AN ACCOUNT OF Mr. Locke's Religion, Out of his Own Writings, and in his Own Words.  
Together with some OBSERVATIONS upon it, and a Twofold Appendix.  
I. A Specimen of Mr. Locke's Way of Answering Authors, out of his ESSAY, l. 1. c. 3. where he takes upon him to Examine some of the Lord Herbert's Principles.  
II. A brief Enquiry whether SOCINIANISM be justly Charged upon Mr. LOCK.  
LONDON, Printed; and Sold by J. Nutt near Stationers-Hall. M DCC.   

Mr. Lock's Treatises out of which the following Account is Collected.  

1. HIS Thoughts of Education, Edit. An. 1693.  
2. His Essay of Humane Understanding, An. 1695.  
3. His Reasonableness of Christianity, An. 1696.  
4. His Vindication of it, An. 1695.  
5. His Second Vindication of it, An. 1697.  
6. His First Letter, An. 1697.  
7. His Second Letter, An. 1697.  
8. His Third Letter, An. 1699.    

ERRATA.  
PAge 4. Line 9 for Conquently r. Consequently. p. 42. l. 12. for Preceded r. Preceded. p. 45. l. 33. after limits r. it. p. 50. l. 37. for 384. r. 284. p. 57 l. 7. deal of. p. 77. l. 11. for Certainly r. Certainty. p. 80. l. 33. for Heb. r. Hab. p. 105. l. 12. for Memorio r. Memoria. p. 112. l. 5. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. and l. 15. for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.   

A Premonition to the Reader.  
IN his Preface to his Reasonableness of Christianity, Mr. Lock tells us, That the little Satisfaction and Consistency that is to be found in most of the Systems of Divinity that he had met with, made him betake himself to the sole reading of the Scripture; and what he received from thence he delivered to his Reader in that Treatise. And as the little Satisfaction and Consistency which he found in some Systems of Divinity, was the Occasion of his Writing and Publishing that Discourse; so, the little Satisfaction and Consistency which I found in his System, (viz. his Reasonableness of Christianity forementioned) was one Occasion of my drawing up the following Account and the Observations upon it.  
When Mr. Lock says, The little Satisfaction and Consistency to be found in most of the Systems of Divinity that he had met with; these Words Most of the Systems imply, that he had met with some Systems in which more Satisfaction and Consistency may be found; and he would have obliged the World, if he had pleased to acquaint us what Systems those are.  
In giving an Account of his Religion, that neither He might have Cause to complain, nor the Reader to suspect that I have misrepresented him; I judged it necessary to do it out of his own Writings, and in his own Words. I thought this would be the most effectual course to satisfy both him and others, that I had no Design to represent him to his Disadvantage.  
It was also necessary to set down that which Mr. Lock hath delivered agreeably to the Form of found Words, and to the Doctrine which is according to Godliness, as well as that in which he departs from the Truth, and from the Words of wholesome Doctrine; for otherwise the Account would have been imperfect; and withal, if I had omitted that which is good and justifiable, and presented the Reader only with that which is to be disliked and disapproved in his Religion, I should have incurred the Gild of disobeying the Charge given 1 Tim. 5. 21. to do nothing by Partiality, or inclining to one part more than the other. I am so far from envying Mr. Lock the Honour of having said some things well, that I hearty wish he had said all so; and that there had been nothing reprebensible, or deserving Censure, in his Religion. Besides, there may be those who will more willingly learn some Truths from Mr. Lock than from others, embracing them more readily upon the account of his Approbation or Recommendation; and for the sake of these I thought it not amiss to transcribe that which was consonant to Truth, as well as that which I found dissonant from it. By this means also the Reader may better perceive the little Consistency that there is in Mr. Lock's Writings, how he destroys that which he had built up, asserts the Truth in one place, and seeks to obtrude on us the contrary Error in another.  
The Account is divided into Chapters, and in every Chapter I first set down what Mr. Lock says upon those Heads that are mentioned in the Contents of it, and then subjoin some brief Observations upon it. And that the Reader may more readily find any Passage transcribed out of Mr. Lock, I have directed him to the Book, Chapter, and Section of his Essay, and to the Page in his other Treatises; as I have also signified what Editions of them I have made use of.  
I am very sensible, how little Encouragement there is from without, for any Man to appear in the Maintenance of those weighty Truths which are treated of in the following Account and the Observations upon it. The Consideration of which may perhaps incline the Reader more firmly to believe, that it is only a desire to be useful and serviceable while he is in the World, and a real Concern for the Truth and for Religion, that put the Author upon this Work, upon which Account he hopes that his sincere, though weak, Endeavours will be more favourably accepted. The Result of those Endeavours he here presents to public View, humbly commending it to the Blessing of Heaven; and if by it he hath done any acceptable Service to God and his Church, he hath his Desire; and may that Holy and Blessed Trinity, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, have the Glory.   

AN ACCOUNT OF Mr. Locke's Religion, Out of his Own Writings, etc.  

CHAP. I. Of GOD.  
TO come to the being certain that there is a God, I think we need go no farther than ourselves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Being. I think it is beyond question, That Man has a clear Perception of his own Being; he knows certainly that he exists, and that he is Something. In the next place, Man knows, by an intuitive Certainty, that bore Nothing cannot produce any real Being. If therefore we know there is some real Being, and that Nonentity cannot produce any real Being, it is an evident Demonstration, that from Eternity there has been Something; since what was not from Eternity had a Beginning, and what had a Beginning must be produced by something else. Next it is evident, That what had its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being, from another too: All the Powers it has must be owing to, and received from the same Source. This eternal Source then of all Being, must also be the Source and Original of all Power; and so this eternal Being must be also the most powerful. Again, a Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge. We have then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there is some knowing intelligent Being in the World. There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, and when Knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be said, There was a time when no Being had any Knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all Understanding; I reply, That then it was impossible there should ever have been any Knowledge: it being impossible that things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, should produce a knowing Being. Thus, from the Consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, that There is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not; the thing is evident. Mr. Lock, Essay l. 4. c. 10. §. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. There is no Truth which a Man may more evidently make out to himself, than the Existence of a God, Essay, l. 1. c. 4. §. 22. We have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a God, than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing else without us. The being of a God is so fundamental a Truth, and of that consequence, that all Religion and genuine Morality depend thereon. Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 6, 7. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Though the Essay says so much of our certain Knowledge of the Existence of a God; yet it also tells us, that he hath given us no innate Ideas of himself; he has stamped no original Characters on our Minds, wherein we may read his Being. So l. 4. c. 10. §. 1. It also informs us, that Navigation hath discovered whole Nations, amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God; adding, that perhaps if we should with attention mind the Lives and Discourses of People not so far off, we should have too much reason to fear, that many in more civilised Countries have no very strong and clear Impressions of a Deity upon their Minds. See l. 1. c. 4. §. 8. Now as to the second of these, The Discovery of whole Nations, amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God; some think that Mr. Lock had done better if he had not urged it: for they judge that it tends to the invalidating the Argument which is made use of, not only by Christians, but also (as they tell us) by the wisest and greatest Men among the Heathens, to prove the Existence of a Deity. The Argument is drawn from the universal Consent of Mankind, as to the Being of a God. What says Mr. Lock to this? He denies that he doth invalidate it, and it concerned him to deny it; for he who had said in his first Letter, that no Arguments that are made use of to work the Persuasion of a God into men's minds, should be invalidated, granting it to be of ill consequence; should be very careful that he do not invalidate any such Arguments. But I ask, Doth not Mr. Lock invalidate the Argument from the universal Consent of Mankind, who says expressly, that besides the Atheists, taken notice of amongst the Ancients, and left branded upon the Records of History, Navigation hath discovered whole Nations, amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God? Can there be an universal Consent, when besides particular Persons, there are whole Nations that do not consent? Yea, so far they are from consenting, that they have not so much as any Notion of a God: Yet notwithstanding all this, Mr. Lock asserts, that he hath not said one word that does in the least invalidate the Argument for a God, or does at all tend to the invalidating it. For (says he) I think that the universal Consent of Mankind, as to the being of a God, amounts to thus much, That the vastly greater Majority of Mankind have in all Ages of the World actually believed a God; that a Majority of the remaining part have not actually disbelieved it; and conquently, those who have actually opposed the Belief of a God, have truly been very few. See his Third Letter, p. 447, 448. Where some perhaps would ask, 1. What Mr. Lock means by the vastly greater Majority of Mankind? If he had said, A very great Majority of Mankind, he might have been understood; but, The vastly greater Majority of Mankind, implies that we may divide Mankind into two Majorities, the one of which is vastly greater than the other. 2. They may perhaps also ask, Whether all that do not actually oppose the Being of a God, or not actually disbelieve it, do consent to it? If they all do not, then though they that actually oppose be truly very few, yet they that consent not to it may be many: and though it should be granted to be true, that the majority of those that believe not that there is a God, do not yet actually disbelieve it, it will not follow that the Majority of them do consent to it: for I am prone to think, that none do truly and inwardly consent to it, who do not believe it. And therefore that which Mr. Lock says of not disbelieving, and the fewness of those that oppose, doth not help the matter at all. 2. The Question than is, Whether (to use his own Words) in respect of the incomparably greater Majority of those who have owned the Belief of a God, it may be said to be the universal Consent of Mankind? Or, Whether that can be said to have the universal Consent of Mankind, to which, besides particular Persons, whole Nations do not consent. Now I think there are very few that will not answer it in the Negative. I cannot imagine that they who have urged the universal Consent of Mankind as an Argument, did believe that, besides particular Persons, whole Nations did not consent. And therefore it this which Mr. Lock urgeth be true, the Argument from universal Consent seems to be totally invalidated. Wherefore it will be necessary to examine how he hath acquitted himself in the proof of it; viz. That there have been not only particular Persons Atheists, but also whole Nations who had no Notion of a God. 1. He mentions the Atheists taken notice of amongst the Ancients, and left branded upon the Records of History; but this only in general: if he had descended to Particulars, perhaps it would have been found, that at least some of them were branded with Atheism, because they did not favour the Heathen Polytheism; or, because they thought those that were accounted Gods, not to be Gods: which was the Accusation against Socrates. See Diog. Laert. in vit. Socrat. And 'tis very observable, that Cicero, De Natura Deorum, l. 1. names only two that thought there were no Gods; viz. Diagoras Melius and Theodorus Cyrenaicus: and Clemens Alcxandrinus defends them, saying, that they were Men of a sober Life; and expressing his Admiration how it came that they called them Atheists. See him in Admonit. ad Gentes, p. 11. 2. He brings Testimonies to prove, that Navigation hath discovered whole Nations, amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God; so far were they from consenting to the existing of a Deity. He alleges the Relations of several Writers, but he should have been so kind, as to have transcribed their Words for us, (for I find that they are not to be met with every where,) whereas he hath only given us the Words of two of them, or three at the most. The Words which he sets down out of Nicolaus de Techoes Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum, are these; Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum & hominis animam significet, nulla Sacra habet, nulla Idola. See the Essay, l. 1. c. 4. §. 8. Out of Mr. Ovington's Relation of his Voyage to Surat, he gives us these Words, They are sunk even below Idolatry, are destitute of both Priest and Temple, and saving a little show of rejoicing, which is made at the Full and New Moon, have lost all kind of Religious Devotion. Nature hath so richly provided for their Convenience in this Life, that they have drowned all Sense of the God of it, and are grown quite careless of the next. He adds, That Coore, an Inhabitant of the Country, who could speak English, assured Mr. Terry, that they of Soldania had no God: See the Third Letter, p. 450. Now as to these Testimonies, 1. It must be remembered that Mr. Lock would prove from them, that there are whole Nations amongst whom there is found no Notion of a God: whereas it is not said in any of these Testimonies, that the Nations spoken of had no Notion of a God. Nicolaus de Techo tells of a People that have no Idols or Images, no Sacred Offices or Services, no Name for God: but he doth not say, that they had no Notion of him. He says likewise, That they had not a Name for Man's Soul; but it doth not follow thence, that they had no Notion of something within them that did Think, Understand, Will, Reason, etc. Coore says, That they of Soldania had no God; i. e. They had no particular God (as other Heathens might have) which their whole Nation worshipped: but it cannot be inferred hence, that they had no Notion of a God. Mr. Ovington says, That they are sunk even below Idolatry; but he doth not say, That they are sunk so low, as that they have not so much as any Notion of a Deity. 2. Yea, Mr. Ovington's Testimony is clearly against Mr. Lock; for, when he says, Saving a little show of Rejoicing which is made at the Full and New Moon, they have lost all kind of Religious Devotion; it is manifest that, according to him, they expressed some Religious Devotion every Full and New Moon. And when he says, that they have drowned all Sense of the God of it; doth not this necessarily imply that they had a Sense of him before they drowned it? Not to add, That too many among us seem to have drowned all Sense of a God, and are grown quite careless of a future Life; though they profess the Belief of a God, and of the Life of the World to come. Besides these three, Mr. Lock names Sir Tho. Rhoe apud Thevenot, p. 2. and Jo. de Lery, c. 16. Sir Tho. Rhoe apud Thevenot, I have not met with. Of Joannes Lerius his Historia Navigationis in Brasiliam, c. 16. I can give some account. It is true that he says of his Tovoupinambaultii, that they are ignorant of the true God; and also, that they acknowledge no false Gods, whether Celestial or Terrestrial. But afterwards he proposes the Question, Whether these Americans lived without any Religion? Where though he first answers, that they want but a very little of it; yet he adds, that they believe the Immortality of the Soul, and that the Souls of the Virtuous shall live in perpetual Pleasure and Delights, but the Souls of the rest in everlasting Torments after this Life. He tells also, that they had their Priests, and their Assemblies once in three Years, in which they believed that a Spirit talked with them. He takes notice also of their Trembling at the hearing of Thunder, which (says he) argues a dread of some Power. And finally, he makes frequent mention of a Cacodaemon which they said was seen by them, sometime in one shape, sometime in another, and did most miserably vex them. From all this he concludes, that Religion was not quite extinguished, but some sparks of it remained among them. Thus I have examined all Mr. Lock's Testimonies, (except Sir Tho. Rhoe's, which I could not meet with;) and now the Reader may judge how firmly he hath proved, That amongst some whole Nations there is found no Notion of a God. And if it appear that he hath not firmly proved it, than not only the Argument for the Existence of a God, drawn from the universal Consent of Mankind, is left in full force, and that holds true which Tully saith, de Legibus, l. 1. Nulla gens est, neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera, quae non etiamsi ignoret qualem habere Deum debeat, tamen habendum sciat; but also Mr. Lock's principal Argument to prove his darling Notion, that we have no innate Ideas of a God, falls to the ground. His principal Argument that he urgeth for proof of that Notion, is this which I have insisted upon, that whole Nations are found to have no Notion of a God: And we see how far he is from evincing this.  
As to the Argument which follows in the same place, (viz. Essay, l. 1. c. 4. §. 8.) whereby he would prove that beloved Notion, that we have no innate Ideas of a God, drawn from the Atheism which is among us, which (says he) some profligate Wretches do barefacedly own, and others would, if the fear of the Magistrate's Sword, or their Neighbour's Censure, did not tie up People's Tongues, it signifies nothing; unless Mr. Lock could assure us (which he cannot) that their Atheistical Discourse is the Language of their Hearts, as it is too plainly the Language of their Lips and Lives. For any thing that he knows, their Hearts may give their Tongues the Lie, and there may be inward Fears and Whispers that there is a God, at the same time that they most stoutly deny it: or if not at the same time, yet afterward Sickness, or the Approach of Death, may awake the Sense of a Deity, which they hoped they had laid asleep, never to awake; and make the Notions and Characters which they had laboured to obliterate, as legible as ever.  
Before I leave this, I cannot but observe, that, though in his Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 7. Mr. Lock would not examine how far the Idea of a most Perfect Being does or does not prove the Existence of a God, yet in his First Letter, p. 119. he clearly determines it in the Negative, saying, That the Complex Idea, for which the sound [GOD] stands, will not prove the real Existence of a Being answering that Idea, as p. 121. he tells us, that he thought it would not prove it when he writ his Essay. I take notice of this, because hereby he invalidates another Argument for proving the Existence of a Deity, when but a little before, viz. p. 114. he had affirmed it to be of ill Consequence to invalidate any Arguments that are made use of to work the Persuasion of a God into men's Minds, and when otherwhere, viz, Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 7. he blames others for endeavouring to invalidate such Arguments. Why then doth he that himself, which he condemns in others? He tells us, in his First Letter, p. 115. That when he writ his Essay, he was unwilling to show the Weakness of the Argument from the Idea of God; but when he writ that Letter, he had taken Courage, and pronounceth roundly, that the Idea mentioned will not prove the Existence of a God.  
But to conclude, how blame-worthy soever Mr. Lock may be for weakening these two Arguments made use of to prove the Existence of a Deity, the one from the universal Consent of Mankind, as to the Being of a God, the other from the Idea that we have of him; yet we should not judge charitably, if we concluded thence, that he doth not believe a God.    

CHAP. II. Of the Attributes of God.  
I Do not pretend to say how the Attributes are in God, who is infinitely beyond the Reach of our narrow Capacities. They do, without doubt, contain in them all possible Perfection. Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 2. c. 17. §. 1.  

His Wisdom, Power, and Goodness.  
His Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, are inexhaustible, incomprehensible, etc. Essay, l. 2. c. 17. §. 1. I judge it as certain and as clear a Truth as any can any where be delivered, That the invisible things of God, from the Creation of the World, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead, Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 7. He has in his Hand Rewards and Punishments, and Power enough to call to Account the proudest Offender, Essay, l. 1. c. 3. §. 6. What God can do, must not be limited to what we can conceive of it: This would be to make our Comprehension infinite, or God finite. If you do not understand the Operations of your own finite Mind, do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the Operations of that eternal, infinite Mind, who made and governs all things, Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 19 God is truly above all passive Power, Essay, l. 2. c. 21. §. 2. He knows our Frailty, pities our Weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do; and sees what is, and what is not in our Power, and so will judge as a kind and merciful Father, Essay, l. 2. c. 21. §. 53.   

His Knowledge, Happiness, and Veracity.  
The Eternal Being must also be Knowing, and all other Knowing Being's must depend on him, and have no other Ways of Knowledge, or Extent of Power, than what he gives them: And if he made those, he made also the less excellent Pieces of this Universe, all inanimate Being's; whereby his Omniscience, Power, and Providence, will be established, and all his other Attributes necessarily follow, Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 12, 13. God sees Men in the dark, Essay, l. 1. c. 3. §. 6. Perception and Knowledge in that One Eternal Being, where it has its Source, 'tis visible must be essentially inseparable from it, the Third Letter, p. 410. God Almighty is under the Necessity of being Happy, Essay, l. 2. c. 21. §. 50. The Veracity of God is a Demonstration of the Truth of what he hath revealed, the Third Letter, p. 420. An infinitely Powerful and Wise being cannot but be Veracious. Besides, I speak in more Places than one of the Goodness of God, another Evidence, as I take it, of his Veracity, Answ. to Remarks, p. 3. He cannot deceive, nor be deceived, the Third Letter, p. 147.   

His Immateriality, Eternity, and Ubiquity.  
'Tis past all doubt, that every one that examines and reasons right, may come to a Certainty, that God is perfectly Immaterial, the Third Letter, p. 147. The Idea of an Eternal, Actual, Knowing Being, hath a Connexion with the Idea of Immateriality, the First Letter, p. 139. God fills Eternity, and 'tis hard to find a Reason why any one should doubt that he likewise fills Immensity. His Infinite Being is certainly as boundless one way as another, Essay, l. 2. c. 15. §. 3. We can conceive the Eternal Duration of the Almighty far different from that of Man, or any other Finite Being. His Duration being accompanied with Infinite Knowledge, and Infinite Power, he sees all things past and to come, and they are no more distant from his Knowledge, no farther removed from his Sight, than the present. They all lie under the same View: And there is nothing which be cannot make exist each moment he pleases, Essay, l. 2. c. 15. §. 12. We apply our Idea of Infinite to the First and Supreme Being, primarily in respect of his Duration and Ubiquity, Essay, l. 2. c. 17. §. 1. Motion cannot be attributed to God, not because he is a Spirit, but because he is an Infinite Spirit, Essay, l. 2. c. 23. §. 21.   

His Infinity, and other Perfections.  
The great God, of whom and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly Infinite; but yet, when we apply to that First and Supreme Being our Idea of Infinite, in our weak and narrow Thoughts, we do it primarily in respect of his Duration and Ubiquity; and, I think, more figuratively to his Power, Wisdom, Goodness, and other Attributes, which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, etc. For when we call them Infinite, we have no other Idea of this Infinity, but what carries with it some Reflection on and Intimation of that Number, or Extent of the Acts and Objects of God's Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, which can never be supposed so great or so many, which these Attributes will not surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our Thoughts with all the Infinity of endless Number, Essay, l. 2. c. 17. §. 1. Whatsoever is first of all things, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have at least all the Perfections that can ever after exist, Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 10. Thus Mr. Lock.   

OBSERVATIONS.  
When Mr. Lock says, that God is truly above all passive Power, I shall not trouble myself to inquire whether the Expression, Passive Power, be proper or no: His Meaning is, that he can receive not Change.  
That is most true which he saith of the Eternal Duration of God, That we can conceive it far different from that of Man, or any other Finite Being; for his Duration hath not either Beginning or End of Days, which agrees to no Finite Being, neither to Man nor Angel. But as to the Difference which Mr. Lock assigns, it is manifest, that it is not in the Duration itself, but in the Knowledge and Power which accompany it: God sees all things past, present, and to come, they all lie under the same View; and he can make any thing exist each moment that he pleases: But this cannot be said of any Finite Being whatsoever. So that Mr. Lock shows that there is a great Difference between the Knowledge and Power of God, and ours; but as to the Eternal Duration of God, of which he was here speaking, that is a distinct Attribute.  
When he saith, That when we apply to God our Idea of Infinity in our weak and narrow Thoughts, we do it primarily in respect of his Duration and Ubiquity, and, I think, more figuratively to his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, and other Attributes, which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, etc. It may be enquired what he means by more figuratively: Is it his Meaning, that we apply it to him less figuratively, in respect of his Duration and Ubiquity? If so, we apply it to him figuratively, even in respect of them; and consequently we do not apply Infinity to God properly in any respect; which Conclusion surely Mr. Lock will not own. Besides, if it be true which Mr. Lock says, that the Power, Wisdom, Goodness, and other Attributes of God, are properly Inexhaustible and Incomprehensible, why is it not as true that they are properly Boundless or Infinite?  
It may be enquired also what Mr. Lock means when he speaks of our multiplying the Acts and Objects of God's Power, etc. in our Thoughts, with all the Infinity of endless Number. If our Thoughts can multiply them with all the Infinity of endless Number, how are they narrow Thoughts, as Mr. Lock often saith they are? Besides, he says they may be surmounted and exceeded, which they cannot be, after that we have multiplied them with all Infinity of endless Number; for Infinity cannot be exceeded.  
Lastly, I am not satisfied, that we can have no other Idea of the Infinity of God's Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, but what carries with it some Reflection on the Number and Extent of the Acts and Objects of those Attributes; for those Perfections of Infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, would have been in God, though there had been no Acts or Objects of them.    

CHAP. III. Of the Idea of God.  
THAT of a God is such an Idea as is agreeable to the common Light of Reason, and naturally deducible from every Part of our Knowledge: For the visible Marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power appear so plainly in all the Works of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the Discovery of a Deity. Thus Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 1. c. 4. §. 9  

OBSERVATIONS.  
I am far from questioning the Truth of any thing of this. I only take occasion here to intimate, That I cannot but agree with those that think, that Mr. Lock and others, had done better, if they had not amused the World so much with the Term Idea as they have done. And Mr. Lock's using it so much in his Essay, seems not to be very consistent with his Promise and Profession in the Preface or Epistle to the Reader, p. 4. where his Words are these, My appearing in Print being on purpose to be as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make what I have to say as easy and intelligible to all sorts of Readers as I can. Now there are that think, that Mr. Lock had made his Essay more easy and intelligible to all sorts of Readers, if he had made use of other Terms, and not filled every Page almost with the mention of Ideas. Yea, not only others are of that Opinion, but I might appeal to Mr. Lock himself, if he be of the same Mind that he was when he writ his First Letter, where, p. 127. speaking of his Essay, l. 4. c. 10. he hath these Words, I thought it most proper to express myself in the most usual and familiar way, to let it the easier into men's Minds by common Words, and known Ways of Expression: And therefore, as I think, I have scarce used the Word Idea in that whole Chapter, but only in one place. Here Mr. Lock says plainly, that he therefore scarce used the Word Idea in that Chapter, that he might let things the easier into men's Minds: And then why did he not likewise forbear the use of it in other Chapters, especially when he had engaged to his Reader, that he would make things as easy and intelligible to all sorts of Readers as he could; and here also confesses, that things are let more easily into men's Minds by common Words, and known or familiar Ways of Expression.    

CHAP. IU. Of the Worship of God, and of the Heart.  
GOD is to be worshipped in Spirit and in Truth, with Application of Mind, and Sincerity of Heart. In public Assemblies, where some Actions must be open to the View of the World, all that can appear and be seen is to be done decently, and in Order, and to Edification. Decency, Order, and Edification, are to regulate all the public Acts of Worship. Praises and Prayer humbly offered to God, is the Worship he now demands, and in these every one is to look after his own Heart. Mr. Lock Reasonab. of Christian. p. 286, 287. 'Tis his peculiar Care of Mankind, most eminently discovered in his Promises to them, that shows his Bounty and Goodness; and consequently engages their Hearts in Love and Affection to him. This Oblation of an Heart fixed, with Dependence and Affection on him, is the most acceptable Tribute we can pay him, the Foundation of true Devotion, and Life of all Religion. Ibid. p. 248. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Mr. Lock says very well, That in Public Assemblies all things are to be done decently; but it is also true, that in Private or Secret Prayer, a Decent or Reverend Gesture is to be used. St. Peter kneeled down, and cried, or prayed, Acts 9 40. I bow my Knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, says St. Paul, Ephes. 3. 14. Yea our Lord himself, St. Luke 22. 41. did the same.  
In like manner, when Mr. Lock says, that Praises and Prayer are the Worship which God now demands, it is true that they are Parts of it; but there are other Parts of it, as sitting at his Feet, and hearing his Word, and so devout receiving the Sacrament, swearing by his Name, when we are lawfully called to it, etc. In all which we must chief look after the Heart, it being that which God principally regards: Indeed he regards nothing where it is wanting. The Heart must bear the greatest Part in every Service, though (as I said) a Reverend outward Gesture is to be used also.    

CHAP. V Of the Works of God; of the Creation particularly; also of the Image of God.  
THE Works of Nature show the Wisdom and Power of God. Mr. Lock Reasonab. of Christian. p. 248. The infinite omnipotent Creator of all things out of nothing, etc. The Third Letter, p. 152. You will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer, No; because it is not reasonable to deny the Power of an infinite Being, because we cannot comprehend its Operation. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the manner of their Production. We cannot conceive how Thought (or any thing but Motion in Body) can move Body: and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves in all voluntary Motions, which are produced in us only by the free Thoughts of our own Minds. 'Tis an over-valuing ourselves, to reduce all to the narrow measure of our Capacity, and to conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension; Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 19 When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before, as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exist in rerum natura, which had before no Being, we call it Creation; Essay, l. 2. c. 26. §. 2. Adam being the Son of God, S. Luke 3. 38. had this part also of the Likeness and Image of his Father, viz. that he was immortal; Jesus Christ being also the Son of God, was, like his Father, immortal. The great Evidence that Jesus was the Son of God, was his Resurrection, Acts 13. 32, 33. Then the Image of his Father appeared in him, when he visibly entered into the state of Immortality. And that Immortality is a part of that Image wherein these (who were the immediate Sons of God, so as to have no other Father) were made like their Father, appears probable, not only from the places in Genesis concerning Adam, above taken notice of; but seems to me also to be intimated in some Expressions concerning Jesus the Son of God, in the New Testament. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 202, 203, 207. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
I agree with Mr. Lock, That Immortality is part of that Image of God in which Adam was created; but as to Christ, he, as Man, was not made like his Father in that part of his Image, till he was raised from the Dead: for before that, as Man, he was was mortal. As Man he did partake of our Infirmities, and was in all things made like unto us, only without Sin; and so he was made like us, in being mortal. He was indeed made Man for the suffering of Death, Heb. 2. 9 which he did; for it follows in the same Verse, that By the grace of God he tasted death for every man; wherefore God highly exalted him, and crowned him with Glory, Honour, and Immortality.  
The first place in the New Testament which, according to Mr. Lock, intimates that Immortality is a part of that Image wherein Christ, as Man, was made like his Father, is Col. 1. 15. where he is called The Image of the invisible God, and the firstborn of every Creature. But how appears it that he is called so as Man? Certainly, as God, he is most properly the Image of the invisible God. But you will say it follows, the firstborn of every Creature; and so he is spoken of in this place as a Creature, i. e. as Man. To which I answer; 1. Suppose I should grant that the Apostle speaks of him as a Creature in this latter Expression, doth it follow that he must speak of him as such in the former? Might he not call him the Image of the invisible God, as God; and the firstborn of every Creature, as Man? 2. I do not grant that the Apostle in these words, the firstborn of every Creature, speaks of him as Man. The Meaning may be, that he was begotten of the Father before any Creature whatsoever did exist; and therefore it immediately follows, ver. 16, 17. By him were all things created, that are in Heaven, and that are in Earth, visible and invisible, whether Thrones or Dominions, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created by him and for him. He is before all things, and by him all things consist. Which agrees with S. John 1. 2, 3. The Word was in the beginning with God. By him all things were made, and without him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not as much as any one thing was made that was made. And we are told, ver. 1. that this Word was God. These words therefore, The firstborn of every Creature, do not hinder but that the former words, Who is the image of the invisible God, were spoken of Christ as God; and then they make not for Mr. Lock's purpose, who would have him here called the Image of the invisible God as he is Man. I know that Mr. Lock saith, that the words The firstborn of every Creature are explained ver. 18. where he is termed The firstborn from the dead. But I conceive that these are distinct things, and that we need look no farther for the Explication than ver. 17. He is the firstborn of every Creature, ver. 15. i. e. He is before all things, v. 17.    

CHAP. VI Of Christ.  
THE Son of God whilst clothed in Flesh was subject to all the Frailties and Inconveniences of Humane Nature, Sin excepted. Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 3. c. 9 §. 23. Christ, after a Life illustrious in Miracles and good Works, attended with Humility, Meekness, Patience, and Suffering, and every way conformable to the Prophecies of him, was lead as a Sheep to the slaughter, and with all Quiet and Submission brought to the Cross, though there were no guilt or fault found in him. Reason. of Christian. p. 61. Christ's coming into the World was not for such an end as the overturning the measures of Right and Wrong, and thereby introducing and authorising Irregularity, Confusion, and Disorder in the World; but, on the contrary, to reform the corrupt State of degenerate Man, and out of those who would mend their Lives, and bring forth fruit meet for Repentance, erect a new Kingdom. Ibid. p. 215. The chief end of his Coming was to be a King; and as such, to be received by those who would be his Subjects in the Kingdom which he came to erect. Ibid. p. 217. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
What means Mr. Lock when he says, The Son of God was clothed with flesh? Is it his Meaning, that the eternal Son of God, the second Person in the Trinity, was clothed with Flesh? If so, it was to be wished that he would do that Justice to himself, plainly to declare it, and thereby remove out of men's minds the Jealousies they have of him as to this Point.  
It may be enquired also, what he means by that Expression, Whilst clothed in Flesh? As there was a time before the Son of God was incarnate or clothed with Flesh, so hath he after his Incarnation ceased to be clothed with it? Particularly, Will Mr. Lock say that he was not clothed with it after his Resurrection? If so, I ask whether he will not plainly contradict our Blessed Saviour, who told his Disciples, after his being risen from the Dead, that he had Flesh and Bones, S. Luke 24. 39 It may then concern him to explain himself as to this also.  
Mr. Lock's Meaning also is not very plain, when he says, that the chief End of Christ's coming was to be a King, and to be received as such. It is most true, that the Prophets foretold that he should be a King; and it may be said, that he came to fulfil the Prophecies that had been of him, as it is also true that he was a King. But I do not remember that it is said, that the chief End of his coming was to be a King. It is written, that he came into the World to save Sinners, to seek and to save that which was lost, that whosoever believes in him should not perish, but have everlasting Life; that he was manifested to take away our Sins, and to dissolve the works of the Devil, 1 Joh. 3. 5, 8. that he appeared to put away Sin by the sacrifice of himself, Heb. 9 26. And when Pilate asked him, whether he was a King? he did not answer, For this cause came I into the World, that I might be a King; but, For this cause I came into the World, that I should bear witness to the Truth, S. John 18. 37. Among these several Ends, I do not find the being a King expressly mentioned for one (as every one of these is) much less is it called the chief End. Finally, Mr. Lock himself, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 241. mentions something else as the great End. His words are, Pardon and Forgiveness of Sins, and Salvation by him, was the great End of his coming.    

