PARRHASIANA: OR, THOUGHTS UPON Several Subjects; AS, CRITICISM, HISTORY, MORALITY, AND POLITICS.  
By Monsieur Le Clerk, under the feigned Name of Theodorus Parrhasi.  
Done into English by ****  
London: Printed for A. and J. Churchil, at the Black Swan, in Pater-Noster-Row. MDCC.   

THE PREFACE OF THE AUTHOR.  
'TIS an Observation made long ago, That the World is pleased with Miscellany Thoughts upon several Subjects, as appears not only by the kind reception the Thoughts of Monsieur Paschal and Monsieur de la Bruyere's Characters have found, but likewise by the Scaligerana, Perroniana, Sorberiana, Valesiana, Menagiana, etc. some of which have seen several Editions. This gave me Encouragement to set down in Paper several Reflections which I had made upon very different Subjects, and now to venture them abroad.  
I have not divided the Thoughts into several 
* This was our Author's Modesty: However▪ for the ease of the English Reader, we have divided it into Chap.  Chapters, but only by some Marginal Notes, because I never pretended to give any thing finished upon any of the Matters I treat of. However I may affirm that, generally speaking, they are better connected than any of those I have mentioned above. If I had so thought fit, I could have swelled each of them into several little Tracts, by making a few Additions to them, and some of them I might have distinguished by Chapters: But before I could bring them to this Regularity, I must of necessity say many Things, which have been delivered by others in so exact and perspicuous a manner, that there was no occasion to repeat them after them. My Design was only to touch upon those Things, which to the best of my Knowledge were never said before, or if they have been, were not so fully handled and supported, as now you find them. For Instance, there are several complete Treatises of Rhetoric, and the Art of writing History, to which a Man may have recourse in order to form in his Mind an exact Idea of these Sciences; but I never read or saw any of those Matters so fully handled as they deserve. And therefore the Reader may if he pleases join what I have said concerning them as a Supplement to those Treatises of Rhetoric and History that are extant, or else furnish himself out of others what is deficient in mine.  
The principal Thing I aimed at in this Collection of different Thoughts, was to say something that might be serviceable to the present Age: I leave it to the Reader to judge whether the Advertisements I give him are well grounded, For my part, I am persuaded that there was a necessity of saying something like it, that Men of Parts may improve these Hints, and enlarge upon at their leisure.  
Perhaps it may be objected that there is too great a Freedom in my Thoughts and Expressions; but unless I am mistaken, they can find nothing which in the least offends against Religion and Good Manners. No Man living is more persuaded of the Truth and Importance of both these things than myself, and I should never engage so hearty as to defend them against those that attack them. The Obedience that is due to Sovereigns and Magistrates is not at all violated by this Liberty, and 'tis no hard matter to be persuaded of this Truth, in the Country where I live: Since there is not a Man here that has not reason to bless the Gentleness of the Government, and of its excellent Maxims, one of the chief of which is To suffer all that are Subjects to it to speak freely, so long as they obey the Civil Laws. In effect let Men carry Liberty as high as they please, provided this Liberty be accompanied by a Love of Justice and of Order, it will only better discover the excellence of this Government, and oblige those that live under it to obey it with more cheefulness.  
As for the rest, the Liberty I have taken in this Collection was never intended to create any Quarrels. I have only made use of it to speak general Truths, which I never apply but to Authors dead long ago. If any Persons of the same Character are now alive, 'tis no fault of mine. It would be impossible ever to Censure any Irregularities, if a Man were to stay till there were none to be found to whom his Censure might be applied. 'Tis sufficient that he has no particular Views, and designs no such matter.  
At the end of this Collection I have only endeavoured to defend the Writings of a certain Author in whom I am interessed, and if I have answered the Calumnies of his Adversaries somewhat sharply, I may safely say that it was not till after several of them had for a long time abused his Silence, and vented their Malice in the most injurious manner that could be. We use to suffer him who defends himself to speak in a higher Tone than those that attack his Innocence, and the World passes by several Things in him which are not pardoned in the Aggressors. But I here declare that I have expressed myself with much more Tenderness than those who have fallen foul upon the Party whom I defend, and those that have read their Libels will make no question of it. I have not entered here into any Matter, but only contented myself to touch some Matters of Fact, till I have a proper opportunity to explain these Matters, as far as I see convenient. In the mean time the Public ought not to be surprised that the Person whom I here defend, has returned no other Answer to those who had a Mind to quarrel with him. He has been, and still is taken up in some Occupations that appear more useful to him, and consequently such as he ought more to mind. There are several honest and discerning Judges that will not be wanting to espouse his Party, till such time as he defends himself, if ever he thinks it necessary. If he's capable of doing the Public any Service either in discovering or supporting any one Truth which is of general Importance, they are more obliged to him in my Opinion, than if he had formally convicted his Adversaries, of a thousand false Reasonings, and a thousand Calumnies. As he is ready to sacrifice his private Resentments to the public Advantage, 'tis but reasonable the Public should do him Justice without his importuning them upon that score.   

Lately Published,  
THE Historical Library of Diodorus the Sicilian. In fifteen Books. The first Five, contain the Antiquities of Egypt, Asia, Africa, Greece, the Islands, and Europe. The last Ten, an historical Account of the Affairs of the Persians, Grecians, Macedonians, and other Parts of the World. To which are added, The fragments of Diodorus that are found in the Bibliotheca of Photius: Together with those Published by H. Valesius, L. Rhodomannus, and F. Vrsinus. Made English by G. Booth, of the City of Chester, Esq in Folio.  
Three Discourses of Happiness, Virtue, and Liberty. Collected from the Works of the Learned Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier.  
Letters written by Sir W. Temple, Baronet, and other Ministers of State, both at Home and Abroad. Containing an Account of the most Important Transactions that passed in Christendom from 1665 to 1672. In Two Volumes. Review'd by Sir W. Temple sometime before his Death: And Published by Jonathan Swift Domestic Chaplain to His Excellency the Earl of Berkeley, one of the Lords Justices of Ireland.  
The Adventures of Telemachus the Son of Ulysses, Part 1.  
All the other Parts will soon be published, and sold by A. & J. Churchil.   

PARRHASIANA: OR, THOUGHTS ON Several Subjects.  

CHAP. I. Of Poets and Poetry.  

What V se is to be made of the Poets.  ABundance of Men read the Poets, who don't know what a Poet is, or at lest can't express what they mean by it. A Poet is one who invents, either in whole or in part, the Subject he treats of; who disposes it in a certain Order proper to surprise the Reader, and make him attentive: In short, he's one who expresses himself in a different manner from the Vulgar, not only in respect of the Cadence, but likewise of the Elocution. That is to say, when a Man sets himself to read a Poem, he ought to consider, that he's going to read the Work of a Liar, who intends to entertain him with Fictions, or at least with Truths so corrupted, that 'tis no easy matter so distinguish one from tother. We ought to remember, that by the glittering Pomp of his Expression, he chief designs to surprise our Reason, and by the Harmony of his Cadence to please our Ears; in order to make us admire his Subject, and give us a great Idea of himself. Such Considerations as these would serve us instead of an Antidote when we read their Compositions, which perhaps may be of some Profit to those who think rightly and justly; but are only fit to seduce others whose Reason is not strong enough to pass a true Judgement upon what pleases them too much.  
If it be demanded, what use a Man may make of the Poets, we are in the first place to distinguish between the Ancients and the Moderns, between those that writ in the living, and those that writ in the dead Languages. We must likewise take care to distinguish between the Advantage a Man may reap from the Poets alone, and which is not to be had by reading any other Compositions, and that which is common to the Writings of the Poets, and those of other Authors: For upon all these Heads a Man may say different things.  
Not to speak of the Advantage, which is to be acquired by reading Authors in Prose as well as in Verse, 'tis certain that the ancient Poets may be serviceable to us in two respects. The first is, That they fill the Mind with admirable Lessons of Morality and Politics, with which they embellish their Works, and that their Maxims being delivered in handsome Terms and in Verse, not only affect us more, but make a more lasting Impression upon our Memory. The second is, That their Style being noble and elevated, warms the Imagination of those that read them, and may accustom them to express themselves in a lively and animated manner. For this reason, the ancient Rhetoricians advised the Reading of them to those that applied themselves to the Study of Eloquence.  
These are in general the greatest Advantages that may be drawn from the ancient Poets, for I don't call Diversion an Advantage, which is the only use some Readers make of them, since a Man may do that by reading of History: Besides, that to read merely to amuse one's self ought not to be looked upon as a serious Occupation. But you will ask me perhaps, Whether the Moderns, who writ in Greek or Latin Verse, may not be of equal Advantage? To which I answer in the Negative, That they are inferior in all respects to the Ancients. Those fine Sentences we admire in their Writings, are scarce at all to be found in those of the Moderns; and besides, there's a vast difference between the Style of the former and that of the latter.  
Several of the Moderns indeed have written Greek and Latin Verses, but resemble the Ancients, just as Apes may be said to resemble Men. They copy their Vices much more than their good Qualities, and indeed 'tis as dangerous to imitate the Thoughts of the Moderns as their Style. Instead of grave and noble Sentences, they give us nothing but gross and mean Thoughts: Instead of Purity and Conciseness, we find in them very suspicious manners of Speaking, and tiresome repetitions of synonymous Expressions, borrowed out of the Ancients, and ill applied. There is scarce any modern Poet, either Greek or Latin, who may not justly be censured with a good part of what I have said. For this reason no body recommends the Reading of them to such as study the bells Lettreses. We send our Youth to the Ancients, and counsel them to read over their Compositions, without so much as condescending to mention to them the modern Poets. In truth, it would be full as ridiculous to read the Moderns, in order to instruct ourselves in the ancient Poetry, as it would be to read the Italian Verses▪ written by Foreigners, as for instance, those of Monsieur Menage, to learn how to write in Italian. All the World knows, that the Italians laugh at them, and find very notorious Solecisms in them. We need not doubt but that the ancient Poets, were they to rise out of their Graves, would laugh in like manner at our Greek and Latin Verses, and be amazed to find so many People in the World, take such mighty pains, and lose so much time to succeed so wretchedly.  
If the ancient Philosophers were to come upon Earth again, and should without prepossession Study the modern Philosophers, they would honestly confess, that they are not to be compared to them in any respect, neither for the Art of Reasoning justly, nor that of ordering and expressing their Thoughts with perspicuity, nor for the importance of their Discoveries. We may pass the same Judgement upon the ancient Critics, and the ancient Interpreters of the Holy Bible, compared with the Moderns. But as for the Poets, those of latter Times (I desire to be understood only of those that writ in the dead Languages) are only Scholars in comparison of those of Antiquity. And what may the reason of this be? 'Tis because the Moderns are sordid Imitators of the Ancients, and can pretend to nothing that is truly original, because they are only Poets by rote and by imitation, and have not penetrated into the Principles of their Art, as the modern Philosophers, and the others, whom I just now mentioned, have done.  
To disengage himself from this servile. Spirit of Imitation, a Man ought to write in his own Mother-tongue. By this means he will think less of the Expressions and Thoughts of the Ancients; and as he is full of modern Words and Ideas, with which he is perfectly well acquainted, he will become an Original. The Poets of this Character do the same service to their Language and Nation, as the Greek and Latin Poets formerly did to theirs. If no one has as yet appeared upon the Stage, who has equalled Homer and Virgil, in the modern Languages, the Reason of it in my opinion is, because they are too much possessed by this Spirit of Imitation, and have not as yet dared to take those Flights, which a noble Imagination, enlightened and regulated by good Sense, might aspire to. Besides, they chequer their Writings too much with the poetic Ornaments of ancient Greece and Italy, which a Man ought wholly to throw aside, who designs to pass for an Original. To effect this, some happy Genius ought to start up, of a Spirit superior to the Pedantry of the Schools, who should give an Example to others, and perform all that Homer would be capable of performing, were he now alive; nay, to model Poetry anew by the Ideas of good Sense, which are infinitely better understood at present than they were formerly. Then we should see Poems free from that absurd Trash of the Pagan Divinities, which the Ancients might well enough introduce into their Works, because the People believed what was told concerning them. As now a-days we believe nothing of this, 'tis impossible for us to relish these antiquated Decorations, without forgetting the Age wherein we live, and the Truths we are most assured of. We must, if I dare so express myself, transplant our Minds to the past Ages, in order to get their Taste and Manners, without which we can never reconcile ourselves to these strange Ornaments. However, those Poets that have written in the modern Languages, may be of some use both for their Thoughts and Style, as I have remarked of the Ancients. I take it for granted that the French, and those of other Nations who understand that Language, are no less obliged to Corneille, Despreaux, Racine, de la Fontaine, de Fontenelle, and others that have excelled in some sorts of Poetry, as the Ancients could possibly be to their best Poets. We find in their Writings a Vein of strong manly Sense, which is not common, an elevation and delicacy of Thoughts set off in such beautiful Expressions, that we cannot read them without admiration. Other Nations, even those of the North, pretend to have produced some Poets, that equal these, or at least are not inferior to them, but I am not able to judge of this matter.  
Having mentioned the principal Advantages that may be drawn from reading the Poets both ancient and modern, 'tis requisite I should say something likewise of the Mischief they may do those People who converse too much with them, and have not sufficiently cultivated their Reason. In the first place, The Poets are full of false Thoughts, by which if we are not deceived, yet we insensibly lose a good Taste and right Judgement, which are the finest Ornaments of Human Nature. By reading these sorts of Books too often, not only with Indulgence, but even with Admiration for the beauty of the Style, we insensibly accustom ourselves to think after the same manner, and to approve for just that which is entirely false. We may observe the same effects of Humane Weakness in the reading of Authors of a quite different Character, which for the very same Reason, never fail to produce the same Effects. In some parts of the World, they read the Fathers of the Church, but especially the Latins, being resolved beforehand to find them polite and solid, and humbly to sacrifice their Reason to them: After which they done't only give quarter to false Thoughts and ill Reasonings, of which their Writings are full, but by little and little they begin to admire and imitate them. They observe no other order in their Thoughts than what an Imagination, heated by the Enthusiasms of a false Rhetoric, suggests; and every Argument, that makes but a tolerable appearance, passes for a good one. The same thing happens to those who heat their Brain too much by reading the Poets: They arrive at that pitch at last as to have no manner of relish for exactness of Reasoning. A Figure of Rhetoric goes with them for a good Argument, provided it be expressed in fine Terms, and the Cadence of it be harmonious. As we pardon a thousand silly things at an Opera in favour of the Music, so the agreeable sound of Words, and the elegance of the Expression makes us at first forgive such things in the Poets, and afterwards in ourselves.  
If we imitate the false Thoughts of the Poets, only by being conversant in their Writings, we must certainly much more spoil ourselves by their Style, but especially when we are young. That which is not too swelling for Verse, is insupportable in Prose: and after we have been accustomed to the Bombast of the Poets, we are apt to think we crawl on the Ground, when we deliver ourselves in a plain natural manner, and the most elevated Language of Prose seems dull and insipid. Thus while we endeavour to write sublimely in Prose, we fall into a poetical Affectation, which is condemned by all the Masters of Eloquence. 
† In Proaem. Lib. VIII.  A Corruptissimo quoque Poetarum, says Quintilian, figuras, seu translationes mutuamur, tum demum ingeniosi scilicet, si ad intelligendos nos opus fit sit ingenio. We borrow Figures and Metaphors from the worst of Poets, and think we are very ingenious, when a Man must have some Wit to understand us.  
In the mean time, while we affect a Style too figurative, we really fall into a cold insipid one, which we pretended to avoid by taking the other Course. For can any thing in Nature be more insipid than to think to shame mean vulgar Things upon the World for great ones, merely because they are expressed in an elevated manner? This is the Reason why, while an Orator of this complexion puts himself almost into convulsive Fits that he may move his Auditory, they are either fast asleep, or in so perfect a state of Insensibility, that 'tis near akin to sleeping. And if he is ever so ill advised as to publish a Work of this nature, 'tis ten times worse for him; for a Reader is infinitely more rigorous than an Auditor.  
This is the Mischief which the reading of the Poets may do such as don't read them with Judgement enough. I don't here speak of that it may have in common with the reading of other Works, which may corrupt the Mind and Heart, but of that Mischief which is peculiar to itself, if we don't take care to prevent it.  

Why Poetry pleases so much.  THERE are only three things that can please us in any Discourse, the Matter of which it is composed, the Order in which this Matter is distributed, and the Style in which it is expressed. Poetry pleases in all these three Respects; but then there are abundance of things to be censured in Poetry upon these very Respects.  
The matter of Heroic and Tragic Poems, (to confine ourselves at present only to them) pleases us for the grandeur of the Actions and Events which it comprehends, and for the Incidents which are rare and surprising, or proper to raise the Passions. That Admiration and Terror, that Pity and Indignation, which they stir up by turns in us, employ and engage our Minds in what they represent, and give us a sensible pleasure when we read them. The Heart of Man is made to be incited by Passions, it takes a delight in being moved; nothing in short is so tiresome to it as a Calm, or so dull as Indolence, and 'tis upon this account that the Poets gain it over to their Party. Who can read the Adventures of Turnus in the Aeneis, without being Affected by them, and without abandoning himself with pleasure to an agreeable Melancholy? Nay, we cannot read, without some emotion, a description of the Passions that disordered the unmerciful Mezentius, after the Death of his Son, which Virgil has expressed in this manner: 
— 
† Lib. Aeneid. X. v. 871.  Aestuat ingens  
Vno in cord pudor, mistóque insania luctu,  
Et furiis agitatus amor, & conscia virtus.  Shame and Grief for the Death of his Son mingled with a furious Anger, Love that provoked him to the last degree, and a sense of his Valour incited his Soul all at once. We are no longer in a condition to judge rightly of Things, when once our Passions have discomposed us. We pardon every thing, nay, we imagine every thing to be good in a Poet, who knows how to unhinge us.  
The Romans who were accustomed to use their Victories with Generosity, and who would have thought it strange to see a parcel of poor Fellows murdered in cold Blood about the Hearse of a General that was fairly killed in Battle, did not however find fault with Virgil for introducing his Aeneas, the most pious of all Men, and the most beloved by the Gods, killing eight Wretches upon the funeral Pile of Pallas.  
— 
† Lib. Aeneid. X. v. 518. Vide & Lib. XI. v. 18.  Sulmone creatos  
Quatuor hîc juvenes, totidem quos educat Vfens,  
Viventes rapit, inferias quos immolet umbris,  
Captiuóque rogi perfundat sanguine flammas.  
Nothing can excuse Virgil, but the Example of Homer, whom he has here imitated. For Homer makes Achilles commit the same Cruelty, who sacrifices a dozen Trojans about Patroclus' funeral Pile in the twenty third Book of the Ilias. But what may be pardoned in an enraged brutal Hero; as Achilles really was, ought never to be forgiven in the pious Aeneas. Besides, Virgil, who was a Man of better Sense, and lived in an Age that was infinitely more polite than Homer's, is less to be excused than he for making his Hero commit so barbarous an Action. However, the World takes no notice of this Inhumanity, out of respect to the great things that he makes Aeneas perform, and the great Idea he gives of him in other places.  
If Virgil has transgressed against the Rules of Decency in making his Aeneas guilty of so inhuman a piece of Cruelty, he has offended against good Sense in changing those Javelins, with which Polymnestor had transfixed Polydorus, into the Branches of a Tree, the Root whereof was Polydorus himself, in his third Book of his Aeneis: in making a golden Bough to sprout from another Tree, in his sixth Book; and in turning the  Ships of Aeneas into so many Sea-Nymphs, in the eleventh. 
† Vossius instituti. Poet. Lib. 1. c. 2.  I know that the common way of excusing Virgil, is by pretending, that in this he accommodated himself to the ancient Fables, and to the Ideas of the People, who had a great esteem for these sorts of Fictions, and thought the Poets used them sparingly when they did not ascribe things that were palpably contradictory to their Gods. These Reasons may serve to excuse the ridiculous Tales of old Women, with which they rock their Children asleep, but not a Poem designed and carried on with a great deal of Art, where we ought to have nothing, but what is probable. It cannot be pretended that the Wonderful shows better in these sorts of things than in those that may really happen. If we must plainly speak the truth, these Fictions are not wonderful, but altogether ridiculous. It will be granted me, I suppose, that if Virgil had let them alone, the Aeneis had lost none of its Beauties, and so he had saved us the Pains to excuse them. To speak impartially, our modern Romances are nothing but so many Poems in prose; but should the Authors of 'em stuff 'em with such improbable Fictions, they would soon be hissed out of the World, altho' we find they introduce Heroes who lived in the remotest Ages. Such, in short, is the famous Romance of Cyrus. Scudery had never had the satisfaction to see the Conclusion of that bulky Romance, had he filled it with such monstrous Chimaeras: And his Bookseller finding not vent for the first Parts, would sooner have been sent to the Galleys, than he would have continued them to the twelfth Volume. For my part all the Difference I can find between the modern Romances and Poems, if we consider the Matter of them, is no more than there is between the Pieces of two Painters, one of whom imitates Nature, and represents nothing but what is to be seen, while the other designs Animals that were never in Nature, as an Elephant with a Crocodile's Head, or some such Monster as that. These last Paintings would rather offend than please the Sight, and the Beauty of the Colours, would never be able to atone for the extravagance of the Painter. I need not give myself the trouble to apply this Comparison to the Subject in hand.  
To come now to the Disposition of a Poem, 'tis certain there is something surprising in it, and which at first sight commands the Reader's attention, because instead of taking up the Action at the beginning, the Poet takes it up at the middle, which keeps the Reader in suspense, and makes him eager to know, how the Hero of the Piece came into those Circumstances wherein he at first finds him. Virgil in his Aeneis has observed this Conduct much better, than Homer has done in his Ilias. The latter gins with the Quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon, and goes on according to the series of Time without recounting any thing that had passed before, but only by scraps and pieces, to which a Man must add a great deal to have a perfect Idea of the Trojan War, till the Death and Funeral of Hector, with which he concludes his Poem. 'Tis true indeed, that the Odyssee is much better managed, but the Aeneis is tightly perfect. It gins at the seventh Year, and the Hero of the Poem relates in the second and third Book all that happened to him before. Thus the Reader, at his first dipping in it, finds himself engaged to read what follows, so soon as he has read the beginning, and that pity which the Misfortunes of the Trojans raise in him, and which Virgil at first sets forth with so much Art, makes him extremely desirous to know how they shall be delivered out of them. Although he knows well enough that 'tis a pure Fiction of the Poet, yet the Matter is so touching and so well disposed, that he forgets that 'tis a Romance, and is not only as much affected by it as if it were a real Truth, but what is more, as if he were mightily interessed in it. From that very moment, as I have already observed, every thing pleases, and of Critics or severe Readers, we become zealous Admirers of him, after which we are concerned for the Reputation of the Man whom we have admired. We cannot endure that any one, whoever he be, should find any Defects in him, altho' they are never so palpable. This is the Reason why Zoilus, surnamed the Scourge of Homer, made himself a thousand times more detested for having had the presumption to censure his Faults, than if he had blasphemed all the Gods. His very Memory was held in Horror and Detestation among the Grammarians, the sworn Partisans of Homer, who failed not to possess their Disciples with the same Hatred of him, that is to say, The World; for all that learned any thing passed at first under their Hands. These Impressions that are made on us in our Childhood are not to be effaced without some trouble, so that we are not to wonder if the World has been so long prejudiced in favour of Homer, even so far as to copy his very Faults.  
Adrian de Valois, who was a very learned Man, has 
† Valesiana, p. 63.  remarked, that Virgil has committed a great fault in the Description he makes of Ascanius. He could not well be less than seven Years old when Troy was taken, because he was able to march along with his Father, who held him by the hand, when he fled out of that City. Scquitúrque patrem non passibus aequis, says Virgil in the second Book of his Aeneis. Consequently then, when Aeneas was at Carthage seven Years after, he was at least fourteen Years old. Dido speaks thus to Aeneas towards the end of the first Book:  
— Nam te jam septima portat  
Omnibus errantem terris & fluxibus aestas.  
In effect Ascanius was able at this time to sit his Horse, and ride out a Hunting. Nay, this was not all, for no less Game would content our young Spark, but a Boar or a Lion thundering down the Mountains. By which it appears that he was not only a good Horseman, but that he was already Master of some Force and Courage.  
At puer Ascanius, 
† Aeneid. Lib. IU. v. 156.  mediis in vallibus, acri  
Gaudet equo, jámque hos cursu, jam praeterit illos:  
Spumantemque dari pecora inter inertia votis  
Optat aprum, aut fulvum descendere monte leonem.  
Nevertheless in this very 
† Aeneid. Lib. I. v. 722. IV. v. 84.  Book, as well as in the first, Dido dandles him upon her Knees like a Child of some four or five Years old. 'Tis visible that when Virgil put that Circumstance into his Poem he forgot himself how old Ascanius ought to have been according to his first supposition. However his Narration so takes up the Reader's Mind, that he is not sensible of this Contradiction, nay, and will not see it, when he is told of it.  
The third thing that makes us take so much pleasure in reading the Poets is their Style, wherein two things are to be observed: The first is the Expression considered in itself, and the other the cadence or the harmony of their Verse. Their Expression pleases when it is according to the Rules of Art, because it is pure, proper, and simple, when it ought to be so, and figurative when it ought to be otherwise. The Figures above all are frequently employed in their Compositions, drawn from the most elevated and beautiful things, so that they fill the Mind with nothing but noble and sublime Ideas.  
Although in general Poets are obliged to follow the same Rules of Rhetoric as those that writ in Prose, yet they are allowed to employ much more Decoration, and to heighten all their Descriptions with the most lively Colours. There is as much difference between the same Subject, as it is managed by a Poet, and by an Orator, as there is between an Assembly of Men dressed in plain ordinary , and the same Assembly in their richest Apparel upon some solemn Festival. The Descriptions when finely touched, particularly charm the Reader, who fancies he does not read the Descriptions of things recounted by the Poet, but that he sees them with his Eyes, and is present at all the Actions. Homer is excellent upon this score, which occasioned the saying, That he surpassed the Painters, who only represent that which strikes the Eye, whereas he frequently paints the Thoughts, without so much as speaking. Therefore we ought not to be surprised if the Poets please us more than the Orators.  
The liveliness of their Colours strikes our Eyes so strongly, that we forget with them the Rules of good Sense, if we are not very much upon our Guard all the while we read them. The irregular Imagination of the Poet expresses itself in so noble and sublime a manner, that it easily overpowers ours, and gives it the same Movements, by which itself is agitated, and this makes all its Irregularities to disappear. For instance, Virgil it in the first Book of his 
† Vers. 25. & seqq.  Aeneis, thus describes the Habitation of the Winds.  
— Hîc vasto Rex Aeolus antro  
Luctantes ventos, tempestatésque sonoras  
Imperio permit, ac vinclis & carcere fraenat.  
Here in a vast Cavern King Aeolus commands the Winds that struggle to get out, and the roaring Tempests which he imprisons. I would not have taken notice how ridiculous it was to make the four Winds to come out of one hole of a Rock in a little Island near Sicily, because it may be replied, That the Poets are full of the like Blunders, and that we ought not to be so severe with them, if some Interpreters would not bear us down, that all this was an effect of Virgil's great Learning, who knew that the Winds arise from subterraneous Vapours. For, suppose it was so, (altho' 'tis by no means probable) he ought to have assigned to each Wind its particular Cave, and to have placed the East-wind at the most easterly part of Asia, and so the rest; since 'tis impossible to establish the Source of the Winds, if there were one, anywhere but towards those places from whence they seem to come. For this Reason it was that the ancient Greeks placed the Residence of Boreas in Thrace, who came from thence to carry away the Daughter of the King of Athens; altho' I cannot comprehend what shift he made to get home back again, unless we answer like the Fellow, who having given the Name of the Southwind to the Northwind, defended himself by saying, That in truth it was the Southwind, brat that he was then endeavouring to get home again. But let us see what follows:  
Illi indignantes magno cum murmur, montis  
Circum claustra fremunt. Celsâ sedet Aeolus arce,  
Sceptra tenens, mollitque animos & temperate iras.  
Nî faciat, mania ac terras, coelúmque profundum  
Quip ferant rapidi secum, verrántque per auras.  
Angry with being locked up in this manner, they rage with a great noise about the Mountain that confines them: But Aeolus who sits on a high Eminence, with a Sceptre in his Hand, softens and moderates their Indignation. If he did not do so, they would carry away with them the Sea, the Earth and Heaven like so many Balls through the Air. This is what we may properly call, To throw the House out of the Windows. Can it be supposed, with any manner of probability, that the Winds that arise from the Earth, and brush over its Surface, would blow it the Lord knows whether, if some body did not look after them? Besides, whither would they blow it? What! to the imaginary Spaces, or the Intermons of Epicurus? What is this Heaven that the Winds would carry through the Air? Some Interpreters say, That 'tis the Air itself: But what can be more ridiculous than to say, That the Wind carries the Air through the Air; that is to say, that the Air moving from a certain Quarter is carried cross itself? If we are to understand the celestial Bodies, to wit, the fixed Stars and Planets, 'tis not only a gross mistake in Phisics, worse than the idle Dreams of Epicurus, but a monstrous Hyperbole. I know it may be replied, That Virgil considers the Winds as Persons, nay, what is more, as Gods; but whatever is feigned of those sorts of Gods, whom the Mythologists call Physical Gods, aught to be founded upon the Nature of the things that are deified. Thus take it in what sense you please, 'tis evident that we cannot excuse this Passage. He still adds, 
Sed pater omnipotens, speluncis abdidit atris,  
Hoc metuens, molémque & montes insuper altos  
Imposuit, regémque dedit, qui foedere certo  
Et premere & laxas sciret dare justus habenas.   
But the almighty Father (Jupiter) fearing this, hide them in black Caverns, and over them set massy high Mountains. Besides this, he gave them a King, who by his Order knew how to hold in, and let lose the Reins, according to certain Laws. As if two or three small Mountains were able to keep in those Deities, that with the Breath of their Mouth could blow Heaven and Earth, whither they pleased, and as if a thing so changeable as the Winds, so far as we know any thing of this Nature, could be subjected to Laws. However these magnificent Expressions that Virgil uses in this place, hoodwink the Reader to that degree, that he does not perceive the absurdity of this Fiction. There are several more in Homer, which I will not examine, having no intention to make a complete Critic upon these two celebrated Poets, or indeed any other.  
I know that what they call Probable and Wonderful in Poetry, signifies another thing than what we commonly call by that Name. We look upon it in Homer and Hesiod as Wonderful, but not exceeding the Bounds of poetical Probability, that there are more 
† Hom. Iliad. Lib. XVIII. Hesiod. in Clypeo Herculis.  Sculptures upon one Buckler, in basso relievo, than can be imagined to be crowded in a Space a hundred times as big; that these Sculptures move and speak as if they were so many living Persons; nay, that some of them hang in the Air and fly about the Bucklers like Flies, yet don't stir from it. To excuse the Ridiculousness of these Fictions, 'tis pretended, that these Bucklers were wrought by a God; but, who ever saw the Gods work Miracles in this nature? All this had passed for absurd idle stuff, had it been written in Prose, but we admire it in Verse for the beauty of the Expression, just as we admire Grotesque Figures upon Marble for the fineness of the Sculpture. This set Virgil upon imitating these Poets in his description of Aeneas' Shield, which is to be found in the eighth Book of the Aeneis, tho' it is not altogether so extravagant. Theocritus has attempted the same thing upon a wretched wooden Cup, in his first Idyllium, where he likewise represents things, which Sculpture cannot express.  
But that we may be the better able to conceive the Ridiculousness of this poetical Probability, let us hear what Aristotle says of it in his Art of Poetry, altho' he pretends to defend the Poets, and to give them Rules. 
† Chap. XXV. We follow the Version of M. Dacier.  We ought, says he, to use the Wonderful in Tragedy, but much more in an Epic Poem, which, is this respect, goes as far as the Unreasonable: For as in an Epic Poem we don't see the Persons that Act, all that exceeds the bounds of Reason, is very proper to produce the Wonderful in it. For Example, what Homer tells us of Hector 's being pursued by Achilles, would be ridiculous upon the Theatre, for no one could forbear laughing to behold the Greeks on one side, without making any motion, and Achilles on the other, who pursues Hector, and gives the Sign to his Troops: But this is not seen in an Epic Poem. Now the Wonderful is always agreeable, and for a proof of this, we find that those that relate a Story, commonly add to the Truth, that they may better please the Hearers. This is well enough, when we don't carry Matters farther than they'll bear; but when we go to the Unreasonable, we make ourselves ridiculous to those that love to use their Reason in every thing, that is, to all wise Persons. A Poet, says he a little lower, ought rather to choose things Impossible, provided they have the air of Probability, than the Possible, that are incredible, with all their Possibility. I own that all that is Possible is not credible; but whatever is Impossible, in my Opinion, is much less so. 'Tis to no purpose to say, That what is impossible to Men, is not so to the Gods; and so that when the Gods intervene, those things that are impossible to Men, become probable. A Man that has not debauched his Taste by a blind admiration of Antiquity, cannot digest this foolish profusion of Miracles for the sake of Trifles, of which Homer is so full. None but the 
† Inhabitants, of the Isle of Scheria, in the jonic Sea.  Phaeacians, whom Ulysses bantered as he pleased, without fearing to of, he ca●l'd a Liar for his pains, could divert themselves with reading these ridiculous Miracles, were they not told with all the agreeableness imaginable, I mean as to the Expression.  
Another thing which contributes very much to surprise our Reason in reading the Poets, is the pleasant Cadence of their Verse, which flatters our Ears after the same manner as Music does. When an Air pleases us, we never consider the Words, as we find it by experience at an Opera, which we are not able to read with any tolerable patience; but when 'tis represented on the Theatre, we hear it with admiration. As Music charms our Ears, by striking them differently at several certain measured times; by never passing all on the sudden from one extreme Tone to another, which is quite opposite to it, by carrying no Tone too high for fear of shocking our Ears, but by employing Tones that are proportioned to our Organs; and lastly, by making us hear the same Cadences, in the same Order, more than once: After the same manner the Poets, by using Syllables of a certain quantity (I speak of the Latins and Greeks) in certain places; by choosing Words of an agreeable Sound; by breaking their Course, which would otherwise seem harsh, with Caesuras; and by making us feel this Harmony some time after, fill our Ears so deliciously, that they obtain our Favour for a world of false Thoughts.  
To be convinced of the truth of this Assertion, a Man need only set the finest Passages of the Poets in the natural order of Construction, and he will find nothing in them to please him. Although we may there discover Disjecti membra Poetae, to use Horace's Expression, 'tis all of it nothing but a cold heap of great Words. Let us take, for Instance, the beginning of Simon's Speech in the second Book of the Aeneis, which is assuredly the most artificial Speech that can be made, and Charms every one that reads it. Equidem, Rex, f●●t ●bor tibi cuncta, quaecunque sucrint vera, neque nega●●o n●e de gente Argolicâ. Hoc primum; nec si improba fortuna finxit Sinonem miserum, finget etiam va●●●●, mendacémque. Here indeed is a Latin Discourse, however it does not come up to the Majesty of Verse. I will not give any more Instances of this Nature, because every Man may try this Experiment, in any place he thinks fit to single out. 'Tis likewise easy to transpose after the same manner the description of Aeolus' Den, and the Reader will soon perceive that the Cadence of the Verse serves very much to help it off.  

The Inconveniences of Poetry.  HOWEVER there's one thing to be observed in relation to Verse, which is, That if the Poets have some Advantage over those that writ in Prose, by reason of their Cadence, there are several Inconveniences which they cannot always avoid. For Instance, They cannot say all they have a mind to say, neither do they say it in that manner as they could wish; they are forced to convert the Order of the Words, tho' never so much against their Inclination; they frequently say that which they would not say, and clog their Discourse with superfluous Epithets, and sometimes forced one's, to fill up the Measure of their Verse. There are abundance of noble significant Words, that cannot stand in some sorts of Poetry, especially the Heroic, so that they are often forced to lay aside good Thoughts that come into their Head, because Words that are necessary to express them fully, cannot come into the Verse. If the Poet is not resolved to part with his Thought, he must employ other Words that are not proper, and often invert them strangely to make up his Measure. 'Tis true indeed, that in this respect we are apt to do the Poet's Justice enough, in favour of their Cadence, since we have been so complaisant as to bestow the Name of Figures upon real Faults of Discourse, according to the Observation of Quintilian: 
† Lib. 1. c. 8.  Poetis quia plerumque metro servire coguntur, adeò ignoscitur, ut vitia ipsa aliis in carmine appellationibus nominantur. Metaplasmos enim & Schematismos, & Schemata vocamus, & laudem virtutis necessitati damus. We are so favourable to the Poets, because they are confined to measure, that even Vices in Verse, go under other Names. We call them Metaplasms and Figures, and praise that as a Beauty, which was the mere effect of Necessity.  
But there is nothing so inconvenient, as when being at a loss how to fill up a Verse which is well begun, they are obliged to end it ill. Nothing is more common in Homer and Hesiod than these Botches of a word or more to stop up the Gap. Nay, we find whole Verses and Expressions, that return every moment upon us, rather to serve for Passevolans, if I may be allowed so to speak, and to make up the number, than for any real Necessity. What they might very well express in one word or two, they frequently employ a whole Verse to do it in, and sometimes more; and all this to no other purpose than to make the Discourse more insipid and tiresome. Had I written this Book in Latin, I would have cited Examples enough to justify this Assertion, in the mean time I appeal for the truth of it to all those that have read these Poets, with a mind disengaged from the Prejudices of the Grammarians.  
'Tis very probable that the Reason why Virgil, who has avoided these Faults more carefully than the abovementioned Greek Poets, left some imperfect Verses in his Aeneis, was only because he could not at first fill them up without making some Botches, or at least some useless Repetitions. There are some Passages in his life relating to this Affair, which deserve our Observation. However he could not avoid, and that very often, to use several Words and Expressions, that only serve to fill up the Measure. Thus in the first Book of his Aeneis, having assigned a little before the Reasons why Juno was so implacable an Adversary to Aeneas, he repeats it again about the fortieth Verse, Aeternum servans sub pectore vulnus." Carrying an eternal Wound in" her Soul. Take away these words, and you maim the Verse indeed, but not the Sense. A little lower Juno promises Deiopeia for a Wife to Aeolus in these Words: 
Connubio jungam stabili, propriámque dicabo,  
Omnes let tecum, meritis pro talibus, annos  
Exigat & pulchrâ faciat to prole parentem.   
I will give her you in Marriage for ever, that she may pass her Days with you, and make you the Father of fine Children. There's nothing more belongs to the Sense than these Words, Connubio jungam, quae pulcrâ faciat to prole parentem. I will give her you in Marriage, that she may bring you fine Children, whatever the Interpreters have said upon this place. Jupiter as he is telling Venus what the Fortune would be of Aeneas' Posterity, to let her know that Ascanius would Reign thirty Years, thus expresses himself, v. 271. 
At puer Ascanius, cui nunc cognomen julo  
Additur, (Ilus erat dum res stetit Ilia Regno)  
Trignta magnos volvendis mensibus orbs  
Imperio explebit.  But young Ascanius, who is at present Surnamed julus (he was called Ilus while the Kingdom of Ilium lasted) will Reign thirty long Years. Now nothing is essential in this Passage, but the three first Words of the first Verse, and the third Verse, At puer triginta, etc. Whether we put the other words in Jupiter's Mouth, or the Poets, who speaks by the Parenthesis, 'tis a Botch which the necessity of the Metre extorted from Virgil. What is the worst on't is this, That injudicious Poets who have taken these Faults for Beauties, have often drained themselves to repeat the same thing in different Words, as if the Readers were to esteem their Verses not by their intrinsic Worth, but by their Number. Ovid and Lucan have been very justly charged with this Fault, altho' the latter wanted not the poetical Enthusiasm, and the former had the most easy Versification in the World.  

Personal Defects of Poets.  IN the 
† p. 318. Edit. Col.  Scaligerana we meet with this Judgement of Scaliger, No Man ever was a Poet, or loved to read the Poets, but his Heart was seated in the right place. He expresses it much more warmly in 
* Tho' our Author has not cited it, yet I thought it would not be a miss to set it down, Nunquam Poesis, aut poetarum amor in abjectum & humilem animam cadit, & omnium maxime divina sequitur ingenia, eorumque perpetuus fere comes, Ibid.  Latin. I suppose that by having his Heart seated in the right place, he means, having a good Opinion of himself, for indeed there are few Poets who have not a leaning that way. Poetical Enthusiasm makes these Gentlemen believe that they are above the ordinary Race of Mankind, because they speak a Language peculiar to themselves, and when this Fury seizes them, there are certain Traces in their Countenance, which sufficiently declare that, 
† Hor. L. II. Sat. seven. v. 117.  Aut insanit homo, aut versus facit— " This Man is either a Fool or a Poet. Their slow walking, their discomposed Air seems to come from this; for being accustomed to make Verses, and by't their Nails as they walk, they would persuade us that they are thinking on something when they thinking on just nothing. To return to Scaliger, if he believed that Poets or Lovers of Poetry were uncapable of stooping to mean things, 'tis certain he could never reckon those for Poets or Lovers of Poetry, who have written so many Verses in Praise of the Roman Emperors and their Favourites, whose Vices they have commended as well as their Virtues: that is to say, Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Statius, Martial, and the rest whom I need not mention, after I have mentioned these five; the three first of which excessively flattered Augustus, and those that were near his Person, and the other two the infamous Domitian. What meanesses in particular did not Ovid stoop to, to get himself recalled from Banishment? Did not Virgil and Horace place Augustus, when living, among the number of the Gods? Thus we cannot excuse this Judgement of Scaliger, who was no Poet, tho' he writ Verses sometimes, but by Virtue of the poetical Privilege of Lying, when there was an occasion for it.  

An Examination of what Horace says in, Favour of Poets.  HORACE in the first Epistle of his second Book, which is addressed to Augustus makes a sort of an Apology for the Poets, upon which 'tis not hard matter to confute him: 
Hic error tamen, & levis haec insania quantas  
Virtutes habeat sic collige; vatis avarus  
Non temerè est animus; versus amat, hoc studet unum,  Learn, says he, the Virtues that accompany this Fault and this slight Folly. 'Tis rare that a Poet has a covetous Soul, he loves nothing but Verses: this is his only Passion. But this Passion for making Verses sometimes agrees well enough with that of getting Money, and there are few People that think they ought to be better considered for the Pains they take than the Poets. Horace, to do him Justice, was not Covetous, as far as we can judged of him by his Writings; but one of the Grecian Poets, whom he esteemed above the rest, I mean the inimitable Pindar, was as greedy a Wretch as a Man well could be. His Odes were purely written to get the Pence, and we find him all along making a Panegyric upon Riches, which showed plainly enough that he expected a Present for his Pains. What can be more scandalous than the Compliment he makes to Xenocrates of Agrigentum, in the second of his Isthmians. The Muse, says he, was not then a Friend to Gain, nor Mercenary, and it was not the fashion to sell the sweet and agreeable Songs of Terpsichore, that have their Forehead silvered; but at present she gives leave to follow the Advice of an Argian, which is not repugnant to the Truth. Riches, Riches make a Man, cried he, being himself destitute of Money and Friends: You are Wise, and I don't sing to an Ignorant. This was enough to make a Man that knew his Right Hard from his Left to comprehend, that the Poet wanted to be greased in the Hand. If 
* This is he who writ La Pucelle, a French Heroic Poem, in the composing of which he took up near twenty Years, which occasioned the following Epigram upon him: 
Illa Capellani dudum expectata Puella,  
Post longa, in lucem tempora, venit anus.  The Reason why he was so long about it, was because he had a Pension of Two Thousand Franks a Year from the Duke of Longueville, which he thought would be stopped after the publishing of his Poem. See the Menag. Vol. 1. p. 38.  Chapelain had been comparable in any respect to Pindar, there had been another Poet too, who must have been turned out of Horace's number. But Pindar alone is sufficient to prove him mistaken, and I leave to such as have more leisure than myself to compile a Catalogue of covetous Poets. I will only observe that Horace contradicts himself afterwards, where he thus rallies a Comic Latin Poet. v. 173, 
Quantus sit Dossennus edacibus in Parasitis,  
Quà non astricto percurrat pulpita socco,  
Gestit enim in loculos nummum demittere, post hac  
Securus cadat, an recto stet fabula talo.  How many Verses does Dossennus employ to describe gluttonous Parasites? How much liberty does he allow himself in regard of the Measure? His whole Ambition is to get Money in his Pocket for his Plays, and he does not trouble himself at all whether they succeed afterwards, or not. We might join Simonides to Pindar and Dossennus; and those who have a mind to be more particularly informed of his Begging and his Avarice, need only to consult Phaedrus, Lib. IU. Fab. xxiv. What follows afterwards in Horace is full as true as what went before: 
Detrimenta, fugas servorum, incendia ridet,  
Non fraudem socio, pueróve incogitat ullam  
Pupillo; vivit siliquis, & pane secundo.  He laughs at Losses, the running away of his Slaves, and the burning of his Houses. He neither deceives his Friend, nor his Pupil; he lives upon Pulse and Brown-bread. If this were true, the Poets would he more disengaged from the Vanities of this wicked World, than even the Monks themselves, and such of our Friends as we desired to free from the Temptations of this Life, we should not advise to retire into a Religious House, but possess them with the Love of Poetry: By that means they would be healed of all those Desires with which the rest of Mankind are so violently agitated. But a Poet as Covetous as Pindar, or several others, would be the last Man that I should repose any Confidence in. I own that a frugal sober Poet may be able to live upon Pulse and Brown-bread, altho' he has wherewith to live better if he pleases; but then he does not do this by Virtue of his Poetry. Horace himself never observed Sobrietry, but according to the Maxims of Epicurus, that is to say, When he found good Cheer was incompatible with his Health, and so forth. If he delivers any Precepts for Temperance in his Works, there are other places where he piously exhorts us to drink and make much of ourselves. There is no necessity to point at these places in order to refute him, for our Youth knows them but too well. In a word, 'Tis downright Raillery to pretend to exempt the Poets from Vices, to which they are subject as well as other Men. On the other hand, I think we ought not to accuse them in particular, as if Poetry inspired them with ill Inclinations. They are in this respect neither better nor worse than the rest of the World: But to return to Horace, who continues to speak of them in this manner: Militiae quamquam piger & malus, utilis urbi. Although a bad Soldier and lazy, yet he forbears not to be Serviceable to the State. Horace designed without question to be understood here the Poets of his own time; for he knew well enough that Tyrtaeus, Alcaeus, and other Poets of Antiquity had performed Miracles in the Field. For his own part, he fairly betook himself to his Heels at the Battle of Philippi, 
† Ovid. VII. L. 2.  Relictâ non bene parmulâ, leaving his Shield behind him. But let's now see wherein a Poet may be useful to the State in time of Peace: 
Si das hoc, parvis quoque rebus magna juvari,  
Os tenerum pueri balbúmque Poeta figurat.  
Torquet ab obscoenis jam nunc sermonibus aurem,  
Mox etiam pectus praeceptis format amicis,  
Aspertiatis, & invidiae corrector, & irae.  
Rectè facta refert, orientia tempora notis  
Instruit exemplis, inopem solatur & aegrum.  If you will grant me that small things may be serviceable to great Ones; 'tis the Poet that forms words for Children who know not yet how to speak. He turns aside their Ears even from obscene Discourses, and afterwards instructs them in wholesome Precepts. He corrects rough Behaviour, Envy and Anger: He relates noble Actions, and furnishes Youth with famous Examples: He comforts the Poor and Sorrowful. In the second Verse Horace alludes to the Custom they had of making Children learn the Poets, almost as soon as they were able to talk; this helped to give them so great a Veneration for them, that they never left it afterwards, so that the most absurd things did not shock them in a more advanced Age. For Instance, They made their Childen learn Homer, he that speaks of the Gods not only as bare Men, but even as vicious Men; after which they were disposed to receive all sorts of Absurdities in matters of Religion, and accordingly they did so. What care the Ancients took to teach their Children Homer may be seen in the beginning of the Allegories of Heraclides Ponticus. The Philosophers complained, both before and after the time of Horace of this ill effect of Fables; witness Plato in his Books of the Commonwealth, and Plutarch in his Treatise, After what manner young Men ought to read the Poets.  
'Tis to no purpose to say, That we find good Examples in him; for to humble that Excuse, we likewise find some of the worst that can be. Homer frequently extols Virtue, but then he represents very wicked Men as Favourites of Heaven. Achilles, for Instance, is protected by the Gods in a most extraordinary manner, because he is the Son of Thetis, altho' he was hot and ungovernable, and more like to a wild Beast, than a Man. He never describes the Gods as lovers of Virtue or haters of Vice, as he ought to have done, but on the contrary divided among themselves upon the different Interests of Men below, and that by Passion merely, without any regard to good Manners, or the Justice of the Cause. As many of them espoused the Trojan, as the Grecian Party, altho' the Quarrel of the first is really not to be defended. The succeeding Poets, who were blind Admirers of Homer, took no more care than he did to give us good Examples, as it might easily be made appear if it were necessary. We are only obliged to them for a Moral Sentence now and then interspersed in their Writings, for which they are beholding to the Philosophers.  
As for what Horace lays down, That the Poets turn aside Youth from obscene Discourses, it would be no hard matter to produce abundance of places in Homer and Hesiod, that are good for nothing but to give us very villainous Ideas, and to Debauch the Minds of young People, if in producing them, I should not commit the same Fault as they did. Let a Man not only take Ovid and Catullus into his Hands, and an infinite number of other good Poets, but even Horace himself, without castrating them, and then see what a heap of filthy Stuff he may find in them. But the Morals of the virtuous Horace, were not overrigid, no more than those of his Master Epicurus, and he succeeded infinitely better with him to preach upon the Juice of the Grape, than to meddle with a continued Body of Ethics.  
His Satyrs are none of the fittest things in the World to reform Rudeness, Envy and Anger, no more than those Satyrs of the other Poets that are still remaining. They are all stuffed with Passages that proceed from these; altho' there are here some Moral Precepts interwoven, but without connexion, and without Principles. Their Discourses resemble that of a certain Parson who wished himself at the Devil, yet swore very hearty, that if he heard any of his Parishioners Swear, or talk of the Devil, he would excommunicate them. Horace himself shows us the intolerable Abuse of the ancient Poetry in these remarkable words, where he speaks of the ancient Greek Comedy: 
— Saevus apertam  
In rabiem verti coepit jocus, & per honestas  
Ire minax impune domos. Doluere cruento  
Dente lacessiti; suit intactis quoque cura  
Conditione super communi. Quin etiam lex  
Poenáque lata, malo quae nollet carmine quemquam  
Describi; vertêre modum, formidine fustis  
Ad benedicendum, delectandúmque coacti,  This cruel Raillery in time turned to downright Rage, and saucily exposed the most virtuous Families. Those that suffered by their stabbing Satyrs, were not a little concerned, nay, even such as were not touched, took the Alarm by reason of the common danger. At last certain Laws were enacted, with Penalties affixed to them, to hinder them from writing scurrilous Lampoons against any Man whatever. The Poets, for fear of a Cudgel, left off this way of Writing, and were forced to divert and speak well of their Auditors. Aristophanes is still extant, who was one of the principal Ornaments of this old Comedy, full of Gall and Calumny, and in Horace's time abundance more were remaining upon whom he set a great Value, as appears by divers places in his Works. Now what could a Man learn from Poets full of Scandal and Ribbaldry, such as Aristophanes was, if he Read them with admiration, unless it were to By't without pity and discretion, and talk after the most insufferable rate that can be imagined? Thus the reading of these Poets could not but be highly prejudicial, notwithstanding Horace had so good an Opinion of them. Although we don't introduce People by their Names in Comedies, as the ancient Greeks did, yet for all that we have not left off writing scandalous Satyrs, where we frequently name them, or else describe them so plainly, that all the World knows who it is we mean. Epigrams likewise, that were always in vogue, are for the generality pieces that By't to some purpose. Those that have read Catullus, Horace, Persius, Juvenal and Martial, know very well that what I here advance is laterally true. After this we must needs own that Horace makes merry with us, when he pretends to affirm that the Poets are very serviceable to reform the Manners of young Men, and cure them of Anger, Envy, and a rude Behaviour.  
But it will be objected, that these very Poets, whom I have mentioned, have a thousand moral Say in their Writings, and are useful, for instance, to comfort Men in adversity or any ill Circumstances, as Horace says: I own all this, but than you must grant me at the same time, that there are a thousand other Passages in their Writings, that in all probability will produce the quite contrary Effect. They frequently describe Riches, Honours, and Pleasure in so lively and charming a manner; and on the contrary, they paint Poverty and the sad Consequences of it, as something so dismal and insupportable, that after a Man has read them, 'tis a hard matter for him not to be strangely cast down. Let a Man read what Theognis has said of Poverty, and the care we ought to take to avoid it, and he will own with me that the greatest Miser in the World cannot say more. Yet he is a sententious Poet, and we put him into the Hands of Boys for the sake of his moral Say. Let a Man read in Horace and several other Poets, what they say of the pleasure a Man finds to be considered in the World, to arrive at Honour and acquire Glory, and he'll be satisfied that the Descriptions they make of Virtue, which is to be esteemed, altho' it is despised, are extremely forced in Comparison of the Praises they bestow upon Honour and Reputation. The reason of this difference is, that the latter Commendations pour down in a stream, whereas the former only come by fits and starts, when they designed to imitate the Philosophers. I need not say any thing of Pleasures to those that have read Horace, who know well enough that he speaks of them in so insinuating a strain, that his Eloquence upon this Head is wholly contagious. If we therefore find in the Poets some Passages that are Good, which I don't deny, we likewise find in them abundance that are vicious, so that we often find them arguing pro and con, without giving us any certain steady Rules to discern Bad from Good. This is visible from Stobaeus' Collection, wherein we may find upon several moral Subjects, Arguments on both sides, drawn out of the Poets.  
But to return to Horace, he goes on with this Panegyric upon those of his own Profession in these Terms: 
Castis cum pueris ignara puella mariti  
Disceret unde preces, vatem nisi Musa dedisset?  
Poscit opem Chorus, & praesentia numina sentit.  
Coelestes implorat aquas, doctâ prece, blandus,  
Avertit morbos, metuenda pericula pellit,  
Impetrat & pacem, & locupletem frugibus annum.  
Carmine Dii superi placantur, Carmine Manes.  Young Boys and Maids that never knew what Marriage was, how should they learn their Prayers, if the Muse had not given them Poets. The Chorus implores the assistance of the Gods and finds their favour. They supplicate for Rain, they avert Sicknesses and Dangers that are to be feared, they obtain Peace and fertile Years. Verse equally appeases the heavenly and infernal Deities.  
I will not say that all this is pure Banter out of Horace's Mouth, who did not believe that the Gods concerned themselves in the governing of the World, no more than Epicurus; since to demand the assistance of the Gods, and to address one's self to a fortuitous concourse of Atoms, according to, him is one and the same thing. I will only observe that in this place he alludes to the Prayer which the young Boys and Girls sung for three Days and Nights at the Secular Games. But what can be more ridiculous than to affirm, that we should not have known how to Pray, if there had been no Poets in the World? Were they then afraid to Pray in Prose, or did they believe that the Divinity would be sooner affected by a pompous Discourse in Metre than by a simple Prayer in Prose? Did they think that the Gods were better pleased to hear their Praises in Music, than an Elogium recited without singing? Tho' this be absurd in the highest Degree, 'tis nevertheless very certain, that the Poets endeavoured to make the World believe it, in order to make their Art more valued. They have feigned Miracles, and made Souls come back from Purgatory (for by the by the Pagans had their Purgatory as well as the Christians,) to propagate this Belief, that the Deity took greater Pleasure to be praised in Verse than Prose. 
† See Phaedrus IU. Fab. 24.  They have told us that Simonides having agreed for a certain Price with a Champion to compose an Ode upon his Victory, finding this Champion was too obscure a Fellow to furnish a Poet with Materials enough to make an Ode, he took up two thirds of it with the Praises of Castor and Pollux; upon which the Champion would give him no more than a third part of what he had bargained with him for; but had the civility however to invite him to Dinner. Simonides, who no doubt on't loved good Cheer, when it cost him nothing, did not fail to come to the Entertainment, altho' the Champion had broke his word with him. As they were merry at the Table, and Simonides laid hearty about him, to revenge himself for the scurvy Trick the other had played him, two young Men covered with Dust, and all over in a Sweat, as if they had road Post, sent to speak with Simonides immediately, who was no sooner informed of it, and had scarce got out of the Room, when all on the sudden (Oh prodigious Miracle) the Roof of the House fell upon the rest of the Guests, and buried them in the Ruins: and the two Men who had sent to speak with Simonides were not where to be seen. All the World, says the History, when they came to hear of this Accident, were firmly persuaded that Castor and Pollux came on purpose to save our Poet's Life, for having praised them in his Ode. Those that believed this Legend, to be sure paid Simonides well, when they employed him. By this means he filled his strong Chest, which he carried about him to put his Money in; for he had, as he himself said, two Chests, where he deposited the Rewards that were given him, one of which was always very light, and the other pretty heavy. In the former he put the Compliments that were made him, and in the other his Mony.  
What is reported of Pindar was no less ingeniously contrived to show what esteem the Gods had for the Incense of the Poets. 
† Pausan, Boeoticor. p. 515.  A little before his Death he dreamt, that the Goddess Proserpina reproached him with having composed Hymns upon all the Deities except herself, but that she expectd that he would write one in her Praise, so soon as he came to her Dominions. Soon after he was dead, he appeared in a Dream, as the Tradition goes, to an old Kinswoman of his at Thebes, and sung to her a Song in honour of this Goddess, which our ancient Gentlewoman remembered so well, that she wrote it down, as soon as she awaked, in the very words she heard it, The Priestess of Delphos, as the same Author informs us, did a considerable Service by Apollo's Order to a Poet of so covetous a Soul as Pindar was, for she commanded those of Delphos to give him a share of all the first Fruits, which they offered to Apollo. After this manner did the Poets and their Friends endeavour to persuade the World, that the Gods esteemed their Language much more than that of other Men, and consequently that they obtained of them whatever they had occasion for, more easily than any other People.  
This is the Doctrine that Horace in the abovementioned Verses preaches to Augustus and his Readers, as earnestly as he was able. The credulous People actually believed it, but what would not those People swallow down, who imagined that they appeased the Indignation of the Gods by dancing about their Altars? A great part of the Pagan World, as a witty Man has remarked, were strongly persuaded that they paid their Gods in good Money, when they paid them in Dances and Songs. As these two things are nearly related one to another, there is no question but the Poets did all that in them lay to entertain the People in these Imaginations. Thus we find in the Grecian and Roman History, that whenever they thought their Gods were angry with them, they consecrated certain Sports and Games to them, in which Dramatical Representations, Dances and Songs made a great part.  

