A SERMON preached at St Paul's, By HENRY MAISTERSON Fellow of St. John's College in Cambridge.  
HINC LUCEM ET POCULA SACRA  
Alma Mater   blazon or coat of arms 
Printed by Roger Daniel, Printer to the University. 1641.   

To the virtuous and Right Worshipful the Lady Delves, wife to Sir Thomas Delves Knight and Baronet in Cheshire.  
MADAM,  
THe world hath been dead to me of late; I wish I were as dead to it. It is hard to make or keep a friend in adversity: and innocency is no protection; it rather exposeth unto dangers. But I intent not to write satyrs, nor to trouble your Ladyship with any tedious or unacceptable discourse. I rather submit myself and cause to him, who is best able to judge: and amongst other my worthy friends, whose favour hath had influence upon me, I fly unto yourself for protection, humbly entreating you to accept of my homage and service, whilst according to my engagements I do ever remain '  
Your Ladyships in all hmuble observance, HENRY MAISTERSON.   
HEB. 13.18. For we trust we have a good conscience, in all things willing to live honestly. 
SAint Paul (for him we'll suppose with all the Greek Fathers, and Saint Augustine, Ambrose and Gregory among the Latin, to be the author of this Epistle) knowing prayer to be the golden key that unlocketh the cabinet both of earthly and heavenly blessings, in these words useth an argument or reason to move the Hebrews to remember him in their prayers, and that is his confidence upon good ground that he hath a good conscience; For we trust we have a good conscience, in all things willing to live honestly.  
Which words without any rack or violence offer themselves to this division: first, The Apostles confident persuasion, we trust: secondly, the Object of it, that we have a good conscience: thirdly, the foundation or ground upon which this edifice of trust which tower's up to heaven is built, and that is in these words, in all things willing to live honestly. Which words are not referred to the predicate good conscience, as though they were a bare description thereof, or a difference to distinguish what kind of good conscience the Apostle means, and to be read thus, We trust we have a good conscience, or a good heart, which is willing in all things to live honestly; or not able to fulfil the law of God as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 propounded unto Adam, but yet willing to perform Evangelicall obedience, and in all things to live honestly: but they are referred to the subject, we, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and are to be read thus, We, willing in all things to live honestly, trust we have a good conscience. And so they note unto us not barely the object of his trust, but the ground thereof. And then the reasoning stands thus. First, To move them to pray for him, he useth this argument. If I have a good conscience, than you are bound by a special relation to pray for me, not only as a man but as a believer: but I have a good conscience. Therefore pray for me. Secondly, To prove his minor, he reasons thus, He that is careful and willing in all things to live honestly, he hath a good conscience, or he may be confident that he hath a good conscience: but I am willing in all things to live honestly. Therefore I trust I have a good conscience.  
To omit the coherence of these words with the former, noted unto us in the conjunction For, and to consider them absolutely, and in themselves, they afford these three propositions: first, From the object of St. Paul's trust. for that is in nature before the act conversant about it, That St. Paul had a good conscience: secondly, From the act conversant about this object, That St. Paul was confidently persuaded that he had a good conscience: thirdly, That he was persuaded upon this ground, because he was careful and willing in all things to live honestly.  
First, St. Paul had a good conscience. For these words, we have a good conscience, though read in the plural number, are to be understood in the singular, as appeareth by the context, And I beseech you somewhat more earnestly so to do, that I may be restored to you more quickly.  
And here by the way, we may take notice of St. Paul's modesty (verba haec modestiae serviunt, saith a Commentatour upon this place) who, when he is to speak any thing that tends to his own commendation, sometimes useth the third person, as if he spoke of some other, not of himself, 2. Cor. 12. sometimes the plural number, as ashamed to appropriate that praise to himself, which indeed belongeth unto him. A good example for them to think upon, whose vainglorious mouths are wont to trumpet out their own praises, whilst they forget that of the Greek Comedian, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, nothing is more lamentable than vain glory; or that of chrysostom, Homil. 4. in 1. cap. Matth. Si glorificari cupis, gloriam despice, & eris omnibus gloriosior; but of this a word only by the way.  
Now for the better understanding of this proposition, it is necessary first to lay open the nature of conscience in general, and the several acts & offices thereof: secondly the nature of good conscience, and the several kinds thereof: thirdly, to show what kind of good conscience St. Paul meaneth, when he saith, we trust we have a good conscience.  
First, What conscience is. Conscience is a part of the practical understanding, in all reasonable creatures, applying their actions to some rule, which it conceiveth to be the Law of God, and determining either with them, or against them.  
It is a part: not that the understanding hath parts properly, it being one simple and undivided faculty, but by way of analogy in respect of divers objects and actions: And I call it a part, to show that it is a natural power, or quality created together with the soul, and inseparable from it, and not an act or a habit or any thing that may be lost.  
Secondly, It is a part of the understanding, not of the will or affections. For however some effects there are in the will, and affections, which proceed from conscience, as fear and terror, which are therefore called fear and terror of conscience; yet these are but extrinsecall effects of conscience, and flow not immediately from it, but from the will, as from the next and immediate cause, from conscience remotely, in respect of that influence, which the understanding hath upon the affections.  
