A COMPENDIUM Of the ART of LOGIC AND RHETORIC in the English Tongue.  
Containing All that PETER RAMUS, ARISTOTLE, and Others have writ thereon: WITH Plain DIRECTIONS for the more easy understanding and practice of the same.  
LONDON, Printed by Thomas Maxey, 1651.   

To the Courteous Reader.  
BEnevolent Reader, I do here present this small work, hoping it may produce good effects. Certainly it hath assayed before time to thrust itself into the world, but that it found so kind friends, who considering the unworthiness, were pleased to suppress it, and keep it prisoner in the Jail of their own houses. Howbeit now it is adventured abro●d, and with the spring beginneth to spring afresh. It's Winter's imprisonment is like to better its Summer's condition●; for I have laboured, so far as I could, to prune and lop off the former errors, that it may be the more plausible. I have also adorned it with a new weed, to wit, of a Dialogue, or Questions and Answers, that so my Book may even learn to stoop to the weakest capacities. If i● shall be thought to come in a new fashion, may you please to look into the world, you may see abundance in this habit, our common Catechisms wear this gown; yea, Mr. St. Egerton of the Black Friars in London, hath contracted the same treatises of Mr. Rogers into this form. For my part, I hold it more easy than the former tract, neither greatly prejudicial to the Author.  
This adorned, I have given this my second son full liberty to be a freeman, banishing my first and worst labours from the view (so far as I can) of all men. For seeing it would not, when I would, I hold it not fit, that now it should be published. Touching that work, it flowed so inconsiderately from my pen, and slipped so rashly out of my hand, that it escaped not without many defaults, imperfections, obscurities and blemishes: that with the Egyptian Grasshopper, it will not only consume some part, but utterly ●at up and waste the golden season, and happy hours of the courteous Reader. Let this last work then, kind Reader, find favour in thine eyes: if that winter bird should be seen, it would appear like a Cuckoo at Christmas, or like the Owl, which is the admiration of other birds. I will only now show thee the causes producing this last work, and the use thereof, and so leave it to thy discreet judgement. The causes are manifold, first to stop the springing of that Abortive fore-spoken of, that so it might not thrive to the discredit of its parent Secondly, that the gratuity and thankfulness to my Uncle aforesaid, might not to be buried in oblivion; for Tritum est perire, quod facis ingrato. Thirdly, for the benefit, as I said, of the simpliest capacity. And finally, for the zeal I bear to mine own Country, being willing and desirous, that not only men, but even women should exercise themselves in the study of the sacred Arts.  
If any shall demand what benefit shall redound hereby? or what may be the use hereof? I answer, it will avail greatly, not only for Civil, and Moral discourse, but also for the overthrowing of all Errors, either in Manners or Doctrine, for saith Ovid, 
Add quod ingenuas didicisse fideli●er arts,  
Emollit mores, nec sinet esse feros.   
But may some say, I live privately, converse not in the world; what need have I of this Science? It seemeth to consist chiefly in disputing, but I employ myself most in silence and meditation. Well friend, thou mayst have great benefit by this Science, even in that likewise: an example of which, word for word, I have here produced out of Mr. egerton's Treaty aforesaid, that so thou mightest know how to benefit thyself by this science, even in thy Meditation.  
What thing is this, O my soul, that doth so besot thee? or what manner of thing may it be, wherewith thou art so delighted, or rather bewitched? And how doth the Holy Ghost in the Scripture define it, and set it forth? who sinners but they that rebel against God, and against his holy will revealed in his Word? And what other thing is sin, but a breach and transgression of the Law of God, 1 john, 3.4. A turning out of the way of life, as the phrase of the Old Testament doth import; and a swerving from the right mark and end, as the word useth in the New Testament to signify, viz. The glory of God, and thine own salvation.  
This cursed thing called sin, is not of one sort or kind; it is as a Monster of many heads, and (as it were) a beast of many Horns.  
It is both original, bred and born with us; and actual springing out of us from that venomous root of our Original Corruption.  
Again, it is either inward, lurking● and boiling in the heart; or outward, showing itself in the life and conversation: sometimes it only inhabi●●th and dwelleth in us, and ofttimes it doth reign and overrule us; sometimes it is but an error and infirmity, and sometimes, it is a wilful and presumptuous evil, Psal. 19.11,12. Sometimes it is pardonable by the Free Grace and Mercy of God, to them that truly believe and repent; and sometimes it is utterly unpardonable, and never to be forgiven, being such, that it is impossible that the Committers thereof should be renewed by repentance, Math. 12. Heb. 6. Sometimes it rusheth mediately, and directly against God; and sometimes it reacheth more properly to the hurt of our neighbour.  
But who is able to reckon up all the Branches of this most bitter and venomous Tree; wherefore (to look more nearly unto it) whence proceedeth this deadly poison? what may be the cause whereof it cometh? and the Fountain from whence it springeth? Surely, my Soul, it is even thyself: thou art the Root that bringeth forth all this bitterness; thou art the Fountain from whence all this deadly Venom doth arise. For every man is tempted to sin, and he is drawn away of his own Concupiscence, and enticed.  
Beware, therefore, O rebellious Soul! that thou lay not the blame upon the Lord; neither make him the Author of thy sin: For thou, O God, as thou canst not be tempted to evil they self, so thou temptest no man to commit sin, being a thing which thou so strictly forbiddest to all, and so severely threatnest in whomsoever it is found; and for which thou so grievously plaguest the wicked, and so sharply correctest thine own Children, james 1,13,14. Heb. 12. 7,8. Thou, O Lord, art holiness itself, and the Fountain thereof; And there is none eternally, and unchangeably good, but thee alone, Math. 19 Thou madest man good at the beginning, but he sought many inventions, Eccles. 12. So all the imaginations and thoughts of his heart became only evil continually, or every day, Sabbath and all, Gen. 6. 5.  
True it is indeed, That the Devil that old Dragon, using the subtle Serpent for his instrument, did offer the first occasion of sinning, whereby he became an external cause of sin, and is called a Mutherer from the beginning, and the Author and Father of all deceit, john 8.44. Yet man had power to have resisted him if he would, which he not doing, became the true and proper efficient cause of Corrupting himself, and all his posterity; who likewise, by means of the poison derived from his Loins, became also the proper and immediate causes o● their own sins.  
Mark well then (O my Soul) the Root of this evil; and furthrr consider, what unsavoury and cursed fruit it bringeth forth; surely, even such as itself is, for such as the Tree is, such are the fruits: as is the root, so are the branches: a poisoned fountain, casteth forth no wholesome streams, james 3. And who can bring (as the Wiseman saith) a clean thing out of filthiness? surely there is not one, but only he who is holiness itself, john 14.4. And without all Controversy, the reward and wages of sin, is death's and that not only temporal, and bodily, which is a separation of the body from the soul for a season, but also spiritual and eternal, both of soul and body for ever and ever. Is any good thing withheld from us? let us thank our sin for it: is any plague or punishment laid upon us? be sure that sin is the cause, or at the least (even in the dearest Children of God) the occasion of it. Is any good blessing of God made of no force, or even turned to a Curse to us? we may be sure that it is by reason of our sin: for (as the Prophet saith) The Lord's hand is not shortened that it cannot save, nor his ear heavy that it cannot hear, but our iniquities separate betwixt us and our God, and our sins do hide his face from us that he will not hear, Esay 59 1, 2. Finally (as job saith) Misery springeth not forth of the dust, neither doth Affliction spring one of the earth, but man is born to labour as the sparkles fly upward, Job. 5. 6, 7. As if he should say, Man is as prone by nature to sin against God, and consequently to pull God's judgements upon himself, as the fire (which is a light Element) is naturally prone to ascend and mount aloft.  
And to the end that thou (my soul) mayst see upon what an ugly monster thou hast set thy delight, dost do●e upon, and art bewitched withal, consider how fair and how amible piety and virtue are; for as they make a man lovely and honourable, so sin maketh him loathsome and contemptible: The fear of God (saith Solomon) makes the face of a man to shine and be beautiful, but impiety and profaneness do deface and disfigure the image of God in him, and cause both God and all good men to loath & detest him as a polluted and● filthy thing, Favour (saith the same Wiseman) is deceitful, and beauty is vanity; but the woman that feareth ●he Lord, she shall be praised, Prov. 31.39. A vile person is contemned (that is, a profane man and basely esteemed, how great soever he be in the world) in the eyes of him that feareth God, Psal. 15.4. And piety is the only beauty that the Lord himself is delighted with, 1 Pet. 3.4. Therefore it is clear in the contrary part, that he loatheth and abhorreth impiety and sin. And yet my soul, to bring thee further out of love with this most ugly monster, consider whereunto it is like, and to what it may be compared. It is like (saith Esay) to filthy rags, that are cast aside upon the dunghill, and detested of all the passers by. It biteth as a serpent, and stingeth as a Cockatrice, creepeth as a gangrene or deadly canker, that eateth to the heart and cannot be cured; and though it seem sweet in the begiuning, yet it is most bitter in the end, and that which relisheth like honey in the mouth, will prove rank poison in the bowels. Finally, O my soul if thou peruse the holy Scriptures, thou shalt find no book, no leaf, no chapter● nor scarce any verse, wherein there is not some precept, some prohibition, some promise, some threatening or some example which seems not very fitly and profitably to show forth the amiableness of virtue, and the ugliness of sin, and with what care, zeal, watchfulness, etc. the one is to be shun●●●, and the other to be embraced. Thus far Mr. Egerton, Lib. 3, Cap. 6.  
Now that thou mayst attain (kind reader) unto this sweet delight of meditation, or to the top of whatsoever felicity thou aimest at by this art, use my book in this manner following.  
It consisting only of rules and examples, will be no great burden for thee to commit it all to memory; and so, whether thou meditatest or discoursest of sin or piety in the general, or any vice or virtue in the particular, thou shalt find from the head of this Art, after the example foreshowed, abundance of matter to furnish thy meditation. So, cum paucis sapientibus, I commit my labour to thy discreet and favourable construction, and with equal respect to all indifferently rest.  R. F. junior.  

PETER RAMUS to the READER.  
ARchymedes (O Reader) would have the re●●●● of the Spheres and Clidastes (in which Invention he had more vehemently laboured) engraven upon his sepulchre. And truly, shouldst thou ask me of my vigils and studies, I desire a pillar to be raised upon my grave from the instructions of the Art of Logic. Touching the cause of the wish; they answer, first to the accurateness of the Art: the books of invention of Arguments, and their disposition to be judged, not only from Aristotle Organical, Rhetorical, Physical: but from Cicero and Quintilian, and so many Orators. In all which we have strived with all study and diligence, by all reasonable ways to contract them briefly into these two Books, that no particle, or the least shadow of Logic might be there confused, whose truth might not be expressly delivered. And this shall be first made known touching Archymedes his Problem. They answer secondly to the use of Logic, the elegance and dignity of all the parts to be explicated, to stir up Logical meditations, as well the popular phrases of Poets, Orators, Historiographers; as also the liberal and ingenuous arts of a new Body, delivered in a new form to the studious, adorned with excellent endowments: And le●t any should fear le●t they should happen to be strangers, they are given and committed to the liberal custodies of their schools. This shallbe secondly made known touching Archymedes his problem. Those therefore shall be witness of so many day and night watches, touching the truth and utility of Logic, and shall answer for the cause of our wish; shall also admonish thee (Reader) as I hope, of I know not what madness is in most Academies of Europe, disputing of their sophistical precepts, how that they are far unlike both to the verity and utility of Logic, and shall also inflame thee to the study of the more true and profitable Faculties. But beside this, there is objected, a great company, exstructed with theatrical reproaches, threatening pains of tribunal judgement, condemnation at the least of filthy ignorance and calumny, will thrust us from the whole Kingdom of Philosophy, as strange and unheard o● prescription, both with hands and tongue. Whither will they forbid the small cause of our wish? what freedom was obtained by King Henry from the envy of so mad a judge; or to the more solid judgement of a milder Censurer? What afterward (when this Logical order had set foot in the cause of Religion) was a more great offence, the life and health of us being aimed at by those three civil wars? will these show no cause of our wish? yea, rather they do admonish, That we give great thanks to the Almighty, who hath aided and protected the course of our studies hitherto, neither would suffer them by any means to be interrupted. Therefore I witness, that this light of Logic will avail greatly to the studious in setting forth the truth, as also to adorn the ingenuous Arts; as chiefly the illustrating the heavenly mysteries of the sacred Doctrine: I pray that it may grow up more and more to these things; and that this Book may be happily concluded, to the glory of God.   

A TABLE OF THE Chapters in the two Books of Peter Ramus his DIALECTICA.  

In the first Book.  

1. The definition of Dialectica.  
2. The parts and kinds of arguments.  
3. The Efficient procreant and Conservant cause.  
4. The Efficient alone, and with others.  
5. The Efficient by himself, or an Accident.  
6. The Matter.  
7. The Form.  
8. The End.  
9 The Effects.  
10. The Subject.  
11. The Adjunct.  
12. Diverses.  
13. Desperates.  
14. Relates.  
15. Adverses.  
16. Contradicents'.  
17. Privants.  
18. Equals.  
19 Greater's.  
20. Lessers.  
21. Likes.  
22. Dislikes.  
23. Conjugates.  
24. Notation.  
25. Distribution.  
26. Distribution of the Causes.  
27. Distribution of the Effects, whether of Kind or Species.  
28. The Distribution from the Subjects  
29. The Distribution from the Adjunct  
30. Definition. 31. Description.  
32. Testimony Divine.  
33. Testimonies humane of Laws and Sentences.    

In the second Book.  

1. Of judgement.  
2. Axiomas affirming or denying.  
3. True and False.  
4. The simple Axioma.  
5. the copulate Axioma.  
6. The connexed Axioma.  
7. The discrete Axioma.  
8. The disjunct Axioma.  
9 The Syllogism and his parts.  
10. The ●imple and contraected syllogism.  
11. The first kind of the simple explicate Syllogism.  
12. The simple explicate Syllogism.  
13. The first connexed Syllogism.  
14. The second connexed Syllogism.  
15. The first disjunct Syllogism.  
16. The second disjunct Syllogism.  
17. The only method according to Aristotle.  
18. The first illustration of Method by examples of arts.  
19 The second example of Poets, Orators. and Historiographers.  
20. The secrets of Method.     

In Laudem Scientia Dialecticae sacrae.  

THe sacred Sciences do Praeise deserve,  
And merit Laud, because that they conserve,  
The use of Manners; also do declare  
What things in Man most acceptable are.  
But amongst them, all there's none so high in Reach  
As Dialectica, which reasoning doth teach.   

This at the first from God Almighty came,  
From Heaven descended this bright shining flame.  
God Reason taught, and Man he did inspire  
With Faculties, which Logic doth require.  
The Matter, Precepts, Form Methodical,  
The end is Reason's use, to teach t'h unlearned all.   

Th' effects are divers, which I cannot tell,  
Except I had a tongue which did excel.  
The Arts before confusedly did lie,  
Till Logicks use composed them curiously.  
But what do I discoursing of this thing,  
When Praises to the worth the Learned cannot sing?    

THE FIRST BOOK OF PETER RAMUS His DIALECTICA of Invention.  

CAP. 1. What Dialectica is.  
Question.  
WHat is Dialectica?  
A. Dialectica is the art of disputing well, and in that sense is called Logic.   

CAP. 2. The parts of Dialectica, and kinds of Arguments.  
Q. How many parts hath Dialectica?  
A. Dialectica hath two parts, Invention and Judgement.  
Q. What is Invention?  
A. Invention is a part of Dialectica of inventing Arguments.  
Q. What is an Argument?  
A. An Argument is that which i● affected to argue any thing: such a● are all reasons considered a part and b● themselves.  
Q. What be the Kind's?  
A. Artificial and inartificial.  
Q. What is an Artificial Argument  
A. That which argueth of itself.  
Q. What be the Kind's?  
A. First, or derived from the First  
Q. What is First?  
A. First is that which is of its own Original.  
Q. What be the Kind's?  
A. Simple or Comparative.  
Q. What is Simple?  
A. Simple is that which is considered simply and absolutely.  
Q. What be the Kind's?  
A. Agreeing or disagreeing.  
Q. What is Agreeing?  
A. That which agreeth with t● thing which it argueth.  
Q. What be the Kind's?  
A. Agreeing absolutely or after certain manner.  
Q. What is agreeing absolutely?  
A. The Cause and Effect.   

CAP. 3. The Efficient, Procreant, and Conservant Cause.  
Q. What is the Cause?  
A. The Cause is that by whose force the thing is.  
Q. What is the Pro●it of it?  
A. This first place of invention is the foundation of all knowledge: and he is believed to know, of whom the cause is held.  
As the Poet sayeth worthily: 
The man sure happy is, who cause of things doth know.   
Q. How is the Cause divided?  
A. Into two kinds, Efficient and Matter, or Form and End.  
Q. What is the Efficient Cause?  
A. The Efficient Cause is that from which the thing is.  
Q. How many kinds hath it?  
A. There appeareth to us no true Kind's, yet the great plenty of it is distinguished by certain means.  
Q. What is that which effecteth by ●he first means?  
A. That which procreateth or dependeth.  
Q. Give me an example out of som● Poet.  
A. Ovid 1. Remedio Amoris.  
Therefore when thou shalt look in this ou● med' cinall Art  
My admonition do, set Idleness apart.  
This causeth thee to love, this doth defen● it still;  
This is the cause of joy, as meat sometimes breeds ill.  
Take lastly sloth away, God Cupid's bow is lost  
His torches lose their light, contemned away they're tossed.  
Q. Give me a more familiar example●  
A. The Father and Mother procreate, the Nurse defendeth.  
Q. Give an example of this out of some Poet.  
A. 4. AEneid.  
thouart not God's Child, ne Dardanus his son,  
Thou rather from the steep ●ard rocks didst come  
Of Caucasus: it seemeth of that breed,  
Hyrcanian Tigers thee with breasts did feed.  
AEglog. 8.  
Now what this whoreson love is I well wo●  
It is a little busy boy, begot  
Not of man's seed, ne like to one of us;  
But farthest Garamants and Ismarus,  
Or rocky Rhodope, as it should seem,  
In their rough ragged hills engendered him.  
Q. Do not builders and governor's of Cities come under this head?  
A. Yes: Romulus the builder of the City of Rome, also all other Kings, Consuls, and Emperors are defenders and keepers.   

CAP. 4. The Efficient alone and with others.  
Q. What is that which effecteth by the second means?  
A. That which effecteth alone, or with others.  
Q. What are those others?  
A. Some oftentimes are Principal, others are helping and Ministers.  
Q. Give an example of the Cause that effecteth by itself.  
A. AEneid. 6. Nisus calleth back both the blame and the punishment of the Slaughter, from Euryalus upon himself, because he was the only Author.  
Lo here I am who only did this deed,  
Latians, against me turn your swords with speed.  
'Twas my deceit: He could it never do,  
Ne would his courage serve him therunto●  
Q. Give an example of the solitary Cause, with Principals and Fellow● out of some Orator.  
A. The solitary cause with many both Principals and Fellows, is diversely set forth pro Marcello. For the warlike Praises (saith the Orator) they are wont to extenuate truly by words● and to detract them from their Leaders, to communicate them with many, lest they should be proper to their Commanders: and certainly in war, the strength of the Soldiers, opportunity of places, help of fellows, ranks, pro●vision do much avail. But Fortune (as it were) by her own right, challengeth the chiefest part to herself, and whosoever is prosperously carried, that altogether she leadeth. But yet of this glory (o Caesar) which a little before thou didst obtain, thou hast no companion: all that, how much soever it is, (which truly is the chiefest) all (I say) is thine. The Centurion, Precedent, Ranks and Companies have taken from thee none of this praise: Yea, even the Lady of humane affairs, Fortune offereth not herself into the society of this glory, to thee she giveth place, and confesseth it all and wholly to be thine.  
Q. Are not Instruments numbered among helping Causes?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give an example of it?  
A. By this Argument the impious Epicure disputeth that the world was never made. Primo de Nat. For by what eyes of the mind (saith he) could your Plato behold the frame of so great a work, whereby he maketh it constructed and builded of God? what labour? what iron Ingine? what Leaver? what Devises? what Ministers were there of so great a work?   

CAP. 5. The Efficient by itself, or an Accident.  
Q. What is that which effecteth by the third means?  
A. That which effecteth by itself, or an Accident.  
Q. How effecteth it by itself?  
A. When it effecteth by its own faculty.  
Q. How effecteth it by its own faculty?  
A. When it effecteth by Nature or Counsel.  
Q. Give an example of that which effecteth by Nature.  
A. The Efficient of the winds is Natural. AEneid. 1.  
The East and South winds on the Sea do blow,  
They rush through deep, till on the top they show.  
The Africks' oft with these his blasts conjoins,  
And so the floods are cast up by the Winds.  
Q. Give some example of that which effecteth by counsel.  
A. That confession of Cicero, touching himself, is an example of Counsel. The war taken in hand (o Caesar) waged also for the most part; not constrained by any of my Judgement and Will, I came forth to those wars which were undertaken against thee.  
Q. How doth the Efficient Cause effect by an Accident?  
A. When it effecteth by an external faculty.  
Q. How doth it effect by an external faculty?  
A. When it is done by Necessity or Fortune.  
Q. How by Necessity?  
A. When as the Efficient is constrained to the Effect.  
Q. Give an example of this.  
A. There is one in the excuse of the Pompeians. But to me truly (saith the Orator) if there may be sought out a proper and true name of our evil, it doth seem, that we are fallen into a certain fatal calamity, that hath occupied the unprovident minds of men; that none should wonder how humane Counsel is overcome by Divine Necessity.  
Q. How by Fortune?  
A. When somewhat happeneth beyond the Scope of the Efficient.  
Q. Give an example.  
A. So the case chanced, saith Tullius (tertio de ●at. deo.) That Pherius the enemy was profitable to jason, who opened his imposthume with his sword; which the Physicians could by no means heal.  
Q. May not imprudence be numbered amongst these kinds of Causes?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give an example.  
A. Ovid. de Trist. 2.  
Why hurtful light or aught else did I see?  
The fault was mine, & not unknown to me.  
Wise Actaeon Diana naked saw,  
And food became to's dogs devouring maw.  
Blind fortune amongst the Gods is surely blamed,  
Ne pardon gets, the Gods she hath so harmed.  
Q. Do not Deprecations than proceed from hence?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give an example.  
A. Pro P.L. Pardon o Father: he hath erred: he is slipped: he thought not: if ever hereafter. And a little after, I have erred: I have done rashly: it repenteth me: I fly to thy clemency: I ask pardon for mine offence: I entreat thee that thou wilt pardon me.  
Q. What first causeth ●he name of Fortune?  
A. The ignorances' of the Cause's hath feigned this name: for when as something happened beyond Counsel and Hope, it was called by the common people Fortune.  
Q. What is juvenal's opinion of it?  
A. Wise if we were, no God should want but Fortune, 
We place thee high, & often thee importune.    

CAP. 6. The Matter.  
Q. What is the Matter?  
A. The Matter is the cause of which the thing is.  
Q. Give an example out of some Poet.  
A. By this feigned Argument, the house of the Sun is compounded of gold, carbunkles, Ivory and Silver.  
Ovid. 2. Metamorph.  
The Sun's high place was built with pillars tall,  
The gold did shine, Carbunkles flames let fall.  
The top thereof was laid with Ivory neat,  
And silver doors in portal shined feat.  
AEglog. 3.  
A merry Musor framed of beechen-tree,  
Carved work, by hand of divine Alcimeden,  
'Tis round impaled with a scattering trail  
Of tender Vine, and over all between,  
A pale green Ivy, wherewith as a vale,  
The thick diffussed clusters shaded been.  
Q. Give an example out of some Orator?  
A. Caesar 1. Bel. Civil. Caesar commanded his soldiers to make ships of that kind, which in former years the use of the Britain's had taught him: first they made the Keel and Pins of light matter, the rest of the body of the ship being knit together with Osiers, was covered over with Leather.   

CAP. 7. The Form.  
Q. The first kind of the Cause, in the Efficient and Matter being expounded; the second followeth, in the Form and the End; What therefore is the Form?  
A. The Form is the Cause by which the thing is that which it is.  
Q. What is the benefit of it?  
A. From hence the thing is distinguished from all other things, and the Form is ingenerated together with the thing itself.  
Q. Give some example of it.  
A. A reasonable soul is the form of a man, because by it a man is a man, and is distinguished from all other creatures thereby. The form of the geometrical figures is in traingles and quadrangles. Heaven, Earth, Trees, Fishes are the form of Physical things● From whence the chief explication of things, as it is by nature, so (if it may be found out) it shall be, as in artificial things it is more easily met withal.  
Q. Give example out of some Orator.  
A. Caesar lib. 7. B●t all the French walls are almost of this form; the beams long and plain, with equal distance between themabout two foot, are placed upon the foundation. These are bound within, and fastened very strongly: for those spaces (of which we speak) are filled up to the top with great stones. These placed and knit together, an other row is also added, that the same might keep the spaces: neither do the beams touch one another, but being distant by equal spaces, all of them are strongly fastened, great stones being placed between them. And even so is the whole work knit together until the just height of the wall be fulfilled. This work therefore is not deformed, as well for the comeliness and variety, beams and stones being by courses, which keep their rows in right lines; as, because it hath the chief strength for profit and defence of Cities, because it doth defend both from the misch●efe of stones, and the material ram, which with its forty feet, being oft bound to the long beams inward, can neither be broken or drawn back again.  
Q. Give an example out of some Poet.  
A. AEneid. 1. Virgil describeth the form of this port.  
Between two seas, two Lands there do lie,  
Sidwayes they're made, the waters run fast by.  
Huge double Rocks that do reach up to heaven,  
Under the which the sea lie still and calm:  
And by that place the green woods there are growing,  
Forth from the same comes great black darkness flowing.  
Under which rock a den's made very fleet,  
Wherein's rich living stones and waters sweet,  
Houses for Nymphs and chains for ships there laid,  
Which would not by the Anchor chains bestaid.   

CAP. 8. The End.  
Q. What is the end?  
A. The end is the Cause for whose sake the thing is.  
Q. Give example.  
A. To Physical things the proposed end is man: to man, God. There is some chief good and last end of all Arts: as to speak well, of Grammar: to plead well, of Rhetoric: to dispute well, of Logic.  
Q. Give example out of some Poet.  
A. AEneid. 1. juno assumeth the end of Marriage when as she promiseth Deiopeia to Aeolus, to wit, for solace and children's sake.  
Nymphs full fourteen I have of bodies rare;  
But who so is most beautiful and fair,  
Even Deiopeia, I to thee do give  
Her year in Marriage state with thee to live,  
Thee to reward for thy love unto me,  
And cause thine offspring beautiful to be.  
Q. Give an example out of some Orator.  
A. Cicero pro Lig. Urgeth Tubero his accuser, when as he presseth the end of the wars taken up against Caesar. And truly (saith he) he is come forth armed against Caesar himself. But what did this Tubero his sword do in the Pharsalian Army? whose sides did the sharp point aim at? who was to feel the force of thy weapon? where was thy mind, eyes, hands, courage? what didst thou desire? what didst thou wish?   

CAP. 9 The Effect.  
Q. What is the Effect?  
A. The Effect is that which ariseth from the Causes, whether begotten or corrupted, or whether any thing be moved by any means. Here the motion, and the thing done by motion, is called the Effect. Of this place are praises and dispraises, of which sacred and profane books are full.  
Q. Give example of this out of some Poet.  
A. AEneid 6. The facts of divers people are compared to the praises of the Romans.  
Some finly carve upon the boiling brass,  
They'll on the marble grave a living face:  
They wish the causes better, they'll descry  
Heavens shining parts, and tell the stars i'th' sky.  
Remember thou Rome's people brave to rule.  
These things shall be thine Art, peace to impose,  
To spare thy subjects, and subdue proud foes.  
Q. What else cometh under this head?  
A. Hitherto are speeches and writings referred.  
Q. Give an example?  
A. Pericles and Hortentius did celebrate the praise of pleading well and by the same argument also Demosthenes and Cicero of writing well.  
Q. What farther?  
A. To this place are referred counsels and deliberations, although not brought to their end.  
Q. Give an example.  
A. Permenio and Phylotus were beaten to death, because they were suspected to be of the conspiracy against Alexander, as Curtius and Arianus have remembered touching Lentulus, Cethegus and others, the complices of Catiline; they suffered punishment by judgement of the Senat.  
Q. Have not virtue and vices their Effects also.  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give an example.  
A● Horace after this manner describeth the Effects of drunkenness.  
Secrets it shows, & hope it doth command,  
Unto the wars it drives, although unarmed:  
It takes the burden from the careful man,  
It teacheth Art to all that will or can.  
Who ere was drunk that wanted Eloquence?  
Was any poor that used this defence?   

CAP. 10. The Subject.  
Q. The argument agreeing after ● certain manner succeedeth, what is tha● then?  
A. The Subject and Adjunct.  
Q. What is the Subject?  
A. The Subject is that to which any thing is adjoined.  
Q. Make this plainer by examples.  
A. The mind is the Subject of science, ignorance, virtue, vice, because these happen beside the being. The body, of health, sickness, strength, weakness beauty, deformity. Man is the Subject of riches, poverty, honour, infamy, apparel, company. The place is the Subject of the thing placed.  
Q. How prove you this last by testimony and example?  
A. The Philosopher's attribute a place to divine beings, although wanting part and greatness. So the place of Geometry, and the difference o● places is in Geometrical things: so o● physic, it is more diligently considered in physical things: In the world, in simple elements, in compound things.  
Q. Give example out of some Poet.  
A. So Virgil in his Georgics admonisheth that the place be diligently sought out for things proposed, as corn, trees, plants, pastures.  
Before we pass into a sea unknown,  
Know we the wind and various manner of Heaven:  
Our native soil and every habitation,  
What will refuse or grow in any nation.  
Some beareth corn, th'other with grapes doth pass,  
Some with tall trees, the rest with unsown grass.  
Q. Proceed further in explicating the subject?  
A. The Subjects of senses are called sensibles; of virtues or vices, things proposed to virtues or vices.  
Q. Give an example of the former.  
A. Colour is the subject of the sight, sound of the hearing; because these senses are occupied and exercised in the sensibles.  
Q. Give an example of the later.  
A. Virtues and vices are set forth in moral Philosophy by this argument: temperance and intemperance, by pleasure: magnanimity and sloth, by danger: liberality and covetousness, by riches.  
Q. Explicate the Subject further?  
A. So things numerable of Arithmetic: miserable (as I may say) are the Subjects of Geometry.  
Q. Give example of the Subject o●● of some Orator.  
A. By the same Subject Cicer● (second Agra) disputeth that there was no contention amongst the people ●o● Campania, because there was no honour. They are not carried (saith he) with the desire of glory: because wher● there is no public honour, there th● desire of glory cannot be. There is n● discord, neither by contention nor ambition: for there is nothing for which they should strive, nothing for which they should war, nothing for which they should contend.  
Q. Give example out of some Poet.  
A. ●ropertius useth this argument.  
Of winds the Sailor's talk, the Husband. men of Bulls,  
The soldiers of their wounds, and shepherds of their wools.   

