OBSERVATIONS, CENSURES and CONFUTATIONS OF NOTORIOUS ERRORS IN Mr. Hobbes HIS LEVIATHAN, and other his Books. To which are annexed, OCCASIONAL ANIMADVERSIONS On some Write of the Socinians, and such Heretics; of the same opinions with him.  
By WILLIAM LUCY Bishop of St. David's.  
LONDON, Printed by J. G. for Nath. Brooke at the Angel in Cornhill, 1663.   

IMPRIMATUR  
Hic Liber, cui Titulus, Observations, Censures and Confutations, of Notorious Errors in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan, and other his Books, etc.  
ROBERTUS PORY, S. T. P. Reverendissimo in Christo Patri ac Domino, Domino Archiepiscopo Cantuar. Sacellanus Domesticus. junii 10. 1662.   

To the Right Honourable EDWARD, Earl of Clarendon, and Lord High Chancellar of ENGLAND, etc.  
MY LORD,  
THere is no man read's Your great name in the Front of this book, but will be ready to inquire in himself, what interest Your Lordship can have in it; I could satisfy them with the common language of Dedications, and say, that those noble and high Favours, I have received by Your Lordship's kindness, make me endeavour, what I can, to acknowledge them, with all humility and gratitude; but these are particular duties, the obligation of them always doth, and will lie upon me, to the utmost of my power. This Treatise is of public concernment; it handle's the highest and greatest business of Church and State that, since the plantation of Christian Religion in England, ever any man had need to write of, and by that Title it is Yours.  
My Lord, I know, and whosoever shall have the happiness to write the story of these times, as he ought, must record it, to Your perpetual honour that those most glorious and blessed alterations, which this present age enjoys, both in Ecclesiastic and Politic concernments, have, in a great part, resulted out of Your presence, and assistance, to our sacred Sovereign, in those intricacies of affairs, with which He, and, in Him, We were all involved; My Lord, I know that most addresses to him, in his accursed exile, were by Your hands transferred to His; the returns again were, for the most part through the same conduct; so that, if there had been flaw or chink in Your Lordship's secrecy, to let out what was committed to Your trust; or defect of prudence in directing what was returned, I have often thought with myself, there would scarce have been a subject faithful and trusted by the King, who could have supervived his Restauration, to congratulate this blessed morning of happiness, which we now enjoy; and therefore most of those gallant persons may acknowledge the preservation of their lives to those great and Counsellour-vertues, (as I may term them, such as most highly adorn a Counsellor of state) with which Your Lordship was endued, I am sure (though unworthy those Epithets) I can affirm it of myself and mine own being.  
This is the reason why this Treatise creep's under, and expects Your Lordship's protection; It handle's the Fundamental articles of all those things which hitherto you, and all virtuous men, have endeavoured to preserve, and for which you and they have suffered so much hardship: for when this unhappy Author slight's those reasons, which have been brought, to defend the eternal infinite being of a God, this Book hath justified it against him; O my Lord; it is that God which hath untwisted and unravelled those many misfortunes with which you were lately entangled, and hath exalted you to a high place of Dignity, wherein you may serve him; as than you have always kept your integrity to him, through many dangers for defence of his glory; ●o, I am confident, the memory and honour of him must always be precious in your sight hereafter.  
When he hath most unworthily disgraced our hope of Heaven, this Treatise hath laboured to vindicate that by reason: my Lord, I know, you have always thought those eternal joys are of an unmeasurable condition, excelling these temporal, and therefore your duty and thankfulness to that God, who hath provided such blessings for you, w●ll assist me to suppress all wicked thoughts and suggestions of false reasons, which may any way disturb the blessed assurance of that glorious expectation.  
When this Author hath spoken very dangerously of the blessed Trinity, this Treatise hath, by reason, as well as Scripture, endeavoured to justify it. My Lord doth know how, without the divinity of our Saviour, there can be no salvation for man; the arm of man only could not compass it; our thought of a God, our hope of heaven, were in vain, without it: the blessed Trinity joyn's in the productions of these divine effects, which we enjoy; Your Lordship therefore will perfect these noble duties towards God, which in such a high measure you have already expressed in protecting such a sacred truth from the blasting of malicious wits.  
These things (my Lord) I dedicate to Your Lordship as to a person of great, and eminent, honour, and worth; besides these there are in this book the vindication of divers truths, which reflect upon you, as the highest dispenser of justice in our Nation, under our Sovereign; He hath abused the nature of justice, of meum and tuum, and let the world out to a dissolute confusion; of which, although I have much more to say hereafter, yet here are delivered many things which may vindicate the anciently-received conclusions from those violences which he hath offered to them; so then, as to a great Patron of Virtue, of Religion, of Justice, these Papers are submitted to your protection; how the particulars are handled by the Author, will be your wisdom to judge; howsoever, since it is the child of my brain, the fruit of my studies, and so one of the dearest things in the world to me, I most humbly beseech you accept this present from him who would make you a nobler, if he could, and acknowledge me to be,  
MY LORD, Your Lordship's most real honourer, and hearty Servant WILL. St. David's   

TO THE CHRISTIAN READER.  
REader, I entreat you, take notice, that long since, in a sullen retirement, being amazed at the transactions of businesses in the Church, so well as State. I not only grieved to observe the ruins of that glorious hedge, with which God had fenced his Vineyard, (that hedge of thorns, which formerly no man could have kicked against, but it would have hurt his foot) broken down; but likewise how the foxes had been in the Vineyard; how they had eaten up and devoured most of those desirable fruits of piety, humility, obedience, and fidelity, which had only a name of honour left them by former writers, but no existence in the practice of men amongst us; Considering these sad misfortunes, and studying what would become of them, I found many gallant men, with noble and heroïque spirits, repairing the hedge, by showing the necessity of that discipline whose decay introduced all those mischiefs to the Church; others, with as high a virtue, and as effectual pens, pruning the Vines, and cherishing those decayed fruits; I honoured their endeavours, but considered cui bono, to what purpose all this learning bestowed; not only the foxes have been nibbling the fruits and branches, but the wild Boar hath been in the Vineyard, and hath so far digged at the roots of Religion, that the principal Vines hang by little strings, and do only live, yea would die if not succoured. (These were my reflections on those times) I therefore thought it necessary for some body, and applied my particular endeavours to cast fresh Earth about those roots of Religion; to chase, if I could, that wild Boar out of the Vineyard into his former Forest of heathenish principles; and surely if any one man, for some hundreds of years, might be called that Boar, it is Mr. Hobbes, no one man ever writing so destructively to the principles of Christianity as he hath done; Upon this reason I bend my study against him and his Books, and did heretofore publish two pieces in an unknown name, being willing to have the business done, but not caring if my name were lost in the World; the first was merely Philosophical, against the two first Chapters of his Leviathan, which yet, because he made that the Introduction and Foundation of his Divinity, I thought it necessarily conducing to my intentions against the other, to begin with; Since my writing that I have found some men, of great worth, and deserved reputation in Letters, that have opined with some things in that piece, upon which I thought to have suspended my putting it out again, until I had enlarged my Discourse with them; but, upon perusal, supposing they could not prophesy, nor had foreseen by reason what I urged, I resolved to publish it as it is, and take some other leisure to censure them, if God give me life. The other piece was against the 12th. th'. 13 th'. and 14th. th'. Chapter; both so falsely printed, that, when I saw them, I could scarce know them for mine own. I have writ against most part of his great errors, but my condition in those times was such that I was forced, upon frequent and sudden searches of inquisitive soldiers, to huddle up my papers, and throw them I know not where, nor can yet find divers of them; those which I can find at this present, I now print, considering how lamely such duties are performed by Executors, and myself grown to that Age as I must commit most things to them shortly, how soon I know not; the rest, God willing, shall come out as I shall discover them, or else can repair what is defective by my memory, at such snatches of time as I can recover from my necessary duties, who love not my life, nor any piece of it, but as it shall conduce to the glory of God, and the good of Christian men, that they may lead a peaceable and godly life in unity and charity, which is the whole endeavour of  
Your brother and servant in and for Jesus Christ, Will: Lucy Bishop of St. David's.   

A Table of General Heads.  

I. OBservations, etc. Upon the first Chapter of Mr. Hobbes' Leviathan, entitled, Of Sense. Page. 1  
II. Observations upon the second Chapter of Leviathan, entitled, Of Imagination. 53  
III. Upon the twelfth Chapter of Leviathan, entitled, Of Religion. 79  
IU. A Transition to some select places in his Element of Philosophy. 94  
V. A paraenetical Digression to Mr. Hobbes. 117  
VI Observations upon the thirteenth Chapter of Leviathan, entitled, Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity and Misery. 137  
VII. Upon the fourteenth Chapter of Leviathan, entitled, Of the first and second Natural Laws, and of Contracts, together with the first Chapter in his Book De Corpore Politico. 164  
VIII. Upon the fifteenth Chapter of Leviathan, entitled, Of other Laws of Nature. 200  
IX. Upon the sixteenth Chapter of Leviathan entitled, Of Persons, Authors, and things Personated. 272  
X. Upon some Writings of the Socinians. 291  
XI. A Digression to the Reader, preceding the Bishop's Additional Animadversions upon a Latin Apologist for Mr. Hobbes. 417    

A TABLE To the several Chapters, Sections, and Series of the whole Book.  


CHAP. I.  
Sect. I. SEnse something else beside representation. Page. 2  
II. The cause of sense discussed; 3 

Not the pressure of the Organ, and consequently the heart or brain; ibid.  
Which implie's sense to be before sense. 4    
III. Not seeming, but some action, must be sense. ibid. 

Sight consisteth not in light or colour figured. 5  
Mr. Hobbes' Aphorism confuted, that motion produceth nothing but motion. ibid.  
No motion in Place, but to Place. 6  
Philosophy-Schools and Universities how necessary to Christendom. ibid.      


CHAP. II.  
I. Whether the subject, wherein colour is, be the object of sight. Colour and Image not the same, nor in the same. 8  
II. His instance of the Sun's appearance by reflection censured. ibid.  
III. Whence it is, that we see the same object double. ibid. 

Colour is in the Object; Image or species not; 9    
IU. Where it is by reflection. Mr. Hobbes' fallacy between that and colour. 10    


CHAP. III.  
I. His tedious proposition. ibid.  
II. Image what. 11 

The apparition of the Object, not of the Brain, much less of Motion. ibid.    
III. As is also Colour. 12  
IU. Mr. Hobbes' inconstancy in the production and seat of sense. ibid.  
V. Sparkes, appearing after a stroke upon the eye, not from any concussion of the brain; 13 

Not from the optic nerve, but rather from the White or Crystalline humour. ibid.  
The like from a white Cat or white Napkin struck in the dark. ibid.  
Which may be only the strong emission of species. 14  
The great Axiom upon which Philosophy, if not Divinity, is founded. ibid.    
VI Mr. Hobbes illogicall in his proofs; ibid. 

He playe's the Mahomet in arguing. 15    
VII. No Image of Light, 16  
VIII. But as incorporated into some body. 17  
IX. The apparition of Light, such as Mr. Hobbes' would make, proves not Image and Colour to be the apparitions of Motion. 18  
X. Fire moves rather upward, then equally every way; ibid.  
XI. Not presently extinguished, when enclosed, and how, when it is. 19  
XII. The motion of Fire what; It hath no positive contraction; 20  
XIII. No rejection of the contiguous Medium. 21 

An Instance in two fired Beacons. ibid.    
XIV. The apparition of Fire, after a stroke, is not by any rebound from the Brain to the Optic Nerve. 22 

The difference great between the apparition of such Fire, and the species issuing from any visible Object. 23    
XV. Improbable, that the Sun worketh, as Mr. Hobbes fancyeth Fire to do. ibid.  
XVI. The indepences of Mr. Hobbes' Illatives. 24  
XVII. Light and Colour two things. ibid.    


CHAP. IU.  
I. Colour, or Image, not the apparition of Motion, but of the Object; the former proved by two Arguments; 25  
II. The later by three. 26, etc.  
III. Colour and Light not the same thing; 28  
IU. Two Arguments for the negative. 30    


CHAP. V.  
I. The first Argument against the reality of Colours answered. 32 

Wherein the being and nature of things consists, and how they are distinguished. ibid.    
II. The second Argument against the reality of Colours other than the reflection of light. 33  
III. Answered. ibid. 

Colours real and intentional not the same. ibid.  
Intentional Colours not the same with Light. 35    
IU. Sight more than a bare reception of species. 36 

The conceit of the Species not founded only upon Aristotle's Texts; ibid.    
V. Aristotle's first reason for them; 37 

A second Argument from Aristotle's image in Plato's eye; ibid.  
A third Argument from the distance between the Object and Organ of Sight. 38  
The species why so called. ibid.  
An Objection answered. ibid.      


CHAP. VI  
I. Mr. Hobbes fallacious in his discourse about conceptions. 39  
II. The Philosophers first opinion concerning Echoes. 40 

Their second opinion concerning Echoes; 41  
Their third opinion concerning Echoes. ibid.    
III. The distinction of formally and virtually applied to their Axiom, Nihil dat quod non habet. 42  
IU. Mr. Hobbes' absurdities touching the production of sounds. ibid.  
V. Smell and Taste where. 44  
VI. What difference between the heat in the fire and that transmitted to the hand; and how it proves no nullity of an external object. ibid. 

The nature of first and second qualities. 45    
VII. Heat is neither pleasure, nor pain, but a cause of both. 46  
VIII. The same cause worketh different effects, according to the subject or object about which it is busied. 47 

Some danger in asserting sensible qualities to be nothing but mere apparitions. 48    
IX. A Universe of motion madly fancied by Mr. Hobbes. ibid.  
X. Colour in the Object when seen by reflection. 50 

Sight when, and when not, deceived. ibid.  
Sense judgeth not of colour, but Reason by collection from it. 5●      


CHAP. VII.  
I. Animals will move themselves after rest; 54 

Every thing will move towards its proper place. ibid.    
II. All Animals, being subject to lassitude, require rest. 55 

Inanimates, by local motion, tend toward rest. ibid.  
All things, able to overcome the ill they are affected with, change themselves. ibid.▪      


CHAP. VIII.  
I. The distinction of Appetite into natural and rational; their conflicts, etc. 57  
II. Appetite and knowledge not more than man hath. 58  
III. What appetite and knowledge is in inferior creatures; and how excellently dispoped by providence. 59  
IU. God's Wisdom, not Art, in the natures of all he made, and disposing the principles of their several operations. 60  
V. All things act according to God's method, with an innate appetite to accomplish his end, though without knowledge how they tend to it. 61    


CHAP. IX.  
I. How standing Water put in motion recovereth rest; 63  
II. How improperly Dreams are assimilated to it when ceasing. 64  
III. Imagination something more than decaying sense; ibid.  
IV. Memory no decaying sense, the act of Sensation being wholly passed. 65 

His illustration from the Sun's light obscuring that of the Stars incongruous. 66    
V▪ Extent of time doth not always weaken the imagination. 67  
VI, VII. Imagination and Memory not one and the same thing. 68  
VIII. What Memory it is that maketh Experience. 69    


CHAP. X.  
I. There have been Prognostic Dreams, and such cannot be said to arise from the agitation of the inward parts. 71  
II. Solomon's opinion of Dreams different from Mr. Hobbes'. 72  
III. His reasons invalid drawn from the differences of Dreams. 73 

Old men's dreams, constitutional dreams, fantastic dreams. ibid.  
Whence coherent and incoherent dreams. 74      


CHAP. XI.  
I. Sensitive creatures become acquainted with words, and signs, by custom, or the suggestions of appetite, not by understanding; 75  
II. The specific souls, and signal differences, distinguishing them each from other; 76 

Their sagacity. 77      


CHAP. XII.  
I. Religion defined; 79 

Why reckoned among the duties of Justice. 80    
II. The seed of Religion in Man only, because rational; ibid.  
III. But Mr. Hobbes' reasons of no force to prove it. ibid.  
IV. His opinion of the feigned Gods, invisible Agents, Ghosts, etc. 81 

Invisible Agents what. ibid.  
Mr. Hobbes stick's an absurd opinion of man's soul undeservedly upon Idolaters. 82    
V. His discourse of Spirits, and Ghosts, etc. too perplexed. 83    


CHAP. XIII.  
I. Mr. Hobbes sow's ambiguous seeds to produce false and true Religion. 85  
II. The opinion of Ghosts could not introduce the assurance that There is a God. ibid.  
III. Ignorance of second causes apt to produce Atheism then Religion. 86  
IU. Devotion to what we fear rather a fruit then seed of Religion. 87  
V. A taking things casual for Prognostics, no seed of the false Religions. 8● 

There have been Sibylls that prophesied of our Saviour. 90      


CHAP. XIV.  
I. The sole immediate seed of Religion an innate principle. 91  
II. To be proved from the chain of Causes. 92 

An eternity of the World, with an infinity of causations, why not to be admitted. ibid.    
III. Somewhat of God, though infinite, may be known; 94  
IV. And that from Phantasms. 95  
V. The conceit of finite and infinite explained; 96 

What conceit may be had of infinite. 98    
VI. An Eternity acknowledged by all of different opinions. 99  
VII. Mr. Hobbes' indifference be the world finite or infinite. 101  
VIII. His contradiction touching the first mover. ibid. 

The first mover proved immovable. ibid.    
IX. Mr. Hobbes' Paralogism, by which he would charge the absurdity of one infinite exceeding another; 102  
X. His disputing ex non concessis. 103 

No infinity at all of numbers. 104  
Why the world cannot be conceived infinite in duration. ibid.    
XI. And yet God, the Creator of it, may and must be. 105 

No before or after in Eternity, and yet how these terms are applicable to God's duration or coexistence, not to his simple or absolute existence. 106    
XII. Our double conceit of God's eternity, to which no computation of time is applicable. 108  
XIII. The doctrine of Eternity most agreeable to H. Scripture. 109  
XIV. No absurdity in asserting Eternity to be a standing instant. 111  
XV. The difference of nunc stans and tunc s●ans, as applied to Eternity. 113  
XVI. Eternity co-exist's with no infinite number of days. 115  
XVII. God so manifest in the creatures, as all ignorance is inexcusable; ibid. 

The Bishop's character of Mr. Hobbes; 117  
And censure of his Dispute here touching the eternity of the world; ibid.  
And of the apology he is likely to make, out of such principles, at the last day. 118  
His Lordship's seasonable and salutary advice to him. 119  
Mr. Hobbes pretends to be content with the doctrine of holy Scripture, the fame of Miracles, Country-custome and Laws, yet wrangles against all. ibid.      


CHAP. XV.  
I. Mr. Hobbes contradicts himself, as touching the seeds of Religion; 121 

Which are more than only an opinion of a Deity. ibid.    
II. Mr. Hobbes more perplexed in his writing then the Schoolmen. 122 

How far the foresaid opinion may be abolished out of humane nature. ibid.    
III. What may be supposed Mr. Hobbes mean's by a Form Religion. 123 

How he imposeth upon his Reader. ibid.  
Form Religion not founded upon his fantastic Faith. 124  
The Jewish and Christian principally to be examined. ibid.      


CHAP. XVI.  
I. No probability of idolatry before the Flood. 125  
II. The first argument for it answered. ibid. 

Invocation taken for the whole worship of God; 126  
Practised by Adam, Abel, Seth, etc. ibid.  
Or for some peculiar additional Devotion. ibid.  
Service vulgarly used to signify Common Prayer; Gloria Patri the Doxology at the end of every Psalm, etc. 127  
Invocation Gen. 4.26. not improbably taken for some peculiar Devotion introduced in Enos' time. 128    
III. The second argument for idolatry before the Flood answered. ibid. 

The punishment in this world many times disproportionate to the sin. ibid.  
Of what sort their sins were, who perished in the Flood. 129    
IU. Revelation, not Reason, did dictate the first Religion. ibid.  
V. The difference betwixt the occasion and foundation of Religion. 130 

Which prevaileth according to the congruity it hath to the will of God; ibid.  
Whatsoever men's opinion be of the Person that introduceth it. 131    
VI. How this difference is consistent with the other of assurance that there is a God. 132 

Why the promised discourse of the Jewish and Christian Religion is omitted. ibid.      


CHAP. XVII.  
I. Mr. Hobbes abstruse in making out his Conclusion of suspected Governors and their Religion. 133  
II. Christian Religion depends not upon the integrity and sufficiency of Church governor's. 134  
III. Religion, form by divine Revelations, may oblige to a belief of seeming contradictions. 135  
IU. The singular excellency of Faith, to be as well against, as above, Reason. 136  
V. Mr. Hobbes' subtlety in his citation and pretermission of examples. 137 

Which, though pertinent, are dangerous to weak capacities. ibid.      


CHAP. XVIII.  
I. Mr. Hobbes' scandalous description of Man. ibid.  
II. The equality of men by nature not universal. 138  
III. The estate in which Adam and Evah were made. ibid. 

That wherein others. 139    
IU. Memory, Experience, and Prudence, distinguished. ibid.  
V. Mr. Hobbes confuse, if not contradictory to himself, in arguing about Prudence. 140  
VI Men universally no such opiniatours of their own prudence, as Mr. Hobbes pretendeth. 141    


CHAP. XIX.  
I. Equality of hopes does not render men enemies; 142  
II. Nor of desires, as appears by the agreement between Abraham and Lot; 143  
III. Nor self-conservation, much less delectation. ibid.  
IU. How, and by what, Hopes and Fears work upon us. 144 

Not Ahab's, but Jezebel's malice destroyed Naboth. 145  
Objection answered. ibid.  
The title of Occupancy sacred, etc. ibid.  
Reason secureth men from fears; ibid.  
Who apprehend no danger from any bare possibility of injury, 146  
Which is generally restrained by the thoughts of God's punitive Justice. ibid.  
How Reason or Arms decide the controversy before occupancy. 147      


CHAP. XX.  
I. Three sorts of men, although without a common humane power to awe them, not in the condition called War. 148  
II. How a common interest in humanity may oblige to mutual friendship. ibid. 

Objection about St. Paul's entertainment in Malita answered. 149    
III. Time being no essential, constitute's no war. ibid.  
IV. Mr. Hobbes' instance in foul weather, to illustrate, erroneous. 150  
V. A disposition to war, before any act of hostility, makes no war. 151 

His impropriety of speech. ibid.    
VI Men unassured of their security make not presently provision for a defensive war. 152    


CHAP. XXI.  
I. An universal war between all individuals of mankind never yet experimented. 153 

Nor proved by Mr. Hobbes' instances. ibid.    
II. What in the Passions makes sins which are not such in themselves. 154 

The several constitutions in the objects of our Passions what, and whence. ibid.    
III. Affected ignorance of the Law a sin. 155 

Every man born under a Lawmaker, and a Law. ibid.    
IV. The Americans have Kings, and justice executed amongst them. 156 

Private families not at war with the Kings and Nations among whom they live. ibid.  
The concord of which hath a better dependence then upon lust. ibid.    
V. The exorbitances of a Civil war prove not men to be in a polemical state by nature. ibid.  
VI The mutual jealousies of Sovereigns render them not like Gladiatours, in a direct posture of war. 157  
VII. Conscience dictate's too men what is right and wrong: what Law and common Power they must submit to. 158  
VIII. Military Valour and Prudence, degenerated into Force and Fraud, lose the nature, and deserve not the name, of the two Cardinal Virtues in war. 159  
IX. Justice and Injustice no faculties, but habits, and may be in a military person. 160  
X. Nations have propriety in Dominions. 161 

Persons in their wives. ibid.  
And estates, ibid.    
XI. Their title to which may be various. 163 

That of Occupancy most evident. ibid.      


CHAP. XXII.  
I. The right of Nature extends farther than to the preservation of life. 164  
II. Several acceptions of Necessity, and the different effects of it accordingly; 165 

Nothing Necessary that God hath not provided for by some Law. ibid.    
III. Necessity of nature makes not every particular man desirous to preserve his life; 166  
IU. It being not in nature the principal of man's happiness. ibid.  
V. Nor the power lost with it considerable in respect of the spiritual activity and perfection gained by Death; 167  
VI Which is not so terrible, and painful, as pretended. 168 

Ancient instances; 169  
The most signal that of Otho and his soldiers. ibid.  
Cato's double attempt to dispatch himself. 170  
Arria's magnanimity in being a like precedent to her husband Paetus. 171  
A modern instance in a young child. 172    
VII. Death seizeth upon men like Sleep; ibid. 

Diogenes takes them for Brother and Sister. ibid.  
A young child mistook one for the other. 173  
Misrepresentations make it otherwise apprehended. ibid.    
VIII. The three periods of Death; ibid. 

In which of them, and when otherwise, pain most affects the sick. 174    
IX. In what cases Life should not be preferred to Death. ibid.    


CHAP. XXIII.  
I. He that hath right to the end, hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end; 176 

The ultimate end excepted. ibid.    
II. He that judgeth by the right of Nature hath a Law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judgement. 177 

To which he is obliged by Reason. ibid.    
III. When the Law of Nature for preservation may be dispensed with; 178 

As the right for a man's preserving some piece of his estate. ibid.    
IV. Mr. Hobbes mistaken in his definition of Right, and division of it from Law. 179  
V. What right is properly, and what wrong. 180 

Whence is proved the consistence of Right with Law. ibid.      


CHAP. XXIV.  
I. What is the Law, what the Right of Nature. 181 

Man, in his most peculiar dominion, subject and tributary to God. ibid.    
II. Man in his first Charter had dominion given him over the creatures, but not over other men. 182 

Man's will not to be the rule of his judgement, nor the reason of of his actions. 183    
III. Why men are exempt from God's general Charter of dominion at Man's creation; ibid. 

To put a restraint on any Vice which had no positive Law against it; ibid.  
As the sin of Sodom, it may reasonably be supposed, had none. 184  
How Mr. Hobbes would have out- Cained Cain in the justification of Fratricide. ibid.  
The contradiction in mutual dominion, every man over every man. 185    
IU. No new Patent made to Noah, but that to Adam reinforced. ibid. 

Noah's Sons like coheirs or in●er-commoners in their right. 186  
They had not the world divided among them by consent, but by casual occupancy, or choice, as every of them thought fit. 187    
V. An Objection answered. ibid. 

The Children of Israel dispossessed the Canaanites by God's prerogative which he had revealed. ibid.  
The first generation of men understood their titles of propriety without God's peremptory command. 188    
VI Jus and Utile not the same thing. ibid. 

Places, etc. not appropriated, become duly his that first seizeth. 189  
How Tully understood Utile far otherwise then Mr. Hobbes. ibid.  
Mr. Hobbes' Argument ex non concessis. ibid.      


CHAP. XXV.  
I. The right of nature not such as Mr. Hobbes defines it; 190  
II. Not liberty, as he describe's it. 191 

external impediments may hinder, but not take away, natural power. ibid.    
III. Exceptions against Mr. Hobbes' definition of the Law of Nature. 192 

A vein of errors that run through his Book. 193    
IU. Mr. Hobbes may be allowed to say, he declares, when he proves nothing; but not to suppose a multitude of falsehoods to make the horridness of one Conclusion. ibid. 

A term wanting to Mr. Hobbes' just engagement in a War; 194    
V. And to him a remembrance of his own principles. 195 

War not the only preservative of Man's right or Nature's; ibid.  
The discourse of Man's laying down his right to all things, etc. unnecessary. ibid.    
VI That is not always really good for which a man part's with his right. 196 

A man may lay down his right to resistance, and preservation of his life for a greater good. 197  
Objection answered. ibid.  
Tertullian's signal instance in the Christians of his time. ibid.    
VII. He may suffer imprisonment, etc. without reluctance, for the same reason; 199 

Obedience being better than sacrifice. ibid.    
VIII. A man may renounce his right pro aris & focis. 200 

For the good of his posterity. ibid.  
Monastic retreats. 201      


CHAP. XXVI.  
I. Diversity of merit. 202 

The Catcher's title to scattered money. ibid.    
II. Benignity to a Musician varyeth not the nature of this or that Donor's Contract. 203  
III. How the owner keep's his property, who intended to renounce it. ibid.  
IV. The distinction ex congruo and ex condigno misunderstood by Mr. Hobbes; 204 

How otherwise expounded by the Schools. 205      


CHAP. XXVII.  
I. Mr. Hobbes' vain supposition of transferring right, etc. 208 

His justifying most horrid sins, where no Covenant had been made against them; ibid.  
His reason frustrate. 209  
As instance of two persons meeting in some place not before inhabited. ibid.  
His imperfect definition of injustice. 210    
II. Suspicion makes not Covenants void. ibid. 

The Case put between two Nations entering League of Confederacy. 211  
The evil consequences of his opinion. ibid.  
Plato's ingenious Fable; ibid.    
III. The Casuists Metus cadens. 212  
IU. A propriety where is no coercive Power. 213 

The foundations whereon Mr. Hobbes build's a Commonwealth, and the justice of it. 214    
V. The Fool's argument against Justice unanswerable out of Mr. Hobbes' principles. 215 

His doctrine more honest than Mr. Hobbes's. ibid.  
Taking away the fear of God an unreasonable supposition. 216  
Uncertain, whether taught or learned of the other, the Fool or Mr. Hobbes. ibid.    
VI Mr. Hobbes' horrid supposal of getting Heaven by unjust violence. 217  
VII. He pretends to confute the Fool; ibid. 

But, by inadvertence, fight's against himself. 218    
VIII. The violation of faith not allowed, for a Kingdom. 219  
IX. Mr. Hobbes mistakes the question; ibid. 

And changeth the terms fraudulently here and otherwhere. 220  
He that mean's to deceive will not declare his intent. 221  
The Bishop's Conclusion about deceit and injustice. 222    
X. Mr. Hobbes' illogicall answer about getting Heaven by violence. ibid. 

Another like it. ibid.  
The Law of Nature give's rules for the attaining eternal felicity after death. 223    
XI. The breach of Covenant, though a wicked one, conduceth not to eternal felicity; yet such Covenants ought to be broken; 224 

As that entered into by Thiefs; ibid.  
The other by an Adulteress. ibid.    
XII. Mr. Hobbes' subtlety in writing against Rebellion. 225 

Which cannot be by his doctrine. ibid.      


CHAP. XXVIII.  
I. Mr. Hobbes unkind to Religion in the disparagement he put's upon natural knowledge; 226  
II. What a persuasive the natural knowledge, or belief we have of eternal happiness, is to withdraw us from our opinion of temporal felicity. 227  
III. The transcendent delight here in our hopes of eternal happiness; 228 

For which we loathe worldly pleasures; ibid.  
And welcome tortures. 229    
IU. Objection answered. ibid. 

The worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happiness. ibid.  
The Merchant-adventurers hazard. 230    
V. Mr. Hobbes can render himself no more secure of temporal than he seems to be (with little satisfaction) of eternal felicity. 231  
VI. The promises and oaths of men, which he makes his greatest assurance being very fallible. ibid.  
VII. His scornful scale of knowledge. 232 

Our evidence greater of future felicity then that ever there was such a man as Julius Caesar; ibid.    
VIII. Being not only delivered to us by Tradition, but most consonant to Reason. 233  
IX. In Man's fellowship with other creatures, and his excellency above them. 234  
X. A very child require's the satisfaction of his Will. 236 

A man's will satisfied with no worldly goods, whether bodily, sensual, or intellectual. ibid.    
XI. His knowledge is defective, and cannot do it. 237 

Nor ought else which is not infinite, and that infinite is God. 238  
Riches do it not, which bring with them an impatient covetousness of getting more, when men have most. 239    
XII. Man hath some imperfect knowledge of God in this life; 240 

None positively of his eminencies, but by revelation. 241  
What Faith does toward it. 242  
What Dreams, Visions, Ecstacies, etc. ibid.    
XIII. The several parts acted by the Understanding and the Will, both which faculties are imperfect in this world. 243  
XIV. The certainty of felicity after death resumed and proved. ibid.  
XV. The Objection answered, touching Man's felicity in the knowledge, etc. he hath, though imperfect. 245 

A second Objection answered, about eternal felicity, being the last Article of our Faith. 246  
The same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason. 247  
An Argument to confirm this drawn from the holy Martyr's constancy in their sufferings. ibid.  
Mr. Hobbes suspected of a design, to disparage the foresaid Article of our Faith. 248      


CHAP. XXIX.  
I. Several qualifications, good and bad, in the making and breaking Covenants. 249  
II. No damage without injury. 250  
III. The explication of Commutative and Distributive Justice; 251 

To which is premised that of common or legal Justice. 252  
Many acts of Justice being not comprehended under the other two. 253    
IU. Argument 1. against an Arithmetical proportion in Commutative Justice examined. 254 

By what the price of any thing may be enhanced. ibid.  
The Asse's head and kab of Pigeon's dung in the siege of Samaria. 255  
When the Arithmetical proportion must be applied to the value of the thing. ibid.    
V. Argument 2. against it answered. 256 

A Judge or Umpire limited by the rule of Justice. ibid.    
VI What may be due by both kinds of justice, without covenant. 257  
VII. The justice of an arbitrator different, according to the case. 259 

Mr. Hobbes too nice and singular in his language. ibid.  
His mistake in the division of justice; 260  
In his measure of commutative. ibid.  
His boldness in confronting all the learned men before him. ibid.  
Bodin's cavil; ibid.  
His a●ery conceit of an harmonical proportion. 261    
VIII. Mr. Hobbes' restraint of Moral Philosophy. ibid.  
IX. His censure of all Philosophers. 262 

He forgets the distinction of a good man and a good citizen. ibid.  
The foundation of Ethics, Economics, Politics. ibid.    
X. Personal and relative perfection how taught by Philosophers. 263 

Mr. Hobbes' Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus; ibid.  
With that of Lucretius. 265  
Epicurus' excellent discourse concerning Death, ibid.  
Frugality, and Temperance. 266  
Mr. Hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the Epicureans, then do the mahometans. 267    
XI. Wherein the Stoics placed humane happiness; ibid. 

Wherein Aristotle. 268    
XII. Mr. Hobbes mistakes the Philosopher's discourse of moderating Passions. ibid. 

St. Paul's Philosophy. 269    
XIII. Of Fortitude and Liberality. 270    


CHAP. XXX.  
I. Mr. Hobbes' definition of a Person too circumstantial; 272  
II. No less applicable to a feigned then a true person. 273  
III. Person not Latin. ibid. 

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, suppositum. 274  
Person differently used in several arts and faculties; ibid.    
IV. Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes. 275 

No man personate's himself. ibid.  
Cicero misinterpreted. ibid.  
Person how taken by the Critics. 276    
V. Boethius' definition of a person; ibid. 

Rich. de sancto Victore object's against it. ibid.  
His other definition of it more difficult. 277  
Scotus' Objections against the former. ibid.    
VI The definition explained and vindicated by the Bishop. 278 

The distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut quo. ibid.  
Reasonable, of what extent. 279  
The Philosophers and Schoolmen could have rectified Mr. Hobbes' mistake of a person. ibid.  
The Etymology and common acception of Persona. 280    
VII. Not the actor, but the acted, is the person. ibid.  
VIII. No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature; 281 

With whomsoever any such is made, it must not be kept. ibid.    
IX. The first part of Mr. Hobbes' answer destroy's the second. 282 

God to be obeyed before Man; ibid.  
An instance in the Hebrew Midwives; ibid.  
Wh●, probably, had covenanted. 283    
X. No breach of covenant which had not a right to bind. 284  
XI. The true God improperly, and overboldly, said to be personated. ibid. 

Moses, though instead of God, did not personate him. 285  
Nor do Kings. ibid.  
Nor Priests. ibid.    
XII. How Moses was instead of God to Aaron. 186 

Hohim used for God, what name. ibid.  
How Moses was made a God to Pharaoh. ibid.  
How fully soever Moses had represented God, he could not personate him. 287    
XIII. The Israelites how the people of God, & how of Moses. 288  
XIV. Moses' phrase shows he personated not God. 289  
XV. God was King of the Israelites, Moses but their Judge and General; ibid. 

A messenger and mediator betwixt God and them. 290      


CHAP. XXXI.  
I. Uncomely to say, our Saviour personated God; 291 

Who was really God; ibid.    
II. Proved to be so from Acts 20.17. & 28. 292 

Against Bernardinus Ochinus, 293  
Refuted by Smiglecius. ibid.  
To whom Smalcius replies, having either not read, or not aright understood Ochinus; 294  
Ochinus deserted by the Socinians. ibid.  
Smalcius attempts in vain to evacuate the Divinity of Christ. 295    
III. Ch●ist's blood not to be called the blood of the Father, according to Smiglecius. 297 

Smalcius' answer that argue's how it may; ibid.  
His argument u●ged to the farthest by the Bishop. 298  
Who finds, the passions, not the actions of men, to be called God's. ibid.  
The shifting Genius of the Socinians deluded by a single word. 299  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated. ibid.  
The Text, which vows it, retorted upon the Socinians. 300    
IU. How Christ is the Son of God. 301 

What a Son is. ibid.    
V. The particulars in the definition applied to our Saviour. 302  
VI. The mystery of our Saviour's divine and humane generation signified Mic. 5.2. 303 

The Bishop's observation upon that Text; ibid.  
Faustus Socinus answered. 304  
And Valkelius; 305  
With other of the Socinians. 307    
VII. The Text taken in pieces and vindicated from their Objections; 308 

One in essence plurally expressed, when the effects are divers. 309  
Christ's eternal Egression compared to the shining of the Sun. 310    
VIII. How from the beginning may signify from eternity. 311 

A twofold consideration of the word Beginning. 312  
A or Ab often denote causations. ibid.  
From the beginning not to be understood, from the beginning of D●vid's reign. ibid.  
The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto. 313    
IX. God's descent to Man's capacity in the doctrine of his Attributes; 314 

Particularly that of his Eternity. ibid.    
X. The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishop; 315 

Who enlargeth upon the Argument against the Photinian or Socinian, and the Arrian. 316      


CHAP. XXXII.  
I. The next name of our Saviour, the Word. 318 

Socinus answered in his explication of St. John. Chap. 1. ibid.  
The opinion of Ebion and Cerinthus discussed; 319  
The shifts of the Socinians. 322    
II. St. John's reason of his writing not solitary, as Socinus allegeth. ibid. 

Beza's genuine lection; 323  
Socinus singular in his, ibid.  
But for a little consonance with Tremelius. ibid.    
III. How the Socinians interpret John 1.1. 324 

With reference to the Baptist's preaching. ibid.    
IV. Their Metaphor; And Metonymy, 325  
V. Figures never used by Christ without intimation how the Text is to be understood; ibid. 

So that of a Vine; A Shepherd; A Door; 326  
His Metonymies of being the Truth, Life, and Resurrection, ibid.  
The Truth and Life may be taken without a figure. 327    
VI. Christ called the Word according to none of those figures; 328 

But, according to the Catholic sense, is the internal word of God. 329  
How Aaron was Moses' mouth; ibid.  
John Baptist called a Voice. ibid.  
The word taken for Christ in a far different sense, 330    
VIII. Not to be understood of our Saviour's humanity, 331 

Neither Metaphorically; Nor Metonymically. ibid.    
IX. Socinus' shift 332  
X. A brief Paraphrase on the first words in St. John. ibid. 

A word internal and external both of God and Man. 333    
XI. The Philosophers of old called the Son of God his word; 335  
XII. As well they who writ after, as who before St. John. 336  
XIII. Which is yielded by Socinus; ibid.  
XIV. Their language used by the Primitive Fathers and Saint Paul; 337 

That of Plato consonant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John. 338  
Plato's description of Heaven paralleled to that of St. John in his Revelation. ibid.    
XV. The words Being with God signify more then Known to God, against Socinus and his followers. 340 

Eternal life, before Christ's Incarnation, known to the Angels, blessed Souls, Prophets, Philosophers. 341  
Although not till afterward manifested to others. 342  
The Philosophers excel the Socinians in this knowledge. ibid.    
XVI. Socinus' other Text of no validity to his purpose. 343  
XVII. The Discourse resumed concerning knowledge of the word before the preaching of St. John Baptist. ibid.  
XVIII. Whether in the Socinian, or Catholic, sense may be more truly said, The word was God. 345  
XIX. God, with them, no proper name, but an Appellative, etc. 346 

Contrary to the use of it (single) throughout the New Testament. ibid.    
XX. How Satan is called the God of this world, etc. 347 

How the Belly, God. ibid.  
The Socinians criticism about the article, ibid.  
Answered. 348  
And Socinus' Instances. ibid.  
How St. cyril's rule is to be understood. ibid.    
XXI. Socinus answered about Tautology. 349 

As likewise to that objection, God cannot be with himself. 350  
Lord and God not both one. 351  
The Word God with, though not of, the Father. ibid.      


CHAP. XXXIII.  
I. The Socinians conceit of the Word being with God in the beginning. 352  
II. Improbable, having no Evangelical authority; 353  
III. That they pretend to proves it not. ibid. 

The distinction of Christ's Divinity and Humanity illustrated; ibid.  
His Ascent into heaven, which they insist on, not corporeal; 354    
IU. His double capacity of Priest and Layman, alleged by them, discussed; 356  
V. How all things we made by him. 357 

St. John's method very considerable against the Socinians interpretation; ibid.  
Which is such, as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions, opposite to those in holy Scripture. 358    
VI Christ's interest in the Creation reinforced against the Socinians gloss; 359 

Wherein he was a principal, no bare instrumental cause. ibid.  
Their other slight objection answered. 360  
The use of words. ibid.  
The benefit of Tradition. ibid.    
VII. How Life eternal, and what else, is to be understood, ver. 4. 361 

How both that, and the natural life, is said to be the light of men. ibid.  
How Christ is called the light, according to Socinus; 362  
How, according to the Bishop. ibid.    
VIII. What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies properly, and why rendered was. ibid. 

Why the Evangelist chose to use it, rather than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, writing of St. John Baptist. 363    
IX. Socinus put's a diminution upon St. John's testimony of Christ; ibid. 

Which is evidently affirmative of his Divinity. 364    
X. Socinus misinterpret's Creation by Recreation or Regeneration; 365 

And misapplie's to his purpose a Text in the Epistle to the E●hesians. 366  
Another violence of his in wresting actual Regeneration to Regeneration in endeavour. 367    
XI. Smalcius' gloss; ibid. 

His various significations put upon the word [World.] ibid.  
Where●n he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader. 368  
The Bishop's Animadversions. 369    
XII. Their sense directly opposite to that evident in the Text. 370  
XIII. The genuine sense of the Terms, not changed, as they object. 371 

Smalcius' reply to Smiglecius, ibid.  
Little becoming a Socinian. 372  
The World knew not the Word, but by supernatural grace. ibid.  
What men apprehend of God by natural abilities. ibid.  
The Objection about St. John's upbraiding the world answered. 373  
The exposition of the words immediately following why omitted. 374    
XIV. The Socinians word could not be made Flesh, ibid. 

Their evasion. 375  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, how used in the beginning of St. John's Gospel. ibid.  
Their heterodox interpretation of Flesh, ibid.  
Not evident in Scripture, cited by Socinus. 376  
The result of their Comment; 177  
The sum of ours. ibid.    
XV. The union of the Divinity with the Humanity implieth no mutation of God into Man, 378 

Notwithstanding the praedication, God is Man. ibid.  
Which is asserted, and by a familiar instance illustrated. ibid.  
Their Objection answered by the dependence of substances upon God. ibid.  
Another Argument of Smalcius'. 379  
Answered by the manner of existing. ibid.  
Christ a true man, though a divine Person; 380  
Whose Conception and Gestation in the blessed Virgin's womb conduced nothing to his personality. ibid.  
The Divinity and Humanity united render him neither two Sons, nor two Persons. ibid.    
XVI. Objection, of his being the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost. 381 

Answer, which identity implie's not that they were made flesh with him; ibid.  
As Scotus illustrate's excellently. 382  
The Bishop's Apology to the Reader. ibid.    
XVII. Smalcius' first Quaere, etc. Rectified; Answered. 383 

All actions not always necessarily according to the nature of him, or that, which act's. ibid.  
Smalcius' second Quaere; Answered and frustrated. 384  
His third Quaere; Answered, with reference to the discourse before concerning the Incarnation of the Father and holy Ghost. ibid.    
XVIII. Our Saviour's mission derogates nothing from the authority and plenitude of power in himself. 385 

Which he exercised in giving commission to his Apostles. 386      


CHAP. XXXIV.  
I. The Socinians opinion of the holy Ghost, 387 

Confuted, and this proved, that he is a distinct Person of the Trinity, not a mere Attribute of the Deity; ibid.    
II. Not the Gospel of Christ, as they pretend out of holy Scripture; 389  
III. Not the gift of God to certain men, but by a figure. 390 

A defiance to them that call for reason in these mysteries. 391      


CHAP. XXXV.  
I. Carthagena's little less than then blasphemous limiting God's power of enlarging the capacity of his Creature. 392  
II. What of God to be proved by reason, and by whom to be attempted. 393  
III. Aquinas' first Argument against the possibility to attain by natural reason any knowledge of the Trinity. 394 

The Bishop's Answer grounded upon Lully's demonstration by aequiparance, ibid.    
IV. Aquinas' second Argument. 395 

The Bishop's first Answer concerning the invisible objects of Faith. ibid.  
The Bishop's second Answer concerning the after-sight of Reason. ibid.  
His third Argument from scorn and scandal. 396  
Answered by the adherence to infallibility of Scripture. ibid.    
V. Trigosius and Carthagena passed by. ibid. 

Truth not opposed to Truth. ibid.  
The Bishop closeth with Raymund Lul, whom he vindicateth against Vasques. 397  
And Aymericus, who makes him an heretic. ibid.  
His advice to the Pope and Cardinal about converting the Saracens. 398  
His devout enterprise according to it, with success. ibid.  
His like adventure among the Moors. ibid.  
Their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance. 399  
The notable effect of his sufferings. ibid.    
VI Lully's undertaking, according to Vasques; ibid. 

Whose Arguments he recite's and formes. 400  
The first proves a personal plurality by concord; ibid.  
Another, from equality, distinction. ibid.  
Vasques' first Answer, excepting against the supposition of a real effective act in God. ibid.  
The Bishop's reply, that Lul not only supposed, but proved i●; ibid.  
His Lordship's explanation of Lully's sense by the necessity of God's acting somewhat from all eternity, or being idle, which could not be. 401    
VII. Vasques chargeth Lul with a mistake of a formal cause for an efficient; who is mistaken by him. 402 

And the cause proved no less efficient than formal. 403  
The discourse drawn into a perfect syllogism, proving the eternal plurality of persons by production. 404  
The Objection, urging that Angels cannot produce the like effect, answered. 405    
VIII. Vasques' satisfactory answer to Lully's arguments for his second Conclusion. 406 

The Bishop proceeds upon other grounds of his to prove the Trinity. ibid.  
God's infinite Simplicity and Unity. ibid.  
His spiritual faculties, Understanding and Will. ibid.  
Himself the infinite object of his Understanding, 407  
Which is eternally productive of his internal word; ibid.  
And that word substantial, the same with Himself. ibid.  
The Bishop guided to this discovery by Scripture, as the Wisemen by a Star. 408    
IX. God's will as fruitful by love, as his Understanding by knowledge; ibid. 

And so productive of a third Person, which is likewise God. 409    
X. Misprinted, XI. ibid.  
XI. These divine productions not to be multiplied, because infinite, by which an objection's answered. 410  
XII. The objection made by the Assertors of the Greek Church answered, according to the sense of the Catholic, touching the procession of the holy Ghost; 411 

Illustrated by a similitude, to facilitate in part our apprehension of it. ibid.    
XIII. How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father, Son, and holy Spirit. 412  
XIV. Why they are called three persons, being no Scripture-language, and how, long ago, debated by St. Augustine. 414 

The extent or limits of this personal distinction the Bishop reverently forbears to determine; 415  
And dislike's the rash curiosity of the Schoolmen. 416    
XV. His Lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason, ibid. 

And seldom quoting the Fathers. 417  
A digression to the Reader. ibid.      


CHAP. XXXVI.  
I. Select Aphorisms out of which the Author (who apologizeth for Mr. Hobbes) draw's his discourse. 418 

A good foundation of his to build upon. 419  
His noble Quaere. ibid.    
II. Animadversions upon his ambiguous sense, touching the conservation of life. ibid.  
III. His study of it as to his own particular. 420 

All men may not have like reason to be so intent. ibid.  
The parts and faculties of men not to be levelled with those of beasts. 421  
The public interest to be preferred and preserved before the personal, or more private. ibid.    
IU. What right a man hath to the means of preserving life, and how he is to use them. 422  
V. Each particular ma● cannot pretend a right to the whole world; 423 

Nor to things conducing only to mediate and particular ends. 424    
VI. The danger of pretending a right to all, and to having a right judgement of it. 425 

Two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time. 426  
All cannot be useful to one particular person; ibid.  
Nor every thing to every one; 427  
Of which no right judgement can be made for want of knowledge; ibid.  
The use of some known interdicted to whom hurtful. ibid.    
VII. Other rules, by which to institute a right judgement, beside Reason. 428 

How all creatures are granted to man's use limited. ibid.  
His impossible supposition. ibid.  
His fallacy a bene divisis, etc. 429    
VIII. The equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all. 430 

The case of necessity implye's no such universal right. ibid.    
IX. Nor the dissolution of any Commonwealth. 431  
X. An Objection framed by the Author; 432 

A second of his not so strong; ibid.  
The first but weakly answered by him without regard to God's end. ibid.    
XI. His first argument for universal right returning, extreme necessity. 433 

The Bishop's several answers to it; ibid.  
His second argument for ancient right in a lawful defence. 434  
How the force or invalidity of this argument may be understood, and how the practice moderated. ibid.    
XII. His Objection and Answer. 435 

The Bishop's Animadversions showing the difference between just defence and unjust invasion, and stating the right of possession. ibid.  
Fear entitles a man to nothing but a guard of himself. 436  
Propriety without Covenant. ibid.  
The right to goods gotten by conquest what, ibid.  
Th● Bishop's answer from the fallibility of judgement. 437    
XIII. His [the Apologist's] argument against the right of Occupancy, ibid. 

Which the Bishop shows to hold well against Covenant. ibid.  
What is the right in necessity. ibid.  
Discovery give's not an equal right with Occupancy. 438  
The imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case. ibid.  
The Author's two Propositions destructive to humane Society; 439  
And Trade. ibid.  
The difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates. ibid.  
Little peace to be expected, if that of Occupancy be not allowed. 440       

The Texts of Holy Scripture illustrated or cited.  
GEN. Chap. Verse Page 1 28 181 29 4 3, 4 126 4 9 184 4 26 125 6 5 129   185 9 1, 2. 186 3, etc. 208 9 26 440 9 27 44 188 10 14 305 12 14 161 15 etc. 13 3 156 4 5 13 7 143 8 9 17 6 305 19 4 183 5 etc. 20 2 161 3 etc. 23 3 162 4 &c 32 10 309 40 5 71 41 1 ib. EXOD. 1 15 282 16 etc. 4 16 329 4 36 286 7 1 ibib. 7 1 330 20 2 288 22 28 286 32 7 288 32 11 290 LEVIT. 24 11 289 12 etc. NUMB. 15 35 290 36 etc. DEUT. 9 12 288 JUDGES 4 17 156 I. SAM. 17 36 270 26 7 ibid. I. KINGS 21 9 145 II. KINGS 6 25 255 JOB. 10 5 314 19 25 338 26 PSAL. 2 7 334 10 6 ibid. 14 1 92 19 1 115 3 4 36 9 389 78 39 376 90 2 109 94 8 95 94 9 96 102 27 314 113 5 355 115 16 185 142 6 245 PROV. 1 20 309 ECCLES. 5 3 72 ISAIAH 4 6 376 6 3 344 40 3 329 55 9 306 11 312 JER. 17 5 376 DAN. 2 1 71 3 16 247 MIC. 5 2 303 315 ZACH. 2 8 298 13 7 316 MAL. 3 4 306 312 WISD. 11 20 104 13 5 116 II. MACCA. 7 2 247 3 etc. St. MATTH. 1 20 71 3 3 330 3 11 364 3 16 387 390 3 17 334 7 2 146 10 1 386 17 11 358 18 18 298 25 45 ibid. 28 18 386 19 20 St. MARK 13 23 258 St. LUKE 2 32 344 2 52 343 3 4 330 3 22 383 3 38 105 12 19 239 12 33 ibid. St. JOHN 1 1 318 324 328 408 1 2 352 1 3 357 1 4 361 1 5 362 1 6 ib. 1 7 363 1 9 378 1 10 365 1 11 299 374 1 14 ibid. 1 17 378 1 18 346 1 23 330 1 29 364 3 12 355 3 13 354 355 4 25 358 8 58 111 10 11 326 10 34 346 35 348 12 3 347 13 15 362 14 4 326 6 14 26 358 15 1 326 17 3 338 18 37 385 19 28 358 20 21 385 20 23 385 398 20 29 120 20 31 322 ACTS 2 24 247 2 36 350 11 2 320 15 1 ibid. 2 etc. 16 9 71 20 17 292 20 28 ib. 28 2 149 ROME 1 5 136 1 10 87 1 18 128 21 1 19 334 20 2 15 158 334 4 13 369 4 18 136 19 16 29 ibid. I. COR. 2 8 354 2 10 388 2 14 372 6 18 299 6 20 300 8 5 346 348 8 6 ibid. 9 28 269 12 4 390 15 50 372 II. COR. 1 22 390 3 6 389 4 4 347 5 1 242 12 4 242 GAL. 5 24 269 EPHES. 1 14 390 2 10 365 PHIL. 3 19 347 3 20 242 II. TIM. 1 10 389 2 13 327 HEB. 1 3 408 1 10 109 11 12 2 5 378 9 12 356 11 1 242 12 1 247 I. PET. 3 20 388 21 II. PET. 3 13 378 I. Epist. St. JOHN 1 2 340 1 1 341 2 REVEL. 1 8 114 2 8 320 19 3 329 21 19 338 20 etc. 22 13 114   

Observations, Censures and Confutations, Of divers Errors in M R. HOBBES HIS LEVIATHAN: Chap. 1. & Chap. 2. Of Humane Nature.  

CHAP. I  
Of Sense, its cause, etc. particularly of Sight.  

Sect. 1.  
I Let pass his Introduction, although very obnoxious to censure, and, first encounter his first Chapter, which seems to be the foundation of what follows, but how unfit to support such a heavy building, will appear in the examining. The Title of this Chapter is Of Sense, and he begins with a definition of the thoughts of Man single, which he saith (are, every one, representation, or appearance, of some quality, or other accident, of a body without us called an Object. 
A man's thought something more than representation. ) In this observe his first mistake, that he makes a man's thought nothing but a representation, and he brings no proof for what he affirms, nor answers such objections as are brought by Philosophers against it; but, as if his Book were writ by him for the Novices of Pythagoras, and his authority were enough, he would have it swallowed without chewing; but that this is true in no thoughts of men, whether intellectual, or sensual, is most apparent to him who shall consider, that when a man sleeps, or indeed is attended upon other business waking, although both visible and audible objects are presented to him, yet he thinks not of them, nor discerns them; so that a man's thought is more than a representation. And to him who shall answer, that this is for lack of attention, I object, he confutes himself, for then thought is not only a representation, but something more, a cogitation of that man, which is an act of the soul; and certainly, as he himself phraseth it, the thought of man is an act of man's, but this representation is an act merely of the object, and therefore cannot be the thought of man: It is true, that in every thought of man there is something appearing, but man's thought is not that apparition, but the apprehension of that appearance, and some way or other some judgement of it; the original or first thought is sense, concerning which, he consents with the stream of Philosophers, that nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu, one way or other. But here he citys another Book, where he hath written more at large of this matter; I shall apply myself to both, that is named Humane Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy, chap. 2. But because I find some things in one, which are not in the other, errors enough in both, I shall treat of them apart, and first of this piece of Leviathan.   

Sect. 2.  
Here first he undertakes to set down the cause of Sense, as if it had but one (as indeed, by his Philosophy, 
Pressure of the heart, or brain, made by the external object, not the true cause of sense.  it might seem to have) this cause he makes to be the external object, which presseth the Organ, proper to each sense, etc. this pressure he follows to the brain and heart, (I wonder which way from the eye, or ear, it gets to the heart,) there this pressure caused a resistance, or counter-passion, or endeavour of the heart to deliver itself, (mark now, the brain, which doubtless is the fountain of sense, is left out) which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without; consider the strange uncouthness of this language; if there be such an endeavour which universally cannot be true, yet this endeavour is inward, although that which presseth it be put out; like a man who thrusteth another out of doors, that endeavour to thrust him out is within, although the man be thrust out, all his endeavour must be within, unless he follow him out of doors, which I think he will not affirm of the brain, or heart. Secondly, consider that it is impossible that the heart, or brain, should be so displeased with all apparitions, although they press them, as to endeavour to be delivered of them; for there are some things of this nature, as sweet Music, Taste, Beauties in visible objects, in all senses some objects so grateful to the Organ, yea, heart, or brain, yea all, that they cannot choose but delight in them, yea hug and embrace them with all kindness; if so, why should they endeavour to expel them? yes, (he may say) because they press them: I ask, how do the brain or heart discern that pressure? All discerning is either by sense or understanding, no understanding before sense, it must therefore be discerned by sense, and then sense must be before there be any sense, for he makes sense not to be, until that which pressed be thrown out: These are unheard-of discourses amongst Philosophers; but his opinions do confute that saying, Nihil dictum quod non fuit dictum prius; and therefore I must be excused for producing new objections to such opinions; consider then that last clause of the former sentence, (which endeavour, being outward, seemeth to be some matter without) First, I have showed the endeavour must be inward; next, let us consider how this endeavour can appear to be somewhat without; according to him, this endeavour expelled that which pressed the brain or heart, but which way can this endeavour look like some matter without? I am confident that neither any other, nor he himself understands what he writ, but he would write somewhat to amuse a Reader; if he had said, the expelled Species, or I know not what he calls it, that which pressed did seem to be some matter without, it had looked like reason, although but like it; but to say, the endeavour did seem to be some matter without, was a strange kind of unreasonable speech; but he goes on, and I mean to follow him close.   

Sect. 3.  

Not seeming, but some action, must be sense.  (And (saith he) this seeming or fancy is that which we call sense, and consisteth, as to the eye, in light or colour, etc.) this seeming, to what doth it seem? that which seems, seems to somewhat, either the soul, or the powers of the soul, the organs, or heart, or brain; now if it seem so to any Agent whatsoever, that act on which apprehends this seeming, must be the sense, not the seeming itself: (This seeming (saith he) to the eye, 
Sight consisteth not in light or colour figured.  consisteth in light or colour figured,) if so, then, say I, it is true, that light or colour, figured, is sight; for when we say, a thing consists in any thing, we mean to express its nature; but to say, that sight is light, or colour figured; or that light and colour figured, is sight, is as much as ●o say, the understanding is a horse; or a horse the understanding; or understanding consists in a horse, because it is busied about it: It is true, understanding of a horse, doth require the being of a horse, or else it could not understand it; and sight doth require light, or colour figured, but it cannot be said to consist in it, but as an object. He proceeds [All qualities, called sensible, are in the object, that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth our Organs diversely.] I will let pass this, because I shall have full occasion to speak of it in the second part, concerning his Element of Policy: He goes on, (neither in us are they any thing but divers motions (for motion produceth nothing but motion) but their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking or dreaming.)  
Here is an Aphorism (as if it were undeniable) but without any proof or reason of it to be received by the Reader, without examining for his authority; 
Motion begets somewhat beside motion.  the Axiom is; That motion begets nothing but motion; a speech far from all truth in Philosophy; for were it not that there is an aim at quiet, there would scarce be any motion, Finis belli Pax, the end to which, and the end for which it is; but to say, it produceth nothing but motion, is against all the experience in the world; for although in some, and most motions, it may be said, that the effect is not produced by the power of the motion, but the virtue of that Agent which operates by motion, and whose instrument that motion is; yet that way that motion doth produce any thing, all things are produced by motion, Substances, Men, Beasts, Trees, Accidents, Colours, Quantities, Places, all whatsoever; but all these things are not motions, yea, this last, which is Place, and in which motions, and the effects of motions, are most sensibly discovered, is so far from being motion, that in our sublunary places there can be no motion in them, but only motions to them; nor can they themselves be locally moved, for the place of every thing is the Ambient Superficies: Now that, with us, is either of Air or Water, and if a man stir in any place, he acquires a new place, and altars the old, so that in that place he stirs not, and you cannot remove the Ambient Aire or Water, but it altars his condition; so that unless he conceive that all things are motion, it cannot be true, that motion begets nothing but motion, for motion produceth all sublunary things. When he writ his Leviathan, there was motion, but this Leviathan, I hope, is not motion; it may, perhaps, in needless Readers, cause motion and commotion, but certainly it lies still under my paper at this time, and will do all this night. This is the strangest Proposition that ever was obtruded upon men, but I desist from it at this instant, perhaps to enlarge hereafter, although I think this abundantly enough. Where he adds, that their appearance to us is fancy, I deny it, but that act which discerns the appearance, may in some sense be called fancy, I grant. What he adds afterwards, 
Philosophy Schools, and Universities, how necessary to Christendom.  concerning the pressure of the eye, etc. I refer to another place, but mean not to lose it. At the latter end he censures all the Philosophy Schools throughout Christendom, but he is not so severe against them, as to wish them an utter extirpation; he will hereafter reserve a room and office for them in the Commonwealth; but he lets us see, by the way, what things (when he is made Visitor General of all Christendom) would be amended. In the mean time I shall show this use of Universities, that there may be always a certain company of learned men in all Professions, by whom, as by a Standard, all dangerous Doctrines may be tried, whether they be Orthodox, or useful to the Commonwealth, or no; which censure I am confident his Leviathan will never abide. And now I will examine this same business of Sense, as it is set down more at large in the second Chapter of his Humane Nature; Chapter 2. censures the 2. Chapter of Humane Nature.    

CHAP. II.  
Concerning the object of Sight, Colour, Image or Species, etc.  

Sect. 1.  
UPon which my first observation is, that although in the head, or contents, of this Chapter, there is put the definition of sense to the 2. number; yet in that 2. number, nor elsewhere in that Chapter, is there any definition of Sense; but in that number, only some little discourse of the outward cause of Sense wrought by the object; which is most illogically done, and, for lack of defining, he disputes most perplexedly every where. I will not trouble the Reader with censuring every line, but because that which is material in this Chapter consists in four propositions, which he undertakes to prove, I will content myself with an enquiry into them.  

Whether the subject, wherein colour is, be to be the object.  1. The first is, that the subject wherein colour and Image are inherent, is not the object of things seen. This he proves, because numb. 5. (every man hath so much experience, as to have seen the Sun, or other visible objects, by reflection in the water, and the Glasses; and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion, that colour and Image may be there where the thing seen is not.) I stop here, and will first examine the proposition itself, which is proposed with much deceit, for he saith, The subject wherein colour and Image are inherent, is not the object. He should have proved first, that colour and Image are the same, which he knows is denied by all his adversaries; colour is in the object of Sight, but there is no need of the Image, where the substance is, nor can the Image of colour be in the same subject with the colour.   

Sect. 2.  
This uniting such things, as are in their nature distinct, breeds a mighty confusion in the discourse, and so dazzles a weak sight, that it can hardly discern betwixt them. 
Colour is in the object.  I say then, that colour is in the object, but Image is not. Next I come to his proof, the appearance of the Sun by reflection, by which he would have proved, that colour and Image are not in the object: but it doth not prove that the colour is not in the object, but only the Image, for the colour remains in the object, when the Image and likeness is gone abroad.   

Sect. 3.  
But he urgeth again, that divers times men see the same object double, 
Whence it is that we s●e the same ●bject double.  as two candles for one, which may happen by distemper, or otherwise without distemper, if a man will, the organs being either in their right temper, or equally distempered. Not to trouble the Reader with my transcribing all, I answer to this, that this double sight may be two ways, either by a distemper of the Organ, or by a false reflection in the medium. The first I have had, and have been cured by Physic; The second is easy, for there may be multiplying glasses, and many such instruments, which many deliver the species double, and then the colour, or object, must appear such: but here is no reason to prove, that the colour is not in the object, because Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis; if the eye be indisposed, it must needs follow, that the species shall be qualified accordingly; And for the medium, or middle place, or mean, which transports the species ●o the eye, it must needs be, that the liquor will taste of that tap out of which it runs; that every story is enlarged or lessened, multiplied or diminished, according to the affection or disposition of the deliverer, and so the indisposition of the medium varying the species, it must needs be, that the colour must appear such, although it be other; but he proves his conclusion thus [one of these Images therefore is not inherent in the object] See here the fallacy put in his proposition at the first, 
The Image or Species not in the object.  Confounding colour, and the Image of it: It is true, the Image, or species (for I will maintain that word) is not in the object, but the colour is; and where he says, one is not in the object, I say neither is, but the colour of which that is an Image, which he in this place doth labour to infringe; and therefore as his Proposition was fallacious, so his proof is vain. And I think I have said enough to this Proposition.   

Sect. 4.  
His second is, That there is nothing without us (really) which we call an Image, or colour. 
Where it is by reflection.  This Proposition is short, and his proof as short, thus numb. 6 Secondly, that the Image of any thing by reflection in glass, or water, or the like, is not any thing in or behind the Glass, or in or under the water, every man may grant to himself, which is the second Proposition. Here you may observe how the former fallacy runs through the whole discourse. His Proposition was, that there was nothing without us, which we call Image or colour: In his proof he disputes only of Images by reflection, not at all of colours; so that, were his argument true, yet it proved not his conclusion, because it proves not, 
Mr. Hobbs' fallacy.  that colours are not without us; but his argument is false, his antecedent as well as consequence; the Image is in the Glass, as appears, for else from the Glass it could not be multiplied to the eye; the Image is there, but the colour is the object; the Image is first in the glass, and from the glass, by removing or multiplying itself, it comes to the eye; and what he says will be granted, is impossible for him that hath eyes, and sees the Image there.    

CHAP. III.  
Image and Colour what: The effect of violent strokes upon the eye: The apparition of Light, motion of Fire, working of the Sun, etc.  

Sect. 1.  
HIs third proposition is, (that the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain or spirit, or some internal substance of the head.) Here is a tedious Proposition, and there is a tedious proof of it; to avoid confusion therefore, I will take this proposition into some pieces, and examine them apart, and then overthrow his proof.   

Sect. 2.  
First, I observe the old fallacy, Image or colour, 
Image what.  both put as one, and the same, but it is false in both, to say that either of them is but an apparition unto us of the motion, which the object worketh in the brain. First for Image, etc. All Images certainly are the apparitions of those things whose Images they are, the Image of a horse, is the apparition of a horse, for they are the apparitions of such things as they make appear, and they make these things, and these things only appear, whose Images they are: Now these visible species make red and green coloured things appear, to wit, the object, not the motion of the brain; which without doubt can have none of these colours.  
For although it is possible to be conceived, 
The apparition of the object, not of the motion.  that from these Images, conveyed to the brain, the brain may receive some likeness of the object, yet that likeness represents, and is the apparition of the object, not the brain. But then to say, it is the apparition of this motion, is ridiculous; it is true, motion, because a thing known, hath its apparitions, it could not be known else, but that is a distinct apparition; as the nature of motion is distinct from other things, so must its apparition be; but to say that all these Images are apparitions of motions, is as much as if he should say, that the apparition of any thing which is quiet, and doth not move, were the apparition of a motion; yea the conceit which a man hath of rest itself, which is incompetible with motion, should be the apparition of its clean contrary, which is motion, and the conceit of the brain being quiet should be the conceit of the brains motion, than which nothing can be more abhorring both to sense and reason.   

Sect. 3.  

As is also Colour.  And then in the next place, colour is not an apparition of the motion, etc. which the object worketh in the brain, etc. His very phrase confutes it, for colour is the object, now if it be the object, it is not an apparition of the mo●ion which the object worketh. Again, colour is a permanent thing, an apparition of a motion is transient, as the motion is, and that motion he names is of little or no stay at all, most sudden. Again, if it be an apparition of such a motion, how came that motion to be green, yellow, blue? etc. either it hath it originally from itself, and then that motion hath colour in it; or else it hath it from the mover, which is the object, then how could the object make it of any colour, when by this Gentleman, it hath none? It cannot be therefore as he saith, that either colour or Image can be the apparition unto us of the motion which the object worketh.   

Sect. 4.  

Mr. Hobbes' Philosophy unconstant.  Secondly, observe how unconstant this gentleman's Philosophy is to himself. I noted before in his Leviathan, how he joined the heart with the brain in his production of sense, and presently after the heart alone: but here, clean contrary, he puts the seat of sense to be the brain, spirits, or some internal substance of the head; which contradictions seem to me most extremely strange in a man so cried up for learning, in a book so laboured, unless a man could think that, conceiving himself infallible, he should write Quicquid in Buccam venerit, what came next. I come now to his proof of his conclusion, which is Numb. 7.   

Sect. 5.  
[For the 3. we are to consider, first, th●t every great agitation, 
Sparks appearing upon a str●ke on the eye not from any concussion of the brain.  or concussion of the blain (as it happeneth from a stroke, especially if the stroke be upon the eye) where the Optic Nerve suffereth any great violence, there appeareth before the eye a certain light] I w●ll stop here, and examine it piece-meal. Could a man imagine such a perturbed discourse to come from so learned a man? He begins with a high language of a great concussion in the brain, which I wondered how he could fetch about, and exemplifies only, as it happens from a stroke, especially if the stroke be upon the eye. What proportion has a stroke upon the eye to a concussion of the brain? though some sparks (as I remember in my childhood, for I will not try those experiments now) though such sparks, I say, may appear after a stroke upon the eye, yet I cannot conceive why any such thing proportionable should happen from a concussion of the brain. 
From the crystalline humour▪ not the optic nerve.  He proceeds [which light is nothing without but an apparition only, all that is real, being the concussion or motion of that Nerve] For this instance, although it be not necessary, as you will see anon, yet, for satisfaction of the reader, I will set down my conceit of it, as I can remember the experiment of this great rule, Nosce teipsum, thus; That fire, light or sparks (for such it seemed to me) which after a great blow flasheth out of the eye, I conceive not to be any issue of the Optic Nerve, which is no way capable, in my judgement, of producing such an effect; but proceeds either from the white or crystalline humour, either of which may have a disposition to it, the crystalline humour, like such a light substance agitated in the dark, may chance to make a little flaring. For the white, as I have seen a very white Cat in the dark, or a very white Napkin, firm & stiff, struck in the dark, send out visible sparks, like those of fire, being, as I think, nothing but strong emission of species. Now the eye is utterly in the dark, for the present, upon such a blow, and therefore these little eruptions of its own light, quickly stopped by some opposition, may return themselves a spectacle to that eye out of which they came; what he saith, That this light is nothing without, I deny it, it is, as I expressed, the sparkling, not from the Nerve, but either the white or crystalline humour, or both; This is my conceit, and hath for its proof some Illustrations from other experiments, when his device of the optic Nerve hath no colour for what he affirms, nor can he show me any thing like it besides; but if he could, let him know, that it is a poor arguing for such a man, who despiseth University learning, to argue an universal conclusion concerning Sense, from a particular Instance, from a disturbed organ; we poor people, that have been only used to University learning, have a conceit amongst us, that that great Axiom, upon which all Philosophy, and perhaps Divinity too is founded, That sense is not deceived, when it is conversant about its proper object, must be understood of a right Medium, a well disposed organ, or else it may, yea, will be deceived, when either of these fail. For him therefore to draw an Aphorism from an experiment of sense, where the Organ is indisposed, must be so far from a good deduction, as a man would argue the contrary.   

Sect. 6.  
Let us consider next his Inference, which is this [from which Experience we may conclude, 
Mr. Hobbes illogical in hi● proofs.  that apparition of light is really nothing but motion within] Now suppose th●s to be granted him, it proves not his conclusion, which is, that colour or image is but an Apparition of motion, etc. There is much difference between these two propositions, first in their subjects, a great deal of difference betwixt colour and Image, which make the subject of his proposition to be proved, and light, which is the subject of this conclusion which he deduceth, for light is neither colour not image, but an illustration of both. 2ly. In the predicate, for an apparition of Motion is one thing, and Motion its self is another. Thus here is poor Logic in this argument, where there is no semblance, how this conclusion, set down here, is deduced out of the premises: first, it is absolutely naught (as I have showed) to prove an Universal conclusion, concerning sense, from a particular instance, and that instance from an indisposed Organ, and that instance itself no where offered to be proved; for where doth he prove, that that light is nothing without? where doth he prove, that all that is real in that light, is the concussion or motion, of the Optic Nerve? Now for a man to enforce a conclusion against all the Universities of Christendom, and all the reason of Philosophy out of Christendom, the Arabians and ancient Grecians, and not show any proof, or evidence, of his premises, was, as if, like another Mahomet, he would maintain his opinion by his sword, without which he hath no one argument.   

Sect. 7.  
But he makes another inference as impertinent as the former [If therefore (saith he) from lucide bodies there can be derived motion, so as to affect the Optic Nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto, there will follow an Image of light somewhere in that line, by which the motion was last derived to the eye] He hath one phrase here, which, 
His inference amiss.  leaving it, as he doth, unexplained, gives a great trouble to the understanding of this proposition, and that is [In such manner as is proper thereunto] what is this proper manner, he should have cleared, I am sure he making it an Inference, with a Therefore, out of the premises, we ought to conceive nothing but a violent stroke, which a lucide body at a distance cannot give, as will, I think, 
And so likewise his conclusion.  appear hereafter. But as his inference is amiss, so is his conclusion, there is no Image of light made by its shining, but of the light body the light itself is the medium, through which the Image of the lucide, or coloured body, is conveyed to the eye, but its self hath not an Image, nor is seen, as is evident; let light shine upon the water, 
Light shining upon the water.  if it come obliquely, or by the interposition of clouds, the body of the Sun or Moon, or any other lucide body, is not reflected, we see nothing but the bare water; and indeed if light in itself could terminate our sight, it could not be the proper means to convey colours to us, but would rather stop their progress, or else coloured pellucid-things, would deliver all things coloured like themselves, as coloured glasses; it is not true therefore that there would follow an Image of light, and, if it would, for the reasons before, that argues nothing for colour; and if there be an Image in the line spoke of, yet that is so far from proving that it is an Image of the motion, as it proves the clear contrary, it is an Image of light, and not of motion: for although, perhaps, he may say, it is an Image of light in motion, yet it is an Image of the light, not of the motion, which was his proposition to prove.   

Sect. 8.  
But he proceeds to explain himself, [That is to say, in the object, if we look directly on it, and in the glass or water, when we look upon it in the time of reflection, which in effect is the third proposition] consider first the coherence, he said before, that the Image was in the line, 
Mr. Hobbes' incoherence.  by which the object was last, etc. (mark now) that is to say, in the object or glass; you cannot say, that the object or glass were in the line, but one of the extreme terms of the line, and indeed not Terminus Initians, beginning, which, in some sense, may be said in the line; but Terminus à quo, the term from which the line takes its motion, which can in no sense be said to be in it: Then conceive that he saith, the Image is in the object, when we look directly upon it; which is most unreasonable, that the Image, and the thing imagined, should be in the same subject: Then conceive it to be affirmed of the Image of light, of which he spoke, the Image of that is no where, 
The image of light where.  as I have showed; itself indeed, as it is propagated, is Imago lucis, an Image of that light, which is inherent in some lucide bodies, as I have conceived, and if not, because I love not to multiply controversies, yet it is such a thing, which neither is, nor can be represented by any image, but only as it is incorporated into some body; so that a light body may be seen in a glass or water, but not light its self, neither in its self, or Image terminating our sight: Now (saith he) this in effect is the third proposition; but let a man put them together, and see which way these can prove, that Image and colour is but an apparition of motion, there is no appearance of proof. But he seems to proceed in proof of this cause, numb. 8. This number is very long, I will therefore take it in pieces.   

Sect. 9  
But (saith he) that from all lucide shining, illuminate bodies, there is a motion produced to the eye, and through the eye to the optic Nerve, and so into the brain, by which that apparition of light and colour is affected (I think it should be effected, is not hard to prove) This Proposition, if proved, conduceth not to the confirmation of the conclusion which he intends; the conclusion which he aims at is, that image and colour are an apparition of motion: Now here he says, he will prove that by this motion, 
Mr. Hobbes' illogical way of discoursing.  which he speaks of, the apparition of light and colour is effected; his Proposition is, that image and colour are apparitions of motion; he sets down to be proved, that by this motion there is an apparition of light and colour; Image and colour are the subject in one of the Propositions, and motion the predicate; motion the subject in the latter, and light and colour the predicate; in nothing the same, which is a most illogical way of discoursing, and extremely fallacious to any Reader, who, by this means, when he finds any thing proved, mistrusts that all is so, although he know not why: So it seems, if this were granted, it were not material; but let us see his proof.   

Sect. 10.  
And first (saith he) it is evident that the fire, the only lucide body upon earth, worketh by motion equally every way, insomuch as the motion of it stopped or enclosed, it is presently extinguished, and no more fire: He is not to be trusted, no not for that which he says he sees, for that which he says is evident, I am confident, to him that hath eyes, appears otherwise, that fire doth not work equally every way; for a candle, any fire that you ever looked on, consider whether it move not by its flame upwards; for although in a candle it necessarily creep downward for its sustenance, yet the motion of the fire is upward more than any other way, whether the endeavour it hath to propagate its like, which is innate in every thing, makes it follow the smoke, as a fit matter to be ignified and made fire▪ or a desire to ascend to the place of motion, as heavy things downward (which I am likely to vindicate from his scorn hereafter) whatsoever it is, that it is done, is evident, against that which he says is evident, that it moves equally every way.   

Sect. 11.  
Why he should say what follows I understand not, that is [in so much as the motion of it stopped, or enclosed, it is presently extinguished, and no more fire] for this no way proves or illustrates the equal motion of the fire; for first the hindering of the operation of the second acts, 
How fire is extinguished by enclosure.  doth not destroy the first, and essence of any thing; the stopping of the streams, doth not presently destroy the Fountain, but the taking away the Fountain dries the stream; and so it is betwixt the first act, which is the form of any thing, and the second, which are the operations. Now the hindering a man from discourse, which is a second act, doth not destroy his being and nature; to hinder or stop the motion of fire is such: And that which he saith, that it is presently extinguished, and no more fire, he must take that term (presently) in a very large sense, for a little time, for we see fire, raked up in embers, keeps its being many hours, yea days, without motion, but feeding upon its own bowels, and consuming away; but it is then ruined by enclosure, when no air is suffered to come to nourish it, or else some fumes, distilled down upon it, do suffocate it, as I say then, so I may add therefore, not because its motions are stopped or enclosed, for which he gives no reason, but because it lacks air to nourish it, or is suffocated, as before; yet suppose it were, this is done when the motion principally aims upward, no whit the more for its distending its self about: In my life I never read a reasonable man talk so unreasonably of sense.   

Sect. 12.  
He goes on [And further, that that motion, whereby the fire worketh is dilation and contraction of itself alternately, commonly called Scintillation, or glowing, is manifest also by experience. 
That it hath no positive contraction. ] There was never heard the like; did ever any man experimentally find such a motion? or was ever contraction called glowing or sparkling? the motion of fire is either that which is natural to inflame or ignifie the neighbouring body, or, what is in way to it, to heat and warm what is about it, and by that, and that, effect out of it exsiccation to prepare a matter for a form of fire, other motion I acknowledge none in fire; that which he calls contraction, I conceive to be nothing but when the smoke or ambient air supplies it not with a fit matter for a flame, then negatively it cannot break forth in that inflaming act, so far as it did before; but for a positive contraction, and withdrawing itself, I absolutely deny, for every natural Agent doth always work, quoad posse, as much, and as far as it can, with all its force, and therefore the fire always dilates, but never contracts, for lack of matter it cannot dilate as far as it did before, but it never contracts: Consider here how little credit is to be given to his words, who cries, it is evident, it is manifest, to those things which have no semblance of truth, nor doth he give them any probable proof, but only his authority to induce an assent.   

Sect. 13.  
He proceeds [From such a motion of the fire must needs a●ise a rejection, or casting from itself of that part of the medium, which is contiguous to it, whereby that part also rejecteth the next, and so successively] until at last he brings it through the Optic Nerve to the brain; 
No rejection of the contiguous medium.  I deny that fire hath this local motion (b●t if any be, it is upward only) the motion proper to fire is ignifying, and, in order to that, calefaction and exsiccation, that rejection or casting away of the air, and so driving the air before it to the eye, as he would make us conceive, is impossible, which I will thus demonstrate; Suppose two Beacons, twenty miles distant each from other, the Beacons both set on fire together, the watchman of either Beacon sees either fire; now if the motion by which the fire of each Beacon hath access to the eye of the watchmen, should be this rejection of the air he speaks of, these two airs, thus rejected, must needs meet in the medium, and in that local motion, being aerial bodies, encounter, and either stop each other, or one drive the other backward, and so it is impossible that both Beacons should be seen, because the rejection of the air to the watchers eye is either stopped in both, or at the least in one; so likewise should you put a body of glass betwixt the fire and your eye, that glass would hinder the motion of the air to your eye, but yet perhaps would enlarge the visibility of the fire, or, at least, the glass being transparent, the eye would see the fire, although the air came not at it. Thus you see an impossibility of this action in its first setting out, and his fancy of sense stifled in its birth, therefore there can no good be expected from it in the progress. But, lest I boast more than do, I will likewise examine that piece.   

Sect. 14.  
Having brought the stroke of the fire, as he conceives to the brain, 
No rebound from the brain to the Optic nerve.  he than saith (that the brain, by resistance or reaction, makes that motion rebound to the Optic Nerve, which we not conceiving as motion, or rebound from within, do think it is without, and call is light, as hath been already showed by a str●ak) Why he should so insist upon this strange, and, until by him, unheard of rebound, I cannot imagine; he gives no reason for it, nor do I think the subject is capable of any; certainly the eye itself is a most tender part, and apprehensive of a stroke from abroad, as well as from a rebound, and certainly the stroke is stronger coming from the fire immediately, then rebounding from the brain, neither is the brain a fit object to make a rebound, rebounds are made by hard and solid bodies, the strokes made upon beds, cushions, and the like, sink, and are lost in them; the rebound is scarce any thing, if any thing, but the brain is such. Now, as I have said before, there is no reason why the brain should expel every object; and again, it may be urged, that either the brain or the eye is the organ of this sense, (no man knows by his discourse what he will say) If the brain, why should it only then perceive the object when it rebounds to the Optic Nerve, and not whilst the stroke is within itself? If the eye be the organ, as certainly it is, why doth it not perceive the object before the rebound, as well as after; as it passeth to the brain, as well as when it cometh from it? I am persuaded he can answer nothing to this Dilemma; what he saith, that (we not conceiving as motion, or rebound from within, do think it is without) is true, if he affirm it of light or colour, as he doth, for we can learn from him no reason to the contrary, and all sense shows us the thing without, and therefore we conceive it such; what he speaks of his instance of a stroke, I have spoke to it before, but here add, that there is a mighty difference betwixt that violent motion, which he expresseth from a stroke upon the eye, which flasheth fire out of the eye, and this natural motion, which proceeding from the visible object, creeps into the eye by the sight of it: I can conceive the first may happen to a blind eye; such sparks, with a violent blow, may be beat out of it; I am confident, if his Philosophy were true, that it comes from the Optic Nerve, it may be done upon an eye that is blind, but this other passage of the object to the eye, is only by the sight, and cannot be where the eye is not fitted for vision.   

Sect. 15.  
His further Philosophy about the Sun, is as strange (methinks) when he says, (we have no reason to doubt, that the Fountain of light, the Sun, worketh any other ways then the fire, at least in this matter.) This matter is in vision I conceive, 
The Sun works not as Mr. Hobbes fancieth.  and that he would have the Sun work as he describes fire: but that will be hard to prove: For first, he must show that the Sun moves by dilation, and contraction: Secondly, that it hath ambient air, or some such easily moved body to be rejected by it: Thirdly, he must prove, that the Sun must so reject that body, as to make it pass through the inferior Orbs; or else he must deny that there are any Orbs, from all these things, which will be very difficult, and those things which I have objected against that motion of fire, the Sun must be vindicated from their opposition, before that conclusion will appear probable, that the Sun worketh, in this act of vision, according to his method before described; not but that I think the Sun and fire do both the same way make themselves appear to our eyes; but as it appeared untrue when it was affirmed of fire before, so that untruth appears more repugnant to reason, when applied to the Sun.   

Sect. 16.  
He proceeds [And thus all vision hath its original from such motion as is here described, for where there is no light, there is no sight, and therefore colour must be the same with light, as being the effect of the lucide bodies.] Thus he; but there were never read such (therefores) writ by a Scholar: How doth this Proposition, All vision hath its original from such motion, 
His independent inferences.  as is here described, arise out of this, where there is no light, there is no sight? There is no dependence of one of these upon the other, and as little in that which follows, and therefore colour also must be the same with light, as being the effect of the lucide body: do these things follow any of them? By this logic a man may argue, because heat and light are the effects of fire, therefore heat is light; when it is evident they are divers, and affect divers senses.   

Sect. 17.  
But I will bestow a little business about the conclusion, 
Light and colour two things.  as well as the deduction, and show that light and colour are two things, in which I mean first to prove his conclusion false, that colour or image are nothing but the apparition of that motion he speaks of. Secondly, that colour is a real thing in the object. And lastly, that it is a distinct thing from light.    

CHAP. IU.  
The apparition of colour, its reality, and difference from light.  

Sect. 1.  
ANd first, that colour or Image is not the Apparition of that Motion, I thus prove; 
Colour, or Image, not the apparition of motion, but of the object.  That which is the apparition of any thing, makes it appear in his own colours, as we speak.  
But this image or colour (I take them as he puts them down together) makes not that motion appear in its colours; ergo: 
2 Argument.   
The major is evident, for if a thing appear truly as it is, it appears in its own likeness, and with such colours as it hath, and unless it be a colour, this Image or colour, he speaks of, makes nothing appear.  
The minor I thus prove, If this image or colour make the motion appear in its colours, than that motion had colour before; but that he denies, for he makes colour to be nothing but the apparition of motion, and if colour or image be the apparition of that motion, that motion must have colour; because it makes the motion appear in nothing but colour, either it must have colour, or it cannot appear by colour, or the image of colour.  
Again, I can confute this his conclusion, thus; 
2 Argument.  That which is the apparition of any other thing, when that other is the same, then that is the same, and when that other varies or changes, that doth so likewise; but when the stroke or motion from the object is the same, the colour or image varies, and when that is divers, the image is the same, therefore it cannot be the apparition of that motion: The major is evident, for the apparition of any thing, is nothing but the showing of it as it is: The minor will be thus illustrated; Suppose two walls equally big, the one black, the other green, these equally strike the brain, the one as the other, but the image or colour represented is black or green, divers; but if any man shall object, that these do not equally strike the brain, I will let him make them equal in all things but the colour, and then they must equally strike, or if, not, the colour of the wall, not the motion in the brain, is that which only appears and makes the difference. Again, when the stroke is divers, sometimes the colour or image is the same; so if we should conceive the strength and difference of motions, we must needs think that solid and strong bodies should move and strike the eye harder than soft and gentle, yet they may easily appear of one colour; as we may see a Downbed, and a stone; either of these instances is enough to show, that colour or image is not the apparition of that motion, but of the object which makes that motion.   

Sect. 2.  

Colour a real thing in the object.  This I conceive, with what went before, may be abundantly enough for the confutation of his conclusion. And next I come, to my second Proposition, which is, That colour is a real thing in the object; to prove this, I shall use this medium; That which produceth real effects, is a real thing; but colour in the object produceth real effects; therefore, etc.  
The major hath its evidence from hence, that nothing can cause an effect nobler, 
1 Argument.  or more excellent than itself, which if colour, that is in the object, be not a real thing, it should do, when it produceth real effects. The minor may be demonstrated by many experiences, because some colours dissipate the Sunbeams, some congregate them, which are real effects: As for instance, take one of your ordinary Burning glasses, use all the art you can, it will not burn white paper or linen, they scatter the beams; but black, or colour the paper or linen, it will inflame it, and so much the easier, the nearer any colour comes to black, which will collect these beams; this is a sign undeniable, that there is some colour in that linen or paper which hath these effects. Again, some colours hurt the sight of the eye, as red, white, and light colours; some are grateful to it, as black or green, these are real effects, and every man's daily experience showeth them to be so.  
Secondly, 
2 Argument.  This may be proved from that operation it hath upon a man's eye; for since the stroke, which he conceives is made upon the eye, must needs be the same made by a white or black wall, as I have showed, or more close, the same wall now white, and anon souted or blacked, it cannot be that the divers species or Image, which is wrought in the eye, can proceed from any thing but that very Colour which is in the wall, because the diversity of the Image must needs argue some diversity of cause, which can be none but the colour of the object, upon examination of all other pretended causes, for that varying, the image altars; and that remaining the same, the image doth so likewise, and this so constant, that to all eyes, well disposed, it appears such, whatsoever they are, so the medium be not some way or other clouded; which must needs argue a certainty of causation to him, who in this very Proposition allows the object a causing virtue; because it is a motion from the object, which is by this image made appear; now the motion is the same from black or green, but the colour only differs.  

