OBSERVATIONS upon a Sermon Entitled, A Confutation of Atheism from the Faculties of the Soul, alias, Matter and Motion cannot think: Preached April 4. 1692.  
By way of REFUTATION.  
THE whole Sermon is comprehended in 39 pages, the first 12 of which, or to page 12, are employed as an Introduction or Apparatus to his Text and Design: and page 12, the Preacher says, he intends to prove, that the Life, Motion, Essence and Nature of Man is derived from God, and may direct Men to the knowledge of him: but all this need not be proved to Men of my opinion, who do willingly agree the Truth of his Assertion.  
P. 13. he says he will prove, That there is an Immaterial Substance in Man, which we call Soul and Spirit, essentially distinct from our Bodies. And this if he shall substantially perform, it shall pass for heroic and above all ordinary power; but presently he seeks to avoid and shift off his performance of Proving, by saying, that the thing is evident in itself. But this I do utterly deny, and think the contrary more evident, viz. That the humane Soul is a material Spirit generated, growing, and falling with the Body, and rising again with it at the sound of the voice of the Archangel, and the trump of God. And upon this Difference between our Positions, the state of our present Controversy will depend. I have denied this his Assertion, That the thing is self-evident. Why, but says he, There is something in Man's Composition that thinks, deliberates, consents and actuates all humane Sensations and Powers; these Activities cannot come from nothing, therefore they come from an immaterial Soul or Spirit in Man. To this I answer, his Consequence is not good; viz. These Powers come from something, ergo, from an Immaterial Spirit: for they may come from a Material Spirit. In proof whereof I argue à simili: The Plants live, grow, flourish and fructify by a Material Spirit: The Infects act admirably by a like Spirit: The Brutus' act sensibly and knowingly by a like Spirit: ergo, Man may perform all his natural Functions by the like means of a Material Spirit, inspiring and acting the proper Organs which God hath made apt for such purposes. We see, in a Musical Organ, every Pipe hath its proper Sound and Function, and the same Breath acts them all; and therein appears a great Effect and Power of Matter and Motion, rightly fabricated, and acted by the hand of Artists: and what then may not God do with them and by them, when he pleaseth?  
I take a second Exception to his saying, there is something in Man's Composition that thinks, argues, etc. He says there is no Man so sceptical as to deny this, or to doubt of it; but his Mistake is great in it: for I do believe, that there is not any particular thing in Man's composition that thinks, argues, etc. but that it is the Man himself, viz. the whole Composition of Soul and Body by a divine and admirable Contexture united, which thinks, argues, and doth all other natural things, which God hath given him a Power and Propensity to do. It is not the Preacher's something in Man that doth all those things which he mentions; but it is the Man that doth them, not that something which he will surmise to be the Soul, for that cannot act without the bodily Organs, not think without the Brain, nor remember without the Organ of Memory, any more than see without an Eye, or speak without a Tongue, or generate without a proper Organ for that purpose.  
And this needs be no news to our Preacher, for his Master Aristotle, in his treatise of the Soul, lib. 2. cap. 5. counts it a great impropriety of speaking to say, that the Soul is sorrowful, fearful, sensitive or rational, angry or the like; and that one may say as properly, that the Soul weaves or builds; and that it is not proper to say, the Soul learns or reasons, but the Man doth so, viz. the whole Compositum of Soul and Body doth them: further he saith there, To love, hate, think, or use reason, are not properly Affections or Actions of the Soul, but of him who hath the Soul. In his 1. cap. dicti Lib. he questions whether the Soul have any Affections or Actions, not communicated to the Compositum or Person, but kept as peculiar to itself. Finally he says, It seems to him, that the Soul hath neither Desire, Anger, Fear, etc. nor can do or suffer by them without the Body; nor that it can so much as perceive or be sensible without it: the very Intellect, he thinks, either is the Fancy, or cannot be acted without it, and then cannot the Soul use it without help of the bodily Organs. Dicaearchus maintains his Master's doctrine in this point, and Pliny in his Natural History, lib. 7. cap. 55. says the like, Show if you can, says he, what is the Substance and Body of the Soul? (as it were) what kind of Matter is it apart from the Body? where lieth the Cogitation which she hath? how doth she see or hear? what toucheth she? nay, what one thing doth she? how is she employed? or if there be none of all this in her, what good can be to her without them? surely these are but Imaginations of Men, who fain would live always. And there is the like Foolery in preserving of men's Dead Bodies: yea, such is the Folly and Vanity of Men, that they think the human Soul extends [naturally] to future Ages; and that Ghosts separated from their Bodies have Sense, and thereupon render Men them honour and worship; making a God of him who is not so much as a Man; as if the manner of men's Breathing differed from that of other Creatures. These were all persons eminently learned, and yet they denied that Man's Powers were acted by any particular or specifical something that was in him; and affirmed (as I do) that all are Actions of the Compositum, or the Man, a Contexture of Soul and Body; and by no means can our Preacher's something perform such Offices, without the divine and admirable Contexture of Soul and Body: for that the one of these without the other can do no such things, nor can probably do or suffer anything at all.  
