks it conduceth to his good; for naturally every man hath this right by his doctrine, and so cannot be supposed by any contract to part from his natural right; all this is evident out of the beginning of the 14. Chap. where he defines the right of nature thus, The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say of his own life; and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means to conduce thereto. And there is much more to this purpose, of which I have already treated in my notes upon that Chap. So that it is clear by his doctrine, That the constitution of a Commonwealth enables the Sovereign to act nothing by right, more than another man, because that constitution doth not restrain the right of nature, and the right of nature empowers every man to act any thing which shall appear to him for his particular advantage, by his Book. I shall treat no more of this now.   

CHAP. XX. SECT. VIII.  
Mr. Hobbs his contradictions discovered and censured. His conclusions tending to disloyalty.  
I Will step to the next paragraph; but first consider that in the beginning of this I last discoursed about, he saith, The consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words, [I authorize, and take upon me all his actions. Now in this he saith, No man is bound by the words themselves either to kill himself, or any other man; and consequently the obligation a man may sometimes have, (upon the command of the Sovereign) to execute any dangerous or dishonourable affair, dependeth not upon the words of our submission, but on the intention, which is to be understood by the end thereof. Mark, Reader, how immediately he contradicts himself, first his consent is contained in these words etc. Secondly it is not contained in the words but in the intention which is to be understood by the end thereof. He indeed put them both together in the preceding page towards the bottom of that page, and there you may find him telling what the end is, Namely the peace of the subjects within themselves and their defence against a common enemy. Now then since he gives the subject this latitude of interpreting the commands of his sovereign, it is not credible that he will judge his own ruin or hurt, or that of his Father, Wife, Children, dear Friends shall conduce to the peace of the subjects within themselves; so that there then he hath safe refuge for mischief by right, and he may refuse to obey upon such grounds as he speaks, and do it rightly.    

CHAP. XXI.  
Liberty given to criminals to assist one another against the sword of justice, the greatest incentive to the late rebellion. The murder of Charles the first legitimated by Mr. Hobbs his conclusions.  
I Wish myself at an end of this, but his gross errors make me stop at more particulars than I intended. Look down towards the conclusion of this page you shall find that at the beginning of that paragraph he concluded it unjust in the defence of another man to resist the sword of the Commonwealth. But (saith he) in case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or committed some capital crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the liberty then to join together and assist and defend one another? Certainly they have; for they but defend their lives, which the guilty may as well do, as the innocent. Let the Reader consider here what a justification this was of those men who bore unjust arms at that time when he writ this book in English. It is true he allows the first rising to be unjust, but all that damnable prosecution of that war, even that act which I never think upon but with horror, the murder of king Charles the first was lawful by him, for when they had drawn their swords in rebellion, their lives were forfeited, and then all the future prosecution was just because in defence of their lives. I but page. 113. (where I am at the bottom of that paragraph) he gives a fair pretence for what he speaks: which is, The offer of pardon taketh from them to whom it is offered, the plea of self defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawful. A goodly piece of nicety! I if a sovereign do not give his subjects pardon for their rebellion, they may continue on; and only the first act is unjust; all other murders, rapines, iniquities of men are not to be reckoned in the catalogue of unjust actions; as if one sin preceding, w●ich causeth the following, might also justify them: and for offering pardon, he knows they have answered, that that cannot serve them, as long as there is power in the offended party to make his revenge, and justify his proceeding against them; and unless they take away that, there is no security for them. These things I thought to have passed by; but being so abominable, it was necessary to lay hold upon them, at the least with this animadversion. And now I pass over twenty more, and leap to his 26. Chap. 148.   

CHAP. XXII.  

SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his endeavour to render the Christian religion suspected. Of the assurance we have of revelations. The difference of assurance from the object, from the acts. Assurance from science, from opinion, from faith. The assurance of faith greater than that of science. The assurance we have of the truth of Christian religion by divine revelation, from the things themselves revealed, from the manner of their delivery, and the persons who delivered them to us. The particulars of the creation described by Moses, not possible to be known without divine revelation. An argument from reason to confirm the former assertion.  
WHich Chap. is entitled of Civil laws, but treats of all laws, and divers distinctions of them, but in this page about the middle of the page he enters into a discourse of divine positive laws, which he distinguisheth from natural laws, that the one are eternal (I will cavil at nothing) that is, he means, always consisting with men to whom they are given; the other had a beginning; the one are universal to all men that have humane nature; but (he saith) the positive are instituted in time, and to particular persons or nations, and declared for such by those, whom God h●th authorised to declare them. But (saith he) this authority of man to declare what be these positive laws of God how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernatural way, to deliver laws to other men. But because it is of the essence of laws, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God. I transcribe all this, because the reader▪ by it should understand from what ground he raiseth two questions, which he answering unchristianly, will require a better satisfaction from my pen. The questions are these. How can a man without supernatural revelation be assured of the revelation received by the declarer? and how can he be bound to obey them? Two noble questions to be disputed against heathens, and because upon all occasions he takes advantage to make himself seem such, (whether he be or no, God knows) I shall endeavour to refute him; But withal give the reader this caution that throughout his Book he violently forceth himself to such disputes as may render Christian religion suspected, as if he had an ambition to make this, Babble shall I say, or impious treatise of his, to be authentic; for what necessity had he here to raise those doubts? It had been enough for him and his whole design to show that the holy Bible had manifested those positive laws to us, and never to have raised such scruples whereby a man may doubt (as it seems he doth) whether these laws are divine or not. Consider therefore his answer for the first question, how a man can be assured of the revelation of another, without a revelation particularly to himself, it is evidently impossible; and I answer it is possiible; we will try it out; and first let us consider this leading term for this discourse, which is [assuted] how a man can be assured; the power of that word must be explained. There is a diversity of assurances, Mathematical, physical, moral, all which have their several force, and differ only by degrees. In the first kind we are assured that two and two make four; and the like; in the second that fire will burn, whose nature doth (if not hindered) break out into the act; in the third that when I see a debauched man stay with a company of drunkards along time at a Tavern I can be assured that they will be inflamed with drink; so likewise when a pious man hears the bell toll to prayers, he will go to Church. Thus our assurance is varied, according to the object which it is busied about. But there is another diversity drawn from the difference of this act, which produceth assurance; as thus, there is an assurance from science, from opinion, from faith. The certainty of science is drawn from the certainty of the medium by which it is proved, and is exceeding great; by some esteemed greater than that of faith; at the least of a greater evidence; although for my part I am not of that mind; for it being a most clear and absolute truth that God is infinitely verax as well as verus, true speaking, as well as true being, and faith (I mean divine faith) being an adhesion to what God speaks, it is not possible to be a falsehood, & then there is the greatest argumentative evidence that can be of the truth of such a proposition which God hath delivered: but I will not involve myself in niceties. That which is proper to my immediate discourse is, that science is, from natural operations, of nature I causes; faith (divine faith) from supernatural, from God; which must be more certain in itself, & ●y faith made more certain to us; opinion is only probable, which may be other; and this probability either relates to science, as it is probable such causes will produce such effects, or such effects proceed; from such causes or else it relates to faith, and it is then, when a good honest man speaks any thing, it is by faith probable to be true; but yet it may be otherwise; only divine faith admits of no falsehood in its self, and requires no doubting or hesitation in us. Now although this assurance of opinion and probability be the least, yet it yields us such an assurance, as we build the greatest moral and politic actions (which are practised amongst us) upon it. As when a man is dead, his hand and seal passes away his estate; witnesses are dead likewise; these are probable arguments only; but being the greatest that the subject question can 〈◊〉, the greatest matters must be regulated by such probable arguments. I can say the like of oaths, they have neither a Physical certainty, nor do they produce a divine faith; but yet when we have hand and seal, and Oath, Mr. Hobbs will not say I think, that we have no assurance. How then can he say that we have no assurance that these are divine revelations, which are delivered in the Bible? (for that is the sense of the question which he proposeth) but that we have great assurance is that which I affirm. I shall not here meddle with School niceties, nor with any thing about infused faith, but only the acquired faith, which we have of these truths. Many learned men have debated this question with great variety of Learning, which may be perused in their Comments upon the 3. of the sentences Dist. 24. as likewise many times in Prologue. and 22. of Aquinas, question, 1. as also in Imas●●undae, with many particular treatises to that purpose. I turn the reader to these places which with ease he may peruse, and find amongst them, what he reads not with me, who intent to deliver such things here, as they have scarce touched upon. My arguments shall be drawn, first from the things delivered in this book; Then from the manner of the delivery, and Thirdly from the persons who delivered these things; in all which I shall not meddle with those particular Books, or Chapters of Books which are controverted betwixt us and the Church of Rome; I think it incomparably handled by my much honoured and truly Reverend Brother john Lord Bishop of Durham; but my design is to show that the bulk of Christianity and our faith is delivered in such a manner, in respect of the things delivered, of the manner of the delivery, and of the persons who delivered them, that it is most rational for a man to assure himself that these were divine revelations, if it be not absolutely impossible that they should be other. I will begin with the things delivered; and first with the beginning of the Bible, the first book of Moses, the 1. Chap. of Genesis, where we find the Creation so delivered, as it was not possible for man to do it without revelation. Men might, and men have by reason (even Philosophers) guessed and proved that the world was created; but to say when, and set it down in such a method, as that a man may find the year in which it was done, this was never undertaken by any, nor could any man do it, but by divine revelation. Yet you may think, that Adam being made a perfect man, might know the instant when he first appeared in the world, and communicate that to Seth, and he downward: but could Adam, without revelation, know, that he was made of earth? Nay could Adam, without revelation, know, how Evah was taken out of him, or all the works of God which were wrought in the 6. days before he was made? this could not be, this story of the Creation must need be a revelation, no man of himself could search it out. But I am afraid Mr. Hobbs will say, it is false; no Christian ever said it was so, but I suppose myself to have to do with an heathen, not an Atheist but a Theist at the best. Well then, it is most reasonable for any man to think, this story to be true; because it is rational for a man to think, that since God will and must be worshipped by men, and it is impossible for men to know, what worship is proper to be given him, unless he tells them; It is then most reasonable for a man to think, that God will prescribe how that worship is to be performed, and therefore caused this whole book to be writ for men's instruction; and in it sets down this work of his creation, to show man the foundation of all his duty, from whence it is derived, that he owes God his being, soul, and Body; that he should be humble, who was taken out of the dust, and to dust he must return, that he that made him can destroy him, and the like; which God being pretended to do no where else, it is most reasonable to think it is done here.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. II.  
The doctrine of the new Testament, and particularly the incarnation of our blessed Saviour, and the manner of it not possible to be known without a revelation. The truth of the incarnation evicted from the miraculous Life and Actions of our blessed Saviour, and the prophecies of the Old Testament, and especially of Isaias. The jews witnesses of the truth of the Books of the Old Testament.  
SO than this being a truth fit for a man to know, it being impossible for man to know it without a revelation, a man may justly be assured that it was revealed by God, and so I will pass to the New Testament where we will consider the conception of the blessed Virgin as related there, and so not p●ssible to be recorded, but from a divine revelation. Men might be assured from the Prophets who writ before of it, that there should be such a thing, and that it should be about that time; but that it should happen now, and that this should be the Virgin which should be the mother of our Saviour, that none could tell but by revelation, no not she herself, It is true, when she found herself with child, she might wonder how that should come about, since she knew not man; as she answered the Angel who foretold it to her Luke the 1. and the 24. but that it should be so contrived and perfected as it was by the overshadowing of the Highest, this she could not have known, but by a revelation. But I doubt Mr. Hobbs will answer this was not so, his wicked wit seems to imagine such a thing, I will prove it therefore by the glorious fruit of her womb, which showed itself to arise from such a stock, and living and dying as he did, he could ●ot be less than descended from such a supernatural generation. Well then, he was so conceived as is taught; and this could not be taught but by divine revelation, therefore he who taught it had divine revelation. I must not spend time in particulars; look upon all the Prophecies in the whole Book of God, so many, as their time is expired, we find them all fufilled; the Prophecies made to Abraham, of the children of Israel's long captivity in Egypt, and their extraction thence, and plantation in the land of Canaan, of all the great transactions of the highest affairs of the world; The erection and destruction of all the great Monarchies which were punctually foretold and accomplished, and foretold long before; could these be foretold by any other way than by divine revelation? Certainly it could not be; nor can the wit of man think how it should be done. Jaddus the high Priest showed Alexander his own story foretold by Daniel. Let us consider how the Prophets long before prophesied of Christ, how the Prophet Isaiah writ like an antedated Evangelist, differing only in these words [shall and did] only in the time. Let us consider, how not only those great and remarkable passges, of his birth, his miracles, his death, his resurrection, (but even such little things as the piercing of his side, the parting of his garment, & casting lots for his vesture, his burial, were foretold hundreds of years before. Let Mr. Hobbs or any other heathen tell me how these could be foretold without divine revelation. But perhaps he will say, as before, these were not true books nor prophecies, but feigned since Christianity. No, even the Jews themselves yet remaining in the world do consent unto them, and are preserved by God, a glorious witness of these truths, who are the greatest enemies of Christianity.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. III.  
The former assertion further proved from the piety of the doctrines taught in the scriptures, and excellency of the matter contained in them. The power of the word of God, and efficacy of Scripture above the reach of Philoophie.  
BUt then consider the doctrines taught here, they are so full of religious piety to God, so full of such excellent moral conversation betwixt men, that the wit of man could not invent them, there must needs be divine revelation in them; there was never any thing delivered by men, mere men, without divine revelation, that had not imperfections in it; he who reads the Philosophers may find it. I do not love to rake their Dunghills, and show their filth; but the duties taught in this book are so divine, and so like God, from whence they came, that they are able to make a man absolutely good if practised. Wherefore as a tree may be known by its fruits, as the heart of man by his language; so these Books may be known to be Gods by the heavenliness of the matters delivered in them; which have such a power of sanctity in them, as is able to make such as receive them of a more Godly disposition than other men; yea than themselves, at other times, before they received these doctrines. I could treat of a strange Metamorphosis in Saul to Paul, who was a persecutor, a destroyer, and when converted with this doctrine accounted it joy to suffer and be persecuted for this cause. As also of King David, who to hide the shame of his adultery, committed Murder, and slept securely in his sin; yet when awakened from that stupidity he was in, and taught his state by the Prophet Nathan, he cares for no shame of this world, so God be pleased, cares for nothing but the shame of his sin, and made his penitence for it to be chanted out in all ages, for all Churches in the 51. Psalm. See that there is a strange power and force in the word of God to turn men to godliness, which no other hath; And the great and mighty effects wrought by this scripture, do fully evince it to be divine, having divine power annexed to them. Thus having showed that the doctrines contained in scripture are fit for a man to believe they are divine, and by divine revelation, yea that they could not proceed from a pen which was not guided and assisted by the holy spirit, we therefore may have assurance that they were such. I shall come next to show how we may be further assured from the manner of their delivery.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. IV.  
The second Argument from the difference of the Style of the Scriptures from the books of Philosophers. The propositions and conclusions in Scripture not so much deduced from reason, as asserted from the Majesty of God, not disputing or endeavouring to persuade, but commanding to do. The rewards and punishments proposed in scripture of eternal truth, impossible to be propounded, or given but by God himself.  
LEt a man look upon all the doctrines of the Philosophers concerning God, his essence, his attributes, concerning the Creation, we shall find that they laboured still to prove what they spoke, and by reason to convince man's understanding. Only I must confess, Trismegistus in his Pomander makes his discourse which is most divine to be revelation (and four ought I know it may be so, much of it) but otherwise they all go upon ratiocination; and the reason is, because such things ought not to be assented to which are not either proved or revealed by God, which is the most invincible evidence that any truth can have. But now Moses and those holy writers inspired by God in their compiling those holy Books only affirm this, and this without arguing the reasons of it, because they were divine, not humane words; likewise in all those moral duties, which concern men, they are writ with the majesty of the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, Do this or this, not disputing, as Plato and Aristotle, how it conduceth to the present happiness, but exacting obedience. It is true when the Prophets disputed with the Gentiles, or Apostles with Jews or Gentiles who believed not their report, they confuted the one by reason, or out of their own authors, and the other out of the former Scriptures; because all proofs must be made ex concessis, and out of such premises they would confirm these Conclusions. God exacted a belief, and this he doth with the greatest arguments and most forcing that are possible, by Praemium and Poena reward and punishment; but such as never King or Emperor either did or was able to propose, by eternal happiness or misery; which nothing can do but God alone. And this is done to those who will receive, or not receive his word. Well, the words contained here are delivered with such an exaction as never man proposed the same truths in; and required with such promises, as never man did meet with nor could perform; we must needs therefore be assured they are divine.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. V.  
The third Argument from the sanctity and integrity of the persons who delivered these truths. The miraculous conduct of the Children of Israel by Moses. The objection of his assertation, of dominion, answered. The predictions of the Prophets not possible without a divine revelation. The truth and certainty of their predictions objected.  
ANd so I come to the persons who delivered these truths to us, who will give us as full assurance as any thing else of the certainty. The persons were of most eminent integrity, and affirmed that these writings were delivered them from God. I will begin with the first Moses a man who approved his conversation with God, and God's approbation of him by most certain signs; first by those mighty wonders which he wrought in Egypt before Pharaoh, & upon him and his in their journey; afterwards by his wonderful conduct of the Children of Israel through the wilderness, the like of which was never known; The bringing water out of the rock, feeding that mighty Host with bread and flesh; the miraculous stopping the mouths of Korah, etc. why should we imagine that this man should lie, and say, he received this law from God, when he did not? Yes, to make himself King among them. Indeed the rebels (last spoke of) did object that, but God confuted it by a miraculous destroying them, and we see although whilst he lived he went betwixt God and them, delivering prayers to God for them, and bringing Gods will to them, yet we find not that he acquired any high matters for himself; the Priesthood which was to be a perpetual dignity he put Aaron into; the Politic government he bequeathed to Josuah; and we do not find him contriving more than an ordinary proportion for his Children, which shows that he had no self end in any thing he did. Nay we may read in the 32. of Exodus, 10. when Moses interceded with God for favour to the Children of Israel, God made him answer, let me alone that my wr●th may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them, and I will make of thee a great Nation; Nevertheless Moses was not bribed with this for his own interest to forsake God's glory: but presently after presseth God for his own honour to have pity upon the Israelites, as you may read vers. 11. etc. where methinks he did like Abraham offer his whole posterity to God's glory and honour; which showeth that Moses had no sinister ends in his actions, but only the glory of God; which certainly could not rise out of such a proud lie, as to take upon him divine revelations, where there were none.  
N●xt let us consider the Prophets, they were men that adventured their lives and suffered miseries for those truths they foretold and ●aught; yea they were sure of it; and they who followed their counsels according to these revelations which God made to them, it was well with them; and mischief followed them who did otherwise. Those things which they foretold did come to pass accordingly, both concerning the Jews and all other nations, yea the whole world; why should not we be assured that these things came from God, which they say were revealed by him, since we see them true in all those works which they forespoke of?   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. VI  
Of the doctrine of the Apostles, the efficacy of their preaching; The power of ●ongues, their sufferings and patience, not possible but from divine inspiration. A further assertion of the same argument à posteriori, such effect not producible but from a divine law.  
IF we descend to the Apostles we shall find they were a sort of men of mean extraction and education; how could it be possible that they unless by revelation, should attain to such an efficacy of preaching, as to be able to convince the whole world, and preach this divine Philosophy? How came they by the power of Tongues to be able to travel through the world, and preach to every man in his own language, but by the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost? Why would they undertake the work through such cruel persecutions foretold them, that they should be as sheep amongst wolves, but that it was a duty enjoined them from the Holy Ghost? and they were sure that he who promised it, would make good their reward in heaven hereafter, for here they were to have miseries. Truly I know not what can be opposed against this, but that both from the matters delivered, rom the manner that they are delivered by, and from the persons who delivered them, we have as great an assurance that these truths were revealed to them by God, as can be wrought by humane faith▪ Yea but let us consider further, and it is scientifical à posteri●ri, from the effect to the cause; for if it be not possible that these effects should come from any cause but God, as indeed I think it not possible, than it is demonstrated that these must be revelations, and we have a mighty assurance of them.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. VII.  
Another argument, ad hominem, Mr. Hobbs his assurance of his being born at Malmsbury, not comparable to this of the verity of the holy scriptures. Some doubts of the place of Mr. Hobbs his birth, from the erring of his doctrines from Christianity. The attestation of the Gospel from the sufferings of the Saints and Martyrs. The increase and continuance of it in despite of persecution. The Scriptures not possible to be written by bad men, in regard their design is to destroy the Kingdom of Satan. Good men would not obtrude a Lie upon the world. Faith resolved into divine revelation. The rest is a preparation to this faith, and conclusion of this point.  
LEt Mr. Hobbs tell me, what assurance he hath of any thing? He saith in the beginning of this Book that he is Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury; I think he is as sure of this as of any thing; but I am much surer, and so may any man be, that this Scripture was writ by divine revelation, than he can be of that; first for his place, that he was of Malmsbury which is a town in Wiltshire, where Christianity is professed, where men are assured of the Scriptures that they are by divine revelation, How should it breed such a monster, who would bring all their hopes of heaven, their faith in God's promises to be dubious? as if they were not promised. But he is Thomas Hobbs, how knows he that? perhaps his mother told him so, and the midwife; I know not whether after he came to the years of discretion, he ever talked with them; but if he did, it is but a weak Testimony in respect of ours which was and is affirmed by such divine and incomparable persons as the Apostles and Prophets were. His Mother, and the Midwife, although true persons, yet were apt to be deceived, and it may be he was a supposititious Child; how oft have such things been done? when chose these men who have delivered infallible truths many ages before they came to pass, cannot be conceived to have any Error. ay, but perhaps, he will say, he is like his father in his countenance, in his speech; certainly not so like, as these truths are to that incomparable essence, which we call God; than which nothing more fully expressed these divine perfections, unless it was his personal word. ay, but his Christening is registered in the Church Book of Malmsbury, a good legal evidence; and perhaps he enjoyed his father's estate by this; I know not, but certainly there is a possibility of Error in it, because the Church Book may be counterfeited, and many a man hath intruded into other men's estates by unjust means; but our evidence is recorded (may I say) or engraven in these volumes which have been attested in every age since the first writing with the Blood of many martyrs; which can be affirmed of no Church Book in the world; worms and Cankers may eat them, and thiefs may break through and steal them and counterfeit them, but these are subject to no corruption, but by the providence of God have been, and will be preserved so long as the world stands, and endures. So I think evidently that it appears that we have as full an assurance that these Scriptures are Divine, as men can have of any thing in this world which they receive by hear-say. Nay let us go further, & examine whether we have not a Demonstration from the effect to the cause, we know such a man was our friend by his voice when he speaks, another by his style, as the report is of Sr. Thomas Moor with Erasmus, aut Erasmus aut Diabolus. Yea Critics every where discern Authors by their Styles; may not we, think you, discern God by these heavenly writings, which are more than humane? When we hear a man discoursing of high points in Philosophy learnedly, we know such an effect cannot proceed from a Country-education at the Cart and Plough, it requires ●nother study and industry. When the Scripture teacheth us things higher than the natural wit of man 〈◊〉 reach to, as I have showed it must needs come from a higher strain than our natural Condition could deliver to us. I will conclude with one word; The Scriptures must be writ by good or ill men; ill men could not do it, it reacheth those doctrines which destroy the Devil, and his Kingdom, all evil; if good men writ it, they would not 〈◊〉 to say th●y were inspired by God when they were not; they would not deliver such things for ass●●●d truth's which none could know but God, if God did not teach it them. Upon these invincible Grounds I think I may say that we have a mighty assurance that these are divine revelations, which he wickedly affirms we have no assurance of. But it may be objected, if the demonstration be so evident, why do not all men receive it? for the understanding is made after such a manner, as the Eye, when you show it colours, the Eye must see them; so show by demonstration a truth to the understanding, it must needs assent. For my part I do not apprehend that man hath liberty in his understanding to accept or refuse truths which are laid open to i●, neither do I think that which is called liberum arbitrium is only a freedom of the will but a result out of them both; however it is not in the understanding alone, nor is this belief of our that these things are revealed only an act of the understanding, but of the will which refuseth to hear the voice of the Charmer charm he never so wisely. Sometimes a malicious Will w●ll not permit a man to study, and think of these arguments, which the more he studyeth, the more he will approve▪ sometimes when he hath studied them it will make him seek further, and being not delighted with that reason which is proposed, it will not be satisfied with it; so that there is a submission to these reasons offered, which is necessary to our assent to them. And certainly that is much by such arguments as show the happiness-men have in being under God's Government; for then men will seek what and wherein ●e will bless them, and when he finds that these Scriptures, and these only, are rational for a man to think are his own dictates, he will willingly submit to them. 〈…〉 when a proud man●●all think, that he and he only is faber not fortuna only but of his own happiness, and that he need not sack to God for assistance, than he sleights all these discourses and listens not to them. But still a man may say, it seems that resolution of our faith is into this way of arguing. I answer no●, our faith is resolved into the divine revelations, that God hath said this, or that; this is but a preparation for that foundation; when a wise and virtuous man tells me any thing, I believe it for the esteem of him, and that is my last resolution of that faith because such a man speaks it: but before this I must be prepared for this, with an acquaintance that this is such a man and I must know he speaketh it. These preparatory Acts are necessary for the introduction of that Act of faith in him; but faith in him is the foundation of my belief in that sentence, it is evidently so in this Case, we believe these divine truths absolutely, and the last resolution of them is into this, that God hath revealed them; but yet it may be enquired, whether these Arguments be necessary to our assent to these divine principles, or not. Certainly to a man who should be converted from Paganism, Vt prudenter credat, that he be not carried about with winds of Doctrine, it is fit, he should have these or some other equivalent Arguments to induce him to them: But to a man born in the Church, and bred up in the Christian religion, it is comfortable to his faith when he finds it attended with such invincible reasons, and he is able to understand them; But if not, simplicity of faith and obedience to God will be blessed by him▪ It will not be expected that I should engage in more niceties of this kind. I hope it appears that we have assurance of these divine revelations. It was therefore not only a bold, but impious and wicked affirmation of him to say it is evidently impossible for a man to be assured of the revelation to another without a revelation particularly made to himself. But he proceeds to answer some seeming proofs brought to affirm the assurance of these revelations, I will put them down in order and examine his answer. The first is drawn from miracles and is thus set down in the place last cited.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. VIII.  
Mr. Hobbs his answer to the first proof retorted: Miracies defined.  
FOR though a man may be induced to believe such revelation, from the Miracles they see him do,] that is the first Objection) he answers [Miracles are marvellous works: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another] This answer of his (to speak ad hominem) doth not become him, as I showed in my first piece page 1●9. He had said that Concerning the world's magnitude and beginning he was content with that doctrine which the Scripture persuaded and the fame of these miracles which confirm them, the Country's custom and the due reverence to the Laws. There you will allow Miracles to confirm them, that is the Scriptures, why now should you not be content with ●hem? They are now, when you writ this, as good, as famous as evident, as they were then, when you writ the other. Well, we will examine the force of Miracles, and see what content they can give a arational man; and before I go further▪ we will consider what we understand by this word Miracle. We do conceive a Miracle to be a work above the reach and power of nature, and extraordinary; not only a strange and wonderful thing to the common observation of men, but above the power of all those things which God hath made produceable by natural causes, so that it is not only strange that nature should do it, but impossible it should produce this effect, which is miraculous. And when I say This miraculous effect, I mean by it, not the work only, as to cure a same man; (such a man perhaps may be cured by natural means physically applied) but to cure him at a distance, with a word speaking, is miraculous; and is a work beyond nature's power: So that then we understand by a Miracle, what is either in its self or in the manner of doing beyond Nature. The lafoy ● term is extraordinary, there are many works beyond the power of Nature, which are ordinarily wrought by God in a most ordinate way, in an infallibly settled course, as they relate to Heaven; which are the giving his Graces to such as are penitent, or pray, or which observe their duties in the use of the Sacraments, with the like, which being ordinate by his sacred Covenants are most certain; and being so, although above Nature, yet are no Miracles because certain and ordinate.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. IX.  
Miracles produced to confirm an untruth are a Lie, and blasphemy against God: This Proposition confirmed. Mr. Hobbs his confederacy with the Devil. Matth. 4. 3. explained. Our blessed Saviour's use of Miracles, for the confirmation of his Gospel. Mr. Hobbs his Logic desired. The apprehensions of men after not the nature of Miracles.  
THus the Nature of Miracles being explained, I think it appears clearly, that because nothing but the God of N●●ure who made this nature, and could have made another, can act beyond or beside that order which he hath settled things in: therefore he must needs be the Author of these effect which are above the reach of Nature, of which ●ind Miracles are. And thus if he should produce them for the confirmation of falsehood, it would be as apparent a Lie, as any f●lse Proposition delivered by words; which certainly, were abominable blasphemy in any man to affirm.  
The force of this Argument will appear from the Devil, who was and is as able a Logician as Mr Hobbs▪ and although he dissemble and labours to make men believe there is no such thing: yet I doubt they two do underhand confederate too much together. Howsoever let us consider an Argument of the Devils, by which he required an assurance of our Saviour's being the Son of God, and consequently God, Matth. 4. 3. where the Devil tempting him, said, If thou be the Son of God command that these stones be made bread. A man might have objected, suppose he should command, and the effect follow, how would this prove him the Son of God? An Angel, or a mere man assisted by God might have done this. But consider now if he had done it upon the Question, and had not been the Son of God, because it must be done by the extraordinary power of God, not by his ordinary power, therefore God in doing it must have confirmed a lie, which it is not possible for God to do, and upon the strength of this Argument of the Devils, we may be assured, that Miracles used to prove any Conclusion are an invincible Argument; for the Devil is abundantly able to dispute▪ And therefore in the last verse of ●aint More's Gospel, it is reported that after Christ had given Commission to the Eleven, they went forth and preached every where, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following; where we may observe as the Devi● urged i● for an Argument, so our Saviour used it for an Argument in the planting of the Church; which is enough for proof of this Conclusion, that the Miracles wrought by our Saviour and his Apostles here, were such Arguments as did enforce belief of what they spoke. I could expatiate in this noble Theme of Miracles, and fall upon divers most Scholastic discourses; but I rather choose to apply myself close to him who answers, [That what is wonderful to one may not be so to another.] The force of which answer lies in this, (That there may be many counterfeit Miracles, which may appear true to one and may be found false by another; and therefore because men may be deceived they have no assurance from them. To this I can say that Mr. Hobbs is not so good a Logician here as the Devil; for the Devil disputed from the real force of the Argument, but Mr. Hobbs draws his Answer from the apprehension of the Heater or Spectator; when it thunders man a man is busy & hears it not, Doth it not therefore thunder, because he doth not hear it? The Sun ariseth and shineth out in the morning when I am in bed and see it not, Doth it therefore not shine because I discern it not? When a man who hath weak Eyes or troubled with the Jaundice comes into a Room, many colours are there which he perceives not; or if he do, they appear yellow to his Eyes, Are they therefore yellow? But this and no other is his consequence against Miracles, because some apprehend them not, therefore they are not, or do not send out that proof which naturally flows from them. Many fallacious Arguments are used▪ (He hath used many,) and because they are fallacies, Are therefore perfect Demonstrations not good? His Answer therefore is not Logical in saying that these things appear marvellous to one, which do not to another. Let a man consider the possibility, or rather impossibility which Nature hath to do such a work, and if he be not learned enough to discuss with a Cause, let him consult with Learned men who are able to judge of it, and he shall by that find whether God hath in an extraordinary manner any hand in it or no; but the Answer▪ which he makes may be returned to all Arguments, whatsoever one understands another doth not▪ therefore they are not good, nor give assurance. And ●o I have finished the first Argument which he framed against himself and answered weakly.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. X.  
Mr. Hobbs his second Argument examined; The truth of Divine revelation to the Apostles, asserted from the gift of Tongues.  
AND I pass to his second Argument and Answer, which is at the bottom of that page; and the Argument is drawn to prove that these were Divine revelations from the Sanctity of the Persons who delivered it. H● answers that [that may be feigned.] I reply, It is improbable, which were enough: but I think I may go further and say it is impossible: for the first clause, that it is improbable, we may discern Reason for it. First, in the Persons the Apostles who delivered these Revelations, and affirmed they were such, it is not probable they should be counterfeited; all counterfeiting is for some end, some worldly end▪ (for a man cannot think to get Heaven by counterfeiting and l●ing) but the Apostles could have no worldly end in what they did, the asserting of these Revelations being the ready way to miseries and unhappiness, which was foretold by their great Master, our most blessed Saviour. We have seen in this distracted world in which we have lived, now and then a man proud with an imagined Enthusiasm, persevere in an abominable lie even to death: but for so many to do it, and suffer for the relation of the same story, it cannot be imagined. And then consider that they were men blessed by God, in having these Revelations, and the relating them: I say relating them: for because the Doctrine was to be divulged to all Nations by them, God assisted them with the gift of Tongues, by which they were able suddenly to relate in their own Language to every Nation the wonderful things which concerned their salvation; And from hence I will draw the impossibility of their feigning their sanctity in the delivery of these Revelations; for as the Revelation was from God, so the very delivery of them by the power of Tongues, was from God, who cannot countenance and make good a lie; But yet certainly although their might be a possibility of being other, (I grant that for Arguments sake which I allow not) yet when there is no probability of the contrary, we have great assurance of that truth, and his answer is most wicked, as well as weak drawn from a possibility of feigning and counterfeiting in the Apostles.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XI.  
Mr. Hobbs his third Argument from the wisdom of the Apostles confirmed: The miraculous consent of men to the revelations published by them; An Argument from the propagation of Christianity against the opposition of the whole world: A serious application and vow for Mr. Hobbs his conversion.  
A Third Argument which he endeavours to put off, is drawn, from the extraordinary wisdom, or extraordinary felicity of his actions, all which (saith he) are marks of God's extraordinary favour. His answer to this is at the bottom of that page thus, The visible felicities of this world are most often the work of God by natural and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by natural reason, that another has had a supernatural revelation of God's will▪ but only a belief, everyone (as the signs thereof shall appear greater or lesser) a firmer or weaker belief. Thus far he. I no ●answer to the first, which concerns their wisdom; I do not remember that I have read the wisdom of these men to be produced for proof of their revelations; yet because he has put it down and given one answer to it, I will urge something for it, that it was and is a great convincing argument, that such poor ignorant illiterate fishermen should attain, or rather be endued from above with such wisdom, as to be able to confute the greatest and best studied Philosophers, and reduce them to consent to their revelations; this must need prove that these men were assisted by some knowledge above Nature. But let that pass since he makes no answer: but for the other, the success of Christianity, that is a most rational argument; and his answer confutes himself, for whereas he saith [the visible felicities of this World are most often the work of God by natural & ordinate causes. I retor: it to him, that the felicities of this world happening to these men were nothing but that general propagation of the Gospel, which was wrought against the force and power of all natural causes; all the Emperors, Kings, and Princes of this World fight against, and suppressing it, with all the force and tyranny which they were able to use, so that their strength grew by oppression, & Sanguis Martyrum was ●emen Ecclesiae. And M. Hobbs cannot think, that that was a natural seed. And so I will conclude this discourse for this time, hoping that God will so assist him that he may see his own error, and with his own hand blot out all these unworthy doubts which he hath cast upon Christianity.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XII.  
Mr. Hobbs his second Question propounded, and discussed; his assumption not clear; the Argument changed and the Reader eluded by him. His manifest declension of the divine positive Law, and imposure of humane Laws in opposition to them, censured. The Law of Nature commands obedience to the positive law of God. The pretensions of all Nations to divine institution, observed.  
ANd here I thought to have knocked off with the satisfaction of the first Quaerie; but as I said before he made two inquiries, the first concerning the assurance of these revelations; I have spoke to that. The second is [how a man can be bound to obey the Laws so revealed] This (he saith,) is not so hard, for if the Laws declared be not against the Law of Nature, which is undoubtedly God's Law, and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act. Thus far Mr. Hobbs: but indeed he utters (in my judgement) a most obscure doctrine, ●r if clear, he speaks very weakly. 'Tis obscure, for although the Law of Nature do oblige, yet it is not apparent to every man, what this Law of Nature is; no not to learned men; for in many cases it is disputed, whether such or such actions are according to the Law of Nature or no; And therefore although the major proposition be unquestionably true, that the Law of Nature is instituted by God, yet the assuming of a Minor to it, [this is the Law of Nature] may be full of dispute, and from thence it will be hard to conclude. Again consider, that when the question was put in the former page, it was concerning the obedience to the revealed laws of God, how a man may ●e bound to obey them, of which he affirmed that we could have no assurance, and that I have immediately before refuted: but now his whole discourse runs upon man's obedience to humane Laws. Thus the Notion and Conceit shuffled and changed, a Reader is distracted, and whilst he finds something seemingly proved, he thinks the undertaken proposition is clear: for where hath he satisfied, yea but seemingly, this Question, How a man can be bound to obey the Revelations? But (saith he) if he undertake to obey a Law which is not against the Law of Nature, he is bound by his own Act. That is, that Act by which (he saith rather than thinks) he instituted a supreme, and that Act only reflects upon humane Laws established by the supreme which he instituted. But I do not find this expressed there in that latitude he now forms it, but rather I thought that he would have supposed that the supreme should be obeyed in such things cross not the Law of God whatsoever, either natural or positive, but it seems now he must be obeyed in all which is not against the Law of Nature only; he would have the Scriptures and positive Laws laid aside. By this if a King shall command us not to be baptised, not to receive the Communion, or, like Darius not to pray to God, for a certain time, not to repent &c. (which are not acts of the Law of Nature, but positive Laws) we should not do them, which must needs be most odious to any Christian man. But indeed had not Mr. Hobbs distinguished these two the positive, and natural Laws of God before in the former page, and raised these doubts, to disgrace the positive laws of God, I could have answered that there is no Law more Natural, than that we should obey the positive Laws of God; for he being the supreme power, must needs have that authority to make Laws for the government of men; and this is universally received. All Nations in the World pretend to have divine Laws for their direction, I mean, positive divine Laws; only Mr. Hobbs denyeth it clearly in this place. Let us examine what follows.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XIII.  
Obedience founded upon the belief, or acknowledgement of his power that commands. Mr. Hobbs his complacency in quarrelling with Religion. The want of reason in his proofs discovered, and censured. Faith commanded by God, urged by promissory and penal Laws. The dreadful punishment of such as believe not, or disturb other men's belief with frivolous arguments. God the searcher of hearts and punisher of evil thoughts contrary to Mr. Hobbs his Doctrine.  
HE is bound, saith he, to obey it but not bound to believe it. A strange proposition: for take his particle [i] how you please, for obedience to divine or humane Laws, he can be bound to obey none, when he hath no belief: for he cannot have an obligation to divine Laws, unless he believe they are given by God, nor can he perform obedience to humane Laws, unless he have a belief that they are made by the supreme power. So that obedience in all kinds supposeth a belief of that authority which commands. But again consider, what he means by this word, belief, He is bound to obey, but not to believe. Certainly (as I said,) he must believe the authority that commands, and 'tis as true, that he must believe that that authority commands this Act, or else he can have no ground for his obedience. This man had a mind to be quarrelling at Religion, but could not find expressions to do it. But he proves his conclusion, for (saith he) men's belief, and interior cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. The vainest and weakest Argument that ever was urged. First, in Logic it cannot follow; because they are subject to the operations of God, they therefore are not subject to commands, as Charity, and all the restraint of exorbitant lusts are subject to his operations, are they not therefore subject to commands? This is a pitiful inference, but then consider further; that faith, and the cogitations of men are commanded by God, that faith is commanded first, Heb. 11. 6. Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them who diligently seek him. Now it is necessary that he who requires us to come, must in that exaction require such things as are necessary to obtain it; and therefore faith without which Heaven cannot be attained. And God hath given a blessed promissory Law that he will bless such as do believe; and penal also, that he will punish such as do not believe. For the first, John 3. 15, 16. Whosoever believeth in him, (that is in Christ) should not perish but have eternal life. The same is added in the 16 verse. God so loved the World, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish but have everlasting life. Here is a Law made concerning happiness, an eternal Law concerning an eternal life, all terms indefinite. The same is repeated in the 18 verse of the same Chap. but with the addition of the penal Law, He that believeth not is condemned already. As likewse our Saviour, Mark 16. 16. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved: but he that believeth not, shall be damned; and this is no more but a pr●mise performed by God, which was made Deut. 18. 15. urged by St. Peter Acts 3. 22. A Prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you of your Brethren, like unto me, him s●all you hear in all things whatsoever he shall say unto you. (v▪ 23.) And it shall co●e to pass that every Soul which will not hear that Prophet shall be destroyed from among the People. Let Mr. Hobbs and his Followers read these thr●e words and tremble, Condemned, Damned, Destroyed who believes not, etc. What shall such be who have not only this privative infidelity, but a positive, which opposeth and disturbs the faith of such as do believe, with foolish and unnecessary Arguments? Faith is commanded and exacted by God, upon a dreadful penalty. So likewise John 3▪ 23. This is his commandment that we should believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ. There in express terms, this belief is commanded: and as I have showed, obedience could not be given to other Laws, if faith did not preceded, which is the first step towards Heaven. I need not speak of other cogitations of the Heart, as Pride, Self-conceitedness, Covetous, desiring others goods, etc. are all prohibited by God, and he will punish them. Mr. Hobbs was therefore to blame very much in saying that faith and the interior cogitations are not subject to God's commands; had they been humane Laws of which he spoke it had been somewhat to the purpose: men cannot know, and therefore cannot punish the interior cogitations, and so not make Laws for them; but God knows and searcheth the heart and reins, and will punish them, and therefore it is fit for him to give commands concerning them.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. X●V.  
External and inferior Acts subject to divine regulation▪ Faith, the fulfilling of that Law which commanded it. Vainglory and fear equally impeding practical Faith.  
BUt it seems there is more in this argument of his, where he saith, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. I have spoken somewhat to this a little before, where I showed that other virtues which cannot be denied to be commanded, are subject to the operations of God, who worketh both to will and to do; who creates and preserves: and although he gives the will, yet if he go not on in the operation, it will never come to perfection; so that by this consequence God can command nothing because he cooperates in the performance. He proceeds with the same proposition, in other terms, and I will follow him. Faith of supernatural Law (saith he) is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same. Faith of that supernatural Law (which concerns Faith) must needs be a fulfilling of it, (if it be such as is according to the Law of Faith, as St. Paul phraseth it Rom. 3. 27) But only (saith he) an assenting to it. What if it be but only an assenting to it, (yet I can show other operations of faith besides that) yet if that assenting be the act which God requires in his command of faith, faith is the fulfilling of that Law which exacts it. And yet give me leave to add one note more, Although faith were a mere act of the understanding, an assent as he terms it) yet because this assent is impeded by many vices in the Soul, which until they are mastered, the Soul cannot break out into a full and complete assent unto the divine propositions, it comes in regard of them under this notion of a command. You may observe, john 12. 4●, 43. Nevertheless among the chief Rulers many believed, but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the Synagogue; for they loved the praise of men, more than the praise of God. Mark, in this they are said to believe, being convinced in their understandings of the truth of the doctrine, they had a credulity of the things, but vainglory hindered them from practising accordingly, the praise of men; as likewise a wicked love of it, and I may add another passion, fear, out of that Phrase because of the Pharisees, i. e. because they feared them; and it is the same which he speaks of the Patents to him who was cured of the blindness, John 9 22. These words spoke his Parents because they feared the Jews. These words, that is, that shifting of the confession of Christ; so that unworthy fear, love, pride, are impediments to faith. I know it may be objected here, that it is spoke of the confession of faith, not the act or habit of faith; and these other things may hinder these outward acts of faith which do not choke its being, and nature. I answer, it is true; but withal it cannot be a● true and right faith which is ashamed, or afraid to express itself; for a true faith of divine perfections, is such as must believe the divine perfections infinitely excellent, and his veracity so likewise; and therefore he must needs be confident that when he honours him, God will bless him, and so cannot fear any thing in this world. This I hope may suffice for the satisfaction of the Reader in this.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XV.  
Faith a duty to God against Mr. Hobbs his assertion; his constant endeavours to asperse the duties of Christianity. Miracles the ordinate means of faith. The use of the means necessary to the attaining of the end.  
HE goes on, and saith, And not a duty that we exhibit to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth. Faith is not a duty which we exhibit to God such a language as was never heard from a Christian, no not from a Jew, a Turk, or an Heathen if he were not an Atheist. If he thought there were a God, he must needs think that faith is due to him. Who would fear him, trust in him, if he doth not believe his promises and threats? If he think he is the chief good, he must think him true in all his sayings; that they are according to his intentions; and that he is able to make good what he intends. Who can honour him, but he that believes he is, or would honour him but he that believes he is a rewarder of them who seek him? It is the duty which he who hath, cannot lack the rest; and he who hath not, doth nothing upright. But it seems he utters his mind clearly in this sentence which he did more obscurely otherwhere, labouring throughout this discourse to weaken our faith. Well let us go on, but, saith he, it is a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth: what therefore no command concerning it? he may say the same of Hope and Charity; and indeed of all the things of this World; the Earth is the Lords, and all that is in it, and to whom he pleaseth he giveth it, but is there therefore no command concerning these things? Consider, Reader, that although faith be God's gift, yet God gives it according to those rules which he hath set down: faith is introduced by hearing, by such settled ways as God hath appointed to produce it: and therefore I do think that no man living can show me faith, where that faith was not wrought by God in his ordinary way of working: and therefore one part of his distinction which he used before, either by God's operation ordinary or extraordinary, might have been spared, if applied to the immediate operation. I know the conversion of St. Paul may be objected, and the like, where God wrought his faith by a miraculous manifestation of himself to him: yet consider that the conversion of St. Paul was produced immediately by that miracle which was in a most settled course of God's working b● hearing and seeing; for hearing the word, or reading it, seeing some vision, or miracle, are most ordinate means by which God bestoweth that blessing upon his servants, by preaching, by visions, by miracles. And I do not believe that any man in the world can persuade me that he hath a right and religious faith, who never heard or saw any thing which did persuade him to it. Again, consider that there are three things, which make a gift profitable besides; the giving, the receiving and the right use of it: the first only concerns God, the two latter men. Now suppose that the Sun (which alone can do it) should shine, if men will remain in their prison, keeping the doors and windows shut, they shall not be able to see by that gift of light; yea if he open the windows of his house, and shut those of his body, he shall not see. Out of these ariseth the faultiness of infidelity, that men shut out that means which God gives them to believe; they will not hear or read the word of God, they scorn his miracles, and all those glorious revelations which have been made to his servants▪ When the hands of God are open to give, and the hands of men not so to receive, and when he sows his seed of righteousness, and the pleasures and the cares of the World choke it, than the duty of faith is subject to a command although given by God.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XVI.  
Unbelief the greatest breach of Gods Law. St. John 3. 18, and 19 explained. The justice of God in the condemnation of men for want of faith. The case of Abraham, Genesis 17. 10. elucidated. The power of Parents asserted.  
HE proceeds, As also unbelief is not a breach of any of his Laws, but a rejection of them all. This was witty, and a good way of arguing; contrariorum eadem est ratio, contraries do illustrate one the other. But consider Reader, is not the rejection of a Law, a breach of a Law? Suppose a man should think (as some have) that no supreme hath power ●o make Laws for life and death; he steals, and by the Law concerning Thievery, is to be executed; doth his rejection of that Law make his felony no breach of that law, which is against it? Certainly it is the greatest breach, it tears the Law in pieces; and is the greatest violation of it that may be. To this purpose our Saviour most clearly, John 3. 18. He who believeth not, is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the Name of the only begotten Son of God. So that according to Mr. Hobbs his Tenent here is a condemnation, but no just one, because, not for the breach of some Law. There mu●● be therefore some divine Law exacting faith▪ which this infidelity doth break. But then Mr. Hobbs would reply to our Saviour, that faith is a gift, and why dost thou punish me for the want of that which is only a gift? Read the 19 verse, and our Saviour doth answer him, And this is the condemnation that light is come into the World, and men love darkness rather than light; the light is the light of faith, and Gods graces which he gives to men, by which they may apprehend divine truths: which yet they do not, because they love darkness rather than light; love not this light of faith, which discovers to them the obliquity of their sinful worldly desires. So that it is apparent that although God gives this light, his grace; yet men preferring the world before it, it is unprofitable. This was the case of these Jews which our Saviour spoke to, john 5▪ 44 How can ye believe which receive honour from one another, and seek not the honour which cometh from God▪ So that men's preferring worldly things before the things of God, causeth them not to receive or make use of God's revelations. But Mr. Hobbs hath Scripture for what he writes, Gen. 17. 10. This is the Covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee, and thy seed after thee Now (saith he) abraham's seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to ●hem for Gods Law. It is true (what he saith) that Abraham's seed had not the revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party in this Covenant. But what can be deduced further from this, than that which is the ordinary condition of contracts? A man gives his estate to another, and to his posterits for ever, upon a condition that they shall pay such and such acknowledgements, which if they perform that estate shall be theirs; but if not, the contract shall be void. Yes, saith Mr. Hobbs, there is more, they are bound to obey whatsoever Abraham should declare for God's Law▪ I see nothing in these words which enforce any such thing: but only the observation of circumcision: thi● God calls his Covenant, being a sign thereof, and this Covenant consisteth in this, that God would be Abraham's God, and his seeds after him, and that he would give them the Land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. The meaning of all which, was, that he would in near and dear respects favour and protect them, as you may read in the 7 and 8 verses of that Chapter. So that here in this is no more employed, but that if they observe circumcision God would bless them; there is no mention of accepting for God's Laws whatsoever Abraham should deliver; and therefore he might have spared his following discourse [which (saith he) they could not be but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their Parents; who (if they be subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have sovereign power over their Children and servants▪ This I say might have been spared, for if the Covenant went no further than I have expressed, (as without doubt it did not) there needs no sovereign power to be forced to it. But I am of his mind that they who are Parents, (where is no other established sovereignty) have that supreme power over their children and servants: which one conclusion will confute the whole body of his Politics, as I intent to show hereafter.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XVII.  
The obedience of Abraham's Family to God's Laws, depended upon that to him, as Father of the Family. Mr. Hobbs his consequences drawn from this proposition not rightly deduced. His constant varying from the English translation observed, and censured. Reason against former deductions. The entire obedience of the Israelites to the dictates of Moses, rather from the conference of his divine inspiration, as a Prophet, than his sovereign power. The Authority of scripture depends not upon the declaration of the sovereign. The worshippers of Baal not excused from the command of the King of Israel. The reasons of Mr. Hobbs his former assertion disproved. The commands of the sovereign justly opposed, when contrary to the Christian faith. Mr. Hobbs his Atheistical conclusions censured.  
BUt he hath another piece of Scripture which you may read, Gen 18. 18, 19 Again where God saith to Abraham, In thee shall all Nations of the Earth be blessed: for I know thou wilt command thy Children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe righteousness and judgement; It is manifest the obedience of his family, who had no revelation, depended on their former obligation to obey their Sovereign. Thus far Mr. Hobbs. I answer, 'tis true that this obedience of Abraham's family to himself, depends upon their filial obedience to him as their Father, and his commanding them depends upon his sovereign power over them as their Father But what? can it be collected hence, that if Abraham had commanded dishonest things, i. e. such actions as were against any will of God, revealed any other way to them, that they should have obeyed him? Certainly no; nay, the contrary is here intimated, for therefore God promised to bless him and his posterity, because he did know that Abraham would command them virtuous things, to keep the way of the Lord. But mark here, Mr. Hobbs still varyes from the English lection, and that to the worse; for it is not what he writes, to keep, but, he will command them, and they shall keep the way of the Lord. So that the sense is; because God foresaw his fatherly care, and their filial duty in these righteous actions, he would bless them. He prosecutes this conclusion with another Scripture thus; At mount Sinai, Moses only went up to God, the people were forbidden to approach on pain of death; yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared unto them for Gods Law. Upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, Exod. 20. Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us lest we die? By which two places, (saith he) it sufficiently appears that in a Commonwealth a Subject that has no certain and assured revelation, particularly to himself concerning the will of God, is to obey for such the command of the Commonwealth. (That is, by his Logic, the sovereign of the Commonwealth.) How this conclusion can be drawn out of these two places of Scripture, I cannot imagine. Why it should not, I shall give these reasons. First, that although these two particular cases were to be understood, as he conceits; yet they are but particular cases, which concerned those only affairs which were under their proper management; and there is no one word which points at them, to make them precedents for others, or to give an universal rule for all others▪ Secondly, whereas he saith that in a Commonwealth a Subject should do thus (as he sets down in one of his instances,) to wit, that of Abraham, there was no Commonwealth; settled, but only a noble family; many things may be proper to a family, which are not for a Commonwealth nay indeed the government of the Israelites under Moses was, as yet, not a perfect established Commonwealth, but only in fieri, the Commonwealth was in moulding, the Laws for the government were in making. Then consider, in Moses his case (for I have writ enough concerning the other the People said they would hear Moses; and good reason for it because they discerned that he had conversation with God; that God's terror was so great that no man durst injure him by doubting his Laws, who had such near converse with God, as he had, when called up to the top of the Mount: and therefore might be trusted on his relation. And therefore it seems their promise of harkening to whatsoever Moses should deliver for God's Law, was to him, as a Prophet, rather than as a King; which indeed was (in that regard) more to be considered. And certainly those dictates of the holy Scripture for our practices which are delivered by King David or Solomon, have not that great obligation upon us as they were Kings, but Prophets; nor are the books which are Scripture and commanded to be so received amongst us, therefore of divine authourity, because Kings declare them to be such; but chose, Kings declare them to be such, because they are such. And, (good Reader) consider further, that this reason of Mr. Hobbs might have excused all the worshippers of Baal: all the idolatries and abominations committed in the reign of Jeroboam, and the rest of those wicked Kings over Israel. For if the people were to receive that, and that only for the word of God, which their supremes authorized, than they authorising those, and only those commands which were directed to those impieties, were so to be accepted and obeyed, unless they had particular revelation; (which in general, the common people never had) and then how could God justly punish them for violating those Laws which he had given them (as he did often) when their Kings exacted otherways? But he gives reason for what he hath delivered; for (saith he) if men were at liberty, to take for God's commandments, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams, and fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is God's commandments; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the commandment of the Common wealth. Alas poor man, what a dream and fancy hath he vainly uttered! this is like to what he affirmed before, that we have no assurance of revelations, unless we had particular revelations ourselves. And what I opposed to that will serve for this; Were all those Councils, all those Fathers, all the consent of the Christian Church, nothing but dreams? all the blood of holy Martyrs nothing but fancies? yea the blood of Christ whereby he hath subdued all the Kings of this Christian World, nothing but dreams and fanciest? which yet are those Medium's by which men oppose Kings, (and aught to do it) when they command contrary to our Christian Faith. Certainly Mr. Hobos said right when he affirmed, That private men must not oppose their dreams or fancies to the Laws of the Land wherein they live. But under that Notion, he doth amiss, when he terms our assent to the revealed will of God ● clearly and intelligently apprehended) a dream or fancy. But because he terms it the Law of the Commonwealth, which hath some sense according to his impossible principles, viz. That the supreme represents the whole, I will tell him it is a phrase of speech never used by any Author before: for a Commonwealth consists in the ordination of all the members of it, supreme and inferior; the supreme is sovereign, the inferior are subjects; but by a common wealth here he only understands the sovereign. But let us proceed with him; out of the former confuted premises he draws this conclusion: I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Moral Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature) all subjects are bound to obey that for divine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Laws of the Commonwealth. Certainly the Moral Law, or the Law of Nature, doth not bid us be baptised, or receive the holy Communion, nay it doth not command us to make a profession of our faith in Jesus Christ. The Law of Nature did not command Daniel, Shedrack, Meshack, and Abednego, to refuse the voluptuous meat which Nebuchadnezar allowed them, and fed upon pulse and water; but the fear that they should break the Law of God by obeying the King; I mean, the positive Law which God had not writ in their Natures, but in Tables; so that this conclusion of his was most Heathenish.   

