THE Bishop of Winchester's VINDICATION Of Himself from divers False, Scandalous and Injurious Reflections made upon him by Mr. RICHARD BAXTER in several of his Writings.  
See the TABLE on the other side of the Leaf.  
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  1 Cor. 11. 16. 
London, Printed by M. Flesher for Joanna Brome, 1683.   

A TABLE OF THE Matters contained in this Book.  

TWo Prefaces, the One to Mr. Baxter, the Other to the Reader.  
The Bishop's Letter, whilst he was Bishop of Worcester, in Vindication of himself against Mr. Baxter's Calumny. Page 1.  
The Attestation of Dr. Gunning and Dr. Pearson. p. 27.  
Mr. Baxter's Theses of Government in general, and his Doctrine of the Government of England in particular. p. 29. 
These formerly Printed 1662. and now Reprinted.   
Loyalty censured, and his Way of Concord disapproved.  
Mr. Baxter's pretended Recantation, printed at the End of his Life of Faith, 1670. and here Reprinted.  
The Scotch Act Anent Religion and the Test, made at Edinburgh, 1681.    

For the Reverend Mr. Richard Baxter.  
Reverend Sir,  
IT is now more than four years since I (being then elder than Barzillai was, when he made the like request to King David) did beg and obtain leave from the King my Gracious Lord and Master to quit my personal attendance on him at the Court in Council, and to retire into the Country, and to serve him there, by praying for him without distraction, or interruption; remembering that old and wise saying, 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉   
And withal resolving, having withdrawn myself from the encumbrance and noise of all Secular Affairs, to mind nothing else (besides the necessary care of mine own Diocese) but the making myself ready by God's gracious assistance for a quiet and a comfortable Exit out of this evil and troublesome World. The near approach whereof (by reason of my great Age) you do well to put me in mind of and I thank you for it, though you do it in such a manner as seems to imply, that you think me to have more need of such a Memento than one of my Age ought to have.  
But then being my unfeigned well-willer (as in the subscription of your Address to me you tell me you are) why do you endeavour so unseasonably to withdraw me from so necessary a work (especially supposing me to have so little time left for the doing of it) which you do, first, by calling me to an Account for what I writ in a Letter above 18 years ago, in which you say there are many mistakes in matter of fact, which (if I say nothing to the contrary) will be taken for granted. And secondly, by your so earnestly pressing me as well as the Bishop of Ely (to whom you make the aforesaid Address also) to tell you what we think of that which you call the Only true way of Concord of all Christian Churches, and if upon Perusal thereof we are convinced it is so, to see that Prejudice resist not, but that we would acknowledge and confess it to be so. But this you know cannot be done without reading over and considering and examining that whole Book of yours; nor consequently by me without taking off my thoughts from minding so much, as otherwise I might do that Vnum necessarium which you advise me to think on, and which indeed is a much more proper employment for one so near the grave as I am, than to engage or to be engaged to Apologise for mine own, or to Censure other men's Writings.  
Yet rather than to seem by my silence to acknowledge what you charge me with to be true, which I cannot without being injurious to truth itself as well as to mine own reputation; I will in the first place vindicate myself from having made so many, or any one so gross a mistake in matter of fact, as you say there are in my aforesaid Letter. And then, if I live long enough and have time enough to spare from better and more necessary employments, I will tell you freely and plainly what I think of the Book you address to the Bishop of Ely and me; I mean whether what you promise in the Title-page of it be performed in it. In the mean time wishing you Saniorem mentem in saniori corpore, I rest (as much as the peace and safety of the Church will permit me to be)  
Your Friend and Servant, George Winton.   

TO THE READER.  
NExt to the carrying of a good Conscience towards God out of the World with him, I think the next care every man ought to have, is to leave a good name or memorial of himself in the World behind him; especially if he be or have been a man of any Eminency of Place, or Office, or Order, either in the Church, or State; because, whatsoever aspersions of infamy are cast upon such men's persons, do commonly in vulgar construction reflect on their Office, and Order also, and are often by the malignancy of the Authors of them intended to do so. And therefore though we must (if it be God's will it should be so) be content, as St. Paul was, to run the race that is set before us, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whether we be well or ill spoken of; yet we may and aught, as St. Paul did (and did it often) do what we can to vindicate our personal Credit and Reputation also; especially when the Credit and Reputation of our Office, or Order, is concerned in it; and more especially when we are ill spoken of publicly, and in Print, and by one that is a professed Adversary to the Church and Order whereof we are, as well as to ourselves; most especially if he be the Head, or one of the heads of a very numerous Party, and therefore likely to be believed in what he says or writes of or against any one (though never so false and injurious) by many too credulous though well meaning men, if he be not publicly contradicted and confuted. This therefore being my very case in all the aforesaid particular circumstances of it; I am constrained (weak, and feeble, and old, as I am, drawing near the end of the 85th year of my age) to enter into the Lists with this great Goliath or Champion of the Non-conformists; not to defend our Church against him or them; that is too great a work for my undertaking, at this time of day, my night being so near, when no man can work; and that work being done (thanks be to God) and done better already than I could have done it (when I was much more able than I now am:) but only to vindicate myself, together with the honour of the Order whereof I am (though I confess myself unworthy to be so) from being guilty of such crimes, and reproaches, as it hath pleased Mr. Baxter to lay unto my charge; which may perhaps, after I am gone, be believed to be true, if they be not proved to be false before I go from hence and be no more seen. And this I had done sooner, had not some of my learned Friends and Brethren advised me not to take notice of any thing Mr. Baxter had said of me; because (as they said) his tongue is no slander, nor his pen neither; especially when he whets either the one or the other against Bishops; and because I had already long ago, both answered and prevented all the Objections he had then, or hath since made against the truth of what I had said of him in relation to the Conference at the Savoy, and of the justice of what I had done to him when I was Bishop of Worcester, which is now above 20 years ago. These persuasions, and reasons, together with the consideration of the little time I had left for better employment, prevailed with me to lay aside some few Observations and Animadversions I had begun to make upon some particulars relating to me in some of Mr. Baxter's late Writings; until some other of my Learned and Reverend Brethren did very lately let me know, that in their opinion, I was obliged for the Church's sake, as well as for mine own, not to suffer it to be said hereafter, that a Bishop of the Church of England having been told, and told in Print, that he was a Preacher of untruths, and consequently a liar in the pulpit, a slanderer of all the Non-conformists, nay a blasphemer, or a defier not of Humanity only, but of the Deity itself, had nothing to say, because he did say nothing, to the contrary; though I could have replied that I thought, and some others of my Reverend Brethren thought also, that the Letter I had written and printed so long ago, with the Testimony annexed to it, was enough, and more than enough, to vindicate me from the two first of those Reproaches, and to prevent the last of them also: yet because they have been again repeated, and because there hath been since a Book written, and written on purpose (as Mr. Baxter the Author of it saith) to prove Bishop Morley to have been grossly mistaken in the relation he hath made in the aforesaid Letter of what was asserted by Mr. Baxter in the aforesaid Conference at the Savoy; and because it was since the writing of that Letter also, that he makes me a defier of Deity and Humanity, because I am not of his opinion, that all unlimited Governors are Tyrants, and have no right to their Governments; for these reasons (I say) and for the satisfaction of some of my friends, rather than out of any inclination of mine own, who love 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be quiet and to do mine own business, as well as Mr. Baxter doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to have an Oar in every man's Boat, and thereby quieta movere, to disquiet both himself and others, I have adventured to launch forth once more; though I have reason to fear I may not live to finish what I have begun, not because I foresee any difficulty at all in the work I have to do (I mean the justifying of myself against any thing Mr. Baxter hath laid unto my charge) but because, humanely speaking, there is so little of the sand in the Hourglass of my life left, which yet if it last but a month or two longer before it be run out, (with the continuance of that mediocrity of health of body and soundness of mind, which by God's great goodness and mercy I do yet enjoy) I hope it will by God's gracious assistance be long enough to make the impartial part of the world see, that Mr. Baxter is not a man of that sincerity, ingenuity or integrity, as he would be thought, (and perhaps he is by those who have his person in admiration) but one that will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to serve his turn for the present, and to keep up his reputation with his party, say or unsay, affirm or deny any thing either in matter of right or of fact, and juggle one proposition into the room of another, as if it were identically the same, or at least equipollent or equivalent to the other, when there is nothing of likeness either in sound or of sense betwixt them. Which that it may the more clearly appear, and that the impartial Reader may the better judge, both of what I have said of him, and what he hath said of me, and whether I or he have dealt more difingenuously or injuriously with one another, I have caused all that I printed before to be reprinted, (viz.) Mr. Baxter's own report of the Conference at the Savoy, and my Letter in reply to that report of his, together with the Collection of Aphorisms out of that Book which he calls his Holy Commonwealth, and all these verbatim in the same words, without any the least addition, diminution, or alteration; only I have added thereunto another Paper of Mr. Baxter's, which I met with since, and which he calls a Revocation or Recantation of his Book of the Holy Commonwealth or Political Aphorisms; which whether it be indeed a Recantation, or such a Recantation as it ought to have been or no, we shall examine in due place. But I have added, I say, that, because it was printed by him since the printing of what I have now reprinted, and because it is in that paper, that Mr. Baxter hath been pleased to expose me as a Defier of Deity and Humanity.  
This Advertisement I thought fit to premise, and withal to desire the impartial Reader, first to peruse what I have reprinted, I mean Mr. Baxter's Narrative to his Kidderminster friends, and my Letter in answer thereunto, together with Mr. Baxter's Political Aphorisms annexed to that Letter, and then to take notice of the time when that Narrative of his and Letter of mine were first printed, which was 10 years before the publishing of his pretended Recantation of all or any of his aforesaid Aphorisms; and lastly when he hath done this to proceed to the perusing of what upon another provocation of Mr. Baxter's I now write to justify what I writ before, and after mature deliberation to pronounce sentence for me or against me, as he shall see cause.  

* April 3. 1683.  Reader, You are desired to take notice, that this work was prepared, designed and expected to have come forth before Easter-Term last.   

THE Bishop of Worcester's LETTER To a Friend For VINDICATION of himself FROM Mr. BAXTER'S Calumny.  
Together with The ATTESTATION of Dr. GUNNING and Dr. PEARSON: AND A Collection of Mr. Baxter's Theses and Doctrine concerning Government. Reprinted.  
— Tenet insanabile multos  
Scribendi Cacoethes—  
LONDON, Printed for Joanna Brome, 1683.   

Mr. Baxter hath lately printed a Book called [The Mischiefs of Self-Ignorance, and the Benefits of Self-Acquaintance] in the Address of which Book to his dearly beloved the Inhabitants of Kidderminster, he hath this ensuing passage relating to the Bishop of Worcester.  
IN a disputation by writing, those of the other part form an Argument, whose Major Proposition was to this sense (for I have no Copy) [Whatsoever Book enjoineth nothing but what is of itself lawful, and by lawful Authority, enjoineth nothing that is sinful,] We denied this Proposition, and at last gave divers Reasons of our denial; amongst which one was, that [It may be unlawful by Accident, and therefore sinful] You now know my Crime; it is my concurring with Learned Reverend Brethren, to give this reason of our denial of a Proposition: yet they are not forbidden to Preach for it, (and I hope shall not be) but only I. You have publicly heard from a mouth that should speak nothing but the words of Charity, Truth and Soberness, (especially there) that this was [a desperate shift that men at the last are forced to] and inferring [that than neither God nor man can enjoin without sin] In City and Country this soundeth forth to my reproach; I should take it for an act of Clemency to have been smitten professedly for nothing, and that it might not have been thought necessary to afflict me by a defamation, that so I might seem justly afflicted by a Prohibition to Preach the Gospel. But indeed is there in these words of ours so great a Crime? though we doubted not but they knew that our Assertion made not Every Evil Accident to be such as made an imposition unlawful, yet we expressed this by word to them at that time, for fear of being misreported: and I told it to the Right Reverend Bishop when he forbade me to Preach, and gave this as a reason: And I must confess I am still guilty of so much weakness, as to be confident that Some things, not Evil of themselves, may have Accidents so Evil, as may make it a sin to him that shall command them. Is this opinion inconsistent with all Government? yea I must confess myself guilty of so much greater weakness, as that I thought I should never have found a man on Earth, that had the ordinary reason of a Man, that had made question of it; yea, I shall say more than that which hath offended (viz.) That whensoever the commanding or forbidding of a thing indifferent is like to occasion more hurt than good, and this may be foreseen, the commanding or forbidding it is a sin. But yet this is not the Assertion that I am chargeable with, but that [Some Accidents there may be that may make the Imposition sinful] If I may ask it without accusing of others, how would my Crime have been denominated if I had said the contrary? should I not have been judged unmeet to live in any governed Society? It is not unlawful of itself to command out a Navy to Sea: but if it were foreseen that they would fall into the Enemy's hands, or were like to perish by any Accident, and the necessity of sending them were small, or none, it were a sin to send them. It is not unlawful of itself to sell Poison, or give a knife to another, or to bid another to do it; but if it were foreseen that they will be used to poison or kill the buyer, it is unlawful; and I think the Law would make him believe it that were guilty. It is not of itself unlawful to light a Candle, or set fire on a straw; but if it may be foreknown, that by another's negligence or wilfulness it is like to set fire on the City, or give fire to a train or store of Gunpowder that is under the Parliament House, when the King and Parliament are there, I crave the Bishop's pardon for believing that it were sinful to do it, or command it; yea or not to hinder it (in any such case) when Quinon vetat peccare cum potest, jubet, yea though going to God's public worship be of itself so far from being a sin, that it is a Duty, yet I think it is a sin to command it to all in time of a raging Pestilence, or when they should be defending the City against the assault of an Enemy, it may rather than be a duty to prohibit it. I think Paul spoke not any thing inconsistent with the Government of God or man, when he bid both the Rulers and the People of the Church, not to destroy him with their meat for whom Christ died: and when he saith, he hath not his power to destruction, but to edification; yea there are evil Accidents of a thing, not evil of itself, that are caused by the Commander: and it is my opinion that they may prove his Command unlawful.  
But what need I use any other instances than that which was the matter of our dispute? Suppose it never so lawful of itself to kneel in the Reception of the Sacrament, if it be imposed by a penalty that is incomparably beyond the proportion of the offence, that penalty is an Accident of the command, and maketh it by Accident sinful in the Commander. If a Prince should have Subjects so weak as that all of them thought it a sin against the example of Christ and the Canons of the General Councils, and many hundred years' practice of the Church, to kneel in the Act of Receiving on the Lord's day, if he should make a Law that all should be put to death that would not kneel, when he foreknew that their Consciences would command them all, or most of them to die rather than obey, would any man deny his command to be unlawful by this Accident? Whether the penalty of ejecting Ministers that dare not put away all that do not kneel, and of casting out all the people that scruple it, from the Church, be too great for such a circumstance (and so in the rest) and whether this, with the lamentable estate of many Congregations, and the divisions that will follow, being all foreseen, do prove the impositions unlawful which were then in Question, is a Case that I had then a clearer call to speak to, than I have now; only I may say, That the Ejecting of the Servants of Christ from the Communion of his Church, and of his faithful Ministers from their Sacred Work, when too many Congregations have none but insufficient, or scandalous Teachers, or no Preaching Ministers at all, will appear a matter of very great moment in the day of our accounts, and such as should not be done upon any but a necessary cause, where the benefit is greater than this hurt (and all the rest) amounts to.  
Having given you (to whom I owe it) this account of the cause for which I am forbidden the exercise of my Ministry in that Country, I now direct these Sermons to your hands, that seeing I cannot teach you as I would, I may teach you as I can: And if I much longer enjoy such Liberty as this, it will be much above my expectation.   

The Bishop of Worcester 's Letter to a Friend for Vindication of himself from Mr. Baxter 's Calumny.  
SIR,  
I Have received that Letter of yours, whereby you inform me that Mr. Baxter hath lately written and printed something with such a reflection upon me, that I am obliged to take notice of it.  
I thank you for your care of my Reputation, which next to Conscience ought to be the dearest of all things to all men, especially to men of my Profession and Order, who the more they are vilified (whether justly or unjustly) the less good they will be able to do, especially amongst those that have industriously been prepossessed with prejudice either against their Persons or their Functions. This was St. Paul's Case, when there were some that did what they could to make the Corinthians to undervalue his Person, that thereby they might discredit his Doctrine, and weaken his Authority, whom therefore he thinks he may without breach of Charity call False Apostles and Deceitful Workers. Nay this was our Saviour's own Case, who, whilst he lived here upon the Earth, was ever and anon traduced and slandered by the Scribes and Pharisees, those proud Hypocrites, who were the greatest pretenders to Holiness, and yet the greatest Seducers of the people, and the grossest falsifiers of God's Word, that ever were in the world, until these our times, which have brought forth a generation of men (St. John Baptist would have called them a Generation of Vipers) who in the Art of holy juggling and malicious slandering have outdone the Pharisees themselves and all that went before them; witness their so often wresting and perverting the Scripture in their Sermons to stir up the people to Sedition, and their as often Libelling the King in their Prayers, in order to the making of his Subjects first to hate him, then to fight against him, and at last to take away his Crown and his Life from him. And is it any wonder that those that are such enemies to Kings, should not be friends to Bishops? or that one (who had done what he could to make the late King odious unto his People) should do what he can likewise to make the Pastor odious unto his Flock? to his Flock, I say; For it is the Bishop of Worcester, and not Mr. Baxter that is Pastor of Kidderminster, as well as of all other Parochial Churches in that Diocese; neither did I or any other Bishop of Worcester, ever commit the Care of Souls in that, or any other Parish of that Diocese to Mr. Baxter, though by that Preface of his to those of Kidderminster, he would make the world believe, that they were his Flock, and not mine, and that therefore he hath the more reason to complain of my defamation of him (as he calls it) in that place and before that people: whereas the truth is that Mr. Baxter was never either Parson, Vicar, or Curate there or any where else in my Diocese; for he never came in by the Door, that is, by any legal right or lawful admission into that Sheepfold, but climbed up some other way, namely, by violence and intrusion, and therefore by Christ's own inference he was a Thief and a Robber; and indeed he did Rob him that was then, and is now again the lawful Vicar of that Church; he Robbed him, I say, first of his Reputation amongst his Flock, and then of his means and maintenance, by taking away the Fleece as well as the Flock from him; though (as Mr. Baxter himself hath confessed to me) He be a man of an unblameable life and conversation, though not of such parts (said Mr. Baxter) as are fit to qualify him for the Cure of so great a Congregation; which whether it were so or no, I am sure Mr. Baxter was not to be the Judge; but in that Case the Bishop that was then living should and would have provided him a Coadjutor, as I have done since, and such an one, as I hope will feed that Flock with much more wholesome Doctrine than Mr. Baxter did, when he sowed the Seed of Schism and Sedition, and blew the Trumpet of Rebellion amongst them. For which cause I thought it my Duty (as being their Pastor in Chief) not only to forbid Mr. Baxter to Preach there any more, which, by the way, he had done without my Licence; but likewise to Preach there myself, and to do what I could to undeceive that poor seduced and miserably deluded People; which was not to be done, as long as they had the person of their Seducer in so great admiration; and therefore by the example of St. Paul, who in order to the same end, did take the same course with Alexander the Coppersmith, with Demas, Philetus and Hymeneus; as likewise by the example of Christ himself, who in order to the same end, did take the same course with the Scribes and Pharisees, I thought it necessary to let them know that one that was of great authority amongst them (meaning indeed, though not naming Mr. Baxter) was not the man they took him for; that he had not dealt faithfully with them, nor preached the word of God sincerely to them, when he made them believe it was lawful for them to take up Arms against the King, nor in suffering (if not making) them to scruple at those things as unlawful, which he he himself confesses to be lawful; and afterwards making use of those scruples of theirs (which he himself had infused into them, or not endeavoured to take from them) as the only argument why those things they did so scruple at should not be enjoined by lawful Authority, though lawful in themselves, because forsooth, the enjoining of things lawful by lawful Authority, if they may by Accident be the occasion of sin, is sinful; which assertion of his (as I then said, and must still maintain) is destructive of humane Society in taking away the Authority of Commanding and the Obligation of Obeying, together with the whole Legislative Power, Civil as well as Ecclesiastical, and Divine as well as Humane. And thus much (as Mr. Baxter himself saith) I told him before in mine own House, neither did he then deny the assertion, or endeavour to disprove what I inferred from it, by any of those distinctions or instances he now useth. And that this is true the Reverend Dr. Warmstry, now Dean of Worcester, will witness for me, whom I desired to be by whilst I conferred with Mr. Baxter, foreseeing what misreport a man of Mr. Baxter's principles and temper was like enough to make of what should pass betwixt us. And it was very well I did so; for I find that the Presbyter as well as the Papist will serve themselves, as often as they are put to it, of their pioe frauds, or holy artifices, of speaking more or less than the truth, as it makes more or less for their purpose or advantage; as likewise of putting non causam pro causa, or a part and a less principal part of the cause for the whole cause. For who would not think that knows not Mr. Baxter, that when he tells his Disciples of Kidderminster, You now know my Crime, with reference to the aforesaid assertion, and to that only, who would not think, I say, that either there was nothing else objected against him, or at lest nothing of moment, or that could be any just and reasonable cause of my forbidding him to Preach in my Diocese? especially when he adds that the Right Reverend Bishop gave him this as a reason for his forbidding him to Preach; where if he means that the Bishop gave him this as the only, or the principal reason, he speaks without truth, and against his Conscience; for the first and principal reason the Bishop gave him for his forbidding him to Preach, was (as he well knows, and as the Dean of Worcester will witness against him) His Preaching before without Licence, having no Cure of his own to Preach to; whereunto when he replied, I had promised to give him such a Licence as the Bishop of London had given him, viz. quam diu se bene gereret, & durante beneplacito, I rejoined, That it was true indeed, I had once promised to give him such a Licence, but withal, that it was as true, that first I had never promised to give him a Licence, if he took it before I gave it him; and that for this presumption of his, I had now forbidden him to Preach any more. Secondly, That I knew more of him since than I did at that time; for, first, I had been credibly informed, that he had abused the Bishop of London 's favour by preaching factiously, though not in the City, yet in the Diocese of London, and I named the place to him: Secondly, that since that promise of mine (which cannot be supposed to be other than Conditional) I myself had heard him, at a Conference in the Savoy, maintaining such a Position as was destructive to Legislative Power both in God and Man (meaning the Assertion before spoken of, viz. That the enjoining of things lawful by lawful Authority, if they might by Accident be the cause of sin, was sinful) which Assertion of his with the horrible consequences of it, I told him then at Worcester, I had formerly told him of at the Savoy openly, and before all the Company that was at the Conference; whereunto all that he replied at my second telling him at Worcester, was, that he had used some distinctions to salve that Assertion from those consequences; but what those distinctions were he did not then mention, (as Dr. Warmstry can witness) though in this printed Address of his to his Friends of Kidderminster, he saith, he did tell the Bishop in what a limited and restrained sense he and his Brethren understood that Assertion; which whether they did or no, will appear by and by, when we shall more nearly examine his printed Narrative as to that particular. In the mean time, though I said indeed that one that held and was likely to teach such Doctrines, was not to be suffered to Preach unto the People, yet this was not then alleged by me as the cause or crime for which I had forbidden him to Preach, (for that, as I said before, was His presuming to Preach without a Licence) but only as a reason why I should have thought myself not obliged by the promise I had formerly made him, to give him a Licence, though he had not otherwise forfeited his claim to that promise by preaching without, or before he had it. Lastly, He might have remembered another reason I gave him why I could not have made good that promise, namely, those Principles of Treason and Rebellion publicly extant in his Books, which I had not taken notice of till after the making of that promise, and which till he should recant in as public a manner, I thought myself obliged in Conscience not to suffer him to Preach in my Diocese; whereunto his answer was, That whatsoever he had said or done in that kind, was pardoned by the Act of Indemnity: True, said I, so far as the King can pardon it, that is, in regard of its corporal punishment here in this world, but it is God that must pardon the guilt or obligation to punishment in the world to come, which he will not without repentance, and it is the Church that must pardon the scandal, which she cannot do neither without an honourable amends made her by public Confession and Recantation. I could tell Mr. Baxter in his ear likewise, that in excuse of his rebellious Principles formerly published, he said, That now the Parliament had declared where the Sovereign Power was, he should acknowledge it and submit to it, as if the King owed his Sovereignty to the Declaration of a Parliament, which is as false as rebellious, and as dangerous a Principle as any of his former: however by what hath been said, it appears that Mr. Baxter meant to impose upon his credulous Friends at Kidderminster, and upon his unwary Readers, by making them believe that was the only cause for which the Bishop forbade him to Preach, which was neither the only, nor the principal cause, why the Bishop did so, nor indeed, to speak properly, any cause of it at all; for the only proper cause for which the Bishop forbade him to Preach, was His preaching before without the Bishop 's Licence; the other which he pretends, together with the third which he conceals, were properly and professedly the causes why the Bishop would not take off that Prohibition, or why he would not give him a Licence to Preach for the future, either at Kidderminster, or in any other place of his Diocese, until he should publicly retract that Position which he had openly asserted at the Conference, and should publicly renounce likewise those seditious and rebellious Principles which are published in his Books. And this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth of what passed betwixt me and Mr. Baxter at Worcester, before I preached at Kidderminster, where whether I defamed him, or he, by saying so, hath not grossly defamed me, will appear by that which follows; wherein that I might neither be deceived myself, nor deceive others, I have not trusted to my own memory only, as Mr. Baxter saith he doth to his, but I have consulted with Dr. Gunning and Dr. Pearson, two of the three that managed that Conference with Mr. Baxter and his Assistants, and have seen that Assertion in the same sense that I object it, and Mr. Baxter disclaims it, affirmed by Mr. Baxter himself under his own hand.  
I found Mr. Baxter at the Savoy engaged in a Dispute, and I perceived that to keep himself off from that part of the Argument which would press near to the merits of the Cause, he had often affirmed in his Answers, That the Command of a most lawful Act was sinful; if that Act commanded might prove to any one a sin per accidens. This Assertion I did then and there presently and openly lay to his charge; and when he denied it (as it was most frequent with him immediately to deny what he had before affirmed) the answers which he had delivered written with his own hand were produced, and upon the reading of them, the justice of my charge was most apparent; whereupon I urged him farther, that this Assertion of his was not only false, but destructive of all Authority Humane and Divine, as not only denying all power to the Church of making Canons Ecclesiastical for the better ordering and governing of the Church, but also taking away all Legislative Power from the King and Parliament, and even from God himself: I delivered at the same time my reason for what I said, which was briefly this, because there can be no Act so good of itself, but may prove per Accidens, or by Accident, a sin; And therefore, if to command an Act which may prove per Accidens a sin, be a sin, than every Command must be a sin. And if to command be a sin, then certainly God can command nothing, because God cannot sin; and by the same reason, Kings, Parliaments and Churches ought not to command any thing, because they ought not to sin.  
Thus far I then charged Mr. Baxter, and to this Charge he gave then no satisfaction. Neither can I yet conceive it possible to give any satisfaction, but by one of these two ways, either by proving that the Assertion, with which I charged him was never his, or by showing that the consequence I urged, is not good; neither of which was he then able to do: and by what he hath now been pleased to publish, it is more than probable that he can never perform either of them.  
For in his bold, but weak Apology, he doth not so much as pretend to show any Invalidity in my Inference, and for the Assertion with which I charged him, he denies it so poorly, and goes about to prove another instead of it so manifestly, that he may without any injury be interpreted to yield it. He saith indeed now, That he told us that his Assertion made not every Evil Accident to be such as made an Imposition unlawful. But whether he ever said so before this time or no, it was then clearly proved that he did assert, That an Act for nothing else, but because it might be per Accidens a sin, could not be commanded without sin.  
And now in his public Appeal, he hath taken a strange way to wipe off all this, for he makes a very brief Narration, and most notoriously imperfect, and then says, You know my Crime, as if that were all that had been, or could be objected against him. Besides, in the relating of this short Narrative, he relies wholly upon his own memory; not so much as endeavouring to satisfy himself, before he presumed to satisfy others. How his memory may be in other things I know not, in this if it hath been faithful to him, he hath been very unfaithful to others. He relates an Answer in what terms he pleaseth, and brings one Proposition, as made by his Opponents in what terms he thinks fit, and the Application of this answer to that Proposition he propoundeth as all his Crime; whereas his Answer was far more largely given, and that to several Propositions in several Syllogisms, of which the Proposition which he relateth was but one, or rather none; so that he hath most shamefully abused his Disciples at Kidderminster, with a short and partial Narrative of his Fact.  
As for his Concurring with Learned Reverend Brethren (which he would pretend to be part of his Crime) and his invidious insinuation, That they are not forbidden to Preach for it, though he be, the reason is clear. He had often delivered this Assertion before the Company, his Brethren had not; the words of the Answer were written with his hand, not with his brethren's. His Brethren had several times declared themselves not to be of his Opinion (as particularly when he affirmed That a man might live without any actual sin). And therefore we were so just as not to charge them with this Assertion; especially considering they did show themselves unwilling to enter upon this dispute, and seemed to like much better another way tending to an amicable and fair compliance, which was wholly frustrated by Mr. Baxter's furious eagerness to engage in a Disputation.  
All his Discourse which followeth (after his imperfect Narrative) in justification of himself, is grounded first, upon a misreporting of his own Assertion; secondly, upon the dissembling of the several Propositions, to which his Answer was so often applied; thirdly, upon his pretending That he says more now, than that which had offended formerly; which is most palpably false, and in all probability (if he have any memory) against his own Conscience. And this will presently appear by the vanity and impertinency of all those specious instances which he brings to mollify his Assertion.  
To Command a Navy to Sea (he says) is lawful, but if it were foreseen that they would fall into the Enemy's hand, or were like to perish by any accident, it were a sin to send them. Is this more than he said before, or is it any defence of his Assertion at all? It is not certainly, because the Opponents had put it expressly in the Proposition; That the Act in itself lawful, was to be supposed to have nothing consequent, which the Commander of it ought to provide against; and yet being so stated, Mr. Baxter affirmed, That if the Act might be per Accidens sinful, the Commanding of it was sin. Now certainly the falling of a Navy into the Enemy's hand, or the perishing of it any other way, if foreseen, aught to be provided against by the Commander; whereas Mr. Baxter's answer did import, That if any Prince did Command a Fleet to Sea, though he did not foresee the Fleet would fall into the Enemy's hand, or perish any other way, yet if by Accident it miscarried that or any other way, which he could not foresee, or were not bound to provide against, the very Command at first was sin.  
The same reason nullifies his instances of the Poison, and the Knife, because the sin in selling them supposeth the murder of the buyer to be foreseen, and consequently that the seller ought to prevent it; but if he will speak in correspondence to his former Answer, he must show, that though the seller do not foresee that the buyer will use the Poison or the Knife, to his own, or any other man's destruction, yet if by any Accident or mistake, either the buyer, or any other perish by the Poison or the Knife, the seller is guilty of his death.  
His instance of setting a City on fire, or putting Gunpowder under the Parliament House when the King and Parliament are there, is of the same nature, and needs no addition of answer but only this, that Mr. Baxter, in a sense too true, hath been very instrumental in setting the City on fire, and in adding powder to the Parliament.  
The rest which follows betrays the same weakness, because the inconveniences are urged upon a Duty to prohibit them, and his Answer did charge the Command with sin in respect of such Accidents, as it was no part of the Commander's Duty to provide against. It is therefore most certain, that no one of those instances singly, nor all of them jointly have any force in any measure to justify that Assertion which Mr. Baxter did maintain, and whereof he is accused.  
As for that last instance, which was (saith he) the matter of the Dispute, and which he urgeth in this manner, (Suppose it never so lawful of itself to Kneel in the reception of the Sacrament, if it be imposed by a penalty, that is incomparably beyond the proportion of the offence, that penalty is an Accident of the Command, and maketh it by Accident sinful to the Commander) he is manifestly guilty of a double falsification: First, in pretending the matter in dispute, was the imposition of kneeling at the Communion; when this very matter was expressly rejected in the very beginning of the Dispute, as belonging to the Canons, not the Common-Prayer-Book, the lawfulness of which Canons the Commissioners had no authority to debate, and Mr. Baxter knows, that his Argument was denied upon that ground. The second falsification is yet greater, in urging the penalty to make the Command sinful, when his Answer did charge the Command with sin, without any relation to the punishment; and when the Proposition he replied to was so framed, that all unjust penalties were in terminis expressly excluded, even than I say he charged the Command of a lawful Act with sin, if it were otherwise by Accident sinful; though by the way I must not grant that the penalty imposed by the Law for not kneeling at the receiving of the Sacrament (namely the not admitting of such as will not kneel, at the receiving of it) is incomparably greater than the offence; for the greatness of the offence in such cases, and as it stands in relation to such or such a penalty appointed for it, is not to be measured by the Quality of the Act considered in itself, but by the more or less mischievous consequences it is likely to produce, if men be not restrained from such an Act by such a penalty; for example, when a Soldier is hanged for stealing of a Hen, or for taking away any thing of never so little a value, without paying for it, no wise man will blame the General for such a severity; because if he did not do so, every one would take what he pleased, which would discourage the Country from bringing in provisions, and consequently the whole Army would be ruined. And as the Martial, so the Civil and Ecclesiastical Laws likewise in commanding or forbidding any thing under such or such a penalty, have an eye not so much to the merit of the Action itself, as to the more or less danger of the Public in the consequences of it; whence it comes to pass, that a less evil may sometimes most justly be forbidden under a more severe penalty than a greater, because the former may be of much more dangerous consequence than the latter; so that he that will judge rightly, and impartially of the equity or iniquity of appointing or inflicting such or such a penalty, he must not so much consider the quality of the Transgression singly in itself, nor whether it be from weakness, or wilfulness in the party transgressing (as he is this or that individual person) but rather he must consider what the Consequence would be of the breach of such a Command if it were not prevented by such a penalty, (always supposing the Command itself to be lawful, and that the transgressor of it is to be considered as he stands in relation to that whole Body, whether Civil, or Ecclesiastical, whereof he is a part;) and that the whole is not to be endangered out of tenderness and indulgence to some particulars, as evidently it would be, if every man were left at liberty to do what seemed best in his own eyes, even in the Ceremonials and Circumstantials of God's Worship; for considering the pride and self-love that is in humane nature, which makes men so overvalue their own practices and their own opinions, that they are always apt to undervalue those that will not conform to them, as it always hath been, so it always will be; he that worshippeth God one way, will either judge or condemn him that worshippeth God another way; he that Kneeleth at the Sacrament, will be thought to be Idolatrous or Superstitious by him that Kneeleth not, and he that kneeleth not will be thought wilful, or weak, by him that kneeleth. And thus from diversity grows dislike, from dislike enmity, from enmity opposition, and from opposition, first Separation and Schism in the Church, and then Faction, Sedition and Rebellion in the State; which is a progress very natural, and I would we had not found it to be so by our own experience; for as the safety of a State depends upon the safety of the Church, so the safety of the Church depends upon Unity, and Unity itself depends upon Uniformity, and Uniformity there cannot be, as long as there is diversity or divers ways of Worship in the same Church, which will be always, unless it be lawful for public Authority to oblige all particulars to one way of public Worship, and that under such penalties, as the Lawgivers shall think necessary to prevent the disturbing of the public peace and safety; the preservation whereof being the main end of all Laws, and of all penalties appointed by Law, those practices that are either intentionally or consequentially destructive to this End, may be, and no doubt ought to be restrained by severe penalties. It is not therefore the not kneeling at the Sacrament, but the breaking of the Orders of the Church, and the endangering of the Peace and Safety of the whole, which our Laws punish by not admitting such unto the Sacrament, as will not, or perhaps dare not kneel at it; for as they will not endanger the Peace of their Consciences for the Church's sake; so it becomes the Lawgivers not to endanger the Churches and the State's Peace for their sakes: And surely when there is a necessity of the yielding of the one or of the other, it is much more reasonable that a part should yield unto the whole, than the whole unto a part, especially when the whole cannot yield without endangering itself, and with itself even those themselves also, that, will they nill they, must be involved in the ruin of it; as the Presbyterians have found by their own experience also, who by their groundless and needless separation from us, have given example and ground enough for others to separate from them, till by dividing and subdividing from one another, there was nothing of Uniformity, or unity, or order, or decency left in that Church, which was formerly (and I hope by the Prudence and Piety of Public Authority will be now again) the Glory and Pattern of all other Protestant and Reformed Churches in the world; of which, by the way, there is not one which doth not use as great severity for the preserving of Unity by Uniformity as we do, even in this particular; for do not the Protestant Churches in France enjoin Standing, the Churches of Holland, Scotland, and the Churches of Germany that follow Calvin enjoin Sitting, and the Churches that follow Luther there and elsewhere enjoin Kneeling as we do, and all of them upon the same penalty of not receiving it otherwise? And is it not as lawful for our Church, as for all other Protestant, and all other Christian Churches, to require of her Children the like conformity to her Laws under the like penalty for the same end, and to prevent the same danger? Yes (replied Mr. Baxter when this question was asked him) just as lawful, that is, not lawful at all, such an injunction upon such a penalty being sinful, wheresoever and by whomsoever it is enjoined. O happy England, that hath such an Aristarchus as is worthy to censure all the Churches of the world, whose Catholic practice (if it cross Mr. Baxter's opinion) must presently without more ado be Condemned as sinful, and all the world must be Liars rather than Mr. Baxter must not be justified in his sayings. You have before seen the ingenuity and veracity, you now see the humility and the modesty of the Man; and indeed in proportion, of the whole Party, for crimine ab uno,— Disce omnes. But doth Mr. Baxter and the rest of his persuasion think indeed, that it is so great and grievous a punishment to be kept from the Sacrament when men will not receive it in that way and upon those terms that the Church offers? if they do, why then do they deny it to so many that hunger and thirst after it, whensoever either by reason of Age, or Lameness, or Sickness, or some other bodily infirmity they cannot come to Church for it? especially when the Catholic Church in the Twelfth Canon of the first General Council commands it be given even to those that are Excommunicate, if they desire it when they are in Extremis, or going out of the world. Secondly, why have they suffered so many whole Parishes in England under their charge to have been without a Communion so many years together, as I am credibly informed they have? Thirdly, why do they reject those from the Sacrament, that will not come before hand to them to be examined by them, there being neither precept nor practice in the Gospel, nor Canon in the Church, either to warrant them to require it, or to oblige the People to submit to it upon any such penalty? I am sure St. Paul when he chides those of the Church of Corinth for coming ignorantly to the Sacrament, and for behaving themselves profanely at the Sacrament, that which he prescribes for avoiding the same or the like faults for the future, is not that every man should come, and be examined by the Minister, but that every man should examine himself before he eat of that Bread and drink of that Cup; And yet I will not deny but that every man before he Communicates aught to be well Catechised and instructed by the Minister, and thereby enabled to examine himself the better; nor will I deny neither but that every man may and aught in case of scruple of Mind or trouble of Conscience to advise with, and to be advised by him that hath the cure of his Soul; but that every man as often as he intends to receive the Sacrament should be obliged under the penalty of being rejected from it, to come and to be examined by the Minister, this is that which I utterly deny, and which I take to be the same thing in other words with that of Auricular Confession; so that they who exact the one, have no reason to condemn the other, unless it be because they would engross it wholly unto themselves: Howsoever, if refusing the Sacrament to those that will not kneel, when the Church enjoins it, be a penalty so far transcending the offence, how much more must the same penalty transcend the offence, when there is indeed no offence at all? for where there is no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, there can be no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, where there is no Law there can be no Transgression, and consequently there being no Law of God nor Man that requires all Communicants to be pre-examined by the Minister, those that are refused the Sacrament because they will not be pre-examined, are punished with the same punishment which they complain of, for no offence at all. And therefore Si maximè digna essem (may our Church say) ista contumelia, indigni vos, qui faceretis tamen; for, Who art thou, O Man, that judgest another? nay, that judgest thy Mother, when thou dost the same, or worse, things, than those are for which thou condemnest her? And how can any man of reason be so scrupulous, as to quit his Calling, rather than deny the Sacrament to those that will not receive it kneeling, when the Church commands it should neither be taken nor given otherwise, and yet make no scruple at all of denying it to whole Parishes? of denying it to those that cannot come to Church for it, though desirous of it, and qualified for it, and such as have most need of it to strengthen their Faith in their last Agony? and lastly, of denying it to such as refuse to be pre-examined by them, and all this without any command or warrant from God's Word, and contrary to the Command and Custom of God's Church? whereby it plainly appears, that either they do not think the receiving of the Sacrament of so great importance, as indeed it is, nor the denying of it so great an injury or punishment as they pretend it to be; or else that they would have every Minister to be a Monarch or Sovereign Lawgiver in his own Parish, and this indeed is that they would fain be at, now they have lost their hopes of governing the whole Kingdom; for you see by what Mr. Baxter adds, that if they may not be suffered to give or deny the Sacrament to whom they please, and in effect to do what they list in their own Parishes, they threaten to quit their Stations, which he calls being Ejected because they dare not put away all that will not kneel at the Sacrament: And this menace they often repeat upon all occasions, as if they were the only men that could carry on the work of the Lord; or as if the Church must needs sink and perish, if it wanted such Pillars as they are to uphold it. But (thanks be to God for it) the Church of England is not yet (notwithstanding all their endeavours to that purpose) reduced to so very ill a condition, that she cannot subsist without them; whereas the truth is, she cannot subsist with them, as long as they continue to be what they have been, the sowers and somenters of Schism in the Church, and Sedition in the State; and as long as they continue to do as they have done in humouring, and hardening, and confirming the people in their obstinate standing out against the lawful commands of their Superiors; which they would never have done at all, if these men had not at first infused into them these scruples. And therefore as God asked Adam and Eve, How came ye to know that ye are naked? so if I should ask those poor Souls whom those sly and subtle Serpents have beguiled and seduced, How came ye to know that ye shall sin against God if ye obey the Orders of the Church in general? or particularly how came ye to know, That it is against the Canons of the General Councils, and many hundred years' practice of the Church to Kneel in the Act of receiving? Did ye or can ye yourselves read those General Councils? Did ye or can ye examine so many hundred years' practice of the Church as Mr. Baxter speaks of? What answer can they make to these demands, but that which Eve made unto God? The Serpent beguiled me, and I did eat; Mr. Baxter, or some such Godly and Learned men as Mr. Baxter is, did tell us so, and we believed them: But what if Mr. Baxter do not believe that himself which he would have you believe? For first he would have you believe that there is great reverence and respect to be given (as indeed there is) to the Canons of General Councils, and to the Catholic practice of the Primitive Church; but doth he himself believe this? if he do, why did he so furiously oppose that which all General Councils approve of and confirm? I mean the Government of the Church by Bishops in the sense wherein it is asserted and practised in our Church? Or why did he persuade Subjects to take Arms against their Sovereign? which he knows to be contrary to the Doctrine and practice of the Primitive Christians for many hundred years more than he speaks of. Secondly, Mr. Baxter would have you believe, that Kneeling at the receiving of the Sacrament is forbidden by General Councils, and contrary to the custom and practice of the Ancient Church, which I am afraid he doth not believe himself; I am sure there is no convincing reason to make him believe it; for it is not the Ancient Church's injunction to stand when they prayed betwixt Easter and Whitsuntide, that will prove they were forbidden to Kneel when they received; especially if the Presbyterian opinion be true, that we are not to be in the Act of Praying, when we are in the Act of receiving; But if we may pray (as no doubt we may and aught to pray) in the Act of Receiving, then supposing the Ancient Injunction of the Church to stand at Prayer upon Sundays betwixt Easter and Whitsuntide to be still in force, yet all the rest of the year we are to kneel when we Pray, and consequently when we Receive, though there were no particular command of our own Church for it. Besides, Mr. Baxter knows that the aforesaid Injunction of the Church was but Temporary, till the people were sufficiently confirmed in the Doctrine and Belief of the Resurrection; for if it had been of perpetual obligation, and were still in force, Mr. Baxter must needs condemn the whole present Church of God for kneeling when they pray betwixt Easter and Whitsuntide, and particularly he must most of all condemn himself and the Presbyterians of England, for not standing when they receive, if at least that Injunction be to be understood of Receiving, as well as Praying; which if it be not, then is it urged by Mr. Baxter against us to no purpose, as indeed it is; And therefore no doubt Mr. Baxter doth not believe himself what he would have others believe, when he presseth that occasional temporary injunction of the Church for standing against kneeling; which if it be of force, must needs condemn his own practice of sitting, as well as ours of kneeling. The like may be said of Christ's example alleged by him also; for would he, or would he not have his Disciples believe that they are obliged to do as Christ did? if he would not have them believe so, why doth he press them with Christ's example? if he would have them believe so, I demand again whether he doth believe it himself or no? if he do not, it is plain he is a Seducer of the People; but if he do believe it, he must needs condemn the French Presbyterians for standing, as well as the English Protestants for kneeling; nay he must needs condemn himself and all other Christians in the world for not doing as Christ did in point of time, I mean for not giving and receiving the Sacrament in the Evening as Christ did, as well as he condemns us for not doing as Christ did in point of gesture; unless he can prove (which I think he cannot) that we are of necessity to follow Christ's example in one circumstance of the same action, and not in another, and in that circumstance which is less, but not in that which is more material; for certainly that circumstance which denominates the action (as the circumstance of time doth the Lord's Supper) is most material; and yet that circumstance by the consent of all Christendom is altered from the Evening to the Morning, and so was the gesture or posture of receiving also, and that upon most just and weighty reasons, till those that delight in change would needs have it otherwise, and that perhaps for no other reason but because they found it settled in the Church: This is not to follow Christ's example, who in things indifferent in their own nature conformed his practice to that of the Church in which he lived, though varying in some circumstances from the Primitive Institution; and particularly in this very action, from which they press us with Christ's example. For it is certain that Christ and his Disciples sat at the Passeover, (though it be uncertain whether he or they sat at the giving and receiving the Sacrament or no, for it was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, after he had supped, saith the Text, Luke 22. 20.) Howsoever it is certain, I say, that Christ and his Disciples sat when they ate the Passeover, and this no doubt was according to the custom of the Jewish Church at that time; but it is as certain that this was not the manner according to the first Institution of it, which was to eat it standing, as you may read, Exod. 12. 11. So that to urge Christ's example against us, is to urge Christ's example against himself; for as we conform ourselves to the Church's order and custom of our times, in receiving the Communion otherwise in point of gesture, than perhaps it was received at the first Institution; so Christ and his Apostles conforming themselves to the order and practice of the Church of their times, did celebrate the Passeover otherwise than according to the first Institution it was to be celebrated in point of gesture also; thereby perhaps intending to teach us, that as long as the Essentials of Doctrine and Worship (which are unalterable) are preserved, we are not to separate from the Church, or quarrel with our Superiors, if those things that are in their own nature alterable, be not always and in all places just the same that they were at first; because there may be very just cause for the alteration of them; and whether there be such a cause or no in this and the like particulars, it is the Church that is to be the Judge. So that there is nothing that can be collected either from the Canons of the Councils, or from the practice of the Primitive Church, no nor from Christ's own example, that can prove Kneeling at the Sacrament to be a sin; neither doth Mr. Baxter himself believe it to be sinful, for if he did, he would not say (as he does, Pag. 411. of his Five Disputations) that he himself would kneel rather than disturb the Peace of the Church, or be deprived of its Communion. In which words he confesseth, First, that Kneeling at the Sacrament is not sinful or unlawful, Secondly, that not to Kneel when it is imposed, is to disturb the Peace of the Church; and, Thirdly, that the imposing of it upon penalty of being deprived of the Communion, is an effectual means to make those that otherwise would not kneel, to conform to it; and consequently that the imposing of it upon such a penalty is prudent and rational, and whatsoever is prudent and rational cannot be unlawful; so that not only the Act of Kneeling itself, but the imposition of it by lawful Authority must needs be lawful. Neither indeed would the People scruple at the imposition, if they had not been taught that the thing itself were unlawful, or if Mr. Baxter would yet teach them to believe what he himself believes, namely, that it is lawful; which with what Conscience he can refuse to do I know not; for sure he is obliged to teach them obedience not to Divine Authority only, but to Humane Authority also in all lawful things; and not to let them go on in such an erroneous opinion, as will disturb the Peace, and deprive them of the Communion of the Church, and consequently make them sin against God and Man and their own Souls. Of which sin of theirs he must needs be a partaker in a great measure, if he do not persuade them from it; seeing (as he himself saith) Qui non vetat peccare cum potest, jubet. And what Power he hath to lead or misled those kind of men, their venturing to kill and be killed in an unrighteous quarrel (upon his persuasion) hath more than enough demonstrated during the time of the late troubles; unless he will say that he hath conjured up a Spirit that he cannot lay. Howsoever by how much the more faulty he hath been in misleading them heretofore, by so much the more zealous he should be to reduce them into the right way hereafter; which if he and the rest of his Brethren can do (as I am confident they can if they will) they will make some amends for the mischief they have done, and then there will be no fear or danger of Ministers being Ejected for their tenderness towards the People, nor of the Ejecting of any of the People from the Communion of the Church for not conforming themselves to the Orders and Commands of it, and consequently, there will be no Schisms or Divisions amongst us, when we shall all worship the same God the same way. But if they will not do this (which by all obligations humane and Divine they are bound to do) for my part I know no better way for undeceiving and reducing of the People, than by removing such Ministers, and then we shall see when the blowing of those boisterous winds ceaseth, whether the waves will not be still or no: In the mean time I hope the removing of erroneous and seditious, will not necessitate the introducing of ignorant and scandalous Ministers, though Mr. Baxter ought to remember, that as there is no sin more heinous than Rebellion, so no teacher ought to be more scandalous (I am sure there is none more dangerous) than a teacher of Rebellion.  
And now (to use Mr. Baxter's own words) I think there is no man to be found on earth, that hath the ordinary reason of a Man, but will confess, That it is indeed destructive of all Government and Legislative power, to Assert (as Mr. Baxter did Assert) the command of a thing in itself lawful by lawful Authority, under no unjust punishment, with no evil circumstance, which the Commander can foresee or aught to provide against (for all these precautions were expressly put in the proposition which Mr. Baxter denied) is a sinful Command, for no other reason, but because the Act Commanded may be by Accident a sin.  
Let Mr. Baxter then know, and (if he have ingenuity enough) confess, that the words I spoke (as to this particular) were words of truth, and words of Charity also, as being intended and spoken to no other end, but to undeceive that People, who by having his person too much in admiration (as if he could neither deceive nor be deceived) had been so long and so dangerously misled by him; so that it was not I that defamed him then, but it is he that hath defamed me now. Neither could I expect less from the boldness of this man and that party, who have had the confidence publicly to own the obligation of the Covenant, even since it hath been condemned to be burnt by the Parliament. And truly I see no reason why all those Books and Sermons which have been Preached and Printed in defence of the Covenant, or to maintain the same or worse principles of Sedition than are in the Covenant, should not be burnt also. Nay I dare be bold to say, that if the Authors of such Books and Sermons were not still of the same opinions, (and if they be, God deliver us from such Preachers) if they were not still, I say, of the same opinions, but did truly repent of them, and were heartily sorry for the horrible mischief they have done by them, they would with those converted Exorcists, Act. 19 19 bring all those Conjuring Books of theirs together, and to save the Hangman a labour; would publicly burn them all with their own hands, that so, though by the burning of their works they may perhaps suffer some loss in point of reputation with some of their Disciples, yet they themselves may be saved, but so as by fire, 1 Cor. 3. 15. At least they ought to be enjoined to write Books of Retractation, as St. Augustine did, having much more reason to do so than St. Augustine had.  
And this, Sir, is all I have to say upon this occasion, and more a great deal than I ought to have said, or than perhaps was needful to be said to one that knows Mr. Baxter and me as well as you do; which if it satisfy you, as I hope it will, you may do what you please with it, in order to the satisfying of others; for this is the first and last trouble I mean to put myself to of this kind, whatsoever provocation I may have from him hereafter,  
Your very affectionate Friend and Servant, G. Worcester.   

The Attestation of Dr. Gunning, and Dr. Pearson.  
Concerning a Command of Lawful Superiors, what was sufficient to its being a a lawful Command.  
THis proposition being brought by us, viz. That Command which commands an Act in itself lawful, and no other act or circumstance unlawful, is not sinful.  
Mr. Baxter denied it for two reasons which he gave in with his own hand in writing thus: One is, Because that may be a sin per accidens, which is not so in itself, and may be unlawfully commanded though that accident be not in the command. Another is, That it may be commanded under an unjust penalty.  
Again this Proposition being brought by us,  
That Command which commandeth an Act in itself lawful, and no other Act whereby any unjust penalty is enjoined, nor any circumstance whence per accidens any sin is consequent which the Commander ought to provide against, is not sinful.  
Mr. Baxter denied it for this reason given in with his own hand in writing thus: Because the first Act commanded may be per accidens unlawful, and be commanded by an unjust penalty, though no other Act or circumstance commanded be such.  
Again this Proposition being brought by us,  
That Command which commandeth an Act in itself lawful, and no other Act whereby any unjust penalty is enjoined, nor any circumstance whence directly or per accidens any sin is consequent, which the Commander ought to provide against, hath in it all things requisite to the lawfulness of a Command, and particularly cannot be guilty of commanding an Act per accidens unlawful, nor of commanding an Act under an unjust penalty.  
Mr. Baxter denied it upon the same Reasons.  
Peter Gunning. John Pearson.   

The Postscript.  
Jest Mr. Baxter should say I have defamed him once more, by charging him with devising and publishing Maxims of Treason, Sedition and Rebellion, (which till he should as publicly recant, I thought it unfit to restore him to the exercise of any Act of the Ministry in my Diocese) I think myself obliged to set down some few of his Political Theses or Aphorisms in his own words, as they are extant (though it be strange such a Book should still be extant) in his [Holy Commonwealth] most falsely and profanely so called.  

Mr. Baxter 's Theses of Government and Governors in General.  

I. Governors are some limited, some de facto unlimited; The unlimited are Tyrants and have no right to that unlimited Government, P. 106. Thes. 101.  
II. The 3. qualifications of necessity to the being of Sovereign Power are, 1. So much understanding, 2. So much will or goodness in himself, 3. So much strength or executive power by his interest in the People or others, as are necessary to the said ends of Government, P. 130. Thes. 133.  
III. From whence he deduceth 3. Corollaries, (viz.) 

1. When Providence depriveth a man of his understanding and intellectual Capacity, and that statedly or to his ordinary temper, it maketh him materiam indispositam and uncapable of Government, though not of the name. Thes. 135.  
2 If God permit Princes to turn so wicked as to be uncapable of governing so as is consistent with the ends of Government, he permits them to depose themselves. Thes. 136.  
3 If Providence statedly disable him that was the Sovereign from the executing of the Law, protecting the just, and other ends of Government, it makes him an uncapable subject of the power, and so deposeth him. Thes. 137.    
IV. Whereunto he subjoins, that though it is possible and likely that the guilt is or may be theirs, who have disabled their Ruler by deserting him, yet he is dismissed and disobliged from the charge of Government; and particular innocent members are disobliged from being governed by him.  
V. If the person (viz. the Sovereign) be justly dispossessed, as by a lawful War, in which he loseth his right, cial if he violate the Constitution and enter into a Military state against the people themselves, and by them be conquered, they are not obliged to restore him, unless there be some special obligation upon them besides their allegiance. Thes. 145.  
VI If the person dispossessed, though it were unjustly, do afterwards become uncapable of Government, it is not the Duty of his Subjects to seek his restitution. Thes. 146. No not although (saith he) the incapacity be but accidental, as if he cannot be restored but by the Arms of the Enemies of God or of the Commonwealth.  
VII. If an Army (of Neighbours, Inhabitants, or whoever) do (though injuriously) expel the Sovereign, and resolve to ruin the Commonwealth, rather than he shall be restored; and if the Commonwealth may prosper without his restauration, it is the duty of such an injured Prince for the Common good to resign his Government, and if he will not, the people ought to judge him as made uncapable by Providence, and not to seek his restitution to the apparent ruin of the Commonwealth. Thes. 147. 
Where by the way we are to note, he makes the People judge of this and all other incapacities of the Prince, and consequently when or for what he is to be Deposed, or not Restored by them.   
VIII. If therefore the rightful Governor be so long dispossessed, that the Commonwealth can be no longer without, but to the apparent hazard of its ruin, we (that is, we the people, or we the Rebels that dispossessed him) are to judge that Providence hath dispossessed the former, and presently to consent to another. Thes. 149.  
IX. When the people are without a Governor, it may be the duty of such as have most strength, ex charitate, to protect the rest from injury. Thes. 150. and consequently they are to submit themselves to the Parliament, or to that Army which deposed or dispossessed or murdered the rightful Governor.  
X. Providence by Conquest or other means doth use so to qualify some persons above others for the Government when the place is void, that no other persons shall be capable competitors, and the persons (doth not he mean the Cromwell's?) shall be as good as named by Providence, whom the people are bound by God to choose, or consent to, so that they are usually brought under a divine obligation to submit to such or such, and take them for their Governors, before those persons have an actual right to Govern. Thes. 151.  
XI. Any thing that is a sufficient sign of the will of God, that this is the person, by whom we must be Governed is enough (as joined to God's Laws) to oblige us to consent and obey him as our Governor. Thes. 153.  
XII. When God doth not notably declare any person or persons qualified above others, there the people must judge as well as they are able according to God's general rules. Thes. 157.  
XIII. And yet All the people have not this right of choosing their Governors, but commonly a part of every Nation must be compelled to consent, etc.  
XIV. Those that are known enemies of the Common Good in the chiefest parts of it, are unmeet to Govern or choose Governors, but such are multitudes of ungodly vicious men. Pag. 174. So that if those that are strongest (though fewest) call themselves the Godly Party, all others besides themselves are to be excluded from Governing or choosing of Governors. And amongst the ungodly that are to be thus excluded, he reckons all those that will not hearken to their Pastors (he means the Presbyterian Classis) or that are despisers of the Lord's-Day, that is, all such as are not Sabbatarians, or will not keep the Lord's day after the Jewish manner, which they prescribe, and which is condemned for Judaisme by all even of the Presbyterian persuasion in the world, but those of England and Scotland only.  
XV. If a People that by Oath and Duty are obliged to a Sovereign, shall sinfully dispossess him, and contrary to their Covenants, choose and Covenant with another, they may be obliged by their latter Covenant notwithstanding their former; and particular subjects that consented not in the breaking of their former Covenants, may yet be obliged by occasion of their latter choice to the person whom they choose. Thes. 181.  
XVI. If a Nation injuriously deprive themselves of a worthy Prince, the hurt will be their own, and they punish themselves; but if it be necessarily to their welfare, it is no injury to him. But a King that by war will seek reparations from the body of the people, doth put himself into an hostile State, and tells them actually that he looks to his own good more than theirs, and bids them take him for their Enemy, and so defend themselves if they can. Pag. 424.  
XVII. Though a Nation wrong their King, and so quoad Meritum causoe, they are on the worse side, yet may he not lawfully war against the public good on that account, nor any help him in such a war, because propter fivem he hath the worse cause. Thes. 352.   
And yet as he tells us (pag 476.) we were to believe the Parliaments Declarations and professions which they made, that the war which they raised was not against the King either in respect of his Authority, or of his Person; but only against Delinquent Subjects, and yet they actually fought against the King in person, and we are to believe (saith Mr. Baxter pag. 422.) that men would kill them whom they fight against.   

Mr. Baxter's Doctrine concerning the Government of England in particular.  
HE denies the Government of England to be Monarchical in these words.  
I. The real Sovereignty, here amongst us was in King, Lords and Commons. Pag. 72.  
II. As to them that argue from the Oath of Supremacy and the title given the King, I refer them (saith Mr. Baxter) to Mr. Lawson's 
He might have referred them to himself, pag. 460. where he gives the same answer to the same objection.  answer to Hobbs' Politics, where he showeth that the Title is often given to the single Person for the honour of the Commonwealth and his encouragement, because he hath an eminent interest: but will not prove the whole Sovereignty to be in him: and the Oath excludeth all others from without, not those whose interest is implied as conjunct with his— The eminent dignity and interest of the King above others allowed the name of a Monarchy or Kingdom to the Commonwealth, though indeed the Sovereignty was mixed in the hands of the Lords and Commons. Pag. 88  
III. He calls it a false supposition. 1. That the Sovereign power was only in the King, and so that it was an absolute Monarchy. 2 That the Parliament had but only the proposing of Laws, and that they were Enacted only by the King's Authority upon their request. 3. That the power of Arms and of War and Peace was in the King alone. And therefore (saith he) those that argue from these false suppositions, conclude that the Parliament being Subjects, may not take up Arms without him, and that it is Rebellion to resist him; and most of this they gather from the Oath of Supremacy, and from the Parliaments calling of themselves his Subjects; but their grounds (saith he) are sandy, and their superstructure false. Pag. 459, & 460.  
And therefore Mr. Baxter tells us, that though the Parliament are Subjects in one capacity, yet have they their part in the Sovereignty also in their higher capacity, Ibid. And upon this false and traitorous supposition he endeavours to justify the late Rebellion, and his own more than ordinary activeness in it. For,  
IU. Where the Sovereignty (saith he) is distributed into several hands (as the King's and Parliaments) and the King invades the others part, they may lawfully defend their own by war, and the Subject lawfully assist them, yea, though the power of the Militia be expressly given to the King, unless it be also expressed that it shall not be in the other. Thes. 363.  
The conclusion (saith he) needs no proof because Sovereignty, as such, hath the power of Arms and of the Laws themselves. The Law that saith the King shall have the Militia supposeth it to be against Enemies and not against the Commonwealth, nor them that have part of the Sovereignty with him. To resist him here is not to resist power, but usurpation and private will; in such a case the Parliament is no more to be resisted than he. Ibid.  
V. If the King raise War against such a Parliament upon their Declaration of the dangers of the Commonwealth, the people are to take it as raised against the Commonwealth. Thes. 358.  
And in that case (saith he) the King may not only be resisted, but ceaseth to be a King, and entereth into a state of War with the people. Thes. 368.  
VI Again, if a Prince that hath not the whole Sovereignty be conquered by a Senate that hath the other part, and that in a just defensive War, that Senate cannot assume the whole Sovereignty, but supposeth that government in specie to remain, and therefore another King must be chosen, if the former be incapable. (Thes. 374.) as he tells us, he is, by ceasing to be King, in the immediately precedent Thes.  
VII. And yet in the Preface to this Book he tells us that the King withdrawing (so he calls the murdering of one King and the casting off of another) the Lords and Commons ruled alone; was not this to change the species of the Government? Which in the immediate words before he had affirmed to be in King, Lords and Commons; which constitution (saith he) we were sworn, and sworn, and sworn again to be faithful to and to defend. And yet speaking of that Parliament which contrary to their Oaths changed this Government by ruling alone, and taking upon them the Supremacy, he tells us that they were the best Governors 
Vide Preface to the H●ly Common wealth. pag. 6.  in all the world, and such as it is forbidden to Subjects to depose upon pain of damnation.  
What then was he that deposed them? one would think Mr. Baxter should have called him a Traitor, but he calls him in the same Preface, the Lord Protector, adding, That he did prudently, piously, faithfully, and to his immortal honour exercise the Government, which he left to his Son, to whom (as Mr. Baxter saith pag. 484.) he is bound to submit as set over us by God, and to obey for conscience sake, and to behave himself as a Loyal Subject towards him, because (as he saith in the same place) a full and free Parliament had owned him: thereby implying, That a maimed and a manacled House of Commons, without King and Lords, and notwithstanding the violent expulsion of the secluded Members were a full and free Parliament; and consequently that if such a Parliament should have taken Arms against the King he must have sided with them. Yea, though they had been never so much in fault, and though they had been the beginners of the War, for he tells us in plain and express terms,  
VIII. That if he had known the Parliament had been the beginners of the War and in most fault, yet the ruin of the trusties and Representatives, and so of all the security of the Nation being a punishment greater than any faults of theirs against the King could deserve from him, their faults could not disoblige him (meaning himself) from defending the Commonwealth. Pag. 480.  
And that he might do this lawfully, and with a good Conscience, he seems to be so confident, that in his Preface, he makes as it were a challenge, saying, that if any man can prove that the King was the highest power in the time of those Divisions, and that he had power to make that war which 
Vid. The Pref to his Holy Commonwealth, prope. finem.  he made, he will offer his head to Justice as a Rebel.  
As if in those times of Division the King had lost or forfeited his Sovereignty, and the Parliament had not only a part, but the whole Sovereignty in themselves.  
IX, Finally Mr. Baxter tells us, Pag. 486. That having often searched into his heart, whether he did lawfully engage into the War or not, and whether he did lawfully encourage so many thousands to it; he tells us, I say, that the issue of all his search was but this,— That he cannot yet see that he was mistaken in the main cause, nor dares he repent of it, nor forbear doing the same, if it were to do again in the same state of things. He tells us indeed in the same place, that if he could be convinced he had sinned in this matter, he would as gladly make a public recantation, as he would eat or drink: which seeing he hath not yet done, it is evident he is still of the same mind, and consequently would upon the same occasion do the same things, viz. fight, and encourage as many thousands as he could to fight against the King for any thing that calls itself, or which he is pleased to call a full and free Parliament: as likewise that he would own and submit to any Usurper of the Sovereignty as set up by God, although he came to it by the murder of his Master, and by trampling upon the Parliament. Lastly, That he would hinder as much as possibly he could the restoring of the rightful Heir unto the Crown. And now whether a man of this Judgement, and of these affections, aught to be permitted to Preach or no, Let any, but himself, judge.    

THE Bishop of Winchester's VINDICATION Of Himself from divers False, Scandalous and Injurious Reflections made upon him by Mr. RICHARD BAXTER in several of his Writings.  
As likewise A Vindication of the Rights and Sovereignty of all Kings (properly so called) and particularly of the King of England's being sole Sovereign over all persons, in all capacities, within his own Realms and Dominions, from What Mr. Baxter (to justify the Rebellion against our late King of ever blessed Memory) hath in many of his False, Factious and Seditious Aphorisms asserted to the contrary.  
Together with A Proposal of a more Legal, and more effectual Expedient for the keeping Popery and Arbitrary Government for ever out of England, than the passing of an Act to exclude the right Heir from Succession to the Crown (either now or hereafter) is, will be, or can be.  
LONDON, Printed for Joanna Brome, 1683.   

SECTION. I.  
Mr. BAXTER'S Assertion at the Savoy undeniably proved upon him; and consequently his Charge against the Bishop of many mistakes in his Letter, in matter of fact, and of his Gross mistaking charge, viz. Concerning the judgement of the Nonconformists of things sinful by Accident, cleared.  
The Bishop of Winchester's Vindication of himself, from divers false, scandalous and injurious Reflections made upon him by Mr. Richard Baxter in several of his Writings.  

CHAP. I.  
Mr. Baxter 's Charge against the Bishop, gathered out of several Writings of his, and set down in his own words.  
MAster Baxter in his Preface to his Book (called by him The true and only way of Concord of all Christian Churches) reflecting upon a Letter of mine, Written and Printed near 20 years before, saith; There are so many Mistakes in matter of fact in it, that although he had made an Answer to it, yet he cast it aside for Peace sake; believing, that the opening of the aforesaid so many mistakes would not easily be born: the rather, because (as he says in the words immediately foregoing) he knew he had greatly incurred both our displeasures already, (to wit, the Bishop of Ely's and mine) for what he had said and done against our Way; and that (as to my particular) the aforesaid Letter of mine was a proof of it.  
Again, in the same Preface to the same Book, he saith, You, (meaning the Bishop of Ely and Me, to whom he addresseth that Preface) have (above all men I know) effectually helped to bring us (meaning himself, and the rest of his Party) under.  
These are Mr. Baxter's compliments when he speaks to me, and therefore, I am not to expect more Civility from him, when he speaks of me, as he doth in divers of his Books which I have seen, and perhaps, in many more of them which I have not seen; (for I hope all men are not bound to read all Mr. Baxter writes:) But in those I have seen, when he speaks of me, it is neither Honoris, nor Charitatis gratiâ; but to reproach me either directly and in express terms, (or covertly and by the buy) as, when in his Preface to the second part of his Plea for Nonconformists, he saith, It was Bishop Morley 's gross mistaking charge that made him write one whole Tract, or Treatise, namely, That of things sinful per Accidens or by accident.  
Again, in the former part of the aforesaid Plea for Nonconformists, he saith, Bishop Morley advised him to read Bilson and Hooker, in whom (saith he) I found more than he approved, for resisting and restraining of Kings.  
Again, in another of his printed Papers; (I mean that Paper which he would have taken for a Recantation of some of those Political Aphorisms, I had laid to his charge) though he do not name me, yet he points directly at me, as if I had accused him for asserting, That all humane powers are limited by God; which to deny (as he there insinuates I do 
* Vid. his Letter to Mr. Hinkley, and his last answer to Dr. Stillingfleet.  and elsewhere plainly tells me I do) is to defy Deity and Humanity: and consequently makes me a defier of them both.  
Lastly, with the same ingenuity and candour, he aims at me more obscurely, and more obliquely indeed, but yet more spitefully and more mischievously; when in the close of his Animadversions upon the Dean of St. Paul's Sermon, he speaks of somebody that removed somebody from a great Man's service, who might have kept him from Apostatising, if he had been suffered to continue with him; meaning my supposed removing Mr. Jones the Author of Elymas the Sorcerer; from being one of the Duke of York's Chaplains.  
These are the things that Mr. Baxter doth either directly and expressly, or implicitly and obliquely charge me withal: And perhaps there be many more in other of his voluminous Writings which I have not seen, nor heard of yet; and all of them as true perhaps as any of those I have here named, that is, not true at all, as I hope I shall make it appear to any indifferent and impartial Reader, that will take the pains to compare his several Allegations with my several Answers to them.   

CHAP. II.  
The Bishop's Answer in general to his charge of Many Mistakes in a Letter of the Bishop's long since printed, together with a pretended Answer of Mr. B 's to it, and the Reason of reprinting that Letter of the Bishop's.  
FIrst then, whereas Mr. Baxter chargeth me with having made many Mistakes in a Letter I writ and printed many years ago, to justify my silencing of him, when I was Bishop of Worcester; it is to be observed,  
1. That this is a charge in general terms only, without specifying any one of those many mistakes in 
He names no one mistake.  particular.  
And 2dly that he names no body, no not so much as any one of his own Party, that now doth, or ever 
Himself the only Accuser.  did for 20 years together, lay any such thing to my Charge besides himself; so that whether there be many or any, or if any mistakes, they being mistakes in matter of Fact (as he saith they are) there is no Constat, no other evidence, but Mr. Baxter's bare Affirmation only, whereunto my bare Negative aught in Law, Equity, and Reason to be esteemed a sufficient Answer. Unless, though according to the Apostolical Canon, an accusation against a Presbyter ought not to be received by a Bishop (for so was Timothy) without two or three witnesses; yet 
An Accusation against a Presbyter not to be received without witnesses.  an accusation of a Bishop by a Presbyter, without any witnesses at all, aught to be believed, and that in matter of Fact too, which cannot be otherwise proved but by Witnesses; or unless, as S. Hierom saith of himself and St. Austin, that Quamvis Episcopus sit major Presbytero, tamen Augustinus est minor Hieronymo; Though a Bishop be greater than a Presbyter, yet Austin is less than Hierom: So Mr. Baxter will say (as I doubt not but he thinks) that though the authority of a Bishop be greater than a Presbyter's, yet such a Presbyter as Mr. Baxter ought to be credited before such a Bishop as Bishop Morley.  
Be it so; but yet neither Bishop nor Presbyter, 
No one to be believed in his own Case.  nor any body else, is to be believed in his own Case, or upon his accusing of a third person upon his own word, or upon his own affirmation only; especially when the accusation is general, without any instance thereof in particular. As if, when one man speaking of another, saith, he is a Liar, a Thief, or a Perjured person, he were to be believed, and the man he speaks of were to be thought to be such a one as he saith he is, without so much as naming, and much less proving any one particular either Lie or Theft or Perjury that he is guilty of.  
What is this, but to make a Pope of a Presbyter? for the Pope claims no more than that his Ipse dixit, his bare saying of a thing, should be proof enough to oblige men to believe what he affirms to be true, no nor so much neither as to matter of fact; 
The Non-Conformists Teachers as Infallible as the Pope.  though some of the Pope's shameless Sycophants have of late offered to maintain that he is as Infallible in matter of Fact, as he is in matter of Faith; and I verily believe him to be so. And I believe likewise that many of the Nonconformists have the same opinion of their Teachers, which the most Bigott-Papists have of their Pope, as to their Veracity at least, if not to their Infallibility also. So I mean as undoubtingly to believe whatsoever they teach them in matters of Faith, or tell them in matters of Fact. But whether it be because they are taught to believe so, or because their having such men's persons in admiration makes them believe so, I will not, I cannot determine: I hope it is the latter rather than the former, though I am afraid, some of their Teachers are well enough pleased they should so esteem and believe of them. Howsoever, or whatsoever may be the cause of it, We are sure enough, by undeniable experience, that it is so.  
And truly Mr. Baxter doth very much presume upon his own very great, or upon my very little Credit in the World, if he thinks that whatsoever he is pleased to say of me, without any proof or instance of it will for his own bare saying of it only, be believed by any, but those of his own party; and by those of his own party, I mean not all the Nonconformists, but the Baxterian Nonconformists 
Baxterian Nonconformists.  only, if there be any such besides himself.  
But Mr. Baxter may perhaps say in his own behalf, that although in his aforesaid Preface to his 
M. Baxter 's Answer to the Bishop's Letter inquired after.  Book of Concord, he gives no particular instance of any of the many mistakes he chargeth me with, yet in his Answer to that Letter of mine, wherein he says, those many mistakes are in general, there were not Instances only, but also Proofs of all and every one of those many mistakes in particular. Well, But Where is that Answer of his to that Letter of mine? Why, Mr. Baxter after he had writ it laid it aside; for so Mr. Baxter himself (which 
Not likely that it was laid aside.  ought to be taken for proof enough) saith. But Why did he lay it aside? Sure he did not mean to lay it aside when he writ it: It was therefore for some very extraordinary reason, if he did so; For never any man had a greater 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, natural tenderness and affection for all the Issues of his own brain, 
His writings; numerous,  than Mr. Baxter seems to have; Which Issues of his are so numerous, as if he had begun to write assoon as he could speak, and to print assoon as he could write; and they do so crowd to come into the world, that one seems to take hold of the heels of another, as Jacob did of Esau's, struggling which should get out first, and from this striving, while they were yet in the womb of his brain, comes their so often 
And contradictious.  crossing, and contradicting of one another, after he is delivered of them.  
This fondness of his towards his own conceptions and the delight he takes in the multiplying and publishing of them makes me think, that 
His own reasons why he laid it aside.  either there was never any such Answer at all made by him, or if indeed there were any such Answer, there were some other reasons, besides what are alleged by him, that made him forbear the Printing of it; for whereas he saith, It was for peace, or for peace sake that he laid it aside, or forbore printing it; because having already (that is, before my publishing of the aforesaid Letter) greatly incurred the Bishop of Ely 's displeasure and mine by what he had said and done against our Way, he believed the opening of so many mistakes in matter of fact (as were in that Letter) would not easily be born; and for that reason, he laid aside that Answer of his to that Letter of mine.  
I cannot believe that this was the only, or indeed any reason at all of his so doing; I mean it was neither his love of peace in general, nor his fear of giving me any farther provocation in particular, that made him suppress that pretended Answer.  
For first, if he were of so peaceable a disposition 
Not probable for peace-sake.  or so great a lover of Peace as he would seem to be, he would not have spent so much of his time in writing so many Volumes to keep up and increase Schism and Separation in the Church, together with Faction and Sedition in the State as he hath done.  
Which might be made to appear yet farther from the manner, as well as the matter of his writing, 
Mr. Baxter Magisterial in his writing.  which is so Magisterial, and with that contempt, undervaluing and vilifying of those he writes against, or that write against him, and sometimes with such exasperating and provoking language as very ill becomes him that pretends to be a Peace maker.  
And perhaps in such a style was that Answer of his written (if he writ any answer at all) to the aforesaid 
What likely might be the reason of his laying it aside.  Letter of mine; and then perhaps too, some wiser Friend of his might advise him to forbear printing of it, at least at that time, namely, at the King's first coming in, against one that came in a little before him, and was sent by him, and had been, all the while the King was abroad, in Exile with him, and for him, and had newly received some more than ordinary marks of his majesty's favour from him. These, or the like considerations to these, being suggested to him, might peradventure at that time prevail with him, rather wholly to suppress, or at least to defer the printing of that Answer of his (if there were any such answer) than thereby so unseasonably to provoke me more, whose displeasure, he saith, he had greatly incurred by what he had said and done against the Bishop of Ely 's way and mine; as if the Bishop of Ely and I had a Way of our own, wherein no body walked but ourselves.  
I would therefore fain know what he calls the Bishop of Ely's way and mine, and for his speaking and acting against which, he had so greatly incurred that Bishop's and my displeasure: Is it a new or a newly found out Way, or a way of our own devising as Mr. Baxter's way is of his? a way that 
Mr. Baxter 's Way a New way of his own.  never any walked in before, nor none but himself doth walk in yet, nor will (I believe) ever walk in hereafter. For it is neither Episcopal, nor Presbyterian, nor wholly Independent, nor any of any other denomination either ancient or modern, that I ever heard of; but partly of all, and partly of none of them. But Ours, I mean, the Way, which the Bishop of Ely and I do walk in, is no By-path, not 
The Bishop's Way the old Church of England-way.  a Way of Sufferance or Toleration only, such as Mr. Baxter and all the Nonconformists plead for: but the Good old way, the King's, the Church of England's way, nay, the Catholic Churches Highway; the Way wherein all the Primitive Fathers, Saints and Martyrs, and all the Orthodox Christians in all Ages, (until the last before this of ours) have gone before us. I mean the Government of the Church by Bishops, teaching all and nothing else, but what was taught by Christ and his Apostles in point of Doctrine; and commanding nothing which God has forbidden, nor forbidding any thing which God has commanded, in the outward Administration of God's public Worship and Service: but making use of that liberty and power that God hath left to his Church in order to Decency and Uniformity and Edification, and consequently in order to that Unity and Concord, which Mr. Baxter doth so much pretend to desire and plead for. This, and no other but this, is the Way of the Church of England, and this, and no other but this is the Way, which the Bishop of Ely and I do walk in, and would have all men else, that are born within the pale of our Church, to walk in also. And therefore, as we cannot choose but be sorry for those that are led or kept out of this way, both for their 
Nonconformist Teachers draw and keep people out of the way.  own and the Church's sake, so we cannot choose but be displeased too with those that not only refuse to walk in it themselves, but endeavour and do what they can to draw others from it, and to keep those that are gone out of it, from returning again into it, by making and preaching and printing Pleas and Apologies for Nonconformists, which can have no other end (consequentially at least, if not intentionally) but to confirm them in their Nonconformity. And surely, he that would not forbear 
Mr. Baxter 's Pleas for them justly taxed.  to do this, and to do it over and over again, being so prejudicial and destructive to the peace of the Church and State (as We have experimentally found it to be) He (I say) that would not forbear to do this for the public peace sake, nor for fear of offending the King and the Parliament, the makers of those Laws against those things and persons, he so loudly and so boldly pleads for, did not in all probability for peace sake (and much less for fear of displeasing Bishop Morley) forbear to publish what he had written in answer to that Letter of the Bishop's which would have been much less provoking, by specifying though not proving some of those many mistakes he now chargeth him with, without naming any of them, and consequently, as much as in him lies, imposing upon his Readers, especially such as are illaffected to Bishops, an implicit belief, that there are indeed many, very many mistakes in the Bishop's Letter; and perhaps gross ones too, and such as Mr. Baxter could have named, and proved also; but being a man of so peaceable, so patient, and so meek a disposition as he is, he did for peace sake, and because he would not provoke the Bishop to be more displeased with him than he was already, forbear to do so; Credat Judoeus, non Ego, Believe it who list for me, as he faith.  
And therefore he must give me leave to think, upon better considerations, that he never writ any 
Most likely that he writ no Answer.  Answer at all to my Letter; So that all the Reply I need to make to this general unattested and unproved Charge of Mr. Baxter, is to oppose my bare Negative to his bare Affirmative; for Affirmantis est probare, He who affirms a thing ought to prove it; which until he hath done, it is to be supposed, (forth reasons before by me alleged) he cannot do; And consequently that the Charge itself is a mere Calumny.  
Which that it may be made more evidently to appear, 
The reason of reprinting the Bishop's Letter with Mr. Baxter 's Aphorisms.  I have caused the self same Letter (wherein he saith there are so many mistakes) without any the least addition, subtraction or alteration, to be reprinted and published, to the end, that such as will vouchsafe to read it without prejudice, may judge betwixt us, whether there be indeed so many, or any such mistakes in matter of Fact in it, as Mr. Baxter saith there are; as likewise, whether I did well or ill in restraining him from preaching in my Diocese; which that all men may the better judge of, I have reprinted likewise those Political Aphorisms of his which were at first annexed to that Letter, not as accusing him for holding them now, but as remembering him of his holding them then, which though it was not the cause (as the Letter tells him) of my Silencing him at first, yet, that together with what he had asserted at the Conference in the Savoy was the cause (as the Letter tells him also) why I continued, and resolved to continue that restraint and Suspension, until he should make a public Recantation, as well of what he had affirmed in the aforesaid Conference, (namely, The unlawfulness of lawful Commands by lawful Authority, if by accident they might be the cause or occasion of sin) as likewise of those not only false and erroneous, but dangerous, seditious and rebellious Maxims of his; which howsoever he may have since repent and recanted, I am sure he had not recanted them then, at least not publicly, or so as I or the World could take notice of it. They therefore that read the Letter with the Aphorisms annexed to it, and reprinted with it, are to consider them rebus sic stantibus, I mean as things were then when they were first printed. And if Mr. Baxter himself would consider them so too, he must needs confess (if at least he will stand to what he hath written 
Mr. Baxter justly silenced upon his own grounds.  since, even in this very Book, of which he would have me give him my opinion) he must needs confess (I say) that he was justly Silenced, or restrained from Preaching, as being then one of Those, who he himself saith are 
* Vid The True and only way of Concord, circa finem.  intolerabiles, that is, such, as ought not to be suffered to Preach, as being disturbers of the public peace, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as St. Paul calls them, that is, Seducers of the people, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, overturning or turning upside down whole Houses or Families, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, whose mouths (St. Paul saith in the same place) ought to be stopped. And if those men's mouths ought to be stopped, that by Seditious Preaching disturb Families, how much more ought they to be silenced, that by Printing and Publishing seditious and rebellious Books and Maxims, do what they can, not only to disturb, but overthrow whole Churches and Kingdoms?  
But Mr. Baxter will say he doth not own any of those Maxims now: I do not say he does, but I do say he did own them, at least he had not disowned them then, when I silenced him; and consequently when he was one of those whom he himself calls intolerabiles, or such as ought not to be permitted to Preach, which is enough to justify what I said or did then. But whether he hath since made or published any declaration, whereby he hath clearly and fully disowned all those Seditious Maxims of his, We shall see hereafter.   

CHAP. III.  
One Particular Gross mistake (as he calls it) charged in a late Treatise of his upon the Bishop, about the Nonconformists judgement of things sinful by accident, taken to task.  
ANd now I should proceed to the consideration of some particulars, which Mr. Baxter is pleased to charge me with in his aforesaid Preface to his aforesaid Book of Concord; having I suppose said enough, if not more than enough, already to his general Charge without witness or proof, relating to my aforesaid Letter, had not Mr. Baxter himself sent me by my friend Mr. Isaac Walton, another Book of his called The second part of the Nonconformists Plea for 
Mr. Baxter 's bundle of extorted and distorted Treatises.  peace, which he calls an extorted and distorted Treatise, or rather a bundle of Treatises bound up together. And distorted enough indeed it is, but how or by whom it was extorted from him I know not; he seems by the many Books he hath written, to be so ready a Writer, that he needed not to have any thing he writes to be extorted from him. For indeed he is rather one of those, quibus difficile est non scribere, who are as hardly to be restrained from Writing, as others are from Preaching. But in this bundle of Treatises, whether extorted or not extorted, there is one wherein I am particularly concerned, He calls it, The judgement of Nonconformists of things sinful by accident; and in his Preface to that whole bundle of Treatises, he saith, This Treatise in particular was written purposely to answer the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley.  
And truly if he had not said so, or if that Treatise had been Printed by itself, I should neither by the 
The Bishop's pretended mistake not mentioned in the Treatise written to answer it.  Title of it, nor by the Book itself have suspected it to have been purposely written against me, or against any mistake of mine: For neither in the Title nor in the Book itself do I find Bishop Morley so much as once named, or any way so characterized by any thing I have said or done, as to conclude myself to be understood by it. Nay, I verily believe, that if I should grant all and every one of the sixty four Propositions asserted in that Treatise to be true, yet nevertheless whatsoever I have laid to Mr. Baxter's charge in that Letter of mine, would be true also; so that I cannot choose but wonder that he should say, as he does in the aforesaid Preface, That this particular Treatise of scandal or evil by accident was purposely written to answer the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley: whereas the Title page to that Treatise saith no such thing, neither is that wherein he saith the Bishop is so grossly mistaken to be found either in terminis terminantibus or oequipollentibus (either in downright terms, or in words that imply as much) in the whole Treatise.  
If it be replied, that as the general Preface to the whole bundle of Treatises called The second Part of the Nonconformists Plea tells me, that I am the man that am guilty of so gross a mistake; so that the Title page to that particular Treatise, We are now speaking of, (though not explicitly and formally, yet implicitly, and intelligibly enough) tells me 
That gross mistake, what it is.  what it was wherein I was so grossly mistaken, namely, in misreporting the Nonconformists judgement of things sinful by accident.  
I rejoin (first) that unless Mr. Baxter thinks that every body is obliged to read all that he Writes, he 
No man bound to read all Mr. Baxter writes.  could not rationally presume, that a man of my age, and one that had so little time left to spare from his more pressing and more important concerns, was likely to inquire after every Book that came out in Print, and to see whether he was concerned in it or no; and it seems Mr. Baxter thought so, and therefore sent me by Mr. Walton that Book, in the Preface whereunto he saith he did purposely write that Treatise in answer to the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley; which I had never seen nor heard of before, nor perhaps should ever have seen or heard of it at all, if Mr. Baxter himself had not sent it to me; and which if he had sent me sooner, I would not have said as I have done in the foregoing Chapter, that he had not given so much as any one Instance of the many mistakes he saith there were in my printed Letter, as indeed he did not where he speaks of them to me; nay, he saith he had laid aside an Answer he had written to that Letter for peace sake, that he might not by opening or publishing so many mistakes of mine, give me any farther cause of being displeased with him. And yet two years 
Mr. Baxter 's ingenuity.  before (mark the ingenuity of the man) he had published a whole Book, consisting of sixty four Propositions besides Quoeries, purposely intended then, (though he doth not say so in plain terms, till two years after) for an Answer to Bishop Morley 's gross mistaking charge; though neither then nor since, neither there nor any where else hath he yet told us what that gross mistaking charge is, but leaves it to be guessed at or collected out of the Title page to that Treatise, which he saith he purposely writ for an Answer to it; wherein whether he hath dealt justly and candidly either with me or with his readers, I am now to consider and examine, after I have premised out of what I have already said two or three short preliminary Observations.  
Whereof the first is this; That it was not, 
Three Observations from what hath been said.  nor could not be for peace sake, nor because he would not give me any farther provocation, (as in his Preface to his Book of Concord he pretends it was) that he laid aside the Answer he saith he had made to my printed Letter; for then, he would not without any farther provocation on my part, have afterwards printed a whole Book on purpose to convince me of one of the many mistakes in that Letter, or rather to expose me to the World, for having been guilty of so gross a mistake as he calls it.  
A second observation is this, That naming but one of those many mistakes he saith there were in that Letter of mine, he doth implicitly confess that he could name no more; because by aggravating that as much as he can, he declares he would not have forborn to specify the rest, if there had been any more to be specified.  
And consequently (which I would have to be observed in the third place) That if this which he calls a gross mistake, be no mistake at all of mine, but a very great Mistake, or rather a very great Calumny of his, as I doubt not but I shall prove it is, Mr. Baxter had no reason to charge that Letter of mine with so many mistakes, nor I any reason to thank him for concealing of them.   

CHAP. IU.  
His dreadful Title page, wherein he ushers in this Charge, examined and retorted upon himself.  
NOw whether that which Mr. Baxter calls a gross mistaking charge be indeed such a charge 
He doth not set down the charge in plain terms, but leaves it to be guessed.  as he would have it to be believed it is, he should in the first place have in plain and express terms set down that charge of mine, as I have set it down myself in that Letter, wherein he saith that gross mistaking charge is.  
For in all debates betwixt rational and ingenuous men (whether in point of opinion, or in matter of fact) the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or thing in question, aught to be clearly stated, and agreed on, betwixt the differing Parties, before they can proceed to the proving, or disproving of any thing that is in difference betwixt them: But this (as I said before) Mr. Baxter hath not done, but only affirmed that such a gross mistaking charge there is of Bishop Morley's, and that he hath written and published such a Treatise in answer to it, leaving his Readers (as I said before) to guests at what that Charge is, or rather what he would have it thought to be; and that is (as may be collected from the Title page to that Treatise which he calls an Answer to that charge) the Bishop's misreporting the judgement of Nonconformists 
The Title page is the Treatise, wherein he pretends to answer it.  of things sinful by Accident, to make men believe that the Nonconformists Asserted, That whatsoever may be the occasion of sin to any, must be taken away; or that nothing may be imposed, which men may take scandal at, or by Accident turn to sin. And he adds, That to save men's Souls from the guilt of believing this misreport, the Treatise following, (saith the Title page) was published; as likewise to help those to repentance, who have polluted their Souls with falsehood and uncharitableness by believing and seconding such reports.  
This I say is the Title page prefixed to the aforesaid Treatise, and a very notable one it is. Never 
Written in as dreadful a style, as any Pope's Bull.  any Pope's Bull came forth with a more dreadful bellowing against all that shall say, write, preach, print or report, or that shall believe any thing that is said, written, printed, preached or reported by any body else, concerning any of the Nonconformists, though never so truly, or never so well attested, if any Nonconformist, especially such a one as Mr. Baxter, one of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, one of those who seem to be Pillars, shall please to disown it; For in that case (saith Mr. Baxter) not only the reporting any such thing is a gross mistake, but the believing such a report doth so pollute men's Souls with falsehood and uncharitableness, that they cannot be saved from the guilt thereof, unless that ensuing Treatise of his do help them to repent of it. So dangerous a thing, it seems it is, not only to report, but to give credit to any thing that is reported to the prejudice either of the doctrine or practice of any of the Godly party; as if they could not err in either, which is in effect to assume unto themselves a more than Popish Infallibility, which is the worst of the Popish errors, as being the ground and foundation of all other heresies or errors that are held by them. And yet they that would be thought the most zealous 
Our zealous Antipapists take up many of the Popish principles.  Antipapists do really, though not professedly, sympathise with the Papists in this which is the Root, and in several of the most pernicious Branches, and false doctrines, growing out of this Root, as appears speculatively by Mr. Baxter's Politic Aphorisms, and practically by what was acted by the Nonconformists, before, and in, and after the late Rebellion against the best of Kings by the worst of Subjects; I mean during the Usurpation of the Sovereignty, first by both Houses, and then by one of the Houses of Parliament, and afterwards by Cromwell, and his Son, and lastly by the Rump or the fag-end or worst part of but one of the two Houses.  
Again, as they sympathise with the Papists in 
They have the same arts of keeping their Proselytes.  some of the worst of their doctrines and practices, to draw more to them, so they imitate them also in making use of the same arts and artifices for keeping of those whom they have made their Proselytes from revolting from them: For as the Romish Confessors do terrify and fright their Converts, by forbidding them upon the penalty of being guilty of mortal sin, to hear or read, and much more to give any credit to any thing that is written or spoken to confute or disparage any of their doctrines or practices; so I know not what other ends Mr. Baxter could have in prefixing so terrifying and terrible a Title to so petty a Treatise, but to fright 
Mr. B is end in this Title.  those that have been seduced by him, from making use of their own reason to bring them into the right way again, by harkening to, or believing of any thing that is or can be said or written by any of us to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any thing that hath been asserted by him, by telling them beforehand, that it is no less than a damnable sin, to believe that he, or the Nonconformists, asserted any such thing, as Bishop Morley by a gross mistake imputes to him, and the rest of the Nonconformists, and therefore that he writ the following Treatise on purpose partly to save men's Souls from the guilt of believing, and partly, to help them to repentance, that have polluted their souls by believing that gross mistake or misreport of the aforesaid Bishop. Whereunto he adds in another place, that it was the fear he should die with the guilt of silence upon him, if he had not published the aforesaid Treatise in order to the aforesaid ends, that made him write it and publish it; as if the salvation of so many men's souls had depended upon it, which if Mr. Baxter himself did believe to 
If it be so as he says, he was highly to blame for not publishing this Treatise sooner.  be true, than woe be to all those that died in the belief of the truth of Bishop Morley's charge before the publishing of this Treatise, and woe to Mr. Baxter himself for publishing this Treatise no sooner. For the first Edition of this his admirable both 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of this his severeign both Antidote to prevent, and Restorative to recover those Souls that were otherwise in danger to be lost for ever, for believing, or for not repenting their belief of Bishop Morley's charge, was not published until the year 76, which was 14 years at least after Bishop Morley's charge was printed. And how did Mr. Baxter know, but that many hundred Souls during that long interval might be infected with that so dangerous a sin of believing the truth of that Charge, and die in that belief without repentance, merely for want of being helped to it by this so efficacious or none-such a remedy, as is prescribed by him in this Treatise?  
Again how could Mr. Baxter himself tell but that 
Upon his own account as well as others.  he might have died in less than 14 years, (which is double the age of a man in Law) especially considering the dying condition he so often tells us he is in, and was in many years before? And then I would fain know, how his deferring so long to publish this so sovereign an Antidote and Remedy against so malignant, and Soulkilling a disease, could consist either with the charity he owes to other men's Souls, or the care of his own? For if it be true that when he did publish it, it was (as he tells us it was) For fear of dying with the guilt of silence upon him; why should not the same cause have produced the same effect sooner? Truly Mr. Baxter had little care of his own as well as of other men's Souls in the mean time, if he himself believes what he would have other men to believe, namely, that the believing of Bishop Morley's mistaking Charge is of so very dangerous a consequence to those that die without repentance for their believing of it. And therefore I verily believe that this was but an hyperbolical 
His design to draw an odium upon the Bishop from all the Nonconformists.  strain of Mr. Baxter's Rhetoric, to enhance the grossness of Bishop Morley's mistaking Charge, and to make his Readers more averse from believing of it; and withal, to make the Bishop himself the more odious to all the Nonconformists, by insinuating, that what the Bishop had affirmed to be the assertion of Mr. Baxter, he had affirmed to be the judgement of all the Nonconformists. For why else doth he entitle the Treatise, which he saith was purposely written to Answer that gross mistaking Charge of Bishop Morley, why doth he entitle it I say, The judgement of the Nonconformists? as if what I had laid to his charge, I had laid to the charge of all the Nonconformists; or as if what I had said he had maintained in the Conference at the Savoy concerning things sinful per Accidens, I had said, all the Nonconformists had maintained it also; which I never said, nor never thought they did.   

