MALEBRANCH's SEARCH AFTER TRUTH. OR A Treatise of the Nature OF THE Humane Mind. AND Of its Management for avoiding Error in the Sciences.  
VOL. I.  
Done out of French from the last Edition.  
LONDON, Printed for I. Dunton at the Raven in the Poultry, and S. Manship at the Ship in Cornhill, 1694.   

TO THE Marquis of NORMANBY.  
My LORD,  
THis Learned Treatise of the Famous Malebranch begs the Favour of your Lordship's Patronage, and if any thing could do so, would almost deserve it. All great Genius's are nearly related to one another, at least there is a sort of Sympathy between them; and the Wits of France have never failed of a kind Reception from those in England, which the most Cruel Wars cannot hinder, nor does Love to our Country forbidden us from doing Justice to theirs. The Translation of good French Books into our Tongue, is a Reprisal on their Nation, who have taken the same way by such Writings as are Famous in Antiquity, doing all that was in their Power for an Universal Language, perhaps to make way for Universal Empire. So that Translation from them again, is only a Countermining them, and Fencing with them at their own Weapons: And this perhaps might succeed as well in our Language as any in Europe, since 'tis much fuller and stronger, and consequently capable of mending an Original; and indeed nothing can hinder it, but want of Encouragement from Men in Power, or Weakness in the Performance. For the First, there is no one that can justly complain of it, who has the Ambition of placing the Name of Normanby before his Writings, it gives him a new Soul, and he ought neither to think or write meanly when he considers at whose Altars his Labours are offered. For the Second, I have as little to say for it, as I could wish our Critics may have to say against it: The Errors that have escaped the Press in the Original, the Difficulty of the Subject, the Confinement of Language for fear of spoiling the Philosopher to gratify the Gentleman, my own necessary Avocations, and the very little time I did it in, cannot promise so correct a Translation, as perhaps it otherwise might have been, yet I am willing to believe, it may in some measure be useful to such as can read it without Prejudice; and it being designed by the Author, only for such as are willing to know the Errors of their Senses and Imagination, and the Weakness of the Humane Mind, in order to discover Truth and Happiness, I cannot be very uneasy about anticipating its Fate amongst others, especially under your Lordship's Protection.  
Indeed I may very well be Ambitious and Proud of such a Protection, when the Government gins to be so very Sensible of the Happy Influences of your great Abilities and Interest. 'Tis a rare Happiness to have Prudence in Council, joined with Bravery in Action: Nay the same Man may be a Politick-General, and Master of much Personal Valour, yet be far enough from an Accomplished Statesman: But to think coolly, yet act warmly, to seize and improve every Advantage, and yet pierce into the Depths of Futurity, and disentangle intricate and distant Causes and Effects, are only Accomplishments for such a King as ours, and such a Minister of State as your Lordship.  
Nor are your great Abilities to serve the Public Good, without particular Instances of your Personal Hazards and Signal Zeal for its Preservation in the late Dutch Wars, when your Lordship was pleased to Command the Royal Catherine, a Post that was the greatest Evidence of your Lordship's Loyalty and Bravery.  
The highest Military and Civil Honours, which require great Application, hinder not your Lordship from excelling in the less Severe Studies, a great Genius will do best upon whatever Employment it fixes itself, witness your Lordship's Essay on Poetry, and that admirable Product of your Youth, the Temple of Death, with several other Miscellany Pieces of your Lordships, which like our great Roscommon's Works, have a particular noble Air, that is not only the Effect of a great Genius, but also of a Genteel and Happy Education, and therefore unimitable by our best Wits, who can only plead the former Qualification: Nor is it any Wonder that so great a Master should Patronise others who have excelled in the same Divine Art, which requires that force of Spirit and fineness of Thought, that are necessary to all, that even in Prose shall do any thing extraordinary, or worthy the Perusal of such Judges as your Lordship; this, Malebranch is allowed by all to have in his Native Language, and therefore if he gives your Lordship no Entertainment, the Defect must be in the Translation, not the Original; the very Faults of this great Man have something in them extremely Beautiful, and the Jewel is so dazzling, that the flaws are scarce discerned. The inscribing these Papers to your Lordship's most honourable Patronage, is the occasion of this Address, wherein I have the Honour to testify both to your Lordship and the World, with how profound a Deference and Respect, I am,  
My LORD, Your Lordship's most Humble and most Obedient Servant Richard Sault.   

THE PREFACE.  
THE Mind of Man is by its Nature, as it were, situated between its Creator and Corporeal Creatures; since according to 
* Nihil est potentius illâ Creaturâ, quae mens dicitur rationalis, nihil est sublimius. Quidquid supra illam est, jam Creator est. Tr. 23. upon St. John.  St. Austin there is nothing above it but God alone, and nothing below it but Bodies: But as the great Elevation it has above all Material things, does not hinder it from being united to them, and from depending in some measure upon a Portion of Matter; so the infinite distance that is between the Sovereign Being and the Mind of Man, does not hinder it from being immediately and in a very strict manner united to him. This last Union raises it above all things; it gives it Life, Light, and all its Felicity; and 
* Quod rationali animâ melius est omnibus consentientibus Deus est. Aug.  St. Austin speaks of this Union in many Passages of his Works, as of that which is the most Natural and the most Essential to the Mind: On the contrary, the Union of the Mind with the Body, debases Man exceedingly, and is the Principal Cause of all our Errors and Miseries.  
I do not wonder that the common sort of Men, or that the Heathen Philosophers, should only consider in the Soul, its Retation and Union with the Body, without distinguishing its Relation and Union with God: But I am surprised that Christian Philosophers, who should prefer the Mind of God to the Mind of Man, Moses to Aristotle, St. Austin to some wretched Commentator upon a Heathen Philosopher, should look upon the Soul rather as the Form of the Body, than as being made after the Image, and for the Image of God, that is, according to 
* Ad ipsam similitudinem non omnia facta sunt, sed sola substantia rationalis. Quare omnia per ipsam, sed ad ipsam non nisi anima rationalis. Itaque substantia rationalis & per ipsam facta est, & ad ipsam: Non enim est ulla natura interposita. Lib. Imp. de Gen. ad Litt.  St. Austin, for Truth, to which alone it is immediately united. It is true the Soul is united to the Body, and is naturally the Form of it; but it is also true, that it is united to God after a much stricter and more Essential manner. The relation it has to its Body might not be; but the relation it has to God is so Essential, that it is impossible to conceive that God could create a Spirit without that Relation.  
It is evident that God can only Act for himself; that he can only Create Spirits to Know and Love him; that he can neither give them any Knowledge, nor imprint any Love in them, but what is for him, and what tends towards him: But he was not obliged to unite Spirits to Bodies as he has done. Therefore the 
* Rectissimè dicitur factus ad imaginem & similitudinem Dei, non enim aliter incommutabilem veritatem posset ment conspicere. De vera Rel.  Relation which our Minds have to God, is Natural, Necessary, and absolutely Indispensible; but the Relation of our Spirits to our Bodies, though Natural, is neither absolutely Necessary, nor Indispensible.  
This is not a proper place to set forth all the Authorities and Reasons, which may induce us to believe, that it is more suitable to the Nature of our Mind to be united to God, than to a Body; these things would lead us too far. To place this Truth in a just Light, it would be necessary to destroy the Principal Foundations of Heathen Philosophy, to explain the Disorders of Sin, to engage what is falsely called Experience, and to argue against the Prejudices and Illusions of the Senses. Therefore to make the common sort of Mankind apprehend this Truth perfectly, is too hard a Task to attempt in a Preface.  
Nevertheless it is not difficult to prove it to attentive Minds, which are acquainted with true Philosophy; for it is enough to put them in mind, that since the Will of God regulates the Nature of every thing, it is more suitable to the Nature of the Soul to be united to God by the Knowledge of Truth, and the Love of Good, than to be united to a Body; since it is certain, as above, that God has created Spirits to Know, and Love him, rather than to Inform Bodies. This Proof is able at first sight to startle Ingenious Minds, then to render them attentive, and lastly to convince them: But it is morally Impossible, that Sensualized Spirits, who can know nothing but what is felt should ever be convinced by such Arguments. These sort of Men must have gross sensible Proofs, because nothing seems real to them, unless it makes an Impression upon their Senses.  
The Fall of the first Man, has so much weakened the 
* Mens, quod non sentit, nisi cum purissima & beatisma est, nulla Cohaeret, nisi ipsi veritati, quae similitudo & Imago patris, & sapientia dicitur. Aug. lib. Imp. de Gen. ad Litt.  Union of our Mind with God, that none but those are sensible of it whose Heart is purified, and whose Mind is enlightened; for this Union seems Imaginary to all those who blindly follow the Judgements of the Senses, and the Motions of the Passions.  
On the contrary, it has so much strengthened the Union of our Soul with our Body, that these two parts of ourselves seem to us to be no longer but one and the same Substance; or rather it has made us such Slaves to our Senses and Passions, that we are inclined to believe our Body is the Principal of the two Parts of which we are composed.  
When we consider the different Employments of Men, we have a great deal of reason to believe, that they have a mean and low Opinion of themselves; for as they all love Felicity, and the Perfection of their Being, and only labour to make themselves Happier or more Perfect, have we not reason to believe, that they have a greater Value for their Body, and the Goods of their Body, than for their Mind, and the Goods thereof, when we see them commonly employed about things that have a Relation to the Body, seldom or never thinking on those which are absolutely necessary for the Perfection of the Mind?  
The greatest part of Men labour with so much Industry and Toil, only to maintain a miserable Life, and to leave their Children some necessary Conveniencies for the Preservation of their Bodies.  
Those, who by the good Fortune, or Chance of their Birth, are not subject to this Necessity, do not show better by their Business and Employments, that they look upon their Soul as the noblest part of their Being: Hunting, Dancing, Gaming, Entertainments are their common Employments; their Soul being a Slave to their Body, Esteems and Cherishes all those Divertisements, though altogether Unworthy of it; but because their Body has a relation to all Sensible Things, the Soul is not only enslaved to the Body, but also to all sensible things by the Body, and for the Body; for 'tis by the Body that Men are united to their Relations, their Friends, their Country, their Employments, and to all sensible Enjoyments, the Preservation of which seems to them as necessary and as valuable as the Preservation of their own Being. Thus the Care of their Estates, and the Desire of increasing them; the Passion of Glory and Grandeur agitates and employs them infinitely more than the perfecting of their Soul.  
Moreover the Learned, and those who pretend to Wit, spend more than half their Life in Actions purely Animal, or such as incline us to think, that they value their Health, their Estate, and their Reputation, more than the Perfection of their Mind. They study more to attain a Chimerical Grandeur, in the Opinion of other Men, than increase the Power and Capacity of their Mind. They make their Heads a kind of Wardrobe, in which they Store up, without choice or order, whatever bears any Character of Learning; I mean, whatever may appear Rare and Extraordinary, and excite the Admiration of other Men. They are proud of being like those Cabinets of Curiosity and Antiquity, which have nothing Rich or Solid in them, the Value whereof only depends on Fancy, Passion and Chance; and they seldom labour to improve their Mind, and to regulate the Motions of their Heart.  
Yet it is not that Men are wholly Ignorant they have a 
* Non exigua hominis portio, sed totius Humana Universitatis substantia est. Amb. 6. Hexa. 7.  Soul, and that this Soul is the chief part of their Being. They have also been convinced a thousand times by Reason and Experience, that it is no very considerable Advantage, to have some Reputation, Riches, and Health for some Years; and generally that all the Advantages of the Body, and such as are only possessed by the Body, and for the Body, are Imaginary and perishable Goods: Men are sensible that it is better to be Just than Rich; to be Reasonable than Learned; to have a lively penetrating Mind, than a quick and active Body. These Truths can never be effaced out of their Mind; and they discover them Infallibly, whenever they are pleased to think on them. Homer, for instance, who praises his Hero for his Nimbleness in Running, might have observed (if had so pleased) that it is a Praise fit for Horses and Greyhounds. Alexander, so Famous in History for his Illustrious Thefts, had sometimes the same Reproaeches from his Reason, as Murderers and Thiefs have, notwithstanding the confused Noise of the Flatterers that were about him. And Cesar, at the passage of the Rubicon, could not forbear discovering that these Reproaches terrified him, when he resolved to Sacrifice the Liberty of his Country to his Ambition.  
The Soul, though strictly united to the Body, is nevertheless united to 
* Ubique veritas praesides omnibus consulentibus te, simulque respondes omnibus etiam diversa consulentibus.  God, and at that very time, when it receives by its Body those lively but confused Sensations, which the Passions Inspire, it receives from the Eternal 
† Liquidè tu respondes, sed non liquidè omnes audiunt. Omnes unde volunt consulunt, sed non semper quod volunt audiunt. Conf. S. Aug. Book 10. C. 26.5. Quint. Cur. Book 7. c. 8.  Truth which presides in its Mind, the Knowledge of its Duty and Disorders. When the Body deceives it, God undeceives it; when it Flatters it, God Mortifies it; and when it Praises and Applauds it, God Reproaches it severely, and Condemns it by the Manifestation of a more Pure and Holy Law, than that of the Flesh which it has followed.  
There was no need for the Scythians to come to Alexander, to teach him his Duty in a foreign Tongue; he knew from him, who instructs the Scythians, and the most Barbarous Nations, the Rules of Justice which he ought to follow: 
* Intus in domicilio cogitationis, nec Hebraea, nec Graeca, nec Latina, nec Barbara Veritas, sine oris & Lingua organis, sine strepitu Syllabarum. Conf. S. Aug. B. 11. c. 3.  The Light of Truth, which lightens all the World enlightened him also; and the Voice of Nature, which speaks neither Greek nor Scythian, etc. spoke to him as to the rest of Mankind, in a very Intelligible Tongue. Whatever Reproaches the Scythians could fasten upon him about his Conduct, they only spoke to his Ears, because God spoke not to his Heart; or rather, God spoke to his Heart, but he only harkening to the Scythians, who did nothing but exasperate his Passion, and unmanned him, so that he heard not the Voice of Truth, although it thundered within him, nor did he see her Light, although it pierced him through.  
It is true our Union with God diminishes and weakens by degrees, according as that which we have with sensible things, Increases and Strengthens; but it is impossible that that Union should be wholly broken, without the Dissolution of our Being. For though such as are plunged in Vice, and indulge their Pleasure, are Insensible of Truth, they are nevertheless united to it. 
* Videtur quasi ipse à te occidere; cum tu ab ipsa occidas. Au. in Ps. 25 Nam etiam sol iste, & videntis faciem illustrat & caesi; ambobus sol praesens est, sed praesene sole unus absens est. Sic & sapientia Dei, Dominus J. C. ubique praesens est, quia ubique est veritas ubique sapientia. Aug. in Joan. Tract. 35.  It does not forsake them, but they forsake it. It's Light shines in Darkness, but it does not always expel it: Just as the light of the Sun encompasses the Blind, and those that close their Eyes, though it enlightens neither.  

* What I say in this place, of the two Unions of the Mind with God, and with the Body, is to be understood according to the common way of conceiving things. For it is certain the Mind can only be immediately united to God; I mean, the Mind only depends truly on God; and if it be united to the Body, or if it depends on it, it is because the Will of God efficaciously causes that Union or that Dependence. This will be easily apprehended by the Sequel of this Work.  The Union of our Mind with our Body is the same: This Union diminishes by degrees, as that which we have with God increases; but it is never quite dissolved but by our Death: For though we were as much enlightened, and as much above the Pleasures of Sense as the Apostles were; yet it is necessary since the Fall, that our Mind should depend on our Body, and that we should feel the Law of our Flesh, continually resisting and opposing the Law of our Mind.  
The Mind becomes Purer, Stronger, more Perspicuous, and more enlarged, proportionably as its Union with God increases; for 'tis he from whom it derives all its Perfection. On the contrary, it becomes Corrupted, Blind, Weak, and is contracted by degrees, as the Union which it has with its Body Increases and Strengthens; because that Union also causes all its Imperfections. Therefore a Man who judges of all things by his Senses, who follows the Motions of his Passions in all things, who perceives nothing but what he feels, and who loves nothing but what flatters him, is in the most wretched Disposition of Mind that he can possibly be in: In that condition he is at a vast distance from Truth, and from his Good. But when a Man only judges of things by the pure 
* Quis enim bene se inspiciens non expertus est? Tanto se aliquid intellexisse sincerius, quanto removere, atq: subducere intentionem mentis à corporis sensibus potuit. Aug. de Immort. animae. Ch. 10.  Ideas of the Mind, when he carefully avoids the confused noise of Creatures, and looking within himself, hearkens to his Sovereign Master in the Silence of his Senses and Passions, it is impossible for him to fall into Error.  
God never deceives those who interrogate him by a serious Application, and by an entire Conversion of their Mind towards him, though they do not always hear his Answers; but when the Mind, removing from God, diffuses itself Externally, when it only Interrogates the Body to learn Truth, harkening only to its Senses, its Imagination and Passions which continually speak to it, it must needs be deceived. Wisdom, Truth, Perfection, and Felicity, are not Goods that can be expected from the Body; he alone who is above us, and from whom we have a Being, can give it Perfection.  
This is what 
* Principium Creaturae intellectualis est aeterna sapientia, quod principium manens in se incommutabiter, nullo modo cessat occulta inspiratione vocationis lequi ei Creaturae, cui principium est, ut convertatur ad id ex quo est; quod aliter formata ac perfecta esse non possit. S. de Gen. ad Litt. Ch. 50.  St. Austin teaches us in these fine words. Eternal Wisdom, says he, is the Principle of all Creatures that are capable of Intelligence; and this Wisdom always remaining the same, never ceases to speak to his Creatures in the secret Recesses of their Reason, that they may turn towards their Principle; because nothing but the sight of the Eternal Wisdom gives a Being to Spirits; and can, as it were, finish them, and give them the last Perfection they are capable of.  

* 
Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. Joan. Ep. 1. c. 3. v. 2.  
Corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam. Sap. 9.10.   When we see God as he is, we shall be like him, says the Apostle St. John: By that Contemplation of Eternal Truth, we shall be elevated to that degree of Greatness, to which all Spiritual Creatures tend by the necessity of their Nature. But while we are on Earth, the weight of the Body Stupifies the Mind; it removes it continually from the Presence of God, or of that Internal Light which Illuminates it; it makes continual Efforts to strengthen its Union with Sensible Objects; and obliges it to represent to itself all things, not as they are in themselves, but according to the relation they have towards the Preservation of Life.  

* Terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem, & difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt, & quae in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labour. Sap. 9.15.  The Body, says the Wise Man, fills the Mind with so great a number of Sensations, that it becomes incapable of knowing those things that are but a little concealed: The sight of the Body dazzles and dissipates that of the Mind, and it is difficult to perceive Truths clearly by the Eyes of the Soul, while we make use of the Eyes of our Body to discover it. This shows that it is only by the Attention of the Mind that Truths are discovered, and that all Sciences are Learned; for the Attention of the Mind is nothing but its Return and Conversion towards God, who is our only Master, and who only can teach us Truth, by the Manifestation of his Substance, as 
* 
Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo, & à quo, & per quem intelligibiliter lucent omnia. S. Sol.  
Insinuavit nobis (Christus) animam humanam non vegetari, non illuminari, non beatificari, nisi ab ipsa Substantia. Dei Aug. in Joan.   St. Austin speaks.  
It is plain by all these things, that we must continually resist the Effort which the Body makes against the Mind, and by degrees accustom ourselves to disbelieve the Testimonies of our Senses in respect of all Bodies which are about us, and which they always represent to us as worthy our Application and Esteem; because we ought never to six upon any thing that is Sensible, nor employ ourselves about it. 'Tis one of the Truths which the Eternal Wisdom seems to have been willing to reveal to us by his Incarnation; for after having raised a sensible Body to the highest Dignity that can be apprehended, he has showed us by the deepest Humiliation of the same Body (which was the greatest of all sensible things) how much we ought to despise all the Objects of our Senses. It is perhaps for the same reason St. Paul said that he knew not Jesus Christ according to the Flesh: For it is not the Flesh of Christ we must rest upon, it is the Spirit which is concealed under that Flesh; Caro vas fuit, quod habebat attend, non quod erat, says St. Austin. That which is 
* Illa autoritas Divina dicenda est, quae non solum insensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem, sed & ipsum hominem agens, ostendit ei quo usque se propter ipsum depresserit, & non teneri sensibus quibus videntur illa miranda; sed ad intellectum jubet evolare, simul demonstrans & quanta hic possit, & cur haec faciat, & quam parvi pendat. Aug. 2. de Ord. 9 Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum, jam non secundum carnem novimus. 2 ad Cor. Tr. in Joan. 27.  visible or sensible in Jesus Christ, only deserves our Adoration because it is united with the Word, which can only be the Object of the Mind.  
It is absolutely necessary for those who aim at Wisdom and Happiness; to be fully convinced and affected with what I have said: It is not enough to believe it upon my word, nor to be persuaded of it by the Lustre of a Transitory Light; they must know it by many Experiences, and many undeniable Demonstrations: These things must never be in danger of being effaced out of their Mind, they must ever be present to it in all their Studies, and other Employments of their Life.  
Those who will give themselves the Trouble to read the Work with some Application which is here published, will, if I am not deceived, commence such a Disposition of Mind; for we have demonstrated in it the different ways wherein our Senses, Imagination, and Passions, are absolutely useless, to the discovery of Truth and Good: On the contrary, that they dazzle and seduce us on all occasions; and generally that all the Knowledge the Mind receives by the Body, or by some inward Motions of the Body, are all false and confused, in respect of the Objects they represent; although they are very useful towards the Preservation of the Body, and of the Goods which have relation to the Body.  
Several Errors are engaged in it, and particularly those that are most universally received, or that occasion the greatest Disorder of the Mind; and we show that most of them proceed from the Union of the Mind with the Body. We design in several places to make the Mind sensible of its Servitude, and of the Dependence it has on all sensible things, that it may awake from its Drowsiness, and make some Efforts for its Deliverance.  
We do not only make a bare Exposition of our Errors, but also explain the Nature of the Mind: We do not, for instance, insist upon a great Enumeration of all the particular Errors of the Senses or Imagination, but upon the Causes of those Errors. We show at once (in the Explanation of these Faculties and general Errors, to which we are subject) an almost infinite Number of those particular Errors into which Men fall. Thus the subject of this Work is the whole Mind of Man; we consider it in itself, in relation to the Body, and in relation to God; we examine the Nature of all its Faculties, and observe the uses we ought to make from hence to avoid Error. Lastly, We explain most of those things we thought useful to advance in the Knowledge of Man.  
The finest, the most agreeable, and most necessary Knowledge, is undoubtedly the Knowledge of ourselves. Of all Humane Sciences, the Science of Man is the most worthy of Man: Nevertheless that Science is not the most cultivated or accomplished Science we have: The common sort of Mankind neglects it wholly; even among those that value themselves upon Sciences, there are but few that apply themselves to it, and there are yet fewer who successfully apply themselves to it. Most of those who are esteemed Learned in the World, have but a confused Knowledge of the Essential Difference that is between the Mind and Body. St. 
Conf. Book 4. Chap. 15.  Austin himself, who has distinguished those two Being's so well, confesses that it was a long time before he could know it. And though it must be granted, that he has explained the Properties of the Soul and Body better than any of those that were before him, and who have succeeded him, until our Age; yet it were to be wished, that he had not attributed to External Bodies, all the Sensible Qualities which we perceive by their means; for indeed they are not clearly contained in the Idea he had of Matter. So that one may confidently say, That the Difference between the Mind and the Body has not been known clearly enough till of late Years.  
Some fancy they know the Nature of the Mind: Others are persuaded that it is impossible to know any thing about it. The greatest part of Men are insensible of the usefulness of that Knowledge, and for that reason they despise it. But all these common Opinions are rather Effects of the Imagination and Inclination of Men, than the Consequences of a clear and distinct Sight of their Mind: It is because they are loath to look within themselves, there to discover their Weaknesses and Infirmities, but they delight in curious Discoveries and fine Sciences; never looking within themselves, they are insensible of the Disorders that happen there; they think they are well, because they are insensible; they find fault with those, who knowing their own Distemper apply Remedies to it; and say, that they make themselves Sick, because they endeavour to cure themselves.  
But these great Genius's, who penetrate into the most mysterious Secrets of Nature; who in their Mind ascend into the Heavens, and who descend even into the Abyss, aught to remember what they are: These great Objects perhaps only serve to dazzle them: The Mind must go out of itself to attain to so many things, but it cannot do it without being dissipated.  
Men are not born to become Astronomers, or Chemists, to spend all their Life in gazing through a Telescope, or in Sweeting at a Furnace; in order to infer little insignificant Consequences from their Laborious Observations. I grant that an Astronomer was the first that discovered Lands, Seas, and Mountains in the Moon; that he was the first that observed Spots in the Sun, and exactly calculated their Motions: I grant that a Chemist hath at last found the Secret of fixing Mercury, or making the Alkaist, by which Vanhelmont boasted he could dissolve all Bodies; but are they become the Wiser or the Happier for this? They may have got some Reputation by it in the World; but if they have considered it, that Reputation has only increased their Servitude.  
Men may look upon Astronomy, Chemistry, and most Sciences, as proper Divertisements for a Gentleman; but they ought not to suffer themselves to be deluded by them, nor to prefer them to the Science of Man; for the Imagination fixes a certain Idea of Grandeur upon Astronomy, because that Science considers great Objects, glorious Objects, Objects which are infinitely above all that are about us; the Mind ought not blindly to embrace that Idea: We should make ourselves Judges and Masters of it, and divest it of that sensible Greatness which astonishes our Reason. The Mind ought to judge of all things according to its Internal Knowledge, without harkening to the false and confused Testimony of the Senses and Imagination; and if it examines all Humane Sciences by the pure Light of Truth which guides it, we dare affirm, that it will despise most of them, and will have more respect for that which teaches us what we are, than for all others whatever.  
Therefore we choose to advise those who are Lovers of Truth, to judge of the Subject of this Work, according to the Answers they will receive from the Sovereign Masters of all Men, after having made their Application to him by serious Reflection, rather than to prevent them by a long Discourse, which they might perhaps look upon as common Places, or the vain Ornaments of a Preface. If they think this Subject worthy their Application and Study, they are desired again not to judge of the matter it contains, by the good or ill manner in which they are expressed, but to look within themselves, to hear there the Decisions they are to follow, and according to which they ought to judge.  
Because we are persuaded that Men cannot teach each other; and those that hear us do not learn the Truths we speak to their Ears, unless he that has discovered them to us, reveal them at the same time to their Mind, we find ourselves obliged to advise those who will profitably read this Work, not to believe us upon our word out of Inclination, nor to oppose what we say out of Aversion: For though we 
* Nolite put●re quemquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine, admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae, si non fit intus qui doceat in anis fit strepitus noster. Aug. in Joan. Auditus per me factus, intellectus per quem? Dixit aliquis & ad eos vestrum, sed non eum videtis. Si intellexistis fratres, dictum est & cordi vestro. Munus Dei est Intelligentia. Aug. in Joan. Tr. 40.  think we have advanced nothing but what we have learned by Meditation, we should be very sorry that others should content themselves to retain and believe our Sentiments without knowing them; or that they should be deceived, either for want of understanding them, or because we are deceived.  

* The Book de Magistro of St. Aust.  The Pride of some of the Learned, who will be believed upon their Word, seems insupportable to us: They will not allow us to consult God after they have spoken, because they do not consult him themselves: They are angry as soon as any body opposes their Sentiments, and they will needs force Men to prefer the Obscurity of their Imagination, to the pure Light of Truth which guides the Mind.  
We are, Thanks be to God, far from being guilty of this way of proceeding, though we are often accused of it: We desire, indeed, that Men should believe the Facts and Experiences we relate, because those things cannot be learned by the Application of the Mind to the Sovereign and Universal Reason. But as for all Truths that are discovered in the true Ideas of those things, which Eternal Truth represents in the Recesses of our 
* Noli putare teipsam esse lucem. Aus. in Psal.  Reason, we expressly advise them not to rely upon what we think of them; for we judge it no small Crime for a Man to compare himself to God, by thus usurping Authority over the Mind.  
The chief reason that we have for desiring those who shall read this Work, to apply themselves seriously to it, is, That we are willing to be made sensible of the Faults we may have committed in it, for we do not pretend to Infallibility. The Mind has so strict a relation to the Body, and has so great a Dependence on it, that we may reasonably fear we have not always clearly distinguished the confused Noise of the Imagination, from the pure Voice of Truth which speaks to the Mind.  
Did God only speak, and did we only judge according to what we hear, we might perhaps use these words of Jesus Christ: 
* Sicut audio sic judico, & jucicium meum justum est, quia non quaero voluntatem meam. Joan. Ch. 5.30.  I Judge according to what I hear, and my Judgement is Just and True. But we have a Body which speaks louder than God himself, and that Body never speaks Truth: We have Self-love, which corrupts the Words of him who always speaks Truth: And we have Pride, which inspires us with Boldness, to judge without harkening to the Words of Truth, according to which only we ought to judge: For the principal Cause of our Errors is, That our Judgements extend themselves further than the clear prospect of our Mind. Therefore I desire those to whom God shall discover my Mistakes, to make me sensible of them, that this Work, which I only give as an Essay, (whose subject is very worthy of men's Application) may be perfected by degrees.  
I had only undertaken it at first with a design to instruct myself, but some Persons having thought that it might be useful for the Public, I willingly consented to publish it, the rather because one of the chief reasons they gave me for it, did suit with the desire I had to be useful to myself. The real way, said they, to be instructed in any Matter, is to propose our Sentiments about it to some Learned Men. It excites our Attention and theirs: Sometimes they have Truths which are unknown to us; and sometimes they go through certain Discoveries which we have neglected out of Inadvertency, or have abandoned for want of Courage and Power.  
It was upon this Prospect of my particular Benefit, and that of some others, I venture to be an Author; but that my hopes may not prove vain, I give this Advice, that Men should not be disgusted at first, if they find things that contradict the common Opinions that are generally approved of by all Men and in all Ages. The Errors I endeavour to destroy, are those that are most general: If Men were very much enlightened, Universal Approbation would be a reason, but 'tis quite contrary. Therefore let it be well remembered, that Reason only aught to preside in the Judgement of all Humane Opinions, which have no relation to Faith, which God only instructs us in after a very different manner from that by which he discovers natural things to us. Let Men look within themselves, and draw near unto the Light which shines there continually, that their Reason may be the more illuminated. Let them carefully avoid the Sensations which are too lively, and all the Emotions of the Soul which take up the Capacity of the Mind: For the least Noise, the least Appearance of Light, often dissipates the sight of the Mind: It is good to avoid all those things, though it is not absolutely necessary. And if in using our utmost 
* Qui hoc videre non potest, oret & agate ut possemereatur, nec ad hominem disputatorem pulset, ut quod non legit legate, sed ad Deum Salvatorem ut quod non valet veleat. Ep. 112. c. 12. Suplexque illi qui lumen mentis accendit attendat, ut intelligat. Cont. Ep. Fund. c. 33.  Endeavours, we cannot resist the continual Impressions which our Bodies, and the Prejudices of our Infancy make upon our Imagination, we must have recourse to Prayer, to receive that from God which we cannot have by our own Power; but still without ceasing to resist our Senses; for that ought to be the continual Employment of those who in Imitation of St. Austin, have a great Love for Truth.   

The CONTENTS.  

BOOK I. Of the Errors of the Senses.  

Chap. 1. I. OF the Nature and Properties of the Understanding. II. Of the Nature and Properties of the Will, and wherein its Liberty consists. Page 1  
Chap. 2. I. Of Judgements and Reasonings. II. That they depend upon the Will. III. What use must be made of its Liberty in respect of them. iv Two General Rules to avoid Error and Sin. V. Necessary Reflections upon these Rules. p. 9  
Chap. 3. I. Answers to some Objections. II. Remarks upon what hath been said about the necessity of Evidence. p. 16  
Chap. 4. I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error, and that of these there are Five Principal ones. II. The General Design of the whole Work, and the particular Design of the first Book. p. 22  
Chap. 5. Of the Senses. I. Two ways of Explaining how they are corrupted by Sin. II. That 'tis not our Senses, but our Liberty, which is the true Cause of our Errors. III. A Rule not to be deceived in the Use of our Senses. p. 25  
Chap. 6. I. Of the Errors of the Sight, in respect of Extension, considered in itself. II. An Enumeration of these Errors, as to invisible Objects. III. Of the Errors of the Sight, concerning relative Extension. p. 33  
Chap. 7. I. Of the Errors of Sight in respect of Figures. II. We have no Knowledge of the least things. III. The Knowledge we have of the greatest things is not exact. iv An Explication of certain Natural Judgements which keep us from being deceived. V That these very Judgements deceive us in particular Occurrences. p. 44  
Chap. 8. I. That our Eyes do not inform us of the greatness or swiftness of Motion considered in itself. II. That Duration, which is necessary to be understood to know what Motion is, is unknown. III. Examples of the Errors of Sight, in respect of Motion and Rest. p. 49  
Chap. 9 A Continuation of the same Subject. I. A General Proof of the Errors of our Sight about Motion. II. That its necessary to know the distance of Objects, to judge of the swiftness of their Motion. III. An Examination of Means to know their distances. p. 54  
Chap. 10. Of Errors about Sensible Qualities I. A distinction of Soul and Body. II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses. III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united. IU. How Objects act upon Bodies. V How upon the Soul; with Reasons why the Soul does not perceive the Motions of the Fibres of the Body. VI Four things which are Confounded in every Sensation. p. 64  
Chap. 11. I. Of the Error we are subject to in respect of the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Senses. II. The Cause of that Error. III. An Objection and Answer. p. 71  
Chap. 12. I. Of the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses. II. That either we perceive not these Motions, or else confound them with our Sensations. III. Experience which proves it. iv Tor●e sorts of Sensations. V The Errors which accompany them. p. 73  
Chap. 13. I. Of the Nature of Sensations. II. That we know them better than we believe we do. III. An Objection and Answer. IU. Why we imagine we know nothing of our Sensations. V That we deceive ourselves in believing that all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects. VI Objection and Answer. p. 80  
Chap. 14. I. Of the false Judgements that accompany our Sensations, and which we confound with them. II. Reasons of these false Judgements. III. That Error is not in our Sensations, but only in these Judgements. p. 90  
Chap. 15. An Explanation of the particular Errors of Sight, which may serve us as an Example of the General Errors of our Senses. p. 95  
Chap. 16. I. That the Errors of our Senses are the most general and fruitful Principles, whence we draw all the false Conclusions, which in their turns also serve us for Principles. II. The Origine of Essential Differences. III. Of substantial Forms. iv Of some other Errors in the Philosophy of the Schools. p 97  
Chap. 17. I. Another Example drawn from Morals, which shows that our Senses only offer us false Goods. II. That 'tis God only who is our true Good. III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stolcks. p. 102  
Chap. 18. I. Our Senses deceive us in things which are not Sensible. II. An Example drawn from the Conversation of Men. III. We must not confide in Sensible Habits. p. 105  
Chap. 19 Two other Examples. I. The first of our Errors concerning the Nature of Bodies. II. The second, of these that relate to the Qualities of these Bodies. p. 109  
Chap. 20. The Conclusion of this first Book. I. That our Senses are only given us for our Bodies. II. That we must doubt of their Testimony. III. That it is not an inconsiderable thing to doubt as we ought to do. p. 113    

BOOK II. Of the Imagination.  

The First Part.  
Chap. 1. I. A General Idea of the Imagination. II. That it includes two Faculties, the one Active, and the other Passive. III. The general Cause of the Changes which happen to the Imagination of Man, and the design of this second Book. p. 117  
Chap. 2. I. Of the Animal Spirits, and the Changes to which they are subject in general. II. That the Chyle goes to the Heart, and thereby produces some change in the Spirits. III. That Wine has the same effect. p. 122  
Chap. 3. That the Air one breaths, causes likewise some change in the Spirits. p. 126  
Chap. 4. I. Of the Change wrought in the Animal Spirits, by the Nerves that go to the Lungs and Heart. II. Of that which is caused by the Nerves, that pass from the Liver to the Spleen, and so into the Bowels. III. That all this is done without the assistance of out Will, but cannot be effected with out a Providence. p. 128  
Chap. 5. I. Of the Memory. II. Of Habits. p. 134  
Chap. 6. I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to such quick Changes as the Spirits are. II. Three different Changes in the three different Ages. p. 139  
Chap. 7. I. Of the Communication which is between the Brain of a Mother, and that of her Child. II. Of the Communication that is between our Brain, and the other parts of our Body, which carries us to Imitation and Compassion. III. An Explanation of the Generation of Monstrous Children, and of the Propagation of the Species. iv Some Irregularities of the Mind, and some Inclinations of the will explained. V Of Concupiscence and Original Sin. VI Objections and Answers. p. 141  
Chap. 8. I. The Changes that happen to the Imagination of a Child after it is Born, by the Conversation it has with its Nurse, its Mother, and other Persons. II. Advice how to Educate it well. p. 160   

The Second Part. Of the Imagination.  
Chap. 1. I. OF the Imagination of Women. II. Of that of Men. III. Of that of Old People. p. 161  
Chap. 2. That the Animal Spirits usually observe the Traces of Ideas which are most Familiar to us; which is the Reason that we never make a sound Judgement of things. p. 168  
Chap. 3. Of the Mutual Connexion between the Ideas of the Mind, and the Traces of the Brain; and of the Mutual Connexion between Traces and Traces, and between Ideas and Ideas. p. 172  
Chap. 4. I. That Studious Men are the most subject to Error. II. The Reason why they rather choose to follow Authority, than make use of their Judgement. p. 182  
Chap. 5. Of the Ill Effects that Reading has upon the Imagination. p. 187  
Chap. 6. That Studious Persons are usually prejudiced in favour of some Author, so that their Principal Alm is to know whathe believed, without minding what he ought to believe. p. 190  
Chap. 7. Of the Prejudices of Commentators. p. 196  
Chap. 8. I. Of the Inventors of New Systems. II. The last Error of Studious Persons. p. 204  
Chap. 9 I. Of Esseminate Wits. II. Of Superficial wits. III. Of Persons of Authority. iv Of those that make Experiments. p. 209   

The Third Part. Of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations.  
Chap. 1. I. OF our Inclination to imitate others in all things; which is the Original of the Communication of Errors that depend upon the Power of Imagination. TWO Two Principal Causes that increase this Inclination. III. What a Strong Imagination is. iv That there are several sorts of it: Of Mad Men, and of such who have a Strong Imagination according to the Sense which is here meant. V Two considerable Defects of those that have a Strong Imagination. VI Of the Power they have to Perswage and Impose. p. 219  
Chap. 2 General Examples of the Force of the Imagination. p. 232  
Chap. 3. I. Of the Force of the Imagination of certain Authors. II. Of Tertullian. p. 241  
Chap. 4. Of Seneca's Imagination. p. 244  
Chap. 5. Of Montagne's Book. p. 253  
Chap. 6. I. Of Imaginary Wizards, and Lycanthropis or Wolf-Men. II. A Conclusion of the Two First Books. p. 263    

BOOK III. Of the Understanding or Pure Mind,  

Chap. 1. I. THought only is Essential to the Mind: Sensation and Imagination are only its Modifications. II. We know not all the Modifications our Souls are capable of. III. They are different from our Knowledge and Love, and are not always the Effects of them. p. 1  
Chap. 2. I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing that relates to Infinity. II. Its limitation is the Original of many Errors. III. And chief of Heresies. iv We must submit our Minds to Faith. p. 9  
Chap. 3. I. That Philosophers dissipate their Mind by applying it to Subjects which include too many Relations, and which depend upon too many things; without keeping any Order in their Studies. II. An Example drawn from Aristotle, III. That Geometricians, on the contrary, proceed well in an Enquiry after Truth, especially those who make use of Algebra. iv That their method increases the power of the Mind; and that Aristotle's Logic weakens it. V Another defect of studious Persons. p. 15  
Chap. 4. I. The Mind cannot long apply itself to any Object, which neither relates to itself, nor to Infinity. II. The Inconstancy, and consequently the Error of the Will, proceeds from this Defect of Application. III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Ideas of the Mind. IU. What is the Original Cause of the Corruption of Manners. V And the Ignorance of the Generality of Mankind. p. 20   

The Second Part of the Pure Understanding. Of the Nature of IDEAS.  
Chap. 1. I. WHat is meant by Ideas; That they truly Exist, and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects. II. A division of all the Modes by which External Objects may be seen. p. 29  
Chap. 2. That material Objects do not emit Species which resemble them. p. 33  
Chap. 3. That the Soul has no power of producing Ideas. The Cause of men's Error, in reference to this Subject. p. 35  
Chap. 4. That we do not sie Objects by the means of Ideas which were created with us. And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occasion for them. p. 41  
Chap. 5, That the Mind neither sees the Essence, nor Existence of Objects, in considering its own Perfections. That none but God sees them in that manner. p. 44  
Chap. 6. That we see all things in God. p. 46  
Chap. 7. I. Four different ways of seeing things. II. How we know God. III. How we know Bodies. iv How we know our Soul. V. How we know the Souls of other Men, and pure Spirits. p. 55  
Chap. 8. I. The Intimate Presence of the Wandering Idea of Being in General, is the Cause of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind, and of the greatest part of the Chimeras of common Philosophy, which hinder many Philosophers from discovering the Solidity of the True Principles of Moral Philosophy. II. Example concerning the Essence of Matter. p. 6●  
Chap. 9 I. The last General Cause of our Errors. II. That the Ideas of things are not always present to the Mind, as soon as 'tis desired. III. That all Finite Minds are liable to Error, and why. iv We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies or Spirits, nor that God is a Spirit, as we conceive Spirits. p. 71  
Chap. 10. Examples of some Physical Errors, into which Men fall, because they suppose that things which differ in their Nature, Qualities, Extension, Duration and Proportion, are alike in all things. p. 77  
Chap. 11. Examples of some Errors of Morality which depend on the same Principle. p. 87  
The Conclusion of the Foree first Books. p. 91    

BOOK iv Of the Inclinations and Natural Motions of the Mind.  

Chap. 1. I. IT's necessary the Mind have Inclinations, as well as the Body Motions. II. God acts the Humane Mind only for himself. III. men's Minds are only inclined to Particular Good, through the Motion they have to Good in General. iv The Origine of the Chief Natural Inclinations, which will make up the Division of this Fourth Book. p. 1  
Chap. 2. I. The Inclination for Good in General, is the Principle of the Disquiet of our Will. II. And consequently of our Negligence and Ignorance. III. First Example, Morality, little known to many Men. IU. Second Example, The Immortality of the Soul disputed by some Men. V That our Ignorance is exceeding great in respect of abstracted things, or such as have but little Relation to us. p. 7  
Chap. 3. I. Curiosity is natural and necessary. II. Three Rules to moderate it. III. Explanation of the first of these Rules. p. 20  
Chap. 4. A Continuation of the same Subject. I. Explanation of the Second Rule of Curiosity. II. Explanation of the Third. p. 27  
Chap. 5. I. Of the Second Natural Inclination, or of Self-Love. II. It is divided into the Love of Being and Wellbeing, or of Greatness and Pleasure. p. 31  
Chap. 6. I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons. II. Of the false Judgements of some Pious Persons. III. Of the false Judgements of the Superstitious and Hypocrites. iv Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes. p. 35  
Chap. 7. Of the desire of Science, and of the Judgements of pretenders to Learning. p. 42  
Chap. 8. I. Of the Desire of being thought Learned. II. Of the Conversation of pretenders to Learning. III. Of their Works. p. 48  
Chap. 9 How the Inclination we have for Honours and Riches lead us to Error. p. 56  
Chap. 10. Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Morality. I. We must shun Pleasure though it make us Happy. II. It must not incline us to the Love of Sensible Delights. p. 58  
Chap. 11. Of the Love of Pleasure, in relation to Speculative Sciences. I. How it hinders us from discovering Truth. II. Some Examples. p. 65  
Chap. 12. Of the Effects which the thought of Future Bliss and Sufferings is capable of producing in the Mind. p. 79  
Chap. 13. I. Of the Third Natural Inclination, which is the Friendship we have for other Men. II. It induces us to approve our Friends Thoughts, and to deceive them by False Praises. p. 85     

A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH.  

BOOK I. Of the Errors of the Senses.  

CHAP. I.  
I. Of the Nature and Properties of the UNDERSTANDING.  
II. Of the Nature and Properties of the WILL, and wherein its Liberty consists.  
ERROR is the Cause of Man's Misery, the corrupt Principle that has produced Evil in the World; 'tis this, which begets and cherishes in our Souls all the Evils that afflict us, and we can never expect a true and solid Happiness, but by a serious Endeavour to avoid it.  
Holy Scripture teaches us, that Men are miserable, only because they are Sinners and Criminals, and they would be neither, if they did not make themselves the Slaves of Sin by assenting to Error.  
If it be true then, that Error is the Origin of Men's Misery, how very just is it, that they should endeavour their Deliverance from it? and certainly an Effort towards it would not be vain and unrewarded, though perhaps it might not have all the effect that could be desired; admit we could not arrive at Infallibility, and accomplish an absolute Victory, yet we should be less deceived, and subject to fewer Evils; We are not to expect an entire Felicity in this Life, because we cannot pretend to Infallibility; but our Endeavours to avoid Error must be as continual as are our Aversions for Misery. In a word, as we earnestly desire Happiness without Hopes of attaining it here, so we must vigorously pursue Infallibility without any present Pretensions to it.  
We ought not to imagine any great Toil in an Enquiry after Truth, 'tis but opening our Eyes, becoming attentive, and exactly observing the 
* Book VI.  following Rules. Exactness of Thought has not that Trouble and Slavery in it, that the Imagination represents; Nay, though we should meet some little Uneasiness at first, yet the attending Satisfaction will abundantly recompense our Pains; for, in fine, 'tis that which produces Light, and discovers Truth.  
But to spend no more time in preparing the Reader's mind to a Search after Truth, which we are willing to believe is already sufficiently disposed thereto, let us examine the Causes and Nature of our Errors; And since the Method of examining things in their Original is more regular and clear, and helps us to a deeper Knowledge of them than any other Process, let us Essay to put it in practice here.  
The Mind of Man having nothing of Matter or Extension in it, 
I. Of the Nature and Properties of the Understanding.  is, undoubtedly, a simple and indivisible Substance, and without any Composition of parts, yet it has been usual to make a distinction of two Faculties in it, Understanding and Will, (which we shall soon explain) for it seems the Notions or Ideas that Men have of them, are not so clear and distinct, as they ought to be.  
But because these Ideas are very abstract, and not the proper Objects of the Imagination, perhaps it will not be amiss to express them by their Relation to those Properties, which are agreeable to Matter, which being easy to be imagined, will render the Notions, which 'tis fit to apply to these Expressions, Understanding and Will, more distinct and familiar to us; We must only take heed to remember, that these Relations betwixt Mind and Matter are not truly adequate, and that the Comparison of these different kinds of Being's serve only to make the Mind more attentive, and, as it were, sensible of the Subject we Discourse upon.  
Matter or Extension includes in it two Properties, Receptibility of different Figures, and Capability of Motion; even so the Mind of Man has two Faculties, Understanding, which is receptible of different Ideas, and Will, which is capable of different Inclinations, or of willing different things. We shall explain in order the Relation that the first Property of Matter has to the first Faculty of the Mind.  
Extension is capable of receiving two sorts of Figures, External, as Roundness in a piece of Wax, Internal, as that which is proper to all the Particles whereof the Wax is composed; for 'tis certain, that all the Particles which make up a piece of Wax, are very different in Shape from those which compose a piece of Iron; I call then, for distinction sake, that simply a Figure, which is External, and that Configuration, which is Internal, and which is necessary to all the Particles whereof the Wax is composed, so as to be what it is. Thus also the Ideas of the Soul are of two Sorts, (taking the name Idea in general for every thing that the Mind immediately perceives) the first represents something without us, as that of a Square, a House, etc. the second, that which passes within us, as Sensation, whether of Grief, Pleasure, etc. And we shall see hereafter, that these last Ideas are nothing else but a Manner of the Mind's Existence, and therefore I shall call them the Modifications of the Mind.  
We might also call the Inclinations of the Soul the Modifications thereof; For 'tis evident, that the Inclination of the Will is a Manner of the Souls Existence, and therefore it might be called the Modification of Soul, as motion in Bodies, being a Manner of their Existence, might be called a Modification of Matter. However I neither call the Inclinations of the Will, nor Motions of Matter, Modifications; since these Inclinations and these Motions have, ordinarily, relation to something External; for the Inclinations have relation to Good, and Motions have relation to some External Body. But the Figures and Configurations of Bodies, and the Sensations of the Soul, have no necessary relation to any thing without; For even as a Figure is round, when all the External parts of a Body are equally distant from the Centre without any relation to things External, so all the Sensations, of which we are capable, could subsist, if there were no Object without us, their Existence includes no necessary relation to Bodies which seem to cause them, as shall be proved elsewhere; and they are nothing else but the Soul modified after such or such a manner, so that they are properly the Modifications of the Soul; I shall then take the Liberty to call them so, to explain myself.  
The first and principal agreement betwixt that Property, that matter has of reserving different Figures and different Configurations, and that Faculty which the Soul has of receiving different Ideas, and different Modifications, is this, even as the Property of receiving different Figures and different Configurations is entirely passive and includes no action, so also the Faculty of receiving different Ideas and different Modifications in the Mind is entirely passive and includes no action: I call this Faculty or Capacity, which the Soul has of receiving all things, UNDERSTANDING.  
Whence we must conclude, that 'tis the Understanding which perceives, since there is nothing else that receives the Ideas of Objects, for 'tis the same thing for the Soul to perceive an Object, as to receive the Idea which represents it. 'Tis also the Understanding which perceives the Modifications of the Soul; for I mean by the word, Understanding, that passive Faculty of the Soul, by which it receives all the different Modifications whereof it is capable; For 'tis the same thing to the Soul to receive that manner of Existence, which is called Pain, as to perceive Pain; since it can receive Pain no other way but by perceiving it; whence we must conclude, that 'tis the Understanding which imagines absent Objects, and perceives those that are present, and that the Sense and Imagination are only the Understanding, perceiving Objects by the Organs of the Body, as shall be explained hereafter.  
Because, when Men feel Pain, or any thing else, they perceive it ordinarily, by the means of the Organs of Sense, they commonly say, that 'tis the Senses which perceive it, without knowing distinctly what they mean by the Term Sense; they fancy there's some Faculty, distinct from the Soul, which makes it, of the Body capable of feeling, for they believe the Organs of Sense do really participate of our perceptions. They imagine, that the Body does so far assist the Mind to perceive, that if the Mind was separated from the Body it could perceive nothing at all: But these thoughts are the effects of Prejudice, and of judging according to our present State of Life, in which we perceive nothing without the Help of the Organs of Sense, as shall be explained more at large. 'Tis to accommodate myself to the common way of speaking, that I shall say hereafter the Senses perceive, but by the word Sense I only mean that passive Faculty of the Soul just mentioned; that is, the Understanding perceiving something by means of what passes in in the Organs of the Body according to the Institution of Nature, as shall be elsewhere explained.  
Another agreement between the passive Faculty of the Soul and that of Matter, is, that as Matter is not truly changed by an alteration of its Figure; for Instance, Wax receives no considerable Change for being round or square, so the Mind receives no Change by the Diversity of Ideas which it has; I mean, the Mind receives no considerable Change, although it receives an Idea of a Square, or a Circle, in perceiving a Square, or a Circle.  
Farther, as it may be said, that Matter undergoes considerable Changes, when it loses the Configuration proper to the parts of the Wax, to receive that which is proper to Fire and Smoke, when the Wax is changed into Fire and Smoke; so it may be said, that the Soul receives very considerable Alterations, when it changes its Modifications, and suffers Pain, after having felt Pleasure. Whence we must conclude, that Ideas are to the Soul very near, what Figures are to Matter; and that Configurations are much the same to Matter, that Sensations are to the Soul.  
There are yet other agreements betwixt the Figures and Configurations of Matter, and the Ideas and Modifications of the Mind, for it seems that Matter is an Image of the Mind; I only mean, there are Properties in Matter, which have betwixt themselves Relations, much like those which are found amongst the Properties belonging to the Mind, although the Nature of the Mind is very different from that of Matter, as shall be clearly shown hereafter.  
From all that I have said, I would have it well remembered, that by the Understanding, I mean that passive Faculty, which the Soul has of perceiving, that is, of receiving not only different Ideas, but also innumerable Sensations, even as Matter is capable of receiving all Manner of External Figures and Internal Configurations.  
The other Property of Matter is, that 'tis capable of receiving several Motions, and the other Faculty of the Soul is, that 'tis capable of receiving several Inclinations, let us compare these together.  
As the Author of Nature is the Universal Cause of all Motions, which are found in Matter, so is He also the General Cause of all the Natural Inclinations in our Minds, and even as all Motions are made in a Straight Line, if they do not meet with some particular and foreign Causes, which determine and change them into Curve Lines, so all the Inclinations we receive from God, are right, and could not have any other End but the possession of Good and Truth, were there not some Extraneous Cause which determines the Impression of Nature towards evil ends: Now 'tis this foreign Cause, which is the Origin of all our Evils, and which Corrupts all our Inclinations.  
To understand this well, we must know, that there is a very considerable Difference betwixt the Impression or Motion, which the Author of Nature produces in Matter, and the Impression or Motion towards Good in General, which the same Author of Nature continually Impresses on the Mind; for Matter is wholly unactive, it has no power to stop its Motion, or to determine or turn itself, one way rather than another: Its motion, as I have said before, is made always in a Straight Line, and when diverted from this motion, it describes a Curve, the nearest to a right line that's possible, because 'tis God that impresses on it its Motion, and regulates its Determination. But 'tis not to with the Will; 
* See the Explanations.  it may be said in one sense to be active, and to have in itself a Power of determining differently the Inclination or Impression that God gives it, for tho' it cannot stop this Impression, it may in a sense be said to turn it which way it pleases, and thereby cause all the disorders, that are in its Inclinations, and all the Miseries, which are the certain and necessary Consequences of Sin.  
So that by the Word WILL, I would be understood to mean, the Natural Impression or Motion, which carries us towards indetermined and universal Good: And by the Word LIBERTY, I only understand the Power which the Mind has of turning that Impression towards agreeable Objects, and so fixing our natural Inclinations on some particular Object, which before were lose and indetermin'd to Universal Good; that is, to God, who comprehends in himself all that's Good,  
Whence 'tis easy to discover, that tho' our Natural Inclinations are voluntary, yet they are not always free with that Liberty of Indifference, that I am speaking of, which includes the Power of Willing or not Willing, or of Willing the contrary to what our Natural Inclinations carry us; for tho' 'tis voluntarily and freely that Men love Good in General, since they can't love against their Will, and 'tis a Contradiction to suppose the Will should ever suffer Constraint, however they love it not freely in the sense that I have just explained, since 'tis out of the Power of our Will not to wish to be Happy.  
But it must be well observed, that the Mind considered as pushed on towards Good in General, can't determine its Motion towards a particular Good, if the same Mind, considered as susceptible of Ideas, has not the Knowledge of this particular Good; that is, in the common way of speaking, the Will is a blind Power, which can only desire those things that the Understanding represents to it: So that the Will can't differently determine the Impression it has for Good, and all its Natural Inclinations, but by commanding the Understanding to represent to it some particular Object. The Power then that the Will has of determining its Inclinations, necessarily includes an ability of carrying the Understanding towards agreeable Objects. I will explain by an Example, what I have said concerning Will and Liberty. A Man represents to himself a Preferment under the Notion of a Good, which he can hope for; immediately the Will wills this Good, that is, the Impression, that the Mind continually receives towards Indetermin'd and Universal Good, inclines it to this Preferment: But as this Preferment is not the Universal Good, and is not considered in a clear and distinct view of the Mind, as Universal Good, (for the Mind never sees clearly that which is not) the Impression, that he had received of Universal Good, is not wholly stopped by this particular Good, the Mind has some motion to go yet farther, it is not necessarily nor invincibly in Love with this Dignity, but is at Liberty in respect thereof. Now its Liberty consists in this, that being not fully convinced that this Dignity includes all the Good, which he is capable of loving, he may suspend his Judgement and Love, and afterwards (as shall be explained in the third Book) he may, by the Union which he has with the Universal Being, or that which includes every Good, think of other things, and consequently love other Goods. In fine, we may compare all other Goods, love 'em according to the Order and Degree in which they are lovely, and refer 'em to him, which includes them all, and which is only worthy to limit our Love, as being only able to fill all our Capacity of Loving.  
Almost the same thing may be said of the Knowledge of Truth, as of the Love of Good; We love the Knowledge of Truth as the Enjoyment of Good, by a Natural Impression; and this Impression, as well as that which carries us towards Good, is not invincible, its only so by the evidence, or by the perfect and absolute knowledge of the Object: And we are as free in our false Judgements, as in our irregular Affections, as shall be shown in the following Chapter.   

CHAP. II.  
I. Of Judgements and Reasonings.  
II. That they depend upon the Will.  
III. What use must be made of its Liberty in respect of them.  
iv Two General Rules to avoid Error and Sin.  
V Necessary Reflections upon these Rules.  
IT might well be concluded, 
Of Judgements and Reasonings.  from what has been said in the preceding Chapter, that the Understanding never judges, since it only perceives; or since Judgements and Reasonings, even in respect of the Understanding, are only pure Perceptions: 'Tis the Will alone which properly Judges in acquiescing in that which the Understanding represents to it, and in voluntarily resting there, 'tis this also which deceives us; but these things must be explained more at large.  
I say then, there is no Difference in respect of the Understanding, between a simple Perception, and a Judging and Reasoning, save, that the Understanding perceives a simple thing by a simple Perception, without any relation to any thing whatever; that it perceives the relation betwixt two or more things in Judging; that, in fine, it perceives the relations that are betwixt the relations of things in reasoning. So that all the operations of the Understanding are pure Perceptions.  
When we perceive, for Example, twice 2 or 4, this is only a Simple Perception: When we Judge that 2 times 2 are 4, or that 2 times 2 are not 5, the Understanding does only yet receive the relation of Equality which is between 2 times 2 and 4, or the relation of Inequality that is between 2 times 2 and 5. Thus the Judgement, in respect of the Understanding, is only the Perception of the Relation between two or more things; but Reasoning is the Perception of the Relation that is found (not between two or more things, for this would be Judgement, but) between two or more Relations of two or more things. Thus, when I conclude that 4  less than 6, and that 2 times 2 making 4, is also consequently less than 6, I perceive not only the Relation of Inequality between 2 times 2 and 6, for then this would be only Judging, but the Relation of Inequality which is betwixt the Relation of 2 times 2 and 4, and the Relation between 4 and 6, which is Reasoning. The Understanding then only perceives, and the Will only judges and reasons by resting itself voluntarily in what the Understanding represents to it; as we said before.  
Nevertheless, 
II. That Judgements and Reasoning depend upon the Will.  when those things that we consider are self evident, it appears to us, that it is not then voluntarily that we assent to them; so that we are inclined to believe, that 'tis not our Will, but Understanding which judges of them.  
But to be convinced of our Error, we must know, that things which we consider, are only then entirely evident, when the Understanding hath examined them on all sides, and all their necessary relations, in order to judge of them; whence it happens, that as the Will can will nothing without knowing, so it cannot act on the Understanding: I mean, it can't desire that it should represent any new thing in its Object, because it has already considered it in every respect, by which it has any Relation to the proposed Question: the Will is then obliged to acquiesce in that, which the Understanding has already represented, and to trouble or agitate it no farther; and this acquiescing is that, which is properly called Judgement and Reasoning. And thus, this Acquiescence or Judgement not being free, when things are in their utmost evidence, appears to us to be involuntary.  
But so long as there is any thing obscure in the Subject that we consider, or that we are not entirely assured that we have discovered all, that is necessary to resolve the Question, as it frequently happens in such as are very difficult, and include many Relations; we are at our Liberty not to consent, and the Will can yet command the Understanding to apply itself to a new Enquiry; hence we are not so far from believing, that the Judgements, we form upon these Subjects, are voluntary.  
Nevertheless, the greatest part of Philosophers pretend, that even these Judgements, which we form upon obscure things, are involuntary, and will generally have it, that a consent to Truth is an action of the Understanding, which they call Assensus, to distinguish it from a Consent to Good, which they attribute to the Will, and which they call Corsensus. But the Cause of their Distinction and Error is this, That in this present State of Life, we often see evident Truths without any reason of Doubt, and so the Will is not indifferent in the Consent that it gives to them, as we have explained above: But 'tis not the same thing as to Good, we know nothing of it, without having some reason of doubting whether we ought to love it; our Passions, and the Inclinations which we Naturally have for sensible Pleasures, are confused Reasons, yet very strong, because of the Corruption of our Nature, and they make us cold and indifferent even in the Love of God. And thus, we evidently perceive our Indifference, and are inwardly convinced that we make use of our Liberty, when we love God.  
But we do not in like manner perceive that we use our Liberty, when we consent to Truth, especially when it appears Self-evident; and this makes us believe that our Consent to Truth is involuntary, as if it were necessary that our actions were indifferent to be voluntary, and as if the Blessed did not love God voluntarily without being interrupted by something else, just as we consent to this evident Proposition, 
Geometricians love not Truth, but the knowledge of Truth, altho' the contrary is commonly asserted.  twice 2 is 4, without being hindered from believing it by some appearance of a contrary Reason.  
But, that we may distinctly perceive the Difference that there is betwixt the Wills consent to a Truth, and its consent to Goodness, we must know the Difference that is betwixt Truth and Goodness, taken in the common acceptation, and in relation to us. The Difference consists in this. Goodness concerns and affects us, but Truth affects us not, for Truth consists only in the relation that two or more things have between themselves, but Goodness consists in the relation of Agreeableness that things have with us. Hence there's but one Action of the Will in respect of Truth, which is its Acquiescence, or Assent, to the Representation of the relation that is between things; But in respect of Goodness there are two, its Acquiescence or Assent to the relation of Agreement that things have with us, and its Love or Motion towards such a thing; which actions are very different, altho' they are ordinarily confounded, for there's much difference betwixt simply acquiescing in, and being carried by Love to what the Mind represents, since Men often acquiesce in things, which they could wish were not, and which they do.  
Now, if we consider well of things, we shall plainly perceive that 'tis the Will always that assents not to things, unless they be disagreeable to it, but to the Representation of things, and the Reason why the Will acquiesces in things, which are in their utmost Evidence, is, (as we have already said) because there is not in those things any Relation which ought to have been considered, that the Understanding hath not perceived. So that it is, as it were, necessary for the Will to leave off Debating, and unprofitably Fatiguing itself, and rest in full Assurance, that it is not deceived, since there's nothing yet farther, upon which it can exercise its Understanding.  
We must chief remark, that in the State we now are, we have only an imperfect Knowledge of things; and by consequence, 'tis absolutely necessary that we have this Liberty of Indifference, by which we may forbear giving our Assent.  
To see the Necessity of it, we must consider that we are carried by our Natural Inclinations towards Truth and Goodness, so that the Will inclining itself only to such things, as the Mind has some knowledge of, it must carry itself to that, which has the appearance of Truth and Goodness; but because every thing, which has the appearance of Goodness, is not always what it appears to be, its evident that if the Will were not free, and if it were infallibly and necessarily carried to every thing, that has these appearances of Goodness and Truth, it would very often be deceived; whence it seems we might conclude, that the Author of its Being was also the Author of its Wander and Errors.  
God has then given us Liberty, 
III. Of the Use that we must make of Liberty, that we may never be deceived.  that we might keep ourselves from being deceived, and from all the Evils which are the effect of our Errors, by never yielding a full Assent to appearances of Truth, but only to Truth itself, that is, in continually applying the Mind, and commanding it to Examine, till it has cleared and resolved every thing that was to be Examined; For Truth is scarce ever without Evidence, and Evidence consists only in a clear and distinct view of all the Parts and Relations of the Object, which are necessary to give an assured Judgement.  
The Use then, that we must make of our Liberty, is, TO USE IT AS MUCH AS WE CAN; that is, Never to consent to any thing whatever, till we are compelled to it, as it were by the inward Reproaches of our Reason.  
To submit to false Appearances of Truth, is to enslave ourselves against the Will of God, but to submit ourselves fairly to the secret Reproaches of our Reason, which follow our not assenting to Evidence, this is to obey the Voice of Eternal Truth. Here are then the two established Rules, which I spoke of, which are very necessary in all Speculative and Moral Sciences, and which we ought to look upon, as the Foundation of all Humane Sciences.  
The first, 
General Rules to avoid Sin.  which relates to Sciences, is this; Never to give an entire assent, but to Propositions that appear so evidently true, that we can't refuse them without feeling an inward regret, and secret reproaches of our Reason; that is, without we knew clearly that we should make an ill use of our Liberty, if we would not assent, or would extend our Power to things, over which we have none.  
The second, which respects Morality, is this; Never to love any Good, absolutely, if we can without remorse forbear. Whence it follows, that we ought to love nothing absolutely, and without relation to any thing else, but God, for 'tis he only, from the Love of whom we can't abstain without this sort of Remorse; that is, without an evident knowledge of our doing ill, supposing him known by Reason and Revelation.  
But we must observe here, 
Necessary reflections upon these General Rules.  that when those things that we perceive do appear very probable to us, we find ourselves extremely inclined to believe them; nay, we are uneasy, when we are not persuaded of them; so that if we are not very cautious, we are in much danger of assenting to them, and consequently of deceiving ourselves; for 'tis a great chance that Truth is exactly like to Probability. Hence it is that I have expressly laid down in these Rules, that we must consent to nothing but what we see evidently, unless we should make an ill use of our Liberty, if we did not consent.  
Now, altho' we perceive ourselves extremely inclined to assent to an appearance of Truth, yet if we take care to examine whether we evidently see ourselves obliged to consent thereto, we shall find the contrary; for if appearance of Truth is grounded upon the Impression of our Senses, I say, an appearance of Truth, falsely so called, than we shall be strongly inclined to comply therewith, not perceiving any other Cause than some Passion, or General Affection, that we have for that which pleases the Senses, as will fully appear hereafter.  
But, if an appearance of Truth arises from some Conformity with Truth, as commonly all probable Knowledge, taken in a certain sense, is true, then if we reflect upon ourselves, we shall perceive that we are inclined to two things, viz. to Believe, and to Examine yet farther, but we shall never find ourselves so much persuaded, as to think we do ill, if we do not absolutely assent.  
Now these two Inclinations, which we find in us, in reference to Probabilities, are very good, for we can, and must assent to apparent Truths, so far as they bear the Image of Truth; however, we must not yet entirely assent, according to the Rule before laid down, but thoroughly examine the Object, that we may have a perfect knowledge of its Nature, truly distinguish between Truth and Falsehood, and afterwards entirely submit, if Evidence compels us thereto.  
We ought much to accustom ourselves to distinguish between Truth and appearance of Truth, by an inward Examination of ourselves, as I have already said; for 'tis for want of this sort of Examination, that we perceive ourselves touched after the same manner with two things so different. For indeed 'tis a matter of the greatest Consequence to make Good use of our Liberty, by denying always nor A●●en to things, or loving them, till we find ourselves compelled thereto by the powerful Voice of the Author of Nature, which I before called the Reproaches of our Reason, and the Regret of our Conscience.  
All the Duties of Spiritual Being's, as well of Angels as of Men, consists chief in this Practice, and it may positively be affirmed, that, if they carefully use their Liberty, and not blindly enslave themselves to Lies and Vanity, they are in the way to the greatest perfection, that they are capable of; provided they suffer not their Understanding to lie idle, but carefully and continually excite it to new Knowledge, rendering it capable of the greatest Truths, by constant meditations upon such Subjects as are worthy their application.  
To perfect our Minds, it's not sufficient to use our Liberty always, so as to assent to nothing, as some Persons do, who pride themselves in knowing nothing, but doubting all things; nor must we so assent to every thing, as many others, who fear nothing so much as being ignorant of something, and pretend to know all things; but we must make a Good use of our Understanding by continual Meditations, so that we may have frequent Opportunities of being able to assent to what it proposes without fear of being deceived.   