3 Argument, or instance of A. B. in the book.  Thirdly, let the Gentleman consider what he did mean to do, when he writ this book; did he mean to colour the paper with real letters, or fancy only? if not with real letters, how could he expect that one word should not be taken for another? he could never think that A. should force the eye or brain, otherwise then B. doth, and so cause another Image, but out of this, that he coloured the paper in another figure, when he made A. then when he made B. Let a man again conceive, that in the same feather of a Cock, he discerns one speck of white, another of red, another of black, and those are all discerned by another man's eye; let a man think what can so distinguish these colours in this, and not in another feather, but that these colours are there, and not in another. It is a strange thing that his wit should think to persuade a man, not only against his own eyes, but all the eyes in the world, and all the reason too, but his own. Well, I conceive this is enough for these two Propositions, That colour is not the Apparition of that motion, and that colour is a real thing in this object: These two passed Propositions are such, wherein I have disputed with Master Hobbes, no man that I ever read of opposing my conclusions, but himself.   

Sect. 3.  
In the next I find various opinions among Scholars, which if he would have studied, 
Colour and light not the same thing.  although not for truth, but to maintain his own opinion only, although against truth (which I doubt he unluckily affects) he might have found much more probable reasons for what he affirms, than any produced by him. The conclusion defended by him, and denied by me, is, That colour and light are the same thing; this he demonstrates thus, towards the later end of the 8. num. where before [Their difference being only this, that when the light cometh directly from the fountain to the eye, or indirectly by reflection from clean and polite bodies, and such as have not inward particular motion internal to alter it, we call it light; but when it cometh to the eye by refl●ction, from uneven, rough, and course bodies, or such as are affected with internal motion of their own to alter it, than we call it colour, colour and light differing only in this, that the one is pure, the other perturbed light] Although to deny is answer sufficient enough for all is said, there being no proof, but as if he were another Moses, he delivers his Philosophy as authentic, coming from his mouth without any arguments, although against the opinions of the whole world; yet I will in little lay open some weaknesses in these expressions: First, think what he means by inward particular motion internal to alter light; certainly unless he means the causes of colour, which must be against himself, I know not what it can be; and then inward motion internal, which should have power to alter light which is external, to that body, was an uneven and coarse kind of expression, if it express any thing; but the weakness of the whole appears to any man that hath eyes; for whereas he saith, when it cometh to the eye by reflection, from uneven, rough, and course bodies, or such, etc. there we call it colour (speaking of light) I say let it come from the most even, most clean and polite bodies that can be imagined, that Nature or Art have made, as Brass, Silver, Gold, yea, heaven itself, we call it colour, as one Star is red, another more white; and therefore this Gentleman is either mistaken, or would deceive in the usage of speech.  
His conclusion itself may be thus overthrown.   

Sect. 4.  

1 Argument.  That which exists when there is no light, that cannot be the same thing with light: But colour exists where there is no light, ergo, colour is not the same with light.  
The major is evident, because the same cannot be, and not be, at the same time, which would be true, if at the same time colour and light being the same, colour should be, and light not.  
The minor will be proved thus; Colours are in the dark where light is not, that will be proved, because at night, when light leaves our Horizon, yet the colours remain the same they were before; and that is proved, because when light (although another light) is brought to them, yet they are, and they appear the same they were before: Now we have an Axiom in nature, and to be overmastered and checked by nothing but divine power, à privatione ad habitum non datur regressus, there is no recalling a word that is spoke, no making that not done, which is once done; not making that up individually and completely the same which is destroyed; no restoring a form, and being once lost; now this being the same it was, and appearing so at the coming of the second light, which it was at the manifestation of the first, it is evident that the light did not give this colour its being, but only the manifestation of its being, and this colour was something besides light, which was made appear by light; I know not what can be answered to this any further.  

2 Argument.  Again, I can dispute thus, That which opposeth light cannot be the same with light; but some colours oppose light; Ergo:  
The major appears, because nothing opposeth itself; the minor is thus illustrated, because black opposeth light, for light hath an affinity with white, and black with darkness, so that such Stars, which have not something to vary their representation, to us appear white, and so do candles, and these white things, amongst us, have something of light in them, and great affinity to it, and therefore are better discerned with a weak and evening light, than darker Clouds are. So likewise black hath an affinity with darkness, which is the total privation of light, insomuch as a shadow, which is a partial privation of light in a particular place, is black, intentionally black, as I shall discourse hereafter: It is true, that neither black, nor any colour, can be seen without light, no more can a shadow; but dark, and black colours and shadows, do oppose light, which is a kind of white, when in reality it is in its own subject, as the Sun, or Star, or Candle. This certainly, joined to what went before, may serve for my last Proposition. But because there are other Opposers of this conclusion besides himself, now I am in, I will speak something to their arguments.    

CHAP. V.  
The reality of colour vindicated by intentional colours and species.  

Sect. 1.  
THe first and chiefest I find is, because colours without light are visible only Potentia, 
Arguments against the reality of colours answered.  only indeed visible but reduced into act, and seen by being enlightened; so that then by this light they are reduced into act, and therefore light is their form. 
1 Argument.   
For answer to this argument, we must know that the being and nature of things consists not in their second acts as they are called, 
Wherein the being and nature of things consists, and how they are distinguished.  which are their operations, but in their first acts, which give them their abilities to work, and they are distinguished by their abilities to operate, when time, and other opportunities, and accommodations are offered; not by their operations themselves. Thus vegetative creatures are distinguished from things inanimate, not by their operations of growth or generation, for than they should not be vegetable creatures in Winter, but by their abilities to grow or generate when their season is offered; and as their abilities distinguish them from others, so amongst themselves their several species, natures, or kinds are distinguished by their abilities to produce several sorts of things by those operations, not by the operations themselves: so it is in all things, the abilities to sense, not the act of sensation, make an Animal; the ability to discourse, not the act, makes the man; for else a beast should not be a beast when he is asleep, nor a man a man, when he is either asleep, or a child. I could instance in all things, quantities, qualities whatsoever: This explains and answers this argument, although colour cannot actually be seen in the dark, yet that concerns not the nature, but the operation of colours, their second act, not their first; they have in them a power of being seen upon occasions and opportunities, even when they are in the dark; darkness to them is like Winter to vegetals, like sleep to beasts, like infancy to man; and as well may they say, that the springing weather, which reduceth the tree to grow, is the tree; that the stroke or blow which wakened the sleepy Lion, is the Lion; that act which enabled the child first to discourse, is the man, as this light the colour; because of its awaking it to an actual emission of species, or being seen.   

Sect. 2.  
Another main argument, 
2 Argument.  which is urged against the distinction betwixt light and colour, is thus form; There is the same reason of all colours, as colours, as of any; but we know that some colours are nothing but light reflected, therefore we may conclude the same of all.  
The major itself stands upon its own strength, by that word (as colours) for where there is the same being, there is the same reason or cause of that being. The minor is exemplified in the colours of Pigeon's necks, in those colours made by a glass of Red-wine, set upon a white cloth, when a great light, or the Sun shines upon the Wine, it will give an eye of red to the white cloth which is under it, as likewise the Sun shining through the coloured glass; these are real colours, but are nothing but light variously reflected; therefore there are colours which are nothing but light.   

Sect. 3.  
For answer to this, we may say to the major, 
Answ. Colours real and intentional not the same.  that there is the same reason of all colours, as colours, which are real colours and material; but that there should be the same reason and nature with them, and intentional, apparent or spiritual colours (for by these names they are called) there being but a nominal, and some outward circumstantive convenience only, is very illogically spoken; as if one should say, that a living, and painted, or dead horse were the same, and had the same nature. To show the convenience and difference of these from real colours, observe that they both are the object of the sight; that when the eye sees that broken light through the red glass, it sees a thing, for what is not, cannot be the object of sense, and because it is seen, it is not unjustly called a colour, for colour is the object of sight, and in that actual relation to the sight, they have both one common nature; but here is the difference, that to the one light gives its being, to the other, only its being seen, for the light falling thick in with that species and images sent forth in their first and strongest emission, when they come immediately from the object, it mingles with them, and gives them a lustre from itself, which is a shining colour; but in all real colours the light adds nothing but a making of them fit to be actually seen; and that they are one real, the other intentional colours, appears by this, that the real are inherent in the object, which is their subject, and so the white of this paper I write upon is inherent in it, and is moved with the motion of this paper, which is the object of my sight at this time; but red, which falls from the glass of wine upon a white cloth, or these colours on Pigeon's necks, move not with the cloth or the Pigeon, for take the Pigeon out of the flaring light, and you shall see only his real colours; and remove the white cloth, and it retains only its whiteness, which is the inherent colour, and the intentional colour follows the glass and light, not its subject; so that here we find the perfect nature of a real, absolute, inherent accident in the one, and but of an intentional relative adherent accident in the other. And here appears a divers nature in these two sorts of colours, they differ in their real nature, although they agree in the relative; and you may see it further illustrated thus: The same thing cannot at the same time have two real colours, red and white, but the white cloth, though shadowed with red from the wine, is white at that time it is so shadowed, which appears, because remove the shadowing body only, which is the glass, and there is the same whiteness, without any alteration or motion in the cloth; and therefore it was the same before, but only received an eye of red from the glass. This may serve for the major, that there is the same reason of all colours, I say all real, not intentional and real.  
Secondly, to the minor, that must prove that these intentional colours do not differ from the light, 
Intentional colours not the same with light▪  which I deny; for although light is an ingredient in the constitution of them, yet it is not the total, no not refracted light, but as it mixeth with divers colours, so it appears diversely, and then, as you cannot say a book is nothing but paper, or paper inked, but a paper written or printed; as a medicine cannot be said to be Rhubarb, although Rhubarb be in it, when there are many other ingredients, and perhaps others more predominant. So is it with this matter, although these intentional colours have light in them, yet they are something else besides light. And thus superabundantly; this latter part concerns not his book, nor indeed, had he erred in this conclusion only, that light is colour, would I have censured him, he had learned men in the same cause engaged with him; but when he thought this should countenance these other Propositions, that there was nothing but an apparition of motion: Secondly, that colour was no real thing in the object, which was abhorring to all sense and teason that was ever bestowed upon these things; finding it in the lump, and thinking it a mistake, have wasted this paper about it.   

Sect. 4.  
But I have not yet finished this business; in the latter end of his first chapter of his Leviathan, he saith, (That the Philosophy Schools throughout christendom, grounded upon some Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine from him, and say, for the cause of vision, the thing seen sendeth forth a visible species, (in English) a visible show, apparition, or aspect, the receiving whereof is sight, etc.)  

Sight more than a bare reception of spe●●ies.  This I must censure, and say, that I think that scarce any Philosophie-School teacheth this conclusion, that the receiving the species is sight, but the judgement of the soul upon the receipt, for receipt is a mere passive thing, but all the language in the world makes to see an active verb; if receipt of the species should make sight, than a Looking-glass would see, for that receives the species, and truly the eye is a kind of animate Looking-glass, as a Looking-glass an inanimate eye; but the difference lies in the activity of the soul, which animates the eye, but not the Looking-glass.  

The conceit of species not founded only upon Aristotle's Texts.  But he is angry with the conceit of species, and would have men believe, that that opinion, so universally held, is founded only upon some Texts of Aristotle; but I will tell him, it is not so founded upon Texts, as if his only authority had gained the general esteem, which that truth hath obtained upon men's judgements, but the reasons of him and his followers, which this Gentleman should have endeavoured to have answered, and not have thought that his bare credit, with scorning it, should prevail against Christendom. But that a Reader may take notice of some of these reasons, and not trouble himself to peruse other books, I will set down one or two, which may suffice.   

Sect. 5.  
The first reason of Aristotle is drawn from our experience thus; We all observe, 
Aristotle's first reason for them.  that when we have discerned things by our senses, and the act of sensing (pardon that word sensing, it is unusual, yet significant) is done, yet there remains in the sensative memory, that image, which represented the object at the first; now it is impossible that that should be any material corporeal thing, for then how could so many huge Towers, Castles, Towns, Kingdoms, yea heaven itself, if a material heaven, remain crowded in so narrow a compass? how could such contraries, as black and white, hot and cold, fire and water, high and low, remain in that little Ark of man's memory? if they were material and real things, they could not, but being spiritual, intentional, and things, as Philosophers speak, diminutae entitatis, they make a shift, with their little entities, to creep into such a corner: And this confounds likewise another Proposition of his, that the reception of these species makes sense; for these entities are received and retained, and kept fast in that box which received them, the memory, but are not sense any longer than they are hot, and fresh from the object; well, then there must be such things as these species, or else there could be no memory of the object, which, in a material condition, could not exist in the memory.  
A second argument may be drawn from another experiment; suppose Aristotle looks upon Plato, 
A second argument from Aristotle's image in Plato's eye.  Aristotle cannot see his own face, but in Plato's eyes he can; how can that come about, but that some intentional, species and image of him crept into Plato's eye? a material thing could not, it must be an intentional, for any material thing would be offensive to Plato's eye, nor could it be that Gambol he talks of so much, a stroke from the object, for than it must have made Plato see Aristotle, not Aristotle himself, according to his Philosophy.  

3 Argument.  A third argument I can frame thus; Every object, which is distant from the organ, must some way or other make itself reach the organ with its own likeness; but for a real passage of colours, or such like objects, there can be no imagination, there are but two ways, either by the propagation of this image, intentionally, through the whole medium, which therefore is not discerned in its passage through the air, because the motion is extremely swift, like the passage of light, instantaneal; and because until it meets with an eye, or glass, or something proper to give it a receipt, it hath no pause for a consideration: 
The species why so called.  This is the most common way of Philosophers; or else it must be by some seminal virtue which it sends abroad, which, when it finds a womb fit to entertain it, there is prolifical, and produceth this image, and therefore in that regard may be called species, because it is such in semine: 
Objection answered.  Now if it should be objected, that if it were the seed of colours, like the seed of plants, it would produce a thing of the same nature, a real colour, not an intentional; It is answered, that second qualities are like equivocal agents, they cannot produce their own nature, like Mules, and the Monsters of Nile, the furthest they go is their image; a colour doth not get a colour of its own nature, as heat doth heat; nor can you make one thing white, by putting another white thing to it, unless you add some of that white body to the other: This conceit hath much pleased me, and I think would meet with all objections, but I am not peremptory in it, because I cannot afford myself leisure to spend so much time about such a youthful study; but, howsoever, one of these ways, I conjecture, whosoever shall think that the object works upon the sense, 〈◊〉 conceive it, and therefore these species. There are many other arguments used by Philosophers, the least of which he hath not touched, but controlleth them, with only, It is otherwise. I will now leave this, and come to his fourth and last Proposition, in his Humane Nature, where before, numb. 9    

CHAP. VI  
Concerning Echoes, production of sounds, and external objects, etc.  
HIs Proposition is, [That as in conception of Vision, so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses, the subject of their inherence is not the subject (I think it false printed, he means sure the object) but the Sentient.  

Sect. 1.  
This Proposition is delivered in a strange fallacious way; 
Mr. Hobb●s fallacious in his discourse.  for whereas his whole discourse and intent is to prove, that sound, as well as colour, is not in the object, but in the sentient; as with colour he joined images; So in this Proposition, which concerns other senses, he leaves out the object, and only names the conception: It is undoubtedly true, that the conception is in that part which conceives, not the conceived; but the business which he labours to prove, and is in question betwixt him and me is, Whether there be any thing conceived out of the Sentient in the object; he says no, and labours to prove it, Nu. 9   

Sect. 2.  
The first argument he proves this by, is drawn from sounds, and, in them, from echoes, (A man (saith he) may hear double, or treble, by multiplication of ec●●●es, which echoes (saith he) are sounds, as well as the original, and, not being in one and the same place, cannot be inherent in the body that maketh them.)  
This argument receives its answer variously from Philosophers, 
The Philosopher's fi●st opinion concerning echoes.  according to their divers conceits of the nature of sounds; for such as conceive sounds to be carried in their real nature, by the motion of the air, to the organ of sense, these conclude an echo to be a new sound propagated by the former, differing from the first individually, not naturally, we may call it, if you will, another of the same, as some Psalms of Hopkins and Sternholds Translation; So that as we see musical instruments, two in the same room, one Viol touched, the other, out of harmony of parts, being fitted and prepared for such a motion and sound, receives the same, and that sound is the first, but a little softer, which in a whispering place, as I have observed at Gloucester Church, it would be stronger: Now this is another motion, a derived motion, and a derived sound from the same first cause; but as the motion was the immediate cause of the first sound; so the first sound was parent and immediate cause of the second sound. Now here is a divers sound and a divers subject, the echoing place, or the air dissipated and expulsed the subject of that echo, but the bodies moved, or the air forced by these bodies, the subject of the first. This is one way of Philosophers, and doth abundantly satisfy his objection, and show there are outward subjects to these two sounds, each hath his own.  
But others make this echo a kind of rebound of that sound, not only stopping the air, 
A second opinion of theirs concerning Echoes.  which carried the sound from going farther; but retorting it again from whence it came, like a Ball, which moves at the first by the hand that banded it out, but, when it is stopped by a wall, returns towards the place it moved from first, if it meet with the wall in a right line to its motion, or, if oblique, moves obliquely, and may in that motion be retorted by two or three walls; and this answer shows the outward subject of this sound to be the air, which carries it about with it, and is retorted.  
A third way is, 
Their third opinion concerning echoes.  of such who conceive the subject of this sound to be air, in which at the first it was propagated; and that sound, from that place and subject of its birth, emitts, as colours do, its species and likeness which by echoing places are entertained, as the images of colours are in looking-glasses, and there show themselves, and from them multiply themselves to the ear, or perhaps to other echoing places, as glasses transmit their species; and this likewise fully answers his objection, and shows how there may be one subject, and divers echoes of the same sound; if the sound be double, it hath a divers subject; if it be a rebound, the same ball is diversely retorted from the power of the same stroke by divers walls; if it be a species or likeness, the same colour with divers images of it. Let no man expect my opinion, be it any of these; it serves my turn to invalid his argument; and these opinions, and some expressions like these, might he have observed in Philosophers, and aught to have confuted.   

Sect. 3.  
But he proceeds with a Philosophical Axiom, Nothing can make any thing, 
Their axiom cleared by the distinction of formally and virtually applied to instances,  which is not in itself. There are some rules given by Philosophers which are something like this, as [Nihil dat quod non habet] Nothing can give that to another which itself hath not. But not to trouble a Reader with other distinctions, this is sufficient for our business, nothing can give another what itself hath not, either formaliter, formally inhering in it, or virtualiter, that is, it hath power of producing it. A man, who hath not a penny in his purse formally, yet having it virtually, can give another a thousand pounds by his Bond or command to his Steward. The heavens, which, according to Aristotle's Philosophy, have no heat in them formally, yet virtually, by their Philosophy, produce heat in sublunary bodies: The steel and flint, which are cold, and have no fire in them, no formal fire, yet knocked together, having it virtually, produce fire enough to burn a world. Instances might fill this sheet, but this last is very pat to this business: The two bodies, which make a noise or sound, have not the noise or sound in them formally, but like fire in a flint, so doth sound lie asleep in them, and by their collision, and knocking together, this fire is produced. I have discoursed of this Proposition before, as it was applied to sight, under those terms (as I remember) that motion produceth, nothing but motion:   

Sect. 4.  

Mr. Hobbes' absurdities in the production of sounds.  I go on with him (he saith the Clapper, the Bell, the air have motions, but not sounds; then he brings this motion to the brain, and there he saith is motion, and not sound; last of all, he gives this motion a rebound from the brain to the nerves outward, and thence it becometh an apparition without, which we call sound.) What I have delivered before concerning the object of sight, I guess, may be applied to this of sound; but in particular, here are some peculiar absurdities, which I will examine, as that he saith, the rebound to the nerves outward, nerves in the plural number, not naming what; so that, by this Philosophy, for all I see, a man may hear with his eyes or nose, for the rebound may be made to them, and he names not any nerve of the ear; and truly, for all I see by his rebounds, a man may see with his ears, and hear with his eyes, for either of these are capable of such motions as he speaks of. But then let me ask this Philosopher, how this motion becomes an apparition? Had that motion that apparition before, or not? If not, how came it by if afterwards? neither could that motion give it that nature of a sound, or apparition, which it had not, according to his Philosophy, nor any thing else that had it not. If the motion had it before, then either in the brain, the air, the bell, or clapper, which he denied. If any thing else had it before, and then produced it, than there was sound before, and this was not the production of sound; but he doth not say that it is sound, but that the apparition is called sound; but as before concerning light, of what was that an apparition? was is not an apparition of sound? Then sound was somewhere else; and then how was it made an apparition? was it made by that which had an apparition in it, or not, as before?   

Sect. 5.  
This is all he hath written there concerning sounds; he runs over all the senses [And (saith he) to proceed to the rest of the senses, it is apparent enough, that the some and taste of the something are not the same to every man, and therefore are not in the thing smelled or tasted, but in the men] short and sweet, and he shall have as short an answer, nay, I shall make his argument stronger, and then refute it: Smell and taste of the same thing, are not the same to the same man at divers times, 
Smell and Taste where.  and yet it doth not follow that these qualities smelled are not in the object, for the defects and ill qualifications of the Organ do disrelish and alter the thing tasted; and yet, upon consideration of his terms, I grant his Proposition, and his inference, but say, that neither prove the conclusion he proposed. His Proposition is true, for he saith, Smell and taste are in the men, not in the thing smelled and tasted; it is true, these are immanent acts, and are in the Organ, produced by the power of the sensitive soul, and are not in the object; but this concludes not against the Universities, that as there is no colour in the object, so there should be no odour or savour, but produced according to his bounds and rebounds; for although the immanent acts are in the agents, yet the things smelled and tasted are elsewhere.   

Sect. 6.  

What difference between the heat in the fire, and transmitted to the hands, and how it proves no nullity of an external object.  Last of all, he cometh to the lowest sense of touch or feeling, and of this sense, he saith [So likewise the heat, we feel from the fire, is manifestly in us, and is quite different from the heat in the fire] I believe that he speaks truth in this, that the heat in my hand is not that particular heat which is in the fire, but yet that word quite different, was a large Phrase; the difference is individual, not specifical; it is a stream of that Fountain, and differs like a stream from the fountain, it loseth by the course, it walks in some degrees of those perfections which it enjoyed at its first setting out: but, that it is another, appears, because take away the fire, and the heat doth not instantly follow the fire, but by degrees wears out of my hand, just like a stream fed and supplied by a fountain, stop the fountain, the streams will in little leisure decay, but not instantly be dried; as light follows the Candle, or as a shadow the man whose shadow it is; This proves it to be another heat from that of the fire; why do we read nothing of apparitions, of bounds and rebounds? this is nothing to his purpose, that heat, which is in my hand, is the Object of my feeling, and it is discerned by some species which expresseth its likeness, as other objects, and presents it to the sensitive soul, which officiates this duty of judging of Touches in every part of a man, which is animated by it, as it discerns colours by the eye, sounds by the Ear, etc. But which way doth this prove, because heat is in my hand, which is felt, therefore there is nothing in the Object discerned. The nature of those Prime qualities, Heat, Cold, Drought, Moisture, is such, that it multiplies their nature even to the Organ, and thus only, immediately, sends out its likeness; (whether this Organ be a nerve, or something else, I question not,) but second Qualities, as light or heavy, hard or soft, touch but the outward skins only, and there, and thence transmit their Species, which is so apparent, as nothing can be more; for take the weight of Lead, and the lightness of a feather, when discerned by a man's hand, can any man say these are in the hand, or Led, or feather? So likewise when I feel a down pillow, and a hard stone, what is it I feel? a softness or hardness in myself? or a gambol of a bound or rebound? these things cannot be imagined, these are real things in that pillow, in that stone, but send forth intentional, not real Images into my hand; of their natures Real they cannot be, for if real, than my hand should be light or heavy, hard or soft, when it discerns those Objects to be such, for whatsoever hath these real Qualities in it, is denominated by them; and then some image there must be, because whatsoever is known, must be known by reception into that faculty which knows it, if not in its self, yet in its Species or Image; and so these, who in their realities cannot come at the Organ, must do it by their Species. But this was much more than needed for a refutation of what he said; but I have not done yet with him, for although his Argument drawn from heat in my hand, to prove the nullity of an external Object, is vain, as I have showed, for this heat is external to the Organ of that Sense; and although it be true, that the heat in my hand differs from that in the fire, which did produce it; yet his Argument is most Illogical, with which he endeavours to prove it thus.   

Sect. 7.  
[For (saith he) our heat is pleasure or pain, according as it is great or moderate; 
Heat is neither pleasure nor pain, but a cause of both.  but in the coal there is no such thing] First consider the Proposition, than the inference. In the Proposition, he affirms, that our heat is a pleasure or pain, which is a most strange speech in a Philosophical discourse, where propriety of speech is expected; and from that man, in that discourse, where, like another Adam, he would impose Names upon every thing, and strives for nothing more than to give things convenient expressions. To the business, heat is neither pleasure, nor pain in us, it may produce both, according to the convenience, or inconvenience it hath with us, but is neither; heat is a cause of sense, but sense is neither pleasure nor pain, but they are results out of sense, as things agreeing or disagreeing to it; so that heat is a cause of both, a remote cause, but formally it cannot be said to be either.   

Sect. 8.  
But suppose it be spoken figuratively (which, in these cases of Philosophical punctual discourses, 
The same cause worketh different effects according to the subject or object about which it is busied.  is not proper) the cause for the effect, doth it follow, that therefore because it is so in a man, and produceth not that effect in the fire, therefore it is not the same heat? certainly causes always work the same effect, where the Subject is the same, but not else: heat hardens clay, which is a common Instance, but softens wax; if fire had sense, as a man hath, it would find pain or pleasure, as a man doth; or if a man had no sense like fire, he would have no pain, or pleasure, as the fire hath not; the same thing works diversely, according to the Subject or Object it is busied about. This conceit of his, I make no question, but meeting with his understanding, which was the Mother of it, mightily pleased him, or else he would never have printed it in two Books, and in one have cited the other; but certainly, meeting with my dull brain, infected with contemptible University learning, it displeaseth me exceedingly, and therefore there is no arguing for the diversity of an Agent, from the diversity of operation, when the Object is divers, it works upon. And here he concludes this business, saying, by this the fourth Proposition is proved, etc. But how, let any man consider. Now I thought to have concluded with him, but number 10. he crowds together such a heap of Solecisms, as must not pass without a consideration of them. His number begins thus, [And from hence also it followeth, that whatsoever accidents or qualities our sense makes us think there be in the world, 
Sensible qualities more than mere apparitions.  they be not there, but are seeming, and apparitions only] I never thought to have read such a Proposition from a reasonable man: The Thief, who is to be arraigned at the Bar, would be glad he could make the Judge to be of this mind, when the evidence shall swear he saw him break up a house, or cut a purse; if he could persuade the Judge that it were but an Apparition, there were no such thing, it were well for him. But suppose this Gentleman's hand were put into the fire, and when he cries out for pain, a man should tell him, there is no such thing but only an apparition of it, do you think he would believe him? But by this Doctrine he hath one evasion, which I know not what to say to, that is, when I shall charge him with it, he can reply, it was only an apparition of such an opinion or discourse, but no such discourse; I can prove it no other way, but that these eyes of mine showed it me in a book under his name called Humane Nature, or another called Leviathan.   

Sect. 9  
But, this being only a negative conclusion, he proceeds further to a positive thus [The things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seem are caused] Surely there was never heard, or read, so much nonsense, and yet it tastes not of folly, but a kind of madness, or else he thinks the world is mad to receive such incredible fancies without colour of reason. Is all without us nothing but motion? Is the standing still of the earth nothing but motion? Is the thing that moves nothing but motion, motion moves somewhat that is not motion; if so, what doth it move? 
A universe of motion madly fancied by Mr. Hobbes.  whatsoever moves, moves something, and if that were motion, the question goes on infinitely, unless we find something to be moved which is not motion; substances, bodies, etc. are not motion; rest is not motion, much less are they these motions by which these seem are caused. I discern a stone hard, cold, heavy, by sense; are these things, yea the stone itself, (for so they term the things that really involves it) nothing but those motions by which they appear? These things confute themselves; and yet I may go further; many of these representations, apparitions, seem, are without motion in the object; the house, standing still unmoved, sends forth its image to my eye, without motion; for all motion is but of six kinds, generation and corruption about substances; augmentation and diminution about quantities; alteration about qualities; lation, or local motion, about place; he can find none of these in this house, neither in its substance, quantity, quality, place; but the motion is in mine eye; no such thing neither; mine eye is changed none of these ways; only an image brought to it, which is undiscernible by any sense but itself; neither is the power of the soul moved, which then proceeds to discern the object; for it is the same power it was before, without any real alteration or change; for it hath the same abilities it had, neither more nor less; but it is true, there is an internal immament act, which results out of that power, without any motion; or if it may, in an improper and forced way, be halled into the notion of motion, in some unused acceptation, yet this must be an internal motion within its self, none of those things he speaks of a motion.  
Much of this is needless; that which sufficeth to show the weakness of his reasoning, is to show, that there are hundreds of things discerned by us, which are not motions, and that is most apparent. He proceeds [And this is the great deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected] If it were true, that this were a deception, I should think it a great one, yea the most universal deception that ever was in the world; but how it shall be corrected by sense, that were worth the observing: He hath showed it thus [For as sense telleth me when I see directly, the colour seemeth to be in the object, so also sense telleth me, when I see by reflection, that colour is not in the object.]   

Sect. 10.  

Colour in the object, when seen by reflection.  First of all observe, that if this were true, yet, being but a particular instance, he cannot deduce that general conclusion out of it, concerning all sights, much less concerning all other senses; then observe upon a direct sight, he puts only a seeming to be in the object, but upon a reflex, peremptorily, that it is not in the object; when, certainly, a direct sight shows its object more clearly than any reflex. But now to his instance; why doth a reflex show it not to be in the object, he sets not down, but perhaps he may say, in a glass the image may seem to be in the glass, and not in the object; I say, the image, that which represents the object, is there, and I have known a Robin Redbreast fight with his own shadow in a glass. To this I answer, that the sight judgeth of colours, 
Sight, when, and when not, deceived.  and therein is not deceived, when the distance is not too great, nor the organ, or medium, ill disposed; for that is its proper object, over which it hath power to judge; but in such things as are a common object to it, and other senses, it is easily mistaken, of which kind are figures, greatness, or littleness, distance of place, and many the like. Thus it mistakes the distance of the Moon from the earth, the bigness of the stars; but then, besides these common objects, there are other which are objectum per accidens, as Logicians, an object not out of its own nature affecting that act or faculty in its self, but by reason of some other thing to which it is annexed, or happens to be joined; so we may say, we see Socrates or Plato, when we see them not, but their colour, and that colour, of theirs, is the only thing by which they are discerned by sight. Now there are mighty mistakes in our senses concerning these; so when we see one man's clothes worn by another, we think him, at the first, to be the man whose clothes he wears; so when we see that man to have a red, who had a pale face, we think him not the same man. My opinion of this mistake is, because although the vision of the colour is an act of sight, yet the applying that colour to the person seems to be an act of reason, a work out of the reach of pure sense. 
Sense judgeth not of colour, but Reason by collection from it.  This by the way of explication, to make all plain, that the Reader may the fuller apprehend my answer to this objection; punctually than I answer, first, that there is no such judgement of sense as to say, that colour is not in the object; for although sense, perhaps, can only discern the colour in the glass; yet sense meddles not with that question, whether the same colour, can be in two subjects; much less, whether this be a real colour in the glass, or whether an intentional, or whether it be in the glass or not; but if it do meddle with this last, yet in that speech, which says it is in the glass, sense meddles beyond its sphere, it judgeth in a cause which belongs not to its Judicature, that may be disputed by reason between him and me, and sense may give in evidence concerning what it knows circumstantially conducing to the truth, but cannot judge of it, it is not its proper object; so then to say, sense sees it in a glass, therefore there is no colour in the object, is vain to reason, which can discern that every accident follows its subject; remove the glass from the face which got that image, and there is no such image in the glass; and chose, remove the man whither you will, the colour is with him, sticks in him, therefore colour is inherent in him, but only from him represented in the glass: The business of inhesion or adhesion belongs not to sense to meddle with; the eye sees divers colours in a Rainbow, it belongs not to sense to judge whether they inhere there or no; so likewise in the Pigeon's neck, and wheresoever it finds them, Reason may dispute and collect from sense, but Sense judgeth not. So that first, as I said, sense when it sees an image in a Looking-glass, collects no negative Proposition, that it is not in the object, no more than the sense of that man, who thinks he sees a man in the Moon, should collect that, therefore there are none upon earth. Secondly, if it judge at all of the subject of inherence, whether the glass or object be the subject, yet this is so extrajudicial an act, so out of the reach of sense, as therefore there is no strong building upon it; thus have I known horses mistaken, and sheep, when the colouts have been the same, and the mistake hath seized upon reason guided by sense, so that men have sworn clean contrary; so weak is Sense in judging of any thing but its proper object; when other things are accidentally joined with the object, they pass an accidental and uncertain judgement upon them; and his first conclusion is true, Sense telleth me, or rather, by the information of sense, I collect, that colour is in the object, when I see it directly; but his second can no way be true, that Sense telleth me, when I see by reflection, that colour is not in the Object; for Sense makes no such Judgement, and Reason with Sense makes a clean contrary collection.  
Thus have I gone through these two Chapters, the first of Leviathan, the second of Humane Nature, which be the Foundation of his whole Book; if the rest prove of the same nature, my labour will be much lost to meddle with it; but I will try some other pieces.     

NOTES UPON THE Second Chapter of Leviathan.  

CHAP. VII.  
How all creatures affect rest or motion, as most convenient for them.  
I Have traveled the first Chapter from the beginning to the end; I shall not trouble the Reader, or myself, so with others, nor can I expect they should deserve it; but if they should, I will let pass many things, and only touch some remarkable passages, which may, in my judgement, be principally worth the censuring.  

Sect. 1.  
He begins this Chapter with a sentence, which he calls an undoubted truth, and I am confident is most absolute, and not to be doubted falsehood; that is, That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever. This proposition is apparently false in all Animals, 
Animals will move themselves after rest.  for every sensitive creature moves its self, and hath the Principles of its own motion in its self, unless the motion be violent; long rest is as unquiet and tedious to such Beasts as long labour, and therefore they will rise, and they will move themselves; rise, if for nothing else, yet out of a lassitude they have of that lazy condition they were in; and likewise they arise and move to their food and sustenance; so that the case put in that latitude and indefinite term, A thing (without any limitation lies still, cannot look like a truth, but that it coming from so learned a man, 
Every thing will move towards its proper place.  men are amazed at the reading of it. But then go further, and let us view the meanest things, even inanimate bodies; every thing is unquiet out of its proper place, and presseth and endeavours to get to it; and when it is out of its place, will move towards it: Suppose a Plummet of lead hung in the Air by a thread, in time the thread wears, the Plummet changeth its place by falling down to the earth, the Plummet moves its self downward; the breaking of the thread cannot move it, for indeed the pressing of the weight of the Lead, which is out of its place, breaks the thread, and moves both the thread and its self down; so that let any thing lie still, yet it will move its self, if it be out of its place. So likewise in motion upward, Take a Bladder full of Air, lay something upon it which may keep it under Water, and let it rest there, then remove the Obstacle which kept it down, it will ascend to its proper place above the Water; and surely nothing but its self moves it, as is most apparent: so far is this indefinite Axiom from an undoubted truth, that it is most evidently false in all Animal motions, and in all natural motions, which are of things out of their places.   

Sect. 2.  
His second Proposition is as bad, That when a thing is in motion, 
All animals, being subject to lassitude, require rest.  it will eternally be in motion unless something else stop it; This is equally false with the other: First, Animal Motions he grants presently after, Men measuring other things by themselves, judge they are weary, and so go to rest. This instance granted in a Man, confutes that indefinite term, when a thing is in motion; and what he speaks of Men, there is the same reason of all sensitive creatures, which abide a lassitude or weariness, as well as man, and must have their Sabbath, their alternam requiem to refresh them, or they cannot subsist; and therefore, when they are in long motions, go to rest themselves; and certainly a man may justly say, that all the local motions of other things, as well as Animals, 
Inanimates, by local motion, tend toward rest.  is to rest; the bladder, which moved itself before from under the Water, rests itself upon the Water; the Plummet of Lead upon the earth; every thing, when it gets its own place, rests in that: So in violent motions, when you shoot an Arrow upward, it makes haste downward of itself, against the violence, and gets to the earth, where it may, and doth rest; so that the nature of every thing is so composed, that as it is unquiet out of its fit and natural place, so it is quiet and rests in it: But he seems to give a reason for both Propositions, namely, that nothing can change itself.  
This may have some resemblance of truth, 
All things, able to overcome the ill th●y are affected with, change themselves.  in respect of the essence of things, because every change seems to imply a corruption and destruction of what it was changed from into that it was changed into, and nothing can affect, or endeavours its own destruction, or ruin; but yet when any body is affected with hurtful accidents, it doth change them for its own advantage; the Water, when it hath that destructive accident, heat in it, by its own force and principles which are in it, works out that hurtful heat, and reduceth its self to its own temper of coldness, when the Violence, which the fire offers to it, is removed. Thus heavy things move downwards, light upwards, when they can remove, or when those Obstacles are removed, which before kept them from their natural places. And thus natural bodies of Animals, expel those hurtful poisonous things, which the strength of their natural constitution can master; and thus all things, when they are beset with any ill which they can overcome, change themselves. Thus it appears, that as his Conclusions were erroneous, so his Reasons and Foundations, upon which he built them, were weak, that nothing can change its self: What he adds of men's measuring other things by themselves, must be affirmed of Fools, for I dare say he never read Philosopher write so.    

CHAP. VIII.  
Of Appetite and Knowledge: how wisely methoded by God in all creatures, to the effecting his ends.  
ENough, I think, is said to that; but in the latter end of this Introduction, I conceive it such, he seems to scorn that received Opinion, That heavy things move downward out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature, etc. ascribing (saith he) appetite and knowledge of what is good for their preservaion (which is more than man has) to things inanimate, absurdly: Thus he.  

Sect. 1.  
This Proposition I censure, and shall show first, that there is such a thing; then answer his objection. 
The distinction of Appetite into Natural and rational, their conflicts, etc.  Appetite may be distinguished into Natural and Rational; Natural is the bent, the disposition every thing hath to the preservation of its self, as it is a particular body; or the generality of the Universe, as it is a part of the whole. Rational appetite is that which a thing hath out of the knowledge it hath of the goodness and fitness which a thing hath for him who doth desire it. Now that there is such an appetite, which we call natural, in every thing which hath not reason, is apparent in every such thing; so that no man can give any account of such actions but by the appetite; As, Why should the Foxes have holes, and the Fowls of the Air have nests, wherein they may lay up and preserve their young, but this, that they have an appetite to preserve them; so likewise, to come lower to his instance, Why do heavy things fall downward, after they have been forced upwards, but that they would preserve themselves; nay, to see these two appetites in the same man, will make it more evident. Every man finds in himself, besides those politic designs which he hath upon study, and arise out of reason, natural desires, and appetites of Meat and Drink, and this against his reasonable appetite; for when his Reason, upon grounds of Physic, directs him not to eat, and, upon the control of Reason, he denies himself Meat, yet he cannot choose but, by his natural appetite, desire Meat; so likewise he hath a natural appetite to live, even when Reason shows him it is fit for him to die, and to fall downwards, even when he would mount upward. Thus we see there are appetites in irrational things, and the irrational part in man, which is not rational; and these cross appetites make great contestation in man about his actions; and sometimes the subject, natural Appetite, doth so powerfully take up Arms against its supreme, the reasonable Appetite, that it conquers the reasonable Appetite, according to that famous Speech of Medéa, so much honoured, both amongst Schools, Divines, and Philosophers: 
— Video meliora proboque  
Deteriora sequor.—  I see what is good, and in my reason approve it, but act what in reason I detest. This invincibly shows this Appetite, and that there is even in Natural things, which have not the use of reason, an appetite to satisfy themselves in what, some way or other, is good for them. Now than I will come to the Answer of that Objection, of his, which he makes with scorn, that (saith he) they ascribe appetite and knowledge to things inanimate, which is more than man hath.   

Sect. 2.  
The negative piece which saith, which is more than man hath, 
Appetite and knowledge is no● more than man hath.  is very false; for although, by reason of his corrupt will, Man sometimes mistakes ill for Good, Good for ill, and prosecutes these things accordingly; yet he doth not this as a Man, but as a depraved man, and either in things which belong to his Election, having an indifferent nature; or else out of some predominant passion within him, which as it draws his Will, so it blinds oftentimes his Understanding; or else when there is a disguise put upon the Object, which makes it appear other than it is; but Man, as Man, hath abilities both to know, and prosecute what is Good, and he always doth desire what is Good, at the least apparent, nor can he do otherwise.   

Sect. 3.  
For the affirmative part, that they ascribe to inanimate things appetite, and Knowledge, etc. 
What appeti●e and knowledge ●in in●eriour ●●eat●res, and ho● excellently disposed by providence.  I could answer out of my former distinction, that they do not ascribe a rational, but a natural appetite, which many times is against reason, as I have showed; but because we see, in unreasonable Animals, Swallows not only building, but fortifying, their nests with such choice and selected Materials, and those so artificially plastered together, as although Man may imitate, yet he cannot equal the ingenuity of the work; because we observe Bees with such Wonderful industry gathering, and, in such a constant method, contriving the disposure of that harvest they lay up against the hard time of Winter, with multitudes of such things which may amaze, and draw the wit of man to admiration, rather than to contention to compare; because in the inferior things we find such a consent and cooperation to the general good of the Universe, as can be paralleled by no heroic virtue of any Roman or Romance; that constantly the very Plebeians of the world, the meanest creatures do expose themselves to a certain ru●n for the public good, as water ascends, air descends to its own destruction, to avoid vacuity; when we shall consider, how, as in Noah's a●k, for the preservation of their species, the wolf and lamb, the lion and the bull, the horse and the bear, the hawk and the Partridge, live in peace; so, for the same intention, fire and water, heat and cold, the greatest enemies in the World meet, and inhabit, and live quietly and harmoniously together, in the same body; I cannot choose but add that there is the same hand and providence disposing one, as did the other, and so will enlarge my answer to an exposition of this business.   

Sect. 4.  
First then consider, that when God, the Great Natura naturans (as the Philosopher calls him) at the first made all the creatures in the world, 
God's wisdom, not Art, in the natures of all he made, and disposing the principles of their several operations.  he gave each of them their several beings and natures, which were the principles of all their operations, which according to those beings they produced; not as he, in his Introduction to his Leviathan, began with somewhat too high a line, (Nature, the Art whereby God hath made and governs the world) certainly if it were lawful to call that infinite wise counsel of God's Will, whereby he worketh all things, and made and governs the World, an Art; yet we could not call that Art, Nature, for Nature is a thing made by God, and therefore not that thing, or Art, by which God did make the World, and in, or with it Nature herself. Again, Nature works necessarily that which it works, insomuch, as even in man, what he doth naturally, is necessarily done; and what by reason, liberally, or freely: so that here was a great boldness in him with God, whilst he commended himself by a high and great phrase, to make that phrase speak diminishingly of God, in these transcendent works of his: But to return whence this observation distracted me; when God gave these natures to every thing, he disposed them to advance his Great Design of the beauteous World, and by that Nature, which he gave them, engrafted in them dispositions to move thus, or thus, as his infinite wisdom knew fittest, either for the particular effect of each nature, or their combined effects to the whole, according to which dispositions they cannot choose but work; and this is called appetite, the natural inclination, and bend of each thing to produce those effects, which either are agreeing to its self, or the public good.   

Sect. 5.  
Now these things are acted by them without their knowledge, only his who directeth them to this end. 
All things act according to God's method, with an innate appetite to accomplish his end, though without knowledge how they tend to it.  As Scotus speaks, a great States-M●n gives divers Officers dispatches of Letters about his public ends; they carry the Letters, and, b●ing diligent in their several charges, bring about the Design, and it may be said, their diligence effected the Project: So here these things do, as it were, carry God's Letters, go on his Errands, and although they know not what they do, yet they, by their acting according to that method he disposeth them in, bringing those mighty works of wisdom to pass, which we observe are done by them; or as you discern in a Clock, which being made artificially, and kept in motion, distinguisheth the hours of the day to us; the hand moves to one or two a Clock, and, when it comes thither, it makes such a noise, which speaks the hour of the day; the Clock moves, and moves to this end, to strike and tell the time of the day, but yet the Clock thinks not of the hour, but moves to that purpose; so is it in these inferior things, they move like a Clock in their order, and the Maker of them aimed them at such or such an effect, they move to it themselves, not knowing what they do, and move to that end is designed them, and certainly as when we see a Clock move in such a Method, and produce such effects, as are beyond the reach of such dull things as Iron and Brass, which are the Materials, we are sure that there was some wiser head in the contrivance and ordering of it: so certainly, when we discern in these creatures acts of a higher and more excellent condition than their nature can produce, constantly acted by them, we cannot choose but perceive that great and powerful wisdom and providence of God in their operations, which we should not forget to consider punctually; therefore to his Argument we say, that these things have an appetite to actions, or such objects, not a knowledge of them; an appetite they have, for nothing moves but by its appetite, unless forced, this appetite is the bend of its Nature to this or that; this is not out of knowledge in its self, but in God who so disposed it; in its fall it is barely that natural inclination which God hath given to each thing, and, in some cases, may be called instinct, and is discerned both in averseness and inclinations, so that heavy bodies, out of this regard, move downwards, and light upwards, having such inclinations naturally in them; but being disposed by a greater wisdom, and if they have any contrary motion, that is forced, which appears because these, upon the remove of obstacles, when they come to themselves, retreat, like rivers into their own channels, by natural motions into their own places, as hath been showed; so then both, that all natural bodies have appetite, appears; and likewise how this in the wisest and the most excellent method, which may be, is in them, although their own Reason guide them not to it, but that infinitely wise Reason of their Maker.  
This, as I conceive, he writeth as an introduction to this Chap. of Imagination; but how it conduceth to his design I see not; what follows, comes a little closer.    

CHAP. IX.  
Of motion ceasing, dreams, decaying sense, imagination, memory, experience, etc.  

Sect. 1  
HE begins with that refuted axiom, when a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder it) eternally, and whatsoever hinders it, cannot in an instant, but by degrees, extinguish it. The rule he gives in his first part hath been already overthrown, and his instance, which he urgeth for illustration from perturbed water, being but a particular instance in one only example, cannot be of force to draw a general conclusion from it, according to any rules of logic; but if it could be, it is so far from proving his conclusion, that it clearly ovetthrows it; for let it be inqu●red, why the water, after that the winds cease at any time, gives over rolling, or, as his instance is in the 3. Chap. of Humane Nature, why, after it is put into motion, the standing water gives over motion; 
How standing water, put in motion, recovereth rest.  The Answer cannot be made from any external thing, but only from its self, that standing water, being a heavy body, works out his enemy motion, and by degrees gets its rest, so that the water, it's own self, produceth its own rest after motion; and for that other piece, that this stop is not in an instant, although in that instance he gives, the phrase he useth is proper enough to say, the hindrance is by degrees, because nature hath to do with an enemy, a violent motion, w●ich cannot be forced away, but by degrees; yet in natural motions we may find it, either when a heavy body falleth down, the further it goes, the swifter it moves, and yet stops upon the sudden, when it comes to the place of its rest; So likewise in that other instance, when the Bladder ascends, the stop is in that instant it gets upon the top of the water; For although all motion is in time, unless generation and corruption, (say the Philosophers) yet the terms of motions are in instant, like those times by which they are measured, as must needs appear evident.   

Sect. 2.  
Then he comes to apply this illustration of his rule to the business in hand, pag. 5. I must now reckon by pages, so also (saith he) it happeneth in the motion, which is made in the internal parts of a man, 
How dreams a●e improperly assimilated to it when ceasing.  then when he sees dreams, etc. for after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it.) Here observe how strangely he joins together seeing and dreaming, as if seeing were a relic of sense, not sense, or a result out of it, as dreaming is; but wherein can we find the convenience betwixt the motion of the water, which stays a little while after the stone is stopped, and this remaining of the Image? that motion of sense is nulled, and therein a quiescence of that act; but as in all other Causes, which are not necessary to the preservation as well as the producing their effects, so here, when the cause is gone, the effect remains, the Image apprehended in sense, and then it hath no other convenience with that Motion, than any other Cause.   

Sect. 3.  
I reject not his Etymology, but deny his Deduction, Therefore (saith he) Imagination is nothing but decaying Sense; 
Imagination something more t●en dec●y●ng sense.  For although Imagination may be derived from Image, yet it is something besides sense in its full notion, for sense is the mere judgement upon a present Object, but Imagination works upon an absent; every Sense judgeth of a particular sensative Object; so sight of Colours, hearing of Sounds, etc. and no other but Fancy, (so here I involve the common sense with it, because he excludes it, and I will multiply no controversy) judgeth of all senses, and distinguisheth them: This is visible, this Audible; yea, conjoins them together, and makes a Composure, sometimes for pleasure, sometimes for grief of divers of them, which sense cannot do, sight cannot judge, or act any way upon sounds, or the ear upon colours, as is evident, a deaf man (though seeing) cannot hear, yet, if ever he did hear, his fancy can imagine sounds.  
So that imagination must needs be something besides decaying sense, which operates where, and when Sense cannot, and is an act upon that which is the relic of Sense; when Sense hath done its work, there remains the Species which the Object sent forth, and upon this Species the power of imagination works its proper operations. Decaying Sense supposeth Sense to be, but imagination works when Sense is not, as upon Colours; when the man, that hath seen, is blind afterwards, there is not the sense of seeing, but there is in that man an imagination of colours, which he hath, but cannot now see: So, in the dark, men imagine colours, but can see none. I conclude therefore, that imagination is something beside sense, which exists when sense faileth.   

Sect. 4.  
He goes on. 
Memory no decaying sense, the act of Sensation being wholly p●st.  [The decay of sense in man (saith he) waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it:] This I apprehend most untrue; for when the Organ ceaseth to judge, that motion which he calleth sense, ceaseth, and is no longer; but those Species lie locked up in the Memory, and there is no act of sensation concerning them, no not a decayed one. That Philosophy, 
His illustration from the Sun's light, obscuring that of the Stars, incongruous.  which he delivers concerning the Sun and the Stars, to illustrate this by, I grant, that the Stars do emit and send forth their Light when the Sun shineth, but the excess of the Sun's Light obscures that of the Stars; yet his Application of it to this purpose is utterly vain; for there both the Objects work, like Natural Agents, according to their utmost, and the greater by its force masters the less; but here, in our business, the Object is removed, or the Organ, and there is no operation of one upon the other at all, the species being crept within the Organ, the eye cannot judge of it; and the object or Organ, being diverted, or indisposed▪ cannot produce such an act any longer; it is as if the Stars were removed out of the Heaven, not shining with the Sun; so that we fancy colours in the dark, when no strength of another Object, more powerful, doth work upon our sense; and sometimes in the dark we do not employ our Imaginations about colours, and yet in that dark we have no vehement Object to obscure our fancy; so that it is not the suppression or weakening of sense, by another Object, which maketh us not see, but the cessation of sense, by the removal of either Organ, or Object, one from another. And again we may observe, that although the Sun shine, and the Objects external move never so powerfully, yet the fancy is busied about some internal conceit, or other things absent, which could not be, if only the vehement strokes from the object did produce this act; for than that being, the fancy should likewise be.   

Sect. 5.  
After this weak Discourse he draws a conclusion thus: [From whence it follows, that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination.] This hath some Truth in it, but is not absolutely true; for many instantly upon sight, 
Extent of time doth not always weaken the imagination.  or hearing of a thing, have no apprehension of it, as we say, it comes in at one ear, and goes out at another; men carelessly taking notice of it, like a thing not heeded, or cared for, lose it presently; we conceiving the memory, like a Box which keeps these Images, may apprehend attention like a Key to it, which locks them up in that Box. Or, apprehending the memory like wax, we may imagine attention like that force which presseth these Images into it; but, without attention, any sensitive object, though discerned, is lost immediately, and doth not stay for time to weaken or wear it out; when, chose, it often happens, that a thing long time forgot, and not thought on, may be revived and quickened again, and remain more lively in the fancy then things of a much later birth: as I remember Seneca speaks of himself, and I think most men may find in themselves to be true; that the things, which he learned when he was a child, did stick faster and fresher in his memory then those things which he learned but a little before; so that although there may be some truth in this; that often it happens out, that time wears out the sense or conceit of a thing; yet, because there are many other things conducing to the preservation and destruction of conceptions besides time, therefore this is not universally true, as he proposeth it, yet should not have been censured by me, but because it seems to conduce to the illustration of what went before, which was an Error not to be swallowed down.   

Sect. 6.  
I let pass what is between, and come to the upshot; [This decaying sense (saith he) when we would express the thing itself, (I mean fancy its self) we call Imagination.]  
This that he calls decaying sense, I confess we call Imagination, but I have showed it not to be sense, therefore not decaying sense. [But (saith he) when we would express the decay, and signify that the Sense is fading, old and past, we call it Memory.]  

His language confuse.  Here are d●vers words, of most distinct nature, huddled together, to confound the Reader, (old and past) many things are now past, yet not old; and those past things, although but just now, are remembered, although not old. Then, saith he, [Imagination and Memory are one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers Names: 
Imagination and Memory not one and the same thing ] I deny that they are the same thing, and prove it thus:   

Sect. 7.  
They who have divers acts which cannot be performed by each other, are not the same thing, (for powers are distinguished by their Acts and Objects) but imagination and memory are such; therefore they are not the same.  
The major hath its proof and illustration already; the minor shall be thus confirmed; first imagination is busied about, and acts things which come not into the reach of memory, as ●oyning two things together, a horse and a man, it makes a centaur; this presently after he applies to imagination, which he calls compounded imagination; now these two, although in their parts they were discerned by sense before, and wrapped up in the memory, yet conjoined together, having been never in the sense, cannot be in the memory; unless after they were framed by the fancy the sensitive memory, but are the fruits of imagination only; so likewise we may say, that there are many things in the memory, which are not imagined when they are in the memory, as thus: The memory is like a Book, in which those things, which are attentively perceived by sense, are by that attention ingraved or locked up, as was before expressed, or written in it; imagination is that internal eye which reads this book, and sometimes reads one word, sometimes another: Now as it happens out, that there are many things in the book which the eye sees not, yea, it cannot see all things at once; so it is in the memory, it is impossible that the Fancy should read half those things which are writ in the Memory; many things are there which cannot be looked upon all at once, and, perhaps, sometimes will never be fancied again or imagined, yet are in the Memory; and therefore certainly, where there are so distinct acts and Objects, the things themselves are distinguished; for we never say a man imagineth any thing, of which he hath not an actual conception; nor that he remembreth any thing by a sensative Memory, of which he hath formerly had no sense; so that those are as much distinguished, in and by their Acts and Objects, as any two Faculties can be.   

Sect. 8.  
What he saith presently after, [That much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience, 
What memory it is that makes Experience. ] is not true in those general terms which he proposeth; for Memory of many things maketh not Experience, but Memory of many things alike; so that he that shall remember that fire burned his hand, water washed it; that this lump of lead felt heavy; teat Bladder of Air Light, makes not an Experimental conclusion, from such remembrances, of either heat, or weight, or lightness; but when he shall find that this Air, and all he meets with, this Lead, and many others are such, than he hath Experience, and by Experience he knows, that it is so with all other; if he shall reply and produce common language, that we usually say, that we had once Experience of such or such a passage; and therefore one trial and sense, with remembrance of it, makes an experience. I answer: That experience in a late way of acceptation is so used, for a particular apprehension with remembrance; but because experience is the mother of knowledge, and one Swallow assures us not of a Summer, nor doth one Conception give us the certainty of any Science; therefore the proper way of taking experience is from the particular knowledge of many individuums of the same nature; and in that sense he must take it, because else in vain he defined it the Memory of many things, and should have rather said, It is the remembrance of any thing: And yet give me leave to interpose my conceit, which is, that Experience is not rightly termed Memory of one thing, or many, for Memory contains many things at quiet in it, which yet are not experiments, until applied to something else, either in speculation or practice; so that when we call precedent examples for rules of future practice, we rub up our memories to see what provision is in that Storehouse, to furnish us with directions in our business at hand; and when we find things of like nature, these are called Experiments. But this being, but a nominal discourse (as much of that which follow▪) I might have saved (as I shall do such things) and have suffered him to beguile any man with it; for it is not material, whether true or false; only I have hinted out the commonest way of speaking concerning experiments, and the usefullest; I skip now to the 6 pag. of the 2. Chap.    

CHAP. X.  
The origine of Dreams, their variety, etc.  
WHerein, impertinently I think to his main purpose in that Chap. he entereth into a long discourse of Dreams, which, because it seems to squint at other matters besides this in hand, I shall with brevity censure as most unsatisfactory, and very erroneous; First, than he saith there, [That because the Brain and Nerves are so benumbed in the sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of external Objects, there can happen in sleep no imagination and therefore no dreams but what proceed from agitation of the inward parts of a man's body.]  

Sect. 1.  
This I conceive erroneous, 
There have been prognostic dreams, and such cannot be said to arise from the agitation of the inward parts.  in that latitude of terms which he useth; for, no doubt, there are many Prophetic Dreams, concerning which the Scripture, both the Old and New Testament, are full of Instance, as Gen. 40. the Butler and Baker had Prophetic Dreams, so likewise Gen. 41. Pharaoh had a Prophetic Dream; such another you may find Dan. 2. of Nebuchadnezzer. In the New Testament we may observe in the 1. Chap. of S. Mat. v. 20. How an Angel appeared to Joseph in a dream: so likewise S. Paul, Acts 16.9. Now these, and many more, which the Scripture and story furnish us withal, and we are bound to believe, do show us, that there are dreams which arise not from the agitation of the inward parts, there being nothing in them that could prognostic any such thing; and therefore this Universal Proposition, (Th●re can be no dream but such) was a fault not to be pardoned: He spoke much better in his Humane Nature, Cap. 3. Num. 3. where he saith, [That the Causes of Dreams (if they be natural) are the Actions or Violence of the inward Parts.] That Parenthesis (if they be natural) stopped a great gap, for these instances were not natural: It was much he should correct the first Copy, making it more erroneous; error it had before, but the rent in his Leviathan was made wider then in his first piece of Humane Nature.   

Sect. 2.  
Error it had before, it was not true to say, that all natural dreams come from the agitation of the inward parts; 
Solomon's opinion of dreams different from Mr. Hobbes'.  for as the greatest Philosopher that was mere man, Solomon, expresseth it, Eccles. 5.3. A Dream cometh through the multitude of business, not only when the inward parts of a man are unquiet and violent, but even then when they are in the best Composure; if a Man have his Fancy disturbed with earnestness of thoughts about any business in the day, in the Night, when he takes his rest, and both the Outward and Inward Senses are locked up by Sleep, his Fancy, being oppressed with the Negotiations of the day, will busy its self about them in the Night, as is most apparent; so that I remember, that the first Latin verses, which I made, were made in my sleep, my thoughts, having run upon nothing else in the day, busied themselves about them in the night; and you shall observe, that a dog, used to hunting, barks in his sleep, with the like, earnestness and useth actions of that nature; so that all natural dreams spring not from the inward parts.   

Sect. 3.  
But in his 3. Chap. of Humane Nature, he offers at some reasons to prove his conclusion, 
His reasons invalide.  and they are delivered at numb. 3. under the name of a Sign, thus: [The signs by which this appeareth to be so, are the differences of dreams (old men commonly dream oftener, and have their dreams more painful than the young) proceeding from the different accidents of man's body] Thus he; 
Old men's dreams.  I conceive this Instance mistaken; God be praised, I have lived to the age of an old man, and I find it other, because I think my thoughts are more composed, and by practice have made my passions less violent, and trouble myself with less eagerness of business; but he saith only, Old men commonly; and then I say, this may be a sign, but not a certain one; yea, in natural things very weak, for the course of Nature is constant, and is a sign that that proposition of his, which is universally proposed, is not universally true; That many times natural Dreams may arise from such inward causes, may be granted, because they cooperate with the business, or thoughts, or passions, to which that man is inclined; but most oft they fail, when it is otherwise. What he further disputes there to show, 
Constitutional dreams:  that such and such Constitutions do produce alike effects in the dreams of those persons, I deny not, so it be not universally affirmed; for we read of some men, who never dreamt; but in the same Numb. pag. 23. he proceeds to another sign thus, [Another sign that Dreams are caused by the Actions of the inward parts, is the disorder and casual consequence of one conception, or image to another. 
Fantastic dreams. ] I grant the conclusion that may be deduced hence, that is, that some Dreams may arise hence, but deny the universality; for fancy not guided by reason, but taking things as, by chance, they offer themselves out of that book of the memory, may be as confused and disorderly, as any disturbance that comes from the inward parts; yea, that confusion can hardly be conceived to come from the inward parts; for suppose the predominant humour be Melancholy or choler; these can suggest only such fancies, when, on a sudden, we may observe that Dreams alter their conditions, and, sometimes in an instant, change from one fancy to another, which that constant condition of the humour cannot promote; his instance which he immediately gives, is not persuasive; thus: For when we are waking, the antecedent thought or conception introduceth and is cause of the consequent (as the water follows a man's finger upon a dry and level Table) but in Dreams there is commonly no coherence. 
Whence coherent, and incoherent, dreams.  This Example seems to me most incongruous to this purpose; for the understanding of man waking, and his fancy, are employed and set at work by his will, which often interrupts and crosseth the Chain of Consequences, and employs the Reason sometimes to seek out new reasons; other fingers to draw water to its end; sometimes commands that finger to stop in the midst of its progress; and so the finger, employed other where, is not followed by the water; but in a Dream, if it arise from such a Physical cause, as many times it doth, a man may conceive rather why things, as they are linked together in the Memory, should follow one another, when one is moved or raised up, because there is no Superior Power to control that Consequence.    

CHAP. XI.  
Sensitive creatures not intelligent; Their specific differences; Their Sagacity.  

Sect. 1  
WEll, that we may part with a Jingle, the rest of his Fancies of dreams, and his dreams of Fancies, I let pass for the present, guessing that what is material in that Discourse, will conveniently be met with hereafter, and now skip to the latter end of the Chap. 2. pag. 8. where he defines understanding to be that imagination which is raised in every creature by word or voluntary signs. I should have let this pass with the rest; 
Sensitive creatures become acquainted with words, and signs, by custom or the suggestions of appetite, not by understanding.  but that I am unwilling to betray that noble faculty of man's soul, his Understanding (by which he is severed from, and exalted above all other sublunary creatures) to that sordid condition of being only a sensual quality. That we may the better apprehend this, we will first observe, that these words, and other such signs which are apprehended by things merely sensual, although the signs are voluntary, such as are imposed by any sign-maker, yet they are perceived to have such signification by those Beasts or Dogs, and the like, not in a rational or intellectual manner, but a natural; for custom merely, which is another nature, and doth the same way facilitate any thing to us as Nature doth, is the only cause of their apprehension of these; and this custom works only by these two Principles, of a love to that which is profitable for them, and a detestation of that is hurtful, which is nothing but that natural appetite before spoken of; for when any of these find that by coming at such a word he is rewarded; by disobeying such a menace, he provokes his own punishment; he by custom being sensible of this, doth accordingly: Nor do any of those words signify any more to that Beast but his pleasure or pain; he understands not any simple term what it signifies, but only these two things; and from these Principles they do not only listen to the words, but speak them, as Parrots, without any understanding more than their belly, and by that you may have Corvos Poetas. Now here is no understanding in these Acts, but almost like a Tree, which if you use to keep bend, it will grow such; so these, being used to the reward or punishment, upon such words, do apprehend them such, and naturally follow or avoid them. But because there are some acts in these beasts which have a nearer affinity with Reason then these he specifies, although I have already written somewhat to this purpose, I will, for the further satisfaction of the Reader, enlarge myself a little, and so pass on to other things.   

Sect. 2.  

〈◊〉 specific souls, & signal differences distinguishing them each from other.  As it is with man, who is one kind or species of Animals, that he hath, besides that general nature of a sensitive soul, another soul which distinguisheth him from other Animals; so likewise it is with the other species or kinds of Animals, they must have some particular soul, or degree of a sensitive soul, which may distinguish them from man, and one from each other; as the Canine or doggish soul distinguisheth a dog from a lion, a bear, a cat, a man. And each of these (besides that general nature of a sensitve soul, in which they all agree) must have some particular soul, or substantial difference in that soul, by which each of these is distinguished from the rest: Now this, whatsoever it is, (which I find not named by Philosophers) but whatsoever this is, it must be the Author of those actions which belong to each; and these peculiar fancies, which do appear in some with a great resemblance of wit, of ingenuity; of docibility, of stupidity and blockishness in others; and this quality, as natural, is propagated throughout the whole kind or species, failing in very few particulars, in some degrees only. And when the peculiar property of any Animal advanceth the condition of it to act like those of men, this in them is called by Philosophers (as I remember) Sagacity, and will appear in divers actions of Elephants, 
Their Sagacity.  Dogs, Birds, which fill the stories of those who write their lives; but all these are wrought not by reason, but by that principle of Nature, which dictates, Eschew evil, and get good, and is directed by the several kinds of Sagacity, which in every kind of Animals hath some addition to the general condition of a sensitive creature, but attains not the height of understanding; but because it may be objected here, how can we discern understanding in man, concerning these simple terms, from that of a beast? I will answer this by experience; for man understands these simple terms in their proper notion, but a beast only in general; I have seen a dog running fiercely at a horse, a woman rebuke him by this Word (Out) which, in its genuine signification, imports Go abroad; and if that Word (Out) had been used to a man, he would have answered, I am out; but the Dog, knowing it only in general to be a phrase of Rebuke, ceased from his barking, and went his way, although other more menacing words, by other men which were present, prevailed not with him, they being, as it is likely, such words which had not been used in his ordinary correction, did not, yet this which, likely, was the Word which had brought him smart, did prevail, to the appeasing him. Perhaps some man, not satisfied in this, may instance in some of those famous Stories of Beasts, which seem to express an apprehension more particular; but I believe, if they were examined, there can be no other further knowledge of simple terms, than this of pleasure and pain to his particular, which may be easily conceived to arise out of that Sagacity which is in every kind of Animals, in several and distinct ways. What he adds, that, understanding which is peculiar to man, is the understanding not only his will, (this should be a Parenthesis, and a most unnecessary one) but his conceptions and thoughts, by the Sequel and Contexture of the names of things into Affirmations and Negations. I can agree with him, that this is peculiar to man, and yet as much may be caviled against this, as that went before; and the sagacious actions of many Beasts would persuade us as soon, that they make Propositions and syllogise, as that they apprehend, understanding the simple terms.     

NOTES UPON THE Twelfth Chapter of Leviathan.  

CHAP. 12.  
Of Religion, the feigned Gods, Ghosts, and the soul of Man.  
HAving done with his Two first Chapters, for this present, I will pass over his Third, concerning the consequence and train of Imaginations, in which are many things very obnoxious to Censure; his fourth of Speech likewise I pass over for the present, and his Fifth with his Sixth, which is nothing but an Exposition of easy terms, which have been better discoursed upon by a hundred several persons; and I skip to his Twelfth,—  
Which begins Pag, 52. and is entitled, Of Religion, wherein, as in many other places, he is to blame not to express what Religion is, that so it might appear how pertinent and reasonable his Discourse is, which if he had done, he might have spared much which he hath written, or otherwise disposed it. That I may proceed therefore the more confidently, take the definition of Religion which is most received, which is:—  

Sect. 1.  
That Religion is a virtue, by which Men give God the worship and honour due to him: 
Religion defined.  And this is the reason why Divines do make Religion a part of justice, and handle it as a Species or part of it, though an imperfect one; because Justice gives to every one as much as is his due exactly; 
Why reckoned among the duties of justice.  but that cannot be done by man to God; and therefore it is imperfectly a part of justice; but yet because in Religion we, after our weak and imperfect manner, do it, therefore it is reckoned among the duties of justice: we do by it give God worship and honour; Worship, as the supreme; Honour, as the most excellent; Those, who are over us, we worship as our Governors, although they have not Excellencies to be honoured for; Those which are our Inferiors, or equals, if they have Excellencies in them, and extraordinary parts, we honour, although not worship them. But these two Excellencies of perfection, and supremacy of Authority over us, being acknowledged by every religious person to be in God, he renders him both those duties in the highest measure, as in justice is due to him for them. Thus we briefly discern what is the Subject he writes of; let us now consider what he writes of it.  
2. First, he saith rightly, that [there is no cause to doubt that the seed of Religion is only in man] for certainly, 
The seed of Religion in man only, because rational.  the Seed of Religion is the assurance that God is infinitely excellent, and hath the highest, and most unquestionable authority over us by the right of Governing us. This apprehension I conceive to be the seed of Religion, and this can be in no Creature which hath not reason and understanding, as Man hath: for, certainly, if they have not understanding to apprehend those divine excellencies, they cannot have Religion: and unless they have liberum arbitrium (which without understanding they cannot have) their actions can be no more pleasing to God than the fire pleaseth him when it burneth.  
3. He labours to give reasons for his Conclusion, others than that I have set down with this Phrase, First, 
Mr. Hobbes' reasons invalid and his discourse impertinent.  Second; but look upon them, they are so incomposed and disjointed, that none of them can produce this Conclusion, That only Man hath the Seed of Religion; But in Page 53. in the beginning he urgeth an Argument from the Chain and Origination of Causes, acknowledged to be of an absolute force for the Causation of a God, and so of the apprehension of the Object to which our Religion is directed. But in all that discourse, let a man consider, whether it be any way pertinent to Religion any otherwise, then to show, there is a God, and to illustrate that saying of his, that fear made the heathen Gods.   

Sect. 4. 
His opinion of the feigned God, invisible Agents, Ghosts etc.   
4. He saith [That fear gives occasion to feign as many Gods, as there are Men that feign them: And for the matter or substance of the invisible Agents so fancied, they could not, by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with the Soul of man, and that the soul of man, was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a Dream to a man that sleepeth, or in a Looking-glass to one that is awake: which men not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but Creatures of the fancy, think to be real, and external substances, and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latins call them Imagines & umbrae, and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those invisible Agents, which they fear, to be like them, save that they appear, and vanish, when they please. Thus far he. In which Period are many strange and forced Expressions without any proof, or illustration. 
Invisible Agents what.  I will touch them briefly, but first I must expound that Phrase used twice by him, Invisible Agents; by that he must understand the false Gods of the Gentiles, for the first Clause, that they conceited those false Gods to be of the same nature with the soul of man, I yield, only more excellent; so was every Daemon esteemed, and so even those Heroes, which were from humanity, in the esteem of Idolatrous men, exalted to a celestial excellency, thought of a greater perfection than themselves had in their earthly condition; and that they had influence, and power over these earthly things, and therefore had Prayers and sacrifice offered to them. But then let us consider his Philosophy concerning man's soul, he saith, That these Idolaters, 
Mr. Hobbes sticks an absurd opinion of man's soul undeservedly upon Idolaters.  who thought their Gods like man's soul, thought a man's soul was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a Dream, or in a Looking-glass] I am persuaded he dreamt when he writ this, he did not so much as see it in any glass in this world; and although it is too much to say, he never read it in any book, (for his Book will witness, that many unexpected things are in Books) yet I can say, that I never heard or read of any Idolater that ever had that absurd opinion concerning the Soul. These two things are things of a very little Entity, the meanest of Accidents, the one a Dream, the work of a sleeping fancy; the other the apparition of a Looking-glass, the weak effect of a poor Accident, Colour, in which it produced itself in a most feeble and weak condition. chose, the soul of man is the most excellent and substantial part in the most excellent Creature man, the Author of all those noble effects which the wit or industry of man can attain unto; and all this affirmed by these Idolaters in their Philosophical Books.   

Sect. 5.  
But he seems to give a reason for it thus [which men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but Creatures of the fancy, think to be real and external substances; and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latins call them Imagines & Umbrae] I cannot conceive to what this Relative (Which) looks, 
His discourse of Spirits and Ghosts etc. too perplexed.  by the preceding words it should be referred to the Dreams or Image in a Looking-glass, but by the consequent words it seems to look further, to the Invisible Agents, for no man was ever so foolish to think that Dreams, or the Image in a Looking-glass, are real substances; nor yet is it true of one piece of them, which is the Image in the Looking-glass, to say it is a Creature of the fancy; for the Image is there, whether the fancy conceit it so, or no. But then to take this word, Which, as it relates to the invisible Agents, which the words following imply [and therefore call them Ghosts] no man ever called the image in a Looking-glass a Ghost: now then in this Sense, although a strange perturbed one, he saith, that men not knowing these Gods of theirs, those invisible Agents to be nothing but Creatures of the fancy called them Ghosts; I believe, if they had known them to be Creatures of the fancy, they would not have so called them Ghosts, as the Latins call them Imagines and Umbrae: Certainly I am persuaded, that the Latins did never call their Gods Imagines or Umbrae. This is a most perplexed discourse, I know not how to make sense of it, nor I believe he himself, for mark he goes on, [and thought them Spirits; that is, thin aerial bodies.] Consider the relative Them, what doth he mean by it? Their Gods, those Invisible Agents? That cannot be for the following words [and these Invisible Agents, which they feared to be like them.] Now if by them before he meant these Invisible Agents, he could not say that they thought them like themselves; but for the other mentioned before, the Dreams or Images in a Glass, no man ever thought to be Spirits or aerial bodies. But he puts a difference betwixt Spirits and Ghosts, or Imagines, or Umbrae, or I know not what [how that they apaear and vanish when they please] and it seems the Ghosts did not: this I believe is not delivered by any, I am confident by none of his enemies, that are studied in School and university-learning; but thus he builds Castles in the air, and I was about to say, fights against them; but he leaves them upon these weak foundations, and never casts a Trench, or plants a Battery against them, with any solid Argument; it may be he throws a stone, an ill word sometimes, but not the least attempt to prove what he says, that ever I read. He proceeds with a discourse, from which I withhold my hand till I come to his Treatise of Angels, which will administer occasion of fuller censure, and here I will leap over to Page 52.    

CHAP. XIII.  
The opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, Devotion to what we fear, taking things casual for Prognostiques, mistaken for seeds of Religion. Of the Sibyls, and their Oracles.  
IN which he sets down four things, wherein consists the natural seed of Religion, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second Causes, Devotion towards what we fear, and taking things Casual for Prognostiques.] Certainly here is a foundation laid for Atheism,  

Sect. 1.  
It is impossible that so goodly a tree, as Religion, should grow out of such rotten and contemptible seeds as these. First, I observe here, that these, he calls seeds, 
Mr. Hobbes sows ambiguous seeds to produce false and true Religion.  he puts not for the immediate, but remote causes of Religion: the immediate Cause (to consent what I can with his Phrase) or the body of the tree, which supports these glorious Acts, is the assurance that there is a GOD; these four Seeds (as he calls them) do but produce that belief in us, and that very weakly, not able to make a man forsake all for God, which Religion must do. Another observation may be, that he doth not make these conceits of his to be the seeds of false Religion only, but even of true; for so presently he discourseth, that these seeds produced either true or false Religion, according to their culture; so that the culture of Abraham, Moses, our blessed Saviour, was but a husbanding of these seeds; and therefore these words must needs be taken in that Indefinite sense they are expressed, that these are the seeds of all Religion. I will consider them apart, and fi●st the Opinion of Ghosts is a seed of Religion.   

Sect. 2.  
All the Opinion of Ghosts, 
The opinion of Ghosts could not introduce the assurance that there is a God.  which he expresseth in the former part of this Chapter, he makes to be an Error; now for Error to be a s●ed of Truth, was never heard of before; an ill tree cannot bring forth good fruit, nor ill seed a good tree; Error the greater growth it hath, the greater is the Error, but it never grows into Truth. Again, in the seventh Chapter he makes Opinion to be a very weak assurance, as indeed it is, although his description of it is weak in that place, but the assurance that there is a God, is the greatest that may be; and therefore not to grow out of such a seed. Thirdly, consider, that although there can be no assurance of God without an assurance of a Ghost or Spirit, because God is expressed in Scripture to be a Spirit, yet the belief and assurance of God cannot grow out of the Opinion of Ghosts; for although the Opinion of Ghosts hath many reasonable and probable arguments in Nature to induce it, which prevailed with many Philosophers to persuade them, that there were such things; yet the Arguments for them are not of like force with those which evince, there is a God; and therefore the assurance of God may introduce and be a seed of the Opinion of Ghosts; but the opinion of Ghosts, which is less certain, and less evident, cannot introduce it. He brings no manner of proof for what he speaks, and in his Catalogue of those Deities which this opinion should produce, Pag 55. He nameth Chaos, Ocean, Planets, Men, Women, and other things which have no likeness with Ghosts or Spirits, although his Daemons and some others have. Now although the opinion of Spirits may persuade a Religion towards those things which were thought Spirits; yet it could never invite, but would cross and oppose those, Religions which were paid to corporeal things; for by all men, who have writ of Spirits, both Christian, and others, Spirits are thought to have a more God like power in them then Bodies; and therefore the opinion of them could not introduce the other.   

Sect. 3.  

Ignorance of second causes apt to produce Atheism then Religion.  His second seed is ignorance of second Causes, a most unhappy and unreasonable speech. Ignorance the Mother of Religion; Ignorance of second Causes cannot make a man acknowledge the first, Rom. 1.20. S. Paul saith, The Invisible things of Him (that is, of God) from the Creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead. This understanding of eternal Power and Godhead is the foundation and ground of Religion, and this was visible, although not in its self, yet in the things that are made, the second Causes; so that not the ignorance, but the knowledge of the second Causes, like Jacob's ladder, leads, us from one to another, step by step, until we ascend to the highest and first Cause. This he himself acknowledgeth before; but as he often doth, so he now forgot what he had said. Ignorance of second Causes that they are second, and mistaking them for first may make a man think them Gods, and so turn a Religion to them; but, as may appear at the bottom of the preceding Page 53. he understands the Ignorance of the Causation of second Causes, which, without doubt, is so far from bringing in Religion, that it is apt to produce Atheism, and an opinion, that the world is governed by chance▪ not by Providence: So that, as for his first, I deny it to be a Seed of Religion, that is, the opinion of Ghosts; so for this Second, the Ignorance of second Causes, I affirm that is an enemy to Religion, stopping the Soul from ascending up to Heaven, by breaking the lowest step of that Ladder which is fixed on Earth.   

Sect. 4.  
His third Seed is Devotion towards what we fear. 
Devotion to what we fear rather a fruit, than seed, of Religion.  That fear, Timor Reverentialis, may be a seed, the fomenter and cherisher of Religion, yea an act of Religion, I do not doubt: but that that ugly sordid fear, which he speaks of, as appears in the bottom of Page 52. is not to be imagined; for the first fear ariseth out of the knowledge and apprehension we have of the Excellency of God; but this second fear, he speaks of, out of Ignorance of Causes. (Because men know there are Causes (saith he) of every thing, but know not those causes, therefore they impute their good or evil fortune to some invisible Agent,) This ignorance o● Causes must needs be understood of second Causes; for ignorance of the first Cause can never make a man worship the first, nor impute the production of things to him; It is true, the ignorance of some Attributes, as his goodness, may make a Maniche think there is an ill God; and the same ignorance may produce almost as ill an opinion in others, that God is the Author of the evil of sin; the one, not apprehending his internal goodness, conceives God evil in himself: the other, not apprehending his Goodness in operation, his Benignity makes him do and produce that is ill; but the ignorance of him, as a first Cause, can never introduce a Religion to him; But then take this ignorance of causes to be the ignorance of the Causation of second Causes, we cannot conceive how that should breed a fear of an invisible Agent, as he terms it, unless it be that god Fortune, which the Poet derideth: Te facimus Fortuna Deum; coeloque locamus. And worthily; for there can be nothing more contradictory than the Providence of God, and the Blindness of Fortune: Now when men cannot find the Chain of Causes, which produce the effects they discerned, and cannot perceive how they depend upon the first Cause, as they cannot who discern not the second, they must needs have that doubt or fear, that they are acted by Fortune, and all things fall alike to all, without either being rewards or punishments, Rods or Scourges, etc. And therefore is so far from introducing of Religion, as it leads to Atheism. But it is not said, that this fear, but the Devotion to what we fear, is the Seed of Religion; I could have wished that among other his expositions of words, he had put down what he means by Devotion, but he hath not: Consider then, the sense of it is, Voto decernere, to decree a thing to another, by a vow; so that when one devotes a thing to another, he than decrees it in a sacred manner to be his. Now then Devotion to what we fear, is decreeing some thing to it by way of Vow; Devotion then to what we fear, if that we fear be God, is not a seed, but a fruit and act of Religion; for Religion is not only, as he, not vainly only, but wickedly, and profanely, defines Chap. 6. page 26. (Fear of Power invisible feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed,) but it is the worship due to God, and this worship is, when it is, as it ought to be, accompanied and attended with reverential fear and awe of that Infinite Excellency; and this makes us devote ourselves in all holy ways to his service; but if these things, we fear, be less than God, although we may devote ourselves, or any thing is ours, to them, it is not Religion, nor in any way doth it introduce Religion. So that if the thing, we fear, have in it the estimation of Divine Excellency, Devotion to it is an Act of Religion, not a Seed; if it have not that estimation, it is an act of some Reverence, or other habit, but no way a Seed of Religion, for a Seed precedes the fruit, and introduceth it, which this doth not.   

Sect. 5.  
His fourth and last Seed is taking things casual for Prognostiques. In all these, 
A taking things casual for Prognostiqu●s, no seed of the ta●●e Religions.  according to his scornful derision, rather than definition of Religion, he makes ●he Seeds of it nothing but Error and Folly; no wonder that the Tree should be so weak and rotten, when the very Seeds are corrupted.  
This Seed he applies Page 56. only to the Religion of the Gentiles, although in general, with the rest, it was uttered of all Religion, and so expressed as I have showed: Indeed if he should speak it of the true Religion, it were most impiously wicked, and would imply, that the very Prophecies in the old and new Testament (which were a true and real Seed of Religion) were but casual things, and not fore-seen by God, and revealed to his Prophets; But I will take him in the best sense that he can be taken, that the taking things casual for Prognostiques, were a seed of those false Religions, and then I say first for the Oracles, men did not therefore believe that there were Gods, and so worship them, because of their oraculous sentences; but because of their belief, that these were Gods, they were confident that they spoke truth, and so expounded them according to the event, whatsoever it was. 
There have been Sibyls that prophesied of our Saviour.  For the Sibyls I might say the like (if they were such as the other) and although he imagined these but feigned, whose Copies we have, yet, that there were such, is evident in Story, and that they prophesied such things as could be applied to none but our Saviour, which were not to be interpreted Casual events, but Prognostiques real; and although the belief in them, for a great while, was a fruit of Religion, for because men believed they were Prophetesses, and inspired by God, therefore they believed what they said; yet afterwards, as it haps in Trees, so did it with their Prophecies, that, which was the fruit of one, was the seed of another; so these Prophecies, which were a fruit of Religion, before were a seed of Religion in planting the Christian Church, and often made use of by the Fathers an Argument against the Idolatrous world, to persuade them to Christianity; but it was not, as he speaks, a taking Casual things for Prognostiques. For the other things, he there reckons up, I guess them, for the most part, unhappy illusions, and the fruit of Superstition, not the seeds of Religion; or else mistakes of second Causes, which in no sense conduce to Religion, as Horoscopy, Presages, and the like.    

CHAP. XIV.  
What the seed of Religion. Concerning the chain of causes. What of God to be known. Of finite and infinite. The first mover. The sound doctrine of Eternity, etc.  

Sect. 1.  
CErtainly the sole immediate seed of Religion, is the assurance that there is a God of an infinite excellency governing all the world; for therefore men perform Religion to him; 
The sole immediate seed of Religion an innate principle.  but that which propagates this naturally, is first without doubt an innate principle, born in, and with a man, which naturally every man hath as soon as he hath reason; and there never was Nation, or society of men, found in the world, which denied it. It is true, there may be now and then, by the suggestions of the Devil, a man found, that with malicious reason hath laboured to dissuade this Principle; but that is not material; There are Errors and Monsters in the moral part of man, as well as in his natural: This Gentleman, who hath by nature the sight of Colours, and ability to discern them, yet hath studied reasons to make men believe he sees none. There is nothing so abhorring to Reason that malicious Reason doth not oppose; but such a truth as this, Quod ubique semper, et ab omnibus, hath been held, cannot be other then natural; and whereas he can show one man breaking this rule, I can show him a hundred that have no use of reason at all, and a thousand that have lost it; so that as such a man, as he, is a rarer sight than those; so he may well be reckoned amongst the worst of fools and madmen; and therefore the Psalmist, Psal. 14.1. saith, The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God; and he himself in this Chapter, pag. 58. affirms, That an opinion of a Deity and Powers invisible, and supernatural, can never be abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may be made to spring out of them: So that this Seed is so naturally and firmly rooted in man's heart, that it cannot be extirpated by any thing, that doth not likewise with it extirpate reason.   

Sect. 2.  

To be proved from the chain of causes.  But because although this is natural, yet some men, by the wickedness of malicious reason, have endeavoured to wither it, therefore other Children of Nature have endeavoured to cherish this root by watering it with the strength of invincible reasons, drawn from the chain of Causes, which suppose a seed or a tree first, and that first to be created, not generated; for if generated, than it requires a preceding tree, or seed, and then that was not first; and so in all the effects in the world. But these men pretend an Eternity in the world, 
An eternity of the world, with an infinity of causations, why not to be admitted.  and so, in the propagation and causation of Natural things, that there may be an infinity of these causations from one to another, which is almost impossible to be conceived; for then there should be an Infinite number of Causes, which cannot be, for then Robert, who is now born, should have no more Paternities or Preceding in causes than Adam had; for if there should be an infinite Number of Causes preceding Adam, then there can be no addition to it; for what can receive addition, is not Infinite, it hath a bound to it, and then all the Causations from Adam to Robert are nothing; for if you should imagine in these five or six Thousand years there may have been so many hundred generations more than were before, I can answer no, the other was infinite; for should you fill this sheet with cyphers, and head them with the figure of one, I can make all these cyphers nine, and the figure of one Nine, and make nine Millions of such sheets; and yet all this, in respect of Eternity, will be not so much as one unite to all this; and six or seven hundred thousand were nothing being added; because whatsoever you add to Robert's number of Fathers, I can add a thousand times as many to Adam's; and therefore Nature, that abhors impossibilities, abhors likewise infinites of Numbers, and, by consequence, of Causations eternally; for a man to say, this Eternity is à parte ante, and not à parte post, is a contradiction; for although there may be some imagination of a thing, which, having a beginning, may have no end, but exist eternally, because it may be created with eternal Principles, and the Number infinite is not presently existing, nor ever shall be; for whensoever you reckon, you shall have a finite time to reckon from, although it were ten thousand Millions of years hence, or whensoever; yet there can be nothing, without a beginning, eternal à parte ante, but must needs have eternal Principles, which no time can corrupt, for if time could corrupt it, as suppose ten thousand years, or a thousand times so many, fix any time, it had been corrupted before this, or else it was not eternal à parte ante. And then to the second part, such a person, he hath actually an Infinite number of Causes, which cannot be; and therefore these things must be created in some certain time: These, and many more arguments, out of Metaphysics, as that which the Philosophers call Essential Subordination of Causes, as likewise many others, are such as of which I may say, that they render the Proposition, There is a God, evidently to be discerned by the Creatures, but, as Aegidius Romanus excellently speaks, Sapientibus, this evidence is perceivable only by wise men; from the disquisition whereof they are not to be scared by the infinity of God's essence, because inaccessible to a finite Inquirer, 
A transition to Mr. Hobbes' Element of Philosophy, etc.  as he plainly asserts it in his Element of Philosophy, etc. whither I will make a transition, to enlarge this discourse, and clear what I have writ from somewhat I find there opposite to my purpose.   

Sect. 3.  
In his said book of Philosophy de Corpore, Cap. 26. Pag. 236. having proposed divers questions about the World, he concludes at the bottom of that pag. and the beginning of the next, Et haec omnia ab eo qui Philosophiam complecti profiteretur universam determinanda essent, 
Somewhat of God, though infinite, may be known.  si quantum quaerit, tantum sciri potest, est autem infiniti scientia finito quaesitori inaccessibilis. Thus far he; And not without reason, no finite understanding can grasp that which is infinite; yet, although we cannot perfectly know that which is Infinite, we may know many things of it. Mr. Hobbes himself, I dare say, doth not know the essence of the Sun, yet there is not the meanest person, which follows the Plough, but knows there is a Sun, and many effects of the Sun, that he doth send forth light, and heat, by which the poor man is comforted. Mr. Hobbes his Argument, Therefore, because finite things cannot know God as he is, we must know nothing of him, is weak. He proceeds.   