CHAP. VII. Of our Advantages by Christ.  
IT will possibly he asked, What Advantage have we by Jesus Christ? Answ. 1. He found the World in a state of Darkness and Error, in reference to the true God; but the clear Revelation he brought with him dissipated the Darkness, made the one invisible true God known to the World. 2. A clear knowledge of their Duty was before wanting to Mankind; but now there needs no more, but to read the inspired Books: all the Duties of Morality lie there clear and plain, and easy to be understood. There is not, I think, any of the Duties of Morality, which he has not somewhere or other, by himself and his Apostles, inculcated over and over again to his Followers in express terms. 3. The outward Forms of worshipping the Deity, wanted a Reformation: to this also our Saviour brought a Remedy in a plain, spiritual, and suitable Worship. 4. Another great Advantage received by him, is the great Encouragement he brought to a virtuous and pious Life, great enough to surmount the Difficulties and Obstacles that lie in the way to it, viz. by bringing Life and Immortality to light, and by putting into the Scale, on the side of Virtue, an exceeding and immortal weight of Glory. 5. One Advantage more we have by Jesus Christ, is, the promise of Assistance; If we do what we can, he will give us his Spirit to help us to do what and how we should. Thus Mr. Lock, Reason. of Christian. p. 257, 263, 267, 284, 285, 286, 287, 290, 291, 292. See also p. 234.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Here where Mr. Lock is treating purposely and largely of the Advantages that we have by Christ, it is justly thought strange, that he should not once make mention of his being a propitiation through faith in his blood, Rom. 3. 25. A propitiation for our Sins, yea also for the sins of the whole World, 1 Joh. 2. 2. Our having Redemption through his Blood, the forgiveness of Sins, Eph. 1. 7. Col. 1. 14. Such an unconceivable Advantage as this that we have by him, should not have been forgotten. If Mr. Lock say, that otherwhere in his Reasonableness of Christianity he doth mention our Redemption by Christ, I grant it; but, 1. I do not at present remember that he any where in it mentions Redemption through his blood. 2. If he do speak of it otherwhere, how easy had it been for him to have named it here among other Advantages, and to have referred his Reader to the places where he had spoken of it? If Mr. Lock say again, that he set down as much as his Argument required; I answer, That he did not: Having moved the Question, What Advantages we have by Christ? and making it his business to answer it, his Argument required that such a transcendent Advantage as this should not have been omitted.  
The truth is, innumerable are the Advantages that we have by Christ; so that it would not have been expected that he should give an account of them all. To instance in some; Beside the Benefits mentioned above, we have by him Vocation, Repentance, Justification, Peace with God, Adoption, Sanctification, Audience of our Prayers, Acceptance of our Persons, Victory over Persecutions, Afflictions, and Death itself; Salvation or Glorification, etc. And therefore that Mr. Lock, though he intimates that our Advantages by Christ are great and many, should insist only upon four or five, and overlook all the rest, especially that he should take no notice of that which is the foundation of many of the other, viz. Christ's redeeming us by his Blood, and being the Propitiation for our Sins, is thought strange by others, whatsoever he himself may think of it,    

CHAP. VIII. Of the Death and Satisfaction of Christ.  
HE that hath incurred Death by his own Transgression cannot lay down his Life for another, as our Saviour professeth he did: Mr. Lock Reasonab. of Christian. p. 208. He declares, Joh. 10. 1.— 21. the laying down his life for both Jews and Gentiles, Ibid. p. 118. He freely gave up himself to Death for us, Second Vindicat. of Reason. of Christian. p. 400. The Design of his coming was to be offered up a Lamb blameless, and void of offence, Ibid. p. 75. Satisfaction may plainly be collected out of several places in my Reasonab. of Christian. Some whereof, which I took out of the Gospels, I mentioned in my Vindication, p. 5. and others of them which I took out of the Epistles, which I shall point out to you now. As, I say, the design of our Saviour's coming was to be offered up, and again I speak of the work of our Redemption, words which in the Epistles are taken to imply Satisfaction. Second Vindicat. of the Reasonab. of Christian. p. 157. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
It had been taken notice of, that Mr. Lock mentioning the Advantages of Christ's coming into the World, hath not one Syllable of his Satisfying for us. Mr. Lock, in Vindication of himself, among other things says, that Satisfaction may be plainly collected out of his Reasonableness of Christianity, where he alleges some Passages out of the Gospels, and some out of the Epistles; and he adds, that those in the Epistles are taken to imply Satisfaction. He doth not say that he himself takes the Words in the Epistles to imply Satisfaction, but only They are taken to imply it; and those that do so take them to imply it, may collect Satisfaction from them: But Mr. Lock doth not declare plainly that the Words do imply Satisfaction, or that Satisfaction may be rightly and firmly concluded from them. In Defence of himself he saith farther, that none can blame his Prudence, if he mentioned only those Advantages which all Christians are agreed in. The Reason then of his not mentioning Satisfaction, is, because all Christians are not agreed as to it. But, 1. Are all that call themselves Christians, agreed as to all the other Advantages which he mentions? 2. If this was the true Reason, Why did it not restrain him from mentioning other things wherein he, and some that are called Christians, do not agree? Mr. Lock will not deny that more Points than one are mentioned in his Reasonableness of Christianity, in which the ordinary Systems and he disagree: And I hope he will allow the Authors of those Systems the Name of Christians.    

CHAP. IX. Of Redemption by Christ; also of his Precepts and perfect Sanctity.  
THey that think there was no Redemption necessary, and consequently that there was none, make Jesus Christ nothing but the Restorer and Preacher of pure Natural Religion, thereby doing Violence to the whole Tenor of the New Testament. Mr. Lock Reason. of Christian. p. 2. The Doctrine of Redemption, and consequently of the Gospel, is founded upon the Supposition of Adam's Fall, Ibid. p. 1. Admirable is the Contrivance of the Divine Wisdom in the whole work of our Redemption. Ibid. p. 160. Our Saviour was the Just One, Act. 7. 57 and 12. 14. who knew no Sin, 2 Cor. 5. 21. who did no Sin, neither was guile found in his mouth, Ibid. p. 208. In the Precepts of Christ there is nothing too much, nothing wanting, but they are such a complete Rule of Life, as the wisest men must acknowledge tends entirely to the good of Mankind; and that all would be happy if all would practise it. Ibid. p. 285. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Both the places out of the Acts in which our Saviour is styled the Just One, are misquoted; whether through the Author's Fault, or the Printer's, I know not. Instead of Act. 7. 57 read Act. 7. 52. and Act. 3. 14. instead of Act. 12. 14.  
Mr. Lock speaking of the Advantages that we have by Christ, largely sets forth the Excellency of the Precepts, or Rule of Morality, which he hath left us in the New Testament. Such a Body of Ethics I think no body will say the World had before our Saviour's time: So Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 273. Again, Where was there any such Code that Mankind might have recourse to as their unerring Rule, before our Saviour's time? Ibid. p. 275. And certainly this is a Subject which Christian Writers, both Ancient and Modern, have insisted much upon; I mean, the Excellency of the Precepts of Christ: but I conceive that we are to understand them so, as that they had no design to disparage the Precepts or Rules for holy living which are left us in the Old Testament. The Jews were not without their Code of excellent Laws, to which they might have Recourse as to an unerring Rule. None will have the Confidence to deny that the Writings of Moses and the Prophets, and other inspired Persons, do contain many excellent Instructions for the regulating men's Lives and Manners. Yea, doth not our Saviour himself, and likewise the Apostles, urge several Duties in the Words of the Old Testament, and making use of its Authority? I shall instance only in the two great Precepts of Doing as we would have others do to us, and Loving Enemies. All things whatever ye would have Men do to you, do ye also to them; for (says our Saviour) this is the Law and the Prophets, S. Matt. 7. 12. And then for Loving Enemies, If thine Enemy hunger feed him, if he thirst give him drink, for doing this thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head, says S. Paul, Rom. 12. 20. transcribing the words of Prov. 25. 21, 22. as they are faithfully translated by the Septuagint. Here then S. Paul, in the very words of Prov. 25. presseth upon his Romans this great Command to love Enemies, to love them not in Word and in Tongue, but in Deed and in Truth, to testify it by relieving them in their Necessity; and then to encourage them to do this, he sets before them the Benefits of it: 1. They would perform an act of Charity to their Enemy, melt him, and reduce him to a better Mind. 2. They would gain a Friend instead of an Enemy; instead of Hatred Returns of Love. 3. Solomon adds, That God also would reward them; Thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head, and the Lord shall reward thee, says Solomon. And this excellent Lecture he here reads us, may, I think, be called (in the Words of an ancient Writer) the top of Philosophy. I only add, That there are the like Commands to love Enemies, and testify that Love by doing them good, in Exod. 23. 4, 5.    

CHAP. X. Of the Name Christ; also of his Offices and Kingdom.  
CHrist is used by the Evangelists and Apostles, in several places, for a proper Name, particularly by S. Luke, as Act. 2. 28. 3. 6, 20. 4. 10. 24. 24, etc. In two of these places it cannot, with good sense, be taken otherwise; for if it be not in Act. 3. 6. and 4. 10. used as a proper Name, we must read those places thus; Jesus the Messiah of Nazareth. And I think it is plain in those others cited, as well as several other places of the New Testament. Mr. Lock, Second Vindicat. of the Reasonab. of Christian. p. 374. The three Offices of Priest, Prophet, and King, are in Holy Writ attributed to our Saviour, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 217. Christ published the Kingdom of the Messiah, that is, his own Royalty, under the Name of the Kingdom of God, and of Heaven, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 73. He spoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, sometimes in reference to his appearing in the World and being believed on by particular Persons; sometimes in reference to the Power should be given him by the Father at his Resurrection; sometimes in reference to his coming to judge the World at the last day, in the full Glory and Completion of his Kingdom, Ibid. Christ's Obedience and Suffering was rewarded with a Kingdom, Ibid. p. 208. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Whether Christ be used in Scripture as a proper Name or no, is not material; but because Mr. Lock insists upon it, it may not be amiss to examine briefly how he proves it. He says, that Christ is used as a proper Name, Act. 2. 28. 3. 6, 20. 4. 10. 24. 24. etc. But I ask, How does that appear? 1. In two of these places (says he) it cannot with any good sense be taken otherwise; for if it be not in Act. 3. 6. and 4. 10. used as a proper Name, we must read those places thus; Jesus the Messiah of Nazareth. 2. I think it is plain in the other places cited. Thus Mr. Lock. But to the former I say, What if we read those places thus, Jesus the Messiah of Nazareth, i. e. Jesus the Messiah that was of Nazareth; is not this good sense? Besides, these Texts might have been produced rather to prove the contrary, for in them his proper Name is expressed, viz. Jesus, to which is superadded this of Christ, given him from his Unction. As to the latter, it is enough to say, that Mr. Lock's Word will scarce pass for a sufficient Proof. But farther, the other places are Act. 2. 38. (not 28. as it is misquoted in Mr. Lock) 3. 20. 24. 24. Now it is so far from being plain that Christ is used in them as a proper Name, that there is no ground at all to think that it is: yea, as to Act. 2. 38. and 3. 20. there is ground to think the contrary. That which Mr. Lock adds (Second Vindicat. p. 375.) that long before the Acts were writ the name of Christ did denote the Person of our Saviour as much as Jesus, is nothing but what every one knows; and therefore in vain doth he trouble either Chronologers, or Suetonius and Tacitus, about it. But how doth he prove that it denoted the Person of our Saviour as a proper Name? or if it did, doth that prove that it is used as a proper Name in those places of the Acts?  
When Mr. Lock says, that Christ's Obedience and Suffering was rewarded with a Kingdom, it must be understood of that Kingdom or Power which was given him by God the Father at his Resurrection; for, that he was a King before his suffering Death, Mr. Lock does not deny.    

CHAP. XI. Of the Son of God, and the Messiah.  
BElieving Jesus to be the Son of God, and to be the Messiah, was the same thing. The Jews, Luke 22. 70. ask Christ, Whether he was the Son of God; plainly demand of him, Whether he were the Messiah: which is evident by comparing that with the three preceding Verses. They ask him, ver. 67. Whether he were the Messiah? He answers, If I tell you, you will not believe: but withal tells them, that from henceforth he should be in possession of the Kingdom of the Messiah; expressed in these words, Hereafter shall the Son of Man sit at the right hand of the Power of God. Which made them all cry out, Art thou then the Son of God? i. e. Dost thou then own thyself to be the Messiah? To which he replies, Ye say that I am. This was the common Signification of the Son of God. Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 34, 35. Confessing Jesus to be the Son of God, is the same with confessing him to be the Messiah; those two Expressions being understood among the Jews to signify the same thing. Ibid. p. 96. Messiah and Son of God were synonymous Terms at that time among the Jews. Ibid. p. 50. The Son of God and the Messiah are one in Signification. Second Vindicat. of the Reasonab. of Christian. p. 353. The Answer of our Saviour, set down by S. Matthew chap. 26. 64. in these words Thou hast said; and by S. Mark chap. 14. 62. in these I am; is an Answer only to this Question, Art thou then the Son of God? and not to that other, Art thou the Messiah? which preceded, and he had answered to before; though Matthew and Mark contracting the Story, set them down together, as if making but one Question, omitting all the intervening Discourse: Whereas 'tis plain out of S. Luke, that they were two distinct Questions, to which Jesus gave two distinct Answers. In the first whereof, he, according to his wont Caution, declined saying in plain express words, that he was the Messiah; though in the latter he owned himself to be the Son of God. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 144, 145. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Here I conceive it will not be very easy to reconcile that which Mr. Lock says p. 34, 35. and otherwhere, with that which he hath p. 144, 145. He says p. 34, 35. That the Jews ask Christ whether he were the Son of God, plainly demand of him whether he was the Messiah; and again, They cry out, art thou the Son of God? i. e. Dost thou then own thyself to be the Messiah? So that here Mr. Lock plainly makes Art thou the Son of God? and, Art thou the Messiah? one and the same Question. And yet p. 145. he says expressly, that they are two distinct Questions, to which Jesus gave two distinct Answers. Yea, he appeals to one and the same Evangelist, S. Luke, for the truth of both these. It is evident by comparing Luke 22. 70. with the three preceding Verses, that the Jews ask whether he were the Son of God, demanded of him whether he were the Messiah; says Mr. Lock p. 34. It is plain out of S. Luke, that they are two distinct Questions, says he p. 145. And indeed it is very plain out of S. Luke, that they are two distinct Questions, not only from our Saviour's giving two distinct Answers to them, but also from hence, that they asked the former Question touching his being the Messiah of their own accord; the latter, whether he was the Son of God, upon occasion of his mentioning his sitting at the right hand of the Power of God, S. Luke 22. 69. I might add, That I question whether they would have accounted it Blasphemy, if he had answered affirmatively to the former Question, as they did when he owned himself to be the Son of God. This directly overthrows all that Mr. Lock saith about the Son of God, and the Messiah, as being synonymous terms, or one in signification; for if they be Expressions of one and the same signification, these two, Art thou the Messiah? and Art thou the Son of God? cannot be distinct Questions, as (according to Mr. Lock) 'tis plain out of S. Luke that they are. No man will say that Art thou the Christ? and Art thou the Messiah? are two distinct Questions, because Messiah and Christ are known to signify the same thing; and if the Son of God and the Messiah did likewise signisie the same thing, those other could not be said to be two distinct Questions. And therefore Mr. Lock must either retract this, that 'tis plain out of S. Luke that Art thou the Messiah? and Art thou the Son of God? are two distinct Questions; or else renounce his beloved Notion, which takes up a great part of his Reasonableness of Christianity, that the Son of God, and the Messiah, are synonymous terms, and one in signification, though not in sound.  
The truth is, the account which Mr. Lock himself gives of the signification of the Son of God, and of the Messiah, is sufficient to overthrow that Notion of his. In his Reasonah. of Christian. p. 30. Mr. Lock having alleged those word, The Messiah, which is, being interpreted, the Christ, John 1. 42. tells us, that Christ is but the Greek name for the Hebrew Messiah, and that both signify the Anointed. So p. 216. he says, The Faith required was, to believe Jesus to be the Messiah, the Anointed. He was anointed to three great Offices, viz. of Priest, Prophet, and King; see him p. 217. Concerning the other Title, the Son of God, he says, p. 303. Who being conceived in the Womb of a Virgin (that had not known Man) by the immediate Power of God, was properly the Son of God; for which he citys Luk. 1. 35. According to Mr. Lock then, the Son of God signifies our Saviour's having been conceived in the Womb of a pure Virgin by the immediate Power of God, whereas Messiah signifies his being anointed to the Offices of a Priest, a Prophet, and a King. Since then, by his own confession, these Titles have two so different Significations, how he can say, and defend, that they are one in signification, I know not.  
If when he says that they are synonymous Terms, Expressions of the same thing, one in Signification, etc. his meaning was only this; that the same Person is expressed or signified by them; that both these Titles agree to the same Person; or, that the same Person is both the Son of God and the Messiah; there would be no Controversy as to it: for, it is that which was never questioned. But Mr. Lock will not be satisfied with this, as appears from his Reasonableness of Christianity, and the two Vindications of it, especially the latter. For it was acknowledged more than once, that the Titles agree, or are applied to the same Person; and yet he is so far from acquiescing, that he disputes the Point as earnestly as ever. See Second Vindication, p. 349, etc.    

CHAP. XII. Of two Natures in one Person, and of the Trinity.  
I Do not remember that I ever read in my Bible either of these Propositions in these precise terms, There are three Persons in one Nature, or There are two Natures and one Person. I do not here question their Truth, nor deny that they may be drawn from the Scripture; but I deny that these very Propositions are in express words in my Bible; for that is the only thing I deny here. Mr. Lock, Third Letter, p. 224.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
It is well known how much Mr. Lock complains that he was joined with the Unitarians. See his Second Letter, p. 7. The World (says he) will be apt to think, that I am the Person who argue against the Trinity, Ibid. p. 24. That I am one of the They and Them that oppose the Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 27. I might transcribe much more to this purpose: But might not Mr. Lock do well (instead of complaining of others) to consider whether he himself hath not given the World reason to suspect that he is no Friend to the Doctrine of the Trinity? As by taking no notice of S. Matth. 28. 19 in his Reasonableness of Christianity, where our Saviour being about to leave the Apostles, and to be taken from them to Heaven, and instructing them what they should teach the Unbelieving Nations, and how they were to admit them into his Church, says, Go teach all Nations, baptising them in (or into) the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. This lay directly in Mr. Lock's way when he was acquainting us what the Apostles were to preach to Unbelievers; so that it may be justly suspected, that there was some special reason of his omitting it; and particularly, that the reason was, because these three, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are mentioned here. So whereas it is believed that this Title, the Son of God, doth in sundry places include or denote that Christ is God; Mr. Lock very studiously and industriously opposeth this: and by so doing, hath likewise given Persons reason to think that he is no Friend to the Doctrine of the Trinity. Thus he contends, that in S. Luk. 4. 41. S. Mar. 3. 11, 12. S. Matth. 16. 16. S. Job. 11. 27. S. Luk. 22. 70. S. Matth. 27. 54. Act. 8. 37. the term the Son of God doth not denote our Saviour's being God. See his Second Vindication, p. 361, 362, 363, 364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 374. I shall not consider all that he saith of these Texts, but with reference to S. Luk. 22. 70. I would ask him, Whether the Jews understood not this Appellation, the Son of God, so as that it denoted the Person so called to be God? And therefore as soon as he had owned himself to be the Son of God, v. 70. they said, What need we any farther witness, for we have heard from his own mouth? ver. 71. We have heard, viz. his Blasphemy, as S. Matthew and S. Mark expound it; Then the High Priest rend his clothes, saying, that he had spoken Blasphemy, what farther need have we of witnesses? behold ye have now heard his Blasphemy? S. Matth. 26. 65. See also S. Mar. 14. 63, 64. If they had not understood that by owning himself to be the Son of God he had made himself God, how could they say that he blasphemed? This matter is fully cleared by S. Job. 10. 33, 35, 36. The Jews said, For a good work we stone thee not, but for Blasphemy, and because thou being a man, makest thyself God. Jesus answered, If your Law called them Gods to whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken, say ye of him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said I am the Son of God? Here it is plain, 1. That the Jews made Christ to be a Blasphemer, because being a Man he made himself God. 2. That according to them, he made himself God, by saying that he was the Son of God. 3. That our Saviour doth not blame the Jews for making this Inference; but contrariwise, maintains that he did not blaspheme in saying that he was the Son of God, and so God, by alleging the Psalmist's words, I said Ye are Gods. If the Psalmist did not blaspheme in recording these words, I said ye are Gods; how say ye that he whom the Father hath set apart and sent into the World, doth blaspheme, because he said that he is the Son of God, and so God?  
But Mr. Lock most especially gives the World just reason to suspect that he is not a Friend to the Doctrine of the Trinity, in his Third Letter: As, 1. By refusing to follow the friendly Advice that was given him for removing all Jealousies and Suspicions of him as to this particular. He was told, that the way to clear himself, had been by declaring to the World, that he owned the Doctrine of the Trinity as it has been received in the Christian Church. But this he would not be persuaded to do, alleging, That he needed not to reply to what was never objected, and clear himself from what was never laid to his Charge. 2. That what was laid upon him, was what he could not do without owning to know what he was sure he did not know. For (says he) how the Doctrine of the Trinity has been always received in the Christian Church, I confess myself ignorant. Thus Mr. Lock, in his Third Letter, p. 7, 9 To the former of which I say, Suppose it was not objected that he did not favour the Doctrine of the Trinity, yet if it was only insinuated, this was a sufficient Reason why he should clear himself. No Man should be silent in the case of such Insinuation. Now Mr. Lock was not ignorant that this had been insinuated, being so well acquainted with two Discourses, one entitled Some Thoughts concerning the several Causes and Occasions of Atheism, the other Socinianism Unmasked; both published before that he was put in mind to clear himself. The very Title of the latter doth insinuate it; and if he would see it plainly objected, he may consult p. 82. where are these words: My next Charge against this Gentleman (i. e. Mr. Lock) was this; that those Texts of Scripture which respect the Holy Trinity, were either disregarded by him, or were interpreted by him after the Antitrinitarian Mode. And this he is so far from denying, that he openly avows it. By which he hath made it clear, that he espouses that Doctrine of the Socinians. Here it is plainly laid to his Charge; and yet Mr. Lock did not think fit, either in his Reply to this Socinianism Unmasked, nor any where else, to clear himself, by declaring to the World that he owns the Doctrine of the Trinity. As to the latter, that he is ignorant how the Doctrine of the Trinity has been always received in the Christian Church, it is not to the purpose: for it was not required of him that he should declare his owning the Doctrine of the Trinity as it has been Always received in the Christian Church, (the word Always is Mr. Lock's addition;) it was only mentioned that he should declare his owning it as it hath been received in the Christian Church: and if he had only declared his owning it as it hath been received in the Church of England, it would have been judged sufficient. Therefore both these are apparently mere Shifts and Evasions.  
2. Mr. Lock gives the World just reason to suspect that he doth not favour the Doctrine of the Trinity, by his disputing so largely and earnestly about the Terms Nature and Person, and his ridiculing that which had been said for clearing the Sense or Signification of them. This Dispute takes up no small part of his Third Letter, (see p. 253, etc. and again p. 352, etc.) after that he had enlarged so much upon them in his two former Letters: see his First Letter, p. 148, etc. and the Second Letter, p. 98, etc.  
Lastly, In the Words that I have transcribed out of this Third Letter, p. 224. he gives the World just cause to doubt that he is no Friend to this Doctrine. The words are; I do not here question the Truth of these Propositions, There are three Persons in one Nature, or There are two Natures and one Person, nor deny that they may be drawn from the Scripture; but I deny that these very Propositions are in express Words in my Bible. For that is the only thing I deny here. If Mr. Lock had said, I do not question the Truth of these Propositions, nor deny, etc. he might have given some Satisfaction. But here is a dead Fly that makes his Ointment to send forth no good savour, viz. the Word Here added, and that twice. He doth not Here question their Truth, and that is the only thing he denies Here: i.e. for this time, and upon this occasion, he did not think fit to express his questioning the one, or denying the other: but he doth not absolutely say that he doth not question or deny the one or other. He saith, For that is the only thing I deny here; whereby I perceive that Mr. Lock has his privileged Particles, as he says that others have theirs: for what the Particle For doth here I know not.    

CHAP. XIII. Of the Scriptures, particularly of the Epistles; also of the Interpretation of them.  
THE Holy Scripture is to me, and always will be, the constant Guide of my Assent; and I shall always hearken to it, as containing infallible Truth, relating to things of the highest Concernment. And I shall presently condemn and quit any Opinion of mine, as soon as I am shown that it is contrary to any Revelation in the Holy Scripture. Mr. Lock, First Letter, p. 226, 227. Every true Christian is under an absolute and indispensible necessity, by being the Subject of Christ, to study the Scriptures with an unprejudiced mind, according to that measure of Time, Opportunity, and Helps which he has; that in those Sacred Writings be may find what his Lord and Master hath by himself, or by the mouths of his Apostles, required of him either to be believed or done. Second Vindicat. of the Reason. of Christian. p. 446. I think it every Christian's Duty to read, search, and study the Holy Scriptures, and make this their great Business. Ibid. p. 201. All that we find in the Revelation of the New Testament being the declared Will and Mind of our Lord and Master, the Messiah, whom we have taken to be our King, we are bound to receive as Right and Truth, or else we are not his Subjects. But it is still what we find in the Scripture; what we, sincerely seeking to know the Will of our Lord, discover to be his Mind. Where it is spoken plainly we cannot miss it; where there is Obscurity, either in the Expressions themselves, or by reason of the seeming contrariety of other Passages, there a fair Endeavour, as much as our Circumstances will permit, secures us from a guilty Disobedience to his Will, or a sinsul Error in Faith. If he had required more of us in those Points, he would have declared his Will plainer to us. Ibid. p. 76. The Holy Writers of the Epistles, inspired from above, writ nothing but Truth, and in most places very weighty Truths to us now, for the expounding, clearing, and confirming of the Christian Doctrine, and establishing those in it who had embraced it. But yet every Sentence of theirs must not be taken up and looked on as a Fundamental Article necessary to Salvation, without an explicit Belief whereof no body could be a Member of Christ's Church here, nor be admitted into his eternal Kingdom hereafter. If all or most of the Truths declared in the Epistles were to be received and believed as Fundamental Articles, what then became of those Christians who were fallen asleep, (as S. Paul witnesses, in his first to the Corinthians, many were,) before these things in the Epistles were revealed to them. Most of the Epistles not being written till above twenty years after our Saviour's Ascension, and some after thirty. Reasonah. of Christian. p. 300. The Epistles resolving Doubts, and reforming Mistakes, are of great Advantage to our Knowledge and Practice. I do not deny but the great Doctrines of the Christian Faith are dropped here and there, and scattered up and down in most of them: But 'tis not in the Epistles we are to learn what are the Fundamental Articles of Faith, where they are promiscuously, and without distinction, mixed with other Truths. We shall find and discern those great and necessary Points best in the Preaching of our Saviour and the Apostles, to those who were yet Strangers and ignorant of the Faith, to bring them in and convert them to it. Ibid. p. 298. Many Doctrines proving and explaining, and giving a farther light into the Gospel, are published in the Epistles to the Corinthians and Thessalonians: These are all of Divine Authority, and none of them may be disbelieved by any one who is a Christian. Second Vindicat of Reason. of Christian. p. 319. Generally, and in necessary Points, the Scriptures are to be understood in the plain direct meaning of the Words and Phrases, such as they may be supposed to have had in the mouths of the Speakers. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 2. He that will read the Epistles as he ought, must observe what 'tis in them is principally aimed at, find what is the Argument in hand, and how managed; he must look into the drift of the Discourse, observe the Coherence and Connexion of the Parts, and see how it is consistent with itself, and other parts of Scripture. The observing of this will best help us to the true meaning and mind of the Writer. Ibid. p. 294. The Scripture gives light to its own meaning, by one place compared with another. Vindicat. of Reasonab. of Christian. p. 22. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
How happy would it be, if Mr. Lock, and I, and all of us, could presently condemn and quit any Opinion of ours, so soon as it is showed that it is contrary to any part of Scripture.  
I do not know any one that affirms that all or most of the Truths contained in the Epistles are Fundamental Articles, so necessary, that without an explicit Belief of them, none can be a Member of Christ's Church here, or admitted into his eternal Kingdom hereafter.  
Mr. Lock, without any necessity, takes upon him to determine a Chronological Question, and is very positive in his Determination. Most of the Epistles (says he) were not written till above twenty years after our Saviour's Ascension, and some after thirty. But there are who refer our Lord's Ascension to his thirty third Year, and the Date of the First and Second Epistles to the Corinthians to An. Dom. 53, that of the First to the Thessalonians to An. Dom. 49, (making the Second to the Thessalonians to have been writ shortly after it,) the Date of S. Peter's First Epistle to An. Dom. 44, as there are who refer that of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, and of both the Epistles to the Thessalonians, to An. Dom. 50; so that according to them, here are five Epistles of which it cannot be said, that they were not written till above twenty years after our Saviour's Ascension. If Mr. Lock say, Suppose it were so, that these five were not written above twenty years after the Ascension, it is true still that most of the Epistles were not written till above twenty years after it; I reply, That a Person that is so positive should not barely say it, but also prove it. How knows he, that there are not some other Epistles which were not written after twenty years after Christ's Ascension? As to that which he adds, That some were written after thirty years from our Saviour's Ascension; it may be observed, that he is so prudent as not to let us know what Epistles they are. And farther, the Martyrdom of S. Peter, S. Paul, and S. James, is supposed by some not to have been after thirty years from our Lord's Ascension, and their Epistles were certainly all writ before their Martyrdom; and therefore it is impossible that their Epistles should be writ later than the thirtieth year after Christ's Ascension, it being supposed that that their Martyrdom was not later than that year. According to Jos. Scaliger, the Martyrdom of the two great Apostles S. Peter and S. Paul was exactly thirty years after the Lord's ascension, according to Syncellus nine and twenty, according to Lydiat eight and twenty; and S. James' Martyrdom, according to all of them, preceded theirs: so that if we follow the account of these three great Masters in Chronology, the Epistle of S. James, the two Epistles of S. Peter, and those of S. Paul, could not be writ after the thirtieth year from Christ's Ascension. There remain the Epistles of S. John and S. Judas, and how will Mr. Lock prove that those were writ after thirty years from our Saviour's Ascension? One that spent much time and pains in the Study of the Chronology of the Old and New Testament, says, That among all the Apostolic Epistles, there is none about whose time of writing we are so far to seek, as about those of S. John. If Mr. Lock say, That there are who give other Accounts of the time of the writing the First Epistle of S. Peter, and of those to the Corinthians and Thessalonians, as also of the time of S. Peter's suffering, and S. Paul's, different from those that are given here of them, I grant it; but what can be inferred from this Disagreement of Expositors or Chronographers, but the Uncertainty of the time of the Date of the Epistles, which should caution Men not to be so positive in such things, as too many are.  
Many of the things which Mr. Lock saith of the Epistles, may be applied also to the Gospels. For instance, All or most of the Truths contained in the Gospels are not to be looked on as Fundamental Articles, so necessary that without an explicit belief of them, none can be admitted into Christ's Church here, or his eternal Kingdom hereafter. Also Fundamental Articles are promiscuously, and without distinction, mixed with other Truths in the Gospels. So he that will read the Gospels as he ought, must observe what 'tis in them that is principally aimed at, find what is the Argument in hand, and how managed; must look into the drift of the Discourse, observe the Coherence and Connexion of the Parts, and see how it is consistent with itself and other parts of Scripture.  
Finally, There are some Fundamental Articles that are distinguished from other Truths in the Epistles: As in Rom. 10. 9 If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe with thy heart that God raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. So 1 Tim. 1. 15. It is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the World to save Sinners. And so Heb. 11. 6. He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.    