CAP. 11. The Adjunct.  
Q. What is the Adjunct?  
A. The Adjunct is that to which any thing is subjected: which argument, though it be lighter than the subject, yet more copious and frequent: therefore of its signs Ovid speaketh 2. Rem. Am.  
Some man (for such there be) may count this small:  
Yet that helps some which doth not profit all.  
Q. Make this plainer.  
A. Those things which are called good and evil of the mind, body, and the whole man, are the Adjuncts of the mind, body, man: also whatsoever happens without the Subject is the Adjunct.  
Q. May not Time also be reduced unto this head?  
A. Yes, as Place was in the Subject, so is Time in the Adjunct, viz. the enduring of things past, present, to come.  
Q. What further is comprised under this head?  
A. All those Qualities beside the Causes adjoined to the Subject, whether they be proper or common.  
Q. What is Proper?  
A. That which agreeth only & wholly with the subject, as laughing with a man, neighing with a horse, barking with a dog.  
Q. What is Common?  
A. That which is not Proper after ●his manner.  
Q. Give example of the Adjunct o● of some Orator.  
A. By this kind of argument, Cicer● in the defence of Roscius the Comedians cavilleth with Fanius Chercus. Do●● not his head and eyebrows, altogeth●●bald, seem to savour of malice, and 〈◊〉 out of deceit? doth he not seem to b●● compounded from the foot to the he●● (if a man may conjecture by his shape● of frauds, fallacies, lies? Who therefore is altogether bald on the head an● eyebrows, lest he should be said to ha● one hair of a good man.  
Q. Give example out of some Poet?  
A. So Martial lib. 2. mocketh Zoil●●  
Red hair, black mouth, short feet and il● squint-eyes,  
'Tis marvel Zoilus if goodness in th● lie●  
Q. What further may be reduced u●●der this head?  
A. Garments and company are A●●juncts.  
Q. Give example.  
A. By this kind of circumstance Dido going a hunting is magnificently set forth, AEneid: 4.  
The morn appeared, Dido forsook the s●●  
The day stir up, to th'heaven youth guid● the way.  
Both nets and gins with pickst●ves all were ready,  
Messalian horse with hunting dogs so greedy:  
Princes did wait, the slow queen did expect,  
With fair clad horse, her way for to direct.  
Forth cometh she at length with mighty train,  
In her long robe with many a long seam:  
Her horse down trapped, with gold her hair was tressed,  
Her robes with golden hooks she close did wrest.  
Q. What is the benefit of Adjuncts?  
A. There is great use of Adjuncts to the Subjects by which they are occupied.  
Q. Give example.  
A. By this argument Plato foretold those Cities to be miserable, where the multitude of Physicians and Judges were wanting: because, of necessity, there was conversant in those cities both intemperance, and injustice.  
And thus much for the place of agreings, from whence every agreeing argument may be said to be one or the same: and all manner of unity and (as I may say) identity are referred hitherto as the first and simple fou●●taines.   

CAP. 12. Diverses.  
Q. You have expounded the first agreeing Argument: the disagreeing followe●● What then is Disagreeing?  
A. That which disagreeth from th● thing.  
Q. How are disagreings manifeste●  
A. disagreings are equally man●●fested amongst themselves, and equal●● argued one of another, although th●● do more clearly shine in their Dis●●greeings.  
Q. What are the kinds of Dis●●greeings?  
A. Two, Divers and Opposite.  
Q. What are Diverses?  
A. Diverses are Disagreeings' whi●● disagree only in reason.  
Q. What are the most frequent no●● of speech for this Argument?  
A. These; Not this, but that; although, yet.  
Q. Give example from some Orator.  
A. Pro Pompeio. He carried not th● victory, but the ensigns of the victo●●  
Q. Give some other examples?  
A. Ovid. secund. Art. Amand.  
Ulysses was not fair but Eloquent.  
AEneid. 2.  
This Priamus though held in dust of death,  
Yet ceased not.  
Also this of the like matter, Pro. Lig. Callest thou that wicked (o Tubero)? Why, he hath not hitherto deserved this name. For some called error, some fear; that which more hardly, hope, desire, hatred, pertinacy; the most grave, temerity: none wicked, besides thyself.   

CAP. 13. Desperates.  
Q. What are Opposites?  
A. Opposites are disagreings, which disagree in reason and thing; therefore cannot be attributed to the same, according to the same, and at the same time.  
Q. Make this plain by example.  
A. So Socrates cannot be black and white of one and the same part; Father and Son of the same man; whole and sick at the same time; b●t he may be white on the one part, black on another; Father of this, Son of that man; ●ound to day, sick to morrow.  
Q. It should seem by this, that the one being affirmed, the other is denied.  
A. So it is.  
Q. What are the ●inds of Opposites?  
A. Disparates or Contraries.  
Q. What are Disparates?  
A. Disparates are opposites, whereo● one is opposed equally to many.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Green, Ash-color, Red, are means between White and Black, which ar● Disparates, both with the extremes, an● among themselves. So liberality an● covetousness are disparates among themselves. So a man, a tree, a ston● and infinite of this kind are Disparates neither can one thing be a man, a tree● a stone.  
Q. Give example out of some Poet.  
A. Virgil. (AEneid. 1.) disputeth b● this Argument.  
O virgin, how shall I remember thee,  
Whose countenance not mortal seems to be  
Thy voice is sure above the humane reac●  
Both which thee Goddess proves, and so ● teach.   

CAP. 14. Relates  
Q. What are Contraries?  
A. Contraries are Opposites, whereof one is opposed to one only.  
Q. What are the kinds of it?  
A. They are either affirming, or denying.  
Q. What is affirming?  
A. Affirming is that of which both of them affirm.  
Q. How many kinds hath it?  
A. Two, Relates and Adverses.  
Q. What are Relates?  
A. Relates are Contraries affirming; of which one consisteth of the mutual affection of the other: and from hence they are named Relates.  
Q. Make this plain by example.  
A. The Father who hath a Son; and the Son who hath a Father, are Relates.  
Q. They may seem by this, to be together by nature.  
A. So they are: so that he which perfectly knoweth the one, knoweth also the rest.  
Q. Give some examples of Relates.  
A. Pro Marc. By which thou truly understandest how much praise there is for the benefit given, when as for the receiving, is so much glory, Marc. against Sosib.  
Sosibian, thou yield'st thou waste bor● thrall,  
When flattering thou thy Father Lord dos● call  
So Quint. lib. 5. cap. 10. If it b● honest to place himself at Rhodes, and to lodge at Hirmaereon. After whic● manner Tullius, in the perfect oration● It is therefore dangerous (saith he) les● any should think it dishonesty, to teach that in the great and glorious Art to others, which it was honesty for him to learn.  
Q. Doth not earnest affection sometimes flow from these Relates?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example out of some Orator.  
A. Cicero in his oration hath brought forth a certain earnest affection fro● these Relates. Now these are grav● (saith he) wife of the son in law, stepmother of the son, and bawd of th● daughter.  
Q. Give example out of some Poet.  
A. All this Ovid hath affected m●●nifestly in his description of the Iron age. Met 1.  
Ne doth the guest safe in his Inn● r●main,  
His host him troubles who doth him r●●ain.  
Sister's even from their brethren are not free,  
The husband longs the death of's wife to see.  
She hateth him, and against him doth conspire;  
The cursed stepdame 's always in an ire.  
The son ●re's time doth's fathers years inquire.  
Q. But the argument of such relations hath nothing contrary: yea it rather argueth mutual causes: as, thou art my Father, I therefore am thy son. How then appeareth the Contraries?  
A. When I say I am thy father, I am not therefore thy son, then are the Contraries true.   

CAP. 15. Adverses.  
Q. Wh●t are Adverses?  
A. Adverses are Contraries affirming, which are perpetually adverse among themselves.  
Q. Give example out of some Po●t.  
A. AEneid. 11.  
No health in war, we all desire peace,  
Q. Give further example.  
A. White and black, hot and cold● virtue and vice, are opposed.  
Q. Give example out of some Orator.  
A. Parad. 1. Cont. Epe. Yet they do hold strongly, and defend accurately, that pleasure is the chief good: which to me truly doth seem to be the voice of beasts, not of men; when as, whether God or Nature (as I may say) the mother of all things, hath given thee a soul, than which nothing is more excellent, nothing more divine; dost thou so cast and throw down thyself, as that thou thinkest there is no difference betwixt thee and the fourfooted beasts?  
Q. Wherein consists the force of this example?  
A. Cicero hath opposed beasts and men, Adverses: pleasure is the good of beasts, and therefore of men.  
Q. Give another example out of some Poet.  
A. So liberty and servitude in Tib. lib. 2.  
So servitude I see prepared for me,  
Yet, parents, freedom would far better be.  
Q. Give example out of an Orator.  
A. Pro Marcell. For temerity is never joined with wisdom's neither is chance admitted to counsel.   

CAP. 16. Contradicents'.  
Q. Having spoken of Contraries Affirming, we are come to Contraries Denying: What are they then?  
A. Contraries denying are such, of which one saith, the other denyeth the same.  
Q. What are the kinds?  
A. They are Contradicents' or Privants.  
Q. What are contradicents?  
A. Contradicents' are contraries denying, of which one denyeth every where.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Just, not Just; a creature, not a creature; it is, it is not: These are Contradicents'.  
Q. Give example out of some Orator.  
A. Pro Murena. The sentences of Cato and Cicero are Contraries; this of the Stoics, that man of the Academics. The Dialogue is in these words; Thou hast known nothing: yea somethings, but not all things. Thou hast done nothing merely for thanks; yet refuse not thanks when as thine office and trust requireth it. Be not moved wit● mercy in condemning; But yet ther● is some praise of humanity. Stand in thine own opinion: except a better should overcome.  
Q. Give example from some Poet.  
A. Mart. lib. 2.  
thouart fair Fabulla, rich, & als' a maid  
Can you deny 'tis truth that I have said●  
But if thou boastest of thyself too much,  
thouart neither fair, a virgin, nor yet rich.  
Q. Give another example out of som● Orator.  
A. Cicero (primo Tusc.) forceth Atticus the Epicure by this argument to confess, That the dead were not miserable, if they were not at all, as the Epicures believe: I had rather (saith he) thou shouldst fear Cerberus, than spea● so inconsiderately. Attic. Why? Marcus, That which thou deniest, that thou sayest. Where is thy wit? For whenas thou sayest, He is miserable; thou than sayest, He is, which is not. Then after long disputation Atticus said, Go to, now I grant, that those which are dead are not miserable; because thou hast forced me to confess, that, they be not at all, lest they should be miserable.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Terrence in Eu. Phedria frameth his speech to Dorus, when as he had affirmed that which he denied afterwards. After a manner (saith he) he saith; after a manner he denyeth.   

CAP. 17. Privants.  
Q. What are Privants?  
A. Privants are Contraries denying, of which one denyeth in the same Subject only, in which the Affirmative (of its own nature) is.  
Q. What is the Affirmative called?  
A. The Habit.  
Q. And what the Negative?  
A. Privation.  
Q. Make this plainer.  
A. Motion and Rest, Drunkenness and Sobriety are comprised under this head.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Mart. lib. 3.  
The art drunken s●re; sober thou would not do't.  
Q. What may further be under th● head?  
A. To be blind, and to see.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Pro Celio. There is therefore one of this family, and he truly is greatly blind: For he shall take no grief who shall not see her.  
Q. What may further be under this head?  
A. Poverty and Riches are thus opposed.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Mart. lib. 5.  
Poor shalt thou be, Emilian if poor:  
Wealth's never given but to th' rich before.  
Q. What further?  
A. Death and Life.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Cont. Mil. Sat ye still, O revengers of this man's death; Whose life, if you thought you could restore, would you?  
Q. What further?  
A. Silence and Speech.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Primo Cat. What expectest thou the authority of the speakers, whose silence thou beholdest to be their pleasures?  
Q. What more?  
A. Mortality and Immortality.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Pro Marc. I grieve when as the commonwealth ought to be immortal, that it consisteth of one mortal life.  
And this sufficeth to be spoken of Disagreeing, from whence every thing may differ from another by certain means.   

CAP. 18. Equals.  
Q Simple arguments were agreings & disagreings; we are now come unto Comparatives. What are Comparatives therefore?  
A. Comparatives are those which are compared amongst themselves.  
Q. How are they manifested?  
A. Although they be equally known by the nature of Comparison; yet one to another is more known and illustrated then another: and oftentimes are judged by shorter notes, sometimes di●stinguished by fuller parts.  
Q. What may these parts be called?  
A. They are named the Proposition and Reddition.  
Q. May not Comparatives also arg● fictions?  
A. Yes, Comparatives do argu● feigned things, and do cause trust.  
Q. What be the kinds of Compari●sons?  
A. Comparison, is in Quantity, o● Quality.  
Q. What is Quantity?  
A. Quantity is that whereby 〈◊〉 showed how much the thing compared is.  
Q. What be the kinds of Quantity●  
A. Equals or Unequals.  
Q. What are Equals?  
A. Equals are those of which ther● is one quantity.  
Q. What is an Equal argument then●  
A. An equal argument is, when an Equal is explicated by an Equal.  
Q. What are the notes of it?  
A. Even, equal, like, the same, that, so much the more, how much the more, by so much, by how much so much, how much, not more nor less.  
Also AEneid. 2. Equal with light winds. AEneid. 3.  
And nowed should grow in equal age with thee, AEneid 6.  
Behold this thing, Great Rome with earth is even:  
The spirit of man shall also equal heaven.  
Q. What further is necessary to these Equals?  
A. A proposition or Reddition doth distinguish them.  
Q. Give example out of some Orator.  
A. Quart. Cat. Whose things done, and the virtues to the same; by which things only the course is contained in its regions and bounds.  
Q. Give example out of some Poet.  
A. AEneid 4.  
As well a bruiter of things false that be,  
As messenger of truth and verity.  
Cat.  
By how much I am worst of poets all,  
By so much thee men best of Patrons call.  
Ovid de Trist. 4.  
As many shells on shore, as roses sweet;  
As many sleeps as men by poppy get;  
As many beasts in woods, fish in sea lie;  
As many birds as in the air do fly;  
So many griefs me pass, which could I tell,  
Icarian waters I might number well.  
Q. Proceed to further examples.  
A. Phil. 9 Neither had he more skill of the Law then of Justice: therefore those things which the Laws had brought forth, chiefly the civil, he always referred to ease and equity: neither had he rather approve actions of strife, then take away controversies.  
Ovid. de Art. Amand.  
'Tis no less virtue for to keep then get.  
Pro Mur. I acknowledge this to be equal for Lucius Murena: and so equal, that neither he shall bè overcome by dignity, neither by dignity shall overcome thee.  
Phil. 2. Whose burden being common, why not a common pay of them?  
Ter. in Adelph. When as I care not for thine, care not thou for mine.  
Q. What may further be comprised under this head?  
A. Of this place are those that follow derived truly from Contraries, but treated of in the place of Equals; as this of Mart.  
Sosibla●, thou yield'st thou wast born thrall,  
When flattering thou thy father Lord dost call.  
Ovid 1. Fast.  
There's price in price, the Censors honours give;  
He giveth friendship: poor alone do live.  
Q. But are they not more frequent from Adverses?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Cicero Syl. Neither do I understand myself to have been angry. But if I defend him whom●thou accusest, why should I not be angry with thee, who accusest him whom I defend? he saith, I accuse mine own enemy: and I said, I defend my friend. So, primo Tus●. But when they confess that there is force enough in vices to cause a miserable life; why should it not be granted, that there is force enough in virtues to effect a blessed life?  
Q. it should seem by this, that Contraries are sequences of Contraries.  
A. So they are.  
Q. What may further be comprised under this head?  
A. Sometimes there is put forth like for like.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Such is the contention of the shepherds in Virg. Eclog. 3. Dametas' first of all putting forth this riddle; 
Tell in what place (and I will reckon thee  
For great Apollo's self) the welkin large  
Just three else broad & no more seems to be.   
And Menal●as answering in this other riddle; 
Tell in what place the flowers have their marge  
With king's names in their leaves inscribed plain,  
And to thyself take Phillis for thy pain.   
Q. Give example of feigned Equals.  
A. Feigned equals are such as is in AEschinus Sacraticus, wherein Socrates showeth Aspatìa speaking to Xenophons' wife, and Xenophon himself. Tell me I pray thee, thou wife of Xenophon, if thy neighbour should have better gold than thou, whether hadst thou rather have hers or thine? Hers, said she. And if she have a gown, and other women's garments of a greater price than thou, whether hadst thou rather have hers or thine? Hers, said she. Go to then, If she have a better husband than thou, hadst thou rather have hers? Here the woman blushed. But Aspasia spoke to Xenophon himself; I pray thee (said she) if thy neighbour have a better horse than thou, hadst thou rather have his or thine? His, said he: but if he have better ground than thou, whether hadst thou rather have his? His, said he: viz. the best. But if he have a better wife than thou hast, whether hadst thou rather have his or thine? And here Xenophon also himself held his peace.   

CAP. 18. Greater's.  
Q. What are unequals?  
A. Unquals are those of which the quantity is not one.  
Q. What be the kinds of unequals?  
A. Unequal is greater or lesser.  
Q. What is Greater?  
A. Greater is that which quantity exceedeth.  
Q. What be the proper notes of it?  
A. Not only, but also; I had rather  
Q. Give example.  
A. Cicero pro Mur. There is take● from amongst us not only that verb●● counterfeit of prudence, but also that Lady of things, Wisdom itself: The thing is carried by force; not only the hateful Orator in pleading, or the prattler, but also the truly good is despi●sed. A horrid soldier is loved.  
Q. Is not a certain logical gradation● sometime joined with a rhetorical climax, taken from hence?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Show example.  
A. Pro Mil. Neither did ho●se handle himself to the people only, but also to the Senate; neither to the Senate only, but also to the public Precedent and soldiers: neither to these alone, but also to the power of those to whom the care of the Senate, soldiers, and the whole commonwealth of Italy was committed.  
Q. Give a poetical example.  
A. Iu. Sat. 8. against a proud nobleman.  
Rather had I Thirses thy Sire should be,  
Whilst that AEatides is like to thee:  
And that thou shouldst with Vulcan armour make,  
Then for Achilles' son men should thee take,  
Or that thy feature should like Thirses be.  
Q. Proceed to further example.  
A. Pro. Marc. Having more admiration than glory. AEneid. 1.  
O fellows, we these evils knew before;  
God will them end, we greater far have boar.  
Cic. pro Mur. Be not so unjust, that when as thy fountains are opened by thine enemies, our rivers should be stopped up even by our friends.  
Q. ●●ve an example of a gradation, without a rhetorical climax.  
TER. Thr. But doth Thais give me many thanks for it? Gn. Many. Thr. Sayest thou so? is she glad? Gn. Not so much for the gift itself, as that i● was given by thee: for that she triumpheth in good earnest.  
Q. Are not also Greater's feigned?  
A. Yes, and of great force.  
Q. Give example  
A. TER. Hert. A Nobleman, if he be made a Lover, can never undergo the charges: much less thou then.  
AEneid. ●.  
O great AEneas, although Jove should not  
Promise to help or aid me now one jot,  
I hope that Italy shall reach to heaven,  
The winds once changed, their forces cros● have driven,  
Arising from black night i'th' city cast,  
Our power is weak, our greatest streng●● but waist   

CAP. 20. Lessers.  
Q. What is Lesser?  
A. Lesser is that whose quantity is exceeded.  
Q. How is a Lesser judged?  
A. Oftentimes by proper notes.  
Q. What be these notes?  
A. Not only: But not all: Rather this then that: Whenas● As also.  
Q. How else?  
A. By Grammatical comparison.  
Q. How lastly?  
A. By the denying of parts.  
Q. Give example of the notes out of some Orator.  
A. CIC. secund. Cat. No man, not only of Rome, but in no corner of all Italy was ever oppressed with so great a Tax, as that he once knew of so incredible a Cesar. Cat. 1. Thou canst rather as an Exul tempt, then as a Consul. vex the Commonwealth. Ag. 2. Which, when to all it is very hard, and an evil reason, then truly to me above the rest.  
Q. Give poetical examples.  
A. Ovid. Trist. 1.  
More fierce than Busiros, more fierce than he  
Who in slow fire his ox burned furiously.  
Ovid. 1. de Remed. Amor.  
Thy body to redeem, bear sword and fire,  
Ne drink to cool thy thirsty hot desire:  
To save thy soul wilt thou not all forbear?  
This part exceeds the other price by far.  
Q. Give example of those which are done by the denying of parts.  
A. Phil. 9 All in all ages who have had the understanding of the Law in this city, if they might be brought together into one place, are not to be equalled with Servius Sulpitius. Cat. 2. Although those which say that Catilina is gone to Messilia, do not so much complain of it, as fear it.  
Q. Is it not sometimes without notes?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Pro Mur. Thou art so much wanting from the perfection of g●●● works, as the foundation, which thou thinkest thou hast not yet laid. Pu● Arch. The stones and deserts ofte● times answer to the voice; wild beas●● are tamed and subdued by singing● shall not then the instructions of the Poets in the best thing move us?  
Q. Is there not also a gradation fr●● Loesses?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Ver. 7. Is it a great act to overthrow the city Rome, to beat a knave, to kill a Parricide? What shall I say? to hang him upon the gallows?  
Q. Are not Lessers also sometimes feigned?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Virg. Eclog. 1.  
The light heeled Hinds in th' air shall fe●● therefore,  
And in the Ocean all the fishes die  
For want of water, on the naked shore:  
The wand'ring Parthian first shall drinken dry  
Huge Araxis; and gus●ing Germany  
Suck down their thirsty throats swift Tigris tide,  
Ere his sweet face shall from my bosom slide.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Phil. 2. O filthy thing, not only to the sight, but also to hear of! If it had happened to thee amongst thine inhuman pots, who would not have accounted it filthy? but in the assembly of the Romans about public affairs, the Master of the Horse, to whom it is not comely to belch, he vomiting a crust of bread and wine, filled his lap and all the Tribunal with stink.   

CAP. 21. Likes.  
Q. You have expounded Comparison in Quantity, Comparison in Quality followeth. What therefore is Quality?  
A. Quality is that whereby the things compared are said to be such.  
Q. What are the kinds of Quality?  
A. Like or Dislike.  
Q. What are Likes?  
A. Likes are those of which there is the same quality.  
Q. What are Likes called?  
A. Like is called Proportion, as the Likes are proportionable.  
Q. What are t●e notes of Likeness, whereby it is concluded in one word?  
A. Like, effigies, in that manner; as also denials of dislikenes.  
Q. What be they?  
A. Such as this; Not otherewise.  
Q. Give example of the first sort.  
A. AEn●id. 1. His mouth and shoulders being like to God. Phi. 9 Though S●rvius Sulpitius could leave no clear monument then his son, the effigies o● his manners, virtues, constancy, piety, wi●●  
Q. Give example out of some Poet.  
A. Ovid. Trist. 1.  
For he or none, even he that made th● wound  
Only Achilles 'tis can make me sound.  
Q. Proceed to farther examples.  
A. In Phis. There was one day● which was to me the likeness of immortality, wherein I returned to my country. Ver. 1. But presently from the sam● likeness of a man, as it were by som● Circean pot, he is made a Bear. P●● Pomp. Therefore all in this place d●● behold Cons. Pompeius not as one sen● from the city; but fallen from heaven. AEneid. 3. They do not that which I hav● commanded. Ter. I am not, neither have been otherwise then he.  
Q. What is the partition of likeness?  
A. Disjoined or continued.  
Q. What is a disjoined similitude?  
A. A disjoined similitude is when as four terms are distinguished to the thing.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Eclog. 5.  
So me thy song as sleep on grass doth please  
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.  
Q. What is the force of this example?  
A. The songs to the hrarers, as sleep to the weary, are four distinct terms.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Ad fratrem: As the best governor's cannot overcome the force of the tempest, so the wisest men oftentimes cannot overcome the violence of fortune.  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. Here are four terms, as the governor to the ship, so wise men to fortune.  
Q● Proceed to farther examples.  
A. Trist. 1.  
As yellow glod in flaming fire is seen,  
So men may trust in time that's sharp and keen.  
Cic. Phil. 2. But even as those who in a great sickness do not taste the sweetness of meat; so the lustful, covetous, wicked have not the taste of true praise. Virgil made these Verses; 
All night it reigned, next day the signs were seen.  
Th' Empire's parted Cesar and Jove between.   
Battillus arrogated them to himself, and obtained a great reward: therefore Virgil in these Verses mocketh Battillus: 
I made these rhimes, another had the land,  
So Birds, you nests not for yourselves have made:  
So you, o Bees, make honey not for you:  
So you, o Sheep, bear wool, but not for you:  
So you, o O xen, plough, but not for you.   
Q. Ar● not the notes sometimes omitted?  
A. Yes, sometimes there is no note at all.  
Q. Give an example.  
A. Virg. Eclog. 2.  
Ah my fair boy, trust not thy hue too much  
Hurtless, though black, by every handsome hand  
Are plucked; while Daisies none vouchsafe  
Though they be white, yet shed they as they stand.  
Q. What is continual likeness?  
A. A continual likeness is when as the first term is to the second, so the second to the third.  
Q. Give an example.  
A. De Leg. 3. See you not that this is the Magistrates power, that he should rule and prescribe right, profitable, and agreeing things with the laws? for as the laws do govern the Magistrates, so the Magistrates do rule the people.  
Q. What is the force of this example?  
A. Here are three terms, Laws, Magistrates, People.  
Q. Have not feigned likeness equal force with these above?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. It appeareth chiefly in this explicated similitude of Esope his Apology, taken out of Horace, Epist● 1.  
But if Rome's people ask me happily,  
Why not amongst judges on the bench fit I,  
And do that which they love, fly that they hate?  
I answer as the crafty Fox of late,  
When tothth' sick lion he this message sen●,  
Feign would I come, to that thing was I bend;  
But that! I saw the steps of many feet  
That way to go, none back again to get.   

CAP. 22. Dislikes.  
Q. What are dislikes.  
A. Dislikes are comparatives, whose quality is divers.  
Q. What are the proper notes of dislikes?  
A. Dislike, different, another.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Pro Plan. Although the paying of money and thanks be unlike. AEneid. 1. O ancient house! O how unlike for that Lord to govern! Caes. Pri. Bel. Gal. All these differed in their tongues, instructions, laws. Agra. 2. One is known by his countenance, another by his voice, another by his gate. De Nat. Deo. 2. Because I have begun to do otherwise then I had said in the beginning.  
Q. Are not dislikes also known by denying the likes?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give an example.  
A. De orat. 2. Philosophy is not like the other arts. AEneid 2. But he was not of that seed wherein thou remember'st Achilles, such was Priamus his enemy. Lor. Epist. 1. There is not the same age, the same mind. Ad frat. 1. So thy ring is not as a certain vessel, but as thyself. Phil. 3. This certain day he is wont to expect not so much of sacrifice as counsel.  
Q. Give some poetical examples.  
A. By this argument the shepherd confesseth his error, AEclog. 1.  
Ah fond friend Melie, I whilom deemed  
That famous city which I now and then  
In common chat amongst our country men,  
Have heard denoted by the name of Rome  
For all the world like to our homely home.  
And by and by; 
— so did I dare  
Kids liken to their Goats, whelps to their dams,  
And Moul-hills wont to mountains to compare.   
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. As neither the whelps to the dogs, nor kids to their dams; so n●●ther is Mantua like to Rome.  
Q. Be not notes of dislikes sometimes wanting?  
A. Yes, oftentimes, and the dislikeness is more clearly explicated.  
Q. Give an example out of some Orator.  
A. Quint. l. 1. ● 11. Brutus slew th● children of the traitors: Muntius di● punish by death the virtue of his son.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Cat: the sun sets and riseth again: but when our little light setteth, there is a perpetual night.   

CAP. 23. Conjugates.  
Q. Hitherto you have expounded th● first arguments, those derived from the first follow; What are they then?  
A. Those derived from the first are these, which are even to that which they argue, as the first from whence they are derived.  
Q. What be the kinds of these arguments?  
A. A Conjugate, a Notation, ● Distribution, and a Definition.  
Q. What are Conjugates?  
A. Conjugates are names drawn diversely from the same principle.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Justice, just, justly.  
Q. Is there not a symbol in conjugated of agreeing arguments?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Propert. lib. 2.  
Because in love there is no liberty,  
Who ever loves, that man can ne'er be free.  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. Here liberty is the cause why we should be free.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Cic. Nat. Deo. 2. Where he speaketh of Dionysius the Tyrant. He commanded that the tables of silver in which were the images o● the gods, should be taken away; in which, after the manner of the Grecians, should b●ingraven, The goods of the gods; saying, that he was willing to use of their goodness.  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. The Gods are good, therefore their goodness is to be used; here from the Effects it is directed to the Causes.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Ter. I am a man, no humane thin● is strange to me.  
Q. Is it not sometimes from the subject to the adjunct?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Phil. 2. I will not handle thee as a Consul, lest thou handle me as one standing for the Consulship. In Pis. When as all the cause was of the Consuls and Senate, both the Consuls and Senate had need of my help.   