Sect. 4.  
Whatsoever we men know, we have learned from our Phantasm; but there is no Phantasm of that which is either Infinite in magnitude, or time, Neque enim homo, saith he, neiiher man, nor any thing that is not infinite, can have any conceit of that which is infinite.) He said true in affirming, that what we know, 
And that from Phantasms.  we have learned from our Phantasm; so although the soul of man have many things in it which have no being in the world, as Chimeras, Utopia's, Leviathans, and our Phantasms are properly of things in the world; yet those things which are in the understanding, and not in the world, are learned from those Phantasms, which are of things in the world; as thus, That man who cannot behold the Sun in his own glory, and lustre, yet seeing him behind a thin Cloud, can learn from thence, that the Sun, who shines so glorious, veiled, and hid from eyes by such a dark body, would have a strange high degree of resplendent lustre, if we could see him as he is: So we learn from Phantasms apparent, as the Apostle speaks, from visible things, to collect many apprehensions of that which is of its self invisible, and not to be perceived; and, having reduced one Conclusion, may collect from thence many more; and men desirous to know God (as he, who desires knowledge, doth) will make such collections. The Prophet David there, in a most heavenly invective, calls them not only fools, but beastly people, who do not so collect, Psal. 94.8. Understand ye brutish among the People: and ye fools, when will ye be wise? Mark; they were foolish, and brutish, because they did not make such Collections. He that planted the Ear, shall he not hear, and he that form the Eye, shall he not see? Thus from one truth men may, and aught to enlarge their talon to another, and learn, as Mr. Hobbes expresseth, from Phantasms. But I like not so well what Mr. Hobbes adds; that there is no Phantasm of that which is Infinite; nor, what he further expresseth; Neither man, nor any thing, that is not Infinite, can have any conceit of that which is Infinite: To understand which I shall take a little pains to explain the conceit of Finite and Infinite,   

Sect. 5.  
Finite is the same to have bounds or limits, beyond which it cannot pass; 
The conceit of finite and infinite explained.  Infinite is that which hath no bounds nor limits; and although, concerning these terms, in the first sounding, a man would think that Infinite should express a mere negation, as finite an affirmation; yet upon judgement of these things, expressed by these terms, we shall find the clean contrary; for by finite we understand non ultra, as much as hitherto, and no farther; but by Infinite we apprehend such a vastness, to which we can always say ultra, that there is further, there is somewhat beyond, and there must be something more. And out of this regard, finite things must have a cause of their finite nature, because whatsoever is bounded, is bounded by somewhat, but infinite can have no cause, because unbounded or limited. These bounds or limits we may consider in three things; in the essence of things, in their quantities, and in their qualities: In their Essence, and so we consider all finite things to be this, and no other; as a Tree is a tree, and not a Beast or Bird, nor another tree; the being of it is bounded, and limited by that difference which constituted it either in its specifical, or particular being; and whatsoever is the Cause of that being, is that which limits that thing, and makes it thus finite in being. But that which is infinite in essence hath no bounds, no limits of that being; it is all essence, without limitation, and, in a most eminent manner, comprehends all being, without any negation. It is true, it is not finite, and therefore it is not a Man, a horse, a dog, a tree, all which names do import a restraint and confinement; but is the perfection of all these, so that no perfection of any thing can be denied of that which is infinite essentially, to say that this infinite is not that; Let us conceive a line infinite; imagine such a thing; This line you cannot say it is a span, a foot, a yard, or mile long, yet it contains in it all these measures, without their limitation; so doth an infinite being contain all beings without confinement, in a more excellent and eminent manner. What I have spoken concerning that which is infinite in essence, or being, may be applied to all other infinites in immensity, in quantity; what is immense must be beyond all bounds of quantity; it must have no limits, but contains eminently all quantities in it: so must number be likewise, if there be any such, which I shall disprove (God willing) hereafter: so must, in respect of duration, Eternity be; It must comprehend all durations, and its self be without beginning and end; so must all Infinites, in respect of quality, be, in regard of wisdom, of mercy, of power, comprehend all those Acts of those qualities, which are in that which is finite, and themselves be without all bounds and limits. H●v●ng thus explained what is meant by infinity, let us return to that which occasioned this discourse [neither man nor any thing which is not infinite (saith he) can have any conceit of that which is infinite] (conceptionem ullam) is his phrase.   

Sect. 5.  

What conceit may be had of infinite.  This I disprove; for although a man's understanding is finite, and cannot grasp, or fully comprehend that which is infinite; yet it can lay hold on it, and apprehend, though not comprehend it; although it cannot enclose the whole being of that is infinite; yet he can discover that it is incomprehensible, and that discovery will give him some conceit of that infiniteness; yea the very knowledge of finite things will yield him some conceit of that is infinite: so he, who traveleth in an enclosed Country, can sever those hedges from his fancy, and can conceit what that Country would be, if those hedges and bounds were removed; although he do not see them so removed; yet he can conceive what manner of Country that would be, if they were removed. Men may conceive that which neither is, nor ever was in the world, as an empty place, against which he hath disputed in his natural Philosophy (although many learned are of opinion against him) and therefore had a conceit of it. Men may, and learned men have expressed their opinions to be of an infinite thing which is not, that is, of an infinite vacuity beyond the heavens, which give bounds to this visible world, & therefore have a conceit of that infinite which they dispute for; men have had a conceit, and, methinks, he is not far from it, that this world hath had an eternal being; and therefore they had a conceit of this we call Eternity, which is an infinite duration; men have a conceit of infinity of number; and therefore somewhere, in his Book of Philosophy (I have forgot where) he most ingeniously expresseth it, that if a man's hand were as active as his head (or to this purpose) he might divide any quantity into infinite parts: his head then is able to do it, and then he must needs have a conceit of his own work; He spoke therefore too much when he said, no finite thing could have any conceit of that is infinite; a conceit it may have, but an imperfect one; and so I go on with him.   

Sect. 6.  
[Neque si quis ab effectu quocunque] Neither (saith he) if a man from any effect to its immediate cause, and from thence to his more remote, and so continually, shall ascend by a most right reasoning; yet he cannot proceed to that which is Eternal, but, being tired, shall flag, at the last, and be ignorant whether he can go further or no] Thus far he, an ingenuous and handsome expression, I confess; but how true, will be examined.  
And first, I hope Mr. Hobbes will not say, he is the wisest man that ever was in the world; or that he only found out right reasoning (and yet he speaks somewhat like this now and then) but, howsoever, because I write not only to him, but to other men, and, I hope, he hath not gained an universal esteem of such with the generality, I thus answer; There was never any sort of reasoning men who denied an Eternity; 
An Eternity acknowledged by all of different opinions.  for whether they held the world had a beginning, or no beginning, which all did, and must do; those which held it had no beginning (as Aristotle, in my judgement) held the world eternal; those which held it had a beginning from Water, as Thales; or Air, as Anaximenes; or Fire, as Heraclitus; or from Atoms, as Democritus, by chance meeting together in the great and infinite Vacuum; not to lose time in confuting all, or any of these, which are most absurd, (yet all these, that held it was principiated by these means, held likewise that that Principle was eternal; so likewise Plato his Ideas and Chaos were eternal.) Let us from the fact consider the manner in one or two instances. If, with Democritus, we make the world constituted by Atoms, when we resolve these mixed bodies into their principles, we come to their Elements, then, with Democritus, those Elements may be resolved into their Atoms; by Aristotle into their Principles, matter, form and privation; these Atoms, according to Democritus, are Eternal; that matter, according to Aristotle; so here is an eternity found; So likewise may be said of Aire, Water, which are by some imagined to be the Principles; or Chaos, and Ideas; If any man can imagine any thing further, that these had a beginning, and were not eternal, his judgement can fly to none but an eternal God; So that still there is, by the ratiocination of man, found out something that is Eternal. When he said [that by the ascending from the immediate cause to the more remote, a man would lose himself] it was most ingenious, and had a truth with it (which perhaps will be farther examined hereafter) if it had been applied to efficient causes; as out of what Egg this Hen was hatched, and what Hen laid this egg, etc. But when we resolve things into their constitutive causes, which make their natures that which they are, than the work will be short as is showed, and the result easy; man need not lose himself in the inquest. What he saith, [that a man tired in the search will be ignorant whether he can go further or no] is not so boldly, as finely affirmed by him; for certainly, although a man be weary in his journey; yet he can discern whether he can go further or no.   

Sect. 7.  
He proceeds, and I [N●que absurdi sequitur quicquam] neither, saith he, would any absurdity follow, 
Mr. Hobbes' indifference, be the world finite or infinite.  whether the world be finite or infinite, since, whatsoever the workman should determine, all those things which we now see, would be seen.] I will not meddle with what concerns not my present business, but remit the madness of the world's infinity in magnitude, as not pertinent to my purpose, and apply myself to that which is in his following words about Eternity.   

Sect. 8.  
[Preterea etsi ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum. [Moreover (saith he) although out of this, that nothing can move itself, may be right enough inferred, that there is some first moving thing, which shall be Eternal; yet that cannot be inferred thence which men do use to infer, to wit, an eternal immovable, but, chose, an eternal thing moved; for, as it is true, that nothing is moved of its self, so it is true likewise, that nothing is moved but from a thing moved.) He is a most unhappy man in his way of reasoning, this contradicts w●at went before; for, 
His contradiction of himself by inadvertence.  if from that conclusion, which he holds true, nothing can move its self, may be deduced a first mover which is Eternal, it necessarily follows, that men, ascending from effects to immediate causes, thence to others, may arrive at that which is eternal, which was denied not six lines before, and hath been confuted by me. Again, observe that that inference, which he censures, must be true, and his inference false; For, if there be a first mover, and every thing moved is moved by another, 
The first mover proved immovable.  then that which moves must itself be unmoved; for if it move, then that was not the first mover, but rather that other thing which moved, that he said was the first movable; for a first can have nothing before it; but that movable, according to his Philosophy, must have another moved thing which moves it; And for the two Propositions, out of which he draws his inference, he saith they are alike true; I, that they are a like false; that which saith, nothing moves its self; For the nature of every thing, as Aristotle defines it, is the Principle of motion and rest of each natural body, that is, the natural motion and rest, and therefore moves every natural body naturally. And therefore the other Proposition is like false, which saith, that every thing which is moved, is moved by something which is moved itself, which can be affirmed of none but violent motions, they are forced by something without, but neither natural, nor animal motions. And this Philosophy he might have known to have been delivered by many of his friends, the Schoolmen, who disavow Aristotle in that Argument. I will leave his discourse in the middle, which is a proud contempt of such as labour to prove the beginning of the World, and close with him again towards the latter end of 237. Pag. where he endeavours to answer an Argument somewhat like that which I urge, but how weakly, let the Reader judge. The Argument itself is not so strong as mine, and shall together be both examined.   

Sect. 9  
He begins thus, [Quis enim hoc modo demonstrantem laudet.] Who, saith he, will praise a man after this manner demonstrating: if the world be Eternal, than the number of days (or any other measure of time) infinite hath preceded the birth of Abraham; but the nativity of Abraham preceded the nativity of Isaac; therefore one infinite, or one eternity, should be greater than another, which is absurd,] thus far he. 
Mr Hobb●s's paralogism.  Consider first the affinity this Argument hath with mine in the place to which this should be inserted; his Argument is drawn from the number of Days, mine of paternity, which overthrows one of his Answers at the first view, as will appear in its place. But that wh●ch he seems to apply his strength against is that Axiom, one Infinite cannot be greater than another; This is used concerning infinite in number; the reason of this is, because whatsoever is infinite, is boundless, it cannot be outgone, but its self outgoes every thing of its kind; now what is greater than another contains that, and exceeds it; so four exceeds three, and therefore gives it bounds; a hundred, and every number is bounded, it is not 100 and one, it is bounded in its self; and therefore every number hath its internal bounds, and, if it be exceeded, it hath external bounds, Minimum quod non, as his friends the Schools speak, so well as maximum quod sic; it hath the least term of that it cannot extend to, as the greatest it can exist in.   

Sect. 10.  
Well, let us consider his answer [Similis demonstratio est,] It is a like Demonstration (saith he) as if he from thence, that there is an infinite number of equal numbers; therefore he should conclude that that there were so many equal numbers as there are numbers equal and unequal together taken.] I find a mighty error run through his whole work, which doth not become a Mathematician, & is evident in this Answer, 
His disputing ex non concessis.  that he disputes Ex non concessis, his Answer is drawn from a supposal, that there is an infinite number of equal numbers, which is false; there is no infinite of either equal or unequal numbers; for suppose the world made of Atoms with Democritus (although they are called Infinite, because man's eye cannot discern them, 
No infinity at all of numbers  nor his wit apprehend them) yet they, being bodies that have dimensions, must have a finite nature; and therefore a certain number of them must go to the constituting another bigger body, suppose a Million to make a barley corn, what number you will, yet it is a number, and that number may be reckoned by unities, every one for a Million, and so every million of Millions may afterwards be reckoned by unities, as one may go for a Million or Millions, and a million of sheets, or papers, may be filled by these, or more greater numbers may be united; yet they are, and will be a certain number of them, and the things of this world are made in number by GOD Almighty, aswell as measure and weight, as the Son of Sirak, Wisdom, 11.20. Well then: there is no infinite number; he answers from an impossible supposal; but now hence doth he infer. If I should grant there were an infinite number of equal numbers, then that should be equal to all numbers, even equal and unequal; yes, it must, for there cannot be an infinite number of unities but must be equal to infinite twoes, three, twenties, hundreds; for 〈◊〉 which is infinite hath no bounds, if it had not infinite twenties, infinite Millions, indeed infinite infinites, it had some bounds, it is not infinite, whatsoever by any reckonings, even by myriads, can be bounded, is not infinite, can be exceeded; therefore it is absurd to say, the world was infinite in duration, for if we conceive it infinite, 
Why the world cannot be conceived infinite in duration.  as I argue, there must be as many paternities of Adam, as of Robert, and all that number of paternities betwixt Adam and Robert are no addition. A drop in the Sea is an addition, because the Sea is bounded and finite, but if it were infinite, there could be no addition to it. The greatest number, that is, may have addition, because it is finite, but what is infinite can have none. Nature therefore, which abhors these impossibilities, allows no infinite being in the world, or to this world; But now consider his answer once again, you shall find the similitude, he answers, clean contrary to my Argument, and the Argument opposed by himself. He says, because there is an infinite number of even numbers, therefore that should be equal. I dispute clean contrary, because an infinite number of even numbers cannot be equal to even and odd, which it must if it be infinite; therefore there is no infinite number of even numbers, twenty must be more than three, and infinite three, if there were any such, must be infinite twenties. Likewise, I think I have said enough to this answer, I will now examine his other.   

Sect. 11.  
He proceeds in the last line of that page, and the beginning of Page 288. [Nun qui Eternitatem mundi sic tollant. Do not (saith he) Who so take away the Eternity of the world, with ●he same work, take eternity from the builder of this World.] No, say I, by my Argument drawn from the certain number of paternities, 
And yet God the Creator, may, and must.  there is no colour for that mistake; for I, with St. Luke, 3. and the last, fix all paternities in God, and make him the father of Adam, beyond which there is no reckoning. But howsoever my Argument is quit of his Answer, yet he, although he argue weakly against himself, answers as weakly, for the Argument no way can be applied to God the maker of the world, not his own Argument. I will therefore, as near as I can, draw out the force of his Argument; for at the first blush it appears not. The maker of the world is Eternal, that is, infinite in duration, and therefore infinite of days may be attributed to him; therefore he cannot have more days added to him, for if no infinite can be longer than another, than he, that had an infinite duration in the days of Abraham, could have no addition in the life of Isaac; so that the denial of an imparity of infinite numbers, denies likewise, by consequence, the infinite of God. For satisfaction to this, Conceive that God is Eternal, which is to be without beginning or end, 
No before or after in Eternity; and yet how these terms are applicable to God's duration or coexistenc●, not to his simple or absolute existence.  the beginning and end of all Creatures, but he is without either; that in Eternity there is neither Prius nor Posterius, before or after; for where there is no alteration, but the thing exists the same for ever, there can be nothing before or after, for these terms require two things to be applied to, either this and another, or this differing from its self; but in that Eternity, before the making of the world, there was nothing besides God, and he without change, so that there could be no use of those relatives before or after; And this Philosophy must be true of whatsoever is eternally existing alone. So Plato concerning his eternal Ideas, before they were incorporated with Chaos; So Democritus must think of his eternal Atoms, before that good luck, which brought them together had, compacted them into those bodies which they made. Now although this, which is eternal, have no before, or after appliable to him existing in himself; yet when he hath made Creatures, then coexisting with them, and in relation to them, these phrases may be applied, as before this man, this thing; before a day, a year, or the like; for such relations may then be had to other things, though none in himself, or to himself; Now, because of this, no duration of time, no Aera, no computation can be applied to God, before the world, to say he was a day or year, or so, by such time as we make our Computations, or can tell how to make any; but it is true to say, he was before the world, which signifies no more but to say, he was, and the world was not; but to say, he was a Day, a month, or year, or the like, is not true, nor to be imagined; for time its self (and therefore the parts of it) is the measure of duration, in regard of its priority or posteriority; so a year hath divers months, weeks; those, days; and they, hours, distinguished by the first, second, etc. Now where is not this priority or posteriority, there can be no imagination of time; so that, for my part, I am of opinion that these, who hold the whole world to be Eternal, must not, cannot reckon the duration of the world (because the whole being must be altogether) to say that it lasts years, days, or so forth, for it must be immutable in its self, although the parts of it are mutable and subject to change, and they may be reckoned by these times, or part of them, according to which they exist; and this world, in the bulk coexisting with its mutable parts, may, in relation to them, be said to be before or after them; But now the case is otherwise with God, who was when there was no world, nor any mutable thing, and then could have none of those relations, which concern them, attributed to him; for when there is no year, day, hour, how can he be said, to endure and last those times? nay, although we should fancy such a thing which is not, as a day, or hour, before this mutable world, yet we cannot apply it to him who hath no succession in him, when he hath no successive thing coexisting with him; as concerning his immensity, he having no quantity, we can say he coexists with these quantitative things that are in the world; but he being such that neither the Heaven, nor heaven of heavens can contain, he must exist without them, and there he cannot be said to exist with any quantity or measure; and to say, Gods being was a day a year, etc. before the world, when there was no time, were as improper as to say, he were a yard long, or a mile, where there was no continued quantity, or body for him to subsist with.   

Sect. 12.  

Our double conceit of God's eternity, to which no computation of time is applicable  By Eternity we conceive either the internal duration of God, or an external measure of that duration, as time is to the duration of successive things; In the first, he being subject to no change nor alteration, no composition or commixtion, we can make no division in it of hours, or days, in his Eternity, because there is no parts of it subject to any change; For the second, if you conceive Eternity to be an outward measure, a real measure you cannot, (for there was no real thing without him) you must make it then only imaginary, in the apprehension of men, what can that be! First then, there was no man to imagine it; secondly, if a man's present imagination work upon it, it must make the measure even to the thing measured, without beginning, without end, altogether without succession, and then th●nk if there can be day, year, Olympiad, Eclipse, Aera, Epocha, any thing that is used for Computation of time, found in it; certainly no man's imagination, I think, can apply any such thing to an eternal being, and therefore not days.   

Sect. 13.  
This doctrine is most agreeing to the Scriptures (which teacheth the truest Philosophy) for the Scripture makes him to be the Creator of the world; if so, 
The doctrine of eternity most agreeable to H. Scripture.  then before the world; then Eternal; then these durations, which are measures of our worldly things, cannot be affirmed of him, nor time, nor parts of it, which are only measures proportioned to those things of this world, which are successive. I need not name the places, but there are many of Scripture which express this eternal being of God, so Psal. 90.2. Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst form the Earth and the World, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art GOD; Here, in this one place, is all the Philosophy I have delivered of God's eternity; here is contained his Eternal being, when the world was not, in that is said before. etc. when they were not, he was. Secondly, here is expressed the total being of the Eternal together, in that is said, Thou art God from everlasting to everlasting, not thou wert, or wilt be, only, but before them thou art; and here is expressed likewise, that, in respect of other things, the Creatures, he may be said to have these relations before and after, though not in relation to himself; but yet no set term, as to say, a day, or two days, or years, before. I am confident there is no one place of Scripture which expresseth any certain measures of duration belonging to him. I know it may be objected to this, that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, Chap. 1. vers. 10, 11, 12. The Apostle, speaking of the Eternity of our Saviour, according to his Divinity, saith; Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the Earth, and the Heavens are the works of thy hands. Verse. 11. They shall perish, but thou remainest, and they all shall wax old as doth a garment. Verse 12. And like a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail. In this place the eternity of Christ's divinity is called years; and therefore those measures of our times must be applied to that Eternity, and then days may, of which years are composed. To this we may most reasonably answer, that the Apostle accommodates his manner of language to the capacity of the vulgar, and the language of men, concerning durations, so well as actions; so before he said, the Heavens were the works of God's hands, as if he had said, because all great works are wrought by hands amongst men, God had hands, by which he wrought those heavens, So, thy years shall not fail; that is, thou art Eternal, because men reckon their duration by years; and yet observe the language, it is said, they are indeficient years, years which fail not, all our years, fail, the last year is gone, this far in going, and until the end of the world, man's years, the world's years, and their durations will fail; but God's years, no part of his duration, reckon it what you will, shall fail. This is the sense of the Scriptures, and men cannot, without a contradiction, expound it of our time, every part of which is deficient; Thus the Philosophy I have delivered being framed according to Scripture, I shall answer his Argument. The days, which may be attributed to God, and the measures of our time, can only be in regard of his coexisting with time in this world, and therefore he doth not, nor can be said to be of more days, than the world hath; for he, who affirms he hath more days, or any such Computation, affirms a falsehood; there were not more days, therefore not a coexisting with them; and therefore he had more days when Isaac was born, then when Abraham; but in neither of them had he an infinite number, but finite numbers of days; nor doth the world yield more; his durance is without number of weeks, or days, what successive thing soever we account by; and therefore that Argument, against the world's eternity, hath no force, applied to God.   

Sect. 14.  
I proceed with him, Ita ab hoc absurdo, etc. [Therefore (saith he) from this absurd thing they fall into another, being constrained to say, that Eternity is a standing instant and an infinite number of numbers is an Unity, which is much more absurd.] There are two parts in this Objection, the first concerns the nunc stans, or permanent instant; the second of innumerable numbers, etc. for perspicuity I take them apart, and handle them distinctly. And first for his absurdity that he conceives to be in a standing instant; if it do not stand still, 
No absurdity in asserting Eternity to be a standing instant.  and when it doth not, it is no longer nunc, or an instant, but time, or at the least two parts of time, but instant it is not; now, certainly, that which hath no mutation cannot choose but perpetually, eternally, stand still; and that, which to mutable things would be time, to him must be instant. I can show him one instant that stood still near two thousand years of time; and therefore, if time could be infinite, would last eternally, which is john 8.58. When the jews wondered that our Saviour should have seen Abraham, he answered, before Abraham was (not I was, but) I am. There is a difference in exposition, some say that this speech is understood of his Humanity, that his humanity was in the thoughts of God, and his Decree, before Abraham; but this cannot be the sense; for Christ being the son and posterity of Abraham, even in the knowledge and decree of God, as well as in his birth in the world, therefore it could not be spoke of his humanity, that it was in the Decree of God before Abraham, for Abraham, in the same Decree, must be before Christ's humanity, as the father of him: But suppose it were, let me inquire, was that being, which Christ had then in the knowledge or being of God before Abraham, was that being existing when he spoke these words, or no? If no, than he could not say I am, but I was; if so, it proves my Conclusion, that there was a nunc stans, a standing instant near two thousand years. But I am well satisfied, that that speech, of his, was meant of his Divinity which is eternally the same, and was before Abraham, when Abraham was; and after him, he being that which is, which was, and is to come, Revelation 1.4. And certainly there must needs be the same reason, that that instant must be Eternal, as that it should stand still so long as before Abraham to our Saviour. But his words, presently after, seem to make another reason of the absurdity in nunc stans, thus.   

Sect. 15.  
[Cur enim Eternitas] Why (saith he) should Eternity be called nunc stans, now standing, rather than tunc, then standing; there must therefore be either many Eternity's, or now and then must signify the same) Thus he for answer; this term stans or standing, is indifferent to time passed or to come, when applied to either positively; but if either doth imply a Negative of that is present, in that second consideration it no way agrees to eternity which is always present; but in the first sense, because eternity comprehends all time, when it is spoke of any thing done or being in time, as that Isaac was borne, or Antichrist shall be, this was, or shall be done, may be in Eternity, which coexists with these times; so, before Abraham was, I am; and who is, was, and shall be, are spoke of him; and then, when Abraham was, he was, without the Negative of was, that is, denying it to be now; then when Antichrist will be, he will be, without any employed Neg. that he is not now; And so comes in the second part of this Objection, that now and then are all one; For answer; although now standing and then standing, 
The difference of nunc stans and tunc stans as applied to Eternity.  if applied to Eternity, signify the same thing, and we conceive, by both of them, an eternal immutable being; yet now, and then, alone do signify divers things; old Abraham, and young Abraham, signify the same person, but old and young are divers. Or thus, Socrates laughing, and Socrates discoursing, are the same, this is false Logic, and he either considered not what he writ, or did it with an intention to deceive; this same term [standing] makes them both be applied to Eternity, for no duration is standing, or lasting, but that which is eternal; all others are successive; that eternal thing, which stands now, without succession, stands then, in passed and future times, whensoever they exist, they changed, but he remaining the same. Expect not a simile to agree in all things, than it must be that very thing which it assimulates: but thus: As you may conceive a firm and strong rock made of some Adamantine, or heavenly, immutable substance; this rock stands still, without change of the least particle; cut a sluice of the Sea into it, whose waves dash upon it, so long as these waves batter upon it, that rock is before one, and behind another, none of which relations it had before; they are in a perpetual flux and change, the rock stands, as it were, unconcerned in them; return that Sea into its own Channel, it hath no respect to any wave again, no more than it had before the coming in of those waters: so that eternal, immutable, unwashable rock of beings, exists of its self, until these turbulent waves of unconstant time are let into it, then, all that while, it hath these relations to it, of past, present, and to come; but when things are retreated again, when time ceaseth, there is no more any of these differences of past, or present, which are applied to time, and it had in relation only to time and temporary things, but is purely nunc stans, or tunc stans, I care not which, if it be stans, if it be standing and permanent, it expresseth the notion of eternity. Well, and yet nunc and tunc, now and then differ in themselves, and are united only in this which we call Eternity. Revel. 1.8. I am Alpha and Omega, there the time that was passed, and the time that was to come, every kind of them was applied to this nunc; the present being, I am, in it comprehended the beginning and the end of others: it might be said of others, they were the beginning, and should be the end; but of him, he is the beginning, and the end, the first and the last, as it is added in the 22. of the same Revelations the 13. He is this in himself; but then take him coexisting with time, he is he who is, who was, and who shall be; so that it is evident his duration taken in its self, is the same time and nunc, now and then; so either of them be considered standing, or permanent; but, in respect of the Creature, he may be said that was or shall be. Thus I hope that Argument is answered; nunc and tunc stans, now and then, so they have that addition of permanent, are the same, which differ without that addition. Now to the second Argument   

Sect. 16.  
[And (saith he) they make an infinite number of numbers an unity.] I deny this Consequence, 
Eternity coex●sts, with no infinite number of days.  it can be enforced no otherwise then that eternal exists an infinite number of days, which I deny; Eternity doth not exist an infinite number of any measures of time, nor any time, when time doth not exist, as is before expressed: but, if there should be an infinite time lasting, it would exist with it; but, the first failing, coexisting with it cannot be.  
Thus the Reader may, in a weak manner, conceive this Eternal Now, how it may be the same with Eternal Then, and how there are not contained an infinite number of numbers in it.   

Sect. 17.  
As to those other Arguments drawn from the government of the Creatures, to prove the main proposition, 
God so manifest in the Creatures, as all ignorance is inexcusable.  that there is a God; I could delight to spend whole sheets in discourse upon them, but that I must not lose myself in this intendment I am about; they are so evident, that, as St. Paul, where before cited, Rom. 1.20. it renders men without excuse; For the Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament showeth his handy work, Psal. 19.1. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard, Vers. 3. So that the manifestation is universal, no man can be excused from the observation of these things, verse 4. Their line, or direction, is gone throughout all the earth, and their words to the end of the world: I must not be long in this Theme; As when a man sees a brave house gloriously built, he cannot choose but think him an excellent workman that wrought it: so doth the beauty of this great building of the World make us admire the workman; As he, who should hear excellent Music, must needs think it the work of some eminent Musician; As a man, when he sees a Great man's house governed with regularity, and ordered in an exact discipline, must needs think there is a discreet Steward or Master, who disposeth and order that family: so when the Method, in which the world is contrived, and disciplined, is considered, a man must needs think that there is an infinite wisdom which governs all: And therefore the son of Sirach, Wisd. 13.5. By the greatness and beauty of Creatures, proportionably, the Maker of them is seen; that is, the maker of this house, the Artist, who composed the Harmony, the Contriver of this discipline is discerned by the effects of it, which, because they require a vast and immense power and wisdom, we must attribute to God; for if a man would think with himself how innumerable accidents, that is, external things, conduce to the producing of the least effect, a man cannot conceive how less than an Infinite wisdom and power could, in such a Method, concentre them to the least business. But I lose myself with delight in this admiration of my God, and I desist. These, and the like reasons do cherish that innate Axiom, That there is a God, even in natural Man; And this leaves all the world without excuse, for not knowing, there is a God, or knowing there is one, but not worshipping him as God, or, knowing him thus, as Nature teacheth him, for worshipping Idols, or Images, which they must needs know not to be the Author of these great effects.     

A PARAENETICAL digression to Mr. HOBBES.  
NOw Mr. Hobbes, if this Treatise come to your hand, as, it is likely, it may, give me leave to advise you a little with words that may lie by you, and so not pass slightly away. You are a man, as I observe, in this Philosophy-treatise, of more than ordinary conceit; you have spent much time in the search of Nature, although you are full of Paradoxes, and those not strengthened with any greater reason than your own Authority; yet they taste of a mighty Acumen ingenii, as likewise of a most industrious and working head, to contrive and bring those apparent Errors to such ends as you have brought them; but, good Sir, consider why do you so constantly in your Leviathan, and upon all occasions, so unnecessarily, take advantages to speak against the known, and most received Truths in Divinity? What need had you in this place to dispute the case of the Eternity of the World, and to say, that the question of the origin of the world should be left to those which are lawfully over us in ordering Divine worship, Pag. 237. Sir, we know who you mean by that from your Leviathan, to wit, the Supreme Magistrate; suppose he should be an Atheist, and deny the Creation; would you do so likewise? you seem to be ready, and invite others to it, in scorning those reasons are brought for it, and labouring to weary the faith of a Christian man in it; It is true, Faith is able to support a fainting Soul against the distractions which wicked Reason can object; but it is a wicked Reason that troubles and distracts it. John 20.20. It is said of the Disciples, that they were glad when they saw the Lord after his Resurrection; not that they doubted of it before, they were not all Didymusses; but Faith herself is comforted by Reason and visible experiments, as it is tired and wearied in struggling against Reason. Consider with yourself what you will answer Almighty God at the last day, when he shall say, I have assisted thee in the purchase of so much Learning, how hast thou used it to my honour? why didst thou abuse it to my dishonour, in disputing against, and disturbing my poor servants from their assents to those Divine truths I prescribed in my word? It will not serve your turn to say, You did it by Fate; for the same Fate will fatalize you to a worse condition then that brought you to this, if you do not repent; it is not in this one point, but twenty more, you are guilty of this fault, studying to countenance Atheistical Wits with shows of Reason to abet their wickednesses. For God's sake (if you think there is one) and his Son Jesus Christ's sake, without whom you cannot be saved (if you think there is a Jesus Christ, and that there will be a Salvation) with your own hand blot out these hand-writings of your own, which will lie against you, and condemn you; it were better done by you, with pardon from God for them, then by others reasons confuted to nothing, and the guilt remain with you. I am persuaded you can object little against this I have writ; and although, after these Arguments I have discussed, Pag. 238. You say concerning the World's magnitude and beginning, you are content with that doctrine which the Scriptures persuade, and the fame of those Miracles which confirm them, the Country-custome, and the due reverence of the Laws; this you say, you are content with, but, like a discontented man, you wrangle against all; can any thing be more clearly delivered in Scripture then the Creation of the world? hath not the constant custom of your Nation, ever since Christianity was planted, acknowledged it? yea, I could tell you the custom of this Nation before Christianity was settled, even the Druids acknowledged it; is it not an act anciently confirmed by our Laws, and yet unrepealed? you then did but speak this, and not do it, but snarl, under a colour of reason, against that which you profess and certainly aught to repent for doing; and though you say, this reasoning contemned by learned men; yet I can show you somewhat like this even in one which you yourself commend in your Epistle, and I am persuaded, you cannot satisfactorily answer this I have said (laying aside the Scripture) but with scorns, as you use to do, or with other as weak blasphemies, I pray God forgive you, and work a repentance in you.  
And now, Reader, do thou forgive the tediousness of this digression; in general, let me advise this, that if thou meetest with any of these muddy-souled Writers, which, with Thomas, will believe nothing but what they see, do then consider our Saviour's answer, Jo. 20.29. Blessed are they that do not see, and yet believe. Doth God reveal in his Sacred and blessed Word any thing that seems incongruous to thy Reason? know it is most agreeing, although thou discoverest it not; and believe what he requires, against thine own reason, so shalt thou be blessed by God, and thy Faith shall be crowned with happiness, which is my prayer, and shall be my endeavour in this, and all I write.  

CHAP. XV.  
Concerning the opinion of a Deity; Form Religion, what, and wherein founded.  

Sect. 1.  
THus, having past a few Observations upon his Seeds of Religion, I skip many impertinent discourses of his in the way, and come to his Notes upon the dissolution of Religion, which are entered upon by him, Pag. 58. thus [From the propagation of Religion it is not hard to understand the Causes of the resolution of the same into its first Seeds or Principles: which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernatural. 
Mr. Hobbes contradicts himself, as touching the seeds of Religion. ] Let the Reader at first consider the inconstancy of this Writer, how immediately he not only deserts what he had writ in this very Chapter, but opposeth it. He just before made those four fancies to be the Seeds of Religion, now he makes it only One, and that not the same with any of the other; nay, he opposeth himself in this very Sentence, for he speaks of the resolution of it into its first Seeds and Principles, in the Plural number, and yet saith, which are only an opinion of a Deity. Thus inconstant is Error, 
Which are more than only an opinion of a Deity, etc.  but then that is an intolerable Phrase for him to use, to term the Seeds of Religion, an Opinion of a Deity; for although this word Opinion may have a large Sense, and be taken for whatsoever knowledge any man hath of any thing, whether by Faith or Demonstration; yet, since he hath formerly defined it in a weak manner to be be a poor and faint assurance, Pag. 31. it was unworthily, and disgracefully done of him, to call this inbred principle, this which abides so much demonstration à Posteriori to the learned, so much persuasive illustration to the meanest capacity, to call this barely Opinion; but he labours throughout the Book covertly to insinuate, as much as he can, a disgraceful conceit of Religion, which I mean to Observe in my travails through it.   

Sect. 2.  
He proceedeth, and affirms that [that can never be abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may again be made to spring out of them by the culture of such men as for such purpose are in reputation.] This Proposition is delivered in such universal terms as makes it exceeding difficult to understand what he means by it, 
Mr. Hobbes more perplexed in his writing then the Schoolmen.  He talks of, and censures the Schoolmen for a mystical way of writing, but, certainly, their language is Significant, Logical, Grammatical, which his is not; for first, what doth he mean by humane nature, the Species or kind of man, as we call it Mankind? I am confident than it is true; but if he mean that particular nature of Socrates or Plato, 
How far the foresaid opinion may be abolished out of humane nature.  although it cannot be so extirpated out of it, as that it cannot be introduced again; yet it is many times so abolished, as it is not introduced by those he names. But then mark what follows [but that new Religions may be made to spring out of them.] Consider at the beginning he spoke of Seeds in the Plural number, than he made those many Seeds but one, now again in this Term (Them) he makes many again; For the Term (Them) can relate to nothing but the former Seeds or Seed specified. He writes most perplexedly, and because not clear expressions to the understanding, therefore not perspicuous to have Observations made upon any thing in his writing but the confusedness, yet I will proceed with him.   

Sest. 3.  
[For (saith he) seeing all form Religion is founded at fi●st upon the Faith which a multitude hath in some one person whom they believe, not only to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally.] Consider how this Gentleman's language contradicts himself: first he made the Seed of Religion only an Opinion of a Deity, that was for taking Opinion in a large Sense; now he makes it to be the belief men have of some man: But yet I can answer for him somewhat: that in the first place he spoke of Religion, now he speaks of it as a form Religion, by which, I think, and only think (for that Phrase, form Religion, 
What may be supposed Mr. Hobbes mean's by a Form Religion.  is an unusual Phrase) yet I think he means some set form of worship, by which, in such or such a manner, men express their duties to God; now as Averro said, to sacrifice to God was dictated by nature, but whether to Venus, or Diana, was the direction of man; so, it may be, he means, by this word Form, some particular restraint of Religion to this or that particular way; and the Seed of this is the Belief, etc. I have made out the sense as well as I can, to make it hold together: Well then, I will take Form Religion for such which, in a several sort of men, is allotted to Divine worship. Seeing then (saith he) all form Religion is founded, etc. 
How he imposeth upon his Reader.  This Phrase seeing then should relate to some former proof or illustration of this Proposition, but I can find no such thing attempted, nor this Proposition any where else delivered by him: This is a strange kind of juggling, to make the Reader believe, that he hath proved that which he never spoke of before. Well: we will examine the Conclusion, [Alderman form Religion is founded at first upon the faith,] we will first examine this Term (founded, 
Form Religion not founded upon his fantastic Faith.  at first) that may be understood, that Religion is bottomed upon this belief, as a building, which is raised upon a rock, is said to be founded upon it which is the last and lowest support of it. Now this belief, which he speaks of, cannot be such, for the foundation of Religion, as he spoke before, is the assurance of a God, which is either had by nature, or by those demonstrations, and illustrations spoke of before; but perhaps, he will say, this is the foundation of Religion, in general, as Religion, but not as a form Religion, as this particular, that is only that Belief which he speaks of; I will therefore examine it in those two most remarkable Religions, 
The Jewish and Christian principally to be examined.  and evidently to be discerned, the Jews Religion, and Christian, in both which we may observe two principal things in the forming them; for Religion, and a most reverential worship due to God is apparent out of nature, and the demonstrations before spoke of; but then the forming it consists in these two things, who this GOD is, whether Jehovah or Baal, Christ or jupiter; and than what manner of worship is to be performed to these; and both these formings, I affirm, are form, bottomed, supported by something much more firm than that belief he speaks of. First then for the form of the jewish Religion, in the first motion, whether Jehovah or Baal, any heathen god be the God to whom Religion is to be paid, this was not founded upon the faith which the multitude had in some one Person, as he fancieth.    

CHAP. XVI.  
What Religion before the Flood. What meant by that Invocation, Gen. 4.26. The sins and punishment of them that perished in the Flood. The prevalence of Religion, whence.  

Sect. 1.  
THe Conditions of Religion before the Flood, 
No prob●li●y of Idolatry before the flood.  hath so little spoke of it in Scripture, as it hath bred dispute amongst Divines whether there were any Idolatry, either Worship of Idols or false Gods in that long tract of time; that which persuades me to think there was none, is, that although the time was long, yet the Ages of men were so vast, that there must needs be a Memorial of the Creation, for there was little more than half a man's life, not above five or six hundred years betwixt Adam and Noah, which must needs be continued in that long-living age by such as were Contemporaries with them both; and then, besides this, there is no mention of any false God worshipped, or any Idolatry in that whole Story. Wherefore in the silence of Scripture, which records other faults of that Age, but not this, we may collect from the former reason justly, that there was no probability of any such forgetting of God, whose great work of making them was so fresh amongst them.   

Sect. 2.  
Some Arguments are objected against this Conclusion; 
1. Argument.  that in the last verse of the 4th. Chapter of Genesis it is said, that Adam's son Seth begot Enos and then men began to call upon the Lord; so that, because men are never without some Religion, and it seems the Religion to the true God was forgot so quickly, it seems necessary that then they should have some Religion to a false God.  

Answ.  For the understanding of this place, conceive with me, that it cannot be understood in that down right sense which the words seem at first to bear, and they who object it, would infer: For Invocation or calling upon the name of the Lord, 
Invocation taken for the whole worship of God.  as it is many times (it being a principal piece of it) is taken for the whole worship of God, it cannot be that men should now begin to do that which, without doubt, Adam, Abel, Seth, and all such as were godly must needs have done long before; 
Practised by Adam Abel, Seth, etc.  Nay, although this Story of the Fathers is delivered by Moses in exceeding short notes, yet in the 3. and 4. vers. of this 4. Chap. it is recorded, that both Cain and Abel brought Oblations to the Lord, which was an Act of Religion; so that Religion did not now begin. There are many witty Expositions given, 
Or for some peculiar additional Devotion.  and some in their Expositions destroy the Text; but what seems most probable to me is, that, as in every age men, desirous of God's honour, studied which way to act it most laudably, and give any addition to it; so now they might, at this time, add something to their natural worship by prostration on the ground, and Oblaeions and sacrifices, as Hymns and Invocations of God, which were not used before: Men began to call upon the name of the Lord in such a way, which afterwards improving itself to a general Devotion amongst the sons of God (as I think pious men were called in those days) it gained that name in a peculiar manner to be attributed to it, so that men began that worship which was known by the name of calling upon God: As you may see in Confession, 
A like instance in Confession  every acknowledgement of a man's sins, or God's goodness, is Confession; yet if you ask, have you been at Confession? It is understood of Confessing to a Priest, and accounting your sins to him. Instances might be very many in this kind; take one more, perhaps a little closer; 
The Church Service.  We know that every pious act is a service to God, yet, for the eminence and excellence of it, The Common Prayer, used in the Church, hath so appropriated that name, that if a man asked were you at Service to day? it will be understood of Common Prayer. If the Question be, at what time did service begin? The answer will be, Nine, Ten, Two, Three a clock, and be applied only to the beginning of serving God with it: yea, I have heard many answer, I was at Sermon, not at Service; so distinctly is the word applied to that of Common Prayer. I can add one Instance more, almost in the very words before specified; 
Gloria Patri.  that Doxology which is used in the Church at the end of every Psalm, and some other times in the Common Prayers, used in divine Service (Glory be to the Father, etc.) did so gain the approbation of that name Gloria Patri, that although all religious devotions paid to God, are honouring and glorifying of him; yet when we hear men speak of Gloria Patri, we know they mean this Doxology, and we can say of it, that Gloria Patri began with Flavianus, as Theodoret (assisted by St. Chrysostom) and Nicephorus; so that although, in the end of this Doxology, it is said, As it was in the beginning, is now, etc. that is, that in all age's men did give Glory to the Father, etc. Yet we can say, that at that time began Glory to the Father, etc. So was it in this occasion, than began the Name of God to be glorified with some particular service, although men did in all ages before glorify him. So that we may well believe that in that time of the birth of Enos, or some years after, began that piece of worship, 
That peculiar devotion introduced in Enos' time.  which, for some eminency, had that name of calling upon God, by the use of speech, appropriated to it. Whether this addition was by the Institution of God immediately; or Divine men, as Seth or Enos, introduced it in the Public Religion, I determine not, being not revealed, but conceive this the most reasonable way of expounding that place, which cannot be understood in that gross way it is urged.   

Sect. 3  

2. Argument.  A second Argument to prove, that there was an Idolatrous worship before the Flood is thus framed. The punishment of Sins is proportioned to the Sins which are punished; now the Flood being the greatest punishment that ever God afflicted the world with, it is necessary that it should be for the worship of false Gods, or Idolatry, which are the greatest Sins.  

Answ. The punishment disproportionate to sin in this world.  To this is rightly answered, that the punishment of Sins in this world is not always proportioned to the sins; All the temporal punishment, that men have, is less than they deserve, and therefore may in justice be moderated according to God's equitable kindness; what punishment God laid upon these men, who perished in the Flood, after death, was not revealed, but the judgement was most right, because they held the truth of God in unrighteousness, as St. Paul, Rom. 1.18. and, as it is in the 21. verse of the same, Because they, knowing GOD, glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations. So that the Condemnation upon the Gentiles was not always for Errors in judgement, but Errors in practice, that although they did know God aright, yet they did not worship him as God. And therefore we may be satisfied, concerning their sins, with what the Scripture revealeth, 
Of what sort were their sins who perished in the Flood.  and need not make them worse than they were described there, which says, That the wickedness of man was great in the Earth, and that every Imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually, Gen. 6.5. and it is the same which S. Paul before, they became vain in their Imaginations, that is, their desires, and affections (as was described before) they were given to all Luxury and sensuality. So that here was a large scope for God's justice to punish, and the temporal punishment of this world, Death by drowning, was vehemently called for by the sins of those men, who lived in that Age, without any addition of false worship. I therefore conclude for that first age, in the first sense, in respect of the God they worshipped, there was none but the right God worshipped in the world; but in regard of the second sense, the manner of worship in their Religion to him, unless these Oblations before spoke of, we find nothing recorded before the Flood, that is necessary to be assented to.   

Sect. 4.  
For both these we cannot conceive, that this Religion, so form, was founded upon the Faith, etc. 
Revelation, not reason, did dictate the first Religion.  For although we may justly think that men, who have either by an Innate principle, or else by reason, knowledge that there is a GOD of an infinite excellency, to whom, out of duty, they owe this divine Worship which is called Religion; we may likewise think, that it is impossible for their capacities to find out what worship would be pleasing to him, unless he reveal it; and therefore did act all they did, in that worship, by his direction; yet, because there is no mention of such direction given by God before the Flood, some men may conceive that Seth, or such pious men, might Inventis addere, and make some additions, now and then, according to the Principles of pious reason, to those received Duties which were acted before, and then that form, or at the least, that piece of the form of Religion was founded upon the Faith, etc. I will therefore explain one distinction which may serve our turn, perhaps often, hereafter in our Controversy, and I think will make this appear easy.   

Sect. 5.  
That is, there is a difference betwixt an occasion of a Religion, 
The difference betwixt the occasion and foundation of a Religion.  and the foundation of it, the occasion may be this Faith he speaks of, but the foundation is the Revelation of the will of God, that he will be so worshipped, as thus; Suppose Seth, or Noah, a man in whom they have such a Faith, that is, an opinion of his wisdom or kindness to them, his esteem with God; suppose such a man should direct such or such a Duty; they listen to it for the estimation they have of his ability; 
Which prevaileth according to the congruity it hath to the will of God.  afterward, upon experience, or examination, they find it congruent to the will of God; then they practise it accordingly with confidence: But if it be received barely upon the credulity of such a person, and found incongruous to the will of God, afterwards it will be rejected; which shows that, not the faith, in the man, is the foundation of this form of Religion, but the Congruence it hath with the will of God. And this is the foundation of all Religion, the Revelation of Gods will to be pleased with such service. As it happens in a foundation, that Rock, upon which a Castle is built, is the foundation, and the sole foundation, there may perhaps be other things necessary, to dig the earth before we come to the Rock, or else to remove the rubbish, which may hinder the settling the house upon it, but only the Rock is the foundation; so it may be, that such a man, of whom he speaks, may be useful to the building of Religion, to the manifestation of this Rock, to the removing many impediments, which would hinder men from settling themselves and their Faith, upon it; but only that is the Rock. There is one clause in this Conclusion which may amuse the Reader, that is, that the person, on whom they believe, they believe to be such [to whom God himself vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally.] Now it is true, this for the most part is necessary to the plantation of Religion, 
Whatsoever men's opinion be of the Person that introduceth it.  as I said, to remove the Obstacles, that this direction, which I receive, is not the word of God, or not pleasing to him, and the like; but the foundation is, that God reveals this to be his will. Suppose Seth preached the duties of Religion, we have this faith, or opinion of Seth (for divine Faith it is not, unless God declare Seth is such) we may have some weak belief that this is the will of God, because honest Seth, to whom God, as we apprehend, makes many revelations, delivers it for such to us; but we believe the duty because God requires it, and upon that we build our Religion, the other is removing the rubbige. Or thus, an Act of Parliament is made, we submit to the Authority, are confident of our security accordingly; yet I, who was not at the making of that Act, know only that that, which I read in the Book, was an Act of Parliament, by the Printer that printed it, and that such an Act is tolerated by the Magistrate to pass for an Act. Now the foundation of the safety of my practice is the Act of Parliament, not the Printer, these are assistants to let me know this is an Act of Parliament, not the foundation; so it is with this case in hand, honest Seth is like the Printer, he delivers it so to me for the will of God, I ought, in discretion, to believe it such; but I build my practice, and found it upon this reason, because it is the will of God. Many may be the Arguments which induce a persuasion that this is the will of God, but because this is the will of God, is the sole foundation of my Religion.   

Sect. 6.  
But it may be Objected, that both he, and I, have said before, that the foundation of Religion was the assurance that there is a God, 
How this difference is consistent with the other of assurance that there is a God  now I make it the revealed will of God, which are not the same: I answer, that it is true, the foundation of Religion, as Religion, is, that there is a God; for therefore we know that we must give him Divine worship, because we know he is such; but the foundation of form Religion, that we must worship him this or that way, is, because he hath revealed that he likes this or that manner of service. And thus, I think, that Proposition is cleared, that not the Faith in the man, but in the revealed will of God, is the foundation of all form Religion. At the first I projected a long discourse concerning the forming the Jewish Religion and the Christian from that, 
Why the promised discourse of the jewish and Christian Religion is omitted.  before I was aware, I stepped into the forming of Religion before the Flood, which might have been spared, but being writ I let pass as it is, and omit what should follow about my design at the first, concerning those two most eminent form Religions, for by this which hath been delivered, and by the continued stories both of the Old and New Testament, it appears, that by Miracles and other Revelations GOD manifested his will to these people in those Ages wheresoever Religion was planted. And indeed this was the sole occasion of publishing the Scriptures; I will not insist therefore at this time upon this Conclusion.    

CHAP. XVII.  
Of suspected Governors, and th●●r forming or adding to Religion. It's independence. ●●●iefe of seeming contradictions, etc.  

Sect. 1.  
HE proceeds [It followeth necessarily, when they that have the government of Religion shall come to have either the wisdom of those men, their sincerity, 
Mr. Hobbes abstruse in making out his conclusion of suspected Governors and their Religion.  or their love suspected.] Let us pause a little upon this Phrase (those men) it is a most ambiguous Relative, if it relate to the man on whom they believed, as before, as it seems to do, thus it must be, that the Governors of the Church suspect those men whose credit was an Argument to form the Religion; but that cannot be, for the suspicion of the Governor, and his lack of assurance, doth not necessarily introduce a doubt in the Religion; because few Governors dare discover their own doubts, and their suspicion is seldom an infectious evil, or, if so, yet not epedemical, unless countenanced and assisted by the Sword; but although the words do import a suspicion in those Governors, yet h●s meaning is, that the Governors own wisdom, integrity, etc. are suspected, as it is evident by the following words [Or that they shall be unable to show any probable token of divine Revelation] this cannot be spoken of the first instruments in the forming Religion, because God confirmed their Doctrine with Miracles every where; it must therefore be understood of the Governors to whom this Religion is committed, but how harshly, in Common language, that Relative (those men) will be applied to these Governors, may easily appear to any man who reads it; well: his Conclusion is, that they, the Governors being suspected, the Religion, which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise, and (without the fear of the Civil Sword) contradicted, and rejected.   

Sect. 2.  
I conceive if his premises had been true, the Conclusion would not be deduced out of them; 
Christian Religion depends not upon the integrity and sufficiency of Church Governors.  for Religion form is like the statute Lsw, as before is expressed, the Governors may be thought as judges, whose ability or integrity may be suspected in expounding the sense of it, yet the Law is still as true, and remains as unsuspected as if they were virtuous; the folly and corrupt manage of the judges may let in a looseness of living, and a neglect of the Law; but it lessens not the Obligation of it, nor the estimation, but amongst sleight and trivial persons. So if Bishops, or the Governors in Religion, cease to have Apostolical integrity or sufficiencies, or that degree of it which should be expected from such persons, they open a gap to the Countenancing of wickedness and profaneness; but the Religion of Christians, which is built and founded upon the revealed will of God in the Statute Book the Bible, is not tainted by it, nor the duty to it in the Opinion of any but men of Fancy; for they neither being the foundation, nor the evidence of the foundation, only preservers of it, out of Office, not of nature, they may do much harm to the building, but not corrupt the foundation, nor destroy the evidence of it, which was set out by those who were instruments in the first forming that Religion, not them which were Governors afterwards.   

Sect. 3.  
He goes on, indeed in some Method and ingenuity, to show how Governors may fall under this suspicion; and first he saith, [That which taketh away the reputation of wisdom in him, who formeth or addeth to Religion, when it is already form, is the enjoining a belief of contradictories] I here stop, and tell you, there is a difference betwixt the formers of a Religion, and the Governors, as I have showed; and for this word Contradiction, I say, that in the forming of Religion, 
Religion form by divine revelations may o●l●ge to a believe of seeming contradictions.  which is to be done by the revealed will of God immediately, the wit of man is not to dispute contradictions; but whatsoever it shall please God to reveal, we are to believe, though it appear to us Contradictory; I dare say, I can demonstrate some things, which a weak and silly man would think contradictions, and a man exceeding me in learning, as much as I do him, may serve me so, and much rather that infinite perfection, and not to be fathomed abyss of Gods most unsearchable wisdom, may say a thousand things apparent to it, feasible by that infinite power, which the wisest man may be at a loss to find possible; and therefore whatsoever is delivered by the first agents in forming a Religion, by the immediate revelation of God, must be believed, although it appear to us full of contradictions; but what he speaks to us concerning the Governors, if they should add any thing to the former credenda, things to be believed, which to humane judgement appears contradictory, their wisdom will be disparaged by it, may be allowed. But at the latter end of that sentence he saith,   

Sect. 4.  
[A man may have a revelation of many things above, but of nothing against natural reason.] This seems to be flat against the excellency of that Faith, 
The singular excellency of Faith to be as well against as above Reason.  for which the Father and pattern of the faithful is commended by St. Paul, Rom. 4.18. who, speaking of Abraham, saith, Who against (not only above) hope, believed in hope; where in express terms the Apostle overthrows his distinction; for against hope (must be against that hope, which natural Reason could give him) he believed in the promise which God made; in Faith as it was with him, so it must be with us. It is said in the following verse, that he considered not his own body now dead, nor the deadness of Sarahs' womb; so must we not consider our impossibility in things delivered by God, how they oppose our reason, but believe, without thought of nature or reason for it, yea though it be against our reason; and therefore it is most appositely phrased by St. Paul in the first and last Chapters to the Romans, Obedience unto faith; men must captivate their Reason to the revelations of God, and, not considering what Reason saith against it, submit to it. Thus I think, in those cases where the instruments of forming a Religion do propose any thing though contrary to our reason, or contradictory in our apprehension, we ought to submit to it, although not, in those cases, to these who have the government in Religion, when it is once form.   

Sect. 5.  
I will add one note more, pertinent to this business, that although in the following 59 pag. he puts down examples which illustrate his other grounds of suspicion, yet, as a man guilty, he sets down none for this, 
Mr. Hobbes' subtlety in his citation and praetermission of examples.  but having (as I have reason to mistrust) some ill design, puts it down in a language, and manner fit enough to steal a belief of what he speaks into an inconsiderate Reader, although he gives no proof of what he writes to a judicious Reader. And now I have finished what I intended concerning this Chapter, for the other things which, he saith, bring these persons into suspicion, by reason of the deficience of those qualities, I grant to him, and cannot choose but say, 
Which, though pertinent, are dangerous to weak capacities.  they were handsome and ingenious expressions, and likewise fitted with very pertinent examples; but they accidentally only, when unluckily they happen to be observed by weak capacities, do distract the vivacity and quickness of their Faith, and so, perhaps, may in tract of time quench and extinguish the flame of it to its first Principles, as I have showed. And here I will settle myself to what follows in the next Chapter.    

CHAP. XVIII.  
Concerning the equality or inequality of men by nature; Their prudence, and self-opinion of it, not universal.  

Sect. 1.  
THis Chapter is entitled Of the natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their felicity or misery: 
Mr. Hobbes' scandalous description of man.  and is the prettiest great nothing that ever I read; it makes a brave and gallant show of ingenious Paradoxes, but is only a show, where truths and falsehoods are so ingeniously mixed as the one sets off the other with a great semblance of reality, although it be but a semblance; He describes a man by his worst pieces only, many of which are truly in him; but delivering them only, without his good, he makes him little better than an incarnate Devil, yea, what is worse, makes him seem to act those things justly which we abominate in them; so that he should be the hatefullest creature in the world; I will therefore, for the honour of Mankind, endeavour to rescue it from such foul scandals and aspersions, not catching at every word, but driving at the main sense of what he delivers.   

Sect. 2.  

The equality of men by nature not universal.  He lays the foundation of this Chapter upon equality of men, which are (saith he) made so equal by nature, that there is an inconsiderable difference. I put not down his own words, but the sense, to avoid tediousness. This Conclusion, for the most part, is true, but, in general false; for, if we look to the bodies of some men, we see them so decrepit, that their strength is not considerable alone; and what he talks of confederacy, by that account he may bring a Fly in competition, for a Fly, with company enough, can effect any thing; and for the Soul, there are some men so sottish, and uncapable of design, or contrivance, that, certainly, there are many Beasts which exceed them in fitness for such business as he allot's them; but, allow this phrase, as he thinks it, to be understood of the greater sort and number of men, not of all.   

Sect. 3.  
Then let us consider that Phrase, (Nature hath made men) what shall we understand by Nature, 
The estate in which Adam and Ev●h were made.  Natura naturans, the God of Nature, who, at the first, made men? then we must affirm this of Adam and Evah, which were made, without question, in no state of enmity, nor in an absolute equality, but such a difference as was necessary for two friends which might assist one another, wishing each other good, and the good of each other was the good of both; the hopes of each, the hopes of both; so that those could not be the works of Nature which he means, being such as were made for peace and amity, and where was impossibility of hostility betwixt them, the hurt of either being the hurt of both, because which soever was destroyed, the other lost much of assistance. We will therefore see how other sons of Nature are made; in what condition whatsoever Man else was made, by nature he was made a poor helpless Child, 
That wherein others.  in the greatest disproportion, both of Soul and body, to his Parents, that possibly can be; and, in this state, there are none of those things which he fancieth, nor hopes of attaining ends, nor fears of others assistance; but the poor Infant confides and trusts in h●s Parents, and submits to them. Methinks, he discourses of Men as if they were Terrigenae, born out of the earth, come up like Seeds, without any relation one to the other. I let alone his secret vaunt of Knowledge, in the latter end of this 60. Pag.   

Sect. 4.  
But in the bottom of that page, 
Memory, Experience, and Prudence distinguished.  he saith [Prudence is but Experience, which equal time bestows equally upon all men, in those things they equally apply themselves to.] See here the unconstancy of this Author; Chap. the 2. Of which I have discoursed, he saith, Experience is memory of many things, Chap. 8. pag. 34. (he saith) Prudence depends upon Experience; now it is but Experience: These two are impossible to be true both; for nothing doth depend upon itself; that, which it depends upon, must be distinct from what depends upon it; now we may distinguish th●se three thus; Memory retains the actions done and passed; Experience collects from thence the practices of men in such cases; but Prudence, according to both Memory, Experience, and the rules of right reason, drawn from all the guidance of History, or Natural reason, or what else can supply any assistance to the intended end, directs a man in his actions; and therefore he spoke very weakly of Prudence, when he said, it was but Experience; and contrarily, there is a mighty difference in men's Prudence; for Prudence is a thing acquired by industry and pains, in which, as men differ in the industry, so they do in Prudence, yea all men have not the like advantages of conversing with able men and Books, which are great helps for the getting Prudence; though they may have the same industry.   

Sect. 5.  
Pag. 61. He saith, that [that which may make such equality (that is, of Prudence, concerning which he had spoken before) incredible, is but a vain conceit of our own wisdom, etc. for such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more Eloquent, or more Learned, yet they will hardly believe there are many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, 
Mr Hobbes confuse, ●f not contradictory to himself, in arguing.  and others at a distance.] This is a strange contradictory passage to its self; for first consider that what was conceited by this to be opposed, was the equality of Prudence; to oppose this he introduceth men's conceits of their own wisdom; he that reflects upon his Exposition of names in Cap. 5. pag. 22. shall find Prudence and Wisdom two things; Therefore a high esteem of a man's own wisdom may be without the like imagination of his own Prudence. Then consider, that he saith, Men will allow others more witty, learned, eloquent, but not more wise; he proves this, because men see their own wit at hand, mark how he said, just before, that they would allow others more wit, but not more wisdom the reason, saith he, because they see their wit at hand; would not this, if it prove any thing, prove the contrary to what he useth it? That, because their wit, not their wisdom, is discerned at hand, others at a distance, therefore their wit must appear great, though not their wisdom. This manner of false reasoning, unreasonable arguing, is frequent with him throughout the whole Book.   

Sect. 6.  
But to the Conclusion; 
Men, universally, no such opiniatours of their own prudence as Mr. Hobbes pretendeth.  this estimation of a man's own eminence in Prudence is least discerned of any thing in that universality which he expresseth; for first, if Prudence, as he just before defined it, be but Experience, it is impossible that young men should think they have as much Experience as old; then if Prudence be (as it is) the guide of a man's actions to their designed ends, then consider that there are none but Fools who do not take advice of men more excellent in their several ways than themselves. Do not men, that would get health, advise with Physicians? for the settling their estates, advise with Lawyers? for the managing of a business at Court, or Country, advise with others more prudent in these practices? In this particular business, although, I am confident, I speak more rationally than he, or perhaps then some others would do with whom I consult; yet I advise with those less scient, but I think more prudent than myself (whether it be discretion to publish this or not) what is the reason of this? but that I, and all others, do acknowledge ourselves to be less prudent, though we find ourselves more learned than some others; well then: that doubt, he raiseth, was but a fancy of his own, and had no foundation upon any ground of reason, or experience, and therefore what he builds upon it must needs fall of its self; where I leave it, and step to the consideration of other inferences which he introduceth, the first of which is thus framed.    

CHAP. XIX.  
Of enmity pretended from equality of our desires. How Reason and Religion restrain men upon mutual injuries, and moderate their fears. The title of Occupancy, etc.  

Sect. 1.  

Equality of hopes does not render men enemies.  FRom this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining our ends, and therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become Enemies.] To understand this, let us look back to what I have said before, and consider men in their Infancy, borne of Parents, and having a necessity to be bred up by them, or else they could never come to be men, with these equalities of abilities, and these hopes he speaks of; all this while they are under their Parent's tuition, and parts of their dominion; but, perhaps, when they come to the age of discretion, they grow entire bodies, and set up for themselves, with hopes of their own, I believe, they have; but what then? two of them may have desires, and then hopes of the same things; yea, perhaps, one of them the same desires and hopes with his Father; must he then become an enemy to that other, or to his Parent? this would make Men to be beasts, or if they have more wit than beasts, to be by that only enabled to be more barbarous and beastly than Beasts themselves.   

Sect. 2.  
In the 13. of Genesis, we may observe, how, when by the contention betwixt the Herdsmen of Abraham and Lot, 
Nor of desires, as appears by the agreement between Abraham and Lot.  Abraham saw it would not be convenient for two persons of their opulency to cohabite together, he therefore gave Lot his choice to take the right or left hand Country, which he pleased. There can be no doubt but that Abraham was more potent than Lot, and could have compelled him to have gone whither he pleased; and there can be no doubt, but, in his choice, he must needs approve that Plain of jordan, which Lot had taken, as most commodious for the feeding their cattle, in the which their wealth principally consisted; but yet he gave him his choice, which, if he had been of Mr. Hobbes his mind, or a man of his forming, he would not have done; a Beast would not have done it, a man, of base disposition would not, but a man of a noble & generous heart did● Certainly men will not be enemies for every thing they desire or hope for, but give way to others in many things, much less do, as he speaks presently after [and in the way to the end which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only.]   

Sect. 3.  
That such Monsters have been in morality, is as apparent as other Monsters in nature; but that it should be universally true, in the sons of Nature, 
Nor self-conservation, much less delectation.  were to make Nature herself a Monster; that which he speaks, of Self-preservation, will be discussed more pertinently hereafter; but to say, that men universally deal so maliciously for delectation, is a most unhappy assertion; It is true, the passions of men are extremely unruly things, when they get the dominion, and carry men to all manner of wickedness; but Men are better than Beasts, and have reason and reasonable wills, by which they can, and do govern their Passions to act what is fit, not what is delightful only. From this passion of Hope, he proceeds to another of Fear; thus [And from hence it comes to pass that where an Invader hath no more to fear then another man's single power] this is an imperfect sentence (but I will collect the meaning of it) If one plant, sow, build, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to dispossess, or deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty; and the Invader is in the like danger again of another] Here now have we two passions, Hope and Fear assaulting every man, and provoking him to do mischief, and how probable to prevail, I will now examine.   

Sect. 4.  
It is very evident that hopes and fears are great guides and rulers of humane actions; and their force and power over us consists principally in the condition and qualities of the Object of hopes and fears; 
How, and by what, Hopes and Fears work upon us.  so that by how much the Object is more desirable or terrible, by so much the Object works more efficaciously, as a greater good more than a less, a greater danger more than a less; so only, but the probability of its falling upon us gives it a great degree of power; for although the falling down of our houses upon us would be a certain and inevitable destruction; yet, because not probable, we fear not. What I speak of fear may be applied to hopes, and yet once again, the powers, that these Objects have, are by Moral persuasions not by Physical or natural operations, which must certainly do their effects, when those do not work with more certainty then moral, which may, or may not be. To come to the business therefore in hand when two men design the same thing, 
Not Ahab's, but Jezabels' malice destroyed Naboth.  suppose the same commodious seat, if one be possessor of it, and the planter there may have such a desire of it, being furious, and wicked, as not to be contented without it, such was the case of Ahab to Naboths vineyard; but yet this Passion of his was not so violent as by sinister means, and the destruction of Naboth, he would get it, that was an act of malice beyond his, of Jezabell, as you may read 1 Kings 21. and yet he as wicked a man as almost ever was. Lo that although men may like, and approve, what another hath; yet the violence of few men's affections runs to such a height in malice, as to do mischief in so high a nature, for their content, as to destroy a man. I know to my instance of Ahab it may be objected, 
Obj.  that he lived in a civil State, in which were Laws, and Ahab durst not act against them; but in these Cases men suppose no coercive power, but their own will and force to Govern. To this I answer, 

Ans.  
The title of Occupancy sacred etc.   that first the title of Occupancy is a most sacred and just title, and gives dominion to the possessor, such as all men, in all Ages, have reverenced; and although there is no coercive nor punishing power, for such injuries as are done in that kind, but Conscience; yet that is enough to keep men in awe, as I shall show you anon. And Ahab, being King over Israel, had no other awe; and therefore there is seldom such violent desires of another's good as doth produce such horrid effects. What I have said of Hopes, 
Reason secureth men from fears.  may be applied to Fears; Fears urge men to a thousand desperate actions; and, certainly, if men were nothing but Beasts, without reason, they could not be secured from fears, without either destruction of other men, or subduing them; nay, subduing them were not enough; For as it happens with beasts, that that Bull, or that Stag, which is subdued this day, finds a time of revenge upon the other a little after; so may it be with men, yea it is more dangerous by so much as men have more wit to effect revenges with. But let us look back, and we sh●ll find, 
Who apprehend no danger from any bare possibility of injury.  that Fear is not where is no probability that the feared thing should happen; not the possibility, but the probability, causeth fear; now then when a man is possessed of any thing, if the new comer to plant by him offer him no disturbance, what probability is there that he should be disturbed by him? men are reasonable Creatures, and sociable, without society they can have no happiness in this world; they know that, if they should have such fear, there could be no peace to men; and therefore, without injustice done, or violence offered or menaced, men do not fear, but rejoice at such vicinity; if the possibility of injury should provoke men to such violence, as he speaks of, men might fear their servants, their Children, and must by anticipation (as he speaks presently) take them away, and no man can live secure so long as there is another man, for there is a possibility of destruction to come to any man, from any man, although not a probability. 
Which is generally restrained by the thought of God's punitive justice.  Let us look back therefore and see that there is in the heart of every man, a thought of a GOD, who amongst other infinite excellency hath punitive justice; to whom vengeance belongs; and there is a secret consent to that great Axiom, such measure as you meet shall be meted to you again; this keeps the universal kind of man in some awe from perpetuating such barbarous acts as he entitles them unto; and, unless now and then, by some prodigious monster, we see them not violate these laws in those high kinds which he surmiseth they do; 
How Reason or Arms decide the controversy before occupancy  All that he writes now I suppose to be but like rubbish, cast in the Reader's way, to hinder his assault upon his Castle of mischief which follows; I lightly remove them now, but will place my Battery strongly presently; but because I have spoke only of such cases where one is possessor, and the other comes with a desire to what he possesses; the case may be otherwise where two persons shall come with equal desire to enjoy the same place, and equal title, that is, neither hath occupancy; and to this I say, they will either debate it by reason, or else fight it out, and the strongest arm will get possession, and, with that, right, not by Conquest, for that gives no title, but by occupancie, and it will be unjust for any to meddle with it whilst it is in his possession. Thus much slightly to these things, premised by him to usher in his unhappy Conclusions. The rest which he saith, in order to them, may be looked upon through the glass of what I have already writ, and will appear of no force; I shall therefore, to avoid tediousness, step to Pag. 62. where he delivers this unheard of Doctrine, until by him uttered.    

CHAP. XX.  
The Condition of War what, or what sort of men not in it, etc.  
[HEreby it is manifest, that, during the time men live without a common Power, to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition is called War, and such a war as is of every man against every man.] First, I will examine that Phrase (whilst men live without a common Power to heep them in awe) if this be understood, as he phraseth it, 
Three sorts of men, although without a common humane power to awe them, not in the condition called War.  of all kind of power, than there is no such time; for there is a power Divine, which always hath an invisible rod, which keeps all men in awe from perpetrating things against that law which is written in their hearts; but if it be understood, as his discourse seems to intimate, of such a Power as is humane; we must then p●sse over all men in their Infancy, whom, although they may have discontents, and fears, and hopes, concerning their Parents, and their Parents concerning them; yet their natures are framed in such necessities of their Parents, and their Parents look down upon them with hearts so filled with kindness and sweetness, and this so settled by nature, that although that disposition may be hindered in its operation sometimes from working its proper effects; yet it is seldom, or never, destroyed from its being; and therefore men in that estate are most peaceable and free from war. We must likewise leave men linked in that domestic bond of Matrimony, betwixt whom, although there may be discontents, yet there cannot properly be said hostility; And we will take men, as is hardly ever known, divers single persons without any relation one to the other, but that of humanity, by several wrecks cast upon the same uninhabited coast; and let us think of these men whether they are all at a war one with another, before they have done, or received any injury one from another.  

Sect. 2.  

How a common interest in humanity may oblige to mutual ●●iendship.  In this Condition, I am confident that these men would be in a state of peace rather than war, and if one by chance should see another in misery, out of that common interest they both have in humanity, he would relieve and help the distressed like a friend, not destroy him as an enemy; and, by that obligation of another, would strengthen, and secure his own condition more against misfortunes, than he could by destroying him; and this humanity is writ in every man's heart, in whom such wicked principles, as his, have not blotted it out; from this principle it came, that (Acts 28.) the barbarous people of Malita entertained St. Paul with such humanity; if they had been of Mr. Hobbes his mind, they would have killed him, but humanity provoked them to kindness, and malicious Axioms had not abused their judgements; and therefore man was to man strange man, such as they had no interest in a friend. I know it may be objected here, 
Ob.  that those of Malita were men united in a Commonwealth, and that might cause them to be so civil. He hath taught me to answer this afterwards, showing how all Commonwealths, being independent bodies, are to one another in the state of war; and therefore other people are to them like other men to each other. If he should again reply, that they should have neither hopes nor fears from this; I answer, 
Repl. Ans.  they might have bor● hopes to get what they had, and fears that they might spy out their weaknesses, and many other the like, which Covetousness and Desire of safety might have suggested to them, but such as, in them, and ingenious spirits, might easily be controlled by humanity.   

Sect. 3.  
But he goes on to prove, that these men are at war one with another (for saith he) [War consisteth not in battle only] true, 
Time being no essential constitutes no war.  for the School distinguish betwixt Bellum and pugna, fight or battle, and war, or the act of fight [but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war.] He is the most unhappy man in his manner of defining that ever writ; can any man think that war consists in a tract of time? It is true, time is necessary to war, it is the measure of all rest or actions in the world, it is the measure of their existence, how long they stay and tarry in the world, and so may be reckoned amongst those outward accommodations with which all natural things are fitted; but it is no essential part of any: To say, that the nature of war or peace, a Horse, or Tree, or Men consists in time, were foolish; they are in time measured by time; but time is not essential constitutively, as his friends the Schoolmen, and University learning teacheth, but consecutively; they do not make these things follow them; and therefore it was weakly explained by him, when he said, that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of wars.   

Sect. 4.  
But he illustrates this by foul weather (saith he) [the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: So the nature of war consisteth not in actual fight, but in the known disposition thereto, 
His instance in foul weather, to illustrate, erroneous.  during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.] His instance, by which he illustrates this Conclusion, is erroneous; for foul weather is not an inclination of time (as he seems to speak, or else he proves not, that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war) but of the heavens in that time; nor is the weather foul if there be only an inclination to foulness, as perhapss in lowering cloudy weather, where is no rain; yet it is fair, as weather is fair effectively in making the ways fair; and this distinction is often observed by our writers of Almanacs; when they will be exact in their Prognostiques of weather, they say, now it is inclinable to rain, than it will be rain, and when it doth rain, or in such a time as rain hath such a predominance to make the ways foul, we call it a foul day or week; but if there be only a disposition to rain, or so little as allays the dust only, we say, for all that, it is fair weather not foul.   

Sect. 5.  
As his Illustration is to blame, so is his Conclusion; 
A disposition to war, before any act of hostility, makes no war.  the disposition to war, no not the known disposition to it, is war, for that disposition is nothing but an inclination to war; but an actual, or habitual hostility, not enmity only, makes war; a man may hate another, one King another, and yet not make war upon him; yet that hatred is a disposition to war. So that a disposition to war makes not war, and then the knowledge of it cannot make it other than it is; but then is war, when two Nations endeavour the subjugation or assaulting one another, or one doth it alone; for although true friendship requires a mutual consent of both parties; yet a war doth not, for war may be, and is commonly, begun by one party, before the other undertakes it; and we say often, that one Nation makes war, and invade's the other unprovided. But because he vaunts often of the propriety of speech, 
His impropriety of speech.  I may tell him, that war is not properly spoke of single men but Kings or Nations; for single men hate one another, cantend one with another, fight one with another, are at enmity one with the other, but not at war, that is proper to public persons, or Nations, only.   

Sect. 6.  
What he writes afterwards, of the incommodities of war, 
Men unassured of their security make not presently provision for a defensive War.  is ingenious, but the application is not rightly made to those men (of which he speaks) who live without other security then what their own strength, and their own invention, shall furnish them withal; For let us consider these men either planting near other men, or alone, we shall still, unless war disturb them, find them adopting and fitting their habitations for their own profit and content; if a man should, in an Hermetical way, live alone, he would fit his habitation for such a solitary life; if he should live amongst neighbours, he would accommodate his affairs, the best way he could, to have a neighbourly friendship with them. The application I cannot see how it can be forced unless his conclusion, that all men are at war, were granted, for instance we can have none but of Hermit's; but for the plantation of families upon the same territories with others, we see Abraham and Lot planting amongst the Canaanites, who, having ground sufficient, lived peaceably with them, and they fitted themselves with all useful things, for a good time having no war. I go on with him therefore on the last particle of the 62. Page; he there begins.    

CHAP. XXI.  
The conceit of an universal war by nature vain. Of the passions and their objects. The great Lawmaker and his Laws. Justice done among the Americans. The law of Nature and dictate of Conscience. Of military valour and prudence. The habits of Justice and Injustice. Of propriety, occupancy, etc.  

Sect. 1.  
[IT may seem strange to some man, who hath not well weighed these things, that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another; and he may therefore not wresting to this inference made from the passions, desire, perhaps, to have the same confirmed by Experience.] It is true, 
An universal war between all individuals of mankind never yet experimented.  the inference from those passions being too weak to prove his conclusion, that every man is at war with every man, we can hardly assent to such an universal proposition concerning a war with all, by all men, the practice of wh●ch was never experimented by any. Let us see his instance briefly: it consists in three things [that men travel armed, 
Nor is it proved by Mr. Hobbes' instances.  they keep their doors locked (these two might be spared in my particular, who do neither) and that in his house he lock's his' chests; by these, saith he, this man accuseth mankind as much by his deeds as he doth by his words; he says so, but I say no. For he accuseth not mankind of this wickedness, that all the world, and each man naturally is at war one with another, but these mistrust that there are some evil and wicked men in the world; these know men may be ill; by these actions, they express it; but he concludes they are so; for, certainly, as Love and Friendship are mighty excellencies in the conversation of man with man, so hatred and wars the greatest evil which he affirmes to be in every man towards every man.   

Sect. 2.  
[Butler, saith he, neither of us accuse nature in it, the desires, and other passions of man are in themselves no sins, no more are the actions which proceed from those desires, till they know a Law that forbids them, which, till laws be made, they cannot know: nor can any Law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.] Thus he; we agree both, 
What in the passions mak●● Sins, which are not such in themelves.  that the passions are not sins, nor the acts proceeding out of them; men may love, hate, fear, hope, etc. but the misapplication of the act to the wrong objects, to love that we should hate, or hate what we should love; or to mistake the degrees, overlove that which is less lovely, or less love that which is more lovely, and the like, this is it makes a sin; now the frame and constitution of the Objects of our passions is either such by Divine Institution, 
The several constitutions in the objects of our passions what and whence.  or humane; by divine, that is, the amiableness and fitness things have to man by that gift of God in nature, or else in the positive law of God, in the book of God: That which is by Humane institution, is that which humane laws make desirable or hateful; of the first sort are these combinations of Parents and Children, of Brethren one amongst another; yea of men in general as men, for men are all made with natural abilities to do one another good; of the second sort are Sacraments, and all such rites, which, having no force in their natural constitution, receive a great loveliness and sweetness, from the Covenants of God to us in them; of the last sort are all our proprieties, as goods, and such things, which by neither God in nature, not his written book, are appropriated to us, but are only given us by the law of the Land wherein we live.   

Sect. 3.  
What is said of Desire, may be applied to any other passion which, affecting any thing contrary to these rules, 
Affected ignorance of the law a sin.  is a sin; now what he adde's [until they know a Law] is not universally material, for Ignorantia juris non excusat, such as he are so far from knowing, that they will have contradictoriam ignorantiam, they will deny, and oppose the very bond of Nature, and teach what is cross to it; not knowledge in such cases is a sin, and the mother of such a sin as leades to Perdition, when men hide their eyes, and will not see the Sun, but draw veils betwixt them and it [which, saith he, until Laws be made, cannot be known] but there is no man made without a law to guide him. [Nor, saith he, can any Law be made until they have agreed upon the person that shall make it] As men, who are borne in a Commonwealth, 
Every man borne under a Law maker and a Law.  do not choose their lawmaker, but submit to him, whose government they were under; so every man is borne a Citizen of the world, and he must submit to that great Governor and Lawmaker of the world, God, and that law he hath made for him to do; so that, whether a man agree upon a Lawmaker, or no, there is a lawmaker, and a Law, under which he is borne, and to which he ought to submit. Pag. 63. he undertake's to satisfy another question thus.   

Sect. 4.  
[It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time or condition of men as this is, and I believe it was never generally so over all the world; but there are many places where they live so now, for the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner as I said before.) Thus far he; His instances in the Americans is false, 
The Americans have Kings and justice exeeuted amongst them.  for they had divers Kings and Kingdoms, and have Justice executed amongst them for misdemeanours, as may appear to any who read's their stories; but howsoever, although they had but private families, yet it doth not follow, that they should be at war with all other; 
Private families not at war with the Kings and Nations among whom they live.  we see Abraham's, Lot's, private families, lived peaceably in that land, where were two Nations, the Canaanites and the Perizites cohabiting that Country with them, Gen. 13. Nay, not so only, but little families may live at peace with mighty Kings, so you may see judges the 4. and 17. That there was peace betwixt jabin a mighty King, who brought a puissant Army into the field, and the house of Heber the Kenite; it was a most unworthy expression, when he said, that the concord of these families dependeth on natural lust; 
The concord of which hath a better dependence then upon lust.  no, it depends upon the natural authority of Parents, the natural duty of Children, the reciprocal returns of obedience and protection betwixt Master and Servant. I hasten to his, and my main design.   

Sect. 5.  
[Howsoever, saith he, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be where there were no common Power to fear, by the manner of life, which men, that have formerly lived under a peaceable Government, use to degenerate into a civil war.] This instance nothing illustrate's his' conclusion, 
The exorbitances of a Civil War prove not men to be in a polemical state by nature.  to prove that men of themselves are at war by an instance drawn from a civil war, or indeed from any other war; for the conditions of war must needs be with those that are at war; but he should prove that they are such before any warlike act, or menaces, hath passed betwixt them, and that he seems to do in what follow's.   

Sect. 6.  
[But (saith he) though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a conditirn of war one against another: yet in all time Kings and persons of sovereign Authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed one on another.] This was so handsomely expressed, 
The mutual jealousies of Sovereigns render them not like Gladiatours in a direct posture of war.  that I could willingly have let it alone; but lest it should, by the ingenuity of it, steal a credit of his opinion into a Reader, I must censure it as nothing to the purpose; for all this can prove no war, but that these Sovereigns imagine each other may be wicked, and Faith-breakers, just as before, because there may be Thiefs in his family, he lock's his Chest This prove's only that they are in a posture of war, but not in war itself; or, indeed, this is not absolutely a posture of war, for that require's men pressed, drawn into the field. And by this reckoning all Nations should be at war one with another; and indeed there is the same condition betwixt them and particular persons, who have no supreme coercive power amongst them to restrain them; but to say, that all Nations are at war one with another, even those who are in peace, were to say, as he did before, that all things are motion, even rest its self. But now I come to the upshot which he aimed at, and I think most wicked, for which cause it was necessary for me lightly to s●eep away the rubbige, which being done, I come to his following discourse.   

Sect. 7.  
[To this war of every man against every man this also is consequent that nothing can be unjust.] He must understand this of such men who are not joined in a politic society; now I deny, that there is nothing unjust to such men, he affirmes it; let us consider his proofs: he proves it thus [the actions of right or wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place] this is the same in other words, but his proof lies in what follows [where there is no common Power, there is no Law, where no law, no injustice] thus he. 
Conscience dictate's too men what is right and wrong; what law and common power they must submit to.  To this I answer, that there is no man born in this world without a Law and a common Power over him and others; the Law is that writ in their hearts, and this is it which St. Paul speaks, Rom. 2.15. Which shows the law written in their hearts, that law of Nature that practic law which is writ in the heart of every man, and this common Power is GOD; and therefore, as St. Paul speaks there, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts, the mean while, accusing or excusing one another; where there is evidence accusing, excusing, there is supposed a common Power, so that there is a Common Power, and this secretly acknowledged by men; and that he hath given them certain laws for the breach of which there is a horror and dread, insomuch as a man cannot live, or it is a prodigy to see a man without all Conscience of the principal and fundamental rules of reason; although men may do and act against those Laws, yet until a long custom of living have hardened their hearts, or some such wicked principles, as his, have, by degrees, stolen an approbation in their their understandings (by degrees, I say, for I think it not possible to be done in an instant) until than it is not pospossible for men to sin against these without an accusation of their Consciences. He proceeds.   

Sect. 8.  
[Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues] In a war actually waged force is of great use, 
Military Va●our and Prudence, degenerated into Force and fraud, lose the nature, and deserve not the name of the the two Cardinal virtues in war.  and may well be called one of the best hinges upon which war is moved; yea, if we take force not for strength but violence, as I think he doth, but in the posture of war, or in war only in expectation, violence is the chief support of all injustice; but certainly it is most improperly called a virtue in any but a most forced and violent way; for virtues are those things which perfect the soul, which make the work and worker good; but no force doth that, neither doth it assist in doing, but it is indifferent to good or bad; then again, force, even in war, may be a help to increase the wickedness of it; if the war be unjust, it is doubly evil, which is fortified with force; If the acts of that war be cruel, it is doubly bloody, which is effected by force: And then for fraud, although stratagems are lawful, yet falsehood in war is wicked, which is comprehended under that notion of fraud, as to promise one thing, and do another; all Stratagems have a double sense, by which the enemy deceive's himself, taking the vizard from the true face; but they, having a true face discernible, are not all visards and forces; where there is no war engaged in, but only some private end or design of one man against another, they are in themselves wicked, and provoke the just vengeance of a war from the injured party upon them. He should have said valour and prudence were cardinal virtues in war, but force and fraud are these degenerated, and when they get these names of force and fraud, they never retain that excellent nature of being Virtues.   

Sect. 9  
He urgeth further; justice and Injustice (saith he) are none of the faculties neither of the body, 
Justice and Injustice, no faculties but habits, and may be in a military person.  nor the mind.] I think if he take Faculty, as he seems to do, for an innate quality, no man ever said they were; therefore his proof is needless, when he comes on [if they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses and Passions] although they are not innate faculties, but acquisite habits, I mean the virtue justice, or the vice injustice; yet the habits may be, when they are acquired with that man who is alone, and when he is alone, though, to act accordingly, require's a present Object; now denominations are given from the habits, not the acts. He proceeds [They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude] our dispute is of a third sort of men, neither in such Society as a civil policy, nor a Solitude, but men without all relations, of being under one common sublunary governance, and yet men cohabiting in the same neighbourhood, where may be perpetrated those horrid and unjust actions of Murder and Thievery, etc. And again, although the acts of Justice do suppose other men to do justice upon; yet it is other men, not other men in the same City, or polities; and when, by the use of those acts, a habit is got, it remaines in Solitude.   

Sect. 10.  
He draw's another Conclusion [Hence thus it is consequent also to the same Condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct, but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it.] The wickedness of this Proposition will best appear betwixt two States, two neighbour Nations, 
Nations have propriety in Dominions.  they certainly have distinct Dominions, and it is injustice for one to take by force from the other, or detain by force what he hath gotten ill, which is against all the consent of men from the beginning of the world; now these two Nations are without any other coercive power in this world, and from that reason are justly paralleled by him to such men as he formerly spoke of; and therefore these Nations should have no propriety (as he explains himself) not in any thing: Consider therefore Gen. 12. and the 20. Chap. How in two places Abraham's wife Sarah was like to have been taken from him by the Kings of those Nations where he lived; 
Persons in their wives.  but God punished them for it; and they acknowledged it would have been a great sin to have laid with another man's wife. Mr. Hobbes would have pleaded with God, there is no propriety in any thing; All men have title to all things; where is no coercive power upon earth, there is no injustice: the woman is any man's who can get her by fraud or force, so long as he can keep her; they who have no common power above them (as these had not) to make Laws, which might appropriate interests to particular persons, these are bound to no law, nor have any propriety but such as force gives them; and then both Abimelek and Pharaoh, or other of them, might lawfully have kept Sarah, Abraham's wife from him; but the Principles of the law of Nature say it was unjust, and they did not do it. Thus it fared concerning the propriety of Wives; now we will examine what propriety men had in Estates, where was no such humane authority: 
And estates.  without doubt the first that ever gave outward Laws, to govern a Nation by, was Moses; and I conceive the Decalogue to be like our Magna Charta, which was not a new law, but a brief and pithy expression of what was the old law, by which this people was governed; so were the Ten Commandments not a new law, but an expression in tables of that moral law of nature, which was writ in the heart of men before, and practised before his time; in particular this of Stealing, which injured the possessor of Meum & tuum, mine and thine; you may read a most excellent passage in the 23. of Gen. with what civility of discourse, and reciprocal courtesies, Abraham bought the field in Machpelah of Ephron the Hittite. First I collect thence, that Abraham judged there was a legal interest in Ephron, for else he would not have paid such a round price for it as four hundred shekels of Silver; and than you may observe how sacred amongst all people the preservation of interest was, for in the last of Gen. you shall find, that Jacob, when he died in Egypt, a great way off, in another Nation, having, both he and his, left the Land, near two hundred years after the purchase, when he and his, without doubt, were not known, scarce remembered, jacob gave order for the burying of his body there, and it was performed without any disturbance; so sacred did those people without any positive law, but the principles of nature, observe the particular interest of particular men, even such who at the time of the Purchase were but sojourners among them, and at the time of the last usage were not so much as cohabitants, but strangers in another Country and Nation; so that we see as men have had always Consciences which directed them in their actions; so those Consciences have had a sense of intruding upon fewer interest, and Abraham was assured that it was such amongst them; for, upon that presumption, he paid so great a price for that field.   