CHAP. III.  
I. Answers to some Objections.  
II. Remarks upon what hath been said about the necessity of Evidence.  
IT is not very difficult to divine, that the practice of the first Rule, which I spoke of in the preceding Chapter, will not please all the World, but especially those imaginary Learned, who pretend to know all things, and yet know nothing at all, pleasing themselves in speaking confidently of the most difficult things, and who certainly are ignorant of the most easy.  
They will not fail to say with Artistotle, that Certainty is only to be found in Mathematics, but in Morality and Physics Probability suffices; That Descartes was very much out in treating of Physics, as he did of Geometry, which was the reason he failed in the attempt; That 'tis impossible for Man to know Nature, That its Springs and Secrets are impenetrable to the Humane Mind; and many other fine things, which they set off with a great deal of Pomp and Magnificence, maintaining it from the Authority of a multitude of Authors, and value themselves much upon knowing their Names, and being able to cite some Passages from them.  
I would entreat these Gentlemen to talk no more of what they profess they do not know, and put a Check to the ridiculous Motions of their Vanity, in forbearing to compose such great Volumes upon those Subjects, which, according to their own Confession, they are ignorant of.  
But let these Persons seriously Examine, whether it be not absolutely necessary either to be deceived, or never to give our entire Consent, except to things fully evident? Whether Truth does not always accompany Geometry, because Geometricians observe this Rule? And if the Errors, into which some are fallen, concerning the Quadrature of the Circle, the Duplication of the Cube, and some other very difficult Problems, proceed not from some Precipitation, or Prejudice, which made 'em take an appearance of Truth for Truth itself?  
Let 'em consider also on the other hand, if Falseness and Confusion does not reign in common Philosophy, because Philosophers content themselves with such an easy Probability as is convenient for their Vanity and Interests. Do we not find every where an infinite Diversity of Opinions, even upon the same Subjects, and consequently an Infinity of Errors? Yet a great number of Disciples suffer themselves to be seduced, and blindly submit to the Authority of these Philosophers, without even comprehending their Opinions.  
'Tis true, there are some who perceive after twenty or thirty years' Loss of time, that they have learned nothing in their Lectures, but they are ashamed to make a sincere Confession of it. They first prove after their own way, that no certain Knowledge can be attained and afterwards they acknowledge, that they know nothing, because they believe they may then safely do it without any Jest upon their Ignorance. It would be sufficient matter of Diversion and Laughter, to hear them give an account of their fine progress in Learning, and to get them in a humour of declaring all the Fatigues they have endured to acquire it; but although this Learned and profound Ignorance deserves our Raillery, it's much better to forbear it, and to pity those who have thus spent so many years, only to Learn this false Proposition, I know nothing, which is an Enemy to all Science and Truth.  
Since the Rule then, which I have established, is so necessary in a Search after Truth, as we have seen it is, so that nothing can be objected against those that propose it; Let such as will not take pains to observe it, at least, not condemn so Illustrious an Author as Monsieur Descartes was, because he followed, or endeavoured, as near as he could, to follow it; They would not Censure him so rashly, if they knew him, nor would they read his Works, as Fables and Romances, which Men read for their Diversion, not Instruction; if they throughly considered this Author, they would still find in themselves some Notions, and Principles of Truth that he teaches, which would undeceive 'em in spite of the Prejudices of their False Learning.  
That Master which inwardly Dictates to us, would have us hear him rather than the Authority of the greatest Philosophers, He is pleased when He Instructs, provided we apply ourselves to what He says; 'tis by Mieditation, and a very exact Attention, that we interrogate him; and 'tis by a certain inward Conviction, and the secret Reproaches of those that do not consent to it, by which He answers.  
We should so read the Works of Men, as not to hope to be instructed by Man, but interrogate Him that is the Light of the World, so that we may be enlightened with the rest of the World, if He does not enlighten us after we have Enquired of Him, no doubt we Enquired amiss.  
Whether therefore we read Aristotle or Descartes, we must not presently believe either, but meditate as they did, or aught to have done, with all the attention whereof we are capable, and afterwards obey the Voice of our Common Master, and honestly submit ourselves to the inward Convictions and Motions which we feel in Meditation.  
After this we are permitted to Judge for or against Authors; And thus having first digested the Principles of Descartes' and Aristotle's Philosophy, we may reject the one, and approve the other; and may be even assured, that the last shall never explain any Phoenomenon of Nature by his own Principles, which have been useless for these Two thousand years, although his Philosophy has been Studied by the Learned in almost all parts of the World, and that on the Contrary, we may boldly say of the other, that he hath penetrated into that which appeared most obscure in the Eyes of Men, and hath showed 'em a sure way to discover all Truths that a limited Understanding can comprehend.  
But without relying on the Opinion that we may have of these two Philosophers, and of all others, let us still look upon 'em as Men, and let not the Aristotelians be displeased, if, after having walked so many Ages in Darkness, without being able to make any further Advancement, we are willing to see with our own Eyes, and if, after having been led like blind Men, we now remember that we have Eyes, and essay to Conduct ourselves.  
Let us then be fully convinced of this Rule, Never to give an entire assent but to things that are evident. This is the most necessary of all Rules in a Search after Truth, and let us not admit any thing into our Minds as Truth, but what appears with the Evidence that this Rule demands. We must be persuaded thereof, to lay by our Prejudices, and it's absolutely necessary that we be delivered from our Prepossessions to enter into the Knowledge of Truth, because the Mind must be Purified before it can be Enlightened. Sapientia prima est Stulitia caruisse.  
But before we finish this Chapter, 
II. Remarks upon what has been said about the necessity of Evidence.  we must Remark Three Things: The first is, that I speak not here of Matters of Faith, which admit not the same Evidence as Natural Sciences do, because we cannot perceive things, but by the Ideas which we have of them, for God hath only given us those Ideas, which are necessary to conduct us in the Natural Order of Things according to which we are created, so that the Mysteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Order, we must not be surprised if we have not the same Ideas of them; for our Souls are created by Virtue of a General Decree, by which we have all the Notions that are necessary for us; 
See the Explanations.  But the Mysteries of Faith have been established only by the Order of Grace, which, according to our Ordinary way of Conception, is a Decree consequent to that Order of Nature.  
We ought then to distinguish the Mysteries of Faith from Natural Things. We must equally submit to Faith and Evidence, but in Matters of Faith we must not look for such Evidence as is in Natural Things; we must not rely upon the Faith, that is, upon the Authority of Philosophers. In a word, to be Faithful, we must believe things not comprehended by Reason; but to be Philosophers, we must take nothing upon Trust.  
'Tis universally agreed upon, that there are other Truths besides those of Faith, in which it would be unjust to demand incontestible Demonstrations, such, for Instance, as relate to History, and other things depending upon Man's Will. For there are two sorts of Truth, Necessary and Contingent, I call them Necessary Truths, that are Immutable in their Nature, and have been Decreed by the unchangeable Will of God, all others are Contingent Truths; Mathematics, Physics, Metaphysics, and even a great part of Morality, contain Necessary Truths; History, Grammar, particular Laws or Customs, and many other things, which depend upon the uncertain Will of Man, include only Contingent Truths.  
'Tis required then, that the Rule, which I have before established, be exactly observed in a Search after Necessary Truths, whose Knowledge may be called Science; and we must content ourselves with the greatest probability of Truth in History, which contains the Knowledge of Contingent Things, for one may generally call by the name of History the Knowledge of Languages, Customs, and even that of the Different Opinions of Philosophers, when they are only learned by Memory, without having had any Evidence or Certainty of them.  
The second Thing to be Remarked, is, that in Morals, Politics, Medicine, and in all Practical Sciences, we are obliged to content ourselves with Probabilities, not always, but for a time, not because it satisfies the Mind, but because there is a necessity for it, and because, if we should defer acting, till we were fully assured of success, we should often lose the opportunity. But though there's a necessity of our Acting, yet we should doubtfully rely upon the event of these things we execute, and endeavour to make such a progress in these Sciences, as that we may in our Affairs act with more certainty; for this aught to be the ordinary end of the Study and Employ of all Thinking Men.  
In fine, the third Observation is, that we must not absolutely despise Probabilities, because it ordinarily happens, that many of 'em being joined together, can as strongly convince us, as the most evident Demonstrations. Of this there are infinite Examples in Physic and Morality. So that oftentimes 'tis of use to collect a sufficient number of them, for Matters which can't be otherwise demonstrated.  
I must confess here, that the Rule which I have imposed is very rigorous; that many would rather desire not to Reason at all, than to Reason upon these Conditions, that they will not move very fast under such Incommodious Circumspections; yet they must agree with me, that they should proceed surely in following this Rule, and that hitherto, for having made too much haste, they have been obliged to turn back again; and even a great many Men will agree with me, that since Monsteur Descartes hath discovered more Truths in thirty years than all other Philosophers, because he submitted to this Law: therefore, if many Men would Philosophise as he did, they might in time know the greatest part of those things, which are necessary for as happy a Life, as can be had upon an Earth, which God hath Cursed.   

CHAP. IU.  
I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error, and that of these there are Five Principal ones.  
II. The General Design of the Whole Work, and the Particular Design of the First Book.  
WE have seen, that Men are only deceived, because they make not that use of their Liberty which they ought to do, and because they do not moderate the haste and eagerness of the Will for bare appearances of Truth; that Error consists only in a Consent of the Will, which is more capacious than the Perception of the Understanding; since Men would not be deceived, if they only judged of what they understand.  
But though, properly speaking, 'tis only an ill Use of Liberty which is the Cause of Error, yet it may be said, that we have many Faculties, which are also the Causes thereof, not true Causes, but such as may be called Occasional ones. 
I. Of the Occasional Causes of these there are Five principal ones.  All our Modes of Perceiving, are so many Occasions of Deceiving us, for since our false Judgements include two things, the Consent of the Will, and the Perception of the Understanding, it is very evident, that all our Modes of Perception may occasionally deceive us, since they are able to incline us to precipitate and rash Assents.  
Now, since 'tis necessary, first to convince the Soul of its Weakness and Errors, to create in it just desires of being delivered from them, and that it may more easily lay aside its Prejudices, we shall endeavour to make an exact Division of all its Modes of Perception, which will be as so many Heads, to every one of which we shall hereafter refer the different Errors we are subject to.  
The Soul can perceive things three ways, by the pure Understanding, by the Imagination, and by the Senses.  
It perceives by the pure Understanding, Spiritual and Universal Things, common Notions, the Idea of Perfection, and of an Infinitely perfect Being, and generally all its Thoughts, when it knows them by Selfreflection. It also perceives some Material Things by the pure Understanding, as Extension with its Properties, for 'tis only the pure Understanding which can perceive a Circle, a perfect Square, a Figure with a thousand Angles, and such like things. These kinds of Perceptions I call pure Intellections, or pure Perceptions, because 'tis not necessary for the Mind to form Corporeal Images in the Brain to represent all those things.  
The Soul perceives only Material Things by the Imagination, which represents them when absent, as if they were present, by forming Images of them in the Brain. 'Tis thus that we imagine all sorts of Figures, as a Circle, a Triangle, a Face, a Horse, Cities, Campaignes, etc. whether we have ever seen them or not. These sorts of Perceptions I call Imaginations, because the Soul represents these things by forming Images of them in the Brain; and because we cannot form Images of Spiritual Things, it follows, that the Soul cannot imagine them, which ought to be well observed.  
In fine, the Soul only perceives sensible and gross Objects by the Senses, which, when present, make an Impression upon the External Organs of its Body; Thus it sees Plains and Rocks, when presented to its Eyes, and feels the hardness of Iron, the point of a Sword, and such like things, and these sorts of Perceptions I call Sentiments or Sensations.  
The Soul then only perceives things after these three ways, which is evident, if we consider that all things we perceive are either Spiritual or Material; if they are Spiritual, 'tis only the pure Understanding which can know them; but if they are Material, they will be either present or absent; if they are absent, the Soul perceives them only by the Imagination; if present, by the Impression which they make upon its Senses; and thus, as we said before, our Souls only perceive things after three ways, by the pure Understanding, by the Imagination, and by the Senses.  
We may then look upon these three Faculties, as certain Heads, to which we may refer men's Errors, and the Causes of these Errors, and so avoid the Confusion wherein their great number would infallibly involve us, if we should speak of 'em without any Method.  
But our Inclinations and Passions act also very strongly upon us, they dazzle our Minds by their false lights, they cover and fill it with darkness; Thus our Inclinations and Passions engage us in an infinite number of Errors, when we follow this false light which they produce in us. We must then consider them, with the three Faculties of the Mind, as the Sources of our Errors and Miscarriages, and to the Errors of the Senses, Imagination, and pure Understanding, also join these that may be attributed to the Passions and Natural Inclinations. Thus we may refer all the Errors of Men, and the Causes of these Errors, to Five Heads, of which we shall Treat as follows.  
First we shall speak of the Errors of the Senses, secondly of the Errors of the Imagination, thirdly of the Errors of the pure Understanding, fourthly of the Errors of the Inclinations, fifthly of the Errors of the Passions. In fine, after having essayed to free the Mind from these Errors, to which it is subject, we shall give a General Method to conduct it in a Search after Truth.  
Let us first Explain the Errors of our Senses, or rather the Errors which we fall into for want of making a right Use of our Senses. We shall not insist so much upon particular Errors, which are almost infinite, as upon the General Causes of these Errors, and of such things as we believe necessary for the Knowledge of the Nature of Man's Mind.   

CHAP V.  
OF THE SENSES.  
I. Two ways of Explaining how they are corrupted by Sin.  
II. That 'tis not our Senses, but our Liberty, which is the true Cause of our Errors.  
III. A Rule not to be deceived in the Use of our Senses.  
WHen we seriously Examine the Senses and Passions of Man, we find 'em so proportioned to the end for which they are given us, that we are not of their Opinion, who say, they are wholly corrupted by Original Sin; But to show that 'tis not without Reason that we descent from them, 'tis necessary to explain in what Order the Faculties and Passions of our first Parent were, whilst in a State of Righteousness, and the Changes and Disorders which happened in them after his Sin; These things may be conceived two ways, the first of which is this:  
It appears, 
Two ways of Explaining the Corruption of the Senses by Sin.  if we consider the Genuine Order of things, that the Soul is sensible of greater pleasure, proportionably to the greatness of the Goods which it enjoys. Pleasure is an Instinct of Nature, or to speak more intelligibly, 'tis an Impression of God himself inclining us towards some Good, which must be so much the stronger, as the Good is greater. According to this Principle, I think we cannot doubt, but that our first Parent coming out of the Hands of God, and before his Sin, found the greatest pleasure in the most solid Goods. Since therefore he was Created to Love God, and since God was his true Good, it may said, that he was inclined to delight in God, who induced him to his Love by a Sensation of Pleasure, and gave him such Internal Satisfactions in his Duty, as counterbalanced the greatest Pleasures of Sense, and such as, since the Fall, Men are insensible of, without a particular Grace.  
Nevertheless, as he had a Body, which God would have him preserve, and look upon, as part of himself, he also made him perceive such Pleasures by his Senses, as we taste in the use of things, that are proper for the Preservation of Life.  
We dare not decide, whether the first Man, before his Fall, could avoid agreeable, or disagreeable Sensations, in the very moment that the Principal part of his Brain was moved by the Actual use of Sensible Things; perhaps, he had this Command over himself, because of his Submission to God, yet the contrary appears more probable, for tho' Adam could stay the Emotions of the Spirits and Blood, and the Shaking of the Brain, which Objects excited in him, because not being yet disordered, his Body was necessarily subject to his Mind: Yet 'tis not likely that he could forbear having Sensations of Objects, at such time as he had not stopped the Motions which they produced in some part of his Body, to which his Soul was immediately United; for the Union of the Soul and Body, consisting chief in a Mutual Relation between the Sensations of the Soul, and the Motions of the Organs of the Body, it appears that it would have been rather Arbitrary than Natural, if Adam could have been Insensible, when the chief part of his Body received some Impression from External Objects; but I forbear making myself a Party in these two Opinions.  
The first Man than took Pleasure in that which added Perfection to his Body, even as in that which did so to his Soul; and because he was in a perfect State, he found the Pleasure of the Soul much greater than that of the Body; so that it was much easier for him to preserve his Righteousness, without the Grace of Jesus Christ, than it is for us, since without it we feel but little satisfaction in our Duty; 
S. Greg. Hom. 39 upon the Gospels.  yet he suffered himself unhappily to be Seduced, and lost his Righteousness by his Disobedience; and the principal Change which happened to him, and which caused all the Disorder of his Senses and Passions, is, That God forsook him by way of Punishment, and would no longer be his Good, or, rather, would not any longer make him sensible of that Pleasure which assured him that he was his Good: So that Sensible Pleasures, which do but incline a Man to Corporeal Good, remaining only, and being no longer Counterballanced by these, which formerly carried him to his true Good, the strict Union which he had with God is strangely weakened, and that which he had with his Body is much strengthened; Sensible Pleasure reigns in his Corrupted Heart, by enslaving him to all Sensible Objects, and the Corruption of his Heart hath darkened his Mind, by turning it aside from that Light which Enlightens it, and inclining it to Judge only of Things, as they can have any Relation with Bodies.  
But after all, we cannot say that there was any great Change in respect of the Senses, 'tis as if two Weights hanged in Aequilibrio in a Balance, and I should take something from one of them, the other would weigh down, without any Change in its self, in Relation to the first Weight, since it is still the same. Thus after the Fall of Adam, the Pleasures of the Senses have Sensualized the Soul, for want of those Internal Delights, which before Counterballanced the Inclination we have for Sensible Goods, but without such a considerable Change in the Senses as is commonly imagined.  
But to come to the second way of Explaining the Disorders of Sin, and which is certainly more Reasonable than the preceding: 'Tis very different from the former, because it depends upon a different Principle, however they both agree in what respects the Senses.  
Because we are Composed of Mind and Body, we have two sorts of Goods to inquire after, viz. Those of the Mind, and those of the Body. We have also two ways of knowing whether a thing is good or bad for us, by the Help of the Mind only, or by the Assistance of the Mind and Body together; We can know what is Good for us, by a clear and evident Knowledge, as also by a Confused Sensation. I know, by Reason, that Justice is Amiable; I also know, by Taste, that such Fruit is Good: The Beauty of Justice is not Tasted, the Goodness of Fruit is not known by Reason, the Goods of the Body deserve not the application of a Mind, which God has made only for himself; the Mind than must receive such kind of Goods, by a short and Incontestable Proof of Sensation, without examining any further: Stones are improper for Nourishment, Experience proves it, and Taste alone will convince all Men of it.  
Pleasure and Pain are therefore Natural and Indubitable Characters of Good and Evil, I confess it, but 'tis for such things only, as in their own Nature are neither good nor bad, nor can be known for such, by a clear and distinct Knowledge; and 'tis only for such things, that, being below the Mind of Man, can neither Reward nor Punish it: In fine, 'tis for such things only, as are unworthy the Application of the Mind; and about which, God being unwilling our Mind should be employed, inclines us to them only by a certain Instinct; I mean, by agreeable or disagreeable Sensations.  
But as for God, who is only the true Good of the Mind, and who only is above it, who only can Reward it a thousand different ways, who is only worthy its Application, and who is not afraid, that those that Love him, should not find him Amiable; He is not content to be loved with a Blind Love, or a Love of Instinct, but will be loved with a Rational Love, and a Love of Choice.  
If the Mind saw only those things in Objects, that are truly there, with adding other things to them by the Imagination, which really are not, it would find much difficulty to Love, or make Use of them; so that it is, as it were, necessary for them to appear agreeable, by causing Sensations which they have not, but 'tis not so with God, it's sufficient to see him as he is, to incline us to him, and it is not necessary that he make use of this Instinct of Pleasure, as a kind of Artifice, to draw our Love to him, without his deserving it.  
Hence we must conclude, that Adam was not carried to the Love of God, and his Duty, by 
* So the Explanations.  prepossessed Pleasure, because the Knowledge which he had of God, as his Good, and the Joy that he continually felt, 
Deus ab initio constituit hominem & reliquit illum in manu consilii sui adjecit mandata & precepta sua Ecc. 15.15.  as a necessary consequent of seeing his Happiness, in being United to God, might suffice to keep him to his Duty, and make him act more Deservingly, than if he had been, as it were, Determined by a prepossessed Pleasure. After this manner he enjoyed full Liberty; and, perhaps, 'twas in this Condition that the Holy Scripture would Represent him by these Words, God made Man in the beginning, and after having proposed his Commandments to him, he left him to himself; that is, without determining him by the Sense of some Prepossessed Pleasure, only keeping him close to a clear Light of his Happiness and Duty. But Experience hath shown the frailty of Adam, in so Regulated and Happy Estate, as that he was in before his Fall, to the Shame of Free Will, and the Glory of God alone.  
But it cannot be said that Adam was inclined to seek after, and make use of Sensible Things, by an exact Knowledge of the Relation they might have with his Body, for if he had, he must have Examined the Configurations of the parts of some Fruit, with all the parts of his own Body, and the Relation resulting from both, to be able to Judge, whether in the heat of his Blood, and a thousand other Dispositions of his Body, this Fruit would be proper for his Nourishment; 'tis plain, that his Mind was entirely employed upon things that were unworthy its application, and even unprositably enough, because he was not long preserved after this manner.  
If we consider then, that the Mind of Adam was not Infinite, we may safely say, that he knew not all the Properties of Bodies that were about him, since 'tis manifest that they are Infinite; and if it be granted, which cannot reasonably be denied, that his Mind was not made to Examine the Motions and Configurations of Matter, but for the Contemplation of God, no one can be displeased, if we assert, that it was biased and disordered in that time, wherein all things should have been perfectly well ordered, if he had been obliged to turn his Mind from the Consideration of the Perfection of his true Good, to Examine the Nature of some Fruit for his Nourishment.  
Adam then had the same Sensations as we have, which suggested to him what was necessary for his Body, without being diverted from God; he was Sensible of Pleasures as we are, and even of Pains, or prepossessed and indeliberate Aversions, but these Pleasures and Pains could not Enslave him, or render him Unhappy like us, because that being Absolute Master of all the Motions which were excited in his Body, he immediately put a stop to them, if he only wished they might cease, and certainly he always wished it, in respect of Pain. How happy had he been, and we also, if he had done the same in respect of Pleasure, and if he had not voluntary strayed from the presence of his God, by suffering his Mind to be taken up with the Beauty, and expected Sweetness of the Forbidden Fruit, or, perhaps, with a Presumptuous Joy that was excited in his Soul, at the Consideration of his Natural Perfections.  
But after he had Sinned, those Pleasures which before only modestly Accosted him, and those Pains, which without disturbing his Felicity, only put him in mind that he might Fall, and become Miserable, were not any longer under his Command, his Senses and Passions Revolted against him, they became Irregular, and made him, like us, a Slave to all Sensible Things.  
Thus the Senses and Passions, do not derive their Origination from Sin, but only the Power they have of Tyrannising over Sinners; and this Power has not so much disordered the Senses, as the Mind and Will of Men, which ceasing to be so strictly united to God. do not any longer receive that Light and Vigour, by which they might preserve their Liberty and Happiness.  
From these two ways of Explaining the Disorders of Sin, we may easily gather, 
A Remedy for that Disorder which Original Sin hath caused in the World; and the foundation of Christian Morality.  that there are two things necessary for our Recovery.  
The first is, That we must lessen that Load we sink under, and which drags towards Sensible. Goods, by continually Retrenching our Pleasures, and Mortifying our Sensuality with Repentance and Circumcision of Heart.  
The second is, That we must beg the Assistance of God's Grace, and that prepossessed Delight which 
* See the Explanations.  Jesus Christ hath particularly Merited for us; without which, whatever we retrench from that first load, will still oppress us, and however small it is, it will Infallibly draw into Sin and Disorder.  
These two things are absolutely Necessary for us, to begin and persevere in our Duty; Reason, as we have showed, does perfectly agree with the Gospel in this, and from both we learn, that Humility, Self-denial, and the Diminution of the Power of Sin, are necessary Preparations for our Recovery, by the Power of Grace, and Reunion with God.  
But in our present State, tho' we are continually obliged to strive against our Senses, yet we must not thence conclude, that they are absolutely corrupted and depraved; for if we consider that they are given us for the Preservation of our Bodies, we shall find that they admirably well perform their Duty, and conduct us, after so just and faithful a manner, for the end we received them, that it seems very injurious so to accuse them of Corruption and Disorder; they so readily inform the Soul by Pain and Pleasure, by agreeable and disagreeable Sensations, of what is necessary to be done or omitted, for the Preservation of Life, that we have little reason to say, this order and exactness is the Consequence of Sin. 
'Tis not our Serser, but our all use of our L●hert● that ●● 〈…〉   
Our Senses then are not so depraved as is imagined, but the inward Constitution of our Soul; 'tis our Liberty that is Corrupted; 'tis not our Senses, but our Will that deceives us, by its precipitate Judgements. For Example, when we see the Light, 'tis certain that we see it; when we feel Warmth, we are not deceived, if we believe we feel it, whether before or after Sin, but we are deceived, when we judge that the Heat we feel is out of the Soul that feels it; as shall be Explained hereafter.  
The Senses than do not deceive us, if we make a good use of our Liberty, and if we accustom not ourselves, upon their account, to Judge of things with too much precipitation; but since it is very difficult to refrain from it, and we are, as it were, constrained thereto, because of the strict Union between our Soul and Body, I shall lay down a Method to conduct us in our use of them, so as to avoid Error.  
We must exactly observe this Rule, 
A Rule to avoid Error in using our Senses.  Never to Judge by the Senses, of things as they are in themselves, but only of the Relation that they have between themselves; for, indeed, they are not given us to know the Truth of Things in themselves, but only for the Conservation of our Body.  
But that we may be wholly delivered from that easiness and inclination we have of following our Senses, in a Search after Truth, we shall particularise, in the following Chapters, some of the chief, and general Errors which we are liable to; whence the Truth, of what we have advanced, will be more Evident.   

CHAP. VI  
I. Of the Errors of the Sight, in respect of Extension, considered in itself.  
II. An Enumeration of these Errors, as to Invisible Objects.  
III. Of the Errors of the Sight, concerning Relative Extension.  
Sighed is the first, the most Noble, and most Extensive of all the Senses, if then they were given us for a Discovery of Truth, this alone would assist us more than all the others together; So that if we can destroy that Authority, which our Eyes have over our Reason, there's little need of any thing else to undeceive us, and to create in us a General Diffidence of all our Senses.  
We shall then show, that we must not rely upon the Testimony of our Sight, to Judge of the Truth of things, as they are in themselves, but only to discover what Relation they have to the Preservation of our Body; that our Eyes generally deceive in all they represent to us, in the Greatness of Bodies, in their Figures and Motions, in Light and Colours, which are the only things we see; that all these things are not what they really appear to be; that all the World is deceived in them, and by this Error led into innumerable others. We shall begin with Extension, and produce those Proofs which incline us to believe, that we never see any thing as it is.  
We commonly see Animals with Microscopes, 
Of the Errors of Sight in respect of Extension, considered in itself.  much less than a Grain of Sand, that is almost Invisible to the naked Eye; 
* Journal des Scavans du 12. Nov, 1668.  we have even seen some a thousand times yet less. These living Atoms walk as well as other Animals. Then they have Legs, and Feet, and Bones in these Legs to uphold them, Muscles to move them, Tendons, and an infinite Number of Fibres in each Muscle; and lastly, Blood, or Animal Spirits, extremely subtle and fine, to fill and contribute successive Motion to these Muscles. It's impossible, without this, to conceive that they Live, are Nourished, and Transport their little Bodies into different Places, according to the different Impression of Objects; or, rather, 'tis impossible that even those, who have employed all their Life time in Anatomy, and an Enquiry into Nature, should represent the number, diversity, and fineness of all the parts whereof these little Bodies are necessarily Composed, to make them live, and execute all those things, that we see them do.  
The Imagination is lost and astonished, at the sight of so surprising a Smallness; it cannot apprehend, nor take hold of such Parts that have no hold for it; and altho' Reason convinces us of the Truth of what we have said, yet the Senses and Imagination oppose it, and often compel us to doubt of it.  
Our Sight is extremely limited, but we must not limit its Object, the Idea which it gives us of Extension hath very narrow Bounds, but we must not thence conclude, that Extension hath the same Bounds; it is, doubtless, Infinite in one Sense, and this little part of Matter, that is hid from Eyes, is capable of containing a World, in which there are as many things, tho' much less in Proportion, as in this great World we Inhabit.  
The little Animals we spoke of, have, perhaps, other little Animals, which they devour, that are Imperceptible, because of their Stupendious Smallness. That which is a Handworm, in respect of us, these Animals are so in respect of it; and, perhaps, there are in Nature yet lesser and lesser, ad infinitum, in so strange a Proportion as this, betwixt a Man and a Handworm.  
We have Evident, and Mathematical Demonstrations, of the infinite Divisibility of Matter, and this is sufficient to incline us to believe, that there may be Animals lesser and lesser, ad Infinitum, altho' out Imagination is lost in the Thought. God made Matter only to form Admirable Works thereof, and since we are certain there are no Particles, whose Smallness is capable of limiting his Power in the formation of those little Animals, why do we unreasonably limit and diminish the Idea we have of an Infinite Creator, by measuring his Power and Operations by our Finite Understanding?  
Experience has already undeceived us in part, by showing us Animals a thousand times less than a Hand-worm, why would we have them to be the last and least of all? for my part I see no reason to imagine it, on the contrary, it's much more probable to believe, that there are some yet much lesser than those we have discovered; for indeed those little Animals are not so much wanting for Microscopes, as Microscopes for them.  
When we examine the 
* Principle of Generation.  Germ (in the midst of Winter) taken out of the Bowl of Tulip, either by the Naked Eye, or a Convex Glass we very easily discover leaves in it that will become green, those that are to compose the Flower of the Tulip, that little Triangular part which encloses the Seed, and the six little Columns which encompass it at the bottom of the Tulip; so that we cannot doubt but the Germ in the Bowl of the Tulip contains a whole Tulip.  
It is reasonable to believe the same of the Germ of a Grain of Mustard, that of the Kernel of an Apple, and generally of all sorts of Trees and Plants, although undiscoverable by the Naked Eye, nor even with a Microscope; and it may be confidently said, that all Trees are contained in little in the Germ of their Seed.  
It does not appear unreasonable to think that there are an infinite number of Trees in one single Germ, since it does not only contain the Tree whose Seed it is, but also a great number of other Seeds, which may also include in themselves new Trees, and new Seeds of Trees, which last also may contain other Trees and Seeds as fruitful as the first, and thus on ad infinitum. So that according to this Opinion, which cannot appear impertinent or ridiculous to any, but those who measure the Wonders of the Almighty Power of God after the Ideas of their own Senses and Imaginations, one might say, that in one Kernel only of an Apple there might be Appletrees, Apples, and Seeds of Appletrees for almost infinite Ages, in the proportion of a perfect Appletree to an Appletree in its Seed; and that Nature does only unfold these little Trees by administering a sensible growth to that which is out of its Seed, and an insensible, but real growth, proportionable to their bigness, to those which we may conceive to be their Seeds; for we cannot doubt but that there may be Bodies small enough to insinuate themselves in the Fibres of these Trees, which we may conceive to be their Seeds, and by that means to nourish them.  
What we have said of Plants and their Germs, may be also applied to Animals, and the Germ of which they are produced; We see in the Germ of a Tulip's Bowl, an entire Tulip; 
* The Germ 〈…〉 〈…〉.  we also see in the Germ of a new laid Egg, a Chicken perhaps entirely form, although it has not been hatched. We discover Frogs in the Eggs of Frogs, and other Animals besides, even in their Germ, upon a Curious Inquisition; but when the Eyes of the Body can pierce no deeper, the Eyes of the Mind must not be limited, 
* V●●●. De 〈…〉, M. 〈…〉.  being much more extended. We suppose then, that all the Bodies of Men and Animals, which shall be produced till the Consummation of Ages, have probably been produced from the Creation of the World; 
* 〈…〉.  I mean, the first Female Animals were perhaps Created with all those of the same Species which they have, and shall Engender to the end of the World.  
We might carry this Thought yet farther, and possibly with much Reason and Truth, but we think it not safe to search too deep into the Works of God, which are altogether infinite; not only our Senses and Imagination are limited in their Comprehension, but also the pure Mind wholly disengaged from Matter, is too gross and feeble to penetrate into the least of his Works, 'tis lost and dissipated, dazzled and affrighted at the sight of what we call an Atom, according to the Language of the Senses; but the pure Mind has always this advantage above the Imagination and Senses, that it knows its own weakness, and the greatness of God; that it perceives the infinity in which it is lost, whereas our Imagination and Senses debase the Works of God, and raise in us a foolish Confidence, which blindly precipitates us into Error. Our Eyes beget in us no Idea of all these things that we discover by Microscopes or by Reason; we see no less a Body with our Eyes than a Worm in the Skin or a Mite, the half of which is nothing, if compared with ourselves: A Mite is but as a Mathematic Point in respect of us, it cannot be divided, but it must be anni●●●lated; Our Sight then does not represent Extension to us, as it is in itself, but according to what it is in proportion to our Body, and because the half of a Mite bears no proportion to our Body, and can neither profit nor injure it, therefore we can't see it.  
But if our Eyes were made as Microscopes, or rather, if they were as small as those of Hand-worms or Mites, we should judge otherwise of the magnitude of Bodies, for without doubt these little Animals have Eyes qualified to see all that is about them, as also their own Body in a much larger proportion than we see it, if not they would not receive those impressions that are necessary for the preservation of themselves, and then their Eyes would be wholly useless.  
To explain these things thoroughly, we must consider, that our own Eyes are indeed nothing else but Natural Spectacles, that their Humours produce the same Effect, as the Glasses in Spectacles, and that according to the Figure of the Chrystaline Humour, and its distance from the Retina, we see Objects very differently; insomuch, that we are certain there are not two Men in the World, who see things in the same bigness, unless their Eyes were in all respects alike.  
This is a Proposition that must be received by all those that study Optics, viz. That Equidistant Objects appear so much the greater, by how much the Image of them is painted greater in the inward part of the Eye. Now 'tis certain, that those Eyes whose crystalline Humour is more Convex, have lesser Images depainted in 'em, in proportion to their Convexity; Those than who are the nearest sighted, having the Chrystaline Humour more Convex, see Objects in a lesser proportion than old Men who have occasion for Spectacles in Reading, or those who have common Convexity, and see very well at a distance.  
All these things are easily demonstrated Geometrically, and if they were not commonly known, we should insist the longer upon them; but because many have treated upon these Matters, those that would be better informed are desired to consult Authors upon it.  
Since 'tis certain that there are not two Men in the World who see Objects in the same bigness, and that commonly the 
* See the Journal des Scavans du Mois de Janvier, 1969.  same Person sees the same things greater with one Eye than another; 'tis plain that we are not to trust to the proportion of things which our Eyes represent to us, we must rather consult our Reason, which proves, that we cannot determine the absolute bigness of Bodies that are about us, nor what Idea we ought to have of the Extension of a Foot Square, or of that of our own Body, so as that this Idea should truly represent it to us; for Reason tells us, that the least of all Bodies, considered in itself, would not be little, since it is composed of an infinite number of parts, out of every one of which God could form a World, which would be but as a Point in respect of all the rest joined together. Thus the Mind of Man is incapable of forming an Idea great enough to comprehend the least Extension in the World since it is limited, but the Idea of Matter is infinite. It is true, the Mind can very near apprehend the proportions, that are betwixt these Infinites whereof the World is Composed, that one, for Instance, is the double of another, that a 
* A French Measure.  Toise contains 6 Feet, yet we cannot form an Idea that represents what these things are in themselves.  
We'll suppose, that the Mind is susceptible of those Ideas, which are equal to, or which measure the Extension of Bodies that we see, for it would be very difficult to persuade Men to the contrary; Let us examine then what may be concluded from this Supposition; This doubtless, that God does not deceive us, that he has not given us Eyes like Convex Glasses to enlarge or diminish Objects, therefore we must believe that our Eyes represents things as they are.  
It is true God never deceives us, but we often deceive ourselves in judging of things with too much precipitation; for we often judge that Objects, whereof we have Ideas, do exist, and that they perfectly resemble our Ideas; yet it frequently happens, that the Objects are either unlike our Ideas, or else have no Existence at all: so that if we have an Idea of any thing, it does not follow from thence, that such a thing exists, much less, that it should wholly resemble the Idea we have of it; for altho' God produces in us such a sensible Idea of Magnitude, when a Toise is before our Eyes, it follows not from thence, that this Toise hath only the Extension, which by this Idea is represented to us. For, first, all Men have not the Sensible Idea of this Toise, since all have not their Eyes disposed after the same manner. Secondly, even the same Person has not the same Sensible Idea thereof, when it is seen with one Eye, and then with the other, as we Instanced before. Lastly, it often happens that the same Person, hath very different Ideas of the same Objects at different times, according as he believes them to be nearer, or farther off him; which shall be elsewhere Explained. 'Tis then an unreasonable Prejudice, to believe that we see Bodies according in their just bigness, for our Eyes being only given us for the Preservation of our Body, they very well discharge their Office, when they cause those Ideas of Objects in us, that are proportionate to the bigness of it. But that we may the better comprehend how we ought to Judge of the Extension of Bodies, in Relation to the Testimony of our Eyes, let us imagine, that God had created a Heaven, and an Earth, of a Portion of Matter as little as a Hand Ball; and Men, upon this Earth, in the same Proportions with those in our Great World: These little Men would see one another, and the parts of their own Bodies, as also the little Animals, which would be capable of incommoding them, or else their Eyes would be useless as to their Preservation. Upon this Supposition it is Evident, that these little Men would have Ideas, as to the bigness of Bodies, very different from those that we have of them, since they would have Relation to their Little World, which, tho' as a Ball, in respect of ours, they would look upon as surrounded with infinite Spaces, such as we imagine about ours.  
Or, if it may more easily be conceived, let us suppose that God had made a World infinitely greater than ours, so that this New World should be, in respect of ours, as ours was in comparison of that which we supposed before. Let us also suppose, that God had observed the same Proportion, in all the Parts of this New World, as he had done in ours; It's manifest, that the Men of this last World would be greater than is the Space betwixt our Earth, and the most distant Stars that we see; this being supposed, if they had the same Idea of the Extension of Bodies as we have, they could not distinguish even some parts of their own Body, and would see some others of prodigious greatness: So that 'tis ridiculous to think, that they would see things of the same bigness as we see them.  
'Tis evident, from these two Suppositions, that the Men of the Great, or Little World, would have very different Notions, about the greatness of Bodies, to what we have, supposing only, that their Eyes gave them Ideas of the Objects, that were about them, proportionably in bigness to their own Bodies; Now if these Men were much assured, upon the Testimony of their own Eyes, that Bodies were as big as they saw them, it's evident they would be deceived, and no body can doubt of it; yet, it's certain, they would have full as much reason as we, to defend their Opinion, let us therefore, at least, by the Example of this Error, apprehend ourselves to be very uncertain of the greatness of those Bodies that we see, and that all we can know by sight, is the proportion that they have to our Bodies. In a word, that our Eyes are not given us to Judge of the Truth of things, but only to discern those things that may either Profit, or Injure us.  
But Men do not only trust their Eyes in Judging of Visible, but also of Invisible Objects; they even conclude, that nothing exists which they see not, thus arrogating to their Sight a certain infinite perspicacity. 'Tis this which hinders them from knowing the true Causes of many Natural Effects: If they attribute them to certain Faculties, and imaginary Qualities, the common Reason is, because they do not see the real ones, which consist in the different Configurations of these Bodies.  
For Example, They see not the Particles of Air and Flame, much less those of Light, or of other Matter yet more Subtle; and this inclines them to believe they do not exist, or at least, to judge they have neither Power nor Action; they have recourse to occult Qualities, or imaginary Faculties, to explain all the effects whereof these imperceptible Particles are the Natural Cause.  
They choose rather to have recourse to the Horror of a Vacuum, for explaining the Elevation of the Water in Pumps, than to the Weight of the Air; to the Qualities of the Moon, for the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, than to the pressure of the Air which environs the Earth; to attractive Faculties in the Sun, for the Elevation of Vapours, than to the Simple Motion or Impulsion, caused by the parts of Subtle Matter, which are continually dispersed by the Sun.  
They look upon that as an Impertinent Opinion, which has recourse to Flesh and Blood, to solve the Motions of Animals, their Habits, or the Corporeal Memory of Man, which is owning, in part, to this, that they conceive the Brain to be very little, and consequently, insufficient to conserve the traces of an almost infinite number of things, which are there; they are willing to believe, tho' they know not how to conceive it, that Beasts have a certain Soul which is neither Body nor Mind; as also, that there are Qualities, and Intentional Species, to solve the Habits and Memory of Men, and such other like things, of which they have no particular Notion in their Minds.  
It would take up too much time to enumerate the Errors which this prejudice begets in us, almost all the Errors in Physics are owing to it, and whoever attentively considers it, will be amazed thereat.  
Although I'm unwilling to insist much upon this head, yet I can't but take notice of the Contempt which Men commonly have for Infects, and other little Animals, which are generated, as they say, out of Corrupted Matter; this is an unjust Contempt, which is founded only upon the Ignorance of the thing despised, and the prejudices already mentioned. There is nothing Contemptible in Nature, all the Works of God are worthy our respect and admiration, especially if we consider the admirable ways by which God makes and preserves them. The least Flies are as perfect Animals as the biggest Creatures, the proportion of their Members is as Just as those of the others, and it even seems, that God has given them more Ornaments to recompense the littleness of their Bodies; they have Crowns, Helmets, and other Curiosities, on their Heads, which outdo the most Luxuriant Fancies of Men; and I may confidently aver, that they who have never seen any thing but with their naked Eye, have never beheld any thing so fine, so exact, and even so magnificent, in the Houses of the greatest Princes, as what we discover with Microscopes upon the Head of a silly Fly.  
It's true, these things are very small, but yet the more surprising, because there are so many Beauties crowded in so small a Space, and altho' they are very common, yet they are not the less valuable, nor less perfect in themselves; on the contrary, the Wisdom of God is more apparent, who hath with so much Magnificence and Profusion, performed almost an infinite number of Miracles in Creating them.  
Nevertheless, our Sight reaches not these Beauties, but makes us despise the Works of God, so worthy our admiration; and because these Animals are little, in comparison of our Bodies, it makes us consider them as absolutely little and contemptible, because of their smallness, as if Bodies could be little in themselves.  
Let us then endeavour to distrust the Impressions of our Senses, in Judging about the bigness of Bodies; and when we say, for Example, that a Bird is little, let us not absolutely understand it to be so, because nothing is either great or little in itself. Even a Bird is great, in comparison of a Fly, but little in respect of our Bodies, but it does not follow that it is so absolutely, for our Body is not the Standard Measure of other Bodies, it's but very small in relation to the Earth, and that in relation to the Circle, which the Sun or the Earth describes, one about the other, and this Circle, in comparison of the Space betwixt us and the fixed Stars; and thus we may still imagine Spaces larger and larger, ad Infinitum.  
But we must not think that our Senses give us the just proportion that Bodies have to one another, 
III. Of the Error of our Eyes, about Extension of Bodies, in relation to one another.  for exactness is not essential to Sensible Knowledge, which is only useful for the Preservation of Life: It's true, we know precisely enough the proportion that Bodies have one with another, if they be near us, but we know little of the proportion that distant Bodies have, because they have little relation to our Body. The Idea of bigness which we have at the sight of some Body, diminishes in proportion, to the condition that this Body is in of hurting us, and this Idea is presently enlarged as Bodies approach us, or rather, as the relation they have with our Body, increases. Lastly, this Relation wholly ceases, I mean, if any Body is so little, or distant from us, that it cannot hurt us, we have no more any Sensation of it. So that by the Eye, we may sometimes judge very near of the proportion that some Bodies have with ours, as also, of that they have among themselves, but we must never believe them to be of that bigness which they appear to us.  
Our Eyes, for Example, represent the Sun and Moon about the bigness of one or two Feet over, but we must not imagine, as Epicurus and Lucretius did, that they are really of this bigness; the Moon appears much greater to the Sight than the fixed Stars, tho' it's certain, that in comparison of them, it is very small. Thus, likewise, we see every day, upon the Earth, two or more things, whose bigness we cannot truly discover, because it's necessary to have their true distance before we Judge of them, which is very difficult to know.  
We have the same trouble to make a certain Judgement of the Proportion of two Bodies, which are close to us, they must be taken in our hands, and compared together; and after all, we frequently remain doubtful about them. This is evident, when we would examine two pieces of Money, which are almost equal, for than we are obliged to place them one upon another, to try, by a surer way than the bare sight, wh●ther they are equal or not. Hence we conclude, that our sight does not only deceive us, in respect of the bigness of Bodies, as they are in themselves, but also in the Proportion which they have when compared together.   

CHAP. VII.  
I. Of the Errors of Sight, in respect of Figures.  
II. We have no Knowledge of the least Things.  
III. The Knowledge we have of the greatest Things is not exact.  
iv An Explication of certain Natural Judgements which keep us from being deceived.  
V That these very Judgements deceive us in particular Occurrences.  
OUR Sight deceives us less in the Representation of Figures, 
I. Of the Errors of Sight concerning Figures.  than of all other things, because a Figure, considered in itself, is absolutely nothing, and because its Nature consists only in the Relation that is betwixt the Parts which terminate some Space, and a Point which is conceived in this Space, and which may be called, as in a Circle, the Centre of the Figure; yet we are deceived a thousand ways in Figures, and we have never any exact Knowledge of them by the Senses.  
We shall now prove, 
II. That we have no Knowledge of the smallest things.  that our Sight reaches not all sort of Extension, but that only which hath a very considerable Relation with our Body; and for this reason, we see not all the parts of the least Animals, or those that compose hard or liquid Bodies. So that being unable to perceive all these Parts, because of their smallness, it follows, that we cannot perceive their Figures, since the Figure of a Body is only the Term that limits it. There are then an infinite number of Figures, and even of the greatest, which our Eyes discover not to us, and therefore they incline the Mind, which relies too much upon their Capaciousness, and which does not sufficiently examine things, to believe that these Figures do not Exist.  
As for Bodies, that are accommodated to our Sight, 
III. That the Knowledge we have of the greatest is not exact.  which are very few in number in comparison of others, we discover their Figure very near, but we never know it exactly by the Senses, we can't even be assured, by the Sight, whether a Circle or a Square, which are two of the most Simple Figures, are not an Ellipse or a Parallelogram, altho' we had these Figures in our Hands, and as near our Eyes as we pleased.  
Moreover, we can't exactly distinguish whether a Line is right or not; especially, if it be pretty long, we must have a Rule for that. But why? We know not whether the Rule itself is such as we suppose it should be, and we cannot absolutely assure ourselves thereof: Yet without the Knowledge of a Line, another Figure can never be known, as is evident to all that know what Figures are.  
This is what may in general be said of Figures that are in our Hands, and before our Eyes, but if they are supposed at a distance from us, how great a Change should we find in the Projection they make upon the bottom of our Eyes? I'm unwilling to describe them here, they are easily Learned in any Book of Optics, or by examining Figures in Picture: For since Painters are obliged to change them almost every where that they may appear Natural, and to Paint, for Example, Circles like Ellipses, 'tis an Infallible Mark of our Errors, in seeing Objects which are not Painted; but these Errors are corrected by new Sensations, which may be looked upon as a kind of Natural Judgements, and which might be called the Judgements of the Senses.  
When we behold a Cube, 
iv An Explication of certain Natural Judgements which guard us from Error.  for Example, 'tis certain that all the sides, or Images of equal bigness with them, are never Projected on the bottom of our Eyes, since the Image of every one of these sides which is Painted upon the Retina, or Optic Nerve, is exactly like a Cube Painted in Perspective; nevertheless, we see them all equal, and are not deceived.  
Now it may be said, that this happens by a kind of Judgement which we make Naturally, viz. that the most distant Faces of a Cube must not Project such great Images, upon the bottom of the Eye, as those Faces which are nearer, as the Senses only Perceive, but never Judge, to speak properly: 'Tis certain that this Judgement is nothing but a compounded Sensation, which consequently may be sometimes false.  
However, 
V That these Judgements deceive us in some particular Occurrences.  that which is nothing else but Sensation in us, may be considered in respect of the Author of Nature, who excites it in us as a kind of Judgement. I speak sometimes of Sensations as of Natural Judgements, because this way of speaking serves to give a reason of Things, as may be seen here, in the Ninth Chapter towards the end, and in many other places.  
Although these Judgements, which I have spoke of, are useful to correct our Senses very many ways, and that without them we should very frequently be deceived, yet they are also occasions of Error. For Instance, If it happens that we see the top of a high Steeple, behind a great Wall or a Mountain, it will appear very near to us, and very little, but if afterwards we should see it, at the same distance, yet with many Fields and Houses betwixt, it would, doubtless, appear the greater, and at a farther distance, altho', in each Station, the Projection of the Rays of the Spire, or its Image, which is Painted at the bottom of our Eyes, would be altogether the same.  
Now, it may be said, that we see it greater, because of a Judgement that we Naturally make, viz. that since there is so much Land betwixt us and the Steeple, it must be further, and consequently greater.  
But on the contrary, if we saw no Fields betwixt us and the Steeple, altho' we even knew there were many, and that it was a great way off, which is very remarkable, it would always appear very near, and very little, as I have said. And it may also be supposed, that this is done by a Natural Judgement of our Soul, which thus sees this Spire, because it Judges it about five or six hundred paces distant; for, commonly, our Imagination does not represent a greater distance, between Objects and us, if it be not assisted by a Sensible view of other interjacent Objects, beyond which it can yet imagine farther.  
'Tis for this cause, 
See the 9th Chapter towards the end.  that when the Moon Rises or Sets, we see it greater, than when it is elevated above the Horizon, for when it is very high, we see no Objects betwixt it and us, whose greatness we know, to Judge of that of the Moon, by comparing them together; but when it is near Setting, we see betwixt it and us many Fields, whose breadth we know very near, and so we Judge it at a greater distance, because we see it at a greater.  
It's observable, that when the Moon is Risen above our Heads, altho' our reason assures us that it is at a very great distance, yet it seems to us to be very little, and very near; for, indeed, these Natural Judgements of Sight, are only built upon the Perceptions of the same Sight, and Reason cannot correct them: So that they very often deceive us, in causing us to form free Judgements, which perfectly agree with them; for when we Judge by our Senses, we are always deceived, but we are never deceived when we conceive, for a Body only Instructs as a Body, but God always teaches us Truth, as I shall show hereafter.  
These false Judgements deceive us, not only as to the distance and bigness of Bodies, but also in making us see their Figure other than it is: We see, for Example, the Sun and Moon, and other Spherical Bodies, very distant, as if they were Plains and Circles, because, at this great distance, we cannot distinguish whether the opposite part is nearer to us than the others; and, because of this, we Judge it at an equal distance. 'Tis for the same reason, we Judge that all the Stars, and the blue which appears in the Heaven, are at the same distance, and, as it were, a perfectly Convex Vault, because our Mind supposes an Equality where it sees no Inequality, altho' it ought not positively to conclude but where it sees evidently.  
I shall not tarry here, to Explain at large the Errors of the Sight, as to the Figures of Bodies, because any Book of Optics will save me that Labour: This Science, indeed, does only show how the Eyes are deceived, and all its direction consists but in helping us to make those Natural Judgements we have spoke of, at such time as we ought not to make them; and this may be done after so many ways, that there is not one Figure in the World which may not be Painted after a thousand different manners, so as that the Sight will Infallibly be deceived thereby. But this is not a place to Explain these things thoroughly: what has been said, is sufficient to show, that we must not trust to our Eyes, when they represent the Figure of Bodies to us, altho' we are not so subject to be deceived by Figures as other things.   

CHAP. VIII.  
I. That our Eyes do not inform us of the greatness or swiftness of Motion considered in itself.  
II. That duration, which is necessary to be understood to know what Motion is, is unknown.  
III. Examples of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest.  
WE have discovered the principal and most general Errors of the Sight about the Extension of Figures, we must now correct those in which it deceives us about the Motion of Matter; and this will not be a very difficult performance, after what we have said about Extension; for there is so great a relation betwixt these two things, that if we are deceived about the bigness of Bodies, we must unavoidably be deceived in their Motion.  
But to offer nothing except what is clear and distinct, we must first take away the Equivocation of the word Motion; for this Term commonly signifies two things, the first is a certain power that is imagined in a moved Body, which is the Cause of its Motion; the second is a continual removal of a Body that is departing from, or approaching to another, that is, considered as in a State of Rest.  
When we say, for Instance, that a Bowl hath communicated its Motion to another, the word Motion is here taken in the first signification, but if it be said simply, that a Boul is in Motion, it is taken in the second Sense. And indeed this term Motion signifies both the Cause and Effect together, which yet are in themselves two different things.  
They seem to me to be in the grossest and most dangerous Error concerning force, who attribute to it Motion, and the transportation of Bodies; these fine terms of Nature, and impressed Qualities, seem to me to be only a proper Subterfuge for the Ignorance of the falsely Learned, 
See the 3d Chapter of the Second Part, 6. l.  and impious Libertines, as may be very easily proved; but this is not a fit place to treat of this force which moves Bodies, it is not visible, and I am here speaking only of the Errors of our Eyes, though I will not omit it where it is necessary.  
Motion taken in the second sense, and for the removing of Bodies which is distant one from another, is something that is visible, and a fit Subject for this Chapter.  
I have, 
I. That our Eyes do not truly inform us of the greatness or swiftness of Motion considered in itself.  I think, in the Sixth Chapter, demonstrated that our Sight does not distinguish the Magnitude of Bodies among themselves, but only in respect to the proportion they have one to another, and particularly to ours. From whence I conclude also, that we cannot know the true and absolute greatness of their Motions, viz. of their Swiftness, or Slowness; but only the proportion these Motions have one to another, and chief with that which generally happens to our Bodies, which I prove thus:  
It is certain that we cannot judge of the greatness of the Motion of a Body, but by the length and space that the same Body has run through; so that since our Eyes do not discover to us the true Length of the Space the Body passes, it follows, that they cannot discover the true greatness of this Motion to us.  
This Proof is only a Consequence of what I have said of Extension, and is evident from what I have there demonstrated; but here is one that depends upon no previous Suppositions; I say then, that although we could certainly know the true greatness of the Space it passed, it would not from thence follow, 
II. That the 〈◊〉 which is necessary in order to the discovering the greatness of Motion, is unknown to us.  that we could know that of its Motion.  
The greatness or swiftness of Motion includes two things. The first is the removing of a Body from one place to another, as from Paris to St. Germains; the second is the time that is necessary to remove it in; Now it is not sufficient to be exactly assured how much space there is between Paris and St. Germains, to know if a Man went thither by a quick or slow Motion; but it is also necessary to know how much time he spent in going thither. I grant then that the true Length of this way is known, but absolutely deny that we can exactly know by Sight, or any other way whatsoever, the time he was in going; and the true greatness of duration.  
It is evident, that at certain times one hour appears as long as four, and on the contrary, at another time, four hours will pass insensibly. As for Instance, when we are filled with Joy, the time seems short, because it passes without our thinking of it; but when we are oppressed with grief, or suffer any pain, the days than seem as long as whole years: The reason of it is, that then the Mind is tired with its duration, because it is troublesome to it, as if it applied itself thereto the more for knowing it better; and so it thinks it longer than when it is taken up with Joy, or some agreeable Employ, which makes it as it were, go out of itself to possess the Object of its Joy; for even as a Person thinks a Picture so much the larger, as he considers more attentively the least things that are represented therein; or, as we shall think the Head of a Fly very great, if we distinguish all the parts thereof with a Microscope. Thus the Mind thinks its duration so much the greater, as it considers it with more attention, and is sensible of all the parts thereof.  
So that I doubt not but God can, after such a manner, apply our Minds to the parts of Duration, by producing in us a great number of Sensations in a very little time, as that an hour may appear as long as many Ages; for, in fine, there is not an Instant in Duration, as there is not an Atom in Bodies, and even as the least particle of Matter may be divided ad infinitum, so we may likewise assign less and less parts of Duration to Infinity, as may easily be demonstrated. If therefore the Mind was attentive to these little parts of Duration, by such Sensations as leave some Traces in the Brain, which it can remember, it would think it without doubt much longer than they otherwise appear to be.  
But indeed the use of Watches sufficiently prove that we have no exact knowledge of Duration, and that is as much as I require; for as we cannot know the greatness of Motion in itself, so we can no more know that of Duration, as we have showed: It follows then, that if we cannot exactly know the absolute greatness of Duration, we cannot precisely understand the absolute greatness of Motion.  
But because we may know some proportions of Durations, or of the times one to another, we may also know some proportions that Motions bear to one another, even as we can know that the Solar year is longer than the Lunar; thus we may also know that a Cannon Bullet moves faster than a Bomb; so that if the use of our Eyes is not to distinguish the absolute greatness of Motion, yet by their help we can know very near the relative greatness, that is, the proportion which one Motion bears to another; and this is all that is necessary to be known for the preservation of our Bodies. 
III. Example of the Error of our Eyes about the Motion or Rest of Bodies.   
There are many Occurrences in which we clearly know that our Sight deceives us about the Motion of Bodies; It frequently happens, that those which appear to move, do not move, and on the contrary, those which seem to be in rest, are in motion; for Example, when we sit in a Vessel that Sails very fast and very steadily, distant Fields and Towns appear to move, and the Vessel to stand still.  
Thus if a Man were placed in the Planet Mars, he would judge by his Sight that the Sun, Earth, and the other Planets, with all the fixed Stars, revolve about him once in about 24 or 25 hours, in which time Mars turns round upon his own Axis, yet the Sun, Earth, and Stars do not turn about this Planet, so that this Man would see things as in motion which moved not, and would believe himself to be in rest whilst he was in motion.  
I will not stay to explain here, how the Man sitting in the Vessel might correct the Error of his Eyes, and how he, whom we have supposed in the Planet Mars, would obstinately persist in his Error; because it is very easy to know the reason thereof, especially if we should reflect upon what would happen to a Man sleeping in a Vessel, and who being suddenly awaked, and looking about him should only see the top of the Mast of some other Vessel coming towards him, certainly if he saw no Sails filled with Wind, no Seaman at Work, and perceived no agitation of his Vessel, nor any thing else of this nature, he would absolutely doubt whether of the two Vessels were in Motion, in vain would he Consult his Eyes, and even his Reason, to discover where the Motion lay.   