CAP. 24. Notations.  
Q. What is notations?  
A. Notation is the interpretation of a name.  
Q. What are names?  
A. Names truly are notes of things.  
Q. May there not be rendered a reason of the names?  
A. Yes, either from the deriation or composition, if they be made by true notation, from some first argument.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Homo ab humo. Ovid. Fast. 6.  
●tat vi terra sua, vi stando vesta vocatur.  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. This is a notation from the cause.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. At focus à flammis, & quod fovit omnia dictus.  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. This is a notation from the effects.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Vir. 4. O Verrea praeclara● quid enim accessisti, quo non attuleris tecum istum diem? & enim quam tu domum, quam urbem adiisti, quod fanum denique, quod non eversum, atque extersum reliqueris? quare appellentur sanè ista Verrea, quae non ex nomine, sed ex moribus, naturâque tuâ constituta esse videantur?  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. This is also a notation from the effects.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Ovid. Fast. 1.  
Prima dies tibi carna datur, dea cardinis haec est,  
Nomine clausa aperit, claudit aper●● suo.  
Q. Wherein is the force of this example?  
A. This is a notation from the subjects in the inward, about which the deity of this goddess is exercised.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. From the adjuncts there is ● notation from Bambalion, Phil. 2. Quia balbus & stupidus: hinc igitu● cavillatio in Antonium generum. Tu● conjugis, bonae foeminae, locupletati● quidem certè, Bambalio quidem pater, ho●o nullo numero, nihil illo contemptius, qui propter haesitantiam linguae, stuporémque cordis, cognomen ex contumelia traxerit.  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. This is a notation from adjuncts.  
Q. Are there not notations also from disagreings?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Quint. lib. 1. cap. 6. Lucus, quia umbra opacus parum luceat●: & ludus, quia sit longissimè a lusu; & does, quia minimè dives.  
Q. May not notation be also from comparatives?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Pyropus, quod ignis flammam imitetur.  
Q. But is there not, as to the notation to his name, so an affection of the name to the notation?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Animi plenus, ergo animosus.  
Q. Show the contrary.  
A. Animosus, ergo animi plenus.   

CAP. 25. Distribution.  
Q. What are the other derived arguments?  
A. Distribution and Definition.  
Q. Is there not a reciprocal affection in both these?  
A. Yes.  
Q. What is the affection in the distribution?  
A. Of all parts with the whole.  
Q. What is the affection in the definition?  
A. Of the Definition with the things defined.  
Q. What is a Distribution?  
A. A Distribution is, when the whole is distributed into parts.  
Q. What is the whole?  
A. The whole is that which containeth parts.  
Q. What are parts?  
A. Parts are those which are contained of the whole.  
Q. It should seem then that the distinction of the whole into parts, is Distribution.  
A. So I said.  
Q. What is then the collection of the parts to the making up of the whole?  
A. It is called Induction.  
Q. Whence is Distribution taken?  
A. Distribution is taken from arguments altogether agreeing, but disagreeing amongst themselves: therefore it shall be by so much more accurate, by how much the agreings of the parts shall be with the whole, and the disagreeing among themselves.   

CAP. 26. The destribution from the cause.  
Q. Whence is the First Distribution?  
A. The first distribution is from absolute agreings.  
Q. What are these absolute agreings?  
A. The Causes and Effects.  
Q. What is distribution from the Causes?  
A. Distribution from the Causes, is when the parts are causes of the whole. Here the distribution of perfect into its members is greatly praised.  
Q. What is Perfect?  
A. Perfect is the whole, to which the parts are essential.  
Q. What is a member?  
A. A member is a part of the whole.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Grammar is divided into Etymology and Syntaxis; Rhetoric, into Elocution and Action; Dialectica, into Invention and Judgement: for those Arts are constituted of those parts.  
Q. What is the principal Distribution?  
A. When the explication of a longer thing is received.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Georg. 1.  
What makes glad corn, and how to till the ground,  
How to plant elms, that be so strong and sound:  
How to guide oxen, cattle how to tend,  
And how the little pretty B●e defend,  
I will declare.—  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Cic. pro Mur. I understand, O you Judges, that the whole accusation hath three parts; one of which is in reprehension of life, another in contention of dignity, the third touching the fault.  
Q. How is the second kind of handling this kind of argument?  
A. Either from the Parts to the Whole; or from the Whole to the Parts.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Cat.  
Quintia is fair to many, so to me,  
I will not therefore this same thing deny;  
But wholly fair I will not say she's not,  
True beauty in her there is not a jot.  
Lesbius' fair in every part, most fine,  
Venus adorned her, clear did make her shine.   

CAP. 27. The distribution from the Effects; also the Genus and Species.  
Q. What is the Distribution from the Effects?  
A. The Distribution from the Effects, is when the Parts are Effects.  
Q. Give example.  
A. In a ship the seamen, some scale the masts, some run in at the doors, some draw water, the Governor holdeth the rudder in the ship.  
Q. May not distribution of Genus into Species be comprised under this head?  
A. Yes, distribution of Genus into Species doth here excel.  
Q. What is Genus?  
A. Genus is the whole essential in par●s  
Q. What is Species?  
A. Species is the parts of Genus.  
Q. Give example.  
A. We say, A living creature is the genus of a man, and a beast; for a living creature is the whole of that effect; viz. a corporal living substance, which commonly pertaineth to the beasts and men: We say, the species of a man and a beast is living, because they are parts of a living subject, which living essence they have common: We say, A man is the genus of every man, and a lion the genus of every lion; but contrary, every man the species of a man, every lion of a lion.  
Q. What is the kinds of the Genus?  
A. The Genus is most general, or subalternat.  
Q. What are the kinds of the Species?  
A. The Species is subalternate, or most special.  
Q. What is the most general Genus?  
A. The most general Genus, is that of which there is no kinds.  
Q. Give example.  
A. In Logical Invention, an argument is the most general genus of artificials, and inartificials.  
Q. What is the subalternate Genus, and the subalternate Species?  
A. The subalternate Genus, as also the subalternate Species, is that which is the species of this, but the genus of that.  
Q. Give example.  
A. The Cause is the species of an absolute arguing Argument, but the genus of the Matter, and Form.  
Q. But what is the most special Species?  
A. The most special Species is that which is individable into other species.  
Q Give example.  
A. The matter and form singly.  
Q. What are the Genus and Species notes of?  
A. Of the Causes and Effects.  
Q. Give example.  
A. In a living thing there is a corporeal essence, which in the matter is belonging commonly to the species, as also the faculty of life & sense, which in the form pertaineth commonly to the species.  
Q. It should seem that the Genus contains the causes which attain to the species of it; and therefore contrarily, the Species contains the Effects of their Genus.  
A. So it is.  
Q. From whence then is that universal famousness and excellency?  
A. From hence, because it declareth the causes.  
Q. Show some example now of the distributions of the Genus into Species.  
A. Distribution of Genus into Species is very excellent truly, but hard and seldom found; yet we will bring what illustrations and examples we can. Ovid. (Met. 1.) divideth living creatures in●o five Species; Stars, Birds Beasts, Fish, Men: he giveth life to the stars, as the Philosophers do.  
No region is without some living thing,  
Stars in the skies, the forms of gods being;  
Birds in the air in abundance be,  
Beasts on the earth, and fishes in the sea.  
But yet amongst these a creature more divine,  
Who may them rule & govern all, in fin●  
There wanted much, until the man w● born.  
So Cic. (Offic. 1.) divideth virtue into four Species, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance; but all that is honest springeth out of one of these four parts; for either it is conversant in the knowledge and skill of the truth, or in the defending the society of men, and giving every one his own; Also in trust of things bargained, or in a high mind and admirable greatness and courage. Or lastly, in all things which are made and called order and means, in which is modesty and temperance.  
Q. What is distribution of the Genus into the forms of the Species?  
A. Distribution of the Genus into the forms of the Species is the same; because the form with the Genus, constitute their Species.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Of living creatures, one is speaking, another dumb.  
Q. May not Genus and Species be ●andled apart and severally?  
A. Yes, Genus and Species are not only handled after this simple form of division, but also apart one from another.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Pro Arc. But least any should wonder that we say so, that there is a certain faculty of wit, and this reason or discipline of speaking; neither that we have truly given ourselves altogether to this study: For all Arts which pertain to humanity, have a certain common hand, and are contained (as it were) in a certain knowledge amongst themselves.  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. Art is the Genus, Poesy and Eloquence the Species.  
Q. Is not the Genus handled also by the Species?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Ovid de Trist. 4.  
Fill thy sad matter with thy virtue's grave.  
Hot glory doth decay, it none can save.  
Who had known Hector, if Troy well had been?  
Through public vices way to virtue's se●●  
Thine Art, o Typhis lies, if in the sea  
There be no floods: if men be well, truly,  
Then Phoebus' Art decayeth instantly.  
That which they hid, and is not known f●● good,  
Appears at last, and shows where evi●● stoo●●  
Q. But are there no special example● fitted to this kind?  
A. Yes, such as this. Attic. 7. Wil● thou leave the city? what if the Frenchmen come? The common-weal●● (he saith) is not in walls, but Altars and Religion. Themistocles did the same, and a whole host of Barbarian were not able to take one city. B●● Pericles did not so, who in the year almost before fifty, when he kept nothing but a wall; our city before being taken, they kept the tower notwithstanding.   

CAP. 28. Distribution from the Subject.  
Q. What is the other distribution?  
A. The other distribution is of agreings after a certain manner.  
Q. What are agreings after a certain manner?  
A. The subjects and adjuncts.  
Q. What is the distribution from subjects?  
A. The distribution from Subjects, is, when the parts are subjects.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Cat.  
Thy maiden-head's not wholly thine, I ween,  
One part thy father gave, the part between  
Thou of thy mother hadst; so that to thee  
None but the third remaineth for to be:  
Therefore resist not two, cast not away  
The thing thy parents gave to thee, I say.  
Q. Give example out of some Orator.  
A. Cic. Tnsc. 1. There are therefore three kinds of good, as I un●erstond from the Stoics, to whose use, oftener than I am wont, we give place. There are therefore those kinde● of good, which may be externally enjoyed of the body: Also because others ar● to be undertaken, they are therefore called good. There are other divine things which do more nearly concern us, and are heavenly; so that those who have attained them, why may I not call them after a manner blessed, yea most happy?   

CAP. 29. Distribution from adjucts.  
Q. What is distribution from Adjuncts.  
A. Distribution from Adjuncts is● when the parts are Adjuncts.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Of men, some are sound, some sick, some rich, some poor.  
Q. Give a poetical example.  
A. Virgil (Georg. 1.) divideth th● world into five parts; the middle scorching hot, the other two extreme col●● the two last temperate.  
Five zones the heavens do hold, the ●i●dle hot,  
The sun there burns, cold in it the●● is n●●  
But on the right and left ha●● there i● seen  
Rain, frost and cold, that's bitter, sharp and keen.  
The two last temperate, yet in them is  
Mortality, and many sicknesses.  
Q. Give an Orator's example.  
A. Caes. Bel. Gal. 1. All France is divided into three parts; of which, one the Belgians inhabit, the other the AEquitans, the third those who in their tongue are called Cetts, in our language the Gauls.   

CAP. 30. Definition.  
Q. What is definition?  
A. Definition is when it is explicated what the thing is, and that interchangeably may be argued with the thing defined.  
Q. What are the ●●●des of Definition?  
A. A Definition is perfect or imperfect.  
Q. What is the Perfect definition called?  
A. This is properly called a Definition.  
Q. What is the Imperfect called?  
A. A Description.  
Q. What is a perfect Definition?  
A. A Perfect definition is a definition consisting of the only Causes which constitute the Essence: such as the causes comprehended by the genus and form.  
Q. Give example.  
A. After this manner is a man defined, viz. by the genus (a living creature) we understand (as it is said) a Corporeal Essence full of life and sense, which is the Matter, and a part of the Form of a man; to which, if thou addest reasonable, thou comprehendest the whole form of a man, by the whole faculty of his Life, Sense, Reason.  
Q. It should seem then that the Perfect definition is nothing else then an universal symbol of the Causes constituting the Essence an● Nature of things?  
A. So it is.  
Q. Give an example.  
A. the Arts have such definitions; Grammar, of well speaking; Rhetoric, of pleading well; Dialectica, of disputing well; Arithmetic, of numbering well; Geometry, of measuring well.   

CAP. 31. Description.  
Q. What is Description?  
A. Description is a definition defining the thing from other arguments also.  
Q. Give example.  
A. This is the description of a man; A man is a living creature, mortal, capable of discipline.  
Q. Are not proper circumstances also mingled with common causes sometimes?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Then it seemeth that succint brevity is not always in this kind.  
A. No, oftentimes it desireth a clearer and greater explication.  
Q. Give an example out of some Orator.  
A. In Mil. Glory is described. But yet of all rewards of virtue (if there be a reason of rewards) the greatest is glory; this one comforteth us touching the shortness of our life, causeth that we are present with the absent; of dead, maketh us to live. To conclude; by these steps we do seem to ascend into heaven.  
Q. Give a poetical example.  
A. AEneid. 4. Fame is described.  
From Lybians temple cometh forth great fame,  
Nought swifter than ill news which bears this name,  
Moving she goes, by going strength she gets;  
She fears at first, at last with winds she fleets,  
Walks on the earth, her head she lifts to th' sky;  
Earth brought her forth, the gods were angry;  
In Coeus and Encelladus his land  
She was at last, as I do understand;  
Her feet were swift, her wings most hurtful were,  
A horrid monster, wicked, full of fear.  
As many feathers as upon her are,  
So many eyes attend her every where,  
So many tongues, so many mouths do sound,  
So many ears do listen her around.  
In night she flies through heaven, and in the shade  
About the earth she goes, no noise is made:  
She fits by the light on houses high,  
And causeth towns to quiver fearfully;  
As well a bruiter of things false that be,  
As messenger of truth and verity.  
Q. Proceed to further example?  
A. Such are the descriptions of plants and living creatures, in Physic: also of rivers, mountains, cities, in Geography and History.   

CAP. 32. Divine testimony.  
Q. You have expounded the Artificial arguments, the inartificial followeth; Tell me then what an inartificial argument is?  
A. An inartificial argument is, that which argueth not by its own nature, but taketh force from some artificial argument.  
Q. It seemeth by this, when a hidden truth of things is more subtly searched for, that this argument hath small force of proof.  
A. So it is: but in civil and humane things oftentimes this argument effecteth the greatest trust from the moving arguments, if wisdom, virtue, and good will be present.  
Q. What is it called?  
A. In one name it is called Testimoyn.  
Q. What are the kinds of Testimo●y●  
A. Divine or Humane.  
Q. What may be comprised under the head of Divine Testimony?  
Q. Not only the miracles of the gods, but also the answers of prophets and fortune-tellers are counted amongst divine Testimonies.  
Q. Give example.  
A. All these are brought forth, Cat. 3 For that I may omit (saith the Orator) the fires seen in the night from the West, and the burning of heaven, as also lightning, and earthquakes, with other many things done to us Consuls, as those which are now done, do seem to proclaim the god's immortality. And a little after; At which time, when the Araspatians' were come together out of all Hetruria, they said that slaughter, burning, perishing of the laws, civil and domestical war, and the fall of the whole City and Empire approached, unless the immortal gods (pleased by all reason) by their power should change those destinies. At length, when he had said that they mocked at the answer of the Arispatians', and that they did more regard the sign of jove turning to the East; He then said; But is not he so present, that it should, seem to be done at the beck of the mighty jove, that when this, morning before my door, by my command and conjuration, the Judges being then in the house of Concordia; at the same time there appeared a sign which being turned towards you and the Senate, both you and the Senate saw manifestly laid open, who they were that were against the health of all men?  
Q. Give another example.  
A. That of Tibullus is more short.  
But if that oracles true things do tell,  
Then this in our name see thou do declare:  
That he doth promise Delius to give  
To be thy spouse, with whom thou'lt happy live.   

CAP. 33. Testimony from humane law and sentences.  
Q. What be the kinds of humane Testimony?  
A. Humane Testimony is common, or proper.  
Q. What is common?  
A. Law, and a famous Sentence.  
Q. What is legal testimony?  
A. Legal testimony is both unwritten and written.  
Q. Bring forth authority for this.  
A. Pro Mil. For there is (O ye Judges) a law not written, but born with us, which we have not received, learned, read; but taken, drawn, expressed from Nature: as if our life should be in some hazard, force, danger either of thiefs or enemies, all honest reason were to be sought of safety; but if the twelve Tables will have the night thee●e, yea the day thief too, if he defend himself after any manner, killed without punishment; who is there that will think him that is slain to be punished, when as there is a sword reached to us, to kill that man by the Laws themselves?  
Q. What are famous Sentences?  
A. Proverbs.  
Q. Give example.  
A. They be such as these. Pares cum paribus facillimè congregantur. Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna.  
Q. What may further be under this head?  
A. Sayings of wisdom also.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Nosce teipsum. Nequid nimis. Sponde praestò ad detrimentum.  
Q. What is Proper testimony?  
A. Such as this of Plato. 1. ad Quint. fratr. And then truly, Plato the Prince of wisdom, and learning, thought those commonwealths blessed, if either learned and wise men governed them, or those that did govern, placed all their study in wisdom and learning.  
Q. Proceed to further example.  
A. Such were in the Poets, AEneid 4 Learn justice and admonitions, and contemn not the rich. So in Homer.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉  
Ajax led out of Salaminus 12 ships.  
The Magatenses were overcome by the Athenians.  
Q. What are testimonies of the living?  
A. Testimonies of the living, are not only when it is inquired of ground, felling of wood, and such like business; but also there are testimonies of obligation, confessing, oath.  
Q. Give an example of obligation.  
A. Phil. 5. For I dare bind my faith (P.C.) to you and the people of Rome, that truly, when no force constrained me, I durst not do; and I feared an opinion of temerity, in a thing greatly hurtful; I promise and swear (P.C.) to become always such a citizen to Cesar, as he himself is, and as we ought chiefly to wish or desire.  
Q. Have we not an obligation set forth sometimes with a pledge?  
A. Yes: Virg. Eclog. 3.  
Wilt then by turns, we hand to hand do try  
What either can, and prove each by our deed?  
I'll pawn this heiser (which lest thou deny)  
She twice hath come already to the pail,  
And two twins suckles at this time. Now say,  
What pawn thou'lt gauge with her to countervail.  
Q. What are the kinds of confession?  
A Confession is free, or extorted by torments.  
Q. What is this later properly called?  
A A question.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Such an argument there is against Milon, who● Cicero derided. Go to then, What, or how is the question? how? where was Roscius? where was Casca? Doth Clodius lay snares for Milon? he hath done, surely the gallows. He had done nothing.  
Q. What further may be reduced hitherto?  
A. Hitherto may be referred the argument which we use when we bring forth our approbation, and experience of our affirmative.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Ver. 4. Even Volcatio, if he had come freely, would he have given a little book? he shall come, he shall be tried; no man truly receiveth it. Ter. Spend thy time in letters, in the woods, in music: It is meet for youth to know these liberal things. I will give diligence.  
Q. Give a poetical example.  
A. Ovid. Trist. 3.  
The which, that thou mayst better credit me,  
Try thou my pains, believe it then to be.  
Q. Give an example also of the Testimony of an oath.  
A. AEneid. 6.  
I swear by th' gods, and all in earth unseen,  
I have departed from thy shore, o Queen.  
Q. This reciprocation seemeth to be more obscure, as because the testimony is true, the witness is also true.  
A. So it is: and thus much sufficeth to have spoken of Invention, the first part of the science Dialectica.    

THE SECOND BOOK OF PETER RAMUS His DIALECTICA of judgement.  

CAP. 1. What judgement is.  
Q. HItherto the first part of Dialectica in Invention hath been expounded; the other part followeth, in Judgement. What then is judgement?  
A. Judgement is the second pa●t of Logic, of disposing arguments to be judged well.  
Q. How are they judged?  
A. Every thing is judged by a certain rule of disposition.  
Q. It may be thought then, that this part of Logic is called both judgement and Disposition from hence.  
A. So it is.   

CAP. 2. An aff●rmative or negative Axioma.  
Q. What are the kinds of judgement?  
A. Judgement is Axiomatical, or dianoetical.  
Q. What is an Axioma?  
A. Axioma is the disposition of an argument with an argument; wherein somewhat is judged to be, or not to be.  
Q. What is it called, and whence receiveth it the name?  
A. In the Latin of Enuntiatum, it is called Enuntiation; of Pronuntiatum, Pronunciation.  
Q. What are the the affections of an Axioma.  
A. An Axioma is Affirmative, or Negative.  
Q. What is affirmative?  
A. Affirmative is when the force of it is affirmed.  
Q. And what Negative?  
A. When it is denied. From hence springeth the contradiction of Axiomas, when the same argument is affirmed or denied.   

CAP. 3. True and false.  
Q. What may be a second kind of the affections of an Axioma?  
A. An Axioma secondly is true or false.  
Q. How true?  
A. When it pronounceth as the thing is.  
Q. How false?  
A. Contrary.  
Q. What are the affections of a true Axioma?  
A. A true Axiomas is contingent or necessary.  
Q. How contingent?  
A. When it is so true, that it may sometimes be false.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Fortune helpeth the bold; for it may be that which is true to day, to morrow may be false: and therefore the judgement of this contingent verity, is called Opinion: those things of the time past or present, may be certain to a man; but of time to come they cannot by nature, although with God all things are present. Therefore Martial doth worthily mock Priscus.  
Priscus, thou often ask'st what I shall be;  
If now most rich, hereafter what, truly?  
Things for to come canst thou not tell them me?  
If thou a Lion art, what wilt thou be?  
Q. How necessary?  
A. When it is always true, neither can be false.  
Q. What is this affirmative called?  
A. This affirmative is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of every thing.  
Q. How impossible?  
A. Contrarily, where it can be true of nothing.  
Q. What belongeth to an Axioma of the arts?  
A. An axioma of the arts ought to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; as also Homogene & Catholic.  
Q. What is an homogene axioma?  
A. An homogene axioma is when the parts are essential among themselves: as the form to the thing form, the subject to its proper adjunct.  
Q. What is this called?  
A. This Genus of the Species is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by itself.  
Q. What is a Catholic axioma.  
A. A Catholic axioma is when the consequent is always true of the anticedent; not only in every thing and by itself, but also reciprocally.  
Q. Give example.  
A. A man is a living creature, reasonable: Number is equal or unequal.  
Q. What is this called?  
A. This is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, universally first.  
Q. What then are the laws of the proper documents of the arts?  
A. These three: the first, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the law of verity: the second, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the law of justice: the third, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, called the law of wisdom. And such is the judgement of catholic axiomas, the most true and chief knowledge.   

CAP. 4. The simple Axioma.  
Q. You have expounded the common affection of axiomas, the kinds follow: what are then the kinds of an axioma,  
A. An axioma is simple or compound.  
Q. What is simple?  
A. Simple is that which is contained in the force of one word; and therefore by an affirmative or negative word it affirmeth or denieth.  
Q Give example.  
A. Fire burneth, fire is hot, fire is not water.  
Q. Show the force of these examples.  
A. Here fire is the antecedent, burneth the consequent: and this is the first disposition of invented things; of the cause with the effect, as in the first example; the subject with the adjunct, as in the second; the disagreeing with the disagreeing, in the third: After a certain manner any argument may be enuntiated (except those full of comparison and distribution); ag●eeings, truly, by affirming; disagreings by denying.  
Q. What are the kinds of a simple axioma.  
A. A simple axioma is general, or special.  
Q. What is general?  
A. General is when the common consequent is attributed generally to the common antecedent: And this contradiction doth not always divide the true and false; but both parts of the contingent, as also not of contingents may be false.  
Q. Give example of the first.  
A. Each place delighted is with Baiis pleasant Rooms.  
No place delighted is with Baiis pleasant Rooms.  
Q. Give example of the second.  
A. Every creature is reasonable: no creature is reasonable.  
Q. What is a special axioma?  
A. A specall axioma is when the consequent is not attributed to every antecedent: and here the contradiction ever divideth the true from the false.  
Q. What are the kinds of special?  
A. Special is particular, or proper.  
Q. What is particular?  
A. Particular is when the common consequent is attributed particularly to the antecedent: but to this axioma it is generally contradicted.  
Q. Give examples.  
A. Somewhat is to be pardoned: Nothing is to be pardoned. Some clemency is not to be praised: All clemency is to be praised.  
Q. What is a proper axioma?  
A. A proper axioma is when the consequent is attributed to a proper antecedent.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Fabulla is fair: whose negative and contradiction is, Fabulla is not fair.   

CAP. 5. The copulative axioma.  
Q. What is the compound axioma?  
A. The compound axioma is that which is contained in the force of a conjunction. Therefore from an affirmative oR negative conjunction it is a affirmed or denied. And a part of the contradiction is true, a part false.  
Q. What are the kinds?  
A. A compound Enunciate is for his conjunction congregative, or segregative.  
Q. What is congregative?  
A. Congregative is that which enuntiateth all agreings by affirming, and disagreings by denying.  
Q. What are the kinds?  
A. Copulative or connexed.  
Q. What is copulative?  
A. Copulative is that whose conjunction is copulative.  
Q Give example.  
A. AEneid. 1.  
The east and south winds on the seas do blow  
They rush through deep till on the top they show,  
The Africa oft with these his blasts conjoins.  
This therefore shall be the negative and contradiction.  
The east and south winds not on seas do blow,  
The rush not through the deep, ne on top show:  
The Africa doth not oft his blasts conjoin.  
Q. But whereupon dependeth the judgement of the copulative enunciate?  
A. The judgement of the copulative Enunciate being true, dependeth of the truth of all parts: false, at the least of one part false.  
Q. What may further be comprised under this head?  
A. The enunciate of a relate quality is of this kind, whose conjunction is the relation itself.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Eclog. 3.  
Some thy song as sleep on grass doth please  
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. Here the copulative judgement is as if he should say, sleep is grateful to the weary, and so thy song is pleasing to me.  
Q. What is the Negative hereof?  
A. 
Not me thy song as sleep on grass doth please  
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.    

CAP. 6. The connexed Axioma.  
Q. What is a connexed Axioma.  
A. A connexed axioma is congregative, whose conjection is connexive.  
Q. Give example.  
A. AEneid. 2. If fortune doth feign Simon miserable, it dishonestly feigneth him to be vain and a liar. Whose negative is, If fortune doth not feign Simon miserably it dishonestly feigneth him to be vain and a liar.  
Q. Is not this conjunction also denied more manifestly, by denying the consequent?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Pro Amer. I am not a murderer, though in their company: De fato: Neither if every Enunciation be true or false, doth it follow therefore that the causes are immutable; For affirmation signifieth, if the Antecedent be, that the consequent is also. Negation therefore and Contradiction determineth, If the Antecedent be, that therefore the consequent is not. Wherefore, when thou shalt judge the connexive to be absolutely true, thou shalt judge it also necessary; and thou shalt understand this necessity to spring from the necessary connexion o● parts, the which may also be even in false parts.  
Q. Give example of this.  
A. If a man be a Lion, he is also four footed; this is a necessary connexion.  
Q. But if the connexion be contingent, and only put for his probability, how shall it be judged then?  
A. Its judgement than shall be only opinion.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Ter: and Phamphilus, if thou dost this, this day is the last thou shalt see me.  
Q. What may be further under this head?  
A. This relation connexive of consequence is like to the connexed axioma. As when Tullius is said to be an orator, he hath also skill in pleading well. And thus much of the Congregative axioma.   

CAP. 7. The discrete Axioma.  
Q. What is a segregative axioma?  
A. A segregative axioma is that whose conjunction is segregative, and therefore enunciateth disagreeing arguments.  
Q. What are the kinds?  
A. A segregative enunciation is discrete or disjunct.  
Q. What is discrete?  
A. Discrete is that whose conjunction is discretive; and therefore of disagreings it chiefly enunciateth diverses.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Tusc. 5. Although they may be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are referred to the mind: Whose negative and contradiction is, Although they may not be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are referred to the mind; or, although they may be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are not referred to the mind. For yet is here a chief conjunction,  
Q. How is the discrete Enunciat judged to be true?  
A. The discrete enunciation is judged to be true and lawful, if the parts be not only true, but may be also discrete.  
Q. How is the false or ridiculous judged?  
A. Contrarily.   

CAP. 8. The disjunct Axioma.  
Q. What is a disjunct axioma?  
A. A disjunct axioma is a segregative axioma, whose conjunction is disjunct.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Goerg. 1.  
There, as they say, is either silent night,  
Always most dark, and void of any light;  
Or else the morning from us here doth go,  
And brings the day unto them there also.  
Q. Show another example.  
A. De fato, Every enunciation is true or false.  
Q. Here it seemeth is signified from the disjunct, that one only is true.  
A. So it is.  
Q. What shall the negative and contradiction be.  
A. Not every enunciation is true or false.  
Q. And what doth the contradiction signify?  
A. That one of them is not true by necessity: for if the disjunction be absolutely true, it is also necessary: and the parts of the disjunct are opposite without any means.  
Q. But although the disjunction be absolutely true, and also necessary; may there not be a necessity, that the parts should be separately necessary?  
A. No.  
Q. Give example.  
A. A man is good or not good. Here the disjunction is necessary, and yet A man is good, is not a necessary enunciation; also A man is not good, is not a necessary enunciation.  
Q. Whereupon then dependeth the necessity of the disjunction?  
A. The necessity of the disjunction dependeth on the necessary opposition and disjunction of the parts, not as their necessary verity.  
Q. But is not the disjunction oftentimes from condition?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Give example.  
A. As if it be thought whether Cleon will come, or Socrates, because it was so agreed that one of them only should come.  
Q. It seemeth by this, that if the disjunction be contingent, it is not absolutely true, but is only opinionable.  
A. So it is, and that more frequently in the use of man.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Ovid. Epist. Lean.  
Either good hap shall now unto me fall,  
Or else fierce death the end of loving thrall.   

CAP. 9 The Syllogism and its parts.  
Q. You have manifested in its self the axiomatical judgement by axiomas: the dianoetical followeth: What therefore is dianoia?  
A. Dianoia is when one axioma is derived from another.  
Q. What are the kinds of Dianoia?  
A. A Syllogism or Method.  
Q. What is a Syllogism?  
A. Syllogism is a Dianoia whereby the question is so disposed with the argument, as the antecedent put, it is necessarily concluded.  
Q. Make this plainer.  
A. When the axioma is doubtful, the question is effected, and there is need of a third argument to be placed with the question, for its trust.  
Q. How many parts hath the antecedent?  
A. The antecedent of a Syllogism hath two parts, a Proposition, and an Assumption.  
Q. What is a proposition?  
A. A proposition is the first part of the antecedent, whereby the consequent of the question is at least disposed with the argument.  
Q. What is the assumption?  
A. The assumption is the second part of the antecedent, which is affirmed from the proposition.  
Q. But what is the consequent part of the syllogism?  
A. The consequent part of the syllogism, is that which embraceth the part of the question, and concludeth it.  
Q. What is it called?  
A. It is called from the nature of its Complexion and Conclusion.  
Q. If any part of the syllogism want, what is said to be?  
A. It is called Enthymema.  
Q. But what if any part happen to be besides its parts?  
A. Then it is called a Porsyllogisme.  
Q. Is not the order of the parts oftentimes confounded?  
A. Yes.  
Q. What then if any doubt shall arise from it?  
A. Then that shall be filled up which wanteth, those cut off which abound, and every part digested into his place.   