CHAP. XXII. SECT. XVIII.  
Mr. Hobbs his further reasons to prove the former assertions examined and censured. His diminution of the authority of the divine positive Law, and constant vilifying of scripture censured. The Law of Nature restrained by the divine positive Law. Obedience in Religious duties not founded in the command of the sovereign, but of God. The persuasion of the Turks, that the Alcoran contains the Law of God, not the command of the Grand Signior causes their conformity to it. The difference between the commands and acts of Christian Princes, and their subjects, from those of other Religions. All other Societies, as that of Thiefs, illegitimate combinations. Mr. Hobbs his doctrine abhorrent to Christianity.  
BUT he labours further to prove it. Which also (saith he) is evident to any man's reason; for whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature, may be made Law in the Name of them that have the Sovereign power; and there is no reason men should be the less obliged by it, when it is propounded in the Name of God. I answer, that whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature, may be made Law by God, i. e. his positive Law; but many Laws are limited, not only by God's Laws of Nature, but his positive Laws likewise, which have as great force as the other to whomsoever they are revealed. (Now I am in the 150 page● let the Reader consider again, how he takes occasion to lessen the authority of Scripture. I am persuaded he can produce no Christian writer from our Saviour's time downward, that ever delivered so unworthy a conceit of the positive Law of God: it is as if he should say, we should obey a Constable's command against the King's command by Statute; for the difference is much less betwixt the King and a Constable, than betwixt the greatest King in the World and God. The common Law which I conceive to be an unwritten tradition, is like the Law of Nature, the Statute Law like the positive Laws: It is lawful (not considering a statute) for a man to act any thing not against the common Law, but if a positive, i e. a statute Law intervene, it is no longer lawful by any private power to act that, which otherwise had been lawful. Thus until a positive Law of God interpose, whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature is lawful; but when that positive Law is manifest, it is necessary that that likewise be obeyed; and no humane Law of man's making can have right to dispense with it. He proceeds [besides, there is no place in the world, where men are permitted to pretend other commandments of God, than are declared for such by the Commonwealth. Christian States punish those that revolt from Christian Religion, and all other States, those that set up any religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Commonwealth 'tis equity (which is the Law of Nature, and therefore an eternal Law of God that every man equally enjoy his Liberty.] Here is an Argument drawn à facto ad jus; Because this is done, therefore it is rightly done; and an equal weight put upon the acts of Heathens, and worshippers of the Sun, Moon, etc. with that of Christians who only worship the true God. As if because Kings justly punish those who violate the Laws of those Kingdoms which they are entrusted with, therefore Thiefs justly may destroy such as break the Laws of their Combination, when indeed the first are just, but the other most unjust▪ The case seems to be the same here: for all those are combinations of Thiefs, who rob God of his due honour required by him & the Christians only act by the Law of God. So that here we may discern a great difference in the right of the two acts of the Christian and the Heathen; but then consider what is the ground of them both, we shall find it different from what Mr. Hobbs delivers. He conceiveth the reason to be this, why delinquents are punished, because they swerve from the Law of the supreme: but it is clearly otherwise; The Christian doth not therefore receive the holy Communion, or repent of his sin, or do such like heavenly duties, because the supreme Magistrate requires them, but because he finds those duties exacted by God in his positive Laws; and if the Magistrate shall controulit, he knows God must be obeyed before man, when he requires contrary to God. And the same reason persuades the Turk concerning his Alcoran, which he vainly imagineth to be the divine Law; and if the Grand Signior himself do contradict that Law they will not obey him, upon that reason. And surely the same Argument prevails with all other Nations who have their Religion by tradition; it is not the Law of man, but the imagined Law of God which they subject themselves unto in divine performances. And therefore though sovereigns punish such transgressions which are against those Laws which they have established for divine; yet it is therefore because they are esteemed divine. Therefore they made such Laws, not that they could think that they ought to be esteemed divine because they established them. I will add but one observation more, which is this; That although he saith, that all Nations practise this, that is, that they allow only such divine Laws, which they have established to be such; yet I believe no Nation in the World, (no Christian I am assured) would have allowed this doctrine to be published, but only such as were in that distracted condition as our poor Nation was when he published it. For since every Christian Kingdom professeth a conformity to divine Law, it cannot be imagined that they durst obtrude such an impossible thing to be credited as that they could make divine Laws, but only confirm and exact an obedience to them. Nay, I can think the same of all, even Heathen Nations. So that it is a conclusion abhorring to Christianity, yea humane Nature wheresoever it is planted with any Religion. For since all do conceive God to be an infinite able and wise Governor even of Kings, supremes, and kingdoms, how can they think it afe for them out of humane obedience to subject his rules to the control of his Subjects, which all Kings and Potentates are? I have handled this Paragraph verbatim, and although there are many more expressions (in this case) which may deserve censure, yet I pass them over, and indeed did think here to have concluded his Politics, and so not to have passed any further censure upon them in this place. But there are some egregious errors hereafter which must not be passed over with silence. I will also skip over his twenty seventh and twenty eight Chapters, as containing things in general less malicious, and I will enter upon his twenty ninth Chapter which he entitles    

Of those things which weaken or tend to the dissolution of a Commonwealth. CHAP. XXIII.  