CHAP. IX.  
A Continuation of the same Subject.  
I. A General Proof of the Errors of our Sight about Motion.  
II. That its necessary to know the distance of Objects, to judge of the swiftness of their Motion  
III. An Examination of Means to know their distances.  
TAke this General Proof of all the Errors we are liable to, in respect of Motion.  
Let A be the Eye of the Beholder, C the Object which I suppose at a considerable distance from A, I say that though the Object remains immovable in C, he may believe it as distant as D, or as near him as B: and though the Object should recede to D, or approach to B, he might believe it immovable in C; on the contrary, although it approach towards B, he may believe it immovable in C, or receding towards D; And although the Object advances from C, to E, H, G or K, he may believe that it's only moved from C to F, or I; On the contrary, although the Object were removed from C to F or ●, he might believe that it was moved to E, or H, or else to G or K. But if the Object be moved in a line equally distant from the Beholder, that is by a Circumference, whose Centre should be the Eye of the Beholder, although the Object move from C to P, he may believe that it moves only from B to O; and on the contrary, if it moves from B to O, he may believe it moves from C to P.  
If beyond the Object C, there be another Object M which he believes immovable, although it moves towards N; or if C moveth more slowly towards F, than M towards N, it will appear to move towards Y, and on the contrary, if, etc. 
II. That it is necessary to know the distance of Objects to find the swiftness of the Motion.   
It's evident that the Proof of all these Propositions, except the last, in which there's no difficulty, depends only upon one thing, that is, we can't always make a certain Judgement of the distance of Objects, and if so, it follows, that we cannot know whether C is advanced towards D, or whether it approaches towards B; and thus also of the other Propositions.  
Now to see whether the Judgements we form about the distance of Objects are certain, we are only to examine the Means we are to make use of in judging; and if these Means are uncertain, 
III. An Examination of the Means of knowing the distance of Objects.  we cannot judge infallibly, there are many of them, and they must be explained.  
The first, the most general, and sometimes the most certain way, that we have to judge of the distance of Objects, is the Angle, which the Rays of our Eyes make, whose point of Concurrence is, or measures, the Object; When this Angle is very great, we see the Object very near; on the contrary, when it is very little, we see it very distant; And the Change which happens in the Situation of our Eyes, according to the Changes of this Angle, is the means whereof our 
* The Soul does not make all the Judgements that are attributed to it, th●se Natural Judgements are only Sensations; and I only speak thus that I may better explain things.  Soul makes use, to judge of the distance or nearness of Objects; for even as a blind Man, who should have in his Hands two straight Sticks, whose length he did not know, might by a kind of Natural Geometry, judge very near of the distance of some Body, in touching it with the end of these two Sticks, by the disposition and distance of his hands: So it may be said, that the Soul Judges of the distance of an Object by the disposition of its Eyes, which is not the same, when the Angle by which he sees, is sometimes greater, 
See the 4th Article of Chap. 7.  and sometimes less, when the Object is nearer, and when it is farther off.  
We shall be easily persuaded of this, if we take the pains to make this very easy Experiment: Hang a Ring upon a Thread with the edge towards you, or else thrust one Stick into the Earth, and take another in your Hand, which shall be crooked at the end, go back two or three steps from the Ring or the Stick, wink with one Eye, and try to put the Stick in your Hand through the Ring, or to touch the other in the Ground traversly, about the height of your Eyes; you will be surprised, not to be able to do that once in an hundred times, which you believe is so easy to be done. Now if you even lay by the Stick, and attempt to put your Finger into the Ring, hanging with the edge towards you, you will find it difficult aforne you were just at it.  
But it must be well observed, that what I have said about putting a crooked Stick through a Ring, or touching another Stick traversly, will not hold, if the Eye be in a right Line with the opening of the Ring, for then there would be no difficulty in it; but it would be easier to effect it with one Eye shut, than with both the Eyes open, because that would guide us.  
Now it may be said, that the difficulty which is found in hitting the hole of the Ring traversly, with but one Eye open, is owing to this, that the Eye being shut, the Angle, which I have spoken of, is unknown; for to know the bigness of the Angle at the Eye, it is not sufficient to know the length of the Base, and one of the Angles at the Base, (unless the other be right) but we must also know the other Angle at the Base, or the length of one of the sides, which can't exactly be known, but by opening the other Eye: And thus the Soul cannot make use of its Natural Geometry to Judge of the distance of the Ring.  
The disposition of the Eyes, which accompanies the Angle, formed by the Visual Rays that meet in the Object, is then one of the best, and most Universal Methods, which the Soul makes use of, to Judge of the distance of Things: If this Angle then, does not admit of any Sensible Change, when the Object is near, if we approach to it, or recede from it; it will follow that the Method is false, and that the Soul cannot make use of it, to Judge of the distance of that Object.  
Now 'tis very easy to know, that this Angle changes remarkably, when an Object that is but one Foot from our Eyes, is removed to four; if it be only removed from four to eight, the change is much less sensible, if from eight to twelve, 'tis still less; if from a thousand to a hundred thousand, 'tis yet less. Lastly, the change will be wholly insensible, if the Object were removed into the Imaginary Spaces; so that if there were a considerable Space betwixt A and C, the Soul could not, by this means, know whether the Object is nearer to B or D.  
'Tis for this reason, that we see the Sun and Moon as if they were wrapped up in Clouds, althô they are extremely distant behind them, and that we Naturally believe all the Stars are at an equal distance, and that the Comets are fixed, or almost without any motion, towards the latter end of their Course: As also, that they wholly dissipate after some Months, because they remove from us, in very near a right Line, to our Eyes, and lose themselves in the great Spaces, whence they return not till after many Years, or even after many Ages.  
To explain the second way, 
The second way of Judging of the distance of Objects.  which the Soul makes use of, to Judge of the distance of Objects, we must know, that 'tis absolutely necessary that the Figure of the Eye be different, according to the different distance of the Objects that we see; for when a Man sees an Object near him, it's necessary that his Eyes were more extended than if the Object were farther off, because, that to the end the Rays of this Object may meet upon the Optic Nerve, (which is necessary for Vision) the distance between this Nerve and the Chrystaline Humour, must be the greater.  
It is true, that if the Chrystaline Humour became more Convex, when the Object is near, it would have the same effect as if the Eye was more extended; but it's incredible, that the Chrystaline Humour can easily change its Convexity, and yet, on the other side, we have a very sensible Proof, that the Eye is extended, or drawn out in length: for Anatomy teaches us, that there are Muscles which encompass the middle of the Eye, and that one may perceive the Effort of these Muscles in compressing, or extending it when any Object is to be seen very near.  
But 'tis not necessary to know here, after what manner this is done, it's enough that it happens from the change of the Eye, whether it be, that the Muscles, that environ it, compress it, or whether the little Nerves, that answer to the Ciliary Ligaments, which keep the Chrystaline, Humour suspended among the other Humours of the Eye, do relax, to increase the Convexity of the Eye, or contract themselves to diminish it.  
For, in fine, the change which happens, be it what it will, is only to cause, that the Rays of Objects may exactly meet together just upon the Optic Nerve. Now 'tis manifest, that when the Object is five hundred Paces, or ten thousand Leagues distant, we see it with the same disposition of the Eye, without any sensible change in the Muscles which encompass it, or in the Nerves which answer to the Ciliary Ligaments of the Chrystaline Humour; and the Rays of Objects meet very exactly upon the Retina, or Optic Nerve. Thus the Soul would Judge that Objects, ten thousand, or a hundred thousand Leagues distant, are only five or six hundred Paces off, if it Judged only of their distance by the disposition of the Eyes, which I have spoken of.  
However, 'tis certain that the Soul makes use of this means when the Object is near: If, for Example, an Object is but half a Foot from us, we distinguish well enough its distance, by the disposition of the Muscles, which compress our Eyes, so as to extend them a little; and even this disposition is painful: If the Object is at the distance of two Foot, we yet distinguish it, because the disposition of the Muscles is a little sensible, althô it is not any longer painful, but if we remove the Object to some considerable distance, this disposition of the Muscles becomes so insensible, that it does not in the least assist us in Judging of the distance of the Object.  
These are two Means that the Soul uses to Judge of the distance of Objects, which are very useless when the Object is five or six hundred Paces distant from us; and which, also, are not certain, althô the Object were nearer.  
The third Means consists in the bigness of the Image, 
The third Means to Judge of the distance of Objects.  which is Painted at the bottom of the Eye, and which represents the Objects as we see them. 'Tis granted, that this Image diminishes in proportion to the distance of the Object, but by how much the Object, that changes its distances removes farther off, by so much is the diminution less sensible: For when an Object is at some reasonable distance, suppose five or six hundred Paces, more or less, in proportion to its magnitude, there arises very considerable alterations in its Elongation, without any sensible change in the Image which represents it, as is easy to be showed. Thus, also, this third Means has the same defect as the two preceding.  
It may be further observed, that the Soul judges not of distant Objects, whose Image is Painted very small upon the Retina. For Example, when I see a Man, or a Tree, at the distance of a hundred Paces, or else many Stars in the Heavens, I judge not that the Man is more distant than the Tree, or that little Stars are farther off than the great ones, althô the Images of the Man, and little Stars, are Painted less upon the Retina than the Tree, or the great Stars.  
Moreover, the bigness of the Object must be known to judge near of its distance; and because I know that a House is greater than a Man, altho' the Image thereof be less than that of a Man, yet I do not therefore judge it nearer, imagine the same of the Stars, our Eyes representing them all at the same distance, althô it be very reasonable to believe some more distant from us than others. Thus there are an Infinity of Objects, whose distance we cannot know, since there's an Infinity of them whose greatness we are ignorant of.  
We also Judge of the distance of the Object, 
The fourth and fifth Means.  by the power whereby it acts upon our Eyes, because a distant one acts more weakly than another; also by the distinction and clearness of the Image which is formed in the Eye; because, when an Object is distant, its necessary that the Eyesight dilate, and consequently, the Rays meet together a little confusedly: Hence it is, that Objects which are but a little distinct, or such as we see confusedly appear distant from us; and on the contrary, clear and distinct Objects appear to be near us. It's evident enough, that these last means are not proper to Judge of the distance of Objects with any certainty: I shall not insist upon the last of all, which is that that helps the Imagination, and which easily carries the Soul to Judge of very distant Objects.  
The sixth and principle Means consists in this, 
The sixth Means to Judge of the distance of Bodies.  That the Eye does not exhibit to the Soul an Object by itself, and distinct from others, but also all Objects lying betwixt us and that, which we consider.  
When, for Example, we look upon a distant Steeple, we commonly see, at the same time, many interjacent Fields and Houses, and because we judge of the distance of these Fields and Houses, and see the Steeple is beyond them, we judge also that it is very distant, and also greater, than if we saw it alone: However, the Image thereof, which is traced at the bottom of our Eye, is always of an equal bigness, whether there are Fields and Houses betwixt us or not, provided we see it at an equal distance, which is supposed. Thus we judge of the bigness of Objects by their imagined distance, and the Bodies betwixt us and the Object do much assist our Imagination in it, even as we judge of Duration, or the length of Time, after some Action done by the remembrance of a confessed Series of Things, which we have done, or of Thoughts which we have successively had after this Action, for 'tis all these Thoughts and Actions which have succeeded one another, that assist our Mind in judging of the length or duration of some Time; or, rather, a confused remembrance of all the successive Thoughts about the same thing, is nothing else but our Judgement of Duration, even as a confused sight of the Fields, which are betwixt us and the Steeple, is the same thing as our Judgement of the distance thereof.  
Hence 'tis easy to know, the true Reason why the Moon appears greater when it rises, than when it is much elevated above the Horizon, for when it rises it appears many League's distant from us, and even beyond the Sensible Horizon, or the Earth which terminates our sight, whereas we judge it to be but about half a League from us, or seven or eight times as high as our Houses, when it is most elevated above the Horizon. Thus we judge it much greater when it is near the Horizon, than when it is very distant from it, because we imagine it much more distant from us, when it rises, than when is it very high.  
It's true, there are a great many Philosophers, who attribute what I have said to the Vapours which rise out of the Earth: I agree with them, that Vapours, refracting the Rays of Objects, make them appear the greater. I know there are more Vapours betwixt us and the Moon, when it rises, than when it is risen very high, and consequently, it must appear something greater, than if it were always equally distant from us: However, it cannot be said that this refraction of the Rays of the Moon, is the cause of these apparent Changes of its greatness, for this refraction hinders not, but that the Image which is traced in the bottom of our Eyes, at the rising of the Moon, is not less than that which is formed there when it has been risen a considerable time.  
Astronomers, which Measure the Diameters of the Planets, observe, that that of the Moon grows larger in proportion to its distance from the Horizon, and consequently, in proportion to its appearing less to us; so that the Diameter of the Image, Painted at the bottom of our Eyes, is lesser when we see it greater. Indeed, when the Moon arises, it's more distant from us, by the Semi-diameter of the Earth, than when it is perpendicularly over our Head, which is the reason that its Diameter is greater than when it arises above the Horizon, because than it approaches to us.  
That then, which is the cause of our seeing it greater when it rises, is not the refraction of its Rays, made by the Vapours coming out of the Earth, since the Image, which is formed by these Rays, is then less, but it is the Natural Judgement that we make of its distance, because it appears beyond the Earth, which we see very distant from us, as was explained before, and I'm surprised that Philosophers should look upon the reason of this appearance, and deceit of our Eyes, to be more difficult to find out, than the greatest Equations of Algebra.  
This means of Judging of the distance of any Object, by the Knowledge of the distance of Things, lying betwixt us and it, is of great use to us, when the other ways, which I have spoken of, fail us, for by this we can Judge, that certain Objects are distant from us many Leagues, which we cannot by any of the others, however, if we Examine, we shall find many defects in it.  
For, first, this way serves only to Judge of Objects which are upon the Earth, and but very rarely, and for the most, very unprofitably, of Things that are in the Air, or in the Heavens. Secondly, we can't make use of it upon the Earth, but in things that are a very few Leagues distant from us. And thirdly, we must be assured, that there are betwixt us and the Object, neither Valleys, Mountains, or any such thing, which hinders us from making use of this means. Lastly, I believe there are none who have not had Experience enough, in this subject, to be persuaded that it is extremely difficult, to make a certain Judgement of the distance of Objects, by a sensible view of Things placed betwixt them and the Object: But I have enlarged too much already upon this head.  
These are the Means by which we Judge of the distance of Objects, we have observed considerable defects in them, and may conclude, that the Judgements which are formed upon them must be very uncertain.  
Hence I can easily show the Truth of the Propositions which I have advanced. I have supposed the Object at 
* See the preceding Figure.  C, considerable distant from A, than it may by many steps advance towards D or B, without my knowing it, since I have no certain means to judge of its distance; it may even be supposed to recede towards D, when 'tis imagined to approach towards B, because the Image of the Object is sometimes Painted greater upon the Optic Nerves, whether because the Air, which is betwixt the Object and the Eye, causes a greater refraction one time than another, or whether it happens, sometimes, from the little tremble of this Nerve; or, lastly, whether the Impression which the imperfect uniting of the Rays, upon the Optic Nerve, are dispersed and communicated to the parts which ought not to be affected with them, for it may happen from many different Causes. Thus the Image of the same Objects, being enlarged on these occasions, inclines the Soul to believe the Object is near: Suppose as much be said about the other Propositions.  
Before I conclude this Chapter, I must observe, that it much concerns us, for the preservation of our Life, to know well the Motion and Rest of Bodies, in proportion to their nearness to us; and that it signifies little, to have an exact Knowledge of the Truth of these Things, when they are removed to a great distance from us. This will evidently show, that what I have advanced in general about all the Senses, as that they do not help us to the Knowledge of Things, but in respect to the preservation of our Body, and not according to what they are in themselves, is exactly true in this case; since we have a more exact Knowledge of the Motion, or Rest of Bodies, in proportion to their nearness: and which we could examine by the Senses, than when they are so distant; That the Relation they have to our Bodies ceases, as when they are five or six hundred Paces from us, if they are of an ordinary bigness, and even nearer than that if they are less; or, in fine, farther off, if they are greater.   

CHAP. X.  
Of Errors about Sensible Qualities.  
I. A distinction of Soul and Body.  
II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses.  
III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately United.  
IU. How Objects act upon Bodies.  
V How upon the Soul; with Reasons why the Soul does not perceive the Motions of the Fibres of the Body.  
VI Four things which are Confounded in every Sensation.  
WE have seen in the preceding Chapters, that the Judgements we form by these means of our Eyes, about Extension, Figure and Motion, are never exactly true; yet, we must confess, they are not absolutely false, they include, at least, this Truth, That Extension, Figure and Motion, whatever they are, are without us.  
It's true, we often see things which are not, and which never were; and we ought not to conclude, that a thing is without us, from hence only, that we see it without us; there is no necessary connexion between an Idea that is presented to the Mind of Man, and the Existence of a thing which this Idea represents. That which happens to those who sleep, or are delirious, sufficiently proves this; however, we can ordinarily be assured, that Extension, Figures and Motions, which we see, are without us: These are not mere imaginary things, they are real; and we are not deceived if we believe they have a real Existence, and which is independent of our Mind, though it's very 
* See the Explanations.  difficult to prove it.  
It is then evident, that the Judgements we make about the Extension, Figures, and Motions of Bodies, contain some Truth; but the same cannot be said of those things that belong to Light, Colours, Sapours, Odours, and all other sensible Qualities; for Truth is never to be found there, as we have shown before.  
We do not here distinguish Light from Colours, because we believe they are not very different, nor can be separately explained. We shall be obliged to speak of other sensible Qualities in General at the same time that we treat of these two, because they might be explained from the same Principles. We ought to be very attentive to the things that follow, for they are of the most important Consequence, and much more useful than those things we have yet spoken of.  
I suppose first, 
Distinction of the Soul and Body.  that the Reader has made some Reflection upon the two 
* I here cast Idea, every thing that is the immediate Object of the Mind.  Ideas which are found in our Soul, one which represents the Body to us, and the other the Mind; that he is able to distinguish them by the positive Attributes which they include; in a word, that he be well persuaded that Extension is different from Thought. Or else, I suppose him to have Read and Considered some Places of St. Augustin, as the 10th Chapt. of the 10th Book of the Trinity, the 4th and 14th Chap. of the Book of the Quantity of the Soul, or the Meditations of Descartes, especially that which respects the Distinction of the Soul and Body; Or, lastly, the Sixth Discourse of M. de Cordemoy, du discernement de l'ame & du Corpse.  
I suppose also, 
II. Explication of the Organs of the Senses.  that he knows the Anatomy of the Organs of the Senses, and that they are composed of small Branches, which have their Original in the middle of the Brain, whence they disperse themselves through all the Members of Sensation, and that at last, without any interruption, terminate at the Extreme parts of the Body; That whilst we are Awake or in Health, one of their Extremities cannot be moved but the other is also moved, because of their perpetual Intention; just as an extended Cord cannot be moved in one part, without communicating motion to another.  
The Reader must also know, that these little Strings or Branches, may be affected after two ways, either at the end, which is at the extremity of the Body, or at that which is in the Brain; If these little Strings are shaken by the Action of External Bodies upon them, and this Motion is not communicated to the Brain, as it often happens in sleep, than the Mind receives no new Sensation by that Action; but if these Strings are moved in the Brain by the Course of the Animal Spirits, or by some other Cause, the Soul perceives something, although the parts of these Strings, which are out of the Brain, and which are dispersed through all the parts of our Bodies, be in perfect rest, as it often happens in sleep.  
It is not amiss to observe here by the by, 
III. The Soul is immediately united to that part of the Brain where the Strings of the Organs of the Senses meet.  how Experience teaches us, that we do sometimes feel pain in such parts of our Bodies as have been cut off, because the Strings of the Brain which belong to those respective parts being shaken after the same manner as if they were effectually hurt, the Soul feels a very real Pain in these Imaginary Parts; Now all these things show visibly, that the Soul immediately resides in that part of the Brain where all the Organs of Sense meet; I mean, it perceives all the Changes, which pass there by means of Objects which Cause, or have been accustomed to Cause them; and perceives nothing that passes out of this part, but by the interposition of the Fibres which terminate there; This Position being well conceived, it will not be very difficult to show how Sensation is made, which must be explained by some Example.  
When I thrust the Point of a Needle into my Hand, 
iv An Example how Objects affect Bodies.  this Point removes and separates the Fibres of the Flesh, the Fibres are continued from this place to the Brain, and when one sleeps they are extended enough not to be shaken, unless those of the Brain be also shaken; it follows, then that the Extremities of these Fibres which are in the Brain are also moved. If the Motion of the Fibres in my Hand is moderate, that of the Fibres of the Brain will be so also; and if the Motion is violent to break something upon my Hand, it will be much stronger and more violent in the Brain.  
Thus also, if I come near the Fire, the small parts of Wood, which it continually, in great number, and with much violence, disperses, (as may be proved by Reason, though our Sight fails us in it) shake these Fibres, and communicate a part of their Motion; If this Motion, I say, is moderate, that of the extremity of the Fibres of the Brain which answer to the Hand, will be moderate; but if this Motion is violent enough in the Hand to separate some parts, as it happens when a Man burns, the Motion of the Internal Fibres of the Brain will be proportionably more violent. This is what happens to our Body when Objects Act upon it; We must now consider what happens to the Soul.  
It resides principally, 
V The effect th●● Objects have upon the Soul● and Reasans why the Soul d●●; n●t perceive the Motions of the Fiber; of the Bod.  if I may be permitted to say so, in this part of the Brain where all the Strings of our Nerves meet together, 'tis placed there to cherish and conserve all the parts of our Body, and consequently it's necessary that it be advertised of all the Changes which happen thereto, and that it can distinguish those which are Conformable to the Constitution of its Body from the others, because it would be very useless to know 'em absolutely, and without any relation to its Body. Since therefore all these Changes of our Fibres, which have no other real Existence but in the Motions which commonly differ only as to the more or less, it's necessary that the Soul look upon 'em as Changes essentially different; for although in themselves they differ but little, 
This ●●●fu● 〈…〉 〈◊〉 is only a Composed Sensation.  yet we must always consider 'em as essentially different in respect of the preservation of the Body.  
Motion, for Example, which causes Pain, very often differs but a little from that which causes Titillation, it is not necessary that there be an Essential difference between these two Motions; but it's necessary that there be an Essential difference between Titillation and Pain, which these two Motions cause in the Soul; for the shaking of the Fibres which accompanies Titillation, 
〈…〉 I 〈…〉 of Natural Judgements in ●. 1. Lib. 1.  informs the Soul of the good Constitution of its Body, that there is power enough to resist the impression of the Object, and that it must not apprehend itself hurt; but the Motion which accompanies Pain being a little more violent, is capable of breaking foam Fiber of the Body, and the Soul must be advertised by foam disagreeable Sensation to take care thereof; Thus, although the Motions which pass in the Body differ only as to more or less, between themselves, yet if they are considered in respect to the preservation of our Life, it may be said that they differ essentially.  
Hence our Soul is sensible only of the Action of Objects upon the Fibres of our Flesh; it would be of no use at all to it to know them, nor could it receive from them sufficient light, to judge whether the things about us were capable of destroying or cherishing the Oeconony of our Body; but it perceives itself touched by these Sensations which differ essentially; and precisely observing the Qualities of Objects, as they stand related to the Body, they make it to perceive very distinctly whether or no these Objects are capable of hurting it.  
Besides this, we must consider, that if the Soul only perceives that which passes in its Hand, when burnt; if it only sees the Motion and Separation of foam Fibres, it would not be at all concerned, and it might even sometimes out of Fancy and Caprice take a satisfaction in it, like those Madmen that divert themselves by breaking every thing to pieces in their Fury.  
Or else, even as a Prisoner would not be uneasy to see one demolish the Walls that confined him, but would even rejoice in hopes of being delivered very soon; so if we only perceive the separation of the parts of our Body, when we are burnt, or receive any hurt, we should soon be persuaded that our Happiness is not confined in the Body, which rather obstructs it, and therefore we should be very glad to see it destroyed.  
Hence it is observable, that the Author of the Union of our Soul and Body hath, with great Wisdom, ordained, that we should be sensible of pain, when there happens a change to the Body which is capable of hurting it; as when a Needle pierces the Flesh, or Fire separates foam parts thereof, and that we should be sensible of Titillation or an agreeable Heat when these Motions are moderated; without perceiving either the truth of what passes in our Body, or the Motions of these Fibres of which we have already spoke.  
First; Because in perceiving Pain and Pleasure which differ otherwise than in the more and less, we more easily distinguish Objects which are the occasion of them; Secondly, because this way of informing us, whether we ought to unite or separate from Bodies which are about us, is more short, and does less employ the Capacity of the Mind which was made for God. Lastly, Because Pain and Pleasure being Modifications of the Soul, which it perceives by means of its Body, and which affect more than the knowledge of Motion or foam Fibres, which belong thereto, this obliges the Mind to be much concerned, and strengthens the Union betwixt the Soul and Body of Man: From all this it is evident, that our Senses were not given us to teach us truth, but for the preservation of our Body.  
What we have said of Titillation and of Pain must be generally understood of all other Sensations, as will be better seen hereafter; We began with these two Sensations rather than with others, because they are more lively, and help us to conceive more sensibly what was to be said.  
It is now very easily shown how we fall into an Infinity of Errors about Light and Colours, and generally about all sensible Qualities. Cold. Heat, Odours, Sapours, Sound, Pain, Titillation, etc. And if I would stay to particularise every one belonging to every Object of the Senses, whole years would not suffice to enumerate them, because they are almost infinite, I shall therefore content myself to speak of 'em in General.  
In almost all Sensations there are four different things which are confounded, 
VI Four things which are confounded in every Sensation.  because they are done all together, and as it were in an Instant, and this is the Principle of all the other Errors of our Senses.  
The first is the Action of the Object; that is, in Heat, for Example, the Impulsion or Agitation of the Particles of Wood against the Fibres of the Hand.  
The second is the Passion of the Organ of Sense, that is, the Agitation of the Fibres of the Hand caused by that of the Particles of Fire, which Agitation is communicated to the Brain, because otherwise the Soul would perceive nothing.  
The third is the Passion, Sensation, or Perception of the Soul, that is, what every one feels who is near the Fire.  
The fourth is the Judgement that the Soul makes, as to that which is in the Hand or in the Fire: Now this Judgement is Natural, or rather it is a Compounded Sensation: But this Sensation, or this Natural Judgement, is almost always followed by another free Judgement, which the Soul is so accustomed to, that it can scarce refrain from it.  
These four things are very different, as may be showed, however Men do not carefully distinguish them, but are inclined to confound them by reason of the strict union betwixt the Soul and Body, which hinders us from separating the Properties of Matter from those of the Mind.  
Yet it is easy for any Man to know, that of these four things which pass in us when we perceive some Object, the two first are proper to the Body, and the two last to the Soul, provided he consider a little the Nature of the Soul and Body as he ought to do, which I have supposed; But these things must be explained in Particulars.   

CHAP. XI.  
I. Of the Error we are subject to in respect of the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Senses.  
II. The Cause of that Error.  
III. An Objection and Answer.  
IN this and the three following Chapters we shall Treat of these Four Things which are confounded and taken for pure Sensation; and shall only in general explain the Errors we are subject to; because, if we should enter into particulars, it would be endless. Yet, I do not doubt, but I may so assist the Mind of such as will seriously Meditate upon what shall be said, as to make them capable of discovering with great facility all the Errors that are caused from our Senses; but it will be requisite then, that they should think with foam application both upon the preceding and following Chapters.  
The first of these things which we confound in all our Sensations, 
I. Of the Erro we are ju●ject to in respect to the Objects acting upon the Fibres of our Serses.  is the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Body. It is most certain that there is hardly any distinction made between the Sensation of the Soul, and this Action of the Objects; of which there needs no proof; for Example, almost all Men imagine, that the heat they feel is in the Fire which causes it; that Light is in the Air, and Colours upon Coloured Objects; they have no thoughts upon the Motions of foam imperceptible Bodies which cause these Sensations.  
It is true, 
II. The Cause of the Error.  that they do not imagine that pain is in the Needle that pricks them, as they judge heat to be in the Fire; the reason is, because the Needle and its Action are visible, but the Particles of the Wood which go out from the Fire, and their Motion against our Hands are not seen; so that seeing nothing that strikes our Hands when we warm ourselves, and feeling heat, we naturally judge this heat to be in the Fire, because we see nothing else there.  
So that 'tis commonly true, that we attribute our Sensations to Objects, when the Causes of these Sensations are unknown to us, and because Pain and Tititation are produced by sensible Bodies, as with a Needle, a Feather which we see and touch, and therefre we do not judge that there is any thing like to these Sentiments, in those Objects that cause them in us.  
It is certain indeed, 
III. Objection.  that we do not imagine that the burning is in the Fire, but only in the Hand, although it is caused by Particles of the Wood as well as the Heat, which we always attribute to the Fire. But the reason of it is, the burning is a kind of Pain, and having many times judged that Pain is not in the External Body which Causes it, we are induced also to make the same Judgement of Burning.  
What further persuades us to judge after this manner, is, that Pain or Burning does strongly apply our Soul to the affected parts of our Bodies, and that diverts us from thinking on other things. Thus the Mind unites the Sensation of burning to that Object that is nearest to it. And because we soon after perceive that the burning hath left foam visible Marks in that part where we felt the Pain, this confirms us in the Judgement we have made that the burning is in the Hand.  
But this must not hinder us from receiving this general Rule, that we use to attribute our Sensations to Objects, every time they act upon us by the Motion of foam invisible Particle. This is the reason that we generally believe that Colours, Light, Odours, Taste, Sound, and foam other Sensations, are in the Air, or in the External Objects which cause them, because all Sensations are produced in us by the Motion of foam Imperceptible Bodies.   

CHAP. XII.  
I. Of the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses.  
II. That either we perceive not these Motions, or else confound them with our Sensations.  
III. Experience, which proves it.  
iv Three sorts of Sensations.  
V The Errors which accompany them.  
THE second thing that may be observed in each of our Sensations, 
I. Errors concerning the motions or shaking of the Fibres of our Senses. II. That we confound them with the Sensa●on of our Soul, and sometime again do not perceive them.  is the shaking of the Fibres of our Nerves, which is communicated unto the Brain; and we deceive ourselves in this, that we confound this shaking with the Sensation of the Soul, and judge there is none when we perceive it not by the Senses.  
We confound, for instance, the Motion that the Fire excites in the Fibres of our Hands with the Sensation of Heat, and we say that the Heat is in our Hand. But because we feel not the shaking that visible Objects produce in the Optic Nerve, which is in the bottom of the Eye, we think that this Nerve is not shaken, and that it is not covered with the Colours that appear to us; on the contrary, we judge that 'tis only external Objects upon which these Colours are dispersed, yet we may see by the following Experiment, that Colours are almost as strong and lively in the bottom of the Optic Nerve, as upon visible Objects.  
Take the Eye of an Ox that is newly killed, 
III. Experience, which proves it.  and strip the Skins from it that are opposite to the Apple of of the Eye, in the place where the Optic Nerve is, and put in their room a little bit of Paper that is very thin; and place this Eye in the hole of a Window, so that the Apple be in the Air, and the back part of the Eye be in the Chamber, which must be shut close so that it may be very dark; and then all the Colours of the Objects which are without the Chamber, will appear upon the bottom of the Eye, but represented upside down. And if these Colours should happen not to be very lively, if the Objects which are painted at the bottom of the Eye are too near, the Eye must be lengthened by pressing the sides closer together, and on the contrary, it must be compessed, if the Objects are too far off.  
By this Experiment, 'tis plain, that we ought to judge, or be sensible of the Colours at the bottom of our Eyes, after the same manner as we judge the Heat to be in our Hand, if our Senses were given us to discover the truth, and if we were guided by Reason in the Judgements we make upon the Objects of our Senses.  
But to be able to give a Reason for the variety of our Judgements upon sensible Qualities, 'tis necessary that we consider how strictly the Soul is united to the Body, and that it is so sensualized since Original Sin, that many things are attributed to it which belong to the Body, and that it is now hardly to be distinguished from it; so that it ascribes to it not only all its Sensations, which we are speaking of, but also the force of Imagining, and even sometimes the power of Reasoning. For there has been a great number of Philosophers that have been ignorant and foolish enough to believe, that the Soul was only a more fine and subtle part of the Body.  
If we read Tertullian, we shall soon see too many proofs of what I say, since we shall find him of the same Opinion, with a great number of Authors whom he Cites. It is true in the Book of the Soul he endeavours to prove, that Faith, Scripture, and even particular Revelation oblige us to believe that the Soul is Corporeal. I will not refute these Opinions, because I have already supposed that we ought to have read foam of St. Augustin or Descartes Works, which would have sufficiently shown the extravagancy of these Thoughts; and also would have confirmed the Mind in the distinction betwixt Extension and Thought, betwixt the Soul and Body.  
The Soul is then so blind that she is ignorant of herself, and does not see that her own Sensations belong to her. 
II. An Explanation of the three kinds of the Sensations of the Soul.  To explain this we must distinguish three sorts of Sensations in the Soul, some strong and lively, others weak and languishing, and some again in the medium between both.  
The strong and lively Sensations are those which surprise the Mind, and awaken it with some force, because they are either very agreeable, or very troublesome, such as are Pain or Pleasure, Heat or Cold, and generally all such as are not only accompanied with Impressions in the Brain, but also with some Motions of the Spirit, such as are proper for the exciting the Passions, as shall afterwards be explained.  
The Weak and Languishing Sensations are those which very little affect the Soul, and which are neither very agreeable, nor very troublesome, as a Moderate Light, all Colours, Ordinary Sounds, which are very weak, etc.  
And the Medium between both I call those sort of Sensations which indifferently touch the Soul, as a great Light, a violent Sound, etc. Now it is to be observed, that a Weak and Languishing Sensation may become indifferent, and afterwards strong and lively. For Example, the Sensation that we have of Light is weak, when the Light of a Flambeau is weak and languishing, or very far from us, and afterwards this Sensation may become indifferent, if the Flambeau be brought near enough to us; and at last it may become very strong and lively, if the Flambeau be brought so near our Eyes that they be dazzled with it, or else, when we look upon the Sun. Thus the Sensation of Light may be strong, weak, or moderate, according to its different degrees.  
These are then the Judgements that our Soul makes of these three sorts of Sensations, 
V Errors which accompany our Sensations.  wherein we may perceive, that it almost always blindly follows the sensible Impressions, or Natural Judgements of our Senses, and that it is pleased, if we may so say, in dispersing itself over all the Objects that it considers, and by divesting itself to  them.  
The first of these Sensations is so lively and moving, that the Soul can scarce hinder itself from acknowledging, that in some respect they belong to it, so that it does not only judge them to be in the Object, but also believes them to be in the Members of the Body, which it considers as a part of itself. Thus it judges that Cold and Heat are not only in the Ice and Fire, but that they are also in its own Hands.  
The Languishing Sensations so little affect the Soul, that it does not believe them to belong to it; nor that they are either within itself, or the Body, but only in the Objects: 'Tis for this reason that we take away Light and Colours from our Soul and Eyes, thereby to adorn External Objects with them, although Reason teaches us, that they are not in the Idea we have of Matter. And Experience shows us we ought to judge them in our Eyes, as well as upon Objects, since we see them as well there as in the Objects, as I have proved by the Instance of an Ox's Eye placed at the hole of a Window.  
Now the Reason why all Men do not immediately see that Colours, Odours, Taste, and all other Sensations are only Modifications of their Soul; is, because we have no clear Idea of our Soul. For when we know any thing by the Idea which represents it, we clearly know all the Modifications it can have. All Men agree, for Example, that Roundness is a Modification of Extension, by a clear Idea which represents it. 
See Chap. 7. 2d part of the 3d Book.  Thus not knowing our Soul by its Idea, as I shall explain hereafter, but only by the Internal Sentiment we have thereof, we know not by a simple Sight, but only by Reasoning, whether Whiteness, Light, Colours, and other Weak and Languishing Sensations, are not Modifications of our Soul; but for the lively Sensations, such as Pain and Pleasure, we easily judge they are within us because we are very sensible that they affect us; and have no need to know them by their Ideas, to perceive they belong us.  
As for Indifferent Sensations the Soul is very much perplexed with them, for on the one hand it would follow the Natural Judgements of the Senses and therefore it removes from it, as much as possible, these sort of Sensations, to attribute them to the Objects; but on the other side, it cannot avoid feeling within self that they belong to it, especially when these Sensations come near those that I call strong and lively; so that 'tis after this manner that it guides itself in the Judgement it makes of them; if a Sensation affects it very much, it concludes it to be in its own Body, as well as in the Object; and if it touches it but a little, the Soul believes it only in the Object. And if this Sensation is exactly in the Medium between the Strong and Weak, than it knows not what to determine, if it Judges by the Senses.  
For Instance, if one looks upon a Candle at a little distance, the Soul judges that the Light is only in the Object; but if the Candle is brought nearer, it judges it to be not only in the Candle, but also in the Eyes. But if we draw back about a foot from it, the Soul continues sometime without judging whether or no the Light is only in the Object; never thinking, as it ought to do, that this Light is or can be, only a Propriety, or Modification of Matter, and that it is only within itself; because it does not think it necessary to make use of its Reason to discover the Truth of what appears therein, but only of the Senses, which never discovers it, and are only given us for the preservation of our Bodies.  
Now why the Soul makes no use of her Reason, that is, of her Understanding, when she considers an Object which may be perceived by the Senses, is, because she is not affected by things that she perceives by the pure Understanding; and that, on the contrary, she is most lively touched by Sensible things; for the Soul applies itself much to what affects it much, and neglects applying itself to things that do not touch it. Thus she almost always conforms her free Judgements, to the Natural Judgements of her Senses.  
To be able to Judge rightly of Light and Colours, as well as all other Sensible Qualities, we must carefully distinguish the Sensation of Colour, from the Motion of the Optic Nerve, and by Reason, discover that Motions and Impulsions, are Proprieties of Bodies, and that thus they may meet in Objects, and in the Organs of our Senses; but that Light and Colours which we see, are Modifications of the Soul, very different from others, and of which also we have as different Ideas.  
It is certain, for instance, that a Country Man sees Colours very plainly, and distinguishes them from every thing that has no Colour. It is also as certain, that he perceives no Motion either in Coloured Objects, or in the bottom of his Eyes; and that therefore he concludes, Colour is not Motion.  
Likewise, a Country man is as sensible of Heat, and hath a sufficient Knowledge to distinguish it from all things which are not Heat, and yet he does not think that 'tis only because the Fibres of his Hands are moved; he thinks the Heat therefore, that he feels, is not Motion, since his Ideas of Heat and Motion are very different, and he can have the one without the other: For there is no reason to be given, that a Square is not round, but only because our Idea of a Square, is different from that we have of a Circle, and that we can think of the one, without thinking of the other.  
There's only a little attention requisite, to be able to know, that 'tis not necessary, that the Cause, which makes us feel such or such a thing, contains it in itself. Thus it is not needful, that I have Light in my Hand, that I might see it, when I strike my Eyes; nor is it necessary, that there should be Heat in the Fire, to make me feel it, when I hold my Hand to it; or, that any other Sensible Quality, that I perceive, should be in the Object; it is sufficient, that they cause some Motion in the Fibres of my Flesh, so that my Soul, which is united thereto, be Modified by some Sensation. There is no Relation, between Motions and Sensations, it is true, but there is none also between the Body and Mind; and since Nature, or the Will of our Creator, has joined these two Substances together, how opposite soever they are in their Nature, it must not seem surprising if their Modifications are Reciprocal; it is necessary that they should be so, that they may together make an entire Being.  
We must observe, that our Senses being given us for the Preservation of our Bodies, it is very proper that they should incline us, to make such Judgements as we do of Sensible Qualities. It is much more advantageous to us, to feel Pain and Heat, as being in our Bodies, than if we Judged them only to be in the Objects that cause them, because, that Pain and Heat being capable of prejudicing our Members, it is fit we should be advertized when they are affected therewith, so as to prevent their being hurt by them.  
But it is not so with Colours, they cannot easily hurt the bottom of the Eye where they meet together, and it is of no use for us to know they are Painted there. These Colours are only necessary to discover Objects more distinctly, and that is the reason our Senses induce us to attribute them only to the Objects. So the Judgements, to which the impression of our Senses carry us, are more Just, if we consider them with relation to the Preservation of our Bodies; but nevertheless, they are various, and very far from the Truth, as has already been shown, in part, and will more evidently appear hereafter.   

CHAP. XIII.  
I. Of the Nature of Sensations.  
II. That we know them better than we lelieve we do.  
III. An Objection and Answer.  
IU. Why we imagine we know nothing of our Sensations.  
V That we deceive ourselves in believing that all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects.  
VI Objection and Answer.  
THE third thing that is in each of our Sensations, 
I. A Definition of Sensations.  or in what we feel, for Example, when we are near the Fire, is, a Modification of our Soul in relation to what passes in the Body to which it is united. This Modification is agreeable, when what passes in the Body is proper to assist the Circulation of the Blood, and the other Functions of Life, which is called by the Equivocal Term of Heat; and this Modification is painful, and perfectly different from the other, when what passes in the Body is capable of incommoding and burning it, that is, when the Motions that are in the Body, are capable of breaking any of its Fibres, and this is generally called Pain or Burning, and so of other Sensations; but these are the common thoughts Men have upon this subject.  
The first Error is, that we unreasonably imagine we have no knowledge of our Sensations. 
II. That we know our own Sensations, better than we believe we do.  We see a great many Men every day who much concern themselves to know what Pleasure, Pain, and the other Sensations are; they grant that they are only in the Soul, and that they are but the Modifications of it. 'Tis true these sort of Men are very much to be admired at, for being willing to learn what they cannot but know already, for it is not possible that a Man should be entirely ignorant what Pain is, when he feels it.  
A Person, for Instance, that burns his Hand, distinguishes very well the Pain he feels from Light, Colour, Sound, Taste, Smell, Pleasure, and from all other Pain than what he feels; He very well distinguishes it from Admiration, from Desire, and Love; from a Square, a Circle, and Motion: in fine, he discerns it very different from all things which are not this Pain that he feels. Now, if he had no knowledge of Pain, I would fain know how he can have any certainty, that what he feels is none of these things.  
We have some knowledge therefore of what we immediately feel, when we see Colours, or when we have any other Sensation; and even 'tis most certain, that if we knew it not, we could know no sensible Object; for 'tis evident we could not distinguish Water from Wine, if we did not know that the Sensations we have of one of them, is different from those we have of the other, and so of all things we know by our Senses.  
It is true, that if I was pressed and required to explain what Pain, Pleasure, and Colour is, etc. I could not do it as it ought to be done by Words; but it follows not from thence, that if I see Colour, or burn myself, I do not know, at least, after some manner, what I actually feel.  
Now the reason why all Sensations cannot be well explained by Words, as all other things are, is, 
III. Objection and Answer.  because it depends upon the Will of Man, to affix the Ideas of Things to such Names as they please; they may call Heaven Ouranos, Schamajim, etc. as the Greeks and Hebrews did; but even those Men cannot, at their pleasure, affix their Sensations to Words, or even to any other thing; they see not Colours, altho' they speak of them, if they open not their Eyes: They relish not Tastes, if no change happens in the order of the Fibres of their Tongue or Brain. In a word, Sensations depend not upon Man's Will, and it is only he who hath made them, that preserves them in the mutual Correspondence that is between the Modifications of the Soul, and those of the Body; so that if any one should desire me to represent to him Heat or Colour, I cannot find Words for that, but I must impress in the Organs of his Senses, the Motions to which Nature unites these Sensations; I must take him to the Fire, and show him some Pictures.  
This is the Reason, why 'tis impossible to give the Blind the least Knowledge of what we mean by Red, Green, Yellow, etc. For since we cannot make ourselves be understood, when he that hears us, has not the same Ideas as we that speak; It is manifest, that Colours not being united to the sound of Words, or to the motion of the Nerve of the Ear, but to that of the Optic Nerve, they cannot be represented to the Blind, since their Optic Nerve cannot be shaken by coloured Objects.  
We have then some Knowledge of our Sensations, let us now see from whence it is, that we seek yet to know them, and believe ourselves ignorant thereof; this is, without doubt, the reason.  
The Soul, 
iv Why it is we imagine we do not know our own Sensations.  since Original Sin, is become, as it were, Corporeal, by its inclination; its love, for Sensible Things, continually diminishes the Union, or Relation, that it hath to Intelligible Things: It is with great disgust, that it conceives Things which do not produce some Sensations in it, and it immediately ceases to consider them: It does all that is in its power, to produce some Images in its Brain, which represent them; and it is so much accustomed to this kind of Conception from our Infancy, that it even thinks it cannot know, what it cannot imagine. Yet there are many things, which not being Corporeal, cannot be represented to the Mind by Corporeal Images, as our Soul, with all its Modifications: But when our Soul would represent to itself its own Nature and Sensations, it does all it can to form a Corporeal Image thereof; It seeks itself in all Corporeal Being's, and takes itself sometimes for one, and sometimes for another; one while for Air, and then again for Fire, or for the Harmony of the parts of its Body. Thus being willing to find itself amongst Bodies, and imagining its own Modifications, which are its Sensations, to be the Modifications of Bodies, we must not wonder if it Errs, and is entirely Ignorant of itself.  
What yet induces it further to be willing to imagine its Sensations, is, that it Judges them to be in the Objects, and that they are even Modifications thereof; and consequently, that 'tis something Corporeal, and which can be Imagined. It Judges therefore, that the Nature of its Sensations consists only in the Motion that causes them, or in some other Modification of a Body; but when it finds that which is different from what it feels, which is neither Corporeal, nor can be represented by Corporeal Images, this embarasses it, and makes it believe that it does not know its own Sensations.  
As for those, who do not make these vain Efforts, 
See the Explanations of the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part, l. 3.  to represent the Soul, and its Modifications, by Corporeal Images, and yet are Solicitous to know the Nature of their Sensations, they must consider, that neither the Soul, or its Modifications, are to be known by the Ideas, taking the word Idea in its true sense, as I have determined, and explained it in the Third Book, but only by an inward Sensation: So that when they desire the Soul, and its Sensations, to be explained by some Ideas, they require what is impossible for all Mankind to give them, since Man cannot Instruct us in giving us Ideas of Things, but only in making us reflect upon those we already have.  
The second Error we are subject to, in respect to our Sensations, is our attributing them to Objects, as has already been explained in the 11th and 12th Chapters.  
The third is, 
V That we deceive ourselves in believing that all Men have the same S●nsations of the same Objects.  our Judging that every one has the same Sensations of the same Objects. For Example, we believe all Mankind that sees the Sky, takes it to be Blue, and the Fields to be Green, and all Visible Objects to be after the same manner as they appear to us; and so of all other Sensible Qualities of the rest of our Senses. Many persons will wonder, that I should bring such things in question as they have thought Indisputable, yet I dare affirm, they have never had any reason to Judge of them after the manner they have done; and altho' I cannot Mathematically demonstrate to them that they are deceived, yet I can demonstrate, 'tis by the greatest Chance in the World if they are not deceived. Nay, I have sufficient Reasons to be assured, that they certainly, are in an Error.  
To know the Truth of what I advance, we must remember what I have already proved, viz. that there is a great difference between Sensations, and the causes of them; for from thence we may Judge, that its possible, absolutely speaking, that the same Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Optic Nerve, do not cause the same Sensations in different persons, that is, to see the same Colours; and that such a Motion may happen, which shall cause in one the Sensation of Green, or Grace in another, or even a new Sensation, which no body before ever had.  
It is certain that this may be, and that Reason does not demonstrate the contrary to us, yet 'tis generally agreed, that 'tis not probable it should be so; It is much more reasonable to believe, that God acts always after the same manner, in respect to the Union he hath created between our Souls and Bodies, and that he hath tied the same Ideas, and the same Sensations, to like Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Brain, altho' in different Persons.  
Let us take it for granted then, as the same Motions of those Fibres, which end in the middle of the Brain, are accompanied with the same Sensations in all Men; so if it happens, that the same Objects produce not the same Motions in their Brain, by consequence they do not excite the same Sensations in their Soul. Now it appears indisputable to me, that all men's Organs of their Senses, not being disposed after the same manner, they cannot receive the same impressions from the same Objects.  
For instance, The blows a Porter hits himself over the sides, to warm himself, would be sufficient to lame a great many Men: The same blow would produce many different Motions, and by consequence, as many different Sensations, in a Man of a strong Constitution, and in a Child, or a Woman, that is of a weak Constitution. So that there not being two Persons in the World, who we can be certain have the Organs of their Senses in a perfect conformity, we cannot affirm that there is two Persons in the World who have exactly the same Sensations of the same Objects.  
This is the Original of that strange variety which we meet with in the Inclinations of Men. There are some who love Music extremely, and others who are insensible of it; and even amongst those that delight in it, some love one kind of Music, and others another, according to the almost infinite diversity that is found in the Fibres of the Nerve of the Ear, in the Blood, and in the Spirits. For instance, how great a difference there is between the Music of France, that of Italy, of Chinese, and other places; and by consequence, between the Tastes that different People have of different kinds of Music. Nay, it even happens, that at different times, by the same Consorts, we receive different Impressions; for if the Imagination is heated by a great quantity of agitated Spirits, we are much more pleased with a bold and dissonant Music, than with one that is more sweet, and more agreeable to mathematical Rules and Exactness. This Experience proves, and it is not very difficult to give a reason of it.  
It is the same also of Odours, he that loves to smell of the Flower of an Orange, it may be cannot endure a Rose, and the contrary.  
There is likewise as much diversity in Tastes, as in any other of the Sensations; Sauces must be very different equally to please different Persons, nay, to please the same Person at different times. One loves that which is sweet, another that which is sour; one thinks Wine agreeable, another hates it; and the same Person who liked it when he was well, thinks it bitter and unpleasant when he's in a Fever; and so of the rest of the Senses: Yet all Men love Pleasure, they all delight in agreeable Sensations, and have all, in respect to that, the same Inclination; they receive not then the same Sensations of the same Objects, since they love them not equally.  
Thus, what makes one Man say he loves that which is sweet, is, because the Sensation he has thereof is agreeable; and that which causes another to say he does not love what is sweet, is, that indeed he has not the same Sensation as he that loves it: And when he says he loves not that which is sweet, he does not mean he does not love to have the same Sensation with the other, but that he has it not: So that he speaks improperly, when he says he loves not that which is sweet, he ought to say he does not love Sugar, Hony, etc. that every one else thinks to be sweet and agreeable, and that he has not the same Taste as others have, because the Fibres of his Tongue are otherwise disposed.  
This is a very Sensible Example: Suppose that of twenty Persons, there was one amongst them who had his Hands very cold, and knew not the Words that are made use of to explain the Sensations of heat and cold; and that on the contrary, all the rest had their Hands extremely hot. If in Winter, cold Water was carried to all of them to Wash in, those whose Hands were very hot, would immediately, upon washing one after another, say this Water is very cold, I don't love it; but when the other, whose Hands were extremely cold, should come at last to wash his Hands, he would say, on the contrary, I don't know why you don't love cold Water, for my part, I take a great deal of pleasure in feeling the cold, and washing my Hands in it.  
From this Instance 'tis very clear, that when this last should say I love cold, it should signify nothing else but that he loves heat, and feels it, whereas the others feel the contrary.  
And so when a Man says, I love what is bitter, and cannot abide sweet things, it is only to be understood, that he has not the same Sensations as those who say they love sweet Things, and have an aversion for whatsoever is bitter.  
It is then certain, that a Sensation which is agreeable to one Person, is also to all those who feel the same; but that the same Objects cause not the same Sensation in all the World, because of the different dispositions of the Organs of the Senses, which is of the highest consequence to be observed, both in respect to Philosophy and Morality.  
'Tis true, an Objection may here be raised, but 'twill be very easily solved, viz. It sometimes happens, that persons who extremely love certain sorts of Food, come afterwards to have an aversion for them, either because in Eating they have found some Dirt in them, or have been Sick, because they have Eat to excess of them; or else for some other reasons. These same Persons say, they no longer love the same Sensations that they loved formerly, for they have them still when they Eat the same Food, and yet they are not agreeable to them.  
To answer to this Objection, it must be observed, that when those Persons taste any Food that they have so much aversion to, they have two very different Sensations at the same time; they have that of the Food they Eat, according to the Objection, and they have also another Sensation of Dislike, which, for instance, proceeds from the strong Imagination they have of the Dirt in what they Eat: The reason of it is, that when two Motions are made in the Brain at the same time, the one is never excited after the other, except it be after a considerable time. Thus, because the agreeable Sensation never comes without this other disgustful one, and because we confound things that are produced at the same time, we imagine that this Sensation that was formerly agreeable to us, is now no longer so; Yet if it is always the same, it is necessary that it should always be agreeable. So that if we imagine it is not agreeable, 'tis because it is joined and confounded with another, that causes more distaste than the other does of agreeableness.  
There is more difficulty to prove that Colours, and some other Sensations, which I have called weak and languishing, are not the same in all Men, because all those Sensations so little affect the Soul, that we cannot distinguish them so well as we can Tastes, or other Sensations more strong and lively, the one being more agreeable than the other; and thus to discover the diversity of Sensations that are found in different Persons, by the variety of their pleasure or dislike: Reason, which always shows that the other Sensations are not the same in different Persons, tells us also, that there will be a variety in the Sensations they have of Colours. And indeed, there is no doubt but there is much diversity in the Organs of Sight in different Persons, as well as in those of the Ear, or the Taste; for there is no reason to suppose a perfect resemblance in the disposition of the Optic Nerve in all Men, since there is an infinite variety in every thing in Nature, and chief in those that are Material, 'tis therefore very probable that all Men see not the same Colours in the same Objects.  
Yet I believe it never, or very rarely happens, that Persons see White or Black to be of any other Colour than we do, altho' they do not see it equally White or Black: But for mixed Colours, as Red, Yellow, and Blue, and chief such as are compounded of all three, I believe there are few Persons who have perfectly the same Sensation of them. For Instance, there are some Persons, who when they look upon cettain Bodies with one Eye, take them to be Yellow, and when they behold them with the other, see them to be Green or Blue; yet if we supposed these Persons Born blind of one Eye, or with both their Eyes so disposed, to see that Blue which we call Green, they would believe they saw Objects of the same colour as we see them, because by Green or Blue, they would always have understood what they see Yellow or Red.  
We may further prove, that all Men see not the same Objects of the same Colour, because, according to the observation of some, the same Colours do not equally please all sorts of Persons, and if these Sensations were the same, they would be equally agreeable to all Men; but because very weighty doubts may be raised against the Answer I have given to the precedent Objection, I do not believe it solid enough to insist upon it.  
Indeed, it is very seldom that we are as much more pleased with one Colour than another, even as we are much more pleased with one Taste than another? The reason is, the Sensations of Colours are not given us to Judge, whether or no Bodies are proper for our Nourishment, that is distinguished by Pleasure and Pain, which are the Natural Characters of Good and Evil; Objects, in respect to their Colour, are neither good nor bad to Eat. If Objects appear agreeable, or disagreeable to us, in respect to their Colour, their sight would be always followed with the course of those Spirits which excite, and accompany the Passions, since the Soul cannot be touched without moving it, and we should often hate good Things, and love bad, so that we should not long preserve our lives. In fine, the Sensations of Colours are only given us to distinguish Bodies from one another, and therefore it does as well, if we see Herbs Red, as if we see them Green, provided the Person that sees them Red or Green, sees them always after the same manner.  
But we have said enough of these Sensations, let us now speak of Natural Judgements, and the free Judgements which accompany them; which is the fourth thing that we confound with the three others, that we have already mentioned.   

CHAP. XIV.  
I. Of the false Judgements that accompany our Sensations, and which we confound with them.  
II. Reasons of these false Judgements.  
III. That Error is not in our Sensations, but only in these Judgements.  
'TIS easily foreseen, 
I. Of the false Judgements that accompany our Sensations, and which we confound with them.  that we shall not meet with many Persons that will not be offended with this General Proposition that I here advance, viz. That we have no Sensation of External Objects, which include not one, or many Judgements; we know, very well, that the generality of the World do not believe, that there is so much as one Judgement in our Sensations, either true or false; so that these Persons, being surprised with the Novelty of this Proposition, will say, without doubt, in themselves, But how can it be? I do not Judge this Wall to be white, I see very well what it is: Nor do I Judge Pain to be in my Hand, I most certainly feel it to be there: And who can doubt of things so certain, if they do not feel Objects otherwise than I do? Indeed, their Inclinations for the Prejudices which they have imbibed from their Infancy, carries them much further, and if they do not Reproach and Contemn those, whom they believe to be persuaded of a contrary Opinion to their own, without doubt they deserve to be placed in the Number of Moderate Persons.  
But we must not here stay to Prophesy of the ill success of our Thoughts, it will be more to the purpose, to endeavour to produce them with the strongest Proofs, and so clearly discover them, that they may be no sooner well examined, or attentively considered, but they must be submitted to. Since 'tis necessary to prove that we have no Sensation of External Objects, which does not include some false Judgement, take it thus:  
It seems Indisputable to me, that our Souls do not fill those vast Spaces which are between us and the fixed Stars, altho' it should be granted that themselves are extended; so likewise, it is not reasonable to believe that our Souls are in the Firmament, when they behold the fixed Stars there: Nor is it Credible that they should go out of their Bodies a thousand Paces, to see Houses at that distance: It is therefore necessary, that our Souls see Houses and Stars where they are not, since it goes not out of the Body where it is, and yet sees them out of itself. Now as the Stars, which are immediately united to the Soul, which are those only that it can see, are not in the Heavens; it from thence follows, that all Men who see Stars in the Heavens, and afterwards voluntarily Judging that they are there, make two false Judgements, whereof the one is Natural, and the other Free. One is a Judgement of the Senses, or a Compounded Sensation, according to which we ought not to Judge, the other is a Free Judgement of the Will, which we cannot hinder ourselves from making; and by conquence, which we ought not to do, if we would avoid Error.  
But the reason that we believe that these Stars, 
II. The Reasons of these false Judgements.  which we see immediately are out of the Soul, and in the Firmament, is, because it is not in the power of the Soul to see them when it pleases, for it cannot perceive them, when the Motions, to which the Ideas of these Objects are Naturally tied, happen in its Brain. Now because the Soul perceives not the Motions of its Organs, but only its own Sensations, and that it knows these same Sensations are not produced in it by its own power, it is induced to Judge that they are without, and in the cause which represents them to it; and it hath so often made these kind of Judgements, in the same time it perceived the Objects, that it can scarcely hinder itself from making them.  
It will be very necessary to explain the foundation of what I have said, to show the usefulness of this infinite number of little Being's, that we call Species and Ideas, which are as nothing, and which represent all things; that we create and destroy when we please, and that our Ignorance hath made us imagine to render a Reason for things that we understand not. We should show the solidity of their Opinion, who believe God is the true Father of Light, who only Instructs all Men, without whom the most simple Truths could not be Intelligible, and the Sun, tho' never so bright, would not be so much as Visible to us; who acknowledge no other Nature than the Will of God, and who, upon these Reflections, have confessed that the Ideas, which represent the Creatures to us, are only the Perfections of God, which answer to these same Creatures, and represent them to us.  
It would be requisite also, to show the Nature of Ideas, and then it would be easy to speak more clearly of what I have mentioned, but that it would carry us too far. In the third Book, these things shall be more fully explained, and order requires it should be referred till then. It suffices, for the present, that I bring a most Sensible and Indisputable Example, wherein we shall find many Judgements confounded, with one and the same Sensation.  
I believe there is no body in the World, who looks upon the Moon, but sees it about a thousand Paces from himself, and who thinks it not greater, when it Rises or Sets, than when it is very high above the Horizon; and it may be also, that we only believe we see it greater, without thinking that we make any Judgement in its Sensation. Yet it is Indisputable, that if there was not some kind of Judgement included in the Sensation, we should not see the Moon in the distance it appears to be: And besides, it would appear less to us when it rises, than when it is got a great way above the Horizon; since we see it great when it rises, only because we believe it farther off, by a Natural Judgement, which I have spoken of in the 6th Chapter: But besides our Natural Judgements, which we may look upon as compounded Sensations, there is almost in all our Sensations a free Judgement; for Men not only determine by a Natural Judgement, that Pain, for instance, is in their Hand, but they also make a free Judgement thereof, they not only feel it there, but likewise believe it so, and have so habituated themselves to form such Judgements, that they find it very difficult to avoid it: Yet these Judgements are very false in themselves, altho' very useful for the preservation of Life, for our Senses Instruct us only for our Bodies, and all our free Judgements, which are conformable to our Senses, are very far from the Truth.  
But that we may not leave all these things, without giving some Means to discover the Reasons thereof, we must know that there are two sorts of Being's; such as our Soul sees immediately, and others that it knows only through the Means of the first. For Instance, when I perceive the Sun rising, I first perceive that which I see immediately, and because I perceive that first Sun only, by reason there is something without me, which produces certain Motions in my Eyes and Brain, I Judge that this first Sun, which is in my Soul, is without, and that it Exists.  
It may further happen that we see this first Sun, which is entirely united to our Soul, tho' the other be not upon the Horizon, and even whether it exists or no; so we may see this first Sun greater when the other rises, than when it is very high, and altho' it be true, that this first Sun that we immediately see, be greater than the other rises, it follows not from thence that this other be greater, for 'tis not properly that which rises, that we see, since it is distant from us many Millions of Miles, but it is that first that is truly greater, and such as we see it, because all things that we immediately see, are always what we see them to be, and we deceive ourselves only because we Judge, that what we immediately see is in the External Object, which causes that Vision in us.  
So when we see Light, in seeing this first Sun, which is immediately united to our Mind, we do not deceive ourselves in believing we see it, it is not possible to doubt thereof: But our Error is. our Willing without any Reason, nay, against all Reason, that this Light, that we immediately see, exists in the Sun, which is without us: 'Tis also the same thing in respect to other Objects of our Senses. 
III. Error is not in our Sensations, but only in our Judgements.   
If we observe carefully, what has been said in the beginning and continuation of this Work, we shall easily see, that of all things that happen in each Sensation, Error proceeds from the Judgements we make, by which we think that our Sensations are in the Objects.  
First, it is not an Error to be ignorant, that the Action of Objects consists in the Motion of some of their parts, and that this Motion communicates itself to the Organs of our Senses, which are the two first things to be observed in each Sensation; for there is a great deal of difference, between being ignorant of a thing, and having a false Notion of it.  
Secondly, we deceive ourselves not in the third, which is properly Sensation; when we feel Heat, see Light, Colours, or other Objects, it is true that we see them, altho' at the same time we should be Mad; for there is nothing more certain, than that all the Visionaries see what they think they do, and their Error consists only in this, that they Judge what they see, to exist truly without them, because they see it so.  
It is this Judgement that includes a Consent of our Liberty, and by consequence, that which is subject to Error; and we ought always to hinder ourselves from making it, according to the Rule we have laid down in the beginning of this Book: that we ought never to Judge of any thing, when we can hinder ourselves from it, and where Evidence and Certainty does not constrain us thereto, as it happens here; for altho' we feel ourselves extremely inclined, by a strong Habit, to Judge that our Sensations are in the Objects, as that Heat is in the Fire, and Colours in Pictures, yet we see not that certain Evidence and Reason, which presses, and obliges us, to believe it; and thus we voluntarily submit to Error, by the ill use that we make of our Liberty, when we freely form such Judgements.   

CHAP. XV.  
An Explanation of the particular Errors of Sight, which may serve us as an Example of the General Errors of our Senses.  
THE Way, I believe, is now made plain, for the discovery of the Errors of our Senses in general, as they have any Relation to Sensible Qualities, which have been treated on, upon the occasion of Light and Colours, which in order ought to be first explained. It seems necessary now to come to particulars, and to examine severally, the Errors into which every one of our Senses betray us; but we shall not now enlarge upon these things, because from what has been already said, a little attention will easily supply a long Discourse, which we should be obliged to make: We shall produce only the general Errors, into which our. Sight betrays us, in reference to Light and Colours; and we doubt not, but this Example alone, will be sufficient to inform us, of the Errors of all the other Senses.  
When we have looked some time upon the Sun, this is what passes in our Eyes and Soul; and these are the Errors we fall into. Those who know the first Elements of Dioptrics, and any thing of the admirable Structure of our Eyes, are not ignorant that the Rays of the Sun are refracted in the Chrystaline, and other Humours, and that they meet afterwards upon the Retina, or Optic Nerve, which, as it were, furnishes with Hang, all the bottom of the Eye, even as the Rays of the Sun, which pass through a Convex Glass, meet together in the focus, at two, three, or four Finger's breadth distant, in proportion to its Convexity: Now Experience shows, that if one put at the focus of the Convex-Glass, a little piece of Stuff, or black Paper 
* Black Paper easily burns, but there must be a greater Convexity to burn White Paper in the same time. , the Rays of the Sun make so great an impression upon this Stuff, or Paper, and agitate the small Particles thereof, with so great a violence, that they break and separate them from one another. In a word, they burn them, or reduce them into Smoke and Ashes. Thus we must conclude, from this Experience, that if the Pupil, through which the Light passes, were so dilated, that it would permit an easy passage for the Rays of the Sun, or on the contrary, was so contracted as to obstruct them, our Retina would suffer the same thing as the piece of Stuff, or black Paper, and the Fibres would be so very much agitated, that they would soon be broken and burnt. It is for this reason, that most Men are sensible of a Pain, if they look upon the Sun but for one moment, because they cannot so well close up the Orifice of the Pupil, but that there will enter sufficient Rays, to agitate the Strings of the Optic Nerve with much violence, and not without danger of breaking them.  
The Soul has no knowledge of what we have spoke, and when it looks upon the Sun, it neither perceives its Optic Nerve, nor any Motion in it; but that's not the Error, 'tis only a simple Ignorance: The first Error it falls into, is, that it Judges the Pain it feels, is in its Eye.  
If immediately, after looking upon the Sun, we go into a dark place, with our Eyes open, the Motion of the Fibres of the Optic Nerve, caused by the Rays of the Sun, diminishes, and changes by little and little. This is all the Change that can be perceived in the Eyes, however, 'tis not what the Soul perceives there, but only a White and Yellow Light: Its second Error is, it Judges that the Light it sees is in the Eyes, or upon the next Wall.  
In fine, the agitation of the Fibres of the Retina, always diminishes, and ceases by little and little; for when a Body has been shaken, nothing can be perceived in it but a diminution of its Motion, but 'tis not that which the Soul perceives in its Eyes, it sees the White become an Orange colour, afterwards Red, and then Blue; And the reason of this Error is, that we Judge there are changes in our Eyes, or upon the next Wall, that differ much, as to the more or less, because the Blue, Orange, and Red Colours, which we see, differ much otherwise among themselves besides in the more and less.  
These are some Errors which we are subject to in reference to Light and Colours; and these Errors beget many others, which shall be explained in the following Chapters.   

