Machivael's DISCOURSES Upon the First Decade of T. LIVIUS, Translated out of the Italian.  
To which is added His Prince.  
With some Marginal Animadversions Noting and Taxing his ERRORS.  
By E. D.  
LONDON, Printed for G. Bedell, and T. Collins; and are to be sold at their Shop at the Middle-Temple Gate in Fleetstreet 1662.   

To the most Noble and Illustrious JAMES Duke of Lenox, Earl of March, Baron of Setrington, Darnly, Terbanten, and Methuen, Lord great Chamberlain and Admiral of Scotland, Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter, and one of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council in both Kingdoms.  
I Offer here to your Grace's patronage my best endeavours, discovering at large their imperfections, in what I can claim mine in this work. For which however I may have incurred the blame of some, as unable to do the Author, I have undertaken, his full right, but rather by my rude stile wronging his original lustre; yet perhaps, with others more moderate, I may find favour and good acceptance, as well for my choice of the Author, whose worth will somewhat bear me out, as because I have contributed hereunto what I ought, which can be no more than what I could. Mine Author was a Florentine, whose national attribute among the Italians is subtlety, and whose particular eminence in cunning hath styled the most cunning, as his Sectaries, Machiavillians. Nor hath this workman taken in hand a work unproper for his skill, being the discovery of the first foundations, and analyzing of the very grounds upon which the Roman Commonwealth was built, and afterwards rose to such glory and power, that neither before nor after all the ages of the world ever afforded the like example.  
This book I conceived, I might not unfitly present your Grace with, as unto whose service I owe myself and what I can, and whom as well for neereness of blood, as affection and favour, his Sacred Majesty may most probably employ in this our ship of State near the helm, to the end it may in some part serve for your experience, as a good sea-card, whereby you may become able and expert, as well in the entrances and passages into all creeks and harbours of quiet, as in the discovery and avoidance of all rocks and shelves; for as at sea it is always seen, that in a stormy and tempestuous time, the master dares not trust the rudder in the hand of others then such as are the best approved and experienced Mariners; so, in all States we find, that however in time of peace and quiet, alliance, blood, and favour have a main stroke in matter of preferments and employments too yet when the times grow perplexed with perils and difficulties, true worth and experience are sought after, and then of value. No climate is so benign, as to afford a perpetual calm, and therefore your Grace may do well to enable yourself for the service of your Prince and Country, that being called for into the steerage in turbulent times, not favour, only may give you a place there, but use find you necessary, whereunto if I could contribute a poor mite, I had done enough.  
Notwithstanding however my Author, in what he hath done well, hath far excelled others, yet is he not without his blemishes and errors to; which, as well as I was able to discover them, I have marked, and thereunto added some observations, taking (as I think) all his notorious errors in this book: Wherein I may have committed faults too, which you may be pleased to pass over, as no strange thing, but accept rather the duty of  
Your Grace's humblest servant, EDWARD DACRES.   

A Table of the Arguments of each several Chapter.  

WHat were in general the beginnings of every City, and especially that of Rome. Chap. 1.  
How many kinds of Commonwealths there are, and what was that of Rome, Chap. 2.  
Upon what occasions the Tribunes of the People were created in Rome, whereby the Commonwealth became more perfect, Chap. 3.  
That the disagreement of the Senate and people of Rome made the Commonwealth both free and mighty. Chap. 4.  
Whether the people or the Nobility are the the better guardians of liberty, and which have greater occasions of being tumultuous, either they that strive to enlarge the State, or they that endeavour but to maintain it. Chap. 5.  
Whether in Rome there could have been such a State founded as would quite have taken away the hatreds between the people and the Senate. Chap. 6.  
How useful accusations are in a Republic for the maintenance of liberty; Chap. 7.  
Accusations are not more beneficial to Commonwealths than Calumnies pernicious. Chap. 8.  
How needful it is, that he who frames anew the laws, and lays new fonndations of a Commonwealth, be alone without Companion or Competitor. Chap. 9  
As the Founders of a Commonwealth or Kingdom are praiseworthy, so the beginners of a Tyranny deserve much infamy. Chap. 10.  
Of the Romans Religion. Chap. 11.  
Of what importance it is to hold a worthy esteem of Religion; and that Italy for having failed therein by means of the Church of Rome hath gone to wrack, Chap. 12.  
In what manner the Romans availed themselves of their Religion, in ordering the City, in undertaking their designs, and stopping of tumults Chap. 13.  
The Romans interpreted their auspexes as necessity. required, and with discretion made a show to observe their Religion; yet upon occasion they neglected it; but if any did rashly contemn it, they punished him. Chap. 14.  
The Samnites for the extreme remedy to their broken state, have recourse to Religion. Chap. 15.  
People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident they become free, have much ado to maintain their liberty. Chap. 16.  
A disorderly people getting their liberty, cannot keep themselves free without great difficulties. Chap. 17.  
In what manner, in a corrupted City; a free state may be maintained, being gotten; or how when they have it not, it may be gotten and well ordered. Chap. 18.  
A very mean Prince may easily subsist, succeeding a brave and valorous Prince; but a mean one following one that is mean, brings a state into great hazard. Chap. 19  
Two continued successions of valorous Princes work great effect, and Commonwealths well ordered, of necessity have valorous successions: And therefore are their gains and increases great. Chap. 20.  
What blame that Prince or Republic deserves that wants soldiers of his own subjects. Chap. 21.  
What we may observe in the case of the three Horatij Romans, and the three Curiatij Alban. Chap. 22.  
That the whole fortune ought not to be laid at stake, where the whole forces try not for it: and for this cause it is often hurtful to guard the passages. Chap. 23.  
Commonwealths well ordered appoint rewards and punishments for their people, and never recompense the one with the other. Chap. 24.  
Whosoever would reform an ancient state in a free City, let him retain at least the shadow of the old customs. Chap. 25.  
A new Prince in a City or Province taken by him, should make innovations in every thing. Chap. 26.  
It is very seldom, that men know how to be altogether mischievous, or altogether good. Chap. 27.  
For what reason the Romans were less ungrateful to their Citizens, than the Athenians. Chap. 28.  
Whether of the two be more ungrateful, people, or a Prince. Chap. 29.  
What means a Prince or Republics should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude, and what a Commander or Citizen to be free from their danger. Chap. 30.  
That the Roman Commanders were never extraordinarily punished, for any error committed, nor at all punished when either by their ignorance, or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them, the Commonwealth suffered. Chap. 31.  
A Prince or Republ. should not defer to do good unto men, until their necessity require it. Chap. 32.  
When an inconvenience is grown in a state or against a state, it is better to bear with it for a while, then presently to struggle with it. Chap. 33.  
The Dictator's authority did good and not harm to the Commonwealth of Rome, and how authorities which the Citizens take upon them of themselves, and not those that are given them by the people's free voices, are hurtful to the government. Chap. 34.  
The reason why in Rome the creation of the Decemvirate was hurtful to the liberty of that Republic, notwithstanding that it was made by public and free voices. Chap. 35.  
The Citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the Commonwealth, ought not disdain the less as unworthy of them. Chap. 36.  
What distastes the Agrarian law gave in Rome, and that it is very offensive to make a law in a Commonwealth, that looks far backwards, and yet goes directly against an ancient custom of the City. Chap. 37.  
Weak Commonwealths are hardly drawn to a certain resolution and know not how to determine, and the course they ordinarily take, they are rather forced too, then choose of themselves. Chap. 38.  
The same accidents are seen to befall several People. Chap. 39  
The creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted, where among many other things is considered, how by the like accident a Republic may be preserved or suppressed. Chap. 40.  
Of humble to become proud, of merciful cruel, without passing through the due means between these extremes, argues indiscretion, and turns not to advantage. Chap. 41.  
How easily men may be corrupted. Chap. 42.  
They that fight for their own glory, are the good and faithful soldiers. Chap. 43.  
A multitude without a head is unprofitable, and a man should not first threaten, and afterwards demand the power. Chap. 44.  
It is a matter of very evil example, when he that makes a law, neglects the observing of it: and it is very dangerous in a State, to make a continual practice of cruel executions. Chap. 45.  
Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another, and first they aim no further then that they themselves suffer no harm of others, afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others. Chap. 46.  
Men though they are deceived in generalities, yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars. Chap. 47.  
He that would not have a Magistracy given to one that is base and lewd, let him cause it to be demanded either by one that is very base and very lewd, or by one that is very noble and very good. Chap. 48.  
If those Cities, that have had their beginning free as Rome, have found difficulty to make laws, that can maintain them so; those that have had their beginning immediately servile, find almost an impossibility. Chap. 49.  
The power of stopping the public actions of the City, should not be given into the hands of one Council, or one Magistracy. Chap. 50.  
A Commonwealth or Prince should make a show to do that of a free mind, which indeed mere necessity compels them to do. Chap. 51.  
To stay the insolence of one that grows powerful in a Commonwealth, there is no way more secure and less offensive, then to seize beforehand, and so prevent him of those ways, by which he attains to that power. Chap. 52.  
The People deceived by a false show of good, oftentimes seek their own ruin, and great hopes and large promises do easily move them. Chap. 53.  
What authority the presence of a great and worthy personage hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude. Chap. 54.  
How easily things are ordered in a City where the people is not corrupted; and that where a parity is, there is no place for a Principality; and where that is not, a Republic cannot be. Chap. 55.  
Before strange accidents and changes befall a City or Country, usually there are some prodigies that forerun them, or men that foretell them. Chap. 56.  
A Common people united are strong and vigorous, but taken apart and separated, vile and contemptible. Chap. 57  
The multitude is more wise and constant than a Prince. Chap. 58.  
What confederation or league is rather to be trusted; either that which is made with a Republic, or that is made with a Prince. Chap. 59  
How the Consulship and every other magistracy in Rome, was given without respect of age. Chap. 60.    

The Table of the second book.  

Which contributed more to the Romans in the conquest of their Empire, either their virtue or their fortune. Chap. 1.  
What people the Romans had to make war withal, and how obstinately they fought for the defence of their liberty. Chap. 2.  
Rome became a great City, by ruining those that were near neighbours unto her, and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dignities. Chap. 3.  
Republics have taken three particular courses to amplify and enlarge their states. Chap. 4.  
That the changes of Religions and languages, together with the chances of floods and pestilences, abolish the memory of things. Chap. 5.  
How the Romans proceeded in making of war. Chap. 6.  
How much land the Romans allowed to each man they sent out to inhabit their Colonies. Chap. 7.  
The occasions, wherefore people leave their own native soils, and invade other countries. Chap. 8.  
Upon what occasions wars are begun among Princes. Chap. 9  
Moneys are not the sinews of war, according to the common opinion. Chap. 10.  
It is not a match wisely made, to join alliance with a Prince, whose credit is greater than his strength. Chap. 11.  
Whether it is better for a Prince fearing to be assailed by his enemy, himself first to begin the war with him, or to expect while it comes home to him. Chap. 12.  
That men rise from poor and small beginnings to great fortunes, rather by the help of guile then force. Chap. 13.  
They are often deceived who think with humility to overcome pride. Chap. 14.  
Weak States are always irresolute in their determinations; and slow deliberations are always hurtful. Chap. 15.  
How much the order used by our soldiers in these modern times, differ from those of the ancients. Chap. 16.  
What esteem our modern armies ought to have of artillery, and if the opinion which is generally conceived of it be true. Chap. 17.  
How by authority taken from the example of the Romans, and from the use of the ancient military discipline, the foot is more to be esteemed then the horse. Chap. 18.  
That conquests in Republics not well governed, and that proceed not according to the Roman valour, procure rather their ruin then advancement. Chap. 19  
What hazard that Prince or Commonwealth runs, which is served by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers. Chap. 20.  
The first Rector that ever the Romans sent to any place, was to Capua four hundred years after they began to make war. Chap. 21.  
How erroneus many times the opinions of men are, when they give their judgements touching great affairs. Chap. 22.  
How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects, whensoever occasion was offered that constrained them thereunto, avoided the middle way, and rather betook themselves to one of the extremes. Chap. 23.  
Fortresses in general do more harm then good. Chap. 24.  
It is a wrong course, to assail a City fallen into discord, thinking by means thereof to become master of it. Chap. 25.  
Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against them that use it, without any return of advantage to them. Chap. 26.  
Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be content with the victory, for oftentimes when that suffices not, they lose it. Chap. 27.  
How dangerous a thing it is for a Republic or Prince, not to revenge an injury done against the public State, or against a private person. Chap. 28.  
Fortune blinds men's eyes, when she will not suffer them to prevent her designs. Ch. 29.  
Republics and Princes that really are mighty, seek not by moneys to make alliance with others, but with their valour and repute of their forces. Chap. 30.  
How dangerous a thing it is to give credit to men that are banished out of their Country. Chap. 31.  
How may ways the Romans used to make themselves masters of Towns. Chap. 32.  
That the Romans gave their Commanders of their armies, free and large Commissions. Chap. 33.    

The Table of the third book.  

FOr the maintenance of a Religion or Commonwealth long in being, it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds. Chap. 1.  
It is a very great part of wisdom sometimes to seem a fool. Chap. 2.  
That it was necessary for preservation of the new gotten liberty, to put Brutus his sons to death. Chap. 3.  
No Prince lives secure in his Principality, while those are living who were despoiled of it. Chap. 4.  
What it is that makes a Prince lose his Kingdom, which he enjoys by right of inheritance. Chap. 5.  
Of Conspiracies. Chap. 6.  
From whence proceeds it, that of the changes from liberty to slavery, and from slavery to liberty, some are without blood, others exceeding bloody. Chap. 7.  
He that will make alteration in a Republic, must consider the subject he is to work upon. Chap. 8.  
How a man must of necessity change with the times, if he will always have good success in his undertake. Chap. 9  
That a Captain cannot avoid battle when his enemy will fight in any case. Ch. 10.  
He that hath to deal with many, however that he be the weaker, provided that he can but support their first violence, overcomes. Chap. 11.  
That a wise Commander upon his own soldiers, should lay all manner of necessity to fight, and take it, as much as he can, from his enemies. Chap. 12.  
Whether more trust is to be reposed in a good Commander having a weak army, or in a good army having a weak Commander. Chap. 13.  
New sleights and inventions that are used in the midst of a fight, and new cries that are heard, what effects they produce. Chap. 14.  
That the command of an army ought to be given in charge only to one, and where there are more, they always err. Chap. 15.  
In time of difficulty and peril, true worth and virtue is sought after; and in calm and quiet times, not their virtues but their wealth, friends and parentage prefer them. Chap. 16.  
That he who hath received any not able disgrace or injury done him from a Prince or Republic, should never be entrusted by them in any employment or service of importance. Chap. 17.  
There is nothing more worthy of a Commander, then to be able to discover beforehand and espy out the enemy's practices. Chap. 18  
Whether in the government of a multitude, mildness or severity be of greater avail. Chap. 19  
One example of humanity prevailed with the Falisci, more than all the force of Rome could. Chap. 20.  
From whence it came that Hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of Scipios, wrought the same effect in Italy, which the other did in Spain. Chap. 21.  
How Manlius Torquatus his rigour, and Valerius Corvinus his mildness gained each of them the same glory. Chap. 22.  
For what cause Camillus was banished Rome. Chap. 23.  
The continuation of governments brought Rome into thraldom. Chap. 24.  
Of Cincinnatus and many Romans poverties ' Chap. 25.  
How that upon the occasion of Women, states have been ruined. Chap. 26.  
How a City at discord in itself is to be united: and how that opinion is not true, that to maintain Cities in obedience, it is necessary to keep them in discord, and divided into factions. Chap. 27.  
That the Citizens actions ought to be well weighed: for many times under virtuous and charitable deeds, are laid the fowdations of Tyranny. Chap. 28.  
That the people's faults grow from their Princes. Chap. 29.  
A Citizen, that will of his own authority do any good in his own City, of necessity must first extinguish all envy: and what order is to be taken for the defence of a City upon the enemy's approach. Chap. 30.  
Powerful Commonwealths, and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage and the same dignity. Chap. 31.  
What means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace. Chap. 32.  
It much furthers an army in the winning of a battle, to be confident of their own forces and their General's valour. Chap. 33.  
What fame, report, or opinion causes the people, to begin to cast their favours upon a Citizen: and whether a Prince or a People do bestow their Magistracies with better judgement. Chap. 34.  
What dangers they incur, that put themselves forwards as Principals to advise any design, which are so much the greater, by how much this carries with it the more difficulty and peril. Chap. 35.  
The reason wherefore the French have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more than men, and afterwards less than women. Chap. 36.  
Whether slight skirmishes or battles are necessary before a great battle; and what is to be done to know a new enemy, when one would avoid those skirmishes. Chap. 37.  
What manner of man that General ought to be, on whose abilities an army may confidently rely Chap. 38.  
That a Commander ought exactly to know situations. Chap. 39  
How deceit is commendable used against the enemy in time of war. Chap. 40.  
That the defence of ones country ought to be undertaken, either with ignominy or with glory, or whatsoever way it be done, it is well defended. Chap. 41.  
Promises extorted by force ought not to be kept. Chap. 42.  
Those men that are bred in the same Country, do throughout all ages keep very near the same nature and dispositim. Chap. 43.  
By sudden supprisal and boldness many times more is obtained, then by ordinary means can be gotten. Chap. 44.  
Which course is the better in a battle, either at the first to sustain only the enemy's shock and reserve some forces till the latter end to give them a blow withal, or else as upon themaine to venture all upon the fury of the first onset Chap. 45.  
Whence proceeds it that one family in a City holds a long time the same manners and disposition. Chap. 46.  
That a good Citizen for the good of his Country ought to forget all private wrongs. Chap. 47.  
When we see the enemy commit a great error, we ought to believe there is some treachery in the business. Chap. 48.  
A Republic if one would preserve it free, hath every day need of provision of new orders: and in regard of his good deserts that way, Fabius was termed Magnus, Chap. 49.   
FINIS.   

MACHIAVELS DISCOURSES UPON THE First DECADE OF T. LIVIUS Translated out of Italian.  

The Preface.  
WHen I consider the esteem which is made of antiquity, and that many times (letting pass further examples) a small piece of an ancient statute hath been bought at a great rate, only to have it at hand, to adorn the house withal, and that thereby they may be able to cause others, who take delight in the art, to draw copies thereof, and these likewise endeavour, as lively as they can, to represent it again in all their works and on the other side seeing the most virtuous actions that histories relate us, to have been archieved by Kingdoms, ancient Commonwealths, King's Captains, Citizens and Lawgivers, and such others who have undergone much for their Country's good; that these, I say, have been rather admired then followed, or rather by every one have been so much avoided, that now the very footsteps of that ancient virtue is utterly defaced, I cannot but both marvel and grieve: and the rather, because I perceive, that in matters of process arising in a Commonwealth among citizens, or in criminal causes, recourse is always made to those judgements and those remedies which formerly have been ordained and practised by the ancients; for the civil-lawes are nothing else, but the opinions given by ancient Lawyers, which since having been reduced to a method, todirect our Doctors of the Law now a days, in giving of their judgements: yet for all this in the ordering of Commonwealths, in the maintenance of States, in the government of Kingdoms, in ordaining of military discipline, in waging of war, in giving judgement upon the subjects, in amplifying of the Empire, there are neither Princes, nor Republics, Commanders, nor Citizens who ever seek after any of these ancient patterns, which I persuade myself proceeds not so much from that weakness, into which the breeding and customs now a days have brought the world, or from that evil which idleness accompanied with ambition hath done to many Christian countries and Cities, as from their want of the true knowledge of histories, in that by reading them, they conceive not that meaning nor relish that tastethey have in them: whence it arises that many who read, take delight to hear the variety of accidents, which are frequent in them, without further regard of imitating them deeming that not only hard, but impossible, as if the heavens, the sun, the elements, and men were altered from what they were of old, in the●ir motion, order and power. Wherefore being desirous to withdraw men from this error, I thought fit to write upon these books of T: Livius, which have escaped the malice of the times, what I thought, conformable to modern and ancient affairs, of purpose for the better understanding of them, that they who shall well peruse these discourses of mine, may there reap that profit for which end the knowledge of history ought to be sought after. And however this be a task of great difficulty, yet by the help of those who have encouraged me to undergo this burden, I believe I shall carry it so far onwards, that there shall be left for him that comes after me, but very little way to bring it to a good end.   

CHAP. I.  
What were in general the beginnings of every city, and especially that of Rome.  
WHosoever shall read what beginning the City of Rome had, who were the Lawmakers, and how it was founded, will nothing marvel that so great virtue was continued so many years in the city, and that from thence afterwards there grew so mighty an Empire, to which that Commonwealth attained. And therefore to discourse first of her birth, I say, that all Cities were built either by the Natives of the place they were built in, or by strangers. The first comes to pass when the inhabitants being dispersed in many and small numbers find they cannot live safe, each one not having strength apart, as well by reason of their situation, as their small number to resist the violence of those that would force them; or if they would join together for their defence, the enemy coming upon them, they cannot do it in time; and when they should be in one body, they must of necessity abandon divers of their retreats, & so become a sudden prey to their enemies: Wherefore to escape these dangers, either of themselves, or upon the motion of some one of authority among them, they confine themselves to dwell together, in a place chosen as well for their better commodity of living as more facility of defence. Of this sort among many others were Athens & Venice. The first under the command of Theseus, was upon the like occasions built by the scattered inhabitants: the other, much people being retired into certain little Lands at the point of the Adriatic Sea (to avoid those wars which then were beginning in Italy by reason of those huge and continual inundations of Barbarians upon the declining of the Roman Empire) began among themselves without the authority of any particular Prince, to live under those laws they thought most proper for their preservation: which proved luckily to them, for the long quiet their situation gave them, that Sea having no outlet, and those people which then afflicted Italy, not having ships to annoy them, so that every little beginning was sufficient to give them that greatness they now have. The second sort is, when a City is built by strangers which are either absolute of themselves, or depend upon others, & such are colonies which are sent out either by a Commonwealth or Prince to disburden their Towns of inhabitants, or for the defence of some country which of late they have gotten, and would safely keep without much expense; of which sort the Romans built many througouht all their dominions; others were built by some Prince, not to make his seat there, but for his glory; and so was Alexandria by Alexander: and because these cities have not their beginning free, they seldom attain to that greatness, as to be esteemed the head cities of Kingdoms. The like beginning had Florence (whither it was built by Sulla's Soldiers, or by chance by the inhabitants of the mountains of Fiesola; who taking heart upon that long peace the world enjoyed under Octavian, came down & dwelled in the plain upon the Arne) for it was built under the Romau government, neither could it in the beginning make greater increase, than what the Prince's favour allowed it. The founders of Cities are then said to be absolute and free, when any people either led by a Prince, or of themselves, are forced by contagion, famine, or war to abandon their native Soil, and seek a new dwelling and these are are content to inhabit the Cities in the Country they have conquered, as Moses did, or build new, as did Aeneas. In this case appears the ability of the founder, and the fortune of the City founded, the which is more or less admirable, as he who gave thereto the beginning was of greater or or less abilities: which is seen in two kinds; the first in choice of the situation, the second in making the laws. And because men act some things upon necessity, others by their own election, and the greater virtue is there seen where election hath the least power; it is to be considered, whether it were better to choose barren places to build Cities in, to the end men being forced to labour for their sustenance, might live the better in agreement, the poverty of their Country giving less occasion of discord, as it was in Raugia: and in many other Cities built in like places, which choice without doubt would be wiselier made and more profitable, of men were content to live of their own, and not seek to rule over others, but seeing it not possible for men to live in security without force, it is necessary to avoid a barren soil, and to plant themselves in fruitful places, where they may be enabled by the plenty of their seat to enlarge and descend their territories against those that would assault them, and overmaster all that would oppose their greatness. And to the end the riches of the country occasion not too much the ease of the people, it would be fit to provide that the laws oblige them to take these pains, the situation doth not, and to imitate those who have lived in pleasant and fruitful countries, and apt to breed men given to Luxury, loath to use that industry virtue requires, and yet were so wise as to prevent those harms the plenty of the soil, and so consequently the people's idleness might cause: having imposed such a necessity of labour upon those they brought up to be Soldiers, as by means of their strict discipline, they far surpassed others who because of their rough and barren countries were borne fierce; such was the Kingdom of the Egyptians that notwithstanding the country's delicacies, the laws strictness prevailed so far, as there were bred by them many great personages: and if time had not worn out their names, it would appear they had deserved as much praise, as did Great Alexauder, and many others whose memories stories continue fresh amongst us: and whosoever had considered the Sultan's Kingdom, and the Mamalucks order, with their military discipline, before they were ruined by Selimus the great Turk, would have seen in that how the Soldiers were trained up in continual exercises, and therein have known how much they feared that case to which the goodness of their Country invited them, unless it had been opposed with severe laws. I avow therefore the choice better in a fertile place, when that good government takes order for a moderate use of the abundance. When Alexander the great had a purpose to build a City for his glory, Dinocrates the Architect came to him and showed him, how it might be built upon Mount Athos, which place, besides that it would be strong, he could so order, that the City should be made in form of a man: which would be a wonder worthy his greatness: and being asked again by Alexander whereupon the inhabitants should live, answered he had not well advised of that point yet: whereat having laughed, he left the mountain alone, & built Alexandria so, that people might resort thither, as well for the farness of the soil, as the commodity of of the sea, and the River Nilus. Whoever then shall examine the beginning of Rome, if Aeneas be taken for the first founder, it must be numbered among the cities that were built by strangers; If Romulus, among those that were built by the Natives; And in what manner soever It were, it will appear it had a beginning free of itself without dependence of any; and moreover that the Laws made by Romulus, Numa, and others, kept it under in an exact obedience (as hereafter shall be said:) so that neither the fruitfulness of the country, the commodity of the Sea, the often victories, nor the vastness of the Empire, could in many ages corrupt it; but maintained it so eminent for virtue, that never any commonwealth came near it. And because those exploits she did, and are recited by T. Livius, were acted upon public or private Counsel, and either within or without the city, I will begin my discourse upon those things passed within land done upon public advice, which I shall think worthy of remark, adding likewise all the dependences thereupon; with which the first book or first part shall end.   

CHAP. II.  
How many kinds of Commonwealths there are; and what was that of Rome.  
I Will sorbear to discourse of those cities which have had their beginnings in subjection under others, and speak of such only as were free in their births from foreign servitude, having had instantly the reins of their own government in their own hands, either as a Commonwealth, or as a Principality which have had. as divers beginnings, so likewise sundry laws and ordinances: for some either in their beginning, or not long after received their laws from one alone, and that at once, as the Spartans' did theirs from Lycurgus: others had theirs casually and at several times, and upon occasion, as Rome: so that it is a great happiness for a Commonwealth to light upon a man of such wisdom so to order the State, as without need of alteration it may continue in security under them: as we see that Sparta kept the same without change or any dangerous tumult above eight hundred years. And on the contrary, that City may in some degree be termed unhappy, which having not met with a judicious founder, is forced to give itself a new frame: and of these the more unlucky is that which is the more amiss: and such is that which together with all its own new ordinances, hath much mistaken the right way to perfection: for it is almost impossible for those of this degree to be settled again by any accident: those others although their order be not exact, yet the beginning they have taken being good, and like enough to prove better, have a good possibility, as may fall out, to become perfect: but sure it is, ' will never be without danger: for the multitude seldom agrees to a new law, if it touch any change of government in the City, unless the necessity of doing it be showed them by some extremity, which never coming without danger, it is like enough the Commonwealth may be sooner ruin●d, then brought into good order. Of which that of Florence gives sufficient proof, which upon that accident of Arezo in the second year was anew ordered, and by that of Pirato in the twelfth inbroyld again. Intending then to treat what were the ordinances of the City of Rome, and the accidents that brought it to perfection, I say, that some, who have writ of Commonwealths, will have it that there was one of these three kinds of States termed by them a Principality, another an Aristocracy, and a third a Popular government: and that they who lay the first grounds of rule and order in a City, ought most to have regard to some one of these, as it seems fittest to their purpose. Some others (and that following the opinion of many more wise) think that there be six sorts of governments; of which three are bad in extremity, and three good in themselves, but so easy to be corrupted, that even they become pernicious. Those which are good, are the three aforesaid; the bad are the other three which depend on these, and every one of them in such sort resemble that which it ap● preaches, that they change suddenly from one into the other: for the Principality easily becomes Tyranny; that of the Nobility falls into the hands of some few; and the Popular will as easily become tumultuous: so that if he that lays the foundation of a Commonwealth, ordains in a City one of these three sorts, it is but for a small continuance: for it is beyond the power of any remedy to hinder that it slip not into its contrary, for the resemblances which in this case there is between the virtue and the vice. These differences of governments grew by chance among men; for in the beginning of the World, when the inhabitants were thin, they were scattered abroad for a time like wild beasts; afterwards man kind increasing, they gathered together, and that they might be able better to defend themselves, they began to cast their eyes upon him who had the most strength and courage among them, and made him their head and obeyed him. Hereupon began the discerning of things good and honest from bad and hurtful: for seeing that if any one hurt his benefactor, it caused hatred and pity among men, blaming the ungrateful, and honouring the thankful; and thinking withal that the same injuries might as well be done to themselves; to avoid the like evil, they betook them to make laws and to make punishments against the offenders: Hence came the knowledge of justice, which was the occasion that when they were to choose a Prince, they sought not after him that was the lustiest, but the wisest and justest. But afterwards when they had their Prince by succession, and not by election, suddenly the heirs began to degenerate from their ancestors; and forsaking virtuous actions, they thought that Princes had nothing to do but to exceed others in luxury and wantonness, and in what belonged to their pleasure: so that the Prince beginning to be hated, and because he was hated to fear, and passing on beyond this fear to hurt, hereon grew Tyranny. Thence afterwards grew those violences, conspiracies and treasons against Princes, which were not undertaken by those that were fearful or weak; but if any surpassed others in courage, valour, wealth, and birth, those were the actors, not being able to endure the shameful life of that Prince. The multitude then following the authority of those great ones, took arms against the Prince; and he being down, they yielded obedience to these as to their deliverers: and they hating the name of one head alone, framed a government of themselves, and in the beginning (in regard of the tyranny passed) carried themselves fairly according to the laws they had made, preferring the public good before their own advantage, and in sum, ruled and maintained the state with exceeding diligence. This government afterwards falling into the hands of their children, who never knew the change of fortune, nor had the experience of adversity, not being content to live in a civil equality, but abandoning themselves to covetousness, ambition, and ravishing of women, so carried it, that they ingross'd in the hands of some few the government that belonged to the whole Nobility, without any regard of the state, in so much that it befell to them quickly as to the Tyrant. For the multitude loathing their government, served itself of any one that had any design against these governor's, and so some there were quickly found that made head against them, who with the aid of the people put them down. And the remembrance of the Prince being yet fresh, and of the wrongs they suffered under him, having taken away this government of few, and being unwilling to restore that of a Prince, they chose the Popular, which they so ordained, that neither a few that were mighty, nor one Prince alone should have any power there. And because all states in the beginning are venerable, this Popular state subsisted a while but not long, especially when that generation was out that ordained it: for suddenly they grew licentious, not fearing private men, nor public Ministers, so that every one living as he listed, they daily did one another divers outrages, and at length wereforced by necessity, or by the persuasion of some good man, for to avoid such insolency, to change a new into a Principality, and so from thence by degrees, they grew exorbitant in their behaviour, and upon the occasions aforesaid: And this is the circle, in which all states turning about have been and are governed: but seldom do they return into the self same governments: for hardly any Commonwealth can be of so long durance as to undergo so many changes, and yet stand afoot: but rather it comes to pass, the state while it is in tumult, counsel and force then always failing, becomes subject to some neighbouring government which is better ordered then itself: but were it not for this, a state were always capable of revolution into these sorts of government: I say then, that all these kinds are pernicious for the short continuance of the three which are good; and the malignity of the other three which are bad: Whereupon the sage Lawgivers having perceived this defect, avoiding each one by itself, chose one that might partake of all, esteeming that more sound and firm: for the one guards the other, being that in one and the same City, there was the Principality, Nobility, and Commonalty as parts of the governments. Among those, who by such like ordinances have deserved most commendations, is Lycurgus, who made his laws after such a manner in Sparta, that giving the King the Nobility, and the people their shares, he composed a government that lasted above eight hundred years, to his great credit and that City's quiet. The contrary befell Solon, who made the laws in Athens, which because it was a popular state, proved but short lived, and he before he died saw the Tyranny of Pisistratus begun: and though after forty years his heirs were driven from thence, and Athens recovered its liberty (because it took again a popular government according to Solon's institutions) it maintained it not above a hundred years, notwithstanding that to hold it, there were many laws made by which the insolences of the great men were restrained and the licentiousness of all in general: which were never provided for by Solon: yet because he compounded not this with the authority of the Principality as also of the Nobility, Athens continued but a short time in respect of Sparta. But let us come to Rome, which though it had not a Lycurgus to put it so in order that it might long subsist free, yet such were the accidents that chanced in it, by reason of the disunion of the Commonalty and the Senate, that what their founder had not provided for, chance did: for if Rome lit not upon the best fortune, it lit upon the next to the best; for though the first ordinances were defective, yet they aimed not amiss at the true perfection: because Romulus and all the Kings made many and good laws and these agreeing to the maintenance of liberty. But because their design was to lay the foundations of a kingdom, and not of a Commonwealth, when the City became free, there wanted many things which were fit to be instituted in favour of liberty, but were never ordained by those Kings. And albeit their Kings lost rule upon the occasion and by the means alleged, yet they that expelled them presently setting up two Consuls who should stand in the King's stead, chased out of Rome the Regal title only, & not the Regal power; so that there being in that Commonwealth the Consuls and the Senate, it was composed only of two of these forenamed qualities, that is to say, of the Principality & Nobility. There remained only to give the Commonalty a place in the government, whereupon the Roman Nobility being grown insolent, upon the occasions (which shall be hereafter told) the people rose up against them, so that rather than to lose all, they were constrained to allow the people their part; & on the other side, the Senate & the Consuls were likewise to continue with so great authority as they might well maintain their degree in that Commonwealth: & so began the creation of the Tribune's of the people, after which the state of that Commonwealth became more firm, all the three kinds of governments having their shares. And fortune did so much favour them, that though they proceeded from the rule of a King, & of the Nobility, to that of the people, by the same degrees, and for the same reasons set down before; yet to give power to the Nobility, they never took away all the authority from the Royalty; nor was the power of the Nobility quite diminished, to give it to the people: but being mingled, it made an exact Commonwealth, to which perfection it came by the departing of the Commonalty from the Senate, as it shall be showed at length in the two next following Chapters.   

CHAP. III.  
Upon what occasions the Tribune's of the people were created in Rome: whereby the Commonwealth became more perfect.  
ACcording as it is showed by all those that reason of civil government, and so every History is full of examples to that purpose, it is necessary that he who frames a Commonwealth, and ordains Laws in it, should presuppose that all men are bend to mischief, and that they have a will to put in practice the wickedness of their minds, so oft as occasion shall serve: and that when any mischief lies covert for a time, it proceeds from an occasion unknown, which is not come to light, because trial of the contrary hath not yet been made, but time afterwards discovers it, which they say is Father of the truth. It seemed that there was in Rome a perfect union of the People and Senate, when the Tarquins were banished, and that the Nobility having laid by their Pride, were become of a popular disposition, and supportable to every one even of the meanest rank. This deceit lay hid, nor was the occasion thereof known as long as the Tarquins lived, of whom the Nobility being afraid, and doubting that upon their ill treating of the people, they might side with them, behaved themselves with good respect towards them: But no sooner were the Tarquins dead, and the Nobility delivered of that fear, but they began to spit against the people the poison that all this while had lurked in their breasts, and in all sorts possible to vex and molest them: which thing confirms what I said before, that men never do good, unless inforc'd thereto: but where choice is abundant, and liberty at pleasure, confusion and disorder suddenly take place. Wherefore it is said, that hunger and poverty make men laborious, and Laws make them good. But where one thing alone by itself without a Law does good, there, is no need of the Law: but when that good custom fails, the Law becomes necessary forthwith. Yet the Tarquins being foiled, who with fear of them kept the Nobility in awe, it was fit to think out a new way which should work the same effect the Tarquins did, when they were alive. And so at length after many broils, tumults, and hazards of breaches between the people and the Nobility, at length for the people's assurance, the Tribune's were created, and they bore such sway and had such credit, that they could always after mediate between the people and the Senate, and stop the Nobilities insolency.   

CHAP. IU.  
That the disagreement of the People and the Senate of Rome, made the Commonwealth both free and mighty.  
I Must not fail to discourse upon these tumults, which were in Rome from the Tarquins death till the creation of the Tribune's; and afterwards upon some other things against the opinion of many, who say that Rome was a very disorderly commonwealth, and full of such confusion, that if good fortune and military virtue had not supplied their defects, it would have been inferior to any. I cannot deny that fortune and warlike discipline were causes of the Roman Empire: but methinks they do not consider, that where good discipline is, it is likely too that there is good order, and seldom also happens it but that there is good fortune. But let us come to the other particulars of that City. I say that they who condemn the troubles between the Nobility and the people, to me seem to blame those things which were the first occasion of Rome's liberty: and that they think more of the stirs and noises which arose from those tumults, than they regard the good effects they brought forth: and that they consider not, how there are two several humours in every Republic, that of the Commons, and the other of the great-ones; and how all the laws that are made in favour of liberty, spring first from their disagreement, as easily we may perceive it followed in Rome. For from the Tarquins to the Gracchies more than 300. years, the tumults of Rome seldom times caused banishment, and very seldom blood: Insomuch as no man can well deem these stirs hurtful, nor say the Commonwealth was divided, which in so long a time through her discord, banished not above eight or ten Citizens, and put very few to death, nor yet condemned many in sums of money. Neither can that be termed with reason in any sort a disorderly Commonwealth, whence we have so many rare examples of virtue: for good examples proceed from good education & a good education from good laws, & good laws from those tumults which many unadvisedly do condemn: for whosoever shall examine the end thereof, shall not find that they produced any banishment or violence in hindrance of the common good, but laws & ordinances in benefit of the public liberty. And if any man should allege that the means were extravagant, & in a manner outragions. To see the people together cry out against the Senate, and the Senate against the people, to run tumultuously through the streers, to shut up their shops, and the whole people of Rome to quit the town, all which things fright even those that read them. I say that every city ought to have its own ways whereby the people may vent their ambition, & especially those cities that in matters of importance will avail themselves of their people; among which Rome had this way, that when the people would have a law made, either they did some of the things forenamed, or refused to have their names enrolled for the wars, so that to quiet them, there was a necessity in some sort to give them satisfaction. And it is but seldom seen, that the desires of free people tend to the hurt of liberty; for they arise either from their oppression, or from their suspicion they are falling into it. And in case these opinions were false, yet is there a means to rectify them, if some discreet Orator in their assemblies persuade them of their error; and the people (as Tully says) though of themselves ignorant, yet are they of capacity to conceive the truth, being told them by any man worthy of credit, and do easily submit. Wherefore we ought more sparingly to blame the Roman Government, and consider the good effects issued from that Commonwealth, which never proceeded but from good causes. And for creating the Tribune's, they deserve exceeding great praise; for besides the giving to the people their share of Government, they were ordained as guardians of the Roman liberty, as it shall appear in the Chapter following.   

CHAP. V.  
Whether the people or the nebiliry are the better Guardians of liberty; and which have greater occasions of being tzmultuous; either they that strive to enlarge the state, or they than endeavour but to maintain it.  
THey who have judiciously laid the foundations of a Commonwealth, have, among other principal things ordained by them, provided a safeguard for liberty, which as it is rightly placed, so is it of long or shorter durance. And because in every Republic there are the Nobility and the Commons, question is made to which of these two more safely may be entrusted the Guard of liberty. And among the Lacedæmonians, and in our times among the Venetians it hath been given to the Nobility; but among the Romans it was committed to the people's trust; and therefore is it necessary to examine which of these two Commonwealths made the better choice. And if a man list to argue the case, there want not arguments on both parts: butif we look to the issue they had, we should yield it to the Nobility, because Sparta and Venice enjoyed either of them their freedom, longer than Rome. And coming to argument I say (first taking part with the Romans) that they ought rather to be entrusted as guardians of any thing, who are least desirous to usurp it, & without doubt considering the designs of the nobility & of the people, we must needs confess they are very ambitious of rule, these only desire not to be oppressed, and consequently affect the continuance of their freedom, having less hope to usurp it, than the Nobility; so● that the people being set as guardians of the Common liberty, it is probable, they are more careful of it; and being themselves out of hope of it, will never suffer that it fall into others hands. On the other side, he that argues for the Spartan and Venetian customs, says, that they who intrust it with them that are powerful, do two good things at once; the one, that they rather give a satisfaction to their ambition, that having a greater part in the Commonwealth, by holding this staff in their hand they have greater reason to be contented: the other is, that they free the people's unquiet minds from such a kind of authority which is the occasion of infinite discords and offences in the Commonwealth, and like enough to bring the Nobility to some desperation, which in time may do much mischief: and they give us Rome itself for an example hereof, that when the Tribune's of the people had this authority in their hands, they were not content to have one Consul to be a Plebeian, but would have both, and thereupon they would have the Censor and the praetor, and all other dignities in the rule of the City: nor was this enough, but led on still with the same rage, they began in after times to adore those men whom they saw fit to curb the Nobility, whereupon grew the power of Marius and the ruin of Rome: and, truly whosoever should sift this matter throughly, the one and the other, would much doubt which he should make choice of for the guardians of liberty, not knowing which sort of men is more hurtsull in a Commonwealth, either that which desires to gain the honour it hath not, or the other which endeavours to maintain what they have already got; and at last, whosoever shall examine the whole throughly, will make this conclusion; Either you reason of a Republic that aims at such a dominion as Rome had, or of one which seeks no farther than her own preservation. In the fir● case, it is best to do as Rome did, and follow her footsteps. In the second, he may follow Venice and Sparta for those occasions, as it shall be said in the Chapter following. But to return to the point, what kind of men are the more hurtful in a Republic? either they that would enlarge the State, or those that are wary not to lose what they have already gotten; I say that Marcus Menenius being made dictator, and Marcus Follius General of the horse, both plebeians, to inquire after certain conspiracies, which were made in Capua against Rome, authority was also given from the people to find out those that in Rome by ambition or any extraordinary way did strive to gain the Consulship, and the other great honours of the City; whereupon the Nobility thinking this authority granted to the dictator as against them, they reported all about Rome that they were not the Nobles that ambituously sought after dignities by unlawful means, but the plebeians who not confident of their births nor worths, sought by extravagant ways to attain to those degrees, and particularly accused the Dictatonr; and so powerful was the accusation, that Menenius in a public assembly, where he complained of the calumnies the Nobility had laid on him, quit the Dictatourship, and submitted himself to the trial, which was made before the People, and after his cause was heard, he was absolved: where it was argued, whether savoured more of ambition, either he that would maintain, or he that would gain; for the one and the other appetite may occasion very great tumults. Yet notwithstanding most commonly are they caused by him who already hath the possession, because the fear of losing doth breed in them the same desires which are in those who aim at conquest: because men think they hold not surely what they have, unless they make a new addition of somewhat else; and besides this, the larger territories they are Master of, the greater force and power they are able to employ in bringing their designs to effect; and this also may we add, that their unlimited and ambitious behaviours kindle in the breasts of those that have not, a desire to have, or to be revenged on those that despoil them, or else to become Lords themselves of that wealth and those honours, which they see others use ill.   

CHAP. VI  
Whether in Rome there could have been ●uch a State founded, as would quite ha●● taken away the hatreds between the People and the Senate.  
WE have discoursed upon the effects, which the differences, betwixt the People and the Senate, made. Now they continuing till the Gracchies, where they occasioned the ruin of the common liberty, some man would wish, that Rome could have achieved these glorious acts she did, without those jars in her. Yet it seems worthy the consideration, to see, if it were possible, so to frame a State in Rome, as could void all differences●; and if a man would examine this, he should have recourse to those Republics, which, without so many fall out and bicker, have been long free, and see, what kind of State theirs was, and whether Rome were capable of it. An example among the ancients is Sparta, among the moderns Venice, both by me formerly named. Sparta made itself a King with a little Senate to govern it. Venice divided not the government with the names, but in one general term, all those that had a hand in it were called Gentlemen, which chance rather cast on them, than the deliberation of their founder: for many inhabitants being met together upon those rocks, where now stands that City upon the occasions foretold, when they were grown to such a number, that for them to live together it was necessary for them to ordain Laws they appointed a form of government, and meeting also together in Counsel to advise touching the City, when they found themselves of sufficient number to make up a body politic, they excluded all others who afterwards in process of time should come to dwell there, from all power in State affairs. And in success of time, finding there were many inhabitants in the place out of the Government, to give them reputation that governed, they called them Gentlemen, and the others plebeians. So that this order might well be begun and continued without the dislike of any: for when it was first made, every one that dwelled at Venice, did equally partake of the Government, so that none could complain: they, who afterwards came to inhabit there, finding the State settled and limited, had neither occasion nor means to make any tumult: there was no occasion, because nothing was taken from them: and the means they had not, because they that governed kept them in subjection, nor trusted them so far with any employment that they could take authority upon them. Add hereunto, that they who afterwards came to inhabit Venice, were not many, nor of so great a number, that there was disproportion between the Governors and those that were governed; for the number of the Gentlemen was either equal to them, or greater than they were: so that for these reasons Venice could well begin such a State and maintain it in unity. Sparta, as I said, was governed by a King and a strict Senate, and might well maintain itself so a long time; because there being in Sparta but few inhabitants, and they having seized upon the Government in prevention of those that should afterwards come to inhabit there, and with reputation living in observance of Lycurgus' Laws, took away quite all occasion of discord, so that they might easily continue together in a long agreement; for Lycurgus by his Laws ordained in Sparta more equality of estates, and less of dignities; for here poverty was to all alike; and the plebeians less ambitious: for the Magistracies of the City were communicable only to some few Citizens, and were held apart from the People, neither did the Nobility ever with their harsh usage make them covetous of them. This eme from the Spartan Kings, who being placed in that Principality, and set in the midst of that Nobility, had no surer means to maintain their dignity steadfast, then to defend the People from injurious oppressions: which made the People, that it neither feared nor affected the Government, and not having the rule nor fearing it, the contention they might have with the Nobility was quite avoided, and all occasion of tumults: and in this sort they might live in peace a long time. But two principal things caused this agreement; because the inhabitants of Sparta were few, and therefore might be governed by few: the other, because not accepting of strangers into their Republic, they had not occasion, either of being corrupted, or making great increase, so as to become insupportable to those few that governed them. Wherefore considering these things, it appears; that the founders of Rome were to have used one of these two expedients, if they desired to maintain it quicker, like one of these Commonwealths we have spoken of: either not to employ the common people in War, as the Venetians; or not admit strangers into the City, as the Spartans': both of which they did, which gave the people force and increase, and sundry occasions of tumults. So that if the Roman State grew more quiet, this inconvenient followed, that it was also weaker; because it disabled itself of the means to come to the greatness it attained. And therefore, if Rome would take away the occasions of disagreements, it took away the means of amplifying the State. And in all humane affairs it is plain, whosoever does throughly examine it, that upon the cutting off one inconvenient, another will straight arise: therefore if thou wouldst make a numerous and a warlike people to enlarge far the bounds of the Empire, thou mak'st them of such a temper, that they shall never be maneggiable at thy will; a● if thou keptst them weak and disarmed to have them at command: but if they get the rule into their hand, thou shalt not be able to bridle them; or else become so base, that thou shalt be made a prey to what enemy so e'er assaults thee. And for this cause in all our deliberations we ought to advise, where least inconvenients are, and to take that for the best course: for there is non● absolutely free from hazard and suspicion Rome then, like Sparta, could have made 〈◊〉 ●rince for life, and a small Senate, but could nor then, as she, not increase the number of her Citizens, having a desire to extend her dominions: which was the cause that a King for term of life, and the little number of Senators, touching their agreement, would have nothing availd. Whereupon if a man were anew to lay grounds of a Republic, he should first resolve, whether he would have it extend its power and rule, as Rome: or confine itself to small limits. In the first case then, he must order it, as Rome, and give place to tumults and general differences, the best he may; for without great number of men, and those warlike, could never any Commonwealth increase, or if it increase, continue. In the second case thou mayst so order it, as Sparta or Venice. But by reason that ambition to extend the dominions, is the poison of such like Commonwealths, their founder ought, as much as may be, in all those ways forbid them to enlarge themselves; for all such gains grounded upon a weak Commonwealth, do quite ruin it, as it befell Sparta and Venice: whereof the first, having subdued as it were all Greece, upon a very small accident, discovered its own weak foundation: for the Rebellion of Thebes following, caused by Pelopidas, with other Cities imitating, utterly ruined that Republic. In like manner Venice, having possessed herself of a great part of Italy, and the greatest not by force, but by money, and craft, when it came to make trial of its force, lost all in a day. I should well believe, that the way to frame a Commonwealth of long continuance, were to order it within as Sparta or Venice, to place it in a strong situation, and make it of such resistance, that no man can hope to subdue it on a sudden; and on the otherside, that it be not so great, to become a terror to the neighbours, and so likely it may long enjoy its State. For upon two occasions ordinarily men make War against a Republic; the one, to become master of it, the other for fear it become master of them. And this way I have spoken of, takes quite away these two causes; for if it be hard to overcome, as I presuppose it, being well furnished for defence, it will seldom, or never chance that any can make a design to conquer it: and if it contains itself within its own limits, and it be manifest by experience, that in it there is no ambition, it shall never come to pass, that any for fear interrupt its quiet. And this would the rather be, if in it were made a Law or order to forbid the amplifying of the State. And without doubt I believe, that the bringing of things to consist in these terms and in this equality of temper, were the true civil Government, and the perfect quiet of a City. But being that all humane things are in continual motion, and nothing stands firm, they must ever be rising or falling. And to many things that reason doth not persuade thee, necessity binds thee; so that having settled a Commonwealth able to maintain itself, not augmenting; and necessity should force it to enlarge itself, it would manifestly loosen its own foundations, and suddenly bring itself to ruin. On the otherside, if the heavens should prove so favourable, as to blow away all clouds and tempests of War, thence would arise that sloth and idleness would either divide them, or make them effeminate. Which two things together, or either by itself, would occasion their ruin And therefore, being impossible (as I think) to poise all things so justly by the balance, or reduce them to this perfection of temper, it is properest, in founding the Republic, to provide for the most honourable part, and so to order it, that when necessity shall enforce its enlarging, it may be able to keep what it hath gotten. And to return to our first discourse, I think it necessary to follow the Roman Ordinances, and not those of other Common wealths; for to find a mediocrity between the one and the other, I think it not possible. And those enmities, which should grow betwixt the people and the Senate, aught to be tolerated, taking them for a necessary inconvenient, to attain to Rome's greatness. For besides other reasons alleged, where the authority of the Tribunes is proved necessary for the preservation of liberty, it manifestly appears what great benefit they make in Commonwealths of the power of accusing, which among other things was committed to the Tribunes, as in the Chapter following shall be declared.   

CHAP. VII.  
How useful accusations are in a Republic for the maintenance of Liberty.  
THere cannot be a more profitable or necessary power given to those that in a city are appointed as guardians of the liberty, then is that of accusing the Citizens to the people, or before any Magistrate, or any council, whensoever they offend in any thing against the free State. This order works two very useful effects in a Republic. The first is, that the Citizens for fear of being accused, attempt nothing against the State; and in case they do, forthwith without any respect given them, are suppresed. The other is, that it gives a way to vent the humours that grow in the Cities, in any manner against any Citizens. And when these humours have not ordinary vents, they burst out extraordinary ways, and so are the ruin of a Commonwealth. And there is not any thing renders a Republic more settled and steadfast, then to ordain it in such a manner, that the alteration of these humours that stir it, have some outlet, appointed by the Laws; which may be showed by divers examples, and especially by that of Coriolanus, which Titus Livius reports: where he says, that the Nobility of Rome being angry with the people, as thinking them to have too much Authority, by creation of the Tribunes, who protected them; and Rome (as some time it chances) being in great want of provisions, and thereupon the Senate sent for Corn into Sicily, Coriolanus an Enemy of the popular faction advised, that now the time was come, they had power to chastise the people, and to take away that Authority which they had laid hold on in prejudice of the Nobility, by keeping them in hunger and want, distributing the Corn to them. Which opinion of his they hearing of, took such distaste against Coriolanus, that had not the Tribunes cited him to appear to defend his cause, the people had slain him in a tumult as he came out of the Senate. Upon which accident, we note that which before was said, how fit and useful it is, that the Commonwealths with their Laws give means to vent the choler, which the universality hath conceived against any one Citizen. For when they have not these ordinary means, they have recourse to extraordinary; and out of question these are of worse effect than those. For if by an orderly course one Citizen be ssuppresed, although it were wrongfully done, yet follwes thereupon little or no disorder in the Republic, because the execution is done without any private man's power, or assistance of foreign forces, which are those, that take away the common liberty; but by the public and lawful power, which have their particular bounds, nor any way pass so far as to endamage, the Commonwealth. And to confirm this opinion with examples, this of Coriolanus from the ancients shall suffice me; upon which let every one consider, what mischief thereby had fallen on the Commonwealth of Rome, if in a tumult he had been slain; for thereupon had grown offences between particular men; offences cause fear, fear seeks defence, for defence men make partisans, and thus parties grow in Cities, and from them the ruin of Cities. But the matter being ordered by public authority, they took away all those mischiefs which might have happened, had it been carried by private power; we have seen in our days what innovations it hath brought on the Florentine Republic, in that the multitude had no legal means to vent their displeasure against a single Citizen: as it befell in the time of Franciscus Valorus, who was as it were Prince of the City, and being by many thought ambitious, and a man that by his insolent and high stomach would not content himself to live within a civil Government, and there being no way in the Commonwealth to resist him, unless with some faction opposite to his, thence it came, that he not doubting other than some extraordinary means, began to seek favourers of his party, to defend him. On the other side, they that opposed him, having no ready way to suppress him, devised some extraordinary ways: insomuch as they came at length to fight, and where (if by an ordinary course he could have been restrained:) his power had sunk with his own loss only a now having to use extraordinary means in breaking it, there ensued not only his, but the ruin of many other Noble Citizens. There might also be alleged, to confirm our former conclusion, the accident chanced in Florence, upon the occasion of Peter Soderinus, which wholly proceeded from the want of means in that Republic, to accuse the ambition of some powerful Citizens; for, it was not enough to accuse a mighty man, before eight Judges in a Commonwealth. The Judges ought to be in great number; for a few do after the manner of two or three; so that if such courses were taken, either the Citizens would have accused him living ill, and thereby, without calling the Spanish Army to aid, would have wreaked their anger on him; or not behaving himself ill, they durst not have ventured to seek his ruin, for fear themselves of incurring danger. And so on all sides had ceased that ravenous cruelty, which was the chief occasion of offence. Whereupon we may conclude this, that so oft as we see foreign forces called upon by any party of Citizens, we may well believe that in that City there is lack of good, Ordinances: even lack of that ordinary means to vent without extraordinary ways the malign humours which grow in men; whereunto it is sufficiently remedied, by allowing of accusations before many Judges, and withal countenancing them. Which courses were so well ordered in Rome, that in so many quarrels between the people and the Senate, neither the one nor the other, nor any particular Citizen ever intended to avail themselves by any foreign strength; because they having a remedy at home, were not necessitated to go seek it abroad. And though the examples above written are sufficient to prove this, yet I will allege another, related by Titus Livius in his History: who reports, that in Clusia, the Noblest City in those days in all Tuscany, by one Lucumon Aruns was ravished, and he, not being able to work his revenge by reason of the ravishers might, went and found out the Frenchmen who then reigned in that place we now call Lombardy and encouraged them to bring an Army to Clusia, showing them that with their gain they might revenge him of the injury done him: and if Aruns had seen possibility to have been righted by any means in the City, he never would have enquired after any barbarous power. But as these accusations are profitable in a Commonwealth: so are calumnies unprofitable and hurtful, as it shall appear by our discourse in the next Chapter.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Accusations are not more beneficial to Commonwealths, than Calumnies pernicious.  
NOtwithstanding, that the virtue of Furius Camillus, after he had freed the City of Rome from the siege and oppression of the Frenchmen, had brought to pass, that none of the Citizens of Rome thought it took any way from their credit or degree, to give him place: yet Manlius Capitolinus could not endure that so much honour and renown should be ascribed to him. Being of opinion, that touching the safety of Rome, in that he, had defended the Capitol from the Enemies he deserved as much as Camillus; and in regard of other warlike glories, he was no way second to him. So that overburdened with envy, nor being able to take rest for this man's honour, and perceiving he could sow no discord among the Fathers, he made his address to the people, scattering among them divers sinister opinions. And among other things, he said this also, that the treasure which was collected for the Frenchmen, and after not given them, was usurped by some private Citizens; and if it were had again, it might be turned to the public good, easing the people of their tributes, or some private debts. These words were of force with the people, so that they began to run together, and as they listed to raise many tumults in the City: Which thing much displeasing the Senate, and they taking it for a matter of great moment, and dangerous, created a dictator, that he might examine the case, and bridle the violence of Manlius. Whereupon the Dictator cited him, and they met in public one against the other, the Dictator environed with the Nobility, Manlius with the People, Manlius was demanded, who had the treasure he spoke of, for the Senate was as desirous to understand as the people. Whereunto Manlius answered not particularly, but as by excuses, said there was no need to tell them what they already knew, so that the Dictator caused him to be put in prison. Hereupon may we observe, how extremely pernicious and damageable are calumnies, as well in free Cities, as in any other kind of Government; and therefore to repress them ought not any Law or Ordinance be spared, that may serve to the purpose. Neither can there be found any better expedient to extinguish them, then to open many ways to accusations; for as they do much help a Republic, so calumnies hurt it: and ●on the other part, there is this difference, that calumnies have no need of Testimonies, nor of any particular encounter to prove them; so that every one may be caluminated, but not accused; accusations being tied to certain particulars and circumstances, to udemonstrate their truth. Men are accused before Magistrates, the People and Counsels; slandered they are by calumnies, as well in private as in public. And there slander is most in use, where accusations are nor accustomed, and where the Cities are loath to receive them. Therefore every founder of a Republic ought so to order it, that therein any Citizen may be accused without fear or suspect. And this done and well observed, he ought sharply to punish the slanderers, who have no reason to complain when they are punished, there being public places to hear his accusations, whom they in private would have slandered. And where this part is not well ordered, there always follows much confusion; for calumnies do provoke and not chastise the Citizens; and those that are provoked, think to avail themselves rather by hating, then fearing the things that are said against them. This part (as it is said) was well ordered at Rome, and always ill in our City of Florence. And as at Rome this order did much good, so at Florence this disorder did much harm: And whosoever reads the stories of this City, shall see, how many slanders have from time to time been devised against those Citizens, who have been employed in the most important affairs of it. Of one they said, he robbed the common: Treasury; of another, he failed of such an attempt, being corrupted; and of a third, he ran, into this or that inconvenient through ambition. From whence proceeded, that on every side grew hatred; whereupon came division, from division they came to factions, from factions to ruin. But had there been a means in Florence to accuse the Citizens, and punish slanderers, that infinite number of calumnies, that afterward grew, had never followed; for those Citizens either condemned or assoiled that they had been, could never have hurt the City, and would have been less accused, than they were slandered; every one (as I have said) being not so readily able to accuse as to slander. And among other things, some Citizens have served themselves of these calumnies, as steps and helps to their ambitious ends; who having to encounter powerful men opposed themselves as they listed, and left nothing undone to work their intent; for taking part with the people, and confirming them in their evil opinion, already conceived of these, have made the people their own friends. And though I could bring examples enough, I will be content with this one. The Florentine Army was in the field at Lucca commanded by John Guicchiard an able Captain. Either his Government was so ill, or the success proved so unlucky, that he failed in taking the Town. So that howsoever the case stood, John was blamed for it, saying, he had been bribed by the Luccheses': which slander being favoured by his Enemies, brought John to extreme despair. And though to justify himself he offered his submission to trial and imprisonment, yet could he never wipe away that blur, because in that Commonwealth there were not the means to do it, whereupon grew much distaste between John's friends, who were the greater part of the potent men, and his Adversaries, who were some that desired to make innovations in Florence. Which matter, upon these and otherlike occasions, increased so, that thereupon ensued the ruin of that Republic. M. Capitolinus therefore was a slanderer, and not an accuser, and the Romans showed directly in this case, how slanderers ought to be punished. For they ought to make them become accusers: and when the accusation proves true, either reward them, or at least not punish them; and when false, punish them, as Manlius.   

CHAP. IX.  
How needful it is, that he who frames anew the Laws, and lays new foundations of a Common wealth, be alone without Companion or Competitor.  
ANd perchance some will think, that I have run too far within the Roman History, not having made any mention yet, of the founders of that Republic, nor of the Laws which belonged, either to their Religion, or their military discipline. And therefore not willing to hold them longer in suspense, who are desirous to understand somewhat in this case, I say, that many peradventure will think this a matter of evil example, that the ordainer of a civil Government, as was Romulus, should first 
* Without question the end was ambition, Royalty admitting no companion. Of whom to free himself, it seems that Romulus stood not much upon how lawful means he used, for Cain-like he slew his brother, and consented to Titus Tatius his death, without doubt, for venturing to take part in the Authority. And touching this, it may be Machiavelli will speak truer near the latter end of his 18. Chapt. Where he says, Because the restoring of a City to a civil and politic Government presupposes a good man, and by violence to become a Prince of a Commonwealth presupposes an evil man, for this cause it shall very seldom come to pass, that a good man will ever strive to make himself Prince by mischievous ways, although his ends therein be all good; nor will a wicked man, by wicked means, attaining to be Prince do good, nor ever comes it into his heart to use that Authority well, which by evil means he came to. And so at the very end of the same 18. Chap. he concludes, that though the intent were not good, there might be a fair colour set upon it by a good success. Whereby our Politician, however he winds and turns, comes at length to discover his evil ground he took, that Jus regnandi gratia violandum est; aliis in rebus pietatem colas, as is that of Euripides.  have taken his brother's life from him, and after have consented to T. Tacius the Sabines death, chosen by him his companion in the Kingdom; judging hereby that his own Citizens might by Authority taken from their Prince for ambition, or desire to rule, endamage those that should oppose their power. Whose opinion we should acknowledge true, if we consider nor the end which induced him to commit this homicide. And we may take this for a general rule, that never or seldom it chances, that any Republic or Kingdom is from the beginning well ordained or throughly new reformed of its old customs, unless the disposing of it depend absolutely upon the will of one. Nay rather there is a necessity of it, that that one be absolute, that appoints the manner how, and by whose understanding all such ordination is regulated. Wherefore a wise founder of a Republic, who seeks not his own advantage, but the public good; not to strengthen his own succession, but seeks his Country's profit, ought endeavour to get the power wholly into his own hands: neither will any man of good judgement ever blame any extraordinary action he shall put in practice, for the settling of a good Government in a Kingdom, or framing sure foundations in a Commonwealth. It holds well together, though the act accuse him, that the effect excuse him; and when that is good, as it proved to Romulus, it will always excuse him; for he that uses violence to waste, is unblamable, not he that uses it for redress and order. And therefore ought he be so wise and virtuous, that the Authority he hath possessed himself of, he leave not to descend hereditarily on another. For men being more inclined to ill then good, his successor may turn that to ambition which he managed virtuously. Besides this, though one be fit to ordain a thing, yet it's not so ordained to last long, when it rests upon the shoulders of one man; well may it endure, being committed to the care of many, to whom it belongs to maintain it. For even so, as many are not proper for the framing of one thing, because all of them hit not on the true good of it, by reason of their several opinions among them so; after they have known it, neither agree they to let it proceed to its advantage. And that Romulus was one of those, who for the death of his brother and companion, might be excused: and that what he did was for the common good, and not for his own ambition, it appears, in that he forth with ordained a Senate, with whom he might take counsel, and by their opinions be advised. And he, who considers well the Authority Romulus reserved himself, will perceive it was no more than to command the Armies, when they had resolved on War; and to assemble the Senate; which was apparent afterwards, when Rome became free upon the banishment of the Tarquins: whereupon the Romans were never brought in any new order, unless that in lieu of a King during life, they made two Consuls yearly: Which confirms, that all the first ordinances of that City were more agreeable to a civil and free Government, then to one absolute and Monarchical. To verify the thing abovesaid, we might bring many examples, as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of Kingdoms and Commonwealths, who could well, having an absolute power in their hands, ordain laws for the common good; but I will let them pass, as well know. I shall allege only one, not so famous, but well worthy their consideration, who desire to be good Lawmakers: which is, That Agis King of Sparta advising to reduce the Spartans' within those bounds the Laws of Lycurgus had included them; thinking that, because they had broken out of that strictness, his City had lost very much of the ancient virtue, and by consequent of force and government, was in the beginning of his attempts slain by the Spartan Ephores, as one, that aimed to possess himself of the Tyranny. But Cleomenes afterwards succeeding him in the Kingdom, upon his reading of Agis Records and Writings, which fell into his hands, he understood his intention, and grew desirous himself, to bring the same thing to pass; but found it was impossible to do that good to his Country, unless he became absolute of authority, it seeming to him, by reason of men's ambition, that he was unable to do good to many, against the will of a few. And taking a fit opportunity, at length he brought in all the Ephores, and every one else that could withstand him, and afterwards restored into force Lycurgus his Laws: Which deliberation had been able to have a new revived Sparta, and gained Cleomenes the reputation Lycurgus had, if then the Macedons power had not grown so vast, and the other Grecian Republic been so weak. For after such order given, being set upon by the Macedons, and finding himself single too weak to deal with them, there being none could give him assistance, was overcome; and his project (though just and commendable) became unperfect. Wheresore, upon the weighing of all these things together, I conclude, it necessary that a founder of a Republiek ought alone to have an absolute authority; and that Romulus, for the death of Remus and Tatius, deserves rather excuse than blame.   

CHAP. X.  
As the Founders of a Commonwealth or Kingdom are exceedingly praiseworthy, so the beginners of a Tyranny deserve much infamy.  
AMongst all commendable men, those deserve esteem in the first place, who have taken care in laying the grounds of divine worship, and true Religion: the next belongs to them who have been the founders of Commonwealths or Kingdoms. After those are they famous that commanding over Armies have enlarged either their Kingdom or Country. To these we may adjoin learned men. And because they are of different dignities, every one of them are valued according to their degree. And to all other men, whose number is infinite, we use to give that share of commendations, which their Art and Skill deserves. On the contrary, infamous are they and execrable, that are the perverters of Religion, the dissipatours of Kingdoms and Republics, enemies of virtue and learning, and of any other art, that brings profit, and renown to mankind; as also are the irreligious, the mad-braind, the ignorant, the slothful, and base. And there will never be any so foolish, or so wise, so mischievous or so good, that the choice of the two qualities of men being made him, will not commend that which is commendable, and blame the unblamable. Notwithstanding seeing that the most part, as it were, beguiled by counterfeit good, and vain glory, suffer themselves either voluntarily or ignorantly to be counted in the number with those that merit more blame than praise● And having means with their perpetual honour to frame a Republic or Kingdom, yet affect they a Tyranny; neither are they advised by this course, what reputation, what glory, what honour, security, quiet, and satisfaction of mind they fly from, and into what infamy, dispraise, blame, danger, and unquietness they plunge themselves: And it is impossible, that, they that live private men in a Commonwealth, or that by fortune, or by their virtues become Princes, if they read the histories, or make any account of antiquities therein related, that those private men, I say, had not rather be Scipio's in their native Country, than Caesar's; and those that are Princes, rather Agesilaus, Timoleon, or Dion, than Nabis, Phalaris, or Dionysius: for they would perceive these execedingly in all men's hatred, and, these as much beloved. They would see also how Timoleon and those of his like had no lefs power in their Country, then had Dionysius or Phalaris; but they would find also they had far more security. Nor let any be deeeived by Caesar's glory, seeing his memory much celebrated by writers: for they that Praise him, were corrupted by his fortune, and frighted by the continuance of the Empire, which being governed under that name, gave not writers leave to speak freely of him. But he that would know what free writers would say of him, let him look upon that they say of Catiline: and Cesar is so much the more to be dispraised, in that he executed the ill, the other did but intend. Let him see also how much they praise Brutus; so that not daring to blame the other, because of his power, they attributed much honour to his Enemy. Let him consider also him that is become Prince in a Republic, what praises, after Rome was made an Empire, those Emperors rather deserved, that lived under the Laws, as good Princes, than they that went a contrary course to them; and he shall find, that Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, and Antonius and Marcus had no need of Praetorian soldiers, nor a multitude of the legions to guard them; for their own virtues, the good will of the people, and the love of the Senate did defend them. Moreover he shall see, that the Eastern and Western Armies were not enough to save Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and the other wicked Emperors from their Enemies, whom their vile conditions and damned lives had procured them. And if their Story were well read over, it might serve to give good instruction to any Prince, to show him the way of glory and of disgrace, the way of security, and of distrust. For of 26 Emperors, that were from Cesar to Maximinus, 16 were slain, 10. only died natural deaths. And if any of those that were slain were good, as Galba and Pertinax, it proceeded from the corruption the predecessor had left among the soldiers. And if among those, those that died natural deaths, any were wicked or lewd, as Severus, it was caused by his great fortune and valonr, which two accompany very few. He shall see also by reading this Story, how a man may order a good Kingdom: for all those Emperors that succeeded in the Empire by inheritance, except Titus, were mischievous; those that were adopted, were all good, as were those five from Nerva to Marcus. And as the Empire fell upon the heirs, it returned always to its destruction. Let a Prince be put in mind of the times from Nerva to Marcus, and compare them with those that went before them, and that followed them; let him choose in which he would have been borne, or over whether he would have had command. For in those that were governed by the good, he shall see a Prince live in security in the midst of his secure Citizens, the world replenished with peace and justice, the Senate enjoying their authority, the Magistrates their honours, and the wealthy Citizens their estates, nobility and virtue exalted, and with these all rest and good. And on the other side all rancour, dissoluteness, corruption, and ambition extinguished, he shall see a return of the golden age, where every one may keep and defend what reputation he pleases, and in the end shall see the world triumph, the Prince reverenced and honoured, and the people in agreement and security If afterwards he consider severally the times of the other Emperors, he shall find the wars made them terrible, and seditions full of discord; as well in peace as in war cruel; so many Princes slain with the sword, so many civil, so many foreign wars, Italy afflicted, and full of new misfortunes, the Cities thereof having been sacked and ruined; he shall see Rome burnt, the Capitol by her own Citizens defaced and spoiled, the ancient temples desolated, and their ceremonies neglected, the cities replete with adulteries, the sea full of banishments, and the rocks besmeared with blood. He shall see follow in Rome a numberless number of cruelties; and Nobility, wealth, honours, and above all, virtue reputed as a most capital crime. He shall see accusers rewarded, servants corrupted against their masters, children against their parents, and they, who had not enemies, oppressed by their friends, and then he shall know very well, how much Rome, Italy, and the world was beholding to Caesar. And without doubt, if he be borne of mankind, he will be frighted from imitating those wicked times, and inflamed with zeal to trace the good. And truly a Prince aiming at glory, would with to be Lord of a disordered City, not to ruin it wholly, as did Caesar, but to recompose and restore it, as Romulus. And believe me, the heavens cannot give men greater occasion of glory, nor men desire it. And if to renew and restore the frame of a City, there were necessity for a man to depose his Principality, the man that did not set it in order because he would not fall from his dignity, should yet deserve excuse. But when he could hold his Principality, and yet restore the government, he is no way excusable. And in sum, let them be well advised, to whom the heavens present such opportunity, that either of these two wales be propounded them, the one that gives them security in life, and makes them glorious after death; the other that causes them to live in continual troubles, and leave behind them in everlasting infamy.   

CHAP. XI.  
Of the Romans Religion.  
THough Romulus were Rome's first founder, and she was to acknowledge from him her birth and bringing up; notwithstanding the heavens judging that Romulus his laws were not sufficient for such an Empire, put it into the Roman senate's minds to elect Numa Pompilius to succeed Romulus, that what he left unfinished, the other might supply. Who finding a very fierce people, and being desirous to reduce them into civil obedience by peaceable ways, applied himself to Religion, as a thing wholly necessary to preserve civility; and ordained it in such a sort, that for many ages there was not such a fear of God, as in that Commonwealth. Which facilitated much any enterprise, whatsoever either the Senate, or those brave Roman courages did undertake. And whosoever shall discourse of the innumerable actions of the people of Rome jointly, and of many of the Romans by themselves in several, shall perceive that those Citizens feared more to break an oath, than the laws; as they that made more account of the power of God, than of man; as it appears manifestly, by the examples of Scipio and Manlius Torquatus: for after that Hannibal had given the Romans an overthrow at Canna, many Citizens assembled together, and being affrighted resolved to quit the country, and go into Sieily; which Scipio understanding went and found them out, and with his sword drawn in his hand compelled them to swear, they would never forsake their native country. Lucius Manlius, that was afterwards called Torquatus, was accused by Marcus Pomponius Tribune of the people, and before the judgement day came, Titus went to find Marcus, and threatening to kill him if he swore not to take the accusation off from his father, bound him by his oath: and he though by fear compelled to swear, yet took the accusation off: and so those Citizens, whom neither the love to their country, nor the laws thereof could retain in Italy, were kept by force of an oath they were constrained to take: and that Tribune laid aside the hatred he bore to the father, the injury he received of the son, and his own reputation, to keep the oath he took: which proceeded of nothing else, but the Religion Numa brought in among them. And it is manifest, if a man consider well the Roman histories, of how much avail their Religion was for the commanding of armies, to reconcile the common people, to preserve good men, and to shame the lewd. So that if we were to dispute, to whether Prince Rome were more obliged, Romulus or Numa; I believe Numa would be preferred; for where Religion is, military discipline is easily brought in; and where they are already warlike, and have no Religion, this hardly follows. And it is plain, that Romulus to order the Senate, and frame certain other civil and military ordinances, had no need of the authority of a God, which to Numa was necessary, who feigned to have familiar conversation with a Nymph, who instructed him wherewith continually to advise the people. And all sprung from this, because he desiring to settle new orders, and unaccustomed in that City, doubted that his own authority was not of full force. And truly never was there yet any maker of extraordinary laws in a nation, that had not his recourse to God; for other. wise the laws had not been accepted. For many several goods are known by a wise man, which have not such evident reasons in themselves, that he by persuasion can quickly make others conceive them. Therefore the wise men, that would free themselves of this difficulty, have recourse to a God: so did Lycurgus, so Solon, so many others, whose design was the same with theirs. Thereupon the people of Rome admiring his goodness and wisdom yielded to all his purposes. But it is true, because those times were then full of Religion, and those men rude and gross, on whom he spent his pains, this much facilitated his designs, being thereby able to mould them into a new form. And without question, if any one in these days would frame a Republic, he should find it easier to deal with rude mountainers, who had never known any civility, than with those who had been accustomed to live in Cities, where the government's corrupted: and a carver shall easier cut a saire Statue out of a rough marble, than out of one that hath been bungled upon by another. Wherefore having well considered all, I conclude, that the Religion introduced by Nutna was one of the principal occasions of that city's happiness; for that caused good orders, good orders brought good fortune, and from their good fortunes grew all the happy successes of their enterprises: and as the observance of divine worship occasions the greatness of a Commonwealth; so the contempt of it destroys it. For where the fear of God is wanting, it must needs be that either that Kingdom goes to ruin, or that it be supported by the awe it stands in of the Prince, who may supply the defects of Religion: and because Princes are but short-lived, that Kingdom must needs have an end quickly, according as the virtue thereof fails: from whence it comes, that governments which depend upon the virtue of one man, abide but a while, because that virtue ends with his life; and it seldom chances that it is renewed by succession, as well says the Poet Dante.  

Rade volte discende per li rami  
L'humana probitate & questo vuole,  
Quell, i lada, perch da lui si chiami. 

Virtue's continue seldom by descent.  
And this to show their spring, the government.  
And that his gifts best termed, and by him sent.     
Therefore the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom consists not wholly in a Prince that governs wisely while he lives, but in one that so order it, that he dying, it can preserve itself. And although it be easier to work rude and untaught people to a new course and frame, yet argues it not therefore an impossibility to prevail with men that have lived in a civil government, and presume somewhat to understand themselves. The Florentines think not themselves either ignorant or rude, yet were they persuaded by Friar Jerom Savanarola, that he talked with GOD. I will not judge whether it were true or not, because we ought not to speak of such a great personage, but with reverence. But truly I say, that very many believed him, not having seen any great matter to perswede them thereto: for his life, doctrine, and the subject he took, were sufficient to make them credit him. Wherefore let no man be discouraged, as if he could not reach to what another hath heretofore attained; for men, as we said in our preface, were born, lived and died, under the same laws of nature.   

CHAP. XII.  
Of what importance it is to hold a worthy esteem of Religion, and that Italy for having failed therein, by means of the Church of Rome, hath gone to wrack.  
THose Princes or those Republics which would keep themselves from ruin, are above all other things, to preserve the ceremonies of their Religion incorrupted, and maintain it always venerable. For there is no greater sign of a countries going to destruction, then to see in it the contempt of divine worship. And this is easy to be understood, it being once known upon what ground the Religion is built where a man is born. For every Religion hath the foundation of its being upon some principal thing. The life of the Gentiles Religion subsisted upon the answers of the oracles, and upon the sect of the conjecturers and soothsayers: all the other ceremonies, sacrifices, and rites depended on these. Because they easily believed, that that God that could foretell thee thy future good or evil, could also send it thee. From hence came the Temples, the Sacrifices and supplications, and all other ceremonies in their veneration: for the Oracle of Delos, the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other famous Oracles held the world in devotion and admiration. As they afterwards began to speak in imperious manner, and their falsehood was discovered among the people, men began to be incredulous, and apt to disturb all good orders, Therefore the Princes of a Republic or Kingdom should maintain the grounds of the Religion they hold; and this being done, they shall easily keep their Commonwealth religious, and eonsequently virtuous and united. They ought also to favour and increase all those things that advantage it, howsoever that they think them false; and the rather should they do it, the wiser they 
* Ammiratus taxes him, saying, it was rather the opinion of a cunning and crafty man, then of one that had either any religion or morality in him, whose plain and simple conditions ought to be free from all fraud and falsehood; and however the Romans were deceived herein, which cannot be denied, yet without doubt they never did this, thinking to deceive themselves, or with intention to deceive others. Thus Ammi. And indeed it savours of Atheism, bringing the mistress to serve the handmaid, religion to serve policy; as if the seasons of the year ought to accommodate themselves to men, rather than men accommodate themselves to the seasons; not considering that Religion propounds to a man a further end than policy points at. A Prince therefore should be well aware of such evil devices, believing constantly that the Religion hath no need of help from falsehood, nor can gain any strength by lies.  are and understand the causes of natural things. And because this course hath been taken by many wise men, hence grew the opinion of miracles which are celebrated even in false Religions; for wise men augment them what beginning so ever they have, and their authority afterwards gives them credit. Of these miracles there was great quantity at Rome: and among others there was this one; the Roman soldiers sacking the Vejentes' City, some of them went into the Temple of Juno, and coming to her image asked her, wilt thou go to Rome? some thought she nodded, another thought she said, yes. For those men being very religious (which T. Livius shows, for that entry into the Temple was without tu mult) all devout and full of reverence, imagined they heard that answer, which p●radventure they presupposed before ●and would be made them; this opinion and belief was altogether favoured and augmented by Camillus and the other principal men of the City. Which Religion if it were maintained among the Princes of the Christian Republic according as by the institutor thereof it was ordained, the Christian States and Republics would be far more in unity, and enjoy more happiness far then now they do: nor does any thing give us so shrewd a conjecture of the declining of it, as to see, that those people that are nearest neighbours to the Church of Rome, head of our Religion, are the most inreligious. And whosoever would well consider the original grounds thereof, and look upon the present use how much this differs from those, without question he would judge the ruin or scourge thereof were near at hand. And because some are of opinion, that the welfare of Italy depends upon the Church of Rome, yet the contrary might rather be proved, considering those that in the Church of Rome observe not the precepts they ought, but rather adulterate the holy and Catholic Ordinances which were wont to be kept. Moreover this comes to pass, because the Church hath always held, and still holds this Country divided: and truly never was any Province either united or happy, unless it were wholly reduced to the obedience of one Commonwealth, or Prince; as it befell France and Spain. And the cause that Italy is not in the same terms, nor hath not one Republic or one Prince to govern it, is only the Church; for having inhabited there and held the ●e●●mporal Government, it hath never been so potent, nor of such prowess, that it could get the rest of Italy into its hands, and become Lords thereof. And on the other side, it was never so weak, that for fear of losing the temporal dominion it could not call in a powerful friend to defend it against him that were grown too puissant in Italy; as anciently it hath been seen by sundry experiences, when by means of Charles the Great it drove out the Lombard's, who had as it were the absolute power of all Italy; and when in our days it took the Venetians power from them by the Frenchmens aid, and afterwards chased away the French by help of the Swisses. Therefore the Church being not powerful to subdue all Italy itself, nor yet suffering any other to master it, hath been the cause, that it could never be brought to have but one head; but hath always been under more Princes and Lords; whereupon is grown such a disunion, and so much weakness, that Italy hath been made osprey not only of powerful Barbarians, but of any the next assailant. For which we and other Italians are beholding to the Church & none else. And whosoever would readily see the truth by certain experience, it were needful he were of such power, as to send the Court of Rome, with the authority it hath in Italy, to dwell in the Swissers Country, who at this day are the only people that live, for their Religion and military discipline, as their ancestors did: and he should find that in a short time the ill orders and customs of that Court would breed more disorder in that Country, than any accident else could, that should evergrow there.   

CHAP. XIII.  
In what manner the Romans availed themselves of their Religion, in ordering the City, in undertaking their designs, and in stopping of tumulis.  
I Think it not out of purpose, to bring some example, where in the Romans served themselves of their Religion, for the ordering of their City, and the following of their enterprises. And though many there are in T. Livius, yet I will content myself with these. The people of Rome having created their Tribunes of Consular power, and except one, all Plebeians, and it falling out that year, that there was pestilence and famine, and certain other prodigies, the Nobility of Rome took hold of this occasion, at the Tribunes new creation, to say that the Gods were angry, because Rome had abused the Majesty of their Empire, and that they had no other means to appease them, then to reduce the election of the Tribunes to the former course. Whence it came, that the people frighted by this superstition made the Tribunes all of the Nobility. The like was also in their Conquest of the Vejentes' City, that the Commanders of their Armies did serve themselves of the Religion, to keep them in heart for any enterprise: for that year the Albanilak being miraculously swelled, and the Roman Soldiers wearied with the long siege, and intending to o'erturn to Rome, the Romans found, that Apollo and certain other Oracles told them, that that year the Vej●ntes City should be taken, that the water of the Albanlake should be poured out: which thing made the soldiers endure the tediousness, of the war and the siege, persuaded by the hope they had to take the Town, and were contented to continue the enterprise; so that Camillus being made dictator subdued the City after ten years' siege. And so the accustomed Religion helped well, both for the taking in of that Town, and for the restitution of the Tribunship to the Nobility; for without the aid thereof, the one or the other had hardly had their success. And this other example I must also add to this purpose. There were in Rome a great many tumults raised upon the occasion of Terentillus a Tribune, he desiring to make a law, for causes which hereafter we shall declare in their place. Among the first remedies which the Nobility served themselves of, was the Religion, whereof they made use two ways: In the first, they made the Sibill's books be searched, and answer as it were to the City, that by means of civil discord they should hazard the loss of their liberty that year: which thing, though the Tribunes had herein discovered their subtlety, yet it so frighted the people, that it quite took off their eagerness in the pursuit. The other way was, that when Appius Herdonius with a great number of outlaws, and slaves, near upon four thousand men, having possessed themselves by right of the Capitol, so that it might be feared that if the Aequi or Volsci, the Romans sworn enemies, had approached the Town, they might have taken it: the Tribunes not forbearing for all this to continue in their obstinacy, and to enact the law made by Terentillus, saying this assault of their; feigned, and not true, one Puhlius Valerius a grave citizen, and of good authority, went out of the Senate, and told them partly in friendly terms, and partly in threatening, the dangers in which the City stood, and the unseasonableness of their demand, and thereby brought the people to swear, they would not forsake the Consul's command. Whereupon the people being returned to obedience, recovered the Capitol by force. But the Consul Publius Valerius being slain in this conflict, there was forthwith another Consul made, one Titus Quintius, who to keep the people from idleness, and to give no space to think again of Terentillus his law, commanded them to go forth of Rome with him against the Volsci, saying that by the oath they had taken not to abandon the Consul, they were bound to follow him; whereunto the Tribunes opposed, saying, that oath was made to the Consul now slain, not to him. Yet Titus Livius shows that the people in awfulness to their Religion world rather obey the Consul● than believe the Tribunes, saying these words in favour of the ancient Religion: Men did not then adays so little reverence the Gods, as now; nor people 
Nondum haec quae nunc tenet seculum negligentia Deum venerat, nec interpretando sibi quisque jus jurandum & leges apras faciebat.  wrest their oaths, nor the laws, to their own ends. Whereby, the Tribunes doubting then to lose their whole dignity, agreed with the Consul to submit to his obedience, and that for a whole year they would treat no more of Terentillus his law, and the Consuls for a year should not draw the people out to war; and thus the Religion gave the Senate means to overcome that difficulty, which, without it, they could never have mastered.   

CHAP. XIV.  
The Romans interpreted their Auspexes, as necessity required, and with discretion made a show to observe their Religion, yet upon occasion they neglected it; but if any did rashly contemn it, they punished them.  
THe Soothsay were not only (as before we have discoursed) for the most part, the ground of the Gentiles ancient Religion, but they were also the occasions of the Roman Republics welfare. Whereupon the Romans had more regard of them, than of any order else, and made use of them in their Consular assemblies, in the beginning of their enterprises, in drawing forth their armies into the field, in fight of pitched battles, and in any other action of theirs of importance either civil or military. Nor ever would they have undertaken any expedition, till first they had persuaded the soldiers, the Gods had promised them the Victory. And among the other orders of Soothsayers, they had some in their Armies, they called Pollarij. And whensoever they intended to fights battle with the Enemy, they would have the Pollarij to make their conjectures: and when the Chickens pecked, they went to fight with good Auspaces; and not pecking, they forbore to fight. Notwithstanding when ●ason showed something was to be done, hough the divination, were averse, yet were they not scared from it: but, they turned and wound it with such terms and fashions so properly, that it appeared, they did it not with an contempt of Religion. Which course was used once in a fight, by Papirius the Consul, which he had (of great importance) with the Samnites, after which they were much worn and broken. For Papirius encountering with the Samnites, and perceiving in the skirmish that the victory was sure, had a mind hereupon to fight a full battle, and therefore commanded the Pollarij, they should make their conjectures; but the Chickens not Pecking, and the chief soothsayer seeing the forwardness of the army to fight, and the opinion the General and all the soldiers had of the victory, that he might not take away the occasion of well doing from the army sent back to the Consul, that the soothsayers answered well; so that while Papirius was ordering his squadrons, some of the Pollarij having told certain soldiers, that the Chickens had not pecked, they told it to Spurius Papirius the Consul's nephew, and he again to the Consul; whereto he suddenly replied, that he should take a care to perform his own duty well, and that for himself and the army the conjectures were fair; and if the Soothsayer had told lies, it would turn to his own loss: and that in effect it should succeed according to his prognostication, he commanded the Lieutenant's to place the Pollarij in the forefront of the battle. Whereupon it chanced that going forward against their enemies, one of the Roman Soldiers threw a dart, and as it happed, slew a principal Soothsayer: which being come to the Consul's ear, he said that all things went forward luckily, and with the God's favour, for the Army by the death of that liar was purged of all crime, and excused of the wrath conceived against them. And thus by knowing how to accommodate his designs to the divinations, he chose to fight, the Army never perceiving that he had any whit neglected the rites of their Religion. Appius Pulcher went a contrary course to this, in Sicily, in the first Carthaginian wars; who desirous to fight with the enemy, caused the Pollarij to make their divinations; and they answering that the Chickens did not feed, he said, let us see then if they will drink, and so made them be thrown into the sea, and then fight, lost the day. And thereupon he was afterwards condemned at Rome, and Papirius honoured; not so much, the one for having won, and the other for having lost, as the one for having crossed the soothsayers with much discretion, the other very rashly. Nor was there any other end of this manner of soothsaying, then to encourage the soldiers to fight, for boldness always wins the victory: which thing was not only in use with the Romans, but with foreigners also; whereof I have a purpose to bring an example in the Chapter following.   

CHAP. XV.  
The Samnites, for the extreme remedy to their broken State, have recourse to Religion.  
THE Samnites having been sundry times routed by the Romans, and at last overthrown in Tuscany, their Armies and their Captains slain, and their confederates overcome, who were the Tuscans, French, and Umbrians: They could not suhsist, neither by their own, nor their 
Nec suls nec externis viribus jam stare potcrant, tamen bello non abstinebant adeo ne infeliciter quidem de fensae libertatis taedebat, & vinci quam non tentare victoriam malebant.  friends forces, yet they would not quit the war, not regarding though they had but ill success in the defence of their liberty; but had rather be overcome, then forbear to try if they could get the victory. Whereupon they put it to the last proof. And because they knew the obstinacy of the soldiers minds would help the victory well forward, and to induce them hereto, there was no better means than Religion, they advised to renew an old sacrifice of theirs by the help of Ovius Pattius their Priest: which they ordered in this manner; the folemn sacrifice being made, and amidst the slain beasts, and the altars set on fire, having caused the chief of the Army to swear never to forsake the fight, they called the soldiers one by one, and in the midst of those altars enclosed by many Centurions with their fwords drawn, first they made them swear, they should not disclose any thing they either heard or saw: afterwards with words of execration, and verses full of horror made them vow and promise to the Gods, to be ready in whatsoever their General should command, never to abandon the fight, and kill whomsoever they saw fly; which if they failed in, might it light upon their family and kindred. And some of them being amazed, and refusing to swear, were presently slain by their Centurions, so that the rest that followed them, frighted by the sierceness of the spectacle, swore all. And to augment the magnificence of their meeting, being sixty thousand men, half of them were clad with white cloth, with plumes and seathers upon their helmets, and thus arrayed they encamped themselves at Aquilonia. Against these came Papirius, who in his speech to encourage his soldiers, said, Surely their plumes could make no wounds, 
Non enim cristas vulnera facere, & picta atque aurata scuta transire Romanum palum.  nor their painted and golden shields defend the blows of the Roman Pikes. And to take away the doubt his soldiers had of their enemies because of the oath taken, said, it was rather a discouragement to them then otherwise; for they were afraid of their own people, the Gods, and their enemies. And when they came to the fight, the Samnites were overthrown, for the Roman virtue, and the fear conceived by reason of their former losses, overcame what ever obstinacy they could have resolved on by force of their Religion or oath taken. Yet it is plain, how they thought they could have no other refuge, nor try other remedy, that could give them hope to recover their lost virtue. Which fully shows, how great confidence Religion well used can give. And though haply this part would be fit rather to have place among the extrinsecall matters, yet depending upon one of the most important ordinances of the Roman Republic, I thought better to insert it in this place, that I might not be driven to interrupt my discourse, and have need to return hereunto many times.   

CHAP. XVI.  
People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident they become free, have much ado to maintain their liberty.  
HOW hard it is for a people, used to live, in subjection to a Prince, afterwards to maintain their liberty, if by any accident they get it, as Rome did upon the Tarquins banishment, very many examples show us, which we read in the memorials of ancient histories. And not without good reason: for the people is nothing different from a brute beast, which (though fierce of nature and wild) hath been bred always in a den and under command; and though by ehance it hath got loose into the fields, yet not being used to seek the sood, nor being acquainted with the coverts, where to hide itself, becomes the prey of the first that seeks to take it, The selfsame thing befalls a people used to live under the government of others; the which not having knowledge to treat of public desences or offences, not knowing the neighbour Princes, nor yet known by them, quickly returns under the yoke, which oftentimes is heavier, then that which before was taken from their neck; and they come to fall into these difficulties, though as yet there be not entered among them much disorder. For a people that is quite debauched cannot for a little while, no not a whit, enjoy their liberty, as it shall after appear. And therefore our speeches are not of those people, where corruption is overgrown, but where there is more good than naught. To this former we may add another difficulty, which is, that the State that becomes free, procures enemies that side against it, and not friends to side with it. Those hold together as enemies, who got advantages by the tyrannical government, feeding upon the Prince's riches whereby they used to help themselves, which being now taken from them, they cannot rest content, but every one is necessitated to try if he can again recall the Royalty, that so they may recover their former advancements. They get not, as I have said, friends to side with them; for the free government propounds honours and rewards upon some worthy and determinated occasions, otherwise it rewards none, nor honours none. And when a man hath received those honours and those advantages, which he thinks, he deserved; he acknowledges no obligation to them that reward him. Moreover, that common good which men reap of free government, is not known by any, while it is possessed; which is, to enjoy freely ones own without suspicion, not to doubt of his wives or daughters honours, not to be in fear for his sons, or for himself. For no man thinks himself beholding to one that offends him not. And therefore if they come to have a free State, as it is above mentioned, there arise those that will be partisans against them, and not side with them: and to prescribe a remedy for these inconvenients and disorders, which these difficulties might bring us, there is none more potent, nor sovereign, nor necessary, than to kill Brutus his sons, who as the Story shows, were induced together with other young Romans, to conspire against their native country, for no other reason, than because they could not so extraordinarily advantage themselves under the Consuls, as under the Kings; so that they thought the people's liberty was become their slavery. And he that undertakes to govern a multitude either by way of liberty, or by way of Principality, and assures not himself of those that are enemies to his new State, is not like to continue long. True it is, that I judge those Princes very unfortunate, who to secure their dominions are to go extravagant ways, having the vast multitude for their enemies: for he that hath but few enemies, easily and without many offences secures himself; but he that hath the universality against him, is never out of jealousy; and the more cruelty he uses, the weaker becomes his power. So that the greatest remedy he hath, is to make the people friendly. And though this discourse be different from the former, treating here of an exceeding good Prince, and there of a Republic, yet that I may not return here often upon this occasion, I shall say somewhat of it, but briefly. And therefore if a Prince would gain the good will of a people, that was enemy to him (speaking of those Princes, that are become Tyrants of their native country) I say, he ought to examine first, what the people desire; and he shall always find, that they desire two things; the one, to be revenged of him that occasioned their slavery; the other, to have their liberty restored. To the first, the Prince can satisfy in whole, to the second in part. As for the first, there is an example to the point. Clearchus a Tyrant of Heraclea being in banishment, it happened that upon a difference risen between the people and the nobility of Heraclea, that the nobility, finding themselves too weak, turned to favour Clearchus, and conspiring with him, against the will of the people, let him into the Town, and took away the people's liberty; so that Clearchus being in a straight between the insolence of the nobility, whom he could not any way content, nor rectify, and the rage of the people, that could not endure thus to have lost their liberty, resolved in one, to free himself of the importunity of the Nobles, and withal to gain the people. And to this purpose having taken a convenient opportunity, cut in pieces all the Nobility, to the people's great satisfaction, And thus he satlsfyed one of the desires the people have, that is, to be revenged. But as for the peoples other desire, to recover their liberty, if the Prince cannot satisfy them, let him examine, what are the reasons make them desire sreedom, and he shall find, there is but a small number of them would be free, to command. But all the rest, which are the many, desire liberty to life securely. For in all Republics of what manner soever ordered, not above forty or fifty Citizens attain to the degrees of authority: and because these are but few, it is an easy thing to be sure of them, either by taking them out of the way, or by letting them share of such honours, as agree to their conditions, which they may very well be contented with. Those others, whom it suffices, If they can live securely, are easily satisfied by making ordinances and laws, wherewith together with his power, he may comprehend their safety in general. And when a Prince does this, and that the people perceive it, that by no accident he breaks those laws, they will begin in a short time to live secure and content. We have an example of the Kingdom of France, which continues not in quiet by other means, than that their Kings are tied to many laws, wherein the security of all his people is contained. And he that was the founder of that State, ordained, that the Kings should dispose of the wars and the moneys at their pleasures, but with all other matters they had nothing to do, but they were at the laws appointment. That Prince therefore or Republic, which secures not themselves at their entrance into the government, aught at least take hold of the first occasion, as the Romans did. He that lets that pass, reputes himself too late, of not having done what he should. The people of Rome being not as yet debauched, when they recovered their liberty, might well maintain it, when Brutus his sons were slain, and the Tarquins dead, by those remedies, and orders, which we have at several times recounted. But had the people been corrupted, neither in Rome, nor any where else, could they have found means strong enough to preserve it, as in the Chapter following we shall show.   

CHAP. XVII.  
A disorderly people, getting their liberty, cannot keep themselves free without very great difficulties.  
I think it necessarily true, that either the Kings were to be expelled out of Rome, or else Rome itself would have grown feeble and of no worth; for considering how exceedingly the Kings were corrupted, if after that rate two or three successions had followed, and that corruption that was in them had distended itself throughout the members, so that they likewise had received of the corruption, it had been impossible ever to have reform it. But losing the head when the body was sound, it might easily be reduced to a free and orderly government. And this should be presupposed for certain, that a debauched City living under a Prince, though that Prince with all his stock be rooted out, yet can it not become free, but rather fall still into the hands of new Lords, who continually make an end one of another. And without the creation of some new Prince, they shall never have an end, unless he by his goodness and valour maintain them free. But their liberty is of no longer conyinuance than his life, as was that o● Syracuse for Dions and Timoelons lives: whose virtues in several times, while they lived kept that City free; so soon as they were dead, it fell into the former servitude, We find not a braver example then that of Rome, which upon the Tarquins banishments, could presently lay hold off, and maintain that liberty. But Caesar being slain, C. Caligula, Nero, and the whole race of the Caesars blotted out, it could not, not only keep, no not so much as give a beginning to their liberty. Neither did so great variety of accidents in one and the same city proceed from other, than that, when the Tarquins were expelled, the people of Rome were not touched with this corruption, and in these latter times they were throughly infected. For then to settle their minds in a resolution against Kings, it was enough to take an oath of them, that never any King should reign at Rome. But in the after ages, the authority and severity of Brutus, with all the Oriental Regions, were not of force to hold them in disposition to maintain that Liberty, which he like the first Brutus had restored them. Which sprung from that corruption, which Marius his faction spread among the people; whereof Caesar coming to be the Chief, could so blind that multitude, that they could not perceive the yoke, which he himself put on their neck. And though this example of Rome be better than any other, yet will I allege to this purpose, some people known in our days. And therefore I say, that no means could ever bring Milan or Naples to their freedom, by reason of the infection of all their members. Which appeared after the death of Philip Visconti, when Milan desiring to recover her liberty, neither was able, nor knew how to keep it. Yet that of Rome was a great happiness, that their Kings grow naught suddenly, that they were banished, and that before the infection was gone down into the bowels of that City, which was the occasion that those many tumults, which were raised in Rome (men doing it to a good end) did not hurt, but help the Commonwealth. And we may make this conclusion, that where the matter is corrupted, laws, though well made, profit little, unless they have such a maker, that with strong hand forces obedience to them, till the matter become good: which, whether it hath ever happened, I know not, or whether it be possible it can happen: for it is plain, as a little before I said, that a City declining by corruption of matter, if ever it chances to rise again, it is merely by the virtue of one man, who is then living, and not by the virtue of the generality, that keeps the good laws in force: and suddenly when that man is dead, it returns to the old guise, as it came to pass at Thebes, which, by the virtue of Epaminondas while he lived, could subsist in form of a Republic and government, but he being gone, it fell into the former disorders. The reason is, because a man cannot live so long a time as is sufficient to disaccustome them to the ill, and accustom them throughly to the good. And if one man of a very long life, or two virtuous Governors successively continued, do not dispose of them to good, when one of them fails, as I have said before, they are presently ruined, unless the other with many dangers, and much bloodshed recover them out of destruction. For that corruption and unfitness for freedom, arises from an inequality, that is in the City: and if a man would reduce it to equality, he must use many extraordinary ways, which few know or will serve themselves of, as other where more particularly shall be said.   

