A REPLY TO THE ANSWER (Printed by his majesty's Command at OXFORD) to a Printed book entitled OBSERVATIONS upon some of his majesty's late Answers and Expresses. By J. M.  
LONDON, Printed for Matthew Walbancke, Anno Dom. 1642.   

A reply to the Answer (printed by his majesty's Command at Oxford) to a printed book entitled Observations upon some of his majesty's late Answers and expresses.  
THe author of the Answer to the Observator (which was p●…inted a●…Oxford (no place more fit to entertain such cavils) by his 〈◊〉 Command (too good a Patron to be thus abused) Begins his dis●…urse by way of Preface, and there would tell us the original of regal Authority, were it not a loss of time (he has been to profuse & prodigal of it in his Book, he doth well to spare it in the Preface) for that he sees ['tis granted to be at 〈◊〉 least mediately from God.] I shall not dispute whether God be the immediate donor of Royalty or no▪ For I take it to be very clear and evident, that the Kings of Israel were of Divine insti●…tion; But that royal Authority should be unto us, or the s●…cceeding ages more of Divine right or Institution, then aristocratical or democratical power, that I deny▪ 〈◊〉 were they of Divine institution, it must of necessity be, that all States must be swayed and ruled by Kings; and the execution of other power were sin, and that I hope 〈◊〉 man will dare to a●…rt. Again, were they of Divine right, they ought to have equal power and Dominion in all places; and that they have not, for as it is well known, in some kingdoms they have greater Authority, in some less; And all vary according to the several laws and Constitutions of their Countries. Why then if they be of human institution, it must be agreed, that no King hath at thi●… day, any special Ordinance from Heaven by which to entitle himself to his crown and regal authority: And hence the consequence is just, that Kings are bound by th●…se qualifications of compact and condition that were made with them by the people, and aught to discharge and execute their royal functions answerable thereunto.  
But than he goes on an●… tells us that power or government [was o●…yned of God for the good of mankind, which was not to be obtained without preservation of order, and therefore he hath commanded all to be subject to the laws of society, not only for wrath, but for conscience sake.] With this limitation the Author saith true, we must submit to the Lawe●… of society, where they do not oppose the Law of God, otherwise not, for how can a man obey for conscience against conscience?  
And he sa●…es we must submit, [not only whilst we enjoy the benefit of Governors, but 〈◊〉 whilst we d●…e suffer under some accidental abuses.] Ay, but what if those abus●… prov●…●…o be wilful? I know that is the author's meaning, though he will not express it, for if his opinion mi●…ht pass as Orthodox, the cases would be all one, I, and what if th●…se abuses strike at our Religion, at our lives, libe●…ies, and estates; at all that God hath entrusted us with, and made us happy in▪ must we here submit and quietly surrender up all our happiness at once▪ a most strange Doctrine. Well let him Preach it at Oxford, to those whom a foolish zeal hath besotted with an unwarrantable devotion to their sovereign. But let us know, that good subjects may preserve these & yet not be the less, but the more dutiful to their King; Is it any breach of duty to deny that which the Law of God and my conscience tells me that I ought not to grant? or can that have the impuration of disloyalty to my sovereign which styles me just before God? well, to pass this (because I shall have occasion to speak more fully to it after) those that maintain this error, misery will be this portion here, and a just judgement hereafter.  
But he tells us that [we cannot reap the constant fruits of an establ●…shed policy, unless by comp●…ct we submit ourselves to some possible inconveniences.] The Author would have done well to have explained 〈◊〉 what he means by those inconveniences; b●…t 〈◊〉 this is his meaning (for the whole s●…ope of his book speaks as m●…ch) that it is possible a King may degenerate into a Ty●…ant, and make his boundless Arbitrary will to be Law, and if this fall out, (as too commonly it doth) yet we must patiently do or s●…ffer what ever (though never so unjustly and contrary to good conscience) is imposed upon us, and which is more, we must by solemn contract bind ourselves beforehand this to do; and why so? for that otherwise there can be no constant benefit of an established policy. A most strange and unnatural assert●…on, was it ever heard, or can it be imagined, that a people should contract to their own ruin? there is a mutual compact betwixt King and People, the King is to govern by a rule if he would have his people to obey; and if he swerve from that, this dissol●…es the contract, and gives the people p●…wer to 〈◊〉 and preserve themselves. And if this were not Law, what benefit could we expect to reap of such an established destructive policy?  
He hath made bad premi●…es, and worse conclusion, for mark what he has d●…uced from thence. Hence (saith he) it follows after a people hath by 〈◊〉 contra●… divested itself of that power which was primarily in them, they cannot upon what pret●…ce soever witho●…t manif●…st breach of Divine Ordinance, and violation of public sa●…th resume that authority which they have placed in another.) This by the way, power (according to the Authors own 〈◊〉) was primarily in the people (a truth ingeniously acknowledged) but the mischief 〈◊〉; they have by contract divest●…d themselves of that power: how is that made good? why thus, they chose one to be King over them, and contracted to obey him; what in omnibus 〈◊〉, in all his commissions, nothing less; for that might be to disodey God, and whether it be lawful to obey God or man, judge you. Ay, but they have given him an absolute Authority, and made him supreme, and therefore not to be q●…stioned by ●…ny inferior p●…wer; and if this were true, his majesty's counsel (who too 〈◊〉 mal●…ne ●…he happiness of King and peop●…, and would work o●… their own 〈◊〉 des●…gnes by the ruin of bo●…h) w●…ld never have advised h●…s Maj●…sty to have inserted this into many of his Declarat●…ons, that his Royal power was committed unto him by God and the Law▪ in trust for the well govern●…ng and 〈◊〉 of his people committ●…d to his charge. And as a trust is for the benefit and behoof of him, for whose sake the conv●…yance in tr●…st was made, n●…t of him, who is the party entrusted. So likew●…se every trust doth impl●… a condit●…on that the party do d●…ly perf●…rme and discharge th●… t●…st, or if h●…e do not, that he be 〈◊〉 so to do. Th●…s th●…n being thus h●…w h●…ve the people tota●…ly divest●…d themselves of their power? I d●…e n●…t speak this to defend the people's 〈◊〉 of their Authority, or to 〈◊〉 that po●…tion of depo●…ng Princes, so far I concur w●…th the Author: but that th●…y should ha●…e a boundl●…sse 〈◊〉 power, that I deny.  
Again (for he maketh a second conclusion o●…t of the former premises) hence it 〈◊〉 (saith he) though ●…he pe●…ple should 〈◊〉 th●…y ●…ght live more hapi●…, if the Ki●…gs 〈◊〉 were mor●… 〈◊〉, his revenues diminish●…d, it were h●…gh sin to 〈◊〉 upon his 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉 in St●…e, when that the K●…ngs Prerogative doth not invade the sub●…ects 〈◊〉 nor their 〈◊〉 entrench 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but ea●…h keep within their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and circumference: But th●…s we must ●…ow, that as the King's crown and 〈◊〉 ●…ower was committed to him in trust f●…r the good of his 〈◊〉, so likewise w●…re his 〈◊〉 and Prerogatives, and if these b●… abused to the 〈◊〉 of l●…berty, and the 〈◊〉 or the dest●…uction of his peo●…le, 'tis no entrenching upon Prerogative, to q●…estion this ab●…se, and endeavour our own preservation.  
Ay, but than he says, it doth no way prejudice regal Authority, that God is the Author of Aristocrat call or democratical power.] Doth the observators saying that God is the auhor of those powers, any way conclude against regal authority? where the powers are various, and no way contradictory or opposite one to another, for a man to conclude the illegality of the one, from the legality of the other, were a very simple and fallacious kind of reasoning.  
But our author will not be thus satisfied, for he doth here charge the Observator with ●…reading in the steps of Ma●…iana and Buchanan sworn enemies ●…o 〈◊〉.] And why so pray you? why because the Observator doth show how the infancy of the world was governed; Most Nations being ruled by their Lords and their Arbitrary edicts, which was not (he saith) in a long time digested. And then for that he further showeth the inconveniences, which in more mat●…re ages were ●…onnd to accompany unconditionate Royalty, but concludes that since most Countries have so●…nd out an art for the regulating the exorbitances of Princes, he is very unjust that will oppose this A●… and Order. And now let any wise and indiff●…rent man j●…dge how falsely and maliciously this imputation of an enemy to Monarchy is cast upon the Observator: for doth the d●…monstrating and disproving of other governments any way strike at Monarchy? or doth it not rather prop or support it? doth not the dis●…llowing of other powers (if not commend) yet tacitly allow and approve our own? Nay doth he not here (as in other places) expr●…sly appla●…de the order and const●…tution of 〈◊〉 Monarchy so well fenced in by the Art of Parliaments? why than what colour or ground is th●…re for this imputation? Is there not a wide d●…fference be●…wixt modification and extirpation? had our Author cons●…red this, certainly he would not have been thus unjust in his censure; Bu●… here we may learn what Doctirine is daily delivered to the King: That it is the King's Crown that is aimed at, & not only so, but even the very dethroning of him & his whole posterity, and in truth so it is, but by his majesty's evil councellors; who to magni●…ie themselves intend the ruin of t●…e commonwealth▪ and is not that in effect a d●…throning of his Majest●…? all that I shall say is but this; No Govenement more blessed or happy, if not abused by the advice of vile and malignant Co●…ellours.  
After so long a Preface, the Author tells us, that he will now take i●…to consideration the Observators grounds, upon which he would overthrow so ancient and well ●…unded a Monarch●….] The false imp●…tation of enmity against this great and well established power will not be thus shaken ●…ff; The truth of it is, he that resolves to say any thing, be it never so scandalous and void of truth, will again 〈◊〉 to stand or fall upon the same principles.  
But give him leave and he will show you one of the grounds that strikes at monarchy (p●…ay observe what an unnecessary ●…nference is h●…re made by the Author.) T●…e observator sa●…th: that,  
The King a●…tributeth the original of his Royalty to God and the Law, making no mention 
Obs.  at all of the grant consent or tr●…st of man therein.]  
A ground●…sse cavile (s●…th the Author) and why so? because when God is fi●…St named, 
Ans.  under what notion can he apprehend ●…aw but as an ag●…eement o●… the people deriving of their power, and committing the 〈◊〉 to his trust.] 
Rep.   
You charge the Observator with a ●…avile, and you labour to ma●…e it good by so large allowance, that I could not have 〈◊〉 so much from Ox●…d. What an agreement o●… the people in the 〈◊〉 of a King, and a deriving of ●…heir power unto him, and whi●…h h●…s yet more, a 〈◊〉 of th●… 〈◊〉 to h●…s Ma●…esty ●…n tr●…st (why then that is no absolute and 〈◊〉 power) t●…s m●…ch all th●…s sh●…ld be granted, but yet I fear, ●…is yo●…▪ not the Observator that dea●…es 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉, tell●…ng him that the 〈◊〉 and agreement of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 obliterated and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is not now to be taken notice of, or ●…hat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the ●…etter of th●… Law, so what else can be the meaning 〈◊〉 tha●… f●…equent ●…xpression in many of his 〈◊〉, Declarations? that he is responsible to God alone for his Actions, not to man. Is not this (since no absolute power was transferred by the people, as it is here confessed, & as I have made it good before) a denying of the consent and agreement of the people, and a granting of a boundless Authority? And how can that and a trust stand together? certainly a dependent and an independent government are not Synonyma. 'tis true, that if a people do erect a King over them, that this is confirmed a●…d ratified in Heaven; But being of human institution this doth no way expunge those qualifications of trust and condition which are incident to, and tacitly pass with this sacred function; and if so, we must of necessity allow a power in some, to see the due discharge and execution of them; nor will it derogate from the honour of God or the dignity of a Prince, that the people exact the due execution of the Law, and the performance of that compact, trust, and condition, that follows sovereignty. By this time I hope our Author may be, satisfied, that it is he that cavils, not the Observator, since it is plain that the word (Law) though it do receive so candid an interpretation from the Observator) may be and is denied to be the consent and agreement of the people. But now how doth this determine against Monarchy? why yes, thus, or not at all; The King denies the people their right, therefore the people may take away his. Is this one of the grounds upon which the Observator doth intend to overthrow Monarchy? yes, if our Author may be judge. Was ever imputation of so great guilt laid upon any man upon such shallow grounds? Well, since he fails here, suspends your judgement but a while, he may make good his charge hereafter. 
Obs.   
That Dominion which is usurped and not just, yet whilst it remains Dominion, and till it be legally again devested, refers to God, as to its Author and Donor, as much as that which is hereditary.] 
Ans.   
To which our Author saith, that usurpation and unjust Dominion can give no right to the possessor. 
Rep.   
Can it any way by the most scrutenous understanding be collected from the Observators words, that usurpation gains a right? what probability can there be of this inference? If this could be made good, laws would be but ciphers and unlawful force upon any man's interest, the best means of living, so that he who could steal most would be the true proprietor of most, and the strongest prove the richest men. But doth not the Observator expressly say, that that Dominion which is usurped is not just? if so, what needs this cavil? O yes, for he saith, that it is a flat contradiction to say, that God is the Author and Donor of Dominion usurped and not just, as well as of that which is hereditary; and what is his reason? why, for that God being Lord proprietary of all, his donation transfers a full right to him ●…n whom he bestows it, and this deed of gift being known, it is not lawful to endeavour a recovery,] and therefore God cannot be the Author and Donor of that dominion which is usurped and not just, for that such a Dominion doth not entitle a man to a full right, because the lawful proprietor may regain it by Conquest, as justice permitts, and so re-establish himself in his Dominion. Yet under favour this is no contradiction, for doth or can the revolution or Maeander of time produce any change or alteration, either in King or State that God is not the Author of? the evil of sin man alone is the father of, for that sin is inconsistent with that absolute purity and holiness that is in God, but the evil of punishment, that is God's. Is there any evil in the City that I have not done saith the Lord? And if God, for the sin of the King or people, or both, shall permit a stranger to usurp upon the dominion of the King, and to entrench upon his sovereignty▪ is it any contradiction to say that God is as much the Author and Donor of this Dominion that is thus gained by usurpation, as he is of that which is hereditary? doubtless not, for God is only the confirmer, man the creator or institutor of both. And though God as absolute sovereign and Proprietor can transfer a full right in any thing unto whom he pleaseth; yet it doth not follow that he will always so do: For as sin may divorce a King from his kingdom, or a people from God's blessing for a time, so true and unfeigned repentance may (through God's mercy) re-establish and unite them again together. When our Author had said (as before) that where God is the Donor of Dominion, that there it is not lawful to it ●…eavor a Recovery; He further adds, that this was the case of Rehoboam, who aft●… the desect of Ten Tribes raised an Army out of Judah & the Tribe of Benjamin in hopes to reduce them 
1 King. 12.  to obedience: But was warned by Shemaiah the man of God, not to fight against his brethren not because it was unlawful in itself, or the success unprobable, but for that this was from the Lord.] I shall not dare to defend a people's revolting from their King (though their burden be great and their yoke heavy) as here Israel's from Reho●…oam, who (when they could not obtain an ease, or discharge of their pressures which they had suffered under 
Verse 8.  his father Solomon) answered the King saying, what portlon have we in David? neither have we inheritance in the Son of Jesse; here they disavowed their King, and not long after 
Verse 7.  have made Jeroboam King in his stead: for my part I do not believe this to be a warrantable Act in Israel. And I conceive that Israel taking up of arms to reduce them 
Verse 8. 9  to obedience was lawful, and that he might have proceeded, and have expected a good success upon his endeavour, had he not had an express command from God to the 
Verse 10.  contrary. But now on the other side, I will not justify Rehoboam in forsaking the council of the sage old men, who (as grave & wise counsellors that seek the good of the public, not their own) advised the King that if he would be a servant unto this people, and serve them, and answer them, and speak good words to them, than they would be his servants for ever; (here you may learn the Office of good Kings and their counsellors) but the King (as most Kings use) rejecting such rigid counsel, betook him to his young men and consulted with them, & asked them what counsel they would give him, ('tis easy to judge what the effect of their counsel would be) and they answer him, thus shalt thou say unto them, my little finger shall be thicker than my father's loins: in stead of an ease of their present miseries, he promises them that he will augment them for the future; no question this was a great sin in Rehoboam, and I am confident had not Israel revolted, they might have justified before God, the taking up of arms against these Malignant Counsellors, for the restoring and reducing of their ancient Rights and Liberties: Kings must serve their people by protecting and defending of them according to Law and right, as also by easing of them of all unlawful pressures, if they expect that their people should serve them in love and obedience.  
The author goes on, and saith, Though force be not Law, yet is after conquest, a people resign their right in part or in whole by a subsequent Act of consent, they are obliged to stand to those conditions, which they made perchance out of a probable fear of harder usage] Who will oppose this, our Author needed not to have laboured for instances to make this good, o●… to have showed us the strong obligation that the Law of God and man, do impose upon such compacts and agreements, for no doubt men ought to be fai●…ull in the discharge of their engagements, though it be to their own prejudice; besides as we say in Law, he that disseises or disposse●…es another of his ●…reehold, or other interest, hath a right against all men, except the disseisee, or the party so dispossessed▪ so without question it is in case of Dominion or Royalty, he that gains a kingdom by Conquest, 〈◊〉 absolute King against all men, except the rightful sovereign, and therefore as our Law is, well known, he may obliterate and utterly extirpate and abolish their old laws and rights, and create & introduct new, which is one strong argument of true & absolute sovereignty. But I hope on the other side our Author will take notice that the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit or discharge Princes of their duty. There is Onus as well as honos, that is, a great burden, charge and care as well as honour and renown, th●…t is inseparably incident to this great function, and therefore he that gains the one, be it by descent, conquest, or otherwise, must discharge the other.  
The fountain and efficient cause of power is the people, and from hence the inference is 
Obs.  just, the King though he be singulis major, yet he is universis minor.  
The author tells us: that, This inference is most weak, and that the quite contrary may clearly be concluded; pray hear his reason, The people being the efficient cause of power 
Ans.  (which can be no other way, but by deriving their divided power, and uniting it in him,) since they cannot retain what they have parted with, nor have what they gave away, it follows ●…e which 〈◊〉 their power (I may add his own particular besides) must needs be greater and more powerful than they. The author's argument, to destroy the Observators 
R●…p.  inference, is but this; that though the people be the fountain and efficient cause of power, yet for that they have made a free Donation of all power to the King since they cannot be owners of that they have given away; therefore it must needs follow, that the King is greater than the people. I doubt the Author will find it a greater difficulty to maintain this Argument then to make it; for if it can be proved (on that hangs the strength of his argument:) that the people have not divested themselves of all power o●…t of his premises, the consequence is just, that the universe is greater than the King. Now if trust and condition are inseparable incidents to Sove●…ty (as I have showed before) it must follow, that the people represented by a Parliament may call in question the breach of them for otherwise the power would be (in eff●…ct) 〈◊〉, which hath been denied even by the King himself, who acknowledgeth that his kingdom is committed to him in trust: and if so (as no doubt p●…dents of that nature are not wanting to posterity, (for that no question that was one main ground of the constitution of Parliaments; the restraining of the exorbitancy of Princes) why then how can it be that the people should have divested themselves of all their power? for it must be agreed that that power which may call in question the discharge of others is the supreme and superintendent, for no inferior power can do it, so that by this time, I hope the Author is satisfied, that the Obse●…ors inference is just, and his reason weak and defective.  
But the Observator tenders a proof of the premises, for (saith he) If the people be 
Obs.  the true ●…ent cause of powe●…; it is a rule in na●…ure, quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale.  
S●…ange (Says the Author) that men upon such palpable sophistry, should endeavour to 
Ans.  cast off Monarchy.  
It is more strange to me that men against clear reason, should make 
Rep.  the●…selves so palpably ignorant, can not the Author difference a reasonable modification or qualificatio●…, from an extreme extirpation, or eradication: if my reason fail me not, it is he that indeavoureth (what ever he pretend) the casting off of Monarchy: for as Monarchy is never so secure, as when fenced in by the wisdom of Parliaments, it submits to their determinations: so it is never so much in danger, as when it exalts itself above and against them, and endeavoureth an absoluteness of sovereignty: hence it may be determined who are the greatest enemies to Monarchs. But pray what is the sophistry the Observator stands accused of? why, it is this; he hath given you a rule that is regularly, not generally true; that will maintain the case in question, not all others: for instance, he tells the Observator, That he will be unwilling to follow the consequence of this rule: and why? for that (saith he) he hath an estate which no question 〈◊〉 would willingly improve, let him bestow it upon me, he will make me rich, a●…d 〈◊〉 richer: for quicquid 〈◊〉 tale est magis tale. Ay, this is tha●…, ●…hat hath made this great combustion, ma●…r of ●…ight and estate, could you persuade us out of our reason, you would quickly seize upon these: but I trust your sophistry shall not so captivate our sense, as to betray ourselves to ruin by a foolish prating with that, which God dispensed unto our Ancestors, and they through his mercy, ●…queathed unto us. If I should tell you. that God made man, therefore God is greater than man, or that the Ocean distributing itself into several streams or rivulets, is greater than those rivulets, and so conclude that therefore, quicquid efficit tale, est magis tal●…, you would presently say, that this were no infallible way of reasoning: why for you to conclude, that it doth not hold in some cases, therefore not in the case in question, is not this the same fallacy? but as before, s now I shall make good the axiom in our case upon his own grounds, for he saith, it doth hold in those agents in whom the quality by which they operate is ●…erent, and from whom it cannot be separated: not true in those who by way of donation d●…st themselves of power or wealth. That power was origi●…lly inherent in the people, that I think will not be questioned. That the people 〈◊〉 not divested themselves of all their power, is cleared thus, (as I have shown before) that power that is fiduciary and upon condition, must needs be subject to a power more supreme, to see the due discharge of this trust and condition, or oth●…rwise it would in effect prove absolute, but I say the royal dignity and authority is fiduciary only and upon condition, therefore it must be sub●…ect to a power more su●…e, w●…h can be no other than the people represented by a Parliament▪ Besides, what a groundless and unnatural thing is it to think, that a people in whom all power did orig●…y reside, should so totally and absolutely dispose that to one, which being abused, must without hope of redress prove their own inevitable destruction.  
Ay, but saith the Author, If the King be universis minor, than the people have p●…ced a King, not over, but 〈◊〉 them; and 〈◊〉 do ill to 〈◊〉, when they might command, they may 〈◊〉 it from the Prince their subject.  
The King is universis minor, less than the public, but he is singulis major over and above all individuals; and therefore the Author in this doth not much mistake himself; for that undutiful and ●…urable passage, of commanding of his majesty, and of making him our subject, I wish withal my soul, that the Author of this book and his associates, were not more guilty of this, than his Parliament▪ could ever Parliament or ●…ple, with more submissiveness, pray or petition his Ma●…estie, than we have done? or can all preceding ages produce an example of greater humility and loyalty to their sovereign? but to pass this, we shall ever count it our duty to petition, and acknowledge our King, while others, though not in words, yet in heart disclaim him.  
The Author saith, His majesty doth most freely acknowledge, and will constantly maintain what ever rights the Law doth give us; ●…et he is not bound to be ray his own.  
Happy England if this were made good unto us. I do not question his royal heart, I believe it to b●…●…ull of pie●…y a●…d truth: but it is you and your Complices that have divided him from his people, and made him act a part clean contrary to his p●…ous 〈◊〉: obtruding the rights and liberties of his 〈◊〉, in not d●…fending the power and privileges of Parliament, in taking up of A●…es against his people, the●…eby to enforce that, which law and right proclaims unjust; but I pres●…e this no further. Happy 〈◊〉, when that prerogative and subjects liberty do not invade each other▪ But let this 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 construction: if pre●…ive be abused to the endangering of the State, 'tis no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his majesty's right, to be ruled by the counsel of his Parliament, for the securing 〈◊〉 his people.  
No dissolution ought to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the consent of 〈◊〉, into such and such 
Obs.  hands, but by the same 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 it had its 〈◊〉.  
The Author by a needless endeavour, would ●…ne have us ri●…tly 〈◊〉 this, 〈◊〉 
Ans.  saith he, Where a man doth by donation or promise part with any 〈◊〉, he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it as his due upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 that it would 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he, where there are ●…wo parties to the contract, as 〈◊〉 case of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉, there the people cannot 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 government without this 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 those few 〈◊〉.  
For my 〈◊〉 I d●…e n●…t believe that ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intended to attribute such a power 
Rep.  to the people, as is here 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no other power may abrogate, but that which did 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉 not in 〈◊〉 ●…clude, that they in all cases may do it, 〈◊〉 the author n●…ght well have 〈◊〉 his labour.  