SECT. I.  
Mr. Hobbs his second Paragraph purged. The signification of the word, Judge. Inferior Judges apply the determinations of Laws concerning good and evil to particular persons and facts. Private men have judicium rationis, and therefore may determine upon their own ratiocination. No man to intrude upon the office of a judge, but by deputation from the Sovereign.  
THe first of these I let pass, as having spoken something of it already materially, and begin with his second which he enters upon page 168. towards the bottom of that Page which begins thus. In the second place, I observe the diseases of a Commonwealth, that proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, that every private man is Judge of good and evil actions. To purge this doctrine from all poison, observe first; that this word, Judge, sounds like a legal Officer, and truly (to speak properly) I think the supreme legislative power is the Judge of politic good and evil; the other subordinate Judges are only Judges of the application of the supreme to particular cases; for instance thus. The legislative power commands that no man shall steal; if he do he shall be thus and thus punished; the Judge applies this sentence of this evil to ●itius, who is brought before him, and accused of this crime; the legislative determins and judgeth, that it is evil in general; but the Judge upon his Bench determines, that this person is guilty of this evil; in neither of which a private man hath right to pass a conclusive sentence concerning other men. But yet give me leave to tell the Reader, that in both these he hath judicium rationis, a rational sentence in his own thoughts, as thus; before a Law is made, he judgeth that this would be fit to be made, and so may discreetly interpose with the legislative power to advise them to act according to those reasons which appear to him as persuasive, for else the Legislator will lack that great assistance which he may receive from the premonitions of prudent men, who, many times, (although they are not lifted up to the dignity of such as sit at the Helm) v●t have either by study or experience equal abilities with them.  
And in the second (viz.) the application, when a private man shall stand by at the pleading or hearing a cause, he perceiving that the Judge carries himself partially to one side, and doth pass his sentence accordingly, this private man cannot choose but judge in his Soul, that this was a wicked sentence; As contrarily when it is justly carried with indifference, he may judge with himself that this was a righteous judgement. But the intruding into the Office of a Judge is altogether unfit without a special deputation to it But since God hath pleased to give man that most excellent faculty of ratiocination both in Natural and Political affairs, he shall desert humanity who should deny himself the exercise of that ability. Nay he may endeavour (if he can) to avert that execution of that sentence, when it is wickedly pronounced; as was the case of Daniel, in the unrighteous sentence decreed upon Susanna; but still not to usurp a judicatory power without lawful authority. But, even in these cases, there must be left judicium rationis and discretionis, a power of reason and judicial discretion to think upon and consider, what is right: but he seems to deny that truth concerning the private actions of that particular man whether it shall be good to do this or that; for so he proceeds.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. II.  
The former assertion of private ratiocination further cleared in Acts commanded against the Law of Nature, or the positive Laws of God. Mr. Hobbs his argument retorted against himself.  
THis is true, saith he, in the condition of mere Nature, where there are no civil Laws; and also under civil government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law. Consider now, Reader, that by the Law, he understands here the civil Law. Consider then that the Laws of any Nation may be against the Law of Nature; in which case he himself hath limited the power of civil Laws. A man is commanded by the National Law to act against the Law of Nature, shall not this private man judge it unfit for him to do that? And without question, in many particulars, the positive Law of God in Scripture is as clear to many men, as that Law written in men's hearts; and therefore in such cases there is no doubt but as God hath imparted to men the power of reasoning, so he hath given men Laws by which they should regulate themselves according to his directions, & they must and aught to use that reason in the guidance of their actions by his rules. But then, concerning the civil Laws themselves, a man may judge in private of them, whether they are prudential or no; yea, every man who is versed in Politics, will judge and think so of them, and sometimes judge they are not prudent, and yet give no disturbance to the peace of the Kingdom: but think it more prudent to be subject to an imprudent Law, than for it to hinder the end of all Laws, which is the peace and quiet of the Kingdom. But now consider further, Turpe est doctori cum culpa redarguit ipsum. He hath writ a book of Polity, he hath censured all the civil Laws in the World, he is a private man, and hath (I believe) no legislative power; why should he take upon him to forbid others to act that which he himself doth in that very place where he forbids them? And yet give me leave to add one Note more; this judging he speaks of must be about his Actions in the future, whether, what he is about to do will be a good or an evil action. Is it possible for a man to live honestly and not to judge of such actions wherein there is any scruple whether they are good or evil? Suppose the civil law (as he would have it) were the only rule to walk by; yet every private man must judge whether this or that act which he is about to undertake, be according to that rule or no. And perhaps he may, in many cases, find work enough for all the wit he hath to regulate himself according to that rule: and although he calls this the poison of a Commonwealth; yet I dare boldly say it is that bread which doth most wholesomly nourish, support and maintain a Commonwealth, (viz.) that every man should consider and judge what is legal, and fit for him to do. Let us go on with him.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. III.  
Of the rule of Actions. The Law of Nature, the measure of humane Actions, in opposition to the Civil Laws, where the case is contradistinct. Instances of Civil Laws commanding unjust things; If the Civil Law command any thing against the Divine Law, or the principles of Faith and Reason. Mr. Hobbs his arrogancy in venting principles contrary to the received opinion of the whole World noted and censured. The case stated and determined. Good Men obedient to bad Laws, not in acting according to them, but by suffering the penalties inflicted by them.  
But (saith he) otherwise, it is manifest, that, the measure of good and evil actions, is the Civil Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is always representative of the Commonwealth▪ Here are two Propositions, I shall handle them apart, they are both indiscreet, and very impertinent to the Question. The first is, that the Civil Law is the measure of our Actions the measure is in definite without any limitation what not the Law of Nature? shall not that be a measure? How shall a man be able to commit Treason then se defendendo against the Civil Law? (which is one of his popular Aphorisms delivered in many places of this Book:) for if the Civil Law be the measure of his actions, he must not violate that for the pretence of the Law of Nature. I urge this ad hominem▪ as a●●nvincible argument against his wicked doctrine, but see it overthrown out of most received principles; It is possible that the Civil Laws may be wicked and dishonest, and so against the Law of God; as even in this Nation, they have made sacrilegious Laws; shall not I judge in myself whether it be fit for me to act according to these Laws? The Law made in Queen Mary's days which shed so much innocent blood, it was fit for every man in that time to suffer rather than to conspire with them. And therefore he must be judge himself what is virtuous for him to do; and that Law is not a rule to guide him sa●ely by. Let this suffice for the first proposition. The second is, And the Judge is the legislator, who is always representative of the Commonwealth. What an impossible Judge for such doubts is here delivered Make the legislator what you will, King, or Senate or what you please; ●he que●ion to be determined may be whether it is fit for Titius, at this hour or instant, to act according to this Civil law concerning which the scruple ariseth? whether it be not against the Divine law? the duty is instant, now required; It is not possible for this man to obtain leave to inquire of the legislator; or if he could, is it not probable that the legislator may not be at leisure to answer such doubts? It cannot be therefore that the legislator can be a proper Judge of such questions; Titius alone must do it himself: neither indeed is it possible for any legislator to foresee all such particular scruples which may arise out of general rules; and therefore there is a necessity for every man to be judge of good and evil, concerning his own particular actions what he should do. But he reduceth great mishaps and ill consequences which follow upon this doctrine, which must be examined. From this false doctrine (saith he) men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common wealth. And why not, good Reader? There is no man that hath reason with him when he studyeth a Law-book, or indeed any other (besides the holy Scripture) but he considers whether that law or discourse be agreeing to the principles of Faith and Reason, whether it be consonant with equity: if a ma● have not his judgement free to himself, how comes it about that Mr. Hobbs hopes to prevail with his discourse against all the laws in the Christian World, but that he himself thinks there is a freedom of judgement left amongst men to determine by their reason what is good or evil▪ But than he adds, [And afterwards to obey, or disobey them as in their private judgement they shall think fit, whereby the Commonwealth is distracted and weakened.] Certainly every man living will obey or disobey as he thinks fit; and this is done by virtuous and good men without distracting or weakening the Commonwealth. For if a virtuous man find the Civil law contradicting God's law either in Nature or Scripture, he cannot think it good moraliter for him to act according to its direction. But his opposing of an established law shall be with submission to the penalty, not contending martially against it, for the accommodation of this present contented being, which is his doctrine; and by this means the Commonwealth will suffer no distraction, but rather confirmation and establishment; when a man's private evil shall be patiently endured, rather than the peace of a kingdom shall be disquieted. I speak no more of this because the sense is much the same with that doctrine which he censured next and condemns.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. IV.  
Mr. Hobbs his proposition everted. Conscience defined and distinguished. Of conclusions secondarily or remotely deduced from the first principles. No conscience properly and strictly erroneous, but being such (according to the vulgar acception of the phrase) however obliges. The case put upon the misinterpretation of Scripture, supposed to prohibit swearing, though for the confirmation of a truth, and the error asserted to be obliging. Two objections answered and the proposition fully cleared; our Saviour's command of not swearing at all examined, and elucidated. Of promissory or assertory Oaths. The paragraph and question concluded.  
ANother Doctrine repugnant to Civil Society, is, That whatsoever a man doth against his Conscience is sin, and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself Judge of good and evil. Certainly the proposition is true, whatsoever a man doth against his Conscience is sin; for Conscience includes in its Name and Nature Science, so that there can be no Conscience, without there be a knowledge of the condition and circumstances to which his Conscience is applied. I would be loath to involve myself into many intricate Questions. But entreat the Reader to consider, that Conscience is the conclusion of a practical Syllogism, in which the Major is either the Act of a principal law of Nature, or some general rule equivalent to it. To understand this, observe, that there are two innate qualities in man, which the Philosophers call, Habitus Principiorum, habits of principles which do so evidence themselves that no rational man doth hear such truths clearly delivered, but he presently assents to them▪ that which is about speculative things they term intellectus, because it is in the prime operation of the understanding; of which Nature are these, That the whole is greater than a part; two and two make four: There is no man that heareth such propositions clearly delivered who doth not presently assent to them. There is another quality which is called by them Synteresis, which is the habit by which we readily assent to practical things, as in the other to speculative, of which Nature are these; That good is desirable, evil to be eschewed; God is to be obeyed in his commands, and the like. Now there is no man, ho, as soon as he hears these Axioms clearly delivered, but doth without ambiguity presently yield an assent to them. Out of these principles when a man makes true collections and deductions, that conclusion is Conscience, as thus:  
All evil is to be eschewed;  
Adultery is evil;  
Therefore Adultery is to be eschewed.  
Such a man who thus argues, acts against his Conscience when he commits Adultery. But not only so when a conclusion is immediately deduced out of Synteresis but that which is more remotely deduced out of it; as take the conclusion of the former syllogism;  
● Adultery is to be eschewed:  
This particular Act, with this forbidden Woman, is Adultery.  
Therefore this is to be eschewed.  
Sure he who commits that sin acts against his Conscience, and so as far as any man can go, with right arguing, so far his Conscience obligeth him▪ Now if we would argue from strong reason, a man may say, there is no such thing as an erroneous Conscience, because if it be not Science, it cannot be Conscience, which upposeth Science and a right drawing out the Conclusion, which proceeds from these evident principles; and then most certainly Mr. Hobbs must be in the wrong, who affirms that it is not sin to act against his Conscience. But let us take Conscience as in the usual way it is taken, not for the conclusion of a direct and certain arguing, from these known and evident principles, (of which before:) but for that conclusion which any man, according to his ability, draws out of these principles although mistaken, and not logically or truly done. (I understand not b● this word [logically] the art of logic, but that natural ratiocination, of which the artificial is an assistant only.) Well then, the question is, whether that a man who acts against that light which he hath, that shows him this particular is unlawful, is sin in him who so acts, although this light be not a true but a bare show of Conscience; and not true Science, or deduction which must be drawn from the principles of Synteresis by true ratiocination? And certainly the opinion is most right and true, and founded upon the strongest principles of reason that can be. For it is a mo● undoubted Axiom which he hath delivered, that laws bind only by the force of their sufficient promulgation. So that if they are made only, they exact no obedience until they be proclaimed; nor then, unless the Proclamation be such as the obliged party may take notice of it; for no man can be bound to that which he cannot know; he cannot obey, unless he know what to obey; nor can he know, unless he have a Revelation to show it him; so that, without question, the very law of Nature could not bind, but that there is a Synteresis that enlightens man's Soul, and makes the goodness of that law manifest. Well then, this man must needs sin who acts against that light he hath: put that case which is common amongst us, A man by misunderstanding the Scriptures thinks that they command him, not to swear: therefore when he is convented before a Judge to attest a truth by that most religious act, of calling God to witness what he saith to be true, or to punish him, if it be false; if this man so conceive these places of Scripture, as if they should render his swearing in any case unlawful, if he do swear, he sins against that light he hath, and it may most justly be imputed to him for sin: for he who thinks, and believes it is the law of God which prohibits it, and yet will do otherwise, prefers men before God, this world before the other, which is the fountain from whence all iniquity proceeds.  
I know but two objections of any moment, which can be made against this conclusion, which I shall satisfy presently. The first is, if a man doth sin in acting against his erroneous Conscience, than a man may sin in acting according to God's commandments; because that he may mistake God's command, and in doing so when he acts according to the true meaning of Gods command he must sin: which may seem most strange at the first view.  
For answer I will consider this Phrase, Act according to God's command. To understand this know that he who obeys God's commands, must do it as a man scienter knowingly. A man cannot pretend to obedience in any act which is done by chance, or ignorantly. Such acts therefore which are done when a man thinks otherwise of the Law of God or the principles of the Law of Nature, than the truth is, though he do the Acts materially directed by them; yet ●●ring in the principles which God hath given him for his guide (I mean the light of his understanding which should show him the way) he doth not act them formally well; he doth bonum, but not been, a good act but not well, according to God's law formally. As for a man to do a good act well, requires a completion of all circumstances, he must do it for a right end. In which first qualification the erroneous man who acts against the light of his Synteresis, must needs miscarry, because he cannot think he acts for the glory of God, when he thinks contrary to the revealed will of God: and indeed it might be shown how he errs in every circumstance▪ Quis, Quid, C●i, Cur, Quomodo, Quando, (Quis.) What? the Creature go against the revealed will of the Creator? etc. But I desist, the restare obvious. Well then, I answer this objection, that he who acts the thing commanded against his erroneous Conscience, although he do that which is materially good, yet in not doing it well he sins.  
The second objection is, that if he who hath an erroneous Conscience must not act against it, such a man is necessitated to 〈◊〉; for he must either act according to his Conscience or against it; in either of which he sins, as in the instance before given; A man whose Conscience tells him that he may not swear, this man is brought before a Judge to give evidence in a Cause of moment, if he do it, or not do it, he sins: but surely the Nature of sin is such, that it is impossible to sin in any act which he cannot choose but do; for sin supposeth a possibility not to sin.  
For answer to this I shall say, that there is no impossibility in the case proposed, for that man may lay aside his error and consider that God hath given a command to swear by his Name, Deut. 6. 13. and elsewhere; the words there are, thou shalt fear the Lord thy God and serve ●im and swear by his Name. Not that he commands us to swear, but supposing swearing to be necessary in all politics for the deciding controversies, he commands that when we swear, we should swear by his Name, because it is a religious act, and aught to be referred to none but himself only; yea God himself hath sworn, Gen. 22. 16. By myself I have sworn, saith the Lord, so like wise Psalm 100 4. The Lord hath sworn, and many like places. It cannot therefore be ill in itself to swear, nor can we think it a privilege or prerogative of Gods to swear: Holy men in all ages have done it: for you may find Abraham divers times, as Gen. 21. 22. He swore in the Covenant with Abimelech. So likewise Isaac, either the same or another Abimelech, Gen. 26. 31. I need not name more places of the same Nature. But to whatsoever may▪ be objected of this kind out of the Old Testament, these may reply, that our Saviour hath instituted a New Law (Mat. 5. 33.) where in the 34 verse he saith, But I say unto you, swear not at all; It is true he so requires them. But let us consider that St. Paul (whose life and actions after his conversion are so eminently excellent, and without blame) divers time swears, yea in his Epistles, which were a greater fault than in ordinary discourse, because 'twas done upon consideration. Nay, in those Epistles which he was directed by the Holy Ghost to write, for the good of the Church of Christ. So you may observe Rome 1. 9 God is my witness: so likewise, 2 Cor. 1. 23. I call God for record upon my Soul. Phillip 1. 8. God is my record. And now it is not possible for any man to think, that so virtuous a man in a premeditated act, as an Epistle writ for a public good, and in that act, guided by the holy Ghost, should commit a sin against that Christ, whose Gospel and Laws he preached and taught every where, with hazard of his life, if that Law were to be understood in that latitude and extent in which it is taken. Any man who considers this, must needs cast about to see, if learned men, (who throughout the whole Christian World have practised with St. Paul) have given any such exposition upon these words of our Saviour as may consist with the universal practice of mankind, and doing that he may find this fully explained so, as fit to show our Saviour's design, which was not in this to control the practice of his servants. The difficulty will lie in these two Phrase, the Negative in the (34) verse, and the Affirmative in the (37) verse. First for the Negative, swear not at all; to apprehend this consider, that these universal, as also indefinite terms are with much caution to be extended, and to be expounded in Scripture according to that consent they have with other places, and the Analogy of Faith. In the 21 verse of this 5 Chap. of St. Matthew, it is said, thou shalt not kill, and lest some should say, there is no universal sign preceding as in my Text, consider the following words which make it as large as this in my Text, whosoever killeth shall be in danger of the judgement. And yet surely it is lawful for an Executioner to hang according to the Law of the Land, and so to kill any man who is condemned, when he hath received a command to do it. So likewise it is lawful for a Soldier in defence of his Country, and for any private man to kill any private man in defence of himself. So likewise the same we may say of our Saviour's words, John 10. and the 8. All that ever came before me, were Thiefs and Robbers. Here are as full and large words as possibly can be; but a man say, what were the Patriarches, the Prophets, and St. John the Baptist Thiefs and Robbers? Certainly no; it is easy to observe many more of the like Nature, and I think one answer will serve them all; thou shalt not kill voluntarily, but upon necessity, or command, (that is) a Natural or Moral necessity, for a command from lawful Superiors introduceth a Moral necessity of obeying. And so for that in St. john, all that came of themselves, unsent by God, were Thiefs and Robbers. But john the Baptist, the Patriarches, and the Prophets were men sent from God. And so for those Swearers, swear not all, that is, of yourselves, unless you are commanded by Superior Powers, unless to confirm some great and considerable truth; which way all virtuous and holy men have ever understood this Text, as their practice assures us; and so that place in St james the 5. must abide the same exposition. And although much more may be said for the exposition of thy Negative command of our Saviour's; yet I conceive that this is sufficient, and so pass to the Affirmative precept in the 37) verse, But let your communication be yea, yea, nay, nay, for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil. Here it ●eems that as our Saviour before forbade swearing by his Negative, swear not at all, so here he insinuates the same by his Affirmative, but let your communication be yea, yea, and nay, nay; and he gives a reason for it, for what is more than these cometh of evil. Thus the Argument being enforced, I answer clearly, that in the Translation of the English there is a full gloss upon the Text which expounds it clearly; for so it is read [let your communication] which intimates that their common conversation should not be powdered with Oaths, which is far distant from those just occasions where oaths are exacted by the commands of Superiors, or the urgency of some great and weighty business which needs a strong affirmation to assure the credulity of it; and the Original which is (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) enforceth no more but let your Speech be yea, etc. And the reason which is added in the Text makes this interpretation good (for what is more than these cometh of evil;) it is not sin, it is not Evil, but cometh of Evil; which is evident, for no man swears in conversation, but either because he doubts his own reputation▪ if he do not swear, or because other men are distrustful, both which arise out of the evil of humane falsehood, which makes him apt to lie. This Text being thu opened let us consider what will result out of it, in the Negative first, and then out of the Affirmative precept; In the Negative we may find that it is opposed to a practice of the Jews, who (by some tradition or other) imagined that it was no sin to swear, but to swear falsely only. So that if a man performed his promise which he swore he would do, it was no sin▪ and it seems therefore to be spoken only of promissory Oaths, not of such which were made to give Testimony of matters of fact; if so, then there is no prohibition of such Oaths which are for the decision of controversies, commonly called Assertory Oaths; and then again, it may justly be conceived, that they (that is the Jews) thought (out of some tradition or other) that it was only unlawful to swear by God, but not by the Creature, for our Saviour's instances are only in them, Thou shalt not swear by Heaven, by Earth, by jerusalem, by the Gold of the Altar, or thy Head. Which he showeth relatively to reach even the Creator himself: so that for these considerations it must be understood that it excludes not assertory Oath which decide controversies, that it extends not to such Oaths where God is religiously called to witness any thing. And then for the second the affirmative precept, it reacheth to our Communication and common conference one with another, that Gods most Sacred Name be not slightly or in vain taken by us; but that either some great business more than ordinary, or else some supreme power must exact it from us. So then this being thus expounded, it must needs appear that in this case, a man may justly depose his error, and he cannot be necessitated to sin, when he hath an error in his Conscience. And truly it is an excellent rule for the practice of a man's life, when he shall find a general practice of good and holy men in all Ages to practise any thing which he is offended at, to suppress that averseness in himself, and with study and pains to cast about which way he may reconcile himself to that common practice, and not without strong and evident grounds (which will hardly be possible) oppose that which the universal practice makes us know, that the universal Church understood as they practised; for if there be an Error in such a practice, a man may find something to excuse himself with erravimum cum patribus; but in the other, nothing but pride and self conceit, which makes him oppose these practices: and surely in these cases it is a safe rule for any man when he finds a place of Scripture which seemingly opposeth the universal doctrine of the Church, which is and hath been so heretofore, to look about how that Scripture may be expounded according to the Analogy of faith and good manners or usage of the Catholic Church, which then must be the sense, and the other (though more apparent at the first) not the true meaning; and by this means he shall not act contrary to his Conscience, but if he do, he must sin.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. V.  
Every man Judge of his own Actions, whether according to the positive Divine Laws, or the Law of Nature. Mr. Hobbs his consequencies observed and censured. His absurd expression of a public Conscience rejected. Opinion and Conscience distinguished. Thoughts not possibly to be regulated by humane Laws. The external manage of Opinion. The proper subject of Regulation. The necessity of distraction from diversity of Opinions unless obtruded upon others. This Argument retorted ad hominem.  
HE proceeds, And it dependeth on the presumption of making himself Judge of good and evil. It doth (say I) for so every man will be, in what concerns his own practice; and must needs be so, for else how can he judge that he doth right or no unless he may judge it? and if there were no Law but what he speaks of, the Civil, he must judge whether his actions be according to that or no when he acts: But Mr. Hobbs acknowledgeth a superior Law to that, to wit, the Law of Nature, and I have showed another the positive Law of God, and he must in both these use judicium privatum, his private judgement, whether his actions accord or no with these superior Laws. Now in all these he must judge and be responsible for that judgement, whether he judge by such rules as aught to guide a prudent man: but he gives a reason for what he speaks, for a man's Conscience and his Judgement is the same thing: and as the judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. This doth not follow, because he may err therefore he should not be guided by it. A man may have a false light showed, or his eyes may be weak, as our eyes, who are old men, are; must he therefore not make use of that light and sight which he hath▪ Nay rather he must be more careful in the diligent using of his eyes, and more seriously examining the light which is offered to them. But in all these offers of reason which he makes in this Case, they may be applied to that judgement which he must make concerning the Law of Nature, or the Civil Law (which he allows a man must judge) whether his actions be according to them, and what ●s the meaning of them as well as what is the meaning of the positive Law of God, and he must and will, if he be a virtuous man, act accordingly. Therefore (saith he) though he that is subject to no Civil Law, sinneth in all he doth against his Conscience, because he hath no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Commonwealth, because the Law is the public Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. I cannot find how to apply this discourse closely to the question, for he who is not embodied in a Commonwealth (saith he) is ruled by his reason, (but hark you) that reason ought to be ruled by the Law of Nature, according to his own doctrine; and according to mine, by whatsoever is a known positive Law of God. Likewise, although there is no Civil Law. And I will tell him farther that no Civil or Politic Law can have power to bind him to the breach of any of these, and therefore what he speaks of a public Conscience is an unheard of Language, and not proper to be applied to Conscience, and most undoubtedly only educeable out of that before unheard of, and most impossible principle of constituting a supreme, which hath been abundantly confuted in my former discourses. Let the Reader take notice that I am now in page the▪ (169) (Otherwise in such diversity as there is of private Consciences, which are but private Opinions, the Commonwealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.) In this clause he sets down the mischiefs (as he thinks) which may happen to a Commonwealth by diversities of Consciences, or Opinions. But before I proceed I will take notice of a mistake whereof he is guilty, when he saith, That private Consciences are but private Opinions. To this I say there may be such Consciences which arise only out of private Opinions, which ought to be overswayed with the greater weight of public Authority: but there are other Consciences which are drawn out of the evident Law of Nature, or clear text of Scripture; these are so strong foundations to build Conscience upon, that a Conscience erected upon one or both of them cannot be shaken by that which he calls a public Conscience▪ howsoever, it is an improper Phrase used by ●im to call Conscience, Opinion, or Science; for it is rather a Conclusion deduced out of either, as I have showed. But then when he is angry in these Politics with diversities of Consciences or Opinions (as he terms them) I would fain have him consider, how any Commonwealth should be able to make a Law to regulate men's thoughts, for they can judge of them only by outward acts, it is only God who can search the hearts and reins, and therefore he only can make ●aws for them. Men may confine the external manage of Opinions and Consciences, which is fit the legislative should do, in all such things which might impede or trouble the well government of a Commonwealth, and punish the expression of them: but let all the power in the World make what Laws they can, men will think what appears most reasonable to their understandings: thoughts are far from the control of any Leviathan whatsoever. And although it is true in some part, that distractions in Commonwealths arise from diversity of Opinions; yet it is not true what he saith, the Common wealth must needs be distracted by them; for so long as they are but Opinions, they do no harm but to those Persons who have them; but if they justify their Opinions to the withdrawing others or themselves from obedience than they are dangerous. And therefore the Leviathan although he cannot know men's Consciences, and therefore not judge of them, must not make Laws for them; yet because he can know and judge of the outward act, which may distrub the peace, he must be severe both in making Laws against, and punishing those faults: yet I cannot choose but wonder, how he who dares publish so many doctrines against all the Leviathans in the World, should not allow others the liberty of thinking against them.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. VI  
Faith and sanctity both inspired and acquired. freewill and grace co-operating to the salvation of Men. Mr. Hobbs his Arguments against this Opinion refuted. Faith and sanctity entitle not any man to government. The means of salvation most certain. Mr. Hobbs his Arguments against the former assertion retorted.  
HE proceeds in another Paragraph, It hath been also commonly taught, that faith and sanctity are▪ not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration or infusion. I will not trouble myself to turn Authors where to find a defender of this proposition, but set down my judgement and then answer his cavil at it: my judgement is, that faith and sanctity are both inspired and acquired; faith is the Gift of God, as the Apostle speaketh, Eph. 2. 8. so likewise sanctification, 1 Cor. 1. 30. and yet they are acquired; and in the Parable of the Talents Mat. 25. we may observe, that the use of God's gifts is blessed by Almighty God with a further enlargement; multitudes of Scriptures might be produced, which would but dull the Reader. So that in this case it is no other wise than it is with almost all the affairs in the World; neither the grass, nor the plants grow without light and influence from the Heavens; nor can the Heavens make them grow unless there be a specifical virtue in the Plant to adapt that influence to that particular operation which is in it. Neither can the Heavens without the Earth; nor the Earth without the Heavens, bring forth the least fruit, according to that Heavenly speech of St. Bernard, Tolle liberum arbitrium, non erit quod salvetur; Tolle gratiam, non erit unde. Take away free choice, and there will be nothing which can be saved for no inferior thing without that faculty is capable of Heaven, that being like the specifical virtue of Plants which co-operates with the general influence from above:) but take away grace there is no means by which these supernatural acts should be performed; that being the influence by which it is enabled to produce these blessed acts of faith and sanctity. So that I say, faith and sanctity are both infused and acquired. Now we will inquire into his exceptions against the absurdity of this opinion (as he conceives,) [which granted, (saith he) I see not why any man should render a reason of his faith.] If the Opinion were, as he sets it down, I can tell him why? that is for the satisfaction of others: but he goes on, Or why, every Christian should not be also a Prophet. I will tell him, because faith and sanctity, and prophecy are divers things, which may and do oft exist apart; and therefore one of them may be, and is oft without the other. Again he saith, Or why any man should take the Law of his Country rather than his own inspiration, for the rule of his actions. I answer, because there are many vain suggestions into the Soul of Man, which are often apt to persuade a man that they are inspirations by God; and therefore we are commanded to try the Spirits, and examine those suggestions whether they agree with such standing rules which ought to guide our actions, amongst which the National law is one. He goes on, And thus (saith he) we fall again into the fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evil. I answer as before, there is no man but will judge of good and evil, if he be an honest man and guide his actions by that judgement, but yet as a private man, if he be such▪ He again, [Or to make Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired, to the dissolution of all Civil Government.] I see no consequence in this, for although a man may be inspired, and can know he is so; yet that inspiration can only serve his own turn, unless he can produce arguments to make me assured of it likewise; and than although a man may be inspired with faith and sanctity, which is the matter in dispute; yet that hath nothing to do with the direction of any other man's actions, unless he can produce some urging argument to assure us that he is inspired, with authority to direct us, which another's faith and sanctity cannot do; for men may be faithful and holy, and yet have no Authority to govern. He goes on thus, to show by discourse that faith and sanctity are not infused thus [Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents which guides us, into the presence of them who speak to us.] Faith comes by hearing, but it is by hearing the word of God, which is Vehiculum Spiritus, and brings the Spirit with it; for certainly as Heaven is more necessary to us, and of greater consequence than all the things of this world; so the means of obtaining it are, without doubt, more certain than any thing in the world. And therefore faith, and the means of getting faith which is most ordinately by hearing, and no doubt but reading likewise, which are the means by which men may be acquainted with the will of God, so likewise [hearing comes by those accidents (as he speaks rightly) which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us.] What can be deduced out of this, but that a man using such means as hearing, and such accidents as bring him into that presence, God blesseth them and pours into them those graces which enable them with faith and sactification. I but (saith he) which accidents are all contrived by God-Almighty; and yet are not supernatural, but only, for the great number of them that concur to every effect, unobservable.] All this is nothing to the purpose, that is, to prove that faith and sacntity are not infused: for whether God contrives those means, or man, which beget faith, or whether those means which bring us to hearing be natural, or supernatural▪ yet God blesseth them; our eyes are natural which see it; our ears are natural which hear those things, which bring us to faith and sanctity; yea our understanding is natural which apprehends them, but God blesseth both the one and the other (as his holy will hath appointed) with supernatural graces. He goes on. [Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent.] Let that be granted; [but yet they are not Miracles.] And that is true likewise, for Miracles, as they are supernatural, so they are things beyond the ordinate and set way of Gods working; which these holy operations of his are not, but most congruous to his set and prescribed way of acting them, upon such productions according to his Covenants. He proceeds [but are brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, by which God worketh them in his elect, at such time as he thinketh fit] It is true; and yet these are ways of Gods prescribing, and which he blesseth; therefore he adds [And these three Opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this part of the World proceeded chiefly from the Tongues and Pens of unlearned divines; who joining the words of holy Scripture together otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that sanctity, and natural reason cannot stand together.] Give me leave, Reader, to retort this discourse to his Person, who not long since in the 26 Chap. page 149. maketh faith not a duty, but a gift of God, and saith it is barely an operation of God's, as likewise internal sanctity. And there put me to the trouble of proving man's concurrence in these acts; and I may assuredly affirm, that he is there exceeding guilty of what he chargeth ignorant Divines with here, (viz.) incongruous putting places of Scripture together, and as much as in him lies to make men believe that sanctity and natural reason cannot stand together; for if faith be only a gift and no act in the receiver, or use of it, insomuch as no command can be given concerning that or sanctity, as he speaks there, certainly natural reason hath nothing to do with it; and as there I was forced to prove the concurrence of man in these Heavenly duties, so here to justify his former doctrine, I must prove the co-operation of God which he seems to deny. Let the Reader put that with this, and he shall find the affirmative part true, and the negative false in both.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. VII.  
Sovereign's obliged by the positive Laws of God. The Laws of Nations, The Law Naturals, The Royal Laws, or Laws of government obligatory to the sovereign. The sovereign free from penal Laws.  
A Fourth opinion, repugnant to the Nature of a Commonwealth, is this, That he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the Civil Laws. Truly I conceive by this Gentleman that he imagines Sovereigns to be strange things, which must be subject to none, but the Law of Nature, for so he expounds it presently, not to the positive Law of God, which having (by him) no assurance that it is such, but from the supreme, he can no further be obliged by it, than he pleaseth. And so that Devilish speech of that wicked woman to her imperial Son, would be made good, Quod libet, licet. But this term [Subject] troubles me to find out what he means thereby, if he mean not, to be guided by it, or else he offends; without all doubt he ought to be ruled by the positive Law of God, and not only by the Natural Law, he ought to be ruled, that is, guided by his own Civil Laws, which he hath made, or given life unto. For how can he expect an observance from others, who will not keep his Laws himself? But if he means by Subject, subject to penalty; that cannot be, I am confident, in a well contrived Commonwealth; because all penalty for breach intimates an inferiority, and as he rightly speaks aftewards, He who punisheth, either bodily, or with shame, or with whatsoever, is in that act superior to him who is punished. But his dispute is out of his own principles, which have been twenty times confuted, that is, He that is subject to the Law, is subject to the Commonwealth, that is, to the Sovereign representative, that is, to himself. This is a weak argument because he is not the representative of the Commonwealth, but the head, and rules it. One word more, there may be Laws in a Commonwealth for Kings, and for Subjects, he must be guided by these which are the Royal Laws, the Laws of governing, although not by these which are inferior, and Laws for Subjects: he must be allowed those prerogatives which are not fit for Subjects to have: But yet he ought to observe the rules of governing. This, I conceive, is enough for what he hath delivered in that Paragraph. He begins another thus.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. VIII.  
Propriety derived from the sovereign of sovereigns. The quiet enjoyment of Estates. The reason according to Mr. Hobbs of the imbodying of men. The propriety of the Subjects. The foundation of the public interest. It excludes not the prerogative of the sovereign. The title of the King of England in many cases decided by the Judges. Mr. Hobbs his indulgence to the late usurped power observed.  
AFifth doctrine, which tendeth to the dissolution of a Commonwealth, is that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods; such as excludeth the right of the sovereign. I do not know what he means by this term [absolute.] Certainly both private and public men have their rights depending upon the Sovereign of Sovereigns; and all they have is at his dispose. But otherways certainly it tends to the dissolution of a Commonwealth, to deny an absolute propriety in private men, and to affirm that in no Commonwealth a Subject can have such propriety, for it being the reason, (according to his own Philosophy) why they embodied themselves into a Commonwealth, that so they might enjoy the fruits of their labours peaceably, not only plough and sow peaceably, but reap the fruits of that pains they take, and call it there own: It cannot be denied, that that justly can be denied them; and if it be they are in such a state as they were without the fruits of their virtuous labours. It is true in the Eastern Monarchies, I read they have not inheritances as they have here, but pro termino vitae, and then all return to that sea out of which they came; but it is otherwise in our European Countries through, and the Laws of every Nation are justly to be observed; but still according to that right which each person hath: and this propriety is so naturally dear unto every man, as there can be no wiser Laws made for the public than such, as private men shall be bettered by them, for then every man will more industriously endeavour the public good, when his private benefit results out of it. I but (saith he) such as excludeth the right of the Sovereign. Indeed I think in that he said more rightly than he meant; for certainly the Sovereign hath a right of a Sovereign, over all his kingdom, or dominion; nay, the propriety of a Sovereign (that is his legal propriety) over his Subjects is over their estates, to determine their Controversies, to have dominion over their Persons, legally to punish, according to his just prerogative. But the title of propriety in his estate, is belonging to the subject in all such things as are not included in the supremes legal prerogative. So that when he has granted Laws which do limit the extent of his power, and indulge the virtuous industry of his subjects, he cannot justly infringe them and call that his right, which he hath condescended not to use. And upon this reason, with us, the Title of the King in many occasions is decided by the Judges in point of Propriety And therefore he did ill in publishing this book in English, (so that it principally concerns us,) and at that time when the liberties and proprieties of the Subject were so abominably invaded by the usurped powers, as if he would provoke them to outdo themselves, and oppress more, and more lawfully, than was pretended. He proceeds.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. IX.  
The sovereign protects the subject in the enjoyment of that right and Propriety which the Law gives him. The rights of sovereignty, not of propriety necessary for the performance of the royal Office, and protection of subjects. Public necessity justifies the invasion of propriety. The partition of the sovereignty among the Optimates not destructive of it, according to Mr. Hobbs his own tenants. The responsa prudentum of high esteem among all Nations.  
EVery man has indeed a propriety that excludes the right of every other Subject. This is granted upon all sides, and (saith he ●h● has it only from the sovereign power; without the protection whereof, (now I am in Page 170.) every other man should have equal right to the same. This is not truly spoke; for the protection of the sovereign doth not make, or give right to any thing, but enables him to use the same; the law gives the right & the sovereign protects us in the enjoying that which the Law hath given. But I wonder at his meaning in what follows, which is, But if the right of the Sovereign also be excluded, he cannot perform the Office they have put him into. That must be understood of the right of the Sovereignty, but not of propriety: if he be not allowed the prerogatives belonging to sovereignty, he cannot protect them; but if he be denied the right of propriety, he cannot well destroy them; but surely may protect them with his justice, and with his power. He expounds himself [which is to defend them both from foreign Enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a Common wealth] A strange inference, unless he have right to their Estates he cannot defend them etc. Surely many Sovereigns have defended and do defend their subjects, and yet have not propriety to their Estates. He who hath a propriety in an estate may use it how he will to his own advantage or content. But this Supremes cannot do with their subjects justly; there may be a case of extremity, where Salus Reipublicae must be suprema lex; put the case an Enemy invades the Kingdom, the land of some particular subject lies fit to make a Fort of; the King by force takes it for the public benefit; not out of propriety that it belongs to himself, but that it belongs to the Commonwealth, to whose public benefit all private interests and proprieties must submit. But I may term the right of such accidents to be an universality rather than a propriety, the universal right of the Commonwealth, not the particular right of one or another. That which follows to this purpose, receives the same answer, In offices of judicature and the like. I pass to a sixth Doctrine which, (he saith) is plainly and directly against the essence of a Commonwealth; and 'tis this, that the sovereign power may be divided. What he means by division, I cannot readily apprehend; if he means that it may not be divided into sundry persons, than he hath overthrown himself, when he constitutes other Government besides Monarchy, as Aristocracy, and Democracy, which are in divers persons, but united; if he means (which he seems to do by his following discourse) two several Kings in the same kingdom, I think it cannot subsist, because of distractions as he intimates; but the fountain of the error, I think is not well derived from the Lawyers, who, (saith he) endeavour to make the Laws depend upon their own learning, and not upon the legislative power. Which way this should conduce to the dependence of the Law upon their learning. I see not; he himself hath discoursed that the responsa prudentum were always in high esteem among the Romans, as the opinion of the Judges are amongst us; and all men have a great reverence of them in all Nations. But▪ these responsa declare what is Law, and they will cease to be prudentes, when they abuse the Law. He begins another Paragraph.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. X.  
The Paragraph asserted. Not the form of Government, but the execution of good Laws makes a Nation happy. The history of the Grecians and Romans vindicated against Mr. Hobbs. Mr. Hobbs his Precepts in his Leviathan; much more seductive and encouraging to rebellion than the forementioned Histories. The abuse of good things ought not to take away the use of them.  
AND as false doctrine so oftentimes the example of different government in a Neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to the alteration of the form already settled. In this truly I am of his mind; for when men see a neighbour prosper in that kind of life he leads, he is apt to pry● into the ways by which he so thrives, and then taking the same course hopes to find it as beneficial to himself, as it hath proved to the other. I approve the discourse throughout, and therefore need not transcribe any more. But yet would have been glad to have read some way, by which this evil, being known, might be hindered or avoided, and truly I can think upon none but by making ourselves more industrious than our Neighbours, by better rewarding virtue and industry, and punishing vice and sloth than they. There is scarce that people whose fundamental principles are not such as may make the Kingdom happy under that government, if they were used to the best advantage; so that it is not the form of Government only, but the disposure in that form which felicitates a Nation, and so the making and execution of good Laws at home will redress the inconvenience which comes from a Neighbouring Nation. He enters upon a new Paragraph, [And as to rebellion in particular against Monarchy, one of the most frequent causes of it, is the reading the Books of policy, and Histories of the Ancient Greeks and Romans.] I wonder he had not put in the Old Testament likewise; but certainly he is out in it: for these Books (he speaks of) do teach Kings and Supremes how to govern and avoid those Rocks upon which their predecessors have been split; they teach Subjects to avoid all rebellion, the most happy and prosperous of which brings confusion if not destruction to that Nation where they are, and very frequently ruin to themselves and their Families, who are Ringleaders in such actions; But if books which encourage to rebellion must be laid aside, then let Leviathan be buried in silence; which I have, and shall show shortly, not by example only, but precept to justify more rebellion than ever any Author did; I but, saith he, (from which (that is these books) young men, and all others as are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason, receiving a strong and delightful impression of the great exploits of war achieved by the conductors of their Armies, receive withal a pleasing Idea of all they have done besides.] I think this may be done, and that these excellent stories which relate the gallant and exemplary virtues of many, may, yea must likewise with them record the vices of others yea, many times the faults of virtuous men, without which never man lived, but our ever blessed Saviour. But what then? shall the Bee lose its honey, because the Spider may suck poison out of the same flower? shall we avoid the Sunshine because many are scorched by it? By this means we should avoid all good things, for there are none so good but foolish and wicked men have made ill use of them; even the mercies of God and all his glorious attributes have by some been applied to evil. This Argument follows not therefore, because weak and ignorant men have ill digested these excellent meats, therefore better stomaches should not use them; without doubt these stories have abundance in them to show virtuous men how to lead their lives, and expose them and lay them down pro focis & aris, which his self-seeking doctrine will not allow. And yet these had been the most proper dictates from him, who writes Politics as conducing more to the public good than any self-preservation which he so much labours for. But a little after he proceeds to show their folly who make ill use of them, which I allow; but presently again he in the bottom of that page seems to argue thus.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XI.  
Truth desired in this Paragraph. Tyrants distinguished. An Usurper justly killed by any subjects for the deliverance of his lawful Sovereign. Lawful sovereigns not to be deposed or murdered for their ill government, but left to the justice of God. The former conclusion asserted. A further vindication of the Books and Histories of the Grecians and Romans.  
FRom the reading (I say) of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings. Surely I believe among all the declarations that such Traitors have made, never any one made his study of such writers justify those horrid acts; Because (saith he) the Greek and Latin writers in their books and discourses of Policy (I am now in the 171 p.) make it lawful and laudable for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. I would have wished that he had named his Authors, for than I could have discerned whether he had abused them or no; to turn and examine all Authors were too tedious for me; yet something I may say in general, that I believe no man of honour for learning and policy, did either amongst the Greeks or Romans affirm, that if he hath called a Monarch a Tyrant, it is laudable for him to kill him; for certainly no man can found the justification of such a Villainy upon his foolish calling him such, but his being such. Now, as I remember, they make Tyrants of two sorts; such as invade the kingdom and usurp it from the right owner; and no doubt but any of those Subjects that owe obedience to their lawful King, may vindicate him and their fellow subjects from that unjust invasion. The other way of Tyranny is by such a man who is a lawful King, by his succession or election according to the Laws of the Realm, but governs arbitrary by his will, not the Law: Now because his right of title and possession, puts him above the reach of legal (though he can never be out of the reach of private) judgement; and seeing it is not lawful for a man to kill any one upon a private judgement, therefore it cannot (ex abundanti) be lawful to kill him, but leave him, Deo ultori: so that if he find such doctrine amongst the Greeks and Romans, he may rationally judge them amiss, and it is no more reasonable for men to be barred the great happiness of the wisdom contained in these books, because fools make ill use of them, than to bar men a sober and healthful use of wine because vicious men abuse it by drunkenness▪ He goes on [from the same books (saith he) they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion, that the subjects in a popular Commonwealth enjoy liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all slaves.] I wonder why he should impute this to the Greek and Latin, more than to the Italians, Germans, or Dutch stories. Certainly most people when they find their own condition hard, are willing to change, and think any other would be better; and it is the same with all other Commonwealths, as well as Monarchies; And therefore he truly added what follows [I say, that they who live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under popular government: for they find no such matter. But as I said before why this should be imputed to the Romans, and Grecians only; not to the Italians, Germans, and others who live equally with them in Commonwealths, I cannot discern; and therefore cannot choose but be offended with that which follows most hyperbolically false.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XII.  
Mr. Hobbs his impossible remedy to a suppositious disease. The learning of the Grecians and Romans again vindicated. Mr. Hobbs his opinion of the necessity of forbidding the use of the Greek and Roman Authors nowhere to be found but in Julian the Apostate.  
IN sum, I cannot imagine, how any thing can be more prejudicial to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such Books to be publicly read, without presently applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their venom. Here he sets down a monstrous disease and applies an impossible salve: that is, that our Grammar Schools (where these books are taught) should be supplied throughout this large kingdom with men of Mr. Hobbs his sufficiency; (for I think none else would serve his turn) none else having discovered this fault in these books, and yet in all the World who are delighted with learning, these books are taught in the initiation of scholars, both Christian and others. Only, I remember Julian the Apostate made a Law by which he thought to have gotten as much ground upon Christianity, as by any that he ever made, which was, that no Christian should read any humanity-books, nor have them read to them. Mr. Hobbs should have been his Chaplain▪ What follows in that Paragraph is nothing but a comparing this disease in a commonwealth with the biting of a mad Dog in an humane body, which I willingly enough assent unto, and so let it pass, and move to the next Pargraph which begins thus.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XIII.  
This Paragraph of Mr. Hobbs when the powers are made contra-distinct and opposite to one another affirmed from the Primitive practices. The decrees of the ancient Councils not passed into La●s, till they were confirmed by the Emperor. The Author's reason of this truth superadded.  
AS there have been Doctors, that hold there be three Souls in a man; so there be also that think there be more Souls (that is more sovereigns) than one, in a Commonwealth; and set up a supremacy against the sovereignty; Canons against Laws; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civil. Certainly this word against, makes this faulty, and therefore we shall find that in the primitive times decrees of Councils themselves grew not into laws, but by the confirmation of Emperors. But the consideration of this Paragraph I leave to the Doctors in the Church of Rome whom it principally concerns, but not us, whose Ecclesiastic Laws are confirmed by the Civil, and therefore need not this dispute: And yet I can add one clause to confirm his conclusion (stronger I think, than any he produced,) which is, that dominion is over persons not parts; he who hath dominion over the Soul hath dominion over the body, which is governed by the Soul; and he who hath dominion over the body hath likewise dominion over the Soul, without which it cannot act any obedience or disobedience. And so I let this alone for the present, and come to the next disease, which is page (172.)   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XIV.  
Mr. Hobbs his reflection upon the Government of England observed and censured; his parallel from the diversity of Souls not enforcing. The comparison of leavyes of money not rightly applied to the nutritive faculty. The power of conduct not well resembled to the Motive faculty in the soul.  
IN the midst of that page this disease begins thus. Sometimes also in the mere Civil Government, there be more than one Soul; as when the power of levying money, (which is the Nutritive faculty) has depended upon a general assembly; the power of conduct and command (which is▪ the motive faculty) on one man; and the power of making laws, (which is the rational faculty,) on the accidental consent not only of those two, but also of a third. There he turns his spleen against our Government in England, without nameing it, but clearly intimating that state and condition which is fundamental to the constitution of our Kingdom. I cannot imagine why, unless he had a mind to provoke the then present Usurper to be most tyrannical in his Government. For certainly this Government as established in Magna Charta at the first, was settled with so grave and weighty consideration, and such a serious manner of confirmation, as never any but the Law of God delivered on Mount Sinai (with thunder, and such astonishments) and in itself so prudent, that nothing can reasonably more conduce to the perpetuity of a kingdom. But let us see what he saith (there is (saith he) more than one Soul.) I think it would trouble his Philosophy to answer these Arguments which are brought by those Philosophers who assert there are more in every man, as also to prove the contrary. But I let that alone, there is no enforcing that from this establishment; for all these several operations (which he speaks of) do arise from the same Soul; so that the lowest, even the giving of money to our King, is by his Authority, and that power is ensouled (as I may speak) by him. But as he is the Soul by which his subjects are enabled to levy such money for his necessity and the necessities of the kingdom; so they are the body which must act by this power, he enables them, for without his assent they cannot levy that money from any but their own particular purses; this he compares to the Nutritive faculty, and indeed not amiss; for as that faculty is dispersed throughout the whole man and each part of him w●ich doth receive nourishment; so these are dispersed throughout the whole kingdom, and indeed they in particular, and the whole kingdom in general receives nutriment in being protected in prosperity and safety, which the Monarch is enabled to do by these supplies. But yet he is mistaken in the application, when he calls this an act of the nutritive faculty, (viz.) to levy money, that is afterwards an act of the King, who makes use of that assistance, to that purpose; this in the first act of bare levying money, looks like an act of exhausting or consumption rather than nutrition. But as wise nature disposed those contributions, which the singular parts sometimes afford the fainting stomach by a return to their advantage afterwards so doth the wisdom of a King make those payring from the other parts produce their greater happiness and plenty: but still observe, this is not as if there were many, but one Soul. All is acted by the supreme power which enables the other to perform, what he doth. From hence he passeth to the King, (The power of conduct and command is (which is the motive faculty on one man.) Why he should call this the motive faculty I do not perceive, since that is Philosophically seated in the sensitive or animal part; but the power of conduct or command must certainly be in the supreme and rational part, for where that is, it commands and governs the sensitive so that they move or acquiesce according to its conduct. But I would he had set down what he means by this faculty and how far he meant it, there would t●en have been something to be understood. There is no doubt but the King hath the power of conducting even in those things he named before and in those which follow, none of which can be a ●ed without him, and therefore aught to have a higher faculty allowed him than that of Motion.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XV.  
Mr. Hobbs his reflection upon the House of Lords and Commons in Parliament. His supposed danger for want of the consent of one or either of these refuted. All humane constitutions subject to error. Government rightly so styled, though without power to take away the lives or estates of Subjects. The several Estates in Parliament termed factious by Mr. Hobbs. No government absolutely and practically pure according to the definition of Politicians, but denominated from the predominant part. The sovereign not the representative of the Commonwealth, no more than the head is of a man. His instance of the Unity in the holy Trinity impertinent. Unity in subordination.  
ANd the power of making Laws (which is the rational faculty) on the accidental consent not only of those two but also of a third. By the third he means the house of Lords, and here he understands that these three ma●e the rational part, which without doubt was necessarily required to the act of conduct, as before; but he attributes nothing in particular to the Lords; let them vindicate themselves, and the House of Commons themselves, I shall only meddle with the inconveniences which arise out of this policy which he begins immediately to fall upon, this endangereth the Commonwealth, sometimes for want of consent to good Laws This danger I never found, but many times the stop of evil Laws which have been projected by private men, or perhaps might pass one house, & faults which have been observed by one which were not taken notice of by the other. A multitude of Councillors gives safety to laws; a weaker understanding many times sees that which a greater overlooked: that which appears lovely to some, may be known to be faulty by others. But certainly these two houses being compounded of men of all conditions who must needs be acquainted with all the unhappinesses in the Government, cannot but be thought most fit to have the examing and passing Laws for the Government. He goes on, but often for want of such nourishment as is most necessary to life and motion.] I doubt this can hardly be made out where the necessity of such contributions shall be made appear, but at such times when his rebellious principles have been infused, for without doubt where such necessities are the necessities of the Kingdom, and the King lacks the supplies proper to such motions as war defensive and offensive, the very state and condition of every man is endangered, and his doctrine of self-preservation will compel men to it, although they cast one eye upon the public. But such things he will say have been done: it is true that the niggardliness of the People to such expenses have brought the kingdom to destruction, I can call it no less; the same may be said of some Kings whose too much frugality has made them lack both men and hearts to serve their occasions. There is nothing humane that is not subject to error, and a possibility of being mistaken. But certainly this as little as any, because this assembly (as he calls them) are men selected for their estates and prudence, and because they are prudent, it is likely they are able, and because of their estates, it is reasonable to think that they should be willing to give their best assistance to the public good. He goes on, for although few perceive that such government, is not government, but division of the Common wealth into three factions, and call it mixed Monarchy Indeed I think that never m●n did conceive that this Government is not Government. Mr. Hobbs doth govern his servants, yet his government is limited with many more bounds than this is, and yet that is a government; he cannot take their clothes from them, or their Estates, much less their lives or limbs, yet he is their Governor. And though he saith only a few did perceive, yet I think until he wrote this none did ever perceive three factions; factions do oppose one another, they are not joined, neither do they cooperate in the same effect, as these do in all things which are done by them. And in this business it seems not to be a co-operation of equal shares in the work, but like an univ●rsal cause working with particular causes. The Sun with the same light shines upon a Rose, a Violet, and a Primrose. Yet with these particular specifical causes produceth those various effects with those several subordinate powers to his, but they were not instituted for factions, nor are such, but subordinate to him, and to concur with him in the legal settlement of that is good for the public: it was therefore very ill phrased of him, to call the factions a mixed Monarchy. For my part I am of the Opinion which I have expressed before, that there is no Government in the World so pure, that it hath no mixture in it, either Monarchy, Aristocracy or Democracy, but the denomination in all these is from the predominant part; yet, (saith he) the truth is, that it is not one Independent Common wealth; but three Independent factions. Again, factions; this needs not unless he can infuse factions, which I hope, he shall never be able to do either with this book or any other; and (saith he not one representative Person, but three. The vanity of this language I have heretofore spoken to. In a Monarchy the Monarch cannot be called the representative Person of the Commonwealth, no more than the head can be termed the representative of man, he is the head of this body politic, and governs it, but not represents it. He is so fond of that conceit (as indeed it is the foundation of his whole polity) that the error mixeth itself in almost every page. But let us go on with him. [In the kingdom of God there may be three Persons Independent, without breach of unity in God that reigneth.] Yes by him there may be twenty, a hundred, or a thousand, and indeed are so many; for as he makes a Person to be a man who represents another as Moses did God (of which I have treated at large in my former part against him) certainly there was a thousand such which represented him in his Kingdom in this World; and therefore this instance is nothing to the purpose, especially concerning the representation here treated of. Yes (saith he) this is without breach of unity in God who reigneth. There can be no doubt of it, for though God be represented by a thousand several men, his unity is the same. And I may say of a King though he be represented in divers Provinces by divers Viceroys, yet he is the same King and the only King. But where men reign that are subject to diversity of opinions (saith he) it cannot be so. What doth he mean by that? I think that where divers men are supremes that have divers opinions, there will be breach of Unity; For perfect Unity there is none such but in God, who b●ing without composition is absolutely not one only in the concrete, as created things are, but Unity which nothing else is, as there is no one man who is so at unity in himself, as not to differ from himself, now judging one thing, than another; yea at the same time, he may have combustion in himself by diversity of Arguments which arise in his thoughts at the same time so that he cannot imagine any perfect Unity amongst men: but yet when there is a subordination, that reduceth them to the nearest method of unity that may be; therefore where there shall be many supremes without subordination, there can be no unity: But where there is a subordination there we may find the greatest unity that this subject is capable of, which will appear by my answer to what follows.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XVI.  
The house of Commons not the King representative of the People. The King only the sovereign; the Peers the Councillors of the King. Mr. Hobbs his unworthy expression of there sovereigns censured. The odiousness of his comparison of two men growing out of the sides of another, observed. The danger of cutting off those sprouts, assimilated to the removal of the two houses of Parliament.  
THerefore (saith he) if the King bear the Person of the People, and the general Assembly also bear the Person of the People, and another Assembly bear the Person of a part of the People, they are not one Person and one Sovereign, but three Persons and three Sovereigns. I answer, the King is not the representative of the People, but their Sovereign; neither doth he act any royal thing by their Authority, but by his own right; the House of Commons are the representative of the People, that is, the Common People, when by the Sovereign they are called, and elected by them pro tempore, during their sitting in Parliament: and as their beginning is by the King's Writ, so their determination is by his dismission. This shows that although they may represent the People, yet he, not they, are Sovereigns. The house of Lords which he means by those who represent a part of the People, represent no body, but their posterity, for whom they act, otherwise they do that business the King calls them for, that is, to advise with him in the great and difficult affairs of the Kingdom; they are as Councillors not Sovereigns; he only Sovereign: and neither one house nor other sits in their sphere, but when he calls them, nor stays after his dismission; nor when they are there can act any material matter concerning the Kingdom, (only advice and inform) but what he who is their Supreme and Sovereign enables them to do. So then there is but one Sovereign in England; though he most unworthily threw in such proud speeches to make them three▪ He proceeds, and I with him. To what disease in the Natural body of a man, I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Commonwealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side with an head, arms, breast and stomach of his own; If he had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact. Thus he. I answer, there is no need of this fancy of his to compare every public disease with a natural, but if he had studied King CHARLES the first his most incomparable Book he would have found this composure not to have been a disease, but a perfect constitution of a healthy body: but since he makes this comparison, I shall tell him, that in such a man take away or cut off that humane sprout which grows out of the principal man, even he will quickly die. I doubt not, but believe confidently it would be so with this polity.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XVII.  
The propriety of the subject again asserted against Mr. Hobbs. His objection of the difficulty of raising money answered. The inconvenience of investing all propriety in the Crown. The convenience and decorum of raising money in a parliamentary way. His late Majesty CHARLES the First, his incomparable essay to this purpose recommended to the author of the Leviathan. Mr. Hobbs his disaffection to the government of this Kingdom censured.  
I Am now in p. the (137.) where, after he hath confessed that these diseases which have been hitherto named are of the greatest and most present danger: (that is his phrase) although a man would think that this form of Government that hath lasted so many hundreds of years could not be in so sudden or present danger; however he now enters upon others which, tho' less, are not unfit to be looked into. He begins, [as first, the difficulty of raising of money for the necessary uses of the Commonwealth; especially in the approach of War,] I must confess this is of dangerous consequence. [●his difficulty ariseth from the Opinion, that every subject hath of a propriety in his lands and goods exclusiv of the Sovereign's right to the use of the same.] I have heretofore taught that men have proprieties in their estates, yet in cases of necessity, as in War, any man's house may be made a fort, any man's land digged to make a trench, with multitudes of the like Nature, according to the necessities and exigencies of the Commonwealth Therefore this propriety without necessity cannot be dangerous, nay, a man may say, that without this propriety we should not have a legal, but arbitrary Government, and that which he himself hath supposed to be the reason why a Commonwealth is instituted would be frustrated, which is that men may peaceably sow and reap, and enjoy the profits of their industry; which if the supreme might lawfully take away together with their estates for the support of his condition, it would quickly come to pass that an Estate invested in the Crown may be the prey of other Subjects, as it was with the Church revenue, which although in Queen ELIZABETH'S time it was alienable to none but the Crown, yet we know that from thence it passed to mean Tenants, until King JAMES most happily gave a stop unto it, by enacting that there should be none afterward passed to the Crown; so that this cannot fitly be termed a hindrance, without which a Commonwealth loseth the end for which it was instituted. But give me leave to speak to the main proposition itself. Why should it be difficult to raise just sums for the defence or good of the public? every man hath an interest in it, and they are reasonable creatures, which will consider both their own and the public benefit. ay, but he will say it hath been so; let this be granted, it is true that all sins and wickednesses have been too, and certainly this is a mighty great one. But let him consider, whether this way of their consent to the performance of this duty be not a decent way of doing it. For first, we may consider that few Persons of great estate do know their own estate, much less a Monarch of a great kingdom. How then can he be able to give a just esteem of every private man's estate to proportion him justly to that service? this cannot be done but by such Persons who are universally acquainted with the generality: and without an equality upon some legal measure the Tax will be unjust and the execution (no doubt worse. Secondly as to the making a Tax for such a supply the Commonalty are necessary, for by them the Collection will be more speedy than by any other means, and therefore I think it a difficulty which may easily be taken away, by letting them see, what necessity there is of such an aid, (I mean not to meddle with these disputes,) and then no doubt but they will be so prudent in the execution of their trust, as to give a proper assistance, or else they are mad or worse. I will conclude this point with that passage in those incomparable directions which that ever to be honoured King CHARLES the First gave his son in his own words (which none else can imitate nearly, much less match) speaking of the Laws of this land which he should govern by, saith, [Which by an admirable temperance give very much to subjects industry, liberty and happiness, and yet reserve enough to the Majesty and prerogative of any King who owns his People as subjects, not as slaves.] And I may say who can add any thing to what this most incomparable King hath writ down which is matchless? Yea what he speaks afterwards of the shifts Kings are put to, and the Comparison Mr. Hobbs makes of this disease to an ague, I let pass, and do only affirm that such discourses savour of an ill disposition to this government, and as I can guests, can tend to no good; neither then when they were first printed nor afterwards. I mean to trouble the Reader no further with his observations of these lesser diseases, as he terms them, in a Commonwealth, but come close to a censure of this which I have formerly noted in this Book.   