CHAP. V.  
Mr. B ' s. Assertion of things sinful by Accident not charged by the Bishop upon all or any of the Nonconformists, as he pretends it to be. The English and Scotch Presbyterians censured. Why all Religions tolerated in Holland.  
FOr indeed I know not what the judgement of Nonconformists (if by Nonconformists he mean all the Nonconformists) is in this or in any other particular, except it be in being Dissenters from the Government and discipline of our Church, as it is by Law established; no nor what is the judgement of all the Nonconformists of any one species or kind of them, (whether Presbyterians or Independents or Anabaptists or Antinomians or any other of any one denomination) as to this particular. And therefore I could not, I am sure I did not, say this or that was the judgement, or that this or that was asserted by the Nonconformists; unless Mr. Baxter will say, that He and all the Nonconformists are and must be always of the same mind and judgement, and consequently, that what I said was asserted by him, I must needs mean it to be asserted by them all also. As if he were to all the Nonconformists what the Pope is to all the Papists, virtually 
Mr. B. makes himself the Head of the Nonconformists and their Advocate;  their whole Church; and therefore as all Papists professing to believe as the Church believes, must needs believe as the Pope believes; so all Nonconformists, because they agree with him in Nonconformity, must therefore needs be of his mind in all things else also; because he takes upon him to be their head, or at least to be their mouth or Advocate General for all of them; as appears by the Title he gives to those two Books of his, which he calls The first and second part of the Nonconformists Plea for Peace; as if they all spoke by his mouth, or had all of them made him their Proxy to speak for them: which if they have done, why doth he not show us his Commission for it? which as he hath not done yet, so I am confident he will never be able to do, no not from all, or from the most of any one 
Without their Commission or approbation.  party of the Nonconformists. Which I am the bolder to affirm, because having sometimes occasionally made use of his Authority in point of opinion, and of his Example in point of practice, for the convincing of some both Presbyterians and Independents, who by their practice seemed to be of another judgement in divers things, than he was, I found that what he said or did signified little or nothing unto them: Nay, they told me in plain terms, that I was very much mistaken, if I thought that Mr. Baxter's either judgement or practice was of so great weight with them, as for that reason only, to make them alter their own either judgement or practice in any thing whatsoever: So that it doth not follow, that because Bishop Morley in that printed Letter of his saith that this or that was Mr. Baxter's Assertion, therefore he said, or must be understood as if he had said, it was the assertion of all or indeed of any other of the Nonconformists but of Mr. Baxter himself only. Of any other I say; for I did not so much 
His two Assistants at the Savoy conference discharged from that Assertion.  as charge both or either of those two Nonconformists, that were Mr. Baxter's Assistants at that Conference with asserting what he asserted. Nay, I do in that Letter of mine discharge them both from concurring with him in that Assertion, which I lay unto his charge, though he saith, he concurred with them in it. I charge him with it, because (as I tell him in my printed Letter) he did often affirm and declare it to be his; and I discharge them from it, because neither of them did affirm or declare it to be theirs, but rather seemed to dislike it, and to descent from him in it.  
But why then (will he say) do I say Crimine ab uno disce omnes, From ones ill carriage you may know the rest; which seems to imply that what I charge upon him I charge upon his whole party, as I do indeed, but not in that same place, nor speaking of the same mater, but for their censuring and condemning all other Protestant Churches in the World 
The Nonconformists condemn all Protestant Churches.  as well as ours, as Mr. Baxter did expressly at the Conference aforesaid, because They as well as We refuse to give the Communion to those that will not receive it so, as by public order it is to be received. And it was upon account of this proud, peevish and censorious humour (of which I take all the Nonconformists, and amongst them the Presbyterians especially, to be more or less guilty) that I then (taking Mr. Baxter to be a Presbyterian) said Crimine ab uno disce omnes; that is, By one man's ill temper you may know the whole party.  
But then as by Omnes All of them, I did not mean all the Nonconformists, so I did not mean all the Presbyterians neither, but those of England and Scotland 
All the Presbyterians abroad agree with us in the main point against our Presbyterians.  only; all foreign Presbyterians, that allow of and practice Calvin's Scheme of Discipline and Government of the Church, agreeing with us against our Presbyterians in the main difference betwixt us and them; namely that as it is in the power of a National Church, to appoint and prescribe to those of her own Communion the usage of such indifferent things, as she shall think to be most for order, decency and edification in the public service and worship of God; so it is in her power also, to oblige all of her Communion, to the use and observation of all such indifferent things after they are prescribed and enjoined (as long as they continue to be so) under the penalty of Excommunication, or of being excluded out of the Society or Communion of that Church, if they do not comply, and much more if they preach or write against any such orders or ordinances, as are made by public Authority, or by the Representatives of the whole Society: and most of all, if they deny thechurches' power to ordain and enjoin any such orders or ordinances; of all which Crimes, or degrees of the same crime, no other Presbyterians are guilty (for aught I know) but those of England and Scotland only; or if perhaps some be, they are excluded from Communion with the National Church wherein they live as well as Nonconformists are with us here in England; so that in Holland itself (where it is said any man may choose his own Religion, or be of what Religion he will) no man that will not subscribe to the Synod of Dort in Rituals as well as Doctrinals is, or can be admitted to be a member, and much less a Preacher in that Church: no nor to the exercise of any Office Civil, or Ecclesiastical in their Church or State. It is true, they suffer men of all Religions to live amongst them, Lutherans 
Why all Religions tolerated in Holland, and how.  as well as Calvinists, Arminians as well as Antiarminians, nay Papists as well as Protestants, and Jews as well as Christians, but not as members of their Church who are Calvinists, and Calvinists only. The rest indeed beforenamed are some of them connived at, and some of them permitted to have their Meetings and preaching after their own way, but it is at their own charge, and severely punishable if they preach or print any thing to the reproach or scandal of the Religion allowed of and established by the State.  
We wish no more, will our Sectaries perhaps say, Let us have but so much liberty as this upon the same terms, and We will thank God and you for it. But what security will you or any of you give us, that when you have that liberty, you will not all of you join together to destroy our Religion, though you know not what to set up instead of it? We see you have done so once already, and attempted it often both before and since, and why may not you do so again? For the Laws were against you then, as much as they are now, and so was the 
Such Toleration not practicable without the charge of a standing Army.  King too. And therefore granting such a Toleration of several Sects of Religion, or ways of Belief and Worship, as there are in Holland; it is not possible (humanely speaking) to secure the public peace either of Church or State, but by keeping up a standing Army of thirty or forty thousand men always in pay (even in times of peace) with a powerful Fleet at Sea, as the Hollanders do to secure themselves from Insurrections at home, as well as Invasions from abroad. Now whether the People of England will be content to be at such a Charge, and to live under such a Government, those that would have such a Liberty of Conscience, or Toleration of Religion as there is in Holland, let them inquire of the people's Representatives, and Petition them to that purpose at their next meeting.  
In the mean time all their Pleas for Peace are but sowing the seeds of War, or like Cadmus sowing the serpent's teeth, which presently grew up to so many armed men, and presently fell a cutting one another's throats; which though it will not be the first work the Sectaries will do, yet it will come to that at last.  
For preventing whereof, considering the nature of man, and the animosity, and the irreconcileableness of differences in Religion, there is no other way to secure the public Peace either in Church or State, no nor the several Sectaries themselves, from outraging and destroying one another, but either the suppressing of them all, by execution of the Laws that are or may be made against them, or by over-awing of them all by such a standing force, as may be always ready and able to keep them from joining together against the Government, or to dissipate them if they should join.  
But if the safety of the Government might be preserved and secured by either of the two aforesaid 
The necessity the Hollanders lie under of keeping up a standing force at Land and Sea.  Ways, why did not the States of the United Provinces (may some men say) make use of the former, rather than the latter of these Expedients, in order to that end? I answer, because they were always after their revolt from Spain in danger of Invasion from abroad, as well as of differences and divisions among themselves at home; and therefore, there was and always will be a necessity of their having and keeping up such a force both at Land and Sea, for their own defence against their potent and confining Enemies, as could not possibly be supported and maintained, but by so vast an Income of Revenue as was not to be expected from so small a Territory as theirs is, though never so industriously husbanded, or thriftily managed, without the help of many more hands, than their own to work and fight for them; and of many more mouths than their own, to consume what the Commodities of their own growth and their trading with other Nations brings in to them; together with the product of that Consumption by the Excise that is laid upon 
Their Excise and other Taxes.  all things that are eat, or drunk, or worn, or bought or sold amongst them: And hence it is, and from other Taxes and Impositions (which are greater than any that by the Turks are imposed upon the Christians) which all that live amongst them are subject to, that they are able to maintain such Armies and Navies as they do and must do for their defence against any sudden and powerful Invasion of them by their enemies that lie round about them; and this makes them not only to suffer as many as will, but to invite and encourage as many as they can, to come and live there, by letting them to be of what Religion they please amongst themselves (so they contribute to the public Charges as well as they who are of the Religion of the Country) because the more mouths they have to eat and drink, the more hands they are able to keep in pay, to oppose any Invasion from without, and withal to suppress and prevent any Commotion or Insurrection from within also. So that there the Toleration of so many Sects and Sectaries as are amongst them, is not only not dangerous, but in a Political sense very useful and advantageous to that Government, by helping them to keep up and pay their Army, which otherwise they must have kept up wholly at their own Charges; by which Army, the Sectaries that help to keep it up are themselves kept under.  
But here with us (thanks be to God) there is no need of having or keeping up a Standing Army, to 
We under no such necessity.  defend us against Invasions from abroad; being naturally fortified and entrenched within so wide and deep a ditch as cannot be passed on a sudden to surprise us, nor at all with such a Force as may very much endanger us, but We shall hear of it time enough to provide against it, by joining all of us (I mean all the whole Nation) together to oppose it, as certainly all of us, (unless we be mad, or worse than mad) shall do upon such an occasion, when our lives, our Wives and all that We have are at stake. And therefore (I say) We need not always be at the Charge of keeping up an Army, against any foreign Enemy, having the Sea for our Wall, and our Ships for our Bulwarks, nor for the preventing of any Insurrection or Rebellion at home neither, if the good Laws which are already made be put in execution, especially those that are made to secure 
Provided the Laws be put in execution.  the established Government both in Church and State; I mean those Laws that are made against all Recusants or Nonconformists, by what name soever they are specified or distinguished: But if instead of putting those Laws in execution, there shall be such a Toleration granted here, as there is in Holland, there will be a necessity of raising and keeping up such a standing Army here, as there is there, though not to defend us against our Enemies abroad, yet to keep peace and prevent a Civil War at home, which will infallibly be the product of such a Toleration, if there be not always a Standing Army to prevent it; and truly if there must be such an Army, it is but reason, that they for the keeping down of whom it is raised and kept up, should be at all the charge of raising and keeping up of it.   

CHAP. VI  
The Charge of that Assertion brought home, and laid at his own door.  
BUt to return from this long (though I hope not altogether impertinent or unseasonable) Digression, to what I was before speaking of; I say Mr. Baxter unjustly chargeth me with charging all, or any of the Nonconformists, but himself only with that which he calls the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley.  
And therefore if all, or any of the Nonconformists▪ think themselves injured to have this Assertion said or thought to be theirs, they may be pleased to take notice whom they are to thank or to blame for it; it is Mr. Baxter, and not Bishop Morley that imputes it to them. And if the believing of Mr. Baxter's holding and maintaining such an assertion be of so dangerous a consequence, that it puts a man into a state of damnation that doth believe it; then Woe be to me, and to all that were then there, (I mean at the Conference in the Savoy) whether Conformists or Nonconformists; for all of them as well as I, heard him assert it, and therefore they cannot choose but believe (whether they will or no) that it was his Assertion, because they heard him assert it, and that not once or twice only but often; nay Woe especially, Woe be to Mr. Baxter himself, who knows it was his Assertion; and therefore though he may, and I believe doth repent his asserting of it, yet he cannot disbelieve that he did assert it, though he were never so willing or desirous to do so; for Nescit vox missa reverti, A word once spoke is not to be recalled: and he cannot choose but remember what he cannot forget, having been then, and since, so often put in mind of it: So that Mr. Baxter has pronounced a dreadful sentence against himself, if the believing that he asserted what I charge him with, be not indeed a gross mistake (as he calls it) which whether it be or no is now to be considered.   

CHAP. VII.  
The Assertion charged upon him, laid down in terminis, with its evil consequences.  
IN order whereunto We are first to consider, what the Assertion was that I charge Mr. Baxter withal, He in his Title page to the Treatise (which he saith was purposely written to answer that Charge) saith it was this (viz.) Whatsoever may be the Occasion of sin to any, must be taken away; or that Nothing may be imposed which Men may take scandal at, or by Accident turn to sin. But the truth is that neither the one nor the other of these Assertions, was that with which I charged Mr. Baxter, either in my Sermon at Kidderminster, or in my printed Letter; but that Assertion which I charged him with, both in my aforesaid Sermon, and in my aforesaid Letter, was this, and no other but this. viz. That the enjoining things lawful by lawful Authority, if they may by Accident be the Occasion of Sin, is sinful: From whence, (if it were true) it would follow, that nothing may be imposed, that may be Accident be the occasion of Sin, nor consequently the Common Prayer Book, which was then the thing in question; but than it would follow likewise, that nothing at all could be imposed (as I then told Mr. Baxter, and since repeated in my aforesaid Letter) by any Civil, any more than by any Ecclesiastical, nor by any Divine, more than by any Humane Authority; because there is nothing which either man or God himself hath commanded, but considering the pravity of humane nature, it may by Accident, be the occasion of Sin. Now that this Assertion, which draws along with it all these Consequences, was that very Assertion, with which I charge Mr. Baxter in my Letter, and did charge him with in my Sermon, appears partly by the Letter itself, which I have reprinted, and partly by a Passage in a book Mr. Baxter had printed before, which was the occasion of my Writing and printing that Letter, and therefore I have reprinted that provoking passage of his also; both which I must desire the Reader of these Papers to peruse beforehand, that he may be the better able to judge whether what I have said already, touching what was the Assertion I charged him with, as likewise, what I shall say to prove he did assert it, be true or no; and consequently whether I in charging him with it was grossly mistaken, or he, in denying he asserted it, be not worse than grossly mistaken. For surely he cannot choose but know and remember whether he asserted it or no. But Affirmantis est probare, (as I said before) It lies upon him who affirms a thing, to prove it; and therefore seeing he denies it, I must prove it.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Some Account of the Conference at the Savoy, where in the Dispute Mr. Baxter owned and stood by that Assertion.  
AND to that end, it is to be considered what kind of thing it is, which is in question betwixt us; it is not matter of dispute, either Speculative, or Practical; (as that was, which was in question betwixt our Disputants and him and his Assistants, at the Savoy-Conference) but a mere matter of fact; namely, whether he did then and there assert, what I in my printed Letter do affirm 
The thing charged upon Mr B. matter of Fact, and proved by Testimony.  he did then and there assert, or no: which being (as I said before) mere matter of fact, is not to be proved or disproved by Metaphysical notions or Logical distinctions, but by the Testimony, pro or con, of Witnesses, that were then and there present, and such, as against whom there lies no exception; such, I am sure, I have produced to prove my Affirmative, as appears by their Subscriptions to my printed and reprinted Letter. And this Testimony of theirs, to prove my Affirmative, was by me produced and published, presently after Mr. Baxter had complained in print to those whom he calls his Parishioners of Kidderminster, (though they were never so legally) that what I had said of him in a Sermon to them, was not true, but only made use of by me, to defame him, that so he might seem to be justly prohibited by me to preach the Gospel.  
Presently (I say) after this his printed complaint 
The Bishop's Letter when and why printed.  of me, I printed that Letter of mine, partly to vindicate and confirm the truth of what I had said, or rather meant of him (for I did not name him) and partly to justify myself for silencing of him, which was not for what he had said at the Conference in the Savoy, or for what I said in my Sermon he had said there, but upon another account; namely, for preaching in my Diocese before he had obtained or asked any leave to do so, as is fully declared and proved by the aforesaid Letter; which though it was written and published for both of the aforesaid ends, yet that Attestation subscribed and annexed to it, as it was at first printed, so it is now reprinted again, not to justify my silencing of Mr. Baxter, or to prove that what he had said at the Conference, was the cause of his being silenced by me, but only to attest the truth of what I had said in my Sermon first, and afterwards in my printed Letter, Mr. Baxter had said or asserted in the aforesaid Conference; 
The Attestation why annexed to it.  which affirmation of mine and attestation of theirs (if it had not been true, and generally taken and acknowledged to be so) why in all this time (it being twenty years since that Letter of mine with that Attestation of theirs was first printed) why I say in all that time, hath none, no not so much as one of all the Nonconformists that were present at the Conference, ever as yet appeared, either to deny 
No notice taken of it for twenty years.  the one, or to disprove the other, except Mr. Baxter himself only? Nor he himself neither, till the very last year, that is, not till his Second part of the Nonconformist's plea for Peace was printed. For in the Preface of that Book it is, that Master Baxter first tells the World and me of the gross mistaking charge of Bishop Morley, meaning (as I suppose) my charging of him, and consequently (as he thinks, or rather would have it to be thought) all the Nonconformists with this Assertion, That a Command of a thing lawful in itself, by lawful Authority, if it may by Accident be the occasion of Sin, is unlawful; and consequently that no such thing ought to be imposed; or if there be any such imposition, it ought to be taken away.  
The first of which three Assertions, I acknowledge to be that which I charge Mr. Baxter with; but not all, or any other of the Nonconformists, besides Mr. Baxter himself. The two last are not 
The Consequences of Mr. B 's Assertion.  charged upon him by me, but are his own Collections from that I charge him with, as being indeed the necessary Consequences of it. For if the command of a lawful thing by lawful Authority be unlawful, if it may by accident be the occasion of Sin, than indeed it will necessarily follow first, that there ought to be no such Command or Imposition; and secondly too, that if there be any such Command or Imposition, it ought to be taken away. For Vno absurdo dato, mille sequuntur; that is, If you grant one absurdity, a thousand will follow at the heels of it: and from this Topick he may conclude against the lawfulness of any Command whatsoever, as I said before, and as I then told him. Whereupon (as it is in my Letter) when I first charged him with the horrible consequences of this Assertion of his, he denied the Assertion itself; I mean, he denied that he had asserted it, until the very words of it, which he had written a little before with his own hand, were produced and read before 
His Assertion written with his own hand.  all the Company; then indeed he added another reason, why the Command of a lawful thing by lawful Authority, might be unlawful, namely if it were commanded under an unjust penalty; Whereunto he afterward added another, or a 3d reason also, namely, if the Evil per Accidens were such as was foreseen, and aught to have been prevented or provided against by the Commander. But neither of these two last or additional reasons did make him quit or forego his first: For it was that, and only that which he stuck to at last, when his other two reasons were by our Disputants wrested from him, or made useless to him; as may appear to any rational man, that will but cast an eye upon their Arguments and his Answers to them, as they are annexed to my Letter at the end of it, where he shall find that our Disputants, being to prove, that what our Church commands to be done in the public 
The first Argument at the Savoy Conference.  service of God by those of her Communion, was lawful for her to command; Their first Argument was this, (viz.) 

That Command (supposing it to be the Command of a lawful Superior) which commands an Act in itself lawful, and no other act or circumstance unlawful, is not sinful.  
But such were all the Commands or Injunctions of our Church in the book of Common-Prayer.  
Ergo, etc.    
I Subjoin the Minor to the Major of this Syllogism, because by Mr. Baxter's not denying of the Minor, which every one believed and expected he would have denied, he seems to grant that to be true; and consequently that there is nothing in that Book enjoined or commanded by our Church, but what is lawful in itself; otherwise no doubt he would have denied the Minor, rather than the Major; 
Mr. B is reason for denying the Major.  but (as I said before) he denied the Major, first because that may be a Sin per accidens, which is not so in itself, and therefore the command thereof may be unlawful, though that Accident be not in the Command: This (I say) was the first reason he gave for his denying of the Major, as he himself confesseth in his printed Address to those of Kidderminster. Afterwards indeed, upon my urging him with those horrid consequences of such an Assertion, he added another reason for his denying the Major, or for his denying the lawfulness of the command of a lawful thing by a lawful Superior, namely, if it were commanded under an unjust penalty; for the invalidating or nullifying rather of which second reason, our Disputants second Syllogism was this, 
The 2d. Syllogism.  

That Command which commandeth an act in itself lawful, and no other act whereby any unjust penalty is enjoined, etc. is a lawful command.  
But that which the Church commands is in itself lawful, and is not commanded under an unjust penalty,  
Ergo etc.    
And here again, one would have thought Mr. Baxter would have denied the Minor, but he did not; and therefore as his not denying the Minor of the first Syllogism, was in effect a Confession, that our Church commands nothing in that Book but what is lawful in itself, so his not denying of the Minor of the second Syllogism, is in effect, a confession also, that the Church enjoins nothing in that Book under an unjust penalty: for still the Proposition he denies is the Major in this Syllogism, as well as in the former, without taking any exception to the Minor in either of them.  
But why did he deny the Major of this Syllogism? 
Mr B. denies the Major again, and his peevish reason for his so doing.  or what reason or reasons did he give for it? Why the very self same, and no other than he gave for his denial of the former; namely, because the first Act commanded may per Accidens be unlawful, and be commanded under an unjust penalty; which in plain terms, is all one as if he had said, The Command of a thing lawful in itself is sinful, because a thing lawful in itself may by Accident become sinful (which is the very Assertion I charge him withal) or because a thing commanded under no unjust penalty, may be commanded under an unjust penalty; Whereas our Major Proposition, which he denied, asserts the lawfulness of such a Command only, as is commanded under no unjust Penalty.  
Yet because there was one starting hole more, 
Another starting hole of his.  which Mr. Baxter might think to get out at; namely that though the thing commanded were lawful in itself, and though it were commanded under no unjust Penalty, yet if by Accident it might be the occasion of such an evil as the Commander ought to provide against, the commanding of it must needs be sinful and unlawful; to stop up this gap, or starting hole (I say) our Disputants added a third Syllogism to the former, of which the Major Proposition was this, 

That Command which commandeth an Act in itself lawful, and no other Act whereby any unjust 
The 3d. Syllogism.  penalty is enjoined, nor any circumstance whence directly, or per Accidens any Sin is consequent, which the Commander ought to provide against, hath in it all things requisite to the lawfulness of it, and particularly cannot be guilty of commanding an Act per Accidens unlawful, nor of commanding an Act under an unjust penalty:  
But such are all the things commanded by our Church in the aforesaid Book.  
Ergo— etc.    
And here again Mr. Baxter without excepting against 
Mr. B. in effect grants the Premises and denies the Conclusion.  the Minor Proposition, denied the Major, without giving any other reason for it, but what he had given before; which was in effect to grant both the Premises, and deny the Conclusion: for the Major is so self-evident a Proposition, that We thought he that could have the confidence to deny it, was not a man any longer to be disputed with.  
Now that these were our Arguments, and that these were his Answers, written, and given in with 
The Attestation made by Dr. Gunning and Dr. Pearson never so much as questioned.  his own hand, appears by the attestation of Dr. Gunning now Bishop of Ely, and Dr. Pearson now Bishop of Chester, and then both of them the Primarii Professores Theologiae (the King's and the Lady Margaret's Professors of Divinity) in the University of Cambridge, and two of the three Disputantsfor the Common-Prayer-Book against Mr. Baxter and his Assistants; which Attestation of theirs being printed and published twenty years ago, and never since contradicted, or so much as questioned by any of the contrary party, no not so much as by Mr. Baxter himself, to this day, I hope there needs no other proof of the truth of it. And if that Attestation be true, than it is evident, that Mr. Baxter did affirm and maintain as well as he could, from first to last, in the Conference, That the command of a thing lawful in itself, by lawful Authority, was unlawful, if by 
The Assertion charged home upon-Mr. B.  Accident it might be the occasion of Sin; though it were not commanded under an unjust penalty, and though that evil, whereof it might be the occasion by Accident, were not such as the Commander was obliged to provide against; For all this he thatdenies the aforesaid Major Proposition of the last of the aforesaid three Syllogisms, as Mr. Baxter did, must needs grant, and consequently must he needs grant and assert also, (if he will not contradict himself) That any command of anything though never so lawful in itself, by what Authority soever it is commanded, is unlawful, if it may be the occasion of Sin though per Accidens only; and though that Accidental Sin or evil be such, as the Commander either did not, or could not foresee, or was not obliged to provide against it: For all this is consequentially and necessarily affirmed and asserted by him that denies the aforesaid Major Proposition for no other reason, but because the Command may by Accident be the Occasion of Sin. But if Mr. Baxter shall say he gave another reason for his denial of the aforesaid Proposition, namely, that such a Command, though never so lawful in itself, might become unlawful, if it were commanded under an unjust penalty; I confess he did, but most illogically and irrationally; because one of the conditions of the Command which the Proposition affirms, and Mr. Baxter denies to be lawful, is, that it must not be commanded under an unjust penalty, and the reason why Mr. Baxter denies it to be lawful, is, because it is or at least it may be commanded under an unjust Penalty: which is all one as if he had said that which is not so, is so, because it may be so.  
This reason therefore being so expressly excluded as it is from being any reason at all why the Proposition which Mr. Baxter denied should be, or could be denied with any show or colour of reason, there was nothing left him to resort to or rely on as his last refuge, but his first reason; namely, because such a command, though it was not commanded under an unjust penalty, yet it might be the occasion of Sin per Accidens, and therefore unlawful to be commanded; which being given for a reason for his denying of the aforesaid Proposition of the last Syllogism, he could not mean it of such an evil per Accidens as that the commander ought to provide against, because it was another of the Conditions expressly required by the Proposition itself, to make a Command lawful, that as it should not command any thing evil in itself, so it should not command any thing neither though never so good in itself, that might by accident be the occasion of such an evil, as the Commander ought to prevent or provide against; so that the occasion of evil in that sense per Accidens, could not be the reason why Mr. Baxter denied the Proposition; and therefore by evil per Accidens in relation to this Proposition and his denial of it, he must needs mean such an evil per Accidens, as was neither commanded under an unjust penalty, nor such as the Commander was obliged to hinder or prevent. Whence it follows that Bishop Morley's charging him with asserting, That the command of that which is lawful in itself is unlawful, 
The Bishop's charge against Mr. B. no gross mistake.  if it may by Accident be the occasion of Sin, was not, as Mr. Baxter saith it was, a gross mistake, or any mistake at all, though he had not asserted it in terminis, or in express terms, as he did often when he gave it for the first of his reasons why he denied the Major Proposition of the first of the aforesaid Syllogisms.   

CHAP. IX.  
His instances of Things lawful in themselves, becoming unlawful by Accident, Impertinent to the present business.  
FRom hence it follows likewise that all those Instances (which Mr. Baxter assigns and alleges in his Narrative to his friends at Kidderminster, to free himself from the Assertion I charge him with, and which his denial of the aforesaid Proposition doth necessarily and manifestly convince him of) are all of them frivolous and impertinent, and not so only but fraudulent, and scandalous, and injurious also; I mean those instances which he gives of such evils per Accidens, as make the Commands of things good and lawful in themselves to become evil and unlawful.  
As, saith he, To command out a Navy to Sea, is not 
Mr. B is Instance of commanding out a Navy to Sea.  unlawful in itself, but if it were foreseen they would fall into the enémies' hands, or were like to perish by any Accident, and the necessity of sending them were small or none, it were a Sin to send them. Again (saith Mr. Baxter) it is not unlawful of itself to sell poison, or to give a knife to another, or 
Of selling poison.  to bid another to do it, but if it were foreseen (he must mean by him that sells the poison, or gives the knife) that they will be used to poison or kill the buyer (he might have added, or any body else) it is unlawful. He goes on and saith, It is not of itself unlawful to light a Candle, or set fire on straw, but if it may be (he should have said if it be) 
Of lighting a candle.  foreknown (to him) that by another's negligence or wilfulness it is like to set fire to the City, or give fire to a train of Gunpowder that is under the Parliament House when the King and Parliament are there, I crave the Bishop's pardon (saith he) for believing it were Sinful to do or command it. You 
All granted  have it, Mr. Baxter, you have the Bishop's pardon not only for believing as you say you do in this last, but in all the former particulars which you instance in also: And I do assure you the Bishop believes them all as much as you do, and so I am confident do all the Episcopal Party in England; for they are all of them notoriously and unquestionably true; and are undoubtedly sufficient to prove the Command of a thing lawful in itself to be unlawful, if the Commander foresees it will be by Accident the cause or occasion of such an evil or mischief as he ought to prevent.  
But what is this to the proving the Command of a thing lawful in itself to be unlawful, if it may be by 
Nothing to the purpose.  Accident the cause or occasion of some such evil as the Commander doth not foresee, or is not bound to prevent? For such a Command it must be, that Mr. Baxter by his denial of the aforesaid Proposition is obliged to prove to be unlawful; and therefore the more of such Instances as these he doth or may allege, the more he seems to prevaricate in his own 
Mr. B is prevarication.  cause, and to argue against himself; just as I have heard a Pleader at the Bar did in Westminster Hall, when the Judge interrupting him, said to him, You, such a one, if you love your Client or his cause, speak no more; for you are all this while speaking against him, though you think you speak for him: The like may I say of Mr. Baxter, and of his Instances, because they do not only not disprove, but prove and confirm the truth of my Charge against him. For if it be the Commander's foreseeing, and being obliged to prevent such an evil or mischief as his Command will be (though but per Accidens) the occasion of, that makes his command to be unlawful; then if the Commander do not foresee it, or be not obliged to prevent it, the Command is not unlawful; as Mr. Baxter by his denying of the aforesaid 
The charge against him stands good.  Proposition must needs conclude it was; so that all his aforesaid Instances are (as I said before) frivolous and impertinent, as to the disproving of my Charge against him, or to the proving of it to be a gross mistaking Charge, as he saith it is.   

CHAP. X.  
His other Instance of Kneeling at the Sacrament, as imposed by an unjust Penalty, were it true, reacheth not his Case.  
ANd so is the other Instance of his likewise which makes the two reasons (which in his aforesaid Answer he did severally insist upon) to be but one, namely, Supposing (saith he) to kneel at the Sacrament to be never so lawful in itself, if it be imposed by a 
His Instance of kneeling at the Sacrament as frivolous;  penalty incomparably beyond the proportion of the offence, that Penalty is an accident of the Command, and maketh it by Accident sinful in the Commander. This instance I say of his, though he speaks of it as very pertinent and argumentative, yet is it as frivolous and impertinent as any of the former; I mean as to the discharging him from the Charge I charge him with, and which his denying of the aforesaid Proposition proves him to be guilty of. For supposing all that he supposeth in this Instance to be 
Supposing an unjustpenalty;  never so true; namely, that the penalty for not receiving the Sacrament is an accident to the command of Kneeling, and supposing too, that penalty to be incomparably beyond the proportion of the offence, and consequently must needs make the command itself to be Sinful in the Commander of it under such a penalty; supposing all this (I say) to be true: what then? Doth this prove the Command of a thing lawful in itself and commanded under no unjust penalty to be sinful in the Commander of it? For this it must prove, or it proves nothing at all, as to the discharging Mr. Baxter from what his denial of the aforesaid proposition proves against him. For doth not that proposition say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or in express words, that The command which it affirms to be a lawful command, must, first, command an act in itself lawful; and, secondly, no other Act whereby an unjust penalty is enjoined; nor, thirdly, any circumstance whence directly or per Accidens any Sin is consequent, which the Commander ought to provide against? And yet such a Command so qualified did Mr. Baxter then deny to be lawful, as appears by the aforesaid subscribed Attestation. And now, what he then denied to be lawful, though it were not commanded under an unjust penalty, he would by this instance prove to be unlawful, because it is commanded, or rather because he supposeth it to be commanded under an unjust penalty. Quo te constringam Protea nodo? What tye can hold one, who so Proteus like shifts his shape? For whether it be or be not commanded under an unjust penalty, the command it seems must be alike unlawful, if Mr. Baxter and his Disciples list not to obey it, that is, if they themselves are not the Commanders of it.  
Again supposing, but not granting Mr. Baxter's supposed unjust penalty for not kneeling at the receiving 
And supposing such an accident as the commander ought to provide again?.  of the Sacrament to be an Accident to the command of kneeling; I ask him, whether it be such an accident as the Commander ought to provide against, or no? If not, how can it be sinful in the Commander to command it? or how can it make his commanding of it to be unlawful? But if it be such an Accident as the Commander ought to provide against, (as indeed every unjust penalty is) than this instance of his is altogether as frivolous and impertinent as any of his former. For that command which we affirmed, and he denied to be lawful, and consequently asserted to be unlawful, was to be such a Command as commanded an Act lawful in itself, and no other Act whence directly or per Accidens any Sin is consequent, which the Commander ought to provide against: But this instance of his, is of such a Command, as is per accidens at least the cause or occasion of some such evil, or sin, as the Commander ought or is obliged to provide against. Whereas if he had meant to speak pertinently (in order to the discharging himself from my charge against him) he should have given us an Instance of the unlawfulness of a lawful command by lawful Authority, where no evil which the Commander ought to provide against, was any way consequent either directly or by Accident only. But this he hath not done yet, nor I dare say ever will do, or can do, though the Metaphysical Limbeck of his brain sweat never so much for it.   

CHAP. XI.  
Those Instances of his, as they are Impertinent, so they are Fraudulently designed.  
ANd thus having (as I suppose) made it appear that all Mr. Baxter's Instances are frivolous and impertinent as to the proving what I charge him with, to be a gross mistake, or indeed any mistake at all, I am now to make it appear also, that those before specified Instances of his, are not only frivolous and impertinent, but fraudulent, scandalous and injurious, and (I am afraid) malicious also, as to the intention and design of them.  
And first, they are fraudulent, and fraudulently 
The fraudulence of these Instances detected.  alleged by Mr. Baxter, because by all and every of those Instances, he would make his Readers to believe that all that he had asserted at the Conference in the Savoy was only the unlawfulness of such commands as the Commander of them foresaw would by accident at least be the cause or occasion of some such evil or mischief as the Commander ought or was obliged to hinder, or provide against; or of such Commands as were commanded under an unjust penalty. For as to make his Readers believe the former, he produceth the instances of commanding a Navy to Sea by him that foresees it would fall into the enemy's hands; and the selling of Poison by him that foresees it will be used to kill the buyer or some body else with it; and of setting Fire on Straw, foreknowing that by another's negligence or wilfulness it is likely to set fire on the City or the Parliament-House; as by these and the like instances (I say) he would make his Parishioners at Kidderminster and others of his Readers believe the former; namely, that when he asserted that the command of a thing lawful in itself was unlawful, if it might by accident be the cause or occasion of sin, he meant it only of such commands where the evil or sin which by accident they would, or probably might be the cause of, was foreseen or ought to have been hindered by the Commander: So by the last of his instances; namely, supposing to kneel at the receiving of the Communion to be lawful, yet the enjoining of it under an unjust penalty makes the Command itself to be unlawful; he would make it to be believed that he did not deny the command of a lawful thing by lawful authority to be lawful, unless it were enjoined or commanded under an unjust penalty, such as he supposeth the penalty for not receiving the Sacrament kneeling to be. So that adding 
Mr. B is design in them.  this last instance to the former, and considering them one with another, or all of them together, his design in alleging of them must needs be this, to make it to be believed that whereas Bishop Morley chargeth him with having affirmed the Command of a lawful Act by lawful Authority to be unlawful, if by accident it might be the cause of sin; all that he said or at least all that he meant was this, that such a Command was unlawful, if the evil, it might by accident be the cause of, was foreseen and ought to have been prevented by him that commanded it, or if it were commanded under an unjust penalty; and consequently that Bishop Morley's charge of him was a gross mistake.  
Whereunto Bishop Morley replies by referring 
His charge convincingly renewed upon him.  himself to Mr. Baxter's aforesaid answers to our Disputants aforesaid Propositions, especially to the third or last of them, which affirming such a command of a thing lawful in itself, under no unjust penalty, and neither directly, nor by accident, the cause of any such evil or mischief, as the Commander of it did foresee, and aught to prevent, was a lawful command; Mr. Baxter by denying this proposition to be true, and consequently such a command to be lawful, because it might be evil by accident, cannot be imagined to mean such an accident as the Commander did foresee, and aught to prevent, nor the enjoining what he commanded under an unjust penalty: both which kinds of accidents the proposition he denied had in terminis excluded; and therefore he must needs mean such an accident as the Commander did not foresee, or was not obliged to prevent; and such a Command as had no unjust penalty annexed to it; and consequently some such accident as either the peevishness or perverseness, or some fault or other in those to whom such a command is given, and who ought and will not submit to it, is the cause of. That therefore 
What he must mean by Accident in his Assertion at the Savoy.  which I did then, and do still charge Master Baxter withal, is, that he did then at the aforesaid Conference assert the Command of a thing lawful in itself to be unlawful, if by accident it might be the occasion of Sin; now that by accident he did not, nor could not mean either the enjoining of it under an unjust penalty, or any other accidental evil which the Commander was obliged to prevent or provide against, is evident, from his denying the Proposition to be true, which affirmed such and no other but such a command of a thing lawful in itself to be lawful, as was neither commanded under an unjust penalty, nor could by accident be the occasion of any either evil or mischief, which the Commander was answerable for or aught to prevent: From Mr. Baxter's denying of this Proposition (I say) and from his giving no other reason for his denying of it, but that such a command as the Proposition affirmed to be lawful might by accident be unlawful, it is undeniably evident he must needs mean such an accident or accidental evil as the Commandee, not the Commander may be guilty of; and if no Command be lawful, that may be the occasion of such an evil, then (as Mr. Baxter truly tells his Kidderminster 
The consequence of his Assertion urged.  Friends) Bishop Morley did infer that no Command either of God or man could be lawful, or (as he is pleased to word it) That neither God nor man can enjoin any thing without Sin, if the sinfulness, it may by accident be the occasion of in those to whom the Command is given, be to be imputed either to the Command, or to the Commander, which I think is little less than blasphemy to affirm; and therefore Mr. Baxter had reason to disguise the Assertion I charge him with, by giving such instances 
His Instances only disguises of his Assertion.  of it as are nothing a kin to it; for all his aforesaid instances are instances of the unlawfulness of such Commands as are or may be the cause or occasion of some such evil or mischief as the Commander foresees and is obliged to prevent, or of such as are commanded under an unjust penalty. Whereas if he would have dealt ingenuously and pertinently he should have given us one instance at least, if not more of the unlawfulness of such a Command, (as he asserted at the Conference to be unlawful, namely of the unlawfulness of such a Command) as was neither commanded under an unjust penalty, nor was the occasion or cause of any such evil, mischief or sin, as the Commander did not foresee, or was not bound to prevent. For how does the unlawfulness of selling of Poison by an Apothecary to one whom he knows or suspects will poison himself or some body else with it, prove the unlawfulness of selling of poison by him that doth not know or suspect any such use will be made of it, because it may fall out that some body or other may be poisoned with it? Or how doth the unlawfulness of commanding a Navy to Sea, when the Commander foresees it will fall into the Enemy's hands, prove the unlawfulness of such a Command, because by such a chance as the Commander did not, nor could not foresee, it did fall into the Enemy's hands? or lastly, how doth the unlawfulness of commanding to kneel at the receiving of the Sacrament, if it were commanded under an unjust penalty, as he supposeth, (but did not nor cannot prove it is) prove the unlawfulness of the same command if it be not commanded under an unjust penalty, as We and all other Protestant Churches in the World, as well as ours, say it is not? for proof whereof I refer the Reader to what I have said long ago in my printed Letter.   

CHAP. XII.  
Further, those Instances are scandalously Injurious. His disingenuous humour of Calumny taken notice of.  
AND now having showed what in truth it was that I charged Mr. Baxter withal, and that I charged him with it truly; and consequently, that all his Instances to the contrary are frivolous, and impertinent, and fraudulent; I am now to make it appear that they are scandalously (if not maliciously) injurious also. For first, as nothing can be more fraudulent than for a man, when he is charged with an Assertion that is false, and in its consequences impious and blasphemous, to substitute 
The Injuriousness of th●se Instances made ou●;  a true one instead of it; and by giving many instances of the latter to endeavour to make it to be believed he is not guilty of the former; so, nothing can be more provoking and injurious than to charge another falsely with what himself may be charged truly: And does not Mr. Baxter do so, by producing those aforesaid instances of his, which no man can read that hath any opinion of Mr. Baxter's veracity and sincerity, but must needs conclude Bishop Morley or those that disputed with Mr. Baxter had affirmed, That the Command of that which is lawful in itself is a lawful Command, 
As implying that the Bishop had asserted the contrary:  though it be commanded under never so unjust a penalty; which is more than insinuated by the last of his instances before specified, namely the Command of Kneeling when we receive the Sacrament, as likewise that I, or they, or some of us, had affirmed the Command of a thing lawful in itself, to be a lawful Command, though the Commander did foresee it would be the cause of some great evil or mischief, which he was bound to prevent; and this is not only insinuated, but necessarily employed in all the rest of the instances produced by him, as in that of sending of a Navy to Sea, foreseeing it will fall into the enemy's hand; and that of selling of Poison, knowing he that buys it will poison himself or some body else with it; concerning which and the like damnable actions he doth in effect plainly enough tell me, that I allow such things to be lawful, when in his libellous Narrative to his Kidderminster Friends he tells them he must crave the Bishop's pardon for believing those or any of the like commands to be sinful; as if the Bishop had asserted all or any of them to be lawful; which if it can be proved the Bishop did, either 
Which the Bishop utterly disclaims.  expressly or implicitly, formally or virtually, dogmatically or consequentially, say there, or any where, any thing which can grammatically be construed or logically inferred to tend towards the asserting or approving of any of the aforesaid instances, the Bishop himself doth hereby acknowledge himself to be utterly unworthy to be called a Bishop, or a Priest, or a Christian, or a Man, but rather a Devil incarnate, or an utter and professed Enemy to all Mankind. But if the Bishop did never affirm or say any such thing, nay if he and the Disputants of the Episcopal party did not by that Proposition, which Mr. Baxter frequently and finally denied, assert the contradictory to this calumny, namely that what the Church enjoined in the Common-Prayer-Book or public service of God, and the Sectaries refused to obey, were therefore lawful injunctions and commands, not only because they were lawful in themselves, and commanded by lawful Authority, but because they were not commanded under any unjust penalty, or might so much as by accident be the cause of any such evil or sin, as they by whom they were enjoined, aught to provide against; if this (I say) be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth of what was then affirmed by Bishop Morley, or by the Disputants, or any other of the Episcopal party as really it is; (and I defy Mr. Baxter, or any of his party to prove the contrary) what then doth Master Baxter deserve for endeavouring by his impertinently, 
Mr. B 's notorious Calumny.  fallaciously and injuriously at least (if not maliciously) alleged Instances, to make so notoriously-impious, unchristian and inhuman a Calumny to be believed, not only of Bishop Morley, but of all the Episcopal party that were there present; for sure Bishop Morley did not differ from the rest of his party, nor the rest of his party from him in this, or any other particular at that Conference?  
And to this very purpose it is in the 48th proposition of the Book (which he saith was purposely written to answer Bishop Morley 's grossly mistaken charge) that Mr. Baxter resumes his instance 
In his Book called The judgement of Nonconformists of things sinful by Accident p. 65.  of an Apothecary's selling Poison to one who he knows will kill his Neighbour, or himself, or his Prince with it, as of a thing thought lawful and justified by us; because (as he makes us speak) the selling of Poison is lawful per se, of itself, and unlawful only per accidens, by accident. Whereunto he adds in the same place, That he hopes that our Casuists (meaning the Casuists of 
Some other Instances of his calumnious dealing.  the Conforming party) shall never see a Law made to command or tolerate all Apothecaries to sell Poison to those that they know mean to use it to treason or murder; As if we had any such amongst us, I mean, of the Episcopal party, that not only justify the selling of Poison by those that know it will be used for Murder or Treason, but would have a Law made to command or tolerate the doing of it. If there be any such Casuists amongst us, I will readily acknowledge they are as bad, if not worse than the worst of the Jesuits; but let Mr. Baxter name any, at least one such Casuist of ours, if he can, or if he cannot, if he have any thing of Ingenuity left in him, let him confess his fraudulent and injurious dealing with us and repent of it. For as for that passage which he quotes out of Ecclesiastical Polity 
* Page. 23.  to prove the Author of that Book such a Casuist as he speaks of, it is so illogical and unconcluding, that none but one that cares not what he says, or that thinks his Ipse dixit, his own bare saying, is enough to conclude quidlibet ex quolibet, any thing from any thing, would have quoted it upon such an occasion.  
In the mean time I do not, I cannot deny, but 
Some amongst us as bad Casuists as the Jesuits.  there be some, nay many Casuists among us, (but they are not of us) as bad as any of the Jesuits, especially in that Casuistical doctrine which is most Jesuitical; I mean, that of the lawfulness of Subjects taking Arms against their Sovereign; nay of selling, buying, imprisoning, deposing and murdering of Kings by their Subjects; I need not name those Casuists, Mr. Baxter knows whom I mean. But of this no more at this time, neither should there have been so much, if Mr. Baxter had not forgotten what he might have learned at School without going to the University; that Qui alterum accusat probri, ipsum se intueri oportet, He who chargeth another with a crime, aught to look home to himself: and it is but just, Vt qui ex maledicendo voluptatem capit, malè audiendo amittat; That he who takes pleasure in speaking ill of others, should lose that pleasure by having his own faults told him.  
And indeed I have very often and very much wondered, that of all men living Mr. Baxter should reproach us so frequently, so loudly, and so groundlessly as he does, with what he knows himself and his party may most justly and undeniably be reproached with, unless he thinks the calling of an honest Woman Whore first will make her that calls her so, to be thought an honest Woman. And indeed men are apt to believe that one would not for shame accuse another of what he knows himself to be more guilty; but experience proves the contrary. And I hope I have proved it too, partly by confirming my Charge against Mr. Baxter, and partly by confuting his Calumny against me. But the truth is, when Mr. Baxter is in his fit of raving against 
Mr. B. cares not what he says against the Bishops.  Bishops and the Episcopal party, he cares not whether what he saith be true or false, pertinent or impertinent, so it be virulent and scandalous enough; having amongst many other of their speculative and practical Maxims, learned of the Popish Puritans, the Jesuits, calumniari audacter, to charge boldly, as hoping that aliquid hoerebit, something will stick, though it be never so improbable or incredible; at least that those of their own Party will believe any thing of or against us, which is perhaps all they care for; of which practice that Mr. Baxter is often and very much guilty in his treating of me, I have given some Instances already, and shall give more hereafter.   

CHAP. XIII.  
The Charge of the forementioned Assertion renewed and made good against Mr. B. notwithstanding that late Treatise of his which he pretends was purposely written in answer to it.  
IF it be objected, that I have said nothing yet in answer to the Creatise, which Mr. Baxter saith he writ on purpose to prove my Charge against him, to be a gross mistake; I confess I have not, because in truth I do not see how I am concerned in it, or how 
That Treatise of his impertinent to this business.  any thing I charge Mr. Baxter withal, is disproved, or so much as offered to be disproved by it. Insomuch that (as I said before) if Mr. Baxter had set out that Treatise by itself, and had not in the Preface to another of his Treatises told me himself, it was purposely written against me, I should not have taken any notice of it at all; neither do I yet, (after the reading of it over and over again and again) see any reason why I should put myself to the trouble of writing, or any body else to the trouble of reading, any thing in reply to it; because if all and every one of his sixty three Metaphysical Propositions, (of which that Treatise of his doth consist) were all of them so many Mathematical Demonstrations (as perhaps he thinks they are) yet my Charge of Mr. Baxter would still stand in full force against him, being not so much as touched, much less overthrown, by any of those Propositions. For 
His charge repeated.  what was that I charged Mr. Baxter withal? was it not this? That he at the Conference in the Savoy denied the command of a thing lawful in itself, and commanded by lawful authority, to be a lawful command, if by accident it might be the cause or occasion of Sin? Yes, will Mr. Baxter say, but then 
His shame Answer,  by accident I meant not every accident, but such an accident as the Commander might and ought to prevent; as for example, the commanding it under an unjust penalty (for that he will have to be an accident) or the commanding of it, though the Commander knows or foresees it will by accident be the cause or occasion of some such evil, or mischief, as he can and aught to provide against. And in the one or the other of these two notions of an accident, would Mr. Baxter have his Assertion (of the unlawfulness of a Command of a lawful thing by lawful Authority, if by accident it may be the occasion of Sin) to be understood; and I cannot blame him; for Secundoe cogitationes sunt meliores, Second thoughts are likely wiser and better than the first. But that he did not then by such an accident as made a lawful command 
with the reply to it.  unlawful, mean an accident in either of those notions is evident, by his frequently and finally denying the command of a thing lawful in itself to be lawful, if by accident it may be the cause of Sin, though it be not enjoined under an unjust penalty, and though the accidental evil or mischief, it may be cause or occasion of, be such as the Commander either cannot or ought not to provide against. Now, he that denies such a command as this to be lawful, or (which is all one) asserts such a command as this to be unlawful, because by accident it may be the cause of Sin, cannot either Grammatically or Logically be understood, to mean such an accident or accidental Sin as the Commander ought to provide against; and consequently, if he mean any thing, he must needs mean such an accident, or accidental evil, as not the Commanding, but the Commanded party, is to answer for. And therefore as 
The consequence of his Assertion.  I said then so I say now, That to assert the lawful command of a lawful thing, to be unlawful, upon such an account, or because it may by such an accident (as Mr. Baxter must needs be understood to mean) be the cause or occasion of Sin, is destructive of all Legislative power Divine as well as Humane: And therefore Bishop Morley was not grossly mistaken either in charging Mr. Baxter with such an assertion, or in charging such an assertion with such impious and pernicious consequences, as he affirms, and I confess I did.  
But Mr. Baxter doth grossly abuse me, and his 
His soul dealing.  Reader too, by substituting a true Assertion instead of a false one for himself, and a false one instead of a true one for the Bishop and his party. As if that which he asserted, was, The unlawfulness of the command of a lawful thing, if either it were commanded under an unjust penalty, or the Commander of it did foresee it would be the cause of some such great evil or sin, as he was obliged to prevent; and that which we had asserted, was, The lawfulness of a Command of a thing lawful in itself, though it were commanded under never so unjust a penalty, or though the Commander of it foresaw it would be the cause of such an evil or mischief as he might and ought to prevent. And as to make the latter of these two Assertions to be believed to be ours, he brings in the aforesaid Suppositions and fraudulent instances of selling of poison, etc. So to make the former to be believed to have been his Assertion then, he asserts that, and none but that now; hoping his friendly or unwary Readers will believe it was the very same which he asserted then. And this indeed he might have reason to hope for from his Friends at Kidderminster, who he knew would believe whatsoever he told them, to be, as he said it was, especially telling it them in print, and before there was any thing in print to the contrary; but that he should think to impose such a belief upon the impartial part of the World, after the truth of what I charge him with had been so long before attested in print, under the hands of two such men, as the Bishops of Ely and Chester, (who could not choose but know what was then said on both sides) is a confidence that never any yet even of Mr. Baxter's own party hath assumed, and I believe never will.  
Good reason therefore had I to reprint that Letter 
The Attestation annexed to the printed Letter proves the charge of that Assertion against Mr. B.  of mine together with the aforesaid Attestation annexed to it, that what is in question betwixt Mr. Baxter and me might truly and clearly be stated, (namely, whether he did, or did not assert what I charge him with) which being only matter of fact, and consequently no way to be decided but by Witnesses, and such Witnesses as cannot justly, nor ever were actually, either by Mr. Baxter himself, or any of his party, in so many years since excepted against; and they having testified so clearly and effectually (as they do) that charge of mine against Mr. Baxter; I know not what needed to have been done more, for my justification and his conviction, but the reprinting of the testimony of two such Witnesses as 
Nothing he saith now can invalidate that testimony.  they are. Against whose Testimony, as to the invalidating of it, nothing he asserts now, though never so true, nor none of the Instances he gives of such an Assertion, though never so pertinent, do, or can signify any thing; for that which I charge him with, and what the aforesaid Witnesses testify against him, is only concerning what he asserted then, and not what he hath asserted at any time since, or doth assert now; which, as is already proved, is very far from being the same which he asserted then. And this Mr. Baxter himself must needs confess, unless he will say (as I think he will not) that there is no difference betwixt denying (as he did then) the command of a lawful thing to be lawful, though it be not commanded under an unjust penalty, and the denying (as he doth now) the lawfulness of such a command if it be commanded under an unjust penalty; or as if it were all one to assert (as he did then) the command of a thing lawful in itself to be unlawful, if by accident it might be the cause or occasion of evil or sin, though it were such an evil or sin as the Commander was not obliged to prevent; and to assert (as he doth now) such a command to be unlawful, if the evil or sin which it might be the cause of, were foreseen and ought to have been prevented by the Commander: But these 
What he saith now, contrary to what he said then.  Assertions being so contrary, (as they are) to one another, Mr. Baxter's asserting that which is true now, will not excuse him from having asserted that which was false then, which was all that I charged him with. If he hath changed his mind since, and be ashamed to own and maintain now, what he then held and asserted, and therefore sought to palliate and disguise it as well as he could, yet he ought not to have excused himself by accusing me, (and which is much worse) by endeavouring to make it to be believed that we of the Episcopal Party asserted the Command of a lawful thing to be lawful, if it were commanded by lawful Authority, though under never so unjust a penalty, and though the Commander did foresee that it would by accident be the cause of never so great a mischief, and such as he knew he was bound to prevent; as the selling of Poison by an Apothecary who foresees it will be made use of to poison some body; and thereby implying that they were only such things as this, or of the like nature to this, which we asserted, and he denied to be lawful; which is evidently and equally 
His false representation of the thing  false in relation to us, and to himself also; for we never asserted the lawfulness of the one nor denied the unlawfulness of the other, as he would have it to be believed we did; so that to what I charged him with before, I must now add not only his want of ingenuity in disguising and misrepresenting what He asserted or denied, but his being guilty of Calumny also, in disguising and misrepresenting what we asserted or denied, at the aforesaid Conference in the Savoy.  
And therefore this being the ground of all that he 
That Treatise of his grounded on a false supposition.  hath said in that Treatise, of which he saith it was purposely written against me to confute my gross mistaking charge against him, needs no refutation, because it proceeds all the way ex falso supposito, upon a false supposition, as if what he asserts there, were the same that he asserted at the Conference; or as if, because what he asserted afterwards was true, therefore what he had said before was not false; or lastly, as if, because he doth not continue to say so, therefore he never did say so; by which kind of Logic he might as well conclude he never thought it lawful to fight against the King, because he now doth not, or at least pretends he doth not; or that he never writ all his Political Aphorisms, because he tells us since that he hath recanted some of them; or that he never thought it lawful to subscribe and conform, when he was ordained by a Bishop, because he doth not think so now: such Inferences as these are not, nor cannot be true, when they are affirmed of any fallible and mutable subject, as all men are both in their Words and Actions; and Mr. Baxter (will some men say) hath been so as much as any man in both of them. So that having sufficiently 
The issue of the whole matter; His charge stands good.  proved, that which I charged Mr. Baxter with, which was, what he asserted then, I have sufficiently discharged myself from being so grossly mistaken as he pretended, or indeed from being mistaken at all; And therefore need say nothing, or at lest no more than I have said already in answer to the aforesaid Book or Treatise of his, which only tells us what his Judgement of things sinful per accidens is now but not what it was then; which was the thing and only thing I charged him withal, which he is so far from disproving, that he doth not as much as deny it, or take any notice at all of it, in this whole Treatise, which he pretends purposely to have written for the confutation of it; which it is so far from confuting, that there be several of his own Propositions in that Treatise that do implicitly and 
His own Treatise fights against him.  consequentially justify my Charge against him, by proving that Proposition of ours to be true, which he then denied as false.  
For Example, Prop. 31. 
* Vid his book of Things sinful by accident.  He saith, Rulers may command many things which the Subject may by accident make sinful for himself to do. And in the next Proposition, he saith, There be some accidents rendering the Act commanded unlawful, which the Commander may and aught to make provision against, or prevent; But there are some which he neither can, nor is bound therefore to forbear or to change his Laws; because (as it follows in the next Proposition) the public welfare is not to be hazarded to save a particular person from himself, and from his sinful inclination to ill doing. And of such Laws, and of such evils, and of such only per accidens did our Proposition in express terms affirm then, what Mr. Baxter asfirms now, but then denied.  
Again, Propos. 36. Mr. Baxter saith, Wicked men are so much inclined to turn all things into sin, that it is not possible to command any thing so good, which bad men may not make sinful use of. Which I hope Mr. Baxter intends not for an Argument to prove the command of lawful things by lawful Authority to be unlawful; nor consequently, to justify his aforesaid denial of our aforesaid Proposition, or to disprove my Charge against him for denying of it.  
Much less doth that Instance he gives in his 48 
The instance of an Aptthecary's selling poison canva, ed.  Proposition come near to what is controverted betwixt him and me, and was then controverted betwixt him and our Disputants at the Savoy. I mean the so often alleged aforesaid instance of an Apothecary's selling of Poison to one whom he knows will use it to murder himself, or some body else with it; which to maintain or justify to be lawful, because it is a sin per accidens, is, saith Mr. Baxter, an inhuman Error: And so indeed it is; and therefore as we were worse than the worst of men, if his imputation of it to us were true; so it being so false, that nothing can be falser, I will not say what Mr. Baxter is, but I will say that his imputing that inhuman Error 
Mr. B 's slanderous imputation.  unto us, as being held, taught, or countenanced, or any way connived at by us, or by any Casuist of ours, is an inhuman and Diabolical slander. For we would have Mr. Baxter know, that we are not so muddy brained (as he is pleased to say we are) but we can and do distinguish betwixt what a Man doth or may foresee, and what he doth not or cannot; as likewise betwixt what a Commander can, and is obliged to hinder, and what either he cannot, or is not obliged to hinder. The former is Mr. Baxter's Apothecary's case, and therefore we do not call his selling of Poison (knowing what mischief will be done with it) a sin or cause of sin per accidens; Mr. Baxter may call it so if he pleases, Nobis 
The Case rightly stated.  non licet esse tam disertis, but we that love to speak plain English, and to call a spade a spade, do not call such a selling of Poison, a casual or an accidental, but an intended and a presumptuous sin; not a Chance-medley, but wilful murder in the Seller, as well as in the Buyer of the poison. Because though the selling and the buying of poison be not sinful per se, or in itself, abstracting from the End for which, and the Intention with which it is sold or bought, because it may be sold and bought and used for a good end as well as for a bad; yet in Mr. Baxter's Apothecary's case, the selling as well as the buying of it is sinful per se and not per accidens, because the Seller is supposed to foresee what the Buyer will do with it. For according to our Grammar, and our Logic too, per accidens is not always nor only opposed to per se, but to praevisum and praedestinatum, to what is foreseen and designed aforehand also; so that whatsoever falls out or comes to pass contra or proeter intentionem or opinionem agentis, Contrary to the intention or opinion or expectation of the Agent, may be said to be per accidens, whether it be per se or no. And in this notion of per accidens Mr. Baxter's Apothecary's selling of poison, cannot excuse him from being a Murderer, or guilty of murder per se, and not per accidens only; no not though per accidens there were not that ill use, that he thought there would be, made of it.  
I might say the like of his Impropriety of speech, when he tells us, That the command of a lawful thing under an unjust penalty is a sin in the Commander per 
Another instance of his, misapplying the term per accidens.  accidens. For though an unjust penalty be an accident or accidental as to the command itself, because it might have been commanded under no penalty at all, or under some other more equitable penalty; yet in respect of the Commander and commanding of it, it is sinful per se, and not per accidens; notwithstanding Mr. Baxter's Metaphysical notion to the contrary: which I note the rather, that he and his admirers may see that he is not the Man of that distinctness in his Notions, nor of that propriety and accurateness in his Expressions, as he would be thought to be; the want whereof he doth so frequently and so insultingly impute to his Adversaries upon all occasions, and particularly in this Treatise of his which we are now speaking of.   

CHAP. XIV.  
A farther Prosecution of that Treatise, as also a farther Account of the Conference at the Savoy.  
IN the beginning of which Treatise, speaking of the Men he had to do with at the Savoy-Conference, he saith, that 
* Vid. The Nonconformists judgement of things sinful by Accident, p. 1.  as they were men of confounding Practices, so they were men of confused Conceptions, and such as could not be reconciled to distinctness and congruity of speech. For with this Encomium of those that disputed with him, he begins that Treatise of his, which he saith he writ 
His Encomium of the Episcopal party.  purposely against me; but I am sure that characteristical Preface thereunto cannot so properly be meant of me, as of those that disputed with him; at least it cannot be meant of me only, but of them also, nor of them and me only neither, but of the whole Episcopal party, at least as to the first Clause of the Character whereby he describes his Adversaries, when he saith, They were Men of 
Why he calls them men of confounding practices.  confounding Practices; for so he takes it for granted the Bishops and Episcopal party are, because they will not consent to the alteration of the settled Government, either in Church or State; or the letting in of Wolves and Foxes in Sheep's clothing into the Sheepfold; I mean all the several sorts of Sectaries, who descent as much perhaps or more from one another than all of them do from us: and consequently such, as if they were admitted within the Pale of the Church, would bring in a very Babel of Confusion along with them. And it is this, and nothing else but this, I mean the keeping of Anarchy and confusion out of the Church and State, which Mr. Baxter is pleased to call a confounding practice: But then he should have remembered who They are, whom he so rudely reflects 
Whom he must mean by that Title.  upon, and who are the Men of such confounding practices: Surely, They were not the men he had to do with, whether by them he means any or all of the Conforming Party that were at that Conference; for what do We conform to but the Laws? and who are the Makers of those Laws for Conformity, and for excluding all that will not conform, but the Parliament? That is, the King, with the consent of Lords and Commons, (and not the Bishops, who do nothing but in obedience to those Laws,) are the Men whom Mr. Baxter (if he speaks properly, as he would be thought to do always) must needs mean by the men of confounding Practices; which how he will justify if he be called in question for it, he were best to consider.  
But as for the men of confused Conceptions, and such as could not be reconciled to distinctness 
Whom he means by the men of confused conceptions.  and congruity of speech, I doubt not but he meant Me for one, (as I doubt not neither but he meant me for one of the men of confounding Practices also) but as he meant more besides myself, when he speaks of men of confounding Practices, so he must do also, when he speaks of men of confused Conceptions; because he speaks of men in the plural number, speaking of both the sorts of them; and therefore by the men of confused Conceptions, though he may, and I believe doth mean me for one, yet he must needs mean those that disputed with him as well as me, and rather them than me, or any other of the Bishops that were there; for the Disputants on our part were they, that he and his Assistants had to deal with.  
And they were men that, I dare say, were never 
Their just Vindication.  thought by any, but Mr. Baxter, to be men of such confused Conceptions, and so irreconcilable to distinctness, and congruity of speech, that is, so utterly without Logic or Grammar as he would have them thought to be. I am sure the University of Cambridge did not think them to be so, when two of them were made the Primary Professors of Theology in that famous University: Neither did the King think them to be so, when he made all three of them Bishops: nor did We that were then Bishops, think them to be so when we made choice of them to be ours and the Church's Advocates in a Cause of so high concernment as that was. But Mr. Baxter having been so shamefully nonplussed as he was at that Disputation, would have it to be believed 
Mr. B is design in so terming them.  by those that were not there, that he had, or should have had much the better of it, if the men he had to deal with, had not been men of such confused Conceptions that they could not understand his meaning by his words, or of such impatience (for that's part of his character of them also) that they would not give him leave to explain himself more fully than he did.  
This might have had some colour of reason in it, 
The Management of the conference at the Savoy how it was.  if the Conference betwixt our and their Disputants had been oral, or by word of mouth, which is always indeed liable to heat, and eagerness, and impatience, and misunderstanding of one another, whilst they are arguing, as likewise, to misreporting afterwards of what was said of either side.  
But this Conference was by writing, to prevent jangling and all other the aforesaid inconveniences, which oral interlocutory Disputes are subject to; as likewise that each party might have time to consider what they were to stick to, and abide by, before they writ it down, and to peruse it afterwards, and if need were, to alter or amend any thing they saw amiss in it before they delivered it to those that were to answer or reply to it. And thus were our Arguments delivered unto them by us, and thus were their Answers to our Arguments delivered unto us by them, all of them written with Mr. Baxter's 
The Dissenters Answers written with Mr. B 's own hand.  own hand, who seemed to be the Dominus factotum, The Ruler of the Roast, in the business.  
The Arguments and the Answers that were written down, and interchangeably delivered from one Party to the other, were the very same in terminis which I have before recited, and which are attested 
The same as are attested in the Bishop's printed Letter.  by the subscriptions of the aforesaid witnesses printed above 20 years since, and now again reprinted with the Letter whereunto they were first annexed; which Attestation, together with the Arguments and Answers which are attested, I desire the Reader seriously and impartially to peruse and consider, and then to judge whether the men Mr. Baxter had to deal with were Men of such confused Conceptions, and so irreconcilable to distinctness and congruity of speech, as he would have them thought to be: or whether indeed he himself were not evidently and inextricably confused, puzzled and perplexed in his Answers to their Arguments; especially when he gave his final Answer to their last Syllogism, 
Mr. B 's final answer strangely peevish and absurd.  the Major Proposition whereof, I am confident, would never have been denied by either of his Assistants, had not he, (being such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Lover of pre-eminence, such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, so contentious and self-willed, as he is,) overruled them both. For who not blinded with prejudice or transported with passion (as Master Baxter often is, and as it seems then was) would have denied (as he did) the truth of this Proposition, (viz.) That Command which commandeth an act in itself lawful, and no other act whereby any unjust penalty is enjoined, nor any circumstance whence directly or per accidens any sin is consequent, which the Commander ought to provide against, hath in it all things requisite to the lawfulness of a Command; and particularly cannot be guilty of commanding an Act per accidens unlawful, nor of commanding an act under an unjust penalty? This, this (I say) was the Proposition which Mr. Baxter did, in Writing with his own hand, finally deny to be true; and this is that which I charge him withal, and from which (as I then told him) it necessarily follows, that no Law, either humane or Divine, can be lawful; because there is no Law of either sort but may by some accident or other, be the cause or occasion of sin.  
For example, Preaching, and Fasting, and Praying, 
The Consequence of it urged.  and Thanksgiving, are all of them God's holy Ordinances; but may not any, nay all of these Ordinances of God himself, be by accident the occasion of sin? nay, were not all of them so in a very high degree in the late Times? being made use of in their several seasons, to stir up and encourage the People to rebel against their Sovereign; and to plunder and murder their fellow Subjects: But did this make God's commanding all or any of these holy Ordinances to be unlawful? by Master Baxter's Logic it must do so, because by accident they were the cause or occasion of very many, and very great sins; and such sins as the Commander foresaw, they would be the occasion of, and might have prevented if he would, by suffering no ill use to be made of them; (which is more than any humane Lawgiver can do) and yet he did not, nor would not prevent those accidental evils, either by forbearing to make such Laws, as he knew would be the occasion of sin, or by repealing, or altering, or dispensing with them after they were made, or by remitting and not inflicting the punishment that was due to the transgressors of them; all which he might have done if he would; but he would not because he was not obliged to do so, and because it seemed best to his infinite wisdom not to do so.  
But Men, Mr. Baxter will say, or humane Lawgivers, are obliged (though God be not) to prevent 
A rejoinder to Mr. B 's Reply.  or provide against all (even accidental) evils which they can prevent, or provide against.  
'Tis true, but not by making no Laws at all. For Meliùs vivitur ubi nihil licet, quam ubi omnia, It is better living under the severest Laws, than under none at all. And if there be any Laws made for men to live by, or to live under, such is the pride and the pravity of humane nature (as Mr. Baxter himself confesseth) that there will be transgressions of them, and such transgressions as the wisest humane Lawgiver cannot foresee, or the most powerful of them be able to prevent; and consequently, no humane Lawgiver is bound to do so; for, Nemo tenetur ad impossibile, No body is bound to impossibilities.  
Neither is a Humane Lawgiver bound to prevent all the Evil which it is possible for him to prevent, if it be not to be prevented, but by making no Laws at all; or if it be not to be prevented, but by omitting or forbearing to do some important public good, which as a Lawgiver he is bound to do. So that no accidental evil which the Lawgiver either cannot or ought not, (and by ought not, I mean, is not bound or obliged) to provide against, can make the command of a thing lawful in itself 
The Consequence charged home.  to be unlawful. And he that denies this (as Mr. Baxter did) must (as I said before) consequently affirm no command, either of man or God to be lawful; because there is no command, either Humane or Divine, but is liable to such accidental evils, as man either cannot or ought not, and God hath not thought fit, to provide against, any otherwise than by forbidding, and threatening to punish the transgressors of them; which Humane Lawgivers are obliged to do also; which being all they can do, and consequently all they are obliged to do, neither they, nor their just Laws, or lawful Commands, are to be blamed or repealed, because they accidentally prove to be the occasion of such evils as the Lawgiver either cannot, or is not bound to provide against. And such sins as these must he needs mean, who denies (as Mr. Baxter did) the command of a lawful thing by lawful Authority, under no unjust penalty, to be lawful, because, by accident it might be the occasion of some such sin as the Commander was not bound to prevent or provide against.  
And therefore I would fain have Mr. Baxter speak out, and tell us plainly and distinctly, (being such 
A Call to Mr. Baxter.  a Master of distinctness as he is) what these accidental evils or sins are, that can make such a command as he denied to be lawful to be unlawful. Sure I am, they can be no such evils or sins as by his aforesaid Instances he would make it to be believed they are. For they are all of them such as the Commander is obliged to hinder or provide against; but he must instance in some such accidental evils or sins which the Commander is not bound to hinder or provide against, and then prove that a lawful command, by being the cause or occasion of such an accidental evil or sin, becomes unlawful; which when he hath done, erit mihi magnus Apollo, I shall take him for a great Prophet; and then I will confess that I have been grossly, very grossly mistaken in my charging of him, as I did.  
In the mean time, he hath grossly, very 
His gross shuffling and cutting.  grossly abused his friends at Kidderminster, in that Narrative of his, where by shuffling in of one Proposition instead of another, a true one instead of a false one, he would make them believe that it was the true one that he asserted, viz. That the Command of a thing lawful in itself was unlawful if it were commanded under an unjust penalty, or would be the occasion of some such evil as the Commander foresaw and ought to prevent. And not the false one, viz. That the Command of a thing lawful in itself was unlawful though it were not commanded under an unjust penalty, nor would be the occasion of any such accidental evil or sin as the Commander was bound to prevent; which was that indeed and in truth which Mr. Baxter asserted, and not the former: And upon his asserting whereof, I do very well remember, (and so may he too, if he will) I stood up, and said, There is no more Disputing with this man who doth in effect deny any of God's commands as well as Man's to be lawful. For what Law or Command of God is there, that may not be the 
His Assertion the occasion of breaking up the Conference.  occasion of some such evil or sin? And so the Disputeended; for Contra Principia negantem non est disputandum, There is no disputing against a man who denies principles: And certainly this if any is a Principle among Christians, That all God's commands are just and righteous; which none of them are or can be, if by accident to be the occasion of sin can make them not to be so; which I affirmed to be the Consequent of what Mr. Baxter had asserted.  
But I did not charge him with asserting the consequence itself; nay, I did not charge him, and much less all or any other of the Nonconformists, 
He is not charged with it as his judgement.  besides him, with asserting that which he did assert, as theirs, or his own judgement; (as by the Title page to his Treatise of sinfulness per accidens (which he saith was purposely written against me) he would make his Readers believe I did) but I charged him with it, 
* In his printed narrative to his friends of Kidderminster.  as a desperate shift he was forced to make use of; for so he himself saith I said I did, (when I charged him with what he had asserted) which implies that I did not charge him with that Assertion, as that which was, or which I did believe to be indeed his Judgement; but rather, with what contrary to his Judgement, he was fain or forced to assert 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to serve his turn for the present, as not knowing how otherwise (all at once) to impeach the lawfulness of the Injunctions of our Church in the Common-Prayer-Book (which was then his business) and consequently to justify his own and his Party's refusing to obey and conform to them.  
And as when I charged him with what he had 
Nor is He, but the Assertion, charged with its Consequences.  asserted, I did not charge him with it, as with that which I thought to be his Judgement; much less, when I charged that Assertion of his with those impious and absurd Consequences that may be, nay, must be inferrred from it, do I charge him with asserting all or any of those Consequences: For a man may abhor the necessary consequences of his own Opinion, as I believe all well meaning Papists (and sure there be some Papists that are well meaning men) do detest and disclaim all the necessary consequences of their blasphemous Doctrine of Transubstantiation, and as I believe Mr. Baxter doth the necessary consequences of that Assertion I charged him with. Nay, I am apt to believe that Mr. Baxter himself, now he sees what will necessarily follow upon that Assertion of his, is sorry and ashamed that ever he did assert it, and wishes with all his heart he had never asserted it; but his heart is too great to suffer him to confess it, and he values his reputation with his Party at too high a rate to acknowledge 
His reputation more valued by him than truth.  that ever he was guilty of so much weakness, as to have denied what he did deny, and consequently to have asserted what he did assert. And therefore (as I said before) he would fain have it to be believed that it was another thing that he denied and asserted, than indeed it was. But all that he hath done hitherto, or can do hereafter, to that end, will be all in vain, and to no purpose, as long as two such Witnesses, as the Bishop of Ely and the Bishop of 
The Attestation utterly spoils all his endeavours of clearing himself.  Chester, who disputed with him, have attested it under their hands, presently after the matter of fact, and when it was fresh in every man's memory, without having been contradicted or excepted against either by Mr. Baxter himself, or any of his party in his behalf, though it be above twenty years ago, since this Attestation of theirs was first printed.  
And therefore whatsoever Mr. Baxter hath said since, or doth say now, or shall say hereafter, it will never make what he did say then to be non dictum, not to have been said, or what he writ then to be non scriptum, not to have been written; so that he may as well call back yesterday as unsay what he had said; repent it he may, but recall it he cannot. If therefore that Pamphlet of his concerning 
That Treatise of his wholly useless to that purpose.  sinfulness per accidens was purposely written (as he saith it was) to prove Bishop Morley was grossly mistaken in charging him with what he did assert then, because he doth not assert it now, or because he now doth assert the contrary; the publishing of it to that end is not only vain and useless but absurd and ridiculous, unless Mr. Baxter thinks his own Party does believe of him, as the Bygott-Papists do of their Pope; namely, that he never erred, because he cannot err; which is Blasphemy to be said of any but of God. For Errare, labi, decipi, suit, eritque semper humanum, to err, to slip, to be deceived and mistaken, hath been and will always be the effect and character of Humane frailty. And therefore Mr. Baxter ought not to have taken it so heinously to be charged, and to be charged ash was with an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, with that which is but an humane infirmity; for so, and no more but so, is all Error. But the denying of it, and much more the persisting in it, and defending of it, and most of all the defending of it by disguising it and making a false representation of it; seems to have somewhat of a much worse principle in it, and makes the Error to be much more culpable, than otherwise it would have been; for Causa Patrocinio non bona pejor erit, A bad cause will but prove worse by standing out in it and endeavouring to make it good.  
It would have been therefore much more ingenuously, and much more excusably too, done of Mr. Baxter, if, as when he speaks of his Political Aphorisms, he saith he would have some part at least of that Book to be taken pro non scripto, as if it had never been written; so in speaking of what I say he said in the Conference at the Savoy he would not have said it was non dictum, a thing that he had not said; but that he would have it taken pro non dicto, as a thing he wished he had not said: and so he might have saved all the pains he hath taken, and all the trouble he hath given his Readers, in his Metaphysical Casuistical Treatise of things sinful per accidens; wherein there is nothing to prove Mr. Baxter did not say, what I say he did at the Conference in the Savoy; nor consequently to prove that I was grossly mistaken in charging him with it; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Which is the thing I was to make out.  
Which being the only Instance he hath given of 
The Upshot: the Bishop's charge against Mr. B. no mistake.  the many mistakes in matter of fact, which he saith there are in that long ago printed, and now reprinted Letter of mine; They that observe how (notwithstanding all the disingenuous, fraudulent, scandalous, and injurious Artifices he hath made use of) he foully fails in the proof of this one mistake only; will (I hope) hardly take his own bare word for proof enough, that there are many, or indeed any other mistakes in matter of fact in that Letter of mine, as he pretends there are, and no doubt would not have omitted to specify, if he could have proved any of them.   
The End of the First Section.   

SECTION II.  
A Confutation at large of Mr. Baxter's Aphorism concerning Governors; wherein, having said, that Governors are some Limited, some de facto Unlimited; he affirms, that The unlimited are Tyrants, and have no right to that unlimited Government.  

CHAP. I.  
A calumnious Charge of Mr. Baxter in some late writings of his, against the Bishop, making him to be a defier of Deity and Humanity, answered. One of his Aphorisms, concerning Governors limited and unlimited, taxed and censured. The Bishop's solemn declaration in the point.  
ANd now having (as I suppose) sufficiently vindicated myself from what Mr. Baxter hath excepted against (as a gross mistake of mine in matter of Fact) in my so long ago printed (and now reprinted) Letter: I am (if I can, and I doubt not but I can) to vindicate myself from a much higher charge of Mr. Baxter's against me, which is no less 
Mr. B. charges the Bishop to be a defier of Deity and Humanity.  than, That I am a defier of Deity and Humanity. An horrible and a diabolical Crime, if true; and therefore an horrible and diabolical Slander, if false; which, whether it be or no I am now to examine.  
But first, I must make it appear, that Mr. Baxter doth indeed, and in totidem verbis, in plain terms, charge me to be so; For proof whereof, I refer myself to a printed Paper of his, now before me, subscribed R. B. and pretended to be a Recantation or Revocation of some of his Political Aphorijms in 
That he doth so proved out of his Recantation,  his Holy Common wealth; in which Paper (which together with some of his Aphorisms I have caused to be reprinted) he saith, He doth not reverse all the matter of that Book, nor all that more than ONE hath accused him of; which he saith he cannot without defying Deity and Humanity, as they, saith he, (meaning his accusers) defy them both.  
In which words it is observable, that the word One is printed in a different Character, from any of the rest, on purpose no doubt, that the Readers of that pretended curtailed Recantation, may take notice of whom he means by that One, which it was easy for any that had read my Collection of some of his Aphorisms, to guests at; but this is certain, that whomsoever he means by that One, he saith of him in express terms, that he is a defier of Deity and Humanity.  
Now that he means me by that One, though it be not clearly and plainly expressed in that Paper, 
and out of his Answer to a Letter of Dr. Hinckley 's,  yet it is more than intimated in Mr. Baxter's Answer to a Letter of Dr. Hinckley's; wherein he doth repeat what the Doctor had said touching those Aphorisms of his, which I had collected and printed, so as though neither of them name me, yet it cannot be doubted, but both of them mean me; the rather, because Mr. Baxter doth there, and in that place of his Letter, set down the very words of the first of those Aphorisms I have collected, from denial of which Aphorism, or rather from the denial of another Proposition substituted by him in the place or instead of that Aphorism, he doth in the aforesaid Paper infer and conclude that One he speaks of to be a defier of Deity and Humanity.  
But to put it out of question that I am the man he means by that One in the aforesaid Paper, and whom he there makes to be a defier of Deity and Humanity: 
And out of his Apology for the Nonconformists Ministry. p. 138.  There is a late (I will not say the last) Book of his (for he may have writ two or three since for aught I know) wherein he saith, He wonders that Bishop Morley (there you have whom he means in words at length, and not in figures or figurative intimations only) did put the denial of this amongst the accused passages of his Political Aphorisms, where (saith he) I expressly speak of God's limitation.  
But what, or of what was that denial of Mr. Baxter, which he wonders the Bishop puts among the accused passages of his Aphorisms? Why, It was (saith he) my denial that there was any such thing in the World as a lawful unlimited Monarchy, or humane Power, expressly speaking of limitation by God. But 
Mr. B. gives a false account of the Bishop's accusing of him.  where doth Bishop Morley accuse Mr. Baxter for denying there is any lawful Monarchy, or humane Power, unlimited by God? He doth it (saith Mr. Baxter) among the Passages of my accused Aphorisms. But why doth not he name the passage where, or the particular Aphorism wherein I do accuse him, for his denying the aforesaid Proposition, or for his denying there is any lawful Monarchy, or any other humane Power, unlimited, or not limited by God? I will tell you why he doth not, because indeed he cannot; there being no such Aphorism nor any such Passage in any of those Aphorisms of his, which I question him for, or accuse him of.  
There is indeed an Aphorism of his (viz.) the first of those which I have collected and exposed, 
The true account what it is the Bishop accuseth him of.  wherein he saith, That of Governors some are limited, and some are unlimited, and those which are de facto unlimited are Tyrants, and have no right to their unlimited Governments: And the reason why I put this Aphorism of his into the catalogue of those which I except against, is his affirming that such Governors (I presume he means all such Governors) as are de facto unlimited, are Tyrants and have no right to their unlimited Governments. It is (I say) his affirming of this, and not his denying the lawfulness of a Monarchy or any other power or species of Government that is not limited by God, that I question him for or accuse him of. For if he thinks the affirming of that and the denying of this to be all one, he is very much mistaken: but the truth is that he is not at all mistaken as to this particular; he knows well enough, that it is not all one to affirm the one and deny the other; for if he had thought it had been so, why did he not specify the Aphorism itself (which I except against) in terminis, as it is set down in my Collection, and as he sets it down himself in his aforesaid Letter to Dr. Hinckley? It had been much more fairly and ingenuously done of him, if he had done so, and much more pertinently too, as to the business in hand; there being no question betwixt him and me (in relation 
The Question rightly stated.  to the truth or falsehood of the aforesaid Aphorism) whether all lawful Monarchies or humane Powers are limited by God or no? but whether all such Governors as are de facto unlimited (not by God but by Men) are Tyrants, and such as have no Right to their unlimited Governments. The former I never did, nor no man that is not a downright professed Atheist can deny to be true: The latter I affirm to be false, and not false and erroneous only, but dangerous and seditious also; and I doubt not but by God's assistance to prove it to be so.  
In the mean time, let no man think it was the not discerning or not animadverting the difference betwixt what Mr. Baxter affirms in his Aphorism, and what he denies in his Paraphrase of it, that makes him substitute the one for the other; Non sic notus Ulysses, The cunning man is better known than so. No, he doth it artificially and designingly, that he might the more probably and plausibly infer from the one, what he knew he could not with any colour of consequence infer from the 
Mr B 's artifice to vent his gall against the Bishop.  other; and thereby to vent the overflowing of his Gall against me, in revenge of my publishing of those Aphorisms of his, whereby he seems to be so much galled.  
And hence it is, that as in the aforesaid recanting 
His wretched falsehood in charging the Bishop.  or rather canting Paper of his, instead of my denying all unlimited Governors to be Tyrants and to have no right to their unlimited Governments (which he affirms in his Aphorism) he saith, I deny all humane Powers to be limited by God, and thence infers that I am a defier of Deity and Humanity: So here again in that aforesaid late printed Book of his, instead of my denial of what he affirms in the aforesaid Aphorism, he saith, that I accuse him for denying that there is any lawful Monarchy or humane Power unlimited by God; and then infers That he who asserteth the contrary (as he implies I do) is 1. (saith he) an Enemy to God, because he denies God to be the universal Sovereign, which is Atheism. 
His zealous descant upon it.  2. He is an Enemy to Kings, because he renders them odious to Mankind by drawing such a picture or description of them, as to say a King is absolutely unlimited in his power, and therefore may deny or blaspheme God, and may destroy City and Kingdom, and kill all the innocent People when he pleaseth. 3. He is an Enemy to all Mankind, who would bring them all into such a slavery to such a Monster. By which large, and indeed monstrous Paraphrase of his, not upon what I do indeed assert, but upon what he would have his Readers believe I do assert, he explains what he means when he said I was a defier of Deity and Humanity.  
Sed ne soevi, magne Sacerdos; But do not bluster so, mighty Presbyter! Is this the humble, the meek, the mortified and daily dying Mr. Baxter? Tantoene animis Coelestibus irae? Have heavenly minds such boisterous passions? And why not, may some Friend of his say; can a man be too zealous for God, or too angry with any that defies God, or that denies his Sovereignty over all his Creatures, and consequently over all humane Powers or Governors? Was not Moses the meekest man alive, and yet was not he angry, very angry, so angry that he broke the Tables of stone wherein the Law was written by God's own hand, because the People had by their Idolatry broken the Law, written by God's own hand in the Tables of their hearts? The like may be said of Phineas, of David, and of St. Paul, who was so angry that he wished that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, The disturbers and overturners, of the Church in those times were cut off (which by the way is as bad, if not worse than silencing.) Why then should Master Baxter be blamed, if he thinks no words bad enough for those that are the defiers of Deity and Humanity, and the Enemies to God, to Kings, and to all Mankind?  
True; but who, or where are they that are so? 
Who they are he means in that descant.  they are those (saith Mr. Baxter in one place) that deny all humane Powers to be limited by God. But who are they that deny all humane Powers to be limited by God? they are (saith Mr. Baxter in another place) Such as deny all Governors whether limited or unlimited to be Subjects themselves, and under the Sovereignty and laws of God. But who are they, or who is he, that denies either this or the former of those two Propositions? Bishop Morley for one (saith Mr. Baxter in the aforesaid late Book of his) and therefore he is a defier of Deity and Humanity; and so are others too for the same reasons, as he tells us in his Paper of Recantation (but they it seems must be nameless.) Well, but how doth he know that Bishop Morley doth or ever did deny either, That all humane Powers are limited by God, or that all Governors are subject to God? Did he ever hear me say so himself? or can he produce any Witness that is fide dignus, That may be believed, who told him so? I am sure I never thought so, and therefore I am sure I never said so. But because he grounds my being a defier of Deity and Humanity upon this supposition, and upon this supposition only, That I deny all Humane Powers to be limited by God, or That all Humane Governors are Subject unto God; And because there be many that will believe whatsoever he saith, because he saith it:  
Be it known to Mr. Baxter and all Baxterians in the World, that I Bishop Morley do in my own name 
The Bishop's solemn declaration concerning Governors.  (and I am confident may do it in the name of all the Episcopal Party, that is, of the whole Church of England truly so called) not only confess and acknowledge, but declare, and aver, and avow; first, That all Humane Powers, and not Humane only, but Terrestrial, Celestial and Infernal Powers also, are subject to God and limited by God; that is, by the Power, the Will and Wisdom of God, so that none of them can do more or less, or otherwise than he wills or permits them to do; and that he restrains, overrules and orders whatsoever they do, as he pleaseth, in order to his own most wise and just ends.  
Secondly, I do acknowledge and declare also, that all humane Powers, or Governors, the Supreme as well as the Subordinate, and the Unlimited (I mean the unlimited by humane Pacts and constitutions) as well as the Limited, are all of them limited by God; and that not by his Power only, but by his Laws also, either as they are written by him in men's hearts, or revealed by him in his Word; and that as all the Heathen World (Kings as well as Subjects) were limited by the former; so all the Christian World, (Kings and States, as well as Subjects) are limited by the latter, and by the former also; so as to be thereby obliged (though not necessitated) to observe the Dictates, and to do nothing contrary to either of those Laws; and if they do not accordingly, that they are answerable to God, and punishable by God for it, as he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, King of Kings and Lord of Lords, as much or more than any of the meanest of their Subjects.  
This is, and always was my Creed as to this parcular; and therefore, instead of defying Deity and 
His disavowal of Mr. B 's charge.  Humanity, I defy Mr. Baxter and all the Baxterians in the World, to prove that I ever did dicto vel scripto, By saying or writing, directly or indirectly, in terminis vel in sensu oequipollenti, In downright terms or equivalent meaning, formally or consequentially, deny all or any humane Powers, or Governors, either de jure, As to matter of right, or de facto, As to matter of fact, to be limited by God; or that I did ever accuse Mr. Baxter or any body else for affirming it.  
And therefore I do now accuse him for having 
Mr. B. a false accuser.  falsely accused me of such a Crime as is no less (as he himself saith) than the defying of Deity and Humanity; which is a very high degree not of Profaneness only, but of Atheism and Blasphemy also; and therefore highly criminal, and highly punishable even here in this world in them that are guilty of it; and per legem talionis, By that law which requires like for like, in those also that accuse any man of it, and cannot prove it; especially in one Church man accusing another, and more especially (according to the ancient Canons of the Church) in a Presbyter accusing a Bishop of so high a Crime as this is.  
But Mr. Baxter it seems will join Issue with me upon this point, and will prove that though I did not in terminis defy Deity and Humanity, by denying in terminis all humane Power to be limited 
His consequential proof of the charge.  by God; Yet I am nevertheless a defier of Deity and Humanity, because I do consequentially deny all humane Powers to be limited by God. And that I do consequentially deny all humane Powers to be limited by God, he proves, or thinks he proves, or rather indeed would have others think he proves it (for I am confident he himself believes it no more than I do) because I deny this Aphorism of his, That all unlimited Governors are Tyrants, and have no right to their unlimited Governments; so that the proof of my being a defier of God, because I deny all humane Powers to be limited by God, depends upon the truth of this Syllogism: 

He that denies all unlimited Governors to be Tyrants, and such as have no right to their unlimited Governments, doth consequentially, or by necessary consequence, deny all humane Powers to be limited by God.  
But Bishop Morley doth deny the former,  
Ergo, he doth deny the latter also.    
Well, suppose he did so, yet if (being not so clearsighted as Mr. Baxter is, nor having such a 
His Metaphysical Microscope.  Metaphysical Microscope as Mr. Baxter hath to see so far into a millstone as Mr. Baxter doth) the Bishop doth not discern either the necessity, or probability, or possibility of any such consequence, must he because he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, moap-eyed, or because he hath no better a discerning faculty than God hath given him, must he needs (I say) be therefore a defier of Deity and Humanity? when if he saw or did believe there were any such consequence, he would be as ready to condemn the opinion from whence it is inferred, and to anathematise the maintainers of it, as Mr. Baxter himself is, or can be?  
But thanks be to God, we have a more merciful Judge than Mr. Baxter is; for Woe be to the Bishop, 
We are not to be judged by consequences.  and Woe be to Mr. Baxter himself; nay, Woe be to the best and wisest of all mankind (neither of which do I think that I or Mr. Baxter himself is) if we were to be judged by the consequences of all our Opinions at the last day. For, I know nothing by myself, says St. Paul (who was spiritually as wise and as good a man as perhaps ever any mere man was) yet I am not, saith he, thereby justified: and therefore though our hearts do not condemn us (says St. John) yet God who is greater than our hearts, may. And truly I know no Man that hath more reason to be afraid to be tried by Consequences than Mr. Baxter himself hath, as I think I have made it appear already from the Consequences of what he asserted at the Savoy-Conference, and shall make it appear more and more before I have done with him.  
And therefore it is for his sake more than for mine own (at least upon this occasion) that I would not have men judged of by the Consequences of their Opinions, though never so truly inferred from them, if they be denied by them. But I say not this, as 
No such consequence in the case.  any way or in any the least degree acknowledging that there is any such Consequence logically or rationally to be inferred, as Mr. Baxter saith there is from my denying of his aforesaid Aphorism to be true, that therefore I deny all humane Powers to be limited by God. 
An unlimited lawful Monarchy, in what sense.   
But doth not (saith Mr. Baxter) he that maintains (as the Bishop doth) that there is such a thing in the world as an unlimited lawful Monarchy or humane Power, consequentially deny, that all humane Powers are limited by God? No, (saith the Bishop) if by unlimited he means unlimited by men, or by humane Laws or constitutions; for some humane Powers may be unlimited in this sense, and yet all of them notwithstanding be limited by God: ay, but saith Mr. Baxter, this subterfuge will not serve the Bishop's turn; for in my Aphorism which he noteth as false, I do expressly speak of God's limitation. Do you so, Mr. Baxter? then the Printer hath done you great wrong, or mine Eyes are grown so dim with age, as no spectacles will enable me to see any such words as limitation of God or by God, either in the Text or Margin of that Aphorism which is now in question; no nor in the Paraphrase which you give us of that Aphorism in the aforesaid late Book of yours, which I have now before me: where indeed it is said that Bishop Morley maintains, (though he had not maintained it then, but means to do it now) that there may be a lawful unlimited Monarchy or Sovereign Power; but it is not said there nor any where else, that Bishop Morley maintains there may be a lawful Monarchy or any other Government (lawful or unlawful) unlimited by God. But he that denies that aforesaid Aphorism (may Mr. Baxter reply) doth consequently maintain there may be such a Monarchy or Sovereign power unlimited by God; because Mr. Baxter doth expressly speak of limitation by God. He doth so indeed in the words immediately subjoined to that Aphorism, but not in the Aphorism itself, neither doth he speak of it in the words subjoined, to explain what he meant by the limitation he speaks of in the Aphorism before, but rather to intimate that it was not a limitation by God, which he before spoke of. For having said in his 
Mr. B is Governors, some limited, some unlimited.  Aphorism, that Of Governors some were limited and some unlimited, and that the unlimited were Tyrants and had no right to their unlimited Governments; he adds (as a reason why the unlimited were Tyrants, and had no right to their Governments) For they are all subject themselves, and under the Sovereignty and Laws of God. Which is in effect, as much and no more than if he had said, Though I tell you, that of Governors some are limited and some are unlimited, I do not mean any of them are unlimited or not limited by God; and what is this but a plain confession that by limitation of Governors in the aforesaid Aphorism, he means their limitation 
If he means limited by men, the consequence is avoided.  by men, and not by God? And then (Ihope) a man may deny all such Governors to be Tyrants, that are not so limited, without denying them to be limited by God; and consequently without incurring the Censure of being a defier of Deity and Humanity. For why, of these Governors or humane Powers that are all of them limited by God, may not some of them be unlimited or not limited by men, that is by humane Pacts, Laws or Constitutions?  
And if this be not Mr. Baxter's own meaning, I would fain know how he will make good his division of Governors, into some that are limited, and some that are unlimited? For, if his meaning be 
If he means limited by God,  this, that of Governors some are limited by God, and some are unlimited by God, he must needs own that assertion to be his, which he would impose upon me; namely that all humane Powers are not limited by God; and consequently besides his avoidable 
The consequence falls upon himself.  involving himself in a palpable Contradiction (for what can be more contradictory, than to say that all Governors are, and some are not limited by God? he doth necessarily make himself, what he would have me thought to be (viz.) a defier of Deity and Humanity, if to deny all humane Powers to be limited by God, be consequently to defy Deity and Humanity. For what more evident or undeniable consequence can there be than this? Some Governors, or some humane Powers, are unlimited, that is, not limited by God; Therefore All Governments, or all humane Powers, are not limited by God; but the Antecedent or former of these two Propositions is Mr. Baxter's (if by limitation in his Aphorism he means limited by God as he saith he does) and therefore the Consequent or latter of these two Propositions must be his also.  
Neither will his de facto do him any service at all, to help him at this dead lift: for, whereas he saith in his Aphorism, Some are limited, and some are de facto unlimited (supposing him still to mean unlimited as well as limited by God) I would fain know what de facto was put in for, and written in another Character, to make it the more observable? Was it, because there was some Metaphysical mystery couched in it? If so, he should have explained himself so, as that we, who want his higher Intellectuals, might have understood what he meant by it; but if he meant no more than ordinary Grammar and Logic enables us to comprehend; namely that de facto is to be understood as it is opposed to de jure, and then (still supposing that by limited and unlimited he means limited and unlimited by God) the meaning of that part of his Aphorism must be this, that of Governors, though all are limited by God de jure, yet some of them are unlimited by God de facto. And then I demand of Mr. Baxter, where there are, or ever 
All Governors limited by God de facto as well as de jure.  were, or ever can be any Governors unlimited or not limited by God de facto as well as de jure, that is, that are not de facto under the Sovereignty and Laws of God, (which is Mr. Baxter's own expression of what he means by being limited by God) and then I say, I would fain know who and where those Governors are that are unlimited by God de facto. And if there neither be, nor can be any such, Mr. Baxter's division of Governors is become a Cripple, and hath but one leg left to stand on; One of the membra dividentia, The members of the distinction, being no where to be found in Rerum Natura, In the world. And he might as truly and rationally have said, Of Governors there are some that are somewhere, and some that are nowhere.   