CAP. 10. The simple contracted Syllogism.  
Q. What are the kinds of a syllogism?  
A. A syllogism is simple or compound.  
Q. What is simple?  
A. Simple is, where the consequent part of the question is placed in the proposition, the antecedent part in the assumption.  
Q. What are the affections of it?  
A. It is affirmed, denied, general, special, and proper.  
Q. How is it affirmed?  
A. From all the affirmative parts.  
Q. How is it denied?  
A. From one negative of the antecedent parts, with complexion.  
Q. How is it general?  
A. From the general proposition and assumption.  
Q. How is it special?  
A. From one of the generals only.  
Q. And how is it proper?  
A. From both propers.  
Q. What are the kinds of the simple syllogism?  
A. The simple syllogism is contracted by parts, or explicated.  
Q. What is contract?  
A. Contract is when the argument for the example is so subjected to a particular question, that the antecedent may be understood to affirm each part; and in the assumption.  
Q. Give an example.  
A. Certain confidence is virtue, as constancy: certain confidence is not virtue, as boldness.  
Q. Show the force of this example.  
A. This argument is understood to go before each part of the question, as if it were expressed; constancy is a virtue, and confidence, and therefore certain confidence is a virtue: also boldness is not a virtue, and yet it is confidence; and therefore some confidence is not a virtue. So in the use of disputing, the Master of the syllogism draweth the judgement, neither is it set forth otherwise. And by this exposition the beginning of the syllogism is expounded by Aristotle, so that the syllogism in its full judgement is more clear and manifest.   

CAP. 11. The first kind of the simple explicated Syllogism.  
Q. What is the explicated Syllogism?  
A. The explicated Syllogism is, whose parts are explicated.  
Q. What are the proprieties in this explicated Syllogism?  
A. Two, first the proposition is general or proper: secondly, the conclusion is like to the antecedent, or the the weaker part.  
Q. What are the kinds of it?  
A. The kinds are twofold.  
Q. What is the first?  
A. The first is, where the argument always followeth the negative in the other part.  
Q. Show some Syllogism of this kind.  
A. GEN. 1.  
Ce- A troubled man useth not his reason well:  
sa- But a wise man useth his reason well:  
re. A wise man is not therefore troubled.  
Q. Produce the example of some Orator for this Syllogism.  
A. This judgement is so brought forth of Cicero, Tusc. 3. And when (saith he) the eye is troubled, it is not honestly affected to the fulfilling of its duty: and the rest of the parts, as also the whole body, when it is moved from its state, wanteth its office and function; so a troubled mind is not honestly affected to fulfil his duty. But the duty of the mind is to use reason, and a wise man is always so affected, that he useth reason most excellently; he is therefore never troubled.  
Q. Give example of another general Syllogism.  
A. GEN. 2.  
Ca- A mortal thing is compound.  
me- A soul is not compound.  
stres. A soul therefore is not mortal.  
Q. Produce the authority of some Ancient, avouching this Syllogism.  
A. Cicero judgeth the soul to be immortal by this syllogism. Tusc. 1. For we cannot doubt, saith he, in our minds, unless we be perchance ignorant in physical things, but that there is nothing knit to souls, nothing connexed, nothing copulate, nothing joined, nothing double; which when it is so, can surely never be parted, nor divided, nor severed, nor drawn asunder, therefore neither perish: for perishing is as it were a departure and separation or breach of those parts, which before the perishing were joined together.  
Q. Give an example of a special syllogism.  
A. SPEC. 1.  
Fe- A pale man is not courageous.  
sti- Maximus is courageous.  
no. Maximus therefore is not pale.  
Q. Produce authority for this syllogism.  
A. But this judgement Ovid. concludeth, De Pont. 3. El. 3.  
Paleness and sloth are not in the high mind,  
Rather with vipers them on ground we find:  
In highest things thy mind excels, we see,  
No name I find t' express the wit of thee.  
Some miseries do taste, hurt and outworn,  
Are made to feel sharp pricking of the thorn:  
Yet thou art wont to help complaining men,  
Amongst which number, pray, let me be then.  
Q. Show another example of the special syllogism.  
A. SPEC. 2.  
Basilius- A dancer is Lecherous.  
ro- Murena is not Lecherous.  
co. Murena therefore is no dancer.  
Q. Produce some Orator for this syllogism?  
A. Cic. pro Mur. For no man almost, being sober, danceth, unless perchance he be mad; neither alone, nor at a moderate and honest banquet; for dancing is the companion of untimely banquets, pleasant places, and many delights: Thou snatchest that from me, that it is necessary that vices should be: thou leavest that whereby this removed, this vice ought not to be at all; no filthy banquet, no love, no gluttony is showed: and when we find not all these things which have the name of pleasure, and vices; there thou canst not find lechery: nay, thinkest thou to find a shadow of lust in such?  
Q. Avouch some other authority after the like manner?  
A. After this manner of judgement Ovid de Trist. 1. concludeth triply, whilst he sets forth the excuse of his verses.  
They that make verses should not merry be,  
Our time is clouded with adversity:  
They that write verses should enjoy their ease,  
The seas, the winds, with winter fierce me press.  
Good poets should not fear, but I fear death,  
I dread lest swords do take away my breath:  
Then what is here, a right judge will admire,  
If reading them they satisfie's desire.  
Q. Give example of proper syllogisms.  
A. PRO. 1.  
Agesilaus is not painted by Apelles.  
Alexander is painted by Apelles.  
Alexander therefore is not Agesilaus.  
Q. Give another example of a proper Syllogism.  
A. PRO. 2.  
Cesar oppressed his country.  
Tullius' oppressed not his country.  
Tullius therefore is not Cesar.   

CAP. 12. The second kind of the simple explicate Sollogism.  
Q What is the second kind of the explicate Syllogism?  
A. The second kind of the explicate Syllogism is, when the argument goeth before in the proposition, the affirmative followeth in the assumption.  
Q. Give an example of an affirmative general after this kind.  
A. AFF. GUN.  
Bar- Every just thing is profitable.  
ba- Every honest thing is just.  
ra. Every honest thing therefore is profitable.  
Q. Produce some Orator avouching this Syllogism.  
A. Thus Cicero concludeth, Offic. 2. The Philosophers, truly, with great authority, severely, sound, and honestly do distinguish these three confused kinds by cogitation. For whatsoever is just, that also they think to be profitable: also, whatsoever is honest, that is just; from whence ariseth, That whatsoever is honest, that is also profitable.  
Q. Give an example of a Negative General Syllogism?  
A. NEG. GEN.  
Ce- A fearful man is not free.  
la- A covetous man is fearful.  
rent. A covetous man therefore is not free.  
Q. Prove this by some Poet.  
A. It is thus concluded and judged by Horace: Epist. 1.  
Who freer is, he that as servant dwelleth,  
Or he that in his moneys love excelleth:  
I do not see, he that desires doth fear,  
And he that fears, his freedom doth not bear.  
Q. Give another example of this kind of Syllogism.  
A. Ter. in Eu. concludeth and judgeth this; That which is void of counsel, cannot be governed by counsel: Love is void of counsel: It cannot therefore be governed by counsel.  
Q. Produce the words of Terrence.  
A. The former Syllogism followeth in these words: Master, that thing which hath in it neither counsel nor means, that thou canst not govern by counsel. In love are all these vices, injuries, suspicions, enmities, flatteries, war, peace again: these uncertain things, if thou wouldst guide by certain reason, thou dost no more than if thou shouldest labour to be mad with reason.  
Q. Give an example of the affirmative special Syllogism.  
A. AFF. SPE.  
Da- Consuls made by virtue, ought studiously to defend the commonwealth.  
ri- Cicero is made Consul by virtue.  
i- Cicero therefore ought studiously to defend the commonwealth.  
Q. Produce Tully's words avouching this Syllogism.  
A. The Orator doth both conclude and judge his own diligence. Agr. 2. For the great care and diligence as well of all the Consuls, aught to be placed in defending the commonwealth, as of those, who not in the cradle, but in the camp were made Consuls: none of our ancients promised to the people of Rome for me, that I ought to be trusted: to ask of me that I ought, even when I did ask, none of our ancestors commended me to you; therefore if I neglect any thing, there is none who shall entreat me for you. Yet while my life lasts (I being he who am able to defend it from their wickedness) I promise to you, O Quirites, that you have committed the commonwealth to the providence of a good trust: to a watchful man, not a coward; to a diligent man, not a sluggard.  
Q. Show another Syllogism of this kind.  
A. That which comes wished for, is grateful.  
Lesbian comes wished for to Catullus.  
She is therefore grateful.  
Q. Set forth Catullus his words, wherein he thus concludeth.  
A. That which we long for with desires great, 
Is acceptable to us when we have't:  
Wherefore this grateful is, more dear than gold,  
That Lesbian is come, our friend of old.  
Thou dost our wishes grant, our hope restore:  
O light most clear! who is there that is more  
Happy than I, who have what I desire;  
Even what I wish, there's nought I can require.   
Q. Give an example of an Negative Special.  
A. NEG. SPE.  
Fe- The deceiver of a loving maid is not to be praised.  
ri- Demophoon is the deceiver of a loving maid, to wit Phillis.  
o● Demophoon therefore is not to be praised.  
Q. Set forth the words of Phillis in Ovid, so judging.  
A. It is no glory virgins to deceive, 
Who love a man, and wish him for to have;  
Simplicity should rather favour gain.  
But I that love, and als● a woman a●,  
Deceived am by thee with flattering stile;  
The gods thy praises make it all the while.   
Q. Give an example of an Affirmative Proper.  
A. AFF. PRO.  
Octavius is Caesar's heir.  
I am Octavius.  
I am therefore Caesar's heir.  
Q. Give an example of a Negative Proper.  
A. NEG. PRO.  
Anthony is not Caesar's son.  
Thou art Anthony.  
Thou art not therefore Caesar's son.   

CAP. 13. The first connexed Syllogism.  
Q. You have expounded hitherto the simple Syllogism: What now is the compound Syllogism?  
A. The compound Syllogism is a Syllogism where the whole question is another part of the affirmed and compound proposition, the argument is another part.  
Q. But what if any thing were taken away in the compound Syllogism?  
A. That were to put a special contradiction.  
Q. What are the kinds of a compound Syllogism?  
A. A compound Syllogism is connexed or disjunct.  
Q. What is a connexed syllogism?  
A. A connexed syllogism, is a compound syllogism of a connexed proposition.  
Q. How many are the manners o● distinction?  
A. It is of two manners.  
Q. What is the first?  
A. The first manner of the connexed syllogism is that which assumeth the antecedent, and the consequent concludeth.  
Q Give an example of th●s.  
A. After this manner Cicero concludeth. lib. 2. De Divinatione.  
If they be gods, it is divination.  
But they are gods.  
It is divination therefore.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. Offic. 3. And if also nature prescribeth this, that a man to a man, whatsoever he be, for that same cause that he is a man, will use consultation, it is necessary according to the same nature, that the profit of all should be common. Which if it be so, all of us are contained in one and the same law of nature; and this, if it be so indeed, we are certainly forbidden by the law of nature to violate one another: but the first is true: the last therefore is also true.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. AEncid. 4. Dido adjureth AEneas to remain with her.  
Dost thou me fly? by these tears I thee pray,  
By thy right hand thee I beseech to stay:  
Else thou wilt leave me wretched here alone.  
By our dear marriage, our dear love, like none.  
If I do aught deserve, if thou hast been  
Sweet unto me, have pity on me then.  
Look on my slippery house, and now I pray,  
If any place for prayers be, I say,  
For Lybians sake, for Nomades his kings,  
Who hated me, and for all other things  
Which I for thee did bear. My credit's lost,  
I am alone, for thee thus am I crossed:  
Besides all this, my fame is quite decayed,  
Rather I had my flesh in dust were laid.  
Q. Doth it always assume the same?  
A. Oftentimes not the same, but a greater.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Cat. 1. If thy parents feared and hated thee, neither couldst thou please them by any reason, in my opinion, thou wert to abstain a little from their sight: now the country (which is our common parent) hateth and feareth thee, and of a long time judgeth nothing of thee, except it be touching thy death. Canst thou neither avoid its authority, neither follow its judgement, neither fearest thou its force?  
Q. What may further be under this head?  
A. This manner of concluding is the very same when the proposition is a relate of time.  
Q. Give example.  
A. After this kind the nymph Oenone in Ovid, concludeth the error of her foolishness.  
When Paris Oenone hoped to forsake,  
It would to Xanthus with all speed betake:  
Xanthus, make haste, return thou back again,  
That so this Paris Oenone may sustain.   

CAP. 14. The second connexed Syllogism.  
Q. What is the second manner of the connexed syllogism?  
A. The second manner of the connexed syllogism taketh away the consequent, that it may take away the antecedent.  
Q. Give example.  
A. If a wise man assent to any thing, sometimes also he shall be opinated.  
But he shall never be opinated.  
Therefore he shall assent to nothing.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. By the like syllogism Ovid. Trist. 12. judgeth his foolishness.  
If I were wise, those sisters I should hate,  
Deities hurtful to whom on them wait●  
But now so great my foolishness is seen,  
I build them altars who my hurt have been.  
These two kinds of the syllogism are most usual of all.   

CAP. 15. The first disjunct Syllogism.  
What is the disjunct syllogism?  
A. The disjunct syllogism is the syllogism composed of a disjunct proposition.  
Q. What are the manners of distinction?  
A. Two.  
Q. What is the first?  
A. The first taketh away one, and concludeth the rest,  
Give example.  
A. Either it is day, or it is night.  
But it is not day.  
It is therefore night.  
Q. Give another example.  
A. The judgement of Cicero in defence of Cluventius is such: But when as this condition was proposed to him, ●●at either he should accuse justly and piously, or die sharply or unworthily: he would rather accuse after that manner, then die after this.  
Q. Make the disjunction appear clearer.  
A. Either he must accuse or die:  
He must not die.  
He must accuse therefore.  
Q. Give another example like to this.  
A. There is the like reasoning, Phil. 2. Dost thou not understand it is determined, that either those who have done this thing are homicides, or revengers of liberty? But attend a little, and take the thoughts of a sober man for a little time; and I who am of them, as myself doth confess, will familiarly argue with thee as a fellow: I deny that there is any mean: I grant, that they are, except they be deliverers and conservers of the Roman Commonwealth, more than villains, more than homicides, more than parricides: if truly it be cruelty, rather to be a father to the country, than a murderer of ones self: Thou art a wise and considerate man, what sayest thou? if they be parricides, why were they honoured of thee, and called to this order by the Roman People? why was Marcus Brutus by thy means freed from the law, if he were absent more than ten days from the city? why did Apolinares receive Marcus Brutus with incredible honour? why was the provinces given to Cassius and Brutus? why were there Questors added? why were the numbers of Legates increased, and this done by thee? they are not therefore homicides. It followeth then, that by thine own judgement, they are deliverers, when as truly there can be no third admitted.  
Q. If the parts of the disjunct proposition shall be more than two, how shall they be judged then?  
A. The art of judging them, and concluding them shall be the same.  
Q. Give example.  
A. So Cicero judgeth Rabitius to be among the Consuls: And we see (saith he) these three to be in the nature of things, to wit, that either he should be with Saturninus, or with the good, or that he should lie hid. But to lie hid is proper to the dead and rotten: to be with Saturnius, of fury and wickedness: Virtue, and honesty, and shamefastness constrained him to be with the Consuls.   

CAP. 16. The second disjunct Syllogism.  
Q. What is the second disjunct?  
A. The second disjunct, from the proposition the affirmative assumeth one, and taketh away the rest.  
Q. Give example.  
A. It is day, or it is night:  
But it is day:  
It is not therefore night.  
Q. Give another example after this manner.  
A. Thus juno concludeth with jove touching Turnus, AEncid. 10.  
What if thou sayest the thing thou dost not mean,  
And should to Turnus give his life again?  
Now I remain in misery and woe,  
And hope for that which will not happen so:  
But rather than this ill should come to pass,  
I'll mock myself, and hope past hope, alas.  
Q. Show another Syllogism of this kind.  
A. There is the like Syllogism effected from a proposition copulative negative, which is called negative complexion, and which obtaineth the force of an affirmative disjunction.  
Q. Give example.  
A. It is not both day and night:  
But it is day:  
It is not therefore night.   

CAP. 17. The only Method according to Aristotle.  
Q. What is Method?  
A. Method is a dianoia of divers homogene axioma, preposed for the clearness of their nature, from whence the agreeing amongst themselves of them are judged and comprehended in memory.  
Q. What is to be considered in Method?  
A. As verity and falsity is beheld in the Axioma, consequence and inconsequence in the Syllogism; so in Method it is to be considered, that by it the more clear may precede, the more obscure may follow; and that altogether order and confusion be judged.  
Q. Make this plainer.  
A. After this manner is disposed from homogene axiomas in the first place by an absolute notion, the first; in the second place the second, in the the third place the third, and so forward.  
Q. It seemeth by this, that Method doth continually pass from universals to ●ingulars?  
A. So it is: for by this sole and only way it proceedeth from antecedents altogether, & absolute notions, to the declaring of unknown consequences. And this is the only Method that Aristotle taught.   

CAP. 18. The first illustration of Methods by illustration of Arts.  
Q. But do not Examples set forth this head more clearly?  
A. Yes, the examples of doctrines and arts do chiefly demonstrate and set forth the unity of Method; in the which, although all the rules are general and universal, yet the degrees of them are distinguished: and by how much every thing shall be more general, by so much it shall more precede.  
Q. Why shall the first be in the most general place and order?  
A. because in light and knowledge it is first.  
Q. Why shall the subalternates follow?  
A. Because in their clearness they are next.  
Q. It seemeth by this, that those things which by nature are more known shall precede, those which are less known are substitute, and at length the most special follow.  
A. So it is.  
Q. What then shall precede and be first?  
A. The most general definition shall be first.  
Q. What shall follow?  
A. The distribution.  
Q. But how if there be many?  
A. Then the partition in perfect parts shall precede.  
Q. What shall follow?  
A. The division into kinds.  
Q. What then?  
A. The parts themselves and the kinds, are in the same order to be handled and defined again, in which they were distributed.  
Q What further is required?  
A. If there shall be a long explication of them, they are to be chained together by the chains of transition.  
Q. What benefit redoundeth from hence?  
A. It refresheth and recreateth the Auditor.  
Q. But may not Example be under this head?  
A. Yes; as a more familiar thing is taken, so a more familiar example must be used.  
Q. Give example of what you have here showed out of the art of Grammar?  
A. All definitions, distributions, are found in the rules of grammar, and every one of them severally judged; and all these documents, inscribed in divers tables, are confounded and mingled together as it were in a certain pot.  
Q. What part of Dialectica teacheth us to compose these confused rules, and digest them into orders? first there is no need of the places of Invention, when as they are all found: neither of the first judgement of Axiomas, when as every axioma is proved and valued: neither of the second judgement of the Syllogism, when as all of them are disputed and concluded controversies of several things by these only syllogisms: it seemeth therefore to be only Method, is it not?  
A. Yes, it is only Method.  
Q. How is it done?  
A. The Logician by this light of artificial Method selecteth out of this pot the definition of Grammar (for that is most general) and placeth it in the first place: Grammar is the doctrine of speaking well. Then he taketh out of the same Oven the partition of Grammar, and placeth it in the second place: the parts of Grammar are two: Etymology and Syntaxis. Then out of the same vessel he separateth the definition of Etymology of words, and joineth it in the third place to those that go before: then he seeketh out the parts of words in letters and syllables, and the kinds in words of number, and without number, and placeth them with their transitions in their several places. And so the definitions of all the parts of Etymology, together with their distributions, colligations, and most special examples he placeth in their several places, and so likewise in the Syntax. This way all the Arts have proposed to themselves.   

CAP. 19 The second example of Method by example of Poets, Orators, Historiographers.  
Q. But is Method only set forth in matter of the arts and doctrines?  
A. No, it is also declared in all things which we would teach easily and plainly: therefore Poets, Orators, and all manner of writers, as often as they propose any thing to teach to their auditors, do follow this way, although they do not enter and insist upon it all alike.  
Q. Give an example out of some Poet.  
A. Virgil in his Georgics dist●buteth, as I said before, the proposed matter into four parts; and in the first book followeth common things, as Astrology, Meteorology, and of corn and tillage; this was the first part of his work: then the transition is adhibited in the beginning of the second book.  
Thus● far of tillage and of stars were we;  
Now of thee, Bacchus, we'll sing presently.  
Then he writeth generally of trees, as also specially of plants; the second transition is adhibited to the third part, but more imperfect and without an Epilogue. In the beginning of the third book of Oxen, Horses, Sheep, Goats, Dogs.  
we'll sing of goddess Pales, als' of him,  
Who by Amphryso kept his sheep most trim.  
At length in the beginning of the fourth book, there is the third transition of the fourth part, but also imperfect from the only preposition of their Bees.  
Now of the eyre honey Bee I'll speak.  
So therefore the Poet studieth to place the most general first, the subalternate middle, the most special in the last place.  
Q. Give another poetical example.  
A. Ovid in Fast. useth this kind of disposition, proposing in the beginning the sum of his work.  
I'll sing of times that pass throughout the year,  
Fall of the stars, and rising I'll declare.  
By and by, having made imploration, he determineth the partition of the year, made first by Romulus, into ten months, which he reprehendeth.  
When as Rooms builder did the year divide,  
In it he made five months, and five beside.  
And a little further he adjoineth Numa his more full Divisor.  
But Numa neither Janus did omit,  
Nor yet the ancient shadows out did put;  
But to th' old months two more appointed he.  
Here the Poet having interpreted the common differences of holy-days, working-days, banquet-dayes, kalends, nonce, ides, at the last he followeth every month in his place, and with a preface after this order, he passeth from generals to the study of specials.  
Ith' whole I have you showed what these things be,  
It now remains we part them presently.  
At length after the exposition of every part, the transition is joined, as in the end of the first, and beginning of the second book.  
The first part of my task is ended now,  
The month is done, my little book also:  
Janus is done, another month beginneth,  
Another book now with that month reneweth.  
And in every one of his books afterward the transitions are adhibited, but less accurately.  
Q. How do the Orators follow this Method?  
A. The Orators in poems, narrations, confirmations, perorations do follow this order, as the nature both of the art, and the order of the thing do require, & sometimes more studiously too.  
Q. Give example.  
A. Cicero in an accusation first by propounding, then by parting, followeth this order. Questor Cu. Paxeris, saith he, thou hast been Consul unto this time fourteen years, and from that day unto this day, in which thou hast made me, I call thee into judgement; there was no void hour found in robbery, wickedness, cruelty, iniquity. This is the proposition and definition of the chief matter, as in this judgement most general. The partition followeth; these are the years consumed in the Questorship, and a Sciatica● Embassage, and the Urban Praetorship, and in the Sicilian Praetorship: wherefore this shall be the fourfold disposition on of my accusation, which four parts with their particular partitions he hath also handled in their several order and place, and coupled them with transitions; the three first in the third book. Wherefore (saith he) his Questorship being showed, and his first magistracy, together with his theft and wickedness looked unto, let us attend to the rest. Then having expounded the faults of his embassadorship, the transition to his Praetorship followeth. But let us now come to that famous Praetorship, & those faults which were more known to those which were present, then to us who come meditated and prepared to pleading. This transition is more imperfect without an epilogue; at length in the beginning of the fourth oration there is the like transition to the fourth part of the Sicilian Praetorship. Many necessary things, O Judges, I must pretermit, that I may in some manner speak of those things which are committed to my trust: for I have received the cause of Sicilia; that Province hath drawn me unto this business.  
Q. Give an example out of the same Historiographer.  
A. Livy doth so embrace the sum of 70. years in the beginning, then divideth them by ten.   

CAP. 20. The secrets of Method.  
Q. It seemeth that in the divers axiomatical homogenes, as also in the judgement of the syllogism, the notes of Method shall be as often as any thing is taught clearly: but is there no other kind of Method?  
A. Yes, when as the auditor shall be deceived in a certain part with delectation and a greater motion● then certain homogenes are rejected, as the lights of definition, partition and transition: and certain heterogenes are assumed, as digressions from the matter, and commotations upon the thing; but chiefly the order of things in the beginning is turned over, and certain antecedents are put after consequents. Therefore to that rule of perfect Method this may seem somewhat more imperfect; the form is not only lame, things being detracted; or abounding, things being added; but also the order of i● being inverted by certain degrees, is preposterours.  
Q. Give an example of it.  
A. The like the Poet maketh with a certain greater kind of artificialness, while he● propoundeth to himself to lead the people, viz. the beastlike heads of the multitude, and therefore he deceiveth divers ways; he beginneth in the middle, & there oftentimes he comprehendeth the first; to conclude the last, he placeth an uncertain and an unthought of chance. So (as Horace saith) Homer disposeth his Iliads.  
Ne doth this man Troy's wars divide so well,  
He always maketh haste th'event to tell:  
Even in the midst his reader he doth catch,  
Leaves off his tract, with haste from it doth snatch;  
And thus he lies, thus mingles false with true,  
So that ne first nor midst in it I view.  
Q. Proceed to further example.  
A. So Virgil taketh AEneas from Sicilia, and makes a narration of him in the banquet of Carthage; and at last bringeth in his divers troubles. So the Commedian Poets, although with great judgement they have distinguished their Comedies by acts and scenes, yet do so effect, that all things seem to be done by chance. The Orators attribute all to victory. Therefore this seemeth to be placed chiefly by them, not so much to teach, as to persuade; when as also those things which do equally excel, are kept even unto the last, and the means are conferred into the middle, according to Homer's disposition.  
FINIS.    

A BRIEF OF THE ART OF RHETORIC.  
Containing in substance All that ARISTOTLE hath written in his Three Books of that Subject, Except only what is not applicable to the English TONGUE.   

A BRIEF Of the ART of RHETORIC. The first Book.  

CHAP. 1. That Rhetoric is an Art consisting not only in moving the passions of the judge; but chiefly in Proofs. And that this Art is profitable.  
WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse: some by chance; but some by method. This method may be discovered: and to discover Method is all one with teaching an Art. If this Art consisted in Criminations only, and the skill to stir up the Judges to Anger, Envy, Fear, Pity, or other affections; a Rhetorician in well ordered Common wealths and States, where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say. For all these perversions of the Judge are beside the question. And that which the pleader is to show, and the Judge to give sentence on, is this only: 'Tis so: or not so. The rest hath been decided already by the Lawmaker; who judging of universals, and future things, could not be corrupted. Besides, 'tis an absurd thing, for a man to make crooked the ruler he means to use.  
It consisteth therefore chiefly in Proofs; which are Inferences: and all Inferences being Sllyogismes, a Logician, if he would observe the difference between a plain Syllogism and an Enthymeme, (which is a Rhetorical Syllogism,) would make the best Rhetorician. For all Syllogisms and Inferences belong properly to Logic; Whether they infer truth or probability: and because without this Art it would often come to pass, that evil men by the advantage of natural abilities, would carry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that are Judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long Scientifical proofs, drawn from the principles through many Syllogisms; and therefore had need to be instructed by the Rhetorical, and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous, to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body, and not to be ashamed of being inferior in the virtue of well expressing the mind.   

CHAP. 2. The Definition of Rhetoric.  
Rhetoric, is that Faculty, by which we understand what will serve our turn, concerning any subject to win belief in the hearer.  
Of those things that beget belief; some require not the help of Art; as Witnesses, Evidences, and the like, which we invent not, but make use of; and some require Art, and are invented by us.  
The belief that proceeds from our invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker; partly from the passions of the hearer: but especially from the proofs of what we allege.  
Proofs are, in Rhetoric, either Examples, or Enthymemes; as in Logic, Inductions, or Syllogisms. For an Example is a short Induction, and an Enthymeme a short Syllogism; out of which are le●t as superfluous, that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer; to avoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of public business needlessly.   

CHAP. 3. Of the several kinds of Orations: and of the Principles of Rhetoric.  
IN all Orations, the Hearer does either hear only; or judge also.  
If he hear only, that's one kind of Oration, and is called Demonstrative.  
If he judge, he must judge either of that which is to come; or of that which is past.  
If of that which is to come, there's another kind of Oration, and is called Deliberative.  
If of that which is past; then 'tis a third kind of Oration, called judicial.  
So there are three kinds of Orations; Demonstrative, judicial Deliberative.  
To which belong their proper times. To the Demonstrative, the Present; To the judicial, the Past; and to the Deliberative, the time to come.  
And their proper Offices. To the Deliberative, Exhortation and Dehortation. To the judicial, Accusation and Defence. And to the Demonstrative, Praising and Dispraising.  
And their proper ends. To the Deliberative, to Prove a thing Profitable, or Unprofitable. To the judicial, Just, or Unjust. To the Demonstrative, Honourable, or Dishonourable.  
The Principles of Rhetoric out of which Enthymemes are to be drawn; are the common opinions that men have concerning Profitable and Unprofitable; Just and unjust, Honourable and Dishonourable; which are the points in the several kinds of Orations questionable. For as in Logic, where certain and infallible knowledge is the scope of our proof, the Principles must be all infallible truths: so in Rhetoric the Principles must be common opinions, such as the Judge is already possessed with: because the end of Rhetoric is victory; which consists in having gotten belief.  
And because nothing is Profitable, Unprofitable, Just, Unjust, Honourable or Dioshonourable, but what has been done, or is to be done; and nothing is to be done, that is not possible: and because there be degrees of Profitable, Unprofitable, Just, Unjust, Honourable, and Dishonourable; an Orator must be ready in other Principles; namely, of what is done and not done; possible and not possible, to come and not to come, and what is Greater, and what is Lesser, both in general, and particularly applied to the thing in question; as what is more and less, generally; and what is more profitable, and less profitable, etc. particularly.   

CHAP. 4. Of the subject of Deliberatives; and the abilities that are required of him that will deliberate of business of State.  
IN Deliberatives there are to be considered the subject, wherein; and the ends whereto the Orator exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.  
The Subject is always something in our own power, the knowledge whereof belongs not to Rhetoric, but for the most part to the Politics; and may be referred in a manner to these five heads.  