CHAP. XVI.  
I. That the Errors of our Senses are the most general and fruitful Principles, whence we draw all the false conclusions, which in their turns also, serve us for Principles.  
II. The Origine of Essential Differences.  
III. Of substantial Forms.  
iv Of some other Errors in the Philosophy of the Schools.  
I Suppose I have sufficiently explained, 
I. The Errors of our Senses serve us for the most useful, and fruitful Principles, to draw false Consequences, which in their turns also serve for Principles.  to unprejudiced Persons, and such as are capable of any attention of Mind, in what our Sensations consist, and the general Errors which are found in them. It rests now to show, that Men use these general Errors as incontestable Principles, by which they will explain all things, that they draw an Infinity of false Consequences from them, which also, in their turns, serve for Principles to draw other Consequences; and that thus, by little and little, they have composed Imaginary Sciences, that have nothing of substance or reality in them, and which they follow with a blind impetuosity; but which, like Phantasms, exhibit to those that embrace them only confusion, and the shame of being seduced, or that Character of Folly, which makes us take pleasure in feeding upon Illusions and Chimeras. But this must be particularised in some Examples.  
It has been already said, that we are accustomed to attribute our own Sensations to Objects, and that we judge Colours, Odours, Sapours, and other Sensible Qualities, to be in Objects that are Coloured, Odiferous, etc. We have discovered that this is an Error; we must now show that we make use of this Error, as a Principle whence we draw our false Consequences, which Consequences we also esteem as other Principles, upon which we build our Reasonings. In a word, we must here explain in what order the Mind proceeds, in searching out some special Truths; where this false Principle, viz. Our Sensations are in Objects, is once so imbibed, that it looks upon it as indubitable.  
But to render this more Sensible, let us take some particular Body, whose Nature we would inquire into, and let us see, for Example, what a Man would do, that should apply himself to know the Nature of Honey and Salt: The first thing, would be to consider their Colour, Smell, Taste, and other Sensible Qualities; what those of the Honey are, and what those of the Salt; in what they agree, and in what they differ; and what Relation they can have with the Qualities of other Bodies: This being done, I believe he would reason much after this manner, supposing he believed it an incontestable Principle, that Sensations were in Objects. 
The Original differences that are attributed to Objects; that these differences are in the Soul.   
Whatever I perceive by tasting, seeing, and feeling this Honey and Salt, are in this Honey and Salt. Now 'tis certain, that what I perceive in this Honey, differs essentially from what I perceive in this Salt; the whiteness of the Salt does, without doubt, differ more from the Colour of the Honey than in the more or less; and the sweetness of the Honey, from the pungent taste of the Salt; and consequently, there must be an essential difference betwixt Honey and Salt, since all that I am sensible of in both, does not only differ as to the more or less, but also essentially.  
This would be the first step this Man would make; for doubtless, he cannot judge that Honey and Salt differ essentially, but because there are some appearances in the one, essentially different from the other: I mean, the Sensations that he has of Honey, differ essentially from those of Salt, since he only judges thereof by the Impressions they make upon the Senses; he than looks upon this Consequence as a new Principle, from whence he draws other conclusions after this manner.  
Since then the Honey and Salt, 
The Original of substantial Forms.  and other natural Bodies, differ essentially from one another, it follows that those are grossly deceived, who would persuade us, that all the difference betwixt these Bodies consists only in the different Configuration of the Particles which compose them: For since Figure is not essential to different Bodies, let the Figure of those Particles, which are imagined to be in the Honey, be changed, the Honey will remain still Honey, altho' its parts should receive the Figure of the Parts of Salt. So that it's necessary there should be some substance, which being joined to the first common Matter of all different Bodies, constitutes their essential difference from one another.  
This is the second advance which this Man would make, and this is the happy discovery of substantial Forms: These are the fruitful substances which produce every thing in Nature, altho' they only subsist in the Imagination of our Philosophers. But let us see the Properties which he will liberally bestow upon this Entity of his Invention, for no doubt but he will dispoil other Substances, of their essential Properties, to  this.  
Since then, 
The Original of all other general Errors in the Physics of the Schools.  there are in every Natural Body two Substances which compose it; one which is common to Honey, Salt, and other Bodies; the other which makes Honey to be Honey, Salt, Salt, and other Bodies to be what they are. It follows that the first, which is Matter, having no contrariety, and being indifferent to all Forms, must rest without any force or action, because it has no need of defending itself; but for others, which are substantial Forms, they have need of being always accompanied with Qualities and Faculties to defend them; they must always be upon their Guard, for fear of being surprised; they must perpetually look to their own Preservation, extend their Empire over their Neighbouring Matter, and push their Conquests as far as they can, for if they were weak and actionless, other Forms would surprise them, and soon annihilate them; they must then always fight, and nourish these Antipathies, and Irreconcilable Hatreds, against other Hostile Forms which endeavour to destroy them.  
If it happens that one Form should take the Matter of another Form; As if, for Example, the form of a Carcase seize the Body of a Dog, this form must not be barely contented to annihilate the form of a Dog, its hatred must also extend to the destruction of all those qualities which its Enemy had; the hair of the Carcase must forthwith wax white, with a whiteness of a new creation; the Blood must be red after such a manner, as we cannot suspect it to be counterfeit, and the whole Body must be covered with qualities that are faithful to the new form, and defend it according to the little power which the qualities of a dead Body have, which must also be destroyed in their turn: But because they cannot always fight, and because all things seek rest, it's certainly necessary that the Fire, for instance, have its Centre, whether it always tends by its lightness, and natural Inclination, that it may once be at rest, and burn no more, and that it may even lay by its heat, which it only kept here below for its defence.  
These are a few of the Consequences which result from this last Principle, that there are Substantial Forms, which we have made our Philosopher conclude with a little too much liberty, for these are usually delivered with a graver Air.  
There are yet an Infinity of other Consequences, which every Philosopher is continually making according to his Humour and Inclination, according to the Fruitfulness or Barrenness of his Imagination; for these are the only things which make them differ from one another. We must not stop here, to overthrow these Chimerical Substances, other Persons have sufficiently examined them, and shown that there are no such things in Nature, and that they serve only to afford a very great number of ridiculous, and even contradictory Consequences. We are satisfied that we have discovered their Original in the Mind of Man, and to have showed that they are all owing, at this time, to the common Prejudice, That Sensations are in the Objects perceived: For, if what has been said, be considered with little attention, viz. That it's necessary, for the preservation of our Body, to have Sensations that are essentially different, altho' the Impressions, which Objects make upon our Bodies, differ very little; We shall clearly see, that 'tis a fault to imagine so great differences in the Objects of our Senses.  
But I must here mention, by the by, that there's nothing to be objected against these Terms, Form and Essential difference. Hony is certainly Honey by its form, and 'tis thus that it essentially differs from Salt, but this form, or this essential difference, consists only in the different Configuration of its parts; 'tis this different Configuration which causes Honey to be Honey, and Salt, Salt: And altho' its only accidental to Matter in general, to have the Configuration of the parts of Honey, or Salt, and so to have the form of Honey or Salt, it may, nevertheless, be said, that it is essential to Honey or Salt, to be what they are, to have such or such a Configuration of Parts. Even as Sensations of Cold, Heat, Pleasure, and Pain, are not essential to the Soul as a Soul, but because it is by these Sensations, that it's said to be sensible of Heat, Cold, Pleasure, and Pain.   

CHAP. XVII.  
I. Another Example drawn from Morals, which shows that our Senses only offer us false Goods.  
II. That 'tis God only who is our true Good.  
III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoics.  
IT has been sufficiently proved, in my Opinion, that this Prejudice, Our Sensations are in Objects, is a very fruitful Principle of Error in Physics; it must now be shown, from Reasons drawn from Morals, that the same Prejudice joined with this, That Objects are the only, and true Causes of our Sensations, is also very dangerous.  
There's nothing so common in the World, 
I. An Example drawn from Morals, that our Senses only offer us false Goods.  as to see Men who are Wedded to Sensible Goods: Some love Music, others good Eating, and others are passionate for other things. Now thus they reason, to persuade themselves that all these Objects are Goods, viz. All these agreeable Tastes which please us in Banquets, these Sounds which affect the Ear, and these other Pleasures which we perceive upon other occasions, are certainly included in Sensible Objects, or, at least, 'tis these Objects that are the occasion of them; or, in fine, we cannot have Sensations without them. Now 'tis impossible to doubt, whether Pleasure be Good, whether Pain be Evil; we are inwardly convinced thereof, and consequently, the Objects of our Senses are very real Goods, which we ought to enjoy that we may be happy.  
This is the Reasoning that we ordinarily, 
I shall explain in the last Book, in what sense Objects work upon Bodies.  and inconsiderately make; and this is that, which inclines us to believe that our Sensations are in Objects, that Objects have in themselves the power of making us Sensible; that we look upon things as our Goods, which are infinitely below us, which can only act upon our Bodies, by producing some Motions in their Fibres, but can never act upon our Souls, or make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain.  
Certainly, if it is not the Soul which acts upon itself, upon occasion of what passes in the Body, nothing else but God can do it; and if it is not the Soul which causes Pleasure, or Pain, according to the different shaking of the Fibres of its Body, as it's very likely it does not, since it often perceives Pleasure and Pain without its consent: I know no other Hand that is powerful enough to produce this Sensation in it, but that of the Author of Nature.  
Indeed, there's none but God that is our true Good, 
II. That 'tis God only who is our Good, and that all Sensible Objects can't make us sensible of Pleasure.  'tis he only that can affect us with all these Pleasures we are capable of, and who, in his Knowledge and Love, ha●● Decreed to excite them in us. And these Pleasures, which he hath linked to the Motions which pass in our Body, to make us careful of our own Preservation, are very little, very weak, and very short, altho' we are enslaved to them in this State whereinto Sin has reduced us; but the Pleasures which he will excite in his Elect in Heaven, are infinitely greater, since he made us to know and love him; for according to the Order of Nature, greater Goods affect us with greater Pleasure, and since God is infinitely above all things, the Pleasure of those that shall enjoy him will certainly surpass all Pleasures.  
What we have said of the Cause of our Errors, 
III. The Original of the Errors of the Epicureans and Sto●es.  in reference to Good, does sufficiently inform us of the falseness of the Opinions of the Stoics and Epicureans about the Supreme Good: The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure, and because they felt it as well in Vice as in Virtue, and even more commonly in the first than the second, they gave themselves up to all sorts of Voluptuousness.  
Now the first Cause of their Error was, that Judging falsely there was something agreeable in the Objects of their Senses, or that they were the true Causes of the Pleasures they felt, and being, besides this, convinced by an inward Sensation which they had in themselves, that Pleasure was a Good for them, or, at least, for the time they enjoyed it, they gave themselves up to the Government of all the Passions, which they apprehended would not incommode them afterwards; whereas, they ought to have considered, that the Pleasure which is felt in Sensible Things, cannot be in these things as their true Causes, nor after any other manner; and consequently, that Sensible Goods cannot be such in respect of our Soul. They should also have considered the other Things which we have explained.  
The Stoics, on the contrary, being persuaded that Sensible Pleasures were only in the Body, and for the Body, and that the Soul ought to have its particular Good, placed its Happiness in Virtue. Now this is the Origine of their Errors, they believed that Sensible Pain and Pleasures were not in the Soul, but only in the Body; they made use of this false Judgement as a Principle for other false Conclusions, as that Pain is not an Evil, nor Pleasure a Good; That the Pleasures of Sense are not good in themselves, but that they are common to Men and Beasts: And, nevertheless, it is easy to show, that altho' the Epicureans and Stoics were deceived in many things, yet they were in the right in some, for the happiness of the Happy consists in an accomplished Virtue; I would say, in the Knowledge and Love of God, and is a very great Pleasure which continually attends them.  
Let us then well remember, that external Objects include nothing, neither agreeable nor disagreeable, that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures, and that we have no reason either to fear or love them, but that God only is to be feared and loved, because he only is able to Punish or Reward us, to make us Sensible of Pain or Pleasure. In fine, 'tis only in God, and from God, that we can expect Pleasures, for which we have so strong, so natural, and so just an Inclination.   

CHAP. XVIII.  
I. Our Senses deceive us in things which are not Sensible.  
II. An Example drawn from the Conversation of Men.  
III. We must not confide in Sensible Habits.  
WE have sufficiently explained the Errors of our Senses, in respect of their Objects, as of Light, Colours, and other Sensible Qualities; we must now show how they seduce us about Objects, to which they have no relation, by obstructing our serious attention, and inclining us to Judge of them upon their Testimony. This is what deserves very well to be Explained.  
Attention and Application of Mind, 
I. That our Senses deceive us in things which are not Sensible.  to the clear and distinct Ideas we have of Objects, is the most necessary thing in the World to know their Nature; for as it is impossible to see the Beauty of any Work, without opening our Eyes, and looking earnestly upon it, so the Mind cannot evidently see the greatest part of Things, with the Relations they have to one another, unless it considers them attentively. Now 'tis certain, that nothing diverts us more from attending the clear and distinct Ideas of our Senses, and consequently, from removing us farther from the Truth, and also deceiving us.  
To apprehend this Truth it's necessary to know, that the three ways of perceiving, viz. by the Senses, Imaginations and Pure Understanding, do not all equally affect the Soul, and consequently, not afford the same equal attention to every thing it perceives by their means, for it is much affected with what touches it much, and less with that which touches it little.  
Now that which it perceives by the Senses, touches and engages it extremely, but that which it knows by the Imagination affects much less; but what the Understanding represents to it, I mean, what it perceives of itself independent of the Senses and Imagination, does very seldom excite it. No body can doubt, but that the least pain of the Senses is more present to the Mind, and renders it more attentive, than the Meditation of a thing of much greater consequence.  
The reason of this is, that the Senses represent Objects as present, but the Imagination as absent: Now, according to the Laws of Order, amongst many Goods or Evils proposed to the Soul, those which are present touch and affect the Soul more than all the others which are absent, because it's necessary for the Soul to determine readily upon what is to be done in this occurrence. Thus it is much more affected with a little Pricking, than with the most elevated Speculations; and the Pleasures and Evils of this World, make a greater impression upon it, than the terrible Pains, or infinite Pleasures of Eternity.  
The Senses then extremely affect the Soul with what they represent to it; now as it is limited, and cannot clearly conceive many things at a time, so it cannot clearly apprehend what the Understanding represents to it, at the same time as the Senses offer something to its consideration; it then forsakes the clear and distinct Ideas of the Understanding, however proper they are to discover the Truth of things as they are in themselves, and applies itself only to the confused Ideas of the Senses, which affect it more, and which represent things unto it, not as they are in themselves, but only according to the Relation they have with its Body.  
If a Man, 
II. An Example drawn from the Conversation of M●n.  for Example, would explain some Truth, it's necessary that he make use of Speech, and that he express his internal Motions and Sentiments in sensible Motions and Ways: Now the Soul cannot, at the same time, perceive distinctly many things. Thus having always a great attention for what comes by the Senses, it very seldom considers the reasons proposed to it, but it is much affected with the sensible Pleasure, which depends upon the Measure of Periods, upon the Relations of Gestures with Words, upon the Beauties of a Face, upon the Air and Manner of one that speaks; however, after it has heard, it must Judge, this is the Custom. Thus its Judgements must be different, according to the diversity of Impressions which it shall receive by the Senses.  
If, for Example, he that speaks, delivers himself easily; if he keeps an agreeable Measure in his Periods, if he has the Air of a Gentleman, and a Man of Sense, and if he is a Person of Quality, if he has a great Retinue, if he speaks with Authority and Gravity, if others hear him with Respect and Silence, if he Converses with Wits of the first Classis; in sine, if he is happy enough to please and to be esteemed, he shall have Reason in whatever he advances, his very Dress shall pass for Demonstration.  
But if he is so unhappy, as to have the contrary Qualities, however, concludingly he demonstrates, he shall prove nothing at all: Let him speak the finest things in the World, they shall never be taken notice of, the attention of his Auditors being only to that which touches the Senses; the disgust they shall entertain to see a Man appear despicably, shall wholly take them up, and divert that application which is due to his Thoughts; his attire shall make its Master, and every thing that he says, contemptible; and his way of speaking being that which is peculiar to a Thoughtful Philosopher, shall incline his Auditors to believe, that these sublime Truths he treats of, being above their ordinary Capacity, are only delirious and extravagant Notions.  
These are the Judgements of Men, their Eyes and Ears Judge of Truth, and not of Reason, even in these very things which depend only on Reason, because Men are only affected with sensible and agreeable Objects, and scarce ever bring with them a strong and serious Attention for the discovery of Truth. 
III. We must not rest upon a sensible and agreeable manner of doing 〈◊〉 thing.   
Nevertheless, it is very unjust to Judge of things after that manner, and to despise Truth, because it wants those Ornaments which please and slatter our Senses: Philosophers, and discerning Persons, should be ashamed to inquire more Industriously into agreeable Matters than into Truth itself, and to feed their Mind with the Vanity of Words, rather than the Truth of Things. 'Tis common to the unthinking part of the World, to Souls of Flesh and Blood, to suffer themselves to be won by the fine Periods, Figures and Motions, which excite the Passions. 
Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur, amantque  
Inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cernunt.  
Veraque constituunt, quae belle tangere possunt  
Aures, & lepido quae sunt fucata sonore.  But Wise men endeavour to Guard themselves against the Malignant Power, and prevailing Charms of these sensible Manners, of doing things; their Senses impose upon them, as well as other men's, for, indeed, they are Men, but they generously despise their Testimonies; they imitate the famous Example of the Judges of Areopagus, who forbade the Advocates to make use of deceitful Words and Figures, and would never hear them but in a dark place, lest their agreeable Gestures should persuade them in prejudice of Truth and Justice: And lastly, that they might apply themselves the better to consider the solidity of their Reasons.   

CHAP. XIX.  
Two other EXAMPLES.  
I. The first of our Errors concerning the Nature of Bodies.  
II. The second, of those that relate to the Qualities of these Bodies.  
WE have showed that there are a great number of Errors, whose first Original is owing to the strong application of the Soul for whatever comes by the Senses, and the inadvertence for things which the Understanding represents to it. We have given an Example of it, drawn from the Conversation of Men, which is of very great consequence in Morals: Here are now others, deduced from the Nature of Things, which its very necessary to observe in Physics.  
One of the principal Errors that respects Physics, 
I. Errors about the Nature of Bodies.  is, that Men imagine a much greater substance in Bodies, which fall under the Cognizance of their Senses, than others which they perceive not; the greatest part of Men believe, that there is much more Matter in Gold and Lead than in Air or Water: And even Children, who only observe by their Senses the effects of Air, commonly imagine that there is nothing real in it. Gold and Siver are very heavy, very hard and sensible; Water and Air, on the contrary, are insensible: From thence Men conclude, that the first have more reality than the last; they judge of the Truth of Things, by the sensible Impression which always deceives us, and neglect the clear and distinct Ideas of the Mind which never deceive us, because what is Sensible affects and touches us more, but what is intelligible stupifies us. These false Judgements respect the substance of Bodies; here's another which relates to the Qualities of these same Bodies.  
Men frequently Judge, 
II. Errors about their Qualities and Perfection.  that Objects, which excite in them the most agreeable Sensations, are the most perfect and pure, without knowing in what Perfection, and the Purity of Matter consists, and even without being concerned about it.  
They say, for Example, that Dirt is impure, and that Water is very clear and pure, but Camels who love muddy Waters, and those Animals that delight in Dirt, are not of their Opinion. These are Beasts, 'tis true, but Men that love the Entrails of a Woodcock, the Excrements of a Polecat, say not that this is impurity, altho' they say the same of all other kinds of Animals. Lastly, Musk and Amber are generally esteemed of all Men, tho' they are nothing else but Excrements.  
Certainly, Men never Judge of the Perfection of Matter and its Purity, but only in relation to their own Senses; and thence it happens, that the Senses being different in all Men, as has been sufficiently explained, they must judge very differently of the Perfection and Purity of Matter. Thus the Books, which are daily Composed upon the Imaginary Perfections, that are attributed to certain Bodies, are necessarily filled with Errors, and variety of strange Fancies, since the Reasonings, which they contain, are grounded only upon the false, confused and irregular Ideas of our Senses.  
Philosopher's must not say, that Matter is Pure or Impure; they know not what they precisely mean by the Words Pure and Impure; they should not speak without knowing what they say: I mean, without having clear and distinct Ideas, which answer to the terms they make use of, for if they had joined clear and distinct Ideas to each of these Words, they would see, that that which they call Pure, would very often be Impure; and that which appears to them to be Impure, would oftentimes be found very Pure.  
If they would, for Example, that that Matter should be the most Pure and Perfect, whose Parts are most thin and apt for Motion, Gold, Silver, and precious Stones, would be very imperfect Bodies; Air and Fire, contrariwise, would be very perfect: Flesh beginning to corrupt, and smell ill, would be tending to Perfection, and a noisome Carcase would be more perfect than common flesh.  
But if, on the contrary, they would have it, that the most perfect Bodies are they, whose parts were most gross and solid, and more unapt for Motion, the Earth would be more perfect than Gold, and the Air and Fire, would be the most imperfect of all Bodies.  
But if they would not affix these clear and distinct Ideas, to the terms Pure and Perfect, which I have mentioned, they are at liberty to substitute others in their room; but if they only pretend to define these Words by sensible Notions, they will eternally confound all things, since they will never fix a signification to the terms which expresses them. All Men, as I have already proved, have very different Sensations of the same Objects; we must not, therefore, define Objects by the Sensations which we have of them, except we delight in obscurity and confusion.  
But, in short, I cannot see that there is any Matter, not excepting even that which the very Heavens are composed of, that is more perfect than another: All Matter seems only capable of Figure and Motion, and 'tis the same thing to it, to have regular or irregular Figures and Motions. Reason does not tell us, that the Sun is more Perfect or Luminous than Dirt, nor that the Beauties of our Romances and Poets, have any advantage over corrupted Carcases, 'tis our false and delusive Senses which thus dictate to us. Whatever is objected against this, all Railleries', Exclamations, etc. will certainly appear ridiculous and cold to any one, which shall attentively examine the Reasons that I have brought.  
Those who perceive, or only have Sensations, believe the Sun full of Light, but those who know how to perceive and reason, do not believe it, provided they use as much Reason as Sensation. I am verily persuaded, that all those who differ the most, as to the Testimony of their Senses, would change their Opinion, if they would seriously meditate upon what has been said, but they love much to indulge the illusions of their Senses; they subject themselves a great while to their Prejudices, they too much forget their Mind, to know that all the Perfections, which they seem to see in Bodies, are only such in relation to it.  
'Tis not these sort of Men that I speak to, I am not concerned for their Approbation or Esteem, they will not hear, therefore they cannot Judge; it's enough that Truth is defended and approved, by those who seriously endeavour to be delivered from the Errors of their Senses, and to make a good use of the Light of their Mind: 'Tis these Persons only, would desire to Meditate upon these Thoughts, with the greatest attention they are capable of, in order to judge of them. I leave the Cause to them, to condemn or approve it as Judges, because that, by their Meditation, they have acquired to themselves such a Right of judging of the Merit, or Demerit of the Cause, that it cannot but in Justice be submitted to them.   

CHAP. XX.  
The Conclusion of this first Book,  
I. That our Senses are only given us for our bodies.  
II. That we must doubt of their Testimony.  
III. That it is not an inconsiderable thing to doubt as we ought to do.  
WE have, in my Opinion, 
I. That our Senses are only given us for the preservation of our Body.  sufficiently discovered the General Errors into which our Senses betray us, both in respect of their proper Objects, as also of those things which are not perceived but by the Understanding. I believe there is no Error we are subject to upon their occasion, whose Cause may not be discovered in some of those things which have been already mentioned, if they be well examined.  
We have also seen, that our Senses are very faithful and exact to Instruct in the Relations, which all Bodies, that are about us, have to one another, but that they are incapable of informing us, what Bodies are in themselves; that, a right use of them, tends only to the Preservation of our Health and Life; that we cannot sufficiently despise them, when they arrogate Dominion over the Mind. This is the thief thing which I wish may be well remembered in all this first Book, viz. That we conceive well that our Senses are only given us for the preservation of our Body, that we six this Thought in our Mind; and that to be delivered from the Ignorance we are now involved in, we seek for other assistances besides those which our Senses afford ●s.  
But if there are some Persons (as certainly there will be too many) who are not persuaded of there last Propositions from what I have here advanced, 
II. We must distrust the Testimony of our Senses.  I would, at least, desire this of them, That they would only learn a little to distrust their Senses; and if they will not wholly reject their Testimony, as false and deceitful, that they will not refuse to doubt of it.  
And indeed, it appears to me, that enough has been said, to create, at least, some scruple in the Mind of reasonable Persons; and consequently, to excite them to make use of their Liberty, otherwise than they have yet done: For if they begin to doubt, whether the Testimony of their Senses are true, they will more easily refrain their assent, and so keep themselves out of those Errors unto which they have hitherto been subject. Especially, if they well remember that Rule in the beginning of this Treatise, Never to give an entire assent but to things entirely evident, and to which they cannot refrain consenting, without knowing certain, that they should make an ill use of their Liberty, if they did not consent.  
Besides, 
III. Th●● it is not an inconsiderable thing to doubt as one ought to do.  let no one imagine that he has made but a small advancement, if he has only learned to doubt. To doubt with Judgement and Reason, is not so small a thing as People imagine, for here it may be said, that there's a great difference betwixt doubting and doubting, we doubt through Passion and Brutality, through Blindness and Malice; and lastly, through Fancy, and only because we would doubt. But we doubt also with Prudence and Caution, with Wisdom and Penetration of Mind. Academics and Atheists, doubt upon the first grounds, true Philosophers on the second: The first doubt is a doubt of darkness, which does not conduct us into light, but always removes us from it. The second doubt is begot of Light, and assists us in some manner to produce it in its proper place.  
Those who doubt only after the first manner, do not apprehend what it is to doubt with Judgement, they laugh at what Defeartes teaches us about doubting, in the first of his Metaphysical Meditations, because it appears to them that he would only have them doubt out of fancy; that he would only have them say, in general, that our Nature is infirm, our Mind is full of blindness, that we must take great care to deface these prejudices, and other like things. It is not sufficient to say, the Mind is weak, we must be sensible of its weaknesses. It is not enough to say, it is subject to Error, we must discover in what our Errors consist. This is what I believe has been begun in this first Book, by explaining the Nature and Errors of our Senses; I shall, in the second, prosecute the same design, by explaining the Nature and Errors of our Imagination.   
The End of the first Book.   

A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH.  
BOOK II. Of the Imagination.  

The First Part.  

CHAP. I.  
I. A general Idea of the Imagination.  
II. That it includes two faculties, the one Active, and the other Passive.  
III. The general Cause of the changes which happen to the Imagination of Man, and the design of this second Book.  
IN the preceding Book we have treated of the Senses, and have endeavoured to explain their Nature, precisely observing what use ought to be made of them. We have discovered the chief, and most general Errors which they make us subject to, and have attempted so to limit their power, that we may expect much, and fear nothing from them, if they are always kept within these limits we have prescribed. In this second Book, we shall treat of the Imagination, Natural Order obliging us to it, for there being so great a Relation between the Senses and the Imagination, we ought not to separate them. It will afterwards appear, that these two Powers differ amongst themselves only as to more or lest.  
This is the order we shall observe in this following. Treatise: It is divided into three Parts. In the first we shall explain the Physical Causes of the disorder and Errors of the Imagination. In the second, we shall make some application of these Causes to the most general Errors of the Imagination; and shall also speak of what may be called the Moral Causes of these Errors. In the third, we shall speak of the contagious Communication of strong Imaginations.  
If the generality of those things that are contained in this Treatise, are not so New, as what has been already said in explaining the Errors of the Senses, they will not however be of less use. Thinking Persons are sensible enough both of the Errors, and even of the Causes of the Errors whereof I treat; but very few make a sufficient reflection thereon. I pretend not to instruct all the World, 'tis the Ignorant I would teach, and only inform others, or rather I endeavour here both to instruct and inform myself.  
We have said in the first Book, 
I. A general Idea of the Imagination.  that the Organs of our Senses were composed of little Fibres, which on one side terminate in the outward parts of the body and skin, and on the other, at the middle of the Brain. Now these little Fibres may be moved two ways, either by beginning at the ends which terminate in the Brain, or those that terminate in the Exterior parts of the body. The agitation of these Fibres cannot be communicated unto the Brain; but the Soul must perceive something; If this Motion gins by an impression that the objects make upon the extremity of the Fibres of our Nerves, is so communicated to the Brain, than the Soul perceives and judges that what it 
* By a Natural judgement, which I 〈◊〉 before judge of in many places.  feels, is without, that is, it perceives an object as present. But if it is only the inward Fibres which are agitated by the course of the 〈◊〉 of Spirit, or by some other way, the Soul imagines and judges that what it imagines is not without, but within the Brain, that is, it perceives an object as absent. This is the difference there is between Sensation and Imagination.  
But it is requisite to observe, that the Fibres of the Brain, are much more agitated by the impression of Objects, than by the course of the Spirits; and that, that is the reason why the Soul is made more sensible by external Objects, which it looks upon as present, and, as it were, capable of making it immediately feel either pleasure or pain, than by the course of the Animal Spirits. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens in Persons who have their Animal Spirits very much agitated by Fasting, Watching, a high Fever, or by some violent Passion, that these Spirits move the internal Fibres of the Brain, with as much force as outward objects could do, so that these Persons perceive what they ought only to imagine, and think they see those objects before their Eyes, which are only in their Imagination. From whence it plainly appears, that in respect to what passes in the Body, the Senses and Imagination differ only as to More or Less, as I have before advanced.  
But to give a more particular and distinct Idea of Imagination, we must know, that every time there happens any change in that part of the Brain where the Nerves meet, there likewise happens some change in the Soul, that is, as we have already explained, if in this part there is any Motion that changes the order of its Fibres, there also happens some New perception in the Soul, and it feels or imagines some New thing; and the Soul can never perceive or imagine any thing anew, except there be some change in the Fibres of this same part of the Brain.  
So that the faculty of Imagining, or the Imagination, consists only in the power that the Soul has of forming to its self Images of objects, in producing a change in the Fibres of this part of the Brain, which may be called the principal part, since it answers to all the parts of our bodies, and is the place where our Soul immediately resides, if we may be permitted to say so.  
That shows us very evidently, that this power which the Soul hath of forming Images includes two things, the one depending upon the Soul itself, and the other upon the Body. 
II. Two faculties in the imagination, one Active, and the other Passive.  The first is Action, and the Command of the Will. The second is the Obedience that is given to it by the Animal Spirits, which trace these Images, and to the Fibres of the Brain, upon which they must be imprinted. In this discourse the name of Imagination is indifferently given to either of these two things, nor are they distinguished by the words Active and Passive which might be given to them; because, by the sense of what we shall speak, may easily be understood which of the two we mean, whether it be of the active imagination of the Soul, or passive imagination of the Body.  
We have not yet determined in particular, what that principal part is, which we have just spoke of, First, because we believe it very unnecessary. Secondly, because we have not a certain knowledge of it. And in fine, we think it better to be silent in a matter whose truth cannot here be demonstrated to others, although it were manifest to us what that principal part is.  
Let it be then according to the opinion of Willis, that common Sense resides in those two Corpuscles he calls Corpora Striata; Let the sinuosity of the Brain preserve the Species of the Memory; and let the Callous body be the seat of the Imagination; or following the Opinion of Fernellius, let us suppose it in the Pia Mater which involves the substance of the Brain, or with D'Cartes in the Glandula Pinealis; or, in fine, let it be in some other part, hitherto unknown, that our Soul exercises its principal functions, 'twill will be very indifferent to me. It suffices, that there is a principal part; Nay, it is absolutely necessary there should be such an one, as also that the foundation of D'Cartes system should subsist; for it ought to be well observed, that althô he were deceived when he assures us that the Soul is immediately united to the Glandula Pinealis, that ought not nevertheless to injure the foundation of his System, from which we shall always gather all the usefulness that can be expected from Truth, to improve ourselves in the knowledge of Man.  
Since then the Imagination consists only in the power that the Soul has of forming to itself Images of Objects, by imprinting them, if we may so say, 
III. The general cause of the Changes that happen in the Imagination, and the design of the 2d Book.  in the Fibres of its Brain; the more distinct and larger the footsteps of these Animal Spirits be, which are the traces of these Images, the more strongly and distinctly the Soul will imagine these Objects. Now even as breadth, depth, and clearness of the traces of any Graving, depend upon the force wherewith the Instrument is acted, and on the Obedience that the Copper renders to the Workman; so the depth, and clearness of the Impressions made on the Imagination depend upon the force of the Animal Spirits, and the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain; 'tis the variety that is found in both these, which makes almost all this great difference that we observe in Persons Minds.  
For 'tis no difficult thing to give a reason for all the different Characters which we meet with in the Mind of Man. On the one side, through Abundance and Want, Agitation and Slowness, or largeness and smallness of the Animal Spirits; and on the other side, through the Delicateness and Courseness, Humidity and Dryness, Flexibility or Inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain; and in fine, through the relation that these Animal Spirits may have with these Fibres. And it would be very reasonable for every one, first to endeavour to represent to himself the different Combinations of these things, and to apply them to all the different Dispositions they meet with; because it is always more useful, nay, even more agreeable to make use of our own Wit, and so accustom it of itself to discover truth, then to suffer it to be spoiled with idleness, by only applying it to such things as are already well known and discovered. Besides, there are some things to be observed in the difference of Peoples Genii that are so fine and so delicate, that althô we may be able to discover and perceive them well ourselves, yet we cannot represent them to, nor make others sensible of them.  
But to explain as much as possible, all these differences that are to be observed in Dispositions; and that very one may the more easily observe in himself the Cause of all the changes that he feels at different times, it seems very proper in general to examine the Cause of these Changes which happen in the Animal Spirits, and in the Fibres of the Brain; because thereby we shall discover all that are found in the Imagination.  
Man never continues very long in the same Mind; every one hath sufficient inward proofs of his own inconstancy, he judges of the same Subject sometimes after one manner, and sometimes after another. In a word, the Life of Man consists only in a Circulation of Blood, and in another Circulation of Thoughts and Desires; and it seems the best way of employing his time would be, in seeking after the Cause of these Changes which happen to us, so that way to know ourselves.   

CHAP. II.  
I. Of the Animal Spirits, and the Changes to which they are subject in general.  
II. That the Chyle goes to the Heart, and thereby produces some change in the Spirits.  
III. That Wine has the same effect.  
'TIS agreed by every on, 
I. Of the Animal Spirits.  that the Animal Spirits are only the most subtle and active parts of the Blood, which subtilises and agitates itself chief by the Fermentation that it receives in the Heart, and by the violent Motion of the Muscles, whereof this part is composed; that the Spirits are conducted with the most of the blood through the Arteries into the Brain; and that there they are separated by some parts that are destined to this use, which are not yet agreed upon.  
From hence may be concluded, that where the Blood is very subtle, there are much Animal Spirits, but where it is gross there are but a sew; that if the Blood is composed of such parts as are easily received into the Heart, or very proper for Motion, the Spirits which are in the Brain, will be extremely heated or agitated; and if on the contrary the Blood ferments not sufficiently in the Heart, the Animal Spirits will be languishing without action, and without strength: so that according to the solidity which shall be found in the parts of the Blood, the Animal Spirits shall be more or less solid, and consequently have more or less strength in their Motion. But these things must be explained more at length, by Examples and incontestible Experiments, to make the truth evident.  
The Authority of the Ancients has not only blinded the Minds of some Men, 
II. That the Chyle goes to the heart and causes some change in the Spirits.  but we may say it has shut their Eyes also. For many Persons have still such a respect for their opinion, or it may be, so opinionative, that they will not see some things, which they could no longer contradict, if they would only please to open their Eyes. We may see every day Persons that are much esteemed for their Learning, who writ Books and publish Conferences against the visible and sensible Experiences of the Circulation of the Blood, against that of Weight, the Exastick power of the Air, and others of the like Nature. The discovery that Mr. Pecquet has made in our time, which we make use of here is in the Number of those that are unfortunate only, because he discovered it before he had grey Hairs and a venerable Beard. But we shall nevertheless make use of it, not fearing but there will be some Judicious Persons who will not find fault with it.  
According to this discovery the Chyle goes not immediately from the Bowels into the Liver by the Mesaraick Veins, as the Ancients believed, but passes from the Bowels into the Lacteal Veins, and afterwards into certain receptacles where they meet, and from thence it goes by the Thoraick Dust or Canal along the Vertebres of the Back, and so mingles itself with the Blood in the Axillary Vein, which enters into the upper part of the Vena Cava; and thus being mingled with the Blood it meets in the Heart.  
From this Experiment may be concluded that the Blood that is mingled with the Chyle, being very different from the other Blood, which has already Circulated many times through the Heart, the Animal Spirits which are only the most subtle parts thereof, will be also very different, in Persons that are Fasting, and others who have just Eat. Moreover, because that amongst Meats and Drinks which are generally used, there is great variety, and even those Persons that use them have bodies diversely disposed; two Persons that have just Dined, and at the same Table, will feel in their faculties of Imagination so great a variety of changes, that it would be impossible to describe.  
It is true, that those who are in perfect health digest so quick, that the entering of the Chyle into the Heart, scarcely augments or diminishes any of its heat, and hinders not the Blood from fermenting there almost the same manner, as if it entered only by itself; so that their Animal Spirits, and by consequence their faculty of imagining, receives very little, if any change. But for Old and infirm People, they observe in themselves very sensible changes after they have Eat, they grow very dull and sleepy, or at least their imagination becomes very Languishing, and they have neither Vivacity or quickness left; they no longer conceive any thing distinctly, nor can they apply themselves to any thing whatsoever; in a word, they are perfectly altered from what they were before.  
But that the most healthful and strongest may also have sensible proofs of what we have already said, 
III. That Wine produces the same effect.  they need only reflect upon what happens to them when they have drunk more Wine than they are accustomed to, or else by observing what would be the effects if they drink Wine one Meal, and Water another. For 'tis certain, that if they are not entirely stupid, or if their bodies are not composed after a very extraordinary manner, they shall soon perceive a gaiety of temper, some little drowsiness, or some other like accident.  
Wine is so Spiritous, that it comes near the nature of our Animal Spirits; but are these a little too luxurious to submit to the command of the Will, because of their Solidity and excessive Agitation. Thus even in the strongest and most vigorous Men, it produces greater changes in the Imagination, and in all the parts of the body, 
Vinum Luctator delosus est.  than Meat or any other Liquors do. It gives us the Foil, to speak with Plautus, and produces many effects in the Mind, which are not so advantageous as those that Horace describes in these Verses.  
Quid non ebrietas designat? Operta recludit,  
Spes jubet esse ratas: in praelia tendit inermes:  
Sollicitis animis onus eximit: addocet arts.  
Faecundi Calices quem non fecere disertum?  
Contracta quem non in paupertate solutum?  
It would be easy enough to give a reason of the principal effects, that the mingling of the Chyle with the Blood produces in the Animal Spirits, and afterwards in the Brain, and even in the Soul itself. As why Wine rejoices us, and gives a certain Vivacity to the Wit, when it is taken with Moderation? and for sometime besots Men, when 'tis drank to Excess? From whence proceeds the heaviness after Meals, and many other such things, for which generally very ridiculous reasons has been given. But though we shall not here make a Book of Natural Philosophy, yet it will be necessary to give some Idea of the Anatomy of the Brain, or make some Suppositions as Mr. D'Cartes has done in his Treatise of Man, without which 'twill be impossible to explain ourselves. But if one reads this Treatise of Monsieur D'Cartes with attention, we may satisfy ourselves upon these questions, because he explains all these things, or at least, gives a sufficient light to discover them, as he has done by Meditation, provided one has some Knowledge of his PRINCIPLES.   

CHAP. III.  
That the Air one breaths, causes likewise some change in the Spirits.  
THE second general Cause of the changes which happens in the Animal Spirits, is the Air we breathe; for, altho' it does immediately make as sensible impressions as the Chyle, nevertheless, in some time, it produces the same effect as the Juice of our Food does presently. This Air enters from Branches of the Windpipe into that of the Venous Artery, and from thence it mingles itself, and ferments with the rest of the Blood in the Heart; and according to its particular disposition, and that of the Blood, it produces great changes in the Animal Spirits, and by consequence, in the faculty of Imagining.  
I know that there are some Persons, who do not believe that the Air mingles itself with the Blood, in the Lungs and Heart, because by their Eyes they cannot discover, in the branches of the Windpipe and those of the Venous Artery, the passages whereby the Air is communicated. But we must not confine the Action of the Mind to that of the Senses, it can penetrate what is impenetrable by them, and apply itself to such things which they cannot. 'Tis certain, that some parts of the Blood continually pass from the branches of the Venous Artery, into those of the Windpipe, as the smell and moistness of the breath sufficiently proves, and yet the passages of this communication are imperceptible; why, therefore, cannot the subtle parts of the Air pass from the branches of the Windpipe into the Venous Artery, altho' the passages of this communication are not so visible. In short, more humours are evacuated by transpiration, from the imperceptible Pores of the Arteries and Skin, than by any other passages of the Body; and even the Pores of the most solid Metals are not so small, but that there are Bodies in Nature small enough to find a free passage, for otherwise these Pores would be closed up. It is true, that the Gross, and branchy parts of the Air, cannot pass through the ordinary Pores of Bodies; and that even Water, altho' very gross, can glide through those passages, where this Air is sometime forced to stop. But we are not speaking here of those gross and branchy parts of the Air; they are, it seems, unuseful enough for fermentation, 'tis only of the smallest parts, such as are swift and sharp, that we speak of, and which have none, or very small branches, to stop them, because they are the most proper for the fermentation of the Blood.  
I might, nevertheless, affirm, upon the Relation of Silvius, that even the grossest part of the Air pass from the Windpipe into the Heart, since he assures us, that he hath seen it pass thither by the help of M. de Swamerdam; for it is more reasonable to believe a Man, who says he has seen it, than a thousand others, who only speak of it by chance. It is then certain, that the most subtle parts of the Air, which we breath, enters into our Heart, and with the Blood and Chyle, maintains there that fire which gives Life and Motion to our Bodies; and that, according to their different Qualities, they produce great changes in the fermentation of the Blood, and in the Animal Spirits.  
The truth of this is every day made evident, by the divers Humours, and different Characters of Persons dispositions that are of different Countries. For Example, the Gascons have a more lively Imagination than the Normans; those of Rouen, Diep, and Picardy, differ very much among themselves, and that much more from the Lower Normans, 
Nunquid non ultra est sapientia in Teman? Jer. c. 49. v. 7.  altho' they be very near together: But if we consider Men, whose Countries are at a greater distance, we shall meet with differences still more strange, as an Italian, and German, or a Dutchman. In fine, there has in all times been some places that have been renowned for the Wisdom of their Inhabitants, as Teman and Athens; and others for their Stupidity, as Thebes, Abdera, and some others.  
Athenis tenue coelum, ex quo acutiores etiam putantur Attici, crassum Thebis. Cic. de fato.  
Abderitanae pectora plebis habes. Mart.  
Boeotum in crasso jurares aere natum. Hor.   

CHAP. IU.  
I. Of the Change wrought in the Animal Spirits, by the Nerves, that go to the Lungs and Heart.  
II. Of that which is caused by the Nerves, that pass from the Liver to the Spleen, and so into the Bowels.  
III. That all this is done without the assistance of our Will, but cannot be effected without a Providence.  
THE third Cause of those changes that happen to the Animal Spirits, is the most general and most active of all, because it is that which produces, maintains, and fortifies all the Passions. To apprehend which well, it's necessary that we know that the fifth, sixth, and eighth pair of the Nerves, have most of their branches extended through the Breast and Belly, where they are very useful for the preservation of the Body, but extremely dangerous to the Soul, because the action of these Nerves do not depend upon the Will, as those do, which serve to move the Arms, Legs, and other external parts of the Body, 
I. of the change of the Spirits, caused by the Nerves, which go to the Lungs and Heart.  for they act much more upon the Soul, than that does upon them.  
It must therefore be considered, that many branches of the eight pair of the Nerves, cast themselves amongst the chief Fibres of all the Muscles, which is the Heart; that they encompass its Orifices, Auricles, and Arteries; that they spread themselves even in the substance of the Lungs, and so, by their different motions, produce very considerable changes in the Blood: For the Nerves, which are dispersed through the Fibres of the Heart, cause it somerimes to extend, and then again to contract, with too much force and precipitancy, pushing, with much violence, a great quantity of Blood towards the Head, and all the external parts of the Body; yet, sometimes, these Nerves produce an effect directly contrary. And the Nerves, which encompass the Orifices, Auricles, and Arteries of the Heart, cause very near the same effect with those Spiracles, or breathing Holes, with which the Chemists moderate the heat of their Furnaces; and as the Spouts do, which are made use of in Fountains, to diminish or increase the force of the stream: For the use of these Nerves is diversely to contract, or dilate the Orifices of the Heart, and so to hasten or retard the filling, and evacuation of the Blood, and thereby to augment of diminish its heat. Thus the Nerves, which are dispersed through the Lungs, have also the same use; for the Lungs are composed only of the branches of the Windpipe, of the Venous Artery, and Arterious Vein, interwoven one with another; it is visible that the Nerves, which are extended throughout the whole substance, by contracting of them, hinders the Air from passing with so much liberty through the branches of the Windpipe, and likewise impedes the motion of the Blood through the Venous Artery into the Arterious Vein, and so into the Heart. Thus these Nerves, according to their different agitation, still augment and diminish the heat and motion of the Blood.  
In all our Passions, we have very sensible Experiments of these different degrees of heat in our Heart. Sometimes we feel it manifestly increase and diminish all of a sudden; and as we falsely judge that our Sensations are in the parts of our Bodies, and so by that means excite our Soul, as it was explained in the first Book, so almost all our Philosophers have imagined, that the Heart was the principal seat of the Passions of the Soul; and this is still the most commonly received Opinion.  
Now, because the faculty of Imagining receives great changes by what happens to the Animal Spirits, and that the Animal Spirits differ very much, according to the different fermentation of the Blood which is made in the Heart, it is very easy to discover why passionate Persons imagine things quite after another manner, from those who consider them in cold Blood.  
The other Cause, which contributes very much either to the augmenting, or diminishing these extraordinary fermentations of the Blood in the Heart, consists in the action of many other branches of the Nerves, which we have already spoke of.  
These branches spread themselves in the Liver, 
II. Of the change of the Spirits caused by the Nerves which go to the Liver, to the Spleen, and the rest of the Bowels.  which contains the most subtle part of the Blood, or what is commonly called the Bile; and in the Spleen, which contains the more gross or Melancholy; in the Pancreas, which contains an acid Juice very proper for fermentation; In the Stomach, Bowels, and other parts which contain the Chyle: And indeed, they are dispersed through every place which can contribute any thing to the varying the fermentation of the Blood in the Heart. Also, the Arteries and Veins are united to these Nerves, as Willis has discovered of the lower Trunk of the great Artery, which is tied to them near the Heart, of the Axillary Artery on the right side the Emulgent Vein, and of some others.  
Thus the use of the Nerves, being diversely to act those parts to which they are joined, it is easy to conceive how the Nerve, which environs the Liver, may, in contracting it, cause a great quantity of Bile to run into the Veins, and into the Dust of the Bile, which being mingled with the Blood in the Veins, and with the Chyle, enters into the Heart through the Dust of the Bile, and there produces a more violent heat than ordinary.  
Thus, when we are moved with certain Passions, the Blood boils in the Arteries and Veins, and this heat spreads itself through the whole Body; the Head is inflamed, and filled with so great a number of Animal Spirits, which being too brisk, and too much agitated by their impetuous course, hinder the Imagination from representing any other things, than those whose Images they form in the Brain; that is, from thinking of any other Objects, besides those of the Passion which Rules.  
It is the same of the little Nerves that go to the Spleen, or to other parts, which contain a thicker Matter, and less susceptible of Heat and Motion; it renders the Imagination altogether languishing and dull, in causing some gross Matter, and such as is difficult to be put in Motion to run into the Blood.  
As for those Nerves which environ the Arteries and Veins, their use is to hinder the Blood from passing, and by contracting them, compel it to run into such places as it finds the freest passage to: So that part of the great Artery, which supplies all the parts above the Heart with Blood, being connected and compressed by these Nerves, the Blood must necessarily enter into the Head in great quantities, and this way produce a change in the Animal Spirits; and, by consequence, in the Imagination.  
But it must be well observed, 
III. That these Judgements happen without the concurrence of our Will, by the order of Providence.  that all this is performed merely by Mechanism: I mean, that all the different Motions of these Nerves, in all the different Passions, are not produced by the Command of the Will, but, on the contrary, are made without, nay, even contrary to its Orders: So that a Body, whose Soul is not so well disposed as that of a healthful Man, shall be capable of all the Motions which accompany our Passions. Thus even Beasts may have the like, altho' they should be only pure Machine's.  
And, indeed, this aught to make us admire the incomprehensible Wisdom of him, who hath so well ordered all these Springs, that it is sufficient for an Object to move the Optic Nerve after such and such a manner, to produce so many different Motions in the Heart, the other parts of the Body, and even in the Face itself; for it hath lately been discovered, that the same Nerve, which extends some of its branches into the Heart, and into the other interior parts; also communicates some of its branches to the Eye, to the Mouth, and to the other parts of the Face: So that it cannot raise any Passion within us, but it also appears outwardly, because there can no motion happen to the branches which go to the Heart, but it also communicates itself to some one of those which are dispersed through the Face.  
The Correspondence and Sympathy which is found between the Nerves of the Face, and some others that answer to other parts of the Body, and which want a Name, is yet more remarkable, and that which produces this great Sympathy, is, that (as in the other Passions) the little Nerves that go to the face, are only branches of that which descends lower.  
When we are surprised with any violent Passion, if we carefully reflect upon what we feel in our Bowels, and the other parts of the Body, where these Nerves enfold themselves, as also upon the changes which accompany it in the face, and if we consider that all these divers agitations of our Nerves are wholly involuntary, and that they happen notwithstanding all the resistance our Will can make against them, we shall not find it so difficult, to suffer out, selves to be persuaded of this plain Exposition that has been made, of all those Relations the Nerves have one to another.  
But if we examine the reasons and end of all these things, we shall find therein so much Order and Wisdom, that but a little serious attention will be requisite to convince those Persons, that are the most Wedded to Epicurus and Lucretius, that there is a Providence which rules the World. When I see a Watch. I have reason to conclude that there is an Intelligence, since it is impossible that Chance should have produced and dispersed all its Wheels into order. How then can it be possible, that Chance, and the meeting together of Atoms, should be able so justly, and proportionably, to dispose all those divers Springs, as appear both in Man, and other Animals? And that Man. and all other living Creatures, should beget others, which bear such an absolute resemblance to them? So it is ridiculous to think, or say, with Lucretius, that 'tis Chance that has formed all the parts whereof Man is composed; that the Eyes were not made to see, but Men were induced to see, because they had Eyes, and so of the other parts of the Body. These are his Words: 
Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata  
Prospicere ut possimus, & ut proffer viai  
Proceras passus, ideo fastigia posse  
Surarum ac feminum pedibus fundata plicari.  
B●achia tum porro validis exapta lacertis  
Esse, manusque datus utrâque ex parte ministras  
 facere ad vitam possimus, quae foret usus.  
Caetera de genere hoc inter quaecumque pretantur  
Omnia perversà praepostera sunt ratione.  
Nil ideo natu'est in nostro corpore ut uti  
Possimus, sed quod natum est id procreat usum.   
Must not one have a strange aversion for a Providence, thus voluntarily to be blinded for fear of acknowledging it, and endeavour to render ourselves insensible to proofs so strong and convincing, as those that Nature has furnished us with? It is true, that if once we come to affect being thought great Wits, or rather Impious, as the Epicureans have done, we shall immediately find ourselves surrounded with darkness, and perceive only by false Lights, boldly deny those things that are most clear, and arrogantly and magisteriously affirm what is most false and obscure.  
This Poet may serve for a proof of the blindness of these mighty Wits, for he boldly determines, tho' contrary to all appearance of Truth, upon the most difficult and obscure Questions; and it seems, that he did not perceive even those Ideas that are most clear and evident. If I should stay to relate some more passages of this Author, to justify what I say, I should make too long and tedious a digression; altho' it may be permitted to make such reflections, as may for a moment divert the Mind from more essential Truths, yet is it never permitted to make such digressions, as for a considerable time take off the Mind from giving attention to the most important Subjects, to apply it to trivial things.   

CHAP. V.  
I. Of the Memory.  
II. Of Habits.  
WE have already explained the general Causes, as well external as internal, which produce any change in the Animal Spirits; and by consequence, in the faculty of Imagining, we have showed that the external are the Food which nourishes us, and the Air we breathe; and that the internal consists in the involuntary agitation of certain Nerves. We know of no other general Causes, and even dare affirm there are none. So that the faculty of Imagining depending, in respect to the Body, only upon these two things, the Animal Spirits, and the disposition of the Brain upon which they act, there remains nothing more, in order to the giving a perfect knowledge of the Imagination, but only to show the different changes that can happen in the substance of the Brain.  
We will examine them, after we have given some Idea of the Memory, and of Habits; that is, of the faculty that we have of thinking of those things that we have before thought of, and of acting things over again which we have already done. Order requires this Method.  
For the Explanation of the Memory, 
I. Of the Memory.  'tis necessary to remember what has already been repeated so many times; that all our different Perceptions depend upon the changes that happen to those Fibres that are in that part of the Brain in which the Soul more particularly resides.  
This only supposed, the nature of the Memory is explained; for even as the Branches of a Tree, which have continued sometime bend in a certain form, still preserve an aptitude to be bend anew after the same manner: So the Fibres of the Brain, having once received certain impressions by the course of the Animal Spirits, and by the action of Objects, along time retain some facility to receive these same dispositions. Now the Memory consists only in this facility, since we think on the same things, when the Brain receives the same impressions.  
As the Animal Spirits act sometimes with more, and sometimes with less force, upon the substance of the Brain, and that sensible Objects make a much greater impression than the Imagination alone, it is easy, from thence, to discover why we do not equally remember all things we perceive. For example, why what one often perceives, is commonly represented more lively to the Soul, than what one perceives but once or twice; why we remember more distinctly what we have seen, than what we have only imagined; and so likewise, why one should know better how the Veins are dispersed through the Liver, after having but once seen a dissection of this part, than after having many times read in a Book of Anatomy, and other like things.  
But if we should reflect upon what hath been before said of the Imagination, and the short discourse made on the Memory, supposing us once delivered from this prejudice, that our Brain is too small to preserve a very great number of traces and impressions, we shall have the pleasure to discover the cause of all these surprising effects of the Memory, whereof St. Austin speaks with so much admiration in his tenth Book of Confessions. We shall not explain these things more fully, because 'twill be more proper for every one to examine them himself with some application of Mind, because such things as we discover by this Method, are always more agreeable, and make a deeper impression on us, than what we learn from others.  
In order to explain Habits, 
TWO Of the Habits.  it is necessary to know the manner how we believe the Soul moves those parts of the Bodies to which it is united.  
According to all appearance, there is always in certain places of the Brain, be they where they will, a great number of Animal Spirits, much agitated by the heat of the Heart from whence they come, and are ready to run into those places into which they find free passage. All the Nerves end in the receptacle of these Spirits, and the Soul hath the 
* I explain elsewhere in what this power consists.  power of determining their Motion, and conducting them by these Nerves into all the Muscles of the Body; these Spiri●s being entered there, they swell them up, and by consequence contract them. Thus they move those parts to which the Muscles are united.  
We shall not find it so difficult to be persuaded, that the Soul moves the Body after the same manner already explained, if we observe, that when we have been a long time without Eating, and are willing to give certain motions to our Bodies, we cannot effect it, and even feel it very troublesome to stand upon our feet. But if we find the means to make any thing, that is very spiritous, run into our Heart, as Wine, or some other like Nourishment, we are loon sensible that the body obeys with much more facility, and moves itself after what manner we desire: For this Experiment alone makes it seem very plain to me, That the Soul could not give Motion to the Body through the defect of Animal Spirits, and that 'tis by their means that it hath recovered its Empire over it.  
Now the infiations of the Muscles are so visible, and so sensible, in the agitation of our Arms, and all the parts of our Body, and it is so reasonable to believe that these Muscles cannot be blown up, but because some body enters into them, even as a Football cannot grow big and turgid, except by the Admission of Air, or some such like thing: It seems, I say, that there can remain no doubt, but that the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Brain, through the Nerves into the Muscles, to blow them up, and to produce there all the Motions that we can wish; for a Muscle being full it is necessarily shorter than if it was empty, so it draws and moves the part to which it is united, as we may see more at large in D'Cartes Book of the Passions. We don't give this Explanation as perfectly demonstrated in all its parts: For to make it entirely evident, there are still many things to be wished, which 'tis almost impossible to explain. But it is also useful enough in our subject to know them; for whether this Explanation be true or false, it remains however equally useful to discover the Nature of Habits: Because if the Soul does not move the Body after this manner, it necessarily moves it some other way which is very like it, from whence we may draw such consequences as we shall make use of.  
But in order to the pursuing our Explanation, it must be observed, that the Spirits do not always find the ways so open and free by which they should pass, and that makes us, for example, sometimes have so much difficulty in the moving our Fingers so quick as is necessary for the playing upon Msiucal Instruments, or the Muscles that serve for pronounciation, to pronounce the word of a strange tongue. But by little and little the Animal Spirits by their continual course open and clear these passages, so that in time one finds no longer resistance. Now Habits consist in this facility, that the Animal Spirits have to pass through the Members of our Bodies.  
It is very easy, according to this Explanation, to resolve an infinite Number of questions which respect Habits: As for Example, why Children are more capable of acquiring new Habits then older Persons are? Why it is so difficult to break ourselves of long habits? Why Men by much speaking have acquired so great a facility to it, that they pronounce their words with an incredible swiftness, and even without thinking thereof. As it too often happens to those that say the Prayers which they have been accustomed to many years, and yet to pronounce one word only, many Muscles must move together, in a certain time, and order, as those of the Tongue, the Lips, Throat, and Diaphragme. But one cannot with a little Meditation satisfy ones self about these questions and many others very curious and useful, but it is not necessary to insist upon these things here.  
It is visible from what has been said, that there is much relation between the Memory and Habits, and that in one sense the Memory may pass for a kind of Habit. For even as Corporeal Habits consist in the facility that the Spirits have acquired to pass through certain places of our Bodies, so the Memory consists in the traces that the same Spirits have impressed on the Brain which are the causes of the facility we have in recalling things again to our Mind: That if there were no perceptions that depended upon the Course of the Animal Spirits, nor on these traces, there would be no difference between the Memory, and the other Habits. It is not also more difficult to conceive that Beasts, although without a Soul and incapable of any perception, after their manner remember such things as have made an impression in their Brain, then to conceive they are capable of acquiring different Habits; 
See the Explanations upon Memory and Spiritual Habits.  And after what I have said of Habits, I don't see much more difficulty in representing to ourselves how the Members of their Bodies may by degrees acquire different Habits, then in conceiving how a Machine first made is not so fitly disposed for Action, as after it has been used for some time.   

CHAP. VI  
I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to such quick Changes as the Spirits are.  
II. Three different Changes in the three different Ages.  
ALL the Parts of Living Bodies are in continual Motion, both the Solid and Fluid parts, the Flesh as well as the Blood; there is only this difference between their Motions, that that of the parts of the Blood is visible and sensible, and that of the Fibres of our Flesh is wholly imperceptible. There is then this difference between the Animal Spirits, and the substance of the Brain, that the Animal Spirits are very much agitated, and very fluid, and the substance of the Brain hath some Solidity and Consistence; so that the Spirits divide themselves into little parts, and in a few hours are dissipated by transpiration through the Pores of those Vessels that contain them, and it very often happens that others succeed which do not perfectly resemble them; but the Fibres of the Brain are not so easily dissipated, there does not often happen any considerable Change in them, and their whole substance cannot be changed but after many years.  
The most considerable differences that are found in a Man's Brain, during the whole Course of his Life, are in Infancy, at his full Strength, and in Old Age.  
The Fibres of the Brain in Children are soft, flexible, and delicate, in perfect Age they become more dry, hard, and strong; but in Old Age, they become wholly inflexible, gross, and sometimes mingled with superfluous humours, that the feeble heat of this Age cannot be any longer dissipated. For as we see the Fibres which compose the Flesh harden in time, and that the Flesh of a young Partridge is without dispute more tender than that of an old one, so the Fibres of the Brain of a Child or Youth, will be much more soft and delicate, than those of Persons that are more advanced in years.  
We shall soon see the reason of these Changes, if we but consider how these Fibres are continually agitated by the Animal Spirits which run round about them in many different ways. For as the Wind dries the Earth by blowing upon it, so the Animal Spirits, through their continual agitation, by little and little render the greatest part of the Fibres of Man's Brain more dry, compressed, and solid; so that Persons a little advanced in Years will almost always have them more inflexible, than those that are Younger. And for those that are of the same Age, as Drunkards who for many years have used Wine to Excess, or such Liquors as have been able to stupefy them, will also have them more solid and more inflexible than such as are deprived of those Drinks during their whole Lives.  
Now the different Constitutions of the Brain in Children, Men at full growth, and old Men, are very considerable Causes of the difference that is observed in their faculty of Imagining, of which we shall afterwards speak.   