CHAP. XVIII.  
In what manner in a corrupted City a free state may be maintained, being gotten; or how when they have it not, it may be gotten, and well ordered.  
I Think, it will not be out of the way, nor disagreeing to the former discourse, to consider whether in a City disordered, a free State can be preserved, that being there a soot already; or not being there, how it may be attained, and then reduced to good order. Whereupon, I say, that it is very hard to do the one or the other: and though it be almost impossible to give a strict rule thereof (because we should necessarily proceed according to the degrees of the corruption) yet it not being unfit to reason of every thing, I shall not let this pass. And I presuppose a city corrupted in extremity, from whence I shall come more to augment such a difficulty, because there are no laws nor ordinances sufficient to bridle a universal corruption. For as there is need of laws, to preserve good customs; so, to have the laws well observed, there is need of good customs. Besides this, the ordinances and laws made in a Republic at birth thereof, when men were good, serve not to purpose afterwards, when once they are grown vicious. And if the laws vary being accommodated according to the accidents, seldom or never vary the old orders of the city: which makes that the new laws suffice nor, because the orders that continue in force do corrupt. And to lay this part more plain to the understanding, I say, that in Rome there was the order of government, or rather of the states, and the laws afterwards which together with the Magistrates did bridle the Citizens. The order of the state was the authority of the people, of the Senate, of the Tribune's, and of the Consuls the manner of demanding or creating of Magistrates and the manner of making laws. These orders little or nothing did they vary among the Citizens; the laws varied which bridled the citizens, as did that law against adulteries, against expenses, against ambition, and many others, according as by degrees the citizens grew corrupted. But the orders of state standing stead. fast, which in the time of corruption were no longer good, those laws which were renewed again, were not of force to keep men good, but would have been well helped, if when the laws were renewed, the orders also had been changed. And that it is true that such orders in a corrupted city were not good, it is expressly seen in two principal heads. As for the creation of Magistrates, and making laws, he people of Rome gave the Consulate and the other Prime degrees of the city, only to those that sued for them. This order was in the beginning good, because none stood for them, but those citizens that esteemed themselves worthy of them, and to receive the repulse was a shame; so that to be thought worthy, every one did well. But this way afterwards in a corrupted City proved very hurtful; for not the best deserving men, but the most powerful, sued for the magistracy, and those of small power (howsoever virtuous) forbore to demand them for fear.  
It came not to this inconvenient, at once, but by degrees, as men fall into all other inconvenients. For the Romans having brought under Africa, and Asia, and reduced well nigh all Greece to their obedience, doubted no way of their liberty, and thought they had no more enemies could scare them. Thus far their security, and the weakness of their enemies worked, that the people of Rome in bestowing the Consulate, regarded not virtue so much as favour, raising to that dignity those that could make most friends, not those that knew best how to subdue their enemies. After, from those that had most favour, they fell to give them to those that had most power. So that the good, by reason of the defect of this order, were quite excluded. A Tribun of the people and any other Citizen might propound a law to the people, and thereupon every Citizen had the liberty to speak either in favour of it, or against it, before it were determined of. This order was commendable, while the integrity of the Citizens held: for it was always well, that every one may give his opinion thereupon, that the people, having heard every one, may after make choice of the best. But the Citizens being grown mischievous, this order became naught; for those that were powerful only propounded laws, not for the common good, but to advance their own powers, and against those dared none to speak, for fear of these. So that the people was brought either by falsehood or force to determine their own ruin. Therefore it was necessary, to the end that Rome in her corrupted age should maintain her liberty, that as in the progress of her life she had made new laws, so should she have made new orders: for other orders and other manners of living aught to be ordained in a good subject, and others in a bad; nor can the form be like, where the matter is quite contrarily disposed. But these orders are either to be renewed all of a sudden when they are discovered to be no longer good, or else by little and little, when their defaults be taken notice of by every one: I say, that either the one or the other of these two things are almost impossible. For to renew them by degrees, it is fit a very wise man should be the cause of it, who should foresee this inconvenient afar off: and when any of these arise, it is a very likely thing that none of these men step forth; and when they should they would never be able to persuade another what they eonceived; because men accustomed always to live in one manner, will not alter it; and the rather not seeing that evil present, which is to be showed by conjectures. Touching the innovation of these orders on a sudden when every one knows they are not good; I say, that this unprofitableness, which is easily known, is hard to correct; for to effect this ordinary means serve not, they being rather hurtful; but of necessity extraordinary remedies are to be put in practice, as violence and war; and in any case ought a man strive to become prince of that city that he may have power to order it at his pleasure. And because the restoring of a city to a politic and a civil government, presupposes a good man; and by violence to become Prince of a Commonwealth presupposes an evil man, for this cause it shall very seldom come to pass, that a good man will ever strive to make himself Prince by mifchievous ways, although his ends therein be all good; nor will a wicked man by wicked means attaining to be Prince, do good; nor ever comes it into his heart to use that authority well, which by evil means he came to. From all these things above written arises the difficulty or impossibility, that is in corrupted cities, theree to maintain a Republic, or to create one anew. And when it were to be created or maintained, it were fittest to reduce it rather towards a popular state; to the end that those men, who by reason of their insolence cannot be amended by the laws, might in some manner be restrained as it were by a regal power. And to constrain them by any other way to become good, would either be a most cruel attempt, or altogether impossible: As I said before, that Cleomenes did, who that he might command alone flew the Ephores; and if Romulus for the same reasons slew his brother, and Titus Tatius the Sabine, but afterwards exercised very virtuously their authority: yet it is to be noted that neither the one nor the other of them had the subject stained with that corruption, whereof we have discoursed in this Chapter: and therefore they might intend well; and when they did not, give colour to a bad design with a good success.   

CHAP. XIX.  
A very mean Prince may easily subsist, succeeding a brave and valorous Prince: but a mean one following a mean, brings a State into great hazard.  
WHen we consider the valour, and the manner of Romulus, Numa, and Tullus proceedings, the first Roman King's, we shall find, that Rome hit upon a very great fortune, having the first King fierce and warlike, the second peaceable and religious, the third of like courage to Romulus, and a lover of war rather than peace. For in Rome it was necessary, that in her infancy there should arise some one to order her in the eourse of civil government; but in like manner it was afterwards needful that the other Kings should betake themselves again to Romulus his valour, otherwise that City would have become effeminate, and been preyed on by her neighbours. Whence we may observe, that the successor, though not of so great valour as the predecessor, is able to maintain a State by the valour of him that hath governed it before, and enjoy the fruits of his labour: but if it come to pass, either that he be of long life or that after him there follows no other of like valour as the first, of necessity that kingdom must go to ruin. So on the contrary, if two of great valour successively follow one the other, it is often seen, they effect mighty things, and eternize their names. David was a man for arms, for learning and judgement excellent: and such was his valour, that having overcome and subdued his neighbours, he left his son Solomen a peaceable Kingdom, which he might well maintain by peaceful means, without any war, and happily possess the fruits of his father's virtue. But he could not leave it now to Roboam his son, who not resembling his Grandfather in virtue, nor having the like good hap his father had, with much ado remained heir to the sixth part of the Kingdom. Bajazet the Turkish Sultan, although he gave himself rather to peace then war, yet could he also enjoy his father Mahomet's labours; who having as David beaten all his neighbours left him a settled Kingdom, easy to be continued by peace: but if his son Selimus, now reigning, had resembled the Father and not the Grandfather, that Kingdom had gone to wrack. But we see this man like to outgo his Grandfather's glory. Whereupon I agree with these examples, that after an excellent Prince a feeble one may subsist, but after one feeble one a Kingdom cannot stand with another, unless it be such a one as France, which subsists by force of her ancient ordinances. And those are weak Princes, that are not in the exercise of war. And therefore I conclude with this discourse, that such was Romulus his valour, that it could give space to Numa Pompilius for many years by peaceful means to govern Rome. But him followed Tullus, who by his courage recovered Romu'us reputation: after him came Ancus, so endowed by nature, that he knew how to use peace, and support war. And first he addressed himself in a peaceable way; but presently when he knew that his neighbours, thinking him esseminate, undervalued him, he considered that to maintain Rome, he was to apply himself to the wars, and rather follow Romulus his steps, than Numas. Hence let all Princes, that hold a State, take example, that he that resembles Numa, shall either keep it or lose it, as the times prove, and fortune's wheel turns; but he that takes after Romulus, armed as he with wisdom and force, shall hold it in any case, unless by an obstinate and overmighty power it be wrested from him. And certainly we may well think, if Rome had light upon a man, for her third King, who knew not how by arms to recover her reputation, she could never afterwards, or not without much ado, have taken root, or attained that growth she after grew to. And thus whiles she lived under the Kings, she ran the hazard of ruining under a weak or naughty King.   

CHAP. XX.  
Two continued successions of virtuous Princes work great effects; and Commonwealths well ordered of necessity have virtuous succession: And therefore are their gains and increases great.  
AFter Rome had banished her Kings, she was delivered of those dangers which, as is before said, she hazarded, a feeble or naughty King succeeding in her. For the sum of the Empire was reduced unto Consuls, who came not to the government, by inheritance, or treachery, or by extreme ambition, but by the voices of the Citizens; and they were always very worthy men, whose virtue and fortune Rome enjoying, could from time to time attain to her vastest greatness, in but so many more years, as she had been under her Kings. For we see, that two continued successions of brave Princes are of force enough to conquer the whole world, as was Philip of Macedon, and Alexander the great. Which so much the rather ought a Republic do, having the means to choose not only two successions, but an infinite number of valorous Princes, who follow one the other; which valorous succession may always be in every well ordered Commonwealth.   

CHAP. XXI.  
What blame that Prince or Republic deserves, that wants soldiers of his own subjects.  
THE Princes of these times, and the modern Republics, who for defences or offences want soldiers of their own, may be ashamed of themselves, and consider by the example of Tullus, that this defect is not for want of men fit for war, but by their fault, who had not the understanding to make their men soldiers. For Tullus, Rome having been forty years in peace, found not (when he succeeded in the Kingdom) a man that had been ere at war. Yet he intending to make war, served not himself either of the Samnites or Tascans, nor of others trained up in arms, but advised as a very prudent man, to make use of his own people. And such was his virtue, that on a sudden with his discipline he made them very good soldiers. Truer it is than any other truth, if where men are, there want soldiers, it is the Prince's fault, not any other defect either of situation or nature. Whereof we have a very late example: For every one knows, how of late days the King of England assailed the Kingdom of France, and took no other soldiers than his own people. And by reason that Kingdom had not been at war above thirty years before, it had neither soldier nor Captain that ever had been at war; yet he nothing doubted with those to set upon a Kingdom furnished with Captains and good Armies, who had continually born arms in the wars of Italy. All this proceeded from that this King was a very wise man, and that Kingdom well governed; which in time of peace neglected not military discipline. Pelopidas and Epaminondas, Thebans, after they had set Thebes at liberty, and drawn her out of bondage of the Spartan government, perceiving well they were in a City accustomed to servitude, and in the midst of esseminate people, yet made no difficulty (such was their virtue) to train them up in arms, and with those to go and meet the Spartan Armies in the field, and overcome them. And he that makes relation of it, says, that these two proved in short time, that not only in Lacedaemon soldiers were bred, but in any other place where men are bred, if they found any could train them in the exercise. As it appears that Tullus knew how to train them to the war. And Virgil could not better express this opinion, nor with other words come near it, where he says:  

——— Residesque movebit  
Tullus in arma viros————  
Peope with peace grown dull, that ne'er used arms.  
Tullus shall soldiers make————    

CHAP. XXII.  
What we may observe in the case of the three Horatij Romans, and the three Curiatij Alban.  
TULLUS the Roman King and Metius the Alban made an agreement, that that people should be Lord of the other, whose three, above mentioned, champions vanquished the others. All the Curiatij, Alban, were slain; there remained alive only one of the Horatij, Romans; and by this, Metius King of the Alban with his people became subject to the Romans. And this Horatius the Conqueror returning into Rome, and meeting one of his own sisters, who had been married to one of the three dead Curiatij, that lamented the death of her husband, slew her. Whereupon that Horatius was brought into judgement, and after many disputes freed, rather at his Father's suit, than for his own merits, Where three things are to be considered. One, that the whole fortune of the State ought never be hazarded with a part of the forces. The other, that in a City well governed faults be never made amends for with deserts: The third, that matches were never wisely made, where a man-ought or can doubt the performance will not follow. For so much imports it a City to become subject, that a man ought not believe, that any of those Kings or people would rest content, that three of their fellow citizens should have brought them to this yoke; of which mind we saw Metius was: who, though presently after the Romans victory, he acknowleged himself vanquished, and promised obedience to Tullus, yet in the first expedition they were to meet against the Vejentes, it appeared, how he sought to deceive him; as he, that was too late aware of his rashness in the bargain he made. And because we have spoken enough of this third thing to be noted, we shall speak only of the other two, in the two following Chapters.   

CHAP. XXIII.  
That the whole fortune ought not be laid at stake, where the whole forces try not for it: and for this cause it is often hurtful to guard the passages.  
NEver was he thought good gamester, that would hazard his whole ●●st, upon less than the strength of his whole game: And this is done divers ways. One is, doing as Tullus and Metius did, when they committed the whole fortune of their country, and the valour of so many men as the one and the other had in their armies, to the vafour and fortune of three of their citizens, which were but a very small part of either of their forces. Nor did they consider, how by this adventure all the toil their ancestors had taken in ordering the Commonwealth so, that it might long continue free, and to make the citizens defenders of their liberty, was all in vain, it being left in the hands of so few to lose it. Which thing those Kings could not have known how more to have undervalved. And for the most part they likewise fall into the same inconvenient, who (upon the enemy's approach) intent to keep the hard places and guard the passages. For this resolution will always be hurtful, unless in that hard passage thou canst bring together all thy whole forces. And in such case, this course may be well taken. But the place being rough, and it not being possible to hold all thy forces there, there is loss in it. And to judge thus I am persuaded by the example I find of those, that when they are assaulted by a powerful enemy, their country being environed with mountains and rocky places, have never endeavoured to fight with the enemy upon the passages or mountains, but have gone beyond to encounter them: or when they would not do this, they have expected them among the mountains, in plain and easy places and not mountainous; and the reason thereof hath been given before. For it is not possible to bring many men together to the guard of mountainous places, because provisions for long time cannot easily be furnished, and because the passages are straight and capable of few, and therefore not possible to withstand an enemy pressing on with the gross of his army. And it is an easy thing for the enemy to come on with his gross; because his intention is but to pass on, and not to stay. And it is impossible for him that awaits him, to await in gross, having to lodge there for a longer time, not knowing when the enemy wiil pass in places (as I said) straight and barren. Losing therefore that passage which thou hadst intended to keep, and wherein thy people and thy army reposed some trust, most commonly there enters such a terror into the rest of thy people, that without any means to make trial of their valour, thou art left the loser, and with part of thy forces thou hast lost all thy fortunes. Every one knows with what difficulty Hannibal past the Alps, which divides Lombardy from France, and those, which divide Lombardy from Tuscany; yet the Romans first expected him upon the Tesin, and afterwards upon the plain of Arezo; and would rather have their army wasted by their enemies, in places where they might overcome, then bring it upon the Alps, where likely it would have been destroyed by the malignity of the place. And whosoever shall with discretion read histories, shall find that very few expert Commanders have assayed to keep the like passages, for these reasons we have said; and because they cannot all divide themselves, the mountains being as open fields, and not having only ordinary and accustomed, but many byways, though not known to strangers, yet to the inhabitants, by whose help thou shalt be guided any way in despite of the opposers. Whereof we can allege a very late example. In the year 1515 when Francis the first King of France intended to pass into Italy, to recover the State of Lombardy, the greatest ground they had that dissuaded his enterprise, was, that the Swisses would step his passage on the mountains, And as after experience showed it, this ground of theirs was slight. For that King having left aside two or three places kept by them, came from thence by another way unknown, and was sooner in Italy then any were aware of him, So that herewith being daunted, they retired into Milan, and all the people of Lombardy took the French party, having failed in the opinion they had, that the French men would be stopped on the top of the mountains.   

CHAP. XXIIII.  
Commonwealths well ordered appoint rewards and punishments for their people, and never recompense the one with the other.  
THE deserts of Horatius had been exceeding great, having by his valour vanquished the Curiatij. His offence was horrible, having slain his sister. Notwithstanding such a kind of homicide so much displeased the Romans that it brought them to dispute, whether they should grant him his life, though his merits were so great and so fresh: Which thing, to him that looks but superficially on it, would seem an example of popular ingratitude. Yet he that shall examine better, and with more consideration inquire, what the orders of Commonwealths ought to be, shall rather blame that people for having absolved him, then for having had a mind to condemn him. And this is the reason, For never any Republic in good ordrr, eancelled the faults of their citizens with their deserts. But having ordained rewards for good service, and punishments for desservice, and having rewarded one when he had done well, if afterwards he commit any offence, they chastise him without any regard to his former merits. And when these orders are strictly observed, a city continues long free, otherwise it would soon go to ruin. For if a man grown into great reputation for some notable piece of service done to the state, should take upon him the confidence that he could without danger of punishment commit any offence, in a short time would he become so unreasonably insolent, that the civil state could no longer consist. It is very necessary, if we would have punishment for offences feared, always to reward good deserts, as it appears they did at Rome. And though the Republic be but poor, and can bestow but little, yet may the subject well content himself with that little; for so even a small gift bestowed on any one, for requital of a good, though great, shall find with him that receives it an honourable and thankful acceptance. The story of Horatius Cocles is very well known, and that also of Mutius Scevola; how the one bore up the enemies upon a bridge, till it was cut off behind him; the other burned his own hand, for having mistaken, when he meant to have killed Porsena the Tuscan King. To these for two such notable acts was given by the publilick two acres of ground to each of them. And mark also the story of Manlius Capitolinus. To him for having delivered the Capitol from the French, which were encamped before it, they who together with him were within besieged gave him a small measure of flour, which reward (according to the then present fortune of Rome) was large, and of such a quality too, that afterwards Manlius, either moved by envy, or his own ill nature, occasioned a sedition in Rome, and seeking to get the people of his faction, was, without any regard had of his good deserts, thrown headlong down from that Capitol which he, to his great renown, had formerly delivered.   

CHAP. XXV.  
Whosoever would reform an ancient state in a free city, let him retain at least the shadow of the old customs.  
HE that hath a mind to reform the state of a City, to bring it into liking, and the better with every one's satisfaction to maintain it, is forced to keep the form or shadow of the ancient customs, to the end the people perceive not the change of them, though indeed they are quite new, & far different from the forepast. For they generally satisfy themselves as well with that that seems to be, as that that is. Nay rather are they many times more moved with appearances, than truths. And for this cause, the Romans knowing this necessity, when first they lived free, having in change of one King created two Consuls, would not suffer them to have more than twelve Lictors, because they should not outgo the number of those that attend on the King. Moreover, when the yearly sacrifice was made in Rome, which could not be done without the presence of the King, and the Romans willing that the people, by the absence of a King, should not find a lack of any of the old ceremonies, created a head of the said sacrifice, whom they called the King Priest; who yet was lower in degree, than the high Priest. So that this way the people was satisfied of that sacrifice, and never had any occasion by any default in it, to wish their Kings again restored. And this they all aught to observe, that would cancel the old manner of living in a city, and reduce it to a new and free course. For being these novelties somewhat move men's minds, therefore thou shouldst do well to call thy wits about thee, and work these alterations in the old mould, as much as might be. And if the magistrates, both in number, and authority, and durance, differ from the ancient, at least let them keep the same name: And this (as I have said) rather ought he to observe, who means to take upon him an absolute authority, which is called a Tyranny, for he is to innovate every thing.   

CHAP. XXVI.  
A new Prince in a city or Province taken by him, should make innovations in every thing.  
WHosoever becomes Prince of a city or state, and the rather, when his forces are but weak to keep it, and means not to hold it neither as a Kingdom, nor as a regular Republic, the best expedient he can find, for the maintenance of that Principality, is, that he (himself being a new Prince) make every thing new in the state, as it is ordinary in the cities to make new governments with new names, with new jurisdictions, with new men, and to enrich the poor, as David did, when he came to the crown. That filled the hungry with good things, and the rich sent empty away. To build moreover new cities, and to pull down some that are built, to remove the inhabitants 
Qui esu●ienre imp 〈…〉 it b 〈…〉 & 〈…〉 vites 〈…〉 isit inanes.  from one place to another, and in some to leave nothing untouched in that Province, that there be neither degree, order, nor state, nor wealth, but he that possesses it, acknowledges it from these. And to take for pattern Philip of Macedon Alexander's father, who by these means became of a little King, Prince of all Greece. And he that writes of him says, that he changed his people from Province to Province, as herdsmen change their herds from pasture to pasture. These courses are very cruel, and against all Christian and humane manner of living. And every man ought refuse to be a King, and desire rather to live a private man, than reign, so much to the ruin of mankind. Yet he that will not use that first way of good, if he will preserve himself, must enter into this of evil. But men take to certain middle ways, which are very naught; for they know not how to be all good, nor all evil: as shall be showed for example in the next chapter.   

CHAP. XXVII.  
It is very seldom, that men know how to be altogether mischievous, or altogether good.  
POpe Julius the second going in the year 1505 to Bolonia to chase out of that state the house of the Benticogli, which had held the principality of that city a hundred years, had a mind also to draw john Pagolus Baglioni out of Perugia, whereof he was a Tyrant, as he that had conspired against all Tyrants, that were seized of any of the Church's lands: and being come near Perugia, with this resolution known to every one, stayed not to enter the City with his Army to guard him, but went in without a guard, notwithstanding that john Pagolus was therein with much people, which he had got together for his defence. So that carried forward by that rage wherewith he governed all things, with his ordinary guard he put himself in his enemy's hands, whom afterwards he led away with him, leaving a governor in that city, to keep it for the Church. By the wise men, that were with the Pope, was noted the rashness of the Pope, and the base cowardice of John Pagolus; nor could they conceit, whence it came, that he did not to his perpetual renown suppress then at once his enemy, and enrich himself with the prey, all the Cardinals being then with the Pope, who had the best of all their Jewels with them. Neither could any man think that he abstained either for goodness or conscience sake, that withheld him. For into the heart of a wicked man, that incestuously conversed with his sister, and that had slain his cousins and nephews, to rule, there could never enter any religious respect. Whereupon every one concluded, that men know not how to be honourably mischievous, nor perfectly good. And where a mischief hath in it greatness, and is generous in some part, they know not how to enter into it. So john Pagolus, who made no account of being an incestuous and public parricide, knew not (or to say better) had not the courage, though upon just occasion, to do an exploit that every one should have admired him for, and he left of himself an everlasting memory; being the first that had showed the Prelates what a thing it is to set at naught, him that lives, and reigns, as they did; and so had done an act, whose greatness had surpassed all infamy, and what ever danger could depend on it.   

CHAP. XXVIII.  
For what reason the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens, than the Athenians.  
WHosoever reads the actions of Republics, shall find in all of them some kind of ingratitude towards their citizens, but less in Rome, than in Athens, or peradventure than in any Commonwealth else. And if we would inquire after the reason thereof, speaking of Rome and Athens, I think it happened, because the Romans had less occasion to suspect their citizens, than had the Athenians. For at Rome, considering her from the banishment of her Kings till Sylla, and Marius, her liberty was never taken away by any of her citizens, so that she had no great reason to suspect them, or by consequence suddenly to offend them. The contrary befell Athens; for her liberty being taken from her in her most flourishing time, and under colour of doing her some good, so soon as she became free, remembering the wrong she had received, and the slavery she had endured, became a sharp revengeress, not only of her citizens faults, but of the shadow of their faults.  
From hence came the banishment and the death of so many rare men. From hence the order of the Osteacisme, and all other violence, which in several times by her was done to the prime of her citizens, And that is very true which those that write of civil government say, that the people bit● more fiercely, after they have recovered their liberty, than while they have continually maintained it. Whosoever then considers what is said, will neither in this blame Athes, nor commend Rome: but will accuse only the necessity, because of the diversity of accidents which did arise in this city For he shall see, if narrowly he look into affairs, if Rome's liberty had been taken away, as was that of Athens, Rome would not have been more pitiful to her citizens, than was Athens. Whereof one may make a very good guess, by that which chanced, after the banishment of the Kings, against Collatine, and Publius Valerius: whereof the first (although he had his hand in the setting of Rome at liberty) was banished, for no other occasion, than that he was surnamed Tarquin. The other having only given suspicion of himself, by building a house upon the hill Celius, was like to have been banished. So that we may well think (seeing how suspicious and severe Rome was in these two things) that she would have been as ungrateful, as Athens, if, as she in her infancy and before her growth, had been so much wronged. And that I need not turn again to this subject of ingratitude, I shall speak further of it in the Chapter following.   

CHAP. XXIX.  
Whether of two be the more ungrateful, a people, or a Prince.  
ME thinks it is not out of the purpose of our former matter, to discourse, whether a Prince or people give us greater examples of ingratitude. ●nd the better to argue this part, I say, this vice of ingratitude grows either of covereousness or suspicion. For when a people or Prince have sent out a Commander of theirs, in any expedition of importance, where that Commander overcoming hath gained a great deal of glory, that Prince or people is in like manner bound to reward him: and if in F●w of reward he disgraces him, or wrongs him, incited thereunto by avarice, not willing by reason of this covetousness, to satisfy him, he commits an error, without excuse, and draws upon himself everlasting infamy. Yet are there many Princes, who offend in this kind. And Cornelius Tacitus declares in this Sentence 
Proclivius est injuriae quod beneficio vicem exsolvere, quia gratia oneri, ultio quaestui habetur.  the occasion. It is more pleasing to revenge an injury, then to requite a courtesy: for thanks is thought a burden, but revenge a gain. But when he rewards him not, but rather hur●s him, not through avarice, but upon suspicion, than the people or Prince deserves some excuse. And of these ingratitudes practised for such cause we read many; for that Commander who valorously hath gained his Lord a Kingdom, by conquering his enemies, replenishing himself with glory, and his soldiers with riches, of force gets such reputation with his own soldiers, with his enemies, and his Kings own subjects, that that victory can no way sayour well to his Lord that put him in the employment. And because men's natures are ambitious, and full of suspicion, and know not how to set limits to their fortune, it is impossible, but that suspicion which grows in the Prince after that Commander's victory, shall by himself be increased upon some way or term insolently used; so that the Prince cannot advise himself otherwise, than to provide for his own safety. And to this end, thinks either to put him to death, or to take away his reputation, which he hath gotten in his army, or among his people, and withal diligence to show, that his valour got not the victory, but rather it came by chance, or by the enemy's cowardice, or by the direction of the other Captains, who were together with him in that employment. After that Vespasian, being in Judea, was by his army declared Emperor, Antonius Primus, who was then with another army in Illiria, took his part, and came thence into Italy against Vitellius, who commanded at Rome, and valorously conquered two Vitellian armies, and made himself, Master of Rome; so that Mutianus sent by Vespanian found all already gotten by Antonius his valour, and all difficulties surpassed. The reward Antonius gained hereby, was, that Mutianus took away his command of the army, and by little and little made him of no authority in Rome; whereupon Antonius went away to Vespasian, who was yet in Asia, by whom he was so coldly received, that in a short time deprived of all dignity he died in despair. And of these examples stories are full. In our days, every one living knows, with what industry and valour Gonsalvus Ferdinand, warring in the Kingdom of Naples against the Frenchmen for Ferdinand King of Arragon, brought that Kingdom under his obedience; and how he had for reward of his conquest, that Ferdinand parted from Arragon, and came to Naples, and first discharged him of his command of soldiers, afterwards took from him the fortresses, and then brought him away with him into Spain, where a while after he died in disgrace. Therefore this suspicion is so natural in Princes, that they cannot escape it; and it is impossible they prove thankful to those, who by victory have under their banners made great conquests. And from that which a Prince is not free, 'tis no marvel, nor a thing worthy of greater note, that a people is not free. For a city living free hath two ends, the one to gain, the other to keep itself free; and it cannot be, but in the one or the other by excess of love it may err. Touching the errors in getting, they shall be spoken of in their place: as for the errors in maintaining their liberty, there are these among others, to hurt those citizens they should reward, and to suspect those they should repose upon. And though these ways in a Republic come to corruption, cause great evils, and that many times they hasten it to a Tyranny, as at Rome it befell Caesar, who by strong hand took away that, which unthankfulness denied him: yet in a Commonwealth not corrupted, are they causes of great good, and make it live more free, keeping men for fear of punishment more virtuous and less ambitious. It is true, that of all people that ever reigned, upon the causes above alleged, Rome was the least ungrateful; for of her ingratitude we may say, there is no other example, but that of Scipio; for Coriolanus and Camillus were banished for the injury, the one and the other had done the people. But the one was not pardoned, because he always continued his malicious mind against the people; the other was not only recalled, but all his life-time after, adored as a Prince. But the ingratitude used towards Scipio, grew from a suspicion the citizens began to have of him, which was never conceived of the others; which arose first from the greatness of the enemy Scipio had overcome; from the reputation that the conquest of so long and perilous a war had given him; from the quick dispatch of it: from those favours which youth, wisdom, and other his memorable virtues had gotten him. Which things were so great, that the Magistrates of Rome feared his authority, more than any thing Which displeased the grave men, as a matter not accustomed in Rome. And his manner of living was thought so extraordinary, that Priscus Cato, reputed a man of great integrity, was the first that stirred against him, and said, that a city could not be called free, where the Magistrates stood in fear of one citizen. So if the people of Rome in this case followed Cato's opinion, they deserve that excuse, which I said before, those Princes and people merit, who through suspicion prove unthankful. Wherefore concluding this discourse, I say, that whether this vice be used either through suspicion or covetousness, it shall appear that the people never put it in practice upon covetousness, and upon suspicion less than Princes, having less cause to be suspicious, as quickly it shall be declared.   

CHAP. XXX.  
What means a Prince or Republic should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude: or what A Commander or Citizen, to be free from their danger.  
A Prince to avoid this necessity of living with suspicion, or being ungrateful, ought personally go to the wars, as in the beginning did those Roman Emperors, and in our days the Turk does; and as those that are valorous have done, and yet do. For overcoming, the glory and the gain is all their own. And when they are not there in person, (the glory of the action belonging to another) they think, they cannot well make that conquest their own, unlefs they put out that glory in another which they themselves knew not how to get, and so become ungrateful, and unjust. And without doubt greater is their loss, than their gain; but when either through negligence, for lack of judgement they stay idle at home, and send out a Commander, I have no other precept to give them, than what they know of themselves. But I advise that Commander, because, as I think, he can hardly escape the nips of unthankfulness, that he betake himself to one of these two expedients; either presently upon his victory let him leave his army, and put himself into his Prince's hands, abstaining from any action savouring of insolence or ambition, that so he having no occasion given of suspicion may have reason to reward him, or at least not hurt him: Or when he likes not to do thus, let him resolutely take part against him, and use all those means whereby he may think to hold from his Prince what he hath gotten, procuring the soldiers and the subjects good wills; let him make friendship with his neighbours, possess with his men the strong places, corrupt the Chief of his army, and assure himself of those he cannot; and this way endeavour to punish his Lord for the ingratitude he would have used towards him. Otherways there are not; but (as it was said before) men know not how to be wholly vicious, nor wholly good. And always it comes to pass, that presently after the victory, they will not part with their army; behave themselves with modesty they cannot, and to stand upon defiance in some honourable terms they know not how. So that being irresolute which way to take, between delay and doubt they are suppressed. But to a Republic which would avoid this vice of ingratitude, we cannot apply the same remedy, we may to a Prince; that is, that she go herself, and not send out in her employments, being necessitated to make use of some one of her citizens. It suits well therefore, that for her best remedy, she take the same course the Commonwealth of Rome took, to be less unthankful than all others. Which grew from her manner of government; for the whole city, both Nobles and Plebeians being trained up to war, there arose always in Rome in all ages men of such valour, experience, and reputation, that there was no occasion to doubt of any one of them, they being many who kept one another in order. And so long they continued ●iu integrity, and with regard not to make others jealous of their ambition, nor give occasion to the people to do them harm, taking them for ambitious persons; for if any one were made Dictator, he got most honour by it, that laid down his Dictatorship soon. And so such like way not being sufficient to raise suspect, could not breed ingratitude. So that a Republic that would not have cause given her to be unthankful, should govern herself in the same manner Rome did. And a citizen that would be free from all their despites, should follow the same steps the citizens of Rome went.   

CHAP. XXXI.  
That the Roman Commanders were never extraordinarily punished for any error committed; nor at all punished, when either by their ignorance, or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them the Commonwealth suffered loss.  
THE Romans, as formerly we have discoursed, were not only less ungrateful, than other Commonwealths, but also were more pitiful, and more advised in the punishment of the Generals of their armies, than any else. For if their fault proceeded from malice, yet they gently chastised them; but if it was through ignorance, they were so far from punishing them, that they rewarded and honoured them. This manner of proceeding was well considered by them; for they judged it a matter of great importance to those that commanded their armies, to have their mind free, without any clog upon it, and without any outwards respects to restrain them in their resolutions; because they would not add new difficulties and danger to a thing by itself hard and dangerous: advising well that with these hindrances a man cannot bravely execute his designs. For example, when they sent an army into Greece, against Philip of Macedon, or into Italy against Hannibal, or against those people they first overcame; That Commander to whom the employment was committed had the vexation of all those cares that follow such charges which are of weight and importance. Now if to such cares, this were added, that many examples of the Romans were recorded, where they had crucified or otherwise put to death those that had lost any battles, it was impossible, that that Captain among so many suspicions could resolve any thing courageously. Therefore they deeming these sufficiently punished with the shame of their loss, they were not willing to startle them with any more grievous punishment Here is one example, of a fault committed, and not through ignorance. Sergius and Verginius were encamped against the Veyans, each of them commanding a part of the army: Sergius was to encounter the Tuscans, and Verginius was to set upon the other side: It chanced, that Sergius being assaulted by the Falisci, and other people, endured rather to be quite routed and put to flight, before he would send for aid to Verginius. And on the other side, Verginius, staying till till he should humble himself, would rather see the dishonour of his country, and the ruin of the army, than secure him. A case indeed very exemplary, and of much malice; neither would it have been for the Commonwealth of Rome's reputation, to have let the one or the other pass without censure. True it is, that where another Republic would have punished them with death, this punished them only in a sum of money. The cause hereof was, not that their offences deserved not greater punishment, but because the Romans would in this case, for the reasons already alleged, continue their ancient customs. And touching errors of ignorance, we have no better example, than that of Maro; through whose rashness the Romans having been broken at Can by Hannibal, where the Republic came endanger to lose her liberty, yet because it was ignorance, and not malice, they not only did not chasise him; but honoured him, and the whole order of the Senator's m●thim upon the way in his return to Rome; and because they could not thank him for the battle fought, they thanked him yet that he was returned to Rome, and had not despaired of the Roman State. When Papirius Cursor would have put Fabius to death, for having contrary to his command fought with the Samnites, among other reasons which Fabius his Father brought against the Dictator's obstinacy was this, that the people of Rome, in any loss that ever her Captains had made, had never done that which Papirius in a victory would have done.   

CHAP. XXXII.  
A Republic or Prince should not defer to do good unto men, until their necessity requires it.  
ALthough it succeeded happily to the Romans, to have used liberality towards the people upon occasion of a sudden danger, when Porsenna made war against Rome, to restore the Tarquins, where the Senate doubting of the people, lest they would sooner accept of the Kings, than endure out the war; to make themselves sure of them, they took off from them the taxes of salt, and every kind of grievance, saying, the poor contributed enough to the common good, if they did but nourish their children; and thereupon in regard of this benefit, the people exposed themselves to endure the siege, the famine, and the war. Yet let none, presuming upon this example, delay to gain the good will of the people till the times of danger; for it will never prove so well to them, as it did to the Romans; for the generality will think they have not this good from thee, but from thy adversaries; and being to fear, that, when that necessity is past, thou wilt withhold from them that good which of force thou didst them, they will not think themselves any way beholding to thee. And the reason why this business succeeded well to the Romans, was, because the State was new, and not well settled yet; and that people also had seen, that formerly laws had been made for their advantage, as that of appeal to the people; so that they might well persuade themselves, that the good they had, was done them, not so muth upon occasion of their enemies coming, as from the good disposition of the Senate towards them. Moreover, the Kings were yet fresh in their memory, by whom they had been many ways scorned, and abused. And because such like occasions seldom fall out, it seldom also comes to pass, that the like remedies are of use: whosoever therefore sit at the helm in a state, be it either a Commonwealth, or a Prince, should consider before hand, what contrary times may come upon them, and what men in their troubles they may stand in need of; and therefore should live with them always in such a manner, that upon any accident chancing, they may find them ready and willing to serve their occasions. And he that governs otherwise, either Prince, or Republic, but especially a Prince, and afterwards upon the exigent, when danger is at hand, thinks with any benefits to recover or obligemen to him, is much deceived; for he does not only not secure himself, but hastens his own destruction.   

CHAP. XXXIII.  
When an inconvenient is much grown, either in a state, or against a state, it is better to bear with it for a while, then presently to struggle with it.  
WHen the commonwealth of Rome grew in reputation, force, and rule, the neighbouring people, who at first were not aware of the harm this new Republic might do them, began, though late, to know their fault; and desiring to remedy that which at first they had neglected, nigh forty several people were joined together against Rome; whereupon the Romans, among the remedies they were wont to make use of in their extremest dangers, betook them to create a dictator, that is, to give power to one man, that without calling any Council he might resolve, and without any appeal, he might execute his resolutions. Which remedy, as than it served to purpose, and was the occasion they overcame those eminent dangers: so it was always exceeding profitable in all those occasions, which in the growth of the Empire at any time did rise against the Republic. Upon which accident we are first to discourse, how that, when an inconvenient that rises either in a Commonwealth or against a Commonwealth, caused by an inward or an outward cause, is become so great, that it begins to make every one afraid, the safer course is, to temporise with it, then strive forthwith to extinguish it. For most commonly it proves, that they who endeavour to quench it kindle it much more, and suddenly pluck down that mischief upon their heads, which was then but feared from thence. And of such like accidents many arise in the Commonwealth, oftener upon inward oceasions then outward. Where oftentimes, either a citizen is suffered to lay hold of more forces than is reasonable; or else some law begins to be corrupted, which is the very nerve and life of liberty. And this error is suffered to pass on so far, that there is more danger in the remedy, then in the evil. And so much the harder is it to know these inconvenients at their birth, by how much more it seems to agree with men's natures, always to favour things in their beginnings: and these favours are of more force, rather than in any thing else, in those works that seem to have somewhat of virtue in them, and are done by young men. For if in a republic any young noble man put forward himself, having in him extraordinary virtue, all the citizens begin to cast their eyes on him, and agree together without any consideration to honour him; so that if he hath any touch of Ambition, meeting with those favours nature affords him, and this accident coming suddenly in place, before the Citizens perceive the errors they are in, it falls out that they have small means to help themselves. And when these, that have the remedies in their powers, would put them in practice, they do but with haste augment his authority. Hereof we might allege sundry examples; but I will give only one out of our own city. Cosmus of Medici, from whom the house of Medici in this city took the beginning of their greatness, came into such reputation, through the favour that his own wisdom and the other citizen's ignorance gave him, that he began to make the state somewhat afraid of him, so that some citizens held it very dangerous to offend him, and others as dangerous to let him alone. But Nicholas of Vizzano living at the same time, who was esteemed a very expert man in civil affairs; and being that the first error was made is not knowing the dangers that might arise upon Cosmus his reputation, while he lived, would never suffer, that they should make the second, which was, that they should endeavour to put him down; judging that such an assay would be altogether the ruin of their state, as in effect it came to pass, which was after his death. For those citizens that were left, not following this advice, made themselves strong against Cosmus, and chased him out of Florence. Whereupon it followed that his faction resenting the injury, a while after recalled him, and made him Prince of the Commonwealth; to which step he could never have climbed, without that manifest opposition. The selfsame befell Rome with Caesar, whose virtue being favoured by Pompey and others, at length came to change their favour into fear, whereof Cic●ro witnesses, saying, that Pompey had late begun to fear Caesar. Which fear caused them to think upon the remedies, and the remedies they used hastened the ruin of their Commonwealth. I say then, that seeing it is a hard thing to know these evils when they arise, this difficulty being occasioned by a deceit, wherewith most things in their beginning do deceive, the wiser way is to dissemble them, when they are known, then to oppose them. For temporising with, them they either are extinguished of themselves, or at least the evil is put off for a longer time. And in all affairs Princes ought to be well advised, who intent either to suppress evils, or to oppose their forces and their invasions, that in lieu of hurt they do them not good; and thinking to thrust on forward a business, they draw it not after them; or instead of choking a plant, they water is not. And they should well consider, wherein the greatest force consists, and when they find their powers sufficient to heal what is amiffe, they should then apply their strongest remedies; or otherwise, let it alone, nor in any case meddle with it; for it would fall out as before hath been said, and as it befell the neighbours of Rome; for whom it had been better, after that Rome was so grown in strength, with treaties of peace to endeavour to quiet it and so yet keep it backward, rather than by making a strong war against it, to force it to new courses, and new defences. For to what other purpose served their conspiracy, then to make them more lively, and to think upon new ways, whereby in a far shorter time they much enlarged their power? Among which, was the creation of a dictator, by which, new order they not only overcame the dangers that hung over their heads, but it was an occasion to stop very many misischiefes, which without that remedy the commonwealth must needs have incurred.   

CHAP. XXXIIII.  
The Dictatours authority did good, and not harm, to the Commonwealth of Rome; and how authorities which the citizens take upon them of themselves, and not those that are given them by the people's free voices, are hurtful to the civil government.  
THose Romans are by some writer condemned, that found out in that city the way to create a dictator, as a thing that in time might occasion the Roman Tyranny; alleging, that the first tyrant that was in that city, commanded it under the title of a dictator, saying, that if this had not been, Caesar could never with any publque title have given any honest colour to his tyranny. Which matter was never well examined by him that holds this opinion, but believed without ground. For it was not the name, not the degree of the dictator, that brought Rome into bondage, but it was the authority the Citizens took upon themselves through the long continuance of their rule. And if in Rome there had been wanting the title of a dictator, they would have taken another: for forces will easily gain titles, but not titles forces. And we see it, that the dictator, while he was made according to the public orders, and not by his own authority, always did good to the city. For those magistrates that are created, and those authorities that are given by extraordinary courses wrong the Republics, and not those that come the rodinary way As it appears it followed in so long a process of time, that never any dictator did otherwise, then good to the Commonwealth. Whereof there are very evident proofs. First because to put a citizen in case that he can do hurt, and take extaordinary authority upon him, we must suppose him to have many conditions, which in a Republic not corrupted he can never have; for he must be very rich, and have many adherents and partisans, which he cannot have, if the laws be strictly observed; and in case they had, such kind of men are so doubted, that the citizens free votes seldom meet in them. Moreover, the Dictarous was created only for a time, and not for ever, and only to remedy the present necessity; for which he was created. And by his authority he had power to resolve by him what courses to take against urgent danger, and to execute any thing without calling a counsel, and to punish any one without appeal. Yet could he do nothing, tending to the diminution of the state, as it would have bin● to take away the Senate's authority, or the people's, to disannul the old ordinances of the city, and to make new; so that, the short time of his Dictatourship meeting with his authority, which was limited to him, and the people of Rome not corrupted, it was impossible he should exceed his bounds, and hurt the city: and, we find by experience, that he evermore advantaged it. And indeed among other Roman ordinances, this is one deserves consideration, and worthy to be reckoned among those which contributed to the enlargement of that Empire: for without such like course taken, cities could hardly escape out of such extravagant mischief's; for the ways ordinarily used in Republics. which more slowly (being that no counsel, nor magistrate hath power of himself to go through with any matter, but in many things nave need of of one another, because there goes time in getting together their consents) their remedies are very dangerous, when they are to cure that which cannot stay for time: and therefore Commonwealths among their orders should have some such like way; and the Republic of Venice (which is excellent among these moderns) hath reserved the authority to a few citizens, that in occurrences of importance, without more advice, all of them jointly of accord may resolve; for when in a Republic there wants such an expedient, it must needs by keeping the old customs go to ruin, or to escape it, break them. And in a Commonwealth, it were to be desired, that nothing should chance, which might call in the use of extraordinary courses. For though that extraordinary way at that time did good, yet the example proves of ill consequence: for the custom is brought in, to break the old orders at first for good, which afterwards under that colour are broken to ill intent. So that a Republic can never be perfect, unless with her laws she hath provided for all things, and for every mischance ordained the remedy, and tract out the way of her government: and therefore concluding I say, that those Republics which in their dangers have not recourse to a dictator, or such like authorities, will always in those heavy accidents fall to ruin. And, in this new ordinance the manner of making the choice is to be noted, how judiciously it was provided for by the Romans; for the creation of the dictator being some what a disgrace to the Consuls, the heads of the City being as well to come under obedience, as others; and presupposing, that some distaste hereof might arise among the citizens, they ordained the power of making this choice should be in the Consuls; thinking, that when the occasion came, that Rome should stand in need of this Royal power, they would do it with a good will, and that they doing it themselves, it would less grieve them: For the hurts, or any evil that a man brings voluntarily upon himself, and of his own choice, are far less troublesome, than those that are done him by another: although that afterwards in the latter times, the Romans used in lieu of a 
Videat Consul ne Respquid detrimenti capiat.  dictator, to give such authority to the Consul in these words, Let the Consul takecare the Commonwealth receive no damage. And to return to our matter, I conclude, that the neighibouring inhabitants of Rome by seeking to suppress them, made them not only provide for their defence, but also gave them the way how they might with more force, better advice, and greater authority offend them.   

CHAP. XXXV.  
The reason, why in Rome the creation of the Decemvirate was hurtful to the liberty of that Republic, notwitstanding that it was made by public and free voices.  
AND it seems contrary to that which was said before, that the authority which is seized on by violence, not that which is given by suffrages, is hurtful to Commonweals, as the election of the ten Citizens created by the people of Rome to make laws therein, who in time became tyrants in it, and without any respect laid hold on the liberty thereof. Where we ought well consider the manner of giving the authority, and the time for which it is given: and when an absolute authority is given for a long time (calling a year or somewhat more a long time) it will always be dangerous, and will produce either good or bad effects, according as the persons to whom it shall be entrusted shall prove good or bad: and if we look into the authority the ten had, and that which the Dictatours had, we shall find that of the ten far to outreach the other. For when the dictator was created, the Tribune's, the Consuls, and the Senate remained still in their authority, nor could the dictator take it from them And if he could deprive one of the Consulship, and remove another from the Senate, yet could he not disannul the whole order of Senators, and make new laws: so that the Senate, the Consuls, and the Tribune's continuing with their authority, came to be as a guard upon him, to keep him from swerving out of he right way. But in the creation of the ten there fell out the clean contrary; for they cashiered the Consuls and Tribune's and gave authority of themselves to make laws and every thing else, as absolutely as the people of Rome. So that being absolute of themselves without Consuls, without Tribune's, without appeal to the people, and hereby having none to look into their courses, the second year they had the means, especially moved by the ambition of Appius, to become insolent. And hereupon it is to be noted, that when it is said, that a power given by free suffrages, never hurt any Commonwealth, we must presuppose, that the people suffer not themselves to be induced to give it, unless with due circumstances, and at due seasons. But when, either being deceived, or upon some other occasion leading them blindsold, they are brought to give it undiscreetly, and in that kind as the people of Rome gave it to the ten, it will befall them always, as it did to these. Which is easily proved, considering the causes that held the Dictatours in goodness, and those that gave the ten occasion of becoming evil. And advising also how those Republics have done, that have been thought well governed, in the giving of authority for a long time, as the Sparitans gave their Kings, and the Venetians their Duke; for a man may preceive that in one or other sort they had their guards upon them, that they who were ill disposed could not at their pleasures abuse that authority. Nor avails it in this case, that the matter is not corrupted; for an absolute authority corrupts the matter in a very short time, gathers friends, and makes partisans, neither is poverty or want of good kindred a let; for wealth, and every other advantage presently runs after them, as particularly in the ereation of the ten we shall treat.   

CHAP. XXXVI.  
The citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the Commonwealth, ought not to disdain the less, as unworthy of them.  
THe Romans had made Marcus Fabius, and Caius Manlius Consuls, and gained a very glorious battle of the Veyentes and the Etruscans, where in Quintus Fabius was slain. the Consul's brother, who had been consul the year before. Where we should well consider, how proper the laws of that city were for her advancement. and how much those other Republic that trace not herfoote steps, decevie themselves. For though the Romans were zealous lovers of glory, yet never did they esteem it dishonourable at one time to obey, where other whiles they had commanded; and to serve in that army whereof they had been Commanders. which custom is contrary to the opinion, laws, and courses of the citizens of our times. And in Venice yet is this error, that a citizen having borne a great office, esteems it a disgrace to accept of a less, and the city allows him to refuse it. Which thing though it were honourable for the private, yet is it wholly unprofitable for the public For a Commonwealth may expect better performance from, and repose more trust in that citizen, who descends from a greater charge to undertake a less, then in him that from a less arises to the command of a greater. Because they cannot with good reason trust him with their weighty affairs, unless they see men about him of such reverence and virtue that his inexperience may be guided and directed by their virtue and authority. And if in Rome there had been that custom which is in Venice, and other Republic and modern Kingdoms, that he who had once been Consul would never go to the war afterwards, but as Consul, many things very prejudicial to the free government of the state would have grown thereupon; and through the errors committed by these new men, and by their ambition, which they might have used with more freedom, not having those grave men about them, by whose presence they might be so kept in awe, that they should not dare to step aside: and so they would have become dissolute; which would all have turned to the public loss.   

CHAP. XXXVII.  
What distaste the Agrarian law gave in Rome, and that it is very offensive to make a law in a Commonwealth, that looks far backwards, and yet goes directly against an ancient custom of the City.  
IT is an opinion of the ancient writers, that men are wont to vex themselves in their crosses, and glut and cloy themselves in their prosperity; and that from the one and the other of these two passions proceed the same affects: for at what time soever men are freed from fight for necessity, they are presently together by the ears through ambition; which is so powerful in men's hearts, that to what degree fo●ver they arise, it never abandons them. The reason is, because nature hath created men in such a sort, that they can desire every thing, but not attain to it. So that the desire of getting being greater than the power to get, thence grows the dislike of what a man enjoys, and the small satisfaction a man hath thereof. Hereupon arises the change of their states, for some men desiring to have more, and others fearing to lose what have they already, they proceed to enmities and war, from whence comes the destruction of one country, and the advantage of another. This discourse I have made, because it sufficed not the Commons of Rome, to secure themselves from the Nobility by creating the Tribune's, to which desire they were forced by nenecessity; but that they suddenly, upon the obtaining thereof began to contend out of ambition, and think to share equally with the nobility both in honours and fortunes, as the things that are in most value with men. Whereupon grew that disease that brought forth the quarrel touching the Agrarian law. And in conclusion, caused the destruction of the Roman Republic. And because Commonwealths well ordered are to maintain the public wealthy, and the particulars poor, it is likely there was in Rome some defect in this law, which either was not so exactly framed at the beginning, but that every day it had need of some revising and amending; or that the making of it was so long put off, that it became scandalous to look so far backwards; or that being well instituted at first, in time it grew by use corrupt. So in what manner soever it were, that law was never mentioned in Rome, but that the whole city was in a tumult. This law had two principal heads. By one they ordered that no citizen could possess more than so many acres of ground: by the other, that the lands which they took from their enemies should be divided among the people of Rome. It came therefore to thwart the Nobility two manner of ways; because they that had the greatest states in possessio, were not permitted by thelaw who were the greater part of the Nobility; and there upon aught not to enjoy it: and when the enemy's goods should be divided among the common people, they took from the Nobility the means to grow rich. These quarrels then being taken up against potent persons, and they by their resistance thinking to defend the public, whensoever (as it is said) mention was made of this law, the whole city was in an uproar; and the Nobility wrought it out with patience and with diligence, either by drawing an army forth into the field, or by opposing another Tribune against him that propounded it, or sometimes by yielding a part, or else by sending a Colony into that place which was to be divided, as it befell them of the Country of Antium, for which upon a dispute touching this law, there was a Colony drawn out of Rome and sent into this place, unto whom the said County was consigned. Where Titus Livius uses a notable kind of speech, saying, that with much ado they found any one in Rome, that would give in their names to go to the said Colony, the people being rather desirous of these advantages in Rome, then to go and enjoy them in Antium. And the quarrel touching this law continued a good while, till the Romans transported their arms into the uttermost parts of Italy, and likewise out of Italy. After which, as it seems, it ceased: which so fell out, because the fields, which the enemies of Rome possessed, were far apart from the people's sight, and in a place where it was not safe to come to cultivate them, and therefore grew they less desirous of them, and the Romans also did less use to punish their enemies in that manner. And when they did dispossess any town of the territory, they there distributed Colonies, so that upon such reasons this law was laid asleep till the Gracchies time, by whom it being afterwards awaked, quite ruined the Roman liberty. For they found their adversaries strength doubled; and hereupon kindled such a hatred between the people, and the Senate, that they came to blows and to blood without civil mean, or order. So that the public magistrates having no power to give remedy hereto, nor either of the factions relying on them, they sought private helps, each party thinking to make a head should defend them. In this quarrel, and disorder, the people chose Marius, and made him four times Consul; and so long he continued his Consulship, with small intervas, that he had power of his own self to make himself thrice more Consul. Against which pestilence the Nobility having no other remedy, began to favour Sylla; and having made him head of their faction, they came to civil wars, and after much bloodshed and change of chance, the Nobility remained conqueror These quarrels were anew revived in Caesar and Pompey's time; for Caesar being made head of Marius his party, and Pompey of Sulla's, coming to fight, Caesar remained victor; who was the first tyrant in Rome, (so that that city never after enjoyed her liberty, such beginning then, and end had the Agrarian law. And although we showed other where, how the discords of Rome between the Senate and the People preserved Rome's liberty, because they sprung from those laws in favour of liberty, and therefore the end of this Agrarian law may seem disagreeing to such a conclusion; yet I say, that upon this I no way change my opinion; for so great is the Nobilities ambition, that if by divers ways and sundry means it were not abated in a city, it would suddenly bring that city to destruction: so that if the strife touching the Agrarian law had much ado in three hundred years to enthral Rome; it is like enough it would have been brought much sooner into servitude, when the people both with this law, and also with their other humours, had not always bridled the Nobilities ambition. We see by this also, how much men esteem wealth rather than honours, because the Nobility of Rome, if it touched matter of honour, ever gave way to the people without any extraordinary distastes: but when it concerned their wealth, so obstinately did they defend it, that the people to vent their humour had their recourse to those extravagant ways that are above discoursed of. The Authors of which disorder were the Gracchis, whose intention ought to be commended, rather than their discretion. For to take away a disorder grown in a Commonwealth, and hereupon to make a law that looks fair backwards, is a course ill advised of; and (as formely it hath been said at large) it doth nothing else but hasten that evil to which the disorder guides thee; but giving way to the time some what, either the mischief comes slower, or of itself at length before it comes to the upshot) goes out   

CHAP. XXXVIII.  
Weak Commonwealths are hardly drawn to a certain resolution, and know not how to determine: and the course they ordinarily take, they are rather forced to, then choose of themselves.  
THere being in Rome a very grievous pestilence, and thereupon the Volsci and the Equi thinking a fit time presented to bring the city of Rome into subjection, these two people having got a very great army together, set upon the Latini and the Hernici, and wasted their country: this the Latini and Hernici were constrained to give notice of at Rome, and entreat, that the Romans would undertake their defence: to whom the Romans, exceedingly afflicted by the plague, answered that they should take a course to defend themselves with their own forces, because they were not then able to do it. Wherein appears the magnanimity and wisdom of that Senate, that even in all fortunes they would reign and give law to those deliberations their vassals should make; nor were they ashamed to resolve any thing, when necessity pressed them to it, though contrary to their manner of living, and the resolutions usually made by them. This I say, because at other times the same Senate had forbidden the said people to arm and defend themselves; and therefore to a Senate, whose judgement had been weaker than was theirs, it would have seemed an abatement of reputation, to have granted them such a defence. But they always weighed businesses in their due balance, and ever chose the lesser ill in lieu of the greater good: for it agreed ill with them; to see themselves unable to defend their subjects; and they were as little content, that they should arm without them, for the reasons alleged, and others also that are evident. Yet knowing, that in any case upon necessity they were to take arms, having the enemy upon their backs, they took the more honourable part, and would rather, that what they were to do, they should do it with their leave, to the end that having disobeyed upon necessity, they should not be accustomed to disobey voluntarily. And though this may well appear a course fit for every Republic to take, the weak and ill advised Common wealths cannot do the like, nor know not how to stand upon terms of honour in the like niceties. The Duke Valentine had taken Faeuza, and made Bologna yield to his conditions; afterwards desiring to return from thence to Rome through Tuscany, sent a confident of his into Florence to ask passage for himself with his army. Hereupon they consulted at Florence, how to manage this business, nor did any one advise them to grant it him. Wherein they followed not the course the Romans took: for the Duke being exceedingly well armed, and the Florentines in a manner disarmed, that they could not hinder his passage, it had been much more for their honour, if it had seemed that he had passed with their licence, rather than by force; for there it was wholly their disgrace, which had been in part less, if they had carried it otherwise. But the worst condition these weak Republics have, is to take to no resolution, so that what party soever they take, they take it perforce; and if any good be done them, it is forced upon them, for which they owe no thanks to their own wisdom. I will give two other examples, that happened in our days in the state of our city, In the year 1500, when Lewi the 12 of France had recovered Milan, being desirous to put Pisa into our hands, for the sum of 50000 ducats, which the Florentines had promised him, after such restitution, he sent his army commanded by the Lord Beaumond towards Pisa, in whom, (although he were a French man) yet the Florentines reposed much trust. This army and Captain came on between Cascina and Pisa, to assail the walls, where staying some days to give order for the siege, there came some Deputies of Pisa to Beaumond, who offered to yield up the city to the French army with these conditions, that upon the King's word he should promise, not to give them into the Florentines hands, till after four months, which terms were utterly refused by the Florentines, whereupon ensued, that after a while they left the siege with disgrace. Nor was that accord refused for other reason, then because they doubted of the King's word; although (such was the weakness of their counsel) that they were forced to put themselves into his protection, though they trusted him not: nor in the mean while did they consider, that the King could easier deliver Pisa into their hands, having gotten possession of it, than promise he would deliver that which he had not yet in his power: wherein if he had failed, it had been easy to discover the King's intention, and so have spared their cost. In such sort that it had been a great deal more to their advantage, had they agreed, that Beaumond should have taken it upon any promise; as it was seen afterwards by experience in the year 1502. when upon the rebellion of Arezzo, the Lord Jubalt was sent by the King of France with succours to the Florentines. Who being come near to Arezzo, began to treat agreement with the town, which upon certain terms would have yielded, as before the Pisans, but were again refused by the Florentines. Which Jubalt perceiving, and thinking that the Florentines did little understand themselves, he began to practise an agreement with them by himself, without admitting the commissaries into the party, so that he concluded a peace of his own head, and thereupon entered Arezzo with his own people, showing the Florentines, they were fools, and understood not the affairs of the world; and if they desired to have Arezzo in their hands, they should let the King know of it, who could more easily deliver it them, having his people already in the town, then if they were without before the walls. In Florence they forbore not to rail upon, and blame the said Jubalt, till they understood, that if Beaumond had been like Jubalt, they should have had Pisa as well as Arezzo. And thus to return to our purpose, Republics which will not come to resolution, seldom make any party much to their advantage, unless they are forced thereupon: because their weakness will never suffer them to determine, where there is any doubt: and unless that doubt be cancelled by a neessitie that violently thrusts them forward, they remain always in suspense.   

CHAP. XXXIX.  
The same accidents are seen to befall several peoples.  
THIS is easily known by any one that considers things present and things long passed, that in all Cities and all people's there are now the same desires and the same humours, there were always; So that it is very easy for him that examines with diligence the things that are past, to foresee the future in any Commonwealth, and to serve himself of those remedies, which were in use among the ancients; or not finding of those which were used, to devise new, for the resemblance these accidents have with the ancient. But because these considerations are neglected, or not understood by the Reader; or if understood, not known to him that governs, it follows, that continually in all successions of ages the same offeeces happen. The City of Florence after 94 years having lost a part of their dominions, as Pisa and other Towns, was forced to make war against those that held them. And because he that had them in his hands, was of great power, it came it pass, that they were at great expense in the wars, without good success. From these great expenses they proceeded with impositions to grieve the people, and from those grievances came the people's murmurings and complaints. And for that this war was ordered by a Magistracy of ten Citizens, who were called the Council of ten for the war, they were maliced by the whole body of the City, as the Authors of the war, and the expenses of the same; and they began to persuade themselves, that by taking away that Magistracy, they should end their wars; so that having to make new, they would not supply the places, but rather suffering that Magistracy to expire, they referred their employments all to the Senate: Which resolution was so hurtful, that not only it ended not the war, (as the generality was persuaded) but those men being put out of the employment, who guided it with understanding, there followed such confusion, that besides Pisa, they lost Arezzo, and many other places, in so much that the people perceiving their error, and that the fever occasioned the mischief, and not the Physician, they created anew the Magistracy of ten. The self same humour grew up in Rome against the name of the Consuls; for the people seeing one war arise from another, giving them no rest, where they ought to have attributed it wholly to their neighbour's ambition, who desired to suppress them, they imputed it rather to the ambition of the nobility; who not being able in Rome to chastise the people protected by the, tribunitial power, endeavoured to draw them our of Rome under the Consuls, and there to oppress them, where they had no assistance. And hereupon they thought it necessary to take away the Consuls, or so to limit their power, that they should have no authority over the people neither at home nor abroad. The first that assa●d to put that law in practice, was one Terentillus a Tribun, who propounded they should create five men, to consider the Consul's power, and moderate it. Which thing much angered the nobility, giving them to think, that the Majestic of the Empire was wholly declined; and that there was not left to the Nobility any dignity more in the Commonwealth. Yet such was the Tribune's obstinacy, that the Consul's name was quite put out, and in the conclusion they were contented after some other order taken, rather to create Tribune's with Consulan power, than the Consuls; in such hatred had they their name and their authority. And so they proceeded a long time, till at length, having known their errors, as the Florentines returned to the Counsel of ten, so they anew created their Consuls.   

CHAP. XL.  
The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what the rain is to be noted; where among many other things is considered, how by the like accident a Republic may be preserved, or suppressed.  
HAving a purpose to discourse particularly of the accidents that happened at Rome upon the creation of the Decemvirate, methinks it is not much out of the way first to relate summarily the story of that creation; and afterwards to sift out the parts that are in those notable actions; which are many and of good consideration, as well for those that endeavour to maintain a Republic free, as for them that intent to bring it under the yoke; for in this discourse there will appear many errors committed by the Senate, and by the people, in prejudice of the Common liberty, and many faults made by Appius Chief of the Decemvirate, lammageable to that tyranny which he had presupposed already founded in Rome. After many disputes and strifes passed between the people and the Nobility, about the framing of new laws in Rome, whereby they might firmly establish the liberty of that State, with one accord they sent Spurius Posthumius with two other Citizens to Athens, for the copies of those laws which Solon gave to that City, that thereupon they might found the Roman Ordinances. After their return, they came to appoint the men that were to examine and frame the said laws. And they ordained ten Citizens for a year, of which Appius Claudius was one, a cunning and a turbulent man. And that they might without any respect make such laws, they took away the power of all other Magistrates in Rome, espeaially of the, Tribune's and Consuls. They took away also all appeal to the people; so that these new officers became absolute Princes of Rome. Afterwards Appius gained the authority of all his other companions, by means of the favours the people did him, for he was grown so popular in his behaviour, that it seemed a marvel, how so suddenly he had changed his nature and disposition, having always before this time been thought a cruel persecutor of the common people. These ten governed themselves very moderately, not having above twelve Lictors, who always went before him that was Chiese among them. And although they had the absolute authority, yet when they were to punish any Citizen of Rome for homicide, they cited him in presence of the people, and made them judge him. They writ their laws in ten Tables; and before they confirmed them, published them to the general view, that every man might read and understand them, whereby it might be known if there were any fault in them, which before their confirmation should be amended. After this Appius caused a rumour to be spread throughout Rome that if to these ten Tables an addition of twoothers were made, they would be perfect So that the conceithereof gave the people occasion to make the Council of ten again for another year, whereunto the people consented willingly, as well because they would not have the Consuls anew ocreated, as for that they hoped they might well subsist without Tribune's, these being judges of the causes, as is aforesaid: It being then agreed to make a new election, the whole nobility betook themselves to sue for these honours, and Appius was amongst the foremost of them, and behaved himself in his suit with so much courtesy towards the people, that all his competitors were jealous of it. 
Credebant enim haud gratuitam in tanta superbia comitetem fore.  They did not believe, that he being so proud a man, used all this courtesy for nought. And being in doubt publicly to oppose him, they resolved to do it cunningly, and so though he were the youngest of them all, they gave him the authority to propound to the people the ten that were to be elected, thinking he would use the same terms others did, not to name himself, being a thing unusual and disgraceful in Rome. But he took this impediment 
Illeverò impedimentum pro occasione arripuit.  for an opportunity: And named himself among the first, to the admiration, and displeasure of all the Nobility; and after named nine others to his own purpose. Which new creation made for another year, began to show the people and the Nobility their error; for suddenly, Appius made an end of dissembling to be what he 
Appius finem fecit ferendae alienae persc 〈…〉.  was not: and began to show his inbred pride: and infected his companions with his own evil conditions: and to fright the people and the Senate, in exchange of twelve Lictors, they made a hundred and twenty. The fear was equal in all, for a while; but they began afterwards to give respect to the Senate, and rudely to handle the Commons. If any one being wronged by one of these judges did appeal to another, he was worse abused in his appeal, than in his first trial. So that the people having perceived their error, began to look the Nobility in the face with a great deal of sorrow; And thence they took occasion to seek after their liberty, 
Et inde libertatis captare auram, unde ser vitutem timendo in eum statum Remp. adduxerát. Vt ipsi taedio praesentium consules desiderarent.  from whence by fearing their bondage, they had brought the Commonwealth into that misery. And the Nobility was well pleased with this their affliction: That being weary of their present condition, they might desire to have their Consuls restored. The days came at length that ended the year: the two Tables of the laws were finished but not published. The ten hereupon took occasion to continue on their Magistracy, and hold the State by violence, and make the young Nobility their guard, on whom they bestowed the goods of those they condemned. With which gifts the youth 
Quibus donis juventus corrum pebatur, & malebat licentiam suam, quam omnium libertatem.  being corrupted, loved rather their own licentious life, than the common liberty. It fell out about this time, that the Sabini and the Volsci made war against the Romans. Upon which fear the ten began to see the weakness of their own estate: for without the Senate they could not take order for the war; and assembling the Senate together they thought they lost their authority: yet upon mere necessity they took this last course; and having gotten the Senators together, many of them spoke against the pride of the ten, and in particular Valerius and Horatius; and their authority had been quite abolished, but that the Senate, of mere envy to the Common people, would not show their authority, thinking, that if the ten should voluntarily depose their Magistracy, the making of Tribune's of the people might perhaps be left. The war was then resolved of, and two armies were led forth commanded by part of the ten: and Appius stayed at home to govern the City. Whereupon it happened, that he fell in love with Virginia; and when he would have taken her by force, her Father Virginius to free her, slew her; whereupon ensued divers tumults at Rome, and in the armies, which being brought back again and joined with the remainder of the people at Rome, went apart thence to the holy mount: where they stayed, till the ten had deposed their Magistracy, and that the Tribune's and Consul's being created, Rome was restored to the ancient form of liberty. It is noted then by the text, that the inconvenient of setting up a Tyranny grew first upon the same occasions, that the greater part of Tyrannies ordinarily use to arise upon in Cities, and this is from the overmuch desire the people have of liberty, and the excessive ambition the Nobility have to command. And when they agree not to make a law in favour of liberty, and either party betakes itself to favour some one, then suddenly starts up a tyranny. The people and the Nobility of Rome consented to create the ten; and to create them with so great authority, as they did for the desire they both had, the one to extinguish the memory of the consuls, the other of the Tribune's. When they were created, the people thinking that Appius was become of the popular faction, and rudely handled the Nobility, the people betook themselves to favour him. And when a people is led into such an error, as to give reputation to any one, because he creates those evil that they hate, if he hath wit, it will always come to pass, that he shall make himself Lord of that City; for he will wait his opportunity together with the people's favour to extinguish the Nobility, and will never endeavour to oppress the people, till he hath quite suppressed the Nobles; at which time when the people shall perceive themselves to be in bondage, they shall not know whether to have recourse for help. This course have they all held, that have laid the foundations of a Tyranny in any Commonwealth. Which if Appius had likewise held, his tyranny would have been of longer durance, and not have failed so quickly; but he went the clean contrary way; nor could a man have done more undiscreetly, than he, who to maintain a tyranny, made those his enemies that bestowed it first upon him, and could still make it good, and fought to gain those to be his friends, who neither agreed to give it him, nor could maintain it to him, and so lost those that were his friends, and strove to make those his friends, that could not be so: For though the nobility desire to tyrannize, yet that part of the nobility that hath not a share in the tyranny, is always enemy to the tyrant; nor is it possible ever to gain them all to his side, by reason of the nobilities exceeding ambition and excessive avarice, seeing that the tyrant cannot have so great wealth, nor so many honours, as to satisfy them all. And thus Appius, forsaking the people, and cleaving to the nobility, committed a most evident error, and so for other reasons abovesaid; and because, if a man will hold any thing by violence, he that forces must needs be stronger than he that is forced. From whence it comes, that those Tyrarts who have the generality to friend, and the great ones their enemies, are in the more safety, because, their violence is supported with greater forces, than that which is favoured by the Nobility, and hated by the people: for with the people's favour the Forces within are sufficient to maintain themselves, as they were to Nabis Tyrant of Sparta, when all Greece and the people of Rome assaulted him, having made himself sure of some few of the Nobility, and always having the people his friend, wherewith he defended himself: which he could not have done, if they had been otherwise. In that other degree, to have but few friends at home, the forces within suffice nor, but must be sought after abread: and they are to be of three kinds, the one to have a guard of strangers, to assure thy person; the other, to have an army in the country, which may serve the same turn the people could; the third, to hold correspondence and friendship with thy put issant neighbours, who may defend thee. And whosoever takes these courses, and observes them rightly, though the people be his enemy, yet in some sort may he save himself. But Appius could not by any army make himself master of the Country, the country there and Rome being one and the same thing; and what he could do, he knew not how to do, and so perished in his beginning. The Senate also and the people in the creation of the Decemvirate committed very great errors. For, though it be formerly said in the discourse touching a Dictator, that those Magistrates, who are made of themselves, not those that are chosen by the people, endamage the liberty, yet the people ought, when they make their Magistrates, take such order in their making, that they restrain them by some regards from growing wicked. And where they should set a guard over them, to keep them good, the Romans took it away, creating that the sole Magistracy in Rome, nullifying all the rest, for the excessive desire (as we before said) The Senate had to suppress the Tribune's, and the Common people the Consuls: which blinded them both so, that they concurred in this disorder: for men (as King Ferdinand said) do oftentimes like certain lesser birds of prey, who so eagerly pursue the prey, whereunto they have a natural provocation, that they perceive not a greater bird over their heads with like eagerness ready to seize on them. The people of Rome's error than is made plain by this discourse, as I propounded it in the beginning, in going to save their liberty; as Appius his errors also in going to seize upon the Tyranny.   

CHAP. XLI.  
Of humble to become, proud, of● merciful cruel, without passing through the due means between these extremes, argues indiscretion, and turns nothing to advantage.  
AMong other termsill used by Appius, to maintain his tyranny, it was not of small moment, to leap too suddenly from one quality to another: for his craft in deceiving the people, by dissembling popularity, was used to good purpose. The terms likewise he held to cause a new creation of the ten, were well used: As also his boldness in creating himself one of them, contrary to the nobilities opinion It was a course rightly taken, to choose his colleagues to his own turn: but it was not advisedly done, presently upon this (according as I said above) to change his disposition at an instant, of a friend to show himself enemy to the people, of courteous to become insolent, of mild harsh, and to do this so suddenly, that without any excuse he discovers to all the falsehood of his heart. For he that hath seemed good for a while, and would, to serve his own turn, become wicked, should come to it by the due degrees; and in such sort goeon with his occasions, that before the different disposition deprive him of his ancient favours, it may have given him so many new, that his authority be no way diminished: otherwise being found unmasked and without friends, he perishes.   

CHAP. XLII.  
How easily men may be corrupted.  
IT is remarkable also in this matter touching the Decemvirate, how easily men are corrupted, so that they make themselves become of acquit contrary nature, though at first good, and well brought up: considering how that youth, which Appius had taken near to him for guard of his person, began to favour the tyranny, for a very small profit which they made thereof. And how Quintus Fabisu, one of the second ten that were chosen, being an excellent man; blinded with a little ambition, and persuaded by the malignity of Appius, changed all his good conditions into very bad, and became like him; which being throughly examined, shall cause those that institute the laws of Republics or Kingdoms to be more exactin bridling humane desires, and in taking from them all hope of escaping scot-free whensoever they offend.   

CHAP. XLIII.  
They that fight for their own glory, are the good and faithful soldiers.  
IT is considerable also upon the above written treaty, what difference there is between an army satisfied and contented in itself, fight for its own glory, and that which is ill disposed, fight for other men's ambition; for where the Roman armies were always wont under the Consuls to be victorious, under the Decem. virate they were always losers. From this example may we know in part the reasons why mercenary soldiers are unprofitable, who have no other obligation to make them stand true to thee, but some small stipend thou bestowest on them. Which cannot be a motive so sufficient, or of such weight, as to gain thee their truth and love so far, as to die in thy behalf. For in those armies, wherein there is not that affection towards him for whom they fight, which makes them become his partisans where can never be so much valour, as to subdue or resist an enemy that hath never so little virtue or courage. And because neither this affection, nor contention can grow in others, more than in thy natural subject, it is necessary in the maintaining of a state, whether it be Commonwealth or Kingdom, to arm the native subjects, as we see all they have done, who with their armies have made any great conquests. The Roman armies under the Decemvirates were valorous as formerly: but because the same disposition was not in them, they achieved not the like exploits. But so soon as the Decemvirate had an end, and they, as free men, began to war, they took to them again their former courages, and by consequence their undertake proved successful, according to their ancient wont.   

CHAP. XLIIII.  
A multitude without a head is unprofitable: and a man should not first threaten; and afterward demand the power.  
THe Common people of Rome, upon the occasion of Verginius being gone apart armed into the Holy Mount, the Senate deputed some unto them to demand, by what authority they had forsaken their Captains and retired into the mountain; and such was the esteem of the Senate's authority, that the people having no head of their multitude, no man durst make answer. And Titus Livius says, they wanted not what to answer, but they wanted who should answer: Which thing does punctually show the unprofitableness of a multitude without a head, and therefore Verginius perceiving the disorder, sound the expedient of creating twenty Tribune's of war who should be their head to answer, and confer with the Senate. And having demanded, that Valenius and Horatius should be sent them, to whom they would declare their minds, these refused to go, till the ten had deposed their magistracy: and being come to the mountain where the people was, the demands were, that they would have the Triburs of the people created again, and that they might appeal to the people from every magistrate, and that all the ten should be delivered into their hands, and they would burn them quick: Valerius and Horatius commended their first demands: and blamed their latter, as Impious, saying, 
Crudelitatem damnatis, crudelitatem initis.  You condemn cruelty, and yet you use it yourselves. And they were advised to leave making mention of the ten, and attend only to lay hold of their authority and power, and afterwards they should not want means of satisfaction; where plainly it appears, how much it savours of folly, and little of wisdom, to demand a thing, and beforehand to say, I will do ill with it. For a man ought not herein discover his intention, but first in any case endeavour to be master of what he desires. For it is enough to ask a man his weapons, without saying to him, I will kill thee with them, being thou hast power, when thou art possessed of them, to do as thou list.   

CHAP. XLV.  
It is a matter of very evil example, when he that makes a law neglects the observing of it: and it is very dangerous in a state, to make a continual practice of cruel executions.  
THe agreement being made and Rome reduced to her ancient form, Verginius cited Appius before the people, to defend his own cause: whom appearing accompanied with many of the Nobility, Verginius commanded to be cast into prison. Appius began to cry out, and appeal to the people. Verginius said, he was not worthy to be allowed that appeal which himself had destroyed, or have the people defend him, who had so much endamaged them. Appius replied, that they ought not to violate that appeal, which they with such earnest desire had ordained. For all this he was imprisoned, and before the day of giving judgement, he slew himself. And though Appius his lewd life deserved any punishment, yet savor'd it but little of eivil government, to violate the laws, and especially that which was but then made. For I believe not, there is any thing of worse example in a Republic, then to make a law, and not observe it; and the more, when he that makes it breaks it. Florence after the ninty fourth year having its state reestablished by the aid of Friar jerom Savanarola, whose writings show his learning, wisdom, and virtue, and having among other ordinances to assure the citizens, caused a law to be made, that a man might appeal to the people from the sentences, which for matter of state, the Eight, or the signory should give: which law he long persuaded, and with much a do at length obtained. It happened that a while after the confirmation of it, five citizens were condemned to death by the signory for some offence touching the state; and they desiring to appeal, were not suffered, and so the law not observed. Which more wronged the reputation of that Friar, than any other accident. For if that appeal was profitable, he should have caused it to be observed, if otherwise, he should never have so urged the making of it. And so much more remarkable was this accident, in that the Friar in those many sermons which he made, after the breach of this law, never either condemned him that broke it, or excused the breach, as he that would not condemn any thing that served to his purpose; and excuse it he could not. Which having discovered his ambitious and factious mind, took much from his credit, and charged him with blame enough. It is a very great fault also in a state, every day in the citizens minds to renew the memory of old wrongs done to this or that man with new punishments, as it befell at Rome after the Decemvirate. For all the ten, and other citizens at sundry times were accused, and condemned, so that all the Nobility were exceedingly affrighted, thinking they would never leave condemning them, till they had destroyed the whole Nobility. And certainly it had produced some inconvenient in the city, if Marcus Duellius the Tribun had not taken order for it. Who made a decree, that for a whole year it should not be lawful for any man to cite or accuse any citizen of Rome, which assured all the Nobility. Where we see, how great a hurt it is to a Republic or Prince, to hold their subjects minds in suspicion and fear with continual persecutions and punishments: and without doubt a worse course cannot be taken. For men that begin to doubt of mischief, in any case provide for themselves in their dangers, and grow bolder, and less respectful how they venture on novelties. Wherefore it is necessary either never to hurt any, or the hurt that is to be done to do at once, and afterwards let men enjoy some assurance, that may give them cause to quiet and settle their minds.   

CHAP. XLVI.  
Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another: and first they aim no further, then that they themselves suffer no hurt of others, afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others.  
THe people of Rome having recovered their liberty, and being returned into their former state, or rather greater, insomuch as they had made new laws, which were as new foundations laid to establish their power, it seemed probable, that Rome for some while would have been at quiet; yet by experience the contrary was seen, for every day there sprung up new tumults and new disagreements. And because Titus Livius very judiciously gives the reason from whence they grew, methinks it is not out of purpose, punctually to relate his words where he says, that always either the people or the Nobility waxed proud, when the other grew humble; and when the Commons contained themselves modestly within their bounds, than began the youth of the Nobility to provoke them with all manner of injuries; nor could the Tribune's much remedy this, for they also had their shares in the sufferance. The Nobility on the other side, although well they wot that their youth was too insolent, yet being that insolency was to be committed by one side, they wished rather their own should be the actors, than the commonalty. And thus the desire of maintaining the liberty caused each to proceed so far till they oppressed the other. And the order of these accidents is, that while men endeavour to be out of fear themselves, they begin to put others in fear; and that injury which they chase from themselves, they thrust upon another, as if there were a necessity either to hurt or to be hurt. Hereby is seen in what manner among other things Commonwealths come to dissolution, and men rise from one ambition to another. And as that sentence of Sallust put in Caesar's mouth, was very true; That all evil examples first 
Quod omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta sunt.  spring from good beginnings. The first thing that those citizens (as is above said) endeavour, who behave themselves ambitiously in a Republic, is, not only to be out of the reach of private men's wrongs, but out of the Magistrates power. To attain hereto, they seek after friendships, which they gain by means, in appearance honest, either by supplying their want of moneys, or by protecting them from those that are too mighty for them. And because this seems worthy and noble, every one is easily deceived, and thereupon no body seeks to remedy it, till he presevering in the same course without let, becomes such a one, that the private Citizens stand in awe of him, and the Magistrates bear him respect. And when he is grown to this height, and no order first taken for restraint of his greatness, he comes to be in such terms, that it proves very dangerous to justle with him, for the causes I have formerly alleged, of the danger there is to strive with an inconvenient, which is already come to some growth in a city, because than it is brought to such an exigent, that there is a necessity to seek either to extinguish it with danger of sudden ruin: or letting it alone, to submit to the yoke of bondage, unless death or some other accident prevent it. For being once come to the terms above written, that both citizens and Magistrates stand in fear to offend him, and his, without much ado after will they understand their own strength, and hurt at their own pleasure. Whereupon a Republic among her ways of government ought to use this, to watch carefully over her citizens, that they have not power under the colour of good to do mischief: and that their reputation be such as may advantage the Commonwealth, and not wrong it, as in its own place we shall argue it.   

CHAP. XLVII.  
Men, though they are deceived in generalities, yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars.  
THE people of Rome (as is abovesaid) having taken in distaste the very name of Consuls, & being desirous that plebeians might be made Consuls, or their authority limited, the Nobility, that the Consular authority might as well be chosen out of the Commons as the Nobility; The people were herewith contented, thinking to abolish the Consulate, and to have their share in this highest dignity Hence grew a notable accident, that when they came to create these Tribune's, which they could have made all plebeians, the people chose 
Quorum co●i●orum eventus docuit, alios animos in contentione libertatis & honoris alios secundum deposita certamina incorrup to judicio esse.  them all out of the Nobility; whereupon Titus Livius uses these words: The event of these assemblies, or Councils, showed, that minds differ much, when contention is made for liberty or honour, and when all strife being appeased, the judgements rest clear. And examining from whence this proceeds, I believe it is from thence that men are more deceived in generalities, than in particularities. The Common people of Rome thought generally, they deserved the Consulate, because they were the greatest part of the City, because they underwent the greater dangers in the wars, because they were they, by force of whose arms Rome maintained her liberty, and became mighty. And thinking (as is said) this their desire reasonable, they would have this authority in any case. But when they came to pass their judgements in particular upon their own men, they perceived their weakness, and judged that no one of them deserved that, which raking them all together, they thought they had been worthy of. So that being ashamed of them, they had recourse to those that were of merit: At which resolution Titus Livius worthily marvailing, says thus; This modesty, uprightness, and greatness of mind, where shall 
Hanc modestiam equitatemque Realitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quae tunc populi universi fuit.  you now adays find it in one man, which then was in whole people? In confirmation hereof, another notable example may be brought which happened in Capua, after that Hannibal had broken the Roman army at Cannae: upon which occasion all Italy being in an uproar, Capua was ready to rise too, for the hatred there was between the people and the Senate. And at that time Pacuvius Calanus being the principal Magistrate, and perceiving the great hazard they went to be slain by them, and the city yielded up to Hannibal, now that the State of Rome was in distress. Afterwards he added, that if they would let him order the business, he would provide so, that they should be both friends; but he would shut them all up in the Palace, and by giving the people power over them to chastise them, save them. The Senators yielded to his advice, and he called the people together, having the whole Senate shut up in the Palace, and said, that the time was come wherein they might take down the Nobilities pride, and revenge themselves on them for the injuries they had received at their hands, he holding them all prisoners in his keeping: but because he thought they liked not their City should be without government, it was fit (being they intended to kill the old Senators) to create new ones first. And therefore he had put the names of all the Senators in a bag, and so would begin to draw them forth one by one before them; and so put them to death presently, as soon as they should have made choice of a Successor. And having begun to take out one, when he was named, there was a great noise made, calling him a proud, cruel, and arrogant man. And Pacu 〈…〉 vius requiring that they should make an exchange of him, the whole multitudestood silent. And after a little while one of the Commons was named: whereat one began to whistle, another to laugh, some to speak in one sort, some in another. And so followed all the rest one after another as they were named, being thought unworthy to be made Senators, so that Pacuvius hereupon taking occasion, said ' seeing that you judge that this City must needs be in ill case without a Senate, and you are not agreed to change your old Senators, I think it would be well that ye were made friends; for this fright wherein the Senators have been put will so humble them, that the courtesy which ye sought otherwhere, ye shall find with them. And hereunto being agreed, there followed the union; and it was plain, how they were deceived, when they were forced to come to particulars. Besides, people in judging generally of affairs and their accidents are beguiled, which they afterwards understand in particular, and perceive the deceit. After the year 1494. the Principal men of the City being chased out of Florence, and there being not any orderly government, but rather an ambitious licentiousness, so that things went from bad to worse, many of the popular faction perceiving the destruction of the City, and understanding no other cause thereof, they blamed the ambition of some powerful man, that nourished these disorders, to the end he might make of it a State to his own purpose, and take away the liberty; and these men were always in the public places of meeting, speaking evil of many Citizens, and threatening them, that if ever they came to the government of the State, they would discover this their treachery and chastise it. It happened oftentimes, that some of these or the like were preferred to the Principal Magistracy, and when they were once in the place, and saw things nearer, they knew well the disorders from whence they grew, and the dangers that hung over them, and the difficulty to remedy them. And having seen how the times and not the men caused the disorder, became forthwith of another mind, and changed their opinion. For the knowledge of things in particular took away that deceit, which when they considered generally, was presupposed in them: so that they that had first, when they were private men, heard them speak, and saw them afterwards being preferred to the chief Magistracy stand quiet, thought it came not from an exacter knowledge of things, but because they had been carried away, and corrupted by the great ones. And this befalling many men many times, it came to a Proverb, that said, these are of one mind in the piazza, and of another in the palace. Considering therefore this whole discourse, we see, how a man may quickly open the people's eyes, for seeing that a generality deceives them, it is expedient to bring them to descend to particulars, as Pacuvius did in Capua, and the Senate in Rome. I think also, this may pass for a conclusion, that no wise man ought to avoid the people's judgement in particular things, about the distributions of degrees and dignities: for only in this the people are not deceived; or if sometime they are deceived, it is very seldom; but a few men are oftentimes deceived, when they are to make the like distribution: Nor do I take it to be superfluous, to show, in the next Chapter, the order the Senate held to clear the people's judgements in these distributions.   

CHAP. XLVIII.  
He that would not have a Magistracy given to one that is base and lewd, let him cause it to be demanded either by one that is very base and lewd, or by one that is noble and very good.  
WHen the Senate was afraid that the Tribune's with Consular authority would be chosen out of the plebeians, they held one of these two courses to prevent it: either they made some of the best reputed men of Rome stand for the magistracy, or they used fit means to corrupt some forbid Plebeian and of the basest condition, who crept in to be competitor with the plebeians that usually of the best quality stood for it. This last way made the people ashamed to bestow it, and the first ashamed to refuse it, all which turns to the purpose of our former discourse: where it's showed, though the people be deceived in generals, yet is it not in particulars.   

CHAP. XLIX.  
If those cities that have had their beginning free, as Rome, have found difficulty to make laws that can maintain them; so those that have had their beginning immediately servile, find almost an impossibility of it.  
How hard a thing it is, in the ordering of a Republic to make provision of all such laws as may keep it free, the proceedings of the Roman Republic does well show; Where notwithstanding that many laws were made first by R●mulus, after by Numa, Tullus Hostilius, and Servius, and last by the ten Citizens created for the like work, nevertheless always in the managing of that city new necessities were discovered, and it was needful to make new laws: as it befell when they created the Censours, which was one of those orders that helped to keep Rome free at that time when she lived in liberty: for being made Arbiters of the fashions and manners of Rome, they were a special occasion that Rome held off so long from being corrupted. Indeed in the beginning of that Magistracy they committed one error creating it for five years: but not long after wards it was amended by the wisdom of Mamercus the Dictator, who, by a new law he made, reduced the said magistracy to the terms of eighteen months. Which the Censor, that were then in office took so much a miss that they put Mamercus out of the Senate ' which thing was much blamed both by the people and the fathers. And because the story shows not any where, that Mamercus could defend himself, it must needs be, that either the historian was defective, or the laws of Rome in this part not perfect: for it is not well, that in a Commonwealth it should so be ordained, that a citizen for publishing a law agreeable to the liberty they lived in, should be wronged without any remedy, But returning to the beginning of this discourse; I say, that a man ought to consider by the creation of this new magistrate, that if those cities that have had their beginnings free, and were under their own government, as Rome, with much ado can find out good laws to maintain them free, it is no marvel, that those cities which have had their beginnings immediately servile, have not found not only difficulty, but impossibity ever so to order themselves, that they can quietly come to a civil government, as appears it befell the city of Florence, because her beginning was in Subjection to the Roman Empire, and having gotten leisure to breathe, began to make her own laws, which having been mingled with the ancient, that were naught, could not work any good effect, and thus she proceeded in a government for 200 years (as we have by certain relations) without ever attaining to such a condition, that she could truly be termed a Republic: and these difficulties which she hath had, have those Cities always had whose beginnings have been like hers And though many times by public and free voices ample authority hath been given to some few Citizens to reform this, yet never have they ordered it to the advantage of the public, but to serve the turn of their own faction, which hath caused more disorder, than order in the City. And to come to some particular example, I say, among other things which he that ordains a Republic should consider, is, that he well advise to what men he gives the power of life and death over his Citizens. This was well provided for in Rome; for by ordinary course they might appeal to the people: yet if there were any occasion of importance, where, to delay execution, by means of the appeal, was dangerous, they had the help of a Dictator, who had power immediately to execute; which remedy they never used, but upon necessity. But Florence and other City's beginning as she did, that is servile, had this authority committed always to a stranger, who was sent by the Prince, to this purpose. When afterwards they became free, they continued this authority in a stranger, whom they called their Captain. Which thing, because he might easily be corrupted by the potent Citizens, was very pernicious. But afterwards this order chagning upon the alteration of the states, they ordained eight Citizens, to supply the Captain's place. Which order of evil became very evil, for the reasons we have otherwhere alleged, that a few are always servants of a few, and especially of the most wealthy: from which the City of Vevice is well guarded, which hath ten citizens, who have power to punish any Citizen without appeal: and because they would not be of sufficient force to punish those that are potent, though they have the authority they have ordained the quaranty, or council of forty: and besides, they have taken care, that the council of the Pregai, which is the chiefer council, may punish them: so that, where there is no want of an accuser, they are never destitute of a Judge, to restrain the great men's insolency. There is then no marvel (seeing that in Rome ordered by itself, and by so many sage persons, there grew every day new occasions, whereupon new laws were to be made in favour of the Common liberty) if in other Cities which have had their beginnings more disordered, there arise such difficulties that put them quite past all recovery.   

CHAP. L.  
The power of stopping the public actions of the city, should not be given into the hands of one council, or one magistracy.  
Titus' Quincius Cincinnatus; and Cneus Iulius Mentus were Consuls together in Rome, who upon a quarrel arisen between them two, made a stay in all the actions belonging to the Republic: which the Senate seeing, persuaded them to create a Dictator, to the end that might be done, which, by reason of their discord, was hindered. But the Consuls disagreeing in every thing else, in this alone were of accord both of them, not to make a Dictator: so that the Senate finding no other help, desired assistance from the Tribune's, who with the Senate's authority forced the Consuls to obey. Where the profitable use of the Tribunate is in the first place remarkable, which served to good purpose to bridle the great men's ambitions exercised not only against the Common people, but also among themselves: in the next place, that it should never be so ordained in a city, that a few should resolve of those things that are the ordinary maintenance of a Commonwealth. For example, if thou givest the power to one Consul to make a distribution of honours and profits, or to a Magistrate to dispatch some business to be done, it is fit to impose a necessity on him, that he do it in any case, or so provide that another might and should do it: otherwise the order would be defective, and perilous, as we see it was in Rome, unless they could have opposed the Consul's obstinacy with the Tribune's authority. In the Commonwealth of Venice the great council bestows both the honours and the profits. It sometime chanced, that the universality upon some disdain conceived, or by reason of some false suggestion did not make choice of any successors to the Magistrates of their Cities, nor to their Ministers of State abroad, which was a very great disorder; for all at once, their Towns and Cities wanted their lawful judges; nor could any thing be obtained while the universality were appeased, or were no longer deceived. And this inconvenient would have brought those Cities to ill terms, had not some discreet Citizens otherwise taken order for them. Who having laid hold of a fit occasion, made a law, that all the Magistrates within or without the City should continue still in their offices, till new choice were made, and their successors appointed. And thus they took away from that counsel all opportunity of enabling them, with the Commonwealths danger, to stop the public actions.   

CHAP. LI.  
A Commonwealth or Prince should make a show to do that of a free mind, which indeed mere necessity compels them to do.  
WIse men gain themselves always the thanks of every thing in their actions, although in truth mere necessity constrains them in any case to do them. This discretion was well made use of by the Roman Senate, when they resolved to add a daily stipend out of the Common treasury to those that served in the wars; it being then of custom there to serve as their own proper charges. But the Senate ceiving, that after that manner they could not long make war; and hereupon neither could they besiege towns, nor lead their armies far off; and judging it needful they should do the one and the other, they determined to allow the said stipends, which they did in such a way, that they got themselves thanks for that, to which they were bound by necessity. And this present was so acceptable to the people, that all Rome seemed overjoyed with it, they thinking it to be a great benefit, which they never had hopes of, nor of themselves had ever sought after. And though the Tribune's did their best to blot out these thanks, by showing it was a matter of grievance and not of case to the people, seeing of necessity they were to impose greater taxes on them, wherewith to pay these stipends, yet could they not prevail so much, but that the people took it very thankfully. Which also the Senate augmented by the course they took in ordering of the tributes. For the greatest and heaviest were those they laid upon the Nobility, and so were those that were first paid.   

CHAP. LII.  
To stay the insolence of one that grows powerful in a Commonwealth, there is no way more secure, and less offensive, than to seike before hand, and so prevent him of those ways by which he attains to that power.  
We see by the above written discourse, how great credit the Nobility got with the people, upon the demonstrations make for their advantage, as well by the stipend appoined, as also by the course they took in imposing the taxes: in which way if the Nobility had continued, they had wholly avoided all manner of tumult in that City, and they had taken from the Tribune's the credit they had with the people, and by consequence their authority. And truly it is not possible in a Commonwealth, especially in those that are corrupted, by any better way, less hurtful, and more easy to oppose the ambition of any Citizen, than to prepossess those ways, by which a man perceives he takes his course, to attain that dignity he aims at. Which means if they had put in practice against Cosmus of Medici, his adversaries had gotten more by the bargain, than by chase him from Florence: For if those Citizens that were at brabble with him had taken the course to favour the people, they had without any embroil or violence taken out of his hands those weapons which were to him of greatest advantage. Peter Soderini gained himself credit with this only in the City of Florence, that he favoued the universality. Which universality gave him the repute, to be a lover of the City's liberty. And surely for those Citizens that envied his greatness, it was much easier, and had been a business of fairer carriage, of less danger and damage to the Commonwealth, to lay hold before hand of those ways by which he became great, than by offering to oppose him, lest that in ruining him, the whole remainder of the Commonwealth also should have fallen to ruin. For if they could have taken out of his hands the forces whereby he became strong, which they might easily have done, they could in all their public counsels and resolutions have opposed him without suspicion or regard. And if any man should reply, that if the Citizens that hated Peter committed an orrour in not prepossessing the ways whereby he gained upon the people: Peter also came to commit an error in not laying hold beforehand of those ways by which his adversaries frighted him: I answer, that Peter deserves excuse, as well because it was hard for him to do it, as because the means were not fit for him to use. For the ways by which he was hurt, were to favour the house of Medici, by which favours they overmastered him, and at last ruined him. Yet Peter could not fairly take his part, because he could not with any good repute destroy that liberty, over which he was appointed as guardian; and seeing these favours could not pass in private, they were suddenly exceeding dangerous to Peter: for what way soever it had been that he had been discovered to be a friend of the Medici, he had fallen into the jealousy, and incurred the hatred of the people. Whereupon his enemies had had greater power to suppress him, then formerly they had. Therefore men ought in every resolution, consider the defects and dangers thereunto belonging, and not fasten on any one of them, when they carry with them more danger than profit, notwithstanding that they seem well to tend to the end propounded: for being otherwise, in this case it would befall them, as it befell Tullius, who by going about to diminish Marc Antonius his power, increased it. For Marc Antonius being judged an enemy of the Senate, and he having got together a great army, good part whereof had followed Caesar's faction, Tullius to take these soldiers from him, persuaded the Senate to set up the reputation of Octavianus, and seng him accompanied with the Consuls, and an army against Marc Antonius; alleging, that so soon as ere the soldiers that followed Marc Antonius should hear the name of Octavianus, Caesar's nephew, and that would be called Caesar too, they would forsake the other, and follow this. So that Marc Antonius being dispossessed of his advantages would easily be suppressed. Which fell out clean contrary. For Marc Antonius got Octavianus to his part, who leaving 〈…〉 lives and the Senate joined forces with him. Which thing proved wholly the ruin of those great men's party. Which also it was easy to have conjectured: nor was that credible which Tullius persuaded himself; but he should rather have made account, that neither that name that with so great glory had exterminated his enemies, and gained himself the principality in Rome, nor yet his heirs, or adherents, would ever suffer them quietly to enjoy their liberty.   