Thirdly, It is a part of the practical understanding; because conversant about action, about things done or to be done, and not about mere speculation.  
Fourthly, in all reasonable creatures; to let you see the proper subject of conscience. For first every one that hath conscience must needs have reason. For conscience compareth a man's life with his rule, which requireth discourse. And therefore things that have no life, or having life that have not reason, cannot be said to have conscience. Secondly it must be a creature. For God the creator of all things having no superior to impose a law upon him, and consequently none that hath either right or power to inflict any punishment, cannot be said properly to have a conscience; yet we may conceive some analogy betwixt some acts of his understanding, and the excusing acts of conscience properly so called. For there being in him an eternal law or rule, which he hath purposed from eternity in all his works of creation to observe, his understanding may reflect upon the works of his hands, compare them with this rule, and judge them conformable thereunto. Thus God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was exceeding good, Gen. 1. that is very artificial, agreeable to that idea, which God, the most skilful workman, before the beginning had set down for himself to do all things by. Nor only doth the understanding of God reflecting upon his actions judge of that artificial bonity which is in them, but also of the moral: For there being certain general practical notions of good and evil naturally seated in the understanding of God, according to which his will, the fountain of action, is moved (for his will is not, properly to speak, the rule of itself, but is guided by counsel) his understanding may reflect upon the moral acts of his will, compare them with their rule, and accordingly judge them just and good, pronouncing an approving sentence upon them, which hath much analogy and agreement with the excusing act of conscience properly so called.  
Thirdly, In all reasonable creatures: because it is impossible that any reasonable creature should be without conscience, it being a part of the understanding; and if any seem to have lost it, they have only lost the use thereof, as a mad man, or a drunken man hath lost the use of reason, and that but for a time. For God will one day awake those consciences that were here asleep, give mouths to those that here were dumb, so that they shall speak, and never cease to speak, judgement, horror, confusion, death. For the condemning sentence of such a conscience doth but remain like letters written with the juice of Oranges to be made legible by the fire of God's wrath.  
Fourthly, Applying their actions to some rule: Here we have the proper act of conscience, together with the object of it. Where first we are to understand moral actions, not such as are merely natural: For these latter cannot be comprehended in the object of conscience, none being ever so mad as to think there was either virtue or vice in them, they being the actions not of us, but of nature in us; and consequently conscience cannot to speak properly either excuse or accuse us for them. Indeed it may tell us we have not done ill in them, because they are neither good nor bad; but this is not properly to excuse: for to excuse properly is to judge that a man hath done well and virtuously, either in a voluntary choosing of some good, which he had power to have refused, or in a voluntary refusing some evil, which he might have chosen.  
Secondly, we are to take action not strictly, for external moral action only; but largely, as it comprehendeth both words and thoughts. For though man's law extend no further than the outward man (Hominum leges non nisi externam honestatem requirunt, nec penetrant usque ad internum cor & animum; ratio est, quia neque corda vident legislatores, nec ipsorum providentia extenditur ultra civilitatem externam) yet Gods Law, which is the rule of conscience, is a discerner of the thoughts, and intents of the heart, Heb. 4.12. And therefore the Psalmist calleth it a perfect law converting the soul, Psal. 19  
Thirdly, all omission of moral action is hither to be referred, whether it be directè or indirectè volita, whether it be a velle non agere, or a non velle agere when we may and aught. For conscience beareth witness of our omission as well as of our commission, of our not doing as well as of our doing.  
Fourthly, their actions: for the object of conscience is our own actions. For conscience is a power that the soul hath to reflect upon itself, and to judge itself: And therefore not others actions, but only so fare as they are made ours, either by imputation grounded upon nature, as the sin of Adam; or else because we are some way a cause of the sins of others, either positively by furthering them, or privatively by not hindering them when we should and might: And in this sense that saying of St Gregory is true, Qui non corrigit resecanda, committit; so likewise in the same sense another prayeth, Lord forgive me my other men's sins. But otherwise the sins of others, which we are no ways guilty of, though they may be objects of our science, and must be objects of our grief too, if we see and know them, yet they need not at all to trouble our conscience.  
Fifthly, Which it conceiveth to be the law of God. These words I add for a twofold reason: 1. Because it is not necessarily required to the general nature and working of conscience, that the thing we make conscience of should be truly commanded; it is sufficient if conscience apprehend it to be so. Thus some out of an erroneous principle make conscience of worshipping relics, of adoring images, of praying to Saints: others again oppose those laudable ceremonies which tend to order, decency and edification in the Church, though God never required these things at their hands, because they conceive themselves bound thereunto by a true and real command. 2. Because it is not necessary that are party commanding or giving the law should be truly and indeed God: it is sufficient to the general working of conscience, that conscience conceive him so. And therefore the Heathen made conscience of those commands which the Devil gave them in the Oracles, because they thought that God spoke by them, and in them. Virgil giveth us two examples of this in one place of his second book of his Aeneid. 