CHAP. VII.  
I. Of the Communication which is between the Brain of a Mother, and that of her Child.  
II. Of the Communication that is between our Brain, and the other parts of our Body, which carries us to Imitation and Compassion.  
III. An Explanation of the generation of Monstrous Children, and of the Propagation of the Species.  
iv Some Irregularities of the Mind, and some Inclinations of the Will explained.  
V Of Concupiscence and Original Sin.  
VI Objections and Answers.  
IT is sufficiently evident to me, that we incline to all things, and that we have a Natural relation to every thing about us that is most useful for the Preservation and conveniency of Life. But these relations are not equal; we are more inclined to France than to China, to the Sun, than to any Star, and to our own House more than to our Neighbours. There are inusible ties which unite us more strictly to Men than to Beasts; to our Relations and Friends than to Strangers; to those we depend upon for the preservation of our Lives, than such from whom we neither fear nor hope any thing.  
What is chief to be observed in this Natural Union which is between us and other Men is, that 'tis so much the greater as we have more need of them. Relations and Friends are strictly United one to another, we may say their Griefs and Miseries are Common, as well as their Joys and Happiness; for all the Passions and Sensations of our Friends are communicated to us by the impression of their aspect and air of their Face. Yet because we cannot absolutely live without them, there is also another stricter Union than that Natural and Mutual one which is betwixt us and them.  
Children in their Mother's Bellies, 
I. Of the Communication which is between the Brain of a Mother and that of a Child.  whose Bodies are not yet entirely form, who are of themselves in as weak and helpless a condition as can be conceived, must also be united with their Mothers in the strictest manner that can be imagined. And alth● their Souls are separated from their Mothers, yet their Bodies being linked together, we must think they have the same Sensations and Passions; and indeed the same thoughts which are excited in the Soul by the motions that are produced in the Body.  
Thus Infants see what their Mothers see, they hear the same Cries, receive the same impressions of Objects, and are agitated with the same Passions. For since the air of a passionate Man's face, penetrates those who look upon him, and naturally imprints in them a passion like that which agitates him, although the Union of the Man with those that consider him is not so great; it seems reasonable to me to think that Mothers are capable of impressing upon their Children all the same Sensations they are affected with, and all the same passions by which they are agitated. For the body of an Infant makes but one with that of the Mothers, the Blood and Spirits are common to both, and Sensations and Passions are the Natural Consequence of the Motion of the Spirits and Blood, which Motions necessarily Communicate themselves from the Mother to the Child. Therefore the passions sensations, and generally all the thoughts which proceed from the body, are common both to the Mother and Child.  
These things appear unquestionable for many reasons, and I advance them only here as a supposition agreeable to my thoughts, but shall sufficiently demonstrate them hereafter: For whatsoever hypothesis can resolve all difficulties that can be brought against it, aught to pass for an unquestionable principle.  
The invisible bonds, by which the Author of Nature unites all these Works, are worthy the Wisdom of God, and admiration of Men, there is nothing that's both more surprising and instructive together; but we think not of it; we suffer ourselves to be conducted without considering who it is that conducts us. Nature is hidden from us as well as its Author, and we feel the Motions which she produces in us, without considering the Causes of 'em; yet are there few things more necessary to be known, for 'tis upon their knowledge that the Explanation of whatsoever belongs to Man depends.  
There are certainly springs in our Brain which Naturally incline us to Imitation, 
II. Of the Communication there is between our Brain and the other parts of our bodies which inclines us to Imitation and Compassion.  for it is very necessary to Civil Society. It is not only requisite that Children should believe their Fathers, Disciples their Masters, and Inferiors those which are above them, for all Men must have some disposition to take the same manners, and to do the same actions with those they live with. To unite Men together there must be a resemblance both of Body and Mind; this is the principle of an infinite Number of things that we shall afterwards treat of, but for what we shall speak of in this Chapter, it is necessary that we know there is Natural dispositions in the Brain which incline us to Compassion as well as Imitation.  
We must then consider, that not only the Animal Spirits carry themselves Naturally into the parts of our Bodies, to cause the same Actions and Motions we see in others, but also in some manner to receive their Injuries, and to take part in their Miseries; for Experience teaches us, that when we very attentively consider any one that is rudely hurt, or that hath any great wound, the Spirits are carried with great force into such parts of our Bodies as answer to those that we see hurt in another: Provided that we do not turn the course of the Animal Spirits otherways, by an industrious and voluntary titillation of some other part of the body: Or except their Natural course to the Heart and Bowels, which is wont to happen in sudden Motions, draw them along with itself, or change that course which we speak of: Or lastly, except some extraordinary connection with the tra●●s of the Brain, and Motions of the Spirits produce the same effect.  
The Spirits being thus carried into the parts of the Body which answer to those that we see hurt in oothers, make a very sensible Impression in delicate Persons who have a lively Imagination, and very tender and soft flesh; for they very often feel a kind of trembling in their Legs, if they attentively look upon any one that hath an Ulcer, or that has actually received some blow there. This that one of my Friends writ me an account of, confirms my Opinion. An Old Man that lived at one of my Sisters being sick, a young Maid Servant of the House held the Candle whilst he was let blood in the Fo●t, and when she saw the Surgeon give the prick with the Lancet, she was seized with such an apprehension, that she felt so lively a pain in the same place of the Foot for three or four days afterwards, that she was forced to keep her Bed all that time. The reason of these accidents is, that the Spirits forcibly diffusing themselves into those parts of our body, which answer to what we see hurt in others, being kept more bend they make the Soul more sensible, and put it upon its guard, to avoid those evils that it sees happen to others.  
This Compassion in the Body, produces one in the Mind, it excites us to help and assist others, because in that we relieve ourselves; and it also stops our Malice and Cruelty; for the horror of Blood, the fear of Death, and in a word, the sensible impression of Compassion, often hinders those from killing of Beasts, who even are much persuaded that they are only Machine's, because the generality of Mankind cannot kill them without hurting themselves by the counterstroke of Compassion.  
What is chief to be observed here, is, that the sensible sight of a wound that any Person receives, produces in those that see it another hurt, so much the more sensible as the beholder is more weak and delicate; because this sensible sight bushes the Animal Spirits with more violence into those parts of the body which answer to what they see hurt, and so make a greater Impression in the Fibres of a delicate body, than in one that is more strong and robust.  
So Men, who are strong and vigorous, are not hurt by the sight of a Murder, they are not so much inclined to Compassion, because this sight offends their Bodies, but because it offends their Reason. These Persons have no pity for Criminals, they are immoveabie and inexorable. But Women and Children suffer much Pain by the Wounds they see others receive; they have a Mecanical Compassion for the Miserable; Nay, they cannot see a Dog beat, or hear him cry, without being disturbed at it.  
As for Infants who are yet in their Mother's Belly; the delicacy of the Fibres of their Flesh, being infinitely greater than that of Women or Children, the Course of the Spirits will produce more considerable changes in them, as we shall afterwards observe.  
Let what I have said be looked upon as a simple Supposition, if it is desired; yet we must endeavour to comprehend it well, if we will distinctly conceive what I would explain in this Chapter. For the two Suppositions that I have made are the principles of an infinite Number of things, which have been generally believed very hidden and mysterious, and which appear impossible to me to be explained, without receiving these Suppositions: Of which here are some Examples.  
About Seven or Eight years ago I saw in the 
* An Hospital in France for such as we passed Cure. III. An Explanation of the generation of Monstrous Children, and of the propagation of the Species.  Incurables a young Man who was born a Fool, and his body broken after the same manner as Criminals are broke on the Wheel. He had lived near twenty Years in this condition, many Persons have seen him, and the late Queen-Mother going to visit this Hospital had the Curiosity to see him, and to touch the Arms and Legs of this young Man in the same places where they were broke.  
According to the principles that I have established, the Cause of this sad Accident was, that his Mother, who heard a Criminal was to be broken, went to see him executed; all the blows that this miserable Man received, so strongly smote the Imagination of this Mother, and by a kind of Counter-blow the render delicate Brain of her 
* According to the first Supposition.  Child. The Fibres of this Woman's Brain were strangely shaken, and it may be broke in some places by the impetuous Course of the Animal Spirits, caused by the sight of so terrible an Action, but she was strong enough to hinder their absolute ruin; though on the contrary, the Fibres of this Child's Brain, being not able to resist the torrent of these Spirits, were entirely dissipated, and the shock was great enough to make him wholly lose his Wits; and this was the reason he came into the World deprived of his Understanding, this was likewise the cause that the same parts of his body was broken as those of the Criminal, whom his Mother saw executed.  
At the sight of this Execution, which was so capable of frighting a Woman, the violent course of the Mother's Animal Spirits, went impetuously from her Brain to all the parts of her Body, which answered to those of the Criminal, 
* According to the second Supposition.  and the same thing passed in the Infant. But because the Bones of the Mother were able to resist the Violence of these Spirits, they received no hurt; Nay, it may be, she did feel no pain, nor the least trembling in her Legs, when the Criminal was broken; but the rapid stream of the Spirits was capable to separate the soft and tender Bones of the Infant, for the Bones are the last parts of the Body that are form, and they have very little consistence in Infants, while they are in the Womb: And it must be observed, that if this Mother had determined the Motion of these Spirits to any other part of her Body by some violent titilation, her Child would not have had his Bones broken, but that part which had answered to that to which the Mother determined these Spirits, had been much hurt, as I have already said.  
The Reasons of this accident may serve to explain in general how Women, who during their being with Child, upon seeing Persons with certain Marks in their Faces, imprint the same on their Children, and in the same part of the Body. And from thence we may judge that advice very reasonable, which bids 'em touch some hidden part of the Body, when they perceive any thing which surprises 'em, and when they are agitated with any violent Passion, for that may cause the Marks to be traced rather upon these hidden parts, than upon the Face of their Infants.  
We should often have instances like to what I have now related, if Infants could live after having received such great Wounds, but generally it causes Abortions. For we may conclude, that almost all Infants who die before they are born, except they be sick, have no other cause of their Death than a fright, some ardent desire, or some other violent passion of their Mothers. Here is also another very particular instance.  
'Tis not above a Year since, that a Woman having with too much application considered the Picture of Saint Pius (when the Feast of his Canonization was celebrated,) was brought to bed of a Child which was perfectly like the Representation of this Saint. He had the Face of an Old Man, as much as it was possible in an Infant that has no Beard, his Arms were crossed upon his Breast, his Eyes turned towards Heaven, and he had a very low Forehead, because the Image of this Saint being raised towards the Vault of the Church, and looking towards Heaven, had almost no Forehead likewise. He had a kind of a confused Mitre upon his Shoulders, with many round marks in the places where Mitres are covered with Stones: And indeed this Child very much resembled the Picture by which his Mother had form him through the power of her Imagination. 'Tis a thing that all Paris might have seen as well as I, because 'twas a long time preserved in Spirits of Wine.  
This instance is the more particular, because there was not the sight of a Man living, and agitated with some passion, who moved the Spirits and Blood of the Mother to produce so strange an effect, but only the sight of a Picture; which yet was very sensible and accompanied with a great emotion of Spirits, caused either through the Zeal and application of the Mother, or through the agitation that the noise of the Feast had produced in her.  
This Mother therefore looking upon this Picture with some application and emotion of Spirits, the Child, according to the first supposition, saw it as she did with the same application and emotion of Spirits. The Mother being lively affected imitated him at left in the Posture, according to the second Supposition, for her body being entirely form, and the Fibres of her Flesh hard enough to resist the course of the Spirits, she could not imitate or make herself like to him in all things; but the Fibres of the Infant's Flesh being extremely soft, and consequently susceptible of all sorts of impressions, the violent course of the Spirits, produced in his Flesh whatsoever was necessary to make him entirely like the Image that he saw, and the imitation to which Children are much more disposed, perfected it as much as possible; but this imitation having given to the body of this Child a figure so very extraordinary, it was also the cause of its Death.  
There are many other Examples in Authors, of the power of the Imagination of Mothers, and there is nothing so fantastical but has caused Abortions sometimes. For they not only make Children deformed, but also marked with such Fruits as they have longed for, as Plumbs, Pears, Grapes, and such like things. For instance. some Mother's having a strong Inclination to eat Pears, the Children imagine and desire them with the same ardour, and the course of the Spirits excited by the image of this desired fruit, disposing itself through the little body, is able to change its figure, because of its sostness: So that these poor Children become like those things they wished for with so much ardour. But the Mothers suffer no Injury, because their bodies are not soft enough to take the figure of such things as they imagine: Thus they cannot imitate them, or render themselves entirely like 'em.  
Now, it must not be imagined that this Correspondence that I have explained, and which is sometimes the cause of such great disorder, is useless or ill ordered by Nature; for on the contrary, it seems very useful in the Propagation of Humane Bodies, or in the formation of the Foetus; and it is absolutely necessary to the transmitting certain dispositions of the Brain, which ought to be different, at different times, and in different Countries. For instance, it is requisite in some Countries that Lambs should have their Brains to disposed as to fly at the sight of a Wolf, because there are many of 'em there, and they have a great deal to fear from them.  
'Tis true, that this Communication of the Mother's Brain with her Infants, has sometimes ill consequences, when the Mothers suffer themselves to be surprised by any violent passion. Yet it seems to me, that without this Communication Women and Animals could not easily beget young ones of the same kind; for although some reason might be given of the formation of the Foetus in general, as D'Cartes has happily enough attempted: However 'tis very difficult, without this Communication of the Mother's Brain with the Child's, to explain how a Mare should not beget an Ox, or an Hen lay an Egg which contains a little Partridge, or some Foul of a new kind; I believe those that have considered the sormation of the Foetus, will be of this opinion.  
The most reasonable thought, and that which is most conformable to experience about this difficule question of the formation of the Foetus, is, that Children are perfectly form, even before the action by which they are conceived, and that their Mothers only contribute to their growth whilst they continue in the Womb. However, this Communication of Animal Spirits, and of the Mother's Brain with the Spirits and Brain of the Child, seems still serviceable to regulate this growth, and determine the parts which serve for its Nourishment, and by little and little to dispose the Child like the Mother, or else like some of the same Species. This appears plain enough by the accidents which happen when the Imagination of the Mother is disordered, and the Natural Disposition of her Brain is changed by some violent passion, for then, as we have already explained, this communication charges the conformation of the body of the Child, and the Mother is so much the more apt to miscarry of the the Foetus, as it has more resemblance to the desired Fruits, and as the Spirits find less resistance in the Fibres of the Infant's body.  
Now it cannot be denied, but that God, without this Communication, was able to have disposed all things in so exact and regular a manner, as would have been necesary for the Propagation of the Species for infinite Ages, that Mothers should never have Miscarried, and even that they should always have had Children of the same bigness, of the same Colour, and that would have resembled in all things: For we must not measure the power of God by our weak Imagination, and we know not the Reasons he had in the construction of his work.  
We see every day that without the help of this Communication, Plants and Trees produce their kinds regularly enough, and that Fowls and many other Animals have no need of it to cherish and bring forth other Animals, when they sit upon Eggs of different kinds as when a Hen sits on a Partridges Eggs. For although we may reasonably conclude that the Seeds and Eggs contain in themselves the Plants and Birds which proceeds from 'em; and that they may produce the little bodies of these Birds, having received their Conformation by the Communication we have spoke of, and the Plants theirs by another Equivocal Communication, yet we cannot be certain of it. But although we cannot discover the reasons why God has made every thing as it is, we must not conclude from thence, that he could make 'em no otherwise.  
If we consider further, that Plants who receive their growth by the action of the Female Plant, resemble her much more than those which come from the seed, as Tuleps for instance, which come from the Root, are of the same Colour as the Tulep itself, and yet those that proceed from the Seed thereof, are almost very different, we cannot doubt, that if the Communication of the Female Plant with the Fruit, is not absolutely necessary to form the same kind, yet it is always requisite to make the Fruit entirely like her.  
So that although God foresaw that this Communication of the Mother's Brain with that of the Infants, would sometimes destroy the Foetus, and produce Monsters, because of the Irregularity of the Mother's imagination; yet this Communication is so admirable, and so necessary, for the Reason's , and for many others that I could yet add, that this knowledge, that God had of these inconvencies, ought not to have hindered him from executing his design. We may say in one sense, that God never had a design to make Monsters, for it appears evident to me, that if God should create one Animal only, it would not be Monstrous. But designing to produce an admirable work by the most simple ways, and unite all these Creatures one to another, he foresaw certain effects that would necessarily follow from the Order and Nature of things, and this hath not diverted him from his design: For, although a Monster, simply considered, be an imperfect work, yet when it is joined with the rest of the creatures, it does not render the World imperfect.  
We have sufficiently explained what power the Imagination of a Mother has over the body of her Child, let us now examine the power it hath over its Mind, and that way discover the first Irregularities of the Mind and Will of Men in his Original: For this is our chief design.  
It is evident that the traces of the Brain are accompanied with Sentiments and Ideas of the Soul, 
iv An Explanation of some irregularities of the Mind, and of the inclinations of the Will.  and that the emotion of the Animal Spirits have no effect in the Body, but what the Motions in the Soul answer to; and in a word, it is certain that all the Sensations and Passions of the Body are accompanied with true Sentiments and Passions in the Soul. Now according to our first supposition, Mother's first communicate the traces of their Brain to their Children, and afterwards the Motions of their Animal Spirits, and so produce the same passion in the mind of their Children, with which they themselves are affected, and by consequence they cortupt both their affections and reason in several respects.  
If so many Children are observed to bear upon their Faces the Marks and Traces of the Idea that affected their Mother, although the Fibres of the skin make much more resistance against the course of the Spirits than the soft parts of the Brain, and though the Spirits are much more agitated in the Brain than towards the Skin; we cannot reasonably doubt but that the Animal Spirits of the Mother produce in the Brain of the Infant many traces by their irregular emotions. Now the great traces of the Brain, and the emotion of the Spirits which answer to them, continuing a long time, and sometimes all the life; it is certain, that as there are few Women who have not some weaknesses, and who have not been moved with some Passion during their being with Child, it cannot be expected but that there will be very few Children, who are not ill inclined to something, and who have not some predominant passion.  
We have only too much experience of these things, and all the World is sensible that there are whole Families who are afflicted with great weakness of Imagination, which they have drawn from their Parents; but it is not necessary here to give any particular Examples thereof. On the contrary, 'tis more proper for the consolation of some Persons to assure 'em, that those weaknesses of the Parents not being Natural, or proper to the Nature of Man, the traces and impressions of the Brain, which are the cause of them, may be effaced by time.  
We may yet add here the Example of King James I. of England, of whom Sir Kenelm Digby speaks in his Book which he writ of the Sympathetic Powder. He tells us, that Mary Stuart being with Child of King James, some Scotch Lords entered her Chamber, and in her presence killed her Secretary, who was an Italian, altho' she cast herself before him to hinder them, that this Princess received some slight hurts by them, and the frights she had, made so great an impression in her Imagination, that she communicated it to the Child in her Womb: So that King James could never endure to see a Naked Sword. He says that he himself was a witness of it, for when he was Knighted, this Prince coming to lay the Sword upon his Shoulder run it straight at his Face, and had wounded him, if some body had not directed it aright where it ought to be. There are so many instances of the like Nature, that 'twould be needless to search Authors for them. I believe there is no body that will dispute these things; for we see a great number of Persons that can't suffer the fight of a Rat, of a Mouse, a Cat, a Frog, and particularly creeping Animals, as Serpents, and Adders; who know no other cause of these extraordinary aversions, but the fear their Mothers had of these several Animals whilst they were with Child of them.  
But what I chief desire should be observed, is, 
An Explanation of Concupiscence and of Original Sin.  that there is all possible probabilities, that Men retain in their Brain to this day the traces and impressions of our first Parents. For as Animals produce their own likeness, and with the like traces in their Brain, which is the cause that Animals of the same Species, have the same Sympathies and Antipathies, and that they perform the same actions in the same occurrences. Thus our first Parents, after their Sin, received such great impressions, and profound traces of sensible things in their Brain as they might very well communicate to their Children; so that this great propensity we have from the Womb to all sensible things, and the great distance from God we are in, by our present state, may in some manner be explained by what has been said.  
For as it is necessary, according to the established order of Nature, that the thoughts of the Soul should be conformable to the traces that are in the Brain. We may say, that as soon as we are form in the Womb, we are polluted with Sin, and infected with the Corruption of our Parents, since from that time we are strongly inclined to the pleasures of our Senses; having in our Brain traces resembling those of the Persons who hath given us being, it is necessary also, that we should have the same thoughts, and the same inclinations which have any relation to sensible objects. 
Rom. ch. 6.5.12, 14. &c   
Thus it is impossible but that we should be born with Concupiscence, and Original Sin. We must be born with Concupiscence, if Concupiscence is only the Natural effort that the traces of the Brain make upon the Mind to engage it to sensible things; and we must be born in Original Sin, if Original Sin is nothing else but the Dominion of Concupiscence, and that these efforts become Victorious and Masters over the Mind and Heart of the Child. Now it is very probable, that the dominion or victory of Concupiscence, is what we call Original Sin in Children, and actual in Men.  
Objections and Answers. This difficulty seems only to recur, that contrary to Experience we might conclude from the principles I have established, that the Mother would always communicate to her Child Habits and Inclinations resembling her own, and a facility of imagining and learning the same things as she knows; for all these things depend, as has been already said, only upon the traces and impressions of the Brain; and it is certain that the impressions and traces of the Mother's Brain are communicated to the Child. This has been proved by the Examples that has been brought concerning Men, and is also confirmed by the Example of Animals, whose young ones have their Brains filled with the same impressions, which is the reason that all those that are of the same kind have the same Voice, the same manner of moving their Members, and also the same craft to take their Prey, and defend themselves from their Enemies: Therefore it must from thence follow, that since all the traces of the Mother's Brain are imprinted in that of the Child's, that the Children must be born with the same Habits, and all the other qualities that the Mothers are possessed of; and even commonly so to preserve them all their Lives, since the Habits they have from their Infancy, are those that are the longest kept; which nevertheless is contrary to experience.  
To answer this Objection, it is requisite it should be known that there are two sorts of traces in the Brain; the one Natural, or proper to the Nature of Man, the other acquired. The Natural are very deep and it is impossible to esface them perfectly, but on the contrary the acquired may be easily lost, because commonly they are not deep; Now although the Natural and acquired differ only as to the More or Less, and that often the first have less force than the second, since we every day accustom Animals to do things perfectly contrary to what they are inclined by these Natural traces (for Example, we use a Dog not to touch Bread, nor to run after a Partridge, although he sees and smells it.) Yet there i● this difference between these traces, that the Natural ones have, if we may so say, secret alliances with the other parts of the body; thus all the Springs of our Machine's assist one the other to preserve themselves in their Natural state. All the parts of our bodies mutually contribute to all necessary things for the preservation, or re-establishment of these Natural traces. Thus we cannot wholly efface them, and they begin to revive when we believe we have destroyed them.  
On the contrary, the acquired Traces, although greater, more profound, and stronger than the Natural, are lost by little and little, if they are not carefully preserved by a continual application of those things that produced them, because the other parts of the body contribute nothing to their preservation, but on the contrary continually endeavour to efface and lose them. We may compare these traces to the common Wounds of the body, they are wounds that our Brains receive which heal of themselves, as these wounds of the body do, by the admirable construction of the Machine.  
As then there is nothing in all the body which is not conformable to the Natural traces, they transmit themselves into Children with all their force: So Parrots hatch little ones, which have the same or Natural voices with themselves: but because acquired traces are only in the Brain, and not dispersed through the rest of the body, except some few of 'em, as when they have been imprinted by the Motions that accompany violent Passions, they must not be transmitted into Children. Thus a Parrot who gives the good Morrow, and good Night to his Master, will not make his little ones as Learned as himself; and so Wise and able Persons will not have Children which resemble them.  
Thus although it be true, that all which passes in the Mother's Brain, passes also in the same time into that of the Child, and that the Mother can see nothing, feel nothing, imagine nothing, that the Child does not likewise see, feel, and imagine, and that a● the false traces of the Mother corrupt the Imagination of the Child: Yet those traces not being Natural in the sense before explained, it must not be wondered at, if they are commonly effaced as soon as the Child is born; for then the cause that form and maintained these traces, no longer subsists, the Natural Constitution of the ●world● contributes to their destruction; and sensible 〈…〉 in their room others that are new, deeper, 〈…〉 greater Number, which efface, almost all those that 〈…〉 had whilst in the Womb. For since it every day 〈◊〉 that a great pain causes us to forget those that 〈…〉, it is not possible but that such lively 〈…〉 Children receive the first time the impression of 〈◊〉 is made upon the delicate organs of their 〈…〉 efface the greatest part of the traces that they ha●● received from the same objects, only by a kind of 〈◊〉 stroke, when they were, as it were, covered in their Mothers ' Womb.  
Yet when these traces are form by a strong passion, and accompanied with a violent agitation of the Blood and Spirits in the Mother, they act with so much force on the Child's Brain, and on the rest of its body, that they imprint there Traces as deep and lasting as Natural ones: As in the Example of Sir Kenelm Digby, in the Child that became a Fool, and all broken in the Brain, and all the Members in which the Imagination of the Mother had produced such great disorders, and likewise in the example of the general corruption of Man's Feature.  
Nor is it to be wondered, if the Children of King James had not the same weakness as their Father; First, because these sort of Traces are never imprinted so far into the rest of the Body as the Natural ones are: Secondly, because the Mother not having the same weakness with the Father, she hindered its happening through the goodness of her Constitution, and because the Mother acts infinitely more upon the Brain than the Father does, as is evident by what has been already said.  
But it must be observed, that all these reasons, which prove that the Children of King James could not participate of the weakness of their Father, prove nothing against the Explanation of Original Sin, or this powerful Inclination for Sensible Things, nor this great distance from God, which we hold from our first Parents; because the Traces, that sensible Objects have imprinted in the Brain of the first Man, were very deep, and were accompanied and augmented with violent Passions, and fortified by the continual use of sensible Things, and such as were necessary to the preservation of life, not only in Adam and Eve, but also, which must be well observed, in the greatest Saints, in all Men and all Women from whom we descend, so that there is nothing which can put a stop to this corruption of Nature. So far are these Traces of our first Fathers, from being effaced by little and little, that, on the contrary, they are augmented daily, and without the Grace of JESUS CHRIST, which continually opposes this torrent, what this Heathen Poet has said, would be absolutely true.  

Aetes' Parentum pejor avis tulit  
Nos nequiores, mox daturos  
Progeniem vitiosiorem.   
For it must be well observed, that those impressions that stir up Sentiments of Piety in the most Devout Mothers, do not communicare it to their unborn Infants; and that, on the contrary, the Traces which excite the Idea of sensible Things, and which are followed lowed with Passions, fail not to communicate to the Infants the Sensation and Love of Sensible Things.  
A Mother, for Instance, who is excited to love God by the Motion of the Spirits, which accompany the Trace of the Image of a venerable Old Man, because this Mother has united the Idea of God to this Trace of the Old Man; for, as we shall soon see in the Chapter of the connexion of Ideas, that it may easily be done, altho' there is no relation between God and the Image of an Old Man. This Mother, I say, can only produce in the Brain of her Child the Trace of an Old Man, and an inclination for Old Men, which is not the love of God wherewith she was affected: For, indeed, there is no Traces in the Brain, which can of themselves stir up any other Ideas than those of Sensible Things, because the Body is not made to Instruct the Mind, and speaks not to the Soul as to itself.  
Thus a Mother, whose Brain is filled with Traces, which by their nature relate to sensible things, and which she cannot efface, since concupiscence still remains in her, because her Body is not brought under subjection, necessarily communicates them to her Child, and begets it a sinner altho' she be righteous. This Mother is righteous, because actually loving, or having loved God by a love of choice, this concupiscence makes her no longer criminal, altho' she should follow the Motions thereof in her sleep: But the Child she begets not loving God by a love of choice, and its heart not being turned towards God, it is evident that it is subject to disorder and irregularity, and that there is nothing in it which deserves not the wrath of God.  
But, when they are regenerated by Baptism, and have been justified either by a disposition of heart, like to that which remains in righteous Persons during the illusions of the Night, or it may be by a free act of love to God, as they have made, being delivered some moments, from the dominion of the Body through the power of this Sacrament; (for, as God hath made them to love him, we cannot conceive that they are actually in the righteousness and order of God, if they love him not, or have not loved him; or, at least, if their heart is not disposed after the same manner, as it would be if they actually loved him) Then, altho' they submit to concupiscence during their Infancy, their concupiscence is no longer Sin; it makes them no longer guilty and worthy of wrath; they cease not to be righteous and agreeable to God, by the same reason as we do not lose Grace, altho' in our sleep we should follow the Motions of concupiscence; for the Brain of Infants is so soft, and they receive so lively and strong impressions of the weakest Objects, as they have not sufficient freedom of Mind to resist them. But I stay too long upon these things, which do not absolutely belong to the subject I treat of. 'Tis enough, that I may conclude here from what I have explained in this Chapter, that all these false Traces, 
See the Explanations.  that Mother's imprint in the Brain of their Children, make their Minds false, and corrupt their Imagination; and that thus the generality of Men, are subject to imagine things otherwise than they are, in giving some false colour, or irregular draught to the Ideas of those things they perceive.   

CHAP. VIII.  
I. The changes that happen to the Imagination of a Child after it is Born, by the Conversation it has with its Nurse, its Mother, and other Persons.  
II. Advice how to Educate it well.  
IN the precedent Chapter, we have considered the Brain of an Infant whilst in the Womb; let us now examine what happens to it as soon as it is Born. In the same time that it quits Darkness, and first sees Light, the cold of the outward Air seizes it; the tenderest embraces of the Woman that receives it, offends its delicate Members; all external Objects surprise it; they are all Subjects of fear to it, because it does not yet know them, nor has it any power of itself, to defend itself, or to fly from them; the Tears and Cries by which it condoles itself, are infallible marks of its pains and fears; for they are, indeed, the Prayers that Nature makes to procure it assistance, to defend it from the evils it suffers, and those it apprehends.  
To be able to conceive well the perplexity of its Mind in this condition, we must remember that the Fibres of its Brain are very soft and delicate; and by consequence, all external Objects make very deep impressions upon them: For since the least things are sometimes capable of hurting a weak Imagination, so great a number of surprising Objects must certainly injure and perplex that of a Child.  
But to have a more lively apprehension of the agitations and pains of Infants, at the time of their first coming into the World, and the prejudices which their Imaginations must receive, let us represent to ourselves what would be the astonishment of Men, if they saw Giants five or six times higher than themselves approach near them, without knowing any thing of their design; or if they saw any new kind of Animal, which had no resemblance to those they have already seen; or only, if a Flying-Horse, or some other Chimaera of our Poets, should suddenly descend from the Clouds. These Prodigies would make deep Traces in the Spirits, and the Brain would be confuted, only to have seen them once.  
Unexpected and frightful events fall out every day, which makes even Men lose their Wits, whose Brains are not very susceptible of new impressions, altho', they have some Experience, and can defend themselves; or, at least, are able to make use of some resolution. Children, when first come into the World, suffer something from every Object that strikes their Senses, to which they are not accustomed: All the Animals they see, are of a new kind to them, since they have seen nothing before like to them; they have neither strength nor experience; the Fibres of their Brain are very delicate and flexible: How then is it possible, but that their Imagination should be injured by so many different Objects?  
It is true, that Mothers have already a little accustomed their Children to the impressions of Objects, since they have already traced them in the Fibres of their Brain, before they were born, and so they are much less hurt, when they see with their own Eyes what they had before in some manner perceived by those of their Mothers. It is also true, that false Traces, and the injuries that their Imagination receives at the sight of so many frightful Objects, are effaced and cured by time; because not being Natural, all Bodies are contrary to them, and extirpate them, as we have seen in the precedent Chapter. And this is the reason that generally all Men are not Fools from their Infancy, yet it does not hinder, but that there is always some Traces so strong and deep, that cannot be effaced all our Lives  
If Men would but seriously reflect upon what passes within themselves, and upon their own thoughts, they would not want Experience to prove what I have said: They would commonly discover in themselves inclinations, and secret aversions, which others have not, for which there can be no other cause ascribed than these Traces of our Infancy. For since the causes of these inclinations and aversions are particular to us, they are not founded in the Nature of Man; and since they are unknown to us, it must be that they have acted in a time, wherein our Memory was not capable to retain the circumstances of things, so as to make us able to remember them; and this time can only be that of our most tender Infancy.  
Mr. D'Cartes hath told us in one of his Letters, that he had a particular kindness for all squinting Persons, and that in having carefully examined the cause of it, he at last found 'twas a defect he had met with in a young Maid whom he had loved, whilst he was yet a Child, and the affection he had for her, made him love all persons that resembled her in any thing.  
But it is not these little Irregularities of our Inclinations which mostly deceive us; it proceeds from this, That all our Minds are weak in some respect or other, and we are all subject to some kind of Folly, altho' we are not sensible of it. When we carefully examine the Genius of those with whom we converse, we easily persuade ourselves of this, altho' we are ourselves an Original of some particular Folly, and may be so accounted by others; yet we shall also find others that have Follies peculiar to themselves, and who differ only as to the more and less.  
Now one of the causes of the different Characters of Dispositions, and without doubt, the difference of the impressions that we receive at our Birth, (as we have shown of the particular and extraordinary Inclinations,) is, because these kinds of folly being commonly constant and durable, they can only depend upon the Constitution of the Animal Spirits, which very easily change; and by consequence, it is necessary that they proceed from false Impressions, which are made in the Fibres of the Brain, when our Memory was not capable of preserving the Ideas thereof; that is, from the beginning of our Life. A general source of the Errors of Man, is the great disorder of their Brain, caused by the impression of external Objects when first they come into the World; but this cause ceases not so soon as may be imagined.  
The common Conversation that Children are obliged to have with their Nurses, or even with their Mothers, who often have no Education, does prejudice, and entirely corrupts their Disposition; these Women entertain them only with silly things, as ridiculous Stories, or such as are only fit to fright them. They never speak to them but of sensible things, and after such a manner as is too sure to confirm them in the false Judgements of their Senses. And, in a word, they cast into their Minds the Seeds of all the weaknesses they themselves have, as of their extravagant apprehensions, ridiculous superstitions, and other the like prejudices; by which means, they neither being accustomed to search after Truth, nor to have any gust of it, they become at last incapable of discerning it, or of making any use of their reason; upon which account, a certain fearfulness and weakness of Spirit seizes them, which continues with them a long time; for there are many persons, who at the Age of fifteen or twenty, that perfectly retain the Spirit of their Nurse.  
It is true, that Children don't appear very proper for the Meditation of Truth, and for abstracted and elevated Sciences, because the Fibres of their Brain, being very delicate, they are easily agitated, even by the weakest and least sensible Objects; and their Soul necessarily having Sensations proportionated to the agitation of these Fibres, she lets go her Metaphysical Thoughts, and pure Intellections, to apply herself only to her own Sensations. Thus, it seems, Children cannot consider the pure Ideas of Truth with sufficient attention, being so often and easily disturbed by the confused Ideas of their Senses.  
Yet we may answer, first, that it is more easy for a Child of seven years to be delivered from the Errors whereinto the Senses lead it, than for a person of Sixty, who has all his life time followed the prejudices of Infancy. Secondly, that if a Child is not capable of the clear and distinct Ideas of Truth, it is at least, capable of being advertised, that its Senses deceive it upon every occasion; and if we do not teach it the Truth, we ought not, at least, to entertain, or fortify it in its Errors. And, lastly, that the youngest Children, how wedded soever they may be to agreeable and painful Sensations, learn soon what grown Persons can't do in much more time; as the Knowledge of the Order and Relations that there is between all Words, and all Things, which they see and hear: For altho' these Things depend chief on the Memory, yet it is plain enough, that they must make great use of their Reason in the manner whereby they learn their Tongue.  
But since the facility that the Fibres of children's Brains have for the receiving the impressions of sensible Objects, 
II. Advice for the well Educating of Children.  is the reason why they are incapable of Judging of abstracted Sciences, it is very easy to remedy it. For 'tis certain, that if Children were taken without fear, without desires, and without hopes; if we did not make them suffer pain, and if we kept them as much as possible from their little pleasures, we might, as soon as they could speak, teach them the most difficult, and most abstracted, or, at least, the most sensible parts of the Mathematics, Mechanics, and other things of the like Nature, which are necessary in the sequel of life: But their Minds are not fit to be applied to abstracted Sciences, when they are agitated by desires, and troubled with frights, which is requisite to be well considered.  
For, as an ambitious Man, who should lose his Riches and Honour, or who should have been raised, all of a sudden, to a great Dignity, which he could not have hoped for, would not be in a condition to resolve Metaphysical Questions, or Algebraick Equations, but only to do such things as his present passion inspired him with. So Children, in whose Brain an Apple, and Sugar-plumb, make as deep impressions, as Offices and Grandeurs do in that of a Man of Forty, are not in a condition of hearing such abstracted Truths as we teach them. So that it may be affirmed, there is nothing more contrary to the advancement of Children in the Sciences, than the continual Divertisements wherewith they recompense them, and the continual Punishments they threaten them with.  
But what is infinitely more considerable, is, that these fears of Chastisement, and these desires of sensible Recompense, with which they fill children's Minds, extremely diverts them from Piety. Devotion is yet more abstracted than Science, it is less relished by corrupted Nature. The Mind of Man is very much inclined to Study, but it is not so to Piety. If, therefore, great agitations permit us not to study, altho' we naturally have some pleasure in it, how is it possible that Children, which are taken up with sensible Pleasures wherewith they recompense them, and with the Pains they fright them with, should preserve a sufficient freedom of Mind, to give them any inclination to Piety?  
The capacity of the Mind is very much limited, many things are not requisite to fill it, and when it is full, it is incapable of new Thoughts, except it empties itself of some it had before: But when the Mind is filled with sensible things, it cannot part with them when it will; to conceive this, we must consider we are all naturally inclined to Good, and Pleasure being the Character whereby we distinguish it from Evil, it is necessary that Pleasures should affect us, and employ us more than all the rest. Pleasure then being united to the use of sensible things, because they are the Goods of Man's Body, there is a kind of necessity that these goods should fill the capacity of our Minds, until God by embittering them, gives us a distaste and horror of them, and by his Grace, makes us feel the sweetness of Heaven, which effaces all the Pleasures of this World. 
S. Aug.  Dando menti caelestem delectationem, quâ omnis terrena delectatio superetur.  
But because we are as much inclined to shun Evil as to love Good, and Pain is the Character that Nature has united to Evil, all that we have said of Pleasure, must, in a contrary sensce, be understood of Pain.  
Since those things, therefore, that make us feel Pleasure and Pain, fill the capacity of the Mind, and that it is not in our power to quit, or not to be affected with them, when we please; it is plain, that we cannot make Children be inclined to Piety no more than Men, if we do not begin with them according to the Precepts of the Gospel, by a privation of all things that touch the Senses, and which excite great desires and great fears, since all the Passions darken and extinguish Grace, and that inward love to our Duty, which God has implanted in us.  
The least Children have reason as well as Men, altho' they have not experience, they have also the same natural inclinations tho' they are carried to very different Objects; they must, therefore, be accustomed to guide themselves by reason, since they have it, and excited to their Duty by rightly managing their good Inclinations. It destroys their reason, and corrupts their best inclinations to engage them to their Duty by sensible impressions. They appear then to be in their Duty, but 'tis only an appearance; Virtue is neither engraven in their Mind nor Heart; they scarcely know it, and they love it much less. Their Mind is full of fears and desires, of aversions to, and love of sensible things, which they cannot disengage themselves from to gain their Liberty, and to make use of their Reason. Thus Children, who are educated after this base and servile manner, accustom themselves by little and little, to a certain insensibility of all the Sentiments of honest Men, and good Christians, which continues with them all their Lives; and when they think themselves freed from Chastisements, either by their Authority or Craft, they abandon themselves to whatever flatters their Concupiscence and their Senses, because, indeed, they know no other good than what is sensible.  
It is true, there are some occurrences wherein it is necessary to instruct Children by their Senses, but it must only be done when Reason is not sufficient. They must first be persuaded to their Duty by Reason, and if they are not capable of acknowledging their obligations to it, it will be best to let them alone for some time; for to force them to do outwardly, what they did not believe their Duty, would not be to instruct them, since 'tis the Mind must be taught and not the Body: 
Qui parcie virgae edit filium suum. Pro. 13.24.  But if they refuse to do what Reason tells them they ought to do, it must never be suffered, some sort of severity must rather be used, for in such a case, according to the Wise man, He that spares the Rod hates his Son.  
If Chastisements neither Instruct the Mind, nor incline us to love Virtue, yet at least, in some measure, they correct the Body, and hinder it from relishing Vice, and by consequence, prevent it from being a slave to it. But what must chief be observed, is, that Punishments fill not the capacity of the Mind as Pleasures do, for they are no sooner at an end, and we free from the danger of suffering them again, but we are easily induced to forget them, because than they neither solicit the Imagination, nor excite the Passions; nor provoke the Concupiscence. In fine, they leave the Mind wholly at liberty to think on what it pleases, so that we may exercise it towards Children, to keep them in their Duty, or, at least, in the appearance of it.  
But tho' it is sometimes necessary to deter and punish Children by sensible Chastisements, yet it must not from thence be concluded, that we ought to persuade them by sensible rewards; we must never make use of any thing that very much affects the Senses, but when the utmost necessity requires it: And there is no need of affecting them with sensible rewards, by representing Pleasures to them as the end of their Labours. For, on the contrary, it would corrupt their best Actions, and rather incline them to Sensuality than Virtue.  
The Impressions of those Pleasures we have once tasted, continue very strongly to affect the Imagination, and often revive in us the Ideas of sensible Goods, always exciting importunate desires which disturb the peace of the Mind: And, in short, they stir up the Concupiscence upon every occasion, and it is as Leaven that corrupts the whole lump. But this is not a proper place to explain these things as they ought to be.   
The End of the First Part of the Second Book.   

The Second Part. Of the Imagination.  

CHAP. I.  
I. Of the Imagination of Women.  
II. Of that of Men,  
III. Of that of Old People.  
WE have given some Idea in the other Pa●● of the Physical Causes, that occasion the Irregularity of the Imagination of Men. In This, we shall endeavour to make some Application of those Causes, to the General Errors of the Imagination, and we shall likewise Treat of the Causes of those Errors, which may be termed Moral.  
It may be seen, by what has been said in the foregoing Chapter, that the extreme fineness of the Fibres of the Brain is one of the Principal Causes that hinder us from applying ourselves with so much thought and study as we ought, to the Discovery of Truths that are but a little Mysterious.  
I. This extreme smallness of Fibres is usually met with in Women; 
Of the Imagination of Women.  and thence it is that their Understanding is so great in every thing that strikes the Senses. 'Tis for Women to determine Fashions, to judge of Language, to distinguish Beauty, and Genteel Manners. In such things as these their Knowledge, Capacity, and Acuteness surpasses that of Men. Whatever depends upon the Senses is under their Jurisdictition; but usually they are unable to dive into Truths, that are any thing difficult to be discovered. Whatever is Abstracted, to them is incomprehensible. They cannot make use of their Imagination to unfold entangled and intricate Questions. They only consider the outside of things; nor has their Imagination either Strength or Extent enough to penetrate to the Bottom, or to Compare all the Parts without distracting themselves. A Trifle puts them out of the way; the least noise affrights 'em; the slightest Motion finds 'em work. In short, the Manner and not the Reality of things, is sufficient to fill the whole Capacity of their Mind; because the smallest Objects producing violent Motions in the Delicate Fibres of the Brain, raise in the Soul those Sentiments which are active and large enough to possess it wholly.  
If it be certain that this delicacy of the Fibres of the Brain is the Principal Cause of these Effects, 'tis not so sure however that 'tis to be met with in all Women; but admit it be, their Animal Spirits have some times such a proportion with the Fibres of their Brains, that there are some Women who have more Solidity of Judgement than some Men. For the strength of Wit consists in a certain Temperament of the grossness and Agitation of the Animal Spirits with the Fibres of the Brain; and Women sometimes have this same just and Equal Constitution. There are some Women strong and constant, others feeble and inconstant. There are some Women Learned, Courageous, and Capable of every Thing. On the other side, there are some Men unactive and Effeminate, uncapable of understanding or doing any Thing. In short, when we attribute any Defects to this or that Sex, to certain Ages, or such and such Conditions, we mean it with a proviso, for the most part; supposing always, that there is no general Rule without an Exception.  
For it is not to be imagined, that all Men, or all Women, of the same Age, Country, or Family, have Brain of the same Constitution. 'Tis more proper to believe, that as we cannot meet with two Faces that resemble each other in every Lineament, so we cannot meet with two Imaginations that are absolutely alike; and that all Men, Women, and Children, differ one from another in the grosser or more refin'd delicacy of the Fibres of the Brain. For as we are not over hastily to suppose an Essential Identity between Things, amongst which we see no Difference, so neither are we to make Essential Differences, where we do not find a Perfect Identity; for these are the Errors into which we usually fall.  
That which is then to be said concerning the Fibres of the Brain, is this, that they are very soft, and very small in Children; that with Age they harden and get strength; that nevertheless they are extremely small in the generality of Women, and in some Men, all their Life-time. There is nothing more to be determined. And this may suffice to be said of Women and Children, that as they make it not their Business to search after Truth and instruct others, so their Errors are not very prejudicial; for they are seldom believed in those things which they advance. Let us therefore speak of Men full grown; whose Wit is in its full strength and vigour; and who may be thought capable to sinned out the Truth and teach it to Others.  
II. The usual time that the Mind and Understanding of Man are in their greatest perfection, 
Of the Imagination of Men in the prime of their yea●  is from Thirty to fifty years: At that Age the Fibres of the Brain have generally acquired a moderate consistence. The Pleasures and Pains of the Senses for the most part make no farther Impression upon 'em; so that they need no more then to defend themselves from violent Passions, which rarely happen, and this they may do, provided they carefully avoid all occasions that excite 'em; so that the Soul being no longer distracted with such kind of Interruptions, may with more ease apply itself to the Contemplation of Truth.  
A Man in such an Estate, and who has quitted the prejudices of his Infancy, who from his Youth has acquired a Promptness to Meditation, who not only retains a clear and distinct Notions of the Mind, and carefully rejects all the confused Ideas of the Senses, and who has both leisure and a Wit to meditate, such a Man will hardly fall into Errors. But 'tis not of such a Man that we are now to Discourse; 'tis of the common sort of Men, who for the most part are of another Constitution.  
The Consistence then, which we meet with at the years of Discretion in the Fibres of men's Brains, is the cause, if it may be so said, of the Solidity and Consistence of their Errors: 'Tis the Seal that Seals their Prejudices, and all their false Opinions, and shelters 'em from the strength of Reason. In a word, the more Advantageous this Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain is to Persons well Educated, the more Disadvantageous it is to the greatest part of Men, since it confirms both the one and the other in their Present Thoughts and Opinions.  
But Men are not only confirmed in their Errors, when they are arrived at the Age of Forty or Fifty years; they are also more subject to fall into new ones; because, that believing themselves at that time able to judge of every thing, as indeed it would become 'em to be so, they decide with presumption, and only consult their own Prepossessions; for Men never argue upon things, but in some relation to those Ideas which are most familiar to 'em. When a Chemist would Argue about some Natural Body, presently his Three Principles come into his Mind. A Peripatic immediately thinks of the four Elements, and the four first Qualities; another Philosopher refers every thing to other Principles. So that nothing can enter into the Mind of Man, which is not immediately infected with the Errors to which it is subject, or which does not augment the number of its Errors.  
This Consistence of the Fibres of the Brain produces another very bad Effect, especially in Persons more advanced in years, which is, to make 'em uncapable of Meditation: They cannot set themselves to the Consideration of those Things which they desire to know; and so they can never penetrate into those Truths which are but a little concealed. They cannot relish the most Rational Sentiments, when they are supported by Principles which appear new to them; though they are otherwise very intelligent in things of which their years have given 'em great Experience. But all that I have here said extends no farther, than only to such as have spent their Youth without making use of their Wit or applying themselves to Study.  
To clear these things, 'tis requisite to know, that we cannot learn any thing whatever it be, without giving our minds to it, and that we cannot be attentive upon any thing, if we do not imagine, and admit a lively representation of it into the Brains. Now, that we may imagine Objects, 'tis necessary that some some part of the Brain give way, or that there should be imprinted on it some other Motion, that so it may be able to form the Traces which are affixed to the Ideas that represent those Objects to us; so that if the Fibres of the Brain are but a little hardened, they will admit no Inclinations or Motions, but what they were formerly accustomed to. Whence it comes to pass, that the Soul can never imagine, nor consequently be attentive upon what it desires, but only upon things that are familiar to it.  
From hence we must conclude, that it is of great advantage for a Man to Exercise himself in merit ●ting upon all sorts of Subjects, that so he may be able to acquire a Readiness to think upon what he pleases. For as we acquire an extraordinary facility to stir our Fingers after various manners, and with a swiftness even to wonder, by frequent use in playing upon Instruments; so the Parts of the Brain, the Motion o● which is requisite to imagine what we desire, do by use and custom acquire a certain easiness and slexibility; which is the reason that Things are imagined more easily, more readily, and more distinctly.  
Now the best way to acquire this Habitude, which makes the chief distinction betwixt a Wise Man and another Person, is to accustom ourselves in our youth to search after the truth of such things as are very difficult, because at that Age the Fibres are more pliable and apt to give way.  
Nevertheless I do not pretend that this Facility is to be acquired by those who are called Men of Study, yet make it their business only to read without meditating, and without searching of themselves, the Decision of a Question before they read it in an Author: For 'tis visible, that by that means only a Man acquires a facility to remember things that he has read. 'Tis every day observable, that they who read much, can never apply their Minds to new things that are told 'em, and that the vanity of their Learning hurrying 'em to judge of those things before they have conceived 'em in their Minds, throws 'em into those Errors▪ which other Men avoid.  
But though the want of Application be the principal Cause of their Errors, there is one that is peculiar to 'em. That in regard they always carry in their Memories an infinite number of confused Species, they presently choose out some one which they look upon to be the Subject of the Dispute, and because the Things that are told 'em do not agree therewith, they judge ridiculously that their Opponent is deceived. If you make it out to 'em, that they themselves are deceived, and that they do not so much as understand the State of the Question, than they are mad, and not able to apprehend what is said to 'em, and they still keep steadfast to the first false Species which their Memory presented to 'em. If you show 'em their Mistake too apparently, they will start a Second and a Third, which they will defend sometimes against all Appearance of Truth; nay, even against their own Consciences; because they have no respect or love for Truth, and because they are ashamed to acknowledge, that there are some things which others know better than themselves.  
What ever has been said concerning Persons of Forty or Fifty years of Age, 
III. Of Old Men.  with more Reason ought to be understood of Old Men, because the Fibres of their Brain are still more inflexible, and that for want of Animal Spirits to trace out new Footsteps, their Imagination becomes altogether languishing. And because the Fibres of their Brain are usually intermixed with many superfluous Humours, therefore they lose by little and little the memory of things past, and fall into Infirmities that are common to Children. So that in their decrepit Age they have those Defects which depend upon the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain, which are to be met with both in Children and grown Men; though it may be said that they are Wiser than either, because they are no longer so subject to their Passions, which proceed from the vehement Agitation of the Animal Spirits.  
We shall not undertake any farther Explanation of these things, because it is easy to make a judgement of this Age, by the others that we have spoken of before, and to conclude from thence, that Old Men with much more difficulty conceive what is said to 'em, than those that are younger, that they are more obstinately tied to their Prejudices and long received Opinions, and consequently that they are more hardened and confirmed in their Errors and Ill Habits. Though this aught to be observed, that the State of Old Age does not happen precisely at Sixty or Seventy years; that all Old Men do not dote; nor are all those, who are past Sixty, always free from the Passions of young People, and that we should proceed too far to draw General Consequences from Established Principles.   

CHAP. II.  
That the Animal Spirits usually observe the Traces of Ideas which are most familiar to us; which is the Reason that we never make a sound Judgement of things.  
I Suppose I have sufficiently explained in the foregoing Chapters the various alterations that are to be met with in the Animal Spirits, and in the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain, according to the several Ages of Man. So that but a little Meditation upon what has been said, will help us to a distinct Knowledge of the Imagination, and of the most common Natural Causes of the Differences that are to be observed among Wits, since all the Alterations that befall the Imagination and the Mind, are but Consequences of those in the Animal Spirits, and in the Fibres of which the Brain is composed.  
But there are several Particular Moral Causes of the Alterations that befall the Imagination of Man, viz. their different Conditions, Employments, and manner of Living; to the Consideration of which we must oblige ourselves, since these sorts of Alterations are the Causes of almost an infinite number of Errors, every one judging of Things according to the relation they have to his Condition. We do not think it necessary to spend time in Explaining the Effects of some indifferent Causes, as great Sicknesses, surprising Misfortunes, and other unexpected Accidents, which make most violent impressions upon the Brain, and extremely disturb it, because these things but rarely happen; and for that the Errors, into which such sort of Persons fall, are so palpable, that they are no way contageous, seeing they are so easily found out and rejected by all the World.  
Now for the more perfect apprehending all the Alterations, which Different Conditions produce in the Imagination, 'tis absolutely necessary to remember that we never imagine Objects but by first forming Images of 'em; and that these Images are nothing else, but the Traces which the Animal Spirits delineate in the Brain, that we imagine things so much the more strongly, the deeper and more plainly these Traces are impressed, and the oftener and more violently the Animal Spirits have passed through them; and that when the Spirits have passed through several times, they enter in more easily than into other parts adjoining, through which they never passed, or at least not so often. This is the most usual Cause of the Confusion and Falsehood of our Ideas. For the Animal Spirits, that are directed by the Action of External Objects, or else by the Orders of the Soul, to produce certain Traces in the Brain, many times produce others, which in truth resemble 'em in something; but which are not altogether the Traces of the same Objects, nor those which the Soul desired to represent to itself; for that the Animal Spirits finding some Resistance in those parts of the Brain, through which they ought to have past, readily turn aside and crowd into the deeper Traces of those Ideas which are more familiar to us. And here we shall produce very manifest and sensible Examples of these Things.  
When they who are not extremely short sighted, behold the Moon, they see two Eyes, a Nose, and a Mouth; in a word, it seems to them as if they saw a Face: Nevertheless there is nothing at all in the Moon of what they imagine there. Many Persons behold there quite another Thing. And they, who take the Moon to be such as she seems to be to them, may be easily undeceived, if they look upon her with a small Prospective Glass; or if they consult the Descriptions which Hevelius, Riccioli, and others have published. Now the Reason why Men generally behold a Face in the Moon, and not the Irregular Spots which are there, is this, because the Traces of the Face, which are in the Brain are very deep, for that we frequently and with great Attention look upon Faces. So that the Animal Spirits finding some Resistance in other parts of the Brain, easily turn aside from the Direction which the Light of the Moon imprints, and enter into those Traces to which the Ideas of a Face are naturally affixed. Besides, that the Appearing Bigness of the Moon, not being much different from the largeness of an ordinary Head at a certain distance, the Impression of it forms those Traces which have a great Affinity with those that represent a Nose, a Mouth, and Eyes; and by that means determines the Spirits to take their Course in the Traces of a Face, Some there are who see a Man a Horseback in the Moon, or any thing else, which is not a Face; because their Imagination having been strongly affected by certain Objects, the same Traces are opened by the least things to which they have any Relation.  
For the same Reason it is, that we imagine we behold Chariots, Men, Lions, and other Animals in the Clouds, when there is the least resemblance between those Creatures and their Figures; and that all Men, but chief they who are accustomed to Designing and Drawing, many times see Heads of Men upon the Walls, where there are several Irregular Spots.  
'Tis for this Reason also, that the Spirits of Wine, entering without any direction of the Will into Traces most familiar to us, help to discover Secrets of the greatest Importance; and that in our sleep we most commonly dream of those Objects which we have seen in the day time, and which had formed the largest Traces in the Brain; for that the Soul always represents to herself those things of which she has the largest and deepest Traces. To these we may add other Examples more Composed.  
A Distemper is a Novelty, it makes such Havoc as surprises the World. This imprints such deep Traces in the Brain, that the Distemper is always present to the Mind. Suppose this Disease, for Example, be called the Scurvy, all Distempers will be the Scurvy. The Scurvy is new, therefore all Distempers shall be the Scurvy. The Scurvy is attended with several Symptoms, many of which are common to other Diseases. That's nothing to the purpose; if it happen that the Sick Person has any one of those Symptoms, he shall be sick of the Scurvy, and they shall not so much as think of other Distempers that are accompanied with the same Symptoms; they will expect that all the Accidents that they have known Scorbutic Persons labour under, befall them also. They shall prescribe the same Remedies, and shall wonder why they do not work the same Effects, as they have wrought in others.  
An Author applies himself to one sort of Study; upon which the Traces of the Subject of his Employment make so deep an Impression, and irradiate so vigorously over all the Brain, that many times they confound and deface the Traces of such things as are very different one from another. There was one, for Example, who compiled several Volumes upon the Cross; this made him see Crosses where ever he came: Nor was it without reason, that Father Morin derides him for believing that a Medal represented a Cross, when it represented quite another thing. And by Virtue of such a sort of Imagination as this it was, that Gilbert, and several others, after they had studied the Loadstone, and admired its Properties, would needs apply, to Magnetic Qualities, a great Number of Natural Effects, which have not the least Correspondence with them.  
The Examples here cited, are sufficient to prove, that (from this extraordinary easiness of the Imagination, to represent to itself the Objects which are most familiar to it, and the difficulty which it undergoes to imagine those which are new and unusual,) it come to pass, that Men are always forming Ideas, which may be called Mixed and Impure, and that the Mind never Judges of things, but with reference to itself, and its first Thoughts. Thus the different Passions of Men, their Inclinations, their Conditions, their Employments, their Qualities, their Studies; in a word, all their various Manners of Living, producing very great differences in their Ideas: And this it is, that makes them fall into an Infinite number of Errors, of which we shall discourse more at large hereafter. This was it that made the Lord Chancellor Bacon utter these Judicious Expressions: All Perceptions, as well of the Sense as of the Mind, are, Ex analogia Hominis, not ex analogia Vniversi, estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inequalis ad radios rerum, qui suam naturam naturae rerum immiscet, camque destorquet & inficit.   

CHAP. III.  
Of the Mutual Connexion between the Ideas of the Mind, and the Traces of the Brain; and of the Mutual Connexion between Traces and Traces, and between Ideas and Ideas.  
AMong all Material Things, there is none more worthy the serious Study of Men, than the Structure of their Bodies, and the Correspondence between all the Parts that Compose it; and of all Spiritual Things, there is none of which the Knowledge is more Necessary than that of the Soul, and how it is Related indispensably to God, and naturally to the Body.  
'Tis not sufficient to perceive, or know confusedly, that the Traces of the Brain are united one to another, and that they are attended by the Motion of the Animal Spirits; that the Traces being stirred up in the Brain, likewise stir up the Ideas in the Mind, and that the Motions excited in the Animal Spirits, excite the Passions in the Will. 'Tis requisite therefore, as much as may be, to understand distinctly the cause of all those different Unions, and chief the Effects which they are capable of producing.  
We must understand the cause of them, to the end we may attain to the Knowledge of Him who is only able to act within us, and to make us Happy or Miserable; and it becomes us to understand the Effects, because we should know ourselves as much as in us lies, and other Men, with whom we Converse: For then, we shall understand the ways and means of Conducting, Governing, and Preserving ourselves, in the most Happy and Perfect condition, to which it is possible for us to attain, according to the Order of Nature, and the Rules of the Gospel; and we shall be able to live with other Men, when we know how to make use of them in our Necessities, and assist them in their Miseries.  
I do not pretend to explain in this Chapter, a Subject of so vast and so large an Extent: Nor do I pretend to it altogether in the whole Work. There are many things of which I am Ignorant as yet, and which I never hope to understand exactly; there are other things which I believe I know, but which I cannot for all that Explain: For there is no Wit, how mean soever it be, that by Meditation cannot discover more Truths, than the most Eloquent Man in the World can relate.  
I. We are not to imagine, 
Of the Union of the Soul with the Body.  as the greatest part of Philosophers do, that the Soul becomes Corporeal, when it is united with the Body, and that the Body becomes a Spirit when it is united with the Soul. The Soul is not diffused into all the Parts of the Body, to give it Life and Motion, as the Imagination fancies; nor does the Body become capable of Sensation by its union with the Soul, as our deluding Senses would seem to convince us. Every Substance remains what it is, and as the Soul is not capable of Extension and Motion, neither is the Body capable of Sensation and Inclinations. All the Alliance of the Body and Soul, which is known to us, consists in a Natural and Mutual correspondence of the Thoughts of the Soul, with the Traces or Phantoms of the Brain, and the Emotions of the Soul with the Motions of the Spirits.  
So soon as the Soul receives some new Ideas, it imprints new Traces in the Brain; and so soon as the Objects produce new Traces, the Soul receives new Ideas: Not that it considers those Traces, for it has no knowledge of them; nor that those Traces include those Ideas, because they have no Relation one with another: Nor, lastly, that the Soul receives her Ideas from those Traces; for, as we shall show in another place, it is not to be conceived that the Soul can receive any thing from the Body, or that it becomes more Knowing, or more Enlightened, by adverting to it, as the Philosophers pretend, who would have it, that the Soul should perceive all Things, per conversionem ad Phantasmata, by Conversion to the Phantasms, or Traces of the Brain.  
So soon as the Soul would have the Arm to move, the Arm is moved, tho' it does not so much as know what it ought to do to make it move; and so soon as the Animal Spirits are agitated, the Soul finds itself moved, tho' it does not so much as know there are Animal Spirits in the Body.  
When I come to treat of the Passions, I shall speak of the Connexion between the Traces of the Brain, and the Motions of the Spirits, and of that between the Ideas and Emotions of the Soul, for that all the Passions depend upon it. My business here, is only to treat of the affinity between Ideas and Traces, and the Connexion of the Traces one with another.  
There are three very considerable Causes of the Connexion of the Ideas with the Traces; 
Three considerable Causes of the union between the Ideas and Traces.  the first, and most general, is the Identity of Time. For frequently it suffices, that we had certain Thoughts, at such time as some new Traces came into our Brain, so that those Traces cannot be produced again, without renewing the same Thoughts. If the Idea of God present itself to my Mind, at the same time that my Brain was struck with the sight of these three Characters, jah, or with the sound of the Word itself, 'tis enough if the Traces, which those Characters have produced, be excited to make me think of God. And I cannot think of God, but there will be produced in my Brain some confused Traces of the Characters, or Sounds, which accompanied the Thought, which I had of God; for the Brain, being never without Phantasms, there are always such, as have some Relation to what we think, tho' many times these Phantasms are very imperfect, and very confused.  
The second Cause of the Connexion of the Ideas with the Traces, and which always supposes the first, is the Will of Man: This Will 〈◊〉 necessary, that this connexion of the Ideas, with the Traces, may be regulated and proper for Use. For if Men had not Naturally an Inclination, to agree between themselves, to affix their Ideas to Sensible Signs, not only this Connexion of Ideas would be absolutely unprofitable for Society, but it would be also very Irregular and Imperfect.  
First, because Ideas are never strongly united with the Traces, but when the Spirits being agitated, they render those Traces deep and durable. So that the Spirits being never agitated but by the Passions, if Men had no such Union to communicate their Sentiments, and participate of those of others, 'tis evident that the exact Union of their Ideas with certain Traces, would be very weak, because they do not subject themselves to those Exact and Regular Connexion's, but to render themselves Intelligible.  
Secondly, the Repetition of the Meeting of the same Ideas, with the same Traces, being necessary to form a Connexion, that may be of long continuance, since the meeting, unless it be accompanied with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits, suffices not to make strong Connexion's; 'tis clear, that if Men should refuse to assent, it would be the greatest Chance in the World, if the same Traces, and Ideas, should meet together; so that the Will of Man is necessary to regulate the Connexion of the same Ideas with the same Traces, tho' this Will of Agreement be not so much an effect of their Choice and Reason, as an Impression of the Author of Nature, who has made us altogether one for another, and with a strong Inclination to unite in Mind, as well as in Body.  
The third Cause of the Connexion of the Ideas with the Traces, is the Constant and Immutable Nature or Will of the Creator. For example; There is a Natural Connexion, and which depends not upon our Will; between the Traces produced by a Tree or Mountain, which we behold, and the Ideas of a Tree or Mountain; between the Traces which the Cries of a Man or Beast, that suffer Pain, beget in our Brain, the Air of one who threatens us, or of whom we stand in fear, and the Ideas of Grief, of Strength, or Weakness; as also between the Sentiments of Compassion, of Fear, and Courage, which are excitedin us.  
These Natural Bands are the strongest of all; they are generally alike in all Men, and they are absolutely necessary for the Preservation of Life: For which reason it is that they depend not upon our Will; for if the Band or Connexion of Ideas, with certain Sounds and Characters, be but feeble, and very different, in several Countries, 'tis because it depends upon the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the reason why it depends upon it, is, because this Connexion is not absolutely necessary for Life, but only for living like Men that are to form, among themselves, a Rational Society.  
Here we must observe, that the Connexion of Ideas that represent to us Spiritual Things, and such as are distinct from us, with the Traces of our Brain, is not, nor can be Natural; and by consequence, it is, or may be different in all Men, for that it has no other 'Cause than their Will, and the Identity of Time, of which I have spoken before. On the other side, the Connexion of the Ideas of all Material Things, with certain particular Traces, is Natural; and hence there are certain Traces that stir up the same Idea in all Men. For Example, there is no question but that all Men have the Idea of a Square, upon the sight of a Square, because that Connexion is Natural, but 'tis to be doubted whither all Men have that Idea, when they hear the Word Square pronounced, because that Connexion is entirely voluntary. The same thing may also be thought of all Traces, that are tied to the Ideas of Spiritual Things.  
But because the Traces, which have a Natural Connexion with Ideas, do affect the Mind, and consequently render it attentive, the greatest part of Men do easily enough comprehend and retain Sensible Truths; that is, the mutual Relations that are between Bodies. On the other side, because the Traces that have no other Connexion with the Ideas then what is voluntary, do never vigorously strike the Mind, 'tis not without a great deal of trouble that all Men Comprehend, and with much more difficulty retain abstracted Truths; that is, the mutual Relations between things that fall not under the Imagination. But when these Relations are never so little compounded, they appear absolutely Incomprehensible, especially to those that are not accustomed to them, in regard they have not fortified the Connexion of those abstracted Ideas with their Traces, by continual Meditation; and tho' others have perfectly comprehended them, they forget them in a short time, because this Connexion is seldom or never so strong as the Natural one.  
It is so true, that all the trouble Men have to comprehend, and retain Spiritual and Abstracted Things, proceeds from the difficulty of fortifying the Connexion of their Ideas with the Traces of their Brain, that when they find a way to explain the Analogies of Spiritual Things, by the Relations of Material Things, they are easily apprehended, and imprinted after such a manner in the Mind, that we are not only strongly convinced of them, but they are also much more easily retained. The General Idea which we have given of the Mind, in the first Chapter of this Work, is, perhaps, a sufficient Proof of this.  
On the contrary, when the Relation between Material things are expressed in such a manner, that there is no Connexion required between the Ideas of the Things, and the Traces of their Expressions, 'tis a difficult matter to apprehend them, and they are easily forgot.  
For Example: They, who begin the Study of Algebra, or the Analytic Art, cannot but with great difficulty apprehend the Algebraic Demonstrations; and when they have once understood them, they never remember them long, because the Squares, for Example, the Parallellograms, Cubes, Solids, etc. being expressed by aa, a3, abc, etc. whose Traces have no Natural Connexion with their Ideas, the Mind is not able to six the Ideas of them, and examme their Relations.  
But they who begin plain Geometry, do presently, and clearly, conceive the Demonstrations that are explained to them, provided they distinctly understand the Terms that are made use of, because the Ideas of a Square, a Circle, etc. are Naturally tied to Traces of the Figures which they see before their Eyes. It also frequently happens, that the Exposition of the Figure alone, which serves for the Demonstration, causes them sooner to apprehend it than the Discourses that explain it, because the Words not being united to the Ideas, but by an Arbitrary Institution, they do not excite those Ideas with sufficient quickness and clearness, to afford a ready apprehension of their Relations; for this is the principal Reason, why it is so hard a matter to understand the Sciences.  
It may be observed by the By, and from what has been already said, that those Writers who Coin a great many new Words, and new Figures, to explain their Sentiments, many times spend their time to little or no benefit; they think to render themselves Intelligible, when indeed they make themselves Incomprehensible. We define all our Terms, and Characters, say they, and others ought to agree to them. 'Tis true, others agree to them in their Will, but their Nature is repugnant thereto. Their Ideas are not joined to those new Terms, because there is required both Use and great Practice for that. The Authors, perhaps, have been accustomed to that Practice, but the Readers have not. When a Man goes about to Instruct the Mind, 'tis requisite to understand it, because he ought to follow Nature, and not to provoke or hurt it.  
Nevertheless, we ought not to condemn the Care that Mathematicians take in defining their Terms, for 'tis evident they ought to define them, to prevent the trouble of Equivocal Words. But, as much as may be, they ought to make use of Terms that are received, or whose signification is not very remote from that which they go about to introduce; and this is that which Mathematicians do not always observe.  
Nor do we pretend, by what we have said, to condemn Algebra; more especially, that which M. Descartes has re-established. For tho' the Novelty of a few Expressions, in that Science, gives the Mind some little trouble at first, yet there is so little variety and confusion in the Expressions; and the Assistance, which the Mind receives by them, so far surpasses the difficulty it meets with, that we can hardly think it possible to find a better way of expressing his Reasoning, or which better suits with the Nature of the Mind, so as to carry it farther into the Discovery of unknown Truths. The terms of that Science have no share at all in the Capacity of the Mind, they do not burden the Memory; they wonderfully abridge all our Ideas and Reasonings, and render them in some measure sensible by Practice. In short, their Benefit is much greater than that of Expressions, tho' Natural, or of Figures designed by Triangles, Squares, and the like, which cannot be serviceable to the searching after, and unfolding Truths, which are but a little Mysterious. But let this suffice, for the connexion of Ideas with the Traces of the Brain. 'Tis necessary now to say something of the connexion of the Traces one with another, and by consequence, of that agreement which is between the Ideas that answer to the Traces.  
This connexion consists in this, 
II. Of the mutual connexion of the Trac●.  that the Traces of the Brain are so well united together, that they can no longer be excited, but all those that were imprinted at the same time will be also excited. For Example, when a Man happens to be at some public Ceremony, if he observes all the circumstances of it, and all the principal Persons that were present, the Time, the Place, the Day, and all other particulars, 'twill be enough that he remembers the Day, or some other circumstance of the Ceremony less remarkable, to represent to himself all the rest. For this reason it is, that when we cannot call to mind the principal Name of a Thing, we sufficiently design it by making use of the Name, that signifies some circumstance of that Thing. As when we cannot call to mind the proper Name of a Church, we may make use of another Name, which signifies a Thing that has some Relation to it. We may say, 'tis that Church where there was such a Crowd, where Mr.— Preaches, or whither we went last Sunday. And not being able to remember the proper Name of a Person, or it being more convenient to design it after another manner, we may denote it by saying, such a one that has a Face pitted with the Smallpox, such a tall Man well Proportioned, or a little Crook-backed Man, according to the Inclinations we have for the Man, tho' he is to blame that makes use of Scornful Expressions.  
Now the Mutual Connexion of the Traces, and consequently, of the Ideas one with another, is not only the foundation of all the Figures of Rhetoric, but of an infinite number of other things of greater Impertance, as in Morality, Politics, and generally in all Sciences, which have any Relation to Man, and by consequence, of many things which we shall treat of in the sequel of this Discourse.  
The cause of this Connexion of several Traces, is the Identity of Time, when they were imprinted in the Brain; for 'tis sufficient, that several Traces were produced at the same time, to renew them altogether: For the Animal Spirits, finding the way of all the Traces open, that are made at the same time, they continue their way, because they pass more easily through it than other parts of the Brain. This is the cause of Memory, and of the Corporeal Habits which are common to us with Beasts.  
These Connexion's of the Traces, are not always accompanied with the Emotions of the Spirits, because all things which we see, do not appear to us always either Good or Evil. These Connexion's also, may alter and break off, because not being always requisite for the Preservation of Life, they ought not always to be the same.  
But there are Traces in our Brains, that are Naturally united one with another, as also with certain Emotions of the Spirits, because such a Connexion is necessary for the Preservation of Life; and their Connexion cannot be broken off, or at least, not very easily, because it's convenient that it should be always the same. For Example, the Trace of a Precipice which a Man sees under himself, and from which he is in danger of falling, or of some great Body which is ready to fall upon us, and crush us to Death, is Naturally joined to the Trace which represents Death, as also to an Emotion of the Spirits, which disposes us to fly, or desire an Escape. This Connexion of Traces never changes, because it is necessary that it should be always the same; and it consists in a Disposition of the Fibres of the Brain, which we have from our Birth.  
All those Connexion's which are not Natural, may, and aught to be broken, because the various Circumstances of Time and Place ought to alter them, so that they may be useful to the Preservation of Life. 'Tis convenient, for Example, that Partridges should fly from Men with Birding-Pieces in their Hands, especially at such times, and in such places, where Men are accustomed to Hunt after them; but it is not necessary that they should fly at other times, and in other places. Thus, for the Preservation of all Creatures, 'tis necessary that there should be certain Connexion's of Traces, which may be easily formed and destroyed; and that there should be others, which may not be broken without great difficulty. And lastly, others which are never to be broken.  
'Tis very useful, to inquire carefully into the different Effects, which these different Connexion's are capable of producing; for they are very numerous, and of great importance for the Understanding of Man, and of all things, between him and which there is any Relation. We shall find in the sequel of this Discourse, that these Things are the Principal Cause of our Errors: But 'tis time to return to what we promised to treat of, and to explain the different Changes that befall the Imagination of Men, by reason of their various Manner of Living.   