CHAP. II.  
Concerning Mr. Baxter 's Governors unlimited de facto. His Ingenuity, Charity and Logic taken notice of, and his Calumny cleared.  
ANd here I might leave the poor Man entangled in his self-contradictions, and fallen himself into the pit which he had digged for me; but I remember that if our enemy's Ox or Ass, and much more if our Enemy himself be fallen into a Pit, we are obliged in charity to do what we can to help 
An expedient to help Mr. B. out of his own pit.  him out. And truly it will be no hard matter to do it, if Mr. Baxter will be so charitable to himself, as to lend us his own helping hand towards it, by telling us truly and plainly what Governors he means by those he says are Unlimited de facto, and 
His Governors de facto unlimited, what.  by telling us too by whom the jure they ought to be limited; for there must be some such unlimited Governors somewhere or other, or else (as I said before) his division which must be Bipes, two-legged at least (as all Logical divisions are) having lost one of its legs, will be stans pede in uno, Standing only upon one leg, and so no division at all. But there are no Governors that are not limited by God saith Mr. Baxter, and limited de facto as well as de jure saith the Bishop, and I think Mr. Baxter will not in cool blood deny that they are so: and therefore Mr. Baxter's de facto Unlimited Governors must needs be such Governors, as though they are both de jure and de facto limited by God, yet are de facto unlimited by Men, or by humane Pacts and Constitutions.  
Speak out, Mr. Baxter; was not this your meaning in your Aphorism? Give glory unto God, and confess the truth, especially when it will be for your own advantage; for hereby you will extricate yourself from those otherwise inextricable difficulties you will inevitably continue to be involved in; I mean the aforesaid self-contradiction and self-condemnation, which will both of them evidently and undeniably follow, and fall upon you, if you persist in your asserting that by Limited in your Aphorism, you mean limited by God. For then by Unlimited you must mean Unlimited by God also. And is it not a plain contradiction for you to say as you do in 
His self contradiction set home, if he means limited by God.  your Aphorism, that some Governors are unlimited or not limited, (meaning not limited by God) and to say as you do say in the words immediately following, that they are all limited by God? Is not this (I say) as plain a contradiction as to say, Omnis homo est rationalis, Every man is rational, and Aliquis or Quidam homo non est rationalis, Some man is not rational? It is so in our Logic, I know not what it may be in Mr. Baxter's. Again, is not the affirming of some Governors to be unlimited or not limited by God a denial, that all humane Powers are limited by God? and consequently doth not Mr. Baxter by affirming the former deny the latter, and thereby prove himself to be what he says I am, a defier of Deity and 
If he mean limited by men, his charge against the Bishop falls.  Humanity? Whereas, if he would acknowledge that by limited and unlimited Governors, in his Aphorism, he means limited and unlimited by men, or by humane Pacts and Constitutions, (as no doubt he did, and as by the whole drift and Tenor of all that follows from that Aphorism, to the very end of that whole Book it manifestly appears he did) neither would he have had any pretence to charge me with being a defier of Deity and Humanity, nor I have had cause for the vindicating of myself from being guilty of so horrid a Crime, to charge him with contradicting and condemning himself as guilty (upon the same supposition) of the same crime which he chargeth me withal: and consequently with pronouncing the terrible censure of being a defier of Deity and Humanity against himself; though really neither He for asserting, nor I for denying the truth of that Aphorism of his, do deserve to be branded with so black and supersevere a stigma or brand as that is.  
And therefore I do not positively charge him, as he doth me, to be a defier either of Deity or Humanity; but all that I have said hitherto, hath been first and principally, for mine own Vindication from Mr. Baxter's calumny and aspersion; and (2.) in order thereunto, to let the World see, first, This Godly Man's candour and ingenuity in stating the question concerning the truth or falsehood of this 
Mr. B is Ingenuity in shuffling in one Proposition instead of another.  Aphorism of his, betwixt him and me. For whereas he cannot choose but know that what I except against, and deny to be true in this Aphorism, is his asserting all unlimited Governors to be Tyrants, and to have no right to their unlimited Governments; he shuffles in another Proposition instead of this, and such a one as is neither affirmed or denied in this Aphorism, as if the Interloper were the same which I denied, (viz.) That all humane Powers are limited by God. But this is but Antiquum obtinere, To do what he hath ever done; he cannot leave this juggling trick: for as he used it once before to disguise what he had asserted at the Conference at the Savoy, so he useth it now to disguise his Aphorism now in question, and will use it again and again upon the like occasion, as we shall see hereafter.  
Secondly, as by his shuffling in one Proposition instead of another, a true one instead of a false one, you may observe Mr. Baxter's sincerity and ingenuity, so by his shuffling in of this rather than of any other, into the place of that which was in question, you may observe his excessive charity towards me, and those of my Order. For designing 
His design to make the Bishop odious.  to make a Bishop, and especially Bishop Morley, (for so he is always pleased to call me, (not honoris gratiâ, For honour's sake, you may be sure) when by name he speaks of me) as odious as he could to all mankind, what more probable, or to the Sectaries more plausible, a Medium could he have devised to make use of to that End, than first to shuffle in this Proposition (All humane Powers are limited by God) and then to make me the denier of it, and finally thereupon to pronounce me a defier of Deity and Humanity?  
Lastly, you may observe likewise his wonderful skill in the art of reasoning, and the Transubstantiating power of his Logic, by which he will needs infer from my maintaining there may be a lawful 
His strange Logic.  unlimited Monarchy, I do therefore deny all humane Powers are limited by God. O the weight of a Straw, when it is turned into a Club and wielded by such a Hercules! For what doth all this signify, but that he had rather belly himself, than not slander me, and that he had rather contradict and condemn himself, than not say something to make a Bishop, and especially Bishop Morley; to be thought to be an Atheist and a Blasphemer? not animadverting perhaps that the fiery darts which he slung at the Bishop might with much more force be retorted against himself; for aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus, Sometimes honest Homer is caught napping; or as we say, It is a good horse that never stumbles; and Malice sometimes is blind, as well as Love.  
By this time, I think, it is evident enough, according to Mr. Baxter's own way of reasoning, that either he himself is a defier of Deity and Humanity, or Bishop Morley is not. And God forbid, that by any concluding argument either of us should be proved to be so. But now this bold and groundless Calumny (from which, for the honour of my Order as being a Bishop, as well as for my 
His calumny cleared.  personal reputation as I am a Christian, I was bound in the first place to vindicate myself) being removed out of the way; it is high time to come to the consideration of that which was, or aught to have been the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the main Question, or the only subject matter of debate betwixt Mr. Baxter and me in relation to this 
An address to the main Question.  Aphorism: namely, whether I had reason to set down this in the Catalogue of those Aphorisms I excepted against, either as false and erroneous, or as dangerous and seditious; (and I confess I set it down, both as false and erroneous, and as dangerous and seditious also;) which I am now to prove it is.   

CHAP. III.  
The Aphorism aforesaid proved to be False, from the account of Paternal Government and ancient Monarchy. Governors not therefore Tyrants, because Unlimited.  
ANd that we may not any longer Andabatarum more pugnare, Fight blindfold or in the dark, as Mr. Baxter loves to do, without discovering or discerning what that is which is affirmed by one or denied by the other, I will once more repeat the 
The Aphorism in question.  Aphorism itself which is This. — Of Governors some are limited, some de facto unlimited; the unlimited are Tyrants, and have no right to their unlimited Governments— This is Mr. Baxter's Aphorism in terminis; and this I confess is one and the first of those Aphorisms of his, which I think are all of them nigro signanda lapillo, To be marked with a black coal; as being all of them, (I mean all that I have specified) not only false and erroneous, but, as I said before, dangerous and seditious also;  
And I put this Aphorism of his in the first place, because it is the most general, as speaking of all Governors, Sovereign as well as Subordinate, lawful and unlawful, limited and unlimited; and pronounceth all the Unlimited, without exception, to be Tyrants, and to have no Right to their unlimited Governments. 2. I put it in the first place, because Mr. Baxter seems to have laid it as the Foundation or Cornerstone, upon which he superstructs all that follows, not in my Collection only, but in that whole Book of his Holy Commonwealth 
This Aphorism the foundation of his Holy Commonwealth.  (as he calls it) from Page 106 to Page 490. that is to the end of the Book: Upon this foundation (I say) all his several discourses that follow in that whole Book are superstructed;  
As, 1. That Of the objective or material differences of Government.  
2. That Of the efficient and conveying Causes of Power.  
3. That Of the happiest Commonwealth, and best form of Government.  
4. How a Commonwealth may best be reduced to a Theocratical temper.  
5. Of the Sovereign's Power over the Pastors of the Church.  
6. Of the Sovereign's Prerogatives and Power governing by Law and Judgements.  
7. Of due Obedience to Rulers, and of Resistance.  
8. And lastly, Of the late War; (for so he calls the late horrid Rebellion) for the justifying whereof, as this Aphorism is laid as the foundation, so all the aforesaid discourses that are built upon it, are especially and finally designed and intended; but most especially two ofthem, I mean that Of the efficient and conveying Causes of Power, and that Of due Obedience to Rulers, and of Resistance. These (I say) are the reasons why I put this before all the rest of his Aphorisms which I except against in my Collection.  
And this I except against, first, as considered in itself, without relating to Us or to our Governors either Civil or Ecclesiastical, and so considered I say it is false and erroneous: and secondly, I except against it also, as it may be considered, and as I verily believe it was intended, with a respect to our Government here in England; and so considered, I say it is dangerous and seditious.  
First then I say that what Mr. Baxter affirms in this Aphorism, (namely, that Governors de facto unlimited are Tyrants, and have no right to their 
This Aphorism of his charged with falsehood.  unlimited Government) is false, and erroneous considered in itself, as it is set down in general terms, without relation or application to any particular species or form of Government.  
For proof whereof, and in order thereunto, I will presume to take for granted, 1. That by Governors 
Three things premised.  (of whom he saith some are limited, and some are unlimited) he means Sovereign or Supreme Governors; Subordinate Governors being all limited by the Supreme, (and therefore none of them unlimited.)  
2. That by limited and unlimited is meant limited and unlimited by Men; there being no such thing as any Governor, how great or absolute soever, that can be said either de jure or de facto to be unlimited by God, as I have already proved.  
And therefore, 3dly. I shall take it for granted also, that by his de facto unlimited Governors, he means such as are not the facto limited by men or by humane Pacts and Constitutions; and consequently of all such Sovereign and Supreme Governors it is that he affirms, that they are Tyrants, and that none of them have any right to their respective so unlimited Governments.  
These things premised, I demand first of Mr. Baxter, what he thinks of Paternal Government or the 
Of Paternal Government.  Government of Fathers over their Children, which was the first and most natural Government that ever was in the World, and was antecedent to Propriety in Nature, as well as in Time; though Mr. Baxter doth Magisterially pro more suo, According to his custom, define 
* Vide His Apology for the Nonconformists Ministry. p. 138.  Propriety to be in Nature antecedent to Dominion.  
But to let that pass, I demand (I say) whether Paternal Government was either de facto or de jure a limited Government by any humane antecedent Law, Pact or Constitution?  
If so, I demand again, by whom or betwixt whom, was it made to be so? There were no Men to make it to before Adam, (unless Mr. Baxter will allow of the dream of the Preadamites) nor any besides Adam, until the World began to be peopled with his Children; of all whom, I presume, 
Adam the first Governor, unlimited.  Mr. Baxter will not deny their Father Adam to have been the lawful Governor, though he was not, nor could not be limited by them, nor by any antecedent Covenant or Constitution made betwixt them and him: whence it follows, that either all de facto unlimited Governors are not Tyrants, and such as have no Right to their unlimited Governments, or that Adam the Father of all Mankind, and the first Governor that ever was in the World, was a Tyrant, and had no right to Govern his own Children, as he did, and his children's Children also, or at least had a right to do so as long as he lived; which was very near a thousand years. So that if any during that time did not submit to his Government, it was not because he was not a lawful, though an unlimited Governor; but because whosoever disobeyed or resisted him, were not only unnatural Children but rebellious Subjects; of whom Cain that killed Abel his Brother was the first, and 
Cain the first Rebel.  probably so were all descended from him, a wicked and rebellious generation, who for their rebellion against God and God's Vicegerent their Father Adam, their Sovereign Lord and King, were all swept away by that universal Inundation and Deluge, wherein all mankind perished, but Noah and his Family only, who were none of the cursed offspring of Cain, but the Posterity of Seth, whom God gave unto Adam, instead of Abel, whom Cain slew.  
After the Deluge, the first Monarch of the new 
Noah the first Monarch after the flood.  World de jure was Noah, and probably de facto too as long as he lived, or at least as long as he and his Children and his children's Children lived together or near one another; and were all one people, and of one language (as the Text tells us they were) until they set upon the building of Babel: but assoon as there was a confusion of Tongues, some speaking one language and some another, than (saith the Text) they were scattered over the face of the Earth; those that spoke the same language and understood one another going together to the same place, and planting themselves in the same Country; which being then uninhabited was jure naturali, By the right of nature, primi occupantis, His that took first possession; and jure Divino positivo also, By God's positive law; God himself telling us, that he hath given the earth to the children of men; that is, to be possessed, inhabited, and cultivated by them.  
So that there were as many several Colonies which 
An account of Government after the confusion of languages.  afterwards grew into as many several Nations, as there were then several Languages, and as many several Governors in chief over them, who if they were not the Fathers and Heads of the several Colonies (as probably enough they might be, and then the Regiment might still be Paternal) yet were without doubt such, as for their eminent courage and virtue, were submitted to by the rest of the same Language; or took upon themselves to be first their Conductors to their several places of habitation, and then to be their Kings or Supreme Governors after they came thither, and became one People or Body-Politick.  
So that upon this division and distribution of 
Unlimited Monarchy most ancient.  Mankind into several Country's and Nations, were those first Kings, whom Justin speaksof, when he tells us that Principio rerum; Gentium, Nationumque Imperium penes Reges erat, That all Nations at first were governed by Kings, & arbitria Principum pro legibus erant, And the Will of the Prince (saith he) was the Law of the People: so that as Monarchy (next to the Paternal) was the most ancient of all Governments, so Arbitrary or unlimited Monarchy was the most ancient of all Monarchies. I say most ancient; I do not say the best; for I do willingly acknowledge a Political Monarchy, (such as ours is in England) 
Political Monarchy (as ours is) better than Despotical.  where the people are Governed by a King governing by Laws, and by Laws made for them by the King, with their own consent, is incomparably a much better Government both for King and People, than an absolute, arbitrary and Despotical Monarchy is, or can be; as I did at large assert and maintain in the Sermon I preached at our present King's Coronation, and afterwards printed by his majesty's special command; which I add to show, that the King himself was of the same Judgement as to that Particular.  
But yet for all that I am not afraid to affirm, that Mr. Baxter's Political Aphorism I am now speaking 
Mr. B is opinion of unlimited Governors false and dangerous.  of, viz. That all unlimited Governors are Tyrants, and have no right to their unlimited Governments, is false in itself, and the publishing of it, as it is capitally criminal in a Subject of any unlimited Government, so it is of dangerous consequence and seditious, even in a limited or Political Government, of any Species or kind whatsoever.  
For there is no species or kind of Government, whether it be Monarchical, or Aristocratical, or Democratical, 
Unlimited Governors not Tyrants, because unlimited.  but it may be limited or unlimited, and it may be more or less limited; but none of them are therefore Tyrannical, because they are unlimited.  
For Tyrannus a Tyrant, properly so called, I mean as now the word signifies; (for at first it signified 
Two sorts of Tyrants.  neither more nor less than a Monarch, or One governing All) is either Tyrannus usurpatione, a Tyrant by Usurpation, or Tyrannus exercitio, a Tyrant in Administration; that is, such a one as doth either violently and injuriously usurp the Government which he hath no right to; or though he hath a right to it, doth wickedly and injuriously behave himself in the exercise of it. And such in 
Cromwell in both senses a Tyrant.  both respects was Cromwell (if ever there were any) notwithstanding Mr. Baxter's magnifying of him, when time was, and exhorting his Son to follow his example in Governing as he did; which was, as he saith, to his immortal glory, and yet was as arbitrarily and as unlimitedly, as ever any of the Assyrian, or Persian, or Roman Emperors did heretofore, or as the Turk or great Mogul now do.  
And so may any unlimited Monarch do, and yet 
Several unlimited Monarches, no Tyrants in either sense.  be neither an Usurper, nor an unjust Governor, nor consequently be a Tyrant in either of the true notions of a Tyrant, as Cromwell was in both: for as in the Monarchies before named, and in all other Kingdoms in all parts of the World, the Succession of Princes one unto another was Hereditary, generally at least, and I think I may say universally, till oflate, and consequently They cannot all of them be said to have been Usurpers, or Tyrants by Usurpation; so many of them have been Just, and Wise, and Temperate, and every way most excellent Princes; and so beloved by their Subjects while they lived, that they were Deified and adored by them after they were dead; and consequently they were not all of them Tyrants in the Exercise of their Governments, though they were unlimited by any antecedent Pact, Covenant or Constitution betwixt them and their Subjects: which is enough to prove that all de facto unlimited Governors are not Tyrants, and consequently to prove this Aphorism of Mr. Baxter's which affirms they are so, to be false. Neither if it could prove them to be Tyrants Exercitio, that is to govern Tyrannically, would that prove them to have no Right to their Government, supposing them to be no Usurpers.   

CHAP. IU.  
No obligation from any Law, either of God or Nature or Nations, that all Governors should be limited by the People. Conquerors in a just War have an Unlimited right; and for the people conquered, after submission, to rise up against them is Rebellion.  
BUt Mr. Baxter perhaps will reply, All of them 
Mr. B is meaning perhaps, that all Governors ought de jure to be limited.  are therefore Usurpers because they are unlimited, as indeed he seems to insinuate by annexing the facto to unlimited; as if de jure all Governors ought to be limited in their governing by antecedent Covenants and Compacts betwixt those that are to govern, and those that are to be governed by them; and therefore those Governors that are not so limited or precontracted with, are Tyrants, and such Tyrants as have no right to govern, because de jure, by right, they ought to be limited or precontracted with. And this I do verily believe to be Mr. Baxter's genuine sense and meaning in this Aphorism; and he that reads what he writes afterwards, especially in his Aphorisms and discourses of the Causes of Conveying power, and of Obedience and Resistance, will I am confident be of my mind as to this particular.  
Now if the reason why he doth so magisterially pronounce all those Governors that are de facto 
No obligation that all Government should be so limited by any law.  Unlimited to be Tyrants, and to have no right to their Governments, be, because they ought the jure to be limited, I mean so limited as is before declared; I demand quo jure, By what right or law, they are obliged to be so limited? Was it jure divino positivo, By divine positive law? or was it jure divino naturali, By divine law of nature? or was it jure gentium, By the law of nations? for one of these three it must be, or else it could not be obligatory to all Governors and all Nations that are to be Governed by them.  
But first it was not jure divino positivo, By divine positive law. For where or in what place of God's 
1. Not by the positive law of God.  word, either of the new or old Testament, do we read any positive command of God, that the Kings or Governors of all Nations, or of any Nation, should be antecedently limited by Pacts or Covenants agreed upon betwixt them and the People, over whom they were to reign, before they could have any just Right or Title to governor reign over them? I am sure the Kings of Israel, though they were limited by God, not as Men only, and as all other Kings are, but as Kings, or in the execution of their Kingly Office, and that jure positivo, By positive law, as well as jure naturali & morali, By natural and moral law; yet they were never limited by the people either antecedenter or consequenter, neither à parte ante nor à parte post; nor was there any command of God, or so much as any intimation from God that they should be so.  
Again, as such limitation of Governors by the 
2 Not by the law of nature.  People is not the jure divino positivo, By any positive law of God, there being no positive Command in God's word for it; so it is not the jure divino naturali, By the law of nature, neither; for than it would have been de facto likewise at first as well as afterwards; and in all places as well as in some; especially in such places, where there are no other rules or Laws for the People to live by, but the dictates of Nature only; as in all inhabited places of the lately discovered New world, where we find no other Government, but by Kings or Monarches, no nor other Kings or Supreme Governors, but such as are unlimited.  
Lastly, as such a limitation of Kings or Supreme Governors by the People, is neither de jure positivo 
3. Not by the law of Nations.  nor naturali, Neither by any positive law, nor by the law of nature; so it is not the jure Gentium, By the law of Nations, neither; For nothing is de jure Gentium, By the law of Nations, but that wherein the interest of all Nations is concerned; as freedom of Trade and Commerce, the inviolableness of the Persons of Ambassadors, etc. but how is the interest of all other Nations concerned in this or that particular Nation's being governed by a limited or unlimited Prince or Governor? and supposing the first Kings or Sovereigns to have been unlimited, as Justine and all other Historians tell us they were; and as in all probability they were indeed in the first plantation of the World: and supposing too their unlimited Governments to have been Hereditary, as all History Humane and Divine do testify also: I would fain know, how the Heirs and Successors of such unlimited Princes could come to be limited. It could not be upon the account of a conditional Election; for an Election cannot be, but into a place that is void; but in an Hereditary Kingdom there is never any vacancy, because in an Hereditary Kingdom The King never dies, though the man 
The King never dies, how to be understood.  who was King doth; for immediately assoon as the Father ceaseth, the Son or next Heir begins to be King, and to be King as his Father was, that is, an unlimited Sovereign as his Father was, and so from generation to generation. And then Mr. Baxter must grant, that the Hereditary Successors of unlimited Governors may have a Right to their unlimited Governments, and such a right as their Subjects cannot deprive them of, without such a governor's own consent; nor he deprive his Heirs of the same right, by his consenting to the limitation or lessening of it, unless they and every one of them consent to it also.  
Or else he must prove that a free People, or a People that were sui juris, At their own disposal, and under no Government at all (if there were ever such a people in the World) might not voluntarily and lawfully submit themselves to the Government of one or more Governors, without any antecedent Pact or Covenant to limit him or them in his or their Government; and for proof of this he must produce some universal binding Law to the contrary; which until he can do, I do and must still affirm, that unlimited Governors (supposing them to be no Usurpers, and that they do not reign tyrannically, as certainly there be some that do not) are not all of them Tyrants, because they are unlimited; or such as have no right to their Governments upon that account only; and consequently that this Aphorism of Mr. Baxter's, which affirms the contrary, is false; 
The consequence driven home.  and would be Treason and justly punishable as Treason, if it were affirmed by a Subject of a Despotical Prince or Sovereign, such as all Kings at first were; and such as all Kings in the East and West - Indieses, and in afric, and some in Europe, as the Turk and Muscovite and French King, are at this day.  
Whereunto may be added the unlimited Right 
Conquerors in a just war unlimited.  and Title which Conquerors have over those they have conquered; I mean such conquerors, as by a just War are become Lords and Masters of the lives and fortunes of those they have subdued; whether they be Rebels or Enemies; and therefore as they may justly save the lives of as many or as few as they please, so, and much more so, may they justly govern those, whose lives they have saved, as they think fit, and most for their own advantage; as the Israelites did the Gibeonites, making them 
Instances out of Scripture.  Hewers of Wood and drawers of Water; that is, by employing them in all manner of drudgery, and servile works: And thus and worse than thus, David did to the Ammonites, even to all the people of the cities of Ammon (saith the Text) which he had conquered, putting them under saws and harrows of iron, and making them pass through the Brick-kilns, because they had violated the jus Gentium or the law of Nations, by the barbarous usage of his Ambassadors, whom out of kindness he had sent unto them. And yet (which is observable) the Ammonites were none of those Nations, which God had devoted to destruction, and commanded the Israelites to make war upon; but it was a War the Ammonites had justly drawn upon themselves with the sad and severe effects of it.  
And what if our King having been so long, and 
The like Case supposed betwixt our King and the Algerines.  so continuedly, and so outrageously injured and provoked by the Algerines robbing and pillaging of his Ships, and enslaving and murdering of his Subjects, should make War upon them, and by God's blessing vanquish and subdue them, making himself Master of all they have, both of strength and wealth, both by Sea and Land, and of that den of Thiefs itself (I mean the City of Algiers,) might he not, if he would, justly destroy them all? or if he thought it better for himself, or more for his own Interest, sell them all for slaves, or use them all as slaves to tug at the Oar all their life long in their own Galleys, or to dig in Mines and Quarries, or to mend high ways, or to put them to any other toilsome or sordid labour, and to have nothing for it but brown Biscuit and water for their food, and for their clothing any thing that will but cover their nakedness; and all this while to be beaten as often and as much as their Taskmasters shall think fit to inflict it? This would be very hard usage you will say, but no harder than that wherewith they have used others; nor no harder than a Conqueror may most justly inflict on such inhuman Monsters, and such professed Enemies of all mankind, as they are. Howsoever I hope Mr. Baxter will not deny such a Conqueror to be an unlimited Governor of those whom he hath so conquered, and yet to have a just right and Title to his unlimited Government, as every Master hath likewise over his slaves, whether they be born in his house, or bought with his money, without capitulating with them beforehand, how he shall govern them, or how they will be governed by him.  
But may not a People though conquered in a just 
Whether aconquered people may after submission free themselves by force?  War, and deservedly made and used as slaves and Vassals by the Conqueror, do what they can, to free themselves from that slavery and servitude? Mr. Baxter thinks they may, as appears by what he saith Page 193 of his Holy-Commonwealth, where 
Mr. B. saith, I.  he tells us that Dominatio, that is, (in his sense) any unlimited Government is penal to the Subjects, and they may escape it if they can, yea though they have submitted themselves to such a servitude: and consequently, à fortiori, By stronger reason, they may do what they can to free themselves from it, if they be forced by a Conqueror to submit to it.  
But this was not the judgement or doctrine of the Prophet Jeremy; for Nabuchadnezzar had no right 
The prophet Jeremy of another judgement.  or title, but that of Conquest, to that unlimited power he exercised over the Jews by making what Viceroys he pleased to govern them, and by imposing and exacting what tribute he pleased from them; and by forcing their King his Vassal to take an Oath of Allegiance to him, which is called the Oath of God, and for the breaking whereof Zedechiah (whom Nabuchadnezzar after he had deposed Jehoiachim, 
2 Chron. 3. 13. Jerem. 5. 2.  made his Viceroy under him) seeking to free himself and the people from that bondage or unlimited power, which the King of Babylon exercised over them, is by God himself declared to be a Rebel, and his endeavouring to cast off that unlimited yoke is called Rebellion; and Rebellion it could not be, 
Zedekiah 's casting off the yoke of the king of Babylon, called Rebellion and punished as such.  unless it had been a rising up against a rightful Sovereign: and therefore as God called it a Rebellion, so he punished it as a Rebellion by giving up Jerusalem and Zedechiah himself into the hands of him against whom he had rebelled; who after he had slain his Children before his eyes, he presently caused them to be put out, that the slaughter of his Children might be the last thing he should ever see; and then carried him captive unto Babylon, and kept him in a dungeon till he died: he caused likewise the walls of Jerusalem to be broken down, and the House of God itself, that glorious fabric, that wonder of the World, to be destroyed, and all the Nobility, Clergy, Gentry, and Artificers of the Nation to be carried away captive also, together with all the wealth and whatsoever was worth the carrying away, leaving nothing but some of the poorer sort of labouring People to dress and till the ground, and to keep it from being overrun with wild beasts. So that all the Jews got by this and their former Rebellion against the King of Assyria, was but the making of their yoke harder to be born, and heavier than it was before; as it seems by the Prophet Jeremy's sad bewailing of it in his Book of Lamentations. And as the Prophet Jeremy declares the Effects, so the Prophet Ezekiel declares the Causes of 
Witnessed by the prophet Ezekiel.  this their miserable condition; namely their Perjury, breaking the Oath of Allegiance they had taken, and their revolting from their obedience they had sworn to the King of Babylon, who had conquered them and forced them to submit to his unlimited power in Government of them; which if it had been unlawful for them to obey, God would not have suffered them to be punished as they were, for endeavouring as they did, to free themselves from it; at least he would not have called that endeavour of theirs a Rebellion, and specified it as the main cause, for which they were so punished.  
And it is very observable, that though God had promised to free them from that yoke, which first the Assyrians had laid upon them, and afterwards 
Their deliverance at last from the Babylonish captivity, was not by force of Arms.  the Persian Monarches did keep them under; yet, when after their seventy years' Captivity was accomplished, and the prefixed time of their deliverance was come, as the Text tells us Daniel knew by Books (namely by what he had read in the former Prophets) it was, God would not suffer them so much as to endeavour to deliver themselves by strong hand, or by rising up in Arms against their unlimited Sovereign, as no doubt he could have done if he would; but he put into the heart first of Cyrus, and afterwards of Artaxerxes Kings of Persia, than their Masters and unlimited Sovereigns, not only to give them leave to return into their own Country, but abundantly to furnish them with Money and Materials of all sorts, for the rebuilding of the Temple and City of Jerusalem, as is recorded at large in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah.  
And like unto this was their former Deliverance out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage, 
As neither was that from the Egyptian bondage.  from whence after a long and grievous slavery they were brought out by a strong hand indeed, but not by a strong hand of their own; for as they never attempted any thing against the arbitrary unlimited Government they lived under, during their very long and very cruel slavery in Egypt, so when at last they went out of it, they went not out without Pharaoh's leave to do so; though there were above Six hundred thousand fight Men amongst them, a number sufficient to have made their way by force against all the Power Pharaoh could have raised to hinder it; but God would not give them courage, or suffer them to do so, to the end that there might 
The reason of this, to give no countenance to rebellion.  be no countenance or colour for Rebellion, against even the most unjust, and injurious, and tyrannical Sovereign Powers, to be found upon record in his Word, as allowed by him in his own People, to justify or encourage any other people or persons, upon any pretence to rebel against their Sovereigns, whether limited or unlimited; nay whether they were no Tyrants or Tyrants, so they were not Usurpers, and consequently Rebels themselves against their rightful Sovereign.  
For, as I have already proved, that all unlimited Governors are not Tyrants, because they are unlimited: so I am now to prove that all Tyrants do not lose their right to their Government, because they are Tyrants or because they govern tyrannically, still supposing them to be no Usurpers.   

CHAP. V.  
That lawful Governors by being Tyrants, do not forfeit their Right to their Government, proved from Scripture, both Negatively and Affirmatively.  
NOw what or whom Mr. Baxter himself doth mean by Tyrants here in this place, it is plain 
What a Tyrant is, in Mr. B is notion.  and evident from what he saith Page 86. of his Political Aphorisms; where distinguishing betwixt an Usurper and a Tyrant, he tells us, that An Usurper is he that wants a Title, and A Tyrant is one that doth abuse it, or useth it not as he ought to use it; that is (saith he) for the common good. So that in his Notion of a Tyrant, he that hath never so just a Title to the Government, if he govern not as he ought to govern, is a Tyrant; and if he be a Tyrant, he hath no Right (saith he) unto his Government, whether it be limited or unlimited.  
No, saith Mr. Baxter, I do not say he hath no right to his Government, but that he hath no right to his unlimited Government, whereby I confess I know not what he means, unless it be this, that an unlimited Governor is not a Governor, but a Tyrant; and that he hath no right to his unlimited Government, because there ought to be no such Government.  
But then again, what will become of his division of Governors, and consequently of Governments also, into some that are limited, and some that are unlimited? If he reply, that though de facto, As to matter of fact, there be some Governors and Governments that are unlimited, yet de jure, As to matter of right, they ought all of them to be limited; and consequently, no man can have a right to an unlimited Government, because a Government that is unlimited is no rightful Government. If this be his meaning, it is but petitio Principii, A begging of that which is in question, nay of that which 
A governor's being unlimited, no hindrance to his Right.  I think I have put out of question already, by the Instances I have given. (1) of Paternal Government in the Old World before the Flood. (2.) Of the first Monarches in the New World after the Flood. (3.) Of all conquerors over those whom they have conquered in a just War; who were all of them unlimited Governors by any humane Constitution, and that not de facto, As in fact, only, but de jure, In right, also; there being no positive law of God, nor no humane antecedent Pact, or Constitution to the contrary. Such likewise were the Roman Emperors; and yet their Right and Title to their unlimited Government was never questioned, either by Christ himself, or by any of the Primitive Christians, who were his first and best disciples. So that there is no more to be said to prove that it is not the governor's (I mean the Sovereign or Supreme governor's) being unlimited that can make him to have no right to his unlimited Government.  
Neither need there to be much said to prove, that 
A lawful governor's being a Tyrant, doth not forfeit his Right.  it is not the lawful governor's being a Tyrant (whether he be limited or unlimited) that can make him lose or forfeit the right he had, or hath, unto his Government, so as to free his Subjects from their obligation of obedience to him, or warrant their taking up of Arms, or rebelling against him, and consequently to depose him and put him to death: for upon the same ground, and by the same reason the former may be done, the latter may be done also. So that the Presbyterians are no more excusable from being our late blessed King's murderers, than the Independents; the latter inferring the Conclusion from the Premises of the former. But this by the way only. I proceed to the proof of what I have in hand, namely,  
That a lawful Sovereign, whether limited or unlimited, 
The Proposition to be proved.  doth not lose or forfeit his right to his Sovereignty or Government over his Subjects by being a Tyrant, or by Governing them in a Tyrannical manner; so as upon that account his Subjects may lawfully disown or rebel against him.  
1. Because there is nothing in God's word to warrant 
Several arguments to prove it.  it.  
2. Because there is much to be alleged out of God's word to disprove it.  
3. Because the Doctrine and Practice of the Primitive Christians is against it.  
4. Because it seemeth to be a contradiction to the nature of the thing itself to maintain it.  
5. And lastly, Because supposing, but not granting it to be true, it would be mischievous to Mankind and destructive to humane Society in the practice of it.  
And first, this Aphorism or Assertion of Mr. Baxter's, viz, That a Sovereign or Supreme Governor (whether limited or unlimited it matters not) hath no Right, or forfeits the Right he had, unto his Government, if he be a Tyrant, or Governs otherwise than by the Laws of either God or man or both he ought to do; is False, because there is nothing in 
The 1. Argument.  Scripture either of the old or new Testament to warrant the truth of it. For this being a matter of so important and universal a concernment as it is, in regard of all Times, Places and Nations, though God foresaw that some, nay many, very many of the Kings or Supreme Governors, both unlimited and limited, not only of other Nations, but of his own People, would be Tyrants, that is, such as would govern their Subjects, not with Equity, Justice and Moderation, as they ought to do; nor according either to Divine or humane Laws (though of their own making) but according to their own Will and pleasures: yet there is no mention of any forfeiture of their Right to govern their Subjects that they incur by it, nor of any permission for their Subjects to rise or rebel, no nor so much as to defend themselves by any kind of force against them; much less to depose them or to set up others in the stead of them: which if they might have done, or if it had been best for them to do so, God no doubt (having so special and peculiar a care of them and kindness for them more than he had for any other of the Nations) would have permitted them (at least) to have done what they could, to have freed themselves from so heavy a yoke, and told them how, and when, and in what case they might have done so: which because he hath not, we may be sure it was not his Will they should do so, and consequently it was not lawful for them to do so; and if not for them, then certainly 'tis for no other Subjects of any other Nation neither.  
Again, besides this proof of the falseness of this Aphorism ab authoritate Scripturae negatiuè, From the authority of Scripture in a Negative way, 
The 2. Argument from Scripture Affirmatively.  because there is nothing in Scripture to justify the truth of it by: there be many Affirmative and positive places in Scripture to prove the contrary; namely, that Sovereign Princes or Supreme Governors do not forfeit their Right to their respective Governments though they be Tyrants, or because they are Tyrants; nor are their Subjects disobliged from their Allegiance and Obedience to them in all lawful things because they are so. Such are all those places in the New Testament, which command obedience to the Sovereign or Supreme Governors that then were; and particularly to Nero himself 
Obedience to Nero himself, strictly commanded.  the Roman Emperor, who was not only one of the worst of Men, but the greatest of Tyrants that ever was in the World. And yet it was in his time, and for subjection and obedience to him, and not to the Roman Senate as partakers of the Sovereignty with him, (as Mr. Baxter would have it) that those strict commands were given to the Christians of those times, that were his Subjects, to obey him in all his lawful commands, and not to resist him, not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, though they could not obey him, when he commanded what was sinful or unlawful.  
Moreover it is observable, that as the Prince then reigning, when these commands of obedience to him, and not resisting of him, were given to the Christians by the Apostles, was a most merciless and cruel Tyrant toward all his Subjects in general, and 
And that when Christians under his actual persecution.  most of all to those that professed themselves Christians in particular: So it is observable (I say) that at this very time this cruel Tyrant did actually persecute the Christians in a most horrible and outrageous manner and measure; and yet even then, when and whilst they were so cruelly persecuted by him, they were commanded to behave themselves as dutiful and obedient Subjects towards him, and that for Conscience sake, and not for fear of punishment only, or for fear of being worse and worse used by him; which the Apostles (who knew the mind of God much better than we do) would never have commanded them to do, if Nero, by his tyrannical usage of them, had lost his right to govern them, or ceased to be their Sovereign.  
Lastly, as it is observable at what time these Precepts of obedience to Sovereign Princes, and of not resisting them, were given to their Christian Subjects, (namely, when the worst of Men, and greatest of Tyrants, and first Persecutor of Christians was their Sovereign) so it is worth our observation also, to take notice of the Persons, whom the Holy Ghost made choice of to publish and proclaim 
Why S. Peter and S. Paul made choice of, to preach up obedience.  these Precepts unto the World. They were St. Peter and St. Paul; of whom the one had been reproved by Christ, whilst he was upon the Earth, for resisting the Magistrate, though it were in defence of Christ himself; and the other was reproved by Christ from Heaven, for obeying the Magistrate's sinful commands by persecuting Christ in his members: but both of them had now better learned Christ, namely, neither to obey the Magistrate when he commanded them to do that which was sinful, nor to resist him when he persecuted them for not obeying of him. And what they had learned themselves, they of all the rest of the Apostles were the fittest to teach others; because as the one of them was more peculiarly than any other of the Twelve, the Apostle of the Jews; so the other of them was as peculiarly the Apostle of the Gentiles; and both of them so by God's own appointment: so that the whole world being according to Scripture divided into Jews and Gentiles, the whole world or all Mankind might be taught this doctrine, which it so much concerns the peace of the world, that all men should learn and practice, namely, the Doctrine of indispensable either active or passive Obedience of Subjects to their Sovereigns, how ill soever they are governed or how much soever they are oppressed by them.   

CHAP. VI  
This Proposition farther proved from the Practice of the Primitive Christians.  
ANd as this was the doctrine preached both to Jews and Gentiles by the Apostles; so was it believed and practised by the Primitive Christians, 
The 3. Argument from the practice of the Primitive Christians.  who followed herein the example of Christ their head, of whom as it was foretold by the Prophets, so it is recorded by the Evangelists, that he was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet as a sheep before the shearer is dumb, so he opened not his mouth, but without murmuring or contradiction submitted himself to the sentence of an unjust Judge, and patiently endured the execution of it; leaving to us an Example (as St. Peter tells us) of suffering as he did without resisting those that are in authority, though they use it or abuse it unjustly and injuriously, and though it be in our power to resist it, as I am sure it was in Christ's. And herein (I say) the first and best of his Disciples followed his example; I mean the Primitive Christians of the three first Ages, that is, all the 
Whilst under Heathen and Tyrant Princes.  while they were subject to Heathen and Tyrannical and persecuting Princes; and yet we do not read that ever they did so much as make any the least doubt of the right, those Tyrannical and persecuting Princes had to govern them: much less did they upon the pretence of those Princes having forfeited their Right to their Government, ever take up arms either offensive or defensive, against any of them; as no doubt they might and would have done, if they had thought or had been taught, that those Princes had either had no right to govern them, because they were unlimited, or that they had forfeited the Right they had, because they were Tyrants.  
For it was not out of Stupidity, or because they were insensible of their sufferings, neither was it 
Their nonresistance not for want of power, etc.  out of Pusillanimity, or want of courage to encounter with their enemies, though never so numerous; for how could they that did not fear death, the most painful and tormenting death, fear any thing that men could do unto them? nor lastly, was it Weakness or want of power to make resistance or to defend themselves against their persecuting Princes, that was the cause they did not, (as not only Bellarmine and other Papists, but many of those that call and think themselves to be the best of Protestants, are not ashamed to say it was) but mere Conscience of their 
But cut of conscience to God.  duty to God, in obeying even such Princes as those were, by doing whatsoever they commanded which God had not forbidden, willingly and cheerfully, and by suffering meekly and patiently whatsoever they did wrongfully inflict upon them, for not obeying them when they could not obey them and God too; as it undeniably appears by those Apologies that were made in the name of all the Primitive Christians of those times, by Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Athenagoras, and others, who all of them tell their persecuting Emperors, that it was not for want of force or courage, but merely for conscience sake and because their Religion had forbidden them to do so, that they did not take up Arms to defend themselves against those Powers that God had set over them; though the power they received from God were never so ill used or abused by them.  
Which having made appear from Precepts of Scripture, and from the Practice of those Precepts by the Primitive Christians, one would think there need no more to be said to justify my exception against this Aphorism of Mr. Baxter's, as being contrary to what was taught by Christ and his Apostles, and what was practised by the first and best of their Disciples.   

CHAP. VII.  
The Revolt of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam, if it were by special commission, no warrant to us.  
BUt yet because there is something in the Old Testament (which is the word of God as well as the New) which may seem to favour Mr. Baxter's opinion; namely, That Tyrants have no right to their Government, or that Sovereign Princes by becoming Tyrants do lose or forfeit the right they had unto their Government; we will consider what can be alleged out of the Old Testament to prove that Assertion.  
There is no such Law I am sure, nor no such positive declaration of God's Will, that a King or Sovereign Prince ceases to be a king or Sovereign, when he is, or because he is a Tyrant; or that his Subjects shall cease to be his Subjects, or cease to acknowledge and obey him as their Sovereign upon that account, or indeed upon any other account whatsoever: much less is there any thing said in the Old Testament to warrant or justify the deposing of Sovereign Princes by their Subjects, upon any pretence of male administration of their Government in any kind or any degree. And therefore if there were never so many Examples or Instances in matter of fact to the contrary, they would never prove the thing itself to be lawful. But indeed there is but one Instance or Example in the whole Old Testament appliable to this purpose, and that is that of Rehoboam, 
The ten Tribes revolt from Rehoboam examined.  from whom the ten Tribes revolted, for but threatening he would oppress them more than his Father had done.  
Now from this one Example only, there be some that do conclude, that Subjects in case of Tyranny and oppression by their Sovereigns (especially if there be otherwise no hope of their being eased or freed from it) may lawfully do as the ten Tribes did, revolt from them and set up others to reign over them.  
But as, à facto ad jus non valet argumentum, From matter of fact to matter of right is no good consequence; so neither, à semel facto ad semper sic faciendum, From a thing's having been once done, to have it always so done, is no good consequence neither. So that supposing, but not granting, that it was lawful for Jeroboam and the Ten tribes to do as they did, because Jeroboam had been formerly told by the Prophet Ahljah, That God would give him those ten Tribes to reign over them; and because God himself, speaking of the revolting of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam; saith 
* 1 Kings 12. 24  expressly, that the thing was from him: supposing I say that upon these considerations this fact of Jeroboam's and the ten Tribes in revolting from Rehoboam, and setting up 
Suppose what they did, might be by special Commission.  Jeroboam in his stead to reign over them, had been no Rebellion of the People against their lawful Sovereign; but an execution of God's command against him, who, though he was their Sovereign, was but God's Subject; and therefore might be punished by him, when, and how, and by whom, and to what degree he pleased; as having forfeited to him for his own and Father's sins all the power and dominion he had over his Subjects, as derived from him, and held of him, and that but durante bene placito, During his good pleasure, only; what I say if, upon such considerations as these, that particular fact of Jeroboam and the ten Tribes were justifiable, would it follow that any other Subject or Subjects, without such a special or particular Commission from God, as they had, might do as they did? Would it not follow as well that any 
The like cases of Abraham.  man might commit Murder, and the most barbarous and the most unnatural of all murders, I mean the murder of his own and only Son, because Abraham was not only permitted, but commanded by God to do so, nay and commended by God for being so ready and so willing as he was to do it? And would it not follow as well likewise, 
Of the Israelites.  that any man might rob, and spoil their Neighbours, because the Israelites did so to the Egyptians and were blameiess, because God who is Lord Paramount of all men's lives and fortunes, (and to whom all men have forfeited themselves and all that they have by their sins) had given them a special and particular Commission to do so? Whereunto I 
Of Phineas.  might add the kill of Zimri and Cozbi by Phineas, which was done no doubt by God's special inspiration, because God was so well pleased with it, that the Plague in the heat and height of it presently ceased; and Phineas was by God himself highly commended and rewarded for it. And yet I believe, 
Those cases applied.  that if any man were indicted and arraigned either for Robbery or Murder, though those that he rob were Egyptians, that is never so much his own or God's enemies, or if those that he killed were actually committing never so great a sin: I believe, I say, that one's pleading the Israelites robbing of the Egyptians to justify his theft, or the other's pleading of Phineas his killing of Zimri and Cozbi to justify his murder, would not save either of them from the Gallows: so neither will the pleading of what was done by Jeroboam and the ten Tribes, (supposing it done by God's special Command or Approbation) justify or excuse any other for doing what they did, unless they could make it appear they have the same Warrant, that they had for the doing of it; which I am sure is not now to be expected, no more than it is to be expected that the Sun should stand still, as it did once at the command of Joshua; or go backward, as it did another time at the entreaty of Hezekiah. We are to be 
No warrant hence for us to do the like.  governed, and to govern ourselves by those Laws and Rules which God hath given to all mankind in general, and not by such extraordinary dispensations as God hath been pleased to give some men at some times in particular; and much less by any pretended or fancied Enthusiasms or inspirations of our own; so that supposing this revolting of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam, and the setting up of Jeroboam to have been lawful, it will not prove it to be lawful for any other Subjects to do so too upon the same pretence (viz. upon the pretence of being never so grievously oppressed) unless they have the same special Warrant of God for it.  
But (2dly.) I affirm that what was done by Jeroboam and the ten Tribes was an unlawful and 
The Revolt sinful against the fifth Commandment.  a sinful action, I mean their revolting from Rehoboam their lawful Sovereign notwithstanding his Fathers or his own oppression of them, because it was a transgression of an everlasting Statute or Ordinance of God (I mean the fifth Commandment of the Moral Law) whereby all mankind is obliged to honour and obey not only their natural Parents, but all their lawful Superiors, and especially him that is Supreme, who is Pater Patrioe, the Father as well as the Ruler of all his Subjects, and set over them by God to be so. And therefore, as a Father 
The case betwixt a King and his Subjects the same as betwixt a father and his children.  doth not lose or forfeit the authority of a Father, by being not so good, so careful, and so kind a Father as he ought to be; nor are his Children thereby discharged from paying him that duty and obedience which they owe unto him, no not although they be never so harshly or hardly dealt with, or used by him: so neither do Kings or Supreme Governors lose the Authority they have over their Subjects, or cease to be their Kings, because they govern them otherwise than they ought to do; nor are their Subjects upon that account disobliged from their Allegiance and Obedience they owe unto them. For if Servants, as St. Peter saith, are to obey their Masters, and not only such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
Or betwixt a Master and his servants. 1 Pet. a. 18.  good and gentle, but such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 too, such as are froward and perverse, that is, such as are not only hard to be pleased, but severe in commanding and cruel in chastising them also; much more are Subjects to obey and to continue in obedience to their Sovereigns, though they be never so severely dealt with by them; and therefore the revolting of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam, being their lawful Sovereign, upon the account of their having been oppressed by his Father, and upon his threatening them to be more oppressed by himself, was not lawful; unless they had had a special Command or Commission from God for it; which it 
No such special commission for the Revolt as wone supposed.  doth not appear they had either by any express words of the Text, or by any necessary consequence that can be inferred from it, either in relation to what was done by Jeroboam, or what was done by the ten Tribes.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Jeroboam 's Case stated, and his pretence enquired into. The Revolt called Rebellion by God himself.  
ANd first as to what was done by Jeroboam, though it may seem to be justifiable, as if it had been done by a special Commission from God, 
Jeroboam 's case stated.  because God had told him by the Prophet Ahijah, that he was to be King over the ten Tribes after they were rend off from the other two Tribes; yet did he not thereby give Jeroboam either Commission or permission to rend them off, or to do any thing towards the rending them off himself. For the words which God spoke by Ahijah the Prophet to Jeroboam were not, Thou shalt rend, but, I will rend the Kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and I 
1 Kings 11. 31.  will give ten Tribes to thee, and not, Thou shalt take ten Tribes unto thyself, by using either force or fraud, or any other sinister, seditious or unlawful means, either for the getting or the keeping of the Kingdom which God had promised to give him. But Jeroboam did both. For first, whether out of a distrust of God's performance of his promise, or 
His distrust and impatience.  out of an impatience to stay God's own time for it, no sooner was Solomon dead, but home comes Jeroboam out of Egypt, not called by God but by a discontented party of the People, to whom after in all probability he had aggravated their grievances, and thereby incensed them as much as he could against the present Government, he offered himself to be their Head, and as such marched with them, to expostulate and capitulate with their King, hoping they would receive an unsatisfactory answer, as they did, and thereupon would presently make him their King, as they did also: So that he had it not from God, who only had power to dispose of it, (for by him, as he himself tells us, King's reign) but from the People, the People that were then under an obligation of obedience to a lawful Sovereign and consequently had no power to dispose of themselves, or to become Subjects to another, no more than he had a right to become their King, until he that promised him he should be so, had made him so, which he could and infallibly would have done in his own good time, without any thing done on Jeroboam's part but the relying upon the promise of God only; which he distrusting or being too impatiently ambitious to stay for the performance of it, took his own seditious and rebellious way for the hastening, as he did afterwards for the keeping of himself to be a King. For as he caused the ten Tribes to revolt from Rehoboam in order to the making himself their King, so he caused them to revolt from God also by setting up other Gods, and other Priests, and other places of worship, thereby making a formal Schism in the Church, to prevent a possibility of reunion in the State. So that as he sinned and made Israel to sin for the getting, so he sinned and 
How he made Israel to sin.  made Israel to sin much more for the holding and keeping of the Kingdom, which he might have had and kept much longer than he did, if he had stayed God's leisure for the having, and done nothing to displease God for the holding of it. Whereas if he would have done as David did, he should have had the success that David had, without sinning himself, or making so many Thousands to sin with him and for him, as headed.  
David was not only told by the Propet Samuel that he should be King, as Jeroboam was by the 
David 's case alike and his different behaviour.  Prophet Ahijah; but he was anointed too, which Jeroboam was not. And yet when it was twice in his power to have stepped up into the Throne by destroying Saul (whom the men of these times would have said, as Abishai did, that God had delivered into his hand to be destroyed by him) he would not do it, nor suffer it to be done, but said, God forbid that I should lay my hand on the Lord's anointed; 
* 1 Sam. 26. 8, 9, etc.  as the Lord liveth, the Lord shall smite him, or his day shall come to die, or he shall descend into battle and perish; howsoever the Lord forbid that I should stretch forth mine hand against the Lord's anointed. This was David's resolution, and this should have been Jeroboam's resolution also, to have expected God's performance of his promise in his own time, and in his own way; and not have snatched the Crown out of God's hand, and put it himself upon his own head, before God had anointed his head for it.  
Moreover it is observable, that is was not that 
The ground of Jeroboam 's pretence.  for which Ahijah the Prophet told Jeroboam, God was so angry with Solomon, that he would rend away ten Tribes of the twelve from his Son (which was Idolatry) it was not that (I say) which Jeroboam pretended to be the cause of his rising and rebelling, and his stirring up the ten Tribes to rebel against Rehoboam; but it was a more popular pretence and such a one as the generality of the People is usually most concerned in, and concerned for; namely, the public grievance by Taxes and Tributes, which how necessary soever for their own defence and safety, do always seem an insupportable burden to the Subjects. And therefore the ambitious Aspirers of all times have always made use of this Topick, first to discontent the People with their present 
His artifice to discontent the people.  condition, though it be never so tolerable, nay never so good a one, and then to promise them a relief of all their imaginary grievances, if they will be ruled by them; which the foolish People believing first call them their Patriots, and afterwards (if they can) make them their Princes, who commonly prove the greatest of Tyrants; and then the People that raised them find and feel the fruits of their own folly, and when it is too late to help it, repent of it. And yet such is the incorrigible madness as well as folly of the multitude, that though it hath been never so often entrapped, it always hath been, and still is and ever will be apt to be taken with the same bait, how dear soever it hath cost them formerly.  
It was not long before this, that Absalon by the counsel of Achitophel made use of the same artifice 
Absalon 's rebellion raised by the same artifice.  to stir up the people, and to make them to rebel against their King and his Father, by making them believe, first, that they were oppressed by David, and had not justice done them; and secondly, if he were in power every man should have right done him, and no man should have cause to complain amongst them. This they were so foolish as to believe, though their condition then was better than ever it had been before, or ever it was afterwards; for it was David a man after God's own heart that was then their King, and who as himself (or rather God's Spirit by his mouth) tells us, fed them with 
Psalm 78. 73.  a faithful and true heart, and ruled them prudently with all his power; and if prudently, then justly no doubt also: and yet it was his not doing of justice that was made the pretence of the rebellion against him; and by whom? by Absalon, one whom the People knew to have been a murderer of his own brother, and therefore not to be a very likely man to govern them either more justly, or more mercifully than his Father did: so that as the pretence of their rising up against David was groundless, so their setting up of Absalon in his stead was folly and madness.  
And now one would have thought, the ill success they had in that action would have made them more wary than to be tempted and prevailed with again, so soon at least as afterwards they were, to another rebellion against the Grandchild of David upon another, and that perhaps upon as groundless a pretence as the former; I mean this of Jeroboam, which we are now speaking of. For the pretence of Jeroboam and the ten Tribes rebellion against Rehoboam 
Jeroboam 's pretence inquired into.  was, because he would not ease them of the heavy yoke which they pretended Solomon his Father had laid upon them: which had it been true to never so great a degree, would have been no just cause of the Rebellion of Subjects against their Sovereign, as is already shown. But I do not find in the History of Solomon's Reign, from the beginning to the end of it, as it is very particularly recorded 
No mention of a yoke in Solomon ' s. reign.  in the first book of Kings, and in the second of Chronicles, any mention of so heavy a yoke, or indeed of any yoke at all that was laid upon any of the Complainants, I mean upon any of the ten Tribes of Israel. I read indeed in the fourth Chapter of the first book of Kings, Verses 20, 21. That there was a great Tribute or Levy made by Solomon, 
The great Tribute was a Levy of men.  for the building of that glorious Temple of God in Jerusalem, which was the wonder of the World, and for other his many and magnificent Structures; and that this Tribute and Levy was of the Persons of his Subjects for bond-service, that is to make them to work as slaves or bondmen under Taskmasters, and that not for wages, but for meat and drink only to maintain them in life and health and strength, to endure the hardship and toilsome labour they were put to.  
But what Subjects of Solomon's were these, 
And that, not of the children of Israel.  that this heavy Yoke was laid upon? They were, saith the Text, The People that were left of the Amorites, Hittites, Perizites, Hivites and Jebusites, which were not of the children of Israel. The Children therefore of those aforesaid Nations, whom the Children of Israel were not able utterly to destroy, were those upon whom Solomon Levied the aforesaid Tribute of men for bond-service. But of the children of Israel, (saith the Text, verse 22 of the same Chapter) did Solomon make no bondmen, but they were men of War, his servants and his Princes, and his Captains and his Rulers of his Chariots and of his Horsemen: which certainly were all of them very honourable and very profitable Employments.  
And that this was so and no otherwise, we have it again attested, 2 Chron. 8. 7, 8, 9 where the Text repeating the former Narrative, that they were the Children of those Nations only who were to be, and were not consumed, whom Solomon made bondmen, and made to pay Tribute; that is, he made some of them bondmen and the rest to pay Tribute. But of the children of Israel (saith the Text) did Solomon make no servants for his work, or to work in his building; neither did he for aught I can find make them pay any Tribute at all; nor indeed had he any need to do so, having all the Nations from Euphrates to the border of Egypt his Tributary Subjects; so that not only he but all Israel were so rich, that silver in Jerusalem was as stones in the street (saith the Text in one place) nay, it was nothing accounted of in the days of Solomon, saith the Text in another place. So that what this heavy yoke was that the ten Tribes complained of, I cannot imagine, unless they were sick of a surfeit of plenty, or weary of being too well at ease. And 
People apt to grow weary of their happiness.  that there is such a sickness, such an Epidemical disease, and that the Common People of all times and places are very apt to be infected with it, we have found by our own experience very lately; and I pray God we may not find it again very shortly; though never People had less reason to complain than we had then, or have now; or than the Israelites had (for aught appears from the History of those times) when Jeroboam and the ten Tribes complained of the heavy yoke they groaned under, which, had it indeed been as grievous as they said it was, or as Rehoboam threatened it should be, yet would not that have been cause enough to warrant or justify them in doing what they did, I mean their renouncing his Sovereignty over them, or their Rebellion against him; their Rebellion I say, for so God calls it, who always calls both Things and Persons by their right and proper names. Men may, and often do call evil good and, good evil; but God doth not; or if he do call some things or persons by better names than in rigour and propriety of speech they deserve to be called by; as when he calls those that are his servants good men, and the works which they do in obedience to him, good works, because for Christ's sake he accounts them to be so, and accepts and rewards them as if they were so, 
In what sense some men and works are called good.  though neither the Men nor their Works be exactly and entirely good, or without any leaven or mixture of bad in them; and consequently God out of his gracious condescension, and to encourage our sincere, though weak endeavours to please 
The Revolt is called Rebellion.  him, may and doth call some things and persons by better names than they deserve to be called by; 
1 Kings 12. 19 2 Chron. 10, 19  yet he never did call any thing or person by a worse name than in exact propriety of speech it was worthy of: And therefore that which God called Rebellion (as he did this of Jeroboam's and the ten Tribes renouncing of Rehoboam's Sovereignty over them) was Rebellion; and what is Rebellion but the resisting or rising up against one whom we ought to obey? so that God by calling that which Jeroboam and the ten Tribes did, a Rebellion, doth thereby declare that Rehoboam (notwithstanding the unwise answer he gave them, and the hard usage his threatening made them believe they were to expect from him) was still their Sovereign, and still to continue to be so; otherwise their renouncing of him and setting up another instead of him would not have been a Rebellion, and I am sure if it had not been so, God would never have called it so; for every resistance is not a Rebellion, but only the resistance of one whom we ought to obey. We are commanded to resist the Devil, and to renounce the Dominion he usurps over us, because he is an Usurper, and is not our lawful Sovereign; and therefore, though we are often commanded to resist him, yet we are never said in Scripture to rebel against him.   

CHAP. IX.  
The Arguments that God foretold it should be, and that the thing is said to be from God, answered. Jeroboam and Jehu compared together.  
AS to what may be said out of Scripture to justify what Jeroboam and the ten Tribes did, from being a Rebellion, or a sinful and unlawful action: as first, that it was but the fulfilling of a Prophecy or the doing of that which God had foretold he would 
Two arguments to justify the revolt.  have to be done; and secondly, that when Rehoboam had gathered together a very great army, intending by force to reduce the ten Tribes to their former obedience and subjection; God forbade him by the Prophet Shemaiah to do so, saying, Ye 
1 Kings 12. 24. 2 Chro. 11. 4.  shall not go up nor fight against your brethren the children of Israel; for this thing is from me.  
I answer first in general that God in plain and express 
The Answer in general.  words having said it was Rebellion, nothing that can be gathered out of any other words of the Text can make it to be no rebellion; for the Collection made out of God's word by men may be false, but God's words themselves must be true.  
Secondly, and more particularly to the first of the places before quoted, to justify that which was done by Jeroboam, that it was but the doing of that which God by the Prophet Ahijah had foretold was to be done, I answer, that God's foretelling a thing 
God's foretelling a thing to be done is not the cause of doing it.  to be done, doth not justify or excuse either the doers or the doing of it; if either the thing itself be evil, or if he that doth it hath no Commission from God for it; or doth it with an ill mind, or by ill means, or to an ill end, a concurrence of all which circumstances there were in this fact of Jeroboam's, and all of them evil and sinful, and therefore all of them from his own evil and sinful disposition, and none of them from God, but by his permission only; and as the bare permission, so the bare foretelling of a thing to be done is no way the cause of the doing of it; and consequently can neither justify nor excuse the doing of it, if it be evil in itself or done with an ill intention, or any otherwise in all respects than it ought to be done. The foretelling therefore of Jeroboam, by Ahijah the Prophet, that he should be King, and reign over the ten Tribes of Israel, can no more excuse him for the way he took to make himself King, nor the ten Tribes for assisting him in it, than Elisha the Prophet foretelling Hazael that he should be King of Syria, did justify or excuse him for murdering Benhadad his Master, 
The like case of Hazael, etc.  that he might be king in his stead; or than God's foretelling the crucifying of Christ, did justify or excuse either the malice of the Jews in accusing, or Pilat's injustice in condemning of our Saviour.  
As to the other place before objected, where God by the Prophet Shemaiah saith, the thing was from 
The evil of sin from God, only by permission.  him; I answer, that the thing, namely, the Rebellion of Jeroboam and the ten Tribes, may be considered as it was malum culpoe, An evil of sin, or as it was malum poenoe, An evil of punishment; that is, as it was an evil of sin in those that were the actors in it; and so it was not from God but permissiuè, or by his permission only; or as it was an evil of punishment justly inflicted upon the house of David for the sin of Solomon, not the sin which Jeroboam and the ten Tribes did falsely (for aught appears in Scripture to the contrary) lay unto his charge, namely, the oppressing of his Subjects, but for his Idolatry, for his forsaking of his God, which as Ahijah told Jeroboam was the sin that God charged him withal, and for which God did not command or give Jeroboam a Commission or leave to rebel against Rehoboam the Son of Solomon, but only suffered him to do so; for God (as St. James tells us) as he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as he is not to be tempted himself with evil, so he doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, tempt no man to evil; but (as it follows in the same place) every one is tempted by his own lust; and so was Jeroboam; for it was not his zeal for God, but his own ambition that made him do what he did to get the Kingdom, as appears by what he did, after he had gotten it, for the keeping of it; for it was the same lust, the same ambition that tempted him first to make Israel to sin by joining with him in rebellion against his and their King, that tempted him afterwards to make Israel to sin by joining with him in Rebellion against his and their God, by setting up the Calves at Dan and Bethel to be worshipped by them.  
Neither was the one of these actions of Jeroboam more or less from God than the other; for as they were both of them morally evil or sinful in themselves, and intentionally and designedly evil in the doers of them, so neither of them were from God; because God is not nor cannot be the author or accessary of any such evil; but as they were evils of punishment, the former an evil of punishment to 
The evil of punishment is from God.  the House of David for Solomon's Idolatry, and the latter an evil of punishment to the house of Israel, for the ten Tribes joining in Rebellion with Jeroboam against their lawful Sovereign; so they were both of them from God, as all evils of punishment are, whether inflicted immediately by God himself as Plagues, Famines, Droughts, Inundations generally are, and as the drowning of the whole World by Noah's flood, and the burning of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire reigned down from heaven, particularly were: or whether they be executed by some men upon others, whether justly or unjustly, whether with or against God's command, whether by good men or bad, nay whether they be executed by Men or by Devils, (as those evils inflicted upon Job were) they are still from God, either as punishments and effects of his vindicativejustice to his Enemies, or as chastisements and effects of his fatherly care and kindness to his Children: so that whatsoever the evil be in itself, and how sinfully soever it may be contrived and executed by men, yet it may be most justly made use of by the Divine Wisdom either for the punishment of his Enemies, or for the bettering of his servants. And thus, and no otherwise than thus, may Jeroboam's and the ten Tribes rebellion, or rather the rending off the ten tribes of Israel from the house of David by that Rebellion, be said to be from God; and God's forbidding Judah to fight with Israel upon that account doth not argue his approbation of what had been wickedly done by those of Israel, but his own resolution to confirm and continue the punishment which he himself had justly inflicted upon those of Judah, who no doubt were the followers of Solomon in his sin of Idolatry and rebellion against God; as those of Israel were in being followers of Jeroboam in their rebellion against the house of David.  
I have insisted the longer upon this particular, because it seems to be the only Instance, that can with any colour of reason be alleged from Scripture to justify the rebellion of Subjects against their lawful Sovereign: For that which was done by Jehoiada against Athaliah was done for the lawful King against a most wicked Usurper; and that which was done by Jehu against Jehoram, was done by a special 
The case of Jehu and Jeroboam unlike.  and particular command of God, such a one as Abraham had for the sacrificing of his Son, and as the Israelites had for spoiling the Egyptians, and as Elijah had for killing the Priests of Baal, as plainly appears from the second book of Chronicles Chap. 22. 7. where it is said, That the Lord anointed Jehu the son of Nimshi to cut off the house of Ahab: whereas Jeroboam was not anointed at all; and David though he was anointed, yet it was not to make him presently and actually King, but only a designing him to be King after the death of Saul, who continued to be the Lord's anointed and David's lawful Sovereign, as long as he lived, and was at several times and upon several occasions acknowledged by David himself to be so; though Saul had forsaken God, and was forsaken of God long before. But Jehu when he was anointed was actually made King; for the Prophet who was sent to anoint him, when he poured the Oylon his head, (saith the Text) said unto him, Thus saith the Lord 
2 Kings 9 6, 7.  God of Israel, I have anointed thee King over the People of the Lord, even over Israel, and thou shalt smite the house of Ahab thy master, that I may avenge the blood of my servants the prophets, etc. And so what Jehu did against the house of Ahab, he had a special Warrant, and an express and positive command from God for the doing of it; and as he had God's command to do it, so he had God's approbation of it, and reward for it, after it was done; for the Lord said unto Jehu (saith the Text, 2 Kings 11. 30.) Because thou hast done well in executing that which is right in mine eyes, and hast done to the house of Ahab according to all that was in mine heart, thy children of the fourth generation shall sit upon the throne of Israel. But Jeroboam had neither God's command to do what he did before he did it, nor God's approbation for doing what he did after he had done it; neither were Solomon or Rehoboam usurpers, as Athaliah, and Ahab, and Jehoram were.  
To conclude, as the Examples even of the best men's actions recorded in Scripture do not make 
The general rule to be followed, unless there be a special dispensation.  what they did to be lawful, any farther than as they were agreeable to the general rule of all men's actions, the Moral Law of God; or as they had a special, a certain and a positive Dispensation from God the Lawgiver himself to do something upon some occasions otherwise than by the general Rule they were obliged to do; and Exceptio in non except is firmat regulam, An exception to a Rule strengthens the Rule in things not excepted: So the doing of that which was justifiably done then, by virtue or warrant of such a Dispensation, is not justifiably to be imitated by any man or number of men now, when no such Warrant, no such Dispensation, from the Lawgiver himself, in so certain, so immediate, and so miraculous a manner as it was then, is to be expected, whatsoever our mad enthusiastics may pretend to the contrary.   

CHAP. X.  
A Recapitulation of the two former Arguments from the word of God and Primitive practice, against both Papists and Presbyterians.  
BY what hath been said already, partly from plain Precepts of Scripture commanding all Christians to obey, and forbidding them to resist, their lawful Sovereigns, though never so unlimited in the Constitution, or never so Tyrannical in the exercise of their Government, (for who ever was, or could be more so, in both respects, than NERO was, in whose reign those Precepts were given?) and partly from the Practice and profession of all Christians, agreeable to those Precepts in the Primitive and purest times; together with the Answer to such Objections, as have been, or may be made from some few misinterpreted and misapplied examples out of Scripture to the contrary: though by what hath been said upon these heads, it hath (I say) been sufficiently proved, that Kings or Sovereign Princes and Governors do not lose their Right to govern their Subjects, though they be Unlimited or Tyrants, and govern otherwise than by God's or their own Laws they ought or are obliged to govern; and consequently that their Subjects do not upon that account cease to be Subjects, so as to be disobliged from obeying even such Sovereigns; from obeying 
To obey actively and passively, what.  them (I say) either actively or passively, that is, by obeying them in all their lawful Commands willingly and cheerfully, and by suffering for not obeying them in their unlawful Commands meekly and patiently, and never in any case, or upon any provocation, to resist, rebel, or take up either offensive or defensive Arms against them; there being nothing to warrant the one more than the other in the word of God or in the practice and judgement of the first and best of Christians; which one would think should be enough to convince all that are Christians now, of the unlawfulness of it.  
And yet of all Christians, those that seem to be most opposite to one another in all things else, (I mean the Papists and the Presbyterians, with other of our Sectaries) agree in this one thing, I mean in the lawfulness of Subjects taking up Arms 
Papists and Presbyterians agree in the doctrine of resisting Kings.  against their Sovereigns: though the former, to wit the Papists, like the old Pharisees, hold nothing to be lawful, for which they have not a Tradition from their forefathers, and the latter, to wit the Presbyterians and their Complices, like the old Scribes hold nothing to be lawful, for which they have not express Scripture. And yet, as both Scribes and Pharisees agreed in thinking it lawful to oppose and fight against the Lord Christ, so both Papists, and Presbyterians, and other Sectaries agree in holding it to be lawful to oppose and fight against the Christ's of the Lord, I mean Kings; though as neither of those had then, so neither of these have now any Warrant either from Scripture or Tradition, that is, either from the written Word of God or from the practice of their primitive Predecessors, to plead for it.   

CHAP. XI.  
An Objection from the Law of Nature, and that those Precepts were temporary and the Primitive Christians were too weak to resist, answered. The Church of England 's judgement upon the case.  
BUt perhaps it may be said (though it cannot be said rationally by any that hold either of the 
The objection.  aforesaid Principles) that though there be nothing to be alleged either from Scripture or Tradition, that is, either from the written word of God or from the practice of the Primitive Christians, to justify the taking up either of offensive or defensive Arms by Subjects against their Sovereigns, yet it may be lawful by the 
From the law of Nature.  Law of Nature, which is the unwritten word of God, or rather word of God written in men's hearts. And this Law of Nature, say they, is as truly the Law of God, as that which is written in Scripture; and therefore whatsoever is justifiable by the Law of Nature, may be and is lawful, though there be no express Warrant for it, either from Scripture, or from the practice of the Best of men in former times; because it being known by all men to be lawful by the Law of Nature, it needed not to be declared to be so by Scripture, nor attested to be so by any men's Practice or Example. Neither will it follòw, say they, that what was lawfully done at one time must necessarily be done at all times, or that it should not be lawful for Christians to do that now which it was not expedient for the Primitive Christians to do 
From their inability to resist.  then; because being so comparatively few and fable, as they were then, their taking up of Arms against their persecuting and oppressing Princes would rather have increased than lessened their sufferings. And what if it were upon that account, and upon that account only (for so some of these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Despisers of Government and Blasphemers of Sovereign Princes, have dared to argue) that Christ and his Apostles did give those Precepts 
And that the precepts of not resisting were temporary.  in Scripture of not resisting even the worst of Princes; and consequently that they were to oblige those to whom they were given, no longer than until they were strong enough to resist, without fear or danger of being the worse for it.  
To this I answer, first, that to have such a thought of Christ or his Apostles, who wrote what they 
The Answer, That to think so is no less than blasphemy.  writ, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, As they were moved or inspired by the holy Ghost, (and for all ages and times as well as for those wherein they were written) is worse than with David's fool, to say in his heart, that there is no God. For to Blaspheme God is worse than to deny him; and how can a Man or the Devil himself blaspheme God more than to make men believe, that he who is Truth itself is a Liar, or at least a deceiver, one that hath sent his Ambassadors the Apostles, nay his Son himself into the World with Credentials under his broad Seal, (I mean the doing of Miracles) in his name to assure the 
Christians, because Christians to be the best of Subjects.  World and the Princes of the World, that those that were Christians, were, because they were Christians, to be the best of Subjects; such as how ill soever they were used, or how much soever they were oppressed, nay how cruelly soever they were persecuted by their Princes, yet were indispensably obliged by their Religion never to rebel, or so much as to attempt to defend themselves by force against even such Princes; and consequently that the Princes and Potentates of the world, whatsoever Religion themselves were of, needed not to fear, nor consequently ought not in reason to persecute any of their Christian Subjects, who were obliged by their Christianity itself, because they were Christians, to be the best of Subjects, and to continue to be so, how numerous or how powerful soever they might grow to be, or how heavy or hard the yoke might be which they groaned under, which being published and made known to the world to be the will of God, as it was by St. Peter his Apostle or Ambassador to the Jews, and by St. Paul his Apostle or Ambassador to the Gentiles; for any that comes after them (whether it be a Bellarmine, a Buchanan, or a Baxter,) to endeavour to make it to be believed, that God and his Ambassadors St. Pawles and St. Peter's meaning was, to oblige Christians to be such Subjects to such Sovereigns, so long, and no longer than they were too weak to resist them; but assoon as they were able, that they were then left at liberty, with God's good leave, not only to revolt from them, but to revenge the wrongs they had suffered under them; for any men now I say to make it, or endeavour to make it to be believed, that this was Christ's or his Apostles meaning, what is it, but to make it to be believed that Christ was indeed such a one, as the High Priest falsely told Pilate he was, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, A deceiver; and that his Apostles 
The Blasphemy made out.  were Legati ad mentiendum missi, Ambassadors sent on purpose by him to deceive those they were sent to? as perhaps some Ambassadors may be sent from one earthly Prince to another. But to say that Christ hath done so, or that he had, or could have any need to do so, is in a very high degree to Blaspheme Christ himself as well as his Apostles, and to make whatsoever they taught besides to be suspected of insincerity; and consequently the whole Christian Religion to be but a design or contrivance for worldly ends only, as it is indeed by the Papists made to be, and by all such Protestants also as make Religion a Cloak for any kind of licentiousness in general, and especially for the lawfulness of the Rebellion of Subjects against their Sovereigns, as all they do, that would have those Apostolical Precepts against resisting of Princes by their Subjects to be but Temporary, and to be obliging not in point of Conscience but in point of Prudence and for fear of punishment only, which is in terminis, directly to contradict the Apostle or rather the Holy Ghost speaking in or by the Apostle, who tells us in express terms, that there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, a necessity 
Subjects obliged in Conscience.  for Subjects to be Subjects, and consequently by no means nor upon any provocation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to resist or rebel against their Sovereigns, and that not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, (saith the Text) for wrath only, not for fear of punishment only, but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, for Conscience sake, and especially for Conscience or for fear of offending God, more than for fear of offending man; and therefore if at all for fear of punishment, it must be more for fear of that punishment which the Text calls damnation, and which God will inflict hereafter upon those that rebel against his Viceroys and consequently against himself, than for fear of any punishment that can be inflicted upon them by Men here.  
I will conclude this Topick with that saying of Grotius in the fourth Chapter of his first book de jure Belli 
A not able saying of Grotius.  & Pacis, and in the seventh Section of that Chapter viz, Certè Christianis Veteribus qui recentes ab Apostolorum & Apostolicorum Virorum disciplina eorum Proecepta & intelligebant meliùs, & perfectiùs implebant, summam ab iis injuriam fieri puto, qui quo minùs ipsi se defenderent in certissimo mortis periculo, vires putant illis non animum defuisse. Certainly there cannot (I think) be a greater injury done to the first Christians, who coming newly from the Discipline of the Apostles and Apostolic men, did better understand and more perfectly practise their Precepts, than there is done by them that think the reason why they did not defend themselves, when they were sure to die if they did not▪ was not because they would not have done so if they could, but because they wanted strength to do so.  
Which saying of Grotius I desire the Reader to take special notice of, the rather, because Grotius himself in the very same Section seems to make it lawful for Christian Subjects to resist the Supreme Magistrate in several cases; and some of them such, wherein the Primitive Christians did not think it lawful for them to do so, as Grotius himself in his aforesaid saying tells us; and because it is upon the authority of Grotius, and what Grotius saith to justify the resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects, that Mr. Baxter doth especially ground his justification of the Rebellion against our late Sovereign. Therefore whether those sayings of Grotius be true or no in themselves, or whether (if they be true) they be pertinently and rationally applied by Mr. Baxter, for his and his Parties doing what they did in the late War against the King or no, we shall examine hereafter.  
In the mean time to the Doctrine of the Scriptures, 
The judgement of the Church of England in the case.  and the practice of the Primitive Christians, we will subjoin the Judgement of our own Church, the Church of England, as of that, which of all Churches now extant in the World, is both for her Doctrine, Government, and public form of Worship, the most Apostolical; whatsoever the Papists or any other Heretics, or the Presbyterians or any other Schismatics and Sectaries do or can say to the contrary.  
But what the Judgement of the Church of England 
Where the Church's judgement to be found.  is, as to this, or any other particular (whether it be matter of Faith or Manners, Doctrine or Practice) it is not to be collected or concluded from the sayings or writings of any one or more particular Doctors of the Church, though of never so great eminency for Learning, or for Piety, or both, but from the Church herself, speaking to us as she doth, first, in her Articles, 2dly. in her Catechism, 3dly, in her Homilies, 4thly. in her Liturgy (which is a Conservatory of Doctrines as well as a form of public Worship) and 5thly. in her Canons.  
In all these I say the Church speaks to us herself (by her representative Body in Convocation) declaring what her own Judgement is, and what she will have the Judgement of all those to be (whom she will admit to be of her Communion) as to matter of doctrine in the three former, and as to matter of practice in the two latter.  
Now as to this particular, of which we are now speaking viz. Whether it be lawful for Subjects in any case, or upon any provocation, forcibly, or by taking up of Arms, to resist their Sovereign: our Church hath clearly and fully declared her judgement negatively in her Homily against Insurrection; which Homily being recited and approved 
Her judgement subscribed to by all that are ordained.  in the Thirty fifth Article of the Book of Articles is subscribed unto by all that subscribe unto those Articles, as all those do that are legally Ordained in our Church; and consequently, as Mr. Baxter himself did, if he were Ordained by a Bishop, as he saith he was. But perhaps Mr. Baxter will say for himself what I remember Mr. Jacomb said for Mr. Calamy, of whom when I had 
Mr. Calamy 's frank subscription.  said at the Conference in the Savoy, that he had at his Ordination not only subscribed to what the Church required him to subscribe unto, but added Non invitus nec coactus, sed lubens libensque subscribo, (which was more than was required of him) to show that he did it freely, willingly and heartily. True indeed (said Mr. Jacomb) Mr. Calamy did so then; but he hath since been heartily sorry for it; and repent of it. And so it seems Mr. Baxter hath done also.  
And therefore I do not subjoin the Doctrine 
Why the judgement of our Church quoted.  and Practice of Ours to the Doctrine and Practice of the Primitive Church, as thinking Mr. Baxter or any of the Dissenters from our Church will be moved at all by it; but to show that the Doctrine and Judgement of our Church is in this particular (as it is in all other matters of any moment both doctrinal and practical) the same with that of the Apostles and Primitive Christians, and consequently that they who condemn or despise this doctrine and practice of Ours do thereby or by so doing condemn and despise the doctrine and practice not of the Primitive Christians only, but of the Apostles and of Christ himself also.   

CHAP. XII.  
Mr. B is meaning in his Aphorism, that Tyrants have no right to govern at all. Tyranny not justified by forbidding resistance. The reproach Mr. B. casts upon the Bishop lights upon Samuel and St. Paul. Mr. B. a favourer of the Novatians.  
BUt perhaps Mr. Baxter may say that in this Aphorism of his, we are now speaking of, he 
What Mr. B 's meaning, that Tyrants have no right to their governments.  doth not say, that either Unlimited Governors or Tyrants have no right at all to their respective Governments, simply and absolutely; but only that they have no right to their Unlimited or Tyrannical Governments, and consequently, that his meaning is, that although (notwithstanding their being Unlimited and Tyrannical) they may have a right to govern, yet they have no right to govern unlimitedly or Tyrannically.  
But as to the first of these, namely, That unlimited Governors have no right to their unlimited Governments; it is absolutely false, as I have more 
It is not; that they have no right to govern tyrannically.  than sufficiently proved already. And although the second, namely, That no Governor hath a right to be a Tyrant, or to govern tyrannically, be true; yet that this truth is not the truth, at least not the whole truth of Mr. Baxter's meaning, appears by many of his following Aphorisms and Comments upon them, especially by those wherein (as if he were totius mundi arbiter, The Ruler of the whole world, or Rex regum and dominus dominantium, King of kings and Lord of lords, that is, a Protestant Pope, or the Catholic moderator and decider of all controversies) 
Vid. his Tract of obedience to rulers and howfar resistance is unlawful àpag. 346. ad pag. 375. of his holy commonwealth.  he boldly and Magisterially defines and states the Cases wherein Subjects may or may not resist their Sovereigns. For as of his special grace and favour he gives Kings, even limited Kings, leave to transgress their bounds to such or such a degree, without forfeiting their right to their Crowns, and without being lawfully resisted by their Subjects for so doing; so if they pass the limits he assigns them (as if he should say to Kings, as the King of Kings 
Vid. ibidem à p. 375. ad p. 456.  saith to the waves of the Sea, Hitherto, O ye Kings, ye may go and no farther) then (saith he) they depose themselves, and then their Subjects ceasing to be Subjects, their rising up or making war against them can be no Rebellion.  
Whereby it plainly appears, that when he saith 
But that they have no right to govern at all.  Tyrants have no right to their unlimited Governments, his meaning is not that they have no right to govern tyrannically, but that they have no right to govern at all. For that Kings have a right to govern tyrannically, or that they do no injury to their Subjects, how much soever they do oppress them, I never heard of any Christian or Heathen, that was of that opinion but Mr. Hobbs only. But I am as 
Mr. Hobb 's opinion and Mr. Baxter 's alike exploded by the Bishop.  far from Mr. Hobbs his opinion, namely, That Kings do not injure their Subjects, when they govern them otherwise than by God's Laws and their own they ought to govern them, as I am from Mr. Baxter's, namely, That Kings do forfeit their rights to their Crowns, That Subjects may resist them, or defend themselves by force against them, when they do so, to any degree whatsoever.  
In all therefore that I have said hitherto for the justifying of my exception against this Aphorism of Mr. Baxter's, there is nothing, I am sure, to justify either the Tyrannical Government of unlimited and despotical Sovereigns, or the illegal and arbitrary Government of limited and political Sovereigns; 
Lawful Sovereigns not to be resisted;  but only to prove that lawful Sovereign Princes, whether limited or unlimited, are not to be resisted by their Subjects: which is no more than St. Paul asserts, speaking of the worst of Princes; nor no more than what may rationally, nay necessarily, 
According to the first institution of Kings by Samuel.  be collected from what Samuel said to the People of Israel, when they would needs have a King, as other Nations had, and when God bids him tell them the manner of their King, or what manner of Kings they must expect to have sometimes, even such as all other Nations had sometimes, bad as well as good; and that they were to endure the one as well as the other, as all other Nations did also. For when he had told them, not what all or any Kings ought to do, or lawfully might do, but what some Kings violently and wrongfully would do; and which if any of their Kings should do (as he foresaw many of them would do) all that they were to do to help themselves, was only to cry unto God to help them; and consequently, that though Kings govern never so unjustly, or never so contrary to God's Laws or their own (as some of the Kings of Judah as well as those of Israel did) yet they must not forcibly be resisted by their subjects, but all that Subjects in that case can or aught to do, is to cry unto God: Preces & lachrymoe, Prayers and tears, being the only arms the Primitive Christians did use, or thought lawful for Christians to use against such Princes.  
And now let Mr. Baxter lay his hand upon his heart, and consider, who it is that in one place he calls a defier of Deity and Humanity; and in another 
Samuel and St. Paul, etc. blasphemed, as defiers of God and man.  place, an Enemy to God, to Kings and to all mankind. It is not Bishop Morley, at least it is not Bishop Morley only; but Samuel the Prophet, and St. Paul the Apostle, and St. Peter too; or rather the Holy Ghost himself that spoke by them: so that what was intended by Mr. Baxter as a reproach to Bishop Morley, is become Blasphemy against God himself, whose truth it is; for the maintaining whereof Bishop Morley is so heinously reproached. And therefore as St. Peter said to Ananias, when Ananias thought he had lied to St. Peter only, Thou hast not lied unto men, but unto God; so might I say unto Mr. Baxter, that he hath not reproached me, or not me only, but the Holy Ghost himself, in calling that doctrine a defiance of Deity and Humanity, and an Enmity to God, to Kings, and to all mankind, which was by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost taught by Samuel the Prophet in the Old Testament, and by St. Paul and St. Peter in the New.  
But is it possible, will some say, that Mr. Baxter being so sober and discreet, and so meek a man (as he is thought to be) should publish in Print so very severe a censure against Bishop Morley, or any man else that is called a Christian, because and only because he maintains that and nothing but that which was taught by Christ and his Apostles, and was believed and practised by the next and best of their Disciples?  
I answer, that Mr. Baxter hath censured Bishop Morley as a defier of Deity and Humanity, and as an Enemy to God, to Kings, and to all mankind, is evident from the places before quoted out of his printed Papers; and that he hath no other but the aforesaid cause for it, is evident likewise from what I have now said to disprove that Calumny: but the way he takes to induce his Readers to believe it, is worth the observation; it being the very same artificial juggling trick which I have observed him to make 
Mr. B 's Juggling.  use of more than once before; I mean his putting a false Proposition of his own, instead or in the place of a true one of mine, and then inferring from the false one, what he knew could not be inferred from the true one, he chargeth me with what he infers from it.  
Thus by misreporting what was affirmed by us and denied by him at the Savoy-Conference, he 
Some Instances of it.  thence infers that I was grossly mistaken in the report I had made of what he said at that Conference.  
And thus again, because I had excepted against that Aphorism of his as false, which affirms all unlimited Governors to be Tyrants, and to have no right to their unlimited Governments, He makes me say, that all humane Powers are not limited by God, and then infers that I am a defier of Deity and Humanity.  
And so here likewise, because I say that lawful Sovereigns are not to be resisted by their Subjects, though they be Tyrants, or though they do govern otherwise, than by God's or their own Laws they ought to govern, he would make his Readers to believe that I justify Tyranny itself, and that Kings may lawfully do what they list to their Subjects, and take away what they list from them, their Lands, their Houses, their Wives, their Children, and their Lives also; and all this, because I say they are not to be resisted, if they do so, by their Subjects. And doth not St. Paul say so too, when he chargeth the Christians upon pain of damnation not to resist Nero? who did all these outrages, and more, and worse also; for he caused 
Nero 's cruelties.  them to be impaled with stakes thrust into their bodies up to their throats, and then besmearing them all over with combustible matter, set 

Pone Tigellinum tadi lucebis in illâ,  
Quâ stantes ardent qui fixo gutture fumant.  Juven. satire.  them on fire to burn like Flamboe's to give light to Passengers, as they went along by night in the streets of Rome. And dares Mr. Baxter say that St. Paul, because he forbade his Christian Subjects to resist this monster, did therefore approve all the horrible cruelties and outrageous crimes that he was guilty of, or that he did thereby encourage all or any other Kings to do as he did? and consequently was an Enemy to God, to Kings, and to 
St. Paul under the same charge of Mr. B. with the Bishop.  all Mankind? I think he dares not; and yet if this Inference of his be good against me, it must from the same Premises be good against St. Paul also; for the same Premises will always infer the same Conclusion: and therefore St. Paul is, or Bishop Morley is not, upon this account, what Mr. Baxter saith he is, an Enemy to God, to Kings, and to all Mankind. But what is Mr. Baxter then in the mean time? certainly either not so good a Logician, or so good a Christian as he would be thought to be.  
I am sure he is not such a Christian as those of the Primitive times were, who neither wanted 
The primitive Christians, fools in Mr. B 's opinion.  courage nor force to defend themselves against the strongest, as well as the cruelest, of their persecuting Princes; and consequently in Mr. Baxter's opinion, were no better than fools or madmen, to suffer so tamely and so patiently (as they did) not only the loss of all they had, but death itself, and death with the most exquisite torments, under their Pagan persecuting Princes, and under some Christian heretical Princes also, rather than they would transgress those Precepts of St. Paul by so much as offering to defend themselves against their Sovereigns, whether Pagans or Heretics, or against those that were commissioned or impowered by them.  
And this doctrine of the unlawfulness for Subjects to defend themselves by force against the most cruel of their most persecuting Princes was universally believed and practised for divers hundreds of years after Christ, without any one instance to the contrary, but once only; and then, that was when an Heretical Arian Emperor was resisted by his Heretical Novatian Subjects; for whom (I mean the Novatian Heretics) Mr. Baxter seems 
Mr. B is kindness to the Novatians, ●●●ence.  to have a very great kindness; but whether upon this account (I mean, because they were the first Christian Subjects that ever resisted their Sovereign) or because the first founder of them made himself a Bishop (in another man's Diocese) as Mr. Baxter and all Baxterians would be; or because they were the old 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first Puritan or pretenders to extraordinary purity and strictness of life (as Mr. Baxter and his followers now do) whether I say it be upon any or all of these accounts I know not: but this I know that Mr. Baxter as often as he mentions them, speaks very favourably of them, although they were (as much as the Orthodox Christians themselves were) for 
and yet they for Bishops.  the Government of the Church by Bishops, and by such Bishops as the Orthodox Bishops than were and as ours now are, I mean Bishops of a different and Superior Order to Presbyters, and exercising Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and authority over them. And therefore there must be some particular and special reason, why Mr. Baxter is so kind to them.  
In the mean time it is observable, that as They were then, so are They now, the greatest pretenders to strictness and severity that then took and now take unto themselves a liberty which God never gave them, nay which God by his Prophets and Christ by his Apostles hath forbidden them to take, I mean the taking up of Arms by Subjects against their Sovereigns, though but defensive only.   

