SIX CONFERRENCES Concerning The Eucharist.   

Novemb. 5. 1678.  
MR. A. Pulton Jesuit, having in his Remarks (published Novemb. 4.) declared in efféct (in P. 29, 30.) that the Principles of Philosophy which contradict the Doctrine of Transubstantiation are to be renounced, and that Christians have the same ground to believe Transubstantiation as the Blessed Trinity, and demanding How great the Confusion of Dr. T. will be at the Day of Judgement, when he shall find that Te●● true: The sid Dr. Tenison the Publisher of THIS BOOK, does, so far as concerns these Particulars, refer Mr. Pulton to IT; and for the rest of his Remarks he will in due time give a very just Answer to them.   

Books lately printed for Richard Chiswell.  

A Dissertation concerning the Government of the Ancient Church: more particularly of the Encroachments of the Bishops of Rome upon other Sus. By WILLIAM CAVE, D. D. Octavo.  
An Answer to Mr. Serjeant's [Sure Footing in Christianity] concerning the Rule of Faith: With some other Discourses. By WILLIAM FALKNER, D. D. 40.  
A Vindication of the Ordinations of the Church of England; in Answer to a Paper written by one of the Church of Rome, to prove the Nullity of our Orders. By GILBERT BURNET, D. D. Octavo.  
An Abridgement of the History of the Reformation of the Church of England. By GILB. BURNET, D. D. Octavo.  
The APOLOGY of the Church of England; and an Epistle to one Signior Scipio, a Venetian Gentleman, concerning the Council of Trent. Written both in Latin, by the Right Reverend Father in God, JOHN JEWEL Lord Bishop of Salisbury: Made English by a Person of Quality. To which is added, The Life of the said Bishop: Collected and written by the same Hand. Octavo.  
The Life of WILLIAM BEDEL, D. D. Bishop of Kilmore in Ireland. Together with Certain Letters which passed betwixt him and James Waddesworth (a late Pensioner of the Holy Inquisition of Sevil) in Matter of Religion, concerning the General Motives to the Roman Obedience. Octavo.  
The Decree made at ROME the Second of March, 1679. condemning some Opinions of the Jesuits, and other Casuists. Quarto.  
A Discourse concerning the Necessity of Reformation, with respect to the Errors and Corruptions of the Church of Rome. Quarto. First and Second Parts.  
A Discourse concerning the Celebration of Divine Service in an Unknown Tongue. Quarto.  
A Papist nor Misrepresented by Protestants. Being a Reply to the Reflections upon the Answer to [A Papist Misrepresented and Represented]. Quarto.  
An Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England, in the several Articles proposed by the late BISHOP of CONDOM, [in his Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church]. Quarto.  
A Defence of the Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England; against the Exceptions of Monsieur de M●a●●, late Bishop of Condon, and his Vindicator. 40.  
A CATECHISM explaining the Doctrine and Practices of the Church of Rome. With an Answer thereunto. By a Protestant of the Church of England. 80.  
A Papist Represented and not Misrepresented, being an Answer to the First, Second, Fifth and Sixth Sheets of the Second Part of the [Papist Misrepresented and Represented]; and for a further Vindication of the GATEGHISM, truly representing the Doctrines and Practices of the Church of Rome. Quarto.  
The Lay-Christian's Obligation to read the Holy Scriptures. Quarto.  
The Plain Man's Reply to the Catholic Missionaries. 240.  
An Answer to THREE PAPERS lately printed, concerning the Authority of the Catholic Church in Matters of Faith, and the Reformation of the Church of England. Quarto.  
A Vindication of the Answer to THREE PAPERS concerning the Unity and Authority of the Catholic Church, and the Reformation of the Church of England. Quarto.  
THE Pillar and Ground of Truth. A Treatise showing that the Roman Church falsely claims to be That Church, and the Pillar of That Truth mentioned by S. Paul in his first Epistle to Timothy, Chap. 3. Vers. 15. 4ᵒ.  
The People's Right to read the Holy Scripture Asserted. 4ᵒ.  
A Short Summary of the principal Controversies between the Church of England and the Church of Rome; being a Vindication of several Protestant Doctrines, in Answer to a Late Pamphlet, Entitled, [Protestancy destitute of Scripture Proofs.] 4ᵒ.  
Two Discourses; Of Purgatory, and Prayers for the Dead.  
An Answer to a Lato Pamphlet, Entitled, [The Judgement and Doctrine of the Clergy of the Church of England concerning one Special Branch of the King's Prerogative, viz. In dispensing with the Penal Laws.] 4ᵒ.  
The Notes of the Church, as laid down by Cardinal Bellarmin, examined and confuted. 4ᵒ.  
Preparation for Death: Being a Letter sent to a young Gentlewoman in France, in a dangerous Distemper of which she died.  
The Difference between the Church of England and the Church of Rome, in opposition to a late Book, Entitled, An Agreement between the Church of England and Church of Rome.  
A PRIVATE FRATER to be used in Difficult Times.  
A True Account of a Conference held about Religion at London, Sept. 29, 1687, between A. Pulton, Jesuit, and Tho. Tennison, D. D. as also of that which led to it, and followed after it. 4ᵒ.  
The Vindication of A. Cressener, Schoolmaster in Long-Acre, from the Aspersions of A. Pulton, Jesuit, Schoolmaster in the Savoy, together with some Account of his Discourse with Mr. Meredith.  
A Discourse showing that Protestants are on the safer Side, notwithstanding the uncharitable Judgement of their Adversaries; and that Their Religion is the surest Way to Heaven. 4ᵒ.  
Six Conferences concerning the Eucharist, wherein is showed, that the Doctrine of Transubstantiation overthrows the Proofs of Christian Religion.  
A Discourse concerning the pretended Sacrament of Extreme Unction; with an account of the Occasions and Beginnings of it in the Western Church. In Three Parts. With a Letter to the Vindicator of the Bishop of Condom.    

SIX CONFERENCES CONCERNING The Eucharist.  
Wherein is showed, That the Doctrine of Transubstantiation overthrows the Proofs of Christian Religion.  

Imprimatur.  
Septemb. 12. 1687. Jo. BATTELY.   
LONDON: Printed for Richard Chiswell, at the Rose and Crown in St. Paul's Churchyard, MDCLXXXVII.   

The CONTENTS Of the Six Conferences concerning the EUCHARIST.  
CONFERENCE I. 
THe First Proof, That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys the certainty of our Senses, which is the Foundation of the strongest Proofs of Christianity.  CONF. II. 
The Second Proof, That Transubstantiation discrediting the Testimony of our Senses, does absolutely overthrow the principal Reasons which confirm the Truth of Christian Religion.  CONF. III. 
Wherein are confirmed the two Proofs contained in the two preceding Discourses.  CONF. IU. 
The Third Proof, That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism in its full perfection; and especially destroys the certainty of Demonstration.  CONF. V. 
Wherein is finally showed, That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism; and absolutely destroys the certainty of First Principles.  CONF. VI. 
Wherein the Proofs contained in the foregoing Discourses are defended; and the impossibility of using them against the Doctrine foe the Trinity is demonstrated.    

SIX CONFERENCES Concerning the EUCHARIST.  

CONFERENCE I. That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys the certainty of our Senses, which is the Foundation of the strongest Proofs of Christianity.  
IT's not many days since I came to Mr. N. and found him in his Study, having his Eyes fixed on a Book; with the reading of which he seemed to be so taken up, as made me think I should do him wrong to interrupt him. Intending therefore to withdraw, without his seeing me; I could not do it without some small disturbance, which made him turn his Head towards the place where I was, and hastily arise towards me.  
You shall not be gone, said he, for I prise your Company at another rate than thus to lose it. The loss, replied I, would rather be mine; and I am afraid lest I should deprive you of the pleasure of some delightful reading, as knowing, by experience, how vexatious it is to be disturbed at such a time.  
What you say, answered he (after he had made me sit down) is very true. I am not a little pleased with reading good Books, and I doubt not, but this which lies before me is of that number. But you have wherewith to make me amends for this Interruption, for I doubt not, but before we part, you will increase the Pleasure which this reading afforded me; and approving this Book, as I dare say you will, you'll not a little confirm me in the good Opinion I have of it; and make me read it henceforward with greater earnestness.  
Your esteem of the Book, replied I, is enough to gain my approbation. I am not wont to make Appeals from your Judgement, having been always so pleased in following it, that 'tis now become a kind of Law, which I never violate. But perhaps I never saw this Book.  
That can't be, answered he, this Book has been too famous for you not to see it, especially considering its some Years since 'twas published. In a word, 'tis the Book which the Ingenious Mr. Huet has written to establish the Truth of Christian Religion 
(a) P. Dan. Huetii demonstratio Evangelica. .  
I do not repent, said I, of my engagement to approve of it, for I have read it with great delight, not to mention the Style, which is delicate, and vows no Ornaments; I sinned it replenished with judicious Observations, and such as lie out of the common Road, full of great sense and plainness. In short, 'tis a Work worthy its Author, who holds a considerable Place amongst Learned Men.  
I have only one thing to say against the Book, and that with regret, because I know you will not herein agree with me. Let's hear it however, said he; It is, replied I, That this Book was made by one of your Party. If that be all the fault, answered he, I am much mistaken if Mr. Huet ever corrects it.  
You may judge what you please of it, replied I; my Opinion is, That this is a capital Fault, and spoil's the whole Work. For whereas this would have been an excellent Piece, had it been wrote by a Protestant; coming from a Person of your Communion, it loses all its Force and Conviction, and overthrows its own Arguments; and should it fall into the hands of a knowing Infidel, he could, with one word answer it.  
This is very surprising, says Mr. N. and you must be a very great Bigot in your Religion, to offer such a strange and incredible Paradox. Has your Belief the privilege of making bad Arguments good Ones? and is ours so unhappy as to corrupt the best Things, and change Demonstrations into Sophisms, as oft as they pass through our hands?  
There may be, replied I, some Truth in what you now say; and I give an Instance of this from one of your Authors 
(b) Education of a Prince. ; who shows, That the greatest part of Seneca's Maxims are false and ridiculous in the Writings of That Philosopher; whereas they would be very proper and excellent in the Writings of a Christian.  
The same may I say of Mr. Huet, and the rest of your Authors, who undertake this Subject. The best Proofs become Paralogisms in their Writings; and 'tis by passing over into ours, that they resume their strength and due efficacy.  
And this is one of the Effects which your Transubstantiation operates, destroying the most convincing Arguments you can offer the Infidels, and giving them an infallible means to defend themselves, and right to maintain, That if these Proofs be good, Transubstantiation is not a part of the Christian Religion; or if Transubstantiation be a part of the Christian Religion, these Proofs he of no validity.  
It's certain, if they be Men endued with sense, they will lay hold of the first of these Propositions. In effect it's apparent, That Mr. Huet's Proof, are valid, and good in themselves; whereas 'tis not certain, That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches, not to say that it ought to be taken for granted, that it is not one of them. It is so strange and offensive, and so little agrees with the whole Body of revealed Truths; either in general, or particular, that a Man needs only the use of his Senses, free from all prejudices, to perceive, That this comes not from the same Spring, and that the Author of Christianity is a very different Person from the Author of Transubstantiation.  
Such Infidels then, that are discerning Men, will separate what's offered to them jointly. They will embrace Christianity, and reject Transubstantiation: They will receive this Holy Religion, as coming from the Spirit of God, and put from them your Doctrine as a humane Invention.  
However 'tis not long of you, That they cast not themselves into the other aforementioned extremity: I mean, the persuading themselves that the Proofs of the Christian Religion be invalid. Yet you are for persuading them, not only That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which the Gospel teaches, but moreover one of its principal ones; one of the most essential Points of Christian Religion, and that which can be least spared. And consequently, if these Infidels be simple enough to believe this, and after such an Error have any reason left, they will only make use of it to persuade themselves, That that Religion which teaches such an incredible Doctrine, could not have been revealed by the Spirit of Truth; and that the Proofs which were made use of to establish the Divinity of it, are of no validity.  
I am so strongly possessed with the belief of Transubstantiation, (said Mr. N.) That I believe no Objections in the World are capable to make me doubt one minute of the truth of it. Yet I must acknowledge, 'twould be a terrible Temptation to me, could you convince me of what you say. It does so highly concern us, That the Proofs of Christianity be valid, That there are few Things but what ought to be sacrificed to so great an Interest; and I know no greater prejudice against a Doctrine, than to show that it weakens these Proofs, and gives advantage to such dangerous Adversaries, as those are, against whom we use them. And therefore I must ingenuously confess to you, That you cannot touch me in a more tender place. But I must affirm at the same time, you have undertaken what you will never be able to prove: That Transubstantiation overthrows the Arguments of Mr. Huet, even those which seem most likely to convert Unbelievers.  
I do not doubt, replied I, but to make it plain to you; and I am willing you should make no account of my Arguments, if you yourself do not find they carry along with them the clearest Evidence. But if you please, let me hear first, which are the Arguments Mr. Huet has made use of, for those are they which be in question between us.  
The Proofs, said he, are certain undeniable historical Matters of Fact; and which are moreover of such a nature, That they cannot be true, if Christian Religion be not of God; and the Matters of Fact be these, That long before our Saviour's Time, the Jews had certain Books which they esteemed Sacred, and which they believed were written by Men inspired of God. That these Books have come down to us without alteration; and that we have them, such as they were before our Lord's Incarnation. That they contain divers Prophecies, which promise a Deliverer to the Jewish Nation; whom they mention under the name of Messiah, distinctly denoting his Birth, his actions, his Death, and Resurrection; and in general, the most remarkable Passages of his Life. That under the Empire of Tiberius, there appeared in Judea a Man called Jesus, who said he was this Messiah. That there was seen in his Person whatever the Writings of the Prophets had foretold should be observable in the Messiah. That he moreover wrought several Miracles to prove his Mission. That having been crucified by the Jews, he, after three days, risen again, and was carried up into Heaven. To which we may add, that after his Ascension, his Apostles proclaimed his Resurrection throughout all the World, and confirmed it by various and infinite Miracles. That this Testimony which they gave, drew on them a thousand cruel Persecutions; and engaged them into the necessity of undergoing Poverty, Contempt, Imprisonments, and the most cruel Punishments the World could inflict on them; yet all this was not able to make them alter their course. That their Preaching persuaded an infinite number of People, of all Nations, and especially great numbers of the Jews. That the Church, which they founded by this means, suffered an uninterrupted Persecution, for the space of 300 Years; and yet daily increased, and spread itself over the whole World.  
'Tis true, that Mr. Huet has not insisted on the last of these Facts; but besides, that they be of the same Order as the preceding; I believe 'tis fit they should be added, as being of great use for the establishing of the Truth of Christian Religion. In a word, if both one and the other be true, 'tis not possible but the Christian Faith must come from God; and he that denies so necessary a Consequence may deny the clearest Truths which have happened in the World.  
These Facts being true, the Birth of Jesus Christ, his Actions, his Death, his Resurrection, his Ascension, and in general, all the particulars of his Life have been foretold, several Ages before they have happened; and what is most considerable, they have been foretold, not by one or two particular Persons, but by a long Train, as I may say, of Prophets, who have succeeded one another in several Ages, and who seem to have been chief raised up for this purpose: by Prophets, I say, in whom were to be seen all the Marks, which denote Persons inspired of God.  
If these Matters of Fact be true, our Saviour himself has justified his Mission by a great number of Miracles, all infinitely above the force of Nature, and circumstanced in the likeliest manner in the World, to persuade us they were the immediate Effects of an Almighty Power.  
If these things be true, the Eternal God has raised up his Son from the Grave, took him up into Heaven; and thereby declared, in an unquestionable manner, That he owned him, not only for his great Prophet, but for his only Son; it not being to be supposed, he would do all these things in favour of one that had falsely usurped that Title.  
If these Facts be true, Christianity has established itself in the World, in a manner wholly Divine; and which shows, with the greatest evidence, That Heaven has concerned itself in it; the Powers thereof alone being able to triumph over the Resistances and Oppositions of the Earth. So that I do not comprehend how a Man can acknowledge all these things, and deny Christian Religion to be of God.  
You are in the right, replied I, but the difficulty, if there be any, consists in establishing the Truth of these things; How will you prove them? For you know the Infidels are not agreed in them. The Infidels, said he, do not dony all of them. They acknowledge several of them, and which consequently there's no need of justifying. As to the rest, in which they will not agree with us, it's no hard matter to establish the Truth of them.  
But what Proofs, said I, must one use for this? Such as are wont to be offered to prove these king of things, answered he. I know, all sorts of Proofs, are not proper to establish all kind of Truths. Abstracted Verities, such as are those which Metaphysics teach us, are not proved by the Senses, nor by Authority, but by Domonstrations. Whereas on the contrary, Matters of Fact do not show themselves, at least in this manner; but if they be present, we make People see or touch them, whom we would convince of the truth of them; and if they are passed, and at a distance, we use the Testimony of those who have seen them, or certainly known them.  
Thus the Truths, which serve for a Foundation to the Proofs of the Christian Religion, consisting in Facts, and those past and ancient enough; you plainly see hence, we must not expect to establish them by Metaphysical or Mathematical Demonstrations, nor by the Depositions of Sense. We must content ourselves with the Testimony of those, who have seen them with their own Eyes, and who could not be deceived themselves, nor have any design of deceiving others.  
Is this sufficient? replied I. A bare Testimony of Men; can it produce any thing else than a Humane Faith? And is Humane Faith a sufficient Foundation for Divine Faith? Is not Humane Faith a kind of Opinion? and can an Opinion uphold what the Scripture calls 
(e) Heb. xi. i.  the Substance of things hoped for, and a demonstration of such as are not seen.  
I am surprised, said he, that so small a thing should stop you. When we consider, in the Testimony received, only the bare Authority of him that speaketh; when we attend to that alone, and the Faith which is grounded thereon, has no other Foundation, than the esteem we have for the Probity and Sincerity of the Witness; I must acknowledge to you, there's no more in all this but an Humane Faith, Opinion, and Probability: and I must moreover acknowledge, that this is not a sufficient Foundation for Divine Faith. But it oft happens, That besides this Persuasion which we have of their Probity and Sincerity of the Witness, or from other Reasons which we have to believe his Veracity; even these Reasons may be so strong, as to drive away all Doubts, and inspire us with an entire certainty. For Example, You and I have never been at Rome, we cannot know there's a City bears that Name, but from the Testimony of those that have seen it. Yet this Testimony is so circumstanced, that a Man must be a Fool, or believe others are such, to reject it. In effect, there are so many People which assure us of it; those that affirm it, have so little interest to deceive us; we see so many things happen, which show that all the World is persuaded of it, That there are few Truths we less doubt of than this. And this is that we call Moral Certitude, which excludes all Doubt, and which according to Mr. Huet, is no less than that of Metaphysical, or Mathematical Demonstrations.  
And this comes very near what one may say of the Testimony of those who witness the Matters of Fact above mentioned. This Testimony was not given by one or two Persons, but by several, at divers times, and in different places. All these Witnesses may have been perfectly instructed in the Facts which they attest, seeing they might have seen them with their own Eyes. They had no worldly Interest in saying what they did: It was, on the contrary, much their interest to conceal or deny it. A thousand suchlike Circumstances do show, that they spoke what they thought; all which added together, will not permit a Man to doubt of the truth of their Testimony. So that we have something more than a bare Opinion, for we have a perfect Certitude.  
By what I can perceive, said I, you are not of the Humour of a great number of your Divines, who seem to delight themselves in extenuating the force and clearness of these Proofs. You know there are some 
(d) Durand. in 3 dist. 24. quest. 3.  who affirm, they are only probalbe. Others assure us 
(e) Du Val in 22. pag. 41. , That their Evidence is not so great, but that there are other things which have as full conviction, and yet are false. Some say they be obscure Reasons, and which do not convince the Mind, that they constrain not an assent; and therefore the Will must determine the Mind, which these Arguments leave at full liberty.  
I do not only, said he to me, not approve all this, but I do not think 'tis sufferable. You are in the right, said I, and I am glad to find you of this Opinion: Not but that what your Divines affirm, gives me great advantage against your Proofs. But besides, that I can acquit myself without them; I am far from preferring so small an Interest, to that of the Glory of Christianity; which partly consists in the force and validity of the Arguguments, which establish the Divinity of it.  
Let us then esteem these Reasons more than probable; and as having that degree of evidence which begets a moral Certainty, excluding all doubtfulness; and which persuadeth not only, that the Matter is as we believe it, but moreover that it cannot be otherwise; and that 'tis morally impossible it should not be. This being supposed, do you believe these Proofs have the highest degree of this Evidence?  