P. 14. Our Preacher says, Such Powers and Actions must have an Efficient Cause; and I grant it, and assign the Contexture of Soul and Body in Man, as the Efficient and proper Cause of all such Actions. Then he says, that Cogitation, Volition and Sensation are neither inherent in Matter as such, nor acquirable to Matter by any Motion or Modification of it. To this I answer, that Sensation and Perception are inherent in Man and Beast, and to each of them belonging, as they are divine Compositions, or rather Contextures, of Soul and Body. Gen. 2.7. says God form Man of the dust of the ground; so c. 3. v. 19 God says to Man, out of the ground wast thou taken, for dust thou art and to dust shalt thou return. We know that human Arts have so far prevailed as to communicate to dead and hard Matter a fixed and regular Motion: Witness Architas his Dove, and Regiomontanus his Eagle, both made of Wood, and a Fly of Iron made by the last, who all flew at their full liberty in the Air, to a certain and considerable distance, and returned in a regular manner to the places from whence they first set out; and this, Men would not then believe could be done without an Immaterial Spirit; that these Engines therefore were moved by Daemons, and the Artists were Conjurers, was a common opinion of those times, and hitherto Artists are with Difficulty defended from such Imputations. Dr. Willis in his Anima Brutorum p. 40. De illis redarguendis solicitus non sum, qui viventium sensus & facultates quascunque perceptivas, non nisi à substantia immateriali immortalique obire posse contendunt; he says, He did not think such Thinkers worthy of any answer; and this perhaps might be his reason for it, he knew that our Preacher's Affertion was maintained by several learned Men, but after a different mode of Argumentation: for when they were pressed by the Argument taken from the Actions and Faculties of the Brutes, viz. that they have and act as many Senses as Men have, and use them as perfectly, that they have as strong and active Affections, Passions, Appetites and local Motions as Men have; that they have Fancy, Memory and Perceivance, like those of Men, though in far lower degrees than those of Men are. Upon averment that all these Faculties in the Brutes were acted by a material Spirit, and a demand why the same might not be effected amongst Men: the Maintainers of Immateriality seem much put to it for an answer to this Objection, and they are divided upon it: some of them say, that Brutes have neither Senses, nor Affections, nor Appetites, nor any sort of Perceivances at all, and that they know no more of what they do, than the Organ-pipes know when they make Music, or a pair of Bellows that they blow the Fire; whence they would infer, that they have not, and need not, any sort of Soul, for that they neither use nor have any sensible Faculty at all. But this Argument appears to me, as I suppose it did to Dr. Willis, argumentum ducens ad absurdum, and therefore but a Fallacy. For what can lightly appear more absurd to the common sense of Mankind, than boldly and seriously to affirm that a Dog or a Horse doth neither hear, see, smell, taste, nor even feel, when they are whipped, spurred or beaten; and that Beasts have neither Love, Wrath, Fear, Expectation or Desire; these Assertions appear so contrary to men's daily experience, and therefore so absurd as to make Dr. Willis think such Arguers deserve no answer: and yet Des Cartes and Sir K. Digby profess to argue on that side, and thereby to support the necessary Immateriality of a human Soul. Others there are who, to support the necessity of such an Immateriality, take a quite different and even a contrary course; for observing the infirmity and absurdity of the forecited Argument, they agree and acknowledge, that Brutes have and use all their Senses, Affections, Passions, Appetites and local Motions as Men use them; and that they have and use Phanfie, Memory, Perceivance and Choice, like, but in a much lower degree than those of Men: but, say they, the Brutes cannot thus act without the assistance and guidance of Spirits or Souls; nay, and that it is not a Material Soul which can serve for such purposes, but that Brutes must of necessity be reputed to have Immaterial Souls, preaexistent before they came into their brutal Bodies, and that shall subsist in a state of Separation after the death of such brutal Bodies: And this they say and affirm, with design to persuade, that there is an absolute necessity for Men to have Immaterial Souls; because, say they, the very Brutes cannot act their Senses and Faculties without such Souls. And these were such Arguers as Dr Willis thought not to deserve his Answer: and yet Dr. More asserts this opinion in terminis; and Baxter follows the same very near, although not altogether so fully. But they are all eagerly bend to establish the Immateriality, and Immortality of Human Souls; for fear, that otherwise there would not be a sufficient ground or foundation for the expectation of Rewards and Punishments future to this Life; not enough remembering or considering the Article of the Resurrection, and the last Judgement, appointed by God for that very purpose of distributing Recompenses according to the behaviour which Men have used in passing through the Trials and Temptations of this World.  