CHAP. IU.  
I. That Studious Men are the most subject to Error,  
II. The Reasons why they rather choose to follow Authothority, than make use of their Judgement.  
THE Differences that are in the various Manners of men's Living, are almost Infinite. There are a great Number of different Conditions, Employments, and Societies. These Differences are the reason, that almost all Men pursue different Designs, and argue upon different Principles. It would be very difficult to meet with several Persons, who have absolutely the same Prospects in one, and the same Community, wherein particular Persons ought to be all of the same Spirit, and have the same Designs: Their different Employs and Conversation, do necessarily give a different Turn and Humour in the way of Managing the Execution of those Things in which they agree: This shows, that it would be an impossible Undertaking to particularise the Moral Causes of Error. But besides, it would be of no use to do it here, 'tis our business only to speak of such Manners of Living, as betray Men into the greatest Number of Errors, and to such as are of the highest Importance. When we shall have Explained those, we shall have opened a Way sufficient to enable the Mind to proceed farther, and every body may be able to Survey, at once, and very easily, the most bidden Causes of several particular Errors, which cannot be explained but with a great deal of Time and Labour. When the Mind sees clearly, it delights itself with pursuing Truth, which it does with an inexpressible swiftness. 
I. That Studicus Persons are the mst subject to Error.  The Employment which seems most necessary to be treated of in this place, because it produces the most considerable changes in the Imagination of Men, and which lead us most into Error, is the Employment of Studious Persons, who make more use of their Memory than Wit. For Experience always shows us, that they who apply themselves most eagerly to the Reading of Books, and to Search after Truth, are those who have lead us into the greatest number of Errors.  
'Tis the same thing with those that Study, as with those that Travel. When a Traveller, by misfortune, has taken the wrong Road, the farther he advances, the more remote he is from the Place whither he designs to go; and the more diligent and hasty he is to arrive to the end of his Journey, the more he wanders out of the way. In like manner, those ardent desires which Men have for Truth, cause 'em to precipitate themselves into the Reading of Books, where they think to find it; or to frame to themselves a Chimerical Systeme of things which they desire to know, for which they have a strong fancy, and which they endeavour by the vain Efforts of Wit to make others relish, to the end they may receive the Honour which is usually due to the Inventors of Systemes. Now let us explain these two Defects.  
'Tis a difficult thing to apprehend, how it comes to pass, that Men of Sense should rather choose to make use of other Persons Judgement in the Search of Truth, than of that which God has bestowed upon 'em. Without doubt, there is infinitely much more pleasure and honour for a Man to guide himself with his own than other Men's Eyes; nor does any Man who has good Eyes ever dream of shutting 'em, or of putting 'em out, in hopes of one to guide him; nevertheless 'tis the same thing with the use of Judgement as with the use of the Eyes; for as the Judgement is ●●●nitely above the Eyes, the use of it is accompanied with satisfactions far more solid, and which content it after another manner, than Light and Colours do the Sight. However Men always make use of their own Eyes to be their Guides; but they seldom or never make use of their own Judgement to discover the Truth.  
But there are several Causes which contribute to this same Perturbation of the Mind. 
II. Reasons why they rather choose to follow Authority than make use of their own Judgement.  First, the Natural Sloth of Men, that will not give themselves the Trouble of Meditation.  
Secondly, Their Inability of Meditating, into which they are fallen, for want of applying themselves to it in their Youth, as has been showed in the Ninth Chapter.  
In the third place, the little Love Men have for Abstracted Truths; which are the foundation of every thing that is to be known here below.  
In the fourth place, the Satisfaction that Men receive from the Knowledge of Probabilities, which are very agreeable and very sensible, because they are built upon Taking Notions.  
In the fifth place, that foolish Vanity which makes us covet to be esteemed Learned: For we call those Learned who have Read most. The knowledge of Opinions is of more use in Conversation, and to be able to puzzle the Minds of the Common Sort, than the knowledge of true Philosophy which is attained by Meditation.  
In the sixth place, because Men, without any Reason, imagine, that the Ancients were more enlightened than we can be; and that there is nothing farther for us to Search after, but what they have already been successful in finding out.  
In the seventh place, a certain false Respect, intermixed with foolish Curiosity, causes us more to admire Things that are most remote, the most ancient, and that come from countries' unknown; and even the most obscure Books. 
Clarus ob obscuram Linguam Lueres.  Thus was Heraclitus heretofore admired for his Obscurity. Men inquire for old Medals, though all defaced with Rust, and preserve, as the Apple of their Eye, the Lantern, or Slipper of some ancient Philosophers, though almost eaten up with Worms; their Antiquity enhances their Price. Some apply themselves to Read the Rabbis, because they wrote in a strange Language, very corrupt and very obscure. Men have a high Esteem for Ancient Opinions, because Time has removed 'em at a great distance from us. And doubtless, had Nimrod wrote the History of his own Reign, all the most refined Politics, all the Sciences, had been contained in it; even as there are some who discover, that Homer and Virgil had the Knowledge of all the Secrets of Nature. Antiquity is to be respected, they cry. How! could Aristotle, Plato, Epicurus, those Great Men, be deceived? They never consider that Aristotle, Plato, and Epicurus, were Men as we are, and of the same Mould and Shape; and that now the World is grown Two thousand years older; 
Veritas filia temporis non autheritatis.  that it has more Experience, that it ought to be more enlightened; and that it is the Age of the World and Experience that enable us to discover the Truth.  
In the Eighth place, because that when a new Opinion or an Author of the time is cried up, it seems that their Fame eclipses ours, because it shines too near it; but they are afraid of no such Injury from the Honour which they pay the Ancients.  
In the Ninth place, because Truth and Novelty can never concur together in Matters of Faith. For Men not being willing to make a distinction between Truths that depend upon Reason, and those that depend upon Tradition, never consider that they ought to be apprehended after a very different manner. They confound Novelty with Errors, and Antiquity with Truth. Luther, Calvin, and others have introduced Innovations, and have been mistaken, therefore Galileo, Harvey, and Descartes are mistaken in their Discoveries. The Impannation of Luther is new, and likewise false; therefore the Circulation of Harvey is false, because it is new. For this Reason it is, that they indifferently, bestow that Odious name of Innovators, both upon Heretics and new Philosophers. The Ideas and Words of Truth and Antiquity, of Falsehood and Novelty have been joined together There's no remedy; the Common sort never separate 'em, and Men of Sense find difficulty enough in it.  
In the Tenth place, because we live in a Time wherein the Knowledge of the Ancient Opinions is still in vogue; and because there are none but those that make use of their Judgement, who can by Force of their Reason wrest themselves from the Contagion of Depraved Customs. When we are in the Throng and the Crowd, 'tis a hard matter not to give way to the Impetuosity of the Torrent that carries us along with it.  
In the last place, because Men act only upon tho score of Interest; and this is the Reason, that even they who deceive themselves, and who perceive the vanity of these sorts of Studies, cease not to apply themselves to 'em for all that; because Honours, Dignities, and Benefices are annexed to 'em; and for that they are always more capable of 'em, who excel in those sorts of Studies, than those that are ignorant of 'em.  
All these Reasons, in my Opinion, sufficiently shows us why Men blindly follow the ancient Opinions, as True; and why, without any Judgement, they reject the new ones, as False: In a word, why they make none or very little use of their Judgement. There are, without question, a great number of Reasons more particular which contribute to it; but if those which we have produced, be but attentively considered, there will be no cause of surprise to see how some People are prejudiced with the Authority of the Ancients.   

CHAP. V.  
Of the Ill Effects that Reading has upon the Imagination.  
THis same False and unworthy Respect, which Men have for the Ancients, produces a great number of most pernicious Effects, which it is convenient to observe.  
The first is, that want of using their own Judgement, does, by little and little, really disable Men from making any use of it at all. For it is not to be imagined, that they who grow old over the Volumes of Plato and Aristotle, make use of their Judgement; they commonly spend so much time in the Reading of those Books, only to endeavour to know the Sentiments of their Authors; and their principal aim is, to know certainly what Opinions they held, without ever troubling themselves much, whither they be consentaneous to Reason or no, as we shall prove in the following Chapter. Thus the Science, and Philosophy which they learn, is properly a Science of Memory, and not a Science of Judgement: They only understand Histories, and Matters of Fact, not evident Truths; and they are rather Historians than true Philosophers.  
The second Effect, which the Reading of the Ancients produces in the Imagination, is, that it puts a strange confusion into all their Ideas who apply themselves to it. There are two different ways to read Authors; the one very good, and very profitable; the other very useless, and even dangerous 'Tis very profitable to read, when we meditate upon what we read: When Men endeavour to find out, by some effect of their Wit, how to resolve the Questions which they meet with in the Titles of the Chapters, before they begin to read them: When they digest, and compare the Ideas of things one with another: In a word, when they make use of their Reason. On the other side, there is no Profit in Reading, when Men understand not what they read; but 'tis dangerous for Men to read, and conceive what they read, when they never examine it sufficiently, to make a good Judgement of it; especially, if they have Memory enough to retain what they have conceived, and do not unwarily assent to what they have read and understood. The first way enlightens the Mind, it fortifies it, and enlarges its Capacity: The second contracts its Extension, and by little and little, renders it both weak, obscure and confused.  
Now the greatest part of those who boast of knowing the Opinions of others, never Study but after the second Manner; and so the more Reading they have, the more their Judgement becomes Feeble and Confused. The Reason is, because the Traces of their Brains are confounded one with another, being very numerous; and because Reason has not digested 'em in order; which hinders the Mind from imagining and representing clearly to itself the Things which it stands in need of. When the Mind goes about to open certain Traces, meeting with others more familiar, it never seeks another Passage. For the Capaciousness of the Brain not being Infinite, 'tis impossible but the great number of Traces formed irregularly, must interfere one with another, and cause a Confusion among the Ideas: 'Tis for this very Reason, that Persons that have great Memories are incapable of judging such things as require much attention.  
But that which is chief to be observed is this, that the Knowledge they acquire, who Read without Meditation, are only to retain the Opinions of others. In a word, that all Sciences that depend upon the Memory, are properly these kinds of Knowledge that puff Men up, because they make a great noise, and infuse a World of Vanity into those that possess them. Thus, they who are learned after that manner, being usually full of Pride and Presumption, pretend they have a Right to Judge of every thing, tho' they are very uncapable; which causes them to fall into a great number of Errors.  
But this false Knowledge does more mischief still; for these Persons fall not alone into Error, they draw along with them almost all the Minds of the Vulgar sort, and a very great Number of young People, who believe all their Decisions as so many Articles of Faith. These falsely Learned, having often prevailed over them, with the weight of their profound Learning, and having deafened them, as well with extraordinary Opinions, as with the Names of ancient and unknown Authors, have gained so powerful an Authority over them, that they respect and admire, as Oracles, whatever they utter, and no less unadvisedly, embrace all their Sentiments. Persons also, much much Ingenious, and more Judicious, who had never known them before, or could not be informed by others what they are, hearing them talk at such a rate, and with so haughty, so imperious, and grave an Air, would have much ado to refrain their respect and esteem for what they say, because it is a difficult thing to forbear paying somewhat to Air and Deportment: For, as it often happens, that a Man who is fierce and daring, abuses others who are stronger, but more prudent and moderate than himself; so they, who maintain Things which are neither true nor probable, put their Adversaries to Silence, by speaking after an imperious, haughty, and grave manner, which surprises them. Now these People, of whom we speak, have a high Conceit of themselves, and despise other Men, as being fortified with a certain Air of Pride, intermixed with Gravity, and a Counterfeit Modesty, which prepossesses, and wins those that hear them.  
For it is to be observed, that all the different Airs of Persons of different Conditions, are only the Natural consequences of that Esteem which every Man has of himself, in reference to others, as it is easy to perceive, if we never so little consider it. Thus the Air of Fierceness and Brutality, is that of a Man, that magnifies himself, and little values the Merit of others. The Modest Air, is that of a Man, who has a low Conceit of himself, a high Esteem for others. The Grave Air, is that of a Man, who has a high Conceit of himself, and greatly Ambitious of others Esteem. And the Simple Air, is that of one who has no great Conceit either of himself, or of any body else. So that all the different Airs, which are almost Infinite, are only the Effects which the different Degrees of Esteem that Men have of themselves, or of those with whom they Converse, naturally produce in our looks, and over all the Exterior parts of our Bodies. We have in the Fourth Chapter, explained the Correspondence between the Nerves that raise the Passions within us, and those which demonstrate them outwardly, by the Air which they Imprint upon the Face.   

CHAP. VI  
That Studious Persons are usually prejudiced in favour of some Author, so that their Principal Aim is to know what he believed, without minding what he ought to believe.  
THere is another fault of great consequence, whereinto great Students usually fall; which is, That they Dote upon some certain Author. If there be any thing true and good in the Book, they cry it up even to excess; every thing is true, the whole is good, every thing in it is to be admired. They please themselves with admiring what they understand not, and they would have all the World admire it as well as themselves. They assume Honour to themselves, from the Praises which they give to those obscure Authors, because thereby they persuade others that they understand them perfectly well; and this affords them no small occasion of Vanity. They value themselves above other Men, because they believe they understand a Piece of Impertinency in an Old Author, or in a Man that, perhaps, never understood himself. How many Learned Men have Sweated, to Illustrate some obscure Passages of the Ancient Philosophers and Poets; and how many great Wits are there, who make it their whole delight to Criticise upon a Word, or the Sentiment of an Author: But 'tis convenient to bring some Instance for what I allege.  
The Question concerning the Immortality of the Soul, is, without all doubt, a Question of great Importance. The Philosophers are not to be blamed, for using all their endeavours to resolve it; and tho' they compile large Volumes, to prove, tho' weakly enough, a Truth that may be demonstrated in a few Words, or in a few Pages at most, yet they are excusable. But who can refrain from laughing, to see them put themselves to such a World of Trouble, to decide what Aristotle thought of it: 'Tis, in my Opinion, a thing of little benefit to those that live now, to know whether there were ever such a Man who was called Aristotle; whether that Man ever wrote those Books which go under his Name; whether he meant such or such a thing, in such a part of his Works; it can neither make a Man more Wise, or more Happy: But 'tis of great Importance to know, whether what he has said be true or false in itself.  
'Tis to no purpose then, to know what Aristotle believed touching the Immortality of the Soul, tho' it be of great moment to know that the Soul is Immortal. However, we are not afraid to assert, that several Learned Men have put themselves to more trouble, to know the Opinion of Aristotle, upon this subject, than the Truth of the Thing in itself, since there are some who have composed whole Folio's, on purpose to unfold what that Philosopher believed of it, but never did so much to know what he ought to have believed of it.  
But tho' so great a number of People have tired their Brains, to resolve what was Aristotle's Opinion, they laboured all to no purpose, since they cannot as yet agree about this trifling Question; which shows, that the Followers of Aristotle are very Unfortunate, to have a Man so obscure to enlighten them; and who himself affected obscurity, as he testifies in a Letter which he wrote to Alexander.  
The Opinion then, of Aristotle, touching the Immortality of the Soul, has been at several times a very great Question, and very considerable among Studious Persons; but because it may not be thought that I talk at Random, and without any Foundation, I am obliged to recite in this place a passage out of La Cerda, somewhat long, and somewhat tedious, wherein that Author has heaped together as many different Authorities upon that subject, as upon a Question of great moment. His words are these that follow, upon the second Chapter of Tertullian, de Resurrectione Carnis.  
Quaestio haec in scholis utrimque validis suspicionibus agitatur, num animam immortalem, mortalemve fecerit Aristoteles. Et quidem Philosophi haud ignobiles asseveraverunt Aristotelem posuisse nostros animos ab interitu alienos. Hi sunt è Graecis & Latinis interpretibus Ammonius uterque, Olympiodorus, Philoponus, Simplicius, Avicenna, uti memorat Mirandula l. 4. the examine vanitatis Cap. 9 Theodorus, Metochytes, Themistius, S. Thomas 2. contra gentes cap. 79. & Phys. lect. 12. & praeterea 12. Metap. lect. 3. & quodlib. 10. qu. 5. art. 1. Albertus, tract. 2. de anima cap. 20. & Tract. 3. cap. 13. Aegidius lib. 3. de anima ad cap. 4. Durandus in 2. dist. 18. qu. 3. Ferrarius loco citato contra gentes, & late Eugubinus l. 9 de perenni Philosophia cap. 18. & quod pluris est, discipulus Aristotelis Theophrastus, magistri mentem & ore & calamo novisse peritus qui poterat.  
In contrariam factionem abiere nonnulli Patres, nec infirmi Philosophi; Justinus in sua Parainesi, Origenes in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, & ut fertur Nazianz. in disp. contra Eunom. & Nyssenus l. 2. de anima cap. 4. Theodoretus de curandis Graecorum affectibus l. 3. Galenus in historia Philosophicâ, Pomponatius l. de immortalitate animae, Simon Portius l. de ment humana; Caietanus 3. de anima cap. 2. In eum sensum, ut caducum animum nostrum putaret Aristoteles, sunt partim adducti ab Alexandro Aphodis auditore, qui sic solitus erat interpretari Aristotelicam mentem; quamvis Eugubinus cap. 21. & 22. eum excuset. Et quidem unde collegisse videtur Alexander mortalitatem, nempe ex 12. Metaph. inde S. Thomas, Theodorus, Metochytes immortalitatem collegerunt.  
Porro Tertullianum neutram hanc opinionem amplexum credo; sed putasse in hac parte ambiguum Aristotelem. Itaque ita citat illum pro utraque. Nam cum hic adscribat Aristoteli mortalitatem animae, tamen l. de anima c. 6. pro contrario opinione immortalitatis citat. Eadem ment fuit Plutarch, pro utraque opinione advocans eundem Philosophum in l. 5. de placitis Philosop. Nam cap. 1. mortalitatem tribuit, & cap. 25. immortalitatem. Ex Scholasticis etiam, qui in neutram partem Aristotelem constantem judicant, sed dubium & ancipitem, sunt Scotus in 4. dist. 43. qu. 2. art. 2. Harveus quodlib. 1. qu. 11. & 1. senten. didst 1. qu. 1. Niphus in Opusculo de immortalitate animae cap. 1. & recentes alii interprete: quam mediam existimationem credo veriorem, sed scholii lex vetat, ut autoritatum pondere librato illud suadeam.  
We give ye all these Citations for true, upon the Credit of the Commentator, believing it would be loss of time to justify them; and because we have not all the Books from whence they were Extracted. Nor do we add any new ones, because we do not envy him the Honour of having well collected them, and for that it would be still more loss of time, had we a desire to do it, tho' we should only, for that purpose, turn over the Indices of the Commentators upon Aristotle.  
We see then, by this passage of La Cerda, that Studious Men, who pass for able Scholars, have put themselves to the Trouble to know what Aristotle believed of the Immortality of the Soul, and that there were some of them that never scrupled to Write Books on purpose, upon this subject; among whom was Pomponatius: For the principal Aim of that Author, in his Book, is to show that Aristotle believed the Soul to be Mortal. And, perhaps, there are some People, who do not only inquire what Aristotle believed upon this subject, but also, look upon it as a Question of great Importance to know, whether, for Example, Tertullian, Plutarch, or others, believed or not, that the Opinion of Aristotle was, that the Soul was Mortal, as we have great reason to believe of La Cerda himself, if we consider the last part of the Passage which we have cited, viz. Porro Tertullianum, etc.  
If it be not very Profitable to know what Aristotle thought, concerning the Immortality of the Soul, nor what Tertullian and Plutarch thought what Aristotle believed, however, the main of the Question about the Immortality, or Mortality of the Soul, is, at least, a Truth very necessary to be known. But there are an infinite number of things, the knowledge of which is very unnecessary, and of which, by consequence, 'tis to yet less purpose to know what the Ancients thought of them: Nevertheless, they put themselves to a World of trouble, to guests at the Sentiments of Philosophers upon subjects of the like Nature. We meet with Books full of these Inquisitions, and these are the Trifles that have raised so many Wars among the Learned. These vain and impertinent Questions, these frivolous Genealogies of unprofitable Opinions, are the Important subjects of the Criticisms of the Learned: They imagine themselves the Absolute Masters of the Genealogical History of substantial Forms, and the World is Ingrateful if it does not acknowledge their Merit. How do these things display the Weakness and Vanity of Human Wit! When Reason does not, that regulates our Studies; our Studies not only grow incapable of perfecting Reason, but even darken, corrupt, and absolutely pervert it. But 'tis necessary here to observe, that in Questions concerning Faith, they are no way to blame, who search what St. Austin, for Example, or any other Fathers of the Church, have believed concerning those things; as neither are they, who inquire whither St. Austin believed what they believed who preceded him, because we cannot attain to Matters of Faith, but by Tradition, Reason not being able to discover them. The most Ancient Belief being the most true, 'tis requisite to know what was that Belief of the Ancients, which cannot be done but by examining the Opinions of several Persons, who succeeded each other at different times. But in things that depend upon Reason, the case is altered, and there is a necessity for Men to trouble themselves what the Ancients believed, that we may know what is needful for ourselves to believe concerning them: Nevertheless, I know not through what confusion of the Mind, certain People are affrighted, if we speak otherwise in Philosophy than Aristotle; but are never moved, if we speak otherwise in Divinity than the Gospel, the Fathers, and the Councils. It seems to me, that they who make the loudest noise against the Novelties of Philosophy, which ought to be esteemed; are they that favour and defend Innovations in Divinity, with the greatest obstinacy, and which ought to be detested. For 'tis not their Language which we blame, as being Authorized by Custom, tho' altogether unknown to Antiquity, but the Errors which they disperse abroad, or which they maintain under the Protection of their confused and equivocal Terms.  
In Matters of Divinity, we should follow Antiquity, because we ought to love Truth, and because Truth is found in Antiquity: 'Tis necessary that all Curiosity should cease, whence once we have sound out the Truth, but in Matters of Philosophy 'tis choir the contrary: we ought to love Novelty, for the same reason that we ought always to love the Truth; we must search after it, and have an uncessant Curiosity for it. If we thought that Aristotle, and Plato, were Infallible, it would be sufficient for us to apply ourselves to understand them, but Reason will not permit us to believe it; for, on the contrary, it requires that we should believe them more ignorant than the New Philosophers, since the World is now grown older by two thousand Years, and has more Experience than it had in Aristotle's and Plato's Days, as we have already said; and because the New Philosophers may not only know all the Truths which the Ancients have left behind them, but may likewise discover many others: Nevertheless, Reason forbids us to believe these New Philosophers upon their own Words, rather than the Ancients. It requires, on the contrary, that we should diligently examine their Thoughts, and refuse our Assent, till it is impossible for us, any longer, to doubt the certainty of their Truth; without being ridiculously prepossed with their great Learning, or other Qualities of their Wit.   

CHAP. VII.  
Of the Prejudices of Commentators.  
THis excess of Prejudice, appears much more strange in those who Comment upon any Author, because they, who undertake that Work, which seems in itself beneath a Man of Sense, imagine that their Authors deserve to be admired by all Men. They also look upon themselves, as making but one Person with their Author; and with this Conceit, Self-love most admirably plays its part. They are cunningly profuse in the Praises of their Authors; they set them off with the best advantage, and heap Honours upon them, well knowing that this Honour will reflect upon themselves. And this Idea of Grandeur, does not only magnify Aristotle or Plato, in the Minds of many Persons, but it imprints also a Respect for all those that have Commented upon them: And such a one would never have Deified his Author, but that he imagined himself, as it were, comprehended in the 〈…〉.  
I do not believe, however, that all Commentators praise their Authors in hopes of a Return; many would abhor it, if they considered it; they Praise them sincerely, and don't think they do it in respect to themselves, but Self-love does it for them, without their perceiving it. Men are not sensible of the Heat which is in their Hearts, tho' it gives Life and Motion to all the other parts of their Body; 'tis necessary that they feel it, by laying their Hands upon their Breast, to be convinced of it, because that Heat is Natural. 'Tis the same thing with Vanity; 'tis so Natural to Man, that he is not sensible of it, tho' it be that, which, as I may so say, giveth Life and Motion to the greatest part of his Thoughts and Designs; it does it many times, in such a manner, as is imperceptible to him. A Man must feel, handle, and search himself, to be convinced that he is Vain. There's no Man yet, has sufficiently been sensible, that 'tis this Vanity which sets the first Wheel of the greatest part of our Actions a going; for tho' Self love, indeed, knows it well enough, yet is that Knowledge to no other end, than to conceal it from all Mankind.  
A Commentator then, having some Relation and Affinity with the Author, upon whom he Comments, his Self-love fails not to discover to him the great subjects of Praise in that Author, to the end he may reap the benefit of them himself: And this is done so dexterously, so subtilely, and so delicately, that it is not to be perceived. But this is not a place to discover the Artifices of Self-love.  
Commentators not only Praise their Authors, because they are prepossessed with an Esteem for them, and because they Honour themselves in Praising them, but also, because it is the Custom, and for that it seems as if there were a necessity of doing it. There are some Persons, who not having any great value for 〈◊〉 Authors, forbea● not, however, to Comment upon them, and that with great Application too, because their Employment, Chance, or their own Capricious Fancy, engages them to undertake the Work. And these People believe themselves obliged, to extol, after a Hyperbolical manner, the Sciences, and Authors upon which they Comment, tho' the Authors are Impertinent, and the Sciences mean and useless.  
And, indeed, it would be a very ridiculous thing for a Man to Comment upon an Author, whom he believes to be Impertinent, and seriously to apply himself to write, in such a manner, as he thought to be of no use. He must therefore, for his Reputation's sake, praise those Sciences, and those Authors, altho' both were Contemptible, and tho' the fault, which he has committed in undertaking an ill Work, may be repaired by another fault as bad. This is the Reason that Learned Men, who Comment upon different Authors, frequently contradict themselves.  
For this Reason also it is, that almost all Prefaces are scarce ever agreeable to Truth or good Sense. If the Comment be upon Aristotle, he is the Genius of Nature: If they Writ upon Plato, he is the Divine Plato. They never Comment upon the Works of Men without Additions to their Names. They are always the Works of Men wholly Divine; of Men who are the Admiration of their Age; or such as have received from God particular Gifts. 'Tis the same thing also, with the Matter which they treat of; 'tis always the most Noble, the most Sublime, and the most useful of all other subjects.  
But that I may not be thought to speak upon my own word, see here, after what manner a famous Commentator among the Learned, writes of the Author upon which he Comments. 'Tis Averro speaking of Aristotle: He says, in his Preface to the Physic; of that Philosopher, that he was the Inventor of Logie, Ethies, and Metaphysies, and that he brought them to Perfection. Complevit, says he, quia nullus eorum, qui seenti sunt eum usque ad hee tempus, quod est mille & quingentorum annorum, quid ●am addidit; nee invenies in ejus verbis errorem alicnjus quantitatis: Et talem esse virtutem in Individu● un●, miracul●sum & extrancum existit; & 〈◊〉 dispositio cum in uno Homine reperi●ur, dignus est esse divinus magis quam Hum●nus. And in other places, he gives him far more Pompous and Magnificent Praises 
* Come ●. de generatione Animal.  Laudemus Deum, qui separavit bunc virum ab aliis in perfectione: appropriavitque ei ultimam dignitatem humanam, quam non omnis homo po●est in quacunque aetate attingere. The same Author also says, Comm. l. 1. destruc. disp. 3. Aristotelis Doctrina est SUMMA VERITAS, quoniam ●jus Intellectus fuit Finis Humani Intellectus: quare bene dicitur de illo, quod ipse fuit creatus & datus nobis divina Providentia, ut non ignoremus possibilia sciri.  
Was not this a Madman for talking at this rate? Was not the Dotage of this Author degenerated into Extravagance and Frenzy? The Doctrine of Aristotle is SOVEREIGN TRUTH, because no body had Understanding like to his, or which came near to his. 'Twas he who was created by God, to teach us what it is possible for us to know. 'Tis ●e who makes all Men Wise; and they are so much the more Learned, the deeper they enter into his Thoughts. And in another place, Aristoteles fuit Princeps, per quem persiciuntur omnes sapientes qui fuerunt p●st cum, licet different ●nter se in intelligendo verba eju, & in co quod sequitur ex eyes. Nevertheless, the Works of this Author are dispersed all over Europe, as also over Countries far more remote. They have been Translated out of Arabic into Hebrew, out of Hebrew into Latin, and it may be into many other Languages, which sufficiently shows the Esteem which the Learned had of him: So that we could not have produced a more manifest Example than this, of the Prejudiced Opinions of Studious Persons; for it shows us, that they are not only many times Prejudiced with an Author, but also, their Prejudice is communicated to others, proportionably to the Esteem which they have in the World: So that the false Pr●is●● which Commentators gives him, are the reason that Persons of meaner Parts, and less Education, who are addicted to Reading, become prepossessed, and fall into an infinite number of Errors. But here's another Eample:  
A certain Doctor, famous among the Learned, 
Prelectiones 12. in prin. Elementor. Euclidis.  who has founded Lectures of Geometry and Astronomy in the University of Oxford, gins a Book, which he made upon the Eight first Propositions of Euclid, with these Words: Consilium meum, Auditores, si vires & vaietudo suffecerit, explicare definitiones, petitiones, communes sententias, & Octo priores Propositiones primi Libri Elementorum, caetera post me venientibus relinquere, And he concludes thus, Exolvi per dei gratiam, Domini Auditores, promissum, liberavi fidem meam, explicavi pro modulo meo, definitiones, petitiones, communes sententias, & octo priores propositiones Elementorum Euclidis. Hic annis fessus, cyclos artemque repono. Succedent in hoc munus alii fortasse magis vegeto corpore, vivido ingenio, etc. Certainly one hour would be enough for a very mean Capacity to learn of himself, or with the help of the most ordinary Geometrician, the Definitions, the Postulates, Axioms, and the eight first Propositions of Euclid; they have hardly need of any Explanation: Yet here's an Author, that talks of this Enterprise as if it were extremely hard and difficult. He is afraid lest his strength should fail him, si vires & valetudo suffecerint. He leaves it to his Successors to perfect what he has left undone, Caetera post me venientibus relinguere. He thanks God, for that by his particular favour, he has performed what he promised. Exclvi per dei gratiam premissum; liberavi fidem meam; explicavi pro modulo meo: What? The Quadrature of a Circle? The Duplication of a Cube? This great Man has explained, pro modulo suo, the Definitions. Postulates, Axioms, and the eight first Propositions of the first Book of Euclids Elements. It may be, that among those that are to succeed him, there will be some that will have more health and strength than himself, to continue this Noble Work. Succedent in hoc munus alii FORTASSE magis vegetes corpore & vivido ingenio. But as for his part, 'tis time for him to take his rest, his annis fessus, cyclos artemque reponit.  
Euclid, certainly, never thought of being so obscure, or of speaking things so extraordinary, when he composed his Elements, that there should be a necessity of making a Book of near three hundred Pages, 
In Quart.  to explain his Definitions, his Postulates, his Axioms, and his Eigh● first Propositions. But this Learned Gentleman, well knows how to magnify the Science of Euclid, and had Age permitted him, and his Strength not failed him, we should have had, by this time, twelve or fifteen large Folio's only upon the Elements of Geometry, which would have been very useful to those that are desirous to learn that Science, and much to the Honour of Euclid.  
These are the odd Designs which false Learning qualifies us for: This Man understood the Greek Language, for we are beholding to him for a Greek Edition of St. Chrysostome's Works. He had also read, perhaps, the Ancient Geometricians: He knew, historically, their Propositions, as well as their Genealogy. He had all the same Respect for Antiquity that Men ought to have for Truth: And what does this same Qualification of Wit produce? A Commentary upon the Definitions, Postulates, Axioms, and the eight first Propositions of Euclid, much more difficult to understand and retain; I do not say, than the Propositions upon which he Comments, but than all that Euclid has Writ upon Geometry.  
There are many People, whose Vanity causes them to speak Greek, and sometimes a Language which they do not understand; for Dictionaries, as well as Index's, and Common Places, are a great help to many Authors, but there are few Men that caution themselves, about heaping up Greek upon a subject where it is little to the purpose to make use of it. And this it is, which makes me believe 'twas a prejudiced Opinion, and an irregular Esteem for Euclid, which formed the design of that Book in the Imagination of its Author.  
Had this Man made as much use of his Reason as of his Memory, in a subject where Reason ought to be employed; or had he had as much Love and Respect for Truth, as Veneration for the Author upon whom he Comments, 'tis very probable, that having spent so much time upon so little subject, he would have acknowledged, that the Definitions which Euclid gives of a Plain Angle, and Parallel Lines, are desective, and that they do not sufficiently explain the Nature of them; and that the second Preposition is Impertinent, since it cannot be proved but by the third Postulate, which cannot be granted, unless you likewise grant the second Proposition. For in granting the third Postulate, which is, On any Centre, and at any Distance, to describe a Circle, they not only grant, that one Line equal to the other, may be drawn from a Point, which Euclid demonstrates by great Circumlocutions in his second Proposition, but also, that an infinite number of Lines, of any length, may be drawn from every Point.  
But the Design of the most part of Commentators is not to illustrate their Authors, and to inquire after Truth, but to show their Learning, and inconsiderately to descend the faults themselves, of those upon whom they Comment: They speak not so much to be understood themselves, or to make their Authors to be understood, as to procure Admiration to themselves and them. Had not the Person, whom we have mentioned, stuffed his Book with Greek Passages, several Names of Authors little known, and other Remarks of the same Nature, of little use to the Understanding of Common Notions, Definitions of Names, and Postulates in Geometry, who would have read his Book? Who would have admired him? And who would have given the Author of it, the Title of a Learned Man, or a Man of Sense?  
After what has been said, I do not believe it can be doubted, that the indiscreet Reading of Authors often prepossesses the Mind. Now so soon as the Mind of a Man is prepossessed, he ceases to be owner of what we call Common Sense: He can no longer give a found Judgement upon any thing, that has Relation to the subject of his Prejudiced Opinion, it infects every thing he thinks on; he can apply himself but very little to any thing, besides what he is Prejudiced in favour of. Thus a Man that admires Aristotle, can never relish any body but Aristotle; he Judges of every thing as it relates to Aristotle; whatever is contrary to his Philosophy, is in his Opinion false, he will have always some Passage of Aristotle in his Mouth; he will Quote him upon all occasions, and upon all sorts of subjects; to prove things obscure, which no body understands, to prove things as clear as day, and which are known to every Child i'th' Street: 'tis all one, because that Aristotle is to him what Reason and Evidence are to others.  
In like manner, if a Man Dote upon Euclid, and Geometry, he shall refer to the Lines and Propositions of his Author, whatever you say to him: He will not talk to ye, but his Words shall have some dependence upon his Science. The whole shall not be greater than a part, only because Euclid says it, and he will not be ashamed to Quote him to prove it, as I have observed. But this is much more usual with those who adhere to other Authors than those of Geometry; and we frequently find large Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic Passages in their Books, to prove things that are perfectly evident.  
All this befalls them, because the Traces, which the Objects of their Prejudiced Opinion have imprinted on the Fibres of their Brains, are so deep, that they always remain open, and for that the Animal Spirits, passing continually quite through them, will not permit them to close: So that the Mind, being constrained to have always those Thoughts that are annexed to the Traces, she becomes, as it were, their Slave, and is always troubled and disquieted by them, when knowing her Errors, she endeavours to apply a Remedy to them. Thus the Mind is continually in danger of falling into a great number of Errors, if she does not always stand upon her Guard, and, with an unalterable Resolution, observe the Rule which we have spoken of at the beginning of this Work, that is to say, never to assent but to Things that are entirely evident.  
I speak not here of the ill choice of those Studies to which they apply themselves, that is a subject to be handled in E●●●ics, tho' it might be referred to what has been said concerning Prejudiced Opinions: For when a Man throws himself desperately upon the study of the Rabbins, and other Books in all forts of Languages, and consequently the most unprofitable, and wastes his whole Life therein, he does it, doubtless, out of a Prejudiced Opinion, and an Imaginary hope of becoming Learned, tho' he will never be able to acquire any real Knowledge by this way of Study. But because this Application to an unprofitable Study, does not so much lead us into Error, as it wastes our Time, and fills us with a foolish Vanity, we shall not here discourse of those, who take pains to become Learned in all sorts of mean, or unprofitable Sciences, whose Number is very great, and who, for the most part, Study with too much Passion.   

CHAP. VIII.  
I. Of the Inventors of New Systems.  
II. The last Error of Studious Persons.  
WE have showed the State of the Imagination of Studious Persons, who abandon themselves wholly to the Authority of certain Authors: There are others, who are very much opposite to them. These are a sort of Persons that never respect any Authors, whatever esteem they have among the Learned: If they had a Value for them once, they have since changed their Minds, and now they set up themselves for Authors. They would fain become the Inventors of some New Opinion, thereby to acquire some Reputation in the World; and they assure themselves, that if they can but say something that has not been said already, they shall not fail of Admirers.  
These sort of Men have usually a strong Imagination, the Fibres of their Brain are of such a Nature, that they preserve a long time, the Traces that are imprinted in them. Thus, when they have once imagined a System that has some Probability, 'tis impossible to undeceive them of their Error: They retain, and tenderly preserve all things, that may be serviceable, in any manner, to confirm it. On the other side, they never take notice of the Objections which are made against it, or else they evade them by some frivolous distinction. Inwardly they please themselves with the sight of their Work, and with the Reputation which they hope to get by it. They only apply themselves to consider the Image of Truth, which their probable Opinions carry: They keep that Image fixed before their Eyes, but they never steadfastly behold those other sides of their Sentiments, which would discover the falsehood of them.  
Great Endowments are required for the framing of any true System; it's necessary that there be a great vivacity and sharpness, besides a certain sublimeness and extension of Judgement, able to survey a great number of things at the same time. Men of mean parts, with all their vivacity, and all their delicacy, are too short sighted, to see what is necessary for the Composing of a System; they stoop at some little difficulties that discourage them, or at some glimmerings that dazzle them: They have not a fight sharp enough to survey the whole Body of a large subject, all at a time.  
But let the Extent and Penetration of the Mind, be never so great, if it be not withal exempt from Passion and Prejudice, there is little to be expected from it; Prejudices possess one part of the Mind, and infect the rest; Passions confound the Ideas a thousand ways, and represent to us, in Objects, whatever we desire to find there. That Passion also, which we have for Truth itself, sometimes deceives us, when it is too vehement; but the desire of appearing Learned, is that which drives us farthest off from attaining true Knowledge.  
There is nothing more rate, than to meet with Persons capable of making new Systems; but it is not so rare a thing, to meet with such as have composed Systems after their own Fancies. There are few People, that Study much, who argue according to Common Notions, there is always some Irregularity in their Ideas; and this sufficiently shows, that they rely upon some particular Systems, which is not known to us: 'Tis true, that all the Books which they Compose do not make it manifest; for when we settle ourselves to Write any Book, which we design to Publish, we take heed, as near as is possible, of what is to be said; and this Attention alone, is ofttimes sufficient to convince us of our Error. Nevertheless, we see from time to time, some Books which prove sufficiently what we have said; for there are Authors, who pride themselves in observing, at the beginning of their Book, that they have invented some new System.  
The Number of Inventors of New Systems, is also very much augmented, by Prejudices conceived against some Authors; for it often happens, that because they have not met with any thing true or solid, in the Opinions of those Authors which they have read, they fall, in the first place, into a great dislike and scorn of all sorts of Books, and afterwards imagine a new Opinion, that carries some Probability, which they greedily embrace, and which becomes more deeply rooted in them, in such manner as we have set forth.  
But when this extraordinary Zeal, which they have for their Opinion, grows cool, or the design of transmitting it to the Public, has obliged them to examine it more exactly and seriously, they discover, and quit the falsehood; but with this condition, that they will never embrace any others, and will condemn all those who pretend to have discovered any Truth.  
Therefore the last, 
II. A consi●● 〈◊〉 Error of Stadions' Persons.  and most dangerous Error of Studious Persons, is this, that they believe there is nothing can be certainly known: They have read many Books, both Ancient and Modern, wherein they could not meet with Truth; they have had several curious Thoughts, which, upon a more strict Examination, they have found false. From whence they conclude, that all Men are like them, and that if they, who believe they have considered some Truths, would but a little more seriously consider them, they would be convinced of their Errors, as well as themselves. This to them, is sufficient to condemn 'em without entering into any farther particular Examination; since, if they did not condemn 'em, it would in some measure be an acknowledgement, that they had more Wit than themselves; which they are not apt to think very probable.  
Therefore they esteem, as obstinate, all those that hold any thing for certain; nor will they by any means hear talk of the Sciences as Evident Truths, which are beyond all contradiction, but only as Opinions of which it is not convenient to be ignorant: However these Persons ought to consider, that though they have read a great number of Books, yet they have not read all, or at least with that attention which is requisite for the right understanding 'em; or if they had many curious thoughts which they sound false in the conclusion, it does not follow they had all the thoughts they might have had; and so it's possible that others have done better than they. For all this, it is not necessary that the others should have more Sense than they, if that be the business that offends 'em, for it's enough that they were only more Fortunate; Nor is there any wrong done 'em by those who profess to know evidently what they are ignorant of, since they say at the same time, that several Ages have been ignorant of the same Truths; not for want of good Wits, but because these good Wits did not first light upon them.  
Let 'em not then be offended, if others see more clearly than they, and speak as they see. Let 'em apply their Minds to what is proposed to 'em, (if their Wit be more capable of Application, after all their Wander) and let 'em then judge: there's no body will hinder 'em; but let 'em be patiented and hold their Tongues, if they resolve to examine nothing. Let 'em consider a little, whether the Answer, which they usually give to most Questions that are asked 'em, they know nothing of the ma●●●●, no Body has hitherto attained it, be a Judicious Answers since that when they make that Answer, they must believe they know all that other Men know, or all that other Men can know. For if they had not these thoughts of themselves, their Answer were still more impertinent. And why do they think it so difficult a thing to confess they know nothing of it, when upon certain Occasions they grant that they knew nothing at all? And wherefore must they conclude that all other Men are ignorant, because they are inwardly convinced that they themselves are ignorant?  
There are these three sorts of Persons who apply themselves to Study. The first dote to little purpose upon some Author, or some false unuseful Science. The second are prepossessed in their own Fancies. The last, which partake of the Qualifications of both the former, are they who imagine they know all that can be known; and who being persuaded that they know nothing of certainty, conclude in general, that nothing can be evidently known; and look upon all things that are proposed to 'em as mere Opinions.  
'Tis easy to see that all the Defects of these three sorts of Persons, depend upon the Properties of the Imagination, which we have explained in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters, but chief in the First, that all this befalls 'em only through Prejudices, in Opinions that blind their Minds, and will not permit 'em to apprehend any other Objects than those of their Prepossessions. It may be said that their Prejudices act their Minds, as the Ministers of Princes do in reference to their Masters. For as those Persons, do, as much as in 'em lies, never permit any but such as are devoted to their Interests, or such as they are no way afraid of, to speak to their Masters; so the Prejudices of these Men will not permit the Mind to behold with a fixed Eye the Ideas of Objects that are wholly pure and unmixed; but they disguise 'em; they cover 'em with their Liveries, and present 'em in that manner all masqued; so that 'tis a difficult thing for 'em to undeceive themselves, and acknowledge their Errors.   

CHAP. IX.  
I. Of Effeminate Wits.  
II. Of Superficial Wits.  
III. Of Persons of Authority.  
iv Of those that make Experiments.  
WHat we have said, is sufficient, in my Opinion, to set forth in general what are the Defects of the Imagination in Studious Persons, and the Errors to which they are most subject. Now in regard there are none but these Persons who trouble themselves with Searching after Truth, and because all the rest of Mankind depends upon them for it, it might be thought that we should here conclude this Second Part. Nevertheless, 'tis convenient to say something more concerning the Errors of other Men, because it will not be amiss to know what they are. 
Of the Effeminate Wits.  Whatever flatters the Senses, extremely affects us; and to whatever affects us, we apply ourselves proportionably to the pleasure we take in it. Thus they, who give themselves up to all manner of the most sensible and pleasing Divertisements, are incapable of penetrating Truths that include any considerable difficulty; because the Receptacle of the Mind, which is not infinite, is wholly taken up with their Pleasures, or at least they have a very great share therein.  
The generality of Great Men, Courtiers, Rich Men, young People, and they that are called by the name of fine Wits, being taken up with continual Pastimes, and only Studying the Art of flattering their Concupiscence and Voluptuous Appetites, by degrees acquire such a Delicacy of Skill in these things, or rather such a Softness, that they may be often said to be rather Effeminate than fine Wits, as they pretend to be. For there is a great difference between Fineness and Softness of Wit, though they are generally confounded one with another.  
Fine Wits are they who discern, by the Conduct of Reason, the most minute differences of things, who foresee the uncommon and almost imperceptible Effects that depend upon Hidden Causes: In short, these are they who penetrate into the Subjects which they consider. But soft Wits have nothing but a false Delicacy; they are neither lively nor piercing; they discern not the Effects from the Causes, even of the most gross palpable thing: Lastly, they neither apprehend nor penetrate into any thing, but are extremely nice as to Manners; A Clownish Word, the Accent of a particular County, a little Grimace, provokes 'em more than a torrent of confused and frivolous Arguments; they cannot know the Defect of Reasoning, but are immediately very sensible of a false Measure, or an irregular Gesture: In short, they understand sensible things perfectly, because they keep their Senses in continual Exercise; but they want the true understanding of things that depend upon Reason, because they seldom or never make use of their own.  
Nevertheless, these are the Persons who are most esteemed in the World, and easily acquire the Reputation of Curious Wits. For when a Man speaks with a free and disengaged Air; when his Expressions are pure and well chosen, when he makes use of Similes that flatter the Senses, and move the Affections after an imperceptible manner, though he utter nothing but trivial things, though there be nothing found, nothing true in all his fine Words, He, according to the Common Opinion, shall be cried up for a Curious Wit, a Refined Wit, a Polished Wit. They never perceive that he is only a Soft Effeminate Wit, and shines only by false Lights, that never enlighten the Mind; and that his persuasions prevail only because we have Eyes, but not because we have Reason.  
Lastly, We do not deny but that all Men are in some measure guilty of this weakness, which we have observed in some. There is not any Man whose Mind is not touched by the Impressions of his Senses and Affections, and who by consequence is not a little swayed by outward Formalities and Language. As to this, all Men differ but in the more or the less. But the reason why this defect is attributed to some particularly, is this; because there are some who acknowledge it to be a fault, and strive to reform it. Whereas they, who have been mentioned by us, look upon it as a very advantageous Accomplishment. Far from acknowledging this same false Delicacy to be the Effect of an Effeminate Softness, and the Original of an Infinite number of the Diseases of the Mind; they imagine it to be an Effect and Mark of the Beauty of their Genius.  
To these, of whom we have spoken, 
Of Superficial Wits.  we may join a very great number of Superficial Wits, who never dive into any thing, and who never apprehend, unless it be confusedly, the differences of things; Not through their own fault, as in those before mentioned, for their Minds are neither filled up, nor contracted by their Divertisements only they have naturally Slender Wits. However this same Slenderness of Wit, proceeds not from the Nature of the Soul, as may be well imagined; but it is caused sometimes by the great scarcity, or the more than ordinary slowness of the Animal Spirits, sometimes through the Inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain; sometimes also through an immoderate abundance of Spirits and Blood, or for some other Reason which it is not worth while to examine.  
There are then two sorts of Wits. Some readily observe the difference of things; and these are True Wits. Others imagine and suppose a Resemblance between 'em, and these are Superficial Wits. The first have a Brain proper to receive clean and distinct Traces of the Objects which they consider; and because they are very attentive to the Ideas of the Traces, they see those Objects, as it were, near at hand, and nothing escapes 'em. But Superficial Wits receive none but feeble or confused Traces of their Objects. They see 'em only, as it were, cursorily at a distance and very confusedly; so that they seem alike to 'em, like the Faces of those which we see afar off, because the Mind supposes always Likeness and Equality, for the Reasons which I shall give in the Third Book.  
The greatest part of those that speak in Public, all those that are called great Talkers, and many of those who are fluent of Speech, though they speak but little, are of this sort. For they who meditate seriously and accurately, are very rarely known to have a Copious Utterance of their own Meditations. Usually they hesitate when they begin to speak, because they are somewhat cautious of making use of Terms that excite in others a false Idea, being ashamed to speak merely for Talk sake, like many that speak boldly of every thing that comes next 'em; they are therefore concerned to find out Words proper to express, as they ought to do, their thoughts, which are not common.  
Though we have a great Veneration for Persons of Piety, Divines, Old Men, and generally for all those who have justly acquired great Authority over other Men, nevertheless we thought ourselves obliged to say this of 'em, it often happens that they believe themselves infallible, because all other Men hearken to 'em with Respect; because they make little use of their Reason in the discovery of Speculative Truths, and for that they condemn with too much freedom, whatever they dislike, before they have seriously considered it. Not that they are to be blamed for not applying themselves to many Sciences of little use; for they are allowed both to let 'em alone, and to despise them if they think convenient; but they are not to judge of 'em rashly as their fancies lead 'em, nor upon ill grounded suspicions. For they are to consider, that the Gravity of their Delivery, the Authority which they have acquired over the Minds of Men and their common custom of confirming what they say by some Passage of the Holy Scripture, will infallibly lead into Error all those that listen to 'em out of Respect, and who being incapable throughly to examine things, suffer themselves to be surprised by Manners and Appearances.  
When Error hath the appearance of Truth, it is oftimes more respected than Truth itself; and this false Respect is attended with dangerous Inconveniencies. Pessima res est errorum Apotheosis, & pro peste intellectus habenda est; si vanis accedat veneratio. Thus, when certain Persons, either out of false Zeal, or out of a Love for their own thoughts, have made use of Scripture to establish false Principles of Natural Philosophy, or any other Science, they have oft been listened to as Oracles by Men that have believed 'em upon their Words, because of that Veneration which they own to Sacred Authority; but it has likewise happened so, that Vicious and Corrupted Minds have hence taken an occasion to despise Religion: So that by a strange Inversion, the Holy Scripture has been the Cause of Error to some, and Truth has been the Motive and Original of Impiety to others. We ought therefore to be careful, as the Author above cited well observes, how we seek for dead things among the living, and never to pretend by the strength of our own Wits to discover in Sacred Scripture what the Holy Ghost hath not thought fit to reveal. Ex divinorum & humanorum malesana admixtione, continues he, non solum educitur Philosophia Phantastica, sed etiam Religio Haretica. Itaque salutare admodum est, si ment sol●ia fidei cantum deatur, quae fidel sunt. All Persons then who have Authority over others, ought to be so much the more cautions in their Decisions by how much they find 'em to be most adhered to. Divines especially aught to take care how they being Religion into contempt through their false Zeal, out of vain glory either to exalt themselves, or disseminate their Opinions. But because it is not for me to tell 'em their Duty, let 'em bear St. Thomas, 
Opuse. 9  who being interrogated by his General, what he thought of some Articles, answered him out of St. Austin in the following manner.  
Multum autem nocet, alia, que ad pietatis Doctrinam non speclant, vel asscrere vel negate, quasi p●●tinentia ad sacram doctrinam. Dicit enim in 5. Confess. cum audio Christianum aliquem fratrem ista quae Philosophi le caeca, aut stellis, de Solis & Lunae motibus dixerunt, nescientem, & aliud pro alio sentientem, patienter intucor opinantem hominem; nec illi obesse video, cum de te, Domine, Creator omnium nostrorum, non credat indigna, si forte sitûs & habitûs Creaturae Corporalis ignoret. Obest autem si haec ad ipsam doctrinam Pietatis pertinere arbitretur, & pertinacius affirmare audeat quod ignorat. Quod autem obsit, manifestat August. in 1. super Genesin ad Litteram. Turpe est, inquit, nimis & perniciosum, ac maxime cavendum, ut Christianum de his rebus veluti secundum Christianas literas loquentem, ita delicare quilibet Infidelis audeat, ut quemadmodum dicitur toto Coelo errare conspiciens, risum tenere vix possit. Et non tamen Molestum est quod errans homo videatur: Sed quod Auditores nostri, ab eis qui foris sunt, talia sensisse creduntur, & cum magno eorum Exitio, de quorum salute satagimus, tanquam indocti reprehenduntur & respumtur. Vnde mihi videtur tutius esse, ut haec que communes Philosophi senserunt, & nostrae Fidei non repugnant, neque esse sic asserenda ut dogmata Fidei, licet aliquando sub nomine Philosophorum introducantur, neque sic esse neganda, tanquam Fidei contraria, ne Sapientibus hujus Mundi contemnendi Doctrinam Fidei occasio praebeatur. It's very dangerous to speak decisively upon Matters which do not belong to Faith, as if they did. St. Austin tells us in his 5th Book of Confessions, When I see, says he, a Christian that is not acquainted with the Opinions of Philosophers, concerning the Heavens, the Stars, and the Motions of the Sun and Moon, and would take one thing for an other; I let 'em alone in these Opinions and Doubts: For I don't see that Ignorance in the situation of Bodies, the different ordering of Matter, can injure 'em; provided he has not unworthy Sentiments of thee our Lord, who art the Creator of us all. But it does him an Injury, if he is persuaded that these things concern Religion, and if he is so bold as obstinately to affirm what he knows not. The same Saint explains his Thoughts yet more clearly upon this Subject in the first Book of the Literal Explication of Genesis in these Terms: A Christian must take a great deal of Care that he does not speak of these Things, as if they were Holy Scripture, for an Infidel who should hear him speak Extravigances that should have no appearances of Truth could not forbear laughing at him, so the Christian is only Confounded, and the Infidel would be very little Edified. Yet what is more mischievous in these Encounters than a Man's being deceived, is, that these Infidels that we endeavour to Convert, imagine falsely, and to their inevitable ruin, that our Authors have very extravigant Sentiments; so that they condemn and despise 'em as ignorant Men; it is therefore in my Opinion more proper, not to affirm the common received Opinions of Philosophers, as Matters of Faith, which are not contrary to our Faith, although we may sometimes make use of the Authority of Philosophers to make 'em be received. We must not also reject these Opinions as contrary to our Faith, that we may give no occasion to the Wise Men of this World to Dispute the holy Truths of the Christian Religion.  
The greatest part of Mankind are so negligent and void of Reason, that they make no distinction between the Word of God and that of Men, when they are joined together, so that they fall into Error, while they approve both, and into Impiety while they despise both indifferently. Nor is it a difficult thing to see the Cause of these last Errors; They proceed from the Connexion of Ideas explained in the Eleventh Chapter; nor is it necessary to insist any farther upon the Explanation of 'em here.  
However it seems worth our while to say something of Chemists, 
Of those that make Experiments.  and generally of all those that spend their time in making Experiments. They are People that Search after Truth; and their Opinions are usually followed without any Examination. Therefore their Errors are so much the more dangerous, because they are imparted to others with so much the more ease.  
'Tis better, without question, to Study Nature than Books. Visible and sensible Experiments are certainly much more evident Proofs than the Arguments of Men. Nor are they to be blamed, who, being engaged by their Profession in the Study of Natural Philosophy, endeavour to improve their Skill by continual Experiments, provided they apply their Labours to the Improvement of the most necessary Sciences. Therefore Experimental Philosophy is not to be found fault with, nor they who make it their practice, but only their Defects.  
The first is, that they are seldom guided, in making their Experiments by the Light of Reason, but by Chance. From whence it comes to pass that they become but little more Learned or Knowing, after they have spent much time and Money.  
The second is, because they are more Sedulous in Curious and Extraordinary Experiments, than such as are most common and familiar. Nevertheless the most Common Experiments are the most Simple; and therefore they ought first of all to apply themselves to those, before they settle to such as are more compounded, and which depend upon a greater number of Causes.  
The third is, because they prosecute those Experiments that bring in Profit, and neglect those that serve to illuminate the Mind.  
The fourth is, because they do not accurately enough observe all the particular Circumstances of Time, Place and Quality of the Drugs which they make use of; though the least of these Circumstances is sufficient to frustrate the Effect which they desire. For it is to be observed, that all the Terms of which the Physicians make use of are Equivocal: For Example, Wine, has as many various significations as there are varieties of Soil, different Seasons, different Manners of making Wine, and different Manners of preserving it; so that in general we may say, that there are not two Tuns of Wine altogether alike. Therefore when a Physician, in order to the making such an Experiment, says, take Wine, no body knows, but very confusedly, what he means. Therefore there is very great Caution to be used in Experiments; nor ought they to attempt Compounded one's, till they know the Reason of the more Simple and Common.  
The fifth arises from hence, that too many Consequences are drawn from one Experiment: Whereas, on the contrary, we want several Experiments to infer one true Conclusion.  
Lastly, the greatest part of Physicians and Chemists consider only the Particular Effects of Nature; they never return to the first Notions of Things, that compose Bodies; Nevertheless, 'tis most certain, that no Man can clearly and distinctly understand the particular Phenomena of Natural Philosophy, unless he be Master of the more General Principles, and unless he also know something in Metaphysics. In a word, they often want Courage and Constancy; they are terrified and tired with the Labour and Expense. There are many other Defects in the Persons before mentioned; but it is not our business here to enlarge.  
The Causes of these Defects are little Application, and the Properties of the Imagination explained in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapter; and because we never judge otherwise of the difference and alterations of Bodies, than by the Apprehensions we have of 'em, as has been said in the First Book.    

The Third Part. Of the contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations.  