CHAP. XIV. Of the Preaching of Christ; as also the Commission he gave to his Apostles, and the LXX Disciples, and their Preaching.  
THE Religion our Saviour and his Apostles proposed, consisted in that short, plain, easy, and intelligible Summary, which I set down in my Reasonab. of Christian. in these words; Believing Jesus to be the Saviour promised, and taking him now raised from the Dead, and constituted the Lord and Judge of Men, to be their King and Ruler. Mr. Lock Vindicat. of the Reasonab. of Christian. p. 28. As to our Saviour and his Apostles, the whole aim of all their Preaching every where was to convince the unbelieving World of these two great Truths: First, That there was one eternal invisible God, Maker of Heaven and Earth; and next, That Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah, the promised King and Saviour. Second Vindicat. of the Reason. of Christian. p. 237. Our Saviour preached every where the Kingdom of God, and by his Miracles declared himself to be the King of that Kingdom. The Apostles preached the same; and after his Ascension, openly avowed him to be the Prince and Saviour promised. Ibid. p. 252. By these and the like places we may be satisfied what it was that the Apostles taught and preached; even this one Proposition, That Jesus was the Messiah. Ibid. p. 282. This one Doctrine, That Jesus was the Messiah, was that which was proposed in our Saviour's time to be believed as necessary to make a Man a Christian: The same Doctrine was likewise what was proposed afterward in the preaching of the Apostles to Unbelievers, to make them Christians. Ibid. p. 318. There is yet one Consideration remaining, which were sufficient of itself to convince us that it was the sole Article of Faith which was preached; and that is, the Commissions of those that were sent to preach the Gospel. Our Saviour's Commission, or End of his being sent, and the Execution of it, both terminated in this, That he declared the good News, that the Kingdom of the Messiah was come, and gave them to understand by the Miracles he did, that he himself was he. So the Commission that he gave the Apostles was, that they should acquaint their Hearers that the Kingdom of the Messiah was come; and let them know, by the Miracles they did in his Name, that he was that King and Deliverer they expected. And his Commission to the Seventy whom he sent to preach, was so exactly conformable to that which he had before given to the Twelve Apostles, that there needs but this one thing more to be observed to convince any one that they were sent to convert their Hearers to this sole Belief, that the Kingdom of the Messiah was come, and that Jesus was the Messiah. Ibid. p. 289, 290, 296, 299. Accordingly, the preaching of the Apostles every where in the Acts tended to this one Point, to prove that Jesus was the Messiah. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 31. What that Word was through which others should believe on Christ S. Joh. 17. 20. we have seen in the preaching of the Apostles all through the History of the Acts, viz. this one great Point, that Jesus was the Messiah. Ibid. p. 186.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
It is strange that Mr. Lock should say in so many places, without any Restriction or Limitation, that this, that Jesus is the Messiah, is the sole Doctrine, that one Point or Article, which was preached; when he himself otherwhere puts so many Restrictions and Limitations upon it: As, 1. When in his Reasonab. of Christian. p. 195. he says, This was the only Gospel-Article of Faith which was preached to them. He doth not say, The only Article of Faith, but the only Gospel-Article. He grants that the Apostles preached the Article of one true eternal and invisible God, Maker of Heaven and Earth, (see Reasonab. of Christian. p. 43, 44.) but he doth not call this a Gospel-Article. 2. When he says that it was the only Article necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, the sole Doctrine, upon their assent to which, or Disbelief of it, Men were pronounced Believers or Unbelievers, and accordingly received into the Church of Christ. Ibid. p. 195. 3. He limits to the Preaching of our Saviour and his Apostles, to those who were yet Strangers and ignorant of the Faith, to bring them in, and convert them to it. Ibid. p. 298. See also p. 295. and 297.  
It is strange also that he should contend so much that this was the only Article of Faith that was preached, when he acknowledges that several other Articles were preached. Indeed now after his Death, his Resurrection was also commonly required to be believed as a necessary Article. So Mr. Lock, Ibid. p. 31. Their great business was to be Witnesses to Jesus of his Life, Death, Resurrection, and Ascension; which, put together, were undeniable Proofs of his being the Messiah. So the same Mr. Lock, Ibid. p. 188. speaking of the Apostles, who certainly did not fail to execute their great Business, which was to preach, or bear witness to the Articles of Christ's Life, Death, Resurrection, and Ascension, and not only that of his being the Messiah. In the next Page, (viz. 190.) he hath these words, We see what it was that was to be preached to all Nations; viz. That he was the Messiah that had suffered, and risen from the Dead the third day, and fulfilled all things that was written in the Old Testament concerning the Messiah, and that those that believed this, and repent, should have remission of Sins through this Faith in him. And p. 191. he tells us, that S. Paul preached that Jesus was the Messiah, the King who being risen from the Dead, now reigneth, and shall more publicly manifest his Kingdom in judging the World at the last day. Surely nothing can be more plain, than that by Mr. Lock's own Acknowledgement, the Apostles preached the Articles of our dear Lord's Suffering, Rising the third Day, fulfilling all the Prophecies of the Old Testament concerning him, now reigning, and future coming to judge the World, and that those who truly believe and repent, shall receive remission of Sins through Faith in him; and not one Article only. And therefore he very fitly calls them concomitant Articles; since the Apostles, in their preaching, often joined them with that Article, that Jesus is the Messiah. The belief of Jesus of Nazareth r to be the Messiah, together with those concomitant Articles of his Resurrection, Rule, and coming again to judge the World, etc. Thus Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 293, 294. To reconcile these Acknowledgements with his Doctrine of one Article, he tryeth many ways, but all in vain. 1. As to the Article of the Resurrection, he would persuade us that the Article of Jesus' being the Messiah and it are but one. These two important Articles are inseparable, and in effect make but one. For believe one and you believe both, deny one of them and you can believe neither. So Mr. Lock in his Second Vindication, p. 309. But every one sees, that all he could say is, that in effect they make but one; and that with the same breath he expressly calls them two Articles. There is therefore no necessity of our insisting upon this, they that please may see what he himself saith in the same Vindication, p. 25, 26. 2. He insists much upon it, that our Saviour's Crucifixion, Death, and Resurrection, are mentioned and made use of as Arguments to persuade men of this Fundamental Truth, viz. That Jesus was the Messiah; they were not proposed as Fundamental Articles, which the Apostles principally aimed at, and endeavoured to convince men of. Second Vindicat. p. 268, 269. So again, p. 323. he urges that his Death and Resurrection were Matters of Fact, which happened to him in their due time, to complete in him the Character and Predictions of the Messiah, and demonstrate him to be the Deliverer promised; they were no more necessary to be believed to make a man a Christian, than any other part of Divine Revelation, etc. Thus Mr. Lock. But the Question is not, Whether the Crucifixion, Death, and Resurrection of Christ were proposed by the Apostles as the Fundamental Truths which they principally aimed at, and endeavoured to convince their Hearers of; but whether they were not proposed by them as Fundamental Truths. Whether this, That Jesus is the Messiah, be the principal Article; and, whether it was the only Article preached by the Apostles, as necessary to the making Men Christians, are different Questions. Mr. Lock, in his Reasonab. of Christian. p. 31. says expressly of the Article of Christ's Resurrection, that it was also commonly required to be believed as a necessary Article. Where we may observe the Word Also; which denotes, that not only the Article of Jesus' being the Messiah, but also this of the Resurrection, was commonly required as necessary. And accordingly the same Mr. Lock says presently after, That our Saviour's Resurrection is necessary now to be believed by those who would receive him as the Messiah. It is true, that in a place lately cited, viz. his Second Vindication, p. 323. he says, That the Articles of Christ's Death and Resurrection are no more necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, than any other part of divine Revelation; but than it immediately follows, But as far as they have an immediate Connexion with his being the Messiah, and cannot be denied without denying him to be the Messiah: And so he plainly grants, That so far as they have such a Connexion with his being the Messiah, they are necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian: which is as much as we need desire; for thence it follows, that this, that Jesus is the Messiah, was not the sole Doctrine that was preached as necessary to be believed to that end. I must not forget that Mr. Lock also saith, That our Saviour's Crucifixion, Death, and Resurrection, were mentioned and made use of to prove that Jesus was the Messiah. If so, these Articles, that Jesus was Crucify'd, that he Died, and that he Risen from Death, were the Premises; and this, that he was the Messiah, the Conclusion. Now it must be acknowledged, that the Premises are necessary to be believed before we can believe the Conclusion: and therefore this makes against Mr. Lock, not at all for him. If we cannot believe that Jesus was the Messiah unless we believe that he risen from the dead, (which Mr. Lock confesses,) then the Article of the Resurrection was necessary to be preached and believed to make a man a Christian. 3. He says that his Resurrection and some other Articles, are put for his being the Messiah, and proposed to be believed in the place of it; but I shall ●●ve occasion to examine this very shortly.  
To proceed then, How can Mr. Lock say, that this, that Jesus was the Messiah, was the only Gospel-Article preached by the Apostles to Unbelievers, to bring them to the Faith; when he grants, that in some of their discourses it was omitted, yea and other Articles at the same time insisted on? Thus, in his Reasonab. of Christianity, p. 31. he says, that Christ's Resurrection was sometimes solely insisted on. So in his Second Vindication, p. 284. he plainly confesses, that in the Story of what Paul and Barnabas said at Lystra, the Article of the Messiah is not mentioned; tho' at the same time they preached the Article of the one living God. See also Ibid. p. 307. where he says, that 'tis not at all to be wondered, that his Resurrection, his Ascension, his Rule and Dominion, and his coming to Judge the quick and the dead, should sometimes in Scripture be put alone as sufficient Descriptions of the Messiah. Thus Act. 10. our Saviour, in Peter's discourse to Cornelius, when he brought him the Gospel, is described to be the Messiah by his Miracles, Death, Resurrection, Dominion, and cocoming to judge the quick and the dead. Here he grants in express words, that our Lord's Resurrection, Ascension, Dominion, and judging the quick and dead, are sometimes put alone; and if they be sometimes put alone, than the Article of his being the Messiah is sometimes omitted. To the same purpose he says, Ibid. p. 308. These, where they are set alone for the Faith to which Salvation is promised, plainly signify the believing Jesus to be the Messiah. Here he grants again, That the four Articles just now mentioned are sometimes set alone, and that the Article of Jesus' being the Messiah is only signified (viz. by those four Articles) and not expressed. And indeed this is Mr. Lock's usual Evasion, that tho' other Articles are only insisted on in some places, yet the Article of our Saviour's being the Messiah is signified by those Articles, the believing them is put for believing him to be the Messiah, they are proposed to be believed in the place of it; see his Second Vindication, p. 307, 327. Where we may be sure, that his Meaning is not, that the other Articles were to be believed, and the Article that Jesus is the Messiah was not to be believed (tho' the words, Proposed to be believed in place of it, are capable of that sense:) but if I do not mistake, his Meaning is, that those Articles were proposed to be believed, that believing them they might believe also, that Jesus was the Messiah, because those were convincing Proofs of this. But whatever his Meaning is, this is manifest, that they were proposed by the Apostles to Unbelievers, as necessary to be believed to make them Christian: And this is sufficient for the Confutation of those who say, that only one Gospel-Article was preached as necessary to be believed to that end. Before I leave this, I must not omit to take notice, that Mr. Lock doth assign a Reason why Paul and Barnabas did not mention the Article of the Messiah, which I shall set down in his own words, Having (says he) begun their preaching with that of one living God, they had not time to proceed farther, and propose to them what yet remained to make them Christians, but they were by the instigation of the Jews fallen upon, and Paul stoned, before he could come to open to them this other fundamental Article of the Gospel; Thus Mr. Lock, Second Vindication p. 384, who certainly relied very much upon his Reader's Credulity when he writ this, presuming that he would never consult the History of the Acts. For this, that the Apostles had not time to proceed to the Article of the Messiah, is his mere Fiction, there is no ground for it, nor the least footstep thereof in that History; tho' he hath the Confidence to say that it is apparent; yea the quite contrary appears, that they had time to finish their Discourse, and did finish it. For S. Luke, Act. 14. having set down their words, or the sum of them, v. 15, 16, 17, says v. 18. And with these say scarce restrained they the people, that they had not done sacrifice to them. This shows that they had finished their Discourse; as it also shows what effect it had, it did restrain the Multitude from sacrificing to them, but with difficulty. The People were at that time so far from stoning them, or giving them any disturbance or interruption, that they looked upon them as Gods come down to them in the likeness of Men, and would have honoured them as such. Tho' after this (and how long after, Mr. Lock, with all his Skill in Chronology, cannot tell us) Jews came from Antioch and Iconium, who persuaded the People, and they stoned Paul. See Act. 14. 19  
Lastly, Is it not strange that he should say, that this, that Jesus is the Messiah, was the only Gospel-Article preached by our Saviour and his Apostles; and yet maintain that the Apostles did not in plain and direct words preach this Doctrine, of his being the Messiah, till after his Resurrection, and that our Saviour did not in plain and direct words declare himself to the Jews to be the Messiah, till near the time of his Death? Thus in his Reasonableness of Christianity, p. 55, etc. having observed that there is a threefold declaration of the Messiah, 1. by Miracles, 2. by Phrases and Circumlocutions, that did signify and intimate his coming, tho' not in direct words pointing out his Person; he comes, p. 59 to the third or last, which is, by plain and direct words declaring the Doctrine of the Messiah, speaking out that Jesus was he; as we see the Apostles did when they went about preaching the Gospel after our Saviour's Resurrection. This was the open clear way, and that which one would think the Messiah himself, when he came, should have taken, especially if it be of that moment, that upon men's believing him to be the Messiah depended the Forgiveness of their Sins. And yet we see that our Saviour did not, but on the contrary, for the most part made no other discovery of himself, at least in Judea, and at the beginning of his Ministry, but in the two former ways, which were more obscure. Thus Mr. Lock. So that according to him, as our Saviour did not take the open clear way of discovering himself to be the Messiah, so his Disciples did not speak out that he was so, till after his Resurrection. Yea he insists largely upon our Saviour's concealment of his being the Christ. Now I say, Is it not strange that he should dwell so long upon his concealing his being so, and yet maintain at the same time, that his being the Messiah was the only Gospel-Article preached by him?  
Since Mr. Lock appeals so confidently to the History of the Evangelists, and of the Acts, and abounds so much in Citations out of them to make good his Pretensions, insomuch that some have computed that this takes up about three quarters of his Reasonableness of Christianity, it might have been expected that I should have examined the Texts by him alleged; but that would have swelled this Tract too much; withal, I may have an opportunity hereafter of doing this, (tho' that which hath been said might save that labour) for it will be easy to show that many of the places he produceth make indeed against and not for him.  
As to the Commission given to the Apostles, how comes it that he takes notice of that which they had when Christ sent them to preach to the Jews, and makes no mention of that which he gave them when taking his solemn Farewell of them, he sent them to preach to all Nations? He ought certainly to have taken notice of the one as well as the other. This Commission we have S. Mat. 28. 19, 20. Go teach all Nations, baptising them in the name (or, into the name) of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things what soever I have commanded you. The Apostles were to teach adult Persons before they baptised them; and what were they to teach them? surely the necessary Doctrine concerning those in or into whose Name they were to be baptised; and so concerning the Holy Ghost, as well as touching the Father and the Son. If Mr. Lock will translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make Disciples, it comes to to the same; for they could not be made Disciples without being taught. We see then what their Commission was, viz. to teach the Doctrine of the Holy, Blessed, and Glorious Trinity, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and so to admit Men into the Church by Baptism. And we are sure that they faithfully executed their Commission, and did that which their Lord and Master gave them in charge. Whence it is clearly manifest, what the Apostles were to teach all Nations; and consequently, what they did teach them.    

CHAP. XV. Of the Fall of Adam.  
WHat Adam fell from, was the state of perfect Obedience. By this Fall he lost Paradise, wherein was Tranquillity and the Tree of Life, i. e. he lost Bliss and Immortality. The Penalty annexed to the Breach of the Law stands thus, Gen. 2. 17. In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die. How was this executed? In the day he did eat he did not actually die, but his Life began from thence to shorten and waste, and to have an end. Death, i. e. a state of Death and Mortality, entered by Sin: Mr. Lock, Reason. of Christ. p. 3, 4. By Death here, I can understand nothing but a ceasing to be, the losing of all Actions of Life and Sense. Such a Death came on Adam and all his Posterity by his first Disobedience in Paradise, under which Death they should have lain for ever, had it not been for the Redemption by Jesus Christ: Ibid. p. 6. As Adam was turned out of Paradise, so all his Posterity was born out of it, out of the reach of the Tree of Life; all like their Father Adam, in a state of Mortality, void of the Tranquillity and Bliss of Paradise. Ibid. p. 7. Though all die in Adam, yet none are truly punished but for their own Deeds. Ibid. p. 9 Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Expositors are not agreed what Death it is which God threatened to Adam upon his eating the forbidden Fruit. Mr. Lock (if I mistake him not) can by Death here understand nothing but that which we call the Death of the Body, or a natural or temporal Death: And I believe few will deny that this Death was threatened in the words Thou shalt surely die, Gen. 2. 17. The great Objection against this, is that which Mr. Lock intimates, viz. that it is said, In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die; whereas it was above nine hundred years after his eating, that Adam died this Death. But hereto it may be answered, 1. That in the day that he did eat (taking the words in the strict sense) this Death became due to him, or he became a Child of Death. God might have said to him as Solomon to Abiathar, 1 Kings 2. 26. Thou art worthy of death, but I will not at this time put thee to death. 2. In that day he became liable to Diseases, which were Harbingers of this Death, which did by degrees weaken the strength of Nature, and at last introduce Death. 3. St. Hierom and Theodoret do testify that Symmachus, instead of Thou shalt surely die, translates Thou shalt be mortal; and the rendering is approved and commended by S. Hierom in Tradit. Hebr. in gen. Now according to it there is no difficulty, for Adam did become mortal that day. 4. Some say that Adam repent, and that upon his Repentance the Execution of the Threatening was respited; as others say that it was respited upon the account of the Remedy which God had prepared, viz. The Seed of the Woman. Lastly, There is no necessity that the words In the day be taken so strictly, we may understand them more largely; viz. At what time thou shalt eat thereof, know assuredly, that thou shalt die the death. As Solomon says to Shimei, On the day thou goest out, and passest over the Brook Kidron, thou shalt know for certain that thou shalt surely die, 1 Kings 2. 37. It could not be Solomon's Meaning, that Shimei should surely die the very same day that he passed over Kidron; for he could not foresee that Shimei would return to Jerusalem the self same day, or that word would be brought to him the self same day that he had passed over; he only tells Shimei, that if he should pass over, he would forfeit his Life, and be certainly put to Death, whensoever he should please to give order for the execution of the Sentence.  
Therefore, notwithstanding the forementioned Objection, we may conclude, that Adam was to die that Death which we call the Death of the Body, or a natural Death: and thus far Mr. Lock is in the right. The Question is, Whether he be in the right, when he says that by the Death threatened Gen. 2. 17. he can understand nothing but this Death. What thinks he of a Death of Afflictions, outward Sufferings and Calamities? May not this be comprehended under the word Death, Gen. 2.? Is not the Word Death taken in this Sense in other places of Scripture? When S. Paul says of himself, that he was in Deaths oft, may we not interpret it in Sufferings oft? See 2 Cor. 11. 23. In like manner, when he says 1 Cor. 15. 31. I die daily, may we not suppose that he had respect to the Afflictions and Sufferings that came daily upon him for the sake of Christ? But most plainly the Word is thus to be understood Exod. 10. 17. where Pharaoh says to Moses and Aaron, Entreat the Lord your God, that he may take away from me this Death only. Here by Death is understood nothing but the Plague of Locusts. With respect to these Afflictions and Calamities, one says, Incipimus enim, si forte nescis, tum mori, cum primum incipimus vivere, & mors cum vita protenditur. And thus Adam begun to die, i.e. to be liable to the Afflictions and Miseries of Life, that very day that he sinned.  
But Mr. Lock informs us more particularly what he cannot understand by Death Genesis 2. saying, 1. Some will have it to be a state of Gild, wherein not only he, but all his Posterity, was so involved, that every one descended of him deserved endless torment in Hell-fire. 2. They would have it be also a state of necessary sinning, and provoking God in every Action that Men do: see Reasonab. of Christianity, p. 4, 5. whereas he cannot subscribe to either of these significations of the Word Death. But I must acknowledge myself so ignorant, as not to know the Authors of these two Interpretations. It would have been more satisfaction to his Readers, if Mr. Lock had given us the Names of them, together with their express Words, and directed us to the places where we might have found them. But he not having done this, it cannot be expected that any notice should be taken of what he says concerning them. There are who say, that by Death, Gen. 2. we are to understand not only that natural Death, and that Death of external Afflictions and Sufferings of which we have spoken, but also a spiritual Death, (so they call the loss of so much of the Image of God as consisted in perfect Righteousness and true Holiness, and of that Light and Strength which Adam had before his Fall,) and likewise of everlasting Death. They conceive that all these are comprehended under the Penalty threatened Gen. 2. And if Mr. Lock had disputed against these, I should perhaps have considered his Arguments. It may be said, that he doth argue against those who make everlasting Death to be comprehended in that Threatening; for, that which we call eternal Death, he calls eternal Life in Misery. His words are these: It seems a strange way of understanding a Law, which requires the plainest and directest words, that by Death should be meant eternal Life in Misery. Can any one be supposed by a Law that says for Felony you shall die, not that he should lose his Life, but be kept alive in perpetual exquisite Torments. Thus Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 5. labouring to expose those who make a double Death both of Body and Soul, not only temporal but also eternal, to be threatened to Adam; but it cannot be said that he argues against them, for here is nothing that looks like an Argument. 1. He says, It is strange that by Death should be meant eternal Life in Misery; but instead of Eternal Life in Misery, he should have said Eternal Death in Misery; for a Life in perpetual exquisite Torments and Misery, is more truly a Death than a Life. The Margin of our Bibles, Gen. 2. 17. instead of Thou shalt surely die, hath, Dying thou shalt die; which Words seem very properly to express men's dying everlastingly. 2. I cannot say that he doth say, but I believe that he would have said, that he who says for Felony thou shalt die, cannot be supposed to mean (not that he should lose his Life, but) that he should be kept alive in perpetual exquisite Torments. But the cases are not parallel, for they that expound the Words Thou shalt surely die, of a double Death, say that he should both lose or departed out of this present Life, and also after his Departure suffer those perpetual exquisite Torments. Besides, an earthly Lawgiver, who can only kill the body, when he says Thou shalt die, cannot be supposed to mean that the Person should suffer such Torments; but it cannot be inferred hence, that when the heavenly Lawgiver, who after he hath killed is able to destroy both Soul and Body in Hell, says Thou shall die, he may not fitly be supposed to threaten Eternal Death as well as Temporal.  
But that which gives greatest Offence is still behind; and that is, that he describes that which we call a natural or temporal Death, not only by losing all actions of Lise and Sense, but also by ceasing to be. His words are these; By Death here I can understand nothing but ceasing to be, the losing of all actions of Life and Sense, see Reasonab. of Christian. p. 6. And so again p. 15. This being the case, that whoever is guilty of any Sin should certainly die, and cease to be. That when Men die their Bodies lose all actions of Life and Sense, we need not be told; but ceasing to be is a quite different thing, and according to the known sense of the words can signify nothing but the being annihilated. It will therefore concern Mr. Lock to find out some other Sense of the Words which we know not of, for it seems very strange that he should make Death an Annihilation.  
When Mr. Lock says, that none are truly punished but for their own deeds, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 9 we may gather from that which immediately follows, that his Meaning is, that there will be no Condemnation to any one, at the great Judgement, but for his own Deeds; but that Persons have suffered otherwise for the Sins of others, there are sundry Instances in Holy Writ, and Mr. Lock here alleges the Words of the Apostle, affirming that in Adam all die.    

CHAP. XVI. Of the Law of Nature, and of Moses' Law.  
THe Law of Nature is a Law knowable by the Light of Nature; i. e. without the help of positive Revelation. It is something that we may attain to the knowledge of, by our natural Faculties, from natural Principles: Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 1. c. 3. §. 13. The existence of God is so many ways manifest, and the Obedience we own him so congruous to the Light of Reason, that a great part of Mankind give Testimony to the Law of Nature: Ibid. §. 6. Every Christian, both as a Deist, and as a Christian, is obliged to study both the Law of Nature and the revealed Law, that in them he may know the Will of God, and of Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. Second Vindication, p. 77. The Civil and Ritual part of the Law delivered by Moses obliges not Christians, tho' to the Jews it were a part of the Law of Works; it being a part of the Law of Nature, that Man ought to obey every positive Law of God, whenever he shall please to make any such Addition to the Law of his Nature. But the moral part of Moses' Law, or the moral Law, (which is every where the same, the eternal Rule of Right) obliges Christians, and all Men, every where, and is to all Men the standing Law of Works: Reasonab of Christian. p. 21, 22. No one Precept or Rule of the eternal Law of Right, which is holy, just and good, is abrogated or repealed, nor indeed can be, whilst God is an holy, just and righteous God, and Man a rational Creature. The duties of that Law arising from the Constitution of his very Nature, are of eternal obligation; and it cannot be taken away, or dispensed with, without changing the nature of things, and overturning the Measures of Right and Wrong: Ibid. p. 214. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
It is known to be Mr. Lock's darling Notion, That there are no innate Ideas, and no innate Law, and consequently, according to him, the Law of Nature is not innate; but he tells us, that the knowledge of it is attained by the light of Nature, or by our natural Faculties from natural Principles. But I would ask him, Whence we have these natural Principles, from which, by our natural Faculties, we attain to the Knowledge of the Law of Nature; for he denies all innate Principles. Will he say then, that we own them to the Superstition of a Nurse, or the Authority of an Old Woman, or our Educations? for these he mentions Essay, l. 1. c. 3. §. 22. and 26. where he is giving an account how Men commonly come by their Principles. If he say this, I would know why he calls those which are taught us by Old Women, or our Nurses, Parents, and Schoolmasters, natural Principles. If Mr. Lock please to satisfy us as to these Queries, I may possibly farther consider his Description of the Law of Nature.  
Farther, I believe that there have been many that have not made use of the Light of Reason, and the natural Faculties which God hath given them, as they should have done, and withal have not had the advantage of any Revelation, or of being taught, who yet have had some Knowledge of the Duties and Dictates of the Law of Nature, and have assented to them as just and good, as soon as they were proposed to them.    

CHAP. XVII. Of Natural and Revealed Religion, or of the Light of Reason, and that of Revelation.  
IT is not to be wondered, that the Will of God, when clothed in words, should be liable to that Doubt and Uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of Conveyance. And we ought to magnify his Goodness, that he hath spread before all the World such legible Characters of his Works and Providence, and given all Mankind so sufficient a light of Reason, that they to whom this written Word never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) either doubt of the being of a God, or of the Obedience due to him. Since then the Precepts of Natural Religion are plain and very intelligible to all Mankind, and seldom come to be controverted, and other revealed Truths which are conveyed to us by Books and Languages, are liable to the common and natural Obscurities incident to Words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own Sense and Interpretations of the latter. Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 3. c. 9 §. 23. Whatsoever Truth we come to the discovery of from the Knowledge and Contemplation of our own clear Ideas, will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation: for the Knowledge we have that this Revelation came from God, can never be so sure as the Knowledge that we have from our own clear and distinct Ideas. The History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings which had their Original from Revelation; and yet no body, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood as Noah that saw it, or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater Assurance than that of his Senses, that it is writ in the Book supposed writ by Moses inspired; but he has not so great an Assurance that Moses writ that Book, as if he had seen Moses write it; so that the assurance of its being a Revelation is less still than the assurance of his Senses. Ibid. l. 4. c. 18. §. 4. A man ought to hearken to Reason, even in immediate and original Revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself; but to all those who pretend not to immediate Revelation, but are required to pay Obedience, and to receive the Truths revealed to others, which by the Tradition of Writings or Word of Mouth are conveyed down to them, Reason hath a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. Ibid. §. 6. Whatsoever is divine Revelation, aught to overrule our Opinions, Prejudices, and Interests. Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true, no doubt can be made of it. But whether it be a divine Revelation or no, Reason must judge, which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence for that which is less evident, or preser less Certainty to the greater. There can be no Evidence that any Traditional Revelation is of divine Original in the words we receive it, and in the Sense we understand it, so clear and so certain, as those of the Principles of Reason. Ibid. §. 10. No Proposition can be received for divine Revelation, or obtain the Assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge. Ibid. §. 5. No Proposition can be received for divine Revelation, which is contradictory to a self-evident Proposition. The Third Letter, p. 230. Give me leave to ask your Lordship, Whether where there be Propositions, of whose Truth you have certain Knowledge, you can receive any Proposition for divine Revelation which contradicts that Certainty. Ibid. p. 218. There is one sort of Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our Assent upon bare Testimony, whether the thing proposed agree with common Experience and the ordinary Course of things or no. The Reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive or be deceived; and that is of God himself. This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar Name, Revelation; and our Assent to it, Faith, which has as much Certainty as our knowledge itself, and we may as well doubt of our own Being as we can whether any Revelation from God be true. Only we must be sure that it be a Divine Revelation, and that we understand it right. Essay, l. 4. c. 16. §. 14. I think it is possible to be certain upon the Testimony of God, where I know it is the Testimony of God. The third Letter, p. 133. All Divine Revelation requires the Obedience of Faith, and all the parts of it are to be received with a Docility and disposition prepared to embrace and assent to all Truth's coming from God. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 302. Natural Religion, in its full extent, was not where that I know taken care of by the force of natural Reason. It should seem that 'tis too hard a thing for unassisted Reason to establish Morality, in all its parts, upon its true Foundation, with a clear and convincing Light. Ibid. p. 268. 'Tis no diminishing to Revelation, that Reason gives it Suffrage too to the Truth's Revelation has discovered. The Apostles delivered no Precepts, but such, as tho' Reason of itself had not clearly made out, yet it could not but assent to when thus discovered, and think itself indebted for the Discovery. Ibid. p. 281, 284. I gratefully receive and rejoice in the Light of Revelation, which sets me at rest in many things, the manner whereof my poor Reason can by no means make out to me. I readily believe what ever God has declared, tho' my Reason find Difficulties in it which I cannot master. The Third Letter, p. 443, 444. Though the Light of Nature gave some obscure glimmering, some uncertain hopes of a Future state; yet humane Reason could attain to no Clearness, no Certainty about it, but it was Jesus Christ alone who brought Life and Immortality to light through the Gospel. Ibid. p. 439. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Every one must observe how much Mr. Lock in his Essay, speaks on the behalf of Natural Religion; telling us, that the Precepts of it are plain and very intelligible to all Mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; whereas (says he) revealed Truths are liable to the common and Natural Obscurities and Difficulties incident to Words, and therefore he recommends the Precepts of natural Religion to our careful and diligent observation. God (says he farther) hath spread before all Mankind such legible Characters of his Works and Providence, and given them so sufficient a Light of Reason, that they to whom this written Word never came could not (whenever they set themselves to search) doubt of the being of a God. Thus Mr. Lock.  
But how doth this last, that they could not doubt of the Being of a God, agree with that which he says other where (viz. Essay. l. 1. c. 4. §. 8.) concerning the Atheists among the Ancients, and those at the Bay of Soldamia in Brasil, etc. who (if he might be believed) had not as much as any Notion of a Deity? Mr. Lock perhaps will say of them of the Bay of Soldamia and Brasil, that they did not set themselves to search: but surely he will not say this of those reputed Atheists that were anciently, among the inquisitive Greeks. In like manner, how can Mr. Lock say that the points of natural Religion were so seldom controverted? Were there no Controversies among the ancient Greeks about things relating to Ethics or Morality, as well as about those that appertained to other parts of Philosophy? Were not the several Sects of Philosophers divided about these things as well as about others? Will he say that there were no Controversies among the inquisitive Heathen, about the Nature and Immortality of the Soul, and that the sufficient Light of Reason (of which he speaks) made all clear as to this? No; for contrariwise, he tells us, that Cicero enumerates several Opinions of the Philosophers about it, and also how uncertain Cicero himself was about it, and that Christ alone brought Immortality to light: See the Third Letter, p. 438, 439. So as to Man's chief Good or Happiness, were there no Controversies, no diversity of Opinions, about that? Doth not the same Cicero, Tuscul. Quaest l. 5. vers. fin. take notice of the various Sentiments about it? Yea, doth not Varro apud S. August. de Civit. Dei, l. 19 c. 1. speak of two hundred eighty eight Sects or several Opinions concerning it? I might add, That the legible Characters of God's Works and Providence spread before all the World (of which Mr. Lock speaks) have not prevented all Controversies among Heathens about God himself; and therefore Cicero, in the very beginning of his Books de Natura Deorum, takes notice of the different Opinions about that Subject; De qua tam variae sunt doctissimorum hominum, tamque discrepantes sententiae, etc. I may conclude therefore, that we have little reason to say that the Principles and Precepts of Natural Religion are so plain and very intelligible to all Mankind, and so little controverted, as Mr. Lock would make them to be.  
And we have as little reason to be satisfied with that which Mr. Lock says of the Obscurity of the Truths of Revealed Religion. His only reason here is, because they are conveyed to us by Books and Languages, and so liable to the common and natural Obscurities and Difficulties incident to Words. And so a little before, that it is not to be wondered that the Will of God, when clothed in Words, should be liable to that Doubt and Uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of Conveyance, Essay, l. 3. c. 10. §. 23. So then, according to Mr. Lock, Doubt and Uncertainty, Obscurities and Difficulties, unavoidably attend Words; they are not only common, but even natural to them. And so all the Will of God, all Revealed Truths, since they are conveyed by Words, according to him, are obscure, difficult, and uncertain. So that Love God and Love thy Neighbour, Fast and Pray, Do as you would be done unto, would have been, according to him, dark or obscure Instructions, if they had all of them been revealed only, and none of them also Precepts of the Law of Nature. So Love your Enemies, Bless them that curse you, Do good to them that hate you, Pray for them that persecute you, and Blessed are ye when men shall reproach and persecute you, and speak all evil against you fulsly for my sake, for great is your reward in Heaven; are all dark and obscure. Yea finally, all that Mr. Lock hath writ is obscure, if this be true, that Doubt and Uncertainty, Obscurity and Difficulty, do unavoidably attend Words, and are natural to them; for in Writing he makes use of Words. Doth not Mr. Lock himself confute this Notion concerning the Obscurity of Words, when he faith that Christ brought Life and Immortality to light by the Gospel? (see his Third Letter, p. 439.) for Christ and his Apostles made use of Words in preaching the Gospel, as the Evangelists also did in writing it. And when (Ibid. p. 443.) he so gratefully received and rejoiced in the Light of Revelation, I suppose he did not judge Revealed Truths to be so dark and obscure as he did when he writ his Essay. If any would be satisfied about the Law of Nature, and that of Scripture, and the Plainness or Clearness of them, I should advise them to read Mr. Hooker Eccles. Pol. l. 1. §. 12.  
As to the Question, Whether, and how far, Reason is to judge of Revelation, we need not dispute it, since now there is no new Revelation expected, and it is certain that nothing which is already revealed in Holy Writ is contrary to Reason. As to Mr. Lock, he expresses himself very variously in this matter: as, 1. No Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge, Essay, l. 4. c. 18. §. 5. 2. Nothing that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason, has a Right to be urged or assented to as a matter of Faith. Ibid. §. 10. 3. No Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation, which is contradictory to a self-evident Proposition. The Third Letter, p. 230. Perhaps he will say that Contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge, and to the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason, and to a self-evident Proposition, are in effect the same, only different Expressions of the same thing. To which I answer; Suppose it be so, yet if, descending to Particulars, we are uncertain whether such or such Propositions be self-evident or no, of what Use is this Rule to us? According to some, such Propositions are self-evident; but others will not allow that they are: as for instance, this, that the essential Properties of a Man are to reason and discourse, which others reckon among self evident Propositions, yea Maxims, is flatly denied to be such by Mr. Lock in his Third Letter, p. 263.  
Mr. Lock, in his Essay, l. 4. c. 18. §. 3. distinguishes between Original and Traditional Revelation. The former he also calls Immediate, because it is revealed immediately by God; the latter is that which is delivered over to others by Word or Writing. He also tells us (Ibid. §. 6.) that a Man ought to hearken to Reason even in Immediate and Original Revelation, and in Traditional Reason hath a great deal more to do. But I would ask him, Whether Abraham ought to have harkened to Reason in that Revelation concerning the offering Isaac. It was Faith, (Heb. 11. 17.) not Reason, that induced him to receive it as a Divine Revelation. Had he consulted Reason, that would have told him positively, that it could not come from God, since it commanded that which was so clearly forbidden, not only by the Laws which God himself had given to Noah, and before him to Adam, but also by the Law of Nature. There could not be any thing more contradictory to the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason, than this Injunction which Abraham so readily obeyed was.  
In his Essay, l. 4. c. 18. §. 4. he hath these Words; No body, I think, will say that he has as certain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood as Noah that saw it, or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and seen it. And I readily grant, that no Man, who understands what he says, will affirm that he has as clear a Knowledge of the Flood, and of the Circumstances of it in every Particular, as Noah had that saw it: but this I shall be bold to say, that I know not but that there may be some who as firmly and certainly believe that there was such a Flood as is described in the Book of Genesis, as if they had been then alive and seen it; as I hope that there may now be some of those blessed ones, who though they have not, with the Apostle Thomas, seen the Print of the Nails, yet do as certainly and firmly believe our Lord's Resurrection, as if they had seen it.  
In the same Essay, l. 4. c. 16. §. 14. he writes thus, The Testimony of God is called by a peculiar Name Revelation, and our Assent to it Faith, which has as much Certainly as our Knowledge itself. Where I would have these last Words observed, Faith has as much Certainty as our Knowledge in self, because otherwhere Mr. Lock denies all Certainty of Faith.    

CHAP. XVIII. Of Mysteries, or Things above Reason.  
I Wish I could say there were no Mysteries in the Holy Scripture: I acknowledge there are to me, and I fear always will be. Mr. Lock, in his First Letter, p. 226, 227. Things are distinguished into those that are according to, above, and contrary to Reason. 1. According to Reason are such Propositions whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those Ideas we have from Sensation and Reflection, and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above Reason are such Propositions whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles. 3. Contrary to Reason are such Propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct Ideas. Thus, the Existence of one God, is according to Reason; the Existence of more than one God, contrary to Reason; the Resurrection of the Body after Death, above Reason. Above Reason also may be taken in a double Sense; viz. above Probability, and above Certainty, and in that large Sense also, contrary to Reason, is, I suppose, sometimes taken, Essay, l. 4. c. 17. §. 23. There being many things wherein we have very imperfect Notions or none at all, and other things of whose past, present, or future Existence, by the natural Use of our Faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all; these are beyond the Discovery of our natural Faculties and above Reason, and Reason hath directly nothing to do with them. Thus, that part of the Angels rebelled against God, and therefore lost their first happy Estate, and, that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again; these, and the like, are beyond the Discoveries of Reason. Ibid. c. 18. §. 7.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Mr. Lock, in his Second Letter, complains that he is joined with Unitarians, and the Author of Christianity not mysterious, p. 7. and that therefore the World would be apt to think that he is the Person who argues against the Trinity, and denies Mysteries, p. 24. Wherefore that he might clear himself from this latter Imputation of denying Mysteries, he says, That there are Mysteries in Holy Scripture to him, and he fears that there always will be. But if hereby he only means, that there are some things in Scripture hard to be understood, and which he fears he shall never understand, I know not but that the Author of Christianity not mysterious may say the same.  
However, he distinguisheth very well of things according to, above, and contrary to Reason; but when in his Essay, l. 4. c. 18. §. 7. he had reckoned this, that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again, among things above Reason; in his Third Letter, p. 210. he tells us, that in the next Edition of his Essay he shall change these words, The Bodies of Men shall rise, into these, The dead shall rise. But I shall take farther notice of this, when I reflect upon his Doctrine of the Resurrection.    