CHAP. LIII.  
The people deceived by a false show of good oftentimes seek their own ruin; and that great hope and large promises do easily move them.  
WHen the ●yentes City was taken, the people of Rome were possessed of an opinion, that it would be profitable for them to send half the Romans to dwell at Veyum: and because that City had a plentiful country about it, frequent with buildings, and near neighbouring to Rome, half of the Roman Citizens might thereby be enriched, without giving any disturbance to the civil government by reason of their near situation. Which thing the Senate and the graver Romans thought so unprofitable or rather so hurtful, that they freely professed, they would rather suffer death, then agree to any such matter: so that the business coming to dispute, did so iorage the people against the Senate, that they had come to blows and to blood, had not some of the graver and reverenter Citizens opposed themselves against their fury; whose regard bridled the people so, that they proceeded not in their insolency. Here two things are to be noted, the first, 〈◊〉 people many times deceived by an imaginary good, cover their own ruin; and unless they be given to understand, which is the evil, and which the good, by some man they trust, the Republics ordinarily run much hazard. And when it so falls out, that the people hath no great confidence in any one, as sometimes it comes to pass, having been of late deceived either by things, or men, of necessity they go to ruin. And Dante, to this purpose, says, in his discourse of a Monarchy:  

A populo molte volte grida,  
Viva la sua morte amocoia lavita  
The vulgar oftimes their own ruin choose  
And life for death ignorantly refuse.   
From this increduliti 〈…〉 ises, that sometimes in Commonwealths good courses are not taken, as formerly it was said touching the Venetians, when being set upon by so many enemies, they could not resolve till they were quite ruined, to gain any of them again, by restitution of what they had wrongfully taken Whereupon war was made against them, and a conspiracy of the Princes. Wherefore when we consider here, that which is easy, and that which is hard to persuade a people to, this distinction is to be made. Either, that which thou art to persuade them to, represents at the first view gain or loss; or is a course that carries somewhat in it of courage or cowardice, And when in things that are propounded to the people, there appears advantage, though cover lie therebe disadvantage in it; and when it seems courageous, though underneath there be covertly hid the destruction of the Republic, it will always be very easy to draw the multitude thereto. And so likewise it will be always very difficult to persuade them to those courses, where there appears either cowardice or loss, though when it is better weighed and advised upon, therein is contained both safety and advantage. And what I have said is confirmed with very many examples of the Romans, as also with those from abroad, both modern and ancient. For from hence grew the evil opinion which was raised in Rome of Fab Max. who could not persuade the people of Rome, that it was profitable for that commonwealth to proceed slowly in that war, & to sustain and bear up against Hannibal's violence without fight: for the people deemed it a base course, nor had they judgement to discern the advantage there was to be gotten by it: nor had Fab. reasons sufficient to make it plain by demonstrations: & ordinarily the people are so much blinded in these opinions of courage, that though they of Rome had committed that error to give power to him that was Commander of the horse under Fab. to fight with Hannib. whether F. would or no, & that by reason thereof the Roman army had like to have been broken, if F. had not succoured it, yet this experience served them not, but that they afterwards made Varro C. not for any other worth of his, but because in all meetings & public places of Rome, he had bragged he would discomfit Han. whensoever he had power given him to do it: whence came the battle & discomfiture at Cannae, & near upon the ruin of Rome. I will allege one other Ro. example. Hannibal had been in Italy 8. or 10. years, & had filled the whole country full of bloody slaughters of the Romans, when there came into the Senate one M. Centenius Penula, a very base fellow, yet he had had some place of charge in the army; And offered, that if they would give him authority to levy an army of voluntaries, in what place soever it were in Italy, he would in a short time deliver into their hands Hannibal, either prisoner or dead. The Senate thought his demand very rash, yet they considering that if it were denied him, and afterwards his motion were made known to the people, that some trouble might arise thereupon, and so the evil will and envy thereof light upon the Senate, they yielded to him, being content rather to suffer the hazard of all those that went out with him, then to give any occasion of raising new discontents among the people, considering how likely this course was to be acceptable, and how hard to be dissuaded. He went then with this inordinate and rude multitude to seek out Hannibal, with whom he no sooner met, but he and all his troops were either slain or routed. In Greece in the city of Athens, Nicias a very grave and discreet man, could never persuade the people that it was not for their good to go and undertake an expedition against Sicily, so that they having resolved thereupon, contrary to the wise men's likeing, there ensued the whole ruin of Athens. Scipio when he was made Consul, and that he desired the province of Africa, promising the utter ruin of Carthage, whereunto the Senate not agreeing by the advice of Fabius Maximus, threatened to propound it to the people, as he that well knew how such like resolutions pleased them. We could also to this purpose lay down some examples of our own city, as was that of Hercules Betivogli, commander for the Florentines, together with Antoni Giacomini; after they had routed Bartolomeus Alvianus at Saint Vincenti, they went to encamp before Pisa, which enterprise was resolved on by the people upon the brave promises Hercules made them; though many discreet citizens did no way like of it, yet they could not hinder it, thrust on by the general desire, which was grounded on the commanders large promises. I say therefore, that there is not an easier way to enlarge a Commonwealth, where the people hath the authority, then to put them into brave undertake. For where the people is of any worth or valour, those will be always well liked of, and if any man be of different opinion, he shall not be of force to persuade it. But if hereupon comes the destruction of the city, thence proceeds also, and most ordinarily the particular ruin of those citizens who are made the commanders of such like undertake; for the people having presupposed the victory, when they go by the loss, never impute it to their General's evil fortune or want of sufficient forces, but blame him rather of treason or ignorance, and so either put him to death, imprison or confine him, as it befell very many Carthaginian Captains, and Athenians. Nor shall any of the former victories gloriously gotten, afterwards shelter them, for the present mishap cancels the records of all good past: as it befell Antoni Giacomini our country man here, who not having overcome the Pisans, as the people presupposed, and he had promised, fell into such disgrace with the people, that for all his many good services passed, he lived rather by the courtesy of those that having power with the people, protected him, then by any assurance else was given him.   

CHAP. LIV.  
What authority the presence of great and worthy personages hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude.  
THe second thing remarkable upon the text alleged in the former Chapter is, that nothing so readily restrains the fury of a multitude enraged, as the reverence of some grave man coming among them, as Virgil says to the same purpose, and not without reason.  

Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem  
Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus astant. 

If then by chance some reverend man they spy,  
They all grow silent, and their ears ap 〈…〉     
And therefore that man of worth and merit, that either hath the command of an army, or that abides in a city where a tumult arises, ought represent himself upon the occasion, with the greatest grace, and in as honourable terms as may be, cladding himself with the ornaments belonging to his degree and quality, to gain him the more reverence. A few years ago, Florence was divided into two factions, of the Frateschi and Arrabiati, for so they were called: and coming to blows, the Frateschi were overcome, among whom was Paul Antonius Sodorini, a citizen of great esteem in those days: and the people in the time of those tumults going in arms to sack his house, Franciscus his brother then Bishop of Valterra, and now Cardinal, was by chance in his house, who presently having perceived the stir, and seen the multitude coming, clad himself with his most honourable vestments and thereupon his episcopal rochet, and so met these armed people, where by the awfulness of his person and good words he stayed them: Which thing throughout the City for many days was much noted and celebrated. I conclude then that there is not a more settled nor more necessary remedy to stop the fury of a multitude, than the presence of such a man, who in his aspect and worth brings an awful reverence with him. And thereupon we see (to return to the text formerly alleged) with what obstinacy the Commons of Rome accepted the party, to go to Veium, thinking it advantageous to them, but never considering the mischief therein involved; and how being there arose divers tumults upon the occasion, there would have been harm done, had not the Senate accompanied with many grave and reverend personages restrained their fury.   

CHAP. LV.  
How easily things are ordered in a city where the people is not corrupted: and that where a parity is there is no place for a principality; and where that is not, a Republic cannot be.  
ALthough that heretofore we have sufficiently treated, what is to be feared and what to be hoped for of Cities that are corrupted: yet methinks it is not out of purpose to consider a resolution the Senate took, touching the vow Camillus made, to give the tenth part of the prey they took from the Veientes, to Apollo. Which prey being fallen into the people's hands, seeing they could no otherwise ever see any account of it, the Senate made an edict, that every one should publicly produce the tenth part of what he had gotten in the spoil of Veium. And though this resolution took not place, the Senate having afterwards found out another expedient, and by other means given satisfaction to Apollo for the people, yet we perceive by these determinations, how much the Senate trusted in the people's goodness and how they judged, that there was not one of them but would punctually bring forth what he was commanded by the edict. And on the other side, how the people thought not in any part to deceive the edict, by giving less than was due, but rather to free themselves therefrom, by showing their open distaste at such course taken. This example with many others, above alleged, give very good evidence of the great goodness and religion was in that people, and what might be hoped for of them. And truly where this goodness is not, little can be hoped for: as we can hope for nothing in those country's, which in these days we see corrupted, as in Italy above others, so France and Spain retain a part of the same corruption: and if in those countries we see not so great disorders as every day arise in Italy, it proceeds not so much from the people's goodness (which is very much failed) as from that they are under one King who keeps them together in union, not only by his virtue, but by the ordinary course of government in those Kingdoms, which is not yet quite perverted. This goodness is yet seen in Germany, and this kind of conscience is also of great force with those people, which is the occasion that many Republics continue free, and do so strictly observe their own laws, that no foreign enemy abroad, nor ambitious man at home, dares offer to seize on them. And to prove this true, that in those country's there remain still the marks of that ancient goodness, I will give another example, like to that abovesaid of the Senate and of the people of Rome. Those Republics use, when they chance to have need of any money they lay out for the common good, that the Magistrates, or the Consuls, having, authority, should tax the inhabitants of the city one or two in the hundred, of that which every man is worth. And such a resolution being made according to the order of the town, every man comes before thereceivers of that tax, and having first taken an oath to pay a convenient sum, he throws into a chest, appointed to that purpose, what in his conscience he thinks he should pay. Of which payment there is no other witness, but he that pays. Whereby we may well guests at the great good and religion there is yet left among those men. And we may well think, that every one pays the due sum; for if it were not paid, the imposition would not yield that quantity, as those of old time were wont to do: which failing, the deceit would appear: whereupon they would seek some other means to levy their moneys, than this. Which goodness is so much the more to be admired in these times, because it is very rare, or rather remains only in this country. Which proceeds from two things, the one, because they have not had much commerce with their neighbours; for neither have these gone into their countries, nor they come to visit these, because they have been contented with those goods, to feed on those victuals, and to be clad with those wools, which the country affords; whereby is taken away the occasion of all conversation, and the beginning of all corruption. For so they could not learn the French, Spanish, or Italian manners, which nations together corrupt the whole world. The other reason is, because those Republics where the common liberty is preserved, and uncorrupted, do not permit that any citizen of theirs should live after the manner of a gentleman, but rather maintain among them an equality; and those that live in that country are cruel enemies to the Lords and Gentlemen. And if by chance they fall into their hands, they put them to death, as the principal authors of corruption, and occasions of scandal. And to make plain this name of gentlemen what it is, I say, that those are called gentlemen, that live in idleness, yet deliciously, of the profits of their estates, without having any care to cultivate their lands, or to take any other pains necessary to the maintenance of man's life. These kind of men are very hurtful in every Commonwealth, and country; but worse are they, that, besides the foresaid fortunes, hold strong Castles, and have vassals that obey them. With these two sorts of men the Kingdom of Naples abounds. the country about Rome, Romagna, and Lombardia. This is the cause, that in those country's there hath never been any Republic nor any civil government: for such kinds of men are enemies to all civil government. And if a man had a mind to bring into such country's the form of a Commonwealth, he would find it impossible; but to bring them under some order, if any man had the power, he could take no other course, then reduce them to a Royalty. The reason is this, because where the matter is so extremely corrupted, that the laws are not able to restrain it, it is needful to ordain together with them a greater power, which is the authority of a King, who by his absolute and extraordinary power may be of force to bridle the excessive ambition and corruption of the mighty. This reason is verified in the example of Tuscany: where we see that in a small space of country three Republics have long consisted, Florence, Sienna, and Lucca; and that the other cities of that country serve in such a kind, that they have their dispositions and their orders much like them, and that they would willingly maintain the common liberty, all this arises from hence, because there are no lords of Castles in those country's, and never a one, or very few Gentlemen; but such equality, that an understanding man that hath applied himself to the knowledge of the ancient civil governments, might easily reduce them to a free state. But their misfortune hath been so great, that as yet they have not lit upon any man that had either the power or knowledge to put it in execution. This conclusion than I draw from hence, that he that strives to frame a Republic where there are many gentlemen, cannot do it, unless he first dspatch them all out of the way: and he that would erect a Monarchy or a principality where there is much equality, shall never effect it, unless he draws out of that equality many of ambitious and turbulent minds, and makes them rather gentlemen in effect, then in title, enriching them with Castles, and possessions, allowing them the favour of wealth and men, to the end that he being placed in the midst of them, by their means may maintain his power, and they by his favour preserve their ambition, and the rest be constrained to bear that yoke which force and nothing else can make them endure. And there being by this way a proportion from him that forces, to him that is forced, thereby men continue settled every one in their order. And because to bring a country to be a Republic which is fit to be a Kingdom, and of one fit to be a Republic to make a Kingdom, is a subject worthy of a man of extraordinary judgement and authority; many there have been that have endeavoured it, but few have been able to go through with it: because the weight and consequence thereof partly frights them, and partly so overbears them, that they fail in their first beginnings. I think the experience we have of the Republic of Venice will seem a little to contrary my opinion, that where there are gentlemen, a Republic cannot be instituted: for there none can partake of the dignities, unless they be gentlemen. The answer hereto is, that this example makes no opposition against us; for the gentlemen in that Republic are rather in name, then in effect: for they have not great revenues out of possessions, and lands, but their great wealth is founded upon merchandise, and movable goods; and moreover none of them hold any Castles, or have any jurisdiction over men: but the name of gentleman among them is a name of honour and credit, not being grounded upon any of those things that caused those in other cities to be called gentlemen. And as other Republics have all their divisions under several names, so Venice is divided into the Gentility, and the Commonalty; and their order is, that those are capable of all honours, these not. Which is not any cause of imbroile among them, for the reasons we have other where said. Let a Commonwealth then be there ordained, where allthings are reduced to an equality; and chose, let a Prince be made, where great inequality is; otherwise shall there be neither proportion nor continuance.   

CHAP. LVI.  
Before strange accidents and changes befall a City or a country, usually there are some prodigies which forerun them, or men that foretell them.  
FRom whence this proceeds I know not, but it is evident as well by ancient as modern examples, that no very heavy accident ever befell any country or City, that hath not been foretold either by some Diviners, or by some revelations, or prodigies, or signs from heaven. And not to go too far from home to fetch the proof hereof, every one knows how long before the coming of Charles the eighth of France into Italy was foretold by Friar Jerome Savanarola: and how besides this, it was said throughout all Tuscany, that there were heard in the air, and seen over Arrezzo, many men in arms skirmishing together. Moreover we all know here that before Laurens of Medici the old man's death the Duemo or principal Church was fired with lightning on the top, even to the ruin thereof. Nor is any man here ignorant how a little before that Peter Soderini, who had been made the Florentines chief Standard-bearer for life, was banished and deprived of his dignities, the Palace was in the same manner burnt with lightning. A man might allege other examples beside these, but I leave them rather to avoid tediousness. I shall relate that only which Titus Livius speaks of, before the the Frenchmens coming to Rome, and that is, how one Marcus Ceditius a Plebeian told the Senate, that he had heard at midnight, as he passed by the new way, a voice greater than any man's, which warned him to tell the Magistrates that the Frenchmen were coming to Rome. The reason hereof I think fit to be discoursed upon, and treated of by some man well versed in the knowledge of natural and supernatural things, which I profess not. Yet it may be, as some Philosophers will have it, that the air being full of spirits, who by their natural knowledge foreseeing things to come take compassion upon men, and advertise them by such like signs, to the end they should prepare themselves for their defence. But however it is, we may find it true, that always after such strange accidents, new and extraordinary chances befall country's.   

CHAP. LVII.  
The Common people united are strong and vigorous, but taken apart and separated, vile and contemptible.  
MAny Romans (the country all about being much ruined and wasted upon the Frenchmens passage to Rome) were gone to dwell at Veyum, contrary to the appointment and order of the Senate; who, to remedy this disorder, commanded by their public edicts, that every one within a set time, under a certain penalty, should return to inhabit at Rome. At which edicts at first, they against whom they were directed, scoffed; but afterwards, when the time drew near that they were to obey, they all yielded their obedience. And Titus Livius uses 
Ex ferocibus universis singt, metu suo obedientes fuere.  these words: Of fierce that they were all in general, each one out of his particular fear became obedient. And truly the nature of a multitude in this particular cannot better be laid open, than here in this Text it is showed: for the multitude is many times very insolent in their speeches against their Prince's decrees. Afterwards when they see their punishment near and certain, not trusting to one another, they hasten all to obedience; so that it plainly appears, that a man ought to have regard to the good or ill disposition of the people towards him; if it be good, to take such order that it may still continue; if ill, to provide so that it cannot hurt him. This is meant for those ill dispositions which the people have bred in them upon any other occasion, than for the loss of their liberty, or for the love of their Prince, who is yet living. For the evil humours that arise from these causes are terrible beyond measure, and have need of great remedies to restrain them. Their other indispositions will be easy, when they have not made choice of any heads, to whom they may have their recourse: for on oneside, there is not a more dreadful thing, than a dissolute multitude, and without a head: and on the other side, there is nothing weaker than it; for though they have their weapons in their hands, yet will it be easy to reduce them, provided that thou canst avoid the first shock of their fury: for when their rage is a little appeased and every one considers that he is to return again to his home, they begin then a little to doubt of themselves, and to take a care for their safety, either by flight or agreement. Therefore a multitude up in arms, desiring to escape these dangers, is to make ehoyce of a head out of themselves who may direct them, keep them united, and provide for their defence, as did the common people of Rome, when after the death of Virginia, they departed from Rome, and for their own preservations, they chose 20 Tribune's from among themselves: which if they do not, there always befalls them that which Titus Livius says in his above written discourse, that jointly together they are of strength and vigour; but when each one afterwards begins to advise of his own danger, they become weak and contemptible.   

CHAP. LVIII.  
The multitude is more wise and constant, than a Prince.  
THat nothing is more vain or inconstant than the multitude, as well our Author Titus Livius, as all other Historians do affirm: for we find it often in the relations of men's actions, that the multitude hath condemned some man to death, whom afterwards they have grieved for and exceedingly wished for again: as we see the people of Rome did for Manlius Capitolinus, whom after they had condemned to death, they much desired again. And these are the words of the Author. The people, after that by 
Populus brevi, post ●quam ab eo periculum 〈…〉 rat, desiderium 〈◊〉  his death they perceived themselves free from danger, wished him alive again. And in another place, when he shows the accidents that followed in 〈…〉 cusa after the death of Hieronymus, High 〈…〉 nephew, he says, This is the 
Haec natura multitudinis est; aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur.  nature of the multitude, that they are either slavish in their obedience, or insolent in their avihority. I know not, whether herein I undertake not too hard a task, so full of difficulties, that I must either give it over with shame, or continue it with blame, having a desire to defend that, which, as I have said, is accused by all writers. But however it be, I do not judge it, nor ever will, a defect to defend some opinions with their reasons, without any intention to use either authority or force. Therefore I say, that of that defect whereof those writers accuse the multitude, all men in particular are guilty, and especially Princes: for every one that is not regulated by the laws would commit the same errors which the loose multitude does. And this we may easily know, for there are and have been many evil Princes; and virtuous and discreet ones but a few. I speak of Princes, that have been able to break the bridle that could check them; among whom we reckon not those that were in Egypt, when in that very ancientest antiquity that country was governed by the laws; nor those of Spauta, nor those that in our days are in France, which Kingdom is ordered more by the laws, than any other which in these times we have knowledge of. And these Kings which grow up under such constitutions are not to be accounted in that number, from whence we are to consider the nature of every man by himself, and discern if he be like the multitude: for in parallel with them, we should set down a multitude in like manner regulated by the laws, as they are, and therein shall be found the same goodness that is in them: and we shall see they neither insolently domineer, nor slavishly serve, as the people of Rome, which whilst the Republic continued uncorrupted, never served basely, nor ruled proudly, but with their own customs, and Magistrates held their own degree honourably. And when it was necessary to rise up against one that were powerful, they did it, as it appeared in the example of Manlius, and in that of the ten, and others, who went about to oppress them. And when it was requisite they should obey the Dictator's, and the Consuls, for the common safety, they did it likewise: and if the people of Rome desired again Manlius Capitolinus being dead, it is no marvel; for they desired his virtues, which had been such, that the remembrance of them moved every one to compassion, and might be of force likewise to work the same effect in a Prince: for it is the opinion of all writers, that virtue is commended even in ones enemies. And if Manlius, in the midst of that great desire had been revived, the people of Rome would have given the same judgement upon him that they had done when they drew him out of prison, and condemned him to death. In like manner we see there were some Princes esteemed wise too, that have put some men to death, whom afterwards they have much desired again; as Alexander did Clitus, and others of his friends, and Herod Mariam. But that which our Historian speaks touching the nature of the multitude, belongs not to that which is regulated by the laws, as was that of the Romans, but to that which is loose, as was that of the Syracusians, which committed those errors that men enraged and dissolute fall into, as did Alexander the Great, and Herod, in the cases aforesaid. Therefore the nature of the multitude is not more blame-worthy, than that of Princes: for all equally do err, when all without respect have power to err. Whereof, besides this I have alleged, there are examples enough, as well among the Roman Emperors, as other Kings and Princes, where we may see such unconstancy and variation of life, as never was yet seen in any multitude. I conclude then, beyond the common opinion, which says, that the people when they have the principality in their hands, are various, mutable, unthankful, affirming that these faul●s are no otherwise in them, than they are in particular Princes. And if a man blamed both peoples and Princes together, he might say true; but exempting Princes, he is deceived. For a people that rules, and is well in order, will be constant, prudent and grateful, as well as a Prince, or better, though esteemed wise. And on the other side, a Prince loosened from the law will be unthankful, various, and imprudent, more than the people: and the diversity of their proceeding arises not from the diversity of their dispositions (because in all of them it is much after one manner, and if there be any advantage on either side, it is on the people's part) but rather that the one hath more regard to the laws under which they live, than the other. And he that considers the people of Rome, shall find that for four hundred years the name of a King was hateful to them, and yet were they zealous for the glory, and common good of their country: and he shall see many examples among them that witness the one thing, and the other of them And if any man allege to me the unthankfulness they used towards Scipio, I answer that which formerly at large was said in this matter, where it was made plain, that people are less ungrateful than Princes. But as touching wisdom, and settled staidness, I say that a people is wiser and more stayed, and of more exact judgement than a Prince. And therefore not without cause the people's voice is likened to God's voice; for we see that the universal opinions bring to pass rare effects in their presages, so that it seems by their secret virtues they foresee their own good or evil. And touching their judgement in things, it is seldom seen, that when they hear two Orators, pleading each of them a contrary part, when they are both of equal worth, but that they follow the better opinion, and are very capable of the truth they hear. And if in matters of courage, or in things that appear profitable (as it was abovesaid) they err, many times also does a Prince err, drawn aside by his own passions, which are greater in them then in the people. We see likewise in their choosing of Officers, they make a far better choice than does a Prince. Nor will a people ever be persuaded to advance to dignity a man infamous and of a corrupt life, to which a Prince may easily and divers ways be brought. We see a people begin to hate some one thing, and continue many ages in the same opinion, which we see not it a Prince. And of the one and the other of these two things, the people of Rome shall serve me for witness, which in so many hundreds of years, in so many electio 〈…〉 of Consuls and Tribune's, never made four choices, whereof they had cause to repent them. And they hated so much (as I said) the name of a King, that no citizen of theirs could ever so far oblige them, that if once he affected the Royalty, they would pardon his due punishment. Moreover we see, that in those cities where the Principality is in the people, in a short time exceeding great increases are made, and far greater than those that have been made under the government of a Prince, as Rome did after the banishment of her Kings, and Athens after she freed herself from Pisistratue; which proceeds from nothing else, but that the people's governments are better than Princes. Nor will we agree to this, that all that our Historian says in the text before alleged, or any where else, opposes this our opinion; for if we shall run over all the disorders of peoples, & the disorders of Princes, and all the glorious actions of people, as those also of Princes, we shall see the people far surmount the Princes in virtue and in glory. And if Princes exceed the people in ordaining of Laws, in framing a civil government, in making of statutes and new institutions, yet in the maintenance and preservation hereof the people go so far beyond them, that they attain to the glory of their founders. And in sum, to conclude this matter, I say, that as Prince's states have lasted long, so likewise have those of Republics; and the one and the other have had need to be regulated by the laws: for a Prince that hath the power to do what he list, commits divers follies; and a people that can do what they will, seldom give great proofs of their wisdom. If then the argument be touching a Prince and a people tied and chained to their laws, a man shall see more virtue in the People, then in the Prince: but if the reasoning be of the one and the other loose from the laws, fewer errors will appear in the people then in the Prince; and those less, and which are capable of greater remedies: for a good man may easily have the means to persuade with a licentious and tumultuous people, and so reduce them to reason. But to a mischievous Prince no man can speak, nor is there any other remedy but the sword. 
☞ But this is such a remedy as hath no warrant from divine or humane laws, especially when that a Tyrant is the true and lawful Prince of the country, however that by his evil government and administration of the affairs he deservedly be termed a Tyrant. That of David none is ignorant of, Sam. 1. 24. and 5.  Whereupon a man may guests at the importance of one and the others evil: for if words are of Where he cut off the lappet of Saul's garment, and therefore was checked by his own conscience. And that in the Psalm, 140. Touch not mine anointed, etc. Nor do the heathen writers any thing give way hereunto; wherefore Tacitus says, Ferenda regum ingenia, neque usui crebras mutationes. Ann. 12. and Quomodo sterilitatem & caetera naturae mala, ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate: Vitia erunt donec homines, sed neque haec continua, & meliorum interventu pensantur. Hist. 4. I need not allege others: The troubles that fell upon the Roman Empire when they began to murder their Princes, however bad, may argue their part: which was when Nero, Otho, Galba, Vitellius successively were slain, Tacitus speaking of the story he writ of it, says it was, Opus plenum magnis casibus, arroxpraelijs, discors seditioni bus, ipsa etiam pace saevum, Hist. 1. For they are much deceived who promise themselves quiet by means of a Tyrant's death: for as julius Caesar said, Kingdoms never change them without great combustions, and states suffer worse mischief's, by not enduring insolent princes. For howbeit both particulars, and the public also smarts because of this disorder, yet the life of the Prince is the very soul and bond of the Republic: Rege incolumi mens omnibus una est, Amisso rapere fidem, says the Poet. This case hath been argued by divers at large, and the only remedy is thus concluded on. The treacle of this venom is prayer and not vengeance: the people oppressed shall lift up their heart to God, as did the Israelites, when tyrannised over by Pharaoh; for the cruelties of bad Princes come not to pass by chance; and therefore is it necessary to have our recourse to God, who sometimes for chastisement sometimes for try all permits them. force to cure the people's evil, when as that of Kings requires the sword; there is no man that will not say, but that where the medicines mustbe stronger, the more dangerous are the evils. When a people is risen in tumult, the follies which they commit are not so perilous, nor is there such fear to be had of the present evil, as of that which may befall, it being possible some Tyrant may grow up in the midst of that confusion. But during the time of mischievous Princes the contrary happens; for the greatest fear is of the present evil; and of the time to come there is hope, men easily persuading themselves, that his evil life may produce their liberty. So that a man may see the difference between the one and the other; the desperate fear of the one, is, of the present state; of the other, of the state into which it may fall. The multitudes cruelties are exercised against those that they fear, lest they should seize upon the common good. The Princes against those that they fear, lest they should seek to recover their own again. But the opinion against the people grows daily, for every one may freely speak evil of the people without fear, even while they have the government in their hands. A man speaks not evil of Princes, but with many fears and jealousies. Nor is it much out of purpose (seeing the matter draws me to it) to argue in the Chapter following, what Confederacies a man may best trust to, either those that be made with a Republic, or that are made with a Prince.   

CHAP. LIX.  
What Confederation or league is rather to be trusted, either that which is made with a Republic, or that is made with a Prince.  
BEcause every day we have it, that one Prince with another, or one Republic with another make leagues, and join friendship together, and in like manner also confederacies are drawn and agreements made between a Republic and a Prince. I think to examine, which is the firmest league, whereof a man should make surest account of; either of that with a Republic, or the other with a Prince. And examining the whole, I believe that in many cases they are alike, and in some there is some difference: and therefore, that accords made by force shall not be truly kept thee neither by Prince nor commonwealth. And I think that when fear comes upon them touching their state, as well the one as the other, rather than perish, will break their faith with thee, and requite thee with unthankfulness. Demetrius, he that was ever termed the taker of cities, had done exceeding much good to the Athenians; it chanced afterwards, that being routed by his enemies, and seeking refuge in Athens as in a city that was his friend, and much engaged to him, he was not admitted into it. Which grieved him much more than the loss of his soldiers and army had done. Pompey when his army was routed by Caesar in Thessaly, fled into Egypt to Ptolemy, who formerly had been restored by him into his kingdom, and was put to death by him. Which things we see had the same occasions: yet more humanity and less injury was used by the Republic, then by the Prince. Therefore where there is fear, a man shall find in effect the same faith. And if there be any Commonwealth or Prince who to keep their faith with thee, expect while they ruin, it may proceed also from the same occasion. And as for a Prince, it may well chance, that he is allied to some powerful Prince, who though he then hath not the opportunity to defend him, yet may he well hope, that in time he may restore him into his state, or else that having taken side with him as partisan, he thinks he cannot obtain a faithful and fair accord with his enemy. Of this sort were those Princes of the Kingdom of Naples, that took part with the French. And for Republics, of this sort was Saguntum in Spain, which till it was ruined taken part with the Romans; and so was Florence for siding with the French in the year one thousand five hundred and twelve. And I believe, having summed up every thing, that in these cases, where the danger is urgent, there is more assurance rather in the Republics, then in the Princes: for though the Republics were of the same mind and had the same intention as Princes had, yet for that they move but slowly, it will cause them to stay longer in resolving themselves, than a Prince will; and thereupon they will be longer a breaking their faith then he. Confederacies are broken for profit, Wherein Commonwealths are far stricter in their observance of accords, than Princes. And we might bring many examples, where even for a very small gain a Prince hath broken his faith; and where exceeding great advantages could not one whit move a Commonwealth, as was the party Themistocles propounded to the Athenians, to whom in an oration made them he said, that he could advise them so, that their country should gain much advantage by it, but them he might not tell it, for fear of discovering it, for by the discovery the opportunity of doing it would be taken away. Whereupon the Athenians chose Aristides, to whom he should communicate this secret, and together with him consult upon it: whom Themistocles showed how the whole naval army of all Greece was in their hands under their protection, though entrusted them upon their faith, so that it was in their power by the ruin thereof to make themselves Lords of all Greece. Whereupon Aristides told the people that Themistocles advice was exceeding profitable, but very dishonest. For which cause the people wholly refused it, which Philip of Macedon would not have done, nor those other Princes who seek their own gain rather, and have made more advantage by breaking their faith, than by any way else. Touching the breaking of agreements, upon the not observance of some particulars therein, I mean not to meddle with them, being ordinary matters; but I speak of those that break upon extraordinary and main points. Wherein, by what we have said, I believe the people are less faulty than the Princes, and therefore may better be trusted than they.   

CHAP. LX.  
How the Consulship and every other Magistracy in Rome was given without respect of age.  
IT appears by order of the Story, that the Commonwealth of Rome, after that the Consulship came among the people, bestowed it upon their Citizens, without regard of years or blood: and indeed they never had respect to age, but altogether aimed at virtue, whether it were in young, or old. Which we perceive by the testimony of Valerius Corvinus, who at 23. years of age was made Consul. And the same Valerius, speaking to his soldiers, said, That the Consulship was the reward of vertuc, and not of blood. Which thing, 
Erat praemium virtutis, non sanguinis.  whether it were advisedly said or no, might require much dispute. And touching blood, this was yielded to upon necessity, and this necessity that was in Rome might be in every City that would do the same things Rome did, as otherwhere is said: for toil, and labour cannot be imposed on men without reward; nor can their hopes of obtaining reward be taken from them, without danger. And therefore it was fit timely to give them hope of the Consulship, and by this hope were they a while fed without having it; at length that hope served not, but there was a necessity to come to performance with them. But the City that employs not their people in any glorious action may treat the mafter their own manner, as other where it was argued. But that which will take the same course Rome took, must make this distinction. And grant that it be so, for that of time there is no reply: nay rather it is necessary; for in the choosing of a young man into a degree which hath need of the discretion of an old man, it is likely (the people being to make the choice) that some very worthy and noble action of his prefers him thereto. And when a young man becomes endowed with such virtues that he hath made himself famous by his heroic actions, it were a very great wrong, that that City might not serve herself of him then, but should be put off to expect, till that vigour and quickness of spirit were grown old and dull, whereof in that age his country might have made good use, as Rome did of Valerius Corvinus, of Scipio, and Pompey, and many others, that triumphed very young.    

THE SECOND BOOK.  

THE PREFACE.  
MEN do always commend, but not always with reason, the times of old, and blame the present: and they take part so much with things past, that they celebrate not only those ages which they have known by the memory writers have lest them, but those also, which now being old, they remember they have seen in their youth. And when this their opinion is false, as most commonly it is, I persuade myself the reasons that bring them into this error, are divers. And the first I take to be, that of matters of old the truth is not wholly known, & of thoil actions most commonly those things are concealed that would bring any infamy upon the times, but whatsoever advances their credit & glory is set out with magnificence. For most writers do so much follow the conquerors fortune, that to make their victories glorious, they not only augment what they have virtuously done but they so illustrate their enomies actions, that those that are afterwards born in any of their countries, either conquering or conquered, have cause to admire those men and times, and so consequently are forced exceedingly to praise and love them. Besides this, men hating things either for fear, or envic, two very powerful causes of hatred are quite spent in things that are passed, being they are not able to hurt, nor can give occasion of envic. But on the contrary part, it comes to pass that those things that are now in hand, and we see, which by reason of the through knowledge we have of them, no tittle thereof being concealed from us, and knowing in them together with the good, many things worthy dislike, hereupon we are compelled to judge them much Inferior to matters of old, although that in truth the present deserve far more glory and reputation: this I say, not arguing touching the arts, which are now brought to such perfection, that the times cannot take from them, nor add but little more glory to them; but speaking of things belonging to means lives and manners, whereof the proofs are not very evident; I answer, that this custom above written of praising and blaming is sometimes false and sometimes true: for sometimes they must needs light upon the truth; because all humane things are continually in motion, and either rise or fall. As we see the civil government of a city or country so ordained by some rare person, that for a time even by reason of the worth of this man, the State mends much, and is more and more amplified: he that is then borne in that State, and commends more the times of old, than those modern, is much deceived: and the cause of his error proceeds from those things that have been formerly said. But those that are afterwards born in that City or country, whose days are only during their decline from their excellence, then err nor. And I devising with myself whence these things proceed, I think the world hath continued always in one manner, and that in i● hath been always as much good as evil; but that that good and evil does change from country to country, as it appears by that which is discovered to us of those ancient kingdoms, which altered from the one to the other, by change of manners. But the world continued the same. There was only this difference, that where it first had placed its virtue in Assiria, it afterwards removed it into Media, then into persia, in so much that at length it came into Italy, and so to Rome. And if after the Roman Empire there succeeded not any other that lasted, nor where the world had retired all its virtue together; yet we see it was spread abroad into several Nations, where men behaved themselves very bravely and valouroufly, as in the Kingdom of France, the Kingdom of the Turks, and that of the Sultan; so now adays in Germany, and so among those that were first of the Saracin sect, which did great exploits, and made themselves masters of so great a part of the world, after they had destroyed the Eastern Empire of Rome. In all these Provinces then, after the Romans were ruined, and in all these sects hath that virtue resided; and now in some of them indeed it may be wished for, but in othersome worthily commended. And he that is borne in those Countries, and praises the times past more than the present, may be deceived: but he that is borne in Italy and not in Greece, and is not become either in Italy, a Tramontan, or in Greece, a Turk, hath reason to blame the times present, and commend the former, for therein were many things made them marvel, but in these there is nothing can recover them out of extreme misery, infamy, and disgrace, where there is no observance either of Religion or Laws, nor of warlike discipline, but they are wholly bespotted with all manner of filthiness. And so much the more detestable are these vices, by how much they are most in those that are greatest, who sitting in their Tribunals command all, and will be adored. But returning to our discourse, I say, that if men's understandings are corrupted in matter of judgement, touching which age is the better, the present or that of old, in those things by reason of their antiquity they could not have such an exact knowledge, as they might have of their own times, yet should they not be corrupted in old men touching the judgement of the times of their youth, and old age, having known and seen equally the one and the other; Which thing would be true, if those men all the time of their lives continued still at the same state of judgement, and had the same desires. But they altering, though the times, change not, yet cannot seem so to men to continue the same, they having other desires, other delights, and other considerations in their old age, than in their youth: for the strength of men's bodies, when they grow old, decaying, and their judgements and understandings increasing, as must needs be, that those things which in their youths they thought supportable and good, becomes afterwards to them growing old intolerable and hurtful: and where these men ought herein to lay the fault upon their own judgements, they blame the times. Besides this, the desire of man being insatiable (because of nature he hath it, that he can and will desire every thing, though of fortune he be so limited, that he can attain but a few) there arises thence a dislike in men's minds, and a loathing of the things they enjoy which causes them to blame the times present and commend those passed, as also those that are to come, although they have no motives grounded upon reason to incite them thereto. I know not then, whether I shall deserve to be numbered among them that are deceived; if too much in these discourses of mine I shall praise the times of the ancient Romans, and blame our own. And truly if the virtue that then reigned, and the vice that now reigns, were not more clear than the Sun, I should not speak so freely, for fear I should incur the censure of that error whereof I have now blamed others: but the matter being so evident, that every man sees it, I shall with boldness speak that plainly which I conceive of those & these times, to the end those young men who shall chance to read these my writings, may avoid the evil of these times, and prepare their minds to imitate the good of these of old, whensoever their good, fortune shall give them occasion: for it is the duty of a good man, to reach unto others that good, which by reason of the malignity of the times, and of fortune, thou hast not been able to do thyself, to the end that many being given to understand hereof, some of them, whom the heavens shall more favour, may put it in practice. And having in my former book of discourses spoken of the Romans deliberations, touching their affairs within the City; in this we shall treat of those which the people of Rome did, belonging to the enlargement of the Empire.   

CHAP. I.  
Which contributed more to the Romans in the conquest of their Empire, either their virtue, or their fortune.  
MAny have been of opinion, among whom is Plutarch a great Writer, that the people of Rome were more favoured by fortune, than assisted by their virtues, in gaining their Empire. And among other reasons which he alleadges to that purpose, he says, it appears by the confession of the same people, that they acknowledged all their victories from fortune, having consecrated more Temples to her, than to any other god. And Livy seems to side with this opinion: because it is very seldom, that he brings in any Roman speaking where he makes mention of virtue, but that he joins fortune therewith. Whereunto I will not yield in any terms, nor think I it can be maintained: for if never any Republic made the same Progress that Rome made; it is because never hath any Republic been so ordered to make its advantage, as Rome was: for the valour of their armies gained them their Empire, and their order of proceeding, and their own manor with that which their first founder likewise devised for them, made them keep what they had gotten, as hereafter in several discourses shall be declared. That two strong wars never at the same time met together to shake their state, they say, it was the people of Rome's fortune, and not their valour: for they had no wars with the Latins, till they had not only beaten the Samnites, but were fain to undertake a war in defence of them. Neither warred they with the Tuscans, till they had first subdued the Latins, and wholly weakened the Samnices with many routs: whereof if two entire powers (when they were fresh) had joined together against the Romans, without doubt a man may easily conjecture that the ruin of the Roman Republic would have followed thereupon. But however this thing came to pass, it never befell them to have two strong wars made against them at once, but rather luckily it proved, that when one began, the other ended, and at the end of one another began, Which we may easily see, by viewing their wars, how they followed in order: for letting alone those wars which they made before Rome was taken by the Frenchmen, we see, that whilst they fought with the Aequi and the Volsci, never (so long as these people were of any considerable power) did any other people set upon them. They they being conquered, the war against the Samnites began; and though before the finishing of this war the Latins Rebelled against the Romans, nevertheless, when that rebellion followed, the Samnites were in league with Rome, and with their army helped the Romans to bring down the Latins pride; and when they were subdued, the war with the Samnites again was revived. But their forces being broken by divers defeats given them, the war with the Tuscans arose; and when that was quieted, the Samni es began anew to stir, upon Pyrrhus has passage into Italy; when he was defeated, and beaten back into Greece, than first was kindled the fire of the Carthaginian wars: nor was that quenched till that all the French, as well beyond, as on this side the Alps, conspired against the Romans; so that between Pobolonia and Pisa, where now is the tower at Saint Vincenti, they were vanquished with a very great slaughter. After this, for the space of 20 years, they had not any war of much importance: for they had no quarrel with any but with the Ligurians, and the remainder of those French that werein Lombardie: and so they continued, till the second Carrhaginian war begin; Which troubled Italy for 16 years' space. Which being made an end of with great glory, that of Macedon sprung up, and was ended, when that of Antiochus, and afterwards that of Asia took their turns. After which victory, there remained not in the whole world neither Prince nor Republic that either by themselves or altogether could oppose the Roman Forces. But before that last victory, he that considers the order of these wars, and the manner of their proceeding, shall find mingled with their fortune much valour and wisdom; so that he who examines the occasion of such fortune, shall easily discover it: for it is very certain, that when a Prince or a people have gained such a reputation, that neither prince nor people bordering upon him dares by himself assault him, and is afraid of him, it will always so fall out, that none of them all will set upon him, unless forced thereto, so that it shall be at that great Prince's choice, to war with which of his neighbours he shall please, and the rest with little pains to quiet. Who, partly in regard of his power, partly beguiled by some devices he shall make use of to lull them asleep, are easily kept from stirring. And for other powerful Princes, who are more remote and have no dealing with him, they look upon the matter, as a thing afar off, and nothing belonging to them. In which error they continue so long, till the fire comes close to their doors: which then being come so near, they have no means to extinguish it, but only to use their own arms, which suffice nor, the enemy being now grown exceeding mighty. I will let pass, how the Samnites stood still and looked upon the Romans, while they overcame the Volsci and the Aequi: and that I may not be too tedious, I will satisfy myself with the Carthaginians, who were of great power and estimation, when the Romans warred with the Samnites and Tuscans: for even then they were Masters of all Africa, and had Sardinia and Sicily in their hands, and had the rule of some part of Spain. Who being that their forces were remote from the people of Rome's confines, never thought of assaulting them, nor of giving succours to the Samnites, and Tuscans; but as if the Romans increase had been the Carthaginians advantage, they made a confederacy with them, seeking their friendship: nor did they perceive their error committed, till the Romans having subdued all those peoples that lay between them and the Carthaginians, began to make war with them for the rule of Sicily and Spain. The selfsame befell the French, that happened to the Carthaginians, and so to Philip of Macedon, and Antiochus; and every one of them believed (while the Romans were busy with another) that that other might chance to vanquish them, and that they had time enough, either by peace or war, to defend themselves from them. So that, I believe, that the same fortune herein the Romans had, all Princes would have had, provided, that they proceeded as the people of Rome did, and were of equal valour with them. To this purpose it would not be unfit, to declare the course the people of Rome held in their entryes into other Prince's countries, but that inour treaty of Principalities, we have discoursed thereupon at laege. I will only say this in bries, they always did put in practice to make themselves some friends in the Countries they came newly acquainted with, who served them for a ladder to climb up to them, or a gate to enter them, or a tye to hold them; as it appears, by means of the Capuans they entered into Samnium, by the Camertins into Tuscany, by the Mamertins into Scicly, by the Saguntins into Spain, by Mafinissa into Africa, by the A olians into Greece, by Eumenes and other Princes into Asia, by the Masilians and the Heduans into France. And so they never failed of the like supports, whereby to facilitate their undertake, either in the enlargement of their dominions, or in the maintaining them. Which, those people that shall observe, shall find themselves in less want of good fortune, than they who neglect it. And to the end, that every one may know of what avail our virtue was beyond their for une, in the conquest of their Empire, we will treat in the Chapter following, concerning the quality of those people with whom they were to make war, and with what obstinacy they defended their liberty.   

CHAP. II.  
What people the Romans had to make war withal, and how obstinately they fought for the defence of their liberty.  
NOthing made it more painful to the Romans to vanquish their neighbours near about them, as also some other Country's further off, than the affection that in those days many people did bear to their liberty, which they so obstinately defended, that they had never been subdued, but by an excessive valour: for, by many examples, we know to what dangers they exposed themselves, as well for the maintenance as the recovery of it; and what revenges they took against those that had laid hold on it. We know likewise what damages peoples and cities receive by servitude And whereas now adays, there is only one Country that can say, she hath free Cities in her: in ancienttimes people lived very free in all country's. We see that in those times whereof at this present we speak, in Italy from the alps (which make a partition between Tuscany and Lombardy) even to the very point of Italy, there were many free peoples, as were the Tuscans, the Romans the Samnites, and many others, that dwelled in the other parts of Italy: nor does any man relate, that there was any King, besides those that reigned in Rome, and Porsena King of Tuscany; whose race how it came to an end, history leaves us no memory. But we plainly see, that at the same time the Romans went to incamp before Vejum, Tuscany was free, and so absolutely enjoyed their liberty, and withal so much hated the name of a Prince, that the inhabitants of Vejum for their defence having made a King among them, asked aid of the Tuscans against the Romans; but they resolved after many deliberations taken, to give them none whiles they lived under a King, judging it not right to defend their country, who of themselves had subjected it to another. And it is an easy thing to gue●s, whereupon it is that people take such an affection to their liberty: because we see by experience, that cities have never been much amplified neither in domition nor riches, unless only during their liberty. And truly it is a strange thing to consider, unto what greatness Athens attained in the space of a hundred years, after she had freed herself from Pisistratus his tyranny: but above all it is most strange to think unto what greatness Rome attained after she was delivered from her Kings: The reason thereof is easy to be understood: for it is no man's particular go●●, but the common good, that amplifies the city. And without question this common good is not regarded but in Republics, for there whatsoever makes for their advantage is put in practice: and though it turns to this or that private man's loss, yet are they so many, whom the said good concerns, that they are always able to put it forward, in despite of those few that suffer by it. The contrary falls our, when there is a prince; where, most commonly, that which makes for him endammages the City, and that which makes for the city hurts him; so that suddenly where a Tyranny 
* How this will hold with the general and most received tenant, I cannot see; being that the Prince and the people are said to make only one politic body; and the welfare of the part cannot be separated from the good of the whole. Famous is that fable of Aesop's, which Menenius Agrippa made use of, to reconcile the Commons of Rome, upon distaste against the Senate, gone a part in the holy mount: On a time that in man all things accorded well together, each particular member advised, and complained that by their care and pains all things necessary were sought after, and provided for the belly, and that the belly only remained idle amongst them, enjoying, those delicates which their labour had prepared: and thereupon conspired together that the hands should not put meat to the mouth, nor the mouth receive it, nor the teeth chaw it: but thus while in this choler they thought by famine to subdue the belly, the whole body fainted. Whereby it came to appear that the belly afforded its service too, and as well gave as received nourishment, distributing by the veins, throughout the whole body, out of this meat which it had digested, the blood well concocted, whereby each part was nourished. Who is it that feels not, when any part fails, the whole is in disorder? and who sees not likewise, when any part of the body draws unto it more than its proportionable nutriture, that the whole pines thereupon? as from the swelling of the spleen, the health of the whole body is disturbed, and therefore by some Politics not unfitly compared to a Prince's exchequer, which when it excessively abounds beggars the whole country. And it is a folly to think (saith a Spavish author) that the poverty of the Commonalty will not redound to the breaking of private patrimonies, nor can great revenues continue there, where the Commonwealth is racked to the very bones. All these things serve to argue the mutual sympathy, as between the head and the members, so between the Prince and his subjects; and to divide the interest of the Prince from that of the people, cannot agree with good policy; for as in the natural body it breeds diseases, so in the politic it produces disorder and destruction.  grows upon a free state, the least ill that can thence result to those cities, is not to proceed, nor increase more in power, nor wealth: but for the most part, or rather always, it comes to pass, that they go backward: And if hap would have it, that a Tyranc should prove valorous, who by his courage and prowess should enlarge his dominions, there would thence no profit arise to the Republic, but to him alone: for he cannot advance any of these citizens that are brave and worthy, over whom he tyrannises, unless he desires to give himself some jeulousy of them. Nor can he yet subject or make tributary the cities that he conquers, to that city which he tyrannises over; for it is not for his advantage to make it powerful; it rather makes for him, to hold the state disjoined, that each town and province acknowledge him, in so much that of his conquests, he only reaps he good, and not his country. And he hat would see the confirmation of this opinion, let him read Xenophon in his treaty of a Tyranny It is no marval then, that the peoples of old did so extremely harc Tyrants, and loved the free government, & that the very name of liberty was in such request amongst them: as it happened, when Hieronymus, nephew of Hiero the Syracusan, was slain in Siracusa: for the news of his death being brought to his army, which lay not far from the city, they began to rise up in tumult, and take their arms in hand against them that slew him: but when they perceived that in Siracusa all cried out liberty, alured with the delight of that name, they were all appeased, and laid aside their anger conceived against them that killed the Tyrant, & advised together by what means there might be ordained in that city a free government. And it is no marvel, that people take extraordinary revenge of those that have laid hold of their liberty. Touching which there are many examples, whereof I intent to relate only one, that fell out in Corcira a City of Greece, in the times of the Peloponnesian war: where the province being divided into two factions, one of which followed the Athenians, the other the Spartans'; it came to pass, that of many cities which were divided among themselves, the one part followed the friendship of the Spartans', the other that of Athens; it happening so, that in the said city the Nobility prevailed, and took from the people their liberty; but the people by means of the Athenians took hear again, and having laid hold on the Nobility, shut them up into a prison capable of them all, from whence they drew them out by eight and by ten at a time, pretending to banish them into several parts, but they put them to death after a cruel manner. Whereof they that remained having some notice, resolved as much as lay in their power, to avoid this shameful death; so that armed with what they could get, and fight with those that sought to enter, they defendeed the passage into the prison: whereupon, the people running together uncovered the top of the house, and with the ruins thereof overwhelmed them. There followed also in the said province many such other horrible chances, so that we find it true, that people pursue more agerly the revenge of a liberty once taken from them actually, then of that which was only contrived in the intention to be plucked from them. Weighing then from whence it may arise, that in the times of old people esteemed more of liberty, than now a days, I believe it proceeds from the same cause which makes men less valiant now adays then formerly, which I think is the difference of our education from that of old, grounded upon the difference of our Religion from the ancient: for our Religion having showed 
* Hear Machia. falsely imputes the cause of men's cowardliness to Christian Religion. I need not allege any battles fought by the Christians, to prove him a liar; histories frequently afford us examples, as well ancient as modern, where they have been as resolutely fought by the Christians, as ever were any by the Pagans: nay our own memories may well supply us with some if we want. If we mark from whence Machiavelli takes his argument, it is from that the Pagans slew a multitude of sacrifices, the sight of which being terrible made men of thesame disposition. By the same reason must it follow that our butchers and surgeons are more valiant than other men, as who customarily have their hands imbrued in blood: I may well allow them to be more cruel, and therefore our laws exclude them from being of the jury of life and death: but of being more valiant I never heard they had the reputation.  us the truth, and the true way, causes us less to make account of the honour of this world; whereupon the Gentiles esteeming much of it, and placing therein their greatest good, became braver in their actions. Which may be considered from many of their orders, beginning from the magnificence of their sacrifices and the poorness of ours, where indeed the pomp is more delicate than magnific, but not any action of bravery or fierceness. And with the Gentiles also there was no want of pomp and magnificence in the ceremonies, but thereunto was added the action of the sacrifice full of blood and cruelty, slaying a multitude of beasts; The sight of which being terrible made men of the same disposition. Besides, the ancient Religion did not beatificate but only men fraught with worldly glory, as were the Commanders of armies, and Princes of nations. Our Religion hath rather glorified humble and contemplative men, than those of action. Moreover it hath placed the chief good in humility, and in the rejecting and contempt of worldly things. That other imagined the chief happiness to consist in the greatness of courage, in the strength of body, and in all other things fit to make men exceeding valiant: and if our Religion requires valour in a man, it is rather that he be fit for a strong sufferance, then for a strong action. This manner of living then, as it seems, hath made the world become feeble, and given it in prey to wicked persons, who may securely rule over it, as they list, seeing that all men to obtain paradise, think rather of suffering their wrongs, then revenging them: and though it may appear, that the world is grown effeminate, and the heavens disarmed, it proceeds without doubt from the cowardice of men, who have given an interpretation of our Religion according to their own lazy and idle dispositions, and not agreeable to virtue: for if they would consider how much it allows the advancement and defence of ones country, they should see that it wills, that we should love and honour it, and so prepare ourselves that we may be able to defend it. These kinds of educations then, and false interpretations, cause that there be not so many Republics now adays in the world as were of old. Nor by consequence do we see among people such an affection to liberty as formerly: although I believe rather the reason hereof is, because the Roman Empire with its force and power extinguished all the Republics and free governments. And though afterwards that Empire was dissolved, yet could not the cities again be restored, and anew ordered in a civil government, unless it were in very few places of that Empire. Yet howsoever it was, the Romans in every little corner of the world found, as it were, a conspiracy of Commonwealths very strongly armed, and very obstinate to defend their liberties; which shows that the people of Rome without an extraordinary and rare valour had never made conquest of them. And to give an example of some member thereof, that of the Samnires shall suffice me: who (and indeed it is admirable, and so Titus Livius avows it) were so powerful and warlike, that they were of force, till the time of Papirius Cursor the Consul, son of the first Papirius, to resist the Romans, which was for the space of forty six years, after so many routs, destruction of their towns, and so many slaughters made in their country: especially considering the country then, where so many cities were, and such a vast number of men, though now almost not inhabited. And then there was such order, and so great force, that it was insuperable, had it not been assaulted by a Roman power. And it is an easy thing to know, whence that order and this disorder arise, for all that came from the free manner of living then, and this from the slavery now. For all countries and provinces which live free in every part, as formerly I said, make exceeding large progresses: for here we see the people more numerous, because the marriages are more free, and desired by men: being that every one willingly begets those children which he believes he can bring up, and nourish, without doubting their patrimony will be ravished from them; and when he knows they are borne free and not slaves, so that by means of their virtue they may become Princes. We see riches likewise increase there in greater measure, as well those which arise from cultivation, as those which are gotten by the trades of handicraftmen: for every one is more provident in gaining and multiplying of those goods, which, when he hath gotten, he believes he shall peaceably enjoy. From whence it comes to pass, that men even contend who shall more advance the private and public good; so that the one and the other increase exceedingly. The contrary hereof follows in all those countries that live in servitude; and so much the more fail they of their accustomed good, by how much their servitude is harder. And of all hard servitudes, none exceeds that which is subject to a free Republic, because ordinarily it is of longest continuance, and so least hopes there are of being delivered from it: a second reason is, the end of a Republic is to enfeeble and weaken all other bodies in her, whereby to augment her own. Which thing a Prince that brings thee under his rule does not, especially if it be not some Barbarian Prince, a ruiner of countries, and a destroyer of all civil societyes among men, as are the eastern Princes. But if any of them have been instructed in humane customs and the arts ordinary among men, they most commonly affect equality in the cities they have subdued, and let them still possess all their arts and ancient customs; so that, if they cannot increase, as in liberty, they go not to wrack, as in thraldom, speaking of that thraldom into which cities fall, when they serve a stranger; for I have formerly spoken enough of subjection to a native. Whosoever then considers well all that which is said, will not much marvel at the power which the Samnites had being free, nor at their weakness into which afterwards they fell by servitude. And Titus Livius gives us good testimony thereof in many places, in Hannibal's wars, where he declares, that the Saminteses being oppressed by one Legion of soldiers, that were in Nola, sent Ambassadors to Hannibal to entreat him for succours; whose speeches were to this purpose, that they had for a hundred years warred with the Romans, serving themselves only of their own soldiers and Captains, and had many times withstood two Consular armies, and two Consuls, and that now they were brought so low, they had much a do to defend themselves from one small Roman legion that was in Nol●●.   

CHAP. III.  
Rome became a great city, by ruining those that were near neighbours to her, and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dignisies.  
ALL this while Rome waxed great upon the 
Creseit in terea Roma Albae ruinis  ruins of Alba. Those that intent a city should far enlarge the bounds of her domnions, ought withal endeavour provide, that she be well fraught with inhabitants: for without a great multitude of men in her, she will never be able to grow great. And this is done two ways, either by love or by force: by love holding the ways open and secure to strangers, that might have a design to come and dwell in it, to the end that every one might come willingly to inhabit it; by force ruining and defacing the neighbour cities and sending out the inhabitants thereof to dwell in thine: all which was punctually observed in Rome, so that in the timeof the sixth King in Rome there dwelled 80 thousand men able to bear arms: for the Romans meant to behave themselves like the good husbandman, who to make a plant grow big, and fructify, and ripen well its fruits, cuts off the firstsprouts it thrusts forth, that so the virtue thereof remaining yet in the root of the plant, may shortly after bring forth others more lively and fruitful. And that this course held was necessary and good for the founding and enlarging of an Empire, the Example of Sparta and Athens shows us plain, who being both very warlike Republics, and furnished with excellent laws, yet could they never attain to the Roman Empires greatness, which seemed indeed a little more tumultuary and not so well ordered as they, whereof can be alleged no other reason, than that aforesaid. For Rome having enlarged by those two ways the body of her city, was able to put in arms six hundred and 80 thousand soldiers, whereas Sparta and Athens never exceeded each of them twenty thousand men. Which proceeded not from that the situation of Rome was more bountiful than theirs, but only from the different course they took: for Lycurgus founder of the Spartan Republic considering that nothing could soon take away the power of his laws, than a commixtion of new inhabitants, did what he could to hinder strangers from living with them; and that they should neither join matrimonies with them, nor admit them into their civil government, nor have any thing to do with them, which are the ordinary occasions of accord among men. He ordained likewise that leather money should pass currant, thereby to take from every one the desire to come thither and bring any merchandise, or art to them: so that, that city could never grow big by multiplying her inhabitants. And because all our actions imitate nature, it is neither possible, nor natural, that the slender body of a tree should bear a gross bough; therefore a small Republic cannot hold cities nor kingdoms of greater power and strength than she herself is; and if perchance it comes to pass that she lays hold on them, it befalls her as it does that tree the boughs whereof are greater than the body, that sustaining it with much ado, with every small b'ast it is broken, as we see it happened to Sparta: which having seized on the rule of all the cities of Greece, Thebes no sooner rebelled against her, but all the other cities likewise fell from her, and so remained as the dead trunk of a tree without branches: which could never befall Rome, having her body and stock so huge, that it was of force with ease to support any bough whatsoever. This manner then of proceeding, together with those others which we shall afterwards speak of, made Rome exceeding great and powerful. Which Titus Livius shows in few words where he says, All this while Rome 
Crescit in terea Roma Albae ruinis.  waxed great upon the ruins of Alba   

CHAP. FOUR  
Republics have taken three particular courses, to amplify and enlarge their states.  
HE that hath read the ancient histories with observation, finds that Commonwealths have three manner of ways to amplify their states. The one hath been that which the ancient Tuscans followed, to make a league of many Republics together, where no one is preferred before the other, neither in authority nor in dignity; and to make other cities partakers with them in their gains; just as now adays the Swisses do, and formerly in Greece the Achaeans and Etolians were wont. And because the Romans had much war with the Tuscans, the better to show the quality of this first way, I will enlarge myself in giving notice of them par ieularly. Before the Romans had any great power in Italy, the Tuscans were very mighty both by sea and by land: and though there is no particular history that touches their affairs, yet is there some small remembrance thereof, and some signs left us of their greatness; and we know, how they sent a colony to the sea coast above, called by them Adria, which proved of such renown, that it gave the name to that sea, and the Latins call it the Adris tick to this day. Moreover we know, that they had conquered all from Tiber, to the very foot of the Alps, which encompass the whole body of Italy. Notwithstanding that two hundred years before the Romans grew to any considerable strength, the said Tuscans lost the dominion of that country which is now called Lombardy; Which was seized on by the French; who either driven by necessity, or alured by the delicacy of the fruits, especially the wines, came into Italy under the conduct of Bellovesus their Captain, and having defeated and chased out the natives; seated themselves in that place, therein built many cities, and called the Country Gallia, from the name they then bare; and this they held till they were conquered by the Romans. The Tuscans then lived with that equality, and proceeded in the amplifying their State, in that first manner, spoken of before: and there were twelve Cities, among which were Clusium, Vejum, Desola, Aretium, and Volaterra and the like; who by way of league ruled their dominions; nor could they enlarge their conquests beyond the bounds of Italy, whereof also there was a great part left untouched by them, for the reasons which we shall afterwards tell. The other manner is to make allies, yet not so thought, that thou still reservest not to thyself the principal place in the command & rule and title of all the exploits, which course was always observed by the Romans. The third manner is, to make them immediately subjects, and not allies, as did the Spartans' and Athenians: of which three ways, this last is altogether unprofitable; as it appears, it was in the two foresaid Republics, which, for no other cause went to ruin, but for possessing themselves of those dominions, which they were not able to hold. For it is a thing of great difficulty and pains to hold the government of Cities by violence, especially of those that have been accustomed to live free. And if thou be'st not in arms, and well furnished with good numbers of soldiers, thou canst neither command, nor rule them. And to be able to do this, it is necessary to make friends and companions, who may assist thee in multiplying the people of thy City. And because these two Cities, did neither the one nor the other of these, their manner of proceeding was of no advantage to them. And because Rome which gives us an example touching this third manner, did the one and the other, therefore grew it to that excessive power: and for that she alone took this course of living, she alone therefore became so mighty: For she having taken to her throughout all Italy many for her companions to help her, who in many things lived with her upon equal terms; but on the other side, as is abovesaid, reserving to herself always the seat of the Empire, and the title of commanding, these their companions (who were never aware of it) with their own pains & loss of their own blood came to bring their own necks to the yoke: for when they began to transport their Armies out of Italy, and to reduce Kingdoms into Provinces, & to make thosetheir subjects, who for that they were used to live under Kings, were never much troubled to become Subjects; and receiving Roman Governors over them, and having been overcome by Armies, whereof the Romans had the name and title, they acknowledged no other head, but Rome. So that those allies of Rome that were in Italy, found themselves on a sudden begirt round by Rome's Subjects, and oppressed by an exceeding vast City, as then Rome was: and when they perceived the deceit into which they had been trained, it was too late to help it, Rome had then gotten such authority with foreign Nations, and was then of such strength within itself, the people of their City being grown very numerous and warlike. And although those their companions, to be revenged on them for these injuries, conspired together against them, yet in a short time were they losers by the war, making their own conditions worse: for of allies, they became Subjects. Which manner of proceeding (as is said) hath been observed only by the Romans: nor can a Republic that would enlarge her State take any other; for experience hath not showed us any course more certain or true. This way formerly spoken of concerning the leagues, wherein anciently the Tuscans, Acheans, and Aerosians lived, and which now adays the Swisses use, is the better way next after that the Romans took: for, it being not possible by it to grow very great, thou gainest two advantages thereby, the one, that easily thou drawest no war upon thee; the other, that what thou gettest thou easily holdest. The reason why they cannot grow great, is, because they are disunited Republics, and placed in divers seats; which makes it more difficult to consult and resolve. And besides, because they are not very greedy of extending the limits of their dominions; for that divers Commonalties being to participate of that rule, they value not so much such conquests, as does a Republic alone, which hopes to enjoy it all herself. Moreover, they govern themselves by common advice and counsel, and therefore of force they must be slower in every deliberation, than they that live within the walls of the same City. It is plain also by experience, that this manner of proceeding prescribes itself certain bounds, which it passes not; nor have we any example that they were exceeded. And these were to join together some dozen or fourteen Commonalties, and afterwards never seek to go beyond that: for being come to those terms, that they think they are able to defend themselves against every one, they desire no greater power, as well because necessity does not bind them to have greater force; as also because they understand not any great profits that arise from such like purchases, for the causes formerly alleged: for then of necessity they must either go on forward to make themselves allies, and so the multitude would make a confusion; or else to make them their subjects: and because they see herein many difficulties, and no great advantage in holding them, they make no account of them. Whereupon, when they have attained to such greatness, that they think they may live secure, they apply themselves to two things; the one to entertain others in their protection, and undertake their defences, and by these means to draw money from every part, which they can very easily divide among one another, and the other to serve in the wars under another, and to take pay of this or that Prince, who gives them wages for their service, as now adays the Swissers do, and as we read, those we spoke of before did, whereof Titus Livius bears witness, where he says, that when Philip King of Macedon came to a parley with Titus Quintius Flamminius, to treat an accord in presence of a Prercur of the Aetolians, the said praetor coming to some words with Philip; was reproved by him for avarice and infidelity, saying, that the Ae●olians were not ashamed to take pay and serve in the wars on both sides, so that many times their ensigns were seen in two contrary Armies. We know withal, that this manner of proceeding by Leagues hath been always alike, and hath prodeced the same effects. We see also, that that way of making people become subjects hath been always weak, and brought forth but small advantages; and when they have exceeded the due mean, they have gone to ruin, And if this course of making Subjects, be unprofitable in warlike Commonwealths, surely in those that are disordered, it must needs be far worse, as in our days have been the Republics of Italy. Wherefore we find that to be the true way, which the Romans held, which is the rather to be admired, in somuch as there was no other example thereof before that of Rome, nor since hath been any that hath imitated it. And touching the leagues, there are the Swissers only & the Swevian league that follows them. And, as in the conclusion of this matter shall be said, so many orders observed by the Romans, as well concerning the affairs within the City, as those without, in these our times are not only not followed, but made no account of; some of them are deemed untrue, some unpossble, others nothing to purpose, or unprofitable: so that whiles we stand still in this ignorance, we become a prey to any that invades our Country. And though it should seem difficult to imitate the Romans, yet ought it not seem so, to follow the steps of the ancient Tuscans, especially to the Tuscans now living: for though they were not able for the reasons alleged, to make themselves an Empire like that of Rome, yet could they gain them that power in Italy, that their manner of proceeding would permit them, which for a long time was with great glory of their rule, and wars, and with exceeding great commendation of their manners and religion. Which power and glory was first abated by the French, and afterwards quite put out by the Romans, and so put out, that of this power, which two thousand years since was very great, at this present we have no memory left. Which hath made me muse, what the cause is that matters are thus forgotten, whereof in the Chapter following we shall treat.   

CHAP. V.  
That the changes of Religions and Languages, together with the chances of floods or pestilences, abolish the memory of things.  
TO those Philosophers, who would have made men believe that the world is eternal, I think one might have replied, that if such antiquity were true, it would be consequent, that we should have some notice of more than five thousand years' time past, being that it is not apparent, how the remembrances of times by several occasions were abolished. Whereof part proceeds from men, and part from heaven. Those that proceed from men, are the changes of sects and tongues: for when a new sect begins, that is, a new religion, the first endeavour, to gain itself reputation, is, to blot out the memory of the old; and when it so falls out, that the founders of the new sect are of a different language, they easily extinguish it: which thing is known, by considering the ways, which the Christian Religion used against the Sect of the Gentiles, whereby it hath cancelled all their orders and ceremonies, and defaced the whole remembrance 
* This is all calumny; for we find not that any have preserved the records of learning more than the Christians, however much intermixed with Paganisine. I take it that that these memorial were last in the vast deluges of the Vandals, Goths, and Hunns, who themselves being barbarous and ignorant, envied others learning; and therefore destroyed all the registers of antiquity they could find: which our Author injuriously imputes to the Christians, being that they time out of mind, have caused those books to be taught the youth in their schools and we find that the most esteemed Fathers in the Church were adorned with that learning, which they are raxed to have persecuted; which serves also very necessarily for the better understanding and illustrating of Theology, and affords good arguments many times to our Divines for the conviction of the Gentiles out of their own writers. Nor do I find there was any other restraint in those studies, than that men were advised to apply themselves soberly thereunto, as not being studies to dwell in, but tending rather to the service of Theology.  of thatancient Theology. It is true, that they attained not thoroughly to wipe out the knowledge of the prime men thereof, which was occasioned by their maintaining of the Latin tongue, to which they were forced, being they were to write this new Law in it: for if they could have writ it in a new tongue, considering the other persecutions they made against it, there would have been no remembrance left of things past. And whosoever reads what courses St. Gregory took, and the other heads of the Christian Religion, shall see with what obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient memorial, burning all the Poets and Historians works, defacing their images, and destroying every other thing that gave any lightwww. of that antiquity; so that if to this persecution, they had added a new language, we should have seen every thing in a short time forgotten. It is very likely therefore that what the founders of the Christian Religion did against the sect of the Gentiles, they of Gentilis●●e had done formerly to the Sect that preceded it: and because the sects in a five or six thousand years chance two or three times, the memory of things passed before that time is utterly lost. And though yet there remain some remembrance thereof, we take it as some fabulous thing, whereunto no man gives credit, as it befalls the story written by Diodorus Siculus, in which though he gives account of a forty or fifty thousand years, nevertheless is it esteemed (and so I think it too) a false tail. As for the causes that proceed from heaven, they are such as extinguish the race of mankind, and reduce to a small number the inhabitants of part of the world; and this comes to pass, either by pestilence or famine, or by a deluge of waters; but that of most importance is this last, because it is more universal, and because those that escape, are all such as live among the mountains and are simple and ignorant people, who having no knowledge of antiquity, cannot derive it to their posterity: and if among them any knowing man chance to escape, to gain himself, reputation and a name, he conceals it, and altars it at his own pleasure, so that there is left to his successors only so much as he hath been pleased to commit to writing, and no more. And that these in undations, pestilences, and famines sometimes come, I believe there is no doubt, as well because all histories are full of them, as for that we see this effect of defacing the memory of things, as also becavie it accords well with reason that it is so: for nature, as in simple bodies, when there is gathered together enough superfluous matter, moves many times of itself, and makes a purgation, which is the preservation of that body; so it falls out in this mixed body of mankind, that when all countries are stuffed with inhabitants, that they can neither live there, nor go otherwhere, because all places are already possessed and replenished, and when the subtlety and wickedness of man is grown to that fullness it can attain to, it holds with reason, that of force the world be purged by one of these three ways, that men being become few, and having suffered much, may live with more convenience and grow better, whereupon it is nothing strange, that, as it is abovesaid, the Tuscan nation in old time was very potent, full of Religion and virtue, had their own manners and their native tongue, which the power the Romans quite abolished, so that, as it is said, only their name remains still in the memory of posterity.   

CHAP. VI  
How the Romans proceeded in making of war.  
HAving discoursed, how the Romans proceeded in enlarging their State, we will now treat of their proceedings in making of war, and in every one of their actions it will appear with how great judgement, they left aside the common way that others went, whereby they might more easily attain the highest pitch of greatness. The intention of that man, that makes war, either by election or by ambition, is to get, and keep what he hath gotten, and to proceed so there with, that he may enrich and not impoverish his own country. It is necessary for him then, both in getting and holding, to take a care not to diminish, but rather to augment the public profit of his country. He that will do these things, must follow the way and course the Romans took, who at first made their wars great and short; for coming into the field with huge armies, all the wars they had with the Latins, Samnites and Tuscans, they dispatched in a very short time: and if notice were exactly taken of all those wars they made from the beginning of Rome, till the siege of Veium, we should find they were all ended, one in six days, another in ten, and a third in some twenty day's space: for their custom was this; so soon as ever they had discovered the war, they presently went out with their armies and fought with their enemies, who being overmastered (to save their Country from spoil) yielded to their conditions, and the Romans condemned them in loss of some of their territories, and those they turned to their private Profits, or bestowed them upon some Colony they sent thither, which being seituate upon some Frontier of theirs, became Guardians of their confines, to the advantage of the inhabitants of that Colony, who had those fields in possession, and with the profit of the generality of Rome, that held this guard without expense. Nor could there be any way more assured, nor of more strength or advantage: for till the enemy went into the field, this guard was sufficient. And when they went forth strong into the field to oppress that Colony, the Romans also went out with their forces, and joined battle with them, wherein having got the day, they laid more heavy burdens on them, and so returned home. Thus came they by little and little to great credit among them, and forces in themselves. And this course held they always, till they changed their manner of proceeding in war: which was after the siege of Vejum, where to enable them to make a long war they determined to pay the soldiers, whereas formerly, being that the wars were short, there was no need to give them pay. And though the Romans gave pay, and that by virtue hereof they were able to make longer wars, and to make those more remote, they were forced to stay longer in the field, yet did they never alter from their first order, to dispatch them quickly, according to the time and place. Nor did they ever leave sending of Colonies: for besides their natural guise, the Consul's ambition held them to their first custom of making their wars short; for being created but for a years time, and thereof to stay at home six months, they desired to finish the war, that they might triumph. To send Colonies, the profit and great advantage they made thereof, still prevailed with them. They altered indeed somewhat touching the spoils, whereof they were not so liberal, as in former times they had been; because they thought there was not so great need, the soldiers receiving their stipends; as also because the spoils being greater, they intended therewith so to fill the common treasure, that they might not be constrained upon any enterprise in hand to levy moneys upon the City. Which order in a very short time much enriched their treasury. These two courses than they took, about the dividing the spoils, and sending of Colonies, caused Rome to grow rich by the war, whereas other Princes and Republics, if they find that means to relieve themselves, become impoverishd; so that it came to this at last, that a Consul thought he might not triumph unless he brought much gold and silver and spoils of every kind into the treasury: Thus the Romans by their above written ways, sometimes by making a quick end of the wars, otherwhiles by drawing them out at length with discomfitures and invasions and treaties to their advantage, grew always more mighty.   

CHAP. VII.  
How much land the Romans allowed to each man they sent out to inhabit their Colonies.  
BY what parcels the Romans did divide the land among them, I believe it is hard to find out the truth, because I think they bestowed on them more or less, according to the places, whether they sent the Colonies; and it is credible, howsoever the case went, and whether soever they were sent, the allowance was but small. First to the end they might be able to send the more men thither, they being entrusted with the guard of that country. Besides, because they living sparingly at home, it agrees not with reason, that they would allow their men, where wishall to abound much abroad And Titus Livius says, that, 
Terna jugera & septunnces viritim divise●ant  when they had taken Veium, they sent a Colony thither, and to each man they gave three acres and a half and a twelfth part. For besides the things above written, they judge it was not the quantity of the land that supplied their wants, but the well c●●tiating of it. And moreover it is very necessary, that the whole Colony have fields in common, were every one may freely feed his cattle, and woods from whence to fetch fuel for firing, without which a Colony cannot well subfist.   

CHAP. VIII.  
The occasion, wherefore people leave their own native soils, and invade other countries.  
Seeing that we have formerly discoursed of the manner of proceeding in war which the Romans used, and how the Tuscans were assailed by the French, me thinks it were not much from the matter, to show, that there are two sorts of war made. The one is through the ambitions of Princes, or Commonwealths, who endeavour the enlargement of their dominions; such as were the wars of Alexander the Great, and the Romans, and such as now adays every Prince and Potentate makes one with another. Which wars are dangerous indeed, but yet they do not wholly chase the inhabitants out of a country; for the Conqueror is contented only with the obedience of nations, and most commonly suffers them to live under their own Laws, and enjoy their own goods in their own houses. The other kind of war is, when the whole people with all their families, rise from a place, forced either by famine or war, and go to seek a new habitation and new Country, not out of ambition to command, as the others, but to possess it by themselves, and to drive thence or destroy the ancient inhabitants thereof. This kind of war is very cruel and terrible: And touching these wars, Sallust speaks in the end of the Jugurthin, where he says, that when Jugurth was overcome, the French were perceived to stir, who then came into Italy: and there he relates, that the people of Rome fought with all other Nations for rule and command, but with the French every one fought for his life and safety: For it sufficeth a Prince or Commonwealth that assails a Country, to destroy only those that command, whereas these populations must make a general destruction, being that they will live upon that, which formerly sustained others. The Romans had three several wars of these, exceeding dangerous. The first was that when Rome was taken, which was seized on by those Frenchmen, that (as is above said) had taken Lombardy from the Tuscans, and seated themselves there; whereof Titus Livius alleges two reasons; The first, as we said before, is, that they were allured by the pleasantness of the fruits and the wines of Italy, whereof they had scarcity in France: the second, that the people in France being exceedingly multiplied, the Country could not seed them, whereupon the Princes of those places thought it fit, that part of them should go to seek some new habitation, and that resolution being taken, they chose for Captains of them that were to depart, Bellovessus, and Sicovessus, two French Kings, whereof Bellovessus came into Italy, and Sicovessus went into Spain. Upon the passage of which Bellovessus followed the seizure of Lombardy, and thereupon the war, which first the French made against Rome. Next this was that, they made after the first Carthaginian war, when between Piombin and Pisa they slew more than hundred thousand, French. The third was, when the Germans and Cimbrians came into Italy, who having overcome several Roman Armies, were subdued by Marius. The Romans then mastered these three very perilous wars, nor was there need of less valour than theirs to overcome them: for we see, how that after the valour of the Romans failed, and their armies lost their ancient virtue, that Empire was ruind by such like people, as the Goths, Vandals, and such others, who possessed themselves of the whole western Empire. Such people come out of their own Countries, as is above said, compelled thereto by necessity, which necessity proceeds either from famine, or from some war and oppression inflicted on them in their own Countries. So that they are constrained to seek new habitations. And these either are in great multitudes, and then they break with violence into others countries, destroy the Inhabitants, possess their goods, make a new Kingdom, and change the name of the country, as Moses did, and those people likewise that seized upon the Roman Empire; for these new names, that are in Italy, and in the other Provinces, grew from nothing else, than that they were so named by their new Lords. As is Lombardy now, which was called Gallia Cisalpina; France was called Gallia Transalpina, and now is named of the French; for so were those people called, that made themselves masters of it. Sclavonia was called Illyrium; Hungary, Pannonia; England, Brittanny; and many other Countries, that have changed their names, which it would be too long to recite. Moses also called that part of Syria, which he made himself master of, Jury. And, because I have formerly said, that some people are driven out of their own habitations by war, whereupon they are forced to seek a new, where to seat themselves, I will allege an example to that purpose, of the Maurusians, ancientiy a people of Syria; Who having notice of the Hebrews coming, and thinking they could not resist them, thought it better to leave their Country, than in striving to save that, lose themselves; And so rising thence with their families, they went into Africa, where they sat down, driving out the Inhabitants they found in those places. And so they, who could not defend their own Country, could yet take that of others from them. And Procopius, who writes of the war, that Bellifarius made with the Vandals, that possessed themselves of Africa, reports that he read Letters written in certain pillars, in those parts where these Maurusians did inhabit, thus saying, 
Nos Maurusij, qui fugimus a fancy jesu latronis filij Navae.  We are Maurusians' who fled from the face of Jesus the robber, who was Son of Nave. Where the occasion of the departure of these people out of Syria plainly appears; wherefore these people are very terrible, when they are driven out by extreme necessity, and unless they be encountered by puissant forces, cannot be stopped: but when those that are constrained to abandon their Country are not very numerous, there is no such danger of them, as of those people we spoke, because they cannot use such violence, but aught rather by some stratagem, make themselves masters of some strong place, and therein being settled, keep it by making of friends and allies; as we see Aeneas did with Dido, the Massilians and others, who all by agreement with their neighbours, where they once set themselves down, were able to continue. The people that go forth in the greatest multitudes, and those also that have gone forth, almost all came out from those parts of Scythia, cold, and poor Countries, where, because there are men in abundance, and the Country of that condition, that it cannot feed them all, they are compelled to go forth, having many causes to drive them out, and nothing to keep them in. And if now for these five hundred years it hath not happened, that any of these nations have made an inundation upon any Country, it hath proceeded from several reasons. The first is, the great evacuation that Country made in the declining of the Empire, they having since sent out huge swarms more than thirty several times: the second is, because Germany, and England, from whence these people came, have their Countries well mended, so that they are able to live there, with better conveniency; and thereupon not necessitated to change their seat. On the other side, these men being very warlike, are as it were a Bulwark against the Scythians, who border upon them, to keep them within their confines and territories: and many times there chance great risings among the Tartars, who are kept in by the Hungarians and Polacks: who vaunt, and not without reason, that were it not for their forces, Italy and the Church had often felt the weight of the Tartars Armies. And this shall suffice, touching those forenamed peoples.   

CHAP. IX.  
Upon what occasions commonly wars are begun among Princes.  
THe occasion, that gave beginning to the wars between the Romans and Samnites, who had being long in league together, is very ordinary, and happens often to powerful Principalities Which occasion, either comes by chance, or else is offered by him that desires to make war. That which was between the Romans and Samnites, feil out by chance: for the Samnites intention was not, by making war first against the Sidicini, and then against the Campani, afterwards to set upon the Romans. But the Campani being oppressed, having their recourse to Rome, beyond the Romans expectation and the Samnites, the Campani giving themselves into the Romans hands, they were constrained to descend them, as their subjects, and take upon them that war, which they thought with their honour they could not avod: For it seemed very reasonable to the Romans, not to undertake the defence of the Campani, though their friends, against the Samnites their friends; but they thought it also a shame not to descend them, when they were their subjects; or recommended to their protection, judging that when they had not taken that defence in hand, they cut off the way from all others that ever should have a mind to shelter themselves under their power. And Rome having for her main end the Empire and glory, and not qui●t, could not refuse this enterprise. The self same occasion gave beginning to the first war against the Carthaginians, for the defence of the Massinese, which the Romans undertook in Sicily; which fell out by chance also. But now the second war, that grew between them, came not by chance. For Hannibal the Carthaginian Captains, set upon the Saguntins that were allies to the Romans in Spain, not so much for to endamage them, as to provoke the Romans to wars, and to have occasion to fight with them, and so to pass into Italy. This manner of kinoling new wars hath been always used among those that are mighty and that have some saith joined, some other respects: for if I desire to make war with a Prince, and between us some capitulations of peace have firmly been observed a long time, upon some other title fair justifiable, and under some other colour, I will assail some ally of his, rather than himself, knowing very well, that in setting upon his alley, either he will resent it, and so I shall have my intent of moving war against him; or not resenting it, his weakness shall be discovered, or his infidelity, in not defending one that is under his protection; and the one and the other of these two is sufficient to discredit him, and facilitate my designs. Therefore what we have formerly said, may be noted touching the taking occasions to move war, out of this example of the yielding of the Campani; and besides what remedy a City may have, which cannot by herself alone make her defence, and yet in any case would not fall into her assailants hands. Which is freely to give herself into his hands, who thou hast a purpose should defend thee, as the Capuans to the Romans, and the Florentines to Robert King of Naples, who though he would not defend them as allies, yet afterwards defended them being his subjects, against the forces of Castruvius of Lucca, who then put them hard to it.   

CHAP. X.  
Moneys are not the sinews of war, according to the common opinion.  
BEcause every one can begin a war at his own pleasure, but not end it, a Prince should before he undertake an enterprise, measure his own forces, and order himself according to them; he should also have so much judgement, that he deceive not himself with the conceit of his own forces; and he shall always be sure to be deceived when he measures them, either by the situation, or by the good will of men towards him, his own proper forces on the other side failing him: for the things aforesaid may increase well thy forces, though give thee them they cannot; and by themselves alone they are of on worth, nor nothing avail without the help of Soldiers faithful to thee: for great store of treasure serves to no purpose without that; nor the strength of thy Country, neither doth the faithfulness nor good will of men last; for these cannot be faithful to thee, thou not having force to defend them. Every mountain, every lake, every unaccessible place is made plain, where the strong defendants are wanting. Nay rather moneys are so far from defending thee, that they expose thee for a prey. Nor is there any thing more false than that common opinion that affirms Moneys to be the sinews of war, which sentence was first given by Q. Curtius, in the war between Antipater the Macedonian, and the King of Sparta; Where he relates, that for want of moneys, the King of Spar●a was forced to fight, and was broken whereas if he had deferred the battle a few days, news had come into Greece of Alexander's death, where he had remained conqueror without combat. But his treasure failing, and he doubting his Army would leave him for want thereof, was constrained to hazard the battle; whereupon Q Curtius says, that moneys are the firews of war; which sentence is alleged every day, and followed too by some Princes, not quite so wise as they should be: for making this their ground, they believe, that this is able to defend them, if they have treasure enough; and never consider, that if treasure were of force to overcome, that Darius would have conquered Alexander, the greeks mastered the Romans, and in our days the Duke Charles subdued the Swissers, and not long time since the Pope and the Florentines together would have found no difficulty in overcoming Francis Maria nephew of Pope Julius the second in the war of Orbin. But all these above named, were overcome by those who esteemed not money, but good Soldiers the sinews of war. Among other things, that Croesus' King of Lydia showed to Solon the Athenian, was a treasure unmeasurable, and ask him what he thought of his power, Solon answerrd him, he thought him no whit the more powerful for that; for war was made with iron and not with gold, and some one might come, who had more iron than be, and take his gold from him. Moreover, when after the death of Alexander the Great, a vast multitude of French passed over into Greece, and after into Asia, the French sending Ambassadors to the King of Macedon to treat some accord, that King to show them his power, and to fright them, let them see his treasure, where was much gold and silver, whereupon these French, who had in a manner concluded a firm peace, broke 't; their desire grew so great then to take his gold from him: and so was that King despoilded for that which he had gathered together to defend him. The Venetians also, a few years since, having their treasury full of coin, lost their whole State, being not able to defend themselves thereby. Wherefore I say, that gold as the common opinion cries it up, is not the sinews of war, but a good Army of slour Soldiers; for gold is not sufficient to find good Soldiers, but good Soldiers are able well to find our gold. As for the Romans (if they would have waged war by monies rather than with the sword) the treasure of the world, considering their vast undertake, and the great difficulties they had therein, would not have served their turns. But they making their wars with the sword, never found scarcity of gold; for they had it in abundance brought even into their Camps by those that stood in fear of them. And if that Spartan King for want of money, were to hazard the fortune of a battle, that befell him upon the matter of moneys, which many times hath chanced upon other occasions: for it hath been often seen, that when an Army wants provision of victuals, and is necessitated either to samish or sight, usually they make choice to fight, because it is greater honour, and where in some sort Fortune hath in her power to savour thee. Moreover, it hath often come to pass, that a Commander perceiving succours coming to his enemy's Army, must either fight with them quickly, and make trial of the chance of battle, or expecting the engrossing of the Army, come at length to fight perforce upon many disadvantages. Besides, it hath been seen, as it befell Asdrubal, when in the Mar●hes he was assaulted by Claudius Nero, together with the other Roman Consul, that when a Captain is necsstated either to fly or fight, he always makes choice to fight; thinking by this bargain, though exceeding hazardous, he may gain; but in that other he must needs lose in any case. There are therefore many necessities that can force a Captain beyond what he intended, to resolve to put it to a battle, among which sometimes may happen the scarcity of moneys, though not therefore should we esteem monies to be the sinews of war rather, than other things, which bring men into the like necessities. We may therefore resolve the question, that money is not the sinews of war, but good Soldiers rather. It is true, moneys are necessary in the second place, but it is such a necessity, which good Soldiers themselves may overcome: for it it as impossible that good Soldiers should lack money, as by moneys alone to produce good Soldiers. What we here aver, every History shows us to be true in many places, notwithstanding that Pericles persuaded the Athenians to make war with a●l Peloponnesus, declaring, that they might overcome that war with industry and by force of money; and though in that war the Athenians sometimes prospeed, yet at last they lost it, and the advice, and good Soldiers of Sparta prevailed more, than the industry and money of Athens. But Titus Livius gives us a better testimony for this opinion than any one else, where discoursing of Alexander the Great, whether if he had come into Italy, he had been able to vanquish the Romans, he shows there three things necessary in the war; a great number of Soldiers, & those good, wise Commanders, and good fortune: where examining, whether either the Romans or Alexander excelld herein, at length he concludes, without making any mention of moneys. The Capuans, when they were required by the Sidicins, to take Arms in their behalf against the Samnites, should not have measured their power by their treasure, but by their good Soldiers: for by taking that course they took to assist them, after two overthrows, to save themselves, they were forced to become tributaries to the Romans.   

CHAP. XI.  
It is not a match wisely made, to join alliance with a Prince, whose credit is greater than his strength.  
Titus' Livius having a purpose to show the Sidicins error in relying upon the Capuans aid, and the Capuans error also in believing they were able to defend them, could not express it in more lively terms then these, The Capuans contributed to the 
Campani magis nomen in auxilium sidiciorum, quam vires ad praesidium attulerunt.  Sidicins aid, rather more reputation than forces. Where we may observe, that those leagues that are made with Princes, who have not either the commodity to assist thee by reason of the distance of place, or forces to do it, because of some disorder of their own at home, or for some other occasion, add rather reputation to them that trust in them, than any strength to their party: as in our days it befell the Florentines, when in the year 1479. the Pope and the King of Naples assailed them: who being allies of the King of France, drew from that alliance more reputation to their side, then safe guard: as likely enough it would befall that Prince now, who under Maximilian the Emperor's protection should undertake any enterprise: for this is one sort of those allyances, which bring more fame than advantage, as here in this text is alleged, that of the Capuans brought the Sidicins. Therefore in this point the Capuans committed an error, in esteeming their own forces greater than they were. And so sometimes the small discretion men have, causes them when they neither know how, nor have the means to defend themselves, to take upon them the protections of others which the Tarentines also did: who, when the Roman army was going to join battle with that of the Samnites, sent their Ambassadors to the Roman Consul, to let him understand that they willed there should be peace between those two people; and how that otherwise they should make war against the party that should refu●e it. So that the Consul scoffing at this proposition, caused the triumphs to sound in presence of their ten Ambassadors, and so made his army march towards the enemy, showing the Tarentins by his deeds and not by words what answer they deserved. And having now discoursed in this Chapter against some courses Princes take amiss for others defence, I will in that that follows speak touching those they take for their own defence.   

CHAP. XII.  
Whether it be better for a Prince, fearing to be assailed by his enemy, himself first to begin the war with him, or to expect while it comes home to him.  
I Have heard it disputed sometimes by men well practised in military discipline, if there be two Princes near of equal force, and the one that is the more resolute have proclaimed war against the other, which were the best course for that other, either to attend quietly in his own confines whiles his enemy come upon him, or else to go find him at home, and there assail him. And I have heard them allege arguments on both sides; and those that argue for this going to assail him, produce the counsel that Croesus gave Cyrus, when being arrived upon the borders of the Messagetes to make war against them, their Queen Thomyris sent him word, that he should take his choice, either to enter into her kingdom where she would await him, or if he would rather that she should come and si●nde him in his own. And when the matter came to dispute, Croesus advised against the opinion of the rest, to go & seek her in her own country; urging that otherwise if he overcame her far from her own confines, he could not take her kingdom from her, because she would have time to repair her losses; but if he conquered her within her own territories, he might pursue her just upon her slight; & so giving her no time of recovery, take the state from her. Moreover they allege the advice that Hannibal gave Antiochus, when that King had a purpose to make wary against the Romans, where he shows how the Romans could not be overcome but in Italy; for there another might avail himself of their arms, their wealth, and their friends also. But whosoever fought with them out of Italy, leaving Italy free to them, left them that strength, that never would want life to give them fresh supplies at all occasions. And concluded, that it was easier to take Rome from them, than the Empire; and Italy, rather than their other provinces. Agathocles also is alleged, who not being able to support the war at home, assailed the Carthaginians, who then had made war against him, and brought them to ask peace. The example of Scipio is likewise urged, who to take the war out of Italy, assailed Africa. They that maintain the contrary, say, that he that would bring his enemy to destruction, should withdraw him from home. The Athenians are brought for example, who while they made a convenient war at their own homes, remained victors: but when they departed out of their country, and transported their army into S●cily, they quite lost their liberty. They allege the poetical sables withal, where it is showed, how that Anteus King of Lybia assailed by Egyptian Hercules was insuperable, whiles he stayed for him within the confines of his own Kingdom, but when by Hercules' subtlety he was trained out of it, he lost both state and life. Whereby occasion was given to the fable of Anteus, that while he was upon the ground, he recovered forces from his Mother, which was the ground, which Hercules perceiving, took him up in his arms, and held him from the earth. Modern advices also are alleged; every one knows that Ferdinand King of Naples was in his days held a very wise Prince; and some two years before his death fame flying, that Charles the eight then King of France had a determination to come and assail him, after he had made much preparation fell sick, when on his deathbed, among other memorial he left his son Alphonsus, was this also, that he should attend his enemies coming within his Country, and upon no case should dr●w any of his forces out of his state, but should await them within his own confines with his strength entire. Which was not followed by him, but there was an army sent into Romania, which without any combat, lost both itself and the state. The arguments, which besides the things abovesaid, are brought on each side, are these; that he, that assails, comes on with more courage, than he that attends, which gives the army more confidence: Besides this, it takes away from the enemy divers conveniencies of being able to make use of what is his own; for he cannot help himself upon those subjects, whose houses have first been sacked and their goods pillaged: and for having the enemy in the house; the Prince is constrained to take more care how he wrings money from them, and vexes them: so that he comes to dry that fountain, as Hannibal says, which furnishes, him with means to sustain the war. To this may be added, that the soldiers being in a foreign country, are forced to fight, and of that necessity makes a virtue, as we have often said; on the other side, they say, when one awaits his enemy, he does it with much advantage: for without any discommodity to thyself thou art able to give thine enemy much trouble to come by his provisions, and other necessaries belonging to an army. Thou canst also better hinder his designs, because thou knowest the country better than he. Thou canst also encounter him with more forces, because there they may easily be united, which thou canst not draw all from home. Thou canst also being routed, recover thyself with more ease, because many of thy army will save themselves, in that they have their places of refuge near, as well because the supplies are not to come from far; thou bringst to the hazard all thy forces, and not all thy fortune; whereas parting thence thou hazzardst all thy fortune with but a part of thy forces. And some there have been who the better to weaken their enemy, suffer him to enter many day's journeys into their country, and take divers towns, to the end that leaving gatrisons in all of them, he may weaken his army, and so they may afterwards fight with him at more odds. But to give my opinion herein what I think, I believe, this distinction is to be made; Either my country is armed, as was that of the Romans, or that of the Swissers is, or it is disarmed as that of the Carthaginians was, or else that of the King of France, or the Italians country is. In this case the enemy is to be kept off from coming in, because thy advantage than consists in thy revenue, and not in thy men, so that whensoever the current thereof is cut off from thee, thou art quite spoiled; nor doth any thing so much hinder thee, as the war within thy doors. The Carthaginians yield us evident examples hereof, who, whiles they had their own home free, were able with their revenue to make war against the Romans, which, when it was assailed, could not supply them against Agathocles. The Florentines had not any remedy against Castruccius Lord of ●ucca, because he warred with them in their own country, so that they were fain, for their defence, to yield themselves to Robert King of Naples. But Castruccius being dead, the same Florentines had the courage to assail the Duke of Milan at his own home, and wrought so far as to take his country from him; so much valour showed they in foreign wars, and such cowardice in their domestic. But when countries are armed, as that of Rome was, and as the Swissers are, the nearer thou comest to them, the harder they are to vanquish; for these bodies are able to bring together more forces to resist a sudden violence, than they are to, assail an enemy abroad. Neither in this case does the authority of Hannibal move me, because his passion, and his own interest, made him say so to Antiochus; ●r if ●h● Romans had in that space of time received those three routs in France, which they had in Italy by Hannibal, without doubt they had been quite undone: for than they could not have helped themselves by the remainders of their armies, nor could they have had those conveniencies to repair their losses, nor made head against their enemies with such strength as they did. We never find, that to afsail any country they sent out an army passing the number of 50000. But to defend themselves at home against the French after the first Punic war, they armed eighteen hundred thousand men. Nor could they afterwards defeat them in Lombardy, as they did in Tuscany: because against so great a maltitude of enemies, they had never been able to draw so great forces so far out, nor fight with them upon the like advantage. The Cimbrians broke an army of the Romans in Germany, nor could the Romans any way help themselves. But when they came into Italy, that they once united their forces together, they presently dispatched them. The Swissers it is easy to vanquish our of their own Country, whether they cannot send above thirty or forty thousand men: but to overcome them at home, where they are able to make a body of a hundred thousand men, is exceeding difficult. I conclude therefore anew, that that Prince, who hath his people armed and addressed for war, may always well expect a mighty and dangerous war at his own home, neither let him go to meet it. But he, whose subjects are unarmed, and his country unaccustomed to war, let him always keep it as far from home as he can. And so the one and the other, each in their degree, will better defend themselves.   

CHAP. XIII.  
That men rise from poor and small beginnings to great fortunes, rather by the help of guile than force.  
I Take it to be very true, that seldom or never it comes to pass, that men of mean fortunes attain to any high degrees without force or fraud: unless that dignity, which a man hath gotten, came to him by gift, or was cast on him by inheritance Neither do I think, we ever find, that force alone suffices; but we often see, that guile alone avails, as he shall clearly perceive, that reads Philip of Macedons life, and that of Agathocles the Sicilian, and many others such like, who from very vile and poor fortunes have gained either a Kingdom, or some other great dignities. Xenophon in Cyrus his life, declares this necessity of deceit, being that the first expedition which he makes Cyrus to undertake against the Armenian King, is full of guile, and how by deceit, and nor by force he makes him seize on his Kingdom; by which Action he concludes nothing else, but that it is necessary for a Prince, that will achieve great matters, to learn to be a cunning deceiver. Besides this he makes him deceive Ciaxares King of the Medes his Mother's uncle many ways, without which fraud he shows Cyrus could never have attained to that greatness he afterwards came. And I believe, 
* Because this whole Chapter tends to show how necessary for a Prince's advantage guile is, and it is again recommended by precept in Machiavels Treaty of a Prince, I cannot but take notice that here he is unblamable. Dolus an virtus quis in host requir it, is not meant De dolo Malo: supposed by Machiavelli in his Prince Chap. 19 where he persuades a Prince to use the Lion's force, and the Fox's craft. To be able in all Military stratagems and slights to circumvent the enemy, is one of the most requisite and not able parts in a Commander: provided there be no breach of Faith, nor Oath violated: for as Tully says, Est jusjurandum affirmatio Religiosa: quod autem affirmate, quasi Deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. It is much unworthy of a Prince (says a worthy late Author) to falsify his word, either to enemy or subject that it be; and the more villainy is it to use covert fraud, than open violence, because the enemy lies more open by giving credit to his faith: And fraus distringit, non dissolvit perjurium. And with how much more solemnity Prince's Oaths are ordinarily taken, me thinks, so much the more sincerity ought they to carry with them, having drawn together many eyes & ears as witnesses of their truth or falsehood. I shall conclude then with Tacitus, in the 4. of his Annal. Caereris mortalibus in constant confilia quod sibi conducere putant; principum diversa sors est, quibus praecipua rerum ad samam dirigenda.  that there was never any placed in a low condition that ever came to any great dignity only by plain force; and ingenuously; though I grant that by guile alone one well may, as John Galeacius did who took from his uncle Barnard the state and rule of Lombardy. And that, which Princes are necessitated to do in the beginnings of their increase, Republics are likewise forced to, till they are become mighty; then force alone suffices. And because Rome in every part lit either by chance or by choice upon all the necessary means to become great, it failed not also of this, nor in her beginning could have dealt more cunningly, than to take the course we formerly discoursed of, to make her some companions; for under this name, she brought many to be her servants, as were the Latins, and other people near about her: for first she served herself of their arms in subduing her neighbours round about, and in taking upon herself the reputation of the state; afterwards when she had brought them under likewise, she came to such growth, that no power was able to withstand her. And the Latins never perceived their own servitude, till after that they saw the Samnites twice broken, and forced to agreement. Which victory as it gained the Romans great reputation with foreign Princes, whereby they heard of the Romans name, though they never felt their arms: so it bred great envy and suspect in those that both saw and felt their strength, among which were the Latins: And so far prevailed this envy and fear, that not only the Latins, but the Colonies which they had in Latium together with the Capuans by them lately defended, conspired all against the name of the Romans. And the Latins moved that war in that manner, as is formerly said, that for the most part wars are moved, not assailing the Romans, but defending the Sidicins against the Samnites, against whom the Samnites made war with the Romans leave. And that it is true, that the Latins stirred upon the knowledge of this deceit, T. Livius declares it by the mouth of Annius Setinus a Latin praetor, who told them in their assembly, thus, For if yet we can endure 
Nam si etiam nunc sub umbra faederis aequi servitutem pati possumus, etc.  servitude, under the name of an equal league. Wherefore we find the Romans in their first growth wanted not that guile, which they had need to make use of, that from low beginnings aim to mount high, which the more covert it is, is the less discommendable, as was this of the Romans.   