It were strange if the people subjecting itself to ●…mmand, should 〈◊〉 at 〈◊〉 thing but its 
Obs.  own good, in the fi●…st and last place.  
After the Author had confessed this, yet saith he, for that the peo●… could not attain 
Ans.  this, without a common protector to admin●…ster justice equally amongst them, they found it n●…ssary in a higher degree to provide for his good, in recompense ●…f their 〈◊〉, &c. and so concludes, that the good of either is mu●…ally involved, and that the people may be hap●…, they must first provide for the happiness of their Ruler.  
That the good of both hath a 〈◊〉 dependence upon each other no 〈◊〉, but that the 
Rep.  constitution of government, was 〈◊〉 and principally for the good of the pe●…ple, that's as 〈◊〉, and therefore that ought first to be 〈◊〉.  
The Author charges the Observator, with breaking out into a most scandalous and false invective 〈◊〉 the late government, and this he counts 〈◊〉 of any 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 he give any answer we should be s●…re to have it, but what he cannot answer, h●…e cannot answer, he can by some sophistical flight evade, or else tell you, (as ●…re) that it is false, though the lie reflect upon himself; but he may (without offence) give it to himself, as he doth in the very words following, by which he confesses, that the Subject groaned under some grievances.  
If I should have demanded of the Author before Parliament (granting he were not one who added to the burden) whether that the Kingdom were not even ready to sink and faint away under those heavy pressures of Monopolies, shipmoney, coat and conduct money, and the like (most illegal charges, such as our Ancestors never knew) I am confident that he would have answered me in the affirmative, and have further added, that the body politic must die, if that a Parliament did not interpose▪ for the securing of it; and are these now become false and scandalous invectives? 'tis very strange that the Author should so suddenly forget God's goodne●…e and mercy towards us, in this Parliament, as not only to forget the blessing, but even to deny the benefit: for he saith,  
Wè owe it to the goodness of his Majesty, that we are free, even from the fear of them for the future.  
No respect at all is to be had of the Parliament, as if they were not so much as instruments in the conveyance of this mercy: 'tis pity that he should share in the blessing, that will not acknowledge the hand that conveyed it. We shall ever with all humility acknowledg●… his majesty's goodness and grace towards us this Parliament, in taking off those unjust burdens that pressed our shoulders; and yet not forget our Worthies: and by the way, let me say this; he that lays an unjust burden upon me, and after long suffering, binds himself to ease me of it for the future, as it is no restitution or recompense for the evil already undergone, so he doth no more than what the Law of God and an upright conscience ties him to.  
I but saith the Author, Compare us to any other Nation in the Christian world, we in our worst times, were least unhappy.  
A strange reason, that because other Nations are not so happy as we, perchance out of defect of their Government, or themselves, that therefore we must enslave ourselves to be like them: I fear this is the labour of the time, to reduce us to their condition; and I hope this will be our care, not to be content with a comparative happiness only, but to labour to maintain our ancient rights and privileges.  
Again the Author saith, that he shall not endeavour to excuse the former times, by comparison with our present miseries: though neither be defirable, yet we are too sensible, which we have justest reason to complain of.  
'tis certain that no evil is defirable, but yet if Fate decree it, let me suffer under the hand of justice, rather than of wrong and oppression. Besides desperate diseases, must have desperate cures, if these times bring greater misery than the former, thanks be to the Author and his con●…derates; the public calamity now, is but the sad effect of that before. Had we freely enjoyed our birthright and inheritance then, there would not have been this civil combustion now: bad premises must have bad conclusions.  
I 〈◊〉 under this word (protect) the King intends not only to shield us from all kind of evil, but to promote us also to all kind of Polyticall happiness, according to his utmost 
Obs.  devoir.  
Saith the Author, I never did apprehend in the word (protect) 〈◊〉 large notion. Every particular 
Ans.  subject hath a just title, and may challenge an interest in whatsoever is meant by the word protection: is the King therefore bo●…nd to promote every particular person to all kinds of political happiness? to advance all to honours, offices, power, command?  
I wonder how you can now apprehend this word (protect) under so large a notion: or 
〈◊〉  is it possible (were you not resolved to cavil) that these words should give you ground for it? certainly (if my reason fail me not) political happiness hath reference only to the body politic, and that is not capable of any advancement, to any ho●…our, office, or power, and to take the words in other sense were to make them impossible, for can it be thought or expected that his majesty should be bound to advance all his Subjects to places of honour or power? since if all should be in authority they might command themselves, there would be none left to obey. The sense of the Observator is plainly this, that the King by this word protect is not only to intend a shielding us from all evil, but likewise a promoting of the commo●…wealth to all kind of political happiness: by endeavouring to enrich, not impoverish his Kingdom: by maintaining peace, and establishing good and wholesome laws amongst his people, and by putting of such in place of power and authority, that may see the due execution of the same.  
Though all single 〈◊〉 ought to look upon the late Bills passed by the King, as matters 
Obs.  of grace, with all thankfulness and humility, yet the King himself, looking upon the whole State, aught to acknowledge that he cannot merit of it &c. all hath proceeded but from his mere duty.  
It was believed heretofore (saith the Author) the greatest happiness of a Prince, that 
Ans.  〈◊〉 was able, and his greatest glory, to be willing to oblige his people. But now he is made not capable of doing any courtesy. When he hath done all he can, he hath discharged the duty of a trusty servant.  
Whatsoever hath been or could be attributed to any Prince in point of grace or humble 
Rep.  acknowledgement, that we ascribe unto our gracious sovereign, with all humility: and we shall always account it our happiness, to have a Prince not only able, but willing to engage his people by his grace and goodness; But must it therefore be thought to be a dishonour or derogation from his gracious and public favours, to say, that he doth but fungi officio, discharge his office, or duty, according as the law of God and man obligeth him? certainly had Rhehoboam's Sages thought that their council had carried the least badge of irreverence or disrespect to their Prince, they would not have advised him in such rough and unacceptable language, that if he would be a servant to that people and serve them, &c. that then they would be his servants for ever. Good Princes have acknowledged themselves servants to the common wealth. And 'tis the council of young men only that suggest the contrary. But it is a certain position, that that Prince will never discharge his trust aright, that sacrifices too much to his royalty. Here the Author may see, that other ages have been guilty of the like irreverence and disrespect (as this Sycophantean Co●…tier is pleased to style it) to Princes. 
Obs.   
Again he saith, That if all single persons ought to look upon the late Bills passed by the King, as matters of grace. 
Ans.   
Then they truly are so, for no obligation can lie upon any man, to believe things ●…therwise than they are. 
Rep:   
'tis true, things that are simply good, or simply evil, cannot be varied by circumstances: & and therefore no obligation may constrain a man to believe them otherwise. But that which is not in itself good or bad, but varies according to its several object; in such case, for one and the same act to produce good to one, and ill to another, is no novelty: and here the application denominates the action. So in this case, one and the same action may be matter of grace to one, and yet but matter of d●…ty to another. As when a judge doth Justice to a man, as to him 'tis grace and favour, but with reference to the law, t●…s but his duty.  
Ay but he saith, That this ground destroys the power of bene●…nce in a Pri●…ce, and the duty of gratitude in subjects.  
Under favour nothing less▪ for as it is his Ma●…esties office and duty by all means of grace and favour, as also by justice and right, to endeavour the happiness of the common Wealth; so it is our duty by all means of humble acknowledgement, to be grateful, 'tis a great mercy for to have a Prince that will govern his people according to Law and right. And it were a great judgement, for the people not to be thankful.  
The King ought not to account that a profit, or strength to him which is a loss 
Obs.  and wasting to the people, nor ought ●…ee to think that pe●…sht to him, which is gained to the people.  
By the same Argument the people may share all that be hath, and he is ●…ound to believe that 
Ans.  be hath lost nothing.  
All that the observator here drives at, is but this, that the King's strength and riches, 
Rep.  a●…e embarked in the happiness and prosperity of h●…s people; and therefore that it is not their debilitating or impoverishing, that will any way 〈◊〉, or enrich his majesty, but the contrary; blessed be the King in his portion, may it increase to nonplus arithmetic, and his days, time; But yet let him know, that the misery or happiness of his people are by way of r●…flection made his.  
Is King an●… people have several ●…ghts (saith the Author) what law is there which binds the King suo j●…re cedere, and enables the people to preserve their rights, nay to challenge his?  
No do●…bt the King and people have several rights (happy State, when they do not entrench upon each other) but in this they va●…y; the King, for the most part, is seized or poss●…ssed in jure 〈◊〉, and the people in their own right: so that the King hath n●… that 〈◊〉 of property, that the people hath: And no doubt the King at first (as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the Author) received his demesnes from his people, as a recompense of his care, to whom they owed their security; and therefore if it were law for 〈◊〉, no question the people might most colourably justify an encroachment. A●… the King by the Law of God and man is bound to do justice, and to protect and de●… his people: and therefore if he have any right or privilege that is inconsistent wi●…h these, he is obliged suo jure cedere. But again, doth any one go about to take away the Kings right, or to divest any property of his? Nay rather do they not in defect of his 〈◊〉, and in his right, employ and manage them according to the trust reposed in him; or if they did do it, ought not the King rather to lose his right or privilege, then that the public ●…erish or be destroyed? 
Obs.   
regal dignity was erected to preserve the commonalty: But that which is the end is ●…arre 〈◊〉 honourable and valuable in nature, and policy, then that which is the means.  
The conclusion impl●…d is, therefore the commons more honourable than the sovereign. 
Ans.   
'tis no dishonour to h●…s majesty, for to say, that the commonalty or body politic is 
Rep.  more honourable than he: did he not receive his dignity from them, and for their behalf? is he not a servant to the commonwealth? and is not the common wealth of greater valuation and esteem? Ay, that the author doth agree too, but he saith, it doth not follow, that therefore it is more honourable. Pray what is honour? but the estimate and repute of people, so that every man is more or less 〈◊〉, according to the greater or lesser valuation and 〈◊〉, that he is had in with the people. honour est magis in hon●…rante, quam in honorato, and no d●…ubt the public good carries the greatest price and estimate, therefore the more honourable. l, b●…t saith the Author, how do you maintain your Argument: That because the end is more honourable and valuable than the means, therefore the commonalty is more 〈◊〉 than the king. For saith he, 〈◊〉 are ministering spirits for the good of men, ●…ut will it therefore follow, that because the end is more honourable than the means, that me●… are more honourable than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. So saith he, Christ is made the head of the Church, for the salvation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the end is 〈◊〉 honourable and ●…aluable ●…an the means, can it therefore be, that man is more ho●…ble and valuable than C●…st?  
These cases may receive a short answer, for 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 is pleased to say, that the highest 〈◊〉 of angel's ministration, and the ob●…ce of Chi●…st, is the gl●…ry of God; 〈◊〉 ●…our it is the proximate end, and so it is not in 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 than in other human acts or 〈◊〉: so 〈◊〉 these cases conclude 〈◊〉 us, n●… against us; b●…t 〈◊〉 that they could hold, this is a strange way 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉, that 〈◊〉 a rule will not stand in one 〈◊〉 case▪ that therefore it will in no 〈◊〉; allow me but this 〈◊〉 in dispute, and I will 〈◊〉 overthrow, or maintain 〈◊〉 c●…e in question: as for 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 is the means of the salvation of men's 〈◊〉, is not t●…e end h●…e mo●…e 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 th●…n the means? So 〈◊〉 and sord●…d labour may raise a man to g●…at rich●…s and 〈◊〉, and is not the end here, more 〈◊〉 and valuable than the means. Now 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to ●…clude from these cases to the case in d●…bate you would say were a very fallacious 〈◊〉, turn but the s●…ales the case is your ●…wn.  
But the Author saith, that 〈◊〉 rule ●…h hold in s●…ch 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 unto their ends, and have no proper goodnes●… of their ●…wne, but a K●…ng 〈◊〉 .  
The 〈◊〉 were made for man●… sustinence, and here no question, the end is more ho●… and valuable than the means, and yet we must n●…t 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 per 〈◊〉 in the creature. So the word of God preached is good in itself▪ and yet here the end is more honourable than the means, So the King might be an honourable person in himself which the superaddition of royalty doth not destroy, but en●…rease, and yet withal this, being but the means to preserve the 〈◊〉; may be less honourable and valuable than they who are the end of his royalty.  
This directs us to the trancendent {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of all politics, to the Paramount Law that shall 
Obs.  give law to all human laws whatsoever, and that is salus populi.  
How many nations hath this abused principle brought to ruin and confusion. 
Ans.   
He instances in none; but would subtly insinuate such things into your belief, that 
Rep.  might make you to fear your present condition; but if phanta●…mes or chymoeraes have vainly frighted others, happily out of their wits, shall not we therefore wisely secure ou●… selves ●…rom apparent and visible dangers? the abuse of a good thing, doth no way conclude against the lawful use. But a●…ter he had agreed this to be the end of all government, he holds it without doubt, that governor's proportion all their laws to that end; for (saith he) who that is wise, will not provide for their safety as well as he can, in whose destruction his own is ●…nvolved.  
I wish from my very soul that this were duly pondered on, salus Regis & populi, lie now at stake for a 〈◊〉, and is like to be lost, without the King, by the advice of his great council, be pleased, providere salvationi regni sui. gracious sovereign, suffer not your people (and in them your own honour and happiness) to die, who (God knows) seek nothing but the maintenance and preservation of both.  
Well, after this, the Author tells us of a crafty kind of people' (who he means, God knows, for I believe he himself doth not) who by fair glosses and pretences insinuate themselves into the hearts of the multitude, who pity their sufferings, and tell them they are not so well governed as they might be; these things if applied to our state and condition, are not bare pretences. And then he instances in the story of Absalon, who stole away the hearts of his father's subjects, under a pretence of doing o●… them justice; this Absalon, I fear, is nearer Oxford than London: after he saith, they promise 〈◊〉, and to effect this, desi●…es the peopl●…s assistance, unhappy people and fit to be enslaved, that will not yield their aid for redu●…ing of their ancient liberties. Then, he saith, the people full of great hopes, cry up these men, as the only fit iustruments of state, none deserve better of the common wealth (let the mo●…th of malice suggest what it can by way of detraction) than such as have haza●…ded their lives and fortunes for reducing of its former happiness; and no instruments so fit as these, that are chosen by public consent and approbation. Having thus ga●…ned the 〈◊〉 of the people, their next work is to pick a quarrel 〈◊〉 great 〈◊〉 that by 〈◊〉 t●…m, they make 〈◊〉 for thems●…lves, is that to pick a quarrel with great officers to accuse them legally for their unjust oppression and malignity to the common wealth? and if they ●…hance to be expulsed (though it seldom prove so) as justice requireth, where can you find their accusers in their room? which possibly might have been had they desired it. Then he saith, if these men will not out of their preferments. the people are acquainted, the●…e are the only ●…ubs, which 〈◊〉 a ●…appy government; ●…hese are the close enemies to the State. No wonder if the people be so informed; those that have been 〈◊〉 the oppreslers of the Common wealth, will, rather than suffer their actions to come to the test, prove even the destroyer's 〈◊〉 it. And is not salus ●…uli now concerned, and the whole Ki●…gdome in danger and (to use his own words▪ though with more real intention) no way to escape this imminent peril but by tearing o●… these men from the Prince; who endeavour to rent the King from his people, and utterly to destroy both. A●…ter all this large and dark discourse, he concludes by way of advice; and what is that? why wholesome counsel, I warrant you. Let them (saith he) rely upon their governors, who have 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 (es●…ecially i●… they have given them great and late sig●…es of their 〈◊〉 to and care of 〈◊〉, this is the most 〈◊〉 way of safety▪ I marry sir, thi●… is good doctrine indeed: because 〈◊〉 will hazard his fortune, which i●… greater; must I therefore expose mine to ruin, which is less: but stay, hath any one individual, a greater portion than the public? or m●…re to lose than the body politic? if so, we will intrust our store with him, and run the hazard; if otherwise, you will give us leave to secu●…e the great●…r, and more considerable portion. A●…d under the A●…thors favour, 'tis no probable way of safety, ●…r a man to 〈◊〉 himself wit●… his enemy. Ay but th●…n hear what he saith immediately after the precedent words, if 〈◊〉 should miscarry (saith he) which they can have no reason to suspect) they would perish with a great deal of di●…cretion. The Law of God, of Nature, of Nations, and the municipal Law of the Land, do all inab'e a man to maintain his life and fortunes, though by force and violence. And can it then be thought that a whole kingdom and people should be bound (under I know not what divine obligation) to yield themselves as a pray to the malice of their enemies▪ 'tis not the bond of governors, that can challenge a submission to things unlawf●…ll: and for that cause, that I am not bound to obey, it were unnatural, if I migh●… not defend: and therefore with the author's favour, it were high sin and indiscretion for me to lose my life, when I might save it. 
Obs.   
It seems 〈◊〉 all to me, that any Nation should be bound to contribute its own inherent puissance, merely to abet tyranny, and support slavery. 
Ans.   
The inconveniences of Tyranny conclude nothing against just Monarch●….  
That is true, I but what if a just Monarch shall degenerate into a tyrant? then I perceive 
Rep.  you will allow, that the inconveniences of Tyranny conclude somewhat. I but, saith the author, It is so far from being unnatural, that any nation should be bound to contribute its power to that end, that some have made it their choice, others their refuge. What, to be made slaves? most unreasonable, most unnatural. All creatures (much more man) do by nature desire liberty. 'tis that we were all borne to; and as he doth oppugn nature, so he waves part of his right and inheritance, that consents to thraldom. No temporal blessing next to life, greater than an ample freedom; No greater misery, than a vile and sordid slavery. I but wh●…t if the author's position hold true? that some Nations have so far degenerated as to exchange a Palace for a Prison (though perchance that by force too) as the State of Rome, Turkey, and France; must their examples be precedents for us? or is it any whit the less unnatural because they do it? I but the Author saith, There may be reasonable motives why a people should consent to slavery; as if in danger of a potent enemy, they could hire none on gentler conditions, to undertake their defence, or if reduced to extreme want, they had not wherewith to sustain themselves, they may very probably, like Esau, ●…asse away their 〈◊〉- right, 〈◊〉: and he gives you an instance of both these, of the fi●…st, the 〈◊〉 to the Children of Israel: and of the last, the Egyptians to Pharaoh. 'tis an old and true saying, that necessity hath no law; the law of nature binds every man to defend and maintain his liberty, but necessity may untie this bond; for it is better to be, though miserable, than not to be at all. But now to conclude from a case of necessity, to a case out of necessity, is no good reasoning. To say that to save my life, I may part with my liberty; and therefore like Esau with his birthright, I may pass it away for a mess of pottage; this is a most foolish and unreasonable argument. To conclude this, freedom, as it is a great mercy, so it ought of temporal blessings, next to our lives, to receive the greatest estimate; the slavery of the body is the 〈◊〉 to the thraldom of conscience; and if we foolishly surrender up this, the other will not be long after.  
From the word (trust) used by his majesty, he gathers, the King doth admit his interest i●… 
Obs.  the C●…owne in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
No ground for this collection: for there may be a trust, and that is so much the greater, if 
Ans.  free from condition.  
Under the author's favour the collection is very natural; for (as I have shown before) 
Rep  every trust implieth a condition; that the party entrusted faithfully discharge and execute that trust that is reposed in him: and did not the King accept his crown upon the same condition? Beside●…, ●…ll osfices of trust and confidence, or that concern the administration of justice (as Lawyers well know) carry a long with them a tacit condition; and th●… office of a King, hath those qualifications in the most s●…perlative degree, of any other, and therefore must of necessity be conditionate. But the Author saith, That this is true in some sense, and his majesty hath always acknowledged, he is bound to maintain the rights and liberty of the Subject: yet we must not so understand it, as if the right to his Kingdom were so conditionate, that it wer●… capable of forfeiture upon a not exact performance of covenant. It can never be thought with any candid and f●…ire interpretation, that the Observators intention was, that the King might, for breach of this condition, forfeit his crown; for it is clear that the not executing of a trust, doth not forfeit the estate or interest entrusted: besides 'tis regularly true in our law, that that which is not grantable, is not forfeitable▪ but the crown is not grantable, e●…go, & c. ●…ut that which most confirms me in this is, that the Observator hath in ●…art declared his judgement against the opinion o●… deposing Prin●…es, which I conc●…ive he would not have done, had he thought the crown forfeitable; all that he intends (if I may be thought fit to be his expositor) is (as I suppose) but this, that he would not have Kings have an absolute and unquestionable power, so that their exorbitancy might not (though with greater happiness to the Common wealth) be regulated by a Parliament.  
As for the word (elegerit) whether it be future or past it skils not much. 
Obs.   
If he ●…ake notice of the conclusion deduced thence, he may find as much difference between the tenses; as between Democracy and Monarchy. 
Ans.   
Give me leave to make the premises, and do you raise what conclusion you will. The 
Rep.  Observator (who knew certainly to distinguish the Tenses as well as the Author) seems to intend only thus much, that if elegerit be taken in the future tense, well and good; it makes for him; for then the King (according to the very letter of his oath) is bound under the heavy sin of perjury to grant such laws as a●…e requested of him by his people; and then he can have no negative voice. But admitting it be expounded in the preter perfect tense, and not in the future; why yet saith the Observator, it matters not: for by the oath and the Law of the land the king is bound to do justice; and the granting of new laws unto his people upon their request, is an act of justice, & necessary as well as the dispencing of the old, & therefore there being the same necessitity, the public trust must needs equally extend to both. But the Aethor will show us, why elegerit, must of necessity be taken in the preterrerfect, not in the future, as this case is, for saith he, the word (consuetudines) which cannot refer to the future, undeniably evinces, it was meant of the time past.] Under favour this doth not infallibly conclude that elegerit must be taken in the preter perfect tense, for no more than the King can grant such customs as the people sh●…ll choose, for that it must be time, not the King's Patent, that can create a custom; so neither can the King grant such laws or customs unto a people, which they have already chosen, and which have been established and ratified unto them, by all his predecessors; for quod semel meum est ultra meum esse non potest, that which is mine own already cannot be given unto me. So that the oath must be construed, reddendo singula singulis, as we say in law; that is, that he will confirm their ancient customs which they do already enjoy. and that he will grant unto them such new laws as they shall hereafter make choice of: other reasonable construction the oath will not admit of, and agreeing with this exposition is the first clause of his magisties' oath, where demand is made whether his majesty will grant and co●…firm unto his people their ancient laws and customs, who answers that he will. And contrary to that which the Author doth assert, the Parliament have made it clear and manifest by their declaration lately published, how that elegerit hath been always rendered in the future tense, and not in the preter perfect tense. So that I shall pass this over without any further trouble, conceaving that the Author may (if he have not resolved to the contrary) upon these grounds be fully convinced in this particular.  
The King is bound to consent to new Laws, ●…f they be necessary, as well as defend the old. 
Obs.   
His majesty never thought otherwise; but he is not bound to an implicit faith, to believe all necessary which is pretended to be so. 
Ans.   
This is in plain terms to invert the method, for the King to choose laws not the 
Rep.  people: for if he will consent to none (be they of never so great necessity) but such as he himself holds convenient, what then is become of the people's election? this is to prescribe and enforce laws upon the people, ●…ot to consent to them upon their election. Besides, who so proper a judge of the necessity or conveniency of a publi●…e law as the republic? those that know the want of the benefit, must needs be most sensible of the necessity.  
The word elegerit; if it be in the preterperfect tense, yet shows, that the people's election 
Obs.  had been the ground of ancient ●…a●…es and customs; and why the people's election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever, I cannot discover.  
The election there spoken of, is the election of the diffusive, no●… of any representative body, 
Ans.  that with the tacit consent of the Prince, and so os much other authority.  
Under favour it is of no other authority, for though it should be con●…essed that at first the diffusive body did choose their laws, which had the tacit consent of the Prince, and that 
Rep.  since the people have granted the King a negative voice in his Parliaments, which is the representative body of the kingdom, yet being with this qualification, that his Majesty grant all necessary laws desired by the people, hence it follows, that the representative body (having as great power, and as good judgement, to discern of laws necessary, as the diffusive) have the same power of election, which ought to be of as great moment and consequence as ever.  
For the representative, their ancient right is not denied, no law shall be abrog●…ted, none ●…acted without their assen●…. But there is a mean between doing nothing, a●…d all.  