Our Preacher insists, That if Sensation were inherent in Matter, Stocks and Stones would be Percipient and Rational Creatures. To this, I say, that may be competent to, and inherent in one sort of Matter, which is very incompetent to, and incoherent with, another sort of Matter. But he seems to intent a confounding all sorts of Matter together, as if Logs, Metals, and Stones, were of the same nature with Flesh, Blood and Brain, or those of Water, Air and Fire; amongst all which sorts of Matter, I say, there are very great Differences; and some of these sorts of Matter are capable of such Effects and Operations, as others of them are not.  
P. 15. Aimed only against Atheists,, and such as deny there are any Spiritual Substunces. I say thereunto, I am not of that Belief or Opinion.  
P. 17. He says, Matter cannot acquire Motion of itself. This I deny: For I say, that Wind and Fire are Matter, and yet Self-movers; nor do they, or can they, ever lose their Motion, or cease moving so long as they continue to be Wind or Fire. And if we shall consider the Dust of which Adam was made, we may find that it may be so comminuted and refined, as when pounced through a fine Searce, the smallest part of it will rise up again like a thin cloud, ascending upwards of itself, and apt to be moved with every little Breath; resembling, and fine as those Atoms which we call Motes in the Sun, and which of their own nature maintain a perpetual Motion. It seems a Compositum of such active Particles impregnated with rorid Steams and Juices apt to ascend by adhering to any solid Body, are not apt alone for Motion, but that by the hand and skill of a Divine Artist there may be made of such like Ingredients, a Cogitative Matter. For an instance of which, we may propound the Infects, who have nothing but mere earth and dust impregnated for their Originals, and yet act regularly, and according to the Rules and Directions of Art and Science; witness the Bees, the Aunts, and the admirable Textures of the Spiders; God thereby revealing to us, that he can, out of mere Matter, produce Arts and Sciences, and especially for the preservation and benefit of his Creatures: but far beyond the Practice or Knowledge of Men to perform, and even their Powers to conceive or apprehend the true and next reasons or causes of such Performances: To such purpose Phil. Melanchthon, lib. de anima, p. 20. He had just before recited, Certas descriptiones Philisophicas, quae si de pecudis anima tantum quaereretur, utcunque monstrarent, aliquid quod cogitari potest in materia fons esse actionum: nondum tamen penitus haec perspicimus, & cur ita factum sit sapientia est artificis, non nostra. Pag. 112. he says, Maxim admirandum est cerebrum, quod est domicilium, ac officina cogitationum. And although we do not thoroughly know the Substance and Operation of the Brain, nor the ubi or, quomodo such things are wrought in it, but must leave such Knowledge to the Wisdom of the Creator: Yet thus much, says he, Men may know of it; oriri ejus materiam à subtilissima parte seminis & plena spirituum, quae in formatione foetus; in illam hominis arcem summam quasi exaestuat, cum epar, cor, & venulae inchoantur. And this derivation of the Brain, and its daily and known Performances, make it look very like a mat●ria Cogitativa; and as such it shall be left here, notwithstanding our Author the Preachers pretences to the contrary.  
In this page he handles Matter, as if three of the Elements, viz. Water, Air, and Fire were no parts of Matter; which I pass for an apparent mistake: And he says, Matter cannot acquire Motion of itself without thrusting of some other Body, or intrinsical Motion of an immaterial Spirit. This is denied before, and instances given of the Wind and Fire, which move themselves and other things about them, during the whole continuance of their own being.  