Sect. 11.  
If it should be asked, how men should come to get these interests? I will not here scan all ways; 

Th●ir title to which may be various.  
That of Occupancy most evident.   one is evident, that is, Occupancy, taking possession of it first, for all the things in this world being but Bona utilia, and the profit they have is their service to man, he who first gets possession of them is Lord of them; thus Fowls and Fishes, even in planted Nations, which are no man's possessions being caught by any man, are his to make profit, and when one man hath caught them, that they are his possession, it is thievery to rob him of them. I speak not here of Deer, Coneys, Hares, nor Fishes in ponds, etc. which are impaled, and so for their habitation, by our laws, are made to pay their host with their lives; nor such things which our laws indulging the pleasures of Gent. and men of quality, have appropriated to certain persons and places, as Pheasants, and Partridges, and the like, but whatsoever no national particular Law hath given to another, that the law of Nature gives to the first possessor: and this law men find before any positive law of Nations in the practice of the world; so that then it is apparent, that, without positive laws, or an outward humane coercive power, the law of Nations hath always given a propriety in this world's goods to the sons of men.  
Thus I have passed my opinion upon his 13. Chapter, and I think have given reasons for what I spoke; but if this be not enough, let the Reader consider what I shall speak to the next Chapter, and that will the more fully describe the mist of his opinions, and confirm mine more stronger.     

Censures upon the 14th Chapter of LEVIATHAN, which is entitled, The first and second natural Laws and of Contracts, which thus begins.  

CHAP. XXII.  
Concerning the pretended necessity in Nature for the preservation of life. The prospect of an happiness beyond it; Death represented more terrible than it is, etc.  

Sect. 1.  
[THE right of Nature, which Writers commonly call jus Naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, his own life, and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.]  
Here is a description of the right of Nature, which is that he saith, 
The right of Nature extends farther than to the preservation of life.  Writers call Jus Naturale: I believe this Gentleman never in his life read Jus Naturale so described in any Author. It is true, to preserve a man's own life is a branch of the right of nature, but it doth not contain the whole nature of it, as if the right of nature extended to nothing else but the preservation of a man's own life; there are many other things which the right of nature enables us to do; but because I find this question in my opinion more methodically and Schollarly delivered in his Book entitled De Copore Politico, Cap. 1. I shall therefore consider that first; and, having cleared that discourse, apply myself to this description, and I will begin with his 6. Number.  
That number begins thus.   

Sect. 2.  
[Forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire that which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful, but most of all the terrible enemy of nature, Death, from whom men expect the loss of all power, and also the greatest of bodily pain in the losing. 
Several acceptions of Necessity and the different effects of it accordingly. ] The phrase, which I here censure first, is that necessity makes us do this: I know this word Necessity is often used for what we term want or poverty, because such a man need's somewhat, therefore we say he is in necessity; and in this sense there may be some truth in that Proposition; for because men's lives have lack of supplies; and, according to this Gentleman, all the world are his enemies, or, what is the truth, no man will have so much care to supply him as himself, therefore he must do it; but then take necessity as it opposeth contingency, which is the common logical sense, it is absolutely false, for many men throw and take away their own lives; now that which is necessarily done, cannot be otherwise; men cannot choose but do what they do out of necessity; the phrase were much more proper to say, that the law of nature enjoyne's them to provide for themselves; for the great Natura naturans, God, as I said before, 
Nothing necessary that God hath not provided for by some Law.  knows our necessities, and like a wise lawmaker, makes laws to provide for them, and so infinitely wise are those laws that what he hath not, by some law or other, provided for, it is not necessary for any man whatsoever; and certainly therefore where is no lawful and honest way to preserve it, life its self is not necessary; he seems therefore to express himself better in Corpore politico then in Leviathan, because in Leviathan he restrain's this right of Nature only to the preservation of his own life, but in this, I now write against, he saith not only but [most of all his own life] other things he may have a right unto, but most of all, or chiefly the preservation of his own life, or rather the avoiding of death.   

Sect. 3.  

Necessity of nature makes not every particular man desirous to preserve his life.  What he saith, that (necessity of nature makes us desire our own good, and avoid that which is hurtful) is true in that generality, but applied to any particular, is false; for there is no particular but may appear to some men good, and to others hurtful: even these things, life or death, are such; some men have thought this temporal life a misery clothed with these circumstances they possess it with, like a rotten house, which, when the winds and rain drives in, is worse than the open fields; like a Prison, it were better have no house than that; such is the body to the soul; and therefore men may, and have often wished to be delivered out of it, and death to some men is as desired as a freedom from a Gaol. This Gentleman talks up and down in these books, not only like a natural man, but like the worst of them, and the wickedest; for wise men among them have written much in contempt of these sensual temporal things, in which he placeth the only aim and happiness of man.   

Sect. 4.  

It being 〈◊〉 in nature the principal of man's happiness.  Certainly, even in Nature the life of man is not the principal thing of man's happiness, and then not of man's intention and care; for Life is a thing which a man enjoys in common with Beasts and Trees, and therefore if man's happiness should be in that, he were no better, yea much worse than they whose excellency consists in a relation to man; to live only, is to be a Beast, a Plant only; but to live virtuously and reasonably, to glorify that God who gave him those abilities by which his life is happy, that is the end of man, and of man's life, which he is to leave then when he cannot enjoy it upon these conditions; and to a Christian man, as to the best of Philosophers who had thoughts and assurance of Eternity, this life hath been reputed of little value; and to die no misery; because it is but the passage to a better and more spiritual life, although perhaps there may be some difficulties in opening the gate; yet it is not to be compared with the happiness it admits into, nay, it hath been of such esteem amongst men of honour always, that they would choose to die virtuously, rather than live dishonourably; Instances would be numerous out of the Roman story; so that it is impossible, in that absolute sense, without limitation, in which he speaks it, to be true, that this is the whole right of Nature, as his Leviathan or his chief or principal as his Corpus politicum, to preserve this life, or to avoid this enemy, death, which, for multitudes, may, and, for not a few reasons, aught to be despised: These phrases which he useth,   

Sect. 5.  
From whom we expect the less of power] he meane's, 
Nor the power lost with it considerable in respect of the spiritual activity and perfection gained by Death.  Death [and the greatest of bodily pains in the losing] must be censured next; and first of the first. By death we do not lose all power; yea without doubt, like a man out of prison, he is more active and able than he was within; so is the soul, when it is broke out of this gaol or dunghill, its natural corruptible body; nor can he say that he meant bodily power, for than he would not have left out that word Bodily in this which he joined with Pain in his following sentence; men, without question, who have hopes of that better life hereafter, do not expect the loss of all power by this death, but rather the increase of it; and therefore, suppose he should say he meant bodily power, which indeed must needs be lost by death, yet who is troubled to lose a bag of Silver, when in its room shall be left a bag of Gold; to lose bodily power, and gain spiritual? It was said of our Druids in England, who taught the Immortality of the soul, Ignavi est rediturae parcere vitae, it was a poor dull thing, to spare that life which would return again; but then if they had pried into, and could have considered, the glorious immortal existence, which men shall have hereafter for the mortal and contemptible being here, it might have been said that it were not only a dull, but a beastly thing for a man so much to affect the sensual pleasures of this fleshly life, as to be unwilling for the loss of them to gain Spiritual perfections; we cannot then say that we expect to lose by death all our power; and if we do leave bodily powers, we are not loser's, but gainers by it.   

Sect. 6.  

Which is not so terrible, and painful, as pretended.  His next phrase is [That by death we expect in the losing these Powers, the greatest bodily pain.] This Gentleman I guess hath only looked upon Death in those horrid vizards, and disguises which fearful men mask it with, he hath not been so often in the house of mourning as I have, and there made this observation, that Death is not so horrid as many men conceit it, nor the pains so great, that Death is not so fearful, is apparent, not only in experience of those Martyrs who have died for the glory of CHRIST, and so by their blessed sufferings for him have had an assurance that they shall reign with him; but even in those who with heroic spirits have confronted Death in politic concernments, yea sought it, which showed, that there is not a necessity of nature to preserve Life, or that they expected the greatest pain in the losing it. I could fill divers sheets with instances both ancient and modern, these I let pass, lest they kick me in the teeth whilst I follow them in the Chase; for the former; consider how many wicked men have killed themselves for fear of worse pains alive, so Sardanapalus, so Cleopatra, so Nero, 
Ancient instances.  multitudes esteeming the pains of Death deliverance from the pains of unhappy life, and themselves made choice of death upon such Conditions; but take one instance, where men were not concerned in the benefit of death themselves, but took it in relation to others good; we may read in the life of Otho, or rather in his death, that when after his loss in that great and fatal battle betwixt his forces and those of Vitellius, he being retreated, and discontented, 
The most signal that of Otho and his soldiers  his Soldiers flocked to him, beseeching him to head them again, and regain the loss of that day, promising how that they were all ready to die in that cause, with, and for him, if there should be necessity; and, to give him assurance of what they said, one of the most obscure and meanest sort of Soldiers drew his sword and killing himself told him, know O Caesar, that we are all provided thus to die for thee! this man had no end for himself, but only to encourage Otho, either for his Country's good, or his own, to engage again; yet go on, and we shall find that Otho, unmoved with this or any thing else killed himself likewise, and his soldiers carrying him to his funeral Pile, many more slew themselves there to die with him; so that as love of his Country, or Otho's imagined virtues provoked the first, so a bare love to his person inflamed the rest to die with him; now certainly there could not be a necessity of Nature in these men to expect the greatest pains in death, nor indeed can I think there is such pain; Old men wear out questionless like a Candle; those deaths which this Gent. speaks of, are by the assaults of enemies, or condemnation of superiors; these are sudden, and, although there should be great pain, yet, finishing their work quickly, are to be less valued; but I do not think that there is such pain, and therefore, as it is reported of Cato, so it happens to many, that when they have wounded themselves and are somewhat holpen, 
Cato's double attempt to dispatch himself.  they yet kill themselves again; for so it was with Cato, as Plutarch describes him, after his wounding himself and fall from his Bed, that his bowels gushed out, and his Physician, having found them unhurt, had put them up into their own place again, he returning to himself (sure he was in the porch of death, and had viewed it throughly) thrust his Physician away, tore his wound wider, let out his bowels, and with them his life; this is familiar in Common experience; now if there were so much pains in death, although they who were ignorant of it might easily adventure upon it, yet not they who knew it, as Cato and those other; for, without doubt, the pains of death were passed by Cato, when his Physician came to him, and he had lost his senses; so likewise the death of Arria, Paelus his wife, which is Celebrated by Marshal's excellent Epigram.  
Cas●a suo gladium cum traderet Arria Paeto,  
Quem de visceribus traxerat ipsa suis:  
Crede mihi vulnus quod feci non dolet inquit, 
Arria'● magnanimity in being a like precedent to her husband Paetus.   
Sed quod tu facies, hoc mihi Paete dolet.  
The story goes thus, she stole to her Husband in prison, bring's him a sword under her Coat, invites him to kill himself with it, he was fearful, she to encourage him, draws her sword, runne's it into her own body first, gives herself a deadly wound, then give's it him with this high expression of kindness.  
Believe me, Paetus, this wound grieves not me,  
That wound's my grief which must be made by thee.  
Now although we may allow the manner, the sweetness, the elegancy of this kindness, to be the Poets, yet the ground of the expression we may conceive to be real, that she desired to have her Husband die (as some thought) honourably, which he, having received some of Mr. Hobbes his Principles, was fearful to do; she encouraged him to it by her own example, and then told him, it was no hard matter to die. Now if it had been so full of pain, as Mr. Hobbes would have it, that pain would not have given her leave to have attended his good in the midst of it. To the same purpose I can tell a story of a Child of mine own, somewhat above four years old, who being sickly, I put out to a neighbour's house, in whose care I confided, to attend her; she grew weaker and weaker unto death, and almost immediately before her death the man of the house coming home from his business, she called the woman, whom she usually called, old Mother: old Mother, said she, go give the old man his breakfast, he will be angry else; and leave such a boy to rock me in my Cradle, and so straightway died. 
A modern instance in a young child.  This is my Collection, if death had been so painful, this Child could not have had so much leisure f●om the anguish of it, as to have attended that ease of her own rocking, or that kindness to the old man▪   

Sect. 7.  
I have (I thank God) seen divers dye without any apprehension of any great pains in them, 
Death seizeth upon men like sleep.  yea like a sleep, so hath Death seized upon them, so like sleep, as by the bystanders it could not be discerned from it, and hath made me often think that Death is to a dying man, as sleep to a sleepy, and as much desired; when the body hath been tired out with long labour it hath so gone to his long rest, which to us who have assurance of the Resurrection, is no other; and to this purpose, I remember a Story related by Plutarch, that when Diogenes was towards his death, 
Diogenes takes them for brother and Sister▪  having taken his Cicuta which was the sleepy medicine that he, and Socrates, and divers others used, his Physician raising him up even as he was about to die, and ask him whether he felt any trouble, Diogenes answered, no; for, saith he, the brother ushers in the sister, meaning he was asleep, as men seem to us many times before their death. And I can second this Story with another, out of mine own family, of a Son of mine who was but two years old; and when death laid hands upon him, he still cried out to go to sleep; now he would sleep in this man's arms, then on the Bed; sleep is often called an Image of Death, but death came to him in the image of sleep; he had been oft acquainted with sleep, had never heard Death abused by those invectives which sensual men use against it; and when Death came, 
A young child mistook one for the other.  he took it for sleep; nay, so like (to many) is that repose of death to that of sleep, that when they are forced from it by the importunate clamours, 
Misrepresentations make it otherwise apprehended.  or halings and pulling of friends, it is just as a man awaked from sleep, and many men have complained of it as of an unjust violence. It is therefore the ugly Sceletons and pictures of death which men see, and the abusive language and Rhetoric which hath been used towards it, which makes death so fearful, as it is, amongst men; and therefore I could tell of some who having heard death in the common manner calumniated, when upon their deathbed they have been told of its approach, have wondered that that was death which had so little anguish and grief in it; I do not here say that no men have pain in death, there are three periods of time into which death may be divided.   

Sect. 8.  
There is that tract of time when first a sickness gets such a head as it is deadly; 
The three periods of death.  there is secondly that interim in which man grows insensible; and there is, thirdly, that instant in which the soul of man is separated from the body: in regard of which last it was truly spoke of Seneca, when he said, Death should not be fearful, which, when it comes, is not discerned; for Death taken in this last acceptation cannot be perceived, no not in the second, but taking Death in the first way, it is many times more, many times less painful, of which I would dilate Physically, but avoid tediousness; It is a thing as apparent, as almost death its self, that sometimes in that tract of time there may be pain, and most oft is; but there are greater pains, I believe, to many people that outlive their sicknesses, than those when diseases grow deadly; and I am persuaded that the same disease, unless by wounds (and many times in them too) I say the same disease is most oft more painful when it is curable before it be deadly, 
In which of them, and when otherwise pain most affects the sick.  then afterwards, because the spirits are quicker, & the man more sensible; & therefore I conclude, that it is not true, that there is a necessity of nature which maketh men in general avoid death in general, as the thing by which he must needs expect the greatest pain; for it often happens that there is little pain; and people that have died with a sense of death's ugliness, and so, with some impatience, I have found complaining of common accidents, and such which had no participation of death in them, and no cooperation to the dissolution of soul and body by death, as Aches in particular parts, sometimes they were galled, and that troubled them; sometimes that there were clods or hardness in the Bed, etc. All which showed that these pains, not those of Death, were more sensible than even death its self.   

Sect. 9  

In what cases life should not ●e preferred to Death.  [He proceeds, It is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbs both from death and pain] had he put in that little word and esteemed a little thing by him, (justly and honestly) he had said truth; but alas else how unreasonable a thing it is, that a man, to save himself from a little pain, should act things prejudicial to the glory of God, the public good, or else some greater good of his own; any man, who hath sense of any thing but sense, and unworthy ease, cannot choose but apprehend that the greater good should be chosen before the less, such are those before specified. Therefore in such Cases that they, for pain or death its self, are relinquished is against reason. What he adde's [And that which is not against reason we call right, etc.] I agree to; for certainly there is no wrong which is not against reason; but his deduction [It is therefore a right of Nature, that every man may preserve his own life and limbs with all the power he hath] This deduction, by what is already said, cannot be true, but when his life and limbs are not opposed by some greater good.    

CHAP. XXIII.  
Of using or misusing means in order to their end. The regulation of man's judgement in it. The preservation of life and estate when necessary. Of right and wrong, Law, etc.  

Sect. 1.  
1. I Come now to Number 7. which begins thus [And because where a man hath right to the end, and the end cannot be attained without the means, that is, without such things as are necessary to the end, it is consequent that it is not against reason, and therefore right, for a man to use all means, and do whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body.] How vile and illogicall is this; had he proved that the body were the end of man: or, instead of body, had he said, for the preservation of that end, his axiom, explained thus, might have borne him out in it; but, as it is pu●, there is no connexion; for suppose a man hath right to the end, his own happiness, and by that right likewise to all means which conduce to it; yet unless this body can be proved to be that end, his application of it to the body is of no force. Well; I will examine his Aphorism. First he, who hath right to the end, hath not right to all means of getting it, is apparent; 
He that hath right to the end, hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end.  for he who hath right to an estate, or an house, hath not right to take it by force, he must only use legal means for the obtaining and preserving it, and so, though a man have right to his body or life, yet he hath no right to preserve it by unlawful actions; It is a most just rule of law, that a man must so use his own, as he must not hurt another; a man hath right to water and a Meadow, but he must not so use his water and his meadow, as by overflowing his meadow he should drown his neighbours Corne. So although a man have right to his life, yet this right is not of such a transcendent power as to enable him, for the preservation of that life, to hurt others and destroy their lives.  
But once again, for further and clearer explication of that rule he gives concerning an end let us observe, 
The ultimate end excepted.  that it hath no truth but concerning the last end, and in that it hath; for since all men's actions are for an end, that is, his summum bonum, his happiness, every man, out of necessity of nature, doth, what he doth, for it, and the utmost he can for it; but this life or body is not man's happiness, and for any second end, there being no necessity of the end itself, there is much less of any means which conduce to it; and therefore of such ends, of which nature man's temporal life and body are, there is no manner of truth in it, no more than if we should say, it were right for a man to do what he can, any thing to obtain pleasure, or profit, upon which he sets his heart.   

Sect. 2.  
His 8. Numb. must be likewise examined which saith [Also every man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the means, and of the greatness of the danger. This hath some truth in it, and yet not to be so understood, 
He that judgeth by the right of Nature hath a law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judgement.  that by right of nature a man may judge what he will, and accordingly act, and what he acts is right, as he seems to imply here, & from hence enforces afterwards; for as in our judicatures there must use be made of Judges, and the decrees of those Judges will regulate and govern our possessions; yet those Judges have rules by which their judicatures should be regulated, and what they act contrary to those rules, or Laws, although it may be effected, yet it is wicked; so it is in those, no doubt; but every man will (in such an impossible state as he supposeth man) judge of the means and necessity, but yet there is a law of nature in every man, by which his judgement should be guided, and what he judgeth, though never so congruent to his will, contrary to this law, is not right; so that, as a Judge, though what he judgeth must be performed, and he hath power to judge what he thinks fit; yet he hath right to judge only according to the law of that Nation which gave him the power of being a Judge, all other judgement is by power, but not by right; so is it with this man, he may act against the law of nature for the preservation of his life or Limb, but if not right, it is wicked to do so. The Argument he brings for proof of this Conclusion convinceth not me. [For, saith he, if it be against reason that I be Judge of mine own danger myself, 
To which he is obliged by Reason.  than it is reason that another may be Judge, etc.] It is reason, say I, that in such a Case I am Judge, but it is reason likewise, that I judge according to Law, and make my will be guided by reason, not my reason regulated by my will; because it is mine, it is not therefore right; but because mine according to the law of nature and right reason; of which he himself afterwards grants, there are divers laws both of men in society, to men single, and to men that live together, although not united in a policy.   

Sect. 3.  
In his 9 Number he affirms [As a man's judgement in right of nature is to be employed for his own benefit, 
When the law of Nature for preservation may be dispensed with etc.  so also the strength, etc. of every man is then rightly employed when he useth it for himself.] To use the Phrase of the time, this Gent. is very selfish, and indeed there is some reason in what he writes; for as his judgement, so his strength, etc. but his judgement is to be employed according to the law of nature only for himself, and so his strength; when some greater good shall be proposed to him, the good of his family, his Nation, the glory of God in his virtuous death, than this life is to be neglected and contemned; as a limb is to be lost rather than a life, the less good rather than the greater, so a private life rather than that of a Nation. But his Argument is feeble and of no force, when he saith [Else a man hath no right to preserve himself, 
As the right for a man's preserving some piece of his estate. ] for although it be right for a man to preserve himself, yet not with those other greater losses; it is right for a man to preserve each piece of his estate, yet to preserve it by force, or loss of a Sons life or his own, when that piece of his estate shall be inconsiderable, it is not right for him to do it; In a word, a man's understanding, strength, or whatsoever a man hath, he hath right to bestow upon the preservation of this life; but then when they are not called for by some more excellent and more desirable good than this life, than they are to be bestowed upon that better employment, not this.   

Sect. 4.  
Now I am arrived at his 10. and last Number, which I mean to handle in this Chapter, which begins thus [Every man by nature hath right to all things, that is to say, to do whatsoever he listeth, to whom he listeth, to possess, use and enjoy all things he will and can.] A good large Commission: I will examine it, and, to the understanding it, I will return to his Leviathan, where I left Pag. 64. and discussing the beginning of that 14. Chap. lay a foundation for that truth which this Number occasions me to deliver. First then, let me observe, that as in the beginning of this Chap. he define's right by equity, liberty; 
Mr. Hobbes mistaken in his definition of Right, and division of it from Law.  so immediately after he define's liberty to be the absence of external impediments; and again a little after, putting a distinction betwixt right and law, he saith, that Law and Right differ as much as Obligation and Liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent; in which proposition he discovers a mighty weakness; for in his definition of right he makes it nothing but the power and ability to do what he will, as indeed he makes it afterwards, when right implies an equitable title to what he doth; and a man may have right, when he hath not power to do accordingly, but is hindered by external impediments from acting according to his right; that definition of his is therefore very weak; for what he speaks, that Law and Right are inconsistent, I am so directly in my judgement against it, that I think there is no right to any thing but by law, which I will thus confirm by what follows.   

Sect. 5.  
Right and wrong, or injury, are opposite terms; so that right is the convenience or agreement which one thing hath with another; 
What right is properly, and what wrong.  and wrong is the disagreement; as it is a right line which agrees with the rule of straightness; a crooked line or a wrong one, which deviates from those rules; a right shot that which hit's the white, and a wrong which misseth. So it is a right action which is according to the rules of Actions, and a wrong which differs from them. These rules are that we call law, which regulates our actions; and when they are done, accordingly they are right, and we have right to do them; and to this purpose, he said in the preceding Chap. 
Whence is proved the consistence of Right with Law.  Where no law, no injustice; and I may say, where can be no injustice, there can be no justice; contraries appertain to the same subject, and expel each other out of it. So then, if right be an agreeing with some rule or law, it is so far from being inconsistent with it, that it cannot be without it. As in a Commonwealth, a man hath only such a right to use or act any thing as the law of that Commonwealth gives him; so in the generality of this world, a man can only have right to do or act such things which the universal law of nature directs or empowers him to do. Thus his Leviathan being touched, concerning this point, I will return to his De Corpore politico, where I left, and show what manner of right the law of Nature gives a man; and whether there be such a large Charter as he expresseth, or no.    

CHAP. XXIV.  
Of the law and right of nature. Man's subjection to God, and dominion over the Creatures; The rules of his actions. Man exempted out of Adam's charter; why. Noah's Patent; And his Sons possessing themselves of the world. The titles of propriety discussed. Jus & Vtile, etc.  

Sect. 1.  
TO understand which, let us conceive, that the law of Nature belonging to every thing is that law which was given it at the Creation; and the right of nature, 
What is the law, what the Right of Nature.  or jus Naturale, must be that authority or title is granted by that law to use or do any thing; which title can be nothing but that jus or right which God gave him, Gen. 1.28, 29. Which we find to extend to the Earth, the Fowl, the fishes, 
Man in his most peculiar dominion▪ subject and tributary to God.  the living things that move upon the earth, the herbs and trees; This is his Jus Naturale, but yet this is not to be used as he will, although he be Lord of them, there are laws for Lords as well as servants, Kings as well as subjects; and they must be subject to the King of heaven, as their subjects to them; yea, in these things which they are made Lords over; We may see in the 4. of Genesis, that Cain and Abel brought Oblations to GOD of those things over which they had a most peculiar dominion; they paid God, as it were, a tribute out of those things he gave them a right to by that law of nature which he gave them at their creation; from whence it appears that man hath not such right to any thing, much less to all things, to do what he pleaseth with or to them, for than they had had no right to have neglected that duty of Oblation, and then they could have done nothing by which God should have put a difference betwixt Cain and his Oblation; and Abel and his Oblation, as he did:   

Sect. 2.  

Man in his first Charter had dominion given him over the creatures, but not over other men.  Then secondly, let us consider that here is not in this Charter expressed any right a man hath over other men, but this right is equally granted to Man over those creatures there specified, but none to any man over another; Therefore all right that any man hath to do any thing to another must either be by nature, as Parents, in regard of whose origination of their Child's lives and educa●●●● of them, they have naturally a right to govern and 〈◊〉 any things concerning them; or else it must be by 〈◊〉 Covenant, concession or yielding, expressed or 〈◊〉 of one to the other; but in the original Charter 〈◊〉 is not any grant or privilege given to one over 〈◊〉; and therefore barbarous acts of inhumanity, 〈◊〉 it is to be supposed that no man would yield 〈◊〉 should act upon him, no man can have right to 〈◊〉; Upon these Considerations his proposition must 〈◊〉 perish, when he saith, every man hath right to any 〈◊〉; but he seems to prove it thus. [For seeing all 〈◊〉 he willeth must therefore be good to him, in his own ●●dgement, because he willeth them, and may tend to his preservation some way or other, or he may judge so, and we have ●ade him judge thereof, Sect. 8. If he had said, I have ●ade him judge thereof, the force of the Argument would quickly have been shattered, because his authority is weak to constitute a Judge in so weighty affairs; but when he said we, I wonder who he means. I am sure I was none of them, nor do I remember to have read any other, but himself, of that mind, That every man must be judge of his own Cause: I know every man will judge and act according to his judgement, who is an honest and virtuous man; but to be a Judge Authoritatiuè, which that phrase (we have made him judge thereof) doth imply, 
Man's will not to b● the rule of his judgement, nor the reason of his actions.  is that which no man saith but himself; how he is a Judge, I have showed before, by what right to judge, by the law of Nature, not by his making him; his will hath not right with it to act any thing because he willeth it, but because it is regulated by the laws of nature, and acts according to those rules, therefore only he hath right to do what he doth by them; and therefore his Conclusion, which (he saith) follow's out of his premises, is vain, which is, that all things may be rightly done by him.   

Sect. 3.  
He goes on with another, [for saith he, for this cause it is rightly said, Natura dedit omnia omnibus, 
Why men a●e exempt from God's general charter of dominion at man● creation·  that nature hath given all things to all men] the truth of this must next be examined. Nature may be said to have given all things to all men, those things before expressed in God's charter at man's Creation; but nature hath not given men right over one another, which is mainly importuned by him in both these Treatises, and must be understood in the latitude of that universal term all things; for unless other men, all things cannot be given to him; now that other men are not given to each other will appear out of this, that then God should not be offended with those acts which were done one to another where is no positive law; 
To put a restraint on any unce which had no positive law against it.  for where there is no positive law of God's, or man's prohibiting them, only the law of nature is of force to restrain men's actions, and to give right to every thing; and, without doubt God can be displeased with nothing that is right; well then, let us cast our eyes upon the 19 Chap. of Genesis; we shall find there the Sodomites attempting a most wicked and unjust act upon two strangers way-faring men, 
As the sin of Sodom●, it may be reasonably supposed, had none.  as they thought, because the assault was so universal by the old and young, of the City, it is reasonable to think, there was no positive law against that sin, for men universally would not confront a positive law; and again, if there had been any positive law, it is probable, Lot would have urged it to them; but there being none, and these men by the height of their lust (which is one of Mr. Hobbes his titles) having smothered the light of nature, pursued the design, and had the wrath of God falling on them by Fire; why was God so angry? Mr. Hobbes would have told him, there is no positive law forbidding it, and thou hast given all things to all men by Nature, and it is lawful for any man to do any thing to any man. Let us ascend higher, and consider, in the 4. of Genesis, that Cain kills Abel; in the 9 vers. God questions Cain about him, Where is thy brother Abel? His answer was somewhat like Mr. Hobbes', I know not, am I my brother's keeper? and yet this was but like him, it was very short of Mr. Hobbes' his impiety; he only pleaded that he was not accountable for him, he was not to be charged with his condition, be it what it will; Mr. Hobbes he would have told God, thou hast given him to me, and I had right to do what I would with him, by thy Commission; this villain won thy favour from me, and now I have taken him away by that natural right which thou hast given me; Mr. Hobbes he would have out-Cained Cain himself, 
How Mr Hobbes would have out-Cained Cain in the justification of fratricide.  in his justification of these horrid acts, by his Principles; but because God, whose anger is never but most just, did express himself so severely against him, & could not be just, unless these Sodomites and Cain had transgressed some Law (which could be none but the law of Nature) it must needs show that these men had no right to do what they would with any thing, that is, with other persons; but had their right confined in many acts by the law of nature▪ again, 
The contradiction in mutual dominion, every man over every man.  if every man had right over every other person, than those men have mutually right over one an●●her, and the same persons, in the same cause, in respect of the same persons, should be both superiors and inferiors, which is a contradiction, and impossible to be. I let this pass therefore without further trouble, and come to examine how Nature hath given all those other things, the Earth, the Fowls, the beasts, to all men.   

Sect. 4.  
To understand this we must have recourse to the Charter before mentioned in the first of Genesis, 
No new Patent made to Noah but thaes to Adam reinforced.  as likewise Psal. 115.16. The earth hath he given to the Children of men, which gift was made by the law of nature at the first Creation, for else we find no other Grant, unless some men may think it a new Patent which was made to Noah and his sons, Gen. 9 Which yet upon examination will appear no other but a renewing of the former Charter, which being given to man in his integrity, he might justly suspect to be lost by his sin; God therefore, in this replanting the world, repeats the former privileges, almost word for word, after the Flood; and therefore if it were a gift of God by nature at the first, or with nature in the Creation, it is now either a positive law, or else a renewing of the former Charter. Let us now examine it, and begin with Noah, for whatsoever the other Charter to Adam was, if it differ from that to Noah, as sure it doth not, in any material thing, yet it would advance the knowledge of this truth but little, because all that was passed w●s so washed with the flood, as there was utterly a new beginning; now we may observe then in the 9 Chap. of Gen. vers. 1. That God blessed Noah and his sons, and gave the possession of all sublunary things to them indifferently; for although there was a principality in Noah, without doubt, over his Sons; yet it seems by that term (ye) in the plural number, that a right to all these Creatures was granted to them all, and by that universal phrase over every beast, etc. I● seems that every one had a right to all these, though Noah had his paternal dominion over his sons only; 
Noah's sons like coheires or entercommoners in their right.  and this general right is described by some Casuists to be like that of Coheires to the same inheritance when their father is dead, each of which hath his right to the whole until they come to a partition; and this is called Non plenum dominium; they have a right to the whole, but not a full right; there is no grass upon that inheritance which you can say any of these Coheirs have not a right unto until the partition, yet no one hath a full dominion of the whole, they cannot sell, or alien the whole. Or, methinks, it was like entercommoners in the same pasture; every entercommoner hath right to the whole Common, and his Cattle hath right to feed in any place, and eat what they will, and can get, and so hath every man's Cattle that entercommunes with him, they have all the same right; yet that which any man's Cattle hath seized on, is proper only to those Cattle, and when he hath mouthed any grass, it is an injustice in another entercommoner to take that away out of his mouth, which his Cattle had seized upon; So was it with those sons of Noah, they were entercommoners of the world, they might, the jure, any one, seize upon any thing, any part of it, and being seized of it, it was then his, and he had a propriety in that which before he was only a Commoner of; this was the donation of God, and they were all put out into their Common; and you shall find, not long after, how they took their shares and several possessions, and from thence forward it was unlawful to dispossess any of what they were seized. For my part I cannot believe, as some men, that are over-wise, do think, that the world was divided by consent amongst such a handful of men, none of all which, I can guess, knew half the world; but, as I expressed before, 
They had not the world divided among them by consent, but by casual occupancy, or choice, as every of them thought fit.  being entercommoners thrust into the same Common, as they found places fit for them, and not possessed of others, they entered upon them, and enjoyed them, and those places they enjoyed in common before; and every one had a title to them before that entrance; but afterwards the possessed enjoyed by their private title; and it were injustice to defraud them of those possessions.   

Sect. 5.  
I know it may be objected, 
Obj. Ans.  how that the Children of Israel dispossessed the Canaanites; and it is clearly answered, that God, who gave men their titles, 
The Children of Israel dispossessed the Canaanites by God's prerogative which he had received  never gave them so absolutely, no not in any Commission by the law of Nature its self, but he reserved a prerogarive to dispose of any thing otherwise, when it should please him; and that God, by that prerogative, did give to the Children of Israel their title to that land, to the Egyptians goods, to many other things; which gift of Gods if any man can show to any thing which is another's, it ceaseth to be that others, and becomes his; for the earth is the Lords, he is the absolute Proprietor, our propriety is but usu-fructuary, and that dum Domino placuerit; yet until his will is revealed to dispose otherwise of it, it is injustice to take any man's estate from him. For these proprieties, although no man can show an universal peremptory command of Gods, that thus or thus these or those worldly goods shall be appropriated to th●se or those men, yet men in the very first plantation of the world did apprehend God that granted this power of appropriating some parts peculiar to themselves in the Charter of entercommoning. So it appears, that Noah, 
The first generation of men understood their titles of propriety without God's peremptory command.  understood it in the 9 Chap of Genesis, presently upon the sin of Cham verse 27. God shall enlarge jaephet, and he shall dwell in the Tents of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant; which could not be, but that there must be a propriety in Shem. So that then it seems evident to me, that both the rights of Common and propriety were passed in the same deed, because as the other was expressed in the beginning of the Chapter; so this employed or supposed in the latter end; I think I have said enough of this Conclusion, how Nature gave all things to all men. If you will have a Law-phrase, they had juc ad rem, not in re, they had a title to the thing, to any thing, a remote title, every man is capable to have any thing; and if the true Proprietor desert it, it may be his; but they have only a title in re, which have lawful possession of it, to enjoy and make use of it: He proceeds.   

Sect. 6.  
[So that jus & utile, right and profit, is the same thing.] I am sure such a right is the greatest wrong in the world; 
Jus and Utile not the same thing.  to pretend right to what another is rightfully seized of, is most unjust; the world, until it was possessed, and each piece of it, was indifferent to any man, and so is still; but when possessed, it is injustice to deprive the possessor of what he enjoye's. He again [But that right of all, as to all things, is in effect no better than if no man had right to any thing] thi● were true of his manner of right he delivered, but not of that I have expressed; for by that right I spoke of, all the first planters of the world had right to what they planted, and yet at this day, 
Places &c not 〈…〉 that first seizeth.  when any land is found inhabited only by beasts, whether such as was never before discovered, or deserted by the former inhabiters, it becomes the right of him that enters upon it; so likewise all such Fowl●, Beast's, fishes, precious stones, which by no Civil law of particular Nations are appropriated, are his who seizeth first upon them; and it is an injustice, by force, or fraud, to deprive them of what they have so seized.  
I remember Tully hath an excellent discourse, 
How Tul●ie understood Utile far otherwise than M● Hobbes.  in one Paradox, to show, That Honestum & utile is the same; but then in that he takes Utile not, as Mr. Hobbes, for gain, or what conduceth to the saving this life; these things he utterly contemns, and shows they are not profitable, but unprofitable, or many times hurtful to man; but he understands this word profitable for that which conduceth to man's happiness; and ●his he affirms to be only such things as are honest, I think no man ever justified his Conclusion, as he understands these terms of profit and right.  
He ends this Sect. with an endeavour to prove his Conclusion [For saith he, 
Mr. Hobbes' Argument ex non concessis.  there is little use and benefit of that right a man hath, when another, as strong or strength than himself hath right to the same.] This Argument would have some force if his foundation had been well laid, which was, that every man had right to every thing even in another's possession; but that appears to be a mistake in him, and therefore this Argument is weak which is drawn ex non concessis.    

CHAP. XXV.  
Concerning nature's right, liberty, power; Of war and self-preservation by it. For what ends and advantages a man may renounce his right to life liberty, etc.  

Sect. 1.  
THus having finished my discourse upon this subject, as much as concerns his Corpus Politicum, I return to examine his handling the same in his Leviathan, to see if the diversity of expression in this from the other doth add any thing to the confirmation of his design, Cap. 14. pag. 64. He defines the right of nature to be, the liberty every man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature.  

The right of nature not such as Mr. Hobbs defines it.  This definition I except against, as not cut out even to the thing defined. First, it is too narrow, for this right of nature concerns not himself alone, but a man by right of nature hath right to many things which relate not to his own life: Yea, if it have such a liberty which consisteth in, to do, or, not to do (as he expound's it presently after) than it is a right of nature, to forbear to use his own power, for the preservation of his life, aswell as to use it; so that out of this regard his definition agrees not to every particular contained in the right of nature. Secondly, like an ill made garment, as it is too straight in one place, so it is too wide in another, the liberty a man hath to use his power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own life, is not a right of nature; for the right of nature, as I have showed, is a result out of the law of Nature, which impower's him for that action; but the law of nature gives not a man leave to do what he will for the preservation, etc. (as I have showed before) but only such things as are just, and according to right reason and the most public and greatest intendments of Nature, to which every particular man's nature and life is aimed by that Nature which gives him his nature, are to be preferred before his life.   

Sect. 2.  
The next thing I blame is his description of Liberty, thus, [By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments.] This is a most improper exposition of that liberty he immediately before put in the definition of right, 
Nor liberty, as he describe's it.  for external impediments have nothing to do with the liberty of right; nor doth the taking away the ability to recover his estate by strength of opposition, take away the right to have it, especially this natural right; for other rights, by civil institution, and donation, do in some manner, depend upon outward things, because those national laws, which give them these rights, are outward, although right and title be an inward thing, the issue of that outward law; but in natural right the very law which give's a man this right is an internal law, a law writ in man's heart; and therefore the liberty which attends this right, and which, he saith, this right is, can in no sense be understood to be the absence of external impediments; he adds [Which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would.] This is weakly said, 
External impediments may hinder, but not take away natural power.  or most impertinently, or both; for external impediments can take away no part of natural power (which alone is necessary to natural right) this may hinder nature in its operations, but this cannot take away the power of operating; and in oecconomicks the disobedience of a Son may hinder the acts of a Parents exercising his jus naturale, his natural right over his son but it cannot take away his natural right over him: These rights are internal things, which are not much concerned in what is outward but remain and keep their being, whatsoever outward things happen.   

Sect. 3.  
His third thing to be censured in this Chap. and Pag. is his definition of a Law of nature which is this [A law of nature (Lex naturalis) is a precept, or general Rule found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which it may be best preserved. 
Exceptions against Mr. Hobbes definition of the law of nature. ] He is a most unhappy man in his definitions, which are foundations upon which he build's his discourse, yet are so weak as they cannot themselves withstand the least opposition which many Reasons may assault them with. First for this, we may observe, that if he had said, such a Precept, as he se●s down, had been a law of nature, or a conclusion deduced out of a law of nature, he had spoke truth; but saying, a law of Nature is such a precept, he makes this precepe to be the Predicate, as we University-men, abused with University●learning, term it, and then it must be as large as the subject. A law of nature is what this is not; for, first, he makes this precept to be only a prohibition, To a negative law. A precept (saith he) by which a man is forbidden etc. when certainly, although there are negative precepts; yet they are founded upon affirmative precepts; no negative which is not supported by an affirmative, and this law forbidding, must be founded upon this affirmative duty enjoined by the law of nature that a man must love his own life. Certainly had not Mr. Hobbes proudly contemned University learning, he would have writ more properly, and have seduced himself into fewer errors; next, 
A vein of errors that run through his book.  observe with me that general error which runne's through his whole discourse; that he makes Nature aiming, in all her intendments, at the benefit only of particulars in those provident laws which she hath made for the universal, when, indeed, the nature of all laws is to look to the public, and particulars only as they are parts of the public. The latter part of that Section I have showed erroneous already, which affirms law and right inconsistent.   

Sect. 4.  
His next Sect. in the same page and Chap. begins thus [And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent Chap.) is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason.] He said somewhat like truth, 

Mr. Hobbes may be allowed to say, he declares, when he proves nothing.  
But not to suppose a multitude of falsehoods to make up the horridness of one conclusion.   when he said it was declared in the precedent Chapter; for certainly there was a bare declaration of such a thing, no m●nner of proof that had show of reason.  
Posito quolibet, sequitur quidlibet; if men suppose impossible things, they may from thence-argue impossibilities, Uno absurdo concesso, mille sequuntur, an error in the foundation, in the first drawing a line, multiplies its self all the way, thus in this instance he goes on [And there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies, it followeth that in such a condition every man hath right to every thing even to one another's bodies,] see how many falsehoods are supposed to make up this horrid conclusion. First, that unreasonable definition of the right of Nature. Secondly, that, as bad, of the law of Nature. Thirdly, That not to be imagined thesis that every man is at war with every man, without all which this cannot follow, that every man hath right to one another's bodies; for certainly that Nature which gave a right in common to the universal world, besides that, gave every man a propriety in his own body, and none had interest in it but by jus naturae, as Parents, or by some concession expressed or employed, as in polities; yea in war (saith he) certainly not so, neither; for by the law of Arms men have not right to butcher one another without there be martial opposition; there are inhumanities' in wars, which men have no right to use, as perhaps will be showed hereafter; so that then all these Propositions (which are all apparently false) must be granted, or else the Conclusion which is drawn out of these denied premises is void and of no cleverness; yet take his Conclusion altogether, it hath some likeness of truth with it, [That in such a Condition every man hath right, etc.] In such a condition, which was never known, which is impossible, in such a condition a man may have such a right; he proceeds in the same place [And consequently it is a Precept, 
A term wanting to Mr. Hobbes' just engagement in a war.  or general rule of reason, that every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he hath hope of obtaining it: and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps ●nd advantages of war.] This conclusion might have been granted without these unjust means of obtaining it, only one term added to the last clause, which is, when he hath used sufficient means to obtain peace and cannot get it, than he may make use of the advantages of war; for without this term sufficient a man may attempt a peace, and upon any denial or pause, at the first, he might with justice engage in a war which were most unjust.   

Sect. 5.  
That which follows is against his own Principles, the first branch of which rule (saith he) containeth the first and fundamental law of nature (which is to seek peace, and follow it) this, according to his principles, can be but a deduction out of the law of nature; for if the law of nature be, as he defined it, just before in this page, a Precept by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive to his life, 
And to him a remembrance of his own principles.  this can be no other but a deduction out of that.  
[The second (saith he) is the sum of the right of nature, which is, by all means we can to defend ourselves. 
War not the only preservative of man's right or Nature's. ] The second branch is not the sum of this right, etc. but a branch of it; for there are many other means to preserve ourselves besides war, although in a desperate case war may be one. What follows in that Chap. concerning the second law of nature, deduced out of this, that a man should lay down his right to all things, etc. I think it needless to speak of; for first there is no man hath, 
The discourse of man's laying down his right to all things, etc. unnecessary.  by nature, right to any person but his own; secondly, a man need's lay down his right to nothing; for his right to any thing returns to him, if any thing lack an owner, which is not disposed of by such powers, which by deduction from the law of nature, are authorised to sett●e them otherwise; and therefore all those needless definitions and descriptions of what it is to lay down a right, what renouncing, what transferring, what obligation, duty, injustice, are; which are touched in the 65. Page, I let go at present and for altogether, unless some just occasion hereafter may make me look back upon them; only that require's a censure, which he deliver's in the bottom of that Page, and the beginning of the next, which discourse as I conceive it wicked in its self, so it renders all which he spoke before exceeding malicious.   

Sect. 6.  
This discourse begins thus [Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it, it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some other good he hopeth for thereby.] This I grant so far as the words express it; 
That is not always really good for which a man pa●ts with 〈◊〉 right.  but there is something he implies which will render it fit for censure anon; his reason likewise I allow, which follows [for it is a voluntary act, and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself] as for his deduct on which is laid therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood, by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred] this in general hath some truth; for since the end of man is his happiness, which he must needs love, happiness and goodness being as proper an object of the will, as colours to the sight, or any other, yet this applied to any particular thing will be found erroneous; for although good and happiness must needs, by the law of nature, be desired; yet because what is that good and happiness is not so universally apparent, when that good and happiness shall be instanced in any particular, it will not be universally received; Now I will consider his examples [As first (saith he) a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life] This is a mistake in him, a man can, and many men have done it; a man can, for a man can prefer other things before his life, and therefore can exchange h●s life for that; men ought to prefer their Country's good before their own, both being in its self a greater good, and of greater durance; men may prefer their souls eternal good beyond this life, the hope of which give's the greatest comfort this life is capable of; 
A man may lay down his right to resistance, and preservation of his life for a greater good.  one may and aught to prefer the glory of God before his own life; by which that eternal good of his own soul shall be assured to him; these men may, and aught to prefer, who are Christians; and as Reason guide's to these actions, so Experience of them who have done it, for these ends, shows it may be done; but there are a hundred little by-ends for which men have done it; those of honour in several kinds, for riches, for present pleasures; and there is almost no worldly contentment, for which some men have not adventured, and lost their lives; but it may justly be objected, 
Obj. Ans.  that those did not virtuously do it. I answer; that is not material to his proposition, wh●ch useth not the word, ought not, but cannot lay down, etc. yet in the first conditions, before named, which are virtuous, take one eminent Story, besides a multitude, told by Tertullian in his Apologeticus adversus Gentes, Cap. 37. the story is thus; Tertullian lived in the time of Severus, who persecuted the Christian's most barbarously: Tertullian, being converted to Christianity, takes courage, and writes this Book in defence of them, against that cruel manner of persecuting, which was to destroy them unheard, only upon confessing Christianity, like Wolves or beasts odious to the Commonwealth; amongst other slanders, by which this Injustice was coloured to the world, this was one, which they were accused of, that they were ill affected to the Imperial government, 
Tertullian's signal instance in the Christians of his time.  and were enemies to it. Tertullian, in answer to this, saith in 37. Cap. If we were maliciously affected to revenge the injuries done us; Velure una nox pauculis faculis largitatem ultionis possit operari si malum malo dispungi penes nos liceret. The meaning of which is, that they were strong enough to set the City on fire, in one night, when they would. Now saith he, if we would declare ourselves enemies, we are strong enough to make it good, the Mauri, or Marcomauri, or Parthi are not so numerous, they inhabit one Country, we the world; what war are we not fit for, even with unequal forces, who can suffer ourselves tam libenter trucidari, so willingly to be slain? but, saith he, in this discipline we have learned to be killed, rather than kill; yea, if we would not fight against you, we could, without rebellion, by a mere desertion, destroy you, by the loss of so many Citizens, this very divorce would astonish you, you would lack men whom to govern. Let him that will, read that Chap. and the rest about it, he shall find the Christians killed, tortured, yea persecuted, dead, so that the sanctuary of the grave, as he speaketh was not a refuge for them; he shall find that they could easily vindicate themselves from these evils; yet they chose to suffer them, rather than do the least evil, having implicitly covenanted with that government, by being born under it, to obey it; nay this shewes, that they, and such a world of men, were of this opinion; and it was apparently known, or else he durst not have published this discourse to be read by the Emperor, and to dissuade him from his persecution by such an Argument, which, for matter of fact, might so easily have been confuted. Had these men been of Mr. Hobbes his mind, they would have said, what do you talk of Obedience, give us life, in defence of which a man may kill any man, or men? yea all the world rightfully; nor can any Covenant, by words, or otherwise, divest us of this right; but they were not of his opinion, and their practice is enough to confute Mr. Hobbes, that a man can lay down that right, etc. and it was virtuous so to do.   

Sect. 7.  
What he farther instances in, concerning Wounds, Chains, and Imprisonment, 
He may suffer imprisonment etc. without reluctance for the same reason..  how th●t the same may be said of them as of a man's life; that no covenant can pass away a man's right of rescuing himself from them, may seem answered in what was applied to those of Life; because if we may pass away our right to our own life, much rather to these lesser things; but I will examine his reason [both (saith he) because there is no benefit consequent to such patience, as there is to the patience of suffering another to be Wounded or Imprisoned] no benefit? Yes surely, great every way, when these afflictions are laid upon us by lawful Magistrates, 
Obedience being better than sacrifice.  than there is the benefit of obedience then which no sacrifice is more grateful to Almighty God; it is that which is the foundation of polity, and without which no Commonwealth can subsist; for if men should not subject for Conscience, and think that obedience to punishments a virtuous duty, which carry's its reward in its self, no man would ever submit, so long as he could find any means to struggle; the innumerable instances might be made of this, might of themselves fill a volume; take but that one of Marcus Regulus, how he rather than he would violate a little promise, and that with an Enemy, did expose and thrust himself ●nto such vengeance, and tortures, as the greatest malice could impose upon him; how much rather upon those weighty, though implicit Covenants, which every man makes with that Commonwealth wherein he lives, to obey the Laws made for the good of it, how much rather may they exact a submission to them, though with our own loss and injury?   

Sect. 8.  
He goes on [And lastly, the motive and end, for which this renouncing and transferring of Rights is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man's person in his life, and in the means ●f so preserving life as not to be weary of it.]  
I will not discourse over again these terms, renouncing and transferring of right, the nature of which I have before debated, 
A man may renounce h●s right pro ●ris et foci●.  but here only touch upon what the end of men's submission to the laws of Politic society is, and wherein it consists, which is that he means by th●se phrases Renouncing, etc. and, surely, to say, it is nothing else but the security, etc. is much too bold an assertion; for certainly Pro aris & focis, was wont to be the Argument why men did engage themselves in any dangerous or hard adventure, and Pro aris first. I may say the same for the good of their Posterity, 
For the good of his posterity.  for which we have read the famous story of the Children of Israel, drawing our that painful and laborious journey through so many hazards and perils, forty years together, that their Posterity might live contentedly and blessedly in Canaan; and we daily find multitudes of men amongst us who spend as long time without any comfort in their own lives. (I speak of these sensual comforts and eases which he intimate's▪) only out of this regard, that they have an expectation, that their Posterity after them may live plentifully.  
Again, as I instanced before, the good of the Commonwealth in which they live hath not only here a sufficient Argument to persuade a hard, but even to cast off all life for their Country's good; I need not speak of the monastic retreats, which in God's cause many yea multitudes of men, make, 
Monastic retreats.  and no doubt many honestly and piously, in truth and reality, even to be Anchorites, and renounce all contentment in this world; all which makes it apparent, that this life, and the contentments of it, are not the sole and only end for which men renounce their rights and interests; and therefore men may enter into such Covenants, where even the subjection of their lives, and all the accommodation of it may justly be engaged, without any misconstruction or fraud, as he seems to imply immediately after, and therefore that must fall of itself, and I need speak no more to it. What follows in the same Page; concerning Contracts, Covenants, etc. I let pass, unless, by misapplication of them, I find hereafter that they are abused to the prejudice of some cause, which will deserve vindication, and I will now come to what he speaks of Merit, at the bottom of page 67. and the beginning of 68    

CHAP. XXVI.  
Of merit by contrast and otherwise. The distinction ex congruo & condigno expounded according to the schools.  

Sect. 1.  
HE that performeth first (saith the Author) in the case of Contract, is said to merit that which he is to receive by the performance of the other, and he hath it as due.] This is true which he writes, this is Merit, but this expression comprehends not all merit, this is a legal merit; a man in this case may implead the party he conracted with, and gain his reward by right of law; but there may be merit without a legal title, as thus; A soldier takes a Prisoner, useth him civilly, dismisseth him, afterwards that soldier, 
Diversity of Merit.  who was so treated, takes his taker prisoner, he, without question, deserved to be civilly used again by him; Titius finds Sempronius a poor necessitous Child, takes him into his house, breeds him up carefully; without question Titius deserves from Sempronius all dutiful observances, but he cannot implead him for it, but in humanity it is due to both these from whom they have received these obliging kindnesses, although there was no Contract preceding. 
The Catchers title so scattered money.  What he adds presently after, of a man who scatter's money, to be his who catcheth it, is no differing case from the other, for it is by way of Contract, and the title to that money is as legal in him who first snatcheth up the money, as in him who should get that money by any other Contract. In the bottom of that page he adds [But there is between those two sorts of merit this difference, that in Contract I merit by virtue of mine own power and the Contractors need but in this case of free gift (so he calls that scattering of Money) I am enabled to merit only by the benignity of the giver.]   

Sect. 2.  
This distinction I conceive manifestly weak; for first, what he saith of that he calls Contract is as true of the other, that in contract I merit by virtue of my power and the Contractors need; so is it in that contract, as I call it, where money is scattered for him who can first catch it; he who catcheth it first hath it by his own power of catching, and the Contractors need of that pleasure to see men, scramble for the Money; and he deserves it, as well as a Musician doth his hire, or any other of these men which are contracted with for any of our pleasures or recreations So likewise in the second part of his distinction what he affirms of this other, which he calls Free gift may as truly be spoken of the first which he calls Contract, thus [but in this of Free gift I am enabled to merit only by the benignity of the giver.] What is it, 
Benignity to a Musician varieth not the, nature of this or that Donors' contract.  I would ask, that enables ● Musician to merit that angel, or what else the liberal Gentleman gives him for his hour's delight he had from him, but the benignity of the donor; if he play a day together to a man who hath a clunched hand or no affection to the music (as it often happens) they spend their time in vain at an unwelcome window, they then merit no more than such boys that should catch up loose moneys without the right owners disposing of it to them by some Contract preceding; but that which he speaks of the benignity of the giver, that, that enabled the receiver to merit; that hath nothing to do in the varying the nature of a contract; for in Contracts not the affection of the Contractor, which is not possible to be truly known, but the words or signs by which the Contract is made, are able to make a difference in it, for else contracts might be differenced according to all humane affections or vices, hopeful, fearful, voluptuous, covetous, ambitious, etc. but these do not vary the natures of Contracts, no more than should the benignity of the donor.   

Sect. 3.  
But he proceeds with another difference [In Contracts (saith he) I merit at the Contractors hand that he should depart with his right; in this case of gift I merit not that the giver should part with his right, but that then when he hath pasted with it, it should be mine. 
How the owner keeps his ptoderty, who intended to renounce it. ] Here is a show of something, but indeed it is exceeding vain and empty; for if that money be cast about for such as take it by scrambling, or the like, if no body come to scramble, the right owner keepeth his property, and doth not out himself of that property until a scrambler come and get it; I have seen money taken up again, so the case is evident. A piece of Plate is provided as the reward of him who hath the swiftest horse to run, at such a time, or such a place; if any horses come and run, the swiftest horse gets the Plate; but if there come none, the Plate is where it was, and the other part of runners being not performed, neither doth the contractor lose his first interest; but if it shall happen that the right owner throw away his interest, and forsake it, without a Condition of any other side, those goods taken up will be like a thing found, and perhaps fall into the hand of the Lord, not the taker; all thi● shows, that, in these instances of his, the giver doth not depart with his Right, until the Condition of his gift be performed, and by the performance of that condition a man merits his deserting his right.   

Sect. 4.  
4. But at the last, in the beginning of Page 68 he undertakes to expound by this (which he hath delivered) a School distinction, thus; [This is the meaning of that Distinction of the schools between Meritum congrui and Meritum condigni; for, God Almighty having promised Paradise to those men (hood winked with carnal desires) that can walk through the world according to the Precepts and limits prescribed by him, they say, he that shall so walk shall merit Paradise ex Congruo; but because no man can demand a right to it by his own righteousness or any other power within himself but by the grace of God only, 
The distinction ex congruo & ex condigno misunderstood by Mr. Hobbes.  they say no man merits Paradise ex Condigno] thus far he.  
I cannot blame this Gentleman to be offended with the Schoolmen, since it seems to be a learning strange to him, and in appearance is the fate of it, as well as other Learning, to be scorned by them who understands it not, which this gentleman doth not, or else he maliciously writes, and offer's to expound this easy distinction. First, the Conclusion (as he expresseth it,) is no where delivered in the Schools; for with one consent, unless some passages in Gregorius Ariminensis, and Durand, expounded otherwise, The Schools, both old and later agree to deliver, that Heaven or Glory (which he calls Paradise) is merited ex Condigno; because that righteous men, acting such things by the assistance of God's grace, in the mystical union with Christ their head, to which God hath promised heaven, heaven is due to them, as a reward of such actions, not for their own ' excellency in an Arithmetical proportion, as some; 
How otherwise expounded by the Schools.  but a Geometrieal; or as others, by their Arithmetical proportion taken virtually, as a seed is virtually a Tree, and hath abilities virtually, as a tree hath actually; so these gracious acts have glory virtually in them, as being the seed of glory; and then, although God can be no debtor to any man's Merits; yet, he having put such a prize upon them in his Gospel, these have such a blessing due to them, not out of Congruity only, but Condignity, at which rate God doth value them, by his standard; but then as they say; Heaven is merited by the righteous ex Condigno, so they say that these Graces, which enable a man to merit heaven ex Condigno, by God's Covenant those graces are merited, ex Congruo, by that man before he is justified or righteous; so that then to understand the distinction better, lest a Reader should be misguided by him who is no way acquainted with School-Divinity, know that Merit ex Condigno necessarily requires a Covenant but ex Congruo none. The first can never fail, because founded upon justice and title; the other may, because built only upon Grace, as thus; a man promiseth that he who fights this day well shall be made a Captain; or a King promiseth that he who pleads such a cause ably shall be made a Judge; these places are due to him who doth it; there is another, who by industry in the Law hath greater abilities than he, and hath pleaded a hundred causes better; another man who hath fought in twenty battles better, yet not being employed in these services to which the promise was made, they deserve those places ex Congruo, but the other ex Condigno; the one is truly, and as truly merit as the other, but he deserves it not legally out of a law or Covenant, but his own virtue, and the gallantry of his Commander in chief who rewards virtue; or thus, he who meeting a poor man in necessity shall bargain with him to pay him doubly for those Clothes he supplies him with when he comes to a better fortune, which he then adventures upon: when he doth come to such a Condition the other merits that ex Condigno, he must & aught to have it paid, it is his due; the who seeing that or such another in that sad case should, without any compact, supply him, when he came to a happier estate, ex Congruo merits a return from him; although he cannot claim any thing upon debt or due, yet out of Congruity it is fit he should be satisfied. I do not here justify the distinction in its application by the Schoolmen, but only set down my observation of his unjust dealing with them, and how unlike their meaning is to his; for the Prize he speaks of, which is proposed to him who winneth it out of Covenant, that man who gaineth it hath it out of right of Condignity, not out of the equality his work hath to the reward in its self intrinsically, but out of that extrinsecall value which is added to it by the owner's Covenant; and therefore what he adds may have some truth, that [Because writers are not agreed upon the signification of the terms of Art, he will determine nothing in it.] I believe all circumstances will hardly be agreed upon; yet thus much as I have delivered, which is contrary to what he writes, is universally consented unto by them; and there is none of them but says, that what God hath Covenanted for, is merited ex Condigno by them who act their part.     

NOTES UPON THE Fifteenth Chapter of Leviathan.  

CHAP. XXVII.  
Of transfering right; Sins independence on Covenants. Which are not void by suspiiion. Of propriety and Coercive Power. An arbitration between the Fool and Mr. Hobbes concerning Justice, the fear of God, getting Heaven by violence, etc. Faith not to be violated; Concerning the Law of nature in order to aeternal felicity. Breach of Covenant. Rebellion.  

Sect. 1.  
CAp. 15. Pag. 71. In the beginning of this Chap. will appear the unhappiness of his former discourse, concerning men's natural right, over one another, 
Mr. Hobbes' vain supposition of transferring right, etc.  here, in his first words, he supposeth [That law of nature by which men are obliged to transfer their right one to another] The vanity of which I have discussed before; from this he draws a third [That men must keep their Covenants made one to another.] The conclusion is good, 
His justiying most horrid sins, where no Covenant had been made against them.  and of the highest consequence, in all commerce betwixt men that possibly can be; but his Commendation of it is not so commendable as his conclusion, but most dangerous; his words are these [And in this Law of nature consisteth the fountain and original of justice] This Law is of keeping of Covenants. Let the Reader look back upon Cap. 14. Sect. 4. and he shall find the wicked Sins of the Sodomites, of Cain, in which no man can say, that there was any Covenant betwixt those parties preceded, concerning such actions; and then, upon that score, they were just, because not unjust; now if the fountain of Justice were Covenant, than those actions (being where was no Covenant preceding) could not be unjust. His reason, by which he confirms this, 
His reason frustrate.  is not so solid asmight be expected from such a learned man, which is this; [for where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred; and every man hath right to every thing; and, consequently, no action can be unjust.] See here, Reader, how necessary it is timely to stop an Error; it is a Sickness in a man's soul, and aught to be nipped in its growth; it is an ill Guest, which is easier kept out, then thrust out, especially when it comes with force of a Law, or Axiom, as this did. Had he proved before, that every man hath right to every thing, even in the possession of another's person, yea to fewer person, as he pretended to do, than this Conclusion would have justly been deduced thence: but I think, that being confuted, this Conclusion must likewise fall with it. 
An instance of two persons meeting in some place not before inhabited.  Let us consider two or more men of divers nations met together in some, before not inhabited, place; were it not unjust, against the law of nature, that one should murder, or maim the other, without any injury from him? were it not just, that they should help one another in distress, by the Law of humanity? If he say, not, consider his own saying (for a man so learned, as he is, cannot but, in many things, acknowledge the universal rules which govern the world, although he may misapply them) see therefore pag. 65. Cap. 14. This (saith he) is that law of the Gospel; Whatsoever ye require that others should do to you, that do you to them: and that law of all men; Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne f●ceris] apply this law to these men, without any Covenant, expressed, or employed, but only that; would any of these think it just, that the other should do him violence or Injury? It is unjust then by this law, that he should do it to the other.  

His imperfect definition of injustice.  He again labours to confirm his Conclusion from the definition of injustice, which, saith he, is [The not performance of Covenant] this definition was never (I think) writ before; although a thousand have treated of injustice, yet never any defined it so; It is true, every breach of Covenant is Injustice: but Injustice is what is not a breach of Covenant, as I have showed, and therefore will insist no further upon it.   

Sect. 2.  
He goes on [But because Covenants of mutual trust where there is a fear on either part (as hath been said in the former chap.) are invalid] The place he mentioned is pag. 68▪ where he deliver's that [If a Covenant be made wherein neither of the p●●●les perform presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion it is void. but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, 
Suspicion makes not Covenants void.  it is not void.]  
This proposition, although it make a fair show, upon a superficial view; yet we shall find it, upon diligent examination, to be full of unhappy errors. Had he said, such Covenants are dangerous to be kept: and that men with wicked principles will not keep them, he had said somewhat that might have borne him out in it; but to say, they are void, is to affirm, they have no obliging nature, or Tie with them, which is not to be endured by justice..  
I will first put him the Case betwixt two neighbouring nations; they enter Leagues of Confederacy; 
The case put between two nations entering League of Confederacy.  they covenant upon Articles; these two are just like such particular men, unbodied in a commonwealth: can any man think, that when any of these are afraid of the other's breach of Articles, it shall therefore be fit for him to break? can his fear dissolve his Covenant? yes, perhaps, as in his 14. Chap. to which this related [If this suspicion be reasonable] A suspicion, though reasonable, is but a suspicion; and it is possible for any man to find reasons for suspicions; by this all bargains, and Contracts of nations one with another will be made nothing; 
The evil consequences of his opinion.  for no doubt but all nations may, and will suspect one another, and yet dare not break their promises and Covenants which they make; If this doctrine of his were received, it would make all Commerce betwixt nations void, yea, I will tell him, betwixt men in private, so that those sacred Sponsalia betwixt man and woman were void, if no Witnesses to them; all those promises, yea Oaths (for they are but a stronger bond of the same Covenant) should be void, if no Witnesses to testify the Covenant; If men's Covenants cannot bind them, before they make a Leviathan, why should that Covenant bind them? for the Covenant concerning their superior must be before he is who is an effect of it. 
Plato's ingenious Fable.  Plato in his Protagoras tell's a most ingenious fable, the result of which is this, that the world being uninhabited, jupiter appointed Epimetheus to make all sorts of beasts; but Prometheus he appointed to make men, and endued them with Wisdom; these men built Cities; fenced themselves from beasts, but by their wisdom were more wicked than beasts, and injured one another most impiously; upon that he sent Mercury amongst them; who brought the men two Sisters, justice and Modesty, which regulated them in all virtue, and Civility one towards another; These are universally given to men, and are with them, where evil principles, and wicked customs, h●ve not extirpated them; So that that which the School, from the Philosophers, calls Synder●sis, dictate●s to men those great Axioms of practice: do to others as ye would be done unto; and keep your faith, and promise, with the like: and no man doth violate these, but with an Injury to the rest and quiet of his mind. I could tell stories of moral men, innumerable, who would keep Covenant, even with their ruin, and death; but they are obvious: It is apparent, that although men may, and do break Covenants; yet they are not void; they have a Tie upon man in his Conscience▪ which makes them afraid to offend in Scandalous and great Injuries.   

Sect. 3.  
He proceeds, [Though the original of justice be the making of Covenants; yet injustice there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away, which, while men are in the condition of war, cannot be done.] Thus far he: This phrase, such fear, must be understood of that fear a man hath of another's violation of Covenant; I think all this is satisfied: that there may be injustice before Covenant; injustice against the practice law of nature; injustice after Covenant, in the violation of it; and although he imagine's fear to secure a man from violating Covenant, it must certainly be such as the Casuists speak of, metus cadens, 
The Casuists metus ●adens.  such as would shake a valiant or constant man, as some certain argument of Death, or ruin, not suspicion's, that another will not keep his Covenant which must excuse. Again, I have already showed, that men are not naturally in a condition of war; so that he build's upon very false foundations. I will not trouble the Reader with nine or ten lines together, which are nothing but repetitions of formerly refuted conclusions: but in the next page 72. near the beginning, he bring's something like a new Argument, from the usual definition of justice among the Schoolmen, thus:   

Sect. 4.  
And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools; for they say, that Justice is the constant rule of giving to every man his own: And therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no Injustice, and where there is no coercive Power erected, that is, where there is no Commonwealth, there is no propriety, all men having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Commonwealth, there nothing is unjust.] I am glad to find him speaking something in the Schools, although not fully approving it: the definition shall pass without any further trouble; although I think it not perfect yet it will prove much better than any thing he hath produced. Let us examine his inference, which is drawn into some Syllogistical form, and therefore will abide a juster answer.  
His Major is undeniable; where is no propriety, 
A propriety, where is no Coercive Power.  there is no injustice; but his minor is mightily to blame, unproved any where, which is, where is no coercive Power erected, that is, no Commonwealth, there is no propriety; This Proposition I have showed often to be erroneous; men have right to their own persons, their Wives, their possessions, without this Power coercive of a Commonwealth; and therefore this Conclusion is not rightly deduced out of the premises.  
But now, good Reader, pause with me a while, and consider with me, 
The foundations wherein Mr. Hobbes builds a Common wealth and the justice of it.  how contrary these me●nes will work to his intention's; he intends to build ● Common wealth, and the justice of i●, upon ●hese foundations. That there can be no justice or injustice until then▪ no not in Covenants which ●●l●ven▪ and 〈◊〉 justice a being; then is the terror of the coercive powe● 〈◊〉; if it were true, I am persuaded, there were no suc● 〈◊〉 as justice or injustice, for then there would n●t be [a constant rule] or, which is a better word, a habit of virtue of giving every one his own; but ● fear of the Magistrate, if he do not; and the Supreme Magistrate, who principally hath both the sword ●nd purse of justice (reward and punishment) in his power, could not do justice or injustice, because he hath no coercive power above him; and he makes no Covenant (as he discourseth) and I mean to con●ute hereafter: but further, whatsoever wickedness, oppression, murder, man can do secretly, secure from the eye and sword of men, had no injustice in it; for if the coercive power of the civil Magistrate, operating upon the fear of men, be that which gives the name of justice (as he affirmes) then, without it, no action deserve's that name. What follow's immediately, is but a repetition of what went before.  
In the margin of the same page is written, justice not contrary to Reason,] what he writes of this head must be next examined.   

Sect. 5.  
He begins thus [The fool hath said in his hea●t there is no such thing as justice; and sometimes also with his tongue seriously alleging that every man's conservation and contentment being committed to his care, there could be no reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make, keep, or not keep, Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to one's benefit] Thus he makes the fool to confirm his wicked Conclusion; and, for my part, 
The fool's argument unanswerable out of Mr. Hobbes' principles.  I think the fools ' argument is unanswerable, out of Mr. Hobbes his principles: for if it be true, as he hath supposed, that every man hath a natural right to every thing, and every man's conservation and contentment is committed to his own charge; and that no man can renounce by any Covenant his right to defend himself from death, wounds, imprisonment, which he delivered in his 66 page (and, without doubt, much more may be said for other contentments, then for some of these) than he can by no Covenant be obliged to forsake any thing, but only such little things as are scarcely considerable in justice.  
He goes on [He does not therein deny that there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept▪ and that such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them; 
His doctrine more honest than Mr. Hobbes  justice] In this the fool's doctrine, if he understand Covenants of such as are made before there is incorporation in a Commonwealth, is more honest than Mr. Hobbes': for Mr. Hobbes deliver's, that such Covenants are invalid, because there must be a fear of breach on the other side, and so the Covenant is dull, and a man cannot commit injustice in the breach of them, which this fool acknowledgeth. His next words are [But he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the fear of God (for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God) may not sometimes stand with that Reason which dictateth to every man his own good, and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition to neglect not only the dispraise, and revile, but also the power of other men] taking away the fear of God) It a man take from any act, or habit, those circumstances which make it evil, 
Taking away the fear of God, an unreasonable supposition.  it will be good; but I am persuaded that a fear of God is so rooted in the hearts of men, that although men may darken the light, and clear sight of it, with wicked reasoning; although men may hinder the vivacity in the opposition of it, by customary inhabiting, reigning sins: yet it cannot be so extirpated, but that it will appear, and break out sometimes into action: and although a fool, or wicked man may sometimes say so; yet other times he will not believe his own words, and must oft fear he is in the wrong. 
Uncertain whether taugh or learned of the other the Fool or Mr. Hobbes.  This kind of reasoning either Mr Hobbes taught, or learned from him; for I am persuaded never man disputed so high Conclusions out of such impossible supposals, as he hath; such is this, if there were no fear of God. Let us see the force of the fool's Argument; he seems to affirm, that Injustice, taking away the fear of God, will stand with that Reason which dictateth to every man his own good; I am persuaded it is good when Injustice may be committed where is no Common wealth, when men commit injustice so secretly that no Magistrate may take notice of it; for if no God, no heaven, or hell, praemium or poena, for good or ill actions; and then a man's considerations are chiefly about his own ease, pleasure, and contentment in his bodily and sensitive life; but yet I must add one restraint to the fool's proposition: Injustice may stand with that Reason which prescribe's his own good, that is, his pleasure, or contentment; but not with right Reason, for right Reason prefers the public good before the private, which cannot subsist without justice..   

Sect. 6.  
He goes on with the fools argument most unhappily; he was a witty fool, who disputed so [The Kingdom of God is gotten by violence; but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against justice, or else justice is not to be approved for good] what another horrid impossible supposal is here brought to confirm the precedent? 
Mr. Hobbes' horrid supposal, of getting Heaven by unjust violence.  that heaven should be got by unjust violence; the Kingdom of God, which is God's gift only, should be forced out of his hands, by wicked actions, against his will; but yet there is a different condition in this with the other, because the Kingdom of God comprehends in it all happiness which belongs to any, and without which, at the last departure of his Soul, a man must be miserable; and therefore it is that the Philosophers call that summum bonum, which, when revealed, men cannot choose but desire: and therefore if a man could either by fraud, or force, get it, God, who hath so framed a man's desires, that there is a necessity for him to desire it, could never be offended at such endeavours; nor can it be unjust for men so to do.   

Sect. 7.  
He proceeds, [From such reasoning as this, Successful wickedness hath obtained the name of virtue]. 
He pretends to confute the Foole.  Here begins to confute that conclusion of the fool; that there is no such thing as justice: this sentence is his foundation, and he thus argue's; If there be no injustice, but all men are to do what is most reasonable, that is, most conducing to their own good, that is, worldly pleasure, or profit, then successful wickedness may be called Virtue, which is abominable, and most odious; for certainly virtue is not measured by the event, but the nature of the act, and the natural tendence of it to that is good.  

But by inadvertense fights against himself.  This argument of his, against the fool, is strong, but let us examine it; doth not this, and all he speaks against the fool, fight against himself in the 13. Chap. of his Leviathan? concerning which I have discoursed before. He deliver's that [men naturally have a right to all things; and any one may rightly do any thing to any man for the securing of his life or contentment; and that men are in a state of war (before they are incorporated into a Commonwealth) with all the world; that in that state, fraud and force are the Cardinal virtues]; so then, in this state, any successful wickedness must needs be called Virtue because a man, in such means (according to his doctrine) act's nothing but what he hath right to do, and therefore was just, and acted according to reason, and by such means obtains his end's which are his own preservation and contentment.  
Again, he hath delivered Chap. 14. [that no man can renounce his right of delivering himself from wounds, and chains, and imprisonment, or indeed of any such thing as may make his life wearisome to him]; well then: let it be considered, if a man have naturally right to all those things which may secure and preserve them; then let his Compacts, or Covenants, be whatsoever, yet they are invalid, which infringe this right which a man hath no power to alien from himself; then, in order to these, whatsoever a man act's after he hath covenanted▪ himself into a commonwealth, be it never so wicked, must be clothed with the specious name of virtue; because according to reason and right; so that (let him say what he will) this unlucky fool disputed most unanswerably against his principles, and the main hinges upon which his policy moves, though nothing against mine.   

Sest. 8.  
He goes on [And some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith, yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a Kingdom. 
The violation of faith not allowed, for a Kingdom. ] I do not remember that I have read the violation of faith for the getting a Kingdom justified by any man but Machiavelli, who indeed approves any means to bring a man to what he aime's at; but, certainly, no man esteemed for Christianity, or morality: It is said of Julius Caesar, that he would often repeat out of Euripides that Sentence, which he rendered, 
Quod si violandum est jus, regnandi gratiâ  
Violandum est, aliis rebus pietatem colas.  But let the Reader consider, that it is here with (if) if right be to be violated; and what Tully says of him, that he was captus Imperii consuetudine, ensnared with the custom or habit of commanding, which in his infancy he had coveted, and from thence would use that speech, and did practise it as unluckily as other usurpers; but, sure, every man, who is mastered with any habit of wickedness the fruition of which he viciously covets, will say as much for that, as Caesar for governing; but none, as I know of, hath delivered it for a practic conclusion but only Machiavelli; therefore that word [some] might have been spared by Mr. Hobbes,   

Sect. 9  
Page 73. He comes to make particular answers, which are not satisfactory to the fool's argument, 
Mr. Hobbes mistakes the question.  and therefore must be examined; in the second line he state's the question, certainly, not punctually to the purpose; for whereas the fool's conclusion was, that there was no such thing as injustice, he saith lin. 2. (that [The Question is not of promises mutual, where there is no security of performance on the other side; as when there is no civil power erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants.] This is a most hateful parenthesis, (as I have showed) he goes on [but either where one of the parties hath performed already; or where there is a power to make him perform] so that here is a great restraint to the fool's conclusion, and a limitation of the fool's argument, which I am persuaded, if he had disputed with Mr. Hobbes, he would not have allowed, for he was bred up in Mr. Hobbes his principles, and dispute's shrewdly out of them; but although this be not pertinent to the fool, yet let the fool grant that this shall be the question as Mr. Hobbes put's it Wh●ther it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other, to perform, or not] Hear the poor fool is abused mightily, for the fool's conclusion was about justice; Mr. Hobbes put's the question concerning benefit only: certainly many high Injustices have been beneficial, as he calls benefit, that is, profitable for this life's advantages; but yet see by what fraudulent steps he steale's into the change of these Terms: first he hath said, that justice is not against Reason; Reason is not against the Law, 
And changeth 〈◊〉 terms fraudulently h●re and otherwhere.  which looketh only at the happiness of this life to that particular man; therefore justice is whatsoever any man act's for his own good; all which expressions have been before showed not to be depending one upon the other; but let us examine his argument [I say (saith he) it is not against reason] from justice he went to reason; from reason to benefit; and now from benefit to reason again, for the manifestation of which he hath a long discourse to show, that the wisdom of actions is not to be measured by the events, but the foresight and design (which shall be granted him,) Secondly▪ in that refuted imagination of [every man's being at war with every man for want of a common power to keep them in awe, no man can hope to defend himself by his own power, strength, and wit etc. Therefore he who declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that h●lp him, can in reason expect no other means of safety then what can be had from his own single power] This is the force of what he there writes: But consider, Reader, with me, that this is not to the purpose; for the fool's Conclusion was concerning the justice and honesty of a thing; he only out-wit's the fool, and discourseth of cunning, or craft, or worldly profit of those actions, what is most profitable for the advance of the Agent'● ease and pleasure: but then consider further, and see if this answer of his satisfy that doubt; The Question, according to his own framing, is, whether it be profitable to deceive or not; his answer is drawn from a declaration that that man should make, that he think's i● fit to deceive, which no man but a verier fool than he, who objected it, did ever do; 
He that means to deceive will not declare his intent.  there is no power to act any great wickedness, but under the show of Piety, not by professing to deceive, but by professing not to deceive; oaths, covenants, protestations, cursings of themselves, are the horrid masks of Impiety, which wicked men use to deceive with, the Devil can no way so efficaciously deceive, as by putting on the shape or likeness of an Angel, sometimes by putting a false gloss upon the Text, as with Adam; sometimes urging the Scripture its self, as with our Saviour. That child of the Devil's, who will prosper in this world, must not protest and declare that he will deceive, but protest against it, and utterly defy it; so excellently the Poet makes Sinon, in that high fraud of his, Cousin by the denying of Cozenage, nec si miserum fortuna Sinonem Finxit, vanum etiam mendacemque improba finget· Mr. Hobbes, I am confident, well knows, that he, who is premonished of his danger, will avoid it; even birds do avoid the net openly laid before them; so that certainly this comes not close to Mr. Hobbes his purpose which should prove, that it were not wisely done according to his wisdom, to deceive, when he speaks only of such who manifest and declare they will deceive; and it is a main fault which runne's throughout his whole book, that he attempts one proposition, and, by shuffling and changing the Terms, proves another.  

The Bishop's Conclusion.  Now my conclusion is, that all deceit is injustice, all injustice unprofitable, because against the most sacred Lawmaker, who will avenge it here, or hereafter, whether men take notice of it, or no; evil and injustice will hunt the wicked person; only honesty and justice will bring a man peace and prosperity at the last.   

Sect. 10.  
Afterwards he bring's another Answer, concerning the getting of heaven by violence, 
Mr. Hobbes' illogical Answer.  which is not logical; for although he says truth, that there is but one way of getting heaven, which is, not breaking, but keeping of Covenant; yet, the Fool supposing the impossibility that men might get heaven by unjust violence, he was to answer logically out of the premises, and not to deny the supposition.  
Then he comes to answer that argument which amused me, 
Another like it  concerning the getting sovereignty by rebellion: for let a man read his manner of writing and judge whether in that he did not seem to make this an argument against the fool (as indeed it was) when, says he, from such reasoning as this successful wickedness is called Virtue: now from the hatefulness of this Conclusion he overthrow's the fool's Conclusion. I allow his answer, but think he had had more reason to have confirmed the argument then overthrown it, because, as I have showed, it was a doctrine corroborated by the main principles of his book; then he raiseth a new discourse about another opinion [There be some (saith he) that proceed farther, and will not have the Law of Nature to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of man's life upon earth, but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death.] I am of that mind, 
The Law of Nature give's rules for the attaining eternal felicity afrte death.  that the Law of Nature doth give rules for the attaining eternal felicity after death; for it is a most undoubted rule of the Law of Nature, as to the general, that bonum est appetibile, so to the particular, that according to the degrees of goodness, that which is majus bonum, is magis appetibile, and aught to be more desired than what is minus; and this is so universally delivered by Nature, that no reasonable man here's the tearmes, and understands them, but he assent's to them; here is a major, one rule delivered concerning eternal life hereafter; if we can find a Minor corresponding, it will be (I think) one of the clearest delivered truths that can result out of that habit called by Philosophers intellectus or habitus principiorum; but here, in these Terms he puts it, there can be no doubt of it: for if it be an eternal felicity (as he calls it) and all Christians believe, the very Terms render it clear, that an Eternal is more to be desired then a Temporary, and therefore more to be endeavoured for. I insist no further upon this at this instant; I come to that he applye's this to.   

Sect. 11.  
[To which (saith he) they think the breach of Covenant may conduce, and consequently to be just and reasonable] I think he never read in any Author this Conclusion delivered, 
The breach of Covenant though a wicked one conduceth not to eternal felicity yet such Covenants ought to be broken.  that the breach of Covenant doth conduce to eternal felicity; for he put's it in unlimited Terms: It is true, if any man, or men, make a Covenant to do any wicked thing, although they bind it by an oath, they are bound, and, in order to heaven, they ought, to repent of that Covenant, and not keep it; but it is not the breach of Covenant, as a Covenant, which disposeth them to heaven, but the acting of that holy thing which that wicked Covenant forbids them to do: 
As that entered into by Thiefs.  Suppose a Combination of Thiefs should covenant with each other to act whatsoever such a person, whom they make their supreme, should command; one of this College should have a sense of that wicked life he lives in, knowing that it leads to hell and perdition, can any man think he is not bound to leave that Society, and disobey whatsoever command is imposed upon him of Robbery or Murder? Suppose an Adulteress married woman should, by her oath, 
The other by an Adulteress.  covenant with her Adulterer to appropriate her body to him, do not you think she was bound, in order to heaven, to break that wicked Covenant? So is it with all Covenants to do evil, they ought to violate them; but it is not the violation of Covenant, but the doing of righteousness, which is acceptably pleasing to God; but he instance's in his following words:   

Sect. 12.  
[Such are they (saith he) who think it a work of merit, to kill, or depose, or rebel against the sovereign power constituted over them by their own consent] This instance he give's because he hoped that writing against such a horrid diabolical doctrine would usher in the rest of his wicked opinions plausibly; 
Mr Hobbes' subtlety in writing against Rebelion.  I am not intended to defend their opinions who think so; but yet I will say this for them, that I think they that write for killing of kings, which are the Papists, and some others, as destructive of civil Society as they, will pretend that those Sovereigns are not constituted over them by their own consent: they will say, they never consented to his Coronation; to his acception; never took the Oath of Allegiance and Supremacy: And I will say, that if this be all the ground of this sin in rebellion, 
which cannot be by his doctrine.  there is no such thing as rebellion by Mr. Hobbes his doctrine; for Mr. Hobbes (as will be seen hereafter) makes no Sovereign, or Leviathan, but such as is consented unto by every particular, of which kind there is none in the world: and therefore, where men have not made such a consent, and are bound by that Covenant which is not to be seen in the whole world, there can be no sin in rebellion; but this was only an instance to lead on his future scorn of religion, being in its self impertinent    

CHAP. XXVIII.  
Concerning the extent of natural knowledge; Our hopes of eternal happiness; and our advantages in the prosecution of it; Whereof; as to its certainty de futuro, we may be more secure than we can be of any thing, from Tradition and Reason; How unsatisfied man's Understanding and Will is in all things else but it and God. Concerning the last Article of our faith.  

Sect. 1.  
BUt (saith he) because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death; much less of the reward that is then to be given to the breach of Faith] Had he stayed there, 
Mr. Hobbes unkind to Religion in the disparagement he puts upon natural knowledge.  although this squints at mischief, yet this might have been slept over, and might have been somewhat excused, and a man might have said, that he only denied a natural knowledge of this reward, not a divine faith; and we Christians may be content with this, although it is an unkind act to Religion, to hinder it from any assistance, especially in so high a point as this, which moves the first foot towards heaven, He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them who seek him; So that these two acts of faith are those which leads a man out of this world towards heaven, to believe there is a God; and that he is a rewarder of them who seek him; both which the Author hath slighted; Of the first I have spoken: Of the second I shall now treat. But I say, had he given it only this slur, I would have passed it over; but as he denies the assistance of Nature to the knowledge of future happiness; so be most disgracefully adde's [but only a belief grounded upon ●th●r men's saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally] Could any thing be spoke more slightingly, or unworthily, of the hope of heaven? of all the expectation of Christianity? I kerb in myself, who could be angry in bitter Language, and do think it would be comely to do so; but let others do it that will, I only mean to discourse soberly against it, in no passion.   

Sect. 2.  
First, then, suppose all, he saith here were true; 
What a persuasive the natural knowledge, or belief we have of eternal happiness, is to withdraw us from our opinion of temporal felicity.  that our knowledge of heaven were nothing but a belief etc. yet it ought to persuade more than any motive can be brought to regulate our actions with; which will appear, first, out of the nature of the happiness compared with others; next out of the evidence it hath from the nature of happiness; for it is an eternal happiness, a spiritual bappin●sse; an eternal happiness, therefore more to be desired then any temporal felicity whatsoever: the content that a man hath in this life is but for this life, and this life is so momentary, that there is no man hath assurance of one day's delay in it; and let him who hath lead a life in an affluence of all this world's goods, think what he is the better for them on his deathbed; what will it profit a man to gain the whole world, and lose his own Soul? yea all his felicity past adds but to his misery; he may say, fuimus Troes, etc. but hath with it a miserum fuisse; he cannot choose but sit down by the waters of Babylon, and weep, when he remembers the Zion of happiness, which he hath lost, but cannot now enjoy. I will not drench myself in this common place of the frailness, weakness, and vanity of this world's pleasure: It is evident, in respect of eternity, it is as nothing, so that then, upon the proposal of such a question, whether had you rather enjoy this world's felicity, whilst you live, or eternal happiness hereafter? the answer must needs be, as if it were proposed, whether had you rather have the possession of an estate for a day, or an Inheritance for ever? and as a man would say to that, I care not for this possession a day, it is of no moment; so must a man's judgement conclude; this life is nothing; it is but a day, not that certain; I am not made happy by any thing which can be added to me this day, but for hereafter; and the notion of eternity doth so fill the appetite of man, and hath such a conveniency with it, as he cannot choose, if he ponder in his Soul the excellency of it, but desire and embrace it.   

Sect. 3.  

The transcendent delight here in our hopes of eternal happiness.  Then let a man go further, and see, that those thoughts we have of this eternal felicity, do not represent it to us as of a bodily felicity only, but a spiritual, an intellectual felicity, proper for man, such felicity as only can make man happy, and such as can make man happy alone. Conceive a man with a troubled Spirit, thoughts perplexed, a wounded conscience, to speak in the Scripture language, 
For which we loath worldly pleasures.  bring all the riches of this world's pleasure, meats, drinks, music, delightful sights; make up a body composed of sensual contentments, he abhorre's them; they vex him, they rather trouble him, then ease him, or content him; because the intellectual disturbance, which he hath, savour's not those things of these poor bodily delights; they are as much below the contentments of his mind, as childish Toys to the contemplations of some grave and serious Philosopher. Again, fill a Soul with those speculations which, at this distance from it, he can have of heaven, and let him have to that an assurance, that he is in the way to it; bring fires, faggots, gridirons, pincers, what you will, 
And welcome tortures.  he will have blessed, and charitable, and comfortable thoughts at that time; so that, with St. Stephen, he can thank them for their tortures, and bless them, and, like a man that hath received a benefit, pray to God to bless his benefactors; so can such a man be happy, when he hath spiritual happiness, in the midst of all worldly miseries. This therefore must be most desirable, without which no man is happy, and with which no man miserable; with all worldly, sensual goods a man may be miserable, who hath them; but not so with those; which fortify a man against all the fiery darts of Satan in this world, and hereafter give him eternal felicity, without any disturbance. So that then these worldly goods, and this eternal, admit no comparison to him that apprehend's the one and the other; that eternal felicity must needs be more desirable than the other. Men may object, had we such assurance of one as the other, this were true; 
Obj.  but we have weak assurance of this, and great of worldly; therefore we let this go, and content ourselves with the other.   