I wonder at the Author that he dare utter such palpable and known falsities. How often have the privileges of Parliament been infringed? even to amazement and wonder, that all foregoing ages cannot produce the like: and is there not an illegal commission of Array, (though not enacted) yet ordained and set up in opposition to the Parliament. But whtch is yet above all, and strikes at their very essence, are they not (because others do neglect their duty, and the trust reposed in them by the public) denied even the very name of a Parliament, and therein the power and virtue of it? and whether this be not a denying of their right,, let the world judge. The Author saith true, that there is a mean between doing nothing and all. But I would fain know how we shall be assured of this mean if his majesty (upon pretence of unnecessary) shall have power to deny whatsoever is requested by the parliament?  
The result of all is, Our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety 
Obs.  in all t●…e subjects, lives, liberties, and possessions, or in any thing else to the crown appertaining, as subjects have in the King's dignity.  
The Author saith, That what should be meant by subjects having an unconditionate and 
Ans.  h●…gh 〈◊〉 in the King's dignity, surpasses his understanding.  
〈◊〉 not the Author loved division, he would not have thus severed the Observators 
Rep.  words, thereby to pu●… a dylemma upon himself, and others: for the Observator saith before, that the King was made for the people, and not the people for the King, and thence raiseth this conclusion (which under savour is very natural) that therefore the King hath not that absolute right of property in the people and their interest, as they have in his majesty and his possession: and now will any man (except our Author who understands not) deny this for a truth?  
Ay, but he saith, it seems to s●…eake this wicked doctrine, that subjects may dispose of the sovereignty as ●…hey please.  
'tis strange that our Author will pass his judgement (especially so severe an one) upon any thing that he doth not understand: because happily it may conclude thus much, that his sacred person and his actions ought to be directed and ruled by his great council the Par●… 〈◊〉 it therefore thence be deduced, that they may dispose of his sovereignty at pleasure: this is the author's meaning not ours.  
If the King 〈◊〉 such high 〈◊〉 as subjects, it were not lawful, or natural for him to expo●…e 
Obs.  his 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 for his 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 is it 〈◊〉 for subjects then to do so? 
Ans.   
What a strange 〈◊〉 is this; is it not lawful for a man, by the hazard of his person, 
〈◊〉.  to defen●… his proper●…y? which cannot be maintained without the defence of his country. But this doth no way prove that if the Kings right were as absolute as the subjects, that he might expose h●…s life and for●…une for their defence: for no doubt he that loseth his life when he might have saved it is a man slayer; and if the people had been made for the King, not the King for the people, what Law could have warranted the hazarding of his person, ●…or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? But to disprove, this conclusion, he saith, That the people have as great, 〈◊〉 g●…eater 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…or the King, and this he makes good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the 〈◊〉, which 〈◊〉, that I become your Le●…ge of life 〈◊〉 g●…ds. &c. as 〈◊〉 by ●…he Pro●…station and 〈◊〉 of legiance which are to the same effect. He is no true subject that will not expose 〈◊〉 and all that he hath, for the preservation of his King an●… Sovera●…e, we shall ever acknowledge that strong tie and obligation, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 us to do it. But yet we must 〈◊〉 that the King's oath, and the Law of the Land (which engage the King to protect and defend his kingdom and people) are equal●… 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 that the Observator had shown the effic●…ent cause of Parliament to wit the people, an●… he final cause safety and liberty, he descends to this,  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉 he) 〈◊〉 are aimed at in Parliaments, not to be attained to by o●… 
Obs.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 est of the people might be satisfied, ●…nd Kings better counselled.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 certainly, many kingdoms have enjoyed a most high de●… 
〈◊〉.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. A 〈◊〉 Monarchs, who knew no Parliaments.  
Th●…s possibly may be 〈◊〉; but I ●…ope it shall not 〈◊〉 into the hearts of English 
R●…p.  Subjects any whit the greater affection to that kind of 〈◊〉; I believe indeed that this is that the Author would fain persuade us to; These are the main grounds of the sad division our Religion and our Parliaments: God enable us to maintai●… both; for if we part with either, we shake hands and bid adieu to all happiness. The Author saith that two ●…her 〈◊〉 might have been named as assential as the former, which are to supply his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Subsidies, and assent to the abrogation of old laws, and enacting new.] The latter I 〈◊〉 agree to be so, but I never heard before, that the supplying of his majesty's wants by Subsidies, was one of the essential ends of the calling of Parliament. It was accounted formerly the mai●… end of calling of a Parliament, the ease or relief of the subject, and the granting of Subsidies was then esteemed but as a congratulation or thankful acknowledgement of the King's grace and favour towards them in that Parliament; and is it now become one of the main ends? I suppose the Author speaks out of a late experience; 'Twas never happy with England since this Law was broached. And wheresoever Kings advance their own profit, or but make it ●…quall with that of the public, the people will never enjoy true happiness.  
In the sums of Edward 1. (●…laus. 7. in 3. dors.) We see the first end of Parliaments expressed: 
Obser.  for he inserts in the writ, that whatsoeve●… affair is 〈◊〉 public concernment, aught to receive public approbation, Quod owns tangit, 〈◊〉 omnibus app●…obari debet & tractari.] The Author tells us that this must be understood with due caution, lest we reduce ourselves to our primirive estate, by dissolving the bonds of Government; and therefore saith he, the policy of all est●…tes for the avoydi●…g of all confusion hath been, to leave the transaction of public affairs, to some certain number, and their suffrages do in Law bind the rest; So saith he in absolute Monarchies what Princes do is legally the act of all; and he makes the result of all to be this, Those things which the Law doth require, shall be transacted only by Parliament, the people 
A●…s.  do handle and approve of by their Knights and ●…rgesses: those things which the law hath entrusted the King with many of which concern the good of the who●…) what bee doth is their act.]  
I shall not with our Author dare to confine Parliaments, whose power is vast and incognit as my Lord Cook speaks: And yet I shall not ascribe so unlimited a power unto them, as to 
〈◊〉.  give them ju●…isdiction in all cases. (They themselves who best know their power) have in their late Declaration protested against it; for they say, they have power of jurisdiction of declaring the law in particular cases before them; than not in all cases: But who shall be Judge of those cafes, by which they are entitled to jurisdiction? can ther●… be any one a Competent Judge of this, but themselves? and they having past their judgement, who ought or dare to contradict it? no reversing of their judgement, but by the judgement of a subsequent Parliament; why then since none can know their power, or if they could, they are not competent Judges of it; how dare any one go about▪ to dispute their power or call in question their judgement? The desire of the Commons in the reign of Edw. 3. was, that they might not advise in things de queux ils nount pas cognizance, the matter in debate then concerning the settling of intestine commotions, guarding the Marches in Scotland and the Seas; concludes no more than this, that they thought themselves not▪ competent counsellors in thi●… case (happily by reason of their unskilfulness in that way, or for that the King had then more able Counsellors to advise with in that matter) which under favour is no renouncing of jurisdiction. But to give a more full and satisfactory answer, at that time the King complied with his Parliament, and would not be advised by others, and then there being no breach of trust, there 〈◊〉 the less reason for the Parliament to advise or intermeddle with affairs of that nature; But if the King had then deserted the counsel of his Parliament, and cleaved to the advice of his young men like Rehoboam, certainly than they would not have deserted their power in danger of the Common-w●…alth, which by their writ and their oaths, they are bound to preserve and defend, and therefore clearly not out of their ●…gnizance; for that passage in the Diary of 1. Hen. 4. I wonder the Author should so far forget himself, as to think that author●…ty of any moment; when he doth produce the Record, I will then give him an answer. So that I take this as an undeniable position, that where the King doth duly execute the trust reposed in him, there the 〈◊〉 are bound by his act▪ and the Parliament in such ca●…e have no 〈◊〉 or jurisdiction: B●…t if on the co●…trary the King infringe his trust to the endangering of the Kingdom, there the Parliament may & are bound to 〈◊〉 for the securing o●… the King & 〈◊〉.  
The 〈◊〉 will not pass over th●…s r●…le thus; for saith he, if quod omnes tangit, ab 〈◊〉 opprob●…ri debet; with what equity then may the clergy, who are a considerable part of this kingdom be excluded?] Why yes, by the same eq●…ity, that the Statute of 21. Hen. 8. doth excl●…de them from being Farmers; that those who have devoted themselves solely to God's service, might not miscere se secularibus negotijs, encumber thems●…lves with secular affairs, for that this would be an impediment to the execution of their sacred function; 'Twas ne●…er happy with this Nation since pride and covetousness so possessed the clergy; and temporal jurisdiction was dispensed by ecclesiastical persons: And since they proved better Lawyers than Divines, they ●…arved their flock, and made them more like wolves, than sheep, and Heathens than Christians. I wish they would not desire temporal pre●…erment, but keep themselves (as they ought) in their proper sphere, & ponder on this, that it is no small happiness to be exempted from State 〈◊〉 & molestations; & that it is the greatest honour to be the servant of God.  
The Author saith that the King tells them, their writ may direct them to know their power, which is to counsel, not to command.] I wish with all my heart, that he and his associates could plead as clear a conscience from this, as his Parliament can, though certainly they may make a more colourable pretence to it, than the cavaliers; if begging and entreating with all the veness that possibly can be, be a commanding, then are the Parliament highly guilty if it, otherwise not; again saith the Author, the writ runs, super dubijs negotijs tractaturi, vestrumque consilium impensuri; So that the clear meaning is, their advice is not law, except the royal assent established it into an Act.] If the author please but to advise with the learned, he will find that, tractare, is of a more large signification than to treat of or debate only. But was it ever said, that their advice should be Law without the regal assent? They have power to declare what the law of the land is, in case of public concernment, as now, but it was never so much as thought on, that they could make a new law, or alter the old, without his Majesty; We must distinguish between the declaring or adjudging of a new case by the reason of the old law, and the making of a new law; the one they may do without his majesty's consent, the other they cannot.  
'Tis alleged that the King call●…th them Counsellors, not in all things, but in quibusdam arduis, &c. and the case of Wentworth is cited by his Majesty, who being a member of the House of Commons, was committed, by Queen Elizabeth but for proposing, they might advise the Q●…eene in a matter she thought they had nothing to do to m●…ddle with.  
To which the Observator answereth a mere example (though of Queen Elizabeth) is no Law.] 
Obs.   
'Tis true saith the Author, but when grounded upon Authority, I pray where is it? and no way 
Ans.  excepted against by those who have been always earnest defendors of their privileges, it may be reckoned among sound precedents.]  
Happily there was never the like occasion to except against i●…, as having never been urged, 
●…ep  how then could it be answered? I am confident, that there was never any age before so guilty of the judging and questioning of the power of Parliaments. But pray hear the Parliament, and as you ought, so rest satisfied, who say, that some precedents ought not to be rules, this you must agree to, for that some are not lawful; But furthey they say, that no precedents can be bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament, because some ought not to be followed, and all may ●…all short and be different from the case in question. 
Obs.   
The King denies the assembly of the Lords and Commons, when be withdraweth himself●…, to be rightly named a Parl●…ament, or to have any power of any Court, and consequen●…ly to be any thing, but a mere convention of so many private men.] 
Ans.   
This is falsely imposed on his Majesty, his answers and massages speaks the contrary, which are directed to both Houses of Parliament.]  
Had it not been doubted that other direction might have caused some mistake and miscarriage, 
〈◊〉.  or at least have deni●…d them that acceptance, that his Majesti●…s Messages do d●…serve, I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 o●…her name and style would have been found out, for doth he not in these very M●…ssages call th●…m an inconsiderable number, and a company of factious 〈◊〉 persons and the lik●…? 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not the styles of a Parliament, and for th●…ir pow●…r if they can do nothing wi●…hout his M●…jesties consent, and that not to be obtained neither; what are they more th●…n a Cipher? or a mere conv●…ntion of private men? And is this a falsity? But our authors language sh●…ll not provoke to a retaliation. 
〈◊〉.   
The King doth assert, that because the law hath trusted him with a P●…erogative to discontinue P●…aments, to the danger or prejudice of the kingdom, this is no breach of that trust, because in 〈◊〉 of Law, the people may not assemble in Parliament, but by his writ.] 
A●…s.   
〈◊〉 is gross 〈◊〉, saith the author, Howev●…r I am sure the language is gros●…e; I had no time to 〈◊〉 for to disprove the Author, but this I am certain of, that his M●…jestie doth strongly urge that prerogative and his power and ●…lection thereby, which gives a strong intimation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 of freedom and power therein: But why is it false? because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author, if it appear to him necessary, or expedient for the kingdom, he ac●…, he is obliged by that trust reposed in him to issue out his writs.] 
〈◊〉.   
'tis not to be 〈◊〉 ●…hat wh●…n the people granted this Prerogative to his majesty, that they would give him so vast a power, as to make him the sole Judge of the necessity of a Parli●…ment: for if so, upon the 〈◊〉 of not necessary, and that upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 counsellors, be the kingdom in never so imminent, never so appa●…ent danger, it must be destroyed for want of a Parliament; certainly this was never the intention of this trust: Besides, who can be so competent a Judge of any approaching danger, or of any malignities or pressures in the Common wealth, as they who speak out of the common sense and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉? However this is certain, the kingdom canno●… suff●…r by a Parliament, i●… may withou●….  
If the Parliament make any transition in other matters, than what be pleases to propose, they 
Obs.  are liable to imprisonment at his pleasure.  
The sense of his inference is this, that because they cannot justify the meddling with things, 
A●…s.  which belong not to their cognizance, therefore they may be punished, if they meddle with those that do.  
This is the author's inference, not the Observators, He doth not say, that for executing 
Rep.  their due power they may be imprisoned, no, such inconsequent conclu●…ious we leave to the Author. But this he seemeth to speak, that it should be very hard and unreasonable, that the power of judging of the jurisdiction and authority of a Parliament should reside only in the King's breast, when that none can determine aright of them, but themselves; for if so, if the King at any time shall say they exceed their power, they may be imprisoned at plea●…ure.  
The Author telling the people how far their engagement goes with the Parliament, saith That if they exceed their 〈◊〉, and Vote things not belonging to their cognizance, the people by no means is engaged in it, as having no legal way of expressing of themselves in such cases.  
This is in plain terms to tell the people, in what cases they are to submit to, and maintain and descend the Parliament; in what not; certainly persons cannot be so 〈◊〉 as to thin●… that the illegal acts of a Parliament s●…ould bind them; but on the other side, I hope they will not be so foolish as to believe every thing to be illegal, which the Author is pleased to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: but rather cast themselves upon their care (as in duty they are bound) whom they have entrusted with the public security; But I hope the Author will now be advised, that on the contrary the people are no more engaged in the illegal proceedings of the Prince (in those things that he is entrusted with for the public) than of the Parliament.  
It is impossible (saith the King) that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to us, and our heirs for ever, and the same trust, and a power above that trust (for such is the power they pretend to) be committed to others.  
It is true (saith the Observator) Two supremes cannot be in the same sense and respect. 
Obs.   
This is a weak answer saith the Author. 
Ans.   
So weak that the Author cannot reply to it; for nothing is more known or assented to 
Rep.  than this, that the King is singulis major, yet universis minor.  
It seems (Says the Author) the King hath taken the Oath of Alligeance as well as we, and we may call him 〈◊〉 fellow subject.  
Did we ever speak of two Kings? or can there be so in one common wealth? But much less can there be any alligeance due from the sovereign to the subject; certainly the Author was not himself: But to prove his reasoning yet more absurd, we do not say that the King is singulis minor, but that he is universis minor, and I hope ●…he universe or body politic, never swore alligeance or supremacy to the King, neither is it possible that it should, for that it is a body only in consideration of Law, that hath neither life, nor motion like other individuals; and therefore not capable of doing of any act in that capacity, so that notwithstanding this shallow rea●…, the King is universis minor.  
Ay, but saith the Author, You tell us that he is greater than one, you do not tell us that he is better than two, this is no greater supremacy, than probably he had before he was a King. The Prince is singulis major as well as ●…ee, nay, may not any Lord in the Land chal 〈◊〉 the same supremacy over all the Knights, any Knight over all Esqui●…es?  
What a poor and senseless cavil is this, do not we say that he is universis minor? and doth it not then consequently follow that we allow him major to all that is less than the universe? When you can reduce the universe to so small a number as two, then will his Majesty be less than those two, until than he is greater; for those slender instances to prove as great a supremacy in the Prince, nay in every nobleman over all Knights, and in Knights over all Esquires; I must tell him, had not his senses b●…ene ravished by, and swallow●…d up in Mon●…rchy, he would never have so much forgot himself; can there be any one singulis major but the King? he that accounts himself so high, 〈◊〉 to be made lower by the head? the Prince himself is not sing●…lis major, till he survive his Father. To be short, all others are but comparatively great, the King only is great in the superlative.  
ay, but to take us off these corrupt glosses (I would there were no more 〈◊〉 in him●… the Author 〈◊〉 us to 24. H. 8. ca. 12. which (as he saith) 〈◊〉 the King to be universis major, the preface of which statute 〈◊〉 thus, that this kingdom hath been always acknowledged to be an Empire, governed by one supreme head and King, having the dignity and regal estate of the same, unto whom a body politic compact of all sorts and degrees of people &c. been bounden and owen next to God, a natural and humble obedience.  
Doth this prove the King universis major? under favour nothing less: for we must not understand this, that the body politic doth owe obedience, but that the several sorts and degrees of people, of which this body is compacted and made, that they do owe obedience, for to take it otherwise, were to make an absurd and impossible construction. For as I have said before, how is it possible that a body politic (which is a body only in judgement, of law or contemplation,) that hath neither life, sense, nor motion that that should owe homage or obedience to any one? much less a natural obedience as the Statute speaketh, so that clearly this doth not a●… all disprove the former position.  
If there were no King at all in England, you would call this government an Aristocracy: and why I beseech you, do you not conf●…sse the name now, seeing the thing is altogether the same? for if they give his voice, 'tis all one, as if he had no voice; if their p●…wer must overrule his, 'tis all one as if he were 〈◊〉 of all. Certainly Monarchy hath committed a Rape upon the author's reason and understanding, or else he could not be thus overseen. Doth the Parliament go about to take away the King's voice, or to disrobe him of his power: more than the known law of the land doth approve of? Did they even declare or publish such a power to be in them, that they might enact any new laws, or abrogate the old, without his majesty's consent? Nay, ●…ove they not frequently processed the contrary? why then, what have they done that should have the least colour of intitling them to an aristocratical Government? O yes; for they▪ have voted and published it to the world, that the power of declaring law (〈◊〉 Paul amento) in case of any public concernment: doth refide in them; and that though the King neither doth, nor will consent, yet he is obliged by their Votes. And is this any greater power or privilege than every other inferior Court hath? or is it more than they themselves formerly without the least scruple have exercised? by declaring law in dubious points of Stat●…s and erroneous judgements. And is their ancient, undoubted, and unquestionable right now become a power aristocratical? 'tis strange that the times should so vary the case, and that long enjoyment or possession (which doth usually confirm and strengthen a man's right) should be a means to take it away. But before I pass this over, let me tell the Author, that it is a most idle, scandalous and false aspersion: and if I do in all this wrong him, let he himself judge upon his own inference, which is this, that the defending and maintaining of the ancient ●…ight and government, is a labouring for an introducting of a new, and if he chance to blush (as he well may) at his own inconsequent reasoning, let him mend it herea●…ter.  
I but saith he, I dare say that all Histories and Records (except of such Parliaments which deposed their King, which the Observ●…or 〈◊〉 no free one ever did) cannot produce an example of this nature, that the two houses should pretend to a power which must of necessity overrule the King.  
That there is not the least colour of a pretence to such a power, I have before plainly evidenced it. Kut ay pray hear his reason, why this power, as to some respects may not be greater than the King. Because (saith he) since the law hath given the King a power, by dissolving of the Parliament, to take away that power (as is pretended) greater than his own, if they had ever made claim to superiority over him, he would quickly have put an end to that dispute.  
This is in plain terms to say, that a power that is but temporary, cannot be greater, than that which is continuing and unalterable: a strange fallacy, why, if the Kingmake one high Constable of England ad 〈◊〉, (whom we know hath a power very extensive) shall we conclude that his dignity or authority is inferior to others of less quality and esteem, because dissolvable at the King's pleasure? Or if the King confer the dignity and Office of Lord Keeper to another, by committing of the seal unto his custody, is he therefore not superior to the rest of the Nobility because removable at his majesty's will and discretion? an absurdity to think it.  
Before this power be challinged, it would be fit to vote down that clause in a law, made 2 H. 5 cited by his Majesty, That it is of the King's regality to grant or deny such of their petitions; as pleaseth himself.  
For that this is said to be cited by his Majesty, I shall not question the truth of it, though I have searched the Statutes, and I cannot find any such clause; But admitting it to be so, did ever any one make a question whether that there were such a Prerogative in rerum natura, as the King's negative voice? certainly not. The matter in debate is whether it be so absolute and uncircumscribed that the Parliament can do nothing, no, not so much as declare what the common law is, without his majesty's consent, or whether it be bounded and limited; So that this great and most supreme Court may not be like a body without a soul, or a numberless cipher: And for tha●… of the Statute, that he may deny their petitions, can you thence deduce, that he may deny their rights? their right of declaring law in ca●…e of public concernment, is not involved within the narrow compass of a petition.  
To the most absolute ●…mpire in the world, this condition is most natural and necessary, that the 
Obs.  safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his.  
It is against common s●…nse to suppose a King that is in his ●…its, who ●…ll not provide for the 
Ans.  safety of his people; nay, who will not part with some of his right, rather than they should perish, because in their destruction he loseth all.  
I would to God that sad experience did not inform us that you speak several languages, 
Rep.  one thing to us, another to his Majesty, if it were not so, the settling of the Militia by his Parliament, by reason of the abuse of that trust, to the endangering of the Kingdom, by ●…he advise of ill affected counsellors, would not have ca●…sed this great combustion. Ay, but then the Author saith. This doth not prove a King should part with his rights, as often as they will pretend to be in danger. Nor can it be thought rea●…onable, if that a Parliament, and in that a whole kingdom can use pretences. Was ever age guilty of such disrespects to a Parliament? If this were once admitted, what wild plots would be invented? what strange 〈◊〉 would be received ●…rom invisible spies. Strange! that a Parliament should fancy and invent n●…series to themselves, and should thus frighten the public with phantasms or Chimaeraes. I hope th●… Author will prove it by experience, that it is not so easy a m●…tter to deceive a whole Common weal●…h. I (saith he) and so often as crafty men were ambitious or covetous, so of●…n the silly people were to be frighted. More strange yet! that ambition and covetousness should at once possess a whole Parliament; and that a whole commonwealth should be accoun but a silly people, so easy to be wrought upon. I hope this disparagement to the public will work an answerable acceptance to the people.  
Since all natural power is in those who obey, they which contract to obey to their own ruin, or having so contracted, they which esteem suc●… a contract before their own preservation are sellonious to themselves and rebellious to nature.  
For example (says the Author, an agreement patiently to submit themselves to the Ordinary trial of law, and to suffer, if it should see fall out, t●…ough under an undeserved sentence. In this case be that doth not make resistance, and prerr his preservation to his contract is pronounced Felo de se, and a rebel to nature. 
Ans.   
And he puts other examples of the like nature, as that of the Martyrs, ●…nd of our Saviour Christ, and demands our thoughts of ●…hem, whether they were self murderers or no? 
Rep.   
What a strange affected mistake is this of the Author, can there be the least colourable inference out of what the Observator hath delivered, to justify any individual opposition and infringement of contract? or to make good an innocents oppugning of the sword of Justice, to rescue his own life? I dare confidently asfirme, not the least title to this purpose. No; a man ought to discharge his Covenant though it be to his disadvantage. And ruat Coelum, fiat 〈◊〉, though heaven itself (if it were possible) should be destroyed, yet let justice ●…ourish. That were a way to open a gap for all disorder and breach of rule and society, without which no common wealth can be of long subsistence. If thou suffer unjustly, God will abundantly remunerate thy sufferings, and repay it upon the head of thine enemies; wherefore much better it is for thee to submit to thy censure by patience, than to incur the breach of all society by d●…sobedience.  
Ay, but saith the Author, If reason will not satisfy, perhaps 〈◊〉 may, Q●…i 〈◊〉 potestati, ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt, to resist the Magistrate, 〈◊〉. And he saith, that answer (with which too many are deceived) cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion; this 〈◊〉 obliges private men, but not Magistrates, Since inferior Magistrates being opposed to the supreme power are but as pirvate men, and in this respect the reason of obedience is common 
Rom. 13 ●…  to 〈◊〉.  