I in effect suppose, That the moral Evidence consists not in an indivisible Point. It receives several degrees, yea infinite ones; It arises from the concourse of Circumstances which give weight to the Testimony, on which it is grounded: and as these Circumstnaces may be compacted, and diversified into a thousand different shapes; there may be in them a thousand different degrees of this Evidence. So that though it be morally evident, there be two Cities in Italy, one of which is called Rome, and the other Viterbe; yet we are more certain of the existence of the first, than of that of the second, because we have more Relations of the one than of the other. It's morally evident, that Alexander, Cesar, and Henry IV have been, than that the first conquered Darius, and the second the Gauls, and that the third dissipated the League. Yet we are more certain of the latter of these Facts, than of the second; and of the second, more than of the first. Believe then, that the Facts, whence are drawn the Proofs of Christianity, are as evident, as that there is a City called Rome.  
First of all, said he to me, I think we are not obliged to make the same judgement of all these Facts, some of them being more evident than others; and consequently one cannot say of all of them, without exception, that they are as unquestionable as the Existence of Rome; but yet, I think, we may say it of some of them.  
Supposing, said I, one might say it of all of them. You will at least grant, that is as much as can be said of them; and that it is more evident, that whatever you have offered is true, than it is, That there's in Italy a City known under the name of Rome.  
This is, said he, a thing which I am far from denying, and which no Body ever did or will deny. There is even one of our Divines who has said the same in so many words 
(g) Martinon de side Disp. 10. Sect. 8. Num. 60. ; and I am persuaded, that all the rest would have said the same had they the occasion.  
Let me, said I, offer you another Question, and then I will conclude. Do you think that the highest degree of moral Evidence, is higher than the highest degree of the Evidence of Sense? Do you believe, for Example, that 'tis more evident to you and I, that there's a City called Rome, than 'tis at present evident to us that its day?  
I am far from thinking so, replied he: The moral Evidence is grounded on the certainty of Sense; and if our Senses may deceive us, the moral Evidence is a mere Chimaera. How, for Example, can I know there is such a Town called Rome, if those who have seen it, and on whose Word I rely, may be deceived themselves?  
It must then be granted, That the moral Evidence is never greater than that of Sense. I add, 'tis far less; the Reason is, That if we will build on the Deposition of a Witness, we should not only be sure he knows what he says; we should also know, that he says what he thinks, and disguises not his Sentiments. Seeing then we are never so sure of what others think, as of what we think ourselves; so we are never so certain that others have seen what they affirm, as we are certain we see what we behold.  
It's then plain, That I am more assured of what I do not know, but by the relation of my Senses, than of that which has the highest degree of moral Evidence. But this is not all, for, I say, but one half of what may be alleged. The Example which you have made use of, gives me occasion to add something stronger. You ask me, if it be more evident there's a City called Rome, than 'tis evident that it's now Day. You do not consider, That I do not only know, by myown Senses, it is Day, but by those of others. For were I, in fine, blind, yet I might know this with certainty, I need only to be led to the Exchange, to Church, to Dinner, etc. for this purpose. And therefore I take it for granted, That the blind Men about our Streets, are as certain 'tis Day, as that there is such a place as Rome.  
I believe then, That the Evidence which arises from the relations of Sense, considered alone, is not greater than the moral Evidence, being impossible to be less, as I now proved; I affirm, That in this Supposition, to demand whether 'tis more evident it is Day, than whether there be such a City as Rome, is just as if you should ask, whether two be more than one. The Existence of Rome, as to us, has but one only Evidence, and that a moral one: Whereas, it is now Day, has two, the Moral Evidence, and the Evidence of Sense: Each of these two is at least equal to that of the Existence of Rome. It is at least then as much again evident it is Day, as that there's a City called Rome.  
Yet is it true, said I, it's more evident the Eucharist is Bread and Wine, than that it is Day: Only the Senses of those who live, and are awake at present, attest the latter; whereas the Senses of all Men, who live, or have lived, since the planting of the Gospel, have affirmed the former. All our Senses do not attest it's now Day, only our Sight tells us so, whereas all our Senses tell us, That the Eucharist is Bread and Wine. In effect, take a consecrated Host, take consesecrated Wine; Ask your Eyes what they are? Ask your Nose, your , and your Hands; Ask them ten thousand times the same Question; they will ever answer you, what they have always answered those who have consulted them on this Matter. They will tell you, 'tis Bread and Wine; In a word, the Senses never attested any thing in a more clear, expressive, and authentic manner, than what they depose on the Subject of the Eucharist. And if they deceive us herein; they are not to be believed in any thing whatever.  
Grant we then the Proofs of Christianity do use the highest degree of Moral Evidence, seeing the Testimony of our Senses circumstanced in the manner as that is, which shows us the Eucharist to be Bread and Wine, hath at least twice as much evidence as that which has the highest degree of moral Evidence; it's beyond all question that this Testimony is twice again as evident as the Proofs of Christianity.  
This is clear, and I do not believe, you either will, or can deny it. Here then are three grand Conclusions, which I draw from this Principle.  
The first, That if Transubstantiation were one of the Doctrines of Christianity, as you pretend, Christian Religion would be opposed with greater strength than Mr. Huet could bring forth to maintain it. In effect, did Transubstantiation make a part of Christian Religion, one might oppose against it, whatever is offered against Transubstantiation.  
I have now showed you, one may oppose against Transubstantiation, all the evidence of Sense. One might offer all this same Evidence against Christianity, were it true that Christianity comprehended Transubstantiation.  
This is that which opposes Christianity in your Principles. Let's see now, what Mr. Huet does to maintain it. He brings Arguments, which, as we have already observed are only grounded on moral Evidence, which is never half so great as that of sense. If then two be more than one; it's clear, That granting Transubstantiation to be one of the Christian Doctrines, Christianity is attacked with greater strength than Mr. Huet can defend it with. It is clear, according to this Supposition, an Infidel will more strongly prove, That Christian Religion is false, than Mr. Huet can prove it is true.  
All which would never be, were Transubstantiation put out of the number of Christian Doctrines. By which means, the Proofs of this Holy Religion would conserve all their strength; and the Infidels would have nothing that's rational to oppose against them. These Proofs are most solid in themselves, and capable of convincing every reasonable Body, who searches the Truth, and is disposed to follow it through all parts where he finds it. There's nothing but Transubstantiation, which weakens them.  
Granting Transubstantiation, these Proofs will be of no validity: Take away this Doctrine, our Proofs subsist, and have their effect. It does not belong then to your Doctors who hold Transubstantiation, to defend Christianity. The best Arguments will never be good ones in their Mouths. Only we can propose them without weakening them. So that I told you nothing but what you find true, when I affirmed a while ago, That Mr. Huet's Book, which would be an excellent Work, were it writ by a Protestant, is without conviction, coming from a Man of your Party.  
And this is, Sir, my first Conclusion.  
The second follows, which is, That whereas an Infidel, to whom was offered Mr. Huet's Arguments, without any mention of Transubstantiation, or who should suppose that Christianity does not oblige us to believe it, would be irrational, should he not embrace a Religion so well grounded; so in like manner he would fall in to as great a fault, and act as much against Reason; if supposing the contrary, and letting himself be persuaded, one cannot be a Christian without believing Transubstantiation, he should receive both. Transubstantiation and Christian Religion.  
What I have now been saying to you, does necessarily draw along with it this Consequence. But to remark more clearly the necessity of it, be pleased to observe, That what makes an Infidel a Christian, are the Reasons which persuade him, That the Christian Religion was revealed by God. In effect, that which induces us to believe Things, are the Reasons, good or bad, which seem to us to uphold the Opinion which we embrace. So that should one Persuade one's self of any thing without Ground or Reason, that Man will act foolishly and sottishly, though the thing itself should be true. So the Infidel, who shall make himself a Christian without Reason, would apparently offend against good Sense. And this is the general Notion of your Divines, which I need not allege to you; for having read them, you must needs remember them.  
A Man than never believes without Reason, if he believes wisely and judiciously: But it seldom happening, that the Reasons are all on one side, there being commonly some for, and some against; you will not deny, but every time when this happens, it's the duty of a wise Man, and of such a one who will not be mistaken, to take the Balance, if I may so speak, and exactly weigh these Reasons, to give the preference to those which appear to him of greatest weight.  
I do not know whether any Body uses to do otherwise. One may, I confess, prefer Reasons, which in truth and reality, are of less force than the contrary ones. But this is, when a Man deceives himself, 
Ex duobus credibilibus non tenetur homo credere alterum, quod est minus, vel equaliter credibile. Bannez 22. Quast. 10. Art 1. Concl. 3. Non est prudentis hominis alteram partem assentire prae alterâ, si pari vel sere pari momento rationes utrinque urgeant. Censeo ad haec neque fieri omnino posse, ut eam partem quis approbet assensu suo in quam nihil inclinat majoris ponderis, quam in adversam. Rationis utrinque pares rationes sunt nullae. Multo minus fieri potest ut alteram partem quis approbet, si in alteram inclinet pondus majus. Est. Dilucid. Communis doctrinae Theol. n. 22, & 23.  by taking the weakest Arguments for the strongest. For, in fine, I am persuaded, That a Man convinced of the weakness of a Reason, will never after value that as he does another, which appears stronger to him; seeing to yield to a Reason, is to judge it stronger than that which opposes it.  
It's the same with Reasons or Arguments, as 'tis with Weights; put two Weights in a pair of Scales, and if they be equal, the Scales shall stand at an equal balance; if they be unequal, the Scale will immediately incline downwards, wherein is the greatest weight. In the same manner offer a rational Man Arguments, which maintain an Opinion, and others which oppose it. If after all things well considered, he finds these Opinions of equal force, he will incline to neither side. But for the smallest advantage, which those of one side have over those of the other, the Mind determines itself for the strongest; Or at least, it does not determine itself for the weakest; and it is every whit as impossible it should do it, as 'tis impossible a lesser Weight should weigh down a greater.  
But whether this be so, or not, you will at least allow me this, That it ought not to be, and that 'tis contrary to good sense to determine one's self in favour of an Opinion, which we see grounded on Reasons less strong than those which oppose it. And this is what your Authors do acknowledge 
(h) Martinon de fide Disp. 5. Sect. 7. n. 42. ; and in effect, were it otherwise, one might innocently leave a good Religion, and take up a bad one; although we saw the Religion we leave more firmly grounded than that we take up. But this being ridiculous, it must be acknowledged, that good Sense will not let a Man embrace an Opinion which he sees is more strongly opposed than maintained.  
This being granted, Sir, Let's suppose an Infidel, to whom is offered Mr. Huet's Arguments; if he be wise, he will not yield to them, till he has seen whether there be any thing which opposes these Arguments which counterballances them, or dissipates them. Imagine we afterwards the Christian Doctrine to be proposed to him, discharged of Transubstantiation. 'Tis clear, he will find nothing which shall counterpoise these Reasons. So that these Reasons being good, and nothing being able to diminish the solidity of them, if he be wise he will embrace them.  
Let us on the contrary imagine, that by an Illusion, of which we have seen a thousand Examples, he is made believe, That Transubstantiation is inseparable from Christianity. What will he do? If he be rational, he will take the Balance, and weigh on one hand Mr. Huet's Arguments, and on the other, those which combat Transubstantiation, and consequently Christianity, in the supposition he is in that they are inseparable. If he holds the Balance even, he will find, That the Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation, weigh more than those which favour Christianity; He will find that the first weigh two, and the second but one. In effect, the weight of Reasons is their Evidence. The Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation, have all the evidence of Sense; those of Mr. Huet have only a moral Evidence, which at most have but half of that of Sense. The first then weigh as much again as the second. This being so, how can you expect the Infidel should give the preference to the second over the first; and whom will you persuade, that if he does do it, he will act regularly.  
Do you know what right Reason will suggest to him? That Transubstantiation is not one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches. He will say it is impossible Mr. Huet's Reasons should be valid, if Christianity comprehends Transubstantiation; and it must necessarily be, either that this Doctrine has been added to the Christian Religion, contrary to the intention of its Founder, or that these Reasons be false. Yet it's apparent these Reasons are not false, seeing they are evident; and that the more they are considered, the greater impression they make. We must then believe, that Transubstantiation which would destroy them, should it take place, is not one of the Christian Doctrines.  
He will confirm himself in this Opinion, by this Consideration, That the Author of Christianity, whoever he was, having formed his Religion, with a design to make it be embraced by all Men; and being able to make it very fit to be universally received, by not burdening it with Transubstantiation, it is not to be supposed he introduced this Doctrine, which is likely only to make it be rejected by judicious Men.  
This will more especially appear to him inconceivable in respect of God, whom he will acknowledge for the true Author of this Holy Religion, if he well comprehends the force of Mr. Huet's Reasons. So good and wise a God, could unto on one hand require Men should embrace the Revelation he offered them; and on the other, lay an invincible opposition between this Revelation, and the purest notices of Reason, which he himself had given them to be their Rule in all Cases. he could not on one hand oblige them to be Christians, under pain of eternal damnation; and on the other, so order things that they could not be such, without violating all the Maxims of good Sense, and all the Rules of Prudence.  
And this is, Sir, what the Insidel will say if he be a rational Person. But if he has not understanding enough to perceive all this, yet at least he will see, That right Reason will not let him embrace the Christian Religion, such as it is offered him.  
I add, in the Third place, That not only he ought not to embrace it, but that it is impossible he should. Which is easy to be proved from the principles of your own Divines. All of them hold 
(i) Greg. de Val. Tom. 3. Disp. 1. Quest. 1. Punct 1. §. 7. Coninte de actib. sup. disp. 13. dub. 1. Maerat. de fid. disp. 16. Sect. 3 Goner. de fid. disp. 1. art. 8. Rhod. de fid. quest. 2. Sect. 4. §. 2. , That the first Act of Divine Faith, is always preceded by a Judgement morally evident; which shows, That what one is going to believe, is worthy to be believed. They affirm, That without this Judgement Faith can never be formed in the Soul. They say, moreover, That this Judgement is only grounded on what they call Reasons of Belief, or Motives of Credibility; which are, at bottom the Proofs of Christianity. They say, That the Infidel weighing these Reasons, and finding them good and solid; he concludes, that the Doctrine which they maintain aught to be received.  
I now ask you, How the Infidel can form this inward Judgement, and pronounce that Christian Religion deserves to be received, in the time wherein he sees that the Reasons which induce him to embrace it, are opposed by other Reasons, stronger and clearer? I demand of you, if in case this can be, Whether such a Judgement would not be apparently false? For how in effect, can one say a thing is worthy to be believed, when one has more reason to think it self than to believe its true? Do we call such a thing credible? Is't not rather incredible?  
I might drive on these Consequences father; I could show you that Transubstantiation hath other Consequences, which are no less vexatious; But this not appearing necessary, I shall content myself at this time, with ask you, Whether these three Consequences, which I have taken from your Belief, are not very terrible? and whether it be not better to renounce the Doctrine which draws them oafter it, than to admit them? Yet they be necessary, and you must receive them, unless you'll deny some of the Propositions which you have granted me.  
Neither will this much help you, because that in effect whatever you have granted me is most certain, and when you would have this brought into question, I'll not fear the making you grant it again, there being nothing in all this but what is highly evident.  
What you now said to me at length, answered Mr. N. is plausible enough, and I must confess I did not believe your Cause could be pleaded so strongly. And yet I am persuaded, that this is not solid, and I hope to answer all you have said, when I have thought more of it. Pray let me sleep upon it, and I'll give you an account to morrow morning of what has come into my mind.  
I was far from denying so reasonable a request; I only told him before I went away, That if this Proof appeared to him stronger, than those we are wont to use in this matter, this only arose from a certain Air of Novelty, which might be in the manner of proposing it; and that in the main, the common Proofs are no less convincing than those; and if they did not appear so, this only proceeded from our being insensibly accustomed to believe them false, there having been a thousand things invented to elude the force of them.  
It being long since, said I, that they have been opposed against you; your Doctors therefore have left no Stone unturned to lessen the value of them. To this end they have sorged a thousand Distinctions, sought a thousand Subterfuges, and have wanted no Artifice nor Colour to make them pass in the World. And therefore when we offer them against you, we find you always ready to slight them. It would have been the same with what I just now offered you, had you foreseen the course of my Objections; and you would have taken care not to say several things with which your Books are full, and which should be henceforward left out, unless you are minded to show the World how you condemn your own Principles.  
I hereupon took my leave of him, and withdrew; praying God, from the bottom of my Heart, to bless my Endeavours; and so to prosper this Seed which was sown, (as it were unawares) that it might one day bring forth Fruit to his Glory.   

CONFERENCE II. The Second Proof, That Transubstantiation discrediting the Testimony of our Senses, does absolutely overthrow the principal Reasons which confirm the Truth of Christian Religion.  
WHEN I parted from Mr. N. there was no mention made of the Place where we were to meet; which made me believe (knowing his obliging temper) he would come the next day to me. But being unwilling he should give himself that trouble, I was resolved to prevent him, by being with him first. He told me he was troubled he could not be as diligent as I was; for immediately after I had left him, a Business came upon him of great Importance, which had employed his Thoughts to that very time; but having ended that Affair, he hoped he should now have an opportunity of acquitting himself of the Engagement he was in.  
Will you, said I to him, let me impart to you another Thought, which has great conformity with that, which was the Subject of our Yesterday Discourse. By which means you may examine both these Arguments at a time; and perhaps the one will hinder you from stopping at things, which will appear to you proper to get rid of the other.  
I am of your mind, said he, but I desire you would propose this second Proof all at once. For, in sine, there's oft more artifice, than sincerity, in discovering what one has to say by pieces. He that answers, and knows not where his Adversary will lead him, takes many times fruitless Precautions, and sometimes neglects necessary Ones. He let's pass certain things which strike deepest, and amuses himself with others, which are of no effect. And therefore I think it best, That the Respondent should see at once the Difficulty proposed to him, and know at first what he is to take care of; and therefore, I pray you, henceforward, to deal in this manner with me.  
What you say would be necessary, replied I, had you an Adversary who sought only to surprise, and who more regarded Victory than Truth. But, I must tell you plainly, this Artifice appears so inconsiderable, and unworthy of an honest Man, especially of a Christian, that I cannot but be troubled at your suspicion. Pray therefore believe, this is not my intention; for if I have followed, in our preceding Discourse, such a method as you do not like, 'twas because I thought it the fittest to lead those insensibly to the Truth, who are farthest from it. You know, the greatest Men among the Ancients have been of this Sentiment; and that it was particularly the Method of Socrates, and his famous Disciple Plato. Yet seeing you will have me take another course, I shall reduce my second Argument to three Propositions; all three being so evidently certain, that I cannot see how they can be overthrown.  
The first is; That if Transubstantiation takes place, our Senses are deceived in taking for Bread and Wine what is not so.  
The second is; That if our Senses may be mistaken in the Eucharist, they may be as well mistaken in every thing else; so that their Depositions have nothing certain.  
The third is; That if our Senses may be mistaken in the discovery of their Objects, be they what they will, The Proofs of Christian Religion are of no value.  
The better to comprehend the Force of this Argument, I believe 'twill not be amiss to pass over it again, and carefully to examine its Propositions.  
The first appears to me very evident; for I have always taken Error to be the persuading of a Man's self, That a thing is what it is not, or to judge that it is not what it is. This being granted, it cannot be denied, but that our Senses do deceive us in the Eucharist, if they attempt the persuading us, That it is any other thing than what it is.  
Yet this they do, if Transubstantiation takes place: For, in fine, if this Doctrine were true, the Eucharist would not be Bread and Wine, but our Saviour's proper Body and Blood. And yet our Senses attest the contrary; they all unanimously say, with one Voice, that it is not our Lord's Body and Blood, but Bread and Wine.  
To prove what I say, Show the Eucharist to an Infidel, who has no knowledge of your Mystery, and ask him what it is. He'll answer, without hesitation, 'tis Bread and Wine. Ask a Child the same question, he will return you the same answer. In fine, offer it to a Brute, and he will do what he is wont when ordinary Bread and Wine is set before him.  
Now what is the common light to this Infidel, this Child, and brute Beast? nothing else but that of Sense: whereupon it cannot be denied but our senses tell us, that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine; and it appears impossible to affirm, that it is not so, without giving the lie to these Faculties.  
This will appear more clearly, if you please to consider, That the Faculty which tells us that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine, is the same which makes us discern other Objects; and makes us say of each of them, This is such a thing.  
Who will deny, that 'tis by means of the Senses we discover what is present to us? In effect, those who have lost the use of their Senses, do discern nothing: and those who are not absolutely deprived of these Faculties, yet have them weakened through defect of the Organs, are easily mistaken. Led a blind Man within some paces of a Statue, and ask him, what that is which stands before him? He will answer you, he does not know: offer the same question to another that is not quite blind, but yet has bad Eyes; He'll tell you perhaps, 'tis a Man. Whereas on the contrary, a Man, whose sight is good, will tell you presently, 'tis a Statue. Is it not plain then, That 'tis the Sight which discerns this Object? When then we see the Eucharist, and we touch and taste it, we say its Bread and Wine, it's clear we say it from the relation of our Eyes, our Hands, and our Mouths. And consequently if it be found, that 'tis not Bread and Wine, it cannot be denied but that 'tis our Senses which have cheated, and deceived us.  