Sect. 4.  
For answer to this, conceive with me, first, 
Ans.  that although the assurance of the Testimony which is given to these Divine happinesses were much short of that is given to the other, yet in prudence men ought to prosecute it; First because we can be no losers of worldly happiness by the prosecution of this; there is no action, 
The worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happiness.  which a man doth in order to eternal felicity, which hinders, but rather addes to temporal felicity; the governing and regulating our passions, without which no man can have any happiness, faith, hope, and charity, with all their proper operations; that man is happier here in this world who hath these habits, & operates accordingly, than he who hath the greatest excess of all worldly things; but, contrariwise, the luxurious enjoying these temporary things robs a man of those eternal joys; these actions, in which is most safety, being prejudicial to no rational felicity; a man acting by the rules of prudence ought rather to do, such actions than those which are hazardous of his safety, though seemingly more evident because they appear of no other profit then for temporal, for sensual contents, and may hurt the other; but these will be profitable for eternal, spiritual good, and cannot hurt temporal; 
Merchant adventurer.  We find Merchants venturing their estates, their lives to the East-Indies, per tot discrimina rerum, although a Journey full of hazard, rather than piddle at nearer and more secure trades, because the return of the first is of a higher value; If men then reasonably take such pains, with so much hazard of life, for such a little difference of advantage as is betwixt these two, only because there is a possibility of a better return here; much rather should men engage in this great adventure for eternity, where upon weaker premises (if they were so) men must expect such an invaluable gain, and are assured of no possible loss: but I let this pass. Suppose the evidence of it were none but such as Mr. Hobbes report's, A belief grounded upon others sayings etc. yet these other men are such, and these from whom they received it, as may give a better assurance than we can have of any worldly things.   

Sect. 5.  
Let us, to this purpose, consider what assurance Mr. Hobbes hath of his worldly felicity, 
Mr. Hobbes can render himself more secure of temporal than he seems to be (with little satisfaction) of eternal felicity  The felicity he placeth in the enjoyment of this life, and the accommodations of it; the security of this is by a Covenant made by every man in a Commonwealth with every man, to submit themselves to a Leviathan, or supreme Governor, and make him their representative in all his actions, as will hereafter more fully be discoursed upon; Now I shall show, and it is evident, there is no such thing, than no security▪ But suppose there were, he will allow his Leviathan to covenant nothing with his subjects, than they have not so much as a promise for their security, not so much as is here spoken by him concerning man's felicity: a belief grounded upon other men's sayings, and here is no manner of promise; but because I labour to advance the security men have of this unicum nec●ssarium, I will not only compare it with Mr. Hobbes his security, but all that can be had in any politic Society.   

Sect. 6.  
What security can any man have for the enjoying his studied worldly happiness? all the security, 
The promises, and oaths of men, which he makes his greatest assurance being very fallible.  he can have is from the promises, or oaths of men, that they will do this, or that; this is the greatest safety that any man can have; but, alas, how inconsiderable are promises, yea oaths of men, unless honest men, I would our experience did not teach us; and who can have more than a weak probable assurance of another's integrity, unless he have sealed it with his blood? which cannot be showed in any politic concernment de futuro, that it shall be, and if any man would do such an act, as to die for confirmation of it, he might be reckoned a mad man. But, chose, let us examine the assurance that we have of this.   

Sect. 7.  

His scornful scale of knowledge.  [It is grounded (saith he) upon other men's saying that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that kn●w others, that knew it supernaturally.] This is a most scornful speech; but had he set down what men these were who first said they received it supernaturally, the case had been clear; they were the Apostles, men of a known and assured integrity, men that sealed this Truth with their blood, and died in and for the justification of it; this no man would do for that he were not assured of. This, at their deaths, was a comfort in the midst of a thousand agonies. Now, as Aristotle speaks, it is a probable Topicke what a learned and honest man delivers in matter of opinion; so for matter of fact, without doubt, what virtuous men dare and did die for, is truth. It is the strongest assurance that can be given to man of it. These men therefore, who affirmed, that they did receive this most divine Truth supernaturally, aught to have a strong assent given to what they say: 
Our evidence greater of future felicity then that ever there was such a man as Julus Caesar.  I would ask him, what assurance he hath that there was a Julius Caesar; nothing but this, that it was a belief grounded upon, etc. (as he speaks of this) yet I dare say, he is more assured that there was a Julius Caesar, than he can be of any future worldly felicity although the evidence which is given for that truth, is not to be compared with the evidence, given for this of our future felicity; for he can never show me a man who durst die for the defence of that, as multitudes for the justification of this. This then, although it be handed to us from man to man, as the other, yet it being delivered by such men must needs have a persuasive force with it, more than other, which have a like Tradition, but not by such undoubtable means.   

Sect. 8.  
But I will not leave him so; this Truth, that there is an eternal felicity provided for men hereafter, 
Being not only delivered to us by Tradition, but most consonant ●o Reason,  is not only by Tradition delivered unto us, from such as had it supernaturally revealed; bus is also most consonant to reason, and may most reasonably be deduced out of its principles, and therefore ought most seriously, and most faithfully to be confided in; that it is so, I will require but one supposal, which I think I have cleared in my former Treatise, that there is a God; this being granted, we must needs apprehend him provident over those works of his, and, in particular, more eminently over man, which is the most excellent piece of this fabric, and indeed the only piece which actively honours and dishonour's him; here now we find it not always true, that men, who honour him, who forsake all, even their very lives for him here, are blessed by him in this world, I mean with worldly blessings; yea, because they forsake all, and their lives, they cannot be blessed here. Is it possible to think that God will desert those which hold him so dear to them, and value him at so high a rate? It is true, I read of job and many others, that have had a restitution of worldly comforts; but that is not so with all; and those that die for him leave the world, can have no reward in this world; Again, is it possible that this God of an infinite excellency, wisdom, power, justice etc. should suffer so many villains to eat up his Children and Servants, as it were bread? to commit Sacrilege in all kinds? perjury, blasphemy and the like? persevering in those sins, to pass without any punishment? wh●ch some do in this world, (although but a few) supposing a God, men cannot think so; and therefore, supposing a God, it is not to be imagined, but that there is an eternal happiness provided for such as serve God, which is all I contend for.   

Sect. 9  
Again, let us consider man in himself, as he is a fellow creature wi●h beasts, 
In Man's fellowship with other Creatures, and his excellency above them.  plants, stones, etc. we shall, upon consideration of all the Creatures in the world, find that every Creature hath an object fitted to any power it hath, and some matter or other fit to fill every empty room in it, and satisfy every natural desire in it; to see this clear, let us first view the lowest sort of things, stones, earth, water, air, etc. which have no life in them, if they have power to operate by their quality, to heat or cool, there are objects in the world fit for such actions; if they have appetites of this place or that, high or low, there are room's in the world to receive them; if the matter (as Aristotle) desire's forms, there are forms to fit it; you may find this truly applied to any thing, according to that sacred Axiom, so often urged by both Divines and Philosophers, Deus et Natura nihil faciunt frustra; whereas if there were nothing to satisfy those powers and appetites, they were in vain; if we climb higher to plants and Trees, which have life and no sense, it is evident in them, that their powers and desires of nutrition, generation, augmentation, by which they exceed these inferior things, have, whilst they are in this world, enough plentifully in this world to satisfy these appetites, as well as those which they have in common with those other inferior things, Then come to that other degree higher, to beasts and such things which do not live only, but have a power of moving themselves, of apprehending by Sense, of delighting themselves in sensual things; these appetites have that which can satisfy, yea fill their desires, so that more cannot be desired; yea there is to be had in this world not only a Satisfaction but a satiety of sensual pleasure; not a belly full only, but enough to surfeit; so that, for all those things below man, whatsoever they are, there is something which can sufficiently satisfy all the powers and appetites they have. Can we think God is so liberal to these things, and less to man? As the Apostle dispute's doth God take care of Oxen? that is, in comparison of us men; As our Saviour, if he so cloth the grass of the field shall he not much rather take care for us? if he hath so provided for them, in these mean faculties and appetites, which have here (as the Schoolmen speak) vestigium Dei, only a footstep of God in them, shall he not much ra●her for these noble powers and appetite of Reason and Will in man, which are made after his image? certainly it were a high ingratitude to think so; well then, let us inquire what satisfaction there can be found for these humane powers of Reason and Will, by which he excels all other things, that must be it which a man desire's, for every thing endeavor's the perfecting of its powers, and the satisfaction of its appetite, which is truly the good of that thing to which it belongs.   

Sect. 10.  
It is an undoubted conclusion, a Principle, if not the Principle, which the inbred Law of nature, which governe's man, hath taught every Child of man, and so powerfully imprinted it in him, 
A very chi●d requires he satisfaction of his Will.  th●t no Child, which hath reason, will deny but that he would be happy; and in particular, if he understand the Terms, that that is his happiness, to have all his desires, to have his Will satisfied; for, until that be, he hath some deficiency; there is something farther to be enquired after; he is not at h●s journey's end; ●hus it is with all things, there is enough for any thing below man to fulfil its appetite to surfeit; but not so, for man's appetite; this will appear ou● of the consideration of the things in this world which are reputed good, 
A man's Will satisfied wi●h no worldly goods, whether bodily, sensual, or intellectual.  those that are bodily, sensual, intellectual; bodily, strength, beauty, health, these cannot satisfy a man's soul, though altogether; join to these all sensual delights, meats, drinks, luxuriousness in any kind, for hearing, seeing, smelling; let a man have all, those are but things which beasts may enjoy as well as he, and in these he cannot excel them; yea they excel him in a fuller fruition of them then he can have; then they are apt to have many casualties to deprive us of them, and a certainty that one day they must be lost, which to a man that hath a forecast with him (which other inferior Creatures have not) must needs disturb the content he might take in enjoying them: consider those humane intellectual things, which have pretended a title to man's felicity either the Stoick's Apathy, freedom from passion, or the Aristotelian way of governing Passions by Reason, although those were handsome and ingenious, and those men trod some steps towards felicity, yet they were but the first Steps only, and those the lowest; for if the Subjects be tumultuous, the King cannot be in safety. The Stoic instead of ruling, would kill his Subjects; take away all Passions, and then the King in man will lack fitting instruments to effect his business; the Aristotelian governed, or at the le●st prescribed rules to govern the Passions, but left the Palace of Reason unrectified; and although he freed it from the rebellion of Passions, yet satisfied it no● with plenty at home; to conclude, that which makes a man happy, and satisfie's his Soul, must be something in him, by which he excell's beasts, that must be his Reason, and reasonable Will; this Will is not satisfied but by knowledge; no satisfaction of it, but the enjoying that it love's; no love without knowledge, and therefore though the Will be the seat of happiness, yet the Understanding is the Conduit by which th●s happiness is brought to the Will.   

Sect. 11.  
Now let us then examine what there can be in the Will, brought by the Understanding, 
H●s knowledge ●s defective, and cannot do it.  which can satisfy it, and make it happy in this life; certainly all the things in the world cannot do it; for although a man desire's to know any thing, every thing, yet he cannot be happy in knowing all the things in the world. I will not dispute concerning those things which men do know, for alas it is mighty short of what men may know; the business of men's lives take them so up, that he is a wise man who knows any thing in any one Art; many things we know, quòd sunt, yet we know not the things, nor the manner of them; in the Mathematics there is such a thing as quadratura circuli, but the work of it is not found out; there is a certain number of the stars, but men do not know it: there is a certain influence, but the most cunning ginger is deceived in h●s prognostiques; this might be endless; but did any one man know all these; did he know all the contrivance of Policies; were he expert in all Mechanics, in natural knowledge, in Moral, in any of which never man was perfect, yet his soul would not be full with all this, nor his appetite of knowledge; for he must needs desire (when he knows all these) to know the cause of all, which is God; as in Trismegistus his Poemander, when he asked this Philosophic and knowing man, what he desired? he answered, I desire to know things and their causes; the knowledge of any thing without their causes, is not satisfactory to a man's soul; and although men are proud of little Sciences, yet satisfied they cannot be without the knowledge of God, and his causation of things; the world cannot fill the vastness of man's soul or desire; they can, and do think of other worlds, and of him who is the cause of all, and desire to know him; I speak not of the base sort of men, who live little otherwise then beasts; and than whom beasts are more happy; but of them who live like men, excelling beasts by these divine faculties of reason and will; these cannot choose but desire to know God: for knowledge is of Truth, God is the fountain of all truth, from whence it came, yea Truth its self; and therefore that Understanding, 
Nor ought else which is not infinite, and that infinite is God.  which is carried to Truth; cannot be at rest until it come to know him again; God is infinite, nothing can fill the understanding but what is infinite. Let a Mathematician make the greatest number he can, another, yea himself, in his understanding can make a greater; the Understanding of man can grasp and contain any finite thing, and therefore is greater. Let him imagine a world as great, a line as long as he can, yet the understanding of another, yea his own, at a second act, can enlarge that, and make it greater; so that whatsoever is finite cannot fill a man's Soul, but only what is infinite; and therefore only God, who is infinite, can be satisfactory to man's understanding. What I say for the Understanding, I say likewise for the Will; what is less than infinite cannot satisfy it; I speak not of these beastly sensual affections, they may be surfeited upon, yea the very enjoying them makes men loathe them: but of his humane Will, his intellectual, nothing can satisfy that but what is infinitely good; 
Riches do it not, wh●ch bring with them an impatient covetousness of getting more, when men have most.  let us look upon riches, and things of that nature, although they are thirsted after most eagerly by man's ●easonable Will (no beast covet's Wealth) yet the Soul of man is never satisfied with them, but they prove like fuel to the fire, the more a man hath the more he desire's they, who have so much as their riches is a burden to them, are fain to lay the load upon other men's Shoulders, their Servants to manage for them; yet these men desire more; he, who is in mean estate, require's little additions to content him; when he hath gotten that, he hath larger desires; when a Kingdom, another; a world; and than grieve's he can have no more. I never read the desi●e of riches satisfied in any man but him in the Parable, who cried, Soul take thine ease, for thou hast Treasures laid up for many ages; such flashes, and little inconsiderable ejaculations of Content, men sometimes have, upon the enjoyment of worldly wealth; but had that man been asked a little after, would you have another Ba●ne full of Corn? he would have been of another mind, and have said, let me have that, and tha●, and a thousand more; and had he all the wealth in the world, unless this should be secured to him, that neither rust nor Moth shall corrupt it, nor Thiefs break through and steal it, yea that that great Thief, death, shall not take him from it, his Will cannot be contented; which yet was never granted to men in this world. I will not stay upon this; riches are not things absolutely good, but relatively only, as they are referred to other things, they are only bona utilia, profitable goods, and that word profit intimate's some other things that they are profitable for; and therefore they who desire riches, desire some other thing for which these riches are desired, and therefore they cannot satisfy that man's desire who covet's them, but he must go further; in one word, to conclude this discourse, goodness, happiness absolute, is the object of man's will; there is nothing good, but God; all other things are partial goods, they have some good, but they lack more than they have; and where there is a deficiency, that is not absolutely good; therefore not any thing, not all things, can satisfy man's will, but he only; for still there will be a further desire in the Covetous soul of man, until they have him who is all good; Now then, if the Understanding can be filled with nothing but God; if the Will can be satisfied with nothing but him; it is most reasonable that there should be some such Condition, where these two highest powers, which are given under the Sun, should be satisfied.   

Sect. 12.  
I will next inquire, whether this satisfaction can be in this life; if not, sure there must be such a thing hereafter; and for this, it is fi●st evident that man hath some knowledge of God in this life; 
Man hath some imperfect knowledge of God in this life.  he can by examining causes find that there must be a first; yea, he can from thence affirm that he must be free from all imperfections, incorporeal, immense, and the like, because Corporiety, Mensurability, finiteness, argue imperfection. Thus have men Philosophised by reason: but the understanding is not filled with this; as you may observe a Countryman, when he see's another write, walk, speak, and the like, he can tell you, these are the effects of some excellent principles in that man who doth them; ask him, what it is? he can, with all the world, tell you, it is his Soul; but ask, what that Soul is? he is at a stand, he knows nothing of it; such are our thoughts of God, from whose works of his we know there is a cause which bringe's these mighty things to pass, which we call God; but what that God is, who doth them, we are at a loss, by all the reason man can find out; for as a dog can apprehend his master's kindness to him, or his anger, yet cannot know the excellency of his Master's Wisdom, power, etc. because he is in a lower rank of things than man is; much less is man able to reach at that infinite excellency of God, being many degrees much lower than God, than any Creature is below man. This is the knowledge a man may have of God; if there be any thing else, it must be that other way, in which many Divines have trod, besides these negatives of imperfections, to conceive these things we call perfections to be in a much more infinitely excellent manner in him who is God: So a husbandman may know that a learned man exceeds him in knowledge, and that this knowledge is in divine, natural, and moral things; but what that knowledge of his is, he cannot tell, unless that learned man reveal it to him; so it is in respect of God, 
None positively of his eminencies, but by revelation.  we know he hath excellencies beyond us, that these consist in these or these eminencies; but what is the nature of these eminencies, no man can know, but he to whom God reveale's them; yet he cannot choose but desire to know them; But it may here be said, that God hath revealed these excellencies of his in his holy book; he hath revealed something of himself in Scripture, enough for a viaticum, for a rep●st by the way, in a Riddle, darkly, behind a Cloud; by which he believe's there are such things; yet faith cannot make men absolutely perfect; it is the support, 
What Faith do●'s toward it.  the foundation of things hoped for; but Peregrinamur fide, we must be strangers from happiness, whilst we live in faith; it is of things absent; happiness consists in the fruition, the possession of what is present, which cannot be so long as we are believing; Faith give's a man a nearer approach to happiness, than any thing else in this world; and therefore a faithful man can pass better through all the affronts of this world, than any other; because he knows there is a happiness for him elsewhere; that he is approaching to it; his conversation is in heaven, as S. Paul speaketh; his thoughts are there, his business and negotiation; this world belongs not to him; but yet he is going to his happiness; only, he is not there, until he put off his flesh and blood. There are other revelations to prophetic persons, 
What dreams, visions, ecstasies etc.  by dreams, visions, and other apparitions, by which God is pleased to reveal himself to some especial Servants of his; but these are of some particular things, which cannot fill the vast understanding of man; there are likewise ecstasies in some men, which (I guess) have had by them fuller and greater manifestations of God; of that kind was that Saint Paul speaks of, in which were unutterable mysteries; but these are very short, enough to give a man a taste of heaven, not satisfy him; enough to make him long for more of the same, and desire to be dissolved, and be with Christ; enough to give him an eagerness of desire, mixed with the Comfort of assurance. He who hath happiness, as it must be full, so it must be constant, without loss, or fear of losing: for although beasts are happy in the present enjoyment of their happy objects, because they have no forecast of any future evil, unless such little Sagacities, and instincts of nature as dispose them to these, or these provisions for the future; yet man, having foreseeing eyes, always looking at what will become of him hereafter, cannot be happy in the present without forecast of the future, what he shall be; and therefore these temporary felicities cannot make him blessed.   

Sect. 13.  
What I have said of the Understanding, 
The several parts acted by the Understanding and the Will, both which faculties are imperfect in this world.  may be applied to the Will; for the Understanding give's light to all the Will's actions; and the reasonable Will cannot possibly enjoy any thing without it: Therefore as the Understanding cannot in this world fully apprehend the infinite good, neither can the Will enjoy it; the Will joye's in nothing which is not present; and the Understanding is that only arm which embraceth this infinite good, and the only hand which layeth hold of it to convey it to the Will; and therefore, because the Understanding cannot fully, and clearly, receive this infinite Goodness, neither Understanding, nor Will, neither of these most excellent faculties, can be perfected in this World.   

Sect. 14.  
And now after this tedious discourse, 
The certainty of felicity after death resumed and proved.  from which I can yet hardly withdraw my Pen, consider my Argument, and see if in reason it may not yield a man as strong assurance as almost any natural Truth, that there is a felicity after death: Consider the most apparent truths which thy Reason can perswad● thee to of things unseen; thou art assured that all men in all the world are mortal, and must die: ask the reason; thou seest, or ●earest, that all here do so where thou livest, and from thence canst collect that death belongs to all mankind: thou knowest that the fire burns in the Indies, because it hath a power of burning, and an appetite to it wheresoever it is: so I w●ll argue not from one Species, or sort of things, but from all the things in this world: there is nothing in the world which hath an appetite not satisfiable, a power without an adequate subject, as Logicians speak, therefore it must be in man, in whom certainly there can be nothing in vain or imperfect; so that the certainty of this is drawn from the most universal Principle that is in Nature, and such a Principle which is as universally touched upon by Philosophers and Schoolmen, as any one whatsoever, that Deus & natura nihil faciunt frustra; that frustra est potentia quae nunquam reducitur in actum; which these powers should be, if there were no felicity after this life, because there can be none absolutely here.   

Sect. 15.  
I know of but two things which can be objected here against this Conclusion, and I will endeavour to satisfy them in order, severally.  

Object. 1.  The first is, that although man cannot enjoy the complete full satisfaction of these powers in this life, yet he may be happy in those little parcels of knowledge of God, and his delight in that, by confining his desire and curbing it in, sapere ad sobrietatem, as S. Paul speaketh: and thus he will be happy here in this life.  
I answer, this may breed a moderate content, 
Ans. The Objection answered, touching man's felicity in the knowledge etc. he hath, though imperfect.  but not a happiness: Happiness is, th●n which no more can be desired; but there is no man knows so much of God in this life, that he ought not to desire more, because more is knowable; for although in the fullness of happiness the whole blessed Vision is manifest in a glorious manner, at one act, and that enjoyed; yet here we get it by piece-meal, now one, than another apprehension, by parts, and pieces; and the Infiniteness of Divine perfections is such, that no man's life, applied to nothing else, can compass a full apprehension of it; yea, the further he goes in this Journey, the further he finds himself at a loss, and behind with knowledge; therefore a man must not be content, but strive for more knowledge; or if he have some content, yet this cannot be satisfaction of the powers, but a curbing them, which yield's but a half enjoyment, such as may be proper for a Viator, a Traveller to it, not a possessor of happiness in hope, as the Prophet David say'th; but God is our portion in the land of the living: we are here in the land of the dying, where others and we die daily, and our happiness here is God, but God in hope; when we come to the land of the living, God will be our portion and possession: to conclude, men may have a begun happiness here, but no● perfect until hereafter: man perhaps may have content here, but felicity only in heaven after life. A Traveller joye's his heart to see at a distance that happy Palace where he hope's for comfort, but he is not satisfied until he come there: so it is with us in our Journey to heaven; the happiness we have here is our hope of it, but hereafter our possession.  
The next Objection may be, 
Objection 2.  That this future Felicity is an Article of our Faith, the Conclusion of all the Twelve, The resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting: Now if it were demonstrable thus by reason, an act of Faith is not necessary to it.  

Answer. A second Objection answered, about Eternal felicity, being the last Article of our Faith.  I can here bring the first and last Articles of our Faith together, that which concerns God's creation, and this which concerns man's salvation, man's beginning and end, which are both from God, and say, That for both of them there is abundance of reason, but those Reasons cannot be easily argued by every man; and yet though every man cannot Philosophise in high points of learning, every man can believe these Conclusions which are proved by learned men, and that belief is required of every man; and surely belief hath great force to fasten men to that which they, upon good grounds, believe; no man knows who is his Mother, but by his belief of very easy people to deceive, and to be deceived; and yet this belief is constantly adhered unto by all sorts of men, so that men dare depose, that such a one was this man's Mother, and such this man's; none of us, that are not traveled in those parts, know that there is a Constantinople, yet we are assured by hear-say, and are most confident there is such a City: and stronger than all these may our Faith be of this Truth, as I have showed; Faith and Reason do not destroy, but help, one the other; for it is with our way to heaven, as to other places; when a man hath showed us one way, we can by that guess at another, which hath proportion and convenience to that; like lights, when you have kindled one Candle, you may easily light others at that: when the Soul of man is enlightened by Faith, it can with much more ease afterwards enlighten Reason, which perhaps else it would never have thought upon, and Reason sometimes assist's Faith; for when the persons, we believe, deliver to be believed nothing but that is reasonable, it is with comfort swallowed down and entertained, and the work of Faith hath less labour when it imposeth no unreasonable thing. Thus you see the same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason, 
The same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason.  and therefore although proved in one, yet exalted as an Article in the other.  
I could now insist upon the Article of Faith, how confirmed by Scripture, but that is done by an hundred men before, and is evident too to every one that looks upon the New Testament: I could further enlarge upon that I have already touched, concerning the Credibility and Fitness to believe those men which delivered it to us, that certainly, as Festus said to S. Paul, 
An Argument to confirm this, drawn from the H. Martyr's constancy in their sufferings.  not he only, but all the rest were mad with learning, or something else, who did endure so many afflictions, yea death, for Religion, if there were no reward hereafter; and the Story of their sufferings was sealed to us by the blood of thousands in divers immediate Centuryes, and continued by the most universally consented Story in the world: so that, for certainty we, have not so much reason to believe any Article of the Faith (I speak of reason) nor any Conclusion delivered by relation, as this one, That there is a Blessedness hereafter for God's servants▪ because this is the reason, and chief reason, why these men durst die for Religion; this made Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, Dan. 3. despise the fire for God's cause; the Heroic Sons, 2 Mac. 7. contemn Tortures with a most noble Constancy, because they looked for a better and happier life; so, as it is phrased Hebr. 12.1. We are compassed about with a mighty cloud of Witnesses, or indeed a cloud of mighty Witnesses, to evidence the Truth: Mr. Hobbes therefore did not do this noble heavenly Conclusion right, 
Mr. Hobbes suspected of a design, to disparage the foresaid Article of our ●aith.  when he said, [It is received only upon a belief, grounded upon other men's saying, that know it supernaturally, or that they know those that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally] which was a disgraceful expression, and, I can justly fear, intended to that purpose, to disparage this Article; for let a man consider his Conclusion which follows, [Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature▪] This, he saith, was opposed by some who held killing of Sovereigns lawful: this seemed out of his premises to be argued; for thus, That which conduceth to future felicity ought to be done; but the breach of faith in killing of Sovereigns conduceth to future felicity, therefore etc. what need had he any way to have disgraced our hope of heaven; it might have served his turn much better to have showed how the God of Truth love's Truth, and hate's Falsehood; how impossible it is that Error and Falsehood should be the way to Truth, how inconsistent they are: these things would abundantly have served his turn, and have contented the Reader; but to leave that, and fall foul, without occasion, upon our hope of heaven, was very ill done of him.    

CHAP. XXIX.  
Of Covenants, and keeping faith; Of damage and injury. The exercise of justice in its several kinds. Arithmetical proportion is that called Commutative. What in it and distributive may be due without Covenant. The justice of an Arbritratour. Mr. Hobbes' mistakes, about justice, merit etc. Bodin's harmonical proportion. The old Philosophers unjustly censured by Mr. Hobbes. Of Epicurus and his Philosophy; The Stoics, etc. Fortitude and Liberality stated better by them then he pretends.  

Sect. 1.  
I Leave this now, and on with him [Others (saith he) that allow, for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons, as heretics etc.] I condemn this with him, but do not approve his reason for it, which is [If any fault of a man be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made, the same aught in reason to have been sufficient to have hindered the making of it.] I allow not this answer, 
Several qualific●tions, good and bad, in the making and breaking Covenants.  because it destroye's that supposition, upon which it was grounded, which is that men have made a Covenant; now the question is, whether that Covenant may lawfully be broke; this is no satisfaction, to say, that there was the same reason not to make the Covenant, as to break it, for both may be amiss, to make it rashly, and to break it rashly; and one may be well, another ill; as to covenant to do any honest thing, the Covenant was good, the breach ill; So likewise the Covenant may be ill, and the breach good, as in those examples before instanced in; not as it is a 〈…〉 of ●aith but of that wicked bond; nay▪ I can show made a Covenant with another, may do it with an orthodox man, or with one not apparent to be other, and yet the man afterwards turn heretic, or discover his heresy; in that case it is not possible for the Covenanter to find the same reason in making, as was in breaking his Covenants; so that, although his Conclusion be true, that faith is to be kept with all men, yet his foundation and ground, upon which he built it, was faulty: Indeed the ground upon which his conclusion is established is, that God is the God of truth, that Religion destroye's not, but perfects moral virtues, amongst which, veracity Truth-speaking, is a principal one, and therefore cannot teach to break faith with any one: I would have these men who taught that doctrine, consider, how it had been possible for the Apostle to have enlarged Christian Religion amongst the Gentiles, if they had broached such a doctrine, so odious to humanity: but they taught the quite contrary, as is evident; I let it pass, and proceed.   

Sect. 2.  
His application of justice and Injustice to men, and actions, is ingenuous, but at the bottom of the page 74. he endeavours to show that sometimes damage is done to one, when the Injury is done to another [As when the Master commands his Servant to give money to a Stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before Covenanted to obey: but that damage redoundeth to the stranger to whom he had no obligation] this is handsome, 
No damage without injury.  but a little too fine: for I am persuaded that no damage can be where is no loss; loss cannot be where a thing is not had; he that hath nothing can lose nothing; for his instance, the Stranger had right to his Master's kindness; and the same bond, which tied the Servant to obey his Master in that command, obliged him likewise to give it to the stranger; and that bounty of the Master so justly entitled the stranger to it▪ as that Servant, who defrauded him of it, is bound in Conscience to make him restitution afterwards for that injury. He hath another instance, by which he endeavor's to illustrate this proposition, at the top of 75 page [In commonwealths private men may remit to one another their debts; but not robberies, or other violences, whereby they are endamaged] how doth this prove that injury may be done to one, and the damage to another? any man may forgive, or remit any damage, or injury (no damage without Injury) so far as it concerns himself, but not wherein it concerns another; nor doth his following reason speak any more; Because (saith he) the detaining of debt is an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and violence are injuries to the Person of the Commonwealth] So than it seem●s, by him, that damage is not without Injury; when the Commonwealth is dammaged, it is injured; where a private man is dammaged, he is injured; & either of these may remit those damages or Injuries are done to them, and their parts in the same act, when one and the same act doth often endamage and injure both; but neither can justly intermeddle with the other's interest.   

Sest. 3.  
He proceeds, [justice of actions is by writers divided into Commutative and Distributive] This distinction he censure's; I shall censure him for it, 
The explication of Commutative and Distributive justice.  but before I do that, that my judgement may appear more clear, when it is applied to the several particulars, I will permit an explication of that division, how it is understood by the consent of those he calls writers, which are Schoolmen, Casuists and Moral Philosophers.  

To which is premised that of common or legal justice▪  Thus they discourse of justice: justice of actions is either in the act●ons of a particular, relating to the whole body of the Commonwealth; or of the body or whole to particulars; or of particulars one to another, The first ●hey call Communis Iusti●ia▪ or legalis, common or legal Justice; Common, because it concerns the community, and legal, because it hath the same intent with all Laws, which is the public benefit: or else because it is required by the law of that nation, or some Aphorism of the law of nature, which dict●te's that the whole should be preserved rather than any particular; of this sort are the performance of those duties and services which are required by ●he laws of the Land, as the repairs of Highways, paying public Taxes in to the Exchequer; yea, to expose a man's life to danger for the public good, and preservation of either Church, or State. The second sort, of the whole to particulars, is that they call Distributive justice, which is apparent in the rewarding and punishing of men; and in this is required a Geometrical proportion, which require's four terms, as thus; such a proportion as two hath to four, hath three to six, it is just half; or such as six hath to eight, fifteen hath to twenty, it is three parts of four; thus when a Parish relieve's the poor w●th the public Stock, such a family as hath three bedrid people in it must have treble the relief of that which hath but one, out of the public Stock: So in disposing Offices, it is justice that he who merit's accordingly, should be exalted to dignity, and rewards proportionable; he, who h●th merit for a Captain, a Captain's place; a Colonel, a Colonel's; and so in all professions; and it is not justly done in him who hath the dispensation of these Dignities, to give the less worthy the place of more worth, and the more worthy the place of less worth.  
The third kind is of particular men one with another, and this they term Commutative Justice, which consists in exchanges and the trade and negotiation one man hath with another; to this they assign the measure Arithmetical, which is so much as the other, five for five: he, who hath right to five shillings, must have five shillings, and no more; he, who hath so much damage, must▪ in justice, have so much satisfaction, and no more, without any consideration of merit or demerit; virtue or vice; a shilling's worth of work must be paid with a shilling: this is the general Doctrine which is delivered by Writers concerning Justice. Let us see what he except's. What he writ is not true; Justice of Actions is not by Writers divided into Commutative and Distributive; when he saith, Justice of Actions, he must understand Justice in its general notion, which, by the consent of all Writers, is first divided into legal or common Justice, and particular; 
Many acts of Justice being not comprehended under the other two.  there are many acts of Justice which are not comprehended under these two; I mean not only the acts of those that are called Theological Virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity, which are just acts, but are not contained in this Division; but there are many acts of Moral Justice which are none of these; as thus, It is a gallant and heroic act of justice, for a man to adventure his life for the Safety of his Country; justice it is, because due to his Country, that any one part should perish rather than the whole; but neither Commutative, nor Distributive Justice, as may appear. It is a just action, in the danger of the Commonwealth running to hazard, for a wise man to interpose his advice, to rescue it from that menacing ruin; yet it is neither of these two; it is a just act (I think) for me to write these notes upon his Book; to admonish men to avoid the danger it threatens, if not prevented; but not distributive or Commutative Justice, but that which is called Common or legal justice, which looks to the public good; so that you see, there are many acts of justice legal not comprehended under these heads, and this commonly delivered by Writers; but his exceptions are against the other two. His first quarrel is against the doctrine of Commutative; and it is thus;   

Sect. 4.  
[Commutative therefore they place in the equality of the value of the things contracted for, as if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merit's,] so here are two arguments against an Arithmetical proportion in Commutative Justice, 
Argument 1. against an Arithmetical proportion in Commutative Justice examined.  I will examine them both [as if it w●re injustice to sell dearer than we buy] That's the first: This is not a good consequence, for the value of every thing is not to be considered only from its own intrinsical virtue and excellency; but, as he speaks handsomely afterwards, from [the appetite of the buyer] yea from many external accommodations which a thing hath, 
By what the price of any thing may ●e enhanced.  as from that pains and industry the owner took in getting these goods; from the hazard he made in getting them; from the necessity or pleasure he hath of those things; all which may justly raise the price of any commodity, and are, in themselves, things valuable: I could instance in every particular; but it is obvious, and it is delivered by all Casuists, that these things are honestly to be priced, and valued, by the Seller; he speaks ingenuously, when he saith, a little after, that [The value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the Contractors] so tha● where there is a certain contract, the Arithmetical proportion, in Commutative justice, is to be reckoned from the words of the Contract, not from the inward value of the thing contracted for; the first is certain, the other will always be dubious: you may observe in the second Book of the Kings, 
The Asse's head and kab of Pigeon's dung in the Siege of Samaria.  6.25. that, in the Siege of Samaria, an Asse's head was sold for fourscore pieces of silver, and a kab of Pigeon's dung for five pieces of silver: this had no Arithmetical proportion to the internal worth of the things, but as they were priced by the Seller's necessity, which is a valuable addition to any thing which is sold: So that, in express contracts, the sense of the Contract is always to be considered in Commutative justice; but Commutative justice hath to do in many things where there are not verbal and certain Terms expressed, and, in such Dealings, the Arithmetical proportion must, in some rule, 
When the Arithmetical proportion must be applied to the value of the thing.  be applied to the value of the thing, as thus, in a clear Instance; A man hath hired many to reap in his field, he finds another idle; bids him go to work with the rest; he doth his Day's work with them; he ought to be paid, according as he paid the other men, because although there was not a punctual Contract, yet, it is evident, he valued a man's Dayes-work at such a rate: So likewise, as I have known a Master and a Servant-man contract ofttimes in private, at the quarter▪ Day they Differ about the Wages; the Master says so much, the Servant, more; it is just the Servant should be paid; in those Countries where there are Statute-Wages determined, which ought to be in all, they have a recourse to that Standard, and there it shall be valued how much. Thus, where Contracts are expressed, the Terms of them expound the Arithmetical proportion; but where not, the value must some other way be examined, and that applied. And this may suffice, for answer to his first Argument, which said, we might not then sell dearer than we buy: for, upon many occasions we may, and it is just to do so: As to his Confirmation, That the Contractors appetites values all things: it is true, that the Arithmetical proportion is considered according to the Contract; but where there is no such Contract, there the internal value of the thing is only considered; but in both an Arithmetical proportion is considered, which he seemed to be displeased with.   

Sect. 5.  

2. Argument against it answered.  His second Argument is, That [if this proportion should be observed, than it were injustice to give more than a man deserves.] This Argument may be blown away with saying, that giving, or not giving, have nothing to do with justice; giving belongs to another virtue, ca●led Liberality; acts of Justice are acts of Du●ty; acts of Giving are acts of Bounty: but this I may tell him, that it were an act of Injustice for that Judge or Umpire, 
A Judge or Umpire 〈◊〉 by the rule of ●ustice.  in a Case of Commutative Justice, betwixt John Astiles and John An-oakes, who should make John Astiles to give John An-oakes but a little more than the Arithmetical proportion was due to him; he may give him out of his own purse what he pleaseth; but, out of justice, he can compel John Astiles to give no more, or rather pay no more, than a shillingworth of money for a shillingworth of work, unless for costs, or cause of 〈◊〉: So that▪ here▪ his second Argument against 〈…〉 another man hath merited, but he cannot justly be forced to pay more.   

Sect. 6.  
Now what follows, I think, reflects upon Distributive justice: [Merit (saith he) (besides that which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive) is not due by Justice, but is rewarded of Grace only.] This Proposition is not sense, which is, Merit is not due by Justice, but Grace only; the rest is a Parenthesis: no merit can properly be said to be due, but the thing merited; or else, it may be, that merit, such as he meane's, hath nothing due to it by justice, but by grace; as much as if he should say, that where is no Covenant, nothing is due out of justice, but grace.  
This I take to be very erroneous; As first, 
What may be due, by both kinds of Justice, without Covenant.  in Commutative then Distributive justice; in Commutative, restitution of fame, health, estate, when a man hath secretly injured another, is due, out of Commutative justice; he ought to make reparations, for injuries done in those things; but it is not possible to conceive that such a man, who injured another, should contract with him to make him satisfaction for that injury. The like we may find in Distributive justice; take the Instance before; Every Parish is to relieve the poor which belongs to it; suppose three poor; one, weak with old age, can do somewhat for his living; another so decrepit, that he is able to do nothing; a third beyond the former, both himself, and his wife, perhaps a child, all disabled to help themselves; those several persons never contracted with the Overseers of the poor of that place for any alms; they never, upon Covenant, acted any thing which fore-merited th●s relief; ye●, of justice Distributive, those several miserable people ought, by the Overseers of the poor, in a Geometrical proportion, to be so relieved: So, in Colleges, there are divers degrees of Places, and in many with this Clause, Let the most worthy be preferred; suppose now two Places void, and two unworthy, or not so worthy as some other two, should be preferred; were not thi● injustice, that the less worthy of the two most eminent should be preferred to the best Place, and the more worthy to the worst? this is injustice in Distributive justice; yet neither of these made a Covenant to oblige the other Fellows: I am persuaded Mr. Hobbes, when he wrote this, thought to have merited so much of all the Leviathans in Christendom, (or, at the least, from the Protector) that they ought to have preferred him to some great Office in their State: but yet, I am confident, he never contracted with any for the reward: for merit ariseth not only from grace or favour, but duty and justice; although Commutative justice only consider's the case, yet Distributive casts an eye principally upon the person, and his qualifications. He concludes, [therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right] The sense, in which it useth to be expounded, is th●t sense I have delivered, and, by what I have delivered, it appears right. F●●st, in Commutative justice an Arithmetical proportion must be considered: and secondly, in Distributive a Geometrical.   

Sect. 7.  
He goes on, [To speak properly, Commutative Justice is the Justice of a Contractor, that is, a Performance of Covenant in Buying and Selling, etc.] Thi● I have showed erroneous: see him again, [And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator, that is to say, the act of defining what is Just; Wherein (beinst trusted by them who made him Arbitrator,) if he perform his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: 
The justice of an Arbitrator different, according to the Case. ] Here is one c●se put for twenty of a divers nature: It is is true, in such a case, an Arbitrator may do an act of Distributive justice, as in dividing of an estate betwixt Wife and Children, and many other of such condition, when there ought to be a regard of differing relation, and necessity; but many times, in a Reference to an Arbitrator, the case may be clearly an act of Commutative justice; and, according to that justice, all the goods, contended for, must, to a penny, be assigned, according to an Arithmetical proportion, without any consideration of several merits; and, in such a case, there is no distribution, to divers their own: So that the justice of an Arbitrator may be, according to the Case in which he is to arbitrate, either Commutative, or Distributive; what he addes, that [This, which he had delivered before,) is Just Distribution; and may be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice] is hard to be apprehended; 
Mr. Hobbes 〈◊〉 nice and singular in his language.  and how it should be, indeed, just distribution, yet improperly Distributive justice, poseth me, and (I think) will him, to explain, unless he understand the first to be an act, the second a virtue or habit of justice, which is countenanced with no one phrase used by him; [but (saith he) more properly equity] why should he undertake not to cross the language received amongst the common people only, but the community of learned men, with a bare affirmation? he must use it otherwise than all Authors before; Equity is a rule, by which men must walk in the acts of all justice; but the virtue is Justice, by which men deal equally, whether Arbitrator or private person. 
His mistake in the division of justice.  In this Treatise of Justice, you may discern him to blame, in saying that [Writers divide Justice, into Commutative and Distributive,] in which he was mistaken; for justice is first divided into legal or Common justice, and particular; it is particular justice only which is divided into Commutative and Distributive; Secondly, he was to blame to deny, that Commutative justice is to be acted according to an arithmetical proportion, 
In his measure of commutative.  measuring it only by the things commuted; when he knows, that all Casuists allow twenty Circumstances, which may enhanse the price. Thirdly, he was mistaken, when he said, [than it were lawful to give more to a man than he merits;] Fourthly, he did not deliver the truth, when he said, there is no merit from justice, but grace only, where the distribution is made; Fiftly, he said too much, when he said [Distributive justice is the act of an Arbitrator; and Commutative of a Contractor.] And here let the Reader consider, whether it be not a bold undertaking of Mr Hobbes, 
His boldness in confronting all the learned men before him.  to confront all the learned men in the world; Schoolmen, Philosophers, ancient and latter, Casuists, Politicians, (all which with one Consent, honour and approve this distinction,) upon so weak grounds as are put down here; I remember no one Author that opposeth it; I am confident, I have looked upon an hundred; only Bodin in his sixth book de Republica, cap. 6. where he cavill's at this distinction, 
Bod●n's cavil.  methinks, as if he thought that Aristotle would have had a Commonwealth governed by these distinctly, one, or the other; but not have used them both at the same time, in his Commonwealth; and then the necessities of both in their several opportunities would have made one, alone, improper, and therefore he adds a third and new proportion, unheard of before, which he imagine's would complete the work, which he calls harmonica proportio; 
His airy conceit of an harmonical proportion.  but I can guess it a mere airy conceit, not clearly expressed by him, nor intelligible by any; for he can never show how the proportions in Music should correspond to the Offices in a Commonwealth, which must be done, if he make that proportion the only rule for it; and therefore it hath gained no ground upon the judgement of learned men; and I believe Mr. Hobbes his opinion will gain as little. But, to have my Judgement, Mr. Hobbes was angry with it, because the Schoolmen use it, and would not allow himself patience to examine their Grounds.   

Sect. 8.  
I pass over the rest of that Chapter, in which are some things most ingenious, as his discourse of Complacency, in the 76 page, and in some other things: but that most of all he crowde's in that abominable Aphorism before refuted: that all men are naturally at war one with another, until I come to the last Clause, where he falls foul again upon all manner of writers, page 80. where he saith, 
Mr. Hobbes' restraint of Moral Philosophy.  that [the Science of Virtue and Vice is Moral Philosophy.] This so far is true, that it is a good piece of moral Philosophy, to treat of the Law of Nature, and to show how all virtuous actions are deduced out of it, and agree with it; but this is not all the Office of a moral Philosopher; he is first to teach the end, which is man's Summum bonum, his chief good; his felicity, happiness, then to teach the means, which are those virtues deduced out of the Law of nature, and to show how they conduce to the end; so that he confined moral Philosophy in too narrow bounds, when he restrained it to Virtue and Vice, which are only the means, and are handled by a moral Philosopher only in order to his end. Now he comes to his high strain again, censuring the world.   

Sect. 9  
But (saith he) the writers of moral Philosophy, though they acknowledge the same Virtues and Vices; yet, not seeing wherein consisteth their Goodness, nor that they come to be praised, as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions, as if not the cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the quantity of a gift made liberality.] There are many things in this Period to be censured, First, 
His censure of all Philosophers.  I blame him for accusing the whole Company of the Philosophers of ignorance, in so weighty a business, not so much as pardoning any one; when, for my part, who have turned over hundreds of books in this business, I know no one so blind as himself in this particular point, I say no one, either Christian, or other; for first he committeth a mighty fault in forgetting that famous distinction, 
He forgets the distinction of a good man and a good Citizen.  betwixt a good man, and a good Citizen, acknowledged by multitudes of Philosophers, and must needs be by any man, who consider's that a man may be discoursed of, either concerning himself in his own nature, and the ways of perfecting it; or else in relation to others; in the first consideration, that Science which perfects him is called Ethicke or Moral Philosophy: 
The foundation of ethics, Economics Politikes.  for the second, which referre's him to others, it is either to a family, than it is Oeconomick; or else to a State or City, and then it is Politic. Now the writers of moral Philosophy discourse which way a man should perfect himself; so that they give Ru●es, which way he should be happy in a desert; in the midst of the most unhappy state in the world; in the midst of worldly plenties, miseries: such surely are perfect in this world; and such only; and this is the foundation of all Economics and Politics: no man can be either O●conomically or Politicly virtuous, who is not so in himself; and being so in himself, having neither family nor City to dispose himself to, he may not be such to other men. Mr. Hobbes dedicate's a m●n wholly to others in this place, as in others he makes a man dispose all things to himself, and consider's not the divers sh●res which his Parents, his friends (I may add) his Children▪ and, above all, his God, is to have out of him, as well as his Country. Now Mr. Hobbes placeth the whole relation of man to be towards others, when in this period he saith in effect, That,   

Sect. 10.  
[The Philosophers did not know that humane virtues came to be praised as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living] which are things only in respect of others: but I may tell Mr. Hobbes, that, in their politics and Economics, 
Personal and relative perfection how taught by Philosophers.  they teach this relative perfection as fully, and much truer, then hd, as will appear; but in Ethics they teach how these virtues are excellent in themselves, and do perfect the owner; this is done by all sorts of Philosophers; to begin with the Epicureans, whose Philosophy doth, in many things, 
Mr. Hobbes' Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus.  agree with his, although, in some things, he consent's with the Stoics; in mine opinion he chooseth the worst pieces in both; first Epicurus agrees with him in this, that he makes pleasure the happiness, the chief good of man, as Mr. Hobbes doth in many places; and I know Lactantius favour's Epicurus so much, as to say, he meant the pleasures of the soul; yet surely it seems to be the sensual part of the Soul only; for, in that Epistle he writes to Menoeceus, which is the chief we have of his moral Philosophy, he seems to me to do otherwise; and places man's happiness, as Mr. Hobbes doth elsewhere, in the enjoying sensual Contentments: now Mr. Hobbes, in those other places, did better than in this, where he placed man's happiness within himself, and the use of his virtues conducing to himself; but here in relation to others, which is so extrinsecall a thing, as it is impossible for a man 〈◊〉 be happy in; for it is possible a man may lack these accommodations of other men, to converse, and be sociable, and affable with; and then he is not happy, who can be miserable, which Epicurus himself denied to be possible to a virtuous and prudent man; so that, in respect of the end, although Epicurus make the same happiness, as Mr. Hobbes in other places, yet Epicurus, and Mr. Hobbes in other places, speak righter than Mr. Hobbes in this. Then, consider the means of obtaining this end: Epicurus first writes against the fear of the Gods, as he calls them; a thing, which Mr. Hobbes countenanceth, although he let's fall in one place (as Mr. Hobbes now and then will) that God doth punish wicked men, and bless the honest and virtuous; yet he after speaks against man's fear of any such thing; because (saith he) nothing must be spoken of the Gods, but eternal felicity, which they could not have if they were concerned in humane affairs, & therefore denies, prayers, or any religious duty, to have any power with the deities, as I remember, Mr. H●bs, out of his Stoical principles of the fate or necessity which belongs to all things, and actions. Cross principles produce the same wicked conclusion in both, like as Herod and Pilate join together in nothing but crucifying Truth; To the same purpose Lucretius (a follower of Epicurus) speaks in his first, fifth and sixth books; 
With that of Lucretius.  and divers times makes it the greatest piece of happiness, to abhor Religion and contemn it; and makes man, by that act, to be the greatest Conqueror. 
Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim  
Obteritur, nos exaequat victoria Caelo.  And one of Mr, Hobbes his Principles of religion is made by him to be the chief, the ignorance of second causes. Thus do men, who conspire against Religion, meet likewise in the means: But Epicurus and Lucretius spoke out fully, Mr. Hobbes darkly; thus they join in one Principle, by which happiness may be acquired; but, in another, Epicurus far exceeds him; for placing happiness, as he doth, in the enjoyment of this world's contentments, 
Epicurus' excellent discourse concerning Death.  Epicurus contemne's and despiseth death, and will not allow it to be any evil, and dispute's most excellently, to prove it is not to be feared, for (saith he) that is not to be feared which hurt's not (a true rule, for those things are only to be feared being absent, which, when they are present, will hurt us). Now (saith he, death hurt's no man, for when death comes, man is not, therefore not hurt by it; It hurt's neither the living, nor the dead, saith he; not the living, for, whilst men live, death is not; not the dead, for where death is, man is not: The force of this Argument is necessary, because in all Injuries or hurts, that come, there must be these two Terms, the thing hurting and that hurted, but these can never be together, death and man: now herein he excell's Mr. Hobbes, for whether Mr. Hobbes makes man's happiness to consist in the enjoying the world, or in a Complacency or contentment with other men; yet, when he makes death so fearful a thing, as he doth, it is in vain for that man to look for happiness, who knows he must die, when he shall lose this happiness, and he may die this day, and suddenly lose it, by that which he, and such men, make their greatest evil, death: so that Epicurus, and his Sect, went beyond Mr. Hobbes, and spoke more justifiably, out of these Principles, than he did. But Epicurus goes on, and deliver's, how these sensual pleasures are to be preserved, 
Frugality and Temperance.  by Frugality, and temperance; two virtues which I cannot find in Mr. Hobbes his whole book, which yet necessarily conduce to the preservation of this felicity; Frugality, that so the stock may be supported, which must maintain his pleasures; Temperance, which [is a moderate use of them, that so he may enjoy them the fuller; Frugality preserve's the fuel, Temperance the fire; and (as he speaks) the enjoyment of a man's pleasure doth not consist in the use of luxurious superfluities, but in the proportion the object hath to the appetite, or the necessity of the man who enjoye's it. So a hungry, needy, and necessitous man finds as great pleasure in a Crust of bread, and a draught of water, as any riotous person doth in his greatest excess of dainties. Now I read, in Mr. Hobbes, nothing of these two, which are as necessary as any, for the happiness which sensual pleasures can bring to a man; and therefore, although I think, this Sect erred as much as any in his morals; yet, I think likewise, that these writers did think more truly than he, wherein the goodness of these virtues (of which he speaks) consisteth, that is, making, men happy; and gave better reasons, for what they said, than he. I have dwelled longer upon this Sect, both because few men have described it aright, which I have read; and likewise because it containing as ill, or worse, opinions, than any other, hath suffered most justly, under the general Censure of Writers. And, although it being a doctrine which flattered our flesh and blood, and thereby, for a while, got a great applause amongst men, and the readers of this Philosophy, like Ranters in divinity, were much followed for a while; yet in the passages of an age or two, it was cried down; and I know not of any late writers, 
Mr. Hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the Epicureans than do the mahometans.  who hath so nearly insinuated his worst opinions, as this Author, with whom I have to do, unless it be the mahometans, who agree with the Epicureans in this, that sensual pleasure is the happiness of man; but here they differ; the mahometans make that happiness eternal hereafter: but Epicurus (with whom Mr. Hobbes seems to shake hands) in this world only.   

Sect. 11.  
To discourse of the Stoic Philosophy, were needles, 
Wherein the Stoics placed human happiness.  because the common Authors, which are read by the generality of men, as Tully, Seneca, Epictetus, do manifestly show how they placed humane happiness in his own breast, and in his power, which is the enjoyment of himself, without the disturbance of passions. And, to this end, they imposed that impossible means of rooting out passions, as living only by reason; which certainly, if it could be done, would make man's life like that of the Angels; or his bodily life like his spiritual, And these Cardinal virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance, to be the supports of all this work; and that man's happiness hath no dependence upon any thing without him; these certainly carried with them much more persuasive reason to induce the end, which these virtues aimed at, than any thing Mr. Hobbes hath delivered. 
Wherein Aristotle.  Then, for Aristotle, who, as appears, in the tenth of his Ethics, Cap. 7. makes, first, the happiness of man to consist in action, and that in the noblest action of man, which is of man's Understanding; then in the excellentest Act of his Understanding, which is Contemplation; and last of all, in the perfectest act of Contemplation, which is the Contemplation of God. I will not discourse his reasons, which were worthy his writing this way. A man may be happy alone without any reference to a Commonwealth, yea the business of public affairs would but hinder and distract this; and throughout that book, these virtues are taught in relation of this chief Good of man, his happiness, in which he may well rest, and seek no further; but, in his Politics, he shows how the same virtues conduce to the public; Mr. Hobbes, therefore, was much to blame, when he, in general, passed so weak (though cruel) a Censure upon the universality of moral Philosophers, as to say, they did not see wherein the goodness of these Virtues, they wrote of, consisted: and his instance is as much to blame, which is, that   

Sect. 12.  
[Those Writers place them in the mediocrity of passions, as if not the Cause, but the Degrees of daring, made Fortitude; 
Mr Hobbes m●stake's the Philosopher's discourse of moderating assions.  or not the Cause, but quantity of a gift, made liberality; He is mistaken, almost in every word he writ. First that moral virtue, called justice, is not in the passions, nor in any thing th●t hath not reason; So I may say by prudence, nor do Philosophers say it is; nor are many of the laws of nature (as he calle's them) written in these inferior faculties, but in the superior; nor do these men, who write of these things, so foolishly discourse of those virtues, whose nature is busied about the moderating of passions, as if there were no more to do but to bridle a man's passions; but then finding it necessary for the attaining man's happiness in this World, that men's passions must be kerbed, without which, like an unruly horse, these passions will transport a man to a thousand inconveniencies, and not be governed by Reason, but run away with it; these virtuous habits subdue those passions, that they act so far, and no farther, than prudence, and right Reason shall direct them; so that men's passions facilitated by Custom, to the yoke, are made to stop, turn or move, according to time, place, persons, manner of working, quantity of working, all Circumstances, as Prudence and right Reason shall prescribe: And this Philosophy St. Paul taught, Gal. 5.24. and tearmes it crucifying the flesh and the passions of it, 1 Cor 9 ult. I keep under, 
St. Paul's Philosophy.  or beat down my body (that is) keep it in subjection, lest▪ while I preach to others, I myself should be a cast away: he that keep's not under his body, his flesh, and the passions of it, can never regulate them according to Reason; and therefore this Philosophy of theirs was most excellent, according to true grounds of Reason; but his Censure is much mistaken, where he seems to make those Philosophers only terminate the moderation of these passions in themselves, and not reflect them upon that is most desirable, the subjecting them to Reason, which all I meet with do. And the mistake runne's in the instance given.   

Sect. 13.  
[As if not the Cause, but the degrees of daring made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the quantity of a gift made liberality.] I wonder, when he read any writer of note so absurd, 
Of Fortitude and liberality.  as he makes all Philosophers in general: for Fortitude, they make it (as all other) to consist in mediocrity; it is excelled by temerity, or rashness; it is defective in Cowardliness; and these are both degenerations from the virtue Fortitude; which Fortitude is to dare do that (what danger soever be in it) which Reason prescribe's; and to forbear to do that (what advantage soever shall accrue) which just Reason shall forbid. Take an Instance in that man of God, David, in Sam. 17. we may read that he durst encounter with a Lion and a Bear, to rescue an innocent Lamb out of their mouths: he dares fight with Goliath in complete armour, with nothing but a sling and a stone, to rescue his Country; yet a little after we shall read of him flying out of his Wife's Window for safety: yea, in the 26. of the same book, we shall find David, and only Abishai with him, entering the whole army of Saul: an Act than which nothing could be more bold or hazardous; and taking his Spear, and bottle from his holster, and yet, he durst not touch his person, for committing of treason; each an act of true Fortitude, to dare so much, when it was fit, and dare do no more, when it was fit; no not for a Kingdom: the Rules of Fortitude, are, not to fear, or hope for any thing, but upon the guidance of right Reason; So that the daring to say, or do unjust actions, is opposite to fortitude: I may say the like of liberality, it hath two vices nigardliness and prodigality; It is prodigality, profusely to throw away man's estate, or loosely to waste it, upon idle and vain persons and occasions; but it is nigardliness, to grudge his own, or other men's necessity's, that which he can spare from his Conveniences. Fortitude, Liberality, all virtues have their Times, places, persons, with other Circumstances, to be considered in their practices, without which they are not esteemed virtues amongst Philosophers. This made some Philosophers think Prudence the only virtue, varied according to the diversity of the objects, it was busied about, because that consider's these Circumstances; others make it the chief, having an Interest in the acts of every other virtue; so that he was utterly mistaken, in that expression; nor are all virtues only by Philosophers assigned, to moderate passions, but actions, as Aristotle discourseth; as is apparent in that Cardinal virtue of Justice. To conclude, a virtuous man makes passions Servants to Reason, and governe's them, a vicious man let's them be his Masters which hinders him from true felicity. I have done with this, and had not touched upon it, but, through this weak discourse, Mr. Hobbes thought to have obtruded upon an heedless Reader, or such as is not versed in Moral Philosophy, a Contempt of so much excellent doctrine, delivered by so many learned men; and to have (unjustly) usurped the name of the only excellent Philosopher, which I (who acknowledge myself a Novice to the others) ought not to subscribe to.     

CENSURES UPON THE Sixteenth Chapter of Leviathan. ENTITLED, Of Persons, Authors, and Things personated.  

CHAP. XXX.  
A Person what, and what to personate. Boethius' definition explained and asserted. Of keeping and breaking Covenants. The true God personated neither by Moses, nor any else. The Israelites, whose people.  

Sect. 1.  
THIS Chapter I should wholly have let pass, but that, by a few weak Grammatical Notes, the plot of it seems to be aimed at most profane and wicked purposes: for that reason I must censure it, as not befitting a Christian Writer, and in its self containing many dangerous falsities; he begins it thus:  

Mr. Hobbes' definition of a Person too circumstantial.  [A person is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or any other thing, to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.] Reader, here is a strange Definition; Definitions should be short, without unnecessary Circumstances, of which this is composed: I will make it shorter for him, in his own sense; A person is he who doth or speaks any thing; and this is as full as his; for whosoever doth or speaks, his words or deeds are considered either as his own, or another's; or he might have said, it is a particular man, for actions or speeches of every particular man are either considered as his own, or representing another man, or thing; so that his tedious description might, without such circumstances, have been cut shorter, and have had the full expression of his intendment. But because Mr. Hobbes will speak pertinently, and be clearly understood what he meane's, he proceede's with a distinction.   

Sect. 2.  
[When they are considered as his own (that is, those actions or words) then is he called a Natural Person: and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person.] Thus may a man be distinguished into a true and counterfeit man; 
No less applicable to a feigned than a true person.  and no more than the picture or the image of a man is a true man, no more is a feigned or artificial person, a true person; and yet this feigned or artificial person doth as fully agree to his definition, as the true person; which shows the Definition to be to blame: The Metaphysicians have an undoubted Axiom, that ens and verum convertuntur; what is not truly such, is not such. If then such a man, whom he name's, be but a feigned person, he is not a person truly, and then not a person; yet we shall find him endeavouring to set him out, as the only true person, presently afterward with his Grammar Rules.   

Sect. 3.  
[The word person (saith he) is Latin. 
Person not Latin. ] Sir persona is Latin, person is English; if he had said, person had been derived from the Latin, it had been Truth; but to say, person is Latin, is false; persona in no case is person, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  [instead whereof the Greeks have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,] it is true they have, and those two in Greek and Latin are, by the use of speaking, most strictly in these two Languages appropriated, to signify this which we call person in English; there were other words often used to the same purpose. The Grecians used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and the Latins Suppositum, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Suppositum.  which in time (for words, — juvenum ritu florent modò n●ta vigentque) grew out of esteem, and now signify other subsisting substances, and those two former have gained, in the language of Divines, the expression of that which we in English call person; and there was reason for it, because the latter have been frequently used, by Divines and Philosophers in ancient times, for other things besides persons; and so now, to avoid equivocations or tedious Descriptions, both Divines and Philosophers speak both of suppositum and hypostasis, in a general nature, as belonging to all other substances; but persona and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as peculiar to reasonable substances, so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a reasonable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and persona a reasonable suppositum. He goes on with [which (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,) signifies the face, as persona in Latin signifies the disguise. 
Person differently used in several arts and faculties. ] This is true, consented unto by all Grammarians; but use of words in divers matters, and divers arts, is divers: First in the Art of Grammar, we find but three persons, I, thou, and he. Secondly, in Civil Law, we sometimes find it the quality of a man, as rich, or poor; In Canon Law a Dignity, Bishop called person, etc. in Metaphysics and Divinity, a reasonable subsistence; which is totally neglected by Mr. Hobbes, as some other acceptations: so that, when he had so debated, in such a large Discourse, upon the sense of the word, he was to blame, in dwelling only among the Players, to have omitted the use of this Word in so many Sciences. Consider the result of this horrid Criticism.   

Sect. 4.  
[So (saith he) that a Person is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and, 
Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes.  to personate, is to act or represent himself or another:] This is it I foretold you of, that although a feigned thing cannot be a true thing, yet he makes the feigned only the true, and the representor only to be the true person, not to be, who is represented; and although in his Definition he said, That [a Person is he whose words or actions are considered as his own, etc.] and in his following division there was a natural and a feigned person; yet here he makes all persons feigned, and their words and actions to be others: If he answer, that his words were [represent himself or another] then if he act himself, it is enough to constitute him a person. 
No man personate's himself. ] I reply, that what it is to act himself, he hath expressed in the words immediately preceding, [a Person is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common conversation:] Now no man can properly be said to act himself, or represent himself; for the Actor and the acted, the Representor and the represented, are two. He proceeds, [and he that acteth another is said to bear his Person, or act in his name:] very true, but if he bear's fewer person, the other is the person, not he that bear's it: The Constable bear's, represents the person of a King, but is not his person; so doth a Player; this makes all against himself, and so doth that which follows, [In which sense Cicero useth it, where he says, 
Cicero misinterpreted.  Unus sustineo tres personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis: I bear three persons; Mine own, my Adversaries, and the Judges:] and it is likely he might say so truly, but he doth not say, I am three persons, but I bear three, or act them; they were the persons, whose parts he acted, at that time; not he who acted them; the persons which he bore, and he who bore them, are divers; thus he overthrows himself, when he labours to show, that the Representor is the person; but his Argument proves only the represented to be the person; and this we shall find in the ancient Tragedies and Comedies put out. 
Person how taken by the Critics.  The Critic, which put●s them out, calle's the persons those which were represented, not the Actors, as is to be seen in Seneca and Terence, etc. not that I deny, this word hath sometimes been used by Writers, as Mr. Hobbes expresseth it: but I deny that that is the universal acception of that word; or that Mr. Hobbes his Argument doth show, that it was ever so accepted: but rather clean contrary; the person is he who is represented, not the Representor. But now it will become me to show the right use of the word, and how it may and must be used otherwise than Mr. Hobbes directs.   

Sect. 5.  

Boethius' definition of a person.  A person then, taken in the most received conceit, that Divines and Philosophers acknowledge, is defined by Boethius, de duabus naturis, to be rationalis naturae individua substantia: An individual substance of a rational nature: This Definition is most generally received, and I doubt not, but it will abide the Test, when it is clearly explained, which I shall endeavour to do; only Richardus de Sancto Victore gave it a rub, 
Rich. de Sancto V●ctore, object's against it.  and makes men pause a while to explain it; for he, in his fourth book de Trinitate, cap. 21. object's against this, that it is too large, because it agrees to that which is not a Person, as the Divine Essence; for, saith he, this Divine Essence is the Trinity, which is not one Person. In ●is 24 cap. he give's another Definition: Persona est per se existens, 
His other Definition of it.  solùm juxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum: A person is a thing existing by its self only, according to a single manner of a reasonable existence: if he had expounded, 
More difficult.  what this singular manner of a reasonable existence is, by which we might have discerned how the manner of existing had been divers from others, he had acted somewhat that we might have understood his meaning; but, as it is, will be very hard: and this learned man (I see) but little followed; only his Countryman Scotus in 1 mum senten. distinc. 23. quaest. unica, 
Scotus' Objections against the former.  with his Sect make other Objections against this Definition, because (saith he) by this Definition, the Soul of man, separated from the body, should be a person, for it agrees to that Soul; but that the Soul separated is a person, is denied by him, as indeed by most, although affirmed by some very learned, as the Master of the Sentences himself, and others: again, saith Scotus, by this Definition, there would be no Person in God, because individuale cannot be where is no Dividuum, a dividible thing, which cannot be affirmed of God. Again, this phrase, rationalis naturae, only agrees to man, not to God, or Angels, whose knowledge is after a more excellent way, than by ratiocination and discourse. These are the main Objections of Scotus, and his followers, which I would answer immediately in their order, but that I think the bare explication of Boethius his Definition will do it, without more business, which thus I do.   

Sect. 6.  

The Definition explained and vindicated by the Bishop.  First a person is a substance; by that Term it is opposed to all accidents, and things only imaginary; it is an individual substance, by that Term it is opposed to those are called second substances, the general or sp●cial natures of substances, which are dividual into many of the same nature, as a Man, a Lion; there are many of the same kind under each of these notions, but there are no more the same as one person; yet if perhaps that Term of Richardus de Sancto Victore might seem more fully expressing this business, 
The Distinction of Communicable ut quod and ut qu●.  which is (it is incommunicable) he may use it, and by that may be denied, that the Soul of man separated is a person; because, although it is incommunicable, ut quod (as the Scotists speak) yet it is not absolutely, for it is communicable ut quo; which distinction may be thus explained; that thing is communicable ut quod, which communicate's its self wholly, and in recto, as they speak, so that it communicate's in such a manner, as a man can say another is this; so do general or special, any universal natures, as we can say, Socrates is a man, a sensitive thing, and the like: but there are other things communicate themselves ut quo, when by them a thing receive's an addition of some nature, yet not such, as that we may say another thing is this, but that it hath this, or is made such, or such, by it: so whiteness, heat, coldness, or any form, the Soul of man, the form of any thing, these communicate themselves ut quo, by which that thing, to which they are communicated, may be said to be white, or have whiteness; to be hot, or have heat; not to be whiteness or heat; to be animated or have a Soul; but not to be that soul, and the like: thus they say that the Soul of man, separated, is communicable ut quo, though incommunicable ut quod; it hath in its self an aptitude to inform the body again, though it be now separated; but, a person is absolutely incommunicable. The last Term in this Definition is, 
Reasonable, of what extent.  that it is rationalis, of a reasonable nature: this word reasonable, must be understood, of any intellectual nature, whether by discourse or else, and so it comprehends all, Divine, Angelical, or whatsoever; and, if I am not deceived, this mere exposition will satisfy all the Objections which have been made: that of Richardus who saith, this agrees to the Divine Nature, which is the Trinity: No, saith my Definition, that Divine Nature is Dividual; communicable, to three persons; Scotus his first Argument, that it agrees with a Soul separated: No, say I, that is communicable ut quo. His second, which saith, that individuum must be of that is divisible: I think, I might deny that Proposition; howsoever to that which follows, that God cannot be divided, I say, not into Being's or Nature's; but, he is into Persons, and that without all Composition. His third, that this phrase Rational cannot be understood of God, is true in a gross sense, as no words we use, can, yet reason may, be affirmed of God in a superexcellent manner, which excelleth our knowledge or Discourse; and Angels, although they discourse not, as most think; yet they have an Angelical reason, which discerns, in a finer manner, those things without Discourse, which we do by Discourse; nor is it necessary, 
The Philosophers ●nd Schoolmen could have rectified Mr, H●bbes's mistake of a person.  that rationality should be bound up only in the notion of Discourse, but may well be extended to all manner of knowledge, beyond beasts. Thus you may discern, what a person is esteemed to be, amongst such as know how to define; and Mr. Hobbes, if his hatred to the School and common Philosophy be not such as will not suffer him to read their Books, might easily have discovered this amongst them, and have not suffered himself to be transported with the imagination of how this word is used upon the Stage; only (for which Valla and some such are called Pedagogues and Players, 
The Etymology and common acception of Persona.  rather than Philosophers) in words, we are not always to consider their Etymology, but how they are used; yet if we should go to the Etymology of this word, the most commonly received amongst the Schools is significant of the true use, which is per se una, a person, because it is by its self one; nor are we to consider only how words have been used, but how they are now in our English; formerly a Knave signified a servant, now a dishonest man; Bawdry signified only bravery, now obscenity, with hundreds of the same nature: So that since the Exposition, which I have given of this word Person, is that which you shall find always to be the meaning of it when it is used amongst Philosophers, when he give's another sense of it, he ought to have showed more reason for it, than he hath. But he hath a Design in it: I will therefore consider that.   

Sest. 7.  
Page 81. about the top of the leaf he saith [Of persons artificial some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent; and then the Person is the Actor; and he that owneth his words or actions, is the Author] I am of another mind, 
Not the Actor, but the acted is the person.  not the Actor, but the acted is the person, as will appear manifestly: A Constable hath his actions, and his words, legally spoke in the King's name, owned as the King's; yet he is not the person of the King, but the King, in his own person, act's by him; he bear's the person, represents the person of the King: but the King is the person, he the Actor or Representer: the Author, according to his phrase, is the person, not the actor. I commend his observations, upon Authority, and what follows in that page, only I can by no means approve what he saith, in the middle of that page.   

Sect. 8.  
When the actor doth any thing against the law of Nature by command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature.] This is very erroneous, 
No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature  or else it makes an impossible supposition, for this supposition [if he be obliged by a former Covenant] must either be understood, that some former Covenant had power to bind him to do this act against the Law of Nature, and that is impossible: for no Authority, but that of the God of nature, can have right to cross the Law of Nature; and than it is most consonant to the Law of Nature, to obey him contrary to all Covenants, made to any other, by any authority, yea even of God himself; and upon this ground the obedience of Abraham to sacrifice his only Son (which was as cross to Nature as any thing could be) was most honourable; or else must be understood, that some Covenant, 
With whomsoever any such is made, it must not be kept.  of one man to another, of general obedience, in all things should have power to oblige him to break the Law of Nature, upon such a man's command; and than it is most wicked; First, it is sinful to make such a Covenant; and it is doubly wicked, to keep it: for when a man makes such a bargain, it is supposed to be in licitis et honestis, in lawful and honest things, not against the Law of Nature; yea, should a man, in express terms, Covenant or bargain, in particular, to do this individual thing which is unlawful, he were bound to repent, and not to do it: his reason, he give's for the Conclusion, is not strong enough to enforce it, which is.   

Sect. 9  
For though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant] This answer consists of two parts, 
The fi●st part of Mr. Hobbes' answer destroye's the second▪  I shall examine them distinctly: First he saith [it is not his] that is, his that doth it; he put's these relative terms very doubtfully; to this I reply, if it be not his, he is not responsible for not doing of it: for no m●n can be responsible for that which belongs not to him, for any act, but what is his own; that which he hath not power and Authority to do, his doing is not virtuous, nor his not doing viticus; so that the first part of his answer destroye's the second, which makes the Law of Nature to act against the Law of Nature, when he hath covenanted to do it; but certainly those actions are the actors own acts, and he shall answer for them, be blessed or cursed for them; 
God to be obeyed before man.  and because a man owe's obedience to God only, and to men, only for God's sake, therefore whatsoever any man shall command, contrary to God's Law written in the Bible, or the nature of man, is a sin against God: and disobedience to men commanding against the Law of God, is true obedience with God. 
An instance in the Hebrew Midwives.  See one Instance in the first of Exodus, begin the Story, at the fifteenth verse you shall find Pharaoh commanding the Hebrew Midwives, that they should destroy ●he Male Children of the Hebrews: it is said in the 17 verse, the Midwives feared God and did not as the King of Egypt commanded, and in the 21. verse it is said, because the Midwives feared God, that God made them houses, that is, blessed them: here it is evident, that when a Command was given, to act that horrid sin of murder, which is against the Law of Nature, God blessed those persons who feared God more than men, and would not be actors in that which was against the Law of Nature, to destroy innocent Children: nor can Mr. Hobbes have any evasion, to say, 
Who probably had covenanted.  they had not covenanted to do this act, for it is exceeding probable that when Pharaoh commanded them to do it, he would not have dismissed them without a promise; as it is reasonable to think, when he convented them, and charged them with their fault, they would have excused themselves with saying, they did not promise; but besides this Mr. Hobbes a little after this (which I intent to treat) teacheth, that every Subject makes a Covenant with Leviathan, to own his actions and obey him; now than although there were no other Covenant, these Midwives living under that Government, where Leviathan Pharaoh commanded it, they had covenanted to obey him, yet God blessed them, because they did not; So that, it seems their actions were their own, for which God blessed them, though contrary to the command of Pharaoh.   

Sect. 10.  
The second part of his answer is this [But contrarily to refuse to do it (that is, what is commanded.) is against the Law of Nature that forbiddeth breach of Covenant] It is true, that the breach of Covenant considered, in its self, is against the Law of Nature; for a man by Covenant give's away his liberty of using, 
No breach of Covenant which had not a right to bi●d.  or acting that thing for which he covenanted, otherwise then by his Covenant: but consider now, if a man, that hath alienated away formerly his right to an estate, or had no right to it, should make a deed of that estate to another man, such an act could be of no benefit to that other: This is that man's case who shall Covenant to act against the Law of God, written in books or hearts; he cannot covenant to do it, it is void ipso facto, it is God's due, and he cannot alien it, and what he shall act, according to such a Covenant, is wicked, the very pretence to have power to do it, is a Conspiracy against God and his right of Dominion over us: so that there can be no breach of such a Covenant, which had no right to tie or bind any man; that Conclusion therefore was a great mistake of Mr. Hobbes, and is justly censured here, because conducing to other ill Consequences hereafter.   

Sect. 11.  
In the 82. page, having discoursed of many things which may and may not be personated, towards the midst of that page, he saith that [the true God may be personated] This phrase gave me an amazement: for I cannot call to mind any such expression made either in Scripture, 
The true God improperly and overboldly said to be personated.  or Orthodox ecclesiastical writers, and, understanding personating in that sense that Mr. Hobbes doth, to say, the Actor is the person, it was too boldly affirmed by him (I think) without any ground; had he spoke of the true God, as he did before of Idols, to say, man might be trusted for those Gods, in things which are dedicated to pious uses, and so, in the place of God, receive and dispose such Legacies, and, in that sense, say, they personate God, quoad haec; thus far there might have been some excuse; but to say, that the true God may be personated by any thing which is not God, was too great an exaltation of the Creature, and diminution of his excellency; but yet thus he doth, as appears by his Instance [as he was; first by Moses, who governed the Israelites (that were not his, but God's people) not in his own name with hoc dicit Moses, but in God's name with hoc dicit Dominus] first by Moses. I am persuaded, 
Moses, though instead of God, did not personate him.  he can never show me, that the true God was ever personated by Moses, A man may be instead of God, in divers Offices; to the poor are in the room of God, instead of his hands, receive in God's stead those Alms which, for God's sake, are given them; Kings, 
Nor do Kings.  and those which are in Authority, are in God's stead, to govern and rule us, and therefore we make conscience of obedience to them, because for this purpose they are ordained of God: Priests are loco Dei, in the place of God, in Sacris, holy Duties; 
Nor Priests.  so that they open or shut the gates of heaven, absolve and bind m●n, and he that despiseth them, in those holy dispensations, despiseth Christ himself; but, none of these can be said to personate God, nor can any Creature do it; he who personate's God, must represent an infinite Excellency, infinite in Power, infinite in Wisdom, etc. yea must represent an unspeakable, an incommunicable, unexpressible, an unrepresentable excellency, which is impossible: If Mr. Hobbes had said, that some men, as Moses, were Messengers of God, as the Apostles; Ambassadors of God, to deliver or act his will amongst us, he had said aright; but to make them personate him, sound's too high for a finite Creature in his sense.   

Sect. 12.  
I know Exodus 4.36. it is said by God to Moses, That Aaron should be his Spokesman to the people; he should be to him instead of a mouth; and Moses should be to him instead of God. And again, Exodus 7.1. See I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet. By the understanding these two places, I think may be cleared whatsoever can be said, 
How Moses was instead of God to Aaron.  for Moses his personating God; for that which concerns h●s being a God to Aaron, we may observe, that he could be no otherwise a God to Aaron, then Aaron was a Mouth to Moses; the same words are used to both: How was he a mouth, but by speaking, and delivering those things which Moses directed? the same way was he a God to Aaron, by directing Aaron, such things as God directed: so as the people need not doubt, but what Aaron spoke was by the Direction of Moses; so Aaron need not doubt, but what Moses appointed him to do, or speak, was the will of God; and it is remarkable, that in both these places, the word used for God is ELOHIM, 
ELOHIM.  which is a name given often to Kings and Princes, to men in Authority, so in particular; not to multiply the places, in the 22 of Exodus, 28. Thou shalt not revile the Gods, that is the Princes, so thou shalt be to him as God, or a Prince; howsoever, the place enforceth no more, but that Moses should be so a God, as Aaron was his mouth, that was, to deliver his will; this is not to personate or represent him as a person. The second place is as clear, 
How Moses was made a God to Pharaoh.  where Moses is said in the 7 Chap. 1. to be made a God to Pharaoh. The story is thus; Moses had something of man in him, and was afraid to go to Pharaoh: be not afraid of him, saith God to him, as he is above thee without me, so thou shall be above him with me; I can rule him, thou shalt be a God to him: thou shalt terrify him with signs and wonders, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy Prophet, that is, deliver thy words, as it is expounded in the following verse; or else we may take Elohim, in the other sense, for a Prince or King; so, I have made thee a King or Prince over Pharaoh, thou shalt have power over him, as he over his subjects; but, which way soever, he is but enabled by God, for certain works; and we may take another observation; in neither of these places, is he called God or a Representment of God, but God to Aaron, God to Pharaoh, that is, to those particular persons, in those particular businesses: but this comes not up close to Mr. Hobbes who says, the true God may be personated; concerning which there is no such expression in these Texts: but that Moses was made an Instrument of God's, to act some things towards these two persons, Pharaoh and Aaron. Nay, I will add one note more, 
Ho● fully soever Moses had represented God, he could not personate him.  that from these Texts, had Moses represented God never so fully, yet could he not be said to personate God, according to Mr. Hobbes his understanding a person, for a person, by Mr. Hobbes, is such a man as is a Lieutenant, a representer, an Attorney etc. according to all these phrases he expresseth him in the preceding page; but none of these could Moses be, because all those must be notified that they are such to the parties with whom they negotiated; but this certainly was only expressed to Moses, he was made acquainted with this power, not Aaron, not Pharaoh; and therefore he was not made one of Mr. Hobbes his persons: but if he were, which no where appears, yet, it is most evident, not in that sense, which he express●th, that is, in respect of the people, which is his expression [who governed the people] now he is never said to be a God to the people, which yet he might have been by the same word, which is used in those places, signifiing a Ruler, or Prince: he addes an unadvised Parenthesis [that were not his, but God's People.]   

Sect. 13.  
They were God's by adopting them into a more peculiar favour then any other nation in the world, 
The Israelites how the people of G●d, and how of M●ses.  guarding them with eminent Miracles of his providence; they were Moses his people, by being under God the Dispenser of those acts of providence, and therefore Exodus 32.7. God called them his people; Get thee down, for thy people, which thou broughtest out of the Land of Egypt, have corrupted themselves; and Moses repeating, in a long Discourse, the mercies of God's providence towards them, rehearseth the same words, Deut. 9.12. so that they were the people of God, by his especial grace; and they were Moses his people, by his being, under God, their Governor; the same act is attributed to the first and supreme Cause, in a most high and eminent way; to the second, as an Instrument, cooperating with it. In the 20 of Genesis, it is said, that God brought them out of the Land of Egypt; in this place it is said, that Moses brought them; both in their several ways, God, as the first, Moses as the second Cause: but let us consider, perhaps he gives, a reason for what he s●ith; he affirmes that Moses govern's the people, not in his own name, with hoc dicit Moses: but in God's, with hoc dicit Dominus.   

Sect. 14.  
If this would serve to make him personate another, than he and I should personate God; for when we urge Scripture, we say God, or the Spirit of God saith it; nay, 
Moses' phrase shows he personated not God.  I may say for Moses (whose humility was far from usurping that excellency which Mr. Hobbes ascribe's unto him) if he had personated God, in Mr. Hobbe● his sense, he would not have used that phrase, hoc dicit Dominus, but Ego hoc dico; let a man consider a Player upon the Stage, when he personates and act's a King, he doth not say, the King saith this, or the Lord, but I command, as if he were a King; and this is, by Mr. Hobbes the original of this word person, to which he applie's all.   

Sect. 15.  
One word more: I am of Opinion, as Mr. Hobbes in another place speaks rightly (and others, 
God was King of the Israelites, Moses but their Judge and General.  before him, say a much) that in the time of Moses, Josua, and the Judges, God was the sole King of the Israelites; he gave them Laws; they by Covenant bound themselves to obey those Laws; he to protect them; and Moses was so far from being their King, that he gave them no Laws; so that he was but, as it were, a Judge, and a General to lead them in their battles, as God directed, and to judge their Causes according to God's Laws which he had given them; and we shall find that Moses used that Authority but sparingly, for, he had recourse to God still, in any weighty matter of that nature, and would not judge any thing besides the letter of the Law: So you may find Leviticus 24.11, 12, 13, 14. that the Lord himself gave sentence upon him who had blasphemed his name; he was in the 12. verse put in ward, that the mind of the Lord might be known, in the 13. verse the Lord spoke un●o Moses, not his person, but his Officer, bring forth, etc. verse 14. See likewise Numbers 15.35. The Lord declared to Moses what should be done to the man who gathered sticks on the Sabbath day; and the like you may find in the Case of Zelophehad Numbers 27. verse 1. and Moses brought their cause before the Lord, verse 5. and verse 6. the Lord spoke unto Moses saying, etc. so that Moses was so far from personating God, that he did nothing but as a Messenger, 
A messenger and Mediator betwixt God and them  and Mediator betwixt God and them, delivering God's will to them, their requests, and many times his own, for them, to God; and therefore though God in 32. of Exodus, when he was angry with the abominations of the Israelites, would disown them, and his peculiar interest in them; he, as it were, threw them off to Moses, and called them his people; yet Moses pleading for them verse 11. etc. returns them to God again, and calle's them his people, which he brought forth of the Land of Egypt; he owned none of those glorious works to be his, of which he was but an Instrument, but attributed all to God. Well, than we see Moses was but an instrument, a Judge, a General, and those Offices in a weak manner performed, not without a perpetual direction from God; but in nothing did he personate him; so that I think Mr. Hobbes was deceived in using this unheard of phrase, concerning Moses; but I would he had rested in this, and had gone no further; me thinks, I could have forgiven this, (although somewhat too bold a language) taking personating in a very large sense, that Moses, and all Kings, might be said, in a little weak manner, to personate God (although I did distaste it) but what follows is worse.    

CHAP. XXXI.  
Christ personated not God, being really God himself. His Divinity asserted against Smalcius and other Socinians. Christ's blood not the blood of the Father, the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appropriating it to him Acts 20.28. His Filiation and eternal Generation vindicated from the Subtle exceptions of Valkelius, etc. And our Saviour justified in his first name of being the Son of God.  

Sect. 1.  
[SEcondly, by the Son of man, his own Son, our Saviour Jesus Christ] I will stop here, 
Uncomely to say, our Saviour personated God.  and leave the intent of our Saviour's coming, to another place; he makes here our Saviour to personate God, he calls him truly the Son of man, and the Son of God; but in saying, he personated God, he used a phrase no whit comely to express such a sacred Mystery by; no man can properly be said to personate another, who is that other; now this son of man is the son of God, and he is God, and thought it no robbery to be equal with God; if he be God, he cannot be said, in any propriety of speech, to personate God; for he, who personate's another, is not really that other, but counterfeitly only; Now our blessed Saviour is really God, which he would have him personate, 
Who was really God.  and therefore cannot personate God. This truth, not long since, had had no need to have been spoken of, amongst Christians; whosoever, heretofore, professed the name of Christ, did readily assent to it; but of late it hath been denied by many, in Polonia, and the infection hath come into our nation, and that infection hath Antidotes prepared for it, which are able to remove it from the heart of those who would cordially apply it to them; so that there need no more to be said to it; yet because they, who read this little treatise, may perhaps not have opportunity, or leisure, to look upon other writers, I shall add a word or two to satisfy the Reader concerning this business, and show, that Mr. Hobbes hath very unhandsomely expressed himself in it, and derogatorily from the eternal deity of our most blessed Saviour; and first in saying [he doth personate God,] for although he say, he is the Son of God, his own Son, which in its self were enough to satisfy a Reader, that he must be of the same nature with his father (for every Son is such) yet, since the waywardness of men hath studied so many foolish distinctions, to beguile the simple, amongst which that is one of a natural and adopted Son, of an eternally, and a temporary begotten Son; to which sense are expounded, that Christ is his Son, but an adopted; Christ is his own, but a Temporary begotten Son, either when the holy Ghost overshadowed the blessed Virgin, as soon, or before the world was made, as others; ●his phrase of his cannot shelter him from many peevish and perverse doctrines, when he makes him not to be, but to personate God: I shall first show that he is God, and then, how it is not incongruous to reason to say it, labouring in all to make my Reason ascend up to my Faith, not my Faith descend to my Reason; cross to which I have thought (since first I was acquainted with their writings) that the Socinians first laid a plot for Religion by Reason, than laboured to wrest Scriptures to that plot.   

Sect. 2.  