'tis not usual with me to intren●…h upon another man's profession, but seeing I am here enforced to it, give me leave a little to sail out of my way to answer the Author. First, for the taking up of arms, or the waging of a war in general: I never heard any man oppose the leg●…timation of that war, that had these three requisites or ingredients. A lawful authotity commanding 〈◊〉, as the ●…agistrate. A just and lawf●…ll end, or cause occasioning it, as the defence of our Religion, liberties, and the like. And a good affection in following of it, as not with rashness or temerity but after all other means sirst endeavoured. And now I appeal to any indifferent man, whom neither fear nor affection hath engaged to the contrary, whether all these are not exactly made good in this great ●…taking of the Parliament?  
Ay, but saith the Author, how doth this an●…wer the taking up of arms against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King, for 〈◊〉 all o her 〈◊〉 are but as private men compared with him? To this I ●…nswer, 〈◊〉 under he A●…ors favour, ●…he supr●…am power (as I have made it good before) is the people represented by a Parlia●…ent, and then, no doubt, that precept of the Apostle comprehending the King as well as other persons, do●…h (according to his own Argument) justify he Parliament in their proceed●…s, and make good ●…heir taking up of arms in their own just defence.  
Ay, but hen the Author 〈◊〉 hat of the Apostle, that the Magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum, God's minister to thee 〈◊〉 thy good, and though thou suffer by him unjusty, yet there he is 〈◊〉 in bonum, for that by thy patient suffering thou shalt thereby gain an eternal reward.  
Cer●…inly, God never made Magistrates on purpose to a●…ict and 〈◊〉 over their p●…ople, th●…t they by patient 〈◊〉 might enjoy the gre●…ter happin●… hereafter. No, that they prov●… corrupt issues from hemselves, not from any divine determination; and therefore if the M●…gistrate do prove to be Minister nobis in malum, a Minister to thee ●…or thy ill, he is, not than 〈◊〉 minister, God's Minister, for that he doth transgress and go beyond his commission, and in such case under the favour of M. Doctor Ferne, conscience do●…h not only deny obedience, but command and justify 〈◊〉. But in all this conceive me 〈◊〉, 'tis the magistrates, not any 〈◊〉 opposition, that I justify; and this being undertaken with the due circumstance, is not a means to destroy order and society, but maintain them; But yet I hope our Au●…hor will be here informed that this is not our case. For do we take up arms against our sovereign▪ may he perish, who in his thoughts intends him the least ill; No, 'tis (as the Parliament have often declared) against his Malignant councillors? such who endeavour (whatever their 〈◊〉 may be to his Majesty) the subversion of our Religion, and the destruction of the public. And I hope there is nothing in the word of God that opposeth this. O yes; in opposing h●…s authority, you fight against him; Strange! if it should, be so; when neither the law of God nor man, do oblige obedience to commands unlawful. He that obeys the magistrate upon such terms, doth it at his own peril; and I hope 'tis lawful for the Parliament to depress any civil or private combustion. Ay, but what if that authority have the King's person accompanying it, may you in such case make resistance▪ No question we may, for 'tis not the person of the King that can legitimate an action, that is in itself unlawful: nor add any greater force or vigour to their Commission that obey. Besides the personal presence of the King, doth, or doth not countermand his authority; if it do countermand his authority, than they have no power to warrant their act●…on; if it do not, yet the act is 〈◊〉. So then let them take their choice, they see their terms. Unhappy people who having committed themselves to the government of one King only, might not oppose the unlawful and tyrannical regiment of so many.  
It being in effect objected (as appears befo●…e) That a ●…emporall power (meaning the Parliament:) cannot be greater than that which is lasting and unalterable (intending the King.)  
Is this were so, saith the Observator, the Romans have done impolitickly in creating Dictators, 
Obs.  when any great extremity assailed them, and yet we know it was very prosperous to them, sometimes to change the ●…orme of government.  
Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger; to trust to a Monarchy, not 〈◊〉 Aristoc●…y, 
Ans.  and much less to a Democracy.  
What have we to do with Aristocracy, or Democracy▪ God be blessed, we, nor know, nor desire 
Rep.  any other government than that of Monarchy▪ and we shall with all h●…mility cast ourselves upon his majesty's care and providence guided by his Parliament; But if sed●…ced by malignant and destructive counsel, we are not bound to yield ourselves as a pr●…y, to the ran●… and malice of his and our enemies.  
The King objects; if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than councillors, we make them Comptrollers, and this is not ●…ble to Royalty.  
To which the Observator answers, 〈◊〉 say (saith he) that to co●…t is more than to counsel, 
Obs.  〈◊〉 yet not a●…es so much as to command and control.  
True▪ (saith the Author) not always, but than it is when their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impose a necessity 
A●…s.  upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 the like. 
R●…p.   
Doth their consent impose a greater necessity or engagement upon the King, than the consent or declaration of law in cases of public con●…nt, by former Parliaments, hath done▪ or than the judgement of his Judges in inferior Courts do●…h do? who are so counsellors for the King, as that the King may not countermand their judgements, and yet it were an harsh thing to say that they are therefore 〈◊〉 ●…nd courtiers of the King, therefore it holds in Parliaments a ●…tiori. ay, but saith the Author the 〈◊〉 why the King cannot countermand their judgement, is, because they 〈◊〉 his person, and ●…is consent is by law involved in ●…at by law they do, for that the act of a delegated power is his act, and there would be no end if he should undo what be hath done. But (saith he) in Pa●…ament, the Lord's 〈◊〉 in a personal capacity, and the House of Commo●…s as representing the body of the Ki●…me, and therefore the cases do not agree.  
Under correction of the Author I shall make the case parallel, notwithstanding this 
Rep.  objection. I do agree, that in all acts of public 〈◊〉, which ●…e but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only (I hope it will not offend any one to say that they are Ministers to the commonwealth) as in case of making and consenting to new laws, or repealing of the old, or the like; there the Lo●…ds sit in a personal capacity, and the Commons as represe●…ting the body of the kingdom; But in all acts that are judicial, as in case of reversing of 〈◊〉 judgements or of declaring or explaining the law of the Land, there they represent the person of the King; for that he is ●…ons Iustitiae, the fountain of justice, and no●…e c●…n 〈◊〉 such a power without it be first delegated to them by the King; and therefore in such a case their judgements do ●…ly involve the judgement of the King, and do oblige him as strongly as the 〈◊〉 o●… d●…terminations of the Judges. Now none can de●…y their declaring of the law in case of the Militia to be a judicial act, therefore the consequence is clear that the King is justly bound by it. Ay, but further he saith, The judges swear they will not assent to any thing, 〈◊〉 may turn the King in damage or 〈◊〉, by any manner, way, or colo●…. 18. E. 3. And do not the Parl●…ent ●…o the same by their oath of supremacy, and their late Prote●…tion? If you seriously examine them, you will find that their obligation is the same. And now I hope the A●…thor will make good his 〈◊〉 to me; who said, that when I could make these th●…nges agree to the two Houses, I should conclude from the judge's sentence, to their votes; wherefore I do 〈◊〉 that there being the s●…e reason, there o●…ght to be the same La●…. Ay, but for a further answer (Seeing his former will not hold) saith the Author, in matters of law there lies an appeal to them (a writ of error being brought) as to the highest Court, not so in matters of State. Be●…ause whilst they 〈◊〉 sentence according to known▪ laws, the State is no way endangered thereby, but if they challenge to themselves a liberty of passing sentence according to reason of State, they may when they please▪ overthrow our laws. The counties which 〈◊〉 them▪ look upon them as judges, ●…ot Politi●…s. 'tis not impossible they should be both▪ and whatsoever the judgement of the Co●…ties were that entrusted them, certain I am that he is not fit to occupy a place in that great Assembly, that is not at least in some reasonable measure so qualified; that whilst the 〈◊〉 and other Sages skilled 〈◊〉 that profession, are within guiding and directing of▪ his great Ship 〈◊〉 to ●…aw, men experienced in the politics, may sit at stern to secure it from the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 invasion, and civil combustion. And wh●…n the Author can produce so able a 〈◊〉, so 〈◊〉, so much engaged in the welfarre of the kingdom, and so void of self respect; then will we upo●… his request de●…ert our Parliament; until then, I hope all faithful and true hearted people will adhereunto them. For that empty shadow and vain dream, of a possibili●… of the●…r 〈◊〉 the Law; it is a wonder to me that any 〈◊〉 man's fancy should so abuse itself. To 〈◊〉 the author's language upon himself. Can it be conceived that men in their wits, who 〈◊〉 all that they have by the benefit of the Law, and no doubt have as great a portion to lose 〈◊〉 others, should ex●…te that, which is the principal evidence of the●…r 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 of life or 〈◊〉, and so pin themselves and their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, upon unknown 〈◊〉, 'tis extreme madness and folly to think it. 
Obs.   
we ought not to conceive that they will either counsel or consent to any thing, but what 
Ans.  is publiquel●… advantageous.  
When the King 〈◊〉 they do not otherwise, he will 〈◊〉 willingly sollow their 〈◊〉. 
Rep.   
I dare confidently affirm, that no antiquity or Records w●… 〈◊〉 are a●…le to 〈◊〉 one example of this nature, where the King's single conceit or 〈◊〉 is opposed 〈◊〉 that o●… h●… whole Parliament. But it can●… be exp●… that they should 〈◊〉, while that the King by such malignant Co●…nsell is kept a●… so great a d●…st 〈◊〉.  
By such Couns●…ll and 〈◊〉 we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the K●…ng li●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
Obser.   
Such a cons●…nt in which his is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉 not so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 
〈◊〉.  〈◊〉 at all; 〈◊〉 doth not limit, but take it away.  
Doth this 〈◊〉 which doth ●…citely 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉, more 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 his 
Rep.  power, than that of their 〈◊〉, o●… 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉? The 〈◊〉 (saith he) doth not 〈◊〉 to have to 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 old, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉 them. Neither do they without his 〈◊〉, they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and so would he A●…thor ingenio●…sly acknowledge, if that he were not so much 〈◊〉▪ with 〈◊〉 and prejudice. But happily he doth not understand the difference b●…tweene constituting new, or repealing the old laws, and declaring or expounding the laws in being, how did Ship-money destroy our propriety (saith he) but by this very consequence? What a gross mistake is this? Because the Ki●…gs judgement is involved in that of his Parliaments, and of his Judges according to law; must it therefore follow th●…t the whole kingdom should be obliged by his majesty's determination against Law; Or because legally we coul●… not be divested of our property without our cons●…nt, must not ther●…fore the King be bound by the judgement of his Parliament, which doth tacitly include his cons●…nt? Ay, but saith he Ejus est velle, qui potest nolle. He only ha●● freedom of consent or disagreement, that may at his election do either. 'Tis true; But this must be understood of an actual consent, or dis●…greement and not of an implied. For in Corporations or bodies politic, wh●…re the Major part carri●…s it, will you say that the residue are not bound, because that they had not ●…lection to ●…ssent, or dissent, as the case falls out to be? This were a way to open a gapp●… to all disorder and confusion. So the King's consent is included in that of his Judges; and y●…t I hope you will not say, that the King there had freedom of dissenting, which is the very cas●… of the Parliament.  
It is alleged in derogation of Parliaments, wha●…soever the right of Parliament is, to assemble 
Obser.  and treat in all cases of a public nature; yet without the King's concurrence and consent they are liveless conventions, without all virtue and power, the very name of Parliaments is not due to them.  
Ay, but saith the Author, you should deliver the King's sense and words truly; the sum of 
Ans.  which is only thus, The two Houses have not power of making laws and altering the established government without him.  
What a strange construction is this; This is no more than will be readily agreed you; you 
Rep.  shall not need disput●… it; therefore questionless the words must import somewhat else. The truth of it is, your mist●…ke, (of which you are fr●…quently guilty) is this, that you promi●…uously counfound the making of new laws and the altering of the establish●…d government with declaring of the Common-law in being; which is palpable sophistication; And now I would fain be resolved by any indifferent understanding, whether if th●…y may not do that, without the King's actual concurrence and agreement, and that not to be obtained, they be not a mere livele●…e convention of private men without all virtue or power? It must be agreed that he that is act●…ated and moved by another power only hath none in himself.  
This allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments, and subjects us ●…o as unbounded a regiment 
Obser.  of the King●… mere will, as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under.  
The Author saith that there is no colour of reason in this; and why? for (saith he) are we 
Ans.  not lef●… in the same state in which we were? His Majesty denying to bring in a new gove●…nmennt: doth not take away the old.  
The Author saith true, that we are in the same state indeed, but 'tis as we were before, and without the Parl●…ament, subject to the King's mere will and lawless regiment. And though his 
Rep.  majesty's d●…nying to bring in a new government, doth not take away the old, yet his denying of the old government, is an introducting of a new.  
upon the same reason, by the King's d●●●●tion, other Courts must needs be vertuelesse and 
Obser.  void.  
It were a strange consequence to conclude, that because that may be done without the King, to 
Ans.  which his consent by law is not required; therefore that may be done without him, to which his consent is by law necessary.  
Under reformation, the King's actual consent to any legal or judicial determination in 
Rep.  Parliament is no more required, than it is to that of his Judges; yet, with the author's favour, both have the implied and tacit consent; and therefore upon the same ground, of the King's desertion, other C●…urts must be vertul●…sse, and quietly possess a vacation in term time, as well as his Parliament. Ay, but saith the Author it is against common sense to fancy; ●…hat he which en●…oyes all by the benefit of laws should hinder the due administration of justice according to those ●…awes, and so wilfully endanger not only his rights, but safety, by putting the kingdom into tumults and combustion.  
T●…is is an argument to persuade a man; no ground to convince him, or a probable inducing r●…ason, no legal conclusion. To argue from a probability to nec●…ssity, as to sa●… it is not likely it should be so, therefore it is not so, is a strange p●…ece of logic. administration of j●…stice is delegated to the Parliament (though in a more high and sup●…reminent way) ●…swell as to inferior Judges and the King gains as much honour and benefit, nay mo●…e, by the free effl●…x and current of justice in that Co●…rt, than in any other: and yet we see the stream is stopped, so that a deluge and inundation of misery hath bespread the face of the whole kingdom; and ●…o have fancied this, not long since, would have b●… as much opposite to common sense, as the other. 
Obser.   
It is attempted to divide between part and part in Parliament. 
Ans.   
Who those attempte●…s are, I inquire not. I suppose, be means those who divided the Lords into good and bad, the members of the House of Commons ●…to well and ill affected. 
Rep.   
You need not much inquire, your book speaks you an acquaintance with them. But know those that are bad or ill affected, made that distinction themselves, not others.  
It is a wonderful thing that the King's papers being ●…raited scarce with any thing ●…s, but such 
Obser.  doctrines of division tending all to the subve●…sion of our ancient ●…damentall constitutions, 〈◊〉 support all our ancient liberties, ●…nd to the erection of an 〈◊〉 rule, should fi●…d such applause in the world. 
Ans.   
There is a vast difference between declaring what divisions are and causing them to b●…; to show; is not to teach division.  
Far be it from me to lay the least imputation of guilt in this kind up●…n his sacred person, 
R●…p.  No; the confidence that I ever had of his goodness, pi●…ty, and love to his people, bids me silence. But this I may, without breach of charity, or stain of loyalty, conclude, that the best Prince may be corrupted, or if not so, seduced by those, who v●…w themselves 〈◊〉 servants to his Majesty, and the public, whereas th●…ir actions, which tend to nothing but rapine and spoil, do plainly testify the contrary. These are they that can dispense with their breach of trust (how they will be absolved I know not) and not only sequester themselves, but 〈◊〉 the King from his Parliament, and his people, and to open the gap more wide, and make the breach more incurable; advise His Majesty (contrary to his pious 〈◊〉) by published declarations to traduce his Parliament, an●… cast most strange and unheard of obloquies upon them, and to charge them with such 〈◊〉 their thoughts were never guilty of. Thereby to render them odious unto the people; So that by destroying the mutual bond of confi●…ence and affection, we ourselves might be made actors in our own ruin; and if this be not to cause division, as well as to declare it, and to teach it, as well as show it, let the wo●…ld judge.  
Ay, b●…t 〈◊〉 the Author, it is beyond 〈◊〉, if the K●…ngs a●…mes are such, as he would have the world believe, that they should fin●… such applause. I neither d●…re, nor can charge his M●…jesty with aims that are indirect; but if he were guilty in this nature (which I profess my faith is not as yet strong enough to believe) we must know that all actions o●… Kings find acceptance, and renow●…e with many; and the very worst will not want some to appla●…d them. But pray hear his reason, why 'tis not probable i●… the King's intentions were such, they should find such applause; for saith he, consider the persons from w●…m; men that have muc●… more to lose, than some who may aim at ge●…ting 〈◊〉 fo●…unes, by pretending they are in danger to lo●…e what they have. None are so ri●…h but they may have and desire more; and 'tis 〈◊〉 they that have least, are best 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 young men might in all probability, have as great a portion to expose to hazard, as the grave and sage 〈◊〉, and yet you see they preferred their vile and ambitio●… counsel before the good of the public. Ay, b●…t then he sai●…, they are known not to value their lives equal to their 〈◊〉. Very good, if it were true; yet for all this, they may be to choose their Religion. Nay, which is more, they a●…e 〈◊〉 o●… as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as honesty: it may be greater; neither of which would permit them to be 〈◊〉 to make themselves miserable, and pull upon their posterity and country perpetual slavery. Doth the Author think that his i●…sinuating probabilities (which are 〈◊〉 strongest Arguments) shall evince us that the sun shines not, though our eyes 〈◊〉 the contrary. Might not this with the sam●… strength of reason, have been urged in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 young 〈◊〉, and yet we see what wretched advise they gave the King; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not but 〈◊〉, that they did 〈◊〉 enslave their posterity and 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it, to ●…cuse the K●…ng to intend that, wh●… the world sees, how much 〈◊〉 ●…h s●…d ●…y to 〈◊〉 it. What 〈◊〉 of expression is it to say we accuse the King of 〈◊〉 an arbitrary rule? 〈◊〉 we labour nothing more than to 〈◊〉 his Majesty; No nation that ever enjoyed a municipal law; ev●… 〈◊〉 n●…rer to an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than we not long since did; and did we in all our 〈◊〉 in the least 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or accuse his Majesty? No; w●… 〈◊〉 his evil 〈◊〉, who wrought that 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉, and they (as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to do●…) who dare oppress his p●…ple, stick not (to di●…charge themselves) to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 evil actions upon their sovereign; and such is the subtlety of our Author here. If you imp●…ach him for any public desservice, he knows whether to fly ●…or 〈◊〉.  
Could our Anc●…s ever have bele●…ved 〈◊〉 should come a King, who would plead 〈◊〉 M●…na C●…a, who would ●…rd his C●…wne in the ●…nce of his S●…bjects 〈◊〉, and d●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, than the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 rule?  
This 〈◊〉 be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So●…; ●…ut our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his evil 〈◊〉 pleai against Magna Char●…a, and too apparently hazard his crown, in the destruction of his Subjects, and their liberties; endeavouring nothing more, than the introducting of an Arbitrary rule.  
If the King 〈◊〉 parted from his Parliament merely because they sought his oppression, and he 
Obs.  ●…d no 〈◊〉 means to withstand their 〈◊〉, let this proclaim them a void Assembly.  
His 〈◊〉 never 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 charge to the Parliament: the more impudent the Author that 
Ans.  dare do it, when his Majesty decli●… it: For he saith, it is most evident, there was too great rea●… to 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉, when not withstanding his deepest 〈◊〉 to maintain the true esta●… sh●…, they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉.  
I dare not charge his 〈◊〉 with any thing▪ I have no authority for it: But this I say; 
Rep.  when justice 〈◊〉 be denied, and the course thereof obstructed, against such firebrands, 〈◊〉, and engines of all 〈◊〉, as Jesuits, Seminary Priests and the like; When Papists shall approach so 〈◊〉 the Throne, and none admitted into greater favour and affection than they; certainly I may conclude (without prejudice to my King) that the Pope harbours in some of his counsels 〈◊〉; And this means being used, what alteration future necessity or 〈◊〉 may impose 〈◊〉 cast upon us, is not difficult to judge. When notwithstanding 〈◊〉 ut●… 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 happy 〈◊〉 on in Ireland &c. and his frequent pressing them 〈◊〉 new 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 the people were made 〈◊〉, he was a favourer of their bloody 〈◊〉.  
It must be acknowledged the King ●…n 〈◊〉, most wicked council that afterwards depressed it; witness the many 〈◊〉 that did intervene su●…ly manifested to the World. And which is above all, the seizing of that poor supply that was sent unto them. Whea the baser sort of the people were 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Parliament in clamourous and 〈◊〉 able 〈◊〉, &c. And were there not many of them (having neither offensive nor de●… weapons) most 〈◊〉, inhumanly, and barbarously 〈◊〉 and butchered for their pains? punishment sufficient for their 〈◊〉, if they committed any. When seditious Pam●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out, and 〈◊〉 I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 day and night to abuse the King. For my par: 〈◊〉 there were any such, I was never guilty of countenancing or abetting of them; No, not so much as by their reading. However this I am certain of, that whatsoever, the wit of malice could 〈◊〉 was daily and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and vented against the Parliament.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 encouraged, whilst they did cast public 〈◊〉 upon the 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and which if they bade 〈◊〉 duly executed, would have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 us to our 〈◊〉 peace and quiet, which we so long enjoyed, as we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉.  
Whom our Author may 〈◊〉 within the compass of this notion of factious Preachers, 〈◊〉 ●…now not. But I fear by the stile of his book, he comprehends all such as preach th●… word of God in ●…ruth and sincerity, not fearing the face of men, that will not be wrought upon to call evil, g●…d, or good evil. Had Paul lived in these days, I doubt our Author would, (〈◊〉 like) have accused h●…m for a pestilent fellow, a mover of sedition, and a 〈◊〉 of Sects, and the like, and for my part, I think that those whom he intends, and Paul were equally guile y of these offences. And yet you hear what testimony Paul gives of himself, after the way 
〈◊〉. 〈◊〉. 5▪  which 〈◊〉 call 〈◊〉, so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the God of my 〈◊〉. O, the 〈◊〉 of these times that we are 〈◊〉 into, that 〈◊〉 labouring for truth, honesty, and a good conscience, that will no●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by every idle and 〈◊〉 innovation, should 〈◊〉 accounted 〈◊〉! but I 
〈◊〉 14.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 our Author when he speaks of faction, to reflect upon himself, by a serious 〈◊〉. But 〈◊〉 us that th●… laws have been 〈◊〉ed; 〈◊〉 if he had 〈◊〉 an answer he would 〈◊〉 showed us in what. Delosus 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 no●… 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 aling to hide your ●…ders in generals: the more 〈◊〉, if 〈◊〉, that the●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 reply. The last vain fear was; when such seditious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 even 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉, &c. Contention with words, makes no 〈◊〉 of blood, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this should be one cause of fear, that should drive the King to so great a di●…. Well, 〈◊〉 is both 〈◊〉 and sedition in our author's book, had they 〈◊〉 as sure ven●… in the 〈◊〉, they would not have gone unpunished, but I believe he can sooner wri●…e sedition, 〈◊〉 he can define it; But to conclude this, 'tis wonderful that these chimeras which so 〈◊〉 the King at London, should likewise cause him to raise an Army in the North.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 King could be 〈◊〉 wisely or faithfully advised by any other Cou●…t, o●… 〈◊〉 his single 
〈◊〉.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 before all advice whatsoever, 'twere not only vain, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that the 〈◊〉 kingdom should be troubled to make elections, and that the 〈◊〉 e●… 〈◊〉 attend the public 〈◊〉.  
The King never refused to advise with them. 
Ans.   
What a 〈◊〉 falsity is this, No doubt the Author can 〈◊〉 London from York; 
Rep.  And the Commission of Array from the Mi●…; But than 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 us, that the ●…all, but not the only form of the King's answer to such 〈◊〉 as they were not 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉, L'Roy 〈◊〉, proves that after the advice of this his great 〈◊〉, he is yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 further with persons or 〈◊〉, as his own 〈◊〉 shall think 〈◊〉.  
Master Crompton in his 〈◊〉 of Cou●…ts ●…ells us, ●…at when the King did cons●… a Bill, than he endorsed it L'Koy volt, the King will h●… it so, is ●…e did not ●…gree, than he endorsed it, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which as he ●…es, was an absolu●… denial, why ●…hen no ground for this in●…erence, that the King was at election to advis●… further with any other Co●…ll. 〈◊〉 if it were so, this proves de facto that th●… King hath had this power, but do●…h no way 〈◊〉 th●… Obs' rvators reason; how that if this might be permitted, 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 to call Parliaments. ●…sides, they are the most supreme council in England, and therefore according 〈◊〉 the rule of Law, in ●…he presence of this Couns●…ll, all inf●…riour Counc●…ls ought to cease. Again, what they council or det●…rmine, is done in a legal and judicial way, and therefore not to be 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 extra judicial advice wha●…ever; No, nor by 〈◊〉 judg●…ment of any other Court, but a subsequent Parliam●…nt. 