It is not worth the while to set upon the proving of a thing which your Divines willingly grant. One might produce some hundred's of places in their Works, where they affirm what I say 
(a) See the Treatise of the Authority of the Senses, Chap. 6. . They maintain, that the Fathers 
(b) Bell. de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24.  have strictly charged their People not to trust their Senses in this occasion, extremely blaming those who suffer themselves to be guided by these Faculties, in a matter wherein according to them we should follow no other Light than that of Faith and Revelation.  
They pretend nothing does more enhance the merit of this Faith, Than her raising herself above the Senses, and persuading herself of the contrary of what these Faculties do witness to us. I do not doubt, Sir, but you have observed all this in the reading of your Authors.  
It's true, answered he, and I will not contest with you about this first Proposition; But I will not grant you the second. For, in fine, what necessity is there, that the Senses deceiving us in this Object, they cannot faithfully instruct us in any other? Is it not very likely, that this is a single Error, and without any consequence? May they not deceive us in this occasion, and in some others, without extending this to all? In effect, the greatest Liars do sometimes tell true, and perhaps there is not one amongst this sort of People, but speaks more Truth than Lies. Why may we not then say the same thing of our Senses?  
You have not well comprehended my meaning, rereplied I, for I did not say, That if our Senses be deceived in the Eucharist, they must necessarily be deceived in every thing else. But only that they may be so, that the thing is not impossible, and we shall never be certain of the contrary, unless we know it by some other way. This is all, I say, and I hope to show you in what follows, that I need no more.  
In the mean time, my Proposition thus expressed, is undeniable. In effect, he that deceives once, may deceive always; and 'tis sufficient, a Witness be once detected of Falsity, to be suspected all his Life. Thus the Senses, according to you, making untrue reports on the Eucharist, we may as well suspect them to do the same on other things.  
This is clear; but to make it more unquestionable, be pleased to consider, That if the Senses do once deceive, their relation is no longer a certain Mark, and an unquestionable Proof of Truth: For how can we look on that to be a certain Mark of Truth, which is sometimes joined with Error? And consequently, To have no other Foundation for ones Perwasions, than the relations of our Senses, this would be to rest on uncertain and doubtful Marks, and to expose one's self to the greatest likelihood of being deceived.  
To say the same thing in another manner, let me, Sir, ask you, Whether the bare relation of our Senses, without any other Succours, be a sufficient Motive to persuade us what they attest, or not? If it be, 'tis not possible our Senses can once deceive us; for if they should, we should have a sufficient Motive to persuade us of a thing which is false, which we must be far from saying. For were this so, we should be bound to deceive ourselves; and this Error would not only be excusable, but necessary; there would be an Obligation of falling into it, and 'twould be a fault if we did not. But this is intolerably absurd.  
Now if the Testimony of our Senses be not a sufficient Foundation whereon to ground a solid Porswasion; 'Tis plain there's no certainty in resting on their Testimony, and that 'tis imprudent to rely on them. So that we must say one of these two things; either that the Senses do never deceive, no not in the Eucharist; or if that they do deceive in the Eucharist, they may always deceive, and that their report is never certain.  
And so much the more, seeing there was never any occasion, wherein one has more reason to persuade one's self, That our senses do not deceive us, than in this; 'Tis not only one of our senses, which shows us the Eucharist to be Bread and Wine; as it happens in infinite occasions, where the single testimony of one of these Faculties, suffices to make us strongly believe things. But all the Senses, wherewith Nature has provided us; Not the Senses of one or two particular Persons, as yours or mine, but those of all Men in the World, not excepting one. These Senses make not their Reports of a strange and foreign Matter, but of one of the most ordinary and familiar things they are conversant about. So that if they may be deceived herein, they may be deceived in every thing else; for I know not in what occasion they may be certain, if not in this.  
I do in effect acknowledge, it sometimes happens our Senses do deceive us, whether through defect of the Organ, which is out of order, or through the failure of the Medium, which is not simple and uniform, or by reason of the distance, or disproportion of the Object. But this hinders me not from saying, you cannot allege me any Example, which shows us these Faculties abuse us in Circumstances, like those which are to be found in the report they make of the Eucharist; and wherein not only, none of those different Springs of our aforementioned Errors have any place; but wherein a Man may use all imaginable precautions, to assure himself, he is not mistaken. For, in fine, let not a Man content himself with the bare looking on and viewing the Symbols of this Sacrament, but use all his other Senses; and those of all the Men in the world; Let a Man apply himself thereto with all possible attention, make all trials and proofs which he can, yet still will his Senses hold the same Language, ever saying, 'tis Bread and Wine: So that if they may deceive us in such an occasion as this, we have nothing left to oppose the Academics, who have been at such pains to show these Faculties are not to be trusted.  
In effect, this Proof would be in a different manner convincing, than that which these Philosophers were wont to use. They tell us, all Objects appear yellow to Ichterical People, and all Meats bitter to those whose Tongues are full of Bile; that a Stick half plunged into the Water, seems either broken or crooked, though it be straight and entire; That a square Spire appears round to those who look on it at a distance. But 'tis clear, all this proves nothing against those who grant, That our Senses deceive us when the Organ is out of order, when the Medium is not simple, when the Object is not placed at a just distance; and who only pretend the report of these Faculties is faithful, out of the case marked by these Exceptions, and some others such like. But if it were not in the Eucharist where 'tis clear, one cannot apply either this Exception, or any other, the cause of these Faculties would be absolutely desperate, and we should have nothing left to defend it.  
Yet there must be something that is weighty produced in its favour; for were it otherwise, the Proofs of Christian Religion would be of no solidity. And this is (as you see) my third Proposition; and if I prove it as strongly as I have proved the two former, I need add nothing to the Conclusion of my Argument, to make you acknowledge what I just now offered; That your Transubstantiation does absolutely overthrow our strongest Arguments against Infidelity.  
In the mean time, this Proposition is so evident, that I don't believe there's a Disputant in the World obstinate enough to contend it with me. First, the Proofs of our Religion are drawn from the Matters of Fact you mentioned Yesterday, and from the assurance which those who delivered them to us, had of their reality. Those that attested them, knew them only by the means of their Senses, not from Arguments or Reasonings; for they saw them with their own Eyes; and by consequence, if their Eyes, and other Organs of their Senses might be therein deceived, they had in proper speaking no certainty of them; and if they had no certainty, we are to blame in making account of their Testimony.  
For example; We believe Jesus Christ is risen, because the Apostles have highly attested this Matter of Fact; and that we have just occasion to believe they were strongly persuaded of the truth of what they said. But what persuasion could they have of this, if the Senses are not to be trusted? And in effect ask them, how they knew their Master is risen? They will only allege the testimony of their Senses. They will tell you, their Eyes have seen him, their Ears have heard him speak, their Hands have touched him. But if both Eyes, Hands, yea and Ears, if all their Senses are deceivers, who can assure us they did not cheat the Apostles? who will assure us that these Holy Men have effectually seen, touched, and heard, what they imagined they saw, touched, and heard?  
The same, I say, of the Proofs of the Jewish Religion, the truth of which is one of the principal Foundations of the Christian Faith. What is the strongest Proof of this Holy Religion? Is it not that which is taken from the Prodigy which Moses showed to the Jews when he brought it to them from God? But what certainty can there be of all these Prodigies, if the Senses of those who have been Witnesses of them, may have been deceived? How could they persuade themselves of the reality of them, had they only for a Foundation of their Persuasion, the uncertain report of some Faculties liable to infinite Errors and Delusions? Were they not very silly People, to expose themselves to so many dangers, on so slight grounds? And are not we also very credulous, to build our Faith on the Persuasion which these People had of these Facts? This Faith, I say, whereby we steer our Lives, and on which we advance so many fine Hopes, and magnificent Pretensions?  
This is not all; both one and the other of these Proofs, do moreover suppose in another manner the certitude of the Senses; Which is, That 'tis only the Senses which instruct in the Testimony which these Faculties have given, whether to the Ancient Jews, or the Apostles; and which both one and the other have given to the Truth. For, in fine, how can we know that neither the Jews nor the Apostles did attest all these Facts, but by means of their Senses? Imagine a Man bereft of all his five Senses, or only of the two principal ones, Sight and Hearing; suppose him at the same time both Deaf and Blind; how will you make him understand the solidity of these Proofs? You may speak to him long enough of the Prophecies of the Old Testament, of our Saviour's and Moses his Miracles, and other things which establish the Truth of Christian Religion. This will be just the same as if you discoursed to a Stone.  
It's only our Senses then, which make us receive these Proofs. So that should we know, That those of the Apostles, and other Witnesses of the Truth, could not deceive them; this would signify nothing to us, should we have just reason to believe we might be deceived by ours. By consequence, the certainty of Sense is doubly necessary to establish the solidity of the Proofs of Christianity; and these Proofs will be two ways uncertain, if the report of our Senses be not to be trusted.  
See now, Sir, if there be any thing more true than what I told you a while ago, That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys these Proofs, and takes from them all their Validity. See whether in supposing this Doctrine, one may hinder Libertines from using this arguing: It's contrary to good Sense, to receive this Revelation which destroys itself, which overthrows its own Foundations, which annuls and discredit's the means by which it endeavours to establish itself, and whose Proofs cannot be true, without being false; nor assured, without being uncertain.  
This is what may be said of Christianity, if it be true, it teaches things contrary to the relation of our Senses. For, in fine, Christianity has hitherto established itself, only on the depositions of these Faculties. Hereby it has met with belief in the Minds of Men. If then one of its Maxims be, we must not trust any of our Senses; it's evident and unquestionable, we may say of it what we now affirmed.  
It's evident it is self-contradictory, enjoining us on one hand, to believe the report of our Senses, when they instruct us in what should induce us to receive it; and forbidding us at the same time to hearken to them in one of its chiefest Doctrines. It overthrows its own Foundations, seeing it destroys the faithfulness of our Senses, on which the persuasion which we have of its truth is grounded. Hereby it annuls and discredits the means by which it endeavours to set up itself; and this is so visible, that we need not undertake to show it. In a word, its Proofs cannot be true, without being false; nor certain, without being uncertain. In effect, if the Proofs of Christianity be good, whatever it says is true, and if whatever it says be true, these Proofs be nothing worth, seeing one of the things which it affirms, is, That the report of our Senses, whence these Proofs be taken, is uncertain.  
Is it not true, Sir, That setting up Transubstantiation, the Infidels would, on very good grounds, use this Arguing? In particular, would they not have reason to complain, that they are not sincerely dealt with, seeing we pretend to convince them by the Depositions of Witnesses, which we do not produce, till we have stripped them of all their Authority, and declared them unfaithful, and deceivers?  
After this great Interest, I see nothing which is worth contending for, and if our Faith loses the means of establishing itself in the World, as she does lose it in losing her Proofs: It's not worth the while to demonstrate the other Consequences of your Doctrine, nor particularly the Disorders which the uncertainty of our Senses once established, would infallibly bring forth into the World. They are both infinite and inexplicable, because that in effect, our Senses are almost the only Guides which we follow; and their Fidelity is the chief Foundation of all the certainty we can have therein. Your abstracted Truths, which are perceivable only to the Understanding, and which are so useful in Sciences, are of little use in the Commerce of the World, wherein Men apply themselves to things which be singular, which are not known but by the interposition of the Senses. So that to ruin the certainty of our Senses, is to turn all into confusion, and reduce Men to such a condition, that they shall not take a step without being troubled with some Scruple.  
But as I have already observed, this is not the Point. 'Tis sufficient I have showed, That the solidity of the Proofs which establish the Truth of Christian Religion, depends on the certainty of our Senses; so that Transubstantiation absolutely destroying this certainty, invalidates these Proofs, and stops the Mouths of those who undertake the Conversion of the Infidels. This single Consequence is dreadful enough, and we need not draw any other, to show the falsity of the Principle whence it flows.  
It's better to pass to my third Proof, which is, to show, That your Doctrine overthrows the certainty of our Reason, as well as that of our Senses; and gives such an establishment to Scepticism, as bereaves us of all means of finding out the Truth.  
And this is what I intent to make clear to you, if I have not already tired your patience. I shall hear you with all my Heart, answered he; but I must tell you, That before I hear your third Argument, I should be very glad to examine the two you have already offered me, for I see abundance of things which I might oppose against what you have said; but they lying something obscurely and confusedly in my Mind, I must beg time of you to bring them into some clearness and order; which as soon as I have done, I shall not fail to wait on you with an account of them.  
I easily consented to what he desired, telling him, I wished every Body would as maturely examine these great Points before they determined themselves. I blamed the rashness of those, whose Eyes are dazzled with the first glance of an Argument, whereby they fall into a ridiculous lightness, or an insupportable obstinacy. Mr. N. spoke to the same purpose; and our conversation having for some time been on this Point, I took my leave of him and departed.   

CONFERENCE III. Wherein are confirmed the two Proofs contained in the two preceding Discourses.  
THE next Day Mr. N. took the pains to come to me, and immediately told me, he had carefully applied himself to examine my Reasons, and believed he had found a solution of them. I have observed, said he to me, that both your Propositions depend on the same Supposition, to wit, That Transubstantiation is directly contrary to the reports of our Senses; and that whereas this Doctrine tells us the Eucharist is no longer Bread nor Wine, but the proper Body and Blood of our Saviour; our Senses on the contrary tell us, That this Sacrament is not the Body and Blood of our Saviour, but real Bread and Wine.  
This has inclined me to think, That though our Divines have not considered your Proofs in the same manner you have proposed them, yet I might find in their Writings wherewith to defend myself, by what they answer to the direct Testimony of our Senses, which your Authors have always objected. I have enquired into what they have said on this Subject, and found five different Solutions. Some of them have absolutely denied, without reserve, that our Senses have any certainty. Others acknowledge, that these Faculties do not deceive us in the things comprehended in the order of Nature; but they will not suffer us to consult them in Matters of Faith. Some allow them a certainty in Matters of Faith, but say, 'tis a certainty inferior to that of Faith. Most of them assure us, That the Senses do not perceive the Substance; so that the Error wherein one falls, by persuading one's self that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine, is not in the Senses, but in our Reason. Others do, in fine, acknowledge that our Senses do well perceive the Substance, but in an indirect manner, and with great incertitude; so that their report is not certain, but in reference to the accidents.  
I am well assured the two first Answers be false; and should I not otherwise know it, your second Reason would not permit me to doubt of it. For, in fine, were our Senses without certainty, whether in general or in particular, in Matters of Faith, the Proofs of Christian Religion would be but mere delusions, as you sufficiently convinced me Yesterday.  
The third of these Answers, supposes a Thing which is false, to wit, That a Faculty which has certainty, may ever have need of being corrected. It supposes another which is very doubtful, and in which our Divines are not agreed, viz. That Faith has more certainty than the Testimony of our Senses. Moreover, granting all this to be true, I know not whether one might make use of it against your Reasons. You do not speak of the certainty which a Man that believes already may have of the Truths of Salvation, but only of that which one might give an Infidel. But the means to persuade an Infidel, that the Senses may deceive, must be by convincing him of the Divinity of our Religion, which accuses the Senses of Infidelity. And the way to convince him of the Divinity of this Religion, must be by Reasons which suppose that these Faculties do not deceive us.  
I do not then make any great reckoning of these three Answers, and therefore I shall not oppose them against you. But 'tis not the same with the two last; for if it be true, that our Senses reach not so far as the Substance, but perceive only the Accidents: all that these Faculties learn us of the Eucharist, is, That this Sacrament still retains the Accidents of Bread and Wine; which is a true Notion, and contains nothing contrary to our belief. Should we say, moreover, with those who make the second Answer, That our Senses well perceive the Substance, but yet in a manner indirect, and subject to Error and Deceit; one may truly say, That Transubstantiation is contrary to the report of our Senses, but not to this direct and certain report, whence springs this firm persuasion, called Experimental Knowledge. It will be only contrary to this indirect and uncertain Report, which can only establish a tottering Opinion, which is almost as often false as true.  
This being granted, you cannot re-establish your Proofs, unless you distinctly maintain these three things.  
First, That the Senses do perceive the very Substance itself, either directly or indirectly; however, with certainty.  
The second, That this Certainty which our Senses give us touching the Substances, is greater than that of the Facts, whence are drawn the Proofs of Christianity.  
The third, That this Certainty is the ground of these Proofs; and that they cannot subsist, if our Senses may be deceived in the discerning of these kind of Objects.  
‛ I would be an easy matter for me, said I to him, to maintain this against all opposition. But others 
(a) See the Treatise of the Authority of the Senses.  having already done it; and this Discussion being likely to engage us into difficult Inquiries, and the force of my Arguments not depending thereon, I therefore am willing to wave that dispute, and betake myself to what is so evident and undeniable, as I am sure must satisfy you.  
Will you not grant me, Sir, That we do every day discern one Substance from another? Will you not grant me, for Example, that I now distinguish whatever is in this Chamber, and that I can truly say, This is a Table, this is a Book, this is a Bed, this a Chair. I do not say there's certainty in these Judgements I make. I do not determine which is the Faculty which makes me do it. I only say, I do do it. Can you deny me this to be true, or shall I set about the proving of it?  
No, answered he. A Man must be void of Sense that requires it. Will you then in the second place deny me, pursued I, that I make this judgement by some of the Faculties which God has given me; I mean those Faculties purely natural, which are common to all Men, and perform their Functions without any supernatural assistance, internal or external, without any external Revelation, without any inward illumination of the Spirit?  
I am far from denying it, answered he, and I am persuaded, there's no Catholic that questions it. This, said I, is enough, and I need no more for the subsistence of my Proofs.  
And to convince you of what I say, I shall bring them to this Head; I shall retrench whatever you dislike in them, and instead of the Senses which trouble you, I shall only speak of that natural Faculty which makes us distinguish one Substance from another. You'll see they will keep all their strength, and be wholly sheltered from your Distinctions.  
I begin with the second; There being some necessity for it. It consisted of these three Propositions.  
1. If Transubstantiation has place, our Senses deceive us in the report they make of the Eucharist.  
2. If our Senses deceive us in the report which they make of the Eucharist, they may as well deceive us in every thing else.  
3. If our Senses may deceive us in every thing, the Proofs of Christianity are of no solidity.  
This is the sum of my Second Proof which I offered you yesterday.  
Now be pleased to observe how I further express it.  
1. If Transubstantiation has place, the natural Faculty which God has given us, whereby to distinguish one Substance from another, this Faculty deceives us in the notice it gives us of the Eucharist.  
2. If the natural Faculty whereby we distinguish one Substance from another, be mistaken on the Subject of the Eucharist, nothing hinders but that it may be the fame on other Substances.  
3. If the natural Faculty, whereby we discern the Substances, has no certainty, the Proofs for Christian Religion be of no weight.  
You see, Sir, that forming my Argument in this manner, your Distinctions are beside the purpose, and altogether fruitless. Wherefore you cannot defend yourself but in denying some of the Propositions of which it consists; but which of the three can you deny? Not the first, I suppose; For, in fine, if Transubstantiation has place, The Sacrament of the Eucharist is not Bread nor Wine, but our Saviour's proper Body and Blood. Yet the natural Faculty whereby we discern the Substances from one another, whatever that is, and whatever name we give it, this Faculty tells us, that 'tis not the Body and Blood of Christ, but Bread and Wine.  
If you doubt of this; show this Sacrament to a Man endued only with those Faculties which Nature has given us, and who has never received any supernatural assistance, to a Jew, or to a Mahometan or Pagan: Ask him what it is, and you'll see how little he will hesitate to answer you, it's Bread and Wine.  
If you still doubt of this, desire a Priest to mix a consecrated Host amongst others unconsecrated; Employ then all your natural Faculties to distinguish that which is the Body of Christ from the rest, which is mere Bread; You'll find all your care here to no purpose.  
It's then certain, that the natural Faculty, whereby we discern Substances, affirms plainly the Eucharist to be Bread and Wine, and therefore deceives us, if your Belief be true. Thus my first Proposition labours under no difficulty. And the second is no less certain than the first. For, in fine, if the natural Faculty, whereby we distinguish one Substance from another, may take the Body of Christ for Bread and Wine, there will be no deceit, of which 'twill not be capable, there being nothing in the World more discernible, and subject to less mistakes, than an human Body on one hand, and a morsel of Bread, and some drops of Wine on the other.  
I have only then to prove my third Proposition, which is in effect the only one, which appears to have need. Yet is it certain, I shall have little trouble to make you agree with me in it. It saith, That the certainty with accompanies the Acts of the natural Faculty, and makes us distinguish the Substances; That this Certitude, I say, is the Foundation of the Proofs of Christianity, and that we cannot solidly establish the truth of this Holy Religion, if the Senses may deceive us in the reports they make of these kind of Objects.  
I conceive nothing more certain than this Proposition. In effect, we agreed in our first Conference, That the Proofs of Christian Religion depends on the Truth of certain Facts, which we never saw, but which are attested to us by Persons whose Testimony ought not to be suspected by us. Yet it will reasonably be so, if we be not in a capacity to discern certainly particular Substances. And this will clearly appear, if we run through the most important of these Facts.  