CHAP. I.  
I. Of our Inclination to imitate others in all things; which is the Original of the Communication of Errors that depend upon the Power of Imagination.  
II. Two Principal Causes that increase this Inclination.  
III. What a Strong Imagination is.  
iv That there are several sorts of it: Of Mad Men, and of such who have a Strong Imagination according to the Sense which is here meant.  
V Two considerable Defects of those that have a Strong Imagination.  
VI Of the Power they have to Persuade and Impose.  
HAving Explained the Nature of Imagination, the Defects to which it is subject, and how our own Imagination leads us into Error, there nothing more remains for us to Discourse of in this Second Book, but of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations, and that is, of the Prevailing Power which some Men have to engage others in their Errors.  
Strong Imaginations are extremely Contagious; they prevail over those that are weak; they make 'em stoop to their own Laws, and imprint upon 'em their own Characters. Therefore, because Men that have particular Ideas, and a Strong and Vigorous Imagination, most commonly exceed the Bounds of Reason, there are few more General Causes of Error than this pernicious Communication of the Imagination.  
For the better understanding what this Contagion is, and how it is transmitted from one to another, we must consider that all Men have need of one another, and that they are made to compose, among themselves, several Bodies, of which the Parts should have a mutual Correspondence one with another; for the upholding of which Union it is, that God has commanded 'em to be Charitable one toward another; but because Self-Love might by little and little extinguish Charity, and by that means dissolve the Bond of Civil Society, the Almighty judged it convenient that Men should be united together by Natural Ties, which might subsist when Charity failed, and which might defend it against the Efforts of Self-Love.  
These Natural Ties which are common to us with Beasts, consist in a certain Disposition of the Brain, with which all Men are endued, to imitate those with whom they Converse, to make the same Judgements which they do, and to be subject to the same Passions of the Mind to which they are subject. And this same Disposition usually unites Men together much more close and firmly than Charity grounded upon Reason, which sort of Charity is very rare.  
Unless a Man be endued with this same Disposition of the Brain, to partake of our Sentiments and our Passions, he is incapable of his own Nature to unite himself with us, and compose one Body. He is like those Stones of an irregular form, for which there is no room in a Building, because they cannot be joined to the rest.  
Oderunt hilarem tristes, tristemque jocosi,  
Sedatum celeres, agilem gnavumque remissi.  
It requires a larger Portion of Virtue than Men are ware of, not to break with those that no way sympathise with our Passions, but whose Sentiments are in all things contrary to ours. Nor is it altogether without Reason: For when a Man has good cause to be Sad or Joyful, 'tis in some measure an Affront not to correspond with him in his Sentiments. If he be Sad, 'tis not proper to appear before him with a brisk and jolly Air, which argues Gladness, and which strongly imprints the Motions of it in his Imagination; for this is to put him out of that Condition which is most convenient and pleasing to him, Sadness being the most delightful of all the Passions to a Man in Misery.  
All Men therefore have a certain Disposition of the Brain, 
Two Principal Causes that increase our Inclination to imitate one another.  which naturally inclines 'em to be affected after the same manner as some of those with whom they Converse. Now there are two Principal Causes that foment and increase this Disposition, the first is in the Soul, the second in the Body: The first consists in the Natural Propensity of Men to Grandeur and Advancement. This Propensity it is, which imperceptibly excites us to imitate Persons of Quality, in their manner of Speaking, Walking, Dress, and Outward Air. This is the Original of New Modes, of the Instability of living Languages, and of certain general Corruptions of Manners. This is the chief Origine of all Extravagant and Fantastic Novelties, which are not supported by Reason, but Human Fancy and Pleasure.  
The other Cause which much incline to imitate others, and which we ought chief to Discourse of here, consists in a certain Impression which Persons of a Strong Imagination make upon Feeble Minds, and upon Tender and Delicate Brains. 
What a Strong Imagination is.  I understand by a Strong and Vigorous Imagination that Constitution of the Brain which makes it capable of Traces extremely deep, and fill the Receptacle of the Mind in such a manner, that it cannot attend to other things than such as the Images themselves represent to it.  
There are two sorts of Persons who have a Strong Imagination in this Sense. 
Two sorts of it.  The first receive these deep Traces by an Unvoluntary and Irregular Impression of the Animal Spirits; and the others, of whom we intent principally to Discourse here, receive 'em from a certain Disposition which is observed in the Substance of the Brains.  
'Tis visible that the first are absolute Mad Men, seeing they are constrained by the Natural Connexion which is between their Ideas and their Traces, to think upon things not thought of by others with whom they Converse; which renders 'em incapable of speaking to the purpose, and answering directly to Questions that are asked 'em.  
There are an infinite number of this sort of People who only differ in the more or the less; and it may be said, that all such as are agitated with some violent Passion are of their number, since at the time of their Emotion, the Animal Spirits so forcibly imprint the Traces and Images of their Passion, that they are incapable of thinking upon any thing else.  
But 'tis to be observed, that all these sort of Persons are not capable of corrupting the Imagination of any Man, let his Mind be never so weak, and his Brain never so soft and delicate; and this for two Reasons. The first, Because they are not able to answer conformably to the Ideas of others, they can persuade 'em to nothing; And secondly, Because the Disturbance of their Mind being altogether manifest, whatever they say is harkened to with contempt.  
Nevertheless, 'tis true that Passionate Persons put us into Passions, and make Impressions in our Imagination like those with which they themselves are affected. But in regard their Transports are manifestly visible, we resist those Impressions, and get rid of 'em soon after. They rub out of themselves, when they are not fomented by the Cause that produced 'em, that is to say, when the Transported Persons are departed out of our presence, and when the sensible sight of the Characters, which Passion formed in the Countenance, produces no farther Alteration in the Fibres of our Brain, nor any Agitation in our Animal Spirits.  
I only Examine here that sort of Strong and Vigorous Imagination which consists in a Disposition of the Brain proper to receive very deep Traces of more feeble and less active Objects.  
'Tis no defect, to have a Brain proper for a Strong Imagination of Things, and for the Reception of the most distinct and lively Images of the most inconsiderable Objects, provided that the Mind be always Mistress of the Imagination, that these Images be imprinted by her Orders, and that they may be defaced when she pleases; for hence arises sagacity and strength of Wit. But when the Imagination overrules the Soul, and these Traces form themselves by the Disposition of the Brain, and by the Activity of the Objects and Spirits, without expecting the Orders of the Will, this is a most Mischievous Vice, and a kind of Madness. We shall therefore endeavour to set forth the Character of those who have a Strong Imagination of this sort.  
To that purpose it behoves us to remember that the Receptacle of the Mind is confined to narrow limits. 2. That it is filled with no Object more easily than with the Sensations of the Mind, and generally with the Perceptions of Objects that affect us very much. 3. That the deep Traces of the Brain are always accompanied with Sensations, or other Perceptions that vigorously affect us. For thereby 'tis easy to know the Genuine Characters of their Wit who have a Strong Imagination.  
The first is, 
Two considerable Defects in those who have a Strong Imagination.  that these Persons are not capable of giving a sound Judgement of things that are a little difficult and perplexed, because the Receptacle of the Mind being filled with Ideas that are by Nature connexed with those very deep Traces, they have not the Liberty to think of several things at the same time. But in Compound Questions, 'tis requisite that the Mind should survey with one quick and sudden motion the Ideas of many things, and discover, at one single view, the Correspondencies and Connexion's that are necessary for the resolving of those Questions.  
All Men know by their own Experience, that they are not capable of applying themselves to the Search of any Truth, at such time as they are afflicted with any violent Pain, because then, there are in the Brain those deep Traces which take up the Capacity of the Mind. Thus, those Persons of whom we speak, having deeper Traces of the same Objects, (as we suppose) they cannot have so great an Extension of Mind, nor comprehend so many things together as the others. The first Defect of these Persons is to have a narrow Wit, and how much the narrower it is, so much the deeper Traces their Brain receives of inconsiderable Objects.  
The second Defect is, they are Visionaries, yet after a Delicate Manner, and difficult to be discovered. The Vulgar sort of Men believe 'em not to be such; there are none but just and clear Wits that perceive their Visions, and the Deviations of their Imagination.  
Now that we may be able to conceive the Original of this Defect, 'tis necessary to remember what we have said at the beginning of the second Book: That as to those things which are acted in the Brain, the Senses and Imagination differ only in the more and less; that it is by reason of the largeness and deepness of the Traces, that the Mind becomes sensible of Objects; that it judges of 'em as present, and capable of affecting it, and so near it as to make it sensible of Pain and Pleasure. For when the Traces of an Object are small, the Soul imagines only that same Object; it does not judge it to be present, nor does it look upon it to be very great or very considerable; but as the Traces become deeper and greater, the Mind also judges that the Object becomes greater and more considerable, approaches nearer to us, and lastly is more apt to affect and injure us.  
Those Visionaries of whom we here discourse, are not arrived to that Excess of Folly, to believe they see present before their Eyes those Objects which are Absent. The Traces of their Brain are not yet deep enough; they are but half Mad; were they absolutely so, 'twere in vain for us to talk of 'em here. Seeing that all Men being sensible of their Errors, they would not suffer themselves to be deluded by 'em. They are not Visionaries in respect of the Senses, but only in reference to the Imagination. Madmen are Visionaries in reference to the Senses, because they see not Things as they are, and many times believe they see those Things which are not. However 'tis evident that Visionaries in reference to the Senses, and in reference to the Imagination, differ only in the more and less; neither is the Passing from one Condition to the other very difficult. Whence it comes to pass, that the Distemper of Mind in the latter, aught to be represented by comparing it with the Distemper of the former, which is more manifest, and more strongly affects the Mind; since in things which differ not otherwise than in the more or less, those things that less sensibly affect us are always to be explained by those things that affect us more vehemently.  
The second Defect of those who have a strong and vigorous Imagination, is, that they are Visionaries as to the Imagination, or barely Visionaries; for we call those Madmen, that are Visionaries in reference to the Senses. And thus we have enumerated the Vices of Visionary or Fantastic Wits.  
These People exceed their Bounds in every thing; they extol mean and abject things; they magnify small things, and bring remote things near to the sight. Nothing appears to 'em what it really is. They admire every thing; they exclaim against every thing without Discretion. If they are naturally disposed to be fearful; I mean, if their Animal Spirits are in small quantity, without vigour, without motion, they are afraid of every thing, they tremble at the shaking of a Leaf. But if they abound in Blood and Spirits, which is most usual, they feed themselves with vain Hopes, and give themselves up to their Imagination which is fruitful in Ideas, and according to the Proverb, they build Castles in the Air, with extraordinary joy and satisfaction. They are vehement in their Passions, obstinate in their Opinions, always full of, and highly satisfied in the Contemplation of themselves. When they have a fancy to be accounted famous Wits, and to set up for Authors, (for there are Authors of all sorts, as well Visionaries as others;) What Extravagancies, what Deliriums, what Rave are they not guilty of! They never imitate Nature, every thing is affected, forced, and rapturous; they rather Skip and Leap than Walk, they speak in Measure, they utter nothing but Figures and Hyperboles. If they addict themselves to Godliness, and to follow it according to their own Fancies, they put on a Spirit of Judaisme and Pharisaic Hypocrisy; their Minds are altogether intent upon the outside of things, External Ceremonies, and performances of no moment: They become scrupulous, fearful, and superstitious. If you will believe them, every thing belongs to Faith, and every thing is Essential, except what really belongs to Faith, and what is truly Essential. For many times their Minds being taken up with Duties of little moment, they neglect the more useful and more important Precepts of the Gospel, in reference to Justice, Mercy, and Faith. What needs any more? They that desire to be convinced of these Defects, and many others, need only to consider what passes in their daily Conversations.  
But they that have a Strong and Vigorous Imagination are endued with other Qualities, which 'tis very necessary for us to explain in this Place. We have only spoken hitherto of their Defects, we are now to Discourse of their Virtues and Prerogatives; among which they have one that principally regards our subject; for by means of that Prerogative they rule over the Minds of the Vulgar, obtrude their Ideas upon 'em, and communicate to 'em all those false Impressions with which they are affected.  
This Prerogative consists in a strong and vigorous manner of expressing themselves, 
That they who have a strong Imagination castly persuade others.  though it be not natural. They who have a strong Imagination of things, express 'em vigorously, and persuade all those who are convin●●●, rather by outward show, and sensible Impression, than by the force of Reason. For the Brains of those who excel in Strength of Imagination, admitting deep Traces of the Subjects which they imagine, as we have said before, those Traces for the most part are not imprinted without a great Commotion of the Animal Spirits, which dispose the whole Body after a quick and lively manner to express the Cogitations of the Mind. Thus the Air of their Face, the Tone of their Voice, and Elegancy of Speech enlivening their Expressions, they gain Attention of their Spectators and Hearers, and prepare 'em to receive Mechanically the Impression of the Image that violently moves 'em. For in short, those things that are deeply infused into our Mind, are usually as deeply infused by us into the Minds of others. He that is moved by a vehement Passion, still moves others with the same Passion; and though his Rhetoric be often Irregular, yet for all that, 'tis very persuasive: Because the External Air and Gesture, as being most sensible, acts more vigorously upon the Imagination of Men, than the most solid Arguments, that are sedately pronounced, because those Ratiocinations neither flatter the Senses, nor strike the Imagination.  
Persons then, who excel in Imagination, have the advantage to please, to affect, and persuade, because they form the most lively and sensible Images of their thoughts. But there are other Causes that contribute to their easy gaining upon the Mind: For they never Discourse but upon easy Subjects, and such as are within the reach of Vulgar Apprehensions: They never make use of other Expressions and Terms than such as only excite the Confused Notions of the Senses, which always most vehemently affect us: They never talk of Sublime and Difficult Matters but after a Rambling manner, and by way of Common Places: For they dare not venture themselves to dive into Particulars, and stick close to Principles; whither it be, because they do not understand those Matters; or whether they are afraid lest they should for want of Terms entangle themselves, and tyre the Minds of those that are not accustomed to a serious Attention.  
From what has been said, it is easy to judge, that the Vie●s of an Irregular Imagination are extremely Contagious and th●● they very easily insinuate and dispe●●e themselves into the Minds of most People. But they who have a Strong Imagination, being usually En●●●es to Reason and good Sense, because of their want of Wit, and the Phantomes of their Brain, to which they are subject, it may be thence readily inferred, that there are few Causes of our Errors more universal, than the Contagious Communication of the Disorders and Distempers of the Imagination. But we ought to prove these Truths by Examples and Experiments Familiar to all the World.   

CHAP. II.  
General Examples of the Force of the Imagination.  
THere are frequent Examples of this Communication of the Imagination in Children, in respect of their Parents, more especially in Girls, in respect of their Mothers; in Men Servants in respect of their Masters; and Maid Servants in respect of their Mistresses; in Scholars in respect of their Schoolmasters; Courtiers in respect of their Princes, and generally in all Inferiors in respect of their Superiors. Provided that Parents, Masters, and other Superiors be endued with something of a Strong Imagination; otherwise the Weak Imagination of Parents or Masters will make no considerable Impression in Children or Servants.  
The Effects of this Communication are also to be observed in Persons of Equal Conditions; but that is not so usual; because there is not that Veneration among them, which disposes the Mind in such a manner as to admit the Impression of Strong Imaginations without any Examination. Lastly, these Effects are to be met with in Superiors in respect of their Inferiors: For many times Inferiors are endued with an Imagination so lively and imperious, that they bend the Minds of their Masters and Superiors which way they please themselves.  
It will be an easy thing to apprehend how Fathers and Mothers make very strong Impressions upon the Imaginations of their Children, if we consider, that these Natural Dispositions of our Brain, which inclines us to imitate those with whom we Converse, and to be affected with the same Sentiments and Passions, are far stronger in Children, in respect of their Parents, than in other Men: For which several Reasons may be given; and the first is, because they are of the same Blood: For as Parents frequently transmit to their Children a Disposition to certain Hereditary Distempers, as the Gout, the Stone, Madness, and generally all those Diseases which do not come by accident, or from some extraordinary Fermentation of the Humours, as Fevers, Agues, etc. for it is visible, that as those Diseases cannot be communicated, so they imprint the Dispositions of their own upon the Brains of their Children, and bend their Imaginations in such a manner, as to render 'em capable of the same Sentiments with themselves.  
The second Reason is, because that Children have very little Familiarity with other Men, who might sometimes else impress other Traces in their Brains, and in some measure frustrate the continual Effort of Paternal Impressions. For as a Man that never stirred out of his own Country usually imagines the Manners and Customs of Foreign Nations to be altogether contrary to Reason, so a Child that never stirred out of his Father's House, imagines the Sentiments of his Parents and their manner of living to be the Standard of Universal Reason; or, rather he does not believe there are any other Principles of Reason or Virtue, than what he has imbibed from his Parents: He therefore believes whatever he hears his Parents say, and conforms himself in whatever they do.  
But this Imagination of Parents is so strong, that it not only acts upon the Imagination of Children, but also upon other parts of the Body. A Son imitates the Gate, the Speech, and Gestures of his Father. A Daughter imitates the Dress, the Pace, and Voice of her Mother: If the Mother Lisps, the Daughter Lisps; if the Mother have an ill Habit of holding her Head awry, the Daughter does so too. Lastly, Children imitate their Parents in every thing, in their Defects and their ill Gestures, in their Errors and their Vices.  
There are several other Causes which augment the Effect of this Impression: Of which the chiefest are the Authority of Parents, the Dependency of Children, and the mutual Affection both of the one and the other. But these Causes are common to Courtiers, and Servants, and generally to all Inferiors as well as to Children. We shall now Explain the Matter by the Example of Courtiers.  
There are some People who judge of what they see, by what is conspicuous before their Eyes; as of Sublimness, Power, and Capacity of Mind, which lie concealed from their Knowledge, by that Nobility, those Dignities, and that Wealth which is known to 'em. They frequently measure one by the other. And our dependence upon Great Men so much above us, our desire to participate of their Grandeur, and the vast Splendour that environs 'em, incline us frequently to pay Divine Honours to Mortal Men, if it may be lawful for me to say so. For if God confer Authority upon Princes, Men ascribe Infallibility to 'em; an Infallibility so universal as not to be circumscribed within any bounds in any thing, or upon any occafion, nor tied to any Ceremonies. Great Men know all things naturally: Though they decide Questions of which they have no knowledge, yet they have always Reason on their side. He that dares adventure to Examine what they say, is ignorant, and knows nothing; He that raises any doubts, derogates from that Veneration which is due to 'em; He that condemns 'em, is guilty of Rebellion; or at least is a Sot, a Madman, and fit for nothing but to be made a Laughing Stock to all the World.  
But if Great Men vouchsafe us their Favours; then, if we do not approve all their Say, we are not only Obstinate, Headstrong, and Rebellious, but Ungrateful and Perfidious; this is a fault beyond reparation, that renders us unworthy of their Favours, which is the Reason that Courtiers, and by a necessary Consequence, almost all other People without any Consideration, swear to the Sentiments of their Sovereign, and frequently surrender themselves, even in Matters of Religion, to their Humours and Capriccios.  
France and Germany furnish us with too many Examples of these Irregular Submissions to the Impious Commands of their Princes. The Histories of later Ages are full of 'em. Nor were there wanting some Persons well advanced in years, who changed their Religion 4 or 5 times in compliance with the Inconstancy of their Princes in that Particular.  
The Revolutions of Religion in Sweden and Denmark, may serve us for a Proof of the Dominion which some Minds have over others. But there were also other very considerable Causes of these Revolutions. And these surprising Changes are so many Proofs of the Contagious Communication of the Imagination. But these Proofs are too general and great, they rather astonish and dazzle the Mind, than illuminate it, because there are too many Causes that concur to produce these great Events.  
If Courtiers and other Men many times abandon Truths that are Essential, and not to be forsaken, but with the hazard of Eternity, 'tis visible that they will venture less to uphold abstracted Truths, less certain and of little use. If the Religion of the Prince be the Religion of his Subjects, the Reason also of the Prince must be the Reason likewise of his Subjects. And so the Sentiments of the Prince, will be always Alamode. His Pleasures, his Passions, his Words, his Habit, and generally all his Actions, will be imitated. For the Prince is himself the Essential Rule of Manners: And it rarely happens that he does any thing but what is absolutely modish. Now as all the Al●●rations of the Mode are no more than so many various Ornaments and Graces, 'tis no wonder that Prince's act so strongly upon the Imagination of other Men.  
If Alexander hangs his Head on one side, all his Courtiers do the same. If Dionysius the Tyrant applies himself to Geometry, upon the arrival of Plato at Syracuse, Geometry presently becomes Alamode, and the King's Palace, says Plutarch, is immediately covered with a Mist of Dust, through the great number of those that draw Figures upon the Ground. But so soon as Plato is offended with the Prince, and that the Prince indulging his Pleasures, gins to be weary of Geometry, the Courtiers also lay it quite aside. A Man would think, 
In Moral Works; How to distinguish a Flatterer from a Friend.  (continues the same Author) that they were enchanted, and that some Circe had transformed 'em into other Men: They pass from their Love of Philosophy, to their Inclination to Debauchery, which before they abhorred. Thus 'tis in the Power of Princes to change Virtues into Vices, because they are able to change all Ideas with a Word only; There needs no more than the least Nod of their Heads, or the least motion of their Bodies, their Eyes, or their Lips, to make Knowledge and Learning pass for contemptible Pedantry; Rashness, Brutishness, and Cruelty, for greatness of Courage; and Impiety and Libertinism for Strength and Liberty of Wit.  
But in this, as well as in other things, I would have it presupposed, that Princes excel in Strength and Vigour of Imagination: For had they an Imagination Weak and Languishing, they could never enliven 'em with that Turn, and Energy, that invincibly subdues and vanquishes feeble Minds.  
If the force of Imagination alone, without the assistance of Reason, be able to produce such wonderful Effects, there is nothing so Fantastic or Extravagant which is not sufficiently powerful to persuade, let it be only supported by some Appearance of Reason. I thus prove it by Examples.  
An Ancient Author reports, 
Diodorus Siculus Biblioth. Hist, l. 3.  that in Ethiopia the Courtiers made themselves Lame, and Deformed, nay, that they even dismembered, and laid violent hands upon themselves, that they might resemble their Princes: They looked upon it as Ignominious to appear with two Eyes, or to walk upright in the Train of a Prince that was blind of one Eye, or halted of one Leg; in like manner, they durst not appear at Court but with a little indented Hat, with White Buskins, and Gilt Spurs: That Fashion of the Ethiopians was very Fantastical and Inconvenient, nevertheless it was the Mode: They followed it with a World of Joy, and defying the Pain which they were to endure, minded only the Honour which they did themselves, in showing their Generosity and Affection for their King. last, this False Argument of Friendship supporting the Extravagance of the Fashion, has made it pass into a Custom and a Law that has been a long time observed.  
The Relations of those who have Travelled into the East, inform us that this Custom is still observed in several countries': But what necessity of twice crossing the Line to fetch from thence the Religious observation of unreasonable Laws and Customs, or to find out People that follow inconvenient and Fantastical Modes; we need not go any farther than France; For wheresoever Men are indulgent to their Passions, wherever the Imagination is Mistress of Reason, there is also a prodigious Fantasticalness and Inconstancy of Manners: What think you of our Women, that during the most bitter Frosts and Snow in Winter, display their Naked Breasts, but in the Excessive Heats of Summer they hid their Necks and Bosoms, and go so straight Laced that they can hardly Breath? Certainly if by that Custom they suffer not so much Pain as the Ethiopians, they ought at least to be more ashamed: The Pain is not so great, but their Reason for enduring it is not so apparent, and there is at least an equal Fantasticalness. An Ethiopian may allege, that 'tis out of Generosity that he digs out one of his Eyes; but what can a Christian Lady say for herself, that makes a vaunting show of that which Nature and Religion oblige her to conceal? Only that 'tis the Mode, and nothing more. But this Mode is Fantastic, Inconvenient, Undecent, and Unworthy the Manners of a Christian. It has no other Original, but a Reason manifestly depraved, and a secret Corruption of the Heart; 'tis scandalous to observe it; 'tis openly to side with the Irregularities of the Imagination against Reason; to revolt from Purity to Impurity, from the Spirit of God to the Spirit of the World: In a Word, 'tis a violation of the Laws of Reason and the Gospel, to follow this Mode. 'Tis no matter,— 'tis the Mode,— that is to say a Law more Sacred and Inviolable than that which God himself wrote upon the Tables of Moses, or which he engraved by his Holy Spirit in the Hearts of Christians.  
In truth, I know not whether the French have any Reason to Laugh at the Ethiopians and Savages: 'Tis true that the first time a Man should happen to see a Lame and One-Eyed Prince, attended by a Company of Cripples and Single-Eyed Persons, 'twould be a hard matter to abstain from Laughter: However time would familiarize the Sight, and the greatness of their Courage and Friendship would be more admired, than the weakness of their Judgement would be derided: But 'tis not the same thing with the Modes of France; their Fantasticalness is not supported by any Probable Reason; so that if they are not so troublesome, they are still the more Ridiculous. In a word, they wear the Character of a most Corrupted Age, wherein there is nothing sufficiently powerful to moderate the Irregularity of the Imagination.  
What we have said of Courtiers is to be understood of the greatest part of Men Servants in reference to their Masters, and Maid Servants in reference to their Mistresses, and that we may not spend too much time, I would have it to be understood of all Superiors; but chief of Children in reference to their Parents: because Children are under a particular Dependency upon their Parents because their Parents have a particular Love and Tenderness for 'em, which other Persons have not; Lastly, because Children are induced by Reason to that Submission and Obsequiousness, that many times exceed the Bounds of Reason.  
But 'tis not always necessary, that other Men should have Authority over us, or that we should depend in some measure upon 'em, to enable 'em to work upon the Imagination: For the only power of the Imagination is sometimes sufficient for that purpose, seeing it frequently falls out, that Persons, such as are unknown, of no Reputation, and for whom we are not prepossessed with any Esteem, are endued with such a force of Imagination, and by Consequence so lively and moving, that they persuade us we neither know which way, nor how. 'Tis true, it seems very strange, but there is nothing so common.  
Now this Imaginary Persuasion can only come from the power of a Visionary Person, who speaks without understanding what he says, and by that means inclines the Minds of those that harken to him to believe strongly without knowing what they believe: For most Men are so stupefied with the Effort of a Dazzling Expression, that they judge as their Passion leads 'em, of those things which they understand but very confusedly. And I desire the Readers of this Treatise to observe such Examples as they meet with in their daily Conversations, and to revolve in their Minds what passes upon those Occasions; for I make no question but they will find more Benefit by it than they can imagine.  
But it is farther to be observed, that there are two things that wonderfully contribute to the Operations of the Forcible Imagination of others over us: The first is an Air of Piety and Gravity; The second, an Air of Libertinism and Confidence. For according to our Propensity either to Devotion or Licentiousness, Persons that speak with a Grave and Pious Air, or an Air of Confidence, and Libertinism work very differently upon us.  
'Tis true, that of these there are some more dangerous than others. However have a care of being deluded by the outward shows either of the one or the other; or of submitting to any thing but the force of solid Arguments, To this may be uttered after a Grave and Modest manner, and Impiety and Blasphemy may be covered with the Cloak of Piety. It behoves us to Examine according to the Precept of St. John, whether the Spirits are of God or no, and not confide in every Spirit. The Devils sometimes transform themselves into Angels of Light. Nor are there wanting some Persons, who having, as it were, a Natural Air of Piety, are looked upon as Men endued with true Devotion, and under that Mask are so daring as to pronounce Men free and exempted from their Essential Obligations, and even from the Love of God and their Neighbours, on purpose to enslave 'em to some Pharisaical Practice or Ceremony.  
But the Imaginations, whose Impression and Contagion we ought most chief to avoid, are those of certain Persons in the World who affect the Title of Great Wits, which they acquire with little difficulty: For now there needs no more than with a certain Air of Impudence to deny Original Sin, the Immortality of the Soul, or to scoff at some received Opinion of the Church, to acquire the Rare Title of a Great Wit among the Common sort of Men.  
These slender Wits are usually full of Fire, and I know not by what Air of Licence and Boldness they impiously impose upon other men's Minds, and incline weak Imaginations to surrender to Lively and Plausible Words, but such as signify nothing to those which duly weigh and consider 'em. They are very happy in their Expressions, though very unfortunate in their Reasons. But because even Men, how reasonable soever they are, rather choose to be affected with the sensible Pleasure of Gesture and Expressions, than to tyre themselves with the difficult Examination of Reason; therefore 'tis visible that those Wits are preferred to others, and by that means communicate their Errors and Malignity through the Power which they have over the Imaginations of other Men.   

CHAP. III.  
I. Of the Force of the Imagination of certain Authors.  
II. Of Tertullian.  
ONE of the greatest and most Remarkable Proofs of the Power which some Imaginations have over others, is the Power that certain Authors have to persuade, though they bring no Reasons for what they say. For Example, Tertullian, Seneca, Montaigne, and some others give a Turn to their Words, that have so many Charms, and such a Lustre as dazzles the Minds of most People, though in their Writings the Imaginations of those Authors be but imperfectly painted and shadowed. Their Words, though they want Life, have a greater Efficacy in 'em, than the Reasons of some Persons: They enter, they penetrate, and command the Mind after so imperious a manner, that they force it to a blind Obedience, and tyrannically compel it to an unthought of Submission. The Mind is willing to believe, but knows not what to believe; for when it fain would know what it desires to believe, and approaches near those Phantomes, to distinguish what they are, they vanish into Air with all their Pomp and Splendour.  
Though the Writings of the Authors above mentioned are very proper to demonstrate the Force of Imagination, and though I propose 'em for Example sake, yet do I not go about to condemn 'em in all things: There are some certain Beauties in 'em that I cannot but applaud; nor is it my design to inveigh against the Universal Approbation of many Ages. I protest that I have a high Respect for some of Tertullian's Works; more especially for his Apology against the Gentiles, and his Book of Prescriptions against Heretics; I also admire Seneca in some parts of his Writings; but as for Montaigne's whole Book, I very little value it.  
Tertullian was in truth a Man of profound Learning; but he had a better Memory than Judgement; he had more of Penetration and Extent of Imagination, than of Wit: Nor can it be denied but that he was a Visionary in that sense which I have already explained, and that he was infected with all those Vices which I have attributed to Visionary Wits. The Respect which he had for Montanus and his Prophetesses, is an undeniable Proof of the Weakness of his Judgement. That Heat, those Transports, those Enthusiasms of his upon Petty Subjects, palpably demonstrate the Disorder of his Imagination. How many irregular Ceremonies are there in his Hyperboles, and his Figures? How many Pompous and Magnificent Arguments, that only force Persuasion and Proof by astonishing and dazzling the Mind?  
Of what use, for Example, is it to that Author, when he would justify himself for having put on the Philosopher's Gown, and not the Garment he was wont to wear, to tell us, that the Gown had formerly been in fashion at Carthage? Would it be a sufficient Excuse for a Man now to wear a Cap and a Ruff, because our Forefathers made use of them? And would it look decent for the Women in this Age to wear Farthingales and French Hoods, unless it were in Carnaval time, when they had a mind to disguise themselves?  
What could he infer from those Pompous and Magnificent Descriptions of the Revolutions and Casualties that happen in the World, or what could they contribute to his Justification? The Moon varies in her Aspects; the Year in the Seasons of it; the Fields look of another Hue in the Winter, than in Summer. There happen Inundations that drown whole Provinces, and Earthquakes that swallow up entire Cities. New Cities are built, new Colonies settled; we have heard of Inundations of People that have overrun and subdued Kingdoms: in a Word, all Nature is subject to change. Therefore Tertullian lays aside his common Garment to put on his Gown. What, I would fain know, have all those various Mutations, and others without number which he anxiously inquires into, and describes with forced, obscure, and wrested Expressions, to do with his Matter? The Peacock cannot move his Foot, but he changes colour; the Serpent creeping through some narrow Hole strips off his Skin and renews his Age; therefore Tertullian had reason to change his Habit. Who, in cold Blood, and with a Sedate Mind, but would draw these Conclusions; or, who would not laugh at the Author himself, to hear him make such Inferences; Did he not trouble and dizzy the Brains of his Reader with the noise of his Rhetoric?  
Almost all the rest of his Little Book De Pallio, is full of Reasons as remote from his Subject, as These, which certainly could prove nothing at all, if the Mind did not suffer itself to be stupefied; but 'tis to no purpose to stay any longer upon these Things. 'Tis sufficient to say thus much farther only, that if Exactness of Mind, as also Perspicuity and Clearness in Words ought always to appear in every thing we Writ, seeing we Writ to no other end but to be understood; If this, I say, be true, then is Tertullian never to be excused, who, by the Confession of Salmasius himself, the greatest Critic of this Age, did all he could to render himself obscure, 
Multos etiam vidi, post quam bene aestuassent ut eum assequerentur nihil praeter sudorem, & inanem animi satigationem lucrat●s, ab ejus lectione discessisse. Sic qui Scotinos haberi viderique, dignus qui hoc cognomentum haberet, voluit, adeo quod voluit a semetipso impetravit, & efficere id quod optabat valuit, ut liquido jurare ausim, niminem ad hoc tumpu● extitisse qui possit jurare hunc libellum a capite ad calcem usque totum a se non minus bene intellectum quam lectum. Salm. in Epist. ded. Comm. in Textum.  and so well accomplished his design, that the Commentator himself is not afraid to swear, that he was never as yet perfectly understood by any Man. But though the Genius of that Nation, the Custom then in fashion, or the Nature of satire and Raillery at that time in use, might in some measure justify his design of Studying Obscurity, and setting himself above the Reach of Human Understanding, all this can never be able to excuse the Idle Reasons, and Deviations of an Author, who in several other of his Works, as well as in This, adventured to utter whatever came into his Mind, provided it were some extraordinary Thought, or some bold Expression by which he was in hopes to make a vaunting show of the power, or to say better, of the irregularity of this Imagination.   

CHAP. IU.  
Of Seneca 's Imagination.  
SEneca's Imagination is sometimes no better regulated than that of Tertullian. His Impetuous Commotions frequently hurry him into countries' unknown to him, where nevertheless he Travels with the same assurance, as if he had known where he was, and whither he was going. Provided he make large Steps, and adorn his Periods with Figures and just Cadencies, he thinks he has gone a great way: But he is like your Dancers, who always end at the same place where they began.  
It behoves us to distinguish rightly between the Force and Beauty of Words, and the Force and Beauty of Reasons. 'Tis true there appears much of Efficacy and Elegancy in Seneca's Words, but there is little of Strength or Clearness in his Reasons. By the Strength of his Imagination he gives such a certain Turn to his Words, as to render 'em moving, stirring, and persuasive by Impression, but he does not afford 'em that perspicuity, nor that pure Light, whereby the Mind may be enlightened and persuaded by Evidence. He convinces because he moves, and pleases; but I can hardly believe that they are convinced by him that read him sedately, and who being ware of surprisal, never yield but when vanquished by perspicuity, and demonstrations of Reason. In a word, provided he speaks and speaks well, he is not very solicitous what he says; as if a Man could speak well, yet not know what he said. And thus he convinces by a blind persuasion, which they who admit, do not well apprehend after what manner they came to admit; as if the Mind ought to suffer itself to be convinced, unless it distinctly understand the Matter after due Examination.  
What is more Pompous and Magnificent than his Idea of a Wise Man, yet at the Bottom, what more Vain and Imaginary? His Portraiture of Cato is too Illustrious to be accounted Genuine: They are Adulterations and Paintings that only impose upon such as never study or know the Nature of Man. Cato was a Man subject to all the Miseries that befall Mankind; and therefore to say he was invulnerable was an egregious Mistake: They that strike him, hurt him. 
Itaque non refert, quam multa in illum tela coniiciantur, cum sit nulli penetrabilis. Quomodo quorumdam lapidum inexpugnabilis ferro duritia est, nec secari adamas, aut caedi vel teri potest, sed incurrentiae ultro retundit: quemadmodum projecti in altum s●●puli mare frangunt, nec ipsi ulla saevitiae vestigia tot verberati saeculis ostentant. I●● sapientis animus solidus est, & id roboris collegit, ut tam tutus sit ab injuria quam illa quae extuli. Sen. c. 5. Tract Quod in sapientem, etc.  He had neither the Hardness of an Adamant, which Iron cannot bruise; nor the Firmness of Rocks, which the Waves cannot shake, as Seneca pretends. In a word, he was not insensible. And the same Seneca finds himself obliged to grant it, when his Imagination was a little cooled, and he began to reflect upon what he had said.  
But will he not agree that his Wiseman may be reduced to Misery, since he grants him not to be insensible of Pain: No, without question, Pain does not affect his Wiseman; the fear of Pain does not disturb him: He is above the Frowns of Fortune, and the Malice of Men; they are not able to disquiet him.  
There are no Walls or Towers in the strongest Places, 
Adsum hoc vobis probaturus: sub isto tot civitatum eversore munimenta incursu arietis labefieri, & turrium altitudinem cuniculis ac latentibus fossis repente residere, & aequaturum editissimas arces aggerem crescere. At nulla machinamenta posse reperiri quae bene fundatum animum agitent. And a little lower, Non Babylonis muros ill● contuleris, quos Alexander i●●●●●it; non Cartaginis, aut Numantiae moenia una manu capta; non Capitolium arcemve: habent ista hostile vestigium. Chap. 6.  which the Ramms and other Engines do not cause to shake; or which are not overturned by time. But there are no Engines so strong, as to be able to shake the Constant Mind of a Wiseman. You must not compare him to the Walls of Babylon that Alexander forced, nor those of Carthage or Numantia, which the same Arm overthrew nor the Capitol and Citadel; they still retain the Marks of the Enemies having been Master of 'em.  
Those Arrows which are shot against the Sun, 
Quid tu putas cum stolidus ille Rex multitudine telorum diem obscurasset, ullam sagittom in  incidisse.  caelestia humanas manus effugiunt, & ab his qui templa diruunt, aut simulachra conflant, nihil divinitati nocetur, ita quidquid fit in sapientem proterué, petulanter, superbé, frustra tentatur, chap. 4. Inter fragorem templorum super Deos suos cadentium uni homini pax fuit. chap. 5.  never mount so high as to come near it. The Sactiledges that are committed in destroying Temples, and melting down the Images, never injure the Deity: The Gods themselves may be overwhelmed under the Ruin of their Temples, but h●s Wiseman shall never be overwhelmed, or if he be, he shall receive no harm.  
But never think, 
Non est ut dicas ita ut soles, hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri. Non fingimus istum humani ingeni● vanum decus, nec ingentem imaginem rei falsae concipimus: sed qualem confirmamus, exhibuimus, & exhibebimus. Caeterum hic ipse M. Cato vereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit. ch. 7.  (says Seneca) that this Wiseman whom I describe to thee, is not where to be found. 'Tis not a vain fiction to raise the Mind of Man. It is not a great Idea without Reality and Truth. It may be also that Cato surpasses this Idea.  
But methinks, 
Videor mihi intueri animum tuum incensum, & effervescentem: paras acclamare. Haec sunt, quae auctoritatem praeceptis vestris detrahant. Magna promittitis, & quae ne optari quidem, ne dùm credi possunt. And a little lower, Ita sublato altè supercilio in eadem, quaecaeteri, descendetis, mutatis rerum nominibus; tale itaque aliquid & in hoc esse suspicor, quod prima specie pulchrum atque magnificum est, nec injuriam, nec contumeliam accepturum esse sapientem. And a little lower, Ego vero sapientem non imaginario honore verborum exornare constitui, sed eo loco ponere, quò nulla perveniat injuria.  continues he, that I see your Spirit moved and in a heat. You will say perhaps that this is a way to make a Man contemptible, to promise things that can neither be believed nor hoped for, and that the Stoics only change the names of things, to speak the same things after a more magnificent and pompous manner. But you are deceived. I do not go about to extol a Wiseman by these magnificent and plausible words: I only pretend, that he is in an inaccessible place, where he can receive no injury.  
Thus you see how Seneca's strong Imagination prevails over his weak Reason. But is it possible that Men, continually sensible of their Miseries and Weaknesses, can admit into their Breast such vain and soaring Thoughts? Can a Rational Man ever be convinced in himself, that his Pain never affects or hurts him? But wherefore does he force Cato upon us? For certainly let him attribute as much fortitude and wisdom to him as he pleases, he never arrived at that height as to endure without any commotion; I will not say, the heinous Injuries of Men falling upon him, Beating and Robbing him, but the very Sting of a Flie. What can there be more weak against such strong and convincing Proofs, as those of our own Experience, than this Egregious Reason of Seneca's? and yet 'tis one of his Principal Proofs.  
He that wounds, 
Validius debet esse quod laedit, eo quod laeditur. Non est autem fortior nequitia virtute. Non potest ergo laedi sapiens. Injuria, in bonos non tentatur nisi à malis, bonis inter se pax est. Quod si laedi nisi infirmior non potest, malus autem bono infirmior est, nec injuria bonis nisi à dispari verenda est; injuria in sapientem virum non cadit, chap. 7.  (says he) ought to be stronger than he that is wounded: Vice is not stronger than Virtue. Therefore a Wiseman cannot be injured: For there needs no more than to answer, either that all Men are Sinners, and consequently deserve the Misery which they suffer; which Religion teaches us: Or if Vice be stronger than Virtue, the Vicious may be stronger sometimes than good Men, as Experience shows us.  
Epicurus had reason to say, 
Epicurius ait injurias tolerabiles esse saptenti, nos injurias non esse, c. 15.  that Injuries were tolerable to a Wise Man. But Seneca was in the wrong to affirm, that Wise Men could not be injured. The Virtue of the Stoics could not render 'em Invulnerable, since true Virtue does not hinder us from being Miserable, nor from being fit Objects of Pity when we suffer any Mischief. St. Paul and the Primitive Christians had more Virtue than Cato and all the Stoics; nevertheless they confessed, that the Pains which they suffered reduced 'em to misery, though they were happy in the hopes of Eternal Reward. Si tantum in hac vita sperantes sumus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus Hominibus, says St. Paul.  
God alone by his Grace can endue us with true and solid Virtue; and therefore he alone can bring us to true and solid Happiness. But he neither promises nor bestows it in this Life. 'Tis in the other Life that we must hope for it from his Justice, as the Reward of those Miseries which we suffered for Love of him. We are not at present in possession of that Repose which nothing can trouble. Neither does the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ afford us invincible strength; it leaves us to the feeling of our own weakness, that being convinced of our frailty, we may understand that there is nothing in this World wherewith we may not be injured; and that we may be enabled to bear those injuries which are offered us, with that true Patience, which arises from Christian Humility and Modesty, not with a lofty haughty Patience, that appeared in the Constancy of proud Cato.  
Cato took in good part a Box of the Ear that was given him; he never revenged himself; nor did he pardon it; but he arrogantly denied that he had any injury done him. He would have it believed that he was above those that struck him: His Patience was nothing but Pride and Insolency: It was injurious to those that affronted: For by that same Stoical Patience did Cato show, that he looked upon his Enemies as Beasts, that are not worth the anger of a Wiseman, and therefore he takes no notice of 'em. 'Tis this same Scorn of his Enemies, and high Esteem of himself, that Seneca calls greatness of Courage. Majori animo, says he of the injury done to Cato, non agnovit quam ignovisset. How madly does he confound Magnanimity with Pride, and separate Patience from Humility, to join it with insufferable Arrogancy! But how delightfully does this same Madness flatter the Vanity of Man, who always refuses to submit and debase himself? And how dangerous is it, especially for Christians, to imbibe the Doctrine of a Master so Indiscreet and void of Judgement as Seneca; but whose Imagination is so strong, so vigorous, and so impetuous, that it dazzles, and like a Torrent hurries along with it People of weak Understanding, and such as are prone to the Flatteries of Pleasure and Concupiscence.  
Rather let Christians learn from their Master, that the Wicked are they who are able to hurt 'em, and that Good Men are sometimes liable to the Injuries of the Impious by the permission of Providence. When one of the Officers belonging to the Highpriest smote Jesus Christ upon the Face, He, the Wisest of all the Wisest among Christians, infinitely Wise, and likewise as Powerful as he is Wise, does not deny but that he was injured by the Officer; however he was not angry; he does not, as Cato did, revenge himself, but he pardons, as one that had suffered a real Injury; He could have revenged himself, and destroyed his Enemies; but the suffered with an humble and modest Patience, which was no way injurious to any body; no, not to the Miscreant that did him the Mischief. Cato on the other side, neither being able, nor daring to take a real Revenge for the Injury he had received, feigns at least an Imaginary Vengeance that flatters his own Vanity and Pride; he raises himself in his own mind above the Clouds; from thence he beholds poor Mortals as small as Flies, and he contemns 'em as Infects uncapable of hurting him, and unworthy of his Anger. This is a Fiction becoming the Wise Cato. From this Fiction arises that Magnanimity and Constancy of his Courage that resembles him to the Gods. It is this that renders him invulnerable, since it advances him above all the Strength and Malignity of other Men. Poor Cato! who by thy Virtue thinkest thyself superior to all other Mortals! Thy Wisdom is but Madness, and thy Magnanimity an Abomination in the sight of God, whatever the Wise Men of the World thinks of it; 
Sapieutia huj●s mundi est stultitia coram Deo. Q●d homimbus altum est, abominatio est ante Deum. Luc. 16.  There are Visionaries of several sorts; some imagine themselves to be transformed into Cocks and Hens; others believe themselves to be Kings or Emperors; others in imitation of the Deity, arrogate an absolute Independency to themselves. But though Men are always looked upon as Madmen who believe themselves to be transformed into Cocks or Kings, yet are they not always numbered among the Frantic Visionaries, who believe that their Virtue resembles 'em to God, and Independent from all Authority and Command, The Reason of it is, that it is not enough to have Raving Thoughts to be counted a Madman; they must be accounted Frantic and Ridiculous by others: For Madmen never pass for what they are among such as resemble themselves, but only among Men of Sense and Wisdom, as Wisemen are never looked upon to be such by those that are Mad: Men than acknowledge those to be Fools who conceit themselves to be turned into Cocks and Kings, because all Men of Sense believe that it is not so easy for any Body to become a Cock or a King. But Men in all Ages have thought they might be equal to the Gods. Their Vanity has infused this Opinion into 'em as a thing probable enough: They learned it from their first Parents: For without doubt our first Parents were of that Opinion, when they obeyed the Devil, who tempted 'em with a Promise that they should be like to God, Eritis sicut Dii. The most pure Intelligences endued with Celestial Precepts and Clear Understandings, were so blinded by their own Pride, that they thought they might throw off the Yoke of Divine Authority, and seat themselves upon the Throne of God. So that 'tis no wonder, if Men, who are inferior to Angels in Purity and Understanding, abandon themselves to the same Motions of their Vanity which blinds and seduces 'em.  
If the Temptation of Grandeur and Independency be the strongest of all, 'tis because it seems to us, as it did to our Forefathers, more comformable to our Reason as well as to our Inclination; for we are not always sensible of our own Weaknesses and Wants that cause us to stand in need of every thing. Had the Serpent menaced our first Parents by telling 'em, That unless they eat of the Fruit which God had forbid 'em to eat, they should be transformed, the one into a Cock, the other into a Hen, I question whether they would not have derided so foolish a Tempeation; for we should have derided it ourselves. But the Devil judging of others by himself, well knew that Ambition and desire of Independency were the Poind sides against which he was to plant his Batteries.  
The Second Reason why we look upon those to be Madmen that believe themselves to be transformed into Cocks and Kings, and yet have not the same thoughts of those who believe that no Body can hurt 'em, as being above all Pain, is this, because they who are Hypochondraical display their Mistakes visibly to all People, so that every body may be an Eye-witness of their Error. But when Cato assures us, that they who struck him never hurt him, he asserts it, or may assert it, with so much Confidence and Gravity, that a Man may justly question whether he be really the same as he appears to be: And we may be inclined to think, that his Soul is not to be shaken, because his Body seems to be immovable. For the outward Air of the Body is generally a mark of the inward disposition of the Mind. So that a daring and undaunted Liar persuades us sometimes to believe things incredible; because their talking with so much Confidence, is a Proof that affects the Senses; and therefore a most effectual Argument that strongly convinces the generality of People. Few there are therefore, who look upon the Stoics as Visionaries, or as Audacious Liars, because we have no sensible Proof of that which lies reserved in their Breast, and because the Air of the Face is a most sensible Proof that easily imposes upon us; besides that our innate Vanity readily induces us to believe, that Man is capable of that Grandeur and Independency to which he pretends.  
Hence it is apparent, that those Errors which abound in Seneca's Writings are of all others the most Pernicious and Contagious; because they are a sort of Delicate, Insinuating Errors, proportioned to the Vanity of Mankind, and like to that wherein the Devil engaged our first Parents. They are likewise arrayed with those Pompous and Magnificent Ornaments, which make way for 'em into most men's Minds. They enter, take possession, stupefy, and captivate 'em, not with a Blindness that inclines those miserable Mortals to Humility, a sensibleness of their own Ignorance, and an acknowledgement of it before others, but with a Haughty dazzling Blindness, and a Blindness accompanied with some false Glimmerings. And when once Men are smitten with this blindness of Pride, they presently rank themselves in the number of fine and great Wits. Others also reckon 'em in the same Order, and admire 'em. So that there is nothing that can be thought more Contagious than this Blindness, because the Vanity and Sensuality of Men, the Corruption of their Senses and Passions, dispose them to be known thereby, and puts 'em also upon infecting others with it.  
I believe then there is no Author more proper than Seneca, to demonstrate how contagious the Imagination of some Men is, who are called fine and great Wits; and what a Command strong and vigorous Imaginations have over Weak and more Illiterate People; not by the strength or evidence of their Arguments, which are the productions of Wit; but by a certain turn and liveliness of Expression, which depends upon the Force of Imagination.  
I know well that this Author is highly esteemed in the World, and that I shall be accused of more than ordinary rashness, for having spoken of him, as of a Man that had a Strong Imagination, but little Judgement. But it was chief by reason of this Esteem, that I undertook to speak of him; not out of Envy or any Morose Humour, but because his great Reputation will excite many to consider more attentively those Errors of his which I have hinted. We ought, as much as in us lies, to produce famous Examples for the confirmation of things that we assert, when they are of Consequence, and he that Criticizes upon a Book sometimes does it an honour. However it be, if I find fault with any thing in Seneca's Writings, I am not single in that Opinion; For not to speak of some Illustrious Persons in this Age, 'tis about 1600 years ago that a certain Judicious Author observed;  

1. In Philosophia parum diligens. 2. Velles eum dixisse suo ingenio, alieno judicio. 3. Si aliqua Contempsisset, etc. consensu potius Eruditorum, quam puerorum amore comprobaretur. Quintil. l. 10. c. 1.  1. That there was little Exactness in his Philosophy. 2. Little Judgement or Exactness in his Elocution. 3. That his Reputation was more grounded upon the Imprudent Heat of Young Men, than confirmed by the consent of the Wise and Learned.  
'Tis in vain to Encounter palpable Errors with Public Writings, because they are not Contagious. 'Tis ridiculous to admonish Men that Hypochondraical Persons are in some measure mad; they know it well enough: But if they for whom they have a high value, mistake, 'tis necessary to bid 'em have a care of such, for fear lest they adhere to their Errors. Now it is manifest that Seneca's Spirit is a Spirit of Pride and Vanity. Therefore since Pride, according to the Scripture, is the Original of Sin, Initium peccati Superbia, the Spirit of Seneca cannot be the Spirit of the Gospel. Nor can his Morals have any alliance with Christian Morals, which are only true and solid.  
'Tis certain, that all Seneca's thoughts are neither false nor dangerous: They who being endued with a found Wit, have attained the Doctrine of Christian Morals, may read him to good advantage. Great Men have made a profitable use of him; neither is it my intention to blame those, who being willing to comply with the weakness of other Men, who had so high an esteem for him, have drawn Arguments from the Writings of that Author to defend the Morals of Jesus Christ, and to engage the Enemies of the Gospel with their own Weapons.  
There are some good things in the Alcoran, and we find some true Prophecies in the Centuries of Nostra Damus. We make use of the Alcoran to confound the Religion of the Turks; and the Prophecies of Nestra Damus may be serviceable to convince some Whimsical Persons. But it does not follow, because there is something good in the Alcoran, that the Alcoran is to be called a good Book; as some true Explanations of Nostra Damus' Centuries will not make Nostra Damus a Right Prophet; and they who make use of these Books to the ends aforesaid, cannot be said to have a real Esteem for 'em.  
It would be in vain for any Man to oppose what I have said concerning Seneca, by bringing a great number of Passages out of that Author conformable to the solid Truths of the Gospel. I agree that there are some such, as there are also in the Alcoran, and in other Impious Books: And they would do me wrong, to overwhelm me with the Authority of an infinite number of People that have made use of Seneca; because we may sometimes make use of a Book which we believe to be impertinent, provided they with whom we have to deal, have not the same Opinion of the Author as we have.  
To ruin all the Philosophy of the Stoics there needs but only one thing, sufficiently proved by Experience, as also by what we have already said: That we should be bound to our Body, our Parents, our Friends, our Prince, our Country, by those ties that we neither can, and which it would be a shame for us to endeavour to break. Our Soul is united to our Body, and by means of our Body to all things visible, by a Hand so powerful, that it is impossible for us to break that Union. 'Tis impossible to prick our Body, but the whole Individuum must be pricked and hurt: Because we are in that condition, that this mutual Harmony between us and the Body is absolutely necessary. In like manner it is impossible for us to be attacked with Injuries and Contumelies, but we must be offended at 'em. For that God, who has made us to maintain Society with other Men, has endued us with a Propensity to all that can join us together, which can never be vanquished by ourselves. 'Tis merely chimerical to say, that Pain does not hurt us, that Words of Scorn and Contempt do not offend us, because we are above all this. No Mortal Man was ever above Nature, unless by an accession of Grace; and never any Stoic despised Honour and the Esteem of Men by the Strength and Constancy of his Mind only.  
Men may overcome their Passions by contrary Possions: They may vanquish Fear or Pain by ●●●ity; that is, they may scorn to fly, or to complain; when perceiving the Eyes of many People upon 'em, desire of Honour supports 'em, and stops those Corporeal Motions that would induce 'em to fly. This is their Victory, if it may be called a Victory; but this is no delivering themselves from Servitude; it may perhaps be said, that they have only changed their Master for some time, or rather enlarged their Bondage: Such Men are only wise, happy, and free in outward appearance, but in reality undergo a most severe and cruel Servitude. We may resist our Natural Union with our Body by the help of our Union with Men. We may resist Nature by the Strength of Nature: We may resist God by the Strength that he has given us: But no Man can resist God by the Strength of his own Wit; nor can Nature be overcome but by Grace, because God cannot be overcome, if I may be permitted to say so, without the special Assistance of God.  
Thus that Magnificent Division of all things, into those things that have no dependence upon us, and upon which we ought not to depend, seems to be consentaneous to Reason, but not conformable to that disorderly condition to which Sin has reduced us. We are united to all Creatures by the Appointment of God, but we absolutely depend upon 'em through the Disorder of Sin. So that since Felicity cannot subsist with Pain and Anxiety, we can never hope to be happy in this Life by imagining with ourselves, that we do not depend upon those Things to which we are naturally enslaved. All our Felicity in this Life is grounded upon a Lively Faith, and a Strong Hope, which afford us some sort of Enjoyment of our future Bliss by way of Anticipation; and we may live according to the Precepts of Virtue, and vanquish Nature, if supported by that Grace which Jesus Christ has merited for us.   

CHAP. V.  
Of Montagne 's Book.  
MOntagne's Essays may serve for another Proof of the Power which some Imaginations have over others. For that Author has a certain Free Air, and gives such a natural and so lively a Turn to his Thoughts, that it is a difficult thing to read him without being entangled in his Snares. The Carelessness which he affects becomes him so well, that it renders him beloved of all Men, but despised of none; and his Haughtiness is the Haughtiness of a worthy Good Man, that procures him all Veneration, but no Hatred. The Genteel and Free Air, supported by some Learning, works so prodigious effects upon men's Minds, that they often admire him, and surrender to his Decisions, without daring to examine him, and sometimes before they understand him. His Reasons never convince, because he never produces any, but what are weak and without any solidity: And indeed he has no Principles upon which to ground his Arguments; nor does he observe any Order in drawing his Conclusions from Principles. For a Passage out of some History proves nothing: a short Fable demonstrates nothing: two Verses out of Horace; an Apothegme out of Cleomenes' or Caesars, are not sufficient to convince any Rational Man: Nevertheless his Essays are no more than a Rhapsody of Histories, Fables, Sentences, Elegant Words, Distiches, and Apothegms.  
'Tis true that Montagne is not to be looked upon in his Essays as a Man that argues, but only writes to divert himself, he indulges his Genius, and makes it his Business to please, but not to instruct; so that if all his Readers read him only to divertise themselves, his Book would not be so dangerous. But 'tis almost as impossible not to have that which delights us, as to refram from Meats that please our Taste. The Mind can take no delight in reading an Author without imbibing his Sentiments, or at least without receiving some Tincture, which, intermixing with his Ideas, render 'em confused and obscure.  
'Tis not only dangerous to read Montagne for diversion sake, because the pleasure Men take in reading him, engages them insensibly in his Opinions, but because that Pleasure is more capital than it is vulgarly thought to be: For certain it is, that Pleasure arising principally from an eager Appetite, does but ferment and fortify the Passions; and the Style of that Author therefore pleases us, because it actects us and awakens our Passions after an imperceptible manner.  
It would be much to the purpose to prove what we have said in particular of Montagne's Essays, and generally that the delight we take in all the variety of Styles proceeds only from a secret Corruption of the Heart; but it is not here our design, it would carry us too far from our subject: Nevertheless, if we would but reflect upon the Connexion of the Ideas, and the Passions already mentioned, and upon what passes in ourselves, at the same time we read a Piece that is well writ, we shall easily discover ourselves to be most delighted with that Author that is most accommodated to our Affections and Dispositions; if we are delighted with a sublime noble and free Style, it is because Vanity aspires to Rule and Empire; if with a Soft and Effeminate Style, 'tis because we are prone to Softness and Pleasure. In a word, 'tis a certain Perception of Sensible Things, and not from any Perception of Truth, that we are even in spite of our Wills cherished and affected with certain Authors.  
But to return to Montagne, I am of Opinion his chiefest Votaries give this reason for their admiring him, because he is an Author judicious and free from Pedantry, and for that after a diligent Scrutiny he in a wonderful manner detected the Nature and Infitmities of Man's Reason. If I then make it out that Montagne as much a Gentleman as he was, yet for all that, was as much a Pedant as many others, and that he had a very mean knowledge of Human Reason, certainly I shall then make it evident that his Admirers were not compelled into an Admiration of him by Convincing Reasons, but by the Strength of that Author's Imagination.  
The Word Pedant is very Equivocal, but in my Opinion Custom and Reason require that we should call those Pedants, who to make a fair show of their false Learning, quote at random all sorts of Authors; who, to gain a Popular Applause, talk only for talking's sake, and to make themselves admired by Fools; who rake together without Judgement or Discretion Apothegms and Passages of History, to prove, or make a show of proving Things that cannot be proved but by Reasons.  
Pedants are opposed to Men that make use of their Reason, and that which renders 'em odious to Men of Worth and Sense is this, that Pedants are Enemies to Reason. For Men of true Ingenuity love naturally sound Arguments, nor can they endure the Conversation of Men that will not admit of the use of Reason. Now those Persons whom we have described can never argue truly, because their Brains are very shallow, and stuffed with false Learning besides. Nor will they argue, because they find that some Men admire 'em more when they cite any unknown Author, or any Sentence of an ancient Writer, than when they pretend to Reasoning: So that their Vanity Congratulating itself for the Veneration that is paid 'em, causes 'em to apply themselves to the Study of all those Obsolete and unusual Sciences, that procure the gaping astonishment of the Vulgar.  
Pedants than are Vain and Arrogant, Men of great Memories, but of little Judgement, quick and abounding in Quotations, unfortunate and weak in their Arguments; endued with a vigorous and spacious Imagination, but volatile, irregular, and no ways able to contain itself within the bounds of Exactness.  
After all this, it will be no difficult thing to prove, that Montagne was as much a Pedant as several others, according to the Notion of the Word Pedant, which seems most conformable to Reason and Custom. I speak not here of Gowned Pedants, or Schoolmasters; 'tis not the Gown that makes a Pedant. Montagne, who had such an aversion for Pedantry, might never wear a long Gown, but he could not so easily discharge himself of his peculiar Vices. He has laboured to acquire a Genteel Air, but he never studied how to be Master of a Just Mind, or at least his Studies proved ineffectual: And therefore he adorned his Wit with a sort of Learning that did not taste of the School, but was empty, vain, and trivial; while he neglected to cultivate his Reason, to corroborate his Judgement, and acquire to himself the Virtues of a Worthy Man.  
Montagne's Book is stuffed with so many Proofs of the Pride and Vanity of the Author, that it would be a needless thing perhaps to spend time in the particular enumeration of 'em. For he must be a Man extremely conceited to believe, that People would read such a large Book on purpose to understand the Genius and Humour of the Author. Certainly he must think himself separated from the Vulgar, and look upon himself as some extraordinary Person. All Men are essentially obliged to turn the Mind of those that are prone to reverence 'em, towards him who alone deserves to be adored: And Religion teaches, that the Mind and Heart of Man, which were only made for God, should never be taken up with ourselves, nor step at self-admiration and self-love. When St. John fell prostrate at the Feet of the Angel of God, the Angel bid him rise, 
Apoc. 19.10. Conservus tuus sum, adora deum.  I am thy Fellow-servant, said he, and of thy Brethren, worship God. Only the Devils, and those that partake of their Impious Pride, aspire to Adoration. But to exact, that other Men should employ themselves in meditating upon our Affections and Cogitations, What is this but to seek after not only an External, but an Internal and Real Adoration? and ardently to desire the same Worship which God requires to be paid to himself in Spirit and Truth?  
Montagne wrote his Essays, to no other end but to paint forth his own Humours and Inclinations; he himself confesses as much in his Advertisement to the Reader inserted in all the Editions, 'Tis myself that I paint forth, 'tis I that am the Subject of my own Book. And this is apparent enough to them that read it. For there are very few Chapters wherein he does not make some Digression or other to speak of himself. And there are some whole Chapters which he consumes in talking of no body else but himself. Wherefore, though he composed his Book to make the Portraiture of himself, yet he published it for others to read. 'Twas therefore his design to turn the Gazing Eyes and Attentions of all Men upon himself, though he says, he knew not any reason he had to employ his Leisure upon a Subject so vain and frivolous. Thus his own words condemn him. For if he thought there was no reason why Men should employ themselves in reading his Book, certainly he acted against Common Sense in causing his Essays to be published: Whence we are obliged to believe, that either he spoke one thing and thought another, or that he did amiss to Print his Book.  
'Tis also a very pleasant Excuse of his Vanity, to say, that he had never written but for the sake of his Friends and Relations: For if that were true, wherefore did he suffer three Impressions? Would not one have been enough for his Friends and Relation? How came it to pass that he enlarged his Book in the last Impressions, and never expunged any thing out of it, unless it were because Fortune favoured his Intentions: I add, says he, but I never correct, for he that has once mortgaged his Work to the Public, in my Opinion, has no farther right to it. Let him say better if he can in another Book. But let him not corrupt the work that he has sold. At this rate nothing is to be purchased from such Men till after they are dead. Let Men consider well before they appear in public: Who bids 'em make such haste? My Book is always one and the same. And therefore he mortgaged and published his Book as well to pleasure other Men, as his Relations and Friends. But though he had endeavoured to oblige his Friends and Relations only, and to have turned their Minds and Hearts upon his Picture made by himself, all the time that was to be spent in reading his Book, certainly his Vanity was ne'er the more to be excused.  
If it be a fault for a Man to speak often of himself, certainly 'tis a piece of Impudence, or rather a kind of Madness for a Man to be always making Panegyries upon himself as Montagne does; for it is not only a Sin against Christian Humility, but against Right Reason.  
Men were made to live together, and to form Civil Bodies and Societies; but it is to be observed, that the Private Members which compose those Societies, would not take it well to be accounted the meanest Member of the Body which they constitute. No wonder then if those Men, that praise and extol themselves above others, looking upon the rest as the meanest Members of the Society, and considering themselves the chiefest and most Honourable, incur the Hatred of all Men, instead of procuring their Love and Esteem.  
Therefore 'tis a Vanity, an Indiscreet and Ridiculous Vanity for Montagne continually to speak in Praise of himself; and it is a Vanity still more extravagant in the same Author to describe his own Faults: For, if you observe it, you shall find, that he only discovers those Vices, which through the Corruption of the Age Men pride themselves in being guilty of; that he willingly ascribes to himself those that he thinks will procure him the Honour of a good Wit, and the Air of a Gentleman. And all this, that by a seeming ingenuous Confession of his Vices, he may gain the more easy Belief when he flies out into his own Praises. 
L. 3. c. 13.  And therefore he might justly say, That Self-Praise and Self-Scorn arose from the same Air of Arrogance. This is always a certain Sign that a Man is puffed up with a high Conceit of himself; and, in my Opinion, Montagne seems more Haughty and Vain when he displays his Vices, than when he cries up his Virtues; for who would bear with such an unsanctified Pride, that glories in those Vices which should rather be an occasion of Humility. I should less impatiently brook a Man who is ashamed to confess his faults, than another who is not afraid to make open proclamation of 'em. And, in my Opinion, there is no Man but aught to have a just dildain of that over free and unchristianlike way wherein Montagne displays his Vices. But let us examine the other Qualities of his Mind.  
If we may believe Montagne upon his own Word; 
L. 2. c. 1●  a little thing will persuade as, 
L. 1 c. 24.  that he was a Man of no Retention, that his Memory was capable of nothing, unfaithful and creacherous, 
L. 2. c. 17.  but that he wanted neither Sense nor Judgement. Nevertheless, if we may believe the Portraiture of his own Wit, I mean, his own Book, we must be of another Opinion. I cannot receive a Command, says he, without my Pocket-Book, or if I have any Discourse to remember, if it be very long, I am reduced to that miserable necessity to learn by Heart, Verbatim, what I have to say; otherwise both behaviour and assurance would fail me, as being afraid lest my Memory should fail me. A Man that can get by Heart a long Discourse, Word for Word, and to a tittle, that he may the better be enabled to compose his outward Gesture, and for the emboldening his Delivery, does he seem to want rather Memory than Judgement? Or may a Man believe Mentagne when he says this of himself? I am forced to call my Servants by the Names of their Employments, or of the Countries where they were born; for I can hardly remember their Proper Names; and if I should live long, I question whether I should remember my own Name. Can a Lord of a small Village have such a Crowd of Servants, that he cannot remember their Names, and yet get by Heart a long Oration? A Man, 
L. 12. c. 17.  who was born and bred in the Country among Peasants and Hinds, who has his Head and Hands full of Family Cares and Business, and who confesses, that 'tis his Opinion, that we ought not to neglect these things which lie under our Feet, whatever we have in our Hands nor what is of most concernment to us for the Necessities of Life; 
L. 12. c. 17.  Can he, I say, forget the Names of his Domestic Servants? Can he be ignorant (as he says himself) of the greatest part of the Coins; of the difference of one Grain from another, either growing, or in the Barn, unless they be such as he sees every day, or such things as every Child knows, as the use of Leaven in making Bread, or why People Tun up their Wine, and yet have a Memory stuffed with the Names and Principles of the Ancient Philosophers, the Ideas of Plato, Epicurus 's Atoms, Leucippus and Democratus 's Vacuum, Thales 's Water, Anaxiamander 's Infinite Nature, Diogenes 's Air, 
L. 2. c. 12.  Pythagoras 's Numbers and Symmetry, Parmenides 's Infinity, Musclus 's Vnit, Apollodorus 's Water and Fire, Anaxagoras 's Similar Parts, Empedocles 's Sympathy and Antipathy, Heraclitus 's Fire, etc. Can a Man that within the space of three or four Pages citys above Fifty Names of several Authors, with their different Opinions, who has filled his whole Work with Fragments of Histories, and indigested Apothegms, who says, that History and Poetry are his Diversion in Books; 
L. 1. c. 25.  who contradicts himself every moment, and in the same Chapter, even in things which he pretends to have the most certain knowledge of, as the Endowments of his Mind and Affections; Is it for such a Man, I say, to boast a Judgement superior to his Memory?  
Let us confess then, that Montagne excelled in Forgetfulness; since he assures us, that he wishes we had the same Opinion of him, more especially since it is no way repugnant to Truth. But we are unwilling to believe him upon his Word, or by the Applauses which he bestows upon himself, that he was a Man of Great Judgement, and extraordinary Sagacity of Mind. For being led by such a prejudiced Opinion, we might too easily assent to those false and dangerous Opinions which he obtrudes upon the World with an Impious Confidence and Boldness, which only stupifies and dazzles weak Minds.  
Another thing for which Montagne is in the second place so highly commended, is, that he had a perfect knowledge of the Mind of Man, that he penetrated into the most hidden Recesses of it, the Nature and Properties, the Strength and Weakness of it; and in a Word, that knew all that could be known of it. Let us now see whether he merits these Eulogies, and whence it comes to pass that they are so liberally bestowed upon him.  
They who have read Montagne, well know that he affected to be thought a Pyrrhonian, and that he took a pride in doubting of every thing. 
L. 1. c. 12.  The Belief of Certainty, says he, is a Certain Testimony of Extreme Folly and Uncertainty; nor are there any greater Fools, or less Philosophers, than the Philodoxes of Plato. On the other side, he bestows such large Encomiums upon the Pryhonians in the same Chapter, that 'tis impossible to question but that he was one of the same Sect. 'Twas necessary in his time for one that would be accounted an able and accomplished Man, to doubt of every thing: And the Title of a great Wit, of which he was ambitious, engaged him farther in those his Opinions. Supposing him therefore to be an Academic also, we might, at once, convince him to be one of the most ignorant among Men; not only in what concerns the Nature of the Mind, but in every thing else. For since there is an Essential Difference between Knowing and Doubting, if the Academics speak what they think, when they assure us they know nothing, we may justly say they are the most ignorant of all Men.  
Nor are they only the most ignorant of all Men, but they are also the most obstinate Assertors of the most Irrational Opinions: For they not only reject whatever is most certain, and most universally received, that they may be accounted great Wits; but by the same violence of the Imagination, they please themselves with talking after a decisive manner of the most uncertain and improbable things. Montagne apparently labours under this Distemper; and therefore of necessity we must conclude, that he was not only ignorant of the Nature of Man's Mind, but also that he was entangled in many gross Errors in reference to that Subject, granting that he spoke what he thought, as it became him to do.  
For what may we say of a Man, who confounds Mind and Matter together, who recites the most extravagant Opinions of the Philosophers upon the anture of the Soul yet so far from condemning 'em, that he rather approves 'em, though most repugnant to Reason; who sees not the Necessity of the Immortality of our Souls; who believes that Human Reason is not capable of understanding it; 
●. 2. c. 12.  and looks upon all the Prooss that are brought to confirm it, as so many ' Dreams which the desire of Immortality produces in us. Somnia non decentis, sed optantis; who is angry with Men; because they separate themselves from the Crowd of other Creatures, and distinguish themselves from Beasts, which he calls, our Fellow Brethren, and our Companions; and which, as he believes, discourse together, understand one another, and laugh at us, as we speak, understand each other, and deride them; who believes there is a greater difference between a Man and a Man, than between a Man and a Beast; and who attributes even to Spiders, Deliberation, Thought, and Conclusion; and who after he has asserted that the Frame of Man's Body has no advantage over that of Beasts, willingly embraces the following Sentiment, That it is not Reason, nor Ratiocination, nor the Soul, that renders M●n more Excellent than Beasts, but our Beauty, our Complexion, and the Structure of our Limbs; above which Prerogatives we ought not to prefer our Understanding, our Prudence, and other Virtues, etc. Can a Man, who relying upon these Whimsical Opinions, conclude, That 'tis not for his Ratiocination, but his Pride and Obstinacy that Man Extols himself above Beasts: Can such a Man, I say have an exact knowledge of the Mind of Man, or is it to be thought that he can persuade others he has it?  
But we must do Justice to all the World, and give a faithful Character of Montegne's Parts. He had a bad Memory, and a worse Judgement, 'tis true, but those two Qualities together do not compose that which usually the World calls the Beauty of the Mind. 'Tis the Elegancy, the Vivacity, the Extension of the Imagination, that procures a Man the Reputation of being a good Wit. The Common sort of People admire that which glitters, not that which is solid, because they have a greater value for that which affects their Senses, than for that which informs their Reason. And therefore mistaking Elegancy of Imagination for Elegancy of Wit, it may be said that Montagne had an Elegant and Extraordinary Wit. His Ideas are false, but splendid; his Expressions irregular or bold, but pleasant; his Discourses ill supported by Reason, but well imagined. There is throughout his Book a Character of an Original which pleases infinitely: Though he be an Usurper of others men's Draughts, it may be said that his Bold and Strong Imagination gives the Turn of an Original to every thing he Copies. Lastly, he has all those things ready at hand, which are necessary to please and allure; nor have I obscurely demonstrated, as I am apt to believe, that he has acquired Admiration among so many Men, not by convincing their Reason by Evident Arguments, but by subduing their Minds by the Commanding and Victorious power of his Imagination.   