Obser.   
And the Observator adds this as a reason, why the King's judgement only ought not to be 〈◊〉, for saith he, the many eyes of so many chief Gentlemen, out of all parts see more than sewer. 
A●…s.   
The same reason (saith the Author) which denies a li●…y of d●…ing to the King (that is such a number who see more, because they are more) may deny it to the House of peers in comparison of the House of Commons, and to that House too, in comparison of the People, and so 〈◊〉 King and Lords are voted out of Parliament. 
R●….   
What a poor evasion is this, and contrary to common sense, that this reason should deny a liberty of dislenting to the House of peers, in comparison of the House of Commons: for that they are much the major part of the Parliament, and to that Ho●…se too in comparison 〈◊〉 the people; For the first he may as well argue that the major part of the Judges in the King's Bench, should bind the minor in the common Pleas, or 〈◊〉 versá; and as soon maintain it; for though both the Houses make but one Court, yet they are so distinct, that each doth officiate in its proper sphere: and the conclusions of the one cannot bind the other; and for the latt●…r, that the people's judgement, because the greater number, should sway the House of Commons; H●…e may as well reason, that though I give away my ●…t, yet the property is not altered, and as soon prove it. When he can make 〈◊〉 p●…ople to represent the House of Commons, not the House of Commons the people, then shall the people's judg●…ment for majority carry it. Until then, we must, as we are 〈◊〉, by our election, submit to their determinations. Besides, four hundred choice, grave and solid men, may 〈◊〉 and discover as much as f●…ure hun●…d thousand; 'Tis no 〈◊〉 of number, but 〈◊〉 qualification, not the plurality of eyes, b●… the 〈◊〉, that sees most; y●…t as one good 〈◊〉 m●…y se●… more than many bad ones; so i●… must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 many good ones must 〈◊〉 that one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Au 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 showeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is no●… g●…lly tru●…, i●… it be 〈◊〉 true, it is 〈◊〉. For (〈◊〉 he) I d●… 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 almost any Pa●…ent man, he will 〈◊〉 us upon the 〈◊〉 of a Bill, 〈◊〉 one 〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉 Hou●…e hath found 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and urged more exceptions than 〈◊〉 hun●… would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 e●…. This possibly may be, but the string probability is on the o●…r fi●…le. 〈◊〉 c●…ally one may se●…●…ore than 〈◊〉 ●…ndred, is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ei●…her probable or 〈◊〉 that it will be 〈◊〉. For my part I shall never waive a probable certainty, for a mere 〈◊〉, nor in ●…quall judgemen●…s prefer an unite before a plurality. Th●…e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Nay, whole Parlia●… 〈◊〉 been 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 Null, ●…y succeeding Pa●…liaments, and instances in many. I shall not endeavour to maintain an infallibility in a 〈◊〉, nor did I ever believe (considering them to be b●…t ●…n) that they could not 〈◊〉 in judgement, as well as others. But for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 to an 〈◊〉 to say that which hath been, may be, and therefore it 〈◊〉: is s●…ch a piece 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a●… I never 〈◊〉 o●….  
The ●…w 〈◊〉 ends 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 needs 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Co●…lls mo●…e 〈◊〉, impe●…all 
Obser.  and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Ce●… 〈◊〉 m●…y 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as any other private Subject. 
Ans.   
What, may 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, casually me●… from the several Counties▪ strangers to each other; the 
Rep.  most 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 men for wisdom and manners; and propably of the best for●…nes, intrus●…d with the public, have as many buy and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and as soon infringe their 〈◊〉, as any 〈◊〉 su●…iect? When ever the 〈◊〉 makes this good, I will sacrifice my reason to his will; a●…d b●…ve all to be sound Doctrine which he preaches.  
They are strangely transported with the love of a pop●… state, who can so 〈◊〉 their 〈◊〉, as to force themselves to think, the members of it may not be extremely sub●…ect to am●…ition, covetousness, battered and affection. And they are as strongly ravish●… wi●… the love of Mo●…rchy; who can bel●…ive that all these may not sway the Scep●…er, and rule the King to the oppressing an●… i●…aving of his Subjects. But what? do●…h the Author count this a popular State? I never learned before, that wh●…re the people had one princip●…ll Governor over them, as a King, that, that should be a Democracy. Doubtless he is no●… well read in the politics, or if he be, he doth much wrong himself, and dishonour his King, so grossly to mistake a Monarchy, for a Democracy.  
Then he instances in the Bishop of Durham's case, by which he saith we are told in the 3. cap. of the second Parliament held 1. Mariae, how that that B●…prick was d●…lved in a form? Par●…ament. 7. Ed. 6. Which was compassed and brought to pass by the ●…nister labour, great 〈◊〉, and corrupt means of certain ambit●…s persons, then being in 〈◊〉, ●…ather to i●…rich themselves and their friends, with a great part o●… the possessions of 〈◊〉 sa●…d ●…shopprick, than upon just occasion or godly zeal. And then he concl●…des; Let the wo●…ld judge whether this age may not be subject to the same temptation, and whether the desire to share the means of the Church, may not have as strong operations as ●…ormerly. I did never p●…ead ●…or an unerring power in that great ass●…bly, that's too papistical; for though Parliament men, yet still but men, subject to th●… same infirmities with others. But as it is against law to presume any wrong of that great body, so it is as much 〈◊〉 reason to think that so many from several places, of several consti●… and 〈◊〉 sho●…ld all comb●… to labour for themselves, not the public, or ad●… that they may (which is very improbable) yet still let us pay them that tribu●…e, which former ages ha●…h done, of love and obedience, and strong presumption to the contrary. our judgemen●…s are but extrajudicial and illegal, 'tis ●…he succeeding Parliament only, that can or ●…th power to amend their errors, if ●…hey commi●… any; 'tis our duty to pr●…ume 〈◊〉 best, and leave ●…heir actions to the ●…enning and comptrol of ●…heir wise successors; And let us take this for a caution, that the errors of their 〈◊〉 ough●… not (ho●…gh it be most 〈◊〉 and maliciously endeavoured) to win us to a belief, of the like in th●…m. That others have transgressed the limits of trust, is no good 〈◊〉 ●…o prove th●…t t●…ey do so; nor with the leave of t●…e Author will the Bishop of 〈◊〉 case any way impeach the age we live in; 'tis one thing ●…o dissolve one bishopric, ano●…her to extirpate the function, as h●…ppily not ●…ure Divino, and therefore unwarrantable; base and sordid lucre may perchance suggest the one, 'tis conscience only that must promote the other. No●…hing more common in the Roman story, than the bribing of the Senate. God be praised our stories cannot testify the like of Parliaments, neither is there 
That was a P●…pular 〈◊〉.  any concluding from a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to a Parliame●…, Our Author well knows they will not hold parallel; and he that should make such a comparison, deserves to be made an everlasting monument of distoyalti●… and d●…shonour to his country.  
Ay, but saith 〈◊〉, they must evidently have more private ends than the King, who may be misled, upon wantonness, but they must struggle with solid temptations, desire of riches, desire of honours, there being an emptiness in them, whereas he is f●…ll and satisfied. No King s●… g●…eat and honourable, bu●… may extend his dominions, and he that is circumscribed by law, would fa●…ne make his Government obsolute, and are not these strong s●…ducing temptations? Nay, is it not most frequent, that the greatest have the most vast and unlimited desires? He that enjoys much would y●…t be a Croesus, and every King an Alexander, and he that cannot conq●…er other parts of the world, would 〈◊〉 enslave his Subjects.  
we have ever fo●…d 〈◊〉 and Antipathy betwixt the Court and the country, 
Obs.  but never any till now, ●…etwixt the 〈◊〉, and the body of the kingdom▪ ●…epresented.  
How, b●…wixt them, and those many that entrusted them? are not they satisfied with their carriage? If this were never till now, it may seem to be upon some causes which never were 
Ans.  til●… now.  
Th●… Author saith true, but let me tell him, that the grounds move from such as he (who 〈◊〉 the good and 〈◊〉 of ●…heir Co●…trey in a happy reformation) corrupt th●… people 
Rep.  by their ill exampl●…, and w●…rse doctrine, dividing betwixt King and Parliament, and 〈◊〉, telling of them that they are bound (by I know not w●…at div●… precept and injunction) to desert the 〈◊〉, and adhere to the King, though it be to the apparent destruction of both Kingand p●…ple; and whether this be true or no, let the Author and ●…hat reverend Doctor of 
Dr. Ferne.  Cambridge witness.  
Except Master Hollis ●…is rich widow, I never ●…eard that promotion came to any one by serving 
Obs.  in Parliament.  
If the 〈◊〉 propo●…ions ●…ad passed, it would have been no news to bear of many promoted▪ 
Ans.  &c. Nay it 〈◊〉 been rare ●…o have heard of any advanced out of Parliament &c.  
The greater had be●…e the happiness both for King and people. Are there not there a●…l 〈◊〉 
Rep.  of Nobility and Gentry? men of approved integrity and ●…yncerity to their God, and of known faith and loyalty to their King and country? And can any (let malice itself speak) be more meri orious or capable to receive honour and preferment than they, who have the vote both of King and people for their true and ●…aithfull service to both? Had it gone on, his Majesty had increased his own honour, and add●…d to his people's security.  
The Lords and Commons ought not to be deserted, u●…sse we will allow, that the King may 
Obs.  〈◊〉 whe●…her he will admit o●… any counsel at all, or no, in the disposing 〈◊〉 our lives, lands, and 〈◊〉.  
By law he cannot, he will not refuse to ●…earken t●… his gr●…t Couns●…ll. 
Ans.   
To be advised by them but yet to do what he li●…t, is this to harken to their counsel? 
Rep.  That is not the way to satis●… the grounds of calling Parliaments, to make the King ●…ole Arbiter of public 〈◊〉.  
he only s●…yes, he is 〈◊〉 bound 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…is own understanding, or to contradict his hour conscience ●…or 〈◊〉 Counsellors sake what soe●…er.  
If he should do so in things ●…ubious, and o●… which he ought not to be the sole Judge, so that his single judgement must of necessity be of less cons●…quence, than ●…hat of his Parliament, 'twere no contradiction to conscience; But why the advice of his Parliament should be more opposite to conscience than any privy (and at this time) unwar●…ntable 〈◊〉 seems a mystery.  
'tis granted in things visible and 〈◊〉, that judge which is a so●…e judge, and hath com●…●…ower to see his own judgement exec●…d, o●…ght not to determine against the light of 〈◊〉 
Ol●….  or evidence of ●…act.  
Sole judge or no●… al●…ers not the case, neither is there any 〈◊〉 o●…ely to visible and certain 
Ans.  things; in the 〈◊〉 of a trust, the cons●…ence must be g●…ded ●…y a moral 〈◊〉, or high pro●…lity.  
It doth plainly difference the case, for where a man is a sole ●…udge, he ought to be 〈◊〉 
Rep.  by the evidence of ●…act, either in certainty or 〈◊〉, and cannot determine 〈◊〉 that; but where he is not the sole judge, and the matter prove very d●…ous and incertain, there 〈◊〉 may and is bound to submit to the judgement of the majority, and ought not to pre●…rre h●…s own ●…udgement or opinion.  
The sin of Pilate was, that when 〈◊〉 might ●…ave saved our Savi●…ur from an unjust dea●…, 
Obs●…r.  yet upon oc●…sations cont●…ctory in themselves, contrary to strange revelations from 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 would suffer ●…ocence to fall, and pass senten●…e of dea●…h 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 a blood-t●…sty ●…ultitude.  
Concerning strange revelations ●…o the 〈◊〉, all that I meet with is this, his wise told him 
Ans.  saving, have thou 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉, with that just man, for I have 〈◊〉 many things this day in a 
M●…t 27. 19  ●…reame because of him, what was revelation to her; was but a single tradition to h●…m, she was obliged to believe God speaking to her, ●…e was not ●…ound to believe a woman speaking to him, &c.  
I shall not descant as our A●…thor d●…th, upon this reve●…ation, nor trouble myself to show 
Rep.  of what validity and esteem it ought to have 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉; though 〈◊〉 it ought not to have been vilipended and r●…jected; and the rather for tha●… he him●…lfe could discover no fault in him, as he professes Ioh. 18▪ and again M●…. 27. 18. he says he knew that for 〈◊〉 they 
〈◊〉. 18.  had delivered him, wherefore it must needs aggravate his fin, who contrary to the 〈◊〉 of his wife, agreeing with his own knowledge, should thus pass sentence of death upon an innocent. Neither were these grounds 〈◊〉 in this 〈◊〉, to challenge his assent, and make him yield to their vote, which the A●…thor by way of allu●…on to the Observator, h●…re 〈◊〉 down, ●…at his single judgement was not to be preferred before all advice. Th●…t the many eyes of all the people s●…e more than his. Besides there was a 〈◊〉 gro●…nded upon nature, that a 〈◊〉 can ha●…e no private ends to mislead it. No▪ 〈◊〉 here was a sole 〈◊〉, and knew Christ to be innocent, and therefore contrary to his own knowledge and evidence of fact; 〈◊〉 ●…ot to ha●…e b●…ene ●…wayed by the multi●…de; but where there is a joint judi●…all power, this doth no way conclude against a wise concession to the majority in cases dubious and 〈◊〉.  
If one Iud●…e upon the Bench 〈◊〉 f●…om thr●…e, or one 〈◊〉 at the 〈◊〉 from eleven, they 
Obsor.  may submit to the major number though perhaps less 〈◊〉 than 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 ●…putation of guilt.  
The Oa●…h of the 〈◊〉 is, that t●…y will do r●…ght bet●…ixt party and par●…y, accor●…g to ●…vidence 
Ans.  given in, not their ●…ellowes votes. How his Ca●…uists will satisfy a man's conscience, when he violates this Oath, I know not.  
The Author mistakes, 'tis no v●…ation of oath, in matters dubious, for the 〈◊〉 to yield to 〈◊〉 
Rep.  whose verdict must needs be of greater strength 〈◊〉 validi●…y, for ●…hough poss●…ly that one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than the eleven; yet; 'tis eleven to one (Odds sufficient) that he doth not. And if he doth (as he ought) agree with them in their verdict, this is no compliance in vote, but a proceeding accord●…g to the information of testimony; And therefore in this case he need not appeal to a casu●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉, for if he do right betwixt pa●…ty and party, the oath is sufficiently 〈◊〉. 'tis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 many 〈◊〉, there may 〈◊〉 a legal submission, but then the Law doth not require 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 act contrary to conscience, but provides for the preservation of the innocency of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by making the act of the major part, have the force of the whole.  
A 〈◊〉 ought not so to sacrifice to his own net, or to be devoted to his own opinion, as not to 〈◊〉 to the greater number of his 〈◊〉. Nay, we know 〈◊〉 usual for one single judge being 〈◊〉 to the other 〈◊〉, to release his opinion; and do we think in this he doth an act con●… to conscience? seeing all men are subject 〈◊〉 error, the more secure and safe way is in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for one to 〈◊〉 to the judgement of many, and not for many to 〈◊〉 to the Vote of one.  
〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, much more in State, where the very satisfying a 〈◊〉, sometimes in things not other 
Obser.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉, may prove not only 〈◊〉, but 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of peace and 〈◊〉 of strife. 
Ans.   
True, if in law, 〈◊〉 otherwise. A 〈◊〉 must not displease God to please the 〈◊〉.  
If the Author intend in matters clear and obvious to every eye, there he is in the right, a 
Rep.  governor ought not to displease God, to please the people. But if in matters 〈◊〉 and in●…, here he fails, it may be both convenient and lawful in such case to subscribe to the 〈◊〉: Many times the 〈◊〉 of an unreasonable request, doth not satisfy, but increase their 〈◊〉.] 'tis expedient sometimes for Governors to grant that which otherwise would not be necessary. There is a freedom of policy they may make use of suitable to the times and occasions, and not prejudice the law of God or their own 〈◊〉. That which at another time may be unreasonable, may now be couvenient, Better to run the hazard of an illimited desire, than to destroy all for want of their present satisfaction.  
That the 〈◊〉 and Magazine of Hull &c. should be entrusted into such hands, as were in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good 〈◊〉 me, conscience and understanding could plead nothing against it. 
Obser.   
The King had more 〈◊〉 of some, 〈◊〉 more confidence in the fidelity of others. 
Ans.   
The same may be verified of the Parliament, though upon better ground and 〈◊〉; our 
Rep.  former sufferings could not but engage our 〈◊〉 the future. And how could we trust those with this great ship of the Common wealth in an imminent storm, who had 〈◊〉 run it upon the rocks and quicksands in a calm?  
If 〈◊〉 could 〈◊〉 been 〈◊〉 (as it could not; for the contrary was true) that this would 
Obser.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and have 〈◊〉 the occasion of greater danger.  
What hath been the cause of these unhappy 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 the taking of the King's town 
Ans.  from him by 〈◊〉, and the illegal 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉, upon 〈◊〉 of apparent danger.  
What impudence of Malice are these times reduced to? that any private pen dare charge 
〈◊〉.  the Parliament with such 〈◊〉? Is 〈◊〉 the town of Hull possessed in his 〈◊〉 behalf, for the securing of him and his 〈◊〉? and is not the 〈◊〉 thereof 〈◊〉 upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as the Parliament have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it? If his Majesty should 〈◊〉 a for●… force or 〈◊〉 to invade the 〈◊〉, and should surrender up a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, is 〈◊〉 not lawful for his Subjects to seize his 〈◊〉; for his and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? And for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is said to be 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all law, and had 〈◊〉 most absolute 〈◊〉 that ever 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to; yet let me tell him, that 〈◊〉 doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 to stile 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which the 〈◊〉 have upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be legal. And I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 can imagine his 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 rate that of the 〈◊〉; Nay, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet 〈◊〉, for the Par●… to 〈◊〉 all this upon 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, and to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where no 〈◊〉 was, &c. 〈◊〉 if the 〈◊〉 (〈◊〉 he) had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: it might in so many 〈◊〉 be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, &c. Doth the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all other 〈◊〉 to be blind, 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉? 〈◊〉, are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, because his confidence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the 〈◊〉 danger which 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉, hath not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; we owe it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and vi●… of the Parliament: 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which 〈◊〉 have 〈◊〉 by this time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ruin and destruction. Besides there is no 〈◊〉 the cause or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉: shall we conclude the clouds which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉, to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vapours, 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 down 〈◊〉 us? or that our 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 an idle 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 happily our care, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impediment hath 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 the ground and cause of our jealousy? 
Obs.   
The Observator having showed how that Kings are 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, saith what 〈◊〉 is it then in 〈◊〉, when they will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conscience and reason in things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the people  
No Man justifies pretended conscience, no man can condemn real. 
Ans.   
'tis true but conscience 〈◊〉 not to oppose or contradict that, which is good and behoovefor 
Rep.  the people. Ay, but there is no ground of objecting of pretences (saith the Author) and why so? because the people are deceived, and if they look upon his actions, they will 〈◊〉 unto them as 〈◊〉 as the day. I am so 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉, piety and goodness, that I 〈◊〉 they 〈◊〉 so? 'tis his evil 〈◊〉 that causes this misunderstanding and breach 〈◊〉 his sacred person, and his 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 that their 〈◊〉 will prejudice his right; and that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with honour and a good 〈◊〉 grant 〈◊〉, which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to, would injure 〈◊〉. Ay, but again, 〈◊〉, (saith he) he that hath 〈◊〉 so much in this. 〈◊〉 and that in a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as put all 〈◊〉 royal 〈◊〉 acts 〈◊〉 grace together, they 〈◊〉 much short of his. And no wonder the 〈◊〉 was sick of many 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 through the long 〈◊〉 of Parliaments; and all these (which by their happy continuance might have been prevented) must now apply 〈◊〉 to the sovereign 〈◊〉 of his royal Grace and favour, for their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. Would not have 〈◊〉 any thing which was 〈◊〉, not anything (since 〈◊〉 wants 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them) but 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 him into far worse 〈◊〉 than that of poverty. 'tis not his majesty's necessity that can 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 his evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a compliance with his Parliament; what is his necessity to them? if theirs find a supply, 〈◊〉 Rex & 〈◊〉 regnum, they care not. But 'tis strange! would settling of the 〈◊〉 by the advice of his Parliament, put the King in a worse 〈◊〉, than poverty? why, yes; he that gives away part of his 〈◊〉, is poorer 〈◊〉 if he had divested himself of the 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 plus 〈◊〉, a pretty fallacy.  
The virtue of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 been denied to the Commons, and a 〈◊〉 hath 〈◊〉 made 
Obs.  betwixt the parties chosen, and the party's 〈◊〉, and so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all 〈◊〉; that immovable 〈◊〉 of all 〈◊〉 and power, whereby the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 right of all the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of England, hath 〈◊〉 attempted to be 〈◊〉 and disturbed.  
There may be a 〈◊〉 in the imputation of Severance, and 〈◊〉 of representation to the Commons. 
Ans.  For put the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 men of a county, present a 〈◊〉 to the House against ●…ed laws, and the 〈◊〉 discipline of the 〈◊〉; this is received and thanks returned; if 〈◊〉 another petition (modestly and 〈◊〉 expressing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as that most excellent petition of Kent) be presented, 〈◊〉 by men more 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 etc and this in 〈◊〉 of the present government &c. 'tis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 it, this by no 〈◊〉 is to be called a 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 of representation.  
'tis neither number, nor 〈◊〉 of persons (though I confess these may 〈◊〉 somewhat the 
Rep.  better gloss upon 〈◊〉) 〈◊〉 can 〈◊〉 a petition, either good, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; No, 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of it. And they that shall dare to make one 〈◊〉 against 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and ●…terminations of the House, 'tis no 〈◊〉 if they be put to make a second, for their 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 in so doing, 'tis they, not the House, that deny the 〈◊〉 of representation. 
〈◊〉.   
Most of our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Parliaments have proceeded 〈◊〉 this; 〈◊〉 the people upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 accusations, have been so 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 themselves from their representatives, and 〈◊〉 there can be nothing under Heaven, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…cing 
Ans.  God, which can be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉, than 〈◊〉. 
Rep.   
Here we may see the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
And 〈◊〉 you may d'scover the over pouring of 〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; for (saith he) certainly we 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Oath of 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. ●…ther did ever (as I have made 〈◊〉 good before) the body 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 it 〈◊〉 evidently follow (saith 〈◊〉) that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. If one 〈◊〉 can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 may 〈◊〉 his 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 ●…wise, it will prove 〈◊〉.  
This he grants as 〈◊〉, that the 〈◊〉 power of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
〈◊〉.  King, and 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 can make a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or Law, without the 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King.  
This one 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 constantly 〈◊〉 to, would 〈◊〉 prevented 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
〈◊〉.  might restore the kingdom to 〈◊〉.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author never read any Law, that knows not what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 must receive an equitable & favourable 〈◊〉, according as 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
〈◊〉.  of the case administers occasion; for summum jus, est 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the law may 〈◊〉 be unlawful.  
And therefore the 〈◊〉 doth make a good qualification of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 ●…ing 
〈◊〉.  only in 〈◊〉 cases; but if the safety of the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto them, than an extraordinary course may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
This is it which hath so m●…serably rent this K●…ngdome, and raised these sad divisions. 
Ans.   
Most malicious and scandalous; 'tis not this; but the want of its due observance, and negl●…ct 
Rep.  of our duty, th●…t hath raised thes ●…ad distrac●…ions. Fi●…st the People are made believe they are in danger. Strange! that a Parliament should infringe their trust, and so easily deceive a whole kingdom. Then a prevention of th●…se dangers is promised. Good reason ●…oo; a whole kingdom ought not to be sold to misery and destruction upon an easy rate.  
The 〈◊〉 is this, in case of apparent and immi●…ent danger, the people's sasety is not 〈◊〉 be negl●…cted; they ought not to be exposed as a Prey to the enemy; therefore most ●…it they should be put into a posture of defence. Well, what could reason or malice itself object against this▪ I, but than none so fit judges of this apparent and imminent danger, as the two Houses. Is any one so fit? Or can any discover more than the r●…presentative body of the whole kingdom▪ Wherefore they to order this Militia. Had on●… Author intended to have dealt fairly and candidly, he would have shown the man▪ humble Petitions and requests of the Parliament, to his Majesty, for the ordering of the Militia, according to their advice, ●…or the better security of his people: and His Majesti●…s negative return unto them; before they (according to their duty) undertook in his Majesti●…s and his people behal●…e, the trust and ma●…age of the same. And now it must be in their power to command men, 〈◊〉 horses, seize on all the Ammunition, send for what supples of money, they think necessary, for the repelling those dangers. This is but a consequence of the other, it were but in vain to lay a foundation, if they had not power ●…o raise the Structure. Ay, but here we are fallen back again into (what we so much complained of) Arbitrary powe●…. 'Tis much that one, who pretends to be M●…ster of his reason should be thus mistaken.  