CHAP. XIII.  
Sovereigns highly accountable to God. The doctrine of Nonresistance, to the advantage of Subjects as well as of Kings. Hobbists, Papists and Sectaries, censured. Mr. B is Aphorism justly excepted against, and the Bishop vindicated from being a Defier and an Enemy to God and Man.  
THe contrary doctrine whereunto which we maintain might have been suspected of flattery to Kings, (as Mr. Baxter calls it,) if it had not been St. Paul's as well as ours; or if, because we teach that Kings are not to be resisted by their Subjects, 
The Doctrine of nonresistance, no flattery to Kings, as Mr. B. calls it.  it would follow therefore that we taught likewise, that such Kings as govern otherwise than by God's Laws and their own they ought to do, were not accountable to any, or not punishable at all for so doing. Whereas Mr. Baxter knows that we of the Church of England believe and teach that Kings the greatest of Kings, are as much nay more 
King's accountable to God and punished by him.  accountable to God, and punishable by God, either here or hereafter, for whatsoever they do amiss, than the meanest of their Subjects are to them or by them; and so much the rather; because they are not punishable but by God only.  
And therefore as it would not only be absurd but ridiculous, that because a man saith the Deputy 
Mr. B 's absurd conclusion, set forth by a like instance.  Lieutenant or Viceroy of Ireland is not to be questioned or punished by any in Ireland for what he doth amiss there; therefore he is not to be questioned or punished at all; or that he whose Viceroy he is, namely, the King of England may not or will not punish him, either there, or when he comes home: so it is equally absurd and ridiculous, to conclude (as Mr. Baxter does) that Bishop Morley, because he holds that Kings are not accountable to or punishable by their Subjects, therefore he must needs encourage them to be Tyrants, as if they were not, or as if Bishop Morley thought and taught they were not, answerable to God and punishable by God for their Tyranny, either here or hereafter; and that not only for their oppression and ill usage of their Subjects, but for the dishonour they have done unto God, whose Viceroys and Representatives they are; and therefore should be as he is, not only just and righteous, but merciful and benign and gracious to all their Subjects. Thus we Believe and thus we Teach.  
And withal we believe and teach also, That Subjects who suffer wrongfully, and yet patiently, 
Subject's advantage from wrongful sufferings.  under oppressing, Tyrannical and persecuting Princes, (as the Primitive Christians did, and rejoiced when they did so) shall be sure to be either the sooner delivered from sufferings here, or to be finally so recompensed and rewarded hereafter, that they shall find to their unspeakable and endless comfort and joy, that it was good for them that they were so oppressed and afflicted. Thus I say do we believe, and thus do we teach both Kings and Subjects; and if both Kings and Subjects did believe and do as we teach them, neither would Subjects have cause to complain of their Kings, nor Kings to be jealous or afraid of their Subjects.  
More to blame therefore are they (whosoever they are) that teach the contrary either in relation to Kings or Subjects.  
Such in relation to Kings are the Habbists and other the like Atheistical flatterers of Kings, who 
The Hobbists censured on the one hand.  would make them believe, they may do what they list, without doing any injury to their Subjects; and without being answerable to God for it; and that either because there is no God at all, or that there is no other life after this.  
And such in relation to Subjects are the Papists, the Presbyterians, Independents, and the rest of the Sectaries, who teach it to be lawful for 
The Papists and Sectaries on the other;  Subjects, when they are grieved and oppressed by their Sovereigns to such a degree, or (which is all one) when they think themselves to be so, to take up Arms against them; whereby they show themselves to be much more such, as Mr. Baxter would have Bishop Morley believed to be, I mean Enemies to God, to Kings, and to Subjects, and consequently to all Mankind than Bishop Morley is.  
1. For first. are not they Enemies to God, who teach men to rebel against God? and is it not rebellion 
As Enemies to God.  against God to rebel against the Viceroy of God? who because he is God's Viceroy is accountable for what he doth, well or ill, to none but God. And therefore in this case, (if any) God may most Emphatically say, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Vengeance is mine, I will repay; it belongs to me and to none but me to call mine own Viceroys to an account, and to punish them when and how I think fit; and therefore for Subjects to take the sword in this case, is to take it, or rather to wrest it out of God's hand, as well as the King's; and to use it against the King, is to use it against God; and therefore they that take it and use it, if they do not perish by the King's sword, I mean the sword of War or of Justice, here by bodily death; they shall undoubtedly, except they repent before they go hence, perish by the sword of God, Bodies and Souls too in the life to come.  
2. Are they not Enemies to Kings, who teach 
Enemies to Kings,  that Kings may be resisted and deposed by their Subjects for maladministration of their Governments, whether real, or but imaginary and pretended only, of which the Subjects themselves are to be the Judges? and consequently the best of Princes as well as the worst are to reign but precariò, Upon precarious terms, or durante bene placito, During the good pleasure of the people.  
3. Are not the Teachers of this doctrine Enemies 
And enemies to all subjects.  to all Subjects as well as to all Kings? first by making their King's jealous and afraid of them, and therefore more inclined or perhaps necessitated to weaken and impoverish and keep them under; (as Pharaoh did the Israelites) by laying heavy burdens upon them, and oppressing them (more than otherwise they would have reason or perhaps a will to do) that they may not be able to rise up against them, when such Demagogues as our Schismatical Preachers are, have a mind to stir them up to do so: Who, secondly, do what they can to rob Subjects of that inestimable reward, which God hath promised to all such as suffer wrongfully, and yet patiently, or as St. Peter phraseth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as it becomes Christians: and not only so, but thirdly, do engage them, instead of suffering less wrongfully, to hazard the suffering of more rightfully from their Princes, if they do not prevail in their Rebellion, and to a certainty of suffering infinitely much more from God whether they prevail or not, if they die in or after their rebellion without repentance.  
And now I think I have sufficiently justified the reasonableness of my exception to that Aphorism of 
The Bishop's justification of his exception against Mr. B is Aphorism;  Mr. Baxter's (which he saith he wonders Bishop Morley did except against) by having proved it to be false in both the particulars that are asserted in it. As first, That all unlimited Governors are Tyrants, and (2dly) That no unlimited Governor or Tyrant hath a right unto his Government; and consequently that the Subjects of Unlimited or Tyrannical Governors are not obliged to obey them, but may resist them, at least for defending of themselves against them; both which particulars having proved to be false, I hope I have sufficiently vindicated myself also from that horrible calumny of being a defier of Deity and Humanity, and an Enemy 
And his Vindication of himself from being a defier etc. and an enemy to God, etc.  to God, to Kings and to all mankind, as Mr. Baxter, out of his abundant Zeal and little charity, saith I am, and would make his unwary Readers believe me to be; not from any thing I say myself, but from what he is pleased to say for me; and then (as if I had said it myself) to infer from it the calumny which he before intended (but could not tell how to do it otherwise) to fix upon me. Of which disingenuous and insincere artifice of his (as I said before) we have seen several Instances already, and shall see more hereafter.   

CHAP. XIV.  
That Scripture, Rom. 13. for the unlawfulness of resisting, asserted. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly rendered to Resist, and implies more than simply Not to obey. Our Translation Vindicated against Mr. B. and others, who censure it and vary from it, as he often doth.  
ANd yet before we proceed any farther, we are to take notice of and remove a shrewd Remora or obstruction out of the way, which Mr. Baxter hath laid, to take away from us the authority of one of the principal places of Scripture, whereon we ground our doctrine of the unlawfulness of resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects in any case or upon any provocation whatsoever; 
Rom. 13. for the unlawfulness of resisting rescued.  and that is the 13 Chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and in that Chapter especially upon the 2d. Verse, whereof the words in Greek are these, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which by our last and by our most authentical Translation are rendered in English thus; Whosoever resisteth the power, viz. the Sovereign Power or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the higher power, (as it is called in the verse before) resisteth the Ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. And it is against our Translation of some words, or rather of one of the words in this Verse, that Mr. Baxter makes this objection, not against the word power, nor as Sovereign power is meant by it; (though contrary to St. Paul's meaning and the truth of the Roman History, he will have the Sovereign Power there meant, not to be in the Emperor alone, but in him and the Roman Senate also, as he 
The Senate of Rome had part of the Sovereignty with Nero. H. C. p. 353.  faith it is in the King and Parliament here in England (and one as truly as the other) neither doth he except against the translation of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the word damnation, though it always doth not signify so severe a judgement:) but he tells us that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not properly translated by the word resisting: And why so? because 
Mr. B is exception against our Translation.  saith he, There is a Resistance contrary to Subjection, and that is forbidden, and there is a Resistance not contrary to Subjection, and that is not forbidden. 
H. C. p. 352.  Might he not as well have said, there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to resist, contrary to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be subject, and there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to resist, not contrary to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to be subject? And therefore St. Paul did not speak properly, when he opposed the one unto the other; and yet St. Paul tells the Corinthians (who were Grecians) that he spoke more languages than they all, and no doubt understood the propriety of them as well as they did. Howsoever we are sure that St. Paul understood 
Our Translation vindicated.  God's meaning and how to express it so as he would have it to be understood; neither is it to be doubted, but that a commissioned Company of so many learned men, as were employed in the last and most accurate Translation of our English Bible, did very well understand St. Paul's meaning, as he expressed it in Greek; and knew how to render it as properly in English, as any one private man ought in modesty to think he can or could have done, especially if he be no greater a Critic in the Greek language than Mr. Baxter appears to 
Mr. B. no great Critic in the Greek.  be by the several Instances a 
* Vid. a vindication of the Primitive Church in answer to Mr. B 's Church History.  learned man gives of his many gross mistakes of the meaning of several Greek words quoted by him in his Church History; which I would not have observed, but that I find Mr. Baxter so full and fond of his mending of the magnificat, I mean his frequent and needless finding fault with our Church's Translation.  
And truly I could wish that even such as are more skilful in the Original Languages in which 
A remark in general upon those who censure our Translation.  the Scriptures were written, than Mr. Baxter seems to be, would forbear in their popular Sermons, and in their English Treatises, to censure so boldly (as some of them do,) such and such places of Scripture as they have or take occasion to speak of, as either not truly, or not properly translated in our Bibles, when there is no necessity for their so doing; and when they may thereby give occasion to their unlearned Auditors or Readers, to doubt of any other, and perhaps of all other places of Scripture, as well as of those by them quoted, and censured, viz. Whether they be truly or properly translated or no: which may bring them at length to question and doubt of the truth of the whole written word of God; and whither that may bring them God knows; perhaps to Quakerism or some other kind of Fanaticism, or perhaps to downright Atheism.  
And therefore I say I could wish, and if I had 
The danger and vanity of such bold censures.  authority enough, I would take care, that neither in Sermons, (unless in the Universities and other like learned Auditories) nor in any of our ordinary English Books of Divinity, any sense or Exposition should be given of any place, passage or word in the Scripture, other than is rendered in the allowed and vulgar English Translation which is used in our Churches; and that not only (though chiefly) for the reason before specified, but also because (as it is commonly used) it is more for ostentation of a man's self, than for edification of the People; nay many times it is made use of also to countenance and abett some Heretical or Schismatical opinion of a Party, or to gratify some Novel fancy or Notion of a man's own, contrary to or differing from the received doctrine or usage of the Church.  
And for one or both of these ends, I think I may, 
Some examples of Mr. B 's thus doing.  without breach of Charity, believe Mr. Baxter doth so often find fault with and vary from the allowed Translation of the Text, and will have another of his own devising preferred before it.  
For example; the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as often as it occurs in the New Testament, is rendered in our Translation by the word City, and most truly and properly, as being derived from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as consisting of many, or a multitude of People cohabiting or incorporated together. But Mr. Baxter 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a city with him stands for a Market town.  will have it (as he often tells us) to signify not a City but a Market town; as if he thought the Noun 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be derived from the Verb 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vendo, to sell; contrary to all Etymology or Analogy of derivation of one word from another, and contrary to the use, and sense, and signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in all Greek Writers profane as well as Sacred.  
And why then would Mr. Baxter have it signify a Market town? it could not be (if he knows any thing at all of Greek) out of ignorance only; but it was because being not able to deny (without contradicting all Antiquity) that every Bishop even in that first age of the Church and so downwards was Bishop of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a city, and consequently of as many several Congregations, as were in or belonging to that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or City, he had no other way to make his own Novel fantastical notion of a Congregational Episcopacy, or that no Bishop was or ought to be Bishop of more than one 
Because he would have no Bishop of more than one congregation.  Congregation, possibly reconcilable with the Primitive Notion of Episcopacy, but by making the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contra jus normámque loquendi, Against the right and rule of speech, to signify not a City consisting ordinarily of many Congregations, but a Market town; which yet if it were true, would not serve his turn neither, because there be Market towns even with us here in England, that have some of them many, and many of them more than one Congregation, and consequently according to Mr. Baxter's Hypothesis ought every one of them to have more Bishops than one also.  
Another instance of Mr. Baxter's disliking our Translation is, because it doth not favour, or rather indeed, because it doth condemn his own opinion and practice, and not his own only, but the opinion and practice of his whole Party, is that I named before, and am now more particularly to consider, I mean our Translation of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the word resisting; which as he saith 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not properly rendered, he saith, to resist.  is not a proper Translation of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉: And why so, good Mr. Baxter? why! because He and his Party have resisted their Sovereign; and therefore some resistance of Sovereigns by their Subjects must be lawful, and if lawful, than not forbidden by St. Paul, and consequently by Mr. Baxter's Logic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (which it seems he confesseth or implies at least to be forbidden by St. Paul to all Subjects in all cases) is not, cannot properly be translated by the word resisting, because resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects is lawful (say they) in some cases.  
And indeed it would be so, if not obeying were the first and chief resisting; or the proper and 
To resist is more than not to obey.  primary signification of the English word resisting were simply not obeying, and no more, as Mr. Baxter tells us it is. For not to Obey their Sovereign in 
Vid. Holy Commonwealth p. 37. p 377.  some cases is so far from being unlawful, that it is the duty of all Subjects to do so in all such cases wherein they cannot obey their Earthly Sovereign without sinning against their Heavenly Sovereign: and yet in those very cases (as I said before) though they may and must disobey their earthly Sovereign, yet they may not, they must not resist him; but meekly and patiently Submit to what punishment (though never so unjustly) he shall please to inflict upon them. Whereby it plainly appears that simply not to obey is not to resist, much less is it to resist in the chief and most proper signification of the word, as Mr. Baxter saith it is.  
But God forbid it should be so! for then sins of ignorance and sins of infirmity would be more properly a resisting of God than sins of wilful obstinacy 
So to resist God is more than not to obey him.  and presumption; and the best of God's servants might more properly be said to resist God than the greatest of his Enemies; because the best of his servants do not always obey him, nay do never obey him in all things, nor in any thing as they ought to obey him, though they be never so careful and desirous to do so. And can such as these properly, nay most properly be said to resist God? can they who humble themselves under the mighty hand of God, because they cannot obey him as they would, be said to resist him? God forbid! for God resists them that resist him; and who are they? not the humble but the proud: for to the humble (saith St. Peter) he giveth grace, but he resisteth the proud, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith the Text; God sets himself in Battle array (as it were) against the proud to resist them, when they rise up (as it were) to assail and defy and provoke him, as Pharaoh and Julian the Apostate did.  
For indeed the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as well as the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, which are both of them used in the same sense in the aforesaid place (viz. Rom. 13. 2.) by St. Paul, (and are therefore both of them rendered by the same word in our Translation) are both of them Military terms; and the genuine, primary 
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to resist are both Military Terms.  and proper signification of the one as well as of the other, is to be in a military posture of resisting, that is of defending one's self against one that assails him, and therefore purposely used by St. Paul to teach all Christian Subjects, that though they were never so wrongfully or never so much oppressed or persecuted by their Sovereigns, they should be so far from assailing or making war against them, that they should not so much as defend themselves by a forcible resisting of them, though they were assailed by them; as Mauritius and his Legion were, who being Six thousand six hundred well armed and very valiant men, suffered themselves to be all killed upon the place, without drawing a sword or lifting up a hand in their own defence against any of them that were sent by their Emperor to be the Executioners of his most unjust and cruel commands: for it was for no other crime but because they were Christians, and would not sacrifice to Heathen Idols as the rest of the Army did.  
And for the aforesaid reason of St. Paul's did our Translatours render both the aforesaid words of St. Paul, 
Our Translatours of St. Paul 's judgement, as Mr. B. is not.  by our English word to resist, not only because to resist in a military notion is the primary and proper sense and signification both of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the words in the Text, but because they were (as our Church is) of St. Paul's judgement, namely, That it is unlawful for Subjects to take up defensive as well as offensive Arms against their Sovereign: of which Judgement, because Mr. Baxter and those of his party are not, therefore the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must not be properly translated by the word resisting.   

CHAP. XV.  
Subjects resisting their Sovereign irrational, as inconsistent with all Government; wherein of necessity a Supreme Power, and that unquestionable. Monarchy the only Government of God's making. Some false Assertions and self-contradictions of Mr. Baxter 's taken notice of.  
BUt to leave this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or bickering about a word, (though I hope it was a Digression 
What meant by Resisting.  not altogether useless and impertinent) by resisting we mean a forcible resistance, or taking up of Arms by Subjects against their Sovereign, whether offensive or defensive, upon any pretence whatsoever: which I affirm to be unlawful, not only because it is impious and irreligious; but because it is irrational, and impolitic, and imprudent also.  
That it is impious and irreligious hath been proved already; first, because it is not only not allowed 
Resistance impious and irreligious.  but contradicted and forbidden by God's word; and secondly, because it was not only not practised, but disclaimed and declared against, by the Primitive and best Christians. I am now to prove it to be irrational, as well as impious, and impolitic, and imprudent, as well as irreligious.  
And first, I say, 'tis irrational because it is inconsistent with the necessary, natural and essential 
Irrational also, as inconsistent with the being of a Body Politic.  constitution of all Government, in all National Societies, of any kind whatsoever; and consequently destructive to the very being itself of the body Politic.  
For in all National Societies (I mean such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or independent upon any other Societies) 
The necessity of a Supreme power in all Bodies Politic.  there is, and of necessity always must be, some where or other an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that is, a Supreme Power, or a Supremacy of Power, whereunto all other powers in the same Society are Subordinate, as being derived from it, and subservient and accountable to it, and overruled and punishable by it: the supereminent and Supreme Power itself, and whosoever is entrusted and invested with it, being always, and in all cases, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unquestionable, and consequently unpunishable: because to question, to judge, and to 
That Supreme power, unquestionable.  punish, are all of them Acts of Authority and Jurisdiction, which cannot be exercised but by a superior on his inferior; but Supremo non datur superior, The Supreme hath no superior above him, in the same Body Politic; and where the Supremacy is, there can be no liableness to coercion.  
Now this ratiocination or dictate of Reason is grounded upon a dictate of Nature itself; namely, 
The reason of this, grounded upon Nature  that in the Subordination of things and persons unto one another, the●e cannot be Progressus in infinitum, A progression to infinity. And therefore that which Grotius saith to this purpose is evidently and necessarily true; namely, that in Imperiis quia non datur progressus in infinitum, omniuò aut in aliqua 
Grotius his testimony  persona, aut Coetu consistendum est, quorum peccata queniam superiorem se Judicem non habent, ultori Deo sunt relinquenda: That is, In Governments, because there cannot be an infinite or endless progress, we must of necessity set a stop in some one person or company of men, whose faults or miscarriages, because they have no Judge above them, are to be left to God the Avenger. O utinam vir ille magnus, etc. I wish that great man had said so always, and without exception; for any one Exception, (of which he hath divers) will make the whole Rule itself to be useless and insignificant, as we shall see hereafter.  
In the mean time that there is such an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Sovereign Power in every National independent Government or Body Politic, Mr. Baxter doth not deny; and that it may be not only in one, as in Monarchy, but in more than one as in an Aristocracy or a Democracy, I will not gainsay; though I must needs observe by the way that Ab initio non fuit sic, From the beginning it was not so. And that there is but one of these three forms or kinds of Government of God's making, and that was Monarchy. For as God made the first Man after his own Image, or after the Image 
Monarchy, God's government.  or likeness of himself, so he made the first Government of mankind here on earth, that of Nations I mean as well as that of Families, and particularly that of his own People the Jews, after the Image or likeness of his own Government in Heaven; which was, and is, and ever will be, Monarchical: neither do we find in Scripture any Precept for obedience to be given, or for prayers to be made for any Sovereigns, or Supreme Governors, but for Kings only. The other two sorts of Government, (of which the last (viz.) Democracy is incomparably the worst) are but men's inventions, and shall have an end, as all other Inventions of men shall have also: but Monarchy, as it was from everlasting, so it shall be to everlasting.  
But to let this pass; whether it be a Monarchy, or an Aristocracy, or a Democracy, the Sovereign 
Mr. B 's just and loyal opinion of the Sovereign's power. Vid. Holy Com. p. 72.  or Those that have the Sovereign Power are (saith Mr. Baxter) above all the Humane Laws of the Commonwealth; that is (saith he) they have Power to make Laws, and to repeal them, to correct, add to them, and dispense with them, and pardon the breach of them to particular persons; and the Sovereign (as he is Sovereign) is not bound to keep them, or to suffer by them. And the reason of this (saith he) is evident from the nature of Sovereignty (mark that,) because he that is the Sovereign is the highest, and therefore hath no higher to obey.  
Euge, Mr. Baxter! Well said, so far Loyal Mr. Baxter! And farther yet, namely, in the next Aphorism to this, That a Sovereigns is not free from the obligation of the Laws of God, nor from the fundamental Contracts of the Commonwealth (he must mean where there are such fundamental contracts) nor from any of his own public promises, nor to make Laws against God's Laws or the common good: whereunto if he had added, though he be free from being questioned or quarrelled with for it by his Subjects; hitherto I could have been content to have gone with him in his Politics, but no farther; for 
Spoilt by his following Aphorisms.  as to what he adds in his next and some other of his following Aphorisms; as,  
1. That the same natural Person may be both Sovereign and Subject, and that as Sovereign he 
H. C. p. 73.  may pardon others, and as Subject he may be punished himself.  
2. That Sovereignty is divisible, so that some part of it may be in the King, and some part in others of the same Body Politic: or (as in his own words) A mixed Commonwealth is that in which the other two, or all three forms of a Commonwealth (viz. Monarchy, 
H. C. p. 87. Aph. 79.  Aristocracy and Democracy) are so conjunct, that the Supremacy is divided among them, sometimes equally and sometimes unequally.  
3. That it may be called a Monarchy, where one hath not the sole Sovereignty; and that England is such 
H. C. p. 87. 88  a Monarchy.  
4. That the Existence of the natural Person or Persons of Sovereigns, or of such as have the Sovereignty, 
H. C. p. 74.  is not necessary to the existence of a Commonwealth, but the natural existence of Subjects is necessary. So that there may be Subjects that are Subjects to nobody, and consequently Subjects that are no Subjects, or a Body without a Head which is really no body at all, either in a natural or political capacity.  
These and the like Assertions of Mr. Baxter I take not only to be falsities, but self contradictions: and 
Upon these suppositions Mr. B. justifies the late Rebellion;  yet upon some of these absurd suppositions, if not upon all of them, he endeavours to justify the late horrid Rebellion or (as he calls it) the late War against the King. And upon the same grounds he may, and consequentially doth (horres●o referens, I tremble at the thought of it) the cutting off his head also. For if he were not a Monarch but in name only, 
And by consequence the King's murder.  as Mr. Baxter saith he was not, and therefore had but a part in the Sovereignty as Mr. Baxter saith he had not: And if he that hath but a part of the Sovereignty be a Subject as well as a Sovereign (as Mr. Baxter saith he is) and as a Subject may be punished (as Mr. Baxter saith he may) why might not the Democratical Independents justify what they did to him afterwards, as well as the Aristocratical Presbyterians 
The Independents as justifiable as the Presbyterians.  could justify what they did to him before? I mean their making War against him, and their buying, selling and imprisoning of him, and taking away all that he had from him but his life only: and that in all probability they would have done also, if he had not been taken away from them as he was by the Independents, who had been their Servants until then, but then began to think of making themselves their Masters, by getting the King's Person out of their power into their own; but still proceeding upon the same Presbyterian Principles from the first to the last; I mean upon the aforesaid Assertions of Mr. Baxter, which are all of them inconsistent with the very being, or essential Constitution of any Body Politic whatsoever.  
For first there can be no Body Politic without 
Those Assertions of Mr. B 's taken to task.  some to govern as well as others to be governed; and of those that govern, (ne detur processus ad infinitum, That we may not run upon an endless errand) one or more that are Sovereign or Supreme: And therefore the Existence of the natural Person or Persons of Sovereigns, or him or them that have the Sovereignty, is as necessary to the Existence of a Commonwealth or any Body Politic as the natural existence of Subjects is. Otherwise there might be Subjects which were Subjects to nobody, and consequently no Subjects at all: which is as absurd as to say there may be the Existence of a Body without the Existence of the Head of that Body, which was one of Mr. Baxter's aforesaid Assertions.  
Again in all Bodies Politic, He or they that have the Sovereign Power, are above all the rest of the body whereof they are Sovereigns, and therefore cannot be Subject to any or all of them; and if so, than the same natural Person cannot be both a Sovereign and a Subject too, which was another of Mr. Baxter's aforesaid Assertions.  
Again, if he that is a Sovereign cannot be a Subject (as it is a contradiction in adjecto to say he can be) than he cannot be questionable or punishable for any thing he does, as Mr. Baxter saith he may be.  
Again, Sovereignty is a thing which is in its own nature indivisible, so that in whomsoever it is, it is Wholly, and in whomsoever it is not wholly it is not at all; and consequently cannot be divided either equally or unequally, as Mr. Baxter likewise saith it may be.  
Finally, that it may be called a Monarchy, where One hath not the sole Sovereignty, is true, (because that which is not a Monarchy, may be called a Monarchy) but that it may truly be so called is false; as it is false likewise, that the Kingdom of England is such a Monarchy, as Mr. Baxter in the last of his aforesaid Assertions saith it is.  
But of the two last of these Particulars I shall have occasion to speak more at large, when we come to examine, whether the Body Politic of England be such a mixed Body Politic, as Mr. Baxter saith it is; and whether the Sovereignty thereof be not in the King alone, but so divided, as he affirms it to be betwixt the King and the Parliament: upon which Supposition only he justifies, or presumes to justify the late Rebellion to have been a just war against the late King.  
Whereby it plainly appears, that even in Mr. Baxter's own opinion, where the Sovereignty is not divided, but wholly in one and the same person (as it is not only in all Despotical, but in all Kingdoms properly so called, whether Despotical or Political) or wholly in one and the same Coetus, or Assembly, (whether Aristocratical or Democratical) it ought not, it cannot be resisted without shattering in pieces the very essential constituting parts of the Commonwealth, by dividing the members from the head, which is all that I am concerned to prove at present; namely, that Subjects resisting their Sovereign, is inconsistent with the very being of a Body Politic, of what Species or denomination soever it is.   

CHAP. XVI.  
Resistance inconsistent with peoples well being, as proving the occasion of Civil War. A case put by Grotius and several Instances proposed by him, which seem to allow Resistance, examined and cleared.  
AGain, suppose it were not Inconsistent with the Being, yet if it be inconsistent with the Wellbeing of the Body Politic or Commonwealth, for Subjects to resist or rise up in Arms against their Sovereign, that is enough to prove it to be unlawful; and consequently the endeavouring to make the People believe it to be lawful, by writing or preaching in defence of it, is dangerous and seditious, and such a thing as ought not to be endured in a well-governed State, of any kind whatsoever.  
Now that this doctrine, That it is lawful for 
Resistance inconsistent with the well-being of Bodies Politic.  Subjects in any case to resist or rise up in arms against their Sovereign, is inconsistent with the Wellbeing of all Bodies Politic or Commonwealths of what kind or denomination soever, and consequently inconsistent with the welfare or well-being of all Mankind here in this World, methinks should need no other Argument to make it to be believed, but this one only; that it undeniably makes all Humane Societies to be always and unavoidably liable to the worst of evils, that can befall any State 
As being an occasion of Civil War, the worst of evils.  or humane Society, and that is a Civil War; which besides the horrible mischiefs it brings with it; it commonly ends in a more insupportable Tyranny and bondage of the whole body of the People, than what was pretended to have been the cause of it. For proof whereof I might appeal not only to the Testimony of all Histories of all Ages and of all Nations as well as of our own, but to the personal Experience of many thousands yet living, who have all of them seen, and many of them felt, what I have said of a Civil War to be true; namely, that it is the greatest of Evils a State is subject unto, and consequently ought not to be engaged in for the preventing, avoiding, or remedying of any that are less.  
Nor are they (will Mr. Baxter say) the Peccadillo's 
No small matter in Mr. B is opinion, that will excuse resisting.  of the Prince, or the petite Grievances of Subjects by their Sovereigns, that can excuse their resisting or rising up in Arms against them: but they must be such as are of Public Concernment; and such as against which by the Laws of Nature for Self-preservation, men are not only permitted, but obliged to defend themselves.  
I know that Grotius (who is often, but not always 
Grotius puts a case, but contradicts himself and the Primitive Christians in his answer to it.  pertinently cited by Mr. Baxter) in his answer to this question, An Lex de non resistendo nos obligat in gravissimo & certissimo discrimine, that is, Whether the Law of nonresistance doth oblige us in a most grievous and most certain hazard, seems to grant, that in such a case it may be lawful for Subjects 
De jure belli & pacis, lib. 1. c. 4 p. 104.  to resist their Sovereigns. But than it is observable (first) that it is a contradiction to his own general Rule viz. Summum imperium tenentibus resisti jure non posse, That those who have the Supreme Power cannot lawfully or by right be resisted. Secondly, it is a Contradiction to the judgement and practice of the Primitive Christians, and consequently to the doctrine of the Apostles, and of Christ himself. For as Grotius himself tells us in one place, Consuetudo veterum Christianorum est optima legis Christianoe interpres, that is, The custom of the old Christians is the best Interpreter of the Christian Law, in the general; so in this very particular he tells us in another place, namely, in that before by me cited and which I desired to be observed; Nempe Christianis veteribus qui recentes ab Apostolorum & Apostolicorum virorum disciplinâ, 
A passage of his before cited, concerning the Primitive Christians, compared with this.  eorum proescripta & intelligebant meliùs & perfectiùs implebant, summam fieri injuriam puto ab iis, qui, quo minùs ipsi se defenderent in certissimo mortis periculo, vires putant illis non animum defuisse. In which saying of his taking it for granted, that the Primitive Christians, which did best understand the Apostolical Precepts, and did most perfectly conform their practice thereunto, would not nor did not defend themselves, no not in certissimo mortis periculo, when they were sure to be killed if they did not: and that not because they wanted either strength or courage, but because they thought as they were taught that it was not lawful for them to do so. And there cannot (saith Grotius in that place) a greater injury be done to those Primitive Christians, than to think otherwise of them, that is, than to think that it was not for Conscience sake, but for want of strength that they forbore to defend themselves in certissimo mortis periculo, In the most certain peril of death; which is I think all one with in gravissimo & certissimo discrimine, In the most grievous and most certain hazard; so that if it be lawful for Christians to do that now ingravissimo & certissimo discrimine, In the most grievous and certain hazard, which the Primitive Christians, who best understood (saith Grotius) the Apostolical doctrine, thought it not lawful for them to do then in certissimo mortis periculo, In the most certain peril of death, that is, in the very same case; it must be by virtue of some other Gospel, or of some special dispensation, that we have, and they had not; or that those Apostolical Precepts de non resistendo Supremam potestatem habentibus, Of not resisting those who have the Supreme Power, were to be no longer in force, than until the Christian Subjects should have power enough to resist their Sovereigns, or at least to defend themselves against them. Which opinion, how derogatory it is to the simplicity, sincerity and veracity of the Gospel, and consequently how unworthy to be owned by any that owns himself to be a Christian, I think I have sufficiently proved already: nor can I suspect a man of so great Learning and Ingenuity, as Grotius was, ever to have been of this opinion, though I cannot see how he can be defended from leaning towards it, when he affirms, or seems at least to affirm, that may be done now by Christian Subjects, which was never done, nor never thought lawful to be done in the very same case by the Primitive Christians, though they had strength enough to do it, and though (saith he) they best understood the Apostolical Precepts, and did most punctually comply with the meaning of them. 
He himself in effect disallows his own Answer.   
And therefore lastly, it is observable, (and I am willing to observe it for that Great man's sake) that such a resistance of Sovereigns by their Subjects, even in such a case, in gravissimo & certissimo discrimine, In the most grievous and most certain hazard, is not to be allowed (saith Grotius) Nisi cum hoc fortè additamento, si fieri possit absque maxima Reipublicoe perturbatione aut exitio plurimorum innocentium, Unless it can be done without a very great perturbation or disturbance of the Commonwealth, and without the destruction of very many innocent Persons: which in effect is all one, as if he had said, it is never to be done at all. For how there can be a forcible resistance of Sovereigns by their Subjects, or how Subjects can rise up in Arms, and make use of them either offensively or defensively against their Sovereigns, Absque maxima Reipublicoe perturbatione & exitio plurimorum innocentium; Without a very great perturbation of the Commonwealth, or without the destruction of very many innocent persons, I cannot understand: except we can imagine the Sovereign will have no Subjects to fight for him, (which Christ supposeth all Kings of this world have) on that there will be fight without killing; or that none or very few of those, that are innocent of either party, will be killed; which in a Civil War 
De jure Belli ac pacis p. 112.  (which of all other Wars is commonly the most bloody and most cruel) is not to be imagined. And consequently if Kings are not to be resisted by their Subjects, but in such a case as this, they are never to be resisted at all; because there can never be such a Case: so that Grotius his main Axiom, Summam potestatem tenentibus resisti jure non posse, That those who have the Supreme Power cannot lawfully he resisted, is still safe and without exception.  
Neither is the truth of it impeached by any of those several Instances, which he (I mean Grotius) 
Some instances of his, wherein Resistance may seem lawful, examined.  subjoins, and which seem (saith he) to be Exceptions to this Rule, but indeed are not.  
1. For as to the first of those Instances, it speaks of such Kings, as were never Kings at all but in name only, as the Kings of Lacedoemon were.  
2. The second speaks of those that had been Kings, but ceased to be so by their own voluntary resignations, as Diocletian did, and some of our Saxon Kings did also, and retired into Monasteries.  
3. The third speaks of such Kings as would alienate their Kingdoms unto Strangers, whom the Subjects may refuse to obey without resisting their own Sovereigns, and are bound to do so, not only in regard of the natural Allegiance all Subjects owe to their natural Sovereign and to him only as long as he lives, or as long as he continues to be their Sovereign; but in regard that after his death or after he voluntarily ceaseth to be their King, they owe the same Allegiance to his legal Successor in all Hereditary Kingdoms: And therefore (saith Grotius) the act or attempt of such an Alienation is null in itself and consequently is not at all obligatory to the Subject.  
4. The fourth speaks of such Kings as Verè hostili animo in totius Populi exitium feruntur, that is, Such Kings as would if they could destroy all their Subjects, and endeavour to do so; Sed vix videtur (saith Grotius) id accidere posse in Rege mentis compote, But this (saith he) is hard to be imagined of any King that is mentis compos, that is in his wits, or that is not stark mad: and if he be stark mad, or not mentis compos, not in his right mind, than his case is the same with that of Kings that are Minors or Infants, and his Kingly Power is to be administered in his name by such, as by the Laws or Customs of his Kingdom, are to have the custody or care of him, while he continues in that condition, who are no more to be resisted by the Subject, than the King himself was before he was in that condition.  
5. The fifth instance is of such Kings, as In ipsâ delatione imperii, In the very making of them Kings are made Kings upon this express condition, That if they do this or that, so or so, Subditi omni obedientioe vinculo solvuntur, The Subjects are discharged from all obligation of obedience to them: for then (saith Grotius) he that was King became a private person again. But I say, such a one was never a King at all, properly so called: because in the very Act, whereby he was made or rather called a King, he was indeed made a Subject to them (whomsoever they were) that had power to question whether he had done this or no, and to un-king him if he had, nay if he had not, if they should think he had, or say he had though they thought or knew he had not.  
6. The sixth Instance is, when the King hath but a part of the Supreme Power; and the Senate and the People have another part of it. But then say I (as I said before) the King is no King properly so called. I mean is no Sovereign, but a piece of Sovereign (if there can be such a thing,) and it is the Sovereign, He or They, that have the Sovereignty or the whole Sovereign power, that I say are in no case to be resisted by their Subjects.  
7. The seventh and last is the same in sense with the fifth, though it differ in words or in the manner of expression, both of them speaking of one as King who is indeed no King, that is, no Sovereign, as no man or number of men in any Society of men can be said to be, that have others in the same Society equal with them, and much less superior to them, as they must be to whom they are obnoxious and accountable for their ill managery of their Government, and who have authority to deprive them of it, and depose them from it.  
And of none but such Kings as these, that is, such as are not Kings indeed but in name only, are all 
Th●se Instances of his are of Kings and n● Kings.  the aforefaid Instances (wherein Grotius seems to grant it to be lawful for Subjects to resist their Kings) to be understood, but two only, and those are the third and the fourth, in the former of 
The third Instance.  which there is nothing either said or meant of the Subjects resisting of their Sovereign, but only of their not obeying him, if he would have them become Subjects to a stranger; which they cannot do, if they would, without becoming injurious not only to him, but also to his Successors (as I said before.) And there is a great difference betwixt resisting and not obeying of Sovereigns by their Subjects, though Mr. Baxter will needs have not obeying to be resisting in its primary and most proper signification.  
As to the other of these two Instances, which 
The fourth Instance.  may be meant of Kings properly so called (I mean such Kings as are indeed Sovereigns) namely the fourth, wherein upon supposition there were such a a King as would do and did what he could to ruin his own Kingdom, and to destroy all his own Subjects; Grotius grants indeed, that in such a case Rex abdicat Regnum, or the King renounces his Kingdom, or doth ipso facto declare he will be no longer their King, because voluntas imperandi & voluntas perdendi non possunt simul consistere, Because a Will to reign and a Will to have none to reign over are inconsistent with one another. But withal he tells us, it is hardly credible, (he might have said utterly incredible) there should be such a King unless he were mad, and if he be mad, there be other ways (as I said before) to hinder him from doing himself or his People so horrible a mischief without their taking up of Arms or rebelling against him.  
So that I do not see how it can be rationally concluded 
Those Instances but seeming Exceptions.  out of any of the aforesaid Instances, that it is lawful to resist him or them that have the Sovereign Power. Neither indeed doth Grotius propose them to infer any such conclusion, but rather to establish the contrary, as appears plainly by the words immediately preceding, which are these; Diximus summum Imperium tenentibus resisti jure non posse; nunc quoedam sunt, quoe Lectorem monere debemus nè putet in hanc legem delinquere eos, qui reverà non delinquunt, that is, We have said (saith he) that is, we have positively affirmed or concluded that those that have the Supreme Power may not lawfully be resisted; but now we are to give the Reader a Caveat, that he may not think those to be transgressors of this Law who indeed are not, or that to be a transgression of this Law which indeed is not. And then he proposeth all the aforesaid Instances, as seeming to be, but not being indeed inconsistent with the Law (as he calls it) of not resisting the Supreme Power, wheresoever it is placed, or whosoever they be that are invested with it; that Law of 
The Law of non-resisting, the foundation and preservative of humane society.  not resisting the Supreme Power being the very foundation upon which all Humane Societies of all kinds are built and superstructed, and the Palladium, The pledge of security, whereby they are preserved in their several forms or constitutions, so that from or against this Law there lies no exception nor any dispensation with it, by any humane Authority upon any pretence either of Civil or Religious Interest, or upon any either pretended or real Grievance of the Subject by their Sovereign, in any kind or degree whatsoever.   

CHAP. XVII.  
Several other Reasons, to prove the unlawfulness of resisting, in any Case whatsoever. The Holy League in France and our late Rebellion brought in by way of Parallel.  
ANd the Reasons for this, besides what hath been already produced out of Scripture, are; First, Because the object of humane Prudence in the constitution of humane Societies, and Kingdoms 
Other reasons for nonresistance.  or Commonwealths, is not to prevent all such Grievances as possibly may be; no nor all such as (considering the pravity and perverseness of humane nature) ordinarily will be, and of necessity must be, even in the best constituted and best managed State or humane Society whatsoever. For as St. Paul saith, Oportet esse Hoereses, There must be Heresies in the Church; not, as if it were not better there were none, but because as long as men are men, that is, such cross-grained creatures, and of such different Morals and Intellectuals from one another as they are, there cannot choose but be some Heresies in the Church; so, and for the very same reason, oportet esse gravamina, there must be, that is, there cannot choose but be Grievances in the Civil State or Commonwealth also. And therefore the object of humane prudence (seeing it cannot prevent or provide against all evils that may or will be in all States) it is as much as may be to prevent or provide against those that are the greatest rather than the lesser, and those that are likely to happen often, rather than those that are not likely to happen at all, or very seldom; and those that are inconsistent with the being, rather than those that are inconsistent with the well-being only of a State or Body Politic. For as in the body natural, so in the body Politic, no remedy is to be prescribed or applied that is worse than the disease. And therefore,  
Secondly, Any gravamina, nay all the gravamina or grievances, that Subjects can suffer under their Sovereign, are to be endured, rather than they are to rebel or to rise up in Arms against him; because that will be the cause of more and greater evils, than any of these are, or can be, against which it can be made use of for a remedy: For no Tyranny can be so bad as Anarchy, and any Government, how Tyrannical soever, is better than none. And therefore it was the saying of one of the wisest Statesmen that ever was in the World, Iniquissimam pacem justissimo bello antefero, I prefer, said he, the most injurious Peace, that is such a peace wherein men are obnoxious to the greatest injuries, before the most just War; he means the most just Civil War, or such a Civil War, as may seem to have the justest or most justifiable causes for it: because indeed any Civil War, upon what grounds or pretences soever it be undertaken, puts the whole body of the Commonwealth into a much worse condition than it can be under any Government or any Governors whatsoever. For whilst there is a Government, though neverso unjust or injurious, there is some authority and execution of Laws for the protection of the innocent, if not of the Subjects against the Sovereign, yet of the Subjects against one another; but Silent leges inter arma, When rebellion is up there is no safety for any man against any man, not for Fathers against their Children, nor for Brethren against Brethren, Non hospes ab hospite tutus, One friend is not safe from another. To conclude, Rebellion is the engagement of the whole body of the Commonwealth against itself, and will if it be not suppressed make it at length Felo de se, A murderer of itself, and to end either in the desolation or dissolution of itself. So that whereas all other evils are but prejudicial to the well-being, This, I mean Rebellion or a rebellious Civil War, is always in its tendency, though not always perhaps in the event, destructive to the very Being of all States and Humane Societies whatsoever; and consequently to the peace and welfare of Subjects as well as Sovereigns, that is, to all and every one of mankind. And therefore this being the greatest of all Evils, it is never to be made use of to prevent or redress any that are less, and consequently never to be made use of at all; because all other evils incident to a Body Politic are less than this, and that not only taken singly but jointly also.  
And yet Thirdly, there is one Reason more, why in humane prudence and according to the dictates of right reason, the Rebellion of Subjects against their Sovereign ought not to be allowed; no, not though possibly it might so happen that (humanely speaking) there could be no other way or means to preserve the very Being of the Body Politic: as for example, in one of the aforesaid Instances or Cases which is put by Grotius (but put by him as hardly credible) supposing there should be such a King as would profess so implacable a hatred to his Subjects, that he would if he could destroy them all; and that he will endeavour to do so: The question is whether, because possibly there may be such a Case, there ought not to be some exception from the aforesaid general Rule of the unlawfulness of Subjects taking up of Arms to resist their Sovereign in any case whatsoever; I answer No; and that not only because St. Paul in his prohibition to resist the Supreme Power hath made no such exception, though one of the Supreme Powers, whom he forbid the Christians to resist, did wish the whole body of the Roman people had but one head, that he might cut it off at one blow; and another of them had set the capital City of his Empire on fire, commanding his Soldiers to kill all the Citizens that endeavoured to quench the burning of their Houses; he himself in the mean while playing upon an Instrument all the time it was a burning: Neither will I insist upon the Judgement and Practice of the Primitive Christians, who though they knew their Sovereigns the Heathen Emperors had professed they would, and really did what they could to destroy all their Christian Subjects; yet the Christians did not think that either this profession or practice of their Sovereigns (which was an evident and undeniable demonstration of their implacable hatred against them) was sufficient to dispense with them for resisting of or for defending themselves against them: as was notably exemplified by what was done and suffered by Mauritius and his Legion according to that Heroical story before recited. But I will not insist, I say, upon any Argument drawn from any religious Topick, to justify my denial of any exception to be made to the general Rule of non-resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects, or for dispensing with Subjects to resist their Sovereigns in any case whatsoever, though possibly there may be such a Case (as Barclay, and Grotius out of Barclay, puts) even among Christians. But that which I insist on at present is this, that abstracting from the consideration of what God hath either commanded or forbidden in his Word, as likewise from the consideration of Heaven or Hell, or of any other life after this, where men are to be rewarded or punished for what they have done here; it is not only prudent and convenient, but absolutely necessary to the peace and welfare, and safety, and happiness of all mankind here in this world, that men should be taught and believe, that the resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects is always and utterly unlawful in any case whatsoever; 
Resistance unlawful even in Grotius his Case.  yea though possibly such might be the Case, as that they would all be destroyed, if they did not resist: and that for these reasons.  
First, Because it is not only very improbable, but as Grotius himself saith scarcely credible, there should ever be any such Case.  
Secondly, Because (according to a Maxim of our own Law) A mischief is better than an inconvenience; that is, (as I conceive) it is better for a State to run the hazard of a greater future evil, which may either not happen at all, or (if at all) very rarely, than for the avoiding of it to admit or submit to a lesser, whereunto it may always and must very often be obnoxious.  
Thirdly, Because, if it be allowed to be lawful for Subjects to resist their Sovereign in such a Case as Grotius puts, or in any other case whatsoever; it will be always and altogether as dangerous both to Prince and People, as if it were granted in never so many other cases also; because that one may always be pretended to be the present case, and the People may be always made to believe it is so, though it be never so improbable to be so.  
As may appear by divers Examples besides those I have already quoted out of Scripture, especially that of David, who though he was the best of Kings that Nation ever had, yet his Son Absalon made the People believe that he neglected to do them justice in hearing their complaints, and redressing their grievances, and thereby stole away their hearts from his Father, (saith the Text) and made them to rebel against him.  
But to instance in one Example or two more, nearer home and nearer our own times.  
It is not long since the Princes of the House of Lorraine, I mean the Guises, being excluded by 
An Instance, from the Holy League in France.  Henry the Third of France from the chief managery of affairs, which they formerly had in that Kingdom, resolved to gain that by force, which they could not keep by the King's favour; and to that end, to stir up the People under some public and plausible pretence to join with them in a rebellion against the King. But what that pretence should be, which the People should be baited withal, being debated by the chief of the Faction, and some being of one mind and some of another, Henry Duke of Guise, being head of the whole party, stood up and said; What need is there of any debate or consultation as to this particular? can there be a better, or more plausible, or more efficacious Motive to stir up the People to join with us against the King; than to 
The Catholic Religion, the pretence there.  make them believe the Catholic Religion is in danger, and that the King is not only a favourer of the Hugonotts but a Hugonott himself in his heart, and therefore that it is absolutely necessary for all good Catholics to join in an Association or Holy League for the defence of the Catholic Faith, and to oppose the bringing in of Hugonott Heresy against all persons of all conditions whatsoever, and consequently the King himself? It was easily agreed to by all the rest of the Conspirators, that this was a very plausible pretence indeed, but withal so incredible as to the King's particular, as that it would not be very difficult only, but impossible to make the People believe it, and consequently to make them rise up against the King upon that account; it being generally known and believed that that King was as Bigott or zealous a Roman Catholic as any was in France; having been himself not a Spectator only but an Actor also in the Massacre of the Hugonotts at Paris not long before; and was still such a Devote, that he was never almost seen in public but betwixt two Capuchins, with a Crucifix in his hand and his Beads at his girdle. Whereunto the Duke of Guise replied laughing, Let me alone (said he) with the managing of that part of the affair. I will undertake within one month by those I will set on work (meaning the Jesuits, the Friars and other Popular Preachers) to make the King to be believed over all France to be as arrant a Hugonott as any in Geneva. And so he did; whereupon that Rebellious Association (which by its Godfather the Pope was called the Holy League) was made against the King, and as bloody a War as ever was in France was raised and maintained by it; neither did it end with the death of the King (who was murdered by a Jacobin Friar) but continued against his Successor upon the same pretence and with the same intentions: the deluded People in the mean time being made to believe by their Ghostly Fathers, that it was God's Cause they fought for, and that those that died or were killed in it, were sure to go immediately and directly to Heaven, without dropping into Purgatory by the way.  
Another Example of the same kind we had here 
The like Instance from our late Rebellion in England.  of late amongst Ourselves; that is of the People's being stirred up by their Preachers to join with a factious, ambitious and discontented Party of the Nobility, Gentry and Commons in a Rebellion against our late Sovereign Lord of ever blessed memory, upon as false and groundless a pretence, as that was against the King of France. For, as there the People were made to believe by their Popish Preachers, that their Religion was in danger, and that their King was an Hugonott or Presbyterian, though as I said before he indeed was (as he processed himself to be) a very zealous and rigid Papist, and had given more than proof enough that he was so: Even so our People here were by their Presbyterian and other their Schismatical Preachers made to believe, that the Protestant Religion here was in very great danger, and 
The Protestant Religion the pretence here.  that Popery was very likely to be brought in, because the King was a Papist or Popishly affected at least; whereas it was evident to all the world both by his Profession and his Practice, that he was as truly a zealous and devout Protestant as any the best of his Protestant Subjects, and moreover as resolute a defender of the Protestant Faith as it is settled and established by Law in the Church of England against both Papists and Schismatics, as any King could or ought to be; I might add, as knowingly so too as ever any King was, but his Father only. And yet thousands of his Subjects were made to believe that he was a Papist in his heart, and upon that account were persuaded and engaged to fight against him; nay many of them were made to believe, that the Protestant Religion itself, as it was established by Law, was but disguised Popery, and that the Common Prayer Book was but the Popish Missal or Mass Book translated into English, and that the Bishops with all the Episcopal Clergy were an Antichristian Hierarchy, and were or would be all of them Vassals to the Pope, as soon as they had an opportunity safely to profess themselves to be so. Now if the People could be made to believe (as we see they were) that such a King as He was, and such a Church as Ours is, were Popish or Popishly affected, against all Evidence both of reason and of sense to the contrary; what is there that they cannot be made to believe? and consequently what security can there be for Kings from their Subjects, either for their Power or their Persons? or for Subjects from their fellow Subjects, or for preserving of the public Peace for a moment only? If there be any one, I say any one case of any kind in any degree, wherein Subjects may be allowed without scruple of Conscience to take up Arms against their Sovereign; that one (as I said before) shall always be pretended and believed to be the Case, as often as the contrivers and trumpeters of Sedition and Rebellion will have it to be so, though there be no ground or reason at all for it, as it is evident there was not in either of the aforesaid Instances or Examples.  
I know there were other pretences besides that of 
Other pretences made use of for the late Rebellion.  Religion, to justify the Rebellion against the late King, as his breach of Trust, his violation of Laws, his bringing or endeavouring to bring in Arbitrary Government, and (as Mr. Baxter would have it to be believed, though Grotius thinks it incredible that any King in his wits should do so) his professing himself an Enemy to the whole body of the People by making War against them all, (as if he meant to be a King without Subjects) and finally whatsoever was thought to be most likely to make either his Person or his Government or both to be feared and hated by the whole Nation, though really and truly there was no more ground for any of them than there was for his purpose of bringing in Popery; which though the Grandees of the Faction knew well enough, yet they knew too that it would serve their turn as well as if it were true, if the People could be made to believe it was so, and withal that they might lawfully, nay that they were bound in conscience with their Lives and Fortunes to defend themselves, their Wives and Children, from being made slaves (for that's the style it must run in) by the King or his Evil Counselors, who ought to be brought to condign punishment by force, if it cannot be done by Law; against which the People were made to believe the King did protect those Evil Counselors of his. And by this means was that Good, that Godly, that Gracious, that Just and every way Virtuous King of ours, brought first to be rebelled against, and at last to be murdered by his own Subjects in his capital City, and before his own Palace gates. And thus may the best Prince that ever was, will be or can be in the World, be exposed, traduced and ruined; and the best Government in the World be brought to confusion and dissolution: and all the Subjects, for fear of an imaginary slavery, be made Slaves indeed to those whom they helped to make them so; there being no way to secure any Prince, State or People, from being always obnoxious to these fatal mischiefs, but the maintaining of this Axiom or Maxim of true Policy, as Sacred and inviolable (viz.) That 
The doctrine of Nonresistance recommended.  Sovereigns are not forcibly to be resisted by their Subjects in any case or upon any provocation whatsoever. And that this Maxim may be kept Sacred and inviolable, as being the Palladium, the Preservative of the public peace, and of the very being, as well as of the well-being of Humane Society; it ought to be the special care of him or them that have the Supreme Power to forbid under very severe penalty, the printing, preaching, or any way infusing or insinuating into the ears or hearts of the People any Doctrine to the contrary, as being not only false and erroneous, but dangerous and Seditious also; so seditious and so dangerous, that if the Sovereign have not power to secure himself from the Pulpit and the Press, or if he do not make use of that power, I am afraid that it is not his Sceptre nor his Sword, that will be able to secure him from his People, or his People from themselves, I mean from cutting the throats of one another.   
The End of the Second Section.   

SECTION III.  
The late War in England against the King proved to have been a Rebellion, whatever Mr. Baxter plead or argue in defence or justification of it.  

CHAP. I.  
The late War proved to have been made against the King, and consequently to be Rebellion. The Parliaments Declaration discussed, together with the danger of Arbitrary Votes. The Judge's opinion in the Earl of Essex his Case in Queen Elizabeth's time. The Presbyterian Clergy charged with the Rebellion.  
AND thus having, as I conceive, sufficiently proved it to be unlawful for Subjects to rise up in Arms against their Sovereign, in any case or upon any provocation whatsoever; as being not only contrary to the Precepts of the Gospel, and the Practice of the Primitive Christians, but to the Dictates of right Reason also: I thought there would have been no need of saying any more to prove the 
The Bishop's grounds to prove the late War unlawful.  late War here in England to be Unlawful; because I took it for granted, that it was a War made against the King, and that our King was our only Sovereign, and that those that made the War were but Subjects, mere Subjects, and no more than Subjects. But Mr. Baxter tells us,  
First, That the late War was not made against 
Mr. B's contrary grounds to justify it.  the King.  
Secondly, That the King was not our Sovereign, at least not our sole Sovereign. And,  
Thirdly, That those that made the War were not mere Subjects, but had their share in the Sovereignty, and that in the chiefest part of the Sovereignty (namely the Legislative power) as well as the King had.  
And upon these grounds he builds his Babel of confusion; and of the solidity of these grounds he is so very confident, that he saith he will confess himself 
His confidence of these grounds.  to have been a Rebel, nay, a most perfidious Rebei, and that he will offer his Head to Justice as a 
H. C. p. 489, 490.  Rebel, if these grounds of his can be solidly confuted. Let us try therefore, whether they be so impregnable, as he presumes they are or no. I for my part am so far from thinking them to be so, that they seem to me to have no solidity at all in any of them.  
We will begin with the first, viz. that the late 
The first of them considered.  War here in England was not a War against the King, and therefore could not be a Rebellion. The Consequence I confess to be good; But how doth he prove the Antecedent? why, he proves the Antecedent, namely, that the War was not against the 
H. C. 476. ad sinem istius pagine. The Parliaments Declaration.  King, because the Parliament declared it was not against the King, but only against his evil Counsellors, and his Delinquent Subjects, that misled him, and were his Enemies as well as the Commonwealths. And it was upon this account, saith Mr. Baxter, that I served the Parliament; nor do I know (saith he) that I 
Ibid.  ever fought against the King, unless every one of the King's Soldiers was a King; or some one of them at 
Mr. B. personally engaged in the War.  least. From which saying of his, I observe by the way, that Mr. Baxter himself, in obedience to the Parliament, did himself personally fight against the King's Soldiers, but not against the King, unless some one of those Soldiers he fought against was the King; as if no body can be said to fight against the King, but one that hath a personal Combat or Duel with the King. And perhaps the Parliament, not 
The Parliaments design in that Declaration.  thinking it time yet to speak out, did hope to make the People believe, that they made War against Delinquent Subjects only, and not against the King; because they did not, as the King of Syria did, 
* 2 Chron. 18. v. 30.  command their General and his Officers to fight with neither small nor great, but only with the King. It is true, the Parliament did not so: but it is true too, that they did not except the King from being fought with neither; nor consequently from being killed. For, as Mr. Baxter saith, it is to be supposed those that 
Mr. B's own confession in the case. H. C. p. 422.  fight would kill those with whom they fight: and then what might have become of the King, if Mr. Baxter had happened to encounter him when he was a fight with other of his Soldiers? But, to let this pass, as spoken of occasionally only, Mr. Baxter tells us, that he and those that engaged with him in the late War were obliged to believe the Parliaments Declaration that it was not a War against the King, because the 
H. C. p. 471.  Parliament were not only the most competent Witnesses and Judges, but the chosen trusties of the People's Liberties.  
But whom or what doth Mr. Baxter mean by such 
By Parliament Mr. B. means the House of Commons.  Parliaments as the People are obliged to believe? surely not the King, Lords and Commons, which is the true notion of a Parliament; no, nor the Lords and Commons (who both of them together are but the Body of a Parliament without a Head.) For the reason which he gives, why they (the People) are obliged to believe them, is, because they are their chosen trusties; but so are the House of Commons only, and not the Lords. So that whatsoever the House of Commons declare or remonstrate unto the People, is to be believed to be true, and just, and legal, and the People to act accordingly; and some there will always be that will do so.  
For Example, the House of Commons in the late 
The ground of Felton's Murdering the D. of Buckingham, a Vote of the House of Commons.  King's time Voted the Duke of Buckingham (this Duke's Father) to be an Enemy to the public; and therefore Felton thought himself obliged to kill him, and did so, and for no other reason but that only. For being presently apprehended and asked why he did it? Look (said he) betwixt the Crown and Lining of my Hat, and you shall find the reason why I thought myself bound in conscience to God, and in duty to my King and Country to do it. And there (as he told them they should) they found a Paper stitched to the inside of the Lining with the aforesaid Vote of the House of Commons written upon it. And this was told me by a very credible Witness Sir Tho. Alisbury, than one of the Masters of Requests, but formerly Secretary for the Admiralty to the aforesaid Duke, who was by when he was Murdered, and heard the aforesaid Examination of Felton, and his justifying of what he had done upon that account of the aforesaid Vote of the House of Commons, which was taken out of his Hat, and seen and read by the aforesaid Sir Tho. Alisbury.  
I have repeated the Story of this matter of fact, 
The dangerous consequence of such Votes.  the rather, because there have been of late divers such Votes passed in the House of Commons against several Persons of eminent Quality and Dignity, who were all of them to be supposed to be innocent until they were proved to be guilty; and yet before any such proof made, or any proceeding against them per legem terrae, or according to the Law of the Land; as some of them were, so all of the like quality, that is, all the Nobility, may be condemned by a Major party of a House of Commons, as Enemies to the Commonwealth, or of King and Kingdom; and according to Mr. Baxter's Doctrine, must by the People be believed to be so; and consequently they that are so Voted, how many, how great, and how innocent soever they are, they are to be exposed to have their throats cut by any Fanatical Zealot, or (which is worse) to be torn in pieces by the enraged Rabble, as the two Dewitts were lately in Holland, and as Dr. Lamb was in London in the Reign of King James. For it is but giving of the Word in such a season, and down goes that Voted, or rather that Devoted Person, and is knocked on the head before he can open his mouth to speak for himself, when perhaps he is not the Man they took him for neither.  
What is become in the mean time of Magna Charta? 
No man safe in such cases.  Where is the security thereby provided, for the Lives, Liberties and Properties of Freeborn Englishmen? when an arbitrary Vote of the House of Commons, if it be believed (as Mr. Baxter saith it must be) by the People; and be put in execution (as Mr. Baxter cannot deny but it may be, because it hath been) may take away any man's life, how innocent soever, without any farther process, or a legal proof of any crime against him. For who is there that can secure himself from such a Vote? or that can be secured after he is devoted by such a Vote, from being killed by the next man that meets him in the Streets? for there be more Feltons' (saith Mr. Baxter) than one; neither will the hanging of one discourage all the rest from hazarding their lives upon the same account, as long as they are possessed and actuated with the same principle, (viz.) that it is not only lawful, but a glorious and meritorious deed, to kill any man that is an Enemy to the Public; and withal that he is obliged to believe that any, or as many, as the House of Commons shall declare to be so, are so.  
It was high time therefore for the King to give a stop to such proceedings by dissolving the late Parliament, to prevent the proscribing of all that were about him and employed by him, and perhaps the remonstrating against himself also as their Predecessors had done against his Father: which Remonstrance 
The Remonstrance of the House of Commons made use of for the destruction of the King's Person.  made by the then House of Commons, as it was intended and made use of at first by the Presbyterians to begin and carry on their Rebellion against the King and his Party; so was it made use of at last also by the Independents for the destruction of the King's Person: the pretended maladministration of the Government (which was the matter of the Remonstrance) being that for which he was indicted and condemned and put to death by the Independents. And yet that very Remonstrance it was that Mr. Baxter in the place before quoted saith, the People were obliged to believe, and consequently to act thereupon as afterwards they did, and yet good man he was in the mean time far from being guilty of any hurt to the King's Person, or destruction of his 
Hol. C. p. 489,  Power.  
But why was he or the rest of the People obliged 
Parliaments not infallible nor impeccable by Mr. B's own confession,  to believe either that Remonstrance or his Declaration of the House of Commons? were they infallible that they could not be deceived themselves, or were they impeccable that they could not deceive others? neither the one nor the other: For Mr. Baxter himself tells us, it is well known that Parliaments, quà tales, (as such) are not divine, religious, Protestant, or just: That sometimes the major part in either or both Houses may be the worst. And therefore I should think not always to be believed in what they declare, nor always to be complied with by the People (whose trusties they are) in whatsoever they command or undertake. For if They be such as Mr. Baxter saith They may be, may They not betray their trust, and act contrary to the Interest of those that trust them? Yes, saith Mr. Baxter, they may, and consequently may (saith he) forfeit their power as well as Kings; nay, in some cases (saith Mr. Baxter) We are all, (that is the whole Nation) to take part with the King against the Parliament: as First, If they would depose 
Holy Com-w. pag. 437, 438.  the King unjustly, or change the Government; or, Secondly, If they notoriously betray their trust in fundamentals, or in points that the Common good depends on (as if ever any Parliament did, That we are now 
And in some cases to be deferred by the People. Ibid.  speaking of did, and did it most notoriously) there (saith he) the People's duty is to forsake them and to cleave to the King against them. But who shall be Judge whether they do so or no? or if there be a division betwixt those between whom the Sovereignty is divided (as Mr. Baxter supposeth it is betwixt King and Parliament here in England) and the one usurps, or is pretended to usurp upon the other; What then? why then, saith Mr. Baxter, it belongs 
Holy Com-w. pag. 439.  to the People to judge whose cause is best and to resist the usurping party. But the People (as he tells us in another place) cannot themselves judge for themselves; 
Mr. B's inconsistence in the resolution of such cases.  and therefore (saith he) the Constitution of the Government having made the Parliament the trusties of our Liberties, hath made them our Eyes by which We must discern our dangers: And therefore (as he saith a little before in the same page) We are obliged to believe them as the most competent Witnesses, and Judges, and the chosen trusties of our Liberties. So that if there be a difference betwixt the King and the House of Commons, and the House of Commons would depose the King never so unjustly, or change the Government never so notoriously, or betray their trust never so perfidiously, yet if the House of Commons themselves will not say they do so, but declare the contrary, the People are to believe them and to side with them against the King; yea, and against the House of Lords too, if they join with the King: which how it can consist with the Doctrine of Co-ordination, or with his own aforesaid Assertion, that in some cases the People are to cleave to the King against the Parliament, he were best to consider.  
In the mean time, thanks be to God, We have a 
The Law a sure Rule.  better and a more certain Rule of right and wrong and to be guided in what We are to believe and do, than an arbitrary Vote of the major part of the House of Commons; and that is the known Law of the Land. For verissimum illud (saith Grotius) ubi semel à jure recessum est, incerta esse omnia; 
* In Prolegom. de jure Belli & Pacis.  when we are once out of the road and rule of the Law, we know not whither We are a going, nor what we are a doing.  
If therefore the question be, Whether the late War 
The E. of Essex his case in Q. Elizabeth's time.  was made against the King or no; it is not a Declaration of the House of Commons, or of both Houses, either pro or con, that will decide the question; but Ad legem, ad legem, it is the Law that must do it, and the Law hath done it. For when the Earl of Essex in Queen Elizabeth's time, at his Arraignment for Treason and Rebellion against the Queen, (because he took up Arms without her Commission) pleaded that he did it for the Queen and not against her; because his meaning was only to remove Cecil and Cobham and Raleigh and other evil Councillors that were about her, and were hers and the States Enemies as well as his; protesting then, as Mr. Baxter does now, that he meant not any the least hurt to the Queen's Person or diminution of her Power: upon which often reiterated protestation of the Earls, especially that of his meaning no hurt to the Queen's Person; the Sages of the Law, that were Assessors to the Lords that were his Judges, being asked by the Lords, what was the Judgement of the 
The Judge's Opinion in that case.  Law in that Case; Pronunciarunt, si quis attentaverit ita se firmare, ut Rex resistere non potuerit, Rebellionis tenetur, etc. They pronounced or declared that 
* Cambd. Eliz. ad Ann. 1601.  if any man should attempt to make himself so strong that the King should not be able to resist him, he is guilty of Rebellion. Item that the Law interpreteth that in every Rebellion there is a conspiracy against the Life and Crown of the King; for a Rebel will never suffer the King to live or reign, who may afterwards punish or revenge such his Treason or Rebellion. Which Interpretation of the Law of England they confirmed,  
First, By the Imperial or Civil Law, whereby to 
A threefold confirmation of that their opinion.  do any thing against the safety of the Prince is reputed to be Treason.  
Secondly, By the force of Reason; because it cannot be but that he, which hath once given Law to his King, should never permit the King to recover his former authority, or to live, left at any time after he should revenge it.  
Thirdly and lastly, They confirmed it likewise by Examples drawn from our English Chronicles of Edward the II. and Richard the II. both which being once by force of Arms gotten by their Subjects into their Power, were not long after Deposed and made away also.  
I have repeated at large what was then said to be 
Three Observations drawn from thence.  the Law of England by the authorised and sworn Expositors of the Laws, I mean the Judges. And from what was said by them then in that particular Case, I observe,  
First, That Arms taken up, or Forces raised by Subjects of what condition or upon what pretence soever, without the Sovereign's leave or commission, are in construction of Law taken up and raised against the Sovereign.  
Secondly, That such Forces so raised, against whomsoever or to what end soever they are pretended to be employed, are in construction of Law intended not only to take away the King's Power but his Life also.  
And, Thirdly, Because the Law presumes, that those that have taken away his Power will not let him live, for fear he may recover his Power, and revenge himself of those that took it away from him; I cannot choose but think that the Presbyterian Party, though they did not at first intent to take away the King's life, yet after they had taken away his Power, and made him their Prisoner, and used 
The Presbyterians would have done what the Independents did, had they been let alone.  him so barbarously as they did whilst he was their Prisoner, I cannot choose but think, I say, that (had not the Independents taken him out of their hands) they would have taken away his life at last also, though not by a formal public judiciary Trial as the Independents did; but some way or other they would have done it. For who can believe they would have suffered him to live, or at least to live as a King, whom They could not choose but think they had provoked beyond a capacity of being Pardoned by him, if ever he should be in a condition to be revenged of them? And why should We think they would have stuck at making him away in the dark or in a Prison, whom before they had so often endeavoured to kill in the open Field? For it is to be supposed, saith Mr. Baxter, that those that fight would kill those they fight against; and therefore 
Holy Com. p. 422.  it is to be supposed likewise (say I) that those that commissioned their Armies to fight against their King (as the Presbyterian Parliament did the Earl of Essex) did commission them likewise to kill the King if they could. For I never heard that the King was excepted from being fought against, and 
The King's Person excepted in none of their Commissions.  consequently from being killed, in any of their Commissions: or that so much as any private Instruction or Intimation was given to my Lord of Essex or to any of his Officers, much less to all of them, to spare the King: such a one I mean as David gave to Joab and the Officers of his Army for the sparing of Absolom. So that there was no more care taken by the Parliament for sparing of the King's life, than for sparing the life of any of those whom their Armies were commissioned to sight against and kill; and consequently they were commissioned to kill the King as well as any of the rest They were to fight withal.  
And if so, than not only those that commissioned 
The Presbyterian Clergy taxed, as to the late King's Death.  those that fought against the King, but those that stirred them up, and encouraged them to fight against the King, did stir them up and encourage them to kill the King also: and if so, how can the Presbyterian Clergy of those times, especially the London and Parliament Preachers, be excused from being intentionally guilty of the late King's death, before he was 
Fid. Evangil. Armatum.  actually murdered by the Independents.  
But of all the rest how will Mr. Baxter excuse 
Mr. B. particularly charged.  himself who tells us it is to be supposed that those that fight would kill those they fight against, and consequently that those that encourage them to fight, do encourage them to kill those whom they fight against, and withal confesseth that he encouraged thousands to do that which the Law calls fight against the King; how will he, I say, excuse himself from being, consequentially at least, if not intentionally, guilty of the late King's Death? How then can he with any ingenuity or sincerity say, that he was never guilty of hurt to the Person or destruction of 
Hol. Com. p. 489, & 490.  the Power of the King? And yet he doth say so, and that so confidently, that he professeth likewise that if either this or that (viz) that if either he was guilty 
Notwithstanding his confidence. Ibid.  of hurt to the Person, or destruction of the Power of the King, can be proved against him, he will never gainsay them that call him a most perfidious Rebel, and tell him he is guilty of a far greater sin, than Murder, Whoredom, Drunkenness, and such like.  
In the mean time he doth confess, and is convinced, 
Rebellion, as Mr. B. owns, a greater sin than Murder, whoredom, Drunkenness, etc.  it seems, that a Rebel is a worse man and a greater sinner, than a Drunkard, or a Whoremonger, or a Murderer, if he be indeed a Rebel, though perhaps he doth not think so; which is a severer sentence than I durst have pronounced upon many of those that were indeed Rebels, but did not think 
Some were Rebels, who did not think themselves so.  themselves to be so; but were misled by their spiritual guides, who made them believe that to fight against the King was to fight for the King; and that all the while they were doing God and the King good service: which the greater diminution it was of their sin that were so deceived, the greater aggravation it was of their guilt that did so deceive them. And yet those, that were the least sinners of these Rebels, were according to Mr. Baxter's account greater sinners than Drunkards, Whoremongers and Murderers: so that if he could as truly (as he doth boldly and frequently) charge most of the Episcopal Party with Drunkenness and Uncleanness and Profaneness, yet seeing he cannot charge them with Rebellion against their Sovereign, they will still be less evil, how bad soever they are, than the best of those of his Party, if They were Rebels, as I think They have acknowledged themselves to be, by suing for and taking out their Pardons for their Rebellion.  
Neither can the Bishops and the Episcopal Clergy be so answerable to God and the World for the dissoluteness, 
The Schismatical Clergy under a just reproof.  debauchery and Profaneness of those of their Party (were it as general and as great as Mr. Baxter would have it believed to be) as the Schismatical Clergy are for the Rebellion against the King, their Sacrilege against God; and for the plundering and murdering of their fellow Subjects by those of their Party; because none of them can say with any colour of truth or credibility, that any of our Clergy did ever encourage any of our Party to be dissolute, or debauched, or profane, or blasphemous, or Atheistical, in any kind or in any degree: much less did We commend them for being so, or pray to God to make them so, or thank God because they were so; but We can say and say it truly, that the Schismatical Clergy were not only Rebels and the greatest of Rebels themselves, but did what they could, by preaching and praying and fasting and thanksgiving, to make the whole Nation (as they did all that were their Proselytes) to be Rebels; if at least the fight of Subjects against their Sovereign be Rebellion; or if those that are guilty of hurt to the Person of the King or destruction of his Power be Rebels, as Mr. Baxter saith they are.   

CHAP. II.  
The Destruction of the King's Power by the Presbyterians (as afterwards of his Person by the Independents, etc.) proves the late War to have been made against the King (and consequently to have been Rebellion) whatever the Parliament declared to the contrary.  
NOW that all those, that fought and that commissioned and encouraged others to fight in the late War, were guilty of the Destruction of the 
The King's Power destroyed in the late War.  King's Power, is so undeniably evident and apparent, that it needs no proof. Unless Mr. Baxter will say, that the King never had any Power at all; for I am sure they brought him to that pass by that War, that he had no power at all at last, witness his condition at Holmby, where he was so far from having the Power of a King, that he had not the Liberty of a Subject, neither as to the liberty of his Person, or of his Conscience; For they would not allow him one of his own Chaplains to assist him in the service of God. And to this diminution or rather annihilation of power was that good King brought by those, who were all of them commissioned by the Presbyterian Parliament, and many thousands of them encouraged by Mr. Baxter himself (as Mr. Baxter himself confesseth) 
The Presbyterian Party who destroyed his Power, by Mr. B 's own confession, Rebels.  so that if those that were guilty of the destruction of the King's Power were Rebels, (as Mr. Baxter saith he will not gainsay but they were) then Mr. Baxter and those of the Presbyterian Party were all of them Rebels. For it was whilst that Party was in power, and it was by that power of theirs, that the King's Power was destroyed, and he left utterly unable to defend himself against the Independents, Anabaptists, and other fanatics, who after his Power was destroyed by the Presbyterians destroyed his Person also.  
And therefore supposing, but not granting, that 
Nor consequently can they be: absolved from the guilt of the King's murder.  neither Mr. Baxter, nor any other of the Presbyterian Party had intended any hurt to the King's Person; yet that will not absolve them from being guilty of the hurt that was done unto his Person, or of the King's murder: no more than those Thiefs, who (as Salmasius saith) having robbed and disarmed a man, and left him bound hand and foot to be devoured of wild Beasts, because they do not actually hurt or kill him themselves, can be said not to be guilty of his death, if afterward by a Lion or a Bear or a Wolf he be destroyed and devoured.  
And thus much for proof that the late War was 
The late War than was made against the King.  made against the King, notwithstanding the Parliament (as Mr. Baxter calls it) declared to the contrary; and consequently was a Rebellion properly so called; as likewise for proof, that those that were engaged or did engage others in that War, (whatsoever their intentions were or might be) they were all of them guilty of the destruction of the King's Power: and consequently perfidious Rebels, and worse than Whoremongers, Drunkards, and Murderers in Mr. Baxter's own judgement, notwithstanding his Protestation to the contrary.  
We have done skirmishing with Mr. Baxter's fordorn-hope, and a forlorn-hope it was indeed, if he did hope he could induce any to believe, not only against their reason, but against their sense also, that which verily I believe he doth not believe himself; namely, that the late War was not made against 
And that though the Parliament declared it was not.  the King. I am sure he did not, at least he was not bound to believe it (as he saith he was) because his and the People's trusties for their Liberties (that is the House of Commons) had declared it was not: unless he will say that the House of Commons is such a body of men, as is either infallible or impeccable; so that whatsoever they or the major part of them declare must needs be so as they declare it to be, and that the People are bound to believe it to be so, because they have no other way to inform themselves, but by their trusties; and because these are such trusties, as they are sure will not, cannot betray the trust reposed in them: and yet Mr. Baxter himself saith, (as I noted before) that the Major part of both Houses may be the worst, and such as the People are bound to take part with the King against them. How then can he with any ingenuity, or hope to be believed, say that he and the People were bound to believe, that the late War was not made against the King, because one or both Houses of Parliament had declared it was not? And yet this is the only Argument he brings for the proof of it.  
But truth will out sometimes before a Man is aware, and though he takes never so much care to suppress it. For whereas in the place before quoted, Mr. Baxter (though he confesseth he fought against the King's Soldiers) yet he affirms he fought not against the King, thereby implying that he thought it unlawful to fight against the King, though not against those commissioned by him: yet in another place he saith, it is no resisting of Power but of Injustice, to fight against the King and his Soldiers for 
H. Com. p. 419.  the common good; thereby implying, that to fight against the King's Soldiers or his Army, is to fight against the King; or that it is as lawful to fight against the one as against the other; and consequently it is evident that notwithstanding the Parliaments Declaration to the contrary, Mr. Baxter 
Mr. B. proved to believe so himself.  himself did believe the late War to be made against the King, and must therefore have been (at least in this particular) an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, one self-condemned, in pretending he did, and was bound to believe it was not made against the King, but against his evil Councillors, and other his Delinquent Subjects only.   

CHAP. III.  
Another ground of Mr. B's justifying the late War, that according to our constitution the King is not sole Sovereign, disproved. The Act for the Rebel-Parliaments sitting, censured. All Kings (properly so called) not accountable to the People, but to God only.  
AND this doth farther appear by the little confidence 
Another Topick of Mr. B 's that the late War was not Rebellion.  he himself seems to have in this Topick. For supposing (as he had all the reason in the World to suppose) that the aforesaid Declaration of the Parliament (as he 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, abusively and falsely calls it) would signify nothing with considering and understanding men, as to the justifying of the late War from being a downright Rebellion, as indeed it was; he seems to quit this as an indefensible Out-work, and retires to that which he thinks to be a much stronger Hold; and which if he can maintain, he thinks, that though he should grant the late War to have been made against the King; yet it was not, could not be a Rebellion, because it was not made by Subjects against their Sovereign. For the King of England, (saith he) according to the constitution of 
Because the King, he saith, is not sole Sovereign.  our Government is not our sole Sovereign, but there be others that be partners with him in the Sovereignty itself; and of this he is so very confident, that he saith in positive and express terms, that if any man 
Mr. B 's bold offer. Vid. Praef. to Holy C. prope finem.  can prove that the King was the highest power in the time of those Divisions, He will offer his head to justice for a Rebel.  
Which saying of his seems to require some animadversion upon it, as not being an absolute denial of the King's Sovereignty, or of the Kings being the highest Power, but of his being Sovereign or highest Power, during those times of division only; which seems to imply that he was (even in Mr. Baxters' opinion) the Sovereign or highest Power before those times of division.  
And if this be his meaning, as it must be, (if there 
What Mr. B 's meaning is in denying the King to be the highest Power in the time of our divisions.  be any meaning at all in those words) than it is not from the Constitution of the Government (as Mr. Baxter saith it is) that the King, I mean our King of England, is not the Sovereign or the highest Power always and in all times and to all intents and purposes: but it was from the Alteration of the essential Constitution of our Government, and from the iniquity of those Times and Persons that made that alteration; that the King did not, nor could not then exercise those Acts of Sovereignty or Supreme Power, which was as legally invested and as inseparably inherent 
The King's Power taken from him, his Authority remained good.  in him, even then, as ever it was before. For though the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Power, might and was, yet the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Authority, was not nor could not be taken from him, but by taking away his Life also.  
Unless Mr. Baxter will say (and there seems to 
The Act, which the King past, for the Parliaments sitting,  be some such secret intimation in that saying of his I last quoted) that the King himself gave away his Sovereignty, or that he made his two Houses of Parliament partakers with him in it, when he passed an Act for their sitting until They themselves should be willing or content to be dissolved. I confess this was a very great alteration in the very fundamental constitution of the Government, and I confess the King passed such an Act: the very great straits he was then in, together with the minatory importunity of the two Houses, backed by the insolent and tumultuous behaviour of the Multitude, necessitating him (as it were) to do that, which never any of his Predecessors did before him, (and I hope never any of his Successors will do after him.) I mean to pass such an Act as that was: Although that Act gave neither of the Houses singly, nor both of them 
Gave them no more Power, than they had before.  jointly, any whit or jot of more Power (but only of sitting longer) than what They or their Predecessors had before, or their Successors now have. And I hope Mr. Baxter will not say that is a Power to repeal Acts, to make Ordinances of equal validity and obligation with Acts without the Royal Assent to them, to raise Armies and moneys to maintain them upon their fellow-subjects and against their fellow-subjects and against the King himself also. Did the Act, that gave them a Power to sit until they thought fit to be dissolved, give them Power to do all, or any of these things before specified? and many other, as bold, as bad and as illegal as any of those were? or because they had leave to sit as long as they listed, had they leave to do what they listed also? No, no; it was their ingrateful and ungracious abuse of the Kings too gracious favour to them, that was the cause of all those evils, that afterwards upon that occasion befell Him and the whole Royal Family, and all his Loyal Subjects. And therefore 
The worst Act, that blessed King ever did.  of all the Acts that ever that good King did, I take the passing of the aforesaid Act, for the sitting of the two Houses, not during his, but their own pleasures, to be the worst, not only in point of prudence and policy, as most prejudicial to the Crown and Government in general; but in point of Right and Justice also, to all and every one of the rest of his Subjects: I mean as many of them as were capable of choosing, and of being chosen Parliament-men; who were all of them by the passing of this Act excluded from having what was due to them, in either of those capacities; and consequently, from the Rights and Privileges of Freeborn Englishmen, as long as those Parliament-Men, that were then in being, should please to sit; and that might be, are was (as We saw afterwards) as long as they lived, or at least as long as they could; I mean till the Army, which they raised, made them to rise whether they would or no; and yet there want not some that say they are still in being.  
But to return from this digression, because it is 
Mr. B grounds his denial of the King's Sovereignty upon the constitution of the Government.  not upon this particular occasional alteration of the Government, that Mr. Baxter doth openly and professedly ground his denial of the King's Sovereignty here in England; but upon the fundamental and essential constitution of the Government itself; and consequently he denies England to be a Kingdom and our King to be a King properly so called. For he himself defines a Kingdom to be such a Commonwealth 
His definition of a Kingdom. H. C. p. 85.  or body Politic as hath but one Person only for its Sovereign. So that according to this definition, all Kingdoms that are Kingdoms indeed are Monarchies, and all Kings that are Kings indeed or Kings properly so called are Monarches. I say Kings properly so called, because some have been called Kings, who were really no Kings, as the Kings of Sparta or Lacedaemon were; who were but Generals 
The Lacedaemonian Kings, only titular.  of their Armies only, the Sovereign Power of the State being in those that were called the Ephori or Overseers, to whom those they called their Kings were legally accountable for all their actions, and by whom they were legally punishable, even with death itself, for their delinquencies; whereas the Ephori were accountable to none, nor punishable by any; and therefore the Sovereign Power of the State was in them, and consequently their Kings were Kings and no Kings, that is Kings in name and title only, but really and indeed no more than Subjects. So that the Government of Lacedaemon was not Regal 
The Government there Aristocratical.  or Monarchical, but Aristocratical: and so Thucydides calls it. For as speaking of the Athenians, he calls them the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Multitude, or Populace, because their Government was Democratical, so speaking of the Lacedæmonians he calls them the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Best sort of People, or the Nobless, because their Government was Aristocratical; whereas if it had been truly Regal, or their Kings had been truly and properly called Kings, he should have called them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Royalists or Kings-men, or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the Subjects of Monarches, because their Government would then have been Monarchical. For a Government to be Regal and to be Monarchical is all one, there being no King properly so called but he is a Monarch, that is, one that governs all and is subject to none, and consequentially accountable to none for any thing he doth in his own Kingdom.  
And this is true of all Kings properly so called, whether they be greater or less, Successive or Elective, 
All Kings indeed unaccountable to the Reople:  and whether they be despotical or Political; for both Successive and Elective Kings properly so called may be either despotical or Political: for as the Successive Kings in the three first Monarchies were Successive and despotical, and are so still in the East and South parts of the World and in both the Indies: so those of the fourth and last Monarchy also, (I mean) the Roman Emperors, whether Successive or Elective, were all of them despotical; and so in Europe are the successive Emperors of Turkey and Russia and Tartary at this day, that is such as are not only Monarches, that is such as have the whole Sovereign Power solely in themselves (as all Kings or Monarches properly so called have also) but have and exercise that Sovereignty or Sovereign Power without being bounded or limited by any Laws or Rules to govern by, but as Lords over their Vassals absolutely and arbitrarily according to their own Will and Pleasures. Whereas Political Kings and 
Even Political Kings, who are obliged to govern by Law;  Princes, whether Successive, as the Kings of England and of France and of Spain; or Elective, as the Emperor of Germany and the King of Poland; are obliged to govern according to the Political Constitutions and Laws of their several respective Signories and Dominions, but not so as to forfeit their right to their Crowns or to be accountable to any judicatory, or punishable by any Power here on Earth, if they do not do so; no, though they be Kings but by Election only; so they be 
And though Kings by Election only.  elected to be Kings indeed, and not in name and title only, as the aforesaid Kings of Lacedaemon were, and as the Dukes of Venice now are, who are Subjects to the Senate there, as the Kings of Lacedaemon were to the Ephori in Sparta, though those were Successive, and these Elective. For it is not their succeeding or being elected, or being called Kings, that makes them to be Kings indeed; but their being invested with Kingly Power, that is to be over all and under none, whether they be born or elected to be so; or by what name or title soever they be called, whether Kings, Emperors, Sophies, Sultan's, or but Dukes only. For the Duke of Florence is as much a Monarch in his own Dominions, as any of the former are in theirs.  
He therefore that is born or chosen to be such 
All such King's accountable to God only.  a King is not nor cannot, after he is such a King, be accountable or punishable for any thing he does, how unjustly or how much against Law soever it may be, but to God only, and by God: because all within his own Dominions are his Subjects, and none without his own Kingdoms and Dominions (though they be never so much greater or more powerful Kings than he) have any thing to do with him, and much less have They any authority over him, which they must have that can justly pretend to punish any man, how great a Delinquent soever he may be, or what wrong soever he hath done against others or against themselves.   

CHAP. IU.  
A Query resolved, whether a King Elective may not be Deposed, upon non-performance of conditions? Our King proved from Mr. B 's own Principles, to be a sole Sovereign.  
BUT may not the People, that choose one to be their King upon such or such conditions, upon 
The Question.  his non-performance of such conditions Depose him or take away that Power over them they gave unto him? I answer, that if they choose him to be their King indeed, and not in name and title only, 
The Answer.  than he did thereby become their King indeed, that is, their Monarch, or Sovereign Lord over all of them; and consequently they did all of them become 
1 Reason. The People upon their choice part with all the Power they had.  his Subjects without any Power Civil or Military left in themselves but subordinate to him or derived from him, and consequently such as could not lawfully in any case, or upon any provocation be used against him: The People having by such an Election parted with all the Power they formerly had, without any reservation, and much less power of resumption. And this was well understood by Valerian the next Successor but one to Julian the 
Valerian 's Reply in the like case.  Apostate, who being chosen by the Army to be their Emperor, and they crying out to him to name another to be Censors imperii, a Partner in the Empire, or one to govern with him, he gave them this notable Answer. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 
Vid. Zozom. lib. 6. cap. 6.  〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. It was in your Power, O my Soldiers, said he, to choose me to reign over you; but now you have chosen me, that which you demand belongs not to you but to me: and it becomes you as Subjects to be quiet (or not to meddle with matters of Government) and to me as your King and Emperor to consider what is fit to be done.  
Again I answer that, even in Elective Kingdoms, 
2 Reason. A King so chosen hath hic Kingly Power immediately from God, and not from the People, as Mr. B. grants.  he that is chosen by the People to be their King hath not his Kingly Power from them that chose him, but from God: which is in express terms not only granted but asserted by Mr. Baxter, and he values himself upon it, as being upon that account a better friend to Kings than (as he saith) some Episcopal men are; and indeed if he were always and in all he saith consistent with himself he would not be so great an Enemy to Kings, as in this and many other of his Aphorisms (which I have collected out of his Book of a Holy Commonwealth) he hath showed himself to be. For if it be not the People, who choose him to be their King, that give him his Kingly Power, but that he hath it immediately from God, I wonder by what right or authority they can pretend to take that from him, which not they but God hath given to him. Surely they will not say they may do it whether God will or no; and of God's Will that they should do so, or may do so, They can have no declaration or signification, but either from some plain positive standing Rule in Scripture or from special extraordinary and immediate Revelation, such as Abraham had for the sacrificing his Son Isaac, or as Jehu had for the destroying the House of Ahab. But as to this latter, as I hope Mr. Baxter is not yet Fanatic enough to pretend, so I am sure he can find no such declaration or signification of Gods Will for the former, I mean in the Scriptures either of the Old or New Testament, as They were always and universally understood by the first and best Christians.  
It is true indeed that in the Scripture God hath 
Nothing in Scripture, for People to control their Kings.  commanded Kings or Sovereign Princes to govern according to his and their own Laws too that are conformable unto his, and threatened them if they do not, and punished them when they have not. But where or in what place of the Old or New Testament hath God appointed or permitted all or any of the People to do so? I mean, to punish their Kings by Deposing them, or by taking any part of the Kingly Power he had given them, away from them? Surely God did not only foresee but foretell, that many of the Kings of his own People the Jews would be, some of them Idolaters, and some of them Murderers and Adulterers, and some of them Tyrants and great oppressers of their Subjects, as appears by samuel's Speech unto them at the Election of Saul their first King; but he doth not give them, or any order of Men among them there or any where else any either commission or permission authoritatively to inquire into their King's Actions or to call them to an account for them. And therefore the Kings of Juda and Israel were Kings indeed, and so are 
The state of the Jewish Kings.  those Kings whether despotical or Political, whether Successive or Elective, which have no ordinary standing legal Power or Judicatory above them, whereunto they are Subject and accountable, as the Lacedaemonian Kings were unto the Ephori, and therefore were no Kings indeed but in name and in title only. But there is no such legal ordinary standing Power or Judicatory here in England above our King (for Rex in regno suo non habet superiorem, imò nec parem, the King in his own Kingdom hath none above him, no nor equal to him, is a Maxim of our Law) and therefore our King must 
Our King, according to Mr. B 's own Principles, a sole Sovereign.  needs be a Sovereign and a sole Sovereign, according to Mr. baxter's own Principles and Concessions. For this is one of Mr. baxter's own Principles, that every Commonwealth or Body Politic must have a Sovereign; the form of a Commonwealth (saith 
Holy Com. p. 61.  he) being the relation of Sovereign and Subjects to each other; as likewise this is another of his Aphorisms or Principles that the Sovereign of one Commonwealth 
Ibid. p. 62.  must be one and but one: and by but one he must needs mean but one Person, or but one Caetus or Company of men; and consequently in which soever of them it is, it must be solely and wholly: so that to be Sovereign and not to be sole Sovereign seems to be a contradiction in adjecto. From whence I argue, that if there must be a Sovereign or Supreme Power in every State or Body Politic, and that be the Sovereign or Supreme Power which by the Legal Constitution hath no Superior Power above it, than the Regal is the Sovereign or Supreme Power in England; because according to the Legal Constitution of this Kingdom there is no Power Superior to it or Predominant over it, but all other Powers are derived from it and Subordinate and Subject and Subservient to it.  
Again, if the Sovereign of one Commonwealth, State or Kingdom must be One, and but One only, then if the King of England be a Sovereign (as having no Superior he must needs be) he must be a sole Sovereign also.  
Neither do I see how either of these Conclusions can with any colour of reason be denied, but by assigning some Power in some Person or Persons, which by the Legal and Fundamental Constitution of this Kingdom is above the 
The King hath no Superior to judge him, nor Peers to try him.  King, or at least equal to him. But as it is a Maxim of our Law (as I said before) that Rex in regno suo non habet superiorem, the King in his own Kingdom hath none above him; so it is a Maxim too that he hath not parem neither, none equal to him: so that according to our Law as there is none to judge him because he hath no Superior, so there is no Way of trying him, because he hath no Peers; those whom We call Peers being his Subjects though They are Pares or Peers in relation to one another.   