CHAP. XIIII.  
They are often deceived, who think with humility to overcome pride.  
WE often see that humility does not only not help, but hurt some times, especially when it is used towards insolent men; who either for envy or some other occasion, have conceived hatred against thee. Whereof our Historian gives us good testimony in this occasion of war between the Romans and the Latins: for the Samnites complaining to the Romans, that the Latins had assailed them, the Romans would not yet forbid the Latins that war, being desirous nor any way to incense them. Whereby they did not only not incense them, but made them become more insolent towards them, so that they sooner discovered themselves enemies, whereof the words used 
Tentastis patientiam, negando militem; quis dubitat exarsisse eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorens; exercitus nos parare adversus Samnites faeritos suos audierunt nec moy erunt 〈◊〉 ab● urbe; unde laec illi● nanra modestia nisi conscientia virium & nostrarum & suarum?  by the forenamed: Latin praetor, Annlus in the same assembly, give good proof, saying: Te tried their patience in refusing them soldiers; who doubts but they were angry, yet this disgrace have they suffered: they have heard we prepare an army against the Samnites their allies; nor for this stirred they one foot out of the City: and whence came this modesty of theirs think ye, but from their knowledge as well of your Forces as their own? And therefore hereby we plainly see, how much the Romans patience increased the Latins arrogance. Wherefore a Prince should never agree to descend a whit from his rank, not ever let go any thing upon accord, if he have a mind to leave it honourably, but only then when he is able, or when he thinks also he is able to maintain it: for it is better for the most part (the matter being brought to such terms, that thou canst not let it go in the manner above said) to let it be taken from thee by force, rather than by fear of forces: for it thou lettestit go for fear, thou dost it to free thyself from war, which most commonly it will not do; for he to whom with such open cowardice thou hast yielded this, will not there with rest satisfied, but take other things from thee also, and will the rather be incited against thee, in that he values thee less; when likewise on the other side, thou shalt find thy friends more slack in thy defence, esteeming thee either weak or cowardly. But if thou forthwith upon discovery of thy enemy's intent, gettest thy forces in a readiness, howsoever they be inferior to his, he will begin to make account of thee, as also will other Princes thy neighbours above thee, so that some there will be who will have a mind to aid thee (thou being in arms) who, if thou hadst abandoned thyself, would never have struck stroke for thee. This is meant, when thou hast but one enemy. But in case thou hast more, thou shalt do very wisely, to render what thou hast belonging to any one of them for to regain him to thee, notwithstanding the war be discovered, that thou mayest take him asunder from the other confederates thine enemies.   

CHAP. XV.  
Weak states are always irresolute in their determinations; and slow deliberations are always hurtful.  
IN this very same matter, and in the same beginnings of the War between the Latins and the Romans, we may observe, that in every consultation it is good to come to the particular of that which is to be deliberated on, and not to stay long in doubt, and upon the uncertainty of a thing. Which is manifest in the consultation the Latins made, when they thought to quit themselves of the Romans: for the Romans having had some sent of this ill humour that had possessed the Latins, to be ascertained of the master, and to try if without arms they could regain those people, gave order they should send eight Citizens to Rome, to the end they might advise with them. The Latins, understanding this, and being conscious to themselves of many things done contrary to the will of the Romans, called an assembly together, to appoint who should go to Rome, and to give them order what they should 
Ad summa rerum nostrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis quid agendum nobis quam quid loquendum sit; facile erit explicatis consillis, accommodate webs verba.  say. And Annius their praetor being in the assembly during this dispute, uttered these words: The sum of our affairs is, as I take it, that ye should advise rather what we should do, than what we should say; for it is an easy matter, when things are once resolved on, to put them into fit terms. Without question these words are most true, and aught to be relished by every Prince, and every Commonwealth: for during the uncertainly and doubt of that which a man will do, there is no man knows what he should say: but when the mind is once settled and resolved of what is to be done, words to the purpose easily follow. I have the more willingly noted this passage, by reason that many times I have known that such doubt hath much wronged public actions, even to the loss and disgrace of our Republic. And it shall ever come to pass, that, in doubtful cases, and where there is need of judgement to deliberate, this resolution shall be when they are to be advised, and deliberated on by weak man. No less hurtful also are slick and slow consultations, than these ambiguous, especially those that are to be taken in favour of any friend; for slowness helps no body, and hurts one's self. These resolutions so taken, proceed either from weakness of courage, or forces, or from their malignity that should resolve, who guided by their own passtors, to ruin a State, and to fulfil some desire of their own, s●ff●r not the consultation to go forward, but rather hinder and cross it. For good Citizens, though they perceive the whole stream of the people to run the more dangerous way, yet will they never hinder the delibaration, being that those affairs attend not time. When Jerome the Tyrant in Syraacusa was dead, there being a great war between the Carthaginians, and the Romans, the Syracusians put it to question, which alliance they should take, the Roman or Carthaginian; and such was the eagerness of the parties, that the matter remained in doubt, and they took to neither side, til' that Apollonides one of the chief men in Syracufia, in a very discreet Oration of his, showed that they were not to be blamed that advised to adhere to the Romans, nor they that would take part with the Carthaginians, but rather that irresolution and slowness in taking to any side was detestable; for he saw fully in that ambiguity the ruin of the Republic. But were it that the party were once made, on which side soe'er it were, a●man might conceive some good hopes upon it. Nor could Titus Livius more fully show, than in his part he does, the harm which this hanging in suspense draws after it. He makes it plain also in this case of the Latins; for the Lavinians being sought to by them for aid against the Romans, put off the resolute on of it so long, that when they were just going forth of the town to give succours to them, news came that the Latins were defeated. Whereupon their praetor Milonius said, We shall pay ●ear to the Romans for this little way we have gone: for if at first they had resolved either to help, or not to help the Latins, not helping them they had not given offence to the Romans; but helping them, had their aid, come in time, with the addition of their Forces, they might have gained them the victory; but by delay loss came every way, as it befell them. And had the Florentines observed this well, they had never received so many damages nor troubles by the French, as they had in Lewis the twelfths' passage into Italy against Lodowick Duke of Milan: for the King treating of such a passage, sought the Florentines for their consent; and their Agents that were with the King, agreed with him, to stand neuters, and that the King coming into Italy, should maintain them in their State, and receive them into his protection, and gave the City a month's time to ratify this. Which ratification was delayed by some, who in their little wisdom favoured Duke Lodowick's affairs, till that the King was even upon the point of victory, when the Florentines offering the ratification, it would not be accepted by the King, who knew the Florentines came by force, and not willingly to his friendship. Which the City of Florence was to buy out dear, and like enough to have lost the state, as afterwards another time upon the like accident it chanc'r. And so much the worse was the course they took; for it was of no advantage to Duke Lodowick, who if he had been victor, would have showed more displeasure against them, than did the King. And though touching the mischief this weakness brings upon a Republic, we have formerly spoken in another Chapter; yet upon a new occasion offered by a new accident, I had a mind to repeat it thinking it very specially a matter worthy to be noted by all Republics like unto ours.   

CHAP. XVI.  
How much the orders used by our Soldiers in these modern times, differ from those of the ancients.  
THe Romans fought not a battle in any war they undertook with any Nation, of greater importance than this with the Latins, in Torquatus and Decius his Consulship: for in all reason it had followed, that as the Latins by losing it became Subjects, the Romans should have undergone the same condition, had not they got the mastery; and of this opinion is Titus Livius: for on each part he makes the Armies equal for their order, valour, resolution, and number; he makes there this difference only, that the Commanders of the Roman Army were of more valour than those of the Latins. It appears also that in the ordering of this battle, there befell two accidents, the like whereof was never seen before, nor since have we had but rare examples following them: that of two Consuls, to hold their Soldiers minds firm and obedient to their commands, and resolute to fight, the one killed himself, the other his Son. The equality which Titus Livius says in these two Armies, was, because they had both served in the wars a long time together; they used the●ame language, order, and arms: for in the ordering of their battle, they had the same manner, and their Troops and the Captains of them had the same names; there was a necessity being they were of equal force and valour, that something extraordinary should happen, that could settle and fix the one's resolution, rather than the others: in which (as otherwhere we have said) consists the victory: for while that lasts in the combarants' hearts, the Armies never turn their backs. And to the end it might last the longer in the Romans breasts than in the Latins, partly fortune, and partly the Consùls valour were cause; for Torquatus killed his son, and Decius' himself. Titus Livius, where he shows the equality of their forces, sets down the whole order the Romans used in their Armies and in their battles. Which being that he relates at large, I will not rehearse again, but discourse only upon that I shall think remarkable, and which, because it hath been neglected by all our Captains of later times, hath been the occasion of many disorders in several Armies stand battles. I say therefore, that out of Livius his words we gather that the Roman Army had three principal divisions, which in proper terms may be called Squadrons; the first was of the Hastati, the second of the Prencipi, the third of the Triarij: and each of these had their horsemen. In the ordering of a battle, they placed the Hastati for most, in the second place on the right side, upon the shoulders of those the Prencipi were set, and in the third place yet in the same file, the riarij came. The horse of all these ranks they placed on the right hand and on the left of these three battles: which Squadrons of horse from their forms and Places were called wings: because they looked like the two wings of that body. They ranged the first Squadron of the Hastati, which was in front, in a manner close shut together, that it might be able either to force upon, or sustain the enemy. The second Squadron of the Prencipi (because it was not the first to fight, but was ordained to succour the for most, in case it was either beaten or driven back) this they made not so compact together, but kept their ranks thin, so that they might receive in to them without disordering themselves the first Squadron, whensoever being pressed on by the enemy, they were forced to retire. The third Squadron of the Triarij had their ranks yet thinner than the second; that, if need were, they might receive the two former Squadrons of the Hastati and Prencipi. The troops then being all placed in this order, began the fight: and if the Hastati were forced or overcome, they retired into the thinness of the ranks of the Prencipi, and they united together, and having made of two battalions one body, undertook the fight afresh; and if these were beaten back and routed, they fell back into the thinner ranks of the Triarij, and so all the battalions became one body, renewed the fight again, where if they vanquished, because they had not other repair, they lost the day. And because that always when this last quadron of the Triarij came to try for it, the Army was in danger, thereupon grew his Proverb, Thematter came so far as the Triarij. The 
Res redacta est ad Triatios.  Commanders of our days, as they have abandoned all the other instructions, and follow nor in any part the ancient discipline, so have they quite neglected this part, which is of no small importance: for he that so arrang●s his Army, that in the fight he can three times repair himself, to lose he must have fortune three times his enemy, and be to encounter a valour sufficient to vanquish him. But he that stands only on the first shock (as now our Christian Armies do) may easily lose: for every little disorder, or mean valour, is able to take from him the victory. That which makes our Armies not able to recover themselves three times, is, because they have lost the manner of receiving one Squadron within another: Which comes to pass, because now adays battles are ranged which one of these two disorders; either they place their troops at the shoulders the one of another, and make their battle large of breadth, and thin in depth; which makes it weaker, because there is but small distance from the breast to the back. And when to make it stronger, they reduce the troops to the Roman manner, if the first front be broken, not having order to be received in the second, they fall together into a confusion, and rout themselves: for if that before be beaten back, it falls upon the second; if the second strives to advance, it is hindered by the first: Whereupon the first and the second both beating upon the third, causes such a confusion, that commonly a very little matter destroys a whole Army. The Spanish and French Armies in the battle at Ravenna, where the Lord de Poor General of the French forces died, which was (according to our times) a well fought battle, was arranged in one of these forenamed ways: which is, that one and the other Army came on with all their people placed to shoulder the one the other, so that neither army had but one front, and were much more in breadth then in depth. And this befalls them always, where they have a large plain, as they had at Ravenna. For knowing the disorder they make in retiring, by placing themselves in one file, they avoid it when they can, which they do by making the front large, as it is said. But when the scite of the country restrains them, they remain in the forenamed disorder, without advising themselves of the remedy. In which they pass through their enemy's countries, they go out to forage, or venture on any other exploit. And at Saint Regulus in that occasion of Pisa, and otherwhere, where the Florentines were routed by the Pisans, during the war which was between the Florentines and that city, for their rebellion, after Charles the King of France his passage into Italy, those defeats were caused by nothing else but by their own horse: which being in vanguard, and by the enemies beaten back into the Florentine foot, routed it, whereupon all the remainder turned their backs; and Criacus de Borgo, the ancient general of the Florentine infantry, hath said it many times in my hearing, that they had never been routed but by their own horse. The Swisses who are the principal masters of our modern wars, when they serve with the French, above all things have a care to place themselves on the side, for fear their own horse driven back should beat upon them. And howbeit these things seem easy to understand, and very easy to practise, yet hath not there been any of our contemporary Commanders, that would follow these ancient orders, or amend the modern. And though they have made their Armies tripartite, terming the one the Vanguard, the other the Battle, and the last the Rereguard: they make no other use thereof, but to command them when they are quatered in their lodgings, but in any service, very seldom it is (as is formerly said) but that they make all these bodies run one fortune. And because many to excuse their own ignorance, allege that the violence of the Artillery permits not that many of the ancient orders be observed, I will argue it in the next Chapter, and examine, whether the Artillery do hinder the practice of the ancient valour.   

CHAP. XVII.  
What esteem our modern armies ought to have of artillery, and if the opinion; which is generally conceived of it, be true.  
WHen I consider, besides the things formerly written, how many pitched battles were fought by the Romans at several times, that general opinion which many hold, comes into my mind, that if artillery had been used in those days, the Romans could never so easily have subdued the countries they did, nor have brought these nations they did, to become their tributaries, nor in any case could they have made such brave conquests. They say moreover, that by reason of these guns, men cannot put in practice nor show the valour they could of old. And then they add a third matter, that it makes it more difficult to come to a battle now, then formerly; nor can they contain themselves within the orders of those times, so that in time the war will be all reduced to the artillery. And being desirous now not out of purpose to argue touching the the truth of such opinions, and how much artillery hath augmented or diminished the force of armies, and whether they bereave or afford good Captain's occasion to behave themselves valourously, I will begin to speak concerning, their first opinion; that the ancient Roman armies would never have made those conquests they did, had artillery been then in use. Whereupon I say in answer, that war is made either in defence or offence. And then we are to examine, to which of these two parts it does more good or hame. And though reasons may be alleged on both sides, yet I think, that without comparison the defendant receives more damage by it, than the assailant. The reason, which hereof I give, is, that the defendant is either within a walled town, or in the field within trenches: If he be in a town, either it is but little, as most commonly for tresses are, or great and large. In the first case, the defendant is quite lost; for such is the force of artillery, that no wall be it of what thickness it will, but in a few days is ruined by it. And if those that are within the walls, have not good room to retire themselves, with retrenchments and fortifications, they are lost; nor can they support the shock of the enemy, when he would enter by breach in the wall, nor hath he any help herein of his artillery: for this is a maxim, that where met can enter in by throngs and with violence, the artillery cannot keep them off. Therefore the furious assaults of the Tramontanes it is not possible for the defendant to resist; but the assaults the Italians give, are well enough endured, who never all in a throng, but scatteringly come to the fight, which they by a name very fit for the purpose, call skirmishes. And these that go with this disorder and timcrousnesse to enter a breach, where artillery is, go to an apparent death, and against them artillery is a good use: but those who in throngs, when the one presses forward the other, come to the breach, unless sustained by ditches and ramparts, will enter any place, and the artillery shall never beat them off; and though some few of them be slain, yet can they never be so many as can hinder them of victory. That this is true, we find in many conquests which fortainers have here made in Italy, especially in that of Brescia: for that town having rebelled against the French, and the fort holding good yet for the French King, the Venetians were to support all the violence, that from thence could fall in upon the town, having all that way guarded with artillery, that descended from the fortress into the city, some of them being planted against the front, others upon the flanks, and so in every other place fir. Whereof the Lord of Fois made not any account, but descending a foot with his troops passed through the midst of them, and took the town, nor ever appeared it that he had received thereby any notable loss. So that he who defends a little town (as it is said) which is walled in, but hath not space to retire with ●etrenchments and fortifications, and trusts upon the artillery, is presently lost. And thou defendest a great town, and hast conveniency for retreat, yet without comparison is the artillery more available to those without, then within the walls. First, because thou wouldst with thy artillery annoy those without, thou must of force raise thyself with it above the level: for while thou art on the level, every small fence or trench that the enemy makes secures him, and thou canst no ways damage him; so that thou being to raise thyself, and to mount thy pieces on the curtain of the wall, or some other way, drawest two difficulties upon thee. The first is, that thou canst not bring ordnance thither, neither of that bigness nor effect, that he without can, being that great things are not manageable in small spaces. The other is, that though we grant thou canst bring such pieces thither, yet canst thou not make those safe and strong fortifications to secure thy artillery within which they without can, being upon the plain ground, and having those conveniences, and that room, they can desire. So that it is impossible for him that defends a town to keep his artillery mounted on those high places, when those without have store of great and good pieces. And if he brings them into lower places, they become for the most part unprofitable, as it is said. So that the defence of a city is to be made by the bodies of men, as it was the custom of old, and with the small shot: Whereby if they make any small advantage, in regard of the small shot, they suffer as much loss, which counterpoises all the good the artillery can do them: for by them the town walls are all laid flat, and, as it were, buried in the ditches, so that when the enemy comes to enter by assault, either because the walls are beaten down, or that the ditches are filled, he that is within, hath more disadvantages thereby, then otherwise he had. And therefore (as it was formerly said) these instruments of wa●re do more help the besieger, than the besieged. Touching the third point, which is to retire into the camp, and there to make intrenchments, to keep off from battle till some convenience or advantage gotten, I say, that herein thou hast no more help ordinarily to keep thee from fight, than had the ancients. And sometimes by reason of the artillery thou hast more disadvantage: for if the enemy come upon thee, and have some small advantage of the field, as it may easily chance that he gets the upper ground of thee, or that at his arrival thou hast not fully cast up thy trenches, nor covered thyself well with them, presently he dislodges thee without remdy, and thou art forced to come cut of thy fortifications and fight: which befell the Spaniards in the battle at Ravenna, who, being fortified between the river Roncus, and a trench they had cast up, the fence whereof was not of that height was needful, so that the French had gotten some small advantage of the ground, were forced by the artillery out of their fortifications to come to fight. But grant (as most commonly it should be) that the place where thou hast encamped, were higher than those others whereof the enemies were masters, and that their fortifications were good and secure in such sort as by means of situation and other thy preparations the enemy dares not assail thee, in this case they will be forced to use those means, which of old they were wont, when any one lay with his army, where he could not be endamaged, which were to forage the country and pillage it, to beleaguer some of the chief towns, to hinder thy provisions, so that by some necessity thou shalt of force dislodge and be brought to fight, where the artillery, as we shall hereafter show is not of so great effect. Considering then what sort of wars the Romars made, being in all most all of them they were assailants, and not defendants, it shall appear (being that these things above written are true.) that they would have had greater advantages, and sooner have made their conconquests, had the artillery been in those times. Touching the second point, that men cannot make proof of their valour as of old they might, by reason of the artillery, I say, that it is true, that where men are to show themselves in scattered troops, they run more hazard, then when they are to scale a wall or make such like assaults, where they are not all in one body, but each one a part shows himself. It is true also that the Captains and Commanders of armies are exposed to more danger of death, being that then the artillery can reach them in any place; nor avails it them to be in the hindermost ranks, or environed by their valiantest Soldiers. Yet we see, that neither of these two dangers do often endamage much; for places fortified are not easily scaled, nor do they weakly go to assail them: but if they will take them, they must besieges them, as it was the custom of old. And where they take their towns by assault, the dangers now a days are not much greater than they were wont to be: for even in those times they who defended the towns, wanted not their instruments of war where with to shoot at their enemies, which (though perhaps they were not of that violence) yet for slaughter were of the same effect. Touching the death of Captains and Commanders, in four and twenty years' time, that these last wars have been in Italy, we have not so many examples, as in ten years the ancients had: for from Count Lodowick of Mirandola, that died at Ferrara, when the Venetians, a few years since, assayed that state, and the Duke of Nemours, that died at Cerignuola, there hath not any one been slain by the canon: For the Lord of Fois was slain by the sword at Ravenna, and not by the Cannon. So that if men give no particular proofs of their valour, it is not caused by their canon, but prooeeds from their evil orders, and the feebleness of their armies, which when they want valour in the gross, cannot then in any particular make show of it. Touching the third allegation made by them, that they can never come to join battle, but that the sum of all will depend upon the artillery, I say that this opinion is utterly false, and so shall it be held by those who according to the valour of old will employ their armies: for whosoever will have a good army, must use them in trainings or rather in battles to come up close to the enemy, and there fall to handy blows with him, and take him by the collar: and they ought to ground more upon the infantry than the cavalry, for some reasons we shall here, after allege. And when they shall rely most upon the foot, and upon these ways we have spoken of, the artillery becomes quite unprofitable; for more easily can the infantry avoid the blow of the cannon by coming up close to the enemy, then of old they could escape the sury of the Elephants, the chariors armed with hooks, and such other unaccusiomed encounters which the Roman infantry met with, and sound remedy against, which they would to much the more easily have found against these, as much as the time is of very short durance in which the artillery can harm thee, in comparison of of that wherein the Elephants and chariots ●id mischief: for these in the very middle and heat of the battle did put all into disorder; whereas the artillery hinders thee only before the battle: which hindrance the infantry easily avoid, either by going covered under the natural scite of the place, or by stooping towards the ground when they shoot: which also we see by experience is not necessary, especially to escape the canon, which can hardly be so right levelled, but that if they go high they miss thee, if low they come short of thee. Afterwards when the armies are come to handy blows, this is more clear than the light, that neither the great nor small shot can do thee much harm: for if the enemy places the artillery before him, thou mayst easily take it; if behind him, it hurts himself before it can touch thee: or if it be on either side of thee, it cannot so gall thee, but that thou mayest come up close to it; whereupon will follow the effect we have said. Nor needs there much dispute upon this: for we have seen it by the example of the Swissers, who at Navarra in the year 1513. without arrillery or horse assailed the French army within their fortifications being guarded with artillery, and yet routed them being no way hindered thereby: and the reason is, (besides the things formerly alleged) because the artillery hath need to be guarded, if we would it should make any good execution, either by some wall, or trenches or some kind of fortifications, and when it fails of these defences it becomes a prey to the enemy, & so is made unprofitable, as it comes to pass when it is defended only by men, or as it may be in field battles, it cannot be placed on the flank, unless it be on that manner, that the ancients used their instruments of war, when they placed them without their squadrers, because they should play from without the ranks; and whensoever they were put at, either by the horse or others they retired behind the legions: whose ever accounts otherwise of them, does not well understand the use of them, and trusts'upon that, which may easily deceive him, and if the Turk by the help of his artillery, have gained any victory of the Sophy and the So'dan, it was not occasioned by other virtue of it, then by the affright the unusual noise thereof put the horse into. Therefore I conclude, coming to the end of this discourse, that the artillery is prossitable in an army, where there is a mingle of the ancient valour, without which it avails little against a courageous army.   

CHAP. XVIII.  
How by authority taken from the Romans, and from the use of the ancient military discipline, the foot is more to be esteemed, than the horse.  
WE can plainly sshew it by many reasons and examples, how much the Romans in all military actions did prefer the infantry before the cavalry, and thereupon grounded the assurance of all their executions, as it appears by many examples, and among others, when they sought with the Latins near the lake of Regillum, where the Roman Army giving ground a little, for their succours, the horsemen were commanded to light and serve a soct whereby they made good the fight and gained the victory. Where it is manifest, the Romans had more confidence in them being a foot, than a horseback, They used the same terms in many other fights, and sound it always a present help in their dangers. Nor let Hannibal's opinion counterbalance this, who seeing in the battle at Canna that the Consuls made their horsemen light and serve afoot, scoffing at the course they took, said, I 
Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites.  had rather indeed they should be delivered bound into my hands. Which opinion however that it was uttered by a very able man, yet if we are to follow authorities, we may rather give credit to a Roman Commonwealth, and so many excellent Captains, that flourished in it, than to one Hannibal alone, though without this authority the reasons are evident: for a man on foot can go in many places, where a horseback he cannot: he may be able to instruct them, how to keep their ranks, and being somewhat confused, how they may be restored again. It is very hard to make the horse keep their ranks, and when once they are in disorder, it is impossible to recover them. Besides this, as we see it among men, so is it among horses; some there are which have but small courage, others again exceeding courageous. And many times it falls out, that a brave horse is backed by a cowardly fellow, and sometimes a timorous jade is mounted by a stout Soldier; and there which way soever it is that this disparity follows, arises uprofitableness and disorder. The infantry well united in their ranks are easily able to rout the horse, and very hardly can they be routed by them: Which opinion is confirmed (besides many ancient modern examples) by their authorities who have left us the records of ancient Republics, where they show us, how that at first they began to make war a horseback, because they understood neither the order nor the use of the foot, which when they once had the knowledge of, they quickly conceived how much more profitable they were than the horse. But hereupon it follows not that the horse are not necessary in armies, to discover, and to forage and pray about in the Country, and to pursue the enemies in their slight, and in part also to oppose all the attempts of the the adversaries horse. But the groundwork, and the very nerves of the army, and whereof most account is to be made, is the Infantry. And among the Italian Princes faults, which have euthraled Italy to strangers, there is none greater than that they made no account of this order, and turned all their regard towards the service of horsemen: Which disorder proceeded from the evil disposition of the Captains, and their ignorance that governed the State: by reason that for these twenty-five years last past all the military affairs in Italy were in the hands of men that had no settled estates, but were Captains adventurers, serving where they could have pay, who presently devised how they could maintain their reputation, they continuing in arms when the Princes were unarmed. And because they could not continually get pay for a good number of foot, nor had any subjects whereof to serve themselves, and a small number got them no credit, they be took themselves to horse: for a Captain having pay for 200 or 300 horse, subsisted thereby in good repute, and the payment was not such, but that those that ruled the State could easily satisfy it. And to the end this should come on more easily, and to keep themselves the better in esteem, they took all respect and reputation from the foot, and referred all to their cavalry; And so far increased they this disorder, that in the greatest Army they levied, the least part of them was foot. Which custom, together with many other disorders intermixed with it, hath much weakened the Italian Soldiery, so that this Country hath easily been trodden under foot by all strangers. This error, of esteeming the horse more than the foot, is laid open yet more plainly, by another example of the Romans. The Romans were encamped at Sora; and a troop of horse having made a sally out of the town to assualt the Camp, a Captain of the Roman horse went to encounter them with his Cavalry, whereupon the first shock, meeting breast to breast, it chanced that the Commander of each troop was slain, and the residue being left without government, and the skirmish still continuing, the Romans that they might the better vanquish their enemies, light from their horses, and forced their enemies (if they would defend themselves) to do the like, wherewith the Romans carried away the victory. This example could not serve better to the purpose, in showing of how much value the infantry is, above the horse: for if in other occasions the Consuls made the horsemen to dismount, it was to succour the foot that were in distress, and had need of aid. But in this place they light not to assist the foot, nor to fight with their enemy's foot, but fight a horseback with horsemen, they thought that though they were not able to master them on horseback, that alightning they could more easily vanquish them: I will therefore conclude, that a body of foot in good order and array cannot without much difficulty be overcome by another body of foot. Crassus and Marchus Antonius both Romans, made an introde of many day's journeys into the Parthians Kingdom, with a very few horse and a good number of foot, where they encountered with numberless troops of the Parthian horse. Crassus' was left there dead with part of the Army; Marcus Antonius valorously saved himself. Nevertheless, in these Roman losses it appears, how much the Infantry exceeded the horse: for being in an open Country, where there are few mountains, and very few rivers, and the Sea-coast far off, and remote from all conveniency, yet for all this did Marcus Antonius even in the opinion of the Parthians themselves, very valourously escape, nor ever durst the whole Parthian Cavalry venture to break into the ranks of his Army. If Crassus perished there, whosoever well reads his actions, shall find, that he was rather treacherously beguiled, than forced, nor ever in all his disorders, durst the Parthians set upon him, but always went along by him, to keep in his soldiers from straggling, and getting of provisions, and by promising fairly, but observing nothing, brought him at length unto extreme distress. I should think I were to take much pains in persuading that the valour of the infantry does much excel that of the horse, but that there are many modern examples which give us a very satisfactory testimony. And 'tis well known that 9000 Swisses at Navarra, formerly alleged by us, went to encounter 10000 horse and as many more foot, & vanquished them: for the horse could no way harm them, and the foot being for the most part Gascoignes and ill ordered, they made small account of. We see likewise that afterwards 36000 Swisses, went to find Francis the French King about Milan, who had an army of 20000 horse and 40000 foot, and a 100 tyre of Ordnance; and though they gained not the battle at at Navarra, yet they fought bravely two days together, and when at length they were broken the moiety of them escaped. Marcus Regulus Attilius presumed with his infantry to encounter not only the enemy's horse, but their Elephants; and though his purpose came not to effect, yet was it not so, but that the valour of his infantry was such, that he had very good reason to hope he might well overcome that difficulty. And therefore I answer, that he that would overcome a body of foot in good array, must oppose them with another body of foot in better order than they; otherwise he sustains an evident loss. In the day's days of Philip Visconti Duke of Milan, there came down into Lombardy some 16000 Swisses, whereupon the Duke Carmignuola being then his General, sent him with near upon a thousand horse and some few foot to encounter them: Who not knowing the manner of their fight, went to meet them with his horse, not doubting but that he could presently rout them. But finding them to stand firm, and having lost many Soldiers, retired; yet being a very able man, and knowing in new accidents how to try new ways, having repaired his broken troops, he went again to meet them, where he made all his armed men a light, and serve on foot, and so by them having made a head to those of his infantry, he invested the Swisses, who found no way to help themselves: for Carmignuolaes' horsemen bring lighted, who were well armed, were able with facility to enter into the Swisses ranks without much hurt: which when they had pierced, they could easily harm; so that of their whole number there was left only that part alive, that was by Carmignuolaes' courtesy preserved. I believe well that many know this difference of valour that is between the one and the other of these orders, but so unhappy are these times, that neither the ancient nor modern examples, nor the acknowledgement of the error is of force to prevail with modern Princes to readvise themselves and consider, that to recover the reputation of the Soldiery of a Country or State, it is necessary to revive again these orders and entertain them near their persons, to encourage them and allow them means to live, to the end they may restore to them both life and reputation. But as we use to forsake these customs, so we leave other orders also formerly spoken of; whereupon it comes to pass, that the very conquests we make turn to our losses, and not to the advancement of a State, as hereafter we shall say.   

CHAP. XIX.  
That Conquests in Republics not well governed, and which proceed not according to the Roman virtue, prove rather their ruin, than advancement.  
THese opinions contrary to the truth, and grounded on evil precedents, which have been introduced by these our corrupt ages, cause men not to stand much upon straying from old wont uses. Some thirty years ago, an Italian would never have been persuaded, that ten thousand foot in a plain had ever been able to assault ten thousand horse and so many more foot, and not only fight with them, but vanquish them too, as it is plain by the example of the battle at Navarra; by us sundry times alleged. And however that Stories are full of them, yet would they not have given us credit: and if they had believed us, they would have said, that in these day's men are better armed, and that a squadron of men at arms would have been of force to have shocked with a rock, and not only with a body of foot, and thus with these false excuses they corrupted their judgements. Nor would they have taken into consideration, that Lucullus with a few foot routed a 150000 horse that Tigranes led, and yet among those horsemen there was a sort of them very like our men at arms. And so this fallacy was discovered by the example of foreign Nations. And as thereby it proves true, touching the infantry, which is related in Story, so ought it be believed that all the rest of the ancient orders are true and useful. And when this were once credited, Republics and Princes would fail less, and be of more strength to resist any force should come upon them, nor hope so much in the flight; and those that should have in their hands the government of State, would be better able to guide it, either by way of amplification or by way of preservation, and would think that to increase the number of their Citizens, and make them as their associates and not vassals, to send forth Colonies to keep the countries gained, to make a general stock out of the booties taken, to tame the enemy with incursions, & by set battles, & not long sieges, to maintain the public state in wealth, & the private in scarcity, and to be industrious in keeping the armies in good discipline, are the means to enlarge a Commonwealth & gain an Empire. And when this way of amplification should not like them, than should they think that all addition to their state are the ruin of Commonwealths, and therefore should restrain all ambition, regulating their City according to their laws and customs, forbidding all inlargments, only aiming at defenee of what they have, and keeping them under good government, as the Republics of Germany do, and so have lived free a good while. Notwithstanding (as otherwhere I have said, when I discoursed touching the difference there was in the ordering of a State to become fit to conquer; and the ordering of one to be able to maintain itself) it is impossible, that a Republic should have the hap to stand quiet, and enjoy her own liberty, with her small Territories: for though she molest not others yet she shall be molested herself: she may also have some mind or some necessity in some part to extend her bounds: and in case she have no enemy abroad, yet may she find some one at home, as it must needs be always that such be found among a great many potent citizens, and if those Republics of Germany can subsist in that manner, & have been able to continue for a time it arises from some conditions, that are in that Country, & which are no where else sound, nor could they maintain such a manner of government without them. This part of Germany, whereof I speak, was subject to the Roman Empire, as were France & Spain; but when the Empire began to decline, & the title of the Empire was brought into that Country, the most potent of those Cities began (according to the baseness or the necessity of those Emperors) to set themselves at liberty, buying themselves out from the Empire, and reserving thereunto only a a certain annual rent. Insomuch as by little and little, all those Cities, which he●d immediately of the Emperor, and were no way in subjection to any Prince, in such like manner set themselves free. It happened in the same times, when these Cities bought out their liberties, that certain commonalties of the Duke of Austria's subjects, rebelled agianst him, among which were Tilibourg, the Swisses and others, who prospering in the beginning, by little and little came to such growth, that they not only shaken off the Austrian yoke, but even became a terror to all their neighbours, and these are those they call Swisses. This Country therefore is divided into the Swisses, Republcks, which they call-free Towns, Princes, and the Emperor. And the reason why among such variety of governments there arise no wars, or if any do, why they continue not, is that reverence they yield to the Emperor, who albeit he hath no great forces, yet is held in such esteem among them, that he always reconciles them, & with his authority interposing himself as Mediator, takes away all discontents: & the greatest & longest wars that have been there, were those that followed between the Swisses & the Duke of Austria; and though now for these many years the Emperor and the Duke of Austria have been one and the same thing, yet was he never so powerful as to tame the Swisses insolence, where there was never any means of accord, unless it were by force; nor hath the residue of Germany ever given him much assistance: partly because those commonalties cannot find in their hearts to hurt those that desire to live under a civil government, as they themselves do and partly because those Princes are not able, being poor, or will not, by reason that they envy too great puissance. Those commonalties therefore may live contented with their small dominions, because they have no occasion (in regard of the Imperial Authority) to wish it greater. They may live the better in union within their own walls, because they have the enemy near at hand, who would willingly take any opportunity to lay hold on them, whensoever they should fall into discord: but if that country were otherwise conditioned, it were fit for them to seek the enlargement of their State, & so interrupt their own rest: and because otherwhere there are not the like terms, this manner of living cannot be followed, and there is a necessity either to strengthen the State by way of leagues, or to amplify it as the Romans did. And whosoever undertake any other course of government, seek not their own life, but ruin and desttruction: for many ways, and for many reasons are conquests hurtful: for it is very possible to gain dominion, and not strength; and he that does increase his dominions, & yet grows not in strength, must needs go to wrack. They cannot grow strong, that grow poor in the wars, although they prove victorious, because their conquests cost them more than they get by them, as the Venetians & the Florentines did, who have been much weaker, when the one commanded all Lombardy, and the other Tuscany, then when the one was contented with the seaonley and the other with six miles round of territories: for all this preceded from their desire to conquer, & their ignorance to take the right course: and they deserve the more blame, in that they have very little excuse having seen the ways the Romans went, because they might have followed their example, being that the Romans without any pattern to follow, by their own judgement, found out a fit way to go. Moreover sometimes such gains gotten do no small harm to a well governed Commonwealth, when either such a city or country is conquered that abounds with pleasures, where by conversation with them, their manners are learned, as it happened to Rome at first in the conquest of Capua, & afterwards to Hannibal. And had Capua been of further distance from the City, that the soldiers error had not had the remedy near hand, or that Rome had been in some part corrupted, without question that conquest had proved the Roman Republics ruin. And T. Livius witnesss the same in these words: Even than was Capua little good for the military discipline, 
Jam tunc minime sal bris militari disciplinae Capua, instrun entum omnium voluptatum, delinitos militum animos avertit a memoria patriae.  which being the instrument of all sorts of pleasures, besotted the soldiers minds so, that they forgot their native Countries. And truly such like Cities sufficiently avenge themselves on their Conquerors without fight, or loss of blood; for by infecting them with their contagious vices, they expose them to the conquest of whoever assails them. And Juvenal could not better have expressed this, then where in his Satyrs he says, that by their conquests of foreign nations, their minds were possessed with foreign vices, in exchange of parsimony, & other excellent virtues; Glutrony and luxury making their habitation there, revenged the 
Gula & Luxuris incubuit, ●ictunique ulci 〈…〉 orbem.  world's Conquest on them. If therefore these gettings were likely to have been dangerous to the Romans, in the times that they proceeded with such wisdom and virtue, how will they prove to those who go on in much different ways from them? and who besides the other errors they run into (whereof we have formerly spoken enough) serve themselves of either mercenary or auxiliary soldiers? whereupon those mischiefs often befall them, which we shall mention in the following chap.   

CHAP. XX.  
What hazard that Prince or Commonwealth runs, which is served by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers.  
IF in another work of mine I had not treated at large of mercenary and auxiliary soldiers how unprofitable they are, and how very profitable the native soldiers of the Country are, I would much more have enlarged myself in this discourse, than now I purpose; but having otherwhere discoursed hereupon at length, I shall now only point at it. Not yet did I think fit wholly to pass it over, having found in Titus Livius so large an example belonging to those soldiers: for auxiliary soldiers are those that a Prince or Commonwealth sends with their Captains and pay ready furnished in thy aid. And coming to the text of T. Livius, I say, that the Romans having in several places broken two armies of the Samnites with their forces, which they sent to succour the Capuans, and thereby freed them from that war the Samnites made against them, purposing to return to Rome, to the end the Capuans despoiled of aid should not a new become a prey to the Samnites, left behind them in the country about Capua two legions to defend them. Which legions growing corrupt through idleness, began to be ensnared with the delicacies thereof So that having for gotten their own country, and the reverence they ought to the Senate, they resolved to take arms, and make themselves Lords of that Country, which they by their valours had defended, thinking those inhabitants not worthy to enjoy those goods, which they knew not how to defend. Which thing, the Romans having had some inkling of it before, was stopped, and punished by them, as, where we speak of conspiracies, it shall be showed at large. Therefore I say again, that of all kinds of soldiers the auxiliaries are the most dangerous; Because among those, that Prince or Republic that uses them for aid, hath no authority, but only he that sends them: for auxiliary soldiers are those that are sent th●e by a Prince, as I have said, under the command of his own Captains, under his own ensigns and pay also, as this army was, which the Romans sent to Capua. These kinds of soldiers, when they have vanquished, most commonly pillage as well them that have hired them, as the enemy against whom they have hired them; and this they do, either through the malign disposition of their Prince that sends them, or through their own ambition And however the Romans had no intention to violate the agreement and conventions made with the Capuans, yet the facility wherewith those soldiers thought themselves able to take their town, was such that it might have been of force to persuade them to think of taking the town and State from the Capuans: Many examples to this purpose may be alleged; but this, and that of the inhabitants of Rhegium shall suffice me, from whom both lives & town were taken by one legion of soldiers, which the Romans had there left in garrison. Therefore a Prince or a Republic should rather take any other course, than seek to bring auxiliary soldiers into his Country, principally when he is most to rely upon them: for any accord or agreement (though very hard) to which he shall yield with his enemy, shall be more tolerable than this. And if things past were well called to mind, and those that are present well considered on, for one that hath had good success in such a business, a man shall find exceeding many who have been abused. And a Prince, or an ambitious Republic can never have a fitter opportunity to seize on a Town or Country, than when they are required to send their armies for defence thereof. Wherefore he that is so ambitious, that not only for his own defence, but for offence to another, calls in such like aids, seeks to gain that he cannot hold, and which also he that gets it for him, can at his pleasure take from him, But so great is man's ambition, that if he can fulfil his desire for the present, he is never aware of that evil, which shortly after may thence redound to him. Nor do the ancient examples avail any thing with him, as well in this, as in other things we have treated of: for were men hereby moved, they would perceive that the more freely and fairly they dealt with their neighbours, and the farther of they were from making themselves masters of them, the more readily would they offer to cast themselves into their arms, as hereafter shall appear by example of the Capuans.   

CHAP. XXI.  
The first praetor that the Romans ever sent to any place, was to Capua, four hundred years after they began to make war.  
HOw much the Romans in their manner of proceeding in their Conquests did differ from those, who now a days enlarge their dominions, we have formerly discoursed enough, and how they suffered those Towns which they did not utterly race, to live with their own laws, as well those that yielded to them as subjects, as those that came under their protection as associates. And in them they left no marks of the Roman Empire, but tied them to some certain conditions, which whiles they observed, they still maintained them in their state and dignity. And we know that these courses were continued till they began to Conquer abroad out of Italy, and that they reduced Kingdoms and States into Provinces. Whereof the example is very clear; for the first place that ever they sent any Preror to was Capua, whether they sent him not through their own ambition, but upon the Capuans entreaty, who (being they were at discord one with another) judged it necessary to have a Citizen of Rome amongst them, that might put them in order again and reunite them. The Antiates also moved by their example, and constrained by the same necessity required to have a Perfect sent them. And T. Livius says upon this occasion, and upon this new way of ruling; That now not only the Roman 
Quod jam non solum arma, sed jura Romana pollebant.  arms, but their laws also were in great repute. We see therefore how much this course taken, furthered the Romans advancement: for those Cities especially that are accustomed to live free, or to be governed by their own Citizens, are well enough contented to live in another manner of quiet under a rule they see not (though it may bring some burden with it too) rather than under that which they having every day in their view, continually reproaches them with their slavery. Besides this; the Prince gains hereby another advantage, that his Officers having not in their hands these judicatures and magistracies, whereby they were to regulate those Cities, there can no imputation or aspersion be cast upon the Prince. And hereby many occasions of calumny and hatred against him are taken away. And that this is true, besides ancient examples, which we could allege, we have one of late memory in Italy: for as it is well known (Geneva having been several times possessed by the French) that King did always (except at this present time) send them a French Governor, who under him should govern them. For this present only, but upon any intention of the Kings; but it seemed necessity so ordered it, he hath suffered them to be governed by their own laws, and to have a Genowes for their Magistrate. And I make no question but that he that inquires which of these two ways most secures the King for his rule over them, & gives the people most satisfaction, would the rather allow of this latter. Moreover men cast themselves the more freely into thy arms, the further off they think thee from being desirous to rule; & so much the less do they fear thee in regard of their liberty, by how much the more courteous and familiar thou art with them. This familiarity and free manner of behaviour made the Capuans hasty to ask a Prerour of the Romans: but had the Romans of themselves made but the least show they would have sent one thicher, they would presently have been in jealousy of them, and started from them. But what need we go to Capua and Rome for examples, having store enough at Florence and in Tuscany? It is well known how long since it is that Pistotia willingly yielded itself to the government of Florence. It is as well known also, what enmity hath been between the Florentines and the Pisans, the Luckeses and the sienneses; and this difference of disposition proceeds not from thence, that the Pistoyeses value not their liberty, as well as others do, but because the Florentines used these with that respect they do their own brothers, but the others they treated as enemies. This was the occasion made the Pistoyeses offer themselves freely to be governed by them; and the others struggle with all might and main, as yet they do also, not to come under them. And doubtless, had the Florentines either by way of alliances or succours grown familiar with their neighbours, and not have always scared them, they had at this instant been Lords of all Tuscany. But hereupon I advise not, that arms and force are not to be used, but that they are to be reserved for the last place, where and when other means will not serve.   

CHAP. XXII.  
How erroneous many times the opinions of men are, when they give their judgements touching great affairs.  
HOw false oftentimes men's opinions are, they well see, who are eye-witnesses of their deliberations, which many times unless they be determined of by able men, are contrary to all truth. And because that excellent men in corrupted Commonwealths (especially in peaceable times) both for envy and occasions of ambition are maligned, such adwise is followed, as by reason of a common error is well approved of, or such as is put forward by men that aim rather at grace and favour then the general good. This error afterward is discovered in times of adversity, and of force recourse is had to those that in times of peace were utterly forgotten, as in its own place in this part it shall fully be spoken of. There are also certain accedents where men are very easily beguiled, if not well experienced in affairs, the present accident having in itself many likelihoods fit to make that credible, whereof in such a case men are persuaded. These words are spoken upon that which Numicius the praetor (after that the Latins were defeated by the Romans) persuaded them; and upon that which few years since, many believed, when Francis the first, King of France came to the Conquest of Milan, which was defended by the Swissers. Therefore I say, that Lewis the Twelfth being dead, and Francis of Angoulesme succeeding in the Kingdom of France, and desiring to restore the Duchy of Milan to the Kingdom whereof the Swissers had of late possessed themselves, by means of Pope Julius the seconds encouragement, desired to have some aid in Italy, which might further his undertake, so that besides the Venetians, whom King Lewis had gained, he tried the Florentines, and Pope Leo the tenth, thinking his enterprise much facilitated, by having them to side with him, because the King of Spain's soldiers were in Lombardy, and some of the Emperor's forces in Verona. Pope Leo yielded not to the King's desire, but by those that counselled him, he was persuaded (as it was said) to stand neuter, showing him that herein consisted certain victory: for it was nothing at all for the Churches good, to have either mighty in Italy, the King or the Swissers. But if he desired to restore it to the ancient liberty, it was fit to free it from the one and the other. And because it was not possible to varquish the one or the other, divided or united, it was not amis to let them overcome one another, and that afterwards the Church with her allies should assail the conqueror, and it was impossible to find a better occasion than the present, both being encamped: and so the Pope having his forces in order, whereby he might be able to present himself upon the confines of Lombardy, near the two armies under colour of guarding his own state, should there abide till they had fought their battle: which in all probability (each army being very valorous) could not but prove bloody to them both and leave the Conqueror so feeble, that the Pope might easily assail and break him, and thereby he should attain to become Lord of Lombardy, and only arbitrator of all Italy. And how erroneous this opinion was, appeared by the event of the matter: for the Swissers being vanquished after a long fight, the Popes and the Spanish soldiers were so far from assailing the Conquerors, that they prepared themselves with what haste they could for flight; which also would have little availed them had it not been for the King's humanity or coldness in their pursuit, who sought not after a second victory, but was contented to make agreement with the Church. This opinion hath some arguments for it, which carry a colour of truth, but indeed are far from it: for it seldom comes to pass, that the Conqueror loses many of his soldiers; for of them, there are some only slai in the battle, and not in the flight: and during the heat of the combat, whiles men stand face to face one with another, few of them fall, especially because for the most part this continues but a small while. And in case it should last long, and many of the Conquerors should fall; yet such is the reputation, and terror also, that victory draws with it, that it far exceeds the damage, that by the death of those soldiers can be suffered. So that an Army, which upon the opinion, that such a one were weakened, going to assail it, would be much deceived, unless it were such an Army that at all times, before and after the victory, were able to deal with it. In this case the assailing Army may be able according to the fortune and valour it hath to win or lose: but that which had formerly fought, & vanquished, would have some advantage of the other: Which appears plainly by the experience the Latins gave us, and the fallacy by which Numicius the praetor was abused, as also by the damage which those people brought upon themselves by believing him, who (when the Romans had vanquished the Latins) cried out through all Latium, that then was it time to assail the Romans, who were weakened with the late fight they had with the Latins; that the Romans had carried away only the name of the victory, but had suffered all other sorts of damages, even as much as if they had been overcome, and that any small force, if now a fresh it should assail them, were enough to dispatch them. Whereupon those people that gave credit to him, levied a new army, and were presently defeated, and so suffered that loss, which others shall that hold the like opinion.   

CHAP. XXIII.  
How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects, whensoever occasion was offered, that constrained them thereunto, avoided the mid way, and rather betook themselves to one of the extremes.  
THe Latins were now reduced 
〈◊〉 Jam Latio is status erat rerum, ut neque pecem, neque bellum pati possent.  to such terms, that they could neither endure peace, nor maintain War. Of all unhappy conditions this is the worst, unto which a Prince or Republic can be brought, that they can neither accept of peace, nor support the War; unto which those are reduced, who are overmuch offended at the conditions of peace, and on the other side, if they have a mind to make war, either they must cast themselves as a prey into the hands of those that aid them, or become a prey to their enemy. And into these mischances men fall by evil advices and evil courses, by not having well weighed their own forces, as before it was said: for that Republic or Prince, that should well weigh them, very hardly would ever be brought to those terms the Latins came, who when they should not have made accord with the Romans, made it, and when, they should not have broke peace with them broke it. Whereby they brought it so to pass that their agreement and disagreement with the Romans did equally endamage them. The Latins than were overcome and much broken at first by Manlus Torquatus, and afterwards by Camillus; who having forced them to yield and render themselves to the Romans, and put Garrisons in all the I owns in Latium, and taken hostages of them all, when he came back to Rome, related to the Senate, that all Latium was in the people of Rome's hands. And because this judgement is remarkable, and deserves note, to the end it may be followed, when Princes have the like occasions given them, I will produce the very words, that Livy put in Camillus his mouth, which did testify both of the manner the Romans held in amplifying the State, and that in their judgements touching the State, they always avoided the middle way, and turned to the extremes: for a government is nothing else, but to have such a tye upon the subjects, that they either cannot, or will not hurt thee. This is done either by making thyself fully sure of them, in taking away from them all means to hurt thee, or by doing them so much good, that it is not probable they will wish to change their state: all which is there comprehended; first by the proposition Camillus made, and afterwards by the judgement the Senate gave thereupon. His words were these, In this consultation, the immortal Gods have given you so much power, that it is wholly in your hands to choose, whether Latium shall continue still a Nation or no. And 
Dij mortales ita vos potentes hujus consilit fecerunt, ut, sit Latium, an non fit, in vestra manu posuerint. Itaque pacem vobis (quò ad Latinos attinet) parere in perpetuum, vel saeviendo vel ignoscendo potestis. Vultis crudelius consulere in deditos victosque, licet delere nomen Latinum. Vultis exemplo majorum augere re●n Romanam, victos in civitatem accipiendo, materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppeditat. Certe id firmissimum imperium est, quo obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos, dum expectatione stupent, seu paena seu beneficio praeoccupari oporcet.  therefore now may ye for ever procure yourselves repose and security from thence, either by rigour and punishment, or by clemency and pardon; choose ye whether. Are ye minded to proceed by way of cruelty against those that have yielded, and are vanquished? ye may indeed blot out the very name of Latium; But will ye, as your ancestors have done before you, enlarge the Roman Empire, by receiving into your City those whom ye have conquered? Then have ye here means to grow mighty to your great glory. Certes that government is of all other most sure, where the subjects take joy in their obedience. And therefore it is behooveful, whiles their minds are in suspense between fear and hope, to prevent them either with speedy punishment or benefit. To this purpose followed the Senate's deliberation, which was according to the Consul's words; for calling them Town by Town, before them, those that were of any moment, they either much benefited, or quite ruined them, granting divers exemptions and privileges to those they would do good to, freely making them Citizens, and giving them security every way. They dismantled the other strong Towns, and sent Colonies thither, and brought the people from thence into Rome, and so dispersed them, that neither with their arms nor counsel they could do any more harm: Nor ever did they make use of any neutral way, in things (as I have said) of moment. Prince's should imitate this judgement given; and hereunto the Florentines should have intended, when in the year 1502. Arezzo and the valley of Chiana rebelled; which had they done, they had secured their Government, and much amplified the City of Florence, and likewise might have given them those fields they wanted for their sustenance: But they made use rather of that middle way, which is the most pernicious, in giving judgement upon men, so that part of the Aretins they confined, part they condemned, and took from all of them their honours, and ancient degrees in the City, and yet left the City whole and untouched: And if any Citizen in their Consultations advised that Arezzo should be dismantelled, and razed, they who seemed to be of the wiser sort, said it would be a disgrace to the Florentines to raze it; because it would be thought then that Florence wanted forces to hold them; which are some of those Reasons that seem to be, but are not true: For by the same reason a patricide were not to be put to death, not any vile or scandalous person, it being a shame for that Prince to show that he is not able to bridle such a man alone: and these kind of men having such opinions, perceive not, how men in particular, and sometimes a whole City together too, do wrong a State: so that for others example, and his own safeguard, a Prince hath no other remedy, but utterly to raze it. And indeed the honour consists in the knowledge and power to chastise, and not in being able to hold a City under still with many dangers: for the Prince that punishes not him that offends, so that he cannot offend more, is esteemed ignorant and unworthy. This sentence which the Romans gave, is confirmed by the judgement they gave upon the Privernates. Where by the Text in Livy two things may be observed: the one, which is formerly spoken of, that subjects are either to be obliged by good done them, or else to be quite extinguished; the other is, how much avails the generous conrage of the mind, and true speaking in the presence of sage and discreet men. The Senate of Rome was assembled to give their sentence upon the Privernates, who having been in Rebellion, were by force reduced to the Roman obedience. Many Citizens were sent from the Privernates to crave pardon of the Senate, who 
Quam poenam meritos Privernates censeret. Eas inquam merentur, qui se libertate dignos censent. Quid si poenam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobis cum habituros● spear muss? Si ●onam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam; sin malam, haud diuturnam. Se audivisse vocem & liberi & viri, nec credi posse ullum populum, aut hominem denique in ea conditione, cu●us eum poenite at diutius quam necesse sit mansurum; ibi pacem; isse fidam, ubi voluntarij pacatisint, neque eo loco, ubi servitutem esse velint, fidem sperandam esse. Eos demum, qui nihil praeserquam del ibertate cogitant, dignos; esse qui Romanifiant.  being come before them, were thus asked by one of the Senators, What Punishment he should censure the Privernates worthy of? Whereunto one of the Privernates replied, The same that they deserve, who think themselves worthy of liberty. Whereunto the Consul answered, What if we remit you your punishment, what peace shall we hope for with you? To which he said again, If it be good you give us, you shall have it faithfully and perpetually observed, if ill, not long. Whereupon the wives of those of the Senate, howbeit many were angry thereat, said, That they had heard a stout and a free man speak; neither was it credible that any Nation, or any man indeed, would continue any longer, than he must needs, in such a condition, whereof he reputes himself; and there only was it likely a peace would be inviolably kept, where it was made of their own good wills and freely; but it was in no case to be hoped for there, where they were brought into bondage and servitude. and upon these words they decreed, that the Privernates should be made Citizens of Rome, and honoured them with all the privileges of their Bourgessie, saying, That they finally were worthy to be Citizens of Rome, who valued nothing else in comparison of their liberty. So much were these generous spirits taken with this stout and free answer: for, an answer else would have been false and cowardly. And those that think otherwise of men (especially such as are used to be free, or to their thinking are free) are much deceived, and by this deceit are they feduced to take wrong courses for themselves, and of little satisfaction to others: from whence arise the often rebellions and ruins of States. But to return to our discourse, I conclude as well by this, as by that judgement given upon the Latins, when sentence is to pass upon puissant Cities, and that have been accustomed to enjoy their liberties, it is necessary either utterly to raze them, or by benefiting of them to oblige them; otherwise it is all to no purpose; for the middle way here in is absolutely to be avoided, which is dangerous, as it proved to the Samnites, having enclosed the Romans at the gallows of Gaudium, when they would not follow that old man's counsel that advised them, either to let them go with all courtesy and love, or put them all to the sword. But they taking that neutral way, disarming them, and putting them all to pass under the gallows, let them go with shame and disdain so that a while after they found by their own damage how advantageous that old man's advice had been, and how hurtful their own resolution was, as we shall discourse thereof more at large in its own place.   

CHAP. XXIV.  
Fortresses in general do more harm then good.  
PEradventure it may seem to the wise men of our times a matter not well advised on, that the Romans, when they would make themselves sure of the people of Latium, and of the City of Privernum, never thought upon the building of some Fortress which might serve for a bridle to hold them in obedience, especially being it passes for a Proverb in Florence, alleged by our State's men, that Pisa and other such like Cities should be kept with Citradells. And truly had the Romans been like them, they would have provided for the building of them: but because they were of another kind of courage, and judgement, and had another manner of power, therefore they never built any. and whiles Rome lived free, and observed her own ordinances, & institutions, for the propagation of virtue, she never built any one to keep under Cities or Provinces, though it may be, she preserved some of them she found already built. Whereupon having seen the manner of the Romans proceedings herein, and that of the Princes of our times, I think to take it into consideration, whether it be good to build Fortresses, & whether they advantage or wrong him that builds them. We must consider then, that Fortresses are built either for resistance against the enemy, or for defence against any tumult of the subjects. In the first case they are unnecessary, in the second hurtful. And to give a reason, wherefore in the second case they are hurtful, I say, that that Prince or Republic that is afraid of his own subjects, and their rebellion, must needs have his fear arising from the hatred his own subjects bear him; and that hatred from his own evil carriages, which evil carriages proceed from thence, either that he believes he is able to keep them under by force, or from the Prince's small discretion: and one of the causes that makes him think himself able to rule them by force, is the having built these Citradels, over them: for evil treatings, which are the causes of hatred, for the most part are derived from thence, that that Prince or Republic hath Citadels upon them; which (when this is true) are far more hurtful, than profitable: for first (as it is said) they make thee bolder and more rough among thy subjects, being that thou hast thy security within them: for all these forces and violences which are in use to bridle a people withal, are of no value, but these two; either that thou hast always a good Army ready to send into the field, as the Romans had, or that thou dost disperse, extinguish, disorder, and disunite them so, that in no case they can make such a body as can hurt thee: for be it that thou dost impoverish them, They that are despoiled of their 
Spoliatis arma supersunt. ●●●or arma ministrat.  goods, have weapons left them. If thou disarmst them, Even rage will find them weapons. If thou destroyest their heads, and proceedest still to injure the rest, there will grow up again new heads, as fast as those of Hydra. If thou buildest Citadels, they are quite unprofitable in time of peace, because they encourage thee to wrong them; but in time of war they are of least use; for then are they assaulted by the enemy, and thy subjects too; nor is it possible they can resist them both. And if ever they were unprofitable, they are now a days so, in regard of the Artillery, by reasons of whose fury and violence, it is impossible to defend small fortresses, and where there is no place for retiring with new retrenchments, as formerly hath been showed. But I will dispute this matter more plainly yet. Wilt thou O Prince with these Citadels kerb thy Citizens? or wilt thou whether Prince or Commonwealth that thou art, bridle a City thou hast taken by war? I will address myself to the Prince, and tell him, that such a Fortress to curb his Citizens cannot be more unprofitable, for the reasons above alleged: because it makes thee prompter, and less careful how thou dost oppress them, which oppression makes them desperate in attempting thy ruin, and so enrages them, that that Fortress, which is the cause thereof, can no way preserve thee; so that a sage and good Prince, to keep himself still good, and that he may not give occasion to, nor embolden his children to become bad, will never build fortress, to the end they rely not upon the Citadels, but rather upon the hearts of men. And if Count Francis Storce that came to be Duke of Milan was reputed wise, and yet in Milan he built a Citadel, I say, that herein he little showed his wisdom, as appeared by the effect, seeing that Fortress proved rather a disadvantage and loss, than any safeguard to his heirs: for thinking that by means thereof they might pass their time in security, and yet injure their Citizens and subjects, they forbore not any kind of violence; whereupon being grown very odious, they lost the state, so soon as they were assailed by their enemy. Nor could that fortress defend them, nor did it any way advantage them in the war, and in time of peace it had done them much harm; for if there had been no such citradel, and they for want of discretion only had sharply handled some of their subjects, they might sooner have discovered the danger, and withdrawn themselves from it, and so afterwards they would have been able with more courage to have resisted the French fury, having their subjects to friend without any fortress, then having them become thine enemies with thy fortress, which gives thee no help at all. For either it is lost by the treachery of him that guards it, or is forced by the assailant, or else by famine. And if thou wouldst that these should avail thee, and help the to recover a state lost, where only the fortress holds for thee, thou must have an army, wherewith thou mayst assault him that chased the from thence. And whensoever thou hast this army, thou couldst not in any wise fail of recovering the State, howsoever there were no fortress at all; and that the more easily, by how much the Inhabitants would be more thy friends, then if thou hadst ill-treated them through presumption upon thy fortress. And it hath been proved by experience, how that this Citadel of Milan hath little availed either the forces or the French party in the adversity of the one or other, but hath rather brought upon them many ruins and mischiefs, having never advised, by means thereof, upon any fair way to keep that state. Guido Ubaldo Duke of Urbin, son to Frederick, who in his days was esteemed a great Captain, being driven out of his state by Caesar Borgia son to Pope Alexander the sixth, when afterwards upon a new grown occasion he returned thither again, he caused all the fortresses to be demolished that were in the Country, thinking they did more harm then good: for he having gained men's hearts to him, for their sakes would not abide them; and in regard of enemies, he saw they were not able to defend him, it being needful to have a good army in the field to preserve them withal, so that he resolved to raze them all. Pope Julius, having driven the Bentivogli out of Bolonia, built a Citadel there, and caused a governor of his to ransack them shrewdly, insomuch that the people rebelled, and he suddenly lost the Citadel, so that it served him to little purpose, or rather wronged him as much, as carrying himself otherwise it could have helped him. Nicolas of Castello father of the Vitelli, returning into his Country from whence he had been banished, forthwith demolished two several fortresses, which Pope Sextus the fourth had built there, deeming that not the fortress, but the people's good wills were more likely to continue him in his State. But of all other examples, the freshest and of most remark in every point, and that which is fittest to show the incommodity of building them, and the fruit of razing them, is that of Genua which fell out in these latter times. It is well known how that Genua in the year 1507. rebelled against Lewis the Twelfth, King of France, who came in person, and with all his strength to regain it: which being done, he caused an exceeding strong Citadel to be built there, surpassing in strength all others that are now adays known: for in regard of the situation, and the other circumstances belonging thereto, it was impregnable, being placed upon the very point of a hill, which stretched itself out into the sea, called by the Genueses, Godefa. And hereby the whole port, and a great part of the Town of Genua was subject to its battery: It happened afterwards in the year of our Lord God 1512. when the French were driven out of Italy, for all the fortress, Genua rebelled and Octavian Fregoso recovered the State thereof, who by his industry in the term of 16 months took it by famine, and as every one believed, so he was advised by many, to reserve it for his refuge in any accident. But he, as he was exceeding wise, knowing that they were not fortresses, but men's good wills that preserved Princes in their state, razed it to the ground, And so without laying the foundation of his dominion upon the fortress, but rather upon his own valour and judgement, he hath continually held it, and holds it yet. And whereas a thousand foot were formerly of force to charge the state of Genua, his adversaries have since assailed it with ten thousand, and have not been able to hurt him. By this therefore it appears, how the demolishing of the fortress hurt not Octavian at all, nor did the building of it advantage the King of France: for when he was able to come into Italy bringing an army with him, he might recover Genua, though he had no fortress there; but when he could bring no army with him into Italy, neither could he keep the Genueses in obedience, though he had a fortress there. It was therefore an expense to the King to build it, and a shame to lose it, and to Octavian a glory to regain it. But let us come to those Republics that raise up fortresses, not in their native countries, but in those they have conquered. And to show this fallacy, if that example of France and Genua suffice not, this of Florence and Pisa may, where the Florentines had built a citadel, to keep that town in subjection: And never advised themselves, that a City which had always been a processed enemy to the Florentines, having lived free, which hath a recourse to liberty for a colour of Rebellion, it was necessary (being desirous to keep her) to use that manner the Romans had, either to take her as a companion into the state, or to deface and ruin her: for of what value citadels are, we saw in King Charles his coming into Italy, to whom they were yielded, either through the treachery or cowardice of their governors. Whereas if they had not been, the Florentines would never have grounded their ability of keeping Pisa still upon them, nor would the King have been of power that way to have bereft the Florentines of that City; and those means, whereby until that time it had been maintained, would peradventure have been of force to preserve it. And without doubt they could not have made a worse trial, then that of the fortresses. I conclude therefore, that for the safety of ones native Country, a strong hold is but hurtful; & to keep under Towns that are conquered, citadels avail little. And hereunto the Authority of the Romans shall suffice me, who dismantelled the Towns they intended to hold by force, & never built up their walls; and if any one against this opinion should allege me the example of Tarentum in ancient times, and in these modern that of Brescia, which places, by means of the citadels, were recovered from the subjects rebellion: I answer, that at the years end Fabius Maximus was sent with the whole Army to recover Tarentum, who would have been able to recover that, though thete had been no citadel there. And though Fabius put those means in practice, yet had they never been, he would have used some other, which would have produced the same effect. And I know not what advantage a citadel yields, that to regain thee the Town, requires a Consular Army, and a Fabius Maximus for commander, before it can be done. And that the Romans in any case had recovered it plainly, appears by the example of Capua, where there was no citadel, but they got it by the soldiers valour. But to that of Brescia, I say, that seldom chances which befell in that rebellion, that the fortress which is possessed still by thy forces (the Town being fallen into rebellion) should have a great army to friend and near hand, as was that of the French: for the Lord De Fois the Kings General being with his army at Bolonia, when he understood the loss of Brescia, by means of the Fortress indeed recovered the Town. Therefore that Fortress yet stood in need (to do any good) of such a one as was the Lord of Fois, and a French army, that in three days might relieve them; so that this example against those on the contrary side is of small weight: for many fortresses have been taken in the wars in our days, and recovered by the same fortune that the field hath been taken, and recovered again, not only in Lombardy, but in Romania, in the Kingdom of Naples, and in all parts of Italy. But touching the building of sortresses for defence against foreign enemies, I say, they are not useful to those people, nor Kingdoms, who have good armies on foot; they are rather unprofitable, because that good armies without fortresses are of force to keep them: but fortresses without good armies cannot defend thee. And this we see by experience of those who have been held excellent in matters of state and government and other things, as we know the Romans and Spartans' were: for if the Romans built no fortresses, the Spartans' did not only forbear from them, but suffered none of their Cities to be walled in neither, because they would have no other guard but a man's own valour, to defend him. Whereupon when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian, whether the walls about Athens were not very fair, he answered him, yes, if all the inhabitants of the Town were women. To that Prince than that hath good armies, when upon the maritime frontiers of his state he hath a fortress, that for some few days he is able to sustain the enemy, till things are somewhat ordered, it would sometimes be of small avail, but of no necessity. But when a Prince hath no strong army, fortresses either in the heart of his State, or at his frontiers, are hurtful, or unprofitable: hurtful, because he easily loses them, and being lost they make war upon him; or put case they are so strong, that the enemy cannot take them, they are left behind by the enemy's army, and so they become of no service. For good armies, if they meet not with very sharp encounters, enter far into their enemy's Countries, 〈◊〉 thou't regard either of Town or fortress they leave behind them: As it was evident in the ancient Stories, and as we see Francis Maria did, who in these latter times without any regard of them, left ten of the enemy's Cities behind him, to assail that of Urbin, That Prince than that can raise a good army, can do well enough, without having any strong holds: but he that cannot have an army ready, should never build any: well may he fortify the City of his abode, and keep it in good strength, and the Citizens thereof well disposed, whereby he may be able to support the enemy's violence, till either some accord, or some foreign aid come to his relief. All other designs are expensive in time of peace, and unfruitful in time of war. And whosoever shall well weigh all this that I have said, shall perceive that the Romans as they were in all other their affairs very judicious, so were they very well advised in this judgement they gave upon the Latins, and the Privernates, where taking no care at all for citadels, they assured themselves of them by wiser and better ways.   

CHAP. XXV.  
It is a wrong course to assail a City fallen into discord, thinking by means thereof, to master it.  
IN the Roman Republic the people and the Nobility were so far fallen asunder, that the Veyentes together with the Eburans by means of their disagreement, thought they might be able quite to root out the Romans: and having levied an Army, and foraged all the Country of Rome, the Senate armed out Cneus Manilius and M. Fabius against them, who having brought their Army near to that of the Veyntes, they forbear not with all insolences and reproaches to revile them, and disgrace the Roman name, and such was their fool-hardiness and presumptions that the Romans though then they were ar●ods one with another, came to agreement, and so coming to the combat, broke and vanquished them. We see therefore how much men deceive themselves (as formerly we have treated) in the courses they take, and that many times where they think to get, they lose. The Veyentes believed, that by getting upon the Romans that were at variance one with another, they should overcome them, but it proved the occasion of reconcilement to the Romans, but of ruin to themselves: for the causes of discord in Republics, is most commonly idleness and peace; and the cause of union and concord is fear and war. Wherefore had the Veyentes been wise, the more at variance they had perceived Rome to have been, so much the more should they have forborn from war against them, and with devices of Peace cast about how to master them. The way is, to endeavour to be reputed a confident friend of that City, which is in discord: and whiles they come not to arms, to carry himself as an Umpire between both parties. And when they do come to arms, to afford some slow favours to the weaker party, as well to keep them still at war, and consume them, as to hinder them from doubting that with thy great forces thou meanest to suppress them, and become their Prince. And when this part is well played, it cannot fail ordinarily, but that it will directly have the success thou lookest for. The City of Pistoya (as in another discourse and to another purpose I said) came to the Florentines Republic, by no other trick than this: for it being divided in factions, the Florentines now favouring the one, and then the other without any imputation of blame from either, brought them to such terms, that being tired with their tumultuous living, they came willingly to cast themselves into the Florentines arms. The City of Sienna never changed her State upon the Florentines favour, but when their courtesies came but thin and small: for when they were frequent and strong, they united them rather for the defence of the State in which they lived. I will add to these aforesaid one other example. Philp Visconti Duke of Milan, several times made war against the Florentines, grounding much upon their disagreements, and always came off a loser. Whereupon he was wont to say, when he complained of the evil success of his undertake, that the Florentines follies had made him spend two millions of gold to no purpose. Therefore (as it was said before) the Veyentes and the Etruscans deceived themselves by this conceit of theirs, and were at last in a set battle vanquished by the Romans. And thus will others find themselves deceived, whoever shall seek by the like course, and upon the same occasion to subdu any nation or people.   

CHAP. XXVI.  
Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against those that use it, without any return of advantage to them.  
I Eeleeve it is one of the greatest parts of wisdom in men, to abstain from threatening or injuring of any one in words; for neither the one nor other bereave the enemy of any part of his strength; but the one makes him more wary of thee, and the other bear more deadly hatred against thee, and devise by all manner of ways he can to hurt thee. This is plain by the example of the Veyentes, whereof we spoke in the former Chapter: who to the wrong of making war against the Romans, added the reproach of words, from which every prudent Commander ought to restrain his soldiers: so that they are things that incense and provoke the enemy to revenge, and are no defence (as it is said) against the hurt he does, insomuch that they are all weapons thrown from thee, which return again upon thee, Whereof there followed a notable example a good while since in Asia, where Gabades a Commander of the Persians, having a long while lain encamped before Amida, and determined upon the tediousness of the siege to depart, and therefore to that purpose rising with his camp, those of the Town being come all upon the walls, and grown insolent upon their victory, forbore no kind of outrage, disgracing, blaming and reproaching the enemy with his baseness and cowardice: whereupon Gabades being incensed, altered his purpose, and returned to the siege, where such was their indignation at the contumely, that in a few days they took and sacked the Town. In the same manner it befell the Veyentes, who were not content (as is said) to make war against the Romans, but they railed on them in vile terms, going even to their very trenches to reproach them, so that they incensed them more with their words then blows: and those soldiers which were hardly drawn to fight, constrained the Consul to begin to fight, so that the Veyentes suffered, as the others we spoke of before, for their insolence. Wherefore every good Commander of armies, and good Governor of Commonwealths is to practise all possible remedies, that these injuries or reproaches be not used either in the city or the army, neither one among another, nor against the enemy: for being practised against the enemy, there arise from thence the aforesaid inconvenients: and among themselves they would do worse, when there is no reparation made, which wise and judicious men have always awarded. When the Roman legions left at Capua conspired against the Capuans, as in its place shall be related, and a sedition was there occasioned by this conspiracy, (which was afterwards quieted by Valerius Corvinus) among other constitutions which were made in the agreement, they ordained very grievous punishments for those that should ever reproach any of those soldiers with that sedition. Tiberius Gracchus, who during the wars with Hannibal was made a Captain over some certain number of slaves, whom the Romans for want of men had put into arms, ordained specially a capital punishment for any that should object to any of them their servitude: so hurtful a matter (as it is said) was it thought by the Romans to set men at nought, and reproach them with any disgrace; for there is nothing so much incenses men to rage or breeds more hatred in them, whether it be spoken in earnest or in jest. Bitter taunts when they have too 
Facetiae asperae quae nimium ex vero traxerunt, acrem sui memoriam reliquunt.  great a mingle of truth with them, leave behind them a very distasteful remembrance.   

CHAP. XXVII.  
Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be contented with the victory: for oftentimes when that suffices them not, they lose it.  
THE using of disgraceful words against the enemy, proceeds most commonly from an insolency, which either the victory or a false hope of victory incites thee to: which false hope causes men to err not only in their sayings, but in their doings also: for this hope when it enters into men's breasts, makes them go beyond the point, and many times lose the opportunity of having a certain good, hoping to attain unto a better uncertain good: and because this is a matter worthy consideration, men often deceiving themselves, to the damage of their State, I am of advice to show it particularly by ancient examples and modern, being it cannot so distinctly be proved by reasons. Hannibal, after he had defeated the Romans at Canna, sent his Agents to Carthage, to give them notice of the victory, and to demand new supplies. It was argued in the Senate, what was fit to be done. Hanno an old man and a discreet Citizen of Carthage advised, to use this victory wisely, and make peace with the Romans, being that now they might have it upon reasonable terms, having gained a battle; and that they should not go about to seek for it after a battle lost: for it should be the Carthaginians design to show the Romans, that they were able to deal with them, and having gotten a victory, they should take a care not to lose it for hope of a greater. This course was not taken, but afterwards the Senate of Carthage understood that this was very good counsel, when the occasion was lost. When Alexander the Great had conquered all the Levant, the Commonwealth of Tyre, famous in those days, and puissant, by reason that their City was seated in the water, as Venice is, seeing Alexander's greatness, sent Ambassadors to him to tell him, that they would become his faithful servans, and yield him what obedience he should desire, but that they would not admit either him or his soldiers into their Town. Whereat Alexander disdaining, that any one City should shut her gates against him, seeing he had forced all others open throughout the whole world, would not accept their conditions, but rejected them, and forthwith sent his army thither. That Town stood in the water, and was well provided with victuals, and other munition fit for defence, so that Alexander after four months spent, considering that one City took away all that time from his glory, which many other great conquests never did, and therefore determined to try an agreement, and to grant what they of themselves had asked. But they of Tyre being grown insolent hereupon, not only refused the conditions, but slew those that came to treat with them. Whereupon Alexander all enraged at this affront, so stronly assaulted the Town, that he took it, destroyed it, and slew or made slaves all the men therein. A Spanish Army came upon the Florentines Territories, to restore the Medici into Florence, and to lay some taxes upon the Town, being hired hereunto by some Citizens inhabiting therein, who put them in hopes that as soon as they should set foot in their Country, they would take arms in favour of them; they coming into the plain, and none of these discovering themselves to be for them, because they had want of victuals, tried to make an agreement, whereupon the Florentines grown proud, would not accept of any, upon which occasion followed the loss of Prato, and the ruin of that State. Therefore Princes cannot commit a greater error when they are assailed (in case the assailants are far more puissant than they) then to refuse all terms of agreement, especially when they are proffered them: for never will such poor ones be offered, wherein is not in a good measure comprised his good that accepts them, and some part of his victory. Wherefore the Tyrians should have satisfied themselves, that Alexander accepted those conditions he had formerly refused: and their victory had been great enough, when with their arms in hand, they had made so mighty a Prince as he to yield to their demands. It should have sufficed the Florentines also, and they had gotten a good victory too, if the Spanish army gave way to any of their desires, though they had not fulfilled all of them; for that army's design was to change the State of Florence, to take away her devotion to France, and to draw some moneys from her. When of these three the people had yielded to two, which were the last, and had gotten themselves but one, which was the preservation of their state, they within had each of them gained some honour and satisfaction, nor should the people have troubled themselves for the other two things, one remaining to them; nor should they have offered, sing they had been sure of a certain victory to hazard it at fortune's discretion, trying even the extremity thereof, which never any wise man will endanger himself in, unless it be upon necessity. Hannibal being departed out of Italy, where he had been very glorious for sixteen years, recalled by his own country men the Carthaginians, to relieve his native Country, found Asdrubal and Syphax defeated, the Kingdom of Numidia lost, and Carthage restrained within the compass of her own walls, which had no other refuge but him and his army: and knowing that was his Country's last hopes, he would not hazard it, till he had first made trial of all other remedies: nor was he ashamed to ask peace, judging, that if there was any way to save his Country, it was by that, and not by war, which being refused him, though he had been sure to lose, he would not fail to fight, thinking that it might fall out so, that possible it was for him to overcome, and if lose, it he must lose it gloriously. And if Hannibal, who was so valorous a captain, and had his army entire, did require peace, before he would hazard the battle, when he perceived that in losing it, his country would be subdued, what should another of less valour and experience than he do? But men run into this error, by not knowing how to limit their hopes, so that grounded on their own vast conceits, without weighing their strengths, they are utterly ruined.   

CHAP. XXVIII.  
How dangerous a thing it is for a Republic or Prince not to revenge an injury done against a public State, or against a private person.  
WHat, indignation may cause men to do, is easily known, by that which befell the Romans, when they sent the three Fabiuses for Ambassadors to the French, who came to invade Tuscany, and in particular Clusium: for the people of Clusium, having sent to require aid at Rome, the Romans sent their Ambassadors to the French, to let them know they were to forbear from making war against the Tuscans, which ambassadors being upon the place, and fitter to play the Soldiers part, than the Ambassadors, the French and the Tuscans coming to fight, they ranked themselves amongst the foremost to combat the French, whence it came, that being known by them, they converted all the hatred they bore the Tuscans against the Romans, which hatred became greater: for the French by their Ambassadors having complained to the Senate of this injury, and required in satisfaction of the damage, that the aforementioned Fabiuses should be given into their hands, they were not only not given them, or in any other manner punished, but when the time of their Assemblies came, they were made Tribune's with Consular power: insomuch that the French perceiving those to be honoured, that should have been punipunished, took all this as done in despite and disgrace to them: and thus incensed with rage and disdain they came to assail Rome, which they took, the Capitol excepted. Which destruction fell upon the Romans, only for their inobservance of justice: for their Ambassadors having offended against the law of nations, when they should have been punished, were honoured. Therefore it is worthy consideration, how much every Republic or Prince should beware of doing the like wrong, not only against a nation, but also against any particular man: for if a man be exceedingly offended either by the public, or by any private man, and hath had no reparation made him to his content: if he lives in a Commonwealth, he will seek even with the utter ruin thereof to avenge himself: if he lives under a Prince, and be a man of any courage, he will never rest, till in some kind or other he be revenged on him, however that he knows he draws thereby his own destruction on his head. And to verify this, there is not a fitter nor truer example, then that of Philip of Macedon Alexander's Father. In his Court there was a very handsome young noble man named Pausanias, and of him one Attalus, one of the chiefest men, that was near about Philip, was enamoured; who having several times tried if he would yield to him, and finding him far off from consenting to any such thing, determined to gain that by a trick and by force, which no way else he saw he could attain to. And having made a solemn invitation, whereat Pausanias and many other noble men met, after that every one had liberally eat and drink, caused Pausanias to be taken and brought to some by-chamber, were not only by force he satisfied his beastly lust upon him, but the more to disgrace him, he made him be so used by many others in the like manner. Of which injury Pausanias several times made his complaint to Philip, who having held him a long time in hope of revenging him, instead thereof made Attalus governor of a Province in Greece; whereupon Pausanias seeing his enemy honoured, and not punished, converted his indignation not against him that had injured him, but against Philip that had not avenged him. And on a morning when Philip's daughter was solemnly married to Alexander of Epirus, as Philip went to the Temple to celebrate the espousals, he slew him between the two Alexanders, the son, and the son in law. Which example is much like that of the Romans, and is remarkable for all those that rule, who should never value any man at so low a rate, as to think (that by heaping injury upon injury) he that is thus wronged will not devise some way to be revenged, though it be with his own utter loss and destruction.   

CHAP. XXIX.  
Fortune blinds men's minds, when she will not suffer them to prevent her designs.  
IF we consider well the course of humane affairs, we shall many times see things come to pass, and chances happen which the heavens altogether would not, that order should be taken to prevent. And in as much as this, which I speak of, befell Rome, where there was so much valour, so much Religion and good order, it is no marvel if the same thing often fall out in a City or Country that wants the said things: and because this place is very remarkable to show the power heaven hath over human things, T. Livius at large and with words of very great efficacy represses it, saying, that the heavens would for some end, that the Romans should know their power; and therefore caused those Fabiuses to err, that were sent Ambassadors to the French, and by their means provoked them to make war against Rome. And afterwards ordained, that for the suppressing of that war, there was nothing done in Rome worthy of the Romans, having first ordained, that Camillus, who only was able to remedy so great a mischief should then be banished to Ardea. And then the French coming towards Rome, they who to resist the fury of the Volsci and many their neighbouring enemies, had several times created a dictator; now upon the approach of the French never created any. Moreover, for their choice of Soldiers, it was very weak, and without any extraordinary diligence: & they were so slow in taking of arms, that they were hardly time enough to encounter the French at the river Allia, ten miles from Rome. Here the Tribune's pitched their camp without any ordinary diligence: not viewing the ground first, neither encompassing it with trench or pali●ado, making use neither of human nor divine helps. And in ranging of their battle, they left their ranks so thin and weak, that as well the Soldiers as the Captains did nothing worthy of the Roman discipline. They fought afterwards without any effusion of blood, for they fled before they were assailed: the greater part went thence to Veium, the other retired to Rome, who never going into their own houses, went unto the Capitol: so that the Senate taking no care to defend Rome, did not so much as shut the gates, and part of them fled from thence, and part got into the Capitol; yet in defence thereof, they had not such disorder; for they did not cloy it with unusual people, they furnished it with all the Corn they could possibly get, that it might endure out the siege: and the greater part of the unprofitable multitude of old men, women, and children, fled unto the neighbouring Towns about, the rest stayed at Rome for a prey to the French. So that whoever should have read of the brave achievements of that people many years before, and afterwards of these times following them, would have much a do to believe it were the same people. And T. Livius having reckoned up the aforesaid disorders, concludes thus, So much does fortune 
Adeò obcaecat animos fortuna, cum vim suam refringi non vult.  blind men's eyes, when she would not have her force withstood. Nor can this conclusion be more true. Whereupon men that are always under hard crosses deserve the less blame, as they that enjoy continual prosperity also merit less praise; for we shall many times see those led to their destruction, and these advanced to an extraordinory greatness by some occasion the heavens have presented in their furtherances hereto, giving means to the one to behave himself virtuously, & quite bereaving the other of them. And we may well say fortune does this, for she makes choice of a man (when she purposes to bring great matters to pass) of such judgement and spirit, that knows how to make use of those occasions she presents him. So in like manner, when she would bring horrible destructions upon any Place, she there prefers men to that purpose, that they may help to draw on that ruin. And in case there be any that may prevent these mischiefs, she either brings him to his end, or else deprives him of all abilities to do any good. This we very well know by our Author's discourse, how that fortune for to amplify Rome, and to bring it to that greatness it attained to, deemed it necessary to scourge it, as we shall discourse at large in the beginning of the next book following, but yet would not wholly ruin it. And this appears, in as much as she banished Camillus, but put him not to death: she made Rome be taken, but not the Capitol: she ordained that the Romaus should not think out any thing of avail to save Rome; yet for defence of the Capitol, they wanted of no good advice. To the end Rome should be taken, she caused the greater part of those Soldiers, that were routed at Allia, to go to Vejum. And as for defence of the City of Rome, she cut off all the ways to order it, so she prepared every thing ready to recover it again, having conducted an entire Roman Army to Vejum, and Camillus to Ardea, whereby they might be able to make a strong head under the command of a Captain never blemished with any disgrace of loss yet, & throughly whole in his reputation, for the recovery of his Country. We might here produce some modern example to confirm what we have said: but because I think it unnecessary, being this may well suffice, I shall omit it. I avow therefore this to be very true, as by many histories we may see it, that men may well follow fortune, but not oppose it; they may well wove her webs, but not break them. Wherefore let men never abandon themselves, being they know not what shall become of them in the end, the passages of their fortunes being through crooked and unknown ways; they should ever hope, and so hoping put on still, and never give over in despair, whatsoever chance or trouble they be fallen into.   

CHAP. XXX.  
Republics and Princes, that really are mighty, seek not by moneys to make alliance with others, but by their valour, and repute of their Forces.  
THe Romans were straightly besieged in the Capitol, and however they looked for aid from Vejum, and from Camillus, being forced by famine, they came to terms of agreement with the French, to redeem themselves for a certain sum of money, upon which agreement, as they were weighing the gold, Camillus, arrived with his Army, which fortune brought to pass (says our Historian) to the end that the Romans should not live 
Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent  redeemed by gold. Which thing is not only remarkable in this part, but in the procese of this Commonwealths actions, where it is evident, that they never vanquished Towns with moneys, nor ever bought peace by money, but by prowess in the wars. Which I think never befell any other Republic; and among other signs by which a man discerns the power of a State, he is to mark in what manner it lives with the neighbouring States. And when it is so ordered, that they become tributaries thereunto, to keep friendship with it, there is an assured sign, that that State is powerful. But when the said neighbours, though inferiors to it, draw money from thence, there is then a great evidence of the weakness thereof. Read all the Roman Stories, and ye shall see how the Massilians, the Aeduans, the Rhodians, Hiero, the Syracusan, Enmenes, and Massinissa Kings joining upon the confines of the Roman Empire, to have friendship with it, concurred in expenses and tribute at all times that need was, seeking after no other requital thereof, but to be protected by it. We shall see the contrary in poor and feeble States; and so beginning at ours of Florence in the times past, even when the reputation thereof was at the greatest, there was never a great Lord in Romania, that had not some allowance from thence, and besides she gave to those of Perugia, and Castilia, & to all the rest of her neighbours. For had this City been warlike and strong, the contrary would have followed; for all those to have been under the protection of it, would have given money, and have sought to buy its friendship, and not to sell their own. Neither have the Florentines alone lived in this baseness, but the Venetians, and the King of France, who, though a Prince of great Dominions, life's tributary to the Swisses, and the King of Engl. The cause whereof is, in that he disarms his subjects, and because that King and those other afore-named had rather enjoy a present profit to rack their people and squeeze them, and avoid rather an imaginary than a real danger, than do such expedients as would secure and for ever make their States happy. Which disorder, though some while it may produce quiet, yet in time it proves the cause of want, losses, and unrecoverable ruin. And it would be too long to relate, how many times the Florentines, the Venetians, and this Kingdom, have redeemed themselves even in the wars, and how many times they have subjected themselves to disgrace, which the Romans were only once like to have done. It would be tedious to tell, how many Towns the Florentines and Venetians have bought, whereof afterwards the inconvenience hath been found, and how that those things that are bought with gold, men know not how to descend with the sword. The Romans observed this brave way and manner of living, while they were free; but after they came under their Emperor's governments, and that those Emperors grow naught, and loved the shade, and could not endure any toil in the Sun, they began also to redeem themselves, sometimes from the Parthians, sometimes from the Germans, and now and then also from some others of their neighbours, which was the beginning of that great Empire's ruin. Whereupon arose the like inconvenients from their having disarmed their people, from whence also proceeds another greater, that the nearer thy enemy comes to thee, the weaker he finds thee; for whosoever lives after that manner we have spoken of above, treats evil those subjects he hath within his dominions, because his men are not so well disciplined in the wars, as to keep the enemy from entering into the heart of their Country Whence it proceeds, that to keep the enemy off: he allows some provision of moneys to those Princes or people that border upon his Country. And thereupon, those States make some resistance upon the confines only, which when the enemy hath past, they have no kind of remedy left: and they perceive not, that this their manner of proceeding, is quite contrary to all good order: for the heart and the vital parts of a body are to be armed, and not the extremities thereof; for it can live without those, but if these be hurt it dies: but these States keep the heart disarmed, and arm their hands and feet. What this disorder hath done at Florence, hath been and is daily seen: for when any Army possess the frontiers, and enters near to the heart of the Country, there is no further remedy. We saw not long since the same proof of the Venetians; and had not their. City been begirt by the waters, we should have seen an end of it. We have not so often seen this trial in France, because it is so great a Kingdom, that it hath few enemies mightier than it: nevertheless. when the English invaded that Country in the year 1513. the whole Country quaked, and the King himself, and every one thought, that one defeat alone would have been sufficient to lose him the State. The contrary befell the Romans; for the nearer the enemy approached to Rome, the more able he found the City to make resistance. And it was evident, when Hannibal came into Italy, that after three defeats, and the slaughters of so many Captains and soldiers, they were not only able to sustain the enemy, but to vanquish him. All this proceeded from that they had well armed the heart, and made small account of the extremities; for the foundation of their State was the people of Rome; and the Latins, and the other Towns their allies in Italy, and their Colonies, from whence they drew so many Soldiers, that with them they were able to fight with and keep in awe the whole world. And that this is true, it appears by the question Hanno the Carthaginian put to Hannibal's agents, after that great overthrow at Canna, who having exceedingly magnified Hannibal's great acts, were asked by Hanno, whether any of the Komans were yet come to demand peace, or if any Town of the Latins, or any of their Colonies had yet rebelld against the Roman; and they denying the one and the other, Hanno replied, Then is the war yet as entire as it was at first. We see therefore by this discourse, and what we have otherwhere said, what difference there is between the proceedings of Republics now adays, and those of the ancients. We see also hereupon every day exceeding great losses, and wonderful great conquests: for where men are but of small valour and resolution, fortune shows much power: and because she is always various, therefore do Commonwealths and States change often, and will always change, till at length some one stand up, who is so much a lover of antiquity, as to regulate her, that she take not occasion to show at every turn of the Sun, how great her power is.   

CHAP. XXXI.  
How dangerons a thing it is, to give credit to men that are banished out of their Country.  
MEthinks it is not out of purpose, to treat among these other discourses, how dangerous a thing it is to trust those that are banished out of their Country, these being matters that every day are practised by those that are Rulers of States; especially seeing it may be proved by a memorable example out of T. Livius in his history, though this thing be out of his purpose quite. When Alexander the Great passed into Asia with his Army, Alexander of Epirus his kinsman & uncle, came with certain troops into Italy, being called upon by some outlawd Lucan's, who put him in hope, that by their means he might become master of that whole Country. Whereupon it came to pass, that he being come into Italy upon their word and assurance, was slain by them; their Citizens, having promised them their return into their Country, if they slew him. Therefore should it be considered, how vain their words and promises are, who are banished their Countries; for, in regard of their word, it is to be thought, that whensoever by other means than thine, they can be restored to their Country, they will forsake thee, and cleave to others, notwithstanding all the promises they have made thee. And this is the reason why there is no hold to their word, because so extreme is their desire to return to to their native homes, that naturally they believe many things that are false, and some things out of their own cunning they add; so that between what they think, and what they say they think, they put thee in such hopes, that grounding thereupon, thou art brought to a vain expense, or to undertake somewhat that proves thy destruction. I will satisfy myself with the aforesaid example of Alexander, and only this other of Themistocles the Athenian, who being outlawd, fled to Darius in Asia, where he promised him so much, when he should invade Greece, that Darius undertook the enterprise. But Themistocles not being able to make good his promises, either for shame or fear of punishment, poisoned himself. And if Themistocles a rare man committed this error, what should we think but that they do much more err, who because of their less virtue will suffer themselves to be more violently drawn by their own passions and desires. And therefore a Prince ought to proceed very slowly in undertake upon the relation of exiled men; for otherwise he suffers either great shame, or damage by them And because it seldom comes to pass, that Towns and Countries are taken by stealth, or by intelligence that any one hath in them; methinks it is not much out of purpose to treat thereof in the Chapter following, adding thereunto by how many ways the Romans got them.   

CHAP. XXXII.  
How many ways the Romans used to make themselves masters of towns.  
THe Romans applying themselves all to the war, did evermore make it with all advantage possible, as well for the expense, as for every thing else belonging thereto. From hence it proceeded, that they were always aware of taking of towns by long sieges, thinking it a matter of great charges, and incommodity, that surpasses far the profit their conquest thereof can bring. And for this cause they though it more for their own advantage, to take a town any way else then by siege. Whereupon in such great and so many wars, we have very few examples of sieges made by them. The ways then whereby they got their towns, were either by conquest or yielding. And this conquest was either by force or open violence, or by force mingled with fraud. Open violence was either by assault, without beating the walls, which was to beleagure a town round with an army: 
Agred urbem coronâ  for they environed it, and combated it on all parts, and many times it proved so luckily to them, that in one assault they took a town, though a very vast one, as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain. Or when this assault served not, they betook them to break down the walls with their rams, and other their warlike engines, or else by some mine or vault they made, whereby they entered the City, by which way the took the City of Veium; or to make themselves equal in height with those that defended the walls, they made towers of wood, or cast up mountains of earth, which leaned upon the wall on the outside, whereby they might get to the height of it. Against these assaults, they that defended the towns, in the first case in regard of their being besinged round, rannne a more sudden hazard, and had more doubtful remedies: for having need in every place of many defendants, perchance either those that they had, were not so many as could supply every place, or change often to refresh them: or if they could, they were not all of equal courage to make resistance: and in case the skirmish had inclined in any part, all had been lost. Therefore it came to pass (as I said) that this way lit many times on good success. But when it succeeded not at first, they did not much more try that way, because it was dangerous for the army: for the City being able for so long a space to defend itself, the army could not but grow weak, and hardly be able to withstand any sally of the enemies from within, and besides the soldiers disordered and wearied themselves hereby, yet notwithstanding for once, and that on the sudden, they assailed that way) As for the breaking down of the walls, they made resistance as they do now adays with new reparations, and against their mines, they made countermines, and thereby they opposed their enemies either with their arms in hand, or with other engines, & among others this was one, they filled divers vessels with feathers, and set fire on them, which being thus kindled they put into the Mine, so that by the smoke and stink thereof, the enemy was hindered of entering thereinto: and if they assailed them with towers of wood, they sought to fire them. And for the mounts of earth, they commonly broke open the wall underneath, whereupon the mount did lean, drawing thence the earth into the town, whereby they without did raise their mount, so that however they brought the earth without, being that they within carried it away, the mount came to no great matter. These ways of assailing cannot be continued long: for they must either rise from the siege, and seek by other means to make an end of the war, as Scipio did when being entered into Africa he assaulted Utica, but could not take it, he rose thence with his whole camp, and sought how to overthrow the Carthaginian armies; or else they must turn again to the siege, as they did at Veium, Capua, Carthage, and jerusalem, and other like towns, which they took by siege. As for conquest by force and fraud, as it befell Palepolis, it chanced that the Romans, by treating with the inhabitants took some town. But by his assailing the Romans and others, tried many, but prevailed in few: the reason is, because every small impediment breaks the design, and impediments easily happen: for either the conspiracy is discovered before it takes effect; and without much difficulty it is discovered, as well through their infidelity, to whom it is communicated, as by the difficulty to put it in practice, being they are to agree with enemies with whom they cannot parley, but under some other colour. But in case the conspiracy be not disclosed in the ordering of it, there arise multitudes of difficulties in putting it in execution: for if either thou comest before the time appointed, or after, all is spoiled, if any false alarm be given, as was that of the geese in the Capitol; if any usual order be broken, every little error, or affright taken, spoils the design. Hereunto may be added the darkness of the night which often puts in fear the rather those that undertake such perilous things. And the greater part of those men that are brought upon such enterprises, being unexperienced in the situation, the country, and the places, whether they areled, become astonished, disheartened, and confused upon every small accident shall happen; And every shadow is of force to make them run away. Nor ever was there any more happy in thief fraudulent night plots, than Aratus Sicioneus, who was as base and cowardly in any action by day, as he was of worth and spirit in these by night. Which we may well think was rather through some hidden virtue wherewith he was endowed, then because there was naturally required in them the more good luck. Many of these ways are put in practice, few of them come to trial, and very few take effect. Touching the gaining of towns by yielding, they yield either of good will or by force: this willingness arises either upon some foreign necessity, which compels them to fly unto thy protection, as Capua did unto the Romans, or through a desire to be well governed, being allured by the good government that Prince holds among them that have given themselves into his hands: as the Rodians, the Massilians, and other like cities did, that gave themselves unto the Romans. Touching surrendering up upon force, proceeds either from a long siege, as is formerly said, or from a continual oppression of incursions, pillagings, and other hard usages, which when a city desires to be freed from she yields herself. Of all those said ways the Romans practised this last more than four hundred and fifty years to weary out their neighbours with routs and incursions, and by gaining credit with them, by gaining credit with them, by means of agreements made, as we have said otherwhere; and upon that way they always grounded, though they tried all, but in the other they found things either dangerous or unprofitable. For in a siege, there is length of time and expenses: in forcible assault, doubt and danger: and in conspiracies, uncertainty. And they saw, that by the defeat of an enemy's army, sometimes they got a Kingdom in one day, and to take by siege a town that was obstinate, it cost them many years.   