CHAP. XIX. Of the Law of Works, and the Law of Faith; also of Justification.  
THE Law of Works, is that Law which requires perfect Obedience without any Remission or Abatement; so that by that Law, a Man cannot be just, or justified, without an exact performance of every tittle. The Language of this Law is, Do this and live, Transgress and die; no Dispensation, no Atonement. Under the Law of Works is comprehended also the Law of Nature, as well as the Law given by Moses. Nay, whatever God requires any where to be done without making any allowance for Faith, that is a part of the Law of Works. So the forbidding Adam to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, was part of the Law of Works. The Civil and Ritual part of the Law delivered by Moses, was to the Jews a part of the Law of Works; but the moral part of Moses' Law, or the Moral Law, obliges all Men every where, and is to all Men the standing Law of Works. But Christian Believers have the Privilege to be under the Law of Faith too, which is that Law whereby God justifies a Man for believing, though by his Works he be not just and righteous; i. e. though he come short of perfect Obedience to the Law of Works. God alone does or can justify or make just those who by their Works are not so; which he doth, by counting their Faith for Righteousness, i. e. for a complete Performance of the Law. The Difference between the Law of Works and the Law of Faith, is only this; that the Law of Works makes no allowance for failing on any occasion. Those that obey are righteous, those that in any part disobey are unrighteous, and must not expect Life, the reward of Righteousness. But by the Law of Faith, Faith is allowed to supply the defect of full Obedience, and so the Believers are admitted to Life and Immortality as if they were righteous. Were there no Law of Works, there could be no Law of Faith. For there could be no need of Faith which should be counted to Men for Righteousness, if there were no Law to be the Rule and Measure of Righteousness which Men failed in their obedience to. Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22. The Rule therefore of the Covenant of Works was never abolished, tho' the rigour were abated. The Duties enjoined in it were Duties still. Their Obligations never ceased. Ibid. p. 225. The Law of Faith is for every one to believe what God requires him to believe, as a Condition of the Covenant he makes with him, and not to doubt of the Performance of his Promise. Ibid. p. 24, 25. Righteousness or an exact Obedience to the Law, seems, by the Scripture to have a Claim of Right to Eternal Life. Ibid. p. 11.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Mr. Lock, who thinks it our Duty, as far as we deliver any thing for Revelation, to keep close to the Words of the Scripture, (see his third Letter, p. 210.) doth not observe his own Rule when he says, that God justifies a Man for believing; this not being the Scripture-Language, as far as I remember. We are often said to be justified by Faith, and if he will also, just by Faith, as Faith is oft said to be impated to Men for Righteousness, and God is styled the justifier of him that believes; but I do not find that the Scripture useth these Words, that he is the justifier of any Man for believing.  
Having said that exact Obedience to the Law seems to have a Claim of Right to eternal Life, Mr. Lock alleges for it Rom. 4. 4. and Revel. 22. 14. see his Reasonab. of Christian. p. 11. In Rom. 4. 4. 'tis said, To him that worketh the reward is not reckoned of grace, but of debt. In Rev. 22. 14. the Words in our Translation are Blessed are they that do his Commandments, that they may have right to the tree of Life. Mr. Lock adds in the same Character, Which is in the Paradise of God; but nothing of this is in the Text. Besides the Word that is here translated Right is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which (as is well known) signifies Licence or Power, as well as Right, and not only by the Vulgar, but also by the Syriack, Arabic, and Aethhiopic, it is rendered Power. And this Signification agrees exactly with the Text, Blessed are they that do his Commandments, that they may have Power or Licence to eat of the tree of Life. In this place therefore there is nothing concerning any Claim of Right, and consequently it is not at all to the purpose: I might have added, that Mr. Lock speaks of exact Obedience to the Law, and perhaps he would not find it an easy matter to prove that by Doing his Commandments here is meant such exact unsinning Obedience. But tho' Rev. 22. 14. will not prove his Claim of Right, yet if he use those words in a larger sense, as they may denote a Right by Promise, I do not deny that his former Text, viz. Rom. 4. 4. may prove it. To him that worketh, the reward (which God is supposed to have promised in the Covenant of Works) is reckoned as debt; he may lay claim to it as his Right by virtue of that Promise. But if he take them in the strict sense, as if exact Obedience had properly merited the Reward, and might have claimed it of Right, tho' no such Promise or Covenant had intervened, he will hardly prove that from Rom. 4. Yea our Saviour seems to have determined very plainly against such a Claim, S. Luke. 17. 10. When ye shall have done all things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which was our duty to do.    

CHAP. XX. Of Faith in general.  
FAith is nothing else but an Assent founded upon the highest Reason. Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 4. c. 16. §. 14. The Matter of Faith being only Divine Revelation, and nothing else, Faith, as we use the Word (called commonly Divine Faith) has to do with no Propositions but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who make Revelation alone the sole Object of Faith, can say that it is a matter of Faith and not of Reason, to believe that such or such a Proposition, to be found in such or such a Book, is of divine Inspiration; unless it be revealed that that Proposition, or all in that Book, was communicated by divine Inspiration. Without such a Revelation, the believing or not believing that Proposition or Book to be of divine Authority, can never be matter of Faith, but matter of Reason, and such as I must come to the Assent to only by the use of my Reason. Things beyond the discovery of our natural Faculties, and above Reason, are, when revealed, the proper matter of Faith. Whatever Proposition is revealed, of whose truth our Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions, cannot judge, that is purely matter of Faith. Where the Principles of Reason have not evidenced a Proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, and ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may be matter of Faith. Ibid. c. 18. §. 6, 7, 9 Faith has as much Certainty as our Knowledge itself. Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation. Essay, l. 4. c. 16. §. 14. To talk of the Certainty of Faith, seems all one to me, as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing; a way of speaking, not easy to me to understand. Bring Faith to Certainty, and it ceases to be Faith. When it is brought to Certainty, Faith is destroyed; 'tis Knowledge then, and Faith no longer. The Second Letter, p. 95, 96. My Bible, Heb. 10. 22. expresses the highest degree of Faith, which the Apostle recommended to Believers in his time, by Full Assurance. I find my Bible speaks of the Assurance of Faith, but no where, that I can remember, of the Certainty of Faith; though in many places it speaks of the Certainty of Knowledge; and therefore I speak so too, and shall not, I think, be condemned for keeping close to the Expressions of our Bible. The Third Letter, p. 122, 123. I say with Mr. Chillingworth, c. 6. §. 3. that I do hearty acknowledge and believe the Articles of our Faith to be in themselves Truths, as certain and infallible, as the very common Principles of Geometry and Metaphysics. But that there is not required of us a Knowledge of them, and an Adherence to them, as certain as that of Sense or Science; and that for this Reason, (among others given both by Mr. Chillingworth and Mr. Hooker) viz. that Faith is not Knowledge, no more than three is four, but eminently contained in it: so that he that knows believes, and something more; but he that believes, many times does not know; nay, if he doth barely and merely believe, he doth never know. These are Mr. Chillingworth's own Words, c. 6. §. 2. That this Assurance of Faith may approach very near to Certainty, and not come short of it in a sure and steady influence on the Mind, I have so plainly declared (Essay, l. 4. c. 17. §. 16.) that no body, I think, can question it. There I say of some Propositions wherein Knowledge (i. e. in my sense, Certainty) fails us, that their Probability is so clear and strong, that Assent as necessarily follows it, as Knowledge doth Demonstration, Ibid. p. 124. Herein lies the Difference between Probability and Certainty, Faith and Knowledge; that in all the parts of Knowledge there is Intuition, each immediate Idea, each Step, has its visible and certain Connexion; in Belief, not so; Essay, l. 4. c. 15. §. 3. To say that Believing and Knowing stand upon the same grounds, would be, I think, to say that Probability and Demonstration are the same thing. The Third Letter, p. 223. He that says he barely believes, acknowledges that he assents to a Proposition as true, upon bare Probability, Ibid. p. 159. I think it is possible to be certain upon the Testimony of God, where I know that it is the Testimony of God; because in such a case, that Testimony is capable not only to make me believe, but, if I consider it right, to make me know the thing to be so: and so I may be certain. For the Veracity of God is as capable of making me know a Proposition to be true, as any other way of Proof can be; and therefore I do not in such a case barely believe, but know, such a Proposition to be true, and attain Certainty. Ibid. p. 133. Faith, as contradistinguished to Reason, is the Assent to any Proposition not made out by the Deductions of Reason, but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming immediately from God. Essay, l. 4. c. 18. §. 2. Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind, which, if it be regulated as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reason, and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies, and seeks not Truth as he ought. Ibid. c. 17. §. 24. Where I want evidence of things, there yet is ground enough for me to believe, because God hath said it. The First Letter, p. 227. S. Paul, in his Epistles, often puts Faith for the whole Duty of a Christian. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 199. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
When Mr. Lock says that the Matter or Object of Faith is only Divine Revelation, and nothing else, if by Divine Revelation be meant the whole Scripture, the Historical part of it together with the rest (for all Scripture is given by the Inspiration of God, 2 Tim. 3. 16. writ by Men inspired and guided by his infallible Spirit) it is very true. And as to that which he infers, that then it cannot be said, that it is matter of Faith and not of Reason, to believe that such or such a Proposition to be sound in such or such a Book is of Divine Inspiration, unless it be revealed that that Proposition or all in that Book was communicated by Divine Inspiration, we need not contend much with him about it, since in the place just now alleged viz. 2 Tim. 3. 16. we have a Divine Testimony or Revelation that all the Books of Scripture which were writ and received before the writing of the Second Epistle to Timothy (which as is concluded by all was writ very late) are divinely inspired.  
Mr. Lock sometimes saith, that Faith hath as much Certainly as our Knowledge itself, and that it leaves no manner of Doubt or Hesitation; yet other where he declaims against the Certainty of Faith. Now I would know how he can reconcile himself to himself in this. He says that to talk of the Certainty of Faith seems all one as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing, that Certainty destroys Faith, when it is brought to Certainty Faith is destroyed, 'tis Knowledge then and Faith no longer. For to him to know and be certain is the same thing (see his Second Letter, p. 93.) and Certainty the same thing with Knowledge; see his Third Letter, p. 122. Now if this be so, if Certainty and Knowledge are the same thing, then as he says, that to talk of the Certainty of Faith seems all one as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing; so he might have said, that to talk of the Certainty of Knowledge seems all one as to talk of the Knowledge of Knowing, and that to talk of certain Knowledge seems all one as to talk of known Knowing; a way of speaking not easy to be understood. Yea, as often as Mr. Lock useth these Expressions Certainty of Knowledge and Certain Knowledge, so oft he confutes this Fancy of his, that Knowledge and Certainty are the same thing. As when we say a certain Persuasion or a certain Truth, these Expressions imply that there may be a Persuasion or a Truth not so certain; so when we say Certain Knowledge, it seems to imply that there may be a Knowledge not so certain. And so when Mr. Lock says, We certainly know, and We have a more certain Knowledge, Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 6. doth he not plainly imply, that there is a Knowledge less certain? So that it is clear from his own Expreshons that Knowledge and Certainty are not the same thing. But that which I chief desire to know is, How Mr. Lock will reconcile his denying Certainty to Faith with his saying that Faith hath as much Certainty as our Knowledge itself.  
Whereas, Mr. Lock, says that he finds his Bible speaks of the Assurance of Faith, but no where that he can remember of the Certainty of Faith; I desire that he would please to let us know the difference between Assurance and Certainty, or between Full Assurance and Certainty. As to the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Heb. 10. 22. which is translated Full Assurance, I suppose the Translators (if they had pleased) might have rendered it Full Certainty, or Full Persuasion, or Certain Persuasion, as Erasmus and others render it by Certitudo.  
As Mr. Lock craves leave to use the Words of Mr. Chillingworth, so he ought to crave his Reader's Pardon for not transcribing his Words so largely as he ought to have done. For though it sufficiently appears from so much as he hath cited from him, that Mr. Chillingworth makes against, and not for him; yet it would have been more apparent, if he had alleged him more fully. Mr. Chillingworth, as Mr. Lock citys him, says, that there is not required of us a Knowledge of the Articles of Faith, and an Adherence to them as certain as that of Sense or Science. In which Words, if by an Adherence to them be meant an Assent to or Belief of them, Certainty is plainly ascribed to Belief or Faith, (which Mr. Lock will not allow) though not a Certainty equal to that of Sense or Science. But let us take a view of Mr. Chillingworth's Words at large; I do (says he) hearty acknowledge and believe the Articles of our Faith to be in themselves Truths as certain and insallible, as the very common Principles of Geometry and Metaphysics. But that there is required of us a Knowledge of them, or an Adherence to them, as certain as that of Sense or Science; that such a Certainty is required of us under pain of Damnation, so that no Man can hope to be in the state of Salvation but he that finds in himself such a degree of Faith, such a strength of Adherence: this I have already demonstrated to be a great Error, and of dangerous and pernicious Consequence. Thus Mr. Chillingworth, c. 6. §. 3. We see now, what it is that this great Man saith; viz. That a Certainty equal to that of Sense or Science is not required of all Men under pain of Damnation, so that no Man can be in a state of Salvation that hath it not. But God may grant that degree of Certainty to some which he doth not require under pain of Damnation of all.  
Mr. Lock farther tells us, that there is not required of us a Knowledge of the Articles of our Faith, and an Adherence to them as certain as that of Sense or Science, and that for this reason among others; viz. that Faith is not Knowledge, no more than Three is Four, but eminently contained in it; so that he that knows believes, and something more, but he that believes many times does not know; nay, if he doth barely and merely believe, he doth never know. These are Mr. Chillingworth's own words. Thus Mr. Lock. And I grant that the words Faith is not Knowledge, etc. are Mr. Chillingworth's; but these, And that for this reason among others, are not his, but Mr. Lock's own. Mr. Chillingworth would never have offered such a Reason to prove that there is not required of us a Knowledge of the Articles of our Faith, and an Adherence to them as certain as that of Sense and Science. He, and other worthy Men of our Church who writ in his time, were not wont to argue so loosely; and withal, he gives it as a Reason of something else: see him cap. 6. §. 2. There every one may also see, that when he says Faith is not Knowledge, he takes the word Knowledge in a different Sense from that in which he takes it §. 3. where he speaks of the Knowledge of the Articles of our Faith. When he speaks of Knowledge of the Articles of Faith, he, by Knowledge, understands only an Apprehension or Belief; but when he says Faith is not Knowledge, he takes the Word properly and exactly in the Sense in which he uses the Word Science. By this time Mr. Lock may see what the Task is that he hath set himself; viz. He is to prove this Consequence, Faith is not Knowledge, therefore there is not required of us under pain of Damnation, an Apprehension or Belief of the Articles of Faith as certain as that of Sense or Science.  
But, since Mr. Lock mentions Mr. Hooker together with Mr. Chillingworth, as if they countenanced his Notion of Faith and Certainty; I have considered that which they say of this Matter, and find that he hath no countenance at all from those excellent Persons. He makes Knowledge and Certainty to be the same thing, and Faith to be only Probability: let him show where either Mr. Hooker or Mr. Chillingworth doth either of these. He distinguishes between Assurance and Certainty; yea, he makes full Assurance of Faith to come short of Certainty: I would know where those excellent Persons do this. He ridicules the Certainty of Faith, but Mr. Hooker and Mr. Chillingworth ascribe a Certainty to Faith. They both of them speak of a Certainty of Evidence, and a Certainty of Adherence; and when Mr. Hooker (in his Sermon upon Heb. 1. 4.) says, that this Certainty of Adherence is greater in us than the other, he plainly implies, that both the one and the other Certainty is in us, but not both in the same degree. And as to Mr. Chillingworth, when he says of this Hypothesis, that all the Articles of our Faith were revealed by God, we cannot ordinarily have any rational or acquired Certainty more than moral, (see him c. 1. §. 8.) he grants that we may have a moral Certainty of that Hypothesis. But §. 9 he adds, Yet this I say not, as if I doubted that the Spirit of God being implored by devout and humble Prayer and sincere Obedience, may and will, by degrees, advance his Servants higher, and give them a Certainty of Adherence beyond their Certainty of Evidence. But what God gives as a reward to Believers is one thing, and what he requires of all Men, as their duty, is another; and what he will accept of, out of Grace and Favour, is yet another. To those that believe, and live according to their Faith, he gives by degrees the Spirit of Obsignation and Confirmation, which makes them know (though how they know not) what they did but believe: and to be as fully and resolutely assured of the Gospel of Christ, as those which heard it from Christ himself with their ears, which saw it with their eyes, which looked upon it, and whose hands handled the Word of Life. If Mr. Lock will say thus much with Mr. Chillingworth, more will not be required of him.  
I said that Mr. Lock makes Faith to be only Probability; and I have in this Chapter transcribed sundry Passages from him which make this out. Herein lies the Difference between Probability and Certainty, Faith and Knowledge, says he in Essay, l. 4. c. 15. §. 3. where as Knowledge is in his Sense Certainty, so Faith is Probability. So again, He (says he) that says he barely believes, acknowledges that he assents to a Proposition, as true, upon bare Probability. And again, To say that Believing and Knowing stand upon the same grounds, is, I think, to s●y that Probability and Demonstration are the same thing. See his Third Letter, p. 159, 223.  
Mr. Lock (in his Third Letter, p. 124.) ha●h these Words: That this Assurance of Faith may approach very near to Certainty, and not come short of it in a sure and steady influence on the Mind; I have so plainly declared (Essay, l. 4. c. 17. §. 16.) that no body, I think, can question it. If you ask in what words he declares it, he tells us, that speaking of some Propositions wherein Knowledge (i. e. in his sense Certainty) fails us, he says, that their Probability is so clear and strong, that Assent as necessarily follows it, as Knowledge does Demonstration. Thus Mr. Lock. But how does he so plainly declare that the Assurance of Faith may approach very near to Certainty, and not come short of it in a sure and steady influence on the Mind, when neither in the Words which he citys, nor in that whole Section out of which he citys them, there is any mention either of the Assurance of Faith, or of Faith itself. He speaks indeed of probable Mediums, the probability of some of which may be so clear and strong, that Assent necessarily follows it; and perhaps he would have us to apply this to the probable Grounds of Faith, for he will not allow the Grounds of Faith to be more than probable. But as he saith of probable Mediums, that they cannot bring us to the lowest degree of Knowledge, so probable Grounds of Faith cannot bring us to the lowest degree of Certainty; and so, according to him, our Faith cannot advance itself above Probability, as was observed before.  
When Mr. Lock says in his Third Letter, p. 133. I think it is possible to be certain upon the Testimony of God, where I know that it is the Testimony of God, should he not rather have said, It is impossible for him who knows that God is true, yea Truth itself, not to be certain upon the Testimony of God, provided he know that it is the Testimony of God? And after all, what is this to us who live now? since, according to Mr. Lock, it is impossible for us (unless we had an immediate Revelation from God himself) to know that it is the Testimony of God; and so by this Proviso he makes it impossible for us (without such an immediate Revelation) to be certain upon the Testimony of God, though we should be supposed to have a certain knowledge of his Veracity.    

CHAP. XXI. Of Abraham's Faith, and the Faith of those that lived before our Saviour's time.  
THE Faith for which God justified Abraham, what was it? It was the believing God when he engaged his Promise in the Covenant he made with him. The Faith which God counted to Abraham for Righteousness, was nothing but a firm Belief of what God declared to him, and a steadfast relying on him for the accomplishment of what he had promised. Abraham believed that tho' he and Sarah were old, and past the time and hopes of Children, yet he should have a Son by her, and by him become the Father of a great People which should possess the Land of Canaan. The thing promised to him was no more but a Son by his Wife Sarah, and a numerous Posterity by him which should possess the Land of Canaan. These were but temporal Blessings and (except the Birth of a Son) very remote, suchas he should never live to see. But because he questioned not the performance of it, but rested fully satisfied in the Goodness, Truth, and Faithfulness of God who had promised, it was counted to him for Righteousness. The Faith whereby those Believers of old (i. e. before our Saviour's time) pleased God, was nothing but a steadfast reliance on the Goodness and Faithfulness of God, for those good things which either the light of Nature or particular Promises had given them grounds to hope for. This was all that was required of them, to be persuaded of and embrace the Promises which they had. They could be persuaded of no more than was proposed to them, embrace no more than was revealed. They had a Belief of the Messiah to come? they believed that God would, according to his Promise, in due time send the Messiah to be a King and Deliverer. All that was required before the Messiah's appearing in the World was, to believe what God had revealed, and to rely with a full Assurance on God for the performance of his Promise, and to believe that in due time he would send them the Messiah, this anointed King, this promised Saviour and Deliverer, according to his Word. Thus Mr. Lock p. 23, 24, 247, 249, 252, 253, 254. of his Reasonab. of Christianity.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Here in Reasonab. of Christian. p. 23. Mr. Lock says, This Faith for which God justified Abraham, as p. 24. he says Ahraham was justified for his Faith, and in like manner p. 22. God justifies a Man for believing: Now (as it was observed above, Chap. 19) this is not the Scripture-Language, he constantly reads in his Bible Justified by Faith, not for it. It may therefore be justly wondered that Mr. Lock, who is so much for keeping close to the Expressions of his Bible, and thinks it our Duty to do it (see his Third Letter, p. 123. and 210.) should affect to say so often that God justifies for Faith. But perhaps he will correct it in his next Edition.  
It is also just matter of Wonder, that he should say, that no more than temporal Blessings were promised to Abraham, and that the Faith which God counted to him for Righteousness was nothing but his believing those Promises, and resting fully satisfied of their Performance; (See Reasonab. of Christian. p. 24. and 249.) especially when speaking of those Believers of old mentioned Heb. 11. (of whom Abraham is one) he says expressly, that they had a Belief of the Messiah to come, and that they believed that God would, according to his Promise, in due time send the Messiah: see Ibid. p. 253, 254. And he that consults the New Testament, will find, that as to the Promise of the Messiah, and the Belief of it, there is more said of Abraham than of the rest. Abraham saw Christ's day, and rejoiced, S. John 8. 56. In thy Seed shall all the Kindred's of the earth be blessed, Act. 3. 25. To Abraham were the Promises made, and to his Seed, which is Christ, Gal. 3. 16.    

CHAP. XXII. Of our Faith under the Gospel.  
THE Belief of one invisible eternal omnipotent God, Maker of Heaven and Earth, etc. was required before the Revelation of the Gospel as well as now. The Gospel was writ to induce Men into a belief of this Proposition, that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah; which if they believed, they should have Life. After his Death, his Resurrection was also commonly required to be believed as a necessary Article, and sometimes solely insisted on. Salvation or Perdition depends upon believing or rejecting this one Proposition, That Jesus was the Messiah. I mean, this is all is required to be believed by those who acknowledge but one eternal and invisible God, the Maker of Heaven and Earth. For, that there is something more required to Salvation besides believing, we shall see hereafter. All that was to be believed for Justification was no more but this single Proposition, that Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ, or the Messiah. This, that Jesus was the Messiah, was all the Doctrine the Apostles proposed to be believed. Above three score years after our Saviour's Passion, S. John knew nothing else required to be believed for the attaining of life, but that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God. Whoever would believe him to be the Saviour promised, and take him now raised from the dead, and constituted the Lord and Judge of all Men, to be their King and Ruler, should be saved. Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 25, 29, 31, 43, 47, 93, 194, 304. That this, that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah, is the sole Doctrine pressed and required to be believed in the whole Tenor of our Saviour's and his Apostles preaching, we have showed through the whole History of the Evangelists and the Acts. And I challenge them to show that there was any other Doctrine upon their Assent to which, or Disbelief of it, Men were pronounced Believers or Unbelievers, and accordingly received into the Church of Christ, or else kept out of it. Ibid. p. 195. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Mr. Lock challenges others to show any other Doctrine, when he shows it himself. He says, that our Lord's Resurrection was also commonly required to be believed as a necessary Article, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 31. What can be more plain? So The Belief of one invisible, eternal, omnipotent God, Maker of Heaven and Earth, etc. is required. Ibid. p. 25. We must believe him to have been raised from the dead, and constituted the Lord and Judge of all Men, and to be our King and Ruler; for if we do not believe these, how can we take him now raised from the dead, and constituted the Lord and Judge of all Men, to be our King and Ruler, which he expressly requires? Ibid. p. 304. He says, Ibid. p. 30. that we may gather what was to be believed by all Nations, from what was preached to them by the Apostles. Now he expressly tells us, that the Apostle S. Paul preached that Jesus being risen from the dead, now reigneth, and shall more publicly manifest his Kingdom in judging the world at the last day. Ibid. p. 191. In like manner, p. 190. We see what it was our Saviour preached to the Apostles, and what it was that was to be preached to all Nations; viz. That he was the Messiah that had suffered, and risen from the dead the third day, and fulfilled all things that was written in the Old Testament concerning the Messiah; and that those who believed this and repent, should receive Remission of their Sins through this Faith in him. Here Mr. Lock plainly testifies, that beside this one Article, That Jesus is the Messiah, the Apostles preached, that he suffered, risen again, fulfilled all things that were written in the Old Testament concerning him, that he now reigneth, shall judge the World at the last day, and that those that repent, and believe the Gospel, shall receive Remission of Sins. Is it not then matter of greatest Admiration, that the same Person should tell us that Salvation or Perdition depends upon believing or rejecting this one Proposition, that Jesus was the Messiah, Ibid. p. 43. that all that was to be believed for Justification, was no more but this single Proposition, p. 47. that this was all the Doctrine the Apostles proposed to be believed, p. 93. that for three score years after our Saviour's Passion, S. John knew nothing else required to be believed for the attaining of Life but this, p. 194. and that this is the sole Doctrine required to be believed, p. 195. especially when in his Vindication of his Reasonab. of Christian. p. 29. he seems to complain of those that blamed him for contending for one Article? Having (says he) thus plainly mentioned more than one Article, I might have taken it amiss, etc. And so in his Second Vindication, p. 26. he hath these words, That there is one God, and Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, who risen again from the dead, ascended into Heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God, shall come to judge the quick and dead, are more than one Article, and may very properly be called These Articles. Now in the foregoing Page he refers us to places in his Reasonab. of Christian. where he makes the Belief of all these necessary, which (says he) is evidence enough that I contended not for one single Article, and no more. All that I can say is, that it is not easy to reconcile Mr. Lock to himself, or to make out that sundry Passages in his Reasonab. of Christianity do not clash with each other.  
He says, in Reasonab. of Christian. p. 31. that Christ's Resurrection was sometimes solely insisted on, and yet he will confess that we cannot thence conclude that to be the sole Article that is necessary to be believed. Why then doth he urge so much that this, that Jesus is the Christ, is the sole Doctrine, the only Article, that one Proposition, that is required to be believed, because perhaps it is sometimes solely insisted on?  
Mr. Lock, Ibid. p. 43. having said that S. Paul tells the Jews at Antioch, Act. 13. 46. It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you, but seeing you put it off from you, we turn to the Gentiles, adds, Here 'tis plain that S. Paul's charging their Blood upon their own heads, is, for opposing this single Truth, that Jesus was the Messiah, that Salvation or Perdition depends upon believing or rejecting this one Proposition: Thus Mr. Lock. But I would know how all this is plain from the Words which he alleges from Acts 13. 46. for 'tis certain that it is not said in express terms, either that the charging their Blood on their own Heads is for opposing this single Truth, that Jesus is the Messiah, or that Salvation or Perdition depends upon believing or rejecting this one Proposition. It is true, when the Apostle says, Ye put it from you, he intimates, that it was wholly their own fault that they did not receive Benefit by the Words being spoken to them, and that may look something toward the charging their Blood upon their own Heads; but as to all the rest, there is not the least ground or footstep of it, Act. 13. 46. Perhaps Mr. Lock will say, that by the Word of God there is meant no more than this one Proposition, That Jesus is the Messiah: But who will not rather believe, that when St. Paul said, It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you, he thereby meant that Word of God which he had preached to them of Antioch in Pisidia, (as is recorded in that Chapter,) and which the Jews contradicted. He had preached, That God had of the Seed of David, according to Promise, raised up to Israel a Saviour Jesus, v. 23. That the Jews at Jerusalem had condemned him, and desired Pilate to put him to Death, and in so doing, fulfilled the Voices of the Prophets, and the things that were written concerning him, v. 27, 28, 29. that he was also buried, and that God raised him from the dead no more to see Corruption, according to the Prophecies of him, and that he was seen for many Days after his Resurrection, v. 29, 30, 31. usque ad 38. and that every one that believes should receive Remission of Sins by him, and be justified from all things, from which they could not be justified by the Law of Moses, v. 38, 39 All these are more than one single Truth, or one Proposition, and are all comprehended under the Word of God, mentioned, v. 46. And it may be observed, that in all that Sermon, from the beginning of v. 16. to v. 42. there is not express mention as much as once made of Jesus' being the Messiah, or King, tho' there is of his being a Justifier and Saviour.  
In his Reasonab. of Christian. p. 47. Mr. Lock hath these Words, So that all that was to be believed for Justification, was no more but this single Proposition, That Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah. The Words, So that, import, that he deduceth this from one or more of the Texts of Scripture which he there alleadges, and, if I mistake not, from the last of them, viz. Act. 10. 43. where 'tis said, To him (i. e. Jesus of Nazareth) give all the Prophet's witness, that through his Name whosoever believeth in him shall receive Remission of Sins. Here indeed is mention of Remission of Sins, or Justification; but that all that was to be believed for Justification, was that single Proposition which he so often mentions, will never be proved from that Text. Yea, Mr. Lock, speaking of St. Peter's Sermon to Cornelius, Act. 10. (of which that Text is a part) doth not say that there is in it any express mention of our Saviour's being the Messiah, but (says he) he is described to be so by his Miracles, Death, Resurrection, Dominion, and coming to judge the quick and the dead: See him in his Second Vindication, p. 307.  
In his Reasonab. of Christian. p. 93. he alleges the Words of Act. 8. 4. They that were scattered abroad, went every where preaching the Word. Which Word was nothing (says he) but this, that Jesus was the Messiah: But if you ask how he proves this, he only says, As we have found by examining what they preached all through their History. Where, by their History, he means, undoubtedly, the History of the Apostles; and when he says, they preached, that they must be the Apostles, whereas they that are said to have preached the Word, Acts 8. 4. were not the Apostles; for we are told, v. 1. that the Apostles were not scattered abroad as those were that are mentioned, v. 4. But to wave this: Whereas Mr. Lock so often saith, that by examining what the Apostles preached all through their History, he had found, that the Word preached by them was nothing but this, that Jesus was the Messiah, I have just now showed, that it is easy for any one to find the contrary, by examining only that part of the History of the Apostles, which we have, Acts 10. from v. 34. to v. 44. and Acts 13. from v. 23. to v. 42. where, by Mr. Lock's own Confession, they treated of the Miracles, Death, Resurrection, and Dominion of our Saviour, and of his coming to judge the World, as also of Remission of Sins by him. See him in Reasonab. of Christian,, p. 41. and Second Vindication, p. 307.  
In his Reasonab. of Christian. p. 194. Mr. Lock says, Above threescore Years after our Saviour's Passion, St. John knew nothing else required to be believed, for the attaining of Life, but that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God. But will he hold to this, that St. John knew nothing else required to be believed, and admit of no Limitation, or Exception? Did he not know that it was necessary to believe One Only True God? St. John 17. 3. Did he not know that it was necessary to believe, that God raised the Lord Jesus from the dead? But what shall we say to the Words of St. John 20. 31. which Mr. Lock alleges, Ibid. p. 193. and from which he infers this, These are written, that ye may believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God; and that believing, ye may have Life in his Name? I answer, That it may be said, 1. That here it is as much required, that we believe Jesus to be the Son of God, as 'tis to believe him to be the Messiah. 2. That these, that Jesus is the Messiah, and that he is the Son of God, are two principal Articles, and therefore mentioned by St. John; but he does not say, These are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and only this; neither does he say, And that believing this alone, ye may have Life: But, And that believing in general, i. e. believing all that the Holy Ghost makes necessary to be believed. If thou believe in thine Heart, that God raised the Lord Jesus from the dead, thou shalt be saved, Rom. 10. 9 Because in these Words our Lord's Resurrection is solely insisted on, Mr. Lock will not conclude, that St. Paul knew nothing else required to be believed for attaining Life but that: And then why should he conclude, concerning St. John, that he knew nothing else required to be believed but these two Articles, that Jesus is the Messiah, and that he is the Son of God, because St. John 20. 31. he mentions only these? I know that Mr. Lock does not allow us to call them two Articles; but I am so little moved with his saying (and not proving) that Messiah and the Son of God are two Expressions signifying one and the same thing, that I make bold to do it without his Licence.  
Mr. Lock, perhaps, will think that I neglect him, if I do not take notice of his Chronology. He says, That above threescore Years after our Saviour's Passion, St. John knew nothing else required to be believed. His Reason is, Because St. John's Gospel was written so long after, as (says he) both Epiphanius and St. Jerom assure us. I shall grant, that St. John's Gospel might, perhaps, be writ so long after our Lord's Crucifixion; for St. Hierom, in Catalogo, and in Lib. 1. con. Jovinian, says, That Ecclesiastical History makes St. John to have lived threescore and eight Years after the Lord's Passion. But I cannot but take notice of Mr. Lock's Caution (some may call it his Prudence) in not referring us to the Places where Epiphanius, and St. Hierom, assure us, that it was writ so late. As to Epiphanius, it is true, that in Haeres. 51. he says, that St. John writ his Gospel after the ninetieth Year of his Age; and if he had also told us how old St. John was at the time when our Saviour was crucified, we might have known whether, according to Epiphanius, St. John writ his Gospel above threescore Years after our Lord's Passion; but I do not remember that Epiphanius hath any where told us St. John's Age at the time of our Saviour's Suffering. And as to St. Hierom, I have not found that he doth acquaint us, either in what Year of his own Age, or how long after his Lord's Passion it was that St. John writ his Gospel.    