Why the Roman Law grants no Immunity to Poets.  HOWEVER it seems the Poets were never able to gain the Roman Lawyers over to their side. At least the Emperor Justinian has inserted into the Code a Law of Philip, which is not much for their Reputation or Favour. In the fifty second Title Lib. 10. where we find a Collection of Laws made by divers Emperors in favour of Grammarians, Rhetors, Lawyers and Physicians, in which Immunities, Privileges, and public Stipends are granted to those that taught these Sciences or exercised them by public Authority; we see this Law of the Emperor Philip. Poetae nullâ Immunitatis Prarogatiuâ juvantur: The Poets enjoy not the Privilege of any Immunity. We cannot accuse Philip, as if he were the only Person that had not been favourable to the Poets, for if any Ordinance had ever passed in their Favour, Trebonian had not failed to insert it into the Code. 'Tis probable that after Philip's time, some Poets who had a good Opinion of themselves, would have had their share in the Immunities, which the Professors of other Sciences enjoyed, and that Complaint of this being made to the Emperor, he explained in this manner the Laws in favour of those that taught the Sciences publicly. The Interpreters of the Code have taken a world of pains to find out the Reason of this Law, as I have observed in those whom I have consulted, but have missed it in my Opinion. However several good Reasons may be assigned: The first is, That the public Masters of other Sciences are serviceable to the State, by instructing the Youth in useful Knowledge; but a Poet whose chief Business it is to spend his time in composing Romances in Verse, (for Epic Poems are the sublimest Productions of Poetry) what such mighty Service does he do the State, as to deserve a public Recompense? No Roman Emperor ever believed it, and for that Reason they would not grant the Poets any Immunities In the second place, If there was any Advantage in having a set number of Poets in the Republic, the Grammarians ought to be thanked for it, who without being Poets themselves, taught all that was to be taught of the art of Poetry; witness those who have written the best about it, yet were no Poets. In short, had any Immunities been granted to the Poets, all the Subjects of the Roman Empire had busied themselves in making of Verses, and had pretended to pass for Poets, only to be excused from other Duties of the State. Then you would have seen, Corvos Poëtas, & Poëtridas picas." Crows turn Poets, and Pies Poetesses. Don't tell me that they might have erected Tribunals to distinguish between good and bad Poets. What a prodigious number of such Courts must have been erected to read and examine all the Pieces that would have been brought before them, which could not have been done without a vast Expense to the Public. Besides that several notorious Abuses would have of necessity crept in, which I need not recount at large. I will only say, That every Fellow who thought he was able to equal Chaerilus (a dull heavy Rascal in Alexander's time, who made him an odd sort of a Present for some Verses he had written in his Praise) would have put in his Claim to these Privileges, it being highly reasonable, that a Man who would have been judged to be a good Poet by Alexander, the Disciple of Aristotle, and Admirer of Homer, should be recknoned in this number. The Emperors would have been persecuted every hour of the Day by Poets of all sorts and sizes, bringing their Verses to them, and complaining of the great Injury that had been done them, to deny them this honourable Name. It cannot be replied to this, that every one is not capable of making Verses, for when such Feats are to be done, but especially in one's Mother-Tongue, a Million of Blocheads think themselves able to do it, and this ridiculous Imagination would soon overspread all the World out of hopes of Gain, 

† Persius' in Prologo.  Quis expedivit Psittaco suum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
Picásque docuit verba nostra conari?  
Magister artis, ingenîque largitor  
Venture, negatas artifex sequi voces.  
Quod si dolosi spes refulserit nummi,  
Corvos Poëtas & Poëtridas Picas,  
Cantare credas Pegaseïum melos.  Who was it, says a Poet, that taught Parrots to cry, Good morrow in Greek, and Pies to endeavour to talk as we do? The Belly, which is the Master of Arts, which gives Wit, and makes them imitate Words that Nature never taught them. If there were a deceitful Appearance of the least Gain you should have Crows become Poets, and those Poetesses the Pies to sing most admirable Verses. I would never advise any Prince to make this Experiment, but for fear of extinguishing the poetic Fire he may bestow Rewards upon those that are capable of teaching other Sciences, and give them leave to make Verses now and then, if they have a Talon that way.  

Whether Epic Poets have written with a design to instruct or to divert.  I HAVE said in the beginning of this Work that the Poets are not altogether unuseful. I don't pretend here to unsay it; but I dare affirm that the Epic Poets never proposed to themselves Instruction as the principal part of their Design, but only to give Diversion to the Reader, and instruct him no farther than it contributed to the Ornament of his Poem. I know indeed that those that have written about the Art of Poetry are of a different Opinion, but I am satisfied they have rather said that which the Poets ought to have done, than what they have actually done. To convince the Reader likewise of this, we need only examine some few of their principal Reasons.  
A Man 
† Le Bossu, L. I. c. 3.  of Wit who has written about Epic Poetry in French with a great deal of Art and Perspicuity, thus defines an Heroic Poem. 'Tis, says he, a Discourse invented with Art to form the Manners by Instructions disguised under Allegories of an important Action, which is told in Verse in a manner probable, diverting and wonderful. But if we look more nearly upon it, we shall find that this Definition is only the Definition of an Idea. For in fine if I should deny, that it appears by any place of Homer and Virgil, that they had any other design than that of pleasing their Readers, no body can tell how to prove the contrary. It will be urged perhaps that we may draw certain Instructions from those Events that are related in their Poems. But I maintain that there never was any Narration in the World from which some sort of a Moral might not be deduced, altho' the Author of it never dreamt of any such thing. Take any Romance or Novel you please, and I will engage to draw some moral Instructions out of it, which the Writer of that Romance or Novel had not any intention to give us. As Man is a rational Creature, subject to Laws which regulate his Conduct, he can scarce say any thing, upon which one may not be able to moralise as much as he pleases. Therefore to be assured that any Poet had a design to give us certain Lessons, 'tis necessary that he should tell us so himself, or at least set it down in his Writings after such a manner that no body could doubt it. Now 'tis certain that there is nothing in Homer or in Virgil that can convince us that they designed to instruct us in certain moral Doctrines.  
I take it for granted, that if by the help of our reasoning we deduce moral Instructions out of these Poets, conformable to the Ideas of Virtue and Vice which they might have (for we must judge of them by their Ideas, and not by our own) we may likewise by the like Reasonings draw quite contrary Conclusions. Now if this be true, 'tis visible that what they say in favour of Virtue, and against Vice, is of very little Advantage to the World.  
Let us see what they say of the Fable of the Iliads, or of that which the Poet has invented, with a design to insinuate something to the Greeks. 
† Ibid. c. 8.  We are told, That Homer seeing Greece divided into so many States as it had Cities, yet upon emergent Affairs frequently obliged to unite in one body against the common Enemy, designed to let his Countrymen see in his Iliads that nothing but a good Understanding between them could make any of their Designs that were form and carried on by so many Generals, to succeed; and on the contrary, that Divisions and Quarrels proved always fatal to these Confederacies. Therefore Homer, as they pretend built his Fable upon this great Truth, that a Misunderstanding of Princes certainly Ruins their Dominions. I sing, says he, the Anger of Achilles, so pernicious to the Greeks, and which has destroyed so many Heroes, while King Agamemnon and this Prince quarrelled one with another.  
I confess indeed that such an Instruction as this may be drawn from the Iliads, and that Homer faithfully relates all the Calamities that the Grecians suffered, during the contest between Agamemnon and Achilles. But let him have told this in what manner he pleased, yet 'tis certain we might have inferred a moral Doctrine from it, as I have already said; and we don't find in any one place of his Poem, that he proposed this as his end. All that is said upon this Head is nothing but mere Conjecture, and we have as much reason to reject as to propose it. If we may conclude from Homer's Narration concerning the Greeks, that in such a Confederacy as theirs was, it was necessary to pitch upon one General, and obey his Orders, may we not infer the quite contrary Doctrine from what he tells us of the Trojans; that because they obeyed Priam, who suffered himself to be governed by his Sons; and their Captains and those of their Allies blindly followed the Advice of Hector, they entirely ruin'd themselves? Therefore Homer teaches us by all this, that the too great Authority of any Prince, as was that of King Priam, supported by his Sons, is the ruin of a State, which much necessarily be undone, let it be never so unanimous, when it is ill governed. It had been much better for this Prince and his Family that they had not had Authority enough to keep Helen, in spite of the Trojans, for then by delivering her to her Husband, they had avoided a War, which brought the most dismal Calamities upon them, that were ever mentioned by the Poets. What may not a Man be able to say on this Occasion, upon that admirable Maxim of good Policy, That in a well-regulated State there ought not to be any Authority superior to the Laws, or any single Person who may do whatever he pleases, without fearing to be called to an Account for it? One might likewise make most excellent Observations upon the Counsel of 
† See the eighteenth Book of the Ilias.  Polydamas to go back into Troy to avoid the Indignation of Achilles, and upon Hector's Answer, where one might show that a General ought to listen to the Advice of his principal Officers, and that 'tis much better to let slip an Opportunity of gaining some Advantage over the Enemy, than to Ruin one's self to all intents and purposes, by obeying a General who abuses his Authority, and hazards all. Besides one may say, That Homer had it never in his Thoughts to show that Divisions were of fatal consequence, since in his Poem he introduces the Gods strangely 
† See particularly the 20th. Book.  divided between themselves about the Quarrel of the Trojans and Greeks, yet did not believe they were to be blamed for it.  
To come now to the 
† Bossu, Lib. I. c. 10.  Odysseys: 'Tis pretended that the principal Design of the Poet is to make it appear, that the Absence of a Person from his own House, or his not having a vigilant Eye upon all that is done there, occasions great Disorders in his Affairs, so that the principal and most essential part of the Action is the Absence of the Hero. It cannot be denied but that Homer designed to describe the Absence of Ulysses, and the Irregularities it caused in his Family; but who can assure us that this was his chief Design, and that it was not rather to affect and divert the Reader, by raising his Compassion for Ulysses and his Fireside, and by exciting his Admiration and Curiosity by those extraordinary Accidents that befell him? He was obliged to make Ulysses very prudent, and much favoured by the Gods to get himself out of those Dangers in which he was involved, which makes him to be the more admired and esteemed by the Reader. I confess, that among all this there is a great deal of good Instruction, but 'tis only an embroidery of the Fable, and not the principal Design of the Poet. We find the like Reflections in all our Romances, altho' the Authors of them had no other end but to amuse the Reader, by recounting to him in an agreeable manner, a Fiction for a true History. We cannot therefore draw from thence any Consequence in favour of Homer, unless we likewise ascribe to Scudery and Calprenede a philosophical Design to instruct the Public by their Romances, whose only end was to amuse and divert those People, that are at a loss how to employ their leisure Hours.  
Besides, had he designed to insinuate that a Prince ought not to absent himself from Home, he had much better have taken any other Person than Ulysses, who left his House and Native-Country with great Unwillingness, and if he was absent, it was only because he could not help it. He ought to have chosen one that went a rambling out of Indiscretion, and loitered abroad merely for want of a good Conduct, which had much more clearly discovered what it was the Poet intended to teach. By seeing Imprudence punished, we should much sooner have comprehended that a Prince is obliged in Interest to stay at Home, than in seeing some Disorders happen in a Man's House who is kept abroad in spite of his own Inclination, and is absent only because 'tis impossible for him to return home.  
But suppose these Reasons were not so strong as they are, we might at one blow destroy the abovementioned Hypothesis, by offering others that carry as much probability in them. Nothing could hinder a Man from asserting upon the same Principles, that the Poet's Design was to show that no hindrance of what Nature soever can hinder the execution of the Decrees of Fate. This Doctrine frequently occurs in Homer, and indeed the Odysseys is nothing but a Comment upon it. We find Ulysses there surrounded with Pleasures and strong Temptations, to make him forget his Native-Country. We find him encompassed with terrible Dangers, out of which he happily frees himself, because Heaven had decreed that he should return home in safety. Homer tells us 
† Odyss. Lib. 1. vers. 16.  not far from the beginning of the Odysseys, that when the Years of Vlysses' Absence were over, the time was come wherein the Gods had destined his return to Ithaca, and that he did not without some difficulty find himself even among his Friends.  
One might likewise pretend that Homer designed to describe conjugal Love to us, by representing on one side Penelope not to be moved with Caresses and Menaces of her Suitors, during so long an Absence, and suffering herself rather to be ruined by these Fellows, who all the while they were Courting her, lived at her Expense, than to comply with any one of them; and on the other side, Ulysses who could not be overcome by the Charms of Circe, nor of Calypso, nor of the Daughter of Alcinous, but always passionately desired to see his dear Penelope again, to whom nevertheless he was not so faithful as she was to him. But even this contributes to show his Constancy, since Goddesses themselves such as Circe and Calypso were, who refused him no Favours, were not able to detain him in their agreeable Islands, altho' they tempted him with so great a Bribe as Immortality. It is true that Homer mixes the Love of his Native-Country with his Desire to return, but it is not incompatible with that of his Wife. Patriae, 
† De Ora. L. 1. c. 44.  says Cicero, tanta est vis, ac tanta natura, ut Ithacam illam in asperrimis saxulis, tanquam nidulum affixam sapientissimus vir immortalitati anteponeret. The Love of one's Country is so forcible and natural, that the wisest Man of antiquity preferred Ithaca, which is situated like a Bird's Nest among sharp Rocks, to Immortality itself.  
It will be granted me, that since we can give so many different interpretations to this pretended Allegory, which composes the Odysseys, it is not very probable that Homer proposed any of them in particular, as the end and mark of his Work, or that if he had such a Design in his Head, he has executed it very ill. An Allegory which is so obscure, that it is equally capable of different Meanings, is no longer an Allegory, but a Riddle.  
What is likewise said of the 
† Le Bossu Liv. 1. c. 11.  moral Design, which Virgil proposed to himself in his Aeneis, is no better founded. Some People would needs persuade us, that this Poet designed to instruct Augustus, as the Founder of a mighty Empire, and to inspire him, as well as his Successors with the same Spirit and Conduct, which had made this Empire so great. A wise Roman, say they, who was an able Politician in his time ('tis Cicero they mean) informs us that Clemency was so peculiar to this Government, that it reigned there even in the midst of War, and that nothing but downright absolute Necessity could make them suspend the Observing of it. They maintain that this is the Instruction, which Virgil designed to give the Roman Emperors in his Aeneis.  
But to this it may be replied in the first place, that Virgil indeed represents Aeneas all along as one that was very devout, and ready on all occasions to follow the Orders of Heaven; but he does not make him exercise any extraordinary Compassion towards the Vanquished. We don't find that he any where signalises his Clemency. On the contrary he makes him in all his Battles kill those that cried to him for Quarter, without the least remorse.  
In the second place, If we had a mind to reason upon the Supposition that Virgil designed to give us moral Instructions, 'tis more natural to imagine that his Intention was to demonstrate, that we ought to submit to the Orders of Providence, altho' they appear hard and difficult to execute. This is a Thought which runs through the whole Aeneis, as it would be easy to demonstrate. We might likewise say, That he designed to inform the Romans, that the Establishment of a great Empire is not made without a particular Providence of Heaven, and to possess them consequently with devout Thoughts. But these Projects are by no means fit for an Epicurean, and all the World knows that Virgil embraced the Opinions of Epicurus as well as his Friend Horace.  
If we must plainly deliver the Truth, 'tis highly probable that Virgil meant nothing else than to flatter Augustus and the Romans in particular, by making a Romance about the Origine of their Empire, and of the julian Family, which he deduces from julus, the Son of Aeneas, according to the Tradition of that Family. This was certainly the Poet's Aim, who seldom loses any occasion to flatter Augustus and the Romans in general, and not to exhort the Emperors to Clemency.  
Thus you have beheld the moral Projects of the three finest Epic Poems that were ever composed, entirely overthrown; after which, it will not be hard to believe that Tragic Poems are not written for nobler Ends. Aristotle defines Tragedy thus: 'Tis, 
† Ch. IU. Of his Poetry.  says he, the Imitation of a grave entire Action, which has a just Greatness, etc. which by the means of Compassion and Terror fully purgeth in us these and the like Passions. Thus the Tragic Poets would pretend to heal the Passions of their Auditors, or at least to lessen them, by exciting Terror and Compassion in their Souls. I won't say, that no Tragic Poet in the World ever proposed a moral Design to himself; but I believe that for the generality they have not troubled themselves about that matter, and that the moral Passages scattered up and down in their Compositions, are rather to embellish the Subject, and please the Audience, than with a Design to calm their Passions. It may indeed sometimes so fall out, that the Spectator by seeing the Calamities of Humane Life represented on the Stage, and the incertainty of Honour and Greatness described in a lively manner, on purpose to affect him, may moderate himself a little better in his Desires and Transports; but Terror and Pity are not healed, by being often raised in the Heart: On the contrary, in process of time Men accustom themselves to them so well, that the least thing at long run is capable to disturb them. After this manner all Habitudes are form. By having the same Movements often within us they become so natural, that 'tis very difficult to disengage ourselves from them. But it will be objected perhaps, that by virtue of seeing these sad and terrible Objects, which are represented in Tragedies, we may come in time to be less sensible of the impressions of Pity and Fear; as Soldiers use to despise Dangers, wherein they frequently find themselves engaged. But this Comparison signifies just nothing, for Soldiers as often as they find themselves in Danger, do all they can to dissipate their Fears, and encourage one another: whereas a Tragic Poet sets all his Engines on work to raise the Passions of the Auditors; and as the latter takes no manner of care to oppose his Design, 'tis no wonder that at last they contract a habit of those very Passions which the Poet excites in them.  
It will still be urged that Examples of the Misfortunes of Human Life, which we see in Tragedies, dispose those that behold them often represented on the Theatre, to be less surprised at them,  they fall upon themselves. 
† Vide Marc. Antoninum. L. XI. n. 6. & ad eum locum Tho. Gatakerum.  It is true that the Philosopher's endeavour to make this use of Tragedy, and that they frequently cite Instances out of them, to persuade Men to Constancy. But 'tis one thing to endeavour to draw some Profit from a thing which is established, and another to do the same thing with a certain Design. The Philosophers are to be commended for their Endeavours to lead Men to Virtue, by the very Objects of their Passions and their Pleasures; but the Tragic Poets rather busied their Brains to procure the Applause of the People and their Diversion, than their Reformation or Amendment. Thus they oftener arrive at the first of these Ends, than at the second.  
The Comic Poets pretended also to have a share in this Honour, and it was commonly said, To Teach Comedy as well as Tragedy, to mean the publishing of any Dramatic Compositions. In effect, by representing common Life, and rallying the Follies of the World, they might perhaps make a better Impression upon their Auditors, than by pompously setting forth the extraordinary Calamities of Heroes and Princes, after the manner of the Tragic Poets. There are but few Kings, and Great Men in the World, to whom alone the Examples of Tragedy can be well suited: But on the contrary, we have infinite numbers of private Men, who may, to their great Advantage, behold their Passions and Humours lashed and ridiculed in Comedy. But before the Comic Poets can pretend to pass for public Teachers of Virtue, 'tis necessary that they should be first Philosophers, or else that none but Philosophers should deal in Comedy: As we find it to be quite otherwise, 'tis no wonder that our Comedies, being composed by those that are not the most regular Men in the World, have no less contributed to propagate Vice, than to show the Folly of it. They don't represent Intemperance, and divers other Vices as blamable, but when they are carried to great Excess, that is to say, never but when they may hurt the Estabishment or Fortune of those People who abandon themselves to them. Now, sound Philosophy demands a great deal more Virtue from us than will just keep us from being Scandalous, or ruining ourselves in the World. Thus, whatever they allege for themselves, the Comic Poets seem to have nothing else in view but to divert the Public, and to get Reputation and Money by diverting them. To compass this, they were obliged to mix abundance of moral Sentences in the Conversation of their Persons, because they frequently hold such sorts of Discourses; and because that after they have laughed hearty, the Public is diverted with these Sallies of Morality, rather for the variety of the Entertainment, than for any Instruction. A sufficient Proof of this is that they are not a jot the better for it, as a 
† Plautus in Rud. Act. IU. Sec. 7.  Comic Poet has very well observed in these Verses.  
Spectavi ego pridem Comicos ad istum modum  
Sapienter dicta dicere atque iis plaudier,  
Cum illos sapientes mores monstrabant populo;  
Sed cùm inde suam quisque ibant divorsi domum,  
Nullus erat illo pacto, ut illi jusserunt.  
I have often seen that after the Comic Poets have said good things, and that they have been applauded for them, while they taught good Manners to the People, as soon as they were got home, no body was the better for their Advice.  
I don't pretend to prove by this Discourse that we cannot give very useful Precepts in Verse, and that they have not been actually given in them. All that I would show by it is, that whatever has been said of the moral Designs of the finest Compositions of ancient Poetry, has much more appearance than Solidity in it, when we come to examine it nearly. This does not in the least hinder, but that a Poet, who has tasted the good Maxims of a Philosophy which is somewhat severer, than that of the greatest Poets of Antiquity was, and who possesseth them as they did the Opinions of their own time, may not undertake a Poem with the same Views, that have been vainly ascribed to them, and by this means re-establish the Honour of Poetry, which has been defamed by the Faults we have already taken notice of. 'Tis of such a Poet, that we may truly say what Horace says of him, whom he endeavoured to instruct in his Art of Poetry: 
Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci,  
Lectorem delectando, paritérque monendo.  that Writer gains the good Opinion of the whole World, who mixes the useful with the agreeable, by diverting his Reader, and giving him good Advice at the same time. But I am mightily afraid that such a Poet has for a long while been nothing else but a pure Idea without reality.   

CHAP. II. Of True and False Eloquence.  
NOTHING is more esteemed than Eloquence, not only among Men of Learning, but even the Vulgar: However, there is scarce any thing of which for the generality, we have a wronger Idea. 'Tis certain that 'tis the most useful thing in the World, when we really possess it; but 'tis as certain that when we only believe we possess it, and have persuaded the Multitude of it, there is scarce any thing so pernicious. We not only take a Phantom for something Real, but we frequently put off a Falsehood for a Truth, or at least instead of illustrating the Truth we lose it in the thickest Darkness. I call true Eloquence, that the Reader may not be deceived, The Art of speaking Truth, as we ought to speak it, to convince reasonable Men, to render them attentive, and to affect them, if 'tis necessary, while we speak it. On the contrary, false Eloquence is an Art, if it deserves such a Name, of recommending Falsehood instead of Truth, and of making the same Respect be paid to the former, which is only due to the latter: To which we ought to add the want of Address in those that propose Truth itself, but do it in so awkward and silly a manner, that they make their Hearers doubt of it, and that no one listens to them, nor is affected by their Discourse, altho' in the bottom 'tis true.  
To show the Excellence of true Eloquence, and the Disadvantages of the false, would take up a complete Treatise of Rhetoric, which is far from my Thoughts at present. I will only make some general Reflections upon the four parts of this Science, Invention, Disposition, Expression and Pronunciation.  
I. INVENTION consists, 
Of Invention.  as every one knows, in discovering all that can be said upon a Subject we have chose to treat of; but as we ought not to say every thing that comes into our Heads, altho' it belongs to the Subject in hand, because than we should never make an end, we ought necessarily to make choice of those Thoughts that are proper to the end we propose to ourselves: and herein the Art and Address of an Orator consists. Unless a Man is perfectly Stupid, and has never read in his Life, 'tis impossible for him to be wholly unprovided of Matter, when he has any Truth or historical Fact to discourse upon; but then, unless he understands the Art of Thinking justly, and has often made long and profound Reflections upon it, unless he has a true Relish and Discernment, we find that he generally makes an ill Choice of the things that present themselves to his Mind: he will enlarge too much upon things of little Importance, or dwell upon such as have no connexion with the Subject in hand, while he omits those that are more important and Effential, or touches them but slightly. This is what happens daily, but especially to Preachers, who without Understanding the Rules of Art, learn to preach by Rote and Custom.  
But to talk more particularly upon this Occasion, we are apt to commit three Faults principally, which don't appear so to the Eyes of those who are not able to distinguish true Eloquence from the false, but which are not the less for all that, and which for that very Reason, produce very ill Effects.  
The first is, that abundance of People are of the Opinion, That provided they talk a great deal, so that their Matter never fails them, 'tis enough to give them the Character of eloquent Men, unless it happens that they are altogether destitute of exterior Talents that relate to the Style and Pronunciation. To be able to talk an Hour or too about a Trifle of no Consequence, altho' without Choice and Judgement, seems to be the finest thing in the World, provided a Man does not hesitate but runs glibly on, and moves his Auditors. We foolishly persuade ourselves that we acquire the Reputation of Men of Wit, in spite of good Sense, as if it were possible to be one without the other. 'Tis the same with Authors as with Orators, altho' they ought to be much more severe in the Choice of their Thoughts, as a Reader is infinitely harder to please, than one that hears. However, if they can so order Matters, as to make a large Book, and they don't want Words when they are attacked, they think that they perfectly satisfy all Difficulties, and answer all Objections. Thus this sort of People fall foul upon every thing without Distinction, which does not suit with their Passions, in a vain Presumption, that a Torrent of Words will effectually do their Business for them, and that they shall never want a Supply. I knew a Man of this Character, who thought that Talking and Proving were the same thing; so that after he had talked a great deal, he fancied he brought abundance of Proofs; and on the contrary, that those that talk little prove nothing. He persuaded himself that the World counts the Sentences in a Book just as they do Soldiers in an Army, and that the more Ink a Man uses, the more Reason he has on his side. One may apply to this Man a Saying of 
† See Aulus Gell. L. 1. c. xv.  Sallust, Satis loquentiae, sapientiae parum, Words enough, but little good Sense. On the other hand, those that are really Eloquent, after they have formed a clear Idea of the Propositions they intent to prove, (for this in short is the end of all Discourses whatever they are, if they are reasonable) make use only of those Proofs that appear the most simple, the most direct, and the most sensible, and reject all the rest. After this they adorn the Proofs they have chosen with all the Decorations that solid Eloquence uses to employ, and of which I shall take occasion to discourse at the Conclusion of these Reflections. When they have a fertile Subject, which deserves to be enlarged upon, they talk the longer of it: But if it is Barren, and the thing in hand is not of that importance, as to require a long Examination, they soon dispatch it. In a word, they lengthen their Discourse according to the Nature of their Subject; whereas others amplify theirs, according to the extravagant Desire they have to talk much, or to make a show of their pretended Eloquence. The former talk when they have something to communicate, which deserves to be heard, and the latter never hold their Tongue, but when no Body will do the Penance to listen to them.  
The second Fault we may observe in those that are only Masters of a false Eloquence, and which concerns the Choice of what is proper to be said, is that they believe that if they are not allowed to say every thing that comes into their head, they are not however obliged to use no Arguments, but such as are concluding. They flatter themselves that the World ought to consider them as Persons of a nice Discernment, if they employ no Reasonings that are palpably absurd, that shock the Imagination. The slightest Appearances and the most incertain Probabilities serve their turn. They perpetually confound the Possible with the Probable, and the Probable with the True. Their Discourses and Works are full of Reasonings of this Nature, which would no more endure the Test of Logic, than a gilded Shilling would endure the Touchstone. If we confine them to Syllogism, and carefully consider their equivocal Expressions, and their precarious Principles, we shall find at first sight, that they are nothing but pure Sophisms which are founded upon Ambiguities or Suppositions that cannot be defended: We shall find that by Reasoning after this manner, there is nothing which we cannot attack and nothing which we cannot prove. We may meet abundance of Examples of this Nature in the Writings of the ancient Philosophers, and Fathers of the Church, especially when they Dispute or Reason upon the Old Testament. In every Page we find Suppositions altogether uncertain, and which 'tis impossible to prove, if once we deny them, and Arguments that are wholly built upon the Ambiguity of some Words, which they would not give themselves the trouble to explain, to have an occasion to Reason out of our sight. It will be told me perhaps, that I ought to talk more respectfully of the Fathers, and that the consent of Antiquity, for Reasoning in this manner, is a sufficient Proof that it is warrantable and good. But I have nothing to do here with Theological Doctrines, wherein their Authority uses to be of weight: Logic, at present, is the Business in debate, which will not allow the Authority of Citations, but only the strict Rules of Art. Whoever violates them, is to be tried before the Tribunal of Logicians, tho' it were an Ecumenical Council, confirmed by several others. There is no Authority in the World that can make Arbitrary Laws for good Reasoning, or change a Sophism into a true Syllogism, or make a just Argument become a Sophism, without altering something in it. No Person has power to grant Immunities to the Prejudice of the Rights of Reason, or to make any Exception in favour of any thing of this Nature. We must either obey the Rules, or undergo the Sentence. The true Rhetoricians follow upon this occasion the Authority of the Philosophers, or rather the inviolable Light of good Sense. They maintain, that when a Man is to prove any thing solidly, he ought to employ no Reasonings, but those that are solid: If he will needs make use of probable Reasonings, whatever he concludes from them, cannot be more certain than the Proofs he brings. All that he can make of them will only amount to a Probability. Now as there are several Degrees of Probability, a Man likewise ought to have a regard to that, and to make slight Appearances go for no more than they are really worth.  
In the Civil Law, for Example, there is no Authority which can make a bad Consequence go for a good one. When any thing is to be proved by a Law or an Act, we must plainly show that the Terms of that Law or Act cannot be possibly understood in another sense. Probability, especially when it is slight, serves only to spoil our Cause: For the Advocate of the other side, let him underhand his Profession never so little, will not fail to observe that nothing concluding has been urged in the Case; and the Judges demand solid Proofs, and not simple Conjectures. If any Man should be so ill-advised as to Reason at the Bar upon the Laws, as Origene does upon the Bible, he would be hissed out of the Court, and in a short time no Body would retain him, unless he entirely changed his Method. Let People say what they please, since the Fathers never had any such Privilege from Heaven, as to be exempted from following the Laws of good Logic, we lie under no Obligation to believe that those Reasonings are good in their Writings, which would be exploded any where else.  
However, in several parts of the World, those that design for the Pulpit, read them to model themselves upon their Eloquence, and to use, upon occasion, their Words or their Arguments, and as if they durst not employ the Rules of Logic to examine them by, they learn by little and little to Reason just as they did, and at last to declaim against Reason, for fear, I suppose, lest the World should find out their little Sophistry. This is one of the most crying Sins of Ecclesiastical Eloquence, as 'tis managed in those Places where the Fathers are the Copies they writ after. A Man ought to leave his Reason and Logic behind him in the Church-Porch to be edified with such Preaching. Thus these arbitrary Suppositipons, and irregular Reasonings have made the Italians say of these sorts of Discourse, that, il creder è di cortesia, they believe them merely out of good Manners and Civility: And for this cause when they have any false Point, or any unjust Reasoning, their Answer is, guardate questo per la predica, keep this Nonsense to yourself till you are a Preacher. They are convinced by Experience, that abundance of things, which we patiently suffer from the Pulpit, would be ridiculous in a serious Conversation of rational Persons.  
On the contrary, true substantial Eloquence suffers us to utter nothing for Truth, but what we prove in so convincing a manner, that the strictest Logicians can have nothing to object against it. If we have nothing, as I have already said, but probable things to propose, she will oblige us to acquaint our Auditors with it. As she has no other design but to instruct, and that in a solid manner, so that the Reader shall not only be persuaded upon the spot, but retain the Truth which has been demonstrated to him, in his Mind; she never employs any of those tinsel Arguments that may glitter for a Moment, but soon after disappear; the only uses the eternal and inviolable Lights of good Sense, which appear to be so much the more true, the nearer we come to examine them.  
However, now and then an occasion presents itself, where it is lawful for us to make use of weak Reasonings for a little time. And this happens when our Hearers or Readers are more affected by them than by the best Arguments. In such a Case, we are obliged to accommodate ourselves to their Imbecility, in order to gain them over to our side, and afterwards to be in a condition to instruct them better, when they can hearken to what we have to offer to them, without prejudice. The Mind of Man is Haughty and Jealous, and sometimes he cannot be undeceived but by himself, by our making a dexterous use of those Principles which he admits for true ones so that he attributes the change, that is made in him, to his own Knowledge, and not to that of another. We must therefore make use of his Principles, which are frequently either false or incertain, as if they were built upon Truth, to make him draw a Consequence from them, which be would not otherwise admit.  
If we had only honest sincere Men to deal with, who search after nothing but the Truth, than we need do no more than propose it clearly to them, in order to bring them over to us: But we are obliged every moment of the day to undeceive People that are governed by their Passions, and prepossessed by a thousand Prejudices directly opposite to the Truth; and therefore we must, as far as 'tis possible, Reason with such Men either upon common Principles, or their own proper Ideas. If we let them see, that we are at too great a distance from their Opinions, or that we look down upon their Errors with contempt, they immediately take it for granted, that we despise their Persons, and this Consideration alone makes them shut their Ears to the Truth. Upon this account the Masters of this Art inform those that would persuade others, not to advance any thing that may in the least wound the Imagination of their Auditors, and make them suspect that we want Respect or Consideration for them. We may observe this wise Precaution in the first Discourses which the Apostles heretofore made to the Jews and Pagans, whom they managed with as much Address as was possible. We may upon this Head, consider the Harangue which St. Paul makes to the Athenians, in the 17th Chap. of the Acts where he makes use of the Inscription upon an Altar, and the Words of a Greek Poet, and gives them the best Meaning he could, to endeavour to gain these Idolaters, as it were, out of their own proper Principles. We likewise find in his Writings that he managed the Jews with great dexterity, before they had constrained him by their ill treatment to break off with them, and address himself to the Gentiles. On these Occasions, he says abundance of things which suppose the vulgar Opinions, tho' he did not at the same time believe them to be altogether true. But we ought never to use this Method, but when we are compelled, that is to say, when the Truth would be rejected at first sight, if it appeared to be such, as it is really in itself.  
The third Fault that is to be censured in the Eloquence of several People, is that they believe that they ought to be considered as Authors or Orators of a good Judgement and Taste, when their Reasons are just and concluding, tho' they never trouble themselves, whether they make for the Subject, or at least whether what they propose to prove, is precisely the same with what they prove. They don't explain the Questions in hand so clearly as they ought to be, and the Reasons which afterwards they bring, don't direct the Reader or Hearer to find out those Truths that they engage to prove. They choose certain Reasonings which they extend by divers Reflections, and embellish with several Examples, without concerning themselves about any thing else, but that what they deliver be true in itself, and has some relation to what they treat of. Thus they put the change upon their Auditors, and if they don't deceive them in the bottom of things, they deceive them at least in their expectation. The Authors, whom I have named, are full of this Cheat. The Title of their Works, and the fine Promises they make at first to treat of certain Matters, draw on the Reader, who is desirous to be instructed in them. But so soon as he sets himself to read them, he perceives that his Author shams him off with something else than what he expected to find in him. He cannot then forbear to cry out, Quò nunc se proripit ille? Whither is the Man a going? It seems that so soon as he would enter upon the Matter, the irregularity of his Imagination hurries his Reason whither it never intended to go; like a restif Horse that runs away with a Man in spite of his Teeth, when he has not strength or skill enough to keep him in and govern him. He gallops away with mighty speed, and does not stumble, but goes where no Body expected he should go.  
On the contrary, those that know how to speak and write according to the Rules of Art, propose at first the Question they intent to treat of, with all Perspicuity imaginable, so that neither themselves, nor those that hear or read them can possibly be deceived. They go to their Journey's end in the straitest and plainest Road, and their whole Discourse conspires, if I may use the Expression, to prove the same thing. The Auditor, or the Reader on his side, perfectly well comprehending what he had a mind to demonstrate, and the Proofs he brings to support it, finds himself satisfied and instructed, so that he is never deceived upon the same Subject, so long as he remembers what he has heard, or read.  

The ill Effects of false Rhetoric.  THE Defects, I have remarked in false Eloquence, are at least in part the occasion of several Disorders we see in the World, which nothing but true Rhetoric can remedy.  
The first is, that such People as suffer themselves to be born away by a multitude of Words, by false Reasons, or Thoughts that make nothing to the Subject in hand, are overwhelmed indeed with the noise of the Words, and the great number of the Thoughts, but they understand not a syllable of the Matter. Although they fancy they are much bettered by a Discourse of this nature which they have heard or read, yet they cannot tell what it contains, nor reduce it to certain clear and continued Heads. Every thing is confused, every thing is turned upside down in their Minds and as Connexion and Order are of excellent use to the Memory, which otherwise is apt to be disordered and to lose what it has learned, these Gentlemen soon forget what they have read or heard.  
The second Disorder, which this pretended Eloquence produceth, is that those People that are accustomed to it, come to lose their Taste and Judgement insensibly, and at last find themselves utterly uncapable of judging what ought to be said and what omitted, what is good and what is bad reasoning, what is to the purpose and what not. They are no longer able to separate what is treated of from what makes nothing to the Subject, nor to discern the Proofs that are brought to bring about ones Ends, from what is introduced merely for Show and Ornament, or for the sake of some resemblance.  
The third Disorder is, that if the End of the Discourse be to correct the Faults of the Readers and Auditors, the multitude of impertinent Words, the weakness of the Reasonings, and the judicious Choice of the Thoughts, produce but very sorry Effects. As we are persuaded without knowing why or wherefore, and have no clear and continued Principles to preserve ourselves from Error, and to regulate our Conduct aright, our Manners will infallibly derive an unhappy Tincture from the disorder of our Minds we do Good and Evil without discerning them so distinctly as we ought to do, and our Lives become a perpetual mixture of a little Virtue and a great deal of Vice. We know the general Rules of Good and Evil confusedly, and we apply them almost by mere accident to the particular Actions of Life.  
Let us suppose on the contrary, that by some Miracle or other it so fell out in some Kingdom or Republic, that they had no public Orator (the Reader will soon perceive that I mean our Preachers here) nor so much as one Writer that exactly observed the Rules abovementioned of good Rhetoric, I don't in the least question but that we should soon behold a considerable change in their Discourses and in their Lives. The public Assemblies would be excellent Schools for the Heart and Mind to take a true cast in: We should not learn the Trick there to pay ourselves with a parcel of insignificant words, we should say nothing but what was to the purpose, and reason justly upon the Opinions of Religion and upon Morality, and this Knowledge would soon diffuse itself all over our Lives and Actions. We should no longer see such vast numbers of People, that only do Good by mere accident almost, and only avoid Evil by mere good luck, by reason of their confused and uncertain Lights, by which they regulate their Conduct. But we must needs own, if we will speak out the truth, as we ought to do in a Matter of so great importance, that we for the most part see ten Orators that are proper to do Mischief, for one that is capable to edify us solidly; so that we ought not to wonder if the uncertain Multitude blunder and grope their way at midday, without knowing what Road they should take, or implicitly follow the first Man they meet.  

Of Disposition  II. THIS is enough to be said upon the Article of Invention, which is the most important part of Rhetoric, and the foundation of all the rest, since 'tis necessary we know what we ought to say, before we think how to range and express it. Nevertheless 'tis of very great consequence to dispose the matter, we have found out by Meditation, in a right order, because the disposition is of infinite use to make others rightly understand what we intent to say, and to make them perceive the force of the Proofs which we allege.  
The Rhetors lay down good general Precepts concerning the disposition of a Discourse, in regard to the Order we ought to observe between the parts which compose it, and what we ought to follow in each of these parts. I find nothing to censure in them as for what they teach upon this Head, and am of Opinion, that those that speak in public would do very well to read over from time to time the Precepts of the Masters of this Art, the greatest part of which are founded upon good Sense. But there is one thing wanting in them, which is of that consideration, that without it all their Precepts signify just nothing. 'Tis this, that they say almost nothing about the essential ordering of the Thoughts among one another, in each part of the Discourse, and which is absolutely necessary, whether it be to avoid Repetions, or to instruct more easily, and to convince the Reader or Auditor. This Order is not only necessary in those Discourses which we pronounce without publishing them in Print; but principally in Books of what nature soever they be. However one may justly say that nothing has been more neglected not only by the ancient Orators, but especially by the Philosophers, the greatest part of whose Discourses is a mere Confusion and Chaos. Plutarch, for instance, among the Greeks, and Seneca among the Latins, have written with the greatest Confusion in the World. The ecclesiastical Authors have imitated them in this particular. We see both the one and the other, frequently begin to treat of a Subject without taking the least care to state the Question in Terms clear and without equivocation, and then on they gallop, without knowing from whence they set out or whither they are going, till such time as their Imagination is perfectly foundered, and they can run no longer. Read their Treatises and Discourses over and over again, and you will find a vast number of them, wherein you can neither comprehend the principal Design they drive at, nor the Method they proposed to follow, in order to execute it. The best are those, whose Design we can perceive in gross, and where the Matter is not too far fetched, altho' there is no Order in it. They heap together a world of Materials to build, as one would think, a fine Structure, but afterwards they throw them one upon another without Order and any Rules of Architecture. Thus 'tis a difficult matter well to disentangle this confusion of Thoughts, and to form a clear and continued Idea of their Sentiments, which has in part proved the occasion of so many Disputes about their Doctrine.  
It must be owned, that those that writ or speak now a days have much more Method, at least for the greatest part; and 'tis an undeniable Truth, that in this respect we very much surpass the Ancients, whatever the Admirers of Antiquity may pretend. However there are abundance of People still in the World, who never made any serious reflection upon a Method to dispose their Reasons, in such a manner as shall be proper to make their Discourse clear and concluding. If they sometimes succeed in this, 'tis by mere hazard, for they trespass oftener against the most essential Rules.  
These Rules had continued as it were hidden among the Geometricians till the time of Descartes, who first discovered the great Use that might be made of them upon all occasions. Since the Discoveries that have been made in our Age about them, several Persons have enlarged and even rectified his Thoughts as we may see in the Logic of the Port-Royal, and the 
† By F. Male Branch  Search after Truth. The same Matter has likewise been treated with care in a Latin 
† Logicae Joannis Clerici, denuo edita, anno 1698  Logic, printed twice at Amsterdam within a few Years, where the use that may be made of it in all sorts of Disquisitions, is shown at large. These Books are too common, to want any transcribing here.  
I will only say in general, that these Rules teach us that we ought in the first place to have an exact knowledge of the Question we intent to handle, and to express it without Ambiguity: In the second place, That we must divide it into its parts, if it is composed of several Propositions: Thirdly, That we must range these Propositions in that Order, that the most simple and most easy may march first; Fourthly, That the Propositions that follow aught to be deduced from the preceding ones, as far as is possible. There are other particular Rules with which I shall not meddle here. 'Tis sufficient to remark that these general Rules are notoriously violated both in Discourses and in Writings. We set ourselves to compose, without knowing well what we are minded to treat of, and after some division ill understood, we say in each part what we think belongs to it, without troubling ourselves in what Order we range it. What is more, several Persons, who affect to be thought Wits, take a pride in retailing their Thoughts without any manner of connexion, and think it enough that each Thought in particular has a relation to the Subject they treat upon. This is called Writing and Preaching by Thoughts, and after this manner it is that a good part of the Treatises, which compose the famous Collection of the Essays of Morality are written, the drift and end of which we cannot comprehend, but in a general way, and whose Method is exceedingly embroiled. Although the Style of them is pure and fine, and there are abundance of noble independent Thoughts in 'em; yet, to speak freely what I think, these Works taken in the Gross, are full of nonsensical Stuff, and Sophisms: The reason of which, in my Opinion, is only this, because those that composed them, either did not know what a good Method was, or at least did not know the importance of observing it.  
In the mean time no Man can question the Excellence of the abovementioned Rules, if it were only because all the Truths of the Mathematicians depend upon them. 'Tis impossible to deny that the Order they prescribe is admirable, both to enlighten the Mind, and touch the Heart of reasonable Persons. 'Tis likewise as plain 'tis extremely useful and convenient for those that writ; for by this means they form a Plan of what they should say with all the ease imaginable, when once they are accustomed to them: They avoid impertinent Repetitions, and the Pain of finding out independent Thoughts, and afterwards of connecting them together by unnatural Transitions. I own indeed, that such as have not used to make themselves a Plan, which they are to follow, and have contracted a habitude of Speaking without one, will find themselves shackled by it; but those that reason ●ill, don't love, for the same reason, the Rules of good Reasoning. Does it therefore follow, that they must not endeavour to reform themselves, or that others must imitate them?  
I know nothing that can be objected against this, but some Opinions of the Rhetors. They maintain, for Instance, 
† Quinil. Lib. IU. c. 5.  That it is not good to divide one's Matter with exactness, because it seems too much studied, and the generality of things are more agreeable, when they appear to be invented on the sudden, and deduced from the thing itself, than when we believe the Orator meditated on them at home. Pleraque gratiora si inventa subitò, nec demo allata, sed inter dicendum ex re ipsâ nata videantur. To which I answer, That this Remark may perhaps hold good in a Reply which an Advocate makes before the Judges, where some things may seem to have been invented upon the Spot. But on other Occasions, when all the World knows we come prepared, in what we writ and order to be Printed, this sort of a Cheat will not pass Muster. Thus, 'tis plain, that Quintilian made this Remark upon the account of the Advocates only, for whose use principally he composed his Book of Institutions. In this Occasion, those that have a bad Cause to defend, are often forced to make use of divers Artifices that are below the Eloquence I have been talking of, which will only undertake the Defence of a good Cause. Of this kind is the Artifice that the same Rhetor speaks of in the following Words: Sometimes, says he, we must put false Dice upon the Judge, and insinuate ourselves into his favour by several Artifices, so that he may believe we have a different design from that we have in reality. Now and then a Man is forced to propose something, which 'tis difficult to obtain; and if the Judge foresees it, he is afraid of it, before we speak to the Point; just as we see a wounded Man fears the Instruments of a Chirurgeon, when he sees them, before the Operation gins. But if a Discourse happens to make some Impression upon a Judge, who distrusts nothing, and having had no Intimation of the Business, is not upon his Guard; than it produces such Effects, which a Man could not have believed, if they had been premised him beforehand. In the mean time we must not only avoid the dividing of what we are about, but we must not so much as treat of it at all. We must disturb and ruffle the Passions of the Auditors, and hinder them from being too attentive to Matter of Fact: For an Orator not only proposes to himself to instruct, but much more to move. Now nothing is so contrary to this as an exact and scrupulous Division, at a time when we endeavour to hinder the Judge from making any use of his Judgement. Interim verò etiam fallendus est Judex, & varijs artibus subeundus, ut aliud agi, quàm quod petimus, putet. Nam est nonnumquam dura propositio, quam Judex, si providet, non aliter reformidat, quàm qui ferrum medid priusquàm curetur adspexit, etc.  
'Tis true, indeed, that we sometimes meet with People of so unaccountable a Temper, and so averse to Truth, that the most exact Disposition of Reasons, and the most proper to show their Force or Weakness, shocks and provokes them; so that we are forced, in our own Defence, to take Byways, and wheel round about, to bring them to themselves. When we have such Gentlemen as these to deal with, we must make an Exception to the General Rule, from which otherwise we ought never to departed without a visible Necessity. As the principal End of those that talk or write, is to recommend the Truth, we must change the order wherein it shines with greatest Lustre, if this Lustre too much offends the Eyes of those, who as yet don't love her. As the Precepts of this Art were laid down by those that have written of them, only to lead us to this End, we must of necessity lay them aside, when they no longer lead us to it. It would be downright Madness to adhere superstitiously to these Precepts against the interest of the Cause we have undertaken. 
† Quin●. Lib. IU. c. 2.  Amentis est, superstione proeceptorum, contrà rationem causoe trahi.  
When this does not happen, we ought both in our Books and in our Discourses to follow the most exact Method that is possible, so that it may be known at first sight what is the general Design we propose to ourselves, and what are the Parts of it; as likewise that we may show the Connexion of all these Parts and Reasonings, of which they are composed. This Order carries Light and Convicton with it, as I have already said; and besides this, the Reader or Hearer is more attentive to it, and is not so soon tired. This is the Judgement of Quintilian, who tells us, that Division, where it is properly used, gives a great deal of Light and Ornament to a Discourse. It not only occasions, continues he, that whatever is said becomes more clear, in drawing, as it were, from among a crowd of Thoughts, that which we have a design to say, and in setting it before the Eyes of the Judges, but it relieves the Hearer also, in showing him the end of each part, after the same manner as the Miles that are marked upon Stone in the great Roads, are a refreshment to the Travellers: For 'tis some satisfaction to know how far we are gone in our Journey, and we surmount what remains behind with more Alacrity, when we know how long it is for nothing can seem long, if we see the end of it. 
† Lib. IU. c. 5.  Opportunè adbibita plurimùm orationi lucis & gratiae confert. Neque enim id solum efficit ut clariora fiant quae dicantur, rebus velut ex turba extractis, & in conspectu judicum positis sed resicit quoque audientem, certo singularium partium fine: Non aliter quàm facientibus iter multùm detrahunt fatigationis netata, inscriptis lapidibus, spatia. Name & exhausti laboris nosse mensuram voluptati est, & hortatur ad reliqua fortiùs exsequenda scire quantum supersit. Nihil enim longum videri necesse est, in quo quid ultimum sit certum est. Now if Division alone produces this Effect, according to this judicious Rhetorician, what may we not expect from a complete Method, which ought to reign in each part of the Discourse, and which represents all the Reasonings, of which it is composed, in their natural Order.  
There is scarce any Author or Orator to be found now a-days, that writes wholly without Division, as Plutarch and Seneca have done, and as abundance of Greek and Latin Fathers have practised; but then there are several that divide their Subject amiss, and observe no Order, neither between the general Parts, nor between the particular Reasonings. This proceeds in the first place from their not having an Idea extensive enough of what they design to say, and from their dividing their Subject, before they fully know the Parts of it; secondly, from their being ignorant of the Rules of Division, or not thinking on them; and lastly, from their not knowing of what Consequence it is to place the most simple Idea, before those that are more compounded. While those that speak and write, are ignorant of these general Principles of Logic, 'tis impossible but there must be a world of Confusion in their Discourse, and consequently a world of Obscurity, which cannot fail to lessen the Attention of those that either hear or read them, and which must of necessity disgust them. I suppose that the Discourses are good in themselves and that a Man instructed in the Method of ordering his Thoughts, might be able to make exact and solid Discourses of them. But 'tis much worse, when 'tis nothing but a confused Tissu of ill Reasonings, for 'tis impossible to do any good with it, tho' you cast it into as good Order as you please. This Confusion than serves as a Cloud to conceal the weakness of the Reasons from those, who will not give, themselves the trouble to examine them nearer at hand, or are not capable of doing it.  