The most considerable, and the most decisive, is without difficulty, being our Saviour's Resurrection; for the whole depends hereon. If this Fact be false, the Gospel is but a mere Romance; and if it be true, it cannot be denied but God has declared himself hereby in the most authentic manner in the World, in favour of our Holy Religion. And the Apostles were chief sent to attest the Truth of this Fact; and hence it is, That they so often seem to affect (as it were) the title of Witnesses of their Master's Resurrection.  
But 'tis very considerable, That the Apostles were not present at our Lord's Resurrection. He was not in the Sepulchre when these holy Men arrived there; and they found only the Funeral Linen wherewith his Body was wrapped. They knew not then our Saviour was risen, by seeing him come out of the Tomb, and as they beheld Lazarus; but they gathered it from two other Facts, of which they were certain, having already seen the first, and seeing then actually the second. The one was his Death, and the other his Life. They were sure our Lord had expired on the Cross; That his Side was pierced with a Spear, that they might be certain of his Death. They knew that he was buried, and consequently could not have the least suspicion that he was not really dead. They saw him afterwards alive, and walking, acting, and speaking, whence they concluded in the clearest manner in the World, and the least liable to mistake, that he was effectually risen.  
It's then plain, that the Truth of Christ's Resurrection depends on one hand, in knowing whether he died; and on the other, whether he lived after his Death. But what certainty can there be of either of these two Facts, if there be none in the judgement we make of Substances? These two Facts are equally contested. The Basilidians denied heretofore the first, and the Mahometans deny it to this day, both affirming, 'twas not our Saviour Christ, but Simon the Cyrenian that was crucified by the Jews. The Jews have ever denied the second. They say, it's very true, our Saviour died on the Cross, but that he never risen again, and that what the Apostles related of it, was a mere Fable.  
If we may be deceived in these kind of Objects, what can we oppose to either of these Enemies of the Truth? How shall we convince either the Basilidians, or Mahometans, That it was Jesus, and not Simon who expired on the Cross? How shall we persuade the Jews the Apostles were not deceived in imagining they saw him alive and risen? Will not both one and the other have grounds to tell us we have no certainty for what we affirm? The Turks will tell us, That seeing we may be so easily deceived in the discerning of Substances, it's very likely the Jews took Simon for Jesus Christ. The Jews will answer, the Error was not theirs, but that the Apostles took some Spirit, or living Man, for their Master. And as to us, we have nothing convincing to oppose against one or the other.  
And here, Sir, let me entreat you to consider the imprudence of Bellarmine. Amongst other Reasons, he uses to show the Senses have no certainty, when the Question is about discerning the Substances; he particularly citys 
(b) Bell. de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24.  the Instance of Mary Magdalen, who took our Saviour risen for the Gardener. I shall not stand to show here the weakness of this Argument, nor say 'twas scarcely then light when Mary came into the Garden where our Saviour was buried. Neither shall I use long Discourses to prove, That her trouble, grief, or perhaps modesty, would not let her look directly on a Man whom she did not know.  
But that which I would entreat you to consider, is, the stroke which this Argument of Bellarmine might give to the certainty of our Faith, were it as solid as he pretends it to be. It proves nothing, or it proves one might take our Saviour risen for another Man; and consequently, that one might take another Man for Jesus Christ risen; and so when the Apostles saw our Lord risen, they were not assured 'twas he; so that having no greater certainty than these Holy Men, we have reason to doubt of this great Miracle, which is the principal prop of our Faith.  
And these are the natural Consequences of Bellarmin's Argument. I must acknowledge there's no great reason to fear this should meet with belief in men's Minds. In effect you may, as long as you please, maintain, we may be mistaken in the discerning of Substances. You will not find any Body that will be persuaded of so absurd a Paradox. All the World will believe their Sight; and I am of Opinion, whatever you may say, That you little doubt but 'tis I that have the honour of conversing with you now; and I desire no other Judge but your own Conscience, would you please to let it speak your sense in this Matter. But though there be no danger of falling into Bellarmin's Opinion in this Point, and admitting all the Consequences of the Principles which he establishes, yet is it plain 'tis not long of him we do not do it, and hereby doubt of our Saviour's Resurrection, as well as of a thousand other important Matters, were his Answers and Arguments as solid as he would have him thought to be.  
Moreover, what I now said of our Saviour's Resurrection, is applicable to all other Resurrections which have been wrought, either by our Lord himself, or his Apostles. The truth of this Miracle, and the force of the Proof drawn thence, depend on the knowing whether those who were seen alive, were really those who were dead a while before. But the means of knowing it is, whether any of our Faculties do precisely determine concerning Substances, and whether it be an easy and common thing for them to be deceived?  
When our Lord cured the Man born blind, the Pharisees who found themselves so perplexed with the Proof which was drawn thence in favour of the Truth, might easily clear themselves of it, by supposing your Maxims. They needed only to have said, That he who saw, and vaunted of the recovery of his Sight, was not the Person who was blind a while before, but rather an Impostor, whom our Saviour had set up; and though it seemed to those who had known him, that he was the same Person, yet 'twas not to be believed, seeing our Senses have not the least shadow of certainty in the discerning of particular Substances. When our Saviour multiplied the Bread to feed the multitude which followed him, we may doubt of the Truth of this Miracle, if we may believo what this Multitude eat was not Bread; and we may doubt that it was Bread, if we have not any Faculty to make us distinguish one thing from another. When our Lord walked on the Sea, he wrought, without doubt, a signal Miracle. But this Miracle signifies nothing, unless we be assured it was on the Water, and not on a Plain that our Saviour walked: of which we may doubt, if we have not Faculties to discern certainly these Objects.  
All the Miracles which have served only to transform Substances, may be called into question if your Opinion be allowed. For if our Senses tell us nothing certain touching Substances; how shall we know there was ever made any real change: And to what purpose was the changing of Moses his Rod, to persuade, either this Prophet to accept of the Calling God had offered him, or Pharaoh to let the Children of Israel go? To what purpose was the changing of the Waters of the River of Nile into Blood, or that of Cana into Wine, if those who saw all these Conversions, might doubt whether they were true, and whether they had any other place but in their abused Fancies?  
The Prophecies are also another great source of Proofs to establish the Truth of Christian Religion. Yet 'tis certain, that Prophecies prove nothing but by the conformity which they have with the Events. But what certainty can we have of Events, if we may be deceived in the discerning of Substances? The Person of Jesus Christ, that of his Holy Mother, his Apostles, his Cross, his Sepulchre, the People whom he converted, the Sick he healed, the Dead he raised up, and an hundred other things which the Prophets foretold, were Substances. Whence it follows, if those who have seen all these things may have been deceived, there remains to us no more certainty touching the accomplishment of the Ancient Oracles: and this great Proof of the Divinity of Christianity, which gives such Perplexity to the Infidels, and such great Consolation to the Faithful, will be no more of any weight.  
I told you Yesterday, that one of the strongest Proofs of Christian Religion, is the Truth of the Jewish Religion; and that all the Miracles which authorised the Vocation of Moses, do highly establish that of our Saviour Jesus Christ. But is it not true, that almost all that God did to give credit and authority to this Prophet, would have been fruitless, if those who were the Spectators might been deceived in the Question of Substances?  
The Author of the Discourse touching the Proofs of the Books of Moses 
(c) Disc. etc. pag. 123.  affirms, That 'tis to attribute to all the People of the Jews, the greatest extravagancy to believe they may have been deceived in these Matters. It's clear, says he, that we must suppose all these People mad and besides themselves, to say, they thought to pass through the Red Sea dryshod, when 'twas not such matter; in thinking they beheld a Mountain on fire, when they saw no such thing; That they fed on Manna, when they had nothing but common Food; in believing their  were not worn out, although they were obliged oftentimes to change them; in their believing to have seen Moses strike the Rock, whence flowed Water sufficient to satisfy the thirst of six hundred thousand Men, when in truth there was no such thing.  
But it's plain all this might happen, although this People consisted only of wise and intelligent Persons; if it be true, there's no certainty in the distinction we make of Substances, seeing that the Sea, the Mountain of Sinai, the Fire which covered it, the Manna, the Jews Garments, the Rock, and the Waters which flowed thence, were something more than Accidents.  
This Author cannot comprehend there could be so general an Error, and that it could infect six hundred thousand Men capable of bearing Arms. But that wherein one falls on the Subject of the Eucharist, supposing this Sacrament not to be Bread and Wine, will be more general, seeing 'twill be common to all Mankind without exception.  
It's then clear, Sir, that the Truth of the Facts, which establish the Divinity of the Christian Religion, depends on the Certitude, whereby we distinguish the Substances from one another. But this being granted, my second Proof subsists and has its effect; if not in the same form I gave it Yesterday, yet at least in that I now give it. However this concerns me but little; and provided I obtain what I demand, I shall be willing it should be in the manner you please: whether it be the Senses, or the rational Faculty, or what other Faculty you will, which makes us distinguish the Substances, all this is indifferent to me, provided you grant me, That 'tis the same Faculty which discerns that which makes us become Christians. This being granted, 'twill be undeniable, that this Faculty cannot be accused of deceiving us in what she tells us of the Eucharist, without taking from it whatever it has of Certainty and Authority in the Facts which serve for a Foundation to Faith.  
Here's then my second Proof perfectly reestablished, I shall now do the same thing for the first. I drew it hence, That the Certainty of the Senses being incomparably greater than that we call Moral; should it be granted that Transubstantiation was one of the Doctrines which Christianity obliges us to believe, the Objections which might be made against this Holy Religion would have more strength than the Proofs which establish the Divinity of it, because that in effect these Proofs have only a moral Evidence; whereas the Objections which may be offered against this Holy Religion, might have the Evidence of all the Senses, which clearly witness against Transubstantiation. You do not grant me this last Proposition; you affirm 'tis not the Senses, but Reason, which says, the Eucharist is Bread and Wine, because you pretend there's only this last Faculty in a condition to discern the Substances; and that should the Senses give some Indication, they would do it in a manner equally doubtful and indirect. I have already declared my unwillingness to enter into all these Discussions; for whatever the Faculty is which makes us discern, whether the Substances in general, or that of the Eucharist in particular, it's sufficient it is a natural Faculty. In this Supposition I thus re-establish my first Proof.  
The certainty which accompanies the Functions of the natural Faculty, which makes us discern one Substance from another, is greater than that we call Moral. If then this Faculty tells us the Eucharist is Bread and Wine, as it must be granted it does, one may offer against Transubstantiation, and consequently against Christianity, allowing Transubstantiation to be one of its Doctrines; one may, I say, offer against it, a greater certitude than that of the Proofs which establish the Divinity of it, whereby 'twill be more rational to reject than embrace it.  
This Consequence is necessary, and whatever past in our first Conference, does invincibly prove it. So that I only need to establish the Principle whence I draw it, viz. That the certainty whereby we commonly discern the Substances from one another, is greater than that we call Moral. And this is all you can desire of me; and if I convince you, I expect from your justice no further contentions about it.  
It's then easy to make you acknowledge this. Be pleased then to consider, that when we are only morally assured of a thing, the certainty we have of it, is not comparable to that which those have, on whose Testimony it's believed. For Example, I am only morally assured of Cesar's Victories, and Alexander's Conquest. But the Soldiers which served under these two Captains, and were in their Armies, and shared with them in their Labours; these Soldiers, I say, were far more certain of them than I am, yea, more than the Historians themselves to whom they related them, and on whose Testimony I believe them.  
I am only morally certain of the being of the Cities of Jerusalem, Rome, and Constantinople, having never been in those Places. But those that have been, and lived there, those are far more certain of it than I can be, because in effect they have seen these Cities with their own eyes.  
You gave me the Reason of this in our first Conference; though indeed you made the Application of it to the certainty of the Senses. But it not being the Application which makes the solidity of it, 'twill be still as strong, whatever use is made of it. You tell me we know the things of which we have, that which we call a moral certainty, only because they are attested to us by Persons whom we have no cause to suspect, and who tells us they have seen them with their own Eyes. But though these Persons be not in any sort suspected by us, we are far from being so assured of the truth of their Testimony, as we are from the Reports of our Senses. it's impossible for us to doubt we see, what we do see; but it's not impossible for us to doubt, whether others have seen what they tell us. We see, in this respect, the bottom of our own Hearts, but we see not all that passes in the Hearts of others. We have great Reasons to believe they do not deceive us; but these Reasons have not the evidence which accompanies this inward sense of our own Actions, which is commonly called Conscience.  
You made me observe, in the second place, that our Senses do not attest to us the truth of things of which we have no other Certitude than that we call Moral; whereas we may easily have a Moral Certainty of most things which are attested to us by our proper Senses. My Senses, for example, do not inform me there's a City called Rome; wherefore I have no other than a moral Certainty of it. But I do not only know by my own Senses, there is a City called Paris, I know it moreover, by those of others, who see, and have seen it a thousand times: so that I have a double Certainty of the being of this Town, the moral one, and that of Sense. By consequence, as two is more than one; so that Certainty which is merely Moral, is necessarily inferior to that of the Senses. Suppose, we now, they are not our Senses, but some other Faculty, which makes us immediately discern things; yet this will not hinder us from saying still, That those who are assured of the Existence of any thing, by the reports of this Faculty, whatever it be, have greater certainty of it, than those who know it only from the Testimony of those who have informed themselves by themselves, and from the exercise of their own proper Faculties. So that take it how we will, it is clear, that when we are assured only morally of a thing, we are much less than those on the Testimony of whom it is believed: Or to speak better, it is plain, that the moral Certainty does still suppose another greater in those whose Authority is its Prop and Foundation.  
If I then show you, one may have this kind of Certitude termed moral, touching Substances, which are no longer, or are now in distant parts, and where we have never been; but I do not say enough, if I show you we may have the highest degree of this kind of certainty, shall I not hereby convince you, That the moral Certainty is always inferior to that which attends the Functions of the natural Faculty, which discovers to us the difference of Substances? If I do this, Sir, will you not be satisfied?  
I shall be fully so, answered he; and I promise you, that if you prove it me clearly, I shall not trouble myself nor you with a Reply.  
I can easily do it, said I; For is it not true, that when any one would make us conceive a moral Certainty in the highest Point of its Perfection, the commonest Examples which are produced, are those of the Existence of the City of Rome, to those who have never been there; that of the Pope, Grand Signior, or Emperor, to those that have never seen them; and as to the past, that of Alexander the Great, Cesar, Pompey, and other Hero's of Antiquity. Scarcely any Author that treats of this Suject, but alleges one or the other of these Instances: Yet the City of Rome is a Substance, or to speak more exactly, an heap of Substances of several kinds. Alexander, Caesar, Pompey, and all the rest of the ancient Hero's, were something more than Accidents. And consequently, had not God given us a Faculty capable of discerning the Substances with certainty, there would be no assurance from the Testimony of those who have seen this; and instead of a moral Certainty, the greatest which can be imagined, we should only have a slight Opinion, and without Foundation.  
Is it not true, Sir, that we are morally assured there was heretofore at Rhodes a great Colossus of Brass; that there was a stately Temple at Ephesus, consecrated to Diana, and at Rome another dedicated to Jupiter? Have we not the like certainty? that there are still Pyramids of Stone in Egypt of excessive heights; that there's a Mount in Sicily which vomits Fire; that there are Elephants in the Indies, Lions in afric, Crocodiles in the Nile? Yet this Colossus, these Temples, Pyramids, Mountain, Lions and Crocodiles, what are these but Substances, whose Existence is not known to us but by the Testimony of those who have seen them with their own Eyes; or, to say nothing which may move you, who perceived them by means of the Faculty which God has given us to know these kind of Objects? But not to go so far, I now showed you, that the Truth of the Facts, whence are taken the Proofs which establish the Divinity of the Christian Religion, and even of the Jewish, depends on the faithfulness of the Report, which this natural Faculty has made of several Substances; and that if this Faculty may be herein mistaken, these Proofs are in no wise convincing. It being then certain, that we are morally assured of the Truth of these Facts, it cannot be denied we have a moral Certainty of several Substances, and that those who were informed of them by themselves, have a greater certainty than we.  
Can you, Sir, now doubt, I have not made good my word? Will you not grant me, that the discerning of Substances, whatever the Faculty is whereby this is done, is attended with a greater certainty that the moral one? Thus this Faculty telling me the Eucharist is Bread and Wine, and telling it me with all the force and constancy it is able; is it not apparent there's a clearness in its Evidence far greater than that in the Proofs of Christianity? Does not my Proof then return with its full strength and convictions? May I not always say, That Transubstantiation is opposed with greater strength of Argument, than the Christian Religion is defended with?  
We are agreed, that the Proofs for Christianity have only a moral Evidence; and I now shown you, That that which persuades us the Eucharist is Bread and Wine, is far more certain than what is morally so. Can you, after this, deny that there is not greater certainty in what combats Transubstantiation, than in what establishes the Truth of Christian Religion? Can you deny that that which is more than sufficient to establish the Truth of Christian Religion, discharged of Transubstantiation, is too weak to maintain it, granting Transubstantiation to be one of the Doctrines which she requires to be believed?  
You see then, Sir, the fruitlessness of your Answer; you see it lets my two Proofs subsist in their full strength; you see, that whether it be the Senses or Reason which make us know and discern the Substances, we have still cause to believe the Eucharist is Bread and Wine; and that this Persuasion cannot be rendered doubtful and uncertain, without shaking the whole Foundation of Christianity, and without giving the Infidels an infallible means of triumphing over this Holy Religion.  
Mr. N. was about forming an Answer, when he was hindered by the arrival of one of my Friends who came from a long Voyage, and whose return was a surprise to me: I was much joyed to see him. But Mr. N. to whom he was a Stranger, took hence an occasion to be gone, without informing me of his thoughts on what I told him.   

CONFERENCE IU. The Third Proof, That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism in its full perfection; and especially destroys the certainty of Demonstration.  
I Was very desirous to know what effect my last conference had on Mr. N. I was moreover willing to show him my third Proof: Whereupon I went to his House, where he received me with his usual civility; and our Discourse having insensibly led us to Matters of Religion, I took the liberty to ask him, Whether he had throughly considered what had passed in our foregoing Debates?  
He hereupon ingenuously acknowledged, He could find no means to defend against my Instances the Answer he had made me, nor how to offer me better. Yet he added, he was so persuaded of the truth of his Belief, That he would rather yield up to me Mr. Huet's Proofs, than to imagine the whole Church could be deceived in so important a Matter as that of the Sacrament. In effect, said he to me, What hurt can there be in saying, this Author has ill defended a good Cause, and made use of false reasonings for the maintaining of the Truth? What do you say, Sir? said I; you ask me, What hurt there can be in what you say? I affirm to you, that nothing can be worse. For, Sir, I would not have you mistaken, Mr. Huet's Proofs are not of his invention: he only digested them into order, strengthened and illustrated them with curious Remarks and pressing Considerations: and as to the main of them, he has taken them out of Authors that have wrote on that Subject before him: and indeed he has also commendably taken them from the discourses of the Prophets, and the Son of God himself, and his Apostles.  
Christ himself is the first that has used these Proofs. He several times alleged the Predictions of the Prophets; and as oft did cite his Miracles. He alleged his Resurrection; and these were his strongest Arms his greatest Arguments. He made use of them to stop the mouths of the Scribes and Pharisees, whom he looked upon as his professed Enemies. He used them to persuade the multitudes which followed him; and who hereby in some sort showed their readiness to receive his Doctrine. Believe me 
(a) John xiv.  for my Works, said he to them. And in another place 
(b) St. John v. 36. , The Works which I do, bear testimony of me.  
He used them to confirm the Faith of his Disciples, and opposes this alone to the Temptations which shook them. 
(c) Luke 24.25, 26, 27.  O fools, and flow of heart, to believe all that the Prophets have spoken. Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his Glory? Then says St. Luke, beginning at Moses and all the Prophets, he expounded to them in all the Scriptures, the things concerning himself. And when St. John the Baptist sent to him his Disciples to demand of him, whether he was the Messiah? he gave them for his full answer these words, 
(d) Mat. xi, 4, 5.  Go and tell John what you see and hear. The Blind recover their sight, the Lame walk, the Lepers are cleansed, the Deaf hear, the Dead are risen, and the Gospel is preached to the Poor.  
The Apostles have herein imitated their Master as well as in other things; one of them declaring, at the end of his Gospel 
(e) John x●.  That he wrote the Miracles of the Son of God, that we might believe that Jesus is the the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing we might have Life through his Name. The Fathers have followed these incomparable Guides. The modern Authors have trod in their steps. Ask me now, Sir, than no more what hurt there is in saying, Mr. Huet's Proofs be of no weight. I dare say they be not only valid, but that he can not be a Christian who naturally denies them.  
Your Answer is also attended with this Vexation, that 'tis equally injurious to the Wisdom of God, and to the Memory of those who have hitherto embraced the Profession of the Truth. For as to the first, if the accomplishment of the ancient Prophecies, the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apostles, do prove nothing, Wherefore did God take that care to perform them? And whom will you persuade that he raised up such a long train of Prophets, so many times forced Nature, and overthrew the ancientest and firmest of its Laws; and that he did all this, I say, for nothing, without any Necessity, any Reaor Profit? Is this the Character of the Divine Wisdom, which commonly arriving at the greatest Ends, by the smallest and most contemptible Means in appearance, must needs be far from using such great ones, and setting at work such Machines' to do nothing?  