CHAP. V.  
The English Monarchy asserted against Mr. B. who would have the Kingdom of England to be a mixed Commonwealth. My Lord Chief Justice Cook 's judgement on the point.  
THIS one would think were enough to prove the King of England not only to be our Sovereign but our sole Sovereign; and consequently the Kingdom of England to be properly and indeed (as it hath always been accounted both at home and abroad) a Monarchy, or a Government in chief by one and by one only.  
No, saith Mr. Baxter, it hath not always been accounted to be so. For it hath been a Controversy, 
Mr. B. starts a Controversy, which form of Government the English is.  saith he (having spoken before of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy) to which of these forms our English Commonwealth was and is to be reckoned; and the uncertainty of this (saith he) was 
H. C. p. 87.  one cause of our Wars.  
Whereunto I answer, that I never heard, nor I verily 
This Controversy never heard of, till the late times.  believe ever any body else did hear of any such Controversy here in England, at least as to the Civil Government. As to the Ecclesiastical Government indeed of the Church there hath been a Controversy betwixt us and the Church of Rome, whether the King or the Pope be the Governor in chief of it; as likewise betwixt us and the Presbyterians, whether the King or a National Synod ought to have the Supreme managery of it. But as to the Civil Government of the State, there was never any question made (for aught I ever heard) by any of the otherwise Dissenting Parties, but that it was Monarchical, and that the King was the sole Sovereign of it and in it, before that Rebellious Parliament set up for a 
The Rebell-Parliament modest at first.  share in the Sovereignty: which they did not at first neither; but did in all their Addresses to him acknowledge him to be their Sovereign, and that not as they were particular Persons only, but as they were the representative Body of all the Commons of England: neither did the House of Peers ever make the least doubt of doing so also; nor of taking the Oath of Allegiance as to their Sovereign. So that there being then no controversy of the King's Sovereignty over the whole Nation, whether diffusively or representatively considered; nor consequently whether this Kingdom were a Monarchy properly so called or no; this Controversy, (I say, there being then no such controversy in being;) could not be one of the causes of the War, as Mr. Baxter saith it was; I am sure it was none of the causes then pretended.  
And yet I am apt enough to think that the contrivers 
The secret design of some, from the first, to change the Government.  and promoters of the War that were then leading-men in the House of Commons, and some of them in the House of Lords also, did from the very beginning design and intend a real change and alteration of the Government itself, though They openly pretended but a reformation of abuses that were in it only. I mean they did intend to turn the Monarchy into an Aristocracy, and to make a Duke of Venice of the King; as appears by the 19 Propositions, which when they thought themselves strong enough to own they made to him. But this They concealed for a long time from the main Body of their Party, for fear it might alienate most or many of them, that had any thing of Loyalty or Conscience, from them. Or if they did communicate this arcanum, this secret of their grand design to any, it was only to those whom they were sure of, as desiring such a change of the Government as themselves did, and whose help they were to make use of for the bringing of it about; I mean the popular Presbyterian and other Schismatical Preachers; and perhaps 
Mr. B. makes the Kingdom of England, a mixed Commonwealth.  Mr. Baxter was one of them: Otherwise I should wonder how he comes to say, as he doth, the Parliaments have affirmed it (namely the Kingdom of England) to be a mixed Commonwealth. 
H. C. p. 87.  For sure by Parliament he meant Parliament-men: for Parliaments say nothing but by Votes or Orders of the respective Houses, and I verily believe there never was any such Vote passed in either of them; if there were, he should have done well to have named those Parliaments or at least some one of those Parliaments that had affirmed the Kingdom or (as he calls it) the Commonwealth of England not to be Monarchical, but a mixed Government; which no doubt he would have done, if he could, being so desirous, as he seems to be, to have it so. 
My Lord Cook 's judgement in the Case.   
But I can tell him of one who was Speaker of the House of Commons, and as Learned a one in the Laws and Legal Constitutions of this Realm, & likewise as knowing what were the Powers and Privileges of both Houses of Parliament, as ever was before or since Him in the Chair; and that was my Lord Cook who saith and saith it positively as a known and undoubted truth, That this Kingdom of ours is a Monarchy, and Monarchy successive by inherent 
In the Preface to his fourth Book of Reports.  Birthright; adding that of all others it is the most absolute and perfect Form of Governments, excluding Interregnums and with it infinite inconveniences. 
His judgement to be preferred before foreign Lawyers and Divines.   
And now what say you, Mr. Baxter? Do you not think this Oracle of our Law (for so I think he is esteemed by those of his Profession) do you not think (I say) that he understood the Legal and Fundamental Constitution of this Kingdom, as well as you do or any of those foreign Lawyers or Divines, whose judgements perhaps you may rely on and be misled by? I name Divines as well as Lawyers, because some of the Protestant as well as Popish Divines have done what they can to lessen the Power of Kings: the latter to make them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to make them accountable and subject to the Pope, and the former to make them accountable and subject to the People, to their own Subjects, which is as dangerous and much more dishonourable than the other.   

CHAP. VI  
Calvin answered, who though he allows not private Persons to resist, yet requires it of some Magistrates, whom he supposes the Guardians of the People's Liberty. No such Magistrates, as he supposeth, nor doth he say there are, and if there were, they would be extremely inconvenient to the public. This Opinion taxed by Grotius, who yet himself, supposing the Sovereignty shared betwixt the King and People, in some case allows resistance.  
AND yet this so dangerous and so dishonourable a subjection of Kings to their own Subjects doth Mr. Calvin, the Patriarch of the Presbyterians, 
Calvin the Patriarch of the Presbyterians.  approve of; I call him the Patriarch of the Presbyterians, because he was the first that after 1500 years' Government of the Church by Bishops, invented and set up a Government of the Church by a Parity of Presbyters without Bishops; and this and this only can properly and truly be called Calvinism; 
What properly Calvinism.  whatsoever he holds besides, even the most rigid of his Tenets, having been held by some of the Schoolmen and some of the Fathers also.  
But this Calvin I say (though otherwise a very Learned and (as our judicious Hooker saith of him) incomparably the wisest man that ever the French Church 
Calvin condemns Resistance of Kings by private men, but obliges some sort of Magistrates to it.  did enjoy since the hour it did enjoy him,) though he doth not allow of the resisting of Kings, even the worst and most tyrannical of Kings, by such of their Subjects as are but private men, and consequently not by the generality of the People; yet, Si qui nunc sunt (saith he) populares Magistratus ad moderandam Regum libidinem constituti (quales olim erant qui Lacedomoniis Regibus oppositi erant Ephori; & quâ etiam fortè potestate (ut nunc res habent) funguntur in singulis Regnis tres Ordines, quum primarios conventus peragunt) adeò illos serocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto, ut si Regibus impotenter grassantibus, & humili Plebeculae insultantibus conniveant, corum dissimulationem nefariâ perfidiâ non carere affirmem; quia Populi libertatem, cujus se Tutores Dei ordinatione positos nôrunt, fraudulenter produnt.  
I have put down this passage of calvin's in his own words, which for the English Readers sake may be thus translated. If there be now (saith he) any such popular Magistrates constituted (I presume he meant legally constituted or appointed by Law) for the moderating or restraining the lust or unbridled appetites of Kings) such as were of old time the Ephori to the Lacedaemonian Kings; and which Power also (as things now are) perhaps the three Orders or Estates have in several Kingdoms when they meet in Parliament) I am so far from forbidding them (saith he) to interpose their Authority for restraining the raging licentiousness of Kings; that if they do but connive at them, when they impotently domineer and insult upon the poor Commonalty, I do affirm that connivance of theirs is a nefarious persidiousness, because they do fraudulently betray the People's Liberty, whereof they know they are made the Guardians by God's appointment.  
In which passage of Mr. calvin's (wherewith he concludes his Book of Institutions) I observe that he speaks not with that confidence and clearness as he useth to speak with, in declaring his judgement upon other occasions, nor as he doth in the Paragraph preceding this, in which he doth positively and resolutely condemn the resistance of Kings by their Subjects in any case or upon any provocation whatsoever; and for this he brings undeniable arguments and proofs out of Scripture, and answers clearly and solidly all objections to the contrary. But when he comes (with his deprivatis hominibus loquor, that is, I speak of private men) to tell us that by Subjects that are not to resist their Kings he means private Men only; what he gave with one hand he takes away with the other, by not only permitting and allowing, but by obliging and enjoining some that are Magistrates to restrain their Kings from oppressing or insulting (as he calls it) over their People, and to bind their Kings as it were to the good behaviour; which how it can be done, if Kings have no mind to be so bound, but by force, he doth not tell us; and how it can be done by force without the assistance of private men, he doth not tell us neither; nor consequently without making private Subjects to resist their King, which as he told us before was utterly unlawful in any Case whatsoever. So that he seems, as to this point, to speak very doubtfully and warily. For first he doth not say there are now any such Magistrates, that are to be Umpires, as it were, betwixt Kings and their 
His wariness in expressing himself.  Subjects, with Power to curb and restrain Kings from governing of their People otherwise than they ought to do; such as (saith he) were the Ephori in relation to the Lacedaemonian Kings: but he saith si qui nuno sunt (if there be any such Magistrates now, as the Ephori were then) and as fortè (saith he) perhaps he doth not say certé, for certain, or absque dubio without doubt, the Conventions of the three Estates are in those Kingdoms wherein are such Conventions, (meaning I presume the Kingdoms of England and France and others, if there be any other of the like Constitution) so that if such a Convention or Assembly of the three Estates have no such Power as the Ephori had (as Calvin doth not positively affirm they have, but that fortè or perhaps they may have, and consequently that forté and perhaps they may not have neither) then hath Calvin this to say for himself, that if such Conventions or 
The three Estates have no such Power, as he supposeth.  Assemblies have no such Power (as most certainly they have not, nor ever had where Kings were Kings indeed and not in name only, as the Spartan Kings were) he hath this (I say) to say for himself, that what he positively affirms afterwards, that such Magistrates or such Assemblies may and aught to do for the restraining and curbing of Kings, was only upon supposition that they were legally invested with the same Power over their respective Kings, as the Ephori were legally invested with over the Kings of Lacedaemon: which if it be not true (as he that saith but perhaps it is, doth thereby grant that perhaps it is not neither) then is not he chargeable with that which follows; namely, with this Opinion or Doctrine, that such popular Magistrates (as he calls them) or such representative Assemblies of the People might and ought to do what the Ephori did. And thus these two little Adverbs Fortè and Ferè, Perhaps and Almost do (as the Proverb saith) save 
Perhaps, a salvo for a Lye.  many a Lie, and are of great use to insinuate that unto others as true, which we are not sure of our selves; as also for the bringing men off from being answerable for what they so warily and doubtfully affirm, if they be questioned for it and undeniably convinced of the falsehood of it.  
And truly that Calvin himself did doubt, whether 
Calvin himself doubts, whether there be any such Magistrates, as he speaketh of.  there were any such Magistrates in any of those Kingdoms he seems to speak of, that had such Power and Authority in relation to their Kings as the Ephori had in relation to the Kings of Lacedaemon; I make no doubt at all: and that not only in regard of his Fortè, perhaps, which I have already spoke of; but also because he gives us not so much as one Instance of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that there are any such Magistrates, nor one argument for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it, that there should be any such, either from Reason or from Authority either Divine or Humane, that is, from either any Example or Precept of God's Law, or of any Humane Constitution in any Kingdom; though by saying (as he doth) that those Populares Magistratus are the Tutores, the Guardians or Defenders of the People's Liberty against the violence of Kings, Dei Ordinatione by the Ordinance of God, he seemeth 
No such Magistrates, by God's Ordinance.  to think that they are by Gods own appointment: which is very strange it should be so now, and was never so in the Kingdom of his own framing for his own People, for whom he professeth he had a greater kindness than for any other Nation; and therefore no doubt would have made such a provision for their security from being oppressed by their Kings, whom he foresaw would be such oppressors as many of them proved to be. But we see he did not. And therefore if there be any where such Magistratus Populares or Tutelares Populi, Guardians of the People, to protect the People against their Kings; I conclude that it is not an Ordinance of God but an Invention of man, and such an invention as is likely to embroil States and Kingdoms in a Civil War, 
The inconvenience and mischief of such Magistrates, if there were any such.  (which is the worst of Evils) rather than to preserve the public peace and quiet by keeping fair quarter or a good correspondence betwixt King and People. For quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? Who shall take care of the Keepers of our Liberties themselves? For who shall secure either King or People from these securers of the People from the King? May not they be as cruel, as covetous, as voluptuous, as selfseeking, and every way as careless of the public good as the worst of Kings? Nay, are they not more likely to be so? all of them having a divided Interest of their own from that of the Public, and each of them from that of one another. Whereas the King's Interest, (if he be a King indeed and not a titular King only) is one and the same with the Public, both in regard of himself and of his Posterity also, if his Kingdom be Hereditary; and consequently if he do that which is best for himself, he must needs do that which is best for his People also; so that supposing him to be Wise for himself there will be no danger of his doing any thing wittingly and willingly that will endanger the Peace and Prosperity of his People: because that which will endanger theirs will endanger his own also. But supposing the King, for the present, as bad as bad may be, yet he may mend, or if he do not, he is mortal, and his successor may be better; or if not, yet at the worst, it is more tolerable to have one ill Governor in chief than many, and the worst of Monarchies is better than the best of Oligarchyes; because it is easier to satisfy the lust, the cruelty, the avarice or any other inordinate appetite of one, than of many; especially of many that have no body to control them as the Ephori had not. And such it seems Calvin supposeth there are or aught to be in all Kingdoms: at least those that are his followers believe that to have been his meaning; namely, that though it be unlawful and damnable for private Subjects to resist the King or supreme Governor; yet it is not only lawful but laudable for such Magistrates as are supposed to be Guardians of the People's Liberties, redigere Reges in ordinem, to reduce their Kings, and that by force, (if it cannot be done otherwise) and to keep them within the bounds of Law and Equity according to their discretion.  
And no doubt they were the followers of Calvin, whom Grotius speaks of when he says, Inventi sunt 
This opinion of Calvin and his Followers taxed by Grotius.  nostro saeculo viri, eruditi quidem illi, sed temporibus & locis nimiùm servientes, qui sibi primùm (ita enim credo) deinde aliis persuaderent, ea quae jam dict a sunt locum habere in privatis, non etiam in magistratibus inferioribus, quibus jus esse putant resistendi injuriis ejus, cujus summum est imperium, imò & peccare eos ni id faciant: Quae opinio admittenda non est. There are men (saith he) in this age of ours (which was next to that of calvin's) learned indeed, but too much serving the times and places wherein they live, who having first been persuaded themselves, (for so I charitably believe) did afterwards persuade others that what I have before spoken of (meaning the unlawfulness of resisting of Sovereigns by their Subjects) is to be understood of private men, and not of inferior Magistrates also; whose Right they think it is to resist the injuries of him that hath the supreme Power; nay, that they sin if they do not. Which opinion, saith he, is not to be admitted; he might have said, is to be detested, as being such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such a root of bitterness, as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, when it springs up, will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, turn all up-side down, wheresoever it is admitted.  
But what was Grotius his reason, why this opinion 
Heb 12. 15. His reason for it.  was not to be admitted? Why because, saith he, though those Magistrates are in relation to their Inferiors public Officers, 
Nam Magistratus illi inferiorum quidem ratione habità sunt publicae personae, at superiores si considerentur privati sunt. Grotius de jure Belli & Pacis. l. 1. cap. 4. sect. 6.  yet in relation to their Superiors they are but private Persons, especially in relation to the Supreme; from whom all inferior Magistrates derive their Power. And yet they were such Magistrates who drove their Bishop out of Geneva, who was their Prince, their Sovereign Prince, as well as their Bishop, before Calvin came thither indeed, but I do not find that ever he blamed them for it.  
But doth not Grotius himself allow of the resisting of Kings by their Subjects in several Cases? Yes, 
Another passage of Grotius, wherein he allows resistance of Kings.  he doth so, but not without contradicting himself, and the Apostolical Doctrine and Practice in one of them, as I have already observed, and as to the rest I have spoken already also, excepting the last but one of them only. And that is, when the King hath but a part of the Sovereignty, and the People or the Senate hath a part of it also; for then (saith he) 
Si Rex habeat partem summi Imperii, partem alteram populus aut senatus; Regi in partem non suam involanti, vi justè opponi poterit quia catenus imperium non habet: quod locum habere censeo, etlamsi dictum sit belli potestatem penes Regem fore: id enim de Bello externo intelligendum est, cum alioqui quisquis Imperii summi partem habeat, non possit non habere eam partem tuendi potestatem, quod ubls fit potest Rex suam Imperii partem belli jure amittere. Grot. Ibid.  if the King invade that part which is not his, or which doth not belong to him, he may justly be resisted; because as to that his Power doth not extend: which (saith he) I do think may be truly affirmed though the Power of the Sword or of making War be said to be in the King; for that is to be understood in relation to a foreign War only. Whereas otherwise whosoever hath a part of the Sovereignty cannot but have a right to defend his part of the Sovereignty, whereby it may so happen that the King may by the Law of Arms lose that which was his own part of the Sovereignty.  
I have set down this passage of Grotius both in his own words and mine at the full length, because it is upon Grotius' supposition and resolution in this case, that Mr. Baxter grounds the justice of the Parliaments War against the King, and the injustice of 
This passage the ground of Mr. B's justifying the late War.  the Kings against the Parliament; and that with so great a confidence that he saith he is willing to forfeit his head if he be disproved in either. We will therefore, First, Examine whether there can be such a Case as Grotius supposeth or no; Secondly, If there be such a Case, Whether that be the case in England, as Mr. Baxter saith it is.   

CHAP. VII.  
The Case, which Grotius supposeth, not possible. The Sovereignty not to be divided. Instances in the Roman Empire. A King conditionally elected, no King indeed, but in Title only. In all the changes of the Roman State, no division of the Sovereignty.  
AND first as to the first of these Particulars (I mean the Supposition itself) namely the division of the Sovereignty or Supreme Power; the 
No such Case possible, as Grotius supposeth.  very possibility whereof, that there should be such a thing in any Body Politic whatsoever, seems to be a contradiction in terminis in downright terms, to what Grotius himself affirms to be an inseparable property of Sovereignty; namely, that it is quid per se indivisum, a thing of itself undivided, and by quid 
Sovereignty indivisible.  per se indivisum a thing of itself undivided, he must needs mean id quod suâ naturâ est indivisible, that which in its own nature is indivisible, or something that cannot be divided; because otherwise to say that Sovereignty or Supreme Power est quid per se indivisum, is a thing of itself undivided, should not distinguish it from any other subordinate Power which may be actu or per accidens indivisum, actually or by accident undivided, though potentiâ and per se potentially or of itself it may be divisible into never so many parts or particles. Now if Sovereignty be (as according to Grotius it is) per se indivisum quid, a thing of itself undivided, or suâ naturâ indivisibile, that which in its own nature is indivisible. I cannot see with what congruity of reason it can be said to be divided, as Grotius in the very same period saith it may be, siuè per parts potentiales sive subjectivas, either by its potential or its subjective parts. For as for that division of the Roman 
The division of the Roman Empire, no division of Sovereignty.  Empire per partes subjectivas, by its subjective parts; when the Eastern part of it was governed by one and the Western by another, and the Northern perhaps by a third, as it was by the three Sons of Constantine, there was indeed a division of the Empire and a fatal one it was, but there was no division of Sovereignty; for every one of the three was a Sovereign in his own part or portion of the Empire, just so as during the Heptarchy of the Saxon Kings 
Our English Heptarchy such.  here in England, the Island was divided into seven several Governments, but every one of the seven was a Monarchy and had a Sovereign of its own independent upon any of the other, so that there was then no more a division of Sovereignty than there was afterwards when Edgar became Monarch of the whole Island, or than there is now by the addition of the Kingdom of Scotland and Ireland to it.  
I know the Roman Emperors did sometimes assumere 
Partners in the Empire, upon what account.  sibi socios in imperio, take to themselves partners or companions in the Empire; but then the Sovereignty was either wholly and jointly in both of them, as it was in the two Consuls after the expulsion of the Kings, or as it is in the whole Venetian Senate at this day: or else he whom the Emperor assumed as his companion in the Empire was thereby designed only to be his Successor, as the King of the Romans is now in Germany, but continued a Subject and subordinate to him that assumed or adopted him, as long as he lived. So that in this case there was no division of the Sovereignty itself no more than in the former.  
And much less can there be said to be a division of 
The Case, when a King is conditionally elected.  the Sovereignty per parts potentiales by its potential parts (as Grotius saith they are called) when a People that is sui juris Regem eligens, quosdam actus (scilicet potentiae) sibi servet, alios autem Regi deferat, that is, when a free People in choosing themselves a King reserve some Acts of Power to themselves as well as they give others to their King; neque tamen id fit quotiescunque Rex promissis quibusdamque obligatur, but I would not have this (saith he) to be understood to be the case when Kings are obliged or oblige themselves by certain promises only; (mark that Mr. Baxter,) sed tunc id fieri intelligendum est, si quid Populus adhuc liber futuro Regi imperet per modum manentis Praecepti, aut si quid sit additum Regem cogi aut puniri posse. But this (saith he) that is, this division of Sovereignty, per parts potentiales by its potential parts or acts of Power, is to be understood when the People being as yet free enjoin their King that shall be (and that by a standing Law or Precept which they will have always to be continued in force) to do or not to do this or that; or if any thing be added to imply that the King may be or is to be compelled or punished if he do otherwise. Then or in this Case Grotius seems to think there is a division of the Sovereignty itself betwixt the King (so conditionally elected) and the People so magisterially electing him. And upon this not only false but (pace tanti viri dixerim, let me speak it by favour and with leave of so great a man as he was) in my opinion absurd supposition he adds, that in this case the People may not only defend by force their own part of the Sovereignty if the King invade it, but jure belli by right of War, take away his part also, if they overcome him in the Contest. Which perhaps may be true upon the supposition of such a division of the Sovereign Power, or rather (to say the truth) upon supposition of such a conditional Election made by the People of such a Magistrate as shall have the title of King and be entrusted with the managery of some part of the public affairs either of War or Peace, but so as to be accountable to the People or to some judicatory appointed by the People, whether he hath kept or exceeded the bounds and limits of his delegated Power and Authority or no, and if he have, to be liable not only to the forfeiture of it, but to be punished for it also.  
And what is this but to be such a King as those of 
A King thus Elected, a King in title only.  Sparta were? who as Grotius himself tells us were not Kings indeed, but in name and title only; because indeed (as he tells us also) they were subject to the People or to the Judicatory of the Ephori appointed by the People by whom, si peccarent Reges illi in leges ac Rempublicam non tantum vi repelli poterant, sed si opus sit puniri morte, quod Pausaniae Lacedemoniorum Regi contigit; and therefore (saith he) those Kings (and consequently, say I, all such Kings as those) if they offended against the Laws or against the Commonwealth they might not only be resisted by force, but if need were punished by death, as Pausanias one of their Kings was. And this he affirms to be the case of omnium Principum qui sub Populo sunt, of all Princes who are under the People; and if they be under the People, they cannot be over the People too, but the People must needs be over and above or superior unto them. And then how can Grotius rationally or consistingly with himself 
No division of the Sovereignty in this Case, as being wholly in the People.  say there is a division of the Sovereignty or of the supreme Power betwixt such a People and such Kings as these are? He might as well have said that the Sovereignty is divided betwixt the King and the General of his Army by Land or the Admiral of his Fleet by Sea or the Viceroy of any of his Provinces; for as the King reserves the whole Sovereignty or supreme Power unto himself, how great soever the Title or Power is which he delegates unto others: so in the aforesaid case put by Grotius the People retained the whole Sovereignty unto themselves, notwithstanding any Power or Title they are pleased to give to him whom they choose to be their King.  
And this Grotius knew well enough, as appears 
Grotius inconsistent with himself.  by the inconsistency of what he saith in this place with what he saith in others, and especially by the inconsistency of his supposing that to be actually divided which he had formerly affirmed to be per se indivisum or in its own nature indivisible, I mean Sovereignty or the supreme Power in every Body Politic, of what kind or denomination soever, whether it be in personâ in a single Person, or in Caetu in a Company or Assembly of men; for it cannot be partly in the one and partly in the other, nor ever was, no not in the Roman State itself which had many Changes Indeed but never any Division of the Sovereignty betwixt the governing and the governed 
An account of the changes in the Roman States in none of which ever any Division of the Sovereignty.  party in any one of them. For as, when the Kings governed, the Sovereignty was all of it in them; and none of it either in the Senate or in the People; so was it afterwards 〈…〉 Consul's, and after that in the Consuls and the Senate; then for a short time in the Decemviri, and in none besides them; and often when they were in very great danger and extremity the Sovereignty was wholly in one man only, whom though they did not call a King, yet never any King was more or perhaps so much a Sovereign as he was, or had the supreme Power in a higher or so high a degree as he had; and therefore he was emphatically called a Dictator, because ejus dictum erat pro lege; his word was a Law as well to the Senate as to the People, and as well to the People as to the Senate; and this Government, though by the first institution it was but to continue six months at a time, yet when Julius Caesar got it, he made it perpetual, and so became the first of the last sort of Governors in the Roman State who from him were called Caesares, and might have been called Dictatores also, as well as Caesares and Imperatores; for they had always the same Power which the Dictator's before Julius Caesar had but for a time only; of the last of whom before himself (who was Sylla) Caesar scoffingly was wont to say Scylla nescivit dictare, that Sylla did notknow how to dictate or act the Dictator, because he had laid down the Dictatorship when he might have kept it, and consequently of a Sovereign became a Subject.  
But as the Government by Dictator's in Rome before 
The changes of Government in that State, but three, properly speaking.  Caesar was but temporary and extraordinary; so was that of the Decemviri and the Triumvirs also; and therefore to speak properly there were but three Changes of the ordinary and standing Government in the Roman State, of which the first was Monarchical under the Kings into an Aristocratical under the Consuls and Senate; the second from Aristocratical into Democratical under the People and their Tribunes, and the third into Monarchical again under their Emperors. And as when the Government was Aristocratical, the whole Sovereignty was in the Senate, 
The Sovereignty not divided all the while.  and as likewise when the Government was Democratical, the whole Sovereignty was in the People; so likewise when the Government was Monarchical, as it was first under their Kings and at last under their Emperors, the whole Sovereignty was in those Kings and Emperors. For though there was a Senate when there were Emperors, as well as when there were Kings, yet those Senators were not Partners in the Sovereignty with either of them, but Subjects to them 
The Senate not Copartners in it with the Emperor, as Mr. B. would have it.  both; though Mr. Baxter will needs have the Senate as well as the Emperor of Rome to be understood by St. Paul, when he saith, Let every soul be Subject to the higher Powers; as if the Senate then were not any of those that were to be subject to the Emperor, but of those that were to be obeyed as well as the Emperor, as being Copartners with him in the Sovereignty. But perhaps Mr. Baxter had never heard of the Lex Regia, the Royal Law, whereby the whole Power of the Senate and People of Rome was transferred unto their Emperors; and so his ignorance of that particular might lead him into that error, though I believe he had something of design in it also; as namely from the supposition of such Co-partnership of Sovereignty in the Roman Senate with the Emperor of Rome, to infer the like Co-partnership of Sovereignty in the Parliament of England with our King; though very illogically, as shall be showed hereafter.   

CHAP. VIII.  
The Low-Country War against the King of Spain, justified by Grotius, upon another account; in that the whole Sovereignty, he saith, was in the States, and King Philip had usurped it. Sovereignty is wholly, wherever it is, like the Soul in the Body.  
IN the mean time I cannot choose but think that 
Grotius his design in his supposed Division of the Sovereignty, to justify the Netherlands war against the King of Spain.  Grotius had some design of his own to serve, when he supposeth there may be such a division of the Sovereignty betwixt such a Prince and such a People as he here speaks of; namely, when a free People in choosing one to be their King enjoin him by a standing and perpetual Law to be content with such a part or parcel of the Sovereignty, reserving to themselves the rest, which if he invades they may not only resist him by force, but, if they can, depose him also; which if Grotius can prove to have been the Case of the United Provinces when they took up Arms against the King of Spain, he thinks thereby to justify the War, which his Countrymen have for so many years together made and maintained against the aforesaid King; or at least to excuse himself and them, not having been Rebels against the King of Spain, because neither he was nor any of his Predecessors had been, their Sovereign, at least not their sole Sovereign; nor indeed (if what he says in his Book de Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae be true) not their Sovereign at all but their Subject rather. For the House of Spain (saith he) could have no more nor no other Right to the Sovereignty of the United 
A Book of his, wherein he states the Case.  Provinces and the rest of the Netherlands or Low-Countries, than they derived from the House of Burgundy, nor the House of Burgundy any more than what came to them by marrying with the Heirs of the several Princes of those respective Provinces, who could derive to their Husbands no more than was derived to them from their Parents; and that, as Grotius tells us in the aforesaid Book of his (which he Dedicates, Illustrissimis Hollandiae West-Frisiaeque Ordinibus, to the States of Holland and West-Friezland) was not the Sovereignty or supreme Power of any of those States and Provinces wherein they and their Husbands in their Right succeeded, because none of their Fathers nor Forefathers, from the very beginning of Government in those Countries, (particularly of Holland and West-Friezland) which he reckons to have been more than a thousand and seven hundred years before his writing of that Book, had ever any of them the Sovereignty or supreme Power. For although some of them were at first called Reges (saith he) that is Kings, and some of them Deuces or Dukes; yet had they no more Power than those who were afterwards called Gravii or Comites, Graves or Counts, and that was none of the Sovereignty or supreme Power, which was always penes Ordines, in the States, just so as now it is (saith Grotius) that is as it was at the very time when he writ that Book, which was in the time of Grave Maurice, or when Maurice Prince of Orange was Grave of Holland and West-Friezland and Zealand under the States of those Provinces, quarum summa Potestas, of which the Sovereignty or supreme Power, as it was then, so (saith Grotius) it had been always before in the 
He lodges the Sovereignty all along in the States, and makes K. Philip an Usurper os it.  States, until the House of Burgundy did first secretly begin to undermine, and Philip the II. of Spain did afterwards openly and violently and injuriously invade and usurp the Sovereignty itself of those Countries, being Heir to them indeed, but not as Sovereign, but as Grave or Count only, the Sovereignty being still in the States, as it always had been. And upon this Usurpation of the Sovereignty by 
Lib. de Antiquitate Reipub. Baravicae. cap. 7. page 49.  Philip of Spain (saith Grotius) it was that Holland and the rest of the United Provinces took Arms, and at length, cum Philippum nec preces nec monita ad saniorem mentem revocare poterant, when neither their entreaties nor admonitions could prevail with Philip to reduce him to a better mind, that is, to make him to be content with the same Power which his Predecessors (as Graves) had under the States: then (saith he) Foederatorum Populorum Ordines the States of the United Provinces, Pronunciarunt Philippum ob violatas Imperii leges ipso jure Principatu excidisse, did pronounce or declare that Philip for violating the Laws of the Government had legally forfeited his Right to the Principality or Graveship which he formerly had under the respective States of those Provinces.  
So that all that can be gathered out of this passage 
This, however it may perhaps, justify his Countrymen, doth not reach the Case in hand.  or indeed out of this whole Book of Grotius is but this, that he who invades the Sovereign Power whereunto he hath no Right, may not only be resisted by those that have the Sovereign Power; but may forfeit the Right, which he had before to any Office or Authority under them. Which though perhaps it may be enough to excuse the United Provinces from being Rebels against the King of Spain, and to justify the War they made against him; as likewise for their taking away the Hereditary Lands which he held of them and under them, (it being indeed as much and all that can be said to that purpose) yet by Grotius his favour it is not enough to justify what he saith in that before quoted place in his Book de jure Belli & Pacis (which was the occasion of this digression) namely, that either there may be such a division of the Sovereignty betwixt the King and Senate, or betwixt the King and the States of his Kingdom, as he there asserts; or that the States that are under the King may not only defend their part of the Power they derive from the King, against the King, but that the King may forfeit his part of the Sovereignty to Them by his invading of Theirs.  
For first in this Narrative of his for the justifying 
This further made out.  of the War made by the States of the United Provinces against the King of Spain, there is not a word of any division of the Sovereignty of any of those Provinces betwixt him and the States: but the Sovereignty or supreme Power is asserted to have always been and always is de jure, by right, in the States. Secondly, That by the Sovereignty or supreme Power he meant the whole Sovereignty or whole supreme Power, and not a part or the chief part of it only, it is evident; because he saith it was always the same that it was when he writ that Tract, 
The whole Sovereignty, he saith, was always in the States.  which was when Grave Maurice was their General, in whose Fathers time when the Confederate States began to make War against the Spaniards, Grotius tells us that ex eo tempore summa Ordinum Potestas, 
De Antiquitate Relpub. Batav. p. 52.  quam postremorum Principum licentia non parum obscuraverat, luci reddita palàm effulsit; from that time forward (saith he) the supreme Power or Sovereignty of the States, which by Licence taken by the later of their Princes (he means the Burgundians 
Ib. p. 49.  and the Spaniards) had been much obscured (he doth not say wholly extinguished) being restored to its former lustre did openly shine forth; especially after the Spaniard had treated with them as Sovereign and free Estates, and acknowledged them to be so, and that he claimed no right to them or authority over them: which though the facto he did, de jure according to Grotius he ought not to have done before, because though he was King of Spain, he was no more King of those Provinces, than their Deuces or first Generals were, who though they were then called Kings, yet nihil manifestius est (saith 
Their Kings but Titular.  Grotius) quam Reges illos fuisse vel Laconicos nomine solo, reverâ ipsâ nihil nisi optimatium primos; There is nothing more manifest (saith he) than that those Kings were just such Kings as those of the Lacedæmonians, that is, Kings in name only; but really and indeed no more than the chief of the Optimates or the Nobility; as he that was called Princeps Senatûs was in Rome, whilst it was an Aristocracy, or as the Duke of Venice or the Prince of Orange now is.  
So that if a People, who in choosing of a King (whom they may choose whether They will choose or no) reserve to themselves but a part of the Sovereignty, may justly resist their King if he invade that part which they have reserved to themselves, and in case they prove too hard for him take away that part of the Sovereignty from him, which they had before given him (as Grotius supposeth they may) than à fortiori, with much more reason, those that reserve the whole Sovereignty to themselves (as Grotius tells us the States did) may justly do what 
The States, according to Grotius, in their war with the King of Spain, did but recover what was their own before.  they can to maintain it, or to recover it from any that shall attempt to take it from them; especially from any one that is employed by them, and under them, how great soever his employment may be, or by what name or title soever they be dignified or distinguished from the rest of their ordinary Subjects: And this saith Grotius was the case betwixt the States of the United Provinces and the King of Spain as he stood related to those Provinces, when they first took up Arms against him to regain what was their own before, when it was usurped by him; and when afterwards to secure it for the future they took away from him that to which before he had by inheritance a just right and title to, I mean, the Prerogative of being their Grave or their chief Magistrate though not their Sovereign. And consequently the Premises (quorum penes sit Authorem fides, let our Author answer for that) being supposed to be 
upon these grounds, if true, that War no Rebellion.  true, that War of the Hollanders against the Spaniard upon that account could be no Rebellion.  
Be it so, Non equidem invideo, nec repugno, I for my part am not sorry for it, nor do I gainsay it; but rather I am glad there is so much to be said for any of the reformed Religion to justify their taking up Arms; and I wish there were as much to be said for the Protestants in France and for all other both Lutherans and Calvinists in all other places; namely that the Reformation in Religion had been made in every one of the several Countries and Cities by those that had the Sovereignty, as Grotius saith it was in the United Provinces, and as we are sure it was in England, and where we are sure the Sovereignty is all of it in the King, as it is in all Kings that are Kings indeed and not in title or name only; as all those Kings are, saith Grotius, qui subsunt Populo, who are under the People. From which one saying of Grotius I think we may conclude, that there neither is nor can be any division of the Sovereignty betwixt the King and the People, as he supposeth there may be; for in all Kingdoms whatsoever whether properly or improperly so called the King doth either subesse populo, is under the People, and then 
The Sovereignty of necessity either wholly in the People or wholly in the King.  the Sovereignty is wholly in the People, and none of it in the King, what Power or Authority soever is delegated unto him by the People; especially if it be delegated sub conditione & paenâ, conditionally and upon penalty of forfeiture or any other punishment: or else the Populus, that is, all or the whole body of the People doth subesse Regi, is under the King, and then the Sovereignty is wholly in the King, what privileges or immunities soever he may grant to all or any of his Subjects, or however he may oblige himself by promise or oath to govern them according to the Laws of his own or Predecessors making. So that the Sovereignty must either be Wholly in the People, and then he that is called a King, is indeed no King; or it must be Wholly in the King, and then the People have nothing to do with it, or with any part of it: Sovereignty 
Sovereignty or the supreme Power is that in the Body Politic, which the Soul is in the natural Body.  being such a thing in the Body Politic, as the Soul is in the Body Natural. For as the Soul animates or enlivens the whole Body Natural, not by being some of it, or some part of it, in one member, and some part of it in another, but by being (as the Philosopher saith it is) tota in toto & tota in quâlibet parie, by being all of it in all and in every one of the members, according to their several capacities of receiving the several influences and operations of it, in order to the preservation of the whole Body Natural: so Sovereignty or the supreme Power, wheresoever or in whomsoever it is, it is that which animates and enlivens and actuates the whole Body Politic, but not by being itself divided; but by dividing and deriving its influences into all and every part of the whole Body Politic, as the Sun doth its light by the dispersing of its beams or heat into and over the whole World and all the several parts of it, though itself in the mean time remains wholly and entirely in its own Orb.   

CHAP. IX.  
Grotius his Case hath no place in the English Monarchy, where the King is sole Sovereign. The Parliament never declared otherwise, (as Mr. B. saith they did) but owned him ever to be so in their Addresses. Sovereignty entitles to Majesty.  
BUT supposing (though not granting) there 
No such division of the Sovereignty in England.  may be and hath been somewhere or other such a division of the Sovereignty betwixt King and People as Grotius supposeth; yet it is certain there is none such here in England: for if ENGLAND be a Monarchy, than (saith Mr. Baxter himself) the whole Sovereignty must be but in One only, 
If England a Monarchy, as it is, the King sole Sovereign.  and if but in one I hope by that One he means the King and not the Pope, though some of his Parasites will have him to be the Monarch of the whole Christian World in general; and though he lays claim to the Monarchy of England in particular as held in Fee of him ever since King John surrendered the Sovereignty thereof to his Holiness. But Mr. Baxter, I am sure, is not so much a Papist, (though in some especially of their Political opinions he doth symbolise with them) as to acknowledge the Pope to be his Sovereign, for then neither he nor his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, those that are like-minded, could be (as they fain would be) every one a Pope in his own Parish; neither do I think he is yet so far gone in Fanaticism, as that by the King, whom he grants to be the sole Sovereign in a Monarchy, he meaneth no other King but King Jesus; as the fifth Monarchy-men do here in England, and the Presbyterian Whigs do in Scotland. No, I do willingly absolve Mr. Baxter from being guilty of either of these extravagant absurdities; but that which I charge Mr. Baxter with is this, that he denies England to be a Monarchy, 
Both which Mr. B. denies, though sworn by him at his Ordination.  and consequently that the whole Sovereignty thereof is in the King, though he himself hath sworn it is so, when he took the Oath of Supremacy as I am sure he did or ought to have done when he was Episcopally Ordained as he saith he was; but it seems he hath better studied the point since or is more enlightened than he was then: Or perhaps the Parliament had not then, or he had not heard they had declared 
The Parliaments pretended Declaration about it, inquired after.  this Government of ours to be no Monarchy but a mixed Government, because the Sovereignty was not in the King alone, but in the King and Parliament, that is partly in the King, and partly in themselves. But when and what these Parliaments were, or how and when and to whom they made such a Declaration he doth not vouchsafe to tell us, which is an uncivil neglect of his Readers if he can, and an impudent slandering of the King and both Houses of Parliament if he cannot; I say of the King and both Houses of Parliament, because it is the King and both Houses that constitutea Parliament, the King as the Head and the two Houses as the representative Body of the People: and he may as well and as properly call that Corpus integrum or a complete Body that hath no Head, as call either or both of the Houses a Parliament without the King. Now I 
No such Declaration to be heard of, from any Parliament.  would fain learn of Mr. Baxter, when any Parliament properly so called, that is, the King Lords and Commons did ever declare this Kingdom to be no Monarchy or that the Sovereignty or supreme Power was not wholly in the King? Nay, taking the two Houses without the King or a Commissioner for the King to be a Parliament, as after the King left them or rather after they had driven the King away from them, they falsely pretended themselves to be; taking, I say, the Parliament in this notion for the two Houses only without the King, did ever the two Houses declare the Government of England according to the legal constitution of it to be no Monarchy? or that the Sovereignty or supreme Power was not in the King? I confess I never heard they did so, I mean by any conjunct Declaration or by any concurring Vote of both Houses, no nor so much as by the single Vote of the House of Commons, which being but one and the lower of the two Houses, and who are always uncovered at their Conferences with 
The House of Commons, which with Mr. B. goes for the Parliament, how Representatives of the People.  the Lords, are very often by Mr. Baxter called the Parliament, because as he saith they are the Representatives or trusties of the People of England; whereas indeed they are the Representatives and trusties not of the People but of the Commons of England only, unless he will say that the Nobility and Clergy, or at least the Lords Spiritual and Temporal are none of the People of England; for surely they are not represented by the House of Commons. And therefore if Mr. Baxter were to speak of it in Latin I think he would not (I am sure he should not) call it by the name of Domus Populi, the House of the People, but Domus Plebis, the House of the Commonalty, or as I think the Lawyers call it by the name of Domus Communium, the House of Commons. I am sure Livy (who knew how to call things in Latin by their proper names as well as any man does now) tells us that in a contest betwixt a Consul and a Tribune, the Tribune bearing himself high upon the account of his Office; the Consul said, Scias te non Populi sed Plebis Romanae Magistratum esse, You must know, Sir, that you are an Officer, not of the People, but of the Commonalty of Rome.  
And yet this may be said in excuse of Mr. Baxter's mistake when he calls them the Representatives of the People, that he saith no more of them than the House of Commons, which he means, said of itself; for to the four first that Preached before them (of whom I myself was one) they gave each of them a piece of Plate with this Inscription, Donum Populi Anglicani, the Gift of the People of England, (by order of the House no doubt) engraven on it; which perhaps they meant not to be Grammatically but Prophetically understood, that is to be understood of them not as they were then, but what they meant to be before they left sitting, and as we saw they were after they had put down the Lords as well as the King, and made themselves the High and 
Of Representatives at last they made themselves Lords and Masters.  Mighty States of England and Ireland; and instead of Representatives and trusties made themselves Lords and Masters of those that trusted them; until He whom they had trusted with their Forces made himself Lord and Master of them also; the People in the mean time (the Freeborn People of England) having been made or rather having made themselves as arrant Slaves and Vassals, as ever any People were, unto them both.  
But to return to what I was speaking of; I do not find (I say) that any Parliament properly so called, that is the King Lords and Commons, or that both or either of the two Houses jointly or severally did ever declare or vote the Kingdom of England to be no Monarchy, or that the King of England was not the Sovereign and sole Sovereign of and in this and all other his Kingdoms and Dominions.  
On the contrary I find that in all the Addresses 
In their Addresses they always acknowledged the King their Sovereign.  made to the King as well by both Houses jointly as by either of them severally, from the beginning of the War to the end of it, they always acknowledged the King to be their Sovereign, and themselves (even in their public and Parliamentary capacity) to be his Subjects. And if in their Parliamentary notion and capacity they were his Subjects, I wonder in what notion or capacity they can be said to be Partners or partakers with him in the Sovereignty. 
If the two Houses (either or both) have a share in the Sovereignty, they would have a title to Majesty also.   
Besides he that will have either or both of the Houses to have a part of the Sovereignty must allow them a Title to Majesty also. For Majesty and Sovereignty are Termini Convertibiles, convertible terms, as the Houses themselves confess, when they treat the King sometimes with the title of Sovereign, and sometimes with the title of Majesty, as signifying by both these Words but one and the same thing, namely the Supremacy of Power in the King. Now I would fain know of Mr. Baxter, whether if he were to Petition the House of Lords or the House of Commons or both of them, he would address it to their Majesty the House of Lords, or to their Majesty the House of Commons, or to their Majesty the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament: if he did I believe he would be laughed at for his folly by them, and perhaps punished for his presumption by the King. And yet if the Sovereignty be divided betwixt Them and the King (as he saith it is) I see no reason why the title of Majesty may not be given to Them as well as to the King; or at least partly to them, and partly to him, though but proportionably to the division of the Sovereignty betwixt them; of which if the King's part be greater than that of the House of Lords, and that of the House of Lords be greater than that of the House of Commons (which I am afraid Mr. Baxter will hardly allow,) then if Majesty be the proper attribute of Sovereignty, and Excellent a proper Epithet to Majesty, than (according to Mr. Baxter's distinctness of notion and expression) the style of the House of Commons should be Their Excellent Majesty, and the style of the House of Lords Their More Excellent Majesty, as well as the King's style is His Most Excellent Majesty; and then there may be Treason against the House of Lords, or against the House of Commons as well as against the King, if laesa Majestas, the offending or injuring of Majesty be Treason; nay then we have three Sovereigns and not one only: for whosoever hath any share in the Sovereignty is a Sovereign; and then I wonder why we do not take an Oath of Allegiance to the two Houses, as well as to the King: nay, I wonder much more why they of both Houses do all of them take an Oath of Allegiance to the King, and cannot sit in either House till they do so. Surely one Sovereign doth not owe Allegiance to another, no not the least of Sovereigns to the greatest; for as all Sovereigns, the greatest as well as the least are equally under God, so the least as well as the greatest are equally under none but God, at lest quatenùs so far forth as they are Sovereigns, or in those things and places where and when they have a right to Sovereignty or to any part thereof.   

CHAP. X.  
The King declared by an Act of Parliament (enjoining the Oath of Supremacy) to be the only Supreme Governor. Mr. B 's sorry evasion of this Oath, and Queen Elizabeth's Declaration concerning it.  
BUT what need is there of making such Collections or Inferences from the Addresses made to the King from either or both Houses of Parliament with their full subscriptions thereunto, to prove that they acknowledge the King to be their Sovereign, their foal Sovereign, and themselves to be his Subjects, his humble and loyal Subjects, even in their Parliamentary capacity? for in that capacity it was that they addressed themselves to him. What need is there, I say, of insisting upon such more remote though very pregnant and concluding proofs, when several Parliaments properly so called, that is Parliaments consisting of the head the King, and all the integral members, that is, of the Lords Spiritual as well as Temporal together with the House of 
The King declared to be the only Supreme Governor, by an Act of Parliament.  Commons, have in positive and express words, and that not by a Vote, Order, or Ordinance, but by an Act declared the King not only to be the Supreme but the only Supreme Governor of this Realm and of all other his Highness' Dominions and Countries, and that as well in all Spiritual or Ecclesiastical things and causes as temporal. These, I say, are the very words of an Act of Parliament properly so called, that is of a full and free, of a complete and an entire Parliament, I mean the Act of Uniformity, 
To wit, by the Act of Uniformity.  wherein the Parliament doth not only declare its own sense and judgement concerning the King's sole Supremacy, but prescribes an Oath to be taken by all that are to be admitted to teach the People, what they are to think of the King; I mean all that are to be admitted into holy Orders, whereby they are enjoined to testify and declare in their Conscience that the King is the only Supreme Governor of this Realm; and I hope Mr. Baxter hath more reverence for Parliaments than to say or think that the Parliament did enjoin men to swear that which they did not themselves believe to be true, especially those of the House of Commons, who I think do all of them take the Oath of Supremacy.  
And yet this so clear, so evident and so irrefragable a proof of the Parliaments acknowledgement of the King's sole Supremacy, Mr. Baxter is pleased to slight as if it signified nothing, calling it a sandy 
H. C. 460.  foundation: for though he be pinched to the quick with this Argument, yet he makes as if he felt it not; and perceiving there was no help for him in Logic or Metaphysics, he makes use of a figure in Rhetoric, which is either not to take notice of 
Mr. B. slights what he cannot answer.  what they cannot answer, or if they cannot choose but take notice of it to slight or scoff at it, as if it were not worth the answering or taking notice of. And yet that he may not seem absque omni ratione insanire, to have no pretence or show of reason for his slighting or rejecting of it, he tells us that this Oath was made in relation to Papists only, and was enjoined to be taken for the discovery of those that were 
Ibid.  suspected to be so.  
Surely if we look to the first enacting of that 
The Oath of Supremacy not made against Papists only, as he saith.  Oath and the primary or original cause of it, it was not for the distinguishing of Papists from Protestants; for they were Papists in Henry the viii time, and as great Persecutors of the Protestants as any were in those times, that compiled and consented to the enacting and enjoining of that Oath; but it was to distinguish Papists from Papists, Papists that would from Papists that would not acknowledge the King's Supremacy.  
And for the same end and purpose, the same Oath 
The use, Q. Elizabeth made of that Oath.  was renewed in Queen ELIZABETH'S time in the beginning of her Reign for the distinguishing of loyal from disloyal Papists, as appears by the reasons she gave why She did not impose that Oath upon any of the Barons or House of Lords, though many of them were then Papists, because she did not (as she said) make any doubt of their loyalty, but she caused it to be administered to the Popish Prelates, and other ecclesiastics, who had almost all of them (plerisque omnibus saith Cambden) taken it in her Father's time, but refusing it then were deprived of their spiritual promotions for so doing, lest they might teach the People to do so also, and perhaps do more than so; that is from denying her Supremacy in Spirituals to proceed to the denying of it in Temporals also, which we see they are now come to, not by their Popish but Presbyterian Teachers.  
For preventing whereof and for obviating the 
She justified herself in it by a public Declaration.  scandalous interpretations that were made of it as that thereby she (the Queen) arrogated a Power unto herself sacrâ in Ecclesiâ celebrandi, of performing divine Offices in the Church, Illa edito scripto (saith Cambden) she published a Declaration, wherein she affirms se nihil aliud arrogare quam quod ad coronam Angliae jam olim jure spectavit, that she arrogated nothing to herself but what anciently belonged of right to the Crown of England. Scilicet se sub Deo 
Camd. Eliz. p. 39, 40.  summam & supremam gubernationem & potestatem in omnes Regni Anglici Ordines (sive illi sunt Ecclesiastici sive Laici) habere: quodque nulla extranea potestas, ullam in eos jurisdictionem vel authoritatem habeat aut habere debeat. Namely, that she under God had the supreme Government and Power over all orders of men in England whether ecclesiastics or Laics: and withal, that no foreign Power had or aught to have any Jurisdiction or Authority over any of them.  
From which Declaration published by that pious 
Three things observed from that Declaration of Hers.  and prudent Prince it is observable, First, That the aforesaid Oath of Supremacy was intended by Her, as well for the asserting of her own Supremacy over all Orders of men in her own Kingdom in all their capacities, as it was for the disclaiming and renouncing any foreign Jurisdiction, that was or could be pretended or claimed over all or any of her Subjects in any capacity whatsoever.  
Secondly, From this Declaration of Hers it is farther to be observed, that she will have her own Sovereignty and Supremacy in omnes Ordines Regni, over all Orders and Estates of men here at home, to be asserted and sworn to before they shall swear to disclaim and renounce all foreign Authority and Jurisdiction. And with very good reason; because it would have done her, and will do her Successors very little or rather no good at all, for their Subjects to renounce all Sovereignty from abroad, as long as they are taught or suffered to be taught that there are any other Sovereign or any other invested with any part of the Sovereignty here at home, but their Kings only.  
Lastly, From the aforesaid Declaration we may observe also that the Queen by the Injunction of the Oath of Supremacy professeth to claim nothing to be acknowledged or sworn to, but what the jure and jam olim, what anciently and of right did belong to the Crown of England; and consequently that the Supremacy or Sovereignty over all Estates or Orders of men in England was from all Antiquity, that is (as I conceive) from the beginning of Monarchy or ever since there were Kings in England, and that not ex dono Populi, by gift of the People or compact with the People, but jure by right; and by what Right? not jure Electionis but Hereditatis, not by right of Election but of Succession, and jure Coronae, by right of the Crown, as being inseparably annexed to the Crown, or rather inherent in the Crown; there being none (as I have already proved) that can properly be called a King or Crowned Head (whether by Succession or Election) but he must be the supreme and sole Sovereign, over all in his own Kingdom.  
Which as to our Kings here in England, as it was 
The Supremacy, the chief Prerogative of the Crown.  acknowledged by those Parliaments that enacted the Oath of Supremacy before the War; so is it by the Act of Uniformity since the War, or since the King's return, and consequently since the Crowns restauration to those Prerogatives, that are of right belonging to it; of which the Supremacy or Sovereignty over all in the Kingdom inclusively (as well as in relation to all without the Kingdom exclusively) is the chiefest. For if there be any either within or without the Kingdom either superior over him or equal to him, or partaker in any part of the Sovereignty with him, he cannot be said to be the only supreme Governor of this Realm, and of all other his Dominions and Countries, as by the Act of Uniformity those of the King's Subjects that are to teach all the rest of their fellow Subjects are obliged not only to say but swear he is: nor is it so much as to be imagined that the King Lords and Commons would have obliged any to take such an Oath, if they themselves had not believed the whole subject matter of it to be true.   

CHAP. XI.  
The Oath of Supremacy further explained. The Kings being declared the sole supreme Governor, cuts off all pretence at home as well as foreign claim.  
I say the whole subject matter of it, for there be evidently 
Two parts in the Oath of Supremacy; the one Assertory, the other Promissory.  two several distinct parts of that Oath, both of which every one of them that takes it is equally obliged to swear unto; of which the first is Assertory, and the second Promissory. In the former he that swears asserts the King's Sovereignty affirmatively, affirming him to have the sole supreme power over all 
In the Assertory part two Clauses, one Affirmative, the other Negative.  Persons, in all Causes, within his Realms and Dominions, and then negatively by denying any foreign Power or any without his Dominions to have any Jurisdiction over any of his Subjects or to have any thing to do within his Dominions. And it is in regard of the latter of these two clauses only, that this Oath can be said to be enacted and imposed for the discovery and conviction of Papists, and that not of all Papists 
The later Clause discovers Papists.  neither, but such Papists only as believe the Pope to have the supreme Power over all Christians in Spirituals at least, if not in Temporals, whose Subjects soever they may be in Temporals. But as to the former 
The former Clause asserts the Monarchy.  of these two Clauses in the Assertory part of this Oath which affirms the King to be sole Sovereign, or that he is the Only supreme Governor in this Realm, it seems principally, if not wholly to be intended to assert the Government of this Kingdom to be Monarchical and to make it be acknowledged to be so.  
For by swearing that the King is the only supreme 
What intended by swearing the King to be the only supreme Governor.  Governor of this Realm, etc. they do virtually and by necessary consequence swear also that all other Governors within the Realm, as they do severally and jointly derive their Power of governing from him, so they are jointly as well as severally subordinate unto him, and therefore none of them either severally or jointly coordinate with him. Because, if any of them or all of them in any capacity were so, or believed by the Parliament to be so, the Parliament by enjoining men to swear the King is the only supreme Governor of this Realm, must needs be chargeable with enjoining Perjury, or which is worse, with compelling others to swear that to be truth which they themselves do not believe to be so; which cannot be avoided but by concluding that the Injunction of the Oath of Supremacy by Parliament is a Declaration of Parliament, that this Kingdom is a Monarchy properly so called, because the Sovereignty or supreme Power is in one Person only, namely in the King; and if in him only then in him wholly also.  
And that this was the Parliaments meaning in 
The distinction, which the Rubric makes betwixt those two Clauses.  prescribing and enjoining that Oath of Supremacy, may farther and (if it be possible) more undeniably and demonstratively be made to appear, it is very observable that in the Rubric prefixed before the Administration of that Oath, (which Rubric is a part of the Act of Parliament as well as the Oath itself) it is said the Bishop shall cause The Oath of the King's Supremacy, And against the Power and Authority of all Foreign Potentates, etc. 
Vid. The form and manner of making of Deacons.  to be administered, etc. It is observable (I say) that in the aforesaid Rubric there is a clear and a very notable distinction made betwixt the two first Clauses of the Assertory part of the Oath, namely, betwixt the Clause affirming the King to be the only supreme Governor of this Realm, and the Clause denying any foreign Prince, Person, Prelate, or Potentate, to have any Jurisdiction, Power, Superiority or Authority Ecclesiastical or Spiritual within this Realm. The distinction (I say) by the Rubric made betwixt the two Clauses is very notable; for it is the first of them only that is called by the Rubric the Oath of the King's Supremacy; whereas the 
The first Clause is called the Oath.  latter is said to be against the Power and Authority of all Foreign Potentates, and therefore is more properly to be called an Abjuration than an Oath. And 
The second is rather an Abjuration.  yet it is this Abjuration only that Mr. Baxter will have to be meant by the Oath of Supremacy; whereas this abjuration is not the Oath of Supremacy itself, but a Deduction only from the Oath of Supremacy. For because the King is the only supreme Governor of this Realm, therefore neither Pope, nor any other foreign Prince, Prelate or Potentate can claim or pretend to any Supremacy or part of Supremacy here in this Kingdom. So that he that can truly swear the one may safely per modum sequelae, by way of consequence, swear the other also.  
But though the truth of the former doth necessarily infer the truth of the latter, yet the truth of 
The former Clause infers the later; the later not the former.  the latter doth not necessarily infer the truth of the former. For though it be never so true, and never so undoubtedly acknowledged to be so, that no Foreigner or none without the Realm of what quality or denomination soever, doth or can justly pretend to the supreme or any part of the supreme Power either Civil or Ecclesiastical here in England; yet supposing the supreme Power to be divided (as Grotius supposeth it may be in some Kingdoms, and Mr. Baxter saith it is here in this Kingdom) it will not follow I confess that the King is, or that the Parliament that made this Act and enjoined this Oath to be taken, did thereby acknowledge the King to be, the only supreme Governor of this Realm. But the Parliament by enjoining the Oath to be taken, and those that take it not only abjurare to abjure or for swear all foreign jurisdiction, but jurare to swear positively and plainly, That the King is the only supreme Governor of this Realm over all Persons in all Cases and Capacities, do evidently declare that They themselves believe and acknowledge the King to be so, and consequently whatsoever division there may be of the supreme Power in other Kingdoms yet in this there is none.  
For the first, the most immediate and most natural deduction from this Proposition, (viz.) The King is the only supreme Governor of this Realm, is the excluding all others in this Realm from having any thing to do with the supreme Government of it. And therefore the swearing to this Proposition alone is called by the Rubric the taking of the Oath of the King's Supremacy; the following abjuration of all foreign Authorities, being but a deduction and that not a primary but a secondary deduction from it.  
And therefore 'tis a vain and senseless shift of Mr. Baxter's for the avoiding of the dint of this 
The Kings being the only supreme Governor, excludes all pretence to the Supremacy from any other, as well at home as abroad.  Argument, which doth jugulum causae ferire, cut the very throat of his cause, to say as he doth, that the end of imposing and taking of this Oath was only for the excluding of all pretence to the Supremacy or to any part of the Supremacy here from abroad, and not for the acknowledging the King's sole Supremacy here at home. Whereas it is indeed the King's sole Supremacy here at home that is (as it is called by the Rubric) the Oath of the King's Supremacy, and not the excluding of all foreign claim or pretence to it; which to speak properly (as Mr. Baxter saith he loves to do) is as I said before an abjuration rather than an Oath, or at most but the negative and consequent part of the Oath; the affirmative and antecedent part thereof being the assertion of the whole supreme Power in the Government of this Kingdom to be in the King and King only, and consequently exclusive of any pretence to it, or to any participation of it by any either at home or abroad, especially by any at home. 
Why not an express abjuration of the Supremacies being in any at home, beside the King, as of its being in any abroad.   
But why then, will Mr. Baxter perhaps say, was there not annexed to the positive part of this Oath an abjuration or express disowning the supreme Power or any part of the supreme Power to be in any here at home, besides the King, as well as there is an abjuration or an express disowning of it to be in any abroad?  
I answer because there was no need at all of it, 
The 1 Reason.  First, because he that hath sworn the Supremacy or supreme Power to be in the King only, hath eo ipso in that very thing, or by so swearing forsworn the being of it, or any part of it, in any other besides the King.  
If it be replied, that upon this account there needed not have been any abjuration or disowning of any foreign Authority annexed to the other part of it neither.  
I answer, Secondly, That although really there 
The 2 Reason.  was no need of an express or explicit disowning or renouncing of the one more than the other, because the swearing to the positive part of the Oath is implicitly and virtually a disowning or renouncing of them both; yet because there had been anciently, and was then, and was like to be still, a claim to the Supremacy here in England (at 
There is a claim to the Supremacy from abroad, no such pretence at home.  least in matters Spiritual and Ecclesiastical) by some that were abroad, I mean by the Pope for himself and his Successors; therefore the Parliament thought it meet and prudent and in some respects necessary, to add or annex to the Assertion of the King's sole Supremacy here at home an express and explicit Renuntiation of all the Right that was or could be pretended to it from abroad, but did not think it to be at all necessary to add or annex the like express or explicit renuntiation of any such Power to be in any here at home: because there was none then here at home so impudent as openly and avowedly to pretend to it, or to any part of it. For here are no Ephori, no Overseers or Guardians of the State, as there were in Lacedaemon, nor no such Senate as there is in Venice, nor no such High and Mighty States as there are in Holland. For we have but One high and mighty, and he is so high and mighty that there is none but the Almighty that is above him, and all others in his own Dominions, how much higher and mightier they may seem to be in relation to one another, are equally below him and subject to him.   

CHAP. XII.  
From the two Houses Petitioning the King, and his being free to grant or deny, is proved that there is no Co-ordination; beside the inconsistence of it with the Government.  
I know there was in the beginning of the late Rebellious times a Discourse written and published 
A Pamphlet in the late times taxed, which makes the two Houses coordinate with the King.  to make the foolish part of the World believe, (for with wise and considering men I am sure it could have no weight) that the two Houses of Parliament were coordinate with the King, and consequently not Subordinate to the King in relation to the making and repealing of Laws, and the determining of all things of public concernment for the Government of the Kingdom; and consequently that according to the nature of Coordinates, where all three could not, or would not, or did not agree, the two that did agree were to overrule the third that did not.  
An excellent project or expedient, as the deviser 
The project of Co-ordination utterly inconsistent with our Government.  of it thought, to make a Triumvirate of a Monarchy, or a Republic of a Kingdom: but he did not consider that it was liable to one little inconvenience, namely that it was utterly and absolutely unpracticable, being altogether inconsistent with the fundamental Constitution of our Government; which is not to have the two Houses of Parliament always in being as the Senate of Rome was, and the Senate of Venice is, or to assemble and meet when and where they will and to continue as long together as they will, as (Grotius tells us) the Ordines or States of Holland of right did, even whilst They had a King. But our Parliaments here in England are so far from having always an actual, settled, and constant being, that they have no being at all, but what the King gives them by his Writ of Summons; neither can they assemble or meet but when he calls them, nor either depart sooner or continue longer together than he will have them; neither while they do (by his leave and command) continue together, have they any Power to make any new Law or to repeal any old Law, but only to pray, propose or advise the making of the one or the repealing of the other by the King.  
And this being so, (as undeniably it is so by the 
The constitution the same now as ever.  legal and fundamental Constitution of the Government) I wonder when and by what Authority it came to be altered. For supposing but not granting that a Parliament truly so called may make such a change in the fundamental Constitution of the Government, as to make an Aristocracy or a Democracy of a Monarchy, by the Monarches own consent to it, (which I for my part think they cannot, the Monarch himself in an Hereditary Monarchy being but a Trustee for his Successors) but supposing (I say) such a change could be made by a Parliament properly so called, I demand when and by what Parliament such a Change was made, and whether the King did ever consent to it? if not, we are still where we were, whatsoever Power a legal or complete Parliament may be said or imagined to have, and consequently there is not (as yet at least) any such Co-ordination of King Lords and Commons, as the Author of the aforesaid discourse pretended there is.  
It is true indeed, that the two Houses of Parliament 
The two Houses Petitioning the King a proof, that there is no Co-ordination.  in the year 42 did Petition the King, that he would be pleased to grant such things as they proposed unto him; but hence it will not follow that he was bound to do so, nay thence it will follow that neither he nor any of his Predecessors were bound to do so: for than they that were the boldest in their demands that ever met and sat in Parliament, would have claimed it as of right and not Petitioned for it as they did; at least, if they had vouchsafed to have Petitioned for it, they would have called their Petition a Petition of Right, which they did not. So that by very Petitioning the King to grant those things, which they proposed as agreed on by both Houses, they acknowledged that the King was not bound by any Law, Custom, or Precedent from his Predecessors to consent to what both Houses had agreed on, and consequently that there was no such Co-ordination betwixt the King, Lords and Commons, by the fundamental Constitution of this Kingdom, as by the aforesaid A●●hor was pretended to be.  
And therefo 〈…〉 in his answer to the Petition 
The King free to grant or deny, as he pleaseth.  of the 〈…〉 the 19 Propositions which they pretend humbly to desire (but indeed peremptorily press) him to grant, tells them, That to say he is obliged to pass all Laws that shall be offered unto him by both Houses, (howsoever his own Judgement and Conscience shall be unsatisfied with them) is to broach a new Doctrine, a point of Policy as proper for their present business, as destructive to all rights of Parliaments; adding that it was out of a strange shamelesness that they would forget (for sure there being so many Lawyers among them some of them could not choose but remember it) a Clause in a Law still in force made in the second year of King Henry the V. wherein both Houses of Parliament acknowledge that it is of the King's Regality to grant or deny such of their Petitions as pleaseth himself.  
And if it were so, and acknowledged by both Houses of Parliament to be so in Henry the V's time, I would fain know in what Kings Reign, or by what Kings consent that Act or the aforesaid Clause in that Act, which was in force so lately, comes to be repealed, or whether any Law or Act of Parliament can be either made or repealed without the King's consent.   

CHAP. XIII.  
An Ordinance of both Houses, no Law; and consequently no legal Authority for the late War against the King. The Militia or the Power of the Sword, acknowledged by the two Houses themselves to be in the King. A Sermon of Archbishop Ushers in the Isle of Wight Preached to the same Purpose.  
NOT a Law perhaps (may Mr. Baxter say) properly so called, but an Ordinance of both Houses may, and that without the King's consent to it, nay notwithstanding the Kings declaring and protesting against it, oblige all the People of England to do or not to do what the two Houses will have them, as much as any Law consented to by the King ever did or can do; nay, and may repeal any Law made by the King, by the advice and with the consent of both Houses, any Law or Custom to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding.  
But per quam Regulam, by what Rule, Mr. Baxter? By what Law of God or man can this be done? Why, by an Ordinance of both Houses, which is equivalent at least to an Act of Parliament properly so 
An Ordinance of both Houses, with Mr. B. equivalent to an Act of Parliament.  called; and so it had need to be, Mr. Baxter, and more too, to warrant the doing of such things; such horrible mischiefs and Villainies as have been done against God by Sacrilege, against the King by Rebellion, and by Subjects against their fellow Subjects by plundering, and imprisoning, and murdering one another, of which side soever they were; for all will be put to the account of them that had no authority, I mean no legal and just Authority, to warrant them to do what they did. And therefore Mr. Baxter, you were best be very sure that the two Houses had Authority to make such a War as they did, not only without Commission from the King, but against the King, and to engage you and by you to 
No legal Authority for the late War against the King.  engage so many thousands as you say they did in it. You were best I say be very sure of it; for it is not your head or your neck only which you say you are willing to hazard upon that account, but your soul itself, and the Everlasting Woe or Welfare of it, that lies at stake for it. Be not deceived, God is not to be mocked: It is not the Confederacy of the two Houses, it is not the Covenanting of the two Nations, that can justify either their commanding, or their being obeyed in any thing which God hath forbidden or not allowed them to command or to be obeyed in by some known Law of his own or of the Land; neither of which I am sure can be produced by them.  
Moreover it is not the redressing of Grievances 
Nor can any pretence justify it.  (had they been as many or more and as great or greater than the House of Commons in their virulent and malicious Remonstrance to the People represented them to be) nor the Reformation of Religion (though there had been much more need of it than there was) no nor the truly intending (as well as pretending) never so good, or never so necessary an End for the public Good either spiritual or temporal of the whole Nation, that can justify the Means they made use of, if they had not Authority to make use of them: I mean in their taking of the Sword out of the King's hands, where the Law of God and of the Land had placed it, and taking it into their own notwithstanding Gods and man's Law to the contrary.  
For the proof of the first part of which Assertion 
Mr. B. himself appealed to.  of mine I appeal to Mr. Baxter himself; for amongst his many false, and impious, and pernicious Aphorisms, he hath this true one, that it is not lawful for a Nation to fight for the preservation of their Religion, 
Holy Com. w. p. 441.  or their worldly goods and liberties, without just authority and licence: Whereunto he adds by way of exposition and illustration of his meaning, That it is but a delusory course of some in these times that write many Volumes to prove, that Subjects may not bear Arms against their Princes for Religion; as if those that were against them did think that Religion only as the end, yea, or Life or Liberty would justify Rebellion, or that the Efficient Authorising Cause were not necessary as well as the Final. Where bearing Arms against Princes is warrantable quoad fundamentum, as to the ground of it, this will warrant it quoad finem, as to the end of it. A good End must have a good Ground. Again, for proof of the latter part of my Assertion; namely, that the Sword or the Power of making War was by Law in the King's hand, and not in theirs, I appeal to the Acknowledgement of the two Houses 
The two Houses themselves acknowledged the power of the Sword to be in the King.  themselves, who after they had settled the Militia before the War was actually begun, yet knowing and being conscious to themselves that they had done it illegally and by usurpation of the King's Authority without any Commission or leave from him for the doing of it, they make it one of the 19 Propositions they sent to the King when he was at York in the year 42. That his Majesty would be pleased to rest satisfied with that course that the Lords and the House of Commons have appointed for the ordering of the Militia until the same shall be farther settled by a Bill: by which Proposition they do plainly confess, First, That they had taken the Sword, by having ordered 
Some Remarks upon that acknowledgement.  the Militia of the Kingdom. Secondly, That they had no Commission or leave from the King for it, by saying it was done by their own appointment. Thirdly, That they knew they had entrenched upon his Authority by so doing. Why else should they desire his Majesty would be pleased to rest satisfied with what they had done in that particular at lest pro tempore at the present, until the same (that is the ordering of the Militia) should be farther settled by Bill. Whereby, Fourthly, They confess that the Power of settling it, and consequently of making any use of it, was not in them as yet by Law, until by a Bill consented to by the King it were made a Law; and consequently that the Ordinances of both Houses as they called them, did not nor could not make any thing they ordered to be done, legal or obligatory to the whole Nation. And hence or from this consciousness 
The invalidity of their Ordinances made out.  of the insufficiency of their own Authority to justify either before God or the World the lawfulness of doing what they had done and meant to do, it was that they so earnestly and so often pressed the King to pass their Ordinances into Acts. For though they did what they could to make the poor deluded People believe that their Ordinances were as legal, as valid, and as obligatory as Acts, for the draining of their Purses and exposing of their Persons; yet by their being so desirous as they were, (even after their victory and when the King was their Prisoner) to legitimate their spurious Ordinances by turning them into Acts, it is evident they did not themselves believe what they and their Preachers made the People to believe concerning the validity of any of those Ordinances, especially that for taking up of Arms; as if the Power of the Sword and ordering of the Militia of the Kingdom to fight for whom and against whom they pleased, and upon what account they pleased, had been in them: which by what I have said it doth not only appear it was not, but that they knew it was not, but was and always had been in the Crown as the King tells them 
The King asserts the Militia.  in his answer to the aforesaid Proposition of the two Houses, telling them that he will no more part with 
Vid. the Kings Answer from York to the 19 Propositions.  his Right in the Militia than with his Crown; and indeed when he parts with the one, he doth in effect part with the other also: for as the Crown upon his head is the Emblem of his Sovereignty, so the Sword and the Sceptre, that are always when he appears as a King carried before him, are the Emblems of the two supporters of his Crown or of his Sovereignty; the Sword the Emblem of his supreme Military, and the Sceptre the Emblem of his supreme Civil or judiciary Power, and both of them signify that he is the fountain of all Power; and that there is no Power that can be legally exercised within any of his Realms and Dominions but what is derived from him and exercised immediately or mediately by him, and for him.  
And that this is true in Divinity as well as by the 
A remarkable passage in a Sermon of Archbishop Usher at the Treaty in the Isle of Wight.  Law of the Land in relation to our King, I will cite the Authority of a Casuist, whom Mr. Baxter seems to have a great reverence for and esteem of, though he were a Bishop and more than a Bishop; I mean Archbishop Usher, whose Reduction of Episcopacy Mr. Baxter seems to approve; though the Archbishop himself (as I have been informed) would not own it to be his. This Great and Good man (I say) preaching before the last King at the Treaty in the Isle of Wight, did in that Sermon of his positively and in plain terms more than once or twice affirm the King, our King, to be the fountain of Power under God within his own Dominions, and that therefore no Power could lawfully be assumed or made use of by any upon any pretence whatsoever, but as it was derived by Commission from the King. These were his very words, whereunto he added, This is true Doctrine, were the King a Papist, or a Pagan, and much more when he is (as our King is) a Christian King, an Orthodox Christian King; and that not in profession only, but in practice also. And then having somewhat enlarged himself in speaking of the King's personal Virtues and Graces both moral and spiritual. Now (said he) some that hear me may think I flatter him; indeed I do not, but I confess that what I have said of him, I have said to comfort him; for never any man of his quality had more need of it, both in regard of the unworthy usage he hath had, and the unworthy condition he is now in; which I hope, said he, will last no longer. For this (as he then added) is the 49th year of his Age, and at the end of the 49th year began the year of Jubilee among the Jews; and then every bondman was made free, and every Prisoner was set at liberty; and every one that had been kept out of possession was restored to it. And if (said he) We be not worse than Jews, it will be so with us now also. Haec audivimus magnum illum virum, non magis verè quam fortiter & animosè disserentem: these things we heard that Great man discoursing of, with no less courage and resolution than with truth. And I have repeated it so often upon several occasions both at home and abroad for his honour, that I verily believe these for the most part were the very same words, or very near the very same numerical words, as well as the identical sense of that passage of his Sermon, which I have repeated.  
And although I cannot produce many Witnesses to 
Sir Phil. Warwick a witness to that passage.  attest the truth of what I have here said as to this particular, there being but one besides myself (at least that I can remember) now living that heard that Sermon; yet that One is one of that credit and reputation with the generality of good men that he is multorum instar, as good as a great many, to make any thing he attests upon his own knowledge to be believed; and this was so notable a passage to be delivered at such a time, and in such a place, by One that was nominated not by the King, but by the Commissioners for the Parliament, to be sent for thither, that I am sure Sir Philip Warwick could not choose but take special notice of it (as I think every body did that heard it) and therefore I am sure he cannot forget it, or at least will remember it assoon as he is put in mind of it. And to him I appeal for the verifying of what I have said as to this particular. But if any man shall, notwithstanding Sir Philip 
An objection against its credibility answered.  Warwick's attestation, think it to be incredible, that the two Houses of Parliament, being then in their Zenith, should endure any such thing to be said so much to their reproach and condemnation of their cause and of all their proceedings without any animadversion upon him that said it; I answer, it was partly because they were then in their Zenith, so high advanced and so highly elevated with the success God had (for our sins and for their obduration) permitted them to have, that they despised what any man did or could say against them; and partly because they could not have taken notice of it without inflicting some punishment or other upon him for it: which they could not have done (he being a man of such eminency not only in regard of his quality, but much more in regard of his learning and sanctity, and in regard of the very great reputation he had thereby acquired both at home and abroad) without exposing themselves to the envy and hatred of the whole World, and without doing themselves any good by it; and therefore all things considered, they thought it best to take no notice at all of it, as for aught I ever heard they did not.  
Howsoever what I affirm that pious and learned Archbishop said (whether he said it or no) is true; namely, that the Power of the Sword or the Power of making War, though for their own defence only, or for never so good an end, was not in the two 
The Parliaments own acknowledgement further made out.  Houses, but in the King, and in the King only, as they did themselves acknowledge; because at that very time, and at that very Treaty, one of the prime Articles which they mainly insisted on, was to have the Sword for so many years to be put into their hands by the Kings passing of an Act of Parliament to that purpose, and for their raising of money, during that time for the support and exercise of that Power in what proportion they thought or should think fit, upon their Fellow-Subjects; all which they had done before by virtue of their Ordinances only: which either they did or did not think to be a legal and sufficient Authority for their taking of the Sword, and using it as they did; If they did think so, why might not the same authority have been sufficient for the continuance of it? and if so, what need was there of an Act for the trusting them with it but for a time only? But if they did not think their own Ordinances to be a legal and sufficient Authority for their taking of the Sword, and taxing of the People; and the exercising all those other Acts of Arbitrary Power which they did for so many years together, by virtue of their own Ordinances only; why then habemus confitentes reos, We have their own confession, not only that they took the Sword, which neither the Law nor the King had put into their hands, and therefore were Usurpers of the Regal Authority: but had made use of it against the King, or, which is all one, against those that were commissioned by the King, and therefore were Traitors and Rebels; as likewise that their own Ordinances were not legally sufficient to justify their so doing, and consequently that they have not such a Legislative Power as Mr. Baxter saith they have, and which he is so confident of, as that he offers his head to the Block, if the reasons he gives for the proof of it be disproved; which I am now in the last place to try whether I can do or not.   
The end of the third Section.   

SECT. IV.  
England a Monarchy, and the Sovereignty solely in the KING, proved against Mr. Baxter; as also that neither the Parliaments concurrence (as the People's Representatives) to the making Laws, nor their being trusties for the People's Rights, gives them any share in the Sovereignty.  

CHAP. I.  
The mischief of Schismatical Books. Mr. Baxter 's Anti-episcopal and Anti-monarchical Aphorisms. The Sovereignty not divided (as Mr. B. saith) betwixt KING and Parliament. Proved by the Parliaments acknowledgements, and by the Oath of Supremacy.  
AND first thanks be to God and the King, that Mr. Baxter is not Lugdunensem causam dicturus ad aram, that he is not to plead his cause at the Kings-Bench Barr. For God knows that all the hurt I wish him is, that no more hurt may be done by Him; and for this end, and for this end only it was, that I silenced him from preaching; and for this end, and for this end only it is, that I would have him prohibited from writing, or at least from publishing what he writes, until he is licenced by Authority to do so. For when he hath published such pernicious Principles 
T●e mischievousness of some of Mr. B. 's writings.  against the legal constitution of the Church and State, as he hath done in divers of his Books, especially in that of the Holy Commonwealth, it is too late and to very little purpose to say as he doth say of some of them, that he would have them taken pro non scriptis, as if they had not been written. For, 
Serò medicina paratur,  
cum mala per long as invaluêre moras.  that is, Physic comes too late, when ill humours through long delays have got too great a head.  
An Arch-Heretick may by God's mercy be himself 
Heresy and Schism propagated by Books, though the Authors themselves repent their errors.  reconciled to the Truth, and become Orthodox, and an Arch-Schismatick may by the same mercy be reconciled to the Church, and become Conformable; and yet that Heresy that was broached by the one, and that Schism that was introduced by the other, may be propagated and perpetuated by their Books and by their Disciples from Generation to Generation to the World's end: and if Master Baxter will needs have a secondary Original sin, I think this is that which may most properly be so called.  
Our Countryman Brown (who would needs have our Church of England to be no Church) 
An Instance of Brown the Father of the Brownists.  was himself convinced of this error, so that he not only became a Member, but a Minister of the Church of England, and (as I have been informed) died Parson of a Parish called A-Church in Northamptonshire. But did Brownism die with him? No; there are Brownists still, and will be, God knows how long, perhaps till Dooms day put an end to the World, and all the Divisions that have been, are, or shall be in it. So that as nothing can be more criminal than to be the Author of a Schism, Sect or Heresy; so nothing can be more dangerous than to suffer the spreading and growth of them, especially of such of them as are destructive in their natural tendency (whatsoever the intention of the Authors and Abettors may be) to the peace and welfare of the established Government either in Church or State.  
And such, say I, are Mr. Baxter's Anti-episcopal 
Mr. Baxter the Founder of the Baxterian Sect.  Aphorisms in relation to the Church, and such are his Anti-monarchical Aphorisms in relation to the State; which will be Thorns in the sides of both Church and State, to trouble and molest them, if they be not Engines to undermine or overthrow them, as long as there be Baxterians in the World, as there will be no doubt, long after Mr. Baxter is dead; and though he himself before he dies, do truly and heartily (as I do truly and heartily wish he may, if he have not done it yet) repent of having been the Author of some, and Abetter of all of them.  
As for his Anti-episcopal Aphorisms, and all other 
His Anti-episcopal Aphorisms passed by.  his Heterodoxies relating to the established Government & Discipline of the Church, they have been so thoroughly canvassed, and so thoroughly confuted by so many, much more learned Pens than mine, that as I have said already in my Preface, so I say again, I mean not to meddle with any of them. But as for his Anti-monarchical Aphorisms, because 
His Anti-monarchical Aphorisms justly excepted against.  he saith I am a defier of Deity and Humanity, for taking exceptions against them, and for my justifying the rights of Kings against the grounds he lays for justifying the resisting of Kings by their Subjects, and particularly of the late horrid Rebellion of the worst of Subjects against the best of Kings, the most groundless in its causes, and the most unchristian and the most inhuman in its effects, that ever was in this or perhaps in any other Kingdom: I thought myself concerned to enlarge myself in saying of what I have said to justify my exceptions against those Aphorisms; some of which I have before printed and now reprinted, and could have printed many more, and some of them as bad as the worst of those, and as destructive of the established Government in all Bodies Politic, especially to that of this in our Kingdom, which is and hath been always taken for a Kingdom, properly so called, that is, for a Monarchy, or for such a State or Body Politic, wherein the Sovereignty or Supremacy of power is in One only.  
Mr. Baxter, in order to justifying of the late 
The Sovereignty, he saith, divided betwixt King and Parliament, and his Reasons to prove it.  Rebellion, tells us, it is no Monarchy, because the Sovereignty is not in one only, namely not in the King alone, but divided betwixt the King and the two Houses of Parliament; which he endeavours to prove,  
First, by the Testimony of both Parties principally concerned in it; namely, the Parliaments affirming, and the King's owning and acknowledging of it.  
And (2dly) by Reason or by Arguments drawn from the Constitution and Practice of the Government itself.  
As to the King's own Acknowledgement, that there is such a division of the Sovereignty betwixt 
Of his first Proof.  Him and the Lords and Commons, I shall speak of it hereafter. And as to the Parliaments affirming of it (which he only saith they do and have done without naming any time when, or what Parliaments they were that did so) I have answered at large already, and that not only negatively by denying that any Parliament properly so called, that is, consisting of King, Lords and Commons, did ever affirm or can in reason be supposed ever to have affirmed any such thing; but positively also, that all Parliaments even those that are improperly so called, I mean the Body without the Head, or as the two Houses only are called the Parliament, even in this notion I say the Parliament hath 
The Parliament hath always acknowledged the King their Sovereign.  always in all Addresses that have been made to the King by either of the Houses severally, or by both Houses jointly, acknowledged the King to be their Sovereign, and themselves to be his humble and loyal Subjects; and that when they Address themselves to Him not as so many several single Persons, or every one in his Personal capacity, but as in their representative or Parliamentary capacity, as they were one or both of the two Houses; and how they be Sovereigns and Subjects, or partly Sovereigns and partly Subjects in one and the same notion, or under one and the same capacity, is too subtle and airy a speculation for me to comprehend. But that which I did then and do now principally insist upon for proof of the Parliaments acknowledgements of the King's Sovereignty, or that the Sovereignty here in this Kingdom is in the King alone, and not in the King, Lords and Commons jointly, as Mr. Baxter would have it, is the Oath of Supremacy, 
The Oath of Supremacy proves it.  whereby in as positive and as plain words as can be devised, several Parliaments (properly so called) have declared and caused it to be sworn that the King is the only Supreme Governor of this Realm and of all other his Highness' Dominions and Countries, as well in all Spiritual and Ecclesiastical things and causes as Temporal. Which I repeat again, because (which I did not observe before) the Parliament by enjoining Men to swear that the King is the only Supreme Governor in Spirituals as well as Temporals, seems to suppose or to take it for granted, that there were none that pretended to be the King's Subjects, but would willingly and readily acknowledge the King to be the only Supreme Governor in Temporals, and consequently that there is no division of the Sovereignty betwixt the King and the Parliament, or betwixt the King, Lords and Commons. For it is the Sovereignty in Temporals only that Mr. Baxter would have to be so divided; for as to the Sovereignty in Ecclesiastical things or causes, I believe if Mr. Baxter would tell us what lies at the bottom of his heart, we should find that he thinks neither King nor Parliament have any thing to do with it; and consequently that there can be no division of that betwixt them. But of this we shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.  
Now therefore having postponed the consideration of what Mr. Baxter infers for proof of his pretended Division of the Sovereignty betwixt the King and Parliament from the Kings own concessions; I proceed to the examination of the Reasons he gives to prove this Kingdom to be no Monarchy, or that the Sovereignty thereof is not 
His second Proof from the Legislative power.  in one only. Which reasons of his are all of them reducible to this one of the Legislative power, or the power of making and repealing Laws for the whole Nation, which (as he saith) is not only a part but a principal part of the Sovereignty; and therefore if this be not in the King alone, but divided between the King and Parliament, as Mr. Baxter saith it is, the Sovereignty cannot be in the King alone, but must be divided betwixt the King and Parliament.   

CHAP. II.  
What is meant by the word Parliament. The two Houses being called together and dismissed at the King's pleasure, are not coordinate or sharers with him in the Sovereignty.  
NOW this being the sum and substance of all Mr. Baxter hath said to prove the War made by the Parliament against the King was a just War and no Rebellion, and whereon he so confidently relies, that he is ready, he saith, to offer his Head to Justice if it can be solidly confuted, either as to the Truth of it, or as to the Inference he makes from it; we will therefore examine,  
First, whether the Hypothesis, namely that the Legislative Power is divided betwixt the King and the Parliament, be true or no.  
And 2dly, supposing, not granting it to be so; whether he doth rightly infer from thence, that therefore the War made by the Parliament against the King was a just War and no Rebellion.  
First then as to the Hypothesis itself, so far as 
The Legislative power solely in the King.  it supposeth the Legislative Power to be a part and principal part of the Sovereignty, I grant it to be true; but as it supposeth the Legislative power to be partly in the King and partly in the Parliament, so as that the Laws are made by the Parliament as well as by the King, I affirm it to be false.  
For proving of which Assertion of mine, and consequently for disproving the contrary Assertion of Mr. Baxters,  
We are first to agree what is meant by the word Parliament.  
2dly, How that which is meant by the word Parliament comes to be a Parliament, or whence it hath its being what it is, and its meeting when it does meet, and its continuance after they are met:  
3dly, What they do or legally can do in order to Law-making whilst they sit.  
First then as to what is meant by the word 
By Parliament is meant, not King, Lords & Commons;  Parliament in this Hypothesis, it cannot be the King, Lords and Commons, because the Legislative power which is supposed to be divided betwixt the King and the Parliament cannot be supposed to be divided betwixt the King and the King, as it must be if it be divided betwixt the King and the Parliament, as the Parliament signifies the King, Lords and Commons; and therefore by the word Parliament here must needs be meant the Lords and Commons 
but Lords and Commons, that is, the two Houses.  only, or the two Houses, as they make up that Body whereof the King is the Head. And in this sense the word Parliament is always taken, when the King and Parliament are spoken of together, as distinct from one another; as when the King is said to call, or prorogue, or dissolve the Parliament, or the Parliament to make Addresses, or to grant Subsidies to the King. And in this sense I think Mr. Baxter would be thought to understand the word Parliament, when he saith the Legislative power is divided betwixt the King and Parliament, that is, betwixt the King and the two Houses of Parliament. Though there be many passages in this Book of his Holy Commonwealth, 
Mr. B. by Parliament often understands the House of Commons,  where speaking of the Parliament, he must needs mean the House of Commons exclusively to the House of Lords; as when he tells us the Parliament is to be believed by the People, because they are the People's Representatives and trusties, where by Parliament must needs be meant the House of Commons only, they and not the House of Lords being the Representatives and the trusties of the Commons. And so again when he saith the King is obliged to pass such Laws quas Vulgus elegerit, which the People or Commonalty shall make choice of; he must needs mean that the King must needs pass such Laws as the House of Commons will have him to pass; so that the whole Legislative power is to be in the House of 
and in effect lodges the whole Legislative power in them.  Commons alone exclusively to the Lords as well as to the King, and to the King as well as to the Lords; the King being only to declare that to be Law, which the House of Commons without the concurrence of the Lords had voted to be so; and this we saw and felt it come to at last; and that it may not come to it again (for it seems to be furiously driving that way) it concerns the Lords as well as the King to consider.  
But I will not in this debate take advantage of this notion of a Parliament, I mean as it is often taken by Mr. Baxter for the House of Commons only; but I will consider it, as it is taken for both Houses, and that not only severally but as in conjunction with one another.  
And as thus considered, the next Inquiry is, how they come to be so, or whence they have 
How the two Houses come to be a Parliament.  their Parliamentary existence and continuance, I mean their being and continuing to be two Houses of Parliament; and consequently whence they have the power of doing what they do, or legally can do, whilst they are two Houses.  
If the Lords Temporal say they are of the Lords House by their Birthrights, because they are Lords; and the Lords Spiritual say they are of the House of Lords, because they are Representatives of the Clergy, or because they are Bishops: I answer it is true indeed they are so, or have a right to be so, when there is a House of Lords, because they are constituting parts or members of it; but neither of them can be actually and existingly of the House of Lords, before there is a House of Lords, and there is not, nor cannot be actually a House of Lords, or any existence of such an House, until the King summons both the 
The Lords summoned by the King.  Lords Temporal and the Lords Spiritual to come and meet together at such a time, in such a place; and when upon such a summons, or by virtue of the King's command, they do come and meet together at such a time, in such a place appointed, and then and not till then they are a House of Lords. The like may be said as to the House of Commons. For if the Knights and Burgesses shall say when they are met, that they are the House of Commons, because they are chosen 
The Commons chosen by the People, with the King's leave.  by the People to be their Representatives; 'tis true they are so; but who gave the People leave or power to choose them to be their Representatives, or to be that Body which we call the House of Commons? Was it not the King? could the People have done it without the King's Authority enabling them to do it, or could they refuse to do it when he commanded them to do it? If not; then though the choice of those that are to be of the House of Commons be from the People, yet the People's power to choose them being from the King, it is that which makes them after they are chosen to be the House of Commons when they meet together; which must be when and where the King pleaseth: So that after they be chosen by the People to be the House of Commons, or to be the representative body of the People; yet are they not the House of Commons, nor the representative body of the People, till they meet at the time and in the place by the King appointed, at least so many of them as are agreed on to be sufficient to make them act as a House, or in their representative capacity. The like in proportion may be said of the House of Lords also. So that both Houses of Parliament 
The King gives the Parliament its being and continuance, as he pleaseth.  (as such) have no existence or being at all until the King gives it them by calling them together, nor continuance in being any longer than he pleaseth to continue them. For as when he saith unto them, Come, they must come; so when he saith unto them, Go, they must go, according to the legal and established Constitution of our Government.  
Which being so, I wonder how the two Houses 
The two Houses therefore, not coordinate, nor sharers in the Sovereignty, with the King.  can be said to be coordinate with the King, or how the Sovereignty can be said to be divided betwixt the King and the two Houses, when neither of them are Houses till he makes them to be so, nor continue to be Houses any longer than he will have them to do so. Indeed if the two Houses of Parliament were Bodies that were always in being as the Senate of Rome was, and as the Senates of Venice and Genoa now are; or such as might assemble and meet together, when and as often as they pleased, and continue together as long as they pleased, as the States of Holland may and do now; and as Grotius tells us they might 
Vid. Grotium de Antiquitate Reipub. Batavicae.  and did even then, when they had Kings, such he means as were called Kings, but were no more Kings indeed than those of Sparta were, as Grotius himself tells us in the same place; if I say our two Houses of Parliament were such a Senate as were always in being, or might be so when they pleased, and continue so as long as they pleased, there might perhaps be some pretence for their having some part in the Sovereignty. But when they have no being at all till the King gives it them by calling them together, and are reducible to what they were before, that is, to no being again, whensoever he pleaseth to dismiss them; I cannot imagine in what sense the two Houses of Parliament can be said, either to be coordinate with the King, or to have any share in the Sovereignty or Kingly power. I am sure that according to the established constitution of our Government, as they have not yet, so it is and always will be in the King's power to prevent their Usurpation of any such power, (as long I mean as he keeps the power of calling and dismissing, that is, of making and unmaking them in his own hands) and confequently of acting any thing in their Parliamentary capacity to the prejudice of the Crown or of the People: I say to the prejudice of the Crown, or of the People; because 
What hurts the Crown, hurts the People.  what is really prejudicial to the Crown, is really prejudicial to the People also; howsoever or by whomsoever the People may be and are often made to believe otherwise, and are not to be convinced of their error but by their feeling only.   