Of the Expression.  III. ALTHO' the Invention and Disposition of Thoughts be the two first parts of Rhetoric, and that no one can pretend to real Eloquence, without observing the above mentioned Rules relating to both, 'tis nevertheless very certain that if we don't add to all this, the other Rules, which the Masters of this Art have given us about Elocution, we cannot pass for Eloquent. For in short, the Thoughts may be just and well ordered; and yet, for Example, not be intelligible, by reason of the ill Choice of the Expressions. Now a Discourse, unintelligible or only difficult to be understood, can never pass for Eloquent. We may say the same thing of other Faults of the Style, upon which we may consult the Rhetors. When a Man has nothing else to do but to satisfy himself in Thinking or Writing, 'tis enough for him to observe the Rules that relate to Invention and Disposition: But when he is to communicate his Thoughts to others, they ought to be conceived in clear and proper Terms, that may make such an impression upon their Minds as we desire.  
We propose to ourselves three Things in Speaking or Writing, or at least one or two of them; that is, to instruct, to give pleasure, and to move the Passions. We may likewise reduce to three sorts of Things, all that we undertake to talk about: The first is of that which regards common Life, or things of pure Speculation, which of themselves are not proper to excite any Movement in the Mind of those that hear them: The second is of that which is a little more elevated, tho' for all that it has nothing extraordinary nor great: The third is of great Things that are not common in Good and Evil. The first require a simple and proper Style; the second an Elocution somewhat more raised, and the third a sublime Style. We ought to look upon it as an inviolable Law, always to suit our Style to our Matter and Design. We are not more allowed to use a low Style when we are about great Things, nor an elevated Style when we talk of vulgar Matters, than we can dress a fullgrown Man in the  of a little Boy, or a little Boy in the  of a well-grown Man. We are likewise as much forbidden a figurative and vehement Style, when we design to instruct, as we are to cry out Fire, when we only see a scrap of Paper on Fire. On the contrary, we ought to look upon it as unpardonable indifference to express great Things in a cold and grovelling Style. This is what we may say in general about the Style, and to this may be reduced the principal Rules of Rhetoric, that concern the Expression.  
He is truly Eloquent, says a great Orator, who so order his Speech, as to prove, to please, and to affect us. We are obliged to prove whatever we advance. The Agreement of Discourse requires that it divert the Hearer; and to make an entire Conquest of him, we must bend him. This one thing contributes more than all the rest, to gain one's Cause. There are as many different Styles, as there are Duties imposed on an Orator; exact Expressions serve to prove, a middle Style to delight, and a vehement Style to move; and 'tis in this that all the force of a Discourse consists. 
* Cicero in Oratore, c. 21.  Erit cloquens is, qui— ita dicet, ut probet, ut delectet, ut flectat. Probare necessitatis est, delectare suavitatis, flectere victoriae; nam id unum ex omnibus ad obtinendas causas potest plurimúm. Sed quot officia Oratoris, tot sunt genera dicendi; subtle in probando, modicum in delectando, vehemens in flectendo; in quo uno vis omnis Oratoris est. He afterwards shows that the Judgement of an Orator appears chief in observing a Decorum in relation to the Matter. All his Discourse deserves to be read, but I could not set it down here.  
Above all things, he ought to be a perfect Master of the Language he makes use of; that is to say, he should know the proper and figurative Sense of every word, and all that concerns the Grammar of that Language; which is to be learned by reading and consulting the choicest Authors. This aught to be practised from our very Infancy, for fear lest if we tarry too long, we should have a Style formed, as it were, by hazard, before we are perfectly skilled in our Mother-Tongue, which happens very frequently. Then we have no time to study the Language; the indispensable Affairs of Life, and the Habit we have contracted of speaking ill, will not permit us to apply ourselves sufficiently to it, to correct ourselves of those Faults to which we have been accustomed for so many Years. If we say this truly of our Mother-Tongue, we shall find it much more when we have to do with Dead or Foreign Languages.  
So soon as we have Taste enough to distinguish a Discourse that is written Elegantly from one that is not, and to take pleasure in reading it, we are then fit to hear and comprehend the Lessons of the Rhetoricians. The first thing we ought to do, in order to arrive one day at solid Eloquence, is to accustom ourselves to write in proper and simple Terms, so as to commit, if possible, no Fault against the Propriety of Language, nor against the Prespicuity of Style. As the principal End of Speaking, is to be understood, the first thing we should endeavour to obtain, is a Habit of Speaking so well, that the Hearers may not only divine our Thoughts, but likewise that it may not be possible not to understand them, when we have no design to speak obscurely.  
This, one would think, should be easy, since the most simple and natural manner of Speaking aught to present itself first to the Mind: But we are encompassed from our Cradle by People that express themselves ill, and that have no relish for these sort of things so that we are forced to study for that, which Nature ought to have taught us. Among the Greeks they had Grammarians, to whom they sent their Children so soon as they were able to write and read, to teach them to speak their own Tongue truly, which they could not get at home with their Parents, nor by the common use of Life. Among the Romans they not only taught Greek but Latin likewise. We ought in like manner to have Grammarians now a-days maintained at the public Salary, to teach our Youth the Modern Languages and I wonder, for my part, that no Establishments of this Nature have been erected any where; for in short, there is no Nation which does not love to hear its Language spoken Politely; nay some Nations have taken extraordinary Pains to Polish theirs.  
They that donted know what it is to write in pure and proper Terms, and to express themselves with Perspicuity, imagine that there's nothing so easy as this, and that 'tis much more difficult to speak in a more elevated Manner. These People are of Opinion, that a stronger Genius is required to describe some tragical Accident in a pompous magnificent manner than to discourse of the ordinary things of Human Life, in a clear familiar way: But in this they are extremely mistaken. 'Tis much easier, for instance, to imitate the Hydropic Sublimity of Seneca or Lucan, than the unaffected simplicity of Terence, and some Epigrams of Martial. I dare affirm that those that are capable of writing like Terence, may reach Lucan's Grandeur, if they please: but I defy a Man who has always used himself to a swelling Style, ever to imitate Terence happily. To speak of a modern Language, I am persuaded that Brebeuf, who, as every one knows, has translated the Pharsalia in Verse as bloated, as those of the Original, would never have been able to compose two or three Pages of Moliere's Misanthrope; and that Moliere on the contrary, if he had thought it worth his while, could have soared as high as Brebeuf. We have several pieces of La Fontaine written in as good an Heroic Style as any by those that have always practised the elevated Style, but there is not one of these sublime Genius's that could ever come near his Fables.  
What I have here maintained may seem a Paradox to those that have not sufficiently reflected upon it: However, to convince these Gentlemen I would only desire them to try how they can imitate any Author that has written in a proper and simple Style, and is esteemed in his kind, and afterwards to imitate the sublime Style of any of our most elevated Writers. They will then be convinced by experience that the ancient Masters of this Art had reason to judge the first more difficult than the second, altho' the first does not seem to be so at first sight. 
† Cicero in Oratore. c. 23.  Orationis sublimitas imitabilis quidem illa videtur esse existimanti, sed nihil est experienti minùs. The exactness of Discourse seems easy to imitate when we content ourselves with judging without making a trial: But when we have tried it, we shall find it to be quite otherwise. Horace said the same thing, speaking of the natural Style of Conversation. I will make Verses composed of known Expressions, so that in reading them every one shall hope to do the like: But those that will endeavour to make the Experiment, will sweat and take a world of Pains to no purpose; so much force is there in Order and Connexion, and so much elegance in a Style that is taken from the common Language.  

Art. Poet. ver. 240.  Ex noto fictum carmen se quar, ut sibi quivis  
Speret idem, suder multùm, frustráque laboret  
Ausus idem, tantùm series juncturáque pollet!  
Tantùm de medio sumptis accedit honoris!  
This Talon, says another, is neglected by abundance of People, who look after nothing but the Acclamations of the Multitude, whom they have to applaud them, or else come accidentally to hear them, and who cannot endure that silence which Approbation produces. They fancy that they are not Eloquent, unless they deafen all that are about them with their Cries and Clamours. They believe that it only belongs to Conversation to describe what they are talking of in vulgar Terms, and that even ignorant People may do it; whereas no Body knows whether they don't do that which they despise as easy, either because they will not do it, or because they find it impossible and out of their reach. For there is nothing in the extent of Eloquence, which those who have tried all find so difficult to imitate, as that which every one thinks he should have said in the same manner, when he heard it: Because People don't believe that this Style is elegant, but that it is sincere. An Orator never speaks better, than when he appears to speak the Truth. 
† Quintil. Lib. IU. c. 2.  Neque enim aliud in eloquentia cuncta experti difficilius reperient, quâm id quod se dicturos fuisse omnes putant, postquàm audierunt; quia non bona judicant illa, sed vera. Tum autem optimè dicit Orator, cùm videtur vera dicere.  
If we may believe any one in his own Profession, when there is no Temptation to conceal the Truth, we cannot reasonably doubt of what the three great Masters in the Art of writing both in Verse and Prose have told us. This Style which they commend so warmly is composed only of pure and proper Expressions, of obvious easy Metaphors, and Figures that arise from the thing itself, which are never used but for necessity, and to illustrate their meaning. The principal Rock, which we ought to avoid in this simple and natural Language is Obscurity, and 'tis for that reason that we carefully shun every thing that may produce it, as equivocal Terms, too great plenty of Figures, and an ill Disposition of Words and Thoughts. This is the Style we should employ to instruct; this is the Language of Truth, which desires nothing more than to appear all naked to the Eyes of Men. Those who have no other Design but to make her appear, choose to express themselves in this manner, where every thing frequently is neglected, except Perspicuity, and where Negligence, according to the Judgement of Cicero, Is a Negligence which is not disagreeable, and which comes from a Man, who is more solicitous about Things than Words. 
† In Oratore c. 23.  Non ingrata negligentia, de re hominis, magis quàm de verbis, laborantis.  
Those that can talk and write after this manner, avoid two Faults, which in my Opinion, are unpardonable in those that value themselves upon declaiming. The first is Obscurity, the greatest fault that a Man can commit in speaking, since the end of speaking, as I suppose, is to be understood. This Fault principally reigns in the Style of Declaimers who speak nothing naturally, but muffle up all in figurative Expressions, for fear they should fall into a low frigid Style, who give us a clear and distinct Idea of nothing, so that 'tis difficult to know exactly what they mean. With this Fault we may justly charge the greatest part of the Greek and Latin Fathers, who are almost perpetually upon the Harangue, and who avoid clear and proper Expressions with as much care as the Athenian Orators sought after them. Thus every thing almost is disguised and swelled in their Writings, in so extraordinary a manner, that a Man has all the difficulty in the World to understand them, when they treat of a Subject which is somewhat obscure in itself. Sometimes they carry Matters so extravagantly high, that one cannot tell whether they talk seriously, or have a mind only to impose upon the Populace. This in truth was the Fault of the Times as well as of the Men; for the Eloquence of those Ages was extremely different from that of the ancient Orators, either Athenian or Roman, as a Woman that is loaded, and encumbered with superfluity of Habits is from one in a modest Garb. Thus we must excuse this Fault in them, but we ought to take care not to imitate them in it. The Reader may see this Subject treated more at large in 
† Vide Artem. Crit. P. 2. S. 1. cap. 15, & 16.  Authors that have composed the History of Rhetoric.  
Another Fault, which we find not in a simple and natural Style, is, that there is nothing in it to make those, that writ so, suspected of a sort of Affectation, which is exceedingly prejudicial to those that would persuade. I mean, the Affectation to appear eloquent, which a discerning Hearer is no sooner sensible of, but he suspects that the Orator whom he hears, or the Author whom he reads is more intent to display his own Eloquence than to teach him the Truth, and give him any useful Instructions from that very minute he believes that it may be possible for the Person that speaks to believe very little of what he says, that he only chose this Subject to get himself some Reputation by treating of it eloquently. Besides, when we are hearty affected by any thing, and nothing but Nature talks, we use in our Discourses no far-fetched Ornaments of Rhetoric, but only such as arise from the Subject, without our thinking on them. The same thing may be observed in Tragedy itself, when it is rightly composed.  
Et 
† Horat. de Art Poet. v. 95.  Tragicus plerumque dolet sermone pedestri.  
Telephus & Peleus, cùm pauper & exsul uterque  
Projicit ampullas & sesquipedalia verba,  
Si curate cor spectantis tetigisse querelâ.  
Even the Tragic Poets sometimes express Grief in common Language. Telephus and Peleus, when they lie under the Hardships of Poverty and Banishment, wholly throw aside affected Expressions and big rumbling Words, if they have a mind to interest the Spectator in their Complaints. The Reason of this is because we cannot be touched but by the natural representation of a Passion, and that all Affectation shocks us. I am persuaded that a simple plain Discourse, provided it be naturally delivered, moves those Auditors that have a true Taste, more feelingly than the tallest Metaphors and that even upon Paper it is much more affecting than one that is penned in a more sublime Style.  
However, I confess that there are certain occasions on which we are indispensably obliged to rise above the vulgar Style; as, for instance, when we are to praise or condemn any thing, when we would excite Admiration or Hatred; in short, when our Subject is of a more elevated Character than what happens daily. On such an occasion the Reader or Auditor is very well pleased that we should have recourse to Rhetorical Ornaments. As it is not so much our Business at such a time to instruct as to delight him, or to excite in him Passions more turbulent than Pity, he is satisfied with these Decorations nay, what is more, he expects them, so that it we disappoint him, we make him despise us, and no longer attend to what we say. He thinks it but requisite that he that speaks or writes to entertain him, should be well prepared beforehand, and tell him nothing but that which does not frequently fall into every Body's Head.  
When the Occasion is extraordinary, or when the Subject is naturally sublime, we expect a Style of the same Dignity, that transports, that ravishes, that governs and turns our Soul's abou● as it pleases. This is the sublime Style, concerning which Longinus has written a Treatise, which is in every Body's Hands, especially since it has been 
† By Mr. Boileau.  translated into French.  
I will not dwell any longer upon these two latter sorts of Styles, which are or aught to be properly the Style of Sermons if we except those places in them, where we only explain the Matter before us, without drawing any Consequences from it, or making any application to the Auditors. 'Tis sufficient to say, That those that aspire to this Eloquence cannot too often read over those Passages in the celebrated Masters of this Art where 'tis handled. An infinite number of People confound the sublime Style with Fustian, and think they ravish all the World with Admiration, when they lose themselves in the Clouds, and are laughed and ridiculed by all Men of a true Palat. The reason of this is, because they don't enough consider the Rules of this Art, and done't know that we ought to express s ourselves in magnificent Terms only about those things that are Sublime in their own Nature.  

Objections against what has been said.  SOME Objections, which at first sight seem to have something in them, may be railed against what I have asserted relating to Eloquence. As for instance, That several of the Ancients, whom I have accused of having committed very gross Faults against the Rules, and several of the Moderns, whom I have imitated, did pats in their own time, and still pass in ours for Models of Eloquence, in the Opinions of a vast number of People that understand Rhetoric, and are by no means to be called Men of an ill Relish. One may go yet farther, and urge, That we behold every Day Books received with great Applause, and that we hear with Admiration several Discourses wherein scarce any of the abovementioned Rules are observed. As Eloquence, will these Gentlemen pretend, is only for those whom we have to do with, so soon as we have found out the Mystery to please and to affect them in Speaking or Writing, we have Title enough to set up for Men of Eloquence.  
Indeed if the established Rules of Rhetoric, which are for the generality of them supported by the Authority of the most famous Rhetors, were arbitrary Laws, and founded rather upon the usage of some Language, which depends upon the Caprice of the Multitude, than upon Reason, which never changes I confess that one might confront them with Examples, and counterbalance the Authority, they have got, by the Reputation of those who have violated them: But as they are built upon everlasting Foundations, we can only conclude, that the Taste of those Gentlemen, who first admired those that neglected these Laws, was a depraved Taste, and that if there are any Men of Wit, who continue still to praise the vicious Rhetoric of the past Ages, they only follow the Custom in it, without consulting their Reason, and repeat without examination, what had been told them from their Infancy. We cannot make the Fathers, and Philosophers, who lived after Jesus Christ, pass for just Reasoners, nor for methodical Authors but as they were the most ingenious Men of their times, nay, and sometimes formidable by their Authority, and by their Cabals, they were excessively praised in their own and the succeeding Ages, which yet were darker and more ignorant than their own. These Praises have been handed down like a Tradition to us, and we are only the Echoes, if I may so express myself, of the most barbarous and gross Centuries, without being at the pains to examine, whether what we say after them be true or not. We daily commend, merely out of custom, several Works, which we should have been ashamed to have written ourselves, and which, in truth, we could not write in this Age, without drawing the contempt of all the World upon us.  
That which still keeps up this Language, which at the bottom is not sincere, is that every Man citys the Fathers in Theological Controversies, and desires to have them of his own side; yet this could not be done with any Advantage, if People were generally persuaded that they were bad Orators, and yet worse Logicians. Thus we set as high a value on them as we are able, without being satisfied of their Merit, to make use of their Authority in Time and Place against those who have declared against those Opinions, which we suppose to have been favoured by the Fathers. Were it not for Custom and these Politic Reasons, we should make no scruple to treat them as a parcel of Men that stand in need of their Antiquity to make us bear with them.  
I confess s that even now a-days a Man may be admired by the People, and pass for an eloquent Writer in his own Imagination, who violates every moment the Rules of good Rhetoric and of right Reason: But does it therefore follow, that there is no such thing as true Rhetoric and Reason? If this were allowed, we might say, That the Rhetoric and Reason of the Europeans, are good in Europe, but are worth nothing in Asia and Afric, where the People neither talk, nor reason after the same manner. We ought to commend in Asia and Afric the ridiculous and fantastical Thoughts of the People that inhabit those two mighty Parts of the Earth, because they find an infinite number of Admirers there. Now if we would not fall into these Absurdities, we must own that we ought not to accommodate ourselves to the Taste of the People, any farther than good Sense will warrant us and that those who are so desirous to be applauded by them without this, abuse their Ignorance, which they should endeavour to undeceive, whereas they labour to increase it by their vicious manner of Discoursing. Thus true Judges will not be wanting to oppose themselves to the Taste of the Multitude; and tho' they don't make so great a noise as the latter, they are the true Distributers of a solid and lasting Reputation.  
We may upon this Head add, what Quintilian has observed of the Orators of his own Time, viz. That we are obliged to accommodate ourselves to the Humour of the People, who have no great regard for this extraordinary justness of Thought, of Order and Expression. We are forced, said they, to compose our Discourses according to the relish of others, and we must often speak before People who are wholly ignorant, and have no knowledge of other Sciences. If we don't gain them over to our Party by delighting them, if we don't persuade them by the vehemence of our Discourse, or sometimes by moving their Passions, we cannot obtain even those things that are just and reasonable. 
† Lib. IU. c. 14.  Nobis ad aliorum judicia componenda est oratio, & saepius apud omnino imperitos atque aliarum certe ignaros literarum loquendum est; quos nisi & delectatione allicimus, & viribus trahimus & nonnunquam turbamus affectibus, ipsa quae justa ac vera sunt, tenere non possumus.  
But after all good Reasonings proposed in a clear and elegant manner, and thrown into a good order, are likelier to take with the People, than Fustian and Bombast, which they think they understand, while at the bottom they know nothing of it. Besides, the Rules that are given us done't in the least hinder us from embellishing our Discourse with  may please the Auditor, provided that these Embellishments don't spoil the Perspicuity. Nullum ornatum, says Quintilian in the same place, qui modo non obscuret, subtrahendum puto. We ought not to retrench any Ornaments, unless they make the Sense obscure. We may likewise move the Passions of the Auditor; but this ought not to be done till we have enlightened his Understanding that he may know why he is moved, and be convinced by his Judgement that he has reason to be so. But the public Orators have often incensed the People against those that did not please them, without informing them by any clear Reason why they deserved their Indignation. They think it enough to charge them with a thousand odious things, but don't give themselves the trouble to prove them; but speaking them in a vehement, pathetic manner, and appearing to be persuaded themselves of the Truth they say, they easily gain the People to their side, without any solid Reason. We cannot pretend that this Conduct aught to be imitated, without openly declaring oneself an Enemy to good Sense and Equity.  

Of the Pronunciation.  iv I SHOULD now, according to the method I proposed to myself, speak of Pronunciation, but I cannot do better than to send my Reader to a little Book about the Action of an Orator, composed by Michael le Faucheur: 'Tis a Masterpiece in its kind, to which nothing can be added. I will only mention two things which at the bottom comprehend all: The first is, That we ought to recite naturally, I mean to modulate the Tone of our Voice, so as the Nature of the Things, we treat about, requires, to explain or relate any thing in the same Pitch of Voice as we are used to observe when we relate or explain any thing, and wherein we show a great concern before grave Persons, and to express the Passions, that may reign in the Discourse, as we commonly do when we don't think of haranguing, but only follow the movement of the Passion by which we are animated. It ought to be with the Gesture exactly as with the Voice. The second thing we ought to remark, is, That when they tell us we ought to follow Nature, they mean Nature polished by a Gentlemanlike Education, and by conversing with Persons of good Breeding: Otherwise, if those that have been meanly educated, and have contracted vicious Habits, which by length of time become natural to them, should be so ill advised as to recite in Public, before they have reform their ill manner, they would certainly be laughed at by all the World. There are some Persons, whose Behaviour is naturally so cold and unconcerned, that if they did not show a little more Heat and Life when they appeared in Public, they would most infallibly set the whole Company a sleeping. Others on the contrary, are of so fiery a Temper, that they cry out from the beginning to the end, without having the least regard to the difference of the matter of which they talk. We ought therefore to follow Nature, but Nature polished by Education and Care, if we have a mind to speak in Public.  
We have often seen a Discourse, that has been neither faulty in the Matter, the Disposition, nor the Expression, to displease merely for the ill Pronunciation of him that delivered it, but especially because his Pronunciation had something forced and affected, which did not show the Man to be in earnest. 'Tis one of the most common Faults, with our Preachers, to deliver themselves in such a Tone of Voice as was never heard out of a Pulpit, and to have such Gestures with them as express no Passion, and are not where seen but there. One would swear, that so soon as they begin to talk and to toss their Arms, they were not the same Men, and that they talk to a sort of People whose Manners are clearly different: They complain, they are angry, they admire, in a word, they express all the Passions which they have a mind to represent, after another way than the rest of the World are acquainted with. If a Man should behave himself so ridiculously at the Bar, there is no question but that he would set the Judges a laughing; and in a serious Conversation, where things of great Consequence are to be treated off, the Tone of the Pulpit would be much more insufferable. A Man would be to entrench upon a Merry Andrew's Province, should he fling about his Arms, and show a thousand Gestures that are only good to drive away the Flies. I have been told that a famous Advocate discoursing on a day with a very awkward Orator, of this Character, as the Orator asked him how he liked his manner of reciting, and whether he thought it would not succeed at the Bar: The Advocate bluntly told him, That the very first thing, those young Gentlemen that designed to appear at the Bar, aught to do, was to forget all his Lessons, and return to that natural manner which he had endeavoured to efface instead of polishing.  
I have frequently heard an Orator, who was scarce Master of any one of the other Talents we choir in a Man of his Profession, but who recited in so natural and so lively a manner, that he charmed his Auditors by this single Qualification, accompanied with a strong articulate Voice; I never heard him, but he put me in mind of a certain Story of 
† Cicero in Orat. C. 17.  Demosthenes, who being asked what was the chief part of Rhetoric, answered, Pronunciation; being next asked, what was the second best, he still answered, Pronunciation; and so on, till they dropped the Question. His meaning was, that this Talon was of the last Consequence in Athens, where Affairs of the greatest importance, in relation to the State and to private Men, were often determined in a bare Pleading, without the drawing of any Writings. 'Tis likewise extremely serviceable in our Pulpits; but 'tis only for the Reputation of the Preacher, and not for the public Advantage, when it is not joined with the other parts of good Rhetoric. At such times the People go from the Sermon, full of Admiration for the Parson, altho' they scarce understand a Word he told them, and are not in the least convinced, by Reason, of any one thing he would have persuaded to do. On the contrary, they ought to go out of Church full of Admiration for the Gospel, full of a true Sense of their own Faults, and full of a vigorous Resolution to correct them, without thinking upon the Orator: They ought to be able to repeat whatever they have learned, and to carry home with them an exact Idea of their Duties, without minding the Person from whom they learned them. A good Judge takes no notice at all of an Advocate's Action, but of his Reasonings, when he is to pass a definitive Sentence but especially if it be a matter of any importance.  
We cannot blame those that take a due care of their Pronunciation: On the contrary, we should have just Reason to complain of them, if they did not do it; but then 'tis necessary they should join the other parts of Rhetoric with it, and cultivate them with so much the more care, as they are of more importance. An Orator ought to be ashamed to deceive the People, who only consider the outside, because they have been used to be paid in that Money: It should make him blush to think that he sends home his Auditors well satisfied, that he recites well, but little instructed in the Matter he treated of; like those Orators, of whom Quintilian has observed very judiciously, That they soften their Voice, and turn themselves in different manners; that they hang down the Head, and toss their Arms about; that they affect a great abundance of Things, and artificial Words; and that at last (what seems to be monstrous) People commend the Action, but don't understand a Jot of the Cause they have pleaded. 
† Lib. 4. c. 2.  Vocem flectunt et cervicem reponunt, et brachium in latus jactant, totoque et rerum et verborum et compositionis genere lasciviunt; deinde (id quod sit monstro simile) placet actio, causa non intelligitur.  
Those that have any tenderness of Conscience ought to employ this Talon of reciting agreeably; and by that means of rendering the Auditors attentive, only to instruct them better, and make them relish the great Truths of the Gospel. To effect this, they should vigorously apply themselves to perform their other Duties that are requisite in a public Orator, and to speak to the Congregation that listens to them; not as if they hoped the manner of their Recital would make every thing pass, but as if they spoke before severe Judges, who would not pardon them one false Thought, who would require from them an exact Order, and a Style suited to the Matter they talk of; and as if when they come out of the Pulpit, they were to leave the written Sermon in their Hands, to be examined by them at leisure. Without this, what can one say of the Eloquence of the Pulpit, which he cannot at the same time apply to that of the Stage, which we go to hear not for Instruction, but only for our Diversion? What can we think of the Office of a public Orator, but what we think of the vilest and worst employed of all Trades, the Followers of which endeavour to get what we promised them, without troubling themselves whether their Work be good or no? Our Orators ought to fear these Reproaches with so much the more reason, as they retail to the People things of the highest importance; nay, and call their Discourses the Word of God, upon pretence that the first Preachers of the Gospel, whom God had honoured with the Gift of Miracles, and of extraordinary Revelations, gave this Name to what they preached to the People. 'Tis now a-days a sort of Sacrilege to speak in this manner of a negligent Discourse, where we can neither see good Sense, nor Method, nor Language suitable to the Occasion, but which is delivered with a great deal of Boldness and Presumption, as if it comprehended in effect nothing but heavenly Oracles.  
Since God does not make himself known to Men, but by Reason and Revelation, we ought to call nothing his Word, but what is clearly founded either upon one, or the other, and not a dull trifling Discourse, where we find no traces of any light either natural, or supernatural. If we ought to endeavour to have an agreeable outside, it is not because from that moment we are in possession of Saying all, and shamming every thing upon a blind ignorant Congregation, by means of their Voice and Gesture that please them; but only to accommodate ourselves to their Weakness, and be in a condition to make them listen to that which is really the Word of God. Formerly the Miracles, which the Apostles performed, and the great Sanctity of their Lives rendered their Auditors attentive to what they uttered, tho' it was destitute of the Ornaments of Humane Eloquence. But , when Miracles are no longer wrought, and that the Holiness of the Lives of these public Orators is not so very extraordinary, 'tis but reasonable, that, in order to attract our Attention, they should employ, not the secular Arm, as is the practice of some Countries, but all that may serve to enlighten and touch reasonable Men, and sometimes even those that are a little too delicate.  
I am afraid I have said too much upon this sort of Eloquence; but must we always dissemble, either out of fearfulness or interest, those Truths that would be of infinite Use, if one Day we should listen to them? If all those that might profit themselves by it, neglect to do it, perhaps some one may do it, and be followed by some others. Quintilian after having spoken scurvily enough of the Orators of his time, concludes, That it is better to omit these sorts of things, for fear of offending more People by reproving what is bad, than we oblige them by giving them good Advice. 
† Lib. IU. c. 2.  Haec omittamus, ne minùs gratiae, praecipiendo recta; quam offensae, reprehendendo prava, mereamur. But when should we speak Truth, tho' the most important in the World, if we were to stay till it would make us Friends among the generality of Mankind? Perhaps never.   

CHAP. III. Of History and the Defference between the Modern and Ancient Historians.  
NOTHING is so entertaining and instructive as History, when it is well written; and on the contrary, nothing more infamous and hurtful, when it is not written as it ought to be: that is to say, when it delivers Lies instead of Truth, nay even when it dissembles it. The former supplies us with what we want in Experience, which is always shut up in narrow bounds, by faithfully relating all that happened before us, by which we may reap as great Benefit, as if we had actually seen them. On the other hand, the latter instructs us in nothing, because it reports things otherwise than they fell out, and indeed than they commonly do fall out. The first represents a Man, such as he is, with his good and bad Qualities, with his laudable Actions, and those that deserve Censure: The second describes him such as the Historian wishes him to have been, whether bad or good, or rather it substitutes a Phantom in his place. As a true and sincere History proposes the Advantage of the Reader by discovering Truth to him: So that which is false and disguised has no other end but the Profit of the Historian, who hopes to get something by lying or by dissembling what he knows.  
Four things, in my Opinion, are requisite to make a good Historian, and without them we cannot expect any thing considerable from him. 

The first is, To be well Instructed in what he attempts to Relate:  
The second, To be capable of Saying without any Disguise what he believes to be true:  
The third, To know how to Relate what he knows: And lastly,  
the fourth, To be able to form a true Judgement of the Events he reports, and of the Men who contributed to bring them about.   It will not be amiss to make some Reflections upon these four things; a general Knowledge of which may enable us to judge whether a History be good, or bad.  

Of the Matter of History.  I. A MAN may be instructed two several ways in what he relates when he writes the History of his own time, that is to say, either by himself or others. He is instructed by himself in what he saw and what he managed, the consequence of which he observed himself: But it must be confessed that this does not go very far, since that absolutely speaking, he could do but very few things by himself, and could be present but in one place at a time. That which others do, they relate to us, just as they themselves think sit, especially if there were but few Witnesses of their Actions, or if these Witnesses are dead, or dare not contradict them. They either take care not to speak of the Faults they committed, or else they strangely disguise them. If any Disadvantageous Accident befalls them, they attribute it either to the Malice of others, or to ill Fortune, but never to their own Indiscretion. He that questions this, needs only cast his Eyes upon the Memoirs, which abundance of illustrious Persons have composed of their own Life, and there he will  find enough to justify my Assertion. These are not Historians, who speak of themselves without Passion: They are rather Advocates that plead their own Cause, or that make their own Apology before Posterity, as well as before those who lived in their own time. What has been said of these Memoirs, the same, and perhaps much worse we may say of the Reports that have been made to Princes and Generals concerning Matters that were transacted in those places where they were not. This occasioned Asinius Pollio to say, That the Memoirs of Caesar (for so we ought to call his Commentaries in English) were written with little Care, and with too little regard to the Truth; because he too easily believed the greatest part of what was related to him about the Actions of other Men, and has unfaithfully reported what he himself did, either out of Design, or through defect of Memory. 
† Sueton. in Jul. Caesare. c. 56.  Pollio Asinius parùm diligentèr, parúmque integrâ veritate compositos (Caesaris Commentarios) putat; cùm pleraque, quae per alios erant gesta temerè crediderit, & quae per se, vel consulto, vel etiam memoriâ lapsus perperam ediderit. It is not to be doubted but that those that afterwards writ Memoirs in imitation of him, have been guilty of the same Practice. Cicero in one of his 
† Ad Fam. Lib. V Epist. 12.  Letters, wherein he testifies an extraordinary desire to see the History of his Consulship written by Lucceius, says merrily, that if this Historian refused him this favour, he would write it himself, after the Example of several Persons before him. But as you know well enough, continues he, there are Inconveniences in this manner of Writing: Because a Man is obliged to speak of himself with too much reservedness, when he comes to recount any thing that deserves Commendation, and to omit whatever is to be found fault with: Sed quod te non fugit, haec sunt in hoc genere vitia; & ut verecundiùs de se ipsi scribant necesse est, siquid est laudandum, et praetereant suquid fortè reprehendendum est.  
The Case being thus, we must not expect to learn the whole truth exactly either from Princes, or their Ministers, or their Generals, even tho' we might ask them any Questions we desired to be informed in, and they were inclined fairly to answer them, which however but very rarely happens. What course then shall an Historian take to inform himself of the Truth? For my part I see no other way for him, than to inquire of all the People he can, to listen to what is said of all sides, and what Enemies report one of another, to heap together all that is published in several Languages of both the Parties, and especially the public Acts: And lastly, To compare all these different Reports with abundance of care. By this means he comes to be convinced, that there are certain incontestable matters of Fact in which all the World are a greed; but that there are several Circumstances of which a Man cannot be certain, by reason of all the great variety of Reports. An Historian ought to pass over these doubtful Matters in general terms, for fear of deceiving his Reader by a Relation, which he cannot warrant.  
In order to collect his Materials well, 'tis requisite that he should be skilled in several Languages, that he should know the form of Government of those places, whose History he writes, as also their Interests; that he be acquainted with the Genius of the People and their Forces; that he be not ignorant of the Situation of Places; and, above all this, that he be laborious, attentive, and diligent, have a good Discernment, a solid Judgement, and a sincere Mind. If one of these Qualifications be wanting, 'tis enough to make an Author uncapable of succeeding. For Instance, we have seen some Years ago several Histories published in France, wherein are related abundance of matters of Fact, and other things relating to England and Holland. A Man will at first sight observe that many of these Authors were not in a Capacity to consult the Writings and Relations that were daily published in these two places, and that they were entirely ignorant of their manner of Government and their Forces, as well as of the Genius of their People, He will likewise find that the Difference of Opinions, concerning the Principles of Religion and Politics, has made them take things quite otherwise than they were. I done't at all question but that on the other side great Faults have been committed, in relation to France, especially by those, who do not understand French, or never were in France, or suffered themselves to be too much influenced by a Spirit of Partiality. It must however be said, that the Government of France, and all that belongs to it, is more easy to be understood by Strangers, than the Affairs of Strangers by French Men.  
Sometimes though we are furnished with all the necessary Assistances to know the truth of a Fact, Negligence makes us commit abominable Mistakes. Thus Vittorio Siri, in his 
† Tom. ●. p. 665.  Memory Recondite, speaks of the Night, in which Lewis the XIV. was born. Quattro hore speses il Re in quel colloquio, si che l'hora trovatasi troppo tarda per ritornare quella notte nevosissima (correndo il mese di Decembre à Grobois, convenne per forzosa necessità dormire) à Parige; & rimasto il letto del Re à Grobois, la Regina colla cena li fece part del suo; notte fortunatissima per la Francia, perch per un intrecciamento di circostance si stupende, s'infantò il Dolfino, etc. Not to take notice of the nonsensical Bombast in these words, which might suffer a little perhaps too through the Fault of the Printer; Siri might easily have known that Lewis the XIV. was not born in December but September, and not at Paris, but at St.  en Say. So gross a Mistake as this must needs be the effect of an inexcusable Negligence. Some have been of Opinion, that the Example alleged out of Siri, is not well chosen, but see what the Author has said about it, in the Nouvelles de la Republiquae des Lettres of this present Year, in September.  
Perhaps it will be told me, that I require so many things in an Historian to judge him only capable of informing himself as to matters of Fact for which he has occasion, that there are but very few, who, in my Opinion, aught to be suffered to write History. I own it, and further add, that I look upon it to be the most difficult Task in the World, if a Man would acquit himself in it as he ought. But then the Advantages, that those who are now living, and those that come after us, may reap from a good History, are so great, we ought not to expect it from an ordinary Man.  
It will still be objected perhaps, that suppose an able Man, such as I have described, had done all that lay in his power to inform himself of the Truth, he would still be at a loss to find out the Springs and Motives of several very considerable Actions, because the Persons concerned in them are obliged in Interest to keep 'em concealed, and that without this Knowledge, a History will resemble a Body without a Soul, all whose Movements appear to be forced. To this I answer, That by divers indisputable Matters of Fact, and by the General Knowledge we have of the Interests and Designs of the several Powers that are mentioned there, we may clearly enough know the General Motives that set them in Action, and which are undoubtedly the most important and, as it were, the principal Wheels, which move the whole Machine, whose Motion is there described: As for the others, which we cannot penetrate into, we must either let them alone, and else relate them in a doubting manner. An Historian is not obliged to recount every thing, and to advance nothing but what he is positively certain of: He is only obliged not to relate any thing that is false for true, and not warrant any thing that is incertain.  
What I have said, concerns the History of the present Age, or what happens during the Life of the Historian. When we undertake an History, in which we cannot instruct ourselves from the Mouths of ocular Witnesses who are all dead, either lately, or a long while ago; all we can do, is to consult the Writings that are remaining, whether they be Public or Private; and for this end we must take the same care, and have the same Knowledge and Qualifications, which I have already mentioned, in respect of Witnesses and Modern Writings. Above all, we ought to bring with us a great stock of Discernment for this sort of Reading, that we may not be surprised by Relations stuffed with lies, or too passionately written.  
The ancient Greek and Latin Historians, that have attempted to write the History of the remotest Times, or at least of the Ages which immediately preceded theirs, have, often observed this Maxim very religiously, altho' I cannot deny that several of them have neglected it. When they speak of the fabulous Times, they give us the History of them for no more than they are worth, that is to say, for a Narration, where among some true Matters of Fact, there are an infinite number of Lies. When they come down to the History of those Ages, of which they had certain Monuments extant, they took a great deal of Pains to distinguish between the true and the false. Of this we find some remarkable Examples, in the Roman History of Dionysius Halicarnasseus, and even in that of Livy, tho' it is not so judicious nor exact. Polybius has given us undoubted Marks of an exquisite Judgement in his History; a fair Instance of which we may find in the 
† Lib. I. p. 18.  Judgement he makes of two Historians, one of which favoured the Romans, and the other the Carthaginians: I was so much the more induced to attempt the History of this War, because those who are commonly supposed to have written it the best, have not so carefully followed the Truth, as they ought to have done. I don't believe indeed that they published Lies with a design, when I consider their Life and the Party they followed: But in my Opinion, the same thing befell them which happens to Men who are blinded by Love. It appears to Philinus, by reason of his Prepossession for his own Side, that the Carthaginians did every thing bravely, and the Romans quite otherwise. Fabius is of a different Opinion. He afterwards most admirably describes that disinteressed Impartiality, in which an Historian ought always to continue, and I will cite some of his words a little lower. But I must here set down an Instance he gives us of the Passion of these two Historians, and after what manner we ought to judge of passionate Relations. Philinus, says he, in the beginning of his Narration and of his second Book tells us, that while the Carthaginians and Syracusians besieged Messina, the Romans got into the Town by Sea, and sallying out immediately against the Syracusians, they were obliged to turn back to the Town with a considerable Loss: That afterwards making another Sally upon the Carthaginians, they were not only sound beaten, but a great number of their Soldiers were made Prisoners. After having related this, he says, that Hiero King of Syracuse, after this Battle became so extravagant that he not only set Fire on his Camp that Instant, and retired in the Night to Syracuse, but abandoned all the strong Places he possessed upon the Frontier of those of Messina: That the Carthaginians, after the same Battle, abandoned likewise their Camp, and dispersed themselves in the Towns, daring to defend nothing of that which had not been fortified: That for this reason, their Leaders perceiving the fear of their Soldiers, resolved not to hazard a Battle: That the Romans who followed them, not only plundered the Country, but also attempted to Besiege Syracuse, and take it by Force. This Narration, adds Polybius, appears to me so full of Absurdities, that I don't think it necessary to bestow a longer Examination upon it; for those whom he had represented as Besieging Messina, and Conquerors of the Romans, he describes afterwards flying, abandoning all Places that were not fortified, and at last besieged, and full of fears. On the contrary, those whom he had described as vanquished and besieged, he represents them pursuing their Enemies, Masters of the Field, and at last Besieging Syracuse. 'Tis impossible to reconcile these Matters of Fact; for it follows of necessity, that either what he said at first is false, or that the following Narration is false: But this Narration in effect is true, for the Carthaginians and Syracusians abandoned the Field, and the Romans immediately besieged Syracuse, etc. We must therefore confess, that what he had said in the beginning was false, and that altho' the Romans came off Conquerors in the Battles they fought about Messina, he had represented them as beaten. We shall find that Philinus does the same in all his Work, and that Fabius comes not short of him. By this 'tis evident, that we may discover the falsity of several Matters of Fact, by examining what follows in the History.  
It would be an easy matter to apply this to the different Relations we have had published of the War, which was lately concluded between France, England, and Holland. One side describes France to us always Victorious, acting prudently on all Occasions, abounding in every thing, in a Condition to continue the War several Years longer: And on the contrary, its Enemies almost always beaten, losing their Towns one after another for want of Provisions, exhausted and ready to beg a Peace at the Feet of the Conquerors. It would follow naturally from hence, that the great Superiority of the Conqueror would put him in a Condition to give such a Peace as he pleased. Nevertheless we have seen the contrary, since he has restored all that he has taken, and more than that; after he had pressed in an extraordinary manner to have a Peace. On the other side, they have represented France as drained and dispeopled to all Eternity, by the gross Solecisms of its Politics, and by its excessive Expenses; whereas its Enemies were still formidable, and in very flourishing Circumstances. If this had been entirely true, the Peace ought to have been more Advantageous for them, as well as their Success in the War. To say the truth, both Parties ought to abate very much of their Rodomantades and Calumnies. Some People perhaps will think that I have expressed myself too freely about an Affair so recent; but when I was speaking of the Laws of History, was it possible for me to speak otherwise? A Man must have a very mean Opinion of the People that were interessed in the last War, to think they are uncapable of hearing the least truth upon that occasion. For my part, I don't believe them to be so unreasonable.  
'Tis a common Question, whether those who writ ancient History, or at least a History of which there are no living Witnesses, aught to cite the Authors, whom they make use of, in every Page, or every Article. Upon this there are different Opinions; some believe that it is not at all necessary to make use of such Citations, and that the Reader ought to rely upon the Choice and Sincerity of the Historian, without ask him from whence he took the Matters of Fact, he recounts. They ground themselves upon the Practice of the ancient Greek and Latin Historians, who very rarely quote the Authors they make use of; as for instance, when there is some difference of Opinion between them. Since therefore we trust the Relations of these Historians, they maintain that we ought to show the same Complaisance to the Moderns. If an Historian finds it for his purpose, he may publish, say they, a List of the Historians, whom he has consulted, either at the beginning or end of his History, that we may see from whom he has borrowed his Materials; but he is not obliged to cite them for every Fact in particular.  
Others maintain, that an Historian ought to cite his Authors all along, and pretend that the Ancients were in the wrong not to do it; and that we ought not so entirely to depend upon them for that very reason. Indeed, if the thing be ill in itself, the Example of the Ancients does not make it a jot the better, and nothing aught to hinder us from doing better than they. The Republic of Letters is at last become a Country of Reason and Light, and not of Authority and implicit Faith, as it has been but too long. Multitudes pass no longer there for Arguments, and all Cabals are silenced. There is no Divine or Humane Law which prohibits us to bring the Art of writing History to Perfection, as we have endeavoured to bring to Perfection the other Arts and Sciences. As a Philosopher is not to be excused now a-days if he speaks obscurely, or supposes incertain things for certain, after the Example of Aristotle and other ancient Philosophers, who have committed the same Faults: So the Example of Herodotus or Livy is no manner of Protection to those that imitate their Defects and Vices. If we commend them, it must always be remembered that these Commendations are paid to what is good in them, as the Purity and Elegance of their Style but by no means to their Faults and Imperfections. Besides, we ought to consider that we esteem them in part, because we have no other Monuments left but theirs; and that we don't believe them but when we have no just Reason to contradict them, or for the sake of the Probability of their Narrations, or because we have no Testimony more ancient and more exact than theirs, to correct them. We believe in short the Gross of the History, but we remain in suspense as to the Circumstances.  
The Case being thus, if there are great inconveniences in making no Citations, neither the Example of the Ancients nor their Imitators, is enough to cover from Censure such as have omitted to do it. We therefore maintain, that if a Man avoids to quote his Vouchers, the reason of it is, because he would not have any one to examine the History, as he relates it, by comparing the Narration with that of other Historians who writ before him. For what way is there to examine what any Author says, in case he citys no one in particular, unless we had every Book that he consulted, and had carefully read them, and preserved them in our Memory? Not one Man in a thousand is capable of it, and not one Man in a thousand has all the Books which he ought to have for this purpose. But besides this, we have always a just Pretence to think that we are imposed upon; for it may so happen; that the Author whom we read, has followed some Historian, whom those who have an interest to examine the History, have not by them, or else have not read him, or lastly, have forgotten him. But tho' we dare not immediately charge that Historian with Falsehood, who has not made his Citations, so neither dare we rely upon him. As by following this Method, 'tis easy for a Man to shame a Romance upon the World without fear of discovery, and to give his History whatever Turn he pleases, the suspicious Reader does not know where to take his Word, and immediately throws aside a Book, on which he cannot safety depend.  
It has been affirmed, that a Modern Historian who has composed a very large History concerning the Troubles of Religion, took this course, that he might with more safety invent what might make for his side, and satisfy the Facts that displeased him. For my part, I never examined him, and therefore can say nothing to this Business; but I must confess that the Method he has followed, makes him suspected of all that has been laid to his Charge, and that he has no other way to justify himself, but by fairly producing his Witnesses; otherwise he will never answer the Objections and Complaints that have been made against his Books, and which without question have come to his Ears before now.  
Besides this, they maintain that the Precaution which some Writers have taken to place the Authors whom they followed, at the Head of their History, is altogether insignificant, unless they had cited the particular Places, because that it is liable to almost all the Inconveniences which we complained of in those who done't cite at all. In effect 'tis a very difficult matter to know what Historian a Man may have followed, in every Fact, even tho' he had them all: But they carry the Matter farther, and say, That oftentimes this pompous Catalogue of Authors is, only made for Ostentation, and that the Compiler of it perhaps never saw the Covers of half the Books he puts in his Musterroll. 'Tis certain that nothing is so easy as to compose a great List of Historians whom we never beheld, and to place them boldly at the Head of a History; but supposing it composed with never so much sincerity, yet still it depends upon the Reader, whether he will believe it or no. There is only one thing I know of, which can pardon this in an Historian, and that is our being assured of his Veracity. For this reason it is that we don't think the worse of Thuanus, for having used this Conduct. Those evident Marks of Sincerity and Moderation which he shows all along, have made us forgive him this Fault, altho' we don't forgive it in such People as Varillas, whose Passion and Romancing Genius are conspicuous in every Line of his Works.  