Suspensi Eurypylum scitatum oracula Phoebi  
Mittimus: ísque adytis haec tristia dicta reportat,  
Sanguine placastis ventos, & virgine caesâ,  
Cùm primùm Iliacas, Danai, venistis ad oras;  
Sanguine quaerendi reditus, animâque litandum  
Argolica: vulgi quae vox ut venit ad aures,  
Obstupuere animi, gelidúsque per imacucurrit  
Ossa tremor, cui fata parent, quem poscat Apollo.  But it is necessary that conscience conceive both the command to be real, and the party commanding to be truly God, else it cannot bind us to obey the command, or to fear the commander. For God only, who is creator of conscience, hath this privilege to bind conscience: And none can give this subjection to any, but to such a one as he apprehendeth to be more than a creature. And therefore the Heathen were wont to call those that were sent to inquire of their oracles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, vel ex 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, quasi Dei curam gerentes, and the ships wherein they were sent, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and their sacrifices, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
And if any object and say, That we are and aught to be obedient to the laws of men for conscience sake, Rom. 13.5. And therefore humane laws bind conscience. I answer, That humane laws bind not conscience properly by inherent virtue in themselves, but by virtue of the general law of God, which commandeth obedience unto men; as water may burn or scald, not by any natural quality from itself, but by heat received from fire: and a breach is made in conscience, not simply because man's law is neglected, but because God's law is broken. For, Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God, Rom. 13.2.  
Lastly, Determining either with them, or against them, which is another act of conscience, and that is, after application of our actions to their rule, to judge of their conformity or difformity thereunto.  
But for the better understanding of conscience, consider with me these distinct acts, and offices of conscience.  
First, to know and keep the law and rule which a man thinketh himself bound to observe: and conscience in this respect is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
Secondly, To take notice of a man's actions before they are done to consider what he is about to do, after, to remember and bear witness of them upon occasion, judging of the entity and existence of the action, as whether done or not done, whether with such and such circumstances, or without.  
Thirdly, To apply the action to the rule, and compare these two together; which act is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, and from it conscience in the Schoolmans' opinion hath its name, because it is a knowing of the action together with the rule, or an applying of these two together.  
Fourthly, To judge of the quality of the action according to the rule, or of its agreeing or disagreeing to the same; and this act is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, the last and perfectest act of reason, or of conscience. And because every law containeth two things. 1. A command of obedience: 2. A threatening of punishment in case obedience be not performed: First conscience judgeth whether the command be kept or transgressed, and consequently whether the action for quality be good or evil, which is to excuse or accuse: Secondly, It judgeth of the guilt and desert, whether the punishment threatened belong to the agent for this action or not, and so absolveth or condemneth.  
These are the intrinsical acts of conscience, which flow immediately from it; but by reason of that influence which the understanding hath upon the affections, there is a sift act of conscience which is to comfort and torment in respect of good and bad actions past; to spur on, to bridle and restrain in respect of good and bad actions to come: which it doth by stirring up those four principal affections of the soul, as Aquinas calleth them, viz. Joy and Sorrow, Hope and Fear; but this is but an extrinsecall effect of conscience, as I have already showed. All this is done by a practical syllogism thus,—  
Every one that committeth murder transgresseth the law of God, and deserveth everlasting damnation: But, saith the conscience of him that is guilty, I have committed such an act, at such a time, in such a place, which is murder: Therefore I have transgressed the law of God, etc.  
He that committeth murder transgresseth the law of God, and deserveth everlasting damnation: there is the first act of conscience, viz. knowledge of the command, and of the punishment due to the transgression of it. But I have committed such an act, in such a place, at such a time; there is the second act of conscience, which is to remember and bear witness of a man's actions, whether done, or not done, whether with such and such circumstances or without. Which is murder: there is the third act, application of the general knowledge to this particular action. Therefore I have transgrèssed the law of God: there is accusation; and deserved everlasting damnation; there is sentence of condemnation. And upon this sentence in the understanding, followeth fear and terror in the affections. And thus much for the explication of the general nature of conscience, and the several acts and offices thereof.  
The next thing that I am to insist upon, is the nature of good conscience, and the several kinds thereof. Conscience thus described is either good or bad: A good conscience is such a one as is conformable to that rule, by which it ought to be guided; A bad one, is such a one as wants conformity thereunto. Both may be distinguished according to their several subjects, into the good and bad conscience of men, and of Angels.  
Man's conscience (for that only we are to speak of now) is good when conformable to the will of God revealed in the Scriptures. Now because the Scripture hath two parts, answering to the twofold estate of man before and since the fall, viz. the Law and the Gospel, hence it cometh to pass that good conscience is twofold; either Legally good, which hath that perfection which the law requireth; or Evangelically good, which hath that perfection which the Gospel accepteth unto salvation: Of the former sort was the conscience of Adam before his fall; of the latter sort was the conscience of Adam after his repentance. I might be large in showing the difference, betwixt these two kinds of good conscience; but I haste. This latter may again be distinguished into an upright conscience, and a peaceable conscience. An upright conscience is a conscience sprinkled with the blood of Christ, or, a conscience purified by faith, such as is in every man that hath repent him truly of his sins past, being for the present careful and willing above all things in all things to live honestly.  