CHAP. XXIII. Of Saving Faith and Unbelief.  
THey that believe Jesus to be the Messiah, their King, but will not obey his Laws, and will not have him to rule over them, they are but greater Rebels, and God will not justify them for a Faith, which doth but increase their Gild, and oppose diametrically the Kingdom and Design of the Messiah, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all Iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar People, zealous of good Works, Tit. 2. 14. And therefore St. Paul tells the Galatians, That that which availeth is Faith; but Faith working by Love, and that Faith without Works, i. e. the Works of sincere Obedience to the Law and Will of Christ, is not sufficient for our Justification, St. James shows at large, Chap. 2. Only those who believe Jesus to be the Messiah, and take him to be their King, with a sincere Endeavour after Righteousness, in obeying his Law, shall have their past Sins not imputed to them, and shall have that Faith taken instead of Obedience. Mr. Lock's Reasonab. of Christian. p. 213, 214, 215. None are sentenced or punished for Unbelief, but only for their Misdeeds. They are Workers of Iniquity on whom the Sentence is pronounced. Every where the Sentence follows doing or not doing, without any mention of believing or not believing: Not that any, to whom the Gospel hath been preached, shall be saved, without believing Jesus to be the Messiah; for all being Sinners, and Transgressor's of the Law, and so unjust, are all liable to Condemnation, unless they believe, and so through Grace are justified by God for this Faith, which shall be accounted to them for Righteousness. But the rest wanting this Cover, this Allowance for their Transgressions, must answer for all their Actions, and being found Transgressor's of the Law, shall, by the Letter and Sanction of the Law, be condemned for not having paid a full Obedience to that Law, and not for want of Faith: That is, not the Gild on which the Punishment is laid, tho' it be the want of Faith which lays open their Gild uncovered, and exposes them to the Sentence of the Law against all that are unrighteous. Ibid. p. 243, 245, 246. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Of the Expression, Justified for Faith, whereas the Scripture-Language is Justified by Faith, I took notice before Chap. 19 and 21.  
Here I cannot but observe how apt Men are to run into Extremes. There are some that say that Unbelief is the only Sin for which Men shall be condemned; they shall be condemned not for their other Sins, but, solely, for this. Mr. Lock, on the other hand, would persuade us, that Men shall not be condemned at all for Unbelief: The Sentence (says he) follows not doing, without any mention of not believing. He alleges for this, St. John 5. 28, 29. St. Matth. 7. 22, 23. 13. 14, 49. 16. 24. 25. 24, etc. St. Luke 13. 26. But, 1. In many of these Places, as St. John 5. 28, 29. St. Matth. 13. 41. (not 14, as it is in Mr. Lock,) and 49. St. Matth. 16. 27. (not 24. as Mr. Lock,) there is not the least mention of any Sentence, therefore it is manifest that they do not tell us for what Men shall be sentenced. 2. Those who are mentioned, St. Matth. 7. 22, 23. and St. Luke 13. 26, 27. were Believers, and so could not be sentenced for Unbelief. I do not say, that they believed to the saving of their Souls, or with a saving Faith, a Faith working by Love, and bringing forth the Fruits of good Works; for the contrary is most manifest, they were Workers of Iniquity, or Unrighteousness: But I say, that they were Believers, they should say unto Christ, Lord, Lord; yea, they were such Believers as not only owned him for their Lord, but also prophesied, cast out Devils, and did many mighty Works in his Name; and therefore, if they were not sentenced for Unbelief, but only for their Misdeeds, it cannot be thought strange. 3. Let it be supposed that they were Unbelievers, all that these Texts say, is, that Workers of Iniquity shall hear that Sentence, I tell you, I know you not, depart from me. And if it may be hence inferred, that they are to be condemned only for working Iniquity, then from St. Mark 16. 16. where it is said, He that believes not, shall be damned, it may be concluded that he shall be condemned only for Unbelief; that the Sentence shall follow not believing, without any mention of not doing. But this Inference Mr. Lock will not allow. They are Workers of Iniquity, on whom the Sentence is pronounced, says Mr. Lock, out of St. Matth. 7. 23. They are Unbelievers who shall be condemned, say I, out of St. Mark 16. 16. And if from St. Mark 16. Mr. Lock will not conclude that Men shall be condemned only for Unbelief, and not for working Iniquity, why does he conclude from St. Matth. 7. that they shall be condemned only for working Iniquity, and not for Unbelief? 4. As to St. Matth. 25. 24, etc. which may seem to be more to Mr. Lock's Purpose than the former; for this tells us expressly for what Men shall be sentenced to Punishment, which the other do not, (the Judge shall say to those on his Left Hand, Depart from me, ye cursed; for I was hungry, and ye gave me not to eat, etc.) it is enough to say, That if, because the Sentence of extreme Malediction shall be pronounced upon Men, because they did not feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, take in the Strangers, cloth the naked, visit the sick and imprisoned, he can infer, that Men shall be condemned only for their not having done these things, and not for their Unbelief; then certainly, because St. John 3. 18. it is said, He that believeth not, is now condemned, because he hath not believed in the Name of the only begotten Son of God, we may infer, that Men are and shall be condemned only for their not believing, and not for their not doing. If Men shall be condemned only for the Sins mentioned St. Matth. 25. then they must be condemned only for Sins of Uncharitableness. Impenitence is not expressly mentioned in these Places of Scripture, produced by Mr. Lock, any more than Unbelief. Will he say, that Men shall not be condemned for their Impenitence? The Truth is, that he may with as much Reason say That, as say that the Sentence shall not be pronounced on them for their Infidelity. Why should Mr. Lock think it strange that Men should be condemned for not paying Obedience to the Command of Christ, who hath commanded all Men every where to believe and repent? Unbelief is a Sin which is the Cause of all our other Sins, which would be prevented, if we did unfeignedly, and with a lively Faith, believe the Gospel: It is also that which, as it were, binds and fastens the Gild of our other Sins upon us; they will not be forgiven, unless we believe and repent: And yet, according to Mr. Lock, Men shall be condemned for their other Sins, and not for this.  
I have perhaps dwelled too long upon this, yet I think it not amiss to give a brief Account why I render St. John 3. 18. He that believeth not is now condemned, whereas in our Translation it is, He that believeth not is condemned already. The Words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is now condemned, or is now judged, as most worthy of Condemnation. Now that God hath expressed such wonderful Love to the World, by sending his only begotten Son into it, not to condemn it, but that by him the World might be saved, (see v. 16, 17.) and now that he is come into the World, and hath wrought such Miracles, he that believes not must be most justly worthy of Condemnation, because he believes not in the Name of the only begotten Son of God, being given, that every one that believes in him should not perish, but have everlasting Life. Now that Light is come into the World, if Men will not believe in the Light, every one will judge that they are justly worthy of Condemnation, as our Saviour says in the very next Words, v. 19 This is the Condemnation, (i. e. that which chief deserves Condemnation,) that Light hath come into the World, and Men have loved Darkness more than the Light. If this Rendering and Exposition of the Words be received, Commentators will not need to trouble themselves so much as they have done, with enquiring in what Sense the Unbeliever is said to be already condemned, since this which I offer is a plain and easy Interpretation, He that believes not, is now condemned, (now, after the Son of God's being actually come into the World, after Miracles wrought, and the Gospel preached by him,) because he believes not in the Name of the only begotten Son of God. This Text then plainly shows the Danger and Desert of not believing, and therefore it concerns us to beware, lest as the Israelites, of whom the Apostle speaks Heb. 4. did not enter into the promised Land, by reason of Unbelief, v. 6. so we be excluded the Heavenly Canaan for our Unbelief, v. 11,    

CHAP. XXIV. Of Repentance, Baptism, and Remission of Sins.  
REpentance is as absolute a Condition of the Covenant of Grace as Faith, and as necessary to be performed as that. This was not only the Beginning of our Saviour's preaching, but the Sum of all that he did preach, viz. That Men should repent and believe the good Tidings which he brought them. Believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and repenting, were so necessary and fundamental Parts of the Covenant of Grace, that one of them alone is often put for both. Repentance is not only a Sorrow for Sins past, but (what is a natural Consequence of that Sorrow, if it be real,) a turning from them into a new and contrary Life. It is an hearty Sorrow for our past Misdeeds, and a sincere Resolution and Endeavour, to the utmost of our Power, to conform all our Actions to the Law of God. It does not consist in one single Act of Sorrow, (tho' that being the first and leading Act, gives Denomination to the whole,) but in doing Works meet for Repentance, in a sincere Obedience to the Law of Christ, the remainder of our Lives. It is in other Words well expressed by newness of Life: And sometimes turning about is put alone to signify Repentance. Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 197, 198, 200, 201. To be baptised into his Name is to enrol ourselves into the Kingdom of Jesus the Messiah, and profess ourselves his Subjects. By Baptism we are made Denizens, and solemnly incorporated into that Kingdom, Ibid. p. 212, 213. Baptism was made use of by our Saviour to be that solemn visible Act whereby those who believed him to be the Messiah received him as their King, and professed Obedience to him, were admitted as Subjects into his Kingdom. So Peter began, Acts 2. 38. Repent, and be baptised; these two things were required for the Remission of Sins, Ibid. p. 199, 200. God proposed to the Children of Men, that as many of them as would believe Jesus his Son to be the Messiah, the promised Deliverer, and would receive him for their King and Ruler, should have all their past Sins, Disobedience, and Rebellion forgiven them; and if, for the future, they lived in a sincere Obedience to his Law, to the utmost of their Power, the Sins of Humane Frailty, for the time to come, as well as all those of their past Lives, should for his Son's sake, because they gave themselves up to him to be his Subjects, be forgiven them: Tho' in consideration of men's becoming Christ's Subjects by Faith in him, whereby they believe and take him to be the Messiah, their former Sins shall be forgiven, yet he will own none to be his, nor receive them as true Denizens of the New Jerusalem, into the Inheritance of Eternal Life, but leave them to the Condemnation of the Unrighteous, who renounce not their former Miscarriages, and live in a sincere Obedience to his Commands. Ibid. p. 211, 212, 241. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and Repenting, are so necessary and fundamental Parts of the Covenant of Grace, that one of them alone is often put for both; so Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 198. But I would know why they are the more necessary and fundamental Parts of the Convenant of Grace, on this account, that one of them alone is oft put for both; or how this, that one of them alone is oft put for both, doth prove that they are necessary and fundamental Parts of it. Withal, how appears it, that one of them alone is oft put for both? All the Proof that he tenders for it is in the Words immediately following: For (says he) St. Mark, chap. 6. 12. mentions nothing but their preaching Repentance, as St. Luke in the parallel Place, chap. 9 6. mentions nothing but their evangelizing or preaching the good News of the Kingdom of the Messiah. Thus Mr. Lock. But how will he hence make good this Inference, Therefore, of these two, Believing and Repenting, one alone is oft put for both? There is no mention of believing in either Place: St. Luke says, that the Apostles preached the Gospel; St. Mark says, that they preached, that Men should repent; of believing here is not a Word. But from both Texts we may gather that this, That Jesus is the Messiah, was not the only Article which the Apostles preached: For in St. Mark 6. 12. they preached, that Men should repent, or that they should have their Sins remitted upon their Repentance, as St. Peter afterward preached, Repent, and be baptised for the Remission of Sins, Acts 2. 38. and, as our Saviour says, St. Luke 24. 47. that Repentance and Remission of Sins should be preached; so that it is clear, that the Apostles preached this Article of Remission of Sins upon our repenting. And then, in St. Luke 9 6. they preached the Gospel, which comprehends more than that one Article, That Jesus is the Messiah, as the good News, that a Saviour was born into the World, etc.  
Mr. Lock, in Reasonab. of Christianity, p. 201. having said, that sometimes turning about is put alone to signify Repentance, citys St. Matth. 13. 15. and St. Luke 22. 32. where the Word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and why that should be rendered to turn about, rather than to convert or turn, I am to be taught.  
Ibid. p. 212. he says, That to be baptised into the Name of Christ, is to enrol ourselves in the Kingdom of Jesus the Messiah. But as we are said to be baptised in or into the Name of the Lord Jesus, so we are also said to be baptised in or into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, St. Matth. 28. 19 Now to be baptised in the Name of the Holy Ghost, cannot signify the enrolling ourselves in the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost; for we do not read in Holy Writ of the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost, as we do of the Kingdom of the dear Son of God: And why then should we make In or into the Name to signify one thing when it is spoken of the Son, and another when it is spoken of the Holy Ghost, or of the whole blessed and glorious Trinity? As then to baptise in or into the Name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is to baptise, 1. by Authority and Commission from them; 2. into the Worship and faithful Service of them all the Days of our Life: So I conceive we are to interpret the being baptised in or into the Name of the Lord Jesus.  
Ibid. p. 241. Mr. Lock says, In consideration of men's becoming Christ's Subjects by Faith in him, whereby they believe and take him to be the Messiah, their former Sins shall be forgiven. But other where he makes Men become the Subjects of Christ by Baptism as well as by Faith, and both Repentance and Baptism to be required for the Remission of Sins, (alleging Acts 2. 38.) and not Faith only. And therefore he might have expressed the Gospel-Terms, or the Conditions of Forgiveness, more fully, by saying, that if Men repent, and believe the Gospel, and be baptised, they shall, through the Merits and Death of their blessed Saviour, have their former Sins forgiven.    

CHAP. XXV. Of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Signification of the Word Spirit.  
IF that will not serve his turn, I will tell him a Principle of mine that will clear the Soul's Immortality to him, and that is the Revelation of Life and Immortality by Jesus Christ, through the Gospel. Mr. Lock, Answer to Remarks, p. 5, 6. Perhaps my using the Word Spirit for a thinking Substance, without excluding Materiality out of it, will be thought too great a Liberty; but the most enlightened of all the ancient People of God, Solomon himself, speaks after the same manner. Nor did the way of speaking in our Saviour's time vary from this. I would not be thought hereby to say, That Spirit does never signify a purely immaterial Substance: In that Sense the Scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says God is a Spirit; and in that Sense I have proved, from my Principles, That there is a Spiritual Substance, and am certain that there is a Spiritual Immaterial Substance. The First Letter, p. 68 71, 72, 73.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Mr. Lock, in his Answer to Remarks, p. 5. hath these Words, I suppose this Author, (i. e. the Author of the Remarks) will not question the Soul's Immateriality to be a Proof of its Immortality: Doth he not then, by taking so much Pains to persuade us that its Immateriality cannot be demonstratively proved, manifestly weaken one Proof of its Immortality? Mr. Lock, in Essay, l. 4. c. 3. §. 6. says, That he would not any way lessen the Belief of the Soul's Immateriality: But he cannot expect that we should believe Words against the Evidence of Deeds. Yet, in his Essay, l. 2. c. 23. §. 18. he hath let fall some Words, from which I think the Soul's Immateriality may be proved: The Ideas we have belonging and peculiar to Spirit, are Thinking and Will. Thus Mr. Lock. Now (say I) if Thinking and Willing are peculiar to Spirit, than the Soul which thinks and wills is a Spirit. And that by Spirit he in that Chapter means an immaterial Substance, is evident; for he opposeth Spirit to material Substance. Besides the complex Ideas we have of material sensible Substances, we are able to frame the complex Idea of a Spirit. So Mr. Lock, §. 15. And so what he in the very next Sentence calls immaterial Substances, in his Margin he calls spiritual Substances. If then Thinking and Willing are peculiar to Spirit, the Soul which thinks and wills is a Spirit, or spiritual immaterial Substance.  
I cannot reconcile the Immortality of the Soul with men's ceasing to be when they die. Mr. Lock, who useth that Expression of ceasing to be, more than once, (see above, Chap. 15.) must invent some unknown Sense of it, which may reconcile them.  
I showed, just now, That Mr. Lock, in Essay, l. 2. c. 23. did by Spirit understand an immaterial Substance; and indeed he doth own that he doth so, in his Third Letter, p. 430. I shall transcribe his Words at large: From the Ideas of Thought, (says he,) and a Power of moving of Matter, which we experience in ourselves, there was no more difficulty to conclude there was an immaterial Substance in us, than that we had material Parts. These Ideas of Thinking and Power, of moving of Matter, I in another Place showed, did demonstratively lead us to the certain Knowledge of the Existence of an immaterial Thinking Being, in whom we have the Idea of Spirit in the strictest Sense, in which Sense I also applied it to the Soul, in that 23d. Chapter. Thus Mr. Lock. And yet, in his First Letter, p. 68 he tells us of his using the Word Spirit (not in that which he calls the strictest Sense, but) for a thinking Substance, without excluding Materiality out of it. He sets himself also to defend his using it thus.  
This he doth, first, by the Authority of Cicero and Virgil, (Ibid. p. 69, 70.) who (as he says) call the Soul Spiritus, and yet do not deny it to be a subtle Matter. But supposing this which he says, to be true, we may return Answer in his own Words, in his Third Letter, p. 126. That Latin Sentence, Nil tam certum est quam quod de dubio certum, being objected, he taking it to be a Saying of the Romans, answers thus, As I take it, they (i. e. the Romans) never use the English Word Certainty; and tho' it be true, that the English Word Certainty, be taken from the Latin Word Certus; yet that therefore Certainty in English is used exactly in the same Sense that Certus is in Latin, that I think you will not say. The very same say I, As I take it, Cicero and Virgil never used the English Word Spirit; and tho' our Word Spirit be from the Latin Spiritus, yet that therefore Spirit in English, is used exactly in the same Sense that Spiritus is in Latin, Mr. Lock I think will not say. If he thought this a sufficient Answer to others, why should it not be a sufficient Answer to him?  
But farther, Mr. Lock having said in his First Letter, p. 69. that both Cicero and Virgil call the Soul Spiritus, in answer hereto it was suggested concerning Cicero, That in his Tusculan Questions, in the Entrance of the Dispute about the Soul, he takes Animus for the Soul, and neither Anima nor Spiritus; and that Spiritus is taken by him for Breath. Now if this be true, that is not which Mr. Lock says, that Cicero calls the Soul Spiritus. What says he in his Third Letter to this? Not a Word, nor doth he take the least notice of it, neither doth he in that long Reply in his Third Letter, p. 431, etc. produce one place out of Cicero, wherein he useth Spiritus for the Soul. If it be said that he had done that in his First Letter, I answer, that he there citys only one place, where he takes the Words on trust, and sets them down thus: Vita continetur corpore & spiritu; see him, p. 70. But if he had consulted Cicero himself, he would have found (in Orat. pro Marcello, vers. fin.) the Words to be these: Nec haec tua vita dicenda est, quae corpore & spiritu continetur, illa, inquam, illa vita est tua Caesar, quae vigebit memorio. Saeculonum omnium, quam posteritas alet, quam ipsa aeternitas semper intuebitur. Let Mr. Lock himself now judge whether Spiritus here must be necessarily understood to signify the Soul, and whether it can be more fitly interpreted than in the Sense in which Cicero most constantly useth it, as signifying Breath, even the Breath of our Nostrils, without which the Body cannot live, and which is so necessary to preserve this mortal Life, which the Orator tells Caesar was not his Life.  
As to Virgil, Mr. Lock only citys these Words out of him, Dum Spiritus hos regit artus, saying, that he speaks of the Soul; see his First Letter, p. 70 In answer to this, he was told, that Spiritus is there taken for the Vital Spirit; and that Virgil did believe the Soul to be more than a mere Vital Spirit, and that it subsisted and acted in a separate State: To all which, Mr. Lock, in his Reply in his Third Letter, p. 440, 441. says nothing at all, nor does he take the least notice of it.  
But Mr. Lock, to justify his using the Word Spirit in such a Signification, alleges the Authority of one greater than Cicero or Virgil, or the most enlightened Person of the Heathen World, viz. Solomon himself, Eccles. 3. 19, 21. That which befalleth the Sons of Men befalleth Beasts, even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one Spirit. Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beast that goeth down to the Earth, See Mr. Lock's First Letter, p. 71. To which I answer, 1. How appears it that these are Solomon's Words, and not the Say of others, which Solomon only repeats? Is it probable that Solomon would affirm absolutely, as his own Sense, that Man hath no Pre-eminence above a Beast? Which Words we have, v. 19 tho' they are omitted by Mr. Lock. If they be not Solomon's Words, than it is clear that he hath not the Authority of Solomon; yea, than he hath not the Authority of our Translators, who (this being supposed) applied not the Word Spirit to Beasts; but they, whose Words the Preacher repeats, applied the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to them, which Word our Translators render Breath, v. 19 and Spirit, v. 21. 2. But let it be supposed (tho' not granted) that they are Solomon's Words and Sense, I need only borrow once more Mr. Lock's Words: As I take it, Solomon never used the English Word Spirit; and tho' it be true that the Hebrew Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is often rendered Spirit, yet that therefore Spirit in English hath exactly the same Signification that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hath in Hebrew, I think Mr. Lock will not say; for then Spirit must signify the Wind, Breath, etc. since 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is applied to these. In vain therefore doth he pretend that he hath the Authority of Solomon.  
And yet he seeks to justify his use of the Word also by the Authority of one greater than Solomon. When our Saviour (says he) after his Resurrection stood in the midst of them, they were affrighted, and supposed that they had seen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Spirit, S. Luke 24. 37. But our Saviour says to them, v. 39 Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself, handle me and see, for a Spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me have. See Mr. Lock, First Letter, p. 71, 72. who forgot to tell us who the They and Them are; but they are the Apostles: and from our Saviour's words to them he here argues. And if he would argue directly, he must do it in this or the like form; If our Saviour say that a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones, than he useth the word Spirit as signifying something from which Matter is not excluded. But Mr. Lock must have invented a new Logic before he could have made good this Consequence: He therefore goes another way to work both in his First and in his Third Letter. I shall briefly examine what he says in both.  
In his First Letter, p. 72. he says, that these words of our Saviour's put the same distinction between Body and Spirit that Cicero did in the place above cited, viz. That the one was a gross Compages that could be felt and handled, and the other such as Virgil describes the Ghost or Soul of Anchises: 
Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum,  
Ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago,  
Par levibus vent is, volucrique simillima somno.  Thus Mr. Lock. So that in short, according to him, in those words of our Saviour an Image is called a Spirit. And can we not conceive an Image that doth not include Matter? I may instance in those Ideas or Images which are the immediate Objects of Mr. Lock's Mind in thinking, are they material? Likewise in the Images that we see in our Dreams, which latter Instance I the rather mention, because Virgil, in these very Verses, compares the Image of which he speaks to Sleep, or to an Image appearing in Sleep, (formam apparentem in somnis) as some interpret it.  
In his Third Letter, p. 444, he says, that from these words of our Saviour, a Spirit hath not Flesh and Bones, it follows, that in Apparitions there is something that appears, and that that which appears is not wholly immaterial: Thus Mr. Lock. In Answer to it, I shall remind him, that in his Second Vindication of the Reasonab. of Christian. p. 228. he mentions a Request which Mr. Chillingworth puts up to Mr. Knot, and I think it no less necessary to be put up to him: Sir, I beseech you, when you writ again, do us the favour to write nothing but Syllogisms: for I find it an extreme trouble to find out the concealed Propositions which are to connect the parts of your Enthymems. As now, for example, I profess to you, that I have done my best endeavour to find some Glue, or Sodder, or Cement, or Thread, or any thing, to tie the Antecedent and this Consequent together. Thus Mr. Chillingworth. Here Mr. Lock's Enthymem is this, A Spirit hath not flesh and bones, ergo, In Apparitions there is something that appears, and that which appears is not wholly immaterial. If Mr. Lock can find some Glue or Sodder to join the Antecedent and this Consequent together, it is well: but if he cannot, I shall make bold to add, that no body else can. Neither can he evade by saying that it was not from those words only, (viz. A Spirit hath not flesh and bones,) but from the whole Text S. Luke 24. 37, 39 that he draws that Consequence, that what appears is not wholly immaterial; for the case is the same. This may suffice as to his Authorities, which are found to do him no service at all.  
He subjoins in his First Letter, p. 72, 73. I would not be thought hereby to say that Spirit never signifies a purely immaterial Substance. In that Sense the Scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says God is a Spirit; and in that sense I have used it, and in that sense I have proved, from my Principles, that there is a spiritual Substance, and am certain that there is a spiritual immaterial Substance. Thus Mr. Lock. But might he not have left out those words I take it, and affirmed positively that when the Scripture says God is a Spirit, the word Spirit signifies a purely immaterial Substance? He tells that he is certain that there is a spiritual immaterial Substance, and I therefore hope that he is certain that God is such: and if it be a certain Truth that God is a spiritual immaterial Substance, in what sense can the Scripture be judged to say that he is a Spirit but in this? God is a Spirit, and the Worshippers of him ought to worship in Spirit, S. John 4. 24. i e. with their Minds (or, with application of Mind, as Mr. Lock interprets it in his Reasonab. of Christ. p. 286.) which Minds are likewise spiritual immaterial Substances.    

CHAP. XXVI. Of Conscience, Consideration, and Freedom.  
COnscience is nothing else but our own Opinion of our own Actions, Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 1. c. 3. §. 8. 'Tis a Mistake, to think that Men cannot change the displeasingness or Indifferency that is in Actions into Pleasure and Desire, if they will do but what is in their Power. A due Consideration will do it in some cases. Any Action is rendered more or less pleasing only by the contemplation of the End, and the being more or less persuaded of its tendency to it, or necessary connexion with it. This is certain, that Morality, established upon its true Foundations, cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but consider; and he that will not be so much a rational Creature as to reflect seriously upon infinite Happiness and Misery, must needs condemn himself, as not making that use of his Understanding he should. Ibid. l. 2. c. 21. §. 69, 79. By a due Consideration, and examining any Good proposed, it is in our power to raise our Desires in a due proportion to the value of that Good, whereby it may come to work upon the Will, and be pursued. The Mind having in most cases, as is evident dent in Experience, a Power to suspend the Execution and Satisfaction of any of its Desires; and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider the Objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the Liberty Man has, and from the not using it right comes all that variety of Mistakes, Errors, and Faults, we run into in the Conduct of our Lives, and our Endeavours after Happiness; whilst we precipitate the Determination of our Wills, and engage too soon before Examination. Were we determined by any thing but the last Result of our Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, we were not free. If we look upon those superior Being's above us who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have reason to judge they are more steadily determined in their choice of Good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy or less free than we are. Even the Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best. The constant desire of Happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, no body I think accounts an Abridgement of Liberty, or at least an Abridgement of Liberty to be complained of. The suspending any particular Desire, and keeping it from determining the Will, and engaging us in Action, is standing still, where we are not sufficiently assured of the way; Examination is the consulting a Guide; the Determination of the Will upon Enquiry is following the direction of that Guide; and he that hath a power to act or not to act according as such Determination directs, is a free Agent; such Determination abridges not that Power wherein Liberty consists. The Care of ourselves, that we mistake not imaginary for real Happiness, is the necessary Foundation of our Liberty, and the stronger Ties we have to an unalterable Pursuit of Happiness in general, which is our greatest Good, and which, as such, our Desires always follow, the more are we free from any necessary Determination of our Will to any particular Action, or from a necessary Compliance with our Desire set upon any particular and then appearing greater Good, till we have duly examined whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real Happiness. Let not any one say that he cannot govern his Passions, nor hinder them from breaking out and carrying him into Action; for, what he can do before a Prince, or a great Man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will. Ibid. §. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53. God having revealed that there shall be a Day of Judgement, I think that Foundation enough to conclude Men are free enough to he made answerable for their Actions, and to receive according to what they have done. The Third Letter, p. 444. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
When Mr. Lock writ his Essay, he had not tied himself so strictly to use the Scripture-Language in speaking of matters of Religion, as he had when he writ his Third Letter. This appears, as from other Instances, so from his Definition or Description of Conscience. If he had been so much for the using Scripture-Language then as he was afterward, he would not have described Conscience to be nothing else but our own Opinion of our own Actions. He had spoke more consonantly to Scripture-Language, if he had put the Word Knowledge, or Testimony, or Judgement instead of Opinion. For, according to Scripture, Conscience is that within us which knows, and also witnesses, and judges of our Actions, Conversations, etc. as it also judges of the Actions and Conversations of others.  
1. Knowledge is in Scripture attributed to the Heart or Conscience. Thus Eccles. 7. 22. Thine own Heart knows, that thou thyself hast cursed others. The Vulgar reads, Thy Conscience knows, etc. Heart is frequently put for Conscience; see 1 Sam. 24. 5. and 2 Sam. 24. 10. and 1 Joh. 3. 19, 20, 21, etc. The Hebrew Word which both the Seventy and also our Translation in the Margin renders Conscience, Eccles. 10. 20. viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 denotes Knowledge, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Word which the Chaldee Paraphrast there useth also doth, they both coming from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Curse not the King, no not in thy thought: so our Translation hath it in the Text; but in the Margin, instead of Thy Thought we have Thy Conscience; and so the Meaning is, Curse not the King, though thou do it so secretly that none but thine own Heart or Conscience can know it. And it is observable, that Gen. 43. 22. where Joseph's Brethren say We know not who put our money in our sacks, instead of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We know not, the Vulgar hath Non est in nostra Conscientia.  
2. Conscience is frequently said in Scripture to bear witness; My Conscience bearing me witness, so the Apostle Rom. 9 1. who also, 2 Cor. 1. 12. speaks of the Testimony of his Conscience; and Rom. 2. 15. says of the Heathens, that their Conscience did bear witness.  
3. Judging is also attributed to the Heart or Conscience in Scripture. Thus 1 John 3. 20. If our Heart (i. e. our Conscience) condemn us: and so again, If our Heart (or Conscience) condemn us not. So S. Paul, 1 Cor. 8. 7. Some with Conscience of an Idol to this hour eat of somewhat as offered to an Idol. With Conscience of an Idol, i. e. their Conscience judging that an Idol was something. And so S. Peter, If a man for Conscience toward God endure grief, 1 Pet. 2. 19 For Conscience toward God, i. e. because his Conscience judgeth that he ought to obey God.  
Thus we read of Conscience its knowing, witnessing, and judging; but where will Mr. Lock find any thing that favours his Description, viz. that it is nothing else but our Opinion, & c.? In his Essay, l. 4. c. 15. §. 3. he makes Opinion to be the receiving a Proposition for true, without certain Knowledge that it is so: But Conscience both knows, (as we have seen,) and also certainly knows. There is one indeed that is greater than our Consciences, and knows all things, and with such Certainty as that nothing can compare with him: But that transcendent Certainty of the Divine Knowledge being excepted, there is no Knowledge that can pretend to greater and more absolute Certainty than that of Conscience. And therefore, even according to Mr. Lock, it is impossible that Conscience should be an Opinion.  
But this is not the only Fault in Mr. Lock's Description of Conscience: It is (says he) our own Opinion of our own Actions; as if men's Consciences had to do only with Actions, yea, only with our own Actions. But Conscience will not have its Authority or Jurisdiction confined within so narrow Limits: It will sit as Judge, not only upon men's Actions, but also upon their Speeches, yea, upon our Thoughts, Affections, Aims, Purposes, or Intentions, and the Sincerity of them. None of these is or can be hid from the Eye of Conscience, which knows them all, and is thereby qualified to be both Witness and Judge of them. St. Paul, Rom. 9 1, 2. appeals to his Conscience as witness of his speaking the Truth, and of the great Affection he bore to his Countrymen: I say the Truth in Christ, I lie not, my Conscience bearing me witness, that I have great Heaviness and continual Sorrow in my Heart, etc. And in like manner, 2 Cor. 1. 12. he tells of his Conscience's bearing Testimony of his Conversation and Sincerity: Our Rejoicing is this, the Testimony of our Conscience, that in Simplicity and godly Sincerity we have had our Conversation in the World. I add, That tho' Mr. Lock only mentions our own Actions, yet it is apparent, even from Scripture, that Conscience also judgeth of the Actions and Conversations of others. We commend ourselves to every Man's Conscience, says the Apostle, 2 Cor. 4. 2. i e. We endeavour to order our Speech, Actions, and Conversation so, as that every Man's Conscience cannot but judge and think well of them. So, 2 Cor. 5. 11. We (says he) are made manifest to God, and I trust that we are also made manifest in your Consciences; q. d. God knows and is Witness of our sincere Purpose, and I hope that your Consciences are also satisfied of it, and ready to bear Testimony to it. Add to these 1 Cor. 10. 28, 29. If any Man say to you, This is offered in Sacrifice to Idols, eat not for his sake that showed it, and for Conscience sake: Conscience, I say, not thine own, but the others; for why is my Liberty judged of another Man's Conscience? In this Case, tho' I am satisfied in mine own Conscience, that I am at liberty, and may lawfully eat; yet I must forbear, for the sake of the other Man's Conscience: For, why should my Liberty be judged by another's Conscience? i. e. Why should I use my Liberty, and eat then, when another Man's Conscience will judge that I have sinned in eating, and entertain Jealousies or hard Thoughts of me. This may suffice for Mr. Lock's Description of Conscience.  
He might have expressed himself more plainly than he has done, when he says, That Morality established upon its true Foundations, cannot but determine the Choice in any one who will but consider. He hath not plainly told us what those true Foundations are; but if he mean by them that infinite Happiness and Misery, those Rewards and Punishments of another Life, which he mentions in the Words following, I would ask, whether it be not rather the Consideration of those Foundations which so effectually determines the Choice, than the Consideration of the Morality that is established upon them. I the rather ask this Question, because Mr. Lock, in this very Place (Essay, l. 2. c. 21. § 70.) says expressly, That the Rewards and Punishments of another Life, which the Almighty hath established as the Enforcements of his Laws, are of weight enough to determine the Choice against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can show. He speaks also of the Foundations of Morality, in Essay, l. 4. c. 3. §. 18. but there likewise he doth not acquaint us what those Foundations are. His Words are these, The Idea of a Supreme Being, Infinite in Power, Goodness, and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend, and the Idea of ourselves, as understanding rational Creatures, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such Foundations of our Duty, and Rules of Action, as might place Morality amongst the Sciences capable of Demonstration; wherein I doubt not but from Principles as incontestable as those of the Mathematics, by necessary Consequences the Measures of Right and Wrong might be made out.  
Mr. Lock says, (in Essay, l. 2. c. 21. §. 48.) Were we determined by any thing but the last Result of our own Minds, judging of the good or evil of any Action, we were not free. Now if this be true, that the last Result of our Mind judging of the good or evil of any Action, determines us, and nothing else, how comes it that he affirms, (Ibid. §. 31, 33, 34.) That Uneasiness determines the Will, and also takes so much Pains to prove it, Ibid. §. 36, 37, 38, 39, 40? I would know whether Uneasiness doth determine the Wills of those who enjoy complete Happiness, as the Spirits of Just Men made perfect do. Tho' I do not deny that too many men's Desires and sensual Appetites causing uneasiness in them, do determine them to act contrary to the last Result of their Minds, judging the Action to be evil: And so (to use Mr. Lock's Words, Ibid. §. 35.) they are from time to time in the State of that unhappy Complainer, Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor; which Sentence is allowed for ●rue, and made good by constant Experience: Therefore in the Heathen Poets we meet with many such Complaints. The Words immediately preceding those, Video meliora, etc. are these, Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque Cupido Mens aliud suadet: That unhappy Wretch, (viz. Medea) complains, that tho' her Mind saw, and approved, and persuaded her to the better, yet the Vehemence of her Desire persuaded, yea, even hurried her to the worse, and made her unwillingly follow it. In like manner, in Euripides' Medea, Act 4. vers. fin. she complains that her Passion overcame her Reason, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Yea, we find the like Complaints in Holy Writ, I delight in the Law of God after the inward Man: But I see another Law in my Members, warring against the Law of my Mind, and bringing me into Captivity to the Law of Sin. So then I with the Mind indeed serve the Law of God, but with the Flesh the Law of Sin, Rom. 7. 22, 23, 25. And so he in Lactantius, l. 4. c. 24. Volo equidem non peccare, sed vincor: Sentio me peccare, sed necessitas fragilitatis impellit, cui repugnare non possum. I readily grant, that Men in this State are not free, (for the Apostle tells us, that they are Captives and Slaves, sold under Sin, and have Reason to cry out, Wretched Man that I am! who shall deliver me?) and that (as Mr. Lock says in Essay, l. 2. c. 21. §. 47.) 'tis the Perfection of our Nature to desire, will, and act, according to the last Result of a fair Examination; and therefore it would be a great Happiness, if we were determined by nothing else but the last Result of our Minds, judging those Actions to be good or evil which are really so. But, alas! too frequent Experience evinceth, that men's sensual Desires, and the Uneasiness which those Desires do cause in them, do determine them many times to do contrary to the right Judgement of their Minds; and so, tho' with their Minds they serve the Law of God, i. e. their Minds judge that they should do that which the Law of God requires; yet with their Flesh they serve the Law of Sin, i. e. their fleshly Desires prevail and determine them to act contrary to the Law of God.    

CHAP. XXVII. Of the Securing our Future State, and the Punishment of those that would not follow Christ.  
SInce our Natural Faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal Fabric and real Essences of Bodies, but yet plainly discover to us the Being of a God, and the Knowledge of ourselves, enough to lead us into a full and clear Discovery of our Duty, and great Concernment; it will become us, as rational Creatures, to employ those Faculties in those Inquiries, and in that sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greatest Interest, i. e. the Condition of our Eternal Estate. No Man is so wholly taken up with the Attendance on the means of Living, as to have no spare time at all to think on his Soul, and inform himself in Matters of Religion. Were Men as intent upon this as they are on things of lower Concernment, there are none so enslaved to the Necessity of Life, who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledge. Mr. Lock, in Essay, l. 4. c. 12. §. 11. and c. 19 §. 3. The Punishment of those who would not follow him, (i. e. Christ,) was to lose their Souls, i. e. their Lives, Mark 8. 35— 38. as is plain, considering the Occasion it was spoke on. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 15. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
When Mr. Lock says, That the Punishment of those who would not follow Christ, was to lose their Souls, i. e. their Lives. This is ushered in with the Words, And therefore; and yet it is not easy to perceive how this is inferred from that which Mr. Lock had said before, or how it proves or illustrates it; so that perhaps these Conjunctions, And therefore, are here to be looked upon as some of Mr. Lock's privileged Particles. But to wave that, he allegeth for this, St. Mark 8. 35— 38. whereas, in v. 38. there is not that Expression of losing their Souls, but it is said, that the Son of Man will be ashamed of them when he cometh in the Glory of his Father with the Holy Angels; and consequently he will not then own them, but contrariwise say, I know you not, depart from me into everlasting Fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels. This may help us to understand what is meant by the losing the Soul, v. 35. Mr. Lock understands by it their losing their Life, or (as he expresses it a little before) their dying, and ceasing to be: But how can ceasing to be consist with the suffering the Torment of the everlasting Fire prepared for the Devil and the other lapsed Angels?  
They shall lose their Souls, i. e. their Lives, as is plain, considering the Occasion it was spoke on. Thus Mr. Lock. We must therefore look back to find on what Occasion this was spoken. We are told, St. Mark 8. 31, 32, 33, 34. that our Saviour having openly foretold that he should be put to death, and rise again, Simon Peter rebuked him for it; but he, when he had rebuked Peter, called to him the Multitude, together with his Disciples, and said, If any one will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his Cross, and follow me. Then follows the mention of the losing their Souls, v. 35. Whosoever (says he) will save his Soul, shall lose it. We see now the Occasion of Christ's speaking these last Words; and I would know how it makes it plain, that by losing the Soul here is meant losing the Life, in Mr. Lock's Sense, i. e. as it signifies dying, and ceasing to be. For my part, I cannot but think that we may most safely rely on St. Luke's Exposition: He, c. 9 v. 24. hath these Words, Whosoever will save his Soul, shall lose it, i. e. his Soul; but, v. 25. instead of lose his Soul, he hath lose himself: What is a Man profited, if he gain the whole World, and lose himself? Thus St. Luke. Nothing is more usual in Scripture than for the Soul to be put for the whole Person; and so St. Luke teaches us to expound it here. When other Evangelists say, And lose his own Soul, (see St. Matth. 16. 26. St. Mark 8. 36.) St. Luke says, And lose himself. The Punishment then of him that will not deny himself, and follow Christ is to lose his Soul, i. e. himself, both Body and Soul, to have both Soul and Body destroyed in Hell. Hi corpus & animam perdunt pariter in Gehennam, says Origen, Homil. 36. in S. Luke.    