Of Truth.  II. THE second thing we require of an Historian, is that after he has taken all poffible care to instruct himself in the Truth, to have the Courage to declare it without being biased. Who is it but must know that the principal Law of History, is that it dare to utter nothing which is false, and that it dare to speak all the truth, that it may not give the least Umbrage, that it is influenced either by Affection or Prejudice? These, in short, are its Foundations that are known by all the World. 
† Cicero Lib. II. de Oratore c. 15.  Quis nescit primam esse Historiae legem, nequid falsi dicere audeat; deinde nequid veri non audeat; ne qua suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo, nequa simultatis? Haec scilicet fundamenta nota suns omnibus.  
But in order to observe this Law, which is without dispute essential to History, a Man before he sets himself down to Write, ought entirely to disengage himself from all sorts of Passions and Prepossessions, without which he will certainly suppress or disguise the Truth, nay and publish a thousand Lies either on purpose, or else for want of taking due heed. 'Tis impossible to say any thing upon this Article more vehement, or more solid, or more necessary than what Lucian has said in that Treatise, where he teaches us in what manner a History ought to be written. I will here set down some of his words, and will follow d' Ablancourt's Translation, altho' it only expresses the Author's Meaning, and has retrenched a great deal from the Original. Above all, says he, we ought not to be devoted to any Party; for we must not do like that Painter who painted a Monarch de profil, because he had only one Eye: We ought to represent him entire. Let not his Respect for his Country hinder him from relating the Losses she has sustained, or the Faults she has committed; for an Historian, no more than a Player, is to be blamed for the Misfortunes he represents. If it were in our power to repair Disorders by disguising them, or passing them over in silence, Thucydides had not been wanting to have razed with a stroke of his Pen the Fortifications of the Enemy, and to have re-establshed the Affairs of his Country; but even the Gods themselves are not able to change whatever is past. Therefore 'tis the Duty of an Historian to recount all Transactions, just as they happened, which 'tis impossible for him to do, when he is a Dependant upon any Prince or Republic, from whom he has any thing to hope or fear.  he is obliged to speak of 'em, he ought to have a greater regard for Truth, than for his Interest, or Passion. For she is the only Divinity to whom he ought to Sacrifice, without thinking of the rest. In short he ought always to have before his Eyes the judgement of Posterity, if he would not rather wear the Character of a Flatterer than that of an Historian.— I would have my Historian zealous to speak the Truth, and that he lie under no Temptations to conceal it; let him make no Allowances to Fear or Hope, to Friendship or Hatred; let him not be of any Country or Party, and let him call every thing by its true Name, without remembering either to offend or please. And this, continueth he, is the Method which Thucydides followed, altho' he saw Herodotus was in so great Esteem, that his Books had the Names of the Muses bestowed upon them. It is infinitely better for me, said he, to write something that will last for ever, than only endeavour to please for the present. I ought not to take in fabulous Stories, but to transmit to Posterity the Truth, as it happened.— See now what ought to be the Sentiments of a true Historian.  
These are such evident Truths that 'tis impossible to reject them, however it may be convenient to enlarge upon them a little more, to show the great Importance of them, in a more sensible manner. I say then that an Historian ought at first setting out to forget that he has any Friends, Relations, or any Country; that he may be able to speak of them with the same disinteressed Freedom as if he had no manner of Engagements to them. The Duties of a Friend, of a Relation, or of a Citizen are one thing, and the Duty of an Historian another. The former are confined to certain Persons and Places, whose advantage we endeavour to procure, but the latter concerns all Mankind in general, that are able to read History, in whatever place or time they are born. As 'tis but convenient that the Interests of our Friends and Relations should give way to those of our Country, because 'tis much better to procure the Advantage of a great number of Persons, or of a whole Society, than that of some few of its Members, so in the same manner the present Interest of one's Country ought to be less considered, than that which is infinitely more extensive, the Interest of all Mankind. 
† Lib. I. p. 18. Edit. Amstel.  Polybius speaking of some Historians who had been too favourable to their Country, says admirably well, That in other Duties of Life this Disposition was not to be blamed. For 'tis just that a good Man should be a Friend to his Friend, and to his Country, and bear a Hatred to their Enemies, and a Friend to their Friends. But so soon as he takes the Character of an Historian upon him, that very moment he ought to forget all this. An Historian is frequently obliged to speak well of his Enemies, and to give them-great Commendations, when their Actions deserve it. He must often censure his nearest Relations, and cover them with Infamy, when they have committed such Faults that he cannot speak otherwise of them. As a Creature which has lost its Eyes becomes unserviceable; in the same manner, if you take away Truth from History, what remains is good for nothing. For this Consideration he should not make any difficulty to condemn his Friends, and blame his Enemies. He must not be afraid to censure the same Persons upon whom he has bestowed Commendations, since those that are in the Government cannot always succeed, nor on the other hand, commit Faults perpetually. Without having any regard to the Persons, he ought to relate things by themselves, and to speak of them in his History, as they deserve. Some one will say perhaps that these are fine words, and that they comprehend an excellent Lesson, but a Man must be Master of a great deal of Courage and Resolution, he must love Truth in an extraordinary manner to observe the Rules which this Historian has laid down. These are Qualities that are not easily to be found; and has he followed the same Precepts himself, which he recommends to others?  
But I ask the Gentlemen, who start these Difficulties, Whether they imagine that to Writ a History be an Employment proper for every one that can express himself with Facility? Whether they believe that a mean-spirited Wretch, that a Flatterer, that a covetous interessed Man is fit to instruct all Posterity? A Man's Talents ought to answer the Greatness of such an Enterprise; and if 'tis a rare matter to find Persons that possess them all, 'tis equally as rare to find Histories that deserve to be read. As for Polybius, only those that never read him, can possibly take him for a Philosopher or Preacher, which People often do the quite contrary to what they recommend to others. He shows all along that he had a very great Esteem for Aratus, the General of the Achaeans: However, that does not hinder him from censuring in his Conduct, with great freedom, whatever he thought was amiss in it. For instance, He describes at length, in the fourth Book of his History, the Faults, which Aratus committed in a Battle against the Aetolians, that was purely lost by his means; without dissembling any thing of, and endeavouring to excuse what would admit of no Apology. He knew what difference there is between Pardoning and Justifying; and altho' he was of opinion that the Achaeans ought to pardon Aratus for the Faults he had committed upon this Occasion, in consideration of the great Services he had done their Republic, and the Honesty of his Intentions, yet he knew that 'twas not an Historian's Business to endeavour to Justify them. But Polybius was by no means capable of betraying the Truth in favour of Aratus: he who does in no manner conceal the Faults of Philopoemen, nor those of Lycortas; the latter of whom was his Father, and the former his Friend and Protector. This the Reader may easily remark in his 
† Excerpta Legat. 41.  Narration of the Embassy of Lycortas in Egypt, in the Name of the Achaeans. He went thither to renew the Alliance which the Achaeans had long before made with the Ptolomys, and this Design had been vigorously supported by Philopoemen. However heacquitted himself so negligently in this Employ, that he contented himself with making the King of Egypt Swear, and with swearing himself in the Name or the Achaeans, before he had agreed upon any Articles with him; altho' the Achaeans had made several different Treaties with the Ptolomys. At his return home, Aristenus, General of the Achaeans, who was of the contrary Faction, as he was giving his Advice in the general Assembly of Achaia, asked him what sort of an Alliance he had renewed with the King of Egypt, and reckoned up several Treaties which the Republic had made with his Predecessors. Upon this the Assembly was eager to know which of these Treaties he had confirmed. Now this, says the Son of Lycortas, was what neither Philopoemen himself, who, as being General, had advised the renewing of the Alliance, nor Lycortas, nor the other Ambassadors, who had been at Alexandria, could say any thing to. It was therefore unanimously adjudged, that they had acquitted themselves very negligently in their Commission. Aristenus, on the contrary, seemed to be a Man of Ability, as being the only Person who knew what he said. 'Tis after this manner that Polybius speaks of his Protector and of his Father. He observes the same Conduct, when he speaks of those Persons for whom he had no Kindness. He lays down their Virtues with as much Impartiality as their Vices; because his only pleasure was to speak Truth. I will give an Instance of it below.  
The best Historians have imitated him more or less, according as they had more or less Courage, or Love for the Truth. It is almost impossible for a Man not to have an Aversion for the Enemies of his Country, or those from whom he has received any personal Injury. He will have an Idea of Injustice generally before his Eyes, whenever he thinks of them, and this will so far influence him as to make him represent them for a People, or a Set of Men that are Enemies to Justice. The Princes that entered into a Cofederacy against France, (in the War which began in 1688, and ended in 1697) and their Subjects have looked upon, and do still look upon France as an unjust Power, which designed to make itself Mistress of all Europe. In France, on the other hand, they have accused the Allies of Injustice, and it may be they are still prepossessed with this Opinion. Thus it happens that when Writers of these different Countries, undertake to speak of the contrary Party, they seldom fail to load it with an odious Character, and to make an Apology for their own. As their Minds are possessed by prejudice and Passion, their Thoughts consequently take the same Tincture, even without, their being sensible of it; and this is the Reason why we see nothing almost upon these Subjects, that deserves to be read. But as we ought to forget that we have Friends, Relations, and a Country, when we are obliged to mention them in History, so we ought not to number whether others, whom we have occasion to speak of, be Enemies, whether public or private. 'Tis impossible to say any thing more proper to this purpose, than what Polybius has said upon the occasion of Timaeus the Historian, and Agathocles, the Tyrant of Syracuse; and this is so much the more worthy of our observation, as Polybius was born in a Commonwealth, and extremely tinctured with Republican Inclinations, as appears by what remains of his Works. 
† Lib. XII. p. 917.  As wise People, says he, when they have a mind to be revenged on their Enemies, done't so much consider what their Enemies have deserved at their Hands, as what Equity and good Manners will suffer them to do them; in like manner, when we are to say any thing disadvantageous of them, we should not so much consider what they deserve should be said of them, as what is fitting for us to publish; and indeed 'tis necessary that we should have a regard to this above all things. Those that measure every thing by their Anger and Hatred, fall unavoidably into a thousand Faults, and speak more III of them than they ought to do. For this Reason we have Justice on our side to refuse our belief to the greatest part of those things, which Timaeus has alleged against Demochares. No body can excuse this in him, or believe him, because he has exceeded all the bounds of Justice, in gratifying his reviling Humour. Nay I can't endure the scandalous things he tells us of Agathocles, he who was a wicked Man: I mean what says of him towards the conclusion of his History, where he lays the most infamous Debaucheries to his Charge, etc. There is no question but Nature had bestowed very eminent Qualities upon Agathocles, which sufficiently appears even by what Timaeus has said of him. For since he left the Wheel, the Smoke, and Clay of his Father's Shop, who was an ordinary Potter, being scarce eighteen Years old when he came to Syracuse, yet from these disadvantageous Circumstances, he was able some time after to make himself Master of all Sicily, and to involve the Carthaginians in very great Difficulties; and lastly, since he had grown old in Tyranny, he died with the Name and Dignity of a King; are we not forced to own that he was an extraordinary Man, and that he was possessed of admirable Talents for the execution of great Affairs? Upon this account an Historian is obliged to recount to Posterity not only what was ill and blamable in Agathocles, but likewise whatever was worthy of Commendation. This aught to be the Aim and Intention of History: But Timaeus blinded by his natural Inclination to Calumny, reports the Bad with a world of Animosity and Exaggeration, and passes over all his noble Actions in a few words. In all appearance he was ignorant, that to suppress in a History what really happened is no less a Lie than to advance what never was.  
We may join to Polybius a famous modern Historian, who after he had suffered exceedingly by the Injustice of a great Prince, yet for all that was not wanting to relate his great Exploits, with as much care and diligence as any other Historian, and to speak all along of him, as his eminent Qualities deserved, without suffering the least word to drop from him, which might show that he had a just occasion to complain of him. I mean the incomparable Hugo Grotius, who, in his History of the Low-Countries, has spoke of Prince Maurice of Nassau, as if he had never had any Quarrel with him. Here is now a remarkable Instance of Impartiality, which shows that it is by no means impossible for a Man to overcome his Passion, and to speak honourably of his Enemies, as abundance of People imagine, who judge of others by themselves.  
Another thing that has contributed to ruin the Sincerity of several Historians, is that they undertook the writing of History, to obtain some Reward, or to Advance themselves in the Party wherein they were obliged. Suppose that an Historian lies really under such Circumstances that he has occasion for some Acknowledgement, and that he believes to obtain it by favouring a Party, 'tis a hundred to one if his Occasions don't prevail over his Love for Truth. There are but few Men that are able without some regret to behold Flatterers recompensed for their Writings, living in Reputation and enjoying their Pleasures, when melancholy Truth is discouraged and contemned, together with all those that dare admire her, or speak of her in public. And there are as few learned Men, whose Fortunes, generally speaking, are none of the greatest, whom Rewards cannot gain, or at least prevail with to conceal what is III, if they don't invent advantageous Facts for those that recompense them. From hence it follows that the business of writing modern History, in those places where a Man is any ways interessed, ought not to be an Office or Employment, by which one proposes purely Profit to himself. A Man may write foreign or ancient Histories, in which all the World is pleased to hear the truth, because we are no farther concerned in that than only to know what has happened. But 'tis almost impossible to write in any Government by public Order, and in consequence of a Pension, the Transactions that lately fell out in it, and at the same time to confine himself religiously to the Truth. After this, when we see throngs of People crowd and press to obtain the like Employments, who can forbear crying out, Oh! Homines ad mentiendum paratos! Here are Men that are ready to tell Lies for their Interest.  
But may it not so happen that a Prince or a Government may be pleased for a Man to say the Truth, nay and even recompense the generous Liberty of an Historian, who has told both the good and bad without dissembling in the least? Is this Virtue impracticable, or above Humane Nature? There is no question to be made but this is possible to God, who is able to change the Hearts of Men as he pleases; but I look upon it to be impossible to Men, in the present Condition wherein we find them. Flatterers are not only rewarded in all places of the World, but we look upon those Persons to be disaffected and seditious, that dare proclaim any Faults that we have committed; and we are more severe in punishing such People, than we are liberal in rewarding those that Flatter us. Princes imagine that it is not so advantageous for them that we speak Well of them, as 'tis dangerous to suffer us to speak the least III of them. Mankind is  violently prejudiced against the Praises of those, that cannot blame without exposing themselves to some Disgrace, and easily believe the Ill, which it is dangerous to speak. This is the reason why we are much more afraid of a sincere Writer, than we love those that are ready to say all that we would have them say. Thus even those Persons who would scorn to prostitute themselves so meanly as to tell Lies for a Reward, have not Courage enough oftentimes to expose themselves to Persecutions for speaking the Truth.  
If Sovereign Princes had a mind to instruct Posterity at their own Expense, they ought so to manage Matters, that Historians might have nothing to fear from them, for describing their Defects as well as their Virtues, and the Faults they have committed as well as their fine Actions. Those to whom they address themselves to write their History, aught to answer them in some such a manner as follows. If you would have the World believe the Good I can write of you, give me leave not to dissemble, whatever may with truth be said to your disadvantage. If you would have them think that it is not out of Interest that I commend you, take care that they have not any reason to suspect that the fear of being Illused has not hindered my Pen from writing what may be justly censured. Otherwise leave me at liberty to hold my Tongue, and reserve your Favours for other Persons than for Flatterers, who are as little believed when they praise those, to whom they have sold their Liberty, as when they blame without reason the Enemies of their Benefactors. For my part, there are no Lies or Dissimulations to be bought of me, and I will never sell the Truth. But to make such a plaindealing Speech as this is, a Man must be of the Humour of Philoxenus who rather chose to drudge in the vilest Employment, with Irons upon his Feet, than not to ridicule the wretched Verses of a certain Tyrant of Syracuse: But we have few Men of this Temper.  
But it is not only Passion that may misled an Historian, for there are Prepossessions that may have the same Effect upon him, and equally lead him out of his way. When we have once entertained a good Opinion of a Man, we are resolved without farther Examination to believe all that is said to his Advantage; and on the other hand we readily believe all the Ill that is reported of those whom we don't esteem. However, it may so fall out, that Persons, who in all Respects deserve our Admiration, may commit very great Faults, and that others, who little deserve to be esteemed, may sometimes do very good Actions. Humane Nature is not so equal in itself, whatever condition it may be in, but it frequently passes from Good to Evil, and from Evil to Good, when we least intent it. The Examples of Aratus and Agathocles which I have already cited, are an evident Proof of it. Therefore an Historian ought to disengage himself from all Prevention, and to exanine in themselves the Proofs of those Facts he is going to relate: To censure, if there be a just Occasion for it, those whom he has Esteemed, and, on the contrary, to praise those of whom he had a bad Opinion, if they deserve it.  
Polybius infinitely esteemed the Romans upon the score of moral and military Virtues, and in truth he had reason to admire them upon several Accounts. It is not to be supposed that he could have so advantageous an Idea of the Carthaginians, and to say the truth, they did not equal the Romans. However, this does not hinder him from publishing the Faults of the former, and their Violation of Faith upon divers occasions, as particularly their Usage of the Carthaginians after the end of the first Punic War. In like manner he commends the good conduct of the Carthaginian Generals, when they deserved it. Thus the Romans had so great an esteem for his Sincerity and Judgement, that Brutus, who killed Julius Caesar, made an Abridgement of his History in the latter part of his Life, at which time he was most of all taken up with Business.  
But we find few Historians so impartial and sincere. The present Writers of France don't think that 'tis possible for the Council that governs it, to commit the least Indiscretions, so high an Idea they have of their wise Maxims, and steady Conduct. I will not pretend to oppose this Idea of theirs, because in truth it is founded upon divers weighty Reasons: But they should judge of Facts and their Consequences, without having any regard to them; because the most prudent Councils are not always infallible, but are subject to take false Measures, altho' this does not happen so often to them. It is likewise reasonable that those that admire the Conduct of the other Princes of Europe, who joined against France, should remember that the best Heads are sometimes over-seen: We ought to do Justice reciprocally one to another, and to judge of Faults and great Actions, by themselves, and by their Consequences, and not altogether by Preposession.  

Of Ecclesiastic History  THESE Precautions, in my Opinion, are absolutely necessary for an Historian, if he would acquit himself, as he ought, in his Undertaking. We may find, as already has been observed, Examples and Proofs of it in the best Historians of Pagan Antiquity. But there is a sort of History among Christians, wherein, if we must talk Historically, that is to say, without being biased, all the abovementioned Rules, that have been prescribed for the Writing of History, are neglected and violated. An Orthodox Author that undertakes to Compose an Ecclesiastic History, cannot be too  and zealous for his own Party, nor have too violent an Aversion for the other Sects: He must show this Disposition of Mind all along in his Work; for therwise he will be defamed not only for a Man of no Abilities, but likewise for an impious Person. 'Tis but just he should propose to himself, as a Recompense for his Labour, some Ecclesiastic Dignities, if he is of a Profession to pretend to them, or some other equivalent, if he is a Laic, upon condition he all along favour Orthodoxy, that is, his own Party. If he be so ill advised, as to speak never so little in favour of the Heretics, or such as are opposite to his own side, he must expect to be exposed to the fury of Zealots, to their Accusations, and perhaps to all the Punishments, Ecclesiastic and Civil, that are inflicted in the place where he lives; unless he will retract these rash Truths, which are to be found in him, advantageous to Heresy. He ought to fore-arm himself with this Prejudice and never lay it aside, viz. That all that may be honourable in Heretics is false, and that all that is said to their Disreputation is true: As on the contrary, every thing that can do honour to the Orthodox is undoubted, and all that reflects upon them is a downright Life. 'Tis necessary that an Orthodox Historian should carefully suppress, or at least extenuate, as far as in him lies, the Errors and Vices of those that are respected among the Orthodox, altho' they are not well known by them; and on the other hand, that he exaggerate, as much as he can, the Mistakes and Faults of the Heretics. Besides, he ought to remember that any Orthodox may serve as a Witness against a Heretic, and aught to be believed upon his word; and that on the contrary, a Heretic's word ought never to be taken against the Orthodox. All the honour that must be allowed him, is to hearken to him when he has any thing to say in favour of Orthodoxy, or against himself. An Orthodox may be cited as a Witness in his own proper Cause, but a Heretic must not be so even in that of another. In short, there are Maxims, which he must not examine but follow, if he undertakes to write Ecclesiastic History, under pain of Infamy, Excommunication, Banishment, etc. After this manner the Centuriators of Magdeburg have written on one side, and Cardinal Baronius on the other; which has obtained both of them among their own Party, an immortal Reputation: But we must confess at the same time that they were not the first; and that they only imitated the generality of those that preceded them, in this way of Writing. It had been the fashion several Ages before this, to search out in Antiquity, not what was really there, but what we judged aught to be there, for the good of the Party which we had espoused; and to represent the Ancients, such as we found it for our purpose, that they should be, for the advantage of the Cause, which we have undertaken to defend. A Man certainly found his profit in writing after this manner, and danger in doing otherwise.  
Sozomen, in 
* Lib. I. c. 1.  his Ecclesiastic History, after having enumerated the Monuments, out of which he compiled it, goes on as follows: For fear lest any one should condemn my Work of Falsehood, upon my not being sufficiently instructed in Matters as they happened, because he finds the Relations in other Author's different from mine; he must understand that upon the occasion of Arius' Opinions, and those which sprung up afterwards, the Governors of the Church being divided, every one writ to those of his own Opinion concerning those things, which he himself had taken to Heart: That having assembled Synods apart, they confirmed whatever they had a mind to, and frequently condemned their Adversaries in their absence; That they made their Court to the Emperors and the Great Men about them, and left no Stone unturned to gain them over to their side, and make them receive their own Opinions; That in order to pass for Orthodox in the World, each Party took a particular care to collect the Letters which favoured their Sect, and omitted the rest. And this, says he, has given me abundance of trouble in my Search after the Truth. But since the Sincerity of History requires that we should do all that in us lies to discover the Truth, I thought myself obliged diligently to examine these sorts of Writings. If I relate the Quarrels which the Ecclesiastics have had among one another, about the Preference of their Sects; let no one believe that this proceeds from Malice, or any sinister Design. Besides that, 'tis just, as I have already observed, that an Historian should prefer the Truth to all things; the Truth of the Doctrines of the Catholic Church does but appear the more by it, having been several times put to the Proof, by the cunning Designs of those that opposed it, etc. It seems that he durst not speak all that he thought, for after he had taken notice of the Quarrels and Ambition of the Ecclesiastics, as well as of their Writings and Letters, directly opposite one to the other; he ought to have told his Reader what Rules he had followed in his History, to distinguish the Truth from Falsehood: Besides, he ought to have concluded otherwise than he has done, and have said that the vicious Lives, and wicked Actions of the Ecclesiastics have no Connexion with the Christian Religion, which condemns them, and consequently ought not to be set down to her Account; That therefore for his speaking Truth of the first Fathers of the Church, altho' it was not advantageous for them, no such Conclusion ought to be drawn, as that he designed to do the least injury to Religion; That we ought not to confound the private and personal Interests of the Churchmen with the general Interest of the Gospel; That this was an Artifice which the irregular Clergy made use of, to authorise their ill living, or hinder others from daring to reprove it, as if what was levelled only at their disorders, must needs strike directly at Religion itself, whose unworthy Ministers they must own themselves to be; That we ought likewise to distinguish between good and bad, between Orders that were instituted with Reason in the Church, and the Abuse that was made of them; in order to let the World see that those who blame the Abuse, don't censure the thing itself, and that those who recount the ill Actions of wicked Men, don't lose the Respect which ought to be paid to the Good; That it is notoriously manifest that the Truth of Opinions don't make all such as profess them, virtuous; and that speculative Errors don't corrupt the Manners of all those who are engaged in them; so that the mixture of good and bad in the Conduct of Life, is almost equal between the Orthodox and the Heretics; That therefore we ought not to take all for Gospel which the former say, nor yet to reject every thing as false that comes from the second; but that we ought to examine what both of them can say, according to the same Rules which the Law prescribes for sifting of Witnesses, in Civil and Criminal Affairs; That in fine, it is of the last importance to speak out the truth freely in all this, lest the Libertines should imagine that 'tis a Belief among the Christians, that the Opinions of the Mind, or Employments in the Church, change Vice into Virtue, and Virtue into Vice; and lest Persons of weak Judgements should insensibly be led into it by seeing both one and the other equally consecrated in the Person of Ecclesiastics, and at last forget that the Christian Religion consists in believing the Doctrines of the Gospel, and obeying its Precepts, and not in the Respect that is paid to Men, who are neither made better, nor more knowing by their Dignities. This is what ought to be said in a Preface to an Ecclesiastic History, and what Sozomen perhaps would have said, if he had dared to speak all that he thought: But it was too dangerous at that time to speak thus at Constantinople, as it is still so in the greatest part of Europe.  

Of the Style of History.  III. IT is not necessary that I should speak of the Order which an Historian ought to observe, because the Series of the Time sufficiently directs him in that, and the Rhetors have assigned Rules for the Narration, which are as suitable to an Historian as they are to an Orator. As for the Style, the only Qualities which it ought to have, is to be pure, clear, and as concise as possible, without becoming obscure. 'Tis in History where we ought principally to employ that simple and natural Style, which the Masters of this Art so exceedingly commend. As an Historian only proposes to himself to inform his Reader of what has happened, without any design to move or divert him, any farther than the Matter may contribute to it, without the Historians having any such Thought; all sorts of studied Ornaments are superfluous, and an Affectation of showing one's Eloquence is altogether impertinent. We ought to hear what is said upon this Head by Lucian, or by d'Ablancourt; for it signifies nothing which of the two speaks, provided that the Rules are good. History, say they, is more chaste than Poetry, and can no more employ the Ornaments of the latter, than a virtuous Woman those of a Harlot; and so much the more as it has no occasion to be beholding to Fiction, and has none of those Figures and Movements which transport and disorder the Soul. If you bestow too much Decoration upon it, you make it resemble Hercules, when he has Omphale's  on, which is the highest piece of Extravagance. They likewise say in another place, discoursing of an Historian; That his Style ought to be clear and natural, without being low; for as we assign him Freedom and Truth to regulate the Matter of his Narration, so Clearness and Perspicuity ought to regulate the Manner of it. The Figures ought neither to be too sublime, nor too far fetched; unless when he comes to describe a Battle, or to make an Harangue: For upon those occasions, he is allowed to elevate his Style, and if I may so express myself, to unfurl all the Sails of his Eloquence. However, it is not necessary that he should raise himself in proportion to the things, of which he talks; and he ought to preserve his Style altogether free from the Enthusiasm and Fury of Poetry; for 'tis to be feared that if he rises too high, his Head will be apt to grow giddy, and lose itself in Fiction— Therefore if he has a mind to rise, let it rather be by the Things than the Words; for 'tis infinitely better that his Style should be ordinary, and his Thoughts sublime, than that his Thoughts should be mean and his Style elevated, or that he should suffer himself to be too violently hurried by the force of his Imagination. Let his Periods be neither too long nor too much studied; his Style neither too harmonious, nor too negligent, because one has a tincture of Barbarity, and the other of Affectation.  
This is all that may reasonably be said in general of an Historical Style; for I am by no means of their Opinion, who pretend that the Style of an Historian ought to be more elevated than that of an Orator, and almost Poetical, as 
* Lib. X. c. 1.  Quintilian believed. Neither do I believe that 'tis necessary for a Man to be an Orator to be an Historian, as 
† Lib. II. de Oratore, c. 9 & seq.  Cicero has maintained. As Instruction is his main and principal Business, all that is not serviceable to that end, has no relation to the History, what Taste soever the Ancients had of these Matters, who were somewhat too fond of the Ornaments of Rhetoric. If a Man has a mind to please his Reader by his Style, 'tis enough if it has the abovementioned Qualities. A Narration conceived in pure Terms, clear and short, is sufficiently agreeable of itself, and needs no Foreign Ornaments to recommend it, if the things we relate do otherwise deserve to be read. So soon as the Reader perceives that an Historian makes it his Business to display his Eloquence, he has a very just Reason to suspect his want of Integrity, because 'tis the Custom of Declamers to alter the things they relate, that they may make a better show in the Declamatory manner. Cicero in his Brutus, having compared the death of Coriolanus with that of Themistocles, as if both one and the other had been slain, 
* Cap. 11.  excuses himself for doing so to his Friend Atticus, who believed that he died of a natural Death, and accordingly had affirmed so much in a History of his own Composing; upon which Atticus answers him very handsomely, That he might use what liberty he pleased, because the Rhetors were allowed to departed from the truth of History, to have a better opportunity of showing their Parts. For as for what you have feigned about Coriolanus, is no more than what Clitarehus and Stratocles have feigned about Themistocles. Thucydides, who was an Athenian, descended from a good Family, and a great Man; and what is more, one that lived a little time after him, only tells us that he died, that he was buried privately in Attica, and that some suspected that he was Poisoned. But these two Authors relate, how that having sacrficed a Bull, he received the Blood in a Cup, and fell down dead after he had drank it. The reason was, that they were able to describe this Death in a Tragical magnificent manner, where this common Death furnished them with no Topics, on which they might display their Rhetoric. Therefore since your Occasions require that Themistocles and Coriolanus should resemble one another in every thing, I will, if you please, lend you a Cup for the latter; nay, I will provide you with a Victim, that Coriolanus may be in all respects another: Themistocles. Concessum est Rhetoribus ementiri in Historiis, ut aliquid dicere possint argutius.  
For this very Reason a Man ought to avoid all sort of Affectation in an Historical Style: But above all things, he ought to take care that it be pure, because since the Purity of the Style is by no means incompatible with the Truth, 'tis ridiculous to dishearten the Reader by a barbarous Style. Such, for instance, is that of Aubigné in his History, which we can hardly endure to read for that very Reason, and which nothing can excuse, since it was in his power to write otherwise, as we may find by his other Works.  
Such is likewise, in part, the Style of Mezeray, in his great History of France, and likewise in his Abridgement. Without being a jot the worse Historian, he might have written much better French, at a time when the Language was infinitely more pure and polite, than it seems to have been by his Writings. By Purity and Politeness, I don't mean a Style elaborately turned in a Declamatory strain, such as are the Styles of John Baptist Nani, in his History of Venice; or of Emanuel Tesauro, in his Historical Writings; but a Choice of Words and Expressions conformable to the best use of the Tongue, and the connecting of them, which hath nothing harsh nor intricate. In this way of writing, Cornelius Nepos, and Julius Caesar, excel among the Ancients; and among the Moderns, the Author of the Life of St. Lewis (I mean the Abbot de la Chaise) and he that writ the History of Theodosius the Great, and the Life of Cardinal Ximenes.  
If a Man follows this Advice, 'tis almost impossible for him to be obscure; for 'tis certain, that the good use of any Tongue, authorises nothing that may make the Narration obscure. Those that talk obscurely, don't fall into this Fault, by conforming themselves to the general Use, but by affecting to talk otherwise than the rest of the World do. Not one of those that spoke well at Athens or Rome, talked so obscurely as Thucydides and Tacitus have written. It proceeded from their endeavouring to rise above the common use, that they have fallen into this obscurity, which we so justly blame in their Style. No one can deny that this sort of Style is not affected, and that these Authors thought to recommend their Histories by a masculine Eloquence, if I may so express myself, in which a Man thinks to express abundance of things in a few words, which is above the vulgar way. I can't imagine what Charms some learned Men discovered in this manner of writing, who have attempted to imitate them, as Hugo Grotius, and Denys Vossius in his Translation of de Rheide's History. For after all, good Thoughts need not be made obscure to appear good to those that understand them; and the Reader, who is forced to stop every moment to find out the meaning, is not at all obliged to the Historian who gives him this trouble. By this means they have brought it to pass, that excellent Histories, in regard of their Matter, are read but by very few People; whereas, instead of proposing to instruct those, who understand the Latin Tongue well enough to read an Historian with pleasure, they should endeavour to make themselves understood, without difficulty, by those who have not arrived to that perfection in that Language, and to render their Works useful to as many Persons, as is possible. The more any History is worthy of being Read, for the variety of Events it comprehends, the more it deserves to be spread abroad. The Authority of the Ancients, who have neglected this perspicuity of Style, aught to be no protection to the Moderns, who have imitated them, against the Reasons I have mentioned above, or rather against good Sense.  
All that we can say is, That the obscurity of these Authors comes in part from the brevity of their Expressions and Periods, which necessarily carries along with it something of Darkness, tho' it has I know not what more Majesty and Life than a more extended Style. I own it has, but then I maintain, that to represent truly the Character of these Historians, we must join to this brevity an impropriety of Terms and Expressions, and a perplexed Construction, which without dispute are no Ornaments to any Style. We ought no farther to be Concise than Perspicuity will give us leave, whatever Advantage we may otherwise find in Brevity; for indeed there is no Advantage that can equal that of being rightly understood, when a Man writes to be so. The impropriety of Terms and perplexity of the Constuction can never make a Discourse more fit to be read, but only by those who like better what they don't understand, than what they do, and whose Votes, in my opinion, it is worth no learned Man's while to obtain.  
Salust's Style is not so concise as that of Tacitus, but 'tis no less animated; and were it not for his Antique manner of Speaking, and the boldness of his Metaphors, he would be infinitely more clear, without losing any thing of his force. If we compare Strada to Grotius, or to de Rheide, we shall find him in truth somewhat more diffusive, and his Expressions sometimes bordering more upon Poetry than History. Nevertheless, he has nothing languishing in him, and if we retrench his Superfluities in some places, and correct the vicious Latin in others, there are few Historians that would be more delightful to be read, in respect of the Style; unless there were a perfect necessity to make him speak after the manner of Oracles.  
I might add some other things relating to the Style of History, but it never was in my Thoughts to write any thing complete upon this matter. The famous Gerard John Vossius has gone through all the Questions almost, that use to be proposed upon this Subject, and tho' in some places he seems to have made a greater use of his Reading, than of his Judgement, (a common Fault, with Writers of his Character) yet I have no design to contradict him.  

Of the Judgements that are made in History.  iv TO make a perfect Historian, a Man ought not only to know the Verity of the Facts which he recounts, and have a Will to publish and Art to express it, as it ought to be; he likewise ought to be profoundly read in Morality and Politics, without which he will never be able to pass a true Judgement upon Humane Actions. 
† See Vossius de Arte Histor. c. 18.  It is true, there are some Persons, who believe that an Historian ought to content himself with recounting things as they happened, without interposing his own Opinion, and leave the Reader to take that side which the things themselves will incline him to take, without endeavouring to prepossess him. But as this reservedness may be justifiable in doubtful Matters, yet when the Events themselves speak, if I may be allowed so to express myself, who can take it ill if the Historian joins his Judgement to them? The generality of Readers are pleased to read it, and indeed want such helps to refresh their Memories as to what results from what they have read. That Man can by no means be said to prepossess them, who only judgeth of a thing which he has related, and that too upon incontestable Facts, which themselves have read. Thus we find this has been the constant practice of almost all Historians, some of whom however judge in a more direct manner, and others more obliquely, according to their different Genius. Some intermix more Sentences than others do, and some again would have them interwoven into the Series of the Narration, although ' others place them independently by themselves, and out of the Design of the History, that they may be the more taken notice of. In this we ought to observe certain Bounds, within which we shall not be liable to censure, that is to say, the Sentences ought neither to be too frequent, nor too far fetched. Otherwise it will look as if we had written a History to have an opportunity of retailing Sentences, than Sentences to render the History more useful. We cannot accuse Strada with having had a design to publish his Collections of moral Sentences when he was composing his History, but we cannot deny that he was a little too profuse of them. Any Man may observe this in the Indices of his two Volumes, where we find a great number of them upon every Letter of the Alphabet.  
But what is of most importance in this Occasion, the Judgements we make aught to be just, and the Sentences such as may pass for unquestionable Maxims. For this Effect, we ought to apply ourselves vigorously to Morality and Politics, without which we shall be liable to make wrong Reflections, and to utter deceitful Maxims. This is not a place to establish the Principles of these Sciences. I will only remark in general, that as History takes in all Ages and all Nations, and that an Historian ought to be an equitable Judge of so many different Nations, whose Opinions differ so vastly one from another; 'tis necessary he should keep himself within the general Ideas which good Sense will furnish him with, about Religion, about Virtue and Vice, about the reciprocal Duties of the People, and of those that govern them; and lastly, about whatever Nations may owe one to another.  
Otherwise, if an Historian judges of a Nation by the Principles of a Religion, which is unknown to it, or which it disapproves, he takes a Party, and exposes his own Religion to undergo the same Law, when Historians of a different Religion shall write the History of a Nation whose Opinions he shall approve. For no Man upon the Face of the Earth has a right to lay down contested Opinions as if they were indisputable, and if he will needs condemn others upon this Foot, he cannot in justice complain if others condemn him in asserting contrary Opinions, which they believe to be true. For example, let a Catholic Historian write a History of the Troubles of Religion, which have happened in Europe since the last Age, he ought not, in the Judgements which he makes of the Protestants, to set up such Ideas as the Mobb and those that are no better instructed, frame to themselves of the Deity, as if it had the same Passions with the Ecclesiastics, and aught to destroy in this and tother World, those that have had the Presumption to find fault with their Doctrine and their Conduct. Or at least if he have any such Ideas, they ought never to come into his History, where we only see these Quarrels, which Men have with one another, and by no means the secret Thoughts of the Divinity, who does not always send Prosperity as a mark of his Favour, nor calamitous Accidents as a sign of his Indignation. Whatever Sentiments a Man may have upon the Subject of Religion, we want not Examples to prove, That Prosperity as often accompanies what we believe to be Error and Injustice, as what we look upon to be Truth and a a good Cause. There is no Party, upon which what they object to others, may not be retorted in this Case.  
For instance, it was ridiculous in Strada to remark, as he frequently does, upon the Eve of what Festival, a Town was attacked by the Spanish Army; as if the Saint to whom the Church of Rome has consecrated that Day, had favoured the Spaniards to make them Victorious. In like manner, we should laugh at any Protestant who should affirm it to be a sensible Mark that the Invocation of saints is a Practice disagreeable to God, because the Protestants did beat the Catholics in such and such Engagements, altho' the latter had recommended themselves, before the Battle began, to all the Saints in Paradise. The same Strada often menaceth what he calls Heresy, with all sorts of Calamities, and promiseth Victories to the Monarchy of Spain against the United Provinces, upon the score of its Zeal for the Catholic Religion. We are now sensible how ill a Prophet he has proved in this particular; and if we are to judge of God's Designs by the Events, we ought to say that Providence had decreed that the United Provinces should become an absolute independent Republic, for the Preservation of the Crown of Spain, to the Interests of which it was to be as firmly devoted at the end of the XVII. Century, as it had been opposite to it till towards the middle of the same Age, and about the end of the former.  
To show how little a stress we ought to lay upon these Theological Reflections, the abovementioned Historian, who never fails to attribute the Advantages of the Spaniards to a particular Favour of Heaven, which declared itself against Heresy, is obliged shamefully to turn the Tables, when he comes to speak of the Victory, which the English obtained over the pretended invincible Armada of the Spaniards, and to reason in the following manner: 
† Towards the end of Lib. IX. Dec. 2.  'Tis reported that Queen Elizabeth went to Church in a Triumphal Chariot, in the midst of the Colours of the vanquished Enemy, and that she ordered the Spoils of the Spaniards to be hung up there, after she had given Thanks to God for this Victory, who had been, as she believed, so favourable to her upon this Occasion: Whereas at that very time when she made it be believed that he most favoured her, he showed that he was incensed against her, since he permitted her to abuse this good Success, to confirm Heresy, the Yoke of which she might have shaken off, both for herself and for her Kingdom, to her great Advantage, if she had been overcome. Besides the Winds and Tempests did not give the English much reason to magnify themselves, and they had no reason to believe themselves better Men, because they were more fortunate, unless they conclude that we ought to prefer the Impiety of Saracens and Turks to the Piety of the Christians, since these Barbarians have often beaten the best prepared Forces of the Christians. This last Reflection is very true: But if Strada had remembered it all along, where he speaks of the Victories of the Spaniards, he might very well have spared a great deal of impertinent Rhetoric, to show the favours of Heaven towards the Catholics, in the Advantages they gained over their Enemies. This it is to have two Weights and two Measures, to pretend that Providence favours one side, when it gives them Victory, and that it is angry with the other, when it treats them after the same manner. However I am of Opinion, that one may safely say, that in case the Spaniards had succeeded in their designed Invasion of England, Strada would have said, That God had changed the Winds in their favour, and blessed a Fleet, which went to exterpate Heresy in that Kingdom.  
It will perhaps be offered in favour of Strada, and other Historians, who writ in this manner, of whatsoever party they are, that it is not possible they should believe that Religion not to be true, which they follow, and consequently that they should not look upon every thing as a favour of Heaven, which serves to establish it. For my part, I don't in the least hinder them from thinking so, but I maintain that these Reflections ought not to be allowed a place in History, when 'tis no part of our Business to render to our Religion what we own to it, but to instruct all Mankind, if we are able, by Truths which cannot be contested on any side. Let them believe what they please, as for what concerns their own particular, but let them censure none, except it be upon Principles of good Sense, or of Religion, that are acknowledged even by those whom they censure. No Man ought to be blamed for not doing what he believes he ought not to do, according to his own Principles, so long as he retains them, altho' these Principles are false. If we can blame him, 'tis for receiving Falsities without examination, but it belongs to Divines to enter into this Dispute and not to Historians, who don't treat of the Errors but of the Actions of Men.  
Besides this, these Historians, that are so partial in the matter of Religion, are extremely subject to give an advantageous turn to all the conduct of that Party, which supports what they believe to be the Truth, to say no worse of them. I don't speak of the Varillas and Maimbourgs, and other Liars of that stamp, who have renounced all Truth; but even of more moderate Historians. It were to be wished that when they begin to write their Histories, they had forgotten the Party which they espoused, in the present Divisions of Christendom; that they might have been able to speak of their Disputes and Differences, as Men would do that were not at all concerned in them. The Love of a Party, as reasonable as it may appear to be, makes us always lean somewhat towards it, when we come to relate any thing that is disadvantageous to the good Cause.  
If I might here be allowed to describe the Idea, which I would have an Historian frame to himself of the Divinity, in relation to those Events that are comprehended in History, I would tell him that he ought to consider God as the common Father of all Mankind, who looks down with compassion upon their Errors and their Vices, but contents himself with giving them Laws, which they may observe or violate, without his intervening to make them be obeyed by Rewards or by sensible Pains during this Life, reserving it to himself to display his Justice, when he shall have judged that Mankind has continued long enough upon the Earth. As these Sentiments can be called in question by no Man, an Historian ought to look upon what we call Happiness or Unhappiness in the things of this Life, as Accidents that neither denote the Anger, nor the Approbation of Heaven, and to draw no Consequences in this respect, either to the Advantage or Disadvantage of any Party whatsoever.  
Although God has discovered to Mankind by Reason and by Revelation, what is agreeable to him, yet he has accompanied neither the one nor the other with so great a Light, that it should be impossible for us to take that for Reason or Revelation, which is not really so. He permits Men to dispute upon these Principles, and without doubt he likewise looks upon them with pity, yet for all that he does not draw the Curtain, if I may so speak, which conceals him from our Eyes, and appear in an contestable manner to come to decide our Controversies. He will do that, whenever he sees it convenient; in the mean time 'tis every one's Duty to remember that he is a Man, subject to Error as well as another, and equally submitted to this last Judgement of the Creator of the World. None among us Christians disagree about these Principles, and Historians in particular aught to remember them more than any other Men. If they thought seriously of them, they would not be ready to make such sharp and violent Invectives, against the speculative Errors of other Men, even supposing them to be Errors.  
Strada, for example, had not declaimed so eagerly against Heresy, as he does upon all Occasions, and principally in his 
† In the beginning of Lib. II. Dec. 1.  History, when he assigns the Causes of the Wars of the Low-Countries, where he employs all his Eloquence to persuade the World, that Heresy causeth nothing but Disorders and Rebellions, and makes Men wicked and Atheists. When the Protestant Historians fall into the like Invectives, speaking of the famous Catholic League, which for so long a time tore France in pieces, the contrary Party cannot endure this bitter Language, and say, That this is to Preach, and not to Write a History. If we had any remainders of Equity left among us, we should unanimously condemn these Practices, and be so honest as to own that the Vices of Men have infinitely a greater share in the Disorders of Europe, than Religion, in whatsoever manner 'tis explained. We should forbear all these Invectives, which indeed are pardonable in no Man, but much less in an Historian; or if we must needs be venting our Malice against those Parties whom we disapprove, we must not take it ill, if they return us the same Language in their turn.  
But herein lies our Weakness, to imagine that God is as partial and peevish as ourselves are, and consequently that he requires of us that we lose no opportunity of railing and exclaiming against those, whose Creator and Father he is as well as of the most fiery Zealots, and rendering them odious whatever it costs us.  
Historians ought to be more prudent, and those that read them aught likewise to approve those generally who come nearest to this noble Idea, which the Masters of this Art give us of a disinteressed Historian. True Judges have exceedingly commended Thuanus, who in his History has observed so admirable a moderation, in relation to the Party wherein he was born and wherein he died: But those who could not endure to hear any Truth's prejudicial to their Party, have exclaimed vehemently against him. Such a Man was Justus Lipsius, a great Critic, but one of a shallow Judgement in every thing besides, who writ to him, 
† See the Scaligerana, p. 391. Ed. Amstel. an. 1695.  That this History very much displeased him, and the Liberty he took in writing it, was not suitable for this Age. These are the Terms which de Thou uses in a Letter to Jos. Scaliger, dated June 29th. 1606. I don't know, continues he, whether I ought to make him any answer. He is mightily changed since he left Leyden for Louvain. I am the very same I ever was, and will be, if it pleases God, ready to correct any thing which I have written. He exhorts me strongly to this correction, but does not tell me wherein, so that I know not what to make of his Advice.— I believe he would send me to the Inquisition, but it will be a hard matter to reconcile the French Liberty to that Yoke. He deserves a sharper Answer than I am in a Humour to write. I was willing to set down the greatest part of this Letter, that I might draw two Consequences from it: The first is, that oftentimes even Men of Learning; who know the value of Liberty, are the very first to betray her infamously, as Lipsius did, altho' they know well enough that they do ill in it. This Grammarian, who bond himself hand and foot, like a mean-spirited Slave, to the Jesuits, when he retired to Louvain, was well enough satisfied in his own Conscience that the Thou had advanced nothing false, at least out of Passion, and did not tax him with deserting the Interest of Truth, but only with taking a liberty, which was not suitable for this Age; as if we were born to be Slaves, rather than those that were born in former Ages! What Privilege of Heaven did they receive, which we have not? We are no less free than they, except it be because we are afraid of our own Shadows, and that instead of defending at least modestly those that have more Generosity than others, we not only abandon them to the fury of the Factious, who make use of the pretence of Religion to hinder Truth from being spoken, but even endeavour to destroy them, to procure to ourselves the favour of the Druids. If all the Men of Learning in France had been of Lipsius' Humour, we had lost this illustrious Precedent, to whom Posterity is so much obliged, and who is, if I must say it, the last of the French Historians, who has spoken with moderation of an opposite Party in respect of Religion. For as for Mezeray, he was very far from observing the Laws of History in this particular, altho' they still commend that little liberty he shows, in a Country, where it is entirely extinct.  
Another Consequence which I draw from this slavish and cowardly Advice of Lipsius, is that we ought to be glad that he was only Historiographer of Spain; for a Man of his Temper would at least have dissembled all that he knew disadvantageous to his own Party, and have poisoned all the rest, 
† See his Epist. ad Belgas Cent. 2. Ep. 67.  altho' he pretends to set up for a Philosopher, and what is more, for a Stoic. The King of Spain did very well to give him a Pension in consideration of his great Learning, but he should not give him a Farthing, in quality of an Historian, a Title for which he was altogether unfit. The History of the Miracles of the two Notre-dames, for which he has been so justly ridiculed, sufficiently shows what he was capable of doing, in a History, wherein Religion was any ways concerned.  
The second thing, wherein those that attempt to write a History, aught to be perfectly instructed, is the Principles upon which Humane Society in general, and particular Societies are founded, and principally all that has a relation to Justice and Injustice. Without this, they will never be able to pass a solid Judgement upon almost any single Action that comes before them. They will be liable to take very wicked Men for Models of Virtue, and on the other hand, virtuous Persons for Men of a most flagitious Character. They will bestow the Eulogiums of Virtue upon Vice, and treat Virtue herself no better than a Criminal. What is Vice with some People, passes for Virtue with others, and what we approve in our own Country, we look upon as execrable in an Enemy. Those that afterwards read these Histories, and have not a better stock of Knowledge than the Historians, instead of drawing those Advantages which they ought from 'em, will soon fill their Minds with false Ideas, which at long run will have but too great an Influence upon their Conduct.  
An Historian therefore aught to consider what are the Duties, which the very Constitution of Humane Nature has imposed upon all Men, of what Condition or Quality soever, and in what place or time sooner they are born. These are the Laws which all Men are obliged to observe one with another, which can never suffer any change, nor be altered by any form of Government whatsoever; without violating the Principles of Humanity, and consequently without deserving Censure. For example, (for it is not my Business here to treat at large of that matter) the weakness of Humane Nature has imposed a necessity upon us of assisting one another, and the least experience of Life teaches us that we ought not to do that to another, which we should call Injustice if they did to us. This Principle being put, and 'tis impossible to shake it, it will necessarily follow that whatever is contrary to it, aught to be blamed, let the Person who did it be who he will, and under what pretence he pleases.  
Therefore those that writ History ought to condemn without partiality whatever opposes this Principle of Humane Society. This ought chief to discover itself in those that writ Lives, where they have an occasion to speak distinctly of the Virtues and Vices of those Persons whose History they writ. We can hardly blame the Pagan Authors in this respect, I mean such as are of any Esteem; for 'tis certain that they done't in the least dissemble the Vices which were known to them, and that they likewise bestow upon Virtue the Commendations she deserved, according to the Idea which they had of it. This is what we may remark in the Lives of Plutarch, for Instance, and of Suetonius, wherein they distribute their Censures and their Praises with a great deal of Justice and Freedom. All that we can find fault in them, is that they had not the clearest and exactest Ideas of Virtue and Vice. For Example, Ambition and a Passion for making War, either to gain a Crown, or acquire Reputation, or to oppress one's Neighbour, and to be admired by the wickedest of Men, pass for Virtues in their Writings, or at least for the Qualities of an Heroic Soul, that is elevated above the Vulgar. We may easily perceive by the manner wherein these Authors speak of their Heroes, that they took several for Great Men, who were indeed Great Scourges both of their own Country and the neighbouring Nations.  
The mischief is, that after the Revelation of the Gospel, we are not much wiser than before. We may discover, by the Style of some Christian Historians, who have written the Lives of several illustrious Men, either separately, or in the course of their general Histories, that they no less admired them notwithstanding their Injustices, and all the other Artifices they employed to advance themselves, than if they had always observed the nicest Justice in all their Actions. Nay, several People believe that this scrupulous Virtue is incompatible with that which makes what we call a great Prince, or a great Statesman. To illustrate this by a famous Instance, we framed to ourselves a high Idea of Charles the Fifth, as heretofore we did of Julius Caesar, tho' very little Justice went into his Composition; as if the Idea of a great Man could possibly subsist without this Virtue. Historians that are full of this vulgar Prepossession, merely for not having studied enough the Principles of Morality, deceive their Readers, who know no better than themselves; and thus we continue from Generation to Generation to admire these fine People, because they have had the good Fortune, if I may be allowed so to speak, to do a world of Mischief to infinite numbers of their Contemporaries, without being called to an account for it.  
There is however this difference between the ancient Historians and the Moderns, that the former speak much more freely of the Persons, whose Lives they writ, and dissemble their Vices much less than the Moderns have done in the like Compositions. At least I don't remember that I ever met any Modern who writ his Thoughts with that freedom and sincerity, which is so emphatically conspicuous in the two abovementioned Authors. The greatest part of them endeavour to set off their Hero as much as they can; as if the Reader were more obliged to them for concealing from him the Defects of those whose Lives they writ, than for discovering them to him; whereas the very Essence of History requires of us, that we describe their Defects and the ill Consequences occasioned by them, that we teach the rest of the World to shun them, as well as to imitate those Virtues, of which she gives us the Examples. If a Man of the Genius of Plutarch or Suetonius, as far as he can reasonably be so , had written the Life of Cardinal Richelieu, or of Cardinal Mazarin, he would have written it after another manner than the Sieur Aubery has done, who has had so bad an opinion of our Age, that he has endeavoured to persuade the World that they were pious Men, and good Bishops. He would not have forgotten their good Qualities, such as were their Vigilance and Address, but he would not have presumed so far upon his Reader as to have talked of their Devotion and Humility. Several Persons are likewise of opinion, that it was downright Raillery to strive to make a Saint of Cardinal Ximenes, since all the Actions of his Life sufficiently discovered that he was a very haughty and ambitious Man.  
The Greeks and Romans have generally committed a very great fault against the Principles of Humanity, and that is, when they speak of the Incursions which their Generals made into those Countries which they call Barbarous, of their manner of subduing them, and how they treated the People who rebelled against them, after they had overcome by force; they slide gently over these places, as if the Greeks and Romans had committed no Inhumanity in all this. When the Greeks made Depredations upon the Persians and their Subjects, to carry them into Slavery and killed all such as pretended to oppose them, they 
† See Grotius de jure B. & P. Lib. II. ●● 20. n. 41. etc. 22. n. 10.  called this Civilising the barbarous Nations. Nay, they said that the Greeks were naturally Enemies of the Persians, and that Nature taught them to make War against them. On the contrary, when the Persians or any other People, whom they called Barbarous, that is to say, All those who could not talk Greek, showed any such Civilities to them, these were a pack of Monsters that made nothing of violating the most sacred things in the World, and 'twould surprise you to see what 
† See Isocrat. Panegyr.  terrible Descriptions they make of their Inhumanities'. The Romans were guilty of the same Trick, and never speak with Horror, but when they talk of the Mischiefs they suffered from other Nations. When they overrun these very same Nations with Fire and Sword, and make Slaves of the Inhabitants of a whole City, for having endeavoured to throw off their injust Yoke, or when they force the Prisoners of War to turn Gladiators, and kill one another to divert the Roman Mobb, all this is nothing but sport and pastime. But when the Gauls or the Parthians ill used those whom they had taken Prisoners, why then they thought no Punishment could be too severe, to mortify these People as they deserved.  
The Greek and Roman Historians are full of an excessive Indulgence for their own Nation, and forgive nothing in others; because their Ideas of Justice and Humanity were too limited and narrow, and they knew not that all Men are equal in matter of natural Right. 
† See Plutarch in his Life.  Caesar had no more right to make War upon the Gauls and Germans, than the Pirates of Cilicia had to take him Prisoner, and sell him for so much Ransom. In the mean time, these Pirates are never mentioned but with Detestation, and the Victories of Caesar are infinitely extolled.  
Christian's ought not to imitate the Pagans, knowing by the Gospel that all Men are Brothers, and are subject to the same Laws one towards another, by the Right of Nature proceeding from God himself who is the common Father of all Mankind. However, when they come to speak of Christians and Turks, one would often be tempted to think that the Turks were created by the bad Principle of the Manichaeans, whom we were not at all obliged to treat with Humanity, but when we could not hurt them with safety to ourselves; but that on the contrary, the Turks were obliged to observe all the Laws of Justice towards the Christians, as if they were the only Creatures of the good Principle. The Turks on their side are not much more reasonable towards the Christians; but these latter as having received a fuller Light, aught to be more Wise and Humane. When they speak of the Violences committed by the Knights of Malta upon the Turks, they ought to speak of them in the same Terms, as of the Robberies of the Pirates of Barbary upon the Christians. On the contrary, all the Ports of Christendom are full of Groans and Complaints, when those of Algiers or Tunis have taken a Christian Prize; and all the World rejoices when the Knights of Malta take any Turkish Vessel. The Lives of several grand Masters of Malta, and many Knights of that Order are full of that Injustice. There is no sort of Punishment which the Robberies of these Turkish Pirates upon the Christians don't deserve: there are no Commendations which the like Civilities of the Knights of Malta to the Mahumetans don't challenge.  
If the Turks should endeavour to pervert the Christians in their Empire, by Rewards, or Punishments; by giving Money to such as would take the Turban, and by ill using those that should continue firm to their Religion, how should we exclaim against this Barbarity, and what dismal Complaints should we hear in all parts of Christendom upon so Tragical a Scene! And if the Mahometans tired out with the Constancy of the Christians, who obeyed them, should all at once turn them out of their Habitations, and oblige them to quit the Dominions of the Grand Signior, when we should see all Christendom filled with Grecian Refugees, all People would Curse the Mahometan Tyranny, and exclaim at such horrid Injustice. And no doubt on't they would have good reason so to do, because there is no Authority in the World, which has a Right to impose a Religion upon any Man whatever, nor to persecute those that are of a different Opinion, merely upon that account.  
But when Cardinal 
† See his Life by M. Flechier. Lib. I.  Ximenes converted the Moors of Granada with a Purse in one Hand and Chains in the other, some People will tell you that the Moors had no Reason to Complain. What is a detestable Action in a Mufti or an Alfaqui, becomes a meritorious Work when a Christian Churchman does it; tho' he cannot produce any Power from Heaven, which authorises him to treat the Mahometans in a manner which they cannot employ against the Christians, without Injustice. By what Revelation do we know that God has given certain Rules of Justice to the Christians, and Laws altogether different to other People? For my part, I confess I don't know.  
But if it should be replied, That Truth has this right over Falsity, that it may persecute those that are in an Error, by those whose Sentiments are true, I have two things by way of answer to it. The first is, That Men still dispute what is true and what false; and that the Mahometans, for instance, are as fond of their Opinions as the Christians can be persuaded of theirs. Thus if you lay it down for a Rule, that Truth has a right to persecute Error, you furnish them with Weapons, and you cannot complain of their Persecutions. For, in short, so long as they are fond of Mahumetanism, 'tis a necessary Consequence that they fancy themselves in the right to persecute the Christians. The second thing is, That altho' I should allow you, that the Persons whom you persecute are in an Error, yet I will always maintain that Error is not a Crime, when those that are engaged in it, in all other Respects observe the Laws of Civil Society, and are not punishable for any breach of good Manners. 'Tis evident therefore that there is no Power which has a right to ill Use, and persecute its Subjects under a pretence of Error in Religion; as there is no Magistrate that can punish a Mathematician for making a Mistake in Calculation.  
It follows from hence that an Historian, who ought to ground his Judgement upon Truths that are indisputable and universally received, aught to speak with Indignation of the Conduct of Cardinal Ximenes, and the Catholic Kings towards the Moors, instead of approving or palliating it, as some Historians have done. They describe Ximenes and these Princes to us, as Lovers of Justice, yet make them commit a crying Injustice against several thousands of Moors, by persecuting them, and forcing them out of their Native Country, because they would not turn Christians. If the Moors that lived on the Southside of the Straight of Gibraltar, had used the same Cruelties towards the Christians that had been found among them, what horrid Descriptions had they not made of it in Spain!  
'Tis not only the Infidels, who have smarted under this sort of Justice, which is never good but when it has the stronger side to support it: Christians have employed it against Christians, I mean those whom we call Heretics. The Historians of each Party being prepossessed with this strange Idea, have in scandalous manner extolled the Justice of Princes, who have made use of violent Methods to ruin those that were of their own Opinion, and exclaim without Reason against the contrary party, when they take the same course. Now we must either condemn all those that persecute for the sake of Opinion, or equally absolve them. When they deposed the Arian Bishops and Priests, and sent them into Banishment; when they used their Followers ill, and took away their Churches from them, than they did nothing but Justice, and care was taken to suppress all the Complaints which they made of these ill Treatments, and of the odious Circumstances that attended them. But when the Arians returned the like Kindness to the Bishop of Alexandria and some others, and endeavoured to oppress their Party, than there was a horrible Violation of all manner of Justice, and both the East and the West have reason to rise up in Arms, to oblige the Emperor Constantius to re-establish them. For my part, I cannot endure the Visions of the Arians, concerning their three unequal Gods, neither do I pretend to excuse the Violence of their Conduct; but I don't comprehend how these that were subject to Error as well as they, and who erred in effect, if they believed three collateral Gods, as they are accused to have done, which I will not examine here; I don't comprehend, I say, how they could complain of their Persecutions, after they had persecuted them before. Neither can I see how the Ecclesiastic Historians can clear themselves of what we may lay to their charge, that is, of having no certain fixed Rule of Justice and Injustice; since Eusebius of Nicomedia passes for an injust Man because he persecuted, while the same thing is called Justice in Athanasius of Alexandria. This was the case of the other Heresies, who used the Orthodox III, when they were uppermost; and who were ill used in their turn, when they happened to be the weakest.  
Thus, as the Result of the Majority of Voices, is called Truth in such a History; so whatever the strongest Party does, goes by the Name of Justice. The weakest side is always accounted Erroneous and Unjust. I believe that no such thing can be objected to the Heathen Historians. Tho' they were often partial, as I have already said; yet they never referred to any Assembly the care of deciding for them, what is True or False, Just or Unjust, and in so absolute a manner as to oblige Men to Sacrifice to such Decisions all the Notions they had before of Truth and Falsehood, Equity and Iniquity; as the Christians have done for several Ages, and as many of them do it still to this Day.  
Many other things might be said concerning the Proceed of those Assemblies, which have often trampled on all the Rules of Equity or Justice, which the Civil Laws so wisely prescribe.  
The Assemblies, which condemned those they called Heretics, have often deprived them of the liberty of defending themselves, and were made up of Men, who could be, without any Scruple, both Judges and Parties. Notwithstanding, most Historians applaud them, and speak of them with an extraordinary Respect. Thus, what would be called Injustice, Cabal and Oppression, in a judiciary Court, goes by the Name of Justice, Zeal and Equity, in the Councils. It ought therefore to be remembered that those Words signify quite another thing in the Writings of a Church-Historian, than they do in another History. The Reason of it, is, because they who writ the History of the Church, have, for the most part, no true and exact Ideas of Virtue and Vice.  
What I have said, relates to the Ideas of Morality, which an Historian ought to have, before he undertakes to inform Posterity; one may see how necessary they are to him; but 'tis no less necessary that he should have true Notions of Politics; since History is not only concerned about private men's Actions, but also about the reciprocal Duties of People and their Governors, and what the several Nations own to one another, To this all Policy may be reduced, which is nothing else but the Art of making a People Happy, by a good and just Government, and by protecting them against their Enemies.  
I will not undertake to treat here of that Science at large: I shall only touch upon some of its general Principles, which, I think, an Historian ought to keep always in mind, and which are too much neglected at present. The first is, That they, who govern Nations, aught to make the Happiness of those, whom God has committed to their Care, the chief End of their Government. Which comprehends all the Duties of those, who are at the Head of a Society, and is a Principle so generally received, that the most unjust Tyrants durst scarce contradict it. The Happiness of a People, (that there may be no Equivocation in that Word) does undeniably consist, 