CHAP. III.  
The Legislative power solely in the King. How far the Parliament concerned in making Laws. Dr. Sanderson 's judgement of it. Mr. B. ascribes the whole Sovereignty to the Usurpers, upon the King's loss of his Part, against a Thests of his own.  
BUT although it be the King's Summons of them or calling of them together that makes them to be the two Houses, and consequently that enables them to act as the two Houses, or in their Parliamentary capacity; and although they cease to be two Houses, or to have any power to act in a Parliamentary capacity, when the King pleaseth to dismiss them: yet because Mr. Baxter may say, that as long as they are two Houses, or as long as the King permits them to sit together in their Parliamentary capacity, they have a Legislative power or right of 
The Legislative power a branch of Sovereignty.  making Laws together with the King for the whole Kingdom, and consequently are partakers of the Sovereignty with the King also, the making of Laws for the whole Nation being undoubtedly one of the Essentials of the Sovereignty or supreme power. We are therefore in the 
How far the two Houses concerned in that.  3d. place to inquire, what the two Houses do or legally can do as to the making of our Laws, and whether that be enough to entitle them to be properly called Legislators, or if I may so speak Collegislators with the King.  
All that ever I heard that either of the two Houses severally, or both of them jointly could legally do in order to Law-making, is but the framing and proposing or offering unto the King such Bills or materials as they think fit to be made Laws by the King, if he think them fit to 
They only propose Bills.  be made Laws also. Here is the two Houses Non-ultra, hitherto they may go but no further: And sure it is not the proposing of any thing to be made a Law, that is the making of a Law, or that can prove the Proposers to be the Lawmakers; especially if he to whom they propose it may choose whether he will make it a Law or no; as there was never any doubt made but he might before the rebellious Parliament in the late King's time broached the contrary, together with many other Anti-monarchical Paradoxes, to justify their own Anti-monarchical and rebellious Practices, against the known Laws, Customs and Constitutions of this Kingdom; of which this was one of the most essential, that as the Houses had a liberty to pass and propose Bills to the King; so the King might as he saw cause or thought fit, make or not make them to be or not to be Laws, 
The Royal Assent makes them Laws.  by giving or not giving his Royal assent unto them. For it is the King's Fiat or the stamp of Royal Authority upon them that makes those Bills to become Laws, obliging all the King's Subjects to the obedience of them, or for nonobedience to the Penalties appointed by them; So that the Bills are but the materia ex quâ, the matter out of which Laws may be made; but the forma per quam, the formalis ratio, or intrinsical and specifical form, by which what were before Bills, become Laws, is the obliging power 
by giving them an obliging power.  which the King by his Fiat breathes into them, as God doth the Soul into the Body, to make it a living and a rational Creature. And therefore Mr. Baxter, who (being so Metaphysical a man as he is) as he must needs know that it is forma or causa formalis, the form or formal cause, per quam res est quod est, which makes every thing to be what it is; must needs know too, and (if he have any ingenuity) confess likewise that from whence and whence only the Laws have their obliging power (which is formalis ratio Legis, that which makes Law to be Law) from thence and thence only those Laws must have their being also; and consequently if it be the King's Fiat 
The King alone our Lawmaker.  only that gives those Bills, that are by the two Houses presented to him, an obliging power over the whole Nation, thereby making them of Bills to become Laws, the King and none but the King must needs be the sole efficient or maker of those Laws. For as Forma est causa per quam res est quod est, so Efficiens est causa à quâ res est quod est, As the Form is the cause by which the thing is what it is; so the Efficient is the cause from which the thing is what it is; by introducing that form, which makes it to be what it is. If therefore the Law hath its obliging power (which is its form, or that which makes it to be Law) from the King and the King only, the King and the King only must needs be the efficient and sole efficient cause of Law, and consequently the whole Legislative power must needs be in him only: unless Mr. Baxter can prove that the two Houses of Parliament can of themselves, and by their own Authority only, make their Bills to be Laws, or at least that they join with the King in making them to be so. For if it be the Kings own arbitrary consent only which makes that to be a Law which was no Law before he consented to it, then must it needs be confessed that the King is the sole efficient of all Law, and consequently the only Lawgiver in his own Kingdom, according to the determination of the very learned, judicious and truly pious, and conscientious Casuist Doctor Sanderson Bishop of Lincoln, who in his Lecture 
Dr. sanderson's judgement in the case.  de Legum humanarum causâ efficient, speaking of our King, hath these very weighty and remarkable words. cum illa sola censenda sit cujusque rei causa efficiens principalis & sufficiens, quae per se immediatè producit & in materiam praeparatam introducit eam formam, quae illi rei dat nomen & esse, etsi ad productionem istius effectûs alia etiam concurrere oporteat, vel antecedere potius, ad praevias dispositiones, quò materia ad recipiendam formam ab agente intentam aptior reddatur, omninò constat, quotcunque demùm ea sint quae ad legem recte constituendam antecedenter requiruntur, voluntatem tamen principis (ex cujus unius arbitratu & jussione omnes Legum Rogationes aut ratae habentur aut irritae) esse solam & adaequatam publicarum Legum efficientem causam. Seeing (saith he) that is to be held the principal efficient and sufficient cause of every thing which of itself and immediately produceth and introduceth into the matter prepared for it, that form which giveth name and being to that thing, though for the producing of that effect, other things also must concur or rather precede, as previous dispositions to make the matter fitter to receive the form intended by the Agent to be introduced into it; it is certain for all that (how many soever the things are that are antecedently requisite for the constituting of the Law) the Will of the Prince, on whose alone arbitrary consent or descent the ratifying or rejecting of such Laws as are tendered unto him doth depend, is the sole and adequate efficient cause of all public Laws.  
This I say was the judgement of that very learned, 
His Commendation for an excellent Casuist.  pious and very judicious Casuist Dr. Sanderson, concerning the only proper adequate subject of the Legislative power here in England, who was Professor of Casuistical Divinity in the University of Oxford, as long as the Rebellious Parliament would suffer him to be so; and who would in all probability (if he might have been suffered to have continued some few years longer) have left us a truer and more exact and complete body of Casuistical Divinity than any the World hath been so happy as to see yet, and in which the World hath more need to be truly and thoroughly instructed, in order to peace here and happiness hereafter, than in any other part either of Polemical or Dogmatical Divinity, the Essentials of the Creed excepted only. But that very reason it was for which the Usurpers of the Regal power in those times would not suffer so vigorously an Opposer, and so strongly and clearly a Convincer of that Traitorous and Tyrannical Usurpation of theirs to be a public Professor and Standard of that truth, which they were concerned the People should be kept ignorant of, or made to believe the contrary, as they were by such Preachers, as they who could not endure sound Doctrine heaped up 
1 Ep. Tim. Cap. 4. v. 3.  unto themselves after their own Lusts; and by such Casuists and Writers of Political Aphorisms (as Mr. Baxter was) whose business it was to make the People believe the Usurpation of an Arbitrary power and Tyranny to be an Holy Commonwealth; 
The design of Mr. B. 's Holy Commonwealth.  for such was the Government here, which Mr. Baxter in his Preface to that Book of his, calls the best Government in all the World, affirming those that were then the Governors, namely the two Houses of Parliament without the King, not only to have a part of the Supremacy or Sovereignty, but to have all the Supremacy or whole Sovereignty, and therefore such as whom to resist or depose is forbidden (saith he) to Subjects upon pain of damnation. They are his own words in the before-cited 
He entitles the Usurpers to the whole Sovereignty;  place, which one would think were hardly to be reconciled with what he affirms in the place we are now examining, (viz.) That the Supremacy or Sovereignty is divided betwixt the King and them, and consequently that they have not the Supremacy, but a part of it only. But for answer to this Objection perhaps he will say (as indeed in effect he doth say) that although before the War betwixt the King and them they had but a part of the Sovereignty only, yet the 
By the King's having lost his part:  King having by force endeavoured to take their part from them, and being overcome by them he had lost his own part, which jure belli, by right 
Vid. H. C. Thes. 145. & 363.  of War, did accrue to them, and so they became the Possessors of the whole Sovereignty, though the King was then living. But he had ceased to be King (saith Mr. Baxter) because he had entered into 
Thes. 368.  a state of War with his People, and consequently by Mr. Baxter's Logic had lost his part of the Sovereignty. But who was to have his part of the Sovereignty, (supposing him to be justly deprived of it) Those that had the other part of it by whom he was conquered? No, saith Mr. Baxter; for if (saith he) a Prince that hath not 
And this too against a Thesis of his own.  the whole Sovereignty be conquered by a Senate that hath the other part, and that in a just defensive War, that Senate cannot assume the whole Sovereignty, but 
Thes. 374.  supposeth that Government in specie to remain; and therefore another King must be chosen if the former be incapable.   

CHAP. IU.  
Mr. B. 's high strain in commending those for the best Governors in all the World, whom yet he owns to be Intruders and Usurpers. His compliance with Richard remarked. His high commendation taxed and challenged. The Recapitulation.  
WHat he means by the last words of this Thesis, (viz. Another King must be chosen 
Mr. B. 's Thesis further examined.  if the former be incapable) I know not, unless he means, that the former King, though he had lost his part in the Sovereignty, and ceased to be King by being conquered by the Parliament in a just War; yet he might be capable of being King again, if the Parliament thought fit to choose him; which having used him as they had done, Mr. Baxter no doubt wished as heartily, as he thought it likely they would do. But whatsoever Mr. Baxter meant by these last words of this Thesis, it is evident that his meaning in the words before, was that the Parliament by their conquering of the King in defence of their own pretended part of the Sovereignty, did not gain that part which he lost; nor consequently could (as he saith) assume the whole Sovereignty to themselves. But they did assume the whole Sovereignty, even that Parliament did assume it, those Lords and Commons did assume the whole Sovereignty, who, (as Mr. Baxter saith) were the Best Governors in all the World, and such as whom to resist or depose is 
Who in Mr. B. 's account the best Governors in all the World:  forbidden to Subjects on pain of damnation. And why so Mr. Baxter? because (saith he) they had the Supremacy, that is, the whole Sovereignty. But whom doth Mr. Baxter mean by those the best Governors in all the World, and whom all the Subjects of England were forbidden to resist on pain of damnation, because they had the Supreme power; I mean (saith he) them whom you (speaking 
See the Preface to the Holy Commonwealth.  to the Soldiers) called the corrupt Majority, or the 143. imprisoned and secluded Members, who as the majority had you know what power, and the remaining Members that now sit again as many of them as are living. Whereby it plainly appears that he meant the two Houses, or the majority of the two Houses of Parliament in 47. and consequently that they were those that had then the Supreme power; and who, because they had the Supreme power, were on pain of damnation not to be resisted. But how came they by that Supreme Power? not by having conquered the King, saith Mr. Baxter in that before quoted Thesis; for that, saith he, did not give them a right to more of the Sovereignty than they had before, which was (saith he) but a part of it, neither was that to make any change of the Government in specie, and consequently the Sovereignty was still, (according to his Hypothesis) to be in a King, Lords and Commons; and therefore the two Houses of Parliament or Senate (as he calls them in the aforesaid Thesis) could not assume the whole Sovereignty; where by [could not] he must mean they could not the jure, by right, assume it, that is, they had no right or just title to it. And what are they that assume Sovereignty without any Right or just title to it? some (saith Mr. Baxter) call them Tyrants: 
Whom yet he owns to be Intruders and Usurpers.  but what doth he himself call them? He saith they may be more fitly called (and you must know he loves to speak properly and distinctly) Invaders, Intruders and Usurpers; but are the 
II. C. p. 86.  People bound to obey, or not to resist Invaders, Intruders and Usurpers upon pain of damnation? No, (saith Mr. Baxter) when it is notorious they have no title to govern them, the People are not bound 
Thesis', 375.  to obey them. Now what can be more notorious than that the two Houses had not the Sovereignty, at least not the whole Sovereignty, whilst the King was alive, and whilst he was acknowledged and treated with by them as their King, as he was at that very time Mr. Baxter saith they had the Supreme Power, and consequently if they had it, (as indeed they had it de facto, in fact) they held it without any title or Right to it, and therefore by Mr. Baxter's own confession they had it as Invaders and Usurpers. And if notwithstanding they were Invaders and Usurpers, they were the best Governors in all the World, and not to be 
His strange shuffling and self-contradiction.  resisted on pain of damnation, (as Mr. Baxter tells us in one place) then are the People bound to obey notorious Invaders and Usurpers; which in another place he saith they are not; but yet he saith it with such limitations and exceptions, as one may see he leaves a Latitude for any man to submit to any that are in the possession of the Supreme Power, whether they have any right to all or any of it, or no; or though they be never so much Invaders or Usurpers of it; as all of them 
A short account of those Usurpers.  were that succeeded one another from the beginning of the War with the late King until the Restauration of our present Sovereign.  
As first the two Houses governing arbitrarily and independently whilst the King lived.  
2dly, The House of Commons alone after the King's murder and Martyrdom, assuming to themselves the title of a free State, or Sovereign Commonwealth.  
3dly, Cromvel the Father making himself Master of all, and of servus servorum, a servant of servants, becoming Dominus Dominantium, a Lord of Lords: of whom Mr. Baxter saith in the same Preface, That he did prudently, piously and faithfully, 
Mr. B. 's flattery to Oliver.  and to his immortal Honour, exercise the Government.  
4thly, Cromwell the Son, to whom he saith, he 
His compliance with Richard.  was bound to submit, as set over him by God, and to obey for conscience sake, and to behave himself as a loyal Subject towards him; because, as he saith in the same place, a full and free Parliament hath owned him: Hereby acknowledging,  
First, That a full and free Parliament, meaning 
Three Remarks upon it.  the two Houses only, may own or disown whom they will to be set over them by God, and consequently whom in conscience they are bound to obey, whether he have an Hereditary Right to it or no: For Cromwell the Son could have no such Right from his Father, neither doth Mr. Baxter pretend he had any such right.  
2dly, That without Writs issuing from the King, the People may meet and choose Knights and Burgesses to be their Representatives, and that they that be so chosen make up a full and free House of Commons, as likewise such as the Usurper is pleased to call Lords, though they be no Lords, and have not so much as one Lord truly and properly so called amongst them, do make up a full and free House of Lords.  
3dly, That two such Houses do make up a full and free Parliament. And such a Parliament was that with such a Summoner of it, and such a Head to it (as Cromwell the Son was) which were the Powers that Mr. Baxter saith were last laid by; and of which together with those that were laid by before (he means laid by or deposed by the Soldiery to whom he addresseth his Preface to his Holy Commonwealth) he hath so excessively 
His Eulogy of the Usurpers.  high an opinion, that he saith 
* Pref. to Holy Com. W.  he should with great rejoicings give a thousand thanks to that Man that will acquaint him with one Nation in all the Earth, that hath better Governors in Sovereign Power (as to Wisdom and Holiness conjunct) than those that have been resisted or deposed in England. Where, by those Powers he so much magnifies that were resisted and deposed here in England, you may be sure he means not the King, nor the Kingly Government, (though that was the only Sovereign Power that was resisted and deposed) but for aught I see, or he saith to the contrary, he may and doth mean all others that successively usurped and exercised Sovereign Power both before and after the late King's death, till his Son's coming in; and consequently not only the two Houses of Parliament before the King's death, but the One House, I mean the House of Commons (presently after the King's death; yea and both the Cromwel's also, of which the former was resisted, though not deposed, and the latter was both resisted and deposed, together with the several mock-Parliaments in both their times, and the last mock-Parliament of all, which by the admirable conduct and courage of that ever to be renowned, and ever to be remembered Soldier and Servant of God, the King and his Country (I mean General MONK) was shattered in pieces never to be soldered or reunited, in order to restoring of the Sovereign Power to its only true and right owner, the King. For as for all or for any of the rest of those Sovereign Powers, as Mr. Baxter calls them, and which he magnifies so much, 
Mr. B. rebuked for his Extravagance; and his best Governors challenged.  they were as far from having any right to Sovereign Power, as they were from being the best Governors in all the World, as Mr. Baxter most falsely (and I had almost said most impudently) saith they were. For let him name that which he thinks to have been the best of those Governments or Governors, betwixt the assuming and usurping of the Sovereign Power by the two Houses of the long Parliament and the present King's coming home: And I will undertake (as old as I am) if God spare me life and health, to demonstrate, that they were not only as arrant Traitors and Rebels as ever were in the World, but that in the managery and exercise of their usurped Power they carried themselves as hypocritically and blasphemously towards God, in the use of his Name and his Ordinances; as insolently, insultingly and barbarously towards their King; not only in their buying and selling and imprisoning of Him, but even in their Addresses to him and treating with Him; and withal as arbitrarily, as despotically, as injuriously and every way as tyrannically towards their Fellow-Subjects, in taking away their Goods, their Liberties and their Lives, not only without but against Law, as ever any Governors did (whether justly or unjustly so called) either in this or any other Nation.  
But when I say this, I would not be understood to mean what I say, of all that sat in both or either 
All that slaid and sat in Parliament, not censured.  of the two Houses of Parliament, that made War against the King; for I do verily believe there were many (and I know there were some) both of the Lords and Commons, that after the King was driven away, stayed and sat in both Houses, and did what they could to hinder the rebellious and outrageous proceedings of the factious Party, which was predominant in the one House as well as in the other. But the Tide was too strong, and those good Men too few to stem the current, or to prevent the overflowing of it, as it did, over all the banks and boundaries of Obedience to the Laws, as well as of Allegiance to the King; And therefore, as Mr. Baxter, when he tells us the two Houses of Parliament were the best Governors in all the World, he tells us too, that by the two Houses he means the Majority of the two Houses; so when I say they were Usurpers and Traitors and Rebels, and as ill Governors or Managers of their usurped power, as ever were before them in this or in any other Kingdom, I mean the Majority of those two Houses only: Which it was not my purpose to say so much of, as I have said at present; but my just indignation at Mr. Baxter's extravagant magnifying such men as they were, hath carried me out of the way I was in; which was to prove that neither those nor any other two Houses of Parliament can properly and truly be said to share with the King in the Sovereignty or Supreme Power, upon the account of theirs as well as the King's Legislative 
The Recapitulation of the Legislative power being only in the King.  Power in making Laws for the whole Kingdom; which (as I have already proved) is the King's Act only by making Bills to be Laws by his FIAT or Assent to them, thereby giving them that enlivening and obliging power, which they had not before, and which makes them to be Laws, and this being solely the King's Act without any Act of either or both of the Houses in conjunction with it, it is the King alone that makes the Law, or that makes that to be a Law which was not a Law before, how fit soever it might be to be made a Law, whereof the King is the only final Judge also; from whom there lies no appeal to either or both the Houses, so that whatsoever Preparatory Act or Acts of either or both Houses may be necessary in order to the making of Laws antecedently to the King's Fiat, yet it is the King's Fiat only that makes them to be Laws, especially, it being at his choice whether he will make them to be Laws or not, after the two Houses have done what legally they can do towards it.   

CHAP. V.  
Upon Mr. Baxter 's grounds the KING may make Laws, in some Cases, without the consent of the two Houses. Shipmoney justified, upon the same grounds. It is the King's Assent that makes Laws. The Parliaments concurrence, wherein it lies.  
IF it be objected, that as the two Houses cannot make a Law without the King's Assent, so neither 
An Objection.  can the King make a Law without the Consent of the two Houses; and that therefore the two Houses as well as the King are the Lawmakers.  
For answer hereunto, I will not say as Mr. 
Mr. B. 's opinion, that a Sovereign, though limited by compact, may act for the People's safety against their consent.  Baxter seems to say, when he puts the Question, whether if the People will not consent to that which is necessary for their own Preservation, the Sovereign may not do it against their wills? and answers, he may do it though he be not an absolute but a limited Sovereign, and limited by Covenant, that is, (as he expresseth himself in other places) by an antecedent compact with the People, when they chose or admitted him to be their Sovereign; and consequently, that even such a Sovereign notwithstanding such a compact (as for instance, that he will not, nor shall not make any Law without the Nobilities, and People's consent) may of himself and without their consents make such a Law, as is necessary for their 
And why not make Laws then for that end, without their consent?  Preservation, or that he judgeth to be so; for in this case he is, and of necessity must be the only Judge whether it be necessary for their Preservation or no; and therefore if he judge it to be so, he may according to Mr. Baxter's opinion, not withstanding any compact or Constitution to the contrary, make such a Law not only without, but against their consents, (as Mr. Baxter words it) because (saith he) that Sovereign is God's Officer 
His reason for that opinion.  for the ends of Government, and therefore cannot lawfully be restrained by the People from preserving them; because the People have no power above God, and because it is still to be supposed that the People desire their own Preservation, and therefore mistakingly resist the means which else they would 
v. p. 119. Thes. 120.  consent to. This is one of Mr. Baxter's Political Aphorisms; which if it be true, my Answer to the aforesaid Objection might be this, That although the Parliament, or the two Houses of Parliament 
The Answer according to that Opinion.  cannot make any Laws without the King's consent, yet the King may make Laws without their consent in some cases; namely, when the public safety is concerned that such a Law or such Laws should be made, though one or both of the Houses will not consent to it. In such a Case I say (not according to mine own but Mr. Baxter's opinion) such a Law or such Laws may be made by the King without, nay, against the consent of both Houses; and à paritate rationis, for the same cause and by the like reason, Money may be raised; if without raising of Money, a Naval Force (for example) as may be sufficient for the preservation of the Kingdom from imminent dangers by a foreign Invasion cannot be had; and then (according to Mr. Baxter's Hypothesis) 
Ship-Money justified, upon Mr. B. 's grounds.  what can be said against raising of Ship-money by the late King? he being the Judge of the greatness and imminency of the danger, and that it could not stay for a Parliamentary Supply, there being no Parliament then sitting, and the greatest Extraparliamentary Judicatory of the Nation having been advised with by the King, and given him their opinions that he might legally do what he did; certainly these things considered, if Mr. Baxter's Aphorism be true, the King's raising or endeavouring to raise Ship-money without consent of Parliament, was not so heinous a violation of the legal constitution, which he was obliged or had obliged himself to govern by (especially after it was by his consent condemned in Parliament) as to be made (as it is by Mr. Baxter) one of the principal causes of his siding with the Parliament in Rebellion against the King. For if the King were maximè dignus istâ contumeliâ, indignus illequi faceret tamen; if he did never so much deserve this affront, yet it did not become Mr. Baxter to give it him: not only because by the highest Judicature then in being it was declared to be legal; but because according to Mr. Baxter's own judgement declared in this Aphorism, the King might have done it supposing it necessary for the Preservation of the public, though it had not been legal.  
But this shall not be my Answer to the aforesaid Objection. I remember what I have said before 
The Bishop's own answer.  upon another Occasion, (viz.) that A mischief is better than an Inconvenience; which I think is a maxim of our Law, and the meaning of it is (as I conceive) that it is better to run the hazard of a very great Evil, which possibly may, but is very unlikely will, befall us, than for the avoiding or preventing of it to make use of such a Remedy, as frequently may be and probably will be made use of, when there is no such Occasion for it or need of it. And so that which was used as a Remedy for the present, may prove a Malady for the future, in the Consequence of it. And therefore for answer to the aforesaid objection, I will not say that the King can make Laws to oblige the whole Nation without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, though never so much for the public good, or never so necessary for the preservation of the whole Kingdom: but this I will say, that though such Laws cannot be made without their consent; yet it is not they, nor 
Though Laws are not made without the People's consent in Parliament, yet that consent doth not make them Laws.  their consenting to them that makes them to be Laws. For then either the Bills would be Laws assoon as they were passed by both Houses, or the being passed by the two Houses must oblige the King to pass them also; but neither of these is true, according to the legal and fundamental constitution of our Government; as appears not only by the constant Practice to the contrary, but by the frequent and importunate Addresses made unto the late King by the two Houses of the rebellious Parliament, to make their Ordinances 
Ordinances of themselves not Laws.  to be Laws by his consent to them; which certainly being so high as they were then, they would never have done, if they had thought that either their Ordinances were Laws, or had the Obligatory power of Laws before the King gave it to them; or that he might not if he would, refuse to give it. So that it being not only the King's consent, but his free, arbitrary and voluntary 
The King's Assent gives being to the Laws.  consent that gives being to all Laws, the Legislative Power (properly so called) must needs be in the King and in the King only. The Legislative Power I say properly so called, I mean the very making of that to be Law which is Law, abstracting from whatsoever it is that goes before, or that follows after it is made; for certainly neither of them can be essential to the making of it, and yet both of them may be very requisite for the making of the Laws to be such as may the more willingly be obeyed by the People. Now by what goes before the making of Laws here with 
How the two Houses concur to the making of Laws.  us, I mean the considering, debating and agreeing of both Houses what shall be proposed to the King by them, to be by him made to be Laws; and by what follows after the King by his Le Roy le veult hath made them Laws, I mean the solemn Preface or Preamble to them, whereby it is declared that there was a concurrence of the Lords and Commons to the making or enacting of them: because the subject matter of them was prepared and agreed on by the Lords and Commons, and then and not till then proposed to the King by them to be made Laws by him; So that the subject matter of our Laws is and always must be from the two Houses, or at least from their 
The matter of the Laws from the Parliament, the Form from the King.  agreement and consenting to it. And in this respect it is, that they may be said to concur to the making of our Laws, though they do not make them. For it is (as I said before) not the Matter, ex quâ res est, out of which a thing is made, which is prepared and proposed by the Houses, but the Form, per quam res est, by which a thing is what it is, which is wholly from the King, that makes what the Houses propose to him to be made a Law, to be a Law; which although he may do or refuse to do as he pleaseth, yet because he can make nothing to be Law, but what by the Agreement of both Houses is proposed to him to be made a Law by him; and consequently though our Laws are not nor cannot be made by them, yet they are not nor cannot be made without them neither; therefore I say they do concur to the making of them, though they do not make them. They concur to the making of them, because the Legislative matter, or the matter, whereof Laws are made and must be made, is from them; but they do not make them, because the form, whereby they are made to be what they are, is not at all from them, but solely and wholly from the King; and consequently he is the sole efficient or maker of them.  
And yet because he cannot make them but of 
Why the Laws said to be enacted by King, Lords & Commons.  such materials as are by the two Houses prepared and proposed unto him, therefore they are said in the common and modern stile to be enacted not by the King only, but by the King, Lords, and Commons, that is, by the King and the two Houses also, to the end that the People who are to be governed by them may (as I said before) the more willingly submit to them, when they know that although they are called the King's Laws, as being made by him; yet the materials whereof they were made were first devised, debated, digested and agreed on, and then suggested to the King, not only by the Lords, but by the House of Commons also, that is, by their own Representatives and trusties, and consequently in effect by their own selves; when they know this, I say, they must needs be the more willing to submit to them.   

CHAP. VI  
The Preface of our Laws doth not prove the Legislative Power to be in the Parliament. The Old stile of enacting Laws why changed by Henry the VIII. and why since resumed.  
AND this, and no more than this, is the meaning of the modern form of prefacing 
The Modern stile of enacting Laws.  our Laws and Statutes which we call Acts of Parliament; when they are said to be enacted by the King, Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, and by the Authority of the same; which I call the modern stile, because anciently it was otherwise. And therefore Mr. Baxter laying so much stress (as he doth) upon this form of words to prove the Legislative Power, and consequently a principal branch of the Sovereignty, to be partly in the Parliament (meaning the two Houses of Parliament) doth well and wisely to say that he will not run to Records; for he knows (if he know any 
H. C. p. 46●.  thing in that kind) that this was not the stile that was anciently used in Prefacing the Acts or Statutes made by our Kings in Parliament; Ab initio non fuit sic, from the beginning it was not so.  
For from the first of our Parliaments (recorded by Poulton) which was in the 9th. of Hen. III. to the 15th. of Hen. VIII. this stile of Be it enacted by the King, Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, was never used; but during all that long Interval of Eleven Kings Reigns, and the very many several Parliaments held by them, the making, ordaining and passing of Laws, was in the King's 
The Ancient stile or form.  name only, sometime with this addition, by or with the Advice and consent of his Bishops, Earls, Barons, etc. without naming the Commons: and sometimes by the advice of His Bishops, Earls, Barons, etc. at the request of the Commonalty, or at the special request of the Commons; and sometimes with consent of the Commons as well as of the Lords. But still and always the making or enacting of the Laws is said to be by the King alone; sometimes in these words, We of Our mere free will have given and granted, which is the stile of Magna Charta, or the great Charter itself; sometimes in these, The King willeth and commandeth; and sometimes in these, It is by the King made, provided and ordained.  
This I say was the stile all along, which was used in passing of Laws or Acts of Parliament until the 15th. of Hen. VIII. for about 300. years. And then indeed it began to be changed from, Be it 
When the change began.  Enacted by the King, with the advice and consent of the Lords and Commons, to Be it enacted by the King, Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons; but not constantly. For in the very next King's time, his very first Act of Parliament 
The Old stile resumed afterward.  Cap. 1. runs in the old stile, (viz.) Be it enacted by the King's Highness with the assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons. And again in the same Parliament, Cap. 4. it is said that at the humble Petition and suit of the Lords and Commons in that Parliament assembled, the King did declare, ordain and enact by the Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and of the Commons, etc.  
In the same old stile likewise runs the first Act of Queen Mary, (viz.) Be it ordained and enacted by the Queen our Sovereign Lady; with the consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and of the Commons, etc.  
The like we find in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, as may be seen in the Act of Uniformity made by Her, and prefixed in our Common-Prayer-Book to another Act of the same kind made by our present King. For in that of Queen Elizabeth the stile is, Be it enacted by the Queen's Highness, with the consent of the Lords and Commons in this Parliament assembled, etc. And in that of our present King it is, Be it enacted by the Kings most Excellent Majesty, by the advice and with the consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and of the Commons in this Parliament assembled, etc.  
So that the first of the two Proofs Mr. Baxter allegeth for the Legislative power in the Parliament, 
Mr. B. 's Argument for the Legislative power in the Parliament from the Preface of our Laws, unconclusive.  as well as in the King, and consequently their participating with him in the Sovereignty, is not so convincingly conclusive from the stile used in the Preface to Acts of Parliament, as he would have it thought to be; but that it may without immodesty be contradicted, though he tells 
Holy Com. p. 462.  us it cannot; because, saith he, the Laws expressly speak their Authority, when they say: Be it enacted by the King, Lords and Commons in Parliament and by the Authority of the same. It is not (saith he) upon their Petition or Proposal only, but by them or by their Authority. But did the Laws anciently speak thus at all? or do all of them speak thus 
All the Ancient and several Modern Instances against him.  in all our modern and later Acts? I think I have given him Instances of both sorts to the contrary; and such and so many Instances as must carry the Question, if it be to be decided by the speaking of the Laws, either in regard of their Antiquity or Plurality. For (as I said before) all Laws made before Hen. VIII. speak and speak expressly the King, and none but the King, to be the maker of them; as may appear by the Instances before given, and of many more that might have been given, even as many more as there were Acts of Parliament during the Reigns of so many Kings for 300. years; during which time I cannot find so much as one single instance of any Law which is said to be enacted by King, Lords and Commons, but by the King, with the advice and consent of the Lords and Commons, when most is ascribed to them, I mean to the Commons; for sometimes it is upon the request, and sometimes upon the humble Petition of the Commons, and with the advice and consent of the Lords, that the Law is said to be enacted by the King. So that if (as I said before) the question of who are the Lawmakers be to be decided by the speaking of the Laws themselves (as Mr. Baxter calls it) as either they are more venerable for Antiquity, or considerable for Plurality, the King and none but the King must be acknowledged to be the Enacter or the maker of them.  
And truly one would think that those Laws that are most ancient, and consequently nearest in time to the first Institution of Parliaments, though they were not the most in number, were most to be credited for speaking most properly of who they were that made them then, and consequently who it is that makes them now. Unless Mr. Baxter will say it was the King, and King alone indeed that made the Laws, in Parliament then; but it is the King, Lords and Commons, or the King and Parliament that makes them now; and consequently that the King is not so much a King now as He was then, and that the constitution of the Kingdom itself is changed from Monarchical to Aristocratical. But then I must ask him by whom and when this great change was made? Was it by him that brought in this new stile of, Be it enacted by the King, Lords and Commons, etc. That was Hen. the VIII. who was not a Man likely to 
Why Henry the VIII. changed the Old stile.  give away any of his Authority, or to part with any part of his Sovereignty to his own Subjects, who rescued it from the Pope's encroachments: And yet perhaps even He meaning to make use of the Parliament for the countenancing whatever he had a mind to do, though never so extravagant in itself, though never so offensive to Foreign Princes his Allies, or never so injurious to his own Children, because he thought it would be serviceable to his own ends, (after he had forced the two Houses to consent to what he listed to enact) to join them with himself in the enacting of it, as well as by assenting to it, to make it so much the more plausible, or at least so much the less grievous unto the People. Otherwise it is most certain that never any King of England after the making of Magna Charta, reigned so despotically and arbitrarily as he did; or whom the two 
His meaning in it could not be, to part with any of his Sovereignty.  Houses of Parliament stood so much in awe of, as they did of Him: as appears by his making them consent to the doing and undoing, to the enacting and repealing of whatsoever he would have to be done or undone, to be enacted or repealed. And therefore it is not to be imagined that such a King as he was did mean by changing of the stile, to lessen the Legislative Power itself, which was in his Predecessors, by admitting those, whom he used as he did, the two Houses of Parliament, to a participation of any the least degree of Sovereignty.  
And as he never meant to do so, so they, 
Nor was it so understood, by either King or Parliament.  the two Houses of Parliament, did not then, or ever since, (for aught I ever heard) understand that to be the meaning of the Alteration from Be it enacted by the King with the consent of the Lords and Commons, to Be it enacted by the King, Lords and Commons, to signify that either the King's power, as to the making of Laws, was less or the Parliaments greater than it was before this alteration of stile. For if it had been understood either by the King or Parliament to signify any such thing; as the King, (especially such a King as Hen. VIII. was) would never have suffered the alteration of the former to the latter; So the two Houses who are jealous enough of their Power and Privileges would never have suffered the alteration of the latter to the former again, (as it was altered by King Edward, Queen Marry and Queen Elizabeth, King Henry's three immediate Successors; and as it is altered by our present King in the Act of Uniformity.) For as the alteration of the former to the latter could not have been made without the Kings, so the alteration of the latter to the former, could not have been made without the consent of the two Houses neither.  
And therefore I verily believe that if any thing 
Most likely it was to please the People.  at all was meant by the alteration of the former stile to the latter, it was only ad faciendum Populum, to gain the People, that the People might more willingly receive and submit to the Laws, when they were made, (especially such of them as might seem to pinch them in their Purses) when they were said to be enacted by the Lords and Commons, or by the Lords and their Representatives, and consequently by themselves, as well as by the King; for Volentibus non fit injuria, where there is consent, there is no injury.  
And yet again lest by this alteration of stile, 
Why the Old stile resumed since.  and misinterpretation of it, the King's Prerogative of being the sole Sovereign, and consequently the sole Law giver, might be thought to be diminished, by being communicated to either or both Houses of Parliament; therefore the first, most ancient, and withal the longest continued stile of, Be it enacted by our Sovereign Lord the King, by the advice and with the consent of the Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled, was presently after the first alteration of it resumed by the three next succeeding Princes; as it hath been also now of late by our present Sovereign, and by all of them with the consent of the Lords and Commons thereunto.   

CHAP. VII.  
The Laws enacted by the Authority of Parliament, in what sense. Why called Acts of Parliament. They provide the Matter of the Laws, the King gives the Form.  
BUT withal, (will Mr. Baxter perhaps say) with this Addition, and by the Authority 
An Objection.  of the same; that is, by the Authority of the Parliament: so that according to this former stile, our Laws are said to be made and enacted by the Authority of the Parliament, and consequently by the Authority of the two Houses, of Lords and Commons, as well as by the Kings.  
For answer whereunto I might say in the first place, that it was not till after 200. Years from the first Parliament, that we read of in our Book of Statutes, namely, not until the Reign of Henry 
Those words, And by the Authority of the same, when added, and why.  the VI who owed his Title (such as it was) to the Parliament, and to the Parliament (as it signifies the two Houses only) without the King; for by the Authority of such a Parliament it was, (that is, of a Body without a Head) that Henry Bullingbrook was made King, Richard the Second surrender being neither voluntary, nor lawful, if it had been voluntary, as was acknowledged by the two Houses themselves, when Richard Duke of York claimed the Crown, as the right Heir to it; thereby acknowledging likewise that although they had de facto, yet they could not the jure, exclude the right Heir. Howsoever their Authority being the only Title which the (then) present King had and held the Crown by, as having not the courage either of his Grandfather or his Father to claim it by Conquest, and hold it by force, as they did; He was willing to acknowledge he held it by Authority of Parliament, as the word Parliament is taken for the two Houses of Parliament without a King; And this perhaps might be the reason why at first in that weak King's time to Be it enacted by the King with the consent of Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled, was added, and by the Authority of the same.  
But this is not the Answer I rely on, because this addition hath been continued ever since; whereas the alteration I before spoke of, did not, as I have already showed.  
And therefore 2dly to this Objection, that when it 
The Answer.  is said, Be it enacted by our Sovereign Lord the King by the advice and with the consent of the King, Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled, it is said also, and by Authority of the same. My Answer is, that by the word Parliament, is not meant the 
By Parliament here meant, not Lords & Commons only without the King.  two Houses, or the Lords and Commons only, that is the Body without a Head, but the Body with the Head to direct and govern it, as the natural Head doth the Body natural, and more than so; for the natural Head, though it directs and governs, yet it doth not give its Being to the Body natural, but the Parliamentary Head gives its very Being itself to the Parliamentary body, as being made what it is by his Call, and dissolved into what it was at his pleasure, that is, into so many single and private Persons as they were before, as I have already showed.  
And truly if we mark the words well, By the Authority of the same, cannot be meant the Authority 
What meant, by the Authority of the same.  of those that are assembled in Parliament, but of the Parliament itself wherein they are assembled, which is as it is commonly truly and properly called the King's great Council, or the King's High Court of Parliament. It is by the Authority 
The Parliament the King's great Council, and High Court.  therefore of that great Council, or by the Authority of that High Court, that our Laws are said to be enacted: But whence is it that this great Council, or this High Court hath its Authority? 
Their Authority from the King.  Is it not from the King? Is it not from Him that makes them to be such a Council and makes them to be such a Court by his calling and assembling them together? So that to say Be it enacted by the Authority of the Parliament, is no more in effect, than to say Be it enacted by the King in Parliament, or, Be it enacted by the King's Authority in his great Council, or in his High Court of Parliament. For as all Inferior Courts are, and Act by the King's Authority, so is, and doth the High Court of Parliament itself also; for 
They act in that respect, as other Courts do.  as it doth not, nor cannot make itself, no more than the Inferior Courts do or can (for if it did or could, it might meet as often, and subsist as long as they listed themselves) so their acting when they are a Court, is as the Actings of other Courts are (if they Act as they ought to Act) in and by the same Authority from whence they have their Being; for Agere sequitur esse, acting follows upon being, as Mr. Baxter often (but sometimes very impertinently) tells us. And therefore as in all other Courts, because they are the King's Courts, the Judgements that are there given, and the Decrees that are there decreed, for interpreting, applying and moderating of Laws already made, are the King's Decrees, and the King's Judgements, because they are made by his Authority, or by an Authority derived from him and delegated by Him, and might if he pleased be executed by him in Person, as some of them have been by some of his Predecessors; so in the High Court of Parliament, where Laws are to be made, the Laws that are there made are the King's Laws, and that not only as being made 
Why our Laws called the King's Laws.  in one of his Courts, but made in a formal and solemn manner, either by himself personally and immediately; or by special Commission granted and authorised by him to do it for him. For it is the Le Roy le veult (whether pronounced by himself, or by any other authorised by him) that makes the Law. So that it is the Kings Will and the King's will only to have it a Law that makes it a Law, and not any Act antecedent or subsequent of either or both the Houses of Parliament.  
But why then are our Laws called Acts of 
Why called Acts of Parliament.  Parliament? Because, as I said before, they are made by the King in Parliament: Yea but they are said to be Enacted by Authority of Parliament; that is, say I, by the King's Authority in Parliament. But they are said to be enacted by the Lords and Commons, as well as by the King; but it is not said they are enacted by the Authority of the Lords and Commons, as well as by the Kings. So that by enacting by Lords and Commons, is meant by the Lords and Commons, advising or consenting to the matter of them, as appears by the indifferent use sometimes of one of the forms, and sometimes of the other, as I observed before. Whereunto may be added, that 
Advice or consent sometimes entitles to the Act.  it is not unusual to ascribe the doing of a thing to Him or them that are but the advisers of it, or consenters to it. Thus we call that an Order of Council, which is ordered by the King in Council, or by the advice of his Council. And thus St. Paul saith, The Saints shall judge the World, and 
1 Cor. 6. 2.  Christ himself saith, that his twelve Apostles shall sit upon twelve Thrones, judging the twelve Tribes of 
Matth. 19 28.  Israel. Yet it is certain (as Christ tells us in another place) that the Father hath committed all judgement 
Joh. 5. 22.  to the Son, and hath joined none in Commission with him. So that it is Christ, and Christ done that shall absolve those that shall be absolved and shall condemn those that shall be condemned, which are the proper Acts of a Judge quatenus as he is a Judge, and therefore of none but him that is a Judge. How then can the Saints be 
The Saints judging the World, applied to this case.  said to judge the World, or the twelve Apostles be said to judge the twelve Tribes? Why they do it by consenting to and approving of the judgement which shall be given by Christ, whether it be the sentence of absolution or condemnation, upon whomsoever it is pronounced. So though it be the King, and the King only that properly speaking doth make the Laws, yet because he never makes any Laws, but such as are agreed on and consented to by both Houses of Parliament; therefore the two Houses of Parliament may, in the same sense that the Saints are said to judge the World, be said to make our Laws, that is, by consenting to the King's making of them to be Laws: But yet with this difference (which is indeed no small one) that Christ's judging of the World 
The difference in the Case.  needs not the approbation or consent to it antecedently or consequently either of Saints or Angels: but the King according to the legally established constitution of our Government cannot make a Law, but the matter of it must be antecedently agreed on by both Houses of Parliament, as a fit subject for the King to make a Law of in their Opinions, if he please, and if it be so in his opinion also. So that the King is finally the only and sole Judge, whether what is agreed on and proposed by them as fit to be made a Law be fit to be made a Law or no; and if he thinks it fit to be so, it is he and none but he, that by his Le veult makes it Law.  
So that to conclude this Point, the thing proposed 
The four Causes of our Laws, viz. Efficient, Matter, Form and End of them, explained.  (whether by King or either of the Houses) is the Matter or material cause, ex quâ, or out of which the Law is made; the Efficient or the causa à qua, whereby or by whom the matter of the Law is made to be a Law, is the King and the King only; the Formal cause, or the cause per quam res est quod est, by which a thing is that thing which it is, or that whereby it actually becomes, and is effectually made to be a Law, is the King's declaration of his Assent or Will to make it a Law by those Nomothetical or Legislative words pronounced by himself or in his Name, Le Roy le veult; the Final cause, or the cause propter quam Res est, for which or for the sake whereof a thing is, is Bonum Publicum, the Public good. So that the consent of the two Houses to what is proposed 
What kind of Cause, the Consent of the two Houses is.  to be made a Law, is but that which we call Causa sine quâ non, a Cause, without which a thing is not to be; which indeed is a condition rather than a cause, but such a condition as is so necessary for disposing of the matter to receive the form, that the efficient cannot introduce the form without it, though he be not necessitated to introduce the form by it; that is, it is such a condition, as without which the King cannot make what is so conditioned to be a Law, though it do not necessitate him to make that to be a Law which is so conditioned, so that as I said before, it is but Causa sine quâ non only, which is indeed no cause at all.  
And this I think enough to prove the Legislative 
The Legislative power and the Sovereignty in the King only.  power to be in the King and in the King only; and consequently that the Sovereignty upon this account is not divided betwixt the King and the two Houses either equally or unequally, or that they have any part of it or share in it.  
And yet upon this Supposition, and upon this supposition only, Mr. Baxter concludes, first that 
Two Conclusions of Mr. B. 's upon his supposition of the Sovereignty divided.  the Kingdom of England is no Monarchy. And Secondly that the Parliament's defending of their own part of the Sovereignty against the King's Invasion of it was a just War and no Rebellion.  
By the first of which Conclusions he seems to think that there is no Monarchy, but where the Government is Despotical and Arbitrary; ubi Arbitria Principum (as Justin saith) pro Legibus sunt; where the Will of the Sovereign is the Law of the Subject: And such indeed were the first, especially the Eastern Monarchies of the World; and 
The Eastern Monarches not altogether Arbitrary.  yet not altogether so neither, as appears from the 7th. compared with the 15th. Verse of the 6th. Chapter of the Prophecy of Daniel; for as in the former of those Verses, we find there was a consultation by a Senate or Parliament of all the Precedents, Governors, Counsellors and Captains of the Kingdom of Persia for the making of a Decree or Law by the King, which he did by his signing of it; so in the latter of those Verses we find also that it was a standing Law of, or amongst the Medes and Persians, that no Decree or Statute made by the King, with the advice of an Assembly of the chief Men of his Kingdom, could be changed or repealed without the consent (as I presume they meant) of those that advised the King to make it. So that there were or might be some fundamental unchangeable Laws or Rules even in the most absolute and most despotical Monarchies; for such was the Persian, if ever there were any; and yet you see there was a Law by which the King himself was obliged. And probably the like was in the former or first Monarchy that of the Chaldeans or Assyrians also: For as Darius here, so Nabuchadnezzar there, called all his Princes and great Men, when he made a Decree, that all that would not fall down and worship the Image he had set up, should be cast into the fiery Furnace, Dan. 3. 12, etc.   

CHAP. VIII.  
The English Monarchy asserted. The King under no Judicatory, Accountable to God alone. That Laws are not to be made without the People's consent in Parliament, was from the favour of the Kings.  
THE Truth is, that it is not the Governing by Law or without Law that makes the Government to be Monarchical, but the governing 
What it is, denominates a Monarchy.  of One over all; whether his way of Governing be Arbitrary, & Despotical, or Legal and Political. Ours indeed is Legal and Political; but for all that it is Monarchical, because it is but One that governs us all. He governs indeed, and is obliged, and hath obliged himself, by his Coronation Oath, to govern by Law: but it was not his Coronation Oath that made him King; for all our Kings are as much Kings before they take the Oath, as they are after the taking of it. Neither is it their governing by Law that gives them their Right, nor their not governing by Law that can take away their Right they have unto their Crowns: for then there must be some Judicatory above them to judge betwixt them and 
No Judicatory above the King.  their People, whether they have forfeited their Right or no; and if they have, to take the forfeiture of it; And if there be such a Judicatory, it is indeed no Monarchy, though it may be called a Kingdom (as that of Sparta was) as I have proved at large already. Mr. Baxter therefore, if he will prove this Kingdom of ours to be no Monarchy, he must prove there is some such standing Judicatory here amongst us as the Ephori were in Sparta. If he saith the Parliament is such a Judicatory, He must prove it to be a 
The Parliament no such Judicatory.  Court or Judicatory always in being, as that of the Ephori was, and as the Senate of Venice is, and not such a one as must not meet but when the King calls them; and must be gone when he bids them; and such a Judicatory is our Parliament, according to the Legal Constitution of this Kingdom. And how such a King as ours can be liable or obnoxious to such a Judicatory as this, (which he may make or unmake as he pleaseth) so as to be questioned, or tried, or judged, or condemned by it, as the Spartan Kings might be, and were by the Ephori, and as the Dukes of Venice may be and have been by their Senate, let Mr. Baxter tell us if he can. For my part I cannot imagine the Practicability of it (I mean the practicability of it de jure, as to right) in any Case, or upon any Provocation whatsoever.  
And therefore when our Law saith the King can do no wrong, the meaning is not (as I conceive) 
The King can do no wrong, how meant.  that the King cannot do that, or command that to be done, which is really a wrong or injury to any, or perhaps to many, or all of his Subjects, as David did, when he numbered the People, for which sin 70. Thousand of them were swept away by the Plague in three days: But the meaning of that Maxim in our Law I say (as I humbly conceive) is, that if the King should do or cause to be done never so great a wrong, yet he is not legally accountable, or questionable, or punishable for it by any power on Earth, and much less by any of his own Subjects. Whereunto another Maxim of our Law seems to be a Witness, which tells us, that the Crown takes away all 
Another Maxim to that purpose.  defects, or that he who is King, is not chargeable with or answerable for whatsoever he hath done amiss. And hereunto the Law of God bears witness also. For in this sense it was, that King David confessing those two great sins of Adultery 
King David accountable to God alone;  and Murder unto God, saith: Against Thee Only have I sinned: not as if he thought he had not sinned very highly and heinously too against Bathsheba and Vriah, by defiling the one and murdering the other; but because he was not accountable to, or punishable by any but God for it. Any other Man of the Nation, that had committed either of those Crimes, must by God's own Judicial Law have been put to death for it without mercy. How came it to pass then that David, who was notoriously guilty of both those capital Crimes, was never called to account for either or both of them? The reason is plain, because there was none that had Authority to call him to an account for it: not any other King; for all Kings (properly so called) are equal, as to the right of non-subordination to one another, and Par in parem non habet Imperium, a Peer or equal hath no right of Authority over his equal or Peer; and much less Inferior in Superiorem, an Inferior over his Superior: for such are Subjects, of all Qualities and in all Capacities, in relation to their Sovereigns.  
But did David then escape unpunished? No; for God, who is only their Superior, and therefore 
and punished by him.  the only Judge of Kings, did question and arraign and judge and condemn and punish him for it, though not by shedding his blood for the blood that he had shed; yet by shedding the blood of his darling Son Absolom, which was more grievous than the shedding of his own blood would have been to him, as appears by his so often and so passionately wishing he had died for him.  
Be wise therefore, O ye Kings; and be learned, O ye Judges; Ye that are Supreme Judges here 
David 's Monition to Kings.  on Earth; and think not, because you cannot be punished by Men, therefore you shall not be punished at all, if you deserve to be so: for Reges in ipsos Imperium est Jovis, the Almighty God's rule and authority is over Kings themselves, could a Heathen man say. The exemption of Kings from being punished by Men doth make them the more obnoxious to be punished by God, either here or hereafter; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 (saith the Apostle) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it is a fearful and terrible thing to fall into the hands of the living God.  
But of the punishment which Kings are to expect from God, I have spoken before, as likewise why Kings, who are Monarches or Kings indeed, cannot be questioned or called to account for any thing they have done, or may be supposed to have done amiss, because they have no Superior. That which I am now doing, is to prove our King to be a Monarch, because he hath no Superior; nor is ever a whit the less a Monarch, because, according to the legal Establishment or constitution of our Kingdom, our Kings cannot make Laws for their Subjects without the consent of their Representatives, that is, without their Subjects own consents in Parliament.  
For I demand, how comes it to pass that they 
The People's privilege of consenting to their Laws, a favour at first of the Kings.  cannot? Is it not because they did at first, out of their mere grace and favour to their Subjects, give away the Power they had formerly of doing otherwise? William the Conqueror, from whom our Kings ever since derive their Right and Title to the Crown, could and did make Laws 
William the Conqueror made Laws without their consent.  for the People, without ask or having their antecedent consent to them. It is true, the Conqueror himself, when he was crowned King, took an Oath to govern justly, and afterwards he took an Oath to observe the Ancient Laws of the Realm, established by his Noble Predecessors the Kings of England, and especially those of Edward the Confessor (as Daniel tells us:) but it is true too (as the same Historian tells us) He brought in the Customs of Normandy, so that the main stream of our Common Law with the practice thereof (saith the same Author) flowed out of Normandy, notwithstanding all Objections that can be made to the contrary: And it was the Son of this Conqueror (Henry the First) who, because (saith the same Author) he would not wrest any thing by an Imperial Power from the Subjects, took a course to obtain their free consents to serve his occasions, in their General Assemblies of the three Estates of the Land, which he first convoked at Salisbury 
Parliament first so called in Henry I. time.  in the Fifteenth Year of his Reign, which had from his time the name of Parliaments, according to the manner of Normandy. And in all probability, as this was the beginning of our Kings not raising of Money, so was it likewise of their not making of Laws, but with the consent of the Representatives of their People in Parliament. But whether it began then, or sooner, or later, I am sure it must be the Kings granting of it that made it to be what it is; I mean the legal way of proceeding in order to the making of Laws by our Kings for the Government of their People.  
A most excellent way indeed, but such a one, as whosoever may have been the deviser or advisers of it, it could never have been established as it is, but by the King's voluntary and arbitrary consent to it. I say his arbitrary as well as his voluntary consent to it, because it was in his power (whosoever the King was that granted it first) not to have granted it, if he would.   

CHAP. IX.  
Mr. B. 's whimsy of an antecedent Compact between the King and People. Their consent to the making of Laws, when ever brought in, a thing of Grant, not of Contract. Their double Capacity, as Mr. B. fancies and states it.  
FOR to think there was any Government here in England before that of Kings, or that the People, when they were under no Government at all, did or could unanimously consent to be governed by one, whom they should choose to 
An antecedent compact of the People with the King, a political whimsy of Mr. B ' s.  be their King, upon such or such conditions, and with such or such limitations, reserving to themselves such or such Rights, Liberties and Privileges, as it should not be in the King's power to take from them, and which it should be lawful for them to defend by force, if he attempted to do so; and all this by virtue of an Original antecedent compact or contract with their King, when they chose him to be so: This (I say) is but a Political whimsy of Mr. Baxter's, who thinks he sees Visions, when he doth but dream Dreams. For although those that are under one kind of Government may change it for another (whether lawfully or unlawfully, for a better or for a worse, I now dispute not) yet for a Multitude that are under no Government at all, (which is Mr. Hobbs his Hypothesis, as well as Mr. 
Mr. Hobbs and Mr. Baxter agree.  Baxter's) to meet all together at one and the same time, and in one and the same place, and then and there, all and every one of them, to agree upon one kind of Government, and upon the choice of the same individual Person or Persons to govern them, I think it (considering the variety and contrariety that there is in several men's 
The extreme unlikelihood of the supposition.  Intellectuals and Affections) to be the next degree to impossible; for to say the Major part did conclude the Minor, is to suppose a Government before there was a Government; there being nothing in Nature (supposing all Men to be originally and equally free) why any one Man should be deprived of his natural freedom without his own consent by never so great a plurality of others that are otherwise minded.  
The beginning therefore of all Dominion and 
Our Government at first arbitrary.  Government, next to that of the Paternal, was no doubt the subduing of the weaker by the stronger, who governed those whom they had subdued arbitrarily and despotically, as the Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans, successively did the Inhabitants of this Island, when they mastered them at first, though afterwards they governed them by Laws, but by Laws imposed upon them, and not antecedently consented to or proposed by them.  
When this way of proceeding was first brought in is not expressly set down, for aught I can find in any of our Historians: I am sure it was not so ab initio, from the beginning, as appears by the contrary practice during the Government of this Island by all the aforesaid Nations before the Conquest, nor by the Normans after the Conquest, until the Reign of the aforesaid Henry the First, if it were so then; for that is not expressly, (as to the making of Laws) recorded neither. But because it is expressly recorded, that it was that 
'tis likely the Custom of not making Laws without the People's consent began under Henry I. with that other,  King, who did first call together such an Assembly as was then first and hath been ever since called a Parliament (I mean an Assembly consisting of all the three Estates, and not of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal only, as was the Custom in former times) and because his End in constituting and calling together such an Assembly, was to let the People see that he would not take away 
of not raising Money without their consent.  their Money from them, (as his Predecessors had done, when and how and to what degree they pleased) but would be content with what the People themselves should, by Representatives of their own choosing, willingly and freely of their own accord think fit to give him, believing that the Money so given, would be as much, and perhaps more, but certainly much more easily raised, and less grudgingly paid, than what might by force, against their wills, be extorted from them. This (I say) being one of the Ends, why that wise and prudent Prince did first constitute such an Assembly for the more easy and plausible pretence of raising of Money by the consent of those that are to pay it, it is more than probable that another of his Ends was to make the People more willing to submit and to be obedient to the Laws (when they were made) by making such a Constitution as required the People's consent to the making of them, before they were made; which Constitution hath been continued ever since.  
But that it was at first by Grant from the King, after he was actually King, and not by any 
However it was, it was not by Compact but by Grant.  antecedent Compact betwixt the People, before they were Subjects, and Him (whom they chose or meant to choose for their King) before he was King, is evident from the unanimous consent and testimony of all our Historians, who never make mention of any other form of Government here in this Island but that of Kings, and of King's succeeding immediately one to another, without any Interval or Interposition of any other form of Government, wherein the People were at liberty to choose what Government, and what Governors, and upon what conditions they pleased. But as the Governors of this Nation were always Kings, so the People were always Subjects, and never spoken of in any other capacity but of Subjects; which I note, and desire the Reader to take special notice of, to convince him of the vanity and falsehood of Mr. Baxter's distinction between 
Mr. B. 's vain and false distinction of two capacities in the People, as Free and as Subjects.  the two several Capacities, wherein (as he saith) the People are represented by the Parliament. For first, saith he, the Parliament representeth the People as Free, and (2dly) as Subjects. As the Parliament representeth the People as Subjects; so (saith he) they can do nothing but humbly manifest their grievances and Petition for 
H. C. p. 459.  Relief: but as the Parliament representeth the People as free, so they are to secure the People's Rights and Liberties as their trusties. But what are those Rights and Liberties, that the Parliament as they are the trusties for the People are to secure to them and to maintain for them? Why such (saith he) as when they were Free, and before they were Subjects, they reserved to themselves by an antecedent Compact or Covenant, upon a conditional performance whereof they were content to become Subjects. For I take it for undeniable (saith Mr. Baxter) that the Government is constituted 
H. C. p. 458.  by Contract, and that in the Contract the People have not absolutely subjected themselves to 
Some Rights, he saith, reserved by the People in their Contract, and the Parliament their trusties.  the Sovereign without reserving any Rights and Liberties to themselves, but that some Rights are reserved by them and exempted from the Prince's power; and therefore that the Parliament are their trusties for the securing of those exempted Rights, and so represent the People as Free, so far as that Exemption signifies.   

CHAP. X.  
Mr. B. 's Compact and Reservation of Rights canvassed. The People's Rights, by Donation of the Kings. They had no Representatives till Henry the First.  
THIS Mr. Baxter saith he takes for undeniable; but I say, and have already proved, that in saying so he is very much mistaken, whether by Government he means all Government in general, or the Government of this Kingdom of ours in particular.  
For first, as to Government in general, it is not true that it hath always been grounded upon 
Government not always founded upon Contract, as Mr. B. saith it is.  an antecedent compact or contract, or that the People have not sometimes subjected themselves absolutely to their Sovereigns, without reserving to themselves any Rights, Liberties or Privileges; for the contrary hereof is so certain and so evident that nothing can be more, as appears by what I have already said, not only of Paternal but of Regal Government, and that not only under the first Kings, quorum Arbitria pro Legibus erant, whose wills and pleasures passed for Laws, but under all Kings that have ever since and do now govern arbitrarily and despotically, as many do in all parts of the World; none of which can be imagined to have made any such contract with their People or their People with them, as Mr. Baxter speaks of. The like may be said of Conquerors, and the People subdued by them. If Mr. Baxter replies that it is of such a People as are free and sui Juris, at their own disposal only, that he speaks when he saith, that there is no such People that do absolutely subject themselves unto their Sovereign without reserving any Rights or Liberties to themselves; I say this is false also, whether he mean that no such People can do so, or that no such People have done so.  
For first if a Man that is free may make himself a Servant to whomsoever he will, and such a 
A free People, as well as a free Man, may give up themselves to be governed without any reservation of Rights.  Servant as shall be wholly at the disposing of his Master, without reserving any thing of Liberty or Propriety unto himself, as we see it was ordinary for Men to do, not only among the Gentiles, but among the Jews themselves; insomuch that some of them chose to continue Bondmen, when by the Jubilee they might have been made free; And why may not any number of Men, (whether they be a City or a Nation) being free and sui Juris, or at their own disposing, give themselves up, if they will and think it to be best for them, to be arbitrarily governed by some other more powerful State or Prince without any antecedent compact, condition or reservation?  
2dly, That any free People may do so, it is evident, because some free People have done so: for 
Several free People have done so.  example, the People of Campania, a Province of Italy, being then a free State, subjected themselves to the People of Rome, in this form of words, Populum Campanum, Vrbemque Capuam, Agros, Delubra Deûm, Divina Humanaque omnia, in vestram, 
Grotius de jure Belli ac pacis.  (Patres Conscripti) ditionem dedimus: We surrender and give up into your power, Lords of the Senate, the whole People of Campania and the City Capua, our Lands, the Temples of our Gods, in a word, all whatever concerns either Church or State, God or Man. Et quid obstat (saith Grotius) what hinders why any other People may not subject themselves and all that they have to any one powerful Man or Prince in the same manner? Certainly (saith he) there were many Nations that did so and lived very happily under such a Government; so that if Mr. Baxter thinks that there never was any Government submitted unto by any free People, but upon an antecedent contract and a reserve of some Liberties and Privileges to themselves to be always exempted from the Jurisdiction of Him or them to whom they became Subjects, He is much mistaken.  
But if by Government he means the Government of this Nation of ours in particular, when he saith 
Particularly in our Government no such thing as Contract or Reservation off Rights.  he takes it for undeniable, that it was constituted by Contract, and that in the Contract the People have not absolutely subjected themselves unto the Sovereign without reserving any Rights and Liberties unto themselves, exempted from the Prince's power, for the securing of which the Parliament are their trusties. If this be his meaning I say, I demand of Him first, when was this Nation of ours a free People, and when was it under any Government but that of Kings? surely never since that of the Romans, who governed them as a Province, arbitrarily and despotically, by their Lieutenants whom they sent hither; and so did their British, Saxon and Danish Princes for the most part for aught appears in any of our Historians to the contrary, or if some of them governed by Laws, (as Ina, Alfred, and some others of the Saxon Kings, and Canutus the Dane did,) yet the Laws whereby they governed were all of them made by themselves after they were Kings, and not by way of compact with their Subjects. No more were the Laws of Edward the Confessor himself, which were the Subject matter of Magna Charta, or the great Charter, containing all the Rights, Immunities and Liberties of the People, but 
The People's Rights, not by bargain, but by Grants of their Kings.  not as bargained for by them before their admitting of any of their Kings to be Kings, but indulged unto them and conferred upon them by the Donation and Concession of their Kings; who partly of their own accord, and partly by the Advice of the Lords and Bishops of their Council, did make those Laws in favour of the People, not only without being aforehand obliged by Compact or Contract with the People to do so, but without so much as advising with them or any Representatives of theirs when they did so; there being no such Parliaments, and consequently no such Representatives of the People as there are now, until 
The People had no Representatives till Henry I.  the Reign (as I said before) of Henry the First after the Conquest, for He was the first of our Kings (say our Chronicles) that instituted the form now in use of the High Court of Parliament: for before his time, only certain of the Nobility and Prelates of the Realm were called to consultation about the most important affairs of the State: but he caused the Commons also to be Represented by 
Vid. Daniel's Hist. & Baker's Chron.  Knights and Burgesses of their own choosing, and made that Court (saith the Historian) to consist of three parts, the Nobility, the Clergy, and the Common People representing the whole Body of the Realm. So that before this there were no Representatives of the Peoplé of their own choosing, to be their trusties, for the securing to them their pretended reserved Rights and Exemptions by an antecedent contract or compact made betwixt them and him that was to govern them, whilst they were yet free, and before he was their Governor; and 
Mr. B. 's supposition, a mere fiction.  therefore this supposition of such a compact or contract betwixt the King before He was King, and the People before they were his Subjects here in this Kingdom (which Mr. Baxter saith he takes for undeniable) is undeniably a mere fiction of his own Imagination and Invention, and consequently whatsoever is by him grounded upon this supposition is not only fallacious but altogether false and fictitious also.   

CHAP. XI.  
Mr. B. 's Justification of the late Rebellion from this Compact, etc. The King's Coronation-Oath doth not prove any such Compact, etc. nor can it be proved by any authentic Record. The state of affairs during the Usurpation.  
BUT true and undeniably indeed true it is that the People of England have now and have had long, for many Generations, even from Henry 
The Privileges and Representatives the People now have are not by any antecedent Compact.  the First's time, such Privileges, Liberties and Immunities, as are contained and specified in Magna Charta, and such Representatives in Parliament for the asserting of those Privileges, and to see that no Laws should be made for them without their consent to them; but that they have or ever had them by an antecedent compact with the King before they were his Subjects, is that which I affirm to be false; and consequently that Mr. Baxter's distinction of the People's being represented in Parliament in a double capacity, namely, either as they are now, that is, as they are Subjects, or as they were as first, that is, as they were before they were Subjects, is frivolous and fictitious: for they never 
The People's being represented in a double capacity, as Mr. B. fancies, made an Argument by him, to justify the late Rebellion.  were, nor are now represented in Parliament any otherwise than as Subjects only. And as such Mr. Baxter confesseth that neither they nor their Representatives can do more than complain if they be grieved, and humbly Petition the King that they may be relieved. But as their Representatives in Parliament are the People's trusties, they do represent them (saith Mr. Baxter) not as Subjects, but as they were before they were Subjects, when as Freemen they did contract for the reservation of such Privileges and Immunities unto themselves, which the King was not to violate or take away from them, or if he did attempt to do so, those Representatives of theirs as trusties were to do what they could even by force, if they could not by fair means, to maintain and preserve, or to vindicate and recover those aforesaid reserved Privileges and Immunities, and that the People were obliged to assist them against the King in so doing. And upon this undeniable supposition (as he calls it) he endeavours to justify the late Rebellion; insomuch that he saith he thought he should have been a Traitor to the Parliament, if he had not taken part with them. 
Holy Com. W.   
This supposition therefore being of so very great importance, as that upon the truth or falsity thereof the justification or condemnation of the late War, and consequently of the Bodies and Souls of all those that were engaged in it, doth by Mr. Baxter's own confession wholly depend, he ought to have been very sure, that it had been indeed undeniably true in point of Fact; and that it could by undeniable Records be demonstrably evidenced to be so. For it is not his taking it to be undeniable 
H. C. Thes. 361.  (as he saith he doth) can prove it is so, or will make it believed to be so; neither are the Oaths of Kings, nor the Charters and Laws, in which they 
The King's Coronation. Oath doth not prove any such compact or Reserves, etc. as Mr. B. affirms.  have expressed their consent to govern according to those Charters and Laws, together with the ancient Customs of the Nation, that can prove there was either at first, or at any time since, any such compact or contract, as Mr. Baxter supposeth to have been betwixt the People before they were Subjects, and the King before he was King, and that there were such reserves of such and such Rights and Privileges antecedently conditioned for by one of the Parties and consented to by the other upon penalty of forfeiture of the Crown upon breaking of the Covenant to such or such a degree, and that the Parliament were to be the People's trusties for the securing of the performance of the antecedent Covenant or Contract, and might make War with the King for the breach of it, and that the People were obliged to assist them in it. All which Particulars Mr. Baxter supposeth to be the subject matter of his supposed antecedent Compact or Contract betwixt the Kings of England and their People, and thinks he hath proved it because our Kings swear at their Coronation, that they will govern according to the Laws already made by the Kings their Predecessors, and that shall be made afterwards by themselves in Parliament.  
But first, (as I have observed already) Are not our King's Kings before the taking of the Oath? 
This made out in three Considerations.  Was not out present King so, de jure, by right, many years before he came home? and was he not so the facto, in fact, as well as de jure, by possession as well as by title two years before he was crowned after he came home, and consequently before his taking of the Oath?  
2dly, Is there any thing in the Oath obliging him to the keeping of it, upon penalty of forfeiture of his Regal Power and Dignity, or for the discharging of his Subjects from their Allegiance to him if he do not keep it?  
3dly, Is there any mention or Intimation in that Oath, of the Parliaments or any other trusties for the People, to judge betwixt them and the King, whether he keeps the contract or no, and to question and punish him, if he do not, as the Ephori might do, and did punish the Kings of Sparta, because indeed they were no Kings but in name only; and no more than so would our Kings be neither, if there were any such antecedent contract as 
Mr. B. makes the King, a King in name only.  Mr. Baxter supposeth there is, or if the Parliament were such trusties for the People as he supposeth them to be.  
But it is not his supposing will serve the turn for the proof either of the one or of the other; but he must produce authentic and undeniable Records to verify and evidence the truth and certainty of both. For example, he must in the first place produce some such authentic undeniable 
He hath no authentic Record for such a Contract, as he supposeth.  Record, wherein it is averred that at such a time the People (being then free) did stipulate and contract with him whom they meant to choose to be their King, saying, as he supposeth them to say, We choose You and your Family successively to rule us on 
Holy Com. W. p. 377.  these and no other terms: Accept these terms, or We accept not you. Upon which Terms consented to by him, and so being chosen by them, he obligeth Himself (saith Mr. Baxter) and all his Successors that will rule, that is, (if they will not be deposed) to 
H. C. p. 468.  rule upon that foundation. And upon some such formal contract as this it is that he takes it for undeniable, that the Government of this Kingdom of ours was at first constituted; which if he could make it appear by any authentic Record (as I am sure he cannot) yet that would be but one half of the work he hath to do. For supposing but not granting, that once upon a time, no Man knows when, there was such a contract betwixt the People, whilst they were free, and their King that was to be, that they should have such or such Rights, Privileges and Immunities reserved to them, and that the King upon breach of his part of the Covenant should forfeit his Right to them; supposing I say but not granting all this to be true; yet if he cannot produce some other as Authentic a Record to prove that the Parliament were by that 
Nor for the Parliaments being the People's trusties for their reserved Rights.  antecedent supposed compact or contract (agreed upon by both Parties) to be trusties, and such trusties for the reserved Rights and Liberties of the People, as might in case they were to such or such a degree violated by the King or his Ministers, legally do what the late Parliament did (namely, make Laws without the King, and make War against the King, or those that were commissioned by the King) he shall never be able to excuse them from being in the highest degree guilty of a most illegal and insolent and impudent Invasion and Usurpation of the King's authority in the one, nor of a most Traitorous, avowed, and boldfaced Rebellion against the Person as well as the Sovereignty of the King in the other; and consequently that all that assisted them (whether it were with their hands or with their tongues, with their Swords or with their Pens, with their prayers or with their Purses) were as arrant Traitors and Rebels as they were.  
Whereas if Mr. Baxter can make it evidently to appear that there was such an Original constitution 
Were the Original constitution such, as Mr. B. makes it, the King would not be sole Sovereign nor Sovereign at all.  of Government by such a compact or contract betwixt the People on the one part, and the King and his Successors on the other part, and that by virtue of the said Original constitution the Parliament was appointed and agreed on by both Parties to be such trusties for the People, as he saith the Parliament was, we are now speaking of; and that they might legally do what that Parliament did, for the discharging of their Trust; If he can make this, I say, evidently appear from any authentic Record, I must and will confess that the Government here with us is indeed no Monarchy; and that not only for the reason given by Mr. Baxter, because the whole Sovereignty is not in one Person, namely in the King, but partly in the King, and partly in the Parliament; but also because (according to Mr. Baxter's supposition) the Sovereignty is not at all in the King, but wholly in the Parliament, as it was in the Ephori in Sparta, and as it is now in the Senate of Venice.  
But thanks be to God it is not come to that yet, 
A brief account of the Government and its changes, during the Usurpation, till the Kings Return.  though it were once very near coming to it, when they had gotten an Act to sit as long as they listed, and took upon them to make Laws, to raise Money, and to make War; and consequently to play REX (as we say) by exercising all the Acts of Sovereignty, and by pressing the King to divest himself of them, by making another Act not only to justify what they had done, but to enable them to do the same things for one and twenty Years more. And by that time the Monarchy would have been like an old Almanac worn out of date, and either an Aristocracy or rather a Democracy not only set up, but settled instead of it, as we saw it was assoon as the Monarchy by the Murder of the then Monarch seemed to be quite down; the House of Commons assuming and usurping to themselves the whole Government of the Kingdom without King or Lords (which the Lords as well as the King ought to remember) calling themselves a free State, and behaving themselves as such both at home and abroad for the short time of their Reign; which was until their Servant made himself their Master by making use of that Army for the pulling of them down, which they were forced to keep in pay at the excessive charge of the People for the keeping of themselves up. And then They and the People too saw and felt the difference between a legitimate and legal Monarchy and the despotical Arbitrary Government of an Usurped Tyranny, which made them wish and pray and long for the Return of the right Heir, and the restoring of the right Government, having found by woeful experience that every change they had made, was first from good to bad, and then from bad to worse, and lastly from worse to worst of all (I mean the Rump-Parliament) that so having made trial of them all, they might be the more careful to hold fast the best, if God should be pleased to restore it to them again, which in his infinite goodness and mercy he hath done, and that in a strange and almost miraculous manner by making the Thiefs fall out amongst themselves in dividing of the spoil, that so the true Owner might have, what they robbed him of, again.   
The End of the Fourth Section.   

SECT V.  
An Expedient proposed for the preservation of our Government and Religion, as now by Law Established, from Arbitrary Power and Popery or Presbytery, etc. without Exclusion of the Right Heir.  

CHAP. I.  
People bugbeared with Popery and Arbitrary Government. The Privileges of English Subjects by the Favour and Grants of their KINGS. Their Representatives in Parliament. Grotius thwarts Mr. B. in his main Principle.  
AND now one would have thought that being so lately delivered from so base and 
A serious Expostulation with people for their uneasiness.  shameful as well as heavy and grievous a Bondage, we should not so soon have forgotten what we suffered under a Succession of various Tyrannies, nor so soon have been weary of our Quails and Manna, as to be so desirous, as many of us seem to be, to return to the same, or perhaps (if it be possible) to a worse Bondage than that they were under before; and to that end there be some that do as good as say one to another, as that rebellious backsliding and ever-murmuring Generation of the Jews did; Let us us make us a 
Numb. c. 14. v. 4.  Captain, and let us return into Egypt.  
And why so? why so soon so weary of well-being? Is there any Nation under heaven in a 
No reason for it,  better, nay in so good a condition as we are? Are not we the only People of Europe that are in Peace, when all our Neighbours are in War with one another? Doth not every one of us from the highest to the lowest enjoy the Liberty of his person, the Propriety of his goods, and the fruit of his Industry, without having any of it without his own consent taken away from him? So that if ever it might be said of any, it may now most emphatically be said of us; Happy are the people that are in such a case.  
Yes! may some men say, if we were sure to continue always as we are; but we are afraid we 
The pretended ground of it.  shall not; we are afraid of Popery, we are afraid of Arbitrary Government, which may take away all we have from us, that is or aught to be dear to us.  
But why should we fear, where no fear is? Is not our Religion, our Liberty, and our Properties 
The ill effect of causeless fears.  secured unto us by the Laws? and by such Laws as can never be repealed but by our own consents? Did not such a needless fear as this make us rebel against our late Gracious Sovereign Lord the King, and by that Rebellion make our fellow Subjects, nay the basest and vilest and meanest of our fellow Subjects, to be Lords over us? And if ever we come into such a slavery, or any slavery at all again, it must be by such a Rebellion produced by such a pretended fear, or by a Foreign Invasion invited by our divisions amongst ourselves, that must be the cause of it.  
Never was there a better Constitution of a Government than ours is; nor ever was there better security 
The Constitution of our Government.  for the keeping of it as it is, than we have. Never were there Subjects that had more and greater, or so many and great Privileges as 
The Subject's Rights and Privileges.  the Subjects of England have; neither do our Kings deny them to be of right due unto them, as appears by the late King's answer to the Petition of Right; but due unto them not by capitulations and contracts with them, before they were Subjects; but either by Donations or by Concessions of our Kings to them, when they were and as they were their Subjects.  
Neither is it denied, but that the People now have and of right aught to have Representatives 
Their representatives in Parliament.  in Parliament of their own choosing: But that this was not nor could not be always so, and that it was by the King's mere Grace and favour when it first began to be so, appears by what I have already observed concerning the first Parliament (properly so called) here in England, instituted by Henry the first, and as Daniel (one of the most judicious of our English Historians) tells us, after the manner of Normandy.  
But that ever since it hath been so I deny not neither; namely, that the People have had, have, and aught to have such Representatives in Parliament of their own choosing, but to represent them, not as they were (no body knows when) as Freemen before they had Kings or were under any Government at all, but as they are now and have been ever since, and were long before there were Parliaments, I mean as Subjects, and consequently such as Mr. Baxter confesseth have no other lawful way of redressing their Grievances, if they have any (though never so great or so many) but their Representatives complaining and petitioning the King for the relief of them; and 
The duty of those Representatives.  that either by desiring him to put the Laws in execution, already made in favour of them (as they did in the late King's time by the Petition of Right) or to Enact (if need be) new Laws for explanation and confirmation of the old ones, or to punish those, by whom the Legal Rights and Privileges of the People have been Violated. All this I grant the People's Representatives in Parliament may, and if there be cause for it ought to do, and that not as they are the People's Representatives only but their trusties also: nay and 
How to act as trusties also.  more than this, namely, not to promote or give their consent to the making of any such Laws as may be prejudicial to the public, though they may seem to gratify, or may seem to be serviceable to the People; nor to hinder the passing of such Acts as are really for the People's good, though perhaps to the Major, that is, the most unwise and least judicious part of the People themselves, they may seem to be otherwise. And therefore their Representatives and trusties as they are to consent or descent, so are they to judge for them what is or what is not to be consented to by them in behalf of them. They are not always the best Husbands for the People that are most sparing of their Purses; especially when the refusing to part with some may hazard the loss of all. Neither is every thing that is got from the King, a gain to the Subjects; for the King's power may be too little to protect, as well as too great, to oppress them; and according to the present conjuncture, the former is much more to be feared than the latter: And therefore the best service that can be done for the People by their Representatives in Parliament is to keep the Balance even betwixt the Prerogatives of the Sovereign and the Privileges of the Subject, by not 
An even Balance to be kept betwixt Prerogative and Privilege.  endeavouring to entrench upon the one or to enhance the other, but always and above all things to remember that as they are themselves Subjects, so they are Representatives of Subjects, and trusties for Subjects, as they are Subjects; and therefore are not to treat the King as if they were Coordinate or Copartners with him in the Sovereignty: but as it becomes Subjects and the Representatives of Subjects, and such as have the honour of being there in that capacity, and have the liberty of promoting or hindering the Laws that are to be made for those they represent, from the mere Grace and Favour and Goodness of the King and his Predecessors; and therefore the King is not by them, nor by those they represent, to be esteemed to be less a King, or less their King, or less their Sovereign, than he was before; no 
The King compared to a Father and a Husband.  more than a Father is less a Father or hath less the Authority of a Father, the kinder and more indulgent he is unto his Children; or a Husband hath less of the Authority of a Husband the kinder or more indulgent he is to his Wife.  
And therefore it is well and prudently observed 
Two observations of Grotius,  by Grotius, first, Non desinere summum esse imperium, etiamsi is qui imperaturus est, promittat aliqua 
De jure Belli & Pacis, cap. 3. p. 81.  subditis aut Deo, etiam talia quae ad Imperii rationem pertineant. Sovereignty or Sovereign power doth not cease to be Sovereignty or Sovereign power, though the Sovereign do restrain himself, either by promise to his Subjects, or by Oath to God, even in such things as are essential to the Government; And therefore (Secondly) he observes likewise that, Multùm falluntur qui existimant, cum Reges Acta quaedam sua 
lb. p. 83.  nolunt rata esse, nisi à senatu aut alio coetu aliquo probentur, partitionem fieri potestatis. They are very much deceived (saith he) that think that because there be some Acts that Kings will not have to be ratifyed, unless they are approved or consented to by a Senate or some such assembly, that therefore there is a partition of the Sovereignty. Mark that, Mr. Baxter, and tell me whether any thing can be more apparently 
Applied to Mr. B's. main principle.  contradictory to your Main Principle of the Soveraignty's being divided, betwixt our Kings and their Parliaments, and to the main and only reason you give for it, namely, that our Kings do not, (or, if you will, cannot) make Laws for the People without their Parliaments, or without the People's Representatives in Parliament consent to them. For the only reason why they 
How it came that Laws are not to be made without a Parliament.  cannot is, because they have obliged themselves by promise to their People and by Oath to God at their Coronation, that they will not. For ab initio non fuit sic, from the beginning of our English Monarchy it was not so, as I have at large showed, and as I have proved likewise that this and all other Privileges of the People had their beginning from the bounty and goodness of our Kings to their People, when they were their Subjects; and not from any bargain or contract of the People, before they were Subjects, with any of their Kings, as Mr. Baxter fond as well as falsely imagines, without any proof or offer of proof out of any of our Historians or Records for it. Whereas the truth is, that all our Kings, except the British (of whom we know nothing of certainty,) I mean all our Kings of the Saxon, Danish and Norman Races, coming in by Conquest, were not only Monarches, but Despotical Monarches, that is, such as governed arbitrarily without any Laws at all but that of their own will and pleasure; or by such Laws as they made with or by the advice of such as they thought fit to advise with, which were never any of the common People, or any Representatives for them, until after the Norman Conquest. And then indeed the Despotical began to be a Political Monarchy by 
When our Monarchy began to be Political.  Henry the first's constituting of such a Parliament as we now have; and by his Successors granting and confirming the Great Charter, and by all of their obliging themselves successively to continue to the People the Privileges granted unto them by that Charter; and to govern by such Laws as have been made by their Predecessors, or shall be made by themselves with the consent of the People's Representatives in Parliament. By these Grants I say and concessions and condescensions of our former Kings, and by the confirmation of them by their Successors etc. the Monarchy which was at first Despotical, is become Political, being changed from an absolute and arbitrary to a regulated and Legal Government; yet so as it is still a Monarchy; that is, it is still, the Government of one over all, and one who is accountable to 
Yet still a Monarchy.  none under God; which are the only essentials requisite to the constituting of Monarchy; the Governing Arbitrarily or Legally, with, or without Laws, being but Accidentals to it only.   

CHAP. II.  
The English Government, a Monarchy, however managed. The excellency of our Constitution set forth.  
NO more is the subordinate Managery of it in such a manner as may seem to have something of Aristocracy or Democracy mingled with it, which, saith Grotius, was the cause of Polybius his Error; Qui ad mixtum genus reipub. 
A mistake in Polybius. Grotius de jure Belli & pacis, lib. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 19  refert Romanam rempub. quae illo tempore, si non actiones ipsas, sed jus agendi respicimus, merè fuit popularis. Who will have the Roman Commonwealth to have been a mixed form of Government when it was merely popular or Democratical, because he looked at the managery of it only, and not at the Authority whereby it was managed; not considering that both the Authority of the Senate, quam ad Optimatum regimen refert, which Polybius refers to an Aristocratical, and that of the Consuls also, which he refers to a Regal or Kingly kind of Government; subdita erat Populo, were at that time equally subject unto the People; and consequently notwithstanding this show of mixture in the managery of that Government, the Government itself was not a mixed Government in relation to the Sovereignty 
We are to judge of a Government, not by the Managery, but by the Sovereignty of it.  of it, or to the fountain of Power in it, which gives not only the formal denomination, but the Essential specification to all Political Governments whatsoever: Grotius therefore, what he saith of the error of Polybius in judging the Roman to have been a mixed Commonwealth when it was not, will have it be understood of all those Writers of Politics, who upon the same grounds are mistaken, as Polybius was. For idem de aliorum Politica scribentium sententiis (saith Grotius) 
Ib.  dictum volo, qui magis externam speciem & quotidianam administrationem, quam jus ipsum summi Imperii spect are congruens ducunt suo instituto. What I said of Polybius, saith he, I would have to be understood of other Writers of Politics, who think the looking at the outward and ordinary administration of Affairs, rather than at the right itself of the Supreme Power, to be more agreeable and conducing to their end in writing, (that is) to the derogating from the Supreme Power of Monarchy, either by embasing it with the mixture of some less noble species of Government with it, or to weaken and enfeeble it by dividing of it. For what other can be the meaning of these words of Grotius than this, either as they are in the Text, or in relation to the context? And if this be his meaning, what could he have said more pertinently to prove the Government here 
This Rule applied to the English Monarchy.  in England to be a mere Monarchy, and consequently the Sovereignty to be wholly in one person, not withstanding any thing Mr. Baxter hath said or any man else can say to the contrary.  
And that it is not now, as it was at first, an absolute arbitrary and Despotical, but a regulated legal and Political Monarchy we owe to the mere grace and favour of our Kings; and I wish that as it was gratia gratis data, a grace freely given, on their parts; so it may be gratia gratos faciens, a grace that may make us grateful, on our parts also.  
And certainly it would be so, if the Subjects of England did but know or would but consider 
The happy condition of English Subjects.  in how much more happy a condition they are or may be if they will, (and would be if it were not for their seditious Preachers) than any other Subjects in the World are, or ever were, I had almost said or indeed can be, under what Government soever, if they be not situated as we are: Because no Government upon the Continent can be safe from being suddenly invaded and overrun by its confining Neighbours, if he or they that have the Supreme Power be not enabled to raise such Forces and Money to pay them without staying for the advice or consent of his or their Subjects, as may be sufficient to defend them from their Enemies, and which being raised may be made use of for the oppressing of their Subjects: Whereas we being Islanders entrenched and surrounded by the Ocean, and consequently not being in danger of being suddenly surprised and overrun by any from abroad, our Kings have obliged themselves to raise no Money (without which no formidable Forces can be raised and maintained) by any Taxes or Impositions upon their Subjects without their own consent in Parliament, thereby securing both the liberty of their Persons, and Property of their Goods unto them, and that they shall never be put to any charge but for the necessary defence of themselves, and for their own safety and welfare, as well as for the Honour of the King and their Country.  
This, together with many other Privileges which the Subjects of this Kingdom have above 
An Account of a Sermon, the Bishop preached before the Long Parliament, in commendation of the English constitution, both in Church and State.  all other Subjects in the World that I know or ever heard of, made me presume (when I was One of the four first that was appointed to preach to the House of Commons of the Long Parliament in the late King's time) to tell them and to endeavour to prove unto them that the Constitutions both of Church and State, as they were here by Law established (abstracting from the ill managery which might be in either through the faults or frailties of some particular men) were both of them the best in their kind that were in the Christian World: that of the State for the reasons before specified, and that of the Church because it was the only Church (now extant) that professed and maintained both the Apostolic Doctrine and Apostolical Government: All other Christian Churches in the World, East, West, North, and South, failing either in the one or in the other, or both of them; and besides, because the Government of our Church was more agreeable with Monarchy, and with such a Monarchy as ours is, than either Popery, or Presbytery, or Independency is, or any other that can be devised by the wit of Man is or can be. And therefore I did hope they would not think of making any change or alteration in the legal and fundamental Constitution either of Church or State, but only to rectify what they should find to be otherwise than according to the legal Constitution it ought to be in either of them, by causing the Laws of the one and the Canons of the other to be put in execution. This I say I presumed to preach to the then House of Commons, as fearing there were many amongst them that were given to change, though not such and so horrible a change as they made afterwards both in the Church and State: For truly could I have foreseen, and had told any of their Grandees then (though it had been Cromwell himself) as the Prophet Elisha told Hazael that he and those that joined with him should do such things as afterwards he did, he would I believe have answered me as Hazael did the Prophet, What, do you think I am a Dog, that I should do such horrible and barbarous things as you speak of? And yet both of them I mean Hazael and Cromwell did such things afterwards; so dangerous a thing it is to leave the Road and to wander in by-paths: For as Grotius well observes, Verissimum illud, omnia incerta esse simul ac à jure recessum est: No man knows whither he is going when he is once out of the right way, nor whither the Devil may drive him, when he will not be led by God's direction. And therefore I concluded, that in my humble opinion the best and wisest prayer that any could make unto God in the behalf of this Church and State, was, that if either of them had swerved from what it was or ought to be according to its legal constitution, it might be reduced to its right frame and temper according to the standard; and that never Alteration or Innovation might be made in the fundamental constitution of either of them.  
And this Declaration I thought myself obliged in conscience to make, though I knew well enough that many of my Auditors would be displeased with it, as indeed they were, as I found by their usage of me afterwards, though then it was too early to make any show of it; and therefore I was presented with a Piece of Plate with this Inscription, Donum Populi Anglicani, as the other first three Preachers were, but not desired, as they were, to print my Sermon.  
I repeat this matter of fact to let the World 
The reason, why this Account given.  know that, though I was then by some thought and said to be a Puritan, as I am now by others thought and said to be a Papist, I was then, and ever had been, as I am now; and am now as I was then, and by the grace of God ever will be, a true Son of the CHURCH of ENGLAND, as it was then and is now by Law established; and consequently a loyal Subject to the King, whatsoever either Papists or Presbyterians may think, or rather make others believe they think of me. I am sure mine own conscience bears me witness, that I was always what I pretended myself to be, and all that knew me heretofore, and do know me now (whether Protestants, Papists or Presbyterians) will I am confident bear me witness that I was always as I am now both in judgement and practice, in relation both to the Secular Government of the State and the Ecclesiastical Government of the Church, and to the Monarchical Government over them both.  
Over them both I say; for there being two main parts or members of every Body Politic, and 
Church and State both subject to the Monarchy.  consequently of Monarchy (especially amongst Christians) namely the State Civil and the State Ecclesiastical; if both these Parts or States of the Body Politic be not governed in chief by one and the same Person, they cannot be said to be parts or members of the same Monarchy.   

CHAP. III.  
A like danger to Monarchy from Popery and Presbytery. Our Church-government justly commended. Division-mongers or Separatists as justly censured.  
BOth these States are not nor cannot be governed by one and the same Person, where the 
Popery and Presbytery both destructive to Monarchy.  State Ecclesiastical or Government of the Church is either Popish or Presbyterian, because the State Ecclesiastical, if it be Popish, will be governed in chief by none but the Pope; and if it be Presbyterian (Presbyterian I mean in the height, as it was in Scotland, and would have been in England) it will be governed in chief by none but itself; the one, to wit Popery, introducing another Sovereign; and the other, to wit Presbytery, introducing another Sovereignty into the same body Politic, and consequently they are both of them destructive unto Monarchy.  
Neither can a Prince be Sovereign so much as in civilibus, in civil affairs, as long as another besides himself (either abroad or at home) doth claim and exercise a Sovereignty over the same Subjects, though it be but in Ecclesiasticis, in Church-affairs only.  
Because those that pretend to a Sovereign Power in Ecclesiasticals, (as indeed both the Conclave and the National Synod do pretend) must needs pretend likewise to a Sovereign Power of judging what is Ecclesiastical, and consequently by affirming what they please to be Ecclesiastical, they may govern how they please even in those things that are merely Civil also.  
So that supposing two distinct Supreme Judicatories, one Civil and the other Ecclesiastical in 
Two Supremes in one Kingdom inconsistent.  the same Body Politic or in the same Kingdom, (as there must needs be, if the Government of the Church be either Popish or Presbyterian) there cannot choose but be perpetual clashing betwixt those two Jurisdictions and the abettors of them, the one continually either affronting and undermining, or being affronted and undermined by the other.  
And then let it be considered how the People in the mean time (who in several respects must be supposed to be equally subject to them both) must needs in case of contrary commands (there being no Appeal from the one unto the other) be distracted and confounded betwixt them both; it being impossible (as Christ himself tells us) for a man to serve two Masters, of the which one is not subordinate unto the other; and as impossible likewise it is (as the same Christ tells us) for a Kingdom divided within itself, and consequently against itself (as every Kingdom having two Sovereign Powers in it at the same time must needs be) to stand, that is, to continue firm and stable without falling at one time or other into such terrible Convulsions of Schisms, Factions and Seditions, as will finally bring it to Dissolution.  
Many sad Instances of this truth we read of in 
History and Experience have taught us the inconvenience of the one and the other.  our Chronicles whilst the usurped and exercised Ecclesiastical Supremacy in this Kingdom was in the Papacy, but none so sad, as those we ourselves have seen and felt of late, whilst the Presbytery exercised in Scotland, and in England laid claim to, the same power. For indeed Popery and Presbytery (though they look divers ways with their Heads;) yet they are tied together like Samson's Foxes by their Tails, carrying the same Firebrands of combustion, wheresoever they come, I mean the same Principles of Sedition and Rebellion against Sovereign Princes and Estates, if they will not be ruled by them.  
And therefore as our King's Predecessors, to redeem themselves and their People from the slavery 
No fear of either's Return.  of the Papacy, did wisely and courageously drive out Popery; so it is not to be doubted but his Majesty that now is, to prevent the same or a worse bondage to the Consistory, will with the same wisdom and courage keep out the Presbytery; as being indeed where it governs in chief (as it would do wheresoever it is) a bondage by so much worse and more ignominious than Popery, by how much worse it is to be subject to many Tyrants than to one, and by how much less it is ignominious for a King to be a Vassal to a foreign Prince, than to all or any of his own Subjects.  
But thanks be to God, we have no reason to fear that either our King or Parliament will ever think of introducing either Popery or Presbytery to be predominant here amongst us, having had so sensible an experience formerly of the one and lately of the other; especially being already possessed, as we are, of such an Ecclesiastical 
A just commendation of our Church-Government.  Government, as was instituted by Christ and his Apostles, universally received and approved by the Primitive Christians; and by Law established amongst ourselves: a Government pretending to no power at all above the King, nor to no power under the King neither but from him, and by him, and for him: a Government enjoining active obedience to all lawful commands of lawful Authority; and passive obedience when we cannot obey actively, forbidding and condemning all taking up of Arms offensive or defensive by Subjects of any quality or in any capacity against their Sovereign (whatsoever he be either in regard of his Intellectuals, or his Morals, or his Religion) in any case, upon any pretence, or upon any provocation whatsoever: Finally, such a Government as hath no relation to any foreign Prince or State to protect or assist it from abroad, nor any foundation in the Body of the Common People to rise up for it or with it at home; but having all its dependence under God upon the Crown; and all its security in and by the Law; and consequently if at any time it happens to transgress against either, (as some times by the faults or frailties of particular men, I will not deny but it may) yet even then or in that case it will easily be corrected and reduced into order; and that by the ordinary course of Justice, without charging the Subject or endangering the Peace of the Kingdom by levying a War to suppress it; and without fear of an Invasion from abroad, or an Insurrection at home in defence of it; which cannot in the same case be probably affirmed of either of the former.  
Having therefore such an excellent constitution of Government both Civil and Ecclesiastical as we 
What duty we owe to such a Constitution.  have, and both of them by Law established, that which we have to do in the first place, is to be thankful to God for it, who hath not dealt so with any other Nation, and then not only to live quietly and peaceably and contentedly under it for the present; but to do what we can in our several places and stations for the upholding and perpetuating of it, that our Posterity may have cause to bless God for it and for us also. And to that end in the first place to mark those (as the Apostle advises us 
* Rom. c. 16. v. 17. ) that make divisions amongst us, by libelling the Government either of the Church or State, either in their Pamphlets, or in their Pulpits; and to mark them so, as to set a Mark upon 
A mark to be set upon Dividers.  them, as men not to be followed but avoided by us, though they pretend never so much care of us or kindness to us. For such as these they were, who (as the Apostle tells us in the aforesaid place) did then as these do now, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, by good words and fair speeches deceive the hearts of the simple. And the way not to be deceived by them, is, not to hearken to them, by resorting to their illegal Conventicles, and forsaking our own Legal Assemblies and Congregations, as the manner of some is: (Hebr. 10. 25.) And what manner of Men those are that do so, another Apostle tells us, 
The Character of Separatists. Ep. Judas, v. 16.  They are murmurers, complainers, walking after their own Lusts, and their mouth speaketh great swelling words, having men's Persons in admiration because of advantage. Whereunto, to complete the Character of them, he adds, These he they that separate themselves, sensual, not having the 
V. 19  Spirit; which is as much as if he had said, though there be none that do more or do so much pretend to purity or having the Spirit as the Separatists do; the only cause of their separation being, as some of them say, the sensuality and want of the Spirit in those from whom they separate: yet indeed the cause of their separation is because themselves are sensual, and have not the 
They are sensual.  Spirit, or because they know not what spirit they are of; for as there be many kinds of Spirits, so there be many kinds of sensuality also; for Pride, and Envy, and Malice, and Slander, and especially speaking evil of Dignities, and covetousness, and every other inordinate or immoderate Affection are sensualities, as well as carnal Lust and Drunkenness; and so is Separation itself also. For when one saith I am of Paul, and another I am of Apollo's, are you not carnal? saith the Apostle 
* 1 Cor. 3. 4. . And are not (say I) all that are carnal, sensual? So that it is not men's saying or thinking they have the Spirit will prove they have the Spirit; nor their calling themselves the Godly Party, will make them to be the Godly party; but their very being of a Party proveth them to be Schismatics; and their being Schismatics proveth them to be ungodly. I am sure every one of the Parties appropriating the Spirit unto itself, and being so 
What Spirit it is guides them?  divided as they are both in Doctrine and Worship amongst themselves, is a demonstration that they are not inspired or guided by one and the same Spirit; or that they have not the Spirit of Unity, nor consequently the Spirit of Sanctity, nor of Holiness neither, how boldly or boastingly soever they may pretend to it. But Mundus vult decipi, the World hath a mind to be deceived: for as long as there are Broachers of lies, there will be Believers of lies; for as the Father of lies tempts some to be the Teachers, so he tempts others to be the Believers of them. And therefore unless the Spirit of falsehood and division and sedition, be by 
The ill Consequence, if that Spirit be not restrained.  the Spirit of truth of unity and of concord, cast out of them, that seem to be possessed with him (which is above all things to be wished and prayed for) or those that are so possessed be kept from infecting others by teaching and printing with that intolerable licence as they do, and have done for so many years together, we are not to expect to be long without another Civil War; and whether the effects of that will not be as bad or worse than the former, no man can tell: I am sure we are not always to expect miracles; I mean such a miraculous deliverance as we have once had from so many several sorts of arbitrary and Tyrannical Governments as that War brought us to, or rather as we ourselves brought ourselves to, by that Rebellion, and as such a rebellion as that was may, and nothing but such a rebellion as that was can (probably and humanely speaking) bring us to again.   