Then belike all proceedings in cases according to equity and necessity (which justice requireth, should not be regulated by the strict rule and severity of law, as not being within the intention of it, for that such constructive might prove distinction to the rule) is a prosecution of an arbitrary power. The manage of a business in case of necessity, need not keep correspondence and agreement with the rule, neith●…r that to be stile●… Arbitrary, which necessit●… makes lawful. Was not this the very case of Ship-money? there likewise was a pretence of danger and necessity, and none so compelent a judge of this as the King, and therefore for the securing of the people, money must be immediately raised without the Subjects consent. With the author's favour these cases do no way run parallel, for will it therefore follow, that because the King cannot (upon no pretence whatsoever) take away the Subjects prop●…rty, without their consent; that the Parliam●…ent may not take it with their con●…ent? Most inconsequent. The Parliament represent the people, which the King doth not; And therefore their conclusions do 〈◊〉 ●…he people; wh●…ch the Kings cannot. But than he presles an Argument that was made against the ship-money, which he saith will hold in our case.  
It was then laid down as a sure 〈◊〉 of reason, that it was better for the kingdom, though it were in real danger, in arena 〈◊〉 capere, to 〈◊〉 for itself as well as it w●…s able by a sudden defence, than that the King should pr●…vide such a remedy, which would be so easily, so ●…quently abused upon every pre●…ence of d●…nger, to p●…event such an evil, which could extremely seldom, o●… almost never hap●…en, for an Army and Navy could not be so 〈◊〉 provided, but that we must have some intelligence of it. So 〈◊〉 ●…aith in case of the Militia better suffer it in the old wa●…, and the kingdom 〈◊〉 for itself in case of 〈◊〉, than to 〈◊〉 the hazard of the 〈◊〉 abuse of it, to the putting of the Kingdom into a combustion, upon I know not what vain pretences.  
I believe the Author preached a quite contrary Doctrine before the Parli●…ment, O, the power and virtue of this great Assembly▪ that can so Metamorphize men, as to mak●… th●…m sp●…ak acco●…ding to the dictate of reas●…n, not aff●…ction. But for his Argument the ground of the ob●…ection that was laid down against the Ship-money, was, the possible frequent abuse that might be of such a remedy, upon eve●…y pretence of danger: which without controversy carries a great deal of wait with it. And when our A●…thor can make it good (as he h●…th strongly 〈◊〉, but much failed in it) that a Communit●… ma●… have those many private ends to mislead it, that a King may, then sh●…ll we agree that the cases do in reason parallel; until then, we must ●…ell him, th●…t there is ●…oure hundr●…d to one against him.  
I 〈◊〉 the world judge whether the 〈◊〉 Sir I●…hn Ho hams act Treason, be not contrary 
Obs.  to the cleare●…t 〈◊〉 of human reason▪ and the ●…trongest inclinations of nature; for every private man may defined himself by force, if 〈◊〉, though by the force of his magistrate, or his own 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be not, without all confidence by fl●…ght.  
Sir John Hotham's seizing upon the King's town and Ammunition, was, it seems in his own 
Ans.  defence; who assaulted him? Did his Majesty drive him into Hull?  
No, But his Mejesty would have driven him out, he being possessed of it by the Authority 
Rep.  of Parliament, for the securing of him and his people. And though it be not lawful for a Subject to seize a town in his own defence, yet having got it by a lawful authority: he may defend himself, and it, against any assault by the same power. Neither can any other extrajudicial power or command discharge him of that trust, which was committed to him in a legal and judicial way by another. What can he think of the Gunpowder traitors, was their resistance a just defence? Then certainly every rebellion is a just war. His conclusion is very just; For questionless there can be no war unlawful, if their resistance were a warrantable defence. But I hope the Author will give us leave to tell him, that the cases are more different than a Papist, and a Prot●…stant; they agree in somewhat, the cases in nothing; for they had neither lawful cause, nor sufficient authority on their side to maintain resistance; as Sir John Hotham had. Again they were traitors before by their horrid unnatural and cruel attempt; But I hope Sir John Hotham's bare seizing of the town could not proclaim him traitor; But enough of this in a case so manifest. He may as soon convince a man of common sense, that black and white are the same colour, as that these cases run parallel.  
Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard, being uncapable of flight, must yield 
Obs.  their throats, and submit to Assassinates, if their King will not allow them defence.  
There is a great difference, betwixt a Subjects defending of himself, and offending his King. 
Ans.  His fea●…es are over witty, if they will not permit him, to think himself safe, except he get into one of the King's Forts for his better security.  
Without question he that may defend, may offend; for how is it possible that I should defend 
Rep.  myself, if I may not offend my enemy? What a senseless thing, and void of reason is it, to maintain that Subjects may take up arms to defend themselves, against the unlawful Tyranny of their Prince; but yet upon his approach they must not use any hostile act, but stand like so many stocks, immovable what is this but opposi●…um in objecto, a fl●…t contradiction; or a taking up of arms in jest, to make me capable of losing my life in earnest? If this were all we could do, the most facile way for wicked Princes to accomplish their ends, would be ●…his, by Tyranny and oppression, to engage the people, in this imaginary defensive war, thereby to disarm them, and force obedience to their unjust desires: or slay them with their own weapons. But to pass this. If a King shall take up arms to d●…stroy his people, no question law, reason and policy will warrant their seizing of ●…ny fort, or public place of defence, for their own better security.  
See if we are not left as a Prey, to the same bloody hands, as have done such diabolical exploits 
Obs.  in Ireland &c. If we may not take up arms for our own safety, or if it be possible for us to take up arms, without s●…me ●…otes or Ordinances to regulate the Militia.  
Subjects upon invasi●…n, would not have wanted Commission to take up arms. 
Ans.   
But upon a civil combustion they might; he that will give me power to fight against his 
Rep.  enemy; will not give me authority to oppose himself, but doubtless this is no rule in the Politiq●…es, for a man first to receive one blow, and then to stand upon his guard, to keep off the second, better by a vigilant providence to prevent both; or to expect an invasion, and then be to ●…eke our Commission, enemies are more easy kept out, than th●…y can be repelled, when they are once in.  
Ay, but he saith, this would be of ill consequence to subjects, if they might have power to take up arms, as often as ambitious choleric men for their own ends shall persuade th●…m they are in danger. For by this means, being easily deceived, whilst they endeavour to avoid false, they would run themselves beadlong upon true perils.  
Th●…se ambitious men (which he himself knows not) and these pretended dangers (because he himself fears not) have a strong influence upon the Authors whole book; 'tis very much that the reason and senses of a whole Nation, should be so easily captivated. But 'tis his only plea, and therefore you must give him leave to make use of hi●… pr●…tences, or you bid him silence. Well, to tell our Author once for all; as no man can or will justify a pretended cause of fear so no man can condemn a real. And without he will say, that there can be no cause of fear, without he be privy to it; this aspersion is by no means to be suffered; for by this we shall never know how to believe that we are in danger; for that true fears may be blasted with the ignominy of feigned and pretended carry the visage of true. 
Obser.   
The King says; the Parliament denies &c. to whether now in this uncertainty 〈◊〉 the subje●● bounded to adhere?  
we may consider whether the Houses, do not barely say; and whether his Majesty doth not 
Ans.  descend so far, as to give reasons for what ●…e doth, and to show the kingdom the ground of his actions, by particular citation of the laws, which justify them.  
What the two Houses of Parliament barely say; then belike, if his suffrage be of any account, 
Rep.  they prove or make good nothing. Was ever age guilty of so great irreverence, or of offering so grea●… an afforo●…t an●… in ●…ignity to this great Assembly? Of whom, as the law saith, we ought not to imagine a dishonourable thing, much less to speak it. I am confident that all Histori●…s that ever were, cannot give you one example of so high disdain and presumption. What the two Ho●…ses barely say? He hath a great measure of confidence that dare say it, for my part I dare not return the contrary, but I leave it to the whole wo●…ld to judge, whether that they do not exactly prove and maintain their own assertion; and utterly disprove and destroy the contrary objections and conclusions. Ay, but saith the Author, we ought to agree, whether swer●…ing from law, be to be judged by the actions, or by the authors; that is, if the King should ●…ave done what ever they did, and the Houses, what ever he did, whether all would not th●…n have be●…n l●…gall, because don by them. Certainly 'tis no good way of judging, to conclude the legality or illegality of an action from the Author or Actor, 'tis the applying of the rule to the action, that denominates it, eithergood, or bad. However we ought not totally to reject these circumst●…nces, of place and persons, for no doubt that in some cases may be lawful for one, that will not be lawf●…ll for another. And it is more than probable, that the Parliament may in many cases have a more extensive pow●…r than the King, However certain I am, that it is but charity in our Author to grant them his belief; that they will not approve or maintain that in themselves: which they condemn as illegal in his Majesty. The King doth not desire to captivate any man's understanding to his authority, but is willing to make all the world the judge of his actions. And have the Parliament withheld any thing, that might give satisfaction to the people? Neither ●…s a blind ob dienc●… a part of any man's duty to the Houses. he, who after so great l●…ght and evidence of the integrity and justice of the Parliaments proceedings, shall say. he obeys, he knows not upon what grounds; may justly be conclud●…d to be Non compos mentis, robbed of his senses. Some things he saith, are matter of fact, here we may be guided by sense●…, and judge as we see. With the author's favour, this to an ordinary capacity, may be a dangerous way of determining, for though we must always judge according to the outward s●…nse in matter of fact▪ yet we must have this caution, that we g●…e no further, as for instance; If I see one enter and seisea Castle, or fort of the Kings (put the case Hull) that he did enter, that my sense directs me to discern, but whether he keep the possession for, or against the King, that is examinable upon other circumstances, and is matter of law, depending upon reason and judgement, and this every ordinary capacity cannot judge of. But saith he, this every one may ●…udge of, whether the King hath seized on any thing wherein the subject hath a property? That 〈◊〉 thupon the ●…ower and privileges of Parliament, the best evidence to maintain the title that we have to ●…ll that ever we enjoy; Or whether that the Subject hath not seized on something, wherein the King hath a property?  
That we must yield affirmative to, that the Subject hath not seized on the King's property; but it is to his use and behoof, for the securing of him and his people. So that the King loseth nothing, but both gain protection and safety thereby. Whether the King hath raised war against the Parliament, that is, whether his guard was an Army. A very strange and unusual guard of 15000. or 20000 And whether Hull is now London, Very manifect it is not, but the forces, that ●…ound no b●…tter success approaching London, may (for aught I know) make a speedy retreat to York again.  
we had a maxim, and it was grounded upon nature, and never till this Parliament, withstood, 
Obs.  t●…at a community can have no private ends, to mislead it, and make it injurious to itself.  
True, in a sta●…e where a collective bod●… 〈◊〉: and the reason of it, is evident, for 
Ans.  though every man aim at his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 interest, yet except it be agreeable to the in●…erest of the Major part, it will never pass into an act, and i●… it be advantageous for the most, it is to be esteemed public; Now what service this c●…n do the two Houses, I cannot see, because they are a representative body. 
R●…p.   
O, yes, very much; and let me tell you, none could have said more in their vindication, for 〈◊〉 your own language upon yourself, though every man in Parliament, aim at his 〈◊〉 ●…erticular interest, 〈◊〉 except it be agreeable to the interest of the Major part, it will never 〈◊〉 into an act, and if it be advantageous for the most, it is to be esteemed public. But you will say, it is indeed to be esteemed so: and yet in truth it may be otherwise.  
First, this ough●… not to be presumed; and again, I dare confidently asfirme it, that the 〈◊〉 part of 3. or 4. hundred, may carry as public Spirits, and as free from self respects, or the persecution of Private interest, as the Major part of the collective body. And no doubt had not our predecessors at first, and all the succeeding ages since, been possessed with these thoughts, two should not have satisfied every Bu●…rough, nor the like number every County. Ay, but he 〈◊〉, the reasons why this Kingdom hath seldom 〈◊〉 under the corruptions of a 〈◊〉.  
He doth well to say seldom indeed, for he citys no example of this nature; and had there been any such, I know the Author would not withheld them, are First, for that it was a 〈◊〉, for the most part, but of short continuance, so that they hold not time to ●…ould and fashion 〈◊〉 aims; and when called together again, the body was much altered.  
The Author, no doubt, had he been so w●…ll disposed, as to have done his country that right, could have shown us many Parliaments of long continuance; and when he had done, 〈◊〉 have been able to have charged them with the least corruptions; But h●…e is mightily carried ●… way with vain imaginations and 〈◊〉. He thinks short Parliaments, had they been long, would have been adulterated, and donis empta corrupted with gifts, like the 〈◊〉 of Rome, which, he so much instances in. Had he ever been acquainted with charity, it would have taught him better surmises of his private brother, much more of so great and reverend assembly as the Parliament, But his second and chief reason is, ●…or that the final determination 〈◊〉 not in one, nor two hands, but the joint consent of three estates is necessary. 'Tis true, for the making new laws, or altering, or repealing the old; But not so in case of declaring of the common Law of the land, for that the two Houses may do, as an ancient right belonging to that supreme Court, without the consent of his Majesty, and why this power should be conceived more to traduce this Parliament, (as our Author laboureth to insinuate into our belief) than it hath done others formerly, 〈◊〉 to me a Mystery. 
Obs.   
The king may safely leave his highest rights to Parliaments. 
Obs.   
If this be all the motive, he may as safely keep them.  
Must the kingdom be put to conf●…ict with u●…ter ruin, and 〈◊〉, the sad (but certain) 
Rep.  〈◊〉 of cruel war, for want of that, which 〈◊〉 granted by the Ki●…g, would no way prejudice his right, and being enjoyed by the people, would bring great happiness and security to both.  
None knows better, or aff●…cts more the sweetness of this so well balanced a Mona●…chy. 
Obs.   
I bele●…ve they affect Monarchy; why then doth this Author endeavour to take it away, by denying 
Ans.  the king power of 〈◊〉, which our ancestors inviolably pres●…rved, as a most happy r●…straint of Aristocracy or D●…mocracy. 
Rep.   
It is said, that by debating or reasoning of a thing, a man shall thereby be brought at last, to discover the true reason. Which cert●…inely our Author will never do; who labours to defend one 〈◊〉 by another, ●…he subverting of Monarchy by denying of the King a negative voice. None can sp●…ake mor●… (that is not a ravished doctor, or fawning parasite) to t●…stifie his affections to th●…s admira le and well established Government than the Author doth. Neither doth he througho●…t his 〈◊〉 book, deny the King's Prerogative of a negative voice. All that he undertakes; i●… but to show them their ne plus ultra, ●…nd to del neat and demonstr●…te th●… true cir●… and bo●…ndaries of Royalty; and whether this be an end●…avour to take it away, let the weakest capacity judge. 
Obs.   
It hath be●…ne often in the power of former Parliaments, to load that rule with greater fetters and clogs, but they would not.  
A 〈◊〉 good 〈◊〉, there is little reason now to do it. 
Ans.   
Their 〈◊〉 of their just rights and privileges, is no loading or fettering of 〈◊〉, 
Rep.  but a keeping it in its equal and due 〈◊〉.  
The Observato●…r having showed the exact and Geomet●…icall distance that the three estates 
Obser.  keep, one having no power to hurt or prejudice the other, but all labouring exactly for the good whole, 〈◊〉 us, not to secek to 〈◊〉 this purity of composition. 
Ans.   
Very good council: but 〈◊〉 ●…e 〈◊〉 in the words 〈◊〉 following. 
Rep.   
Is not a persuading of he King that his Parliament intends the divesting of his ancient prerogatives and rights▪ and which is more, the diss●…lution of Monarchy; and by these 〈◊〉 
Obser.  insinuations, dividing him from his Parliam●…nt, a mean●…s to corrupt this 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 Why then no doubt, his words following are very seasonable, That we must not conceive that both Gent●…y and Nobility, can 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 king.  
Therefore it will be 〈◊〉 for the king to leave all ●…o their disposal, who certain●…ly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Ans.  nothing but what is fitting.  
This is the author's construction and conclusion; But 'tis ●…ery 〈◊〉 that he should 〈◊〉 
Rep.  it out of this text, that because the Parliament cannot combine 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉▪ therefore it is fitting for the King to surrender up his power to the 〈◊〉, I 〈◊〉 say that such a rule and predominancy never entr●…d the thoughts of any one, but himself. Is not the conclusion more just; that therefore this will maintain the Parliament in defending their own rights? Doub●…lesse it is. For my part, my Vote shall always be, that the King may sway his Scep●…er in its just extent and latitude, that the people may b●… made to know th●…ir due distance; and that the Parliament en●…oy their ancient rights, that the King may not 〈◊〉 upon liberty.  
The Observator having showed how that no change of Government can be advantageous to the Lords and Common: he descends to show, how that though it might, yet it cannot be effected,  
For that their power is merely derivative, so that except we will conceive that both King 
Obs.  and people will be consenting to the usurpation, nothing can be done.  
Then it is confess●…d, the King hath a right of dissenting. 
Ans.   
Confessed (out Author thinks he hath here got a great advantage of us, out of our own 
R●…p.  confession) why, was it ever denied that the King's consent w●…s not necessary, to the making of new laws, or to the altering or 〈◊〉 of the old? Nay, hath it not be●…ne agreed that his assent is so essentially necessary in such cases, that if he will dissent (as he may) nothing can be don●… without him? why then a fortiori he shall have a n●…gative power, where the alteration of th●… form of Government is propound●…d. But he must understand, that this doth no-way derogate or detract from the right of the Parliament in declaring the common law of the land in certain cases before them, without his majesty's consent, for that that is a power incident to this great Court, as well as others inferior, and in such case the King hath no negative voice.  
●…xcept both King and people. 
Obser.   
He●…e (saith he) a power is given to the people collectively beyond the Lord's C●…mmons and 
Ans.  King.  
If ever he make good this collection out of the Observators words: I'll r●…nounce my understanding. 
R●…p.  All that he 〈◊〉 to intimate unto us, is but this, that the changing of the ancient established form, of our Government, is Casus omissus out of their Commission; and therefore not to be accompli●…ed by them, without the consent of both King and people. 〈◊〉 doth not say, that the Collective body may do it, without the consent of the 〈◊〉, Lords and Commons; This happily might be a predominant power; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consent is necessary, for the introducting of a new frame of Government. Now, how this should be, a transferring of a power to the people collectively, beyond the Lords, C●…mmons and king; I must confess I apprehend not; therefore the construction is either very foreign, or my capacity extreme dull.  
If the King be an affecter of true liberty, he hath in Parliament a power as ●…xtensive as ever 
Obs.  the Roman Dictators was, for the preventing of public d●…resses.  
He saith that though the Romans could not endure a King, yet in effect they had the same 
Ans.  thing, for in any immi●…nt dangers, necessity of State forced them to choose a Dictator, which (as he says) had absolute power over them) and to submit to his Authority, which relieved them in their greatest extremities. Hence (he saith) we may make the truest judgement, what form of Government the wisest Romans esteemed most convenient. And concludes that fince they preferred the unbounded power of one to a popular sway, we have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this Government. &c.  
May all the blessings of Heaven and Earth-inrich and encompass his royal sceptre; 
R●…p.  May he for ever enjoy the utmost limit of his just and legal power; And may this happy glorious succesefull (and never sufficiently) to be encomiasted) Government continue (Widow the least interruption) amongst us; until time hath spent its last period, and brought a dissolution and final conclusion on all things; And I take him to be no true and faithful member of the Common Wealth that will not say Amen.  
If the counsel of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding, and good 
Obs.  conscience, and the council of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto, there needed no such contestation.  
If the council of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience, 
Ans.  and the council of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto, there needed no such contestation.  
That the Parliament and Court should be at variance, 'tis no news, there hath been always 
R●…p.  a secret enmity and antipathy b●…twixt them. The Court never well digesting the happiness and freedom os 〈◊〉 people, nor they the oppression, and public disservice of the Court; the one still contending for an absoluteness of 〈◊〉; the other for the maintenance and descending of their liberty. But I n●…ver heard before that the counsel or advise of the Court was opposed to that of the Parliament; or could any way balance with that: doub●…lesse they are not equ●…ll competitors; the Parliament repres●…nt the public, and those counsellors themselves only, the one studies to augment the Common wealth, the other their own: wherefore he is perfidious to himself, and treacherous to h●…s country, that can be so transported with words, as to renounce the Parliament▪ for my part, I shall lay it down, as one of the Articles of my belief, that the counsel of ●…he Court is directly opposite to common understanding, and good conscience; and the council of the Parliament, evidently consonant thereunto: good cause then of contestation in defence of 〈◊〉 public.  
The Observator having laid it down as a ground that 〈◊〉 c●…nnot reasonably be supposed, 
Ob●….  the greatest counsel of the kingdom should not gi●… the most faithful advice, adds; there●…ore Princes if they may not be led by their own opinions, rather than by the sacred and awful counsels of whole Nations, unreasonably complain, they are denied liberty of conscience, and 〈◊〉 out of their own unde●…standings.  
I appeal to any man's judgement, whether any thing can be ●…ged for the authority of a Lay 
Ans.  council, that it 〈◊〉 to in●…orce a submission of judgement, and a performance of duties arising from trust agreeable there●…o, which may not with (at least) equal advantages, be pressed for the same binding power in counsels Eccleciasticall; And yet the●…e (he saith (it would go hard, but a man would find some answer (as easily he migh●…) whereby to justify his liberty of dissenting in some things which he says, we may with very little al●…eraton apply to civil counsels.  
I confe●…e this is a point more 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 by a Divine, than a Lawyer, but 'tis 〈◊〉 frequent 
〈◊〉  with me to trespass upon another man's profession: 〈◊〉 give me ●…ave a little, that our Author may not pass u●…nswered, to speak my 〈◊〉 in this particular. Now (with the favour of the Author (if my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 me not) there is a wide 〈◊〉, as to our case betwe●…ne lay and 〈◊〉 counsels. For I take this for a ●…rtaine and clear truth in d●…vinity, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 counsel whatsoever (be it of never so great ability or eminency) 〈◊〉 oblige the conscience of a man by their dicisions or determinations; for th●…t the conscience of a man, is (if I may so speak) out of their jurisdiction, 'tis God alone that hath power over that. Besides he that opposes the dictates of conscience sins against God. The Apostle in the 14. to the Rom. showing how men ought not to contemn or condemn one another for things indifferent says in the 5. verse, one man esteemeth one day above another, another est●…emeth every day alike; let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. By this 'tis manifest I ought not to be guided by the conscience of other men. Again ver. 14 there is nothing (saith he) unclean of itself: but ●…o 〈◊〉 that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean, by this likewise, it is clear that what my conscience persw●…des me is unlawf●…ll (be the judgement of other men what it will) ought not to be enforced upon me. Again the last verse, He that doubteth is damned, if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith, is fin. So that for my part I take it, as an unquestionable ●…ruth, that no ecclesiastical authority whatsoever hath power over a man's conscience, though it be, but in things indifferent. But now on the other side, I take it to be as evident and as 〈◊〉 an assertion, that any Lay counsel may in 〈◊〉 merely civil or moral, no way reflecting upon the word of God, oblige the conscience (which indeed is but the bare opinion and judgement of a man) by their conclusions, and determinations; and in such ease 'tis no sin, for a man to oppose his own reason, by submission to the judgement of o●…hers. And if this were not a truth, Justice would be but slow paid, and the law as various as the several dispositions of men, and every man would have power to infringe the law upon every 〈◊〉 of opposition to conscience. 〈◊〉 but the Author goes on, and tells us that though amongst probable A●…guments, that drawn 〈◊〉 the Authority of wise men, carry with it greatest weight, yet it must give place to a greater reaso●…. 'tis ●…rue; where the greater or better reason is evident: but 〈◊〉 are not bound to renounce our own understanding, and to believe that to be the better reason, which you affirm to be so. The Parliament must in strength of probability give the better reason; and when you can prove the contrary (which as yet you fall much short of) then shall we be of your belief, until than you must give us leave to retain our own. Now to every man belongs a judgement of 〈◊〉, which must decide for what concerns his particular duty. 'tis true where he is sole Arbiter, and where it co●…cernes his own particular only; but where the public is interested, there it is otherwise. So (He ●…aith) in the King's case. The Votes, which carry in them the authority of of both Houses, shall bear great sway, and is it be in things extremely dubious; they may turn the Scales of the other ●…ide. This truth, if firmly stood to (as it ought) would suddenly per●…d this sad contestation. But alas, how quickly 'tis broken. For he saith, if greater reason seem to contradict them, his Majesty will not hoodwink his understanding▪ and blindly ●…ollow, whether they please to lead him, he will walk by the greater light. greater reason, very much that the reason of the Court, should preponderate that of the Parliament; For example (he sa●…h) 〈◊〉 majesty perceiving how much his people may sister under ar●… power, is resolved never to make use of it, and th●…nks it less fitting any other should. I would to God h●…s Majestic had never been wrought upon by his evil counsel to break his resolution. Is it not an arbitrary way of rule for to tak●… away men's property without their cons●…nt? And is i●… not arbitrary for the King to pre●…e his own single ex●…udiciall judgement, before that of his Parliaments▪  
But it is told him now, the use of it will be for their good, by reason of app●…ent imminent dangers.  