P. 18. He says, no parts of Matter, considered in themselves, are hot or cold, white or black, bitter or sweet; and that they have neither light or colour, heat or sound; these are not, says he, in Bodies absolutely considered, but in our Eyes, Ears, and other Organs of Sense. I answer, Quod non ego credulus illi; I grant Men cannot perceive such qualities in Matter but by means of their Senses, but withal do believe that there are Light, and Bodies illuminating, though Men should not see them; so Sounds not heard, so Heat without men's feeling it, discoverable enough by seeing it at a distance, consumption of the fuel, and the scorched blackness of such parts of the fuel as are left after such a fire. But yet he will prove what he said to be true, by an instance: For, says he, If glass that hath no colour at all, be broke and braid into small parcels, those small parcels will look to be of a white colour, and yet truly they have no more colour in them than they had before, and that truly is none at all. I grant him there is in this instance a deceptio visus, and that the thing appears otherwise than it is: Shall it be concluded, that because our Senses are deceived in some things, therefore we cannot trust them in any thing? there seems small foundation for such a conclusion. And I will thereupon put him another instance, viz. Put a straight Stick into the water, presently it will appear crooked, but take it out, and it will look straight again, and was always so notwithstanding its appearance. He may as well pretend to infer, that there are really no crooked sticks in Nature, as that Matter hath no real Qualities because Men are deceived, in thinking his bray'd-Glass to be white. And yet he says, P. 19 That he hath sufficiently proved his Assertion: But I beg his pardon, for thinking he is mistaken. He says there, That the Qualities in Bodies can no more be conceived to be real, than Roses or Honey can be thought to smell and taste their own sweetness. Had he said, than Roses have a sweet smell, or Honey a sweet taste, the saying might have been both coherent and true; whereas now it seems to be neither.  
P. 20. He pretends to believe, and persuade, that the Body of Man is a Senseless piece of Matter, which hath neither colour, warmth, softness, etc. He says, he hath proved this, but I do not know where; and I beg his pardon for not believing him; For I must adhere to Thomas Didymus against him, trusting my own Senses in their healthy and sound Condition, to judge of their proper Objects, placed at a reasonable distance, and the fitting Sphere of their Activity, and assisted by the ordinary Powers of Human Perception or Judgement; which easily discovers, that the Sight is deceived, when it takes his bray'd-Glass to be really white, or my Stick in the water to be really crooked. He says farther, It is not Blood and Bones that can judge, nor can the Head or Brain do it, as being only Body, and not imaginative. P. 21. But, says he, Our opposers may reply, [and so they do] That the Animal Spirits, and Insensible Particles there residing, [viz. in the Head and Brain] do actuate the common Sense, Fancy, Memory, Judgement and other Powers of the Understanding. To this he replies, the thing cannot be so; for that their Spirits must have each a determinate Figure, as Cubes, Spheres, Cones, etc. But this is not granted him; for I say rather, that these Spirits in the Head are Particles of the purest Blood Inflamed, glowing and lucid, irradiating the Brain, and all the Ventricles or Concavities of it, with the appendances of Apprehension and Memory thereunto belonging. He says, We do not grind inanimate Corn into Living and Rational Meal: and that Nails, Hair, Horns and Hoofs, may bid as fair for Understanding as the finest Animl Spirit of them all. To this I answer, That the inflamed glowing Particles of Blood, called Spirits, are not in themselves Sentient or Intelligent, but they are the Actus primus corporis Organici, viz. The Active Principle of Life, Motion, Sense and Understanding in Man and Beast; stimulating and acting every Part and Organ of the Body to the performance of those Duties for which by the Great Creator they were intended and made. Those Spirits therefore Act the Eye to see, the Ear to hear, the Tongue to speak, the Liver to make blood, the Heart to purify and refine it, the Understanding or Brain to apprehend, judge and remember: It cannot make one Organ perform the Function of another Organ, but acts every Organ according to its proper Use and natural Capacity, And therefore it is not the Soul or the Body that act, enable, or govern the Man, but the Man, by the activity of his Soul, and the aptitude of his bodily Organs, doth all those things which we daily see are done amongst us, not by Soul or Body singly, but by the Virtues and Contexture of both together.  