1. In being only obliged to obey the Laws, which are approved by a long Use, or enacted according to the usual manner.  
2. In enjoying quietly one's Estate, and the Fruit of one's Labour, as long as one obeys the Laws, without being under the apprehension of being deprived of it by any violent Means.  
3. In contributing to the public Charges, as much as the Subjects can bear, without being overburdened.   'Tis manifest, that if the Will of a fickle and inconstant Man, surrounded with Flatterers, takes place of the Law; or if one is not sure of what he possesses; or pays more than he is able, there can be no Happiness under such a Government. This we may observe in the Despotic Empires of Asia, where the People, subject to those three Inconveniences, are the most unfortunate Men in the World.  
Those general Principles being laid down, no manner of Government ought to be Praised by an Historian, but as much as it is agreeable to them; nor ought a Prince to be Esteemed further than he conforms himself to the same. This was the Sense of the Greek and Latin Historians on this Matter: They Brand with the Name of Tyranny any sort of Government, wherein the Laws are Arbitrary, and where no Man is sure of what he has, and the Charges are so Exorbitant, that the People have much ado to live. They also call Tyrants those, who govern after that manner, whether there be but one, or many. Such were their Notions concerning a good Policy; as one may see by a careful Reading of Aristotle's Politics.  
Tho' it is manifest that a People cannot be Happy under such a Government, as I have described; and tho' it cannot be doubted, but that Men form several Societies in order to their Happiness; yet there have been some Men, since the XVI. Century, of which Nicholas Machiavelli may be accounted the Chief, who have endeavoured to introduce a Notion of Policy quite different from that which I have described. They have had no Regard to the Natural and Inviolable End of all Rational Societies but only enquired by what means the Heads of Societies might render themselves absolute Masters of the Laws, and the People's Lives and Estates, and make themselves greater at their Neighbour's Cost, without any regard to Justice. This is the only thing, which the Policy of a Sovereign ought to aim at, according to those Authors, and he ought to place all his Prudence in compassing his Designs by any means, provided they be safe. They do not concern themselves about what is Just or Unjust, but only about that which the Supreme Power can do, without endangering itself. That sort of Politicians look upon People, not as Men, whose Good their Rulers ought to procure, as much as they can; but as a Pack of Hunting-Dogs, which ought to be kept only as far as they can afford Sport. Machiavel's Prince minds only his own Good, and is no farther concerned in the Good of his Subjects, than he can better himself by it. This is exactly the Notion the Grecians had of a Tyrant, according to 
† Polit. Lib. III. c. 7.  Aristotle's Definition, who says, That Tyranny is a Monarchy, which aims only at the Good of a Monarch.  
This is not a fit place to confute that Doctrine; which being compared with what I have said of a true Policy, will easily appear unworthy of a Man, who has not lost all Sense of Virtue. Indeed those, who are most fond of it, dare not openly own such pernicious Principles. The most Arbitrary Princes, without excepting the Grand Signior, endeavour to persuade their Subjects, that the Good of the State, is the only thing they aim at, to which they Sacrifice all things, if they aim to be believed. Thus Tyranny and Vice make, as it were, satisfaction to Freedom and Virtue. But because there are , especially among those, who are the nearest Attendants of Princes, a great many Men, who only mind their private Advantage, by flattering Sovereign Princes, and so Reigning with them, if they can, Machiavelism, tho' never so detestable, has made a great Progress in the World. Those, who are infected with it, brand with the Name of Seditious Doctrine the Sentiments of those, who believe that the Power of Princes is bounded by the Laws; and they continually say, in Europe as well as in Asia, that a Prince is Master of his Subjects Lives and Estates. And because 'tis not safe in many Countries to contradict those scandalous Discourses; that Doctrine, or at least part of it, has been entertained by several Historians. They intimate , that a State cannot be Happy and Quiet, unless People blindly submit to the Will of a Prince; as being born, not to form, with their Fellow-Creatures, a Society advantageous to all its Members, but to be Slaves to the Prince.  
Churchmen, most of whom claim a Right to a like Monarchy over the Souls of Men, have flattered the temporal Power, as much as they could; in hopes of being upheld by it in their Claim, and of reigning likewise over the Bodies, as well as the Souls of Men; because of the strict Connexion there is between those two things. And the better to succeed in their Design, they have made use of the Divine Authority, as if the Christian Religion was only consistent with an absolute Empire over Men's Bodies and Souls: as the Muftis and Alfaquis promise Mahomet's Paradise to those, who are the best Slaves to the Sultan.  
This is the Reason why we see so many Histories written by such Men, full of that Spirit of Slavery towards spiritual and temporal Sovereigns: And herein many of our Modern Historians are much inferior to the Heathen Historians. We may observe in the latter, constant and settled Principles of Equity and Justice, when they treat of Princes and their Subjects. Every Page of their Histories contains such Sentiments as become free and rational Men. But the Histories of many Modern Authors are full of shameful Flatteries of Princes, to whose Will they Sacrifice all their Notions of Equity and Justice. They will tell you, that the least Irregularities of the People towards their Sovereigns, deserve all the Punishments of this Life, and the Life to come; but the greatest Crimes of a Prince against his Subjects are but Venial Sins.  
I have often observed, that many of those, who speak of the Revolutions of England, in Histories, or in common Discourse, express a great Indignation against the Inhabitants of that Country; because they have not submitted themselves to their Kings, as Slaves, in imitation of their Neighbours. The English are commonly accounted a wild and inconstant Nation, for no other reason but because they obey their Kings, when they do not encroach upon their Privileges; and oppose their Designs, when they go about to destroy them; whereas, in other Countries, they are used to obey unjust as well as just Commands. That happy Nation is as Dutiful and Obedient to its Kings; as it can be, without endangering the loss of the public Liberty: and whilst their Kings require nothing from them that is contrary to their Privileges, they are ready to do any thing for them: as we have seen in this last War, ended in 1697. under the Reign of a Prince, who lets them enjoy their Liberties. But they will not make themselves Slaves, as others have done. Their Neighbours, who are submitted to an Arbitrary Power, call it Wildness and Inconstancy; whereas a Greek or Roman Historian would call it Constancy and Love of Liberty. On the contrary a blind Obedience, ready to commit all sorts of Crimes at a Prince's Command, is accounted by them Faithfulness to one's Prince and Country; whereas the Greek and Latin Authors would have called it Slavery. Thus the Change of Notions and Customs has brought in the Change of the Names of Virtues and Vices. The Words of Cato to the Senate, as we find them in Sallust, may be applied to those Men: We have lost a great while ago, says he, speaking of his time, the true Names of things; because to give away another Man's Estate, goes by the Name of Liberality, and Boldness in doing Ill is called Courage. Jam pridem nos vera rerum Vocabula amisimus, quia bona aliena largiri Liberalitas, malarum rerum Audacia Fortitudo vocatur.  
'Tis certain that the ancient Historians very much exceed the Modern in this respect; but there is one thing, in which the latter do perhaps exceed the former. It seems that the ancient Historians were ignorant of what Nations own to one another. Justice and Equity seemed to them to be Virtues, good for private Men, but to which a whole Nation was not bound. 'Tis for this reason that they describe with great admiration the Conquests of great Empires, such as the Persian, and Roman. If at any time they find fault with the Conduct of those ancient Conquerors, they do it only, when they shamefully broke their Promise, or were excessively Cruel. But they seldom blame the desire of domineering, and enslaving neighbouring Countries, on the first favourable Opportunity. Such a desire, if it can be satisfied by the way of Arms, is accounted by the heathen Historians a noble and heroical Act. They very much esteemed those, who enlarged the Bounds of the Empire, without enquiring whether it was just or not, provided they were successful in their Undertake. The Romans, for Example, made continual Wars, not so much in their own Defence, as to make themselves Masters, first, of Italy, and then of the neighbouring Countries; till they had submitted to their Empire the best parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa, all along the Mediterranean Sea. The Greek and Latin Historians strove who should describe best their Wars and Conquests, in such a manner as easily shows that they much more admired their Bravery and Skill in improving the Occasions of making themselves greater, than they would have admired the justest People in the World, who keeping within their Bounds, would have been contented to repulse the Injuries of their Neighbours, without endeavouring to enlarge their Territories. If at any time they blame their Ambition and Injustice, as they do sometimes; 'tis nothing if compared with the Praises they bestow on them, when they mention their Victories.  
The Christian Religion having given us more exact and complete Notions of Justice, than the Heathens commonly had, several Christian Historians have spoken of the Ambition of the ancient Conquerors, in Terms more agreeable to the immutable Law of Justice, than the Heathen Historians ever did. I confess that the ancient Philosophers have said a great many things on this Point, which are almost as sound as what has been said by Christians; but it was only the Philosophers that spoke so, and the Historians had no great Regard to their Opinions.  
An 
† H. Grotius.  Incomparable Author hath, the first shown, in this XVII. Century, what are not only, the Laws of Peace, but also of War; and has so clearly taught what Nations own to one another, that it can no longer be doubted whether making War out of mere Ambition be not perfect Robbing and Murdering. That great Man has reduced into an Art, and methodically proved the Truths, which were dispersed in several Authors, on this Matter, and has confirmed them with many Examples and Quotations. So that if any Historian will give the Title of Just and Pious to any Prince, who made, or will hereafter make War out of Ambition; he ought not to take it ill, if he is accounted a base and shameful Flatterer. A Prince, who has reduced several Provinces to an extreme Misery and Poverty, and destroyed several Millions of People, out of mere Ambition, and without being provoked, will never be looked upon as a good Man, unless Paganism should prevail again, or Machiavelism should become  the Religion in fashion. The Heathens praised much the Clemency of Julius Caesar, to whom, what I have said, might have been justly objected; because he spared the Lives of many of his Fellow-Citizens, who had fought against him to preserve the Liberty of their Country, and at last submitted to his Tyranny. But no Historian, worthy of that Name, can hereafter cry up the Clemency of those, who have done, or will do any such thing. Princes, who little think of the Miseries, which a War brings on their Subjects and Neighbours; or are not moved with the Calamities and Tears of an infinite number of innocent and unfortunate Families, or the great Bloodshed which attends a long War, will never be cried up as Merciful and Just, but by such Men as have scarce any Notion of those Virtues, or by Flatterers, whom no Body can bear with, but they who dare not contradict ' 'em.  
This is what I had to say concerning History. If I have spoken somewhat freely, let no Body find fault with me for it, but rather with the Matter itself, which admits of no Palliation. I know very well that this Discourse and the like will not hinder Historians from Flattering and Lying; but I suppose those Gentlemen will not take it ill, if one speaks sometimes the Truth.   

CHAP. IU. Of the Decay of Humane Learning, and the Causes of it.  
THERE is without doubt a Decay in the Commonwealth of Learning, in several Respects; but I shall only mention that which concerns Philology. 'Tis certain we have not seen, for a long time, in any part of Europe, any Men, who equal the illustrious Critics, who lived in the last Century, and the beginning of this. For Example, We see no Body, who equals in Learning, Application of Mind, and Bulk as well as Number of Books, Joseph Scaliger, Justus Lipsius, Isaac Casaubon, Claudius Salmasius, Hugo Grotius, John Meursius, John Selden, and a great many others, whom I need not name, because they are known to every Body. I have a due Esteem for many learned Men of my Acquaintance; but I am persuaded that none of them will complain, if I say that I know none, who equals those great Men in Learning. We have seen nothing for a long time, that can be compared with their Works.  
I have enquired into the Reasons of it, and I think I have found some satisfactory ones. Some of them concern those, who should favour the Study of Humane Learning, but do it not: and some concern them, that profess that Study, and bring Contempt upon it. I shall instance upon some few, to which the Reader may add his own, and what he has observed by his Experience.  

The Difficulties of that Study.  I. TO begin with the latter, I mean, that which can be objected to the Men of Learning. The first Reason why few Men have applied themselves to the Study of Humane Learning, and consequently why fewer still have had an extraordinary Success in it, is that they who were learned in that sort of Science, did not care to make it easy to others. Because most of them attained to the Learning they had, not by a short and methodical Way, but by a vast Reading and a prodigious Labour; they did not at all care to facilitate to others the means of acquiring that Learning. Having, if I may so say, got with much ado to the top of the Rock, through steep and thorny Ways, they thought it just that others should undergo the same Toil, if they would attain to the same degree of Learning. But because there are few Men, whose Genius is so bend to the Study of Humane Learning, as to resolve upon taking so much Pains, to get the Knowledge of it; 'tis no wonder if most Men have been discouraged, almost from the Beginning, and if a great Knowledge of that sort of Learning is so scarce at present.  
Perhaps it will be asked, What those learned Men of the first Rank should have done, to facilitate that Study, besides what they have done? I answer that there are two-sorts of Books, which may serve to acquire that sort of Knowledge; which have been wanting, ever since the Study of Humane Learning hath been in Vogue.  

Of Critical Notes upon the Latin Authors.  THE first Books we want are good Editions of all the Greek and Latin Authors, not only correct, but also illustrated with all necessary Notes, to make them more Intelligible. But to come to Particulars, I begin with the Latin Authors, and I say that the learned Men, I have mentioned, or others like them, should have given us at least all the good Latin Authors, not only revised upon such ancient Manuscripts as we have, but also illustrated with short, clear and methodical Notes on all the difficult Places, and such as were not above the Capacity of young Men, and might serve those, who have made some Progress. Whereas the learned Men I spoke of, have been most times contented to publish Authors with mere critical Notes, about the true Reading; to which if they have added any thing for the understanding of the Expressions, Opinions or Customs, they have done it only upon some few places, to make a show of their great Reading, by publishing their common Places, or Compilations; besides, what they say is often so much out of the way, that it is of no use for the better Understanding of an Author. But there are a great many other places, which will put not only a young Beginner to a stand, but also such as have made a greater Progress, upon which they say nothing at all. When the Text of an Author is clear, they will often speak much and enlarge upon it; but when it is difficult and obscure, they say nothing at all. There are some Critics, who think it beneath them to make such Notes; they say that they are only good for young Men, and that those who have made some Progress, may easily be without 'em: But neither of them is altogether true. There are many grave Men, who have nobler Employments, and want good Notes upon the difficult Places of ancient Authors, and would be very glad to find some. They have not time enough to look in other Books for the Explications they want; because they read those Authors only for their Recreation, when their Business is over, and not to weary themselves in turning over large Volumes, to find the Explication of a Place they do not understand. Besides, 'tis; a more difficult thing to write such Notes, than 'tis commonly believed. The Notes of Paul Manucius upon Cicero's Epistles, which are such as I would have, cost him much more Pains than the Critical Notes of many others, tho' never so much esteemed; and it had been much better to put them under the Text, rather than several others, which are only about the true Reading. Eight Readers in ten want Manucius' Notes, but scarce look on what is said concerning the Various Readins. 'Tis to no purpose to say that it is an Abuse: Such is men's Humour, and few have time enough to examine so many needless Punctilios. The most Curious are contented to have recourse to those Compilations, when 'tis necessary they should exactly understand the Sense of a Passage; otherwise they would not look on them. And indeed, the Reader retains not much in his Memory, when he has read them.  
Short Notes, well worded, which contain nothing without a Proof for it, or at least refer the Reader to a good Author for the Truth of what they say, quoting exactly the place, that it may be easily found; such Notes, I say, are a great Treasure for most Readers. But 'tis not so easy to make 'em, as to Quibble about some various Readins, or to make some Digressions.  
Some Men of Learning, much inferior to those I have mentioned, have undertaken in our Age, especially in Holland, to supply that Defect, and to collect several Notes out of several Critics, who had written upon the best Authors, or explained them by the by in some other Works. They go by the Name of Notes Variorum: But the greatest part of the first Collections were very ill made, because those who went about it, were not qualified for it. They have often pitched upon the worst, have not alleged the Proofs of the Authors they abridged, and have often misrepresented their Thoughts. And to insert Notes , they have been as large on the clear as the obscure Passages, and filled their Collections with useless or unseasonable Digressions.  
Every Body complaining of the Notes Variorum, some learned Men thought it necessary to make a Choice of the best Critics, and insert all their Notes together with some other good Remarks of other Authors. Such are the Latter Editions, Cum Notis Variorum, and they are without doubt to be preferred before the former. The Public has been better pleased with them, and all those, who love Humane Learning, have been extremely glad to have a complete Collection out of all the best Critics, to consult it when there is an occasion for't. Notwithstanding, they complain still of one thing, and I think they have some Reason for it. They wish that those, who make such Collections, would only put under the Text such Notes as may serve for the understanding of the Expressions, Opinions, Customs, etc. Supplying what is wanting in them, as much as it can be done; and that all the complete and full Notes should be referred to the end of the Book, to consult them upon occasion. They wish besides that those Notes of several Authors were so disposed, that one might find them all at once in one place; whereas one must run over a whole Volume, to find what each Author says, which is too long and tedious. We have two Editions of Caesar's Commentaries by Goth. Junger●annus, wherein all the Notes are at the end of the Book, and 'tis no easy thing to make use of them, because every one of those Notes is by itself, in ●ts order; whereas if they were mixed, one might see with a glance of the Eye whatever the Commentators say upon each Place.  
They thought in France it were better, if those, who undertook to publish the Classic Authors for the Use of the Dauphin, should take out of the ●earned Men, who wrote before them, what they should think fit. But, if I may be allowed to ●peak the Truth, Most of those Interpreters have but indifferently performed their Part. First, They made use of very bad Editions; whereas ●hey should have followed the best: which, I ●hink, is an unpardonable Fault. Secondly, One may see In their Notes, the same Faults I have observed in the first Holland Editions, Cum Notis ●ariorum. However there is one thing in the Paris Editions, which is wanting in the Holland Editions. There are in the former some Index's of all the Words, which may be of great Use to ●ind out the Passages wanted, when one remembers but some Words of them. But it must be confessed that those Indices would be better and shorter, if laying aside all the trivial and common Words, which no Body ever looks for, as the Verb Sum with all its Tenses, Conjunctions, Adverbs and Prepositions, when they contain no particular Signification, that deserves to be taken notice of, etc. they had inserted not only the Words by themselves, but also the Phrases. The Reason of it is, because no Body looks in an Index for the Verb Sum, for instance, in its ordinary Signification; and if any Body looked for it in an uncommon sense, it would perhaps take up a whole Day to find it in the Index, unless one knew near at hand where to find it. The same may be said of a great many other Words. Whereas, if the Phraeses were contained in the Index, when they are not common, one might presently find the Passage one looks for. 'Tis for this Reason we so much esteem the Indices of Mathias Berneggerus and John Freinshemius, who were learned Men, and made exact and judiciouss Indices of several good Authors, tho' they inserted not all the Words. But it may be that those who had the direction of the Editions, For the Use of the Dauphin, did not think fit to trust the Authors of those Indices, and ordered them to insert all the Words, lest they should forget some material thing. The Authors of the Notes should have taken upon them the care of doing it; and if they were learned enough to write Notes, they should have been judged capable of making good Indices.  
If therefore the Liberality of a great Prince and his Ministers has had no better Success; 'tis the Fault of those, who have been put upon that Work: But that Project was very good in itself, and becoming the Generosity of a great Prince, and the Learning of those, who were entrusted with the Education of the Dauphin. At the same time that they were writing for Him, they would have done a great piece of Service, not only to France, but also to, the rest of Europe; if they had gone about it according to the Method, which, as I said before, the Compilers of the Notes Variorum should have followed.  

Of the Translations of Greek Authors, and Notes upon them.  HAVING spoken of the Latin Authors, I must now say something of the Greek. The Performances of the learned Men of the first Rank, ●re here more deficient still. There are but few, whose Translations are exact, most of them being rather Paraphrases, than Translations, especially on the difficult Places; which makes them far less useful. One would think that they, who made 'em, designed they should be read, by themselves, by those, who understood not the Greek Tongue: whereas such Translations should be placed by the Text, to help those, who read the original, when they meet with some difficult Passages. The worst of all is, that most of 'em are not faithful enough, and often misrepresent the Sense of the Original; because few of 'em were made by very learned Men. They, who were able to do it well, were discouraged, looking upon it as a tedious Labour, and which was beneath them; and those, who undertook it, were not qualified for it. Isaac Casaubon has very well Translated Polybius, Aeneas Tacticus, and the Characters of theophra. It were to be wished, that that learned Man had Translated many other Authors as well as those. He would have done a much greater Service to the Public, than by writing against Baronius concerning some Matters he understood not so well, and which 'twas too late for him to Study in his old Age.  
Perhaps some will say that I insist too much upon the Translations of Greek Authors, and that studious Men should use themselves to read the Originals without the help of a Translation. But I answer, That to use one's self to it, one must have some help, and that there can be none better than a Translation placed by the Text. I appeal to them, who have attained to so great a Knowledge of the Greek Tongue, as to want such a help no longer. It has been useful to every Body, especially in the Reading of difficult Authors, such as the tragical Poets, and the like, as Pindar, Lycophron, Thucydides, etc. A good Translation is as useful as a Commentary, and no Body needs be more ashamed to consult it, than to consult some Notes. If the Translator was a learned Man, 'tis to be presumed that he took more Pains to explain his Author, than one can often take by Reading him, and certainly he deserves to be taken notice of. Menagius says, in the Menagiana, that tho' he had studied that Tongue for a long time, he could not be without a Translation; and I think several People would say the same, if they were as sincere as he was.  
We have few Greek Authors, illustrated with Notes upon all the difficult places, and the Notes we have are as Deficient as those that have been made upon the Latin Authors. However they have lately published in Holland three Greek Authors, Cum Notis Variorum, which one may approve of; because they contain the entire Notes of several learned Men. I mean Diogenes Laertius, Longinus and Callimachus. They have also within these few Years printed some Greek Authors in England, with the ancient Scholia, and some critical Notes; but they are not to be compared to those of Holland, either for Order, or the excellency of the Notes, tho' they are not at all to be despised. They should have placed all the Notes under the Text, which was an easy thing to do, because they are short enough; to save the Time and Labour of the Reader, who is unwilling to have recourse to the end of a Book, whilst he reads an Author; especially being uncertain whether he will find some Notes upon the Passage he does not understand. Some Critics will frown at the Reading of what I say; but in this they oppose the Judgement of every Body, who may justly desire to save his Time and Labour, as much as is possible.  
I know there are some Men, whose Learning ought by no means to be despised, who will complain that what I have said, tends to facilitate the Knowledge of the Sciences to Lazy Men, and even to render 'em contemptible, by making them too common. I confess I could wish that the way to Learning were made so plain and easy, that the most Lazy Men might become Learned: Indeed, what signifies it to take much Pains, which in itself is of no Ufe? We esteem those, who labour hard, and apply themselves to Study for a long time, only because a great Labour and Application serve to acquire a useful Knowledge. 'Tis well to use oneself to take Pains, not because it is a Meritorious thing in itself; but because in this Life we can get nothing without Pains. This Truth, confirmed by the Experience of all Ages, aught to free our morose Philologers from the fear of being soon overtaken by those, who go a more smooth and shorter way than they went. Which way soever one takes to learn the Greek Tongue, it will always require much time, and a great Application and Memory, without which 'tis impossible to attain to a considerable Knowledge of it.  
Besides, 'tis altogether false, That if the Knowledge of ancient Authors should grow common, learned Men would be less esteemed. Such a fear would be well grounded, if it was a barren Science, which could afford no Pleasure; for such a Science, aught to be despised, as soon as 'tis known. But when a Science is useful and pleasant; the better it is known, the more it is cherished, and those, who know it, are so much the more esteemed. On the contrary, however useful it might be in itself, and whatever Pleasure it could afford to those who knew it; if it be known only to few, those who are Strangers to it, are apt to doubt of its Usefulness and Charms; because things, that are seen only with another Man's Eyes, are not so easily believed. Whilst the Learning of the Grecians, and the Beauty of their Language, were known at Rome only by the Report of some few Men, who had studied them; others, who knew but little or nothing at all of them, despised and even hated ' 'em. Cato the Censor, in a Book of Precepts directed to his Son, spoke of that Nation 
† Apud Plinium. H. N. Lib. XXIX. c. 1.  in these Terms: I'll tell you in a proper time what I have discovered concerning the Grecians at Athens, and I'll demonstrate to you that it is good to know something of their Learning, but not to learn it throughly. It is a very wicked and intractable Nation. Take it as the Words of a Prophet: If ever that Nation teaches others its Learning, it will spoil all, especially if it sends its Physicians hither. The Grecians are sworn to kill all the Barbarians with the Art of Physic: Dicam de istis Graecis suo loco, Marce Fili, quid Athenis exquisitum habeam; & quod bonum sit illorum litteras inspicere, non perdiscere, vincam. Nequissimum & indocile genus illorum, & hoc puta Vatem dixisse: quandocunque ista gens suas litteras dabit, omnia corrumpet. Tum etiam magis, si Medicos suos huc mittet. Jurarunt inter se barbaros necare omnes Medicinâ. There is no need I should show the Unjustice and Falsehood of that Judgement. Yet such Discourses were the Reason why a great while after the Grecians, especially the Physicians, were expelled from Rome, as we find it in the next Words of Pliny. But when the Romans grew more Learned, and became generally acquainted with the Greek Tongue; they were ashamed of their Rusticity, and the Grecians were infinitely more esteemed. There was not one Rich Man in Rome, but kept a Greek Grammarian or Philosopher in his House, as we learn from Lucian in a Treatise, which he wrote a purpose on that Subject.  
Our Humanists should endeavour, for the same Reason, to make the Reading of the Greek Authors as easy as they can. And then perhaps Men of the highest Rank would take delight in the Reading of them, and upon that account be great Benefctors to those, who should contribute to their Diversion. I only mention Diversion, tho' I am fully persuaded, that such a Reading would be very useful; because they, who have some Employments in the State, have not time enough, to make a formal Study of that sort of Learning, and read the ancient Authors only for their Pleasure. On the contrary, whilst Men in Authority believe that it is so difficult a thing to read the Greek Authors, that it requires all the Leisure of a Canon; they will look on that Study as a thing, wherein they are not at all concerned, and at last will altogether despise it and those, who esteem it. It were to be wished that such a thing had not already happened; but it will be much worse hereafter, unless the Lovers of the Greek Antiquities prevent it, by making that sort of Learning more easy than it has been hitherto.  

Other Helps wanting.  IN order to it, we should have not only good Editions of the Greek Authors, and such as I have before described; but also good Dictionaries, which should contain all the Discoveries that have been made in the Greek Tongue, since Henry Stephen and Robert Constantin, who are the last who made good Dictionaries. We have only had since pitiful Abridgements, to which nothing new has been added. It were to be wished that some learned Men, well versed in the Writings of the Critics, who have written since, as well as in the Reading of ancient Authors, would undertake to Augment Constantin's Dictionary.  
We want also some methodical Treatises of the Greek Antiquities, by the Reading of which one might learn the Opinions and Customs of the Grecians, without being obliged to read all the Treatises that have been published on that Subject. Notwithstanding all the Collections that have been made, we have nothing that is exact and complete on that Matter. But if no Body will make a methodical Treatise of all those things, it were at least to be wished that in an Age, wherein Dictionaries are so much in vogue, some Body would write a good one, that should contain whatever was written on that Subject, to have recourse to it on occasion; the Collections we have, being so confused and imperfect, that 'tis a hard matter to make use of 'em, or to find in them the Solution of one's Difficulties.  
What I have said of these latter Helps, for the understanding of the Greek Authors, ought also to be understood of the Latin; tho' we have greater Helps to understand the latter than the former.  

Humanists praise their Trade too much.  II. THERE are some Men, who believe that it the best way to have their Profession esteemed, is to Praise it excessively; without scrupling to undervalue all the rest in comparison of that, which they would have esteemed. They are like those Preachers, who extol the Saints, they will Praise on their Festival-Days, above all others. Such a Method may be good, to impose on the Common People for a little time; but at the bottom it is good for nothing, because it never fails to offend reasonable Men, who will have every thing to be valued according to its Worth, and take it ill when they perceive they have been deceived. They despise nothing that is useful, but they will not have any thing to be accounted more useful than really it is.  
They, who have spent their time in the Reading of ancient Authors, are commonly guilty of that Fault. If you would believe them, they that never read 'em, are not to be compared with those, that have. All other Sciences come not near this, which, they say, opens the way to all the Learning in the World. They, that have not studied it, are deprived of so great a Help, that there is none like it; and they, who applied themselves to it, are the only Men, who can raise the highest Designs to the greatest perfection.  
It cannot be denied but that the Reading of ancient Authors is very useful to us; but, if it were possible that we should be as ancient as they are, and that they should be in our place and read our Writings as we read theirs; would they get no Benefit by it? They would without doubt learn more from our Works, than we can from theirs. From whence it follows that we ought to read the ancient Authors, perfect their Knowledge by ours, and not despise those, who excel in the Modern Learning. I will not meddle with the famous Dispute, whether the ancient Authors ought to be preferred before the modern, or not; but I think, that those, who are Strangers to Antiquity, have reason to complain that they are despised, because they have no other Knowledge but such as the present time can afford ' 'em.  
I will readily grant that it is necessary to join the Knowledge of ancient Times with ours, and to take out of the original Authors what we desire to know of them; but it is not just to cry up that Knowledge, as if it contained whatever is necessary to be known. Quintilian rightly said: 
† Instit. Lib. 1. c. 1.  Si quid discere satis non est, ideo necesse non est: What is not sufficient to make one Learned, is notwithstanding necessary: And such are the Principles of Grammar, which he speaks of. But I would alto invert his Thought, Thus: Siquid dicere necesse est, ideo satis non est: Tho' a Science be necessary, yet we must not fancy that it is sufficient to make one Learned.  
It were much better to Praise the ancient Authors and the means of understanding them, less than they deserve, and that those who study them, should find in 'em more than they expected; than to Praise them so much, that they who read them, may justly complain they were deceived. And then they will not only abate of those excessive Praises, but the Discontent, which arises from their having been deceived, will make 'em apt to deprive that Science of the Praises it justly deserves. How many Men are there, who having applied themselves, for example, to the Reading of Aristotle, because of the great Encomiums bestowed on him, left it off with a great Contempt for that Philosopher; because they had not found in him the tenth part of what they were told? whereas, had that Author been moderately praised, they would have read his Works with great satisfaction; because of the great variety of the Subjects he treats of, and the occasion he gives to think of several things, which perhaps no Body would think of, if he had not read 'em; not to mention the Knowledge of the Opinions of many other Philosophers, which he furnishes his Reader with.  
It requires some Pains, application of Mind, and Sagacity, to make a more than ordinary Improvement in Humane Learning. The Reading of good critical Books is both pleasant and useful; no Body doubts of it. But the Knowledge of Words ought not to be preferred to the Knowledge of Things; which is the Fault of some Humanists, who despise all other Sciences, and fancy they ought to be placed in the first Rank of Learned Men, Thus they raise against themselves those who profess other Sciences, and they draw Contempt on their Learning, which would be esteemed, if they spoke modestly of it.  

Personal Faults of the Humanists.  III. But that which is worse, and makes Humane Learning much more Contemptible, is, that many of those, who have very much applied themselves to it, show by their own Example, that that Science, which they so excessively Praise, produces not the Effects one might have expected after so many Praises. When we hear any of those Gentlemen say in a very elegant Latin Style, and prove by the Testimony of all the Greek and Roman Authors, that the Study of Humane Learning will, far better than any other Science, make a Man judicious, exact and discerning, soften his Manners, and take away his Wildress and Rusticity, when, I say, we hear so many Encomiums, and look for the admirable Effects of that Science in its Panegyrists, we are strangely surprised to find often the quite contrary. One can hardly imagine but that if it could really produce so happy a Change in Men, it would chief be observed in those, who profess it; and when one sees there is nothing of it, all those Praises seem to be groundless.  
some Men of that Profession, who cannot be ranked among the Vulgar, do often Reason very pitifully, and know not how to order well their Thoughts; they load their Memory with a vast number of Words, and very few Things; they are full of a ridiculous Pride, which makes 'em decide every thing with a magisterial Air, which wise Men cannot endure; they by't every Body, quarrel with one another for Trifles, and give one another the foulest Language; in a word, instead of that charming Politeness, which, they say, is only to be found in the ancient Writers, we see nothing in them but a Pedantry, which can be endured no where but amongst Scholars.  
It would require a whole Volume, if I would enlarge upon the several Faults of the Humanists, as much as it were necessary, to draw a full Picture of them. But there is no need to enlarge upon those Faults, whereof we see every day but too many Examples; and I neither design to defame that Trade, not those who profess it. All that I could with, is that those, who know themselves to be guilty of Faults, which make their Profession contemptible, would seriously mend them, and endeavour to get the Affection of honest Men by a contrary Method. Who could forbear loving Humane Learning, if those who have most applied themselves to it, did reason With more exactness and clearness than others; if they displayed before their Readers not only an elegant Latin Style, but such things as are above the Capacity of the Common People, and useful to be known; if they shown as much Modesty as reading, and never boldly decided any thing but what may be evidently proved; if they exceeded other Men in good Nature and Condescension for one another, and never defended themselves, or attacked others but with Reasons, without Bitterness and Animosity: Lastly, if they shown in their Manners as much Politeness as is to be seen in the Style of good Authors, Who could forbear cherishing such Men, and bestowing upon them as many Favours as one could?  
If we could see such a Change, there would be no farther occasion to complain of the Contempt, which Humane Learning, and those who profess it, commonly lie under; for certainly it were impossible they should not be valued.  
Some morose Humanists will perhaps say, That 'tis ill done of me to censure after that manner those of his Profession; since it is certain that those, who apply themselves to other Sciences, as Divines and Philosophers, do no less scandalise the World, by not living according to their Profession. But I do not intent to excuse or defend those, of whom I say nothing, and ought not to speak in this place. It is enough for me that I have said nothing of those, whom I have mentioned, but what is confirmed by a daily experience. If other Men are guilty of the same Faults with us; ours are not less real, and we eaten no less bound to mend them, than if others were free from them; especially when those Faults are so prejudicial to a Science, and to those who profess it.  
I have heard of a rich Man, who had no tincture of Humane Learning, that having heard it very much praised by a Friend of his, who besides that Knowledge, had all the Qualifications necessary to gain esteem, he resolved to carry his Son to a famous University, and to spare no cost for his Education. But having very good natural Parts, and having been told too, that Scholarship makes one very often Pedantic and Proud; he would go himself and spend some time in that University together with his Son, to make choice of a good Professor, under whose care he might improve without being infected with the Pedantry and foolish Pride which Scholars are wont to bring with them from the Universities. He went therefore to the University, and the better to know the Professors, before he should resolve on the Choice he was to make, he often treated them together, and one after another, heard them speak, and gave them occasion to Discourse of several things, especially of such as he was throughly acquainted with. He did the like with their best Scholars. He knew in a little time all the Intrigues of the University, and soon perceived that those who professed the Study of Humane Learning, were exactly like those, whom I have said to be the cause of the Contempt it lies under. The Gentleman left that University very much dissatisfied, and went to another to make a new Trial, in which he had no better Success. He began then to think that the Gentleman, who had praised so much the Study of Humane Learning, had played him a Trick, and would hear no more on't, believing that his Friend had had a good Success by reason of his Natural Parts, not by the Reading of ancient Authors. He thought that his Son would improve enough, by the Knowledge of the Affairs of the World, without troubling himself with a Science, which seemed to him to be no better than a Cheat; and being a Man of great Authority, he did not a little Prejudice the Universities, where he had looked in vain for some Men like his Friend. Nay, he came to fancy that the great Men amongst the Ancients, whose Works he had heard so much praised, had been such Pedants as he had seen in the University; and he was like to believe that Demosthenes and Cicero were Professors of Rhetoric like those he had lately converted with, and that the Authors of an inferior Rank were mere Ushers.  
Perhaps it will be said that such Censures and the like are unjust, and that Men's Faults ought always to be distinguished from the Defects of the Sciences they profess. I grant it; but such Censures have always been so common in the World, that it cannot be expected that Men should have other Thoughts concerning this Matter; and they, who, by their personal Faults, defame the Sciences they Teach, are still more to blame, than those who make a wrong Judgement of them, upon such an account. I could willingly tell those Gentlemen, what one said to the Declamators of his Time: Pace vestrâ liceat dixisse, primi omnium eloquentiam perdidistis: Give me leave to tell you, That you are the chief Men, who have destroyed Humane Learnin.  

Humane Learning neglected by those, who used to encourage it.  iv LET us now see what the Humanists have to say against others; for we must do every Body Justice, and it is certain that they, who should Honour and Reward those, who excel in the Knowledge of Humane Learning, do it no more: which without doubt is one of the chief Reasons of its decay. For there are very few Men generous enough, to Cultivate with much pains a barren Science, which is of no use in the World. Men fit for that sort of Learning would no more be wanting now than they were till the middle of this Age; but there being no Rewards, they who are qualified for it, are altogether discouraged, looking upon it as an ungrateful Work. One may say, on this occasion, something like to what Martial said to those, who wondered that there were no Virgil's in their time: 
† Lib. VIII. Ep. 58.  Let there be Maecenas', and no Virgil's will be wanting; your very Country-Farms will afford you some.  
Sint Maecenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones';  
Virgiliúmque tibi vel tua Rura dabunt.  

† Lib. 1. Ep. 108.  You tell me often, replied he to another, that I am an idle Man, and that I should write some noble Piece. Procure me such a Leisure as Maecenas procured to Horaece and Virgil; and then I'll endeavour to Write something that will never Die, and to immortalize my Name. Oxen take no delight in Ploughing a Barren Ground: A fat Soil wearies the Labourer; but the Manuring of it is Profitable.  
Saepé mihi dicis, Luci clarissime Juli;  
Scribe aliquid magnum, desidiosus homo es.  
Otia da nobis, sed qualia fecerat olim  
Maecenas Flacco, Virgilióque suo.  
Condere victuras tentem per saecula chartas,  
Et nomen flammis eripuisse meum.  
In steriles campos nolunt juga ferre Juvenci;  
Pingue solum lassat, sed juvat ipse labour.  
Humane Learning, in Popish Countries, is of no use in order to get Church-Dignities; which are bestowed for quite another reason than to put a Man in a condition of serving the Public, and illustrating Antiquity; and the Places of Professors in Humane Learning are too few in their Universities, and of too small an Income, to encourage many People to Study. Some Religious Orders, which teach that Science, as the Jesuits, cultivate it only as much as it is necessary for them, to be Teachers of Rhetoric, that is, very slightly. Besides they seldom read the Protestant Critics, who notwithstanding are much more Learned than theirs; at least one Age since, or . So that there can be but few among Papists, who make an extraordinary Progress in that Science; because few have a Genius that leads 'em to it, and are under proper Circumstances for it.  
Most Scholars, among Protestants, are maintained by the Public only to Preach, and are obliged to spend their time in making of Sermons. And as to the Places of Professors of Humane Learning, they are neither more numerous nor better than in the Popish Countries. So that it is no wonder if there be so few Men, among the Protestants, who excel in that sort of Learning.  
But what's the reason, will some say, that Humane Learning is no more encouraged? Have the Defects of it been found out, and is it looked upon now as an useless Science? No new Defects have been discovered in it, but it is not in Fashion now, as it was before, no more than other things. Towards the end of the XV. Century, and the beginning of the XVI. Princes were great Encouragers of those, who excelled in Humane Learning. They bestowed Gifts and Pensions on them, and raised them to several Dignities; which was the Reason why there were so many very Learned Men in Italy and France, especially under Leo X. and Francis I. It was then the Fashion, among great Princes, to encourage Learning, whether they themselves were acquainted with it, or loved it only because they heard others discourse of it. The Favours they bestowed on Men of Learning produced so great an Encouragement, that it lasted not only whilst Learning was favoured by Princes, but also a good while after. That first Impetuosity of the Mind, which is so agreeable to our natural Curiosity of knowing the Opinions and Actions of those, who lived before us; that Motion, I say, like that which the Wind raises in the Sea, could not be calmed all of a sudden, and yield  to the Carelessness of those, who mind only the present Time, and care as little for the Time past, as for the Time to come.  
But a great many learned Men having embraced the Protestant Religion, and proclaimed , That the Knowledge of Humane Learning had opened a Way to the Understanding of Holy Scripture, and Church-History; so that the best Way to know the Errors and Abuses, which wanted a Reformation, was to Learn throughly the ancient Tongues; the Party, who had no mind to make any Alteration in the Practices, or Opinions of the latter Ages, began to suspect those who so much cried up Humane Learning, and so by degrees neglected to promote it. All Favours were only bestowed upon the zealous Defenders of the Ecclesiastical Monarchy; and Learning, which had been so much admired before, was looked upon by degrees as a thing, which might do it more Harm than Good. Thus Italy and Spain ceased almost to produce any thing of that kind, and the Libraries became useless Ornaments for the Inhabitants of those Countries. That Dislike of Humane Learning spread, as a Contagion, in the neighbouring Countries, and even in those, where they should be of quite another Opinion.  
'Tis reported that a great Minister of State, who was altogether a Stranger to Learning, used to call those who professed it Seditious Persons; in all likelihood because they are the Men, who have most insisted upon the Authority of the Laws, Justice and Equity. Indeed in the Countries, where Machiavelism prevails, the Notions of the Ancients concerning those things, do not at all agree with the ungovernable Passions of a Supreme Power. And this I think is one of the Reasons, which are very Prejudicial to Learning in some Countries.  
Thus the Defenders of the Supreme Authority of the Ecclesiastical Monarchy, on the one side, and the Defenders of the Arbitrary Power of Temporal Princes, on the other, have been of Opinion that the Reading of the ancient Heathen or Christian Writers was so far from being necessary, that it was believed for some time, it were much better on the contrary that the Republican Notions of the Grecians and Romans should be forgotten, and that the Opinions of the ancient Christians both in the East and West, which do not agree with the Modern Doctrine and Interests, should be covered with the Veil of an unintelligible Language. They have looked for Men, who would obey without any Reply, and make it their Business to Maintain and Increase the Spiritual and Temporal Power, without any regard to the Notions which Men had in former Times. Soldiers, who have no Principles, nor Sense of Virtue, and Clergymen, who are blind Slaves to the present Power, and examine nothing, and execute with the utmost Rigour whatever Orders they receive, are looked upon as the most unmoveable Pillars of the Church and State; and they, who quote ancient Authors, and whose Principles are independent on the Will of Princes, can have no Hearing.  

Some Reasons to cultivate Humane Learning anew.  BUT in the Countries, where they make it their Business to have no Laws but such as are founded upon natural Equity, they need not fear that the Republican Antiquity should contradict 'em; and therefore they should encourage those, who endeavour to give the Knowledge of it. They, who are not afraid to find any thing in the original Works of Ecclesiastical Writers, that may be prejudicial to the Notions of Religion and Virtue, which Holy Scripture affords, should omit nothing, to encnourage Men to inquire after Truth. The better it is known, the greater the Authority of the Laws will be, and Justice more flourishing.  
Tho' properly speaking, Humane Learning includes only the Knowledge of ancient Languages, and what is necessary to know Antiquity; yet it puts us in a condition of knowing things themselves, by furnishing us with the means of Conversing, as it were, with a great many learned Men both Heathen and Christians. So that it has a strict Connexion with all the Knowledge we can get by the Reading of ancient Authors: And the Desire of Knowing what they, who lived before us, believed, said, or did, as much as it can be Known, cannot be satisfied without such a Learning. The Knowledge of Dead Languages is, as it were, an Interpreter, whom we carry along with us, to Travel, if I may so say, in an Intelligible World, which exists only in Books written in Languages, that are not spoken at present. Without such an Interpreter, 'tis impossible to know what passed in it. And as great Princes have Interpreters of several Languages to treat with Strangers; so we must keep up that Knowledge, and make in as common, as it can possibly be; unless we give over the Thoughts of knowing what passed in former Times.  
These general Reasons, and several particular ones, which I pass by, should engage Princes to encourage the Study of Humane Learning; and they, who apply themselves to it, should use their utmost endeavours, to make it Easy and Pleasant to those, whose Favours can make it flourish again, more than ever it did. I do not pretend to have shown all the ways that can be taken in order to it: 'Tis enough for me that I have pointed at some of the chief, and given occasion to think of it to those, whom it most concerns.   

CHAP. V Of the Decay of some States.  
THERE are some States, which do manifestly Decay, in respect of Arts, and Strength. There is no need I should name them, and show their Weakness particularly. Every Body knows it; but every Body knows not how they come to be weakened.  
The better to understand the Reasons of the Decay of a State, it is necessary to know what can make it flourish; since it falls to Decay, because it wants that which could put it in a flovishing Condition. There are chief three things, which can make a State Happy at Home, and Dreaded Abroad. 