1. Of levying of money. To which point he that will speak as he ought to do, aught to know before hand the revenue of the State, now much it is, and wherein it consisteth: and also how great are the necessary charges and expenses of the same. This knowledge is gotten partly by a man's own experience, partly by Relations, and accounts in writing.  
2. Of Peace and War. Concerning which the Counsellor or Deliberator, aught to know the strength of the Commonwealth; how much it both now is, and hereafter may be; and wherein that power consisteth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and Relations at home; and partly by the sight of Wars, and of their events abroad.  
3. Of the safeguard of the Country. Wherein he only is able to give counsel, that knows the forms, and number, and places of the Garrisons.  
4. Of Provision. Wherein to speak well, it is necessary for a man to know what is sufficient to maintain the State; what Commodities they have at home growing; what they must fetch in through need; and what they may carry out through abundance.  
5. Of making Laws. To which is necessary so much Political, or Civil Philosophy, as to know what are the several kinds of Governments; and by what means, either from without or from within, each of those kinds is preserved, or destroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by observing the several Governments in times past, by History; and partly by observing the Government of the times present in several Nations, by Travel.   
So that to him that will speak in a Council of State, there is necessary this; History, Sight of Wars, Travel, Knowledge of the Revenue, Expenses, Forces, Havens, Garrisons, Wares, and Provisions in the State he lives in; and what is needful for that State, either to export, or import.   

CHAP. 5. Of the ends which the Orator in Deliberatives, propoundeth, whereby to exhort, or dehort.  
AN Orator in exhorting always propoundeth Felicity, or some part of Felicity to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto: and in Dehortation the contrary.  
By Felicity, is meant commonly, Prosperity with virtue, or a continual content of the life with surety. And the parts of it are such things as we call good, in body, mind, or fortune; such as these that follow.  

1. Nobility, which to a State or Nation is, to have been ancient inhabitants; and to have had most anciently, and in most ●umber, famous Generals in the Wars, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation. And to a private man, to have been descended lawfully of a family, which hath yielded most anciently, and in most number, men known to the world for virtue, riches, or any thing in general estimation.  
2. Many and good Children. Which is also public and private. Public, when there is much youth in the State endued with virtue, (namely, of the body, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity: Of the mind, valour, and temperance) Private, when a man hath many such Children, both Male and Female. The virtues commonly respected in women, are of the body, Beauty, and Stature; Of the mind, Temperance, and Housewifery, without sordidness.  
3. Riches. Which is, Money, cattle, Lands, Householdstuff; with the power to dispose of them.  
4. Glory. Which is the reputation of Virtue, or of the possession of such things as all, or most men, or wise men desire.  
5. Honour. Which is the glory of benefitting, or being able to benefit others. To benefit others, is to contribute somewhat, not easily had, to another man's safety, or riches. The parts of Honour are, Sacrifices, Monuments, Rewards, Dedication of places, Precedence, Sepulchers, Statues, public Pensions, Adorations, Presents.  
6. Health. Which is the being free from Diseases, with strength to use the body.  
7. Beauty. Which is to different Ages different. To Youth, strength of body, and sweetness of aspect. To full men, strength of body fit for the Wars, and Countenance sweet, with a mixture of Terror. To old men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a Countenance not displeasing.  
8. Strength. Which is the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the Mover. To move, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to press together.  
9 Stature. Which is then just, when a man in height, breadth, and thickness of body doth so exceed the most, as nevertheless it be no hindrance to the quickness of his motion.  
10. Good old Age. Which is, that which comes late, and with the least trouble.  
11. Many and good Friends. Which is, to have many that will do for his sake that which they think will be for his good.  
12. Prosperity. Which is, to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to Fortune.  
13. Virtue. Which is then to be defined, when we speak of Praise.   
These are the grounds from whence we exhort.  
Dehortation is from the contraries of these.   

CHAP. 6. Of the Colours or common opinions concerning Good and Evil.  
IN Deliberatives, the Principles, or Elements from whence we draw our Proofs, are common Opinions concerning Good and Evil. And these Principles are either Absolute, or Comparative. And those that are Absolute, are either Disputable, or Indisputable.  
The Indisputable Principles are such as these;  
Good, is that which we love for itself.  
And that, for which we love some what else.  
And that which all ●hings desire.  
And that to every man which his reason dictates.  
And that, which when we have, we are well, or satisfied.  
And that which satisfies.  
And the Cause or Effect of any of these.  
And that which preserves any of these.  
And that which keeps off, or destroys the contrary of any of these.  
Also to take the Good, and reject the Evil, is Good.  
And to take the greater Good, rather than the less; and the lesser Evil, rather than the greater.  
Further, all Virtues are Good.  
And Pleasure.  
And all things Beautiful.  
And Justice, Valour, Temperance, Magnanimity, Magnificence; and other like habits.  
And Health, Beauty, Strength, etc.  
And Riches.  
And Friends.  
And Honour, and Glory.  
And Ability to say or do: also Towardliness, Will, and the like.  
And Whatsoever Art, or Science.  
And Life.  
And Whatsoever is Just.  
The Disputable Principles are such as follow.  

That is, Good, whose contrary is Evil.  
And whose contrary is good for our Enemies.  
And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of.  
And of which there cannot be too much.  
And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed.  
And that which many desire.  
And that which is praised.  
And that which even our Enemies and evil men praise.  
And What good me prefer.  
And What we do advise.  
And that which is Possible, is Good (to undertake.)  
And that which is Easie.  
And that which depends on our own Will.  
And that which is proper for us to do.  
And what no man else can do.  
And whatsoever is Extraordinary.  
And what is suitable.  
And that which wants a little of being at an end.  
And what we hope to master.  
And what we are fit for.  
And what evil men do not.  
And what we love to do.    

CHAP. 7. Of the Colours, or common Opinions concerning Good and Evil comparatively.  
THE Colours of Good comparatively depend partly upon the following Definitions of Comparatives.  

1. More, is so much, and somewhat besides.  
2. Less, is that, which and somewhat else is so much.  
3. Greater and more in number are said only Comparatively to Lesle, and Fewer in number.  
4. Great and Little, Many and Few, are taken Comparatively to the Most of the same kind. So that Great and Many, is that which exceeds; Little and Few, is that which is exceeded by the Most of the same kind.   
Partly from the precedent Definitions of Good absolutely.  
Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively then are these.  
Greater Good is Many, than Fewer, or one of those many.  
And Greater is the kind, in which the greatest is greater than the greatest of another kind. And greater is that Good than another good, whose kind is greater than fewer kind.  
And Greater is that from which another Good follows; then the Good which follows.  
And of two which exceed a third, Greater is that which exceeds it most.  
And that which causes the greater Good.  
And that which proceeds from a greater Good.  
And Greater is that which is chosen for itself, then that which is chosen from somewhat else.  
And the end greater than that which is not the end.  
And that which less needs other things, then that which more.  
And that which is independent, then that which is dependent of another.  
And the Beginning, than not the Beginning.  
[Seeing the Beginning is a greater Good, or Evil, then that which is not the Beginning; and the End, then that which is not the End; One may argue from this Colour both ways: as Leodamas against Chabri●s, would have the Actor more to blame then the Advisor; and against Calli●tratus, the Advisor more than the Actor.]  
And the Cause, than not the Cause.  
And that which hath a greater Beginning or Cause.  
And the Beginning, or Cause of a greater Good, or Evil.  
And that which is scarce, greater than that which is Plentiful; because harder to get.  
And that which is Plentiful, then that which is Scarce; because oftener in Use.  
And that which is Easy, then that which is Hard.  
And that whose Contrary is greater.  
And that whose Want is greater.  
And Virtue than not Virtue, a greater Good. Vice, than not Vice, a greater Evil.  
And greater Good, or Evil is that, the effects whereof are more Honourable or more Shameful.  
And the effects of greater Virtues, or Vices.  
And the Excess whereof is more tolerable, a greater Good.  
And those things which may with more honour be desired.  
And the desire of better things.  
And those things whereof the Knowledge is better.  
And the Knowledge of better things.  
And that which wise men prefer.  
And that which is in better men.  
And that which better men choose.  
And that which is more, then that which is less delightful.  
And that which is more, then that which is less Honourable.  
And that which we would have for ourselves and Friends, a greater Good; and the contrary a greater Evil.  
And that which is Lasting, then that which is not Lasting.  
And that which is Firm, then that which is not Firm.  
And what many desire, than what few.  
And what the Adversary, or Judge confesseth to be greater, is greater.  
And Common then Common.  
And not Common than not Common.  
And what is more Laudable.  
And that which is more Honoured, a greater Good.  
And that which is more Punished, a greater Evil.  
And both Good and Evil divided then undivided, appear greater.  
And Compounded then Simple, appear greater.  
And that which is done with Opportunity, Age, Place, Time, Means disadvantageous, greater than otherwise.  
And that which is natural, then that which is attained unto.  
And the same part of that which is great, then of that which is less.  
And that which is nearest to the end designed.  
And that which is Good or Evil to one's self, then that which is simply so.  
And Possible, than not possible.  
And that which comes toward the end of our Life.  
And that which we do really, then that which we do for show.  
And that which we would be, rather than what we would seem to be.  
And that which is good for more purposes, is the greater Good.  
And that which serves us in great necessity.  
And that which is joined wi●h less trouble.  
And that which is joined with more delight.  
And of the two, that which added to a third makes the whole the greater.  
And that which having, we are more sensible of.  
And in every thing, that which we most esteem.   

CHAP. 8. Of the several kinds of Governments.  
BEcause Hortation and Dehortation concern the Commonwealth, and are drawn from the Elements of Good and Evil; as we have spoken of them already in the Abstract, so we must speak of them also in the Concrete; that is, of what is Good or Evil to each sort of Commonwealth in special.  
The Government of a Commonwealth, is either Democracy, or Aristocracy, or Oligarchy, or Monarchy.  
Democracy is that, wherein all men with equal right, are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot.  
Aristocracy is that wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those, that had the best education, according to what the Laws prescribe for best.  
Oligarchy is that, where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth.  
Monarchy is that, wherein one man hath the Government of all; which Government, if he limit it by Law, is called Kingdom; if by his own will, Tyranny.  
The end of Democracy, or the People's Government, is Liberty.  
The end of Oligarchy, is the riches of those that govern.  
The end of Aristocracy, is good Laws, and good ordering of the City.  
The end of Monarchy, or Kings, is the safety of the People, and conservation of his own authority.  
Good therefore, in each sort of Government is that which conduceth to these their ends.  
And because belief is not gotten only by proofs, but also from manners; the manners of each sort of Commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to persuade, or dissuade in matter of State. Their manners may be known by their designs; & their designs by their ends; and their ends by what we see them take pleasure in. But of this more accurately in the Politics.   

CAP. 9 Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable.  
IN a Demonstrative Oration, the subject whereof is Praise, or Dispraise; the proofs are to be drawn from the Elements of Honourable, and Dishonourable.  
In this place we anticipate the second way of getting belief; which is from the manners of the Speaker. For Praise, whether it come in as the prinpall business, or upon the by, depends still upon the same Principles. Which are these.  
Honourable, is that, which we love for itself, and is withal laudable.  
And that Good, which pleaseth us only because 'tis Good.  
And Virtue.  
Virtue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good; and the faculty of doing many, and great things well.  
The kinds of it are these; 

1. justice; which is a Virtue whereby every man obtains what by law is his.  
2. Fortitude; which is a Virtue by which a man carries himself honourably, and according to the Laws, in time of danger.  
3. Temperance; which is a Virtue whereby a man governs himself in matter of pleasure according to the Law.  
4. Liberality; which is a Virtue, by which we benefit others in matter of money.  
5. Magnanimity; which is a Virtue, by which a man is apt to do great benefits.  
6. Magnificence; which is a Virtue, by which a man is apt to be at great cost.  
7. Prudence; which is an Intellectual Virtue, by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Felicity.    
And Honourable, are the Causes, and Effects of things Honourable.  
And the Works of Virtue.  
And the signs of Virtue.  
And those actions, the reward whereof is Honor.  
And the reward whereof is rather Honour, than Money.  
And that which we do not for our own sakes.  
And what we do for our Country's good, neglecting our own.  
And those things are Honourable, which good of themselves, are not so to the Owner.  
And those things which happen to the dead, rather than to the living.  
And what we do for other men, especially for Benefactors.  
And bestowing of Benefits.  
And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.  
And those things which men strive for earnestly, but without fear of Adversary.  
And of the more Honourable, and better men, the Virtues are more Honourable.  
And more Honourable are the virtues that tend to other men's benefit, than those which tend to ones own.  
And Honourable are those things which are Just.  
And Revenge is Honourable.  
And Victory.  
And Honor.  
And Monuments.  
And those things which happen not to the living.  
And things that excel.  
And what none can do but we.  
And Possessions we reap no profit by.  
And those things which are had in honour particularly in several places.  
And the signs of praise.  
And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or Mechanic.  
And that which seems Honourable; Namely such as follow; 

Vices confining upon Virtue.  
And the extremes of Virtues.  
And what the Auditors think Honourable.  
And that which is in estimation.  
And that which is done according to custom.    
Besides, in a Demonstrative Oration, the Orator must show, that he whom he praiseth, did what he praiseth unconstrainedly, and willingly.  
And he does so, who does the same often.  
Praise, is speech, declaring the magnitude of a Virtue, Action, or Work.  
But to praise the Work from the Virtue of the Worker, is a circular Proof.  
To Magnify, and to Praise, differ in themselves, as Felicity and Virtue. For Praise declares a man's Virtue; and Magnifying declares his Felicity.  
Praise is a kind of inverted Precept. For to say, Do it because 'tis good, is a Precept. But to say, He is good because he did it, is Praise.  
An Orator in Praising must also use the forms of Amplification; such as these: 

He was the first that did it.  
The only man that did it.  
The special man that did it.  
He did it with disadvantage of Time.  
He did it with little help.    
He was the cause, that the Law ordained Rewards and Honours for such Actions.  
Further, he that will praise a Man, must compare him with others; and his actions with the actions of others; especially with such as are renowned.  
And Amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Oration then to any other. For here the Actions are confessed; and the Orator's part is only this, to contribute unto them Magnitude and Luster.   

CHAP. 10. Of Accusation and Defence, with the Definition of Injury.  
IN a judicial Oration, which consists in Accusation and Defence, the thing to be proved is, that Injury has been done: and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn, are these three: 

1. The causes that move to Injury.  
2. The Persons apt to do Injury.  
3. The Persons obnoxious, or apt to suffer Injury.    
An Injury is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the Law.  
Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge, and without compulsion.  
The causes of Voluntary Actions are Intemperance, and a Vicious disposition concerning things Desirable. A● the Covetous man does against ●he Law, out of an intemperate desire of Money.  
All Actions proceed either from the doers disposition, or not.  
Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Chance, by Compulsion, or by Natural necessity.  
Those that proceed from the Doers disposition, are such as he does by Custom, or upon Premeditation, or in Anger, or out of Intemperance.  
By Chance are said to be done those things, whereof neither the Cause, nor the Scope is evident; and which are done neither orderly, nor always, nor most commonly after the same manner.  
By Nature are said to be done those things, the Causes whereof are in the Doer; and are done orderly, and always, or for the most part after the same manner.  
By Compulsion are done those things, which are against the Appetite, and Ordination of the Doer.  
By Custom those Actions are said to be done, the Cause whereof is this, that the Doer has done them often.  
Upon Premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit, as the End, or the way to the End.  
In Anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose of Revenge.  
Out of Intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightful.  
In sum, every Voluntary Action tends either to Profit or Pleasure.  
The Colours of Profitable are already set down.  
The Colours of that which is Pleasing follow next.   

CHAP. 11. Of the Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Pleasure.  
PLeasure is a sudden and sensible motion of the Soul, towards that which is Natural.  
Grief is the Contrary.  
Pleasant therefore is that, which is the cause of such motion.  
And to return to ones own Nature.  
And Customs.  
And those things that are not violent.  
Unpleasant are those things, which proceed from Necessity, as Cares, Study, Contentions. The contrary whereof, Ease, Remission from Labour and Care: also Play, Rest, Sleep, are Pleasant.  
Pleasant also is that, to which we have an appetite.  
Also the appetites themselves, if they be sensual; as Thirst, Hunger, and Lust.  
Also those things to which we have an appetite upon persuasion and Reason.  
And those things we remember, whether they pleased, or displeased, then when they were present.  
And the things we hope for.  
And Anger.  
And to be in Love.  
And Revenge.  
And Victory. Therefore  
Also contentious Games; as Tables, Chess, Dice, Tennis, etc.  
And Hunting.  
And Suits in Law.  
And Honour and Reputation amongst men in Honour and Reputation.  
And to Love.  
And to be Beloved and Respected.  
And to be admired.  
And to be Flattered.  
And a Flatterer: (for be seems both to love and admire.)  
And the same thing Often.  
And Change, or Variety.  
And What we return to afresh.  
And to Learn.  
And to admire.  
And to do Good.  
And to receive Good.  
And to help up again one that's fallen.  
And to finish that which is unperfect.  
And Imitation.  
And therefore the Art of Painting.  
And the Art of Carving Images.  
And the Art of Poetry.  
And Pictures and Statues.  
And other men's Dangers, so they be near.  
And to have escaped hardly.  
And things of a kind please one another.  
And every one himself.  
And one's own pleases him.  
And to bear Sway.  
And to be thought Wise.  
And to dwell upon that which he is good at.  
And ridiculous actions, Sayings and Persons.   

CHAP. 12. Presumptions of Injury drawn from the persons that do it: or Common Opinious concerning the aptitude of Persons to do Injury.  
OF the Causes which move to Injury, namely, Profit and Pleasure, has been already spoken, Chap. 6. 7. 11.  
It follows next to speak of the Persons, that are apt to do Injury.  
The Doers of Injury are.  

Such as think they can do it.  
And such as think to be undiscovered when they have done it.  
And such as think, though they be discovered, they shall not be called in question for it.  
And such as think, though they be called in question for it, that their Mulct will be less than their Gain, which either themselves or their friends receive by the Injury.   
Able to do Injury are.  

Such as are Eloquent.  
And such as are practised in business.  
And such as have skill in Process.  
And such as have many Friends.  
And Rich Men.  
And such as have Rich Friends; or Rich Servants; or Rich Partners.   
Undiscovered when they have done it, are 

Such are not apt to commit the crimes whereof they are accused: as Feeble Men, Slaughter: Poor, and not Beautiful Men, Adultery.  
And such as one would think could not choose but be discovered.  
And such as do Injuries, whereof there hath been no Example.  
And such as have none, or many enemies.  
And such as can easily conceal what they do.  
And such as have some body to transfer the fault upon.    
They that do Injury openly, are 

Such, whose friends have been injured.  
And such as have the Judge's fo● friends.  
And such as can escape their trial at Law.  
And such as can put off their trial.  
And such as can corrupt the Judges.  
And such as can avoid the payment of their fine.  
And such as can defer the payment.  
And such as cannot pay at all.  
And such as by the Injury get manifestly, much, and presently; when the fine is uncertain, little, and to come.  
And such as get by the Injury, money; by the penalty, shame only.  
And such on the contrary, as get honour by the Injury, and suffer the mulct of money only, or banishment, or the like.  
And such as have often escaped, or been undiscovered.  
And such as have often attempted in vain.  
And such as consider present pleasure, more than pain to come; and so intemperate men are apt to do Injury.  
And such as consider pleasure to come, more than present pain; and so temperate men are apt to do Injury.  
And such as may seem to have done it by Fortune, Nature, Necessity, or Custom; and by Error rather than by Injustice.  
And such as have means to get pardon.  
And such as want Necessaries, as poor men: or Unnecessaries, as rich men●  
And such as are of very good, or very bad Reputation.     

CHAP. 13. Presumptions of Injury drawn from the Persons that suffer, and from the matter of the Injury.  
OF those that do Injury, and why they do it, it hath been already spoken.  
Now of the persons that suffer, and of the Matter wherein they suffer, the common Opinions are these:  
Persons obnoxious to Injury are, 

Such as have the things that we want either as necessary, or as delightful.  
And such as are far from us.  
And such as are at hand.  
And such as are unwary, and Cre●dulous.  
And such as are Lazy.  
And such as are Modest.  
And such as have swallowed many Injuries.  
And such as we have injured often before.  
And such as never before.  
And such as are in our danger.  
And such as are ill beloved generally.  
And such as are envied.  
And our Friends.  
And our Enemies.  
And such as, wanting friends, have no great ability either in speech or action.  
And such as shall be loser's by going to Law; as Strangers, and Workmen.  
And such as have done the Injuries they suffer.  
And such as have committed a crime, or would have done, or are about to do.  
And such as, by doing them an Injury, we shall gratify our friends or superiors.  
And such, whose friendship we have newly left, and accuse.  
And such as another would do the Injury to, if we should not.  
And such as by injuring, we get greater means of doing good.    
The Matters wherein men are obnoxious to Injury are, 

Those things wherein all, or most men use to deal unjustly.  
And those things which are easily hid, and put off into other hands, or altered.  
And those things which a man is ashamed to have suffered.  
And those things wherein prosecution of Injury, may be thought a love of contention.     

CAP. 14. Of those things which are necessary t● be known for the Definition of Just and Unjust.  
WHen the fact is evident, the next inquiry is, whether it be just, or unjust.  
For the Definition of Just and Unjust, we must know what Law is; tha● is, what the Law of Nature, what the Law of Nations; what the Law Civil, what written Law, and what unwritten Law is: and what Persons; that is, what a public Person, or the City is; and what a private Person, or Citizen is.  
unjust in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the Law of Nature.  
unjust in the opinion of all men of those Nations which traffic and come together, is that which is contrary to the Law common to those Nations.  
unjust only in one Commonwealth, is that which is contrary to the Law Civil, or Law of that Commonwealth.  
He that is accused to have done any thing against the Public, or a private Person, is accused to do it either ignorantly, or unwillingly, or in anger, or upon premeditation.  
And because the defendant does many times confess the fact, but deny the unjustice; as that he took, but did not steal; and did, but not adultery; it is necessary to know the Definitions of Theft, Adultery, and all other crimes.  
What facts are contrary to the written Laws, may be known by the Laws themselves.  
Besides written Laws, whatsoever is Just, proceeds from Equity, or Goodness.  
From Goodness proceeds that which we are praised, or honoured for.  
From Equity proceed those actions, which though the written Law command not, yet being interpreted reasonably, and supplied, seems to require at our hands.  
Actions of Equity are such as these.  
Not too rigorously to punish Errors, Mischances, or Injuries.  
To pardon the faults that adhere to Mankind.  
And not to consider the Law so much, as the Lawmakers mind; and not the Words so much, as the mean●●● of the Law.  
And not to regard so much the Fact, as the intention of the Doer; nor part of the Fact, but the Whole; nor what the Doer is, but what he has been always, or for the most part.  
And to remember better the Good received, than the iii.  
And to endure injuries patiently.  
And to submit rather to the sentence of a Judge, then of the sword.  
And to the sentence of an Arbitrator, rather than of a Judge.   

CHAP. 15. Of the Colours or Common Opinions concerning Injuries, comparatively.  
Common Opinions concerning Injuries comparatively, are such as these:  
Greater is the Injury which proceed from greater Iniquity.  
And from which proceedeth greater's damage.  
And of which there is no revenge.  
And for which there is no remedy.  
And by occasion of which, he that hath received the Injury, hath done some mischief to himself.  
He does the greater Injury, that does it first, or alone, or with few.  
And he that does it often.  
Greater Injury is that, against which Laws and Penalties were first made.  
And that which is more brutal, or more approaching to the actions of beasts.  
And that which is done upon more premeditation.  
And by which more Laws are broken.  
And which is done in the place of execution.  
And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the Injury.  
And which is committed against well deservers.  
And which is committed against the unwritten Law; because good men should observe the Law for Justice, and not for fear of punishment.  
And which is committed against the written Law; because he that will do Injury neglecting the penalty set down in the written Law, is much more likely to transgress the unwritten Law, where there is no penalty at all.   

CHAP. 16. Of Proofs inartificial.  
OF Artificial Proofs we have already spoken.  
inartificial Proofs, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five sorts.  

1. Laws. And those are Civil, or written Law: the Law or Custom of Nations: and the universal Law of Nature.  
2. Witness. And those are such as concern Matter; and such as concern Manners. Also, they be ancient, or present.  
3. Evidences, or Writings.  
4. Question, or Torture.  
5. Oaths. And those be either given, or taken, or both, or neither.   
For Laws, we use them thus.  
When the written Law makes against us, we appeal to the Law of Nature, alleging, 

That to be greatest Justice, which is greatest Equity.  
That the Law of Nature is immutable; the written Law mutable.  
That the written Law is but seeming Justice; the Law of Nature very Justice. And Justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be.  
That the Judge ought to discern between true and adulterate Justice.  
That they are better men that obey unwritten, then written Laws.  
That the Law against us does contradict some other Law. And when the Law has a double interpretation, that is the true one, which makes for us.  
And that the cause of the Law being abolished, the Law is no more of Validity.    
But when the written Law makes for us, and Equity for the Adversary, we must allege, 

That a Man may use Equity, not as a liberty to judge against the Law; but only as a security against being forsworn, when he knows not the Law.  
That men seek not Equity because 'tis good simply, but because good for them.  
That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the Law.  
That as in other Arts, and namely in Physic, Fallacies are pernicious; so in a Commonwealth 'tis pernicious to use pretexts against the Law.  
And that in Commonwealths well instituted, to seem wiser than the Laws, is prohibited.    
For Witnesses, we must use them thus: 

When we have them not, we must stand for Presumptions, and say, 

That in Equity sentence ought to be given according to the most probability.  
That Presumptions are the testimony of the things themselves, and cannot be bribed.  
That they cannot lie.    
When we have witnesses, against him that has them not, we must say, 

That Presumptions, if they be false, cannot be punished.  
That if Presumptions were enough, witnesses were superfluous.      
For writings, when they favour us; we must say, 

That writings are private and particular Laws; and he that takes away the use of Evidences, abolisheth the Law.  
That since Contracts and Negotiations pass by writings, he that bars their use, dissolves humane Society.  
Against them, if they favour the Adversary, we may say,  
That since Laws do not bind, that are fraudulently made to pass, much less writings.  
And that the Judge being to dispense Justice, ought rather to consider what is just, than what is in the Writing.  
That Writings may be gotten by fraud or force; but Justice by neither.  
That the Writing is repugnant to some Law, Civil, or Natural; or to justice; or to Honesty.  
That 'tis repugnant to some other writing before, or after.  
That it crosses some commodity of the Judge (which must not be said directly, but implied cunningly.)    
For the Torture, if the giving of it make for us, we must say, 

That 'tis the only testimony that is certain.  
But if it make for the Adversary, we may say.  
That men enforced by Torture, speak as well that which is false, as that which is true.  
That they who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from pain.    
For Oaths; he that will not put his Adversary to his Oath, may allege, 

That he makes no scruple to be forsworn.  
That by swearing, he will carry the cause; which not swearing, he must lose.  
That he had rather trust his cause in the hand of the Judge, then of the Adversary.    
He that refuseth to take the Oath, may say, 

That the matter is not worth so much.  
That if he had been an evil man, he had sworn, and carried his cause.  
That to try it by swearing for a religious man against an irreligious, is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in Combat.    
He that is willing to take the Oath, may pretend.  

That he had rather trust himself, than his Adversary; and that 'tis equal dealing for an irreligious man to give, and for a religious man to take the Oath.  
That 'tis his duty to take the Oath, since he has required to have sworn judges.   
He that Offers the Oath may preten●, 

That he does piously commit his cause to the Gods.  
That he makes his Adversary himself Judge.  
That 'twere absurd for him not to swear, that has required the Judges to be sworn.  
And of these are to be compounded the Forms we are to use, when we would give, and not take the Oath; or take, and not give; or both give and take; or neither give nor take.    
But if one have sworn contrary to a former Oath, he may pretend; 

That he was forced.  
That he was deceived, and that nether of these is Perjury, since Perjury is voluntary.    
But if the Adversary do so, he may say; 

That he that stands not to what he hath sworn, subverteth humane society.  
And (turning to the Judge) What reason have we to require, that you should be sworn, that judge o●r cause; when we will not stand to that we swear ourselves.  
And so much for Proofs inartificial.      

The second Book.  

CHAP. 1. The Introduction.  
OF Belief proceeding from our Invention, that part which consisteth in proof, is already spoken of.  
The other two parts follow; whereof one ariseth from the manners of the speaker; the other from the passions of the Hearer.  
The Principles, Colours, or Common Opinions upon which a man's belief is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be had partly out of that which hath been said before concerning Virtue, Book. 1. Chap. 9 partly out of those things which shall be said by and by, concerning the Passions. For a man is believed either for his Prudence, or for his Probity, which are Virtues; or for good will: of which among the Passions.  
The Principles concerning belief, arising from the passion of the Hearer, are to be gathered from that which shall now be said of the several Passions in order.  
In every one of which three things are to be considered.  

1. First, how men are affected.  
2. Secondly, Towards whom.  
3. Thirdly, For what.    

CHAP. 2. Of Anger.  
ANger is desire of revenge, joined with grief for that He, or some of his, is, or seems to be neglected.  
The object of Anger is always some particular, or indiduall thing.  
In Anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagination of revenge to come.  
To Neglect, is to esteem little or nothing: and of three kinds.  

1. Contempt.  
2. Crossing.  
3. Contumely.   
Contempt, is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself.  
Crossing is the hindrance of another man's will without design to profit himself.  
Contumely, is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.  
The common Opinions concerning Anger are therefore such as follow.  