CHAP. IU.  
An Expedient proposed to secure the Government both in Church and State, viz. some such Law, as the Scotch Test. The Heir of the Crown's being a Papist or a Presbyterian, etc. comes much to the same pass.  
FOR the preventing whereof, why should not 
The late example of the Scots recommended.  we follow the example of the Scots in that which is good, as well as we did follow their example in that which was evil? We took such a Covenant as they did, in order to the making and helping us to make such a War against our King and theirs, as they did, and for the alteration of the Government and Religion established by Law in both Kingdoms. And why should not we make such a Law as they have now made for the preservation of their Government and Religion, as it is now by Law established amongst them? why should not we, I say, make such a Law for the maintenance and preservation of the Government and Religion established by Law amongst Us also? 
Their Test.  I mean such a Law, whereby all Men are disabled 
Vid. the Acts and Laws made in Scotland. when the Duke of York was the King's Commissioner there. An. 1681.  and made uncapable of any Office or Place of Power and Trust, either Military or Civil or Ecclesiastical; as likewise of being chosen themselves, or of choosing others, to be Members of Parliament, as will not take such a Test and Oath as they have taken in Scotland; that is, never to give their consent to the Alteration either of the Religion or of the Government either in Church or State, as it is there by Law established. Such a Law as this, and no worldly means but such a Law as this, will secure us and our Posterity from all that we fear or pretend to be afraid of; especially from Arbitrary Government and Popery, and from Presbytery too. For the Heir of the Crown may be a Presbyterian, or an Independent, or an Antinomian, 
The Heir of the Crown being a Presbyterian, etc. all one case, as his being a Papist.  or an Anabaptist, or a Socinian, and may be every whit as great a Zealot and as much a Bigot in any of those persuasions, as any Papist can be in his; and consequently be as zealous and industrious to promote, bring in, and set up his Religion for the Only or at least for the Predominant, Religion of the State, as any Papist can be to bring in Popery; and consequently to suppress all of any other persuasion but his own, and that perhaps with as bloody a persecution as ever any Papist did, when he hath as much power to do it.  
Of this One of the Sects hath given us proof more than enough already, I mean the Presbyterians, who for the setting up of their Dagon instead of the Ark of God, and for the abolishing of Monarchy in the State as well as Episcopacy in the 
Just Reflections upon the Presbyterian Covenant.  Church, entered into that Antichristian League and Covenant with the Scots, whereby both Nations were engaged in a bloody War with and against one another, of which the execrable effects, as no Act of Oblivion can ever make to be forgotten, so can they never be remembered without horror, nor indeed should be remembered without detestation of the procatarctical or promoting causes of it; of which the most principal and most energetical was that Presbyterian Solemn League and Covenant, for the setting up that Idol of theirs, the Presbyterian Government; for which they were so peremptorily and pertinaciously zealous and ambitious, that in all their Treaties with the late King, one of the conditions of Peace always was the abolishing of Episcopacy, and setting up Presbytery instead of it; without consenting whereunto, and without taking of the Covenant, as the Scotch Presbyterians did refuse the late King, so the English Presbyterians would, if they might have had their will, have refused the present King to reign over them; as might be made appear by the Consultation had amongst the Grandees of that Party to that purpose, till they found 
General Monks conduct praised.  it would be in vain to stand upon such terms, the Noble and never to be forgotten General, the late Duke of Albemarle, being resolved to bring in the King as a King, without condition; and therefore as well for that, as for his whole most prudent as well as loyal and courageous Conduct in that great affair, I think that which was said of Fabius Maximus, may be as properly and truly verified of him. 
Vnus homo nobis cunct ando restituit rem.   
That is, One Man by his wary conduct hath restored our State and welfare.  
And I wish it were engraven in Golden Letters upon his Tomb, ad sempiternam rei memoriam, for an everlasting Memorial.  
But to return unto what I was speaking of; what I have said already is enough to prove, that a Presbyterian Heir of the Crown would do what 
The Sectaries will not endure Us nor one another.  he could to bring in and set up the Presbyterian Government, (which can no more consist with Monarchy in the State, than it can with Episcopacy in the Church) and make us all Presbyterians; as well as a Po●ish Heir would to bring in Popery, and to make us all Papists. And that they would not suffer any that would not conform to them and comply with them is evident, not only by what they did against us, that were as they called us Cavaliers and Malignants, but against their own Brethren in Iniquity, the Independents and all the rest of the Sectaries, their Fellow-Rebels against the King, and Companions in Arms against Us; all of whom they would have suppressed as well as they did Us, if it had been in their power to do so; as appears by their Books, Sermons and Addresses to that (which they called a Parliament) against them.  
And what the Presbyterians did against us, and would have done against the Independents by the Parliament, the Independents did against them by the Army. And so no doubt would any other of the Schismatical Parties have done against all the rest that were not of their persuasion, if they had got the power into their hands.  
But none of them (may some of their Friends 
They and the Papists much alike, as to cruelty.  say) would have been so cruel as the Papists, who hold it not only lawful but meritorious to put Heretics, that is, all that are not Papists, to death.  
Did not the Presbyterians and Independents, and the rest of the Sectaries that joined with them in the War against the King, think so too, when they killed as many as they could of the Royal Party, and when their Preachers encouraged them to do so, which he that doubts of let him read Evangelium armatum for his conviction.  
But that they will say was but in the heat of blood, whilst the War lasted; afterwards they suffered us to live amongst them. And so (say I) do the Papists too, and to enjoy not only their lives, but their liberties and their legal possessions and goods also, in many, nay in most places where there is no Inquisition; which was more than we of the Church of England (especially we of the Clergy) were suffered to enjoy here under the Reign of either the Presbyterians or Independents. And whether they would not have proceeded 
Their Principles much what the same,  to blood, as well as the Papists, upon the account of Religion only, I have reason to doubt; or rather I have no reason to doubt but they would; for as it is a Popish opinion that all Heretics are to be put to death, and that all that are not Papists are Heretics; so it is a Presbyterian opinion that no Idolater is to be suffered to live, and that all Papists are Idolaters, as likewise that all the Bishops and Episcopal Party of the Church of England are Papists, and consequently Idolaters, that is, such as by the Law of God are to be put to death.  
And if they did not put this doctrine in practice here, as they have done in Scotland (witness the 
And practices too, upon occasion.  murder of the late Primate there upon the account of Religion only, whatsoever the first printed Narrative of that horrid Fact said to the contrary) it was because their reign was so short, and because they were not so well settled in their Dominion, as to think it safe for them to proceed so far. The Church of Rome herself did not at first proceed with that extremity of Rigour against those she calls Heretics, as she did afterwards. It is but of late that the bloody Inquisition was set up by the Church of Rome, and that but in some places. And was not that of the Tryers here 
The Tryers a kind of Inquisition.  in England, in order to the depriving Men of their livelihoods though not of their lives, some such thing? And who can tell whether it might not have proceeded to deprivation of life also, as well as the Roman Inquisition doth, if it had gotten power and authority enough to support it?  
We know that the Anabaptists, who made a great part of that rebellious Army against the late 
An Instance from the Anabaptists.  King of blessed Memory, were a Sect that did profess at first that it was not lawful for them to defend either their Goods or their Lives, though never so injuriously threatened or attempted to be taken away from them by any, though not their Superiors, but even by Thiefs and Pirates; insomuch as they would not carry Guns in their Ships, when they went to Sea, for fear of being tempted to make resistance in defence of their Goods or of themselves, by having wherewithal to do it. And yet I have been credibly informed, that there were none in that rebellious Army, whose feet were more swift and their hands more ready to shed blood than theirs of that Sect were, as fearing to offend God by doing his work negligently; or that their own lives should go for theirs, if they spared or suffered any to escape, whom it was in their power to kill. So that now, as one of their Officers said lately, The Sword is become a good Ordinance of God in its season. And of the same mind with the Anabaptists (if they be not yet) may the Quakers 
The like may be judged of the other Sects.  and all the rest of the Sectaries come in time to be also, together with those merely moral Philosophical Christians (I mean the Socinians) themselves, how much soever they seem for the present to dislike the propagating of Religion by force; which there is no Sect but doth profess also, whilst they want power to practise it themselves; It being as natural for all sorts of Heretics and Sectaries to endeavour the propagating of their opinions, by making as many Proselytes as they can, as it is for single Persons to desire and endeavour the propagating of their kind by natural Generation.   

CHAP. V.  
The Exclusion of the right Heir, contrary to the Law of God, both Natural and Positive.  
SUpposing therefore (but not granting) the present 
The danger, if the Heir of the Crown be of any other Religion, alike, as if he be a Papist.  Heir of the Crown to be a Papist; as I will not deny but that he may (as long as he continues to be so) wish and desire that all were of the same Religion; so they that would have him excluded upon that Account, must needs grant likewise, that if any Heir of the Crown after him, or at any time hereafter shall chance to be of any other Religion than that established by Law, and consequently as desirous as a Papist can be to change or abolish that and bring in his own in the stead of it, which may be as bad or perhaps worse than Popery, (as I take not only Paganism (whatsoever Julian the Apostate saith to the contrary) but Socinianism to be also.) They must grant, I say, that upon the same account whosoever shall be of any other than the established Religion, must be excluded from succession to the Crown, for fear of the alteration he may possibly make of the established Religion in the Church, and probably of the established Government in the State also. Which I confess to be a thing of such dangerous consequence, that it ought to be prevented and provided against by any lawful effectual Means 
What Means to be used, to prevent this danger.  that can be made use of to that purpose; especially where the present constitution of the Church and State is such as ours is, that is such a one, as I think (all things considered) there cannot be a better; and therefore I say it will become the wisdom of the State to prevent (as much as by humane prudence it may be prevented) any alteration either of the Religion or of the Government (I mean as to the essentials of either of them:) but than it must be by the use of such Means as are lawful and effectual.  
And first the Means that must be made use of to prevent such an alteration must be lawful, evidently and undoubtedly lawful, and that both in relation to the Law of God, and in relation to the Law of the Land also.  
But the excluding of the right Heir from his Inheritance seems to be contrary to both; and 
The Exclusion of the right Heir, against the practice of all Nations;  by the right Heir, I mean the firstborn, or him that is nearest in blood to him that is, or was for, merly in possession. And that such a one hath a right of succession, from which God would not have him to be excluded, appears by the almost universal practice of all Nations in all Ages and in all Places, which Practice being every where and almost the same among those, that in all things else differ so much from one another, must needs proceed from some Principle common to them 
And consequently against the Law of Nature.  all; and what can that be but the Law of Nature? and what is the Law of Nature but the Law of God himself written in men's hearts?  
And therefore it was according to this Law (before there was any positive Law of God or Man in the case) that Jacob in blessing of his Children 
Jacob 's three eldest Sons forfeited their Birthright.  before his death did acknowledge Reuben's right of Primogeniture, by saying that his was the excellency of dignity and the excellency of power, because 
Gen c. 49. v. 3, 4.  he was his firstborn, if he had not forfeited it by defiling his Father's Bed, and consequently by committing Incest as well as Adultery, crimes punishable by death, even in those days; as appears by Judah's condemning his Daughter-in-Law Thamar to be burnt, supposing her to have been an Adulteress. And it was for a crime punishable by death also, that Simeon and Levi the two next eldest Sons of Jacob lost the privilege of their Birthright also; namely for being guilty of the horrible murder of the Inhabitants of the whole City of Shechem. And thus the dignity of Excellency and the dignity of Power came to be the Inheritance of Judah, Jacob's fourth Son, because the three Elder Brothers had forfeited their Right thereunto by being guilty of such Crimes as were punishable by death: which guilt of theirs being given by their Father Jacob as a reason why, or cause for which they were disinherited; from thence we may infer, first, that naturally or according to the Law of Nature the Eldest; and consequently the next in blood hath a right to inherit before those that are younger, or those that are farther off: And (2dly) That they are not to be 
Two Cases of disherison.  excluded from that right of theirs, but for some very great crime, or unless God, who disposeth of all things as he pleaseth, do prefer the younger before the elder, as he did Jacob before Esau, Ephraim before Manasses, and David the youngest before all his elder Brethren; though Isaac, and Joseph, and Samuel himself seem to wonder why he did so, it being contrary to the dictates of Nature and the general practice of all Mankind; and contrary to the general Positive Law of God himself also 
The Right of Inheritance, according to God's positive Law.  concerning the descent of Inheritances from Father to Son; and if he have no Son, to his Daughters, and if he have no Daughters to his nearest Kinsman of his Family, as is set down at large, Numb. 27. from Verse the 8th. to the 12th. compared with Deuteronomy the 21. v. 16. where it is said that if a Man have a younger Son by a Wife that he loves better than he loved her by whom he had his eldest Son, he shall not make the Son of his beloved Wife the firstborn, (that is, his Heir) before the Son of the Wife whom he hated, who is indeed the firstborn or indeed his eldest, and therefore indeed and in right his Heir: which right it seems by the Text his Father could not deprive him of or take from him, unless he were so rebellious and incorrigible as that he was to be stoned by the People and put to death for it, as may be gathered from the Verses immediately following in the aforesaid Chapter. So that it seems it was not by the Positive Law of God, in the power of the Father to deprive his eldest Son of his Birth right for any thing less than would deprive him of his Life; neither was a younger Son to be preferred before the eldest, as to the Prerogatives of Birthright, because he was a better Man or a better Son; because the Prerogative of Birthright was not founded in Grace, but in Nature; and therefore though Cain was graceless and impious, and Abel a righteous and religious Person, yet God tells Cain that he was to rule over Abel, which he could have no right or title to, but because he was his elder Brother; and so was profane Esau to rule over Jacob upon that Account only, if he had not sold him his Birthright, and with it his Right and Title to Lordship over him.  
And as this was the way of succeeding in the Government of Families, so was it in the Government 
The like in succession of Kingdoms.  of Kingdoms also; generally amongst the Gentiles as they were led by the light and instinct of Nature only, and particularly amongst the Jews by the Positive Law of God, as appears by the Catalogue and Genealogy of the Kings of Juda, where the eldest of the Sons did always succeed his Father in the Kingdom without interruption, unless God himself (who is King of Kings) was pleased to interpose, as he did in the succession of David to Saul, and of Solomon to David, which were both of them Acts of God's Prerogative, and not according to the ordinary course of Law amongst the Jews, as appears by Solomon's answer to his Mother Batshebah when she spoke to him to let his Brother Adonijah have Abishag the Shunamite to Wife; Ask for him, said he, the Kingdom also; for he is mine elder Brother: which is a 
1 Kings c. 2. v. 22.  plain confession of Solomon himself that according to the ordinary course of Law then in force. Adonijah 
A donijah his Case, and why Solomon preferred to the Throne.  should have succeeded David in the Kingdom, had not David (who was a Prophet as well as a King) known God's mind to the contrary: And indeed God had made known his mind unto David concerning Solomon by Nathan the Prophet, when assoon as he was born he called his name Jedidiah, that is, beloved of the Lord, thereby making David to understand that he was designed to succeed him in the Throne. Whereunto may be added that perhaps Adonijah was confederate with Absolom (whose Brother he was by the same Mother) in his rebellion against David, and consequently had forfeited what was due to 
1 Kings c. 1. v. 6.  him by his Birthright, being guilty of what he deserved to be put to death for, though by reason of his Father's fondness of him he was not put to death for it. 
Ibid.   
But whether this, or God's Intimation of his pleasure to David by Nathan the Prophet, were the reason that Solomon the younger Brother was preferred before Adonijah the eldest to succeed David in the Kingdom, it is evident by Solomon's aforesaid answer to his Mother, and by the constant course of succession in that Kingdom, that there, as well as in all other Nations, the eldest Son or nearest in blood was legally to succeed in Thrones as well as in Families, and do so still, and are of right to do so in all Hereditary Kingdoms: from which right grounded upon the Law of Nature, attested by the general practice of all Mankind in all places, and in all ages, and ratified by God's positive Law to his own People; I see not how any man can be excluded without some kind of Violation of the Law of Nature, or without some kind of unbecoming Reflection upon the Positive Law of God itself, as if God had not made as good and as wise a Law to obviate all inconveniences for his own People, as any People could make for themselves.   

CHAP. VI  
Such Exclusion, against the Law of the Land also; and were there or could there be such a Law, it would be unjust in the present case, and of dangerous consequence.  
BUT if it be said that several Nations, according 
Granting that the Judicial Law obligeth none but Jews;  to several Climates they live in, may be of several Inclinations and dispositions, and therefore that a Law which may be very proper and useful for one sort of People may not be so convenient for another, and consequently that the Judicial Law which God gave to the Jews, though it were best for them, it may not be best for us or for any other Nation: nay, because it was best for them it cannot be best for all other Nations or for any other Nation, that are naturally of a contrary or of another kind of temper or constitution than they were; so that the Judicial Law of the Jews obligeth none but those for whom it was made, and to whom it was given, God having left it free to those that have the Legislative power in every Nation to make such Laws, as they think most proper and most effectual for the well governing themselves; so that they command nothing that is forbidden, nor forbid nothing that is commanded by the Moral Law of God.  
Be it so, and be it supposed likewise though not granted, that there is nothing in the Natural or 
The Exclusion of the right Heir is contrary to the Law of the Land.  Moral Law of God against disinheriting of the right Heir of an Hereditary Kingdom: let us see whether there be any Law of the Land, or any legal way according to the constitution of this Kingdom of ours, that can warrant the doing of it; unless the Heir of the Crown be guilty of some such crime, as by Law is a forfeiture of his Life as well as his Birthright; which one Case excepted (wherein the present Heir of the Crown is not so much as pretended to be at all concerned)  
I demand first whether there be any Law now in being for excluding the right Heir of this Hereditary 
No such Law now in being;  Kingdom, upon the pretence that is alleged but not proved against him: for if there be no such Law, there can be no such transgression, because every 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must be (as St. John tells us) an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, every transgression must be a transgression of some Law or other; and where there is no Law there is no Transgression, saith St. Paul.  
If it be said, that though he cannot be excluded, by any Law already made, yet a Law may be made by Act of Parliament which may exclude him; I demand again, whether according to the fundamental and essential constitutions of Parliament there can be any Act of Parliament, or any Law made by Act of Parliament, without the Lords and the King's consent to it, as well as that 
Nor can be made, without the King's consent;  of the House of Commons? if not, as yet there is not, so more than probably there will never be any such Act pass, or Law made, the King and Lords having already declared their dissent from it.  
But (3dly) supposing the King and Lords should agree with the House of Commons to make a Law for the excluding of the next Heir of the Crown, upon such an account as never any Heir of the Crown was excluded before, nor by Law to be excluded; and consequently for which he could not foresee that he deserved or was to be excluded; I demand by what reason, justice, or equity that 
Nor, were it made, would be just, in the present Case.  Law can be prejudicial to him, or to any right of his, all Laws being to look forwards, and not backwards, (that is) to enjoin or prohibit something for the future upon such or such Penalties for the disobeying of them, but not for the punishing of any thing that was done before there was any such Law for the prohibiting of it; so that supposing, but not granting that by such a Law the Heir of the Crown might justly be excluded from the succession for the future; yet he that is Heir at present, and was so before any such Law was made, cannot (as I humbly conceive) upon such a pretence be excluded without violence done unto the Law, as well as injury done unto himself.  
If it be said that Salus Populi est suprema lex, the safety of the People is the supreme Law, and that the safety of the Kingdom doth require that as such a Law should be presently made, so it should be presently executed also; I answer that the Supreme Law is, That no evil should be done that good may come thereof; and besides that, the safety and peace of the Kingdom would in all probability 
The dangerous consequence of such a Law.  be much more endangered by the putting or attempting to put such a Law in Execution, than it is yet, or I hope ever will be, for want of such a Law, the present execution whereof would for fear of but a supposed uncertain future evil (which many things we do see, and many more we do not see may hinder) put us into a real, a certain, and a present as evil a condition, as any we seem to be afraid of, and desirous to prevent; I mean a present Civil War; and perhaps a Foreign War too. And then Dic mihi quis furor est ne moriare mori? Tell me, what madness is it to kill one's self for fear of being killed? I say, what a madness is it to run into a present greater evil, to prevent a less, that is to come, and probably may not come at all?   

CHAP. VII.  
Supposing such a Law, it would not be effectual for the keeping out of Popery and Arbitrary Government.  
TO conclude, supposing such a Law should be justly made and justly executed upon the preset Heir of the Crown; and supposing too that Inconvenience from abroad and at home should not follow upon it for the present: How would this secure us from the bringing in of Popery for the future, unless the Act or Law should be made to extend to the excluding all future Heirs of the Crown as well as the present, that might be suspected 
Such a Law, if made and executed, would not be effectual against future Heirs.  to be Papists, though not legally proved to be so? Would it not be easy for any future Heir of the Crown to defeat the efficacy of it, and to avoid the Execution of it upon himself, by concealing his being of that religion till he was King? And then it is a known Maxim of our Law, that the Crown takes away all defects in him, I suppose it means, that is the rightful Heir to it, and against whom (after he is King) as no force can be used without a Rebellion, so no Law can be made without Vsurpution; the one being the taking of his Sword, and the other the taking of his Sceptre out of his hands: so that if such a Law be made to extend to the exclusion of all future Heirs of the Crown as well as the present, it would not be effectual for the keeping out of Popery, and much less for the keeping out of Arbitrary Government; or for the securing of the Protestant Religion; unless we shall say that nothing but Popery can bring in Arbitrary Government, which is to lie against our late experience to the contrary, 
Arbitrary Government may be brought in by other ways, as well as by Popery.  when Tyranny, and Tyranny in the highest degree, and under many several sorts of Tyrants, was brought in without Popery, and the Protestànt Religion of the Church of England was not only suppressed and persecuted, but endeavoured to be quite extirpated, and for ever to be abolished, by the greatest pretenders of enmity to Popery; though indeed the greatest of its Friends, and the most likely to be a most effectual means to bring it in, by their then endeavouring to overthrow, and by their now endeavouring to undermine the strongest Bulwark, the Protestant Religion truly so called hath in the World against Popery, I mean the Protestant Religion of the Church of England.  
And as this Church of ours according to the present legal constitution of it, both as to Doctrine 
A brief commendation of the Church of England and the Civil Government.  and Government, is the best fenced of any Church in the World, not only against Popery, but all other Heresies and Schisms; some of them as bad if not worse both in their speculative and practical opinions than Popery itself is: So the legal constitution of our civil Government also is, (I verily believe) the best Government now extant in the World, or perhaps ever was or can be for the keeping out of Tyranny or arbitrary Government; of what disposition or religion soever the Prince or Governor in chief (for the time) shall happen to be of, so the legal established constitution of the Government be not altered.   

CHAP. VIII.  
The Scotch Test an Assurance that there can no change be in Government, either of Church or State. The case of Protestants in Queen Mary's time much different from what it is now.  
FOR preventing whereof the best, and (as I verily believe) the only effectual means, that can be devised and put in practice, is (as I said before) the making of such an Act of Parliament here in England as is lately made in Scotland, viz. That for the future no Man shall be capable of any 
The Scotch Test proposed, to keep out Popery and Arbitrary Government.  place, power, trust or profit, Military, Civil or Ecclesiastical; or to choose or be chosen a Parliament man; but he that will take such a Test, as is there specified, (viz.) That he will never give his consent for the alteration either of the Religion or the Government by Law established in the Church and State. Which being once enacted, I for my part cannot foresee how either Popery or Arbitrary, I might add or any other Government or Religion prejudicial to the rights either of King or Subject, can be brought in amongst us, but by an absolute conquest of the whole Nation.  
For as for Popery and Arbitrary Government 
Which upon the supposition of such a Law, cannot be brought in;  (the pretended Objects of our present fears) that they will be brought in by a Popish Successor, (supposing there be any such) if he be not excluded, the aforesaid Act after it is enacted will make it impossible for him to effect it, though he have never so strong an Inclination or desire to do it.  
For if he endeavour to do it, it must be either by force or fair means; if by force, it must be either 
Neither by force,  by an Army of his own Subjects or of Foreigners; if by an Army of his own Subjects, it must be an Army of Papists only, which being not one to 500 in proportion to the rest of the Nation, and all of them excluded by the aforesaid Act from all places of Power or Trust, will make but a very inconsiderable handful of Men to attempt, and much less to effect any thing by force against the Body of the Nation, whom we are to suppose to be obliged by the aforesaid Act not to consent to, and much less to assist the bringing in either of Popery or Arbitrary Government.  
So that if it be by force, it must be by an Army of Foreigners, and such an Army as shall be able to subdue the whole Nation; and then he that brings them in cannot choose but fear they will subdue us for themselves, and not for him; and therefore will take heed of running such a hazard for any consideration whatsoever.  
We are not therefore to fear it will be attempted to be done by force: Nor that it can be effected if it should be attempted to be done by fair 
Nor by fair means.  means neither, that is, by Law, or by making any Act of Parliament for the introducing of Popery, when there shall be an Act before in force to prevent any Man's choosing or being chosen a Member of the House of Commons, that is not obliged by Oath never to give his consent to the passing of such an Act, and all Popish Lords are already excluded from voting in the House of Lords.  
But why may not a Popish Successor cause both these Acts to be repealed? as Queen MARY did, 
An Objection from what Queen Mary did.  for the Reducing of Popery, those that were made by Her Brother Edward the Sixth, for the Excluding of Popery?  
I answer, because of the vast difference between those times and these. Then the Protestant Religion 
The Case much different then, from what it is now.  was but begun to be planted in this Kingdom, and had not taken root enough for the settling and growth and continuance of it, much the major part of the People being still Popishly affected in their Hearts, though they were by the Laws then in force restrained from the open profession of it; as appeared by their so readily and so gladly returning (as most of them did) to it, and by their not only accepting but desiring and purchasing the Pape's Absolution for revolting from it. So that it was very easy for Queen Mary to make that Alteration which she did by repealing such Acts and Laws as she found in favour of the Protestant Religion, and to re-enact or restore such as were for the establishment of Popery, which she found to have been repealed by Her Predecessor. And to make this work of hers the more easy, she did and could without any legal impediment to the contrary bestow all places of Trust, Power and Profit, Civil, Military and Ecclesiastical upon such as were as zealous as she herself was for the suppressing of the Protestant, and setting up of the Roman Religion instead of it.  
Whereas now the Protestant Religion has been settled here in England for above fourscore years before the Rebellion and above twenty years since, and the Popish suppressed for twenty years longer, even during all the time of the Rebellion itself, whilst the Sectaries usurped the Supreme Power, and whilst the Protestant Religion of the Church of England was suppressed and persecuted also. But all that while Popery was kept down and Presbytery was set up, and spread itself so much in and over all parts of the whole Kingdom, that we have much more reason to fear the alteration of Government both in Church and State by setting up of Presbytery 
Prebytery more likely to alter the Government than Popery.  instead of Episcopacy in the one, and of a Commonwealth instead of Monarchy in the other, than Popery or Arbitrary Government under a King in either; as long as the Laws we have already against both are in force, whereby all Papists are made uncapable of having any thing to do in the Government as it now is, and of doing any thing towards the alteration of it by repealing or giving their votes for repealing any of those Laws that are in force against Popery, or for the making of any new Laws in favour of it, being (as I said before) excluded from sitting in either of the Houses; without the consent of the major part of which Houses the King himself (though he be the sole Lawgiver or sole maker of our Laws properly speaking as I have proved at large already) can neither make nor repeal Laws; but is according to the legal constitution of this Kingdom obliged, and has obliged himself neither to make any New Laws nor to repeal any Old ones, nor to Govern any otherways than by such Laws as are in force and have been or shall be so made, that is, with the consent of both Houses of Parliament, either by himself or by His Predecessors. So that there wants nothing to perpetuate our happiness under the best Government that ever any People did or can live under, but to be assured that never any change (as to the species and essentials of it) shall be made in it; And such 
Such a Test will be an assurance of no change to be.  an assurance (as far as any thing in this world can be assured) the making of such an Act here for the taking of such a Test (as is already made and taken in Scotland) will give us, of what Persuasion soever in point of Religion, or of what Inclination soever in point of Government, the Successor to the Crown at any time may chance to be, especially after he hath taken the Coronation Oath to Govern no otherwise than by Laws made and to be made by Act of Parliament.   

CHAP. IX.  
The Coronation-Oath alike dispensable, whether the Successor be a Papist or a Presbyterian. Mr. B. 's judgement of our Government, and his wish for better order in choice of Parliament-men; with the Bishop's judgement what ought to be their main Qualification.  
IF it be objected that if the Successor be a Papist, there is no Oath he can take, but he 
An Objection; that a Popish Successor will be absolved from his Oath.  may be and will be by the Pope easily and willingly absolved from the Sin in taking it, and from the Obligation to keep it.  
I answer first, that the same Objection will be as valid against a Presbyterian as against a Popish 
The thing the same if a Presbyterian.  Successor; for that the Classis as well as the Conclave can dispense with the obligation of Oaths, we have seen and felt too: For what was the imposing of the Solemn League and Covenant, but a discharging of those that took it, by those that persuaded them to take it, from being any longer obliged by the Oanths of Allegiance and Supremacy, which they had formerly taken?  
But Secondly, my answer is, that I do not ground 
The full ground of that Assurance of no Change to be in the Government.  the Assurance of the continuance of our present Government either in Church or State, either wholly or chiefly upon the Successors keeping of his Coronation Oath (of what persuasion soever he is or may be) but upon the a version which 99 parts at least of an 100 of the whole Nation have from Popery and Arbitrary Government, and upon the Laws already in force against both, and upon the supposition of such a new Law to be made here as there is in Scotland for the preserving and securing of the old ones: viz. That no man be capacitated to choose or be chosen to be a Parliament-man, before He hath taken that or such another Oath as that, which by the aforesaid Act of Parliament in Scotland is prescribed and enjoined to be taken. Which Oath why those that fear the bringing in of Popery and Arbitrary Government should not be very willing to take, I can see no reason, unless they would bring in something else as destructive to the present Government as Popery itself: and then I see no reason neither why they should not be excluded from choosing and being chosen members of Parliament as well as the Papists are? For why should any that are Enemies to the Government, one way or other, be put in a capacity either to undermine the foundation or to weaken the props and the Pillars of it? or to make any substantial alteration in it? considering (as Mr. Baxter himself confesseth) That for aught he sees the Government of 
Mr. B. 's own commendation of our Government.  this Commonwealth (I presume he takes the word Commonwealth not as a specifical but a generical Notion, as it signifies any body Politic) is already balanced with as much prudence, caution and equality, 
Vid. H. Com. p. 207.  as the curiousest of the models that self conceited men would obtrude with so much ostentation.  
And that by Government of this Commonwealth 
What he means by the Government of this Commonwealth.  he means the Government of this Kingdom, not as it was governed by a State before the Usurpation of Cromwell the Father, or by the Army and Rump-Parliament, after the deposing of Cromwell the Son, but as it was to be Governed according to the Legal constitution by King, Lords and Commons, that is, by a King Governing by Laws made with the consent of the Lords and Commons in Parliament. I take this (I say) to be Mr. Baxter's meaning by that which he calls the Government of this Commonwealth: because in other places he seems not only to dislike but abhor 
Vid. H Com. from 89. to the 104 page.  the Government of a Commonwealth in a specifical Notion, that is, as it signifies a Democratical or popular Government, for no fewer than 20. several reasons; at the end of which (he saith) I conclude therefore that this Ignorant, impious, mutable, cruel, violent rout shall never have my consent for the Sovereignty: and in another place (as I have already observed) he saith that although the two Houses of Parliament, as having (he thinks) a part of the Sovereignty, may lawfully in defence of that part of theirs make War against the King, or those commissioned by the King; yet though in that contest they get the victory, they do not thereby gain the whole Sovereignty to themselves, nor cannot alter the former constitution, but must have the same, or some other King in his stead; whereby it plainly appears that by the aforesaid Government of this Commonwealth, as he cannot mean a Democratical or popular, so he cannot mean an Aristocratical or a Parliamentary Government without a King. And therefore if he will sibi constare, hold to what he saith, and not contradict Himself (as he does in many other things) by that Government of this Commonwealth, which he saith is already balanced with so much prudence and caution, he must needs mean this political regulated Monarchy of ours, which we now enjoy; and consequently that it ought not to be changed for any other form, frame or model of Government, which the curiosity of self conceited men (saith Mr. Baxter) he might have said, or the Ambition of Proud, or the greediness of Covetous, or the malice of Discontented, or the Bigotry of Heretics, or the peevishness of Schismatics, may endeavour to obtrude upon us instead of it. For preventing whereof, I could wish (as he doth in the same place) that some better order were taken for the Exclusion of unworthy persons 
His wish for better order in Election of Parliament-men. H. Com. W. Page 27. & 208.  from Electing or being Elected members of Parliament, that so (says he) being out of danger of impious Parliaments, chosen by an impious Majority of the People, we should then build all the Fabric of our Government on a Rock, which else will have a foundation of Sand: And then a multitude of errors would thus be corrected at once, and more done for our happiness than a thousand of the new Fantastical devices will accomplish.  
Euge, well said again Mr. Baxter! No man can 
Wherein the Bishop agrees with him.  more heartily say Amen than I can to this wish of yours, that none were to choose or to be chosen Parliament-men, but those that were worthy to choose and to be chosen; nor no man can more fully concur with you in this Opinion than I do, That such a Parliament so chosen would be more effectual for the Establishment of our Government upon a Rocky or impregnable foundation, as likewise for the correcting of such errors and miscarriages, as by reason of the ill management of the best Government, are, or possibly may be in it, and consequently for the making of us more happy than any new Fantastically devised model of Government can do. In all this, I say, I agree with Mr. Baxter; But in the Notion of who are worthy or unworthy to choose or to be chosen, I am afraid we shall differ very much; for perhaps Mr. Baxter and those of his Party may think those that 
Whom Mr B. perhaps thinks worhty to choose or be chosen.  are Dissenters from the Government of the Church are the only worthy men to choose and to be chosen Members of the Parliament; I am sure by that stir and stickling they have made in the late Elections for Knights and Burgesses in all Counties and Corporations it appears they think so. Whereas I am of opinion that none but such as are conformable 
Whom the Bishop thinks such.  in point of Judgement and well inclined in point of Affection to the present Government both in Church and State, as to the species or kind of either, (that is, as the one is Monarchical and the other Episcopal) is fit to choose or to be chosen a Parliament-man, and consequently that none of those that are not well affected to the present Government are fit to choose or to be chosen, though they pretend never so much to be the Godly party; nay though they were indeed as good and Godly men as they say they are, and would have others believe them to be. For though as Moses wished, that all the Lords people were Prophets, and yet did not think them to be so; so I wish that all good and Godly men were wise and prudent men also, but I cannot believe they are so; nor consequently that they are sufficiently qualified either to be Statesmen themselves, or to discern who are fit to be Statesmen. And unskilful though well meaning Workmen may be marring whilst they think they are mending, and pluck down more in a day than wiser men can build up again in a year. And therefore the Fabric of our present Government being so good a one as that Mr. Baxter himself by preferring it before any new Fantastical mode or model that can be devised, or obtruded upon us, doth as good as confess there cannot be a better; certainly the main care that is to be taken by the wisdom of the State is to prevent the alteration or change of it: And consequently the main Qualification 
The main qualification of a Parliament-man.  to be required in those that choose and are to be chosen to be Statesmen, is their being obliged to maintain and uphold the present Government as it is by Law established (I still mean as to the species or kind of it) and then as wise and good men may find work enough (without meddling with removing or moving of Foundations) to mend the faults that are, and to prevent those that may be in the superstructure: So those that are not so wise as they should be, nor so good as they would seem to be (and those are the men most likely to be meddling) will not be able to do any great harm, so long as the foundations themselves are secured from being undermined or overthrown by them.   

CHAP. X.  
The excluding some Persons from choosing or being chosen into Parliament, no injury. The Test reinforced upon this account that, if the Successor consent to it, it cannot but hold good.  
IF it be objected that the making of such a Law would be the excluding of many of the Freemen 
An Objection against the Test.  and Freeholders' of the People from one of the greatest of the privileges of their Birthright, namely, the choosing and being chosen Members of Parliament.  
I Answer, that if the security of the Government and the Peace and Welfare of the Kingdom require 
A threefold Answer.  it, and the Majority of the People's representatives (without which it cannot be done) consent to it, it is no more than in many other cases is done already.  
Secondly, I answer, that in this very case All the Papists (who if they be not a great number, I wonder why we should be so much afraid of them) all the Papists (I say) who are all of them Freemen, and as Freemen have a right to choose and be chosen into the House of Commons, and some of them by Birth to be Peers of the Realm, yet are all of them excluded from both Houses, and so are all Outlawed and Excommunicated persons, and such are or should be all the Sectaries that will not come unto our Churches.  
Thirdly, Did not both Houses of Parliament make it one of the conditions of Peace with the late King, that none that had served him against them should be capable of sitting in either of the Houses for Twenty one years to come? And why might not the King with much more reason have demanded the exclusion of all those that had fought for the Parliament against Him from the same privilege? Or why may not those that will not oblige themselves by Oath to maintain the Government legally established by King, Lords and Commons be much more reasonably, and much more justly and equitably excluded from having any thing to do in the Government, or in the making of our Laws than those that would not take the Oath of Abjuration and of being faithful to the Government, as it was illegally set up without King and Lords, were excluded not only from choosing or being chosen into Parliaments, but from having any protection or benefit of the Laws by the upstart Free-state, (as they called themselves) but were indeed no better than Rebels and Robbers.  
It is not therefore to be doubted but that such a Law, as is made in Scotland, may by the same Authority 
A reinforcement of the Test;  respectively be made in England and in Ireland also; Neither is it to be doubted but that such a Law, if it were made, would be the best security that can be given against the bringing in of Popery or Arbitrary Government; especially if the rightful Successor will not oppose but promote the making of such a Law here, as I do verily believe, and as all reasonable men have reason to believe, he will; because he did not only consent to, but promote the making of that Law in Scotland. And if he be willing not only to 
* Which if consented to by the Successor, no reason to believe but it will be kept.  consent to, but to promote the making of such a Law here, why should we not believe that he intends and resolves to keep it and maintain it also, whatsoever his own private persuasion in point of Religion may be for the present (for God may and I hope will persuade Japhet to dwell in the Tents of Shem) or continue to be for the future? For if he did not intend and resolve it should be kept when it is made, and consequently that Popery and Arbitrary Government should be kept out by it, nothing could be more imprudent than to promote the making of such a Law, whereby all that have or are to have interest in the making and repealing of Laws, and in all places of trust and power, Civil, Military and Ecclesiastical, in both Kingdoms, are to be obliged by Oath never to consent to the alteration of the Government, as it is now by Law established, nor consequently to the bringing in either of Popery or Arbitrary Government; which Oath when they have taken, as they cannot be dispensed with for the breaking it, if they would, so they would not if they could; being such as are to be supposed to be enemies both to Popery, and Arbitrary Government, and therefore such as would do, what legally they could, for keeping out of both, though they were not sworn, and much more being sworn to do so. And therefore it is not to be supposed that the Successor intends or means to attempt the bringing in of either of them, if he be willing such a Law should be made, as will make it exceedingly difficult, if not utterly impossible for him to do it. Let us try therefore whether He will not consent to the making of such a Law here, as willingly as he has done in Scotland, and let the consenting or not consenting to the making of such a Law here, as there is there, and the taking, or refusing to take such an Oath, as by that Law is prescribed to be taken by those that are to choose, or to be chosen Members of Parliament for the future, be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the mark of trial, whereby to Judge who are friends and who are enemies to the present Government, and who are most likely to desire and endeavour an alteration of it.   

CHAP. XI.  
Some of Mr. Baxter 's Principles, grounds of Rebellion. An unhappy Instance of difference about Privilege betwixt the two Houses of Parliament.  
AND thus I have done with what I thought myself especially concerned to do, namely, the justifying of my Exceptions against those Political Theses in Mr. Baxter's Holy Commonwealth, whereby he endeavours to justify the Rebellion 
A Recital of some of Mr. B 's Principles, by which he justifies the late Rebellion;  against the late King, and to countenance and encourage any Rebellion upon the same grounds against this or any other of our Kings for the future. For first, if the Sovereignty was divided then betwixt the King and the two Houses of Parliament, so it is now, and so it will be always as long as the present constitution of our Government shall continue. Secondly, if where the Sovereignty is divided they that have any share in it, may by force of Arms defend their part of it against whosoever attempts to take it from them. Thirdly, if the two Houses are to be believed and assisted by the People, whensoever they shall declare that the King takes away or attempts to take away their part of the Sovereignty, (all which are Mr. Baxter's Political Aphorisms or Maxims of State) doth it not follow that when and as often as there is a corrupt Majority in both Houses (as Mr. Baxter grants there may be, and we by woeful experience have found there has been) doth it not follow, I say, from these Principles of Mr. Baxter's, that the 
and by which upon the like occasion Rebellion is encouraged for the time to come.  People not only may, but are obliged to rebel and take up Arms against the King, whensoever a factious Majority in both Houses shall declare there is, though really there is no such cause as they pretend there is to do so? Nay if there be but such a factious ill principled or ill affected Majority in the House of Commons only: For it is the House of Commons which Mr. Baxter means, when he talks of the People's Representatives and trusties whom they are to believe, and whom they are to assist. And they are (says he) the Representatives and trusties of the People not only in the Condition 
The Parliament how the People's. Representatives and trusties, in Mr. B. 's sense.  of Subjects as the People are now, but likewise in the Condition of Contracters, as they were before they were Subjects, and as such did by contract reserve to themselves such and such Privileges and Exemptions from Regal Jurisdiction, which the House of Commons (as they are their trusties in that Notion) are bound to defend, as they (the People) are bound to assist the House of Commons in defending of them. And the representing the People by the House of Commons under this Notion, together with their having a part of the Sovereignty as well as the House of Lords, is by necessary consequence from Mr. Baxter's principles, to justify the People's making War not only against the King, but against the King and House of Lords also, if they shall not agree to whatsoever the House of Commons shall propose as an Original reserved right of their Representees as they were Contractors, and before they were Subjects. And of their Original reserved rights they may 
The People's Rights and Privileges.  pretend to as many as they please; for it is but their saying they are so, and the People must believe them to be so; because they are not their Representatives only, but their trusties also; and therefore it is by their Eyes (says Mr. Baxter) that 
H. Com. W. p 471.  the People are to see, and by their Ears that the People are to hear, and by their Declarations that the People are to judge whether their Rights and Privileges be invaded or no, and whether they be such rights and privileges as were granted by our Kings, after they were Kings to their People, as graces and favours to their Subjects; or such as were contracted for with Him that was to be King before he was King by those that were to be his Subjects before they were his Subjects. For it seems by Mr. Baxter's distinction, that the People may take Arms against the King to defend or recover the one, but not the other: And therefore it were to be wished that we had an Authentical Catalogue of those we may fight for, that we may not be Rebels before we are aware; as likewise it were to be wished also that we had a Catalogue of the Privileges of both Houses of Parliament, 
The Privilege of Parliament.  that knowing them we might take the better heed of offending against any of them; especially considering how great a crime it may be and how great a punishment it may deserve, if either or both the Houses are partakers of the Sovereignty with the King. As likewise for another (and in my humble opinion) a very weighty and important reason; namely to prevent the Kings not being able to govern by Parliament, though he be never so willing and desirous to do so; as when there is a difference betwixt the two Houses concerning privilege, there the order is that whatsoever business they are about, of what concernment or importance soever, it must cease, and nothing must be done until the difference concerning Privilege be decided; which being no other way to be decided but by one of the Houses yielding to the other, (for neither the King nor the Judges are admitted to umpire betwixt them) if after Conference upon conference they finally adhere on both sides (as they did in the case of Dr. Sherley's appealing 
An Instance of an unhappy difference betwixt the two Houses concerning Privilege.  to the House of Lords from a Decree in Chancery, wherein one of the House of Commons was concerned) there is no more to be done that Sessions, though Hannibal were add portas, knocking at the City-gates, though the business they were about before were of never so public, or never so necessary a concernment, as indeed that which we were about then was; namely the passing of an Act for securing the Government both in Church and State by taking such a Test, as the aforesaid Test that was lately enacted to be taken in Scotland, and which would undoubtedly have passed in the Lord's House at that time, if some that desired an alteration in both, had not thrown that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that stone of offence betwixt the two Houses; which as it was done to hinder what we were a doing then, so that or the like may be done at any time by either of the Houses to make any Parliament useless and fruitless, though there be never so present, or so great need of it, and though the King and the People do never so much desire the contrary; unless there be some means devised and consented to by both Parties to adjust the difference betwixt them, as there is betwixt all other differing Parties but these only; or unless the Privileges of each of the Houses be so particularly enumerated and clearly stated by the consent of both of them, that there may not be any difference betwixt them upon this account for the future.  
If I have been too bold in saying what I have said in relation to either of the two Houses of Parliament, I humbly beg pardon of them both; for Si peccavi, peccavi honestâ ment, if I have offended in it, I have done it out of an honest meaning; I am sure I did not intend to lessen the dignity, or power or privileges of either of them; Good luck have they with their Honour! but all that I said upon this Subject hath been to vindicate the King's Sovereignty over all His Subjects, of all denominations and in all capacities whatsoever; which I am sure may well enough consist with whatsoever Power or Privilege can by the legal constitution of this Kingdom be claimed by either or both Houses of Parliament.   

CHAP. XII.  
The Kings making our Laws, no disparagement to the Parliament. The several ways of justifying the taking up Arms against the King. The danger of Mr. B. 's Principles that way.  
WHereunto if it be objected that by making 
In what sense the King sole Lawgiver.  the King sole Lawgiver, or the sole Lawmaker, I seem to take away the greatest of all the Privileges the two Houses have, and which it most concerns all the People of England they should have; I answer, it were true indeed that I did so, if by saying the King is the sole Lawgiver or the sole maker of our Laws, I meant he could make what Law he pleased; but when I say withal, that although whatsoever is Law is made by the King to be Law, yet he cannot make any Law, or any thing to be Law without the consent of both Houses to it, or to his making of it; by giving to Caesar what is Caesar's, by giving to the King what belongs to the King, I take away nothing from either of the Houses that belongs unto them, or what is requisite for them to have for the securing of themselves and the People from Arbitrary Government; for which end it is abundantly sufficient, that the dissent of either of the Houses can hinder the making of any Law, though the consent of both of them cannot make a Law; for that would destroy the Monarchy, not by dividing the Sovereignty betwixt the King and the two Houses, which is really impossible, but by vesting the Sovereignty wholly in the two Houses, and consequently by taking it wholly from the King; whereas the power to hinder the making of Laws without their consent being vested in the Houses, and the power of making Laws with their consent being vested in the King, the Sovereignty and Majesty that is due to a Monarch is reserved to the Prince, and as great power and Authority (as Subjects are capable of) is communicated to the two Houses, and their Liberty and Property which is due to them, is secured to all the People: which blessed frame and temper of our English 
The blessed frame of English government.  Government is such, as no wiser can be devised, nor no better can be desired, and such as no Nation but ours under Heaven is or can be (unless it be situated as ours is) so happy as to enjoy; and therefore such a one, as if it were well understood, and seriously considered by us, it would make us first to be truly and heartily thankful to God for it; Secondly, to live obediently, quietly and contentedly under it, and consequently not only to be content but desirous that such a Law as I before spoke of should be made to prevent the alteration or change of it into any other form or frame of Government whatsoever.  
And in the mean time not to give ear or credit to any of those seditious Preachers, or Pamphleteers, 
A caution against seditious Preachers and Scribblers.  who do what they can to disaffect the People to this excellent Government as it is by Law established; and only to this end, that as they have once already, so they may now again make such an alteration in this Government, as to turn the Monarchy into a State, and Episcopacy into Presbytery; which because they think it cannot be done now, but as it was done then, namely by a Rebellion; therefore as they did always, so they do still maintain that it is lawful for Subjects in some cases to 
Several ways to prove it lawful to take up Arms against the King.  take up Arms against their Sovereign, though some of them take one way to prove it lawful, and some another; for some will have a middle kind of power betwixt the King and People to be umpires or Arbitrators between them, whose Arbitrement if the King will not submit to, they may by force compel him with the assistance of the People, and the People are bound to assist them in so doing; this is CALVIN's way, whereunto he adds 
Calvin 's way.  that fortassè Ordines Regni in Angliâ, that perhaps the Parliament in England are this middle sort of Magistrates: Others will have the King and the two Houses of Parliament to be Coordinates, and 
Herl 's way.  that any of the two is to overrule the third, and consequently the two Houses of Parliament to overrule the King if They agree and He will not; this was HERL's way, one of the Prolocutors of the Westminster Assembly, called together by the two Houses in the Rebellious Parliament: But Master BAXTER will have the Sovereignty divided betwixt 
Mr. Baxter 's way.  the King and the two Houses, or betwixt the King and the Parliament; and will have it to be lawful for either of the Parties to defend its own Right by force, if it be encroached upon by the other; and that the People are to take part with the Party encroached upon, against the Party encroaching; but with this difference, that They are always to believe what the Parliament declares against the King to be true, because they are their trusties, not only to defend their Rights, but to inform their Judgements whether they be wronged or no: and because they are their trusties, not only as they are Subjects now, but as they were originally or at first Contractors before they were Subjects; and did then by bargain reserve unto themselves certain Privileges and Immunities to be exempted for ever from the King's Jurisdiction; which if their trusties whom they are to believe, declare to be violated, they may lawfully take Arms against the King to maintain or recover those Rights of theirs, and to defend that part of the Sovereignty which the Parliament have in the Government.  
Now putting all these things together, and supposing a corrupt Majority of Parliament-men in both Houses, as Mr. Baxter confesseth there may be, and we know there hath been, and therefore may be so again, who can secure the King, though he reign never so much according to Law, from being always in danger of a Rebellion, or the 
Upon such Principles, the King in continual danger of Rebellion.  Kingdom from being always in danger of a Civil War! which being the worst of Evils that can happen to any Body Politic, they that sit at the helm ought above all things else to take especial care to prevent the broaching any such Principles as tend to the stirring up of the People to Sedition and Rebellion, by making them believe that in some cases it is not only lawful but their duty to take up Arms against the King; and that they shall do God and the King too good service in so doing. Such are those Principles of Mr. Baxter before rehearsed, published and owned by 
Some of Mr. B. 's Principles peculiarly such.  him in many of his Books, especially in that of the Holy Commonwealth: and amongst the rest especially two, of which he seems to be the Original Parent or very first Author: as namely first, That the People of England are represented by their trusties in Parliament not only as Subjects to the King, but as Contractors with the King, before he was their King and before they were his Subjects; for which he brings no other proof, but that he takes it for undeniable. And (2dly) That the Sovereignty here with us is not in the King alone (as the Oath of Supremacy saith it is) but that it is divided betwixt the King and the two Houses of Parliament; and for proof of this the only reason he gives is, That the Legislative Power which is essential to Sovereignty is in them as well as in the King; and the late King himself confessed it to be so. Whether it be so or no, I have already considered and examined at large, and I hope have proved, that the King, and the King alone is the efficient cause, or maker of our Laws, whatsoever the two Houses may antecedently do towards the making of them.   

CHAP. XIII.  
The late King's owning, that the Laws are made jointly by King, Lords and Commons, how to be understood.  
NEither do I think what Mr. Baxter saith the late King confesseth in his answer from York to the Parliaments XIX, Propositions, namely That in this Kingdom the Laws are jointly made by 
What the late King meant by saying, The Laws are jointly made by King, Lords and Commons.  a King, by an House of Peers, and by an House of Commons chosen by the People, doth (being rightly understood) contradict what I have said of the making of our Laws by the King only: For although to say, the same thing is made solely by one, and jointly by more than one, seems to be a contradiction; yet if by making the same thing be meant the making of it, not in the same but several senses, it is no contradiction to say it is made by one and no more in one sense, and yet that it is made jointly by more in another sense. For example, according to an instance before given; It may truly be said that Christ alone shall judge the World, and yet it may truly be said that the XII. Apostles (for 
How Christ alone will judge the World, and yet the Saints shall judge it too.  so saith Christ himself) and all the rest of the Saints (for so saith St. Paul) shall judge the World together with him: because the judging of the World by Christ is meant in one sense, and the judging of the World by the Saints in another. For it is Christ and Christ alone, or Christ and none but Christ shall judge the World, as a Judge properly so called, that is, authoritatiuè, or by his own inherent power and Authority: But the Saints are said to judge the World approbatiuè, by assenting to and approving of the judgement given by Christ, as just and righteous; so that in propriety of speech, they are not to be called Judges, but Assessors and Assenters only.  
In like manner, as to the making of our Laws, it may be truly said, that the King alone is the maker 
How the Laws made by the King alone, and yet jointly by the King, Lords and Commons.  of them; because it is by the King and by the King alone, that they are made to be Laws, which were before no Laws; and yet it may truly (though not so properly) be said too, that they are made by the King, and the two Houses of Parliament; because they do consent to the Kings making of them to be Laws, and not only so, but also because they do not only consent to the making and publishing of them after they are made Laws by the King, but they must consent to have them made Laws by the King, before the King can make them to be Laws. And yet for all that, it is the King and the King alone who by his LE ROT LE VEVLT or his FIAT doth make them to be Laws. In which operative and efficacious words neither of the Houses concur with him; and yet it is by those words only, or alone, that what was before but a Bill, that is, an Embryo, or at most but materia disposita, matter fit to be made a Law of, is informed and enlivened with that obliging power and authority both directive and coactive, which makes it to be a Law. So that all the two Houses can be said to do towards the making of a Law, is to give it a posse fieri, a capacity to be made a Law, but it is the King, and the King only that gives it its factum esse, its being made so; and yet because the King cannot by his Fiat give it its factum esse, till it be agreed on by the two Houses, and because the two Houses, by their agreeing on it, do give it its fieri posse, or make it ready and fit to be made a Law; therefore it may truly (though not properly) be said to be made jointly by the King, Lords, and Commons; because though it be not made by the Lords and Commons, but by the King only, yet it cannot be made without them neither, that is, without their doing something antecedently, without their doing whereof the King cannot make Laws. And this was that, and all that, which the late King meant, when he said that the Laws of this Kingdom were made jointly by the King, Lords, and Commons, that is, (according to the old Parliamentary stile) by the King, with the consent of the Lords and Commons; or if you will, by the King, but not without the consent of the Lords and Commons.  
But I hope Mr. Baxter (who would be thought the Master of propriety and distinctness of speaking) will 
Some Instances ad hominem, to convince Mr. B of this meaning.  not affirm, that a thing can properly be said to be done by him or them, without whose consent it cannot be done. For I think it is one of the main matters, wherein he differs or dissents from our Church, that a Priest or Minister of the Word and Sacraments cannot be ordained without consent of the People; will he therefore deny that it is the Bishop with his Presbyters that ordains him, or will he say that he is jointly ordained by the Bishop and the People? Certainly none but they that lay hands upon him have any thing to do in the Act of Ordination; So that it doth not follow, that because a Law cannot be made, without the precedent consent of both Houses of Parliament, that therefore they have any thing to do (properly speaking) in the making of it.  
Again, supposing Mr. Baxter is of the opinion of the Protestant Churches abroad, that there can be no marriage without consent of Parents, and supposing that opinion to be true; yet I suppose neither Mr. Baxter, nor any of the Ministers of those Churches, will say 
Vid. M B 's second Def. of mere Nonconf. p. 127.  that it is the consent of Parents that makes the Marriage, though it cannot be a Marriage without it.  
Many other Instances of the like nature might be given; but this is enough to prove the thing we have in 
A brief Rebearsal of our Law-making.  hand, namely, that though in some sense it may be said that our Laws are made by the King and Parliament, or by the King, Lords and Commons, because they cannot be made by the King, without the consent of the Lords and Commons; yet properly speaking, it is the King alone, who by his LE ROY LE VEVLT makes them to be Laws, in which Law-making Act of his, neither of the Houses do join, or are joined with him; and therefore the Laws so made cannot properly be said to be made by the King and them jointly.  
And yet because they cannot be made by the King without their antecedent consent to them and proposing of them, they may truly be said to concur To the making though not In the making of them. And this, and no more but this, was undoubtedly the late King's meaning, when he said the Laws were made here in England by the King, Lords, and Commons, or upon their proposing such and such Bills, being first agreed upon by them, to be made Laws by him.   

CHAP. XIV.  
The making of Laws in the Roman State applied to Us. Mr. B. 's division of the Sovereignty rectified. The King's Negative voice asserted, and the Enemies of Monarchy detected.  
THus when the Sovereignty was in the People of 
How Laws made in the Roman Commonwealth.  Rome, the Senate did concur to the making of Laws for the Commonwealth, but did not make them; they concurred to the making of them, by consulting and debating what was fit to be made a Law by the People, as having no power to make it a Law themselves; the making of Laws being an Act of Sovereignty; and the Sovereignty being then not in the Senate but in the People; and therefore the Senate did not so much as pretend to the making of Laws, but only to the proposing of Laws to be made by a higher power, namely that of the People; as appears by the formal and solemn stile relating to the making of Laws in those times, which was this, Senatus rog at, Populus jubet, the Senate requesteth or proposeth, namely, such or such a thing to be made a Law, but the People commands or enjoins it; (that is) the People maketh what was proposed by the Senate for a Law, to be a Law.  
And as this was the stile in relation to making of 
How in our Monarchy.  Laws in a Democracy, when and where the Sovereignty was in the People; so à paritate rationis, upon the like reason and account, in a Monarchy, where the Sovereignty is in One, the stile ought to be Populus rog at, Rex jubet; the People requests, and the King grants. And so indeed it was, (as I observed before) according to the ancient stile used in our Parliaments here in 
The ancient stile of our Laws.  England, in divers Acts and Statutes, wherein the King is said to give or grant sometimes at the special request, and sometimes at the humble Petition of the Commons. Neither doth the Alteration of the Style (at the Request) to (with the consent) argue an alteration in the species of the Government; for the King is still the sole Lawmaker or Lawgiver, as much as he was before, and consequently as much a Monarch, though less Despotical, and more Political, in the managery and execution of his Kingly Power; having by his Predecessors and his own voluntary and gracious condescension obliged himself not to exercise his Legislative power, or to make any Laws without the consent of those that are to be governed by them; which, though it do not make him cease to be a Monarch, or to have the Sovereignty or supreme power wholly and solely in himself; yet it makes him cease to be an absolute, arbitrary, and despotical, 
Our King not an absolute, but a legal Monarch.  and to become a legal, regulated and Political Monarch, or a King that is to govern his People by Laws; Laws indeed of his own making, but not without their consent to them, I mean without their consent by their Representatives in Parliament; together with the consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, which all of them jointly are the Representatives of the three Estates, or of that whole Body Politic, whereof 
The three Estates.  the King is the Head. And as it is he that governs the whole Body, so it is he that makes the Laws to govern the whole Body: which because they are not made by the King without the consent of the three Estates representing that Body; therefore Mr. Baxter thinks they are made by the three Estates, as well as by the King, 
Whence Mr. B. 's error of dividing the Sovereignty.  and therefore that the Sovereignty is divided betwixt the King and them, and consequently, that this is no Monarchy, but a mixed Government; which is the same mistake that Grotius (as I said before) observeth to have been the error of Polybius, in judging the Roman to have been a mixed Government, and the Sovereignty or supreme power thereof to have been divided, betwixt the Consuls, the Senate, & the People, when (saith Grotius) the Government was indeed merely popular or Democratical. And the cause of this mistake in Polybius (saith Grotius) was his respiciens ad actiones ipsas, & non ad jus agendi; his looking at the things that were done, & not at the authority whereby they were done; whereas if he had considered that what was done either by the Consuls, or by the Senate, was done by an authority derived from the People, & signified nothing if it were not ratified by the People, he would have been convinced, that the Sovereignty or supreme power was wholly in the People, & consequently, that it was a mere Democracy and not a mixed Government. In like manner Mr. Baxter looking only at the things that are done by the 3. Estates in Parliament, as to their concurrence to the making of Laws, & subordinate managery of other parts of the Government; & not considering by whose Authority they do what they do, and that all that they do signifies nothing, unless it be ratified by the King, erroneously at least (if not fallaciously) concludes the Sovereignty or supreme power itself to be divided betwixt the King and the 3. Estates, or betwixt the King & the 2. Houses of Parliament; whereas their very Parliamentary being, & consequently the power of their Parliamentary acting, is derived from the Supremacy of power, inseparably and indivisibly and incommunicably inherent in the King.  
But although the Sovereignty itself or original fountain 
The Sovereignty how in its streams divided, and in its acts limited.  of all power in a Monarchy be indivisibly & incommunicably in the person of the King, yet the streams that issue or flow from that fountain may be, and are, and of necessity must be divided & communicated, so as may be most serviceable for the several uses, the whole body Politic, or the whole body of the Kingdom may have of it. And as this Supreme or Sovereign Power (though it be always indivisibly inherent in the King, as the fountain of it) may have its several streams divided & communicated: so in the exercise of its several Acts & operations, it may be, & in all Political Kingdoms it is, limited & determined in some more, & in some less, but in none more nor so much for the good of the Subject without prejudice to the Sovereignty & Majesty of the King, than in this of ours; where the People by their Representatives, are not only admitted to propose what they would have to be made Laws; but where no Law can be made but what they propose or consent to, though they do not make it, & though it be in the King's power to refuse the making of it; because the Laws, we have already, are sufficient to secure all their Rights unto the People, as long as they are in force; & in force they will be, until the People themselves do consent to the repealing of them: For the King as he can make no new Law, so he can repeal no old Law without the consent of the Representatives of the People; who most certainly will never give their consent for repealing of Magna Charta, or the Petition of Right, or any other Law now in force, for the securing any of their just Rights and Privileges. So that the King's Negative is not, nor cannot be prejudicial to the Interest of the People, but 
The King's Negative voice necessary to preserve Monarchy.  it is absolutely necessary for the preservation of Monarchy. For if the King could not refuse to make what the 2. Houses propose to be Laws, the Sovereignty would be wholly in them, & not at all in him; Nay he would be so far from having the Sovereignty of a King, that he would not have the liberty of the meanest of his Subjects, that sits in the House of Commons, in giving his I or No, according to the dictate of his own Reason and Conscience, which as it is every private man's right by nature, as he is a reasonable Creature, so it is the King's right by Nature and Prerogative too, as he is a King, it being impossible to be a King without it. And therefore those that say the King is bound to pass all those Laws, quas Vulgus elegerit, which the People or Commonalty shall make choice of; or that he is but one of the three Coordinates, & therefore may be overvoted by 
Who Enemies to Monarchy.  the other two; or that he hath but a part of the Sovereignty, and therefore cannot overrule those that have their parts in the Sovereignty as well as he; or that he may not prorogue or dissolve Parliaments when he thinks fit to do so; All these are Enemies not only to the well-being, but to the very being of Monarchy; and that not of absolute or despotical Monarchy only, but of Political or Paternal Monarchy also. And therefore though they cajole and flatter the People never so much, they are the greatest Enemies they have, and as such the People ought to look upon them, & would do so, if they were not like Beasts without understanding, nay worse than Beasts without sense and memory of what they have so often and so lately suffered by listening to the same Songs of the same Sirens, or sweet Singers, that have so often deceived them.  
But if the People cannot or will not understand the things that belong unto their peace; yet Be wise O ye Kings, 
A Caveat to Sovereigns.  and be learned O ye Judges of the Earth; be wise for the People's sake, & be wise for your own sakes also. For if you do not prevent the raising & raging of those waves, the Pilot as well as the Passengers will be swallowed up by them. And there is no way to prevent the raising of those Waves, nor the raging of them when they are raised, but by rebuking the Winds that raised them; for if it were not for those boisterous Winds that puff them up, there would be no such swelling Waves as we see there are.  
In the mean time (I hope) I have said nothing for the 
The Conclusion of this and the three foregoing Sections.  justifying of myself from being a Defier of Deity and Humanity, and from being an Enemy to God, to Kings, and to all Mankind, (as Mr. Baxter saith I am, because I maintain it to be Unlawful for Subjects to resist their Sovereigns in any cause, or upon any provocation whatsoever:) and for the confutation of Mr. Baxter's erroneous and seditious Aphorisms or Principles to the contrary; I hope, I say, I have said nothing in order to either of these ends, that will give any just offence to such as are judicious and impartial Friends to Truth, and do really wish and desire the continuance of the Peace and welfare of their Country; and then for such as are contrary minded, I care not what they think, or say of me.   
The End of the Fifth Section.   

SECTION VI.  
The rest of Mr. Baxter's Reflections called to account; as concerning the Bishop's advising him to read Hooker and Bilson; as also his helping effectually (together with the Bishop of Ely) to bring Mr. B. and his party under; and lastly his causing Mr. Jones to be put out of the Duke's Service.  

CHAP. I.  
The Reason why the Bishop advised Mr. B. to read Hooker and Bilson; and Mr. B 's fraud in giving the account laid open.  
THe rest of those things, he chargeth me withal, being of much less importance, I shall consider with much more brevity, both for the Reader's sake, and my own. And I will begin with that which indeed would be of no importance at all, and consequently not worth the taking notice of, but that there is something of art and fraud concealed in it, which ought to be detected to manifest Mr. Baxter's 
Mr. B is insincerity of dealing.  constant disingenuous and insincere dealing with those he writes against, either by making them say what they did not, and then concluding what he lists from it; or by huddling things together that were said upon several occasions, and to several ends and purposes, as if they had been said upon one and the same occasion, and to one and the same end and purpose. Of the former of those juggling Arts of his, I have given divers Instances already: I shall now give one of the latter also. For whereas he saith, I advised him to read BILSON and HOOKER; it is very true, I did so; but whereas he adds, that he found in them more than he approved for resisting and restraining Kings, he would have it to be understood, that I advised him to read both those Authors upon one and the same Subject; namely, concerning the resisting and restraining of Kings, which he knows to be false. For I did not advise him to read either the one or the other of those Authors, or any Author else upon that Argument, there being nothing at that time either in Debate or Discourse betwixt him and me; but of the Service and Ceremonies of our 
The true account of the Bishop's advising him to read th●se 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 s.  Church▪ and of the Government of the visible Catholic Church, in all Ages, and in all places. And as touching the former, I advised him to read Hooker's Ecclesiastical Policy, so touching the latter Bishop Bilson; but what Book of Bishop Bilson's? Not that of Christian Subjection, as he would make his Readers to believe it was; but his Book of the perpetual Government of Christ's Church in defence of Episcopacy. So that in saying I advised him to read Hooker and Bilson, and adding, that he found more in them than he approved for resisting and restraining of Kings; it is evident, that he did fallaciously 
Mr. B 's fallacious intent in giving the account as he does.  intend to make his Readers believe,  
First, That I advised him to read both those Authors for his better information in one and the same thing: whereas that for which I advised him to read Mr. Hooker, was the justification of the Rites and Ceremonies, and outward form of worship in our Church; and that for which I advised him to read Bishop Bilson, was to convince him that the Church of Christ had been always governed, as ours is, by Bishops.  
Secondly, By what he saith he would have it believed also, that the thing for which I advised him to read the aforesaid Authors, was to inform him what he was to believe concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of Princes being resisted by their Subjects; whereas in that Book of Bishop Bilson's, which I advised him to read, there is nothing at all of that Argument, nor in Mr. Hooker neither.  
Thirdly, He would make his Readers to believe also, that I approve of what both or either of those Two Authors hold to the prejudice of Princes; but he himself doth not; and consequently that he is a better friend to Princes than either they or I am. For if I advised him to read Hooker and Bilson, as he affirms, and I confess I did, and to read them, as Authors, whose opinion touching the resisting of Kings by their Subjects I approved of (as he insinuates,) but He did not; he must needs imply, not only that Hooker and Bilson were, but that I am more for the lawfulness of Kings being resisted and restrained by their Subjects, than he is: Whereas if he had intended to have dealt fairly and ingenuously, either with me or his Readers, he should have told them not only that I advised him to read Hooker and Bilson, but what Books of theirs I advised him to read, and to what end and purpose I advised him to read them, which was (as I said before) to read Mr. Hooker for the justifying of the Service and Ceremonies of our Church, and Bishop Bilson for the justifying of the Government of our Church by Bishops, and neither of them to that end and purpose which he would have his Readers believe I did, (viz.) touching the lawfulness of the restraining and resisting of Kings by their Subjects; for which he saith there was more in them than he could approve of, and yet no more than I must needs be thought to approve, because I recommended the reading of them to him: and consequently that I (as I said before) was more for restraining and resisting of Kings by their Subjects, than he was; so that by concealing what Books of those Authors they were, which I advised him to read, and upon what Subject, and to what end I advised him to read them, and, which is worse, by substituting another Subject matter, instead of that which I advised him to read them for, (wholly foreign to it,) his fraudulent dealing with his Readers, as well as with me, is so apparent, that it cannot be denied, and so foul that it cannot be excused.  
But supposing it had been true, that I had advised him to read both those Authors upon the same Argument, and that Argument had been concerning the restraining and resisting of Kings; yet I see no reason why he should say, that he found more in them for the restraining and resisting of Kings than He did approve.   

CHAP. II.  
Mr. Hooker saith more in favour of Kingly Power, and of our King in particular, than Mr. B. can approve.  
FOr first, as for Mr. Hooker (supposing the three last Books of his Ecclesiastical Policy to be set forth without any alteration or Interpolation, as he left them, which many suspect they were not) but supposing, I say, they were all of them set forth as he left them, yet there is nothing to be found in any one of them, or in any of his former Books, for the lawfulness of resisting of Kings by their Subjects in any case, or upon any provocation whatsoever: but on the contrary in the Eighth or last of those three Books of his Ecclesiastical Policy, wherein ex instituto, On set purpose, he treats of the Power of Kings in the managery both of Civil and Ecclesiastical 
Mr. Hooker 's judgement of Kingly power; whether he be King by choice,  Affairs, though he supposeth most Kings to have been originally chosen by the People, as a Man is chosen by a Woman to be her Husband: yet as the Power of a Husband is not from the Woman that chooseth him, but from God; so the Kingly Power is not from the People that choose such or such a Man to be their King, but from God only: so that as the Woman cannot take away the power of a Husband from her Husband, after he is her Husband; so the People cannot take away the Kingly power from their King, after he is their King. And therefore he concludes, That in case the Kingly or supreme Power should be made use of to the public 
Vid Hooker 's Eccl. Pol. lib. 8. p. 456.  detriment, he sees not how the Body (meaning the whole Body politic) by any just means should be able to help itself without the consent of him that hath the supreme Power. What could he have said more convincingly for the Declaration of his own Opinion, concerning the unlawfulness of the People's using Force against their King, though he make use of his Kingly Power to the detriment of the public, or of the People in general? And though he be such a King as he supposeth, to have originally derived his Title from the free choice of the People, or from the choice of a free People? much less if he come in by Conquest; For some multitudes 
Or by Conquest.  (saith Mr. Hooker) are brought into Subjection by force, Divine Providence itself so disposing; 
Vid. Hooker 's Eccl. Pol. lib. 8. p 454.  for it is God that giveth Victory in the day of Battle; and unto whom Dominion is in this sort derived, the same they enjoy according to the Law of Nations, which Law authorizeth conquerors to reign as absolute Lords over them whom they vanquish.  
Now this way, that is by Conquest, was their Dominion 
This of Conquest, our case at first.  or Kingly Power over this Nation of ours originally derived to our present Race of Kings.  
But may they therefore now reign absolutely and at their own Will and Pleasure, as their first Predecessors who came in by Conquest did, or might have done? No, Mr. Hooker doth not say so, nor I neither; but he saith, and so say I too, That by means of after agreement (or rather by after condescensions, concessions and grants of Kings) it comes to pass in Kingdoms, that they whose ancient Predecessors were by violence and force made Subject, do by little and little grow into the sweet of Kingly Government, 
Vid. Hooker, p. 454.  that is a Government of Kings governing by Laws in a free and voluntary manner condescended 
Our Kings since have restrained themselves.  unto. And thus this Kingdom of ours of Despotical became Political, by our Kings limiting and restraining themselves by Laws of their own and their Predecessors making, and much more by restraining themselves from making any Laws at all, but such as the Lords and Commons in Parliament should consent to. And this is all the restraint that Mr. Hooker acknowledgeth our Kings to be Subject to; and is this more than Mr. Baxter doth or can approve of? This doth not hinder the Government to be truly Monarchical, which Mr. Baxter saith it is not; nor the Supremacy to be wholly in one Person, both as to Ecclesiastical and secular affairs, as Mr. Hooker saith it is, and Mr. Baxter saith it is not. So that it 
What it is that Mr. B. doth not approve.  was not Mr. Hooker's restraining, but his extending, or rather acknowledging and defending the extent of the Power of all Kings in general, and of the Kings of England in particular, that Mr. Baxter doth not, nor cannot consistingly with himself approve of. We will instance in what he saith of our own King only, according as he himself desireth to be understood, when he tells us, that what he speaks of Kings, shall be in respect of the slate and nature of this Kingdom.  
And first he tells us, That this is an hereditary 
Mr Hooker 's judgement of the descent of the Crown.  Kingdom, and that in hereditary Kingdoms Birth giveth right to Sovereign Dominion, and that the Death of the Predecessor putteth the Successor by blood in Seisin: He adds, That if it should so happen, that a man without right of blood be elected, and put into possession, with all the usual Ceremonies, and Solemnities, all such new Elections and investing are utterly void; the Inheritor by blood may dispossess him as an Usurper: the contrary opinion whereunto (he saith) is an unnatural conceit, and an insolent position, set abroach by seeds-men of Rebellion, only to animate unquiet Spirits, and to feed them with possibility of aspiring to Thrones, if they can win the Hearts of the People. What say you, Mr. Baxter, 
More than Mr. B. approves.  is not this more in favour of such Kings as ours is, than you approve? I am sure it is more than you did approve, when (as you tell us in your Holy-Common-Wealth) you were bound to submit to the present Government, as set over us by God, and to obey 
pag. 184.  for Conscience sake, and to behave yourself as a loyal Subject towards them. But what was that present Government? It must be one or other of those Governments betwixt the late King's Murder and his Son's Restauration, which in Mr. Hooker's judgement were all of them Usurpations, and consequently all that voluntarily adhered and submitted to them Rebels and Traitors, because they did as much as in them lay to exclude and keep out the right Heir from the Crown in an hereditary Kingdom. So that I do not wonder if Mr. Baxter found more in Mr. Hooker than he could approve, as to this particular; but it was not for his too much restraining the Power of the King over his People, but for his restraining the Power of the People over their King, by setting up what Governors and what Government they please, contrary to the fundamental Institution of the Kingdom.  
Again, as Mr. Baxter might find more in Mr. Hooker 
Of the King's Supremacy.  than he could approve or had approved, for limiting the descent of the supreme Power here with us, to the next in blood, or the right Heir, without exception: so in regard of the supreme Power itself as it is vested in our King, he might find more in Mr. Hooker than he did approve, not for the restraint but extent of it, and that in regard both of persons and of things.  
And first of Persons: For Mr. Hooker speaking of our King's Supremacy, saith, that thereby it is 
Over all persons.  intended and meant to exclude partly foreign Powers, and partly the Power which belongeth in several unto others, contained as parts in that politic Body over which the King hath Supremacy; in and by which words, all Persons, as well within as without the Kingdom, are excluded from having any part in the Sovereignty or supreme Power here in England; None without the Kingdom having any thing to do with it, and All within the Kingdom being subject to it. And this is the true interpretation of the Oath of Supremacy; whereby (as I have proved before) the King is acknowledged to be the only supreme Governor in as well as of this Kingdom, and by consequence exclusively not only in relation to any that do pretend from abroad, but also from any that may pretend at home to have any part in or of the Supremacy with him. Whereas Mr. Baxter will have the Oath of Supremacy 
This again more than Mr. B. approves.  to be understood as intending only to exclude foreign Pretenders to any Supremacy here, namely the Pope and his Successors; but not to exclude some that are at home, namely the Parliament from having a part of it. So that in respect (I mean in respect of the extent) of the King's Supremacy over all Persons in all capacities, Mr. Baxter might find more in Mr. Hooker than he could approve of (viz.) the King's Supremacy over all Persons in his Kingdom; and consequently his being the only Supreme Governor being utterly inconsistent with the division of the Sovereignty betwixt the King and Parliament, which is Mr. Baxter's fundamental Principle, upon which he grounds his defence of the late Rebellion, and lays a foundation of the like Rebellions from Generation to Generation for the future.  
Again, as Mr. Baxter might find more in Mr. Hooker 
Of the King's Supremacy, as to things.  than he could approve, for the extent of the King's Supremacy in regard of the Persons over whom, so might he likewise in regard of the Things whereunto it is extended: concerning which in the general Mr. Hooker saith, Our Kings, when they are to 
Eccles. Pol. p. 457. lib. 8.  take possession of the Crown, have it pointed out before their Eyes, even by the very solemnities and rites of their Inaugurations, to what affairs their supreme Power and Authority reacheth: crowned (saith he) we see they are, enthronized, and anointed: The Crown is a sign of their military Dominion; the Throne, of sedentary or judicial; the Oil of religious or sacred power. So that according to Mr. Hooker, the jus gladii, the Power of the Sword, or the right of making War, as likewise of making Laws both Civil and Ecclesiastical belongs to the King's Supremacy. And to both those ends, (as he tells us afterwards) it is one of our King's Prerogatives to call and dissolve all solemn Assemblies 
Lib. 8. p. 469.  about our public affairs, either in Church or State, so that there can be no such voluntary Associations of Churches as Mr. Baxter would have, nor no such Associations of the People, without the King's leave, as others would have; no, nor no making of Laws neither, either in Parliament for the State, or in Convocation for the Church, when they are called and met together, but by the King; and that not only because no Law of any kind can be made without the Royal Assent, by reason of the King's Negative; without which (saith Mr. Hooker) 
Of his Negative voice.  the King were King but in name only: but because it is the Royal Assent that makes it to be a Law. For though (as the same Mr. Hooker observes) Wisdom 
p. 471.  is requisite for the devising and discussing of Laws (he means the Wisdom of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, for the devising and discussing of Laws for the State; and the Wisdom of the Representatives of the Clergy in the Convocation, for the devising 
Of his making of Laws.  and discussing of Laws for the Church) yet it is not that Wisdom, saith he, that makes them to be Laws, 
p. 472.  but that which establisheth them, and maketh them to be Laws is Power; even the Power of Dominion: the chiefty whereof (saith he) amongst us, resteth in the Person of the King. Whereunto he adds, Is there any Law of Christ's which forbiddeth Kings and Rulers of the Earth to have such sovereign and supreme Power, in making of Laws either Civil or Ecclesiastical? Which question being virtually a negative Proposition, implies that there is no Law of God to prohibit any King to do what our King doth, that is (as he positively and clearly affirms) to make Laws for his own Subjects by that supreme Power that resteth in his own Person, and consequently is not divided betwixt him and the Parliament; no, not in the making of Laws, which is the only instance given by Mr. Baxter to prove the Sovereignty or supreme 
This against Mr. B.  Power in this Kingdom not to be in the King alone, or in the King only; which (as I said before) is the Foundation on which he superstructs the building of his Babel, or the Justification of the late Confusion and Rebellion. And therefore he had reason to say he found more in Hooker than he did 
And therefore not approved by him.  approve; because, to approve all he found in Hooker touching the supreme Power, either of all Kings in general, or of our own Kings in particular, had been to condemn himself, who is much more for the restraining and resisting of Kings by their Subjects, than Mr. Hooker; who (as I said before) hath not a word of resisting, nor of restraining them neither, any otherwise than as they have restrained themselves by Laws of their own making. So that Mr. Hooker may still retain that honourable title which learned Men have given him of judicious Hooker, whatsoever voluminous Mr. Baxter hath said upon this or any other occasion, to take it away from him.   

CHAP. III.  
Bishop Bilson, though in an error, yet saith not so much for the resisting of Kings as Mr. B. doth. The Case stated of Subjects rebelling upon the account of Religion, and of other Princes assisting them.  
AS for Bishop BILSON whom Mr. Baxter saith I advised him to read, I confess I cannot say He hath nothing for the resisting of Kings by their Subjects in any of his Books; but this I can say, that he hath nothing to that purpose in that Book of his which I advised Mr. Baxter to read; no, nor in any of his Books hath he so much for resisting of Kings, as Mr. Baxter himself in his Book of the Holy Commonwealth. And therefore I wonder he should say he found more in BILSON, for the resisting and restraining of Kings than he could approve.  
Bishop Bilson was one of my Predecessors in 
Bishop Bilson in an error about resistance.  the Bishopric of Winchester, and much more before me in Learning than he was in Time: but Bernardus non vidit omnia, and the learnedst and best of Men are but Men, and therefore may err; and good men, very good men, may be the apt to fall into some kind of errors, both speculatively and practically, by indulging too much even to their good affections. And therefore 
The ground of his error.  I believe it was his Zeal for the true Religion, and his compassion to those that were persecuted for it, that made this Learned and Good Man say so much as he doth (which is more than I wish he had) in excuse of taking up of Arms by the French, Dutch, and Scotch Protestants in defence of themselves and their Religion, against their several respective Princes. And I think we ought to believe that it was for the same reason (and not for reason of State only) that Queen Elizabeth did at the same time assist with Men, Money and Arms, all the aforesaid Subjects against their aforesaid Sovereigns.  
But yet, for all that, I do not think that either 
The censure of it.  the Queen did well in doing what she did, or that the Bishop did well in writing what he writ in defence of them; because I do not think they themselves, I mean the subjects of those Princes, did well in making that resistance, which they did, contrary to the Precepts of the Gospel, and to the Practice of the Primitive Christians. And I remember that upon this consideration, during the time of our own troubles, I have often thought, and 
A Remark upon our late Rebellion.  sometimes said to some of my familiar friends, that I was afraid that God had permitted the People's rising up in Rebellion against the Crown and the Church here, because the Crown had assisted, and so eminent a Churchman had excused the rising up of other Prince's Subjects in Rebellion against them abroad. For though ours had not really the same provocation to rebel, as the Subjects of those Princes had (viz.) of being persecuted and oppressed for Conscience sake, and for professing the true Religion, as they were; yet they pretended themselves to be so, and so may Subjects of any Prince, or of any Religion, at any time, and whether truly or falsely it is all one, as to the endangering of the public Peace and Welfare of all Kingdoms and States: which will be always in danger of a Civil War, if but in any one case only it be allowed to be lawful for Subjects to resist those that have the supreme Power; and of a foreign War also, if the Rebellious Subjects of one Prince or State may be lawfully assisted by another State or Prince, because they are of the same Religion, whether the true one or a false, (as I said before) it makes no matter: 
Religion, true or false, inspirits men alike.  for it is not the trueness of any Religion, but men's believing it to be the true, and only true Religion, that makes men think they are obliged in Conscience to contend for it, as appears by some men's being as zealous for the maintaining and propagating of Judaisme, and Mahometanism, as others are for Christianity; and amongst Christians, so many of them being as zealous, and perhaps more zealous for Schism and Heresy, than others are for Unity and Orthodoxy: And we see the Papists have their Confessors and their Martyrs as well as Protestants.  
And therefore if a Protestant King may assist Protestant 
Not safe, nor lawful for one Prince to assist another's Rebel-Subjects.  Rebels against their Popish Kings, because they are of his (which he believes to be the only true) Religion: why may not a Popish King for the very same reason assist Popish Rebels against their Protestant Kings, because he believes the Popish to be the only true Religion also? and consequently as long as there are diversities of Religion in the World (as there will be till the World's end) there will be no security of Peace or safety at home or from abroad, either for King or Subjects. The great and good God therefore, who is the Author of Peace, and lover of Concord, as he will not have Subjects to resist their Princes, so he will not have one Prince to assist another Prince's Subjects in their Rebellion against him, in any case, or upon any account whatsoever. Mediate or intercede for their pardon, or for the mitigation of their sufferings he may; but encourage or assist them in resisting he may not. For the Rule, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris, To do as we would be done by, holds in Princes and States as well as in private persons; and surely there is no Prince or State, that would have their rebellious Subjects to be assisted in their Rebellion by any other Prince or State, and consequently, they must needs be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, condemned by themselves, when they do that unto others which they would not have done unto themselves.  
What shall we say then? Are we not to help those that are persecuted for the professing of our own and the true Religion? No, we are not to help them in resisting, and making War against 
How we are to help those who are persecuted for Religion.  their Sovereign; but rather to admonish them to suffer patiently; and then to help them by our Prayers to be delivered by God, who can and will deliver them, if they suffer patiently and wrongfully; or if he do not deliver them here, he will abundantly and superabundantly recompense them hereafter. In the mean time if they be banished or forced to fly out of their own Country, we are to receive them kindly, and to relieve them charitably and bountifully, as we would be glad to be received and relieved ourselves, if we were in their condition.  
And this is all I have to say as to this particular, 
Mr. B is design in this reflection defeated.  of which I need to have said no more to discover Mr. Baxter's fraudulent and disingenuous dealing with me, and with his Readers, than what I said at first (viz.) That although I did advise him to read Mr. Hooker and Bishop Bilson, yet I did not advise him to read either of them upon that Argument, or to that end and purpose, as he pretends I did; thereby to insinuate that there being more in them for the restraining and resisting of Kings, than he did approve, I, that advised him to read them, must needs be more for the restraining and resisting of Kings than he was. This was that which he principally aimed at; but I hope I have made it appear, he hath miss his mark.   

CHAP. IU.  
The Bishop charged with helping to bring Mr. B. and his party under. By his party he means not the Presbyterians, but all the Nonconformists.  
MR. Baxter in his Preface to his Book of Concord, addressing himself to the Bishop of Ely and me, saith, You have above all men I know effectually helped to bring us under: but whom he means by Us, or what he means by bringing them under, he doth not tell us, nor how We have done it effectually or more effectually than any he knows besides. But sure it is some heinous crime or other (at least in his opinion) that he intends to charge us with. And therefore he should have done well to have expressed more fully and clearly, what he meant by it: But seeing it hath not pleased him to do so, we must guests at his meaning as well as we can, both in regard of the Thing he saith We have done, and of the Persons We have done it unto.  
And first for the Persons, whom he means by 
Whom he means by Us.  Us; I should have thought he had meant the Presbyterians, but that by Us must be meant some, of whom he himself is one, and he hath not only disclaimed his being a Presbyterian, but takes it for an injurious and scandalous expression of an Episcopal Indignation against him, to be said to be the Antesignanus, or Standard-bearer of the Presbyterians, being no Presbyterian himself, and therefore could 
He disowns himself to be a Presbyterian,  not be their Antesignanus, or not theirs only. But why might not he be a Presbyterian then, when I thought he was so, though he was not so afterwards, nor be not now? For sure he hath not been semper idem, Always of the same Opinion. Time was when he was an Episcoparian, or he would not have been ordained by a Bishop (as he saith he was) nor would not have subscribed to what he did; And yet whatsoever it is that he is for now, I am sure it is not Episcopacy in the controverted Notion and sense of it. And therefore his disclaiming his being a Presbyterian now, doth not prove he was not so then when I thought he was. But supposing I was mistaken in thinking 
And takes it for an affront to be thought so.  him to be a Presbyterian, I know not why he should take it as an affront to be thought to be so: for being evidently and confessedly a Dissenter from the Government, and public way of Worship, as it is established by Law in the Church of England, I thought it was more for his Honour to be thought and treated with as a Presbyterian, than as one of any other of the more novel and more ignoble Sects; which though they all of them have Presbytery for their Mother, yet they had not all of them Calvin for their Father, but are the bastard issue of unknown Sires.  
Besides I had reason to think that Mr. Baxter 
Why called their Antesignanus.  was of the same persuasion that his Commilitones, his Fellow-soldiers, in the Dispute at the Savoy were, who were always taken for Presbyterians, and did not take it for a Reproach, but rather for an Honour to be thought to be so. And if it be honourable to be of such, or such a party, it is much more honourable to be the Antesignanus, or leader of such a party.  
And therefore thinking as I did, for the reasons aforesaid, Mr. Baxter to be a Presbyterian, and hearing he had been a Soldier in the late War, and having observed how he had behaved himself as a Leader in the aforesaid Dispute at the Savoy, I thought I could not call him a more proper name in relation to both his Professions, I mean that of a Warrior, and that of a Disputer, than that of Antesignanus, a Standard-bearer.  
But perhaps I may be mistaken all this while in thinking Mr. Baxter takes it ill to be called either Antesignanus, or Antesignanus Presbyterianorum: Whereas it is his being called Antesignanus of the Presbyterians only, and not of the other Sects as well as of that, which offends; it being a diminution of his just Title to be the Antesignanus but of one Sect only, whereas he undertakes the defence of all the Nonconformists, so far forth at least as they refuse to conform to the Church of England, how much soever they may differ among themselves; as appears by the Title page of one of his last Books, published last Year, but written (as he saith) many Years before, and called, An Apology for the Nonconformists Ministry, containing their Reasons for their Preaching, and an Answer to the Accusations urged as Reasons for the silencing about 2000 by Bishop Morley, Dr. Saywell, Mr. durel, etc. From which Title of that Book of his, it is manifest that 
Mr. B. an Apologist for all the Nonconformists.  he owns himself an Apologist for all the Nonconformists, at least for all their Preachers, and especially for all those that were silenced, which were all that had been Preachers before, (of what Sect or denomination soever,) which would not subscribe and submit to the Act of Uniformity after the King's Restauration. And those were Anabaptists, Antinomians, Quakers, Fifth monarchy men, as well as Presbyterians and Independents: for all these were Nonconformists, and every of these Sects had their Preachers, who were all of them equally silenced by the Act of Uniformity; and therefore must be reckoned amongst those for whom Mr. Baxter professeth himself to be an Apologist; and indeed if they be not, I think he will hardly make up one of his 2000 silenced Preachers. If he say that in the aforesaid Title to that Book of his, it is the Nonconformists Ministry, or the Ministers of the Nonconformists 
What his Nonconformist Ministers are.  that he pleads for; I demand whether by the Ministry he means only such as have an outward Call by public Authority to the Work of the Ministry, or to the teaching of others; whether that calling be by the Episcopal or Presbyterian way of Ordination? If so, than not only all those gifted men, that pretend to no other but an inward calling, are excluded from being any of his 2000 whom he pleads for; but the Congregational or Independent Preachers also, who have no outward calling but from their own Congregations only; and so perhaps have the Gifted men (whether Anabaptists, or Quakers, or any other of the Fanatical holders-forth) from those that are their own Auditors also; so that Mr. Baxter must either leave out those (I mean the Independents) or take in these (I mean all the rest of the Sectaries) into the number of those he calls the Nonconformist Ministry, and for whom he professeth he maketh the aforesaid Apology, and whom he would have restored to the same liberty or licence of preaching which they had formerly in the time of the Rebellion, and Usurpation. A very sober and seasonable Proposal to be made to Bishops, and those Bishops whom he makes it to, are very much beholding to him for the good opinion he hath of them, as the only men of their Order that are likely to hearken to such a proposal.  
In the mean time we may learn from hence, whom he means by the word (Us,) when he tells the Bishop of Ely and Me, that We two, of all he knows, have most effectually helped to bring Us (that is, all the Nonconformists of all kinds) under.   