There are these things required to it.  
First, That it be well principled, and know in some good measure God's commandments, accounting them the rule by which all action is to be guided. According to that Psal. 119. vers. 105. Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my paths. For as it is necessarily required to the general nature and working of conscience, that it have some principles which it may upon occasion apply to particular actions; so it is essential to a good or an upright conscience, that it know the true rule, and be informed with good and honest principles, so that so fare as conscience is either ignorant of the true rule, or guided by a false, so fare it is not good, but evil and corrupt: and if it be either altogether ignorant of any of the main commandments, the practice of which is necessarily required to a Christian life, as namely, that we must believe in Christ, repent of our sins, and the like; or entertain any principle, which doth by direct and immediate consequence overthrow any of these, it is not only secundùm quid, but simpliciter and absolutè mala, and falleth short of that evangelical goodness, which is spoken of in my text. And because knowledge of the commandment and things to be practised doth necessarily presuppose knowledge of the creed and of things to be believed, it being impossible he should not err in principles of action, who is ignorant of the fundamental points of faith; for example, he that thinketh there is no God, or no Christ, or that they regard not men's actions, to reward the good and punish the bad, or that is ignorant of any of these three propositions, he can never lay down this for a practical conclusion, That God is to be served, or Christ to be obeyed: For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him, Heb. 11.6. hence it cometh to pass that a knowledge & assent to the fundamental points of faith, at least general and confused, is necessarily required to integrity of conscience, as being the foundation of that practical knowledge, which ought to be the rule of our actions.  
Secondly, As the second act of conscience in general was to take notice of a man's actions, so it is required in the second place to the nature of an upright conscience, that out of a godly solicitude and fear to offend God, it observe a man's carriage, and take notice of his actions; that it consider before his actions what he is about to do, that it remember and bear witness afterward what he hath done, that so they may be applied to their rule: And this is actio intellectûs imperaeta à voluntate. And therefore those men that out of a natural strength of memory, or because of some extraordinary impression that some notorious sins have made in them, remember their evil actions against their will, whereas they would forget them, that so they might be secure; or those that out of carnal security take no notice of their actions, but do things rashly, hand over head, & afterward carelessly forget what they have done, have not integrity of conscience. I speak not here of that forgetfulness which proceedeth from a defect in memory, but either from a custom of sin, as those that have got such a habit of swearing that they know not when they swear; or from gross security, and want of fear of the Lord.  
Thirdly, That it apply a man's actions to the right rule impartially. And this likewise is actio intellectûs imperata à voluntate, and proceedeth from that godly solicitude, which I spoke of before. And therefore those men that apply not their actions at all to the law of God, or if they do, do it partially, grossly favouring themselves in their sins as being loath to find them out or to part with them, have not integrity of conscience. Nay, these are far from having it: For, Nemo periculosiùs peccat, quàm qui peccata defendit, None sin more desperately than those that find out colours and excuses to cover and extenuate their sin. And this impartial application must be before and after our actions: before, that sin may be avoided; after, that if we have sinned we may repent. Of the former we have a notable example in Joseph, who when his Mistress tempted him to that wicked act, consented not immediately unto her, but out of a godly solicitude and fear to offend God, applieth the action to the law of God, and upon impartial application finding it to be unlawful, returneth her this answer, How shall I do this great wickedness, and sin against God? Of the latter we have an example in the Prophet David, Psalm. 119.59. I thought on my ways, and turned my feet to thy testimonies. And the want of this impartial application, as it is the cause of men's lying in sin without repentance, so it is the cause of their first fall into sin. Hoc nos pessimos facit, quòd nemo vitam suam respicit, saith Seneca,  
For upon impartial application necessarily followeth the fourth act of an upright conscience, which is the conclusion of the former premises, to wit, a true and sincere judgement of the action according to the commandment, at least so fare as conscience shall be enlightened and enabled to judge; or a determination, that those particular actions are good, which are indeed such, and that those are evil, which are in their nature evil; And this likewise is either before or after our actions. If this practical judgement of an upright conscience be before our actions, than the effect of it is cohibere à malo, & instigare ad bonum, to spur us on to the practice of good, and to restrain us effectually from evil: which efficacious power the understanding hath upon the will and affections, and consequently upon the whole man, virtute prioris actûs voluntatis, by virtue of a former complete and peremptory resolution of the will, whereby we are resolved to choose that which is good, and refuse that which is evil, where ever we meet with it; which is that very desire in all things to live honestly, which the Apostle speaketh of in my text. For that desire which is the foundation of the Apostles trust, is not a bare velleity, but a completa voluntas, which when he came to particulars put him upon action. And therefore those men whose consciences put them not upon the practice of good, nor restrain them effectually from evil; but suffer them to live in the wilful omission of good, or commission of evil, have not integrity of conscience.  
If the action be past, and bad for quality, than the judgement of an upright conscience is to accuse and condemn, that is, to judge the sin worthy damnation: And the effect of this is grief and sorrow, not only for the punishment we have made ourselves obnoxious to, but for the sin itself. And therefore seared consciences, which never smite men for their sins; and secure consciences, which do it but sometimes, and for grosser sins; and on the other side wicked tormenting consciences, which cause grief only for the punishment and not for the offence (such as was Cain's, My sin is greater than I can bear) these kinds of consciences are not upright.  