CHAP. XXVIII. Of the Church, also of Infallibility, and Transubstantiation.  
IT was upon this Proposition, That Jesus was the Messiah, the Son of the living God, owned by St. Peter, that our Saviour said he would build his Church, Matth. 16. 16, 17, 18. The Confession made by St. Peter, Matth. 16. 16. is the Rock on which our Saviour has promised to build his Church. Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 27. 48. The Romanists say, 'Tis best for Men, and so suitable to the Goodness of God, that there should be an infallible Judge of Controversies on Earth; and therefore there is one. And I by the same Reason, say, 'Tis better for Men that every Man himself should be insallible. I leave them to consider, whether by the Force of this Argument they shall think that every Man is so, Essay, l. 1. c. 4. §. 12. I know no other infallible Guide but the Spirit of God in the Scriptures; Second Vindication of Reasonab. of Christian. p. 341. The Ideas of one Body and one Place, do so clearly agree, and the Mind has so evident a Perception of their Agreement, that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms the same Body to be in two distant Places at once, however it should pretend to the Authority of a Divine Revelation: Since the Evidence, 1. That we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to God; 2. That we understand it right, can never be so great as the Evidence of our own intuitive Knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once, Essay, l. 4. c. 18. §. 5.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Mr. Lock often repeats it, That the Confession made by St. Peter, St. Matth. 16. 16. was the Rock on which Christ would build his Church. We have it in his Reasonab. of Christian. not only in the Places already alleged, but also in p. 102, 103, and 104, 105. If he would infer thence, that this Article alone, That Jesus is the Messiah, is necessary to make Men Christians; or, that only these two Articles, That he is the Messiah, and, That he is the Son of God, are so necessary, he may know that this cannot be deduced from it. If he argue thus, The Church is founded upon these Articles, as upon a Rock, therefore only the Belief of them is necessary to make a Man a Member of the Church; I deny his Consequence, for more than the believing the first Foundation of the Church may be necessary to make a Man a Member of it.  
As to the Words, This Rock, it is acknowledged that sundry of the ancient Expositors have interpreted it to be the Faith which St. Peter confessed. Upon this Rock will I build my Church, i. e. the Faith which thou hast confessed; so St. Chrysost. in St. Matth. Homil. 55. Christ called this Confession a Rock, etc. For it really is the Rock of Godliness; so St. Basil. Seleuc. Orat. 25. What is this, upon this Rock I will build my Church? Upon this Faith on that which is said, Thou art Christ the Son of the living God; so St. August. Tract. 10. in primam Joannis. I may add Theophylact: Peter having confessed the Son of God, he (i. e. Christ,) saith, This Confession which thou hast confessed shall be the Foundation of Believers. Thus Theophyl. in loc.  
But tho' these and other ancient Writers do by this Rock understand the Faith which was confessed, yet there want not among them those who make it to be the Author and Finisher of our Faith, viz. Christ. Upon those Words, 1 Cor. 3. 11. Other Foundation no Man can lay, than that which is laid, which is Jesus the Christ. Theodoret says thus, Blessed Peter laid this Foundation, or rather the Lord himself: For Peter having said, Thou art the Son of the living God, the Lord said, On this Rock I will build my Church: Be not ye therefore denominated from Men, for Christ is the Foundation. The Interlineary Gloss in St. Matth. 16. 18. says, This Rock, i. e. Christ, in whom thou believest. And our Anselm, Ibid. as plainly, On this Rock, i. e. upon myself I will build my Church, q. d. Thou art so Peter, from me (Petra) the Rock, as that yet the Dignity of being the Foundation is reserved for me. But St. Austin, tho' he was alleged as favouring the former Exposition, yet is otherwhere as clearly and fully for this as you can desire. Therefore the Lord saith, On this Rock I will build my Church, because Peter had said, Thou art Christ the Son of the living God. Therefore, says he, on this Rock which thou hast confessed, I will build my Church. Christ was the Rock upon which Foundation even Peter himself was built; for other Foundation no Man can lay than that which is laid, to wit, Christ Jesus. The Church therefore which is founded on Christ, etc. St. August. Tratat. 124. in Joannem. And again, Thou art Peter, and on this Rock which thou. host confessed, on this Rock which thou hast known, saying, Thou art Christ the Son of the living God, I will build my Church, i. e. upon myself, the Son of the living God, I will build my Church; I will build thee upon me, not me upon thee. Men that were willing to be built upon Men, said, I am of Paul, I of Apollo's, I of Cephas, i. e. Peter; but others who would not be built upon Peter, but upon Petra a Rock, said, I am of Christ. Thus St. August. de Verbis Domini; see Matth. Serm. 13. These plainly make this Rock to be Christ himself.  
Besides these already mentioned, there occurrs in the Writings of some of the Fathers a third Interpretation of the Rock here spoken of, viz. That which makes St. Peter to be the Person to whom Christ makes Promise of so great a Dignity, that he would build his Church upon him. The Romish Writers abound with Citations to this purpose, and tho' because some of them are out of Writings that are not judged to be of sufficient Authority, and in others of them they have not showed that Fidelity they ought to have done, many of them are of no weight, yet it is granted that some of the Ancients have inclined to this Sense of the Place; and therefore there is no Necessity that I should give myself the trouble to transcribe their Words. Mr. Lock may perhaps say, that this Exposition is so much for the Advantage of the Papal Interest, and in favour of the Bishop of Rome's Universal Pastorship, that Protestants must not admit of it. But I answer, Why is it more for the Advantage of the Papal Interest that St. Peter should be the Rock on which Christ would build his Church, than it is that he would give him the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven? Why do they who say that these Words, On this Rock I will build my Church, were spoken personally of Peter, more favour Popery than they who will have those Words, To thee I will give the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, to be said personally to Peter? For why may we not argue as strongly for the universal Pastorship from the latter Words, as from the former? And yet Mr. Lock himself tells us expressly, that the latter Words were said personally to Peter; see his Reasonab, of Christian. p. 105. I think it not amiss here to transcribe the Words of Episcopius, in loc-Concedi atque indulgeri posse putaverim Pontificiis, quod per Hanc Petram intelligatur ipsa persona Petri, idque quia probabilibus valde nituntur argumentis. At vero dicet quis, sic datur Pontificiis quod volunt. Id vero pernegatur consequi. Etsi enim Petro hic aliquid promittatur, aut de eo aliquid futurum affirmetur, id tamen non fit cum aliorum Discipulorum aut Apostolorum exclusione. Aliud enim longe est Petro hoc dici, aliud soli Petro ea dici quae aliis non competant, aut eodem saliem jure aliis Discipulis tribui nequeant. Prius concedi posse putamus, posterius vero negamus, id enim sufficit plusquam satis ad Primatum Petri, & quae ei (si quis fuisset) ridicule admodum & stolide superstruitur Pontificis Romani Praerogativa, evertendum. Thus Episcopius. And there are Protestant Divines of great Esteem for their Learning and Judgement, and who have engaged as zealously as any other against the Papal Interest, who have gone farther, have not only made the Person of St. Peter to be meant by the Rock, but also somewhat peculiar to be granted him, and yet show that this affords not the least Advantage to the Pope's Pretensions that he is Universal Pastor. To omit some of our English Divines, they that please may consult Cameron either in his Praelections, in St. Matth. 16. 18. or in the great Critics.  
Episcopius says that this, That the Church should be built on him as on a Rock, was granted to Peter in common with the other Apostles. And to the same purpose speaks Origen, Tractat. 1. in Matth. If thou thinkest that the whole Church was built upon Peter alone, what wilt thou say of John the Son of Thunder, and every one of the Apostles? Shall we dare to say that the Gates of Hell could not prevail against St. Peter only, but could prevail against the rest? And a little after, If that saying, To thee I will give the Keys, was common to the other Apostles, why was not the rest which was then said as to Peter common to them too? So that this may be a fourth Exposition, that by the Rock is meant St. Peter, not alone but together with the other Apostles. As he made that Confession, Thou art Christ the Son of the living God, not for himself only, but also in the Name of the other Apostles; so, according to this Sense, he received this Grant for the rest of the Apostles as well as for himself.  
I have alleged the foresaid Testimonies to satisfy Mr. Lock, That Persons of approved Piety as well as Learning, have judged our Saviour's Words, On this Rock I will build my Church, capable of other Interpretations than that which is mentioned by him, viz. That the Faith which was confessed by St. Peter, 〈◊〉 those Articles, That Jesus is the Christ, and, That he is the Son of the living God, are the Rock on which the Church is built. This is the only Interpretation that can do Mr. Lock any Service, and therefore he takes no notice of the rest. But he should not be himself guilty of that which he condemns so much in others, i. e. the imposing his Interpretations of Scripture upon us. And therefore he must not be displeased, if we do not grant that which Mr. Lock here affirms without any Proof, that this Proposition, That Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of the living God, was that Rock on which our Lord said that he would build his Church.  
Mr. Lock says, that the Evidence that we deceive not ourselves in ascribing a Revelation to God, can never be so great as the Evidence of our own intuitive Knowledge; where, if his Meaning be, that we can never be so certain that any Revelation (suppose the Scripture) is from God, as we are of the Object of our intuitive Knowledge, I must deny it; for I firmly believe that there have been and may now be those, who are as certain that the Scriptures are the Word of God, as they can be of that which they clearly see, and distinctly perceive by any other of their Senses. And I am confirmed in this Belief by the Words of Mr. Chillingworth, c. 1. §. 9 To those (says he) that believe and live according to their Faith, God gives by degrees the Spirit of Obsignation and Confirmation, and to be as fully and resolutely assured of the Gospel of Christ, as those which heard it from Christ himself with their Ears, which saw it with their Eyes, which looked upon it, and whose Hands handled the Word of Life.    

CHAP. XXIX. Of Fundamentals, and the Apostles Creed.  
GOD alone can appoint what shall be necessarily believed by every one whom he will justify; and what he has so appointed and declared is alone necessary. No body can add to these Fundamental Articles of Faith, nor make any other necessary, but what God himself hath made and declared to be so. And what these are which God requires of those who will enter into and receive the Benefits of the New Covenant, has already been shown. An explicit Belief of these is absolutely required of all those to whom the Gospel of Jesus Christ is preached. Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 301. The Primitive Church admitted converted Heathens to Baptism upon the Faith contained in the Apostles Creed. A bare Profession of that Faith, and no more, was required of them to be received into the Church, and made Members of Christ's Body. How little different the Faith of the ancient Church was from the Faith I have mentioned, may be seen in these Words of Tertullian: Regula fidei una omnium est sola immobilis, irreformabilis, credendi scilicet in unicum Deum omnipotentem, mundi conditorem, & Filium ejus Jesum Christum, natum ex Virgin Maria, crucifixum sub Pontio Pilato, tertia die resuscitatum a mortuis, receptum in coelis, sedentem nunc ad dextram Patris, venturum judicare vivos & mortuos, per carnis etiam resurrectionem. Hac lege Fidei manente caetera jam disciplinae & conversationis admittunt novitatem correctionis: Tert. de Virg. Velan. in princip. This was the Faith that in Tertullian's time sufficed to make a Christian. And the Church of England only proposes the Articles of the Apostles Creed to the Convert to be baptised; and upon his professing a Belief of them, asks whether he will be baptised in this Faith; and upon the Profession of this Faith, and no other, the Church baptises him into it. The Apostles Creed is the Faith I was baptised into, no one tittle whereof I have renounced, that I know. And, I heretofore thought that gave me title to be a Christian. Second Vindicat. p. 177, 178, 182. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
Mr. Lock tells us, in Reasonab. of Christian. p. 301. that it had been already shown what the Fundamental Articles of Faith are. But I ask, How had it been shown? He had sometimes affirmed positively, that this, that Jesus of Nazareth is the only Gospel-Article of Faith that was required, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 195. that Salvation or Perdition depends upon believing or rejecting this one Proposition, that Jesus was the Messiah. Ibid. p. 43. that this was all the Doctrine the Apostles proposed to be believed. Ibid. p. 93. At other times he had said, that it was also required for the attaining of Life, that they should believe that Jesus is the Son of God. Ibid. p. 194. He had also spoken of concomitant Articles, viz. Christ's Resurrection, Rule, and coming again to judge the World, saying, that these, together with Jesus of Nazareth's being the Messiah, are all the Faith required as necessary to Justification. Ibid. p. 293, 294. Otherwhere he mentions his Suffering, and having fulfilled all things that were written in the Old Testament concerning the Messiah; adding, that those that believed this, and repent, should receive Remission of their Sins through this Faith in him. Ibid. p. 190. Thus Mr. Lock had shown what the Fundamental Articles of the Faith are, or rather, had showed how wavering and uncertain he himself is concerning them, assigning sometimes only one, sometimes two, sometimes more.  
He brings the Words of Tertullian. de Virg. Velan. to show how little different the Faith of the ancient Church was from the Faith he hath mentioned: but, 1. It would have been more for his Reputation, if the Faith which he mentions had not been at all different from that of the ancient Church. 2. Tertullian's Words there do not show that the Faith of the ancient Church differed little from his. For by comparing the Rule of Faith which he lays down here with that which he gives us in Lib. de Prescript. adv. Haeret. and in Lib. adv. Praxeam, it fully appears, that he did not design this for a complete Account of the Faith of the ancient Church; for, some things that are in this are omitted in the other; as, Omnipotentem (a Word certainly very material) is left out in both of them: and more things are added; as, Universa de nihilo produxerit per Verbum suum. Id Verbum Filium ejus appellatum, etc. Carnem factum, etc. Misisse vicariam vim Spiritus Sancti, is all added in Lib. de Prescript. and so Sermo ejus per quem omnia facta sunt, & sine quo factum est nihil. Ex ea (i. e. Virgin) natum hominem & Deum, mortuum & sepultum; Qui miserit Spiritum Sanctum, is all superadded in Lib. adv. Praxeam. Tertullian therefore will not be found to be a Friend to Mr. Lock, who might rather have said, that it may be seen in Tertullian, how far different the Faith of the ancient Church was from the Faith he hath mentioned.  
He tells us, that the Apostles Creed is the Faith he was baptised into, and that he hath not renounced one tittle thereof that he knows. But hath he not renounced the Article of the Resurrection of the Body, when he tells us, that in his next Edition of his Essay of Humane Understanding he will have the Word Body blotted out, and change these Words of his Book, The dead Bodies of Men shall rise, into these, The dead shall rise? See his Third Letter, pag. 210.    

CHAP. XXX. Of Virtue and Vice, Self-denial and Education.  
GOD hath, by an inseparable Connexion, joined Virtue and public Happiness together, and made the Practice thereof necessary to the Preservation of Society, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous Man has to do. Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 1. c. 3. §. 6. The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude and Obliquity, seem to me to be these three; 1. The Divine Law. 2. The Civil Law. 3. The Law of Opinion or Reputation, if I may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first of these, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins or Duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be Virtues or Vices. By Divine Law, I mean that Law which God has set to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature, or the Voice of Revelation. Virtue and Vice are Names pretended and supposed every where to stand for Actions in their own nature right or wrong; and as far as they really are so applied, they so far are coincident with the Divine Law abovementioned. But yet whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these Names of Virtue and Vice, in the particular Instances of their Application through the several Nations and Societies of Men in the World, are constantly attributed only to such Actions as in each Country or Society are in Reputation or Diseredit. Thus the measure of what is every where called and esteemed Virtue and Vice, is this Approbation or Dislike, Praise or Blame, which by a secret or tacit Consent establishes itself in the several Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of Men in the World; whereby several Actions come to find Credit or Disgrace among them, according to the Judgement, Maxims, and Fashions of that place. By this Approbation and Dislike they establish among themselves what they will call Virtue and Vice. Esteem and Discredit, Virtue and Vice, do yet in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong which the Law of God hath established; there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general Good of Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he hath set them; and nothing that breeds such Mischiefs and Confusion as the Neglect of them. And therefore Men, without renouncing all Sense and Reason, and their own Interest, which they are so constantly true to, could not generally mistake in placing their Commendation and Blame on that side that really deserved it not. Nay, even those Men whose Practice was otherwise, failed not to give their Approbation right, few being depraved to that degree, as not to condemn at least in others the Faults they themselves were guilty of; whereby even in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Virtue and Vice, were pretty well preserved. So that even the Exhortations of inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common Repute, Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good Report, if there be any Virtue, if there be any Praise, etc. Ibid. l. 2. c. 28. §. 7, 8, 10, 11. The Foundation of Vice lies in wrong measures of Good. Ibid. l. 4. c. 19 §. 16. Reputation is not the true principle and measure of Virtue, for that is the knowledge of a Man's Duty, and the satisfaction it is to obey his Maker in following the Dictates of that Light God has given him, with the hopes of Acceptation and Reward. I place Virtue as the first and most necessary of those Endowments that belong to a Man or a Gentleman, as absolutely requisite to make him valued and beloved by others, acceptable or tolerable to himself; without that I think he will neither be happy in this nor the other World. Of Education, p. 61, 157. It seems plain to me, that the Principle of all Virtue and Excellency lies in a Power of denying ourselves the Satisfaction of our own Desires, where Reason doth not authorise them. This Power is to be got and improved by Custom, made easy and familiar by an early Practice. He that has not a Mastery over his Inclinations, he that knows not how to resist the Importunity of present Pleasure and Pain for the sake of what Reason tells him is fit to be done, wants the true Principle of Virtue and Industry. This Temper therefore, so contrary to unguided Nature, is to be got betimes; and this Habit, as the true foundation of future Ability and Happiness, is to be wrought into the Mind as early as may be, and so to be confirmed by all the Care and Ways imaginable. Ibid. p. 37, 38, 46. Christ commands Self-denial, and the exposing ourselves to Suffering and Danger, rather than to deny or disown him. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 224. As the foundation of Virtue, there ought very early to be imprinted in the Minds of Children a true Notion of God, as of the independent supreme Being, Author and Maker of all things, from whom we receive all our Good, that loves us, and gives us all things, hears and sees every thing, and does all manner of Good to those that love and obey him, and consequent to it a Love and Reverence of him. They must be taught also to pray to him. The Lord's Prayer, the Creeds, and ten Commandments, 'tis necessary they should learn perfectly by heart. The Knowledge of Virtue all along from the beginning, in all the Instances they are capable of, being taught them more by Practice than Rules, I know not whether they should read any other Discourses of Morality but what they find in the Bible. Of Education, p. 157, 158, 185, 220. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
When Mr. Lock, in Essay l. 2. c. 28. §. 7. having named three distinct Laws, the Divine Law, the Civil Law, and the Law of Opinion or Reputation (as he calls it) says, that by the first Men judge whether their Actions are Sins or Duties, by the second whether they be criminal or innocent, by the third whether they be Virtues or Vices, doth he not plainly distinguish Sins and Duties from Vices and Virtues? For, 1. He makes Men to judge of Vices and Virtues by one Law, of Sins and Duties by another. 2. They judge by an infallible Rule of the one, by a very fallible one of the other. 3. Criminal and Innocent, are plainly distinct from Sins and Duties; and so we cannot but judge, that according to Mr. Lock, Vices and Virtues are distinct from both. Now if so, it might not be amiss, if he would inform us where the Distinction between them lies; for I have always thought that there is a very near Affinity as between Vice and Sin on the one hand, so between Virtue and Duty on the other hand. But tho', according to Mr. Lock, Men do judge of Virtue and Vice by his Law of Opinion and Reputation; yet he will not say that they ought to do so. He tells us here, §. 11. that the Law of Nature ought to be the Rule of Virtue and Vice, and expresses it more largely in his Epistle to the Reader: The Law of Nature, says he, is that standing and unalterable Rule by which Men ought to judge of the moral Rectitude and Pravity of their Actions, and accordingly denominate them Virtues or Vices. But I had rather say, that the Law which ought to be the Rule whereby Men judge of Sins and Duties, ought also to be the Rule by which they are to judge of Vices and Virtues, and that is the Divine Law, which (Mr. Lock himself being Judge) comprehends more than the Law of Nature. By the Divine Law (says he here, §. 8.) I mean that Law which God has set to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature, or the Voice of Revelation. So (say I) the Law of God comprehending both the Law of Nature and his revealed Law, is the Rule whereby Men ought to judge of Virtues and Vices.  
But Mr. Lock will prove, that his Law of Opinion or Reputation, or (as he also expresses it) Approbation or Dislike, Praise or Blame, is the common measure of Virtue and Vice. This (says he) will appear to any one who considers that every where Virtue and Praise, Vice and Blame, go together. Virtue is every where that which is thought praiseworthy, and nothing else but that which has the Allowance of public Esteem is called Virtue. Thus Mr. Lock here, viz. l. 2. c. 28. §. 11. But I would know whether he speaks of true and real, or of reputed Virtue: if of reputed, it is not to the purpose, since every one will grant, without Proof, that his Law of Reputation is the Rule of reputed Virtue; and it signifies no more than this, that that is reputed Virtue which is reputed such. Besides, how can it be worth the while to inquire after the Rule of reputed Virtue? If on the other side, he speak of true real Virtue, I believe that no Man before him ever said that true Virtue and Praise every where went together. Constant Experience may teach every Man the contrary. It is very rarely that true Virtue hath met with such Entertainment in the World: but, on the other hand, it would fill large Volumes, if we could set down all the Instances of reproached and despised Virtue, which the several Ages of the World have afforded.  
Mr. Lock goes on, and tells us, that Virtue and Praise are so united, that they are called often by the same name. His Meaning is, that Virtue is called often by the name of Praise; but he gives us only two Instances of it. The one is out of Virgil. AEneid. l. 1. Sunt sua praemia laudi; where laudi is by some interpreted virtuti, by others factis laudabilibus, or gestis bellicis: but the whole Verse is this; En Priamus, sunt hic etiam sua praemia laudi: and why may not laudi have here the usual Signification? Certainly, though I shall not be confident that it is the right Interpretation of the Verse, yet if referring sua to Priamus I should construe it thus, Lo Priamus, here also are his rewards to his Praise, I believe Mr. Lock would not find it very easy to confute it. The other Instance is out of Cicero, Tusc. Qu. l. 2. whose Words Mr. Lock hath transcribed, but I shall do it more fully: Nihil habet praestantius, nihil quod magis expetat; quam honestatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus. Hisce ego pluribus nominibus unam rem declarari volo, sed utor, ut quammaxime significem, pluribus. Volo autem dicere illud homini longe optimum esse, quod ipsum sit optandum per se, a virtute profectum vel in ipsa virtute situm, sua sponte laudabile; quod quidem citius dixerim solum quam summum bonum. Thus Cicero, who himself declares what that one thing is which he would signify by all those Names, viz. the chief or rather only Good, which is praiseworthy and desirable for itself, proceeds from Virtue, or is placed in Virtue. We need then no other Commentary but Tully's own. That which he signifies by Honestatem, Laudem, Dignitatem, Decus, is the chief Good, concerning which he would not determine whether it proceed from Virtue, or consists in it. It doth not appear then by these Citations out of Virgil and Tully, that they called Virtue and Praise by the same Name. But I shall be so liberal to Mr. Lock, as to suppose that those two great Persons, and other good Writers, have called Virtue by the Name of Praise, it will do him no Service after all, unless they did this for the Reason which he assigns, viz. because Virtue and Praise are united, and every where go together; and therefore it is incumbent upon him to prove that they did it for this Reason, which is a very difficult Task. I on the other side can easily assign more probable Reasons why they might do it. If any call Virtue by the Name of Praise, they had good ground for doing it, because true Virtue is always praiseworthy, and Men ought evermore to praise and celebrate it, tho' it too often meets with a contrary Reward from the World, is reproached and despised; as Vice on the other hand is too frequently magnified and extolled.  
But Mr. Lock endeavours to persuade us that reputed and true Virtue are in a great measure the same. For so he says here, that Esteem and Discredit, Virtue and Vice, do in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the Law of God hath established. And again, Men without renouncing all Sense and Reason and their own Interest, could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side that really deserved it not. Again, In the corruption of manners the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Virtue and Vice, were pretty well preserved, for which he alleges, Phil. 4. 8. He had said in the words immediately preceding, that even those Men whose practice was otherwise failed not to give their Approbation right, few being depraved to that degree as not to condemn at least in others the faults they themselves were guilty of. Thus Mr. Lock, in Essay, l. 2. c. 28. §. 11. And in his Epistle to the Reader he says, that Men in that way of denominating their Actions did not for the most part much vary from the Law of Nature.  
For answer to this, 1. How doth that which Mr. Lock says (viz. that few were depraved to that degree as not to condemn at least in others the faults they themselves were guilty of) agree with Rom. 1. 32. and other places of Scripture? In Rom. 1. 32. it is said, that they (i. e. the Gentiles) not only did the same (viz. the things that are mentioned in the foregoing Verses) but took pleasure in them that did them. They were not ignorant, that they who commit such things are worthy of Death, and yet practised them themselves, and not only so but they also approved of others that practised them. For so the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be rendered Comprobant. St. chrysostom, in loc. expounds it by Praising, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and so again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and is followed by O●●umenius. Theophylact interprets it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, they patronise or defend others that do them, appear as Advocates for them, so far they are from condemning them. So they that forsake the Law will praise the wicked Man, Prov. 28. 4. Those that keep the Law (as it follows there) will contend with wicked Men, but those that forsake it will be so far from contending with them, or condemning them, that contrariwise they will praise them. The Apostle also tells of some whose Glory is in their Shame, Phil. 3. 19 How then can Mr. Lock say that there are few depraved to that degree as not to condemn in others the faults they themselves are guilty of? When the Scripture speaks of those that make their Shame matter of glorying, and of so many that instead of condemning did praise, approve, and take pleasure in those that live in the practice of most heinous Sins. Also, how can he say as he doth, that Vice and Blame every where go together? when we are so plainly told in Holy Writ, that Vice and Praise so often go together, that Vice in this World meets with the Reward due to Virtue, is approved, applauded, commended.  
2. How can he say that reputed Virtue and Vice, in a great measure, every where corresponds to that which the Law of God hath established to be Virtue and Vice? when he tells us, that what is counted a Virtue in one Country, passes for Vice in another: For the Opinions of these Countries being directly contrary the one to the other, it is impossible that both of them should in any measure correspond with the Law of God. If the Divine Law have determined on the part of that Country which esteems such a thing to be a Virtue, than the Opinion of the other Country in which it is reputed to be a Vice cannot be agreeable to that Law; and if it hath not determined either way, either that it is a Virtue, or that it is a Vice, then neither of the two Opinions can pretend to agree with it. I know what Mr. Lock saith, Though what was thought praiseworthy in one place escaped not censure in another, and so in different Societies Virtues and Vices were changed; yet as to the main, they for the most part kept the same every where. But, 1. We may observe how cautiously and timorously he expresseth it; As to the main, and for the most part: it seems the one Expression would not secure him, without superadding the other. 2. It will be no difficulty to show that as to the main, and for the most part, they were not the same: for, all that is necessary to this is, to make it appear, that the Opinions of the Philosophers among the Heathens concerning Virtue and Vice, were not the same (as to the main, and for the most part) with the Opinions of those who judged of them by the Rule of the Law of God. Aristotle Politic. l. 7. c. 16. teaches it to be lawful to procure an Abortion before that which is conceived hath Life and Sense. Diogenes Laertius, in the Life of Zeno, tells of some that taught not only the Lawfulness of Self-murder, but also the Reasonableness of it. Cicero de Invent. l. 2. vers. fin. joins Revenge with Religion, Piety, Veracity, etc. and refers them all to that which he calls Natura jus; and it is a known Speech of his, ad Attic. l. 9 c. 14. Odi hominem & odero, utinam ulcisci poscem. And Aristotle, Ethic. l. 4. c. 11. will scarce excuse him from being faulty that doth not revenge himself. They that please, may see how much Cicero in Orat. pro M. Coelio says in defence of Meretricii amores, Si quis est qui etiam Meretriciis amoribus interdictum juventuti putet, est ille quidem valde severus, etc. The Community of Wives, and murdering such Infants as were weak and sickly, or deformed, was taught by the Laws of Lycurgus (see Plutarch, in Lycurgo;) and Community of Wives by Xenophon, de Republ. Lacedaem. We are told also by Tertullian Apologet. c. 39 that Socrates among the Greeks, and Cato among the Romans, lent their Wives to others; and Strabo, l. 11. with several others, testifies the same of Cato, and adds, that this was the ancient Custom of the Romans. Yea Diogenes the Cynic, and Plato, and the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus, were all of Opinion that Wives ought to be common, as Diogenes Laertius in Zenone informs us; and they that desire to see Plato's Judgement, may consult him de Republ. l. 5. and other where. As these that I have mentioned agreed with Lycurgus as to the Community of Wives, so there were too many that were for the Lawfulness of exposing or murdering Children, as he was. We may justly admire that Seneca, de Ira, l. 1. c. 15. should give such Advice as he does. At corrigi nequeunt, nihilque in illis bonae spei capax est. Tollantur e coetu mortalium. Portentosos foetus extinguimus, liberos quoque si debiles monstrosique sint editi mergimus: so he. Cicero, de Natur. Deor. l. 3. vers. fin. counted it a fault to acknowledge that we own any Virtue to God; that (says he) is not a Gift from God, we have it of ourselves. His Words are these; Virtutem nemo unquam acceptam Deo retulit, nimirum recte. Propter virtutem enim jure laudamur, & de virtute recte gloriamur, quod non contingeret, si id donum a Deo non a nobis haberemus. I shall add only one Instance more out of Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. l. 3. where he shows that the Stoics allowed Paedaresty, together with the foulest Incests, citing the Words of Zeno and Chrysippus. The very same is charged upon that Sect by Theophilus Antioch, ad Autolyc. l. 3. And as to Paedaresty, the Words of Tatianus, con. Graecos, p. 164, 165. are most apposite to our Purpose, especially if the Latin Interpreter hath rendered them right: Barbari puerorum amores damnant, iidem apud Romanos praerogativa dignantur. Much more might have been added, but this is more than enough to confute Mr. Lock's strange Assertion, That Esteem and Discredit, Virtue and Vice, do in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the Law of God hath established; or (as he expresses it in his Epistle to the Reader) that Men in denominating Virtue and Vice, did not, for the most part, much vary from the Law of Nature.  
But Mr. Lock will prove this from Scripture: Even the Exhortations of inspired Teachers have not feared (I suppose he means even inspired Teachers in their Exhortations have not feared) to appeal to common Repute. Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good Report, if there be any Virtue, if there be any Praise, etc. Phil. 4. 8. Thus Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 2. c. 28. §. 11. But in what Words doth the Apostle appeal to common Repute? Not in the Word Virtue, for by that he undoubtedly means real Virtue; not in the Word Praise, for by it is understood that which is truly Praiseworthy, (sua sponte laudabile, as Tully says;) not in the Words, whatsoever is lovely, for Oecumenius in loc. teaches us to understand thereby whatsoever is amiable in the Eyes of God, or of the Faithful, (〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.) Is it then in the Words, whatsoever is of good Report, that he appeals to it? It must be in these if in any. But, 1. As Oecumenius teaches us to understand the former Words, whatsoever is lovely, not in the Eyes of all Men but of the Faithful; so why may we not restrain the latter Words thus, What soever is of good Report, i. e. with good Men, or with those who know how to make a right Estimate of things, who have their Senses exercised to discern between good and evil? 2. Or may not the Words be expounded thus, Whatsoever is in itself, or of its own Nature, such as deserves that we should be well spoken of for it, or such as Men cannot but speak well of us for it, whosoever they be, whether Christians, or those that are without. St. Paul would have us to do all such things as Men ought to speak well of, but not every thing which any one may speak well of, for some may speak well of the Covetous, whom the Lord abhorreth, Psal. 10. 3. and that may be highly esteemed with Men which is an Abomination in the Sight of God. It is then a great Mistake to think that the Apostle here appeals to common Esteem and Repute; which is so uncertain, that if it was the Measure of Virtue and Vice, by reason of the different Temper, Education, Fashion, Judgement, Maxims, and Interest of Men in several Ages and Places, it would fall out, that what is Virtue in one Age would be Vice in another, as Mr. Lock confesses, that what is accounted Virtue in one place, passes for Vice in another. That which is so uncertain and changeable cannot but vary much from the certain and unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, viz. the Law of God, let Mr. Lock pretend to the contrary what he will, and plead as much as he will for his Law of Opinion and Reputation.  
When Mr. Lock says, that Men are so constantly true to their Interest, he cannot surely mean their chiefest Interest, viz. the Interest of their Souls; for he must needs be sensible how regardless Men are of that, and how ready to betray it.  
Tho' in his Treatise of Education, p. 61. he says, That Reputation is not the true Principle and Measure of Virtue, yet he adds, That it is that which comes nearest to it. But it may do well, if he please, to explain what he means by its coming nearest the true Principle and Measure of Virtue.  
When in his Treatise of Education, p. 185. he says, the Lord's Prayer, the Creeds, and Ten Commandments, etc. doth he by the Creeds understand those Three Creeds which we have in our Liturgy, called the Apostles, the Nicene, and Athanasian? Or is Creeds put for Creed by the Mistake of the Press?    