CHAP. XXXIII.  
How the Romans gave the Commanders of their armies free and large Commissions.  
I Think it fit for him (that by reading of Livies story would make advantage thereof) well to consider all the ways of the people and Senate of Rome's proceedings: and among other things that merit consideration, his is one, to see with what authority they sent forth their Consuls, Dictator's, & Commanders of armies, which we see was very great, and the Senate reserved thing else to themselves, but a power to make new wars, and to confirm peace, but they referred every thing else to the arbitrement and power of the Consul: for when the people and the Senate had once resolved on the war, (as for example sake against the Latins) they left all the rest to the Consul's discretion, who had free power either to fight a battle, or to leave it, and to besiege either this, or any other town else as he pleased. Which things by many examples are verified, and especially by that which fell out in an expedition against the Tuscans: for Fabius the Consul having overcome them near unto Sutrium, and intending with his army to pass the wood Cimina, and go into Tuscany, he did not only not advise with the Senate, but gave them no notice at all of it, though he was to make the war in a new country full of doubts and dangers: which is witnessed by a resolution of the Senate taken directly against this very course; who having understood of the victory Fabius had gotten, and doubting he would venture to pass the said woods into Tuscany, thinking it would be well not to try that war, nor ruin that hazard, sent two Deputies unto Fabius, to give him notice, they would not have him pass into Tuscany: who came thither, when he had already past, and gotten the victory, and in lieu of hindering the war, they returned Ambassadors of his conquest and victory gotten. And whosoever considers these terms, will find them discreetly used: for if the Senate would have had the Consul to proceed on forwards in the war, only as they gave him order, they had made him less circumspect, and slower in his actions: for he would have thought, that the glory of the victory had not been wholly his, but that the Senate had participated with him, by whose counsel he had been governed. Besides this, the Senate then obliged themselves to advise in things they could not have the means to understand. For, notwithstanding than among them there were men exceedingly well experienced in the wars, yet being they were not upon the place, and therefore ignorant of very many particulars, which are needful for him to know that will advise well, by interposing their Council, they would have committed many errors. And for this cause they suffered the Consul to do all of himself, and that the glory thereof should be entirely his, the love of which they thought would provoke and encourage him to do well. I have the more willingly marked this place, because I see that the Republics now adays, as the Venetian and the Florentine, understand it not so: and if their Commanders, Proveditours, and Commissioners are to plant any battery, they will know it first, and advise thereupon. Which course deserves the same praise the others do, which altogether have brought them into those miseries they now suffer.    

THE THIRD BOOK.  

CHAP. I.  
For the maintenance of a Religion or a Commonwealth long in being, it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds.  
IT is most true, that all things in the world have an end of their life: but those things eninjoy that course that is generally ordained them by heaven, whichdisorder not their body, but govern it in such a regular course, that either it changes not, or if it does, it is for the better, and not for the worst. And because I speak of mixed bodies, such as are Republics and sects, I say, that those changes are for the health thereof, which bring them back to their first beginnings: and therefore are they the best ordered, and subsist the longest which (by the help of their own orders) may often be renewed, or that by accident without the same orders attain to the said renovation. And it is more clear than the light, that these bodies not being renewed, last not; and the way to renew them is (as is said) to reduce them to their first beginnings; for all beginnings of Sects, Commonwealths and Kingdoms, must needs contain some goodness in them, by means whereof they recover their first reputation and increase: for in process of time that goodness grows corrupt, and unless something happen, that reduces it to the just mark, that body must needs be destroyed. And our Doctors of Physic say (speaking of the bodies of men) That a man daily gathers some 
●tidie aggregatur ali●●, quod quandoque get curatione.  evil, which sometimes hath need of cure. This reducing to the beginning (speaking of Commonwealths) is done either by some outward accident, or by some prudence within. Touching the first, we see it was necessary, that Rome should be taken by the French, if we would have her spring again; and thus springing again, should recover a new life, and a new virtue, and take herself a new to the observance of religion, and justice, which began in her to be much blemished, which we may easily gather by the Story of Livy, where he shows that in drawing gut the army against the French, and in creating the Tribunes with Consular power, they observed not any religious ceremony: so in like manner, they did not only not punish the three Fabiuses who against the law of nations had fought against the French, but created them tribunes. And we may well think, that of other good laws also ordained by Romulus, and their other sage Princes, they began now to hold less esteem than was reasonable, or necessary to maintain a free government. This foreign blow therefore lit on them, to the end they should anew betake themselves to all the old orders of their City, and to show that people, that it was not necessary not only to maintain religion and justice, but to esteem well of their good Citizens, & to make more account of their virtue, than of those profits, which they thought they lost or got by their means: Which we see, came directly to pass; for presently after Rome was recovered from the French, they renewed all the rites of their ancient Religion, they punished those Fabiuses who fought against the Law of Nations, and afterwards made such account of Camillus his virtue and goodness, that the Senate & all others wholly laying envy aside, gave the whole government of the Commonwealth into hit hands. It is necessary therefore (as I have said) that men, who live together in any order, should often revise themselves, either upon occasion given by outward, or else by inward accidents. And for these last, they must either proceed from a law, which may take a review as it were of the men that are in that body, or else from some good man that may arise among them, who by his example & virtuous actions may work the same effect, which that law or order can. This good then arises in Commonwealths, by the virtue of some man, or the force of some order. And touching this last, those orders that reduced the Roman Republic to its own beginning, were the Tribune's of the people, the Censors, & all those other laws, which were made against the ambition or insolence of men, which orders have need to be quickened by the virtue of some one Citizen, that courageously joins with them for their execution, maugre the power of those that break them. The executions whereof, before the sacking of Rome by the French, were notable, the death of Brutus his sons, the death of those of the Decemvirate, that of Melius touching the laying down the price of their corn: after the taking of Rome, was the death of Manlius Capitolinus, the death of the son of Manlius Torquatus, the execution which Papirius Cursor did upon the Commander of his cavalry, the accusation of the Scipios: which things being they were extraordinary & remarkable, whenosever any of them did chance, caused men more strictly to conform themselves to the exact rule; and when these began to fall out seldom, then began they to give men more leisure to grow naught, and become more dangerous and tumultuous; for from one to another of such like executions, there should not pass more than ten years' time; for after such a time men begin again to change their manners and trespass against the laws: and unless something chance, which anew calls the punishment to memory, and puts them in fear thereof, there mere together so many delinquents, that without danger they cannot be punished. To this purpose, they who governed the State of Florence from 1434. to 1494. said it was necessary every fifth year to reform the State, otherwise it was hard to maintain it; and they called reforming of the State, to put that terror and fear in men, which they caused in them at the first founding of the laws, having then severely punished those that had offended against their manner of living. But when the memory of that punishment is once extinguished, men again take the boldness to attempt some innovations, and speak ill of the present State: and therefore it is necessary to take order for it by reducing it to the first grounds. Also this bringing back of Republics to their beginnings, arises sometimes from the plain virtue of some one man, without dependence on any law, inciting thee to any execution: yet are they of so great reputation, and of such remark, that the good men desire to follow them, and the bad are ashamed to live contrarily to them. Those that in Rome particularly worked these good effects, were Horatius Cocles, Scevola, Fabritius, the two Deccis, Regulus, Attilius, and some others, who by their rare and worthy examples, in Rome wrought the same effect that good laws and good orders could. And if the forenamed executions of laws together with these particulars examples had succeeded every ten years in this City, it had been of necessary consequence that it could never be corrupted: but as the one and the other of these two things began to fall out seldom, the corruptions multiplied: for after Marcus Regulus the like example was never more seen. And though in Rome there arose the two Cato's, yet such was the distance between him and them, and between them, from th'one to th'other, and they remained so alone, that with their good examples they could effectuate no good thing, and especially the last Cato, who finding a great part of the City corrupted, could not prevail so by his example, as to better his Citizens And this may suffice for Republics. But touching Religions, we see also these reformations are necessary, by example of our Religion: which had it not been reduced again to its principles by Saint Francis, and Saint Dominique, it would have been quite defaced: for these by their poverty, and their imitation of Christ's life, made a new impression thereof in men's minds, which was quite blotted our thence: and their new rules were so powerful, and now are the cause that the dishonesty of the Prelates, and the heads of the Religion, do not ruin it, partly by their living in poverty, and partly by the great credit they have in confessing the people, and preaching to them, whereby they give them to understand that it is evil, to speak evil against him that is evil; and that it is good, rather to live in obedience to them; and if they are faulty, to leave them to the chastisement of God. And so they offend the most they can; for they fear not the punishment they see not, and believe not. This reformation than hath and does maintain this Religion. Kingdom's also have need of reforming and restoring their laws to their first beginnings. And we see how much good this does in the Kingdom of France; Which Kingdom is governed more by its laws and customs than any other Kingdom else. Of which laws and customs, the Parliaments are the principal maintainers, and especially that of Paris, which restores them again to life, whensoever it makes any execution against a Prince of the Realm, and that they condemn the King in their sentences: and till this present it hath maintained itself, by being an obstinate executioner against that Nobility: but whensoever it should suffer any of their faults to escape unpunished, and they chance to multiply, without doubt it would come to pass that either they were to be corrected with great disorder, or that Kingdom come to a dissolution. Therefore we conclude that there is nothing more necessary in a politic government, Sect, Kingdom, or Commonwealth that it be, than to restore it to that reputation which in its first beginning it had, and take a care that either the customs be good, or the men good, that they may rather work this effect, that it be not left to some foreign force to do it: For (however that sometimes it be an excellent remedy, as it proved to Rome) yet is it so dangerous, that it is in no case to be desired: And to make it appear to any man, how much the actions of particular men served to advance Rome's greatness, and wrought many good effects in that City, I will come to the narration and discourse of them, within the bounds whereof we will conclude this third Book, and last part of this first decade. And howbeit the King's actions were great and remarkable, being the History sets them down at large, we shall omit them, nor speak of them otherwise, unless it be touching some thing they did belonging to their private advantage; and here we will begin with Brutus, Father of the Roman liberty.   

CHAP. II.  
It is a very great part of wisdom, sometime to seem a fool.  
NO man was ever reputed so sage or wise for any thing that ever he did, as Junius Brutus deserves to be accounted for taking upon him the person of a fool; and though Titus Livius expresses no other but one reason to induce him thereto, which was to live in security, and preserve his patrimony; yet if we consider his manner of proceeding, we may believe, that he thus dissembled, to the end he might be less observed, & have the more conveniency to suppress the Kings, and free his Country, upon any occasion offered. And that he thought upon this, it appears first in the interpretation he made of Apollo's Oracle, when he feigned to fall down, that he might kiss the ground, deeming thereby that the Gods favoured his designs; and afterwards when at the occasion where Lucretia was slain, among the Father, husband, and other of her kindred, he was the first that drew the knife out of the wound, and made those that were present swear they would never more endure in time to come a King in Rome. From his example are those to learn, that are discontented with any Prince: and firct they should measure and weigh their own forces: and if they are so powerful, that they are able to discover themselves as enemies, and openly make war against him, than ought they plainly go that way, as least dangerous and the morehonorable. But if they be of such condition, that they are not able to enter into terms of open hostility against him, than ought they to use all industry in seeking to gain his favour; and to this effect enter into him by all those ways that are fit, following him in his sports, and taking pleasure in all those things they see he delights in. This familiarity first causes thee to live secure, and without running any hazard, gives thee means to enjoy that Prince's good fortune with him, and lays the way open to thee to satisfy thy own mind. It is true that some say, they would not stand so near the Princes, as to be oppressed with their ruins, nor so far off, but that when their ruin comes, they may be able time enough to rise upon some part of their ruins. Which middle way would be the truest, were it rightly kept. But because I think it is impossible, it is meet to reduce it to the two ways above mentioned, which is either to be at large from them, or cleave close to them. He that does otherwise, if he be a man of eminent qualities, lives in continual danger. Nor sufficeth it to say, I care not for any thing, I desire neither honours, nor wealth, I will live quietly, and without entering into any faction; for these excuses are heard, but pass not as current. Neither can men of quality choose this standing quiet, however that heartily they make choice of it and without any ambition, because they are not believed in it, in so much as though they themselves would, yet others will not let them live so. They must then play the fool as Brutus did; and he plays the fool a great deal, that praises, and prates to them, is present at, and bears a part in those things that are against his own mind, to comply with his Prince's delights. And seeing we have spoken of this man's wisdom in recovering of the State, we will now speak of his severity in maintaining it.   

CHAP. III.  
That it was necessary, for preservation of the new gotten liberty, to put Brutus his sons to death.  
B Butus his severity was no less necessary than useful to maintain Rome in the liberty she had gotten, which was of rare example in all memorial of things happened, to see the Father sit on his Tribunal, and not only condemn his sons to death, but be present and assistant at it. And this is always well known to those that read ancient stories, how that after the change of a State, either from a Republic into a Tyranny, or from a Tyranny into a Republic, some memorable execution upon the enemies of the present condition is needful. And he that sets up a Tyranny, and flaies not Brutus; and he that brings in liberty, and slays not Brutus his sons, can hardly subsist. And because for merly we have discoursed hereof at large, I refer myself to what was then spoken hereof. I shall allege here only one example which was in our times, and in our Country: that of Peter Soderini, who thought with his patience and goodness to overcome that passionate desire which was in the sons of Brutus, to return under another government, but deceived himself therein. And albeit he by his wisdom perceived well this necessity, and that the way and ambition of those that shoved against him, gave him occasion to extinguish them, yet he never bent his mind to it: for besides his opinion that he was able by patience and goodness to work out all ill humours, and by liberality towards them, to wear out any enmity was borne against him, he was of advice (as many times by discourse he showed some of his friends) that if he would strongly encounter the oppositions were made against him, and master his adversaries, he had need take upon him extraordinary authority, whereby he should break the civil equality among them. Which thing (however that he should never afterwards act tyrannically) would so much affright the multitude, that they would never agree after his death to create a new standard-bearer for life, which dignity he held fit to put forward and maintain. This respect was wise and good: yet must we never suffer any evil to continue in regard of a good, being that good may easily be suppressed by that evil. And he should believe, being his actions and his intentions were to be judged by their end (in case that good fortune and life should have accompanied him) that he could have assured every one, how that what he had done, was for the safety of his Country, not for his own ambition, whereby he might have been able to regulate things in such a manner, that no successor of his could do that for evil, which he had done for good. But the first opinion deceived him, not knowing that malice is not abated by time, nor appeased by any good turn. So that because he was ignorant how to imitate Brutus, he lost together with his Country the State, and his own reputation. And as it is a hard thing to save a free State, so is it not easy to preserve a Monarchy, as in the Chapter following it shall be showed.   

CHAP. IU.  
No Prince lives secure in his Principality, while those are living who were despoilded of it.  
THe death of Tarquinus Priscus caused by the sons of Ancus, and the death of Servius Tullus caused by Tarqvinius the proud, show how hard and dangerous it is, to despoil any one of a Kingdom, and suffer him to live, though he endeavour by many favours to gain him. And we see how Tarqvinius Prisons was deceived in thinking legally to possess that Kingdom, in that it was given him by the people, and confirmed by the Senate. Neither did he believe that disdain could so much prevail with Ancus his sons, that they would not be satisfied, with what all Rome was contented. And Servius Tullus deluded himself, in thinking he could with new obligations gain the good will of Tarquin's sons. So that touching the first, every Prince may well be advisd that he cannot live sure of his Principality, while they live who were bereaved of it. Touching the second, every one that is of power may well remember, that never were old injuries cancelld with new favours, especially when the new favours are less of value than the wrongs done And without all doubt Servius Tullus was nothing wise to think that Tarquin's sons would patiently endure to be his sons in law, whose King they thought by right they ought to be. And this desire of reigning is so great, that it not only enters their breasts, that look to succeed in the Kingdom, but they also who no ways expect it. As in Tarqvinius his wife, Servius his young daughter, who would wish this rage against that piety she ought her father, set her husband against him, to take his life from him, and his Kingdom thereby; so much more accounted she to be a Queen, than the daughter of a King. If then Tarquininus Priscus and Servius Tullus lost the Kingdom for not assuring themselves of those upon whose right they had usurpd, Tarqvinius the proud lost it for not observing the ancient King's Customs, as shall be showed in the Chapter following.   

CHAP. V.  
What it is that makes a King lose his Kingdom, which he enjoys by right of inheritance.  
TArquinius the proud having stain Servius Tullus, and of him no heirs remaining behind, came to possess the Kingdom securely, having no cause to fear, those things that had hurt his predecessors. And however his way of getting the Kingdom had been so extraordinary, and odious, yet had he observed the ancient customs of the other Kings, he would have been borne with: nor would the Senate nor the Commonalty have risen against him to wrest the State out of his hands. He was not then banished because his son Sextus ravished Lucretia, but for that he had broken the laws of the kingdom, and ruled tyrannously, having taken all authority from the Senate, and reserved it wholly to himself, and those affairs, which had been dispatched in public by the Senate of Rome with general satssfaction, he reduced to be treated in his own Palace, which gained him both blame and envy: so that in a very short time he despoilded Rome of all that liberty which she had always maintained under others. Nor was this enough to make the Senate his enemy, but he provoked the people also against him, tiring them out in base mechanic services, and such as were far different from that, wherein his ancestors had employed them: so that having replenished Rome with examples of his cruelty and pride, he had now disposed all the Romans minds to rebellion, whensoever occasion should be off read And had not that accident of Lucretia fallen out, so soon as any other should have chanced, it would have produced the same effect: for if Tarqvinius had lived, as the other Kings did, and Sextus his son had committed that offence, Brutus & Collatinus would have had recourse to Tarqvinius, for revenge against Sextus, and not to the people of Rome. Therefore let Princes know, that at the same hour they begin to lose the State, when they begin to violate the Laws, & and those manners & customs that are ancient, under which men have lived a long time. And in case they come to lose their State, and should ever become so wise as to understand with what facility they maintain their Principalities, who follow good counsel, they themselves would much more lament their loss & blame themselves more than others would: for it is much easier to be beloved by the good, than by the bad; & to obey the Laws, than command over them. And if they would understand what course they were to take, whereby to put this in practice, and that they are not to undergo greater labour than to view the lives of good Princes, & take them for looking-glasses, such as were Timoleon the Corinthian, & Aratus Sicioneus, & such like, in whose lives they shall find security & satisfaction, as well of him that rules, as of him that is ruled, they would have a desire to become like them, being able for the reasons alleged to do so; for men, when they are well governed, seek after no other liberty, as it befell the people that were governed by the two were named before, who were constrained to be Princes whiles they lived, however they tried many times to retire themselves to a private life. And because in this & the two precedent Chapters, we have discoursed of humours stirred up against Princes, and of the conspiracy made by Brutus his sons against their Country, & of those against Tarqvinius Priscus & Servius Tullus: methinks it is not out of our purpose to speak at large thereof in the following Chapter, being a matter whereof Princes and private men may worthy take notice.   

CHAP. VI  
Of Conspiracies.  
I Would not omit to discourse somewhat touching Conspiracies, being they are dangerous for Princes and private men also: for we see that more Princes have lost their lives thereby, and States too, than by open war: because few are able to make open war against Princes, but every one may conspire against them On the other side, private men enter not into a more dangerous nor rash enterprise than this: for it is full of difficulties, and exceeding perilous every way; From whence proceeds it, that many of them are practised, but few succeed. To the end there of that Princes may learn to beware of these dangers, and private men be more fearful to thrust themselves into them, or rather learn to content themselves to live under that rule which their fortune hath allotted them, I shall speak thereof more at large, not omitting any thing remarkable, that may serve for instruction of the one or the other. And truly that of Tacitus is well termed a golden sentence, where he says, that men are to reverence things past, and submit to what is present; and should wish for good Princes, but whatsoever they are, endure them: and verily he who does otherwise, ruins both himself and his Country. We must then (entering into the matter) consider against whom Conspiracies are made and we shall find they are plotted against amans Country, or against his Prince, of which two I intent this present discourse: for touching those that are practised to deliver a Town into the enemy's hands that besiege it, or that have likelihood with this for any cause, we have already sufficiently spoken. And we will treat in this first part, touching that against a Prince: and first we will examine the reasons thereof, which are many, though one there is of more importance than all the rest. And this is general hatred: for that Prince, that hath provoked general hate, must needs have netted some particulars, somewhat more than others, insomuch that they long to be revenged on him: and they are the more incited hereto, by the general hatred they find conceived against him. A Prince than ought to avoid these public blames, and how he should behave himself to avoid them (having treated otherwhere) I will not now middle: for if he beware well of them, offences against particulars shall be of small force to hurt him: one reason is, because Princes seldom light upon men that are so sensible of an injury as to run such extreme hazard to revenge them; the other is, that though they were of such resolution, and force, as might serve to do it, yet would that general good will of men to that Prince withhold them from it. The injuries must be either touching the fortunes, lives, or honours. Of those that are touching men's lives, the threats are more dangerous than the execution, or rather the threats are very dangerous; but in the execution there is no danger at all; for he that is dead cannot think upon revenge; and those that remain alive, most commonly leave to think of him that is dead: but he that is threatened, and sees himself put to a point, either to do or suffer, becomes a very dangerous man to the Prince, as we shall say particularly in due place. The fortunes and honours of a man are those two things which excepting this necessity, touch men more nearly than any other offence, where of a Prince should be well aware: for he can never strip a man so bare, but that he may find a kinfe to revenge himself, nor so much dishonour any one, but that he may still hold an obstinate resolution of vengeance. And touching honours, the dishonouring of women is of most importance, and after this the scorn and disgrace of their persons. This armed Pausanias against Philip of Macedon, and this hath put weapons in many others hands against divers Princes. And in our days Julius Belanti had no other motive to conspire against Pandulphus the tyrant of Sienna, but only for that he had given him one of his daughters to wife and afterwards taken her away from him, as in its place we shall relate. The greatest cause the Pazzi had to conspire against the Medici, was, the inheritance of John Bonrosnei, whereof they were dispossessed by their order. And another cause, and a very great one too, why men plot treachery against a Prince, is a desire which they have to free their country, which hath been seized on by him. This moved Brutus and Cassius against Caesar. This incited many others against Falaris, Dionysius, and such other usurpers of their Countries. Nor can any Tyrant free himself from the danger of his humour by other means then by laying down his Tyranny. And because we find none will do this, there are but few of them that come not to ill ends; Which gave juvenal occasion to say, 
Few Tyrants unto Pluto's Court do go, 
Ad generum Cereris sine caede & sanguine pauci Descendunt Reges & sic ca morre Tiranni.   
But that are thither sent by bloody blow.   
The dangers that (as I said before) accompany conspiracies, are great, and continual: for in such cases there is danger in plotting them, in executing them, and after they are executed too. Those that conspire, are either one or more; that of one cannot be termed a conspiracy, but a settled resolution bred in a man to slay a Prince. This alone of all the three dangers, which conspiracies hazard, is free from the first. For before the putting it in execution, it carries no hazard with it, being none is made privy to his secret, nor is there any danger, that his purpose come to the Prince's ear. A resolution after this sort may happen to be found in any man of any condition, little or great, Noble or ignoble, familiar or not familiar with he Prince: for at some times it is permitted to any man to speak with him and; he that comes to speak with him may vent this passion of his mind. Pausanias, of whom we have otherwhere spoken, slew Philip of Macodon, as he was going to the Temple environed with a thousand armed men, and between his own son and son in law; but he was one of the Nobles, and well known to the Prince. A poor and abject Spaniard struck Ferdinand King of Spain with a knife in the neck; however the wound was not mortal, yet hereby it appeared, that he had both courage and opportunity to do it. A Turkish Priest named Dervis, drew a scimitarre against Bajazet, father of this present Turk, but hit him not, yet wanted he neither courage nor commodity for his purpose. Of this sort of resolutions thus bend, I think there are many, that would do it: for in willing this, there is neither punishment, nor danger at all, but few venture to act it; and of those that do, exceeding few or none there are, that are not slain in the act. Therefore no man willingly will thrust himself upon a certain death. But let us leave these single resolutions, and come to consider the conspiracies have been made by great men, or those that are very familiar with the Prince: for others (unless they be stark mad) will never offer to conspire: for mean men, and not familiar with the Prince, want all those conveniencies, which are required in the executing of a conspiracy. First●, mean men cannot find those that will be true to them: for no one man can apply himself to their wills for any of those hopes which cause men to adventure upon desperate dangers, so that when they have enlarged themselves to two or three persons, some one of them becomes an accuser, and ruins all. But in case they should be so happy, that none should discover their plots, yet in the execution are they beset with such difficulties having not free access unto the Prince) that it is impossible, but that there in they must perish: for if great men, who ordinarily come near him, are oppressed with such difficulties, which we shall presently mention, it must needs be that with those these difficulties must perpetually increase. Therefore men (because where there is loss both of life and fortunes they are not stark mad) when they find themselves weak, are well aware of what they do: and when they are very weary of a Prince, they are contented only to curse him, and expect, while those that are of higher quality than themselves, do avenge them. And yet in case that any of such like as these should have assailed any thing, the design they had might well be laudable, but not their wisdom. We see therefore, that those that have conspired, were all great men, or familiar with the Prince: Whereof many have conspired, as well being moved by too many favours, as by too many injuries. As Perennius was against Commodus, Plautianus against Severus, Sejanus against Tiberius. All these were by their Emperors so enriched with wealth, and dignified with titles and honours, that it seemed there wanted not any thing to perfect their power but the Empire itself, which they meaning not to fail of, betook themselves to conspire against their Prince, and their treasons all had that end, which their ingratitude well deserved. However that among those of this sort in these latter times that of jacob Apianus against Petrus Gambacorti Prince of Pisa succeeded fortunately, which jacobus having had his education and breeding and credit too from him, afterwards took the state from him. Of this sort was that of Coppola in our days against Ferdinand King of Arragon, which Coppola having attained to that greatness, that he thought he wanted nothing but the Kingdom, meaning not to go without, lost his life. And indeed if any conspiracy against Princes made by great men be ever like to take effect, this was very probable, being made by one that might have been termed a King for his power and conveniencies he had to work his will. But that greedy ambition which blinds them in their desire to rule, blinds them as well in the managing of this enterprise: for if they know how to act this villainy with discretion, it were impossible but it should succeed. A Prince than that would be well wary of conspiracies, should be more jealous of those to whom he hath afforded most favours, then of those to whom he hath done most wrongs: for these want the means, and those have them at pleasure, and the will is a like; for the desire of rule is as great or greater then that of revenge. Wherefore they are to confer but so much authority upon their favourites, that still between it and the Principality they keep a distance, and leave (as it were) some obstacle in their way; otherwise seldom falls it out but that it chances to them, as to the forementioned Princes. But let us return to our order. I say, that being they are to be great men that plot these treasons, and have easy access unto the Prince, we are to discourse upon the successes of these their undertake, what they have been, and point at the reason that hath caused them to prove happy or unhappy. And (as I formerly said) at three several times, herein are dangers found. In the plotting, in the acting, and after. Therefore are there very few that prove lucky: for it is almost impossible to pass all these happily. And beginning to treat touching the dangers of the the first, that are of most importance, I say, there had need be much circumspection and advisement, which likewise had need be seconded by good fortune, that in the contriving and ordering of a conspiracy, it be not disclosed; for that is done either by relation, or by conjecture. This relation proceeds from the small faith; or small discretion of those men with whom thou communicatest thy secret. And it is a thing ordinary to find but small saith; for thou canst not communicate it but to thy confidents, who for love of thee may adventure death, or to men that are discontented with the Prince. Of confidents, possible it is that one or two may be found; but when thou openest thyself to more; it is impossible thou shouldest find them. Besides the good will they bear thee, had need be very great, to the end they be not affrighted at the punishment and peril they incur. Moreover men are often deceived touching the love, which thou believest another bears thee, nor canst thou ever assure thyself of it, unless thou hast had experience thereof; and to make proof of it herein is exceeding dangerous; and though thou hast had proof thereof in some other dangerous exploit, where they have stuck close upon thee, yet canst thou not from thence measure them for this, being this danger surpasses all others. If thou measurest their faith by their discontent against their Prince, therein thou mayest easily deceive thyself: For so soon as thou hast revealed thy mind to that malcontent, thou givest him a subject whereupon to work again his own content; and either his hatred had need be great, or thy power with him of much force to keep him faithful. Hereupon it arises, that very many of them are discovered & crushed even in the egg; and when one of them among many men hath been kept secret any time, it hath been thought of as a miracle as was that of Piso against Nero, & in our days that of Laurence and julian of Medici, whereunto above fifty persons were made privy, who met together all to discover themselves in the execution thereof. As for the discovery for want of discretion, that falls out when a conspirator is not wary in his talk, so that a servant or another third person comes take notice thereof, as it beef Brutus his sons, who in contriving the business with Tarquin's Ambassadors, were understood by a slave who accused them: or else through a certain lightness of thine own, thou communicatest it to a woman, or a child which thou lovest, or some such slight person, as Dimus did, one of those that conspired with Philotas against Alexander the Great, who told the treason to Nicomacus, a child which he loved, who presently told it to Ciballinus his brother, and Ciballinus to the King. Touching discovery by conjecture, we have an example for it, where Piso conspired against Nero, at which time Scevinus one of the conspirators, the day before that he was to slay Nero, made his will, and gave order that Milichius his freeman should cause his old and rusty dagger to be scoured; he made all his slaves free, and gave them money; he appointed many clouts to bind up wounds to be prepared; by which conjectures Milichius being assured of the business, accused, him before Nero. Scevinus was taken, and with him Natalis one of the Conspirators, who had been seen the day before to talk a good while and privately in his company, who not agreeing concerning the discourse they held, were forced to confess the truth. So that the treason was bewrayed, and the conspirators utterly ruined. From these occasions of discovery it is impossible to beware, but that through malice, indiscretion, or fondness all comes to light, whensoever the complotters thereof pass the number of three or four; and in case that more than one of them chance to be taken, it is impossible but that it must be so; for two cannot be so well agreed of all their discourses together, but that in some things they shall jar. When one alone that is resolute, is laid hold on, he may through the strength of his courage, be able to conceal the rest of his complices: but then must his consors show no less resolution than he, in standing firm and not discovering themselves by flight: for on which side soever courage fails, either on his that is taken, or his that is at liberty, the conspiracy is disclosed. And the example alleged by T. Livius, is very rare in the treason that was plotted against Ier lamus King of Siracusa, where Theodorus one of the conspirators being taken, with a stout courage concealed all his companions, and accused the King's friends; and on the other part, all the confederates were confident of Theodorus his resolution, that not one of them forsook Siracusa, or made any show of fear, Wherefore all these dangers are to be passed in the ordering of a conspiracy, before the acting of it. Against which these are the remedies; The first and truest whereof, or better to term it, the only one is, not to give leisure to our complices to accuse us, nor communicate the matter unto them, till just when thou meanest to put it in execution, and not before. They who have thus done, assuredly escape the dangers belonging to the practice thereof; and oftentimes the others also, or rather have they all had good success: and I think every one that is wise should endeavour to carry the matter thus. I will content myself to produce only two examples. Nelematus not being able to endure the tyranny of Aristorimus, Tyrant of Epirus, assembled together in his house many of his friends and kinsfolk, and having encouraged them to set their Country at liberty, some of them required time to be advised and prepared: whereupon Nelematus caused his servants to shut the doors, and told those he had called together, That they should either swear presently to do this, or if not, he would deliver them all prisoners to Aristotimus: whereby all of them, being moved, swore, and so without more delay, went and put in execution what Nelematus had ordered. One of the Magis having by treachery seized upon the kingdom of Persia, Orthanus a great man had notice thereof, and found out the deceit, and thereupon conferred with six other Princes of that State, saying, he was now underraking to vindicate the Kingdom from the Tyranny of that Magician; and when some of them demanded time, Darius rose up (one of the six that was called by Orthanus) and said, Either we will all now go and execute this, or else I will go and accuse you all: so rising all by consent, and not giving any one time to repent himself, they happily effected what they desired. Like unto these two examples also, is the course the Aetolians took to put Nabis the Spartan Tyrant to death, who sent Alessamenes a Citizen of theirs with 300 horse and 1000 foot to Nabis, under colour of giving him aid: the secret they communicated to Alessamenes only; the others that were with him they charged to obey him in whatsoever matter it were, under pain of banishment. This man went into Sparta, never communicating his Commission to any, till just he was to put it in execution, whereupon it fell out that he slew him. They then by these means escaped the dangers that accompany the plotting and ordering of Conspiracies; and whoever shall do as they did, shall always be sure to escape them: And that every one also is able so to do, I will show by the example of Piso alleged before. Piso was a very great man, and of much esteem, and very familiar with Nero, on whom we much relied: And Nero went oftentimes to banquet with him in his gardens: Piso therefore might have procured himself friends of spirit and courage, and willing too to put such a thing in execution, being a matter easy for any great man to compass; and when he had had Nero in his gardens, then communicated the business to them, and with fit words persuaded them to it, so that they could not have had time to refuse, and impossible had it been, but that it must have taken effect. And if we shall examine all the others we have mentioned, we shall find very few could have been otherwise carried. But men that ordinarily do not well weigh the actions of the world, often commit very great errors, and the greater in those actions, that have something of extraordiry in them, as this. The matter than is never to be communicated, but upon necessity, or even at the very acting of it, and yet if thou wilt communicate it, let that be but unto one of whom thou hast had long experience, or that therein is interested upon the same reasons thou art. It is easier to find one man of that condition than many, and thereby also is less danger. Moreover, when he should deceive thee, there were some means left yet to descend thee, which could not be where the conspirators are many: for it is the saying of a wise man, that with one alone a man may speak any thing for one man; I, is as good as another man's No, provided that nothing be given by thee under thine own hand-writing. And of writing any thing a man shouldbe as wary as of a perilous rock; for nothing convicts thee sooner than thine own hand. Plautianus having a mind to skill Severus the Emperor, Antonius his son, committed the execution of it to Saturninus a Tribune: who purposing to accuse and not obey him, yet doubting when he should come to the trial, Plautianus would be believed before him, asked him a note under his hand, that might give him assurance of his Commission; which Plautianus, blinded with ambition, gave him, whereupon it followed, that he was accused and convicted by the Tribune, without which, and certain other tokens, Plautianus had carried it clear against him, so boldly he denied it. Therefore when one only accuses, there may be some remedy, especially in case thou be'st not convicted by any writing of thive, or countermarks, whereof a man should be well aware. In Piso's conspiracy there was a woman called Epicaris, which formerly had been one of Nero's Mistresses, who thinking it would serve well to purpose to join with the conspirators, one that was a Captain of some galleys, which Nero kept for his safeguard, opened to him the conspiracy, but not who were the conspirators, whereupon that Captain contrary to his word given, accused her before Nero; but such was her boldness in denying it, that Nero was astonished thereat, & condemned her not. There are then in communicating the matter to one alone two dangers; the one that the party go not voluntarily to accuse thee, alleging some proof against thee; the other that he detect thee not constrained and forced thereunto by torture, having been apprehended upon some conjecture or suspicion had of him: but in either of these two dangers there is some remedy, being that in the one it may be denied, by saying the party did it out of hatred he bore thee; and in the other, by alleging that the extremity of torture compelled him to utter any thing, though false. It is wisdom then to make no man privy to such a secret, but rather to order it conformably to the above alleged examples; or in case thou revealst it, not to exceed one, where though there be somewhat more danger, yet is there much less than when it is discovered to divers. Near unto this course is, when a necessity constrains thee to do that to the Prince, which thou seest he would do unto thee, which necessity is so excessive, that it gives thee leisure only to provide for thy security. This necessity brings the business ordinarily to a good end; and to prove it, two examples shall suffice me. Cammodus the Emperor did use Lettus and Elettus, Captains of his guard, among his familiar and principal friends, and Martia among his chief Concubines and Mistresses: but because sometime he had been reprehended by them for some things done, whereby he had disgraced his person and the Empire, he resolved to put them to death, and writ in a list the names of Martia, Lettus, and Eletius, and some others, who the night following he meant should die, and so put that list under his pillow; and when he went to rise, a little boy which he loved, playing about his chamber and his bed, found that list, and going out with it in his hand met with Martia, who took it from him, and read it, and having seen the contents thereof, sent for Lettus and Elettus, whereupon they three knowing the danger they were in, resolved to prevent it, and so without longer delay the night following slew Commodus. Antoninus Caracalla the Emperor was in Mesopotamia with his Armies, whereof Macrinus was chief Commander, a man more politic than wa●lick; and as it comes to pass, Princes that are not good, are always fearful, lest others work against them, what they are guilty to themselves they well deserve; Antoninus writ to Mate nianus his friend at Rome, that he should inquire of the Astrologers if any one aspired to the Empire, and should advise him of it. Whereupon Maternianus writ back unto him, Macrinus was he that aspired thereto; but the Letter coming first to Macrinus his hand, before the Emperors, and he thereby perceiving the necessity imposed upon him, agreed with Martialis 〈◊〉 Centurion, one of his confidents (whose brother a few days before Antoninus had slain) that he should kill him, which was luckily done by him. It is evident then, that this necessity which gives no leisure, works even the same effect which that course did, I formerly said, Nelematus of Epirus took. We see also that proved which I spoke of in the beginning of this discourse, that Prince's threats retort more mischiefs on them, and occasion more desperate conspiracies, than the wrongs they do; wheroef a Prince ●ought to take good heed: for men are either to be well treated by them, or at least to be put out of doubt of them, that they be not reducd to such terms, as to think they must of force either kill or be killed: Touching the dangers that are incurred upon the execution, they arise either from changing the order given, or from want of courage in the actor, or from some error the actor commits for want of judgement, or from the fail of fully perfecting the matter in hand by leaving some of those surviving who were appointed for death. I think therefore that nothing so much disturbs or hinders men's actions, as at an instant without respite of time, to be compelled to alter an order once given, or divert the course of it a different way from that it was first intended And if this variation causes disorder in any thing, it is in the actions of war, and such like matters, whereof we now speak: for in such occasions, there is nothing so necessary for men to do, as to resolve with themselves to execute fully all that is looked for at their hands. And if men have a good while bend their minds to one course or order, and that chance suddenly to be altered, it must needs breed some disturbance to them all, and ruin the whole design, so that it is much better for them to execute any thing according to the order first given (however that some inconvenient ensue thereupon) then, by desiring to cancel that, to enter into a thousand inconveniences. This happens when they have not time to put themselves in order again: for when a man hath leisure, he may go his own way he likes best. The Conspiracy of the Pazzi against Laurence and Julian of the house of Medi●ia, is well known: the order given amongst them was this, that they should invite the Cardinal of Saint George to dinner, and thereat kill them they intended; where they had their appointments who were to slay these, as those also that were to seize on the Palace, and they that were to run about the streets, and call the people together to lay hold of their liberty. It so fell out, that the Pazzi and the Medici together with the Cardinal being in the Cathedral Church of Florence at Mass, notice was given that Julian would not dine there that day, which caused the Conspirators to consult together, and what they were to have done in the house to those of Medici, they resolved to do in the Church, which gave disturbance to the whole order: for John Baptista de Monte sacro, would not be guilty of murder committed in the Church, insomuch as they were forced to change the actors in every part, who having not time to settle & confirm their resolutions, committed such errors, that in the very execution thereof they were all ruin'd. Courage sails him that is to execute any thing, either through reverence of the person he is to do the mischief upon, or through the executioners own innate cowardice. Such is the Majesty and reverence which the presence of a Prince carries along with it, that it is an ordinary thing for it, either to mitigate or toaffright an executioner. A Slave was sent to Marius, when he was taken prisoner by the Minturveses, to kill him, who amazed at the presence of the man, and at the remembrance of his name proved so cowardly, that he lost all power to slay him. And if there be such power in the person of a man that is bound, and in prison, and in a manner choked up with ill fortune, how much more may we think there is in a Prince that is at liberty attired in the Majesty of his ornaments of state, and environed with his train, insomuch that the pomp thereof is of force to affright, or else with the least courtesy he shall receive thee, to humble thee again before him. There were some conspired against Sitalces King of Thrace, and they appointed amongst them a day for the execution, and met at the place agreed on where the Prince was, but none of them once moved to hurt him, so that they parted all thence without attempting any thing, and without knowing what it was that hindered them, but blaming one another for the fail: into such errors they often fall afterwards, in so much as the treason was discovered, and they suffered punishment for that evil, which they could, but durst not act. Against Alfonsus' Duke of Ferrara, two of his own brothers conspired together, and used the help of one Giannes' a Priest & Musician belonging to that Duke who many times at their intrety brought the Duke amongst them, so that it was in their power to kill him; yet never was any of them so hardy as to do it, whereupon at length being discovered they suffered for their wickedness, and want of wit. This negligence could not proceed from elsewhere then from that of necessity the Prince's presence did affright them, or that some courtesy he showed them humbled them. In such executions an inconvenient or error many times arises, either for lack of discretion or courage: for when the one or other of these two once amazes thee, thou art borne forward in such confusion of thy understanding, that it makes thee both say and do what thou oughtest not. And that men are thus astonished and confounded, Livy does very well show it, where he sets forth Alexamenes the Etolian, as he went about to kill Nabis the Spartan, whereof we spoke formerly, that when he came to the execution, and discovered to those that were with him, what he was to do, T. Livius says these words: He gathers together his wits to him, which 
Colligit & ipse animum confusum tantae cogitatione rei.  the consideration of so weighty a matter had somewhat disordered For it is impossible, that any man (though of a resolute courage, & accustomed to the slaughters of men, and use of his weapons) should not be quite astonished. Therefore choice is to be made of men experienced in such matters, nor should one commit them to any other, however he be esteemed very courageous: for let no man that hath not formerly made trial of himself, presume too much upon his courage in the performance of any great exploit. This amazement than may either cause thee to let thy weapons fall out of thy hands, or such words from thy month, as may work the same effect. Luciila Commodus his sister had so ordered it, that Quintianus should kill him. And he awaited Cowmodus in the passage into the Theatre, where with a naked poinard coming up to him, he cried out, This the Senate sends thee; which words caused him to be first laid hold on, before he could bring down his arm to strike him. M. Antonius of Volterra appointed (as we said before) to kill Laurence of Medici, as he came near him, said, Ah Traitor! which saying of his occasioned the safety of Laurence, and the wrack of that Conspiracy. Such a matter may be fully perfected, when it is practised only against one head, for the reasons alleged: but very hardly can it well be accomplished against two principals, or rather impossibly: for it is impossible that one and the like action should succeed at the same instant in several places: for it cannot be, but whither a man will or no, the one shall ruin the other, being done at several times. So that if it be a thing very hazardous and full of danger and small advisedness to practise against the person of one Prince alone; certainly to conspire against two, is wholly vain and to no purpose. And were it not for the reverence I bear to the Historian, I would never believe, that were possible, which Herodian says of Plautianus, that he gave the charge to Saturninus the Centurion to kill Severus and Antoninus abiding in several place; for it dissents so much from reason, that nothing else but this authority would make me credit it. Certain young men of Athens conspired together against Diocles and Hippias Tyrants of that City, and slew Diocles; but Hippias that remained, revenged it. Chiones and Leonides, Heracleans, that were Plato's Disciples, conspired against Clearchus and Satirus that were Tyrants; they slew Clearchus, and Satirus that was left alive punished the fact. And the Pazzi, several times alleged by us, has not the fortune to kill but julian alone. Insomuch as every one should be so wise as forbear to conspire against several principals: for he neither advantageth himself, nor his Country, nor any body else: but rather they that are left behind, become more intolerable and fiercer, as Florence, Athens, and Heraclea, which I spoke of before, know well It is true, that the conspiracy which Pelopidas practised to free Thebes his native Country, had all manner of difficulties, yet it succeeded luckily: for Pelopidas conspired not only against two Tyrants, but against ten: and not only was he not a confident of any of theirs, and so had no easy access unto any of those Tyrants, but he was a rebel: yet for all this came he into Thebes, slew the Tyrants and set the Country at liberty. Nevertheless he affected all this with the assistance of one Carrion a Counsellor belonging to those Tyrants, by whose means he had easy access to execute his purpose. Yet let none take example from him: for it was an enterprise almost impossible, and a miracle it was that it succeeded; and so it was, and is now esteemed by those writers that celebrate the memory thereof, as a matter of great rarity, and without pattern. Such an execution may be hindered by a false imagination, or upon some sudden accident, that arises just upon the fact. On the morning that Brutus and the other Conspirators purposed to kill Caesar, it fell out so that he talked a good while with Cn. Popilius Len●●, one of the Conspirators, whereupon the others seeing this long discourse, they were in fear lest the said Popilius had revealed the Conspiracy to Caesar, and they were about to attempt to slay Caesar there, & not expect till he came into the Senate, had it not been that when the discourse ended, they saw that Cesar made not any extraordinary motion thereat, and so they settled themselves anew. These false conceits are to be considered, and weighed with discretion, & the rather, because they are easy to be taken; for he that hath aguilty conscience, easily believes that others talk of him a word may be herd spoken to another purpose, that may much trouble thy mind, and make thee believe it touches the matter thou hast in hand, and cause thee by thy flight to discover thine own Conspiracy, or put the action into disorder by hastening it faster than its time. And this comes to pass the more easily, where Many are made privy to the Conspiracy. Touching the accidents (because they fall out unexpected) they cannot be showed but by examples, and make men wary, according to their rule. ●ulius Belanti of Sienna (of whom I have formerly made mention) for the hatred which he bore to Pandulphus that had taken his daughter from him, whom he had first given him to wife, resolved to kill him, and chose this time. Pandulphus went almost every day to visit a kinsman of his that was sick, and in going thither passed by Julius his house: Who perceiving this, provided so, that his Conspirators were altogether ready in his house to kill Pandulphus, as he should pass and having placed them all armed in the entry, he had one stood in the window, that as Pandulphus should pass, when he came near to the entry, should make a sign. It chanced that Pandulphus coming, & the other having given the sign, he met a friend that stopped him, and some of those that were with him passed forward before him, and hearing the noise of arms, they discovered the ambush laid, so that Pandulphus escaped, and Julius with his confederates were constrained to fly from Sienna. The chance of that meeting hindered the success of that action, & ruin'd quite Julius his enterprise. For which accidents (because they are very rare) we cannot find any remedy, it is very necessary to examine well those that may chance, and help them as we can. It remains now only, that we discourse of the dangers which they run after the execution done, which are all but one, and this it is, when any one is left alive to revenge the dead Prince. There may then his brothers or his sons be left, or other of his allies to whom the Principality may belong, & may be left alive by thy negligence, or upon some occasions (formerly spoken of) that may execute this revenge, as it befell John Andrea's of Lampognano, who together with his Complotters having slain the Duke of Milan, and there being left alive one son of his and two brothers, they were ready at hand time enough to revenge his death. And truly in this case these conspirators are excusable: because they have here no remedy, but when any of them survives, for lack of good advisement, or through their negligence, than indeed thereiss no excuse to be made for them. Some conspirators at Forly slew Count jerolamus their Lord, took prisoners his wife and sons, which were but little ones; and thinking they could have no security, unless they became masters of the fortress, which the governor was not willing to give into their hands; whereupon the Lady Katherine (for so the Countess was called) promised the Traitors, that if they would let her enter therein, she would cause it to be delivered up to them, and that they should keep her sons for pledges. They upon her word thus given, suffered her to enter in, who so soon as she was within the walls, reproached them with the murder of her husband, and threatened them with all manner of revenge; & to let them know she had no regard of her children, she showed them her privy parts, saying she had the means left her to bring forth others, so that they not knowing what to do, and too late perceiving their own error, suffered perpetual exile in punishment of their lack of wit. But of all dangers that can befall after the execution, there is node moon certain, nor more terrible, then when the people is a friend to that Prince thou hast slain: for against this the conspirators can have no remedy: for they can never secure themselves. We have Caesar for example hereof, who because he had the people of Rome to friend, was by their means revenged: for when they had chased the conspirators from Rome they caused all of them in several places to be slain. Treasons that are practised against ones own Country, are less dangerous for those that work them, than those that are practised aghast Princes: for in the ordering of them the dangers are less than in the others, and in executing of them they are the same, and after the execution there is none at all. In the plotting and working them the dangers are not many: for a Citizen may frame himself so, as to be capable of power, without manifesting his mind therein or intention to any one; and unless those his purposes receive some interruption, he may happily proceed in his design: but if any law made, chance to cross them, he must stay his time, and seek some other course. This is to be understood of a Republic where in corruption is entered in some part; for in one not corrupted (no evil beginning taking 〈◊〉 place there) these thoughts cannot enter into the heart of any citizen. The Citizens then may by several means and many ways aspire unto the Principality, where they run no hazard of being oppressed, as well because Republics are more slew then a Prince and stand less in doubt, & ●●h refore are less wary as also because they carry more respect towards their principal citizens, and therefore are they the more audacious and more insolent to practise against them. Few there are but have read Catiline's conspiracy written by Sallust, & know how that afterwards when it was discovered, Catiline, did not only abide in Rome, but came into the Senate-house, & spoke in villainous terms against the Senate and the Consul; so great was the respect that that City bore to her Citizens so that when he was departed from Rome, and had his Armies already on foot, Lentulus nor those others had never been laid hold on, had not there been letters of his own hand brought against him, which manifestly accused him. Hanno the most potent Citizen in Carthage, aspiring to a Tyranny, had provided at the marriage of one of his own daughters to poison all the Senate, and afterwards make himself Prince. When this matter was known, the Senate took no other order then to make a law which limited the excess of expenses anbanquets and weddings; such was the respect they bore to men of their qualities. It is very true that in the executing of a treason against ones native Country, there is more difficulty, and greater dangers; for very seldom is it, that thy own forces suffice, being to conspire against so many; for every one hath not an Army at his command, as Cesar Agathocles or Cl●omenes, and such like, who at one pluck have been able to seize on the Country: for unto such the way is easy and safe enough, But others that have not such advantages of forces, must do it either with some slight or artifice, or by the aid of foreign forces. As for slights and tricks, Pisistratus the Athenian having over come the Megarenses, and thereby got credit with the people, one morning came out among them wounded, saying, The nobility through envy had thus wronged him, and asked leave of them for his defence to have a guard of armed men about him. By this power he easily attained to such greatness, that he brought Athens under his Tyranny. Pandulfus Petrucci returned himself with others that were outlawed into Sienna, & there he had the charge given him over the common guard of Justice, as a Mecanick office, and which others refused, yet in time those armed men gave him such reputation, that shortly after he became Lord of the Town. Many others have used other endeavours, and other ways, and in a short space, and without danger have attained to the same. Those that by their own force, or by help of forrain-forces have conspired to make themselves Lords over their native Countries, have had several successes, as fortune hath befriended them or otherwise. Catiline we spoke of before, was ruined thereby. Hanno (of whom we formerly made mention) when the poison took not effect, armed many thousands of his partisans, who with himself were all slain. Some of the prime Citizens of Thebes, to the end they might become Lords of the Town, called to their aid a Sparian army, and so took upon them the rule of that City. So that when we shall have examined all the conspiracies made against a Country, we shall not find any, at least very few, that in the plotting thereof have been suppressed, but all of them either have taken effect, or been ruined in the execution rather. When they are once acted, they carry not with them any further dangers, than the nature of a Principality hath in itself: for when a man hath once gotten to be a Tyrant, he hath his own proper and ordinary dangers belonging to him, against which there are no other remedies than those we have formerly touched. This is that which I had to write touching conspiracies: and if I have discoursed of those only that are executed with the sword, and not done by poison, it is because they have all the same rule. It is rue, that those done with poison, are the more dangerous, because they are more uncertain, for that a man cannot administer by every one, and he must needs reveal it to him that he makes his instrument; and from this necessity of revealing it, arises thy danger: moreover upon many accidents a draught of poison cannot prove deadly, as it befell those that slew Co●modus; for he having vomited up the poison which they gave him, they were forced to strangle him, before they could make him die. Whereupon I judge that Princes have not a greater enemy than treason; because when a treason is once practised against them, it either brings them to their end, or procures them much infamy; for if it succeeds, they die; if it be discovered, and they slay the traitors, men always suppose it hath been some device of that Princes, to vent his avarice and cruelty against the bloods and estates of those he hath put to death. I would not fail therefore to warn those Princes or Republics against which treasons have been devised, that they be wary, when a conspiracy is once disclosed to them, before they go about to revenge it, but first to pty narrowly into it, and to seek to understand well the qualities thereof, and weigh well the conditions of the conspirators, and their own; and when they find them great and mighty, never to discover them, till they be furnished with sufficient forces to crush them; for in doing otherwise, they should discover it to their own ruin: Wherefore they ought to dissemble it with all possible care; because the conspirators, when they find themselves discovered, of force are driven to act what they can without respect. We have an example hereof from the Romans, who having lift two legions of soldiers to guard the Capuans against the Samnitcs, as otherwhere we have said, the heads of those Legions conspired together to oppress the Capuans: Whereof notice being given at Rome, the matter was committed to Rutilius the new Consul, that he should take order for it, who to lull asleep the conspirators, gave it out, that the Senate had again confirmed the Capuan Legions abode there: Which those soldiers giving credit to, and thinking they had time enough to execute their purpose, they never went about to hasten the matter: And so they stood still, till they began to see that the Consul separated them one from another, which thing having begotten suspicion in them, made them discover themselves, and execute their design. Nor can there be a fuller example on the one or the other part: for hereby it appears how slow men are in matters, where they think they have time enough; and how quick, when a necessity drives them to it. Nor can a Prince or Republic (that would defer the discovery of a treason for his own advantage) take a better course, then by some device or trick offer the conspirators shortly some handsome opportunity, to the end that they attending that, or thinking they have time enough, may give leisure to that Prince or Commonwealth to punish them. They who have done otherwise, have hastened their own destruction, as the Duke of Athens did, and William of the family of the Pazzi. The Duke being become the tyrant of Florence, and understanding that there was a conspiracy plotted against him, caused without further examining the matter, one of the conspirators to be laid hold on, which gave and alarm to the rest, whereupon arming themselves, they took the state from him. William being a Commissary in the valley of Chiana in the year 1501. having had notice, that in Arezzo there was a conspiracy in favour of the Vitelli, to take that Town from the Florentines, presently went to the town, and not considering his own forces, nor the conspirators, nor taking order to furnish himself with any, by the Bishop's advice, who was his sons, caused one of the conspirators to be laid hands on, whereupon the first presently took arms, got away the town from the Florentines, and William of a Commissary was made a prisoner. But when those conspiracies are feeble, they may and aught without any regard be suppressed. Yet in any case we must not follow two courses which have been used in a manner contrary one to the other: The one by the forenamed Duke of Athens, who to show he believed that he had the citizens of Florence good wills, put one to death that detected a conspiracy against him: The other by Dion a Syracusan, who to sound the mind of one whom he had in suspicion, agreed that calippus, of whom he was very confident, should make him believe that he were working a plot against him; but these matters fell out ill for them both. For the one took all courage away from the accusers, and encouraged traitors; the other made the way easy to his own ruin, or rather he himself was principal of the conspiracy against himself, and so it fell out; for calippus (being that he could without any respect practise such a thing against Dion) did it so in earnest, that he took both his life and his State from him.   

CHAP. VII.  
From whence proceeds it, that of the changes from liberty to slavery, and from slavery to liberty, some are without blood, others exceeding bloody?  
SOme will marvel perchance from whence it comes to pass, that of many changes which are made from a free State to a Tyrannical, and contrarily, some are with much effusion of blood, others quite without any: for, as we learn by Histories, in such like alterations sometimes very many men have been slain, and sometimes again not one hath suffered any injury, as i● befell in the change that Rome made from her Kings to Consuls, wherein none but the Tarquins were banished, without wrong done to any body else. Which depends hereupon; for that State that is changed, begins first either by violence, or without it: and when it begins with violence, it must needs begin with doing wrong to many; and it is necessary afterwards that in its destruction, they who have been wronged, revenge themselves, and so from their desire of revenge proceeds the effusion of blood and death of many. But when that State is begun by the common consent of an universality, and thereby hath been amplified, it hath no cause afterwards, when that universality is ruined, to wrong others than the head only; and of this kind was the State of Rome, and the Tarquins banishment, as also was in Florence the State which the Medici held, when afterwards in their destructions in the year 1444. none else were hurt but they. And so such like changes never prove very dangerous; but those rather are very full of danger, which are wrought by those that endeavour to revenge themselves withal, which have been such, that they have caused horror even in him that reads them. And because of examples to this purpose histories are full fraught, I will let this pass.   

CHAP. VIII.  
He that will make alteration in a Republic, must consider the subject he is to work upon.  
IT hath been formerly treated how that a malicious Citizen cannot work mischief in a Republic that is not grown corrupted; which conclusion is confirmed (besides the reasons that then were alleged) with the example of Sp. Cassius, and of Manlius Capitolinus. Which Spurius being an ambitious man, and desirous to take upon him extraordinary authority in Rome, and gain the people to him by doing them many good turns, as was that, to sell them those fields, which the Romans had taken from the Hermici, this his ambition was descried by the Fathers, and so much suspected, that when hh spoke to the people and offered to give them those moneys, which the Corn was sold for, that the Public had caused to be brought from Sicily, they wholly refused them, thinking that Spurius meant to give them the price of their liberty. But had that people been already corrupted, they would not have refused the said price, but rather have opened him that way to the tyranny, which now they shut against him. A fuller example hereof Manlius Capitolinus represents unto us; for in him we see, what excellencies of mind and body, how many brave exploits acted in defence of a man's native Country, a brutish desire of rule quite races out: which (as it appeared) grew in him, through the envy he bore Camillus for the honours were done him, whereby his understanding was so blinded, as not considering the manner of Government used in the City, nor examining, whereupon he was to work, unapt as yet to receive so evil a form, betook himself to raise tumults in Rome against the Senate, and contrary to the Laws of his Country. Wherein the perfection of that City is very evident, and the goodness of the matter thereof; for in his case none of the Nobility, however that they were very eager defenders the one of another, never stirred in his favour, nor any of his kindred undertook any thing in his defence: whereas ordinarily when others were accused, they used to accompany them in a rueful manner, clad in black, and all sorrowful; whereby they might gain compassion in favour of the defendant, and with Manlius none of these were seen. The Tribunas of the people, who were wont to favour those things, which seemed to be moved for the people's advantage, and the more they were against the Nobility, so much the forwarder used to thrust them, in this case held with the Nobility to suppress a common mischief. The people of Rome exceedingly desirous of their own advantage, and a great favourer of any thing that thwarted the Nobility, however they afforded Manlius many favours, nevertheless, when the Tribunes cited him, and referred his cause to be judged by the people, that people being become judge of a defendant, without regard condemned him to death. Wherefore I believe there is not any example in this History more proper to show the goodness of that Commonwealth's orders, than this, seeing that not one of this whole City moved in behalf of a very valorous Citizen, who as well publicly as privately had done many worthy acts: because in all of them the love of their country was of more force than any other regard, and they considered more the present danger; that depended on him, than his forepast deserts, so that by his death they set themselves at liberty. And T. Livius says, This end had that man, who had he not been born in a 
Hunc exitum habuit vir, nisi in libera civitate natus esset, memorabilis.  free State, was worthy of admiration. Where two things are to be considered; the one, that by other means a man ought to seek after glory in a City corrupted, than in one that lives strictly according to the civil government; the other is (which is almost the same with the first) that men in their proceedings, and the rather in actions of consequence should consider the times, and conform themselves thereunto: and those that by their evil choice, or natural inclination disagree with the times, most commonly live unhappily, and their actions have but ill successes. The contrary befalls those that can accord with the times: and without question, by the Historians words which we for merly mentioned, we may make this conclusion, that if Manlius had been borne in the times that Marius and Silla were, where the matter was already corrupted, that his ambition could have made some impression therein, he might, have workd the same effect, and had the same success that Silla and Marius had, and others afterwards, who after them aspired to the Tyranny. So in like manner, if Silla and Marius had lived in Manlius his days. they had been crushed in the very egg: for one man may indeed begin with his evil courses and mischievous ways to debauch the people of a City: but it is impossible that one man's life can suffice to corrupt it so, that he himself can make any advantage thereof. And in case it were possible, that in tract of time, he could do it, yet would it be impossible, in regard of the manner of men's proceedings, who are impatient, and cannot defer any passion of theirs long. Moreover, they err in their affairs, and in those especially which they much desire, in so much as either through their small patience, or through their error, they would venture upon the executing of their purposes, in counter time, and so come to an evil end. Therefore is it necessary, if a man would gain authority in a Republic, and induce some ill for me thereinto, to find the matter already disordered by time, and that by little and little, and from age to age is brought into disorder, which of force comes thereunto, when it is not (as formerly hath been said) refreshd by virtuous examples, or by new ●aws reduced to the first principles. Manlius ●hen had been a rare man, and famous, had he been borne in a corrupted City. And therefore should those Citizens that in Republics undertake any thing either in favour of liberty, or in favour of Tyranny, consider the subject they are to work on, and from thence conjecture the difficulty of the work: for it is as hard and dangerous to set free a people that would live in thraldom, as to enthral a people that would live free. And because we have before rouchd, that in all manner of actions men should consider the quality of the times, and proceed conformably to those, we will speak of them at length in the Chapter following.   

CHAP. IX.  
How a man must of necessity change with the times, if he will always have good success in his undertake.  
I Have many times considered, how the occasion of men's good or evil fortunes depends upon the manner of the encounter of their proceedings with the times: for it is evident, that some men proceed in their affairs with violence, others with regard and wariness. And because that in the one and other of these two ways, the convenient terms are transgressed, being that they cannot hit upon the true way; both in the one and the other they fail. But he fails least, and oftenest lights upon good success, that meets (as I have said) time in its own way, and always proceeds according as his own nature puts him forward. Every one knows how Fabius Maximus proceeded with his Army carefully and warily, far from all that kind of metle and confidence which other whiles the Romans used; and his good fortune would have it, that this his way agreed well with the times: for Hannibal being come a young man into Italy, and with a fresh gale of fortune, and having twice broken the Roman Armies, and that Republic almost lost all her good soldiers, and therefore being affrighted, could not light upon better fortune than to have such a Captain, who by his slowness and wariness should keep the enemy in play with vain delays: Nor could Fabius have met with times fitter for his ways: whereupon came it to pass that he grew glorious. And that Fabius did this upon the instigation of his own nature, and not upon a mere choice, we see that when Scipio desired to pass over into Africa with those Armies, whereby to make an end of the war, Fabius much contradicted it, as he that could not go out of his own pace, nor leave his own custom, so that for all him, Hannibal might have continued still in Italy; for he perceived not, that the times were changed, and it was needful to alter the manner of making war. And had Fabius been King of Rome, he might easily have spoiled that war, because he would not have known how to alter his proceedings with the alteration of times. But being he was born in a Republic, where there was divers Citizens, and divers humours, as she had Fabius, who was excellent in those times, when the war was only to be supported; so had she Scipio in the times when their enemies were to be overcome. Whence arises it, that a Republic hath a longer life, and longer enjoys good fortune than a principality: because she can better fit herself for several accidents, by reason of the variety of her Subjects that are in her, then can a Prince: for a man that is accustomed to proceed in one manner, never altars, as it is said, and must of necessity, when the times disagree with his way, go to wrack. Peter Soderini, formerly spoken of, proceeded in all his affairs with mildness and patience: and he and his Country prospered, while the times agreed with his manner of proceedings: but when the times fell out so, that it was needful to break off all patience and mildness, he knew not how to do it: so that together with his Country he fell to ruin. Pope Julius the second carried himself all the time of his Pontificate with great violence and rage, and because the times sorted well therewith, all his undertake succeeded well. But if other times had come, that would have required other advice, of force he must have gone to destruction: because he would never have altered his manner nor order in his proceedings. And that we cannot change ourselves, there are two reasons; the one because we cannot resist that which our nature is inclined to; the other is, because when one man in such a kind of proceeding hath gone on luckily, it is impossible to persuade him, that things will prove well, where he proceeds otherwise. Whereupon it comes to pass, that in one man fortune varies, because she changes the times, and he changes not his courses. Thence arises also the ruin of a City, because the orders of Common wealths change not with the times, as we have treated heretofore at large, but they are flower: for it is a greater trouble to them to change; and to effect it, they have need of times which should in a manner take a Republic quite off the things whereby a thorough alteration should be made in her: for which one man alone suffices not by changing the manner of her proceedings. And because we have made mention of Fabius Maximus, who held off Hannibal with delays, I purpose to treat in the following Chapter, whether a Captain, being desirous to fight a battle with the enemy in any case, can be so hindered that he do it not.   

CHAP. X.  
That a Captain cannot avoid battle, when his enemy will fight in any case.  
CNeus Sulpitius the dictator held off from 
Cneus Sulpitius Dictator adversus Gallos bellum trahebat, nolens le fortunae committere adversus hostem, quem tempus deteriorem in dies, & locus alienus faceret.  fight with the French, being not willing to stand at fortune's discretion in a trial against his enemy, whom time and a strange Country would continually weaken and consume. When such an error en●ues, where all men or the greater part of them err, I think it not much amiss marry times to reprove it. Wherefore though I have formerly several times showed, how the actions about great matters now adays differ from those of ancient times; yet I think it not superfluous at this present to repeat it: for if in any part it differs from the ancient orders, it is especially in military orders, where now is not any of those things observed, which the ancients made much account of. And this inconvenient grew first hereupon, because Commonwealths and Princes, have committed this care to o●hers, and to avoid dangers, have much lai● aside that exercise; and if perchance sometime a King in our days venture to go in person, we believe not therefore that he seeks out any new orders, that are more commendable: for when they chance to give themselves to that employment, they do it rather in show of their pomp, then upon any other laudable occasion. Yet do these commit lesser errors, personally visiting their armies, and keeping in their own hands the Majesty of their Government, then Republikes do, especially those of Italy, which trust to others, not understanding any thing in the wars, or attending to any thing belonging to them: and on the other side, when they are desirous (whereby they may seem to be Princes) to take any thing into deliberation, they commit therein exceeding many errors. And however that other where I have treated of some of them, yet at this present I will not forbear to tell one of very great importance. When these lazy Princes, or effeminate Commonwealths send forth any Commander of theirs, the wisest commission that they think they can give him, is to charge him, that in any case he fight not a battle, but avoid it, and conceiting with themselves that herein they imitate Fabius Maximus his discretion, who by forbearing to fight, saved the Roman State; they understand not that most commonly, this commission is either to no purpose, or else hurtful. For we must take this for a conclusion, that a General, that will abide in the field, cannot avoid a battle, when the enemy will in any case fight. So that this commission is but thus, as if he should say, fight with thine enemy at his pleasure, and not at thine own. For if a man will abide in the field and not fight, the surest way is to keep himself fifty miles off from his enemy at least, and then keep good espiouns, so that if he chance to bend towards thee, thou mayst avoid him at leisure. Another course is to immure himself up in a City; but the one and the other of these two courses is very pernicious. In the first he leaves his Country in prey to the enemy; and a valiant Prince will rather hazard the battle than prolong the war with so much damage to his Subjects. And in the second the loss is evident; for it must needs be, that retiring thyself within the walls of a Town with thy Army, thou be besieged, and at length suffer famine, and so be forced to yield: insomuch as to avoid battle by either of these two means, must needs prove very hurtful. The course that Fabius Maximus held, to abide in strong places is very good, when thou hast an Army so valorous, that the enemy dares not come to find thee in thy advantages. Nor can it be said that Fabius avoided fight, but rather that he would fight at his advantage. For if Hannibal had gone to find him, Fabius would have stayed for him, and fought with him; but Hannibal durst not deal with him after his manner. So the battle was as well avoided by Hannibal as by Fabius; but if one of them had been desirous to have hazarded in any case, the other had but one of these three remedies, to wit those two we have before mentioned, or to fly. There are many examples and maxims in the war, which the Romans made with Philip of Macedon, Father of Perses, to make good what I say; for Philip being assailed by the Romans, resolved not to come to battle; and therefore first he thought to do as Fabius Maximus had done in Italy, and placed himself with his Army upon the top of a mountain, where he fortified himself all he could, deeming that the Romans had not the heart to come and find him there; but when they went thither, and fought with him, and drove him from the mountain, being not able to withstand them, he fled with the greater part of his people: and that which saved him was the roughness of the Country, so that the Romans could not follow the pursuit. Philip then being unwilling to fight, and having pitched his camp near the Romans, had no other mean but to fly; and having found by this experience, that when they meant not to fight, it was not enough for them to get upon the top of the mountains; and having no mind to enclose himself in any Town, resolved to take the other course, to remove many miles distant from the Romans Campe. Whereupon, if the Romans were in one Province, they went into another, and so always they went thither from whence the Romans were parted: and considering in the end, how that in prolonging the war this way, his own estate declined, and how that his Subjects were sometimes by himself, otherwhile by his enemies daily oppressed, resolved to put it to the trial of a day, and so came to a set battle with the Romans. It is profitable than not to fight, when the Armies have these conditions which Fabius his Army had, or that then had that of Cneus Sulpirius, which are, to have an Army so good, that the enemy dares not come and find thee within thy fortifications, and that the enemy though he be in thy Country, yet hath he not much footing therein, where he may suffer want of provisions; and in this case the course is advantageous for the reasons Titus Livius alleges: Unwilling to stand at fortune's discretion on a trial 
Nolens se fortunae committere adversus hostem, quem tempus deteriorem indies, & locus alienus faceret.  against his enemy, whom time and a strange Country would daily weaken and consume. But in any other case the battle cannot be avoided, but with thy shame and danger: for to fly (as Philip did) is the same that it is to be routed, and that with the more disgrace, by how much the less thou hast made proof of thy valour. And however he had the luck to escape, another could not have had the like, unless he had help by the situation of the Country, as well as he. That Hannibal was a master in the art of war, I think every one will acknowledge, and being to oppose Scipio in Africa, if he had seen any advantage in prolonging the war, without doubt he would have done it, and peradventure could too (being a good Commander and having a good Army) as well as Fabius did in Italy. But being he did it not, we may well believe, that some important reason persuaded him so; for a Prince that hath an Army levied, and sees that for want of moneys or friends he cannot keep them long together, is a very fool if he ventures not his fortune, before his Army falls asunder; for by delaying he certainly loses, whereas hazarding he might overcome. Another thing there is yet much to be accounted of, which is, that a man ought (even in his losing) seek to gain glory; and it is more glory, to be overcome by force, than by any other inconvenient, that may have made thee lose. Therefore it must needs be that Hannibal was forced by these necessities; and on the other side Scipio, if Hannibal would have protracted the war, and he durst not have adventured to go seek him in his Trenches, had not suffered therein, in that he had already overcome Syphax, and taken so many Towns in Africa, so that he could have continued there with security and conveniency, as well as in Italy. Which was not so with Hannibal, when he had to deal with Fabius, nor with those Frenchmen, when they were opposed by Sulpitius. So much the less also can he avoid the fight, that with an Army invades another man's Country, he must (whensoever the enemy faces him) fight with him, and if he encamps before any Town, so much the rather is he obliged to fight, as in our days it befell Duke Charles of Burgundy, who being set down before Morat, a Town belonging to the Swissers, was assaulted by them and broken: and so it chanced to the French Army, that encamping at Novarra, was in like manner routed by the Swissers.   

CHAP. XI.  
He that hath to deal with many, however that he be the weaker, provided that he can but support their first violence, overcomes.  
THe Tribunes of the people's power in Rome was great, and necessary, as many times we have said: for otherwise it would never have been possible to bridle the Nobilities ambition, which would much sooner, than it did, have corrupted that Commonwealth: yet because in every thing (as is often said) some evil proper to every thing lies lurking in it, which causes new accidents to arise, it is needful with new orders to remedy them. Wherefore the Tribunitial power being grown insolent, and terrible to the Nobility, and to all Rome, some very hurtful inconvenient to the Roman liberty would have risen, if the way had not been showed by Appius Claudius, whereby they might defend themselves against the Tribunes ambition: which was that they always found some one among them, that either was fearful or might be corrupted, or that was a lover of the common good: so that they disposed him to oppose other men's wills, that desired to draw forward any deliberation against the Senate's will. Which remedy was a great allay to such an authority, and a long time much helped Rome. Which thing hath made me consider, that whensoever many powerful ones are united together against one that is powerful, though all they together are much more puissant than he, yet may there much more be hoped for in him alone, though less powerful, then in those many, though very strong: for (leaving a part all those things, wherein one alone is able to do more than many, which things are innumerable) this will always come to pass, that one alone, taking but a little care, shall be able to disunite those many, and so weaken that body which was strong. I will not herein allege ancient examples, which are very frequent; the modern shall suffice me, which have fallen in our days. In the year 1484. all Italy conspired against the Venetians, who when they were in a manner wholly lost, and could not any more abide in the field with their Army, they corrupted Lodowick that then ruled in Milan, and by means of that corruption made an accord, wherein they not only had again the towns they had lost, but usurped a part of the state of Ferrara. And thus they that had been loser's in the war, remained gainers by the peace. A few years past, the whole world conspired against France; yet before they came to see the end of the war, Spain broke off from her confederates, and made agreement with her, in so much as the rest of the confederates also were forced to make their accords too. So that without doubt, we ought always judge, when we see a war made by many against one, that that one is like to be a gainer at the end, provided that he be of such valour, that he is able to sustain the first brunts, and so govern himself with the time as to attend time: which if he were not able to do, he would run the hazard of many dangers, as it happened to the Venetians in the eighth year, who if they could have temporised with the French Army, and so have had time to gain themselves some of those that were confederated against them, they might have escaped that destruction, but not having so good an Army, as thereby to play with the enemy awhile; and hereupon not having had leisure to take any of them asunder, they were ruined: for we saw, that the Pope when he had what was his, became their friend, and so Spain, and very willingly the one and the other of these two Princes would have saved them the state of Lombardy against France, for fear of making it too great in Italy, if it had been in their power. The Venetians then might have given a part, to save the rest, which if they had done in time, that it had appeared it was not of extreme necessity, and before the beginning of the war, would have been wisely done of them; but when the wars were begun, it was disgraceful, and peradventure of small benefit. But before such imbroiles, few of the Citizens of Venice could foresee the danger, very few the way to help, and none to advise it. But to return again to the beginning of this discourse, I conclude, that even so as the Senate of Rome had a remedy to save their country from the Tribunes ambition, because they were many, so shall any Prince that is assailed by many, find a remedy, whensoever he knows with discretion how to use the convenient means to disunite them.   

CHAP. XII.  
That a wise Commander upon his own soldiers should lay all manner of necessity to fight, and take it, as much as he can, from his enemies.  
AT other times we have treated, of what advantage necessity is to hamane actions, and to what glory they have thereby been promoted; and that by some moral Philosophers it hath been written, that men's hands and tongues two of their worthiest instruments to ennoble them, would never have worked so perfectly, nor have brought men's labours to that excellency, whereunto we see them now come, had they not been thrust forward by necessity. The virtue then of such necessity being known by the ancient Commanders of Armies, and how thereby the soldier's minds were made the more obstinate to fight, they used all their industry, to force them by it. And on the other side, they aswell endeavoured, to free their enemies from it; and hereupon many times they opened that way to the enemy, which they could have shut against them, and shut it against their own soldiers, which they could have left open for them. He than that desires, either that a City defend itself obstinately, or that an Army in the field fight it out resolutely, must try his wits to make an impression in the breasts of them that are to fight, that such a necessity lies upon them. Whereupon a discreet Commander that is going to besige a Town, may conjecture of the facility or difficulty in taking it, by the knowledge and consideration of the necessity that binds the inhabitants to defend themselves; and as he finds the necessity urging them to be great, so let him judge it difficult to overcome them, or otherwise easy. Whence it proceeds, that those Towns which have rebelled, are harder to be regained than they were at their first conquest; for in the beginning not having any cause to fear punishment, as not having offended, they yield easily; but thinking (after they have rebelled) that they have offended, and hereupon fearing the chastisement, they prove harder to be recovered. Moreover such obstinacy arises from the innate hatreds which neighbouring Princes and Republics, bear one to another, which proceeds from their ambition to rule, and the jealousy of their own state, especially if they be Republikes as it chances in Tuscany. Which strife and contention hath caused, and ever will, a great difficulty in the mastery of the one or other. Whereof he that considers well the City of Florence's neighbours, and those of Venice, will not marvel (as many do) that Florence hath spent more in her wars, and gained less than Venice, for this is, because the Venetians never found their neighbouring Towns so obstinate in their defence, as Florence hath; for that all the Towns confining upon Venice have been accustomed to live in subjection under a Prince, and not free; and those that have been used to serve, make small account of changing their Lord, or rather many times they much desire it. So that Venice (however she hath had more powerful neighbours than Florence) yet because she hath found the Towns less obstinate against her, hath been able sooner to subdue them then the other could, being environed round, by free Towns. A Commander therefore should (to return to our first discourse) when he sits down before any Town, provide with all diligence to take from the defendants all scruples of such necessity, and conquently such obstinacy, promising pardon, if they are afraid of punishment: and if they doubt their liberty is aimed at, show them there is nothing intended against the common good, but against some few ambitious men in the City, which thing hath, many times facilitated such enterprises and take of Towns. And though such colours are easily seen through, and especially by understanding men, yet are the people oft deceived thereby, who being desirous of the present peace, shut their eyes against any other, snare that under large promises can be laid for them. And this way exceeding many Cities have been reduced to servitude, as it befell Florence in these latter days, and Crassus also with his whole Army, who though he knew the Parthians promises were not to be credited, which were made only to take from his soldiers the necessity of defending themselves, yet could he not keep them obstinate, being blinded by the offers of peace made them by their enemies, as in particular may be seen in his life, by him that shall read it. When the Samnites, contrary to the articles of agreement, upon the ambition of some few had foraged and spoiled the Romans their confederates fields, and afterwards sent Ambassadors to Rome to require peace, offering to make restitution of all that was taken, and deliver them prisoners the authors of those broils and robberies, they were refused by the Romans, and sent back to Samnium without hope of agreement: Claudius Pontius the commander of the Samnites Army, with a notable oration of his showed, the Romans would have war in any case; and though for their own parts they wished for peace, yet necessity made them take the war in hand, saying these words, They justly take arms that are forced to do so; and piously too 
Justum est bellum, quibus necessarium; & pia arma, quibus nisi in armis spes non est.  who have no other hope but in them. Upon which necessity he with his soldiers grounded his hopes of victory. And to the end I need not return again to this matter, I think it fit to allege those examples of the Romans, which are most worthy of remark; Caius Manilius went forth with an army to encounter the Veientes, and part of their Army having forced his trenches, Manilius came speedily with new Troops to succour his own, and that the Veientes should not escape, guarded all the passages into the camp. Whereupon the Veientes seeing themselves shut in of all sides, began to fight with such fury, that they slew Manilius, and would have otherthrown all the rest of the Romans, if, by the wisdom of one Tribune, a way for them to escape by, had not been opened. Where we see that while necessity constraned the Veientes to fight, they stood to it stoutly; but as soon as a way was opened for them, they thought more upon flying then fight. The Volsci and Equi having entered with their armies upon the Roman territories, the Consuls were sent against them, and whiles they were in fight, the Volscies' army, the chief whereof was Vectius Metius, chanced to to be enclosed between their own trenches, which the Romans were now become masters of, and the other Roman Army, who seeing they must all either die or make way by the sword, he spoke thus to his soldiers, Come along with me; there is neither rampire nor ditch to oppose you, 
Ite mecum; non murus nec vallum; armati armatis obstant, virtute pates; quod ultimum & maximum telum est, necessitate superiores estis.  but men only against men: you are equal to them in valour, and, which is the last and hardest weapon, your necessity gives you advantage of them. Insomuch as this necessity is termed by Titus Livius the extremest and greatest weapon. Camillus the wisest of all the Roman commanders being got within the walls of the Vejentes' City with his Army, whereby to take it more easily, and to free the enemies from that last necessity of defending themselves gave command so that the Vejentes heard it, that none should hurt those that were disarmed: so that having cast all their arms upon the ground, that City was taken with little or no effusion of blood; Which course was afterwards followed by many Commanders.   

CHAP. XIII.  
Whether more trust is to be reposed in a good Commander that hath a weak Army, or in a good Army that hath a weak Commander.  
COriolanus being banished from Rome, went from thence to the Volsci, where having gotten together an Army to be revenged of his own Citizens, came from thence to Rome; from whence he was moved to depart, rather for pity to his mother, than by the Romans forces. Upon which place T. Livius says, that hereby it is known that the Commonwealth of Rome grew more by the Captain's valours, than the soldiers, considering that the Volsci formerly had been always losers, and only then had overcome when Co●iolanus was their General: And how ever that Livy holds such an opinion, yet we see in many places of his History, that Soldiers without any Captain have given extraordinary proofs of their valours, and have been better ordered and fiercer after the death of their Consuls, than before they were slain, as it happened in the Army which the Romans had in Spain under the Scipios, which when the two Captains were slain, was able by its own valour not only to save itself, but overcome the enemy, and keep that Province for the Republic. So relating all, we shall find many examples where the Soldiers valour alone hath got the day, and many others where the General's valour only hath done the same effect. In so much as we may well judge, that either of them hath need of the other. And here it is not amiss to consider first, whether is most to be feared, either a good Army led by an unskilful Commander, or a good Commander followed by a bad Army. And taking after Caesar's opinion, small account is to be made of the one or the other: for when he went into Spain against Afranius and Petrejus, who had with them a good Army, he said he little doubted them, Because he went against an Army that 
Ibat ad exerci um sine da 〈…〉.  lacked a Commander, showing the Commander's weakness. On the contrary when he went into Thessaly against Pompey, he said, I go against a Commander without an Army. 
Vado ad ducem sine exercitu.  Another thing may be considered, which is more easy, either for a good Commander to make a good Army, or for a good Army to make a good Commander; Whereupon I answer, that the question seems already decided: for more easily many shall find one, or shall instruct one so that he become good, than one alone shall many. Lucullus when he was sent against Mithridates, was altogether unexpert in the war; yet that good Army, wherein were so many good Chieftains, quickly made him a skilful Commander. For want of Soldiers the Romans put many slaves in Arms, and gave order to Sempronius Gracchus to train them, who in a small time made a very good Army of them. Pelopidas and Epaminondas (as we have said otherwhere) after they had delivered Thebes their native Country out of the Spartans' bondage, made the Thebans exceeding good Soldiers in a short time, that they were able not only to sustain ', but overcome the Soldiers of Sparta; so that the case is equal on both sides: for the one being good, may soon find the other so: yet a good Army without a good head, ordinarily becomes insolent and dangerous; as was the Macedonian Army after Alexander his death, and likewise the Veterane soldiers in the civil wars. So that I think, that much more account is to be made of a Commander that hath time and convenience to train up and arm his Soldiers, than of an insolent Army, having a Captain from among them tumultuarily made their Chief. Wherefore double glory and renown may well be ascribed to those Commanders, who have not only taken upon them to overcome the enemy, but before their coming to fight with them, have to make them fit for the occasion, disciplined and instructed their Armies well: for therein appears their vertuo double and admirable; whereas if the charge hereof were communicated to many, far less account or esteem would be made of them.   

CHAP. XIV.  
New sleights and inventions, that are used in the midst of a fight, and new cries that are heard, what effects they produce.  
OF what moment in combats and fights a new accident is, that arises upon any new matter seen or heard, appears in many places, and especially in that occasion, where the Romans fought with the Volsci, where Qu●ntius seeing one of the horns of his Army beginning to fail, began to cry out aloud, that they should stand firm: because the other horn of the Army was already victorious: by which words, having encouraged his own, and affrighted his enemies, he overcame them. And if such vociserations in an Army well ordered be of great effect, in one then that is but tumultuary and ill disciplined, they must needs be of much greater: because the whole frame thereof moves by the like wind. To this purpose I will allege a notable example befallen in our days. The City of Perugia, a few years since, was divided into two factions, of the Oddi, and the Bagliori; these reigned there, the others were banished men, who having by help of their allies gotten an Army together, and brought it into some Town consigning upon Perugia, by favour of their faction one night entered the City, & without being descried, came to take the Piazza; & because that City hath chains on all the corners of the ways, which kept them bard, the Soldiers belonging to the Oddi had a man went before them, who with a bar of Iron was to break the locks of those chains, to the end the horse might pass, & there being but one only left them to break, which immediately opened into the Piazza, and now a general alarm being given, and he that broke them, being oppressed by the multitude that followed him, and not able therefore well to lift up his arms with his bar, whereby to employ it, chanced to say Stand back; which word going by degrees, saying back, began to cause the furthest off to fly, and so by little and little the rest with such force, that they all routed one another. And thus the design of the Oddi, by occasion of so poor an accident, became frustrate. Where we may consider, that discipline and order is not useful in an Army so much for orderly fight, as that every small accident put thee not quite into disorder: for, were it for nothing else, the ordinary multitude is unfit for the wars, because every rumour, every voice, every noise changes them, and puts them to flight. And therefore a good Commander, among his other orders, ought appoint those that are to take the word from him, & to pass it to others, and accustom his Soldiers, so that they give no credit save only to their own officers, to the end that they tell them only, what is given them in charge from him: for when this part is not well observed, many disorders often fall out. Touching the sight of these new things every Commander ought well bend his wits, to make some show whiles the battle is in trial, whereby to encourage his own, and dishearten the enemy, because among those accidents which may give thee the victory, this is the most effectual. Whereof we allege for testimony the example of Cneus Sulpitius the Roman dictator, who coming to fight a battle with the French, armed all the poor drudges and rascality of the Camp: and having mounted them upon Mules and poor Asses with arms and ensigns, to make them seem as if they were cavalry, he placed them behind a hill, and commanded that at a signal given, whiles he was in the hottest of the battle they should show themselves to the enemy, which thing so ordered and done, put the French men in such a fright that they lost they day. And therefore a good Commander ought to do two things; the one is, to try some of these inventions to startle the enemy: the other, to stand so prepared that the enemy offering any such to him, he may be able to discover and quite frustrate them, as did the Indian King to Semiramis; who seeing, that King had a great number of Elephants, to affright him, and make him think she had more herself than he, made a great many of them of Bulls and Bufaloes hides, and having put them upon Camels, sent them before: but that King finding out her deceit, turned it upon her not only vain but hurtful. Mammercus was sent Dictator against the Fidenates, who to affright the Roman Army, appointed that in the heat of the skirmish a good number of soldiers should sally forth of Fidenas with lights upon the top of their Lances, to the end that the Romans taken a while with the novelty of the matter, should fall into some disorder. Whereupon it is to be noted, that when such devices carry more truth than appearance with them, they may well be represented to the view of men, because that having in them a great deal of that which is lively and likely, their weakness cannot so quickly be discovered: but when they have more of fiction in them than of truth, it is better either not to use them, or using them to keep them off at such a distance that a full discovery of them cannot suddenly be made, as was that trick of the Muleteers Cn. Sulpitius practised: for when there is nothing but weakness within them, as they are approached, they are quickly seen through, and do thee wrong rather than give thee advantage, as those Elephants did to Semiramis, and the fires to the Fidenates; which however that at first they a little troubled the Army, yet when the dictator came up to them, and began to cry out, That they might be ashamed to fly from the smoke like Bees, but that they should rather turn back their slames upon them, saying, Bnrne out these people of Fidenas with fire, 
Suis flammis delete Fidenas, quas vestris beneficijs placare non potuistis.  whose rancorous spirits you could never assuage with all your courtesy. Thus that device of the Fidenates served them to no purpose, and so they lost the fight.   

CHAP. XV.  
That the command of an Army ought to be given in charge only to one; and where there are more, they always err.  
THe Fidenates having rebelld, and slain that Colony, which the Romans had sent to Fidenas, the Romans created four Tribune's with Consular power to exact satisfaction for this wrong done: whereof one being left for the safeguard of Rome, the rest were sent against the Fidenates, and the Vejentes, who because they were at variance one with another, brought back disgrace from the service, though no loss: of the disgrace they were the cause, but that they received no loss, the Soldiers valour was the cause. Whereupon the Romans seeing this disorder, had their recourse to the creation of a Dictator, to the end one alone should rectify again, what three had disordered. Whence we see the unprofitableness of many Commanders in one Army or Town, that is to defend itself: and T. Livius cannot more plainly express it, than in these words, here written; Three Tribune's with Consular power taught us how unprofitable 
Tres Tribuni potestate Consulari documento fuere, quam plurium imperium bello in utile esset: tendendo ad sua quisque consilia, cum alij aliud videretur, apperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti.  a thing it was, to have many Commanders in the war; for every one of them making several parties, and each one thinking his own best, gave opportunity to the enemy. And however that this is example sufficient to prove the disorder which a plurality of Commanders causes in the war, yet will I allege some other as well modern as ancient, for the better declaration of it. In the year 1500. after the reprisal of Milan by Lewes the twelfth of France, he sent his Army to Pisa, to restore it to the Florentines, whether John Baptista Ridolphi and Luke Antony of the Albizzi were sent Commissaries. And because john Baptista was a man of credit and years, Luke left the whole government in every thing unto him. And if he did not discover his ambition in opposing him, yet he manifested it by his silence, and neglecting and scorning every thing that was ordered, so that he nothing furthered the actions of the Camp neither in word nor in deed, as if he had been a man of no worth. But afterwards it appeared quite contrary, when upon an occasion following, john Baptista was fain to return to Florence; Luke being left alone showed his abilities, both by his courage, industry and counsel. All which things were in a manner quite lost in him, while he had a companion. I will anew produce in confirmation hereof T. Livius his words, who relating, how that Quintius and Agrippa his Colleague, being sent by the Romans against the Aequi, the whole disposing of the war was in Quintius his hands, and says: In the managing of weighty affairs, it is the safest 
Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est, summam Imperij apud unum esse.  way to commit the main charge to one. Which is clean contrary, to what is now adays practised by our Republics and Princes: who use to send into those places, that they may the better order them, more Commissaries, and more Commanders than one, which causes much confusion: and if the occasion were inquired after, why the Italian and French Armies are now adays ruined, we should find this had been the principal. And it may truly be concluded, that it is to more purpose to employ one man alone of but ordinary judgement in such an expedition, than two very able men together with equal commission.   

CHAP. XVI.  
In times of difficulty and peril true worth and virtue is sought after, and in calm and quiet times, not men's virtues, but their wealth, friends, and parentage prefer them.  
IT was always and ever will be, that great personages and the worthiest men, in peaceable times, are of small esteem: for because of envy, following the reputation which their virtue hath gained them, in such times there are many Citizens, that are ambitious, not only to be their equals, but superiors; and to this purpose there is a place in Thucydides the Greek Historian, which serves very fitly, where he shows that when the Athenian Republic came off victor in the Peloponnesian war, and had taken down the Spartans pride, and in a manner subjected all Greece, the Athenians conceited so highly of themselves, as that they designed the conquest of Sicily also. This enterprise came to be disputed in Athens: Alcibiades and some other Citizens persuaded it, as they that little caring for the public good, thought only upon the advancing their own particular reputations, each one of them having hopes to be sent Commander in the employment. But Nicias that was the principal among the best reputed of Athens, dissuaded it: and the greatest reason he alleged in persuading the people to give credit to his words, was this, because while he advised them thus that the war should nor proceed, he persuaded them to that which was not for his advantage; for while Athens was in peace, he knew, there were many Citizens would go before him; but in time of war he was sure none could go before, no nor come near him. We see therefore, that in Republics there is this disorder, in times of peace to make small account of able men, which thing enrages them two several ways, the one to see their own degrees fail them; the other to see unworthy men, and of smaller abilities than themselves, made their companions or rather their superiors: which disorder in Republics hath caused much destruction; for those Citizens who see themselves undeservedly despised, and know that quiet times are the occasion thereof, devise all the ways they can to disturb them, suggesting inducements to new wars in prejudice of the Commonwealth. And devising what might be the remedies hereof, we find two; the one to keep the Citizens always poor, to the end that riches without virtue should not be able to corrupt neither those nor others: the other to be always so ready for the war, as that they may be able continually to make war, & may have need always of well reputed Citizens, as Rome did in her first beginnings; for that City having always some Armies abroad, there was ever place left to men's virtues, nor could they bereave such a one of his dignity, that deserved it; or confer it upon another not deserving it; for in case that such a thing were done, some times upon mistake or for trial, there quickly ensued such a disorder thereupon and a danger, that all returned presently into the right way. But these other Commonwealths, that are not so ordered as she, and that then only make war when necessity constrains them, cannot free themselves of such an inconvenient, or rather they will always incur it, and there will ever some disorder be ready to arise, when that virtuous Citizen thus neglected is of a revengeful disposition, and hath in the City some good repute and correspondence; and from this the City of Rome kept herself free a good while. Yet she (after she had subdued Carthage and Antiochus, as we said otherwhere, being no more in doubt of the issue of her wars) thought she might give the Command of her Armies to whom she pleased, not so much regarding their virtues as their other qualities, ingratiating them with the people: for we see Paulus Emilius had several repulses in demanding the Consulate, before he was made Consul, till the Macedonian war chanced, which because it was thought dangerous, by general consent of the City was committed to him. In our City of Florence after the year 1494. many wars following, one upon the neck of the other, and all the Citizens of Florence having made unlucky trial of themselves, the City by chance lit upon one man who-shewed them the manner how their Armies were to be commanded, which was Antoni Giacomini: and whiles the wars in hand were perilous, the other Citizen's ambitions ceased; and in the election of Commissary or Commander of their Armies, he had no competitor stood with him. But when as any war was to be made where no hazard was, but a great deal of honour and dignity, he found always so many competitors, that they being to make election of there Commissaries to beleaguer Piza, he was left out of the number. And however it was not perceived evidently, that evil would befall the State, because Antony was not sent thither, yet may we easily conjecture, because the Pisans having no means for further defence or sustenance, had Antony been sent thither, they would before that have been so straightly beset, that they should have surrendered themselves to the Florentines directions. But they being besieged by Commanders that understood not how to begird, nor force them, were so long held in hand, that the City of Florence bought them, whereas they might have had them by force. It was likely that such a distaste with Antony might have done much, and he had need truly of much patience, and so good a disposition as not to desire revenge hereupon, either with the destruction of the City (if he were able) or with the wrong of any particular Citizen, where of a Republic ought to beware, as in the Chapter following we shall treat.   

CHAP. XVII.  
That he who hath received any notable disgrace or injury done him from a Prince or Commonwealth, should never after be entrusted by them with any employment or service of importance.  
A Commonwealth should be well advised, never to commit any weighty service to any one, to whom any notable injury hath been done. Claudius' Nero (who left his Army which he had lying in front against Hannibal, and with part thereof went into the Marches to find the other Consul, to combat Asdrubal, before he should join with Hannibal) had formerly in Spain been encamped against Asdrubal, and having shut him up in a place with his Army, so that Asdrubal, was either to fight at disadvantage, or perish by famine, was cunningly by Asdrubal so long held in hand with certain treaties of agreement, that he scaped him, and took from him the opportunity he had to suppress him. Which thing being known at Rome, got him great discredit as well with the Senate as the people, and he was spoken of very disgracefully throughout the City, to his great disreputation and despite thereat too: but being afterwards made Consul, and sent against Hannibal, took the course we have said, which was a very dangerous one, so that Rome was amazed and in tumults, till news arrived of Hasdrubals defeat, and Claudius being afterwards asked on what ground he undertook so dangerous a course, where without an extreme necessity he had hazarded the liberty of Rome, answered that he had done it, because if it proved lucky, he should recover the glory he had formerly lost in Spain: and if it failed him, and this course fell out cross, he knew he should be revenged of that City and those Citizens, who had unthankfully and undiscreetly wronged him. And when these passions, arising from such offences, are of such force in a Citizen of Rome, and in those days before corruption was crept into Rome, we may well guess how powerful they are in a Citizen of such a City that is not so regulated nor ordered as she then was: and because to such like disorders which grow up in Commonwealths, no certain remedy can be assigned, there follows an impossibility to frame a perpetual Commonwealth for by many unexpected ways desiruction breaks in upon it.   

CHAP. XVIII.  
There is nothing more worthy of a Commander, than to be able to discover before ha●d, and espy out the enemy's practices.  
EPaminondas the Theban said, that nothing was more advantageous or useful to a Commander, than to know the enemy's designs and purposes; and because it is hard to attain to that knowledge. ●he deserves the greater commendations, who takes such a course that he ghesses it out. And it is not so hard to discover the enemy's purposes as some times to understand his actions, and not so much his actions, which by him are done a far off, as those present and near hand: for it hath many times chanced, that a fight having continued till night, he hath vanquished that thinks he hath lo●, and he lost that thought he had overcome; which error hath caused some to take resolutions clean contrary to their own good, as it befell Brutus and Cassius, who upon this mistake lost their war; for Brutus having overcome on his wing, Cassius believed he had lost, that the whole Army was broken, and upon this error despairing of his own safety, slew himself. In our days in the battle at Saint Cecily in Lombardy that Francis the King of France sought with the Swissers, the night overtaking them, that part of the Swissers, which remained entire, thought they had got the victory, knowing nothing of those that had been broken and slain. Which error was the occasion that they themselves escaped not, staying to fight again on the morning much at their disadvantage: such like error also caused to mistake, and well near ruined thereby the Popes & the Spanish Army, which upon this false advice of victory passed the Po, and had it gone never so little on for warder, had been prisoner to the French, who were the Conquerors. The like error to this happened in the Romans Camp, and in that also of the Equi, where Sempronius the Consul was with the Army to encounter the enemy, and the battle being joined, the combat lasted while night with variable fortune on the one and the other side: and night being come, each Army being half broken, neither of them returned to their quarters, but both of them chose rather to withdraw themselves unto the adjoining hills, where they thought they might been more secure, and the Roman Army divided itself into two parts, whereof the one went with the Consul, the other with one Tempanius a Centurion, whose valour that day kept the Roman Army from being wholly routed; the morning being come, the Roman Consul, without hearing further of the enemy, retired towards Rome, and the like did the Equys Army, because each of these thought the enemy had been victor, and therefore they each withdrew themselves, without any regard that they left their Camps in prey to the Enemy. It fell out that Tempanius who was there with the remainder of the Roman Army, retiring too, learned by certain wounded soldiers of the Equi, that their Captains were gone and had abandoned their quarters, upon which news he went into the Roman quarters and saved them, but sacked those of the Equi, and so returned victorious to Rome: which victory (as we see) consists only in, who hath notice of the enemy's disorder. Where we should consider, that it may often come to pass, that the two Armies which are in front one against another, may be both in the like disorder, and suffer the same wants, and that after remains vanquisher that first comes to knowledge of the others necessities. And hereof I will give a domestic and modern example. In the year one thousand four-hundred ninty eight, when the Florentines had a great Army about Pisa, and beleaguered the Town very strongly, whereof the Venetians having undetaken the protection, and notseeing any otherway to save it, resolved to divert the war, by assailing the territories of Florence on the other side; wherefore with a strong Army they entered by the valley of Lamona, and seized upon the Village of Marradi, and besieged the Fortress of Castiglione which is upon the hill above: Which the Florentines perceiving, resolved to succour Marradi, and yet not lessen their forces which they had about Pisa; so that having levied new foot, and appointed new horse, they sent them that way, whose Commanders were Jacobus Quartus of Appian, Lord of Piombin, and Count Rinuccius of Marcian. These then being come to the hills above Marradi, the enemies lest beleaguering Marradi, and betook themselves to the Village; where these two Armies being infront one against the other for some days, both suffered much for the scarcity of provisions. and other necessaries; and neither daring to set upon the other, nor either knowing the others wants, both at once resolved over night to raise their Camps the morning following, and retire, the Venetian toward Berzighella and Faenza, the other toward Casaglia and Mugello. the morning then come, and each Camp having begun to send away their carriages, by chance a woman parted from the Bourg of Marradi, and came towards the Florentine Camp, being secure enough from wrong, because of her old age, and poverty, desirous belike to see some of her friends in that Camp, by whom the Florentine Captains understanding of the Venetian Camps departure, upon this news grew a little more courageous, and having changed their purpose, as if they had dislodged their enemies, went out, and took their quarters, and writ to Florence, they had repulsed and vanquished them. Which victory proceeded from nothing else, than from having first had notice of their enemy's departure: which notice had it been given on the other side, would have wrought the same effect against ours.   