CHAP. XXIII. SECT. XVIII.  
The conclusion of all; the Author's just censure of this book of Mr. Hobbs.  
FIrst I affirm, that it is not a book to be tolerated by Kings or supremes: because according to his doctrine concerning the original of all such there is none in the Universal World: for if it be necessary (as he saith it is in the 17 Chap. where he handles the generation of Commonwealths, and in the 18 Chap. where he sets down the institution of a Common wealth, and in the 13 Chap. This only is the way to erect a Common wealth, which way, etc. Now if this be the only way which have showed not only not to be practised but not practicable, there not only is none in the World, but there can be none hereafter, and therefore this doctrine is not to be tolerated, either by them who think themselves supremes, or may hereafter be such, because they neither are nor shall be such supremes as he describes, and they (by his doctrine) ought to be.  
Again it is to be abhorred by supremes, because it leaves too easy and open a gap, yea a countenance for rebellion: for if the Law of Nature be only to take care for a man's own particular (as he saith it is) and that every man should endeavour and aught by any means to free himself from death or wounds, or any thing which may render his life unhappy, how easy it is for these suggestions to be whispered in the ear, of people upon any mishap in government, without which none can be, let the reader think. (I will not teach him.) So that by this doctrine the deliverance from private misery may justify the execution of a public ruin. So that whether we look upon the generation of supremes, (concerning which there neither is nor can be any such,) or upon the preservation thereof, there is according to his doctrine, no security in the throne of sovereignty, but it may justly be disturbed by their subjects upon any terrors struck in them from a jealousy that they may be deprived of their contented being.  
Now as this book is dangerous for Kings and Supremes; so it is in some conclusions destructive to the Comfort & happy being of subjects, when he takes away their propriety: for if they have no title to the enjoyment of their lives and estates, but these must be at the will of the Lord only (that is of the supreme) which he affirmed but a little before, than the very end of polity is lost, which is that men may quietly enjoy the fruits of their own virtue and industry, may sow and reap, work and receive the benefit of their labour without fear of loss or injury. It is true that there is an impossibility that there should be any such thing, but to that man who is guarded by God's providence, who alone can foresee and deliver a man from all danger: But yet humane providence, with good Laws and Virtuous execution of them may protect men in safety against all humane oppression, which in wisely settled Commonwealths ought to be done; and although a Supreme may by force wring from a subject what is his, yet he doth it unjustly and shall be responsible for it to his supreme, which again he hath denied by saying that a Sovereign can do nothing unjustly. So that in such a Case there is no room for any man who may have his Estate taken away without injustice, (that is, justly without breach of Law.) It is not fit then to be tolerated by Sovereigns, or Subjects.) I may yet go further and affirm it not fit to be tolerated by Christians, because it robs them of all Assurance of heaven, and all the Covenants of God by saying that they have no assurance that their holy Books are revealed by God, which if it were true, their confidence and trust in God's promises are vain, and all the Religion performed to our Blessed Saviour, which only depends upon that assurance they have of the Revelation made in that Book.  
Lastly, it is not to be tolerated by those Theists who think there is a God; because all such do think that this God hath many glorious attributes; Is infinite in Essence, infinite in all his attributes, power, wisdom, justice, mercy; all which do propagate in men a fear and love of him, and are in themselves so excellent, that the least of them (if any one may be said the least) is to be valued by every knowing man beyond a world: yet his legislator, his supreme must have power to Eclipse this glorious Sun, and to have so much as he will, and no more be revealed of him.  
Again, this glorious God is by all Theists apprehended to be the governor of Heaven and Earth, rewarder of good men and a punisher of all such as work wickedness, when he makes him to reward only and punish his own decrees and acts, not those of men; And therefore I think it a Book not to be suffered amongst Christians, and I am confident, would not be tolerated amongst such kingdoms which do not acknowledge our Saviour, but only one God.  
FINIS.     