For his saying, that Men cannot grind Corn into Living and Rational Meal: If it have a meaning, it seems to intent, that Corn cannot be so used as to effect Life and Rationality in Men; and if it be taken in that sense, the opinion seems to be a very clear mistake: For every days Experience shows, that Corn ground and made into Bread is one of the strongest supports of Life, both for Man and Beast; that concocted in the Stomach, is converted into Blood in the Liver, purified in the Heart, sent thence by the Arteries into the Head and Brain, where becoming a Spirit inflamed and lucid, it acts in all the Organs, the Powers of Life, Motion, Senses, and Understanding. And if such Corn be Brewed into Drink, we know it may be made so spirited, as a little of it will very much revive, quicken and cherish the Natural Faculties of Man and Beast, and particulary the discerning and rational Powers of Mankind, in increasing activity and mettle both in Body and Soul. We say of Wine, Moderate sumptum acuit ingenium. 1 Esdras 3. Wine makes the mind of a Beggar equal to that of a King, and turns every thought into jollity. This grows from the subtlety and activity of that Liquor, and the many and strong Spirits which are in it, apt to take fire and be inflamed, and to burn till the whole Spirit of it be consumed. And the Soul Material, is not only refreshed and strengthened by Corn and Wine, as well as the Body; but the Soul generally of any sort, material or immaterial, cannot live or continue in the Body without Breath, Blood, and daily or sufficient Nourishment. For the Blood, Moses calls it, the life of the creature; and says, the life is in the blood, and as the life it makes atonement upon the Altar. As to the Breath, all Men know that if it be stopped but for a few moments, the Soul, if Material, will be extinguished, and if Immaterial, will be dislodged and driven away from its Body, not able to subsist there (even for a short time) without breath; which, how it should be so very needful for an Immaterial Soul I cannot conceive. Well, but farther, the Man must have daily, or sufficient Nourishment, or else the Soul, as well as the Body, will find want of it, and the Man will decay by degrees, till for want of a supply, death and dissolution must follow, if a supply be not had in time competent. We read 1 Sam. 30. that David at Ziklag found an Egyptian in the field famished, for he had neither eaten nor drunk in three days and three nights; but they gave him Fruit and Water, upon which the Man's Spirit came again to him: so Judg. 15. Samson ready to die for thirst, prayed, and God clavae a hollow place in the Jawbone, and there came water thereout, and when Samson had drunk, his Spirit came again and he revived. In both these cases, if necessary Nourishment had not come in due time, the Persons had died: for upon nourishment they revived, and Sampson's Spirit came again to him and he revived. I demand what sort of Spirit was this which came again and revived Samson? it seems not one that was Immaterial, because that needs not, nor is capable of nourishment: and therefore I conclude it was a Material Spirit, which needed Nourishment, and was capable of being refreshed and revived by it, as adding new Fuel for supporting the flame of Life almost extinguished for want of needful Nourishment. And yet, upon this revival, we find the Egyptians Understanding, Memory and Senses were presently recovered, of which before his eating he had little or no use at all. Whence it appears, that rational Powers are acted by this Spirit, which depends upon Nourishment, as failing and reviving with it. And from all this, it seems one may venture to conclude that Corn may be converted into a living and rational Activity, as being a proper Nourishment for Man and Beast, and for their Bodies and Souls, one as well as the other; as being so for the Man, who is a Contexture of both.  
His six next Pages, viz. from 22 to 28, are intended to confute those who affirm, that the great or little Worlds were not created by God, but that they derive themselves from an accidental Concourse and Cohesion of Atoms. That all were the Works of God, I am ready to grant, and to maintain, as well as he; but in his design to prove God's Providence and Creation by the Immateriality of human Souls, I judge he hath taken a wrong Sow by the ear. The Creation of the World by God, I grant to be true; that the human Soul is Immaterial, I hold not to be true: and I can but be sorry to find our Preacher fallen into the Inconvenience of endeavouring to prove that which is true, by that which perhaps is not true.  
P. 28. He says, Men will object, the Powers and Actions of some Brutes nearly approaching to human Reason, and with some visible Glimpses of Understanding; and say they, if these things can be performed by the pure Mechanism of their Bodies, than it is but raising our Conceptions, and supposing Men to be Engines of a finer make and contexture, and the business is done; for then the Objectors will say, there needs no Immaterial Soul, nor any Soul at all, for the acting of human Faculties, but the Mechanism of human Bodies should be enough to act their Faculties, and perform all that by Men is usually and naturally performed.  