But if the action passed be good for matter and manner, than the act of conscience should be to excuse and absolve, that is, to pronounce it such as God is well pleased with, and doth accept to salvation in Christ: And the effect of this is joy and comfort, such as none can express, and such as a carnal man cannot conceive.  
But because no action is accepted with this kind of acceptation, unless it proceed from justifying faith, (For without faith it is impossible to please God to salvation, Heb. 11.6.) and consequently from an upright conscience, which is a necessary attendant of faith; (For faith purifieth the heart) hence it cometh to pass that a man cannot know that any act he doth is such, unless he know his conscience to be upright and purged by faith: which reflexed act, because it necessarily presupposeth integrity of conscience, (for a man cannot know that his conscience is pure unless it be so) therefore this is not essential to integrity, but to peace of conscience. And so I proceed to the second kind of good conscience, which is a peaceable conscience.  
A peaceable conscience includeth all that I have said of an upright conscience, and superaddeth something more. For though every peaceable conscience be an upright conscience; yet every upright conscience is not always able to speak peace. That which it superaddeth is a power to reflect upon itself, and to testify that it is upright, and purged with the blood of Christ. For as a man may be alive, and not know that he is alive, as a child in his mother's womb, or a man in some distemper; so it is possible that a man may have faith and a good conscience, and yet either through his own weakness, or some other extraordinary distemper or temptation, not know for the present that his conscience is good. But when he is confidently persuaded upon good ground, that all his sins are pardoned, and that his person is justified and at peace with God, than he hath not only uprightness but peace of conscience.  
And so I have done with the second thing I was to treat of, the nature of good conscience in general & the kinds of it: I pass unto the third. And that is, what kind of good conscience St. Paul meaneth when he saith, We trust we have a good conscience.  
First, His words are not to be understood of a conscience Legally good, or at the bar of Justice. For it implieth a contradiction, that any son of fallen Adam should have such a conscience: for than he should be fallen and not fallen; fallen because a son of fallen Adam, not fallen because his conscience were legally good. For this is the sentence of the law, Cursed is every one that abideth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them. it must therefore be understood of a conscience Evangelically good, or at the bar of mercy.  
Secondly, An upright conscience must be understood, and not a peaceable one: For though without doubt St Paul had a peaceable conscience, and these very words do imply as much, because he was persuaded upon good ground that his conscience was good; yet that goodness which is the object of his trust, is goodness of integrity, not of tranquillity; because his trust is built upon this ground, that he was willing in all things to live honestly: which necessarily inferreth integrity but not tranquillity of conscience; because a man may desire in all things to live honestly, and yet sometime for the present not have peace of conscience.  
Thus you see the meaning of the proposition, St Paul had an upright conscience.  
This I might demonstrate à priori, from the causes of integrity, as 1. The Spirit of God, the chief author thereof, which was not wanting to St Paul. 2. The word of God, the external instrument, which St Paul was not ignorant of. 3. Faith resting upon the promises of that word, the internal instrument thereof, wherewith he did abound. I might likewise prove it à posteriori, and show you that St Paul's whole life after his conversion, which lasted from the year of our Saviour's passion, till the fourth year before the destruction of Jerusalem (in all, about thirty seven years) was nothing else but a continual exercise of an upright conscience. And here I might show you what he did for conscience sake, how he traveled to preach the word of God in Arabia, in Galatia and phrygia, in Syria, Asia and Italy, in France, Spain and other countries; and that in the mean time whereas he might (as good reason he might) waiting on the altar have been partaker with the altar, he notwithstanding laboured working with his hands, that he might not be burdensome to any, 1. Cor. 4. He wronged no man, corrupted no man, defrauded no man, 2. Cor. 7. 'Tis not his own testimony of himself, but the testimony of the spirit of truth by him, and of him.  
I might here show likewise what he suffered for conscience sake: of the Jews five times he received forty stripes save one, thrice he was beaten with rods, once stoned; he was stocked at Philippi, after again apprehended at Jerusalem, kept prisoner two years at Caesarea, from thence sent bound to Rome, where he was put to death by Nero, that sanguisuga, that cruel and bloodthirsty tyrant. But that time which is remaining bids me make haste.  
First, than it followeth from this proposition, That every man is bound to get integrity of conscience. For what St Paul saith here of himself, is not proper to him, but common to all believers: And therefore if St. Paul, not as St Paul but as a believer, have an upright conscience, it followeth secundùm id generis, quod est in specie, That every true believer hath an upright conscience, and that every man is bound to get one.  