Hath the Author thus informed his majesty, certainly never any one else did, it were happy both for King and people, that it were no more practised by t●…e Court, than it is by the Parliamen●….  
Concerning the Action at Hull, the Observator agreeth, to take poss●…ssion of the King's 
Obs.  town, and shu●… the gates against h●…m, is treason, if circumstances do not vary the nature of the act, as in this case, he says, th●…y do, for the first thing to be looked on is, that the King was merely d●…ed en●…ance for that time, his general right was not denied.  
If then a subject take up 〈◊〉: against his sovereign in a t●…mporall war, it must not come 
Ans.  〈◊〉 the compass of 〈◊〉.  
No, whether it be temporary or co●…nuing, so he hath the same Commission to justify his 
Rep.  action. And he may leg●…lly possess 〈◊〉 of the King's 〈◊〉, and maintain them against him, so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath no 〈◊〉 in them. 'tis not his confessing that he hath no right, for that all th●… world can judge of, but his doing no wrong that excuses him.  
No de●…ing language was given. 
Obs.   
If a man take away my pu●…se, shall he be acquitted from ●…elony, because he did not give me 
Ans.  ill language too?  
Inventio tua nomen imponit operi 〈◊〉, 'tis the invention (as we say in law) that denominates 
Rep.  the action. And therefore though I cannot acquit him of felony that shall take away your purse, and in exchange give you only good words; yet if he shall rescue your purse out of the hands of Robbers, or take it from your own●… person being in danger, for its better security; and shall again faithfully ●…ore it, when you have liberty to enjoy your own: if he be felon, 〈◊〉 dye for him.  
No act of violence was used. 
Obs.   
This he may say, who hath picked another's pocket; but it is no sufficient plea against the 
Ans.  Law.  
Yes, if he can show a lawful commission for it. 
Rep.   
〈◊〉 he used no violence, though the King for 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉 together, did stand within Musket 
Obs.  s●…t, &c.  
It is no argument of innocence, that he had 〈◊〉 to be more highly guilty, and abstained. 
Ans.   
'tis true, had he been guilty at all. 
〈◊〉.   
The King used terms of desyance, &c. and this makes the Act m●…ely desensive, or rather 
Obs.  passive.  
If this were true, there was never any war, but defensive. For those who by some great injustice 
〈◊〉.  o●…ed provoke a nation to right it s●…e, fight as well to maintain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as what they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
T●… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that offer any injustice or wrong, though they take up a●…mes to secure 
〈◊〉.  themselves, 〈◊〉 on the offensive p●…t, n●…t the defensive. But this rests to prove in our case.  
How 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 to the King any grounds to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 York, many men won●…, 
〈◊〉.  or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seem the same 〈◊〉 to the King, as if he had been pursued to the gates 〈◊〉 ●…ke.  
Certainly it was a 〈◊〉 ground not only to raise a guard, for his safety; but an army to 
〈◊〉.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a●…d to right his 〈◊〉.  
A 〈◊〉 for his safety▪ why Sir 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not advance towards York; nor ever〈◊〉 ●…sed 
.  it. An army to punish th●…t h●…gh indignity. Very just it should be s●…, had there been 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And to right his 〈◊〉 ve●…y reasonable▪ had his Ma●…esty been any way dishonoured?  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the townsmen out of their 〈◊〉. 
〈◊〉.   
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. 
〈◊〉.   
〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉, who acts only by their 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 what are they? Ay but he saith 
〈◊〉.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉. This is but your bare assertion which is n●…t to be credited before the Pa●…liament. But if it had been so, that they had been turned 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, be says the same law would have justified this act as well as the 〈◊〉. So▪ it would; had the primer seisin of their estates been of the like con●…equence and concernme●…t ●…o the public. But, he says, since not only the country about, but the inhabitants within the town have suffered in their estates and liberties.  
If any have suffered without, they may thank the unlawf●…ll assaults of others: if within, their unfaithfulness to the Common wealth.  
Or if they cl●…ymed any interest in it to themselves. 
Obs.   
So much the less reason to 〈◊〉 on it, if he cannot so much as pretend title▪ to it. 
Ans.   
'tis sufficient if the common Wealth claim an interest in it, though he doth not. 
〈◊〉.   
Or have 〈◊〉 the king, utterly denying his right for the future. 
Obs.   
If any law can be produced to justify the taking away the kings goods 〈◊〉 a time, the 〈◊〉 
〈◊〉.  will be cleared.  
If any law, or evidence can be produced to justify the town of Hull to be the King's goods 
〈◊〉.  otherwise than with reference to the common wealth, for the good of which he is entrusted with it, then happily the case may not be so evident.  
Or have made any other ●…se of their possession, but merely to prevent civil war. 
Obs.   
There is not any way more likely to create a civil 〈◊〉, than endeavours to prevent it, by illegal 
Ans.  courses.  
Very just if you could demonstrate any illegal courses that have been taken. 
Rep.   
If the Parliament (the shutting of the King out of Hull was not their act) if the Act of the 
Ob●….  substitute, be not the Act of him that doth authorise him; then I understaud no law, be not virtually the whole kingdom itself.  
The King excl●…ded, it is not. 
Ans.   
'tis certain, but if he exclude himself, than it is. 
Rep.   
If it be not like supreme judicature, as well in matters of State, as matters of law. 
O●….   
Till new laws be enacted, the subject cannot justify any act, but what is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by 
Ans.  the old.  
This is an unquestionable truth, if the Author do not corrupt it by this false gloss, and interpretation; 
Rep.  he must know, 'tis one thing to declare the common law, another to ●…act a new law; the subject may justify an act, by the authority of Parliament, without his majesty's consent in the former, not so in the latter.  
If it be not the great counsel of the kingdom, as well as of the king, to whom it belongeth by 
Ob●….  the consent of all nations, to provide in all extraordinary cases, ne quid detrimenti capiat respublica 〈◊〉 the brand of treason stick upon it.  
No provisions are allowed, but what are legal, lest the remedies prove worse than the 
Ans.  disease.  
Very right, but circumstances may vary a case. And that may, and aught to be legal at 
Rep▪  one time, that nei●…her will, nor can be so, at another And in extraordinary cases, extraordinary provisions, may be made, and ought not to be●… br●…nded with injustice, or breach of Law.  
Nay, if the Parliament would have used this forcible means, unless petitioning would not 
Obs.  have prevailed.  
It is no just cause to take away a 〈◊〉 money, and said he did first desire him to deliver it. 
Ans.   
Clear law; and the cases will no way vary; if the Author can prove that the King hath as 
Rep.  absolute a property in the town of Hull, as any man hath in his money.  
Or if their grounds of 〈◊〉 were 〈◊〉 vain. 
Ob●….   
It is against all equity, to d●…e a wrong, because there is a 〈◊〉 of suffering it. 
A●….   
Right, but I hope you will prove now, that there is a wrong done, and not argue this by 
Rep.  way of admission. Besides, it is against all reason that a whole kingdom should be put to suffer a wrong, out of a mere possibility of doing one.  
Or if the 〈◊〉 of a 〈◊〉 kingdom can be co●…ted vain. 
Ob●….   
Too large an expression, much the greater pa●…t of the kingdom apprehend unjust grounds of 
A●….  jealousies.  
Very good, is not this the Doctrine of division that I impeach our Au●…hor to be guilty of 
Rep▪  before. The Parliament have formerly been esteemed the representative body of the who●… kingdom; But belike now ●…is otherwise, they have (I know not how) lost this honour and privilege; or it is unjustly taken from them. In the easing us of these many pre●…ures, which lay so heavin upon he kingdom (〈◊〉 which we and our whole posterity are eternally engaged unto them) there they did represent us: and their actions for our benefi●…, had an influence upon the whole kingdom. But if they tell us through their vigilancy and great care of us) that we are like to be reduced to a worse condition, through the malicious couns●…ll of those men that wrought our former miseries, if not timely preven●…ed; there they sit in a parsonal capacity only, and we are not bound to believe that we 〈◊〉 in danger, because they say so: No, ala●… they are a seditious, factious and inconsid●…rable number; who intend to raise t●…ir own fortunes, upon v●…ine 〈◊〉 of danger, out of the public d straction●…. O the wit and power of 〈◊〉, that should thus work upon men, to renounce their unde standing, neglect their duty and incur the public ruin, upon a mere possibility tha they may be seduced by the Parliament. But 'tis very m●…ch ●…at the Author should dare to affirm, ●…ha much the greater part of the kingdom appreh●…nd no ground of jealousy, b●…like he hath travailed the w●…ole Kingdom over, and examined men by the Poles, and tak●…n every one's suffrage, and so upon the to ●…l cast up on every side, is able to render you this account, or otherwise he could never make good his assertion.  
O●… if they cl●…yme any such right of judging of dangers, and preventing of them without the 
O●…s.  King's Consent as ordinary and perpetual.  
As of●…en as they have a mind to make use of such a right, 'tis easy ●…or them to call the case extraordinary, 
Ans.  and pretend public dangers.  
If it shall be suffered that their sole●…ne judgements and determinations (which are of so 
〈◊〉.  great weight and credit, that they ought to awe us to a belief of them) shall be blasted with the scandal of vain and pretend●…d; how can it possibly be, ●…hat there should fall out any case 〈◊〉?  
Ay, but the event ought to be Judge; and (he says) they will never be c●…nfuted by that, if not now, for certainly apparent dang●…s did never less app●…e.  
Admirably ingenious, were it not a pure contradiction: for doub●…lesse, if apparent dangers; they must be seen. But let me tell you, that the issue or event is no certain de ermi●… of an imminent danger: a provident care (as now) or an unexpected interposing providence (as in case of the Gunpowder plo●…) may prevent the blow; shall we therefore conclude it was never ofl●…red?  
It would more abundantly have satisfied me, if I had been frighted with secret plots and 〈◊〉 designs.  
Dou●…tlesse those, whom apparent and visible dangers will not frighten; secret and concealed cannot. 
Obs.   
The King might have prevented the same repulse by send●…ng of a messenger before hand. 
Ans.   
That is, if he had not come to g●…t in, he had not b●…ene shut out, if he would have stayed away, he would not have denied h●…m entrance. 
R●…p.   
A very apt conclusion, and it had b●…ene happy his majesty had found so good advice, as to have saved hi●… labour. 
Obs.   
Or by coming without any such considerable forces. 
〈◊〉.   
Let his forces be great, he was not to give law to his Pea. 
〈◊〉.   
No; nor any privy counsel to the Parliam●…nt; B●…t n●…ither is it likely ●…ee would have ●…ave admitted him then, for you 〈◊〉 a lit●…le above, 〈◊〉 offered to enter, with twen●…y Horse only unarmed. Whether his Ma●…esty m●…de any such proffer or no, I know not: nor is i●… material, for 'twas not the paucity of number, th' t could excuse his breach of trust. 
Obs.   
The Scots in England took Newcastle, but by private authority, yet there w●…re other qualifications in that act, sufficient to purge it of Treason. 
Ans.   
The king and Parliament deserved so much respect from you, as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act; you might well let that pass in silence, which they have buried in an act of O●…livion.  
'tis no wrong, either to King or Parliament, for a man to say that is no treason, which 
〈◊〉.  they have adjudged not to be so. Neither is that act of theirs so to be buri●…d in utter silence, as not to acquit and discharge us, if we can plead the same innocency.  
Then the Observator instances at large, in the example of ●…dward the second, misted by 
Obs.  〈◊〉. 
Ans.   
It doth not ●…llow, because one king hath harkened to evil Couns●…ll, therefore all must be denied the liberty to harken to good.  
That is true, but it doth clearly demonstrate thus much, that o●…hers may be misled as well 
Rep.  as he, and when a Parliament shall declare (as now) that the King is misled by evil counsel, 'tis not your b●…re 〈◊〉, that can make good the contrary.  
〈◊〉 p●…tie was but of inconsiderable fortunes. 
Ob●….   
He will get no advantage by putting men's estates into the scales, and balancing their r●…putations. 
Ans.   
What odds may be gained in point of estate, I know not (though I am 〈◊〉 there 
Rep.  will be nothing lost) But without controversy, their reputations cannot be very good, whose cause and counsel is so bad.  
An Aristocracy in Parliament, cannot be erected with●…ut some means, and what this means shall 
Obs.  be, is yet to us altogether inscrutable.  
Certainly he is quicker sighted, than not to perceive what is so obvious, deny the King a negative, 
A●…s.  and the thing is done. 
Rep.   
Had the Parliament (as in truth they never did) denied the King a negative, yet the Author (who pretends to be so quick sighted) would find it a matter of greater weight and difficulty, than to be so easy compassed and effected. 
Obser.   
The power of the Parliaments is but derivative, and depending upon public consent. and how public consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawful, odious tyranny a 'mongst us is not disce●…able.  
It is not thought this was the intent of those that entrusted them, but it may be the abuse of power, 
Ans.  if the King's authority be once swallowed up in theirs; for though their power depend upon a public consent in the election, yet not so after they are met together.  
If the power of Parliament be merely derivative (as it cannot be denied) and that not absolute 
Rep.  and illimit●…d, but qualified and circumscribed (as it must be agreed) why then the consequence is very just, that where they do exceed that power, this doth not ●…gage the consent and obedience of the people; why then without ●…e shall allow that the people's vote, and consent may be had (which is so far from improbable, that it is almost impossible) we may here judge, what an idle fancy and vain dream this is of their labouring to introduct an Aristocracy. He says that He believes they would not be able to go through in that new way. But yet they must needs have a great party; considering their several relations, and the advantage they have in advancing the interests, whether religious or civil, of some, which may be able to do them service, and this would create division in the kingdom. Our Author must vent his contumacious and opprobrious conceits against the Parliament; though they be a contradiction to his own reason. What are their several relations compared with the public? or what advantage can th●…r power of preferment yield them, (since but few can attain to that) in the engaging of a whole kingdom to erect so unlawful and oidous a tyranny?  
His Majesty expresses his indignation, that they should dare to tell their King, they may 
Obs.  without want of modesty or duty depose him. To which the Observator answers, This cannot be collected from these words, That if they should make the highest precedents of other Parliaments their pattern there would be no cause to complain of want of modesty and duty, because (says he,) it may justly be denied, that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the deposing of any king of England.  
What was there asfirmed of Parliaments, had none of his present restriction of free in it. 
Ans.   
What though it had not any candid and ingenious reader would supply it, by a fair intendment; 
Rep.  we ought not to stand upon our captions with the Parliament, whose words and actions ought (if we will be guided by the rule of law) to receive the most honourable and favourable construction of us. Wh●…refore we ought not so critically and unjustly to imagine, when they do generally mention the highest precedents of other Parliaments, that they do include forced parliaments, because (as they well know) these are not precedents, for free Parliaments to be guided by. And do they not by their Declaration dated the second of November 1642. (which I make no question, the Author had a view of before the publishing of his book) say, that in that Declaration, to which this objection refers, they delivered, that they did never so much as suffer this to enter into their thoughts. And further that some precedents were such, as that they ought not to be rules for them to follow; which very reasonably and probably might intend those of deposing Kings. How dare then the Author, (though not expressly, yet tacitly) accuse the Parliament of being guilty of the maintaining that position contrary to their own public profession and vindication? But I pass itover, and leave him to his just censure. He says, that the King is offended at their frank expressions, disguised under the charge of a malignant party. The sense of his answer is this, they have no otherway to clear themselves; for there being foults somewhere, not to lay them upon others, were to take them upon themselves. Happy were our condition if his majesty's evil Counsellors could so easily acquit themselves of any wrong done to the public, as the Parliament can. but than he goes on and says, that his Majesty ha●…h proposed a very good way, which will fully satisfy the world in their innocency (I hope the world is sufficiently satisfied without that) which is not always to accuse, but some times to prove. A most unusual and illegal way; was it ever heard of or known, that evidence should be produced against any man for any kind of delinquency, before the party was brought to his trial? 'twere very unjust to condemn a man, not see●…ng his Accusers, no●… hearing their evidence; I rather believe t●…is is to b●… a proposition of the Authors coining, than to proceed from his majesty▪ And if any Messenger were sent from the Parlibe a proposition of the Authors coining, than to proceed from h●…s Majesty. And if any Messenger were s●…nt from the Parliament, (as I believe one was) to demand a delinquent accused by them; he might have been sufficiently beaten for his pains, and have returned without him. How then could the Parliament make their proof in a legal way, according to this proposition?  
The King demands justice for Tumults, and high indignities offered, and complains of a prohibition, sent from the House of Commons into Southwark, to hinder the process against a riot according to law. The Observators answer is, Equa●… justice could not be obtained against 
Obs.  the Court cavaliers. His majesty never protected them from legal trial, it was free for them to 
Ans.  have proved what they could against them.  
It must have been behind their backs ●…hen; which is a p●…ece of admirable justice; and when 
Rep.  they had made good their proofs; they must have sent to York, for to impeach and d●…mand them and what success that journey would have produced, your jdgmen●… could easily inform you.  
The k●…ng says it being granted by them, that their privileges do not extend to Treason, felony, or breach of the peace, so as to exempt the members from all manner of trial, yet if they be so privileged in the method of their ●…yall, that the cause must first be brought before them, and their consent asked, before you can proceed, than their privileges extend as far in these, as in the most unquestioned cases, because no privileges exempt them fr●…m all manner of trial, the House being acquainted and leave given. I take the law to be (pardon me if I judge amiss) in all cases of a criminal nature, where the person may be seized and sequestered: there though he may be arrested, or detained to appear before them, yet he cannot be proceeded against in any other Court or way than in Parliament, whereby he may he taken or detained fr●…m the service of Parliament, without their consent, and this is no exemption from trial, but only a privilege in the method of it. But now on the other side, in all civil causes, if they demand their privilege, 'tis the frequent practice to allow it them, and this doth totally suspend the prosecution of the suit or trial. Ay but he saith. It was fully intended the members should have had a legal and speedy trial. It cannot be conceived so, since his majesty was advised to make such an unusual and illegal impeachment, and prosecution against them.  
The Parliament do not deny the king a true, real interest, in any thing had by him, either in jure 
Obs.  Coronae, or in jure personae, but only affirms that in the same thing the State hath an interest paramount in cases of publ●…ke extremity, by virtue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary preservation.] The king is a part of the state, and therefore the other part hath not any 
Ans.  power warranted by law, to do what they think fit to his prejudice, upon pretence of public extremity.  
We shall a low your assertion, that the King is part of the State, and that therefore the other 
Rep.  part cannot without him, upon any pretence whatsoever, do any thing that may turn him in prejudice. But this doth tacitly grant that they may do any thing, in case of his diser●…ion, without his consent, that is for his Majesties and the public advantage, and if you had meant to make good your ground, by applying it to the case in qu●…stion, you should not have reasoned thus by way of admission of that, that will by no means be allowed you, but you ought to have proved that the Parliament have done that which is a prejudice to his majesty, and then your consequence would have been very just, whereas it is now but a mere scandalous and Libellious argument: I, but he says, this is Ship money: in every man's lands and good the State hath an interest paramount, in cases of public extremity, by virtue of which it may justly seize and use the same for its own necessary preservation. doubtless no man who pret●…nds to knowledge, were not his reason and understanding captivated, would go about to persuade any man▪ that it is all one to be divested of his property by violence and oppression; as to part with it by free consent and donation; why this is all the resemblance or similitude that the Ship money and the proceedings of Parliament have then let all the world judge how these contraries can possibly run parallel. The head without the body was the State before; now it is a body without an head. That's a monster of your making, 'tis not we. but you that divide the head from the body. I will not turn Prophet, but know if heaven be just, a crime of so great aggravation cannot pass unpunished. 
Obs.   
But the King's things are still reserved for h●…m in b●…tter hands, than he would have put them.  
Though this were true, it were an ill precedent for the subject, who must be bound to give up his 
Ans.  means, as often as they conceive. they could dispose it more wisely.  
There is no concluding from the seizing of Forts, Castles and the like, things merely of public 
Rep.  use and concernment, in which the King hath no other interest, but in reference to his trust, for the good of the public. To the seizing of any man's private or particular in●…erest, in which he hath a sole absolute and unquestionable property. No, why hear what the Author saith, Let what will be pretended, the subject cannot be so stupid, as not to understand thesewho undertake to manage the paramount interest of the state, may seize on any subjects' fortunes, by the same right they take the 〈◊〉.  
With the author's favour he is grossly mistaken: for though it must be agreed that the State hath an interest Paramount in every man's private property: and so if occasion require may call for a part, for the preservation of the whole (and upon such terms, he is unwise that will not freely disburse it) yet it doth not therefore follow, that this is seized by the same right, that the Forts & Castles are, which are merely for the public defence and security. For the Kingdom hath a peculiar & proper interest in the one, which it hath not in the other. And though necessity may justly demand both for the public safety, yet it is the proper work and office of the one, not soof the other.  
That▪ there is an Arbitrary power in every state somewhere, 'tis true, 'tis necessary & no inconveniencefollows 
Obs.  upon it. If he mean by arbitrary a lagistative power, this is granted, yet not to part but the wholebody. 
Ans.   