I say, moreover, that your Answer is injurious to an infinite number of Christians. How many have there been since the Birth of Christianity who have embraced this Holy Religion, by being convinced of its truth by proofs of the same nature of Mr. Huet's? I mean, by the consideration of the Prophecies of the Old and New Testament, and the Miracles of Christ and his Apostles. If what you say be true, they have been simple and foolish People, who have yielded to such things as they ought to have despised. Their Faith was not a solid Persuasion, but a fond Belief, more worthy of blame, than praise; and thus lightly believing, they have showed themselves of the number of those mentioned by the Son of Sirach. Qui citò credunt leves sunt cord.  
And further; If Miracles be of no value, why do you require them of us? Why will you have our first Reformers rejected for this very Reason? Why do you reject People, and reject them without hearing them, as they think they ought to be; and that for this only reason, that they wanted an unnecessary thing, and a Proof which concludes nothing? Is not this, I appeal to yourself, very strange?  
In a word, Sir, if Mr. Huet's Proofs be not good, where shall we find better? What can we say to the Insidels, to bring them to the knowledge of the Truth? And with what success shall we labour for their conversion?  
We shall not want Prooss, nor Means, said Mr. N. we shall have the Proofs of Reason, taken from the nature of the Christian Doctrine itself, the Truth, Sublimity and Purity of its Precepts; and from the conformity it has with the common notions which the corruption of our Nature has left us, and some other such like Considerations, which do not depend on Arguments of Sense.  
Who has told you, Sir, replied I, that these kind of Proofs are proper to convert all sorts of Infidels, without exception? Can you deny what even those who would make the best of them, have expressly remarked 
(f) Cloistian Convers. , That they are a little abstracted, and require not only some application of Mind, but morcover greater light and penetration of thought than the Vulgar is commonly endued with? Yet we must convert the Laplanders, the wild Irish, and Cannibals, which is to say, brutish People, and such about whom it has been disputed in the Schools of Spain, whether they have the use of Reason, and whether they be of the same kind with other Men. What way then have you for the instructing them in things which surpass the Capacity of our Tradesinen and Peasants? But what will you say, if I show you, That your Transubstantiation destroys these kind of Proofs; as well as Mr. Huet's? Will you not grant me after this, that this is a very dangerous Doctrine, and that you cannot soon enough retrench it from the number of those Truths which are taught by Christianity? Yet I can establish more than this; For I can show, that your Belief banishes Certainty from the Acts of Reason, as well as from those of Sense. I can show you it sets open a large Door to Pyrrhonism, whereby it may absolutely reign in the World, there being nothing which can be reasonably opposed against it.  
You see, Sir, 'tis impossible to say any thing of greater force against your Doctrine. For Scepticism, is the last and greatest irregularity, whereinto Reason can throw itself; All others appear to me slight in comparison of this. And so much the rather, because all others may be cured; whereas this is without remedy. In effect, the Sceptics doubting of every thing, and agreeing in nothing, they give no hold to those whose who would reduce them. So that 'tis impossible to dispute regularly with them. For as Motion cannot be made but upon something that's immovable; so a Dispute must turn on something which is indisputable. What way is there then to dispute against a Man who doubts of all; and not only doubts, whether what you tell him be true, but doubts moreover whether you do tell him of it; whether he hears it, yea whether he doubts of it? As for my part, I regard all the reasonings of those who undertake to convince Sceptics, as a perpetual begging of the Question. For, in fine, 'tis impossible to reason against them, without laying down something which they will not grant; because that in effect, these People agreeing in nothing, and it being in the mean time imimpossible to reason, without laying down something, it's clear there's no reasoning against them, without granting what's in question, which is one of the greatest faults a Man that argues can fall into.  
It's then impossible fairly to deny what I said, when I affirmed, That Transubstantiation opens a door to Scepticism; and puts men into a necessity of denying every thing. What I said at first, is a small matter; that it makes void Mr. Huet's proofs; it spares none, overthrowing generally, and without exception, whatever establishes the truth of Christian Religion. So that if I justify this, as I am persuaded I easily can, I shall be sorry to add any thing to the proof, which this alone furnishes me with. In effect those who shall be capable of digesting this, may digest every thing.  
I believe you are in the right, said Mr. N. and I do acknowledge, if you can convince me Transubstantiation draws along with it Scepticism, you will make me suspect it. In effect I conceive nothing more dangerous, nor at the same time so ridiculous as Scepticism; and you can never speak any thing too bad of it, which I will not subscribe to. But I do not much fear your proving what you talk of.  
And I for my part, said I, do not doubt, but I shall do it. Shall I not do it, if I convince you, that in admitting Transubstantiation one is engaged not to rely on any evidence, be it of what kind it will. For in short, Sir, you know the whole dispute with the Sceptics, is to know, Whether there be any thing certain. The Sceptics absolutely deny this. We, as to our parts, affirm, That as there are things doubtful, and uncertain; so there are some we are sure of, and which one may and aught to believe; and when we be asked, what those things be? we answer, they are precisely those which are evident. Because that in effect, according to us, the evidence of a thing, is the foundation of its certainty, and infallible mark of its truth. The Sceptics on the contrary say, that evidence and falsity have nothing inconsistent; that they may be found together, and therefore to conclude a thing to be true, because of its being evident, is ill reasoning, and an exposing of one's self to manifest danger of being deceived.  
So that the whole amounts to this, Whether one may, or aught to rely on the evidence of a thing, as an infallible mark of truth? For if we cannot, the Sceptics have reason, and we can offer nothing against them. And consequently, if I show you, that in granting Transubstantiation, there is no evidence of whatever rank it may be, which does not consist very well with error and falsity; Now shall I not hereby show you, that this Doctrine draws after it the whole train of Sceptical doubts?  
I suppose then a man must be a perfect Sceptic, or none at all. For the mitigations which some would introduce, be absolutely ridiculous. For in fine, we must assure ourselves of whatever is evident, or assure ourselves of nothing, seeing we cannot assure ourselves of any thing but on the account of its evidence. And consequently, if evidence be the lawful ground of certitude, we must be sure of whatever is evident, and put away all Scepticism without reserve. On the contrary, if the evidence of a thing be not sufficient to produce a certainty of it, we can be sure of nothing; we must be perfect Sceptics, and never believe or do any thing. So that all those who are not perfect and complete Sceptics, are not Sceptics at all, seeing they part with the fundamental maxim of their ridiculous System.  
I agree with you in all this, says Mr. N. and will acquit you of your promise, if you show me that Transubstantiation separates Evidence from Truth. This is no hard matter to do, replied I, for in effect I know but two sorts of evidences, the one which strikes the senses, the other which is perceived by the mind. I have showed you that if Transubstantiation takes place, the first is a most unfaithful Note of the Truth. I have showed you, that amongst this great multitude of things, which strike the senses, there is not perhaps one which they do more distinctly perceive, than the matter of the Eucharist. I have showed you, that 'tis an object which shows itself, not only to one or two of our senses, as most of those things do which make us apprehend them; but generally and without exception, all those which God has given us. I have showed you, That they all unanimously do depose, that 'tis Bread and Wine; and that whatever precaution they use to hinder themselves from being deceived, they all find the same thing, and never change their language. This then being a thing which you do believe to be false; and in effect it cannot be true, if your Transubstantiation be received, you see my only task is to convince you, That according to your Principles, this first kind of evidence may lead us into error.  
I am not agreed in that, replied he: For though our senses may deceive us in the Eucharist, they deceive us only in respect of the substance therein contained; but will make us faithful reports on the accidents. And you know our Divines and Philosophers confine the certainty of the senses to the bare accidents: By which means, there lies open a large field for these saculties to exercise their functions in, without running a risk of being mistaken.  
This field, said I to him, is not so vast as it appears to you. Your Authors, and especially Bellarmin 
* Bell de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24. , do not pretend the senses have certainty in respect of all sorts of accidents, without exception. They count two different ranks, the one which are only perceived by one sense, as Colours by the Sight, Sounds by the Ear, Scents by the Smell. The others which are perceived by more than one sense, as Greatness, Situation, Figure, Motion. They call the first proper Objects, and the second common ones. They add, that the report of our senses is not certain, but only in respect of their proper Objects; but as to the common ones, they may easily be déceived. Here's then the certainty of the Senses reduced to half the size you gave it. But this is not all, for Bellarmin stops not here. He moreover distinguishes the judgements we may make on the proper Objects of our Senses in Generals, and in Particulars. For example, when we see a Colour, we may say first in general of it, This is a colour, not a scent or savour. We may say likewise in particular, This is such a colour, 'tis white or red, not green or black. He tells us the Senses are not certain but in the first of these judgements, they often deceiving us in the second. See, Sir, whereunto this Doctrine reduces the certainty of the Senses. For my part, I could like as well he should take 'em quite away. In effect Bellarmin takes from the number of things of which the Senses may give us some assurance, first all substances; in the second place, all the accidents which are perceived by more than one Sense; in the third place, the particular designation of proper Objects, and he leaves them no other certain function than that of distinguishing the proper Objects of one sense from those of another Sense, as Colour from Scent, and the Smell from the Sound.  
Yet it happens, that all the late Philosophers affirm, That this function, to which alone Bellarmin grants some certainty, is the most uncertain; or to speak better, the most deceitful of all. They affirm, That that which we perceive by the Senses, is commonly but one and the same modus, to wit, the figure, which when it is brought to the light, is called Colour; when it moves the Fibres of the Tongue, or Olfactory Nerves, is called Savour, or Odour; and when 'tis felt by the Hand, it takes the name of Roughness or Smoothness.  
Join we now these two Opinions together, that of Bellarmin, and that of these late Philosophers, where shall we be? and of what shall we be certain? We may now then doubt whether it be day, whether we fit, whether you see me, and I you. We may doubt whether amongst this great number of things, which incessantly employ us, and which are the ties and foundations of Society, whether Civil or Ecclesiastic, there be one single one which subsists elsewhere than in our imagination.  
But 'tis not necessary to join Bellarmin's opinion with that of the Modern Philosophers, to find therein the entire ruin of Societies and Religion: The first alone is more than sufficient to work this dismal effect. The certainty he allows is so small, and of so little use, either for the Christian or Religious life, or the Civil, or even for the Natural and Animal one, that in losing the certainty which we thought we had till now in the rest, it may be said we lose all. What signifies the distinguishing to us of a Colour from an Odour, or Savour from a Sound? And to what use may all this serve? It more concerns us to distinguish three sorts of objects, Persons, Actions, and Things, understanding by this last word, all the substances which are not endued with reason and intelligence, as Meats, Poisons, Remedies, Habits, Arms, Working-tools, Plants, Animals, and such like things.  
These are such things as most concern us to know, being things about which we are continually conversant, and whereon depends, not only the preservation of life, and the commerce of Society, but what is more, our everlasting Salvation.  
Yet according to Bellarmin, nothing of all this is certain. We may be mistaken in every thing, seeing all this consists either in substances, or in the common Objects of our Senses, or in proper Objects, of which we must have a particular knowledge; which is to say, in so many things as 'tis impossible to be assured of, if Bellarmin be to be believed. What consusion, what a Chaos is this? We had as good be all blind, deaf and dumb; we had as good have had no Senses, or that there were nothing out of us which our Senses could perceive.  
But the truth of it is, These are but mere whimsies, which have no grounds. For provided we observe the precautions already mentioned, and which all Philosophers agree in, our Senses will never deceive us in any of these kind of Objects; we shall find an unequal certainty every where. Let us then judge in effect by every thing which serves for a foundation to the firmness of our persuasions, by the inclination we have to conceive them, by the conformity of our Sentiments with those of others, and by the observations we have made on the truth of what we think of them, and we shall find a perfect equality in the reports of our Senses, on all these Objects.  
For to speak only now to the chief part of your Answer, I first affirm, 'twill be as difficult for you to persuade yourself, that what you hold in your hand, is not a Glove, but a Stone, Apple, or Sword, as to think it has no colour or scent; although, according to Bellarmin, the first of these judgements is most uncertain; there being only the second, wherein he will allow any certainty. And I affirm, you doubt as little of the first, as the second; and that all the world makes the same judgement with you; and in fine, that there are not more instances to be given, which show we be deceived in the discerning of substances, than in the general or particular judgements which are made of those qualities that are the proper Objects of our Senses; so that we must grant there's certainty in all these things, or in none of them; whereby 'twill appear, that all these different restrictions which have seemed so necessary to Bellarmin, are very unnecessary and ill applied. This is so manifest, that I need not insist any longer on it, but pass on to the second kind of evidence.  
And this moreover is double: In effect there be certain things which are evident in themselves, and 'tis sufficient to comprehend them, and to know the true signification of the terms they are wont to be expressed by, to persuade ourselves immediately of them without any arguing. Their own proper light forces the most obstinate to receive them; and though perhaps a man may disacknowledg them in words, yet he shall believe them in his heart. Such are the first principles of Sciences, and the rest of those certain Truths, in which all the world agree, That one and one are two: That the whole is bigger than a part: That if we take equal numbers from equal numbers, what remains will be even.  
The other Truths are those, which being obscure in themselves, and consequently easily denied when proposed without proof, become evident, when it's showed they have a necessary and indissoluble tye with those other Truths I have already mentioned, and whereof I have said, That they gain reception by their own lustre, which is the natural and ordinary effect of Demonstrations.  
I pretend, that Transubstantiation does equally overthrow the certainty which arises from this double evidence; and I hope to show you this my pretention is well grounded. I begin at the evidence of the second rank, and shall make it appear, That 'tis not long of Transubstantiation, if all Demonstrations be not false; because in effect there are an infinite number of 'em which would become so, were this Doctrine true.  
It's first of all certain, That the nature and property of things, is the vast Field of Demonstrations. This kind of reasoning sets on the proving sometimes the Essence by the Properties, and sometimes the Properties by the Essence; and again sometimes an unknown or contested Property, by another which is more known and unquestionable This being granted, the only Foundation of these three sorts of Demonstrations, is the Connection of Propertie's with one another, and of all of 'em together with the Essence. For might one separate all this, and the Essence could be without the Properties, or the Properties without the Essence, or each of these Properties without any one of the others, there could be no Demonstration made on this Subject; and the Reasonings which shall be used to prove one of these things by the other, would amount to no more than probable Arguments, like those drawn from what they call common Accidents. And therefore the Jesuits of Conimbre affirm 
* Conimb. in lib. 1. post. Anal. cap. 7. quaest. 2. Art 2. , That the Connection of Properties with their Subjects, is the true object of Sciences. They say this Connection is indissoluble, even in reference to the power of God, and they prove it by this Reason, That if God could separate these things, Science might happen to be false; which appeared to them absurd and contradictory.  
If then Transubstantiation does actually separate the Properties from one another, and altogether from the Essence; if it grants some of these Properties without the others; if it grants some one of 'em, or all of 'em together without the Essence; in sine, if it grants the Essence without the Properties; its clear, it saps the Foundations of most Demonstrations, and brings it to pass that nothing shall be more easy than to make great numbers of them, according to all the Forms and Conditions which the Logicians do require; yet, which shall be all Fallacies and Deceits.  
It's certain your belief makes this great separation, and your Doctors themselves do not deny it 
* Vasq. in 3. disput. 187. c. 2. n. 13. . For example, it's commonly believed that the natural properties of a Body are Extension, Division, Motion, Impenetration, taking up a place, etc. All the Philosopher's Books are full of this kind of stuff. And therefore the knowledge of Physics, which ought chief to endeavour at the discovery of the Properties of the Natural Body, which is its Object, makes of this very thing, one of the considerable of its Treatises, and never fails to bring it after that of its Principles, which is the first.  
We believe 'tis the very essence of Accidents, to be actually in their Subject. You do not grant this; yet you grant, if this be not the essence of Accidents, yet 'tis at lest a Property of them: You believe it the Properties of Quantity, to be measured, to be equal, and proportionable to the place it possesses.  
Here are several Properties; yet, Sir, you separate them all from their Subjects; and consequently from the essence whence they flow. Supposing, as you do, the existence of the Accidents of the Bread without a Subject, you maintain something that has extent, that is divisible, movable, figured, impenetrable, and which possesses a place, and yet this must not be Body all this while. Which is to say, you shall grant at once six different Properties of a Natural Body, separated from this Body, and consequently from its essence, which is yet the only spring from whence they flow.  
Establishing the Body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist after the manner of Spirits, you strip it of its divisibility, its impenetrability, and its locality; which is to say, you hereby affirm the Essence to be separated from three of its most Essential Properties. Leaving to this Body its Quantity, you separate this Quantity from the several Properties, which accompany it every where else, the divisibility, impenetrability, the aptitude to be measured, to possess a place, etc.  
Supposing the Accidents of Bread and Wine without a Subject, you do moreover suppose the Essence of these kind of Being's, without the most Essential of their Properties.  
You will have Christ's Body in the Eucharist to retain some of the Properties of the Natural Body, as Quantity, Figure, etc. And lose others, as Divisibility, Impenetrability, the manner of being circumscriptively in a place, etc. which is to say, you separate the Properties from one another. Hereby than you destroy the connexion of Properties between one another, and with their Essence; which as I said just now, is the foundation of most Demonstrations. So that all those which may be made on this Principle, and which Aristotle would have looked upon as convincing and unanswerable proofs, are in our hands but trivial Conjectures, and bare Probabilities.  
Will you have (besides this) Examples, which justify this truth? Shall I give you Demonstrations, which all Philosophers, even your own, have ever respected as very solid ones; which yet are but mere Sophisms granting Transubstantiation? Is it not true, that your Suarez 
* Suarez Met. disp. 1. n. 4.  proves there are Substances, because there are Accidents? There are Accidents, says he, there must then be Substances. He says this is a necessary consequence; and shows it to be so in the sequel by Considerations which perhaps I may hereafter mention. But what can be falser than this, if there can be Accidents without a Subject, as your Transubstantiation supposes?  
All Philosophers both Ancient and Modern, Aristotelians, and Cartesians 
* Arist. Met. Lib 8 cap 1. Perer. Phys. lib 5 cap 4. Suar. Met Disp. 13. Sect. 1. Conimb. in 1. Phys. cap 9 Quaest. 1. Ar. 1. Masius ibidem Quaest. 1. Petit de raref. & Conned. pag. 172. Rohauz Phys. part 1. cap 6. , intending to advance further, and prove the existence of Matter, or Corporal Substance, propose three things observable in nature. The first, that there happens in it Accidental changes, that that which was black becomes white, what was cold becomes hot; and the second, that there happen Substantial changes. there being of wood made fire; and that from a Seed springs up a Tree; and the third, That all this is done by Natural Agents, whose forces are limited.  
Whence they conclude, There must be necessarily some matter which is the Subject of all these several changes, and on which the Natural causes may act. They pretend this proof is demonstrative, and that nothing can be offered against it. But all this having place in the Eucharist, it's clear there must be said one of these two things, Either that this proof is not good, or that the Substance of the Bread and Wine remains in the Sacrament.  
The Cartesians pretend to demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul, by showing it to be distinct from the Body; and they imagine to prove this distinction by saying that Thought, which is a modification of the Soul, is no Material thing. Which they afterwards prove by this reason, That one may deny Thought whatever appertains to the Body, as to be long, large and deep, to be of such and such a figure, to be divisible, etc. yet without destroying for this the notion we have of Thought.  
But can we not deny all this of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist, though it be Material, and not a Spirit? Here's then another deceitful Demonstration if your Transubstantiation has place.  
These Philosophers make great reckoning of a proof which they use against the Vacuum of the Epicureans: They affirm that to suppose a Vacuum, is to contradict one's self, because say they, that a Vacuum, if there be one, must be extensive in length, largeness and depth. But supposing it, this would be a Body; for a Body according to them, is nothing else, but that which is extended in length, largeness and depth. So that were it a Body, 'twould not be a Vacuum. To suppose then a Vacuum, is to contradict ones own Supposition. The Cartesians affirm nothing can oppose this proof. yet is it false, if Transubstantiation be true. For there is, according to you, in the Eucharist something extensive, something that is long, large and deep, and yet not a Body.  
The Peripatetics, says Mr. N. admit not of this proof, and it does not oppose the manner in which the Cartesians explain Transubstantiation; for you know they will not grant, That the Accidents of Bread and Wine subsist without a Subject.  
This is true, replied I to him. But first the existence of Accidents without a Subject, is however opposed by a proof, which the Cartesians respect as demonstrative. And then the manner in which the Cartesians explain what you say God does in the Eucharist, ruins the most part of their Physical Demonstrations; as others have observed 
* See the Treatise of the authority of the Senses.  before me.  
So that you cannot deny but this Doctrine overthrows the certainty of Demonstrations. But this ought not much to surprise you, seeing your Belief overthrows the chiefest and most unquestionable of all Principles.  