CHAP. XXXI. Of the Resurrection of the Body, the Day of Judgement, and Eternal Rewards and Punishments.  
THE Resurrection of the Body after Death is above Reason: That the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again, this being beyond the Discovery of Reason, is purely a Matter of Faith, with which Reason has directly nothing to do, Mr. Lock, Essay, l. 4. c. 17. §. 23. and c. 18. §. 7. Divine Justice shall bring to Judgement at the last Day the very same Persons, to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this Life. He who at first made us begin to subsist here sensible intelligent Being's, and for several Years continued us in such a State, can and will restore us to the like State of Sensibility in another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has designed to Men according to their Do in this Life, Ibid. l. 1. c. 4. §. 5. and l. 4. c. 3. §. 6. We groan within ourselves, waiting for the Adoption, to wit, the Redemption of our Body, Rom. 8. 23. whereby is plainly meant the Change of these frail mortal Bodies into the spiritual immortal Bodies at the Resurrection, when this Mortal shall have put on Immortality, 1 Cor. 15. 54. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 206. This being the Case, that whoever is guilty of any Sin should certainly die and cease to be, the Benefit of Life restored by Christ at the Resurrection, would have been no great Advantage (for as much as here again Death must have seized upon all Mankind, because all had sinned; for the Wages of Sin is every where Death, as well after as before the Resurrection) if God had not found out a way to justify some, Ibid. p. 15. The Scripture is express, that the same Persons shall be raised and appear before the Judgment-Seat of Christ, that every one may receive according to what he has done in his Body. The Third Letter, p. 196. In the New Testament I find our Saviour and the Apostles to preach the Resurrection of the Dead, and the Resurrection from the Dead in many Places; and the Resurrection of the Dead, I acknowledge to be an Article of the Christian Faith. But I do not remember any Place where the Resurrection of the same Body is so much as mentioned. Nay, I do not remember in any Place of the New Testament (where the general Resurrection of the last Day is spoken of) any such Expression as the Resurrection of the Body, much less of the same Body, Ibid. p. 166. When I writ my Essay, I took it for granted, as I doubt not but many others have done, that the Scripture had mentioned in express Terms the Resurrection of the Body; but looking more narrowly into what Revelation has declared concerning the Resurrection, I find no such express Words in the Scripture, as that the Body shall rise or be raised, or the Resurrection of the Body. I shall therefore, in the next Edition of it, change these Words of my Essay, l. 4. c. 18. §. 7. The dead Bodies of Men shall rise, into these of the Scripture, The Dead shall rise. Not that I question that the Dead shall be raised with Bodies, Ibid. p. 210. Tho' I do by no means deny that the same Bodies shall be raised at the last Day, yet I see nothing said to prove it to be an Article of Faith. Ibid. p. 195. The Apostle tells us, at the great Day, when every one shall receive according to his Do, the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open. The Sentence shall be justified by the Consciousness all Persons shall have, that they themselves are the same that committed those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them, Essay, l. 2. c. 27. §. 26. Christ himself, who knew for what he should condemn Men at the last Day, assures us in the two Places where he describes his Proceeding at the great Judgement, that the Sentence of Condemnation passes only on the Workers of Iniquity, such as neglected to fulfil the Law in Acts of Charity, Matth. 7. 23. Luke 13. 27. Matth. 25. 42. That Men may not be deceived by mistaking the Doctrine of Faith, Grace, Free Grace, and the Pardon and Forgiveness of Sin, and Salvation by Christ, (which was the great End of his Coming,) he more than once declares to them, for what Omissions and Miscarriages he shall judge and condemn to death even those who have owned him, and done Miracles in his Name, when he comes at last to render to every one according to what he hath done in the Flesh, sitting upon his great and glorious Tribunal at the end of the World; see John 5. 28, 29. Matth. 13. 14. 16. 24, etc. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 9 241, 242, 243, 244, 245. I am going to a Tribunal that hath a Right to judge of Thoughts. The Third Letter, p. 98. The eternal Condition of a future State infinitely outweighs the Expectation of Riches, or Honour, or any other Worldly Pleasure we can propose to ourselves. The Happiness of another Life shall certainly be agreeable to every one's Wish or Desire. The Rewards and Punishments of another Life, which the Almighty has established as the Enforcements of his Law, are of Weight enough to determine the Choice against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can show, when the eternal State is considered in its bare Possibility, which no body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite and endless Happiness to be but the possible Consequence of a good Life here, or the contrary State the possible Reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude that a Virtuous Life, with the certain Expectation of everlasting Bliss which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the Fear of that dreadful State of Misery which 'tis very possible may overtake the Guilty, or at best the terrible uncertain Hope of Annibilation. This is evidently so, tho' the virtuous Life here had nothing but Pain, and the vicious continual Pleasure, which yet is for the most part quite otherwise, and wicked Men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present Possession, nay, all things considered rightly, have I think the worst part here. But when infinite Happiness is put in one Scale against infinite Misery in the other, if the worst that comes to the pious Man if he mistake, be the best that the wicked Man can attain to if he be in the right, who can without madness run the Venture? Who in his Wits would choose to come within a Possibility of infinite Misery, which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that Hazard: Whereas, on the other hand, the sober Man ventures nothing against Happiness to be got if his Expectation comes to pass. If the good Man be in the right, he is eternally happy; is he mistake, he is not miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistake, he is infinitely miserable. Must it not be a most manifest wrong Judgement that does not presently see to which side in this Case the Preference is to be given? I have forborn to mention any thing of the Certainty or Probability of a future State, designing here to show the wrong Judgement that any one must allow he makes upon his own Principles, laid how he pleases, who prefers the short Pleasures of a vicious Life upon any Consideration, whilst he knows and cannot but be certain that a future Life is at least possible, Essay, l. 2. c. 21. §. 38, 65, 70. Nothing of Pleasure or Pain in this Life can bear any Proportion to endless Happiness or exquisite Misery of an immortal Soul hereafter. Let a Man see that Virtue and Religion are necessary to his Happiness, let him look into the future State of Bliss or Misery, and see there God the righteous Judge ready to render to every one according to his Deeds; to them that by patiented Continuance in well-doing, seek for Glory, and Honour, and Immortality, eternal Life; but to every Soul that doth evil, Indignation and Wrath, Tribulation and Anguish: To him, I say, who hath a Prospect of the different State of perfect Happiness or Misery, that attends all Men after this Life, depending on their Behaviour here, the measures of Good and Evil that govern his Choice, are mightily changed, Ibid. §. 60. Our Saviour requires the Obedience of his Disciples to several of the Commands of the Moral Law he afresh lays upon them, with the Enforcement of unspeakable Rewards and Punishments in another World, according to their Obedience or Disobedience, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 234. The Son of God would in vain have come into the World, to lay the Foundation of a Kingdom, and gather together a select People out of the World, if (they being found guilty at their Appearance before the Judgment-Seat of the righteous Judge of all Men at the last Day) instead of Entrance into eternal Life in the Kingdom he had prepared for them, they should receive Death, the just Reward of Sin, which every one of them was guilty of. This second Death would have left him no Subjects, Ibid. p. 211. Open men's Eyes upon the endless unspeakable Joys of another Life, and their Hearts will find something solid and powerful to move them to live well here. The View of Heaven and Hell will cast a 'Slight upon the short Pleasures and Pains of this present State, and give Attractions and Encouragements to Virtue, which Reason and Interest, and the Care of ourselves, cannot but allow, Ibid. p. 291, 292. Thus Mr. Lock.  

OBSERVATIONS.  
As to the Article of the Resurrection, the first Enquiry must be, Whether there are to be found any such express Words in the Scripture, as that the Body shall rise or be raised, or the Resurrection of the Body, where the general Resurrection is spoken of. If, when Mr. Lock denies that such express Words are found in the Scripture (see his Third Letter, p. 210.) his Meaning be, that those very express Words are not found, I grant that they are not; but if he mean farther, that express Words which signify the very same thing are not to be found, the contrary will easily appear.  
In Rom. 8. 23. there are these express Words, the Redemption of our Body; and Mr. Lock, in Reasonab. of Christian. p. 206. tells us, that thereby is plainly meant the Change of these frail mortal Bodies into the spiritual immortal Bodies at the Resurrection, when this Mortal shall have put on Immortality. In the same Chapter, v. 11. we find these express Words, Quicken your mortal Bodies. He that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal Bodies, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, shall make them to live, restore them to Life after Death, as he restored the crucified Body of Christ to Life; so that to quicken our mortal Bodies, is the same with raising them. And Mr. Lock, in his Third Letter, p. 199. saying, that in the New Testament it is said, Raise the Dead, Quicken or make alive the Dead, the Resurrection of the Dead, clearly makes to Quicken and to Raise to signify the same. And St. Chrysostom (not to mention Occumenius and Theophylact, who follow him,) gives a Reason why St. Paul says, Quicken or give Life to our mortal Bodies, rather than raise them, viz. Because he here speaks only of those who should be raised to Life, (i. e. a blissful or happy Life,) viz. the Faithful, who have the Spirit of God dwelling in them; not of the Wicked, who shall also be raised, but (says he) unto Punishment, not unto Life. There is a third Text which hath so near a Resemblance to these, that it may well be joined with them, viz. Phil. 3. 21. Who shall change our vile Body, that it may be conformed to his glorious Body. When shall the Saviour the Lord Christ effect this wonderful Change, that our vile Body shall be made conformable to his glorious Body? Surely then, when he shall quicken or raise it, and that will be when he comes from Heaven to judge the World, see v. 20. Here is not indeed the Word Raise, but it is plainly employed. The Blessed Jesus when he comes from Heaven will raise our vile Body, and make it conformed to his own glorious Body.  
Will Mr. Lock say that the general Resurrection is not spoken of in these Places? He cannot say it of the first, viz. Rom. 8. 23. without retracting his own express Words in Reasonab. of Christian. p. 206. He cannot say it of the third, viz. Philip. 3. 21. because the immediately foregoing Verse points us to the Time of Christ's coming from Heaven to judge the World. He may perhaps say it of the second, viz. Rom. 8. 11. because some before him have said that the general Resurrection is not spoken of in that Text, particularly Calvin and Piscator.  
Calvin in loc. hath these Words, Mortalia corpora vocat quicquid adhuc restat in nobis morti obnoxium, ut mos illi usit at us est crassioram nostri partem hoc nomine appellare. Unde colligimus non de ultima resurrectione quae momento fiet haberi sermonem; sed de continua Spiritus operatione, quae reliquias carnis paulatim mortificans caelestem vitam in nobis instaurat. He tells us, that by mortal Bodies is understood whatsoever remains still in us obnoxious to Death; which we may grant him, for our Souls are not obnoxious to Death; and therefore our mortal Bodies contain all that remains in us liable to Death. He tells us also, that it is the Apostle's usual manner to call the grosser part of us by that Name, i. e. by the Name of Body; and we may likewise grant him this, for every one grants that the Body is the grosser part of us. But now what would he gather from this? Whence (says he) we collect that the last Resurrection is not spoken of. His Argument put into Form, is this, The Apostle by mortal Bodies understands whatsoever remains still in us obnoxious to Death; therefore the last Resurrection is not spoken of. Mr. Lock may try, if he pleases, whether he can find out any thing to tie this Antecedent and Consequent together, but I can pronounce that it will not be very easy for him to do it.  
Piscater's Words are these, Quum certum sit Apostolum hic non lequi de resurrectione corporum sed animarum. Tho' our own Eyes tell us, that the Apostle uses the word Bodies, (not Souls,) yet, if we will believe Piscator, it is certain that here he speaks not of the Resurrection of Bodies, but of Souls: And how is it certain? Mr. Calvin hath said it, that is all the Assurance that I know of. He that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal Bodies, these are the Apostle's Words. If when he says he raised up Christ from the dead, he speaks of the Resurrection of his Body, not of his Soul, how can we be certain that when he says, Shall quicken your mortal Bodies, he speaks of the Resurrection, not of their Bodies but of their Souls? We see then, that if Mr. Lock fly to this, to say that the general Resurrection is not spoken of, Rom. 8. 11. he will not be much helped either by Calvin or Piscator.  
I confess that there is one who makes the Words to be capable of a twofold Sense, and that is Crellius. According to him they may be interpreted either of the future raising or quickening our mortal Bodies, or of the spiritual quickening them, which consists in this, that they live unto Righteousness and unto God. But he makes the former the principal Sense, the latter only secundary.  
As Mr. Lock says of the Resurrection of the Body, so he says of the Resurrection of the same Body, viz. That he does not remember any Place in the New Testament where it is so much as mentioned; see his Third Letter, p. 166. And my Answer will be the same, viz. That these very express Words, The Resurrection of the same Body, are not to be found, but there are Words that signify so much, or from which it may be clearly and necessarily inferred. I may instance in the three Places abovecited, Rom. 8. 11, 23. Phil. 3. 21. where St. Paul by our Body, our vile Body, and our mortal Bodies, certainly understood the Bodies which he, and the Romans, and the Philippians, than had, and says of these, that they should be redeemed, quickened, changed. Who shall change our vile Body, that it (i. e. that vile Body) may be conformed to his glorious Body, Philip. 3. And (as I have observed before) Mr. Lock, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 206. says, That by the Redemption of our Body, Rom. 8. 23. is plainly meant the Change of these frail mortal Bodies into spiritual immortal Bodies at the Resurrection, when this mortal shall have put on immortality, 1 Cor. 15. 54. Thus he. It is observable also, that in his Third Letter, p. 197. when the Words of that Text, 1 Cor. 15. 53, 54. were urged to prove the Resurrection of the same Body, he returns no Answer to them, and did very prudently in returning none: For doth not St. Paul expressly affirm, that this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality? i. e. this corruptible, this mortal, must be raised to a Life of Incorruption and Immortality. And doth he not also repeat it, When this corruptible, & c.? What can be more plain? This corruptible, this mortal, (which are the Apostles repeated Expressions,) these frail mortal Bodies, (which is Mr. Lock's own Expression,) shall be raised, the Light of the brightest Day cannot be more clear.  
Some perhaps will say, that Mr. Lock does by no means deny that the same Bodies shall be raised at the last Day; they are his own Words in his Third Letter, p. 195. To which I answer, 1. If he do not deny it, why doth he dispute so earnestly against it? Why doth he endeavour, to the utmost of his Power, to baffle the Arguments that are urged for the Proof of it? A great many Pages of his Third Letter being taken up in the discussing this one Point. 2. He says he does by no means deny it, but does he believe it? If he do believe it, it is not upon the Account of any Argument drawn from Reason, for he tells us more than once in his Essay, that the Resurrection of the Body is above Reason; Reason has directly nothing to do with it, but it is purely Matter of Faith; see his Essay, l. 4. c. 17. §. 23. and c. 18. §. 7. He must then believe it upon the Account of some Arguments drawn from Scripture, or being convinced by some Texts of Scripture which teach this Truth. If so, he deserves to be sharply reprehended, for that he would not acquaint us what Texts of Scripture they are that teach it so clearly: Especially having taken so much Pains to show that the Places of Scripture alleged by others did not prove it, he ought to have directed us to those Scriptures which did, and by the Cogency of which he was brought to believe it. But the Truth is, he says plainly, that there are no Scriptures that do prove it; affirming that the Scriptures propose to us, that at the last Day the Dead shall be raised, without determining whether it shall be with the very same Bodies or no; see his Third Letter, p. 168. Tho' therefore he does say, that he by no means denies that the same Bodies shall be raised at the last Day, yet it clearly appears that he does not believe that they shall; for, according to him, there are no Arguments either from Scripture or Reason to induce him to believe it.  
Mr. Lock's Doctrine concerning Adam's Fall, and our Redemption by Christ, is this: God told Adam, that in the Day that he did eat of such a Tree he should surely die; where, by Death, Mr. Lock can understand nothing but a ceasing to be, the losing all Actions of Life and Sense. Such a Death came on Adam and all his Posterity by his first Disobedience, under which Death they should have lain for ever, had it not been for the Redemption by Jesus Christ, who will bring them all to Life again at the last Day; see for this, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 3, 6, 11. But then he tells us, p. 15. that this being the case, that whoever is guilty of any Sin, should certainly die, and cease to be, the Benefit of Life restored by Christ at the Resurrection, would have been no great Advantage, if God had not found out a way to justify some. The Reason of which he gives in a Parenthesis, For as much (says he) as here again (i. e. after the Resurrection) Death must have seized upon all Mankind, (all Mankind must have died and ceased to be the second time,) because all had sinned; for the Wages of Sin is every where Death (which Death is a ceasing to be) as well after as before the Resurrection. This Death after the Resurrection is that which, p. 211. he calls the second Death; which (says he) would have left Christ no Subjects, if God had not found out a way to justify some. As to those who at the Resurrection shall be found unjustified, that second Death shall seize upon them, and sweep them away; so that, according to Mr. Lock, they shall cease to be, i. e. be annihilated, for I can find out no other Sense that these Words, Cease to be, are capable of: Tho' I confess I do not see that this Sense can be consistent with several other Expressions which he uses, viz. that dreadful Estate of Misery, the infinite Misery, the exquisite Misery of an immortal Soul, the perfect Misery, the Indignation and Wrath, Tribulation and Anguish, which shall be after this Life. But it may be Mr. Lock can put such a Sense upon these Expressions, and the like to them, viz. Everlasting Fire, and Everlasting Punishment, in the Words of our Saviour cited by him, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 244, 245. as may consist with ceasing to be, or being annihilated.  
When Mr. Lock says, in Essay, l. 2. c. 21. §. 60. that the measures of Good and Evil govern the Choice; and §. 70. that the Rewards and Punishments of another Life are of weight enough to determine the Choice against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can show; this seems to be not very consistent with that which he had said in the same Chapter, §. 30. that the greater Good in view is not that which determines the Will, in regard to our Actions; and again, §. 35. that Good, the greater Good, tho' apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the Will: For what is the meaning of the Measures of Good and Evil, their governing the Choice, but that it is governed by the greater Good and greater Evil? Or why are the Rewards of another Life of weight enough to determine the Choice against the Pleasures of this, but because they are the greater Good? So that in the Expressions which he uses, §. 60. and 70. he seems to say that the greater Good doth determine the Choice; whereas, §. 30. and 35. he is of the contrary Opinion, that it is not of sufficient weight to determine the Choice, until our Desire raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it. Let a Man (says he) be never so well persuaded of the Advantages of Virtue, that it is as necessary to a Man who hath any great Aims in this World, or Hopes in the next, as Food to Life; yet till he hungers and thirsts after Righteousness, till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his Will will not be determined to any Action in pursuit of this confessed greater Good. Thus Mr. Lock. And I readily grant that a bare View or Prospect of future Rewards and Punishments is not of Force to determine the Choice against present Pleasure and Pain; but it is necessary that we firmly believe them, and be fully convinced of the Certainty of them; as also, that we have them frequently in our Thoughts, and seriously meditate upon the transcendent Happiness of the one, and the unspeakable Miseries of the other, that so our Souls may be inflamed with an hearty Desire of the Rewards, and possessed with a real Fear and serious Dread of the Punishments, before we shall apply ourselves in good earnest to work out our Salvation from the Unhappiness of the one, and to secure our Enjoyment of the Felicity of the other. As to that which he says, that Virtue is as necessary to a Man who has any great Aims in this World, as Food to Life, tho' it will seem a Paradox to some, yet I shall not contradict it; for I know that it is necessary for all Men, yea, as necessary as Food is for our Bodily Sustenance; but I wish that Mr. Lock could persuade those that aim at great things in this World, that Virtue is so absolutely necessary for them.     

A SPECIMEN OF Mr. Locke's Way of Answering Persons: Out of his ESSAY, l. 1. c. 3. §. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19  
MR. Lock, in the Third Chapter of the First Book of his Essay, hath twice set these Words in his Margin, Lord Herbert's innate Principles examined, perhaps because he would have it taken notice of that he durst undertake to grapple with so great a Person. I have therefore taken more especial Notice of that which he saith against that Excellent Writer, and also represented it at length to the Reader's View, that he may likewise take the more Notice of it; the rather, because it will afford him a Specimen of Mr. Lock's Way of Answering Authors.  