Here likewise vanisheth, like the morning dew before the sun, the opinion of those that are so fare from goodness themselves, that they think there is no such thing in rerum natura, in the wide world, as good conscience, that the state of regeneration is but preciseness, that true holiness is but an idea or an ens rationis, a Plato's commonwealth or a mere fancy created in the heads of some fond and scrupulous men; That think with the Thnetopsychitae that the souls of men are mortal, and perish with their bodies; or with the Sadduces and Simon Magus that there is no resurrection; or with Pope Leo the tenth, that the story of the birth, death and resurrection of Christ is but futilis & anilis fabula, an old-wifes' tale, fit for nothing but to fear fools, and keep people in awe, or perhaps to be a bait to catch such fish as St Peter fished for, that have their mouths full of silver; or that think with the Atheist that there is no God, or at least with Epicurus, that there is no providence, that forsooth it cannot stand with the majesty of God to regard what is done in this inferior world (scilicet is superis labor est) making God, as Tertullian complaineth, Otiosum & inexercitum neminem in rebus humanis. But this web is not worth sweeping down: I will not therefore honour the heresy (pardon my mistake, I cannot afford it so good a name, because it is a universal revolt) but the Apostasy, the Atheism so much as to spend time to coufute it; I will rather turn my arguments against them into prayers to God for them, that if it be possible, the thought of their hearts may be forgiven them: for they are in the gall of bitterness, and in the bond of iniquity. And for ourselves, let it ever be our humble prayer to Almighty God, that of all judgements he would keep from us spiritual judgements, blindness of mind, hardness of heart, a reprobate sense, etc. Ever praying as the Church Litany directeth us, From all false doctrine & heresy, from hardness of heart and contempt of thy word and commandments, good Lord deliver us. And, Grant we beseech the, O Lord, that we may never make shipwreck of faith and good conscience, the Ark and ship wherein faith is preserved.  
And so I proceed to a just censure of those that neglect integrity of conscience: and here it is no less than a wonder to behold how conscience is neglected on every side, which yet is not so wonderful as lamentable.  
The covetous man sells the integrity of his conscience for a little red and white earth, one of the basest things in the world, if we except the party that adores it, and maketh it his God: which when he hath got, the Chest he putetth it into may be said to possess it as truly as he. For it keepeth it (clausum possidet arca Jovem) and he doth no more: For he is afraid to use it. Quaerit, & inventis miser abstinet, & timet uti. The ambitious man selleth it for the thing called Honour which can neither be got nor enjoyed without labour and travail. Fructus honos oneris, fructus honoris onus. And therefore the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifieth honour cometh à radice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies ponderosum esse, to be heavy or burdensome. To which we may apply that of St. Augustine, Qui te amat, non te cognoscit; qui te contemnunt, ipsi te intelligunt. The envious man, for a little 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, or a short rejoicing at the misery of his brethren. The vain glorious man, for the breath of the multitude, which he can enjoy no longer than he is every man's servant, Vniversis singulisque servit servus gloriae. The adulterer, for a momentany dalliance, which perhaps leaveth rottenness behind it in his bones.  
The proud person that doteth upon apparel, the thing that blazons man's downfall and the devil's conquest, puts of integrity of conscience as a wear out of fashion, to put on a fantastic garment, which may force the beholders into wonder, not so much at the strangeness of the unwonted habit as the monstrous folly of the party that wears it. Nazianzen affords these no better a name then silk-wormes or butterflies; and doubtless such ridiculous creatures they are in the eyes of God, and his Saints and Angels, who value not the adorning of the outward man, but the comely ornament of an upright and undefiled conscience.  
The beastly intemperate drunkard and glutton (pardon the weakness of the expression) chaps away the integrity of his conscience for a sin which turns men into swine, with such devilish charms, that they would not leave their brutish nature for their former reason; or if you will, for a pleasure scarce two fingers long, quae non durat nisi quantum durat transitus ille per gulam, which continues but whilst the meat passeth from mouth to stomach; and that too is but an anteambulo to usher in a thousand pains and distempers. Such pleasures as these are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, deceitful mistresses, or rather 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, bitter-sweet delights, or, pleasures mixed with pain: Of which St. Cyprian excellently, Voluptatem vicisse voluptas est maxima, The greatest pleasure, is to overcome these pleasures.  
The sacrilegious Church-robber puts out the integrity of his conscience, by putting forth his unhallowed hand to purloyn that which is sacred, and to eat the forbidden fruit, upon which God hath set a noli me tangere. This stole a good conscience from Adam, and cast him out of paradise, whilst he rob God of his forbidden fruit; and I fear it hath deprived many a son of Adam, not only of the integrity of his conscience, but of his earthly inheritance.  
I'll add but one instance more, and that is those restless spirits, whose chief study it is, without call from God, by wicked contrivement and sinful practices to enervate and weaken that wholesome established government, which through the provident care of virtuous kings and religious parliaments hath a long time flourished and still doth flourish (thanks be to God and a good King) both in Church and state. These cell integrity of conscience for swarms of discontented thoughts, whereby they do but turn themselves into hives of unnumbered cares, sorrows and passions, make themselves in an especial manner the outlawryes of heaven, and sometimes procure their own just and deserved punishment.  
Thus I have run through some sins no less dangerous than common: it would not be hard, were it not too tedious, to do the like in all professions; but I'll only instance in one, without private spleen to place or person, and that is the unconscionable tradesman: And for the rest, because time will not permit, I leave their own consciences to make the application.  