CHAP. V.  
How Mr. B. and his party have been brought under, and how they brought in the King.  
WE are therefore now in the second place to guests as well as we can, at what he means 
What he means by bringing them under.  by bringing him and the rest of the Nonconformists Under. There is none of them, I believe, but would be uppermost if they could; for Pride is inseparable from Schism, and it is the downfall of Pride to be brought under. The Two chief Sects of the Nonconformists, the Presbyterians and Independents, have had their turns in being uppermost; the Presbyterians whilst the Parliament, and the Independents whilst the Army and Cromwell had the power: of which two Sects it may be said, as it 
Independents and Presbyterians like Caesar and Pompey.  was of Caesar and Pompey; the one, to wit, the Independents, like Caesar, could not far priorem, could endure none to be above them; and the other, to wit, the Presbyterians, like Pompey, could not far parem, must needs have all to be under them; and therefore each of them having been uppermost before, they must needs be very angry with all those who have helped to bring them both under, after they had domineered so long as they had done. And of those that have helped to bring them under, Mr. Baxter tells the Bishop of Ely and Me, that We two, of all men he knows, have been the chief.  
But under whom, or under what is it that We have helped to bring them? Sure it must be under some Person, or some Thing, that they would not willingly have been brought under; otherwise they would not have been angry with us, or complained of us for so doing.  
Under whom is it therefore that We have helped 
Under whom they are brought, viz. the King.  to bring them? Is it not He under whom they ought always to have been under, namely, the KING, their natural Liege-Lord and Sovereign? But they had brought his Father under them, and therefore were the more unwilling to be brought under his Son, for fear he might remember and revenge what they had done unto his Father. And though they have found the contrary (to the praise of his incomparable Clemency be it spoken) yet (such is their Ingratitude) they seem to be as weary of being under the Son, as they and their Predecessors were of being under the Father; as appears by their taking the same ways, and using the same Arts to dissaffect and stir up the People against the one, as their Predecessors had done formerly against the other. But I hope, though the People now rage so furiously, and some of the Rulers take Counsel together against the Lord, and against his Anointed, yet that which they imagine (namely, to break the bands of their Allegiance asunder, and to cast away the cords thereof from them) will prove but a vain thing; for he that sitteth in Heaven shall laugh them to scorn, the Lord shall have them in derision; and will keep up him, whom he hath set up over us and them too, and will bring down those (how many and how mighty soever they may seem to be) that shall dare to rise up against him.  
But perhaps Mr. Baxter will say, that he and his 
How Mr. B. and his party brought in the King.  Party, for whom he doth apologise, are so far from being concerned in what I have said, for the bringing them under the King, that they were the Men that brought in the King to reign over them, and us too; and that if it had not been for them he had never been brought home as he was. The former clause of which saying of theirs I utterly deny; for they kept him out as long as they could, and would have done so for ever if they could have established any other Government; but that if it had not been for them he had not come home as he did, is true in one sense, that is, he had not come home from having been banished, and forced to live abroad so many Years together, which they were indeed the cause of; but in another sense, namely, that he came home as he did without any capitulations or conditions of restraint put upon him, They, I mean the Nonconformists were so far from being the cause of, that they did what they could to hinder it; and I could name the place where a Consultation was held by the Grandees of the Faction, to oblige him, before he came home, to consent to those very Propositions which were made by the Parliament Commissioners to his Father at the Isle of Wight, which would have lest him but the Name of a King only; but the cursed Cow had short horns; the Army was in better hands than it had been; and he that was Commander in chief of it, having purged out all that would not comply with his loyal Intention to bring in the King as a King, he frustrated the designs of those that would have brought him in manacled, or not have brought him in at all; which were all the Nonconformists, and especially those of the Presbyterian Party, who though they did not, because they could not hinder the King's Restauration in that manner he was restored, nor consequently their being brought under him, so far as to own and acknowledge him to be their King, by taking a pardon from him for what they had done against his Father and himself; yet they do not, nor will not own him as all Subjects ought, and as all good Subjects do own their Kings, by obeying their Laws. And perhaps, that which Mr. Baxter means by the Bishop of Ely's and my helping to bring him and his Party under, is the bringing of them under the obedience of the King's Laws, by silencing such as will not obey them.  
What the Bishop of Ely hath done in that kind I know not; but this I am sure, that neither he 
An account of Ministers silenced by the Bishop.  nor I could have obeyed the Laws ourselves, if we had not silenced those Preachers that would not conform to what they were enjoined by Law; and which if they refused, We that were Bishops were enjoined by Law to silence them as we did, how few or how many soever they were of them; though I verily believe they were not half the number Mr. Baxter speaks of. In the Diocese of Worcester, whilst I was Bishop there, Mr. Baxter himself was the only man whom I silenced; and since I was Bp. of Winchester, which is now above 20 Years, I do not think the Nonconforming Ministers I have silenced have been half so many, I mean half so many men silenced as there have been years since; which I do not say to ingratiate myself with the Nonconforming Party, as if I would not have silenced more if there had been more to silence; that is, if there had been more in possession of any Benefice or Cure of Souls in that Diocese, who refused to conform to all, that by the Act of Uniformity they were enjoined to conform unto: but I say it, to show the impossibility of the silencing 2000 in all, when there were so few silenced in that Diocese of Winchester; which is none of the least, though there be some greater.  
Besides, I presume Mr. Baxter means by his 2000, 
Intruders as well as Nonconforming Ministers put out.  not only such as were put out of their Livings or Cures, for refusing to conform, or for their Inconformity only; but such as likewise were put out because they were Intruders into other men's Livings (as Mr. Baxter himself was) and consequently were by Law compellable to yield possession to the right owners that were then living, who perhaps were some Hundreds of those Thousands. I am sure all We of the Clergy, that were abroad with the King, and all those that were at home, and had been put out, because they would not take the Covenant, and lived till after the King's and the Church's Restitution, by being restored to what was our own before, must needs dispossess many of those whom Mr. Baxter would have thought to have been put out for Inconformity only.  
But supposing all that were put out or silenced, had been put out and silenced for Nonconformity only; and supposing too that there were 2000 of them; yet how the Bishop of Ely and I did more to the bringing so many of them under that penalty than other Bishops did, or than all Bishops were bound to do, I do not understand; unless he means that We did it more effectually than any other of the Bishops did; which is to cast an imputation of Connivance at the breach of the Law in favour of the Nonconformists upon all the rest of our Order, which I think none of them will own as a favour from him. For my own part, as I did willingly consent to the making of that Law, (I mean the Act of Uniformity) so I did as willingly put it in execution, where I was obliged to do so; as believing it not only to be just and equitable, but in an high degree expedient, if not absolutely necessary also.   

CHAP. VI  
The Justice and Equity, as also the Prudence and Necessity of silencing the Nonconformists. The King's Promise at Breda, being only conditional, acquitted.  
ANd first, it was very just, and very equitable also, in relation to what was passed, I mean 
The silencing of the Nonconformists a just and equitable punishment.  if they had been enjoined silence for the future by way of punishment only, for the mischief they had done by Preaching formerly; which was such as I cannot think of without horror, nor they should not think of, without a thankful acknowledging it for a very great Mercy and Favour from God and the King, that they had only the Liberty and opportunity of doing more mischief taken away from them, when their Lives might most justly have been taken away for the mischief they had done before. For it is upon this account that Mr. Br. himself justifies Solomon's deposing Abiathar the Highpriest, 
Mr. B 's own case the same as he makes Abiathar 's to be.  (who was the next person in dignity to the King himself amongst the Jews) because he might have taken away his Life (saith Mr. Baxter) as well as the Priesthood, for his siding with Adonijah in his Rebellion. And might not our King, upon the same account, have taken away Mr. Baxter's own Life, and the Lives of all the rest of the Nonconforming Ministers (as Mr. Baxter calls them) namely for siding with the Rebellious Parliament, and not only for siding with it themselves, but for stirring up all the People to side with it also against his Father and himself? And ought they not then to acknowledge the taking away of but their Livings, (which they had never any legal right to) and their liberty to preach, which they had so horribly abused; ought they not (I say) to acknowledge it to have been, at least a just, if not a very favourable punishment for their former offences; and equitable too, as well as just and favourable, it being but the doing that unto them justly and legally which they had most unjustly and illegally done before to all the Conformable Clergy, by thrusting them out and intruding themselves into their places?  
Again, as the depriving and silencing of the Nonconformists 
The silencing of them prudent and necessary also, by way of caution.  considered as a punishment for what they had done before, was not only just and equitable, but favourable also: So, considered as a Caution against what they might do for the future, it was not only prudent and expedient, but as things than stood absolutely necessary for the securing of the public Peace both in Church and State, and consequently the safety and welfare both of Prince and People.  
For We had reason to believe it was neither a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, 
No thanks to them for the King's coming home.  nor a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, it was neither a remorse for what they had done, nor a change of Mind, either in their judgements or affections, in order to what they would do, that made any of the Nonconformist Parties give way to the King's coming home as he did; but only their disability to hinder it; partly, by reason of the irreconcilable differences among themselves, and partly because the Army was no longer in their Power, but especially because the over ruling Wisdom of the divine Providence would have it to be so. And therefore as we were not to thank them for that blessed change that was made so much against their Wills, both in the Church and State; so, were we not to trust them neither, with having any thing to do, either in the one or in the other; especially in the Church, without giving some assurance beforehand, that they would not preach and act as they had done formerly. And the Assurance, which by the King 
The security, the government required of them.  and his great Council, was thought fit to be given by them, was first a renouncing of the Covenant, and secondly to declare their Assent and Consent to whatsoever by the Act of Uniformity is required of them; either of which if they refused to do, they did as good as tell us in plain terms what we were to expect from them, namely, that they thought themselves bound by their Covenant to pursue the ends of it whensoever there should be an opportunity for it, and in the mean time by their praying and preaching to disaffect the People as much as they could, to that way of public Worship which they themselves refused to comply with and submit to. And can any man think it was safe for us, or consistent with the public Peace, either in Church or State, to suffer such men to continue in their stations, or to be permitted to harangue the People as they were wont to do?  
They themselves (when they were in Power, 
Their own measure meted to them.  though it was by Usurpation only) thought it not only lawful and prudent, but necessary also for the upholding of their illegal and usurped Authority, to deprive and silence all our Clergy that would not take their Covenant, and submit to their Directory. And is it not as lawful, and prudent, and necessary too for Us, in order to the securing of the legal, both Civil and Ecclesiastical, Government, to deprive and silence those that will not renounce that Covenant, whereby they are obliged to ruin both; or that will not join with us in the public Worship of God, as it is prescribed in the Book of Common-Prayer: Certainly, if it were prudent and necessary for Them in their Circumstances then to do the one, it must needs be as prudent and necessary for Us, in our circumstances now, to do the other, even themselves being Judges: to say nothing of the unlawfulness of what they did unto Us, as being unjust in itself, and having nothing to warrant it, but an usurped Power; and the lawfulness of what we do unto them, as being just in itself, and being authorized and commanded to be done by that Power, which We are legally obliged to obey.  
I know Mr. Baxter, and others of the Dissenting Party, use often to allege, and mainly to insist 
The King's Promise at Breda discharged,  upon what the King promised them at BREDA, and made them hope should be done for them, when he came home. But they know, or aught to know, that those promises (whatsoever they were) as they were meant by the King, so they were to be understood by them, to be obliging so far forth only as they should be approved and consented to by his great Council, the Two Houses of Parliament, without whose Advice, Approbation and Consent, 
As being conditional.  they knew the King could repeal no old Law, that was in force against them, nor make any new Law, in favour of them: Either of which the two Houses were so far from advising him to do, that the House of Commons gave him unanswerable reasons (lately reprinted) why nothing of that kind could be done, without hazarding a relapse both of Church and State into as bad, or perhaps a worse condition than that which it was newly come out of. For the preventing whereof it was the House of Commons, the Representatives of the People, and not the Convocation, the Representatives of the Church, that upon mature deliberation, devised and drew up that Bill, which being assented to by the Lords, they presented to the King to be made a Law, (as it was by the King's Fiat) to oblige, and be imposed upon all that are, or pretend to be of the Clergy, before they be permitted to preach unto the People, or to have the Education of Youth here in this Kingdom: and this is the Law called the Act of Uniformity.  
After the making of which Law, by the Advice, and with the Consent of both Houses of Parliament, it is to no purpose to allege or insist upon any former Promise made by the King, and made by him but conditionally only, that is, if he were or should be so advised by his Parliament, and not otherwise. And indeed for them, or any Agents of theirs, to desire any thing of the King before he came home, as to the repealing of any old Law, or the making 
Their carriage, an affront to the Parliament.  of any new Law, without or against such Advice or Consent of Parliament, or any otherwise than conditionally, if the Parliament would consent to it, was a high breach of the highest Privilege of both Houses of Parliament, in those that did desire it then, or do now complain it was not done, when they knew it could not be done by the King alone, and saw the Parliament would not consent to it; and therefore I say, still to insist upon any such promise made by the King, must needs be a very great Affront to both Houses of Parliament, unless they be of Mr. Baxter's opinion, (who as I have before observed) notwithstanding his magnifying the Power of Parliaments, by dividing the Sovereignty betwixt the King and them, affirms, that in some cases the King 
Mr. B is boldness with Parliaments.  may make a Law, not only without, but against the consent of the People, if it be for their good: because it is to be supposed (saith he) they would have consented unto it, if they had known it to be so; which how far it may entrench on the Power of Parliaments, I leave it to them to consider: I am sure, I dare not be so bold with them.   

CHAP. VII.  
The Act of Uniformity, why made. Some other probable Reasons for Nonconformity, and not Conscience altogether, as Mr. Baxter saith it is.  
BUt to return to what we have in hand, the King having by advice, and with the consent of both Houses of Parliament, first passed an Act of Oblivion to quiet men's Minds for what was passed; to prevent 
The reason of the Act of Uniformity.  our falling again into as bad or perhaps a worse condition for the future, if ill principled and ill affected Preachers were permitted to blow the trumpet of Sedition and Rebellion, as they had done formerly, His Majesty did, by the Advice, and with the Consent of the said both Houses of Parliament, enact the aforesaid Act of Uniformity, thereby providing that none should be admitted or permitted to preach to the People, or to teach their Children that would not subscribe and conform to what was required to be subscribed and conformed unto by that Act. Which was no more than they have already consented to by their Representatives in Parliament, and consequently to the Penalties for refusing to conform to it also; which was neither loss 
The penalty of not conforming.  of Life, nor Limb, nor Liberty, nor any part of their Goods, but only their forbearing to preach, until they were better informed, and could bring themselves to comply both in Judgement and Practice, with what their Duty and Obedience to the Law required of them, as some of the learnedst, and generally thought to be as conscientious as any of them (namely, Bp. Reynolds, and Dr. Connant) did; 
Some have conformed.  as perhaps many other learned and conscientious men did also. But they were not one of an hundred, will Mr. Baxter say, in comparison of those that 
Why the rest did not; whether for Conscience, as Mr. B. saith.  did not, nor could not conform: True, I confess, as to those that did not, but whether all that did not, could not, is a thing, with Mr. Baxter's good leave, may be doubted, whatsoever he hath said to the contrary; as when he saith, that to think any that do not conform, would not conform, if they could with a good Conscience, is to think them all to be Fools or mad Men, for preferring Poverty before Plenty, Want before Wealth, Contempt before Honour and Respect, and Imprisonment before Liberty, which no man in his Wits either would, or aught to do, if he might choose whether he would so or no without sin. And therefore Mr. Baxter thinks we must needs grant it is nothing but fear of sinning against God that makes the Nonconformists, not that they will not, but that they dare not conform to what the Laws of the Land as well as of the Church require of them.  
As if all the Nonconforming Ministers that were put out of the Livings they were in, or that by reason of their Inconformity are uncapable of any Preferment in the Church, are therefore all of them men of Conscience, and that whatsoever they ought to do and will not, or will do and ought not, it is for Conscience, or for Conscience sake only, or for fear of sinning against God if they did what they do not, or did not what they do; that is, if either they did conform when they are commanded, or did not preach when they are forbidden. But is there, or can there be no other cause of their not doing what they should do, and their doing what they should not do, but Conscience only? May it not be peevishness in some, and perverseness in others? May it not be Pride and Ambition in the Leaders, and Ignorance and Obstinacy in those that are led by them?  
I remember, that when Bishop Brownrig (who is one of the few Bishops that Mr. Baxter vouchsafes to 
Bp. Brownrig's account of Mr Calamy 's not conforming.  speak well of) and I went together to the Treaty with the late King at the Isle of Wight, he being one of the Three Divines named by the Parliament, and I one of the Three named by the King, (though very unworthy I confess to be so,) when that learned Bishop (I say) and I went together in his Coach towards the Isle of Wight, (I remember not now upon what occasion it was, but) I remember very well that I asked his Lordship whether he knew Mr. Calamy, and he answered me he did, and had known him from his first coming to Cambridge. Pray, my Lord, said I, was he always a Nonconformist? No, said he, far from it in his practice, as well as in his judgement, even until the beginning of these times. How came he then, said I, to be so suddenly, and so strangely changed from what he was? Why said the Bishop, he saw the Tide was turning, and having a good opinion of his own parts, he thought if he was one of the foremost in coming in, he might be one of the foremost, if not the foremost of all the Leaders of the whole Party, as you see (said he) he is: adding that the hope to be head of a Faction was a powerful Temptation. And why might not the same Temptation prevail with many others, that thought as well of themselves as Mr. Calamy did, and consequently might have the same hopes that he had.  
But why then (may it be said) did not the same 
A probable reason why some refused offers of preferment,  men, when the Tide turned again, at the King's coming home, turn with it; especially such of them as were invited by the offer of considerable Preferments, if by conforming they would make themselves capable of them? I answer that some of them did so; and that those that did not, might be kept from doing it for fear of losing the Reputation and Interest they had gotten in the Nonconforming Party; which though it were down for the present, yet it might, they thought, get up again, as it had done formerly, when it was lower than it was then. In the mean time, some of those few that had such Offers made them, and finally refused them, took time to deliberate whether they should refuse them or no: thereby plainly showing that they were not then fully resolved in point of Conscience, that a man might not either be a Bishop or Dean of a Cathedral without sin, though they had formerly condemned and covenanted against both. Neither did their finally refusing of them prove the contrary: for though they might, and did, think it lawful to accept of those offers, and consequently lawful to conform to the Act of Uniformity in order to their being capable of them, yet they might, (as I said 
To wit, to endear themselves to their party.  before) so value the Interest they had in their Party, (which as they knew they should lose by accepting, so they knew they should improve by refusing those Offers,) that for that very reason only they did finally refuse to accept of them; but not till they had made their advantage of such offers having been made unto them; namely, the indearing of themselves by so much the more unto their Party, by how much the more they might have had, if they would have gone off from them: which being made known to those that were their Disciples, as it could not choose but make them the more beloved and esteemed; so it could not choose but make them to be more liberally and largely supplied and maintained also, that they might not be altogether losers by the refusals of such Offers. Whether Mr. Calamy made any such advantage of his refusal of the Bishopric of Litchfield and Coventry or no, I know not; but this I am sure of, that at a meeting betwixt him and others of his Party, with Bishop Henchman, me, and others of our Party, at a Booksellers Shop in St. Paul's Churchyard, Mr. Calamy sitting next to me, did whisperingly ask me what the Bishopric of Litchfield and Coventry was worth yearly, I told him it was commonly valued at 1500 l. per annum; whereunto he replied nothing, but that he thought it had not been worth so much. Why he asked me this question, and whether he made use of my answer in order to the improving the Interest he had before in his own Party, either in point of Credit or Profit, let others guests; but that he asked me such a question, and that I gave him such an answer, I aver verbo Sacerdotis.  
Hereunto I might add, that many would have conformed that did not, especially many of those 
Many stood out, in hopes of a Toleration.  that were beneficed in the Country, if they had not been made believe by the Grandees of their Party in the City, that there would be shortly a Toleration granted upon easier terms than those required by the Act of Uniformity: and so much the rather, and the sooner, the more resolutely and the more generally they refused to comply with, and submit to the Act of Uniformity. Whether they that writ this, and caused it to be dispersed among those that were possessed of Cures in the Country, did believe it themselves or no, or whether meaning to stand out themselves, they made use of this pious fraud to increase the number of those that stood out with them; they did by this means make many refuse to conform, who were afterwards heartily sorry for it, though most of them were ashamed to own they were so.   

CHAP. VIII.  
Mr. Baxter 's Plea for Nonconforming Ministers may alike serve for Popish Priests. The peculiar excellency of the Church's Sermons, viz. her Homilies, set forth.  
BUt supposing, though not granting, that all 
Supposing it is out of Conscience they do not conform, yet they are justly silenced.  that did not conform, and were put out of their employments in the Church upon that account, did refuse to conform for Conscience sake only; doth it therefore follow that having preached as they had, and done as they did, and refusing to give caution that they would not preach so, and do so still, they might not in Justice, or ought not in prudence to be forbidden to preach either in public or private any more, until they should give such caution for their good behaviour for the future, as the Wisdom of the State, as well as of the Church, thought fit to require of them? Sure they will not say that there are none that ought not to be forbidden to preach either in public or in private, in Churches or in Conventicles; and yet I am sure they can name none, that do not, or may not pretend (and as truly perhaps, as any of those Mr. Baxter pleads for) to an obligation of Conscience for their Nonconformity, and for their preaching in Conventicles likewise, as well as any of Mr. Baxter's 2000  
Nay, may not the Popish Priests themselves, (whom I think Mr. Baxter will not deny to be 
The Popish Priests have the same Plea as Mr. B 's Nonconforming Ministers,  justly prohibited to exercise their Priestly Office here among us, and to be justly punishable if they do so,) may not those Popish Priests themselves (I say) justify their saying of Mass, and making of Proselytes by their preaching in Conventicles, by the self same Reasons that are made use of by Mr. Baxter to justify his own practice, and the practice of those he pleads for in his Book called an Apology for the Nonconformist Ministry?  
For first he cannot deny but that schismatical as well as Popish Dissenters or Nonconformists, are forbidden by the same Authority to exercise their Ministry both publicly and privately: so that the Popish Priests may truly say to the Dissenting Ministers, Hic sumus ergo pares, upon this occasion our case is much alike; we are no more transgressors of the Laws than you are.  
Secondly, if doing what they do out of Conscience, or because they are obliged in Conscience to do so, be a sufficient Plea to justify the Dissenting Ministers in transgressing of the Law, why should it not justify the Popish Priests for transgressing of it also? For that they do what they do out of Conscience, or because they think themselves bound in Conscience to do so, cannot be denied, at least there can be no proof to the contrary; and they think the World is bound to believe it of them, rather than of the other, because their Penalty for transgressing of the Law is much greater.  
Thirdly, besides this general Reason of being obliged in Conscience, which the Popish Priests as well as the Dissenting Ministers may allege for transgressing of the Law, whereby both of them are forbidden to exercise their respective Functions, there is none of those Four particular Reasons which Mr. Baxter 
And that upon Mr. B 's own Reasons.  insists on in the aforesaid Book of his, to justify himself and those of his Nonconforming Brethren for preaching as they do, though the Law have forbidden them to do so, but the Popish Priests may pretend to also for their justification in the Execution of their Priestly Office in Conventicles of their own persuasion, or for the gaining of Proselytes to their own Religion.  
I. As first, for example, may not a Romish 
Vid. Apology for the Nonconformist Ministry, p. 14.  Priest say, and say it truly, as Mr. Baxter doth, That he holds the sacred Office of the Ministry or Priesthood consisteth in an obligation to do the work, and an Authority to warrant him therein, and that both these are essential to the Office? as likewise, That Kings and other Magistrates are not by Ordination to 
ibid. p. 15.  give this Office, nor by Degradation to take it away? But what then? May not the King forbid a Popish 
As from the Obligation of holy Orders.  Priest to exercise his Priestly Function here in England, and punish him if he do, though he cannot degrade him, or make him to be no Priest? And if this may be done to a Popish Priest without degrading him, why may it not be done by the same Authority to a dissenting or Nonconforming Minister without degrading him also? Yea, and without taking away any thing that is essential to his Office? For it is not the obligation to do, but to be qualified and willing to do the work of a Minister, that is essential to his Office: neither doth his Ordination give him Authority to do the work of a Minister any otherwise, or any longer than he doth it as it ought to be done. So that this Argument drawn from the Obligation of a Minister to do the work of a Minister after he is ordained, if it prove any thing, it proves either more or less than Mr. Baxter would have it, namely, that either Popish Priests may and aught to exercise their Priestly Office here in England, though by Law they are forbidden: or else, that the Nonconforming Ministers may not, nor ought not to exercise their Ministerial Office, being forbidden to do so by the same Authority, and especially for the same Reasons also; namely for being Disturbers of the public Peace, and holding such Principles as are destructive to Monarchy, the one teaching the Division of the Sovereignty betwixt the King and another Foreign Prince, that is, betwixt the King and the Pope; and the other teaching the Division of the Sovereignty betwixt the King and the Parliament, that is, betwixt the King and his Subjects.  
II. Neither is Mr. Baxter's second Argument 
From their being consecrated to God's service.  for the Nonconforming Ministers being obliged to exercise their Ministry, though they are by Law forbidden to do it, so peculiar to them, but that if it had any force in it, any man that hath been ordained, and thereby been consecrated and devoted to the Ministerial Function may lay claim to it, and make use of it, though he have done or may do never so much hurt by the exercise of it: because he will be guilty of Sacrilege (saith Mr. Baxter) if he do not, and of the highest degree of Sacrilege that can be, it being much more sacrilegious (saith he) to alienate consecrated Persons than consecrated Things from the Service of God. And for proof thereof he tells us, That our Canons inquire after all such as alienate themselves from the Ministry to which they were ordained, and turn to other Callings; adding, We dislike not that Canon, but we wish our observance of it might be thought but a pardonable fault. As if this Canon which forbids men to quit their Ministerial Calling, and to betake themselves to any other Lay Profession, did oblige all those that are Ministers, or have been ordained to be Ministers, to continue in the exercise of their Ministerial Function, though by lawful Authority, and for never so just cause they are forbidden to do so: because forsooth he will be guilty of Sacrilege if he do not: so that he that is once ordained, and thereby consecrated to serve God in the Ministry, though he be never so heretical, or schismatical, or fanatical in point of Opinion; or never so factious, or seditious, or rebellious, or lewd, or debauched in point of Practice, he must not be forbidden to do the work he was ordained to do: or if he be forbidden, he must not forbear to do it notwithstanding, because it will be the highest degree of Sacrilege, except Apostasy it 
ibid. p. 20.  self, if he do: So that this Argument proves nothing neither, or as much for the worst, as it doth for the best that ever were ordained.  
III. The like may be said of Mr. Baxter's third Argument also, which is a deduction from several Texts of Scripture obliging those that have taken upon 
From scriptural Authority.  them the Ministry of the Gospel, to be diligent, and faithful, and constant in the preaching of it. All which places must be understood with this exception, unless they be lawfully, and by their lawful Superiors forbidden to do it. Otherwise there will a Floodgate be opened for the bringing in all manner of Heresies and Schisms into the Church; and of Faction, and Sedition, and Rebellion into the State, as we have found by our own experience it hath done lately into our own Church and State; and will do so again, if such Arguments as these can prevail with us to repeal our Laws, and to grant a Licence, or rather a licentiousness of Preaching, to Men so principled and so affected, as Mr. Baxter himself, and those he pleads for have showed themselves to be; and will not yet give us any security, that they will not preach and do hereafter, as they have done formerly.  
IU. But his fourth main Reason (as he calls it, 
From the guilt of murdering souls if they do not preach. Pag. 45. Plea for Non-con's Ministry.  why those he pleads for must preach, though they be forbidden) is a main one indeed (if it were a true one,) namely, That they should sin against the Law of Nature itself, nay even the great radical Law of Nature, so far as to be guilty of the murdering of men's Souls, if they did not preach though they be forbidden; by what Authority or for what cause soever: for so he must mean, or else he saith nothing to the purpose, and if he means so, he condemns the King and Parliament for forbidding so many hundreds or thousands (as Mr. Baxter saith are silenced, because they will not conform,) and consequently for doing what they can to make so many hundreds and thousands to sin against the radical Law of Nature, and to be guilty of murdering God knows how many men's Souls.  
But Kings and Parliaments, Mr. Baxter may say, are but Men, and Men that may err in commanding what God hath forbidden, and in forbidding what God hath commanded, as they do (saith he) in this particular, and are not therefore to be obeyed: as the Apostles did not and professed they would not obey the High Priest and the Sanhedrim, when they did forbid them to preach any more in the name of Christ; the like, saith he, the Primitive and Orthodox Christians did, though the Pagan and Arian Emperors forbade them to do so.  
But is there the same Reason, Mr. Baxter, or the 
No such necessity of preaching now, as in the primitive times.  same necessity for your preaching now (supposing you would preach nothing but what you should preach) as there was for their preaching then; when Paganism had taken and kept possession of the World for 4000 years together, and Christianity was to be planted instead of it, when the Harvest was so very great, and the Labourers so very few? Whereas Christianity and Orthodox Christianity (as you yourself witness) is (thanks be to God for it) already planted here; and though every Parish be not so well provided for, either with maintenance for a Minister, or with so able a Minister as I wish they were, and hope they will be without need of your assistance; yet there is none, or very few, if any, but such as can read divine Service, wherein are all David's Psalms read once a month, and all the rest of the Holy Scripture once a year, and the Creed and the Decalogue twice or thrice a week, besides the teaching of the Church-Catechism, wherein is the Churches own Exposition of the Creed, the Decalogue, the Lords-Prayer, and of the Nature, Use and Ends of both the Sacraments, together with how we are to be prepared for the receiving of them, and the benefits we are to receive with them and by them. And I demand of Mr. Baxter, whether this, (if there were no more than this) be not enough, by God's blessing upon it, for the conversion and saving of Souls? But over and besides all this, there are, or may be, 
The Homilies of the Church recommended for excellent Sermons.  without their help, as good Sermons, as any they can make, read or preached, every Sunday, even by those that cannot make Sermons themselves; and Sermons upon such Subjects, or Heads, or Common places, as are most fundamental, and most necessary and profitable for the People to be instructed in, both for their belief and practice, in order to the making of them good Men, good Christians, good Subjects, and every way such as they ought to be in all their Relations; and that in so plain, so perspicuous, and so familiar a way of Expression, as that none that have any degree of common understanding, but may understand them; and if it be not their own fault, be edified by them. And all this without any danger of being led into any doctrinal or practical Error, without being in danger of being made Heretics, or Schismatics, or Rebels, by hearing of them. This being the peculiar excellency of those Sermons, I mean the Domilies, above all other Sermons, that all men may be edified and made better, and no man can be corrupted or made worse by them; for they are all of them clean corn, without any mixture either of tares, or of chaff, either of noxious and hurtful, or of vain and unprofitable Ingredients with it; which no man can be sure of from any other Sermons but these, or such as these are only; which can have nothing of the frailty, nor the folly, or the malice of him that delivers them in them: which all other Sermons of every Man's own Composition have, or may have in a greater or less degree, and none had in a greater, than those that were preached in the late times by them, whose preaching again Mr. Baxter doth so earnestly plead for.  
But the reading of a Homily, will Mr. Baxter say, is not preaching, or if it may be called preaching, it 
The efficacy of those Homilies maintained.  is such kind of preaching as hath no Life nor Efficacy in it to work upon men's Minds and Affections that hear it: Not so much perhaps, Mr. Baxter, as if it were delivered viuâ voce, by word of Mouth, by him that was the Composer of it: but to say it hath not, nor cannot have any efficacy at all, is durus sermo, a very hard saying, and such as doth not consist with their own practice; I mean their Repetitions, which they seem to think to be as necessary after a Sermon, as contracting or betrothing before Marriage. And do they think those Repetitions 
An Argument drawn from their own repetitions of Sermons.  of other men's Sermons to be of no Efficacy to make them that hear them the better for them? If they do think so, why do they place so much of Religion in the use of them? If they do not, let them for shame grant as much efficacy to the repetition of the Church Sermons, (I mean the Homilies) or if not to the repetition of them, yet at least to the repetition of the Prophet's Sermons in the Old Testament, and of Christ and his Apostles in the New, as they do to the repetition of those Sermons that are preached by themselves; which though they may think to be better than our Homilies, yet I hope they will not prefer them before, or compare them with Christ's Sermon on the Mount, or with those Sermons of the Prophets and Apostles, which were dictated by the Holy Ghost, and are daily read or repeated in all and every one of our Churches, how meanly soever they are provided for otherwise. So that I do not see how so many thousand Souls, as Mr. Baxter speaks of, must needs be starved for 
Mr. B is murder of Souls, a phantasm.  want of spiritual food, if the 2000 silenced Ministers that he pleads for be not restored to the liberty of Preaching; and much less, how any of those that are silenced, should be guilty of Murder for not preaching, though there were much more need of preaching than there is; for it is not for want of more Labourers, but for want of more maintenance for our Labourers, that our Churches are not so well supplied with Preachers as they might be, without taking in of those that are shut out: or if our Churches are too few, or our Parishes too great, either of those inconveniences might easily be remedied, by building more Churches, and dividing those Parishes; and so might the maintenance of the Orthodox and Conformable Ministry be likewise, if the Parliament would give but as much to indigent Churches as it did to indigent Officers; and than if they were not supplied by able, and industrious, and unblameable Incumbents, let us, that are the Bishops, be blamed for it.   

CHAP. IX.  
Whatever need there may be of preaching, both Popish Priests and Nonconformists ought to be restrained from preaching.  
BUt why in the mean time, until that can be effected, should we not make use of their assistance, 
The assistance of Nonconformists offered gratis. Apol. p. 16.  which they offer us for nothing? For as for maintenance (saith Mr. Baxter) we expect not any. Speak for yourself, Mr. Baxter. I remember the time when an eminent Man of your Party, that is, for the Parliament against the King, had more than twice as many Spiritual Cures at once, and some of them of greater value, than any conformable man hath or can have by Law: and his Apology for it in Print was, that he had but one Living of his own, and the rest he did but keep, until good and godly Pastors could be provided for them; but he kept the Profits of them also, though he was not resident upon any one of them, no not so much as upon that which was his own, being an Intruder into the Headship of a College. I remember too when the Churches in divers great Towns, which had a great number of Souls, and but little maintenance belonging to them, were wholly neglected, and the neighbouring little Villages, where the Cures were small but the Tithes were great, were seized on by the Grandees of the Faction; which was an evident proof that they valued the Fleece more than the Flock; and that they would not then, as Mr. Baxter saith they will now, serve God for nought. But would not the Papists do so also? Yes, perhaps 
Why not to be accepted.  they would, will Mr. Baxter say, but it would be in order to the destroying and not the edifying of the Church: and have we not reason to fear that their offering to preach gratis is with such a meaning and Intention also? We are sure they have done so, and we are not nor cannot be sure they will not do so again, as long as they continue at that distance, as they do, from us.  
In the mean time the Popish Priests being so 
The Popish Priests under a greater obligation of preaching.  persuaded, as they are, namely, that all Protestants are in a State of damnation, have a more rational pretence for the necessity of their preaching to us than our silenced Ministers have, or can have, even upon this account, that unless they do what they can to make us Roman Catholics, they are guilty of our perishing everlastingly. But I hope our silenced Ministers do not think us in such a state of Damnation, as we cannot be delivered out of, but by their preaching, as the Popish Priests may and do think us to be.  
But whatsoever either of them may think of the 
Neither of them to be permitted;  need we have of their preaching, and consequently of their own obligation to preach, though they be forbidden; we that do believe they would do more hurt than good by their preaching, do believe likewise that we are obliged in Conscience to restrain them from preaching, though there were a greater want of Preachers and preaching than there is among us. For sure there was never more need of preaching, and scarcity of Preachers, than when the 
According to Christ's own Caveat,  Gospel began first to be planted, when the Harvest was so great, and the Labourers so few, that Christ bade them pray the Lord of the Harvest to send more labourers into his Harvest; and yet even then Christ would not have all to be harkened unto that took upon them to preach, but bad his Disciples beware of them and of their Doctrine, though they came in Sheep's clothing, (that is) though they made a show of nothing but harmlesness, and meekness, and simplicity, because they might be ravening Wolves for all that. And not long after that, when there was still need of a great many more labourers than there were, to carry on the great work of the conversion of the Gentiles; yet even then St. Paul commands Titus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, to 
and S. Paul 's order to Titus.  silence some of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, of those that were Preachers: and why? because they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, unruly, such as would not be governed, or be brought under any rule or order, but did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, subvert whole houses. And if such Preachers as did but subvert whole houses were to be silenced or not suffered to preach then, when there was so much more need of Preachers and of preaching than there is now, how much more reasonable and necessary is it for us to silence those whose Principles tend to the subverting of whole Kingdoms? especially when we have more Preachers of our own than we can tell how to provide for.  
Again, as in the first plantation of the Church, when there was incomparably most need of Preachers, 
The like practised at the beginning of the Reformation.  the Apostles would not suffer such as were ungovernable or unruly themselves, especially if they taught others to be so also; so in the beginning of the Reformation of our Church from Popish Idolatry, Superstition and Corruption both in Doctrine and Practice, though there was a very great want of able and orthodox Preachers, not only in Edward the sixth's time, but in Queen Elizabeth's time also, for divers years together; yet none of the Popish Priests were suffered to continue in their stations, but very many Cures were supplied with men of very mean abilities, till they could be better provided for, rather than hazard a relapse into Popery by employing any that were Popishly affected in the work of the Ministry. And Mr. Baxter may remember when we of the Church of England as it was established by Law, 
Themselves served the Church of England-men so.  were deprived and silenced for no other reason, but because we could not in Conscience conform to the illegal Government that was by an usurped power set up in the Church and State. I know there were other pretences against some; as disability, immorality and scandal: but the main reason why we were generally turned out of our Free-holds, and forbidden to exercise our Ministerial function was our Nonconformity to the then present Government in the State, and to the then present way of serving God in the Church, though both of them were illegal, and though there was then as much or more need of their being assisted by us, than there is now of our being assisted by them.   

CHAP. X.  
According to Mr. Baxter 's own opinion, the Ministers he pleads for, aught to be silenced. The Act against Conventicles, why made; and what is meant by Seditious Conventicles and Preachers. Mr. Baxter, by his own confession, an incourager of the late Rebellion.  
BUt supposing the want of Preachers and of Preaching to be much greater than it is, may there 
What Preachers to be silenced by Mr. B 's own sentence.  not be a just cause to keep some from preaching and that without Sacrilege or robbing of God, though they have been consecrated to God by Ordination; if afterwards they prove such as are much more likely to do harm than good by their preaching? And such are not only those that are utterly unable to teach, or are notoriously scandalous in their lives and conversations; but such as are heretical or schismatical in their opinions, such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unruly and ungovernable, and apt to stir up strife and Sedition, either in Church or State. Certainly such men as these aught to be silenced and punished too, if they will not forbear preaching, what need soever they may pretend there is for it; otherwise St. Paul would not have given so strict a charge for the silencing of such as he did to Titus. And truly that there are some such as ought to be silenced notwithstanding their consecration to God, Mr. Baxter himself cannot deny. For whom else doth he mean by those he calls intolerabiles 
* Vid. True and only way to concord, part 3.  that is, such as are not to be tolerated or suffered to Preach? Doth he mean none but those who were never ordained? or none but those that are heretical in their opinions, or debauched in their manners, or insufficient for the discharge of their duties? No; he confesseth that in the general all or any whose preaching is likely to do more hurt than good, and particularly such as are against 
Third part of True and only way of conc. p. 121. & 122.  Prince's safety and honour, or whose Principles tend to overthrow the honour and safety of Governors, and to kindle the fire of contention and enmity; or such as draw their hearers Souls into any damnable error or sin; or that persuade men against any precept of the Decalogue, and consequently against any of the precepts of the second Table, as well as of the first; all such as these, saith Mr. Baxter, are to be restrained from preaching; For, far be it (saith Mr. Baxter) from any sober man to think that the Magistrate must let all men do the evil that they will but pretend to God and Conscience for. Which one saying of his makes all that he said before to justify the preaching of his Nonconformists to signify nothing, if they be silenced or forbidden to preach for any of the aforesaid causes by him specified and acknowledged to be such, as Preachers ought to be silenced for, notwithstanding any pretence of conscience to the contrary.  
So this being agreed on betwixt us; the next 
The Ministers Mr. B. pleads for, are such as, he confesseth, aught to be silenced.  thing in question betwixt us is, whether those that are silenced are such as Mr. Baxter confesseth aught to be silenced or no; for if they be, he confesseth likewise, that no pretence of conscience can warrant their preaching, and much less oblige them to preach. For the deciding of this question therefore, whether those that are silenced are justly silenced or no; there remains one, and but one question more, and that is who shall judge and finally determine whether they that are silenced, be or be not such, as aught to be silenced, or restrained from preaching. Surely they themselves must not be their own judges: but who must then? why, who but the Magistrate? (saith Mr. Baxter) who in Church cases and religion hath 
The Magistrate the Judge in this case, saith Mr. B.  the only public judgement whom he shall countenance, maintain, or tolerate, or whom he shall punish or not tolerate nor maintain; but with this caution, so he 
Vid. Third part of Book of Concord, pag. 140.  be not the executioner of the Clergy's sentence without or against his own conscience and judgement. Where by the Magistrate, I hope he means the supreme Magistrate; and by his judgement, he means his judgement according to Law: For the Law and nothing 
The Law is a declaration of his Judgement.  but the Law, is the declaration of the supreme Magistrate's public judgement, in giving whereof he neither is nor can be the executioner of any other man's sentence; but all subordinate Magistrates (whether Civil or Ecclesiastical) are the executioners of the supreme Magistrate's judgement or sentence, and are no farther binding or to be obeyed than they are so.  
Now that the supreme Magistrate with the advice and consent of his great Council hath given his judgement not only who are, and who are not to be tolerated to preach in public or in Churches, appears 
What kind of Preachers tolerated, what not, is there set down:  by the Act of Uniformity; as likewise that he hath given his judgement also, that those who are not to be tolerated to preach in public or in Churches, are not to be tolerated to preach in private, nor in Conventicles neither, appears by those other Acts of Parliament, whereby such preaching is forbidden, and such penalties as are therein specified are to be inflicted upon the transgressors of them. Lastly, as those Acts of Parliament are undeniable evidences who are, and who are not to be tolerated to preach either publicly or privately, according to the public judgement of the State; so the reasons why such preaching and such Preachers are prohibited 
With the reasons of such restraint.  are declared in the Titles and Prefaces of the aforesaid Acts: for example, the Title to one of those Acts, namely that of decimo tertio of our present King, is this, An Act for the safety and preservation of his Majesty's person and Government against treasonable and seditious practices and attempts: and in the Preface to the said Act it is said, that the Lords and Commons assembled in that Parliament deeply weighing and considering the miseries and calamities of well nigh 20 years before his Majesty's happy return, and withal reflecting upon the causes and occasions of so great and deplorable confusions; the growth and increase of which (they say) did in a very great measure proceed from a multitude of seditious Sermons, Pamphlets and Speeches published with a transcendent boldness, from which kind of distemper (say they) as the present age is not wholly free, so posterity may be apt to relapse into them if a timely remedy be not provided; Therefore (say they) We the Lords and Commons having duly considered the Premises, do most humbly beseech your Majesty that it may be enacted, etc.  
By which Title and preface it plainly appears, 
A descant upon those reasons.  that the Lords and Commons did believe, that neither the safety of the King's person, nor of the Government could be secured, if such kind of Preaching and Preachers as had in the late times been the stirrers up of the People to rebellion were not restrained from preaching for the future, unless they would give some such security as the Parliament should think fit to require, which was their renouncing the Covenant and their subscription to the Act 
The security, which the Law requires from Preachers.  of Uniformity which was enacted by the King, by the advice and with the consent of the Lords and Commons, the year following. And it was for their not conforming to this Act of Uniformity, that is, for their not giving that security which the Law required, that they would not preach schismatically and factiously and seditiously, as they had done formerly, for which they were some of them deprived, and all of them disabled to preach publicly in Churches, and consecrated places.  
But this Act not proving effectual enough to prevent the danger, for preventing whereof it was enacted, because those that were forbid to preach publicly and in Churches, did preach the same doctrines in Conventicles and in corners, confirming 
The ground of the Act against Conventicles.  their old, and making more and more new Proselytes, and being more and more followed because they were forbidden to preach in public; Therefore two years after this, there was another Act made by the same Authority, the Title whereof is. An Act to prevent and suppress seditious Conventicles: and the Preface or Preamble thereof is, That for the providing of farther and more speedy remedies against the growing and dangerous practices of seditious Sectaries and other disloyal Persons, who under pretence of tender Consciences do at their meetings contrive Insurrections, as late experience hath showed. Be it enacted, etc. And then tells us first, what shall be taken for a seditious Conventicle, 
What are seditious Conventicles.  namely, any meeting or Assembly in any place under colour or pretence of any exercise of Religion in other manner than is allowed by the Liturgy or practice of the Church of England, where there shall be five Persons or more over and above those of the same house. Secondly, What are to be the Penalties for the first, second and third Offence; and lastly, who are to be the Executioners and Inflicters of these Penalties. Where you see that it is the Highest secular Magistrate (whom Mr. Baxter will have to be judge in Church cases, and of whom he is to tolerate and countenance, and whom he is not to tolerate but to punish) it is he, I say, who by and with the advice and consent of his great Council of Lords and Commons hath judged all such aforesaid Assemblies to be seditious Conventicles, and consequently all the Preachers in them to be seditious Preachers; and I 
Who seditious Preachers.  hope Mr. B. will not deny, because he hath granted it already, that all seditious Preachers are to be restrained; and if they are to be restrained, and restrained by those that are the proper Judges whether they ought to be restrained or no: certainly there can be no reason to excuse, and much less to justify the preaching of those that are so restrained after they are restrained, and during such their restraint; and therefore all those reasons alleged by Mr. Baxter in the aforesaid Book of his called An Apology for 
Mr. B is Apology for them falls to ground.  the Nonconformist Ministers, are to no purpose as to the proving of that which they are alleged to prove, namely the obligation of those silenced Ministers to preach in Conventicles, whom he pleads for though they be silenced, and silenced by those whom he confesseth to have authority to silence them, and whom he confesseth likewise to be the proper judges whether they are to be silenced or no; and though that for which they are forbidden to preach in Conventicles is because such meetings and such preachings are seditious and dangerous as to the safety of the King's Person, as well as of his Government; which Mr. Baxter confesseth (in a place before quoted) to be one cause why men may be justly restrained from preaching; and how they that are justly restrained from preaching can be obliged to preach, Mr. Baxter is to prove when and how he can.  
In the mean time, all that I can imagine Master 
The very Conventicles, whatever people do there, are seditious.  Baxter hath to say is, that though they preach in Conventicles, yet they do not preach Sedition, or any thing that may disaffect their Hearers either to the King or to the Government. But what if they that sit at the helm, and whose office and duty it is to take care nè quid detrimenti Respublica capiat, That the Commonwealth get no harm or come to no damage, do believe, and have reason to believe, that you do and will preach that in private now, which they know you have preached openly and often heretofore, and have no reason to think, but that you are the same men still that you have been always, even since the very beginning of the Reformation; that is, such as have been always and ever will be undermining the established Government of the Church and State? may they not, I say, that sit at the Helm, in order to the securing of the public peace of the Kingdom and safety of the King, may they not in point of justice, nay ought they not in point of prudence and conscience too, upon the aforesaid consideration to forbid such meetings? And if they may and aught to forbid them, the very Meetings themselves after they are forbidden are seditious, whatsoever they say or do when they are met; because by the Eye of the Law they are looked upon as meeting to do that, for the doing whereof the Law forbids them to meet.  
And whereas one of Mr. Baxter's chief reasons 
One main reason of forbidding them, to prevent the murdering of Souls.  why they were obliged in conscience to preach though they are forbidden it, because they shall be guilty of the murdering of Souls if they do not; (the murdering of such Souls he means as might have been saved by their preaching, and do perish for want of it) one of the main reasons why the King by advice of his great Council hath forbidden them to preach, is to prevent the murdering of Souls and Bodies too by their preaching, I mean the Souls and Bodies of such as are by them and their preaching disaffected to the Government both in Church or State, and made ready and resolute to undermine and overturn both, whensoever there shall be an opportunity of so doing, which they would never have thought of, if it had not been for such Preachers and such preaching.  
Mr. Baxter confesseth he encouraged many thousands to engage in the late War: 
* Holy Com. Wealth, p. 486. This Mr. B. charged particularly with, upon his own confession. : which if it were a Rebellion (as no doubt it was, though perhaps he did not think it to be so) was to engage them Bodies and Souls, whether they killed or were killed, in a damnable action: And who can tell whether he and those that are principled as he is, may not even now be encouraging many thousands more to do as they did then, when the like opportunity shall invite them to it? the rather, because Master Baxter himself hath told us, that as yet be cannot 
Ibidem.  see that he was mistaken in the main cause nor dared to repent of it, nor forbear to do the same if it were to do again in the same state of things: that is, if there were, or if there should be such a War betwixt the King and the two Houses of Parliament as there was then, he would encourage as many thousands as he did then to engage against the King. And hath not the King, having such fair warning given him, good reason to prevent the making of Parties by men that are thus minded; and that not for his own sake only, nor only for their sakes, that may be endangered in their bodies and their goods for adhering to him, but even for their sakes also, who may by such Preachers and preaching be persuaded and encouraged to rebel against him, and consequently not only to a hazard of the loss of their lives, but to a certainty of the loss of their Souls without repentance, which is hardly to be hoped for those that die in an Act of sin, especially so great as that of Rebellion? And therefore for this reason only, if there were no other, those that are silenced, ought not to preach for fear of murdering of Souls by their preaching: which is all I have to say to this particular, and which if it be not enough, I hope one or other of those my reverend Brethren, the Bishops, to whom Mr. Baxter addresseth his Plea for the liberty of the Nonconformists to preach notwithstanding their being silenced by Act of Parliament, will more fully and more at large examine and confute that Treatise of his for this reason at least, if there were no other, nè si nullus ex ipsorum numero contradicat, omnes cum illo consentire videantur, Lest if none of their number should gainsay him, they may all be thought to comply and agree with him: and so he and those he pleads for will perhaps boast they do, if none of them say any thing to the contrary.   

CHAP. XI.  
Mr. B is Reflection upon the Bishop, concerning Master Joan 's his being put out of the Duke's service, taken to task, and sent to Elymas the Sorcerer. One thing true in it, that the Protestant Religion may be preserved better without the Nonconformists than with them.  
AND now I am come at last to the consideration of the last of those injurious Reflections, which in the beginning of this Book I observed to have been made upon me by Mr. Baxter, and for the confutation of which I principally intended all that I have written; though many other things (which I thought not of at first) occasionally falling in, have made that which I meant should be but a small Tract to swell into a large Volume; but now I am in, and have gone so far, I must go through with it.  
The Reflection therefore which I am now to speak of, is in Mr. Baxter's Answer to Dr. Stillingfleet's Sermon towards the end of it; the words are these: I must say, that when some Prelates made it their great business to silence, shame and ruin us, and drive 
The words of the Reflection.  us far enough from persons of power, undertaking to preserve the Protestant Religion better without us than with us, and after all cry out themselves that we are in danger of Popery, by their own Pupils and Disciples whose instruction they undertook, men will have leave to think of this awake, and to judge of Causes by Effects.  
These, I say, are the words of that Reflection, which I complain of as intentionally aimed at me (though obliquely and by circumlocution only) especially in the latter part of it. For as for the former 
The Bishop not peculiarly concerned in the former part of those words.  part of that saying of his, where he speaks of some Prelates that made it their great business to silence, shame and ruin them, that is, him and the rest of the Dissenters, though I doubt not but he means me for one of those Prelates, and one of the chief of them, because he tells me and the Bishop of Ely in plain terms, that we two of all he knows have effectually helped to bring them under; yet I do not take myself to be peculiarly concerned in this whether it be truly or falsely averred by him; and therefore though I could tell him and tell him truly, and prove it too, that I never made it any of my business to shame or ruin him or any of the Dissenters, or to silence any more of them than by Law I was not only allowed but obliged to silence; though I could say this (I say) and more too to prove that I never did any the least injury to any of them, but have showed kindness to some that had dealt hardly with me, namely to Mr. Langley of Pembroke College, who having gotten into my Canonry of Christ's Church in Oxford never allowed me one penny out of it during above 12 years I was abroad, nor after I came home made me any recompense: yet thinking I was one would do good for evil, he had the confidence to write to me, and to entreat me to befriend him for the renewing of a Lease he held of Magdalen College, as being their Visitor I did it for him. Though, I say, I could make proof of this, yet I will not insist upon it; that which I except against is a false and injurious reflection upon me particularly, being contained in the words that follow, (viz.) driving us (that is him and those of his Party) far enough from Persons 
The latter part of them particularly aimed at the Bishop.  of power, undertaking to preserve the Protestant Religion better without us than with us, and after cry out themselves that we are in danger of Popery by their own Pupils and Disciples whose instruction they undertook themselves, and then concludes men will have leave to think of this awake, and to judge of causes by effects.  
This, I say, is the Reflection I complain of as false and injurious, and as being myself more particularly aimed at in it than any other of the Prelates he before spoke of For though here as well as there, he makes use of the plural number, as if he meant what he saith of more than one, yet that which he saith of them he knew would be understood by those, by whom he would have it to be understood, to be meant of me, or if not of me only yet of me principally and especially; because he and others perhaps of his Party had heard from Mr. JONES and others from them, that I had caused the said Mr. Jones to be put out of the Duke of York's service, having been before a Chaplain to his Royal Highness' Family; to his Family I say, for he was never 
Mr. Jones a Chaplain to the Duke's Family, not to his Person.  any of the four that were properly and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by way of eminence, called the Duke's Chaplains, but only one of the two who were daily to efficiate in the Duke's Chapel to the Household, whether He or the Duchess were there or no; so that Mr. Jones was not so great a man either in place of attendance or in grace and favour with either of their Highnesses, that either his stay could hinder, or his remove could further any design that I or any man else might have had upon the Duke or Duchess, in order to the seducing or perverting both or either of them in matter of Religion.  
And yet this Mr. Jones was the man, and I verily 
Mr. Jones, the man intended by Mr. B.  believe the only man, Mr. Baxter thought of, though he speaks in the plural number here also, as if we the Prelates had driven them, that is, all or many of them, far enough from persons of Power. Now I would fain know of Mr. Baxter, what one man of their Party was ever driven away by any of the Prelates from any person of Power, or was ever said to be so, but this Mr. Jones only: who was never thought to be one of their Party, whilst he was in the Duke's service; I am sure he professed the contrary; and if he had not, I am sure he could not have been admitted into the Duke's service, as no man else could either into the Duke's, or into any other persons of power, the Law (not made by the Prelates, but by the King in Parliament; I mean the Act of Uniformity) having made all of that Party (as long as they were of that Party) uncapable of being Chaplains or Schoolmasters in Nobleman's or in any great men's Houses, and therefore there was no need of the Prelates driving them farther from persons of power than the Law had driven them already.  
Neither was it for his being one of them (though perhaps he was one of them in his heart) that Mr. Jones was put out of the Duke's service, but for behaving himself otherwise than he ought to have done in it; but how that was I forbear to say, because he is dead: only I must say that I was neither Judge nor Witness, nor Plaintiff nor Defendant, 
The Bishop no way concerned in his being put out of the Duke's service.  nor any way a party in the case, no nor knew not any thing of the matter itself or of the cause of it, until after it was done, as Dr. Killigrew, than Clerk of the Closet to the Duke, and Dr. Turner then and now one of the Duke's Chaplains, will I doubt not be ready to testify if it were tanti, worth the while, to call them to it. But first 
Some reasons, that Mr. Jones is meant by Mr. B. for one that was driven away.  that it was this Mr. Jones that Mr. Baxter means for one and (as I verily believe) the only one (though he speaks in the plural number) that was driven away from a Person of power by any of the Prelates is more than probable; because it is true (as I said before) that Mr. Jones was once in the Duke's service, and because it is true likewise that he was put out of the place he had there, and thereupon growing angry and discontented it is very likely that he applied himself to the discontented Party, and to Mr. Baxter, as one of the most eminent of that Party, and told him that it was the Bishop of Winchester that had caused him to be turned out of the Duke's service; for that there was a good correspondence betwixt Mr. Baxter and him after he was turned out of the Duke's service, appears by the great Encomium Mr. Baxter gives to a Book of his, which he calls An Excellent Historical Treatise, and saith he is sorry that Book 
Vid. The Premonition to the true and only way of Concord.  is not more commonly bought and read; and so I believe is the Printer of it also.  
Again, as for the aforesaid reasons, Mr. Baxter 
And that the Bishop of Winton is meant by the Prelate who drove him away.  must needs mean Mr. Jones for one at least (if not the only one) that was driven away from a Person in power; so, secondly, by the Prelate that drove him away he must needs mean me, because speaking of the Persons of power from whom he was driven, he calls them the Pupils and Disciples of that Prelate or Person whosoever he was that drove him away from them. Now though I never had the honour to be Tutor to the Duke, yet it is true that I had undertaken the instruction of the Duchess, even almost from her Childhood, and therefore she might properly enough be called my Pupil and my Disciple as long as she continued in the way which I had instructed her to walk in, which I am sure she did, with an extraordinary zeal to make others to walk in it also, as long as I continued with her. But, of this I have given the world a large and I hope a satisfactory account already. That for which I speak of it now, is only to prove, that as Mr. Baxter means Mr. Jones by him that was driven away from the Duke and Duchess, so he means me by him that drove him away from them.  
For farther proof whereof I appeal to Mr. Baxter himself, and desire him to name one man more if he can, that he thinks to have been of their Party, that was driven away by me or any other Prelate from any Person of power since the King's return; which if he cannot (as I am confident he cannot) as he must needs mean Mr. Jones, and Mr. Jones only, by the party driven away, so he must needs mean me by the Prelate that did drive him away; as likewise by the Persons of power, he must needs mean the Duke and Duchess of York, from whom he was driven, or removed.  
But neither by me, nor for that cause, which Mr. Baxter would have it thought to be, was Mr. Jones discharged from officiating in the Duke's Family; for (as I said before) he was not then thought to be one of that Party, but professed himself to be a great zealot for the Church of England, as it is by Law established, and therefore his help to keep out Popery could not be refused upon the account of his being a Dissenter, if it had been so necessary and efficacious, as Mr. Baxter would have it thought to have been. And much less was that the cause of his removal, which Mr. Jones in that 
The false account, which Elymas the Sorcerer gives of Mr. Jones 's removal.  most false and scandalous Pamphlet of his (called ELTMAS the Sorcerer) pretends it was, namely, That he the said Jones was removed, and removed by the Bishop of Winchester, to the end that he might not hinder the said Bishop's design, which was the more easily to work upon the Duke and Duchess in order to their quitting of the Protestant Religion, which it seems the Bishop thought he could not effect as long as so able and zealous a Champion for the True Protestant Religion as Mr. Jones was, was suffered to continue either in their Highness' grace and favour, or in their Family, and therefore did artificially contrive the putting him out of both. And to make this to be believed was the scope and end of the writing and publishing of the aforesaid libellous Pamphlet, of 
Mr. B. perhaps the Godfather of that Pamphlet.  which I doubt not but Mr. Baxter had the perusal before it was published, and perhaps was the Godfather that gave it the name of Elymas the Sorcerer, thereby implying, that as Elymas the Sorcerer withstood Saint Paul, and sought to turn away Sergius Paulus the deputy Governor from the Faith which Saint Paul preached, so the Bishop of Winchester removed Mr. Jones that he might not hinder him from perverting the Duke and the Duchess; which though Mr. Baxter doth not say in plain terms, yet he insinuates and intimates as much, when he concludes the Reflection I am now speaking of with these words, Men that are awake must have leave to judge of causes by their effects, thereby implying that if the Pupils and Disciples were perverted, He whose Pupils and Disciples they were must needs be the Perverter of them. And then taking it for granted that the Duke and Duchess were my Pupils and Disciples, or at least one if not both of them, he leaves it to be concluded from their change (which he takes for granted also) what is to be thought of me, who am supposed to have been their Tutor and Instructor.  
So that I think I may without breach of Charity take Mr. Jones his Libel called Elymas the Sorcerer 
Elymas a Comment upon Mr. B 's Text.  to be a Comment upon or an Explanation of Mr. Baxter's Text in this (otherwise somewhat obscure and oblique) Reflection; and therefore what I have published in answer to that may serve to clear me from the imputation of this also.  
And yet there is one thing in this Reflection of Mr. Baxter's, which I will not deny to be true, so far at least as I am concerned in it, viz. That some (I think he might have said all) of the Prelates, nay and all of the Prelatical Party also, 
The Protestant Religion, to be preserved better without the Dissenters than with them.  do believe, that the Protestant Religion may be preserved better without them than with them. For if by the Protestant Religion he means the Protestant Religion as it is by Law established here in England (which is the Protestant Religion we would have to be preserved) nothing can be truer, than that we were better undertake the preservation of it (even against the Papists themselves) without than with the Dissenters from us; who the more and stronger they are, the more are we weakened, rather than strengthened by them; being forced to defend ourselves against them with one hand, as well as against the Papists with the other, and sometimes to defend ourselves against them both at once. For though I doubt not but the Papists and schismatical Protestants here amongst us do mortally hate, and mean to do what they can to destroy one another at last, yet that which both of them agree in to be done first, is the pulling down of us, in order to the setting up of themselves afterwards. And hence it is that the Papists, who are much the cunninger Gamesters, do make the Sectaries to play their Game for them, by making as many divisions as they can amongst us, to the end, that dum singuli pugnant universi vincantur, while we fight in single parties, we may all, the whole body of us, be beaten and worsted. And I pray God it prove not to be so at last.  
In the mean time the aid and assistance, which Mr. Baxter thinks we of the Church of England have from the Nonconformists for the enabling us to defend ourselves against the common Enemy the 
The condition of the Church of England as to Dissenters.  Papists, puts me in mind of what the ingenious Boccalini saith of Spain, that when it was weighed by itself, the weight, that is, the power, wealth and strength thereof was very considerable; but when they put the Kingdom of Naples first, and then the Duchy of Milan into the Scale, thinking thereby to add much to the weightiness of the Spanish Monarchy, they found it to be much lighter, and the less considerable both in strength, power and wealth than it was before: And so no doubt the Church of England of itself alone would be more healthful, more strong, more vigorous, and every way more able than it is to preserve the Protestant Religion, and to defend itself against Popery and all other heretical opposition or invasion from without, if there were neither Presbyterians, nor Independents, nor Baxterians, or any other Dissenters from it, lurking in it; who whilst they seem to be zealous to keep out Popery do effectually (though not intentionally) make way for the bringing of it in. And therefore as a great Statesman in Queen Elizabeth's time was wont to say, That England would be the best Island in the World, if Scotland and Ireland were drowned in the bottom of the Sea (speaking I suppose of Scotland and Ireland as they then were, the one at enmity with us, and the other in rebellion against us, and therefore that it would be better for us, that they were not at all, than to be so near in place to us, and so far off in affection from us) so may I say of the Church of England, That as it is the best, so it would be the happiest of all Churches in the Christian world, if there were not so many tam propè, tam procúlque nobis, That are so near to us, and so far off from us, I mean so many among us that are not of us, who have been, and are, and will be always thorns in our Eyes, and goads in our Sides, unless they be either wholly (as the Irish Rebels were) suppressed by us, or of Enemies become our Friends as the Scotch are, by being united to us, and that not only (as the Scots are) by becoming Subjects to the same King, but Subject to the same Laws also.   
The End of the Sixth Section.   

THE CONCLUSION.  
Wherein two possible Objections, against the whole Design of this Writing, are Answered; Mr. Baxter 's Recantation examined, his professions of Loyalty censured, and his Way of Concord disapproved.  
AND now having sufficiently, and (as I hope) satisfactorily, to all indifferent and impartial Readers, justified what I have truly said of Mr. BAXTER, in that Letter of mine with the Appendices thereunto so long ago Printed; and vindicated myself from all those false and injurious reflections, which in divers passages of several of his Books, he hath either plainly and directly, or obscurely and obliquely made on me; which was all I intended to do; I should here make an end of giving myself or the World any more trouble, did I not foresee, that there might one or two Objections more the novo anew be made against me, which I think I ought to prevent.  
The former of which is, That supposing I have 
Object. 1.  sufficiently proved, that Mr. Baxter did at the Conference at the Savoy assert and maintain, what I in my long ago Printed and now reprinted Letter, do affirm he did assert and maintain, concerning things sinful by Accident; yet seeing that since then, he hath in a Treatise purposely written upon that subject, declared himself to be otherwise minded, than I say he was at that Conference: I ought in Charity to have forborn upbraiding him with what he said then.  
Whereunto I answer, that the difference betwixt 
The Answer.  me and Mr. Baxter, as to that particular, being whether I had falsely charged him or no with what he had said at the aforesaid Conference (as he in an Address to his Parishioners at Kidderminster pretends I had) I was necessitated in mine own defence to prove I had not charged him falsely, but that (howsoever his mind be changed since) he did then assert and maintain, what I in my Sermon at Kidderminster did affirm he had asserted and maintained at that Conference; as it was presently after that Conference attested in Print by the subscriptions of the now Bishops of Ely, and Chester, who were two of the three Disputants on our part, and are yet (God be thanked) alive to confirm and justify the truth of their Attestation (if need be) which hath never yet, though it was Printed above 20 years ago, been excepted against either by Mr. Baxter himself or by any of his Party, and consequently, is as good as acknowledged and confessed to be true. And if that Attestation of theirs be true, all that I affirm to have been asserted by Mr. Baxter, of things sinful by Accident, at that Conference, must needs be true also, whatsoever he hath said and published in any of his Books since to the contrary. Which I take for a sufficient answer to the former of the aforesaid objections, if any such shall be made by Mr. Baxter, or by any other in his behalf hereafter.  
Now as to the latter of the aforesaid Objections, 
Object. 2.  which I foresee may be made against me also, (and which is of much more moment than the former) namely, that it was uncharitably done of me to publish such a Collection of Mr. Baxter's Aphorisms against all Monarchies in general, and this Monarchy of ours in particular, as I did at first with that Letter of mine above 20 years since; and much more uncharitably done of me now, not only to reprint, and publish those Aphorisms again with some others of the same kind out of the same forge, but to aggravate the heinousness and dangerousness of them in relation to Kingly Government, as I have done in this Book of mine, to make him more and more odious to those that are in Power at present, as one that is not only not to be suffered to Preach, or Write, but to Live in a Monarchy; and all this, after he hath disclaimed and recanted what he writ before, and what I except against in those Aphorisms of his.  
My answer therefore hereunto is,  
1. That Mr. Baxter having been silenced by me 
The Answer.  when I was Bishop of Worcester, and coming to me to know the cause of it; I told him it was, because he had Preached in my Diocese without ask my leave, or having any licence from me for it; and that now I could not give him such a Licence, partly in regard of what he had asserted and maintained at the Conference in the Savoy, but principally in regard of many of those Positions or (as he calls them) Aphorisms of his in his Book of the Holy-Commonwealth, which were inconsistent with Kingly Government: and this I told him in the presence of the then Dean of Worcester Dr. Warmestry, and of Mr. Isaac Walton, than my Steward, which he taking no notice of in his Narrative of the cause why I continued his suspension, and would not suffer him to Preach any more in my Diocese; but making his friends at Kidderminster to believe it was only for what he had asserted at the Conference in the Savoy (whereof he made a false relation also) I thought it neither improper nor unnecessary to annex to that Letter of mine (which I had written in answer to that Narrative of his) that Collection of Aphorisms out of the aforesaid Book of his, that the World might be judge whether the Author of such Maxims as those, were fit to be a Preacher in such a Kingdom as this, or no; and this (I say) was the cause why I Printed them at first.  
2. The reason why I have reprinted those Aphorisms as well as that Letter, with an Addition of some others to them and aggravations of them, was to justify my exceptions against them, and to show, that I am not a Defier of Deity and humanity, nor an Enemy to God, to Kings and to all mankind; (as Mr. Baxter would have me thought to be) because I do not think all unlimited Governors to be Tyrants because they are unlimited, or that lawful and rightful Kings, if they be Tyrants or govern tyrannically, may therefore be lawfully resisted or deposed by their Subjects.  
3. And lastly, if I have endeavoured to show the falseness and dangerousness of this and other of his Aphorisms, subservient to the same end, it is not to make him, but those Maxims of his odious, not unto others only that may be hurt by them, but to himself also, that he may repent of them; which if he have done, and done it as he should do, and as himself professed he would do, if he were convinced there were cause for it; I am sure he will not, he cannot be offended with the aggravating the heinousness and dangerousness of any of those opinions or practices, which he himself hates and detests more than any body else can, if he have truly repent of them; which if I should take for granted that he hath done since, yet if he had not done it before those Aphorisms of his, which I excepted against, were first Printed, it was neither uncharitably, nor impertinently, no, nor unnecessarily done of me neither, to let the World know upon what false grounds, and by what fallacious and seditious Maxims and Principles Mr. Baxter had undertaken to justify the late horrid Rebellion, and to justify himself and those Thousands, whom (as he confesseth) he had persuaded to do as He did (viz.) to Rebel and Fight against the King; which he was so far from having repent of, when I first Printed those Aphorisms, that he tells the World in Print, not above a year or two before, that he durst not repent of it, nor forbear the doing of the same, if it were to be done again, in the same state of things. Neither did the World or I hear any thing from him to the contrary till many years after; and whether what he published then, or hath published since, be a sufficient proof that He is not still of the same mind he was, when he published those Aphorisms, may well be doubted. In the mean time those Aphorisms of his being of so dangerous consequence to the public, and having upon that account been the main cause why I would not suffer the Author of them to Preach in my Diocese, until he had as publicly recanted, as he had asserted them, I thought myself obliged to publish them, when I did publish them first, to let the World see I had reason to do what I did to Mr. Baxter, when I did it, how well soever he might behave himself afterwards.  
And as this was the reason why I Printed them at first, so the reason why I have Reprinted them now, was partly to justify my former exceptions against them, and the dangerous consequences of them; and partly to vindicate myself from being a Defier of Deity and Humanity, and an Enemy to God, to Kings, and to all mankind (for excepting against but one of them only) as Mr. Baxter saith I am; and partly likewise to show, that there is still just cause to doubt that Mr. Baxter may still be of the same judgement, as to the holding of the same Seditious and Rebellious Principles, as He did formerly, notwithstanding any thing He hath written as yet to the contrary. The two former would have been reason enough for my Reprinting of those Aphorisms, though it were never so certain or so evident, that Mr. Baxter had really and sincerely recanted them all. The third I add ex abundanti, over and above, and wish with all my heart there were no cause to doubt but that he had really and sincerely recanted them all, or at least those that are most dangerous and prejudicial to the safety, peace, and welfare of our own King and Kingdom; which I am afraid he hath not done, either by what he hath said in that Paper, which he would have taken for a Recantation of some of those Aphorisms in his Holy Commonwealth, or by the professions he hath made of his Loyalty in the second Part of his Plea for the Non-Conformists.  
And first, As to the Paper which he calls a Recantation, 
Mr. B ' s. Recantation, as to the Time, very tardy.  We are to observe the time when it was Printed, which was in the year 70, just 10 years after the Kings coming home. How long may we think it would have been, if the King had not come home at all, or if Richard the Son could have held by force, what Oliver his Father, (whom Mr. Baxter magnifies so much) had gotten for him by murdering of his Master? And truly if this Recantation had been the effect of a true and hearty repentance, I cannot imagine what should be the cause of its coming forth no sooner; unless he was so long before he was convinced that he had done amiss in writing what he had written, or in doing what he had done, during the time of the Rebellion; so that his heart endured as long a Siege as that of Troy, before it would give him leave to make any acknowledgement at all, that he had writ or done any thing to be recanted or repent: But what if the King should have suspended his Pardon as long as Mr. Baxter did his Confession? What might have become of Mr. Baxter in the mean time? And yet surely Confession and Contrition ought to precede forgiveness both in foro Poli, and in foro Soli too, and as well with men as with God. And truly it would have been more for Mr. Baxter's own credit, and for the Kings and Church's satisfaction, if it had been so; I mean, if he had publicly Recanted what he ought, and as he ought to have Recanted, both in point of judgement and practice, a great deal sooner than he did; as either before the Kings coming home, (which had been indeed the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the most proper and most acceptable time) or at least assoon as he had the first opportunity for it after the Kings coming home. And such an opportunity he had, if he could have found in his heart to have made use of it; I mean that time when the King was graciously pleased (though he knew well enough what Mr. Baxter had written and done against his Father and himself) to give him leave to Preach before him in the Chappel-Royal. Then, then (I say) was the time, and there the place, for him publicly, and humbly, and solemnly upon his Knees to have prefaced his Sermon or ensuing Discourse 
His Sermon before the King.  with a self-accusing, self-condemning Exomologesis, or Confession made in his own, and in the name of his whole Party; I mean the contrivers, abettors and promoters of, and actors in that most unchristian and inhuman Conspiracy and Rebellion against the late King, and ended it with a quorum pars magna fui, of which company I myself made a great part: which would have become him much better (speaking of sins inconsistent with a true faith) than the Harangue he made against drunkenness, and swearing, and Atheism, and profaneness, and looseness of life, without saying any thing at all against Hypocrisy, or lying, or standering, or pride, or malice, or covetousness, or sedition, or rebellion; as if those sins were not inconsistent with true faith as well, or as much as the former. But those he knew were thought to be the sins of those of the Kings, and these of those of his own party; as if our sins and not theirs, and consequently we and not they, the Kings and not the Parliaments Party, had been the cause of that unnatural War, and consequently of all those horrible mischiefs that were done in it; together with all the dismal consequences and effects of it; and so indeed in a late Book of his, he is not afraid nor ashamed to tell us in plain terms. But this Sermon of his was made, it seems, before he was convinced he had sinned in encouraging so many thousands (as he saith he did) to the War against the King: so that the time of his Recantation was not yet come, though I presume he stayed not so long before he sued out his Pardon.  
Well, but when the time was come, when he thought fit to publish that Paper which he calls a Recantation, (which was eight or nine years after he 
The manner of his Recantation.  had Preached the aforesaid Sermon before the King) let us see what manner of Recantation it was, or whether it was such a one as can make an impartial and judicious peruser of it believe without doubting that it is so sincere, as an ingenuous and voluntary Recantation ought to be. For besides the tardiness of its coming forth, (which I noted before, and which argues some other motive besides conviction of conscience for the publishing of it) it is farther observable. First, That the wording of it wants that clearness and plainness, which an ingenuous Recantation ought to have; and, Secondly, That it is so clogged and restrained and limited, and shackled as it were, with such and so many exceptions and conditions and provisoes, that such a muddy-brained man as I am cannot tell what to make of it.  
And first as to the want of clearness in the wording 
Not clearly worded.  of it, when he speaks of all he pretends to Recant in that paper, he doth not say I profess my repentance, that ever I held it, but that ever I published it: he might have said as well and perhaps as truly, I am sorry that Bishop Morley's collection of so many false and pernicious Aphorisms out of that Book hath made me profess my repentance for the publishing of them. Howsoever it is not his professing his repentance for the publishing of them can prove he reputes the holding of them, or that he is not still of the same judgement, because though he be so it is not safe for him to profess himself to be so; every 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, there is a difference betwixt times and seasons: that may be safe or seasonable to be said or done, or written and published at one time, that can be neither seasonable nor safe at another. So that we cannot conclude Mr. Baxter to be of any other mind now, than he was before, from his saying that he is sorry, no nor from his being sorry indeed, that he had formerly declared his judgement as he did.  
Again, as the want of clearness and plainness in 
Clogged with Provisoes.  the wording of that pretended Recantation, may make the sincerity, so the clogging of it with so many provisoes may make the ingenuity thereof to be suspected, as if it had been extorted, and not voluntary. For it looks as if he that makes it were afraid he had overshot himself, and said too much, or might be thought by those of his own Party to have said too much in that little he had said before; and therefore he adds the subsequent provisoes, which, if what he had declared before was real and sincere, are all of them needless and impertinent, and worse than needless and impertinent, if he means to limit and restrain what he said before by them, as he seems to do, especially by the first and last of them. For as in the first of those Provisoes he tells us he doth not reverse all the matter of that Book, which he told us before he did Recant, and that not only for some by-passages in it, but in respect of the very scope of it: so in the last of those Provisoes he protests against the judgement of Posterity, (which all sincere and ingenuous Writers do usually appeal unto) as likewise against the judgement of all others that were not of the same time and place (he should have said of the same Party and Persuasion also) as to the censuring either of that Book of his or the revocation of it; as being ignorant of the true causes of them both; and then concludes, that these things provided (viz.) if he may be allowed to except as much of the matter of the Book (he pretends to Recant) from being reversed, as he pleaseth, and upon condition that neither the Book, nor the Recantation of it be censured by any but by whom he pleaseth, he did vouchsafe to publish that Paper which he would have taken for a Recantation: to which aforesaid Provisoes I wonder he did not add one more, That he might be allowed, whensoever he saw cause for it or had need of it, to substitute one Proposition instead of another, a false one instead of a true one, or a true one instead of a false one, and then to infer what he pleased from it; for so as he hath done often in other places, so he hath done once in this scrap of a Recantation also, making me to say that there were some lawful Governors unlimited by God, and thence inferring that I was a defier of Deity and Humanity, when what I said was, that of lawful Governors some were unlimited by men; but of this I have said enough before; and (as I think) I have said enough now touching the insufficiency of this recantation, to prove that Mr. Baxter is really and seriously otherwise minded in point of judgement than he was when he published these Aphorisms which I have now Reprinted.  
Neither can the contrary hereunto be concluded 
His vainglorious professions of Loyalty.  from any, or all of those glorious, or rather vainglorious professions of Loyalty, he makes in behalf of himself, and of his own Party, in the fourth Chapter of the second Part of his Non-Conformists Plea for Peace which can signify nothing, unless he and they do renounce those disloyal and seditious Principles, which in his Book of the Holy Commonwealth he makes use of to justify the War made by the two Houses of Parliament against the late King; as first, That this Kingdom of England 
Some of his disloyal Principles.  is not a Monarchy, and consequently that the Sovereignty is not wholly in the King. Secondly, That the Sovereignty is divided betwixt the King and the two Houses of Parliament. Thirdly, that the two Houses of Parliament may lawfully take Arms, and make War with the King in defence of their own part of the Sovereignty, and of the trust reposed in them by the People; and that the People may, and aught to assist them when they do so. Fourthly, That the People are represented in Parliament not only as Subjects, (for so he confesseth their Representatives are only to complain and supplicate for them) but as Contractors, before they were Subjects, with him that was to be their King, before he was King, for the reservation of such or such rights, franchises, and privileges, to be for ever exempted from the Kings and his Successors jurisdiction; for the preservation of which (if they were invaded or endeavoured to be taken away by the King or any of his Successors) the Parliament, not only as Representatives but trusties also for the People, might by force (if they could not do it otherwise) resist and restrain the King from so doing. Finally, there be many other cases specified by Mr. Baxter in that Book of the Holy Commonwealth, wherein Kings may (as he saith) be lawfully resisted by their Subjects; whence he concludes the War made by the Parliament against the late King to have been purum piumque 
He justifies the late War.  Duellum, a just and a lawful War; and consequently, such a War, as may be made at any time hereafter upon the same Premises, or by virtue of the same Principles; and therefore he tells us in plain terms, not only that he did not, but that he durst not repent of having been engaged in it himself, nor for having engaged so many thousands, (as he confesseth he did) in it; not then perhaps; but hath he not repent of it since? Videtur quòd non: because 
Most likely that he is of the same judgement still.  not having yet renounced any of those Principles or Premises from whence he infers the Conclusion, he is still to be supposed to hold the conclusion he infers from them; nay, and that he will hold it still, and do as he did then upon the like occasion; for so he tells us himself in the place before quoted, where he saith that as he durst not repent of what he had done in the aforesaid War; so he could not forbear the doing of the same (if it were to do again) in the same state of things. 'Tis true indeed he tells us in the same place, that if he were convinced he had sinned in what he had done, he would as willingly make a public Recantation, as he would eat and drink when he is hungry or thirsty. But neither he, nor any of the Non-Conformists, that ever I heard of, hath as yet made any such a public Recantation; and therefore we may rationally, and charitably enough too, conclude that they are still of the same Judgement they were then, and consequently that their Practice will be the same it was then, when the like opportunity invites them to it; which though I hope it will never be, yet we are not sure but it may be, and therefore ought not to be too confident and secure that no such thing will be.  
For mine own part, I must confess, as I always 
Two Plots carrying on.  have been, so I am still of this opinion, that ever since the Reformation, there have been and are two Plots carrying on, sometimes more openly, and sometimes more secretly, the one by those that call themselves the only true Catholics; the other by those that call themselves the only true Protestants; and both of them against the Government as it is established by Law both in Church and State: And as there always hath been, so there ever will be Plotting by both these Parties, until both of them be utterly disabled, and suppressed; for as for making Peace with either of them, I take it, by reason of the perverseness of the one, and peevishness of the other, and the pride of both, to be a thing not to be hoped for. I am sure the way proposed by Mr. Baxter in his Book called The true and only way of Concord of all Christian Churches, will never do it; which Book of his, though (as I said in my Preface) I did not intend to answer, as being abundantly, and superabundantly 
Mr. B 's true and only way of Concord.  confuted before it was written; yet because in his Address of it to the Bishop of Ely and me, he seems desirous to know what we think of it, in reference to the end proposed by it; I will tell him plainly, and in a few words, what is my opinion of it, (viz.) that it is so far from being what he saith it is, The true and only way of Concord in all Churches, that I verily believe that if all the Churches in the World were actually in as perfect Peace and Concord, both in themselves, and with one another, as ever they were or ever can be (humanly speaking) here in this World, that which he calls the true and only way of Concord, (if it were or could be admitted) would in a very short time introduce such and so many unavoidable and irreconcilable differences and dissensions, both speculative and practical, as well in matter of belief as in manner of worship, that there would be no such thing to be seen as order, or unity, or peace in all the Churches of any one Province or Kingdom, and much less, in all the Churches of the Christian World. This National Church of ours therefore being according to the legal establishment thereof, of so sound, so healthful, so orderly and so well compacted a constitution as it is, and which by long experience we have found so agreeable to the established Government of the State, that we cannot make any alteration in the one without great disordering of the other; Let us not give ear to any of those Church and State Mountebanks or Empirics, who if we let them alone a little longer, will never leave mending, till they have marred all.  

Mr. BAXTER'S Recantation, (referred to page of the Conclusion,) Printed 1670. at the end of a Book of His, called The Life of Faith, after a Catalogue of Books Written and Published by the same Author.  
LET the Reader know, that whereas the Bookseller hath in the Catalogue of my Books, named my [Holy-Commonwealth, or Political Aphorisms] I do hereby recall the said Book, and profess my Repentance, that ever I published it, and that not only for some by-passages, but in respect of the secondary part of the very scope. Though the first Part of it, which is the defence of God and Reason I recant not.  
But this Revocation I make with these Provisoes,  
1. That I reverse not all the Matter of that Book, nor all, that more than ONE have accused; As e. g. the Assertion that all Humane Powers are limited by God: And if I may not be pardoned for not defying DEITY and HUMANITY, I shall prefer that ignominy before their present Fastus, and Triumph, who defy them.  
2. That I make not this Recantation to the Military fury, and rebellious pride and tumult, against which I wrote it; nor would have them hence take any encouragement for impenitence.  
3. That though I dislike the Roman Clergies writing so much of Politics, and detest Ministers meddling in State matters without necessity, or a certain call; yet I hold it not simply unbeseeming a Divine, to expound the fifth Commandment, nor to show the dependence of humane Powers on the Divine; nor to instruct Subjects to obey with judgement, and for Conscience sake.  
4. That I protest against the judgement of Posterity, and all others, that were not of the same TIME, and PLACE, as to the (mental) censure, either of the BOOK or the REVOCATION; as being ignorant of the true reasons of them both.  
Which things Provided, I hereby under my hand, as much as in me lieth, reverse the Book, and desire the World to take it as non Scriptum.  
April 15. 1670. R. B.   

ACT Anent Religion and the TEST. August 31. 1681. Made in the Third PARLIAMENT of Our Most High and Dread Sovereign, CHARLES the Second, Holden at EDINBURGH the 28 day of July 1681. By his Royal Highness JAMES Duke of Albany and York, etc. His MAJESTY'S High Commissioner for holding the same, Referred to Section V.  
OUR SOVEREIGN LORD, With His Estates of Parliament Considering, That albeit by many wholesome Laws made by his Royal Grandfather, and Father, of glorious memory, and by himself, in this, and His other Parliaments, since His happy Restauration, the Protestant Religion is carefully asserted, established and secured, against Popery and Phanaticism: Yet the restless Adversaries of our Religion, do not cease to propagat their errors, and to seduce His Majesty's Subjects, from their duty to God, and Loyalty to his Vicegerent, and to overturn the established Religion, by introducing their Superstions, and delusions, into this Church, and Kingdom. And knowing, that nothing can more increase the numbers and confidence of Papists, and Schismatical dissenters from the Established Church, than the supine neglect of putting in Execution the good Laws provided against them, together with their hopes to infinuat themselves, into Offices, and places of trust, and public Employment. THEREFORE, His Majesty, from His Princely and pious zeal, to maintain and preserve the true Protestant Religion, contained in the Confession of Faith, recorded in the first Parliament of King James the Sixth, which is founded on, and agreeable to the written word of GOD; DOTH, with advice and consent of His Estates of Parliament, Require and Command, all his Officers, Judges, and Magistrates, to put the Laws made against Popery, and Papists, Priests, Jesuits, and all persons of any other Order in the Popish Church, especially against sayers and hearers of Mass; Venders and dispersers of forbidden Books; And Ressetters of Popish Priests, and excommunicate Papists: As also against all Fanatic Separatists from this National Church; Against Preachers at House, or Field-Conventicles, and the Ressetters, and harbourers of Preachers, who are Intercommuned; Against disorderly Baptisms, and Marriages, and irregular Ordinations, and all other Schismatical disorders, To full and vigorous execution, according to the Tenor of the Respective Acts of Parliament thereanent provided. And that his Majesty's Princely care to have these Laws put in Execution, against those Enemies of the Protestant Religion, may the more clearly appear: HE DOTH, with advice and consent foresaid, STATUT and ORDAIN, That the Ministers of each Paroch, give up in October Yearly, to their respective Ordinaries, true and exact Lists of all Papists, and Schismatical-withdrawers from the public Worship, in their respective parochs; which Lists are to be subscribed by them; and that the Bishops give in a double of the said's Lists Subscribed by them, to the respective Sheriffs, Stewards, Bailies of Royalty, and Regality, and Magistrates of burgh's, To the effect the said Judges may proceed against them according to Law: As also, the Sheriffs, and other Magistrates foresaids, are hereby ordained to give an account to his Majesty's Privy-Council in December yearly, of their proceedings against those Papists, and Fanatical Separatists, as they will be answerable at their highest peril. And that the diligences done by the Sheriffs, Bailies of Regalities, and other Magistrates foresaids, may be the better enquired into by the Council, the Bishops of the respective Dioceses, are to send exact doubles of the Lists of the Papists, and fanatics, to the Clerks of Privy Council, whereby the diligences of the Sheriffs, and other Judge's foresaids, may be controlled and examined. And to cut of all hopes, from Papists, and fanatics, of their being employed in Offices and Places of public Trust. IT IS HEREBY STATUT and ORDAINED, that the following Oath shall be taken by all Persons in Offices, and places of public Trust, Civil, Ecclesiastical, and Military, especially by all Members of Parliament, and all Electors of Members of Parliament, all Privy-Counsellors, Lords of Session, Members of the Exchequer, Lords of Justiciary, and all other Members of these Courts; all Officers of the Crown, and State; all Arch-Bishops and Bishops; and all Preachers and Ministers of the Gospel whatsoever; all Persons of this Kingdom, named or to be named Commissioners for the Borders; all Members of the Commission for Church Affairs; all Sheriffs, Stewards, Bailies of Royalties and Regalities, Justices of the Peace, Officers of the Mint, Commissars and their Deputs, their Clerks and Fiscals, all Advocats and Procurators before any of these Courts, all Writters to the Signet, all Public Nottars, and other Persons employed in Writing or Agenting; The Lion King at Arms, Heralds, Pursuivants, and Messengers at Arms; all Collectors, Sub-collectours and Farmourers of His Majesty's Customs and Excise; all Magistrates, Deans of Gilled, Counsellors, and Clerks of burgh's Royal and Regality; all Deacons of Trades, and Deacon-Conveeners in the said burgh's; all Masters and Doctors in Universities, Colleges, or Schools; all Chaiplains in Families, Pedagogues to Children; and all Officers and Soldiers in Armies, Forts, or Militia; and all other Persons in public Trust or Office within this Kingdom, Who shall publicly swear, and subscribe the said Oath as follows, viz. The Arch-Bishops, Chief Commander of the Forces, and Officers of the Crown and State, and Counsellors, before the Secret Council: All the Lords of Session, and all Members of the College of Justice, and others depending upon them, before the Session: The Lords of Justiciary, and those depending upon that Court, in the Justice Court: The Lords, and other Members of Exchequer, before the Exchequer: All Bishops, before the Arch-Bishops: All the inferior Clergy, Commissars, Masters and Doctors of Universities, and Schools, Chaiplains and Pedagogues, before the Bishops of the respective Dioceses: Sheriffs, Stewards, Bailies of Royalty and Regality, and those depending on these Jurisdictions, before these respective Courts: And Provests, Bailies and others of the Burgh, before the Town Council: All Collectors and Farmourers of the King's Customs and Excise, before the Exchequer; The Commissioners of the Borders, before the Privy Council; All Justices of Peace, before their Conveener; And the Officers of the Mint, before the General of the Mint; And the Officers of the Forces, before the Commander in Chief; and common Soldiers, before their respective Officers; The Lion, before the Privy Council; and Heralds, Pursuivants and Messengers at Arms, before the Lyon. And His Majesty, with consent foresaid, STATUTES and ORDAINS, that all those who presently possess, or enjoy any of the foresaids Offices, public Trusts, or Employments, shall take and subscribe the following Oath, in one of the foresaids Offices, in manner before prescribed, betwixt and the first of January next, which is to be recorded in the Registers of the respective Courts, and Extracts thereof under the Clerks hands, to be reported to His Majesty's Privy Council, betwixt and the first of March next, One thousand six hundred eighty two, and thereafter in any other Courts, whereof they are Judges or Members, the first time they shall sit, or exerce in any of these respective Courts: AND ORDAINS, that all who shall hereafter be promoted to, or employed in any of the foresaids Offices, Trusts, or Employments, shall at their entry into, and before their exercing thereof, take and subscribe the said Oath, in manner foresaid, to be recorded in the Registers of the respective Courts, and reported to His Majesty's Privy Council, within the space of forty days after their taking the same: And if any shall presume to exercise any of the said's Offices, or Employments, or any public Office, or Trust, within this Kingdom, (the King's lawful Brothers and Sons only excepted) until they take the Oath foresaid, and subscribe it, to be recorded in the Registers of the respective Courts, They shall be declared incapable of all public Trust thereafter, and be further punished with the loss of their Movables, and Liferent-Escheat, the one half whereof to be given to the Informer, and the other half to belong to His Majesty. And His Majesty, with Advice foresaid, recommends to His Privy Council to see this Act put to due and vigorous Execution.   

Follows the Tenor of the OATH to be taken by all Persons in Public Trust.  
I A. B. Solemnly swear in presence of the Eternal God, whom I invocat as Judge, and Witness of my sincere intention of this my Oath, That I own, and sincerely profess the true Protestant Religion, contained in the Confession of Faith, recorded in the first Parliament of King James the Sixth; and that I believe the same to be founded on, and agreeable to the Written Word of God. And I promise and swear, that I shall adhere thereto, during all the days of my life-time, and shall endeavour to educat my Children therein: and shall never consent to any change, or alteration contrary thereto: And that I disown, and renounce all such Principles, Doctrines, or Practices, whether Popish, or Fanatical, which are contrary unto, and inconsistent with the said Protestant Religion, and Confession of Faith. And for testification of my Obedience to my most Gracious Sovereign CHARLES' the Second, I do affirm, and swear, by this my solemn Oath, That the King's Majesty, is the only Supreme Governor of this Realm, over all Persons, and in all Causes, as well Ecclesiastical as Civil; And that no foreign Prince, Person, Pope, Prelate, State, or Potentat, hath or aught to have any Jurisdiction, Power, Superiority, preeminency or Authority Ecclesiastical or Civil, within this Realm. And therefore I do utterly renounce, and forsake all Foreign Jurisdictions, Powers, Superiorities and Authorities, And do promise, that from henceforth, I shall bear Faith and true Allegiance to the King's Majesty, His Heirs and Lawful Successors. And to my Power shall assist and defend, all Rights, Jurisdictions, Prerogatives, Privileges, Prehemineneys, and Authorities belonging to the King's Majesty, His Heirs and Lawful Successors. And I farther affirm and swear by this my solemn Oath, That I Judge it unlawful for Subjects, upon pretence of Reformation, or any other pretence whatsoever, To enter into Covenants or Leagues, or to convocat, conveen, or assemble in any Councils, Conventions, or Assemblies, to treat, consult, or determine, in any matter of State, Civil or Ecclesiastic, without His majesty's special command, or express licence had thereto, or to take up arms against the King, or those commissionated by Him: And that I shall never so rise in Arms, or enter into such Covenant, or Assemblies: And that there lies no Obligation on me from the National Covenant, or the Solemn League and Covenant (so commonly called) or any other manner of way whatsoever, to endeavour any change or alteration in the Government, either in Church or State, as it is now established by the Laws of this Kingdom. And I promise and swear, that I shall with my utmost power, defend, assist, and maintain, His majesty's Jurisdiction foresaid against all deadly: And I shall never decline His majesty's Power and Jurisdictions, As I shall answer to God. And finally, I affirm, and swear, that this my solemn Oath, is given in the plain, genuine sense and meaning of the words, without any equivocation, mental reservation, or any manner of evasion whatsoever; And that I shall not accept, or use, any dispensation from any Creature whatsoever. So help me God.   
FINIS.   

THere are several Treatises of the same Right Reverend Author, written upon several occasions, concerning the Church of Rome and most of the Doctrines in Controversy betwixt us.  
Printed for Joanna Brome.