Mr. Lock, in his Essay. l. 1. c. 3.  
§. 15. When I had writ this, being informed that my Lord Herbert had in his Books de Veritate assigned these innate Principles, I presently consulted him, hoping to find in a Man of so great Parts something that might satisfy me in this Point, and put an end to my Enquiry. In his Chapter de Instinctu Naturali, p. 76. Edit. 1656. I met with these six Marks of his Notitiae Communes, 1. Prioritas, 2. Independentia, 3. Universalitas, 4. Certitudo, 5. Necessitas, i. e. as he explains it, faciunt ad hominis conservationem, 6. Modus conformationis, i. e. assensus nulla interposita mora. And at the latter end of his little Treatise de Religione Laici, he says this of these innate Principles, Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis Religionis confinio arctentur, quae ubique vigent, veritates. Sunt enim in ipsa ment caelitus descriptae, nullisque traditionibus five scriptis five non scriptis obnoxiae, p. 3. And Veritates nostrae Catholicae, quae tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori descripta. Thus having given the Marks of the innate Principles or common Notions, and asserted their being imprinted on the Minds of Men by the Hand of God, he proceeds to set them down, and they are these: 1. Esse aliquod supremum numen, 2. Numen illud coli debere, 3. Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam esse rationem cultus divini, 4. Resipiscendum esse a peccatis, 5. Dari praemium vel poenam post hanc vitam transactam. These, tho' I allow them to be clear Truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Assent to, yet I think he is far from proving that they are innate Impressions in foro interiori descripta: For I must take leave to observe,  
§. 16. First, that these five Propositions are either not all, or more than all, those common Notions writ on our Minds by the Finger of God, if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written. Since there are other Propositions which even by his own Rules have as just a Pretence to such an Original, and may be as well admitted for innate Principles, as at least some of these Five he enumerates, viz. Do as thou wouldst be done unto, and perhaps some Hundreds of others when well considered.  
§. 17. Secondly, That all his Marks are not to be found in each of his five Propositions, viz. his first, second, and third Marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth Marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth Propositions: For besides that we are assured from History of many Men, nay, whole Nations, who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them; I cannot see how the third, viz. That Virtue joined with Piety is the best Worship of God, can be an innate Principle, when the Name or Sound Virtue is so hard to be understood, liable to so much Uncertainty in its Signification, and the thing it stands for so much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore this can be but a very uncertain Rule of Humane Practice, and serve but very little to the Conduct of our Lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assigned as an innate practical Principle.  
§. 18. For let us consider this Proposition as to its meaning (for it is the Sense, and not sound, that is and must be the Principle or common Notion,) viz. Virtue is the best Worship of God, i. e. is most acceptable to him; which is Virtue be taken, as most commonly it is, for those Actions, which according to the different Opinions of several Countries are accounted laudable, will be a Proposition so far from being certain, that it will not be true. If Virtue be taken for Actions conformable to God's Will, or to the Rule prescribed by God, which is the true and only Measure of Virtue; when Virtue is used to signify what is in its own Nature right and good, than this Proposition, That Virtue is the best Worship of God, will be most true and certain, but of very little use in Humane Life, since it will amount to no more but this, viz. That God is pleased with the doing of what he commands; which a Man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command, and so be as far from any Rule or Principle of his Actions as he was before. And I think very few will take a Proposition which amounts to no more than this, viz. That God is pleased with the doing of what he himself commands, for an innate moral Principle writ on the Minds of all Men, (how true and certain soever it may be,) since it teaches so little. Whosoever does so, will have Reason to think Hundreds of Propositions innate Principles, since there are many which have as good a Title as this to be received for such, which no body yet ever put into that Rank of innate Principles.  
§. 19 Nor is the Fourth Proposition, viz. Men must repent of their Sins, much more instructive, till what those Actions are that are meant by Sins are set down: For the Word Peccata, or Sins, being put, as it usually is, to signify in general ill Actions, that will draw on Punishment upon the Doers, what great Principle of Morality can that be to tell us we should be sorry, and cease to do that which will bring Mischief upon us, without knowing what those particular Actions are that will do so. Indeed this is a very true Proposition, and fit to be inculcated on and received by those who are supposed to have been taught what Actions in all kinds are Sins; but neither this nor the former can be imagined to be innate Principles, nor to be of any use if they were innate, unless the particular Measures and Bounds of all Virtues and Vices were engraven in men's Minds, and were innate Principles also, which I think is very much to be doubted: And therefore I imagine it will scarce seem possible that God should engrave Principles in men's Minds in Words of uncertain Signification, such as are Virtues and Sins, which amongst different Men stand for different things: Nay, it cannot be in Words at all, which being in most of these Principles very general Names, cannot be understood, but by knowing the Particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical Instances, the Measures must be taken from the Knowledge of the Actions themselves, and the Rules of them abstracted from Words, and antecedent to the Knowledge of Names; which Rules a Man must know what Language soever he chance to learn, whether English or Japan, or if he should learn no Language at all, or never should understand the use of Words, as happens in the Case of dumb and deaf Men. When it shall be made out, that Men ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Customs of their Country, that it is part of the Worship of God not to kill another Man, not to know more Women than one, not to procure Abortion, not to expose their Children, not to take from another what is his, tho' we want it ourselves, but on the contrary to relieve and supply his Wants; and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more: When, I say, all Men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such Rules, all which come under these two general Words made use of above, viz. Virtues and Sins, there will be more Reason for admitting these and the like for common Notions and practical Principles; yet after all, universal Consent (were there any in Moral Principles) to Truths, the Knowledge whereof might be attained otherwise, would searce prove them to be innate: which is all I contend for.  
Thus far Mr. Lock, and this is all that he answers to the Lord Herbert; it remains that I briefly reply to it.  
Ad. §. 15. Here in his Text Mr. Lock speaks of the Lord Herbert's assigning innate Principles, giving Marks of these innate Principles, and saying so or so of them: Also in his Margin he hath these Words, Lord Herbert's innate Principles examined; and the very same Words are found again in his Margin ad §. 19 And yet I do not observe that the Lord Herbert, either in his Treatise de Veritate, or in that which he entitles Religio Laici, doth as much as once mention either the Expression Innate Principles, or the Word Innate; nor doth Mr. Lock direct us to any Place in either of those Treatises where he doth mention them. 'Tis true, that in his Treatise de Veritate there is frequent mention of Communes Notitiae, and in his Religio Laici of Veritates Catholicae, and we may suppose that Mr. Lock took these common Notions or Notices, and Catholic Verities, to be the same with his innate Principles: In which, if he be mistaken, he both makes the Lord Herbert to say that which he doth not; and withal, while he goes about to prove that those Catholic Verities are not innate Principles, he says nothing at all against that Honourable Person, who never affirmed them to be so.  
If it be said that the Lord Herbert affirms these Catholic Verities to be written by God upon the Hearts of all Men, which is the same with their being innate; I answer, that it is very true that he doth say more than once, that they are in foro interno, or in foro interiori descriptae, & in ment humana a Deo O. M. descriptae; but I question whether it will be for Mr. Lock's Advantage to say, that the being written by God in the Heart, and being innate, are the same; for it may endanger the Overthrow of all that he says concerning innate Principles, and force him to quit his darling Opinion that there are none: For if the Question be put whether there be any Principles written in the Hearts of Men, St. Paul seems to resolve it affirmatively that there are, Rom. 2. 14, 15. When (says he) the Gentiles not having the Law do by Nature the things of the Law, these not having the Law are a Law to themselves; who show the Work of the Law written in their Hearts, their Conscience bearing witness, and their Thoughts accusing or excusing one another. By the Work of the Law here may be understood either, 1. That Work which the Law prescribes, or the Duties that are required by it; or, 2. The Effect of the Law, or that which it effecteth, i. e. the Knowledge of our Duty, or of that which we ought to do, as also of the contrary, i. e. of that which we ought not to do, as the Apostle says expressly, Rom. 3. 20. By the Law is the Knowledge of Sin; or, 3. By the Work of the Law we may understand (as Origen, Theodoret, and several others, seem to do) the Law itself, i. e. not the Letters and Syllables of the Law, but the Sentence, Sum and Substance of it. Which soever of these Expositions we follow, the Sense is in effect the same; so that when St. Paul says that the Gentiles had the Work of the Law written in their Hearts, his Meaning is, that they had the Sentence and Substance of the Law, or many of the Duties prescribed by it, and the Knowledge of them engraven or imprinted in their Hearts. And is it not as clear from hence as any thing possibly can be, that they had some Principles or Communes notitiae written in their Hearts? And therefore if the Lord Herber. only say that there are some common Principles or Catholic Truths written in the Hearts or Minds of Men, he says no more than the Apostle doth; and Mr. Lock, from the Apostle's saying that the Work of the Law was written in the Hearts of the Gentiles, may infer, that he held innate Principles, with as good Reason as he doth from the Lord Herbert's affirming some Truths to be written in the Hearts or Minds of Men, that he held such Principles. And the Truth is, there have not wanted some Prudent and Learned Persons who have expounded these Words of the Apostle of innate Notices or Principles. Quod inquit Paulus Opus scriptum in cordibus, significat has notitias naturales dona esse attributa naturae, & nobiscum nascentia; they are the Words of Melancthon in loc.  
Mr. Lock having transcribed five of the Lord Herbert's Notitiae Communes, adds, These, tho' I allow them to be clear Truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving Assent to; yet I think he is far from proving them innate Impressions in foro interiori descriptae: Where I shall not stand to ask Mr. Lock what answers to the Word These, but I must desire the Reader to bear in Mind that he allows all the five Notitiae Communes to be clear Truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Assent to: For this intimates that there is something of them written in the Heart, which is the Reason why we can hardly avoid assenting to them so soon as they are proposed to us, and we understand the Terms of them. To that which he says farther, that he thinks that the Lord Herbert is far from proving them innate Impressions, I briefly answer, that as Mr. Lock hath not shown, so I have not found that the Lord Herbert any where uses the Phrase Innate Impressions. It is true that he says that his Catholic Verities are in foro interiori descriptae; and if it be said that Mr. Lock thinks that he is far from proving them to be so, I reply, that it will best appear whether he be far from proving it or no, by examining the Reasons of Mr. Lock's thinking so; which we may expect to find, if any where, in the following Sections.  
Ad §. 16. Here Mr. Lock observes, that the Five Propositions set down by the Lord Herbert are either not all, or more than all the common Notions writ on our Minds by the Finger of God, if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written. To which I answer, If Mr. Lock could prove that the five Propositions mentioned by the Lord Herbert, are more than all those common Notions writ in our Minds by the Finger of God, it would follow, that some of them are not such Notions, and that would make directly against the Lord Herbert. But Mr. Lock hath not proved this, and if he had, it would not be for his Advantage, unless he could prove farther that none of them are such Notions; for his known Tenet is, that there are no Notions or Principles at all that are so written in men's Hearts. On the other hand, if Mr. Lock can prove that these Five are not all those common Notions writ in our Minds by the Finger of God, this makes not at all against the Lord Herbert, who never said or thought that they were all; as Mr. Lock might have seen if he had given himself leisure seriously and deliberately to peruse his Treatise de Veritate. He would have found that he very frequently names other common Notions, and particularly he takes notice that there are many Notitiae Communes in Mathematics, which they call Postulata, (p. 181. Edit. 1633.) and speaks of tota notitiarum communium series, p. 206. He would also have found, that where the Lord Herbert sets down those five Propositions, he is not speaking of common Notions in general, but of those only which concern Religion; Notitiae communes circa Religionem is the Title: Yea, in setting down those five he did not design to give us all the common Notions that concern Religion. He himself plainly tells us this, Notitias communes solenniores circa Religionem praemittendas curavi, says he, p. 207. he did not take care to premise all the common Notions that concern Religion, but only the Solenniores. Yea, p. 227. he makes all the Ten Commandments to be Notitiae communes. Mr. Lock says, that this, Do as thou wouldst be done unto, and perhaps some hundreds of others may as justly pretend to be Notitiae communes, as at least some of those five. To which I answer, 1. The Lord Herbert never designed to exclude Do as thou wouldst be done unto from being Notitia communis, for he more than once mentions it as such, viz. p. 54, and 57, and 106. 2. When Mr. Lock says Perhaps some hundreds of others, tho' possibly he intended it only as a Rhetorical Flight, yet I question whether the Lord Herbert would have denied that there are hundreds of Notitiae communes. However, I think it is plain that there is nothing in this Section that makes against that honourable Person, and if Mr. Lock had carefully read his Treatise de Veritate, I believe he would have wholly omitted it.  
Ad §. 17. This Section gins thus, All his (i. e. the Lord Herbert's) Marks are not to be found in each of his five Propositions, viz. his first, second, and third Marks agree perfectly to neither of them. Thus Mr. Lock. Now 'tis impossible to make Sense of these last Words, To neither of them; and therefore I conclude that it is a false Print, but know not what Words to substitute instead of them. Perhaps in the Copy it was thus, His first, second, and third Marks agree perfectly to neither of the two first. If this was his Meaning, that we may judge the better of the Truth thereof, we are to know that the six Marks assigned by the Lord Herbert, are to distinguish the common Notions which we have by natural Instinct from those that we have not without the Help of Discourse. The former are distinguished from the latter by, 1. Priority, 2. Independency, 3. Universality, 4. Certainty, 5. Necessity, 6. The Manner of Conformation. Thus the Lord Herbert. Now (if I do not mistake in correcting the Error of the Press) Mr. Lock says, that the three former Marks do not perfectly agree to the two first Propositions, viz. 1. That there is a God, 2. That he is to be worshipped: Whereby he more than seems to intimate that the three latter Marks do agree perfectly to them. And if so, yea, if only the last of all, i. e. the manner of Conformation, doth agree perfectly to them, the three first Marks must agree likewise to them. If the Minds of Men assent to them without delay as soon as they hear them, and consequently without the Help of any Reasoning or Discourse, this Assent must be, 1. before Discourse, 2. independent upon it, 3. there must be an universal Consent to them.  
It follows in this Section, that the first, second, third, fourth and sixth Marks agree but ill to his third, fourth and fifth Propositions. As before he did not say that the first, second and third Marks do not agree at all to the first and second Propositions, but only that they do not agree perfectly; so here he does not say plainly the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth Marks do not agree to the three last Propositions, but only that they agree but ill with them. But I would ask Mr. Lock whether the fourth Mark, viz. Certainty, doth not perfectly agree to them? Did he not, §. 15. allow them to be clear Truths? And can they be clear Truths, and yet not certain?  
But Mr. Lock gives a Reason why five of the six Marks agree so ill to the three last Propositions: For (says he) besides that we are assured from History of many Men, nay whole Nations, who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them, I cannot see how the third, viz. that Virtue joined with Piety is the best Worship of God, can be an innate Principle, when the Name or Sound Virtue is so hard to be understood, liable to so much uncertainty in its Signification, and the thing it stands for so much contended about, and difficult to be known. Thus Mr. Lock. Now to the former part of this Reason there needs no other Answer than this, that tho' Mr. Lock says that we are assured from History, yet he doth not acquaint us what or whose History it is that gives us the Assurance. If he had given us the Names of the Historians, or their Words, and the Places where they are to be found, we might have examined them, and so judged whether they were to his Purpose or no, as also of what Authority his History-writers were. The Lord Herbert, in his Treatise de Veritate, p. 214. tells of one that had said that in a certain remote Country there was no Form of Religion to be found, but adds, that he was confuted by another, who objected to him his Ignorance of the Language of that Country; and certainly if a Man be not skilled in the Language of a Country, it is not an easy thing for him to know the Religion and Manners of it. But let us suppose that which Mr. Lock says to be true, that History assures us that many Men, nay whole Nations, doubt or disbelieve some or all of the three last Propositions, what will he gain by this? For the Question is not whether some Men may doubt of, or disbelieve these Truths, or some of them; but whether there be any that have not some Notion of them: Even of those that profess themselves Christians, some may possibly doubt of or disbelieve these Truths, but it cannot be said that they have no Notion of them. Lastly, if nothing else could be said against this Part of the Reason, it only shows that the third Mark, viz. Universality, doth not agree to the three last Propositions, it doth not at all affect the other Marks.  
I pass to the latter Part of the Reason, and that is, that Mr. Lock cannot sec how the Third, viz. that Virtue joined with Piety is the best Worship of God, can be an innate Principle. And I do not see how this can be any Reason of that which hath gone before, tho' the word For (unless it be here one of Mr. Lock's privileged Particles) plainly tells us that it was intended for such. Should it be put into Form, how strangely would it look? The third Proposition, viz. That Virtue joined with Piety is the best Worship of God, cannot be an innate Principle; therefore the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth Marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth Propositions. What Cement can be found to join this Antecedent and Consequent together I know not. But let us hear the Reason why Mr. Lock cannot see how the third Proposition forementioned can be an innate Principle. It is because the Name Virtue is so hard to be understood, liable to so much Uncertainty in its Signification, and the thing it stands for so much contended about, and difficult to be known. Now tho' it is true that the Word Virtus hath various Significations, (which may be seen in our Dictionaries,) yet in the Proposition so often mentioned it is easy to be understood, its Signification is certain, and the thing it stands for is easy to be known, and there can be no Contention about it. Yea, Mr. Lock himself, who here speaks of its being hard to be understood, could understand it easily enough when he writ the 15th. Section of this Chapter. There he allows this Proposition to be a clear Truth; but how could he pronounce it to be a clear Truth, if he did not understand the Terms of it? He saith farther, that it is so clear a Truth, that, if rightly explained, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Assent to it; which clearly shows that he knew then the right Explication of it, or when it is rightly explained: How then comes that which he understood so easily then, to be difficult to be understood now when he writ the 17th. Section?  
Mr. Lock concludes this Section thus, And therefore this can be but a very umcertain Rule of Humane Practice, and serve but very little to the Conduct of our Lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assigned as an innate Practical Principle. But I must conclude contrariwise, seeing the Signification of the Terms of this Proposition is so certain, it cannot but be a very certain Rule of Humane Practice, and of excellent Use for the Conduct of the Lives of Men, and very fit to be assigned (if not as an innate Practical Principle, yet) as a Practical Principle written in men's Hearts, which is as much as the Lord Herbert affirms.  
Ad §. 18. When the Truth of a Proposition is so clear, that the Answerer cannot but see and acknowledge it, the usual way is to add to it, or leave some Words out, or substitute others in the Place of them, and so to mould it into another Form, till he thinks that he can say something to it which may pass for a Confutation with the unwary Reader. Mr. Lock thought it necessary to take this Course, and so he here leaves out the Words joined with Piety, and represents the Proposition thus, Virtue is the best Worship of God, i. e. (says he) is most acceptable to him. But this, according to the Lord Herbert's Sense of the Word Virtue is most false; for Virtue joined with Piety is more acceptable to God than Virtue alone, not having Piety its Associate, is. Let the Proposition then stand as it ought to do, and as it is in the Lord Herbert, Virtue joined with Piety is the best Worship of God, and let us see what Mr. Lock offers.  
1. If (says he) Virtue be taken for those Actions, which according to the different Opinions of several Countries are accounted laudable, the Proposition will not be true; i. e. If Virtue be taken for that which is not Virtue, the Proposition will not be true; but if it be taken for that which really is Virtue, (and so the Lord Herbert took it, as Mr. Lock knew very well) it is most certainly true, and confessed by him a little before to be a clear Truth. How vain then is it (if not contradictious) here to make a Supposition of its being taken in a Sense, which would render the Proposition not true. He says here, that Virtue is most commonly taken for those Actions, which, according to the different Opinions of Countries, are accounted laudable; but he only says it, he does not allege as much as one Author who takes it so. Withal, if it was true that it is most commonly taken so, yet it is not to the purpose, since Mr. Lock knew that the Lord Herbert did not take it so.  
2. If (says he) Virtue be taken for Actions conformable to God's Will, or to the Rule prescribed by God, than this Proposition will be most true and certain: And I do readily grant that it is here taken for Actions conformable to the Will of God, and Rule prescribed by him; but it is to be observed, that in this Proposition it is distinguished from Piety, and therefore as the Actions conformable to God's Will, and the Rule prescribed by him, which relate to God, are comprehended under Piety, so under Virtue are comprehended all other Actions that are conformable to the Divine Will and the Rule prescribed us, whether they relate to our Duty towards our Neighbour, or that toward ourselves. And this being manifestly the Sense of the Word which the Lord Herbert intended, the Proposition, Virtue joined with Piety is the best Worship of God, must be acknowledged to be most true and certain: But (says Mr. Lock) however true and certain it may be, it is of very little use in Humane Life; and therefore I think very few will take it for an innate moral Principle writ on the Hearts of all Men. To which I answer, that if it depend upon this, I must look upon Mr. Lock's 'Cause as desperate; for I am so far from granting that this Proposition is of very little use in Humane Life, that contrariwise I positively assert that it is impossible that any general Rule should be of greater use than it is. I challenge Mr. Lock to name any general Rule which is of greater Force to incite Men to the Study and Practice of true Piety and Virtue than this, That Virtue joined with Piety is the best Worship of God.  
But what Reason doth Mr. Lock give of this his strange Assertion, that the forementioned Proposition is of very little use in Humane Life? His Reason is as strange as his Assertion, because it amounts to no more than this, that God is pleased with the doing of what he commands. To which I answer, 1. Suppose this was true, that it amounts to no more, it would not follow that it is of very little use in Humane Life: For ought not this, that God is pleased with it, be an especial Motive to and Enforcement of that great Duty of taking care to do God's Commandments? 2. We may admire that Mr. Lock should say that it amounts to no more than this. Doth this, that it is the best Worship of God, amount to no more than this, that God is pleased with it? Surely it can amount to no less than this, that it is the Worship that best pleases him; as also, that by it we best express our inward Veneration of him, our Belief of his Promises, and Desire to please him, and by it most honour him, etc. He that offereth Praise honoureth me, Psal. 50. ult. and so he that performeth any other Action of Piety, or any virtuous Action, honours or glorifies our Father which is in Heaven; as also, he provokes others, and gives them an Occasion to glorify him, St. Matth. 5. 16. We see then that it amounts to much more than this, that God is pleased with the doing that which he commands.  
Mr. Lock adds, A Man may certainly know this to be true, (viz. that God is pleased with the doing of what he commands,) without knowing what it is that God doth command, and so be as far from any Rule or Principle of his Actions as he was before. But whether this be true or no, I am not at all concerned to inquire; it is certain that we cannot know this Proposition (Virtue joined with Piety is the best Worship of God) to be true, without knowing something of what it is that God commands, for he commands the Practice of the very things expressed in it, viz. Virtue and Piety; yea, these two are the greatest and weightiest things of the Law, or, if you will, the two Commandments on which hang all the Law and the Prophets, St. Matth. 22. 40. And we may observe that the Lord Herbert in his Appendix ad Sacerdotes de Religione Laici, sets down this third common Notion or Proposition more largely thus, Virtutem & Pietatem una cum fide in Deum amoreque ejus intimo conjunctam, esse praecipuam partem cultus Divini. So that here is added express Mention of Faith in God, and an hearty Love of him, which are also things commanded by God. Here is nothing more in this Section that deserves Consideration. As to his Rhetorical Flight concerning Hundreds of Propositions, it hath been touched upon before.  
Ad §. 19 Here Mr. Lock passes to the Lord Herbert's fourth common Notion or Proposition, That Men must repent of their Sins if they expect or desire to have them forgiven. He grants that it is a very true Proposition, and fit to be inculcated; and otherwhere, (viz. in Reasonab. of Christian. p. 256.) he tells us, that the Light of Nature revealed to the Heathens this way of Reconciliation, this Hope of Atonement, that God would forgive them, if they acknowledged their Faults, disapproved the Iniquity of their Transgressions, begged his Pardon, etc. So that even according to Mr. Lock's Doctrine, this Proposition, Men must repent of their Sins if they would have God atoned and their Sins forgiven, bids fair for being a common Notion or Principle writ in the Hearts of Men. But Mr. Lock says that this fourth Proposition is not much more instructive than the third. To which I answer, That if it be but as instructive as the third, it is very fit to be received as a common Notion writ in the Hearts of Men: And then surely it is fit to be received as such when it is acknowledged by Mr. Lock to be more instructive, yea much more instructive when it is set down what those Actions are that are meant by Sins.  
I took notice a little before, that Mr. Lock says that this Proposition is fit to be inculcated: But on whom is it to be inculcated? His Words are these, Fit to be inculcated on and received by those who are supposed to have been taught what Actions in all kinds are Sins. But if it is fit to be inculcated on and received by none but those who are taught what Actions in all kinds are Sins, I fear that it is fit to be inculcated on and received by very few: For I doubt there are few that know what Actions in all kinds are Sins. Perhaps Mr. Lock himself has not attained to know this; there are perhaps some Actions that are Sins, and yet he doth not think them to be so.  
But he proceeds farther, and asserts confidently enough, that neither this (fourth Proposition) nor the former (i. e. the third,) can be imagined to be innate Principles, nor to be of any use if they were innate, unless the particular Measures and Bounds of all Virtues and Vices were engraven in men's Minds, and were innate Principles also, which I think is very much to be doubted. Thus Mr. Lock. Now this seems very high, that no Man can imagine them (or either of them) to be innate Principles, when according to him the Lord Herbert did imagine them to be such; and that they should be of no use, when he himself had intimated before that they are of use: For when, §. 18. he says of the third Proposition that it is of very little use in Humane Life, and that it teaches little, this implies that it is of some use, and teacheth something. And §. 19 when he saith of the fourth Proposition, that it is not much more instructive than the third, he grants that it is more instructive, tho' not much more. Mr. Lock says, that they cannot be imagined to be of any use, unless the particular Measures and Bounds of all Virtues and Vices were engraven in men's Minds, and were innate Principles also. But uppose the particular Measures and Bounds of some Virtues and Vices only were engraven on men's Hearts, and innate Principles, would not these Propositions be of excellent use for inciting us to practise those Virtues, and eschew those Vices? And therefore is not Mr. Lock too severe in pronouncing them to be of no use at all, unless the particular Measures and Bounds of all Virtues and Vices were innate Principles? But the Truth is, he will not allow that any Measures of Virtue and Vice are innate Principles.  
Mr. Lock's next Words are, And therefore I imagine it will scarce seem possible that God should engrave Principles in men's Minds in Words of uncertain Signification, such as are Virtues and Vices, which amongst different Men stand for different things. But how the Words And therefore come here I know not; for I cannot see how this can be drawn as a Conclusion from that which hath gone before. He had said a little before, that the word Sins is usually put to signify in general ill Actions that will draw on Punishment upon the Doers. So that here he makes the Signification of the word Sins to be certain, and can he infer thence that it scarce seems possible that God should engrave Principles in men's Minds in Words of uncertain Signification, as the word Sins is? As to the other word Virtue, I have showed above in answering the 17th. and 18th. Sections, that the Signification of it is not uncertain. But does not Mr. Lock give a sufficient Proof that both the Words are of uncertain Signification, when he says that among different Men they stand for different things? I answer, No; for tho' some may say, This is a Virtue, when others may account it a Vice; and this is a Sin or Vice, when others may say that it is a Virtue; yet by the words Virtue and Sin they mean the same thing, viz. by Sin an ill Action, by Virtue a laudable one.  
Mr. Lock proceeds, and says, Nay it cannot be supposed to be in Words at all, viz. that God engraves Principles in men's Minds: And to the same Purpose he had said before, in the Beginning of §. 18. It is the Sense and not the Sound that is and must be the Principle or common Notion. But against whom doth he say this? Not against the Lord Herbert, who is for our having little regard to Words and Names as much as he can be: Non tam nomina (quae si neglexerimus, magnum in sapientia progressum faciemus) quam res ipsas respicientes consensum illum universalem tanquam veritatem indubiam amplectamini; so he de Veritate, p. 40. And therefore he much varies the Words of these two Propositions, viz. the third and the fourth. In the third Proposition, instead of Virtutem cum Pietate conjunctam, (as he expresseth it in his Religio Laici,) he in his Appendix ad Sacerdot. de Relig. Laici, hath Virtutem & Pietatem una cum Fide in Deum, Amoreque ejus intimo conjunctam; and in his de Veritate, p. 215. Probam facultatum conformitatem; and in the same de Veritate, p. 220. Vitae sanctitatem. So his fourth Proposition, in his Religio Laici he expresses thus, Resipiscendum esse a peccatis; but in his de Veritate, p. 217. more largely thus, Vitia & scelera quaecunque expiari debere ex poenitentia. Hence it most plainly appears that the Lord Herbert made not Words but the Sense to be the Notitia communis.  
We are come at last to Mr. Lock's Conclusion, which he gins thus, When it shall be made out that Men ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Customs of their Country; but he doth not tell us what is to be made out concerning them; for there is no Verb for this Nominative Case, Men ignorant of Words, etc. But I suppose that it is to be supplied out of that which follows; so that his Meaning is this, When it shall be made out, that Men ignorant of Words, or untaught by the Laws and Customs of their Country, and all Men whatsoever, do actually know and allow that it is part of the Worship of God not to kill a Man, not to know more Women than one, not to procure Abortion, not to expose their Children, not to take from another what is his, tho' we want it ourselves, but on the contrary relieve and supply his Wants; and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more: When, I say, all Men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such Rules, all which come under these two general Words, Virtues and Sins, there will be more Reason for admitting these and the like for common Notions and practical Principles. Thus Mr. Lock, who seems to deal very hardly with the Lord Herbert's third and fourth Propositions, in that he will not admit them to be common Notions, or as much as practical Principles, until it be proved that all Men in the World, even those that are ignorant of Words, and untaught by the Laws and Customs of their Country, do actually know and also allow of all these and a thousand other such Rules. Methinks if all Men did actually know these, and but half a thousand other such Truths, we might see very great Reason for admitting those two Propositions to be of great use for directing our Practice, and consequently to have a good Title to be accounted practical Rules or Principles. St. Paul, Rom. 1. instanceth in many things, which the Gentiles actually knew to be ill Actions, that will draw on Punishment upon the Doers, and consequently (according to Mr. Lock) Sins; for having enumerated them, from v. 24. to v. 32. he says v. 32. that they knew that those who do such things are worthy of Death. Now must not every one confess that the Lord Herbert's fourth Proposition, That Men must repent if they would have those Sins forgiven, and escape the Punishment due for them, would have been of very great use to them? Yea, if Men have but Means to know that many things are Virtues or Vices, the two forementioned Propositions must not be denied to be practical Principles, and such as might be very useful in Humane Life, because through their own Default many do not actually know that they are Virtues or Vices. The Lord Herbert makes that golden Rule, St. Matth. 7. 12. Whatsoever things ye would that Men should do unto you do ye so to them, to be a common Notion writ in the Hearts of Men; and would they but call it frequently to mind, and apply it to particular Actions, by the Light of this they might know whether they have the Nature of Sin or no. The Application of this Rule to particular Actions would help us to the Knowledge of a great part of our Duty toward our Neighbour; and therefore our Saviour says, that this is the Law and the Prophets: All my Duty toward my Neighbour depends upon it, the whole Law concerning that is fulfilled in it; it is the Foundation of all Justice and Charity to Men. Hence it was that the Emperor Severus Alexander having heard this Sentence from the Jews or Christians (we may rather think Christians) caused it to be proclaimed by the Crier, and to be writ on the Palace, and on Public Works; see Jul. Capitolinus in Alexandro Severo. To conclude then according to the Lord Herbert, as that Proposition, They must repent of their Sins, if they would have God atoned to them, is writ upon the Hearts of Men; so also is this Sentence, All things whatsoever ye would that Men should do to you do ye likewise to them: By which (if they be not wanting to themselves) they may know in a great measure what particular Actions are Sins, and what they ought to do; so that if that Proposition be not useful and instructive to them, it is their own Fault.  
Mr. Lock having said, that when all Men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such Rules, there will be more Reason for admitting these for common Notions, lest this Concession should be too liberal, adds, Yet after all universal Consent (were there any in Moral Principles) to Truths, the Knowledge whereof might be attained otherwise, would scarce prove them to be innate; which is all I contend for. Thus Mr. Lock. But I do not well understand the meaning of the last words, which is all that I contend for. Doth which relate to that which is here expressed, viz. that universal Consent to Truths, the Knowledge whereof might be attained otherwise, will scarce prove them to be innate, so that this is all that he contends for? Or doth it refer to something not expressed, Mr. Lock having a Privilege to use Words otherwise than ordinary Persons are allowed to do. To this latter I incline, that it is his meaning, that he contends for no more than this, that the Lord Herbert's Propositions are not innate, tho' this is not expressed. But let the one or the other be his meaning, unless we were certain that by his Notitiae communes or Catholic Truths written in the Minds of Men, the Lord Herbert meant the same that Mr. Lock doth by his innate Principles, we cannot say that that honourable Person is at all concerned, or that Mr. Lock's Conclusion doth contradict any thing that he hath delivered.  
Thus I have considered all that Mr. Lock hath said in these five Sections, wherein he hath to do with the Lord Herbert. And now must it not seem strange that he should take upon him to examine what is written by a Person so eminent for his Parts as well as his Quality, and after all have so little to say against him? He only toucheth very slightly upon three of his Propositions, or Notitiae communes, viz. the first, second and fifth; and as to the third and fourth, he had done better if he had passed them by as slightly, unless he had said something more to the purpose. Yea, he is so far from confuting, that he comes very far up toward the confirming all that the honourable Person designed. For he says plainly, §. 15. that all the five Propositions are such Truths, as, if rightly explained, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Assent to. Now of such things, as so soon as they are alleged, all Men acknowledge them to be true or good, they require no Proof or farther Discourse to be assured of the Truth or Goodness of them, we need not fear to say, that they seem to have a good Title, to be received for common Notions or Catholic Truths written in the Hearts of Men; which is all that the Lord Herbert contends for.  
The Reader may also observe Mr. Lock's way of Answering Persons.  
How often doth he complain of others, that they make him to say that which he doth not, bidding them show where it is that he says or pretends such a thing? And may we not likewise ask him where it is, that the Lord Herbert mentions Innate Principles or Innate Impressions?  
Another way very frequently used is, to single out one or two Particulars, and pretend to say something to them; and then the unwary Reader must believe that the whole is answered: So Mr. Lock singles out the third and fourth of the Lord Herbert's Propositions, pretending to say something to them, but takes little or no notice of the other three.  
A third way is, to say the same thing that their Adversary doth, and yet to pretend that he is confuting him all the while: And thus doth Mr. Lock, §. 18. and 19, when he inculcates that it is the Sense (and not the Words) that is the Principle or common Notion.  
There is a fourth way, which I have set down at large in the Beginning of my Answer to §. 18. and shall not need to repeat.  
The last way, most usual with Mr. Lock, is, to pretend that he doth not understand that which he doth; as here it is apparent, that when he writ the 15th Section he knew well enough the Signification of the Word Virtue in the Third Proposition; and yet §. 17. he says it is hard to be understood; and §. 19 pretends it may either have this or that Sense.    

Concerning SOCINIANISM. Whether it is Justly Charged upon Mr. Lock.  
IT is well known, that some have publicly, in plain and express Words, charged Socinianism upon Mr. Lock; and that others conceive that there is too much reason to suspect that he is leavened with many of the Doctrines of Socinus, and his Followers. Mr. Lock, on the other hand, seems to be much displeased that he should be loaded with such an Imputation, yea that he should be so much as joined with those that are Enemies of the Doctrine of the Trinity. He seems also to plead Not Guilty; says, that there is not one Word of Socinianism in his Book, (i. e. in his Reasonab. of Christian.) See his Vindication, p. 13. He professes that he never read the Racovians, Ibid. p. 22. And his Words in his Second Vindication, p. 350. are these; I never read a Page in either of those Socinians: he means Slichtingius and Socinus; though how he can call Socinus a Socinian, I know not. Yea, in that Second Vindication, p. 214. he gives the Socinians a parcel of not very good Language: I shall transcribe his Words at large. 
As far as I can observe (says he) the same Genius seems to influence them all (i. e. all the differing Sects) even those that pretend most to Freedom, the Socinians themselves. For when it is observed how positive and eager they are in their Disputes, how forward to have their Interpretations of Scripture received for Authentic, though to others, in several places, they seem very much strained; how impatient they are of Contradiction, and with what Disrespect and Roughness they often treat their Opposers; may it not be suspected that this so visible Warmth in their present Circumstances, and Zeal for their Orthodoxy, would (had they the Power) work in them as it doth in others? They in their Turns would, I fear, be ready with their Set of Fundamentals, which they would be as forward to impose on others, as others have been to impose contrary Fundamentals on them.  Thus Mr. Lock, expressing some Dislike of the Temper and Carriage of the Socinians.  
But our Question is about their Doctrine, and whether he doth as much dislike that. That we may the better judge of this, the way will be, to inquire first what the Socinians hold; then, how far Mr. Lock doth maintain or disclaim their Doctrines. As to the Doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and his Satisfaction, it is so well known what the Socinians hold, that it is wholly needless to cite or set down the Words of any of them: And if Mr. Lock had been pleased to let the World know plainly what he held as to these weighty Points, he would have done a great Kindness to others in freeing them from their Jealousies of him, and certainly no small Kindness to himself. But he hath not been willing hitherto to do himself and others this Favour, as I have largely showed above, Chap. 8. and 12. But it is not too late to do it still; and therefore I will hope that he may at last condescend so far, as to declare his Thoughts plainly as to these Particulars.  
Whereas our Saviour is frequently, in Scripture, called the Son of God, the Socinians deny that he is so called with respect to his Eternal Generation, or being Begotten of his Father before all World's; as also they deny that his Divinity can be proved thence. Thus Enjedinus in Joh. 5. 18. Non sequitur, si Christus alio modo sit filius Dei quam homines & Angeli esse naturalem Filium & ex essentia Dei natum; and he had said the same before in Joh. 1. 14. So in the Racovian Catechism de Persona Christi, the Answer to the 74th Question is, Ex iis omnibus attribute is Christi nullo modo probari posse naturam ejus divinam. Those Attributes or Appellations are, The Son of the living God, his own Son, his only begotten Son: from these (says the Catechism) Christ's Divine Nature cannot be proved. And Socinus himself, contra Wickum, cap. 5. throughout his long Answer to the first Argument, makes it his Business to show, that the Generation of Christ from the Substance of the Father, and that he is the True God, cannot be proved from those Appellations; and at last concludes it thus, Arbitror me satis dilucide ostendisse, quomodo Christus sit Dei filius, & quidem unigenitus, quamvis ex ipsius Dei substantia generatus non fuerit: And again, Videre possunt pii ac cordati omnes qualem vim habet ad probandum quod Christus sit ille unus verus Deus, adversariorum argumentum, ab eo ductum quod Christus sit Dei filius: Thus Socinus. They all agree in this. See Slichtingius Comment. in Joh. 1. 50. and 20. 31. Wolzogenius Comment. in Matth. 16. 16. (Neque inde sequitur Petrum agnovisse Christum pro tali Filio Dei, qui ab omni aeternitate ex essentia Patris generatus sit, & ipse nihilominus sit Deus altissimus: so he.) Crellius Comment. in 1 Pet. 1. 3. (Necesse non est, says he, vocis Filii Dei significatum ab aeterna quadam ex substantia, Patris generatione arcessere;) not to mention many others. In like manner Mr. Lock, though this Appellation The Son of God occurs so frequently in the Texts which he citys in some of his Writings, yet never expounds it as importing the Deity of Christ, but draws it to another sense. In his Second Vindication, p. 360, etc. he alleges S. Joh. 1. 34. and 3. 35, 36. also S. Joh. 1. 50. S. Luk. 4. 41. S. Mar. 3. 11. S. Matt. 16. 16. S. Joh. 11. 27. S. Luk. 22. 70. S. Matt. 27. 54. (not Luke 27. 54. as by the Fault of the Press it is in Mr. Lock) and of all these Texts he says, p. 369, that we must give up this Argument (viz. from Christ's being called the Son of God) and allow that this Phrase in these places does not necessarily import the Deity of our Saviour, and the Doctrine of the Eternal Generation; unless we think that the Eternal Generation of Jesus the Son of God was a Doctrine that had entered into the Thoughts of John the Baptist, Nathaniel, S. Peter, S. Martha, the Sanhedrim, yea even of the Roman Centurion and the Soldiers that were with him watching Jesus: and he supposes that few think this. It does not necessarily import, says Mr. Lock, just as Crellius says, Necesse non est. And particularly of S. Luk. 22. 70. he says, that if the Son of God be to be taken for a Declaration of his Deity, common and coherent Sense will hardly be made of it. As to S. Luk. 4. 41. and S. Mar. 3. 11. he asks, Who can entertain such a Thought, as that the unclean Spirits had a mind to acknowledge and publish to the People the Deity of our Saviour? And as to S. Matth. 16. 16. he says, that S. Peter can be taken in no other sense, but barely to signify that Jesus was the Messiah; as he also saith, that the Phrase of the Son of God is used by S. Martha Joh. 11. 27. to signify the Messiah, and nothing else.  
Farther, the Socinians make these Expressions, the Messiah, and the Son of God, to have the same Signification. Saepissime in Scriptures Filius Dei & Christus idem denotant; so Crellius in 1 Pet. 1. 3. Ut adeo nomen Christus seu Messiah & nomen Filius Dei ex usu Judaeorum pro eodem sumeretur. Wolzogenius in S. Matth. 16, 16. comparing this place with Mar. 8. 29. and Luk. 9 20. and also alleging Joh. 1. 49. and Luk. 22. 67, 68, 69. Idem est Messiam seu Christum & Filium Dei esse. Enjedinus in S. Mat. 28. 19 So Slichtingius in S. Joh. 1. 50. Ex Nathanaelis confessione videmus Filii illius Dei & Regis illius Israel, i. e. Christi titulum, idem significare. Usitatum enim erat apud Hebraeos Messiam vocare Filium Dei. Again, in Comment. in S. Joh. 20. 31. Christi & Filii Dei titulus pro synonymis usurpantur. Thus also Socinus himself count. Wickum, cap. 5. in Resp. ad Argum. 1. Perspicuum est idem reipsa esse Christum & illum Dei Filium. Idem est esse illum Regem Israelis quod esse Christum. Caiaphas & alii Judaei aliud nihil Filii Dei nomine intellexerunt quam Christum; so he, alleging Matth. 26. 63. Mar. 14. 61. S. Joh. 20. 31. together with the places abovecited by Wolzogenius. I shall only add Volkelius de Vera Religione, l. 5. c. 12. where having compared Matt. 16. 16. with Mar. 8. 29. and Luke 9 20. he concludes thus, Ut facile appareat in locis istis Filium Dei & Christum esse eandem habere significationem: and he also adds, that the same is manifest (viz. that they are Expressions of the very same thing, or that have the same signification) from Luke 22. 67, 70. Joh. 1. 50. and sundry places in S. Joh. being compared. And thus Mr. Lock, The Son of God and the Messiah are one in signification, Second Vindicat. p. 353. Messiah and the Son of God were synonymous Terms at that time among the Jews, Reasonab. of Christian. p. 50. Confessing Jesus to be the Son of God, is the same with confessing him to be the Messiah; those two Expressions being understood among the Jews to signify the same thing, Ibid. p. 96. And therefore almost everywhere in his Reasonab. of Christian. when he alleges any place where Christ is said or confessed to be the Son of God, he interprets it of his being the Messiah. Finally, he proves that these Titles have the same Signification, by comparing S. Matt. 16. 16. with S. Mar. 8. 29. and S. Luke 9 20. and by those other Texts which are made use of by Socinus, Wolzogenius, and Volkelius, to that purpose: See Reasonab. of Christian. p. 102. and otherwhere. Please to see also what I have said above, Chap. II.  
Enjedinus, in Matth. 28. 19 saith, That no other Faith was required of the Gentiles when they were Baptised, than to believe that Jesus is the Messiah or Son of God. Nulla alia fides fuit requisita a gentibus cum baptizabantur, quam ut crederent Jesum esse Messiam, seu Christum, vel Filium Dei. He also tells us, that this is that which all the Writers of the New Testament urge, yea, that it was the Scope and Design of writing the History of the Gospel, alleging S. Job. 20. 31. and that this is the Faith by which the Gentiles were made the People and Children of God. Thus Enjedinus. Now the Reader needs not be admonished of how near Affinity hereto that is which Mr. Lock so earnestly and frequently inculcates; viz. that all that was to be believed for Justification, was no more but this single Proposition, that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah. Reasonab. of Christian. p. 47. that S. John knew nothing else required to be believed for the attaining of life, but that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God. Ibid. p. 194. that this is the sole Doctrine pressed and required to be believed in the whole Tenor of our Saviour's and his Apostles preaching. Ibid. p. 195. and that the Gospel was writ to induce Men to believe this Proposition, that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah; for Proof of it alleging S. Job. 20. 31. as Enjedinus doth. Some of the Socinians (as Crellius Comment. in 1 Corinth. 15. 14. and Welzegenius in Acts 8. 37.) make this Proposition, Jesus Christ is the Son of God, to be a brief Summary of the Christian Faith or Profession, comprising many things in few words: And if they who say that this is all the Faith that is required, had plainly declared that they took it in this comprehensive sense, as a brief Summary of all that we are required to believe concerning Christ, as that he is the only Son of God, our Lord, was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, etc. (as in the Creed) it would not have given so much Offence. Therefore it would not be amiss if they would make such a plain Declaration of their Meaning now.  
Socinus, in his Praelectiones Theologicae, cap. 2. says, that there is not any Opinion or Notion of a Deity naturally implanted in the Mind of Man. Receptior hodie sententia est homini naturaliter ejusque animo insitam esse Divinitatis alicujus opinionem, quam sententiam nos falsam esse arbitramur. And one Reason why he thought thus, was, because not only some single Persons, but also whole Nations, are found, which have no sense or suspicion of a Deity. He instances in the Province of Brasil (or Bresil, as he calls it) and appeals to Historians for the Truth of it. How near Mr. Lock comes to this, the Reader may judge, who in his Essay, l. 4. c. 10. §. 1. says expressly, that God hath stamped no original Characters on our Minds, wherein we may read his Being; and his first and principal Reason for this, l. 1. c. 4. §. 8. is, because besides the Atheists taken notice of among the Ancients, there have been whole Nations amongst whom hath been found no Notion of a God. He instances, as in other places, so in Brasil, and appeals to Navigators and Historians for the Truth of it.  
The Socinians say, that the Soul, separated from the Body, hath no Sense, cannot perform any Action, or enjoy any Pleasure, till the Resurrection. Smalcius frequently inculcates this, Spiritus a corpore separatus nullo sensu praeditus est, & nulla voluptate fruitur ante adventum Christi. And again, Spiritus sine corpore nullas actiones exercere potest. So Smalcius de extremo judicio, §. 3. and in Examine Errorum, Error. 88 Non credimus Spiritum qui ad Deum redit aliquid sentire, aut beatitate aliqua frui ante Christi adventum. In like manner, Socinus himself, in his 5th Epistle to Volkelius, declares it to be his firm Opinion, Post hanc vitam animam hominis non it a per se subsistere, ut praemia ulla poenasve sentiat, vel ista sentiendi sit capax. See also to this purpose, Crellius in Heb. 11. 40. And Slichtingius in 1 Cor. 15. 32. As to Mr. Lock, they that have leisure may inquire whether his words in his Reasonab. of Christian. p. 6. do not look toward this, when he says, that Death is the losing of all Actions of Life and Sense. For it is not easy to conceive how this can be true, unless when Men die the Soul lose all Actions of Life and Sense as well as the Body doth.  
Socinus and his Followers deny Original Sin, and the Corruption of our Nature, because of Adam's Transgression. Concludimus nullum peccatum originale esse, i. e. ex peccato illo primi parentis nullam labem aut pravitatem universo humano generi necessario ingenitam esse sive inflictam quodammodo fuisse: So Socinus in his Praelectiones Theolog. cap. 4. He is followed by the Racovian Catechism, Cap. 10. Quaest 2. Peccatum originis nullum prorsus est, nec e Scriptura id peccatum originis doceri potest: Et lapsus Adae, cum unus actus fuerit; vim eam quae depravare ipsam naturam Adami, multominus vero posteriorum ipsius posset, habere non potuit. To the same purpose are the Words of Volkelius, De vera Religione. l. 5. c. 18. Mr. Lock is not so positive as they are; but he says, that the New Testament doth not any where take notice of the Corruption of Humane Nature in Adam's Posterity, nor tells us that Corruption seized on all because of Adam's Transgression, as well as it tells us so of Death.  
The Socinians say, that the same Bodies shall not arise at the general Resurrection. Corpora haec, quae nunc circumferimus, resurrectura non credimus, sed alia nobis danda esse ab Apostolo edocti statuimus: So Smalcius in Examine. Errorum. Err. 89. Corpora in quibus reviviscent & venient mortui non ea sunt corpora in quibus mortales vixerunt, & quorum corruptione mortui sunt, sed illa sunt longe istis praestantiora, Slichtingius Comment. in 1 Cor. 15. 37. Illi vim argumentationis Apostolicae convellunt, qui in eisdem numero corporibus nos aliquando resurrecturos statuunt, Crellius Comment. in 1 Cor. 15. 13. They that please may also consult Volkelius De vera Religione, l. 3. c. 35. As to Mr. Lock, a large Account hath been given above, Chap. 31. of what he saith as to this Particular; viz. the same Bodies being raised. Where we may also see that he proceeds farther than perhaps the Socinians do, saying, that he finds no such express words in the Scripture as that the Body shall rise or be raised: See the Third Letter, p. 210. To which something hath been said in the forecited Chap. 31. and now, by way of farther Answer, I desire that 1 Cor. 15. 42, 43, 44. may be consulted. It is sown in Corruption, it is raised in Incorruption; it is sown in Ignominy, it is raised in Glory; it is sown in Weakness, it is raised in Power; it is sown a natural Body, it is raised a spiritual Body. Now I ask, What is it that is raised in Incorruption, in Glory, in Power, and a Spiritual Body? Mr. Lock will surely answer, that it is the Body. And if the Body be so necessarily understood, it is the same as if it was expressed. Besides, the words v. 44. may be rendered, The Body is raised Spiritual; and so we have the express words, that the Body is raised.  
The Wicked's suffering eternal Torments after this Life, is denied by the Socinians. Impios futuros immortales, nempe in aeternum opprobrium, nec usquam sacrae Literae comprobant, nec quicquam ex illis afferri posse videtur, unde sententia illa probari possit: So Smalcius in Refut. Frantzii, p. 415. Ut Deus in omnibus justitiae tenax est, ita hic quoque super neminem extendet paenam meritis ejus majorem. Nulla autem esse possunt peccata tam gravia, quae sempiternis cruciatibus possunt aequari. Wolzogenius Comment. in Matth. 24. 46. The like hath Ernestus Somnerus in his Demonstration, entitled, Demonstratio Theologica & Philosophica, quod aeterna impiorum supplicia non arguant Dei justitiam, sed injustitiam. As to Socinus himself, that he was of the same Opinion, appears sufficiently from his Disputation with Puccius, and the Letters which passed between Volkelius and him about it. What Mr. Lock's Opinion is as to this, I shall not determine: On the one hand his making the Death which was threatened to Adam, and which he says is the Wages of Sin as well after as before the Resurrection not to be an eternal Life in Misery, or the being kept alive in perpetual exquisite Torments, but a Ceasing to be, may incline us to think that in this great Point he holds the same that the Socinians do: See his Reasonab. of Christian. p. 5, 6, 15. On the other hand, How far his mentioning infinite Misery, exquisite Misery, unspeakable Punishments, perfect Misery, Tribulation and Anguish, Indignation and Wrath which shall be after this Life, and his transcribing the words of our Saviour in which he speaks of everlasting Fire and everlasting Punishment, may argue that he doth not hold with them, I know not.  
FINIS.