A man would bless himself to think what a world of mysteries are found out in every trade, what tricking and counterfesance to delude the sense, what intricate devices of sophistry & dissimulation, what lying, equivocating, perhaps swearing and forswearing, and all this for the getting of a little money, which when it is lawfully got is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, Luke 16.9. that is, not Mammon about which the sons of men use to be unrighteous, as some understand the words; but Mamona fallax, so Beza, that is, deceivable and uncertain riches, when compassed by lawful means, and no fit objects for us to trust upon, being such things as are but got out of the bowels of the earth, and which they that have them are forced many times (like Euclio in Plautus) to hid there again. And yet notwithstanding how ordinary is it with men, for the getting of this trash, to transgress both against religion and reason, as if they hoped that after this life there were nothing to be hoped for; and to violate the laws of justice in their unequal weights and measures, in their abusing ignorant and unskilful chapmen, whereas commutative justice observes proportionem arithmeticam, an arithmetical proportion, which is immutably one and the same in respect of all persons of what quality soever. Such as these sell integrity of conscience for gain, and yet gain nothing by that bargain but the loss of their souls, whilst with the golden book they swallow down the worm of conscience, and barter away their own eternal happiness for very trifles, which, if they did but like the good merchant buy that pearl our Saviour speaks of, Matth. 13. should as fare as were convenient as a mantissa or an overplus be cast in at their bargain. But if any shall make profession of religion profits stirrup to get up by, and bait craft with humility, rough casting his countenance as if by an hypocritical monopoly he had engrossed all honesty and integrity of conscience, that he may the more easily deceive, his case is fare worse than the former. Is religion grown now to be an art of deceiving? or doth he deserve the name of Christian, whose chief study it is scitè mentiri, id est, mentiri ut lucro sit, nec tamen possis deprehendi, as Erasmus speaketh. Nay I must tell him heis stark nought as well as the former, and doubleth his fault by seeming good. And if any notwithstanding this persuasion shall still persist, either in this or in any other sinful way, let them go on to please themselves, and displease their God in their over greedy pursuit of unprofitable vanity. Let me only have an upright conscience for my portion, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, as Isocrates of virtue; and let me never want it till I envy them.  
And for ourselves, if we delight not to wove the web of our future woe, let it be our chiefest care to get, and having got, to keep integrity of conscience. I'll add but two motives to move you thereunto; A good conscience will be your best friend, and a bad conscience will be your worst enemy.  
1. A bad conscience will be your worst enemy. It deprives us for the present of union with God, of communion with Christ, of interest in his promises, of protection of his angels, and of title to heaven; and when God shall awake it and arm it against us, it will sting us with such torments, as I pray God we may rather know by relation then experience. An ancient Father calls this horror of conscience, primitias infernalis flammae; and I may call it a walking hell. For our Saviour himself seemeth to intimate that the rackings of a self-accusing conscience are the greatest part of their torments that are condemned to that dungeon where darkessen putteth on her blackest garment.  
2. A good conscience will be our best friend. It will be our most plaindealing friend, our fastest friend, and our potentest friend.  
1. Our most plaindealing friend. Some are flattering friends and will not speak and inform men of their miscarriages, but rather make them believe that all their vices are virtues, and all their dusky actions crystalline. Nimis sciti sycophantae, to use Plautus his phrase, men that live altogether out of themselves studying other men's humours. Like Gnatho in Terence, Quicquid dicunt laudo, id rursum si negant, laudo id quoque: negat quis? nego; art? aio. Others again are fearful friends, and dare not speak lest they incur displeasure, and indeed all men naturally are displeased with those that inform them of their misdoings, especially those that are great, and unwonted to be crossed in their desires. These many times reward good counsel with ill turns, and account real injuries the just recompense of wholesome reproof: witness John the Baptist, who lost his head for telling Herod it was not lawful for him to keep his brother's wife. Witness Calisthenes, who lost his life, not for betraying Alexander to others, but because he would not betray Alexander to himself, and account him worthy of divine worship, as all his detestable flatterers did. Witness St paul in my text, who, if St Chrysostoms' testimony be true in his first book adversùs vituperatores vitae monasticae, was slain by Nero for dissuading an harlot of his from prostituting herself to his ungodly desires. The observation of which practices of great ones caused a witty speech to fall from a famous man of our times, that whosoever should follow truth too near the heels it might happily strike out his teeth. And in this regard the most are afraid to admonish, especially great ones when they do amiss, and all generally are  and loath to speak truth. But now a good conscience neither desireth to flatter us, nor feareth to tell us the truth, be we what we will or can be however it be taken.  