CHAP. XIX.  
Whether in the government of a multitude, mildness or severity be of greater avail.  
THe Commonwealth of Rome was in a combustion, because of the differences between the Nobles and the Commons: nevertheless as occasion of wars was offered them, they sent forth with their Armies Quintius and Appius Claudius: Appius because he was cruel and rough in commanding, was ill obeyed by those that followed him, so that almost quite broken he fled from his charge. Quintius by using a mild and gentle behaviour towards his soldiers, found them very obedient, and returned with victory. Whereupon it seems, that to govern a multitude, it is better to be courteous then insolent, compassionate rather than cruel. Notwithstanding Cornelius Tacitus with whom many other writers agree, in a saying of his, concludes the contrary, where he says, To rule a multitude, severity is of more force than mildness. And 
In multitudine regenda, plus paena quam obsequium valet.  devising with myself how each of these opinions may be made good, I say either thou art to govern men that ordinarily are thy companions, or that are always in subjection to thee. When they are thy companions, severity or rigour cannot fully be used against them according as Cornelius argues: and because the common people of Rome had equal power in the Roman government with the Nobility, he that became Prince among them for a time, could not rule them with roughness and rigour. And many time it was evident, that the Roman Commanders did more good that got the good wills of their soldiers, and held but a gentle hand over them, than those that by rough handling kept them in a slavish awe of them, unless they were accompanied with extraordinary endowments, as was Manlius Tarquatus. But he that commands over subjects (whereof Cornelius discourses) to the end they grow not insolent, and by reason of thy two great mildness tread thee not under foot, ought rather betake himself to rigour then gentleness. But this a so is not to exceed moderation, for fear of incurring hatred: for it never turns to any Prince's advantage to gain the people's hate. The way to avoid it is, to lay no hands on the subject's estates: for of blood (when rapine is not the covert cause there) no Prince is thirsty, unless forced thereto, which seldom he is: but where rapine is mixed, this necessity comes always upon them, nor ever want they occasion, nor desire to shed blood, as in another treaty to this purpose is discoursed at large. Quintius was more praise worthy than Appius; and yet the saying of Cornelius limited as it ought to be, but not in the case observed by Appius, deserves approbation. And because we have spoken of severity and mildness, methinks it is not more than needs to show, how one action of humanity was of more force with the Falisci, than many violent acts of hostility.   

CHAP. XX.  
One example of humanity prevailed more with the Falisci, than all the force of Rome could.  
CAmillus with the Army being set down before the Faliscies' Town, and besieging it, a Pedagogue that taught the children of the chiefest men of the City, thinking to gratify Camillus and the people of Rome, under colour of exercise going forth with them out of the Town, brought them all into the Camp before Camillus: where having presented them he said, that by means of them the Town would forth with be delivered into his hands. Which present was not only not accepted by ●amillus, but having caused the Pedagogue to be stripped, and his hands bound behind him, and given to each one of those children a rod in his hand, caused him to be whipped back again by them with many stripes into the Town. Which when they of the Town understood, Camillus his humanity and integrity so much pleased them, that not desiring longer to defend themselves, they resolved to render up the Town to him. Where it is to be considered by this true example, how much more a courteous and charitable act works in men's minds then any one full of cruelty and violence; and how that many times those countries and cities; that no weapons, nor warlike instruments, nor any other force of man hath been able to open, one action of humanity, piety, chastity, or liberality hath laid wide open. Whereof in stories (besides this) we have many other examples. And we all see that the Romans by war were not of power to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy; and yet Fabritius his Frankeness sent him out, when he discovered to him the offer which a familiar friend of his had made the Romans to poison him. We see also, that the conquest of new Carthage got not Scipio Affricanus so much credit in Spain, as the example he gave of his chastity, when he restored a young woman he took, which was exceeding beautiful, untoucheed by him to her husband. The fame of which action got him friendship throughout all Spain. We see moreover how much these virtues are by the people wished for in great men, and how much commended by writers, both by those that set forth Princes lives, and those also that give instructions how they ought to live. Among whom Zenophon takes much painesin showing what honours, how great conquests, and how exceeding good reputation Cyrus gained by his humanity and affability, and by abstaining from all actions of pride, cruelty, luxury, and other vices, which blemish men lives. Yet notwithstanding, seeing Hannibal by courses contrary to these, gained great fame, and great victories, I purpose to discourse thereupon in the Chapter following, from whence this proceeded.   

CHAP. XXI.  
From whence it came, that Hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of Scipios, wrought the same effects in Italy, which the other did in Spain.  
I Think, that some men could well marvel, seeing certain Commanders (notwithstanding that they have led a contrary course of life) bring to effect the like things, which they have done that lived in the manner above written: so that it appears, that the cause of these victories depends not upon the aforesaid reasons; and it seems that those ways gain thee neither more force nor better fortune, being that glory and reputation may be gotten by contrary courses. And not to part from the men I have above written of, and the better to clear what I propounded, I say, as we see Scipio enter into Spain, and by his humanity and mildness gain the friendship of that whole country, and for them be adored and admired of those nations: on the contrary side we see Hannibal enter into Italy, using all contrary ways, which is, by violence, cruelty and rapine, and all manner of infidelity, work the same effect that Scipio did in Spain: for to Hannibal all the Towns in Italy rebelled, and all the people ran after him. And considering whence this may arise, we see therein many reasous: the first is, that men are desirous of new matters, insomuch as very often times as well they that live at case, as they who do not, desire novelty: for (as we said otherwhere, and it is true) men are as well glutted with good, as afflicted and vexed with evil. This desire therefore opens the gates wide to every one, that in any Country makes himself the chief of any innovation. And be he a stranger, they run after him; if of the Country, they come all about him, they strengthen and favour him, so that in what sort soever it be he proceeds, he comes to advance exceedingly in those places. Besides this, men are thrust forward by two principal things, either by love or fear, so that he as well commands them that makes himself beloved, as he that causes himself to be feared; and most commonly he is more followed and obeyed that makes himself be feared, than he that makes himself beloved. Therefore it little imports a Commander by which of these ways he goes, provided that he be a Worthy man, and that worth causes him to be of great repute among men: for when that worth is great as it was in Hannibal and Scipio, it cancels all the errors they commit, either by the great love they bear them, or the great fear they stand in of them. For from the one and the other of these two ways great inconveniences may arise, of force to ruin a Prince: for he that desires to be too much beloved, any little that he swerves from the true way, becomes contemptible. And that other who would be too much feared, when he a little exceeds the mean, grows odious; and to keep the middle way it is not possible: for our nature will not comport it. But it is necessary to allay these things, that exceed, with an extraordinary worth, as Ha nibal and Scpio both did: yet it appeared that the one and the other of them were endamaged by their manner of life, for which they were esteemed and valued. The valuation of both of them we have already spoke of: the damage as for Scipio, was that his own Soldiers in Spain together with some of his friends mutined against him, which proceeded from nothing else than because they feared him not: for men are so unsettled that upon the least overture made to their ambition, they forth with forget all the good will they owe their Prince for his mildness and courtesy, as did the aforesaid Soldiers and friends, in so much as Scipio, to remedy this inconvenient, was constrained to practise that cruelty in some part, which he had abhorred. As for Hannibal, we have no particular example, where the cruelty he used, or his small faith did him any harm. But we may well conceive, that Naples and many other Towns that continued in obedience to the Romans, did it for fear thereof. This we see plainly, that his wicked manner of living, made him more odious to the people of Rome, than any other enemy that Commonwealth ever had: so that, whereas to Pyrrhus (while he was with his Army in Italy) they discovered the party that intended to poison him, they never forgave it Hannibal (though disarmed and banished) till they had made an end of him. These incommodities then accrued to Hannibal for being held impious, a breaker of his faith, and cruel: but on the other side, he thereby got one very great advantage, which is much admired by all Writers, that in his army (though composed of several Nations) there never arose any mutiny, neither among themselves, nor against him. Which we caunot derive from any other cause than from the terror that grew from his person, which was so great, mixed with the reputation he gave of his valour, that it kept his Soldiers in quietness and concord. I conclude then, that it imports not much, in which of these two ways a Commander proceeds, provided he hath so great worth in him, as may well season the one and the other manner of living: for (as it is said) both in the one and the other there is defect and danger, when it is not corrected by some extraordinary endowments. And if Hannibal and Scipio, the one by commendable means, and the other by detestable courses, wrought the same effect, me thinks I should not forbear to discourse also of two Roman Citizens, who by several ways, but both honourable, attained one and the same glory.   

CHAP, XXII.  
How Manlius Torquatus his rigour, and Valereus Corvinus his mildness, gained each of them the same glory.  
AT the same time there were in Rome two famous Captains, Monlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus: who both of equal virtue, had a like triumphed, and lived in equal credit & reputation in Rome; & each of them (touching the enemy) had with equal valour gained it; but as for the Armies, and treating of their Soldiers, they proceeded exceeding differently: for Manlius with all kind of severity commanded them, without intermitting his Soldiers pains or punishments. Valerius on the other part in all kinds and terms of courtesy treated them with a familiar way of affability; for it appears, that the one to keep his Soldiers in obedience put his own son to death, and the other never hurt any. Yet in such a difference of proceeding, each produced the same fruit, as well to the enemy's loss, as the Commonwealths profit, and his own particular; for never any Soldier refused the fight or mutinied against them, or in any part disagreed from their wills, however that Manlius his commands were so rigorous, that all other kinds of commands, which exceeded measure in everity, were termed Manlian commands. Where we are first to consider, whence it was that Manlius was constrained to proceed so rigidly: the next is, what was the cause that these two different ways brought forth the same effect: and in the last place, which is the better of the two, and more profitable to imitate. If any man consider well Manlius his disposition, from the time that T. Livius begins to make mention of him, he shall find him, a very valiant man, religiously loving his Father and his Country, and exceedingly reverencing his Superiors. These things we gather from the slaughter of the Frenchmen, from the defence of his Father against the Tribune, and in that before he went to fight with the Frenchmen, he went to the Consul, with these words, Without thy allowance, 
Injussu tuo adversus hastem nunquam pugnabo, non si certam victoriam videam.  I will never fight with the enemy; no though I were assured of victory. When a man then so disposed attains to such dignity as to command, he desires to find all other men like himself, and his strong courage moves him to command strong and stout things: and the same (when once they are commanded) will likewise that they be observed; and the rule is most certain, that when rigid and hard things are commanded, it is fit with rigour to see them observed; otherwise wouldst thou find thyself much deciv'd. Where it is to be noted that if a man will be obeyed, it is necessary he know how to command; and they know how to command, that make a comparison between their own quality, and theirs that are to obey; and when they see a proportion, then let them command; but when a disproportion, let them forbear. And therefore a wise man said, that to hold a Commonwealth by violence and force, it was needful there were a proportion between the person forcing, and the party forced: and whenever that proportion was, there it was credible that that violence would last: but when the party forced was of more force than the person forcing, it might be doubted that violence would every day fail. But returning to our discourse. I say, that to command stout and strong things it is necessary to be stout too: and he that is of this stoutness, and commands such things, can never by mildness cause them to be observed: but he that hath not this strength of courage, ought beware of these extraordinary commands, and in those ordinary he may well use his own humanity: for ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince, but to the laws and customs. We ought then to be-believe, that Manlius was forced to proceed so roughly, by his own extraordinary commands, whereunto his own nature was inclinable, which are very useful in a Commonwealth, because they reduce the orders thereof to their originals and ancient vigour. And if a Republic were so fortunate, that she often had (as we have formerly said) some one by his example to renew and revive the Laws, and not retain them only from running to ruin, but draw them quite back to their beginnings, she might be perpetual. So that Manlius was one of those, who by the rigour of his commands maintained the military discipline in Rome, drawn thereunto first by his own nature, afterwards from a desire which he had that that should be observed, which his natural inclination had made him ordain. On the other side Valerius might as he pleased proceed with courtesy, as he, whom it sufficed, that the accustomed orders were observed in the Roman Armies: which custom (because it was good) was enough to honour him, and yet not painful to observe; nor did it force Valerius to punish the offenders, as well because it may be there were none, as for that if there had been any, they imputed (as it is said) their punishments to the wont orders and customs, and not to the Prince's cruelty. So that Valerius had power to cause all humanity and mildness to fl●w from himself, whereby he might easily gain his soldiers good wills. Whereupon it came to pass that the one or the other having the same obedience, were able, though proceeding diversely, to work the same effect. They that would follow these, may chance to fall into those vices of contempt and hatred, as I said in my discourse before of Hanaibal and Scipio, which is avoided by an excessive worth in thee, and not otherwise. It remains now that we consider which of these ways of proceeding is the more commendable: which I take to be a matter disputable, because as well the one as other is much praised by writers. Yet they that write how a Prince should rule his subjects, come nearer to Valerius then Manlius. And Xenophon, alleged formerly by me, giving many examples of Cyrus his humanity, accords much with that which T. Livius says of Valerius: for being made Consul against the Samnites, & the day come he was to fight, he spoke to his soldiers with that affability and familiarity, with which he used to behave himself towards them and after such speaking, T. Livius says these words; There was never any Captain more familiar with his soldiers, among the meanest of 
Non alius militi familiatior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia baud gravatè munia obeun do; in ludo praeterea militari cum velocitatis, viriumque inter se aequales certamina incunt; comiter facilis vincere, ac vinci vultu eodem, nec quenquam aspernari parem qui se offerret; factis benignus; pro redactis, haudminus libertatis alienae, quam suae dignitatis memor; & quo nihil popularius est, quibus artibus petierat magistratus, iisdem gerebat.  them, freely undergoing all services: besides in military exercises, whereas the soldiers use to contend with their equals either in swiftness or strength, he himself without change of countenance as graciously and easily lost as won, nor scorned he any one that offered himself to match him; liberal he was, and affable, no less mindful of other men's liberties then of his own dignity; and which is the greatest point of popularity, the same course he took to attain to his magistracy, the same he followed in executing it. In like manner T. Livius speaks honourably of Manlius, showing that his severity in putting his son to death, made the Army so obedient to the Consul, that it was a cause the Romans gained the victory of the Latins: and he proceeds so far in commending him, that after this victory, having set down all the order of the battle, and showed all the dangers which the people of Rome ran, and the difficulties there were to overcome, he concludes thus, that only Manlius his valour gave the Romans that victory. And comparing the forces of the two Armies together, affirms, that that side would have overcome, which soever had had Manlius for their Consul. So that considering all that writers speak hereof, it would be hard to give a good judgement hereupon. Nevertheless, not to leave this part undecided, I say, that in a Citizen living under the laws of a Republic, it is more laudable and less dangerous to proceed as Manlius did; for that way is wholly in favour of the public, and no whit regards private ambition; for by such a course a man cannot gain any partisans, showing himself rigid to every one, favouring only the common good: for no man behaving himself thus, can get any particular friends, which we term (as it was said before) Partisan. In so much that a like manner of proceeding cannot be more profitable nor more approved in a Republic: the public advantage nothing failing in it, and being impossible to give thereby any jealousy of private ambition. But in the course Valerius took it is contrary; for, however that in regard of the public, the same effects are produced, yet there arise many doubts, by reason of the particular good will, which this man gains of his soldiers, which in a long continuance of government might much wrong the common liberty. And if in public there grew no mischief hereupon, the reason was, because the Romans minds as yet were not corrupted, nor he long continued in his command. But if we are to consider a Prince as Xenophon does, we must wholly take to Valerius, and leave Manlius: for a Prince ought in his soldiers and subjects aim at love and obedience: that he maintains the old orders, and is esteemed virtuous, will yield him obedience: and love his affability, humanity, his pity and those other endowments Valerius had, which Xenophon also writes were in Cyrus: for to be a Prince well-willed in particular, and to have his whole Army as particularly affected to him, agrees well with all other parts of his state. But in a Citizen, having an Army so to take part with him, this part agrees not with the rest, which are to oblige him to live under the Laws, and obey the Magistrates. We read among the ancient stories of the Venetian Republic, how that the Galleys of Venice being returned home, and a difference arising between them of the Galleys and the people, whereby an uprear and tumult was raised, nor could the matter be quieted by force of officers, reverence of Citizens, nor fear of the principal Magistrates, of a sudden when Peter Loredanus showed himself to those Mariners, who the year before had been their Commander, for love of him they departed and left the fight. Which obedience. begot such a suspicion in the Senate, that a little while after the Venerians either by im●prisonment or death assured themselves o, him. I conclude therefore that Valerius his manner of proceeding is profitable in a Prince, and hurtful in a Citizen, not only to his country, but to himself: to his country, because those courses prepare a way to tyranny: to himself; for when his country is suspicious of his proceedings, it is constrained to make sure of him with his damage. So on the contrary I affirm that Manlins his proceeding in a Prince is hurtful, and in a citizen profitable, and especially to the country, and also seldom offends, if now this hatred which thy severity draws after it, be not increased by suspicion which by means of thy great reputation thy other virtues charge thee with, as by and by shall be discoursed touching Camillus.   

CHAP. XXIII.  
For what cause Camillus was banished from Rome.  
WE have formerly concluded that by proceeding as Valerius did, a man hurts both his country and himself. And by proceeding as Manlius did, a man advantages his country, and sometimes hurts himself. Which is sufficiently proved by the example of Camillus, who in his manner of proceeding came nearer to Manlius then Valerius. Whereupon Titus Livius speaking of him, says, His virtue the soldiers 
Eius virtutem milites oderant, & mirabantur.  hated, and yet admired. That which caused the admiration of him, was his carefulness, his wisdom, the magnanimity of his spirit, and the good order in employing and commanding his Armies. That which got him hatred, was, that he was more fevere in chastising then liberal in rewarding them. And Titus Livius alleges these occasions of this hatred. The first was, that the moneys which were made of the sale of the Veientes goods, he brought all into the treasury, and divided not together with the spoil among the soldiers. The second, that in his triumph he made his triumphal Chariot be drawn with four white horses, where they said that in his pride he strove to equal the Sun. The third, that he made a vow to give Apollo the tenth part of the prey taken from the Veientes, which (he desiring to pay his vow) was to be taken out of the soldiers hands, who already had got possession of it. Where those things are very easily marked, that make a Prince odious with his people. Of which the principal is, to bereave them of any profit, which is a matter of much importance: for the things that carry any profit with them, when a man is deprived thereof, he never forgets, and every little necessity puts thee in mind of them; and because necessities haunt us every day, thou remember'st these things every day: the other thing is to appear lofty and puffed up with pride, than which nothing is more odious to the people, especially those that enjoy their liberty. And however that from that pride and stateliness of theirs the people receive no hur●●ye do they always hare them that use it: whereof a Prince ought to beware, as of a rock; for to procure hatred without advantage, is but a rash and foolish course.   

CHAP. XXIV.  
The continuation of governments brought Rome into thraldom.  
IF we consider well the proceedings of the Roman Republic, we shall see that two things were the cause of that Republikes dissolution: the one was contentions which grew upon the Agrarian law; the other was the continuation of governments. Which things had they been well seen into in the beginning, and due remedies applied thereto, their free state would have lasted longer, and probably have been less turbulent. And however, that as for the prolonging of any charge we see not that in Rome any tumult was raised, yet in effect we see how much that authority hurt the City, which the Citizens took upon them by such decrees. And if the other Citizens, whose magistracies were prorogued, had been wise and virtuous, as L. Quintius, this inconvenient would never have fallen out, whose goodness in one example is remarkable: for there being an agreement made between the Commons and the Senate, and the Commons having prolonged the Tribunes charges for one year, judging them able to resist the Nobilities ambition, the Senate would for strife sake, with the Commons, and not to seem of less power than they, prologue T. Quintius his Consulship: who absolutely denied this determination of theirs, saying, that they should endeavour to blot out and cancel evil examples, rather than increase their number with another evil one; and so would needs have them make new Consuls. Which goodness and wisdom had it been in all the Cities of Rome, it would never have suffered the introducing of that custom, to prolong magistracies: and from thence they would not have proceeded to the continuation of Commands over Armies, which thing at length ruined that Republic. The first who had his command continued to him, was P. Philo, who being encamped before the City of Palepolis, and his Consulship coming to an end, the Senate thinking he had need upon gotten the victory, sent him no successor, but made him Proconsul, so that he was the first Proconsul. Which thing (though propounded by the Senate for the public good) was that which in time brought Rome into bondage: for the further abroad the Romans went with their Armies, the more thought they such prorogation necessary; and the more they used it; which thing produced two inconveniences; the one that a smaller number of men were employed and practised in commands: and by this the reputation hereof came to be restrained to a few: the other was, that one Citizen continuing long time commander of an Army, got it to himself, and made it of his own faction. For that Army in time forgot the Senate, and took him only for their head. Hereby it came that Sylla and Marius could find soldiers that would take their parts against the Public. By these means could Caesar make himself Lord of his native country. Yet if the Romans had not prolonged these magistracies and commands, they had never so quickly attained so great power: and had their conquests been more slow, they would not so soon have fallen into servitude.   

CHAP. XXV.  
Of Cincinnatus and many other Roman Citizens poverties.  
WE have otherwhere discoursed, that the most profitable ordinance that can be made in a free State, is, that the Citizens be kept bare and poor. And however in Rome it appears not what order that was which wrought this effect (especially considering the Agrarian law had such opposition) never theless it was seen by experience, that four hundred years after Rome was built, there was very great poverty: nor is it credible, that other greater order produced this effect, than to see, that poverty was no bar to any preferment whatsoever, or any honour, and that they went to find out virtue in what cottage soever she dwelled. Which manner of living made people less covet wealth. This appears plain, because when Minutius the Consul besieged with his Army by the Equi, Rome was exceedingly afraid, lest that Army should be lost, so that they created a Dictator, being the last recourse they had in their difficulties, and this was L. Quintius Cincinnatus, who at that time was in his little Country farm, which he then manured with his own hands. 
Operae pretium est audire qui iomnia bumana prae divitiis spernunt, re●ue honori magno locum, neque virtuti putant esse, nisi effusae affluant opes.  Which thing is celebrated by T. Livius in golden words, saying: It is worth the while, to bear them talk, that value nothing in regard of wealth: nor think they a man can have access either unto honours or virtue, but where riches flow abundantly. Cincinnatus was then at plough in his Country Village, which exceeded not the quantity of four acres of ground, when from Rome Deputies were sent him by the Senate to let him know the election of his Dictatourship, and to show him in what danger the Commonwealth than was. He then having taken to him his gown, came to Rome, and levied an Army, and went thence and delivered Minutius; and having broken and despolyed the enemies, and set him free, would not permit that the besieged Army should partake of the prey, saying these words, I will not allow thou shouldst partake of th●● prey, whose prey thou wert to have been: And deprived Minutius of the Consulship, and made him Lieutenant, telling him, Thou shalt stay at this degree, till thou knowest how to be Consul. He had made L. Tarqvinius General of his horse, who out of mere poverty served afoot. It is observable (as is said) what honour they did unto poverty, and how that to a good and worthy man four acres of land were sufficient to maintain him. Which poverty we see that it was also in the days of Marcus Regulus: for being with the Armies in Africa, he asked the Senate leave, he might turn to his Country farm, which was spoilt by his husbandmen. Where we see two very notable things, thè one the poverty, and how they were conten●cd therewith, and how it sufficed these Citizens to gain honour from the wars, & the profits thereof they left to the public: for if they had purposed to grow rich by the wars, it would little have troubled them, that their fields were spoilt. The other is to consider the generous rage of those Citizens, who when they were made Commanders of an Army, exceeded any Prince in magnanimity of spirit, they valued neither Kings nor Commonwealths, nothing affrighted or terrified them; and afterwards when they were returned to live private men, became parsimonious, humble, and men that themselves husbanded and took pains in manuting their own small possessions, obedient to the Magistrates, reverencing their superiors, so that it seems impossible that the same mind could endure such change. This poverty continued yet till the days of Paulus Emilius, which were in a manner the last happy days of that Republic, where a Citizen who by his triumph enriched Rome, notwithstanding kept himself very poor. And moreover, so much was poverty in esteem, that Paulus for reward of behaving himself bravely in the war, gave a silver cup to a son-in-law of his; which was the first piece of Plate he ever had in his house. It were easy with a long discourse to show, how much better fruits poverty produces than riches; and that the one hath honoured Cities, Countries, and Religions; and the other hath been the destruction thereof, had not this subject been handled several times by other writers.   

CHAP. XXVI.  
How that upon the occasion of women, States have been ruined.  
THere fell out in the City of Ardea between the Nobles and the Commons a debate by reason of an alliance: where a young woman that was an heir being as yet to marry, one of the Commons and one of the Nobles wooed her at the same time, and she having no Father alive, her Tutors desired to bestow her on the Plebeian, and her Mother on the Nobleman: whereupon such a tumult was raised, that they came to blows, where the Nobility was in arms in favour of the Nobleman, and the Commons in favour of the Plebeian, so that the Commons having the worse, went out of Ardea, and sent for aid to the Volsci, and the Nobles sent to Rome. The Volsci were there first, and as soon as they arrived they sat down before Ardea. The Romans came afterwards upon them, and enclosed the Volsci between the Town and them, so that they forced them (brought to it by famine) to yield to their discretion. And the Romans entering into Ardea, and putting to death the principals of the sedition, accorded all the matters of that City. In this text are many things to be observed. First we see, that women have been the occasions of many destructions, and have brought great mischiefs upon the Governors of Cities, and have caused many dissensions in them. And (as it hath been already seen in this our Story) that excess committed against Lucretia lost the Tarquins their State. That other act against Virginia deprived the ten of their power. And Aristotle among the principal occasions he shows of Tyrant's destructions, reckons the injuries they did some others for their women in deflowering and ravishing them, or defiling their marriage beds; as touching this part, in the Chapter where we treated of Conspiracies, we spoke at large. I say then, that absolute Princes, and Governors of Commonwealths are to take no smaller care hereof, but aught well consider the disorders, which may grow upon such an accident, and remedy it in time, so that the remedy be neither with the hurt, nor disgrace of their state, or Commonwealth, as it befell the Ardeates, who for having suffered that difference to increase among Citizens, came to take part with their several tactions: and when they would have reunited themselves, were forced to send for foreign aids, which is the beginning of a servitude at hand. But let us come to the other remarkable thing of the manner of reuniting Cities, whereof in the Chapter following we mean to treat.   

CHAP. XXVII.  
How a City at discord in itself is to be united; and how that opinion is not true, that to maintain Cities in obedience, it is necessary to keep them in discord, and divided into factions.  
BY the example of the Roman Consuls, who made a reconciliation among the Ardeates, the way is showed how, matters are to be composed in a City at variance; which is no other, nor can otherways be held, then by putting to death the chief ringleaders of seditions: for of necessity one of these three ways is to be goneeither to put them to death, as they did, or remove them out of the City, or cause them to make peace one with another, with assurance given not to wrong either the other. Of these three ways this last is the most pernicious, less certain, and most unprofitable: for it is impossible, where much blood hath been shed, and other like outrages, that a peace made by force should continue, looking one another in the face every day: and it is very hard for them to forbear injuring one another, being there may every day be given amongst them by reason of their daily conversation new occasions of quarrels. Whereupon a better example cannot be alleged then the City of Pistoya. That City was divided (as still it is) fifteen years ago, into the Panciatichi, and the Cancellieri: but then were they in arms, now they have laid them aside. And after many brabbles among them, they came at length to the shedding of blood, to demolishing of houses, and pillaging of goods, and to all other terms of hostility. And the Florentines that were to reconcile them, always took that third course: and thereupon always arose greater tumults and greater scandals: So that weary hereof, they came to take that secoud course, to remove the heads of the factions, some of which they put in prison, others they confined in several places: in so much as the agreement was able to continue, and so hath done till this present day; but without doubt the safest way had been the first. But because such like executions have some thing in them of greatness of spirit and magnanimity, a feeble Republic knows not how to put them in practice, but is so far there from, that hardly arrives she to use the second remedy. And these are some of those errors, of which I spoke in the beginning, that the Princes of our times commit, being to give their judgements in matters of weight: for they should have a mind to see, how they have carried themselves, who of old have delivered their opinions in like cases. But the weakness of men now a days, caused by their weak education, and their little knowledge of things makes them esteem those opinions of the ancients partly in human, partly impossible. Whereas they have certain of their modern opinions, quite contrary to the truth, as is that, where the wise man of our City a while ago said, it was needful to hold Pistoia by factions; and Pisa with Citadels: nor perceive they how unprofitable the one and the other of these things is. I will pass over the Citadels, because formerly we spoke of them at large, & now discourse of the incommodity that arises from holding the Towns thou hast under thy government, divided into factions. And touching the former, it is impossible thou canst maintain both those ancient factions, Prince or Republic thou art that governst them: for by nature men are inclined to take part in any thing that is divided, and to be pleased more with this than with that; so that the having a faction in that Town discontented with thee, is a cause that the first war that comes, thou losest it: for it is impossible to guard a City, that hath enemies without dors, & within doors. If it be a Republic that governs this City, there is no readier way to make thy Subjects become nought, and to set thy City at variance, than by having in thy dominions a Town thus at odds; for each faction seeks favour, and each part strives to gain friends by all manner of corruption, so that two very great inconveniences arise thereupon: the one is, that thou canst never make them thy friends, because thou canst not well govern them, the rule ofttimes varying, sometimes with the one humour, sometimes with the other: the other is, that that favouring of sides must needs divide thy Republic. And Blondus speaking of the Florentines, and the Pistoyeses, tells us certainly, that while the Florentines thought to reconcile those of Pistoya, they divided themselves. Whereupon we may easily perceive the evil which grows upon this division. In the year 1501. when Aretium was lost, and the whole vale of Tiber, and that of Chiana was taken by the Vitelli and the Duke Valentine, there came a Gentleman called the Lant, sent by the King of France, to cause a restitution of all those Towns lost to the Florentines again: and this de Lant finding in every one of those Fortresses men, who when they came to visit him, told him they were of the faction of Marzocco, he much blamed their division, saying that if in France one of the King's Subjects should say he were of the King's party, he would be punished: because such a speech could signify no less, than that there in the Country were people enemies to the King, whereas that King will that all those Towns be his friends, united in themselves, and without factions. But all these ways, & opinions disserting from the truth, arise from the weakness of those that are Princes, who seeing they are not able to hold their States by force and valour, betake themselves to such like devices, which sometimes when things are in quietness help somewhat; but if they come to any distress, and that they have wars, they quickly show them what little trust thereiss to be had in them.   

CHAP. XXVIII.  
That the Citizens actions ought to be well weighed: for many times under virtuous and charitable deeds are laid the foundations of a Tyranny.  
THe City of Rome being much oppressed by famine, and the public provisions unsufficient to ease it, one Spurius Melius had a mind, being very rich in those times, out of his private estate to make provision of Gorn, and feed the common people to their content. Whereupon the people flocked so thick about him in favour of him, that the Senate perceiving the inconvenient that grew upon this his liberality, to suppress it before it took better hold, created a dictator, and set him on his back, who put him to death. Here is to be noted, that many times those works which seem to be done upon charity and piety, and no way with reason to be condemned, prove very pernicious and dangerous, when they are not looked to in good time. And to argue this matter more particularly, I say that a Republic cannot subsist, nor in, any case be well governed without Citizens of good credit and reputation. On the other side the Citizen's reputation, is the occasion of Tyranny in a Commonwealth. And if we will regulate this matter, it must so be ordered, that the Citizens stand upon such manner of reputation, as may advantage and not endamage the City, nor the liberty thereof. And therefore the means are to be examined, whereby they gain reputation, which in effect are two, either public or private. The public means are, when one by advising well, and doing better for the public benefit, gains reputation. To this honour the way should be set open to the Citizens, and rewards given, as well for good advices, as good actions, so that they are therefore both to be honoured and satisfied: for when these reputations are gotten by these plain and honest courses, they will never prove dangerous. But when they are gained by particular ways (which is the other means by us alleged before) they are very dangerous and hurtful. The private ways are the benefiting this and that other particular, lending moneys, matching with their daughters, protecting them against the magistrates, and doing them such other like favours, which make men become factions, and encourage him that is thus favoured by them, to think he may be able to corrupt the public, & violate the laws. Therefore ought a Republic that is well ordered, give easy access to those that seek favour by public means, but bar out those that work by their own private by ways, as Rome did, we see. For in reward of him that did the public good service, she ordained their triumphs and all those other honours, which she bestowed on her Citizens: and to punish those, who under divers colours aspired to greatness by private ways, she appointed the public accusations: and when these would not serve, because the people was blinded with the show of a false good, she created a Dictator, who by a Kinglike power should reduce those into their ranks again that were broken out, as she did to punish Spurius Melius. And when one of these things is left unpunished, it is of force to ruin a Republic; for hardly upon such an example may she afterwards be brought into the right way again.   

CHAP. XXIX.  
That the people's faults grow first from their Princes.  
PRinces have no reason to complain of any fault, which the people that is under their governments do commit: for their faults must needs proceed either from their negligence, or because they are blemished with the like errors. And whoever shall run over the nations that in our days have been accounted full of robberies, and such like offences, shall perceive they all wholly proceeded from those that governed them who were of the like condition. In Romania those Princes in it before they were extinguished by Pope Alexander the sixth, gave patterns to every one of a most ungodly and unconscionable life: for here a man might see horrible executions upon every slight occasion, and exceeding great rapines: Which first grew from the wickedness of those Princes, not from the mischievous disposition of the people, as they said: for those Princes being but poor, and yet having a mind to live as stately as those that were rich, were necessitated to apply themselves to many rapines, and to practise them divers ways, and among other dishonest ways they take, this was one; they made laws and forbade some kind of action to be done; afterwards they were the first that gave the occasion to break it, nor ever punished they the breakers of it, till afterwards when they saw many others had committed the same fault, and then they began to punish the breach, not for any zeal towards the law made, but for covetousness to recover the penalty: whereupon grew many inconvenients: and above all this, that the people were impoverished, and no way amended, and those that were impoverished used all their wits to work upon those that were their inferior. Whereupon arose all these evils (we have now spoken of) whereof the Prince was the only cause. And that this is true, T. Livius shows us, where he relates, that the Roman Ambassadors, carrying a gift of the spoil taken from the Vejentes to Apollo, were taken by the Corsaires of Lipari in Sicily, and there brought to land. But Timasitheus their Prince, having understood, what gift it was, whether it went, and who sent it, though he were borne in Lipari, yet behaved he himself like a worthy Roman, and told the people, that it was impiety to lay hands on such a gift, in so much as by general consent they set the Ambassadors at liberty with all that was theirs: and the Historians words are these, Timasitheus made all the multitude religious, which 
Timasitheus multitudinem religinne implevit, quae semper regenti est similis.  is done always like a true governor, And Laurence of Medicim confirmation so this opinion says,  

The Prince's actions as examples move,  
And those as their best patterns men approve. 

Et quel che sail Signior famopoi molti,  
Che nel Signor son tulti li octri volti.      

CHAP. XXX.  
A Citizen, that will of his own authority do any good work in his own City, of necessity must first extinguish all envy; and what order is to be given for the defence of a City upon the enemy's approach.  
THe Roman Senate having notice, that all Tuscany had made a new levy of soldiers, with purpose to endamage Rome, and that the Latini and Hernici, who formerly had been their friends, were now joined to the Volsoi, the perpetual enemies of Rome, considered that this war might prove perilous. And Camillus at that time being Tribune with Consular power, thought all might be well done without creating a Dictator, if the other Tribunes his colleagues would yield up unto him the sum and whole command of the Empire, which the said Tribunes willingly did. Nor thought they (says T. Livius) 
Nec quicquam de majestate sua detractum credebant quod majestati ejus concessissent.  it any thing derogated from their Majesty, what they had yielded to his. Whereupon Camillus having taken this obedience upon their words, commanded they should enrol three Armies. Of the first he would be general to go against the Tuscans; Of the second he made Quintus Servilius Conmander, whom he would have to abide near about Rome, to withstand the Latini and the Hernici, if they should stir. He gave Lucius Quintius the command of the third Army, which he levied for the guard of the City, the defence of the gates and the court of justice, in case any chance should happen; besides this he ordained, that Horatius one of his Colleagues, should make provision of arms and corn and other things requisite in time of war. He made Cornelius also his Colleague chief of the Senate, and over the public Council, to consult upon those things which in general were to be executed. Thus were the Tribunes in those times disposed for the good of their Country to command, and to obey. It is noted by the text here, what a virtuous and prudent man may do, and what great good he may because of, and how much he may be able to advantage his country, when by means of his goodness and virtue, he hath quite extinguished all envy, which many times is the cause that men cannot effectuate a good work, the said envy not allowing them that authority which it is necessary they should have in matters of importance. And this envy is quite put out two ways; either by some strong and difficult accident, where every one seeing themselves ready to perish, laying ambition aside, willingly run to obey him, whom they believe by his virtue able to deliver them, as it befell Camillus: who having given so many proofs of his being an admirable man, and having been thrice Dictator, and performed that place always with the advantage of the public, and no way to his own profit, had now caused men not to be afraid of his greatness And because he was so magnanimous, and of such great credit, they thought it no shame to them to be inferiors to him: And therefore says Titus Livius very wisely these words, Nor thought they it any things, etc. Another way is envy blotted out, when either by violence or by course of nature they die that have been thy competitors in attaining to any reputation, or greatness; who seeing the more esteemed than they, it is impossible they ever should be at rest, or have any patience. And when they are accustomed to live in a corrupted City, where their education hath not bred any goodness in them, it is impossible, let what accident will fall out, that they should ever go back from any thing; and without doubt to have their wills, and satisfy the waywardness of their minds, they would be contented even to see the ruin of their native Country. To overcome this envy, there is no other remedy but the death of those that bear it: and when fortune is so favourable to that virtuous man, as that those men die a natural death, he becomes glorious without giving any scandal, when without any obstacle or offence he may display his virtues. But when he hath not this good luck, he must devise by any means to take them out of his way. And before he can do any thing he must practise those ways whereby to overcome this difficulty. And he that reads the Bible with understanding, shall see that Moses was forced (if he would have his laws and ordinances proceed) to put a great number of men to death, who provoked by nothing else but envy, withstood his purpose. This necessity 
I deubt that the understanding which he advises others of, he wants himself: not knowing the meaning of, or not believing the holy writ; whereby he puts men past suspicion of his Atheism. For what he alleges of Moses, he must needs take originally from Moses his books, being we have not any author of that antiquity, as could write any thing of his own knowledge touching those times. But those Mach. seems not to believe further than served his own humour, reading the Scriptures only to a politic end, not so much for the strengthening of his belief, as the bettering of his discourse. Yet however Machiavelli did not, I hope others will believe that Moses delivered to the Israelites the true Oracles of GOD; and that it was not Moses that punished the delinquents among them, but GOD sending his immediate judgements. As in the rebellion of Corah and his complices, Numbers the 16. Moses did but city them as to appearance: but GOD immediately sent his vengeance: For the earth under them opened, vers. 31. And when that wretched fellow gathered sticks on the Sabbath, Numb 15. Moses awaited till GOD passed● the sentence upon him for his death; and the manner thereof, vers. 35. Therefore Machiavelli may justly be taxed for traducing Moses here of more than he hath warrant for, making no other esteem of Moses his bringing the Israelites out of Egypt, and his leading them through the wilderness, then of Romulus his gathering together a●scattered multitude, and laying the foundation of that Commonwealth, which action his courage and ambition of rule and glory thrust him upon; not seeming to take notice, that Moses was immediately called by GOD, and sent to show his wonders and judgements against the Egyptians, and to conduct the Israelites into Canaan (according to GOD'S promises formerly made to their forefathers) wherein he behaved not himself either ambitiously or insolently, nor was any thing done by his own prowess or policy, but merely by the ordinance of GOD.  Friar Jerom Savonarola knew very well, and Peter Soderini chief standard-bearer of Florence knew it also. The one could not overcome it, because he had not power to do it, which was the Friar, and because he was not well understood by those that followed him who might have had power to have done it. But it was not his fault, and his sermons are full of the blames he lays upon the wise men of the world, and of invectives against them; for so he terms those envious men, and all that opposed his ordinances. That others believed that in time, by his goodness, and good fortune, and doing good turns to some of them, quite to extinguish this envy, seeing himself young enough too, and then wearing so many new favours, which the manner of his proceeding afforded him, so that he thought he was able to overcome those many that enviously opposed him, without any scandal, violence, or tumult. And did not know that time cannot stay; goodness is not sufficient, fortune changes; and there is no gift can appease malice. So that the one and the other of these two went to ruin, and their ruin proceeded either from their ignorance, or their disability to overcome this envy. The other thing remarkable is the order which Camillus took both within and abroad for the preservation of Rome. And indeed not without reason the good Historians (as ours here is) set down particularly and distinctly certain cases, to the end posterity should learn how in the like accidents they are to defend themselves. And it ought well be observed in this text, that there is not a more dangerous nor unprofitable defence then that which is confusedly made, and with out order, and this appears by this third army which Camillus caused to be enrolled, and to be left at Rome to guard the Town: for many would have judged that part superfluous, where the people is most commonly armed, and warlike; and for this cause a man would not think it needful to have them enrolled otherwise, but only that it sufficed to cause them to be in arms as occasion should require. But Camillus and who else were wise as he was, think otherwise, who never allow a multitude to take arms, unless by certain order and appointment: Wherefore upon this example, he that is appointed over the guard of a City, should avoid, as a rock, the arming of men in confusion, but ought first have those chosen and registered? which he would have in arms, and whom he would have them obey, where their rendezvous, and whether to go, and command those that are not enrolled to abide every man at his own house, for the safeguard thereof. They that shall take this order in a City assailed, will easily be able to defend themselves: whoever does otherwise, shall neither imitate Camillus, nor defend himself.   

CHAP. XXXI.  
Powerful Commonwealths, and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage, and the same dignity.  
AMong other matters of magnificence, that our Historian brings in Camillus speaking or doing, to show how an excellent man ought to behave himself, he puts these words in his mouth: Neithor did my Dictatorship elevate my courage, nor hath 
Nec mihi Dictatura animos fecit, nec exilium ademit.  my banishment abated it: By which words we see that great personages are always the same in all fortunes. And though she varies, now exalting them, and then bringing them low, they never differ from themselves, but always hold a constant resolution, so steadily fastened to their ordinary course of living, that by every one of them it appears that chance hath no power over them. Weak men behave themselves in another manner: for they befool and besot themselves in good fortune, attributing all the good they have to those virtues which they never knew; whence it proceeds that they grow insupportable and odious to those that are about them; whereupon depends the sudden alteration of fortune, which so soon as they look once in the face, they fall presently into the other defect, and become vile and abject. From hence it comes that such manner of of Princes think rather in adversity how to make an escape, than to stand upon their defence, as those that for having made evil use of good fortune, are not prepared for any kind of safeguard. This virtue, and this vice, which I say, is found in one man alone, we find also in a Republic, of which the Romans and the Venetians serve us for example. Those former never any bad fortune could make abject, nor any good fortune insolent, as it manifestly appeared after the defeat they had at Canna, and after the victory they got against Antiochus: for upon that defeat, however a very great one, because it had been the third together, they never grew base upon it, but continued to send forth Armies; they would not redeem prisoners against the orders they had made, nor send to Hannibal or Carthage to ask peace, but casting aside all those unworthy courses, they thought still upon providing for the war, arming for want of soldiers their old men and slaves. Which thing being known to Hanno the Carthaginian (as was said before) he showed that Senate what small account they were to make of that defeat at Canna. And so it appeared, as those hard times did not affright, nor abase them, on the other part neither did their more fortunate times puff them up: for, when Antiochus sent Ambassadors to Scipio to require an agreement, before they came to join battle, or that he had lost it, Scipio gave him certain conditions of peace, which were, that he should retire into Syria, and leave the rest to the Romans disposing, which Antiochus refusing, and coming to battle and losing it, sent again his Ambassadors to Scipio, with order that he would submit to all those conditions which the Conqueror should impose on him, to whom he propounded no other conditions than what he had fomerly offered before the victory, adding these words: That the Romans if they be overcome, lose not their courages, nor when they overcome grow they insolent. Clean contrary hereunto we have seen the Venetians do: who in their prosperity (thinking they had gotten it by their own valour which they never were guilty of) grew to such an excess of insolence, that they termed the King of France Saint Marks son, they contemned the Church; and their ambition all Italy would not hold, but imagined they were to frame a Monarchy like that of the Romans. Afterwards their good fortune abandoning them, and that they were a little routed by the King of France at Vayla, they not only lost all their State by rebellion, but a good part of it they gave up to the Pope and the King of Spain, even through mere baseness and cowardice. And they became so vile and abject, that they sent Ambassadors to the Emperor, to offer themselves to be his tributaries, and writ letters to the Pope full of baseness and submission, whereby to move him to compassion. Into which unhappiness they fell in four days space, and after a half defeat: for their Army come to battle and to fight, in their retreat lost near one half of their men, yet so that one of their Proveditors that escaped, came to Verona with above five and twenty thousand soldiers between foot and horse: in case that if either the Venetians, or any of their orders had been of value, they might easily have recovered themselves, and looked fortune again in the face, and have been ready either to overcome, or lose more gloriously, or get more honourable terms of agreement: but the baseness of their spirits caused by the quality of their orders, nothing good in matters touching the war, made them at once lose both their State and courage. And so will it always befall any that shall behave themselves as they did: for this growing insolent in good fortune, and abject in evil, arises from the manner of thy proceeding, and from the education wherein thou hast been trained up: Which when it is weak & vain, makes thee like to itself, when otherwise it casts thee in another manner of mould, and makes thee know the world better, rejoicing less at the good besalls thee, as also grieving less at the evil comes upon thee: and that which is said of one man alone, is said also of many that live in the same Commonwealth, who attain to that perfection, which the order and manner of government thereof will afford. And though otherwhere we have said, that the foundation of all States is good military discipline; and where this is not, there can neither be good laws, nor any other thing good, methinks it is not more than needs to repeat it again; for to many purposes, in the reading of this Story, we see this necessity appears, and we see that neither can the soldiers be good, unless they be trained and practised, nor can they be trained, unless composed of thy own subjects: for the wars do not always last, & impossible it is they should: therefore is it necessary to be able to practise this military exercise in time of peace; neither can this exercise be used in regard of the expense, with others then with thy own subjects. Camillus was gone (as we said before) with the Army against the Tuscans, and his soldiers hanving seen the greatness of the enemy's Army were much amazed at it, thinking themselves too weak to sustain the violence of their enemies: the rumour of this fearefulness coming to Camillus his ears, he came forth abroad amongst them, and going about through the Camp, speaking now to one soldier, and then to another, worked this opinion out of their heads, and in conclusion, without any otherwise ordering of his Army, said, Let every man do what he hath learned and used 
Quod quisque didicit, aut consuevit, faciat  to do. And whosoever shall well consider these terms and the words he said to them, for their encouragement to encounter with their enemies, shall perceive that none of these things could be said or done to an Army that had not first been ordered and exercised as well in peace as in war: for upon those soldiers that have not learned to do any thing, a Commander cannot rely, nor believe they can do any thing to the purpose: and were a new Hannibal to command them, he could not subsist: for a General (during the battle) not being able to be in every part, unless he have first taken order to have men of his manner of courage, knowing well his orders, and the ways of his proceeding, must of force ruin there. If then a City shall be armed and ordered as Rome, and that every day the Citizens are put to it to make trial in particular and in general of their own valour, and the power of fortune, it shall always come to pass, that at any time whatsoever, they shall continue settled in the same resolution, and keep themselves in the same dignity. But when they shall be disarmed, and rest only upon the helps of fortune, and not upon their own valours, they shall change as her wheel turns, and give that example of themselves, which the Venetians gave.   

CHAP. XXXII.  
What means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace.  
CIrcei and Velitre two Roman Colonies being rebelled, in hope that the Latins would defend them, afterwards the Latins being overcome, and so those hopes failing them, divers of the Citizens advised, they should send Ambassadors to Rome, to recommend them to the Senate: which course was hindered by those that had been Authors of the rebellion, who were afraid lest the whole punishment should fall upon their heads; and therefore to cut off all treaty of peace, they incited the multitude to take arms, and make an incurfion upon the Rome territories. And truly when any one desires that a people or Prince should wholly take their minds off from agreement, there is no truer nor certainer way than to make them do some foul act against him, with whom thou wouldst not have the accord made. For the fear of that punishment which he shall think he hath deserved for his fault, shall always keep him off. After the first wars which the Carthaginians had with the Romans, those soldiers who had served the Carthaginians in that war in Sicily and Sardinia, when the peace was concluded, went back into Africa, where not being satisfied for their pay, they made wars against the Carthaginians, and having chosen two out of themselves for their heads, Mathus, and Spendius, they took divers Towns of the Carthaginians, and sacked divers. The Carthaginians willing to try any other way then battle, sent Asdrubal a Citizen of theirs Ambassador to them, who they thought had some credit with them, having formerly been their General. And he being come, and Spendius and Mathus desiring to oblige all these Soldiers, never to hope they could have peace again with the Carthaginians, and to engage them in the war, persuaded them it was better to kill him, with all the Citizens of Carthage, which then they had prisoners, Whereupon they not only slew them, but put them to death with torments, to this villainy adding an edict, that all Carthaginians, who in time to come were taken, should in the same sort be slain. Which deliberation and execution made that Army exceeding cruel and obstinate against the Carthaginians.   

CHAP. XXXIII.  
It much furthers and advantages an Army in the winning of a battle, to be confident of their own forces, and their General's valour.  
IT much helps an Army towards the winning of a battle, to make them confident, that in any case they cannot choose but vanquish. The things that give them this confidence, are, that they be well armed and well ordered, and be acquainted one with another. Nor can this confidence or this order be but among those Soldiers that have been borne and lived together. The Commander also must be of repute, so that the Soldiers may be confident of his wisdom: and they shall always be so, when they perceive him to be a man orderly careful, and courageous, and that maintains well, and with esteem the Majesty of his dignity: and he shall always be able to do so, while he punisheth their faults, while he tires not out the soldiers to no purpose, keeps his word with them, shows them an easy way to vanquish the enemy; those things that may endanger them, conceals from them; or if they be evident, by his speeches lessons their opinion of them: which things well observed, are a great occasion of confidence in the Army; and that confidence of victory the Romans used to make their Armies thus confident by way of Religion: from hence proceeded, that by their southsaying and auspiees they created their Consuls, they levied their soldiers, marched with their armies, and fought their battles; and without having done some of these things, never would a good or discreet Commander, have put any thing to hazard, deeming that he might easily lose, unless his soldiers had first understood that the gods were on their side. And when any Consul or Captain of theirs should have fought contrary to the auspexes, they would have punished him, as they did Claudius Pulcher. And however we find this true in all the Roman Histories, yet it is proved more certain by the words which Livy brings in Appius Claudius speaking, who complaining to the people of their Tribunes insolency, and showing that by means of them the auspexes and other matters pertaining to Religion were corrupted, says thus: Let 
Eludant nunc licet Religionem; quid enim est, si pulli non pascentur, fi ex cavea tardius exierint, 〈◊〉 occinuerit avis? parva sunt haec: sed parva ista non contemnendo, Majores nostri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt.  them now scoff at Religion; for, what matter is it, whether the chickens feed, or whether they come slower out of their cage, whether a bird hath sung or no? these, 'tis true, are all small things: but by not contemning of these little things, our Ancestors have exceedingly amplified this Commonwealth. For in these small matters there is force to hold the soldier's united and confident, which thing is a principal occasion of any victory. Yet must these things be accompanied with valour, otherwise they will avail little. The Prenestini having their Army abroad against the Romans, went to encamp upon the river of Allia, a place where the Romans had been overcome by the French, which they did to make their own soldiers confident, and to affright the Romans with the fortune of the place. And though the course they took, was probable for those reasons we have already said, yet the conclusion of the matter showed, that true valour fears not every small accident: Which the Historian says very well, in those words which he makes the dictator speak, who says thus to the Master of his cavalry: Seest thou how they taking benefit of their 
Vides tu fortunâ illos fretos ad Alliam consedisse. At tu fretus armis animisque invade mediam aciem.  fortune, have encamped themselves upon the river Allia? But thou making use of thy Arms and courage assail the very heart of their Army. For a true valour, a good discpline, and an assurance taken from so many victories, cannot be extinguished by matters of small moment, nor does any vain matter affright them, nor one disorder hurt them, as we saw it; for two Manlij being Consuls against the Volsei, by reason that they had rashly sent part of their Army to forage, it followed, that both they that were gone and those that stayed behind, were besieged; from which danger, not the wisdom of the Consuls, but the Soldiers own valour freed them, where T. Livius says these words, The Soldier's valour even without a Commander was 
Militum etiam sine rec●ore stabilis virrus putata est.  thought firm and constant. I will not let pass one term used by Fabius, being newly entered with his Army into Tuscany, to make them confident, deeming such a confidence to be the more necessary, now that he had brought them into a new Country, and to fight with new enemies; who speaking to his soldiers before the fight, and having told them many reasons, whereupon they might hope for the victory, said, that he could also tell them certain good things, and where they might plainly see the victory, but that it was dangerous to disclose them. Which course as it was discreetly used, so deserves it it to be followed.   

CHAP. XXXIV.  
What fame, report, or opinion causes the people to begin to cast their favours upon a Citizen: and whether a Prince or a people do bestow their Magistracies with better judgement.  
OTherwhere we said, that T. Manlius, who afterwards was termed Torquatus, saved L. Manlius his Father from an acccusation, which M. Pomponions Tribune of the people had made against him. And however the manner of saving him, was somewhat violent and extraordinary, yet that filial piety towards his Father, was so acceptable to the general, that it was not only not blamed, but when Tribune were to be appointed over the Legions, T. Manlius was chosen in the second place. Upon which success, I believe it fit to consider, what way the people take to give their judgements upon men in distributing of their charge that thereby we may see, whether that be true which we formerly concluded, that the people is a better distributer than a Prince. I say then, that the people in their distribution follows the report that goes of one by public voice and fame: when they know him not otherwise by his ordinary behaviour, or by presumption or opinion conceived of him. Which two things have been caused either by the Fathers of such, who for that they have been great personages, and of ability in the Cities, it is thought their sons should be like them, until by their actions the contrary be found: Or else it is caused by the courses such a one takes, of whom we speak: the best courses and ways that can be held, are to keep company with grave men, well disposed, and such as by every one are reputed wise. And because there cannot be a greater mark or discovery of a man then by the company he frequents, without question he that uses good company, gains a good name: for it is impossible but that he shall much resemble them. Or indeed this public reputation is gotten by some extraordinary and notable exploit, however private, that hath proved in thy hands very honourable. And of all these three things, which in the beginning gain any one a good reputation, nothing gives if more amply than this last: for that first of parents, and fathers is so deceitful, that men advance therein very leisurely, and that is presently quite spent, when it is not accompanied by the the proper virtue of him that is to be censured. The second way, which makes thee be known by the company thou usest, is better than the first; but is much inferior to the third; for until thou hast given evidence of thyself by some worthy exploir, thy repute is wholly grounded upon opinion, which is very easily canceled. But that third being begun and grounded upon thy works, gives thee at first such renown, that needs must it be, that afterwards thou commit many acts contrary thereunto, if thou wouldst disannul it. Therefore ought those men that spring up in a Commonwealth, take this course, and endeavour by some extraordinary act to begin their rise. Which many at Rome did in their youths, either by publishing of a law, furthering the common good, or by accusing some potent Citizen as a breaker of the laws, by doing such like notable things, and unwonted, whereof men should have occasion to speak afterwards. Neither are such like things needful only to begin one's reputation, but they are as necessary for the maintenance and advancement of it. And to do this, a man had need to renew them again, as Manlius did during his whole life: for when he had defended his father so virtuously and beyond the ordinary strain, and by this action taken his first degree of reputation, after some years he fought with that Frenchman, and took from him that chain of gold, which gave him the name of Torquatus: nor stayed he upon this, but afterwards in riper years he put his son to death for having fought without his allowance, however he had vanquished his enemy. Which three actions gave him a greater name, and throughout all ages make him more famous, then ever any triumph or victory did, wherewith he was adorned as much as any other Roman. And the reason is, because in those victories Manlius had very many like him, but in these particulars he had either very few or none. Scipio the elder got not greater glory by all his triumphs, than that action of defending his father upon the Tesin gained him in his youth, and that other when after the defeat at Canna, courageously with his sword drawn he made many young Romans swear they would never abandon Italy, as already then among them it was resolved which two actions were the beginnings of his reputation, which made him a way to his triumphs of Spain and Africa, which opinion of him was also increased, when he sent back the daughter to her Father, and the wife to her husband in Spain. This manner of proceeding is not alone needful for those Citizens, that would gain reputation, whereby to attain the dignities in their Commonwealth, but is also necessary for Princes to maintain their credits in their Principalities: for nothing gives them so great esteem as to yield some rare examples of themselves, by some deed or pithy saving, agreeable with the common good, which may evidently prove the Prince either magnanimous, or liberal, or just; and that he is such a one, that his life may serve for a pattern, and his wise sayings may be used by his subjects as proverbs. But to return, whereat we began this discourse, I say ' that the people, when they begin to confer any dignity upon one of their Citizens, grounding upon any of those reasons before alleged, take no ill ground; but when afterwards the frequent examples of one man's good carriage makes him better known, then is a better ground taken; for in such case there can never fall any deceit. I speak only of those honours which are given to men in the beginning, before they be well known by a certain experience, or that they transgress from one action to another unlike it; Where both touching the self opinion and the corruption, they always commit less errors, than Princes. And because it may fall out, that the people might be deceived in the report, in the opinion, and actions of a man, conceiving them greater than in truth they are, which would not be so with a Prince, because it is like it should be told him, or that he should be advertised thereof by some of his Counselors; to the end therefore that the people want not these advertisements, the good founders of Republics have ordained, that when the cheisest dignities of Cities are to be bestowed, whereunto it might prove dangerous to prefer unsufficient men, and seeing the people's wills sometimes bend to advance some one unfit, that it may be lawful for any Citizen, and accounted as an honour to him, to publish in their assemblies that man's defects, that the people (this notice not failing them) may the better give their judgements thereupon. And that this was customary at Rome, the oration which F. Maximus made, witnessed, which he uttered before the people in the second Punic war, when at the creation of the Consuls they took a liking to T. Ottasilius; and Fabius; deeming him unsufficent to marnage the Consulate in those times, spoke against him, declaring his unsufficiency, insomuch as he hindered him of that dignity, and converted the people's favours to one that deserved it better than he. The people then in the choice of their Magistrates judge according to the truest marks they can have of men. And when they can be advised, as Princes are, they run into fewer errors than Princes; and that Citizen that will begin to seek the people's favour, must with some notable exploit gain it, as Titus Manlius did.   

CHAP. XXXV.  
What dangers they incur that put themselves forwards as principals to advise any design, which are so much the great, by how much this carries with it the more difficulty and peril.  
HOw dangerous a thing it is for any man to become the ringleader of any new matter, which belongs to many, and how hard a thing it is to meddle in it, and bring it on forwards, and make it good being thus brought forwards, would be too long and too deep a matter to discourse on. Therefore reserving it for a fitter place, I will only treat of those dangers, which Citizens incur, or those that advise a Prince, making themselves chief in persuading him to any weighty and important resolution, so that the Council thereof is wholly imputed to them: for, men judging things by their events, of all the evil that arises thereupon, the blame is wholly laid on him as author; and if good come of it, he is commended for it; but the reward comes much short of the loss is hazarded. This present Sultan Selimus ' termed the great Turk, having made preparation (as some report, who now come from his Country) for the Conquest of Syria and Egypt, was encouraged by one of his Pashas, who was then upon the confines of Persia, to undertake rather an expedition against the Sophy; by whose Counsel being persuaded, he went to that enterprise with an exceeding great army, and coming into a very vast country, where a great part of it is desert, and rivers very few, and finding there those difficulties, which long since had ruined many Roman armies, was so distressed thereby, that he lost there by famine and plague (however that in the war he were the vanquisher) a great part of his army. Whereupon being erraged against the author of that Counsel, he put him to death. We read of many Citizens, that were the advisers to such and such enterprises, who because these had evil success, have straightway been banished. Certain Citizens of Rome there were, who as authors of the advice, stood to have a Consul from among the Commons in Rome; it happened, that the first of them, that went abroad with their armies, was defeated. Whereupon it had proved but unluckily to the authors of that Counsel, had not their party been strong, by whose favour such resolution was taken. It is then most certain, that they who advise a Republic and they that Counsel a Prince, are equally brought into these straits; and if they do not advise those things, which they take to be profitable either for the City or the Prince without respect, they fail of their duties; and in case they do counsel them, they run the hazard of their lives, and of their estates; all men herein being so blind as to judge advices good or evil by the success they take. And devising with myself by what means they might escape this infamy or danger, I see no other way, then that they put things forward moderately, and not take any thing upon them as their own enterprise, and give their opinion without passion, and defend it also modestly without passion, so that if either the City or the Prince followthat advice. it may seem they willingly took that course, and were not drawn thereto by thy importunity. When thou dost so, it is not reasonable that a Prince or a people should seek revenge on thee for thy counsel, it being not followed against other men's wills: for here the danger is, that many having contradicted thee, in the unhappy success of thy advice they will concur in working thy ruin. And if in this case, one should say, that when he fails of that glory which another gets by being one alone against many in advising any course, when it proves luckily, we meet here with two advantages to countervail it: the first is to be quite exempt out of all danger: the second is, if thou advisest any thing modestly, and by reason of the opposition made against it, thy Counsel be not taken, and some disaster follow upon the advice another hath given, thou gainest much glory thereby. And however the glory, which is gotten by mischiefs, befallen thy City or thy Prince, cannot well be said to be enjoyed, yet is there some account to be made of them. I believe there is no other advice can be given to men in this part; for the persuading them to hold their peace, and not give their opinion, would be a thing very unprotable to the Commonwealth and their Princes, & they would hardly be able to escape danger; for in a small time would they be suspected; it might also befall them, as it did those friends of Porse the King of Macedon, who having been defeated by Paulus Emilius, & flying with a few of his confidents, it chanced, that in relating things past, one of them began to tell Perseus of many errors committed by him, which were the occasion of his ruin, to whom Perseus turning said, Traitor, and hast thou delayed to tell me it, until now that I have no remedy? and upon these words slew him with his own hand. And thus he suffered punishment for his silence when he should have spoken, and for having spoken when he should have held his peace: neither avoided he the danger, by not giving his advice. Wherefore I believe the rules above given, are to be kept and observed.   

CHAP. XXXVI.  
The reason wherefore the French have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more than men, and afterwards less than women.  
THe fierceness of that Frenchman who challenged any Roman whatsoever, near the river Anien, to fight with him, and afterwards the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 him and T. Manlius, put 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of that which T. Livius says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 the Frenchmen in the beginning of the combat are more than men, and in the end thereof prove less than women. And weighing well from whence this may proceed, many believe that naturally they are so disposed, which I think is true: but hence it follows not that this their natural humour, which makes them so fierce in the beginning, might not be so ordered by art, as to continue them fierce till the very conclusion: And for proof hereof, I say, that there are armies of three sorts: the one where there is both fury and order, for from the order arises fury and valour, as was that of the Romans; for it appears in all their histories, that there was a very good order in that army, which military discipline in tract of time had brought in amongst them. For in a well trained army, no man is to do any thing but by rule and order. And we find hereby, that in the Roman Army (from which, insomuch as it conquered the whole world, all others may take example) they neither ate, nor slept, nor bought, neither did they any military action nor domestic without the Consul's order: for those armies which do otherwise, are not right armies; and if they come to make any trial of themselves in any action, they do it by force of rage and violence, and not by valour: but where valour is accompanied with due ordinances, it makes good use of the fury in such manner and in such times that no difficulty abates it, nor ever quails the courage, because those good ordinances reinforce the spirit, and the fury, both being still maintained by the hope of over coming, which never fails while the orders hold firm. The contrary falls out in those armies wherein is fury and not order, as were those of the French, who ever failed by little and little For it proved not, that their first assault prevailed, and that their fury whereon they much relied, was not maintained by an ordinate valour, not having any thing else, besides that, wherein to trust, as that grew cool, so they failed. On the other side the Romans doubting less of dangers by reason of their good orders, not distrusting the victory, fought resolutely and obstinately with the same courage and valour as well in the end as in the beginning, or rather enraged by fight, they grew still more fierce. The third kind of armies is, where there is no natural fury, nor accidental order, as the Italian armies are in our days, which are quite unprofitable: and unless they encounter with an army which upon some accident chances to run away, they shall never overcome: and without alleging other examples, we every day see that they give good proofs they have no valour at all. And because by T Livius his testimony, every one may understand, how the good soldiery ought to be ordered and how the bad is, I will set down Papirius Cursor his words, having a mind to punish Fabius the commander of the horse; where he said, Let neither GOD nor man be had in any reverence, nor 
Nemo hominum, nemo Deorum verecundiam habeat, non edicta Imperatotun; non auspicia observentur; sine commeatu vagi milites in pacato & in hostico errent, immemores sacramenti, licentia sola exauctorentur; infrequentia deserantur signa, neque conveniatur ad edictum, nec discernatur interdiu, nocte, aequo an iniquo loco, injussu Imperatoris pugnent; non signa, non ordines servant. jatrocinij modo caeca & fortuita pro solenni & sacrata militia sit.  the General's commands, nor his auspexes be regarded; let the soldier's pillaging up and down for want of provision as well in their friend's country as in their foes, let them cashier themselves, at their pleasures, for, getting their oaths, let them quit their Ensigns, nor come together at command: let them fight without the General's leave by night or by day in place of advantage or disadvantage, caring neither for rank nor order: and let the sacred and and solemn rites of warfare become like the blind and obscure tricks and chances of robberies. By the text here we may easily see whether the warfare in our days, be blind and casual, or sacred and solemn, and how much it comes short of resembling that which properly is termed a warfare, & how it differs from a furious and ordinate warfare as was that of the Romans, or from a furious only as was that of the French.   

CHAP, XXXVII.  
Whether slight skirmishes or combats are necessary before a great battle, and what is to be done to know a new enemy, when one should avoid those skirmishes.  
IT seems that in humane actions (as otherwhere we have discoursed) besides other difficulties, found in bringing any thing to its perfection, there is always some evil very nearly neighbouring to the good: Which so easily grows up with that good, that it seems impossible, if a man would enjoy the one, to be quit of the other. And this we see in all the works of man: and therefore is that good attained with difficulty, unless by thy good fortune thou be so assisted, that she by her power overcome this ordinary and natural inconvenient. The Combat between Manlius T●rquatus and the Frenchman hath put me in mind hereof, where T. Livius says That combat so much imported 
Tanti ea dimicatio ad universi bellieventum fuit, ut Gallorum exercitus, relictis trep dè Castris, in Tiburtinum agrum, mox in Campaniam transierint.  the event of the war, that the French Army leaving their Camp in a fright, went into the Tiburtine Country, and thence into Campania. For I consider on the one side, that a good Commander ought wholly avoid to do any thing which being but of small moment, may produce but evil effects in his Army: for to begin a skirmish or a combat wherein the whole forces are not employed, and yet the whole fertune is there laid to stake, is a thing savouring too much of rashness, as I said before, when I condemned the guarding of the passages. On the other side I consider, that wise and experienced Commanders, when they meet with a new enemy, and that is of reputatson, are forced before they come to join battle, to cause their soldiers to make trial of them by light skirmishes, to the end that beginning to know them, and to have to deal with them, they may be rid of that terror which the report and reputation of these men have put them in. And this part in a General is of exceeding great importance; for there is a kind of necessity in it, which forceth thee thereunte; for thou wilt think that thou goest to thy manifest destruction, unless thou have first by these small experiences made thy soldiers cast out that terror, which by means of the enemy's reputation had possessed their minds. Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with an Army against the Samnites, who were new enemies, and these formerly had never proved the one the others forces, where T. Livius says, that Valerius caused the Romans. to make some small skirmishes with the Samnites, That a new 
Ne eos novum bellum, ne noves hostis terre. et.  war, and a new enemy might not affright th●m. Notwithstanding it is a very great hazard, that thy Soldiers in those skirmishes remaning losers, their fear and cowardice grow not more upon them, and that effects contrary to thy purpose follow not thereupon, that is, that thou fright them not, whereas thy design was to assure them. So that this is one of those things, which hath the evil so near neighbouring unto the good, or rather they are so near joined together, that it is very easy to mistake the one for the other: Whereupon I say, that a good Commander should be very careful, that nothing arise, which upon any accident may take away the courage and heart of his soldiers. That which may be of force to take away their courage, is to begin to lose: and therefore a man should be well aware of these small skirmishes, and no way suffer any of them, unless with exceeding great advantage, and certain hope of victory. Nor ought he undertake to guard any passages, where he cannot bring his whole Army together. Nor should he keep any Towns unless it be those that by losing of them, his utter ruin follows thereupon; and those that he guards, he should take such care both with their defences and also with his Army, that whenever the enemy hath any design to assail them, he may make use of all his forces in rescue of them: the others he should leave undefended: for whensoever any thing is lost, that was before abandoned, the Army being yet afoot, there is neither the reputation of the war lost, nor the hope of conquest. But when any thing is lost, which thou hadst purposed to defend, and every one believe, thou mightst, defend, there is the damage and loss, and there thou hast in a manner, as those Frenchmen did, by a matter of small moment lost the whole war. Philip of Macedon the Father of Perseus, a warlike man, and of great esteem in his time, being assavled by the Romans, forsaken and laid waist much of his Country, as he, who because he was wise, thought it more pernicious to lose reputation by not being able to defend that which he undertook to defend, then by leaving it in prey to the enemy, to lose it as a thing neglected. The Romans when after the defeat at Canna, their estate was in great perplexity, refused many that were under their protection, and so also divers of their own Subjects, charging them to defend themselves the best they could, which are better courses far, than to undertakes defences, and afterwards nor be able to go through with them; for hereby those friends are lost, and forces only in those friends. But returning to the small skirmishes, I say; that yet if a Commander be forced by reason of the newness of the enemy to make any skirmish, he ought take so much advantage in it, that he run no hazard to lose it, nor do, as Marius did, which is the better way. Who going against the Cimbrians, which were an exceeding fierce people, and came to make a prey of Italy, and wheresoever they came, casting a great terror, because of their fierceness and multitude, and by reason they had formerly vanquished a Roman Army, Marius thought it necessary before he came to join battle, to work somewhat, which might make his Soldiers lay aside that terror, which the fear of the enemy had put them in; and as a very well advised Commander, brought his Army several times, where the Cimbrians with their troops were to pass: And thus within the fortifications of his Camp he would that his Soldiers should see them, and accustom their eyes to the view of that enemy, to the end that by seeing a disordinate multitude loaded with baggage and unprofitable arms, and in part too disarmed, they might reassure themselves, and grow desirous of battle, which course as it was discreetly practised by Marius, so likewise ought it be diligently imitated by others, whereby they might not be forced to incur those dangers which I mentioned before, nor to do as the Frenchmen did: Who for a matter of small moment 
Qui ob rem. parvi ponderis, trepidi in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam transie●unt.  fled in a fright into the Triburtine Country, and straight after into Compania. And because we have alleged Valerius Corvinus in this Treaty, in the Chapter following I intent, by the help of his words, to show what manner of man a Commander should be.   

CHAP. XXXVIII.  
What manner of man that General ought to be, on whose abilities an Army may confidently rely.  
VAlerius Corvinus was (as we said formerly) abroad with an Army against the Samnites, new enemies of the people of Rome, whereupon partly to assure his own Soldiers, and partly to make them know the enemy, he caused some of his to enter into certain light skirmishes with them, nor contented herewith, before the day of battle would needs speak to his own soldiers, and show with all efficacy, how little esteem they were to make of such enemies, putting them in mind of their own and his valour also: where it may be noted by the words that Livius brings him in speaking, what manner of man a Commander ought to be, in whom an Army is to have confidence: which words are these; And also to consider, under whose conduct and auspexes you fight; whether he you are to 
Tum etiam intueri cujus ductu, auspicioque incunda sit pugna; utrum audiendus duntaxat magnificus ad hor tator sit verbis tantum ferox, operum militarium expers, an qui & ip a tela tractare, procedere ante signa, versari media in mole pugnae sciat: facta mea, non dicta vos milites sequi volo: nec disciplinam modo, sed exemplum etiam a me petere, qui hac dextrà mihi tres consulatus, summamque laudem peperi.  hearken unto, be only a magnificent exhorter, fierce in words, but not of prowess to show you any military examples, or else such a one that knows how to make use of your arms to march before your ensigns, and behave himself bravely in the thickest of your troops. I would have yond my soldiers to follow my deeds rather than my words, and not to seek your discipline only from me, but your example, who by this right hand have gained three Consulships and the height of honour. Which words well considered teach every man how he ought to proceed if he would hold the dignity of a Commander; and whosoever shall otherwise carry it, shall find in time that dignity (when either by chance or ambition he is raised thereunto) will rather take from him, than any way gain him reputation: for titles honour not men, but men their titles. And from the beginning of this discourse we may consider, that if great Commanders have used extraordinary means to confirm the resolutions of an Army of old soldiers, when they were to encounter with unaccustomed enemies, how much rather is there pains to be taken with an army of freshwater soldiers, who never yet looked the enemy in the face for if an unaccustomed enemy terrifies an army of old soldiers; much more probable is it that any enemy should affright an army of new soldiers, Yet we have many times seen all these difficulties overcome by the exceeding great wisdom of good Commanders, as Gracchus the Roman did and E●aminondas the Theban, of whom we have spoken otherwhere, who with their armies of new soldiers vanquished armies of Veteranes, who had been of long experience. The courses they took, were for many months to exercise them in counterfeit skirmishes, and train them up in obedience and order, and from thence they came to employ them with a great deal of assurance in very fierce battles. Therefore ought no warlike man doubt, but that he may be able to make good soldiers when he wants not men: for that Prince who hath many men, and wants soldiers, should complain rather of his own sloth and small wisdom, then of the people's cowardice.   

CHAP. XXXIX.  
That a Commander ought exactly know situations.  
AMong other things befitting the General of an Army, is the knowledge of situations and countries; for without this knowledge in general and in particular, the Commander of an Army cannot well effectuate any thing. And because all sciences, if a man would be exact in them, require practice, this is one that asks exceeding much practice. And this practice or (as I may term it) particular knowledge is gained rather by means of hunting, then by any other exercise. Wherefore the ancient writers say, that those Heroes, that ruled the world in their days, were brought up in the woods and in frequent hunt: for the chase teacheth thee many things besides this knowledge, which very much concerns the war. And Xenophon in Cyrus his life shows, that Cyrus going to assail the King of Armenia, as he gave order for the service, he put his soldiers in mind that this was nothing else then one of those chases which they had many times made in his company. And he told those he sent to lie in ambush upon the mountains, that they were like unto those that went to pitch their toils upon the hills, and those that scoured the plain; that they were like those that went to put up the beast out of his covert, to the end that being chased, he fall into the toils. This is said to show that the chase according as Xenophon allows of it, hath a kind of resemblance of war. And therefore is such exercise very honourable and well beseeming great personages. Nor can this knowledge of countries by any fitter means be learned then by way of hunting: for the chase makes him that frequents it know how in particular the country lies where he uses to hunt; and when a man hath made himself well acquainted with the scite, of one country, he afterwards with facility comprehends that of all other strange Countries: for every Country and every member of them have some kind of conformity one with another, so that he who knows the one well, may easily attain to the knowledge of the other. But he that hath never practised the one, very hardly or never, unless it be by long experience, can know the other; whereas he that is well versed therein, at the first cast of his eye knows how that plane lies, or that hill rises, how far that valley reaches, and all such other like things, whereof for the time to come he hath gained a settled knowledge. And that this is true, T. Livius shows us by the example of Publius Decius, who being Tribune of the soldiers in the Army which Cornelius the Consul led against the Samnites, when the Consul was forced to betake himself to a valley, where the Romans, arm might easily have been enclosed by the Samnites, this Decius perceiving the danger they were in, said to the Consul, Seest thou Aulus Cornelius that hill which is 
Vides tu Aule Corneli cacumen illud supra hostem? arx illa est spei salutisque nestrae, si eam (qucniam caeci reliquere Samnites) impigrè capimus. Publius Decius tribunus militum unum editum in saltu collem imminentem hostium castris often dit, aditu arduum impedito agmini, expeditis haud difficilem.  above the enemy? that is the strength of our hope and safety, if we, because the Samnites being blind have neglected it, quickly seize on it. And before these words uttered by Decius, T. Livius says, Publius Decius the soldier's Tribune showed a pretty high hill which lay a little higher than the enemy's camp, of hard ascent to men encumbered with complete arms, but of easy access to men lightly harnessed. Whereupon being sent thither himself by the Consul with 3000 soldiers, and having saved the Roman army, and purposing when night came, himself to depart, and so to save himself and his own soldiers, he is brought in thus speaking, Follow me, that yet while it is day light we may discover what places the enemy guards 
Ite mecum, ut dum lucis aliquid superest, quibus locis hostes praesidia ponant, qua pateat hinc exitus exploremus. Haec omnia sagulo militari amictus ne ducem circuire hostes notarent per lustravit.  and which way we may get out. All these things he went to view clad in a soldier's cassock, to the end the enemy should take no notice the Captain rounded them. He therefore that well considers this whole text, shall see how profitable and necessary for a Commander it is to understand the natural situations of countries; for if Decius had not well known them, he had never been able to judge what advantage it was to the Roman army to seize upon that hill; nor could he have been able to discern at such distance, whether thall hill were accessible or no. And when he had once gotten there upon it, having a mind to depart and return again to the Consul, being environed round with enemies, he would never have been able so far off to spy out the passages to escape thence, and discern which places were guarded by the enemy, so that it must be of necessity, that Decius had a very exact knowledge, whereby he brought it to pass that by the taking of that hill, the Roman Army was delivered, and afterwards he himself (being besieged) knew how to find a way of escape both for himself and those that were with him.   

CHAP. XL.  
How deceit is commendable, used against the enemy in time of war.  
HOwever that the use of fraud in any action be detestable, yet in the managing of a war it is a thing laudable and glorious, and he is as much praise, that vanquishes the enemy by deceit, as he that overcomes him by force. And this we see, by the judgement of those that write the lives of great personages, who commend Hannibal and others, who have been very notable in such like ways of proceeding. Whereof because there are many examples every where obvious, I will not add any. I will say this only, that I mean not, that that fraud is glorious, which causes thee to break thy faith given, and agreements made: for that, though it may sometimes gain thee a state or Kingdom, as formerly hath been said, yet will it never get thee any glory But I speak of such a deceit, which is put in practice against such an enemy that trusts not in thee, and that consists properly in matter of war: as was that of Hannibal, when at the lake of Perugia he feigned a flight, whereby he might have enclosed the Consul and the Roman Army; and when to escape out of Fabius Maximus hishand, he tied flaming firebrands to the horns of his whole heard of cattle. The like unto which was that, which Pontius the Samnites General practised to shut in the Roman Army at the gallows of Caudium, where having placed his army behind the mountains, he sent many of his soldiers clad like shepherds with much cattle through the plain, and they being taken by the Romans, and required of where the Samnites army was, agreed all, according to the order received from Ponutis, to say that it was gone to the siege of Nocera. Which thing the Consuls believing, gave them opportunity to shut them up in those precipices of Caudium, wherein as soon as they entered, they were presently besieged by the Samnites; and this victory gained by fraud, would have proved very glorious to Pontius, if he had followed his father's counsel, who advised either to set the Romans freely at liberty, or put them all to the sword, and in no case take the middle way, Which neither gains friends, nor takes 
Quae neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit.  foes out of the way. Which middle way was always pernicious in matters of state, as other where it hath formerly been said.   

CHAP. XLI.  
That the defence of ones country ought to be undertaken, either with ignominy, or with glory, or whatsoever way it be done, it is well defended.  
THe Consul and the Roman Army, as is above said, were besieged by the Samnites, who having propounded to the Romans exceeding dishonourable terms, as was that to make them go under the gallows, and send them without Arms to Rome; and hereupon the Consuls standing amazed, and the whole army in despair, Lucius Lentulus the Romanc Lieutenant said, that, as he thought, no conditions were to be refused to save their country: for the safety of Rome consisting in the life of that Army, he thought it good to save it in any case: and that the Country is well defended, by what means soever it be, either with disgrace, or with glory: for that Army being saved, Rome might in very good time cancel all that ignominy; but in case it were not saved, however it should die gloriously. Rome and her liberty was utterly lost, and so his advice was followed. Which thing deserves well to be noted by any Citizen that chances to be called to counsel his country: for where the deliberation is wholly touching the safety of the country, there ought no consideration to be had of just or unjust, pitiful or cruel, honourable or dishonourable, but rather all other respect being laid aside, that course is to be taken which may preserve the life and maintain the liberty thereof, which thing is followed by the sayings and deeds of the French, in defence of the Majesty of their King, and the power of their Kingdom; for they heat nothing with more impatience, then that it should be said Such a course was dishonourable to their King; for say they, their King cannot suffer dishonour in any resolution taken by him, either in prosperous or adverse fortune: for whether he wins or loses, they commend the action, and say it was done like a King.   

CHAP. XLII.  
Promises extorted by force, ought not to be kept.  
WHen the Consuls were returned to Rome with their disarmed army, and the disgrace which was put upon it, the first that spoke in the Senate, that the peace made at Candium should not be observed, was the Consul S. Posthumius, saying that the people of Rome was not tied thereunto, but that he himself indeed was bound, and the rest that had promised the peace; and therefore the people if they would free themselves from all ties, were to yield up him and the rest that had promised it with him into the Samnites. hands: and this conclusion he held with such obstinacy, that at length the Senate was content therewith, and so sending him and the others to Sanmiam, protested to the Samnites, that the peace was of no force. And in this case so favourable was fortune to Pesthumius, that the Samnites held him not; and when he was returned to Rome among the Romans, he was more glorious by his loss, then Pentius was among the Samnites by his conquest. Where two things are to be noted. The one is, that in what action soever glory may be gotten; for in victory it is ordinarily gained, but in loss, it is obtained either by showing that loss came not by thy default, or by the atcheivement of some valorous action which may cancel it. The others is: that it is no dishonour to violate those promises which by force thou wert constrained to make; and always premises extorted regarding the public, when there is want of strength, shall be broken, and that without the disgrace of him that breaks them. Wherefore in all histories we read several examples, and every day in these modern times we see many of them; and, not only among Princes, promises forced when they want strength, are not kept, but also all other promises are not observed, when the occasions fail that moved them to promise. Which if it be a thing commendable or no, or whether such like ways are to be followed by a Prince or no, it is at large disputed by us in our treaty concerning a Prince, so that for this present we shall not touch it.   

CHAP. XLIII.  
Those men that are bred in the same country, do throughout all ages keep very near the same nature and disposition.  
WIse men are wont to say (and not by chance nor without reason) that he who will see what shall be, let him consider what hath been: for all things in the world at all times have their very encounter with the times of old, Which comes to pass, because those things are wrought by men, who were always & are subject to the same passions; & therefore follows it of necessity, that they take the same effect. It is true, that their actions sometimes in this province are more virtuous, than those in that, & so sometimes in that more than in this, according to the form of their education, wherein those people have taken their manner of living. It gives a facility also in the knowledge of future things by those that are past, to see one Nation a long time hold the same customs and conditions, being either always covetous, or always treacherous, or having some other such vice or virtue. And whosoever shall read the things past belonging to our City of Florence, and consider also what hath happened in the latter times, shall find the Germans and French very covetous, proud, cruel, and unfaithful: for in all these four, several times have they much wronged our City. And touching their small faith, every one know moneys were given to King Charles the 8. of France, and he promised to render the Citadels of Pisa, and yet he never did it. Wherein that King manifested his small faith, and muth avarice. But let us pass over these matters of late memory. Every one may well have heard of that which followed in the war that the Florentines had with the Viscount's of Milan: when Florence being deprived of all other expedients, thought to bring the Emperor into Italy, by his reputation and forces to assail Lombardy. The Emperor promised to bring a good Army with him, and undertake that war against the Viscount's, and defend Florence against their whole power, in case that at his rising up in arms the Florentines would pay him an hundred thousand ducats, and at his arrival in Italy another hundred thousand; to which agreements the Florentines consented, and having made the first payment, and afterwards the second, he came only to Verona, and thence returned back again, having not done any thing in their behalf, blaming them, as if it were their fault, for not having observed the conditions between them. So that if Florence had not been either constrained by necessity, or overcome by passion, and had read and known the ancient customs of the Barbarians, she would never have been neither this time, nor many other times deceived by them, they having behaved themselves always after one manner, and in every part, and with every one used the same terms, as it appears they formerly did to the Tuscans, who being oppressed by the Romans, by reason they had been several times put in flight by them and routed, and seeing that by their own forces alone they were not able to make resistance, they agreed with the French, who dwelled on this side the Alps in Italy, to give them a sum of money, to oblige them to join their Armies with them, whereby to make head against the Romans. Whereupon it followed, that they having taken the moneys, would not afterwards take arms for them, saying these they had received, not to make war upon their enemies, but that they should forbear to forage the country of Tuscany. And thus the Tuscans through the covetousness and small truth of the French, were bereft of their moneys and left without the succours they expected from them. Insomuch as we see by this example of the ancient Tuscans, and that of the Florentines, that the French have continually used the same terms: and hereby may it easily be conjectured, what trust Princes can repose in them.   

CHAP. XLIV.  
By sudden; surprisal and boldness many times more is obtained, then by ordinary means can be gotten.  
THe Samnites being invaded by the Romans, and their army unable to stand in the field against them, determined having left their Towns well guarded in Samnium, to pass with their whole Army into Tuscany, which then had made truce with the Romans, to try with that passage, if by the presence of their Army they could induce the Tuscans to take arms again: which they had denied to their Ambassadors; and in the parley the Samnites had with the Tuscans (showing what principally moved them to take arms) they used a notable term, where they said, They had rebelled, because peace was more grievous to 
Rebellasse quod pax servientibus gravior quam liberis bellum esset.  these in subjection, than was war to them that enjoy their liberty. And so partly by persuasions, partly by the presence of their army, they wrought them to take arms. Where it is to be noted, that when any Prince desires to obtain any thing of another, he ought (if the occasion will bear it) never give him time to advise himself, but carry the matter so, that he may see the necessity of his sudden resolution, which is, when he that is required, perceives that by his denial, or delay, there may arise a sudden and dangerous distaste. These terms were seen to have been well used by Pope Julius with the French, and by De Fois the French Kings General with the Marquis of Mantua: for Pope Julius having a mind to expel the Bentivolij out of Bolonia; and to this purpose thinking he had need of the French forces, and that the Venetians should stand Newtralls; and having solicited the one and the other to this intent, but received from them a doubtful and various answer, resolved by not giving them leisure to bring them both to his bent. Whereupon parting from Rome with those forces he could put together, he went thence towards Bolonia, and to the Venetians he sent that they should continue Newters, and to the King that he should send him forces; so that they all being restrained by the small time they had, and considering that the Pope might with reason take an open distaste at either their delay or refusal, gave way to his will, and the King sent him aid, and the Venetians remained newters. De Fois also being with his Army in Bolonia, and having had notice of the rebellion of Bressia, and being desirous to go to recover it, had two ways, the one through the Kings own dominions long and tedious, the other short through the dominion of Mantua; and not only was he necessitated to pass through the dominions of that Marquis, but of force was to pass by certain sluices between marish grounds and lakes, whereof that country is full, which with fortresses & other means were shut up, and guarded by him: whereupon De Fois having resolved to take the shorter passage, to overcome all difficulties, & give no time to the Marquis to deliberate, at the same instant brought his soldiers on that way, and signified to the Marquis that he should send him the keys of the passage. So that the Marquis surprised by this sudden resolution, sent him the keys, which he would never have done, if De Fois had carried himself more coolly in the matter, that Marquis being in league with the Pope and the Venetians, and having a son of his in the Pope's hands, which things gave him many fair colours to deny him. But being assailed by the sudden course taken (upon the reasons already alleged) yielded. So did the Tuscans with the Samnites, having upon the presence of that Army of Samnium taken arms, which they had otherwise denied them.   

CHAP. XLV.  
Which course is the better in a battle, either at the first to sustain only the enemy's shock, and reserve some forces till the latter end to give them a blow withal, or else as upon the main to venture all upon the fury of the first onset.  
Decius' and Fabius the Roman Consuls were in the field with two armies against the Samnites and Tuscans, and coming to the skirmish and to join battle together, it is worth the noting in that service, which of those ways of proceeding, practised by those two Consuls, were the better: for D●●ius with all his force and violence assailed the enemy; Fabius only held them up, judging the slow assault to be of more advantage, reserving his blow till the last, when the enemy should have lost his first heat of fight, or rage (as some term it) where we see by the success that followed, that Fabius his design took effect better than that of Decius, who tired himself so in the first onset, that seeing his soldiers ready to turn their faces, to attain to that glory by death which by victory he could not, in imitation of his father, he sacrificed himself for the Roman Legions. Which thing when Fabius understood, that he might gain no less glory by living, than his Colleague had gotten by dying, put forward all these forces, which he had reserved for the last pinch, whereby he carried away a very happy victory. From hence is it evident, that Fabius his manner of proceeding is the more secure and warrantable.   

CHAP. XLVI.  
Whence proceeds it, that one family in a City holds a long time the same manners and disposition.  
IT seems that not only one City hath certain ways and orders different from those of another City, and breeds men either more hardy or more effeminate, but in the same City we see the same difference among families: which we find to be true in every City: and in Rome we read of many examples to this purpose: for we see the Manlij were hard and obstinate men, the Publicoli courteous and lovers of the people, the Appij ambitious and enemies of the commonalty, and so many other families, have had their qualities differing one much from the other. Which thing cannot proceed from the blood only, for that must needs alter by reason of the variety of marriages; but it must come from the education, which one family hath divers from another. For it avails much, that a youth from his tender years begins to relish well or ill any one thing: for of necessity it must make an impression, and thereupon give a rule to his manner of proceeding all the days of his life: and were not this so, it would be impossible that all the Appijs should have had the same will, and been led by the same passions, as T. Livius rema●kes in many of them: and for the last, one of them being made Censor, and his Colleague at the end of eighteen months having (as the law ordered it) deposed his magistracy, Appius would not depose his, saying that he might hold his yet five years, according to the first law ordained by the Censors. And however hereupon many speeches were made, and many tumults were caused; yet was there no help to make him lay it down, maugre the people and the greater part of the Senate. And whosoever reads the oration he made against P. Sempronious Tribune of the people, shall note upon that occasion all the Appian insolences, and the goodness and humanity used by many other Citizens in obedience of the laws and in their love to their Country.   

CHAP. XLVII.  
That a good Citizen for the love of his country ought to forget all private wrongs.  
Manlius' the Consul was employed with an Army against the Samnites, and he having been wounded in a battle, and the Army therefore running some hazard, the Senate judged it necessary to send Papirius Cursor thither for Dictator, to supply the want of the Consul; and there being a necessity that the Dictator should be named by Fabius who was then in Tuscany with an Army, and doubting that because he was his enemy, he would not name him, the Senators sent him two Ambassadors to entreat him, that laying aside all private differences for the public goods sake he would name him. Which Fabius did, moved by the love he bore his Country; howbeit by his silence, and many other signs, he showed that nomination pressed him, much. Whereof all those, that would be thought good Citizens, ought take example.   

CHAP. XLVIII.  
When we see the enemy commit a great error, we ought to believe there is some treachery in the business.  
FVlvius remaining Lieutenant in the Army which the Romans had in Tuscany, for that the Consul was gone to Rome by reason of some ceremonies there, the Tuscans to see if they could draw this man forth, laid an ambuscado near the Romans camp, and sent some soldiers clad like shepherds with good store of cattle, and caused them to come insight of the Roman army, who so disguised came near their very trenches, whereupon the Lieutenant marveling at this their presumption, not thinking it a thing reasonable, found such an expedient as discovered the deceit, and so the Tuscans, plot was spoiled. Here it may firly be noted, that the commander of an army ought not to give much credit to an error, which he plainly sees the enemy run into: for there will always be some treachery lurking, it being not a their 〈◊〉 reasonable that men should be so unwary. But oftentimes the desire of victory so blinds men's eyes, that they can see nothing else, but what they think makes all for their advantage. The Frenchmen having overcome the Romans at Alia, and coming to Rome, and finding the gates open, and without guard, stayed all that day, and the next night, without entering in, fearing some treachery, and not possibly believing, there could be such cowardice and so small understanding in the Romans, as utterly to abandon their Country. When in the year 1508 the Florentines besieged Pisa, Alphonso del Mutola, a Citizen of Pisa, was then the Florentines prisoner, and promised if he were set free that he would open a gate of Pisa to the Florentine army, whereupon he had his liberty; afterwards as if it had been to put the matter in execution, he came many times to treat with the commissaries Deputies, but came not privately nor by stealth, but openly and accompanied by some Pisans, who stood aside, while he talked with the Florentines: so that a man might well have guest at his double heart: for there was no probability, that if the end of this practice had been faithfuly intended, as it was promised, it should ever have been so openly treated. But the desire the Florentines had to be masters of Pisa, did so blind them, that by his order coming to the gate of Lucca, they left there divers of their Captains and many others, to their great dishonour, by means of the said Alphonso's double dealing with them.   

CHAP. XLIX.  
A Republic, if one would preserve it free, hath every day need of provision of new orders, and in regard of his good deserts that way Fabius was termed Maximus.  
THere is a necessity (as it hath been said ●other where) that every day in a vast City such accidents, happen as have need of the Physician: and according as they are of more consequence, so have they need of the wiser Physician. And if in any City the like: accidents ever happened, it was in Rome, where there fell out both strange and unexpected, as was that, when it seemed, that all the Roman dames had conspired to kill their husbands: so many were there that had poisoned their husbands, and so many that had prepared the poison to give their husbands. Such like also was that conspiracy of the Baccanalls, which was discovered in the time of the Macedonian wars, wherein were entangled many thousands of men and women: and had it not been revealed, it would have proved very dangerous for that City, or else if the Romans had not been accustomed to chastise a whole multitude of offenders: for were there not other exceeding many evident tokens to show forth the greatness and magnificence of that Republic and power of her executions, yet would it sufficiently appear by the quality of the punishment she imposed on the offenders. She never stood upon it, to put to death by way of justice a whole legion at once, and a whole City, and to confine eight or ten thousand men, with extraordinary hard conditions, had it been to one man alone, much more to so many. As it befell those soldiers, who had fought unfortunately at Canna, whom she confined to Sicily, and laid this on them, that they should never lodge in any Towns, andshould always eat standing. But of all the other execution, the most terrible was that decimation of armies, where by lot throughout a whole army one of ten was put to death. Nor could there, to chastise a whole multitude, a more horrible punishment be found: for when a multitude offends, where the author is not certain, all cannot suffer, because they are too many: and to punish one part, and let the other go scotfree, were to wrong those they should punish, and those that escaped free would be encouraged to offend another time. But to put to death the tenth part by lot, when all deserve it, he that suffers, blames his evil fortune: and he that escapes, is afraid lest that another time the lot may fall on him, and so is wary not to offend. Those empoisoners then & Baccanalls were punished as their offences deserved: And however these diseases in a republic produce evil effects, yet are they not deadly: for that almost always there is time given to correct them; but there is hardly any leisure in those that regard the state, which unless they fall under the hand of some wise man, ruin the City. There was in Rome, by reason of the liberality the Romans used in bestowing the Burgeouship & freedom of their City upon strangers, so many new people borne, that they began to have such a part in the suffnages, that the government began to vary, and parted with those things and from those men, by whom it was accustomed to walk. Which Q. Fabius, who was then Censor, perceiving, the placed all these new people upon whom this disorder depended, under four Tribes, to the end that being reduced into so small spaces they might not corrupt the whole City of Rome. This thing was well understood by Fabius, and by him was there a convenient remedy applied without much change: which was so well accepted by the City, that they always after gave him the title of Maximus.  

Nicolas Machiavelli to Zanobius Buondelmontius and Cosimus Rucelayus health.  
I Send you a present, which if it answers not my obligations to you, yet certainly is it the greatest that Nicolas Machiavelli could commend unto you: for herein I have expressed what I know, and what I have learned by a long experience, and continnal reading of the affairs of the world. And being that neither you nor any body else can look for more of me, you have no reason to complain, I have given you no more. Well may you be sorry at the feebleness of my understanding, being that these relations of mine here are but weak, and at the error of my judgement, being that I myself several times in my discourses am deceived. Which being so, I know not which of us is the less beholding the one to the other, either I to you, who have forced me to wri●e that which of my own self I should never have undertaken: or you to me, who have given you but small satisfaction in my writings. Receive this then so, as things should be taken by friends, where more regard is had to the good will of him that sends, then to the worth of what is sent. And believe that herein I have one alone satisfaction, when I think that, however perchance I may have erred in many circumstances herein, in this alone I know I have not failed in making choice of you to whom before all others I may dedicate these my discourses, partly because in thus doing I have showed some thankfulness for the good turns you have done me, and partly for that me thinks I have quit the common custom of those that write, who use always to dedieate all their works to Princes; and blinded by ambition, and covetousness, attribute to him the commendations of all virtuous qualities, whereas they ought to blame him for what is faulty in him. Whereupon, that's I may not run into this error, I have made choice, not of those that are Princes, but of those that for their many good parts might deserve well to be so: nor of those that are able to bestow preferments, honours, nor wealth upon me, but of those who though they are not powerful, yet are they willing to do well for me: for men, if they would carry a right judgement, should esteem of those that in themselves are, and not of those that have the means to be liberal; and so of those that understand how to govern, and not of those that without understanding have the government of a kingdom. And writers commend rather Hieron of Siracusa when he was a private man, than Perseus of Macedon, when he was a King: For Hieron wanted nothing else of being a Prince, than a Principality: that other had no part of a King but a Kingdom. Enjoy therefore that good or that evil which you yourselves have desired: and if you shall continue still in this error, that these my opinions be acceptable to you, I shall not fail to proceed in the rest of the story, as in the beginning I made my promise.    
FINIS.   