The first is a great number of Inhabitants:  
The second, The Revenues of the State, which ought to be great, without oppressing the People: And  
the third is, The Union of the several Members of the State; who ought to contribute to the public Good.    those things are to be found, it may be said there is Peace and Happiness, unless a very violent Storm raised by a greater Power, should fall upon such a State; and wherever they are wanting, one may certainly affirm, that the State will fall to Decay, if the Disorder last never so little. But I must come to Particulars, and prove each of those three things at large.  
First, It cannot be doubted but that the number of the Inhabitants does so much contribute to the Greatness of a State, that without it any State will be Poor, Weak and in Danger, if the Neighbouring-Countries are better stocked with Inhabitants. The better a Country is Peopled, the more Industrious are the Inhabitants; every one striving to Maintain himself as well as he can; which very much increases Trade, brings in Money from Foreign Countries, and all the Conveniencies of Life, as much as the Situation of the Country can permit it. On the contrary, Few Inhabitants can have no great Industry, because they consume few Commodities, and consequently Trade is far less considerable. They cannot bring in Foreign Money, by exporting their Manufactures, or such things as grow in their Country; because they have but a small quantity of them. Nor can they Import what they want, but in a small quantity, and consequently it will prove too dear.  
If such a State happens to be attacked by some Neighbours, whose Country is better Inhabited, it will not be able to send out an equal Army of its Inhabitants, and consequently it will be sooner or later Invaded; unless they send for Foreign Help, to supply their Weakness. But how can they send for it, having but small Revenues, by reason of the scarcity of the Inhabitants and their want of Industry?  
From whence it necessarily follows, that no greater Fault can be committed against Politics, than to make such Laws as hinder a Country from growing as populous as it can be. For Example, If there are some Laws or Customs in a Country, which do not allow Strangers to settle in it, or make such a Settlement too difficult; such Laws and Customs only serve to weaken the State. But if you suppose that the Country we speak of, is an Island, or near the Sea, and that it has some remote Colonies, or a great Sea-Trade; it must be confessed that the number of its Inhabitants will grow less every day, by reason of those Colonies, and the great number of those who die every Year in their Voyages; and then, if it be a difficult thing for Foreigners to settle themselves in that Country, it will be unpeopled by degrees, or at least never so full of Inhabitants as it should be. There is a famous Island in the North, the Politics whereof fail in that respect. Hence it is that it has but one half of the Inhabitants it might have, if it be compared with a Commonwealth not far from it, or with the fruitful parts of Germany. And therefore it has been observed, that in time of War it cannot make so great a Resistance, in proportion to its extent, as that Commonwealth can.  
There is also in Europe a vast Peninsula, most happily situated between two great Seas, which is infinitely more destitute of Inhabitants, Industry, and the means of defending itself, when attacked; because it lies under the same Circumstances as the Island I just now spoke of, and besides there are some other Causes of its being unpeopled. One of the chief is, that there is but one Religion allowed in it. There is besides, a tyrannical Tribunal, which, under pretence of Religion, may destroy the most innocent Persons. This keeps many People from going to it, who might render it the most flourishing Kingdom in the World, if they were permitted to settle and live safely there, as long as they obey the Civil Laws. Another Reason of it is, that it is full of Priests, Monks and Nuns, who consume a great part of the Revenues of the Country, and do not contribute to make it flourish by their Industry, or by Propagation; because, under pretence of Religion, they make a Vow of Idleness and Celibacy. Indeed they pretend that the State is very much obliged to them, because they instruct the People in Religion, and are more assiduous than others in imploring the Blessing of God, who never fails to hear their Prayers. But some People very much doubt whether Heaven be very full of that sort of Men, and whether they bring God's Blessing upon that Monarchy; at least we have not seen it yet. It cannot be doubted but what they boast of, may be done as well in the State of Marriage, and that they weaken their Country by not Marrying. Those, who live under their Domination, are forced to feign to believe, that by unpeopling a Kingdom, and living idly, they do, it great Service; they are, I say, forced to it upon pain of being thrust into a Dungeon, and ending their Life by a cruel Death. So well do those Men understand the true Interest of their Country, and the Principles of a good Policy!  
The Romans had quite contrary Maxims, which produced admirable Effects. They were so far from being afraid that their City should be filled with Strangers, that from the very beginning they endeavoured to draw in as many People as they could, and made them Citizens of Rome, as well as the most ancient Inhabitants. I shall set down here the Words of Dionysius Halicarnassus, who tells us by what means Romulus increased the City he had built: 
† Lib. II. pag. 88  Knowing, says he, that many Cities of Italy were ill governed by some Tyrants or by a few Men, who had made themselves Masters of them; he resolved to draw in and receive into his City all those, who had been expelled from other Cities; whatever Misfortune had happened to them, provided they were Freemen; to increase thereby the Power of the Romans, and lessen that of their Neighbours. Afterwards he tells us how Romulus made a Place of Refuge, and endeavoured to retain those who fled to it, by making them Citizens of Rome, and giving them some Land to live upon; and then he adds that Romulus had another Maxim of State, Which the Grecians especially, as he thought, should have observed, as being the best of all Maxims, which proved one of the surest Foundations of the Roman Liberty, and did not a little contribute to the Settlement of the Empire. He forbade Killing all the Inhabitants of the Towns which they took, or making them Slaves, or turning their Seats into Meadows. He would have their Lands to be divided among those, who would go and settle themselves in them, and that Roman Colonies should be sent thither. He also bestowed upon some Cities the Privileges of the Roman Citizens. With such Maxims and the like, of a little City he made a great one, as it appeared afterwards. For those, who went with him to live in Rome, were not above three Thousand Foot, and three Hundred Horse; whereas when he died, he left forty Six Thousand Foot and about one Thousand Horse. Dionysius shows that the next Kings, and the Commonwealth followed the same Maxims, whereby Rome grew so populous, that no City in the World exceeded it in the number of Inhabitants. If I should compare, says he, the Customs of the Grecians with these, I could not praise the Lacedæmonians, Thebans, and Athenians, tho' famous for Wisdom; who to preserve their Nobility, without any mixture, have but very seldom bestowed on Strangers the Privileges of their Cities. I will not mention those, who expelled Foreigners. The Lacedæmonians having been defeated in the Battle of Leuctra, in which they lost seventeen Hundred Men, could never recover that Loss, and were shamefully deprived of their Authority. The Thebans and Athenians having been overcome by the Macedonians in one Battle at Cheronea, were deprived of their Pre-eminence among the Grecians, and the Liberty of their Country. But the Romans cumbered with Wars in Spain and Italy, busied in regaining Sicily and Sardinia, enjoying not a full Peace  the Macedonians and Grecians; when the Carthaginians endeavoured at the same time to be the uppermost, the greatest part of Italy having joined with them, and sent for Hannibal; the Romans, I say, tho' exposed to so many Dangers, not only sunk under so many Misfortunes, but grew stronger than before, by the number of their Troops, which were sufficient to resist all their Enemies; and not at all, as some fancy, by the help of Fortune. Had they had no other Help, they had been quite ruined only by the Defeat of Cannae, where out of six Thousand Horse, they saved but three Hundred and Sixty, and out of Eighty Thousand Foot, whom they had raised for that Expedition, there remained after the Battle but three Thousand, and a few more.  
It has been always an easy thing, and is so to this Day for Foreigners to settle themselves in the United Provinces, especially in Holland, and the City of Amsterdam, provided they obey the Laws of the Country; which has made the Country so Populous, that there is none like it in all Europe. Whereas had they scrupled to receive those, who fled thither, it would be a deserted Country, and consequently ruined and subject to the Inquisition; for they had never been able to resist the Spaniards, without a great number of People. But they who founded that Commonwealth, seeing that many People faithful to the Government, under which they lived, were persecuted for their Religion in several parts of Europe, resolved to receive all those, who would retire into their Country, provided they would obey the Civil-Laws. Whereby the States so Peopled their Country, and keep it still so full of Inhabitants, that the long Wars, they have had by Sea and Land, from the beginning of their Commonwealth, and their continual Navigations in the East and West-Indies, do not at all exhaust ' 'em.  
Again, the better to increase the number of the Inhabitants, and lest Poverty should force the Common People to retire into other Countries, they take an extraordinary care of the Poor, for whom there is so much Money spent every Year in the Province of Holland, that several crowned Heads in Europe have not so great a Revenue. From whence arises a prodigious number of Tradesmen of all sorts, Seamen, and People of all Professions, who are necessary in a Country. From thence also arises the extraordinary Industry of its Inhabitants, such as is to be seen no where else.  
That Policy, which is so agreeable to Reason and Revelation, is so Wise and Admirable, as that it is an Unjust and Impious thing to look upon a Man as an Enemy,  his Country or Opinions may be; if he will obey the same Civil Laws, and use his Industry to promote the Good of the State. Nevertheless several great Nations of Europe, which think themselves to be more Polite than the Hollanders, have not been able yet to apprehend a thing so clear, and grounded upon the most certain Principles of Humanity and Christian Religion. They are so far from allowing Foreigners to Settle among them, that they even drive away their Countrymen, either under pretence of Religion, or by taking no care of the Poor. They are far from admiring the Humanity and Christian Charity of their Neighbours. On the contrary, they have so strange a Notion of Morality and Religion, that to take pity of one's Neighbour, and do to him as one would be done by, is looked upon by them as want of Religion and Virtue. But this is not a fit place to enlarge upon that Subject. After what has been said, 'tis no difficult thing to see why some States in Europe fall to Decay, and why on the contrary others are so flourishing.  
The second thing, which I have mentioned as necessary for the Preservation of a State, and to make it flourish, is that it must have great Revenues, without oppressing the People. Which may be done, when a Country is very full of Inhabitants, and no Body exempted from Taxes; because then, tho' every Body pays but little, there will arise large Sums by reason of the great multitude of People. Again, this may be done, when there is great Industry in a Country; because the Imposts upon exported and imported Commodities may bring in a great deal of Money. As to the Lands, they ought to be taxed in proportion to what they yield, and they yield little, when the Country wants Inhabitants, and there is but little Industry in it; because then there is but a small quantity of the Products of the Earth consumed either at home or abroad.  
These are the chief Springs of the Revenues that a State can have. There is no need I should enlarge on it, because it is a thing which every Body knows. For the same reason I shall not prove how necessary it is that a State should have considerable Revenues, to be in a condition of defending itself against a Foreign Invasion. No Man can doubt of it, especially in this Age. I shall only observe some Faults, which they commit in several States against this undoubted Principle.  
The Inhabitants of several Countries may be divided into three Classes. The first is the Clergy, or in general all Churchmen: The second is the Nobility, and those who enjoy the same Privileges with them, by reason of their Employments: And the third is the rest of the People, who live by their Industry, without having any particular Privilege. When the Clergy and Nobility are but few, or have no Privileges, they cannot be looked upon as a considerable part of the State, that is to say, so as to increase or impair much the Public Revenues. But when either of them are very Numerous, and enjoy great Immunities, as in Spain, Italy, and elsewhere; they make a considerable part of the Inhabitants, by reason of their great Number and Riches.  
It cannot be denied but that a great number of Secular and Regular Churchmen, who use no Industry to make their Country Flourish, and enjoy great Revenues without paying any Taxes, must needs be chargeable to the Public; since they considerably lessen the Revenues of the State, and hinder it from being Peopled with Men, who would increase them, and besides have no Industry to bring in Foreign Money. So that the more the number of such Men increases in a State, the lesser will its Revenues be. Besides, it wants People to defend it in an open War; for the Secular Priests and Monks are not bound to defend the Lands which they enjoy; not to mention the Nuns, who, by reason of their Sex, are exempted from it. Their Business is to Eat their Revenues, and not to fight for them; whereas, did those Revenues belong to Laymen, they would think themselves obliged to defend 'em at the hazard of their Lives. Thus the great number of such Men, who think not themselves obliged to help the State with their Money, Industry, or personal Assistance, is a manifest Cause of its Decay. 'Tis without doubt for this reason that we have seen, for several Years, ten Thousand Germans, ill Disciplined, and ill Paid, exact Contributions of five or six Princes, who could easily have raised Forty Thousand Monks. It was also undoubtedly one of the great Causes of the Ruin of the Eastern Empire, which might have cut to pieces the Saracens and Turks, had it been able to keep on foot half as many Soldiers as there were Monks and Nuns, not to mention other Churchmen. All that can be said in behalf of Churchmen, is, That they consume several Commodities, on which Imposts are laid, and so raise the Public Farms; but many Monks consume but little of that sort of Commodities, and Laymen do the same, besides what they pay in particular; so that Churchmen cannot at all be compared with them, in that respect.  
A great number of Nobility, and other Men, who have privileged Employments, does also very much lessen the Revenues of a State; and they want Industry, whereby those Revenues might be increased. For the Nobility, and those who enjoy the same Privileges with them, contribute but little towards the Public Charges, and have no Industry, whereby they may bring in Foreign Money. They know how to get Money out of the Inhabitants, whose Industry they very often Ruin. So that the more Nobility and Privileged Employments there are in a State, the Weaker it grows; and those Princes, who increase the number of them for Money, tho' they seem to get much by it at first, yet lose much thereby afterwards. Several People believe that the only reason why the Empire of Germany has been somewhat perplexed in many Wars, which required great Charges, especially in the War, which ended in 1697. is the great number of Men there is in that Empire, who contribute nothing towards the Charges of the War but their Personal Assistance. 'Tis also thought that Spain is in a great measure so weak as it is, because of the multitude of Noblemen, who together with the Clergy, enjoy the best Lands and Employments in the Kingdom, and contribute very little towards the Charges of the War, in proportion to their Revenues. I am not well enough acquainted with those things, to be positive; but it is certain that so many Principalities and Kingdoms, of which Germany and Spain are made up, have only, for several Years in the late War, caused a mere Diversion of part of the French Troops on the Rhine, and in Catalonia.  
'Tis said in behalf of the Nobility, that it is necessary in time of Peace and in time of War, for the Government of the State, and Conduct of the Armies; because Men of Quality have commonly greater Souls than others, and are more respected by the People. I will not answer, That very often Men of Quality have no greater Souls than several other Men, or that they may have such Faults as will make them unfit to procure the Public Good; but granting that the Nobility is useful to what they say, I maintain that when it is too numerous, it proves Chargeable to the State, unless it be allowed to Trade. For those, who have no Share in the Government, no Employment in the Armies, and no Industry, do but eat the Revenues of the Country, without being serviceable to it. Nay, they are very prejudicial to it, because the shameful Idleness, wherein they often live, without so much as vouchsafing to learn any thing that may improve their Minds, inclines them to all manner of Excess; and by degrees they corrupt the People, who are apt to imitate them. And than one may truly say what the Spanish Nobility said of the Militia, in Ximenes' time, That when Tradesmen leave their Trade, and set up for Gentlemen, there's an end of Arts and Trade, and consequently a State is infallibly lost.  
From whence it may be concluded, that wherever the Dignities are in the Hands of the Clergy and Nobility, and wherever they enjoy the Riches of the Country, it follows that the rest of the People are necessarily oppressed by those two Parties; that they grow weary of their Condition, and that such as have good Parts, and Money, endeavour to purchase Nobility, or to be promoted to Church-Dignities. In the mean time the Arts and Industry, whereby a State flourishes, are neglected, the Public Revenues grow less, and the State weaker. After what has been said, can any one wonder, if the Countries, where such a Disorder is to be seen, are so weak, that they are not able to make the necessary Expenses for their Defence and Preservation? They are full of useless Persons, who are not able to serve their Country, and nevertheless enjoy all the Conveniences it can afford, and trample on those, who can serve it, and use all their Industry towards it. That great number of Men, who do nothing, under pretence of Nobility or Church-Dignities, grow Vicious, and Debauch a great many People, who, were it not for such an ill Example, would be useful to the Society.  
Too great Exactions do also very much contribute to the lessening of the Public Revenues, tho' at first View they seem to increase ' 'em. The Reason of it is, that Trade is thereby soon destroyed, and so that Source of the Public Revenues comes to fail either in part, or in whole. For when there is nothing to be got by Trading, People grow weary of it, and Trade as little as they can. Being by degrees destitute of Money, or having no considerable Sum of it, they can make no great Enterprise; so that Trade is by steps confined to what is altogether necessary for Humane Life, and yields but little to the Prince.  
This is what one 
† Hesiod. Op. & dies. v. 37.  of the most ancient Poets, who lived above two Thousand Years ago, teaches us, speaking of his Brother, who had bribed the Judges, who were then styled Kings, that he might have a greater Share in his paternal Estate: We have formerly, says he, divided our Inheritance; but you took away from me several things, which did not belong to you, by bestowing many Gifts on the Kings, who are greedy of ' 'em. Blind Men, who know not that one half is better that the whole. He means that it were better for Kings to be content with one half of what they exacted from the People, than to extort from them whatever they had, and so incapacitate them to contribute any more to the Supply of their Wants.  
Therefore the Proposals of the public Farmers, or those who invent new Imposts, and promise to bring great Sums into the Public Treasury, if they are permitted to raise new Taxes, aught to be so much the more suspected, the greater the Sums are that they promise; because they cannot raise them, without entirely ruining that Trade, on which they raise it. The same may be said of all exorbitant Taxes, which yield much for the present, but afterwards altogether exhaust those from whom they are exacted. Let us hear Cicero discoursing on this Subject: 
† Verr. III. ●. 119.  If a Farmer, says he, should pay 20000 Sesterces yearly for an Estate in Land, which yielded but 10000, and should get by it 100000 l. after he had cut and sold the Woods, and other Goods and Cattle; the Owner of it would for the present be very glad, whilst he knew nothing of the Loss he had sustained, and would extremely rejoice to have a Farmer, who should so much improve his Land. But if he came to know that his Farmer had sold and alienated that, which made his Estate yield so much as it used to do yearly, he would cause him to be Hanged, and cry out that he had wronged him. So the Roman People, when they hear that Verres has raised the Farm of the Tithes in Sicily, more than Sacerdos, to whom he succeeded, and whose Conduct is unblamable, might be apt to think that they have found a Man, who has well improved the Revenues; which accrue to us from Arable-Lands. But when they come to know that he has sold away all the Utensils of Ploughmen, and whatever they had to pay the Taxes; that out of Covetousness he has deprived Posterity of all Hope, ransacked and plundered the Arable-Lands, and got a great deal by it; they will easily apprehend, that Verres has very much wronged them, and think he deserves to be put to Death. Si quis villicus, etc.  
If Princes and their Ministers would think of this, they might apprehend that by extorting exorbitant Sums from their Subjects, they make 'em unable not only to pay as much afterwards, but also to pay moderate Taxes. Then Industry ceases together with that which keeps it up; that is to say, when there is not Money enough among Trading-men, and the Riches of the State are kept too long in the Hands of the Prince. Then the Subjects are disheartened; for who would rather work for another than for himself? In a word, all those thing produce an extreme Poverty, such as that of the Indians, who are Slaves to their Kings, and had rather be in want of all things, than every them by their Labour, without getting any thing by it.  
A great Minister of State having been told by the famous Bernier, who published his Journey to Indostan, that the People were reduced to an extreme Poverty, all over the East-Indies, asked him what was the reason of it, since the Europeans sent thither great Sums of Money every Year, to buy some of their Commodities. That Traveller answered him, That it was an easy thing to apprehend the Reason of it; which is, that there is no Property in that Country, all things belonging to the Prince, so that the People had nothing of their own. That Minister of State was not very well pleased with that Answer, which gave him to understand, that if they should continue to say that all things belong to the King, in the Country he lived in, a flourishing Kingdom would by degrees be reduced to the same Weakness and Poverty.  
'Tis reported that another Traveller, not less known than the other, (I mean John Baptist Tavernier) having sold the Jewels he had brought from the Indies, told a great Prince, That he designed to buy a Lordship in Switzerland; And that that Prince having asked him why he would not buy one in his Kingdom; the Traveller, who was no polite Man, answered: Because I desire that my Lordship may be my own. A clownish Answer indeed, but which plainly shown Tavernier's meaning: viz. That whoever will enjoy the Fruits of his Labour, aught to retire from a Country, where the Taxes are unlimited.  
What can one think therefore of a Country, where all endeavours are used to leave as little Money as can be in the Hands of those, to whom it belongs? Where they seem to be afraid that the next Generation should find something to live upon? All that one can think of it, is, that it is a beginning of Decay; which numerous Armies, and great Preparations of War cannot conceal from those, who know what can make a State flourish, and what can weaken it.  
There is a famous Commonwealth in Europe, where the Taxes are very great, if compared with what they pay in other Countries; and yet moderate enough, if the State of that Commonwealth be well considered. First, 'Tis a Country, where the greatest part of every one's Estate ●ies in Money, so that the great quantity of Money they have, lessens its Value. Secondly, No Body pays a Real, or Personal Tax but those who are able to do it, the common People paying nothing in particular; whereas in other Countries they are overburdened with Taxes. 'Tis true that the most necessary things for Humane Life are dear enough, but Workmen have the better Pay. And therefore whatever Complaints be made by those, who have much ado to live in it; if they be compared with them, that pay the Tailles, as 'tis practised in other Countries, it will be found that they live much more happily than their Neighbours, as those, who have traveled thither, know very well. Thirdly, Trading Men are not much burdened, and it may be said that those, who contribute most to increase the Public Revenues by Trade, are most favoured. Trade is looked upon in that Commonwealth as the chief thing, which makes every thing plentiful in it, and they have regard to the Hazard which Merchants run in their Commerce, for which Reason they are but little burdened.  
It must be confessed that those, that cannot Trade, and who live upon their Estates, are very much burdened in time of War; they lose one half of the Revenues due to them from the State, or Towns: But it is an unavoidable Inconveniency. For a War cannot be sustained without Money, and Money cannot be had but where it is to be found. All that can be wished by those who contribute so much to the Charges of the War, is that it be never undertaken, but when it is absolutely necessary for the Preservation of the State, that the Public Money be well Husbanded, and that a Peace be made, as soon as it can be, with Safety and Honour. That Commonwealth never fails to do it, and if at any time there is any Fault committed in this respect, they are such Faults as are committed wherever there are Men; and are not Steps deliberately made by the Supreme Power in order to impoverish the Subjects of the State, as 'tis practised in several Kingdoms. Besides, 'tis a great Comfort for the Subjects of that Commonwealth, when they pay great Contributions, that they are sure that no War is ever undertaken by the Commonwealth, but for the Preservation of their Liberty, for the sake of which every Body ought freely to part with his Money. How many Princes are there, who do not make War for the good of their Subjects, but only to satisfy their Ambition; and whose Victories and Conquests make their People greater Slaves and more unhappy than before? Which puts me in mind of a remarkable Answer of a Roman Senator, who at a time when the State was engaged in a dangerous War, having used his endeavours to get a Covetous and Interested Man, tho' his Enemy, to be elected Consul, because he was very well skilled in Military-Affairs, rather than any other, who were not able to command the Armies of the Republic, answered those, who were surprised at it: 
† A Gell. Lib. IU. c. 8.  That they had no reason to wonder, if he had rather be Plundered than Sold: Nihil est quod miremini, si malui compilari quàm venire.  
The third thing, which is absolutely necessary, to make a State Flourish, is that its Members, and those who govern it, aught to agree among themselves, and entirely mind the Public Good. If in a kingly Government, when the King can undertake nothing of Moment, nor make any alteration in the Laws, without the consent of the States, it happens that the King aims at an Arbitrary Power, and that the States on the contrary make it their Business to preserve their Laws and Liberties; such a Division will necessarily unable them to Defend themselves Abroad, and make good Laws at Home. The King is wholly taken up with the Thoughts of surprising and subduing the States, if he can do it; and the States being busied in defending their Liberty against Craft and Violence, cannot mind things of less Moment. In the mean time, a thousand Disorders are committed at Home, and no care is taken to prevent the Evils, which threaten them Abroad. Such a Spectacle has been seen Fourscore Years and more in England, where Kings and Parliaments were so taken up with their public and private Divisions, that they thought of nothing else. In the mean time, a neighbouring Kingdom did whatever it pleased, and put itself in a Capacity to molest all its Neighbours. Nay, it was almost ready to Invade a Commonwealth, whose Forces joined with its own, would have served to put in Fetters not only the Parliament, but also the King of England. During that interval of time, they might have enacted many Laws, which England very much wants, as may be seen by the Experience of its Neighbours, especially the United Provinces.  
In a Commonwealth made up of equal Members, a good Union in procuring the common Good, is of very great use to make it Flourish, and Dissension is the most dangerous thing in the World. We have seen it, in these very Provinces, when in the Year 1672. they were like to be altogether ruined. 
† Introd. ad Hist. Cap. VI n. 21.  Samuel Pufendorf, who was a very Great Man, has in vain enquired for some other Reasons of the extraordinary Progress the Enemies made in so short a time against that Commonwealth. There were no other but Dissension, which hindered it from making the necessary Preparations against the Invasion of its Enemies.  
No Body doubts that Concord will make a State Flourish, and that Discord is very dangerous to it; but care must be taken to have a right Notion of the Meaning of those Words. A Concord useful to a Monarchical or Aristocratical Government, is such as aims at the general Good of those, who live under it. If in a Monarchical State, wherein the Power of the Monarch is limited by the Laws, the chief Members of the State should of their own accord, or by force agree to submit all the Laws to the Prince's Will, without having any regard to the Good of the State, such an Union would not be at all advantageous to it. It would change a Society of free Persons, into a Company of unhappy Slaves. The Readiness of the Chineses to obey their King blindly, does but confirm his Tyranny, and increase their Misery. For those, who depend on the Will of one Man, subject to a thousand Passions, whose Fancies can be restrained by no Law, can be sure of nothing. Such a Man has some Favourites, who have other Favourites under them, and suffer themselves to be Bribed; and such a Form of Government is but a Subordination of Tyrants, every one of whom endeavours to get something by the Slavery of the People.  
But 'tis said, That the general Obedience of the Chinese, serves to maintain the Peace in their Country; and that they enjoy thereby all the Advantages which a good Union can procure: They mean all the Advantages, which can be enjoyed in Slavery. But there is not one Freeman but had rather see more frequent Disorders, than to undergo a perpetual Slavery. Besides, 'tis false that there are no Civil Wars under such a Form a Government. The most enslaved People will be at last weary of an excessive Tyranny, and, at the first opportunity, will show that the Love of Liberty is not quite stifled in their Hearts. Such a thing has happened several times among the Chinese and Turks. Few People being concerned in keeping up Arbitrary Power in a certain Family, or a certain Person, and the greatest part having reason to complain of it; few will oppose a Change in the Government, and other▪ believe that if they get nothing, they will lose but little by it.  
The same aught to be said of an Aristocratical Government. The Union of those, who Govern such a State, would be of no use, unless it procured the Observation of the Laws, and the general Good of the Commonwealth. This we may learn from the History of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens, and the Decemviri of Rome. The Union of those Men served only to oppress the People, and make 'em miserable; because their chief Design was to satisfy their Passions, without having any regard to the Public Good.  
Concord may be also considered with respect to the People, who, when the Government is so settled, they may quietly enjoy the Fruits or their Labour, by obeying the Laws of their Country, (which no Member of the Society can alter, or transgress at his pleasure) ought to think themselves happy, and to obey unanimously the Orders of the Supreme Power. To keep the Multitude in so good an Union, 'tis necessary not only that they be the better for it, but also that they should know their own Happiness. Without which, there will always be some restless Men, who having lost all they had by Debauchery and Idleness, would attempt to recover it by some Disturbance. Such Men will easily persuade a People, who think they live unhappily, to rise up against their Sovereign, on the first occasion. On the contrary, when the People are generally persuaded that they cannot better their Condition by a Change, and that they should hazard losing much by it, it is a very difficult thing to seduce them. I could make several Observations on this Subject; but it is not my design to write a general Treatise of Politics.  
The Union of those, who govern a State, and of the People, aught to aim at the Public Good; from whence it follows, that whatever Union hath not such an Aim, is prejudicial to it. It should rather be called a Conspiracy than an Union; since the Name of a Virtue cannot be reasonably given to a thing, which prejudices or destroys the Society. What has been said of the Civil, may be said of the Ecclesiastical Society, which can only Flourish by the great number of its Members, and by Learning (for Learning is in that Society what Riches are in the other) and Concord. Not to speak now of the Number and Learning of such a Society; I shall only observe that the Union of those, who govern it, ought not to be a tyrannical Conspiracy, which destroys it. Such is, for Example, the Union of the Inquisitors in Spain and Italy, who perfectly agree among themselves, but to do what? To hinder Laymen, as they call 'em, and Churchmen, (who might discover some Errors introduced into Religion out of Ignorance, or Abuses crept into the Discipline, through Ambition,) from proposing at any time a Reformation; and consequently to keep every Body in a profound Ignorance, or an unlawful Dissimulation and Hypocrisy. It were much better for the Church, if there were many Disputes rather than a perpetual Tyranny, which hinders Men from being instructed in the Christian Religion, and convinced of the Truth of it, by good Reasons.  
I shall say no more on this Subject, because I intent only to treat of the Decay of the Civil Society in several States: But I must answer an Objection. 'Tis said, That it is absolutely necessary to suppress Diversity of Opinions in matters of Religion; because under pretence of Religion the State is divided into several Factions, which are so incensed against one another, that they often break into an open War, and use one another most barbarously. And 'tis usual on this occasion to heap up Examples of Disorders and Civil Wars, which happened in several States, under pretence of Religion.  
But what will follow from thence? Nothing but that as soon as a Religion, whatever it be, is established in a Country, no Alteration ought to be allowed in it, for fear it should cause some Disturbance. But such a Principle will justify all the Proceed of the Heathens, Jews, and Mahometans against the Christian Religion; which they have persecuted, to preserve the Public Peace in the Countries, wherein their Religion was the strongest. Besides, 'tis false that the Toleration of several Religions causes any Disturbance: On the contrary, Persecution necessarily produces all the Disturbances, which follow from the diversity of Opinions. Were all those, who obey the Civil Laws, tolerated, and were Men persuaded that Humanity, not to mention Religion, requires of 'em that they should bear with one another, they would live most happily in the World, tho' they were of different Opinions. But when Men are persuaded that the greatest number has the right of deciding what People are to believe, and of persecuting all those, who will not submit to their Judgement; when the strongest Party gins to use ill the Weaker, till it he forced at least to dissemble its Belief; then Disturbances begin, and Persecutors destroy the Civil Society, under pretence of Defending Religion. In a word, they, who only desire to be tolerated, commit no Disorder; and none, but those who Persecute them, Disturb the State.  
But Churchmen, say they, stir up the People to use one another Ill; and Great Men often take hold of such an Opportunity, to raise dangerous Disturbances. But that very thing shows that it is not Toleration, but the want of it, which disturbs the State. Were Men persuaded, as of a Maxim essential to Religion and Policy, that they ought to bear with one another, as long as they observe all the Duties of the Civil Society; the Discourses of Churchmen, or the Cabals of Great Persons would not be able to disturb the Peace of the State, under pretence of Religion.  
But it is not out of Love for the peace of the State, or out of a design to do it Good, that Churchmen have opposed Toleration, and established the contrary Opinion as a Religious Doctrine: No, they have done it out of a desire of Domineering, of not being contradicted, and of increasing their Revenues, which grow more considerable in proportion to the number of those who submit to their Decisions. If Princes encroach never so little on their pretended Privileges, they will endanger the Peace and Tranquillity of the State, rather than abate any thing. If the State enjoys a profound Peace, notwithstanding the diversity of Opinions; they don't scruple to disturb it, that they may oppress such as they do not like.  
If was not for any Sedition that Ferdinand and Isabel expelled the Jews out of Spain in 1492. The Jews had no Authority in the State, and were contented to enjoy the liberty of Trading quietly: They were not accused of any illegal Practices against the Government. The zealous Inquisitors expelled them, to have an occasion of Enriching themselves with the Spoils of a great many Families, and not to do the State a good Service. The ill Designs of the Moors might also have been very easily prevented, in the same Kingdom, after they had been subdued, without making Spain a desert Country, by driving them out of it. I could add more considerable and later Examples of People ill used, not for having committed any Disorder, but by the Suggestion and Conspiracy of Churchmen; whose Divisions, in matters of Religion, have never been so prejudicial to any State, as the fatal Union of the greater Number to oppress the lesser.  
One may easily conclude from what has been said, that the States, the Laws whereof tend to increase the number of the People, and make them quietly enjoy the Fruits of their Labour, by requiring of them no more than they are able to pay; and where they, that command, and they that obey, make the Public Good their chief End, or do nothing at least, but what contributes to it; one may, I say, easily conclude that States, which go upon such Principles, must needs be Flourishing; and on the contrary, that they, which have opposite Maxims, must necessarily fall to Decay. Therefore any State, which expels Loyal and Faithful Subjects, and lessens the Number of them by any means, whatever they be; any State, wherein they are oppressed with Tailles and Imposts, whereby they are so impoverished as not to be able to exercise their Industry: Lastly, any State, wherein they are not unanimous in procuring the Public Good, contains in itself some Principles, which will insensibly destroy it, unless such an Evil be timely prevented. But the Remedy necessary for the Cure of such a Disease can be proposed only by Men, who have nobler Thoughts than the Vulgar. For the common sort of People mind only their private Good, and are no farther concerned in what happens in the State, than as some few Persons, whom they favour, get or lose by it for the present, without caring for others, or for the time to come.   

CHAP. VI A Vindication of Providence from the Objection of the Manichees.  
MR. BAIL has displayed, in several places of his Dictionary, the Objections of the Manichees against the Unity of one Holy and Bountiful God, and even furnished them with some Arguments, to attack the several Systems of the Christians. He thinks that when they argue against us, they are much stronger than we, and that the best way for all the Sects of Christianity is to be silent, and to believe what the Scripture says, without troubling themselves whether what it teaches, agrees with the Light of Reason, or no. I am not of his Opinion, and were I at leisure, I would undertake to show at large that he is mistaken, when he says that they have so great an Advantage over all Christians, whoever they be, I shall only set down here some Principles, which may be made use of, to bring the Manichees from their Error concerning the Ill Principle, which they join with the Good one; but I must first of all make two Observations.  

The first is, That by answering the Objections of the Manichees, I do not design to wrong Mr. bail, whom I do not at all suspect to favour their Opinions. I am persuaded that he has taken a philosophical Liberty of Arguing pro and con, in many cases, only to exercise those who understand the Matters he treats of, and not to favour those, whose Arguments he alleges. The Objections he makes are such as may be made in an Auditory of Divinity and Philosophy; wherein the greater an Objection is, the more Honour there is in resolving it. He may with reason require of his Readers that they should do him that Justice, and it cannot be denied him. For my part, I am very willing to grant his Request; but I think I may likewise be allowed the liberty of Answering his Objections, requiring that no odious Application of my Answers, be made to the Author himself.  
The second thing I shall observe, is, That as Mr. bail thought he might afford the Manichees such Arms as he pleased; I may also be allowed to ward off their Blows, as I shall think fit. He thought it was a great Mortification for Humane Reason not to be able to defend Providence, against one of the most ridiculous Sects that ever were; but I think that one of the least approved Sects among Christians, is able to answer all the Arguments of the Manichees. As he pretends not to defend the System of those Heretics, or approve of the Arguments which he furnishes them with; I ought to have the same Liberty with respect to Origen, in whose Name, if I may so say, I shall undertake to answer the Manichees, I declare I will neither defend nor approve all that he said, nor all that one of his Disciples is going to say. I am not at all concerned in his Reputation, or Doctrine; and every Body may think of 'em as they please. The present Question is not to satisfy any Body on this Subject, but only to stop the Mouth of the Manichees, by introducing an Origenest disputing with them. If such a Man can silence a Manichee, what may not one expect from those, who should argue much better than Origen's Disciples? But I leave it to the Judgement of Divines and Philosophers. I think that an Origenist, having read all the Objections of the Manichees, might argue thus:   
The Manichees pretend they can prove that we must acknowledge an Ill Principle, that is to say, a mischievous One, and an Enemy to Virtue, by reason of two things which we observe in the World. The one is Physical Evil, to which Men are subject; such as are Diseases, Pains, all the Inconveniences of Humane Life; the other is Moral Evil, that is to say, Vice, and whatever is consequent to it. The Manichees are very careful to set forth all the Moral and Physical Evils, which happen to Men; and then they say, that if the Principle, which governs the World, is the Author of those Evils, he is neither a benign Being, nor a Lover of Virtue; and that if he permits them, tho' he sees and can hinder 'em, he is altogether unconcerned for our Miseries, and our good Actions. They add, that it is manifest, that Goodness is not a Property of that Being, since he has decreed to condemn the greatest part of Men to everlasting Punishments, or at least that he hinders 'em not from running headlong into those dreadful Torments; tho' he is not ignorant of it, and can easily prevent so terrible a Misery.  
Our Origenist would go on and say, What the Manichees say concerning the Moral and Physical Evils, which happen among Men, cannot be denied; nor can it be doubted but that if he, who governs them, were the Author of their Vices, he would be an Enemy to Virtue in general, and to Justice in particular, if he should punish them for Faults which himself caused them to commit.  
But it is not true that Men necessarily commit Faults, which God punishes. Necessity is inconsistent with what we call a punishable Fault, as well as with an Action capable of Reward. Either of 'em must have been done freely, that is, so as one might not have done it, to deserve Reward or Punishment. It is a Maxim acknowledged by all the Lawgivers in the World, which no Body can reasonably oppose. Therefore God only permits Men to transgress his Laws, when he has given 'em whatever is necessary to observe them.  
If he does not hinder it, tho' he sees it, and is able to keep us to our Duty; 'tis because he has made us Free, that there might be room for Virtue and Vice, Blame and Praise, Rewards and Punishments. Every one may be convinced of it by his own Experience, and his inward sense of the Faculty he has of doing or not doing good or bad Actions, which deserve to be praised or blamed. This all Lawgivers and Magistrates suppose, as an undeniable Principle; sine they reward or punish Men, according as they obey or break the Laws.  
Our Origenist would go on still, and say: I confess that there arises a great Inconvenience from thence, viz. That Men can make an ill use of the Power they have of obeying or disobeying the Divine Laws; and God could not be ignorant of it, even tho' he had not foreseen it, since all Men disobey his Laws. This is the reason why he does not stop the Current of Physical Evils, which overflow the World. Sinners do not deserve that God should interpose after a Supernatural manner, to free them from those Evils, and they cannot complain of ' 'em.  
But, why, say the Manichees, has God created Men liable to Sin, sine he could not be ignorant of the Evils, which would follow from it? I answer, That Men cannot complain of God upon that account, for two Reasons. The first is, That he does not require of Men, that they should be without Sin; which would be unjust, as being above their Nature. The second is, That God damns no Body merely for having sinned, but for having not repent. If he has made 'em frail, he only requires of 'em what the frailty of their Nature is capable of.  
Besides it was not necessary that God should prevent or stop Moral and Physical Evils, which are the Effects or Punishments of Men's Vices; to be accounted a benign Being, and a Lover of Virtue. That we may be convinced of it, let us examine 'em singly: But we must raise ourselves above the Notions of the Vulgar concerning the Duration and Greatness of the Evils, which happen either during the whole Life of each particular Man, or all the time God will be pleased, that this Earth shall continue. To give an acount of the Conduct of an infinite Being, as much as it is possible for us to do, we must, as it were, forget that we are limited, and place ourselves, if I may be allowed to say so, in the room of him, who is Infinite. Or else we shall not be able to defend his Cause, or give any good account of what he does. God does not act by the limited and weak Notions of Men, which are the Rules of their Conduct; which made him say by a Prophet, That his Ways are not our Ways, nor his Thoughts our Thoughts.  
The physical Evils we suffer, seem to us to be intolerably long, if they last as long as we live, or only some Years. We complain and impatiently cry out that God delays too long to help us; especially if those Evils are very violent. But if we put together all the Evils, which have happened, and shall happen to Mankind, whilst this Earth subsists; our weak Imagination is troubled and terrified, and we are apt to think that he, who governs the World, has scarce any care of us, and is nothing less than a bountiful Being. But if the Almighty should all of a sudden raise our Minds to a State of Perfection, whereby we might have a clear view of the Duration of the Earth, such as it is when compared with Eternity, and see the moment it begun, and the moment it will cease to be; that length of time, which frightens us, would disappear, and we would say that there is an infinitely less proportion between It and Eternity, than there is between one Minute and a Hundred Millions of Years. Then the Evils, which now extort so bitter Complaints from us, and seem to us to be so dreadful, would not move us in the least, because of their short duration. Among Men, if a Child be sick, they who have him under Cure, do but laugh at him, when he complains of the Bitterness of a Remedy which they give him; because they know that in a very short time he will be cured by it. There is an infinite greater disproportion between God and the most understanding Men, than there is between 'em and the most simple Children. So that we cannot reasonably wonder, that God should look upon the Miseries we suffer, as almost nothing; since he only has a complete Idea of a Eternity, and looks upon the beginning and end of our Sufferings as being infinitely nearer than the beginning and end of one Minute.  
We ought to reason after the same manner a concerning Vices and vicious Actions, which last not long with respect to God. If a Clock-maker should make a Pendulum, which being once wound up, would go right for a Year together, abating two or three Seconds, which would not be equal, when it gins to go; would any one say that such a Clock-maker is no exact and skilful Artist? In like manner, if one Day rectifies for all Eternity the Disorders which the ill use of men's Liberty has been the cause of; will any Body wonder that God made 'em not to cease during the moment Men lived on the Earth?  
Our Origenist would go on still, and say: But I perceive that the Manichees will object to me the everlasting Punishments, with which God threatens impenitent Sinners in the Scripture, that is to say, the greatest part of Men. I don't deny but that Christ threatens the Wicked with an Eternal Fire, and I will not insist on the Ambiguity of those words; but how do the Manichees know that the supreme Lawgiver of the World has not the Right of remitting the Punishments, wherewith he threatens the Wicked, when he shall think fit? When a Sovereign Prince condemns any one to a perpetual Imprisonment, he always expresses himself after an absolute manner; but he does not tie his hands, so as not to be able to remit Punishment of those, whom he has condemned.  
When God promises something to his Creatures, his Supreme Goodness and Faithfulness oblige him to make it good; and notwithstanding the infinite Distance there is between him and us, we might justly complain that we were deceived, if he did not perform his Promise. But if, after he has threatened free Creatures, to keep 'em in awe, and begun to punish them, without giving 'em any Hopes of seeing an end of their Punishments; he thinks they have suffered enough, and makes 'em afterwards eternally Happy; who can complain of him? Is there any thing in it that is unworthy of the Divine Goodness, and is not such a Notion very agreeable to the Idea we have of an infinite Mercy, which consequently is not to end with the short duration of men's Lives, to give way to an eternal Severity?  
There is no need our Origenist should speak any longer on this Subject. What he has said, is sufficient to stop the Mouth of the Manichees; and I do not design to show that his Opinion is a plausible one, by enlarging upon it, and confirming it with such Arguments, as in all likelihood Origen used to confirm his Opinion. I have had no other Design than to show that the Manichees would have no cause to triumph over Humane Reason, if they should have to do with such Men as could but defend themselves as well as Origen, whose Opinion is notwithstanding rejected by every Body. After all, there is no Comparison to be made between the Opinions of the Origenists, as I have fairly represented 'em, and Manicheism, or the Doctrine of the Two Principles. The latter is altogether inconsistent with the Christian Religion, one Essential Article whereof is to acknowledge but one God Creator of all Men; whereas Origen's Opinion may be consistent with the Belief of all the Essential Articles of Religion. That Great Man was never called a Heretic for it, whilst he lived; and it would be very hard to declare him Damned, after his Death, merely because of that single Opinion. Besides, since the Manichees must be confuted by Reason rather than Revelation, the greatest part whereof they rejected; it must be confessed that Origen's Method, being not contrary to Reason, may be made used of in such a Case as this. If any one at this day could not be reclaimed any other way, as it might happen; it would not be amiss to argue with him according to this Method; since it is past doubt it were better to be an Origenist, than a Deist, an Atheist or a Manichee. For my part, I undertook this small Essay, only to take off a little of the Manichees Presumption, and excite Divines to treat of this Matter, which would require a whole Volume, if it were particularly examined.   

CHAP. VII. Men easily believe what their Passions suggest to them.  
MEN are apt to Believe what they Desire; and the weakest Reasons, which persuade 'em, appear to 'em like Demonstrations. After they have thus deceived themselves, the decisive way wherewith they discourse of what they Believe, serves to deceive others; or at least they fancy they have persuaded them with Reasons, the weakness whereof would be palpable, if they were free from Passion. Quae volumus, & credimus libenter, & quae sentimus ipsi, reliquos sentire putamus. They are Caesar's words in this Commentaries, Book II. Chap. 27. We willingly Believe, says he, what we Desire, and easily persuade ourselves that others are of the same Mind.  
We find in the Perroniana, That Cardinal Sforza, who did not believe the Power of the Pope, no more than several other things, told Cardinal du Perron that it was an easy thing to prove it at Rome. The reason of it is, that they, who have a mind to get Preferments at Rome, must either believe the Pope's Power, or pretend to believe it. The Ground of this Thought is not new, nor the manner of expressing it. Socrates' said in like manner, as Aristotle 
† Rhet. Lib. II. c. 9  relates it, That it was no difficult thing to Praise the Athenians at Athens.  
The reason of it was, that the Athenians, out of Self-love, were so well pleased with their own Praises, that they admired the worse Reasonings, when they tended to prove something, which was glorious to their City. They applauded the worse Orators, provided the Praises of the Athenians were the Subject of their Discourses.  
They, who only reason out of Passion and Interest, should think sometimes of this, and ask themselves, whether those, who have contrary Passions and Interests, would like their Reasons? and then perhaps they would perceive that Self-love imposes on them. For certainly no Man has a greater right than another to establish this Rule for himself, That what favours him is true, and what is disadvantageous to him, is false. If the Europeans pretend to make use of it, they must not take it ill, if the asiatics will do the same; or if they disapprove of it in the asiatics, they ought to make use of the same Rules, which they will have the asiatics to submit to, and must admit of whatever can be proved by those Rules. Such are the Rules of Logic, which cannot be neglected, in any part of the World, without reasoning ill.  
But it is as difficult to follow those Principles of Reason, when some Passions, or a long Custom oppose them, as it is easy to acknowledge the Truth of 'em, when they are proposed in general. The Chineses, for Example, would readily approve of those Rules, and consequently they should acknowledge all the Truths, which can be proved by them; as this, for Example, that Polygamy is unlawful. Yet 'tis impossible to convince 'em of it, and it is the greatest Obstacle to their Conversion which the Missionaries meet with. 
† Novu. Mem. de la Chine. Vol. II. Lett. 4.  The Mandarins, who are forbidden to use most Pleasures, which the People are allowed, live, as it were, in a kind of Seraglio, to make up that loss, wherein they spend their time, when they are free from Business. Tho' they have but one lawful Wife, yet they are allowed to take as many Concubines as they can maintain, and the Children born of 'em are looked upon as Children of the lawful Wife, and bred up with equal care with them. To be admitted to Baptism, they must promise to the Missionaries that they will part with all their Concubines, and be contented with one lawful Wife. They often promise to the Missionaries every thing else; but their Passions and Customs are too much set against this Point; they cannot believe that God requires of Men that they should have but one Wife, tho' the conformity of this Doctrine with Reason may be more easily shown, than of several others, which the Chineses approve of, without any Reluctancy.  
When we propose to the Mandarins, says a Missionary, the other Difficulties of our Religion, they will dispute, and endeavour to overcome them, and despair not of doing themselves Violence; but this last Point discourages them presently, and takes away from them the thought of Converting themselves. Then he alleges the Example of a Chinese, who would have been Baptised, but was quite out of conceit with it, by reason of that Article.  
The difficulty of acknowledging the Truth increases still among the Chinese, by reason of the Laws, which authorise that ill Custom, and so perplex several of 'em, who would turn Christians, that they know not what to do. They, who turn Christians, are permitted to take to Wife one of their Concubines, if the lawful Wife will not embrace Chistianity; but the Laws forbidden the Chineses to do it, and they are not allowed to Divorce their Wives, but in very few particular Cases. Besides, the Relations of the Wife thus Divorced by her Husband, would not fail to Revenge themselves, and force him in Law to take her again.  
The Conversion of Women is more difficult still. A Concubine, for Example, acknowledges the Truth of the Christian Religion, and is very sensible of the miserable condition she is in. She desires to be freed from it, and admitted to Baptism. She is told that the first thing, which her Faith requires of her, is, to part with her pretended Husband. She gives her Consent to it, and even desires it with all Heart; but she says: I belong to a Mandarin, who bought me. If I leave his House, the Law empowers him to apprehend, and punish me as his Slave. If by chance I escape him, whither can I go to be safe? My Parents, who have Sold me, durst not take me into their House, and I cannot fail to fall into the Hands of another Man, who will draw me into the same State of Life, from which I desire to be freed. I must therefore stay in the House, where I am; but how can I resist a brutish Man, who only minds his Passion, which he may justify by the Laws, and Example of the whole Empire? 'Tis in vain for me to represent to him the Holiness of Christianity, which I desire to embrace; my Entreaties, my Tears, and even my Resistance, and all my Endeavours are not able to move him.  
It happens also sometimes that an Idolater, being weary of his Christian Wife, will accuse her unjustly, and with much Money get a Permission to Sell her to another Man. Nay sometimes he will Sell her without any other Formality, and retire into another Province. How can this Woman, being in the Hands of an Adulterer, whom the Laws authorise, avoid Sin, and persevere in the Faith?  
I thought fit to set down that Passage at large, because supposing that a Man, in the same Circumstances, should be inclined to live, as he did till he heard of the Gospel; the difficulty of getting out of that Trouble, together with the long Habit he has contracted, determines him to believe that the Gospel is false; not by any Reasons, but because if it were true, he must presently Condemn himself, and change his Inclinations and manner of Life, whatever Difficulty and Danger there may be in it. The Jews, in our Saviour's time, were almost in the same Circumstances, by reason of Divorces, and Polygamy. They, who having divorced their Wives, had Married several times, or had many Wives at one time, and besides were inclined to that sort of Life, were apt to believe that the Doctrine of Christ was false, by reason of their Inclinations, and the difficulty of Changing their Lives. 'Tis for this Reason, at least in part, that Christ and his Apostles told the Jews, as well as the Gentiles, That to become his Disciples, they must be born again, become new Men, and forsake their nearest Relations, when they could no longer live with them, according to the Precepts of the Gospel: And this was without doubt one of the great Reasons of the Obstinacy of the Jews. It was a hard thing for them, not only to renounce their Inclinations, which prompted them to change their Wives, and to have many at one time; but also to confess that they had lived in Adultery, and that several of their Children were Illegitimate. Their Children could also hardly endure to be called Children of Adulterers, and to see their Fathers forsake their Mothers. Which caused very great Divisions in the Families of the Jews; and perhaps Christ alludes partly to those Disorders, when he says, That he 
† Luke XII. 51.  is not come to give Peace on Earth, but rather Division, and when he describes the nearest Relations so cruelly divided: From henceforth there shall be five in one House divided, three against two, and two against three. The Father shall be divided against the Son, and the Son against the Father; the Mother against the Daughter, and the Daughter against the Mother; the Mother-in-law against her Daughter-in-law, and the Daughter-in-law against her Mother-in-law. They, who thought of those ill Consequences, and had no great Piety, could not resolve to embrace a Doctrine, which the most honest Men in the Jewish Nation could not receive, without defaming themselves, and falling out with their nearest Kindred. Such a Passion and many other, hindered them from perceiving the Beauty and Truth of the Gospel, which presently shines to the Eyes of those, who are not prepossessed with the like Passions.  
It would be no difficult thing to make an application of that Truth to many Christians, who live in gross Errors still, notwithstanding all the Light of our Age. But 'tis better that every Body should do it himself, provided he takes care not to be in the same Case with those he censures.   

CHAP. VIII. Of Praises and Censures.  
THERE is nothing more Equivocal than Praises and Censures; and no Esteem or Contempt can scarce be grounded on either of them. To mention but one sort of Praises; the Divines of the same Party praise one another, out of so many ill Motives, that one can lay no Stress upon it. They do it commonly out of a great Conceit of their own Notions, and only because of the Resemblance of their Opinions. In such a case, what can one infer from such Praises, but that they, who Praise one another, are of the same Party, and maintain the same Truths or the same Errors? Men will often Praise a Book out of Flattery, to please the Author of it, who is in a great Station, has great Revenues, a great Authority, and some other Qualities, which have no Relation with his Book. But such Praises would soon cease, if that Man should lose his Employments, his Authority, his Revenues, etc. Some will Praise a Book, because they understand not the Matter it treats of, and admire what they do not apprehend. Others do it out of Complaisance, without having any Reason for't, but that they see others do it. 'Tis therefore to no purpose to talk of Approbations of Books, or other like Praises, and cry up a Man's Reputation, which is only grounded on such deceitful Praises.  
However it must be confessed that, in some Cases, Praises may be of some Weight, viz. when Men of Parts Praise and Esteem those that are of a contrary Party; especially when 'tis not their Interest to do so, but on the contrary, they expose themselves by doing it. A Roman Catholic Divine is in such a case, when he Praises a Protestant Writer. It may be said then of those, who are so praised, That none but honest▪ Men Praise them; as Aristotle, said in an Elegy he composed in the Praise of Plato, that he had erected an Altar to that Philosopher, Whom ill Men were not allowed to Praise.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Few Praises of that Nature are better than whole Volumes of Approbations of Men of the same Party, or who can be suspected of Ignorance and Passion.  
The contrary aught to be said of Disadvantageous Judgements, or Censures.  
When Men inveigh against others, who are of different Opinions, and of a contrary Party, what can one conclude from it? Nothing, but that they have different Opinions, and are of a different Party. Men blame out of Envy, or through some other Passion, what they would Praise, if their Passions should cease. They inveigh, for Example, against those; who are of another Party, to set up for Zealots, and to get some Reputation; and because they may safely give up themselves to the most shameful Anger, under pretence of Zeal, and vent a thousand Calumnies, without being punished for it; they deliberately take part in Quarrels, wherein they neither observe the Rules of Christian Charity, nor Natural Equity. Then the Censures they pass upon their Neighbours, show only, that they Envy and Hate 'em, and have a mind to raise themselves by wounding their Reputation: And if Men could see the Hearts of other Men, as they can hear and read their Words, they would often see in the Souls of those, who speak or write so angrily, a secret Esteem for those of whom they speak Ill, which Envy and Hatred endeavour in vain to Stifle. When some Men blame others out of Ignorance, or to imitate those who do the like, as Ignorant and Unjust Men commonly do; what can one conclude from it, but that Dogs never bark alone, where there are other Animals of the same kind? What can one say therefore of those, who, to wrong another Man, take care to collect all the Slanders, and reviling Words of those who have abused him? If any one, to let the Public Know what they ought to think of Samuel Maresius, heretofore Professor of Divinity at Groeningen, should gather all that Gisbertus Voetius said to defame him; and on the contrary, to wrong the Memory of Voetius, should make a Collection of all that. Maresius wrote against him; one might▪ with reason believe that he makes sport with the Public, or designs to impose on simple Men. This has been nevertheless practised of late by a Divine of my Acquaintance against a Friend of mine. He has collected some silly things, which some passionate Divines have writ against him, as if one could rely upon the Judgement of Ignorant and Unjust Men! It would be an easy thing to beat him at his own Weapon, and publish what some Men as Orthodox as himself, have said against his Opinions.  
But Censures ought not to be minded, except when 'tis a Man's Interest to forbear Censuring. When Cardinal Baronius speaks Ill of some Popes, his Opinion deserves without doubt some Consideration. When Melanchton gives but an Ill Character of some Lutherans of his time, one may reasonably think that they gave occasion to speak Ill of ' 'em.  
The same Passions, with which we are moved now, reigned likewise formerly, as all those, who have carefully read the Church-History, are convinced. We must therefore weigh in the same Scales the Praises and Censures of past Ages with those of our time, and give 'em no more Weight than Equity requires, and a severe Examination will allow. If this were done, as it ought to be, how many Church-Histories are there, which would deserve to be thrown into the Fire? The best would serve only for Chronological Tables, to rank Facts according to the order of Time.  
There is another thing to be observed concerning Praises and Censures: or, if you will, Good and Hard Words, viz. The Style of the time, wherein the Authors of 'em lived.  
They, who lived, for Example, when the Republic of Rome was still flourishing, or in the Reign of Julius Caesar, were wont to Praise those of the prevailing Party, and to Blame the Unfortunate, as it has been the constant practice of Men; but they were much more reserved than those, who lived in the Third Century, under the Reign of the last Heathen Emperors, or in the Fourth, under the Reign of the Christian Emperors. In Julius Caesar and even Augustus his time, the greatest Flatterers could not have been endured, if they had said what the Emperors said of themselves in their Laws and Edicts. They, who know the Character of the Age of Augustus need but look on both Codes, to find a great many places in them, which would have been thought intolerable at that time. That, which is most strange, is that the Christian Emperors followed such an ill Custom, even in such Laws as concerned Religion, wherein one would think they should have expressed themselves with more Modesty. For Example, here is a Law of Arcadius, Honorius, and Theodosius Junior, which was published in the Year 404. Let all the Officers of the Palace have warning, that they ought to abstain from going to tumultuous Assemblies; and let those, who, out of a SACRILEGIOUS Mind, dare oppose the Authority of OUR DIVINITY, be deprived of their Employments, and let their Estates be confiscated. Cuncta Officia moneantur tumultuosis se conventiculis abstinere, & qui SACRILEGO animo auctoritatem NOSTRI NUMINIS ausifuerint expugnare, privati cingulo bonorum proscriptione mulctentur. Cod. Theodos. Lib. XVI. Tit. IU. L. 4. The Letters they writ are styled Sacred Letters, 
† Ibid. T. V L. 20.  Sacrae Literae. When the Sons speak of their Father, they call him their Father of Divine Memory, and their Divine Father, 
† Ibid. L. 20. & 26.  Divae recordationis, & divus Genitor. They call their own Laws Oracles and Heavenly Oracles, 
† Ibid. L. 51.  even when they recall ' 'em. Honorius speaking of an Edict, whereby he granted Liberty of Conscience to the Donatists in Africa, expresses himself thus in his Orders, which we find in the 
† Vid. & Cod. Theodos. Gothofredi. T. VI p. 300.  Conference of Carthage: We are not ignorant of the Contents of a HEAVENLY ORACLE, which the Donatists, by a false Interpretation, pretend to favour their Errors, and which we recalled heretofore, tho' it mildly exhorted them to Repentance. Nec sanè latet conscientiam nostram s●rmo COELESTIS ORACULI, quem errori 〈◊〉 posse proficere scaeva Donatistarum interpretatio pro●●●●tur, qui quamvis depravatos animos ad correctionem mitius invitaret, aboleri eum tamen etiam antè assimus.  
When Princes spoke thus of themselves, what would not their flattering Subjects say? They would give 'em the Title of your Perpetuity, and your Eternity, Perennitas and Aeternitas vestra, as we may see in Symmachus' Letters directed to several Emperors. St. Athanasius had reason to laugh at the Arian Bishops, who bestowed that Title on the Emperor Constans: 
† De Synedis p. 718. T. I. Ed. Paris. an. 1698.  They, says he, who deny that the Son is Eternal, call him (the Emperor) eternal King. But the Emperors themselves did not scruple afterwards to assume that Title of Honour, as it appears by a 
† Cod. Theod. L. XV. T. I. L. 31.  Law of Theodosius the Great, which gins thus: If any Judge, having finished a public Work, inscribes his Name on it, rather than that of OUR PERPETUITY, let him be accounted guilty of High-Treason. Si qui Judices perfecto operi suum potiùs nomen quam NOSTRAE PERENNIT ATIS scripserint, Majestatis teneantur obnoxii. Instead of those Words, Tribonian inserted 
† Lib. VIII. T. XII. L. 10  these into the Code, without mentioning OUR DIVINITY, sine NUMINIS NOSTRI mentione.  
Churchmen followed the same Custom; for the Bishops were not called merely by their Names, but with the addition of most Holy, most Pious, most Acceptable to God, most Happy, our most Holy Father, and other such Titles, which the Acts of the Councils are full of, especially when they mentioned the Bishops of Great Cities.  
I doubt not but that they knew very well that those Titles of Honour were not to be understood in their full Sense: However they were not bestowed without Flattery, nor accepted without Vanity.  
The Censures and Invectives of that time were no less excessive. Such is the Character of the Spirit of Flattery: It inspires Men not only with a thousand mean things towards their Superiors, but also with strange and violent Passions against those they are angry with. This one may see in the XVI. Book of the Theodosian Code, Tit. V. concerning Heretics, to whom the Emperors. or their Secretaries give all sort of ill Language. And lest it should be thought that they speak only of the Manichees or other like Heretics, whose Doctrine was inconsistent with Morality; Arcadius and Honorius defined what Heresy is, and denoted those whom they called Heretics. 
† Cod. Theod. Lib. XVI. Tit. V L. 28.  They, who shall be found to recede never so little from the Sense of the Catholic Church, are comprehended under the Name of Heretics, and liable to the Laws, which have been enacted against them. Haereticorum vocabulo continentur, & latis adversùs eos sanctionibus debent succumbere, qui vel levi argumento à judicio Catholicae Religionis, & tramite detecti fuerint deviare. One needs only read the V Title of the XVI. Book of the Theodosian Code against the Heretics, to see that as it was then the Custom to bestow excessive Praise, so they excessively blamed those they did not love. The Heretics are called there not only Men fond of erroneous Opinions, and obstinate; but also Distracted, Mad, Profane, Perfidious, Detestable, and Sacrilegious Men, who have wickedly conspired against the Deity, etc. Jacobus Gothofredus has collected all those reviling Words, and placed them before the Title I have mentioned.  
Tho' it be as clear as Noon Daylight, that the Praises and Censures of that time are most of them strained and excessive; yet several People, who read the Writings of that Age, take no notice of it; and the ancient Customs having been changed in these latter Ages, they fancy that all those, who are styled Saints in those ancient Writings, (which was only a Title of Honour bestowed upon all Bishops and Priests,) are really Saints, in such a Sense as that Word is now understood; that is to say, that they enjoy the Glory of Heaven, and may be safely prayed to, as the Church of Rome holds, as being Mediators between God and Men. From whence it follows that their Writings ought to be infinitely more esteemed than those of the Modern, tho' the latter are composed with greater accuracy, and according to all the Rules of Art. For who durst believe that such Men reasoned ill, and wrote carelessly? They also conclude from it, that Men, who are prayed to, could be guilty of no dangerous Error, and that their Lives ought to be the Pattern of ours. Thus they Canonize them together with their Errors and Vices, to which they were as subject as those, who live now. An Order, that has one of those Saints for its Patron, is always very zealous in the Defence of his Opinions and manner of Life.  
And because those great Saints condemned and persecuted as much as they could those, who receded from their Opinions; they, who admire their Writings, revile, in their imitation, and persecute those, who differ from them. This will always be, as long as the Praises and Censures of the Ancient are approved of without any examination; instead of comparing them with the unchangeable Rule of Reason and the Gospel.   