Proved to be 〈◊〉, from Acts 20.17, & 28.  In proving our blessed Saviour to be God, I shall not use many places of Scripture, one or two will be enough, so they be clear and evident; the first shall be Acts 20. where you shall find that St. Paul verse 17. did at Miletum s●nd to Ephesus, for the elders of the Church which were there; and verse 28. he gave them a charge in these words: Take heed therefore to yourselves and to all the flock over which the holy Ghost hath made you overseeers, to feed the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood. I observe that the Church is called the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood; this Article (he) can relate to none but God, he therefore, who hath purchased this Church with his blood, is God: I will spare nothing that I find brought by any in the way of answer, but do hope this place will vindicate its self, and this cause very clearly. 
Against Bernard. Ochinus▪  First then Bernardinus Ochinus in his second book of his Dialogues, Dialogue 19 but the first of that book page 100 in mine edition, bring's this place and answers it thus: First, that [this is not spoke of the blood of God, but of Christ, of whom a little before Saint Paul spoke] but this is so fa●re from all reason, as nothing can be more; for the Apostle did not name ou● Saviour nearer than four verses before, in the 24. verse which could abide no construction to this; and here, in this period of Scripture, which is entire in its self (the Church of God which he hath purchased with his blood) is no one word which can receive this person, he, but God; that therefore was mighty vain. He addes another answer, that is, that [God may be said to have acquired this Church with his blood, that is, with the blood of Christ, who was his, and whose blood was shed by his will] this answer of his when Smiglecius had overthrown with that reply, that, 
Refuted by Smigl●cius.  [by the same reason the blood of Bullocks and Calves might be called the blood of God which were shed by the will of God] which Argument is of force against that exception o● Ochinus; for if it were therefore called God's blood because shed by his will, than all blood, that is shed by his will, may be called the blood of God; for where is the reason of any thing, there that thing is also; Therefore Valentinus Smalcius, a great Socinian, 
To whom Sm●lcius replies having either not read or not aright understood Ochinus.  in his answer to Smiglecius, de divina verbi incarnatione, Cap. 24. although he will not undertake to defend Ochinus, and indeed seems not to have read him (although he might as well have owned the Title of these Opinions, as Socinus) yet he endeavor's to refute Smiglecius thus; [For (saith he) Ochinus may say, that he did no● say, that Christ's blood was called God's, only because it was shed by the will of God, but for the redemption of us, by the will of God, which the blood of Bullocks and Calves could not be said to do;] thus he; bu●, first, he was mistaken in Ochinus, for he writ nothing but the words I have set down, and therefore could not say, he said so, whatsoever he meant. Secondly, if he had said so, as it seems Smalcius doth, it had not been material, for which way could the offering that blood, for our redemption, appropriate it to God? it might by that reason have been called our blood, because offered for us; but there is no Colour why the offering for us should entitle God to it, by any particular interest. But Ochinus give's a third answer [I can also say, (saith he) that Christ was God by participation, and that in a more excellent manner, than any other of the Elect] This answer of his I find deserted by all the Socinians, 
O●hinus deser●●d by the Socinians.  who allow Christ to be God, but not the great God the Creator, but a man deified, and a God by office, for which those qualifications enabled him; but here the Church, which they were to feed, being acknowledged to be the Church of the great God, they must not fly to a God by participation, but get some other shift. Valentinus Smalcius, where before, 
Smalcius attempts in vain to evacuate the divinity of Christ.  therefore bestowe's that Chap. to expound this place, so as the Divinity of Christ may be avoided; first than he saith that [it is agreed on, who is meant by God in this text, we, the true and chief God, he and his part, the father, because he only is the true and chief God] thus far he speaks true, of both our opinions; but now he is mistaken, when he saith [we agree both, that God the father may be said to have acquired his Church with his blood, only by a figurative speech] first he is mistaken in this, when he saith, that Smiglecius (against whom he writes) should say, that God the father acquired this Church with his blood; for although it were true, that God, who was the father, yet not in the person of the Father, but of the Son, they being both one and the same God. Secondly, he is mistaken in saying, that this was figuratively understood, when indeed it is, as the Text speaks most properly, affirmed of the Son, in whose person the humanity of Christ was taken: that it was acquired or purchased with his own proper blood. He goes on, because (saith he) the whole blood of Christ was, by a singular reason, God's; as Christ himself is called the lamb of God, so the blood of this Lamb may be called rightly the blood of God; and although this manner of speech is not familiar and common in the Scriptures; yet is it not absurd or false] I reply: this manner of speaking is not only unusual, but not found in Scripture, nor (I think) in any other Author of reputation, and is absurd and false; for, certainly, that manner of speaking is absurd and false, which expresseth another thing then what was intended, which this must, if it should mean by the blood of God, the blood of one who was not God, although belonging to God, and, as I m●y spe●k●, Gods, and not Gods; resemble the case in any other thing; I have a Dog (and, because I will make the instance without exception) I set this Dog at a Sheep; the Dog with his Teeth kill's this Sheep; I may truly say, my Dog killed this Sheep; nay, I can say, because I was the Author of it, that I killed the Sheep, but I cannot say I killed the Sheep with my Teeth, unl●sse I had worried the Sheep with mine own Teeth, but I did it with my Dog's, for although the Dog was mine, and his Teeth were mine out of the same interest; yet they were not mine, but my Dog's Teeth; so in all Sacrifices, the beast which was Sacrificed was his beast, for whom it was offered; and the blood was his, as a part of that beast; but yet neither was it in its self, nor was it ever called the man's blood, but the Calve's the Goate's, etc. nor should any man hear these words, purchased by a man's blood, but he would conceive, that that man spilt his blood for that thing; the reason of that is, that whatsoever is a part of another, whether essential, as soul and body, form and matter; or integral, as eye, hand, foot, root, branch, or the like, these have all of them a relation to their whole in themselves and in the usage of their names, and therefore these applications of them cannot be made to any other but their own correlative, without some addition to expound it, as thus; my servant is mine, his Soul and body, bound to serve me; yet, when ●e dies, I cannot say, my Soul left me, for this word Soul intimate's a relation to that body which it animated or ensouled (as I may speak) nor, what that Soul desire's, or hate's, that my Soul desire's or hate's, or the like. So when my horse is blind, I cannot say, that my eyes have lost their sight, because this phrase, mine eyes, relate's to mine own body, of which they are an integral part, and this other not so; the same may be said of my blood; and therefore this learned man, seeing his answer weak, out of the usage of speeches (although perhaps he did not discern the reason) ●all's into passion, and crye's out, [It is better to use this figurative manner of speech, most easy to understand, then to introduce a thing not only absurd, but blasphemous, unto Christian religion, to say, that that one and chief God should have blood, etc.] I forgive his passion, but grieve, to see so much zeal, if not fury, bestowed upon so ill a Cause; for we do not say, that God had blood, as God, but as manhood was united to the divinity in the same person; that he, taking our nature, had it with all its Conditions, body and blood. I shall insist no farther upon this at this time.   

Sect. 3.  
Valentinus Smalcius urgeth out of Smiglecius a little further [this language is unheard of in Scripture, 
Christ●s blood not to be called the blood of the Father, according to Smiglecius.  that Christ's blood should be called the blood of the Father, or that we should be redeemed by the blood of God the Father, nay, if at any time our redemption be attributed to God the Father, than it is added, by Christ, or by his blood, but not by the blood of God the Father,] thus far Smiglecius; now let us observe Smalcius his answer, 
Smalcius that argue's how it may.  thus [this argue's only that the Language is unusual and rare, not that it is impossible and false; that which is rare and unusual may be most true, if it agree with the Analogy of Christian Religion, and may be excused (which, saith he, I have done above) neither doth any thing hinde●, but that that which is commonly properly used, that God by Christ, and his blood, acquired us, may, in one place, be improperly used that God the Father hath acquired us by his own blood] First, that which he affirmes, he hath done above, I conceive to be no more than that refuted exception he made to Smiglecius, that these Speeches might be affirmed of God, by reason that Christ was the Lamb of God, and therefore his blood, God's blood; or else what he spoke in the preceding Chapter, that it must be understood metaphorically, as Zacharie 2.8. he, that toucheth you, toucheth the Apple of mine eye; as likewise Math. 25.45. where our Saviour saith, in that ye did, or did not, these things to his little ones, ye did, or not did, them to him; the meaning is, 
His argument urged to the farthest by the Bishop.  that as God holds his servan●s so dear to him, that he esteeme's the demeanour used to them as done to himself; so these actions done by his dear ones (in which rank Christ was the chief) may be said to be done by him; when Christ shed his blood, than God the Father may be s●id to shed his, because done by one Dear, like himself, to him. I have pressed this Argument to the height, and indeed farther than he hath; and now consider how I shall acquit myself of it, which will be thus; I do not, nor do I think others can, 
Who finds the passions▪ not the actions of men to be called God's.  find the actions of men, called God's actions, although the passions are often; as thus, in that you did it to those, you did it to me; and so he toucheth the Apple of mine eye, of any one that toucheth his Servants; but actions not so, Math. 18.18. as whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in haven: here is a double act, on earth and in heaven; although God interested himself as much in that act of man's, as may be, yet he calls it not his own, but man's act; so likewise he expresseth it john 20.23. Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted; where is set down a twofold action or remission; now this expression is of an action, which he hath purchased with his blood; 
The shifting Genius of the Socinians de— luded by a single word.  and although there was never such a shifting Genius run through any sort of men as these Socinians, to avoid the sense of Scripture; yet, methinke's, this place is penned, as of purpose to delude their evasions; it hath stopped all their Mushes, and therefore it is put emphatically, with his own blood, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intimateth a peculiar propriety to that thing to which it is applied, appropriating it to God, distinct from other things; The answer of Smalcius is, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies no more than suus, his own, and so it is rendered by the vulgar latin, John 1.11. thus it is; but whether truth or no, there is the question; our English rendereth it much better, He came unto his own, and his own received him not; and although this word suus doth not enforce this more restrained and peculiar sense, yet it doth not deny it, but many times is used for it; and certainly, those in St. John were, in a most proper expression, called his, his friends, his kindred, his Servants, what you please of that kind: the same answer may pass to his second instance, which is taken out of the 1 Cor. 6.18. he who commits fornication 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated.  it is by the vulgar Latin translated suum, his body, but by our English much better, his own body; nor indeed can the blood of Christ God, be more his own, than a man's body is his own, and therefore, whatsoever Translators read, it is evident, that this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bear's the same sense every where; and it is remarkable, that these writers, who abhor that vulgar translation in an hundred places, should, in this, refuse the Original for it, upon no ground. He give's another answer [that the blood of Christ may be called the blood of God, although it do not naturally flow from the Father (we do not say, it is the blood of the Father, but of God) because, saith he, chiefly by a miraculous working of the Father, Christ had his blood] but can he show me where there is any such example, or phrase, in Scripture? I believe not; but he goes on with an instance out of Socinus, [Things (saith he) like blood, may be said to be belonging to one, which notwithstanding are not his naturally] I can grant all this, and it hurt's not this last phrase of being his properly, which his Text enforceth; but he instanceth 1 Cor. 6 20. (glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, 
The text, wh●ch vows it, retorted upon the Socinians.  which are Gods) but here is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the word enforcing the propriety; and consider that the Apostle taught the Corinthians, in the beginning of that verse, how to understand that language, that our Souls and bodies are God's; for, (saith he) you are bought with a price; because your Souls and bodies are bought with a price, therefore they are his, his by purchase, yours by nature: and this distinction in either part is put down evidently in the Text: Glorify God in your Soul, and body both which are their own naturally, which yet are his by redemption: nay I can urge this Text, emphatically, for the divinity of Christ: for if he bought us and paid a price for us, than we are h●s, and he, whose we are, is God, most express in the Text; him we must glorify whose we are, that is, God Christ's we are by redemption, therefore Christ is God; thus this Text, urged in one word, to avoid his divinity, proved by the former Text, in the words taken together, doth most clearly confirm it, and yet you see it is not to the purpose, for this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his own is not in the Text, but if it were, yet it might be so used, because our body and Spirit are expressed to be his by purchase, that is God-christs'; and in the Text, which I treat of, the blood of Christ, whom he terms God, is said to be the purchasing price: so that than man's body and Spirit are God's, but his purchase; and that, which they were purchased with, was the blood of God, Christ, his own blood in a most peculiar and proper acception. That our blessed Saviour was God then, appears from this place of Scripture. This Therm hath been handled by abundance; I love n●t actum agere, my design shall be to examine those great and chief names by which he is called in this relation.   

Sect. 4.  
The first is the Son of God, which Mr. Hobbes allowe's him to be, and therefore I might be brief in it; but, 
How Christ is the son of God.  because that this Term, Son, is variously used by Writers, I will somewhat insist upon that acceptation, which is most common, to explain what is intended by it; there is an adopted, and there is a natural Son, a Son which is indeed, and a Son taken into the room of him that is such a one, legally made a Son: the one is a Son begot, the other is made such; the real truly begotten Son is it, which we affirm of our Saviour; he is such a Son of God; we are adopted, made Sons. To know this we must first apprehend what a Son is: A Son is an intellectual substance, 
What a son is.  produced naturally of the same nature with the producer; the general nature is a Substance produced, but yet that very general Term distinguisheth a Son from a Father; for although amongst created things there is no Father which had not a producer, yet, the notion of a father intimates no such thing, and in the holy and blessed Trinity, the Father hath no producer nor origination from any; the rest is the difference; first [an intellectual substance] this distinguisheth it from the generation of beasts, plants, metals, fire, water, or the like, which properly cannot be called Sons of their producers; but if any one will desire that they be called Sons, I will not much contend, or gainsay it; it will no whit hurt my design: The next Term is, (produced naturally) This put's a difference betwixt a Son and arte facta, such things as are made by art: (of the same nature with the producer) This is the last term, and by this it is distinguished from all equivocal generations; and therefore a Worm cannot be said to be the Son of the Sun; for although it be produced naturally by the Sun, yet, it is of another nature, and by that reason is not a Son.   

Sect. 5.  

The particulars in the definition apply●ed to our Saviour.  Thus, the nature of a Son explained, let us examine how it may be applied to our blessed Saviour, the Son of God: first it is evident, and no man will deny, that our Saviour was an intellectual substance, and that he was produced; the chief query will be, upon these two last Clauses; whether produced naturally? and whether of the same nature? and first that he was produced naturally, that will appear out of this; that being produced by God the Father, as all agree, he must be either a Creature, or else naturally produced; indeed, taking naturally in a large sense, for whatsoever opposeth violence, a man may say, that a Creature is produced naturally, by God, because that no violence can force the omnipotent to do any thing; and the Creatures have imprinted in their very natures a passive obedience to God, by which they submit themselves to his sacred will; but in this place we understand naturally, in a more strict meaning, as it opposeth, not only violence, but arte facta, things made by art; for those things, which are done by the nature of any thing, are done primò et per se, not per accidens; of the nature, bend, and disposition of the agent, not because of any accidental addition, which happens to it: this is principally discerned b● the constancy of that action or motion, for when things are accidental, they appear seldom, and, many times, are not such, but things▪ or actions, that flow naturally from any, are so constantly, and, when opportunities are offered, are always such: so it is accidental to me, that I write at this time, I do not always do so, no, not when I am provoked by reading, or studying an untruth, no, not this self same untruth which I write against; but that I should eat meat at dinner, is a natural action, I always do it, unless some accidental thing intervene, to hinder it, and then, the not eating is accidental, but the eating were natural, because this last ariseth out of the disposition and temper of my body; the former, not eating, from some accidental distemper.   

Sect. 6.  
Now then, to show that our Saviour's generation, 
The mystery of our Saviour's divine & humane generation signified Mic. 5.2.  according to his divinity, was such, I shall handle that one place Mic. 5.2. But thou Bethlehem Ephratah, though thou be little amongst the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me, that is to be Ruler in Israel, whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting.  
My observations upon this Text are, 
The Bishop's observation on that Text.  first that it is spoke of our Saviour, this is evident out of that Mat. 2.6. where this Text is applied to him; And thou Bethlehem, in the land of Judah, art not the least amongst the Princes of Judah, for out of thee shall come a Governor that shall rule my People Jsrael. So likewise john 7.42. Hath not the scripture sa●d, tha● Christ cometh of the s●ed of D●vid, and out of the Town of Bethlehem, where David was? This is consented to ●y all; here then le● us consider, that that saying [cometh forth] is understood of his being borne at Bethlehem; this likewise is unquestioned, for aught I find; then let us meditate upon the last Clause, [whose going forth have been from of old, from everlasting;] there is no ●eason to think but that, as his coming forth, in the precedent part of the verse, did signify h●s birth according to his humanity: so this going forth from of old etc. should signify his birth according to his divinity; for these cannot be understood of that birth which was at Bethlehem, which the Prophet saith, shall be, which was acted long time after the Prophet's writing; but of something that was acted long before, which those words enforce, from of old, and from everlasting. Faustus Socinus, in his answer to Wic●us and Bellarmine Cap. 7. pag. 394. thus answers, hujus ipsius rationis vì concludi non solùm de vera nativita●e utrobique agi, s●d etiam de eadem, etc. That the force of this reason doth not only evince, that this is m●ant of a true nativity, but the same nativity: (observe his reason): for (saith he) the latter words, by which he means [come forth] coming from the same root, as the former, must signify the same thing, as they did in the former.] Thus he: but let me answer him; 
Faustus Socinus answered.  that although it did not only proceed out of the same root, but were the very self same word, and did signify the same act; yet, when the Tense is varied, it must needs signify a divers effect or result of that act as thus; the fire an hundred years hence shall warm a man; and the fire an hundred years ago hath warmed a man; here, though the warming be the same verb, and the object, a man, the same, yet, the Tense being varied, shall do it, and hath done it, the act must need's be varied.  
This is just our Case: he shall be born in Bethlehem, saith the Prophet; and his birth was, or hath been of old, etc. It is impossible, but that these must be spoke of two particulars; but Valkelius in his fifth book de vera religione, Cap. 12. pag. 473. give's an unnecessary stop here, saying, that [egression, or going forth is of a larger Scope, than Generation;] but besides that he yield's to the understanding it of Generation, 
And Valkelius.  a little after he must be evinced out of the Text, for egression or coming forth out of Bethlehem, was a nativity, therefore this must be so likewise; again, if this egression, here do not, in its genuine Sense, signify generation, yet it must needs suppose it, for nothing can go forth that is not; it must be before it go forth; therefore either eternal, without being generated; or else generated, before the motion or action of coming forth; both which are alike opposite to these Divines; besides this, I may urge, that it is a common phrase, in the language of Scripture, to say, that one, who is generated by another, cometh out of him; so Gen. 10.14. and Pathrusim and Casluhim out of whom came Philistim, that is, they begat Philistim, so Gen. 17.6. I will make nations of thee, and Kings shall come out of thee, that is, shall be generated by thee; in their degrees of their Generations, they shall be thy Issue. This language is so frequent, I need not instance in it; therefore although it were, and doth often signify something else; yet, it doth often, in Scripture language, signify this emanation, by generation, and for the reasons above must do so here; Socinus, where before quoted, proceedes, and says, that [because these two words, which signify the coming forth, or going forth, are derived from the same root, therefore they must signify the same birth; and therefore if Christ's birth were from eternity, he must be borne in Bethlehem from eternity, but, saith he, the Hebrew word signifies only a Diebus secul●, from the days of old or time] I will not trouble the English Reader with the Hebrew Criticism, which is done by others, and satisfactorily, that in this place it must be understood of eternity. To the first Argument, from the root, I have answered already to that; where he saith, the Hebrew word signifies not eternity; I answer, for the present, that I will not vex the English Reader with these unnecessary Hebrew Criticisms: there are divers have showed that it must be so understood in this place; his two instances out of Isaiah 52.9, 11. and Malachi 3.4. are of no force; for the first, he troubled me, because it was false printed, and truly urged by Valkelius, Isaiah 55.9, 11. in a word I grant, that word may be used for ancient times, or ages; but again, no Socinian can deny that it is used, likewise, for eternity, or before time; howsoever, it is of force against them, who hold our Saviour had no being, before he was borne of the blessed Virgin; and that he was not before, but long after the Prophet writ; but, saith Socinus, [it may be affirmed of his birth in Bethlehem, it was of old, or from everlasting, as he would read it, ab initio & a diebus saeculi must be understood thus, that he, who was to be a Governor, or Ruler in Israel, Suam originem trahere ab initio, & à priscis dìebus, id est, ab eo primo tempore, cum Deus olim in suo populo regem stabilivit, & confirmavit; quod revera caeptum est fieri in persona Davidis; that is, did draw his beginning, or derive his pedigree from the beginning or ancient times, that is, from that first time, when God heretofore established and confirmed his Kingdom, or his people, which was begun to be done in the person of David.  
To this purpose they speak all, Valkelius, Smalcius, etc. but although they have the greatest art of shifting of Scripture that ever men had; 
With other Socinians.  yet certainly it appears a miserable shift in this place; first, observe here, that there is in this sentence, [whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting] no word which in any place of the Bible is pretended to signify a Pedigree, or Series of Ancestors; if no where else, why should it be so here then? nay; here is not any one word, that by any interpretation, or wresting, can signify forefathers, which were before, but only the times in which they lived; if they will read it their own way, which is ab initio & priscis diebus, this can only intimate the time in which this egression was, not the person from whom it was. Next, consider that if this emanation, this egression, here, be understood of his birth in Bethlehem, that as Socinus disputed, our Saviour must be born there, when this was done in it, and yet he, Smalcius, Valkelius, all agree, it doth mean that egression, that Birth; but, Smalcius in tertiam partem Smig. Cap. 26. Pag. 224. saith, that [Socinus doth not say, that Christ was born in these ancient times, but that he said, Sed cum qui certo tempore nasci debuit ait ortum suum habere a progenitoribus antiquissimis, which is that he who should be born at a certain time had his original or rising from most ancient Progenitors,] I am sure Socinus doth say, that the word being derived from the same root, as I said before, must signify the same which it did before] and from that deduced that absurdity, that [if this phrase should be from eternity, Christ was borne in Bethlehem from eternity,] and that, which Smalcius speaks of, is a gross exposition, how this phrase of being from the beginning and in ancient times, should be applied to that birth of our Saviour's at Bethlehem; but the unreasonableness of this appears (besides my former reasons) in that there is not the least tending to such an expression out of this, that such a phrase added no distinct knowledge of this Ruler, which should be borne, more than was before; for every man had his rise from most eminent Progenitors, yea, but this was one born in Bethlehem; why all that were borne in Bethlehem must needs be so; yea, but this was descended ab initio, that is, from David, who was the beginning of that kingdom of Israel; so were many more, no doubt, who were borne in Bethlehem: In my judgement, this Text is the most wretchedly tortured by them, that ever any, when no one word in the Text ever else was used to that purpose; nor in this use is a man taught any thing which was not full in the Text before, which expressed his birth in Bethlehem.   

Sect. 7.  

The text taken in pieces and vindicated from their objections.  I will take every word apart, and vindicate it from their several Objections: first this word egressus, whose goings forth, as our English; their explication of this, is [that he came forth by the generation of his forefather, in particular of David,] I answer, that it is true, that a man may be said to come forth of another, who was long time before in him, as in our usual language, we express it, he descended from such Ancestors (I make their expression clearer than I find it in any of their Authors by this explication,) Nay, we can say, such a man's Son, when he shall be born, will be descended from an ancient family, from Kings and great Persons; but to say, he hath descended, before he is, can abide no answerable construction; but this is our consideration, the Text saith of him, who shall be borne in Bethlehem, but yet is not; that his goings forth have been from of old; now until a man is, he cannot be said, to have his going forth from of old; a man may say it will be; not that it hath been; and therefore, without doubt, this Text, speaking of the same person, which he said should be borne in Bethlehem [whose goings forth] we must understand by it something of that person which was in those ancient times, which can be nothing but our Saviour's divinity; but they object against this Phrase, that it is said goings forth, in the plural number; now according to true doctrine, our Saviour's divinity hath but one emanation, or egression, or going forth, therefore, say they, this cannot be understood of that egression. That our Saviour's Egression, according to his divinity, was but one, will easily be granted by us; but it is excellently observed by Hebricians, 
One in essence plurally expressed, when the effects are divers.  that the holy Ghost is usually pleased to express that which is but one in his essence, by a plural number, when the effest are divers. So Prov. 1.20. Wisdom (we read it] cryeth without, but in the Original it is in the plural number, wisdoms; without doubt the Wisdom of God is one only, as he is one, but the energies, the operations of this wisdom are many, in regard of which it is called wisdoms in that holy language; so likewise concerning the mercy of God Gen. 32.10. the least of thy mercies, when, without doubt, the mercy of God is one, but the operations of mercy are divers; multitudes of Instances might be given to this purpose; and this is the Case of our Saviour's divinity, the emanation, the going forth of it is but one, the operations are divers, and in regard of them it is called goings forth. God's eternal purpose to make man; to forgive him, for Jesus Christ's sake; to work man's redemption by him; to judge the world at the last day by him; these are operations of the eternal emanation of the Son of God; and because these are divers, this going forth of his, which is one, is put in the plural number, goings forth. Again, because I will show that these words, in their own Language, can confute nothing of our Doctrine; conceive with me then that these goings out may be understood of the manifestation of his eternal going out to us. So we say the sun shined oftentimes; 
Christ's eternal egression compared to the shining of the Sun.  this or that day, when we know that the shining of the Sun is nothing but an emission and sending forth his light; which act being a proper passion of the Sun, we know its shining out to have been ever since the Sun was created; but because this blessed act of the Sun is often impeded and hindered from manifesting its self to us, by Clouds or such impediments, therefore we say it shines, only when those Clouds are removed, and that shining, which is always actu exercito, always in operation, hath this operation only then manifested to us; and these shinings of the Sun, in this respect, are said to be many, in Consideration of those various manifestations, although in its own nature it be but one; thus this eternal egression, going forth of the Son of God, although it be but one in its self, yet, in respect of its manifestations to us by Moses and the Prophets, it may, in the plural number, be said to be egr●ssions, many: and yet give me leave to add this, that unless the Sunshine had its being, it could not have those many egressions and manifestations to us: So unless our Saviour had had a being of old or in the beginning, he could not be said to have many egressions: but yet, methinks, I am not full enough in my expression, for taking the words as they require, they may say, that these egressions were not ab initio, or principio, for the egressions, or rather manifestations of his egressions were not made in the beginning; if I should take beginning, as they do, for the beginning of David's reign, they had their answer, but if principium must be the reading, as we require, and indeed is countenanced by both Vatablus, Tremelius, and the Septuagint, let it be then from the beginning; we will distinguish then of a twofold egression of our Saviour, eternal, from the father, and temporal, to us, in his manifestation, to the world in his Creation, in his Prophets, in his providence, and in this sense the Divinity of our Saviour hath divers egressions, and these were a principio, and à diebus seculi, from the beginning, and in ancient days.   

Sect. 8.  
From the beginning] here is not a word, which they do not make a quarrel at; they are like such a man, who should make a Scarecrow, and then throw stones at it; 
How from the beginning may signify from eternity.  or build a Castle in the air, and then shoot at it: first they make the words of a Sentence what they will, and then quarrel with us that it will not abide our sense; in particular it is so here: they say it must be read, a principio, or ab initio, and then they object that eternity hath no beginning, nor end, and therefore it cannot be understood of an eternal emanation, or egression or going forth: well, let it be granted, that eternity hath no beginning, nor end, which is most true; let it be granted, that what we read from of old, is best read, from the beginning, which is not necessary; yet, the Consequence is false, for that eternity, which is God himself, is the beginning of all temporal things; so that from the beginning is, from eternity. This word beginning hath a twofold Consideration in this, as it is that point, or instant, in which any line, 
A twofold consideration of the word Beginning.  or time, begins to be; or else for that external point, or instant, from which that point, or instant took its rise; thus we say, a horse began to run, from that instant in which the sign was given; so we say, it began to be dark, from such an hour; and indeed in all language, 
A or Ab often denote causation●, etc.  used by men, these prepositions, à or ab are used most genuinely to intimate the ultimum quod non, that instant in which the motion, action, or th●ng spoke of, was not, which in our particular, must needs be Eternity; Again, I entreat the Reader to observe with me, that these prepositions à or ab do not always signify the Terms, or points and instances, but very oft the causations and the essence, out of which another comes: so we say, the Son comes from the Father; the heat from the fire; the light from the Sun; now, in this sense, likewise, à principio, from the beginning, that is (from whose goings forth have been of old) as they, from the beginning, from God, as from the beginning, which is eternity, which is God likewise. Thus all things square evenly with our conceit. I will next examine how it can agree with their exposition; [From the beginning, say they, is to be understood from the beginning of David's reign, for this word Beginning is to be applied to the matter precedent, as if it were, from the beginning of this buisiness which is now treated of, and that was (as is evident) the rule and government of Israel, as is evident out of the former part of this verse thus Socinus, where before cited, 
From the beginning, not to be understood, from the beginning of David's reign.  and Valkelius, and for assurance they produce those places before mentioned, Isa. 51.9, 11. and Mal. 3.4. Now he, that will consider those two places, shall find that the connexion so leads them, that they must needs intimate some former time, not eternity; but can any man show me a place where beginning, put absolutely, doth signify any of those ancient times, and not that which was absolutely the beginning of all? I am persuaded, no man can, for, if they could, these men would have done it, who are most industrious for their own ends; but then, suppose this were granted, which ought not to be, that this word beginning may abide such interpretation, what would follow? what egressions, what goings forth, can they show me to be before he was born at Bethlehem? yes, they say, out of his forefather David; no say I, the Chick did not go forth of the egg, much less out of the hen, until it was a Chick; the Son did not go forth from his Father, until he was; the shining had no egression out of the Sun, until that shining had its existence, being necessary to all these actions; and therefore if our Saviour had no existence before his birth at Bethlehem, he could not go forth before; and indeed a man, who consider's their exposition concerning David, and our Saviour's manner of going forth, by having him, according to his humanity, his Father, may say, that his goings forth were before the beginning, which yet were a most strange speech, for he came forth of Judah, Jacob, Isaak, Abraham, Adam, etc. which were before David; but, as I have said, this might be affirmed of him, after he was born, that he did come out of those progenitors, according to his humanity, or, before he was born, 
The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto.  that he should go forth of them; but to say, before he was born, that his goings forth, according to that humanity, which should be born afterwards, were long before this prophecy, this is a Contradiction in adjecto, it is inconsistent; as if I should say, the Chick, that will be hatched a twelvemonths hence, hath come out of such a hen two or three years past; these are impossibilities to be used in the same breath, or, as I may speak, the same verse, the same sentence, to speak in regard of the same thing, of the same person, that he shall go forth of Bethlehem hereafter; and that he hath gone forth long before.   

Sect. 9  

God's descent to man's capacity in the doctrine of his attributes.  Well, I will write no more of this Term, from the beginning: I come now to the last Term, a diebus Seculi, from the days of age; they quarrel at every thing; This (say they) cannot be spoken of eternity, for eternity hath no day's, but is totum simul, without distinction of days; this hath been answered many times; that since the infinite excellencies of God are such, that man, with his weak and finite understanding, cannot comprehend them in their proper notions, he is pleased to veil that glory with such Clouds as man may behold somewhat of him, in part, as the Apostle speaks, darkly, like the Sun behind a Cloud; and in this manner he teacheth all his Attributes, which is well known, and consented to, by Divines; and in this manner he teacheth his eternity. 
Particularly that of his eternity.  So Psalm▪ 102.27. thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end; if he have years, he hath days, one as well as another; so likewise job 10.5. Are thy days as the days of man? are thy years, as man's days? there days are attributed, because man is acquainted with no duration which is not successive; therefore God is pleased to express himself in such a manner as man is capable of learning him by; whence, as it is evident in other God's glorious Attributes, so▪ in this very particular, eternity is used to be expressed by his own pen, in such a language as here, by days, and therefore may abide that sense here; for their expression of David, that his were the days of age, or time, which were meant here; The Arguments before alleged are of strength against it; likewise, he could not be said to go forth, when he was not, if he had no other being but his humanity, which was born long after at Bethlehem.   

Sect. 10.  
And, to conclude my handling this Argument, I will touch one Argument of Ochinus from this place, and, 
The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishop.  the rather, because the book is not in every man's hand; in his 19 Dialogue, which is the first of his second book, he makes the interlocutors himself, who act's the part of an Orthodox man, and Spiritus, which, I conceive, he would have reputed to be some holy Spirit, which should instruct Ochinus better; well then, in my edition put out at Basil 1563, (I know not whether there be any other, unless some pieces in English, translated by an English Lady, long since,) page 136. Ochinus bring's this place, I have discoursed on, [Micheas quoque de Christo loquens, Micheas, speaking of Christ, when he had said, he should arise out of Bethlehem, addes this, whose Original was ancient, from eternal times. In which he shows, that he always, and from eternity, was begotten of the Father,] to which Spiritus answere's, that [this may be spoken of some Spirit created by God before all creatures, that is, from the beginning; and from the days of time, that is, Olympia, heretofore, and before time, or age (Saeculo is his word) yet not ab aeteruo, from eternity] the Spirit answere's so, that Photinianisme, and Socinianism, which conceive that Christ had no being before that at Bethlehem, is confuted, by this Text; but, the Spirit was an Arian, who held that Christ was a Creature, according to a Spiritual being, made before the world. Ochinus therefore presseth him again, [yea, saith he, this Text is spoken of an eternal generation of the Son, therefore he said, Origines, goings out in the plural number, that it might express how continually, and always, he proceede's, in the individual moment of eternity, which cannot be said of that created Spirit. Moreover in Zachary God calle's Christ his Companion, etc.] hear the Spirit leave's Ochinus his Argument, and only falle's upon that place in Zachary; and I am of opinion, the Spirit was at a loss, and therefore will enlarge my Conceit a little upon Ochinus his Argument; 
Who enlargeth upon the Argument against the Photinian or Socinian, and the Arian.  first, it is goings forth, that in the words before signifye's his birth at Bethlehem; why should it not be so here? Creation was never termed a going forth; it can be nothing then but generation. Then consider, against the Arian, and this Arian Spirit (for I suppose all that I can find in the Socinian confuted) that this going forth was before the world was created, out of what must he go forth? there was nothing but God, he must go forth, therefore, out of him; again, consider, that God is eternal, unchangeable, whatsoever goes forth of him must be eternal likewise, or else there must be a change in him; and therefore this must be eternal, as Ochinus urged, and his Spirit never answered. Again, it is in the plural number, (goings forth in the days of Eternity) this cannot be understood of any but an eternal emanation: all other goings forth have an end, when they are gone forth, and they cannot go forth again, unless they return back to the place, from whence they came; but that which goes forth eternally, went forth yesterday, to day, and a thousand days ago, days without number, and will be so afterwards; and, in that respect, it may be goings forth▪ i● all the days and moments of eternity; but yet a man may object, that all this is but one going forth; it is true, but yet, that one contayne's in it ten hundred thousand goings forth, like that Sun which perpetually shine's forth its light, that emanation or going forth of light is one continued Act, yet measuring it by days, or time, it hath divers goings forth, according to divers days, in which it shined, yesterday, the other day, etc. so may I say of this eternal emanation, or going forth, of the Son of God, from his Father, it was one eternal egression or going forth; but measuring it by days, as it is here, it was an hundred thousand, his goings forth were in the days of age or time, as they, or of eternity, as we read it. Thus I conceive, that the errors of the Photinian, or Socinian, and the Arian, are both convicted out of this, and it is proved, that our Saviour had not only a being, before his birth at Bethlehem, but from all eternity; this by the way of egression or emanation▪ not by creation only, which was as natural to his spiritual and true being, as his birth at Bethlehem to his humane nature and name. Having, out of this one place, showed, that the egression of the Son was natural, I could enlarge myself, upon an explication of the last Clause of my definition, to show, that the Son of God is of the same nature with his Father; for having showed how his coming from the Father is by emanation, egression, not like a thing by force, or made to set him out a perfect Son, there is no more required but to prove, how he is of the same nature with the Father; but I love brevity, not to tyre the Reader with the least unnecessary line, because that this will result out of the exposition of those other names, which are given our Saviour in Scripture, I shall knock off from this, and, by explaining them, hope to stop two gaps with one bush.    

CHAP. XXXII.  
Of our Saviour's being the Word; Of Ebion and Cerinthus; The Socinian shifts; Of Christ's speaking by figures; His being the Word by none; The division of it by internal and external; The ancient Philosopher's language consonant to that in holy Scripture about the Word; Who excelled the Socinians in the knowledge of eternal life; With whom God in Saint joh. 1. is but an Appllative; Each particular in which Text is discussed by the Bishop.  

Sect. 1.  
THE next name, that I shall undertake to treat of, is that of (Word) Our Saviour is termed the word; 
The next name of our Saviour, the Word.  and herein I shall treat upon the first part of the first chap. of S. John's Gospel, which because it is of high concernment in the setting forth of this Truth, Socinus, besides those many several places, in which he hath touched upon it, hath written a distinct Comment upon it; So hath Valentinus Smalcius; I shall consider them both in my Treatise upon this Scripture; and whatsoever else I find by them, other where, or any other, pertinently objected▪ to begin then with Socinus in his explication of the first part of the first chap. of john, 
Socinus answered in his Explication of St. John Ch. 1.  put out in Octavo at Racovia 1618. presently after his preface, pag. 4. [Primum itaq (saith he) quicquid de Ebione & Cerinthio vulgò ostentatur; First (saith he) whatsoever is commonly boasted of concerning Ebion and Cerinthus, against whom, as if they denied Christ to have been before his mother, John writ his Gospel, it shall be judged a figment; for, besides that there is no solid thing brought in its proof, there are not lacking efficacious reasons, which constrain us to think the contrary] Thus far he; I will draw his reasons short and answer them; but before he undertake's his reasons he bring's his surmise, why men were of another opinion from him, such as which he cannot answer satisfactorily, but in this place put's off; that they understand not the sense of the Scripture; but I let this discourse alone; his first reason, why this opinion of St. John's Gospel should be false, is page 6. first [that the opinion of Ebion and Cerinthus, was much other (if Ebion were a certain man) and i● so declared by all our Age, and in former ages; 
The opinion of Ebion and Cerinthus discussed.  or if we credit Irenaeus a most ancient Writer, who, recording the doctrines of either, doth not so much as show that doctrine, that they should deny, that Christ, the word of God, was before Mary; yea, when he mentions Cerinthus, he speaks the clean contrary.] I love not to trouble the Reader with the vanity of citing Authors; for the clearing of this story, I shall set down what Irenaeus speaks only; and first for the opinion of Cerinthus, his words are clear; in his first book Chap. 25. speaking of Cerinthus, he addes that [Jesus was not borne of a Virgin, but that he was born of Joseph and Mary, as all other men; after his baptism Christ descended into him, from that Principality which is above all, etc.] So that here I observe a double nature which Cerinthus conceived to be in our Saviour, a manhood, which he called Jesus, begotten by Joseph on Mary; and something above a manhood, which he called Christ, which, not until he was thirty years old, came into him at his baptism: that Jesus suffered, as he speaks a little after, but Christ did not, being spiritual. Thus you see ●renaeus his expression concerning Cerinthus; where you may observe that he allowe's our Saviour no being before he was borne of Mary, as he terms her; for although he grant's him an additional after his baptism, by the descending down of Christ unto him; yet that person had no being before, and that additional was long after his birth of the blessed Virgin; and it is not expressed that he thought that Christ, which came into Jesus, had any being before that coming down; And Tertullian adversus haereticos Num. 312. affirmes of Cerinthus, that he said, [Christ was only a man, without Divinity] to which that of Irenaeus well enough agrees; I quote Tertullian now in Pamelius his edition, 1617. So that there, it seems, that Cerinthus, concerning our Saviour's Divinity, had the same opinion with Socinus. Well, to go on with the story of Cerinthus, he was a man of a most turbulent Spirit; Epiphanius saith, he was the man that raised the charge against St. Peter at Jerusalem, 
Epiphanius contra haeret. tom. 2. cap. 28  for communicating with the Gentiles, Acts 11. in the Case of Cornelius; as likewise, that he raised the tumult against St. Paul, about Circumcision, with a whole leaf of such schismatical practices of his; for they say, he was a Jew by his Father, and so stood, still, for the privileges of their Nation, and the observation of their Rites; upon this ground the loving Spirit of St. John, justly abhorred him, and therefore, as Irenaeus in his third Book, and third Chapter, there are some who have heard Polycarpus report, etc. (which Polycarpus was constituted, Bishop of Smyrna, by St. John, as Irenaeus, Eusebius, and all agree, and that Angel of the Church of Smyrna, which St. John writ to, Apocalypse 2.8.) he, said Irenaeus (who, himself had seen Polycarpus) reported, that St. John, going to wash himself in the Bath at Ephesus, saw Cerinthus, and presently hasted out again, unwashed, saying, that he might fear the Bath would fall, where was that enemy of the Truth Cerinthus; so that here you see two things, that the Opinion of Cerinthus was much the same with that of the Socinians; that this Cerinthus was abhorred by St. John, not as a man, but as an enemy to truth; so that St. John, hating his opinions, might be reasonably thought to provide against them; and all this evident out of that most ancient Author, which Socinus himself quotes; now let us see, de facto, what was done: The same Author, Irenaeus, in his eleventh Chapter of his third Book, somewhat before the middle of that Chapter, affirmes in express terms, that St. John was willing, by his declaring the Gospel, to take away the error of Cerinthus; than which we could have nothing more clear, a most Authentic Author affirming it, upon most just and reasonable grounds; Socinus then said too much, when he affirmed, that it was far from all reason, that Saint John should write against Ebion and Cerinthus; here we see the contrary, as much as it is possible for story to give; but he dispute's again against it page 7. Deinde versimile non est, etc. Moreover it is not likely that John would pass over so great a matter so slightly with silence, but that he would name the haeretiques, or at the least their haeresy, either secretly, or openly, and detest it; which since he hath not done, why did he not somewhere clearly say, that Christ was by nature God and Man, or that he existed before he was born of Mary? why did he affect to be so obscure and sparing, in a thing of so great moment, the ignorance whereof bring's eternal destruction, etc. thus far he; I will not undertake to understand all the Apostle's reasons, but am confident, he had abundance of reason for all he did, but will answer all he saith; first that the Scripture seldom set's down the haeretiques or haeresyes against which it writes, although sometimes it doth. Secondly, to that he saith the Apostle doth not clearly witness that Christ was by nature God and Man, or existed before he was born of Mary, I shall show him that he hath, in as clear terms, as possibly could be, although not in the same; and I am confident, 
The shifts of the Socinians.  that had he expressed this Mystery in those very words he set's down, he and his Companions would have cavilled at them, that those Terms are used otherwise in some places; that there was some Copy, or other, without one of them, or all; that they did relate to something before, or behind, and not to Christ; which are their usual evasions; but it is a vanity of them to teach the Apostle how he should express himself, he hath done it abundantly, and as clearly, as those words would do, as we shall see shortly.   

Sect. 2.  

St. Iohn's ●eason of his writing not solitary, as Socinus allegeth.  But he urgeth farther, that [St. John give's this and no other reason, towards the end of his Gospel, John 20.31. Cur Jesus signa, (I translate it) why he writ the Miracles of Jesus or (as others would have it) his whole history, then that we should believe that Jesus is Christ, the Son of God, and, believing that, we should have life eternal.] I will not trouble his lection which is very erroneous, but let the Reader observe, that although St. John say, that this was the cause why those things, which he writ, were written; yet he useth not that phrase put upon him by Socinus, this & non aliam and no other; but suppose he had, this will serve our design, for all we labour for, is to prove, that our Saviour is the Son of God; it is true, these troublesome men have brought distinctions of the Son into natural and adopted; and the like; but that he is such a Son, as believing of which we may have eternal life, can be conceived nothing less, then that he must be the natural Son, of the same nature with his Father; all other belief, I doubt, will fall short of that excellency; and therefore, Beza, most genuinely, 
Beza's genuine lection.  according to the Original (which prepose's an Article both to Christ and the Son) read's it thus, That ye should believe that Jesus is that Christ, that Son of God; which Emphasis doth exceedingly much elevate the Conceit of him, showing him to be an extraordinary Christ, and an extraordinary, not merely an adopted, Son; which all his Servants are here bound to believe; so that, it seems, St. John writ this Gospel to show, that our Saviour was, in some eminent and peculiar way, the Son of God; 
Socinus rigula● in his▪  that which he addes, that believing in him we might have eternal life, is an absolute avoiding a strong Argument to prove his Godhead; for although I think by life here is meant eternal life; yet in the Original there is no word of eternity, but it is word for word, as it is in our English [ye might have life] through his name, or in his name, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, his power, his strength, which none could grant, but the great God; and truly I wonder where he got that translation, for it is without the Original, nor Beza, nor Erasmus, nor Montanus, nor any, that I see, 
But for a little consonance with Tremelius.  but something like it Tremelius his translation out of the Syriac, and yet he reserve's that Emphasis, which I make use of, and renders it thus, and when ye shall believe, ye shall have life eternal by his name, the force of which last phrase, by his name, was clean omitted by Socinus; so than it seems to me, that if St. john did here, in these words, put down the total reason of his writing this Gospel (which can never be evinced) yet in this is clearly taught this Conclusion of our Saviour's divinity, and that he was the Son of God; nor could ever man have understood it in any other sense than we do, until that foolish conceit of a created God was introduced, of which (God willing) I intend to treat hereafter. Thus I hope I have given a satisfactory answer to his objections against the story of Cerinthus, which one thing granted, the expressions of the rest would be undoubtedly very perspicuous.   

Sect. 3.  
So now at the last, I will address myself to my business, the first Chap. of St. John verse 1. In the beginning was the word, etc. there is scarce any one word in these fourteen or fifteen verses, which I intent (God willing) to expound, that hath not abide some slur, or other, to discountenance the true sense of it; I shall begin with the first word, In the beginning, [This (say they with one consent) is understood of the beginning of the Gospel, 
How the Socinians interpret, Joh. 1.1.  which, (say they) was when John Baptist begun to preach,] so Socinus, where before, at the bottom of page 13. and page 14. In principio erat verbum, In the beginning was the Word, that is, Christ the Son of God, in the beginning of the Gospel, to wit, in that time in which John Baptist began to recall the Israelitish people to the right; and before that, by the preaching of the Baptist, he was known to the Jews, he was, and he was designed by God to this Office (that is) of manifesting his will] thus far Socinus; and by this we see his conceit to be, that in the beginning, 
With re●erence to the Baptist's preaching.  was in the beginning of the Baptist's preaching, then was Christ, the word which was man; he wonder's much, up and down, that men should conceive that St. John should write such mysteries of Christ's essence, according to his divinity, where indeed, we think, he makes him write the unreasonable things of his humanity that ever could have been conceived to be expressed by such phrases, to understand which I must trespass a little farther upon the Reader's patience, to consider what these writers mean by this term (Word) which Socinus and from him, the rest express thus.   

Sect. 4.  
That [it is a figurative expression and is meant of Christ in his Office, not his divine nature; figurative; and so it is either a Metaphor drawn from the similitude Christ hath with our Words; 
Their Metaphor.  for as our Words express our minds to those we converse withal, so Christ expressed the Will of God to men; Secondly, by a Metonymy, 
And Metonymy.  because Christ is the Author of that word which most eminently aught to be called such, because it is more profitable, and more excellent than all other, therefore (saith he) as Christ sometimes useth a Metaphor, calleth himself a vine, a Shepherd, a gate, because he might most fitly be compared to these, and now speaking Metonimycally, he saith, he is the truth, the life and the resurrection, because he is the Author and cause of these, so here, etc.] thus far he; in which he and they have taken a great deal of pains to raise mud in, and darken this clear stream.   

Sect. 5.  
To which I shall say first, that these figures are often used by Christ, 
Figures never used by Christ, without intimation how the text is to be understood.  and such expressions under the notions of Divinity more clearly intelligible; but when they are used by him, he give's some intimation to his Auditor how he shall understand them figuratively only, either in that place, or some other; otherwise a man would hardly assent to him in any but a literal sense. There are abundance of other such like names affirmed of our Saviour, besides those particularly specified by him in this place, all which to handle would require a Volume: I will not therefore engage upon them, but these, he instanceth in now, I will touch upon, that by them the rest may be discerned: First than he calls himself a vine, 
So that of a vine.  John 15.1. I am the true vine, that is, I am like a true vine, a true, not a false vine, which looks like a vine, but is not a true vine, that may be confided in, which will bring forth fruit, and not deceive the husbandman: now that ye may discern the similitude, observe, he addes, my Father is the husbandman, and so goes on with the branches: which evidently show that it is a Similitude. For the second, John 10.11. I am the good shepherd, 
A Shepherd.  he explain's it immediately, a good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep, and so along in that chapter he shows how his sheep are righteous, which makes it apparent that it was a Similitude. Again, his last Metaphor is used in the same chapter, ver. 7. I am the Door of the sheep; 
A Door.  we see he was the shepherd, and he is the door, in a divers sense; as he is the door, he admit's, and shut's out: now these things are so apparent, that the words all about them express them to be Similitudes; if not, a thousand places of Scripture might teach us, that he could not otherwise be a Wooden door; or a vine, that is, a plant; or a shepherd, such as a country- shepherd, whose sheep were beasts. Now let us examine his Metonymy: He saith, he is the truth, life, 
His Metonymies of being the Truth, Life, and Resurrection, etc.  resurrection; two of these I find in one sentence in the 14. of this Gospel the 6. I am, saith our Saviour, the way, the truth, and the life: Truth and Life are his instances; our Saviour having told the Disciples ver. 4. Whither I go, ye know, and the way ye know: Thomas answered, Lord, we know not whither thou goest, how can we then know the way? Jesus answered to this, I am the way, the truth, the life; in this word, the way, no doubt but there may be both those figures he speaks of; a Metaphor first, for as a way is that Middle place which is between the two Terms (à quo and ad quem) from whence, and whither, participating of both and leading whither a man tends; so our Saviour, God and man, participating of both the extremes, heaven and earth; and Man, walking a long by him, shall come to heaven; next we may observe a Metonymy, he was the way, because by his word he direct's us the way; because by his life he hath trod it out for us; and by his graces he help's us to walk in it; and this is apparent to any man who shall consider how impossible it is, for Christ to be a way, a trodden path of ground; or how impossible it is for any such way to lead to the Journeys end, which he aimed at.  
The second Term which is mentioned by Socinus is Truth, 
The Truth and life may be taken without a figure.  and for this I may say that I doubt whether there be any figure necessary; for Christ, as God, being Truth itself, he must needs likewise be verax, true speaking, as well as verus; and if he should deceive or misguide in the way, he should go against his nature, and deny himself, as St. Paul phraseth it, 2 Tim. 2.13. now I can justly say that here is no figure; or, if any, it is but this, which the context exact's, I am the way, by directing you to it, and that an infallible one, which no man can be deceived by, for I am truth its self, which makes good all I have said; and the same I may speak of his last Term (Life) I may justly affirm that there needs be no figure in it; Christ is the life, there is an Article to every Term, life its self, life in the fountain; all other lives are Peter, Paul's, a horse's or dog's life, but he is life its self, life in the fountain, like light in the Sun, much more glorious than any other; therefore thou, who seekest life, life eternal, which is the journey's end of every man, must come by the way which I appoint who am Truth; and come to me, and thou shalt have it. I know as he is life in the fountain, and so may be understood; so he may be a life to us, and called our life, the life of men, of which hereafter, both as an efficient, and an object; as an efficient producing that life; as an object, that life of ours consisting in the beatifical vision of the most sacred and blessed Trinity; but I see no necessity forcing me to this second exposition; but if so the context leads to it, I think I may run through Twenty more, and certainly there are Twenty more, such speeches; but we shall find that there is something in the matter of the discourse, or in the Circumstances of the Text, which induce to it; but in that I have in hand nothing to persuade any man that this Term (word) should be understood according to any of those figures.   

Sect. 6.  

Christ called the Word, according to none of those figures.  Socinus saith, it is used now here in Scripture, but in the writings of this Evangelist; so my search need not be far; in this place of the Gospel in his first Epistle Chapter 1. Verse 1. that which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen, with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the word of Life, etc. here is no Circumstance inducing us to search a sense, that merely a man should be called the word, but rather the contrary, something divine, to which that humanity was united, because (as here) it was from the beginning; and because, in the second Verse, that life, of which this is called the word, is termed eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested to us, was eternal, and with him, he must therefore be eternally with him, this was afterwards manifested to us. A third place is Rev. 19.13. his name is called the word of God; where I can find again nothing to that sense, but in each place of these, this Term, word, may most aptly be understood, 
But according to the Catholic sense is the internal Word of God.  according to the Orthodox Catholic sense, for the internal word of God; nor indeed can they show me any thing like it in Scrirture. Let a man conceive with himself what a strange uncouth phrase it is for a man, who speaks, to be called the word, which he speaks; yet so must he in their language.   

Sect. 7.  
Yea, but they have just such another fetch; 
How Aaron was Moses' mouth.  Aaron is is said, Exodus 4.16. to be Moses his mouth; the phrase is clean otherwise, and is excellently rendered by our Translators, instead of a mouth, because Moses had not a clear utterance; the second Instance is that, 
John Baptist called a voice.  john Baptist is called a voice; for my part I think it a reasonable exposition to say, that john Baptist was rather he that made the noise and voice in the Wilderness, than the voice its self; to which purpose let us look upon the 40. of Isaiah, verse 3. from whence that Text is made use of, by three Evangelists; we shall find there, that the Prophet, like a man in a rapture, seems to hear this noise or voice in the Wilderness, and here thinks what he heard; he saw in his vision john Baptist in a Wilderness, fitting and preparing men for the Gospel; but the voice he heard was the v●ice of john Baptist, who did preach that Doctrine there specified; I know but one objection of moment can be framed against this, which is that john 1.23. when john had been asked, who art thou? he answered, I am the voice, etc. as saith the Prophet Isaiah; to this, first it is memorable, that in the Original it is not, I am, but only (ay) it is thought by many that this Word I am aught to be understood, but if it be not, than he doth not affirm himself to be the voice, but only leave's them to apprehend what he is, by the Prophet Isaiah; but if it be, and that we should read it, as it is commonly (I am) yet since he quotes the Prophet, I know no reason why it should be understood in a sense differing from the Prophets, especially since the two other Evangelists, which mention this place, have not one word of this I am; St. Matthew 3.3. for this is he which was spoken of by the Prophet Isaiah, the voice of one crying in the Wilderness; so likewise St. Luke 3.4. having before delivered, how he preached the Baptism of Repentance, addes, as it is written, in the Book of the words of Isaiah the Prophet, the voice of one, etc. well then, methinke's it is reasonable to conceive, that john was rather he that cried, as he did there, than the voice, which was cried; but I reverence the Antiquity which expound it otherwise, and those heavenly Devotions which the Fathers have deduced from that Metaphor; and therefore will no further discuss that interpretation, that deliver's john to be the voice, but grant it, and Aaron the mouth of Moses, in Exodus; the Case is far differing betwixt these and the word to be taken for Christ, 
The Wo●d taken for Christ in a far different sense.  who by them was mere man, in this sentence (In the beginning was the word) for consider, Reader, if in Exodus it had been said, the mouth was in the beginning, or middle, or latter end of a business, would any man living interpret that of Aaron, without that Comment which the Spirit of God give's, when it saith, that Aaron should be a Spokesman for Moses, and therefore instead of a mouth unto him? again, had any Evangelist said, as here, the word was in the beginning; the voice was in the beginning, could any man have expounded it without that Gloss, of the Prophet Isaiah's saying, and St. John's practice? it must therefore be as wild, and reasonless, to say, that this term (word) when there is no use of Speech, or other phrase in the whole Book of God, expounding it so, should be so interpreted, that our Saviour's humanity, which by them should speak this word, should be here called the word. I must beg the Reader's patience, for this tediousness, but the right understanding of this one syllable (word) is of high Consideration, and therefore I have dwelled so long upon it, but now we'll strike home.   

Sect. 8.  
In this sentence (In the beginning was the word) it is, not possible to understand this Term (word) of our Saviour's humanity, 
Not to be understood of our Saviour's humanity.  which did exist in the beginning of the Gospel, which was when St. john began to preach; for although our Saviour was then in being, yet he was not then the word, for the Gospel was not then preached, but about to be preached, and, according to them, he was called the word in reference only to that word, which was the Gospel; so that although he was man before, in the beginning of the Gospel, yet he could not be, in their notion, the word then, 
Neither Metaphorically,  neither Metaphorically, because than he had not revealed the will of God, concerning the Salvation of men; nor Metonymically, 
Nor Metonymically.  because, then, this word, which reveale's the will of God, was not produced, and the Text most expressly set's down the time, in the beginning was the word.   

Sect. 9  

Socinus' shift.  But Socinus hath one shift, which is on the top of the 14. page of his Treatise against the Pasnonienses, pag. 61. [Christ was then, when John Baptist began to preach, and was then destined by God to that Office, to wit, in opening, or preaching the will of God.] Thus far he; now the revealing the will of God is the nature of the word, and it seems, by him, that although Christ was not actually the word in the beginning of the Gospel, yet he w●s such in God's decree, and that may suffice, to make him the word; but let the Reader consider that he, who is decreed to be any thing, cannot be said to be such, until he actually exist; now the Text saith, In the beginning was the Word, not it shall be the Word when the decree is expired; was, and shall be, differ as much as time can distinguish, and yet what the Text saith was, Socinus saith shall be, when he saith, he was decreed to be; upon such a foundation we may say any thing, that is or shall be a thousand years hence, was a thousand years ago, because it was then decreed to be such. And now it seeming to me, that I have answered whatsoever I have observed, delivered by any man in defence of their exposition, it will become me to apply myself to the Justification of our exposition, which thus I do.   

Sect. 10.  
In the beginning was the word, that is, in the beginning of time, 
A brief Paraphra●● W●●es the first 〈◊〉 in St John.  of things, when the world was created out of nothing, then was the word, than it had its being and existence; other things had their beginning, they being then made, but he being not a thing made in time, but eternal, was then. This is a short delivering the true sense of the words, and I shall endeavour (God willing) to explain them.  
The first Term which I shall endeavour to expound is this Term (Word) a word is twofold, internal, 
A Word internal and external, both of God and Man.  and external; internal is that expression our intellect, or understanding, hath of its conceit within its self; external, is the expression of that internal conceit, (I will not here stand upon the difference betwixt Sermo and Verbum, it is not material) that there is such a difference, is apparent to any man who will consider how he deliver's nothing with his tongue, which he hath not a notion of, in his understanding, before; and that, which he deliver's with his tongue, is the same which was before in his understanding; in the Womb when it is in the understanding, in its birth when it is delivered by the mouth; it had an internal being in the Soul, an external being in the voice; now words are produced two ways, either by voice, or by the hand; by the mouth, or the pen; this Philosophy we must needs apprehend, after our weak manner, to be true; true concerning God, for we cannot think of God as we ought, but we must think that he doth actually know his own infinite excellencyes, and all whatsoever he intends to do, or doth, in Heaven or Earth; this knowledge, being active, produceth somewhat which is his Word; when he pleaseth to express himself outwardly to man, he doth it two ways, or by two sorts of words, written in the hearts of men, or in the Creatures legibly, which are two Books, in which God expresseth his will; or else by voice, immediately framed by himself, or his Prophets inspired by him; the Scripture confirmes all this Philosophy; First for men, I need not write of their inward Words; Psal. 10.6. speaking of the wicked man, he hath said in his heart, I shall never be removed; so Psal. 14.1. The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God; many times there are words and Speeches in the heart, which were never delivered by Tongue or Pen; but never any delivered outwardly, that was not first conceived inwardly; a man may as well be borne, who was never conceived; we may discern the Spirit of God, showing us all those ways of God's speaking, outwardly, Mat. 3. and the last. Lo a voice from Heaven saying, this is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; so Rom. 2.15. which show the works of the Law written in their hearts; there is an expression by writing; and Rom. 1.19, 20. for God hath showed it unto them, for the invisible things from the creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; there we see a writing in the Creatures, and that written by God, for, saith the Text, God hath showed it unto them. And for God's internal word, Psal. 2.7. The Lord hath said unto me, thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee; here was a Word spoken internally by God, and not to man; it was declared to man, but spoken internally only to his Son. Much more may be added, to this purpose, but I love not to weary my Reader unnecessarily; The word spoken of in my Text, is this internal word, and therefore written with an Article, the, or that Word, emphatically; other words are the words of Isaiah, jeremiah, john, Peter, or the like; but this was the, that word, the like of which never was; and to this will agree most aptly all which St. john discourseth, as will appear in my prosecution of it, and to none other.   

Sect. 11.  
And in this St. John giveth the Son of God no new name, but such as men knew him by long before Saint John's time; The Philosophers in all ages, 
The Philosophers of old call●d the Son of God his Word.  when their Souls soared so high as to contemplate the essence of God, his creation and government of the world, they said, he had a Son, or mind, which proceeded from him like Light from the Sun, (that is a simile they are frequent in) and they termed that Son his word; and they say, that that Word made the world, and gave Life and being to all things; thus Trismegistus in the first Chapter of his Poemander: and Section 4. according to the edition of Flussus, he saw in his rapture an indefinite Light; then in the fifth Section he enquired, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, what comes out of the light? the answer was made, The holy word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the holy word; then in the sixth Section, when Trismegistus had begged an expression of this vision, I, saith Poemander, I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intellectus, mens, I a Spirit, I translate it, or, as is commonly amongst those Philosophers, the Supreme Spirit of God, I that Spirit, thy God, am that light: and presently after, that bright or resplendent Word, which thou didst see come out, is the Son of God; I could show much more to this purpose out of him, but this is enough to show, that this, which St. John deliver's here, when he calle's the Son of God the word internal, is according to the language of this Philosopher; if there could be any farther doubt, let any man read that whole Chapter, he shall find his expressions extremely full; the same may be found up and down in Plato, the Sibylls, Zoroaster, and many more, which I need not name, because the observations out of them are made by many, and as well as this acknowledged by Socinus, as I shall show presently.   

Sect. 12.  

As well they who writ after, as who before, St. John.  But this one thing more may be worth the marking, that not only those Philosophers, which writ before St. john, had these expressions, but those who lived after him, as Plotinus, Porphyrius, jamblicus, Proclus; but Amelius, who lived after him about two hundred years, more or less, observe's this concordance of St. john with them: it is true, he calls him a Barbarian, as the pride of the Grecians did all that were not Grecians, but, that, by the Barbarian, he meant St. john, is evident, because he set's down the words of this Text, I treat of, and some following verses, and approves the Consent of that Barbarian: well then, this being a language of learned men, before St. john, to call the Son of God the Word of God, in respect of his Divine nature; and it being observed by Philosophers, who had no by-end, but only the apprehension of this Evangelist, I see no reason why we should be forced to give it a violent sense, not used by any, and most unconsisting (as will appear by the examination of every word) with the rest.   

Sect. 13.  
This consent of these Philosophers Socinus foresaw, and therefore, 
Which is yielded by Socinus.  pag. 37. of this Treatise, he handle's this Sentence, The word was made fl●sh, he saith [Si ea non add●d●sset] If he had not added these words (the word was made fl●sh) some man might, and that by right, have fallen into that error, etc. that he should think that word, of which john writes, to be another thing, or sometimes to have been another thing from the man jesus, and perhaps endowed with Platonical Philosophy, when he should see him here called God, and in the beginning to be wi●h God, (this is pag. 38.) to make the world, etc. he should presently believe that our Evangelist was conformable to Plato, who hath writ of God some things out of which this opinion of the Trinity did flow; and presently after he saith, that other Philosophers had it from Trismegistus] and acknowledgeth jamblichus; so that he yield's that some before, and some after St. john, understood this phrase of St. John's, according to our exposition; but I think that he can show me no writer, before, or after, unless Photinians and themselves, which are the same, that expounded this Text of the humanity of Christ; what concerns that verse, which Socinus applies that discourse to, I shall meet with in its proper place; but what concerns me now, I cannot but think it reasonable, that when so many learned Authors had philosophized with such learned discourses concerning God, his Word, and Spirit, under that language and notion, I cannot but imagine it most congruous to reason, that those divine Speculations of theirs, so far as true, should be countenanced by one Evangelist, one infallible Writer of Divine Truths, that every man might hear God speaking to him in his own language.   

Sect. 14.  
I am sure the first fathers, almost all, 
Their language used by the primitive Fathers and St. Paul.  because they had to do with philosophical men, made use of those conveniencies they had with Scripture, and so did Saint Paul; and I may say of our Evangelist, that he did frequently make use of their language and expressions, never baulking them, but choosing them before other, where they were fit for his purpose, and especially Plato: I could instance in very many of this kind, which any man, who is acquainted with these Authors, knows; but I will select two or three, which have not, as I know of, been used to such purpose; and the first shall be out of Plato's Epistle to Hermias, 
That of Plato consonant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John.  Erastus, and Coriscus; these three, in that Epistle, he invites to have a kindness and friendship one with another, and, to avoid all differences, he adviseth to establish a kind of Covenant and Law one with another, and confirm that even by an oath; in which Oath they should call God to witness, [who is the Captain of all things, present, and future, and the Lord, who is father of that Captain, and cause, whom, saith he, if we truly philosophise, we shall know clearly all of us, so far as the nature of a happy soul can attain unto] in this speech, we see, he clearly set's down the Son of God to be the cause and governor of all things, as in an hundred, well-nigh, other places; then he saith, such as are virtuous shall see him clearly, as a happy soul can do; what is this, but, which holy Job, who was before him too, said, I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that in my fl●sh I shall see God, Job 19.25, 26. and the same that St. John relate's our Saviour to express in his prayer, this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and jesus Christ whom thou hast sent, John 17.3. life eternal, that is the felicity Plato speaks of: it is true, Plato could not say, Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent, because in his humanity our Saviour was not yet seen in the world; but Plato spoke of him according to his Divinity, that felicity consisted in the clear vision of him; and, I may truly say, I was extremely delighted with the observations of this place, and some other more frequently observed; but as I was delighted with this, so I did admire to find Plato, 
Plato's de●●●lption of heaven paralleled to that of St. John in his Revelation.  in his Phoedo, or de anima, describing the heaven where happy souls shall be, when they are departed from th●s life, by those stones which Saint john doth the heavenly jerusalem, Rev. 21. Plato set's down three of them, a Sardius, a jasper, a Smaragdos, with an etc. that there were more. St. john, in the 19 verse, put's them down in another order, a jasper, a Sardius, and the third a Chalcedony, the fourth an Emerald, which fourth, in the Greek, is Smaragdos; now I could not but justly wonder at this Consent, and perhaps may think that there is some greater Mystery in it then is yet discovered; howsoever, this serve's my turn to show, that St. john never avoided the language and expressions of these preceding Philosophers, but used them: This Dialogue, called Phoedo in Plato, contain's that Discourse which Socrates delivered to his friends, at the day of his death, and his whole Comportment in it; amongst other passages, having philosophized concerning the immortality of the soul, and answered all their objections, he falls to treating, how it fared with souls departed, which died wicked, good, better, best; and therein, describing the habitations of those happy souls, put's down these very stones, which St. john mentions, with an Et caetera. This being then apparent, that these gallant and great Philosophers, both before, and after St. john, used this Term Word as he doth, and that St. john no where avoid's their expressions, it is reasonable to think he should not do so here, unless we would find some greater violence offered to the sense of the Text by it, then is yet discovered; or unless, by some other interpretation, we might discern the meaning more clearly expounded, when by their way every term is wrested, as will appear.   

Sect. 15.  
Well, to proceed; this Word being taken for the Son of God, is said, according to his Divinity, to be in the beginning, absolutely, without any limitation, when things first leapt out of nothing, 
The words Being with God signify more th●n Known to God, against Socinus and h●s ●ollowers  [and (saith St. John) the word was with God] Socinus expound's this, thus; [h●c est, that is Jesus, as he was the word of God, before he was manifested by the preaching of the Baptist, Soli Deo notus erat, was only known to God] (mark this word, only) Therefore Valentinus Smalcius was very much to blame, when in the third part of Smiglecius cap. 26. pag. 234. editione Racou. 1613. he saith, in express terms, that Socinus doth not add (Deo soli) known to God only, but to God, and not to men; I shall endeavour to confute both what Socinus, and what he saith; they both agree, and so doth Valkelius and the rest, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is as much as to be seen or known of God; that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which we render (with) signifye's to be discerned; but they are not so elegantly express, as they were before, to tell us by what figure, but they insist much upon the negative part; first, that Christ was not known by any, but God, before St. John's preaching; known he was, but not to be the word; I have showed that he was not the word, in their sense, before he was preached, but, that they may have all the Scope that may be, he was not known that he should be the Word before, but only to God; suppose I granted all this, would it follow, that to be with God, is to be known of God? it can hardly be deduced, for then to be with God should signify nothing but the common condition which bring's to all things, past, present, and to come, for all are known of him; but they seem to parallel this with the first Epistle of this Evangelist, Chap. 1.2. where he speaking of eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested to us, there the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used, as if it were (say they) was manifest to the Father; take Socinus his own words: [Quod perinde est, which is as much as if he should say, we declare to you eternal Life, which before this no man kn●w, because it was only known to God, who had decreed to give it you;] this is in his fifteenth page, for understanding which place we may observe that it is true, that this eternal word of God, which is mentioned in St. John's Gospel, was hid with God from all bodily eyes, until the manifestation of it by the incarnation and nativity of our Saviour, and that because he was with God in the bosom of the Father, as it is expressed John 1.18▪ but after the birth of Christ, in that personal union, it was seen, and heard, as the first verse of this first chap. of his first Epistle expresseth it; but, in relation to their sense, give me leave to expound that second verse of the first chap. of the first Epistle of St. John, so much of it as concerns our business, which is thus much; we declare to you eternal life, which was with the Father, and is now manifested to us; this eternal happy being, which we hope to enjoy hereafter, so much I find consented unto; now (saith Socinus) this Life was only known to God, for (was with the Father) must be so understood by them. I deny this, for, without doubt, the Angels know it, which then enjoyed it, 
Eternal life before Christ's Incarnation known to the Angel●, blessed Souls, Prophets, Philosophers.  and those blessed Souls, which were admitted into Abraham's bosom; the Prophets saw it, and taught this eternal Life; many Philosophers knew it, as I have showed you, and could produce Twenty more, if it were needful; nor, as they answer concerning the word, can they say, they did not know the quale or the quantum, the quality or the quantity of it, for they did know the quality to consist in the beatifical vision; they did know the quantity, that it was eternal; so that then this phrase [which was with God] cannot be understood of being known to him by being decreed such; so that this phrase may, if not must, thus be expounded; in the latter part of the preceding verse the Apostle calls our Saviour the word of life; we shall find in the fourth verse of the first chap. of his Gospel, in him the word was life; in this fi●st verse and the words this is applied to [the word was with God] this life than must needs be with him, because in the word, which was with him, not only because known by him, 
Although not till afterward, manifested to others.  but then, when our Saviour had divulged the Gospel: then this life, which was in the word with the Father, was manifested to us, that is divulged, not only to Prophets by revelation, or Philosophers and Wise men by reason and contemplation, but even to us men, who cannot soar in so high Speculations with our discourse to apprehend it by faith, and not only so, but to apprehend the way of getting it by the merits of Jesus Christ; so that then the Socinian gloss upon this Text is utterly false, which saith, that this Life was only known to God; when, for aught I find, the Philosophers, many of them, 
The Philosopher's excel the Socinians in this knowledge.  apprehended it much better than they, because they conceived the immortality of the Soul; and that the Soul coming from God must needs go to him, and receive according to its works in this flesh; when they, the Socinians, conceive the Soul of man like a beast's, to return to nothing of its self, but its corrupted principles, where Philosophers apprehended the Soul to return to its incorruptible principle, God; so that the text meane's thus much; that the life which was with God, as in the fountain of it, was by our most blessed Saviour revealed to men in such a way, as might most clearly manifest him to the meanest Capacity by faith. Socinus hath another Text, which he would have to serve this illustration, but I find it not mentioned by his followers, as not of force to clear this exposition.   

Sect. 16.  
This is Luke 2. and the last, Jesus increased in Wisdom and Age (so he, but better, Stature, 
Socinus' other Text of no validity to his purpose.  as we) and grace with God and men, that is, in Dei conspectu: the Strength of this comparison lies in this Word (with) which is not the same with what was so rendered in St. John; that was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but I stand not upon this; the very Sense, be it what it will, will overthrow his exposition, for I must not run away to other extravagancies; for he could not grow in Wisdom, Stature or grace in conspectu Dei, which is his gloss, unless he were so re and indeed; and therefore whatsoever is the sense of these Words, which perhaps an other occasion may give me opportunity to expound, his exposition cannot be true; and so I pass from his illustrations of this phrase by Scripture, which I can observe in any of them, and return to my Text.   

Sect. 17.  
[The word was with God) that is (saith he) was known to God, and God only, before the preaching of John Baptist, 
The Discourse resumed concerning the knowledge of the Word before the preaching of St. John Baptist. ] thus Smalcius likewise, and Valkelius; what concerns Angels in this exclusive word (Soli) I have already touched; as likewise how he did falsify Socinus, to say, he did not use it; but they are all peremptory, that no man knew he was the word, before the preaching of the Baptist; but then being pinched by Smiglecius with an objection, that he was known to the Shepherds, to the wise men, to Anna and Simeon, he answers in his 26. chap. to the third part of Smig. page 234. thus; that he was known to God, not only that he was, but his quality, that he was the word: that, before the preaching of John Baptist, he was known to neither Men, nor Angels; they knew him that he should be the deliverer of God's people from the hands of their earthly enemies, but not to be the word; some knew that he should deliver his people from their Sins, but this word they knew not. Well, let my Text confute all this, which saith, the word was with God in the beginning, therefore he was then the word; if they fly to God's foreknowledge in his decree (as I have said) it could not be affirmed of him, that he was with God, but should hereafter be with him: then secondly, that he should be the word, in their sense, is no more, but that he should manifest the will of God concerning men's Salvation, his Gospel-will, and that was known before; I know not how Smiglecius pressed his Argument, whether in those general terms, which Smalcius produceth, or particular; but to this very distinction of his I shall press old Simeon's nunc dimittis, Luke 2.32. where our Saviour is said to be a light, to lighten the Gentiles; now let any man imagine how he should be this light, but by revealing this will of God to them; for my part, I can conceive no other; and yet this is the whole matter, which they make to be expressed by this Term, word; for although the Term its self be not expressed, yet it is clea●ly employed, in that the whole sense of it is either a Metaphor, or a Metonymy, is evident; to this I could add, that the Prophets foresaw this, so Isaiah 60.3. The Gentiles shall come to thy light, that is, the light which his Sermons, his miracles did give, and that evidence of God's will for our Salvation which he did hold forth; this is enough to show, that the Socinians were over-seen in saying, that, according to their sense, no man foresaw that our Saviour should be the word, as well as in saying, that God did know him to be such, when he was not such, that is, before the preaching of the Baptist; and, to conclude; I have no more to do with this phrase concerning their objections, but set down the true meaning of them, which is thus. The Word, which I have showed was in the beginning, the internal Word, was with God, it would not else indeed be from him, for being an internal effect of his understanding, it proceeded not in●o any external existence, but remained there eternally, in Sinu Patris, in the bosom of the Father; but lest any man should doubt that this word might be some accident of another nature than God was, the Text addes, the word was God.   

Sect. 18.  
What the Word is in their Sense, what in ours, is apparent; now it remaines whether in theirs, or ours, 
Whether in the Socinian or Catholic sense may be more truly said, the Word was God.  it may be most truly said, that the word was God: in their sense it is, that he, who declares the will of God, for the Salvation of men, is God; though he be a man, according to his nature, yet he is a God according to his Office; nor will I do them that injury to say, they affirm him God only in regard of this one particular of revealing the will of God, but they say, that planè Div●na Virtus in illo relucebat. So Socinus in his defence of his Animadversions contra Pasnonienses, in assertionem primam, cap. 4. pag. 74. edit. Racou. 1618. So that the effect of their saying is, that Christ, who was this word, was a Creature endowed with divine excellencies.  
But we say, that this Word which, is a real Word, was God in its nature, by being the natural Son of the Father, as my Text, he was God.   

Sect. 19  

God, with them, no proper name, but an Appellative▪ & ●▪  Their exposition of this Text is thus, that this Term, God, is not a proper name to that infinite excellency which created and governe's Heaven and Earth; but an Appellative, or name of Office and Authority; not a name signifying any essence or person, so Socinus upon these Words, and his Followers; but yet he grant's that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is often applied to the great God of all; he saith it is often given to Angels and Men; he seems much to delight in that place, John 10.34. It is written in your Law, I have said ye are Gods, ver. 35. if he call them Gods, unto whom the word of God came, etc. this he stands upon in the Book before specified contra Pasno▪ but in his Comment upon this Text, he insist's upon that Text, 1 Cor. 8.5. For, though there be that are called Gods, whether in Heaven or Earth (as there be Gods many, and Lords many) ver. 6. but unto us there is but one God, etc. [now (saith he) this shewes, that there are many Gods, besides the great God, of one of which this Text ought to be understood,] and, to confirm this, he, in the Chapter before alleged contra Pasn. page 74. urgeth, that the Apostle, to show that he meant not the great God, left out an Article here at 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which he put before; and this is much insisted upon by Smalcius, Valk●lius, and the rest; I shall take these in order, and endeavour to answer them, I think that this same Term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Contrary to the use of it (single) throughout the New Testament.  or God in our language, signifye's God in his essence throughout the New Testament, which is the only Authentic book we have to give any undoubted assent unto for any Term there used; for although it may sometimes be otherwise used, yet there is always some Comment, some words added to it, which do illustrate it in such a manner, as any reasonable man may discern that it is applied to an extrinsecall Sense; in this piece I shall apply myself principally to Crellius, who hath a Chapter of purpose against it, being the 13. Chapter of the first Book de Deo & ejus Attributis, not avoiding any thing I find other where.   

Sect. 20.  
This Doctrine of mine Crellius allowe's, in such cases, where this word God is spoken of such powers [quae ne imperia quidem sunt propriè, sed similitudinem tantum cum eis habent; which are not truly Empires, but have a likeness only to them,] so saith he, Satan, 
How Satan is called, the God of this World, etc.  is called the God of this Word, 2 Cor. 4.4.] where we see it so explained as any man may know the true God is not meant; so likewise the Prince of this World, John 12.3. so likewise the belly, Philip. 3.19. whose God is their belly; in all which he that runneth may read, 
How the belly, God.  this Word God is a Metaphor, so applied to other things by the very Context, that he cannot choose but discern it to be used out of its proper sense; but this is it I contend for, that out of the New Testament no man can show that this Word in the singular number, without a Comment to expound it, in a divers Sense, is used, for any, but for the great God, as it is put here in this; I have bestowed much pains to examine all places used by this Apostle, either in his Gospel, Epistles, or Apocalypse, and I can find none, so that, undoubtedly, it is not his language; that Criticism which is so much stood upon by Crellius, Socinus and all of that opinion, 
The Socinian's Criticism about the Article.  that where there is no Article put to a Word, there it may be understood in a large Sense, but where an Article, in a more strict, for which he tightly produced St. Cyrill; I answer, That neither with Article, nor without can they show me any place where this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Answered.  or God, is used in the singular number absolutely, without some addition to expound it otherwise, for any but the true and great God; if there had been any, sure, after so much pains as they have taken in this Theme, they would have found it; so that then this Word God being put absolutely (the word was God) without any limitation or exposition, it must be understood of the true and great God; 
And Soci●u●'s Instances.  those Instances of Socinus will give no denial to my conclusion; that of John 10.34. where it is said of men, that God had said they were Gods; consider here the plural number, which one only thing is enough to distinguish them from the true God, who can be but one; but then read the next words, ver. 35. he called them Gods, to whom the word of God came: observe here that these Gods were not such by their nature, but by the power of the word of God, and therefore must be of another nature from him; so likewise that in 1 Cor. 8.5. there are Gods many, and Lord▪ many, that is, many which by Gentiles are worshipped for Gods and Lords, ver. 6. yet to us there is but one God, etc. a man may say of these, either they are true Gods or false; if true, they are Gods to us; if false, we have nothing to do with them; though others magnify them and adore them for Gods, yet to us they are not Gods; so that here we have the Context teaching the Sense of these phrases clearly; but in my Text it is put absolutely, without relation to any particular, and therefore aught to be allowed in its proper sense; and for the rule of St. Cyrill, 
How St. Cyr●ll's rule is to be understood  I may justly say of it, that it is to be understood of such words which in their genuine and proper signifiation have such a double sense, a large and a restrained sense, but such Words, which do naturally and properly signify one, and by a Figure signify other things, when they are used for other things, they ought to have some Circumstance to expound that they are applied to those other things, of which nature this word God is, it properly sign●fie's that Divine excellency; but, when it is affirmed of other things, it is out of some resemblance or participation of his Divine Excellencies, which are in them; and then, for what I can find either from them, or mine own Study, there is some Circumstance or other, which demonstrate's that application to us, as may appear out of all these instances before.   

Sect. 21.  
But Smalcius in his Refutation Libelli de divina verbi incarnati natura, cap. 8. pag 94. urgeth against our Conceit thus; [Si in principio, etc. If in the beginning with God, or in God (as Smiglecius would have it) none can be but God, and that which is in God is God, certainly he who says of another, that he is in God, says likewise that he is God, nor may he add that he is God, but by a Tautology; therefore because St. John had said before that he was with God, and added, that he was God, he did not before affirm, that he was God, when he said, he was with God.] This is his discourse, 
Smalcius answered about Tautology.  and it is somewhat perplexed, but the meaning, I guess, is, that this were a Tautology in St. john, if the Antecedent were true, but I will answer all in a word; although it be true, that whatsoever is with God eternally must be God, yet this truth being not so apparent to every man's understanding, it was most useful, for the instruction of men about these divine Truths, that there should be some expressions made of it.  
But pag▪ 50. Smalcius proceeds with another objection, 
As likewise to that objection, God cannot be with himself.  whereas Smiglecius had said, that in this place, God is put absolutely and properly, which is never said of any man, and had expounded what he mean's by that phrase absolutely, to wit, when there is no word to show that it is used improperly (Certè) [Surely (saith he) the Word, or Sermo, speech (so he will render it) is not absolutely here called God, for it is a great demonstration of an improper signification, that, in the sentence just before, it was said, The word was with God, to wit, that one God.] I will a little abreviate his discourse; this cannot be, (saith he) if that God be that word or speech, for (saith he) that one God cannot be with himself; that is the force of his Argument, and my answer I shall draw up short; although nothing, and so not God, can be with himself, because, to be with whomsoever, intimate's a diversity; yet that, which is the same in one respect, may differ from him in another, and, in that regard, be said to be with him, as, in the first, to be that other: Socrates and Plato are in a Room together, Socrates may properly be said to be a man, and to be with a man; although these persons in the Trinity differ not altogether as much as Socrates and Plato, for aught we know, because these are not distinct individurl natures, as they are; yet being distinct persons, agreeing in the same nature, they may be, either of them, truly affirmed to be God, and with one another, which is God; which I think is very evident to any intelligent man.  
Again, he urgeth (Simo porro) Moreover, if he be not absolutely God, who is not the God of all things, and is constituted a God, surely Christ is not God, for he is not the God of the Father] and the second part, that he was constituted a God, he proves out of Acts 2.36. where it is said, that God hath made that same jesus, whom ye crucified, both Lord and Christ, 
Lo●d and God not both one.  [Lord or God (saith he) are all one] before I go further, I shall deny that; Lord is a relative, Lord and servant are relatives, but God is an absolute term, and therefore, as Tertullian excellently dispute's against Hermogenes, God was eternally God, but not eternally Lord, until the generations of the Earth were finished; and this distinction is observed all along the first chapter of Genesis, until the fifth verse of the second; when the world was completed, he is called God still; but from thence all along the Lord God; therefore there is a great difference betwixt saying, our Saviour was made Lord of all, and that he was made God; this I put down here, for fear it might slip out of my head hereafter, when I come to examine the Argument.  
To the first piece: 
The Word God with, though not of the Father.  that this word is not the God of the Father, I answer, the word can have no eminency beyond him whose word it is: but he is God with the Father, the same God in essence, coëqual, coëternal with him; neither is the Father a God over the Son, that is, of an higher excellency, as he is God, but as he is man, as he hath all his being, dignity, eminency, whatsoever he hath, from the Father; he is God of God, light of light, but no whit inferior to the Father, but eternally proceeding from him; as he was man, so he was constituted Lord and Christ, as he was the word, spoken by God in his eternal generation; as man, he was blessed by God in his temporal productions.  
And this sufficeth, for aught I can discern, to answer such Arguments as I find against our opinion: I would have reserved this for another Discourse; I intended (God willing) to justify these Truths by reason, but that I thought thus much necessary to clear this 〈◊〉. Well then, this being sufficiently showed, that the word was God, not man, and aught to be understood in its plain and express terms, that the word was God; I shall proceed.    

CHAP. XXXIII.  
Of the Word's being with God before the beginning of St. John Baptist's preaching; And in heaven before his corporeal Ascension thither; Of his acting in the Creation of the World; What Life is in sin, and how he is called the Light. St. John's testimony of his Divinity evident enough. Whom Socinus misinterpret's in what he writes of the Creation. The Bishop's Animadversions upon Smalcius and Valkelius glosses of the World in St. John. The mystery of Christ's Incarnation discussed with them; Smalcius' three Queries answered.  

Sest. 1.  

The Socinia●s conceit of t●e Word being with God in the beginning  VErse 2. [The same was in the beginning with God] There will be little farther quarrel about these Words, for every term in the sentence hath been examined before; yet, because I have left out one shift of theirs, concerning that being which the word had with God. I may justly insert that here; which is, that Christ was the word, in the beginning of the Gospel preached by john Baptist, ascended up into heaven, and so was with God in the beginning, just so as an Ambassador goes to his King, takes, from his▪ mouth, his directions, and then goes about his Embassy; so our Saviour, with his very humanity, ascended first up into heaven, and so was with God, and then went about wording of it▪ preaching the Gospel; this is the Conceit of Smalcius, Valkelius; how true, we must examine.   

Sect. 2.  
First, it seems strange to me, 
Improbable, having no Evangelical authority.  that it was possible so high and remarkable a passage of our Saviour's Life should no where be recorded by any one of the four Evangelists, when so many actions of less concernment are registered so exactly; but this is not a necessary Argument, it is not written, therefore it is not; but, I may say of that, as St. Augustin once did; it may be with as much reason, and more, denied, then affirmed; for a man, fifteen hundred years after, to relate an action of another man's, whose story was written by divers eye-witnesses, who mentioned no such thing, one would think were very strange.   

Sect. 3.  
Yea, but they have Scripture for it, John 6.62. 
That they pretend to proves it not.  What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up, where he was before? therefore (say they) he was there before, in his humanity; if the Text had added, in his humanity, the Argument had been somewhat, and of force; but the words being as they are, where he was before, it will prove, that he was there before only, which is true of his Divinity, not of his Humanity; 
The distinction of Christ's Divinity and Humanity illustrated.  I know they deride this distinction, and speak basely of it, but it is most true and useful, and I will illustrate it thus: In Socrates, there is a soul and a body, these two constitute the person of Socrates; we can say of Socrates, that he is heavy, and earthy, and falls down, it is true of him, according to his body: we can say again, he is heavenly and light, and ascends upward, that is true, according to his soul; yea, we can truly affirm these, both at the same time, of the same person, taken as that person; so we can say, Socrates is as high as ever he was, when, by iterated contemplation, he admires and adore's God again, which is only by that part which is his soul. Give me leave to apply this to our purpose: the Divinity and Humanity of Christ make one person; what is done by either is done by Christ, 1 Cor. 2.8. they have crucified the Lord of glory, which was according to his Humanity, and he is the Lord of glory according to his Divinity, not his Humanity; so the same Christ may be said to ascend up by h●s Humanity, where he was before with his Divinity. There is one place more which they insist upon, 
His ascent into heaven, which they insist on, not corporeal.  that is John 3.13. where our Saviour saith, No man hath ascended up to heaven but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man, which is in heaven; here (say they) it is intimated, that he had been in heaven before, because it is said in the Preterperfect Tense, he ascended; first I will answer ad homines, that this Text cannot avail their turn; for, first, if it were true, that he ascended in body, yet it must be such an one as descended first, that is, such an one as came down from heaven before, and then he must be in heaven before the beginning, if in the beginning he ascended into heaven (which they say;) but then mark the Clause, that is, one who is in heaven, when our Saviour spoke it; to the later they say, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, existens, being in heaven, because it is a Participle of the Present Tense, by a Grecism, may be understood of the Preterperfect Tense, he was in heaven: I confess such a language is many times used, but that it should be so here, I utterly deny; for it is not fit for us to think, that our Saviour, in so pithy a short delivery of such Mysteries, did use any Tautology, or unnecessary, or non-significant terms; now consider if he had said, that no man ascended into heaven, but he that descended, who was in heaven; what would this last clause add to the rest? no man can ascend up to heaven, but then he must be in heaven: no man can descend from heaven, but then, when he descended, he must be there: and this is apparent to every man, upon the repeating of the very Terms, who understands them; and therefore if it should be construed, who was in heaven, there must be something more in it then I can discern, or else it is a Tautology; but no such thing, taking it, who is in heaven, because that was neither expressly nor impliedly delivered before; so then, to understand this Text, we may go two ways, either take these words figuratively, and that Socinus seems to allow in his 7. chap. against the 10. of Wiceus thus; a man may be said to ascend into heaven, as I spoke before (as Socrates) by contemplation, and to descend by looking down and busieing himself about the things of this world; so God is said to humble himself, to behold the things that are in heaven and earth, and he is in heaven, now at this instant, who contemplate's divine Excellencies, even in this Discourse. Or else we may expound it thus, according to those two natures which were in that one person; no man ascended, etc. Christ's humanity was elevated by the incarnation and union it had with his Divinity; it was a great descent of his Divinity, to be united to his Humanity, and by this Divinity he is still in heaven; and this mightily enforceth his Argument to prove what went before to Nicodemus; If I have told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you of heavenly things? he reprove's them for not believing him, who only can tell them, being the only person who is acquainted truly with heaven, who hath been in heaven by ascent, by descent, by a present inhabitation: now let us see how this can agree with our Saviour's bodily ascent into heaven; indeed in the first sense, I do wonder, Socinus and they did not apply it to our Saviour's being with God, in Contemplation, even before John Baptist his preaching; but I do not find that they have done it, but that that Text is environed with so many Circumstances, that would not abide it, and they only press this for to prove a corporal presence of his humanity, which the Text will endure, for the reasons before specified, and this later hath no colour for them. Well, I have done with what I find they excuse rather than defend their exposition by; now I shall apply myself to the confutation of it.   

Sect. 4.  

His double capacity of Priest and Layman alleged by them, discussed.  It is a hard thing to prove a negative, and in Logic it lies upon them to justify what they affirm against all the stream of Christian writers; but I will endeavour to repeat what others have said before, and argue it clearly; first then, we may observe Heb. 9.12. it is said, that Christ entered once into the holy place; this word once intimates no more, no other time, but then; & this, a man might think, were clear enough; but they have an evasion; he entered once as high Priest, at other times before, he entered as a Layman; methinks they should say, as Ambassador, to receive his commands from his King. Now, Reader, consider how unfit this answer is for their months; certainly, if then in the beginning he did go up to heaven in his Humanity, he was as much a Priest then as the Word, for he was not, nor could be, the Word by their Doctrine, until he delivered the Will of God; that he could not do, until he received his Commission and direction from God; if they say, he had it by the decree and predetermination of God; it is answered, that undoubtedly so was his Priesthood, and therefore he was then as much Priest as Word; and if it might be said, the word was with God, a man may say, the Priest was with him, which that Text to the Hebrews denies, because it saith, he entered but once into the holy place, which was after his death, therefore, could not be said to do it before; this Argument, thus pressed, I have not read urged by others, and I do not know, how they can avoid it; well then, I know not of any thing more need be said to these words; we see them inconsistent with their gloss, and not agreeing to ours, who hold, that the word is eternally produced and with God.   