I was about proving this, when I was hindered by a Message from a Gentleman. I desired Mr. N. to permit me to write an Answer to it, who yielding to my request, our conversation was by this means interrupted for some short time.   

CONFERENCE V Wherein is sinally showed, That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism; and absolutely destroys the certainty of first Principles.  
AS soon as I had ended my Answer, I rejoined Mr. N. and reassumed our former Discourse. You have not forgotten where we left off, said I to him presently. I had undertaken to show you, That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism at its full length; and absolutely overthrows the certainty of our Notices. I have showed it in respect of those which arise from our senses. I afterwards justified it on the subject of Demonstrations; so that I have only now to show you, That this Doctrine does not spare the clearest and most unquestionable of all the Principles. I shall now prove to you, That if your Belief takes place, the most certain of these Maxims will be found false; and consequently the rest, which depend thereon, and which at most have not more evidence than this first, will be doubtful and uncertain.  
This surprises you without doubt, and you imagine I undertake a strange task. Yet I hope easily to acquit myself of it. Only inform me which of those great Truths you may make most account of.  
This has been a matter of some contest, replied he to me; I was taught in the College, that the first and the most certain of all the Principles is this great Maxim, That it is impossible the same thing can be, and cannot be: Or to express it in another manner, That it is impossible for two contradictory Propositions to be true at the same time. I have been always told this is the first step our mind takes in the search of Truth, and at the same time the last thing we find when we search after the foundations of our Persuasions.  
Yet the Cartesians do not grant this 
* See the Art of Thinking, part 4. chap. 5, etc. ; they are agreed indeed that this Maxim is certain and unquestionable; for who dares deny it? But they affirm 'tis of no great use, and however, not the first of all Principles. They prefer this other Maxim before it: One may affirm of each thing, whatever is contained in the distinct Idea we have of it.  
For my part, I think it an easy thing to agree them. The Cartesians Principle is undoubtedly the first of Affirmatives, and the fittest to prove Positive Truths. But that of the Schools is the first of the Negatives, and the properest to destroy Errors and Falsity.  
I am easily of your mind, replied I. But I must add, That Transubstantiation does absolutely overthrow both one and the other of these two Axioms; as well as a great many others, whose certainty is very near that of theirs. Which I shall now prove to you, beginning at the Principle of the Cartesians, on which I shall not long insist. Mr. Rohaut shows in the beginning of his Treatise of Physics 
* Roh. Phys. part. 1. chap. 7. , That 'tis impossible to conceive distinctly matter, without conceiving 'tis extended in length, largeness and depth, that it is figured, and impenetrable. I relate not his Words to you; you may read them in his Chapter of Matter.  
Yet you do not believe our Saviour's Body is impenetrable in the Eucharist. You believe 'tis there after the manner of Spirits, totum in toto, & totum in qualibet parte. For thus has the Council of Trent defined it. As to Figure, I do not know how it can be given to a Body, whose parts are penetrable, and enter into one another. In sine, I do not understand how length can be attributed to it, or largeness, or depth; for what would be the length, largeness and depth, which would be in it? Will it be what it has in its natural Estate? Our Senses attest sufficiently the contrary. Will it be that of Bread and Wine? This cannot be; For were this so, the Body of Christ might be divided into two halfs, into three thirds, into four parts, etc. seeing all these Divisions may be made of the Host.  
Here's then three things which are clearly comprehended in the Idea a man has of a Body, and which yet one cannot affirm of that of Jesus Christ. And consequently, here are three Proofs of the falsity of the Cartesians great Principle. Here's now a fourth, These Philosophers will not deny that that which makes the Essence of each thing, is comprehended in the distinct Idea, which one has of that thing; and that the thing is comprehended in the distinct Idea which we have of that which makes its Essence. For example, if extension be the Essence of Matter, as they pretend; they will acknowledge, that Extension is comprised in the Idea of Matter, and the Matter in the Idea of the Extension; and thus, as one may affirm of Matter, that it is Extensive; so one may affirm of that which is Extensive, that it is Matter. They will as little deny, that the Mass, or Collection of Modusses, is not that which makes the particular Essence of every thing; for every Body knows the Aversion they have to substantial Forms, so much mentioned in the College. By consequence, 'twill be equally impossible to form to ones self a distinct Idea of Bread and Wine, without bringing in all the Modusses of these two Substances, and distinctly conceiving the Mass of these Modusses, without conceiving the Bread and Wine. See now, Sir, if according to the Maxims of the Cartesians you dare affirm, there's Bread and Wine in the Eucharist, as you say, there's that which makes the Essence of Bread and Wine.  
Being not well versed in the new Philosophy, says Mr. N. I shall not undertake to answer what you now offered me. But shall reserve my reply till you undertake to show me our belief destroys the Principle of the Schools, which tell us, That two contradictory Propositions cannot be true. And I am even impatient to see how you will prove this.  
I will easily show you, said I, That this Doctrine includes a great number of Contradictions; and consequently of necessity either this Doctrine must be false, or the contradictory Propositions may be true. It's certain, if I undertake to show you by Arguments, that your belief is contradictory, I shall (I imagine) be engaged in great contests with you.  
We must run over all the knotty Questions of the Schools, and examine their nicest Distinctions. And this is as little pleasant to me, as I believe 'tis to you.  
But I have another less tiresome way than this first; Which is to show you, Sir, That your Doctors agree, 'tis contradictory to say divers things, which are the necessary consequences of your belief, which they easily grant every time they think not of Transubstantiation, and when the Idea of this Doctrine, which commonly confounds their Senses, leaves them some liberty of judging of things according to the light of nature. Behold here an example of what I say.  
Transubstantiation, according to the common Sentiment of the Schools, does necessarily imply the Existence of Accidents without a Subject. I affirm, That this very thing is a pure Contradiction, and here's the manner how I show it. You will allow me, it's a Contradiction to affirm, That an Accident is not an Accident. 'Tis your Suarez, who teaches it in so many words, If the Accident 
* Suar. Met. disp. 32. sect. 1. n. 4. , says he, has no Subject, 'tis not an Accident, but a Substance. You do not rightly comprehend this Author's meaning, says Mr. N. The Essence of the Accident does not consist to be actually in a Subject, but only to may be therein, to be proper to this. 'Tis this Disposition, and this Aptitude, which makes the Essence of the Accident, and which never leaves it, and this is whatever Suarez meant in the passage you have cited.  
You deceive yourself, replied I, Suarez sense is, That Accidents will be Substances, if they be not actually in some Subject. To behold more distinctly this truth, observe if you please, that he does not say this, but to prove there are Substances, for thus he speaks: He says, it cannot be denied but there are Accidents, seeing this is a thing which the Senses attest. Whence he concludes, there are Substances, because if there were not Substances, the Accidents would be without a Subject, and if they had no Subject, they would not be Accidents but Substances.  
Had this Jesuit the Thought you impute to him, his Argument would be reduced to this; There are Accidents: The Accidents are proper to have Subjects: These Subjects must be Substances: Then there are Substances. But first if Suarez meant this, 'tis strange he did not say it. He has spoken enough in his Life, not to be to seek to express his Thoughts, and not to use such uncouth ways as these would be.  
Moreover in attributing to him this sense, you make him make a ridiculous Argument. For in fine, what will this consequence be? Accidents are proper to exist in SubSubstances: There are then Substances. This is just as if I should say, The Fire is proper to melt Ice: Therefore where ever there is Fire, there must necessarily be Ice. Water is proper to quench Fire: Where ever then there is Water, there is also Fire.  
This may suffice on the Subject of your first Contradiction: The second is a little more palpable: It consists in your making the Body of Christ to be in several places at once, without losing its Unity. For in fine, if it be in several places at once, it's separate from its self; and if it be separate from itself, 'tis no longer one only Body. All Philosophers agree there's no certainer mark of a real distinction, than separation, especially that which they call mutual, and which they say consists in separate things, subsisting each apart after the Separation. The mutual separation of two Extremes, saith Suarez, 
* Suar. Met. in indice voce distinctio.  is an evident sign they be really distinguished. Elsewhere he says this is the principal sign 
† Idem Met. disp. 7. Sect. 2. n. 9, & 10. . He also affirms, it matters not to know, Whether the separation be made naturally, or supernaturally; and that all one can say of it, is, That when the separation is made naturally, the distinction is more visibly and apparently known, than when God does does it by Miracle. Yet he affirms it to be then no less real.  
And of this he gives us a considerable example: He says if we consult only natural reason, we shall be apt to doubt whether Quantity be distinct from Matter, because in effect these two things do never subsist without one another in the order of Nature.  
But he adds, That the Mystery of the Eucharist does not permit us to doubt of their distinction, seeing that Quantity does therein Miraculously subsist without Matter.  
On this same Principle Suarez, and all your other Doctors affirm it impossible that the Modusses should subsist without the things Modifide, no, not by an effect of Infinite power; because, say they, there being no real distinction between the Modus and the thing Modifide, it's impossible the Modus should subsist without the thing Modifide.  
There cannot then be a real separation between that which is not really distinct; and to suppose such a separation is a manifest contradiction. Yet your belief supposes this. It supposes the Body of Jesus Christ in several places at a time, I mean in several separate places; which have no contiguity between them, but are distinguished by considerable spaces, and by a great number of Bodies which lie between them. Let's imagine three Consecrated Hosts, one here, the other in China, and the third in America. The Body of Christ is in all these three places, and at the same time in Heaven. It's perfectly entire in each of these four places. It's then separate and far distant from itself.  
Pray tell me, Sir, is not this fair reasoning, to say, The body and the soul of a child of God are two distinct Substances; for after death the body remains in the Sepulchre, and the soul goes to Heaven?  
This is what cannot be denied: But if this reasoning be good, why in the same manner is not this other, which is so like it, also good? The body of Jesus Christ is really distinct from the substance which is between the Priest's hands, for the one is in Heaven, the other on Earth. What difference can there be between these two reasonings, which shall make the first good, and not the latter?  
But here's an instance which I think comes nearer yet; you know the Father's Argument against the Pagans. There were Pagans who imagined their gods dwelled properly and really in the Statues Consecrated to them. And there being not one of these gods to whom they did not Consecrate a great number of these Representations in several parts of the World, hence it manifestly followed, That they were in several places at a time: And the Fathers treated this as contradictory and ridiculous. They maintained that each of these gods could not be but in one place at a time, because if he were in several, he must of necessity be divided, or multiplied: Each of these Statues must contain but a small bit of this god, or else there must be as many gods, as many Jupiter's, as many Mercuries, as many Vnlcans', as there were Statues Consecrated to these false Divinities.  
And this is precisely Arnobius his Argument 
* Arnob. adver. Gentes, lib. 6. pag. 89. Edit. Prior.  in a most excellent passage which I Translated this Morning to read to you. I thereupon drew a Paper out of my Pocket, in which were these following words: The Gods dwell in their Representations: But do they dwell there in such a manner, that each of them is entire in each Statue? Or are they there divided and by parts? Certainly neither one and the same God can be at the same time in several Statues, neither can he be cut into parts by division. Suppose we in effect there are in the world ten thousand Representations of Vulcan, can this God be (as I have already said) in these ten thousand places at a time? I do not believe it. Why not? Because that which of its own nature is singular, cannot multiply itself in conserving its simplicity and unity, much less if what you believe be true, That the Gods have a humane shape. For neither the hand separated from the head, nor the foot divided from the rest of the body, does make the whole person: for you must not say the parts have the same effect as the whole, seeing the whole cannot subsist but by the union of its parts. Now if it be said that this God is wholly entire in each Statue, the truth loses all its strength, seeing it's supposed the same thing may be every where at the same time. Or else it must be said, That each God separates himself in such a manner from himself, that he is at the same time himself and another, not that he is separated, but in such a manner that he is at the same time the same, and another quite different. This then being abhorrent to nature, we must say one or the other of these two things, Either that there's an infinity of Vulcan's, if we will have this God to reside in all the Statues which represent him; or that he is not in one of them, seeing his nature will not suffer him to be divided.  
Is it not true, Sir, pursued I, that I can bring the same Argument against you? I need only change one word in Arnobius, and instead of Vulcan, say the Body of Jesus Christ. The Body of Christ, I may say, exists according to you, in the Eucharist. But does it exist therein in such a manner that 'tis entire in each Consecrated Host? or is it therein divided and in parts? Certainly neither one and the same Body can be at the same time in several Hosts, neither can it be divided into parts. Suppose in effect there be in the world ten thousand Conscrated Hosts, can, as I have already observed, one and the same Body be in these ten thousand places at a time? I do not believe it. Why not? Because that which of its own nature is singular, cannot be multiplied in conserving its simplicity and unity, and so much the less in this occasion, because the question is touching a Body like ours. For neither the Hand separated from the Head, nor the Foot divided from the rest of the Body, does make the whole Person. Now if it be said the Body is quite entire in each of these Hosts, the Truth loses all its force, seeing we suppose the same thing may be in all places at the same time. Or else you must say, That this Body separates itself in such a manner from itself, that it is at the same time the same, and another quite different. This then being abhorrent to nature, you must say one or the other of these two things, Either that there's an infinity of Christ's Body, if you will have this Sacred Body resident in all the Consecrated Hosts; or else that it is not one, seeing Nature suffers it not to be divided into several.  
You see, Sir, I only copy out Arnobous, and faithfully Cite his Words. Yet this is not the only Father who has argued in this manner. St Austin imitated him in his time; and what is most considerable, he makes the whole application of it to the Body of Jesus Christ. You know the Manichees believed our Saviour was at the same time on the Cross, in the Sun and in the Moon, which they ridiculously termed his Ships. St. Austin affirms to them, that this is impossible; and these are his Words, 
* Aug. contr. Faust. lib. 26. cap. 11.  Tell us, I pray you, how many Christ's you believe there are? He whom the Earth brought forth after he was conceived by the Holy Spirit, and which not only hangs on every Tree, but is moreover fixed to every Herb; does he differ from the other, whom the Jews Crucified under Pontius Pilate, and from this third, who is stretched out in the Moon and in the Sun? Or, is it the same Saviour fixed on the Trees by one part of him, and free in the rest, to come to the assistance of that which is fixed? If it be this last, he that suffered according to you under Pontius Pilate; how, in the first place, could he endure this kind of Death, having no flesh, as you pretend? And then again, to whom did he leave these ships, to come and undergo those pains which none but Bodies were capable of? In effect he could not endure those things in reference to his spiritual Presence; and according to the corporal one he could not be at the same time in the Sun, and in the Moon, and on the Cross.  
He could not, says St. Austin! but why could he not? Is it more difficult for a Body to be at the same time on the Cross, in the Moon, and in the Sun, than in Heaven, and an infinite number of places on the Earth? Of necessity (said he in another place) 
† Aug in Joan. tract. 36. pronunciatur.  the body of Jesus Christ risen must be in one only place. But why must it be so? and why may he not be in several places at a time, if he be there in effect, as your Creed bears?  
The most famous among the Fathers have used the same Arguments against the Macedonians. These Heretics affirmed the Holy Spirit to be but a Creature, of a like nature to that of Angels. The Holy Fathers to refute them, allege, That an Angel cannot be in several places at a time; whereas the Holy Spirit was in the same time in several places extreme distant from one another, seeing he never forsook the Apostles, although for the Preaching of the Gospel they were dispersed over all the Earth. Thus does St. Athanasius argue, or one under his name in the dispute he is said to have against Arius, 
(a) Apud. Athan.  Didymus of Alexandria, 
(b) Didym. de Sparke S.  St. Basil, 
(c) Basil de Sp. S. cap 2.  St. Greg. Naz. 
(d) Naz. Orat. 3.7.  St. Ambrose, 
(e) Amb. de Sp. S. lib. 1. cap. 7.  Pascasius Deacon of Rome, 
(f) Pasc. Rom. de Sp. S. lib. 1. cap. 12.  Anastasius Sinait, 
(g) Anast. Sin. lib. 1. de dogm. fid.  Rupert, 
(h) Rup. lib. 10. cap. 22.  and others, very ill, as you see, were it not supposed impossible for the same Body to be in several Places at a time. Were not this held then for undeniable, they would without doubt have been answered, That there's no more difficulty in supposing a Spirit in several Places, than a material Body, as that of our Saviour was. But in effect it appears the Fathers have ever believed this could not be, seeing hereby he refuted the exravagant Opinions of both Heretics and Pagans.  
Moreover your great evasion, which consists in distinguishing what may naturally be, and what may happen by an effect of the Almighty Power of God; this evasion, I say, will not serve in this occasion; for, in fine, the Question was not in these Disputes, what might or what might not naturally be, but what might absolutely be. The Pagans did not pretend, That by means of natural Causes the Gods were placed in Statues consecrated to them. The Manichees did not subject our Saviour to the Laws of Nature. The Macedonians did not believe the Holy Spirit was sent by some created Cause. All these People made the Divine Power intervene in these occasions; and consequently the Father's affirming that what these extravagant People said was impossible, they meant 'twas so in all senses, and that 'twas a mere contradiction.  
It appears then from all I have now said, That according to the truest and best Reason, according to your own Authors, and according to the Fathers, it's a pure contradiction to suppose Christ's Body in several places at a time. But the contradiction will be still more manifest, if we add, That supposing this Divine Body in several places, one may say of it things directly opposite to one another. Considering it such as it is in Heaven, you believe it has its three dimensions, each of which you believe may be measured, and compared with those of other Bodies, which are greater or lesser. You believe it has its parts one out of another, That it possesses a place, whose parts answer those of this sacred Body, That he is therein visible and palpable, acts, etc. You say the direct contrary of this same Body, such as you suppose it in the Eucharist. You believe it there exists after the manner of Spirits, that it is therein reduced to one point, that it has its parts one in another, that 'tis therein invisible, and without action. You also believe, that to consider it only as 'tis in the Eucharist, it's removed out of one place, and let to rest in another; here he is lifted up, and there he is let down. Are not these, Sir, so many contradictions? Is not this to affirm and deny the same thing of the same Subject in relation to the same parts and time? and what do you call contradictory, if this be not so?  
A Body in two places, says Mr. N. is equivalent to two Bodies, and one may say of it the most opposite things, without contradiction. I must acknowledge one cannot do it, when we speak of a Body existing only in one place. But when we speak of a Body, or generally of a Subject, which exists in divers places at a time, there's no contradiction in affirming and denying the same things of it. This is no new answer, and I suppose you have read it in our Authors.  
Your Authors, I confess have made use of it, replied I, but I affirm their answer was insincere, it being not what they thought, but what the interest of their cause required. And for a proof of what I say, is it not true, That when the Question was of things wherein they were not interessed, and which they regarded as absolutely independent from the Eucharist, they have not stuck to maintain 'twas a contradiction to say things opposite of a Body in two places?  
For example, because it's held among you, that Christ's Body is not circumscriptively, that is to say after the manner of Bodies, in such a manner that each of its parts answers to that of the place which it possesses, because, say I, 'tis believed that the Body of Jesus Christ is not in this manner but in Heaven, and that 'tis supposed in the Eucharist only Sacramentally, which is to say after the manner of Spirits, totum in toto & totum in qualibet parte; The Thomists 
* See Masius Phys. lib. 4. cap. 5. quest. 5. assert. 3.  have imagined, That it mattered not, as to the Eucharist, to know whether a Body may be circumscriptively in two places. They thought they might freely explain themselves on this Question, without fearing the judgement they might make of it, should prove of dangerous Consequence to the Doctrine of the Real Presence. Being in this manner withheld by no consideration, and applying themselves to nothing but what appeared to them to be true, they pronounced it impossible for one Body to be circumscriptively in two places; and their strongest reason is, that hereby it might happen, that this Body might be in motion in one of these places, and at rest in another; here it might be cold, and there hot, and so of the rest.  
It's according to them a pure contradiction to say, That a Body which shall be circumscriptively in two places, shall be at the same time at rest and in motion; but if this be a contradiction, why is it not as considerable a one to say these same things of a Body which is Sacramentally in two places, or Sacramentally in one, and circumscriptively in the other? For in fine, are not rest and motion as opposite, and inconsistent when the Bodies which they affect are Sacramentally in two places, as when they be therein circumscriptively? Moreover, what I say of rest and motion, I mean it of all the other oppositions which I denoted to you a while ago.  
And this is what the Jesuits have seen, and which has made them abandon the opinion of the Thomists. They perceived it impossible to maintain, That the Body of Christ is Sacramentally in several places at a time, if he be not there circumscriptively. They perceived one or the other of these things must necessarily be said, Either that a Body cannot be sacramentally, nor circumscriptively in two places, or that it may be there equally either in one or the other of these two manners. They were forced to take one of these sides. Had they been at liberty, they would have taken the first. But in taking it, they must shock Transubstantiation, which they would by no means discredit. They have therefore taken hold of the second, and affirmed, That a Body may be, both Sacramentally and Circumscriptively in two places.  