CHAP. IX. That it is a very difficult thing to Judge without Passion.  
EVERY Body says, That an Author, who writes with Passion, is not to be trusted; and it cannot be denied but that it is a very true Maxim, and very useful to those, who follow It. But to know whether an Author writes with Passion, or no, one ought to free one self from Passion. Otherwise a Man will deceive himself move than he can be deceived by the most interested Author; because every Body mistrusts himself less, than others. He, that will free himself from his Passions, must know that he is subject to them; for he cannot get rid of a Habit, which he thinks he has not contracted. But what must one do, to know it? Men deceive themselves every Day, and believe they keep within the Bounds of Moderation and Equity. I confess that when we are actually agitated with a Passion, we are not capable of judging well of ourselves; but there is scarce any Passion but what has some Intervals. Then the general Light of Reason and Equity, which we have acquired by Study and Experience, shines in our Minds; because they cease to be filled with Fumes of Passions. We must then improve that Time, take a sound Resolution, and form such Maxims as we will always observe: as Physicians make use of the Intervals that are between Fits, to cure those who are sick of a Fever. If they don't prevent new Fits, they will at least lessen the Violence of them. In like manner, some Reflections made, whilst the Mind is calm, do often prevent violent Passions, or at least lessen them in a great measure. He, who often makes such Reflections, will sooner perceive the Effects of 'em: as the effects of Remedies are better known, when they have been reiterated. But there is this difference between a Fever and our Passions, that we often recover of the former, without using any Remedies; whereas we cannot get rid of our Passions, without reflecting on then, and reiterating our Reflections.  
If a Man therefore never Reflects he is past recovery. In some cases every thing contributes to keep up our Passions, and hinder us from Reflecting on the State we are in. This may be observed in what is called Zeal for Religion, in the Sects that are most remote from Truth. That Zeal is nothing else but a vehement Desire of setting up One's Opinions by any means. The Divines of those false Religions cry it up as a Virtue, without which one cannot be acceptable to God, and look upon Peace and Toleration as a detestable Vice. Every Body hears this Doctrine from his tender Years, reads it in all their Books, and sees it practised by the most esteemed Persons. The Zealots get a great Reputation in their Party, and obtain all the Rewards; but the Admirers of peaceable Equity get nothing by it but Trouble and Contempt. Ask therefore no more, how it comes to pass that so marry People ire deceived and imposed upon.  
You will say that you easily apprehend that it it is now very difficult to preserve one's self from the Illusions of Passions; but that you cannot conceive how rational Men could establish Doctrines so contrary to Truth. I answer, That Men in Authority, who sincerely believed some false Doctrines, might have enacted some Laws, and introduced some Customs, as were fit to Authorise a false as well as a true Doctrine; and than it proved a difficult thing to go against the Stream. Some Impostors and Politicians might also have had a hand in it, so that at last the Assertors of a false Doctrine proved so fond of it, that it was a very hard matter to overcome their Prejudices. Thus the most ridiculous Opinions of the Heathens and Mahometans were introduced at first, and afterwards kept up by such means as I have mentioned. Those Nations blindly believe whatever their Writers and Priests tell 'em; without being ware that those Men, getting their Livelihood by those erroneous Doctrines, will not fail to maintain a Party, under whose Ruins they would infallibly sink. Would to God they were the only Men, whose Interest it is to maintain Errors, and oppress the Truth! Would to God that none but they were deceived by their own and other Men's Passions! But it is a general Evil, which in all likelihood will last as long as there are Men in this World. However we must endeavour to oppose it, lest it should excessively increase.   

CHAP. X. Of Mr. Le Clec 's Works.  
NO Body can give a better Account or the Works and Studies of Mr. Le Clerc than I: And since it is necessary that the Public should be informed of it, because of those, who wrote against him, I'll say what I know of it. Humane Learning, Philosophy and Divinity, with their Dependences, have been his chief Studies; and he has equally applied himself to them from his younger Years, so as one of those Sciences succeeded the other, by turns, according to the Circumstances he was in. He does the same still, and 'tis likely he'll continue to do so the rest of his Life: I cannot tell whether he has well succeeded, or no, in the Works he has published concerning those three Sciences: You know the reason of it. But I can tell you, with all the Sincerity I am capable of, that I am persuaded he searched Truth with great Application, without having any other Design but to find it. First, in what concerns the Christian Religion, and then about several Points which concern Divinity, Philosophy, Church-History and Humane Learning. As for the Christian Religion, I know, not only by what he has written concerning it, but also by what he has discoursed, on several Occasions, that he is fully persuaded of the Truth of it; not out of Custom, or Weakness, or because one may sometimes get something by feigning to be persuaded of it, as it seems many do, but out of Reason and upon Examination. Few Men have more meditated on the Christian Religion than he has done; and perhaps there is not one Divine, who has a greater Notion of God and Christianity than he has. He can't abide that weak or doubtful Arguments should be used in their Defence, out of Policy, because they work on the Minds of the People, and Ignorant Men. He thinks that Men thereby equal Divine Revelation with false Religions, which are kept up by such a Method, for want of a better: Whereas no other Arguments ought to be made use of, for the Proof of the Christian Religion, but such as are proper to it, and wholly distinguish it from Falsehood, which cannot be defended with the same Arms. He affirms, That whoever doubts of the truth of Christianity, has not a true Notion of it, or cannot Reason well, or desires to indulge his Passions.  
But to see the Christian Religion in its due Light, he thinks it ought to be considered as it was in its beginning, without mixing any Human Doctrine, or any Explication of unintelligible Things with it. Those Explications and Human Doctrines are, as he thinks, the cause of most Disputes and Errors; not to mention a thousand other Evils, which they have occasioned. Wherefore he speaks of 'em with as much Contempt as he admires what God has revealed to us by Christ and his Apostles.  
Mr. Ʋander Waeyen, a Cocceian Divine, will notwithstanding deprive him of the Title of a Divine, in two Libels he wrote against him. But he troubles himself so little with it, that on the contrary he would be very sorry to be accounted a great Divine by such a Man as that Professor of Franeker. Mr. L. C. professes himself to be a Christian, and does nothing that contradicts his Profession; but he would not be a Divine of Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's, Stamp, and he is not the only Man of that Opinion. There are very few Reformed Divines, but despise that sort of Divinity. Mr. Spanheim, Professor in the University of Leyden, with whom the Professor of Franeker is not at all to be compared, has spoken his Mind plainly enough on this Matter; and Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's Indignation against him has not prejudiced his Reputation in the least. Mr. L. C. beseeches God, That he would teach Mr. Ʋander Waeyen what the Title of a Divine requires of them, who bear it, and will not dishonour it.  
Tho' he had early studied the Philosophy of Descartes, he follows only his general Principles, which he admires; and thinks that the only reason why Descartes did not keep to them, when he came to Particulars, is, That he made too much haste, desiring to publish a complete System before he died. I'll tell you more of it, when I come to Discourse of Mr. L. C s. Philosophical Works. The general design of 'em is to form the Minds of Young Men, and open them a Way to the search of Truth, even in the most important Things. For the Author is of Opinion, That the true Method of Philosophising is of very great use to establish the Truth of the Christian Religion, and show the excellency and necessity of its Precepts. He thinks that a Man must not part with his Reason, or stifle its Light, to perceive the Beauty of Christianity; Such a Method seems to him to be the infallible way of establishing all manner of Errors. On the contrary, the better a Man Reasons, the more he'll be convinced of the Truth of the Christian Religion.  
The Study of Languages and Human Learning has taken up part of his Life, and is still his greatest Diversion. He is persuaded that it is of great use for the understanding of Holy Scripture, as it appears by his Works. He also believes, That that sort of Study is very useful to improve Men's Minds, and moderate their Passions; if at the same time the Study of Philosophy be joined with it; for they must never be divided. A Man enables himself thereby to make his own what he finds in Ancient Authors, that deserves it; without being in danger of admiring their Faults, as it is commonly done by such Critics as only cultivate their Memory. That Reading enables one not only to express his Thoughts agreeably and elegantly, but also more clearly and distinctly; provided it be attenedd with good Logical Rules, which must never be neglected, and which the Critics are most times Strangers to.  
Mr. L. C. is of Opinion, That if the three Sciences, I have mentioned, were joined together; the Knowledge, which depends on them, would very much increase, and consequently Virtue and Honesty would not be so scarce as they are; for he maintains that Ignorance is the Mother of Vice, and that true Learning is the Fountain of the most solid Virtue. If Divines, I say, were also good Philosophers, there would arise a great Advantage from it; they would lay aside all pitiful and childish Arguments, which their Books are full of, and which they often vent as Articles of Faith, whereby they do a great prejudice to Religion. They would not betray it, without being ware of it, by saying that Men must renounce the most certain Knowledge of their Reason, to embrace if. They would propose their Thoughts in a much clearer and better Order, and convince the Minds of their Readers or Hearers after such a manner as would influence their Lives. The whole Body of Divinity would be reduced into Maxims, or necessary Consequences drawn from them, and the necessity thereof would soon appear, in order to live Happily in this present World, and be acceptable to Him, who placed Men on Earth for a short time; to make 'em Happy after Death, if they will observe his Laws, which are very beneficial to them during this Life.  
If Divines understanding Revelation, as they should, and making a good use of Reason, were besides so Skilled in Human Learning, as to be able to read all sorts of Ecclesiastical and Profane Authors in the Original Languages; so many Materials joined together, and rectified by the invariable Rules of Revelation and Reason, and beautified with all the solid Ornaments of a true Eloquence; so many Materials, I say, would have a great influence on the Hearts and Minds of Men. Solid Thoughts being attended with the Order and Light, which Philosophy affords, and set off with all the Ornaments, which Reason allows of, would insinuate themselves into the Minds of the most Obstinate Men, and Charm those, who have a good Judgement and an upright Heart.  
I will not say, That we see now the quite contrary, because Things, which should be inseparable, are now divided: This I leave to the Judgement of those, who are skilled in those Sciences. Mr. L. C. believes, That the Famous Hugo Grotius, whose Writings are above Envy, joined together the three Sciences, I have mentioned. For, if he did not fully understand the Art of thinking well, because the Philosophy of his Time was still full of Darkness; he supplied that defect in great measure by the strength of his Reason. If he shown so much Sense and Judgement, without the help of Art; what would he not have done, if he had been throughly acquainted, as we have been since, with the Art of Reasoning, and ranging one's Thoughts in a good Order? Suppose there were now in Holland, many such Men as Grotius, or more Learned than he was, (a thing not impossible, if Men studied as they should) how great an influence would their Learning have, not only in the United Provinces, but also over all Europe! Then indeed we might hope for such a general Reformation of all Sciences, as would be worthy of Him, who has given us Knowledge, to make a good use of it.  
Mr. L. C. has intimated several times, That so noble an Idea has often Charmed him, and afforded him a thousand agreeable Reveries. If the World never sees any thing answerable to it; they at least, who are Skilled in those Things, may innocently busy themselves about Thoughts, which fill the Mind with Admiration for God, and the Christian Religion, and inspire the desire of knowing and teaching Truth, without Anger and Animosity against those, who are ignorant of it.  
If Philosophers were also Divines, and well versed in Human Learning, how solid and sublime would their Thoughts appear! How useful should we find their Principles! As they would take out of Revelation what is wanting to Reason; so they would by degrees dispose the Minds of those, who learn Philosophy, to take the right side in Matters of Religion, and would show 'em, on all occasions, the Excellency of the Light of Reason. And as the Philosophy of the Schools, which succeeded the wretched Rhetoric of the foregoing Ages, made an end of corrupting Men's Minds, and disfiguring Religion; so a sound Philosophy would kindle again the Light of Reason, which was extinguished only to introduce a thousand Errors, and would dispose Men to perceive all the Beauties of the Gospel. If the Discourses of Philosophers were full of useful Examples, taken out of Ecclesiastical and Profane Authors, to which the Rules of the Art of Reasoning should be applied; such a Method of teaching would make one apprehend the use of Philosophy, which is otherwise altogether confined within the Walls of an Auditory, and so becomes Contemptible.  
I confess, That most Philosophical Matters are not very susceptible of Ornaments; but it is certain, that if they can be expressed in proper Terms, and such as agree with the use of the Language they are expressed in, as much as possible, they become thereby much clearer and more pleasant to every Body, and consequently more useful; because Men are more attentive to what they understand and like, than to such Things as can hardly be understood, and have I know not what, that displeases, tho' they are good in themselves. This has been observed in France, since they began there to Philosophise in French. Some Books full of the most abstruse Philosophical Inquiries, have been read by many People with Delight and Profit; because they are well written, and are free from the barbarous Terms of the Schools. One might have seen the happy Effects of it, if the Inhabitants of that Country were not unwilling to be undeceived.  
To come now to the Study of Languages and Human Learning, it is certain, That if those, who apply themselves to it, would Study Philosophy and Divinity at the same time, they would be much more useful to the Public. That Study concerns Things of the greatest Moment, since the knowledge of the Scripture and Ecclesiastical History depends as much on it, as on the knowledge of the Things themselves. A great many new Discoveries might be made still, in those Sciences, which would raise and enlighten one's Mind, and inspire it with a greater respect for the Divine Revelation. Instead of which, most of our Critics grow Old in the Study of Grammatical Trifles, which are of very little use, and wherein one may be mistaken, without any danger. If they were also Skilled in Philosophy, they would judge much better of the Ancients than they do, and give us a more exact Notion of them, whereby we might be enabled to imitate them in what is good, and avoid what is not so. They would order their Thoughts so as to avoid Error, and enlighten the Minds of their Readers. For want of such a Method, they oftener admire the Faults of the Ancients, than what deserves their Admiration; because they seldom have any certain Criteriums, whereby they may distinguish True from False, and what deserves to be esteemed from what does not. When they have a mind to Communicate their Thoughts; it proves often a confused heap of indigested Learning, which can hardly be reduced into any Order, and is full of False Reasonings. This is partly the reason why that sort of Study is so much despised, and why so many People fancy that it is almost inconsistent with good Sense and Reason.  
Mr. Ʋander Waeyen, who in all likelihood never troubled himself much with Philosophy and Human Learning, having first of all applied himself to the common Divinity of the Reformed, and then to that of Cocceius, seems to be angry, because others Study the Sciences I have been speaking of, and calls Mr. L. C. as it were out of Contempt, Critico-Philosophus, tho' he Compliments him sometimes. Indeed it is much more easy to say any thing that comes into one's Mind, concerning the Sense of the Prophecies; as when they boldly affirm that the Reformed are meant by Juda, and the Lutherans by Ephraim in the Prophets; than to prove every thing exactly by Critical and Philosophical Arguments. If Mr. Ʋander Waeyen is very well contented to be ignorant of those Sciences, no Body can help it; but he must not take it ill, if others value them.  
If the use that is made of the knowledge of ancient Authors, may be often justly blamed; one might find out several ways of setting up again that Science, by a better Method, as I have already said here and elsewhere. But 'tis more proper here to Discourse of Mr. L. C's. Works in particular, after I have laid down his general Notions of the Method of Studying, and of the use of the Sciences he applies himself to.  

Of the Quaestiones Sacrae.  BEING arrived in Holland in the Year 1683. he published the Year following a Book, Entitled, Davidis & Stephani Clerici Quaestiones Sacrae, which are Critical Discourses on some Subjects taken for the most part out of the Scripture. He added to them some Notes of his own, wherein he scruples not to contradict his Uncle and Father, when he thinks they are mistaken; being of Opinion that Truth is to be preferred to the strictest Ties of Blood. He published that Book not only to honour the Memory of his Uncle and Father, who had a great Skill in the Eastern Languages and Human Learning, and whose Lives he prefixed to that Book; but also to serve the Public, which can never be done, but by telling the Truth. He did not think it inconsistent with the Respect he owed to the Memory of two Men so nearly related to him, if he shown that they were fallible like other Men. Notwithstanding, most of his Remarks do only clear or confirm what is contained in those Dissertations. Another Volume of those two Brothers was published in 1682. and printed by Wetstein, in Octavo. But Mr. L. C. added nothing of his own to it, but a Preface. It contains some Speeches on several Subjects, and a Computus Ecclesiasticus of David le Clerc, with some Poetical Pieces of the same, and some Dissertations of Stephen le Clerc upon some Places of several Profane Authors.  

Of his Entretiens de Theologie.  TOWARDS the end of the same Year 1684. Mr. L. C. published a Book of a Friend of his, Entitled, Entretiens sur diverses matieres' de Theology, in Twelves, and because it was too small a Book, he added a second Part to it, made up of five Dialogues. The three First treat of the Extent of our Metaphysical Knowledge, and its use in Religion, and contain several Examples, whereby it clearly appears, That Metaphysicians have often obscured Divinity, and started a thousand Difficulties, by reasoning about Things, of which they had no Ideas. The Authors thinks that we must not extend the use of the Faculties, we have received of God, beyond the Bounds he has prescribed to them, unless we will fall into infinite Errors; and believes, that as our Senses teach us no more of Bodies, than what is necessary for the Preservation of our Lives; so the Light of Reason is of no farther use to us, than to make us obey the Laws of God, and to lead us to the Supreme Felicity. So that God having bestowed Knowledge on us only to that intent, when we will launch out beyond the Bounds of that Knowledge, and what necessarily depends on it; we run the hazard of wandering, and falling into many Doubts, which we cannot resolve, as the Author shows at large.  
The Fourth Dialogue contains an Examination, of several Places of Scripture, which Metaphysicians make an ill use of. Most of those Passages are taken out of the Writings of the Author of The Search after Truth; but there are several Things, which are common to him and other Metaphysicians.  
The Design of those Four Dialogues is to show, that in Matters of Religion, we must keep to Revelation, and not fancy that we have complete and adequate Ideas of the Things contained in it, and that we may draw infinite Consequences from them. If Divines had kept themselves within those Bounds, without adding any Thing to the Doctrines contained in the Scripture, and inventing New Terms, as if they were more convenient than those which the Holy Writers made use of; perhaps the World had not seen the Fourth Part of the Heresies, which have been broached from the Apostles to this time; and the Christian Theology would be much more Beautiful, and more conducing to Piety.  
The Fifth Dialogue contains an Explication of the IX, X, & XI Chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, taken chief out of the Paraphrase of Dr. Hammond; who is now better known in Foreign Countries, since Mr. L. C. published his Works in Latin, as I shall say hereafter. Those Dialogues are the First Book that he published in French, and one may see in it the Three Sciences, I have discoursed of, Divinity, Philosophy, and Critical Learning, concurring to inspire the Reader with Pious and Reasonable Opinions concerning Religion and Morality. For he utterly dissents from those, who cry down Reason, that they may vent, without being contradicted, a thousand Things which really reflect on God and Religion. One may see what he says about it, towards the End of the Third Dialogue. Reason and Revelation never quarrel with one another; and if we see the contrary in School-Divinity, 'tis because what they call Reason, or Revelation, is often a mere Phantom, substituted in their room; as those, who can consult the Scripture, and who reason closely, will easily perceive.  

Of the sentiments sur l'Histoire Critic, etc.  IN the Year 1685. Mr. L. C. published another French Book in Octavo, Entitled, sentiments de quelques Theologiens de Hollande sur l'Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament composée par R. Simon. That Book is writ by way of Letters, wherein Mr. L. C. sets down the Opinions of several Persons concerning the Critical History of the Old Testament by Father Simon, and gives an Account of the Conversations of some Friends discoursing with great Freedom of Father Simon's Book, and some Subjects relating to it. When we discourse with some Persons, whom we do not mistrust, we believe that we may boldly say what we think, especially if we propose our Thoughts as mere Conjectures; because we pretend not to maintain them, as our settled Opinion, and scruple not to give them up, when after a more serious Consideration, those Conjectures appear not to us probable enough, to be defended. This has been done by Mr. L. C. in that Book, wherein he has advanced some Conjectures of his own and of his Friends, without ever pretending to maintain them but as Conjectures, which are not destitute of Probability, and not as his settled Opinion, as if he believed they could be clearly proved.  

A Digression concerning Conjectures  IT is certain that there are several degrees of Likelihood and Certainty in Men's Opinions. It be confessed that the Things we believe are not equally clear, whatever the ancient Stoic Philosophers might say to the contrary, who believed that their Wise Man never conjectured, and that whatever he believed could be demonstrated. Neither yet is every thing uncertain, as the Academians held; and there is an infinite number of Things, which can be demonstrated, or rendered very likely; as Mr. L. C. has shown at large, in the second Part of his Logic. We ought to speak more or less affirmatively, according to the several degrees of Likelihood or Certainty. As it would be ridiculous to speak doubtfully of a clear Mathematical Proposition; so it would not be less absurd to propose a Conjecture as a Demonstration. Men have always been allowed to Conjecture, and say what seemed to them to be probable; but upon condition that they should remember that their Conjectures were not certain Truths. Reason therefore teaches a Man to act differently, when any Body writes against a Conjecture, which he has published, or when he perceives that they writ against a clear Truth out of Malice, or Obstinacy: If any one shows that a Conjecture may be false, the Author of that Conjecture must not take it ill; because a Conjecture is an Opinion wherein one may be mistaken. And if after a more careful Examination, he thinks that his Conjecture is less probable than it seemed to be at first, he ought to look upon it with greater Indifferency, and even give it up, if he finds out something better. A Man must never be positive in Things, which cannot at all be demonstrated, so as to embrace, or defend as certain what is only probable.  
This Mr. L. C. thought he might very well do, with respect to the Conjecture, which is to be found in the VI Letter of the Sentiments, concerning the Compiler of the Pentateuch, who, as he thought, might have been an Honest Israelite, who collected all the Writings of Moses, and added to them some other Facts, taken out of some ancient and creditable Books, for the use of the Samaritans, about the time of the Captivity. As he always called that Opinion a Conjecture; so he never defended it but as such, and thought not himself obliged to maintain it as a thing he was sure of, against those who opposed it. Nay, he shown some Years after, as I shall say in its due place, that tho' there are some Passages in the Pentateuch, which are later than Moses; yet that can be no reason against his being the Author of it.  
He was so much the more willing to give up that Conjecture, because it is one of those Complex Conjectures, if I may so speak, wherein too many uncertain Things are supposed; every one of which being possibly false, it follows from thence that such a Conjecture is not probable enough, to serve as a Principle for the Explication of the Pentateuch. For the more doubtful Things there are in a Conjecture, the more uncertain it is, and the more danger there is in supposing it, to draw Consequences from it. 'Tis with Conjectures as 'tis with Accounts made up of several Sums. If you make an uncertain Supposition concerning the value of one of those Sums, in case you mistake, you mistake but in one particular; but the more uncertain Suppositions you make, the more doubtful will the Account be, and liable to more Errors. What must a Man therefore do in such a Case? He must Conjecture as little as he can, and draw few Consequences from what he has Conjectured, that he may be mistaken as little as may be, if he is in an Error. If Learned Men had always done this, we might have had a more real and solid knowledge of many Things than we have, and could better distinguish what is certain from what is uncertain; whereas when Conjectures are confounded with certainties, we think we know many Things which we really know not. For Example, Joseph Scaliger, who was a very Learned Man, mixed so many Conjectures, in his Book the Emendations Temporum, with what he might have undeniably proved, and drew so many Consequences from them, that a great part of his Chronology is become thereby very suspicious, if not false, as the famous Dionysius Petavius pretends. I know a Man of great Learning, who has published several Learned Books about Ecclesiastical History, and the Opinions of the ancient Christians; but he is so full of Conjectures, some of which are grounded upon ethers, that his Arguments are seldom cogent, and convince few judicious and attentive Readers.  
'Tis much better to say nothing of doubtful Things, or at least to draw no Consequences from them, and run the hazard of appearing less knowing, than to vent too many Uncertainties. But it is a common Fault among Men of Parts: After they have wearied themselves in searching after fugitive Truth, they make to themselves a Phantom of their own Conjectures, which they substitute in its place, lest they should seem to have altogether lost their time. Then to maintain that Phantom, they make other Conjectures, especially when they are hard put to it; and so by degrees instead of solid Truths, they vent only Dreams to those that hear them. When they think they have much contributed to the discovery of Truth's unknown before their time, they often remove them farther from Men's sight; like Turnus in Virgil's Aeneids, who, the more he followed Aeneas' Spectrum, the farther he went from the place, where the Enemies stood.  
I think one might make a very useful Treatise concerning the Art of Conjecturing, which would be reduced into Maxims, the chief whereof are the following: 

1. Every Conjecture must be probable:  
2. It ought to be as simple as possible:  
3. No Consequences must be drawn from it:  
4. One must speak of it doubtfully, as of a thing not certain:  
5. No Body should think himself obliged in Honour to defend it, nor scruple to give it up:  
6. He, who thinks himself obliged to maintain it, must not have recourse to new Suppositions.   The usefulness of those Maxims might be shown by very good Reasons, and several Examples taken out of the Writings of Philosophers and Critics, who have neglected them, and have therefore committed great Errors, and maintained the most uncertain Things in the World, with such a Heat and Confidence as is only to be used in the defence of a certain Truth.  
Several People stand in need of these Remarks, to learn to be less positive about Things they are not certain of, and not to wonder if any one yields up a Conjecture, which he never took for a certain Truth. They, who have little thought of the several degrees of Probability, are wont to speak of every thing with an equal assurance, and maintain with Obstinacy whatever they say, without distinguishing what can be maintained from that which cannot. But this ought not to be the practice of those, who can reason well, and who love the Truth, to which they must consequently sacrifice all their Conjectures.  

Of the Treatise concerning the Inspiration of the Sacred Writers.  THE XI. and XII. Letters of the Sentiments, etc. contain a small Treatise concerning the Inspiration of the Sacred Writers, which Mr. L. C. published not as if he approved of it, but with great caution, and only to engage Learned Men to write on that Subject. He said so positively in several places. And 'tis for this reason that several Divines have examined that Subject in Latin, French and English. Mr. L. C. thinks himself concerned in their Answers, tho' he might have complained that some of 'em observed not Rules of Equity, or Sincerity, not only with respect to the Doctrine contained in the Treatise concerning the Inspiration, etc. but also in reference to himself.  
F. Simon, who was warmly attacked in the Sentiments, etc. answered them with all the Passion and Animosity, that could be expected from a Man, who could allege no good Reasons; and he used all the injurious and unbecoming Words that he could think of, on such an occasion. He would also persuade the World that Dr. Allix, heretofore Minister at Charenton, and Mr. Aubert de Versé, who is now (in 1699.) at Paris, and has a Pension from the Clergy of France, were the Authors of that Book, and that Mr. Aubert, in particular had written the Treatise concerning the Inspiration of the Sacred Authors.  
A short time after, (in 1686.) Mr. L. C. published a Defence of the Sentiments, etc. and throughly confuted F. Simon's Chimerical Discoveries, which have been laughed at since by every Body; declaring to him, That he would answer him no more, tho' he should write never so many Books, because he thought the Public was so well acquainted with their Dispute, as to be able to judge of it, without being troubled any longer with F. Simon's ill Reasonings and Disingenuity. Indeed, when a Man has said all that is necessary, in order to clear and defend Truth, he needs go no farther; the Public being not much concerned in the Reputation and personal Interests of private Men. 'Twas in vain for F. Simon to cry out louder than he did before, according to the custom of those, who maintain a bad Cause; Mr. L. C. despised alike his hard Words, and his repeated Arguments. In his Defence, he says, That what F. Simon published concerning Dr. Allix, and Mr. Aubert, is a great Untruth. They know very well that it is false, and will not ascribe to themselves another Man's Work. They have both written some Books, whereby one may easily know that they have had no hand in the Sentiments, etc. nor in the Treatise concerning the Inspiration, etc. Whatever one may think of their Books, they have done nothing like this, either as to the Style, the Method, or the Matter. I do not say this to wrong them, or to praise any body, but to confute F. Simon the more effectually. They, who have read the other Works of Mr. L. C. will easily believe that he needs not borrow any thing of either of 'em, and that the Author of the Treatise concerning the Inspiration, etc. is quite another Person than those Gentlemen. They would perhaps have done well to declare themselves, that they have had no hand in that Book; but since they have not done it, I hope they will not take it ill, if I do't. If they believe that their Reputation would be wronged, by ascribing to them in part a Book, wherein they have no hand; they would be glad that I have said so here. But if their Silence should arise from some other Cause, which I will not dive into; they cannot complain that the Public should be informed of the truth of a Fact, which might wrong Mr. L. C. who has as little need of them, as they have of him.  

Of the Judgement which some Divines have made of the Sentiments, etc.  In the Year 1688. Mathias Honcamp, Canon of Mentz, published in Latin a Book, Entitled, An Examination of the Critical History of the Old Testament, and of the Sentiments, etc. Mr. L. C. answered him in the X. Vol. of the Bibliotheque Vniverselle; where he gives an ill Character of the Principles and Method of that Author, who perhaps deserved to be treated more sharply.  
In 1690. Mr. Maius, Professor at Giessen, published four Dissertations on the Holy Scripture, wherein he undertook to refute F. Simon, and the Author of the Sentiments, etc. The latter replied something in the XIX. Vol. of the Bibliotheque Vniverselle, where he shows That Mr. Maius ascribes to him some Opinions, which he has not, and that his Arguments are very weak and insignificant. But because he writes chief against the Treatise concerning the Inspiration, etc. Mr. L. C. did not think himself obliged to Dispute about it, either with Mr. Maius, or any body else. He could only have wished that that Author had been able to treat that Subject well, and refute his Antagonist with good Reasons, and not with hard Words, and Arguments, which prove nothing. Equity required also that he should ascribe nothing to Mr. L. C. but what he acknowledges, and publish no Romance about the Authors of the Sentiments, etc. and the Treatise concerning the Inspiration, etc. as he has done, by bringing again Mr. Aubert upon the Stage. This he may be sure of, That Mr. L. C. has a greater and nobler Notion of the Divine Revelation, than he himself seems to have, as well as of Christian Charity, and even natural Equity, which he has very little observed in his Refutation. He has also published some other Dissertations, digested according to the Order of Common-Places, wherein he likewise writes against Mr. L. C. after such a manner as will only impose upon some Young Students of Divinity in the Universities of Germany, but will not please those, who know what Charity and Equity require, and are not Strangers to the Rules of Reasoning well. Mr. L. C. might also complain that Mr. Maius took the pains to transcribe out of his Works the best Things he says concerning the Rolls of the ancient Hebrews, against Dr. Isaac Vossius, and F. Simon, and concerning the Scribes, against the latter. He should at least have been just to Him, of whose Labour he thought he could make a good use; by ascribing to him only so much as he owns, and drawing no odious Consequence against him. I thought myself obliged to say thus much, not to revenge Mr. L. C. for the wrong that Professor designed to do to his Reputation; which must needs be very inconsiderable, and only in Places, where he would be ashamed to be very much Esteemed, knowing what sort of Men are Esteemed there; but to show that he is with good Reason, very little concerned for what some Germane Divines have written against him. 'Tis their Duty to reflect on their own Conduct, whereof they are not to give an account to some Divines of Wittenberg, but to a Judge, who has taught us other Rules of Equity, by which we are to be judged by him. Mr. L. C. beseeches that Supreme Judge that he would be pleased to change their angry and passionate Temper, and the Darkness wherewith they are surrounded, into a Spirit of Charity and Peace, and a Light, which may bring them again into the right Way.  
Mr. Witsius, Professor at Vtrecht, and since at Leyden, has written against several Places of the Sentiments, in his Miscellanea Sacra, printed in the Year 1691. and Mr. L. C. acquainted the Public why he would not answer him, in one of the monthly Accounts of the Histoire des Ouvrages des savans of that Year, where one may see what he thought fit to publish. Having since printed a Dissertation, wherein he shows that Moses is the Author of the Pentateuch, and Mr. Witsius' Book having been Reprinted; the latter congratulated Mr. L. C. in a Preface, upon his not receding from the common Opinion. Because Mr. Witsius has behaved himself, on this occasion, with the Moderation and Equity, which a Divine aught to show towards those, whom he refutes; Mr. L. C. spoke no more of it. They, who will be allowed to Refute others, must not take it ill, if others Refute them. As for the rest, wherein he dissents from Mr. Witsius, he leaves it to the Judgement of those, who shall read their Writings, and will be able to examine the Reasons on both sides. They are so clear, that whoever is only concerned for the Truth, may rightly judge of ' 'em.  
There was no need that Mr. Ʋander Waeyen, who is not at all to be compared with the Professor of Leyden, for Learning, or Wit, should assault him again, with mere hard Words, without alleging any Reason, and without having any regard to what had been written on this Subject. All that can be observed in his Prefaces to the Books of Stephen Rittangelius, which he has lately published, wherein he writes against Mr. L. C. and in his Dissertation concerning the Logos mentioned by St. John, written against the same, which I shall speak of hereafter, is that he has a vehement desire of Defaming Mr. L. C. and making him odious to every Body: A desire very contrary to the Spirit of Christianity, which allows a Man to write against such Opinions as he thinks to be false, but will have him to spare those, who entertain them. In order to it, a Man must only make use of Reasons, to Refute the Doctrines, which he believes to be Erroneous; and must forbear imputing to others such Designs, as they no where intimate; and lay aside whatever will make 'em odious, and not prove the falsity of their Opinions. I am sorry that I am obliged to read a Lecture of Moderation to an old Divine; but he is to blame, for behaving himself as if he was ignorant of those Principles of Christian Morality. For my part, I don't apprehend the Reason of Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's Zeal, or to speak more plainly, of his excessive Anger against Mr. L. C. who never mentioned him in his Writings, that I know of, nor had any Quarrel with him. If he has some Opinions, which that Divine does not approve of, let him Refute them in a civil way, and without falsifying, or dissembling any thing. Since he exceeds Mr. L. C. in Reasons, Learning, number of Disciples, Authority, etc. what is he afraid of? Is he afraid that those, who admire Cocceius, should like Mr. L. C.'s Writings better than Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's Doctrine? If he is not afraid of it, why does he endeavour to stir up the World against a Man, who is not at all to be feared? It were much better for him to show a greater Moderation; for People are apt to think that angry Men are destitute of good Reasons; because they, who know their Strength in this respect, are not wont to be angry with those, whose Errors they may confound by the force of their Arguments. They are more apt to laugh at, or pity the Fooleries of those, who oppose Truth, than to be angry with Opinions, which they know will never prevail, as long as they are destitute of Reason and Humane Helps. But let us see what Mr. Ʋander Waeyen says in particular of the Sentiments, etc.  
In his Preface to Rittangelius' Book, entitled Libra veritatis, to show that he and some others of his Party are not the only Men angry with Mr. L. C.'s Works, he quotes Mr. Maius and Mr. Etzard, two Lutherans, who are used to inveigh against all those, who descent from them, and whom no Body durst compare in any respect with them, that have asserted the same Opinions which they writ against; I mean Grotius and Erasmu●, who had more Sense, Learning, Piety and Virtue than all the Germane Professors together, and whose Writings on the Bible are admired by every Body. Besides, were I willing to make use of Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's Method, I could easily beat him at his own Weapon; for he knows very well what Censures have been passed upon him by some Reformed Divines, with whom he has had many Quarrels. One Letter of Mr. Spanheim, Professor at Leyden, would afford me more Matter than I should want. But I need not take that course, to defend Mr. L. C. who, for the Reasons I have mentioned, when I was discoursing of Praises and Censures, ought not to trouble himself much with what some Lutherans think of him. He is of opinion, that one needs only read their Writings and his, to condemn them, and that there is no necessity for him to answer ' 'em. The more they will inveigh against him, and give him hard Words, the less he will be persuaded to leave off his Studies, to answer their wretched Books.  
Mr. Ʋander Waeyen cannot say, that I speak so, because I am not well pleased with them; seeing he himself would not vouchsafe to hear 'em Discourse concerning the ubiquity of Christ's Humane Nature, or his corporeal Presence in the Sacrament. Would he take it well, if I should cite them against him, about absolute Predestination? He would undoubtedly answer, That their Authority is of no weight, and he would be in the right. Let him therefore use no Method of rendering his Neighbours odious, which he would not that others should use against him.  
Mr. Ʋander Waeyen has, nevertheless, pitched upon two Lutherans, among Mr. L. C.'s Adversaries, whom he believes upon their Word, adding of his own what he thinks fit; as if a Man needed only speak to persuade others. 
† Pag. 3. Diss. de vocabulo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  He says, for instance, That some of the Letters, of which the Sentiments, etc. are made up, bear the name of one De Versé; but it is altogether false. There is not one, that bears any Name, and the Author of the Treatise concerning the Inspiration, etc. (who is not Mr. Aubert de Versé, as I have already said) is denoted by the Letter N. which has no Relation with his Name. 
† Ead. pag.  Neither is it true that Mr. L. C. owns himself to be the Author of that Treatise, tho' he scruples not to say, That he is the Author of the Letters, in which it is inserted. Some few Lines after, he falsely accuses Mr. L. C. of having said that the Pentateuch was possibly compiled by a Priest of Bethlehem: whereas he said Bethel, not Bethlehem. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen adds, as it were by a Parenthesis, that that Priest was certainly an Idolater, as if he knew it by a Revelation; and without intimating that the Author of that Conjecture was persuaded of the contrary, as he plainly says in the beginning of the VII. Letter of his Defence of the Sentiments, p. 167. Lastly, he says, That Mr. L. C. did not scruple to affirm that the Works, which go under the name of Moses, and other inspired Authors, were written by that Priest. But there are two Falsifications in those Words. It is not true that Mr. L. C. ascribed any thing to that Priest, besides the care of collecting the Writings of Moses, and some more ancient Histories, of which the Pentateuch is made up; and it is also false that he said that those Books were written, Scripta esse, by that Man, as if he had been the Author of 'em: He only said that he was possibly the Compiler of the Pentateuch.  
Thus the Reader may see, how faithfully Mr. Ʋander Waeyen relates Mr. L. C.'s Conjecture about the Compiler of the Pentateuch, that he may brand it with the Name of Impiety and Profaneness; without intimating any where that the Author of the Sentiments, etc. said over and over again, when he published that Conjecture, that the Pentateuch contains nothing but what was approved of by the Priests of Jerusalem, and all the Jews who worshipped the true God. 'Tis an easy thing to represent a harmless Conjecture as an impious and profane Opinion, by suppressing part of it at pleasure. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen should know that Mr. L. C. is not fond of that Conjecture, as I have already said, and as it appears by his Latin Dissertation concerning Moses being the Author of the Pentateuch. Equity required that he should say something of it, in imitation of Mr. Witsius, of whom he should have learned that every Body, and especially a Divine, aught to be a Lover of Sincerity. That Professor of Leyden has been generally praised, upon that account; but the Professor of Franeker is not like to increase his Reputation, by taking a contrary course.  
If he could be cured of his Prejudices, and judge without Anger of the Opinions of a Man, whom he has offended, tho' he never was injured by him; one should only Appeal from himself to himself, and desire him to read again the Books, against which he has so much exclaimed. He would then easily perceive that he has transgressed the Laws of Charity and Justice after a strange manner, and is bound to beg God's Pardon for it: I hearty pray God that he would forgive him. He would also learn to forbear writing Romances about other Men, as he has done in the very beginning of his Dissertation; not considering that being evidently convinced of gross Fictions concerning the Opinions he ascribes to Mr. L. C. few People would believe him upon his Word.  

Of the Bibliotheque Universelle.  To return to Mr. L. C.'s Works, he undertook in 1686. to write a Journal, in imitation of those, which were published in several parts of Europe. He entitled it, as every Body knows, Bibliotheque Vniverselle, and endeavoured to do chief Two Things, which are wanting in other Journals. The one is, to give larger and more exact Extracts of considerable Books, than were to be found in other Journals. And Secondly, to insert into it several Pieces of his own, such as are a Project of the Fabulous History, in the I. Vol. an Explication of the Fable of Adonis, in the III; and of the Fable of Ceres, in the VI; an Essay concerning the Poetry of the Hebrews, in the IX; the Life of Eusebius Bishop of Caesarea, in the X; the Lives of St. Cyprian and Prudentius, in the XII, and the Life of. St. Gregory Nazianzen, in the XVIII; the Memoirs concerning the History of Jansenism, in the XIV, etc.  
He wrote the VIII first Volumes, together with Mr. de la Cross, who followed his Advices till the VIII. But in the IX, he undertook to give his Judgement concerning some Books, and Mr. L. C. approved not of his Extracts; so that he was obliged to distinguish his own Extracts from those of Mr. de la Cross, that he might not, be answerable for them. Mr. de la Cross put also his and Mr. L. C.'s Name to the IV Volume, without his Knowledge, and against his Will; for he always designed that his Journal should be Anonymous, as the Leipsick and the Paris Journals. But his Name having been published in one of the Volumes, he was obliged to publish it in the following. Afterwards Mr. L. C. wrote the X Volume alone, and Mr. de la Cross the XI. as may be seen by the Prefaces. The remaining Volumes, to the XIX inclusively, were written by Mr. L. C. excepting the XIII.  
It was necessary to come to these Particulars, not only to show that Mr. L. C. spends his time better than those, who lose theirs in writing Libels; but because some Persons have unawares ascribed to him one Volume, in which he had no Hand. The first who committed that Fault, is Mr. Meibom, in his Additions to a Book of Valentinus Henricus Voglerus, entitled, Introductio Vniversalis in Notitiam cujuscunque generis bonorum Scriptorum, etc. In his Additions to the 29 Page, wherein he speaks of Journals, he complains of the Judgement, which, he says, Mr. L. C. made of his Collection of Writers of the Germane History, in the X Vol. of the Bibliotheque Vniverselle. 'Tis true that Mr. L. C. is the Author of that Volume, but there is not one Word in it about Mr. Meibom's Collection, which he never so much as perused. Mr. Meibom meant the XI Vol. where there is a long Extract of his Collection; but that Volume having been written by Mr. de la Cross, as it appears by the Dedicatory Epistle; it was not just to ascribe it to Mr. L. C. who had no Hand in it. Mr. Meibom has formerly been told of it, in a civil and obliging manner, in the 2d part of the XXII Vol. of the Bibliotheque Vniverselle, Art. V and again lately in the Nouvelles de la Republiques des Lettres, May 1699. because it does not appear that he has retracted, and others have of late committed the same Unjustice after him. 'Tis his Duty to acknowledge his fault; if he does not do it, one may with reason believe that he took delight in committing that Injustice, and look upon him as a Man, who commits such Faults a purpose, and the Public may be acquainted with it upon occasion. Had he only ascribed that Volume to Mr. L. C. without complaining of him; one might think it is a slip of Memory, and overlook it: But Mr. L. C. cannot be silent about it, because Mr. Meibom complains of him, though he has no ground for't.  
Next to Mr. Meibom, the Journalists of Leipsick have committed the same fault, at the end of their Acta, etc. June 1691. Mr. Juncker has also translated the Fault in his Treatise of Journals, published at Leipsick, about the same time. And here I cannot but take notice of a thing, which the Journalists of Leipsick affect to do, with respect to Mr. L. C. and several others. If an angry Author uses any injurious or disobliging Words against him, they never fail to observe it; as if the design of a Journal was to preserve the Memory of injurious Words, which those, who have used them, are often ashamed of. However, if those Gentlemen intent thereby to cry down Books full of injurious Words, and create a dislike of 'em, they do well to take notice of such Passages. But if they do it, because they are well pleased with them, or think they are essential to the Subject, or because they are moved with the same Passion; they can never be too much blamed for it. They may, when they please, inform the Public about it; lest they should give occasion to entertain an ill Opinion of ' 'em.  
Dr. Cave, Canon of if Windsor, was without doubt very well pleased with a Passage of Mr. Meibom against Mr. L. C. since he has lately inserted it in his Dissertation concerning Eusebius, supposing that Mr. L. C. had censured the Collection of the Authors Rerum Germanicarum, in the X Vol. of his Bibliotheque. Herein Dr. Cave has committed two Faults; one of which consists in approving of Mr. Meibom's Injustice; and the other, in designing to wrong Mr. L. C.'s Reputation, by publishing a Passage of that Author; who, if he is an honest Man, will make him Satisfaction very soon, in the Journal of Leipsick, or somewhere else.  
Another Author has committed the same Fault: I mean the Author of the Remarks on the Confession of Sancy, which have been lately printed at Amsterdam. One may see those Remarks on the TWO Chapter. It cannot be said that all the of Volumes the Bibliotheque wore ascribed to Mr. L. C. because Mr. de la Cross was not so well known as he; since the Name of the latter is to be seen in all the Volumes in which he had a Hand (except in the Three First, which are Anonymous) and at the end of the Dedicatory Epistle of the XI Volume in question. He, that will censure any one, must take care not to mistake one Man for another, lest the Innocent should suffer for the Guilty.  
Among those, who have injustly complained of the Bibliotheque, I must also reckon Mr. Poiret a Follower of Antoinette Bourignon; who being exasperated with a little Jest 
† In the V Vol. of the Biblioth.  upon his Divine O Economy, did very much inveigh against Mr. L.C. not only in an opposite Extract, which he caused to be inserted in the Republic des Lettres in 1687. but also some Years after, in along Letter, full of Bitterness and Malice, which he published in 1692. at the end of his Book de Erudition Solida, etc. without giving notice of it to the Bookseller, who was very sorry, for't. Mr. L. C. did not think himself obliged to answer it, because Mr. Poiret is so well known to be a Chimerical Man, that what he says of any one, can do him no wrong. The only thing that Mr. L. C. might be blamed for, on this occasion, is to have been contented with a slight Jest upon a Book, which deserved a very sharp Censure; because it ridicules Religion, from the beginning to the end, by changing it into a mere Fanaticism. Mr. Poiret fancies that all the Fooleries of Mystical Men, and all the Chimaeras he is pleased to add to them, must pass for Oracles; whereas he should be ashamed to make it his Business to seduce the Simple with his ridiculous spiritual Notions. None is imposed upon by the Fanatical Outside of Mystical Men, but those, that are disposed to deceive themselves, and to mistake Chimaeras for Religion, instead of Morality and good Works, which are grounded on the hope of another Life, which the Gospel teaches us. As for those, who know how necessary it is to love one's Neighbour, they will not be imposed upon by Mr. Poiret's Ecstatical Devotion, which is not inconsistent with the greatest Malice. His taking care to make an Apology for St. Augustin, is a great Instance of his want of Sincerity: For, tho' he is far from being of that Father's Opinion concerning absolute Predestination and irresistible Grace, yet he will justify him, to make Mr. L. C. odious, if he can. Such is again the Sense he puts upon St. Augustin's Epistle to Vincentius: He maintains that St. Augustin did not say in that Letter that 'tis lawful to Persecute; as if no Body could read the Works of that Father but he. If Mr. Poiret does not care for Critical Learning, which he seems to despise, he should not meddle with what he understands not. He'll judge this is too hard a Censure, but he justly deserves it, and he must not think that Mr. L. C. will enter into the Lists with him. He has a mind to pick Quarrels, to make, if it were possible, some noise in the World, and so put People upon buying his Books, which no Body reads. But Mr. L. C. will not give him occasion to write many Books. If any Body has any time to lose, let him read Mr. Poiret's Letter, and compare it with Mr. L. C.'s Opinions; for he is resolved to make no other Reply to Mr. Poiret.  