To Mr. Hobbs, or the Reader, or both; I dedicate this short POSTSCRIPT.  

CAP. I.  
A short Introduction declaring the reason of this POSTSCRIPT.  
IN my Epistle before this Treatise, I have said that I heard of some amendments Mr. Hobbs would make in his Leviathan, and upon that stopped these papers which were intended for the Press; being desirous rather that he should do it himself with his own hand, than I; a work which would be very beneficial to his own soul, and more satisfactory to those Readers upon whom his name had gained an Authority; but after a tedious expectation, I found nothing corresponding to my Expectation. Wherefore I urged this Treatise to the Press, where I thought to have it Printed when I came to London; but I was no sooner arrived, than a cruel Cold locked me up in my Chamber, which gave me leisure to inquire after him whilst these Notes were Printing, and found that he had Printed his Leviathan in Latin, which I never before had notice of; I sent for it and viewed it, hoping that it might prove the designed retractation as St. Aug. calls his, or at least a recognition as Bellarmine calls his of the like nature; but truly I found little to that purpose, only the virulency of some English Phrases, now and then more gently expressed in Latin; And at the latter end, which was not in the Title, I found an Appendix consisting of three Chapters, the first of which was of the Nicene Creed, the second of Heresy, the third an Answer to some Objections against his Leviathan.  
In these three I hoped to have found much matter which might show his Ingenuity, in the true censuring his own writings; but indeed very little, what I find I shall deliver here, especially reflecting any such thing as hath already passed my pen, for other things which will deserve whole and entire discourses, I shall reserve to a future consideration, as God shall please to spare me life, and my Episcopal duties afford me leisure.   

CAP. II.  
Of things omitted in this Discourse.  
I Begin with his Chapter upon his Nicene Creed which he enters upon in his 328 page, where I omit his observation upon that Phrase (I believe in) and that likewise which is in the bottom of the precedent, and the subsequent Page, about the exposition of that phrase, which is not in the Creed, that is, Deu● est, God is, which is not in the Creed, for the language of the Creed is (I believe in one God the Father Almighty) in which it is not said there is a God, but supposed, and he affirmed to be one, and he the Father Almighty, so that if we must be forced to make one or more propositions of it, they must be these (I believe there is one, and only one God, and that he is Father Almighty,) where is, is a copula not a substantive as he makes it; and upon which he makes his discourse, but I let it pass as he might well have done being nothing conducing to his or my dispute, 'tis true, à tertio adjacente ad secundum valet argumentum, and therefore when I affirm there is one God, it must be employed there is a God, but this proposition there is one only God, supposeth and implicitly affirms it not by any express propositions.   

CAP. III.  
The Nature of Light examined.  
I Come to page the 330. which opposeth something that I have delivered, there you shall find in the letter (a) which signifieth the Opponent, a question asked, Quid est lumen? and answering himself, lumen ut mihi videtur phantasma est, non res existens. This proposition I have opposed in my first part, Cap. 4. Sect. 2. where I have divers arguments for it, and the Reader may observe my Answers to his Arguments, no one of which is touched here, but a strange new Argument, which I now proceed to examine; whether I may term it argument or illustration of his conclusion I care not, which is thus framed; Exempli gratia si inter oculum & Candelam vitrum statuas, cujus superficies ex multis planis constat, certo modo dispositis, multae tibi videbuntur c●ndelae, scimus tamen unicam ibi esse candelam veram, & proinde caeter●s omnes mera esse phantasmata, idola, hoc est, ut dicit sanctus Paulus nihil. For my part I cannot observe where the force of this Argument lies, to prove that lumen, or light, is a mere Phantasm or nothing, this light shows the Candle, or if he will, represents it, now what represents another must be like it; but nothing cannot be like a thing, being clean contrary, or rather privatively or negatively opposed to it, therefore if light were nothing, it could not represent the Candle; but perhaps the force may be couched in these words, Multae tibi videbuntu● Candelae, there shall many candles appear, to wit, by the reflection of those many plains of glass, but surely this no way enforceth his conclusion, for every one of these plains (for all I know) represents the true Candle, and are so far from being nothing, as they must therefore be something; because they represent something; but they may by a false reflection multiply the Candle, and make it seem many; what if it does? Does the erroneous representing make the representor nothing? certainly no; for then every man who tells a lie should say nothing; for that lie is a false representation; we see that light makes us see the Candle from whence it comes; and indeed any body else in the Rome where it is; truly, if it be not abused by some Ho●us Pocus tricks, or such devices as those juggling glasses he mentions, but the abuse lies in the plains in the glass, which returns the representing light wrong ways, not in the light itself, which is retorted, he might therefore from hence fitter call that nothing, which abuseth the medium, than the light which is abused; he proceeds in the same place with a strangely unnecessary discourse to this purpose as it seems to me, neque tamen (saith he) earum una est verior Candela, quam reliquae quatenus apparent. I need repeat no more if there be strength in any part of his discourse it is in this; but here is none, for although none of these Images of the Candle, is the Candle, yet they are things, such things as did represent the Candle, for the Candle could not be represented to the eye, by that which is nothing, the thing that represents another and that which is represented are two, but both of them must be things, or neither; but now it may be replied to me that this is not Mr. Hobbs his opinion, but the Objectors, I answer with Mr. Hobbs who is personated by (b) ita est so it is, so that although (a) seemed to object this, yet Mr. Hobbs assents to it.   

CAP. IU.  

The Nature of Hypostasis.  
ANd in the 331. he proceeds thus, Sed Patres Ecclesiae illis temporibus, tum ante, tum post concillium Nicenum, in scriptis suis vocem Hypostasis videntur alio modo interpretare, mysterium Trinitatis Christianis omnibus intelligibile reddere cupientes. The meaning of this is, that the Fathers, both before and after the Council of Nice, gave another sense of the word Hypostasis, and (saith he) They thought best to do it by the similitude of fire, light, and heat, the fire they referred to the Father, the light to the Son, the heat to the holy Spirit, in which similitude (saith he) the congruity would perhaps be accurate, but that fire, splendour, (here he changes the term light) heat, neither are substances, nor were thought so by the Fathers, chiefly such as were Aristotelians (of which kind he can produce very few Ancient) unless (saith he) Ignis ponatur pro ignito, fire be put for a fiery thing.   

SECT. II.  
That a Particular Fire is an Hypostasis.  
I Will stop here, and make this Note that I can guess, that never man before him said that a particular fire was not an Hypostasis, for Hypostasis being nothing but an individual substance which then is the subject of accidents, no man can deny that to fire, yes (saith he) unless fire be put for a fiery thing, certainly there is no man that sees or reads this word fire, but it represents to him a fiery thing, as when he reads these words, Earth, Water, Aire, they make him think of Earthy, Watery, Airy things, there is the same reason for fire, and what he puts down that Aristotelian Philosophers should be of his mind, I am persuaded he can produce none that ever affirmed that a particular fire was not an Hypostasis; but he has reason for what he speaks, and therefore follows this discourse with (enim) homo enim, & ignem, & lumen, & ●alorem extinguit quoties libet. The sum of this is, that because a man can at his pleasure extinguish Fire, Heat, and Light, and that so infirm a thing as man is, should extinguish so substantial Creatures created by an omnipotent God, and so reduce it to nothing, We are not commanded to believe it, neither is it credible; these are his very words as near as I can translate them, and I think they are truly done.   

SECT. III.  
His Discourse Censured for changing his Terms.  
NOw I can observe one thing, which is too frequent a fallacy throughout his Book, which is a changing his Terms, which ought not to be when a man brings a Philosophical reason for what he speaks; this appears in those main and substantial Terms of this discourse, to wit, extinguishing fire in the first proposition, and that enlarging which fallows extinguished, & ad nihilum redigere, to annihilate it. Oertainly as nothing can create but God, so nothing can annihilate but he himself, for annihilation is reducing a thing to nothing, as Creation is a producing some creature, or bringing a thing out of nothing; now although nothing can annihilate but God, yet not only man, but many inferior creatures to man can extinguish creatures of his, as in particular, water or earth can extinguish fire, and both watery and earthy bodies, this extinguishing is putting out the Candle, a choking the Fumes, but annihilation destroys the very matter, which no Aristotelian will allow to be possible for any created thing to do, and therefore he was much to blame in a deceitful manner, to mingle Truths and Falsehoods as if they were one thing.   

SECT. IV.  
His Argument Confuted.  
BUt now let us consider his Inference, which is, that it is not credible that so infirm a thing as man should destroy the works of God: Alas! what a pitiful Plea is this, if man by his own sole power should do it; this might look like an argument, but if man doth it by Divine assistance, as the first and moving cause, why should it be hard to think so; I hope the Almighty cannot be denied to have a power of granting such powers; or if he should, we may produce those invincible instances which are formerly given, and thousand more to prove the contrary, where God hath given to creatures inferior to man, abilities to do such works, as water, earth, and the like; yea, fire hath such a power to dry up water, to destroy wood, and the like. And indeed, let him but consider how any man hath a power given him of God, by which he is enabled to destroy another man, a much more noble creature than fire, and then it need not be thought strange that he should have the abilities to do the less; there is enough I think spoke to this.    

CAP. V.  

His Answer to quid est Hypostasis examined.  
I Will skip to page 339. where you shall find in the midst of that page a question put by (A) What is it which the Grecians mean by Hypostaesis, and the answer framed thus, Quum aliquid intueris quod vocas album, in English thus, When you behold any thing which you call white, you impose that name to a substance or a body subject; suppose marble, although the sharpness of your sight cannot penetrate the substance of marble, or any other thing; all this I let pass as a supposed Truth, and serves▪ but for an Introduction to what follows; which is album igitur, a white thing, therefore is the name of a body which is subsisting by its self, not the name of a colour; he is out here very much without doubt, it is the name both of the body and the colour, a body coloured; as when we see a man in his clothes clothed; it is more and another thing then when we see him naked; so when I see a body adorned with white, it is more than when I see only a body which may be in any other colour besides white; He proceeds & impositum, this name is imposed for a certain appearance, or as the Grecians speak 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which seems to be somewhat, but is nothing indeed.   

SECT. II.  
That Colour is a Real thing.  
SUre here again he crosses both me and himself, he crosseth me in that I have delivered in my first part of Censures upon his Leviathan, Cap. 4. Sect. 2. himself as you may observe Sect. 3. I will begin with himself, he affirms colour to be nothing but perturbed Light, or light by reflection from some uneven body. Now then, if this be so, then colour is light, than it must be something, not a mere phantasm, a nothing as he terms it; nay, I dare affirm, if it be but a phantasm, yet it is something, ens intentionale, although not a real, an intentional, although not a real thing; for first consider, it is the work of a noble power, the Fancy, if we take it for the operation, which is the art of Phancying any thing, but if you take it for that eminent effect which is wrought by that operation, and left in the memory, it must be something, and has an abode and being there, it must needs be something therefore, so that if we consider these colours only in the Fancy, they are something if we consider them as he hath taught us, in that being they have without our heads, they are real things; but to write to that which most especially reflects upon me myself, that colour is nothing, I could wish the reader so much leisure as to peruse what I have writ in my former treatise, and he will find that Mr. Hobbs hath neither answered those arguments I there produced, nor confuted any answer I gave to his arguments; I will add something more, and consider (good Reader) if it be not rational; that which not only works real effects, (which I have formerly showed invincibly that Colours do) but likewise in its self suffers change must needs be something; for nothing cannot be changed, it is a pure nonentity, and will be so always, and when it is changed upon any supposition of such a thing, it must be changed to something: Now colours we see changed from white, to redder or greener, and therefore must needs be something: If he shall say, it is but a divers imagination, we shall clear that by the examination of his following discourse, which is this, Quam apparitionem, which apparition without some cause and foundation we sufficiently understand is impssible, viz. white cannot be without some substance to subsist to the apparition which is its cause, and as Logicians speak, its subject here is a great deal of truth in this discourse, but I can find nothing that Proves his conclusion, which is, that colour is nothing, nay, I will retort his discourse to him and prove his conclusion false by it, which thus I do, That which subsists to White must subsist to something, or else that which requires or needs something to subsist to it, must be something, for nothing is nothing, and needs nothing to subsist to it, nor can any thing be said to subsist to nothing, for any entity added to nothing, makes it something, which is most abhorring to nothing. Again, whatsoever hath a cause is something, but these Apparitions have a cause according to him here and elsewhere, for as he makes refracted light in other places to be the cause, so here he makes the subject to be the cause of them, the major is evident, for nothing can cause nothing, for although God by his almighty hand can annihilate any thing what he pleaseth, yet that annihilation is not so properly a production of nothing, as a destruction of a Being; for there is no existence of that nothing, either to or in another, but a taking away of that Being which did formerly exist; so that there can be no Existence of nothing, and therefore to say that nothing is supported or subsisted by a Substance, seems to be a contradiction: That which follows in this Paragraph, is nothing to his purpose, I let it pass therefore, and come to Page 340. and skip divers things which indeed might deserve a sharp Censure, and prosecute only such things which oppose what I have heretofore judged mistakes in him, and to that purpose in the formerly 340. Page, you may perceive, that the Objector (A) puts the Question.    

CHAP. V.  

His Definition of Substance by Ens Examined.  
QVid ergo est Substantia? what is substance? and he is answered by (B) Idem quod Ens, the same with a thing, that is, whatsoever is truly existing, distinct from phantasm and name; this definition or description of substance I must blame, it being only a fuller and clearer expression of that of which I immediately before discoursed, that all these things which we commonly call accidents, are nothing but imaginations, or mere names put to nothing existing, and I will oppose to this that which he delivered in the preceding page, where he saith, that the Latins call the subject of these accidents, ens, subjectum, suppositum, substantiam, basem, & fundamentum. Let me urge hence, whatsoever is a foundation is a foundation of something, therefore these must be something to which substance is the foundation: consider a little (good Reader) that I may make all things clear to the most easy capacity; can the Reader think that that heat which scorched his or my hand is nothing? I speak not of those pointed Atoms, of which some write that they cause heat, but this heat which you and I feel so sensibly, can any think it is nothing? or that cold which benumbs my hand now whilst I am writing, is that nothing? why should we then be troubled with nothing? or that sharpness which enabled the knife or bullet to pierce my flesh, is that nothing? or that they are mere names? which certainly, as such hurt no man, or that they are mere phantasms? can any man think that the mere phantasm of one man can warm, cool, or hurt another? I remember, I think, I have read in Parnelsus, That if one man's inward man be too hard for another's, he may with an engine, as he describes, draw another to him many miles distance. I am not peremptory in the Author, having not my books about me, but I have certainly read it, but did never hear or read that by his fancy, a man could cool or warm another, or support such a burden as we see Carpenters or Builders do by a Mathematical disposing of those materials which they use: Nay, give me Leave to tell the Author of this Paradox, that no man can think that those habits which dispose any man to a ready acting virtuously or viciously are nothing, or but fancies or names. Nay, I will tread one step further, if his doctrine were true, those promised joys of Heaven, which we hope for, and those dreaded torments of Hell, which wicked men are threatened with by God, should be nothing but empty names or fancies, which appears a most horrid thought to a Christian man; for these are not bodies, and therefore by him at the best but fancies. I will here make this observation, that when men vent extravagant opinions, and such as are not usual in Philosophy, intending perhaps they should not proceed beyond their own condition, (which is only Philosophy) and give plausible reasons to persuade those opinions, they believe not, nor can foresee, what ill consequencies they may have in Divinity, but they are like new Laws, which may seem reasonable at first, but nothing but time and experience can assure the benefit of them.   

SECT. II.  
Many Errors in his citing Scripture for his Opinion.  
ANd now Reader give me leave to look a little back upon what I skipped before, which is at the top of Page 340. his Answer to that question, how is Hypostasis taken in the new Testament? His Answer is, after the same manner as it is by other Writers, that manner is it which we just now treated of: And then consider what fearful consequencies will follow out of his instances; his first is, Heb. 1. 3. Our Saviour is called the Character of his person, here (saith he) the word Hypostasis (or person as we render it) that is the substance to the Image of that substance: And then observe by this Philosophy, Christ is nothing, being not the substance; and he adds, to make his conclusion more apparent, he is in the same place called splendour, the splendour of the Divine glory, (that is his Translation) and therefore he adds, sive, or which is the same, lumen de Lucido, light out of a lucid body (so I render his words, for Lucidum or the light body, is the subject or substance, and light is the accident, or nothing rather which proceeds out of it; so that by this Philosophy, the Father should be a substance, and the Son but an accident, or nothing: Let us go on with him, Heb. 1. 11. And the first faith is called the Hypostasis of things hoped for, that is (saith he) for the Speech is Metaphorical) Faith is the Fundament of hope: Now Reader, by his Philosophy, Faith should be a substance, a body, (for he allows no other substance but bodies) which without doubt is a quality inhaerent in the Soul, and by him the things hoped for, or (to give him what scope his words can bear) the hope of future blessings which is founded upon faith is nothing, or at the best but a Fancy: He produceth another Text, 2 Cor. 9 4. where I do not find the word Hypostasis, nor any thing relating to his intent: But now, that the Reader may discern how these Texts are abused by him, I will lend such assistance to him as my present conceit administers to myself; let him consider how in the first to the Hebrews the 3. it is said, that the Son of God is the brightness of his glory, here first is not any mention of Lumen de Lucido, of Light proceeding out of a Lucid body, as he expresseth it; but the splendour or most Illustrious appearance of that unutterable Glory, which was manifested by the Incarnation of the Son of God, and his conversation amongst us in the flesh, which indeed clouding and vailing the extremity of that infinite glory which was in the Deity, with his humanity, he made it more clearly and brightly appear to us than it could have been discerned by humane eyes without it, and in that regard he may well be said to be the brightness of his Glory, because it made that glory which was invisible in its self, visible to us, and those glorious Attributes with it, which were not possible for Nature to reach, or any way comprehend to be apprehended by Faith in him, the Son; And in all this we find neither substance, nor substantiated, which should be founded upon it; But then to proceed to the second passage in that verse, which he made the first, (and the express Image or Character of his person) conceive Reader if you can, how it is possible to make an Image of substance merely substance, not clothed with any accident, colour, figure, or any such thing which is subject to sense, for these are the only things by which we can Caracterize any thing, and these are not in God, this Image or Character thereof must needs be some substantial thing, and that must needs be some substantial thing, and that must be represented to the understanding, (not the sense) which only can apprehend substances, especially abstracted from all accidents; then consider whose Character it must be, to wit Gods, who is infinite, immense, unimmaginable, unintelligible, not to be represented by any thing less than himself, it must needs therefore be another of the same, another it must be, because the Representors and the Represented must be Two, the same it must be, because nothing, no Art or Conceit or any thing, can imagine any thing to characterise God but God; here then in clear terms are two Persons and one Nature; and not his imagination of a substance and accident, or indeed nothing.  
Then we will explain his second place, Heb. 11. 1. faith is there the Hypostasis of things hoped for, we read it substance, there will be no difference about that, he ingeniously confesseth it to be a Metaphor, and surely so it is, and the likeness consists in this, that as a substance is it out of which accidents are produced, which supports and maintains them; so hope (as he expounds it) or the things hoped for, that is the blessings of God either in this or the other world (for God's blessings in this world may be hoped for) arise out of Faith, in which God hath founded them, and which is the sole and only thing by which God hath Covenanted to continue and preserve them to us; thus taking it Metaphorically, as he, but then take it literally, as the Schools distinguish subjectum quo, and subjectum quod, a subject by which this subsists in another, and a subject which supports really the inherent accident; so may I speak of substance, or fundamentum, the foundation of hope without doubt is the reasonable soul of man, out of which this act or habit is produced, and to which it doth adhere or inhere; this soul is the subjectum or fundamentum quod, but faith the substance, or fundamentum quo; by the mediation of which, hope is there fixed and settled; for he that hopes for blessings from God, without Gods revealed promises, which are apprehended only by faith, trusts in his own wit, not in God: thus this Text being explained, there is no violation offered to any Term, but each word hath its proper and genuine signification, and it lays open a clear and manifest truth, which cannot be denied; but contrariwise by his explanation, every word is wrested out of its proper sense and meaning; for faith which is an accident, a habit, must be a substance, hope to exist in the Air where is no foundation, no substance to support it.   

SECT. III.  
Some other things Examined.  
HE comes next in that 340 Page to inquire, Quid est essentia? which is answered, it is not distinguished from substantiae; the next quaere is, what is substans, the same with ens, the same with a thing; that is, whatsoever is truly existing, distinct from fancy and name: Here the Reader may discern how violently he prosecutes the former conceit, that there is no real thing besides substance, as if to inhere, or adhere, were not to exist, but only subsistence were existence; but I shall prosecute this no further now, it being a conclusion to which I do not remember that I have objected any thing heretofore, which are the only things I intended to vindicate in this paper; next he enters upon a long discourse how the Greeks and Latins have distorted names as he terms it, which I omit upon the same reason before, although a most unhappy persuasion of his; But in pag. 342. in his discourse of a person, he opposeth what I have delivered in my 34 Cap. against his sixteenth, which I find much altered in his Latin Edition, and if the Reader will trouble himself so much as to peruse that Treatise of mine, he will find that Mr. Hobbs hath added nothing here that was not in the former, nor answered any thing of my discourse, which I doubt not to affirm, doth much more clearly explain the nature of a person, than any thing he hath put down for it; and I will pass the rest of this Cap. as not opposing my former censures of him; so likewise his second Cap. of Heresy, which was only writ to excuse himself from Heresy, which I never charged him with as I remember, and do here so far acquit him, that I think he never can be judged for one amongst us, nor ever will be, for by him a man may deny any Truths if Leviathan exact it; yea, he must be of Leviathans Religion, and then he can never be judged an Heretic, because Leviathan must be supreme judge, but withal, I think he doth deliver Heretical Doctrine; and that that very conclusion is one, according to the Laws established in our Nation: And I will pass to his third Cap. which is Entitled of certain objections against Leviathan, and is entered upon Page 359.    

CAP. I.  
His Exordium Censured.  
HE begins this third Cap. which concerns the objections against Leviathan, with the story of these last unhappy times, where he raiseth the cause of the War, only from the difference between the Episcopal men and Presbyterian: I will not undertake to rake up that Kenuel, although perhaps I might be able to speak something pertinent, but this I dare affirm, that although the Rebellious party had an animosity against the Episcopal, as they had against all Authority, until they had made themselves sole Governors: yet their chief aim was to pluck down the Regals, and in order to that, it was necessary first to take down Episcopy, which was a support of it; and indeed you shall find that almost all Treasons do pretend Religion; that under the cloak of holiness, they may cover such horrid impieties as must be acted by such parties: It is in vain to give instances which are much too frequent: but then as he well observes, P. 359. towards the bottom, when the Episcopacy was plucked down, Nulla amplius potestas remansit inter Anglos. There was no power left among the English of discerning Heresy, but all Sects appeared in writing, and publishing what divinity every one would. I believe him and the mischief of the indulgence is yet sensible amongst us, well upon that opportunity saith he Page 360. the Author living at Paris used that Liberty in writing: But oh! how much more honourable had it been for him to have writ against it, and to have foreseen those unhappy events, which might have been easily discerned without the help of his Mathematics: but I go on, & jura quidem Regalia, (saith he) the rights of Kings, he hath egregiously defended both in temporal and and spiritual matters: here I must pause, and in a little, put down somethings more largely delivered in the preceding Treatise; he hath supervindicated the Kingly authority in spiritual things, for he hath made him above God himself; so that if God himself command one thing in his word, and the King command another, we must obey the King; he hath done as much in temporal things; for although God by his infinite power confirms the Laws of men, concerning meum & tuum, in appropriation of their temporal estates; yet he gives Ahab leave rightly to take Naboths vineyard; Nay I speak it freely, as he hath exalted it in some things too high, so in some conditions he hath made it nothing, in regard that he hath made every man King of the whole world by nature, which nature cannot be put off whilst he is a man; and therefore whatsoever any man, either by fraud or force, can get from him, is but a just acquiring that which was his natural right; consider then, whether this be egregiè vindicare jura Regalia, egregiously to vindicate the Regal rights, but (saith (A) for all this is spoke by the Objector) wh●l●● he endeavoured to prove this out of Scripture, he lapsed into unheard Opinions, which by most Divines are accused of Heresy and Atheism; certainly the Objector spoke truly, and (B) putteth him to the 〈◊〉▪ what ar● those opinions saith he, and so now I will apply myself to su●h things as reflect upon my former Treatise, omitting such other unhandsome expressions, which if I live, I am likely in a fuller way to treat of.   