They are easily Angry that think they are neglected.  
That think they excel others; as the Rich with the Poor; the Noble with the Obscure, etc.  
And such as think they deserve well.  
And such as grieve to be hindered, opposed, or not assisted. And therefore sick men, poor men, Lovers, and generally all that desire, and attain not, are Angry with those that standing by, are not moved with their wants.  
And such as having expected good, find evil.   
Those that men are Ang●● with, are, 

Such as mock, deride, or jest at them.  
And such as show any kind of Contumely towards them.  
And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon: and the more, by how much we seem the less advanced therein.  
And our friends, rather than those that are not our friends.  
And such as have honoured us, if they continue not.  
And such as requite not our courtesy.  
And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiors.  
And our friends, if they have said, or done us evil, or not good.  
And such as give not ear to our entreaty.  
And such as are joyful, or calm in our distress.  
And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled.  
And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces.  
And such as neglect us in the presence of our Competitors; of those we admire, of those we would have admire us; of those we reverence, and of those that reverence us.  
And such as should help us, and neglect it  
And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest.  
And such as forget us, or our Names.    
An Orator therefore must so frame his judge or Auditor by his Oration; as to make him apt to Anger: and then make his Adversary appear such as men use to be angry withal   

CHAP. 3. Of Reconciling, or Pacifying Anger.  
REconciliation is the Appeasing of Anger.  
Those, to whom men are easily reconciled, are, 

Such as have not offended out of Neglect.  
And such as have done it against their will.  
And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done.  
And such as have done as much to themselves.  
And such as confess and repent.  
And such as are humbled.  
And such as do seriously the same things, that they do seriously.  
And such as have done them more good heretofore, then now hurt.  
And such as sue to them for any thing.  
And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor slighters of others in their own disposition.  
And generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those, whom men are usually angry withal.  
And such as they fear or reverence.  
And such as reverence them.  
And such as have offended their Anger    
Reconcilable are, 

Such as are contrarily affected to those whom we have said before to be easily angry.  
And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live in plenty; and in sum, all that have no cause of grief.  
And such as have given their anger time.    
Men lay down their Anger for these causes.  

Because they have gotten the Victory.  
Because the Offender has suffered more than they meant to inflict.  
Because they have been revenged of another.  
Because they think they suffer justly.  
And because they think the revenge will not be felt, or not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury.  
And because the Offender is dead.   
Whosoever therefore would assuage the anger of his Auditor, must make himself appear such, as men use to be reconciled unto: and beget in his Auditor such opinions, as make him reconcileable.   

CHAP. 4. Of Love and Friends.  
TO Love, is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake.  
A Friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved.  
Friends one to another, are they that mutually love one another.  
A Friend therefore is he, 

That rejoiceth at another's Good.  
And that grieves at his hurt.  
And that wishes the same with us t● a third, whether good, or hurt.  
And that is enemy or friend to the same man.    
We love them, 

That have done good to us, or ours especially if much, readily, or in seaso●●  
That are our Friends Friends.  
That are our Enemy's Enemies.  
That are Liberal.  
That are Valiant.  
That are Just.  
And that we would have love us.  
And good Companions.  
And such as can abide Jests.  
And such as break Jests.  
And such as praise us, especially for somewhat that we doubt of in ourselves.  
And such as are neat.  
And such as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits.  
And such as quickly forget injuries.  
And such as least observe our Errors.  
And such as are not of ill tongue.  
And those that are ignorant of our Vices.  
And such as cross us not when we are busy, or angry.  
And such as are officious towards us.  
And those that are like us.  
And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.  
And such as labour for the same thing, when both may be satisfied.  
And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such, as the world, rather than their own consciences condemns.  
And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults.  
And such as we would have honour us; and not envy, but imitate us.  
And such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to ourselves.  
And such as continue their friendship to the dead.  
And such as speak their mind.  
And such as are not terrible.  
And such as we may rely on.    
The several kinds of friendship, are Society, Familiarity, Consanguinity, Affinity, etc.  
The things that beget love, are, 

The bestowing of Benefits. Gratis.  
The bestowing of Benefits. Unasked.  
The bestowing of Benefits. Privately.     

CHAP. 5. Of Enmity and Hatred.  
THE Colours, or Common Opinion concerning Hatred are to be take● from the contrary of those, which concern Love and Friendship.  
Hatred differs from Anger in this, 

That Anger regards only what i● what is done to ones self; but Hatred not.  
And in this, that Anger regards particulars only; the other universals also.  
And in this, that Anger is curable, Hatred not.  
And in this, that Anger seeks the vexation, Hatred the damage of ones Adversary.  
That with Anger there is always joined Grief; with Hatred not always.  
That Anger may at length be satiated, but Hatred never.    
Hence it appears how the Judge, or Auditor may be made Friend, or Enemy to us; and how our Adversary may be made appear Friend or Enemy to the Judge; and how we may answer to our Adversary, that would make us appear Enemies to him.   

CAP. 6. Of Fear.  
FEar is a trouble, or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or destroy.  
Danger is the nearness of the evil feared.  
The things to be Feared, are, 

Such as have pow●r to hurt.  
And the signs of will to do us hurt, as Anger and Hatred of powerful men.  
And Injustice joined with power.  
And Valour provoked, joined with power.  
And the fear of powerful men.    
The men that are to be feared, are, 

Such as know our faults.  
And such as can do us injury.  
And such as think they are injured by us.  
And such as have done us injury.  
And our Competitors in such things as cannot satisfy both.  
And such as are feared by more powerful men than we are.  
And such as have destroyed greater men than we are.  
And such as use to invade their inferiors.  
And men not passionate, but dissemblers, and crafty, are more to be feared ●hen those that are hasty and free.    
The things especially to be feared are, 

Such, wherein if we err, the error cannot be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our Adversaries pleasure.  
And such as admit either none, or not easy help.  
And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity them.    
They that fear not, are 

Such as expect not evil; or not now; or not this; or not from these.  
And therefore men fear little in prosperity.  
And men fear little that think they have suffered already.    
An Orator therefore that would put Fear into the Auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious; and that greater than he do suffer, and have suffered from those, and at those times they lest thought.   

CHAP. 7. Of Assurance.  
ASsurance is hope, arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evil afar off.  
The things therefore that beget Assurance are, 

The remoteness of those things that are to be feared, and the nearness of their contraries.  
And the facility of great, or many helps or remedies.  
And neither to have done; nor received Injury.  
And to have no Competitors, or not great ones, or if great ones, at least friends; such as we have obliged, or are obliged to.  
And that the danger is extended to more, or greater than us.  
Assured, or Confident, are, They that have oft escaped danger.  
And they to whom most things have succeeded well.  
And they that see their Equals, or inferiors not afraid.  
And they that have wherewith to make themselves feared, as wealth, strength, etc.  
And such as have done others no wrong.  
And such as think themselves in good terms with God-Almighty.  
And such as think they will speed well, that are gone before.     

CHAP. 8. Of Shame.  
SHame is a perturbation of the Mind arising from the apprehension of Evil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a Mans own, or his friend's reputation.  
The things therefore which men are ashamed of are those Actions which proceed from Vice, as, 

To throw away ones arms; to run away, signs of Cowardliness.  
To deny that which is committed to one's trust, a sign of Injustice.  
To have lain with whom, where, and when we ought not, signs of Intemperance.  
To make gain of small and base things; not to help with money whom and how much we ought; to receive help from meaner men; to ask money at use from such as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expect payment of somewhat before lent; and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and so to praise, as one may be thought to ask; signs of Wretchedness.  
To praise one to his face; to praise his virtues too much, and colour his vices; Signs of Flattery.  
To be unable to endure such labours as men endure that are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of less strength than he, signs of Effeminacy.  
To be beholding often to another; and to upbraid those that are beholding to him, ●ignes of Pusillanimity.  
To speak and promise much of ones self more than his due, signs of Arrogance.  
To want those things which ones Equals, all, or most of them have attained to, is also a thing to be ashamed of.  
And to suffer things ignominious, as to serve about another's person; or to be employed in his base actions.  
In Actions of Intemperance, whether willingly, or unwillingly committed; there is shame in Actions of Force, only when they are done unwillingly.    
The men before whom we are ashamed, are such as we respect; namely, 

Those that admire us.  
And those whom we desire should admire us.  
And those whom we admire.  
Those that contend with us for honour.  
Those whose opinion we contemn not.    
And therefore men are most ashamed in the presence 

Of old and well bred men.  
Of those we are always to live with.  
Of those that are not guilty of the same fault.  
Of those that do not easily pardon.  
And of those that are apt to reveal our faults; such as are men injured, Backbiters, Scoffers, Comic Poets.  
And of those before whom we have had always good success.  
And of those who never asked any thing of us before.  
And of such as desire our Friendship.  
And of our familiars, that know none of our Crimes.  
And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named before.    
But in the presence of such whose judgement most men despise, men are not ashamed.  
Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence 

Of those whom we reverence.  
And of those who are concerned in our own, or Ancestors, or Kinsfolks actions or misfortune's, if they be shameful.  
And of their Rivals.  
And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace.    
The Common Opinions concerning Impudence are taken from the contrary of these.   

CHAP. 9 Of Grace, or Favour.  
GRace is that Virtue, by which a man is said to do a good turn, or do service to a man in need; not for his own, but for his cause to whom he do●● it.  
Great Grace is when the need is great; or when they are hard, or difficult things that are conferred, or when the time is seasonable, or when he that conferr's the favour is the only, or first man that did it.  
Need, is a desire joined with grief for the absence of the thing desired.  
Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.  
Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a Grace, or Favour, must show that he needed it to whom it was done.  
Grace it is not, 

Which is done by Chance.  
Nor which is done by Necessity.  
Nor which has been requited.  
Nor that which is done to ones Enemy.  
Nor that which is a trifle.  
Nor that which is naught, if the Giver know the fault.    
And in this manner a man may go over the Predicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a Grace for being This, or for being so Much, or for being Such, or for being Now, etc.   

CHAP. 10. Of Pity, or Compassion.  
PIty is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to himself, or his.  
And because it appertains to Pity, to think that he, or his may fall into the misery he pities in others, it follows that they be most compassionate, 

Who have passed through Misery.  
And old men.  
And weak men.  
And timorous men.  
And learned men.  
And such as have Parents, Wife, and Children.  
And such as think there be honest men.    
And that they are less Compassionate, 

Who are in great despair.  
Who are in great prosperity.  
And they that are Angry; for they consider not.  
And they that are very Confident; for they also consider not.  
And they that are in the Act of contumely; for neither do these consider.  
And they that are astonished with fear.  
And they that think no man honest.    
The things to be pitied are, 

Such as grieve, and withal hurt.  
Such as destroy.  
And Calamities of fortune, if they be great: as none or few friends, dedeformity, weakness, lameness, etc.  
And evil that arrives where good is expected.  
And after extreme Evil, a little Good.  
And through a man's life to have no good offer itself; or being offered, not to have been able to enjoy it.    
Men to be pitied are, 

Such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own.  
And such as be of our own years.  
Such as are like us in manners.  
Such as are of the same, or like stock.  
And our Equals in dignity.  
Those that have lately suffered, or are shortly to suffer injury: and those that have the marks of injury past.  
And those that have the words or actions of them that be in present misery.     

CHAP. 11. Of Indignation.  
OPposite in a manner to Pity in good men, is Indignation, which is grief for the prosperity of a man unworthy.  
With Indignation there is always joined a joy for the prosperity of a man worthy, as Pity is always with contentment in the adversity of them that deserve it.  
In wicked men the opposite of pity is,  
Envy; as also the companion thereof, delight in the harm of others, which the Greeks in one word have called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But of these in the next Chapter.  
Men conceive Indignation against others, not for their virtues, as Justice, etc. For these make Men worthy; and in Indignation we think men unworthy.  
But for those goods which men endued with virtue, and noble men, and handsome men are worthy of.  
And for newly gotten power and riches, rather than for ancient, and especially if by these he has gotten other goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater Indignation against new then ancient Riches, is, that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs. but the ancient seem to have but their own. For with common people, to have been so long, is to be so by Right.  
And for the bestowing of goods incongruously: as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles were bestowed on the most eloquent Ulysses.  
And for the comparison of the Inferior in the same thing, as when one Valiant is compared with a more Valiant; or whether absolutely Superior, as when a good Scholar is compared with a good Man.  
Apt to Indignation are, 

They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them.  
And they that are good.  
And they that are ambitious.  
And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth, than he that hath it.    
Least apt to Indignation are, 

Such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious Nature.  
Who they are, that Rejoice, or Grieve not at the Adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions, may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said.  
Whosoever therefore would turn away the compassion of the Judge, he must make him apt to Indignation; and show that his Adversary is unworthy of the Good, and worthy of the Evil which happens to him.     

CHAP. 12. Of Envy.  
ENvy is grief, for the prosperity of such as ourselves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they receive.  
Such as ourselves, I call those that are equal to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means.  
They are apt to Envy, 

That are within a little of the highest.  
And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is singular in them, especially Wisdom or good Fortune.  
And such as would be thought wise.  
And such as catch at glory in every action.  
And men of poor spirits: for every thing appears great to them.    
The things which men envy in others are, 

Such as bring glory.  
And goods of Fortune.  
And such things as we desire for ourselves.  
And things in the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us a little.    
Obnoxious to envy are,  
Men of our own time, of our own Country, of our own age, and Competitors of our glory.  
And therefore, 

Those whom we strive with for honour.  
And those that covet the same things that we do.  
And those that get quickly, what we hardly obtain, or not at all.  
And those that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us.  
And those that possess what we have possessed heretofore. So old and decayed men envy the young and lusty.  
And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be envied by such as have bestowed much upon the same thing.    
From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Joy for other men's hurt.  
He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevail, when he craves pity, or other favour; must dispose the Judge to Envy; and make his Adversary appear such, as are above described, to be subject to the Envy of others.   

CHAP. 13. Of Emulation.  
EMulation is grief arising from that our Equals possess such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not we also.  
No man therefore Emulates another in things whereof himself is not capable.  
Apt to Emulate are, 

Such as esteem themselves worthy of more than they have.  
And Young and Magnanimous Men.  
And such as already possess the goods for which men are honoured: for they measure their worth by their having.  
And those that are esteemed worthy by others.  
And those whose Ancestors, Kindred, Familiars, Nation, City, have been eminent for some good, do Emulate others for that good.    
Objects of Emulation are, for things; 

Virtues.  
And things whereby we may profit others.  
And things whereby we may please others.    
For Persons, 

They that possess such things.  
And such as many desire to be friends or acquainted with, or like unto.  
And they whose praises fly abroad,  
The contrary of Emulation is Contempt.  
And they that Emulate such as have the goods aforementioned, Contemn such as have them not: and thence it is, that men who live happily enough, unless they have the goods which men honour, are nevertheless Contemned.     

CHAP. 14. Of the Manners of Youth.  
OF Passions we have already spoken.  
We are next to speak of Manners.  
Manners are distinguished by Passions, Habits, Ages, and Fortunes.  
What kind of Manners proceed from Passions, and from Virtues and Vices (which are Habits,) hath been already showed.  
There remains to be spoken of the Manners, that are peculiar to several Ages and Fortunes.  
The Ages are Youth, Middle-Age, Old-Age.  
And first of Youth.  
Young men are, 

Violent in their desirest  
Prompt to execute their desires.  
Incontinent.  
Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before.  
Longing mightily, and soon satisfied.  
Apt to anger, and in their anger Violent: and ready to execute their anger with their hands.  
Lovers of Honour, and of Victory more than Money, as having not been yet in Want.  
Well natured, as having not been acquainted with much malice.  
Full of hope, both because they have not yet been often frustrated, & because they have by natural heat that disposition that other Ages have by Wine; Youth being a kind of natural drunkness. Besides, Hope is of the time to come, whereof Youth hath much, but of the time past little.  
Credulous, because not yet often deceived.  
Easily deceived, because full of Hope.  
Valiant, because apt to Anger and full of Hope; whereof this begets confidence, the other keeps off Fear.  
Bashful, because they estimate the Honour of Actions by the precepts of the Law.  
Magnanimous, because not yet dejected by the misfortunes of humane life.  
And lovers of Honour more than of Profit, because they live more by Custom than by Reason; & by Reason we acquire Profit, but Virtue by Custom.  
Lovers of their Friends and Companions.    
Apt to err in the excess, rather than the defect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, Ne quid nimis; for they overdo every thing: they Love too much, and Hate too much, because thinking themselves wise, they are obstinate in the opinion they have once delivered.  
Doers of Injury rather for Contumely then for damage.  
Merciful, because measuring others by their own Innocence, they think them better than they be, and therefore less to merit what they suffer; which is a cause of Pity.  
And Lovers of Mirth, and by consequence such as love to jest at others.  
jesting is witty Contumely.   

CHAP. 15. Of the Manners of Old Men.  
THe Manners of Old men are in a manner the contraries of those of Youth.  
They determine nothing: they do every thing less vehemently than is fit: they never say they know; but to every thing they say, perhaps and peradventure; which comes to pass from that having lived long, they have often mistaken and been deceived.  
They are peevish because they interpret every thing to the worst.  
And suspicious through Incredulity, and Incredulous by reason of their Experience  
They Love and Hate, as if they meant to continue in neither.  
Are of poor spirits, as having been humbled by the chances of life.  
And Covetous, as knowing how easy 'tis to lose, and hard to get.  
And Timorous, as having been cooled by years.  
And greedy of life: for good things seem greater by the want of them.  
And Lovers of themselves out of Pusillanimity.  
And seek profit more than Honour, because they love themselves; and Profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for ones self.  
And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming.  
And hope little; knowing by Experience that many times good Counsel has been followed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.  
And live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof Old men have good store.  
And are full of Talk, because they delight in their Memory.  
And Vehement in their anger; but not stout enough to execute it.  
They have weak, or no desires, and thence seem Temperate.  
They are slaves to Gain.  
And live more by reason then Custom; because reason leads to Profit, as Custom to that which is Honourable.  
And do Injury to endamage, and not in Contumely.  
And are merciful by Compassion, or imagination of the same Evils in themselves; which is a kind of Infirmity, and not Humanity, as in Young Men, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer Evil.  
And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from evil, because of their Infirmity.  
Seeing then every man loves such men, and their discourses, which are most agreeable to their own Manners; 'tis not hard to collect, how the Orator, and his Oration may be made acceptable to the Hearer, whether Young or Old.   

CHAP. 16. Of the Manners of Middle-aged men.  
THe Manners of Middle-aged men, are between those of Youth, and Old Men: and therefore, 

They neither dare, nor fear too much: but both as is fit.  
They neither believe all; nor reject all; but judge.  
They seek not only what is Honourable, nor only what is Profitable; but both.  
They are neither Covetous, nor Prodigal; but in the mean.  
They are neither easily angry; nor yet stupid: but between both.  
They are Valiant, and withal Temperate.    
And in general, whatsoever is divided in Youth, and Old Men: is compounded in Middle-age.  
And whereof the Excess, or Defect is in Young or Old men; the Mediocrity is in those of Middle-age.  
Middle-age for the Body, I call the time from thirty to five and thirty years: for the Mind, the nine and fortieth, or thereabouts.   

CHAP. 17. Of the Manners of the Nobility.  
OF Manners that proceed from the several Ages we have already spoken.  
We are next to speak of those th● rise from several Fortunes.  
The Manners of the Nobility are, 

To be Ambitious.  
To undervalue their Ancestors Equals. For the goods of Fortune seem the more precious for their Antiquity.  
Nobility is the Virtue of a Stock.  
And Generosity, is not to degenerate from the virtue of his Stock.    
For as in Plants; so in the Races of Men, there is a certain progress; and they grow better and better to a certain point; and change, viz. Subtle Wits into Madness; and stayed wits into stupidity and Blockishness.   

CHAP. 18. Of the Manners of the Rich.  
RIch men are Contumelious, and Proud. T●is they have from their Riches For seeing every thing may be had for Money, having Money, they think they have all that is good.  
And Effeminate; because they have wherewithal to subminister to their Lust.  
And Boasters of their Wealth: and speak● in high terms foolishly. For men willingly talk of what they● love and admire; and think others affect the same that they do: and the truth is, all sorts of men submit to the Rich.  
And think themselves worthy to to command, having that by which men attain Command.  
And in general, they have the Manners of Fortunate Fools.  
They do Injury, with intention not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through Incontinence.  
There is a difference between New and Ancient Riches: for they that are newly come to Wealth have the same faults in a greater degree: for new riches are a kind of rudeness and apprenticeship of Riches.   

CHAP. 19 Of the Manners of Men in Power, and of such as prosper.  
THe Manners of Men in Power, are the same, or better than those of the Rich.  
They have a greater sense of Honour then the Rich; and their Manners are more Manly.  
They are more Industrious than the Rich: for Power is sustained by Industry.  
They are Grave, but without Austereness: for being in place conspicuous, they carry themselves the more modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely Gravity, which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
When they do Injuries, they do great ones.  
The Manners of Men that prosper, are compounded of the Manners of the Nobility, the Rich, and those that are in Power; for to some of these all Prosperity appertains.  
Prosperity in Children, and goods of the Body, make men desire to exceed others in the goods of Fortune.  
Men that Prosper have this ill, to be more proud, and inconsiderate then others  
And this good; that they worship God; trusting in him, for that they find themselves to receive more good than proceeds from their Industry.  
The Manners of Poor Men, Obscure Men, Men without Power, and Men in Adversity, may be collected from the Contrary of what has been said.   

CHAP. 20. Common Places or Principles concerning what May be Done, what Has been Done, and what Shall be Done; or of Fact Possible, Past and Future. Also of Great and Little.  
WE have hitherto set down such Principles as are peculiar to several kinds of Orations.  
Now we are to speak of such Places as are Common to them all; as these, Possible, Done or Passed, Future, Great, Small.  
Possible is that 

The Contrary whereof is Possible.  
And the like whereof is Possible.  
And than which some harder thing is Possible.  
And the beginning whereof is Possible.  
And the end whereof is Possible.  
And the usual consequent whereof is Possible.  
And whatsoever we desire.  
And the beginning whereof is in the power of those whom we can either compel or persuade.  
And part whereof is Possible.  
And part of the whole that is Possible.  
And the General if a Particular.  
And a Particular if the General.  
And of Relatives, if one, the other.  
And that which without Art and Industry is Possible, is much more so with Art and Industry.  
And that which is Possible to Worse, Weaker, and Unskilfulller men, is much more so to Better, Stronger, and more Skilful.    
The Principles concerning Impossible are the Contraries of these.  
That Has been done.  

Then which a harder thing has been Done.  
And the Consequent whereof Has been done.  
And that which being Possible, he had a will to, and nothing hindered.  
And that which was Possible, to him in his Anger.  
And that which he longed to Do.  
And that which was before upon the point of Doing.  
And whose antecedent has been Done; or that, for which it uses to be Done.   
And if that, for whose cause we do this, than this,  
The Principles concerning Not done are the Contraries of these.  
That Shall be done.  

Which some man can, and means to do.  
And which some man can, and desires to Do.  
And which is in the way, and up. on the point to be Done.  
And the antecedents whereof are Past.  
And the Motive whereof is past.   
Of Great and Small, More and Less, see Chap. 7. Book. 1.   

CHAP. 21. Of Example, Similitude, and Fables.  
OF the Principles both general and special from whence Proofs are to be drawn, has been already spoken.  
Now follow the Proofs themselves, which are Examples or Enthymemes.  
An Example is either an Example properly so called (as some Action past:) or a Similitude (which also is, called a Parable:) or a Fable (which contains some Action feigned.)  
An Example properly so called, is this; Darius came not into Greece, till he had first subdued AEgyp●. Xerxes also conquered Egypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont. We ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering Egypt.  
A Similtude, or Parable, is such as followeth: They who choose their Magistrates by Lot, are like them that choose for their Champions those on whom the Lot shall fall, rather than those who have the greatest strength; and for their Pilot, not him that hath skill; but him whose name is drawn out of the Urnc.  
A Fable is in this manner. The Horse desiring to drive out the Stag from his common pasture, took a man to assist him and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his back, obtained his intent, but became subject to the Man. So you of Himaera, having (in hope to he revenged of your Enemies) given unto Phalaris Sovereign Authority, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouths; if you shall also give him a guard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backs, you become his slaves presently past recovery.  
To find out Examples, that is, Actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard, because not in our power.  
But to find Fables and Similitudes, is easier; because by conversing in Philosophy, a man may fain somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.  
Examples, Similitudes and Fables, where Enthymemes are wanting, may serve us in the beginning of an Oration for Inductions; otherwise are to be alleged after Enthymemes for Testimonies.   

CAP. 22. Of a Sentence.  
A Sentence is an universal Proposition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided, in the Actions or Passions of the common life. As,  
A wise man will not suffer his Children to be over-learned.  
And is to an Enthymeme in Rhetoric, as any Proposition is to a Syllogism in Logic.  
And therefore a Sentence, if the reason be rendered, becomes a Conclusion, and both together make an Enthymeme.  
As for Example.  
To be over-learned, besides that it begets effiminacy, procures envy. Therefore he that's wise will not suffer his Children to be over-learned.  
Of Sentences there be four sorts.  
For they either require Proofs, or not: that is, are manifest, or not.  
Such as are manifest, are either so, assoon as they are uttered; as,  
Health is a great Good.  
Or as soon as they are considered; as,  
Men use to hate, whom they have hurt●  
Such as are not manifest, are either Conclusions of Enthymemes; as  
He that's wise, will not suffer his Children, etc.  
Or else are Enthymematicall; that is, have in themselves the force of an Enthymeme; as  
Mortal men ought not to carry immortal anger.  
A Sentence not Manifest, aught to be either Inferred, or Confirmed.  
Inferred thus.  
'Tis not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envied by one's fellow Citizens. A wise man therefore will not have his Children over-learned.  
Confirmed thus.  
A wise man will not have his Children over-learned, seeing too much learning both softens a man's mind, and procures him envy among his fellow Citizens.  
If a reason be added to a manifest Sentence, let it be short.  
Sentences become not every man; but only old men, and such as be well versed in business. For to hear a young man speak Sentences, is ridiculous; and to hear an ignorant man speak Sentences, is absurd.  
Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought no● to be neglected, because they pass for truths. And yet they may be denied, when any laudable custom, or humour may thereby be made appear in the Denier.  
The commodities of Sentences, are two.  
One proceeding from the Vanity of the Hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the Hearer holds.  
Another is, that Sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be esteemed good Sentences, he shall be esteemed a good man; and if evil, an evil man.  
Thus much of Sentences, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.   

CAP. 23. Of the Invention of Enthymemes.  
SEeing an Enthymeme differs from a Logical Syllogism, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor ou● of remote Principles; the Places of it, from whence a man may argue aught to be certain, and determinate.  
And because whosoever makes a Syllogism Rhetorical, or other, should know all, or the most part of that which is in question; as, whosoever is to advise the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make war or no, must know what their revenues be; what, and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at Salamis, Marathon, etc. It will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of.  
He that is to speak ex tempore, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand.  
Proper, I call those things which are least common to others; as, He that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common both to him, and Diomedes; as that he was ● Prince, and warred against the Trojans; but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the war young, and voluntary.  
Let this therefore be one general Place, from that which is Proper.   

CHAP. 24. Of the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.  
FOrasmuch as Enthymemes either infer truly, or seem only so to do; and they which do infer indeed, be either Ostensive; or such as bring a man to some impossibility; we will first set down the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.  
An Ostensive Enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat granted.  
That Enthymeme which brings a man to an impossibility is an Enthymeme wherein from that which the Adversary maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly impossible.  
All Places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent Propositions of Good, Evil, Just, Unjust, Honourable and Dishonourable: namely, they have been set down as applied to particular Subjects, or in Concrete.  
Here they are to be set down in another manner; namely in the Abstract or Universal.  
The first Place then let be from Contraries, which in the Concrete or Particulars is exemplified thus. If Intemperance be hurtful, Temperance is profitable: and if Intemperance be not hurtful; neither is Temperance profitable.  
Another Place may be from Cognomination or affinity of words: as in this Particular. If what is Just be Good; then what is Justly is well: but Justly to die is not well: therefore not all that is Just is Good.  
A third from Relatives; as, This man has justly Done, therefore the other has justly suffered. But this Place sometimes deceives: for a man may suffer justly, yet not from him.  
A fourth from Comparison, three ways.  
From the Great to the Less; as, He has stricken his father; and therefore this man.  
From the Less to the Greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much less man.  
From Equality: as, If Captains be not always the worse esteemed for losing a victory; why should Sophisters?  
Another from the Time: as Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to pass through your Country with my army, before I had aided you against the Phocaeans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you:  
A Sixth from what the adversary says of himself: as, Iphicrates asked Aristophon, whether he would take a bribe to betray the Army: and he answering no; What (says he) is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the Army; and Aristophon not?  
This Place would be ridiculous, where the Defendant were not in much more estimation than the accuser.  
A seventh from the Definition; as that of Socrates; A Spirit is either God, or the Creature of God: and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are Spirits.  
An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word.  
A ninth from Division: as, If all men do what they do for one of three causes, whereof two are impossible; and the Accuser charge not the Defendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it.  
A tenth from Induction: as, At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, etc. And therefore every where.  
An eleventh from Authority, or precedent sentence; as that of Sapph, that Death is evil, for that the Gods have judged it so, in exempting themselves from mortality.  
A twelfth from the Consequence: as, 'Tis not good to be envied; Therefore neither to be learned. 'Tis good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed.  
A thirteenth from two contrary Consequences; as, 'Tis not good to be an Orator, because if he speak the truth, he shall displease men: if he speak falsely, he shall displease God.  
Here is to be noted, that sometimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, If you speak truth, you shall please God; if you speak untruth you shall please men; therefore by all means be an Orator.  
A fourteenth from the quality that men have to praise one thing, and approve another: as, We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no precedent injury; for all men discommend injustice. Again, We ought to war against the Athenians; for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no liberty: but the preservation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve.  
A fifteenth from Proportion: as, seeing we naturalise strangers for their virtues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?  
A sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents: as, He that denies the immortality of the Gods, is no worse than he that has written the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none.  
A seventeenth from that, that men change their mind: as, If when we were in banishment, we fought to recover our Country, why should we not fight now to retain it?  
An eighteenth from a feigned end: as, that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him, not as more valiant than another; but as one that would partake less of the glory.  
A nineteenth from the Cause; as if he would infer he did it from this, that he had cause to do it.  
A twentieth from that which is Incredible, but True: as, that Laws may need a Law to mend them; as well as Fish bred in the salt water, may need salting.   