P. 29. He quotes the other Opinion, viz. That Brutes have degrees of Reason, and their full Senses, and Affections, and Motions, and therefore have Souls, and those Immaterial. Our Preacher passes over both these Opinions as very indifferent things to him, which of them be true, or whether either or neither of them be so. I have shown before that both these Opinions are erroneous, which he thought not fit to assert here, where it seems he properly aught to have done it, although I doubt not but that he believes them to be so. He says We need not be concerned about the Truth in this point, viz. whether the Brutes are Machine's, or have Immortal Souls: but I say, if either of these Opinions be true, the whole Fabric of Nature and Science would thereby be drawn into very great Differences and Alterations, and the point is not indifferent to others, whatsoever it be to him. Well, but, says he, if Men be Machine's, they can have neither Reason nor Sense. He should have gone on and said, but we know that Men have Sense and Reason, and therefore they are not bare Machine's (as some pretend to make men believe:) but instead of that fairer and truer Inference, it pleases him to deliver a Paradoxical and fallacious Axiom of his own, uncoherently enough introduced, viz. Omnipotency itself cannot create cogitative Body, because of an Incapacity in the Subject. I have before spoken concerning Earth pulverised and rarified into the tenuity of a Cloud, impregnated with steams and juices no less, but more fine and active than the Vegetable Souls or Spirits of Plants, mixed and irrigated, and, as it were, steeped and soaked by and with innumerable Rivages and Sources, proceeding from Fountains and Cisterns, with which the outward World daily communicates, for supplying the daily Decays of them. I conceive Matter thus constituted, impregnated, irrigated and enlivened, may, by Divine Power, be made cogitative. That the Infects work according to Rules of Art and Science, I know none who can observe them and deny it: that Brutes have their Senses, Affections, Passions, Appetites and Motions, all Men do grant, but the most blind and wilful among the Cartesians; also that they have Fancy, Memory and Perceivances, acted in and by their Brains, and Dr. Willis dict. lib. p. 59 says, in Hominibus & Brutis eadem prorsus est conformatio organorum animalium. And the Evidences that Cogitation and all other rational Acts in Men, depend upon the Brain, and are performed in it and by it, seem to me so clear and undeniable, as that joined to the rest it may pass for a strong Proof, that the Brain of Man is cogitative Matter, or very like it.  
And as to his phrasing it, that Omnipotence itself cannot make cogitative Body, there may be applied a Saying of Dr. Willis, p. 5. such Men it seems do think, quod Deus nihil amplius fabricare valeat, quam quod homo possit concipere aut effingere. Well, but our Preacher says, this cannot be done because of the Incapacity of the Subject; to this I answer, that Aaron's Rod laid upon the Tabernacle was dry Wood, and seemed to be under an incapacity of bearing Fruit; and yet in the morning, by Divine Power, it had budded, and brought forth Blossoms and yielded Almonds: the Red Sea stood like Walls, and Jordan stayed its Waters from running downwards: the Chaldean Fire forbore to burn God's Servants, or so much as to sing their ; all which are Acts beyond the natural Capacities of the Agents of them: and so was the multiplying of the Loaves and Fishes, under the Gospel: and what will our Preacher say to Matth. 19.24. Hath a Camel the Capacity of going through the Eye of a needle? Christ says, with Men this is impossible, but not with God, for with him all things are possible; whence it seems possible with him to make cogitative Body, notwithstanding our Preachers assurance to the contrary.  
That the cogitative Power very much depends upon the good Disposition, Soundness and Temperament of the Brain, is a thing so well known as it seems to need very little confirmation. David, Psal. 146.3. says, When the breath of man goeth forth he shall turn again to his earth, and then all his thoughts perish, the new Translation reads, Man's breath goeth forth, he returns to his earth, and that very day his thoughts perish. The perishing of his Thoughts may be expounded his Intentions or Designs; but more literally and fully, it seems to intent the Man's power and faculty of Thinking, for the Man dead can think no more. But what is it that dies? our Preacher will deny that his Soul dies; and yet by Death the Man's Faculty of Thinking is certainly destroyed; viz. by Death of the Body, and the Parts and Organs of it, ergo, the Body or some Organs of it are materia cogitativa. And the same may be further proved ex principiis: for during Childhood, and whilst the cogitative Parts and Organs are immature, we think like Children, but grown to maturity we put away childish Thoughts or modes of Thinking: and yet then, if the Brain happen to be clouded with Fumes from the Spleen or other Distempers, or even by those from Wine or Strong-drink, the Man cannot think orderly or rationally; and in phrenetick Distempers men's Thoughts rave and rove without Order or any Coherence or Connexion at all: in Diseases where the Head is stupefied, as Apoplexies, the Man becomes temporally incapable of any Thoughts at all. From all which I collect, that the Particles of Blood inflamed, ascending from the Heart unto the Head, are there further rarified, and made lucid, irradiating the Brain, and the Ventricles thereof; and that to these Spirits and Organs God hath imparted a discerning Faculty or Power, and that when these Organs are sound and perfect, and the flaming Particles clear, bright and lucid, they work to a perfection of degrees in the Minds, Reason and Thoughts of Men; unto which God adds, when he pleases, afflatum divini numinis, and that accumulates an excellency of Perfection to Man, and in him, of thinking, inventing and discerning.  