Of Mr. L. C.'s Philosophical Works.  WHILST Mr. L. C. was writing his Bibliotheque, he translated into Latin the last Books of Thomas Stanley's Philosophical History, which contain the History of the Eastern Philosophy, whereof he had published an Extract in the VII Vol. of the Bibliotheque, which pleased several People. That Book was printed in 1690.  
Mr. L. C. having left off the laborious Work of the Bibliotheque Vniverselle, applied himself to his Commentary on the Pentateuch, as I shall say hereafter; and in the mean time published his Logic, his Ontology, and his Pneumatology, which were reprinted in 1697. He dedicated his Logic to the late Mr. boil; but the Person, who was to present him with a Copy, could not do it, because Mr. boil died in the mean time. This is the reason why Mr. L. C. in his second Edition, dedicated it to Mr. Locke, to whom he had also dedicated his Ontology and Pneumatology. The second Edition is incomparably better than the first; especially for the Style, which the Author has very much corrected. There is at the end of his Logic a Dissertation de Argumento Theologico ex Invidia ducto, which angry and passionate Divines should read over and over, to make 'em leave off the Custom of using base and shameful Artifices, to make those odious, who will not blindly submit to their Decisions.  
To complete his Course of Philosophy, he wrote, shortly after, a Natural Philosophy, which he published in 1695. and was reprinted two Years after, in two Vol. in Octavo. So that all his Philosophical Works are contained in four Vol.  
Whilst I am on this Subject, it will not be an unseasonable Digression, if I undertake to justify Mr. L. C.'s Method of proving the Immortality of the Soul. Being of Opinion that its Essence is unknown to us, he thinks that its Immortality cannot be proved by any Arguments taken from its Nature, and that we must use such Proofs as the Divine Goodness affords us, which has created Men, to make 'em eternally happy. Some think that the Certainty of the Immortality of the Soul is thereby lessened; as if weak Arguments were to pass for good Reasons, because we are concerned in them; and as if we had but doubtful Proofs of the Divine Goodness. Had we no other Proofs of it, but those which the Revelation afford us, methinks they were sufficient to satisfy them, that are convinced of the Truth of the Revelation. A Learned Bishop in England 
† Mr. Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Second Letter, p. 418. & seq.  having objected to a Gentleman of great Parts, that he lessened the Certainty of the Proofs, which persuade us that the Soul is immortal, by saying that its Immateriality cannot be demonstrated; he returned him an Answer, which I shall make use of against those, who have censured Mr. L. C.'s Pneumatology. This your Accusation, says Mr. Locke, of my lessening the credibility of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Resurrection of the Body, is founded on this, That the Immateriality of the Soul cannot he demonstrated from natural Reason. Which Argument of your Lordship's bottoms on this, That Divine Revelation abates of its credibility in all those Articles it proposes proportionably as Humane Reason fails to support the Testimony of God.— Does God promise any thing to Mankind to be believed? It is very fit and credible to be believed, if Reason can demonstrate it to be true. But if Humane Reason comes short in the Case, and cannot make it out, its credibility is thereby lessened: Which is in effect to say, That the Veracity of God is not a firm and sure Foundation of Faith to rely upon, without the concurrent Testimony of Reason, i. e. with reverence be it spoken, God is not to be believed on his own Word, unless what he reveals be in itself credible, and might be believed without him.— What I have above observed, is so visibly contained in your Lordship's Argument, that when I met with it in your Answer to my first Letter, it seemed so strange from a Man of your Lordship's Character, and in a Dispute in Defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity, that I could hardly persuade myself, but it was a Slip of your Pen.  
Your Lordship says, You do not question whether God can give Immortality to a material Substance; but you say it takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality, if it depends only upon God's giving that which of its own nature it is not capable of.  
To which I reply, any one's not being able to demonstrate the Soul to be Immaterial takes off not very much, nor at all from the evidence of its Immortality, if God has revealed that it shall be Immortal; because the Veracity of God is a Demonstration of the Truth of what he has revealed, and the want of another Demonstration of a Proposition, that is demonstratively true, takes not off from the Evidence of it. For where there is a clear Demonstration, there is as much Evidence as any Truth can have, that is not self-evident.— The whole of your Lordship's Discourse here, is to prove, That the Soul cannot be Material because then the Evidence of its being Immortal would be very much lessened. Which is to say, That 'tis not as credible upon Divine Revelation, that a Material Substance should be Immortal, as an Immaterial; or, which is all one, That God is not equally to be believed, when he declares that a Material Substance shall be Immortal, as when he declares that an Immaterial shall be so, because the Immortality of a Material Substance cannot be demonstrated from Natural Reason.  
Let us try this Rule of your Lordship's a little farther. God has revealed, That the Bodies Men shall have after the Resurrection, as well as their Souls, shall live to Eternity. Does your Lordship believe the eternal Life of the one of these, more than of the other, because you think you can prove it of one of them by natural Reason, and of the other not? Or can any one, who admits of Divine Revelation in the Case, doubt of one of them more than the other? Or think this Proposition less credible, the Bodies of Men after the Resurrection, shall live for ever; than this, That the Souls of Men shall, after the Resurrection, live for ever? For that he must do, if be thinks either of them is less credible than the other. If this be so, Reason is to be consulted, how far God is to be believed, and the credit of Divine Testimony, must receive its force from the Evidence of Reason: which is evidently to take away the Credibility of Divine Revelation, in all Supernatural Truths, wherein the Evidence of Reason fails.  
Those, who have found Fault with what Mr. L. C. said concerning the Immortality of them Soul, need only consider those judicious Remarks, to be convinced that their Censures were very ill grounded. But to return to Mr. L. C.'s Philosophical Works; those, who read 'em, may easily perceive, That besides the general Design of that sort of Books, the Author endeavours to make the Study of Philosophy profitable, by applying its Principles to the most sublime Doctrines of Theology; as far as they have a Connexion one with another. He shows, in a thousand places, the Origin of several Errors of School-Divinity, which sprung from a false Philosophy; and sometimes vice versâ, the Errors, which a false Theology introduced into Philosophy; for those two Sciences have often corrupted one another. Elsewhere he lays down a sure Foundation, to convince one's self of the Truth of the Christian Religion. He proves, in his Pneumatology, the Existence of a God, and all his Attributes, as much as it can be done by the mere Light of Reason. Whereby one may observe what are the Foundations of Natural Religion, on which the Christian is built.  
Mr. L. C. expersses, in his Philosophical Works, a great Esteem for Descartos, whose general Principles he follows; but he often departs from his particular Conjectures, which he confutes with Reasons and Experiments. He often declares, in his Pneumatology and Natural, Philosophy, that he proposes only some Conjectures, which might prove false, and he frequently says that a Man must suspend his Judgement. He carefully distinguishes every where what is demonstrable, from that which is uncertain. Those, who have a great respect for Truth in general, and love a Philosophical Sincerity, are obliged to use such a Method; and they, that are so disposed, are better convinced than others, of the narrowness of their Knowledge, think more modestly of themselves, and can more easily bear to be contradicted. On the contrary, those, who distinguish not what is doubtful from what is certain, fancy they know much more than they do; and being proud of their pretended Knowledge, they maintain, with the same assurance, the most uncertain Things, and those which they are most sure of. From thence arise a great many hot Disputes about Things, which no body knows, and wherein they are perhaps mistaken on both sides: From thence also arise all the Evils, which attend long Disputes. Those, who are used to distinguish their Conjectures from what they are able to prove, may more easily attain to a solid and certain knowledge of Truth, than those who believe they know what they know not, and so give over the search of that which they think they have already found. They substitute an imaginary Knowledge in the room of a real one, and so rest satisfied with Phantoms, instead of real Things; and as they boldly take up Things, that have but a slight probability; so they are afraid, on the contrary, to be deceived by Demonstrations, and shun them as carefully as they ought to shun Falsehood. But those, who believe not that they know what they know not, and are not conceited of their own Merits, will be ready to embrace Truth, which way soever it comes.  
That, which I most wonder at, is, That some Men are so Conceited, that they speak, as if they were persuaded that Truth depends not so much on Things themselves, as on the manner of defending it. One would think they believe, That if they stoutly maintain an Opinion, it acquires thereby a greater degree of certainty, and at last happens to be true. Should we grant, say they, That such a Thing is true, we must then give up our Principles. 'Tis therefore better to argue against it, without troubling ourselves whether it be true or not, and never to give ground; like the Man, who being no longer able to reply to what was objected against his Opinion, cried out with great Anger: If what I say be not true, it should be true.  

Of Morery's Dictionary.  BUT to return to Mr. L. C.'s Studies; at the very same time that his Philosophical Works were Composed, Printed for the first time, and Reprinted, he was taken up with the tedious Revision of a Book, which gave him a great deal of trouble. Some Booksellers of Holland having a mind to Print Morery's Dictionary, proposed to him in 1689. to Revise it; which he undertook to do, supposing, That because that Dictionary had been Printed five times in France, it wanted but few Corrections: But having gone about that Work, he soon perceived that he had had a better Opinion of Mr. Morery than he deserved. He perceived too late that the Revision of that Dictionary would be a laborious Work, of no great Honour, and less Profit: But he was obliged to go through, when he had begun. One may see what he said about it, in the XIV. Vol. of the Bibliotheque Vniverselle, and in the Preface before the Holland Editions. He has, in three several Revisions, corrected a prodigious number of Faults, especially in the Articles, which concern ancient History; and after a frequent Perusing, and a long Examination, he found that Mr. Morery was a Man of so little Learning and Exactness, that one cannot rely on any thing that he says. He, that would throughly examine his Dictionary, should have almost all the Books, which he made use of; and it would take up as much time as would be sufficient to make a New one. So that Mr. L. C. was forced to pass over a great many Things, for want of Books and Time. Besides, to speak the Truth, there are a great many Articles in that Dictionary, which deserve not to be corrected by a Man, who can spend his Time better. Of what use would it be to make a laborious Enquiry concerning so many wretched Authors, whom Morery mentions? He, that began that Work, should have been Exact, since he undertook it. Nevertheless, there has been Three Editions of that Dictionary in Holland, from the Year 1690. to the Year 1698. and about Seven Thousand Copies have been Sold: Perhaps so large a Book did never Sell so well before. Indeed, it is necessary to a great many People, who cannot have Libraries, nor read the Original Authors, and are contented with a general Knowledge of Things. The last Edition of Holland is much more Exact than the other, but it is not true, That the Public can now rely upon it, as the Booksellers have inserted in the Advertisement of this VIII. Edition, without Mr. L. C's. Knowledge. 'Tis true, That it is more accurate than the former; but he, that will know something exactly, must necessarily have recourse to the Original Authors. I hear (in 1699.) that there is a new Edition of it coming out at Paris, and I doubt not but that they have corrected several Faults in the Articles, which concern the Modern Authors; because they have at Paris all the Books necessary for it, the Tenth Part of which cannot be had in Holland, because those Books Sell not very well there.  

Of Mr. L. C.'s Commentary on the Pentateuch.  Mr. L. C. having applied himself chief to the Study of the Holy Scripture, designed a great while ago to write a Commentary on the Old Testament; but being not Master of his Time, and Studies, he could not do it, before he left off writing the Bibliotheque Vniverselle. To give a Specimen of his Design, he published in 1690. in one Sheet in Quarto the Prophet Obadiah, translated by him, with a Paraphrase and a Critical Commentary. He imparted that Specimen to his Friends, and sent it every where, to know what the Public thought of such an Undertaking; and having their Approbation, he willingly undertook that Work, which, tho' very great and laborious, did not frighten him, because he always took great delight in that Study. Besides, he was persuaded, that, If he should succeed in his Design, it would prove very useful to the Public.  
He published therefore his Commentary on Genesis, in 1693. with a Paraphrase, and Critical Notes, as he had done the Prophet Obadiah. And because he designed his Book for the use of all those, who apply themselves to the Study of the Holy Scripture, of what Sect or Party soever they be; he abstained from all manner of Controversy, and enquired only into the Literal Sense, without drawing any Theological Consequences from it, which might offend any Christian Society. He searched Truth as impartially as if he had been the first, who undertook such a Work. He agrees, in most Things, with the most Learned Interpreters; but he thinks he has made many new Discoveries, concerning Things themselves, and the manner of proving Things themselves, and the manner of proving them. That Commentary was very acceptable to the Public, as it appeared, in that not only it Sold well, but was likewise approved of by many Learned Men.  
But because there are always some Men, who being not able to Compose any Thing of their own, think notwithstanding that they are good Judges of other Men's Works; the Envy and Malice of some Divines soon broke out against him. Had he made a pitiful Rhapsody out of the several Interpreters, who wrote before him, they would perhaps have approved, or said nothing of him. But whoever endeavours to teach 'em something new, and do better than others, cannot fail to undergo their Censure. A Divine of that Temper took care to Incense against him Dr. Kidder, Bishop of Bath and Wells, who published some English Notes on the Pentateuch, in the Year 1694. That Learned Man, being deceived by a Person, whom he did not mistrust, spoke somewhat unkindly of Mr. L. C. because he believed that some Places of the Pentateuch were not written by Moses; though Monsieur Huet, and Mr. Witsius, and several others scrupled not to acknowledge the like Additions, which indeed are manifest. But Mr. L. C. having complained to the Bishop in a Letter, he received a more obliging Answer from him, as he has already said in his Preface before Exodus. He perceived by that Answer that some Men, who have Reason to speak well of him, and dislike not his Opinions, had given that Prelate an ill Character of him.  
Mr. Edzard Professor of Philosophy at Wittenberg, an University from which no good can be expected, whilst the Spirit of Calovius reigns in it, wrote a very sharp Dissertation against Mr. L. C.'s Explication of the Prophecy concerning the Schilo, which he published without being positive in it, because it is an obscure Passage.  
But the Germane Doctor, to whom every thing seems to be easy, made a confused Collection of most trivial things, and reviling Words, which are peculiar to himself; without caring to reason well, or understand the Author, whom he critizes on purpose to make him odious, as if he should favour the Jews. He fancies that by bawling like a Porter against Mr. L. C. he'll make People believe that White is Black, and that by often saying that what is obscure is clear, it will be so in effect. Let any one read Mr. L. C.'s Explication of the Schilo, and compare it with the Book of that Lutheran Doctor, and then give his Judgement upon the matter. Mr. L. C. is not afraid that the Arguments of Mr. Edzard, and the blind Zeal by which he is acted, should do him any Prejudice; and he will not leave off his Studies to answer him. Otherwise all the Students of the Universities of Germany would enter into the Lists with him, after they have transcribed a pitiful common Place, or a wretched Commentary, and set it off with reviling Words. If those, who despise Grotius, and admire Calovius, do not like Mr. L. C.'s Works; he has no more reason to wonder at it than they have, when they see that he praises Grotius in his Writings, and never expresses any esteem for Calovius and his Imitators. Qui Bavium non odit, amet tua carmina Maevi. It was necessary that the Germane Students should be informed of this, lest they should think that 'tis in their Power to disturb, when they please, Mr. L. C.'s rest with their Libels, and to get some Reputation by putting him upon answering them.  
Mr. Ʋander Waeyen had likewise a mind to signalise himself, by writing against Mr. L. C.'s Commentary on Genesis, in some Theological Disputes held in the University of Franeker. But Mr. L. C. would not answer that Divine, because his way of Disputing showed that he had no love for Truth. For Instance, he wondered that Mr. L. C. should say, That the three Men, mentioned Gen. xviii. who appeared to Abraham, were three Angels; tho' Mr. L. C. followed therein St. Augustin's Opinion, whom he quoted in his Note on that Chapter of Genesis. Nay, he charges Mr. L. C. with want of Sincerity; which is a very absurd Accusation, and unbecoming an honest Man. For none can be suspected of want of Sincerity, but they who maintain a ridiculous Opinion, especially when they get something by it: Whereas in this case no other Opinion can reasonably be maintained; and Mr. Ʋander Waeyen knew very well that Mr. L. C. did not do this to Court any Body.  
Mr. Ʋander Waeyen falls upon him again, in his Dissertation concerning the Logos, and in the very beginning finds fault with some Passages of Mr. L. C.'s Commentary on the other Books of Moses. But because he does it only by the by, and to render him odious; the best answer Mr. L. C. can make, is, to desire the Reader to read attentively those Passages in the Original, if he designs to be a Judge between Mr. Ʋander Waeyen and Mr. L. C. A just and judicious Reader will easily see which of 'em is in the wrong.  
Mr. Ʋander Waeyen here and elsewhere charges Mr. L. C. with favouring the Socinians, whom he no more thought on, when he wrote his Commentary, than if there had never been any such Men in the World. If the Socinians speak truth in some things, and another Man does the same after them, is it a Crime, and does it follow from thence that such a Man believes, in all Respects, as they do? What would Mr. Ʋander Waeyen say, if he knew that Mr. L. C. has been very little conversant with the Writings of the Socinians, that he seldom consults them; and never read any thing of 'em concerning Types; which is the thing wherein he accuses him of favouring the Socinians? He could not at least charge him with imitating them. But 'tis now the constant Practice of some Protestant Divines to call Socinianism all the Opinions they have a mind to traduce; as in Spain and Italy they call Calvinism or Lutheranism the Opinions, with which they charge those, whom they hate. This is Argumentum Theologicum ex invidia ductum, to give an odious Name to a thing, that it may be Condemned without any Examination. Mr. L. C. is no Socinian; but he is not bound to make a Confession of his Faith, as often as some Divines will be pleased to give him hard Words, and pick a Quarrel with him about things of no moment, as Mr. Ʋander Waeyen has done.  

Of his Notes on the beginning of St. John's Gospel.  WHILST Mr. L. C.'s Commentary on the four last Books of Moses was a Printing, in the beginning of the Year 1695. he had 
† See the Preface of the Edit. in 8.  occasion to publish his Thoughts concerning the beginning of St. John's Gospel; and he did it so much the more willingly, because some ill Men were pleased to confound Mr. Clark, an English Man, who favoured the Socinians; some of whom wrote in English concerning St. John's Gospel, so as to make one believe that they doubted of its Authority. This Mr. Clark published, a Book entitled Anti-Nicaenismus, in 1694. and died soon after. If to what I have said you add the Preface of the Notes on the beginning of St. John's Gospel, you may know why Mr. L. C. published that little Book at that time.  
Mr. Benoit a Minister at Delft thought sit to write against it, in a Dissertation printed at Rotterdam in 1696. Mr. L. C. did not answer it, and will not do it for the same Reason, which hindered him from answering several others; viz. because he believed that the Reader was able to judge of that Dispute, by comparing those two Books, without the help of a Reply. I don't know whether Mr. Benoit took it ill; for he desired that his Book should make a noise in the World. However he thought fit to reflect upon Mr. L. C. a great while after, in the Libels he wrote against Mr. Jaquelot and Mr. Le Vassor, tho' Mr. L. C. was not concerned in that Quarrel. Mr. Benoit was in hopes that Mr. L. C. would presently take up the Cudgel, and that his Book, which no Body would buy, would by that means sell the better. But he was mistaken, and Mr. L. C. was as little moved with his Libels as he was with his Dissertation, and would make no Reply out of Prudence, and Contempt for such Disputes. The first Reason he had for it, is that 'tis needless to write Books, in order to explain what every Body understands. 'Tis true that Mr. Benoit speaks, as if he understood it not; but let him read again the Passage he wrote against, and then he may answer himself. Mr. L. C.'s second Reason for not answering him is, that the Indignation which most French Refugees have expressed against his Libels, and the Satisfaction he has been obliged to make, after he had endeavoured to stir up the People against two of his Brethren, have so humbled him, that there is no need any Body else should do it. Instead of writing against those, who don't meddle with him, he should answer the Complaints of several of his Countrymen, who openly charge him with want of Sincerity in his History, which many People look upon as a Book fit to Defame than Honour the Party. His crying down People as Heretics will not put an end to their Complaints: On the contrary, he will perhaps force some great Persons to publish what they heard him say some Years ago: They remember very well that he professed himself at that time to be a moderate Man.  
The next Year 1697. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen published his Dissertation concerning the Logos, which I have already mentioned, and that it might sell the better, added to it a Book of Stephen Rittangelius, who had been a Jew, and turned Christian; wherein he endeavours to prove, that the Chaldee Paraphrasts meant by the Word of God the same thing that St. John did. For my part, I don't believe it, and in my Opinion Rittangelius has very ill confuted his Adversary; but this is not the Question in hand. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen being not contented to confute Mr. L. C. omits nothing to make him odious. He had a great while before acquainted the World that he was about a Dissertation, wherein he would prove that Mr. L. C. had not faithfully cited Philo. Mr. Van Limborch, Mr. L. C.'s Colleague, hearing of it, undertook to compare all the Passages of Philo quoted by Mr. L. C. in his Notes on the beginning of St. John's Gospel; and finding that he had truly cited them, he told some Body of it, who acquainted Mr. Ʋander Waeyen with it. Whereupon Mr. Ʋander Waeyen inveighed so furiously against him, as to accuse him of a base Calumny. Mr. L. C. was at that time so, busy about a Book, which is lately come out, and of which I shall speak hereafter, that he could not answer Mr. Ʋander Waeyen; but Mr. Van Limborch did it with great moderation, and so as to stop the mouth of any other Man but him. A Cocceian Divine, who, for several Years, has been used to Quarrel, does not easily blush, tho' he be clearly convinced; or at least his inward Shame is not to be seen in his Writings. But there is one thing in them, which is very visible, viz. a great Confusion, whereby it plainly appears that he knows not what he says, tho' he makes as great a bustle as he can. This one may observe in Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's Reply, entitled, Responsionis Limborgianae Discussio,; which, from the beginning to the end, is an exact Picture of an Angry Man. As for the matter of it, it is a confused heap of usesless Quotations, and pitiful Arguments, without any Connexion, and Order, and sometimes the Reader is at a loss to find any sense in it. His Dissertation concerning the Logos is no better; but because he took a little more time to compose it, he seems to be more sedate, whereas he is quite out of his Senses in the other. When a Man takes such a course, the Dispute is at an end; for to what purpose should any one answer him? Were he convinced of Calumny a hundred times one after another, he would go on still, without minding what the Public will think of it. For Instance, Mr. Ʋander Waeyen having accused Mr. Van Limborch of want of Sincerity, and having been convinced of it himself, as clearly as that two and two make four, says notwithstanding with his wont Boldness, 
† Discus. p. 48.  that the Remostrants show a greater moderation to I know not whom, than to the Reformed; as if the Books of the former were not full of Protestations, whereby it appears that they are ready to live in the same Communion with the Reformed, provided their Opinions be tolerated. But whilst they require from the Remonstrants that they suppress or renounce their Opinions, when at the same time they canonize and preach up such Doctrines as the Remonstrants believe to be erroneous; how can the latter reunite themselves with a good Conscience? A reunion, whereby a Man suppresses what he thinks to be true, to give place to what he believes to be false, (if there was nothing else,) is unworthy of a pious Man; and there is not one honest Man, among the Reformed, who would approve of such a Reunion with the Lutherans. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen cannot be ignorant of the Sentiments of the Remonstrants on this Matter, since they are known even to Children in the United Provinces. What signifies it to dispute with a Man, who is positive and confident about the most uncertain things, and scruples not to deny what is as clear as Noonday? Besides the Public is not at all concerned in personal Disputes, and will not read Books that contain nothing else.  
Mr. L. C. should therefore lose his time, if he took the Pains to confute the Calumnies and injurious Words of that Professor of Franeker; especially if it be considered that he has expressed in his Works a greater respect for Divine Revelation in general, and the Christian Religion in particular, than his Adversary. 'Tis in vain for Mr. Ʋander Wacyen to call Impious and Profane, some Passages of the Treatise concerning the Inspiration of the Sacred Writers. The Public knows very well that Mr. L. C. does not own himself to be the Author of that Treatise, and that there is scarce any thing in it but what was said before by Grotius, whose Works have been so often reprinted, and who is looked upon as the most excellent Interpeter of the New Testament. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen should have written against him, and he would without doubt have done it, were it not that the mere Name of Grotius will weigh down all the malice of his Adversaries.  
But Mr. L. C. will do well to publish a Latin Book, wherein he'll examine some Questions, which Mr. Ʋander Waeyen has only entangled: For instance, Whether Philo took out of Moses what he says concerning the Logos; Whether the Platonics meant the Word by it; Whether Plato took out of the Old Testament that he says concerning the three Principles, etc. He may show by the by that Mr. Ʋander Waeyen has but slightly studied that Matter, and that it had been more for his Honour not to meddle with it. He may also easily prove that he cited Philo with great Sincerity and Exactness; and that his Adversary shows no Sincerity in what he says on that point. But the Professor of Franeker must not be too impatient. He ought to be contented, now that he has fully vented his Spleen against Mr. L. C.  
As for Mr. Van Limborch, he has so perfectly confuted Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's Objections, and so well satisfied the Public in that matter, that it would be needless to do it again after him. The things; which the latter has collected against the Remonstrants, are so inconsiderable, and confused, and show so much Anger, that every Body may be sensible of it. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's Accusations are so unjudicious, and he is so well known by reason of his Quarrels and passionate Carriage towards other Reformed Divines, that he can do them no prejudice. He has increased the Reputation of those, against whom he wrote, at the cost of his own. I'll Instance upon Mr. Spanheim: 
† See Frid. Spanbemii Ep. ad Amicum, Ed. Vltrajecti 1684. pag. 71. & seq.  Mr. Ʋander Waeyen was so ridiculous as to teach him how to confound the Degrees of Longitude and Latitude, and to laugh at him, because he had said that the New World reaches above 180. Degrees. He could not forbear saying, with a magisterial Air, That Mr. Spanheim spoke very ignorantly, ignorantissimegrave;, and that Geographers reckon only 180. Degrees from one Pole to the other, as if Mr. Spanhiem had meant Degrees of Latitude. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's Dissertation being printed and published, the late Mr. Anselaar, a Minister at Amsterdam, gave him notice of his Blunder; but it was too late. Mr. Spanheim and several others had already got some Copies of it; and that Passage was only mended in those, which remained in the Bookseller's Hands. Mr. Van Limborch hinted by the by at that gross Mistake, to oblige Mr. Ʋander Waeyen to be more modest and reserved in censuring others. 
† Vid. Discus. p. 68  But he feigns to know nothing of it; whereas he should make a good use of such a warning, to leave off insulting so proudly those, who are not of his Mind.  
We may learn from thence, that Boldness and Confidence in speaking prove not that a Man is sure of what he says. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen affords us an instance of it; for he has committed a childish Fault, at the very same time that he was insulting and laughing at Mr. Spanheim, without any reason for it. 'Tis a piece of Craft, which has been practised a thousand times; and tho' the Fallacy lacy of it has been detected as many times, yet the common People are still deceived by it, 
† Juvenal. Sat. XIII. v. 109.  And a great boldness in defending a bad Cause, is looked upon by many as a sign, that a Man trusts the goodness of his Cause:  
Nam cùm magna malae superest audacia causae,  
Creditur à multis fiducia.  
Mr. Van Limborch must not trouble himself with what the Professor of Franeker thinks of his Works. A Man, who is well pleased with precarious Explications of Prophecies, and fills his Head with so many Chimeras, cannot but dislike good and methodical Explications of the Holy Scripture, and such as are grouded on the clear sense of the Words, and Grammatical Rules. But all those, who are acquainted with the Principles of the Reformers, and know that, in matters of Religion, every thing must be proved by the Scripture, literally expounded, without any mixture of Humane Doctrines, will always set a great value on Mr. Van Limborch's Books, whatever Allegorical Divines may think of ' 'em.  
However I believe, as well as Mr. Ʋander Waeyen, that Knowledge shall be increased among Christians; but it will not be by substituting in the room of Reason and Critical Rules, the wandering Fancy of those, who expound the Holy Scripture, as they do the Chiming of Bells. God on the contrary will make use of Reason and Critical Learning, (which are now cultivated more than ever) to produce that Change. The Divines of the Church of England are much esteemed, because they Reason better, and make better use of the Knowledge of Languages, than others do in many other Countries. 'Tis true that Mr. Ʋander Waeyen has no Kindness for them, because they cannot abide the Cocceian Explications of Holy Scripture, but approve of those of Grotius, and other like Interpreters. But how can they help it? They must, as well as so many other Reformed Divines, patiently bear the misfortune of not pleasing him.  

Of the Treatise concerning the Causes of Unbelief.  NEXT to the Commentary on the Pentateuch, Mr. L. C. published his French Treatise concerning the Causes of Unbelief, wherein he examines the Motives and general Reasons, which induce Unbelievers to reject the Christian Religion. He published it in 1696. and promised to translate it into Latin, and to add some Notes, in confirmation of what he says. He is so persuaded that the better a Man reasons, the better he may be convinced of the Truth of the Christian Religion, and the Beauty of its Morality, that he constantly says in that Book that Men fall into Unbelief for want of reasoning well. Nay, 
† B. 2. Ch. VI n. IU.  he affirms that whoever says we must renounce Reason to believe Religion, betrays it; for assoon as we lay aside the Light of Reason, we can apprehend nothing in Revelation, and are not able to understand the Proofs it is grounded upon, which suppose that we can reason. He thinks that those, who have cried down Reason, designed to deceive the People, and make 'em believe any thing.  
But on the other side, Mr. L. C. believes not that we ought to have clear and complete Ideas of all the Doctrines contained in Revelation, and perfectly understand whatever it says. He is far from thinking so. He believes, as well as all those who are not deprived of Common Sense, that there are a great many Things in God and his Revelation, which we do not at all comprehend, and which we very imperfectly unlerstand. But such an Obscurity ought not to be confounded with Contradiction, which cannot consist with Truth. Neither must we pretend to know more than what has been revealed to us, but must be content with that, adding nothing to it. There are some Mysteries in Things that concern God, which we shall never be able to dive into, and which, nevertheless, we are sure of by Revelation, and sometimes too by Reason, as Mr. L. C. has shown in his Pneumatology. For Instance, the Apostles speak of the Messiah, not only as of a Man, but also as they use to speak of God the Father, and ascribe to him the Creation of the World; whereby it appears that they did not look on him as a mere Man, but as being so closely united to the Divinity, that what God did a long time before he was born, may be ascribed to him. But no Man can define the manner of that Union, and form to himself a clear Idea of it. What must we do therefore in such a case? We must be content with the general and confused Idea, which the Scripture gives of that Matter, and not go about to explain what we understand not, or impose on others the necessity of believing our private Explications. 
† See P. 2. Ch. VII n. VI  Reason teaches us that God created the World out of nothing, but no Man can know the manner of it.  
There are a great many other Things, which are true Mysteries, and have been always acknowledged to be such by Mr. L. C. both in Natural and Revealed Religion; so that he is far from thinking that there are none at all, as Mr. Ʋander Waeyen unjustly lays to his Charge. 'Tis true that he is no great Admirer of the Mystical Explications of Prophecies; which the Cocceians give us; but if it be a Crime, all the other Reformed Divines will be guilty of it. If any one likes them, let him enjoy the great Knowledge he thinks to have; but he must not be angry with those, who think they ought rather to meditate the clear Precepts of the Gospel, and endeavour to imprint the love of them in themselves and others.  
All those, who attentively read that Treatise of Mr. L. C. will perceive not only that Unbelievers cannot be convinced by any other Reasons, but also that the Author of it is fully persuaded of the Truth of the Religion he defends, not out of Credulity or Interest, but by good and clear Reasons, and such as no reasonable Man can oppose. This is the use he made of his Philosophical and Theological Studies, as all those, who have read his Works, may observe in a thousand Places.  
Dr. Cave is the only Man, that I know of, who has publicly censured the Treatise concerning the Causes of Unbelief. He was so bold as to say, in his Dissertation concerning Eusebius, That Mr. L. C. shows himself to be ill affected to Christian Divines. If these Words, a Christian Divine, signify in Dr. Cave's Dictionary, a Vicious Man, who looks upon his Profession as a good way to enrich himself, to live a voluptuous Life, and domineer over the Consciences of other Men; 'tis past doubt that such a Christian Divine is not acceptable to Mr. L. C. who has sharply censured those Christian Divines, who dishonour Religion by their scandalous Lives. But if Dr. Cave means by a Christian Divine, a good Man, who lives according to the Religion of Christ and his Apostles; 'tis, a base Calumny in him to say that Mr. L. C. is ill affected to a such Divines. One may see the VI Chap. of the 2d Part of his Treatise concerning the Causes of Unbelief, wherein he gives a description of those Churchmen, who, by reason of their vicious Lives, contribute to confirm Unbelievers in their Obstinacy. There is not one honest Man, but will say as much as he; none but Atheists will confound the Vices of Churchmen with the Maxims of the Christian Religion; and none but Debauchees can desire that Vice should be tolerated for the sake of a Profession, which they dishonour.  
If Mr. L. C. had said that all Churchmen are debauched, and live a scandalous Life, it were a Calumny; but when he says that there are but too many, who do so, what does he say but what every Body knows, and which all good Men lament every where? Those, who complain of the Faults of Clergymen, are really their Friends, since they endeavour to reclaim them; they are also Friends to Christianity, and would do it great Service, if their Complaints were able to produce a happy change in the Lives of Vicious Churchmen. On the contrary, those, who cannot abide that such Men should be censured, and who omit nothing to palliate, and consequently to perpetuate their Faults, which the People imitate or abhor, and which give occasion to Unbelievers to reject the Christian Religion, those, I say, are truly Enemies to Christian Divines and Religion, and only Friends to Church-Preferments and Ecclesiastical Authority.  
I could easily show that Mr. L. C. has not said the fourth part of what was said by St. Gregory Nazianzen and Isidorus Pelusiota on this Subject; yet no Body was ever offended at it. But Dr. Cave will understand better a Latin Book, wherein Mr. L. C. will make hip sensible how much he is to blame for having used him as he has done, upon this account.  
Mr. L. C. is persuaded that those, who will carefully examine his Treatise concerning the Causes of Unbelief, will be convinced that the Study of true Philosophy is of great use, to reclaim Unbelievers, and vindicate Religion from all the Objections that can be raised against it, provided it be attended with the Study of the Holy Scripture. Indeed, those, who cannot reason well, nor expound Scripture according to good Critical Rules, do but expose Religion to the Raileries of Unbelievers, when they undertake to defend it; and 'tis their Fault, if Unbelievers think they have better Reasons than Christian Divines.  

Of his Ars Critica.  IN the beginning of the Year 1697. Mr. L.C. published his Ars Critica in 2 Vol. which was soon after reprinted in England. I shall say nothing of it, because the Journalists have lately published some Extracts of it; besides 'tis a Work well known by reason of its Subject. I shall only observe that it contains a Specimen of what might be done, if the Study of Philosophy and Divinity was attended with the Study of Humane Learning. The Philosophical Turn, which the Author has given to several Things relating to Humane Learning, and the useful Examples he has quoted out of Sacred and Profane Writers, show the Connexion of those Sciences, and how much they help one another. Mr. L. C. expresses as much Sincerity and Fairness in this Work, as in all his other Books: He dissembles no Truth, because, in the Judgement of some, it may be prejudicial. He believes that Dissimulation in Matters of moment is of a most dangerous Consequence, and that those, who practise it, have no great love for Truth, and know not how to defend it. He can't abide that any one should boast of having Truth on his side, and fear at the same time that it will be destroyed by another Truth; as if two True Propositions could be contrary to one another. In effect, when the Unbelievers perceive that a Truth is concealed, and a Falsehood substituted in its place; they never fail to exclaim against such a Pious Fraud, and, so, to bring all the rest into Suspicion: 'Tis in vain for any one to say, that, nevertheless, he maintains Truth; for 'tis plain that such a Man does not assert it, because he loves and is clearly convinced of it, but out of an ill Principle; since he maintains a Falsehood, which he thinks to be useful in the Defence of Truth, with the same Confidence and much greater Heat than he is used to maintain Truth itself. It is a scandalous Conduct, which shows the f●ctious Humour of a Man, who only regards what is useful to him, and could maintain Mahometism in Asia with as great a Zeal as he maintains Christianity in Europe. Such a Man knows not what Truth and Falsehood are, since he believes that the one stands in need of the other; and he dishonours Truth, by acting as if he were afraid it should destroy itself. Such are the Proceed of some Ignorant Zealots, who wrangle, as much as they can, about some various Readins which Mr. L. C. mentions in the 3d Part of his Ars Critica, Sect. III. c. 8. etc. 14.  
A certain English Anonymous Author, who styles himself Master of Arts in the University of Cambridge, has maliciously censured Mr. L. C.'s Ars Critica, out of the same Principle. But Mr. L. C. has already confuted him in a Latin Letter, which has been translated into English, and is printed before his Additions to Dr. Hammond's Notes on the New Testament. I shall speak no more of that Libel, because that Letter will be shortly published in Latin.  
Mr. Ʋander Waeyen, who endeavours to find fault with all the Books of Mr. L. C. has likewise censured some Passages of his Ars Critica. For instance, he blames 
† Diss. de voc. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 164. p. 167.  him for having said that the Efficacious and Irresistible Grace taught by St. Augustin is a Thing, of which we have no Idea, and undertakes † to tell us what it is; but he does it so oddly, that what he says confirms Mr. L. C.'s Opinion. Ille actus, they are Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's Words, qui conversionis primus est, totus tantus quantus liberé exseritur ab eo qui se convertit; totus ille actus praestar divina cura, providentia, gratia ut exseratur, adhibitis iis praedicationis, seu verbi docendi mediis, quae omnes agnoscimus. Totus ille actus est Dei, est hominis, est mediorum effectus, qualibet earum causarum operante suo modo & ordine. GRATIA autem dicitur tum Dei, voluntas, cujus virtute sistitur effectus, qui effectus habet rationem boni citra demeritum praestiti: Tum effectus ipse, qui multiplex est, etc. 

First, It is not true, That when St. Augustin spoke of the inward and irresistible help, which he thought God bestowed on Men for their Conversion, he meant thereby the effect of Grace, or Conversion itself.  
Secondly, I will freely own, That Mr. L. C. is to blame for saying that the Word Grace is very obscure; if any one, that understands Philosophy or Divinity, will sincerely affirm that he clearly apprehends Mr. Ʋander Waeyen's meaning in the Words, which I have just now quoted.   For my part I have no Idea of an Action, which irresistibly forces a Man to Will, and yet leaves him at liberty not to Will.  
But our Cocceian Divine accuses Mr. L. C. of acknowledging an irresistible Grace in that place of his Ars Critica, 
† Part 2. § 1. C. 4. n. 11.  wherein he shows what's meant by these Words, to open the Heart. Mr. L. C. maintains, That there is no Emphasis in them, and that when 'tis said, Act. xuj. 14. That the Lord opened the Heart of Lydia, that she attended unto the Things, that were spoken of Paul, the meaning of it is only, That it came to pass by God's Providence, that Lydia heard attentively St. Paul, whatever means God was pleased to use to that end. Because nothing happens in the World, without the Divine Providence, and we are beholden to God for every Thing; St. Luke said, That God opened the Heart of Lydia, without any Design of teaching us thereby, that such a Grace, as St. Augustin speaks of, wrought efficaciously at that very moment on the Mind of that Woman. One may see what Mr. L. C. said in that place of his Ars Critica. ' Tis. plain he spoke there of no irresistible Grace. Nay, to speak in a strict Sense, the Conversion of Lydia is not mentioned in that place, but only her attention to what St. Paul said, which proved afterwards the cause of her Conversion. St. Luke says nothing of it, because he supposes, that to be attentive to the Gospel, and to believe it, are two Things which commonly go together. Those, who are not strongly prepossess d against the Gospel, and have no Vices that are inconsistent with it, need only be attentive, to acknowledge, love and obey it. The Jews themselves used such an Expression, as Ludovicus Cappellus has observed on Luke xxiv. 45. But the present Question is not about the Thing itself, but only about what Mr. L. C. said in his Ars Critica.  
Mr. Ʋander Waeyen maintains, That Mr. L. C. acknowledges in the same Book as well as he, that the ancient Jews meant by the Word the same thing with the Christians. Let us see what Grounds Mr. Ʋander Waeyen has for this Assertion. Mr. L. C. has a Chapter in his Ars Critica, concerning the Language of Sects, which often seem to agree, but yet denote quite different Things, tho' they use the same Expressions. He gives a remarkable Instance of it, in this Proposition, There is but One God. The ancient Jews meant by it, That there is but one Divine Substance in Number, as all Christians understand it now. But St. Athanasius, and other Consubstantialists, if I may so call 'em, used the same Words in a quite different Sense; only to denote, That there was but one Specific Divine Essence, tho' they acknowledged Three Equal and Coeternal Substances. This has been proved by many Learned Men of this Age, and amongst others by Dr. Cudworth, in his Intellectual System, which Mr. Ʋander Waeyen commends, and is really a very Learned Work, tho' it contains a Doctrine very different from his. This being so; Mr. L. C. says, That by reason of that Ambiguity of Words, it may be, as Grotius thought, that those who seemed to agree, were not of the same Opinion, and that by degrees, tho' they used the same Words, they put another Signification upon them. He adds, That this might so much the more easily happen, as to the Question concerning the Unity of God, because the Christians of the latter Times believed that the Fathers of the Church were of the same Opinion with the Jews, who acknowledged a Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence. But as the Consubstantialists entertained a different Opinion, under the cover of the same Words, which the Jews used, and they durst not part with: So now our Divines make use of the Terms consecrated by the Fathers, but they seem to put another Signification upon ' 'em. Verùm uti Homoousiani sub iisdem verbis, quibus Hebraei utebantur, aliam abscondebant sententiam, cùm non auderent ab iis discedere: Ita nostri hodie Theologi à Patribus verba quidem consecrata retinent, sed alias iis subjicere potestates videntur. How does it appear now, That Mr. L. C. grants that the ancient Jews meant by the Word the same thing that St. John did? Nevertheless, Mr. Ʋander Waeyen says so positively, as if no Body but himself could read a Book, whereof above Two thousand Copies have already been Sold. Who will believe him, when he citys Books less known, and accuses others of Disingenuity?  
Our Cocceian Divine continues to find fault with Mr. L. C. in several places of his Rhapsodies; but there is no need I should lose my time in confuting him. Let him read a Book of Episcopius, which he wrote, if I mistake not, against a Professor of a neighbouring University, and entitled Vedelius Rapsodus: It contains very good Advice, which Mr. Ʋander Waeyen should follow. By what has been said, one may judge of the remaining part of his Book, and be satisfied that no Body can rely on what he says, and believe him upon his word. If any one will take the pains to read his Dissertation, let him look for the Passages which he writes against, and compare them with his Answers, and then give his Judgement about it. I should tyre the Reader's Patience, and have an ill Opinion of him, should I show at large how many ill Reasonings, and impertinent Quotations, and how much Disingenuity there is in those Dissertations. This has has been clearly made out, in respect of several Points; and those, who know the long Disputes he has had with other Reformed Divines, are well enough acquainted with his Genius and manner of Writing.  
However, I must say something still about the conclusion of his Dissertation concerning the Logos. He says, That he has done nothing out of Hatred, or through any ill Passion. But I cannot apprehend what might be the cause of so many passionate and angry Expressions, Lies and Calumnies; unless it were Hatred, and some other like Passion. Certainly these are not the Fruits of Christian Charity, nor the Effects of any Zeal for Truth, since Zeal for Truth has nothing to do with Lies and Calumnies.  
He adds, That he did not propose to himself, as his chief Aim, to reclaim Mr. L. C. I believe it; for 'tis manifest that his chief Aim is to Quarrel, and give himself up to his prevailing Passion, and then to prejudice Mr. L. C.'s Reputation by all the means he can think of. 'Tis in vain for him to deny it; since God and Men judge of our Words by our Actions, and not of our Actions by our Words.  
However he says, That he very much wishes he might reclaim Mr. L. C. and that he hearty prays that God would do it. But what would he reclaim Mr. L. C. from? Would he bring him to the State that he himself is in, and of which he should make haste to get out, by begging God's Pardon for having had so many Quarrels with so many honest Men, without any reason for it, and for having endeavoured to blemish their Reputation by his Calumnies?  
He upbraids Mr. L. C. with His Prejudices, his manner of Philosophising, and rejecting the true Key of Knowledge, the Mystery of the Father and Son. Let the Public judge who of them two is more blinded with Prejudices, and whose Method of Philosophising is more agreeable to Piety and Reason. I don't know what he means by the Mystery of the Father and Son, but I guess he understands by it Cocceius' new Method of explaining the Covenant of Grace, which Mr. L. C. does not believe, no more than the other Reformed Divines. He is very willing to leave that Key of Knowledge to Mr. Ʋander Waeyen, and those who like it. Other Christians believe, that it is a proper Instrument to bar Men from the true Knowledge of Holy Scripture, and Mr. L. C. is of that Opinion. But if they mean by it the Divinity of the Son, his Distinction from the Father, and the Redemption of Mankind; Mr. L. C. is better convinced of 'em than the most zealous Cocceians; but he can't abide that any one should add to those Doctrines any thing that is not contained in Scripture.  
Our Professor of Franeker seems to be angry, because Mr. L. C.'s Writings are esteemed; and he says, that the reason why they are valued, is, Because they favour Profane Men, that is to say, those who laugh at Cocceianism; for whoever despises it, can expect no Quarter from Mr. Ʋander Waeyen, as being a profane, and an impious Man, etc. Such is the Language of those godly conceited Divines, who place Religion in Chimerical Speculations, which they endeavour to confound with the Doctrines revealed in the Holy Scriptures; as 'tis practised by Mr. Ʋander Waeyen and Mr. Poiret, who are good Friends, when they are concerned to defend Fanaticism in general, (for as soon as a Man abandons Reason, he must necessarily fall into Fanaticism) but will prove cruel Enemies, when the Question shall be, Whether John Cocceius' Fanaticism is to be preferred to that of Antoinette Bourignon, or vice versâ. 'Twould be a good sport to hear 'em discourse together, with their usual Moderation, of their Explications of the Revelations, Purgatory, Predestination, &c Mr. Poiret would then cease to be clarissimus, and would be obscurissimus Tenebrio, to say no worse; and God knows what noble Epithets he would in his turn bestow on the Doctor of Franeker.  
The latter says, That Mr. L. C. is one of those Men, who reduce Religion to a few Heads, concerning the Knowledge of God, and some practical Moral Duties, in order to live quietly in this World. But Mr. L. C. neither lessens nor increases the Articles of Faith; he takes 'em out of Holy Scripture, such as they are without making any alteration in them: As for Morality, he approves of no Remissness in it. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen knows it very well, and I pray God forgive him for having so wilfully transgressed his most sacred Laws.  

Of some other Books of Mr. L. C. and of his Adversaries.  NEXT to the Books I have mentioned, Mr. L. C. published a short Abridgement of Universal History, in the Year 1697. in 8. and Dr. Hammond's Paraphrase and Notes on the New Testament in 1698. in Folio, and a Harmony of the Gospels in Greek and Latin in 1699. Those, who have seen these two last Books, and will think of the other which I have spoken of, cannot doubt, whatever Judgement they make of his Opinions, but that he spends his time as well as he can, and they will grant that a Man, who is so busy in expounding Holy Scripture, and serving the Public the best way he can think of, should deserve at least to dive quietly. It is a shameful thing to publish new Libels every Day against a Man, who makes no answer, and whose Opinions are now so well known, that 'tis in vain for any Body to  them. Some Divines will say that they don't look upon 'em to be Orthodox; but they know very well that none but God is a Supreme Judge of true Orthodoxy, as to speculative Doctrines; and that all Men being equal in this respect, they have no other Right but that of answering one another Civilly, and with good Reasons. They should be ashamed to use Lies and Calumnies, to defame those who done't so much as think of ' 'em.  
But perhaps some, who are not acquainted with the way and humour of Divines, will wonder how so many People came to inveigh against Mr. L. C. and may suspect that it is his fault, and that he has given occasion for it. But they will be soon undeceived, if they consider what I am going to say.  

First, they ought to remember that some Divines will presently break out into a violent Anger, if any one is not of their Mind in every thing, and scruples not to say that some of their Arguments are not convincing. They will have the liberty of exclaiming against the Pope, who is a greater Man than they; but they cannot abide that others should not look upon them as Popes, that is to say, Infallible Men. How many Censures did Erasmus and Grotius undergo, two incomparable Men, who do more Honour to Holland than all the Cocceians will ever do! They were obliged to write great Volumes in Folio, to make their Apology in few Words; but they should have written twenty times more, had they been willing to confute at large the Ʋander Waeyens and the Benoits of their time. And if any one would undertake now to make their Apology in due Form, and answer all the Impertinences and Calumnies, that have been vented against 'em, after their Death; it would perhaps require as many Volumes as there are in the last Edition of the Bibliotheca Patrum.  
Secondly, Those who might wonder at the great number of Mr. L. C.'s Adversaries, must know that they ought to reckon but one in every Society; for those Men are like Jays or Magpies, that know but one Tune, that is, one of the same System, which they are not allowed to examine, but must follow, to avoid their Punishments, wherewith Churchmen, who change their Mind, are commonly threatened. Mr. Poiret is the only Man, who being of no Society may safely vent his Chimerical Notions, and is as good as a whole Battalion of Lutherans, against whom he has often signalised himself.  
Thirdly, Mr. L. C. has written a considerable number of Books, and consequently may be allowed to give his Judgement concerning several Subjects relating to Critical Learning, Philosophy, and Divinity, about which Men of Letters are wont to dispute; so that 'tis no wonder if many will contradict him, since there are so many of a passionate Temper and contradicting Humour.  
Lastly, If to what has been said you join Envy and Jealously, which are very common among Men of Learning; you may easily apprehend that some of 'em are out of Humour, because Mr. L. C's Works are not slighted. Mr. Ʋander Waeyen gives us to understand, in several places of his Libels, that he has no kindness for those who buy them, especially for the English. He bitterly complains that Arminianism is got among the English, but the Arminians cannot complain that Cocceianism is entertained by them. To speak the Truth, Mr. L. C. sets a greater value upon the Judgement of that Free and Learned Nation, than upon all the slavish and careless Divines of the rest of Europe. However he could rest satisfied with the Testimony of his Conscience, and the certain hopes that God will protect Truth, and those who maintain it in such a manner as is agreeable to the Precepts of the Gospel.   

Whether Mr. L. C. must leave off his Studies, to answer those, who writ against him.  Hitherto I have given an Account of Mr. L. C.'s Studies, since he came to Holland. Some Men would divert him from them, and put him upon writing another sort of Books. They have assaulted him sometime since, as violently as they could: They have not been sparing of odious Terms, Lies and Calumnies, to exasperate him, and force him to answer them. But he is not so imprudent as to grant 'em their Desire, and lay aside the useful Subjects he is upon, to be at the trouble of laying open their Malice and Ignorance. The Public knows well enough what sort of Men they are. Indeed 'tis in vain for an Author to set up for a zealous Man, and to veil his Anger or Malice with the most specious Pretences; for discerning Men will soon find out his Passion; and as for others, 'tis no great Matter whether they judge right or wrong of it. 'Tis no new thing to see Divines transported with Anger, and their Hatred has occasioned a Proverb. 'Tis well that they are now to be feared no where, but in Places where they are both Judges and Parties.  
It was well observed by Mr. Menage, 
† Menagiana, vol. 2. p. 236.  That Some Men are never refuted, unless they be alive; and that they are not considerable enough, after their death, to oblige any Body to be at that trouble. But there are some, who deserve not to be refuted, whether they be dead or alive: I mean those, who pick Quarrels for quarreling-sake, or to be spoken of, and can make no solid Objections. It would be too great a Pleasure and Honour for them, to see their Satyrs or Declamations answered. I know some among those, that wrote against Mr. L. C. who hearty with that he would in his turn write large Volumes against ' 'em. They are not afraid of good and solid Arguments, as it appears by their way of Reasoning; and they are not ashamed to publish the most palpable Absurdities, with the greatest confidence in the World. But they are vexed, when an Author takes no notice of their Books, and if they can't quarrel abroad, they will quarrel at home with their Colleagues.  
Mr. L. C. designs to write a Latin Dissertation, wherein he'll examine this Question, When a Man must answer the Calumnies of Divines? It is not less necessary than that which was printed at the end of his Logic, De Argumento Theologico ex Invidia ducto. Those, who endeavour to increase their Reputation by speaking ill of him, will see what his Reasons are for not answering them.  
In the mean time, he must apply himself to the Search of Truth, and publish it, as carefully as he has done hitherto, but with the Caution which Christian Prudence requires on such an occasion. Who can be entrusted with the care of speaking and maintaining Truth? Not those, who don't inquire after it, because they don't love it, and stand not in need of it, to raise themselves in the World: Nor those, who have not the necessary Qualifications to find it out, and to publish it: Nor those, who know it, but dare not speak it out, for fear of exposing themselves. For, it must be confessed that in several Christian Societies, they have not the liberty necessary to explain Holy Scripture and Religion. There is but one Christian Society, in Holland, that can do it; and tho' it be inconsiderable, it has already afforded several Great Men. In. all others, they don't often think as they speak, nor speak as they think.  
Indeed many Learned Persons on this side of the Sea and beyond it, among the Roman Catholics and Protestants, look a great while since upon the Writers of that small Party as the Interpreters of the Thoughts, which they themselves dare not publish in Places where they live, and, as the Assertors of Truth and Liberty, which are oppressed almost every where else. I will not make their Encomium, but I shall only say that those, who are in such Circumstances, aught to speak freely, whilst they can do it, and want not People that will hear them. Time will come, when we shall reap the Fruits of the Seeds of Piety, Charity, and all other Christian Virtues, which their Works spread over all Europe; and hereafter it will be a Subject of Wonder, how Men, who so much deserved Thanks, could be so traduced, and ill spoken of They are the only Men, to whom we are beholden for the Moderation, which is every day more and more entertained by the most knowing and judicious Protestants; and for a great many general and particular Truths, which would not have been heard of yet, or been well proved, if those Authors had been silent.  
There is no need I should insist longer on this, Subject, nor say that Mr. L. C. took care of the Edition of some Books written by other Hands. Neither is it necessary that I should mention those, which he wrote, as it were, to divert himself, whilst he was composing some others, which required more attention. Such is his small French Treatise concerning the good or ill Luck of Lotteries, which he published in 1696. when Lotteries were so much in vogue in the United Provinces. He also took care of the Edition of the Fathers of the Apostolic Age, in 1698. in 2 Vol. in Folio, and added some few Notes of his own, as it appears by the Prefaces he prefixed to it. If those, who have more time, a greater Genius, more Learning and Conveniences than he (as there are without doubt a great many in England and elsewhere) would take as much Pains for the Public as he has done; the great number of good Books, which would come out in a few Years, would perhaps create a dislike of so many bad ones, which are published every day. But, besides the  Reasons, they, that could write more commodiously than others, are not commonly so inclined to it, as those, who have less Conveniences.