For a proof of what I have said, in reference to these People's interest in the Question, be pleased to consider in what manner these same Jesuits have decided a Question very like the former, but on a matter which does not seem to have any relation to the Eucharist. Some followers of Aristotle, both Greeks and Arabians, have heretofore entertained a very foolish and ridiculous Opinion. They affirmed 'tis not true, That every man has a reasonable Soul particular to himself; that there's but one for all, which is in all Bodies, without losing its unity, and without being any where than in these Bodies; just as you will have the Body of Jesus Christ exist in the Eucharist, without multiplying itself, and without being elsewhere, excepting in Heaven. The Jesuits undertaking (x) to decide this Question, and forgetting the Eucharist, as in effect 'twas troublesome to remember it, have therefore positively asserted, That the Opinion of these Philosophers is insupportable. Having particularly affirmed that it implies a manifest contradiction, because 'twould happen hereupon, That the same Soul should be at the same time knowing and ignorant, good and bad, happy and unhappy; there being none of these qualities which agree not with several men, and consequently with the same Soul, if it be true there is but one for all men.  
They are without doubt much in the right; but if a Soul in two places, which is united to two several Bodies, cannot be at the same time knowing and ignorant, good and bad, happy and unhappy, without a contradiction; I would then know how one and the same Body can be, without contradiction, in motion and at rest, cold and hot, divisible and indivisible in two several places. It is clear that one of these things is no less impossible nor less contradictory than the other. And consequently it's plain that when your Doctors affirm there's no contradiction in saying, That the same Body in two places may be at the same time at rest and in motion, they do not speak according to their Conscience, but according to the interest of the Cause which they have taken upon them to defend.  
I should never have done, should I undertake to particularise all the other contradictions which your Doctrine contains. Those which I have already denoted, are sufficient to show you, it absolutely destroys this great principle, That the same thing cannot at the same time be, and not be. I pass on then to another Maxim, which is no less evident than that, which is, That the whole is greater than a part. Your Transubstantiation does plainly belie either this Maxim, or that which says, The thing contained is never greater than that which contains it. To make this more apparent, we must observe there are two different opinions in your Schools touching the extension of Christ's Body in the Eucharist. Most hold that it retains it. Others, that it loses it. The Catechism of the Council of Trent seems to uphold the latter of these opinions. And this is what it says, 
* Cat. Trid. Part 2. Tit. de Euch. n. 43.  Let the Curates take care to teach, That Jesus Christ is not in the Sacrament, as in a place, for the place is as the things, in as much as they have greatness; and we do not say our Lord is in the Sacrament, as being little or great, not respecting the quantity; but the substance. For the substance of Bread is changed into the substance of Jesus Christ, not into its greatness or quantity.  
However if this Sentiment be granted, it's certain, That the whole is not greater than its part: Seeing neither the whole nor its parts have any greatness. If on the contrary you follow the first opinion, you overthrew this other Principle, That the thing contained is never greater than that which contains it. In effect Christ's Body, which according to this opinion, has in the Eucharist all the extension which it has in its natural state, will be contained in a space incomparably smaller than it is, there being no space so small, wherein one may not put some crumb of the Host, or some drop of the Consecrated Wine, and consequently all the Body of Jesus Christ.  
This is moreover a Maxim which Philosophers and Divines do equally acknowledge for granted, That nothing produces its self: That nothing has relation to its self. Hereby chief the Fathers were wont to oppose the extravagancy of Sabellius, who acknowledged in the Divinity only one Person under three several Names, and who was at the same time, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. They closed his mouth with this Answer, That the Father begetting the Son, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from both these two Persons, hereby these three have such Relations as must distinguish them, and consequently will not suffer these to be one and the same Person.  
Yet is it true, That as in your Hypothesis the Body of Jesus Christ produces itself, so it has a relation to itself, like those which distinguish the Persons in the Trinity. In effect you hold, That the Transubstantiation is the work of Jesus Christ; and what's more particular, you believe it to be the work of Jesus Christ Man. You believe that the Consecration is a Priestly act of our Saviour, who immolates himself by the Ministry of the Priest, reducing himself into a state of death under the species of Bread and Wine 
* Concil. Trid. Sess. 22. Cap. 2. , you believe 
† See Merat. de incom. disp. 1. Sect. 2.  that Jesus Christ is a Priest only as Man. So that he as Man changing the Bread into his Body, one may say his Humane Nature is his proper work: That it creates itself, produces itself, and consequently that there's a real Relation between Jesus Christ Man, and Jesus Christ Man, between Jesus Christ Priest, or Sacrificer, and Jesus Christ Sacrificed; between Jesus Christ producing, and Jesus Christ produced.  
I suppose in effect, that if Transubstantiation be granted, it would be a real production of the Body of Jesus Christ. For besides, that your most famous Divines acknowledge it, we know it essential to all changes to have two different Terms, one of which is destroyed, and the other produced; and you'll agree with me herein, if you run over all the changes remarked hitherto, whether Substantial or Accidental, Natural or Supernatural. You'll see there's always an Accident, if the change be accidental; or a Substance, if it be substantial, which ceases to exist; and another Accident, or another Substance, which gins to exist, and takes the place of the Accident, or Substance, which is destroyed. And consequently, if the Bread were changed into the Body of Jesus Christ, the Body of Christ must necessarily be produced by this change. And as it would be produced by itself, it would have a real relation to its self, contrary to that Maxim, which implies, That nothing produces itself: and, That nothing relates to its self.  
In fine, Sir, this is a constant Maxim, and ever supposed, though it be never expressed, That whatever has all the sensible marks of a thing, is that thing: That having the essence of it, it ought to bear its name. Hereon depends the certainty of discerning, whether of single things or Species. For in fine, our judgements cannot pierce into the bottom of things, or discover their essence by this sort of knowledge called intuitive in the Schools. We only know them by the help of the sensible marks which distinguish them. So that to overthrow this Maxim, is to render the discerning of things absolutely impossible, or at least doubtful and uncertain.  
And yet this is the effect of Transubstantiation: It places the Body of Christ in the Eucharst under the sensible marks of Bread and Wine, where there's none of these two Substances; and you believe our Lord's Body exists in a place where it has none of the marks which are wont to make it known, and to distinguish it from the rest of things.  
This, Sir, may suffice to show you, That Transubstantiation absolutely overthrows the certitude of our Notices. I believe you perceive, That if it subsists, the first Principles be false, Demonstrations themselves deceive us, our Senses are subject to a thousand delusions; and in a word, we ought to doubt of whatever we have hitherto held for most certain, and we have nothing else to do but to plunge ourselves into Scepticism, which I reckon to be the most deplorable condition in the world, seeing 'tis the total annihilation of our reason.  
Mr. N. was about answering me, but was hindered by the coming in of one of his Friends, who had business with him. We having been a great while together, I laid hold on this occasion, to take my leave of him.   

CONFERENCE VI. Wherein the Proofs contained in the foregoing Discourses are defended, and the impossibility of using them against the Doctrine of the Trinity, is Demonstrated.  
AFTER this last Conversation, there past some days before I saw Mr. N. again. He came not to me, and I was unwilling to force a visit on him; but having at length by good hap met with him alone in his usual Walks, I joined myself to him. We fell at first into several Discourses, and at length on Matters of Religion; when I made bold to ask him, Whether he had thought on what had passed in our former Conferences?  
He answered, That he had in truth ruminated thereon after I had left him, but he was resolved to disturb himself no more with those Matters. For to what purpose, said he, unless to shake a man's faith, and discompose his mind? For I am so persuaded of the truth of Transubstantiation, and I find it has such strong ties with the Principles of Christianity, that I do not at all doubt but it makes up a part of this holy Religion. So that your reasons tending only to show me, that if Transubstantiation be a Doctrine of Christianity, we are to blame in being Christians. I not doubting of the first, must insensibly doubt of the second. Wherefore I had rather once for all to banish these thoughts out of my head, and remain in the state wherein I have hitherto lived, than to run the risk of turning Libertin, which is the thing in the world I most hate.  
In effect, continued he without giving me time to answer; If your way of arguing be good, I could make use of it against the Mystery of the Trinity, and easily direct your proofs against this Capital Truth, and that with the same success as you have done against Transubstantiation: Take, for example, the most specious Objection of the Arrians and Socinians. They affirm this great Mystery absolutely ruins one of the most certain Principles of Sciences. What we believe, reduces itself to two Heads: First, That the Persons of the Trinity are really distinct from one another: the Father is not the Son, and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son. The other, That neither of these Persons is really distinguished from the Divine Essence which they possess: That the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God; and what is more, That the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are but one God, possessing only one Divinity; so that the Divinity of the Father is the same with that of the Son; and that of the Father and the Son is not different from that of the Holy Ghost.  
Pray, Sir, now inform me how to accord all this with the principle which passes for unquestionable in Metaphysics, to wit, That if two Subjects be not distinct from a third, they cannot be distinguished between themselves? How can this principle subsist, if it be true, that the Divine Persons, which are most distinct in themselves, are not at all from the Essence, which is common to them? what can you say in this Demonstration, When two Subjects do not really differ from a third, They differ not really from one another. The Persons of the Trinity differ not really from the Divine Essence which they possess. Then they differ not really from one another.  
You will grant me, that this is a Physical Demonstration, and otherwise evident than those called Moral. May I not then apply to the Trinity, the first proof you have used against Transubstantiation, and say, That if this Mystery made part of the Christian Religion, the Objections the Insidels bring to oppose it, would have more force than the proofs which establish the Divinity of it, seeing these proofs have only a Moral evidence, and the Objections which might be brought against them, have all the evidence termed Physical.  
I say the same thing of your second proof. I need only change therein two words, and instead of Sense and Transubstantiation, say Reason and the Trinity. I need only say, If the Mystery of the Trinity be true, our Reason deceives us in the judgement she makes of it, in thinking to see clearly and distinctly, That the persons of the Divinity are not different from one another: If our Reason deceives us in this, it may as well deceive us in all other things; if it may deceive us in all things, the proofs of Christianity are of no validity.  
Even your third proof cannot escape the being applied to the Mystery of the Trinity. In effect its observable, That the Maxim I now alleged to you, is not only a Metaphysical principle, but the foundation of all affirmatory Syllogisms, which prove one cannot join two terms by the affirmation, but by showing one may join them both to a third, termed a mean. By consequence, if this Maxim be false, as it must of necessity be, if the Mystery of the Trinity be true, we must no longer think of arguing, but yield up the certainty of this sort of knowledge to the Sceptics.  
And here's, Sir, the natural use of your Method, if it be followed; we must retrench from our Religion whatever our reason will not suffer, and as soon as ever she shall see any opposition to arise between her Maxims, and our Mysteries, we have no other party to betake ourselves to, but that of disowning these Mysteries, and rejecting them as so many Errors. Thus Faith shall depend on our Capricio, and we shall henceforward believe, not what it shall please God to reveal to us, but whatever it shall please us to imagine. Would you have me to take this course, or to become an Arian or Socinian? and do you think we ought to yield up every Article of our Faith as soon as ever we shall find any repugnance in them to the deceitful Maxims of our wretched reason, which oftener serves to lead us out, than in the way; and to blind us, than to enlighten us?  
Far am I, replied I, from this; and though I am persuaded of the innocency of my Method, I should be the first to condemn it, did I believe 'twould produce such pernicious effects. But it's certainly an offering of great violence, to make it serve for the drawing from it such dangerous Conclusions. Pray let me justify it, and for this purpose, give me your attention for some minutes.  
It's, first, very strange you should reject Arguments wherein you cannot remark the least defect. They consist of sundry Propositions, amongst which there's not one, but what is not only true, but moreover evident. Moreover they be strictly allied, and their Conclusions are drawn in the most natural manner in the world. Ought they then to be rejected on vain suspicions, and uncertain apprehensions? Is not this proceeding injurious to faith? For what would she be, might her Doctrines be combated by Reasons, which suffer no reply, and from which there's no defence, but by saying, We want examine them? Is not this formally to accuse her, That she will not endure the light? Should all the world follow your example, what shall we answer to the Libertins of the Age? how would they triumph over our Religion?  
Moreover, let me entreat you to consider, there's great difference between your two first proofs, and my two first; yours are drawn from Reason, and mine from Sense. You say 'tis evident to Reason, there are three Essences in the Trinity, or that there's only one Person. Whereas I say it's evident, not only to Reason, but to Sense, That the Eucharist is Bread and Wine.  
What matter is it, said Mr. N. that the Evidence which you oppose to that of the Proofs of Christianity, is that which is perceived by Reason, or that which strikes the Senses, seeing the first is no less than the second? or, to speak better, seeing that is far greater than this?  
It's of great concern, answered I, and that on divers accounts. First, because the Supposition you make is not certain. You suppose, That the certainty of the acts of reason, such as that is which springs from Demonstration, is greater than that which arises from the report of the Senses. I confess this is the Cartesians opinion. But you know the Gassendists hold the contrary. These last, which are certainly not to be contemned, hold there's no greater certainty than that of the Senses. They tell us, They are the Senses which persuade us of the truth of the first Principles, and that we know not, for example, The whole is greater than a part, but by observing in all the Objects which have struck our Senses, that the part was always lesser than the whole.  
They are not only the Gassendists, which are of this opinion; The Vulgar, and generally all those who are not Philosophers, are herein of their opinion; and if you will have them comprehend there are certain things of which they ought to be more strongly persuaded than of what they see, they will presently believe you are not in earnest with them. This appears considerable to me; for you know neither Faith nor Salvation are the portion only of Philosophers; the ordinary people having as great a right to them as the most Learned: So that my Proofs have this advantage, That they be convincing according to the Hypothesis of all the world; whereas yours suppose things which few know, and concerning which all those who are capacitated to judge, are not agreed.  
Especially the first of yours supposes a thing which Mr. Huet opposes with all his strength, 
* Huetii Demonst. Evang. pag. 3, & 4.  That Physical Demonstrations have greater evidence and certitude than Moral ones. He affirms on the contrary, That Moral Demonstrations are the most convincing of all; and that neither Physics nor Metaphysics, nor Geometry, has one to be paralleled with them, whether in general with those which persuade us of most matters of fact, or in particular with those which he makes use of to establish the truth of Christian Religion. He hereupon sufficiently enlarges himself, and I doubt not but you have remarked that place as well as I.  
I may then deny your Supposition, which if I should, I shall have very able persons for my Abettors. But I'll grant what you say to be true, and suppose all the world of your opinion; I know another way to solve your Objection, which is, Sir, That should I agree with you, That considering things in general, the evidence of Reason is greater than that which offers itself to the Senses, this will not hinder me from maintaining, That in particularising things, we shall find incomparably fewer things evident to Reason, than of such as are perceived by the Senses. In effect, how few are the Truths which are perceived by reason alone 
* Dogmatists, such as maintain against the Sceptics the certainty of Sciences. , wherein not only the Sceptics, but the Dogmatists do agree? Scarcely is there one which has not been debated Pro & Con.  
It's not the same of those which are perceived by the Senses. For excepting the Sceptics, whom you cannot bring in against the Senses, seeing they are as bad friends to Reason; Scarce will you find one who will not allow what the Senses discover to us, at least in gross and popular Objects, if I may say so, and which are the only ones we now speak of. Consult all the Sects of the Philosophers, all the people in the Universe, to know whether it be now day, or whether an Horse be greater than an Ant; you will find, I do not say, not a Sect or Nation, but not any one particular person that denies this.  
The light of Sense has moreover this advantage over that of Reason, that it's less liable to be disordered by prejudices. Prejudices make people doubt who are strongly possessed by them, of Truths, which a free Reason, and a disengaged mind clearly perceives. What is there, for example, which my reason perceives more distinctly than the impossibility of a Body's being in two places without division? Yet your Reason imagines to see the contrary. Whence comes this, but from the prejudice wherewith one of us is possessed?  
But 'tis not the same with the Senses. There's no prejudice which hinders them from seeing Objects, such as they are, which we must always understand of the most apparent and grossest Objects.  
There are two sorts of clearness, says an Author much esteemed among you 
* Lawful Prejudices, chap. 14. , the one so lively and piercing, that it's impossible for men not to see it; and which is such as cannot be darkened by any cloud of Prejudices or Passions, whereby it shows itself uniformly to all men; of this kind, adds he, are things exposed to the Senses.  
In a word, It's a thousand times easier to deceive our Reason than our Senses. There's no truth so certain, which a Sophister will not render doubtful by his Subtleties and Artifices. Even the most learned People are sometimes deceived, and we have seen but too many Examples of this in all Ages. But deceive my Senses if you can, on Objects as familiar, as those we now spoke of. Go and inform any one, That the food he commonly uses, is not Bread and Beer.  
The evidence of Sense, then, has great advantages over that which is perceived only by Reason; whence appears the Possibility of my Proofs being good, and your two first objections being not so. Nay, the thing is not only possible, but true, and I hope to convince you of it with little trouble. Whatever you have hitherto said to me, turns on these two Suppositions. The first, That Reason sees evidently on one hand, the truth of this maxim of the Philosophers, That when two Subjects be not distinct from a third, they are not so from one another. The second, That there's more evidence in this, than there is in the Reasons which establish the Truth of Christian Religion.  
But, I first affirm to you, It's impossible these two Suppositions can be true. And if they were, the Arians and Socinians would have good grounds to deny the Mystery of the Trinity. For first, if our Reason evidently saw the Truth of the Maxim you bring against me, we must necessarily say one of these two things; Either that in effect, this Maxim is true, or that Evidence is not a certain mark of Truth. Here's no medium.  
You must of necessity take one of these sides. The second differs in nothing from Scepticism; you must therefore take the first. It must be said, that according to you the Maxim of the Philosophers is true.  
That's my thought, says Mr. N. Are you of the same mind, replied I, on the subject of the Opposition, which you think you evidently see between this Maxim, and the Mystery of the Trinity? Do you think this to be a true and real Opposition? Or do you believe it to be false, although you evidently see it?  
Should I say it's false, answered he, you would make me the same Objection you have already made; you will tell me there may be error in things most evident, seeing I might evidently see Opposition where there is none; and that thus Evidence would not be the mark of Truth; and consequently, That the Sceptics would have Reason to doubt of every thing. To avoid such dangerous Extremities, I had rather tell you, that this Opposition is as true, as 'tis evident.  
You believe, than said I to him, that effectively, and in the Truth of the thing, the Mystery of the Trinity is directly against an unquestionable Maxim. You believe there's a real Contradiction between these two things, and that 'tis impossible to make them agree.  
This is certainly true, answered he. Then said I, the Sceptics must have good grounds, seeing Contradiction is not the note of Falsity. What is there more unquestionable than this Maxim, That if a Proposition be true, that which contradicts it must necessarily be false? Is not this the Foundation of certainty? You now, see Sir, on what precipices you cast yourselves, and what are the unavoidable Consequences of your Suppositions. Hence you see the necessity of acknowledging there are some false; and that in effect, if the Philosopher's Maxim be true, it's not contrary to the Mystery of the Trinity; or if there be any Opposition between this Mystery and this Maxim, we must not conclude the Maxim to be false, seeing its impossible the Mystery should be so.  
But this is not all, I wish you would explain yourself, on Mr. Huets' Sentiment, I lately mentioned to you: Which Demonstrations do you believe most certain, Physical, or Moral ones? Or to speak more precisely, wherein think you lies most certainty and evidence, in the Demonstration you brought against me, in the name or the Socinians and Arians, or in those Mr. Huet makes use of to prove the Truth of the Christian Religion? Take which side you will, you cannot escape me.  
If you say the advantage lies on the side of Mr. Huets' Proofs, you deliver up to me your Objection. In this Supposition right Reason will have us believe the Trinity, notwithstanding the difficulties therein; seeing nothing's more conformable to her Maxims, than always to prefer that which is more evident, before that which is less.  
But if you say on the contrary, That the Arians and Socinians Objection, has more strength than Mr. Huets Proofs: You hereby acknowledge, That the Doctrine of the Trinity is contrary to good Sense, and aught therefore to be rejected, whether by retrenching of it from the number of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches, supposing it can be separated from it, or by rejecting the whole of Christianity, supposing this Doctrine be inseparable from the rest.  
In effect, were these Proofs, and this Objection of an equal force, they would bring the mind into suspense, whence right Reason could not draw it out. She would not know on which side to determine herself; and finding at bottom of this Religion, things which will appear to her evidently false, She would carry us as far off from it, as She would bring us near it, in making us comprehend the force of the Proofs which authorise it.  
Moreover, making two contrary Judgements on the Subject of Religion, one that it is true, because the Proofs produced in its favour are good; the other that it is false, because it teaches Absurdities; She must therefore be deceived in the one or the other of these Judgements, and thus neither the one nor the other of these would be certain.  
How would it be then, supposing all the advantage lay on one side, as it would plainly, if what might be offered against Christianity, has more evidence and certainty, than what is used to establish the Divinity of it? where shall we find that in this Supposition, we must prefer what is less certain, before what is more? And who thinks, if a man does this, he deserves to be eternally miserable?  
How then, says Mr. N. Shall Reason prescribe us what we are to believe? Shall she become the Rule, yea, and Judge of our Faith? And do we not know that the truths of Christianity are infinitely above the Comprehension of human Reason.  