P. 31. Our Preacher says, he hath sufficiently shown that Sense and Perception can never be the product of any kind of Matter or Motion. And if this be true, let our Readers make themselves the Judges. Well, but, says he, if this cannot be corporeal, it must come from an incorporeal Substance within us. If he will take a material Spirit for an incorporeal Substance, we are agreed; but if he will have this incorporeal Substance to be an immaterial, intelligent, angelical Spirit, I answer, he hath not proved the necessity of its being so, nor that the thing is so; nay here he confesses, we cannot conceive the manner of our Souls Action and Passion, nor what hold it can lay on the Body, when it voluntarily moves it: this is what we cannot conceive of such a Soul. But I desire him to tell us what he doth conceive or know concerning such a Soul; that he will evince to Reason, quod sit! quid sit? unde oritur? quando ingreditur? ubi residet? quomodo operatur? an separatim subsistit? quo avolat deficiente corpore? If he can teach scientifically concerning these Points, his word will be better taken in many other things; and yet even then I could hardly credit his next Assertion, viz. though we cannot conceive the Soul nor its Actings, yet we are as certain of them as of any Mathematical Truth whatsoever, which I both can conceive, and may be easily demonstrated to me. The Truth and Reasonableness of this Assertion shall be left to those who are at leisure to consider of them.  
P. 32. He confesses his Ignorance in causes of men's Pleasure, Pain, Sleep, Activity, he says, this Knowledge exceeds Man's narrow Faculties, and is out of the reach of our Discovery: he discerns excellent Final Causes of the vital Conjunction of Body and Soul, but the Instrumental he knows not, nor how they are united or tied together; he resolves all into God's good Pleasure; but he shows us no Evidence that it is, or ever was, his Pleasure, to inform Mankind by an Immaterial, Intelligent Spirit, which is capable of living in a State of Separation from the Body. And if Corporeal Powers be confessedly too hard for him, it may seem strange he should attempt upon the Disquisition, concerning the Being and Operations of an Immaterial Soul in Man, without so much as offering to make any positive proof of the Thing, from the Grounds either of Reason or Scripture. I am not able to credit his bare Word for it, nor his negative proof, that it must be so, because he thinks it cannot be otherwise. These persuasions seem of small force, with those who think the thing may be otherwise, and is truly so.  
P. 35. He thinks, that for Men to deny the Soul, because they cannot see, or any ways perceive it, is not reasonable: and it seems to me full as unreasonable to prove that man hath an Immaterial Soul, because God cannot create Cogitative Body.  
P. 36. He says, He neither can, nor will command God to come from Heaven to consume his opposers. It is well he owns the defect of his power, and it may be, that therefore he will not do it: For that page 26. he says, Banging and Buffeting into Reason is the most proper and effectual to be used against his opposers: It is, says he, the vigorous Execution of good Laws, and not Rational Discourses only, that must be used to reclaim such profane Persous. He means Laws so good as to Establish his Opinion, and set sharp Penalties upon all others who dare profess to believe otherwise. So did Saul, he haled Men and Women and committed them to Prison, because they believed, and worshipped after a way which he thought Heresy. So did the old Romans; and so do the Romanists, the Turks, and the French King; are all of our Preachers mind, viz. The Opinion which prevails and hath most worldly Power shall do best, to make severe Laws with sharp Penalties against their competitors; and this is all that Men can do: And this our Preacher desires should be done on the behalf of his Opinion; and this course detects first his own Inclination: and next, that he hath no great confidence in the force of his own Argument; seeing he says, Persecution and Punishment are the only means likely to prevail for reducing his opposers from their pernicious Errors, forgetting the old Observation, Hodie mihi, cras tibi; the Opinion cried up to day, may fall to morrow: He who thinks he stands may fall: and therefore our Lord's direction is wise and good, as ye would mwn should do unto you, even so do ye unto them. And in Mistakes of the Judgmedt, Men should remember, that none can come to Christ but whom the Father draws, which it seems should pass for an Argument inducing Moderation and Forbearance towards our mistaken, and therefore dissenting Brethren, in Opinions which do not induce, or encourage to an ill Practice or Course of Life.  