CHAP. 25. Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility.  
LEt the first Place be from inspection of Times, Actions, or Words, either of the Adversary, or of the Speaker, or Both. Of the Adversary; as, He says, he loves the People, and yet he wa● in the conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the Speaker; as, He says, I am contentious; and yet I never began suit. Of Both; as He never conferred any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth, whereas I have ransomed divers citizens' with mine own money.  
A second from showing the cause of that which seemed amiss, and serves for men of good reputation that are accused; as, The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen embracing her Son, was absolved as soon as she made appear, that she embraced him upon his arrival from far, by way of Salutation.  
A third, from rendering of the cause; as, Leodamas, to whom it was objected, that he had, under the thirty Tyrants, defaced the Inscription (which the People had set up in a Pillar) of his Ignominy; answered, He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to endear himself to the Tyrants, by the testimony of the People's hatred.  
A fourth from better Counsel; as, He might have done better for himself; therefore he did not this. But this Place deceives, when the better Counsel comes to mind after the Fact.  
A fifth, from the Incompatibility of the things to be done; as, They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the Funeral of Leucothea, were told, that if they thought her a Goddess, they ought not to mourn; and if they thought her a Mortal, they ought not to sacrifice.  
A sixth (which is proper to judicial Orations) from an Inference of Error; as, If he did it not, he was not wise, therefore he did it.  
Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility, please more than Ostensive: for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and more conspicuous to ●h● Auditor.  
Of all Enthymemes, they be best, which we assent to as soon as hear. For such consent pleaseth us; and makes us favourable to the speaker.   

CHAP. 26. Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes.  
OF seeming Enthymemes, one Place may be from the form of speaking; as when a man has repeated divers Sentences, he brings in his conclusion, as if it followed necessarily, though it do not.  
A second from an ambiguous word.  
A third from that which is true divided, to that which is false joined; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should revenge my Father's death, and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father, therefore I justly killed my Mother. Or from that which is true joined, to that which is false divided; as, one cup of Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurtful; therefore one cup of Wine is hurtful.  
A fourth from amplification of the Crime. For neither is the Defendant likely to have committed the Crime he amplifies; nor does the Accuser seem, when he is Passionate, to want ground for his Accusation.  
A fifth from signs; as, when a man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life.  
A sixth from that which comes by Chance, as if from this, that the Tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius, a man should conclude, that in a free Commonwealth loving of Boys were profitable.  
A seventh from the Consequence, as Banishment is to be desired because a banished man has choice of places to dwell in.  
An eighth from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demosthenes his government, the war began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the Peloponnesian war began the Plague, therefore ●ericles that persuaded that war, did ill.  
A ninth from the omission of some Circumstance, as, Helen did what was lawful, when she ran away with Paris, because she had her Father's consent to choose her own Husband; which was true only during the time that she had not chosen.  
A tenth, from that which is probable in some case, to that which is probable simply; as, 'Tis probable, he foresaw, that if he did it, he should be suspecte●; therefore 'tis probable he did it not.  
From this Place one may infer both ways, that he did it not. For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not: again, if he were likely, to do it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be suspected.  
Upon this Place was grounded the Art, which was so much detested in Protagoras, of making the better caus● seem the worse; & the worse the better.   

CHAP. 27. Of the ways to answer the Arguments of the Adversary.  
AN Argument is answered by an opposite Syllogism, or by an Objection.  
The Places of opposite Syllogism are the same with the Places of Syllogisms, or Enthymemes: for a Rhetorical Syllogism is an Enthymeme.  
The Places of Objections are four.  

First, from the same, as, To the Adversary that proves Love to be good by an Enthymeme, may be objected, that no ●a●t is good, and yet Love is want; or particularly thus; The Love of Myrrah to her Father was not good.  
The second from Contraries: as, if the Adversary say, A good man does good to his friends, an Objection might be made, that then an evil man will do also evil to his friends.  
3. From Similitude: as thu●, if the Adversary say, all men that are injured, do ●ate those that have injured them, it may be Objected, that then, all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors, that is to say, be grateful.  
The fourth from the authority of famous men; as when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardoned those acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do; the Objection may be, that Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such acts a double punishment; one for the Act, another for the Drunkenness.   
And forasmuch as all Enthymemes are drawn from Probability, or Example, or from a Sign fallible, or from a Sign infallible: an Enthymeme from Probability may be confuted Really, by showing that for the most part it falls out otherwise; but Apparently, or Sophistically, by showing only that it does not fall out so always; whereupon the Judge thinks the Probability not sufficient to ground his Sentence upon.  
[The Reason whereof is this, That the Judge, while he hears the fact proved Probable, conceives it as true. For the Understanding has no Object but Truth. And therefore by and by, when he shall hear an Instance to the contrary; and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it false, and consequently not so much as Probable. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both Probable and False: and he that says a thing is Probable, the meaning is, he thinks it True, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.]  
An Enthymeme from a fallible sign, is answered, by showing the sign to be fallible.  
An Enthymeme from an Example, is answered, as an Enthymeme from Probability; Really, by showing more Examples to the contrary; Apparently, if he bring Examples enough to make it seem not necessary.  
If the Adversary have more Examples than we, we must make appear, that they are not applicable to the Case.  
An Enthymeme from an infallible Sign, if the Proposition be true, is unanswerable.   

CHAP. 28. Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places. Enthymemes by which Arguments are answered, are the same with those by which the matter in question is proved, or disproved. Objections are not Enthymemes.  
THe first, that Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places appears by this, that Amplification, and Extenuation do prove a fact to be great, or little; and are therefore Enthymemes, to be drawn from Common Places, and therefore are not the Places themselves.  
The second, that Enthymemes, by which Arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by the other.  
The third, that an Objection is no EnthymemE, is apparent by this, that an Objection is no more but an Opinion, Example, or other Instance, produced to make appear, that the Adversaries Argument does not conclude.  
Thus much of Examples, Sentences, Enthymemes, and generally of all things that belong to Argumentation; from what Places they may be drawn, or answered.  
There remains Elocution, and Disposition to be spoken of in the next Book.    

The third Book.  

CHAP. 1. Of the Original of Elocution and Pronunciation.  
THree things being necessary to an Oration, namely Proof, Elocution and Disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which follows.  
As for Action, or Pronunciation, so much as is necessary for an Orator may be fetched out of the Book of the Art of Poetry, in which we have treated of the Action of the Stage.  
For Tragedians were the first that invented such Action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the Magnitude, Tone, and Measure of the Voice; a thing less subject to Art, then is either Proof, or Elocution.  
And yet there have been Rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for Poetry.  
But oratorical Action has not been hitherto reduced to Art.  
And Orators in the beginning, when they saw that the Poets in barren and feigned Arguments, nevertheless attained great Reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice, or connexion of words, fell into a Style, by imitation of them, approaching to Verse, and made choice of words.  
But when the Poets changed their St●le, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the Orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the Voice and Measures proper to themselves.  
Seeing therefore Pronunciation, or Action are in some degree necessary also for an Orator, the Precepts thereof are to be fetched from the Art of Poetry.  
[In the mean time this may be one general Rule. If the Words; Tone, Greatness of the Voice, Gesture of the body and Countenance, seem to proceed all from one Passion, then 'tis well pronounced. Otherwise not.  
For when there appear more passions than one at once, the mind of the Speaker appears unnatural and distracted. Otherwise, as the mind of the speaker, so the mind of the Hearer always.]   

CHAP. 2. Of the choice of Words and Epithets.  
THe virtues of a Word are two; the first, that it be perspicuous; the second, that it be decent; that is, neither above, nor below the thing signified; or, neither too humble, nor too fine,  
Perspicuous are all Words that be Proper  
Fine Words are those, that are borrowed, or translated from other significations; of which in the Art of Poetry.  
The reason why borrowed Words please, is this. Men are affected with Words, as they are with Men, admiring in both that which is foreign and new.  
To make a Poem graceful, many things help; but few an Oration.  
For to a Poet it sufficeth with what Words he can to set out his Poem: but an Orator must not only do that: but also seem not to do it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the less believed; whereas beelefe is the scope of his Oration.  
The Words that an Orator ought to use are of three sorts. Proper; Such as are Received; and Metaphors.  
Words taken from foreign languages, Words compounded, and Words new coined are seldom to be used.  
Synonimaes belong to Poets, and Equivocal words to Sophisters.  
An Orator, if he use Proper words, and Received, and good Metaphors, shall both make his Oration beautiful, and not seem to intend it; and shall speak perspicuously. For in a Metaphor alone there is perspicuity, Novity, and Sweetness.  
Concerning Metaphors the Rules are these.  

1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his Metaphor from somewhat that is better. As for Example, let him call a Crime, an Error. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his Metaphor from somewhat worse, as, call Error, Crime.  
2. A Metaphor ought not to be so far fetched, as that the Similitude may not easily appear.  
3. A Metaphor ought to be drawn from the noblest things, as the Poets do that choose rather to say, Rosy-fingered; then Red fingered Aurora.   
In like manner the Rule of Epithets is,  
That he that will adorn, should use those of the better sort; and he that will disgrace, should use those of the worse: as Simonides being to write an Ode in honour of the victory gotten in a Course by certain Mules, being not well paid, called them by their name [〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉] that signifies their propinquity to Asses: but having received a greater reward, Styles them the sons of swift footed Coursers.   

CHAP. 3. Of the things that make an Oration Flat.  
THe things that make an Oration flat, or insipid, are four.  

1. Words Compounded; [and yet a Man may Compound a word, when the Composition is necessary, for want of a simple word; and easy, and seldom used.]  
2. Foreign words. As for example, such as are newly derived from the Latin; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are foreign in another Language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.  
3. Long, impertinent, and often Epithets.  
4. Metaphors, indecent, and obscure. Obscure they are, when they are far fetched. Indecent when they are ridiculous, as in Comedies; or too grave, as in Tragedies.    

CHAP. 4. Of a Similitude.  
A Similitude differs from a Metaphor only by such Particles of Comparison as these, As; Even as; So; Even so, etc.  
A Similitude therefore is a Metaphor dilated; and a Metaphor is a Similitude Contracted into one Word.  
A Similitude does well in an Oration, so it be not too frequent; for 'tis Poetical.  
An example of a Similitude, is this of Pericles; that said in his Oration, that the Baeotians were like to so many Oaks in a Wood, that did nothing but beat one another.   

CAP. 5. Of the Purity of Language.  
EOure things are necessary to make Language Pure.  

1. The right rendering of those Particles which some antecedent particle does require: As to a Not only, a Not also; and then they are rendered right, when they are not suspended too long.  
2. The use of proper Words, rather than Circumlocutions, unless there be motive to make one do it of purpose.  
3. That there be nothing of double construction, unless there be cause to do it of purpose. As the Prophets (of the Heathen) who speak in general terms, to the end they may the better maintain the truth of their Prophecies; which is easier maintained in generals, then in particulars. For 'tis easier to divine, whether a number be even or odd, then how many; and that a thing will be, then when it will be.  
4. Concordance of Gender, Number, and Person; as not to say Him for Her; Man for Men; Hath for Have.   
In sum; a Man's Language ought to be easy for another to read, pronounce, and point.  
Besides, to divers Antecedents, let divers Relatives, or one Common to them all, be correspondent: as, He saw the Colour; He heard the Sound; or he perceived both Colour and Sound: but by no means, He heard, or saw both.  
Lastly, that which is to be interposed by Parenthesis, let it be done quickly: as, I purposed, having spoken to him (to this, and to this purpose) afterward to be gone. For to put it off thus; I resolved, after I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose, is vicious.   

CHAP. 6. Of the Amplitude and Tenuity of Language.  
A Man shall add Amplitude, or Dignity to his language, but by such means as these.  

1. By changing the Name with the Definition, as occasion shall serve● As, when the Name shall be Indecent, by using the Definition; or Contrary.  
2. By Metaphors.  
3. By using the plural Number for the singular.  
4. By privative Epithets.    

CHAP. 7. Of the Convenience, or Decency of Elocution.  
ELocutions are made Decent, 

1. By speaking Feelingly; that is, with such Passion as is fit for the matter he is in; as Angrily in matter of Injury.  
2. By speaking as becomes the Person of the Speaker; as for a Gentleman to speak Eruditely.  
3. By speaking proportionably to the matter; as of great affairs to speak in a high; and of mean, in a low stile.  
4. By abstaining from Compounded, and from Outlandish Words; unless a man speak Passionately, and have already moved, and, as it were, inebriated his Hearers. Or Ironically.    
It confers also to persuasion very much, to use these ordinary forms of speaking, All men know; 'Tis confessed by all; No man will deny, and the like. For the Hearer consents, surprised with the fear to be esteemed the only Ignorant man.  
'Tis good also, having used a word that signifies more than the matter requires, to abstain from the Pronunciation and Countenance that to such a word belongs; that the Disproportion between it and the matter may the less appear. And when a man has said too much, it will show well to correct himself: For he will get belief by seeming to consider what he says.  
[But in this a man must have a care not to be too precise in showing of this Consideration. For the ostentation of Carefulness is an argument oftentimes of lying; as may be observed in such as tell particularities not easily observed, when they would be thought to speak more precise truth than is required.]   

CHAP. 8. Of two sorts of Stiles.  
THere be two sorts of Stiles.  
The one continued or to be comprehended at once; the other divided, or distinguished by Periods.  
The first sort was in use with ancient Writers; but is now out of date.  
An example of this Style is in the History of Herodotus; wherein there is no Period till the end of the whole History.  
In the other kind of Style, that is distinguished by Periods, a period is such a Part as is perfect in itself; and has such length, as may easily be comprehended by the understanding.  
This later kind is pleasant; the former unpleasant, because this appears finite, the other infinite: in this the Hearer has always somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he foresee no end, and has nothing finished to him: this may easily be committed to memory, because of the measure and cadence (which is the cause that verses be easily remembered;) the other not.  
Every Sentence ought to end with the period, and nothing to be interposed.  
Period is either simple, or divided into Parts.  
Simple is that which is Indivisible; as, I wonder you fear not their ends, whose actions you imitate.  
A Period divided, is that which not only has perfection and length convenient for respiration, but also Parts. As, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, seeing you imitate their actions: where in these words, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, is one Colon, or Part; and in these, Seeing you imitate their actions, another: and both together make the Period.  
The parts, or members, and periods of speech ought neither to be too long, nor too short.  
Too long are they, which are produced beyond the expectation of the Hearer.  
Too short, are they that end before he expects it.  
Those that be too long, leave the Hearer behind, like him that walking, goes beyond the usual end of the walk, and thereby outgoes him that walks with him.  
They that be too short, make the Hearer stumble; for when he looks far before him, the end stops him before he be aware.  
A period that is divided into Parts, is either divided only; or has also an Opposition of the parts one to another.  
Divided only is such as this; This the Senate knows; the Consul sees; and yet the man lives.  
A Period with Opposition of Parts, called also Antithesis, and the parts Antitheta, is when contrary parts are put together; or also joined by a third.  
Contrary parts are put together, as here, The one has obtained Glory, the other Riches; both by my benefit.  
Antitheta are therefore acceptable; because not only the parts appear the better for the opposition; but also for that they carry with them a certain appearance of that kind of Enthymeme, which leads to Impossibility.  
Parts, or Members of a Period, are said to be equal, when they have altogether, or almost equal Number of Syllables.  
Parts, or Members of a period, are said to be like, when they begin, or end alike: and the more Similitudes, and the greater equality there is of Syllables, the more graceful is the Period.   

CHAP. 9 Of those things that grace an Oration, and make it delightful.  
FOrasmuch as there is nothing more delightful to a man, then to find that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those Words are most grateful to the Ear, that make a man seem to see before his eyes the thing signified.  
And therefore foreign Words are unpleasant, because Obscure; and Plain Words, because too Manifest, making us learn nothing new: but Metaphors please; for they beget in us by the Genus, or by some common thing to that with another, a kind of Science: as when an Old Man is called Stubble; a man suddenly learns that he grows up, flourisheth, and withers like Grass, being put in mind of it by the qualities common to Stubble, and to Old Men.  
That which a Metaphor does, a Similitude does the same; but with less grace, because with more prolixity.  
Such Enthymemes are the most graceful, which neither are presently very Manifest, nor yet very hard to be understood; but are comprehended, while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood before.  
The things that make a speech graceful, are these; Antitheta, Metaphors, and Animation.  
Of Antitheta, and Antichesis hath been spoken in the precedent Chapter.  
Of Metaphors the most graceful is that which is drawn from Proportion.  
[Aristotle (in the 12 Chapter of his Poetry) defines a Metaphor to be the translation of a name from one signification to another; whereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the General to the Particular. 2. From the Particular to the General. 3. From one Particular to another. 4. From Proportion.]  
A Metaphor from Proportion is such as this, A State without Youth, is a Year without a Spring.  
Animation is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing before our eyes; as ●he that said, The Athenians poured out their City into Sicily, meaning, they sent thither the greatest Army they could make; and this is the greatest grace of an Oration.  
If therefore in the same Sentence there concur both Metaphor, and this Animation, and also Antithesis, it cannot choose but be very graceful.  
That an Oration is graced by Metaphor, Animation and Antithesis, hath been said: but how 'tis graced, is to be said in the next Chapter.   

CAP. 10. In what manner an Oration is graced by the things aforesaid.  
'tIs graced by Animation, when the actions of living Creatures are attributed to things without life; as when the sword is said to devour.  
Such Metaphors as these come into a Man's mind by the observation of things that have similitude and proportion one to another. And the more unlike, and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more grace hath the Metaphor.  
A Metaphor without Animation, adds grace then, when the Hearer finds he learns somewhat by such use of the word.  
Also Paradoxes are graceful, so men inwardly do believe them: for they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the present another; and somewhat like to those jests which are grounded upon the deceiving of a man's expectation.  
And Paragrams; that is, allusions of words are graceful, if they be well placed; and in Periods not too long; and with Antithesis: for by these means the ambiguity is taken away.  
And ●he more of these; namely, Metaphor, Animation, Antithesis, Equality of members a Period hath, the more graceful it is.  
Similitudes grace an Oration, when they contain also a Metaphor.  
And Proverbes are graceful, because they are Metaphors, or translations of words from one species to another.  
And Hyperboles, because they also are Metaphors: but they are youthful, and bewray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them that be angry; and for that cause are not comely in Old men.   

CHAP. 11. Of the difference between the Style to be used in Writing, and the Style to be used in Pleading.  
THe Style that should be Read aught to be more exact and accurate.  
But the Style of a Pleader ought to be suited to Action and Pronunciation.  
Orations of them that Plead, pass away with the Hearing.  
But those that are Written men carry about them, and are considered at Leasure; and consequently must endure to be sifted and examined.  
Written Orations appear flat in Pleading.  
And Orations made for the Bar, when the Action is away, appear in Reading insipid.  
In Written Orations Repetition is justly condemned.  
But in Plead, by the help of Action, and by some change in the Pleader, Repetition becomes Amplification.  
In written Orations Disjunctives do ill; as, I came, I found him, I asked him: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distinguished by Action.  
But in Plead 'tis Amplification; because that which is but one thing, is made to seem many.  
Of Plead, that which is judicial aught to be more accurate, then that which is before the people.  
And an Oration to the people ought to be more accommodate to Action, than a judicial.  
And of judicial Orations, that aught to be more accurate, which is uttered to few Judges; and that ought to be more accommodate to Action, which is uttered to Many. As in a Picture, the farther he stands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the colours be fine: so in Orations, the farther the Hearer stands off, the less need there is for his Oration to be Elegant.  
Therefore Demonstrative Orations are most proper for writing, the end whereof is to be Read.   

CHAP. 12. Of the parts of an Oration, and their Order.  
THe necessary Parts of an Oration are but two; Propositions, and Proos; which are as it were the Problem, and Demonstration.  
The Proposition is the explication, or opening of the Matter to be proved.  
And Proof is the Demonstration of the Matter propounded.  
To these necessary parts, are sometimes added two other, the Proem and the Epilogue, neither of which are any proof.  
So that in sum, there be four parts of an Oration; the Proem, the Proposition, or (as others call it) the Narration, the Proofs (which contain Confirmation, Confutation, Amplification, and Diminution;) and the Epilogue.   

CHAP. 13. Of the Proem.  
THe Proem is the Beginning of an Oration, and, as it were, the preparing of the way before one enter into it.  
In some kinds of Orations it resembles the Prelude of Musicians, who first play what they list, and afterwards the Tune they intended.  
In other kinds it resembles the Prologue of a Play, that contains the Arguments  
Proems of the first sort, are most proper for Demonstrative Orations; in which a Man is free to foretell, or not, what points he will insist upon; and for the most part 'tis better not: because when a man has not obliged himself to a certain matter, Digression will seem Variety: but if he have engaged himself, Variety will be accounted Digression.  
In Demonstratives the matter of the Proem consisteth in the Praise or Dispraise of some Law or Custom, or in Exhortation, or Dehortation; or in something that serves to incline the Hearer to the purpose.  
Proemes of the second kind are most proper for judicial Orations. For as the Prologue in a Dramatic, and the Exordium in an Epique Poem, setteth first in few words the Argument of the Poem: so in a judicial Oration the Orator ought to exhibit a Model of his Oration, that the mind of the Hearer may not be suspended, and for want of foresight, err or wander.  
Whatsoever else belongs to a proem, is drawn from one of these four; From the Speaker, From the Adversary, From the Hearer, or from the Matter.  
From the Speaker and Adversary are drawn into Proems such Criminations and Purgations as belong not to the cause.  
To the Defendant 'tis necessary in the Proem to answer to the accusations of his Adversary; that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his Oration.  
But to the Plaintiff 'tis better to cast his Criminations all in to the Epilogue, that the Judge may the more easily remember them.  
From the Hearer and from the Matter are drawn into the proem such things as serve to make the Hearer favourable or angry attentive, or not attentive● as need shall require.  
And Hearers use to be attentive to persons that are reputed good; to things that are of great Consequence, or that concern themselves, or that are strange, or that delight.  
But to make the Hearer attentive, is not the part of the proem only, but of any other part of the Oration, and rather of any other part, then of the proem. For the Hearer is every where more remiss then in the beginning. And therefore wheresoever there is need, the Orator must make appear both the probity of his own person, and that the matter in hand is of great Consequence; or that it concerns the Hearer; or that it is new; or that it is delightful.  
He that will have the Hearer attentive to him, but not to the Cause, must on the other side make it seem that the matter is a trifle, without relation to the Hearer, common, and tedious.  
That the Hearer may be favourable to the Speaker, one of two things is re●●ired; that he love him, or that he 〈◊〉 them.  
In Demonstrative Orations, he that ●●ises, shall have the Hearer favourable ●e think himself, or his own manners, course of life, or any thing he loves, comprehended in the same praise.  
On the contrary, he that dispraises, ●●all be heard favourably, if the Hearer ●nd his enemies, or their courses, or any ●●ing he hates, involved in the same dispraise.  
The Proem of a Deliberative Ora●ion is taken from the same things, from ●hich are taken the proemes of judicial Orations. For the matter of a Deliberative Oration needeth not that natural proem, by which is shown what we ●re to speak of; for that is already known: the Proem in these, being made only for the Speakers, or Adversary's sake; or to make the Matter appear great, or little, as one would have it, and is therefore to be taken from the persons of the Plaintiff or Defendant; or from the Hearer, or from the Matter, as in Orations judicial.   

CHAP. 14. Places of Crimination, and Purgation.  
1. ONe is from the removal of ill opinion in the Hearer, imprinted in him by the Adversary, or otherwise.  
2. Another from this, That the thing done is not hurtful, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not dishonourable.  
3. A third from the Recompense; as, I did him harm, but withal I did him honour.  
4. A fourth from the Excuse; as, It was Error, Mischance, or Constraint.  
5. A fifth from the Intention; as, One thing was done, another meant.  
6. A sixth, from the Comprehension of the Accuser; as, What I have done, the Accuser has done the same; or his Father's Kinsman, or Friend.  
7. From the Comprehension of thos● that are in Reputation; as, What I did, such, and such have done the same, who nevertheless are good men.  
8. From Comparison with such as have been falsely accused, or wrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright.  
9 From Recrimination; as, The Accuser is a man of ill life, and therefore not to be believed.  
10. From that the judgement belong to another Place, or Time; as, I have already answered, or am to answer elsewhere to this Matter.  
11. From Grimination of the Crimination; as, It serves only to pervert judgement.  
12. A twelfth, which is common both to Crimination and Purgation, and is taken from some sign; as Teucer is not to be believed, because his Mother was Priam's Sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, because his Father was Priam's enemy.  
13. A thirteenth, proper to Crimination only, from praise and dispraise mixed; as, To praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.  
14. A fourteenth, common both to Crimination and Purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact: ●or he that purgeth himself interpreteth the fact always in the best sense; and he that Criminates, always in the worst; as when Ulysses said, Diomedes chose him for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit: but his Adversary said, He chose him for his cowardice, as the most unlikely to share with him in the Honor.   

CAP. 15. Of the Narration  
THe Narration is not always continued and of one Piece; but sometimes, as in Demonstratives, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole Oration.  
For there being in a Narration something that falls not under Art; as namely, the Actions themselves, wihch the Orator inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the Narration of them where he best may. As for example, if being to praise a Man, you would make a Narration of all his Acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same Acts again, while from some of them you praise his Valour, and from others his Wisdom; whereby your Oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.  
'Tis not necessary always that the Narration be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.  
In the Narration, as oft as may be, 'tis good to insert somewhat commendable in one's self, and unblamable in one's Adversary: As, I advi●ed him, but he would take no Counsel.  
In Narrations, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indignation in the Hearer besides the purpose; as Ulysses in Homer, relating his Travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his wife in thirty Verses, leaving out what might make her sad.  
The Narration ought also to be in such words as argue the Manners; that is, some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not expressed; As, setting his arms a kenbold, he answered, etc. by which is insinuated the Pride of him that so answered.  
In an Oration a man does better to show his affection then his judgement: that is, 'Tis better to say, I like this; then to say, This is better. For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But favour follows Goodness; whereas wisdom procures envy.  
But if this Affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendered, as did Antigone. For when she had said, She loved her brother better than her Husband, or children; she added, for husband and children I may have more; but another brother I cannot, my Parents being both dead. Or else a man must use this form of speaking; I know this affection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such. For 'tis not easily believed, that any man has a mind to do any thing that is not for his own good.  
Besides in a Narration, not only the Actions themselves; but the Passions, and signs that accompany them, are to be discovered.  
And in his Narration a man should make himself and his Adversary be considered for such, and such, as soon, and as covertly as he can.  
A Narration may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning.  
In Deliberative Orations; that is, wheresoever the question is of things to come; a Narration, which is always of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be recounted, that men may Deliberate better of the future: But that is not as Narration, but Proof; for 'tis Example.  
There may also be Narration in Deliberatives, in that part where Crimination and Praise come in: But that part is not Deliberative, but Demonstrative.   

CHAP. 16. Of Proof, or Confirmation, and Refutation.  
PRoofs are to be applied to something Controverted.  
The Controversy in judicial Orations is, Whether it has been done; whether it has been hurtful; whether the matter be so great, and whether it be Just, or no.  
In a question of Fact, one of the Parties of necessity is faulty (for ignorance of the Fact is no excuse) and therefore the Fact is chiefly to be insisted on.  
In Demonstratives, the Fact for the most part is supposed: but the honour and profit of the Fact are to be proved.  
In Deliberatives, the question is, Whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so Great; or whether it be Just; or whether it be profitable.  
Besides the application of the proof to the question, a man ought to observe, whether his Adversary have lied in any point without the Cause. For 'tis a sign he does the same in the Cause.  
The proofs themselves are either Examples, or Enthymemes.  
A Deliberative Oration, because 'tis of things to come, requireth rather Examples, then Enthymemes.  
But a judicial Oration, being of things past, which have a necessity in them, and may be concluded Syllogistically, requireth rather Enthymemes.  
Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together: for they ●hinder one another's force by confounding the Hearer.  
Nor ought a man endeavour to prove every thing by Enthymeme, lest like some Philosophers, he collect what is known, from what is less known.  
Nor ought a man to use Enthymemes, when he would move the Hearer to some affection: For seeing divers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the Enthymeme, or the affection that he would move.  
For the same reason, a man ought not to use Enthymemes when he would express Manners.  
But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his Manners, he may withal use Sentences.  
A Deliberative Oration is more difficult than a judicial, because 'tis of the future, whereas a judicial is of that which is past, and that consequently may be known; and because it has principles, namely the Law; and it is easier to prove from principles, then without.  
Besides, a Deliberative Oration wants those helps of turning to the Adversary, of speaking of himself; of raising passion.  
He therefore that wants matter in a Deliberative Oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise.  
And in Demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party, let him praise or dispraise some body else, as his Father, or Kinsman, or the very virtues or vices themselves.  
He that wants not proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his Mannerss: but he that has no proof, let him nevertheless insinuate his Manners. For a good man is as acceptable, as an exact Oration.  
Of proofs, those that lead to an absurdity, please better than those that are direct or osten●ive; because from the comparison of Contraries, namely, Truth and Falsity, the force of the Syllogism does the better appear.  
Confutation is also a part of proof.  
And he that speaks first, puts it after his own proofs, unless the Controversy contain many and different matters. And he that speaks last, puts it before.  
For 'tis necessary to make way for his own Oration, by removing the Objections of him that spoke before. For the mind abhors both the Man, and his Oration, that is damned beforehand.  
If a man desire his Manners should appear well, (lest speaking of himself he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious, or scurrilous) let him introduce another person.  
Last of all, le●t he cloy his Hearer with Enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with Sentences; but such as have the same force. As here is an Enthymeme. If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, than the time is now, while our Fortune is entire. And this is a Sentence of equal force to it. Wise men make peace, while their Fortune is entire.   

CHAP. 17. Of Interrogations, Answers, and jests.  
THe times wherein 'tis fit to ask one's Adversary a question are chiefly four.  

1. The first is, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by Interrogation draw him to confess the other.  
2. The second, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, one is manifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a question; then the Interrogation will be seasonable; and the absurd Conclusion is presently to be inferred, without adding that Proposition which is manifest.  
3. The third, when a man would make appear that his● Adversary does contradict himself.  
4. The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these, In some sort 'tis so; In some sort 'tis not so.   
Out of these Cases 'tis not ●it to Interrogate. For he whose question succeeds not, is thought vanquished.  
To equivocal questions a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief.  
To Interrogations which we foresee tend to draw from us an Answer, contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our Answer, presently give an Answer to the objection which is implied in the question.  
And where the question exacteth and answer that concludeth against us, we must together with our answer presently distinguish.  
jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse: and grave discourse is deluded by jests.  
The several kinds of jests are set down in the Art of Poetry.  
Whereof one kind is Ironia, and tends to please one's self.  
The other is Scurrility, and tends to please others.  
The later of these has in it a kind of baseness: the former may become a man of good breeding.   