You confound abundance of things, which you should distinguish, replied I First, there's a great deal of difference between discovering to us what we must believe, as revealed of God; and what we must reject, as invented by Men. The first of these Duties contains two parts. In effect, One may make two sorts of enquiry after what one is to believe. First, In examining the Doctrine offered us, and comparing it with the Maxims of Reason, just as we do when we would determine ourselves on a question of Philosophy. The second in examining purely whether this Doctrine has been revealed by God, either by enquiring wherher it makes a part of a Religion supposed Divine; or by enquiring whether the Religion, of which we do not doubt but this Doctrine makes up a part, has been revealed of God.  
It's certain, it cannot be expected from Reason to inquire, in this first manner, what we ought to believe; and this for two Considerations, First, whatever attempts she may make, she will never get the mastery: the clearest wit, and most piercing judgement, not being in a capacity of raising itself, of itself, to the discovery of these sublime Truths which Faith comprehends. And should Reason discover some one, the persuasion she could give us of it, would not be a Divine Faith. It would be perhaps a Science, an Opinion, according as the proofs whereon this is grounded are probable or demonstrative. But this would never be a Divine Faith; it being not possible for Divine Faith to have any other foundation than the authority of God.  
When we would know whether a Doctrine makes part of a Religion of whose Divinity we are otherwise satisfied; as when we would inquire whether Christianity teaches Transubstantiation, or the Real Presence; this is certainly to be examined by Reason. For how can we know this, if we have lost our Reason? Yet in this enquiry she does not so much keep the quality of a Rule, as that of an Organ; I would say, we make this enquiry by means of this faculty called Reason, yet this faculty does not then consult its own proper light, and does not compare the Doctrine offered with its Notions. She only compares it with the Rule which God has given her, the Scripture alone according to us, and the Scripture, Tradition and Councils, according to you.  
It's not the same when the question is to know whether a Religion be Divine; for example, when one deliberates whether one shall be a Christian, Pagan or Mahometan. In this enquiry, Reason alone must be our guide, and the best method it can take, is to examine which of these different Religions which challenges our preference, has the most visible Characters of Divinity; which is it which appears most likely to have been revealed from God, and which on the contrary is that which we have cause to think is a humane invention.  
As to the rejecting of a Doctrine, we have several different means. If it be not conformable to the Rule, we ought not to receive it, we ought to refuse believing it with a Divine Faith. If it be contrary to the Rule, we ought to do more, we ought positively to reject it, and believe it to be false. In a word, if our Senses or Reason expressly attest this Doctrine is not true, we ought to persuade ourselves, not only that it is not true, but that it has never been revealed of God.  
This last duty draws its Original from two different springs: The first is the force of this great Maxim, which is the foundation of Divine Faith, to wit, That whatever God has said is true. Hence properly comes the obligation which we have to believe whatever God has revealed to us. In effect, why should we not believe it, seeing its equally impossible that God should be deceived himself, judging things to be what they are not, as that he should deceive others, by telling them they be not, what he knows they are?  
And this is the true foundation of Divine Faith, and the original of that right which our Reason has, not to believe what is evidently false. Divine Faith does thus Reason: Whatever God has revealed is true. God has revealed such and such a Doctrine: Then this or that Doctrine is true. Reason says for her part: Whatever God has revealed is true. Such or such a Doctrine is not true: Therefore 'twas not revealed by God.  
Should it happen, as you suppose, that God should reveal a Doctrine which appeared plainly false to Reason, we should find ourselves in a dreadful difficulty, or rather in the condition which Divines call a state of perplexity, and which would bring along with it, should it ever happen, an absolute impossibility of knowing what we ought to do. On one hand, we should be bound to believe this Doctrine, on the supposition God had revealed it; and on the other, we should persuade ourselves, that God would not have revealed it, because it appears evidently false, and consequently is not to be believed. So that were it only to hinder this from happening, we should believe that God never reveals any thing which is apparently false to Reason, at least to Reason rectified, and which uses all necessary precautions not to be deceived, for 'tis of that alone whereof I speak.  
Moreover, were it possible for God to reveal a Doctrine evidently false, evidence would be no longer the infallible note of Truth; seeing in this supposition the evidence would accompany this act of our Reason, which would judge this Doctrine to be false, and which would be false itself, seeing this Doctrine being revealed of God, would hereby be necessarily true. So that we ought no longer to reckon on the evidence of things; and the Sceptics would have Reason to doubt of every thing.  
You see then, Sir, That this right of our Reason has most solid foundations. And it is certain that it has been ever acknowledged; and that all sorts of Authors both Ancient and Modern have always believed they might justly conclude a Doctrine was not revealed from God, when they saw it contrary to the purest notices of Reason. And thus on one hand the Fathers have done, who wrote against the Pagans and Heretics; and on the other, all Authors of your Communion, who have Treated on the Controversies which separates us.  
For as to the First, did not Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Minutius Felix, Theophilus of Antioch, Origen, Arnobius, Lactantius, St. Augustin, St. Cyril, and a great many others, oppose Paganism with the absurdities and extravagancies of its mysteries? Did not the same Father's writing against Heretics, use this very argument; affirming the Chimeras and extravagancies which these people believed, could in no sort come from God, being apparently false and contrary to all the lights of Reason? Have not, in fine, all your Authors who writ against us, followed the same method, though with different success? See Bellarmin, Gregory de Valentia, Richlieu, the Author of Prejudices, and generally all your Controvertists. There's not one of them but has pretended to show our Doctrine is not of God, because of the absurdities therein contained.  
All these Authors argue on two Principles; The one, That God has revealed nothing which is false; The other, That whatever is contrary to Reason, is thereby contrary to Truth. Take away which of these Principles you will, and all the Arguments of these Writers will be mere Sophisms.  
St. Augustin proceeds farther: He says we ought to forsake the Communion of the Orthodox Church, and pass over into that of the Heretics, and despise whatever you respect as the foundations of your Faith, could it be made appear, the most dangerous Heretics, such as were then the Manichees, taught the Truth 
* Aug. count. Epist. fund. cap. 4. ; and this is what he teaches us in this famous passage, which your Doctors have ever in their mouths, and wherein he declares that several things retain him in the bosom of the Catholic Church, The consent of all people, The authority grounded on Miracles, and confirmed by Antiquity, Succession, and even the name of Catholic.  
You affirm these are the props and foundations of the true Faith; and I will not now set on showing you the contrary. We may do this another time if you think fitting. At present I am willing to suppose what you say. I pray then consider what Saint Augustin adds: Amongst you, says he, where I see nothing like this, we hear nothing on all hands but promises of Truth; and I confess, adds he, That could you show it me so clearly, that I could not doubt of it, I must prefer it before whatever withholds me in the Catholic Church. You see here how St. Augustin acknowledges, That the evidence which excludes doubtings, is to be preferred before the motives of Faith. He does not say, that if the Manichees had this evidence on their side, we should despise it, and offer against it the certainty of Faith, as you pretend. He says the contrary. He says we should yield; and that which hindered him from doing it, was, That whatever the Manichees said, They had not this evidence which they vaunted of; That they promised great matters, but could not show them. Bellarmin does something like this: 
* Bell. de Motis Eccles. l. 4. cap. 11.  He reckons amongst the Notes of the Church, the holiness of its Doctrine; and makes this holiness consist in her teaching nothing which is false, and imposing nothing which is unjust; and will have us judge of this by the lights of Reason. He afterwards makes the application of this to the Pagans, Jews, Mahometans, ancient Heretics, and lastly to us. He shows as to the first, That they have taught things absurd and abominable; and attempting afterwards to show this on our Subject, he thence concludes, none of these Societies is the true Church.  
By this way of disputing, he plainly subjects your Church to this examination, and tacitly implies she may be rejected, provided she can be convinced of all which he accuses the others. For besides, that he cannot take it ill, That the Infidels and Heretics should treat him in the same manner as he uses them; besides this, his greatest pretention is, That the Church must be known by his marks: seeing than one of his marks is, That she teaches nothing which is false, he hereby consents to the rejection of your Church, if it can be showed from Reason, That she teaches things false and absurd.  
It cannot be denied but Bellarmine has had some Reason to deal thus: For 'twould certainly be a great scandal to the Faithful, and much more to Infidels, could it be clearly and plainly showed, That Christian Religion teaches things directly contrary to Reason. In effect, seeing we embrace this Religion only on the account of the proofs which authorise it, and of whose goodness we cannot judge but by Reason, should this Reason meet with things evidently false in this Religion, she would hereby carry us off as far from it, as she could bring us near it, by making us comprehend these proofs. Moreover, making two contrary judgements on the subject of Religion, the one, That it is true, because the proofs which authorise it are good; the other that it is false, because it teaches things absurd, she must of necessity be deceived in the one or the other, and so neither is certain.  
The Author of the Art of Thinking was not of this mind, says Mr. N. It's certain, says he 
* Art of Thinking, part 4. ch. 11. , That Divine Faith should have more force on our minds, than our own Reason; and this from Reason itself; which shows us we should always prefer what is more certain, to what is less: It being more certain that what God says is true, than what our Reason persuades us, because 'tis more impossible God should deceive us, than our Reason.  
All this, said I, appears to me false and ill digested, and 'tis easy to observe herein such a slight of hand as shows little love to truth. To see this more distinctly, be pleased to consider, That the certainty of every act of Faith depends on the persuasion which we have of two Truths, which are in some sort their props and foundations: The first, That whatever God attests, is true: The second, That God has attested the Doctrine which we believe. You see, that if we doubt of either of these two Truths, it's impossible our Faith can be firm: To what purpose is it to know that God does not lie, if we doubt God has not said a thing? And granting he has said something, if we doubt he has said in particular what's proposed to us to believe. And further, what signifies it for us to know, That God has revealed what's offered us, if we doubt whether all which God says, be true?  
It's then equally necessary to know these two Truths, but they be not always equally evident. The first is ever incomparably more than the second. It's always highly evident, That whatever God says, is true, and therefore no body differs about it, no not the Atheists. For though the Atheists hold there's no God, yet they acknowledge if there were one, he would never speak any thing but what is true. But it's commonly far less evident, That God has revealed what he has in effect revealed: Whence it happens men are so divided about the things which are pretended to be revealed from God. Yet this Author says nothing of this second persuasion: He speaks only of the first. He conceals the weak side, and shows only the strongest. It's certainer, says he, that what God says, is true, than what our Reason persuades us. Be it so. But is it certainer that God has revealed such and such a Doctrine, than 'tis certain one and two are three, and that if I think, I am? This he will not say. Yet if he does not say it, he must acknowledge he has ill reasoned. For if what Reason says be more certain, than it's certain God has revealed the Doctrine of which one is persuaded, he shall have far less certainty of the Truth of this Doctrine, than of what Reason sees distinctly.  
But let us stop a while at what this Author has chosen, and which he has made his strong hold. It's certainer, says he, That what God says is true, than what our Reason persuades us. He makes Reason to say this, and consequently his sense is, that this act of Reason which persuades us, That what God says, is true, is more certain, than what our Reason persuades us. But what does he mean? Does he mean that this act is more certain than any act of Reason whatever? If this be so, he contradicts himself. For this very act being an act of Reason, if it has more certainty than any act of Reason, 'twill be more certain than itself.  
Does he mean that this act is the certainest of all, and that there's no other which equals the certainty of this? If this be his sense, 'tis easy to show him his mistake: First, is this act more certain than that which persuades us of the existence of God? Let him say which he will, he cannot escape me. For to what purpose is it to know, That Truth is essential to God, supposing he exists, if it be less certain that he does exist? If on the contrary, these two acts be equally certain, and if the actual existence be as clearly comprehended in the Idea we have of God, as the unquestionable truth of what he attests; the persuasion we have of this second Truth, is not the certainest of all those perceived by Reason, seeing the persuasion of God's existence is no less certain.  
Is it more certain, That whatever God says is true, than it's certain, That nothing of what appears to us is false? This no man will say, seeing we judge, neither that God exists, nor that whatever he says is true, nor that we can affirm of each thing, whatever is contained in the distinct Idea we have of it, but because all this appears evident. So that here we have a third persuasion, which is no less certain than that which we were to think to be the most infallible.  
But says this Author, God is more uncapable of deceiving us, than our Reason is of being deceived. I grant it. But how do we know this, but by our Reason? and consequently we have only a certitude of Reason, and we are not more certain of it, than that we are certain, That our Reason does not deceive us, whether in this, or other things, which be as evident as this.  
This little subtlety might pass, did we not fear being mistaken in matters of Faith, without accusing even God himself of deceiving us. But a man must be a fool that has such an irrational thought: When we do doubt of matters of Faith, this doubt does never tend to persuade us, God has deceived us in revealing to us what is hard to be believed, but rather persuades us we are mistaken, in taking that for a Divine Revelation, which is only a Doctrine of men. So those who doubt, do never compare the certitude of their Reason with the certainty of God's Testimony. Neither have they ever the least temptation to imagine the first greater than the second. But they always compare this act of their Reason, which has persuaded them God has revealed to 'em what appears to them incredible, with this other act of their Reason, which makes them find incredible what they believed God had revealed to them. And therefore we may cease to believe without imagining God has deceived us, or that our Reason is more incapable of being deceived, than God of deceiving us. And consequently from Gods being more incapable of deceiving us, than our Reason of being deceived, does in no wise follow, That Faith has greater certainty than Reason.  
Let this Author then pardon me if I say, 'Twould be a grievous scandal to Infidels, were it so, That Christian Religion taught things directly contrary to Reason, and which should appear such, not at first sight, but on mature deliberation, after all possible care to prevent being deceived, and after long and serious reflections, which will not at all permit doubtings of the matter's being what it appears.  
But it is also true, Christian Religion has not a Doctrine, which is in this sort contrary to the lights of Reason; and this cannot be denied without contradicting all your School-Divines. For first, if it be true, Christianity teaches things contrary to Reason, what will become of what Cardinal Richlieu, and the Author of the Art of Thinking, say? The first affirms 
(a) Richl. method, Book 1. ch. 1. , That natural light deceives no body; and the other says 
(b) Art of Thinking, part 4. ch. 11. , That things exactly considered; what we see evidently, and from Reason, or from the faithful report of our Senses, is never contrary to what is taught us by Divine Faith.  
What will become of what all your Divines say 
(c) Vasq. in 1. disp. 123. cap. 1 Valent, Tom. 3. disp. 1 quaest. 1 Punct. 4 Bell. de Not. Eccles. cap. 11. Maerat. de fid. disp. 16 Sect. 5. , That the Mystery of the Trinity is far above Reason, but not contrary to it? Would it not be contrary to Reason, if being true, it should appear to it evidently false?  
What will you think of what these same Divines teach after your Angelical Doctor 
(d) Tho. Aqu. part 1. quaest. 1. art. 8. , That 'tis impossible to make Demonstrations against the Truths of Salvation. As Faith, says he, is grounded on infallible Truth, and it being impossible to show that which is contrary to Truth; so it is clear that the proofs made use of against Faith, are not Demonstrations, but Objections which are solvible.  
What will become of what passes for unquestionable in your Schools 
(e) Cajet in 1 quaest. 1 art. 8 Vasq. in 1 disp. 11 cap. 2 & 3. Valent. ubi seq Conint. de act. sup. disp. two. dub. two. Rhod. Tom. 1 disp. 6 quaest. 1. Sect. 3. Mart. de fid. disp. 5 Sect. 4. ? That one may Demonstratively prove, not in truth, That the Mystery of the Trinity, and all the others are true, nor yet whatever is opposed against them is false, but that all the Objections brought against them include some Proposition which is not evident, and which consequently may be denied. Is not this to say our Reason cannot prove demonstratively the falsity of our Mysteries? Does not this absolutely overthrow your Objection?  
You will have the Arians and Socinians Objections to pass for a convincing Demonstration. Yet your Divines affirm it's impossible to make Demonstrations against the Truths of Faith. You say 'tis impossible to answer any thing to this. But your Divines affirm to you, That this Objection, and the rest like it, do necessarily include something which may be denied, and is not evident. They pass further,  
They say one may demonstrate this very thing: Which is to say, one may demonstrate, That it is not possible to offer Demonstrations against us.  
Which is what we may easily justify by another consideration. Which is, to the end an Argument may pass for Demonstrative, every term about it must be perfectly understood, whereby there may arise a clear and distinct Idea in the mind of what it expresseth. And therefore Geometricians use such clear terms in their Demonstrations, that it is impossible but they must be understood; or if any one offers itself clouded with the least obscurity, they immediately carefully explain it. And therefore they make no Demonstration but what is preceded by a great number of Definitions which explain the terms. But how can this be in a Mystery so little known as that of the Trinity?  
For who can pretend to have distinct Ideas, either of the Divine Essence, and its Unity, or of the Persons which possess it, and of their distinction?  
When we are asked, says St. Augustin 
* Aug. de Trin. lib. 5. cap. 9 , what the three are, the mind of man finds itself extreme shallow, and cannot express itself. Yet it is said there are Three Persons, not as if we could define'em, but we rather say so, that we may not say nothing. And in another place 
* Idem. lib. 7. cap. 4. , When 'tis demanded of us what the Three are, we set ourselves on seeking some general or particular term, because the excellency of Divine things is beyond the strength of our expressions. For there's more truth in what we think, than in what we say of God, and more in reality than in thought. I say the same thing of other terms used on this great Subject. They raise in our minds only confused and muddy Ideas. How then will these afford us Demonstrations?  
What do you answer then directly to my Objection? says Mr. N. What do you yourself answer? replied I. For in fine, considering what I have said, you see our interest is the same. In effect it must be said we have no rational Argument to offer against the Arians or Socinians. This last refuge seems to me intolerable, and I should as soon say they have the Reason on their side, and we are possessed with absurd prejudices.  
We must then say these people's Objections may be solidly answered; and do you think, Sir, none of your Divines, not to speak now of ours, have not done it? Were this the case, this truth must have been very unfortunate to have met with no Defender, for so many ages, able to repel the attacks of its adversaries? Moreover, I do not see how you can extol so much as you commonly do, the learning, wisdom, yea and Infallibility of your Church, seeing it seems she has nothing but blind Answers, and vain Tergiversations to refute these Erroneous persons Objections.  
For my part, I am of a very different opinion, and believe your Schoolmen have solidly answered this Objection. First, you know, That several of 'em have denied this Philosophical Maxim; which implies, That two Subjects cannot be distinguished from one another, when they are not so by a third. You know there are several considerable instances offered, as is that of length, largeness and depth, which are very different from one another, although they all differ not from extension.  
Whereunto we may add that of the Modusses, which are not distinct from the things they modify, although distinguished from one another. As for instance, when I shut my hand, I give it a quite different manner of being, from that it has, when open, and stretched out. Of necessity these two manners of being, must be different from one another, seeing it's not only easy to separate them, and to make 'em subsist one without another, but it's impossible to make 'em subsist together, being opposite and inconsistent. Yet 'tis commonly held, That the Modusses be not really distinguishable from the things they modify.  
I say the same thing of the actions of the Soul; there are some of 'em inconsistent. For example, to judge a proposition is true, and to judge that it's false: To will and not to will the same Object: To love and hate the same person. The same soul does this at several times. And consequently does very different acts. Yet these acts, though different from one another, do not really differ from the substance of the soul, but are only mere modifications of it.  
One may then deny your Maxim, or restrain it, and bring exceptions against it. You know your Divines have made several, and showed, That either of 'em secures the Mystery before us. I suppose you do not expect I should recite them, seeing you may find 'em in Father Vincent's Logic, in George Rhodes Theology, and in several other of your Authors.  
Were there not any thing in all this which satisfied me, I should not be much perplexed about it: I should content myself with what I now told you, That all the Objections which can be made against the Mystery of the Trinity, consist of several improper and obscure terms, and such as are incapable of causing distinct Ideas of what is pretended to be signified by 'em. To show then, That this Doctrine does not include Contradictions, as you would insinuate by the Objection I examine; consider the main or bottom of this great Mystery, what makes for, and against it; we should conceive in a just and precise manner what's therein inconsistent, and see clearly these inconsistencies and oppositions. But we being far from such a knowledge of this great Truth, it's then clear, no one can show it includes any thing contradictory.  
But it's not the same with Transubstantiation. What you say of that, includes a great number of palpable and manifest Contradictions, and shocks directly all the notices of Sense and Reason. So that you cannot make too much hast to retrench it from the body of Christian Religion, and remove it out of a place which it so ill supplies.  
A body would think, answered he, to hear you speak, That we might form Christian Religion to our minds, and as soon as a Doctrine is not to our fancy, we may put it our of our Creed. This without doubt would be very agreeable. But, Sir, in excluding Transubstantiation from the number of the Articles of Faith, will you thereby blot it out of Holy Writ, wherein the Divine Spirit has inserted it in such clear and full terms? You know Heaven & Earth shall sooner pass away than the least iota of this holy Word.  
Never fear, replied I, my blotting it out. It never was there. And this I would now make apparent to you, did I not fear we have walked and talked so long, that both your legs and ears are tired.  
FINIS.