Thus have I traced our Preacher, and followed him with Observation through all the Pages of his Sermon, which concern the Immateriality of a human Soul. His Promise made P. 13. to prove there is an Immaterial Soul in Man, seems somewhat unhappily performed, and very unsuccessfully; for he offers no positive Proof at all, and his negative Proof seems very insufficient for the support of so great a Stress and Burden as he hath laid upon it. And it shall be left to the Opinion of our Perusers whether he have well performed his bold Undertaking and Promise or not. Ready however to accept of and to desire a future performance of that which yet seems to be insufficiently attempted. He said, I will prove there is an Immaterial Soul in Man. I think this Sermon to be no performance of this Promise; and I do not believe that our Preacher hath said all, nor the best that he is able to speak to that purpose: he may consider an honest Man ought to be as good as his word, and what he performs not at one time he will endeavour to effect at another, as far as his Power or Talent can be extended. What he hath done to that purpose in this Sermon, seems to me very infirm and little considerable, as depending upon men's opinions what God is able to do. Our Lord himself tells us, that with God all things are possible; and it seems somewhat an odd Assertion, that the Incapacity of Matter should hinder God from making what he will out of it; whereas it seems rather, that he who made Matter out of nothing, can make any thing out of any Matter, and many other things than Men can imagine; and the most Miracles are acted either contrary to, or above and beyond the natural Capacities of the Agents therein employed. If the thing which he promised to prove be really true, it seems he stands engaged for the Proof of it, in the best manner and with the best strength he is able, assisted by his Reading, Contemplation and Conference. The Point is of weighty Consideration, and he hath built upon it the Power and Providence of a Deity; whence it seems he stands engaged to make good the Immateriality of a human Soul, and its Subsistence in a separate state from the Body. This if scientifically he can and does do, or with any apparent probability, he shall be Magnus Apollo, and receive Commendations accordingly; and if he fail or fall short in the Attempt, no more will be said by his present Opponent, than magnis excidit ausis: as magnum, there is glory in the Undertaking, and that he may not excidere ausis, his best Forces are to be employed in the performance of that service to the Church and to the World. In this Sermon he hath forborn the Quotation of Scripture, as disputing with Persons who refused to accept the Authority of it: but if he shall think fit to stick to his word, and to prove or endeavour to prove, that the human Soul is an Immaterial, Intelligent Spirit, he will therein have to do with some who are ready to submit to the Rules and Authority of Scripture, and to be tried by them, as well as by the Rules and Experiments extracted from Nature and Reason: he will then, I hope, make use of that Holy Book to fortify his Tenet, and descendere in arenam, armed with his best Forces drawn out of all Garrisons and Magazines, fit for such a design; so may his Proof appear in the best manner that he can perform it; and why not in the best manner, that the same can be performed? my desire is to see it done in such manner; ready to submit to Truth made visible in any intelligible manner whatsoever. We have learned, that whatsoever doth make manifest is Light; the present Sermon seems to have little of that Light which manifests; but I expect that when he shall undertake to write ex professo upon this subject, and to make full proof of his Assertion according to his promise, that then his Arguments shall place Truth in so good a Light, and set it out in such natural and lively Colours, as thereby she may be easily discovered for what she is. And upon such a Discovery, no Man well meaning and intelligent, who dare trust his Faculties, but will be ready with open Arms to accept and embrace her whom all profess to seek; though too many, with Ixion's Fate, embrace a Cloud instead of Juno. My Meaning is to confide, in some Measure, that he will endeavour to perform his quoted Promise, in the best manner that he is able; and thereupon my desire shall be, that Truth may be his Aim; and that she may fulfil what Esdras declares of her, viz. That She may endure, be strong, and live, and conquer for evermore.  
FINIS.