CAP. 18. Of the Epilogue.  
THe Epilogue must consist of one of these four things.  
Either of inclining the Judge to favour his own, or disfavour the Adversaries side: For then when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise, or dispraise the Parties.  
Or of Amplification or Diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to show how great, or how little that good or evil is.  
Or in moving the Judge to Anger, Love or other Passion. For when 'tis manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, than it will be opportune to excite the Judg.  
Or of Repetition, that the Judge may remember what has been said.  
Repetition consisteth in the matter, and the manner. For the Orator must show, that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his Oration, and how: Namely, by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Adversaries, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.  
FINIS.    

THE ART OF RHETORIC Plainly set forth; With Pertinent EXAMPLES for the more easy understanding, and Practice of the same.  
By a concealed Author.  
LONDON, Printed by Thomas Maxey, 1651.   

THE ART OF RHETORIC.  

Rhetoric is an Art of speaking finely.  
It hath two parts.  

1. Garnishing of speech, called Elocution.  
2. Garnishing of the manner of utterance, called Pronunciation.   
Garnishing of speech is the first part of Rhetoric, whereby the speech itself is beautified and made fine.  
It is either, 

1. The fine manner of words, called a Trope, or,  
2. The fine shape or frame of speech, called a Figure.    
The fine manner of words is a garnishing of Speech, whereby one word is drawn from his first proper signification, to another; as in this sentence: Sin lieth at the door: where Sin is put for the punishment of sin adjoined unto it: lieth at the door signifieth at hand; as that which lieth at the Door, is ready to be brought in.  
This changing of words was first found out by necessity, for the want of words; afterward confirmed by Delight, because such words are pleasant and gracious to the ear. Therefore this change of signification must be shame fa'cd, and, as it were, maidenly, that it may seem rather to be led by the hand to another signification, to be driven by force unto the same: yet sometimes this fine manner of Speech swerveth from this perfection, and then it is,  
Either 

1. The abuse of this fine Speech, called Katachresis, or  
2. The excess of this fineness, called Hyperbole.    
Be not too just, nor too wicked: which speech, although it seem very hard, yet it doth not, without some fineness of Speech, utter thus much, That one seek not a righteousness beyond the Law of God; and that when none can live without all sin, yet that they take heed that sin bear not Dominion over them: As, My tears are my meat day and night. Those that hateme are more in number, than the hairs of my head. Both which do utter by an express of Speech, a great sorrow, and a great number of enemies.  
The abuse of Speech, is, when the change of speech is hard, strange, and unwonted, as in the first example.  
The excess of speech is, when the change of signification is very high and lofty, as in the second Example, and Ps. 6.7.  
But the excellency, or fineness of Words, or Tropes, is most excellent, when divers are, 
Shut up in one; or,  
Continued in many.   
An Example of the first sort is in the 2 Kings: I pray thee, let me have a double portion of thy Spirit: where by Spirit, is meant the gift of the Spirit; and by thy Spirit, the gift of the Spirit like to thine.  
The continuance of Tropes, called an Allegory, is, when one kind of Trope is so continued; as, look with what kind of matter it be begun, with the same it be ended. So in the 23. Psal. The care of God towards his Church, is set forth in the words proper to a Shepherd. So in the whole book of Canticles, the sweet conference of Christ and his Church, is set down by the words proper to the Husband and the Wife. So old age is set down by this garnishing of speech, Eccles. 12. 5,6.  
Hitherto of the properties of a fine manner of words, called a Trope.  
Now the divers sorts do follow.  
They are those which note out, 

1. No Comparison, and are with some Comparison; or,  
2. No respect of Division, or some respect.    
The first is double: 

1. The change of name, called a Metonymy.  
2. The mocking speech, called an Irony.    
The change of name, is where the name of a thing, is put for the name of a thing agreeing with it.  
It is double, 

1. When the cause is put for the thing caused, and chose,  
2. When the thing to which any thing is adjoined, is put for the thing adjoined; and chose.    
The change of name of the cause, is when, Either the name of the Maker, or the name of the Matter, is put for the thing made.  
Of the Maker, when the finder out, or the Author of the thing, or the instrument whereby the thing is done, is put for the thing made. So Moses is put for his Writings: so Love is put for Liberality, or bestowing Benefits, the fruit of Love: so Faith the Cause, is put for Religious serving of God, the thing caused. Rom. 1. So the tongue, the instrument of speech, is put for the Speech itself. Rule thy tongue, james 3.  
Of the Matter: Thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou return; that is, one made of dust.  
Now on the other side, when the thing caused, or the effect is put for any of these causes. So the Gospel of God is called the Power of God to Salvation; That is, the instrument of the power of God. So love is said to be bountiful; because it causeth one to be bountiful. S. Paul ●aith, The Bread that we break, is it not in the Communion of the Body and Blood of Christ? That is, an instrument of the Communion of the body of Christ. So, the body is said to be an earthly Tabernacle: That is, a Tabernacle made of earth.  
The change of Name, or Metonymy, where the subject, or that which hath any thing adjoined, is put for the thing adjoined, or adjoin. So the place is put for those, or that in the place: Set thine house in an order: That is, thy Household matters. It shall be easier for Sodom and Gomorra: that is, the People in Sodom and Gomorra. So Moses Chair is put for the Doctrine, taught in Moses Chair. So, all Jericho and Jerusalem came out: That is, all the men in jericho and jerusalem. So, before, Sin was put for the punishment of sin: Let his blood rest upon us and our children: That is the punishment which shall follow his death. So Christ said, This is my body, That is, a sign or Sacrament of my body. This wine is the new Testament in my blood; That is, a Sign or Seal of the New Testament in my blood. So john saith, He saw the Spirit descending in the likeness of a Dove: That is, the sign of the Spirit.  
On the other side, the Adjunct is put for the thing to which it is Adjoined. As Christ is called our hope. 1. Tit. That is, on whom our hope did depend: So, we are justified by Faith, That is, by Christ, applied by Faith: So, Love is the fulfilling of the Law, That is, those things to which it is Adjoined. Hope for the things hoped for, Rom. 8.28. So in the Epist. ●o the Eph. The days are evil: That is, the Manner, Conversation, and Deeds of men in the days.  
Hitherto of the Metonymy, or change of name.  
Now followeth the Mocking speech, or Irony.   

CHAP. 2.  
THE mocking Trope is, when one contrary is signified by another, as God said, Man is like to one of us. So Christ saith, sleep on; and yet by and by, Arise, let us go: so Paul saith, you are wise, and I am a fool.  
This Trope is perceived, either by the contrariety of the Matter, or the Manner of utterance, or both: so Elias said to the Prophets of Baal, Cry aloud, etc. So the Jews said unto Christ; Hail, King of the jews.  
Hitherto appertaineth the passing by a thing, which yet with a certain elegancy noteth it: so Philemon, 19 That I say not, thou owest thyself unto me.  
Hitherto of the fineness of words which respect no division.  
Now followeth that which respecteth division, called Synecdoche.  
A Synecdoche is when the name of the whole is given to the part; or the name of the part to the whole.  
And it is double; 

1. When the whole is put for the Member, and contrarily.  
2. when the General, or whole kind is put for the Special, or contrarily.    
So S. john, Not only for our sins, but for the sins of the whole world. So Righteousness, a member of Goodness, is put for all goodness: so Unrighteousness is put for all manner of sins.  
Examples of the second sort, as these: So Israel is put for those of juda sometimes: So Nations for the Heathen: A Minister of Christ, for an Apostle of Christ, Rom. 1. A Minister put for a distributer, Rom. 12.  
On the other side, one sort or special is put for the whole sort, or general, in the Examples following. In the Lord's Prayer, Bread, one help of life, is put for all helps: This day, one time, for all times: so Solomon saith, The thing of the day in his day; That is, the thing of the time, in his time.  
So sometimes less is spoken, and yet more is understood; which is called Diminution, or Meiosis: As james saith, to him that knoweth how to do well, and doth not, it is sin: That is, a great sin. So our Saviour Christ saith, If they had not known, they had had no sin: that is, no such great sin as they have now. Likewise the denial by Comparison: so Solomon saith, Receive my words, and not silver: That is, my words rather than silver: so Paul saith, I was sent to Preach, and not to Baptism: That is, not so much to Baptism, as to Preach.  
Hitherto of the fineness of words, which note out no Comparison. Now followeth the fineness of words which noteth out Comparison, called a Metaphor.   

CHAP. III.  
A Metaphor is when the like is signified by the like: as 1 Cor. The Apostle saith, Doctrine must be tried by fire; That is, the evidence of the Word, Spirit, trying Doctrine, as fire doth Metals. So Christ is said to Baptise with fire; where Fire is put for the power of the Holy Ghost, purging as fire: so Christ saith, None shall enter into the Kingdom of God, but ●e that is born of the Holy Ghost and Water: so Paul calleth himself the Father of the Corinth's, who saith, That he begat them in Christ: so he calleth Timothy and Titus his Natural sons in the Faith.  
Hitherto of a Trope, or Garnishing of speech in one word, where the Metaphor is most usual; then the change of name; then the Synecdoche; and last of all, the Irony. Now followeth the ●ine frame or shape of speech, called a Figure.  
A Figure is a Garnishing of speech; wherein the course of the same is changed from the more simple and plain manner of speaking, unto that which is more full of Excellency and Grace. For as in the fineness of words, or a Trope, words are considered asunder by themselves: so in the fine shape or frame of speech or a figure, the apt and pleasant joining together of many words is noted.  
The garnishing of the shape of speech or a Figure, is garnishing of speech in Words, or in a Sentence.  
The garnishing of speech in words, called Figura dictionis, is wherein the speech is garnished by the pleasant and sweet sound of words joined together.  
This is either, 

1. In the measure of sounds; or  
2. In the repetition of sounds.    
The measure of sounds is belonging either to, 

1. Poets, with us called Rhymers; or,  
2. Orators, with us called Eloquent Pleaders.    
The first is the measure of sounds by certain and continual spaces: And it is either, 

1. Rh yme; or,  
2. We rse.    
Rhyme is the first sort, containing a certain measure of Syllables ending a like, and these in the Mother Tongues are most sit for Psalms, Songs, or Sonnets.  
Verses are the second sort, containing certain Feet fitly placed.  
A Foot is a measure framed by the length and shortness of Syllables: For the several sorts whereof, as also of the verses of them, because we have no worthy examples in our English tongue, we judge the large handling of them should be more curious than necessary.  
The measure of sounds belonging to Orators is that which, as it is not uncertain, so it differeth altogether from rhyme and verse, and is very changeable with itself. Therefore in that eloquent speech you must altogether leave rhyme and verse, unless you allege it for authority and pleasure.  
In the Beginning of the Sentence little care is to be had, in the middle lest of all, and in the end chiefest regard is to be had, because the fall of the sentence is most marked, and therefore lest it fall out to be harsh and unplesant both to the mind and ear, there must be most variety and change.  
Now this change must not be above six syllables from the end, and that must be set down in feet of two syllables.  
And thus much of garnishing of speech by the measure of sounds, rather to give some taste of the same to the Readers, then to draw any to the curious and unnecessary practice of it.  
Now followeth the repeating of found'st.   

CAP. 4.  
REpetition of sounds is either of the Like, or the Unlike sound.  
Of the Like, is either continued to the end of, or broken off from the same, or a divers sentence.  
Continued to the end of the same sentence is, when the same sound is repeated without any thing coming between, except a parenthesis; that is, something put in, without the which, notwithstanding the sentence is full. And it is a joining of the same sound, as Rom. 1. As unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness. And in the prayer of Christ, My God, my God. From men by thine hand, O Lord, from men, etc. Psal. 17.  
Continued in a divers sentence is, either a Redoubling, called Anadyplosis; or A pleasant climbing, called Clymax.  
Redoubling is when the same sound is repeated in the end of the former sentence, and the beginning of the sentence following. As, Psal. 9.8. The Lord also will be a refuge to the poor, a refuge, I say, in due time. Psal. 81. 14. For this God is our God. But more plain in Ps. 8. As we have ●eard, so have we seen in the city of our God. God will establish it for ever.  
A pleasant climbing is a redoubling continued by divers degrees or steps of the same sounds: As Rom. 8. 17. If we be children, we be heirs, even heirs of God, annexed with Christ. Rom. 8.30. Whom he predestinated, them also he called; and whom he called, them also he justified; and whom he justified, them also he glorified. Also Rom. 9 14. 15.  
And hitherto of the same sound continued to the end.  
Now followeth the same sound broken off.   

CHAP. 5.  
THE same sound broken off is a repetition of the same in the Beginning; or In the end.  
In the Beginning it is called Anaphora, a bringing of the same again; As Rom. 8. 38.  
Nor death, nor life, nor Angels, etc. nor any other creature shall be able to separate us, etc. So likewise Ephe. 4. 11. Some to be Apostles, some preachers, etc. So Gal. Nor jew, nor Gentile, etc. So likewise Hebr. 11.1.2.  
Repetition of the same sound in the end is called Epistrophe, a turning to the same sound in the end. So Ezech. Behold greater abominations than these. Lament. 3.41. Let us lift up our hearts with our hands unto God in the heavens; we have sinned, and have, rebelled therefore thou hast not spared.  
When both of these are joined together, it is called a coupling or Symplote. As, 2 Cor. 6.4. to the 11. But in all things we approve ourselves, as the Ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, etc. See also 2 Cor. 22. 23.  
Hitherto of the repetitions in the same place.  
Now of those that do interchange their place.  
They are either Epanalepsis, which signifieth to take back; or Epanadoes which signifies a turning to the same tune.  
The first is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the ending, as My son Absolom, my son, 2 Sam. 19 1.  
Epanadoes is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the middle, in the middle and the end, Ezech. 35. 6. I will prepare thee unto blood, and blood shall pursue thee: except thou hate blood, even blood shall pursue thee. And 2. Thes. 2. So that he that doth sit as God, in the temple of God, showeth h●mself that he is God.  
Hitherto of the repetition of those sounds which are like.  
Now of those that are unlike.   

CHAP. 6.  
UNlike A small changing of the name, as Paronomasia. A small changing of the end or case, as Polyptoton.  
A small change of name is, when a word by the change of one letter or Syllable, the signification also is changed, As, Patience, experience. Rom. 5.4. 19 We walk after the flesh, not war in the flesh. So by honour and dishonour, as unknown and yet known.  
A small changing of the end or case, is when words of the same beginning rebound by divers ends: Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no more, death hath no more power over him. He that doth righteousness is righteous. If ye know that he is righteous, know ye that he that doth righteously, is born of him. And of both these there are many in the Scripture, but the translations cannot reach them.  
Hitherto of the garnishing of the shape of speech in words.  
Now followeth the garnishing of the shape of speech in a sentence.   

CHAP. 7.  
GArnishing of the frame of speech in a sentence, is a garnishing of the shape of speech, or a figure; which for the forcible moving of affections, doth after a sort beautify the sense and very meaning of a sentence. Because it hath in it a certain manly majesty, which far surpasseth the soft delicacy or dainties of the former figures.  
It is either the garnishing of speech Alone; or with others.  
The garnishing of speech alone, is when as the sentence is garnished without speech had to other. And it is either in regard of the Matter; or of the Person.  
In regard of the Matter, it is either 

1. A crying out, called Exclamation; or  
2. A pulling or calling back of himself, called Revocation.    
A crying out or Exclamation is the first, which is set forth by a word of calling out: Sometimes of wonder, As, Rom. 8. O the depth of the judgements of God Psa. 8. O Lord, how excellent is thy Name!  
Sometimes of pity; also these words, Behold, Alas, Oh, be signs of this figure: As, O jerusalem, jerusalem, which stonest the prophets. Sometimes of desperation; As, My sin is greater than can be forgiven. Behold, thou drivest me out, etc. Sometimes of wishing: As, O Lord of hosts, how amiable are thy tabernacles? Sometimes of disdaining: As, Rom. 7. in the end, O miserable wretch that I am, who shall deliver me from this body of sin? Sometimes of mocking: as they which said to our Saviour Christ, Ah, thou that, etc.  
Sometimes of cursing and detestation, as in David, Let their table be made a snare, and bow down their back always. Also when this Figure is used in the end of a sentence, it is called a shooting out of the voice, or Epiphonema; as when the sins of jezabel were spoken against, this is added at the end, Seemed it a little to her to do thus and thus.  
So after the high setting forth of the name of God, David shutteth up his praise with this: Blessed be his glorious name, and let all the earth be filled with his glory. Sometimes here is used a certain liberty of speech, wherein is a kind of secret crying out: As Peter, Act. 3. saith: Ye men of Israel, hear these words. And Paul, 1. Cor. 11. Would to God you could suffer a little my foolishness, and indeed ye suffer me.  
Thus much of crying out●  
Now followeth the Figure of calling back, or Revocation.  
Revocation is when any thing is calcal back, and it is as it were a cooling and quenching of the heat of the exclamation that went before.  
And this is either A correction of ones self, called Epanorthrosis; A holding of one's peace, called Aposiopes●s.  
Epanorthrosis is correction, when some thing is called back that went before: as Paul correcteth his doubtfulness of Agrippa's belief, when he saith, Believest thou. King Agrippa, I know thou believest. So, 1. Cor. 15. I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, etc.  
A keeping of silence or Aposiopesis is, when the course of the sentence bygon is so stayed, as thereby some part of the sentence not being uttered, may be understood. So our Saviour Christ saith, My soul is heavy: what shall I say? John. 12. 27.  
Thus much of a Figure garnishing the speech alone in regard of the matter.  
Now followeth the garnishing of the speech alone in regard of the person.   

CHAP. 8.  
GArnishing of the speech alone in regard of the person is double.  
Either in Turning to the person, called Apostrophe, or Feigning of the per●on, called, Prosopopoeia.  
Apostrophe or turning to the person, is when the speech is turned to another person, than the speech appointed did intend or require. And this Apostrophe or turning is diversely seen, according to the diversity of persons. Sometimes it turneth to a man's person; As David in the 6. Psalm, where having gathered arguments of his safety, turneth hastily to the wicked, saying, Away from me, all ye workers of iniquity, for the Lord hath heard the voice of my petition.  
Sometimes, From a man to God, as Psal. 3. David being dismayed with the number of his enemies, turneth himself to God, saying: But thou art my buckler, etc.  
Sometimes to unreasonable creatures without sense. Esai. 1. & Esai. 20.1.  
Prosopopoeia or a feigning of the person, is whereby we do feign another person speaking in our speech; And it is double; Imperfect, and Perfect.  
Imperfect is when the speech of ano-person is set down lightly and indirectly, As in the Psal. 10. David bringeth in the wicked, Who say unto my Soul, Fly as the Bird unto yonder hill.  
A perfect Prosopopoeia is when the whole feigning of the person is set down in our speech, with a fit entering into the same, and a leaving it off. So Wisd. Pro. 8. Where the entrance is in the first Verses, her speech in the rest of the Chapter.  
Hitherto of the figures of sentences concerning one speaking alone.  
Now follow the other, which concern the speeches of two.   

CHAP. 9  
THey which concern the speeches of two, are either In Ask; or in Answering.  
That of Ask, is either in Deliberation; or, in preventing an Objection.  
Deliberation is when we do ever now and then ask, as it were, reasons of our consultation, whereby the mind of the hearers wavering in doubt, doth set down some great thing.  
This deliberation is either in Doubting; or in Communication.  
A Doubting is a deliberating with ourselves, as Paul. 1. Philip. 22. doubting whether it were better to die then to live, he garnisheth his speech on this manner: For I am greatly in doubt ●o● both sides, desiring to be loosed, and to be with● Christ, which is best of all: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you.  
Communication is a deliberation with others. Gal. 3. 1,2. O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, etc.  
And hitherto of the figure of speech between two, called Deliberation.  
Now followeth the figure of speech between two, called the preventing of an Objection, or occupation.  
Occupation is when we do bring an objection, and yield an answer unto it: Therefore this speech between two in the first part, is called the Setting down of the Objection or Occupation. In the later part, an Answering of the Objection, or the subjection: as Rom. 6. What shall we say then? Shall we continue still in sin that grace may abound? In which words is set down the Objection: the answering in these words, God forbid. And here this must be marked, that the Objection is many times wanting, which must be wisely supplied by considering the occasion and answer of it: As, 1. Tim. 5. They will marry, having condemnation. Now lest any might say, what, for marrying? He answereth: No, For denying their first faith.  
Hitherto of the figures of Ask.  
Now followeth the figures of Answering.  
They are either in Suffering of a deed, called Permission ● or, Granting of an argument, called concession.  
Suffering of a deed or permission is, when mockingly we give liberty to any deed; being never so filthy, as Rev. Let him that is filthy be filthy still● And 1. Cor. 14. If any be ignorant, Let him be ignorant.  
Concession or granting of an argument is, when a argument is mockingly yielded unto, as, Eccle. 11. Rejoice, O young man in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee, etc.  
[Hitherto of the first part of Rhetoric, of the garnishing of Speech: the second part, which is the garnishing of Utterance, because it is not yet perfect (for the precepts for the most part pertain to an Orator) which when it shall be perfect, it shall either only contain common precepts for the garnishing of Utterance in all, or also proper precepts for the same in Magistrates, Ambassadors, Captains, and Ministers; therefore until it be so perfected, we think it unnecessary to be translated into English.   

Although the Rules of SOPHISTRY be needless for them that be perfect in LOGIC; yet because the knowledge of them bringeth some profit to young beginners, both for the ready answering of the subtle arguments, and the better practising of Logic and Rhetoric, we have thought good to turn it into the English Tongue.  
SOphistry is the feigned art of Elneches, or coloured reasons.  
A colourable reason, or Elench, is a show of reason to deceive withal.  
It is either When the deceit lieth in ●he Words; or in the default of Logic, ●alled a Sophism.  
In words is, either when the deceit●●eth in one word; or in Words joyned ●ogether. if it were, it should be, Whosoever.  
In one word, is either the darkness of a word; or, the doubtfulness of a word.  
The darkness of a word, or an insolency deceiveth, when by a reason the meaning is not understood, whether the strangeness be through the oldness, newness, or swelling vanity of the words; and of the last sort, is that spoken of in 2 Pet. 2. 18.  
By this fallacy the Papists conclude, the Fathers to be on their side, for deserving by good works.  
Whosoever saith man's merits are crowned, they say man's works do deserve.  
But the Fathers say, man's merits are crowned.  
Therefore the Fathers say, man's works do serve.  
Where Merits is an old word, put for any works done under the hope of reward, whether it come by desert, or freedom of promise.  
Doubtfulness of a word, Likeness of name, is either called Homonymia; or by a Trope or fineness of speech.  
The Likeness of name, or Homonymia, is when one word is given to signify divers things: As, 
He that believeth shall be saved.  
The Hypocrites to whom our Saviour Christ would not commit himself, believed.  
Therefore they shall be saved.   
Where faith doth note out both a justifying faith, and a dead faith.  
Doubtfulness by a Trope, is when a word is taken properly, which is meant figuratively, or contrarily: As 
That which Christ saith is true.  
Christ saith that bread is his body.  
Therefore it is true.  
Where by body is meant the Sign or Sacrament of his body.   
Unto the first, a perfect Logician would answer, that the proposition is not an axiom necessarily true, according to the rule of truth, because of the doubtfulness of the old and new signification of merit. And if the word be far worn out of use, that it be not understood, than the answer must be, I understand it not, or put your axiom in plain words.  
To the second, he would answer, that the proposition or first part, is not according to the rule of righteousness, because the proper subject and adjunct are not joined together: which hath justifying faith, or believeth sincerely, shall be saved; and then the assumption being in the same sense inferred, is false.  
Unto the third he would answer, that the assumption is not necessarily true, because if the word Body be taken properly, it is not then true that is set down: but if it be taken figuratively, it is true, and therefore would bid him make the assumption necessarily true, and then say, Christ faith in proper words, It is my body; and than it is false.  
Hitherto of the fallacies in single words.  
Now of those that are joined together.  
It is either Amphibolia, or the doubtfulness of speech: or, Exposition, or unapt setting down of the reason.  
The first is, when there is doubtfulness in the frame of speech; as thus, If any obey not our word by a letter, note him: where some refer by a letter, to the first part of the Sentence, and some to the later, where the signification of the word, and right pointing doth show, that it must be referred to the first.  
The answer is, that the right & wise placing of the Sentence is perverted.  
Unhaps setting down of the Rea●on, is, when the parts of the question ●nd the reasons entreated, is not set ●own in fit words: as, 
All sin is evil.  
Every child of God doth sin.  
Therefore every child of God is evil.   
Here the answer according to Lo●ick, is that the assumption doth not ●●ke the argument out of the proposition, but putteth in another thing, and ●o it is no right frame of concluding, ●s appeareth by the definition of the assumption.  
Hitherto of the deceits of reason which lie in words.  
Now of the default of Logic, called Sophism.  
It is either General, or Special.  
The General are those which cannot be referred to any part of Logic.  
They are either begging of the question, called the petition of the principle, or bragging of no proof.  
Begging of the question is when nothing is brought to prove but the question, or that which is doubtful: As,  
That righteousness which is both by faith and works, doth justify.  
But this righteousness, is inherent righteousness: Ergo.  
Here the proposition in effect is nothing but a question.  
If together with the blood of Christ we must make perfect satisfaction for our sins, before we come to Heaven.  
Then there must be purgatory for them that die without perfection.  
But the first is so: Ergo. Where the argument they bring is as doubtful, and needeth as much proof as the question.  
The answer is this out of the definition of the Syllogism that there is no new argument invented, therefore it cannot be a certain frame of concluding.  
Bragging of no proof, is when that which is brought is too much, called Redounding.  
It is either impertinent to another matter, called Heterogenium; or a vain repetition, called Tautologia.  
Impertinent, or not to the purpose, is when any thing is brought for a proof, which is nothing near to the matter in hand, whereunto the common proverb giveth answer; I ask you if chee●e, you answer me of chalk.  
A vain repetition is, when the same ●hing in effect, though not in words, is repeated; as they that after long time of prayer say, Let us pray. And this fallacies our Saviour Christ condemneth in prayer, Mat. 5. and this is a fault in Method.  
Special are those which may be referred to certain parts of Logic, and ●hey are of two sorts.  
Such as are referred to the spring of reasons, called invention; or to judgement.  
Those referred to Invention are, when any thing is put for a reason, which is not, as no cause for a cause, no effect for an effect, and so of the ●est.  
In the Distribution this is a proper fallacy, when any thing simply or generally granted, thereby is inferred a certain respect or special not meant nor intended: as,  
He that saith, there are not seven Sacraments, saith true.  
He that saith, there are only three, saith, there are not seven.  
Therefore he that saith, there are three, saith true.  
The right answer is, that the proposition is not necessarily true, for there may be a way to say, there are not seven, and yet affirm an untruth.  
Fallacies of judgement are those that are referred to the judgement of of one sentence, or of more.  
Of one Sentence, either to the Proprieties of an Axiom; or to the Sorts.  
To the proprieties, as when a true is put for a false, and contrarily: and affirmative for a negative, and contrarily. So some take the words of Sain● john, I do not say concerning it, that you shall not pray, for no denial; when as it doth deny to pray for that sin.  
To the Sorts are referred, either to the Simple, or Compound.  
The first when the general is taken for the special, and contrarily. So the Papists by this fallacy do answer to that general saying of Paul; We are justified by faith without the works of the law. Which they understand of works done before faith, when that was ●●ver called in doubt.  
The fallacies which are referred to a compound Axiom, are those which are referred either to a disjoined, or knitting Axiom.  
To a disjoined axiom when the parts indeed are not disjoined: As, Solomon was either a King, or did bear rule.  
To a Knitting axiom is, when the parts are not necessarily knit together, As,  
If Rome be on fire, the Pope's chair is burnt.  
And hitherto of the first sort of fallacies referred to judgement.  
Now followeth the second.  
And they be either those that are referred To a Syllogism.; or To Method.  
And they again are General, and Special.  
General which are referred to the general properties of a Syllogism.  
It is either when all the parts are Denied; or are Particular.  
All parts denied: As, 
No Pope is a Devil.  
No man is a Devil.  
No man is a Pope.   
Therefore.  
And this must be answered, that it is not according to the definition of a Negative syllogism, which must have always one affirmative.  
All particular: As, 
Some unlawful thing must be suffered, as namely that which cannot be taken away.  
The stews is some unlawful thing.  
Therefore the stews must be suffered.   
This is answered by the definition of a special syllogism, which is that hath one part general.  
The special are those which are Simple, or Compound.  
The Simple is of two sorts.  

The first is more Plain.  
The second less Plain.   
More plain is when the assumption is denied, or the question is not particular: As, 
Every Apostle may preach abroad:  
Some Apostle is not a Pope,   
Therefore.  
Some Pope may not preach abroad.  
Also.  
Every Pope is a Lord:  
Some Pope may give an universal licence.  
Therefore every Lord may give an universal licence.  
Less plain hath one fallcy in common when the proposition is special: As, 
Some player is a rogue:  
Every vagabond is rogue,  
Therefore, every player is a vagabond.   
Also, 
Some player is a rogue:  
Every vagabond is a player.  
Therefore every player is a Rogue.   
The fallacy of the first kind is when all the parts be affirmative: As, 
All Paul's Bishops were ordained for unity.  
All Arch-Bishops be ordained for unity.  
Therefore, all Arch-Bishops are Paul's Bishops.   
The fallacy of the second kind is when the assumption is denied: As, 
Every puritan is a Christian.  
No L. Bishop is a puritan.  
Therefore, No L. Bishop is a Christian.   
Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a simple Syllogism.  
Now follow those which are referred to a compound, which are those which are referred either To the Connexive, or To the disjoined.  
Of the first sort one is when the first part or antecedent is denied, that the second or consequent may be ●o likewise: As, 
If any man have two benefices, ●e may escape unpunished at the Bishop's hands.  
But he may not have two benefices,   
Therefore.  
He may not escape unpunished at the Bishop's hands.  
The second part is affirmed, that the first may be so also. As, 
If every ignorant minister were put out of the Church, and a Preacher in his place, we should have good order:  
But we have good order, Therefore  
Every ignorant minister is put out of the Church; and a Preacher in his place.   
Of those referred to the disjoined, the first is, when all the parts of the disjunction or proposition are not affirmed: As, 
Every ignorant minister is to be allowed, or not.  
But he is not.  
Therefore he is.   
The second kind is when the second part of the copulative negative axiom is denied, that the fir●t may be so; As, 
A nonresident, is either a faithful, or unfaithful Minister.  
But he is unfaithful, Ergo, etc.   
And thus much of the fallacies in a Syllogism.  
The fallacy in Method is when, to deceive withal, the end is set in the beginning, the special before the general, good order be gone, confounded: And finally, when darkness, length and hardness is laboured after.   
FINIS.