Sect. 5.  
I will go on, 
How all things were made by him▪  verse 3. [all things were made by him] there is not one word which is not wrested by them: by this (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) all things (say they) is understood all things of the Gospel, for so it is often used in Scripture, not absolutely, but according to the Subject matter that is in hand; and so it is here, the Gospel of St. John was the matter in hand, and these things were established by our Saviour; I do not deny, that that phrase all or all things should be understood of the subject matter; I do deny that the immediate subject matter is the renovation or Gospel, but is the Creation, for if the Apostle had intended that, he would rather have used renovation, regeneration, making new, then absolute making; again, it is evident that St. John, 
St. John's method very considerable against the Socinians interpretation.  in this beginning of his Gospel, describe's the nature of Christ, according to his Divinity, when he was, in the beginning; where he was, with God; what he was, in himself he was God, in his effects, he made all things; then he comes to the preparation of the Gospel by John Baptist, and his Gospel by its self, to his incarnation, he was made flesh; this I put down, to show the Reader, that to us, who observe this method in the Evangelist, that conceit of the Gospel, that these words should relate to it, can have no sense; and again I say, let the Reader observe the places commonly cited by them to this purpose, that this phrase must be understood according to the subject matter, he shall find that there is something obvious in them to show a Reader, that they have such an intention; those places are these, Matth. 17.11. Mark 13.23. John 4.25. and 14, 26. and 19, 28. and some other, which are needless to put down, and would be tedious too; but in all of them there will appear somewhat inviting a man to that understanding, but in this nothing; 
Which is such as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions opposite to those in holy Scripture.  and let the Reader consider, what an uncouth exposition this is, by which I can put the Contrary to every proposition, and, by their gloss, it will be more true than the Text; as thus; The word was not God; the Word did not make all things, for when the beginning was he was not, by them, nor thousands of years after; with God he was not, otherwise then every thing in the World was with him, in his presence and knowledge, and that long after the beginning, contrary to the Text; and he was so far from making all things, that indeed, (by them) he made nothing, but instituted some Laws and Covenants only; now what a horrid way is this, of expounding Scripture, only because they are resolved against our Saviour's eternal Divinity? let us go on.   

Sect. 6.  
[And without him was nothing made that was made] I believe, that, 
Christ's interest in the Creation reinforced against the Socinians gloss  before their glosses had come to this Text, a man could not possibly have put down more distinct Words; was Heaven, or Earth, or any thing else than what is comprised in all? if not, than it was not made without him; he made it, who made all things; yea, but (say they) this must be understood of all the things of the Gospel; I ask, were other things made? if they were, than they were made by him, and without him nothing was made, that was made; I know they will return to their former answer, and say, it must be understood of the subjecta materia, which was the Gospel, that none of those things that were made were made without him; but let a man consider whether it be reasonable to refer this (all things) to such a business; which is treated of two or three verses after, or rather to those things which immediately follow, that is, the things that are made; 
Wherein he was a principal▪ no bare instrumental Cause.  they have an exception likewise against this Word [by] all things were made by him; that signifye's an Instrument, (say they) and by this Christ should be only here an Instrumental Cause, by which God wrought these things; so Smalcius in refutatione libelli de divinâ verbi incarnati naturâ. cap. 11. pag. 68 in my edition, 1614 it is true, he grant's that this Word [by] is often used for a principal cause, as is most evident, as we say, that this house was built by this man, not by his Axe or Hammer, no not by his Servants, yea all things are said to be made by God; but he says, they, who urge this Argument, must prove, that it is never used otherwise; I say, that is not necessary, in Logic; it will be enough if he can prove, that it cannot be used otherwise in this place; and that I hope to do; first against those, who allow our Saviour to make all these things concerning the Gospel; he was the Author of them, and he must not be understood as an Instrument in respect of the sense that they give to [by] here, which makes him to be barely an instrumental Cause; then next, taking [all things] as we do, and surely it must be so, if we understand, that this Word is an Instrument in the making the world, the Heaven and Earth, he must be long before he was born of the Virgin, even before these things themselves were made; which although it will not be of force against the Arrians, yet is against them; so that let this phrase [all things] be understood which way ye will, as they, or we, yet this Word (by) cannot be accommodated to their exposition, for a bare instrumental Cause. There is another slight objection, 
Their other slight objection answered.  that the Father is not made by him, nor the holy Spirit; but the Text answers this, when it saith, without him was nothing made that was made; but let the Reader observe the same Contrariety to the Text, here, that was before; there was more a hundred times made without him, then by him; and, 
The use of words.  if where the full and clear sense of a Text will go one way, it be lawful to expound it otherwise, because some Word, or Words are otherwhere applied to another meaning, it is impossible to prove any thing by words; for the liberty of language doth allow it, and the expressions of all Authors make use of it, to apply the same Words to divers occasions; and, if this licence should be granted to Expositors, there is no refuge but tradition, 
The benefit of Tradition.  which deliver's the sense, not the words, and by that a man may know how, and in what sense, such language was understood, either in the Apostolical or next adjacent times; for it is reasonable to think, that they had, with the words, the sense likewise delivered. Thus I write, because, as appears, these men do use such violence to these Scriptures, as is unreasonable, and without any consent, to their own intent, as I have showed.   

Sect. 7.  
It follows [In him was life] here in these words I find little Opposition; Smalc●us handle's them not, 
How life eternal, and what else is to be understood. ver. 4.  as not material; Socinus saith, this word [life] must be understood of Life eternal; I will not deny that life eternal may be meant, and principally meant, here; but I am confident likewise, that all the life of every thing in the world may truly be said to be in him, in the word, as in the fountain from whence it came, and is still preserved equally as the other; but for Life eternal, it may be said in him, besides that way, as in a fountain, to be in him likewise, as the m●ritorious cause, yea, as in the object, for in the knowledge of him will consist much of our eternal happiness hereafter. 
H●w both that, and the natural life is said to be the light of men.  I will proceed [and this Life was the light of men] that is, if we understand it of the natural Life, this Life, which originally, and preservingly, is in the word, is that light which enlighteneth the understanding in reasonable things, or the very sensitive in sensitive things; for there is necessary to sight and understanding a twofold Light, internal and external; internal, which enable's the power to work; and external, which renders the object visible; this internal light is that life which God preserve's in any living thing, that doth see; but then apply it to the eternal life inchoate or begun here, so those graces, which put a man in the State of future happiness, do likewise, like light, show him the way to it; or for that light perfect in Heaven; for tha● glory, which felicitate's and makes us happy, doth likewise enlighten and show that blessed object of the most sacred Trinity. Here we have no controversy with them, I am brief therefore [And the light shined in darkness, 
How Christ is called the l●ght, according to Socinus.  and the darkness comprehended it not] To this all that Socinus saith is, that Christ is called the light, not only because by heavenly Doctrine he enlightens men to Life eternal; but likewise because that, by an irreprehensible and most holy Life, he shined before them, that they ought to imitate him, for so he says, John 13.15. I have given you an example, that as I have done, so should ye do likewise; the men of this world were this darkness] (saith he, 
How according to the Bishop. ) etc. this hath much truth with it, but not all that this Text conteyne●s; for first, if we conceive Christ to be this light, as he saith, we may take him in a twofold Capacity; as the word, of which was spoke before, the word of God; then we may consider that this, which was before, shined in his humanity, which was darkness in Comparison, and that darkness comprehended it not, that is, obscured it not so, but that some ray or glorious Lustre of his Divinity broke out; or else, the whole person came into the World, which was darkness, and that darkness laboured to crush and suppress him, but did not comprehend him.   

Sect. 8.  
[There was a man sent from God, whose name was John] Let me here admonish the Reader of one word, 
What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies properly, and why rendered was.  to prevent a future objection, with which the whole troop of the Socinians are full and boast, that is [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.] which we render [was] signifye's, in its proper nature, to be born, or begotten of another, or draw his Original from another, and from thence, I conceive, the word gigno in Latin to be derived; but because, amongst all created things, there is nothing which is not originated, doth not draw its being from some other, therefore it is often used to signify to be; but, I am persuaded, no where in the language of this Evangelist; and could the Latin or English Language so well bear with the Graecisme, they would have rendered it, there was a man made sent, factus missus; but because that sound's harshly in these languages, they choose rather to be contented with saying, he was sent, than he was made sent; this Caution I premit, now I meet with the word, for the elegancy of the English rendered it so, but it was used in its natural sense, where the language would bear it, all things were made by him, etc. for although the sense be the same, to say, he was made sent, as to to say, he was sent; yet the English or Latin phrase better agrees with the latter, than the former; and the Evangelist did, of purpose, as St. Cyrill thought, change the phrase, from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Why the Evangelist chose to use it, rather than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, writing of St. John Baptist.  which he had used before, In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the like, because the word was not made nor created; but when he came to St. John, although the sense be much the same, he changed the phrase from he was to that, he was made such, made sent, because he was a made creature.   

Sect. 9  
[The same came for a Witness, 
Socinus put's a diminution upon St. John's testimony of Christ.  to bear witness of that light] I find little in these words excepted against by them, only Socinus urgeth, that if John Baptist were a Witness of Christ, he either knew him not to be that great God, or else he very weakly performed his trust, for he only testified that he was Christ; that he was the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the World; that he should baptise with the holy Ghost and with fire; that he was greater than himself, but nothing of his being the great God; I put down his sense, and first I answer to his last Clause, that if he had put it down in the clearest words, that he or I could invent, they would have found where some of these words had been used to another sense, some where or other in Scripture; but I am persuaded that he did witness enough to satisfy any Conscience, that were not absolutely resolved to the Contrary; 
Which is evidently affirmative of his Divinity.  for first consider that place in the 29. of this Chapter: Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sins of the World. Who can take away man's sins, but God? but the great God, against whom they were committed? and therefore he says in the 34. Verse of the same, bearing witness of it, This is the Son of God, (we mince it in our translation to make the phrase smooth) there is an Article at both Son, and God; it should be, that Son of that God, both with an Emphasis, which these men stand much upon in other places. I know their expositions of these words, but I bring them for illustration, that a man, who is not maliciously ben●, might think this enough to express him the God; and then look upon St. Matth. 3.11. he shall baptise you with the holy Ghost and with fire; who could do that, but the great God? then see in the same place, whose shoes latchet I am not worthy to untie; certainly the meanest man is worthy enough to untie the Shooe-latchet of the greatest King in the World, who is only a man; but if he be God likewise, the greatest is not worthy of the meanest Office about him. Certainly, St. John Baptist delivered abundantly enough for the satisfaction of any sober man in this point.  
I proceed [That all men through him might believe] I find no dispute, concerning this business out of these words; I let them pass therefore; nor about the two next Verses; I come therefore to the tenth Verse.   

Sect. 10.  
[He was in the World, and the World was made by him, 
Socinus misinterprets creation by recreation, or regeneration.  and the World knew him not.] Socinus, in his Comment upon these Words, boast's much, pag. 19 that no man, which he knows, expound's them right but himself; and his exposition is, that the New Testament being full of Hebraisms▪ and the Hebrews, having compound Words, do therefore use uncompounded words for compounds, and so in this place [the World was made by him] is as much as remade, regenerated, made anew; and to this purpose he produceth, Ephes. 2.10. we are his Workmanship, created in Christ Jesus, unto good works. Certainly, if there be no clearer Text than this, this Term (made) need not be wrested to re-makeing; for first let the Reader observe here, that the word, we render (made) is the word which hath abide, and will abide more dispute, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) which is not in that Sentence to the Ephesians▪ This word hath hard luck, it is used to all purposes by them; sometimes it signifye's to be, sometimes to be remade; but I say, always made, in St. John; so that although they would show me, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which are both used in that place, and rendered Workmanship and created, may be used for recreation, yet it would not follow, that this word, which is not of kin to them, should endure that exposition; then, let us consider, that Text in the Ephes. need not to be forced to his sense; for, not to stand upon the expositions of learned men, 
And in supplie's to his purpose a Text in the Epistle to the Ephesians.  which have applied it to the Creation, that by (Christ Jesus) is meant our Saviour according to his Divinity, and so in him (the word) we were all created to good works; but to take it according to the other sense, that this Creation is meant of creating those saving and justifying graces, at which the Apostle seems to point, and in regard of them we are said to be created, those excellent, and supernatural, qualities, being our perfection; so that as a man may be said to be made, when his soul is put in him; a table, or any thing, when that work, which give's it the last compliment and degree of perfection, is added to it; so we in the Text are said to be created, but it doth not say men, we are created another thing, which God by these graces wrought us unto, and, I think, is regeneration; but this phrase doth not, in its nature, signify regeneration, but it signifye's that which is applied to men, who are fallen from a better to a worse condition; to such men it may import a regeneration, because it bring's them back to their former state, and makes them that which was their first condition; and so this creation, in the Text, hath its most genuine and proper sense, which making in my Text should not have, when it is said, that the world was made by him, if by it should be understood, the world was remade or regenerated by him; Again consider, that if this Text should be understood of regeneration, I mean, that Text to the Ephesians, it must be by virtue of that phrase (to good works) [created to good works] for if the Text had barely said, we had been his Workmanship, created by him, no man could have construed it regeneration; but now in this Text, (the world was made by him) there is no phrase to expound it to any thing else, but the mere sense of the words; and yet let us see another violence, if this should be granted, that this phrase (made the world) should be understood for regenerating; and the world for men; all the world, 
Another violence of his in wresting actual regeneration to regeneration in endeavour.  that knows any thing of Christianity, knows likewise that not half the world was regenerated; then (say they) it must be understood of our Saviour's endeavour to regenerate the whole; so that making must be taken for regeneration, regeneration for an endeavour to do it; when, I dare say, he, nor they, can show me any place in Scripture, where this word (make) is used for regeneration, much less merely for an endeavour to do it; nay, I do not think, that they can show me any place, where make is taken for an endeavour, but the very phrase, intimating a produced effect, is no where used for an ineffectual endeavour.   

Sect. 11.  
But I will leave this Comment of Socinus, although countenanced by his followers, and apply myself to Smalcius, 
Smalcius' g●o●●e.  in his 13 cap. refutationis libelli de divinâ verbi incarnati naturâ, pag. 75. upon these words, (The world was made by him) [We deny (saith he) that by the word (World) is signified the old world; 
His various significations put upon the word [World.]  that by the word (made) is signified creation; that by the phrase (by him) is signified a principal agent. I shall undertake these in their order, as he handle's them, but his greatest endeavour is about the first word (the world) which he and I both first meddle with. First, he saith, this word (World) hath divers significations▪ it signifies only men; it signifies the future world; now (saith he) when Saint John saith, the world was made by him, may be understood, that we are reform by him; in which sense it is said, that Christ enlightens every man which cometh into the world, as it is said in the preceding verse; now as Christ is said to enlighten every man, because he used sufficient means, and endeavoured their enlightening, so he is said, to make the world, that is, the men in it, by endeavouring to reform them.] This is a cruel thing, to impose upon a man such expositions, 
Wherein he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader.  where making must be taken for reforming; for although they can show the same root for these words in Hebrew, yet not in Greek, nor any place in the New Testament, where the word used for making is used for reforming; and then that reforming must be understood only an endeavour, not an act, as I have showed. His second way is, to take this word (World) for the future World, life eternal, this is pag. 76. as this Life eternal is revealed, and given by Christ; see again the violence of this exposition; the world is taken for the future, in Heaven; this making of it, by the word, is the revealing of it by Christ; than which never were there heard greater falsifications of any Text; for illustration of which he bring's the 17. Verse of this Chapter, Grace and Truth is by Jesus Christ; when there is nothing in these words, which can give any light to any such sense in the other; for, how can it follow, because Christ is the Agent, by which his Servants receive grace and truth, therefore his making the world, should be understood of his revealing or giving eternal Life; but Valkelius in his fifth Book, de verà religione, cap. 10. pag. 445. and 446. give's other illustrations: that this word (World) should signify the future World; Hebrews 2.5. 2 Peter 3.13. these he put's in the Margin, to justify this acception of the World for the other, and in all which places it is observable; there is no one, but the fourth to the Romans, which hath this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
The Bishop's Animadversions.  which we render World, in it, and sometimes the word new added, which might well expound his sense, as in St. Peter; and sometimes no such intent, as he would have it, to signify the future World so in those places to the Hebrews; but then, for this place to the Romans, although there is this very word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it, as the H●ir of the world, yet Christ was Heir of this world, and the promise was made to Abraham, that all nations in the earth should be blessed in his seed, and so his Seed should be Heir, Lord of all the world, and have kingdom and rule over all nations, ever here on earth. These are the principal things I observe amongst them, to justify their Comment upon that Text; and it appears, that they have not showed, that this word (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉) which we render made, was ever used for regenerating, much less for the intention of it; again, we may mark, that this word, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is never used for the world to come or heaven, without an addition; when it is put absolutely, as here, it signifye's the present World. It will be now time to set down mine own conceit, and vindicate it from such exceptions as they make against it [he was in the world] that is, the word, not the light, because, in the last Clause, where it is said, the World knew him not, him is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, in the Masculine gender, which agrees to the Word, not to the Light, which is the Neuter gender.  
Well then, he was in the world, the great world, the universe, is what was meant by the word was in the world; and this must be true, because the Word was God, and he is every where, he in the world, and the world in him; and this is something that a man learns here for his Faith, that God is always in the world, preserving and looking to it; but, suppose a man should take the word in their Conceit (for a man who preached and taught other men the will of God) were it not a strange needless speech, for a man to say, that he was in the world? Take the world how they will, for the great World which we inhabit, or for the company of men who live in it; (for only in these two senses they understood World in this place) but to say that the Word, the Word God, was in the world; here is something delivered that men would listen to.   

Sest. 12.  
[And the world was made by him] that is, as he is with it in preserving, 
〈◊〉 sense directly opposite to that evident in the Text.  so he was with it in making it, at the first, when it was made; let us view the sense of their way, compared with this: the Word, which is Christ in his humanity, by his Sermons, Miracles, and Life, made, that is, either reform the world, that is men which were in the great World, and this reformation was intentional only, he did not do it, in a flat opposition to the Text, as can be: or else the same, Christ made, that is prepared and fitted to that Heaven, that place of happiness, into which his Servants shall enter hereafter, when in the whole Bible they cannot find this word, which is used here for world, single and alone used for Heaven, or for the reformed or regenerated part of men; nor that this word, which is here rendered (made) is taken for regeneration: Reader, this is a strange way of expounding Scripture.   

Sect. 13.  
[And the world knew him not] that is, the same world which he made, and in which he was, knew him not, did not take such notice as they might, by revelations which were made of him, by the Creature and the Law written in their hearts; here they except against this exposition of the Term (World,) that we vary and change the Term from what it was used for, in the former expositions; there we took the world for the great Mass of created things, but here we take it for the world of men; I say we do not change the sense of any Term, 
The genuine sense of the Terms not changed, as they object.  from the most genuine and natural signification it hath; for although very many, and the greatest number of Expositors do say, that this Term (World) doth signify the men in the world, yet, that very exposition differs not in sense from that I have given, no more than if a man should say, that Socrates did see such or such a thing; or that Socrates his eyes saw it, which is all one; for men are the eye of the World, by which it is able to discern any thing; and when it is said, the world knew him not, it must needs be understood that the men in the world knew him not, because the World can know God by nothing but its understanding part, which is men. It seems by Smalcius in refutatione libelli de divina verbi incarnati natura, pag. 18. that Smiglecius had made an answer, somewhat like this of mine, to which Smalcius replye's, that [this answer profit nothing, for it remaines firm still, 
Smalcius' reply to Smeglecius.  that the word (World) is taken in another sense, in the third Sentence, than it was in the second; since it is certain, that the world, which did not know Christ, is another world from that was made by him;] and too the similitude he answers, that [the men, who did not know Christ, are not such a part of the World▪ as the eye is of man, for when a man see's not, the whole eye see's not; but that men knew not Christ, is only affirmed of part of men, and that the worst part of men, not all men; so that when it is said, that the world knew him not, it must be understood of man in general, not of the ill, the worst part of men.] I return to this: first, that such an answer cannot become a Socinian, 
Little becoming a Socinian.  who do in general make this Synecdoche, pars pro toto, understood here, and it is their own way, and not unusual in Scripture; but, secondly, I say again, that it is true of the whole World, and each particular man, that neither the whole, nor any particular man in the world, did know him, as they were the world, the created World, 
The World knew not the Wo●d, but by supernatural grace.  but by an addition of supernatural favour and grace; this kind of phrase is used by Saint Paul, 1 Cor 15.50. Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God: it is quatenus, as it is fl●sh and blood; but when that corruption hath put on incorruption, when that fl●sh and blood is sanctified, when it is glorified, and endued with supernatural grace, than it shall inherit and possess the kingdom of God, and with these eyes they shall see their Redeemer; so the 1 Cor. 2.14. the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit, but even St. Peter and St. Paul were natural men, they could not have died else, but quatenus, as natural, he cannot do it; that man, who is a natural man, can, but not as he is natural, by the virtue and force of his natural abilities; so it is here, the World [knew him not] that is, by any natural abilities in that worldly condition, in which it was made, unless perfected by some more excellent endowments and blessings; The Prophets knew him, but, they had supernatural assistance; the Shepherds they discern him at his birth, but Angels, told it them; to conclude, we cannot apprehend him, as he is, by any worldly assistance; 
What men apprehended of God by natural abilities.  I am persuaded that men have by the natural abilities, which God hath given them, and the consideration of his Creatures, found out and known, that God made the world, and that he rule's and governe's it by a most exact Wisdom; but that this Wisdom should be a person; that this person should be the Son of God; without some other Light, than he h●th naturally, a man cannot perceive it; for, although it be a most received Axiom in the School, that Omnia opera Dei ad extrà sunt indivisa, that all the outward works of God are wrought by the whole Trinity; yet, they are done by such an unity of the Trinity, as is not observed out of those vestigia's (as they speak,) those partial representations which are in the Creature of it; and therefore, I am persuaded, that Trismegistus, Socrates, Plato, and such others, who have such lively expressions of these mysteries, either had some revelations made to them from above, or else had met with some Prophet or prophetic writing, upon which they confiding were bold, out of t●em, to make these expositions; to this, which I have said, I cannot discern any thing answered, because I have not known it urged to that height by others; nor do I know, what they can object, unless it be, 
The objection about Saint Joh●'s upbraiding the world answered.  that St. John seems to upbraid the world with ingratitude, that they should not take notice of so great a goodness of God's who made it; but this cannot be justly urged against them, who could not know him, whom, as it seems by discourse, the world could not; to this I answer; that for any thing I see, such an intention of the Text is yielded to by writers on both sides, but I discern nothing in the Text that enforceth any more than an historical narrative of the nature and condition of the World, that he was undiscerned in the world, until some supernatural blessing enlightened men; I cannot discern any such upbraiding, as they speak of, but if there be any moral intention besides the history, there is nothing can be deduced more naturally, then, that men, who have this light, are bound to a grateful acknowledgement of all they have, to arise from God, both natural and spiritual things, and to use them to his glory; or, if men will apprehend such a thing as upbraiding, be it, that they may think it consisted in this, that the generality did not know him as they might, men did not apprehend so much as was apprehendible of him; but I choose rather the first exposition, although the second be the common road; and I proceed to the next Verse.  

The exposition of the words immediately following, why omitted.  [He came unto his own, and his own received him not] this and the two next Verses yield a great many heavenly meditations, which I could delight to discourse, as well as think of, but they are not pertinent to this business I have in hand, to show, that our Saviour was the word of God, which was God.   

Sect. 14.  
I therefore let them pass, and come to the 14. Verse, where we find opposition from them with much art, which we render thus [And the Word was made flesh, and dwelled amongst us] there are two propositions in this particle [And the Word was made fl●sh, 
The Socinians Word cou●d not be made Fl●sh. ] that is the first: Here, by the Word, the Socinian understands the same Word as before, Christ, as by preaching and Miracles, he manifested the will of God to men; but that this could not be made flesh, is evident, because it was flesh always, and nothing can be made that which it is; but this Word was always such; if it had been, that flesh was made the Word, there had been some sense in it, because than we had understood that that man, who at the first was not the Word, by preaching, etc. was made the Word; but, this sentence [the Word was made flesh] abide's no such construction; to avoid this, therefore, they fly to that other Term [was made] of which I have treated before, when it came in my way, 
Their evasion.  at the sixth Verse; this word, (say they with one consent) signifye's (to be) and it should be read [the word was fl●sh] this I have examined before and showed, that I can find no place in St. John, where [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] is so used, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how used in the beginning of St. John's Gospel.  that necessarily men must understand it in their sense; so that that place, in the sixth Verse, was so read for the smoothness of the Latin or English Language, which would not abide the verbal translation of the Greek; now I will add thus much; in these 14. Verses, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used for (was) or (being) at the least nine or ten times; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, five or six times for made; what reason can we imagine, that the style or language should be altered here? but then, let us consider what the sense would be, if the Text were read as they would make us believe [the Word was flesh] as much as if we should say, the preacher was a man, which were a most ridiculous speech; and therefore, to avoid this, they fly to this Term flesh, and say, 
Their heterodox interpretation of flesh.  that that Term doth not signify flesh its self, or a man clothed with flesh, pars pro toto, which is often in Scripture; but the humble estate of a man; and here they bestow much Rhetoric, to show, that the Evangelist, having spoken so great things of the Word, that it was with God, was God; that all things were made by him, etc. lest men should enter into this vain Conceit, that he was the great God, he pluck's him down to consider, that he is but a weak man, flesh, subject to many miseries and misfortunes, death and injuries, etc. observe here that this word Flesh in its natural and proper meaning, signifye's a part of man in a figurative manner, by a Synecdoche it signifye's the whole; but, for any thing I can discern, 
Not evident in Scripture.  in Scripture it is not used for any base or miserable condition of man, but only in general Terms, to show, that man, whilst he lives in flesh, is subject to the infirmities of it: the places produced by Socinus speak no more, 
Cited by Socinus.  the first is Psal. 78.39. he remembered that they were but flesh; here is a speech concerning the Israelites in their general State, as men, and as frail and weak, but no particular dejectedness of their Condition, but that they were no better than men. His second place is, Isaiah 40.6. All flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof as the flower of the field; suppose I should yield, that here by flesh is reprepresented a low and mean Condition; yet here is such a Comment joined to this word fl●sh, as enforceth that conceit; but in my Text there is no such thing; so that still I may say, that this Term flesh teacheth us no such thing, without an addition of such other language, as may render it of that sense; but then again, all the expression of any lowness or dejectedness of estate, that is here made, is nothing else but the general condition of mankind, no particular humiliation meant by it; and that is evident out of that phrase [all flesh is grass, etc.] this sign (all) shows it to be meant universally. So likewise Jeremiah 17.5. Cursed be the man that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm. Here is no manner of unhappy condition taught by flesh, but that it is a Creature, and must not be confided in like God. These are the places u●ged by Socinus, and whatsoever I find any where of the same nature; so that I do not find fl●sh taken for the most unhappy sort of men, but for men in general; and when it is said [the word was made flesh] it must, for aught appears yet, be understood, was made man, such a thing which was a creature, which creature was subject to infirmity; but, for a greater evidence to this truth, let us see what will be the result of their Comment, to wit this; that the word, which was the man Christ, 
The result of their Comment.  who preached and taught the will of God to men, was in the beginning of the Gospel; was with God, that is, known only to him; was God, that is, a man in Authority; all things were made by him, that is, all things were established concerning man's reformation in order to heaven, etc. he was in the World, a great strange thing, how could he be out? and the world was made by him, that is, intended to be reform; but, because so great things were spoken of him, to pluck down men's overweening conceit, he is said to be flesh; could any man, that understands these words, as they would have men, conceive he was other? is there any thing, that is delivered in their pretence of the import of these words, that should endanger a man to think otherwise? certainly no; and therefore, throughout all that they have said, is a monstrous violence to God's word. Well, now our exposition, which is most natural to this Text, will appear in its self; the word, the inward word of God, which in its sense was eternal, 
The sum of ours.  was made flesh in time; I know nothing of moment objected against this.   

Sect. 15.  
But the impossibility that God should be made man, st●ll remaining God; [nothing (say they) is made another, but it ceaseth to be its self, when it is made that other; so water, when by rarefaction it is made air, ceaseth to be water, and the like] so Socinus upon this place, pag. 39 so Smalcius cap. 17. refutationis libelli, etc. so often named, pag. 99 and 100 To this we can answer, that although nothing can be made another, by mutation, but it ceaseth from its own being, 
The union of the Divinity with the humanity implieth no mutation of God into Man.  yet it may by union; So the soul and body united may make one person, but this they oppose, [that by this union the body is not affirmed to be the soul, but animatum, a living creature, as we speak; now the effect of this action is, that God must be man, the like predication is not in the world] (say they) what then? 
Notwithstanding the predication, God is Man▪  must not this be true? there is but one Sun, must there be more because there is but one? that there is no more such, makes it seem the more divine; the like, the equality of which is not to be found in the Creatures; and therefore, this ought not to be urged any further. Yet, because they seem unsatisfied without such an answer, although that is not like Christians, give me leave to labour for some easy expressions, which thus I do; 
Wh●ch is asserted, ●nd by a familiar instance illustrated.  A piece of Iron stands by, or in the fire, it gets heat and is made hot, which it was not before, and yet it remaines Iron still; it is true, it is not caliditas, heat its self, but hot; no more can we say that the divinity is the humanity, but God is man: the I●on is made hot; 
Their Objection.  yea, [but (say they) here is an addition of an accident to a substance, a subject; but in the case of God and man, here, you would have two substances united and made one] I shall then philosophise higher than I have hitherto, 
Answered by the dependa●●● of substances up on God.  and say, that in respect, of God, all substances to him are but as accidents to other subjects; as accidents have a dependence upon the subject, so substances upon him, he is only ens per se subsistens, the thing which hath its subsistence by its self, independing upon any other, all other substances like accidents live, move, and have their being in and by him; so that substances are supported by him, accidents by substances; and he may as well be made a man, as a body white, warm, cold, or the like; for all substances having not their existence only, but their manner of existing, depending upon him, as any accident hath its manner of existing depending upon a body, there is no reason, if he please to unite himself to any of them, why he may not do it.  
Smalcius urgeth another Argument thus; 
Another Argument of Smalcius'.  [If the word be made flesh, one of these two will follow, either that the true word is not man, if it take the person of a man; or else that there are two persons of the word and of man, and so two Sons of God in Christ, if he have either person] To these I will answer apart, 
Answered by the manner of existing.  as they are two dividing members; to the first; the true word is man, though it lack the personality of a man, which is thus showed; personality is the modus, the manner of existing of a reasonable substance, the subsistence; as inhesion or dependence, is the manner of existing amongst accidents, so is subsistence with substances, and personality is that to reasonable substances; now, as if God should suspend this last compliment and addition to the existence of an accident, which I make no doubt of (and am confident well may be proved, but will be granted) then this accident should exist without its usual and commoner way of being; so, if God please to suspend this last usual manner of subsisting by its self, from any substance, it would and might exist without it; as we may conceive the body of man to be a being before the infusion of the Soul, yea hath a subsistence of its self; yet after and at that instant of the infusion of the Soul, it receive's a new manner, which it had not before, and grows a person, and exists with and by it; so may any man conceive that the man Christ, united to the divinity, exist's not with a humane personality, but that more excellent of the word of God, the perfection and excellentest piece in every thing, giving the denomination to every thing.  
And yet, he is a man existing in the person of the divinity; Smalcius, in his urging this Argument, insults mightily (saith he) [it is enquired whether it be a true man, 
Christ a true man▪ though a divine pers●n.  which is not an humane person,] I answer; yes, it is a true man, and a person, but a divine p●rson, to be a man and a true man, is to have a reasonable Soul and a body; this he hath, although the manner of his existence be not terminated in this, but the divinity; he goes on and urgeth [that Christ was conceived in the Womb of the blessed Virgin, 
Whose conception and gestation in the blessed Virgin's w●mb conduced nothing to his personality.  a just time sustained there, and at the last borne, all which (saith he) pertains to the constituting a person] I answer, he was thus, although these had nothing to do in the Constitution of his person; these were but the common producers of any individual humane nature, and so, by consequence, were accidents of ordinary personality, although they were undiscerned to work any thing, nay they could work nothing in his personality.  

The Divinity an humanity uni●ed render him neither two Sons nor two persons.  To the second part of this distinction [or else there must be two distinct persons, and so two Sons] that which hath been delivered is sufficient to answer, that there is but one Son, and one person, as Athanasius in his Creed; as the Soul and Body make one man so the Divinity and Humanity make one Christ; the Soul and Body have but one subsistence, when they are united, but, two, when they are severed; so if the humanity had not been taken ken into the Word, or should be left by it, there would be two distinct subsistences, and two distinct persons, but being, as they are, united, there is but one.   

Sect. 16.  
He hath another objection, which he esteems of very great force, pag. 102. which is thus framed: 
Object. Of his being the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost.  [When the word is the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost, it should follow, if the Word be made fl●sh, that the Father and the holy Ghost should be made fl●sh likewise, and so it would agree to the Father and the holy Ghost, to be conceived, born, die, arise again, as well as to the Son, because Omnia opera, etc. all the outward works of the Trinity are inseparable.] For answer to this, 
Answer▪ Which identity implies not that they were made fl●sh with him.  I grant that Axiom to be true, and so far forth as there is any outward action, it is most true, that the whole Trinity conspired in that Act; they all produced this man Christ our Saviour; they all preserved him in his being; but the humanity of our Saviour was united only to the Word, which was his Divinity, and this union was it by which he was made man, nor, in respect of it, can it be said, that that was an external Action, but a taking the humanity into unity with its s●lf; for although the object be an external thing, yet the act being internal, a reception, not an extramission, or working without upon it, it need be no more called an external act, than God's knowledge of the Creatures, whose object is external, but the act internal; for all that can be said of this, is, that this manhood is united to the Word, which union may well be a work of the Trinity, although terminated in the Son; as when a man tye's a knot, by which two points, or any other things are united, the union is wrought by the man, but terminated in these two; so, though this unity is wrought by the Trinity, yet it is terminated in the Word and humanity, not in the other persons; or, if you would have it closer, suppose a man should glue a ring to the middle joint of his little finger, the man made this union, but it is only united or terminated in that joint; nor can we imagine what outward work was terminated by that joint. Scotus to this purpose excellently: [A point terminate●s a line, 
As Scotus illust●ate's excellently.  yet hath no outward work upon it; one relation terminate's another, the Son the Father, yet hath no outward causation or work upon him; this termination, which personality give's to any individual nature, give's it only a finition, and stint's it in these particular bounds, but hath no external work upon it at all; so that the Father and the holy Ghost produce all the outward work with the Son, but the Son only is interested in the union, by being made flesh, etc.] Good Reader, if my weak expressions have not rendered this high Mystery lively to thy Capacity, 
The Bishop's apology to the Reader.  excuse me, I have done mine endeavour; and since they labour with Philosophical tricks and nice ties, to ●ustian and amaze this discourse, I must cross them in their own way, or else their triumph will be endless; the truth is, these Mysteries are revealed quòd sunt, that they are, and men ought to bel●eve that, and should go no farther; but when witty men, with wicked reason, shall labour to lay stumbling-blocks of reason in our way to heaven, it becomes us to lay them aside, which I hope, by the assistance of that God (whose glory I endeavour) I have, and shall do. Smalcius, where before cited, adde's great vaunts of this Argument with most opprobrious Terms, which I meddle not with as impertinent.   

Sect. 17.  
But because he makes some Queries, which he think's, or seems to think, are able to stumble a Reader, being unanswerable, I shall, putting them down, endeavour to answer them; although I may justly say, in cases of this nature, it is as true as in any, that a weak and silly man may ask more, than a learned man can answer. His first is (Potest ne fieri, can it be, that he, who is God, can do any thing, not as God, or in the nature of God? 
Sm●lcius's fi●st Q●erie, etc. ) this last phrase (or in the nature of God) seems to me a strange exposition of that (as God) for quatenus ipsum, 
Rectified.  is not in the nature of the thing which act's, but according to the nature, or to act out of the Principles of that nature; now that may be done even by God in these outward acts of creating and governing the Creature, which acts are not in, but out of his nature, although according to his nature; I do not understand quatenus here in the strictest sense of Logicians, for that which is reciprocal, but in a larger, as I expounded, it; 
Answered. All actions not always necessarily according to the nature of him, or that which act's.  To the Question its self: I answer to it, as it seems to be proposed, as if it were in general, that nothing can act any thing which is not out of the principles of its nature; for this, consider, Socrates is a man, yet he can affect sensual things, which he doth, not as a man, but as a beast, or a sensitive Creature; he groweth and the like, not as a man, that is, out of the principles of humanity, but as a vegetable; again, Socrates is a Son, or a Father, or both; he doth many things as neither; he doth many, being a Son, and a man; as a Son out of the principles of Sonship, not as man out of the principles of humanity; so that when any thing hath a substantial essence and a relative, it may act out of the principles of that relative condition it hath, and not out of the essential nature it hath; if he speak, as he doth, of the persons of the Trinity, no doubt, but those personal actions and relations betwixt Father, Son and holy Spirit, although done and acted in that essence, yet are not essential, but personal; and for other acts, if any person assume any thing into a personal union with it, it may act by and in that united nature, that which it act's, not according to his Divine, that is, out of that principle; thus may it eat, walk, and the like; this (because he still require's instances from the Creature) is evident out of them; a man, when his hand is warmed by fire, or cooled by Frost, can, by putting his hand to another, warm or cool another's hand, still being a m●n, he act's according to the Condition of that quality, which is added to him, and not according to the principles of humanity.  
His second Quere is [Can it be, that a Divine person can be a divers thing from the Divine nature] I think, 
Smalius' second Querie Answered and frustrated.  amongst a thousand which he may read, that have written about this business, who are Orthodox, he can show none that ever affirmed it it; they say that the Father, Son and Spirit are divers persons, but not divers things, diversus est filius, not diversum, a divers person, not a divers substance.  
His third and last Quere is [Whether it may be, that there should be the same nature of all three persons, 
His third Querie  and yet, one of these persons acting something, the nature should not act that same thing?] he instances in the incarnation, birth, death, etc. of the Son, which had the Divine nature, and yet the Father and the holy Spirit, which had the same nature and essence numero, that is, in number, with the Son, 
Answered, with reference to the discourse before concerning the incarnation of the Father and holy Ghost.  should not be incarnate, born, etc.] To this, I conceive, I have spoken sufficiently already, where I have showed, that one person can be incarnate, and not the other, which when it is granted, all the rest will follow, he may be conceived, born, die, etc. in that nature which was united to him, although not in that of which he was a person; which hath been a most Catholic universally received truth, these thousand years and upward, in the Christian world, and therefore ought, if refused, to be confuted with reasons, not with opposition only of the Authority of two or three men, by a plain denial and no more. This is all, of any moment, that I find objected against the exposition of this place, which I hope I have satisfied, and in it evinced, that our Saviour is a person in the Trinity, equal with the Father, and distinct from the Father.   

Sect. 18.  
Which being done, it must needs follow, that Mr. Hobbes was much too bold with him, when he said, he did personate the Father; which, as it is a language unheard-of in Scripture, so it is impossible to be true, he being equal to him in all things, and co-acting with him whatsoever he did, in Heaven or Earth; what he adde's [that our Saviour came to ●educe the Jews, and induce all Nations into the Kingdom of his Father, not as of himself, 
Our Saviour's mission derogates nothing from the authority and plenitude of power in himself.  but as sent from his Father] was weakly affirmed, if not worse; for although in that errand he was sent by the Father, as he was man, yet he, with plenarity of power, did execute the same, as he was the Son of God, and God united to that manhood; of which I think to discourse more fully hereafter; but in a word for the present, t●ke that only one Sentence of our Saviour's, which is the latter part of the 21. Verse of the 20. Chapter of St. John; As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you; this was spoken to his Apostles; here the Father sent Christ as man, to bear witness to the Truth, John 18.37. for this end was I born, and for this end came I into the world, that I should b●ar witness to the truth; so did he command his Apostles, Matth. 28.19, 20. Go teach all nations, 
Wh●ch he exercised in giving commission to his Apostles.  or discipulize them, Verse 20. teaching them to observe all thing whatsoever I have commanded you; where we see that his Authority sent them in the same errand that he was sent in himself; then next, which is most pertinent to this purpose, in the 18. Ver. of the same 28. of St. Matth. he saith, All power is given me in Heaven and in Earth; so if he did not give them such Power or Authority, where the greatest power is given, there the less is included, Matth. 10.1. he gave them power over unclean spirits, those are the greatest and most powerful things in the world; so likewise John 20.23. whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted, etc. there the power of Heaven and Earth is both included; and in none of these is that unworthy diminishing Term added which Mr. Hobbes intrudes, (not as of himself) for, although, as man his Authority is derivative, yet, as God, he gave these powers with Authority immediately from himself, with no expression of any delegation to do it; let this suffice, as at the present, for the examination of that speech of his; concerning which I intent a farther indagation in a fuller discourse, which the opportunity of another error will invite me to.    

CHAP. XXXIV.  
The Holy Ghost proved to be neither Attribute, nor Gospel, nor a mere gift (as the Socinians fancy;) but the third person in the holy Trinity.  

Sect. 1.  
ANd now, my next undertaking must be, to do as much for the holy Spirit, which I shall endeavour to do exceeding briefly: and first, I will set down what mistakes have misguided the Adversaries of this Truth, and vindicating it from them, shall confirm the said Truth with only one Argument which I conceive convincing of it. First then, 
The Socinian's opinion of the holy Ghost.  the Socinians deliver, that the holy Ghost is an Attribute of the Deity, not a person; that it is the virtue and power of God, by which he operate's and produceth those effects that are wrought amongst us, but not a distinct person from either the Father or Son;] To confute this, I shall produce that one place, 
Confuted, and this proved, that he is a distinct person of the Trinity, not a mere Attribute of the Deity.  Luke 3.22. and the holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape like a dove upon him, and lo, a voice from heaven, which said, Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased; the Story of this is evidently thus, Our Saviour was now baptised, and, being gone up, out of the water, as St. Matth. 3.16. he prayed, and then the holy Spirit thus descended upon him; that this was not the power of God, is evident, because, I think, no man can show me a bare Attribute of God represented or said to appear in a bodily shape, but a person or the essence; and secondly, if there were an Attribute expressed here by this bodily apparition, it could not be the power of God, that operating power, by which his wonderful works are wrought, because the innocent unacting nature of a dove doth the least express that of any other, but, as Erasmus most excellently paraphrase's upon the place, he shows us here, that as the dove brought a● Olive branch after the deluge to Noah, in taken that the waters were assuaged, and the wrath of God pacified towards mankind; so the holy Spirit, after the Baptism of our Saviour, by whose Baptism ours received a confirmation, if not an institution, by which, like as by the Ark of No●h, we are delivered from the wrath of God; the holy Spirit appeared in the shape of that Divine messenger before, and brought us comfort, that we shall be delivered as in the Ark; to which St. Peter alludes 1.3.21. the like figure whereunto (that is of the Ark, spoken of in the 20. Verse) is Baptism; well, by no means could it any way notify the power of God in this shape, but his kindness and meekness; now likewise, that it is a distinct person from the other, is evident, because in this very Verse, the other persons are not intimated only, but expressed, the voice from heaven uttering these words, thou art my, etc. manifesting the Father, and the person spoken to declaring the Son.   

Sect. 2.  
But I find another opinion amongst them, which is in the Racovian Catechism, Chapter 6. de Christi prophetico munere, pag. 162. in that edition I use now, at Racovia, 1651. where the question being put, Quid verò Spiritus Sanctus? What is the holy Ghost? he answer's, that first in the New Testament the Gospel of Christ is designed by it; the Catechism produceth two places of Scripture to prove this by: the first, 1 Cor. 2.10. but God hath revealed them, (that is, the things which he hath prepared for them that love him) unto us by his Spirit, where, say those Divines, the holy Spirit is said to reveal the Mysteries of Godliness to God's Servants] the other is 2 Tim. 1.10. where it is said, God hath brought life and immortality to light by the Gospel; [now, say they, in this latter place, the Gospel is said to do that which the Spirit was said to act in the former; therefore they are one.]  
A most piteous Argument: The Fire, a Candle, 
No● the Gospel o● Christ, as they pretend out of holy Scripture.  and the Sun, make us see the same thing, therefore they three are one; but more closely; the internal light in mine eye, or whatsoever it is that fit's the Organ for discerning, and the external light of the Sun, which illuminate's the object, both make me perceive the same visible object, therefore, by their Logic, they are one, which is absurd; so is it with these two, the carnal or natural man, of himself, cannot behold the things of the Spirit, God therefore infuseth into him the holy Ghost, by which he is enabled to discern these Mysteries of Godliness; bue yet th● object lies in the dark, the Gospel therefore reveale's it unto them; as the Kingly Prophet most punctually phras●th it, Psalm 36.9. in thy light we shall see light; in the light of the Spirit we shall see the light of the Gospel; and yet these two are very distinct; nay my Text confute's all; for if there be any thing in this Verse, which looks like the Gospel, it is the words of the voice, thou art my beloved Son, etc. the apparition of the holy Ghost, in the likeness of a dove, hath nothing to do with the Gospel, therefore the Spirit here cannot be taken for the Gospel; but they urge again, that it is called the Gospel of the Spirit, 2 Cor▪ 3 6. I say, therefore it is not the Spirit, it is the Gospel of the Spirit, because it reveale's the Spirit unto us and Spiritual Mysteries; but nothing is the same with that which it reveale's; nay, if we say any thing is of another, we must in that imply, that it is not that other.   

Sect. 3.  
But they go farther, and say, that this phrase, the holy Spirit, signifies Dei Donum, which is given to certain men, 
Not the gift of God to certain men, but by a figure.  and is called the earnest of our inheritance; no doubt, and he cite's 2 Cor. 1.22. as Ephesians 1.14. all this is granted, that the holy Spirit is taken sometimes for the Gifts, but by a Metonymy, the cause for the effect; but that it should never be taken for that Divine person, we deny, and they cannot prove; for, as St. Paul dispute's the case at large, 1 Cor. 12. The gifts of the spirit are divers, but the same Spirit, that third person of the Trinity, is one; so that although the Spirit may be called by the name of those Gifts which proceed from it, yet he is distinct from them, and here it is evident in my Text, he was another thing besides them. This is all that I find objected; and all this is confuted out of this, where the holy Spirit is said to descend upon our Saviour in the likeness of a dove, to which none of these extravagant expressions can be applied. And now, there needs no more from Scripture; Their great defiance to us, 
A defiance to them that call for Reason in these mysteries.  to produce Reason for what we speak, may be defied by us as unnecessary in a Case of Faith; where we have Scripture we must believe beyond, yea against reason; the Scripture hath been abundantly handled by divers, although in these places, which I have handled, I have endeavoured to contribute something to the clearing of them; The rational laid aside by all almost, as an impossible work.   

Sect. 4.  
I therefore will adore and admire that high Mystery, and shall most humbly thank Almighty God, that he hath pleased to reveal such a sacred Truth to our Faith, 
Which notwithstanding may be subservienr to Faith.  but then shall admire likewise his bounty to such men, whose Souls and Reason he hath awakened, by his Spirit, to such a height, as that they have made their Reason attend their Faith and follow it, although non passibus aequis, yet come up to it, and discern that it is most rational for a man to believe it is so; What I have observed in this kind, and wherein I can enlarge the Conceit of others, and explain any thing by reason, I shall set down (having this occasion) and impart to the world, with all humility to more learned men and to adoration of the Divine Excellencies, which are not to be fathomed by man, quid sunt, what they are, although quòd sunt, that they are; believing that they are by faith, humane reason may justly strive to prove them, and certainly it is a Godly work, as impious to labour against it; but I am discouraged mightily by the whole body of the School, who almost with one voice, Thomist and Scotist, cry out that it is impossible to be done.    

CHAP. XXXV.  
Concerning God's enlarging the capacity of Nature, and admitting Reason to some discovery of the Holy Trinity; Of Lullies' Demonstration by Aequiparance; Whom the Bishop magnifies and vindicate's against Vasques, etc. The production of the Son, and procession of the Holy Ghost, by the spiritual acts of the divine Understanding and Will.  

Sect. 1.  

C●rthag●na's l●tle less than blasphemous, intimating God's power of enlarging the capacity of his Creature.  CArthagena is so impudent, that he affirmes, impossibile est per Dei potentiam fieri creaturam, cui sit naturalis cognitio mysterii Trinitatis; in Thomam Quaest 32. art▪ primo conclusione secunda. It is impossible that by the power of God, a creature should be made, to whom the knowledge of the Trinity should be natural; which, in my conceit, is little less than blasphemy; for why cannot ●od make a Creature natural do that which he can enable him to do? for these Terms, natural or supernatural, are only such, because God hath confined Nature to such bounds as it cannot go farther; and exalted other things to such an height, as is ultra Sphaeram activitatis, beyond the reach of that natural arm to come at; but, if it shall please God to enlarge the bounds of that Nature, or draw the other nearer to it, it may then do that naturally, which before, without that enlargement, it could not do; as we see that fire cannot, with its heat, warm a thing which is far off, yet bring that body nee●er to the fire, or let the fire be made more intense, it can then do it; so can God make a Creature●s understanding more intense and active, and, if he please, make that sun whose glorious light, in its self, we cannot behold, have such gentle Clouds interposed, as may make us see him behind them, which in its self nakedly, without those Clouds, we could not; so may God make himself discernible by such expressions as were fit for him, and kindly to us; it is a mighty fault in the great wits frequently, that they will limit God's abilities to their own apprehensions, and because they cannot conceive how, therefore they will say he cannot do it; and, because natural men, in this Condition, cannot apprehend this, therefore God cannot make such a man; and so this Author, whilst he labours to show how divine excellencies transcend our capacities, he himself confine's God's infinite power to his own fancy. But I say, I have almost all against my undertaking, and therefore, before I go, I will smooth the way, by disputing that question de possibilitate rei, whether it be possible to be proved or no.   

Sect. 2.  
To understand which give me leave to preface somethings necessary to be preconceived; first, 
What of God to be proved by Reason, and by whom to be attempted.  we must know that there is a God; that this God is of an infinite excellency, infinitely true, good, immense, eternal, etc. all which have a great consent among Divines, that they may be proved by reason. Secondly, Consider with me that there is a great difference betwixt these two; the man pretended able to prove this by natural reason, who never heard nor apprehended it by faith; and him who hath assented to it first by faith; for the former hath no reason to inquire, or with industring to search, because those things of God only concern him by which he is ruled, as his omnisciency, his justice, his providence, and the like; but these internal excellencies which are only in God, and only work as one principle in the outward works, concerning the Creation or Government of the world, these he hath no occasion further to busy his Soul about; but then when they are revealed by faith, a contemplative Soul ambitiously strive's how he may climb up to them by reason. These permitted, I shall undertake the Question.   

Sect. 3.  
The first opposer, I meet with, is that great Father of the School, 
Aquinas' first argument against the possibility to attain by natural reason any knowledge of the Trinity.  Aquinas himself, who indeed hath spoken as fully as any of his followers; his discourse is in prima parte Quest. 32 Art. primo in corpore: I answer (saith he) It must be said, that it is impossible, by natural reason, to come to the knowledge of the Trinity of the divine persons; for it is proved before (which is Quest. 12. Art 12. in corpore) that man, by natural reason, cannot attain to the knowledge of God by the Creatures, but the Creature induces to the knowledge of God, as effects induce to the knowledge of the cause; that therefore only can be known of God, which is necessary to be affirmed of him, as he is the beginning and cause of the creatures, but the creative virtue of God is common to the whole Trinity, therefore it appertaines to the unity of the essence, not to the Trinity of the persons. (Thus far he,) and this is the first of his Arguments: I will answer them by degrees, one by one, for perspicuity sake.  
To this first I shall answer, that although the greatest part of knowledge is either drawn from the cause to the effect, 
The Bishop's answer grounded upon Lulli's demonstration by aequiparance.  or from the effect to the Cause, and the first only can be applied to God, who hath no cause, and whose effects some way or other, all things are; as from that one infinite being, God, yet Raymund Lul, whom I most honour, in this case, hath thought of other ways of arguing, of as great force and convincing a man's understanding as these, to wit demonstratio per aequiparantiam, by the proportion and equality of things, and per similitudimem, by their likeness, that by equiparance or equivalence he conceiveth to be, when by one or two of an equal excellency an other quality is proved to be as excellent; as thus; because God is infinitely excellent, therefore he is infinitely knowing, infinitely good; again this argument from equivalence may be brought from the power to the acts, thus; the act is proportioned to he power; where is an infinite power, there is an infinite act; where a finite power, there but a finite act; now by these ways I apprehend that a man may prove the Trinity, although not by the effects of God in the Creature, as effects.   

Sect. 4.  
His second Argument is, that to prove the Trinity by reason were derogatory from faith, 
Aquinas' second Argum.  which is of things invisible, as it is Heb. 11. now, saith he, if these things were provable by reason, they were not unseen, that is of natural understandings.  
To this I answer, that from the same inconvenience, the infinite creating power and act of creating were not provable by reason, which is an article of our faith, 
The Bishop's first answer concerning the invisible objects of Faith.  and although we could not prove it, yet we must believe it, which both he and his followers agree to grant.  
Secondly, I answer, that although these things of faith are unseen by mere natural men, without all faith, 
The Bishop's second answer concerning the after-sight of Reason.  yet when a man hath faith, than that light of faith, may show him this or that thing of them, and his Reason may afterwards likewise discern it; for you may conceive a weight too heavy for a weak man to lift, yet when a stronger assist's him, he can do it with him which before he could not without him; or as you may see a weak-sighted man, by the help of his Spectacles, read's those words, which else he could not have read without them, yet having clearly read them with Spectacles can after, by his weaker sight, read them without, because the sense is in his head; so a man who, by his own weak sight of his own reason, cannot lift such a burden as the Trinity, yet having the assistance of a stronger, his faith, he can then lift up his Arm of Reason, to bear it likewise; so he that was forced to use spectacles assistants to his Reason, whereby he might apprehend this Mystery, yet having the sense of it in his head, by that, can afterwards read it by reason; so, though these holy Mysteries are invisible to mere natural men, yet, when made apparent by faith, they may afterwards be discerned likewise by Reason.  

His third argument from scorn and scandal.  Another argument is, that it is unprofitable to faith, for (saith he) when men use reasons that are not convincing, they fall into the scorn of incredulous men, who think that our faith is built upon such reasons only; I answer, 
Answered by the adherence to infallibility of Scripture.  this cannot be with such as I, who profess that my faith depends upon the Scripture, which is infallible, yet have lifted up my Reason to work upon, and serve that Faith.   

Sect. 5.  

Trigosius and Carthagena passed by.  I thought to have examined Trigosius and Carthagena, but I find little in them which will not abundantly be satisfied in my following discourse; I shall let them pass therefore, and for this instant, be contented with what hath been written; only let the Reader observe, that truth is not opposed to any truth, 
Truth not opposed to Truth.  the truth of Faith, to the truth of Reason, divine to humane, nor doth Grace destroy, but perfect Nature; nor only enlighten the Soul to apprehend, but to see; and enable's the Reason to discern what else it could not.  
I have here observed divers Authors undertaking this work, as first Richardus de Sancto victore in his third Book de Trinitate, cap. 2.3, 4. then Bonaventure, in 1. senten. Disp. 2. but he had ill luck with his Argument, for his own Disciples forsake him here, as Corialanus and Trigosius, Scotus likewise somewhat; but all their discourses have been answered, I conceive, satisfactorily; only Raymund Lul, 
The Bishop close●h with Raymund Lul, whom he vindicateth against Vasques.  I think passeth unsatisfied, though undertaken by divers; I shall not doubt, therefore, with his assistance to make good my conclusions of Reason, that there is a Trinity of persons in the unity of essence, Gabriel Vasques, in 1. Question 32. Disput. 133. Dispute's against Lul, of whom he seems to have read three Books, one called Apostrophe, another de Demonstratione aquiparantiae; and Lib. sententiarum, I have no one of these, but three other, his Ars magna, his Ars parva, and his Arbour Scientiarum, and I may add a fourth, bound with his Arbour, called Introductorium, which furnish me with all that he urgeth out of this Author and much more for this purpose; I deal with him first, because other School men seem to derive what they know of Lul, from him, and never to have seen his Books; so that, what shall be satisfactorily spoken to him, will be sufficient for the rest.  
I cannot but commend this Author for a noble enemy, because he speaks civilly of his Adversary, which others do not, but rail at him, for an haeretick, with opprobrious words, 
And Aymericus, who makes him an haeretick.  but he vindicate's him from that unworthy judgement of Aimericus a most censorious unjust Inquisitor, in the fourth Chapter of his former Dispute, where he said, that Raymund Lul, thought these demonstrations might be made good against Saracens; I have not that particular passage in any of his Books, but something like it, in his Arbour Scientiarum, in Arbore Apostolicali, cap. de numero divinali aeternali, at the latter end of that Chapter, where he saith, that (Dominus Papa & ejus fratres Cardinals) the Lord Pope and his brethren the Cardinals should do well, 
His advice to the Pope and Cardinal about converting the Saracens.  if they would ordain certain holy men, devoted to die for Christ, and learned in the Arabic or Saracens language, who should go and preach to the Saracens, and Dispute with them, showing them the Trinity, which Christians believe, etc. and, at the last, by these means, the Pope and Cardinals would more exalt the Catholic faith, then by sword or buckler, or any such like means;] so that, it seems clearly, by this place, that he judged, as Vasques relate's; but more than this I shall tell you, that (when (it seems) he could not get the Pope and Cardinals to do it, 
Hi● devout enterprise according to it, w●th success.  or perhaps they could not find out those persons and devout men which he name) he himself did undertake that work as, Hierome Sanches, who writ his life, relates, and went amongst the Turks, and did convert divers of their Masters, which (saith he) Ipsi vocant Alphochines, and being apprehended, the first time was whipped, banished, and dismissed in a ship, but being one of those devout men, who were resolved to die for Christ, he went again to Bugis in Tunis, 
His like adventure among the 〈◊〉.  where the Moors had built Schools for the Education of youth in the Liberal Sciences, where he converted many of the wisest to Christianity; to be brief: the King caused him to be put into a loathsome prison, where, in hunger and nastiness, he remained seven months, and then being produced and examined he professed himself a Christian, and ready to die for Christ, 
Their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance.  upon which speech he was condemned to a Cave, and there to be overwhelmed with Stones; which Sentence his Executioners acted most cruelly, leaving him, as they thought, dead; but some Merchants stole him away by night, and shipped him, and, by contrary winds, he was driven to the Baleares Insulae, and died fourscore years old, in the year of the Lord▪ 1315. Now let Bernard, Lathenburgensis, Petrus Gallisardus, Aymericus, Faber Faventinus, with other his flanderers, show me any amongst them of more Christian excellency and piety, in that age, than this man, whom they call haeretick; I dare hardly say, 
The notable effect of his sufferings.  if he were an haeretick, (nothing like which I see in his Books) yet that Love which doth, with God, hide a multitude of faults, aught to conceal likewise his faults with men, and this love and charity towards God, of his, might excuse almost any thing; this Baptismus Flaminis, as the Schools call it, this trial by Fire, as St. Peter. But so much for the defence of my Author, to whom I confess myself much beholden; now to the Argument which I undertake to defend.   

Sect. 6.  
Vasques put's Raymund's undertaking to consist of three propositions; first, 
Lully's undertaking according to V●sques.  that there are divers persons in the Trinity; secondly, that they are no more, nor no less, than three; thirdly, that these are the Father, Son and holy Spirit. Vasques likewise saith, that Raymundus undertake's to prove these per demonstrationes aequiparantiae; and he expound's it right, what that aequiparance is, according to one branch, which is the equivalence of the things; but he left out the other, which I set down before, that is, the equivalence betwixt the power and the effect; 
Whose Arguments he recite's and formes.  Next he comes to his particular Argument, his first is (saith he) where is Concord there is plurality, but in the divine Goodness there is Concord, therefore there is plurality. The major (saith Vasques) he leave's unproved, 
The first proves a personal plurality by concord.  but his minor he proves thus; Where is an act, there is Concord betwixt the Agent and the thing produced, But, in the Divine Goodness there is an act, which is bonificare, to make good, Therefore, there is Concord. And then Vasques produceth another Argument of the s●me nature; 
Another from equality, distinction.  Wheresoever is equality, there is a distinction between the two equals, But in the Divine Goodness there is an equality (to wit, betwixt the good thing itself and that which is made good) Therefore there is distinction; to this he answers.  
These are not demonstrations, because they suppose that which is not to be granted by Reason, 
Vasques' first Answer, excepting against the supposition of a real effective act in God.  nor evident, but by Faith, which is, that there is a real act in God, which should be by production (that is (I think) should produce an effect) for (saith he) although it may be proved by natural Reason, that God doth understand and will, and so in God is an act and operation; yet by no certain demonstration, can it be proved, that he should so understand and will, that these acts should produce; and unless Faith did teach us this, we should say, that these acts are his substance, not operations, and are only conceived of us as operation. 
The Bishop's R●ply, that Lul●y not only supposed but proved it.  This is his first answer, to which I shall reply, that, although I am persuaded that that learned Jesuit had found no such th●ng in the Books he had read of Lully's, yet I have found, in those I have with me, an ample proof of that proposition, which he affirm's can●o● be set out by Reason, which is, that there is a real act, which must be a production; for which first I shall cite his arbour quaestionalis, de quaestionibus dignitatis Dei, where the question is put, ut●um productio si● in Deo, whether there be any production in God; his Solutio is, If there be no production in God, then Omnes rationes, all his [reason's] is the word, (but I may call them (as he doth elsewhere) all the forms, all such things, as we affirm knowingly to be in God) should be idle in an infinite extension and infinite duration; Give me leave, Reader, to explain this, for it is a reigning Disease amongst great Artists, that in high notions they do impose new Terms, which do amaze a Reader; but more pardonable in him, who, having run through all Arts and Sciences, writes them for his own Scholars, which, he supposeth, understand his language; to explain him then, 
His Lordship's explanation of Lully's sense by the necessity of God's acting somewhat from all eternity or being idle, which could n●t be.  as well as I can, to such as are not acquainted with his Books, the sense is this; If in God should be no production, than all his Attributes were useless in an infinite extension of place, and an infinite duration of time; I use these terms, although God's immensity infinitely exceeds place, his eternity all time; and the reason of this may be, because we conceive a most unlimited nothing beyond this world, and most unconceivable eternity, when this world was not, and shall not be; now (saith he) if there should be no internal production in God, there would be an infinite vacuity, in which was no production, and an infinite time, in which there was none; and then, in all that vacuity and duration, God were idle, and produced nothing, which were little less than blasphemy for a natural man to say; for he observe's that there is nothing unactive in the whole beings of nature; and the more excellent any thing is, the higher it grows in action, and the more noble the effects; it must be so in God then, unless we conceive something unworthily of him. This I apprehend to be the sum of that Argument; but he mole's me to the Dignities, and Flowers of his Arbour Divinalis; for the Dignities I find reckoned God's goodness and greatness, which we call his immensity, his eternity, etc. new (saith he) all these have their effects; his Goodness produceth that which is good; his immensity that which is such; his eternity the like, etc. in all his other Dignities; and all these being essentially in God, yea God, as he speaks often, there is necessity that either eternally he must produce somewhat, or be idle; Thus, I think, I have made good this proposition against Vasques his first answer; that there must be some effect produced; but he hath another answer.   

Sest. 7.  
Again (saith he) his reason to prove that there is an act of production in God, 
Vasques chargeth Lul with a mistake of a formal cause for an efficient. Who is mistaken by him▪  is because he is bonificativum, bonificare & bonificabile, that is, making good, and the act to make good, and the thing made good; this (saith he) is frivolous, for (saith he) this act is not that which Faith teacheth to be the production of a person, and a rational operation, but it is a certain act not of an efficient or producing cause, but of a formal cause, as we say, whiteness makes a thing white.  
By his leave, first, I find he hath read more in Lul his Arguments than he set down, or else he could not have urged this now, for proof of that which (he said) before he left unproved; Secondly, the proposition to be proved was not, that there was a production of a person, for that was the conclusion before to be proved, and this, that there was a real production, was the medium from whence that will follow; for, if there be an eternal production, it must be another essence, or an other person; the first is impossible, therefore the second must be; and then lastly I answer, that bonification, 
And the cause proved no less efficient than formal.  as making good, is not only taken for a form, but an efficient Cause, which may be thus proved, first from God's goodness, and the infinite excellency of it; now goodness, in its own nature, is communicative, in morality; a good rich man give's more than a poor good man; a good wise man communicate's his wisdom, etc. In nature it is an excellence of fire not only that it is warm in itself, but that it communicate's this warmth to other things; of the Sun, not only that it is light, but that it doth enlighten; of any thing, that it is good, and that it doth communicate that goodness; so then, see if Nature do not teach us, that, if God be an infinite Good, he must communicate and produce an infinite good; thus may we discourse from his infinite power; if good and powerful both, then why should he not produce some infinite effect that is infinitely good? for else his power should be without an act proportionable; let no man talk of this world, this was made in time, and there would have been an infinite duration without it, or that he might make other works before it, they must be all in time; besides that, they are finite things▪ which do not, cannot extend themselves to the expression of such an infinite excellency; and then, let me urge from that other medium aequiparantiae, before spoken of: powers are known by their act, and by their object; all the world acknowledgeth God to have an infinite power; where is the infinite act the infinite production? and then conceiving that this infinite goodness and power are eternal, this production must needs be such if at all, because else there would be a duration in which this power were not produced into act, in which this goodness produced no good. Thus far I think I have vindicated Lul and the conclusion, out of invincible reason, that there is a plurality of persons, it must needs be that God eternally produced some infinitely good effect, which, because it canno● be another essential God, must be another person; If you would have thi● discourse drawn into a perfect Syllogism, 
The discourse drawn into perfect syllogism proving the eternal plurality of persons by production.  take it thus:  
That which is infinite in power, goodness, immensity, eternity, perfection, must produce such an effect eternally;  
But God is infinite in power, etc.  
Therefore God must produce an effect correspondent.  
The major only needs proof; the minor is granted even by Saracens: and I prove the major thus;  
That eternal thing, whose power can never be idle, must produce an effect correspondent to itself eternally;  
But that which is infinite in power, goodness, and the like, is such a thing which can never be idle;  
Therefore it must produce such an effect eternally.  
The major is evident, because, if it be eternal, and never idle, it must produce something, or else its act is in vain; and it being infinite, it must produce an infinite effect, or else the infinity is idle; we see fire, or every thing else, the more intense it is, the greater effect it produceth; and thence climb up by degrees to infinite, we shall find that infinite must needs produce an infinite effect.  
I will only then prove the minor thus.  
That which is infinitely perfect must not only have a lazy power which doth nothing (for that is an infirmity for a power not to act) but must work accordingly.  
But God is infinitely perfect (as is granted by all even Saracens) Therefore he must not have this power idle and act nothing. Let any man inquire, why any power doth not work, it must needs be answered, because the Agent cannot, or will not; to say God cannot, is to deny the infinity of his power, for that power is not infinite, which can be restrained; and to say he will not, doth both destroy his goodness and perfection; his goodness, because goodness is diffusive, it is no● goodness else; and infinite goodness must be infinitely diffusive: his perfection, because it is a greater perfection, to be, and work accordingly, then to be, only; he therefore must needs act this infinitely excellent work eternally; and for my part, I see no reason why a man may not think, that Lul, upon such grounds as this, might convert to this first foundation of the Trinity, that God the Father did eternally produce an infinitely excellent work like himself. I have considered with myself what may logically be objected against this, 
The Objection urging, the Angel cannot produce the like effect answered▪  and I find nothing of moment, but that Angels do not, cannot produce such an effect, which are the Creatures the nearest and likest to God of any; and my answer is, that they do not, because they cannot; and they cannot, because they have limited natures which are confined; but God is infinite, without limitation; if they could▪ they would; but all things that are amongst us, which have vestigia Dei, the footsteps of God, do teach us this, and therefore by reason we ought to think so of God; This may suffice for the first conclusion, that there are divers persons in the God head, to wit one person generating or producing, and another generated or produced.   

Sect. 8.  

Vasqu●s's satisfactory answers to Lully's arguments for his second Conclusion.  The second conclusion, which Vasques charge's Raymund Lul with, is, that he will prove by reason, that there are three persons; which is in his second chapter of his 132. Disp. where before; he produceth Raymund's Argument, I am persuaded, truly according to these books he read of his; and he give's satisfactory answers to what he produceth out of Lul; I will not tyre the Reader with what one or the other speaks there, because I build not upon those grounds expressed in that chap. but upon others, which I shall produce out of Raymund Lul in those books I have of his.  

The B●shop proceeds upon other grounds of his to prove the Trinity.  It is granted by all the Schools, and all that have written any Theology, whether out of Scripture or Reason, that God is infinite and without Composition, most single and one; that in him, not as an accident is in a subject, but modo eminentiori, after some divine manner, transcending our Capacities, 
God's infinite Simplicity and Uni●y.  is both understanding and will; these being in him, or rather being himself, must be infinite.  
This is the first foundation upon which I build, and it is a rock which hitherto hath been shaken with no winds of opposition. The second is like unto it: That since there is a production by God, who is most single and one most spiritual, this production must be by some spiritual not corporeal Faculty; and these are but those two other formerly spoken of, 
His spiritual faculties Understanding and Will.  understanding and will; the understanding of God must be infinite, and that infinite understanding must be fitted with an infinite object; for, unless it be infinite, it cannot be divine, because whatsoever is divine is infinite; an infinite object it must have, because else an infinite faculty should be in vain, at the least in Degrees, that is, it should not have an equal object to employ itself about; 
Himself the infinite object of his Understanding.  this infinite object can be none but himself; for as whatsoever is God must needs be infinite, so whatsoever is infinite must needs be God. They are converted; now then thus I argue:  
God must needs know himself infinitely, eternally; 
Which is eternally productive of his internal Word.  or else there would be some Duration or nunc in which he did not know himself; this knowledge of himself produceth his internal Word, as I have spoken heretofore, that is, the conceit, the expression of himself; It must needs be so; for whatsoever is understood hath, at that instant in which it is understood, an express image or character of itself, in that understanding which apprehend's it; well then, it must necessarily be, that God understanding himself eternally must needs have the expression of himself fully, wholly, with all his infinite perfections which belong to him; but now because in men and Angels, which have a composition in their essence, yea of substance and accident, there their actual understanding is an act, that word, or image, or character, which is produced by that act, is another intentional accident; but in God it cannot be so, he hath no composition, he is made up of nothing, but is purely himself; his act of understanding is substantial, his word is substantial, all the same with himself, all divine, all God; 
And that word subst●●ti●●, the same with himself.  therefore this product of this act of his understanding must be God, God of God, yet another person; the same person cannot be the producer and the produced, nor this produced be other than the same essence with the producer, for it must be infinite, have all the attributes the producer hath, or else it is not a complete understanding, it will be short in somewhat. Nay, I remember Lul, where before cited, saith, Because God is one, and every form (as he calls them) must be operative, even his unitas must be communicated, and unio must have unite (he mean's unif●cere) must make one, as well as be one: (but of this more hereafter.) But if it have all, it must have the Deity, which in essence can be but one; thus we may conceive the production, which is before spoken of, to be the word of God, as St. John, the character or express image of his person, as St. Paul Heb. 1.3. for nothing can be a more express image of another than that which is the word of it, for that, if it be a true word, fully expresse's the being of it. 
The Bishop guided to this discovery by Scripture as the Wisemen by a S●ar.  And hitherto, I think, I have showed the manner of this production to be most rational, as the Scripture hath steered and guided me. The wise men, who came to worship our Saviour at his birth, found him, but could never have thought upon seeking him, much less of seeking him in a Stable in Bethlehem, but that a star guided them: It is somewhat like these men with me; I hope I have, by the guidance of the glorious light of the Scripture, found this word, which without that light I should never have done; and in this journey I have trod these steps; I have showed, that such an infinite perfection, as God is, cannot choose but produce something correspondent to that infinite excellency: I have showed that this must be done by a spiritual act, which in the first place is his understanding: how this is the place which this starlight of the Scripture directs us to: now I go about another work, which could not be raised but upon this foundation.   

Sect. 9  

God's Will as fruitful by love as hi● Understanding by knowledge.  It appearing, that there are two spiritual faculties, Understanding and Will, there is no reason to think, that the Understanding, which is most given to contemplation, should be more fruitful than the Will, which is in its own nature most active; let us therefore consider the producent and the product, him that understands, and that Word, which is the product of that Understanding, to be two distinct, with equal infinite excellencies, and all those perfections, which are in the producer, to be in that which is produced, those perfections infinite, it is not possible but that these must infinitely love one the other; for a right▪ well-guided Will must needs affect with Love that which is excellent and lovely, and so affect it, with such a proportion of love as the object is lovely; therefore that which is infinitely lovely must needs be infinitely loved; we men should love God infinitely, if the vessels of our souls could contain so great a proportion of that heavenly oil of Charity, the object God deserve's it; but either of these, being vessels infinite, cannot be deficient for lack of love, but can have as much love as the object is lovely, which is infinite; well then, it must needs be, that these two, the producer and the produced, must love one another infinitely, and delight infinitely in one another, the Father in such a Son, the Son in such a Father; this love, with which they affect one another, cannot be an accident, there is none such in God, it must be a substance therefore; nor can it be another substance from the Deity, 
And so productive of a third person, which is likewise God.  both because nothing is infinite but the one only true God, and likewise because there is no composition, either accidental or substantial in God, but whatsoever is in God is God; this therefore must be such, so that the first production being granted, that there are two persons, a producing person and a produced, both infinitely excellent, it must follow that there must be a third.   

Sect. 11.  
But now, why no more, may be asked, and my answer is, 
These divine productions not to be multiplied, because infinite, by which an objection's answered.  that those two faculties act infinitely, according to their manner of acts, and having acted infinitely, it is not possible to conceive that there should be any progress beyond that which is infinite, and therefore one word infinitely produced by the Understanding in an infinite perfection; one Love likewise proceeding infinitely from these which are infinite; in other acts of men, or Angels, multitude makes addition, because they are finite; but in these, they would argue an imperfection, as if there were not enough acted before, these three therefore, and no more. If you desire this in a logical Form: An infinite product cannot be other than a person of the Trinity; But the product of that infinite Love betwixt these two persons is an infinite product, Therefore that must be a person of the Trinity.  
The major in this syllogism stands upon its 〈◊〉 legs, for if it be infinite it must be God, if it be God, either essentially or personally, not essentially, because the essence of God can no way be truly said to be produced, being the fountain of all production, therefore it must be taken personally, that a person is produced; The minor will be proved most certain▪  
That product, which is equal to that which is infinite, is infinite; But the product of the Love of these two infinite persons is equal to that is infinite, Therefore, etc.  
The major is clear, because what is equal to that is infinite, must be infinite▪ or else it is not equal; The minor is thus proved; Where the object loved is infinite, and the lover infinite, there the product of that Love must be proportioned; But it is so here, the Divine Excellencies for the object, and the Divine persons the lovers or the Agents; Therefore it is not possible for a a man to conceive it other, then that it must be infinite, and another person from the other two, for the same cannot be the producer and produced in respect of the same; another infinite essence it cannot be, it must therefore be another person.   

Sect. 12.  
But I know it is often objected here by the Assertors of the Greek Church; It cannot be, 
The objection made by the Assertors of the Greek Church answered, according to the sense of the Catholic, touching the procession of the holy Ghost.  that the product of these two Agents should be one and the same person, since it comes from two, no more than two heats proceeding from two fires should be one. I will not here debate School-niceties, which I abhor in such Mysteries as these, where a man cannot speak truth but with danger, as St. Augustine somewhere; but I could tell you of many Schoolmen, and those most learned, that affirm, although this Love come from two persons, yet it is, as they are, one and the same essence; but I dread to teach any thing unrevealed by the Scripture, as it is expounded by the Catholic Church, and that is, that the holy Ghost, which is but one, proceeded from both persons; the manner I dare not pry into, which is unrevealed, and therefore, for answer, say, that as you may see two fires or Candles (if you will) whilst severed, produce two heats, 
Illustrated by a similitude to facilitate in part our apprehension of it.  two lights, yet join these two fires or two Candles together, they are but one, though more intense; yea conceive them a little severed, when and where they meet in their operations with their heat or light, they unite in that quality, and in the product, the effect, they produce in the object, so it is with these; they proceed from two persons united in the same essence; they affect the same object, the same divine perfections, and these two affections join together in one holy and divine flame of Love, complacence, joy, and unspeakable happiness, one in each other, which, being the fullness of infinite happiness, cannot be other then one and the same. Thus, methinks, although we affirm Love to proceed from these two persons as two persons, yet we may well apprehend how they may, in this substantial act, be only one. And now, I hope, I have finished this second undertaking; that those persons are three, the first person that speaks this internal word, the second the Word that is spoken, the third this infinite Love, Joy, Delight, Comfort, that these two have one in another; more cannot be imagined, because we can find but two spiritual faculties in the Divine essence, by which it can produce any thing, that is, Understanding and Will; and in this notion they have both an infinite production, which is the furthest any operation can extend itself; and therefore though consequent productions of creation may be like sparks of the same fire, afterwards produced to give God an external glory, yet no other internal operation, which is infinite, but these two. And now I may apply myself to the third proposition, that these three persons are the Father, the Son, and the holy Spirit.   

Sect. 13.  
First, for the Father and the Son, these two relatives cannot be one without the other; 
How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  and it is evident, out of that which hath been said, that the producer and produced must be Father and Son; for although, perhaps, we cannot properly say, that when fire produceth its like, that product is the son of the fire; nor, perhaps, when we see a plant or beast do it, can we say, that that product is a son; yet when we see any thing, that is rational, do it, we may most properly say, that it is the producer's son; now, that God is such, can be no question, therefore in this production there is a Father, and a Son; for God being most spiritual, we must expect only a pure spiritual propagation, which can be conceived no way so ●itly, as by the Understanding, nor indeed is possible; and here, in this expression, we find all those notions, in which the same is delivered to us in Scripture, to be clearly evident, as that he is the Word, the internal Word of God, the image of God; no image so clear as that which is drawn in the word of any thing, the internal word fully expressing that of which it is the word; so likewise the wisdom of God, because it is the relict of divine knowledge, because it is the highest principle and first fountain of all other beings; and for the third person, the doubt can only be whether he is holy, or whether a person; and indeed there can be no doubt of either, because he is God, and then he must be most spiritual, and most holy. So that that 3. Proposition is as clear as the former, that these persons are the Father, Son and holy Spirit: I thought to have vindicated Raymund Lul from Faber Faventinus, who, being a Scotist, I thought in his Natural Theology had written something various from Vasques, but he deserve's pity, having no knowledge of Lul but by Vasques, and, what is worse, when Vasques excuseth Lul from that opprobrious scandal of being an Heretic, he, who knew nothing of him, but in Vasques, falls upon him with that foul and disgraceful Term, and endeavor's not to answer Vasques his vindication of him.   

Sect. 14.  
It may be justly enquired now, why we should call these three persons, since they are not so termed in Scripture. This question was debated by S. Augustine long ago, 
Why they are called three persons▪ being no Scripture-language, and ●ow, long ago, debated by St. August●ne.  in his 7. book de Trinitate, cap. 4. and, methinks, satisfactorily, in the which he hath these passages; first, Since the Father is God, the Son God, and the holy Ghost God, why are there not three Gods? He that saith the Scripture doth not call them three Gods, and therefore he dares not, answers himself, for neither doth the Scripture call them three persons. He had showed before, that the Scripture saith, that there is one God, and that these three are called God; but as he had showed, that although the Scripture doth not say, that there is one essence of God, yet we believe confidently, there is but one essence; so may we do of these persons; take this phrase, Propterea licuit, disputandi necessitate, tres personas dicere, non quia Scriptura dicit, sed quia Scriptura non contradicit: he saith, That the necessity of Disputation makes a man say something, which is not against Scripture, in this point; and that is enough, for if the Scripture express that there are three, and that loquendi causâ (as he speaks at the beginning of that chapter) de ineffabilibus ●ari aliquo modo possumus quod offa i nullo modo p●ssumus; That (saith he) we may say somewhat of these unspeakable things, which we cannot clearly speak out in full and significant terms, we speak thus: And again in the same chap. Excedit supereminentia Divinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem; verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur; & ve●ius est, quam cogitatur; the result of which is this, that the thoughts of man are short of the Divine perfections, and the language of man short of his thoughts; because our language being form to our usual business, which we converse about, all which are excelled infinitely by the divine perfections, they must be short in their expressions of those divine excellencies: And therefore again that most excellent and learned man in the same chap. Quid igitur restat, nisi ut fateamur loquendi necessitate parta haec vocabula? and indeed they are the most significant which can be found out; for since we conceive that this term person is the last actuality and addition which can be made to any reasonable substance, it may most justly be applied to this of the Trinity and each distinct suppositum thereof; but still with this reservation, that the Divine things are ineffable and not fully to be conceived, much less expressed by us; say God's essence is thus, or thus, we may; but to say, that that language, whatsoever it be, doth fully express his essence, or being, is a presumption in any man; and the like, and no otherwise, of these personalities, it is the nearest expression man can make, and let us be contented with it. A second question may be, 
The extent or limits of this personal distinction the Bishop reverently forbear's to determine.  whether this personal distinction in the Trinity be a main and great difference, or some little and inconsiderable thing: For answer to this, my humility and adoration of the Divine persons is such, that I dare affirm positively nothing in the world, which is not expressed in the holy Scripture; a relation we are sure there is, by which the one is signified to us and not the other, as the Father, the Son, and the holy Spirit proceeding from them, which spiration signifies a procession, which always involve's a person proceeded, and a person from whence it proceeded; and these relations must needs be founded in some substance; when we consider them in God, who hath no accident, but what difference is in that foundation the Scripture is silent, I am at a maze, whether infinite, bccause whatsoever is in God is infinite, and therefore some may conceive it such; but then they must make the unity in God infinite likewise, because that is most primarily affirmed in him, and yet both may be in him, though they seem impossible in us, whose perfections excel our thoughts, as much as these irreconciliable things amount unto; and therefore here I could, with Mr. Hobbes, 
And disl●ke's the rash curiosity of the Schoolmen.  declaim bitterly against the School, who so boldly intrude their busy Wits into the unsearchable things of God, by rashly, according to their imagination, determining twenty, yea an hundred, things about the Trinity, which God hath not revealed, and yet lazily sitting still, and not endeavouring to make their understandings mount up to those things which God hath revealed; it is a most virtuous industry in man, to make his Reason wait upon Faith as close as it can; but it is an effect of a most busy and presumptuous undertaking, to adventure to pry into that Ark, which God hath concealed and hid; as I have attempted the one, so I have abstained from the other.   

Sect. 15.  
But yet, perhaps, I may be censured for undertaking to handle this question by reason, 
His Lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason.  which hath been so generally denied by the School; to which I have already given an answer; but farther; although the generality of the School have deserted this debate, yet many men of high learning have undertaken it, as not only the mighty Lul, but that learned Cusanus in two Books of his the visione Dei, cap. 17. and 18. as likewise the cribratione Koran, lib. 2. cap. 2. usque ad 12. & aliis locis; so likewise Raymundus de Sabu●di in his Theologia naturalis, cap. 47. & sequentibus, Dionysius Carthusianus de fide catholicâ, lib. 2▪ Petrus Pasnonie●sis i● his decisiones Theologica speculativae & morales, lib. 1. cap. 4. quaest. 1. conclusione 1. who think his and Scotus his reason in that place unanswerable; some things likewise in Richardus de Sancto victore and others, by reading of which Author's a man may discern what I have excerpted, and what added.  
But yet I may seem to have neglected Antiquity in seldom or never quoting the Fathers; 
And seldom quoting the Fathers.  for this I can give divers reasons; first, my Genius doth detest that foolish ostentation; and secondly, the use of it is unnecessary in this Controversy, where neither Mr. Hobbes, nor the Socinians, with whom I have to do, make any esteem of that Argument from such Authority; and thirdly, besides that it hath been long since laboriously done by the mighty industry of Bernardus Paxillus de Buzezeb, concerning the first four Centuries (whether he went further I know not) which is enough in this Controversy, the latter Ages having been secured from these questions by the decrees of Councils, and harmony of the Universal Church consenting with them, until Ochinus, or Socinus, unhappily awaked them again.  
Reader, 
A digression to the Reader.  once before I printed my Observations upon 12, 13, 14. Chapters of this Book, then, when it was in the Press, I found one Argument, which I had urged in the matter of Religion, opposed in another Book by Mr. Hobbes, which became me to satisfy, the false printing of that makes me reprint it now; and when that, and the rest, were ready for the printer, I find now again a Latin Book printed at Amsterdam, Entitled, Epistolica dissertatio de principiis justi & decori, continens Apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi Hobbaei de cive, wherein are divers things contrary to that which I have observed upon his 13. and 14. Chap. and therefore in the second edition conceive myself bound to vindicate my Discourse from what is objected against it, which I here endeavour.    

CHAP. XXXVI.  
Concerning preservation of life, and preference of public interest. Of Faculties, Passions, and Parts subservient to the guidance of Reason. Particular men can have no universal right being limited in their proprieties and pretences. The danger of allowing it, and not allowing the right of Occupancy.  

Sect. 1.  

Select Aphorisms out of which the Author draw's his Discourse.  IN the 9 page of this Treatise he supposeth a God, which I like well; and that he created the world in wisdom; and that he will exercise the virtues of justice, and truth in the government of it; These are well supposed; he draw's from hence, that God proposed to himself some end in this creation, (I will dispute nothing which may be granted) to which some fitting means are disposed.  
Secondly, that those means in themselves ought to have an aptitude to the procuring that end.  
And thirdly, that a man shall be blessed, or punished, according as he useth or neglects these means; These are in the 9 and 10. pages. Then in the 14. page he deduceth, that that, whatsoever in its own nature hinders the attaining that end, which was intended by Nature, is forbidden; As likewise, whatsoever is in its own nature so disposed, as without it the end intended by Nature cannot be attained, this is commanded.  
Again he saith, that there are many things which, not from their own nature, but from outward circumstances do acquire the fitness or opposition to the end, and these are permitted by the Law of Nature, and of such consists the Laws of men. This pag. 16.  
These are the chief Aphorisms, out of which he draw's his whole Discourse; and, not to trouble the Reader with any unnecessary quarrels, I will come to the application of these generals, which we may find page 32. and not meddle with any of these rules, unless some urgent occasion makes me look back upon them; in that 32. page he thus discourseth; 
A good foundation of his to build upon.  I contemplating myself as part of the world, it must needs be that not by chance, but by the Counsel of the most prudent and wise God, I am brought forth. This was an excellent foundation to build upon, but, to consider what I shall observe hereafter the better, remember that he contemplated himself, not only in relation to himself, but as part of the world; we must therefore, saith he, examine what God would have done by me; a noble quaere, but remember, 
His noble Quae●e.  that this must be here made by the word of God or Scripture (which he forewarned us of before) but by the rules of right Reason, what they should do who have read no Scripture nor can; but have these principles only, that there is a God, a Governor of the world, who will punish evil, and reward virtue. I will go on with him.   

Sect. 2.  
That (saith he) without doubt, God would have conserved in me which, if it be taken away, he had in vain given me certain parts and proprieties; 
Animadversions upon his ambiguous sense, touching the conservation of life.  There is a truth in that proposition, but we must consider this Phrase, God would have conserved in me; I suppose he means by me; else if he mean it absolutely, without doubt God intends by the fabric of man, and many times by his justice upon wicked men, not to conserve that man to whom he hath given many parts and proprieties, for no other purpose then to preserve his life.  
Secondly, if he take it, as I think he doth (for a conservation by that man himself) it will be so far true only, that a man must preserve that life, that being, in order to which those parts and proprieties were aimed, until some greater good than that, at which those parts were directed, shall arise out of the neglect of it; and this will be made good out of that contemplation of his upon himself as part of the world; now a part must be lost rather than the whole, a hand then a man, a finger then a hand, and so in all relation of parts one upon another.   