CAP. II.  
In which is censured his Definition of Religion.  
THat which immediately follows his making God a Body, which is abominable, but I will not speak of it here but page 361. towards the bottom he enters upon a third Objection, which I have censured in my former Treatise, Cap. 13. Sect. 4. which is thus framed by (A) the Objector, Timor inquit invisibilium potentiarum, the fear of invisible powers, whether those powers be feigned by the man who fears, or conceived from Fables publicly permitted, is Religion; but from them which are not publicly permitted, Superstition; quando vero, when the powers which are feared are true, it is true Religion.  
Thus far the Objection; and first I commend his Latin Edition better than the English, for in his Latin Edition he changed this word (Fables) which is used amongst us for a vain or foolish relation, and put in Histories, which hath a more graceful acceptance; so that the sense is, that Religion is drawn from Histories publicly permitted, which is a milder expression, although the best will be bad enough, as you shall see presently.  
That fear, and reverential fear of these invisible powers, is an Act of Religion, I think no wise man will deny, but that Religion should be shallowed up with fear, and should be nothing else (as he seems to require) is too much; for therefore in that 6 Cap. where these words are, (as that Cap. consists of nothing but definitions, and these definitions pointed at in the Margin) he puts in the Margin against this (Religion) so that this was his definition of Religion, of which it is but one single Act, there being many more of a higher nature proceeding out of it; for Religion being as I defined it, and as it is generally used, that part of Justice by which we give God that Honour and Worship is due to him; certainly, faith in what he speaks, trust and hope in what he promiseth, Love of those excellencies which we discern in him, are much more requisite and due to God than any fear, but a Reverential fear which flows out of those other; fear opposeth trust, and faith, and love: and consider again, he divides Religion only according to the divers application of this fear to the object; so that one way it is Religion, another Superstition, if conceived of Histories, permitted Religion, if otherwise Superstition; when the powers are true powers, it is true Religion; any man may draw the other conclusion out of these premises, if the powers be false, it is false Religion.  

SECT. III.  
The Terms are so put as cannot agree in the Definitum, with some Scriptures examined.  
AGain, consider that he puts these Term's Powers Invisible, without any limitation; so that the fear of Angels or Devils is Religion; for although he seems to be against the spirituality of those dominions good or bad, (of which, God willing, I mean to treat more fully hereafter) yet he doth not deny them to be invisible, and then the fear of them must be Religion, which indeed is only due to God, and therefore not to be admitted in that generality; but this is only an objection by (A) let us see what (B) answers; His answer is thus, Idem asseritur, the same is asserted by Ecclesiastes, The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom. I will not examine the place where it is, I remember the sentence perfectly, but do wonder what he can collect hence for his purpose; this fear Ecclesiastes speaks of, is the fear of the Lord, his, of invisible Powers; there are other powers invisible besides, which are governed and commanded by him, and therefore he deserves all awe, fear, and reverence from us; but they, some of them, I mean the ill Angels or Devils, hatred and contempt as is evident; so that the fear of the Lord is one thing, and the fear of the Invisible powers is another, much more large than the former: Again, Ecclesiastes saith, That the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, when without question Religious worship is that which perfects a man so far as he is capable of perfection in this world, and is the perfection of wisdom; and therefore out of this Text it cannot be deduced, that the fear of Invisible powers is Religion, which is man's chief perfection: Consider good Reader the truth of Ecclesiastes, how it consists with what I have delivered; when a man shall be taught that there is an invisible Agent, who by his Almighty power, and Infinite wisdom, made and still governs this Universe, and will one day judge us men according to our works; then he trembles at the apprehension of it, and that causeth him to seek out which way he may please him, and stop the fury of his wrath from falling upon him, and act accordingly: Thus wisdom is begun, but afterwards this same man out of these beginnings, proceeds to search out Gods will and believe it, to trust and rely upon his promises, to be enamoured with God, and delighted with his excellencies, with following Acts far exceed in the worship of God▪ and his Honour, that first of fear only; so that although the fear of God may introduce and begin Religion, yet unless a man go further, it is not Religion, nor that it is can that Text prove, but he hath another Text which I wonder what he can do with it to this purpose, which is,   

SECT. IV.  
How that Text the Fool hath said in his Heart there is no God, can be applied to his purpose.  
THat the Fool hath said in his heart there is no God; certainly if he said so in his heart, he could not fear God, but that because he thinks there is no God, he could not fear him; therefore should Religion consist in fear? he that thinks there is no such thing, cannot oppose, be angry with, or hate God; doth Religion therefore consist in these? and yet there is less consequence in it, if a man will consider his proposition to be proved hence, it is not that fear is the Religion paid to God, but to invisible powers; many a man who did not think there was a supreme God governing all, did think that there were invisible powers to which they paid their Religious Duties, as most of them to S●medei, and Heroes, and good Gen●i, and the like; so that men may have Religion who say in their hearts there is no God; that is, such as he is generally conceived to be, an infinitely able, and wise Creator, and Governor; yea, some that thought there was a God who had infinitam virtutem, by which he governed the world, yet would not allow him infinitam potentiam, to make it out of nothing; of which nature I conceive Aristotle to be, so that although he and others may think there is no such God as we conceive, yet they might have Religion to such as they conceived to have some pieces of these Divine excellencies; so that that seems to me an objection but weakly answered by him.    

CAP. IU.  

ANd I pass to a fourth Objection made at the bottom of the same page, which is out of the sixteenth Cap. of the same Leviathan, when having treated of persons, and what things may be personated, he at the last affirms, etiam Dei veri, the true God may be personated as he was first by Moses, who governed not his people but Gods, saying, thus saith the Lord; I have discoursed at large upon this expression of his in the 30. Cap. of my first Notes upon his Leviatha●, Sect. 11. and those which follow, it would have become him to have given at the least some observations upon what I said, but he hath not; and I must refer an Impartial Reader to that, but I must observe that this clause is left out in his Latin Edition, and instead thereof, put, that the true God's person is and hath been born, for in his proper person he created the world, this is put instead of Moses his bearing his Person; Good Reader see how he hath amended the matter, did God in Creating the World bear the Person of God? It is a Phrase unheard of in any Divinity Writer; he that bears the person of any man or thing, must be another from that thing which he bears, but in this he destroys his bearing the person of God, when he affirms, he did it in his own, in propriâ personâ, in his own proper person; so that his alteration is to the worse, but I return from whence I came, to Moses again, in which I referred the Reader to my former discourse so far, that he affirms the Son to be, as it seems, the Second Person in the Trinity after Moses, and that of the Holy Ghost, all which I have spoke of at large, and now let us review his answer to this Objection, it may be the Candour of his Exposition will take away the scandal of his Assertion, and that begins in the last line of that Page, and so follows on in the next, and is this.   

SECT. II.  
His Question of our Catechism Examined.  
VIdetur Author hoc loco, the Author seems in this place to explain the doctrine of Trinity, although he do not name the Trinity: I stop here, he hath outgone himself in his English Leviathan, for I did not so far dive into his thoughts, when I spoke of Moses representing God, but one, how that could be understood: but now it seems abominable that Moses should be placed as a person in the Trinity; well, let us see his answer further in this place, that (saith he) he Author did labour to explain the Trinity, was pia● vo●untas, but erronea explicatio; it was a pious desire, but in erroneous explication; surely it is a pious desire ●n any man, to endeavour to explain any Divine truth, out certainly it cannot be imagined, that a man of his parts, and learning, could be so overseen in so high ● Point of Divinity, as to think that such a person ought to pass for the father, but that he would steal ● discredit of that great and most universally received truth, by interposing such a cloud before it; for (saith he) Moses because he after some manner seems to bear the person of God, (as do all Christian Kings) he seems to make him one person of the Trinity, valde negligenter, this was exceeding negligently done: and pitiful repentance for such a crime, to blaspheme God, and call man God, (for so must each person in the Trinity be) no, it looks not like repentance, but a vain excuse, which near upon amounts to a justification, but he proceeds, If (saith he) he had said that God in his proper person had made the world, in the person of his Son, had redeemed mankind▪ in the person of the holy Ghost, had sanctified his Church, he had said no more than is in the Catechism put out by the Church: certainly he is much out in this ●a●ing, for the Catechism of the Church of England, has no such saying, as God in propriâ personâ, God in his proper person did make the world, this expression propriâ personâ is not there, nor I think in any confession of any Christian Church, to be used for the Father; all three are proper Persons, no one more than other, neither doth the Catechism use that very phrase Person in that whole answer, for it is thus, I believe in God the Father, who hath made me, and all the world, not that he made it in propriâ personâ, for it was the work of the whole Trinity, and the God, who is the whole Trinity, is the Almighty Father which made the world, no one word which signifieth one person to be more proper than another: Secondly, in God the Son, who hath Redeemed me and all mankind; it is true, this Redemption being a glorious effect of the Death and Sufferance of Christ, which must needs be acted in his humanity, which was united to his Divinity, to the second Person 〈◊〉 the Trinity, hath a most proper termination in the Son; so that I do yield it must be employed that it was acted in the Son, but it is not expressed; and therefore, although it was materially the same, yet formally it was not, and he said more than was in the Catechism; and for the last, it is not said in the Catechism that God in the Person of the Holy Ghost did Sanctify his Church, but in God the Holy Ghost who sanctifieth me, and all the Elect People of God, which although God the Holy Ghost in the Catechism be the same with the third Person, yet he is not called so there, and we may mark, that although these three Persons are put down in the Catechism, as fountains of those great Blessings comminicated to man; yet no where is any called proper person of God more than the other, nor is any of those blessings appropriated to any person exclusively, shutting out the other; so that although it is said, God the Father, who made me, it is not said without the Son of which abundance of Scripture affirms he made the World, and Mr. Hobbs dealt unhandsomely with our Catechism, when he forced such a sense upon it.   

SECT. III.  
Another Answer Censured.  
BUt perhaps he hath a better Exposition afterwards, for when the Objector immediately after urged that Mr. Hobbs used that Language in divers places, he answered, That all of them might receive that Exposition; but he a little further explains himself thus, Vel si dixisset, or (saith he) if he had said God in his proper person, had constituted himself a Church by the Ministry of Moses, in the person of his Son had redeemed the same; in the person of the holy Ghost, had sanctified the same, he had not erred: Thus far he, but it seems to me strange that both these should be without Errors, for they are extremely different; in the first God in his proper person to Create the World, and the second in his proper person by the Administration of Moses to constitute a Church; but that phrase of, in his proper person, is unheard of amongst any who are not with it called Heretics; for if God the Father did any of those great works in his proper person, than the Son did not operate in them, which is against the whole sense of Scripture, Joh. 1. 3. All things were made by him, and without him was nothing made that was made, Of which I have treated at large in my former Piece with much more, which is to be seen in every Writer upon this Subject, or else the same must be the very person of the Father, which is horrid Divinity, or else not a proper, but an improper person of the Deity, which is alike hateful: Then consider his next proposition, that God in the person of the Son did redeem the same; what is that he calls the same? surely that was the Church of the Israelites only, for Moses constituted no other Church; then Christ Redeemed them only, when before in the former opposition, according to our Church Catechism he Redeems Mankind, which is much larger than the Church which Moses constituted; and then last of all, when he saith, that God in the person of the Holy Ghost did sanctify the same, it is too narrow for his former proposition, which was, that in the Person of the Holy Ghost, God did Sanctify the Church which is much larger than the Synagogue which was constituted by Moses; and when he said he had not Erred, if he had phrased it after that manner, I say it is evident he had erred, and erred grievously in expressing himself either of these ways.    

CAP. V.  
Joh. 1. 1. Explained.  
I Pass now to Page 364. where at the top is objected, that in his 43. Cap. he should say, Joh. 1. 1. that the word there, and so likewise in the 14. verse, doth signify a promise, and that promise is the same with the thing promised; that is, Jesus Christ, as it is Psalm 105. 19 and the 40. 13. and other places; I will not dispute this further, I have writ at large concerning this place, and do answer to him both in this objection, and to his Justification of it in his answer, that avails him nothing towards his disgrace of the Divine Nature of this word, if it should be allowed such a sense: for that he was the person is evident out of his gloss, and let that person be eternally with God, and be God as the Text speaks, that he should make all things, and the like he must needs be that person which we conceive he ●s, and referring the Reader to what I have formerly writ, where the genuine sense of that word is expressed; I pass to the next objection which immediately follows, and crosses one conclusion of mine in this Treatise, though I know not punctually where, my papers being now with the Printer.   

CAP. VI  

Whether it be Lawful for a Faithful man to deny Christ, Examined.  
THe Conclusion by the Objector set down, is drawn from an answer to a Question, What? If a faithful man should be commanded by his Prince to deny Christ, what should he do? he saith, it is lawful to obey his Superiors by the Example of Naaman the Assyrian, who was by the Prophet bid go in Peace, which words, saith the Objector, seem to me not a permission, but a form of Valediction: Mr. Hobbs justifies the conclusion, and begins his answer fortasse, perhaps it is so, if he had answered any thing else, either approving or disproving his Petition, but in this place it can be understood of nothing but a Permission: I will stop here for this present, and examine it, first what the offence was that he seems to parallel with the denying of Christ; the Story is Recorded in the second Book of Kings, Cap. 5. where in the 17. vers. you may observe that Naaman professing thy Servant, will from henceforth neither offer burnt Offerings or Sacrifice to other Gods, but unto the Lord. By burnt Offerings and Sacrifice, we must understand all Religious worship which was due to God, for so it was to him, but then in the 18. verse, he begins to make a scruple, that his attendance upon his Master at his Idolatrical worship, may seem to be a Divine worship, because it might seem to have an affinity with it, and in this doubt he prays a pardon thus, In this thing the Lord pardon thy Servant, that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship th●re, and he leaveth on my hand and I ●ow myself in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon 〈…〉 this thing: Mark you this, it was a tender nicety in this man, who was but little acquainted with 〈…〉, and but newly converted to one Article of 〈…〉 that the Lord was God; but certainly I find not so 〈…〉 in this action as Mr. Hobbs seems to do, in 〈…〉 with the denial of Christ; for first, it is not said he did worship Rimmon, but only that he went into the house, and bowed in the house, not to Rimmon, but if he had, I think I may boldly say, that Idolatry, worshipping a false God, is not so bad as to deny a true one; and therefore, if he had worshipped Rimmon it had not been so bad, as to deny Christ; but I deny that he did worship, or in that act show so much as a practical Idolatry; for to bow to Baal, to bow to Rimmon, is the sin of Idolatry, not to be in the house where Baal or Rimmon was, or to bow in that house, which yet is all that is desired by him; If Elisha had the thoughts which I have, that valedictions may seem to imply a tacit assent of his to what he said, he going no further in worshipping Rimmon; but he proves it farther from the practice of the Primitive Church.   

SECT. II.  
The Canons of the Council of Nice Examined.  
I Will set down his words, You know (saith he) that there were many Christians a little before the Nicene Synod good men, but not most valiant, who being threatened with Deaths or Torments, renounced their Christianity, what punishment do you think was appointed them in that general Synod at Nice? In the 19 Canon of that Council, it is Decreed, that ●e who should do that (is his Phrase, which is deny his Christianity) without Torment's or danger, should return to the Catechism: Here I will pause, and indeed did when I read it, for I was well acquainted with that Council, and the story of it, but remembered no such easy Penance, whereupon being not in my Study, I borrowed Binnius, and there found in his two first Lections no such thing in the 19 Canon of either, as he speaks of, or relating to it; in the 11. of both the vulgar Editions, and the 19 of Pisanus I did; it would be tedious to transcribe the words, but what is material will easily appear in the canvasing his discourse; consider therefore first, that in his answer to the question, he said it was lawful to obey his Prince, commanding to deny Christ; how can any thing in this Cannon prove it to be such, if it were only, as he said, condemning to be amongst the Catechismens', this supposeth it a fault for which a man should be amongst the Catechismens', this supposeth it a fault for which he should be banished the Communion, and on such terms as they were, it could not be, unless they had thought it a heinous crime; then I observe, that in that Eleventh Canon, as the vulgar, it is said of those which prevaricated, without necessity, or without the taking away their goods, or danger of the life, as was done under the Tyranny of Lucinius; here is not Mr. Hobbs his case, Licinius persecuted Christians severely, which being discerned by many a fearful Christian, they would deny Christ before they came to suffer for him, rather than put themselves in that hazard, just as Mr. Hobbs would have men; afterwards repenting of that fault, they would seek admittance into God's mercies communicated in the Church; what thinks the Council? Thus, although such men are adjudged unworthy of humanity, yet let benevolence be administered to them, or as the other Reading, although they are unworthy of mercy, yet let them have humanity showed them: Here you see what a severe judgement was passed upon these men for this Crime, that they are unworthy of any mercy in themselves who should deny Christ, to flatter Princes; but let us see the humanity judged, fit to use towards them; it is true, the Church should imitate God, who hath shut the Gates of Heaven to no penitent Soul, but because the Church cannot have the Allseeing Eye of God to discern who is penitent, but by the outward expressions; therefore the Council sets down what shall be thought a sufficient evidence of it. That which he terms (redire ad Catechumen●s) to return the Catechumen▪ was somewhat, but not half his work, for saith that Council, quicunque, whosoever do truly Repent, let him spend three years inter audicul●s, amongst the hearers, which were the Catechumen; for they were admitted to hear the Catechistical Sermons Preached before they went to Prayers, but not to the Communion of Prayers, which kind of Penance too many men amongst us punish themselves with; but this is not all, then let him detest himself seven years more with all contrition, nor hath the Council done yet, let them communicate with the people two years more in Prayer; so that here are twelve years' Penance, and if in this time he relapsed, he was to begin again, and as it is expressed in other cases, not until his death to receive the Communion; and if he recover, to be where he was when he did receive it; because that out of Christian piety the Eucharist was given him for his viaticum, (as it is called) to strengthen him in his long Journey he was to go; after all this, consider good Reader what a miserable shift Mr. Hobbs was put to, when he took this Canon for to countenance such a horrid conclusion; that it is fit in obedience to man to deny Christ, when this Canon most sharply punisheth that horrid Sin, and he that will read but the next Canon, which is the 12. shall find the like severity used to them, who having at first left the Military girdle stoutly, would afterwards put it on; the story was thus, the Emperors for a reward of their gallantry would give deserving Soldiers a girdle, and by it many privileges: But if they were Christians, and would not renounce their Faith, this girdle was taken from them, and with it, all privileges; divers, after they had refu●ed it upon these accursed terms, being over alured by the pleasures and honour's of the world, would desire it again, and then this Council passeth the like judgement upon those as the former; so that all kinds of denying Christ was most hateful to those Fathers, and sentenced as a most grievous sin, having a most severe penance enjoined it; but he●● Mr. Hobbs again.   

SECT. III.  
Peter's Denial of Christ Examined.  
IT were a Sin (saith he) in an Apostle or Disciple, who had undertaken to Preach the Gospel against Christ's Enemies, and in Peter a great fault, but of infirmity, and easily pardoned by Chr●●●: where good Mr. Hobbs was the infirmity evident; in Peter more than any other person; sure you have no Scripture ground for it, he was forewarned by our Saviour, and so armed against it, yet (saith he) it was easily forg●●en by our Saviour: Good God what easiness do we find, it was not without Repentance, and how sharp that was, we cannot tell, the word of God notifies that he wept bitterly; and how powerful those tears wrought upon our Saviour we know, so that it was hardly spoke of him, and more than he could know to say it was easily; and worse in his conclusion, when he said that horrid sin might be committed without a fault, and that it was lawful to do it; I am sure that fevere sentence which the Council of Nice lay upon it, and the bitter tears of St. Peter, are no arguments for it; and the whole course of Divinity delivered by our Saviour and Apostles, makes against it, and the constant practice of holy and religious men: for our Saviour, Luk. 9 23. If any man will come after me, he must deny himself, and take up the Cross and follow me. Mark you, it is deny himself, not Christ, it is take up his Cross, not cast it away and reject it; his Cross, that is, all affliction which is upon him, as in this case he must either Sin or bear it; thus it is laid upon him; as likewise there are other cases, but this is one and a main one. Again, Mat. 33. He who denies me before men, him will I deny before my Father who is in Heaven. What more pertinent and close against his conclusion; and you may perceive, that as we demean ourselves towards Christ here, he will so demean himself towards us hereafter; if we suffer for him, we shall reign with him; if we forsake him to save this life, we shall have no share in his life or death hereafter; and surely if a man might lawfully deny Christ, it was a strange folly, yea madness in all those glorious Martyrs, who suffered such torments rather than they would deny their Saviour. I have spoke of this before in this very Treatise, and I see nothing opposed to any thing there which was brought against his or for my conclusion; this might have been therefore spared.   

SECT. IV.  
A Digression to Mr. Hobs.  
BUt now Mr. Hobbs, I again bespeak you, leave off the Justification of such horrid Errors as this; consider, if you intent to act according to this Doctrine, you can have no part in Christ, he will reject you at the last day; consider again that you have taught, and by that teaching have tempted others to be of that Error, to love and prefer this temporal life, before that eternal: An Atheistical practice which men may easily be induced to entertain and practise, when there is little reason produced for it; and consider with yourself, that although this is one of the greatest sins a man can commit; yet according to that ever honoured Council in the Canon cited by you, there is room for you in the Church here, and in Heaven hereafter, if you prove penitent; Repent therefore of this your wickedness, that God may according to his Sacred Covenant, have Mercy upon you; Judge yourself, that you be not judged of the Lord; and make amends for this public Scandal you have given to the Church of Christ; which I think since the first Conversion never had any so publicly professed this Doctrine before Leviathan; do it therefore in some public Treatise, and that in English, whereby there may be amends to those who have been seduced by your Doctrines, and so Farewell; This is all which concerns me in this Appendix of yours at this time, therefore I meddle with nothing else.     

AN ALPHABETICAL TABLE Of the Principal CONTENTS.  
In which C. denotes the Chapter, and S. the Section  

A  
THe Promises to Abraham and his Seed, Cap. 22. Sect. 16.  
Why his Family was obliged to obey God's Commands? C. 22. S. 17.  
Whence are Actions, just or unjust? C. 8. S. 2.  
— not from Consent or Dissent, C. 8. S. 2.  
Mixed Actions, what they are, C. 19 S. 6.  
External and Internal Acts subject to God's command, C. 22. S. 14.  
Agag spared, C. 20. S. 2.  
Subjects not freed from their Allegiance, C. 5. S. 4.  
Of the Amazons Commonwealth, C. 16. S. 5. 7.  
St. Ambroses contest with Theodosius, C. 20. S. 4.  
Apostles, their gift of Tongues Miraculous, C. 22. S. 10.  
Their Learning Miraculous, Cap. 22. S. 11.  
Appetite overrules the Will, C. 19 S. 6.  
Aristides Banished, C. 20. S. 5.  
No taking Arms against the King, C. 16. S. 7.  
Assurance of Revelations, C. 22. S. 1.  
What is Assurance? C. 22. S. 1. 

— how many ways it may be had, C. 22. S. 1.  
— that of Faith greater than of Sciences, C. 22. S. 1.  
— what we have of Christian Religion, C. 22. S. 1.    
Athenians used Ostracism, C. 20. S. 5.  
He who Acts by another's Authority, may do injury to him by whose Authority he Acts, C. 8. S. 1.   

B  
The worshippers of Baal not excused by the command of the King of Israel, C. 22. S. 17.  
Bishop's most competent Judges of Books in Religion and of Preaching, C. 10. S. 3.   

C  
The Canons of the Church of England confirmed by Laws, C. 23. S. 13.  
When one is said to be a Captive, C. 17. S. 2.  
To whom a Captive belongs, ibid.  
The first cause doth not necessitate, Cap. 19 Sect. 9, 10, 11, 12.  
The chain of causes not to be discerned, C. 19 S. 10.  
The injuries done to K. Charles I. had their rise from Mr. Hobs' doctrine, C. 14. S. 2. C. 21.  
Children ought to love those that nourished them, C. 16. S. 10.  
Whether they can give consent in their Infancy, C. 16. S. 1.  
Christianity to be introduced by reason and sufferings, and not by force, C. 10. S. 9  
Man only actively capable of commands, C. 19 S. 9  
The difference between the commands of God and of men, C. 18. S. 11.  
External and Internal Acts subject to God's command, C. 22. S. 14.  
Conduct and Command how like the Motive faculty, C. 23. S. 14.  
Commons the Representative of the People, C. 23. S. 16.  
The Division of a Commonwealth into Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy examined, C. 13. S. 1, 2.  
How fathers rather then mothers did erect them, C. 16. S. 5.  
Rules to govern them not certain and demonstrative, C. 18. S. 14.  
Mr. Hobs' Commonwealth no where to be found, C. 4. S. 1. 

— not consistent with Reason, C. 4. S. 2.  
— he first called it a Leviathan, C. 3.    
What is Dominion by Conquest? C. 16. S. 12. 

— how it becomes despotical, C. 16. S. 12.    
When one is said to be Conquered, C. 17. S. 1.  
What power the Victor hath over the Conquered, C. 16. S. 12  
Covenant upon Conquest may give possession, but not right when the cause of the War is not just, C. 17. S. 2.  
Conscience, what it is? C. 23. S. 4. 

whatsoever is against it is sin, C. 23. S. 4.  
what is an erroneous, C. 23. S. 4.  
how it obligeth, ibid.    
Whether there be a public conscience? C. 23. S. 5. 

how private consciences differ from private opinions, ibid.    
Controversies; the Sovereign aught to take care of deciding them, and is accountable to God for the neglect thereof, C. 12. S. 1.  
Covenant not a breath, C. 6. S. 2, 3. C. 16. S. 6.  
whence their Obligation, C. 6. S. 2. C. 16. S. 6. 

the first obligeth. C. 5. S. 1.    
They may be made immediately with God, C. 5. S. 3.  
If made with God against the Sovereign, they do not oblige, ibid.  
Not necessary that the Covenant in government should be made ●ith all as one person, or severally with every one, Cap. 5. Sect. 4.  
The Prince may Covenant in taking his Authority, and not take it upon Covenant, C. 6. S. 1.  
The Sword hath no power but from the Covenant, C. 6. S. 3.  
Creation, the description of it by Moses, not to be known but by Revelation, C. 22. S. 1.   