Nicholas Machiavel's PRINCE.  
ALSO, The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca.  
AND The means Duke Valentine used to put to death Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto of Fermo, Paul, and the Duke of Gravina.  
Translated out of Italian into English, By E. D.  
With some Animadversions noting and taxing his errors.  
LONDON, Printed for Daniel Pakeman, 1661.   

To the most noble and Illustrious, JAMES Duke of Lenox, Earl of March, Baron of Setrington, Darnly, Terbanten, and Methuen, Lord Great Chamberlain and Admiral of Scotland, Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter, and one of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Counsel in both kingdoms.  
Poisons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality, that as destructives of Nature, they are utterly to be abhorred; but we find many, nay most of them have their medicinal uses. This book carries its poison and malice in it; yet me thinks the judicious peruser may honestly make use of it in the actions of his life, with advantage. The Lamprey, they say, hath a venomous string runs all along the back of it; take that out, and it is served in for a choice dish to dainty palates; Epictetus the Philosopher says, Every thing hath two handles, as the fire brand, it may be taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt: the other being laid hold on, will cleave to the very flesh, and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart. Sin hath the condition of the fiery end; the touch of it is wounding with grief unto the soul: nay it is worse; one sin goes not alone but hath many consequences. Your Grace may find the truth of this in your perusal of this Author: your judgement shall easily direct you in finding out the good uses of him: I have pointed at his chiefest errors with my best endeavours, and have devoted them to your Grace's service: which if you shall accept and protect, I shall remain  
Your Grace's humble and devoted servant, EDWARD DACRES.   

The Epistle to the Reader.  
QUestionless some men will blame me for making this Author speak in our vulgar tongue. For his Maxims and Tenants are condemned of all, as pernicious to all Christian States, and hurtful to all humane Societies. Herein I shall answer for myself with the Comedian, Placere studeo bonis quam plurimis, & minimé multos laedere: I endeavour to give content to the most I can of those that are well disposed, and no scandal to any. I grant. I find him blamed and condemned: I do no less myself. Reader, either do thou read him without a prejudicated opinion, and out of thy own judgement tax his errors; or at least, if thou canst stoop so low, make use of my pains to help thee; I will promise thee this reward for thy labour: if thou consider well the actions of the world, thou shalt find him much practised by those that condemn him; who willingly would walk as thiefs do with close lanterns in the night, that they being undescried; and yet seeing all, might surprise the unwary in the dark. Surely this book will infect no man: out of the wicked treasure of a man's own wicked heart, he draws his malice and mischief. From the same flower the Bee sucks honey, from whence the Spider hath his poison. And he that means well, shall be here warned, where the deceitful man learns to set his snares. A judge who hath often used to examine thiefs, becomes the more expert to sift out their tricks. If mischief come hereupon, blame not me, nor blame my Author: lay the saddle on the right horse: but Honey, soit qui mal y pense: let shame light on him that hatched the mischief.   

Nicholas Machiavelli, to the Magnificent Laurence son to Peter of Medicis health.  
THey that desire to ingratiate themselves with a Prince, commonly use to offer themselves to his view, with things of that nature as such persons take most pleasure and delight in: whereupon we see they are many times presented with Horses and Arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and such like ornaments, worthy of their greatness. Having then a mind to offer up myself to your Magnificence, with some testimony of my service to you, I found nothing in my whole inventory, that I think better of, or more esteem, than the knowledge of great men's actions, which I have learned by a long experience of modern affairs, and a continual reading of those of the ancients. Which, now that I have with great diligence long worked it out, and throughly sifted, I commend to your Magnificence. And however I may well think this work unworthy of your view; yet such is your humanity, that I doubt not but it shall find acceptance, considering, that for my part I am not able to tender a greater gift, than to present you with the means, whereby in a very short time you may be able to understand all that, which I, in the space of many years, and with many sufferances and dangers, have made proof and gained the knowledge of. And this work I have not set forth either with elegancy of discourse or stile, nor with any other ornament whereby to captivate the reader, as others use, because I would not have it gain its esteem from elsewhere than from the truth of the matter, and the gravity of the subject. Nor can this be thought presumption, if a man of humble and low condition venture to dilate and discourse upon the governments of Princes; for even as they that with their pencils design out country's, get themselves into the plains below to consider the nature of the mountains, and other high places above; and again to consider the plains below, they get up to the tops of the mountains; in like manner to understand the nature of the people, it is fit to be a Prince; and to know well the dispositions of Princes, suits best with the understanding of a subject. Your Magnificence then may be pleased, to receive this small present, with the same mind that I send it; which if you shall throughly peruse and consider, you shall perceive therein that I exceedingly wish, that you may attain to that greatness, which your own fortune, and your excellent endowments promise you: and if your Magnificence from the very point of your Highness shall sometime cast your eyes upon these inferior places, you shall see how undeservedly I undergo an extreme and continual despite of Fortune.   

THE PRINCE, Written by Nicholas Machiavelli, Secretary and Citizen of Florence.  

CHAP. I.  
How many sorts of Principalities there are, and how many ways they are attained to.  
ALl States, all Dominions that have had, or now have rule over men, have been and are, either Republics or Principalities. Principalities are either hereditary, whereof they of the blood of the Lord thereof have long time been Princes; or else they are new; and those that are new, are either all new, as was the Duchy of Milan to Francis Sforce; or are as members adjoined to the hereditary State of the Prince that gains it; as the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of Spain. These Dominions so gotten, are accustomed either to live under a Prince, or to enjoy their liberty; and are made conquest of, either with others forces, or ones own, either by fortune, or by valour.   

CHAP. II.  
Of Hereditary Principalities.  
I Will not here discourse of Republics, because I have otherwhere treated of them at large: I will apply myself only to a Principality, and proceed, while I wove this web, by arguing thereupon, how these Principalities can be governed and maintained. I say then that in States of inheritance, and accustomed to the blood of their Princes, there are far fewer difficulties to keep them, than in the new: for it suffices only not to transgress the course his Ancestors took, and so afterward to temporise with those accidents that can happen; that if such a Prince be but of ordinary industry, he shall always be able to maintain himself in his State, unless by some extraordinary or excessive power he be deprived thereof; and when he had lost it, upon the least sinister chance that befalls the usurper, he recovers it again. We have in Italy the Duke of Ferrara for example hereof, who was of ability to resist the Venetians, in the year 84. and to withstand Pope Julius in the tenth for no other reason, than because he had of old continued in that rule; for the natural Prince hath fewer occasions, and less heed to give offence, whereupon of necessity he must be more beloved; and unless it be that some extravagant vices of his bring him unto hatred, it is agreeable to reason, that naturally he should be well beloved by his own subjects: and in the antiquity and continuation of the Dominion, the remembrances and occasions of innovations are quite extinguished: for evermore one change leaves a kind of breach or dent, to fasten the building of another.   

CHAP. III.  
Of mixed Principalities.  
BUt the difficulties consist in the new Principality; and first, if it be not all new, but as●a member, so that it may be termed altogether as mixed; and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from a natural difficulty, which we commonly find in all new Principalities; for men do willingly change their Lord, believing to better their condition; and this belief causes them to take arms against him that rules over them, whereby they deceive themselves, because they find after by experience, they have made it worse: which depends upon another natural and ordinary necessity, forcing him always to offend those, whose Prince he newly becomes, as well by his soldiers he is put to entertain upon them as by many other injuries, which a new conquest draws along with it; in such manner as thou findest all those thine enemies, whom thou hast endamaged in the seizing of that Principality, and afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it, for not being able to satisfy them according to their expectations, nor put in practice strong remedies against them, being obliged to them. For however one be very well provided with strong armies, yet hath he always need of the favour of the inhabitants in the Country, to enter thereinto. For these reasons, Lewis the twelfth, King of France, suddenly took Milan, and as soon lost it; and the the first time Lodowick his own forces served well enough to wrest it out of his hands; for those people that had opened him the gates, finding themselves deceived of their opinion, and of that future good which they had promised themselves, could not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them. True it is, that Countries that have rebelled again the second time, being recovered, are harder lost; for their Lord, taking occasion from their rebellion, is less respective of persons, but cares only to secure himself, by punishing the delinquents, to clear all suspicions, and to provide for himself where he thinks he is weakest: so that if to make France lose Milan the first time, it was enough for Duke Lodowick to make some small stir only upon the confines; yet afterwards, before they could make him lose it the second time, they had need of the whole world together against him, and that all his armies should be wasted and driven out of Italy; which proceeded from the forenamed causes: however though both the first and second time it was taken from him. The general causes of the first we have treated of; it remains now that we see those of the second; and set down the remedies that he had, or any one else can have that should chance to be in those terms he was, whereby he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than the King of France did. I say therefore, that these States which by Conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their conquerors, are either of the same province and the same language, or otherwise; and when they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially when they are not used to live free; and to enjoy them securely, it is enough to have extinguished the Prince's line who ruled over them: For in other matters, allowing them their ancient conditions, and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them, men ordinarily live quiet enough; as we have seen that Burgundy did, Brittany, Gascovy, and Normandy, which so long time continued with France: for however there be some difference of language between them, yet can they easily comport one with another; and whosoever makes the conquest of them, meaning to hold them, must have two regards; the first, that the race of their former Prince be quite extinguished; the other, that he change nothing, neither in their laws nor taxes, so that in a very short time they become one entire body with their ancient Principality. But when any States are gained in a Province disagreeing in language, manners, and orders, here are the difficulties, and here is there need of good fortune, and great industry to maintain them; and it would be one of the best and livelyest remedies, for the Conqueror to go in person and dwell there; this would make the possession here of more secure and durable; as the Turk hath done in Greece, who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold that State, had he not gone thither himself in person to dwell, it had never been possible for him to have kept it: for abiding there, he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings, and forthwith can remedy them; whereas being not there present, they are heard of when they are grown to some height, and then is there no help for them. Moreover, the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither: the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the Prince near at hand, whereupon have they more reason to love him, if they mean to be good; and intending to do otherwise, to fear him: and foreign Princes will be well aware how they invade that State; insomuch, that making his abode there, he can very hardly lose it. Another remedy, which is also a better, is to send Colonies into one or two places, which may be as it were the keys of that State; for it is necessary either to do this, or to maintain there many horse and foot. In these colonies the Prince makes no great expense, and either without his charge, or at a very small rate, he may both send and maintain them; and gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses, to bestow them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that State; and those that he offends, remaining dispersed and poor, can never hurt him: and all the rest on one part, have no offence given them, and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet: on the other side, they are wary not to err, for fear it befalls not them, as it did those that were despoiled. I conclude then, that those colonies that are not chargeable, are the more trusty, give the less offence; and they that are offended, being but poor and scattered, can do but little harm, as I have said; for it is to be noted, that men must either be dallied and flattered withal, or else be quite crushed; for they revenge themselves of small damages; but of great ones they are not able; so that when wrong is done to any man, it ought so to be done, that it need fear no return of revenge again, But in lieu of Colonies, by maintaining soldiers there, the expense is great; for the whole revenues of that State are to be spent in the keepingof it; so the conquest proves but a loss to him that hath got it, & endammages him rather; for it hurts that whole State to remove the army from place to place, of which annoyance every one hath a feeling, and so becomes enemy to thee; as they are enemies, I wis, who are outraged by thee in their own houses, whensoever they are able to do thee mischief. Every way than is this guard unprofitable. Besides, he that is in a different Province, (as it is said) should make himself Head and defender of his less powerful neighbours, and devise always to weaken those that are more mighty therein, and take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreiner as mighty as himself; for it will always come to pass, that they shall be brought in by those that are discontented, either upon ambition, or fear; as the E●olians brought the Romans into Greece; and they were brought into every country they came, by the Natives; and the course of the matter is, that so soon as a powerful Stranger enters a country, all those that are the less powerful there, cleave to him, provoked by an envy they bear him that is more mighty than they; so that for these of the weaker sort, he may easily gain them without any pains: for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that he hath gotten: He hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths, nor their authorities, and so he shall easily be able by his own forces, and their assistances, to take down those that are mighty, and remain himself absolute arbitre of that Country. And he that plays not well this part, shall quickly lose what he hath gotten; and while he holds it, shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations. The Romans in the Provinces they seized on, observed well these points, sent colonies thither, entertained the weaker sort, without augmenting any thing their power, abated the forces of those that were mighty, and permitted not any powerful foreigner to gain too much reputation there. And I will content myself only with the country of Greece for example hereof. The achaians and Etolians were entertained by them, the Macedons kingdom was brought low, Antiochus was driven thence, nor ever did the achaians or Etolians deserts prevail so far for them, that they would ever promise to enlarge their State, nor the persuasions of Philip induce them ever to be his friends, without bringing him lower; nor yet could Antiocbus his power make them ever consent that he should hold any State in that country: for the Romans did in these cases that which all judicious Princes ought to do, who are not only to have regard unto all present michiefs, but also to the future, and to provide for those with all industry; for by taking order for those when they are asarre off, it is easy to prevent them; but by delaying till they come near hand to thee, the remedy comes too late; for this malignity is grown incurable: and it befalls this, as the physicians say of the hectic fever, that in the beginning it is easily cured, but hardly known; but in the course of time, not having been known in the beginning, nor cured, it becomes easy to know, but hard to cure. Even so falls it out in matters of State; for by knowing it aloof off (which is given only to a wise man to do) the mischiefs that then spring up, are quickly helped; but when, for not having been perceived, they are suffered to increase, so that every one sees them, there is then no cure for them: therefore the Romans, seeing these inconvenients afear off, always prevented them, and never suffered them to follow; for to escape a war, because they knew that a war is not undertaken, but deferred for another's advantage; therefore would they rather make a war with Philip and Antiochus in Greece, to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in Italy, though for that time they were able to avoid both the one and the other, which they thought not good to do: nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouths of the Sages of our days, to enjoy the benefits of the present time; but that rather, to take the benefit of their valour and wisdom; for time drives forward every thing, and may bring with it as well good as evil, and evil as good. But let us return to France, and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them: and we will speak of Lewis 〈◊〉 not of Charles, as of whom by reason 〈…〉 he long possession he held in Italy we better knew the ways he went: and you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a State of different Language and conditions. King Lewis was brought into Italy by the Venetians ambition, who would have gotten for their shares half the State of Lombardy: I will not blame his coming, or the course he took, because he had a mind to begin to set a foot in Italy; but having not any friends in the country, all gates being barred against him, by reason of King Charles his carriage there, he was constrained to join friendship with those he could; and this consideration well taken, would have proved lucky to him, when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any error. The King then having conquered Lombardy, recovered presently all that reputation that Charles had lost him; Genua yielded to him, the Florentines became friends with him; the Marquis of Mantua, the the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivolti, the Lady of Furli, the Lord of Faenza, Pesaro Rimino, Camerino, and Piombino, the Luc●heses, Pisans and sienneses, every one came and offered him friendship: then might the Venetians consider the rashness of the course they had taken, who, only to get into their hands two Towns in Lombardy, made the King Lord of two thirds in Italy. Let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the King have maintained his reputation in Italy, if he had followed these aforenamed rules, and secured & defended those his friends, who because their number was great, and they weak and fearful, some of the Church, and others of the Venetians were always forced to hold with him, and by their means he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest: but he was no sooner got into Milan, than he took a quite wrong course, by giving aid to Pope Alexander, to seize upon Romania, and perceived not that by this resolution he weakened himself, ruining his own friends, and those had cast themselves into his bosom, making the Church puissant, by adding to their Spiritual power, whereby they gained their authority, and so much temporal estate. And having once got out of the way, he was constrained to go on forward; insomuch as to stop Alexander's ambition, and that he should not become Lord of all Tuscany, of force he was to come into Italy: and this sufficed him not, to have made the Church mighty, and taken away his own friends; but for the desire he had to get the Kingdom of Naples, he divided it with the King of Spain: and where before he was the sole arbitre of Italy, he brought in a competitor, to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country, and all that were ill affected to him, might have otherwhere to make their recourse: and whereas he might have left in that Kingdom some Vice King of his own, he took him from thence, to place another there, that might afterward chase him thence. It is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary, to desire to be of the getting hand: and always when men undertake it, if they can effect it, they shall be praised for it, or at least not blamed: but when they are notable, and yet will undertake it, here lies the blame, here is the error committed. If France then was able with her own power to assail the Kingdom of Naples, she might well have done it; but not being able, she should not have divided it: and if the division she made of Lombardy with the Venetians, deserved some excuse, thereby to set one foot in Italy; yet this merits blame, for not being excused by that necessity. Lewis then committed these five faults; extinguished the feebler ones, augmented the State of another that was already powerful in Italy, brought thereinto a very puissant foreigner, came not thither himself to dwell there, nor planted any colonies there: which faults while he lived, he could not but be the worse for; yet all could not have gone so ill, had he not committed the sixth, to take from the Venetians their State; for if he had not enlarged the Church's territories nor brought the Spaniard into Italy, it had been necessary to take them lower; but having first taken those other courses, he should never have given way to their destruction; for while they had been strong, they would always have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of Lombardy. For the Venetians would never have given thoir consents thereto, unless they should have been made Lords of it themselves; and the others would never have taken it from France, to give it them: and then they would never have dared to go and set upon them both together. And if any one should say, that King Lewis yielded Romania to Alexander, and the Kingdom of Naples to Spain, to avoid a war; I answer with the reasons above alleged, that one should never suffer any disorder to follow, for avoiding of a war; for that war is not saved, but put off to thy disadvantage. And if any others argue, that the King had given his word to the Pope, to do that exploit for him, for dissolving of his marriage, and for giving the Cardinal's Cap to him of Rouen; I answer with that which hereafter I shall say touching Princes words, how they ought to be kept. King Lewis then lost Lombardy, for not having observed some of those terms which others used, who have possessed themselves of countries, and desired to keep them. Nor is this any strange thing, but very ordinary and reasonable: and to this purpose I spoke at Nantes with that French Cardinal, when Valentine (for so ordinarily was Caesar Borgia Pope Alexander's son called) made himself master of Romania; for when the Cardinal said to me, that the Italians understood not the feats of war; I answered, the Frenchmen understood not matters of State: for had they been well versed therein, they would never have suffered the Church to have grown to that greatness. And by experience we have seen it, that the power hereof in Italy, and that of Spain also, was caused by France, and their own ruin proceeded from themselves. From whence a general rule may be taken, which never, or very seldom fails, That he that gives the means to another to become powerful, ruins himself; for that power is caused by him either with his industry, or with his force; and as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant.   

CHAP. IU.  
Wherefore Darius his Kingdom taken by Alexd, rebelled not against Alexander's Successors after his death.  
THe difficulties being considered, which a man hath in the maintaining of a State new gotten, some might marvel how it came to pass, that Alexander the great subdued all Asia in a few years; and having hardly possessed himself of it, died; whereupon it seemed probable that all that State should have rebelled; nevertheless his Successors kept the possession of it, nor found they other difficulty in holding it, than what arose among themselves through their own ambition. I answer, that all the Principalities, whereof we have memory left us, have been governed in two several manners; either by a Prince, and all the rest Vassals, who as ministers by his favour and allowance, do help to govern that Kingdom; or by a Prince and by Barons, who not by their Prince's favour, but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree. And these kinds of Barons have both states of their own, and Vassals who acknowledge them for their Lords; and bore them a true natural affection. Those States that are governed by a Prince and by Vassals, have their Prince ruling over them with more authority: for in all his country, there is none acknowledged for superior, but himself: and if they yield obedience to any one else, it is but as to his minister and officer, nor bear they him any particular good will. The examples of these two different Governments now in our days, are, the Turk, and the King of France. The Turks whole Monarchy is governed by one Lord, and the rest are all his Vassals; and dividing his whole Kingdom into divers Sangiacques or Governments, he sends several thither, and those he chaps and changes, as he pleases. But the King of France is seated in the midst of a multitude of Lords, who of old have been acknowledged for such by their subjects, and being beloved by them, enjoy their preeminencies; nor can the King take their States from them without danger. He than that considers the one and the other of these two States, shall find difficulty in the conquest of the Turks State; but when once it is subdued, great facility to hold it. The reasons of these difficulties in taking of the Turks Kingdom from him, are, because the Invader cannot be called in by the Princes of that Kingdom, nor hope by the rebellion of those which he hath about him, to be able to facilitate his enterprise: which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid; for for they being all his slaves, and obliged to him, can more hardly be corrupted; and put case they were corrupted, little profit could he get by it, they not being able to draw after them any people, for the reasons we have showed: whereupon he that assails the Turk, must think to find him united; and must rather rely upon his own forces, than in the others disorders: but when once he is overcome and broken in the field, so that he cannot repair his armies, there is nothing else to be doubted than the Royal blood, which being once quite out, there is none else left to be feared, none of the others having any credit with the people. And as the conqueror before the victory could not hope in them; so after it, ought he not to fear them. The contrary falls out in Kingdoms governed as is that of France: for it is easy to be entered by the gaining of any Baron in the Kingdom; for there are always some malcontents to be found, and those that are glad of innovation. Those for the reasons alleged are able to open thee a way into that State, and to further thy victory, which afterwards to make good to thee, draws with it exceeding many difficulties, as well with those that have aided thee, as those thou hast suppressed. Nor is it enough for thee to root out the Prince's race: for there remain still those Lords who quickly will be be the ringleaders of new changes; and in case thou art not able to content these, nor extinguish them, thou losest that State, whensoever the occasion is offered. Now if thou shalt consider what sort of government that of Darius was, thou shalt find it like to the Turks dominion, and therefore Alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly, and drive him out of the field; after which victory Darius being dead, that State was left secure to Alexander, for the reasons we treated of before: and his successors, had they continued in amity, might have enjoyed it at ease: nor ever arose there in that Kingdom other tumults, than those they themselves stirred up. But of the States that are ordered and grounded as that of France, it is impossible to become master at such ease: and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of Spain, France, and Greece against the Romans, by reason of the many Principalities those States had: whereof while the memory lasted, the Romans were always doubtful of the possession of them; but the memory of them being quite wiped out, by the power and continuance of the Empire, at length they enjoyed it securely; and they also were able afterwards fight one with another, each of one them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces, according as their authority had gained them credit therein: and that because the blood of their ancient Lords was quite spent, they acknowledged no other but the Romans. By the consideration then of these things, no man will marvel that Alexander had so little trouble to keep together the State of Asia; and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest, as Pyrrhus, and many others; which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conqueror, but from the difference of the subject.   

CHAP. V.  
In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be governed, which, before they were conquered, lived under their own Laws.  
WHen those States that are conquered, as it is said, have been accustomed to live under their own Laws, and in liberty, there are three ways for a man to hold them. The first is to demolish all their strong places; the other, personally to go and dwell there; the third, to suffer them to live under their own Laws, drawing from them some tribute, and creating the rain an Oligarchy, that may continue it in thy service: for that State being created by that Prince, knows it cannot consist without his aid and force, who is like to do all he can to maintain it; and with more facility is a City kept by means of her own Citizens, which hath been used before to live free, than by any other way of keeping. We have for example the Spartans' and the Romans; the Spartans' held Athens and Thebes, creating there an Oligarchy: yet they lost it. The Romans to be sure of Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dismantelled them quite, and so lost them not: they would have kept Greece as the Spartans' had held them, leaving them free, and letring them enjoy their own Laws; and it prospered not with them: so that they were forced to deface many Cities of that province to hold it. For in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under, than by demolishments; and whoever becomes master of a City used to live free, and dismantells it not, let him look himself to be ruined by it; for it always in time of rebellion takes the name of libetry for refuge, and the ancient orders it had; which neither by length of time, nor for any favours afforded them, are ever forgotten; and for any thing that can be done, or ordered, unless the inhabitants be disunited and dispersed, that name is never forgotten, nor those customs: but presently in every chance recourse is thither made: as Pisa did after so many years that she had been subdued by the Florentines. But when the Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a Prince, and that whole race is quite extirpated; on one part being used to obey; on the other, not having their old Prince; they agree not to make one from among themselves: they know not how to live in liberty, in such manner that they are much slower to take arms; and with more facility may a Prince gain them, and secure himself of them. But in Republics there is more life in them, more violent hatred, more earnest desire of revenge; nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them, or suffer them to rest: so that the safest way, is, either to ruin them, or dwell among them.   

CHAP. VI  
Of new Principalities, that are conquered by ones own arms and valour.  
LEt no man marvel, if in the discourse I shall make of new Principalities, both touching a Prince, and touching a State, I shall allege very famous examples: for seeing men almost always walk in the paths beaten by others, and proceed in their actions by imitation; and being that others ways cannot be exactly followed, nor their virtues, whose parterue thou settest before thee, attained unto; a wise man ought always to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons, and imitate those that have been the most excellent: to the end that if his virtue arrive not thereto, at least if may yield some savour thereof, and do as good Archers use, who thinking the place they intent to hit, too far distant, and knowing how far the strength of their bow will carry, they lay their aim a great deal higher than the mark; not for to hit so high with their arrow, but to be able with the help of so high an aim to reach the place they shoot at. I say, that in Principalities wholly new, where there is a new Prince, there is more and less difficulty in maintaining them, as the virtue of their Conqueror is greater or lesser. And because this success, to become a Prince of a private man, presupposes either virtue, or fortune; me thinks the one and other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties; however he that hath less stood upon fortune, hath maintained himself the better. Moreover it some what facilitates the matter in that the Prince is constrained, because he hath not other dominions, in person to come and dwell there. But to come to these who by their owu virtues, and not by fortune, attained to be Princes; the excellentest of these are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like; and though of Moses we are not to reason, he only executing the things that were commanded him by God; yet merits he well to be admired, were it only for that grace that made him worthy to converse with God. But considering Cyrus, and the others, who either got or founded Kingdoms, we shall find them all admirable; and if there particular actions and Laws be throughly weighed, they will not appear much differing from those of Moses, which he received from so Sovereign an instructor. And examining their lives and actions, it will not appear, that they had other help of fortune, than the occasion, which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce what form they then pleased; and without that occasion, the virtue of their mind had been extinguished; and without that virtue, the occasion had been offered in vain. It was then necessary for Moses to find the people of Israel slaves in Egypt, and oppressed by the Egyptians, to the end that they to get out of their thraldom, should be willing to follow him. It was fit that Romulus should not be kept in Albia, but exposed presently after his birth, that he might become King of Rome, and founder of that City. There was need that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the Medes government, and the Medes delicate and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not make proof of his virtue, had not he found the Athenians dispersed. These occasions therefore made these men happy, and their excellent virtue made the occasion be taken notice of, whereby their country became ennobled, and exceeding fortunate. They, who by virtuous ways, like unto these, become Princes, attain the Principality with difficulty, but hold it with much ease; and the difficulties they find in gaining the Principality, arise partly from the new orders and courses they are forced to bring in, to lay the foundation of their State, and work their own security. And it is to be considered, how there is not any thing harder to take in hand, nor doubtfuller to succeed, nor more dangerous to manage, than to be the chief in bringing in new orders; for this Chief finds all those his enemies, that thrive upon the old orders; and hath but luke warm defenders of all those that would do well upon the new orders, which lukewarm temper proceeds partly from fear of the opposers who have the laws to their advantage; partly from the incredulity of the men who truly believe not a new thing, unless there be some certain proof given them thereof. Whereupon it arises, that whensoever they that are adversaries, take the occasion to assail, they do it factiously; and these others defend but coolly, so that their whole party altogether runs a hazard. Therefore it is necessary, being we intent throughly to discourse this part, to examine if these innovators stand of themselves, or if they depend upon others; that is, if to bring their work to effect, it be necessary they should entreat, or be able to constrain; in the first case they always succeed ill, and bring nothing to pass; but when they depend of themselves, and are able to force, then seldom it is that they hazard. Hence came it that all the prophets that were armed, prevailed; but those that were unarmed, were too weak: for besides what we have alleged, the nature of the people is changeable, and easy to be persuaded to a matter; but it is hard also to settle them in that persuasion. And therefore it behoves a man to be so provided, that when they believe no no longer, he may be able to compel them thereto by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would never have been able to cause their Laws long to be obeyed, had they been disarmed; as in our times it befell Friar Jerome Savanarola, who perished in his new constitutions, when the multitude began not to believe him; neither had he the means to keep them firm, that had believed; not to force belief in them that had not believed him. Wherefore such men as these, in their proceedings find great difficulty, and all their dangers are in the way, and these they must surmount by their virtue; but having once mastered them, and beginning to be honoured by all, when they have rooted those out that envied their dignities, they remain powerful, secure, honourable, and happy. To these choice examples, I will add one of less remark; but it shall hold some proportion withthem, and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind, which is Hiero the Sitacusan. He of a private man, became Prince of Siracusa, nor knew he any other aid of fortune than the occasion: for the Siracusans being oppressed, made choice of him for their Captain, whereupon he deserved to be made their Prince: and he was of such virtue even in his private fortune, that he who writes of him, says, he wanted nothing of reigning, but a Kingdom; this man extinguished all the old soldiery, ordained the new; left the old allyances, entertained new; and as he had friendship, and soldiers that were his own, upon that ground he was able to build any edifice; so that he endured much trouble in gaining, and suffered but little in maintaining.   

CHAP. VII.  
Of new Principalities, gotten by fortune, and other men's forces.  
THey who by fortune only become Princes of private men, with small pains attain to it, but have much a do to maintain themselves in it; and find no difficulty at all in the way, because they are carried thither with wings: but all the difficulties arise there, after they are placed in them. And of such sort are those who have an estate given them for money, by the favour of some one that grants it them: as it befell many in Greece, in the cities of Jonia, and Hellespont; where divers Princes were made by Darius, as well for his own safety as his glory; as also them that were made Emperors; who from private men by corrupting the soldiers, attained to the Empire. These subsist merely upon the will, and fortune of those that have advanced them; which are two voluble and unsteady things; and they neither know how, nor are able to continue in that dignity: they know not how, because unless it be a man of great understanding and virtue, it is not probable that he who hath always lived a private life, can know how to command: neither are they able, because they have not any forces that can be friendly or faithful to them. Moreover those States that suddenly fall into a man's hands, as all other things in nature that spring and grow quickly, cannot well have taken root, nor have made their correspondencies so firm, but that the first storm that takes them, ruins them; in case these, who (as it is said) are thus on a sudden clambered up to be Princes, are not of that worth and virtue as to know how to prepare themselves to maintain that which chance hath cast into their bosoms, and can afterwards lay those foundations, which others have cast before they were Princes. For the one and the other of these ways about the attaining to be a Prince, by Virtue, or by Fortune, I will allege you two examples which have been in the days of our memory. These were Francis Sforza, and Caesar Borgia; Francis by just means and with a great deal of virtue, of a private man got to be Duke of Milan; and that which with much pains he had gained, he kept with sma 〈…〉 do. On the other side Caesar Borgia (commonly termed Duke Valentine) got his state by his Father's fortune, and with the same lost it; however that for his own part no pains was spared, nor any thing omitted, which by a discreet and valorous man ought to have been done, to fasten his roots in those Estates, which others arms or fortune had bestowed on him; for (as it was formerly said) he that lays not the foundations first, yet might be able by means of his extraordinary virtues to lay them afterwards, however it be with the great trouble of the architect, and danger of the edifice. If therefore we consider all the Dukes progresses, we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power, which I judge a matter not superflnous to run over; because I should not well know, what better rules I might give to a new Prince, than the pattern of his actions; and however the courses he take, availd him not, yet was it not his fault, but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune. Pope Alexander the sixth, desiring to make the Duke his son a great man, had a great many difficulties, present and future: first he saw no way there was whereby he might be able to make him Lord of any State, that was not the Churches; and if he turned to take that from the Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan, and the Venetians would never agree to it; for Faenza and Riminum were under the Venetians protection. Moreover, he saw that the arms of Italy, and those whereof in particular he might have been able to make some use, were in their hands, who ought to fear the Pope's greatness: and therefore could not any ways rely upon them: being all in the Orsins and Colonies hands, and those of their faction. It was necessary then, that those matters thus appointed by them should be disturbed, and the States of Italy disordered, to be able safely to master part of them, which he then sound easy to do, seeing the Venetians upon three considerations had used the means to bring the French men back again into Italy: which he not only did not withstand, but furthered, with a resolution of King Lewis his ancient marriage. The King then past into Italy with the Venetians aid, and Alexander's consent; nor was he sooner arrived in Milan, than the Pope had soldiers from him for the service of Romania, which was quickly yielded up to him upon the reputation of the King's forces. The Duke then having made himself master of Romania, and beaten the Colonies, desiring to hold it, and proceed for ward, two things hindered him: the one, his own soldiers, which he thought were not true to him; the other, the French men's good wills; that is to say, he feared that the Prince's soldiers, whereof he had served himself, would fail him, and not only hinder his conquest, but take from him what he had gotten; and that the King also would serve him the same turn. He had experience of the Orsini upon an occasion, when after the taking of Faenza he assaulted Bolonia, to which assault he saw them go very cold. And touching the King, he discovered his mind, when having taken the Duchy of Urbin, he invaded Tuscany; from which action the King made him retire; whereupon the Duke resolved to depend no more upon fortune, and other men's arms. And the first thing he did, was, to weaken the Orsini, and Colonnies' factions in Rome: for he gained all their adherents that were gentlemen, giving them large allowances, and honouring them according to their qualities with charges and governments: so that in a few months the good will they bore to the parties was quite extinguished, and wholly bend to the Duke. After this, he waited an occasion to root out the Orsini, having before dispersed those of the family of Colonnia, which fell out well to his hand; and he used it better. For the Orsini being too late aware, that the Dukes and the Church's greatness was their destruction, held a Council together in a dwelling house of theirs in the country adjoining to Perusia. From thence grew the rebellion of Urbin, and the troubles of Romania, and many other dangers befell the Duke, which he overcame all with the help of the French: and having regained his reputation, trusting neither France, nor any foreign forces, to the end he might not be put to make trial of them again, he betook himself to his sleghts; and he knew so well to disguise his intention, that the Orsins, by the mediation of Paul Orsine, were reconciled to him, to whom the Duke was no way wanting in all manner of courtesies whereby to bring them into security, giving them rich garments, money, and horses, till their own simplicities led them all to to Sinigcllia, into his hands. These heads being then plucked off, and their partisans made his friends, the Duke had laid very good foundations, to build his own greatness on, having in his power all Romania with the Duchy of Urbin, and gained the hearts of those people, by beginning to give them some relish of their well being. And because this part is worthy to be taken notice of, and to be imitated by others, I will not let it escape. The Duke, when he had taken Romania, finding it had been under the hands of poor Lords-who had rather pillaged their subjects, than chastised or amended them, giving them more cause of discord, than of peace and union, so that the whole country was fraught with robberies, quarrels, and other sorts of insolences; thought the best way to reduce them to terms of pacification, and obedience to a Princely power, was, to give them some good government: and therefore he set over them one Remiro D' Orco, a cruel hasty man, to whom he gave an absolute power. This man in a very short time settled peace and union amongst them with very great reputation. Afterwards the Duke thought such excessive authority served not so well to his purpose, and doubting it would grow odious, he erected a civil judicature in the midst of the country, where one excellent judge did Preside, and thither every City sent their Advocate: and because he knew the rigours past had bred some hatred against him, to purge the minds of those people, and to gain them wholly to himself, he purposed to show, that if there was any cruelty used, it proceeded not from any order of his, but from the harsh disposition of his Officers. Whereupon laying hold on him, at this occasion, he caused his head to be struck off one morning early in the market place at Cesena, where he was left upon a gibbet, with a bloody sword by his side; the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amazed those people. But to return from whence we have digressd: I say, that the Duke finding himself very strong, and in part out of doubt of the present dangers, because he was armed after his own manner, and had in some good measure suppressed those forces, which, because of their vicinity, were able to annoy him, he wanted nothing else to go on with his Conquest, but the consideration of of France: for he knew, that the King, who now, though late, was advised of his error, would never suffer him: and hereupon he began to seek after new allyances, and to waver with France, when the French came towards Naples against the Spaniards, who then besieged Gagetta; and his design was only to be out of their danger, which had been effected for him, had Pope Alexander lived. And thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate. As for the future, he had reason to doubt lest the new successor to the Papacy would not be his friend, and would endeavour to take that from him that Alexander had bestowed on him; and he thought to provide for this four ways: First by rooting out the races of all those Lords he had despoiled, whereby to take those occasions from the Pope. Secondly, by gaining 〈◊〉 the gentlemen of Rome, whereby he might 〈◊〉 able with those to keep the Pope in some awe. Thirdly, to make the College of Cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be. Fourthly, by making of so large Conquests, before the Pope's death, as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of his enemies. Three of these four at Pope- Alexander's death he had effected, and the fourth 〈◊〉 had near brought to a point. For of those Lords he had stripped, he put to death as many as he could come at, and very few escaped him: he gained him the Roman Gentlemen: and in the College he had made a great faction. And touching his new Conquest, he had a design to become Lord of Tuscany. And he had possessed himself already of Perusia, and Pombin, and taken protection of Pisa: and so soon as he should have cast off his respect to France (which now he meant to hold no longer) being the French were now driven out of the Kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, so that each of them was forced to buy his friendship at any terms; he was then to leap into Pisa. After this Lucca and Sienna were presently to fall to him, partly for envy to the Florentines, and partly for fear. The Florentines had no way to escape him: all which, had it succeeded with him, as without question it had, the very same year that Alexander died, he had made himself master of so great forces, and such reputation, that he would have been able to have stood upon his own bottom, without any dependence of fortune, or resting upon others helps, but only upon his own strength and valour. But Alexander died five years after that he had begun to draw forth his sword: and left him settled only in the State of Romania, with all his other designs in the air, sick unto death, between two very strong armies of his enemies; and yet was there in this Duke such a spirit and courage: and he understood so well, how men are to be gained, and how to be lost, and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time, that, had he not had those armies upon his back, or had been in health, he would have carried through his purpose in spite of all opposition; and that the foundations he grounded upon were good, it appeared in that Romania held for him above a month, and he remained secure in Rome, though even at death's door: and however the Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini came into Rome; yet found they none would take their parts against him. And this he was able to have effected, that if he could not have made him Pope whom he would, he could have hindered him that he would not should be Pope. But had he been in health when Alexander died, every thing had gone easily with him; and he told me on that day that Julius the second was created Pope, that he had forethought on all that which could happen, in case his father chanced to die, and for every thing provided its remedy, this only excepted, that he foresaw not that he himself should at the same time be brought unto death's door also. Having then collected all the Duke's actions, me thinks I could not well blame him, but rather (as I have here done) set him as a pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others arms have been exalted to an Empire. For he being of great courage, and having lofty designs, could not carry himself otherwise; and the only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of Alexander's life, and his own sickness. Whoever therefore deems it necessary in his entrance into a new Principality, to secure himself of his enemies, and gain him friends, to overcome either by force, or by cunning, to make himself beloved, or feared of his people, be followed and reverenced by his soldiers, to root out those that can, or owe thee any hurt, to change the ancient orders with new ways, to be severe, and yet acceptable, magnanimous, and liberal; to extinguish the unfaithful soldiery, and create new; to maintain to himself the armities of Kings and Princes, so that they shall either with favour benefit thee, or be wary how to offend thee; cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this man. He deserves to be found fault withal for the creation of Julius the second, wherein an evil choice was made for him: for, as it is said, not being able to make a Pope to his mind, he could have withheld any one from being Pope; and should never have consented that any one of those Cardinals should have got the Papacy, whom he had ever done harm to; or who having attained the Pontificate were likely to be afraid of him: because men ordinarily do hurt either for fear, or hatred. Those whom he had offended, were among others, he who had the title of St. Peter ad Vincula, Colonna, Sr. George, and Ascanius; all the others that were in possibility of the Popedom, were such as might have feared him rather, except the Cardinal of Rouen, and the Spaniards; these by reason of their alliance and obligation with him, the other because of the power they had, having the Kingdom of France on their party; wherefore the Duke above all things should have created a Spaniard Pope, and in case he could not have done that, he should have agreed that Rouen should have been, and not St. Peter ad Vincula. And whoever believes, that with great personages new benefits blot on the remembrance of old injuries, is much deceived. The Duke therefore in this election, was the cause of this own ruin at last.  
Till we come to this seaventh Chapter, I find not any thing much blame-worthy, unless it be on ground he lays in the second Chapter; whereupon he builds most of thiis Fabric, viz. That Subjects must either be dallied or flattered withal, or quite crushed. Whereby our Author advises his Prince to support his authority with two Cardinal Virtues, Dissimulation and Cruelty. He considers not herein that the head is but a member of the body, though the principal; and the end of the parts is the good of the whole. And here he goes against himself in the twenty sixth Chapter of his Rep. l. 1. where he blames Philip of Macedon for such courses, terming them very cruel, and against all Christian manner of living; and that every man should refuse to be a King, and desire rather to live a private life, than to reign so much to the ruin of mankind. The life of Caesar Borgia, which is here given as a pattern to new Princes, we shall find to have been nothing else but a cunning Carriage of things so, that he might thereby first deceive and inveigle, and then suppress all those that could oppose or hinder his ambition. For if you run ever his life, you shall see the Father Pope Alexander the sixth and him, both embarked for his advancement, wherein they engaged the Papal authority, and reputation of Religion; for faith and conscience these men never knew, though they exacted it of others: there was never promise made, but it was only so far kept as served for advantage; Liberali ey was made use of; Clemency and Cruelty, all alike, as they might serve to work with their purposes. All was sacrificed to ambition; no friendship could tie these men, nor any religion: and no marvel: for ambition made them forget both God and man. But see the end of all this cunning: though this Caesar Borgia contrived all his business so warily, that our Author much commends him, and he had attained near the pitch of his hopes, and had provided for each misadventure could befall him its remedy; Policy showed it selefe unbiased; for he foresaw not at the time of his Father's death, he himself should be brought unto death's door also. And me thinks this Example might have given occasion to our Author to confess, that surely there is a God that ruleth the earth. And many times God cuts off those cunning and mighty men in the height of their purposes, when they think they have near surmounted all dangers and difficulties. To the intent that the living may know, that the most high ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over in the basest of men. Daniel. 4. 17.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Concerning those who by wicked means have attained to a Principality.  
BUt because a man becomes a Prince of a private man two ways, which cannot wholly be attributed either to Fortune or Virtue, I think not fit to let them pass me: howbeit the one of them may be more largely discoursed upon, where the Republics are treated of. These are, when by some wicked and unlawful means a man rises to the Principality; or when a private person by the favour of his fellow Citizens becomes Prince of his country. And speaking of the first manner, it shall be made evident by two Examples, the one ancient, the other modern, without entering otherwise into the justice or merit of this part; for I take it that these are sufficient for any body that is forced to follow them. Agathocles the Sicilian, not of a private man only, but from a base and abject fortune, got to be King of Siracusa. This man borne but of a Potter, continued always a wicked life throughout all the degrees of this fortune: nevertheless he accompanied his lewdness with such a courage and resolution, that applying himself to military affairs, by the degrees thereof he attained to be Praetour of Siracusa, and being settled in that degree, and having determined that he would become Prince, and hold that by violence and without obligation to any other, which by consent had been granted him: and to this purpose having had some private intelligence touching his design with Amilcar the Carithaginian, who was employed with his army in Sicily, one morning gathered the people together and the Senate of Syracuse, as if he had some what to advise with them of matters belonging to the Commonwealth, and upon a sign given, caused his soldiers to kill his Senators, and the richest of the people; who being slain, he usurped the Principality of that City without any civil strife: and however he was twice broken by the Carthaginians, and at last besieged, was able not only to defend his own City, but leaving part of his own army at the defence thereof, with the other invaded Africa, and in a short time freed Siracusa from the siege, and brought the Carthaginians into extreme necessity, who were constrained to accord with him, be contented with the possession of Africa, and quit Sicily to Agathocles. He than that should consider the actions and valour of this man, would not see any, or very few things to be attributed unto Fortune; seeing that as is formerly said, not by any one's favour, but by the degrees of service in war with many sufferings and dangers, to which he had risen, he came to the Principality; and that he maintaned afterwards with so many resolute and hazardous undertake. Yet cannot this be termed virtue or valour to flay his own Citizens, betray his friends, to be without faith, without pity, without religion, which ways are of force to gain dominion, but not glory: for if Agathocles his valour be well weighed, in his enturing upon, and coming off from dangers, and the greatness of his courage, in supporting and mastering of adversities, no man can see why he should be thought any way inferior even to the ablest Captains. Notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with innumerable wickednesses, allow not that he should be celebrated among the most excellent men. That cannot then be attributed to Fortune or Virtue, which without the one or the other was attained to by him. In our days, while Alexander the sixth held the sea, Oliverotie of Fermo, who some few years before had been left young by his parents, was brought up under the care of an uncle of his on the mother's side, called John Foliani, and in the beginning of his youth given, by him to serve in the wars under Paulo Vitelli: to the end that being well instructed in that discipline, he might rise to some worthy degree in the wars. Afterwards when Paulo was dead, he served under Vitellozzo his brother, and in very short time, being ingenious, of a good personage, and brave courage, he became one of the prime men among the troops he served in: but thinking it but servile to depend upon another, he plotted by the aid of some Citizens of Fermo (who liked rather the thraldom of their City than the liberty of it) and by the favour of the Vitelli, to make himself master of Fermo; and writ to John Foliani, that having been many years from home, he had a mind to come and see him and the City, and in some part take notice os his own patrimony; and because he had not employed himself but to purchase honour, to the end his Citizens might perceive, that he had not vainly spent his time, he had a desire to come in good equipage and accompanied with a hundred horse of his friends and servants; and he entreated him that he would be pleased so to take order, that he might be honourably received by the inhabitants of Fermo, which turned as well to his honour that was his uncle, as his that was the nephew. In this, John failed not in any office of courtesy due to his nephew: and caused him to be well received by them of Fermo, and lodged him in his own house: where having passed some days, and stayed to put in order somewhat that was necessary for his intended villainy, he made a very solemn feast, whether he invited John Foliani, and all the prime men of Fermo: and when all their cheer was ended, and all their other entertainments, as in such feasts it is customary, Oliverotto of purpose moved some grave discourses; speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander, and Caesar his son, and their undertake; where unto John and the others making answer, he of a sudden stood up, saying, that those were things to be spoken of in a more secret place, and so retired into a chamber, whether John and all the others Citizens followed him; nor were they sooner set down there, than from some secret place therein came forth divers soldiers, who slew John and all the others: after which homicide Oliverotto got a horseback and ravaged the whole town, and besieged the supreme Magistrate in the palace, so that for fear they were all constrained to obey him, and to settle a government, whereof he made himself Prince; and they being all dead who, had they been discontented with him, could have hurt him; he strengthened himself with new civil and military orders, so that in the space of a year that he held the Principality, he was not only secure in the City of Fermo, but became fearful to all his neighbours; and the conquest of him would have proved difficult, as that of Agathocles, had he not let himself been deceived by Caesar Borgia, when at Sinigallia, as before was said, he took the Orsini and Vitelli: where he also being taken a year after he had committed the parricide, was strangled together with Vitellozzo (whom he had had, for master both of his virtues and vices.) Some man might doubt from whence it should proceed, that Agathocles, and such like, after many treacheries and crueltyes, could possibly live long secure in his own country, and defend himself from his foreign enemies, and that never any of his own Citizens conspired against him, seeing that by means of cruelty, many others have never been able even in peaceable times to maintain their States, much less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this proceeds from the well, or ill using of those cruelties: they may be termed well used (if it be lawful to say well of evil) that are put in practice only once of necessity for security's sake, not insisting therein afterwards; but there is use made of them for the subject's profit, as much as may be. But those that are ill used, are such as though they be but few in the beginning, yet they multiply rather in time, than diminish. They that take that first way, may with the help of God, and men's care, find some remedy for their State, as Agathocles did: for the others, it is impossible they should continue. Whereupon it is to be noted, that in the laying hold of a State, the usurper thereof aught to run over and execute all his cruelties at once, that he be not forced often to return to them, and that he may be able, by not renewing of them, to give men some security, and gain their affections by doing them some courtesies. He that carries it otherwise, either for fearfulness, or upon evil advice, is always constrained to hold his sword drawn in his hand; nor ever can heerely upon his subjects, there being no possibility for them, because of his daily and continual injuries, to live in any safety: for his injuries should be done altogether, that being seldomer t●sted, they might less offend; his favours should be bestowed by little, and little to the end they might keep their taste the better; and above all things a Prince must live with his subjects in such sort, that no accident either of good or evil can make him vary: for necessity coming upon him by reason of adversries, thou hast not time given thee to make advantage of thy cruelties; and the favours which then thou bestowest, will little help thee, being taken as if they came from thee perforce, and so yield no return of thanks.   

CHAP. IX.  
Of the Civil Principality.  
BUt coming to the other part, when a principal Citizen, not by villainy, or any other insufferable violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens becomes Prince of his native country: which we may term a Civil Principality; nor to attain hereunto is Verve wholly ' or Fortune wholly necessary, but rather a fortunate cunning: I say, this Principality is climbed up to, either by the people's help, or the great men's. For, in every City we find these two humours differ; and they spring from this, that the people desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are desirous to command and oppress the people: and from these two several appetites, arise in the City one of these three effects, either a Principality, or Liberty, or Tumultuary licentionsnesse. The Principality is caused either by the people, or the great ones, according as the one or other of these factions have the occasion offered; for the great ones seeing themselves not able to resist the people, begin to turn the whole reputation to one among them, and make him Prince, whereby they may under his shadow vent their spleens. The people also, not being able to support the great men's insolences, converting the whole reputation to one man, create him their Prince, to be protected by his authority. He that comes to the Principality by the assistance of the great ones, subsists with more difficulty, than he that attains to it by the people's favour; for he being made Prince, hath many about him, who account themselves his equals, and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure. But he that gains the Principality by the people's favour, finds himself alone in his throne, and hath none or very few near him that are not very supple to bend: besides this, the great ones cannot upon easy terms be satisfied, or without doing of wrong to others, where as a small matter contents the people: for the end which the people propound to themselves, is more honest than that of the great men, these desiring to oppress, they only not to be oppressed. To this may be added also, that the Prince which is the people's enemy, can never well secure himself of them, because of their multitude; well may he be sure of the Nobles, they being but a few. The worst that a Prince can look for of the people become his enemy, is to be abandoned by them: but when the greatones once grow his enemies, he is not only to fear their abandoning of him, but their making of a party against him also: for there being in them more forecast and craft, they always take time by the forelocks whereby to save themselves, and seek credit with him who they hope shall get the mastery. The Prince likewise is necessitated always to live with the same people, but can do well enough without the same great men; he being able to create new ones, and destroy them again every day, and to take from them, and give them credit as he pleases: and to clear this part, I say, that great men ought to be considered two ways principally, that is, if they take thy proceedings so much to heart, as to engage their fortunes wholly in thine, in case they lie not always catching at spoil, they ought to be well honoured and esteemed: those that bind themselves not to thy fortune, are to be considered also two ways; either they do it for lack of courage, and natural want of spirit, and then shouldst thou serve thyself of them, and of them especially that are men of good advice; for if thy affairs prosper, thou dost thyself honour thereby; if crossed, thou needst not fear them: but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose, and upon occasion of ambition, it is a sign they think more of themselves than of thee: and of these the Prince ought to beware, and account of them as his discovered enemies: for always in thy adversity they will give a hand too to ruin thee. Therefore ought he that comes to be Prince by the people's favour, keep them his friends: which he may easily do, they desiring only to live free from oppression: but he that becomes Prince by the great men's favour, against the will of the people, aught above all things to gain the people to him, which he may easily effect, when he takes upon him their protection: And because men when they find good, where they look for evil, are thereby more endered to their benefactor, therefore grows the people so pliant in their subjection to him, as if by their favours he had attained his dignity. And the Prince is able to gain them to his side by many ways, which because they vary according to the subject, no ●ertaine rule can be given thereupon; wherefore we shall let them pass I will only conclude, that it is necessary for a Prince to have the people his friend; otherwise in his adversities he hath no help. Nabis Prince of the Spartans' supported the siege of all Greece, and an exceeding victorious army of the Romans, and against those defended his native country and State, and this sufficed him alone, that as the danger came upon him, he secured himself of a fewer; whereas if the people had been his enemy, this had nothing availd him. And let no man think to overthrow this my opinion with that common proverb, that He who relies upon the people, lays his foundation in the dirt; for that is true where a private Citizen grounds upon them making his account that the people shall free him, when either his enemies or the Magistrates oppress him: In this case he should find himself often deceived, as it befell the Gracchyes in Rome, and in Florence George Scali: but he being a Prince that grounds thereupon, who can command, and is a man of courage, who hath his wits about him in his adversiryes, and wants not other preparations, and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and orders, shall not prove deceived by them, and shall find he hath laid good foundations. These Principalityes are wont to be upon the point of falling when they go about to skip from the civil order to the absolute: for these Princes either command of themselves, or by the Magistrate; in this last case their State is more weak and dangerous, because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these Citizens, who then areset over the Magistrates, who especially in adverse times are able with facility to take their State from them either by rising up against them, or by nor obeying them; and then the Prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him: for the Citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the Magistrates, are not like in those fractions to obey his: and in doubtful times he shall always have greatest penury of whom he may trust; for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times, when the Citizens have need of the State; for then every one runs, and every one promises, and very one will venture his life for him, when there is no danger near; but in times of hazard, when the State hath need of Citizens, there are but few of them then, and so much the more is this experience dangerous, in that it can be but once made. Therefore a prudent Prince ought to devise a way whereby his Citizens always and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government, and they shall always after prove faithful to him.   

CHAP. X.  
In what manner the Forces of all Principalities ought to be measured.  
IT is requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities, to have another consideration of them, that is, if a Prince have such dominions, that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself, or else whether he hath always need of another to defend him. And to clear this point the better, I judge them able to stand of themselves, who are of power either for their multitudes of men, or quantity of money, to bring into the field a complete army, and join battle with whoever comes to assail them: and so I think those always to stand in need of others help, who are not able to appear in the field against the enemy, but are forced to retire within their walls and guard them. Touching the first case, we have treated already, and shall add somewhat thereto as occasion shall require. In the second case, we cannot say other, save only to encourage such Princes to fortify and guard their own Capital city, and of the country about, not to hold much account; and whoever shall have well fortified that town, and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects, as hath been formerly said, and hereafter shall be, shall never be assailed but with great regard; for men willingly undertake not enterprises, where they see difficulty to work them through; nor can much facility be there found, where one assails him, who hath his town strong and well guarded, and is not hated of his people. The cities of Germany are very free; they have but very little of the country about them belonging to them; and they obey the Emperor, when they please, and they stand not in fear, neither of him nor any other Potentate about them: for they are in such a manner fortified, that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious: for all of them have ditches and rampires, and good store of Artillery, and always have their public cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a year: besides this, whereby to feed the common people, and without any loss to the public, they have always in common whereby they are able for a year to employ them in the labour of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city, and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves: they hold up also the military exercises in repute, and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them. A Prince than that is master of a good strong city, and causeth not himself to be hated, cannot be assaulted; and in case he were, he that should assail him, would be fain to quit him with shame: for the affairs of the world are so various, that it is almost impossible that an army can lie encamped before a town for the space of a whole year: and if any should reply, that the people having their possessions abroad, in case they should see them a fire, would not have patience, and the redious siege and their love to themselves would make them for get their Prince: I answer that a Prince puissant and courageous, will easily master those difficulties, now giving his subjects hope, that the mischiief will not be of durance; sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies, and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy. Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burn and waste their country, upon his arrival, and at those times while men's minds are yet warm, and resolute in their defence: and therefore so much the less ought a Prince doubt: for after some few days, that their courages grow cool, the damages are all done, and mischiefs received, and there is no help for it, and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince, thinking he is now more bound to them, their houses having for his defence been fired, and their possessions wasted; and men's nature is as well to hold themselves obliged for the kindnesses they do, as for those they receive; whereupon if all be well weighed, a wise Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his Citizen's hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege, when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition.   

CHAP. XI.  
Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities.  
THere remains now only that we treat of the Ecclesiastical Principalities, about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten: for they are attained to either by virtue, or Fortune; and without the one or the other they are held: for they are maintained by orders inverterated in the religion, all which are so powerful and of such nature, that they maintain their Princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live. These only have an Estate and defend it not; have subjects and govern them not; and yet their States because undefended, are not taken from them; nor their subjects, though not governed, care not, think not, neither are able to alien themselves from them. These Principalities than are only happy and secure: but they being sustained by superior causes, whereunto humane understanding reaches not, I will not meddle with them: for being set up and maintained by God, it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them. Yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds, that the Church in temporal power hath attained to such greatness, seeing that till the time of Alexander the sixth, the Italian Potentates, and not only they who are entitled the potentates, but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition, in regard of the temporality, made but small account of it; and now a King of France trembles at the power thereof; and it hath been able to drive him out of Italy, and ruin the Venetians; and however this be well known, me thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory. Before that Charles King of France passed into Italy, this country was under the rule of the Pope, Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These Potentates took two things principally to their care; the one, that no foreigner should invade Italy; the other, that no one of them should enlarge their State. They, against whom this care was most taken, were the Pope and the Venetians; and to restrain the Venetians, there needed the union of all the rest, as it was in the defence of Ferrara; and to keep the Pope low, they served themselves of the Barons of Rome, who being divided into two factions, the Orsini and Colonnesi, there was always occasion of offence between them, who standing ready with their arms in hand in the view of the Pope, held the Popedom weak and feeble: and however sometimes there arose a courageous Pope, as was Sextus; yet either his fortune, or his wisdom was not able to free him of these incommodities, and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof; for in ten years; which time, one with another, Popes ordinarily lived, with much ado could they bring low one of the factions. And if, as we may say, one had near put out the Colonnesi, there arose another enemy to the Orsini, who made them grow again, so that there was never time quite to root them out. This than was the cause, why the Pope's temporal power was of small esteem in Italy; there arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixth, who of all the Popes that ever were, showed what a Pope was able to do with money and forces: and he effected, by means of his instrument, Duke Valentine, and by the occasion of the French men's passage, all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Duke's actions: and however his purpose was nothing at all to enlarge the Church dominions, but to make the Duke great; yet what he did, turned to the Church's advantage, which after his death when the Duke was taken away, was the heir of all his pains. Afterwards succeeded Pope Julius, and found the Church great, having all Romania, and all the Barons of Rome being quite rooted out, and by Alexander's persecutions, all their factions worn down; he found also the way open for the heaping up of moneys, never practised before Alexander's time; which things Julius not only followed, but augmented; and thought to make himself master of Bolonia, and extinguish the Venetians, and chase the French men out of Italy: and these designs of his proved all lucky to him, and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the Church, and in no private regard: he kept also the factions of the Orsins and Colonnesi, in the same State he found them: and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration; yet two things have held them quiet; the one the power of the Church, which somewhat affrights them; the other because they have no Cardinals of their factions, who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them: nor shall these parties ever be at rest, while they have Cardinals; because they nourish the factious both in Rome, and abroad; and the Barons than are forced to undertake the defence of them: and thus from the Prelate's ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons. And now hath Pope Leo his Holiness found the Popedom exceeding puissant, of whom it is hoped, that if they amplified it by arms he by his goodness, and infinite other virtues, will much more advantage and dignify it.   

CHAP. XII.  
How many sorts of Military discipline there are and touching Mercenary soldiers.  
HAving treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities, which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon, and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being, and showed the ways whereby many have sought to gain, and hold them, it remains now that I speak in general of the offences and defences, that may chance in each of the forenamed. We have formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good foundations laid; otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack. The Principal foundations that all States have, as well new, as old, or mixed, are good laws, and good arms; and because there cannot be good laws, where there are not good arms; and where there are good arms, there must needs be good laws, I will omit to discourse of the laws, and speak of arms. I say then that the arms, wherewithal a Prince defends his State, either are his own, or mercenary, or auxiliary, or mixed. Those that are mercenary and auxiliar, are unprofitable, and dangerous, and if any one holds his State founded upon mercenary arms, he shall never be quiet, nor secure, because they are never well united, ambitious, and without discipline, treacherous, among their friends stout, among their enemies cowardly; they have no fear of God, nor keep any faith with men; and so long only defer they the doing of mischief, till the enemy comes to assul thee; and in time of peace thou art despoiled by them, in war by thy enemies: the reason hereof is, because they have no other love, nor other cause to keep them in the field, but only a small stipend, which is not of force to make them willing to hazard their lives for thee: they are willing indeed to be thy soldiers, till thou goest to fight; but then they fly, or run away; which thing would cost me but small pains to persuade; for the ruin of Italy hath not had any other cause now a days, than for that it hath these many years relied upon mercenary arms; which a good while since perhaps may have done some man some service, and among themselves they may have been thought valiant: but so soon as any foreign enemy appeared, they quickly showed what they were. Whereupon Charles the King of France, without opposition, made himself master of all Italy: and he that said, that the causes thereof were our faults, said true; but these were not those they believed, but what I have told; and because they were the Prince's faults, they also have suffered the punishment. I will suller show the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary Captains are either very able men, or not: if they be, thou canst not repose any trust in them: for they will always aspire unto their own proper advancements, either by suppressing of thee that art their Lord, or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose: but if the Captain be not valorons, he ordinarily ruins thee: and in case it be answered, that whoever shall have his arms in his hands, whether mercenary or not, will do so: I would reply, that arms are to be employed either by a Prince, or Commonwealth. The Prince ought to go in person, and perform the office of a commander: the Republic is to send forth her Citizens: and when she sends forth one that proves not of abilities, she ought to change him then; and when he does prove valorous, to bridle him so by the laws, that he exceed not his commission. And by experience we see, that Princes and Republics of themselves alone, make very great conquests; but that mercenary arms never do other than harm; and more hardly falls a Republic armed with her own arms under the obedience of one of her own Citizens, than one that is armed by foreign arms. Rome and Sparta subsisted many ages armed and free. The Swissers are exceedingly well armed, and yet very free. Touching mercenary arms that were of old, we have an example of the Car thagians, who near upon were oppressed by their own mercenary soldiers, when the first war with the Romans was finished; however the Carthagians had their own Citizens for their Captains. Philip of Macedon was made by the Thebans after Epaminondas his death, General of their Armies; and after the victory, he took from them their liberty. The Milaneses when Duke Philip was dead, entertained Francis Sforza into their pay against the Venetians, who having vanquished their enemy at Cara●aggio, afterwards joined with them, where by to usurp upon the Milanese his Masters. Sforza his father, being in Joan the Queen of Naples pay, left her on a sudden disarmed; whereupon she, to save her Kingdom, was constrained to cast herself into the King of Arragon's bosom. And in case the Venetians and the Florentines have formerly augmented their State with these kind of arms, and their own Captains, and yet none of them have ever made themselves their Princes, but rather defended them: I answer, that the Florentines in this case have had fortune much their friend: for of valorous Captains, which they might any way fear, some have not been victors, some have had opposition, and others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way. He who overcame not, was John Aouto, of whose faith there could no proof be made, being he vanquished not; but every one will acknowledge, that, had he vanquished, the Florentines were at his discretion. Sforza had always the Bracceschi for his adversaries, so that they were as a guard one upon another. Francis converted all his ambition against Lombardy. Braccio against the Church, and the Kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which followed a while ago. The Florentines made Paul Vitelli their General, a throughly advised man, and who from a private fortune had rose to very great reputation: had he taken Pisa, no man will deny but that the Florentines must have held fast with him; for had he been entertained in their enemies pay, they had no remedy; and they themselves holding of him, of force were to obey him. The Venetians, if we consider their proceedings, we shall see wrought both warily and gloriously, while themselves made war, which was before their undertake by land, where the gentlemen with their own Commons in arms behaved themselves bravely: but when they began to fight by land, they lost their valour, and followed the customs of Italy; and in the beginning of their enlargement by land, because thee had not much territory, and yet were of great reputation, they had not much cause to fear their Captains; but as they began to extend their bounds, which was under their Commander Carminiola, they had a taste of this error: for perceiving he was exceeding valorous, having under his conduct beaten the Duke of Milan; and knowing on the other side, how he was cold in the war, they judged that they could not make any great conquest with him; and because they neither would, nor could cashier him, that they might not lose, what they had gotten, they were forced for their own safeties to put him to death. Since they have had for their General Bartholomew of Berganio, Robert St. Severin, the Count of Petilian, and such like: whereby they were to fear their losses, as well as to hope for gain: as it fell out afterwards at Vayla, where in one day they lost that, which with so much pains they had gotten in eight hundred years: for from these kind of arms grow slack and slow and weak gains; but sadden and wonderful losses: And because I am now come with these examples into Italy, which now these many years, have been governed by mercenary arms, I will search deeper into them, to the end that their course and progress being better discovered, they may be the better amended. You have to understand, that so soon as in these later times the yoke of the Italian Empire began to be shaken off, and the Pope had gotten reputation in the temporality, Italy was divided into several States: for many of the great cities took arms against their Nobility; who under the Emperor's protection had held them in oppression; and the Pope favoured these, whereby he might get himself reputation, in the temporality; of many others, their Citizens became Princes, so that hereupon Italy being come into the Church's hands as it were, and some few Republics, those Priests and Citizens not accustomed to the use of arms, began to take strangers to their pay. The first that gave reputation to these soldiers was Alberick of Como in Romania. From his discipline among others descended Brachio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy; after these followed all others, who even till our days have commanded the arms of Italy; and the success of their valour hath been, that it was overrun by Charles, pillaged by Lewis, forced by Ferdinand, and disgraced by the Swissers. The order which they have held, hath been, first whereby to give reputation to their own arms to take away the credit of the Infantry. This they did, because they having no State of their own, but living upon their industry, their few foot gave them no reputation, and many they were not able to maintain; whereupon they reduced themselves to cavalero, and so with a supportable number they were entertained and honoured: and matters were brought to such terms, that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers you should not find two thousand foot. They had moreover used all industry to free themselves and their soliders of all pains and fear, in their skirmishes, not killing, but taking one another prisoners, and without ransom for their freedom; they repaired not all to their tents by night, nor made palizado or trench thereabout, nor lay in the field in the summer: and all these things were thus contrived and agreed of among them in their military orders, whereby (as is said) to avoid pains and dangers, insomuch as they have brought Italy into slavery and disgrace.   

CHAP. XIII.  
Of Auxiliary Soldiers, mixed, and native.  
THe Auxiliary forces, being the other kind of unprofitable arms, are, when any puissant one is called in, who with his forces comes to assist and defend thee; such as in these later times did Pope Julius' use, who having seen the evil proof of his mercenary soldiers in the enterprise of Ferrara, applied himself to the Auxiliaries, and agreed with Ferdinand King of Spain, that with his Forces he should aid him. These arms may be profitable and advantageous for themselves; but for him that calls them in, hurtful; because in losing, thou art lest defeated; and conquering, thou becomest their prisoner. And however that of these examples the ancient stories are full fraught; yet will I not part from this of Pope Julius the second, which is as yet fresh: whose course could not have been more inconsiderate, for the desire he had to get Ferrara, putting himself wholly into stranger's hands: but his good fortune caused another cause to arise, that hindered him from receiving the fruit of his evil choice; for his Auxiliaries being broken at Ravenna, and the Swissers thereupon arriving, who put the Conquerors to flight beyond all opinion, even their own and others, he chanced not to remain his enemy's prisoner, they being put to flight, nor prisoner to his Auxiliaries, having vanquished by other forces than theirs. The Florentines being wholly disarmed, brought ten thousand French to Pisa for to take it, by which course they ran more hazard, than in any time of their troubles. The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppress his neighbours, brought into Greece ten thousand Turks, who when the war was ended, could not be got out thence, which was the beginning of Greece's fervitude under the Infidels. He than that will in no case be able to overcome, let him serve himself of these arms; for they are much more dangerous than the mercenaries; for by those thy ruin is more suddenly executed; for they are all united, and all bent to the obedience of another. But for the mercenaries to hurt thee, when they have vanquished, there is no more need of time, and greater occasion, they not being all united in a body, and being found out and paid by thee, wherein a third that thou mak'st their head, cannot suddenly gain so great authority, that he can endamage thee. Insumme, in the mercenaries their sloth and laziness to fight is more dangerous: in the auxiliaries their valonr. Wherefore a wise Prince hath always avoided these kind of arms, and betaken himself to his own, and desired rather to loss with his own, than conquer with another's, accounting that not a true victory which was gotten with others arms. I will not doubt to allege Caesar Bargia, and his actions. This Duke entered into Romania with auxiliary arms s bringing with him all French soldiers: but afterwards not accounting those arms secure, bend hinselfe to mercenaries, judging less danger to be in those, and took in pay the Orsini and the Vitelli, which afterwards in the proof of them, finding wavering, unfaithful, and dangerous, he extinguished, and betook himself to his own; and it may easily be perceived what difference there is between the one and the other of these arms, considering the difference that was between the Duke's reputation, when he had the French men alone, and when he had the Orsini and Vitelli; but when he remained with his own, and stood of himself, we shall find it was much augmented: nor ever was it of grate esteem, but when every one saw, that he wholly possessed his own a mes. I thought not to have parted from the Italian examples of late memory; but that I must not let pass that of Hiero the Syracusan, being one of those I formerly named. This man (as I said before) being made general of the Siracusans forces, knew presently that mercenary soldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings, as our Italians are; and finding no way either to hold, or cashier them, made them all be cut to pieces, and afterwards waged war with his own men, and none others. I will also call to memory a figure of the old Testament serving just to this purpose. When David presented himself before Saul to go to fight with Goliath the Philistims Champion, Saul to encourage him, clad him with his own arms, which David when he had them upon his back, refused, saying, he was not able to make any proof of himself therein, and therefore would go meet the enemy with his own sling and sword. In sum, others arms either fall from thy shoulders, or cumber or straighten thee. Charles the seventh, Father of Lewis the eleventh, having by his good fortune and valour set France at liberty from the English, knew well this necessity of being armed with his own arms, and settled in his Kingdom the ordinances of men at arms, and infantry. Afterwards King Lewis his son abolished those of the infantry, and began to take the Swissers to pay; which error followed by the others, is (as now indeed it appears) the cause of that Kingdom's dangers. For having given reputation to the Swissers, they have rendered all their own arms contemptible; for this hath wholly ruind their foot, and obliged their men at arms to foreign arms: for being accustomed to serve with the Swissers, they think they are not able to overcome without them. From whence it comes that the French are not of force against the Swissers, and without them also against others they use not to adventure. Therefore are the French armies mixed, part more naries, and part natives, which arms are far better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries, and much inferior to the natives; and let the said example suffice for that: for the Kingdom of France would have been unconquerable, if Charles his order had been augmented and maintained but men in their small wisdom begin a thing, which then because it hath some favour of good, discovers not the poison that lurks thereunder, as I before said of the hectic fevers. Wherefore that Prince which perceives not mischiefs, but as they grow up, is not truly wise; and this is given but to few: and if we consider the first ruin of the Roman Empire, we shall find it was from taking the Goths first into their pay; for from that beginning the forces of the Roman Empire began to grow weak, and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them. I conclude then that without having arms of their own, no Principality can be secure, or rather is wholly obliged to fortune, not having valour to shelter it in adversity. And it was always the opinion and saying of wise men, that nothing is so weak and unsettled, as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones own proper forces: which are those that are composed of thy subjects, or Citizens, or servants; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary; and the manner how to order those well, is easy to find out, if those orders above named by me, shall be but run over, and if it shall be but considered, how Philip Alexander the Great his Father, and in what manner many Republics and Princes have armed and appointed themselves, to which appointments I refer myself wholly.   

CHAP. XIV.  
What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline.  
A Prince than ought to have no other aim, nor other thought, nor take any thing else for his proper art, but war, and the orders and discipline thereof: for that is the sole art which belongs to him that commands, and is of so great excellency, that not only those that are borne Princes, it maintains so; but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity. And it is seen by the contrary, that when Princes have given themselves more to their delights, than to the wars, they have lost their States; and the first cause that makes thee lose it, is the neglect of that art; and the cause that makes thee gain it, is that thou art experienced and approud in that art. Francis Sforza by being a man at, arms, of a private man became Duke of Milan; and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and pains belonging to those employments of Princes, became private-men. For among other mischiefs thy neglect of arms brings upon thee, it causes thee to be contemned, which is one of those disgraces, from which a Prince ought to keep himself, as hereafter shall be said: for from one that is disarmed to one that is armed there is no proportion; and reason will not, that he who is in arms, should willingly yield obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them, and that he that is disarmed should be in security among his armed vassals; for there being disdain in the one, and suspicion in the other, it is impossible these should ever well cooperate. And therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienced in matter of war, besides the other infelicities belonging to him, as is said, cannot be had in any esteem among his soldiers, nor yet trust in them. Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the art of war, and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the war; which he may be able to do two ways; the one practically, and in his labours and recreations of his body, the other theorically. And touching the practic part, he ought besides the keeping of his own subjcts well trained up in the discipline and exercise of arms, give himself much to the chase, whereby to accustom his body to pains, and partly to understand the manner of situations, and to know how the mountains arise, which way the valleys open themselves, and how the plains are distended flat abroad, and to conceive well the nature of the rivers, and marish ground, and herein to bestow very much care, which knowledge is profitable in two kinds: first he learns thereby to know his own country, and is the better enabled to understand the defence thereof, and afterwards by means of this knowledge and experience in, these situations, easily comprehend any other situation, which a new he hath need to view, for the little hillocks. valleys, plains, rivers, and marish places. For example, they in Tuscany are like unto those of other countries: so that from the knowledge of the site of one country, it is easy to attain to know that of others. And that Prince that wants this skill, fails of the principal part a Commander should be furnished with; for this shows the way how to discover the enemy, to pitch the camp, to lead their armies, to order their battles, and also to besiege a town at thy best advantage. Philopomenes Prince of the achaians, among other praises Writers give him, they say, that in time of peace, he thought not upon any thing so much as the practice of war; and whensoever he was abroad in the field to disport himself with his friends, would often stand still, and discourse with them, in case the enemies were upon the top of that hill, and we here with our army, whether of us two should have the advantage, and how might we safely go to find them, keeping still our orders; and if we would retire ourselves, what course should we take if they retired, how should we follow them? & thus on the way, propounded them all such accidents could befall in any army; would hear their opinions, and tell his own, and confirm it by argument; so that by his continual thought hereupon, when ever he led any army no chance could happen, for which he had not a remedy. But touching the exercise of the mind, a Prince ought to read Histories, and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men, mark how they have behaved themselves in the wars, examine the occasions of their victories, and their losses; whereby they may be able to avoid these, and obtain those; and above all, do as formerly some excellent man hath done, who hath taken upon him to imitate, if any one that hath gone before him hath left his memory glorious; the course he took, and kept always near unto him the remembrances of his actions and worthy deeds: as it is said, that Alexander the great imitated Achilles; Caesar Alexander, and Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, may easily perceive afterwards in Scipio's life how much glory his imitation gained him, and how much Scipio did conform himself in his chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality with those things, that are written by Xenophon of Cyrus. Such like ways ought a wise Prince to take, nor ever be idle in quiet times, but by his pains then, as it were provide himself of store, whereof he may make some use in his adversity, the end that when the times change, he may be able to resist the storms of his hard fortune.   

CHAP. XV.  
Of those things, in respect whereof, men, and especially Princes, are praised, or dispraised.  
IT now remains that we consider what the conditions of a Prince ought to be, and his terms of government over his subjects, and towards his friends. And because I know that many have written hereupon; I doubt, left I venturing also to treat thereof, may be branded with presumption, especially seeing I am like enough to deliver an opinion different from others. But my intent being to write for the advantage of him that understands me, I thought it fitter to follow the effectual truth of the matter, than the imagination thereof; And many Principalities and Republics, have been in imagination, which neither have been seen nor known to be indeed: for there is such a distance between how men do live, and how men ought to live; that he who leaves that which is done, for that which ought to be done, learns sooner his ruin than his preservation; for that man who will profess honesty in all his actions, must needs go to ruin among so many that are dishonest. Whereupon it is necessary for a Prince, desiring to preserve himself, to be able to make use of that honesty, and to lay it aside again, as need shall require. Passing by then things that are only in imagination belonging to a Prince, to discourse upon those that are really true; I lay that all men, whensover mention is made of them, and especially Princes, because they are placed aloft in the view of all, are taken notice of for some of these qualities, which procure them either commendations or blame: and this is that some one is held liberal, some miserable, (miserable I say, nor covetous; for the covetous desire to have, though it were by rapine; but a miserable man is he, that too much for bears to make use of his own) some free givers, others extortioners; some cruel, others piteous; the one a Leaguebreaker, another faithful; the one effeminate and of small courage, the other fierce and couragieus; the one courteous, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other chaste; the one of fair dealing, the other wily and crafty; the one hard, the other easy; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other incredulous, and such like. I know that every one will confess, it were exceedingly praise worthy for a Prince to be adorned with all these above named qualities that are good: but because this is not possible, nor do humane conditions admit such perfection in virtues, it is necessary for him to be so discreet, that he know how to avoid the infamy of those vices which would thrust him out of his State; and if it be possible, beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence; but where it cannot be, let them pass with less regard. And yet, let him not stand much upon it, though he incur the infamy of those vices, without which he can very hardly save his State: for if all be throughly considered, some things we shall find which will have the colour and very face of Virtue, and following them, they will lead the to thy destruction; whereas some others that shall ●s much seem vice, if we take the course they lead us, shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being.  
The second blemish in this our Authors book, I find in his fifteenth Chapter: where he instructs his Prince to use such an ambidexterity as that he may serve himself either of virtue, or vice, according to his adunatage, which in true policy is neither good in attaining the Principality nor in securing it when it is attained. For Politics, presuppose Ethiques, which will never allow this rule: as that a man might make this small difference between virtue, and vice, that he may indifferently lay aside, or take up the, one or the other, and put it in practice as best conduceth to the end he propounds himself. I doubt our Author would have blamed David's regard to Saul, when 1 Sam. 24. in the cave he cut off the lap of Saul's garment, and spared his head; and afterwards in the 26. when he forbade Abishai to strike him as he lay sleeping. Worthy of a Prince's consideration is that saying of Abigal to David 1 Sam. 25. 30. It shall come to pass when the Lord shall have done to my Lord according to all that he hath spoken concerning thee, & shall have appointed thee Ruler over Israel, that this shall be no grief to thee, nor offence of heart unto my Lord, that thou hast forborn to shed blood etc. For surely the conscience of this evil ground whereupon they have either built, or underpropped their tyranny, causes men, as well metus as spes in longum projicere, which sets them a work on further mischief.   

CHAP. XVI.  
Of Liberality, and Miserableness.  
BEginning then at the first of the above mentioned qualities, I say that it would be very well to be accounted liberal: nevertheless, liberality used in such a manner, as to make thee be accounted so, wrongs thee: for in case it be used virtuously, and as it ought to he, it shall never come to be taken notice of, so as to free thee from the infamy of its contrary. And therefore for one to hold the name of liberal among men, it were needful not to omit any sumptuous quality, insomuch that a Prince always so disposed, shall waste all his revenues, and at the end shall be forced, if he will still maintain that reputation of liberality, heavily to burden his subjects, and become a great exactor; and put in practise all those things that can be done to get money: which begins to make him hateful to his subjects, and fall into every one's contempt, growing necessitous: so that having with this liberality wronged many, and imparted of his bounty but to a few; he feels every first mischance, and runs a hazard of every first danger. Which he knowing, and desiring to withdraw himself from, incurs presently the disgrace of being termed miserable. A Prince therefore not being able to use this virtue of liberality, without his own damage, in such a sort, that it may be taken notice of, ought, if he be wise, not to regard the name of Miserable; for in time he shall always be esteemed the more liberal, seeing that by his parsimony his own revenues are sufficient for him; as also he can defend himself against whoever makes war against him, and can do some exploits without grieving his subjects: so that he comes to use his liberality to all those, from whom he takes nothing, who are infinite in number; and his miserableness towards those to whom he gives nothing, who are but a few. In our days we have not seen any, but those who have been held miserable, do any great matters; but the others all quite ruind. Pope Julius the second, however he served himself of the name of Liberal, to get the Papacy, yet never intended he to continue it, to the end he might be able to make war against the King of France: and he made so many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax, because his long thrift supplied his large expenses. This present King of Spain could never have undertaken, nor gone through with so many exploits, had he been accounted liberal. Wherefore a Prince ought little to regard (that he may not be driven to pillage his subjects, that he may be able to defend himself, that he may not fall into poverty and contempt, that he be not forced to become an extortioner) though he incur the name of miserable; for this is one of those vices, which does not pluck him from his throne. And if any one should say, Caesar by his liberality obtained the Empire, and many others (because they both were, and were esteemed liberal) attained to exceeding great dignities. I answer, either thou art already come to be a Prince, or thou art in the way to it; in the first case, this liberality is hurtful; in the second, it is necessary to be accounted so; and Caesar was one of those that aspired to the Principality of Rome. But if after he had gotten it, he had survived, and not forborn those expenses, he would quite have ruined that Empire. And if any one should reply; many have been Princes, and with their armies have done great exploits, who have been held very liberal. I answer, either the Prince spends of his own and his subjects, or that which belongs to others: in the first, he ought to be sparing; in the second, he should not omitany part of liberality. And that Prince that goes abroad with his army, and feeds upon prey, and spoil, and tributes, and hath the disposing of that which belongs to others, necessarily should use this liberality; otherwise would his soldiers never follow him; and of that which is neither thine, nor thy subjects, thou mayest well be a free giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar and Alexander; for the spending of that which is another's, takes not away thy reputation, but rather adds to it, only the wasting of that which is thine own hurts thee; nor is there any thing consumes itself so much as liberality, which whilst thou usest, thou losest the means to make use of it, and becomest poor and abject; or to avoid this poverty, an extortioner and hateful person. And among all those things which a Prince ought to beware of, is, to be despised, and odious; to one and the other of which, liberality brings thee. Wherefore there is more discretion to hold the stile of Miserable, which begets an infamy without hatred, than to desire that of Liberal, whereby to incur the necessity of being thought an extortioner, which procures an infamy with hatred.   

CHAP. XVII.  
Of Cruelty, and Clemency, and whether it is better to be beloved, or feared.  
DEscending afterwards unto the other fore-alledged qualities, I say, that every Prince should desire to be held pitiful, and not cruel. Nevertheless ought he beware that he ill uses not this pity. Caesar Borgia was accounted cruel, yet had his cruelty redressed the disorders in Romania, settled it in union, and restored it to peace, and fidelity: which, if it be well weighed, we shall see was an act of more pity, than that of the people of Florence, who to avoid the term of cruelty, suffered Pistoya to fall to destruction. Wherefore a Prince ought not to regard the infamy of cruelty, for to hold his subjects united and faithful: for by giving a very few proofs of himself the other way, he shall be hold more pitiful than they, who through their too much pity, suffer disorders to follow, from whence arise murders and rapines: for these are wont to hurt an entire universality, whereas the executions practised by a Prince, hurt only some particular. And among all sorts of Princes, it is impossible for a new Prince to avoid the name of cruel, because all new States are full of dangers: Whereupon Virgil by the mouth of Dido excuses the inhumanity of her Kingdom, saying,  

Res dura & Regni novitas me talia cogunt  
Moliri & latè fines custode tenere.  
My hard plight and new State force me to guard.  
My confines all about with watch and ward.   
Nevertheless ought he to be judicious in his giving belief to any thing, or moving himself thereat, nor make his people extremely afraid of him; but proceed in a moderate way with wisdom, and humanity, that his too much confidence make him not unwary, and his too much distrust intolerable; from hence arises a dispute, whether it is better to be beloved or feared: I answer, a man would wish he might be the one and the other: but because hardly can they subsist both together, it is much safer to be feared, than be loved; being that one of the two must needs fail; for touching men, we may say this in general, they are unthankful, unconstant, dissemblers, they avoid dangers, and are covetous of gain; and whilst thou dost them good, they are wholly thine; their blood, their fortunes, lives and children are at thy service, as is said before, when the danger is remote; but when it approaches, they revolt. And that Prince who wholly relies upon their words, unfurnished of all other preparations, goes to wrack: for the friendships that are gotten with rewards, and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind, are dearly bought indeed; but they will neither keep long, nor serve well in time of need: and men do less regard to offend one that is supported by love, than by fear. For love is held by a certainty of obligation, which because men are mischievous, is broken upon any occasion of their own profit. But fear restrains with a dread of punishment which never forsakes a man. Yet ought a Prince cause himself to be beloved in such a manner, that if he gains not love, he may avoid hatred: for it may well stand together, that a man may be feared and not hated; which shall never fail, if he abstain from his subjects goods, and their wives; and whensoever he should be forced to proceed against any of their lives, do it when it is to be done upon a just cause, and apparent conviction; but above all things forbear to lay his hands on other men's goods; for men forget sooner the death of their father, than the loss of their patrimony. Moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods, do never fail: and always he that begins to live by rapine, finds occasion to lay hold upon other men's goods: but against men's lives, they are seldom found, and sooner fail. But where a Prince is abroad in the field with his army, and hath a multitude of soldiers under his government, then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it, though he be termed cruel: for unless he be so, he shall never have his soldiers live in accord one with another, nor ever well disposed to any brave piece of service. Among Hannibal's actions of marvel, this is reckoned for one, that having a very huge army, gathered out of several nations, and all led to serve in a strange country, there was never any dissension neither amongst themselves, nor against their General, as well in their bad fortune as their good. Which could not proceed from any thing else than from that barbarous cruelty of his, which together with his exceeding many virtues, rendered him to his soldiers both venerable and terrible; without which, to that ●ff●ct his other virtues had served him to little purpose: and some writers though not of the best advised, on one side admire these his worthy actions, and on the otherside, condemn the principal causes thereof. And that it is true, that his other virtues would not have sufficed him, we may consider in Scipio, the rarest man not only in the days he liv●d, but even in the memory of man; from whom his army rebelled in Spain: which grew only upon his too much clemency, which had given way to his soldiers to become more licentious, than was well tolerable by military discipline: for which he was reproved by Fabius Maximus in the Senate, who termed him the corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrensians having been destroyed by a Lieutenant of Scipio's, were never revenged by him, nor the insolence of that Lieutenant punished; all this arising from his easy nature: so that one desiring to excuse him in the Senate, said, that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults, than to correct the faults of other men: which disposition of his in time would have wronged Scipio's reputation and gloory, had he therewith continued in his commands: but living under the government of the Senate, this quality of his that would have disgraced him not only was concealed, but proved to the advancement of his glory. I conclude then, returning to the purpose of being feared, and beloved; insomuch as men love at their own pleasure, and to serve their own turn, and their fear depends upon the Prince's pleasure, every wise Prince ought to ground upon that which is of himself, and not upon that which is of another: only this, he ought to use his best wits to avoid hatred, as was said.   

CHAP. XVIII.  
In what manner Princes ought to keep their words.  
HOw commendable in a Prince it is to keep his word, and live with integrity, not making use of cunning and subtlety, every one knows well: yet we see by experience in these our days, that those Princes have effected great matters, who have made small reckoning of keeping their words, and have known by their craft to turn and wind men about, and in the end, have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth. You must then know, there are two kinds of combating or fight; the one by right of the laws, the other merely by force. That first way is proper to men, the other is also common to beasts: but because the first many times suffices not, there is a necessity to make recourse to the second; wherefore it behoves a Prince to know how to make good use of that part which belongs to a beast, as well as that which is proper to a man. This part hath been covertly showed to Princes by ancient writers; who say that Achilles and many others of those ancient Princes were entrusted to Chiron the Senator, to be brought up under his discipline: the moral of this, having for their teacher one that was half a beast and half a man, was nothing else, but that it was needful for a Prince to understand how to make his advantage of the one and the other nature, because neither could subsist without the other. A Prince then being necessitated to know how to make use of that part belonging to a beast, aught to serve himself of the conditions of the Fox and the Lion; for the Lion cannot keep himself from snares, nor the Fox defend himself against the Wolves. He had need then be a Fox, that he may beware of the snares, and a Lion that he may scare the wolves. Those that stand wholly upon the Lion, understand not well themselves. And therefore a wise Prince cannot, nor ought not keep his faith given, when the observance thereof turns to disadvantage, and the occasions that made him promise, are past. For if men were all good, this rule would not be allowable; but being they are full of mischief, and would not make it good to thee, neither art thou tied to keep it with them: nor shall a Prince ever want lawful occasions to give colour to this breach. Very many modern examples hereof might be alleged, wherein might be showed how many peaces concluded, and how many promises made, have been violated and broken by the infidelity of Princes; and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath been nearest the Fox in condition. But it is necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition, and to be able to fain and dissemble throughly; and men are so simple, and yield so much to the present necessities, that he who hath a mind to deceive, shall always find another that will be deceived. I will not conceal any one of the examples that have been of late. Alexander the sixth, never did any thing else than deceive men, and never meant otherwise, and always found whom to work upon; yet never was there man would protest more effectually, nor aver any thing with more solemn oaths, and observe them less than he; nevertheless, his cousenages all thrived well with him; for he knew how to play this part cunningly. Therefore is there no necessity for a Prince to be endued with all above written qualities, but it behooveth well that he seem to be so; or rather I will boldly say this, that having these qualities, and always regulating himself by them, they are hurtful; but seeming to have them, they are advantageous; as to seem pitiful, faithful, mild, religious, and of integrity, and indeed to be so; provided withal thou be'st of such a composition, that if need require to use the contrary, thou canst, and knowest how to apply thyself thereto. And it suffices to conceive this, that a Prince, and especially a new Prince, cannot observe all those things, for which men are held good; he being often forced, for the maintenance of his State, to do contrary to his faith, charity, humanity, and religion: and therefore it behoves him to have a mind so disposed, as to turn and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly I said, not forsake the good, while he can; but to know how to make use of 〈◊〉 evil upon necessity. A Prince than ought to have a special care, that he never let fall any words, but what are all seasoned with the five above written qualities, and let him seem to him that sees and hears him, all pity, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to seem to have, than this last quality: for all men in general judge thereof, rather by the sight, than by the touch; for every man may come to the sight of him, few come to the touch and feeling of him; yvery man may come to see what thou seemest, few come to perceive and understand what thou art; and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who have the majesty of State to protect them: And in all men's actions, especially those of Princes wherein there is no judgement to appeal unto men, forbear to give their censures, till the events and ends of things. Let a Prince therefore take the surest courses he can to maintain his life and State: the means shall always be thought honourable, and commended by every one; for the vulgar is over-taken with the appearance and event of a thing: & for the most part of people, they are but the vulgar: the others that are but few, take place where the vulgar have no subsisteance. A Prince there is in these days, whom I shall not do well to name, that preaches nothing else but peace and faith; but had he kept the one and the other, several times had they taken from him his state and reputation.  
In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth Chap. our Author descends to particulars, persuading his Prince in his sixteenth to such a suppleness of disposition, as that upon occasion he can make use either of liberality or miserableyness, as need shall require. But that of liberality is to last no longer than while he is in the way to some design: which if he well weigh, is not really a reward of virtue, how ere it seems; but a bait and lure to bring birds to the net. In the seventeenth Chap. he treats of clemency and cruelty, neither of which are to be exercised by him as acts of mercy or justice; but as they may serve to advantage his further purposes. And lest the Prince should incline too much to clemnecy, our Author allows rather the restraint by fear, than by love. The contrary to which all stories show us. I will say this only, cruelty may cut of the power of some, but causes the hatred of all, and gives a will to most to take the first occasion offered for revenge. In the eighteenth Chap. our Author discourses how Princes ought to govern themselves in keeping their promises made: whereof he says they ought to make such small reckoning, as that rather they should know by their craft how to turn and wind men about, whereby to take advantage of all winds and fortunes. To this I would oppose that in the fifteenth Psal. v. 5. He that sweareth to his neighbour, and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance. It was a King that writ it, and me thinks the rule he gave, should well befit both King and Subject: and surely this persuades against all taking of advantages. A man may reduce all the causes of faith-breaking to three heads. One may be, because he that promised, had no intention to keep his word; and this is a wicked and malicious way of dealing. A second may be, because he that promised, reputes of his promise made; and that is grounded on unconstancy, and lightness in that he would not be well resolved before he entered into covenant. The third may be, when it so falls out, that it lies not in his power that made the promise to perform it. In which case a man ought to imitate the good debtor, who having not wherewithal to pay, hides not himself, but presents his person to his creditor, willingly suffering imprisonment. The first and second are very vicious and unworthy of a Prince: in the third, men might well be directed by the examples of those two famous Romans, Regulus and Posthumius. I shall close this with the answer of Charles the fifth, when he was pressed to break his word with Luther for his safe return from Worms; Fides rerum 
〈◊〉 Xenocarus i● vit. Car. Quinti.  promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet, tamen apud imperatorem eam consistere oportet. Though truth be banished out of the whole world, yet should it always find harbour in an Emperor's beast.   