But what if one part do desert the other, and refuse to concur with h●…m, must that 〈◊〉 still 
Rep.  and do nothing? But he says, this speaks not to the case, for still they give us a certain rule to live by. And do not the Parliament do the same? No law can be all equity, nor all equity Law, for so the one would confound and destroy the other, but there must be a certain rule upon which to make this equitable construction. Why now I appeal to any one that know●… any thing of the justice of their proceedings; whether that they have not often laid down this as an unqu●…ionable position, that the King by his Prerogative hath the sole ordering of the 〈◊〉, of the Forts, Castles and Magazine throughout the kingdom (why then h●…re is your certain rule to live by) only they make this equitable qualification of it, (and I must say, that it were no just law, if it would not admit of this construction) that in case where 〈◊〉 kingdom is in imminent danger of for reign invasion, or civil combustion, and that the King seduced by evil and Malignant counsellors, will not receive their advice and counsel for the securing of the same; in such ca●… they, who are entrusted with the public, may seize the Forts and Magazine, and 〈◊〉 the Militia for his Ma●…esties and his people's safety and preservation. And doth this any whit destroy the rule? Nay, rather doth it not maintain and support it? Ay but he saith, that he is to justify, there is such a Paramount Law, which shall make other laws truly Oracles, that is, capable of contrary meanings: so that now a man may be justly punished for doing such a thi●…g, because he hath disobeyed the letter of the law; a week after he shall be justly punished too, for no●… doing of the same thing, because he hath disobeyed the equity of the law. This I shall justify, and yet let me tell the Author that this is no forcing or st●…ayning the laws to contrary meaning, but only a Declaration of the true intention of them. The Statu●…e de frangentibus prisenam doth ena●…t that it shall be felony for a prisoner to break prison; the prison by accident is set on fire, t●…e prisoners may in such case break prison for the salvation of their lives, and are no felons, and yet this is against the express letter of the Statute; and shall we in such case say that this is a contrary meaning to the law? No, we may not, 'tis clearly agreeable with the intention of it. Aga●…ne the sole power of ordering of the Militia doth by the law reside in the King: and if in time of peace and secur●…ty, the King duly discharging of his trust, any one shall dare to execute any other Commission, and by virtue of that shall train, muster or discipline any 〈◊〉 his majesty's sub●…ects, without his authority there he is justly punishable as offending against the letter of the law. But now on the other side, if in time of public distraction, and fear of invasion from abroad, or of civil and intestine combustion within, the King shall refuse to harken to the counsel of his Parliament, and shall listen to such advice, as being followed m●…y prove the utter ruin and destruction of the commonwealth: In such case, if they shall take upon them for to order the Militia for the securing of his Majesty and people, and shall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commissions to that purpose; those that in s●…ch case shall disobey, may be punished for not submitting to the equity of the law. And yet still this is no contradiction or contrary ●…eaning to the law, but an eq●…itable & just ●…planation, according to the int●…ntion of it. And if this will not give the Author satisfaction, for my part I think nothing will. Ay but than he citys us Aristotle which saith Those laws are with greatest prudence 〈◊〉 shed, which d●…fine most cases, and which leave nothing which possibly may be determined, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 breast of the judge: And the Author gives the reason of it, for that to leave an ample and large construction according to equity unto judges, may be a means to satisfy corrupt ends. 'twas a wise saying of Aristotle, and no doubt 'tis a very admirable rule and direction, for all legistative powers; to make such laws that might be their own expositors; and that might (if it were possible) extend to all cases; ●…hat so the self respect or corrupted judgement of their interpreters, might not through the dubious, ample or various, sense of them be satisfied. But since it is impossible for them, so 〈◊〉 sorsee and enlarge the law, but they must of necessity l●…ave some c●…ses unprovided for, and some incertain, which must r●…st upon the judgement of the judges of it. How doth it any way oppose law or reason, where there is not for all cases an exact provision, to allow a favourable and 〈◊〉 construction? But then covertly 〈◊〉 to the condition of our times, he tells us a large Story of the 〈◊〉 in Germany, and of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens: what a 〈◊〉 and large power they had got into their hands 〈◊〉 by insinuating themselves into the hearts of the people, and how they did abuse that power by injustice and oppression; and so concludes that upon proportionable grounds and principles such mischeif●…s being then, may be again. Could the Author have made a worse comp●…rison, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 would; was ever great●…r dishonour or indignity cast upon a Parliament, upon such 〈◊〉▪ such groundless and inconsequent reasons and arguments; The Anabaptists they abused Germany, the thirty Tyrants, Athens, and therefore th●… Parliament do England, the rest of His book shows this to be his meaning, though he conclude with a (may be) though he had not regarded his own credit and reputati●…n, yet h●…e should have had some respect to the honour and fame of his Countr●…y, and have studied a better resemblance, though he had not raised a better conclusion. The bad actions or impostures of some, are not infallible precedents for others to be judged by. But to advertise the Author that he do not for the future thus abuse his judgement and discretion; L●…t me give him this caution, when his heart shall suggest any ill of so great and reverend a counsel (whose actions ought to awe him to a good conceit of them) to consider well the grounds and reasons of his mistrust, and when he hath done this, ponder on the great disproportion and inequality that there is betwixt so great a power, and himself, and this will either engage him to a better belief, or force him to silence. And let th●… people take this Caveat, that the subtle pr●…ssing and urging of the ill examples of other men, ought not (though it be most maliciously endeavoured) to persuade us to a belief of the like corruptions in the Parliament.  
The things taken from the King at Hull, were arms, which are of more danger than other kind 
Obs.  of chattels.  
By the same law, all that part of the kingdom which is not confided in, may be disarmed. 
Ans.   
Good reason too, if in a public 〈◊〉, they shall appear in opposition to them, who 
Rep.  endeavour nothing but the public safety, and preservation. Nay, why may not their money be taken too, upon probable fear, they may buy arms with it.  
If that probability can be evidenced by a sufficient proof, I see no reason any man should be permitted to buy a sword, to help to cut his own throat, nay more, to hasten the ruin of the commonwealth. The Subj●…ct is in a miserable condition, that is liable to be undone, as often as they please to be fearful.  
We should be in a far worse condition, if we should not fear, when we have just cause, and prevent the losing of the whole, by a wise parting with some small and inconsiderate portion. Let Brainford evidence this truth. Ay, but he saith it is so far from excusing, it aggravates the fact to take away the King's arms, that is, the means whereby he may seize whatever else belongs unto his Majesty. It doth much extenuate the fact, to seize those things which would be more immediate Agents or instruments in his Majesties and the public ruin; I, but then again he says, that the law of the land hath only entrusted the Prince with arms, so that the Subject ought not to he arrayed, trained and mustered, but by his Commission; He says very much, and of great consequence, had it been at another time. But as circumstances may vary a case, so I hope the Author will learn to distinguish betwixt a case in nece●…ity, and one out of necessity, between the Kings adhering to the advice of his great counsel the Parliament, and his deserting of them, and between the due execution of his trust, and the breach of it. These laid together will much vary the case, and justify the Parliament in their arraying, training and mustering without his majesty's Commission.  
But some determination must be supreme, and therefore either the King's power and trust must 
Obs.  be guided by the directions of the Parliament, or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the King's mere direction.  
No necessity of either, for in cases of this nature, which is confessed to be extraordinary, if the King and Parliament dissent things must be at a stand, and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary 
Ans.  law.  
Our Author doub●…lesse hath a strong Minerva that could make so subtle a decision of a matter 
Rep.  of so great controve●…sie; But I believe this concept was as soon penned, as it was thought on. For what is this, but in plain terms to tell the Parliament hat they might as well have saved their labour. And that if a King seduced by evil counsel shall endeavour the destruction of the public, yet it lies not in the power of the Parliament any way to oppose or prevent it. A sad conclusion, if it would hold.  
But then his Majesty maintaining of his negative power, puts this case, whether if the Papists in Ireland in truth were, or by act or accident had made themselves the Major part of both Houses of Parliament there, and had pretended the trust, (which the Parliament here doth) from the kingdom of Ireland, & thereupon had voted their Religion and liberty to ●…e in danger of extirpation, from a Malignant party of Protestants and Puritans; and therefore that they should put themselves into a possure of defence; that the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of that kingdom were to be put into the hands of such persons as they could confide in &c. Whe●…her he were bound to consent to all such alterations, as these men should propose to him, and resolve to be for the public good.  
I shall not need to prove the unlikely hood of their accomplishing their desired ends; nor go about maintain with the Observator, that there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland, as▪ betwixt England and Wales. Neither do I think if it were so that the two Parliaments would joyn●… for transacting and concluding upon matters for both states. But to the question I shall give this short answer; that I do not conceive the King in such case bound to consent to their proposals. For I never did, nor shall allow, where their conclusions and requ●…sts are evidently against l●…w, reason or Religion (if that may b●… presumed of a Parliament) that in such case the Ki●…g is bound to ye●…ld to their Votes. No; far be it from any one thus to judge; for that were to make him a ●…yrant, though against his will; and to be engaged in his people's ruin against his conscience. But now what use or advantage can be made of this against the cas●… in question (●…he Parliaments proposals being not apparently either against law, reason or Religion) do●…h nonplus my understanding to imagine.  
A faction is said to have prevailed upon a Major part by cunning, ●…orce, absence or accident. The 
O●…s.  Observator argues thus against it. If by cunning we must suppose the King's party in Parliament, hath lost all their law, policy and 〈◊〉.  
The reason why they are overborne may be this, not because they have less law, but more ho●…sty, 
A●…s  which will not permit them to maintain a good cause, by ill means.  
No; the reason is evidently this, that they have li●…le law, and 〈◊〉 Honesty, which wi●…hholds 
Rep.  them from promoting the public saf●…ty. Ay but how falls it out, that after so many reiterated scandals of pretences, and deceivings of the people, the Author should now confess that the cause is good only he adds that there is an ill prosecuting of it, which he ought to prove, if he expects we should believe him. Certainly he did not read what he had writ●…en, or not understand it, or there is some hope now at the last (after the venting of his sple●…ne) that he will prove a convert? But I despair of convincing him by better reason; for he is here in his very next words, fallen into a contradiction; where he sa●…es, that we all know, in how great stead these Piae frauds holy salsehoods, and religious untruth stood, the Church of Rome &c.  
And he concludes that we ought to examine, whether this policy work not (at least in the beginning, till a discovery of their falsehoods is made, and the people is undeceived) the same effects in a civil State; whether there are not such things, as frauds pretended to be Reipublicae salutares  
Here you have his apostasy, you may see how suddenly he hath declined the truth, for he is revolted again into his pretences, deceits and falsehoods. And I wish from my very heart, that these had no greater influence upon the Actions of this man, and such as he is, than they have upon the proceedings of Parliament, and then I am confident our sad Divisions and distractions would not be long lived.  
Ay, but then the Observator says, It cannot be by force, because they have no army visible. 
Obser.   
A thing is said in law to be done by force, not only when men actually suffer; if they make use of 
Ans.  their liberty and refuse to satisfy the passion and humours of some, but then also, when they have just grounds of fear, for this works on the mind as strongly, as the other on the body. 
R●…p.   
Ay, but with the author's favour, this must be such a fear as may possess a generous and settled spirit, not every idle phantasm or chimaera, such as they use to bugbear●… Children withal. It remains then, we examine whether the names of many Gentlemen were not openly read in tumults.  
I marry Sir, here is on●… of the imaginary Spiri●…s, that hath thus forced the understanding and reason of these men. Doubtl●…sse this is not a sufficient ground of fear (were it true, which I much question) to a resolved and settled judgement, neither doth the law t●…ke hold of any such fear as thi●… is. Ay, but than he goes on; whether that they were not posted with directions to th●…ir particular lodgings. ay, here you have another of these Hobgoblins, and deformed Images, more fit to fray children with, than men; Because (if that were true) they were directed to their Chambers, and never intended, (as the event clears it) to approach them; therefore they complied or were silent, and so that faction prevailed. Ay, but he goes yet further, whether the way to the House, were not set with clamorous multitudes, that they must pass through the midst of them, whil●…st they insorme them, what is fit to be voted, and inquire after their names, and what side they take. This is like indeed to carry the visage of truth with it; May not men who are part of the collective body of the commonwealth, whom the Parliament represents considering that sua res agitur, it is their business that is there transacted, have recourse thy her, with a full desire only to be informed of the proceedings of Parliament, and how thing●… succeed for their good, but they must be branded with those ignominious styles of unlawful Ass●…mblies and clamorous multitudes? For their inquiring what their names were, and which s●…de they took; certainly 〈◊〉 they may do without 〈◊〉, and that can be no cause to make me dread a man, because he knows my name, No; nor his being privy to my actions nei 〈◊〉, if I am conscious to myself, that they are such as are just and honourable; ●…nd for their informing of them of what was fit to be voted, that is as like to be true, as that they sho●…ld vote, what they had informed them, For the other two of absence and accident, he says, they may be reduced to this. I t is no wond●…r many stay away, since they must be absent, even whilst th●…y are there. If their wills were absent, by being a verse from the public good, whose fault was it that they stood ciphers? better in such case, their room than their company.  
The Parliament requests of the King, that all great Officers of State, by whom p●…blique affairs, 
Obs.  sh●…ll be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ●…e chosen by 〈◊〉 or nomination of the great counsel. Could the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for him, &c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to 〈◊〉  
Is that the ●…eason, why each man preserves his own right, b●…cause he takes all the rest of mankind 
Ans.  for deadly enemies?  
No, but had I not a strong 〈◊〉 of such men's faith and loyalty; I should not upon just occasion 
〈◊〉.  〈◊〉 to intrust my right with them. Ay, but can he with honour 〈◊〉 himself unfit to manage that 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 the law hath commuted to him? 〈◊〉 not a disavowing of his own ability, to be ruled by the 〈◊〉 of his great counsel the Parliament, one may man●…ge a trust well, and yet no disho●…●…hat a whole Kingdom may do●… it better. With equal reason (says he) they may challenge to themselves the 〈◊〉 of all Bishops, 〈◊〉, Sher●…ffes, 〈◊〉, &c. and dispose of all the preferments of England. For th●… Bishops (thou●…h our sad experience at this day doth inform us) that they have been very bad) yet we shall not speak of what necessity it might be, that they likewise should be, nominated by the great counsel, for that it is boubtfull whether ever they shall come in nomination again. For the Ministers likewise I shall leave them to the choice and free elections of their Patrons. But now for the sheriffs, Justices and other inferior Officers of the law; I must 〈◊〉 I much wonder how those can be brought within the rank and order of great officers of State; neither can there be the like reason possibly rendered, for the nominating of these, as for the other; for though they may be corrupt in their way, yet that is a prejudice only to some particular interests, no danger to the public. The truth of it is, this kingdom hath and doth still suffer under the hea●… pressures of ill 〈◊〉 and Officers of Sta●…e, who instead of defending and propagating the good of the public: have, and do most vilely and traitorously-corrode and gnaw out the very bowels of it. Was not then their req●…st and proposal very reasonable and safe both for King and people, that they might nominate such of that known and public trust and confidence, who by their sedulous care, honest, and direct counsel, and which is above all, by their true and unfeigned zeal and affection to the common wealth, might prevent the like distractions and miseries for the future▪ But to pass this; had his 〈◊〉 been graciously pleased for to harken and comply with this advice of the Parliament, the greater had been his honour in that certain pledge of continued happiness and security to h●…s people.  
If the King 〈◊〉 such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his own good liking only, or upon recommendation 
Obs.  of such a 〈◊〉, here 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of no power; but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole kingdom in Parliament, who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned, this is an emptying himself of majesty, and 〈◊〉 himself of power.  
Is this will cont●…nt them, th●…y shall hav●… as much power, as be ●…rants to his Courtiers. 
Ans.   
If this might be obtained, I am confident they need not make a second requ●…st; Nay, could 
Rep.  they be persuaded, th●…t what●… they could propose, would be conceed by his Majesty, I dare say 〈◊〉 own modesty, judgement and 〈◊〉, would not permit them to be guilty of so great dishonour to their King; as to extend their pe●…itions so far for in●…rease of power, as some lately (to our sad experience) have enjoyed; I but he says, 〈◊〉 must be like the outward senses, and make a true represent at con; the 〈◊〉 of reason is 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉, to make judgement therein: 〈◊〉 informat●…n is not always faithful; This 〈◊〉 no way 〈◊〉 have deprived the King of the Office of reason; for their 〈◊〉 did not 〈◊〉 away 〈◊〉 majesty's power of refusal upon just ca●…se rendered. If by his last words 〈◊〉 intends the information of the Court there he is in the right this age can 〈◊〉 to him, that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not been always faithful; But if he do intend his great 〈◊〉 the Parliament, there he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 against common judgement and understanding, for that no age is able to w●…tnesse any unfaithfulness or 〈◊〉 in a Parliament, I, but he 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to their King, and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his 〈◊〉, yet 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 them●…, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of their own 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 in all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to express their 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. And why so▪ pray 〈◊〉 his reason, For (saith he) they must 〈◊〉 to suffer 〈◊〉 those 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hoped for in a 〈◊〉 divided in it 〈◊〉? This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a fire in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which would 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: For it cannot be 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉▪ 〈◊〉. Very tragically 〈◊〉, though without any 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, I 〈◊〉 that if 〈◊〉 Author 〈◊〉, but to make a 〈◊〉, he will easily inform himself 〈◊〉 that it is very 〈◊〉 to have great 〈◊〉 of State of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and it will be very difficult to 〈◊〉 men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. But if 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and that dan●… incurred to by 〈◊〉 of such a power to the Parliament, 〈◊〉 since there can be no absolute 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 on this side heaven, but that all human inventions, whether of law, or whatever else will retain or contract (either more or less) some mixture or tincture of ill in them. Why then s●…uld 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 benefit, for a possible inconvenience? or reject the unquestionable commodum, for ●…are of a casual incommodum, the bread that a man doth now eat, may choke him, and his house that he now lives in false upon his head; shall he therefore deny himself the certain nutriment of the one, or the secure habitation of the other? for fear of these visible dangers? 'twere fanatic ●…nd ridiculous. By this r●…le a man should 〈◊〉 and decl●…ne all terrene and sublunary happiness whatsoever, for that there is not so 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 condition, that is not subject to a possible pollution and corruption. Now I b●…lieve it doth fully appear that the Law of that Remonstrance laid down by his Majesti by way of 〈◊〉, in seven positions, is just and without offence, ●…eing such as will bring unquestionable happiness both to Church and 〈◊〉, not denying our obedience to the King, 〈◊〉 our 〈◊〉 and faithful service to God.  
1 That the Parliament hath an absolute and 〈◊〉 power of declaring Law.  
This power must rest in 〈◊〉 or in the king, or in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Courts, or 〈◊〉 all suit must be 
Obs.  endless, and it can nowhere rest more safely than in Parliament.  
〈◊〉 two Houses are not the Parliament, The subject of such power is the entire body, which consists 
Ans.  of three estates.  
If deserted by the King they are, otherwise not. Ay, but he says, some things are clear and evident 
Rep.  in law, and want 〈◊〉, if otherwise, all 〈◊〉 subjects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the judge Very just, and some things are dubious in law and want 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (such is the case between the King and Parliament) and this must rest upon the breast of the 〈◊〉, whi●…h in this case is the Parliament. I but h●… says, If the Houses should vote you●…ger brothers ought to 〈◊〉 by the law of England, could this 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of the first 〈◊〉? A 〈◊〉 〈◊〉; but most easily answered and resolved. It is very manifest it could not, for 〈◊〉 this is a case which is evident and clear, and here the law may be its own judge, and needs no other interpreter or declarer. Besides this is a destroying or repealing of the old law, and an int●…oduction of a new, which can●…ot be done, without the three esta●…es. But they may declare what the common law of the land is, without the King, which is only a passing sen●…ence, upon the 〈◊〉 and reasoning of a new case, by the old law, so that the Judges are guided by this rule of law, 〈◊〉 eadem ratio, ibi idem 〈◊〉, where there is the same reason, there ought to be the same law; pray observe, and this will correct your mistake; though the case be new, 〈◊〉 if it may be brought to the 〈◊〉 of the old law) tis idem jus, not 〈◊〉, the same, no new law. The truth of it is, that law is but a more pure and 〈◊〉 reason, and as reason is always one and the same; so of necessity must the law be.  
That the Parliament are bound 〈◊〉 no precedents Statute are not binding 〈◊〉 them, why then 
Obs.  should precedents? Yet there is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 than the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉.  
This is an excellent ground to justify their own innoc●…ncy against all the world. For if they can 
Ans.  make it appear they are not bound ●…o keep 〈◊〉 law, no 〈◊〉 can accuse 〈◊〉 for the breach of any.  
Our Author thinks he hath here got a strong hold and advantage against us. Why we shall allow 
Rep.  (as without 〈◊〉 the Law is) that 〈◊〉 are binding to the two Houses of Parliament, as well as others, till repealed; But doth this any way disprove 〈◊〉 position, that they are not bound to precedents? You know what they say (who are best acquainted with the bounds and 〈◊〉 of their own power) some precedents are not to be followed, 〈◊〉 being not 〈◊〉, and all may fall short, and be different from the 〈◊〉 case and condition of things, and therefore 'tis no reason that they should be bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament. 3. That they are Parliaments and may 
Obse●….  judge of public necessity with●…ut the King, and dispose of any thing.  
They may not 〈◊〉 the King, but being 〈◊〉 by the King, when the kingdom is in 〈◊〉 
Ans.  they may judge of that 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 it, and are to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉, as the whole body of the 〈◊〉. To 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉 he hath granted, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in reason be d si ed. is 
Rep.  not to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉. 〈◊〉, but then by the rule of contraries, to dissent, 〈◊〉 he hath granted whatever might in reason be 〈◊〉, is a 〈◊〉 of the Houses; and this you do 〈◊〉 allow. Why now the only judge in this case of reasonable or 〈◊〉 demands, is the Parliament, and they have adjudged their request 〈◊〉, wherefore it is your duty and mine (〈◊〉 we will oppose our judgements to theirs, which will be extreme arrogancy) to believe they are so: however what their awful authority will not do, their reason ought. But he says; upon pretence of distress, to tak●… illegal courses, is as if th●…y should persuade us we are not in 〈◊〉, and therefore they must break 〈◊〉 beads to forward our recovery. Right, but in case of apparent and imminent danger (as now) if the great physician of the commonwealth shall neglect his patient, it may by all lawf●…ll and legal courses (as it doth now) endeavour its own preservation. Th●…y represent the people to some purposes, not the King to any, and therefore are but a part of the State. Very true, if the King do not desert them, but if he do, than they represent the whole State.  
4. That no member of Parliament, aught to be troubled for treason &c. without leave.  
This is intended of suspicions only, and when leave cannot s●…asonably be ●…ad, and when Competent 
Obs.  accuse appear not ●…n the impeachment.  
If by suspicions, be meant only a bare not confiding in, this injustice cannot be sufficient ground. 
〈◊〉.   
No; nor if by suspicions is meant, a labouring for an Arbitrary power, for which there is no ground, and of which the whole Parliament must needs be equally guilty, this is as insufficient ●… cause of impeachment as the other. But upon Articles drawn, and proofs in readiness, which it is not fit to produce, while the accused parties are at liberty, they may be meddled with. True if competent 〈◊〉 appear in the impeachment, than they may be arrested and detained to appear before the Parliament; but there ought to be no other pros●…cution, in any other Court or way than in Parliament, whereby they may be deprived of a member, without their consent. Ay, but says, he, if the Houses being adjourned, were not able to give consent; or upon too much confidence, sho●…ld not be willing hath not the law provided in such a case for trial of treason? For the first; no doubt, where they are not able to give consent, there they have not power to dissent. And for the latter if upon hearing of the cause, the accusers appear to be competent, and the cause of impeachment legal and just; 'twere to much presumption and confidence in us, for to believe them so confident, as not to be willing, to give way for a legal trial.  
5. That the Sove●…aigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament, the King having no Negative voice.  
This power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose; but to save the kingdom from ruin, in 
Obs  case where the King is so seduced, and that he preserres dangerous men, and prosecu●…s his loyal Subjects.  
Not as ordinary; that is, they will only be Kings as long as they please, and when they are weary of 
Ans.  〈◊〉 the kingdom shall be out of danger, and then it shall be his turn to command again.  
The Author might have spoken truth in better and more honourable language both to King 
Rep.  and Parliament, if he had pleased. That is, they will, as of right they ought, represent the whole State, the King deserting of them, so that, they may be enabled to preserve the kingdom from ruin, and when that shall be out of danger, then shall his majesty freely enjoy his negative, according to law and right. To save it from ruin; the law hath better provided for the people's safety, by prohibit●…ng all illegal executions of power, grounded upon what specious, pretences soever, 〈◊〉. As illegal executions of power (such as the Commission of Array) are not to be justified. So legal (such as the Militia) are not to be condemned. And in case where the King is seduced, that is, when ●…e is not so wise as he should be, because he doth not think as they do, and refuses to satisfy the humours and interests of some. I dare not say that the King is not so wise as he should be, No; such irreverend dialects I leave to the Author. But this I may say, had not his Majesty waived the fa●…full advice of his Parliament (who seek nothing but the peace and happiness of him and his people) and satisfied the humours and interests of others (who aim at nothing more than the ruin of both) these s●…d disasters had not fallen upon us. And prefers (this seems to be the cause of all; preferments do no●… go the right way) true for none but Commissioners of Array, do now hap preferments) dangerous men; that is, such as desire he should govern according to the known laws of the land. were we before the Parliament governed according to the known laws of the land? they are the same men that still labour to defend the same rule and power. And prosecu●…es his loyall●… Subjects; that is, is driven from London to York; where be long time patiently expected the undeceiving of the people. No, he pa●…ed from London, or if you please (that I may speak truth,) was seduced by malignant counsel, to make so unhappy a change; And I wish from my very soul that his sacred person were not more deceived by such, than his people are by the Parliament.  
6. That levying of forces against the personal commands of the King (though accompanied with his presence) is not levying war against the King: but war against his authority, though not person, is war against the King.  
If this were no●… so the Parliament seeing a seduced King, ruining himself and the kingdom 
Ol●….  could not save both, but must stand, and look on.  
It is against common sense to sancy a King ruining himself and kingdom, he can neither be willing 
Ans.  not able.  
'tis not to be presumed that a King rightly informed will, but a King seduced may; and uponRep. ●…reacherous 
  and unworthy advice, for reign aid will not be wanting to do that, which dom●…stick cannot.  
7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings.  
'tis denied that any King was deposed by a free Parliament 〈◊〉 elected. 
Obs.   
This is m●…st 〈◊〉, but takes not off those words upon which this proposition is grounded. 
Ans.   
But it doth, with any fair and candid reading and interpretation: For when the Parliament 
Rep.  saith, that all precedents ought not to be rules for them to be regulated by; this position must necessarily intend those of deposing Kings; for that the precedents of forced Parliaments ought not to be followed.  
These might well have been omitted, as being more fully handled in the book, But lest he should complain any thing was past over, I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer.  
FINIS