D  
Darius, his Kingdom not every way absolute, C. 13. S. 3, 4.  
Denominations are a principatiori, C. 19 S. 6.  
Desire, the difference betwixt it, the will and inclination, ib.  
Disputes concerning Government dangerous, C. 18. S. 3.  
Doctrines which are peaceable only true, C. 10. S. 7.  
By the negligence of Governors and Teachers, false Doctrines are received, C. 10. S. 7.  
Christian Doctrines to be introduced by reason and sufferings, and not by force, cap. 10. sect. 9  
Dominion, not the same in an instituted and acquired Kingdom, cap. 15. sect. 5. c. 16. s. 12. c. 17. s. 1.  
All— not acquired by force, cap. 16. sect. 1.  
What is Paternal, cap. 15. sect. 1.  
Whether a Child can give consent in his Infancy, c. 16. s. 1.  
What is Dominion by conquest, cap. 16. sect. 12.  
What— over the conquered, cap. 16. sect. 12. c. 17. s. 1.  
How it becomes Despotical, cap. 16. sect. 12.  
Dominion by Conquest, vid. Conquest.   

E  
End, he who hath right to the End, how he hath right to the Means, cap. 9 sect. 2.  
England; one only Sovereign in England, cap. 23. s. 16. 

The good constitution of the Realm, c. 23. s. 15, 16.  
Especially in relation to Taxes, cap. 23. sect. 17.    
Ephori, first introduced amongst the Lacedæmonians, and why? cap. 13. sect. 6.  
Equity, what it is? cap. 20. sect. 3.   

F  
Faith resolved into Divine Revelation, cap. 22. sect. 7. 

Commanded by God, c. 22. s. 13, 14, 15. c. 23. s. 6.  
'Tis wrought by ordinate means, cap. 22. sect. 15.  
'Tis both inspired and acquired, cap. 23. sect. 6.  
Faith and Prophecy different things, ibid.  
It comes by hearing, cap. 23. sect. 6.  
Its impediments, cap. 22. sect. 14.    
Father to be obeyed before the Mother, cap. 16. sect. 3. 

where he is unknown to whom the Child belongs, c. 16. s. 8.  
greater respect due to him, then to him who nourished the Child, cap. 16. sect. 10.    
Fear, whether it induceth obedience? cap. 15. sect. 2. 

'Tis an impediment to Faith, cap. 22. sect. 14.    
Free, and Freedom, vid. Liberty.   

G  
Generation more excellent than Preservation, c. 16. s. 11.  
Glory, vainglory an impediment to Faith, c. 22. s. 14.  
God only the Author of Power, c. 18. s. 7. c. 20. s. 1. 

not the Author of those things which are contrary to his commands, cap. 19 sect. 11.  
His positive Laws to be obeyed, cap. 22. sect. 12.  
where that obedience is founded, cap. 22. sect. 13.    
Good; humane Laws cannot make some things good or evil, cap. 11. sect. 5.  
Gospel, Its success Miraculous, cap. 22. sect. 11.  
Government, remissness of it an occasion of tumults, c. 10. s. 9 

The Forms thereof ought to be suited to the disposition of the People, cap. 13. sect. 5.  
'Tis profitable that the people have some interest in it, cap. 13. sect. 6.  
Mr. Hobs' imaginary foundation of it, cap. 14. sect. 1.  
Disputes about Government dangerous, cap. 18. s. 13.    
Gifts are free, cap. 19 sect. 3.   

H  
History useful for Princes, cap. 23. sect. 10. 11. 

Especially the Greek and Roman, c. 23. s. 10, 11, 12.    
Mr. Hobs' Commonwealth no where to be found, c. 4. s. 1. 

'Tis not consistent with Reason, cap. 4. sect. 2.  
He first called it Leviathan, cap. 3.  
His imaginary foundation of Government, c. 14. s. 1.  
He gave dangerous Council to the Protector, c. 14. s. 2.  
— full of contradictions, cap. 16. sect. 2.  
Magnifies his own Politics, cap. 18. sect. 14.  
encourageth Rebellion, cap. 20. sect. 8.  
He makes the Estates in Parliament factious, c. 23. s. 15.  
What assurance he hath of his being born at Malmsbury, cap. 22. sect. 1.  
The Author's opinion of his Book, cap. 23. sect. 18.    
Honour; Titles thereof conferred by the Sovereign, cap. 12. sect. 4.  
Husband, the head of the Wife, cap. 16. sect. 4.  
Hyperbolus banished, cap. 20. sect. 5.   

I  
Jepthas' Vow, cap. 20. sect. 2.  
Jews witnesses of the old Testament, cap. 22. sect. 2. 

— their Government ceased, cap. 18. sect. 12.    
Incarnation of Christ not to be known but by Revelation, cap. 22. sect. 5.  
Inclination distinct from the will and desire, c. 19 s. 6.  
Incorporate; why men Incorporate into bodies Politic? cap. 11. sect. 1.  
Infant, whether it can give consent? cap. 16. sect. 1.  
Injury, What it is? cap. 8. sect. 3. 

How a man may injure himself? cap. 8. sect. 3.    
Injustice, what it is? ibid. 

A Sovereign may do it, cap. 8. sect. 4.    
Innocents' not justly punished, cap. 2. sect. 3.  
Israelites, why obeyed they Moses? cap. 22. sect. 17.  
Judge. What it is properly to Judge? cap. 23. sect. 1. 

Not the same to be a Judge, and constitute a Judge, cap. 10. sect. 10.  
He is to observe, not make a Law, cap. 18. sect. 9  
Every one is Judge of good and evil, cap. 23. sect. 5. 6.    
What Judgement private persons may pass upon public actions, cap. 23. sect. 1, 2, 3.   

K  
Kingdom. What is an acquired Kingdom, c. 15. s. 1. 

Not always acquired by force, ibid.  
The condition of a conquered Kingdom not the same with an instituted, cap. 15. sect. 5.    
Kings. v. Supremes, and Sovereigns. 

Only accountable unto God, c. 5. s. 4. c. 6. s. 1.  
Their account unto him great, cap. 12. s. 5.  
Not punishable by the People, and why? c. 9 s. 1.  
Their power in matters of Religion, c. 10. s. 1.  
That subject to the commands of God, ibid.  
No absolute obedience due to them, cap. 18. s. 4. etc.  
No taking Arms against them, cap. 16. sect. 7.  
They not only sin against God, cap. 20. sect. 4.  
Their power about Preaching and Printing, c. 10. s. 2.  
They have not right to whatsoever the subject possesseth, cap. 18. s. 8. etc.    
Kill. When lawful to kill, cap. 23. sect. 4.   

L  
Lacedaemon. Whether that state was Monarchical, cap. 13. sect. 3. 7.  
Laws. Humane Laws cannot make somethings good or evil, cap. 11. sect. 5. 

Positive Laws of God to be obeyed, cap. 22. sect. 12.  
Where that obedience is founded, cap. 22. s. 13.  
How far the Civil Law and Law of Nature are the Measure of our Actions, cap. 23. sect. 3.  
The Execution of good Laws make a Nation happy, cap. 23. sect. 10.  
Laws for private interest conduce much to the public good, cap. 23. sect. 8.    
Liberty, What it is? cap. 19 sect. 1. 

— from Coaction, cap. 19 sect. 1. 7.  
— from Necessity, cap. 19 sect. 1. 7.  
Who is properly a freeman? cap. 19 sect. 2.  
Not proper only to bodies, cap. 19 sect. 2. 3.  
Who or what is the subject of it? cap. 19 sect. 5.  
What is the Liberty of Man, cap. 19 sect. 5.    
Life, None hath power over his own life, cap. 20. sect. 1.  
Liking or disliking produce not difference in the things themselves, cap. 13. sect. 2.   

M  
Majority. He who dissents from it ought not therefore to be destroyed, cap. 7. sect. 1.  
Man, Superior to Woman. cap. 16. sect. 3. 

The Nobler Sex, ibid.  
Whether he hath power to do any thing in defence of himself, cap. 18. sect. 7.  
He only actively capable of Commands, cap. 19 sect. 9    
Mancipium, what it signifies, cap. 16. sect. 12.  
Marriage; No state without rules about it, cap. 16. sect. 8. 

One born out of it is filius populi, ibid.    
Means. How he hath right to them who hath right to the end, cap. 19 sect. 2.  
Militia belongs to the Sovereign, cap. 12. sect. 2.  
Miracle, What it is? cap. 22. sect. 8. cap. 23. sect. 6. 

God the only Author of them, cap. 22. sect. 9  
Never wrought to confirm a lie, cap. 22. sect. 9  
The gift of tongues miraculous in the Apostles, c. 22. s. 11.  
As also their Learning, ibid.  
And the success of the Gospel, ibid.    
Mishpol. What it signifies, cap. 18. sect. 6.  
Mixed Actions what they are? cap. 19 sect. 6. 

Bodies denominated from the predominant, c. 13. s. 3.    
Monarchy how distinguished from Tyranny, c. 13. s. 2. 

None so absolute as Mr. Hobbs Fancies, cap. 13. sect. 3. 47. cap. 23. s. 15.    
Money. How the levying of it is like the Nutritive faculty? cap. 23. sect. 14.  
Moses. His Integrity, cap. 22. sect. 5. 

Why the Israelites obeyed him? cap. 22. sect. 17.    
Mother, Not to be obeyed before the Father, c. 16. s. 3. 

What power she hath over the Child, c. 16. s. 8. 9  
Whether the Child is first in her power? c. 16. s. 8.    
Murder. A Sin against God and Man, cap. 20. sect. 4.   

N  
Nourish. Greater respect due to the Father then to him who nourisheth the Child, cap. 16. sect. 10.  
Numbers. Small numbers joined together may live peaceably, cap. 1.   

O  
Oaths. Lawful to take an Oath, cap. 23. sect. 4.  
Obedience, better than Sacrifice, cap. 20. sect. 2. 

No absolute obedience due to Kings, cap. 18. s. 4. etc.  
What obedience due to the commands of God and of Men, cap. 18. sect. 11.    
Ostracism in use at Athens, cap. 20. sect. 5.   

P  
Parents love their Children naturally, cap. 16. sect. 9 

Their power over their Children, cap. 22. sect. 16.    
Paul. His conversion, cap. 22. s. 15.  
Peace. Wherein it consisteth, cap. 10. sect. 1. 

— the fruit of Truth, cap. 10. sect. 5.  
Truth not always regulated by it, cap. 10. sect. 4. 5. 6.  
Peaceable Doctrines only true, cap. 10. sect. 4.    
Whether it be consonant to the laws of Nature, cap. 10. s. 5.  
People not give Authority to the Prince, c. 2. s. 2. 3. 4. 6. c. 14. s. 2. c. 20. s. 13. c. 23. s. 16. 

If they could, it were dangerous to the Prince, cap. 2. s. 5.  
Supreme not their Person, c. 2. s. 2. c. 5. s. 12.  
All do not consent to give power to the Supreme, cap. 4. sect. 1. cap. 16. sect. 5.  
— Not the Authors of Right, cap. 4. sect. 3.  
Profitable that they have some interest in Government, cap. 13. sect. 6.    
Pharisees, they and the Scribes not Sovereigns, c. 18. s. 2.  
Power, v. Authority. 

It comes from God, cap. 20. sect. 1. cap. 18. sect. 7.  
Not from the People, v. People.  
Whether one hath power to do any thing in defence of himself, cap. 18. sect. 7.    
Prayers and Tears the Christians remedy, cap. 16. s. 7.  
Preaching, the King's power about it, cap. 10. sect. 2.  
Preservation, what it is? cap. 16. sect. 11. 

Generation more excellent than it, cap. 16. sect. 11.    
Prince, v. King, Supreme, Sovereign,— may err, c. 4. s. 2.  
Printing. The King's power about it, cap. 10. sect. 2.  
Promises in unlawful things oblige not, cap. 15. sect. 3. 4. 

Whether upon fear oblige? cap. 15. sect. 4.    
Prophecy different from faith, cap. 23. sect. 6.  
Propriety, what it is? cap. 11. sect. 3. 

How introduced, cap. 11. sect. 2.  
Not necessary to Peace, cap. 11. sect. 3.  
It may be both in Peace and War, ibid.  
Not depending upon the Sovereign Power, c. 11. s. 3. 4.  
Men in War have not a propriety to their Enemy's Country before it be Conquered, cap. 10. sect. 2.  
Whence the propriety of the Sovereign, cap. 11. s. 4.  
— Whether this conduce to public peace, c. 23. s. 8. 9 17.    
Protection of the sovereign doth not give propriety, c. 23. s. 9   

R  
Reason sometimes disobeyed, cap. 19 sect. 6.  
Rebellion no small Injustice, cap. 5. sect. 2.  
Rebel's always pretend Oppression, cap. 16. sect. 7.  
Religion. Prince's power in matters of Religion, c. 10. s. 1. 

The assurance of Christian Religion, c. 22. s. 1. 2. 3.  
— from the manner of Deliverance, cap. 22. sect. 2.  
— the Doctrines delivered, cap. 22. sect. 3.  
— the different Style, cap. 22. sect. 4.  
— the Punishment and Rewards proposed, ibid.  
— the sanctity of the persons who delivered it, c. 22. s. 5. 6.  
— the sufferings of the Saints, cap. 22. sect. 7.    
Revelations. The assurance of them, cap. 22. sect. 1. 

what things not to be known but by revelation, c. 22. s. 1. 2. 3.    
Right. Not derived from the consent of the people, c. 4. s. 3. 

He who hath right to the End, how to the means, c. 9 s. 2.    
Romulus' preserved by Faustulus, cap. 16. sect. 10.   

S  
Sacrifice, obedience better than it, cap. 20. sect. 2.  
Samuel rejected, cap. 18. sect. 5. etc.  
Sanctity inspired and acquired, cap. 23. sect. 6.  
Sanhedrim ceased, cap. 18. sect. 12.  
Saul chosen, cap. 18. sect. 5. etc. 

Spareth Agag, cap. 20. sect. 2.    
Scribes & Pharisees not the supreme magistrates, c. 18. s. 2.  
Scripture, its Authority not depending upon the Sovereign, cap. 22. sect. 17. 18.  
See. What the word signifies, cap. 19 sect. 10.  
Servants, when one is a Servant, cap. 17. sect. 2. 

— their condition that differing in peace from what they suffer in War, according to Mr. Hobbs, c. 18. s. 8.    
Servitude banished from amongst Christians, cap. 18. s. 2.  
Sin. None necessitated to it, cap. 19 sect. 1. 2.  
Small numbers joined together may live peacably, cap. 1.  
Sodom, Its destruction, cap. 8. sect. 4.  
Sovereign, v. King, Supreme. 

He is not the person of the People, c. 2. s. 2. c. 5. s. 1. 2.  
He may do unjustly, cap. 8. sect. 4.  
His power about deciding Controversies, cap. 12. sect. 1.  
Hath right to the Militia, cap. 12. sect. 2.  
— to choose Counsellors and Officers, ibid.  
Yet not always Officers, ibid.  
Hath power to Punish and Reward, and confer Honours, cap. 12. sect. 4.  
— Not the representative of the people, cap. 13. sect. 1. c. 14. s. 1. 2. c. 23. s. 15. 16.  
— Obliged by their own Promises, cap. 13. sect. 3.  
— Why they are Chosen, cap. 15. sect. 2.  
His Rights in an instituted and acquired dominion not the same, c. 15. s. 5. c. 16. s. 12. c. 17. s. 1.  
No such Sovereignty by Institution as Mr. Hobbs fancies, c. 18. s. 1.  
Whether the Sovereignty be equally absolute in an instituted and acquired Dominion, c. 17. s. 2.  
Not lawful to resist them when they command against ones own interest, c. 20. s. 7.  
Their commands may be opposed when contrary to the Christian Faith, c. 22. s. 17.  
He cannot make Law whatsoever is against the Law of Nature, c. 22. s. 18.  
How he is subject to Laws Divine, c. 23. s. 7.  
How subject to the Civil Laws, ibid.  
The partition of sovereignty not destructive to it, c. 23. s. 9  
Only one Sovereign in England, c. 23. s. 16.    
Speech is free, cap. 19 sect. 4.  
Spirits more, cap. 19 sect. 2.  
Subjects not Authors of their Governor's Action, c. 2. s. 1. 7. c. 4. s. 1. c. 15. s. 1. c. 20. s. 1. 

They cannot be free from their allegiance, & why? c. 5. s. 4.  
Not submit themselves without any contract on the Governors' part, c. 5. s. 4. c. 11. s. 1.  
Not bound to own all the Actions of a Supreme, c. 7. s. 1. cap. 8. sect. 1.  
All men born Subjects, cap. 14. sect. 1.  
Difference between the Subjects of an instituted and conquered Nation, c. 18. s. 1.    
Supremes. All do not consent to give power unto them, c. 4. s. 1. c. 16. s. 5. 

Not Covenant with all in Government, c. 5. s. 4.  
Not take their Government upon Covenant, c. 6. s. 1.  
The Subject not bound to own all his Actions, c. 7. s. 1. cap. 8. sect. 1.  
Not lawful to resist Him in ones own defence, cap. 20. sect. 6. cap. 21.    
Sword hath no power but from the Covenant, c. 6. s. 3. 

That it can give power is dangerous to Princes, ibid.    
Thoughts are free, cap. 19 sect. 2. 

Not liable to humane Laws, cap. 23. sect. 5.    
Truth, whether it is to be regulated by Peace? c. 10. s. 4. 5. 6. 

In matters of doctrine it is only to be considered, c. 10. s. 4.  
Peacable Doctrines only true, ibid.  
Peace and the fruit of it, cap. 10. sect. 5.  
No universal Truths are new, cap. 10. sect. 7.    
Tumults. Remissness of Government an occasion of them, cap. 10. sect. 9  
Tyranny. Whether it and Monarchy be the same form of Government, cap. 13. sect. 2.  
Tyrants of two sorts, cap. 23. sect. 11.   

V  
Unbelief, 'Tis a breach of God's Law, c. 22. s. 16. 

Men justly Condemned for it, ibid.  
It's Punishment, cap. 22. sect. 13.    
Understanding taken two ways, c. 19 s. 5.  
Voluntas facere & fieri, cap. 19 sect. 12.  
Vows, rash, sinful, not obliging, c. 20. sect. 2.  
Uriah Murdered, cap. 20. sect. 3. 4.   

W  
War, what it is properly, cap. 16. sect. 4. 

Whence arise Civil Wars, c. 18. s. 13. 14. 15.    
Water, how it is said to be free, c. 19 s. 7.  
Ways, how they are free, cap. 19 sect. 2.  
Wife subject to the Husband, cap. 16. sect. 4.  
Will, what is the freedom of it, cap. 19 sect. 5. 

— 'Tis conversant about the End and the Means, ibid.  
— Overruled by the Appetite, cap. 19 s. 6.  
the difference betwixt it, desire and inclination, ibid.    
Woman inferior to Man, cap. 16. s. 3. 

— Not bound to prostitute their bodies, c. 17. s. 1.      

The Texts of Holy Scriptures Illustrated or Cited.  

Cap. Vers. Genesis.  
1. C. 2. S. 1.  
3. 5. 11. 18. 11.  
16. 16. 3. 4. 8.  
17. 7. 8. 10. 22. 16.  
18. 18. 19 22. 17.  
2●. 25. 08. 04.  
21. 23. 23. 04.  
22. 16. ibid.  
26. 31. ibid.   

Exod.  
20. 19 22. 17.  
18. 04. etc.  
32. 10. 11, etc. 22. 05.   

Deuter.  
5. 27. 18. 4.  
6. 13. 23. 4.  
17. 14. etc. 18. 6. 7.  
18. 15. 22. 13.   

Judges.  
11. 30. 20. 02.   

1 Samuel.  
2. 27. etc. 8. 4.  
8. 7. 18. 8.  
11. 12. etc. 18. 5. 6.  
17. 19 20. 18. 8.  
12. 3. 4. 18. 8.  
14. 24. 27. 44. 20. 2.  
15. 1. 9 22. ibid.   

2 Samuel.  
12. 1. etc. c. 9 10. etc. 20. 4.   

1 Kings.  
3. 9 18. 9   

Psalms.  
1. 2. 18. 12.  
51. 22. 3.  
4. 14. 20. 4.  
110. 4. 23. 4.  
106. 38. 20. 2.  
119. 132. 18. 6.   

Isaiah.  
33. 9 20. 4.   

Ezekiel.  
46. 18. 18. 6.   

Daniel.  
6. 7. 13. 15. 24. 13 3. 4   

St. Matthew.  
4. 3. 22. 9  
5. 21. 23. 4.  
33. 34. ibid.  
37. ibid.  
16. 6. 16. 18. 12.  
21. 2. 3. 18. 10.  
23. 2. 3. 18. 11. 12.  
4. 12. 16. 18. 12.  
25. 14. etc. 23. 4.   

St. Mark.  
16. 16. 22. 13.  
20. 22. 09.   

St. Luke.  
1. 24. 22. 2.   

St. John.  
3. 15. 16. 18. 22. 13.  
18. 19 22. 16.  
23. 22. 13.  
5. 44. 22. 16.  
9 22. 22. 14.  
10. 8. 23. 4.  
12. 42. 43. 22. 14.   

Acts.  
3. 22. 23. 22. 13.  
4. 5. 18. 11.  
18. 19 10. 1.  
19 18. 11.  
25. 11. 20. 6.   

Romans.  
1. 9 23. 4.  
3. 4. 20. 4.  
27. 22. 14.  
13. 3. 4. 20. 4.   

1 Corinth.  
1. 30. 23. 6.   

2 Corinth.  
1. 23. 23. 4.   

Ephes.  
2. 8. 23. 6.  
5. 22. 23. 16. 4.   

Phill.  
1. 8. 23. 4.   

Hebr.  
11. 6. 22. 13.   

1 St. Peter.  
2. 14. 20. 4.   

St. James.  
5. 12. 23. 4.   
FINIS.   

ERRATA.  
PAge 3 Line 24 read 81 l. 30 r. all authority, p. 4 l. 2 r. impossibility, l. 24 r. you will say, l. 26 r. this election, p. 5. l. 31 r. seems to me, p. 9 l 25 r. impossible, p 11 l. 2 r. fraud, p. 13 l. 5 r depose, p. 17 l 6 r. parts, p. 19 l. 2 r. vindictive, l. 13. r. it, l. 22 r. sibi for tibi, p 41 l. r. conceit, l. 8 r. conquered, l. 31 r. therefore, p▪ 49 l. 13 r. any of the other, p. 50 l 3 r principaliori, l. 20 r. principaliori, p. 53 l 14 r. had done it, p. 54 l. 16 r. other, p 6 l. 6 r. expressed, l. 8 r. more, l 20 r. participate, l. 21 r. resembles, p. 67 l. 5 r. misreckon, p. 68 l. 19 r. but in those, l▪ 30 r. exemplyfied, p. 69 l. 11 r. 103 p. 71 l▪ 17 r. dispose, p. 74 l. 14 r. to a law, p. 77 l. 7 r. gift, l. 17 r. his, l. 16 r Oeconomical, l. 23 r. creatio, l. 25 r. accident▪ p. 79 l. 14 r. about, p. 80 l. 8 r. conquest of, p. 86 l 11. r. and so every man, l. 28 r. by, p. 87 l 12 r. that like Virtue it is commended l. 14 r. and produceth it to satisfy, p. 90 l. 3 for and r. but, p. 92 l. 19 r. safety, p 94 l. 11 r. find, p. 109 l. 21 r spirits, p. 116 l. 15 r. passing, p. 133 l. 10 r. against, l. 21 r. And, p. 137 l. 12 r. Chrysostom, p. 140 l. 15 r. although, p. 146 l. 29 r. self, p. 148 l. 36 r. possible, p. 144. l. 31 r. proceed, for causes r. causes, p. 155 l. 23 r. divine, l. 24 for four r. for, p. 160 l. 8 r. infallible, p. 163 l. 14 r. custom, l. 16 for them r. them, l. 17 r. famous, p. 169. 6 r. weak, l. 13 r. published, l. 30 for one r. no, p. 172 l. 27 r. obey it, l. 28 r. it, p. 173 l. 7 r. authority, p. 174 l. 12 r. infidelity, p. 180 l 26 r. this, p. 184 l. 21 r. Hobbs, p 190 l. 24. r. to it, p. 203 l. 8 r. thus, p. 225 l. 28. r. afterwards, l. 25 r. (which is the motive faculty) p. 226 l. 9 r. acted, p. 227 l. 17 r. examining, p. 228 l. 32 r. independent, p. 235 l. 3 r. which I have showed, l. 14 for it is r. is it.  

In the Postscript.  
p. 12 l. 10 r. other writers, l. 21 r. (so I render his words, l. 26 r. Heb. 11. 1, p. 14 l. 3. r. representor, p. 17 l. 12 r. preceding, l. 34 r. certainly the objectors, p. 21. l. 16 r. genii, p. 24 l. 31 r. communicated, p. 26 l. 23 r. he is, p. 29 l. 13 r. Licinius, p. 29 l. 34 r. thought, l. 35 r. return to the.