CHAP. XIX.  
That Princes should take a care, not to incur contempt or battered.  
BUt because among the qualities, whereof formerly mention is made, I have spoken of those of most importance, I will treat of the others more briefly under these qualities that a Prince is to beware, as in part is abovesaid, and that he fly those things which cause him to be odious or vile: and when ever he shall avoid this, he shall fully have played his part, and in the other disgrace, he shall find no danger at all. There is nothing makes him so odious, as I said, as his extortion of his subjects goods, and abuse of their women, from which he ought to forbear: and so long as he wrongs not his whole people, neither in their goods, nor honours, they live content, and he hath only to strive with the Ambition of some sew: which many ways and easily too, is restrained. To be held various, light, effeminate, faint-hearted, unresolved, these make him be contemned and thought base, which a Prince should shun like rocks, and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and valour; and that in all the private affairs of his subjects, he order it so, that his word stand irrevocable: and maintain himself in such repute, that no man may think either to deceive or wind and turn him about: that Prince that gives such an opinion of himself, is much esteemed, and against him who is so well esteemed, hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects, or by foreigners any invasion, when once notice is taken of his worth, and how much he is reverenced by his subjects: For a Prince ought to have two fears, the one from within, in regard of his subjects; the other from abroad, in regard of his mighty neighbours; from these he defends himself by good arms and good friends; and always he shall have good friends, if he have good arms; and all things shall always stand sure at home, when those abroad are firm, in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them; and however the foreign masters stand but ticklishly; yet if he have taken such courses at home, and lived as we have prescribed, he shall never be able (in case he forsake not himself) to resist all possibility, force and violence, as I said Nabis the Spartan did: but touching his subjects, even when his affairs abroad are settled, it is to be feared they may conspire privily; from which a Prince sufficiently secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned, and keeping himself in his people's good opinion, which it is necessary for him to compass, as formerly we treated at large. And one of the powerfullest remedies a Prince can have against conspiracies, is, net to be hated nor despised by the universality; for always he that conspires, believes the Prince's death is acceptable to the subject: but when he thinks it displeases them, he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter; for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side, are infinite. By experience it is plain, that many times plots have been laid, but few of them have succeeded luckily; for he that conspires, cannot be alone, nor can he take the company of any, but of those, who he believes are malcontents; and so soon as thou hast discovered thyself to a malcontent, thou givest him means to work his own content: for by revealing thy treason, he may well hope for all manner of favour: so that seeing his gain certain of one side; and on the other, finding only doubt and danger, either he had need be a rare friend, or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the Prince, if he keeps his word with thee. And to reduce this matter into short terms: I say, there is nothing but jealousy, fear, and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him; but on the Prince's part, there is the majesty of the principality, he laws, the defences of his friends and the State, which do so guard him; that to all these things the people's good wills being added, it is impossible any one should be so headstrong as to conspire; for ordinarily where a traitor is to fear before the execution of his mischief, in this case he is also to fear afterwards, having the people for his enemy when the fact is committed, and therefore for this cause, not being able to hope for any refuge. Touching this matter, many examples might be brought; but I will content myself to name one which fell out in the memory of our Fathers. Annibal Bentivoliis, grand Father of this Annibal who now lives, that was Prince in Bolonia, being slain by the Canneschi that conspired against him, none of his race being lest, but this John, who was then in swaddling clouts; presently the people rose upon this murder, and slew all the Canneschi which proceeded from the popular affection, which the family of the Bentivoliis held then in Bolonia: which was so great, that being there remained not any, now Hannibal was dead, that was able to manage the State; and having notice that in Florence there was one borne of the Bentivoliis, who till then was taken for a Smith's son: the citizens of Bolonia went to Florence for him, and gave the government of their City to him, which was ruled by him, until John was of fit years to govern. I conclude then, that a Prince ought to make small account of treasons, whiles he hath the people to friend: but if they be his enemies and hate him, he may well fear every thing, and every one. And well ordered States, and discreet Princes have taken care withal diligence, not to cause their great men to fall into desperation, and to content the people, and so to maintain them: for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a Prince. Among the Kingdoms that are well ordered and governed in our days, is that of France, and therein are found exceeding many good orders, whereupon the King's liberty and security depends: of which the chief is the Parliament, and the authority thereof: for he that founded that Kingdom, knowing the great men's ambition and insolence; and judging it necessary there should be a bridle to curb them; and on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones, grounded upon fear, intending to secure them, would not lay this care wholly upon the King, but take this trouble from him, which he might have with the great men, in case he favoured the Commonalty; or with the Commonalty, in case he favoured the great men: and thereupon set up a third judge, which was that, to the end it should keep under the great ones, and favour the meaner sort, without any imputation to the King. It was not possible to take a better, nor wiser course than this; nor a surer way to secure the King, and the Kingdom. From whence we may draw another conclusion worthy of note, that Princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation; and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour. Here again I conclude, that a Prince ought to make good esteem of his Nobility, but not thereby to incur the Commons hatred: It would seem perhaps to many, considering the life & death of many Roman Emperors, that they were examples contrary to my opinion, finding that some have lived worthily, and showed many rare virtues of the mind, and yet have lost the Empire, and been put to death by their own subjects, conspiring against them. Intending then to answer these objections, I shall discourse upon the qualities of some Emperors, declaring the occasions of their ruin, not disagreeing from that which I have alleged; and part thereof I will bestow on the consideration of these things, which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times: and it shall suffice me to take all those Emperors that succeeded in the Empire from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus, who were Mercus and Commodus his son, Pertinax, Julian, Severus, Antonius, Caracalla his son, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximin. And first it is to be noted, that where in the other Principalities, they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles, and the insolence of the people; the Roman Emperors had a third difficulty, having to support the cruelty and covetousness of the soldiers, which was so hard a thing, that it caused the ruin of many, being hard to satisfy the soldiers, and the people; for the people love their quiet, and therefore affect modest Princes; and the soldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage, that is insolent, cruel, and plucking from every one: which things they would have them exercise upon the people, whereby they might be able to double their stipends, and satisfy their avarice and cruelty: whence it proceeds, that those Emperors who either by Nature or by Art, had not such a reputation, as therewith they could curb the one and the other, were always ruind: and the most of them, specially those who as new men came to the principality, finding the difficulty of those two different humours, applied themselves to content the sholdiers, making small account of wronging the people, which was a course then necessary; for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one, ought first endeavour that they incurse not the hatred of any whole universality; and when they cannot attain thereunto, they are to provide with all industry, to avoid the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty. And therefore those Emperors, who because they were but newly called to the Empire, had need of extraordinary favours, more willingly stuck to the soldiers, than to the people; which nevertheless turned to their advantage, or otherwise, according as that Prince knew how to maintain his repute with them. From these causes aforesaid proceeded it, that Marcus Pertinax, and Alexander, though all living modestly, being lovers of justice, and enemies of cruelty, courteous and bountiful, had all from Marcus on ward, miserable ends; Marcus only lived and died exceedingly honoured: for he came to the Empire by inheritance, and was not to acknowledge it either from the soldiers, nor from the people: afterwards being accompanied with many virtues, which made him venerable, he held always whilst he lived the one and the other order within their limits, and was never either hated, or contemned. But Pertinax was created Emperor against the soldiers wills, who being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure that honest course that Pertinax sought to reduce them to: whereupon having gotten himself hatred, and to this hatred added contempt, in that he was old, was ruind in the very beginning of his government. Whence it ought to be observed, that hatred is gained as well by good deeds as bad; and therefore as I formerly said, when a Prince would maintain the State; he is often forced not to be good: for when that generality, whether it be the people, or soldiers, or Nobility, whereof thou thinkst thou stand'st in need to maintain thee, is corrupted, it behoves thee to follow their humour, and content them, and then all good deeds are thy adversaries. But let us come to Alexander who was of that goodness, that among the praises given him, had this for one, that in fourteen years wherein he held the Empire, he never put any man to death, but by course of justice; nevertheless being held effeminate, and a man that suffered himself to be ruled by his mother, and thereupon fallen into contempt, the army conspired against him. Now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antonius, Caracalla, and Maximinus, you shall find them exceeding cruel, and ravenous, who to satisfy their soldiers, forbear no kind of injury that could be done upon the people; and all of them, except Severus, came to evil en●s: for in Severus, there was such extraordinary valour, that while he held the soldiers his friends, however the people were much burdened by him, he might always reign happily: for his valour rendered him so admirable in the soldiers and people's sights; that these in a manner stood amazed and astonished, and those others reverencing and honouring him. And because the actions of this man were exceeding great, being in a new Prince, I will briefly show how well he knew to act the Foxes and the Lion's parts; the conditions of which two, I say, as before, are very necessary for a Prince to imitate. Severus having had experience of julian the Emperor's sloth, persuaded his army (whereof he was commander in Solavonia) that they should do well to go to Rome to revenge Portinax his death, who was put to death by the Imperial guard; and under this pretence, not making any show that he aspired unto the Empire, set his army in march directly towards Rome, and was sooner come into Italy, than it was known he had moved from his station. Being arrived at Rome, he was by the Senate chosen Emperor for fear, and Julian slain. After this beginning, two difficulties yet remained to Severus, before he could make himself Lord of the whole State; the one in Asia, where Niger the General of those armies had gotten the title of Emperor, the other in the West with Albinus, who also aspired to the Empire: and because he thought there might be some danger to discover himself enemy to them both, he purposed to set upon Niger, and cozen Albinas, to whom he writ, that being elected Emperor by the Senate, he would willingly communicate it with him; and thereupon sent him the title of Caesar, and by resolution of the Senate, took him to him for his Colleague; which things were taken by Albinks in true meaning. But afterwards when Severus had overcome and slain Niger, and pacified the affairs and in the East, being returned to Rome, he complained in the Senate of Albinus, how little weighing the benefits received from him, he had sought to slay him by treason, and therefore was he forced to go punish his ingratitude: afterwards he went into France, where he bereft him both of his State and life, whoever then shall in particular examine his actions, shall find he was a very cruel Lion, and as crafty a Fox: and shall see that he was always feared and reverenced by every one, and by the armies not hated; and shall nothing marvel that he being a new man, was able to hold together such a great Empire: for his extraordinary reputation defended him always from that hatred, which the people for his extortions might have conceived against him. But Antonius his son, was also an exceeding brave man, and endued with most excellent qualities, which caused him to be admired by the people, and acceptable to the soldiers, because he was a warlike man, enduring all kind of travel and pains, despising all delicate food, and all kind of effeminacy, which gained him the love of all the armies: nevertheless his fierceness and cruelty were such, and so hideous, having upon many particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of Rome, and all those of Alexandria, that he grew odious to the world, and began to be feared by those also that were near about him; so that he was slain by a Centurion in the very midst of his army. Where it is to be noted, that these kind of deaths, which follow upon the deliberation of a resolved and obstinate mind, cannot by a Prince be avoided: for every one that fears not to die, is able to do it; but a Prince ought to be less afraid of it, because it very seldom falls our. Only should he beware not to do any extreamd injury to any of those of whom he serves himself, or that he hath near about him in any employment of his Principality, as Antonius did: who had reproachfully slain a brother of that Centurion; also threatened him every day, & nevertheless entertained him still as one of the guards of his body, which was a rash course taken, and the way to destruction, as befell him. But let us come to Commodus for whom it was very easy to hold the Empire, by reason it descended upon him by inheritance, being Marcus his son, and it had been enough for him to follow his father's footsteps, and then had he contented both the people and the soldiers: but being of a cruel and savage desposition, whereby to exercise his actions upon the people, he gave himself to entertain armies, and those in all licentionsnesse. On the other part not maintaining his dignity, but often descending upon the stages to combat with fencers, and doing such other like base things, little worthy of the Imperial majesty, he became contemptible in the soldiers sight; and being hated of one part, and despised of the other, he was conspired against, and slain. It remains now, that we declare Maximinus his conditions, who was a very warlike man; and the armies loathing Alexander's effeminacy, whereof I spoke before, when they had slain him, chose this man Emperor, who not long continued so, because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt; the one because he was very base, having kept cattle in Thrace, which was well known to every one, and made them to scorn him; the other, because in the beginning of his Principality having delayed to go to Rome, and enter into possession of the Imperial throne, he had gained the insamy of being thought exceeding cruel, having by his Prefects in Rome, and in every place of the Empire, exercisd many cruelties, insomuch that the whole world being provoked against him to contempt for the baseness of his blood; on the other side upon the hatred conceived against him for fear of his cruelty; first Africa, afterwards the Senate, with all the people of Rome and all Italy, conspired against him, with whom his own army took part; which encamping before Aquileya, and finding some difficulty to take the town, being weary of his cruelties, and because they saw he had so many enemies, fearing him the less, slew him. I purpose not to say any thing either of Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Itlian, who because they were throughly base, were suddenly extinguish; but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse; and I say, that the Princes of our times have less of this difficulty to satisfy the Soldiers extraordinarily in their government; for notwithstanding that there be some considerations to be had of them, yet presently are those armies dissolved, because none of these Princes do use to maintain any armies together, which are annexed and inveterated with the governments of the provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire. And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the soldiers than the people, it was because the soldiers were more powerful than the people: now is it more necessary for all Princes, (except the Turk and the Sultan) to satisfy their people than their soldiers, because the people are more mighty than they; wherein I except the Turk, he always maintaining about his person 12000 foot, and 15000 horse, upon which depends the safety and strength of his Kingdom; and it is necessary that laying afide all other regard of his people, he maintain these his friends. The Souldan's Kingdom is like hereunto, which being wholly in the soldier's power, he must also without respect of his people keep them his friends. And you are to consider, that this State of the Souldan's differs much from all the other Principalities: For it is very like the Papacy, which cannot be termed an hereditary Principality: nor a new Principality: for the sons of the deceased Prince are not heirs and Lords thereof, but he that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them. And this order being of antiquity, cannot be termed a new Principality, because therein are none of those difficulties that are in the new ones: for though the Prince be new, yet are the orders of that state ancient, and ordained to receive him, as if he were their hereditary Prince. But let us return to our matter; whosoever shall consider our discourse before, shall perceive that either hatred, or contempt have caused the ruin of the afore-named Emperors; and shall know also, from it came that part of them proceeding one way, and part a contrary; yet in any of them the one had a happy success, and the others unhappy: for it was of no avail, but rather hurtful for Pertinax and Alexander, because they were new Princes, to desire to imitate Marcus, who by inheritance came to the Principality: and in like manner it was a wrong to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximus, to imitate Severus, because none of them were endued with so great valour as to follow his steps therein. Wherefore a new Prince in his Principality cannot well imitate Marcus his actions; nor yet is it necessary to follow those of Severus: but he ought make choice of those parts in Severus which are necessary for the founding of a State; and to take from Marcus those that are fit and glorious to preserve a State which is already established and settled.   

CHAP. XX.  
Whether the Citadels and many other things which Princes often make use of, are profitable or damageable.  
SOme Princes, whereby they might safely keep their State, have disarmed their subjects; some others have held the towns under their dominion, divided into factions; others have maintained enmities against themselves; others have applied themselves to gain them, where they have suspected at their entrance into the government; others have built Fortresses; and others again have ruined and demolished them: and however that upon all these things, a man cannot well pass a determinate sentence, unless one comes to the particulars of these States, where some such like determinations were to be taken; yet I shall speak of them in so large a manner, as the master of itself will bear. It was never then that a new Prince would disarm his own subjects; but rather when he hath found them disarmed, he hath always armed them. For being beloved, those arms become thine; those become faithful, which thou hadst in suspicion; and those which were faithful, are maintained so; and thy subjects are made thy parrisans; and because all thy subjects cannot be put in arms, when thou bestowest favours on those thou armest, with the others thou canst deal more for thy safety; and that difference of proceeding which they know among them, obliges them to thee; those others excuse thee, judging it necessary that they have deserved more, who have undergone more danger, and so have greater obligation: but when thou disarmst them, thou beginst to offend them, that thou distrustest them, either for cowardice, or small faith; and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred against thee; and because thou canst not stand disarmed, thou must thenturn thyself to mercenary Soldiery, whereof we have formerly spoken what it is, and when it is good; it can never be so much as to defend thee from powerful enemies, and suspected subjects; therefore as I have said, a new Prince in a new Principality hath always ordained them arms. Of examples to this purpose, Histories are full. But when Prince gains a new State, which as a member he adds to his ancient dominions, than it is necessary to disarm that State, unless it be those whom thou hast discovered to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof; and these also in time and upon occasions, it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate, and so order them, that all the arms of thy State be in the hands of thy own Soldiers, who live in thy ancient State near unto thee. Our ancestors and they that were accounted Sages, were wont to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoya in factions, and Pisa with Fortresses; and for this cause maintained some town ssubject to them in differences, whereby to hold it more easily. This, at what time Italy was balanced in a certain manner, might be well done; but me thinks it cannot now a days be well given for a precept; for I do not believe, that divisions made can do any good; rather it must needs be, that when the enemy approaches them, Cities divided are presently lost; for always the weaker part will cleave to the foreign power, and the other not be able to subsist. The Venetians (as I think) moved by the aforesaid reasons, maintained the factions of the Guelphs and Gibellins, in their towns; and however they never suffered them to spill one another's blood, yet they nourished these differences among them, to the end that the citizens employed in these quarrels, should not plot any thing against them: which as it proved, never served them to any great purpose: for being defeated at Vayla, presently one of those two factions took courage and seized upon their whole State. Therefore such like ways argue the Prince's weakness; for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions; for they show them some kind of profit in time of peace, being they are able by means thereof more easily to manage their subjects: but war coming, such like orders discover their fallacy. Without doubt, Princes become great, when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them; and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any new Prince great, who hath more need to gain reputation than an hereditary Prince, causes enemies to rise against him, and him to undertake against them: to the end he may have occasion to master them, and know that ladder, which his enemies have set him upon, whereby to rise yet higher. And therefore many think, that a wise Prince when he hath the occasion, ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the suppressing thereof, his greatness may grow thereupon. Princes, especially those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those men, who in the beginning of their State, have been held suspected, than in those who at their entrance have been their confidents. Pandulphus Petrucci, Prince of Sienna, governed his State, more with them that had been suspected by him, than with the others. But of this matter we cannot speak at large, because it varies according to the subject; I will only say this, that those men, who in the beginning of a Principality were once enemies, if they be of quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support, the Prince might always with the greatest facility gain for his; and they are the rather forced to serve him faithfully, insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion, which was once held of them; and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage, than from those, who serving him too supinely, neglect his affairs. And seeing the matter requires it, I will not omit to put a Prince in mind, who hath a new made himself master of a State; by means of the inward helps he had from thence that he consider well the cause that moved them that favoured him to favour him, if it be not a natural affection towards him; for if it be only because they were not content with their former government, with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends, because it will be impossible for him to content them. By these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern affairs, searching into the cause hereof, we shall find it much more easy to gain those men for friends, who formerly were contented with the State, and therefore were his enemies: than those, who because they were not contented therewith, became his friends, and favoured him in getting the mastery of it. It hath been the custom of Princes, whereby to hold their States more securely, to build Citadels, which might be bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them, and so to have a secure retreat from the first violences. I commend this course, because it hath been used of old; notwithstanding Nicholas Vitelli in our days hath been known to demolish two Citadel in the town of Castello, the better to keep the State; Guidubaldo Duke of Urbin being to return into his State, out of which he was driven by Caesar Borgia, razed all the Fortresses, of that Country, and thought he should hardlyer lose that State again without them. The Bentivodi returning into Bolonia, used the like courses. Citadels than are profitable, or not, according to the times; and if they advantage thee in one part, they do thee harm in another, and this part may be argued thus. That Prince who stands more in fear of his own people than of strangers, aught to build Fortresses: but he that is more afraid of strangers than of his people, should let them alone. Against the house of Sforza, the Castle of Milan, which Francis Sforza built, hath and will make more war, than any other disorder in that State: and therefore the best Citadel that may be, is not to incur the people's hatred; for however thou holdest a Fortress, and the people hate thee, thou canst hardly scape them; for people, when once they have taken arms, never want the help of strangers at their need to take their parts. In our days we never saw that they ever profited any Prince, unless it were the Countess of Furli, when Count Hieronymo of Furli her husband was slain; for by means thereof she escaped the people's rage, and attended aid from Milan, and so recovered her State: and then such were the times that the stranger could not assist the people: but afterwards they served her to little purposes when Caesar Borgia assailed her, & that the people which was her enemy, sided with the stranger. Therefore both then, and at first, it would have been more for her safety, not to have been odious to the people, than to have held the Fortresses. These things being well weighed then, I will commend those that shall build up Fortresses, and him also that shall not; and I will blame him, howsoever he be, that relying upon those, shall make small account of being hated by his people.   

CHAP. XXI,  
How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation.  
THere is nothing gains a Prince such repute as great exploits, and rare trials of himself in Heroic actions. We have now in our days Ferdinand King of Arragon the present King of Spain: he in a manner may be termed a new Prince; for from a very weak King, he is now become for fame and glory, the first King of Christendom, and if you shall well consider his actions, you shall find them all illustrious, and every one of them extraordinary. He in the beginning of his reign assailed Granada, and that exploit was the ground of his State. At first he made that war in security, and without suspicion he should be any ways hindered, and therein held the Barons of Castiglias' minds busied, who thinking upon that war, river minded any innovation; in this while he gained credit and authority with them, they not being aware of it; was able to maintain with the Church and the people's money all his soldiers, and to lay a foundation for his military ordinances with that long war, which afterwards gained him exceeding much honour. Besides this, to the end he might be able hereamong to undertake greater matters, serving himself always of the colour of religion, he gave himself to a kind of religious cruelty, chase and despoiling those Jews out of the Kingdom; nor can this example be more admirable and rare: under the same cloak he invaded Africa and went through with his exploit in Italy: and last of all hath he assailed France, and so always proceeded on forwards contriving of great matters, which always have held his subjects minds in peace and admiration, and busied in attending the event, what it should be: and these his actions have thus grown, one upon another, that they have never given leisure to men so to rest, as they might ever plot any thing against them. Moreover it much avails a Prince to give extraordinary proofs of himself touching the government within, such as those we have heard of Bernard of Milan, whensoever occasion is given by any one, that may off ctuate some great thing either of good or evil, in the civil government; and to find out some way either to reward or punish it, whereof in the wolud much notice may be taken. And above all things a Prince ought to endeavour in all his actions to spread abroad a fame of his magnificence and worthiness. A Prince also is well esteemed, when he is a true friend, or a true enemy; when without any regard he discovers himself in favour of one against another; which course shall be always more profit, than to stand neuter: for if two mighty ones that are thy neighbours, come to fall out, or are of such quality, that one of them vanquishing, thou art like to be in fear of the vanquisher, or not; in either of these two cases, it will ever prove more for thy profit, to discover thyself, and make a good war of it: for in the first case, if thou discoverest not thyself, thou shalt always be a prey to him that overcomes, to the contentment and satisfaction of the vanquished; neither shalt thou have reason on thy side, nor any thing else to defend or receive thee. For he that overcomes, will not have any suspected friends that give him no assistance in his necessity: and he that loses, receives thee not, because thou wouldst not with thy arms in hand run the hazard of his fortune. Antiochus' passed into Greece, thereunto induced by the Etolians, to chase the Romans thence: and sent his Ambassadors to the achaians, who were the Romans friends, to persuade them to stand neuters; on the other side the Romans moved them to join arms with theirs: this matter came to be deliberated on in the council of the achaians, where Antiochus his Ambassador encouraged them to stand neuters, whereunto the Romans Ambassador answered; Touching the course, that is commended to you, as best and profitablest for your State, to wit, not to intermeddle in the war between us, nothing can be more against you: because, not taking either part, you shall remain without thanks, and without reputation a prey to the conqueror. And it will always come to pass that he who is not thy friend, will requite thy neutrality; and he that is thy friend, will urge thee to discover thyself by taking arms for him: and evil advised Princes, to avoid the present dangers, follow often times that way of neutrality, and most commonly go to ruin: but when a Prince discovers himself strongly in favour of a party, if he to whom thou cleavest, overcomes, however that he be puissant, and thou remainest at his disposing, he is obliged to thee, and there is a contract of friendship made; and men are never so openly dishonest, as with such a notorious example of dishonesty to oppress thee. Besides victories are never so prosperous, that the conqueror is like neglect all respects, and especially of justice. But if he to whom thou stickst, loses, thou art received by him; and, while he is able, he aids thee, and so thou becomest partner of a fortune that may arise again; the second case, when they that enter into the lists together, are of such quality, that thou needest not fear him that vanquisheth, so much the more is it discretion in thee to stick to him; for thou goest to ruin one with his assistance, who ought to do the best he could to save him, if he were well advised; and he overcoming, is left at thy discretion, and it is impossible but with thy aid he must overcome. And here it is to be noted, that a Prince should be well aware never to join with any one more powerful than himself, to offend another, unless upon necessity, as formerly is said. For when he overcomes, thou art left at his discretion, and Princes ought avoid as much as they are able, to stand at another's discretion. The Venetians took part with France against the Duke of Milan, and yet could have avoided that partaking, from which proceeded their ruin. But when it cannot be avoided, as in befell the Florentines when the Pope and the King of Spain went both with their armies to Lombardy, there the Prince ought to side with them for the reasons aforesaid. Nor let any State think they are able to make such sure parties, but rather that they are all doubtful; for in the order of things we find it always, that whensoever a man seeks to avoid one inconvenient, he incurs another. But the principal point of judgement, is in discerning between the qualities of inconvenients, and not taking the bad for the good. Moreover a Prince ought to show himself a lover of virtue, and that he honours those that excel in every Art. Afterwards ought he encourage his Citizens, whereby they may be enabled quickly to exercise their faculties as well in merchandise, and husbandry, as in any other kind of traffic, to the end that no man forbear to adorn and cultivate his possessions for fear that he be despoiled of them; or any other to open the commerce upon the danger of heavy impositions: but rather to provide rewards for those that shall set these matters afoot, or for any one else that shall any way amplify his City or State. Besides he ought in the fit times of the year entertain the people with Feasts and Masks; and because every City is divided into Companies, and arts, and Tribes, he ought to take special notice of those bodies, and some times afford them a meeting, and give them some proof of his humanity, and magnificence; yet withal holding firm the majesty of his State; for this must never fail in any case.   

CHAP. XXII.  
Touching Princes Secretaries.  
IT is no small importance to a Prince, the choice he makes, of servants being ordinarily good or bad, as his wisdom is, And first conjecture one gives of a great man, and of his understanding, is, upon the sight of his followers and servants he hath about him, when they prove able and faithful, and then may he always be reputed wise because he hath known how to discern those that are able, and to keep them true to him. But when they are otherwise, there can be no good conjecture made of him; for the first error he commits, is in this choice. There was no man that had any knowledge of Antony of Vanafro, the servant of Pandulfus Petrucci Prince of Sienna, who did not esteem Pandulfus for a very discreet man, having him for his servant. And because there are three kinds of understandings; the one that is advised by itself; the other that understands when it is informed by another; the third that neither is advised by itself nor by the demonstration of another; the first is best, the second is good, and the last quite unprofitable. Therefore it was of necessity, that if Pandulfus attained not the first degree, yet he got to the second; for whenever any one hath the judgement to discern between the good and the evil, that any one does and says, however that he hath not his invention from himself, yet still comes he to take notice of the good or evil actions of that servant; and those he cherishes, and these he suppresses; insomuch that the servant finding no means to deceive his master, keeps himself upright and honest. But how a Prince may throughly understand his servant, here is the way that never fails. When thou seest the servant study more for his own advantage than thine, and that in all his actions, he searches most after his own profit; this man thus qualified, shall never prove good servant, nor canst thou ever rely upon him: for he that holds the Stern of the State in hand, ought never call home his cares to his own particular, but give himself wholly over to his Prince's service, nor ever put him in mind of any thing not appertaining to him. And on the other side the Prince to keep him good to him, aught to take a care for his servant, honouring him, enriching, and obliging him to him, giving him part both of dignities and offices, to the end that the many honours and much wealth bestowed on him, may restrain his desires from other honours, and other wealth, and that those many charges cause him to fear changes that may fall, knowing he is not able to stand without his master. And when both the Princes and the servants are thus disposed, they may rely the one upon the other: when otherwise, the end will ever prove hurtful for the one as well as for the other.   

CHAP. XXIII.  
That Flatterers are to be avoided.  
I Will not omit one principle of great inportance, being an error from which Princes with much difficulty defend themselves, unless they be very discreet, and make a very good choice; and this is concerning flatterors; whereof all writings are full: and that because men please themselves so much in their own things, and therein cozen themselves, that very hardly can they escape this pestilence; and desiring to escape it, there is danger of falling into contempt; for there is no other way to be secure from flattery, but to let men know, that they displease thee not in telling thee truth: but when every one hath this leave, thou losest thy reverence. Therefore ought a wise Prince take a third course, making choice of some understanding men in his State, and give only to them a free liberty of speaking to him the truth; and touching those things only which he inquires of, and nothing else; but he ought to be inquisitive of every thing, and hear their opinions, and then afterwards advise himself after his own manner; and in these deliberations, and with every one of them so carry himself, that they all know, that the more freely they shall speak, the better they shall be liked of: and besides those, not give ear to any one; and thus pursue the thing resolved on, and thence continue obstinate in the resolution taken. He who does otherwise, either falls upon flatterers, or often changes upon the varying of opinions, from whence proceeds it that men conceive but slightly of him. To this purpose I will allege you a modern example. Peter Lucas a servant of Maximilians the present Emperor, speaking of his Majesty, said that he never advised with any body, nor never did any thing after his own way: which was because he took a contrary course to what we have now said: for the Emperor is a close man, who communicates his secrets to none, nor takes counsel of any one; but as they come to be put in practice, they begin to be discovered & known, and so contradicted by those that are near about him; and he as being an easy man, is quickly wrought from them. Whence it comes that what he does to day, he undoes on the morrow; and that he never understands himself what he would, nor what he purposes, & that there is no grounding upon any of his resolutions. A Prince therefore ought always to take counsel, but at his own pleasure, & not at other men's; or rather should take away any man's courage to advise him of any thing, but what he asks: but he ought well to ask at larger and then touching the things enquired of, be a patient hear, of the truth; and perceiving that for some respect the truth were concealed from him, be displeased thereat. And because some men have thought that a Prince that gains the opinion to be wise, may be held so, not by his own natural endowments, but by the good counsels he hath about him; without question they are deceived; for this is a general rule and never fails, that a Prince who of himself is not wise, can never be well advised, unless he should light upon one alone, wholly to direct and govern him, who himself were a very wise man. In this case it is possible he may be well governed: but this would last but little: for that governor in a short time would deprive him of his State; but a Prince not having any parts of nature, being advised of more than one, shall never be able to unite these counsels: of himself shall he never know how to unite them; and each one of the Counsellors, probably will follow that which is most properly his own; and he shall never find the means to amend or discern these things; nor can they fall out otherwise, because men always prove mischievous, unless upon some necessity they be forced to become good: we conclude therefore, that counsels from whencesoever they proceed, must needs take their beginning from the Prince's wisdom, and not the wisdom of the Prince from good counsels.  
In this Chapter our Author prescribes some rules how to avoid flattery, and not to fall into contempt. The extent of these two extremes is so large on both sides, that there is left but a very narrow path for the right temper to walk between them both: and happy were that Prince, who could light on so good a Pilot as to bring him to Port between those rocks and these quicksands. Where Majesty becomes familiar, unless endued with a supereminent virtue, it loses all awful regards: as the light of the Sun, because so ordinary, because so common, we should little value, were it not that all Creatures feel themselves quickened by the rays thereof. On the other side, Omnis insipien arrogantiâ & plausibus capitur, Every fool is taken with his own pride and others flatteryes: and this fool keeps company so much with all great wise men, that hardly with a candle and lantern can they be discerned betwixt. The greatest men are more subject to gross and palpable flatteries; and especially the greatest of men, who are Kings and Princes: for many seek the Ruler's favour. Prov. 28. 26. For there are divers means whereby private men are instructed; Princes have not that good hap: but they whose instruction is of most importance, so soon as they have taken the government upon them, no longer suffer any reproovers: for but few have access unto them, and they who familiary converse with them, do and say all for favour. Isocrat. to Nicocles, All are afraid to give him occasion of displeasure, though by telling him truth. 
Plutarch. de adulatore & amico ciscernendo.  To this purpose therefore says one; a Prince excels in learning to ride the great horse, rather than in any other exercise, because his horse being no flatterer, will show him he makes no difference between him and another man, and unless he keep his seat well, will lay him on the ground. This is plain dealing. Men are more subtle, more double-heatred, they have a heart and a heart, netiher is their tongue their hearts true interpreter. Counsel in the heart of man is like deep waters; but a man of understanding will draw is out. Prov. 20. 5. This understanding is most requisite in a Prince, in as much as the whole Globe is in his hand, and the inferior Orbs are swayed by the motion of the highest. And therefore surely it is the honour of a King to search out such a secret: Prov. 25. 2. His counsellors are his eyes and ears; as they ought to be dear to him, so they ought to be true to him, and make him the true report of things without disguise. If they prove false eyes, let him pluck them out; he may as they use glass eyes, take them forth without pain, and see never a whit the worse for it. The wisdom of a Prince's Counselors is a great argument of the Prince's wisdom. And being the choice of them imports the Prince's credit and safety, our Author will make him amends for his other errors by his good advice in his 22. Chap. whether I refer him.   

CHAP. XXIV.  
Wherefore the Princes of Italy have lost their States.  
WHen these things above said are well observed, they make a new Prince seem as if he had been of old, and presently render him more secure and firm in the State, than if he had already grown ancient therein: for a new Prince is much more observed in his action, than a Prince by inheritance; and when they are known to be virtuous, men are much more gained and obliged to them thereby, than by the antiquity of their blood: for men are much more taken by things present, than by things past, and when in the present they find good, they content themselves therein, and seek no further; or rather they undertake the defence of him to their utmost, when the Prince is not wanting in other matters to himself; and so shall he gain double glory to have given a beginning to a new Principality, adorned, and strengthnd it with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples; as he shall have double shame, that is born a Prince, and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it. And if we shall consider those Lords, that in Italy have lost their States in our days, as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others; first we shall find in them a common defect, touching their arms, for the reasons which have been above discoursed at length. Afterwards we shall see some of them, that either shall have had the people for their enemies; or be it they had the people to friend, could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones: for without such defects as these, States are not lost, which have so many nerves, that they are able to maintain an army in the field. Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he that was vanquished by Titus Quintius, had not much State in regard of the greatness of the Romans and of Greece that assailed him; nevertheless in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertain the people, and assure himself of the Nobles, for many years he made the war good against them: and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him, yet the Kingdom remained in his hands still. Wherefore these our Princes who for many years had continued in their Principalities, for having afterwards lost them, let them not blame Fortune, but their own sloth; because they never having thought during the time of quiet, that they could suffer a change (which is the common fault of men, while fair weather losts, not to provide for the tempest) when afterwards mischiefs came upon them, thought rather upon flying from them, than upon their defence, and hoped that the people, weary of the vanquishers insolence, would recall them: which course when the others fail, is good: but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that: for a man would never go to fall, believing another would come to take him up: which may either not come to pass, or if it does, it is not for thy security, because that defence of his is vile, and depends nor upon thee; but those defences only are good, certain, and durable, which depend upon thy own self, and thy own virtues.   

CHAP. XXV.  
How great power Fortune hath in humane, affairs, and what means there is to resist it.  
IT is not unknown unto me, how that many have held opinion, and still hold it, that the affairs of the world are so governed by fortune, and by God, that men by their wisdom cannot amend or alter them; or rather that there is no remedy for them: and hereupon they would think that it were of no avail to take much pains in any thing, but leave all to be governed by chance. This opinion hath gained the more credit in our days, by reason of the great alteration of things, which we have of late seen, and do every day see, beyond all humane conjecture: upon which, I sometimes thinking, am in some paret inclined to their opinion: nevertheless not to extingush quite our own free will, I think it may be true, that Fortune is the mistress of one half of our actions; but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half, or little less. And I liken her to a precipitous torrent, which when it rages, overflows the plains, overthrows the trees, and buildings, removes the earth from one side, and lays it on another, every one flies before it, every one yields to the fury thereof, as unable to withstand it; and yet however it be thus, when the times are calmer, men are able to make provision against these excesses, with banks and fences so, that afterwards when it swells again, it shall all pass smoothly along, within its channel, or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtful. In like manner befalls it us with fortune, which there shows her power where virtue is not ordained to resist her, and thither turns she all her forces, where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her. And if you shall consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and that which hath given them their motions, you shall see it to be a plain field, without any trench or bank; which had it been fenced with convenienent virtue as was Germany, Spain or France; this inundation would never heave caused these great alterations it hath, or else would it not have reached to us: and this shall suffice to have said, touching the opposing of fortune in general. But restraining myself more to particulars, I say that to day we see a Prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruin; not seeing that he hath altered any condition or quality; which I believe arises first from the causes which we have long since run over, that is because that Prince that relies wholly upon fortune, runs as her wheel turns. I believe also, that he proves the fortunate man, whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time; and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ: for we see that men, in the things that induce them to the end, (which every one propounds to himself, as glory and riches) proceed therein diversely; some with respects, others more bold, and rashly; one with violence, and the other with cunning; the one with patience, th'other with its contrary; and every one by several ways may attain thereto; we see also two veby respective and wary men, the one come to his purpose, and th'other not; and in like manner two equally prosper, taking divers course; the one being wary the other headstrong; which proceeds from nothing else, but from the quality of the times, which agree, or not, with their proceedings. From hence arises that which I said, that two working diversely, produce the same effects & two equally working, the one attains his end, the other not. Hereupon also depends the alteration of the good; for if to one that behaves himself with wariness and patience, times and affairs turn so favourably, that the carriage of his business prove well, he prospers; but if the times and affairs chance, he is ruind, because he changes not his manner of proceeding: not is there any man so wise, that can frame himself hereunto; as well because he cannot go out of the way, from that whereunto Nature inclines him: as also, for that one having always prospered, walking such a way, cannot be persuaded to leave it; and therefore the respective and wary man, when it is fit time for him to use violence and force, knows not how to put it in practice, whereupon he is ruind: but if he could change high disposition with the times and the affairs, he should not change his fortune. Pope Julius the second proceeded in all his actions with very great violence, and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy success. Consider the first exploit he did at Bolonia, even while John Bentivolio lived: the Venetians were not well contented therewith; the King of Spain likewise with the French, had treated of that enterprises; and nowithstanding all this, he stirred up by his own rage and fierceness, personally undertook that expedition: which action of his put in suspense and stopped Spain and the Venetians; those for fear, and the others for desire to recover the Kingdom of Naples; and on the other part drew after him the King of France; for that King seeing him already in motion, and desiring to hold him his friend, whereby to humble the Venetians, thought he could no way deny him his soldiers, without doing him an open injury. Julius then effected that with his violent and heady motion, which no other Pope with all humane wisdom could ever have done; for it he had expected to part from Rome with his conclusions settled, and all his affairs ordered before hand, as any other Pope would have done, he had never brought it to pass: For the King of France would have devised a thousand excuses, and others would have put him in as many fears. I will let pass his other actions, for all of them were alike, and all of them proved lucky to him; and the brevity of his life never suffered him to feel the contrary: for had he litt upon such times afterwards, that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects, there had been his utter ruin; for he would never have left those ways, to which he had been naturally inclined. I conclude then, fortune varying, and men continuing still obstinate to their own ways, prove happy, while these accord together: and as they disagree, prove unhappy: and I think it true, that it is better to be heady than wary; because Fortune is a mistress; and it is necessary, to keep her in obedience to ruffle and force her: and we see, that she suffers herself rather to be mastered by those, than by others that proceed coldly. And therefore, as a mistress, she is a friend to young men, because they are less respective, more rough, and command her with more boldness.  
I have considered the 25 Chapter, as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning: yet me thinks it cannot satisfy a Christian in the causes of the good and bad success of things. The life of man is like a game at Tables; skill avails much I grant, but that's not all: play thy game well, but that will not win: the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play. Examine this; play never so surely, play never so probably, unless the chance thoucastest, lead thee forward to advantage, all hazards are losses, and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch. The sum of this is set down in Ecclesiastes chap, 9 v. 11. The race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance hapeneth to them all. Our cunning Author for all his exact rules he delivere in his books, could not fence against the despite of Fortune, as he complains in his Epistle to this book. Nor that great example of policy, Duke Valentine, whom cur Author commends to Princes for his crafts-master, could so ruffle or force his mistress Fortune, that he could keep her in obedience. Man can contribute no more to his actions that virtue and wisdom: but the success depends upon a power above. Surely there is the finger of god; or as Prov. 16. v. 33. The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. It was nor joseph's wisdom made all things thrive under his hand; but because the Lord was with him, & that which he did, the Lord made it to prosper, Gen 39 Surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence, which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes, as that their effects prove answerable, and sometimes (that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes) the success returns with such a supereminency of worth, that it far exceeds the virtue of the ordinary causes.   

CHAP. XXVI.  
An Exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarians.  
HAving then weighed all things above discoursed, and devising with myself, whether at this present in Italy the time might serve to honour a new Prince, & whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valorous Prince, to introduce such a form, that might do honour to him, and good to the whole generality of the people in the country: me thinks so many things concur in favour of a new Prince, that I know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose. And if as I said, it was necessary, desiring to see Moses his virtue, that the children of Israel should be enthralled in Egypt; and to have experience of the magnanimity of Cyrus his mind, that the Persians should be oppressed by the Medes; and to set forth the excellency of Theseus, that the Athenians should be dispersed; so at this present now we are desirous to know the valour of an Italian spirit, it were necessary Italy should be reduced to the same terms it is now in, and were in more slavery than the Hebrews were; more subject than the Persians; more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, battered, pillaged, rend asunder, overrun, and had undergone all kind of destruction. And however even in these later days, we have had some kind of show of hope in some one, whereby we might have conjectured, that he had been ordained for the deliverance hereof, yet it proved afterwards, that in the very height of all his actions he was curbed by fortune, insomuch that this poor country remaining as it were without life, attends still for him that shall heal her wounds, give an end to all those pillagings and sackings of Lombardy, to those robberies and taxations of the Kingdom, and of Tuscany, and heal them of their soars, now this long time gangrened. We see how she makes her prayers to God, that he send some one to redeem her from these Barbarous cruelties and insolences. We see her also wholly ready and disposed to follow any colours, provided there be any one take them up. Nor do we see at this present, that she can look for other, than your Illustrious Family, to become Cheiftain of this deliverance, which hath now by its own virtue and Fortune been so much exalted, and favoured by God and the Church, whereof it now holds the Principality: and this shall not be very hard for you to do, if you shall call to mind the former actions, and lives of those that are above named. And though those men were very rare and admirable, yet were they men, and every one of them began upon less occasion than this; for neither was their enterprise more just than this, nor more easy; nor was God more their friend, than yours. Here is very great justice: for that war is just, that is necessary; and those arms are religious, when there is no hope left otherwhere, but in them. Here is an exceeding good disposition thereto: nor can there be, where there is a good disposition, a great difficulty, provided that use be made of those orders, which I propounded for aim and direction to you. Besides this, here we see extraordinary things without example effected by God; the sea was opened, a cloud guided the way, devotion poured forth the waters, and it reigned down Manna; all these things have concurred in your greatness, the rest is left for you to do. God will not do every thing himself, that he may not take from us our free will, and part of that glory that belongs to us. Neither is it a marvel, if any of the aforenamed Italians have not been able to compass that, which we may hope your illustrious family shall: though in so many revolutions of Italy, and so many feats of war, it may seem that the whole military virtue therein be quite extinguished; for this arises from that the ancient orders thereof were not good; and there hath since been none that hath known how to invent new ones. Nothing can so much honour a man rising a new, as new laws and new ordinances devised by him: these things when they have a good foundation given them, and contain in them their due greatness, gain him reverence and admiration; and in Italy their wants not the matter wherein to introduce any form. Here is great virtue in the members, were it not wanting in the heads. Consider in the single fights that have been, and duels, how much the Italians have excelled in their strength, activity and address; but when they come to armies, they appear not, and all proceeds from the weakness of the Chieftains; for they that understand the managing of these matters, are not obeyed; and every one presumes to understand; hitherto there having not been any one so highly raised either by fortune or virtue, as that others would submit unto him. From hence proceeds it, that in so long time, and in so many battles fough for these last past 20 years, when there hath been an army wholly Italian, it always hath had evil success; whereof the river Tarus first was witness, afterwards Alexandria, Capua, Genua, Vayla, Bolonia, Mestri. Your Illustrious family then being desirous to tread the footsteps of these worthies who redeemed their countries, must above all things as the very foundation of the whole sabrick, be furnished with soldiers of your own natives: because you cannot have more faithful, true, nor better soldiers; and though every one of them be good, all together they will become better when they shall find themselves entertained, commanded, and honoured by their own Prince. Wherefore it is necessary to provide for those arms, whereby to be able with the Italian valour to make a defence against foreigners. And however the Swiss infantry and Spanish be accounted terrible; yet is there defect in both of them, by which a third order might not only oppose them, but may be confident to vanquish them: for the Spaniards are not able to endure the Horse, and the Swiss are to fear the foot, when they encounter with them, as resolute in the fight as they; whereupon it hath been seen, and upon experience shall be certain, that the Spaniards are not able to bear up against the French Cavalero, and the Swisses have been routed by the Spanish Foot. And though touching this last, there hath not been any entire experience had, yet was there some proof thereof given in the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish Foot affronted the Dutch battalions, which keep the same rank the Swisses do, where the Spaniards with their nimbleness of body, and the help of their targets entered in under their Pikes, and there stood safe to offend them, the Dutch men having no remedy: and had it not been for the Cavalero that rushed in upon them, they had quite defeated them. There may then (the defect of the one and other of these two infantries being discovered) another kind of them be a new ordained, which may be able to make resistance against the Horse, and not fear the Foot, which shall not be a new sort of arms, but change of orders. And these are some of those things which ordained a new, gain reputation and greatness to a new Prince. Therefore this occasion should not be let pass, to the end that Italy after so long a time may see some one redeemed of hers appear. Nor can I express with what dearness of affection he would be received in all those countries which have suffered by those foreign scums, with what thirst of revenge, with what resolution of fidelity, with what piety, with what tears. Would any gates be shut again him? Any people deny him obedience? Any envy oppose him? Would not every Italian fully consent with him? This government of the Barbarians stinks in every one's nostrils. Let your Illustrious Family then undertake this worthy exploit with that courage and those hopes wherewith such just actions are to be attempted; to the end that under your colours, this country may be enabled, and under the protection of your fortune that saying of Petrarch be verified.  

Virtue contr'ul fuore  
Prendera l'arme, & fia il combatter corto:  
Che l'antico valour  
Ne gli Italici cor noné anchor morto. 

Virtue ' against fury shall advance the fight,  
And it i'th' combat soon shall put to slight:  
For th' old Roman valour is not dead,  
Nor in th' Italians breasts extinguished.       

The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca, composed by Nicholas Machiavelli, and presented to Zanobiglioudilmonti and Lingi Alomanni his very good friends.  
ZANOBI and LINGI, my very good friends, it seems a matter of great marvel to those that take it into consideration, how that all they, or the greater part of them, who have effected great things n● this world, and borne up their heads above others contemporaries, have taken their riseth and births from obscure and base beginnings, or such as have been by fortune extraordinarily afflicted. For all of them have been either exposed to the mercy of savage creatures, or had such base Sires, that as ashamed of them, they have feigned themselves sons to Jupiter, or some other Deity; who these have been, every one having knowledge of many of them, we shall omit to relate, as superfluous, yielding rather distaste than delight to the Reader. I am indeed of opinion that it proceeds from hence, viz in that fortune willing to demonstrate unto the world, that she, and not wisdom, gives men their greatness, therefore begins to show her strength at such a time, when wisdom can challenge no interest, but all rather is to be attributed as due to her alone. Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was then one of those, who in regard of the times he lived in, and the City where he was borne, effected very great matters, and had, as others in this kind, neither a very fortunate nor known birth, as in my further discourse of his life it shall appear: which I thought fit to bring to memory, as having found therein a subject of very great example, as well in regard of valour, as fortune. And I thought I might the better direct this discourse unto you two, who of all that I know most delight in such glorious achievements. I say then, that the Family of the Castracani is reckoned among the noble Families of the City of Lucca, however that in these days it be much decayed, according to the course of all other worldly things. Of this there was one Antony borne, who took upon him religious orders, and was a Canon of S. Michael's at Lucca, and in honour thereof was entitled Master Antony. He had but one sister, who was married to Buonaccorso Cennami; but Bnonaccorso being dead, and she remaining a widow, betook herself to live with her brother, with intention not to marry any more. Mr. Antony had behind his house where he dwelled, a vineyard, whereinto by reason of divers gardens bordering thereupon on several sides, the passage was very ordinary. It happened that one morning a little after the Sun rise, Dame Dionora, for so was Master Antony's sister called, walking out into the vineyard, as she was gathering some herbs, after the manner of women, to make a salad withal; she heard somekind of russeling under a vine amongst the leaves, and casting her eye that way, she perceived some little cry there, whereupon drawing near to the noise, she discovered the hands and face of an infant wrapped in the vine leaves, which seemed as if it asked her assistance: so that she partly marvailing, partly frighted, full of pity and amazement, took it up in her arms, and having carried it home, and washed it, and swaddled it in clean clouts, as they use children, at her return presented it to Master Antony: who considering the accident, and seeing the child, was as much amazed and compassionate as was his sister: and advising together what they should do in this case, resolved to bring it up, he being a Priest, and she not having any children. Having then taken a nurse into the house, they nourished it with as much tenderness as if it had been their own child; and causing it to be baptised, named it Castruccio after the name of their own father. Castruccio as he increased in years, so he grew in person and feature, and in every thing he showed wit and discretion: and quickly, according to his age, he learned whatsoever his Master Antony taught him: who purposing to make him a Priest, and to turn over unto him his Canonicate, and his other benefices, instructed him in that way: but he found him not a subject fit for that regular life: For so soon as Castruccio came to 14 years of age, he began to grow a little masterfull towards Master Antony and Dame Dionora, so that he stood no longer in fear of them, laying aside all Church books, he began to handle arms, and took not delight in any thing more than to manage them, or with others his equals to run, leap, or wrestle, and such other like exercises: wherein he showed such courage and strength, that he far surpassed all others of his age; and if any time he gave himself to reading, he took pleasure in nothing else than discourses of wars, and the actions of most famous men: for which cause Master Antony was much grieved at heart. In the City of Lucca there happened to dwell a Gentleman of the Family of the Guinigi, called Master Francis, who for fortunes, esteem, and valour, outwent all others the Citizens of Lucca: who was always trained up in bearing of arms, and who had a long time served under the Vlscounts of Milan; and because he was a Gibelline, he was accounted of a-above all that followed that faction in Lucca. This man being then in Lucca, and assembling morning and evening with the rest of the citizens under the Governor's Palace, which is in the head of the Palace of S. Michael, being the prime place of Lucca, oftentimes saw Castruccio using of those exercises with other lads of the town, wherein I formerly said he took delight; and perceiving that besides the mastering of them, he held over them a kind of Princely authority, and that they again loved and reverenced him, he became very desirous to know what he was, whereof being informed by some there present, he became the more desirous to take him home to him; and calling him one day to him, asked him, where he had rather live, either in a Cavaliers house, where he might learn to ride and use his arms, or abide in a Priest's house, where nothing else were to be heard but their Offices and Masses? Master Francis perceived how much Castruccio was cheered upon the mention of horses and arms; yet he standing a little out of countenance, Master Francis again encouraging him to speak, he answered, that if his Patron would therewith be content, he could not have a greater pleasure than to quit this calling of Priest, and betake himself to that of a soldier. Master Francis was much satisfied with this reply: and in a short time so negotiated in this matter, that Master Antony gave him up to his charge, whereunto he was the rather moved by the lads inclination, judging thereby that he could not hold him much longer in his former course. Castruccio then being preferred from Mr. Antony Castracani the Priest's house to the Palace of Mr. Francis Guinigi the Commander, it was a marvel to think in how short a time he attained to those virtues and good qualities, which are required in a complete Cavalier. First he became an excellent horseman: for he was able to manage the roughest horse at ease; and, though but a youth, in jousts and tournaments he was of prime remark; so that in any action of strength or activity, none could exceed him. These perfections besides were seasoned with such manners, and good qualities, as that touching modesty, it was incredible how that either in word or deed he gave no distaste to any; to his superiors he yielded reverence; he was modest with his equals, and pleasant with his inferiors; which gained him favour, not only in the whole Family of Guinigi, but also in the whole City of Lucca. It chanced in those times, Castru●cio being now arrived to eighteen years of age, that the Gibellins were chased by the Gulfs from Pavia, in favour of whom Master Francis Guinigi was sent for by the Viscounty of Milan, with whom went Castruccio, as he on whose shoulders lay the charge of the whole troops: in which employment, Castruccio gave such proofs of his judgement and courage, that not one in this expedition gained so much esteem as he, and his name became honourable, not only in Pavia, but throughout all Lombardy. Castruccio being then returned to Lucca of far greater esteem than before his departure he was; failed not (to his power) to gain himself friends, practising means to win them. But Master Francis Guinigi now chancing to die, and having left behind him a son named Paul of 13 years of age, appointed Castruccio his Tutor, and the Governor of his estate; having first caused him to be called to him before his death, and entreated him, that he would take upon him the ear to bring up his son with that faithfulness he had found himself; and that what kindnesses he could not return to the father, he would requite to the son. And now at length Master Francis Guinigi being dead, Castruccio left Tutor and Governor to Paul, grew in such credit and power, that the favour he was wont to find in Lucca, in some part was turned into envy, and he was calumniated by many, as who they doubted had some projects upon a tyranny. Among whom the Principal was M. George Opizi, head of the Guelphs faction. This man hoping by the death of Mr Francis to remain without competitor in Lucca, thought that Castruccio, being left with that trust, by the grace & favour of his discreet carriage gained him, had bereaved him of all means to attain thereto; and hereupon sowed many seeds of scandal against him, whereby to choke his well grown credit. Which at first Castruccio disdained, but afterwards grew jealous of it: for he thought that Master George would never rest, till he had so far disgraced him with King Robert of Naples his Lieutenant, as to cause him to chase him out of Lucca. At that time there was one Vguction of Fagginolo of Arezo, than Lord of Pisa, who by the Pisans was first chosen for their commander, and afterwards made himself their Lord. Divers outlawed Luccheses' of the Gibellin faction abode with Vguction, whom Castruccio practised to restore again with Vguctions' aid; and this design he communicated also with his friends at home, who could no way endure the Opizies authority. Having therefore given order, as was requisite, to this purpose, Castruccio fortified the tower of the Honesti, and furnished it with munition and store of victuals whereby upon occasion he might be able to defend himself therein for some time: and the night being come, which was agreed of with Vguction, he gave the sign to him, who was gone down into the plain with much people between the mountains and Lucca; and having seen the signal, he came close to Saint Peter's gate, and fired the antiport: Castruccio on the other side raised a great cry, calling the people to arms, and forced the gate on the other side within: so that Vguction entering with his men, forced the town, and slew Master George with all those of his family, and many others his friends and partisans, and chased out the governor, and changed the State of the City, as Vguction liked best, to the great damage thereof; for it appeared then, that there were above a hundred families chased out of Lucca. Those that fled, part went to Florence, and part to Pistoya, which Cities were then governed by the Guelphs faction; and hereupon they became enemies to Vguction and the Lucheses'. And upon this the Florentines and the rest of the Guelphs thinking the Gibellines faction grown too mighty in Tuscany, accorded together to restore again these exiled Luccheses', and having Levied a huge army, they came to the vale of Nievole, and seizing upon Mount Catino, from hence they went to encamp at Mount Carlo, whereby to have the passage open to Lucca. Whereupon Vguction having gathered a good army of Pisans and Luccheses' besides many Dutch horse which he drew out of Lombardy, went to find the Florentines camp, which perceiving the enemy's approach was removed from Mount Carlo, and settled between Mount Catino and Pescia; and Vguction sat down under Mount Carlo about some two miles of the enemy, where for some days between the horse of the two armies there passed some slight skirmishes: for Vguction being fallen sick, the Pisans and Luccheses' refused to come to battle with the enemy. But Vguctions malady augmenting, he retired to mount Carlo for his recovery, and committed the charge of the army to Castruccio, which was the Guelphs destruction: for hereupon they took courage, esteeming the enemy's armies as left without a head: which Castruccio understood, and lay still some few days, the more to confirm this their opinion, making show of fear, and not suffering any one to go out of the trenches: and on the other side the Guelphs the more they saw this fear, the more insolent they became, and every day being ordered for fight, they presented themselves before Castruccios army, who thinking he had now enough, emboldened them, and having had full notice of what order they kept, resolved to come to the trial of a day: and first with his speeches he confirmed his soldiers courage, and showed them the victory certain, if they would follow his directious. Castruccio had seen how the enemy had placed all his strength in the body of the army, & the weaker sort in the wings thereof: whereupon he did the clean contrary; for he put his best soldiers in his wings, and his slightest people in the body: and issuing out of his trenches with this order, so soon as ever he came within view of the enemy, which solently, as before they had wont, came to find them out, he commanded that those squadrons in the middle should go on leisurely, but that the rest should move with speed, insomuch that when they came to join battle with the enemy, only the wings of each army fought, and the troops in the middle stood unimployd, because the middle part of Castruccio's army had lagguerd so much behind, that the enemy's body had not yet reached to them: and thus the ablest of Castruccio's army came to fight with the weakest of the enemies, and the enemy's strength lay idle, not able to endamage those they were to encounter with, nor could they aid any of their own party: so that without much difficulty, the enemies two wings were both put to flight, and they in the middle seeing themselves left naked on each flank, without having whereupon to show their valour, fled likewise. The rout and the slaughter were great: for there were slain above ten thousand men, with many Officers, and great Cavaliers of the Guelphs faction throughout all Tuscany, and many Princes who came thither in favour of them: to wit, Peter, King Robert's Brother, and Charles' his nephew, and Philip Lord of Taranto: but of Castruccio's side they came not to above three hundred: among which Francis Vguctions son was slain: who being young and over-venturous, was killed at the first onset. This overthrow much augmented Castruccio's credit, so that Vguction grew so jealous and suspicious of his own State, that he continually busied his brains how to bring him to destruction; thinking with himself that that victory had rather taken his power from him, than settled it: and being in this thought, while he awaited some fair colour to effect his designs, it happened that Pieragnolo Michaeli was slain in Lucca, a man of good worth and esteem, and the Assassin fled into Castruccio's house: where the Captains and Sergeants going to apprehend him, were affronted, and hindered by Castruccio, so that the murderer by his aid escaped, which thing Vguction, who was then at Pisa, hearing, and deeming than he had just occasion to punish him, called unto his own son Neri, to whom he had now given the command of Lucca, and charged him, that under colour of inviting Castruccio, he should lay hold on him, and put him to death. Whereupon Castruccio going familiarly into the commanders palaces, not fearing any injury, was first by Neri entertained at supper, and afterwards seized on. And Neri doubting, lest by putting him to death, without any public justification the people might be enraged, kept him alive, till he were better informed by Vguction what was farther to be done in that case: who blaming his son's slowness and cowardice, for the dispatching hereof went out of Pisa with four hundred Horse towards Lucca: and hardly yet was he arrived at the Baths, but the Pisans took arms, and slew Vguctions Lieutenant, and the rest of his family, that remained at Pisa, and made Count Gaddo of Gerardesca their Lord: Vguction before he came to Lucca, had notice of this accident befallen in Pisa; yet thought he it not fit to turn back, left the Luccheses', like as the Pisans, should also shot their gates against him. But the Luccheses' understanding the chance at Pisa notwithstanding that Vguction was entered Lucca, taking this occasion to free Castruccio, first began at their meetings in the Piazze to speak slightly of him, afterwards to make some hub-bub, and from thence came to arms, demanding Castruccio to be set free; insomuch that Vguction for fear of worse, drew him out of prison: Whereupon Castruccio suddenly rallying his friends, with the people's favour made an assault upon Vguction who finding no other remedy, fled thence with his friends, and so went into Lombardy to the Lords of Scala, where afterwards he died poorly. But Castruccio being of a prisoner become as Prince of Lucca, prevailed so by his friends, and with this fresh gale of the peoples, favour that he was made General of their Forces for a year; which being compassed, to gain himself further credit in arms, he purposed to recover for the Luccheses' several town; which rebelld after Vguctions' departue, and went also by the Pisans favour, with whom he had entered into league at the camp, to Serezana; and to win that he had built over it a fort, which, being afterwards changed by the Florentines, is now called Serezanello, and in two months' space took the town, and afterwards in strength of this credit, he won Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in short time all Lunigiana: and to stop the passage that comes from Lombarby into Luginiana, he took Pontremoli and drew out thence Mr. Anastasia Palivicini, who was Lord thereof. Returning then to Lucca with this victory, he was met by the whole people: whereupon Castruccio resolving not to defer longer to make himself Prince, by means of Pazzino of Poggio Puccinello of Porcico, Francisco Boccansecehi, and Cecco Guinigi at that time of great repute in Lucca, but corrupted by him, made himself Lord thereof, and so solemnly and by resolution of the people was elected their Prince. At this time Frederck of Baviere King of the Romans came into Italy to take the Imperial crown, whom Castruccio made his friend, and went to him with five hundred Horse, having left for his Lieutenant at Lucca Paulo Guinigi, whom in remembrance of his father, he made account of as his own child. Castruccio was entertained very honourably by Frederick, who gave him many privileges, and made him his Deputy in Tuseany, and because the Pisans had expelld Gaddo of Gerardesca, and for fear of him asked succours of Frederick, he made Castruccio their Lord, whom the Pisans accepted for fear of the Guelphs faction, and in particular because of the Florentines. Frederick then being returned into Germany, and having left at Rome a governor for his affairs in Italy, all the Gibellins as well Tuscans as Lomdarbs that followed the Imperial faction, had their recourse to Castruccio, and each promised him the Principality of their native country; provided that by his means they might be restored: among whom was Mattheo Guidi, Nardo Scolare, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzi Nardi and Piero Buonacorsi, all Gibellins, and outlawd Florentines: and Castruccio plotting by help of these, and with his own forces to become Lord of all Tuscany, to gain himself credit the more, entered into amity with Mr. Metthem Viscoti Prince of Milan: and trained up all the men ofhi own city and country to arms: and because Lucca had five gates, he divided the country into five parts, armed them, and distributed them under Captains and colours, so that on a sudden he was able to bring together above twenty thousand men into the field, besides the help he might have from Pisa. He then being environed with these forces and friends, it fortuned that Mr. Mattheo Visconti was assailed by the Guelphs of Piacuza; who had driven out the Gibellins, in whose behalf the Florentines and King Robert had sent their troops. Whereupon Mr. Mattheo entreated Castruccio to affaile the Florentines, that they being constrained to defend their own homes, should call back their men out of Londarby. So Castruccio with a good army entered the Vale Arno, took Fucachio, and St. Miniato with great damage of the country; and upon this occasion the Florentines were forced to call back their troops: who were hardly returned into Tuscany, but Castruccio was compelled upon another necessity to haste back to Lucca. And in that City the Family of Poggio being of such power and authority as that it had made Castruccio not only great, but Prince also, and not taking themselves to have been requited as they had deserved, agreed with other Families of Lucca to move the city to rebellion, and to chase Castruccio thence; whereupon taking occasion one morning they came armed upon the Deputy, whom Castruccio had there ordained over Justice, and slew him, and further purposing to raise the people to commotion; Steven of Poggio an arcient and peaceable man, who had no hand at all in this conspiracy, came before them, constrained his friends by his authority amongst them, to lay aside their arms offering himself to mediate with Castruccio for them, that he should satisfy their desires. Thus they laid down their arms, but not with greater discretion than they had taken them up; for Castruccio having had notice of these novelties befallen in Lucca, without making any delay, with part of his troops, leaving Paul Guinigi Commander of the residue, came thence to Lucca, where having found the tumult appeased beyond his expectation, deeming he might with the more ease secure himself, disposed those of his party in several places, as best was for his turn. Steven of Poggio thinking with himself, that Castruccio was beholding to him, went to him, and entreated, not for himself, because he thought it no way needful for him, but for the others of his Family, praying that many things he would pardon, in respect of their youth, and many things in regard of the ancient amity, and obligation he had to the whole kindred. Whereunto Castruccio answered courteously, and bid him be of good cheer, and told him that he received more content the tumult was appeased, than he had had trouble that it was raised, and persuaded Steven to cause them all to come to him, saying, that he thanked God he had given him opportunity to make a show of his clemency, and bounty. They all then presenting themselves upon Stevens word and Castruccios, were together with Steven imprisoned, and put to death. In this mean while the Florentines had recovered S. Miniato; whereupon Castruccio thought fit to stay that war: considering that as yet he was not secure of Lucca, being that he could not safely part from home; and having caused the Florentines to be felt whether they would admit of a truce, he found them easily yielding thereto; for they also were weary of the charge, and desirous to stop the expense. Whereupon they made a truce, of two years, and that every one should keep what they had gotten. In the mean while Castruccio being freed from the war, that he might not again incur those dangers and hazards which formerly he had run, under divers colours and pretences, cut off all those in Lucca, who could have any ambition to to aspire to the Principality, and pardoned not one of them, depriving them of their Country and Fortunes, and those he could get in his clutches, of their lives: affirming that he had found it by experience, that none of them would abide true; and for his better safeguard, built a Fortress in Lucca, and made use of the materials of their Towers, whom he had banished and murdered. While Castruccio was thus quiet with the Florentines, and that he strengthened himself in Lucca, he failed not to do all that he could, without entering into open hostility to increase his greatness: and having a great desire to take Pistoya, thinking with himself that by the possessiou of that City, he had gotten one foot into Florence, gained himself by divers ways the whole mountain to friend, and by the factions he made in Pistoya, so behaved himself, that every one relied much on him. At that time the City was divided (as always it was) into the Bianchi and Neri; head of the Bianchi was Bastiano of Possente; and of the Neri, James of Gia: each of which held straight correspondence with Castrucio, & one desired to expel the other, so that the one and the other after many suspicions came to blows; James made himself strong at the gate towards Florence. Bastiano at that towards Lucca, and the one and the other of them relying more upon Castruccio, than upon the Florentines, judging him more ready and quick of dispatch in any thing touching the war, each of them sent to him secretly for aid: which Castruccio promised to them both, letting James know that he would come in person, and telling Bastiano, he would send Paul Guinigi his Foster son: and appointing a set time, sent Paul by way of Pescia, and himself went strait on to Pistoya; so that about midnight, for thus was it agreed between Castruccio and Paul, they both arrived at Pistoya and there received as friends: being both entered, when Castruccio found his time, he gave the watchword to Paul, whereupon he slew James of Gia, and the other Bastiano of Possente; and all their partakers were partly taken, partly slain, whereupon they forced Pistoya without resistance; and for the government of the town, Castruccio constrained the people to yield him obedience, remitting to them many old debts and duties, and thus did he to the whole Country there abouts, who all flocked together: partly to see the new Prince, so that every one fraught with hopes, or admiring his valour, set his heart at rest. It happened about this time, that the people of Rome mutinyed upon the extreme dearth of provision there, which was caused by the Pope's absence, who was then at Avignon, and they blamed the German government, insomuch that every day murders and other disorders were committed, which Henry the Emperor's Deputy could no way remedy; whereupon he had a great suspicion that the Romans would call in King Robert of Naples, and chase him from Rome, and so restore it to the Pope: And having no nearer Ally, whom he could make recourse unto, than Castruccio, he sent to entreat him, that he would be pleased, not only to send him aid, but to come himself also in person. Castruccio thought this voyage was no way to be put off, as well to render some service of merit to the Emperor, as because now the Emperor was absent from Rome, there was some necessity of it: leaving Paul Guinigi at Lucca, he went thence with two hundred horse to Rome, where he was entertained by Henry, with very much honour; and his presence in a short time gave so much credit to the Imperials, that without blood or other violence, all things were well quieted: for Castruccio having caused a good quantity of corn to be brought by sea out of the Country about Pisa, took away all occasion of offence. Afterwards, partly by admonishing, partly by chastsing the chief Officers of Rome, he reduced them freely under Henry's government; & Castruccio was created a Roman Senator, besides many other honours he received of the people, and that Order he took with very great pomp, putting on a gown of cloth of tissue with great letters before to this purpose, This man is what it pleases God; and again behind, And shall be what God will. In this mean while the Florentines, who were displeased that Castruccio during the truce, had made himself Lord of Pistoya, devised which way they might make it rebel, which by reason of his absence, they thought might easily be effected. Amongst the banished Pistoyeses, who were then at Florence, there was Baldo Cocchi, and James Baldini, both men of authority, and ready for any hazard. These men held correspondence with some friends they had within; so that with the Florentines help they entered by night into Pistoya, and chased thence Castruccios friends and officers, and some of them they slew, and restored the City her liberty, which news much displeased Castruccio; so that having taken leave of Henry, he came with his men by great days journeys to Lucca. The Florentines when they had word of Castruccios return, thinking he would not take much rest, resolved to prevent him, and with their forces to enter first into the Vale of Nievola, before him: supposing, that if they first made themselves masters of that valley, they should cut off from him all means of possibility to recover Pistoya; and so having put in order a great army of all the friends of the Guelphs faction, they came into the territory of Pistoya. On the other side, Castruccio came with his troops to Mount Carlo, and having learned where the Florentines army was, determined not to meet them in the plain of Pistoya, nor to attend them in the plain of Psecia, but if it might be, to encounter them in the strait of Saravalla; deeming that by bringing his design to pass, he should surely gain the victory; for he understood the Florentines had got together some forty thousand men, and he had made choice of some twelve thousand out of all his; and however he was confident of his own industry, and their valour, yet doubted he, lest if he set on them in a large place, he might be environed by the multitude of the enemies. Saravalla is a Castle between Pescia and Pistoya, placed upon a hill that shuts in the Vale of Nievole, not upon the very passage, but above to that some two bow-shots of the place, by which a man passes, is more strait than on the sudden; for of every side it rises gently but in a strait manner, especially upon the hill, where the waters are divided; so that twenty men on the one side and the other would wholly possess it. In this place Castruccio had a design to encounter with the enemy, as well because his small troops should have the advantage, as not to discover the enemy but just upon the skirmish, fearing lest his men seeing the number of the enemies, should be startled. Mr. Manfredi of the Germane nation, was then Lord of the Castle of Saravalla, who before that Castruccio was Lord of Pistoya, had been lest in that Castle, as in a place that was neuter between the Luccheses' and Pistoyeses: nor afterward befell it either of them to offend him, he promising to abide neuter, and not to apply himself to the one or the other: So that for this cause, and for that the situation was strong, he had kept himself thus: but upon this accident Castruccio became desirous to possess this place. And having very near acquaintance with one of the inhabitants of the place, he so appointed his business with him, that the night before the skirmish was to begin, he should take into the town 400 m●n of his, and slay the commander; and abiding thus prepared, he stirred not his army from Mount Carlo, the more to encourage the Florentines to pass, who, because they desired to carry the war far of from Pistoya, and to bring it into the Vale of Nievole, encamped under Saravalla, with intintion the day following to pass the hill, but Castruccio having without any noise taken the Castle in the might, p●rted from Mount Carlo about midnight, and quietly arrived in the morning at the foot of Saravalla, so that at the same instant both the Florentines and he began to ascend the side of the hill. Castruccio had sent his infantry by the road way, & a troop of 400 Horse he had sent upon the left hand towards the Castle: on the other side the Florentines had sent 400 horse before them, and after those their foot moved, not any way thinking they should find Castruccio upon the top of the hill; for they knew nothing of that he had made himself master of the Castle. Thus at unawares the Florentine Horse having got to the top of the hill discovered Castruccios Foot, and were so near approached them, that they had hardly time to lace on their helmets. These men then that were unprovided, being assailed by the others that were prepared, and in order, were fiercely set upon, and with much ado made resistance and indeed some few of them made head a while: but so soon as the noise hereof descended into the Florentines camp, all was full of confusion. The Horse were oppressed by the Foot; the Foot by the Horse, and their carriages; the Commanders because of the straifness of the place could neither advance nor retire: so that no man in this confusion knew what could or should be done: insomuch, that the Horse which were at blows with the enemy's Foot, were cut to pieces, and they not able to defend themselves because the malignity of the scite did not suffer them, yet made they resistance more of necessity than of valour; for being hemmed in by the mountains on both sides behind by their friends, and before by their enemies, they had to way open for flight. Hereupon Castruccio having perceived that his troops were not able to break the enemy, sent a thousand Foot by way of the Castle, causing them to descend with the 400 Horse which he had sent before, who struck them so rudely upon the flank that the Florentines unable longer to resist that violence, vanquished rather by the place than by the enemy, all took them to flight; and the flight began from those who were behind towards Pistoya, who dispersing themselves all along the plain, every one where he best could, provided for his safeguard. This defeat was very great and bloody; many Commanders were taken, among which was Bandino of Rossi, Francisco Brunnelleschi, and John of Tosa, all noble Florentines, and many other Tuscans, besides divers of the Kingdom of Naples, who being sent by King Robert in favour of the Guelphs, served under the Florentines. The Pistoyeses hearing of this rout, without delay chase out the faction of the Guelphs, yielded themselves to Castruccio. Who not contented herewith, took Piato, and all the Castles of the plain, as well on this as on the other side of Arno, and set himself down with his army in the plain of Perettola some two miles off from Florence, where he abode many days to divide the spoil, and to feast for joy of the victory gotten, causing moneys to be stamped in scorn of the Florentines, and races to be run by horsemen and queans: neither failed he to endeavour to corrupt some noble Citizens, to open to him in the night the gates of Florence; but the conspiracy being discovered, they were taken and beheaded, among whom was Thomas Lupacco, and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. Hereupon the Florentines being affrighted upon his defeat, hardly knew any remedy to preserve their liberty; and to the end they might be sure of aid, sent Ambassadors to Robert King of Naples, to give him the City, and the Dominion thereof, Which that King accepied of, not so much for the honour the Florentines had done him, as for that he knew well how much it imported his State that the Guelphs faction should maintain the State of Tuscany: and having agreed with the Florentines to have of them two hundred thousand Florentines by the year, he sent Charles his son with four thousand Horse to Florence: so that the Florentines were somewhat eased of Castruccios troops: for they were constrained to leave their territories and to go to Pisa, there to repress a conspiracy made against him by Benedicto Lanfranschi, one of the chief of Pisa, who not being able to endure that his native country should be enthralled to a Lucchese, conspired against him, plotting to seize upon the Citadel, and to chase out the garrison, and to slay those of Castruccio's party. But because in such matters, if the small number be fit to keep the secret, yet suffices it not to put it in execution: while he went about to gain more men to this purpose, some there were that be wrayed his plot to Castruccio: neithet passed this discovery without the infamy of Bonifacio Cerchi and john Guidi Florentines, who were near neighbours to Pisa; whereupon Benedicto being laid hand on, was put to death, and all the rest of that family banished, and many other Noble Citizens beheaded: and thinking with himself that Pistoya and Pisa were not very faithful unto him, he took care both by his industry and forces to secure himself thereof: which gave leisure to the Florentines to recover their strength, and to be able to attend the return of Charles: who being arrived, they determined to lose no longer time, and gathered ae great number of men; for they called together to their aid in a manner all the Guelphs in Italy, and made an exceeding great army: of more than 30000 Foot, and 10000 Horse, and having advised, which were first to be assailed, either Pistoya or Pisa, they resolved it were better to set first upon Pisa, being a thing more likely to succeed, by reason of the late conspiracy there, as also of more profit, deeming that if Pisa were once gotten, Pistoya would soon render itself. The Florentines then going forth with this army in the beginning of May 1328, suddenly took Lastra Signia, Mount Lupo, and Empoli, and came with their army to St. Miniato; Castruccio on the other part perceiving this great army, which the Florentines had brought again him, was nothing startled, but rather thought that this was the time, when Fortune was to give him in his hand the whole dominion of Tuscany, believing they should have no better success in this of Pisa, than formerly they had in that of Serravalle; and that now they could not hope to repair themselves again, as then; whereupon assembling twenty thousand Foot and 4000 Horse, he brought his army to Fucchio, and sent Paul Guinigi with 5000 Foot to Pisa. Fucchio is seated in a stronger place than any other Castle, upon the territory of Pisa, because it is in the midst between the Goseiana and the Arno, and a little raised from the plain; where he abiding, the enemies were not able, unless they divided their army into two parts; to hinder his provision either from Lucca, or Pisa; neither could they but upon disadvantage either come upon him, or go towards Pisa: for in one case, they might be enclosed in the midst between Castruccios troops, and those of Pisa; in the other case, having the Arno to pass, they could not do it with the enemy on their backs, without very great danger. And Castruccio for their encouragement to undertake the passage, had not placed himself with his troops along the bank of Arno, but a little aside near unto the walls of Fucchio, and had left distance enough between the River and him. The Florentines having gotten St. Miniato, advised whether were to be done, either to go to Pisa, or to find out Castruccio; and having measured the difficulties of both courses, they resolved to go and invest him; the river Arno was so low that a man might wade over it; but yet not so, but that the infantry was wet to the shoulders, and the Horse even to the saddle. Upon the tenth day then of June in the morning, the Florentines in battle array, caused part of their Cavalero to begin to pass, and a body of ten thousand Foot. Castruccio who stood ready, and intent to what he had in his mind to do, with a battalion of five thousand Foot, and three thousand Horse fell upon them: neither gave he them any time to get out of the water but that he was at blows with them; he sent a thousand light armed Foot up by the bank on that part, under the Arno, and a thousand above it, the Florentines Foot were much distressed with the water and weight of their arms, nor had they all yet got over the channel of the river. When some of the Horse had passed, by reason that they had moored the bottom of the Arno, they made the passage the uneasier for them that came after them; for the bottom proving rotten and miry, some of the Horse came over and over on their riders, and many stuck so fast in the mud that they were there stabled: whereupon the Florentine Commanders seeing the difficulty to pass on that part, caused them to retire and make proof of a higher part of the river, whereby to find a sounder bottom, and the channel more favourable for their passage: against whom those whom Castruccio had sent under the bank, made resistance, who slightly armed with targets and darts, in their hands, with huge outcries, wounded them both in the face and breast, insomuch that the horses affrighted both with the cries and strokes, would in no wise pass forwards, but fell foul one upon another; the fight between Castrucio's men and those that were already past, was sharp and terrible, andd of each side there fell many, and every one used all his skill and strength to overcome his adversary. Castruccio's men would force them back into the river; the Florentines strived to put forwards to make place for others, that being come forth of the water, they might be able to stand to the fight, to which obstinacy there was added the Captain's encouragements. Castrucio put his men in mind, that these were the same enemies, which but a little while ago they had beaten at Seravalle. The Florentines reproached theirs, that they being many, should suffer a few to overcome them. But Castruccio perceiving that the fight lasted, and that his own and his adversaries were well wearied, and that on each side many were hurt and slain, he sent out another band of five thousond Foot, and when he brought them up to the very back of his own that fought, he gave order that they before should open, and wheel about, one on the right hand, the other on the left, and so retire; which thing done gave room to the Florentines to advance and gain some ground. But when once they came to handy blows, the fresh men with those that were tired, they stayed not long ere they forced them back into the river, between the Horse of the one side, and the other, yet there was not much advantage: whereupon Castruccio knowing his own inferior, had given order to the leaders, that they should only maintain fight, as he that hoped to overcome the Foot; which done, he might be able with more ease to overcome the Horse; which out as he purposed: for having seen the Foot forced back into the river, he sent the rest of his infantry against the enemy's Horse, who with lances and darts wounding them, and the Cavalero also pressing them with greater fury, put them to flight. The Florentine Commanders seeing the difficulty that their Horse had to pass, strove to make their Foot pass on that part beneath the river, to fight with the flank of Castruccio's troops. But the channel being deep, and all above already possessed by his men, all this proved vain. Whereupon the whole army was put to rout, to Castruccio's great glory and honour, and of so great a multitude there escaped not a third. Many Chieftains were taken, and Charles son of King Robert, together with Michaelangelo Falconi; and Taddeo of the Albizi Florentine Commissaries, fled thence to Empoli. The spoil taken was great, the slaughter exceeding great, as a man may imagine in such and so great a conflict: for of the Florentine army 20231, & of Castruccio's part 1570 were left dead upon the place. But Fortune being enemy to his glory, when as she should have given him life, took it from him, and interrupted those designs which he a long time before had purposed to put in effect: neither could any thing but death hinder him. Castruccio had toiled himself all that day in the battle, when at the end thereof all weary and sweaty, he stayed about the port of Fucchio, to attend the soldiers, as they should return from the victory, and in person receive and thank them, and partly if peradventure any thing should arise from the enemies, that they had made head in any place, he might be ready to give order thereto: judging it the office of a good Commander, to be the first to get a horseback, and the last to light off. Whereupon he standing exposed to a wind, which ordinarily about midday rise; upon the Arno, and uses to be pestiferous, he was all over child. Which thing not being made account of by him, was the occasion of his death: for the night following he was taken with a dangerous fever, which continually augmenting, and the sickness being judged mortal by all the Physicians, and Castruccio perceiving of it, called Paul Guinigi, and spoke to him these words; Had I believed, my son, that Fortune would have cut of my course in the midst of the way, to arrive unto that glory which I by my so many good suce cesses had promised myself, I should have less wearied myself; and to thee as I should have left a smaller estate, so also fewer enemies, and less envy: for I would have been content with the dominion of Lucca & Pisa, and never subdued the Pistoyeses, nor with so many injuries provoked the Florentines; but by making the one and the other of these people my friends, I should have led a life, though not longer, yet surely more quiet; and to thee should I have left an estate, though less, without doubt more secure and firm; but Fortune, who will dispose of all human affairs, gave me not so much judgement, that I was able first to know it, or so much time, that I was able to overcome it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I never denied it to thee, how I came into thy father's house, being yet a young lad, and void of all those hopes which every generous spirit ought to conceive, and how I was by him brought up, and beloved by him as much as if I had been of his own blood; whereupon under his government I became valorous and grew capable of that fortune in which thou hast and dost see me: and because at his death, he committed thee and all this fortunes to my fidelity, I have brought thee up with that affection, and increased them with that fidelity, that I was and am bound to. And because not only whether that alone which was left thee by thy father, but that also which my fortune and valour got, were thine, I never would marry, to the end that the love of children should never take me off, from showing in any part that thankfulness towards thy father's blood, which I thought I was obliged to show. I leave thee therefore a very fair State, whereat I am much pleased: but for that I leave it thee weak and unsettled, I am exceedingly grieved there remains to thee the City of Lucca, which will never be content to live under thy government: Pisa is also thine: wherein there ere men naturally inconstant, and full of treachery: which, however it be divers times accustomed to serve, yet will it always disdain to have a Lucchese for its Lord. Pistoya likewise is left to thee, very little faithful to thee, because it is divided, and by fresh injuries provoked against our Family. Thou hast the Florentines for thy neighbours, and those offended, and divers ways injuryed by us, and not extinguished, to whom the news of my death would be more welcome than the Conquest of all Tuscany. Thou canst not rely upon the Princes of Milan, nor upon the Emperor, because they are far hence, lazy, and very slow with their succours: wherefore thou oughtest not to hope in any thing, but in thy own industry, and the remembrance of my valour, and in the reputation which this present victory gains thee: which if thou shalt know with discretion how to make use of, will aid thee to make an accord with the Florentines, who being affrighted at this present defeat, aught with desire to condescend thereto: whom though I sought to make them mine enemies, and thought it would procure me both power and glory, yet thou art by all means to seek to gain for thy friends; for their friendship will prove thy security and advantage. It is a thing of very much importance in this world for a man to understand his own self, and to know how to measure the forces of his own courage and State; and he that finds himself unfit for war, should endeavour to settle his government by the rules of peace, whereunto thou shalt do well if by my advice thou address thyself, and strive by this way to enjoy my pains and dangers, which shall easily prove successful to thee, when thou shalt account these my advertisements true: and herewithal thou shalt be doubly obliged to me, first that I have left thee this State, and secondly that I have taught thee how to keep it. Afterwards having caused those Citizens to come to him, who of Lucca, Pisa, and Pistoya, served in the wars under him; and having recommended Paul Guinigi to them, and made them swear obedience to him, he died; leaving to all those, that ever knew him, a happy remembrance of him; and to those that had been his friends, so great a desire of him, that never any Prince, that died at any time, left more. His funerals were most honourably solemnised, and he was buried at St. Francisco in Lucca. But neither valour, norfortune were so favourable to Paul Gninigi, as to Castruccio; for not long after, he lost Pistoya, and after Pisa; and with much ado held he the government of Lucca: which continued in his family till Paul the grandchild. Castruccio then was, by what is here showed, a man of rare note, not only for those times he lived in, but for many ages that had passed long before. He was of a stature higher than ordinary, and his limb were well answerable each to other; & of such a grace he was in his aspect, and entertained all men with that humanity, that he never spoke with any that he sent from him discontent; his hair inclined to a reddish colour, and he wore it always cut above his ears; and always in all seasons, whether it reigned or snew, he went with his head uncovered; he was very pleasing to his friends; and terrible to his enemies, just among his subjects, treacherous with foreigners: nor where he could vanquish by fraud, did he everstrive to do it by force: for he said the victory, and not the manner how it was got, gained a man glory; no man entered more boldly into dangers, nor was more wary to get out of them: and he was wont to say, that men ought to prove every thing, but to be astonished at nothing, and that God favours valiant men, who always chastises the feeble with the mighty. He was also very admirable in replying or biting sharply or gentily; and as in this kind he spared not any, so likewise, he was nothing moved, when himself was not spared: so that we have many things he said wittily, and heard patiently, as these: Having caused a Ducat to be given for a Starling, and a friend of his reproving him for it, said Castruccio Thou wouldst not have given above a penny for it, and his friend saying it was true, he replied, a Ducat is les● to me. Having a flatterer about him, and in scorn having spat upon him, the flatterer said, that Fisher men to take a little Fish suffer themselves to be all moiled in the Sea; I will let myself be daubed by a little spittle, to catch a Whale: which Castruccio not only heard patiently, but rewarded. When one told him, that he lived too sumptuonsly; said Castruccio, if this were a vice, there would not be so splendid entertainments at the Saints Feasts. Passing through a street, & seeing a young man coming out of a whore-house all blushing because he had been seen by him, he said to him, Be not ashamed when thou goest out, but when thou interest in. A friend of his giving him a knot to lose, that was curiously tied, said, O fool, dost thou think I will loosen such a thing, which being tied gives me so much trouble? Castruccio saying to one that professed himself a Philosopher, You are of the condition of dogs, that always go about those who can best give them meat; No says the party, we are like Phyfitians, who visit the houses that have most need of them. Going from Pisa to Leghorn by water, and a dangerous storm there arising, and thereupon being much preplexed, was reprehended by one of his company as pusillanimons, saying himself was not afraid of any thing; to whom Castruccio replied, that he nothing marvayled thereat; for every one valued his life, according to its worth. Being asked by onu, what he should do to gain a good esteem? answered him; See when thou goest to a Feast, that a block sit not upon a block. When one blasted that he had read many things, said Castruccio, It were better thou couldst brag thou hadst remembered much. Another bragging though he had tippled much, he was not drunk; he replied, and Ox does the same. Castruccio kept a young loss, which he lay with ordinarily, and thereupon being reproved by a friend, telling him that it was a great wrong to him that he had suffered himself to be so taken by a Wench; Thou art mistaken, quoth Cactruccio, I took her, not she me. Also when one blamed him that he was too delicious in his dy●●, he said to him, I warrant thou woul● si● not spend herein so much as I do; That is true, quoth the other; then replied he Toou 〈◊〉 more covetous than I am gluttonou. Being invited to supper by Tadeo Cernardi a lucchese, a rich and magnificent citizen; and in the hou●. Tadeo showing him a chamber all furnished with cloth of gold, and that it was all ●a●'d with curious stones, which were diversty wrought with sundry colours, and represented flowers, leaves, and such like green things: Castruccio having got together a great deal of spittle in his mouth, spat it full in Tadeos' face; at which he showing himself much troubled, says Castruccio; I knew not where to spit that I might offend thee less. Being asked how Caesar died? saith he, Would to God I might die like him. Being one night in a house of one of his Gentlemen, where there were divers Ladies invited to a Feast, and he dancing, and sporting with them, more than befitted his condition, was reproud by a friend, answered, He that is held a wise man in the day time, will never be thought a fool in the night. One coming to ask a favour at his hands, and Castruccio seeming as if he heard not, sell down upon his knees before him, whereat Castruccio chiding him, he answered, Thou art the cause thereof, who carriest thine cares in thy feet: and thereby he gained double the favour he asked. He used to say, that the way to Hell was easy, because men went thither downwards, and blindfold. When one asked him a favour with many and supperfluous worrds, Castruccio said to him, Hereafter when thou wouldst any thing with me, send another. Such another man having wearied him with a tedious speech, and telling him in the latter end, Perhaps I may have tired you with my long speaking; No, thou hast not, said he, for I heard not one word of all that thou hast spoken. He was wont to say of one who had been a handsome boy, and afterwards became a comely man, that he was too injurious, having first distracted the husbands from their wives, and afterwards the wives from their husbands. To an envious man that laughed, he said, Laughst thou because thou art well, or because another suffers evil? When he was also under the rule of Master Francis Guinigi, one of his playfellows saying to him, What wilt thou that I shall give thee, for a blow on the mouth? Castruccio answered him, a Helmet. Having caused a citizen of Lucca to die, who had helped him in his rising to his greatness, when it was said to him, He had ill done to put to death one of his old friends; he replied; You are deceived, I have put to death a new enemy. Castruccio commended much those that betrothed wives, but never married them, like men that say they will go to Sea, but never do. He said he wondered much at men, that when they bought any vessel of earth or glass, they found it first whether it be good; but in taking a wife they are content only to see her. When he was near death, one ask him, how he would be buried? he answered, with my face downwards: for I know, that as soon as I am dead, this Country shall go upside down. Being asked, whether he never thought to become a Friar to save his Soul? he said No, for it was strange to him, that Lazarus should go to Paradise, and Vguction of Faggivola to Hell. Being asked, when it was best to eat, to preserve the health? he answered, if a man be rich when he is hungry; if he be poor, when he may. Seeing a Gentleman a friend of his, that made his servant truss his points, he said, I hope one day too thou wiltmake his feed thee. Seeing that one had written upon his house in Latin, God keep the wicked hence; said, The master then must not enter here. Passing by a way where there was a little house with a great gate, he said, This house will run out of doors. Treating with an Ambassador of the King of Naples touching some good of the borderers, whereat he was some What angry, when the Ambassador said, Fear you not the King then? Castruccio said, Is this your King good or bad? and he answering that he was good, Castruccio replied, Wherefore then should I be afraid of those that are good? We might relate many others of his sayings, wherein he showed both acurosse of wit, and gravity; but these shall suffice in testimony of his worthy qualities. He lived forty four years, and behaud himself like a Prince in all his fortunes: and as of his good for●●nes there are enough monunments left, so likewise would he there should be seen some of his evil fortunes; for the manacles wherewith he was chained in prison, are yet to be seen fastened in the tower of his dwelling house, where they were put by him, that they might bear witness of his adversity. And because he was no way inseriour to Philip of Macedon, Alexander's father, nor to Scipio of Rome, he died in the same age they two did; and doubtless he would have exceeded the one and the other, if in exchange of Lucca he had had Macedon, or Rome for his Country.   

A Relation of the course taken by Duke Valentine in the murdering of Vitellozzo Vitelli Oliverotio of Fermo, Paul, and the Duke of Gravina, all of them of the Family of the Orisini; composed by Nicholas Machiavelli.  
DUke Valentine was returned from Lombardy, whither he had gone to excuse himself to King Lewis of France, touching those many calumnies which the Florentines charged him with, for the rebellion of Arezo and the other Towns of the Vale of Clicana, and was thence come to Imola; where he plotted his enterprise against john Bentivogh tyrant of Bolonia: for he had a mind to reduce that City into his subjection, and make it head of his Duchy of Romania: which thing being known to the Vitelli and Orsini, and their other complices, they thought the Duke would grow too powerful and that it was to be feared, lest that taking Balonia, he should seek their utter ruin, that he might remain the only Champion of Italy: and hereupon they made a diet at the Magione, in the trritories of Perusia: where there met Cardinal Paulo, and the Duke of Gravina of the Family of the Orsini; Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotti of Fermo, John Paulo Baglioni tyrant of Perusia, and Master Antonio of Venofro, sent by Pandulpho Petrucci head of Sienna: where it was argued amongst them touching the Duke's greatness, and touching what his further intentions were: and that it was necessary to bridle his appetite: otherwise they ran hazard together with others, all to go to ruin: and they determined not to abandon the Bentivoli, and to seek to gain the Florentines; to one and the other of which places they dispatched men, promising aid to the one, and encouraging the other to unite with them, against the common enemy. This Diet was suddenly known throughout all Italy, and those people that under the Duke's government were discontented, among whom were the Vrbinates, began to hope they might be able to inovate some things from whence it proceeded, that their minds being thus held in suspense by some of Vrbino, it was plotted to take the Rock of Lea, which held for the Duke, and these took occasion from hence. The governor fortified the Castle, and causing timber to be carried thither, they of the conspiracy contrived that some great pieces of timber, which they were drawing into the Castle, should be brought upon the bridge, to the end that being thus clogged, it could not be lift up by them within: which occasion being taken, they leapt upon the bridge, and thence into the Rock, by which surprisal, so soon as it was understood, all that State rebelled, and called home again their old Duke. Hope now being laid hold on, not so much by the taking of the Rock, as for the Diet held at the Magione, by means whereof they thought to be assisted: who having heard the rebellion of Urbin, imagined it not fit to lose the occasion: and getting their men together, they put forward, intending if there were any town of all that State remaining in the Duke's hands, to assail it: and they sent afresh again to Florence to solicit that Commonwealth to join with them in extinguishing this common calamity: showing the party already gained, and such an occasion offered as the like was not to be expected. But the Florentines for the hate they bore to the Vitelli and the Orsini upon divers occasions, not only clavae not to them, but sent Nicholas Machiavelli their Secretary, to offer receipt to the Duke, and aid against these his new enemies, who was then in Imola full of fear, because of a sudden and beyond his opinion, his soldiers being become his enemies, he unarmed met with a war at hand: but having taken heart upon the Florentines proffers, he purposed to temporise, and hold off the war with those few people which he had, and with treaties of agreement, and partly to prepare aides, which he provided two ways, by sending to the King of France for men, and partly by taking into his pay all men at arms, and what others else made profession to serve a Horseback, and to all he gave money. Notwithstanding all this, the enemies advanced, and thence came towards Fossombrone; where some of the Duke's troops had made head: which by the Vitelli and Orsini were broken: which thing caused the Duke to turn himself wholly to see if he with treaties of accord could stop this humour: and being an exceeding great dissembler, he failed not of any means to give them to understand who had taken arms against him, that what he had gotten he was willing should be theirs: and that it sufficed him to enjoy the title of Prince, but he was content the Principality should be theirs, and so effectually persuaded he them, that they sent Paul to the Duke to treat of peace, and so stayed their arms: but now the Duke stayed not his preparations, and with a great deal of case increased both his Horse and Foot, and to the end these provisions should not appear, he went and scattered all his soldiers in several places throughout Romans. In this while also came there to him five hundred French lances: and however he was now so strong, that with open force he was able to right himself upon his enemies; yet thought he it the more safe and profitable way to beguile them, and for all this not to stop the treaty for peace: and this matter was so far laboured in, that he made a peace with them, and assured to them their old pays, gave them four thousand ducats in hand, promised not to molest the Bentivoliis, and made alliance with John, and moreover that he could not constrain any of them to come in person to him, more than he thought good himself. On the other side they promised to restore unto him the Duchy of Vrbiu, and all the other places taken by them, and to serve him in any expedition he should undertake; nor without his permission to war with any one, or take pay of any one. This accord being made, Guidubaldo Duke of Urbin fled again to Venice, having first caused all the fortresses of that State to be demolished: for relying upon the people he would not that those sorts, which he thought he could not defend, should fall into the enemy's hands, whereby to bridle his friends. But Duke Valentine having made this agreement, and divided all his troops throughout all Romania, with the Frenchmen at arms, at the end of November departed from Imola, and from thence went to Cesena, where he abode many days to contriye with those that were sent by the Vitelli and the Orsini, who were ready then with their forces in the Duchy of Urbin, what action they should then anew enter in, but not concluding any thing, Oliverotto of Fermo was sent to offer him that if he would adventure an ●expedition against Tuscany they were at his service; in case he would not, they would be ready to serve him against Sinigallia; to whom the Duke answered, that in Tuscany he would not make any war, because the Florentines were his friends: but he was well content they should go to Sinigallia: whence it came to pass that not long after, advice was brought, that the town was yielded to them, but the Fort would not: for the Governor would render it to the Duke in person, and to none else; and thereupon they persuaded him to comebefore it, the Duke thought this occasion very good, and that it would not any way scare them, being he was called by them, and not going of himself: and the more to secure them, he dismissed all his French forces, which returned thence into Lombardy, save only a hundred lances of Mounsieur Candi●les his kinsman, and parting about the middle of December from Cesena, he went thence to Fano; where withal his wiles and craft he could, he persuaded the Vitelli and the Orsini, to expect him at Sinigallia; showing them that such strangeness would make their accord to be neither faithful nor durable; and that he was a man that desired he might avail himself both of the forces and advice of his friends: and however Vitellozzo was very unwilling, and that his brother's death had taught him, that he should not offend a Prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, being wrought to it by Paulo Orfino who had been corrupted by the Duke with gifts and fair promises, he agreed to attend him: whereupon the Duke before the 30 day of December, 1502, that he was to go from Fano, communicated his purpose to eight of his chief confidents, among whom were Don Michael, and the Lord of Enna who was afterwards Cardinal: and gave them charge, that presently as soon as Vitellozzo, Paulo Orsino, the Duke of Gravina, and Oliverotto had met them, each two of them should get one of them between them: consigning each one by name to certain two, who should train them along even into Sinigallia, nor suffer them to part, till they had brought them to the Duke's lodging, and that they were there taken. He afterwards took order that all his Horse and Foot, which were better than two thousand Horse and ten thousand Foot, should be in the morning at break of day upon the Metaure, a River some five miles from Fano, where they should attend him; being then the last day of Deucmber, 'pon the Metaure with those troops, he caused some two hundred Horse to go before him, afterwards the Foot moved, and after them himself in person, with the rest of his men at arms. Fano and Sinigallia are two Cities of the Matches, seituate upon the bank of the Adriatic Sea fifteen miles distant the one from the other: So that he who goes towards Sinigallia hath the Mountains on his right hand, the feet whereof sometimes are so bounded by the Sea, that between them and the water there remains but a very small distance, and where they are most extended, there is not above two miles' distance. The City of Sinigallia from the foot of these Mountains is not much further than a bow-shot, and from the Sea not above a mile distant: along the side hereof runs alittle river, which washeth that part of the walls which is toward Fano, looking towards the high way, so that till it come near unto Sinigallia, it runs for a good part of the way along the Mountains: and being come near up to the river that passes alongst by Sinigallia, it turns upon the left hand alongst the bank thereof: So that running on for the space of a bow-shot, it reaches to a bridge, which passes that river, and stands in front with the gate that enters into Sinigallia; not by a right line, but athwart: before the gate there is a bourg of houses, with a broad place before them, which the bank of the river shoulders upon one side. So that the Vitelli and Orsini having given order to attend the Duke, and personally to honour him, the better to give way to his men, they retired their own into certain Castles, some six miles from Sinigallia, and had left only Oliverotto in Sinigallia with his band, which was some thousand Foot, and a hundred and fifty Horse, which were lodged in the bourg before named. Things being thus ordered, Duke Valentine came thence towards Sinigallia, & when the first head of the Horse troops came up to the bridge, they passed it not, but making stand, they turned their horse, the one part towards the river, the other to the open field, and so left a way in the midst, whereby the infantry passed, which without stop entered the Town. Vitellozzo, Paulo, and the Duke of Gravina upon their mules, accompanied with a few horse, went to meet the Duke: & Vitellozzo disarmed having a cloak all lined with green, being exceeding melancholy, as presaging his own death near at hand, caused a certain admiration of himself in all, the valour of the man being well known, and the fortune he had passed; and it is said, that when he left his soldiers to come into Sinigallia, there to meet the Duke, that he did in a manner take his last leave of them; to his Captains he recommended his house, and the welfare thereof, and admonishd his Nephews, that they should not so much mind the great fortunes of their Family, as the valour of their Ancestors. These three then being come up to the Duke, and done their obeisance, were received by him with a cheerful countenance, and presently by those, who had charge to look to them, taken between them. But when the Duke saw that Oliverotto was wanting, who had stayed with his men at Sinigallia, and attended before at the broad place by his lodging, above the river, to keep them in order, and exercise them: he winked upon Don Michael, to whom the care of Oliverotto was committed, that he should take such order that Oliverotto should not escape him. Whereupon Don Michael road before, and being come to Oliverotto, to told him, that now it was not a time to hold his men together out of their lodgings; because than they would be taken from them by the Duke's soldiers, and therefore persuaded him to send them to their lodgings, and go with him to meet the Duke: which when Oliverotto had done, the Duke came, and having seen seen him, called him; to whom Oliverotto having made reverence, he joined in troop with the rest, and entered into Sinigallia, where all dismounting at the Duke's Lodging, entered with him into a private chamber, they were held prisoners to the Duke, who presently got a horseback, and commanded that Oliverotto and the Orsinies Soldiers should be all rifled. Oliveroto's were all pillaged, by reason they were near at hand; those that belonged to the Orsini and the Vitelli, being more remote having before heard of the ruin of their Masters, had time to get together, where calling to mind the valour and discipline of the Families of the Orsini and Vitelli, jointly all in one body, in despite of the country, and their enemy's power, they saved themselves. But the Duke's soldiers not satisfied with the pillage of of Oliverotto's soldiers, began to sack Sinigallia. And had not the Duke by the death of many stopped their insolence, they would utterly have sacked it. But night being come, and all stirs quiet, the Duke thought fit to put Vitellozzo and Oliverotto to death, and having brought them together, caused them to be strangled. Where neither of them spoke any thing worthy of their life past; for Vitelozzo prayed, that supplication should be made to the Pope, to grant him a plenary Indulgence of all his fins; Oliverotto much lamenting himself, cast all the fault of the injuries against the Duke on Vitelozzo's back. Paul, and the Duke of Gravina were kept alive, till the Duke had word, that at Rome, the Pope had laid hold on the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of Florence, and Master James of the Holy Cross. After which news upon the 18 of January, at the Castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the like manner.   

The Table of the Chapters in the Prince.  

Chap. 1. HOw many sorts of Principalities there are, and how many ways they are attained to. Pag. 1  
Chap. 2. Of hereditary Principalities. p. 2  
Chap. 3. Of mixed Principalities. p 3  
Chap. 4. Wherefore Darius his Kingdom, taken by Alexander, rebelled not against his successors after Alexander's death. p. 13  
Chap. 5. In what manner Cities and Principalities are to be governed, which before they were conquered, lived under their own laws. p. 17  
Chap. 6. Of new Principalities that are conquered by ones own arms and valour. p. 19  
Chap. 7. Of new Principalities gotten by fortune and other men's forces. p. 23  
Chap. 8. Concerning those who by wicked means have attained to a Principality. p. 34  
Chap. 9 Of the Civil Principality. p. 40  
Chap. 10. In what manner the forces of all Principalities ought to be measured. p. 45  
Chap. 11. Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities. p. 47  
Chap. 12. How many sorts of Military discipline there be; and touching mercenary soldiers. p. 51  
Chap. 13. Of Auxiliary Soldiers, mixed and natives. p. 57  
Chap. 14. What belongs to the Prince touching military discipline. p. 62  
Chap. 15. Of those things in respect whereof men, and especially Princes are praised or dispraised. p. 65  
Chap. 16. Of Liherality and Miserableness. p. 68  
Chap. 17. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is better to be beloved or feared. p. 70  
Chap. 18. In what manner Princes ought to keep their word. p. 75  
Chap. 19 That Princes should take a care not to incur contempt or hatred. p. 80  
Chap. 20. Whether the Citadels and many other things, which Princes make use of, are profitable or damageable. p. 93  
Chap. 21. How a Prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation. p. 99  
Chap. 22. Touching Princes Secretaries. p. 103  
Chap. 23. That Flatterers are to be avoided. p. 105  
Chap. 24. Wherefore the Princes of Italy have lost their States. p. 110  
Chap. 25. How great power Fortune hath in humane affairs, and what means there is to resist it. p. 112  
Chap. 26. An exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarions. p. 117  
The life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca. p. 123  
A Relation of the course taken by the Duke Valentine, in the murdering of Vitelozzo Vitelli, Olverotto of Fermo, Paul, and the Duke of Gravita, all of the Family of the Orsini. p. 159   
FNIS.