2. It is our fastest friend. The relation betwixt man and wife is a near relation; but the relation betwixt a man and his conscience is nearer. Conscience lieth with us, sits with us, rides with us; a man may as soon fly from himself as from his conscience. Jonathan never adhered so to David, though the text saith, he loved him, as his own soul. Nisus never stuck so close to Euryalus, though he desired by his own death to ransom the others life, Me, me, adsum qui feci, in me convertite ferrum, etc. Nor This be to her beloved Pyramus, though she endeavoured to accompany him after death, Quique, à me morte revelli Heu solâ peteras: poteris nec morte revelli. I say none of these did so adhere to other, as good conscience will to us; when riches, when friends when parents, when life and breath forsake us, good conscience can, yea cannot choose but cleave unto us:  
Thirdly, It is our potentest friend. Good conscience is the darling of the Almighty, which if we do but continue faithful in her service will crown us with peace of conscience here, and hereafter with eternal happiness. For though these two may happily be severed for some time, as I have already showed, yet the fruit of constancy in righteousness is peace even in this life. And therefore St. Augustine calls them duas sorores; & he that is constant in his love to the one, shall be sure to be beloved of the other. For integrity and peace, like Martha and Mary, dwell under one roof. O sweet and blessed name of peace, the beauty of heaven, the desire of earth, the joy of angels, that every good, and every thing, that all that man delights in! Who but a man possessed with frenzy would not labour for thee? who but a cruel tyrant against his own soul can be content with any other reward but thee? o selix conscientia jucunditas (cries out holy Augustine, as in an ecstasy) paradisus delitiarum, palatium Dei, thalamus Christi, habitaculum Spiritûs sancti: Tu in terra ad huc es, & in caelis habitas. O happy, thrice happy peace of conscience; thou art yet on earth, and yet thou dwellest in heaven, or rather thou changest the earth thou art in, into heaven, what have not the blessed Saints done for thee? what have not the crowned martyrs suffered with thee? Blessed is that soul which possesseth the, or rather which thou possessest. For it hath in deepest sorrow height of joy, prosperity in adversity, liberty in captivity, and life in death. 'Tis an instrument that 's sweetly tuned, 'tis an angel clad in flesh, 'tis a mint of golden thoughts, 'tis a world of joy and concord, where there is nothing but halcyon and summer days of peace. Happy is the man that is in such a case, yea blessed is he that hath peace of conscience for his portion.  
And now me thinks it is labour in vain for Cosmographers to spend themselves in finding out the place where paradise was seated. It was not the whole earth, as some conceive; nor a place mounted higher than the middle region of the air, as others; nor betwixt the tropicks in the torrid zone under the equinoctial; nor in the country of Eden, or in the parting of the two regions Assyria and Babylonia: It is not in your pleasant gardens, though they perhaps may excel those of Alcinous mentioned by Homer, when in the pride of their spring they are bespangled with all choice of eye-pleasing flowers; nor in your orchards of delight, surpassing the Elysian fields, adorned with variety of beautiful walks, & those shaded with the green canopy of every pleasant and fruitful tree: It is not in your glorious wardrobes, though they perhaps be filled with garments of silk, and of broidered work, of fine linen coral and pearl: It is not upon your couches of Ivory, nor in venereous embraces upon beds of down, decked with cover of tapestry, and of carved work, perfumed with myrrh, aloes, and cinnamon. It is not on your richly furnished tables, though they abounded with all variety of creatures that earth, and sea, and air can afford: But if you will needs know where to find out this place of bliss, believe me (for you may) it ever was, and is, and there only is, where there is tranquillity and peace of conscience.  
Lastly, good conscience, if we continue faithful in her service, will crown us with eternal happiness. What preferments hath she procured at the merciful hands of God, for all those that have lived and died in her service? How doth joy now triumph in the eyes, and comfort lodge in the hearts of all those, that whilst they were here upon earth were careful with St. Paul to keep a consciencevoyd of offence toward God, and toward men. How must their souls needs be full of angels pleasures, and swell with overflowing delights, how do they bury the miseries that befell them here, in the triumph of that conquest which they have obtained over the enemies of their salvation? Though my speech should be as endless, as their joys, yet would it come too short of a full expression. For the excellency of happiness can neither come out of the speaker by relation, nor enter into the hearer by apprehension, yet I'll tell you what S. Augustine saith of it, in the 22. Chap. of his meditation. O tu vita quam praeparavit Deus iis qui diligunt eum: vita vitalis, vita beata, vita tranquilla, vita secura, vita pulchra, vita munda, vita casta, vita ignara mortis, nescia tristitiae, etc. Quantò plùs valeo mecum considerare, tantò plùs amore tui langueo. And no marvel, holy Augustine. For those that enjoy this life behold to their unspeakable comfort the host royal of the blessed Angels, the holy spirits of Saints departed, the noble army of martyrs, which now shine much brighter than those flames, which here put a period to their transitory lives, the glorious company of the Apostles, the goodly fellowship of the prophets, and which is more, the most sacred humility of our Saviour, and his comely face, fairer than the sons of men, clearer than the sun, and that which infinitely transcends what is or can be said, the glorious presence of him, who is all in all; a power ineffable, a virtue infinite, a light by abundant clarity invisible. I will therefore conclude with S: Augustine's exclamation, O ergò felix ju ounditas, & jucunda felicitas sanctos videre, cum sanctis esse, & sanctum esse; Deum videre, & Deum in aeternum habere, & ultrá.  
God of his infinite mercy teach our consciences now whilst we live to nature, to die to sin, that so when we die to nature we may live with him in this blissful life of glory.  
FINIS.