Sect. 3.  
He goes on page 33. above all things I find in myself a mighty study (summum studium is his Phrase) his chief and principal study of keeping himself safe and sound, 
His study of it as to his own particular.  as we may speak, salvum & incolumem are his words.  
I believe him, he would never else have writ this Book; 
All men may not have like reason to be so intent.  but although he do so, yet all men do not; for although there is in every man, in every thing, a desire of being, yet some beings, to some men, are surrounded with so many incommodities and troubles, that it is better not to be, then to be such. I have treated of this in my censures upon the fourteenth Chapter of Mr. Hobbes' his Leviathan, and in that handled his Book de corpore politico; but because the language of this Gentleman doth vary from Mr. Hobbes, and therefore those expressions made there may not be applicable so perfectly to him, I shall turn myself to this discourse before me.  
To this study, saith he, do serve the appetites of eating and drinking, of revenge, the effects of love and grief, and, to conclude, all the passions of the soul, and the whole fabric of the body. Yet, for all this, a beast, if he could speak, might say as much for himself as this is (as I have showed before, 
The parts and faculties of men not to be leveled with those of beasts. ) and it were strange if man's parts and faculties had no higher a design then a beast's have; in the universe they, and all the rest, were made subservient to man in this great world, and in this little world, man, no doubt, but they are framed so likewise to be serviceable to that which is humane; and as God hath made man a Ruler over them, so those humane parts of reason and will to govern these beastly sensual affections; and, it is as unseemingly, yea unnatural, for a man's reason to subject itself to those passions and sensual desires, as for a beast to govern a man.  
You may observe a goodly Room in a house, 
The public interest to be preferred and preserved before the personal or more private.  the timber, stones, gilding, or whatsoever adorne's it, are all made and contrived for the necessity or beautifying that Room; yet it may hap, that afterwards that may be discerned to be unuseful, yea hurtful, to that house; that Room must be plucked down, yea the house itself, when it shall offend the street it stands in, and the street, if noisome to the City, to which it belongs; always the Lesser good, and privater interest, must submit to the greater and more public benefit; so must it be with man and these parts, they are useful to this man, this man to the City, that City to the Kingdom; when we see these parts disposed to the advance and preservation of man's life, we know man's life must be cared for, but not when a more public end of the City, in which he lives, shall be prejudiced or hurt by it, and to this end indeed God hath given man reason, by which he may master his private and particular desires, and rule and direct them to their more public end, so that then, in a Logical discourse, we see his reason answered which was thus; That which hath so many passions, appetites, bodily parts subservient to it, must be preserved; But the life of man, etc. ergo.  
You may discern the answer ou● of that hath been already set down, that as those passions, etc. are in themselves useful to man's life, so man's life is useful to that City or Society where he lives; and as these passions are to be refrained and kept under from ruling men's actions, when they, or either of them, are hurtful to man's life, unto which in their creation they were disposed; so man's life its self is not to be desired, but to be laid aside, when it is useless or hurtful to that Society, or farther end, to which it was intended; this, with what hath been delivered against Mr Hobbes his 13. and 14. Chapters, I think abundantly sufficient for answer to this Argument of his; I will pass over many loose buildings, which he hath raised upon this weak foundation, but concern not me, and come now to page 98. where he enters upon another conclusion of Mr. Hobbes, which I have opposed in my piece upon the 14. Chapter of Leviathan; and he begins thus.   

Sect. 4.  
Since God hath commended to me the integrity of my life and members, neither can I for a little while preserve this life and breath without the use of means, it followeth, God hath granted me a right to such means, without which my life cannot be safe, for Qui dat jus ad finem dat jus ad media; he, who give's a right to the end, give's a right to the means. 
What right a man hath to the m●a●s of preserving life, and how he is to use them. ] I am confident I have confu●ed his application of this rule, and expounded the right sense of it, when before I writ of this very business, which was obtruded by Mr. Hobbes in divers things; but yet, for farther satisfaction, Know that the right to the means is only out of that relation they have to the end; if the end itself be not useful, much less the means; yea if obtaining that ●nd, by such means, doth more hurt then good, those means are not to be used; take an instance; A thirsty man desire's drink to quench his thirst, yet, if his Physician find that that drink will increase his Fever, he must not drink, the quenching his thirst, by such means, is worse than his Thirst; so to preserve my life, by such means as do more harm than my life good, is not to be done; of which kind there may be many, had this been urged for the whole species of mankind, which is of so high a concernment in the Fabric of the world, that the design of the whole relate's to it, than his Argument had carried with it such a force as could not easily have been resisted; but when it points at particulars, which are inconsiderable parts of the whole, the preservation of such is not to be husbanded against any public detriment.   

Sect. 5.  
Out of this he draw's the Axiom, The right of possession, and use of those things belongs to me, which soever can yield me profit to the obtaining the end of those things that, I have said above, God require's;  
But when I may judge in a right and uncorrupted judgement, all the creatures in the world can afford me that use;  
Therefore I have a right to all.  
Thus far he, whom I could well guess to be one of Mr. Hobbes his Disciples by his manner of arguing; this he makes a syllogism, but there is not one proposition which hath a Logical form, nor is there a strong connexion of one with another.  
His Axiom, or major, is false, because he supposeth man, particular man, to be the end of all the world.  

Each particular man cannot pretend a right to the whole world.  For else how can the disposure of them to that end (a particular man's advantage) entitle a man to have right unto them; Had this been affirmed by Adam, or Noah, there had been some reasons for it, because they had a right to each piece of the whole world; or had it been affirmed of mankind, the species of man, it had a truth in it, because the world is ordered to the service of that species; but when applied to any particular of that species, on any other Sons of these Fathers of the world, it is of no force, for they have only right to, and can only make use of their shares and particular proportions, which are distributed to them by the Law's and Customs of the world, or of those Nations wherein they live; nor are other things disposed to those particular ends: God hath entitled them no farther.  
I can deny this proposition again out of my former ground; 
Nor to things conducing only to mediate and particular ends.  a man hath absolute right to those things which conduce to the last and universal end, but not to those things which conduce to any mediate and particular end, because that end itself may be useless; now God require's, and Nature require's the more public to be advanced by the more private and particular end; when that second is useless, the means in order to it are so likewise, which have only an utility in order to it.   

Sect. 6.  
His minor he only suspected to be questioned, which is (But when I may judge, in a right and uncorrupt judgement, all the creatures in the world can afford me that use) And therefore he labours with divers arguments to confirm it, which I shall examine, because I think them very erroneous; his first reason is page 99 because (saith he) singuli homines is his Phrase) single men do lawfully use single creatures, neither is there any thing which is forbid their use; now (saith he) that which single men enjoy, any man may enjoy alone, neither out of the cre●●tures part is there any contradiction.  
These are Mr. Hobbes his own manner of disjointed Discourses; the proposition to be proved was, I can judge with a right and uncorrupt judgement, all the creatures in the world can afford me that use, that is, the preservation of my life, and the contentments of it. That he proves because, that single men do lawfully use the single creatures; see if this be not just like to Mr. Hobbes his reasonings; first he proves, that I have a right to all things, because I can judge that they may be useful to me; now he proves, I may judge that they may be useful to me, because single men use single creatures; for the inconsequency of the first; 
The danger of pretending a right to all, and so having a right judgement of it.  suppose a Son in prison for debt should judge, and truly judge, that by the death of his Father his Father's estate would come to him, and by that he should be released out of prison, had he right to kill his Father? by Mr. Hobbes his rules, who saith, that no man can divest himself of the right to keep himself from such conditions which may render his life miserable, he may; and by this Author, who follow's him close, he may, because he can truly judge this is expe●●ent and useful for himself; the same may be said for Wives, Children, for Kings; there may be found reasons why their destructions should conduce to a private man's good; hath he then a right to act those horrid villainies? the first consequence must needs therefore be erroneous, which judgeth of right only by the right judgement of the usefulness which it hath to the particular person; and the second no less, which judgeth the usefulness to me, and a right in me to them, because other men enjoy them: for my part, I should argue more truly clean contrary; because other men lawfully use them, I cannot; two single men, at the same time, cannot lawfully use the same thing with a propriety, 
Two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time.  which implies a negative to another; they may join in the same work, in using the same Lever, to move a great weight; they may warm themselves by the same fire; but have a right in the same thing they cannot, unless they be united into some Corporation, whereby they are made one civil person, which were two natural; but suppose he should mean, as he seems to do, that because no particular thing is forbid any particular man, therefore a particular man hath right to every thing; 
All cannot be useful to one particular perperson.  to this I answer, that a particular man may have right to any particular thing, yet not to all, out of his own principles, because all cannot be useful to him, he is not able to make use of all; he that hath right to eat any piece of meat at the Table, yet hath not right to eat all from other men, or to eat all the meat there, it would surfeit him, although he, and every one at the table may eat what he like's, and what he can civilly seize upon, fit and proper for him: It is so with drinks; an hundred, or more, thirsty men come to the same river, they can judge with an uncorrupt judgement that it is fit for them to drink, and every single man may drink any single part of that water, yet no one or single person can judge it fit to drin● up the river; it is so with clothes, Medicines, any thing that is useful to man; it follow's not therefore, because single men can use these single creatures, therefore one single person may use all of them; and this impossibility ariseth not only out of the injustice used to other men, of which see disputes afterwards, and I shall follow him, but out of the disproportion the universe hath to any particular person, because it is too large; a finite hand can grasp no more than the compass of it can contain; 
Nor every thing to ev●ry one.  and out of the qualities of it every thing is not convenient for every person; he, who only is hungry, lacke's not clothes, etc. he, who is warm, lacke's not a fire, and the like. I know it may be objected against this, that although they are not useful now, yet they may be hereafter, and out of this forecast a man may enjoy all the creatures useful and profitable for him now, or which shall be hereafter. 
Of which no right judgement can be made for want of knowledge.  I answer, they cannot, by a right judgement, think so, first because no man knows them, not the hundreth, nor the hundred thousandth part of the single creatures in the world, therefore he cannot judge they may be useful to him; secondly, there are many things, the very kinds and species of which are not known to any man, many fishes in the seas of the world, birds of the air, 
The use of some known interdicted to whom hurtful.  and the like; many things, we know, would be hurtful to us, the scorching heats of the torrid Zones to us Inhabitants in cold Countries; and our colder would be as offensive to them, these cannot judge those other useful to them, or that they will be useful to them at any time, which are averse to their dispositions; so that although there be none of these things interdicted and forbidden the use of them in themselves, yet by God, that made them and us, many of these things being hurtful to many men, the use of them is forbid to such. That which he addes, neque ex parte creaturarum, etc. neither out of the creatures part is there any moral contradiction, is not true, there is a moral contradiction; because many of these things are hurtful to many men, therefore it is a moral contradiction to say, they should rightly be judged useful; and my first disproportion mentioned, the quantity of the creatures, enlargeth the contradiction; when the vessel will hold but a Pint, it is a contradiction to say, I will put in a Quar● into it; when the narrow compass of any particular man's thoughts can make use of but a few things, to say, that it shall make use of all, is a contradiction, out of the vast quantity of the creature, in respect of the narrowness of our abilities.   

Sect. 7.  
He urgeth another Argument thus: Unless this judgement by that reason instituted be right, there can be given no rule, according to which a judgement may be instituted of things which the Lord God hath granted man to use, or what these things are which he hath withdrawn from his use. I answer, 
O●her rule● by which to institute a right judgement beside reason.  many ways, according to the condition of the place wherein ●e lives; if in a desert, unappropriated to any man, God hath given him right to use any thing, he meet's with, for his accommodation; if he lives in a Polity, God hath given him right to all such things as the Laws of the Nation entitle him to.  
His third and last Argument for this cause is framed at the bottom of pag. 99 
How all creatures are granted to man's us● limited.  Aut omnes creaturae; Either all creature's are granted to man's use, or none. I will stop here, all creatures are granted to man's use, but not to this particular man, but to mankind, which that word man will involve; now he was to prove, that they were useful to every particular, but he proves his conclusion, for, saith he, if it be lawful for me to mine own use to destroy any fit meat and natural form, why not all if it shall be expedient? 
Hi● impossible supposition.  I answer him first, posito quolibet sequitur quidl●bet, that if it may be expedient, is an impossible supposal; it cannot be expedient for any single man to destroy this world. I answer secondly, 
His fallacy à b●ne divisi●, etc.  that it is a fallacy à bene divisi● ad malè conjuncta, the instances before of meat and drink do evince this conclusion; take another; I am ●o ride a journey, my friend offer's me five or six horses, give's me power to use any one, I can use but one; they are all every one such as I have a right unto, but cannot use more than one; I had right to each singular horse, but not to all. We may conceive it just so with any particular man; Suppose we should grant that God, in his journey to heaven, allows man any creature in the world, yet, because he cannot make use of all, he cannot say, that he hath right to all conjunctim. And then lastly, I say, as before, if a man live in a Polity, God hath given him use of such things only which the Law of the Polity entitles him unto; if in a desert, he hath granted him whatsoever he can gain to his use. Thus, I think, his first discourse is clearly enough answered, wherein I observe he is a true follower of Mr. Hobbes, not in his conclusions only, but his way of proving them by most fallacious Arguments.  
So, saith he, it is proved, that out of the creatures part there is no obstacle in them, but that a man may use singulis & omnibus, every single and all of them. This, he think's, he hath proved, how weakly, I have showed.   

Sect. 8.  
He goes on next to show, that there is no repugnance out of the part of my neighbour; I will wait upon that with which he begins this pag. 100 This we have proved (saith he) that man hath right to the use and possession of all things which lack reason. I answer, man hath, but no particular man: But (saith he) since my neighbour is constituted in the same dignity which God would have me sustain (is his word) he ought to enjoy the same privilege which I do, therefore to him should belong a like and equal right ●ver all creatures, neither out of the respect of the creatures is one part allotted to him, another to me.  

The equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all.  This seems by him to be an introduction to what follow's, but indeed contain's a main Argument against him; for two, much less two millions of men, particular men, cannot have a right to the same thing. Therefore, saith he, we must seek somewhere else to find what portion is allotted to him, what to me, and then, saith he, let the adversaries turn which way they will, they must confess that the distinction of these creatures ariseth only out of Covenant; this pag. 101. and this, saith he, they do sufficiently declare, who teach, that in extreme necessity the ancient right doth revive, and the use of those things is made lawful which they by Covenant had disposed away before. Thus far he.  
The case, which he speaks of, may be thus put; A man ready to starve, 
The case of necessity implies no such universal right.  for want of food or clothes, takes a piece of bread, or meat, or a warm garment, which belongs to another man, to supply his extremity; here, say his Authors, in this extremity his right to these things revived: therefore, saith this Writer, he had right to all creatures before, or else his instance is weak: I answer, the consequence is very infirm; he may have right to such parcels of the world, yet not to all; he, who hath right to little pieces in a field, hath not right to the whole; I have showed in my former piece, which I now defend, that no right, but by some Law; the Law of humanity, give's him right to this; by which we may, and aught to suppose, that men should do as they would be done unto; and, when necessity compell's a man to such an extremity, he need not stay to ask for it (which in that necessity he cannot do) but take that leave which humane nature give's one to another, and by which he is entitled to those poor fragments; but what hath this to do with the universe, to the partition of which neither he nor any man living conferred to divide?   

Sest. 9  
Another instance he give's in a dissolved Commonwealth, where the Magistrate can no longer use his authority, there it is lawful for men to invade their neighbour's goods, so they have an honest intention to deliver them when he and the Commonwealth are restored. I put down the sense of his words only for brevity's sake, and answer;  
That it is not true, 
Nor dissolution of any Commonwealth.  that it is lawful to take any neighbour's goods, in such a case, unless he have deserted them; if he have deserted the use of them, any man may use them, not else; yet let a man consider these two instances, he shall find that they are exceeding short to entitle any man to the interest of the whole world, or all the creatures in it. And yet I may add further, that in both those instances a man hath but a temporal use of those things, not a full interest, and estate in them until his extremity be relieved, or until the right owner laid claim to them. A man hath found a ring, he wears it, the use of it is his, but the ring is the right owner's still, and when he finds and claim's it, the use likewise must be the old owner's, it was never the finder's more than the use; so is it with these, the extremity supplied, the Commonwealth restored, he hath no longer use of them, he cannot justly sell or alien any of those things from the true owner, which he may do with any thing is his own, and therefore he had no right, interest, and title in them. He goes on page 102.   

Sect. 10.  
But you may object, a certain portion is not allotted to every single man, 
An Objection framed by the Author.  but any part of the world; neither is it lawful for one to subdue the whole, for than it would be lawful for one man, if he had power to deprive others of the necessaries for life, yea to kill another, which seems to oppose what he had said before, when God decreeing to man the use of this life did decree likewise to bestow upon him the use of these things useful to his life, which, saith he, one man cannot take from another, unless in extreme necessity, but he doth subvert the end which God intended in the creation of another. To this he addes another objection concerning the birthwright of the Eldest Son, who, he saith, 
A second of his not so strong.  hath title to his Father's estate without compact; this second I esteem very weak, and so meddle not with what he writes concerning it; but the first, I am persuaded, is of invincible force, and his answer to it is miserable; his answer is page 103. we answer, saith he, not only in extreme necessities a man may subdue the world, 
The first but weakly answered by him without regard to God's end.  such a necessity being granted (such a necessity is impossible say I, because the world cannot be necessary to relieve any man's extreme necessity, but only very little parts of it) but also if any profit or commodity may be promised to arise thence, as any Lord may use his good, neither can he offend against that justice by which he is bound to render to his neighbour that which is his; the rest in that Paragraph is but flourished to this purpose; now let a man consider how this satisfies the preceding argument, that argument was drawn from the end which God intended in the creating of both these, the preservation of either was equally intended; doth not then that man violate that justice which ought to be used towards his neighbour, when, for his commodities, even in superfluities, he shall deprive his Brother of necessaries? In his discourse there is no semblance of satisfaction to this objection, when in his answer he only affirms, that a man hath right to all things for his commodity, but never set's down, God's end is preserved in that right; I mean to urge this Argument stronger hereafter.   

Sect. 11.  
In the 104. page he undertake's boldly that he will prove, by most efficacious Arguments, 
His first Argument for universal right returning, extreme necessity.  there is a right to the whole world belonging to every man▪ Page 105. he begins his proof; first, saith he, because in extreme necessity a man's ancient right doth revive; he proves that, because, saith he, my calamity cannot produce a right in me to such things, to which I had no right before; my first answer to this is, that it is no more than what was said before; 
The Bishop's several answers to it.  secondly, I answer, as before, that no man can have such an extremity as may need the whole world; he cannot eat, drink, or cloth himself with the whole, but parts, only; thirdly, I answer, his calamity revive's no title in the miserable man, but only reduceth him to be the object of mercy; and what inconsiderable title he hath, is a capability of a passive right to acts of humanity, by which every man, who looks upon that wretched spectacle, is bound to relieve him, and, when extremity give's not leave to any man to stay for the convenience of ask, he takes that, out of a supposal that it will not be denied.  
His second Argument begins in the last line of Page 105. and is thus framed; the most Learned part of Divines and Lawyers consent, that in a moderation of a Lawful defence, 
His second Argument for ancient right in a lawful defence.  the defendant is not made a public person, but doth use his ancient right which God hath granted to every man. I will not trouble the Reader with every word, the sense of the Argument consists in this, that a man may defend himself against violence; that in that defence he may Lawfully kill another; And this ariseth not out of that, that he hath done me wrong or injury, but out of that regard, that God would have me defend myself; Now, saith he, if it be lawful to kill another, much rather to take his goods in defence of myself.  
To understand the force or invalidity of this Argument, 
How the force o● invalidity of this argument m●y be understood, and how the practice moderated.  let us look back to what hath been said, how far my life is to be cared for, and preserved by me, one rule of which is, when a more public concernment will not be obtained by the loss, I am not to preserve my life by the ruin of multitudes of my Nation, or Kingdom, of which I am a member; again, since he in this Discourse supposeth that men believe there is a God; and that this God is a just judge punishing vice, and rewarding virtue, therefore I am to forsake this life, and resign it rather than commit such sins which are of a greater moment, and esteemed so by him, of which nature are Regicides, Parricides, nor ought a man, in rescue of himself, to kill his King or his Father; I am persuaded there is none that think's there is a God, which doth not think that such things are an abomination to him; then we will suppose two men, private persons, the one assaulting the other; surely if a man can safely avoid the danger, he ought to do it; but if he cannot, he may kill rather than be killed, because there is no reason why a man should not think himself of as useful a condition as another private man to the public state, or glory of God; but my killing this man is not because I have a right over his person, but because I have a right to defend mine own person from the injuries which are offered to it by another private person, who hath no more right to kill me, than I him, which is none but in my own defence; for of two evils the Lesle is to be chosen; either are evils in se, but this the Less to me; and this is no other than the former; for it is not Lawful for me to kill another man, if I can avoid his assault, but when there is an extreme necessity, and his assault is otherwise unavoidable; so that it is still in an extreme necessity, and that may be relieved with a few things, much less than the whole world.   

Sect. 12.  
Here he makes an objection thus; How doth all this prove, that one single man hath right to the whole world, 
His Objection,  and that nothing out of the part of my neighbour doth hinder it? (this is page 107.) he answers, it doth very much conduce for it. 
And answer.   
For defence of my life, my liberty, my privileges, it is Lawful to kill another, to break out into war against another; much rather will it be lawful for any man to vindicate these goods to himself, which now submit themselves to the first possessor; and to spoil my neighbour of all those things by which he contend's to out me of my possession.  
For answer; 
The Bishop's Animadversions showing the difference between just 〈…〉 invasion, & sta●ing the r●ght of possession.  surely there is much difference in these cases; In the first I defend my life and estate from an unjust invader; In the second I invade another's right and interest, and when he saith, that the other keep's him out of his possession (quibus possessione mea me contend●t exuere, is his Phrase) I would fain know what possession he can say he hat● when the other, according to his own language, is the occupant; but if he take possession here for the right of possession, what right can he pretend to more than the occupant? or by what Law doth that title accrue to him? That which he addes is of no Great force; or, saith he, when there shall be a just fear that he will do the like by me, if he gain opportunities; this fear, 
Fear entitles a man to nothing but a guard of himself.  he speaks of, entitles a man to nothing but a care of himself until hostility or injury be offered, and then one may be provoked to a just war: since, saith he, these things, which I take from my neighbour, before Covenant, 
Propriety without Covenant.  are no more his then mine;] I doubt not but I have, and shall show, that those things, which are in the possession of another, are his own, if in his lawful possession, without any other Covenant but the Law of nature; in the mean time it must needs be granted, that the title is equal, and melior est conditio possidentis; and since he offer's no force to the other, there can be no justice for the other to offer violence to him; What he adds further, is a Comparison between this case and war, that what is gotten in war is the Conquerors, because then all Covenants cease, and the ancient rights return: Certainly both the antecedent is weak and the consequent, 
The r●ght to good● gotten by conquest what.  the antecedent, because the goods, gotten by conquest, are acquired by conquest, not by an ancient right; many a man gets goods by conquest, in a lawful war, who had no title before to them; I say else, all such gain is but Robbery; nor doth this simile agree; the Difference is great betwixt the taking of a man's estate from him, who offered me no injury, and him who is my enemy, and labours my destruction; At the bottom of the 108. page he begins with a third Argument, which he thus flamen; 
His third Argument.  because the right to the use and possession of things is to be taken from the profit, which I conceive will redound to me by them, therefore what I shall trust will be profitable for me I have a title to. 
The Bishop's answer from the fallibility of judgement.  This Argument he is tedious in, I have reduced the whole force of it to this narrow compass, and do return answer, that mine or any man's judgement of the profitableness give's me no title to it, but the just and right judgement: I may be deceived in my judgement, and judge that profitable which is unprofitable; nay, although I judge truly, that it is profitable, yet so may any man's estate be thought, that it would be profitable for me, if I could get it, nevertheless I have no right to it.   

Sect. 13.  
At the bottom of the 110. page he enters into another discourse against a Conclusion which I have been engaged in, and must therefore undertake: his Argument is thus, Prima occupatio, 
His argument against the right of Occupancy.  The first occupancy before Covenant shows no right of my neighbour in any creature: his main reason is this, because then in no right, in any case of necessity, they can return to me again, because that right is only in such things which are yielded or forsaken; which is a language I remember I have used, and therefore do think this reflects upon me.  
First, to observe the weakness of this Argument, 
Which the Bishop shows to hold well against Covenant.  consider that this Argument fight's equally against himself, as against me; for he holds, a right is obtained by covenant, and yet that right yield's to extreme necessity, therefore a man may say that it follow's with no more force against Occupancy, then against Covenant. 
What is the r●ght in necessity.  Secondly, I deny that the right returns in this condition, but a supposed right of humanity invade's all mankind in such states, so that although a particular man have occupancy, yet that Law, which dictate's, Do as you would be done unto, appoint's the owner to relieve the necessitous person, yet I have delivered, and that truly, that men in general have right to all things as citizens of the world; but when any thing is appropriated by occupancy or civil Laws, it belongs only to that person: Certainly, saith he, ye shall find nothing here but gentium institutio, the institution of nations, which give's the occupant right, but not to him in whose view it comes first. My answer will be short and clear, there is not the same reason for detection to give right, 
Discovery 〈◊〉 not an equal right with Occupancy.  as there is for the other of occupancy; first, an hundred may see the Countre●, yea ten thousand, yet cannot all these have any title to it, which must be in one. If a man had right to what he see's, any man's estate might be his; but whosoever hath a possession hath an interest. Many men see the same bird fly, the same fish in the Sea, yet it is only his who catcheth and gets possession of it; not sight, but occupancy, yield's title and right. He give's a third reason towards the 111. page, Finge, feign, saith he, two men, the one swift of foot, 
The imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case.  the other slow, it appears how unequal this pair of men are in acquiring dominion: I believe they are, and it is so in all conditions, one is strong, another weak; one cunning, another foolish; and these may, by those abilities, according to his method, get right from another; why then not the swift from the slow, as well as in the other disparities? His Conclusion therefore from these premises is exceeding weak, when he bring's it in with a Therefore; Therefore, saith he, to the first occupation out of nature no right is due; the vanity of which conclusion is evident out of what hath been said.  
What he adds next, concerning misery and charity, is not worth the considering; nor his fight with imaginary Arguments which succeed. I shall endeavour now to assist the Reader with some spectacles, whereby he may more easily see through those mists which he hath cast befo●● these truths; and first, he may consider, that these two Propositions, 
The Author's two Propositions destructive to humane Society;  That a man now existing in the world (for of such he must dispute) hath a right to all things in the world; and the second, That first occupancy give's no right, are of such an horrid nature, so destructive to humane society and friendship, that although fallacious arguing might deceive a man's Reason, yet men ought to abhor them: For if it be true, that each particular man hath right to all things, whatsoever a man gets by secure fraud, or force, is but a lawful recovery of his own; For if he ought to bestow his whole endeavours for the advancement of his own contentment, and he hath right to every thing, his secure obtaining is just and right, be it which way it will; Nor can he answer this out of his own principles, and much less out of Mr. Hobbes, who conceiving (as he doth) that this is the right of nature, so Mr. Hobbes expressly, no man can diest himself of it, (and sure no man can put off that which naturally belongs to him) than it must follow, that such things may be acted carefully. 
and Trade.  Then let us consider, the second Proposition, were it received amongst men, how might it spoil all commerce betwixt Merchants, betwixt men of divers nations; for if occupancy give no title, it may be lawful for men to defraud, to get by force what they could from an Indian, because I know of no title they have but of occupancy.  
No man can discern what title any Subjects have in those goods they enjoy, 
The difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates.  who is not thoroughly acquainted with the Laws of those several nations, nor then, unless he can survey their deeds and evidences, by which those goods were conveyed to them: Surely they are not to be wrested out of any man's hands, but by such courses as may first evince his title, and therefore possession, quiet possession, with prescription, is an undoubted just title any where. 
Little peace to be expected if that of Occupancy be not allowed.  And if we will have peace, which is the labour of all Politics, we must allow Occupancy to be a sacred title. And this is evident out of that which was delivered in the 13. and 14 ch. of Leviathan; For it is not possible to think that Ham in the 9 of Genesis did consent to his subjection to Shem or Japhet either, but each would, and might, take their possession in what quarter of the world they would, and the Providence of God would so dispose affairs, that it should come to pass according to that Prophecy. All the sons of Noah were thrust into the Common of the world, when any one seized upon any thing unpossessed, it was his, and must be so, or else men and all things in the world would be in a confusion.    
FINIS.   

An Alphabetical Table of the Principal CONTENTS.  


A  
A, or Ab, often denotes causation, chap. 31. sect. 8. pag. 312.  
How Aaron was Moses' mouth, chap. 32. sect. 7. p. 329.  
The diversity of the Agent cannot be argued from the diversity of operations, the object being divers, cha. 6. sect. 8. p. 47.  
Justice executed among the Americans, chap. 2●. sect. 4. p. 156.  
Why Angels cannot produce a plurality of persons in their spiritual essences, ch. 35. sect. 7. p. 405.  
The distinction of souls in the several kinds of Animals, chap. 11. sect. 2. p. 76.  
Appearance cannot, but the Act discerning it, may be called Fancy, chap. 1. sect. 3. p. 6.  
The division of Appetite into natural and rational, with the definition of each, chap. 8. sect. 1. p 57  
The account of actions by natural Appetite, ibid. the contest between that and the rational, ibid.  
God's wisdom in disposing the Appetites of creatures to their actions and his ends, chap. 8. sect. 4. p. 60. sect. 5. p. 61. which they act without knowledge, ibid.  
Arria's magnanimity showed in a bloody precedent to her husband Paetus, chap. 22. sect. 6. p. 171.  
St. cyril's rule about words to which Articles are, or are not, prefixed, chap. 32. sect. 20. p. 347. How to be understood p. 348.  
Mr. Hobbes' seeds of Religion charged by the Bishop to be a foundation for Atheism, chap. 13. sect. 1. p. 84.  
God's descent to Man's capacity in the doctrine of his Attributes, chap. 31. sect. 9 p. 314.  
The meaning of that Axiom; Nothing can give that to another, which itself hath not, chap. 6. sect. 3. p. 42.  
Aymericus attempts in vain to make Lul an heretic, chap. 35. sect. 5. p. 397.    


B  
The sagacious industry and contrivance of Bees, cha. 8. sect. 8. p. 59  
How from the Beginning Mic. 5.2. may signify from eternity, chap. 31. sect. 8. p. 311.  
A twofold consideration of the word Beginning, p. 312.  
That not to be understood, from the Beginning of David's reign, ibid.  
The Socinians interpret In the Beginning, John 1.1. with reference to the Baptist's preaching, chap. 32. sect. 3. p. 324.  
What is revealed in holy Writ ought to be believed though in show, contrary to Reason, p. 120. chap. 7. sect. 3. p. 135. sect. 4. p. 136.  
The Bishop's apology for the manner of his own writing, chap. 35. sect. 15. p. 416.  
How God is said to have purchased his Church with his own blood, chap. 31. sect. 2. p. 293. God, who was the Father, yet not in the person of the Father, p. 295. Not figuratively understood ibid. Smalcius' interpretation absurd and false ibid. Christ's blood not to be called the Blood of the Father, sect. 3. p. 297.    


C  
How Mr. Hobbes would have out-Cained Cain in the justification of fratricide, chap. 24. sect. 3. p. 184.  
Cato's do●ble attempt to dispatch himself, chap. 22. sect. 6. p. 170.  
How Cerinthus conceived a double nature to be in Christ, chap. 32. sect. 1. p. 319.  
A character of Cerinthus, p. 320.  
Why St. John justly abhorred him, ibid.  
H●s opinion concerning Christ the same with that of the Socinians, p. 321.  
All things able to overcome the ill they are affected with change themselves, chap. 7. sect. 2. p. 55.  
Christ proved to be God, chap. 31 sect. 2. p. 292.  
1 Cor. 6.20. urged by the Bishop for the divinity of Christ, sect. 3. p. 300.  
How Christ was naturally produced, chap. 31. sect. 5. p. 302.  
The mystery of Christ's divine and humane generation signified, Mic. 5.2. cha. 31. sect. 6. p. 303. And so asserted against Socinus, p. 304. And Valkelius, p. 305. With other Socinians, p. 307. The Text taken in pieces, and vindicated from their objections, sect. 7. p. 308.  
Christ's double capacity of Priest and Layman, alleged by the Socinians, discussed, chap. 33. sect. 4. p. 356.  
Christ a true man, though a divine person, chap. 33. sect. 15. p. 380.  
What commission Christ gave his Apostles, sect. 18. p. 386.  
Colour and Image not the same, chap. 2. sect. 1. p. 8.  
Colour in the object when Image is not, sect. 2. ib.  
Colour varied according to the medium, sect. 3. p. 9  
Colour in the object, sect. 4. p. 10.  
Colour no apparition of motion in the brain, chap. 3. sect. 3. p. 12. chap. 4. sect. 1. p. 25.  
Colour a real thing in the object, chap. 4. sect. 2. p. 26.  
Different colours dissipating and congregating the Sunbeams, ibid.  
Colour and Light not the same thing, sect. 4. p. 30.  
Some colours opposite to Light, ib.  
Light not therefore the form of colours, because it produceth them into act, chap. 5. sect. 1. p. 32. sect. 3. p. 34.  
The difference between real and intentional colours, sect. 3. p. 33.  
Intentional colours not the same with Light, chap. 5. sect. 3. p. 35.  
Whence the fancy of colours in the dark, chap. 9 sect. 4. p. 66.  
The foundations, whereon Mr. Hobbes build's a Commonwealth, and the● justice of it, ch. 27. sect. 4. p. 214  
The distinction of Communicable, ut quod, and ut quo, chap. 29. sect. 6. p. 278.  
The Concord of little families not dependent upon lust, ch. 21. sect. 4. p. 156.  
How vulgar speech hath appropriated Confession, chap. 16. sect. 2. p. 126.  
Carthagena confines God's infinite power unto his fancy, chap. 35. sect. 1. p. 393.  
The right to goods by Conquest what, chap. 36. sect. 12. p. 436.  
Conscience dictate's submission to a common power and Laws, chap. 21 sect. 7. p. 158.  
The restraint of Conscience from scandalous and great injuries, chap. 27. sect. 2. page 212.  
When Man resolve's things into their constitutive causes, he need not lose himself in the inquest, chap. 14. sect. 6. p. 100  
Benignity to a Musician varyeth not the nature of this or that Donor's contract, cha. 26. sect. 2. p. 203.  
The original of Justice consisteth not in the Law of Nature for keeping Covenants, ch. 27. sect. 1. p. 208.  
Propriety good without Covenant, p. 209. chap. 36. sect. 12. p. 436.  
Suspicion makes not Covenants void, ch. 27. sect. 2. p. 210.  
The evil consequences of Mr. Hobbes' opinion in it, p. 211.  
The Fool's doctrine about Covenants more honest than Mr. Hobbes' sect. 5. p. 215.  
The breach of Covenant, though a wicked one, conduceth not to eternal felicity; yet such Covenants ought to be broken, sect. 11. p. 224. As that entered into by Thiefs, ib. The other by an Adulteress, ibid.  
Several qualifications, good and bad, in the making and breaking Covenants, chap. 29. sect. 1. p. 249.  
No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature, chap. 30. s. 8. p. 281. With whomsoever any such is made, it must not be kept ib.  
The Hebrew Midwives had, probably, Covenanted, sect. 9 p. 283.  
No breach of covenant which had not a right to bind, sect. 10. p. 284  
The Creation of the World asserted by the same authority Mr. Hobbes pretends he will submit to, p. 119.  
The world's Creation, not the Gospel's renovation, the subject matter of St John, 1.3. ch. 33. sect. 5. p. 357.  
Christ's interest in the Creation reinforced against the Socinians gloss upon that Text, sect. 6. p. 359. Wherein he was a principal, no ba●e instrumental cause, ibid.  
The Creation by Him not to be taken for recreation, or regeneration, sect. 10. p. 365. much less for an endeavour to regenerate, p. 367  
Creatures acting by natural inclinations and appetites compared unto a Clock.  
How God can enlarge the capacity of his creature, and how make the object of knowledge approach the limits of its nature, ch. 35. sect. 1. p. 393.    


D.  
No damage without injury, chap. 29. sect. 2. p. 250.  
Death desired by such as foresee the happiness they are to enjoy, chapter 22. section 4. page 167.  
No loss, but rather increase of power by death, ib. section 5.  
Our Druids opinion of it, p. 168.  
Death not so terrible and painful as pretended, ib. section 6.  
Ancient instances to confirm it; That of Otho and his soldiers most ●●gnal, page 169.  
Arria's encouragement of self-dispatc● to her husband Paetus, page 171.  
A modern instance in the Bishop's child against the supposed pains of death, ibid.  
Death as sleep to many, and alike desirable, section 7. page 172.  
Diogenes took them for Brother and Sister, ibid.  
Another young child of the Bishop's mistake Death for sleep, p. 173  
Misrepresentations make it otherwise apprehended, ibid.  
The three periods of Death, ibid. section 8. In which of them, and when otherwise, pain affects the sick, page 174.  
Epicurus' excellent discourse against the fear of death, chapter 29. section 10. page 265.  
He that mean's to deceive will not declare his intent, chapter 27. section 9 page 221.  
Devotion what, and whence, chapter 13. section 4. page 89.  
How Dogs and other sensitive creatures come acquainted with words and signs, chapter 11. section 1. page 75.  
Man, in his most peculiar Dominion, subject and tributary to God, chapter 44. section 1. page 181.  
Man, in his first Charter, had dominion given him over other creatures, but not over other men, section 2. page 182.  
Why men are exempt, section 3. page 183.  
The contradiction of mutual dominion, every man over every man, page 185.  
How Christ calls himself a Door, chapter 32. section 5. page 326.  
Dreams improperly assimilated to moved water in its return to rest, chapter 9 section 2. page 64.  
Prophetic Dreams, such as are recorded in holy Scripture, arise not from an agitation of the inward pa●ts, chapter 10. s. 1. p. 71. f. 2. p. 72.  
Dreams, according to Solomon, come from the multitude of business, ibid.  
O●d men not always subject to more dreams then young, section 3. page 73.  
The Bishop's opinion of Natural, Constitutionall, and Fantastic dreams, ib. of coherent, and incoherent dreams, page 74.    


E  
The Philosophers first opinion cerning Echoes, chapter 6. sect. 2. p. 40. Their second opinion, page 41. Their third opinion, ib.  
What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies properly, and why rendered was, chapter 33. section 8. page 362. Why the Evangelist chose it rather than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, page 363. what hard luck that word has among the Socicians, section 10. page 365.  
Christ's eternal Egression compared to the shining of the Sun, chapter 31. section 7. page 310.  
ELOHIM, the name of God, often given to Kings and Princes, chapter 30. section 12. page 286.  
Equality of hopes o● desires renders not men always enemies, chapter 19 section 1. page 142. An instance in the contract between Abraham and Lot, section 2. page 143. Nor self-conservation; nor delectation, ib. section 3. Not Equality of desires, chapter 19 section 4. page 145. Ahab's and Naboth's case, ib.  
Upon what hard conditions an Estate is not to be preserved, chapter 23. section 3. page 178.  
No Eternity à parte ante, which is not likewise à part p●st, chapter 14. section 2. page 93.  
An Eternity to be found in all the different principles of Philosophers, section 6. page 99  
How before and after may be applied to God's Eternal being, section 11. page 106.  
The double conceit we may have of it, section 12. page 108.  
The truest Philosophy of it in Scripture, section 13. page 109. Wherein how years and days are applied to it, page 110.  
Eternity a standing instant, section 14. page 111. Which implie's not now and then to be both one, section 15. page 113.  
No● makes an infinite number of numbers an unite, section 16. p. 115.  
Mr. Hobbes blamed by the Bishop for disputing the case of the World's Eternity, and referring the determination to his Leviathan, page 117.  
God's descent to Man's capacity in the doctrine of Eternity, chapter 31. section 9 page 314.  
God's Eternal Existence compared to an immovable standing Rock, chapter 14. section. 15. p. 114  
Experience not simply memory, chapter 9 section 8. page 69. what, and whence, page 70.    


F  
The violation of Faith not allowed for a Kingdom, chapter 27. section 5. page 216. section 8. page 219  
Caesar's sentence out of Euripides does not positively assert it, ibid. His mistake of the question, ib. and change of the terms fraudulently, page 220.  
What Faith conduceth toward eternal happiness, chapter 28. section 12. page 242. How much it fixeth us upon it, section 15. page 246  
A busied Fancy inobservant of light or colour, how radiant soever, chapter 9 section 4. page 66.  
What Fear the fomenter of Devotion, and what not, chapter 13. section 4. page 87.  
Reason subdueth Fear, chapter 19 section 4. page▪ 145. Which no bare possibility, but probability produceth, page 146.  
God's punitive justice secure's men from desperate Fears, ib.  
What Fear it is secure's a man from violating covenant, chapter 27. section 3. page 212.  
Taking away the fear of God an unreasonable supposition made by Mr. Hobbes, section 5. p. 216.  
Our evidence greater for future Felicity then that ever there was such a man as Julius Caesar, chapter 28. section 7. page 232. Being not only delivered to us by Tradition, but most consonant to Reason, section 8. page 233. In Man's fellowship with other Creatures, and his excellency above them, section 9 page 234.  
The certainty of Felicity after death resumed and proved, section 14. page 243.  
Figures never used by Christ without intimation how the Text is to be understood, chapter 32. section 5. page 325.  
The nature of Finite explained, chapter 14. section 5. page 96.  
Fire worketh not by motion equally every way, chaper. 3. section 10. page 181.  
Fire covered not therefore extinguished because its motion is stopped, but because it vows air to nourish it, section. 11. page 19  
Fire, when it cannot dilate, does not contract, section 12. page 20.  
Fire does not reject and chase the medium to the eye, if it should, the fire of two beacons could not be seen each from other, sect. 13. p. 21.  
Flashes of fire from a stroke may affect one that is blind, section 14. page 23.  
The Socinians heterodox interpretation of the word Flesh in Saint John, chapter 33. section 14. page 375. Which is not taken in Scripture for the unhappy sort of men, but for men in general, page 376.  
Force and Fraud no military virtues, chapter 21. section 8. page. 159  
Wherein the ancient Philosophers made true fortitude to consist, chapter 29. section 13. page 270. Exemplified in David, ibid.  
Epicurus' discourse of Frugality and Temperance, section 10. p. 266.    


G  
The holy Ghost a distinct person of the Trinity, no mere Attribute of the Deity, chapter 34. section 1. page 387. Not the Gospel of Christ, as the Socinians pretend, section 2. page 389. Not the gift of God to certain men, section 3. page 390.  
How Gloria Patri is come to be appropriated to the Doxology, chapter 16. section 2. page 127.  
The different effects of burning-glasses, chapter 4. section 2. page 27.  
How the Gentiles conceived their false Gods to be of the same nature with the Soul of Man, chapter 12. section 4. page 82.  
The belief of a God cannot grow out of the opinion of Ghosts, chapter 13. section 2. page 86.  
How evidently God manifests himself in his creatures, chapter 14. section 17. page 115.  
The passions, not the actions, of men to be called God's, chapter 31. section 2. page 298.  
The Word's being with God in Saint John, signifies more than known to God, against Socinus and his followers, chapter 32. section 15. page 340. section 17. page 345.  
How God, with the Socinians, is no proper name, etc. but an Appellative, section 19 page 346.  
How Satan is called the God of this world, section ●0. page▪ 347.  
How the B●lly is God, ibid.  
How 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God, with or without an Article, is to be understood of the great God, ibid.  
How the Word, though God, may be said to have been with God, chapter 32. section 21. page 350. In his divinity, not humanity, cha●ter 33. section 3. page 353.  
Saint John Baptist's testimony sufficient to prove Christ the great God, against Socinus, chapter. 33. section 9 page 363.  
To do any thing as God, and in the nature of God, not the same, section 17. page 383.  
Whose goings forth, etc. Mic. 5.2. how to be interpreted of Christ, chapter 31. section 7. page 308. not to be understood of any but an eternal emanation, section 10. page 316.  
The distinction between a good man and a good citizen, chapter 29. section 9 page 262.  
〈◊〉 justification of the ancient Christians as no enemies to the Imperial government, chapter 25. section 6 page 197.  
Grace does not destroy, but perfect nature, chapter 35. section 5. page 397.    


H  
What a persuasive the natural knowledge, or belief, we have of eternal happiness is to withdraw us from our opinion of temporal felicity, chapter 28. section 2. page 227.  
The transcendent delight we have here in our hopes of eternal happiness, section 3. page 228. fo● which we loath worldly pleasures, ib. and welcome tortures, page 229.  
The worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happiness, sect. 4. ibid.  
Mr. Hobbes can render himself no more secure of temporal than he appears to be (with little satisfaction) of eternal happiness, section 5. page 231.  
Who seems to disparage that article of our Faith, chapter 28. section 15, page 248.  
Wherein the Stoics placed humane happiness, cha●ter 29. section 11. page 267. wherein Aristotle, page 268.  
How the heat in my hand differs from that in the fire, which warmed it. chapter 6. section 6. page 44.  
Improperly said by Mr. Hobbes that heat is a pleasure or pain, section 7. ibid. though a remote cause of both, page 47.  
Plato's description of Heaven paralleled to that of Saint John in his Revelation, chapter 32. section 14. page 338.  
Mr. Hobbes' horrid supposal of getting Heaven by unjust violence, chapter 27. s. 6. page 217.  
The Bishop's character of Mr. Hobbes, page 117.  
Mr. Hobbes censured by the Bishop for discouraging men from their assent to divine truths, page 118. and countenancing Atheists, page 119.  
His Lordship's serious advice to him to blot out such his hand-writings, ibid.  
How hopes and fears affect men, chapter 19 section 4. page 144.  
The principles of humanity keep men from acting violence unprovoked, chapter 2. section 2. page 148.    


I  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated, chapter 31. section 3. page 299.  
The Bishop's opinion, that there was no Idolatry before the Flood, chapter 16. section 1. page 125.  
Men's beginning to call upon the Lord, Gen. 4. no argument for Idolatry before the Flood, ibid. No● God's punishment of the world by the flood, section 3. page 128.  
Jesus increased in wisdom, etc. with God and men, otherwise than Socinus interpret's it, chapter 32. s. 16. page 343.  
Ignorance of second causes apt to produce Atheism then Religion, ch●p●er 13. s. 3. ●age 86.  
Affected ignorance of the Law sin, chapter 21. s. 3. page 155.  
The Image in the glisse, chapter 2. s. 4. page 10.  
Image no apparition of motion in the brains, chapter 3. s. 2. page 11.  
Imagination something besides decaying sense, chapter 9 s. 3. page 64.  
Imagination and Memory proved not to be the same thing, s. 7. page 68  
No Infinity of causations, nor of causes, chapter 14. s. 2. page 92.  
Man hath some knowledge of infinite, s. 3. page 94. s. 4. page 95. s. 5. page 98.  
The nature of infinite explained, page 96.  
No infinity of number, s. 10. page 103. were there such, no one infinity could exceed another, page 104.  
Why no man can have right to act any thing inhumanely, chapter 4. s. 2. page 182.  
A standing instant of two thousand years, chapter 14. s. 14. page 111.  
How sacred amongst all people hath ever been the preservation of interest, chapter 29. s. 10. page 162.  
How invocation in Genesis may be taken for the whole worship of God, chapter 16. s. 2. page 126. Or for some signal additional devotion, ibid.  
That St. John writ against Ebion and Cerinthus proved, contrary to Socinus, chapter 32. s. 1. page 321.  
St. John's rea●on of his writing not solitary, as Socinus allegeth, s. 2. p. 322  
The Israelites how the people of God, and how of Moses, chapter 30. s. 13. page 288.  
God was King of the Israelites; Moses but their Judge and General, s. 15. page 289.  
Justice and Injustice, as acquired habits, may be in a solitary person, chapter 21. s. 9 page 160.  
Mr. Hobbes' imperfect definition of Injustice, chapter 27. s. 1. page 210. Likewise of Justice, s. 4. page 213.  
The Fool's argument against Justice unanswerable out of Mr. Hobbes' principles, s. 5. page 215.  
With what reason Injustice will stand, taking away the fear of God, chapter 27. s. 5. page 216.  
The explication of Commutative and Distributive Justice, chapter 29. s. 3. page 251. To which is premised that of common or legal justice, page 252. Many acts of justice being not comprehended under the other two, page 253.  
Giving, or not giving, have nothing to do with Justice, s. 5. page 256  
In Commutative justice restitution of reparation due without contract, s. 6. page 257. so likewise in Distributive justice, ibid.  
The preference of the less worthy to the better place against Distributive Justice, page 258.  
The justice of an Arbitrator may be Commutative or Distributive, according to the case, s. 7. page 259.  
The difference between Equity and Distributive Justice, ibid.  
Mr. Hobbes' boldness in confronting all learned men before him, touching Commutative and Distributive Justice, page 260. Bodin only excepted, who has an airy conceit of harmonical proportion, ibid.    


K  
Mr. Hobbes unkind to Religion in the disparagement he put's upon natural knowledge, chapter 8. s. 1. page 226.  
His scornful scale of knowledge, s. 7. page 232.  
Man's knowledge so defective, as it cannot satisfy his Will, s. 11. page 237.  
Man hath some imperfect knowledge of God in this life, s. 12. page 240. None of his eminences, but by Revelation, page 241.  
The parcels of knowledge in this life make up no accumulative or collective happiness, s. 15. page 245.    


L  
Every man born under a Lawmaker and a Law, chapter 21. s. 3. page 155. s. 7. page 158.  
The Decalogue was no new Law, s. 10. page 161.  
Exceptions against Mr. Hobbes' definition of the Law of Nature, chapter 25. s. 3. page 192.  
How the Law of Nature, obligeth strangers to mutual succour in distress, chapter 27. s. 1. page 209.  
How it give's rules for the attaining eternal felicity after death, s. 10. page 223.  
Mr. Hobbes makes the Law of Nature to act against the Law of Nature, chapter 30. s. 9 page 282.  
Liberality what, chapter 29. s. 13. page 270.  
Liberty no such thing as Mr. Hobbes describe's it, chapter 25. s. 2. page 191.  
Light, or colour figured, how conducible to sight, chapter 1. s. 3. page 5.  
Light illustrate's the medium, but does not terminate sight, chapter 3. s. 7. page 16. s. 8. page 17.  
How our Saviour is said to be a Light, etc. Luke 2.32. chapter 32. s. 17. page 344.  
How Christ is called the Light according to Socinus; how according to the Bishop, chapter 33. s. 7. page 362. Preservation of life not the principal of man's happiness, chapter 22. s. 4. page 166. When, and how to be regarded, chapter 36. s. 12. page 436.  
In what cases life should not be preferred to death, chapter 22. s. 9 page 114. chapter 36. s. ●. page 420. s. ●. page 421. s. 4. page 423. s. 11. page 434.  
How Christ calls himself the life, chapter 32. s. 5. page 327.  
Eternal life before Christ's Incarnation known to the Angels, blessed souls, Prophets, Philosophers, ib. s. 15. page 341. although not, till afterward, manifested to others, ibid. page 342.  
What life is meant by Saint John to be in the Word, chapter 33. s. 7. page 361. and what the light of men, ibid.  
Raymund Lully's adventures and sufferings for the conversion of the Turks and Moors, chapter 35. s. 5. page 398.    


M  
Man's abilities both to know and prosecute what is good, chapter 8. s. 2. page 58.  
The inequality of men by nature considerably different, chapter 18. s. 2. page 138. Adam and Evah made in no state of enmity, nor absolute equality, ibid. s. 3.  
The debility and helpless condition of other men by nature, page 139.  
Plato's ingenious fable about the making of men and beasts, chapter 27. s. 2. page 211.  
The constancy of the holy Martyrs a most strong reason for eternal happiness, chapter 28. s. 15. page 247.  
Means no otherwise useful then as they relate to an end that is such, chapter 36. s. 4. page 422. s. 5. page 424. All conducing to a private person's advantage not to be used, s. 6. page 425.  
Memory not always weakened by extent of time, chapter 9 s. 5. page 67.  
Memory likened to a box, whereof Attention is the key, ibid. To a book, s. 7. page 69.  
The distinction of Memory, Experience, and Prudence, chapter 18. s. 4. page 139.  
The diversity of Merit, chapter 25. s. 8. page 202.  
The distinction of it ex congruo, and ex condigno, misunderstood by Mr. Hobbes, chapter 26. s. 4. page 204. How otherwise expounded by the Schools, page 205.  
Christ had a plenarity of power in his mission from the Father, chapter 33. s. 18. page 385.  
Moral Philosophy hath a subject of a greater extent than Mr. Hobbes seems to allow it, chapter 29. s. 8. page 261.  
How Moses was instead of God to Aaron, chapter 30. s. 12. page 286.  
How made a God to Pharaoh, ibid. A messenger and mediator betwixt God and his people, s. 15. page 290.  
Motion aims at quiet, chapter 1. s. 3. page 5.  
All things produced by it, p. 6.  
Things without us are not motions causing apparitions, chapter 6. s. 9 page 48.  
The six kinds of motion, page 49.  
No eternity of motion in things moved, unto which no stop or impediment occurre's, chapter 7. s. 2. page 55  
How standing water recover's its rest after motion, chapter 9 s. 1. p. 63.  
A bladder's sudden stopping its motion of ascent on the top of the water, s. 2. page 64.  
The first mover immovable, chapter 14. s. 8. page 101.  
How natural bodies move themselves without being moved by that which is moved, page 102.    


N  
Naboth destroyed not by Ahab's, but Jezabell's malice, chapter 19 s. 4. page 145.  
The being and nature of things consists not in their second but their first act, etc. chapter 5. section 1. page 32  
The right of nature extends farther than to the preservation of life, chapter 22. section 1. page 164.  
Necessity of nature makes not every particular man desirous to preserve his life, section 3. page 166.  
He that judgeth by the right of Nature hath a Law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judgement, chapter 23. section 2. page 177. To which he is obliged by Reason, ib. When the Law of Nature for preservation may be dispensed with, page 178.  
What is the Law, what the Right of Nature, chapter 24. section 1. page 181. Not such as Mr. Hobbes defines it, chapter 25. section 1. page 190.  
External impediments may hinder, but not take away natural power, section 2. p. 191.  
Nature's aiming at the benefit only of particulars, an error which runs through Mr. Hobbes' whole discourse, section 3. p. 193.  
How far natural abilities conduce to the knowledge of God, chapter 33. section 13. page 372.  
Actions not always answerable to the principles of his or its nature which act's, section 17. page 383.  
Several acceptions of necessity, and the different effects of it accordingly, chapter 22. section 2. page 165.  
Nothing necessary that God hath not provided for by some Law, ibid.  
No new Patent made to Noah, but that to Adam reinforced, chapter 24. section 4. p. 185.  
Noah's son's like coheirs or entercommoners in their right, page 186.    


O  
Obedience due in submission to any punishment by a lawful Magistrate, chapter 25. section 7. p. 199.  
God to be obeyed before man, chapter 30. section 9 p. 282. an instance in the Hebrew midwives, ibid.  
The title of Occupancy sacred, chapter 19 section 4. page 145.  
Before Occupancy, Reason or Arm● decide the title, p. 147.  
Of all titles to Interest Occupancy most evident, section 11. page 163. How far in case of necessity to be remitted, chapter 36. section 13. p. 437  
Discovery give's not an equal right with Occupancy, p. 438.  
Little peace to be expected, if the right of Occupancy be not allowed, p. 440.  
Ochinus perverts the sense of Acts 20.17, 28. to detract from the divinity of Christ, chapter 31. section 2. page 293. Refuted by Smiglecius, ib. To whom Smalcius replie's, p. 294. Ochinus deserted by the Socinians, ib.  
The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishop, chapter 31. section 10. p. 315.  
One in essence may be plurally expressed when the effects are divers, section 7. p. 309.  
The heathen Gods not believed for their Oracles, but the Oracles for their Gods, chapter. 13. section 5. page 90.    


P  
The right of Parents over their Children, chapter 24. section 2. page 182.  
What makes passions sinful, chapter 21. section 2. p. 154.  
The various constitutions of the objects to our passions, ibid.  
The passions to be moderated by prudence and right reason, the ancient Ethnic Philosophy, and Saint Paul's, chap. 29. section 12. p. 269. ch. 36. s. 3. p. 421.  
The barbarous Persecutions endured by the Primitive Christians, chapter 25. section 6. p. 197.  
Mr. Hobbes' definition of a Person too circumstantial, chapter 30. section 1. p. 272. No less applicable to a feigned then a true Person, section 2. p. 273.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, suppositum, anciently used to denote what we term Person, section 3. p. 274.  
Person differently used in several Arts and Faculties, ibid. Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes, section 4. p. 275.  
No man Personates himself, ibid.  
That of Cicero interpreted; V●us sustineo tres personas, Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, ibid.  
Per●on how taken by Critics, page 276.  
Boethius' definition of a Person, section 5. ibid. objected against by Ri. de Sancto Victore, ibid.  
By Scotus, p. 277.  
Boethius' other definition of a person more difficult, ibid.  
The former definition explained and vindicated by the Bishop, section 6. page 278.  
The Etymology and common acception of Persona, p. 280.  
Not the Actor, but the acted, is the person, ib.  
The true God improperly and overboldly said to be personated, chapter 30. section 11. p. 284.  
Moses, though instead of God did not personate him, p. 285. s. 12. p. 287. Nor do Kings, Nor Priests, ibid.  
Moses' phrase shows he personated not God, section 14. p. 289.  
Uncomely to say, our Saviour personated God, who was really God himself, chapter 31. section 1. p. 291.  
Personality what, chapter 33. section 15. page 379. What that of Christ in the flesh, ib.  
Diversity of persons implies not diversity of things, section 17. page 384.  
The whole Divine nature not necessarily engaged in the acts of any single person in the Trinity, ibid.  
The eternal plurality of Persons by production in the holy Trinity syllogistically proved, chapter 35. section 7. p. 404.  
Why no more persons than three in the holy Trinity, section 11. p. 410.  
How the product of two Divine Agents may be one and the same Person, section 12. p. 411.  
How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father, Son, and holy Ghost, section. 13. page 412.  
St. Augustine's argument for their being called three Persons, which is no Scripture-language, section 14. p. 414.  
How great is the Personal distinction in the holy Trinity, a mystery yet unrevealed, chapter 35. section 14. p. 415.  
Personal and relative perfection taught by Philosophers, chapter 29. section 10. p. 263.  
How man's knowledge is from Phantasms, chap. 14. s. 4. p. 95.  
The foundation of Ethick, Oeconomick, and Politic Philosophy, chapter 29. section 9 p. 262.  
Mr. Hobbes' Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus, section 10. p. 263. With that of Lucretius, page 265.  
The Philosopher's language used by the Primitive Fathers and St. Paul, chapter 32. section 14. p. 337.  
That of Plato consonant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John, p. 338.  
The Philosophers excel the Socinians in the knowledge of eternal life, section 15. p. 342.  
Place no motion, nor can motion be in it, chapter 1. section 3. p. 6.  
The study of self-preservation not always earnest, chapter 36. section 3. p. 420.  
The Promises and Oaths of men by experience very fallacious, chap. 28. section 6. p. 231.  
Particular interest and propriety very sacred among the ancient Jews, chapter 21. section 10. p. 162.  
God, by his own Prerogative, gave the Children of Israel a title to the Canaanites Land, and the goods of the Egyptians, chapter 24. s. 5. p. 187.  
The first generation of men understood their title of Propriety without God's peremptory command, p. 188.  
Places, etc. not appropriated, become duly his that first seizeth, section 6. p. 189.  
How the owner keep's his Propriety, who intended to renounce it, chapter 26. section 3. p. 203.  
A Propriety where is no coercive power, chapter 27. s. 4. page 213.  
Two persons cannot have a Propriety in the same thing at the same time. ch. 36. sect. 6. page 426. ib. sect. 8 page 430.  
The inequality of men's prudence, chapter 18. section 4. p. 14. ib. s. 5.  
The reasons why men may, and do often distrust their own prudence, section 6. p. 141.  
Prudence whence, and how it may be said to be but experience, chapter 18. section 4. page 140.  
What some Philosophers thought of prudence, chap. 29. sect. 13. p. 271.  
God's punishment in this world not always proportioned to the sin, chapter 16. section 3, p. 128.    


Q  
The qualifications of the visible species according to the disposition or indisposition of the Organ, chapter 2. section 3. p. 9  
The nature of prime qualities as they affect the Organ, chapter 6. section 6. p. 45.  
How second qualities transmit their species, ib.  
Sensible qualities more than mere apparitions, section 8. p. 48.  
Quod ubique, semper, & ab omnibus, etc. a rule seldom opposed by malicious Reason except by that of Mr. Hobbes, chapter 14. section 1. p. 92.    


R  
The approach or analogy to Reason in the acts of inferior creatures, chapter 8. section 3. p. 59  
The same conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason, chapter 28. section 12. page 242.  
Reasonable, of what extent, chapter 30. section 15. page 247.  
A godly work, to make Reason subservient to Faith, chapter 34. section 4. page 391. How it may be so, chapter 35. section 4. page 395. Being neither unprofitable, nor scandalous to Faith, p. 396.  
What of God may be known by Reason, section 2. page 393.  
Unnatural for Reason to subject itself to passions and sensual desires, chapter 36. section 3. page 421.  
No rebound of the object from the brain to the Optic nerve, chapter 3. section 14. page 22.  
Mr. Hobbes' subtlety in writing against Rebellion; which cannot be by his doctrine, chapter 27. section 12. page 225.  
What Religion is, and how it comes to be reckoned a part of Justice, chap- 12. section 1. p. 79.  
What is the seed of Religion, and why only in man, section 2. page 80. chapter 14. section 1. page 91.  
How far Religion may be abated and abolished in particular men, chapter 15. section 2. page 122.  
Formed Religion not founded upon Mr. Hobbes' fantastic Faith, section 3. page 1●4.  
The difference betwixt an occasion and the foundation of Religion explained, ib. section 5.  
How far the opinion of any person, that introduceth it, should prevail with the people, chapter 16. section 5. p. 130.  
Some difference between the foundation of Religion and form Religion, section 6. p. 132.  
The want of integrity and prudence in Chu●ch-Gove●ners, renders not the Catholic Christian Religion suspected, chapter 17. section 1. & 2. p. 133. & 134.  
No eternity of rest in things unmoved, whether animal or natural, when extralocall, chapter 7. section 1 p. 54.  
Revelation did first dictate a form of Religion, which might afterward be improved by Reason, chapter 16. section 4. p. 129.  
God's Revelation of himself by dreams, visions, etc. chapter 28. section 12. p. 242.  
Trismegistus, Socrates, Plato, and such others, probably had Revelations, or met with some Prophetic person or writing, chapter 33. section 13. p. 373.  
R●ches cannot satisfy man's Will, which bring with them an impatient covetousness of getting more, when men have most, chapter 28. section 11. page 239.  
They are not things absolutely good, page 240.  
He that hath right to the end, hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end, chapter 23. section 1. page 176. The ultimate end excepted, ib.  
Mr. Hobbes mistaken in his definition of Right, and distinction of it from Law, chapter 23. section 4. p. 179.  
What Right is properly, and what Wrong, section 5. p. 180.  
The necessary consistence of Right with Law, ib.  
A man need's lay down his right to nothing, chapter 25. section 5. page 195.  
That is not always really good, for which a man part's with his right, section 6. p. 196.  
A man may lay down his right to resistance and preservation of his life for a greater good, page 197.  
A man may renounce his right pro aris & focis, section 8. page 200. and for the good of his posterity, etc. ibid.  
The usefulness of things de futuro give's a man no present Right to them, chapter 36. section 6. page 427. section 12. p. 437.  
What Right the Law of humanity give's a man to what is in the possession of another, section 8. page 430.  
The dissolution of a Commonwealth give's a man no perpetual right to his neighbour's goods, section 9 page 431.    


S  
The sagacity of several Animals, Elephants, Dogs, etc. chapter 11. section 2. page 77. Which yet do not syllogise, though they seem to do it, p. 78.  
Lully's advice to the Pope and Cardinals about converting the Saracens, chapter 35. section 5. page 398.  
Mr Hobbes' censure of all Philosophy-Schools, etc. chapter 1. section 3. page 6.  
The Schoolmen condemned both for their rashness and negligence in the rational search of the holy Trinity, ch. 35. ●. 14. p. 416.  
Holy Scripture to be believed against Reason, chapter 34. section 3. page 390.  
No sense of objects visible or audible in Sleep or Attention, chapter 1. section 1. p. 2.  
The cause of sense, section 2. page 3. Master Hobbes' fancy of it, ibid.  
How it comes to pass that the same object is seen double, chapter 2. section 3. p. 9  
Mr. Hobbes unconstant in placing the seat of sense, chapter 3. section 4. page 12.  
What required to prevent the deception of sense, section 5. page 14.  
No such deception of sense as Mr. Hobbes fancieth, chapter 6. section 9 p. 50.  
Not sense, but Reason, judgeth whether colour seen by reflection be in the object, section 10. p. 51.  
How service in vulgar language is come to be taken for the Common-prayer of the Church, chapter 16. section 2. p. 137.  
How Christ calls himself a Shepherd, chapter 32. section 5. page 326.  
There were Sibylls that prophesied of our Saviour, chapter 13. section 5. page 90.  
Sight, the prae-requisites not wanting, judgeth aright of colours, but not always of a common object, chapter 6. section 10. page 50. nor of objects by accident, as Logicians speak, page 51.  
How the Thief would be gratified, if the object of sight were but apparition, chapter 6. section 8. page 48. The subtlety of an evasion in Mr. Hobbes' power, ibid.  
Smalcius' vain attempt to evacuate the Divinity of Christ, chapter 31. section 2. page 295.  
Smell and Taste are in the men, but sensible qualities in the objects, chap. 6. section 5. p. 44.  
The shifting Genius of the Socinians deluded by a single word, section 3. page 299.  
The Socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto, section 8. p. 313. Their shifts, chapter 32. section 1. page 322.  
The sin of Sodom, and some others, may be supposed to be under no restraint of a positive Law, chapter 24. section 3. p. 183.  
We ought not, beyond the Revelation in holy Scripture to aggravate their sins who perished by the flood, chapter 16. section 3. p. 128.  
How Christ is the Son of God, chapter 31. sect. 4. page 301.  
What a Son is, ibid. The particulars in the definition applied to our Saviour, section 5. p. 302.  
How we must believe Christ to be the natural Son of God, chapter 32. section 3. p. 322.  
Even Idolaters had a better opinion of the soul of Man then to fancy it like the appearance in a dream, or Looking-glass, chap. 12. section 4. page 83.  
The subject of sound, chapter 6. section 2. p. 40.  
Sound dormant before collision, section 3. p. 42.  
Sound no rebound from the brain to the nerves outward, section 4. page 43. Nor apparition of motion, ibid.  
Of Spirits and invisible Agents, chapter 11. section 5. page 83.  
Light and fire from the strong emission of species in the dark, chapter 3. s. 5. p. 13.  
Not the receipt of the species, but the soul's judgement of it, is sight, chapter 5. section 4. p. 36.  
Aristotle's reasons for visible species, chapter 5. section 5. page. 37.  
Why the propagation of them through the medium is not discerned, ibid.  
Their name supposed to be taken from some seminal virtue, ib.  
Why real Colours produce but intentional species, chapter 5. section 5. page 38.  
Whence the appearance of light or fire after a sudden stroke, chapter 3. section 5. p. 13.  
How substances depend upon God as Accidents upon their subjects, chapter 33. section 15 page 378.  
That successful wickedness obtaines the name of Virtue, argued by the Fool, and consonant to Mr. Hobbes' principles, though he disowne's it, chapter 27. section 7. page 217.  
Several difficulties objected against Mr. Hobbes' Philosophy about the Sun, chapter 3. section 15. page 23.  
With what sagacious artifice Swallows build their nests, chapter 8. section 3. page 59  
The actions dictated by what the School calls Synderesis, chapter 27. section 2. page 212.    


T  
Smalcius answered about the Tautology, is in God, and is God, chapter 31. section 21. page 349.  
Man's thought more than a mere representation, chapter 1. section 1. page 2.  
The Catcher's title to scattered money, chapter 26. section 1. page 202.  
The benefit of Tradition, chap. 33. section 6. page 360.  
How otherwise, then by the effects of God in the Creature, we may adventure upon the proof of the holy Trinity, chapter 35. section 3. page 395.  
Lully's undertaking concerning the rational proof of the holy Trinity, ibid. section 6. page 399. Vasques' Answer and the Bishop's reply to his Arguments, page 400. An explanation of his sense, section 7. page 401. section 8. page 406. The Bishop proceede's in this discourse, section 9 page 408.  
The principal Authors that have attempted the rational discovery of the holy Trinity, section 15. page 416.  
How Christ calls himself the Truth chapter 32. section 52. page 327.    


V  
What value may be set on things to be sold, and how enhanced, chapter 29. section 4. page 254.  
When the Arithmetical proportian must be applied to the value of the thing, page 255.  
How Christ calls himself a Vine, chapter 32. section 5. page 326.  
An untouched Viol sounding in harmony with one touched, chapter 6. section 2. p. 40.  
How Man understands simple terms in their proper, but Beasts only in their general, notion, chapter 11. section 2. p. 77.  
Man's understanding imperfect in this world, chapter 28. section 13. page 243.  
The Union of the Divinity with the Humanity implieth no mutation of God into Man, chapter 33. section 15. page 378. It maketh but one Christ, page 380.  
The use and benefit of Universities, chapter 1. section 3. p. 7.  
How John Baptist was called a Voice, chapter 32. section 7. page 329.  
The Bishop discover's no such thing as St. John's unbraiding the World, chapter 1.10. chapter 33. section 13. page 373.  
The use of some things known interdicted, chapter 36. section 6. page 427. How a man may know what is not, page 428. section 7. page 429.  
Jus and Utile not the same thing, chapter 24. section 6. p. 188.  
How Tully understood Utile far otherwise then Mr. Hobbes, page 189.    


W  
How two Walls of different colours equally affect the brain, chapter 4. section 1 page 26.  
Three sorts of men in no condition of War, chapter 20. section 1. page 148.  
What may, and what may not, be called War in respect of time, section 3. page 149. in respect of a disposition to it▪ section 5. page 151.  
Neither a monastike nor sociable course of life put's men presently into a posture of defensive War, section 6. page 152.  
No universal War ever enterprised by Mankind, chapter 21. section 1. page 153.  
The mutual jealousies of Sovereigns put them not presently into a condition of War, section 6. page 157.  
Men have no right to practise inhumanity in War, chapter 25. section 4. page 194.  
What condition praerequisite to a just engagement in War, ibid.  
War not the only Conservatour of Man's right or Nature's, section 5. page 195.  
How Christ calls himself the Way, chapter 32. section 5. page 327.  
What Wether may be rightly called fair or foul, chapter 20. section 1. page 148.  
The Whispering place in Gloucester Church, chapter 6. section 2. page 40.  
Man's Will not to be the rule of his Judgement, nor the reason of his actions, chapter 24. section 2. page 183.  
A very Child require's the satisfaction of his Will, chapter 28. section 10. page 236.  
A man's Will is satisfied with no worldly goods, whether bodily, sensual, or intellectual, section 13. page 243. nor ought else which is not infinite, and that infinite is God, section 11. page 238.  
The Socinians interpret Word, St. John 1.1. by a Metaphor and Metonymy, chapter 32. section 4. page 325.  
How he is there called the Word, section 6. page 328. section 7. page 330.  
The Word not to be understood of our Saviour's Humanity, section 8. page 331. neither Metaphorically nor Metonymically, ibid.  
Socinus' shift, that he was decreed to be the Word, will not serve his purpose, section 9 page 332.  
A Word internal and external both of God and Man, section 10. page 333.  
The Philosophers in all ages called the Son of God his Word, section 11. page 335. as well they who writ after as who before St. John, section 12. page 336. Which is yielded by Socinus, section 13. page 336.  
Discourse concerning the knowledge of the Word before the preaching of St. John Baptist, section 17. page 343.  
Whether in the Socinian or Catholic sense may be more truly said, The Word was God, section 18. page 345.  
How the Word is God with, though not God of, the Father, section 21. page 351.  
The conceit of Smalcius and Valkelius, how the Word was with God in the Beginning, chapter 33. section 1 page 352. Improbable, section 2. page 353.  
The Socinians collusions about the Word's being made Flesh, section 14. page 374.  
How the Word is man, though it lack the personality of man, section 15 page 379.  
The Word's being made flesh imports not the same of the Father and the holy Ghost, with whom he is the same God, section 16. page 381.  
The World was divided among Noah's sons, not by consent, but by casual occupancy, or choice, as every of them thought fit, chapter 24. section 4. page 187.  
Smalcius' several acceptions of the word [World] and the making of it in St. John, wherein he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader, chapter 33. section 11. page 367. Discovered by the Bishop, page 369.  
The word [World] never used single in the Bible for Heaven, nor for the reformed or regenerated part of men, section 12. page 370. It is used for the men in the world, section 13. page 371.  
How the World knew not the Word b●t by supernatural grace, page 372.  
The whole World no particular man's right, chapter 36. section 5. page 424. section 6. page 426. section 11. page 433. section 13. page 439. No● can it be expedient for him to destroy it, section 7. page 429. Nor can there be a necessity privileging him to subdue it, section 10. page 432.    
FINIS.   

Points, Commas, etc. to be rectified by the curious or censorious READER.  
TItle,] after annexed deal Epist. Dedic.] p 2. l. 13. r. honour, Epist. to the Reader] p. 1. l. 6. for State▪ read State, Table to the Chap. and Sect.] ch. 5. s. 2. r. Colours, light, ch. 14 s 1. r. principle, ch. 16. s 5 r Religion, ch. 17. s. 5. r. examples, ch. 21. s. 4. l 4. r. live; s. 10 l. 1. r. Dominions; l 2. r. wives, ●. 11. l. 1 r. various; ch. 23. s. 2. l. 2. r. judgement, ch. 25. s 8. r▪ fo. is; ch 28. s. 8 l. 2 r. Reason, s. 11. r. it; s. 12. l. 3 r it; ch 28. s. 15. l. 5. r. Reason; ch. 29. s. 3. l. 2. r. Justice; ch. 32. s. 5. l. 4 r. Resurrection; s. 21. r. Tautology; ch. 33 s. 1 l 2. r. beginning; ch. 33. s. 13. r. Terms s. 15. l. 3. r. Man; ib. l. 7. r. Sma●●i●●'s, ch. 35. s. 4. l. 6. r. scandal, s. 5. l. 4. r. Vasques; s. 7. l. r. him;  

In the Book.  
Page 3 l. 17. r. endeavour, p. 5. l. 5. r. light, or colour figured, l. 11. r. the understanding ib r. horse doth l. 24. r. it, p. 6. l. 29. r. appearance may p. 8. l. 1. r. subject, ib, p. 9 r. subject, p. 11. l. 19 r. brain; p. 13. l 32. r. ●●aring; p. 14. l. 2. r. species; p 14. l. 18. r. concussion, p. 16. l 20. r. pellucid things would p. 20 l. 15 r. that, which p. 21. l. 13. r. motion, by p. 22. l 2. r conceive's, to p. 23. l. 13 r. eye is l. 17. r. Sun is p. 26. l. 7. r. or, if not, l. 22 r. co●e to l. 25. r. effects is p. 31 l. 29. r. visible, p. 33. l. 1. r. colour, because p 34. l. 8. r. other only p. 35 l. 20. r. predominant: so p. 42 l. 13. r. heavens; The p. 49. l. 1. r. but motion? p. 51. l. 2. r. like; Thus l. 27. r. colour can p. 54. l. 12 r. limitation) p. 55. l. 7. r. Men, measuring p. 56. l. 12. r. Animals expel p 57 l. 17. r. preserve them? l. 20▪ r. preserve themselves? p▪ 62. l. 19 r. wisdom; p. 64. l. 11 r. see's, p. 70. l. 10 r. experience; I answer l. 30 r. being out p. 72. l. 31. r. like earnestness, p. 74. l. 7. r. choler. p. 76. l 1. r. he, by l. 27. r. a man; p. 77 l. 18. r. understanding. But p. 78. l. 14. r. Negations p. 81. l. 20. r. man was l. 22. r. make; l 23. r. men not l. 29. r. please] p. 83. l. 18. r. Agents, l. 19 r. fancy, p. 84. l. 8. r. and, p. 86. l 26. r God like p. 87. l 9 r. leade's us p. ●8. l. 3. r. Cause●, p. 89. l. 3. r. that, among p. 105. l. 21. r. 〈◊〉▪ p. 106. l. 1. r. Argument, l 25. r. together, had compacted p. 110. l. 15. r. heavens; l. 19 r. years fail, p. 111. l. 12. r. instant, p. 112. l. 25. r. standing? p. 114. l. 25. r. duration, p. 122. l. 15. r. Grammatical p. 128. l. 11. r. Flood, is p. 132. l. 19 r. God, is p. 137. l. 7. r. Chapter; l. 24. r. misery; p. 141. l. 2. r. wisdom, p. 142. l. 28. r. or, if p. 146. l. 26. r. excellencies p. 153. l. 24. r. words] p. 158. l 2. r. consequent, l. 15. r. Nature, p. 163. l. 9 r. possessions, p. 167. l. 22. r. Leviathan; ib. principal, p. 169. l. 1. r. great; p 171. l. 7. r. she, p. 174. l 23. r. word, p. 190. l. 4. r. life, p. p. 192. l. 3. r. outward, p. 192. l. 31. r. nature, p. 193. l. 32. r. th●sts p. 191. l. 30. r. war, p. 195. l. 23. r. which, by p. 196. l. 12. r. laid, p. 201. l. 1. r. many, p. 202. l. 18. r. need, l. 29. r. men scramble p. 203. l. 1. r. Free-gift, l. 19 r. signs, by p. 204 l 31 r. himself, but p. 209. l. 4. r. sin's independence ib. r. Covenants; l. 14. r. right over l. 15. r. another; Here p. 210. l. 24 r suspicion, it is void: but p 213. l. 2. r. Covenant, which p. 214. l. 33. r. tongue; p. 218. l. 14. r. Virtue, p. 219. l. 22. r. wickedness, p. 222. l. 9 r. done, according p. 227. l. 10. r. here, were l. 22. r. him, who p. 230. l. 8. r. do such actions, than l. 12. r. evident, because p. 232. l. 27. r. felicity, although the evidence, which l. 29. r. evidence, given p. 234. l. 19 r. rooms p. 235. l. 13. r. disputes, l. 5 r. field, p. 236. l. 25. r. felicity, either l. 51. r. the Stoic, instead p 238. l. 9 r. thing, without l. 23. r. Truth, cannot l. 27. r. understanding, can p, 239. l. 13. r. desire's; they, p 240 l. 6. r. they, who p. 247. l. 22. r. we have p. 259. l. 15. r. distribution to l. 19 r. This (which p. 266. l. 29. r. although, I l. 33. r. making men p. 268. l. 11. r. of God, I l. 30. r. liberality] p. 269. l. 4. r. men, who l. 9 r. Prudence, l. 14. r. mistaken in l. 15. r. passions, l. 16. r. Custom to p. 270. l. 27. r. Fortitude are, p. 271. p. 273. l. 18. r. person a ●rue. p. 282. l. 28. r. men, p. 284. l. 13. r. it is p. 285. l. 24. r. he, who p. 288. l. 4. r. God's People, l. 26. r. give's a reason p. 289. l. 12. r. Mr. Hobbes, the p. 293. l. 20. r. our Saviour l. 33. r. God which p. 299. l. 25. r. God be p. 300. l. 19 r. body, both p 308. l. 1. r. phrase, of p. 312. l. 10. r. which, in p. 334. l. 24. r. word, spoken p. 335. l. 32. r. and, as well as this, acknowledged p. 345. l. 29. r. this Word, which is a real Word, p. 356. l. 24. r. before he p. 357. l. 32. r. God; in p. 358. l. 29. r. this of p. 365. l. 17. r. produceth Ephes. p. 369. l. 1. r. observable, there p. 370. l. 20. r. the same Christ p. 372. l. 28. r. Angels told p. 274. l. 24. r. as, by p. 375. l. 32. r. Flesh, in p. 378. l. 25. r. respect of p. 379. l. 16 r. inhesion, or p. 380. l. 8. r. person; to be p. 383. l. 16. r. expounded it. p. 392. l. 30. r. Creature's p. 393. l. 14. r. But, I say, p. 394. l. 31. r. effects, some p. 395. l. 31. r. faith may p. 396. l. 31. r. and, for l. 33. r. Faith to p. 397. l. 12. r. Lul, I think, passeth p. 397. l. 16. r. essence. Gabriel l. 26. r. Lul from p. 398. l. 2. r. Lul thought p. 399. r. Bernard Luthenburgensis, p. 400. l. 23. r demonstration can p. 405. l. 30. r. Godhead, p. 410. l. 11. r. these they p. 411. l. 24. r. fires, or l. 31. r. object; so p. 413. l. 21. r. Spirit. I p. 421. l. 31. r. end; so p. 427. l. 22. r. them; these p. 434. l. 24. r. Parricides; nor p. 435. l. 29. r. interest; and   

In the Margin.  
P. 11. l. last r. motion; p. 13. l. 7. r. brain; p. 16. l 2. r. amiss; p. 20. l. 3. r. contraction▪ p. 21. l. 3. r. medium; p. 145. l. last r. fears. p. 146. l. 5. r. injury, p. 161. l. 5. r. wives, l 6. r. estates; p. 16●. l. 3. r. various; p. 166. l. 7. r. life; l. last r. happiness; p. 176. l. 8. r. end, p. 177. l. 9 r. judgement, p. 181. l. 5. r. Man, in p. 183. l. last r. it, p. 190. l. 5. r. it▪ p. 193. l. 10. r. nothing; p. 194 l. 4. r. war; p. 200. r. socis; p. 204. l. 4. r. Hobbes▪ p. 215. l. 6. r. principles▪ p. 216. l. 9 r. other, p. 217 l. last r. Fool; p. 219. l. last. r. question; p. 224. l. 2. r. Covenant, l. 4. r. one, l. 6. r. felicity, l. 9 r. broken; l. 12. r. Thiefs; p. 225. l. 4. r. Rebellion; p. 228. l. 5. r. happiness; p. 231. l. 9 r. felicity; p. 232. l. last r. Caesar; p, 237. l last r. it; p. 240. l. last r. life; p. 242. l. 3. r. it; p. 251. l. last r. justice▪ It. p. 252. l. last p. 260. l. 3. r. justice; l. last r. cavil; p. 261. l last r. Philosophy; p. 263. l. last r. Epicurus; p. 267. l. last r. happiness; p. 272. l. last 1. circumstantial; p. 274. l. last r. faculties; p. 277. r it, p. 281. l. 4. r. Nature; p. 282. l. 7. r. obeyed l. last r. Midwives; 285. l. 4. r. him; l. 6. r. Kings; p. 289. l. last r. General; p. 291. l. 4. r. God; It. l. last p. 293. l. 2, r. Ochinus, l. last r. Smiglecius; p. 298. l 4. r. Bishop; p. 300. l. 24. r. God; Christ's r. 304. l. 2. r. answered, p. 314. l. 5. r. Attributes; p▪ 315. l. last r. Bishop; p. 323. l. 4. r. his; p. 325. l. 2. r. Metaphor, l. 4. r. Metonymy, p. 326. l. 2. r. vine; l. 3. r. shepherd; p. 328. l. last r. figures; p. 330. l. last. r. sense; p. 331. l. 4. r. humanity, l. 6. r. Metaphorically, p. 335. l. last. r. Word, p. 341. r. Philosophers, p. 349. l. last. r. Tautology; p. 357. l. last r. interpretation, p. 362. l. 4. r. Socinus; p. 363. l. last. r. Christ, p. 365. r. regeneration; p. 367. l. last World, p. 371. l. last r. Smiglecius, p. 375. l. last r. flesh, p. 376. l. 2. r. Scripture, p. 377. l. 3. r. Comment; p. 378. l. 7. r Man, I●. p. 11. l. 18. r. Objection, p. 379. l. 3 r. Smalcius', p. 380. l. 3. r. person, p. 381. l. last r. him, p. 385. l. last r. himself, p. 387. l. 3. r. Ghost, l last r. Deity; p. 389. l. last r. Scripture; p. 390. l. last r. mysteries, p. 392. l. 4. r. blasphemous limiting p. 396. l. 4. r. scandal, p. 397. l. 6. r. Vasques, p. 398. l 5. r. Saracens p. 399. l. last r. Vasques; p. 400. l. 9 r. Another, from p. 401. l. 8. r. eternity, or p. 405. l. 5. r. effect, p. 40●. l. last r. knowledge; p. 411. l. 13. r. Ghost; p. 415. l. last r. determine; p. 416. l. last r. reason; p. 424. l. 5. r. world; p. 026. l. last r. person; p. 437. l. ●. r. Occupancy.  
The Literal Transpositions, Defects, etc. will discover themselves to the Reader without particular Advertisement, and not disordering the sense, require little or no amendment by his Pen.    

The most remarkable Errors to be amended.  
Table to the Chap. and Sect. chap. ●3. s. 5. for we read Were.  

Numbers mistaken.  
FOr page 207. printed 208. for 208. printed 100 for 312. is printed 212. for 320. printed 220. for 368. printed 37●. page 33. r. chap. 5. p. 80. r. chap. ●●. page 169. r. chap. 22. page 177. r. chap. ●3. page 180. r. chap. 23. page 181. r. chap. 24. p. 184. r. chap. 24. p. 208. r. chap. 27 In the Alphabetical Table col. 2. l. 28. for 181. r. 1●. In the Book.  
Page 7. insert this Title, Observations, etc. upon the second Chapter of his Humane Nature, p. 9 l. 7. for many r. may, p 18. l. 2▪ ●. (I think it should be effected) is not hard to prove, p. 34. l. 9 r. those species, p. 35. l. 31. r. ay, finding, p. 40. l. 21. deal it, p. 44. l. 1. for some r. smell, p. 52. l. 31. for they pass r. it passeth, p. 61. l. 16. r. bring, p. 70. l. 1. for reat r. that, p. 77. l. 4. r. of ingenuity, of docibility, do appear in as great a resemblance of stupidity, p. 95. l. 25. r. deduced, p. 97. l. 12, r. this is not that, p. 100 l. 29. for boldly r. solidly, p. 104. l. 12. r. or more or greater numbers, p. 105. l. 15. r. must be infinite twenties likewise. p. 108. l. 15. deal in it. p. 111. l. 27. r. it would last, p. 114. l. 4. r. unwastable rock, p. 116. l. 29. r. Authors, p. 119. l. 20. for but r. yet, p. 120. l. 2. for but r. only, l. 6. r. is contemned, p. 127. l. 24. r. Gloria Patri began with Flavianus, as Theodore●; assisted by St. Chrysostom, as Nicephorus; p. 144. l. 24. r. and not so only, p. 144. l. 31. for do r. produce, p. 153 l. 12. for wresting r. trusting, p. 161. l. 25. r. either of them, p. 163. l. 29. for describe r. disperse, ●b. r. more strongly, p. 171. l. 25. r. whom, p. 179. l. 2●. r. and for what, p. 180. l. 7. deal that, p. 192. l. 2●. r. only a Prohibition, a negative law, p. 206. l. 22. r. he who, p. 215. l. 1. his own care, p. 217. l. 26. r. he begins, p. 218. l. 25. infer● and r. If a man have naturally right to all those things, and cannot renounce these, than he may rightly act any thing which may secure, p. 285. l. 14. r. ●o receive, p▪ 219. l. 22. r. wickedness, p. 226. l. 23. r. lead, p. 247. l. 8. r. exacted, p. 251. l. 30. r. premit, p. 263. l. 23. for hd r. he, p. 267. l. 11. r. Writer, p. 275. l. 11. for not to be r. not he, p. 285. l. 13. for to r. so, p. 288. l. 22. for Genesis r. E●odus, p. 289. l. 16. r. as much, p. 292. l. 19 for soon r. some, p. 29●. l. 33. r. which was shed, p. 295. l. 13. r. his Church, p. 296. l. 1. r. God's, and not God; p. 304. l. 7. r. goings forth, l. 10, 11. r. these going forth, p. 307. l. 24. for cum r. eum, p. 312. l. 30. r. Isai. 55. p. 328. l. 24. r. nowhere, p. 340. l. 28. r. belongs to all things, p. 347. l. 13. God of this World, p. 352. l. 9 for in sin r. in him, p. 356. l. 11. r. will not endure, p. 365. l. 13. r. having no compound, l. 27. for would, r. could. p. 370. l. 21. r. fitted it, p. 388. l. 4. r. in token, p. 392. l. 17. r. God▪ p. 393. l. 30. r. industry, p. 394. l. 8, r. premitted, p. 399. l. 13. for hardly r. freely, p. 410. l. 12. r. these are three, p. 416. l. 31. r. Who thinks, p. 419. l. 16. r. must not be, p. 419. l. 18. r. but by the rules of right Reason directing what they should do, p. 413. l. ●0. r. many. Had, p. 424. l. 4. for by r. of Adam, l. 10. r. or any▪ p. 4●6. l. 33. for see r. he, p. 428. l. 30. for meat r. neat, p. 432. l. 29. for flourished r. flourishes, p. 439. l. 19 for diest r▪ divest.   

In the Margin.  
● Page 187. l. last for received r. revealed, p. 203. l. 9 r. property, p. 210. l. 4. r. suspicion, p. 214. l. 2. r. whereon, p. 297. l. 7. deal that p. 323. l. 3. r. singular, p. 392. l. 4. for intimating r. limiting, p. 425. l. 4. r. and to having.