CHAP. VI  
I. Of Imaginary Wizards, and Lycanthropis or Wolf-Men.  
II. A Conclusion of the Two First Books.  
THere is nothing wherein the force of the Imagination more prodigiously shows itself, than in the hideous number of Goblins, Apparitions, Witchcrafts, Characters, Enchantments, Charms, and generally of all those things which are thought to depend upon the Power of the Devil.  
There is nothing more terrible, or formidable to the Mind, or which produces in the Brain deeper Traces, than the Idea of an Invisible Power, which we are not able to resist, and which meditates nothing but to do us Mischief: All Discourses which revive that Idea are listened to with Fear and Curiosity. Men adhering to every thing that is extraordinary, take a Fantastic delight to tell surprising and prodigious Stories of the Power and Malice of Wizards, as well to frighten others, as to terrify themselves. So that 'tis no wonder that Wizards are so common in some countries', where the Belief of those Nocturnal Meetings of Wizards called Sabbaths, has too much prevailed; where all the most extravagant Tales of Witchcrafts are heard as so many Authentic Histories, and where real Madmen and Visionaries, whose Imagination was at first disordered as well by the rehearsal of such Tales, as by the Corruption of their own Hearts, are burnt for Wizards. I know that many People will blame me for attributing the greatest part of Witchcrafts to the force of Imagination, because there are some Men who delight in terrifying things, and are angry with those that go about to disabuse 'em; and who are like those that are sick through the power of Imagination, who listen most awfully to their Physicians, that foretell some dismal thing that is to befall 'em, and obey their Prescriptions exactly. Superstition is not easily destroyed, and when ever it is attacked, it finds a great number of Champions; and this same proneness to believe all the Dotages of Daemonographers, is produced and cherished by the same cause that renders the Superstitious obstinate, as may be easily proved. However it will not be amiss to set down in few Words, how, in my Judgement, such Opinions as these came to get footing in the World.  
A Shepherd in his Cottage, after Supper, tells his Wife and Children what was done at the Convention of Wizards called the Sabbat. Now when his Imagination comes to be heated by the Vapours of the Wine, and that he gins to believe himself to have been present at that Imaginary Assembly, he fails not to speak of it after a strong and vigorous manner. His Natural Eloquence, together with the Proneness of his Family to give Ear to so new and terrible a Story, could not but produce strange Traces in their weak Imaginations: Nor is it otherwise naturally possible, that a Woman and little Children being frightened, should be able to penetrate and resist what they hear him say. 'Tis a Husband, 'tis a Father that talks of what he has seen, of what he has done; he is beloved and respected; why should they not believe him? The Shepherd also repeats his Story several days one after another. The Imagination of the Mother and the Children, admit by degrees much deeper traces of it: they are accustomed to it; the fear vanishes, but the conviction remains; and by and by their Curiosity will not be at quiet till they go and anoint themselves; they lay themselves in their Beds in such a posture, and the same disposition of their Mind, still heats their Imagination more and more; the traces which the Shepherd has formed in their Brain, are so very much opened, as to cause 'em in their Sleep to see as present all the Motions of the Ceremony, the description of which they had heard. They rise, ask one another, and tell each other what they have seen; by this means they confirm the traces of their Vision; and they that have the strongest Imagination more easily persuading the rest, they fail not in a few Nights to make a formal Story of this Imaginary Nocturnal Convention. Thus has the Shepherd made complete Wizards; and they in a short time will make a great many others, if being endued with a strong and vigorous Imagination, fear does not hinder them from reling such like Stories.  
There have been sometimes Wizards in good earnest, that is, such as thought themselves really so, and believed they went to Nocturnal Conventions; and who were so convinced of it, that though several Persons waked them, and assured them that they never stirred out of their Beds, they would not believe their Testimony.  
All the world knows, that stories of Hobgoblins being told to Children, affright 'em to that degree, that they will not be alone in the dark or without Company. Because, when the Brain admits no Traces of any present Object, that which was imprinted in their Brain by the help of the story, opens itself afresh, and many times vehemently enough, to represent before their Eyes the Apparitions they were told of; nevertheless these stories are not told 'em otherwise then as Fables. They that tell 'em, do not relate them with the same Air, as if they were convinced of the Truth of them, and many times the Relation itself is cold and languishing. No wonder then, that a Man who believes he has been at a Nocturnal Convention, and by consequence talks with a steadfast and confident utterance, easily persuades some Persons, that hear him with a kind of respect, of all the Circumstances which he particularizes, and transmits' traces into their Imagination like to those by which he himself was received.  
When Men discourse with us, they imprint traces in our Brains like to those which they have themselves. If they are deep, than they talk to us after such a manner, as impresses 'em deep: for they cannot talk to us, but they must make us in some measure like themselves. Infants in the Mother's Womb see nothing but what the Mother sees; and when they come into the World, they imagine very few things, of which their Parents are not the cause; since the wisest of Men, are governed rather by the Imagination of others, that is, by Opinion and Custom, than by the Rules of Reason. Therefore in places where Wizards are burnt, there we find a great number of them, because in the places where they are condemned to the Fire, 'tis really believed that they are Wizards, and that Opinion is more and more confirmed by the various discourses concerning them. Let 'em but cease to punish them, and deal with 'em as Mad Folks, and you shall see that in a little time there will be no Wizards; because they who are only so by the force of Imagination, and who are doubtless the Greatest Number, would return from their Errors.  
Most certainly real Wizards deserve death: and they who are only so through the power of Imagination ought not to be reputed altogether Innocent, for they usually believe themselves to be Witches because they find in themselves a disposition to frequent Nocturnal Conventions, and for that reason anoint themselves with certain Drugs, in order to accomplish their wicked design, But while we punish without distinction all these Criminals, the Vulgar Opinion is confirmed, Wizards multiply through the strength of Imagination, and thus an Infinite number of People are lost and condemned to Eternal Damnation: Which is the reason that several Parliaments never punishing Wizards, there are fewer or hardly any to be found in places under their Jurisdiction, where the Envy, Hatred, and Malice of wicked People cannot make use of that pretence to destroy the Innocent.  
The apprehension of Lycanthropis, or Men who suppose themselves changed into Wolves, is a Chimaera no less Ridiculous. A Man, through an Irregular effort of his Imagination falls into such a Frenzy, that he believes himself transformed into a Wolf every Night. This disorder of his Mind disposes him to all the Actions that are natural to Wolves, or whatever he has heard reported of them. Away he goes then, out of his House at Midnight, runs about the Streets, falls upon the next Child he meets, bites him and handles him very rudely: Also stupid and superstitious People believe this Madman to be a real Wolf; because the Poor unfortunate Fellow believes it himself; and for that he told it in private to some Persons that told it again.  
Were it easy to form in the Brain those Traces that persuade Men they are changed into Wolves; or were it as easy to run about the Streets, and commit the Ravages which these Miserable Wolf-Men commit without being absolutely Mad, as it is to go in a Dream to a Nocturnal Convention, these stories of Men transformed into Wolves, would not fail to produce the same effects as the Tales of Nocturnal Conventions, and we should have as many Wolf-men as Wizards. But the belief of being transformed into a Wolf supposes a great disorder of the Brain, which is more difficult to be produced, than the Delirium of a Man that only believes his going in the Night to a Nocturnal Convention; that is, who believes he sees in the Nighttime things that are not, and who when he wakes, cannot distinguish his Dreams from his Thoughts in the day time.  
'Tis a usual thing for some People to Dream such lively Dreams in the Night time, as to remember 'em exactly when they wake, though the Dream in itself be not very terrible: therefore 'tis no difficult thing for some Men to persuade themselves that they were at a Nocturnal Convention; for 'tis sufficient to that end, that the Brain preserve the Traces that were made in it by the Dream itself.  
The chief thing that hinders us from taking Dreams for Realties is, because we cannot unite our Dreams to those things which we did when we were awake; for thereby we find they were only Dreams. Now Imaginary Wizards cannot judge from thence whether their Nocturnal Convention were nothing but a mere Dream. For they never go to their Convention but in the Night, and what passes in the Assembly cannot be united to their other Actions in the day time: So that 'tis Morally impossible that way to undeceive 'em. Nor is it necessary, that what Imaginary Wizards think they see in their Nocturnal Assemblies should be united together in any Natural Order: for the more confused and Extravagant they are, so much the more real they appear to be. 'Tis therefore sufficient that the Ideas of things done in the Assembly should be Lively and Terrible; which will of necessity happen, because that always unusual news, and extraordinary things, are there believed to be performed.  
But it requires so great a disturbance of the Imagination for a Man to believe himself to be transformed into a Cock, a Goat, a Wolf, or an Ox, that it cannot happen but very rarely; though these great disorders of the Brain do sometimes fall out, either as a Punishment inflicted from Heaven, as the Scripture relates of Nabuchadnezzar, or through a Natural transport of Melancholy in the Brain; of which we find several Examples among Physical Writers.  
Although I am persuaded that real Wizards are very rare, that these Nocturnal Conventions are mere Dreams, and that the Parliaments who dismiss those accusations of Witchcraft, are the most just and Equitable: Nevertheless, I doubt not but that there are any Wizard's Charms, Enchantments, etc. or that the Devil does sometimes thus exercise his Malice upon Men by a particular permission of God, For the Scripture teaches us that the Kingdom of Satan is destroyed; that the Angel of God has thrown the Devil bound in Chains into the deep Abyss, from whence he shall not be released till the end of the World: that Jesus Christ has despoiled him of his Weapons, and that the time shall come, when the Prince of the World shall be Expelled out of the World.  
He had Reigned indeed till the coming of our Saviour, and he still Reigns in such places where our Saviour is not known: but he has no longer any Right or any Power over those that are regenerated in Christ. He cannot tempt them but by the permission of God; or if God gives him leave, 'tis because they are able to vanquish him: Therefore they too much honour the Devil, who relate Stories as Arguments of his Power, as some of our Modern Demonographers do; since such kind of stories render him formidable to weak People.  
Devils are to be despised, as we despise Hangmen. For we ought to tremble only before God. His Power only is to be feared. We ought to be afraid of his Judgements and Wrath, and not provoke him by the Contempt of his Laws and Gospel. He deserves our Attention when he speaks, or when Men speaks to us concerning him. But when Men speak to us concerning the Power of the Devil, 'tis a ridiculous thing to be troubled and dismayed: Our Terror is an Honour to him: He loves to be respected and feared, and his Pride is satisfied, when we humble ourselves before him.  
'Tis now time to conclude this Second Book, and only to observe from what has been said in this and the preceding. 1. That all our thoughts which the Mind has by means of the Body, or by dependence upon the Body, are only for the use of the Body itself. 2. That they are all false and Obscure. 3. That they serve to no other use then to unite us to sensible Good, and to all things that can procure 'em for us; and that this Union leads us into infinite Errors, and very great Miseries. Though we are not always sensible or them, no more than we know the Errors from whence they arise, Of this we shall give the following remarkable Example.  
Our Union with our Mothers in the Womb, which is far more strict than any we can have with Men, is the cause of our greatest Mischiefs; that is to say, of Sin and Concupiscence, which are the Original of all our Miseries. Nevertheless, there was a Necessity that this Union should be so strict as it is to compose the structure of Bodies.  
This Union which was broken by our Birth is succeeded by another, whereby Children are joined to their Parents and Nurses. This Union is less strict than the first, and therefore does less mischief. It only inclined us to believe and imitate our Parents and Nurses in all things. 'Tis visible also, that this Second Union was necessary for us, not as the first for the Forming but the Preservation of the Body; to the end we might understand all things that conduce to the Benefit of it, and to dispose the Body to those Motions which are necessary for the procuring those Things.  
Lastly, The Union which we have at present with all Men does us a great deal of Mischief, though it be not so strict, as being less necessary for the Preservation of the Body. For by reason of this Union it is, that we live by Opinion, that we love and esteem what other Men love and value, though contrary to our Consciences, and the true Ideas which we have of things. I speak not here of that Union which conjoins us with the Minds of other Men; for that Union may prove serviceable for our Instruction: I speak of the Sensible Union between the Imagination, and the Air and Manner of those with whom we converse. Thus it is plain, that all our thoughts that we, have by way of dependency upon the Body, are false, and so much the more pernicious to the Mind, as they are more useful to the Body.  
Let us therefore endeavour by degrees to free ourselves from the Delusions of our Senses from the Visions of our Imagination, and the Impression which the Imagination of other Men makes upon our Minds. Let us carefully reject all these confused Ideas, which we have drawn from that Servitude wherein our Body detains us; and let us only admit the clear and manifest Ideas which the Mind receives from that Union which it necessarily has with the WORD, or WISDOM and ETERNAL TRUTH; as we shall explain in the following Book, which treats of the Understanding, or Pure Mind.    
The End of the Third Part of the Second Book.   

A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH.  
BOOK III. Of the Understanding or Pure Mind.  


CHAP. I.  
I. Thought only is Essential to the Mind: Sensation and Imagination are only its Modifications.  
II. We know not all the Modifications our Souls are capable of.  
III. They are different from our Knowledge and Love, and are not always the Effects of them.  
THE Subject of this Third Treatise is a little Dry and Barren: We here examine the Mind considered in itself, and Independent of the Body, to know the Weaknesses which are peculiar to it, and the Errors which it has only from itself. The Senses and Imagination are Fruitful and Inexhaustible Sources of our Errors and Illusions, but the Mind acting of itself is not so subject to Error. We were troubled to finish the two preceding Treatises, and we are uneasy to begin this; it is not because the Nature or Properties of the Mind is a barren Subject, but because we inquire not so much here into its Properties as Weaknesses. Let no one be Surprised if this Treatise is not so large, nor discovers so many Errors as the preceding Books; nor let any one complain if the Subject is a little dry, abstracted and difficult. The Senses and Imagination ●●●●ot always be moved, nor is it necessary they should. When a Subject is abstracted, he that would ren●●● it Sensible, will obscure it, it's enough to make it Intelligible: There is nothing so Unjust, as the common Complaints of those, who would know every thing, but would apply their Mind to nothing; they are angry if we desire them to become Attentive; they would always have us Affect and Flatter their Senses and Passions. But why? We know we cannot satisfy them. Those who make Romances and Comedies, are obliged to please and captivate the Attention; 'tis enough for us to instruct those who endeavour to become Attentive.  
The Errors of the Senses and Imagination depend upon the Nature and Constitution of the Body, and are discovered by considering the Power they have over the Soul; but the Errors of the Pure Understanding cannot be discovered, but by considering the Nature of the Mind itself, and of the Ideas which are necessary to it, in order to know Objects. So that to penetrate into the Causes of the Errors of the Pure Understanding, it will be necessary for us to insist in this Book, upon the Consideration of the Nature of the Mind, and of Intellectual Ideas.  
We shall first speak of the Mind as it is in itself, and without any relation to the Body to which it is united: So that what we shall say of it, might be said of Pure Intelligences, ●nd with greater Reason, because we here call it the Pure Understanding: By the word Pure Understanding, we pretend not to design that Faculty which the Mind has of knowing Objects without us, without framing Corporeal Images of them in the Brain to represent them: We shall afterwards treat of Intellectual Ideas, by whose means the Pure Understanding perceives Objects without us.  
I do not believe, that after having thought Seriously, 
I. Thought only is Essential to the Mind. To Think and Imagine are only its Modifications.  we can doubt, that the Essence of the Mind consists only in Thought, even as the Essence of Matter consists in Extension: And that according to the different Modifications of Thinking, the Mind can now Will, then Imagine, and lastly Participate of many other particular Forms; so that according to the different Modifications of Extension, Matter is now Water, than Fire, and is capable of infinite other particular Forms.  
By the word Thought, 
By the Essence of a thing, I understand that which is first conceived in a thing, upon which all the Modifications, observed in that thing, depend.  I do not here understand particular Modifications of the Soul, that is, Such or such a Thought, but a Thought that is capable of all kinds of Modifications or Thoughts, even as by Extension, I do not understand such or such a sort of Extension, as Round, Square, etc. but an Extension capable of all sorts of Modifications or Figures: And there was no need of this Comparison, but because we have not so clear an Idea of Thought as of Extension; for Thought is only known by an interior Sentiment or by Conscience, as shall hereafter be explained.  
I do not believe it possible, 
* Second Part of the Pure Mind, Chap. 7.  to conceive a Mind which cannot Think, although it's easy to conceive one which neither Thinks, Imagines nor Wills; even as it's impossible to conceive Matter that is not extended; though one may easily conceive it to be neither Earth, Metal, Square, Round, and even without Motion. Hence we may conclude, That as there may be Matter, which is neither Earth, Metal, Square, Round, or without Motion; so there may also be a Mind, which is neither Sensible of Heat or Cold, which neither Rejoices, is Sad, Imagines or Wills any thing: So that all these Modifications are not Essential to it; Thought only is of the Essence of the Mind, as Extension only is of the Essence of Matter.  
But even as if Matter or Extension were without Motion, it would be wholly useless, and incapable of this Variety of Forms for which it was designed: And as it would be impossible to conceive an Intelligent Being to Will such a Creation, (that is, Matter without Motion, or incapable of Form,) so, if the Mind or Thought were without Will, it's evident that it would be wholly useless, since it would be sometimes carried towards the Objects of its Perceptions, and would not love the Good for which it was made; so that it is impossible to conceive that an Intelligent Being would create it in this Estate. Nevertheless, as Motion is not Essential to Matter, as Extension is, so to Will is not Essential to the Mind, since Willing supposes Perception.  
Therefore Thought only is properly Constitutive of the Essence of the Mind, and the different Manners of Thinking, as Perceiving and Imagining, are only the Modifications of which it is capable, and with which it is not always modified: But to Will, is a Property which always accompanies it, whether it be united to, or separated from the Body; which nevertheless is not Essential to it, since it supposes Thought, and we may conceive a Mind without Will, even as a Body without Motion.  
The Power of Willing is always Inseparable from the Mind, although it is not Essential to it; for even as it is impossible to conceive Matter that cannot be moved, so it is impossible to conceive a Mind which cannot Will, or which is incapable of any Natural Inclination; but as we conceive Matter can exist without Motion, so we can conceive a Mind to exist without any Impression from the Author of Nature towards Good, and consequently without Will, for the Will is nothing else but an Impression of the Author of Nature, 
II. We do not know all the Modifications of which our Soul is capable.  which carries us towards Good in general, as we have more largely explained in the first Chapter of the Treatise upon the Senses.  
What we said before in the Treatise upon the Senses, and what we have just now said of the Nature of the Mind, does not suppose that we know all the Modifications whereof it is capable; we do not suppose such things, but rather believe that there is in the Mind of Man a Capacity of receiving Successively an infinite Number of different Modifications which the Mind itself is Ignorant of.  
The least Portion of Matter can receive a Figure of three, six, ten, or Ten Thousand sides, or a Circular or Ecliptic Figure, which may be considered as made up of an Infinity of Angles and Sides. There is an infinite number of different Species of each of these Figures; an infinite number of Triangles of different kinds; besides other Figures of four, six, ten, or Ten Thousand sides, and infinite Poligons. For the Circle, the Ellipsis, and generally every regular or irregular curve-lined Figure, may be considered as an infinite Poligone. The Ellipsis, for example, as an infinite Poligone, but whose Angles or sides are unequal, being greater towards the lesser Diameter than the other. And thus of infinite other Poligones more compounded and irregular.  
A simple piece of Wax is capable of infinite, or rather infinitely infinite different Modifications which no Mind can comprehend. What reason then is there to imagine, that the Soul which is more noble than the Body, is not capable of more Modifications besides those which it has yet received.  
If we had never felt Pain nor Pleasure, if we had never seen Colour or Light, or if we had been as Blind or Deaf in relation to Colours and Sounds, ought we thence to conclude, that we were incapable of all the Sensations which we now have of Objects, since these Sensations are only Modifications of our Soul, as we have proved in the Treatise of the Senses?  
We must then grant, that the Capacity which the Soul has of receiving different Modifications, is probably greater than the Capacity which it has of conceiving; I mean, as the Mind cannot draw out, or conceive all the Figures whereof Matter is capable; so it cannot comprehend all the different Modifications, which the powerful Hand of God can produce in the Soul, even though we should as distinctly know the Capacity of the Soul, as that of Matter: Which is Absurd from the Reasons brought in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of this Book.  
Our Soul therefore receives very few Modifications here, because it is united to the Body upon which it depends: All its Sensations carry it to its Body; and whereas it cannot enjoy God, it can have no other Modifications besides what the other Enjoyments produce. Matter, which our Body is composed of, is capable of very few Modifications in this Life; this Matter cannot be resolved into Earth and Vapour till after Death; it cannot now become Air, Fire, Diamond, Metal; it cannot be Square, Round, Triangular, it must be Flesh, and have the Figure of Man, that the Soul may be united to it. It is even so with our Soul, it is necessary that it have Sensations of Heat, Cold, Colour, Light, Sounds, Odours, Sapours, and many other Modifications, that it may be united to its Body. All these Sensations engage it to the Preservation of its Machine, they agitate it and terrify it so soon as the least Spring is loosed or broken: And thus the Soul must be subject thereto, as long as the Body shall be subject to Corruption; but as soon as it shall be invested with Immortality, and there shall be no farther Fear of a Dissolution of its Parts, it's reasonable to believe, that it will no longer be affected with these Incommodious Sensations which we unwillingly feel, but with an Infinity of all other different Things, of which we have now no Idea; which shall surpass all our Thoughts, and be worthy of the Greatness and Goodness of God, whom we shall enjoy.  
'Tis therefore against all Reason, that Men imagine to penetrate so into the Nature of the Soul, as to be well assured, that it's only capable of Knowing and Loving. This indeed might be maintained by those who attribute their Sensations to External Objects, or to their own Body, or who pretend that their Passions are in their Heart: For indeed, if we retrench from the Soul, all its Passions and Sensations, whatever can be known in that which is left behind, is only a Chain of Knowledge and Love. But I cannot apprehend how those who have taken their leave of the Illusions of their Senses, can be persuaded that all our Sensations and Passions are only Knowledge and Love; I mean, the confused kinds of Judgements which the Soul draws from Objects relating to the Body which it Animates.  
I do not apprehend how it may be said, That Light, Colours, Odours, etc. are Judgements of the Soul, for on the contrary it seems to me, that Colours, Odours, and other Sensations, are Modifications very different from Judgements.  
Let us choose some of the quickest Sensations which most affect the Mind, and let us see what these Men can say of Colour or of Pleasure: They think according to many very Famous 
* St. Aug. Book 6. De Musica Descartes, dans son homme, etc.  Authors, that these Sensations are only Consequences of the Faculty, which we have of Knowing and Willing; and that Pain, for Example, is nothing else but a certain Solicitude, Repugnancy and Aversion of the Will, against things which it knows to be Hurtful to its Dear Body: But it's evident to me, that this is to confound Pain with Sadness, and make Pain a Consequence of the Knowledge and Action of the Will, whereas on the contrary it precedes both.  
For Example, If a hot Coal was put into the Hand of a Person that was asleep, or should hold his Hands behind his Back, no one, I believe, with any probability of Truth, would affirm, that this Person would forthwith know, that there were some Motions in his Hands contrary to a good Constitution of Body, that afterwards his Will would oppose it, and that this Pain would be a Consequence of this Knowledge of his Mind, and this Opposition of his Will: But rather on the contrary, the first thing that this Person would conceive, when the Coal touched his Hand, would be Pain; and this Knowledge of the Mind, and Opposition of the Will, would be only Consequences of Pain, though indeed they were the Cause of Sadness which followed the Pains.  
But there is much difference between the Pain and the Sadness which it produces, Pain is the first thing which the Soul feels, it precedes Knowledge, and can never be agreeable in itself: But on the contrary, Sadness is the last thing which the Soul feels, Knowledge always precedes it, and it is always pleasant in itself: This is evident from the Pleasure we perceive at the Lamentable Representations of Tragedies, for this Pleasure increases with the Sadness, but Pleasure never increases with Pain. Comedians, who study the Art of Pleasing, know well that the Stage is not to be imbrued with Slaughter, because the Image of a Murder is rather Terrible than Pleasant: But they are not afraid to affect the Spectators with too great a Sadness, because indeed Sadness is always agreeable, when there is a proper Subject of Sadness; there is then an Essential Difference betwixt Sadness and Pain, and one cannot say that Pain is only a Knowledge of the Mind joined to an Opposition of the Will.  
As for other Sensations, such as Odours, Sapours, Sounds, Colours, etc. the greatest part of Men do not think them to be Modifications of the Soul, but on the contrary, that they are dispersed upon Objects; or at least, they are in the Soul as the Idea of a Square or Circle, that is, They are united to the Soul, but are not Modifications thereof: They judge thus of them, because they are not more affected by them, as was shown in the Explanation of the Errors of the Senses.  
We must therefore agree, that we know not all the Modifications whereof our Soul is capable; and besides, those which it has by the Organs of the Senses, it may have innumerable more which it has not yet tried, nor shall know, till it be delivered from the Prison of its Body.  
However we must confess, that even as Matter is capable of infinite Configurations, because of its Extension, so it's visible that the Soul would not be incapable of the Modifications of Pleasure, Pain, nor even of all others which are indifferent to it, if it were incapable of Perception or Thought.  
It is sufficient therefore to know, that the Principle of all these Modifications is Thought; and if any one will have it, that there is any thing in the Soul antecedent to Thought, I shall not dispute it; but as I am certain that no one has any knowledge of his Soul but by Thought, or by an internal Sentiment of whatever passes in his Mind, so I am also assured, that if any one will reason upon the Nature of the Soul, he must consult this internal Sentiment, which will always represent him to himself such as he is; and he must not imagine against his own Conscience, that the Soul is an invisible Fire, a subtle Air, a Harmony, or other like thing.   

CHAP. II.  
I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing that relates to Infinity.  
II. Its limitation is the Original of many Errors.  
III. And chief of Heresies.  
iv We must submit our Minds to Faith.  
WE discover at first sight, 
I. The mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing which relates to infinity.  that the Human Mind is very much limited; from whence two very important Consequences may be drawn. The first, That the Soul can have no perfect Knowledge of Infinity. The second, That it can't know distinctly many things at the same time. For as a piece of Wax is not capable of having many different Figures at the same time; so neither is the Soul capable of having the knowledge of many things at the same time. Likewise a piece of Wax cannot be Square, and Round at the same time, but only part Square and part Round; and so many more different Figures it shall have, they will be so much the less perfect, and distinct: Thus the Soul cannot perceive many things at once, and its Thoughts are so much the more confused as they are greater in Number.  
If a piece of Wax should have a Thousand Sides, and in each Side a different Figure, it would be neither Square, Round, nor Oval, and we could not say of what Figure it would be; so it happens sometimes, that we have so great a number of different Thoughts, that we imagine we think nothing at all, as happens to those that are in a Swoon. The Animal Spirits turning irregularly in the Brain, stirs up so great a number of Traces, that they do not sufficiently open any one of 'em, to excite a particular or distinct Idea in the Mind; so that these persons perceive so great a number things at once, that they perceive nothing distinct, which induces them to think, they have perceived nothing at all.  
There are some who sometimes Swoon away for want of Animal Spirits; but then the Soul having only thoughts of pure Intellection, which leave no Traces in the Brain, they remember nothing when they come to themselves again; which makes them believe they thought of nothing. I have said this by the by, to show those are mistaken, who believe the Soul does not think always, because it sometimes imagines that it thinks on nothing.  
Every one that does but reflect a little upon their own Thoughts, 
II. The limitation of the mind is the Original of many Errors.  have experience enough, that the Mind cannot apply itself to many things at the same time, and much more, that it cannot penetrate into Infinity. Yet I know not by what Caprice some persons, who are not ignorant of this, busy themselves more about the study of infinite Objects, and such Questions as require an infinite Capacity of the Mind, than about what better suits the Capacity of their own Minds; and also why there are a great number of others that are desirous to know every thing, and apply themselves to so many Sciences in the same time, that it confounds them, and makes them uncapable of knowing any Science truly.  
How many Men are there who would comprehend the infinite Divisibility of Matter, and how a little Grain of Sand contains as many parts as the whole World, although much less in proportion. How many Questions are form upon these Subjects which are never resolved; and upon many others which include any thing of Infinity, which yet they would find a Solution of in their own Minds. They apply themselves to it with all possible Attention: But at last all they gain is this, they are prejudiced with some Extravagance, and Error.  
Is it not a pleasant thing to see some Men, who deny the infinite Divisibility of Matter, from hence only, because they cannot comprehend it? Although they very well comprehend the demonstrations that prove it, and at the same time confess, that the Human Mind cannot comprehend Infinity. The Proofs which are brought for the infinite Divisibility of Matter, are as Demonstrative as any thing else in Nature, and these Men confess it when they seriously consider them; however, if we propose to them such Objections as they cannot Solve, their Mind leaves that Evidence, which just before they perceived, and they begin to doubt of it; they are strongly possessed with the Objection they cannot Resolve, and invent some frivolous distinction against the demonstrations of the Infinite Divisibility of Matter; and at last they conclude they were deceived, as also the World with them; and so embrace the contrary Opinion. This they defend with Chimerical Atoms, and other like Absurdities with which the Imagination always furnishes them: Now the Original of all their Errors is this, they are not inwardly convinced, that the Mind of Man is Finite, and that to be persuaded of the infinite Divisibility of Matter, it is not necessary to Comprehend it; because all Objections that cannot be resolved without Comprehending it, are Objections which its impossible to Resolve.  
If men's Curiosity would be terminated by Questions of this Nature, we should have no great reason to be concerned; for if some Men were prepossessed with such Errors, they are Errors of little Consequence: As for others, they have not wholly lost their time, in thinking of things which they cannot comprehend; for they are at least convinced of the weakness of their Mind. It is good, says a very Judicious Author, thus to fatigue the Mind with these 
* The Art of thinking.  kind of Subtleties, to tame its Presumption, and abate its Arrogance in opposing its little Light to the mysteries of Religion, which it cannot comprehend. For since all the Vigour of Man's Mind is constrained to submit to the least Atom of Matter, and to confess, that it sees clearly that it is infinitely Divisible, without being able to comprehend how it may be done, Is not this to Sin against evident Reason, to refuse an Assent to the marvellous Effects of Divine Omnipotence (which is incomprehensible in itself) for this reason, because our Mind cannot comprehend them?  
The most pernicious Effect of Ignorance, 
III. And chief of Heresies.  or rather inadvertency, wherein the weakness and limitation of Man's Mind is Notorious, and consequently, of his incapacity to comprehend whatever relates to infinity, is Heresy. These present times gives more instances than the former, of a great number of Men who are the Authors of a particular Theology, which is only founded upon their own Mind, and the Natural Weakness of Reason, they will not believe what they cannot comprehend.  
The Socinians cannot comprehend the Mysteries of the Trinity, nor of the Incarnation. This is sufficient for them not to believe them, and to Censure others with a fierce and libertine Air that do believe them, as Men born for Slavery.  
A Man who is convinced in himself that he is free, if he troubles his Head very much in endeavouring to reconcile the Knowledge of God and his Decrees with that Liberty: Such a Man I say, is very likely to fall into their Error, who believe that Men are not free. For on the one hand, being unable to conceive how the Providence of God can consist with the Liberty of Man; and on the other, a respect for Religion will hinder him from denying a Providence, he will believe himself constrained to Abridge their Liberty; not sufficiently reflecting upon the Weakness of his own Mind, he will imagine that he can penetrate into the means that God has to reconcile his Detrees with our Liberty.  
But they are not only Heretics which are not attentive enough to consider the Weakness of their Mind, and which take too great a liberty of judging things out of their Jurisdiction; almost all Men have this defect, particularly some Divines of these last Ages; for some of them do so often make use of their Humane Reasonings, to prove or explain Mysteries which surpass Reason, although they may do it out of a good design, and to defend Religion against Heretics, that they often give occasion to the same Heretics to persist obstinately in their Errors, and to treat of Mysheries of Faith as Human Opinions.  
The Motions of the Mind, and the Subtleties of the Schools, are improper to inform Men of their Weakness, and to inspire them with a Spirit of Humility, which is so necessary in the Mysteries of Religion. But all these Human and Subtle Reasonings may, on the contrary, stir up their secret Pride, and incline them to make an ill use of their Judgement, and so to form a Religion agreeable to their own Capacity. We do not see Heretics submit themselves to Philosophic Arguments, or that the reading of Scholastic Books purely does inform them, or condemn their Errors: But on the contrary, they continually take occasion from the weakness of some Scholastic Reasonings, to Ridicule the most sacred Mysteries of our Religion, which indeed are not established upon all these Human Reasonings and Explanations, but only upon the Authority of the written Word of God.  
Indeed Human Reason does not teach us that there is one God in three Persons; ●or how can it be, that the mind of Man is free, although God knew from Eternity all that Man would do: The Reasons that are brought to prove and explain these things, are such only as prove them to those, which will admit them without examining them; but which often seem extravagant to those who will oppose them, denying the foundation of these Mysteries. It may be said on the contrary, that the Objections which are formed against the principal Articles of our Faith, and especially against the Mystery of the Trinity are so strong, that its impossible to give clear and evident Solutions of them, and which do not in the least shock our weak Reason; because indeed these Mysteries are incomprehensible.  
'Tis a better way to Convert Heretics, not to accustom them to make use of their Reason, by proposing to them such uncertain Arguments as are drawn from Philosophy; because the Truths in which we should instruct them do not depend upon Reason; nor is it always necessary to make use of these Reasonings in Truth that may be proved by Reason, as well as by Tradition; as the Immortality of the Soul, Original Sin, the necessity of Grace, the disorder of Nature, and some others; for fear lest their Mind having once tasted the Evidence of Reason in these Questions, should not afterwards be content to submit to those that cannot otherwise be proved but by Tradition: We must on the contrary, oblige them to distrust their own Mind, by showing them its weakness, limitation, and disproportion to mysterious Truths; and when the Pride of their Spirit shall be abated, they will be more easily brought over to Revealed Religion, by showing to them its Authority, and explaining the Tradition of all Ages if they are capable of it.  
But if Men continually divert themselves from seeing the weakness and limitation of their Mind, an indiscreet presumption will lift them up, a deceitful Light will dazzle them, and the Love of Glory will blind them: Thus Heretics will be Eternally Heretics; Philosophers, opinionative and prejudiced; and there will never be any end of Disputation so long as we shall be willing to Dispute with them.   

CHAP. III.  
I. That Philosophers dissipate their Mind by applying it to Subjects which include too many Relations, and which depend upon too many things; without keeping any Order in their Studies.  
II. An Example drawn from Aristotle.  
III. That Geometricians, on the contrary, proceed well in an Enquiry after Truth, especially those who make use of Algebra.  
iv That their method increases the power of the Mind, and that Aristotle 's Logic weakens it.  
V Another defect of studious Persons.  
MEN do not only fall into a great number of Errors, 
I Philosopher's want Order in their Studies.  because they prosecute such Questions as relate to infinity, their Mind being finite, but also because they advert to those that have much Extension, their Mind being very narrow.  
We have said already, that a piece of Wax is incapable of receiving many different and distinct Figures at the same time; and thus the Mind is incapable of receiving many distinct Ideas, that is, of perceiving many things, and very distinctly, at the same time; whence it's easy to conclude, that we must not at first apply ourselves to an Enquiry into hidden Truths, whose knowledge depends upon too many things, and whereof some are not familiar enough to us. For we ought to Study methodically, and make use of what we know distinctly, to apprehend what we know not, or what we know but confusedly: However, the greatest part of those who Study do not take this Course; they make no Essay upon their own Strength; they consult not themselves, to know what they are capable of. 'Tis a secret Vanity, and an irregular desire of knowing; and not Reason which rules their Studies: They begin inconsiderately to inquire into the most secret and impenetrable Truths; and to resolve Questions, which depend upon so great number of Relations, that the most quick and penetrating Mind cannot discover them with any absolute certainty, but after many Ages, and almost an infinity of Experiments.  
There are a great number of Questions of this Nature in Physics and Morality. All Sciences of Bodies and their Qualities, (as of Animals, Plants, Metals, and of their respective Qualities) are Sciences which can never be sufficiently evident nor certain, especially if they be not managed after another Method than heretofore; or if we begin not by the most Simple and least compounded Sciences upon which they depend. But studious Persons will not give themselves the trouble of Philosophising in Order; they do not agree upon the Certainty of Physical Principles, they know not the Nature of Bodies in General, nor their Qualities, but confess it themselves. However, they imagine they can give a reason, why, for Example, the Hairs of Old Men wax White, and yet their Teeth grow Black; which depends upon so many Causes, that it's impossible to give any certain reason for it. To know this, it's necessary to understand in what consists the Whiteness of Hairs in particular, the Humours with which they are nourished, the Philtres through which these Humours pass, the Conformation, and the Root of the Hairs, or the Skin through which they pass, and the difference of all these things in a Young and an Old Man, which it's absolutely impossible, or at least very difficult to know.  
Aristotle, 
II. An example of want of Order in Aristotle.  for example, hath pretended to know the Cause of this Whiteness which happens to Old men's Hairs; he hath given many reasons in different places of his Books: But because he is the Genius of Nature, he stays not there, he inquires deeper: He hath discovered that the Cause, which makes Old men's Hairs White, was the same which made some Persons, and some Horses, have one Eye Blew, and the other of another Colour: These are his words, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉. This is sufficiently Surprising, 
Book V. De Gener. Anim. C. 1.  but there is nothing hid from this great Man; and he gives reasons of so great a Number of things in almost all places of his Physics, which the sharpest Persons of this Age believe Impenetrable; that it was deservedly said of him, That God gave him to us, that we might be Ignorant of nothing that was to be known. Aristotelis Doctrina est Summa Veritas quoniam ejus intellectus fuit finis Humani Intellectus. Quare bene dicitur de illo, quod ipse fuit creatus & datus nobis Divina Providentia ut non ignoremus possibilia Sciri. Averro ought to have added, That Divine Providence gave us Aristotle, to teach us what was impossible to be known. For it's true, that this Philosopher does not only teach us things which may be known, but if, since he must be believed upon his word, his Doctrine be the Sovereign Truth, Summa Veritas, he also teaches us those things which are impossible to be known.  
Certainly one must have much Faith, thus to believe Aristotle, when he gives us only Logical Reasons, and only explains the Effects of Nature, by the Confused Notions of the Senses; especially since he boldly decides Questions which will never be resolved by other Men. Thus Aristotle takes a particular Care to inform us, that we must believe him upon his word; for 'tis an incontestable Axiom with this Author, that the Disciple must believe, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
It is true, that Disciples are sometimes obliged to believe their Master, but their Faith ought to be extended only to Experiments and Matter of Fact; for if they intent to become true Philosophers, they must examine the Reasons of their Masters, and then receive them only when they discover the Evidence of them by their own Judgement. But to be a Peripatetic, it is absolutely necessary to believe and to retain; and the same Disposition of Mind ought to be had at the reading of that Philosophy, as at the reading of an History; for if any one takes the Liberty of making use of his Judgement and Reason, he must not expect ever to be a great Philosopher. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  
But the reason why Aristetle, and many other Philosophers, have pretended to know what can never be known, is, That they have never known the difference betwixt Knowing and Knowing; betwixt having a certain and evident Knowledge, and having but a probable one: And the reason why they never understood this difference, is, That the Subjects to which they applied themselves, being beyond the perfect reach of their Mind, they saw but a part of them without being able to comprehend them all together; which indeed is enough to discover many Probabilities, but not to discover Truth evidently. Besides, they seeking after Science merely out of Vanity, and probabilities being more apt to gain the Esteem of Men than Truth itself, because they are more proportionated to the common reach of the Mind, they have neglected to seek after necessary Means to increase the Capacity of the Mind, and to give it more Extension than it has; so that they have not been able to penetrate the bottom of Truths that are but a little hidden.  
Geometricians have well known how little Extension the Mind has, 
Geometricians behave themselves well in their Search after Truth.  at least they behaved themselves in their Studies after such way, as shows they know it perfectly; especially those that have made use of Algebra, which Vieta and Descartes have renewed and improved in this Age. What I say appears from this, That those Persons have not undertaken the Resolution of very compound Difficulties, before they knew clearly the more Simple on which they depend. They did not apply themselves to the Consideration of Lines, as Conic Sections, until they were Masters of common Geometry.  
But that which is particular to Algebraists, 
iv Their Method enlarges the Capacity of the Mind, that of Aristotle contractsit  is, That they see their Mind cannot be at the same time applied to many Figures, they cannot imagine Solicts that have more than three Dimensions, although it's often necessary to conceive they may have more; they make use of Common and very Familiar Letters to express and abridge their Ideas: Thus the mind not being embarrassed nor employed upon any Representation which it would be obliged to make upon many Figures and Lines, it may perceive at one view, all that it is capable of seeing otherwise. And thus the Mind can penetrate deeper, and extend itself much farther when its Capacity is well managed.  
The Art of rendering the Mind more penetrating and Extensive, consists, as we have elsewhere explained, in a good Management of its Powers and Capacity, not in employing it to no purpose upon things which are not necessary to discover the Truth it seeks after, which ought to be well observed. 
Book VI The Second Part of Method.  For this only shows, that common Logicks are fit to lessen the Capacity of the Mind than to enlarge it; because it is evident, That if in a Search after any Truth, we use the Rules they prescribe us, the Capacity of the Mind is divided, so that it will be unfit to be attentive, and to apprehend all the Extension of the Subject it examines.  
It is therefore sufficiently evident from what I have said, That the greatest part of Men make but little Reflection upon the Nature of the Mind, whilst they apply themselves to a Search after Truth; for indeed they have never been well convinced of its little Extension, and the necessity there is of well managing and enlarging it. And this is one of the most considerable Causes of their Errors, and from hence it is that they have so unhappily perfected their Studies.  
But we do not pretend that there were ever any Men, which were not conscious of their own Limitation, and their little Capacity and Extension of Mind; all the World confesses it, but the Generality of them only know it confusedly, and confess it only with their Mouths. The Method they take in their Study, gives the Lie to their Confession, since they act as if they truly thought their Mind bade no Limits; and they would penetrate into things that depend upon a great many Causes, whereof generally they do not know one.  
There is also another Defect which is very common in these Studious Men, 
V Another Defect in Studious Men.  which is the applying themselves to too many Sciences at once, and if they Study but six Hours in a day, they will sometimes study six different things: 'Tis plain, this Defect proceeds from the same Cause as the rest that I have before mentioned: For 'tis very probable, that if those that study after this manner, know certainly that it was not agreeable to the Capacity of their Minds, and that it was more likely to fill them with Errors and Confusion, than with true Science, they would not suffer themselves to be hurried away by the irregular Motions of their Passions and Vanity; for indeed that is not the way to satisfy the Mind, since 'tis not the proper Means to know any thing.   

CHAP. IU.  
I. The Mind cannot long apply itself to any Object, which neither relates to itself, nor to Infinity.  
II. The Inconstancy, and consequently the Error of the Will, proceeds from this Defect of Application.  
III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Ideas of the Mind.  
IU. What is the Original Cause of the Corruption of Manners.  
V And the Ignorance of the Generality of Mankind.  
THE Mind of Man is not only subject to Error because it is Finite, or more limited than the Objects they consider, as has been explained in the two precedent Chapters; but also because it is Inconstant, and has no Firmness in whatsoever it does, and cannot keep itself fixed long enough upon any Subject, to examine it entirely.  
To conceive the Cause of this Inconstancy and Levity of our Minds, it is necessary to know, that its Action is directed by the Will; which applies it to such Objects as it loves, and is of itself continually Inconstant and unsettled, of which this is the Cause.  
We cannot doubt but God is the Author of all things, that he hath made them for himself, and has inclined the Heart of Man towards him, by a Natural and Invincible Impression that he continually imprints upon him. God cannot Will the Existence of any Mind which cannot love him, or which should love him less than any other Good, if any other besides himself could be found; because he cannot Will that any Mind should not love that which is most Amiable, or love it more than that which is less Amiable.  
Thus it is requisite that a Natural Love should carry us to God, since it comes from him; and that there is nothing that can stop the Motions of it, only God himself who imprinted them. Every bodies Will therefore necessarily follows the Motions of this Love. The Righteous and Wicked, the Happy and the Damned, Love God with this Love; for the Natural Love which we have for God, being the same thing as the Natural Inclination that carries us to Good in General, to the Infinite and Sovereign Good, it is evident that all Minds Love God with this Love, since he only is the Universal, Infinite, and Sovereign Good. For indeed all Spirits, and even the Devils, have an Ardent Desire to be Happy, and to possess the Chief Good: And they desire it without Choice, without Deliberation, without Liberty, and by a Necessity of their Nature. Being therefore made for God, for an Infinite Good, for a Good which comprehends all others in it, our Hearts can never be satisfied but by the Possession of this Good.  
Thus our Will always labouring under an eager Thirst, always agitated with Desires, Anxieties, 
II. The Inconstancy of the Will, Causes the Defect of our Application, and consequently causes our Error.  and full of Inquietudes for the Good that it does not possess, cannot without much Pain suffer the Mind for any time to stop at abstracted Truths, which affect it not, and which it judges uncapable of making it Happy. Thus she Incessantly bushes it forward to search after other Objects, and when in this Agitation, which the Will communicates to it, it meets with any Object, that has the Appearance of a Good, I mean, such as makes the Soul Sensible of any Pleasure, or inward Satisfaction at its approach; then this Thirst is excited anew; these Desires, these wishes, and these Ardours, take new Life; and the Mind being obliged to obey them, engages itself only to that Object, which causes or seems to cause them, to draw it nearer to the Soul which tastes it, and feeds on it for some time. But the Emptiness of Creatures cannot fill the Infinite Capacity of Man's Mind; these little Pleasures irritate its Thirst rather than allay it, and give the Soul a vain sort of a Hope of being satisfied in the Multiplicity of the Pleasures of this Life; which also produces an Inconstancy and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind, which was to discover to it all these Goods.  
It's true, that when the Mind accidentally meets with any Object which is related to Infinity, and which includes in itself some great thing, its Inconstancy and Agitation ceases for some time; for discovering this Object to bear the Character of what the Soul desires, it joins and adheres to it for a long time. But this Adhesion, or rather this Prejudice of the Mind, to examine Subjects that are Infinite or very great, is as useless to it, as that Levity with which it considers things that are proportioned to its Capacity; it is too weak to finish so difficult an Enterprise, and it is vain to force itself to accomplish it. The Comprehension of an Infinite Object, if I may so say, cannot render the Soul Happy, it is incapable of it, but the Love and Enjoyment of an Infinite Good may do it, whereof the Will is capable, by the Motion of that Love which God continually impresses upon it.  
After this we must not be surprised at the Ignorance and Blindness of Men, since their Mind being subject to the Inconstancy and Levity of their Heart, which renders it incapable of considering any thing with a Serious Application, it cannot penetrate into any thing which includes some considerable Difficulty. For, in fine, the Attention of the Mind to the Objects of the Mind, is the same thing as fixing our Eyes upon the Objects of our Eyes; even as a Man who cannot fix his Eyes upon Objects that are about him, cannot see clearly enough to distinguish the Differences of their least Parts, and to know all the relations these little parts have with each other: So a Man who cannot fix the Eyes of his Mind upon things which he would know, cannot sufficiently know them to distinguish all their Parts, and to know all the Relations which they may have among themselves, or to other Subjects.  
However 'tis evident, That all Knowledge consists only in a clear View of the Relations that things have to one another: Therefore when it happens, as in difficult Questions, that the Mind must see at one view, a great Number of Relations which two or more things have amongst themselves, it's evident, That if it has not considered these things with much Attention, and only knows them confusedly, it will be impossible for it to perceive distinctly their Relations, and consequently to form a solid Judgement of them.  
One of the chief Causes of the Want of Application of Mind to abstracted Truths, is, 
III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Ideas of the Mind.  That we see them at a distance; and things which are nearer, are continually represented to our Mind; a great Attention of Mind approaches, if I may so say, to the Ideas of Objects with which it is affected. But it often happens, that when we are Attentive upon Metaphysical Speculations, we are diverted from them, because some Sensation comes upon the Soul which is nearer to it than those Ideas; the least Pain or Pleasure is sufficient to effect this; the reason of it is, Pain and Pleasure, and generally all Sensations, are within the Soul itself, they modify and affect it, much nearer than the simple Ideas of Objects of Pure Intellection, which though present to the Mind do not modify it. Thus the Soul being on the one hand very narrow, and on the other, not being able to hinder Pain, Pleasure, and other Sensations, 
See Ch. 7. Second Part of this Book.  its Capacity is filled with them; and it cannot at the same time be Sensible of any thing, and think freely of other things of which it cannot be Sensible. The Buzzing of a Fly, or some other little Noise, supposing it to be communicated even to the chief part of the Brain, so that the Soul perceives it, is capable, notwithstanding all our Efforts to the contrary, of hindering us from considering abstracted and elevated Truths, because all abstracted Ideas do not modify the Soul, though all Sensations do. 
IU. What is the Original of the Corruption of Manners   
'Tis this that causes a Stupidity and Dullness of Mind, in respect of the great Truths of Christian Morality; hence it is that Men only know them after a Speculative and Unfruitful Manner, without the Grace of Jesus Christ. All the World knows that there is a God, that he must be Adored and Worshipped; but who is it that Serves and Worships him without Grace, which makes us taste a Sweetness and Pleasure in all our Duties? There are very few who are not Sensible of the Emptiness and Instability of the Goods of this World, and even who are not touched with an abstracted, yet always with a very certain and evident Conviction, that they deserve not our Application and Concern. But where are those that Practically Despise these Goods? and who are not Anxious and Careful to obtain them? 'Tis those only who perceive some Bitterness and Disgust in their Enjoyment, or else by the Grace of God are made Sensible of Spiritual Good by an inward Delight which God hath joined to them, who overcome the Impressions of their Senses and the Efforts of Concupiscence. The bare Contemplation of the Mind, does not therefore make us ever resist the Efforts of Concupiscence as we ought to do; an Internal Motion of the Heart must also second it. This Light of the Mind only is, as some say, a Sufficient Grace, which enables us to Condemn ourselves, and informs us of our Weakness, and that we ought to have recourse by Prayer to him who is our Power. But this inward Sentiment of Heart is a Lively Grace which operates, 'tis this which affects and fills us, which persuades the Heart, and without there is no one can think hearty, Nemo est qui cogitet cord. All the most constant Truths of Morality lie hid in the Secret Recesses and Wind of the Mind, and so long as they stay there, are Barren, and without any Power, since the Soul does not taste them. But the Pleasures of the Senses are nearer the Soul, and it being impossible that it should not be sensible of, and love its 
* With a Natural Love, for one may hate Pleasure with a Hatred of choice.  Pleasure, it's impossible to be freed from the World, 
† Because a Love of Choice cannot long refrain from conforming to a Natural Love.  and shake off the Charms of its Senses by its own Power.  
However I do not yet deny that the Righteous, whose Heart hath been livelily turned towards God by prepossessed Delight, cannot without this particular Grace, do some deserving Actions, and resist the Motions of Concupiscence; there are some that are Generous and Constant in the Law of God, by the Power of their Faith, by an assiduous Privation of sensible things, and by a Contempt and Disgust of all Temptations. There are some who act for the most part without tasting preventing and unthought of Pleasure; the only Joy which they find in acting Piously, is the Pleasure alone they are sensible of, and this Pleasure is sufficient to stay them in that Estate, and to confirm the Disposition of their Heart. Those who begin their Conversion, have commonly need of a prepossessed and an indeliberate Pleasure, to free them from their Sensible Goods, to which they are united by other preventing and indeliberate Pleasures. Sadness and Remorse of Conscience is not enough, and they do not yet taste any Joy: But the Just can live by Faith and in Want; and it's even in this Condition that they deserve more; because Men being reasonable, God will be loved by them with a Love of Choice, rather than with a Love of Instinct, and an indeliberate Love; like that by which they love Sensible things, without knowing them to be Good, otherwise than by the Pleasure which they receive from them. However, the greatest part of Men have little Faith, and being continually led to taste Pleasure, they cannot long preserve their elective Love for God, against a Natural Love for Sensible Goods, if their Delight in Grace does not uphold them against the Efforts of Pleasure; for a Delight in Grace, begets, preserves, and increases Charity, as Sensible Pleasures do Desire.  
It is evident from what has been said, 
V Of men's Ignorance.  That Men being never without some Passion, or agreeable or disagreeable Sensations; much of the Capacity and Extension of their Mind is taken up with them: And when they are willing to employ the rest of their Capacity to examine some Truth, they are often diverted by some new Sensations, or by a Disgust which they find in this Exercise; and by an Inconstancy of the Will, which agitates and runs the Mind from one Object to another; so that unless they have accustomed themselves to overcome these Oppositions from their Youth, as has been explained in the Second Part, they will at last be incapable of penetrating into any thing that is a little Difficult, or which requires a little Application.  
We must then conclude, That all Sciences, especially those that include Questions very difficult to be resolved, are full of an infinite Number of Errors; and that we ought to suspect all those great Volumes, which are every day composed upon Physics, Natural Philosophy, and Morality; and especially upon the particular Propositions of these Sciences, which are much more compounded than general ones. We ought even to judge, that these Books are so much the more to be Contemned, as they are better received by the generality of Men; I mean, those who are but little capable of Application, and who know not how to make a good use of their Judgement; because the Applause of the Vulgar, in any difficult Matter, is a certain Argument of the Falsity of that Opinion, and that it is only maintained upon the delusive Notions of the Senses, or some false Lights of the Imagination.  
Yet it is not impossible, but that a Man may of himself discover a greater Number of Truths which have been concealed from former Ages, provided he does not want a good Judgement, but lives in some retired place, where nothing can divert him, if he Seriously apply himself to an enquiry into Truth.  
Wherefore those are very unreasonable, who despise the Philosophy of Descartes without knowing it; only for this reason, because it appears impossible, that one Man of himself should be able to discover the Truth in so Mysterious a Subject as that of Nature: But if they knew the Manner how this Philosopher lived; the Method he took in his Studies, to prevent the Capacity of his Mind from being diverted by any other Objects, besides those whose Truth he would discover; the Clearness of the Ideas upon which he established his Philosophy, and generally all the Advantages he had over the Ancients by new Discoveries: I say, If they consider these things, they would doubtless receive a more reasonable Prejudice in favour of Descartes than of Antiquity, which Authorises Aristotle, Plato, and many others.  
Yet I advise them not to stop at this Prejudice, nor to believe that Descartes is a great Man, and that his Philosophy is good, because he may be advantageously spoke of: Descartes was a Man subject to Error, and mistakes like others: There are none of his Works, even not excepting his Geometry, wherein there are not some Footsteps of the Weakness of the Humane Mind: He must not therefore be believed upon his Word, but be read with Precaution, as he himself advises us to do; examining if he was not deceived, and believing nothing of what he says, but what Evidence, and the Secret Reproaches of our Reason oblige us to believe; for indeed the Mind knows nothing truly, but what it sees evidently.  
We have shown in the preceding Chapters, that our Mind is not infinite; but on the contrary, that it had a very mean Capacity, which is commonly filled with the Sensations of the Soul. And lastly, That the Mind receiving its Direction from the Will, cannot firmly consider any Object, without being soon diverted from it, through its Inconstancy and Levity. These things are certainly the most general Causes of our Errors, and we might longer insist upon them here, but what I have said, is sufficient to discover the Weakness of the Humane Mind, to Persons that are capable of any Attention. In the Fourth and Fifth Book we shall treat more largely of the Errors which our Inclinations and Passions lead us into, and of which we have already said something in this Chapter.    

THE SECOND PART OF THE Pure Understanding.  
Of the Nature of IDEAS.  

CHAP. I.  
I. What is meant by Ideas; That they truly Exist, and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects.  
II. A division of all the Modes by which External Objects may be seen.  
I Think every one will confess, that we do not perceive External Objects by themselves. We see the Sun, the Stars, and many Objects without us; and it is not probable that the Soul should go out of the Body, and walk as it were, through the Heavens, to Contemplate all those Objects there. She does not then see them by themselves, and as the immediate Object of Mind; when it sees the Sun, for instance, it is not the Sun, but something which is nearly united to our Soul; and it is that which I call Idea: So that here by this word Idea, I mean only what is the immediate Object, or the nearest the Mind when it perceives any thing.  
It must be observed, that to make the Mind perceive any Object, it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Object should be actually present, of which we can have no doubt; but it is not requisite that there should be some external Object which resembles this Idea; for it often happens, that we perceive things which are not, and which never had a being. So that we often have in our Minds real Ideas of things which never were. For instance, when a Man imagines a Mountain of Gold, it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Mountain should be really present to his Mind: When a Mad Man, a Man in a high Fever, or a Man that is asleep, sees any terrible Animal before his Eyes, it is certain that the Idea of this Animal truly Exists; and yet this Mountain of Gold, and this Animal, never were.  
However, Men being Naturally inclined to believe that there is none but Corporeal Objects which Exist, they Judge of the Reality and Existence of things quite after another manner than they ought to do; for as soon as they are sensible of any Object, they will certainly have it that this Object Exists, although it often happens, that there is nothing without: And further, they affirm, that this Object is exactly the same as they see it, which never happens. But in respect to the Idea which necessarily Exists, and which can be nothing else besides what it appears to be, they without any reflection, commonly Judge it to be nothing; as if Ideas had not a very great number of Properties: As if the Ideas of a Square, for instance, was not very different from that of some number, and did not represent things perfectly distinct; which could never happen to nothing, since nothing has no Propriety. It is therefore indisputable, that Ideas have a real Existence. But let us examine their Nature and Essence, and see what it can be in the Soul that is capable of representing all things.  
Whatever things the Soul perceives, are either in, or out of its self, those which are in the Soul, are its own thoughts; that is, all its different Modifications; for by these words, Thought, manner of Thinking, or modification of the Soul, I understand in general all things, that can be in the Soul without her perceiving them, as her own Sensations, Imaginations, pure Intellections, or simple Conceptions, even her Passions, and Natural Inclinations. Now our Soul has no need of Ideas to perceive all these things, because they are within the Soul; or rather, the Soul itself, after such or such a manner: Even as the real roundness of some Body, and its Motion, are only this Body Figured, and moved after such or such a manner.  
But as for things that are out of the Soul, we can perceive them only by the means of Ideas, supposing that these things cannot be intimately united to it. There are two sorts of them, Spiritual, and Material: As for the Spiritual, there is some probability that they may discover themselves to the Soul without Ideas, and by themselves. For although Experience teaches us, that we cannot immediately, and of ourselves, declare our Thoughts to one another, but only by words, or some other sensible Sign, to which we have assixed our Ideas: We may say, that God has ordained it so only during this Life, to hinder those Disorders that would soon happen, if Men could make themselves be understood as they pleased. But when Justice and Order shall Reign, and we shall be delivered from the Captivity of our Bodies, we shall perhaps make ourselves mutually understood by an intimate Union of ourselves, as its probable the Angels do in Heaven; so that it does not seem absolutely necessary to admit Ideas to represent spiritual things to the Soul, because it may be, we may see them by themselves, although after a very imperfect manner.  
I examine not here how two Spirits can be united one to the other, and if they can after this manner mutually discover one another's Thoughts. I believe however, that there is no Substance purely intelligible, but that of God; nothing can be evidently known but in his Light; and that the Union of Spirits cannot make them Visible: For although we are most strictly united to ourselves, we are, and shall be unintelligible to ourselves, until we see ourselves in God; and that he represents to us the perfect intelligible Idea that he hath of our being included in his. So that although I may seem here to grant, that Angels can manifest one to another what they are, and what they think; 'tis only because I will not dispute of it, provided I am granted what is not to be doubted, viz. That we cannot see material things by themselves, and without Ideas.  
I shall explain in the Seventh Chapter, my Opinion how we know Spirits; and will show, that at present we cannot absolutely know them by themselves, although it may be they are united to us. But I speak here chiefly of material things, which certainly cannot be united to the Soul, in such a manner as is necessary for us to perceive them: Because being extended, and the Soul not, there is no proportion between them. Besides, our Souls go not out of our Bodies to measure the greatness of the Heaven, and consequently, they cannot see External Bodies, but by the Ideas which represent them. This is what all the World ought to grant.  
We are assured then, 
II. A division of the several ways whereby External Objects may be seen.  that it's absolutely necessary, that the Ideas we have of Bodies, and of all other Objects which we perceive not by themselves, proceed from these Bodies, or these Objects; or else that our Soul has the power of producing these Ideas, or that God Created them with our Souls; or that he produces them every time that we think of any Object; or else that the Soul has all those Perfections in itself that it sees in these Bodies: Or in fine, that it is united with a perfect Being, which in general includes all the Perfections of Created Being's.  
We cannot see Objects but after one of these ways: Let us examine without prejudice, and without frighting ourselves with the difficulty of the Question, which of them seems most probable: It may be we may resolve it very clearly, although we do not pretend here to give such Demonstrations as will satisfy all sorts of persons; but only convincing Proofs to those at least, as will meditate with serious Attention upon them; for perhaps it would be thought too rash if we should pretend otherwise.   

CHAP. II.  
That material Objects do not emit Species which resemble them.  
THe most common received Opinion is that of the Peripatetics, who think that External Objects emit Species which resemble them, and that those Species are carried by the External Senses to the Common Sense or Understanding. They call these Species impressed, because the Object imprints them on the External Senses. These impressed Species being Material and Sensible, are rendered intelligible, by means of the active, or active intellect; and are fit to be received in the passive intellect. These Species thus spiritualised, are called expressed Species, because they are expressed by the impressed ones; and 'tis by them that the Passive Intellect knows all material things.  
We shall not stay to explain at large these sine things, and the divers manners in which different Philosophers conceive them; for although they do not agree as to the number of Faculties which they attribute to the Interior Sense, and the Understanding; and though there are not a few, who doubt whether they have need of any active Intellect, to know sensible Objects, yet however they generally agree, that External Objects emit the Species or Images which represent them. And 'tis only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties, and defend their active intellect: So that this Foundation having no Solidity, as shall soon be shown, it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure.  
We are assured then, that it is improbable that Objects should emit their Images, or Species which represent them, for these reasons. 1. From the impenetrability of Objects: All Objects, as the Sun, Stars, and all such as are near the Eyes, cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures: Wherefore Philosophers commonly say, that these Species are Gross and Material, in which they differ from expressed Species which are Spiritualised. These impressed Species of Objects than are little Bodies, they cannot therefore be penetrated, nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven, which must be full of them. Whence it's easy to conclude, they must be bruised and broken, in moving every way; and thus they cannot render Objects visible.  
Moreover, one may see from the same place or point, a great number of Objects in the Heavens, and on the Earth; therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduced into a Point. But they are impenetrable since they are extended, Therefore, etc.  
But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects: There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World, from whence we cannot discover an almost infinite number of Objects, and even Objects as large as the Sun, Moon, and the Heavens, there is therefore no Point in all the World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet; which is against all appearance of Truth.  
The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species; 
Such as would know how all impressions of Visible Objects, however epposite, may be communicatedwithout being weakened, may read Monsicur Descartes his Dioptrics.  it's evident, that the nearer any Object is, the greater its Species ought to be, since we see the Object's greater. But what is yet more difficult to conceive, according to their Opinion, is, That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope, or a Microscope, the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before; for 'tis yet more difficultly conceived from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant.  
The Third Reason is, when we look upon a perfect Cube, all the Species of its Sides are unequal; nevertheless, we see all the Sides equally Square. So when we consider Ellipses and Parallellograms in a Picture, which cannot but emit like Species, yet we see Circles and Squares: This manifestly shows, that it is not necessary that the Object beheld, should emit Species like itself, that it may be seen.  
In fine, it cannot be conceived how it can be, that a Body, which does not sensibly diminish, should always emit Species on every Side, which should continually fill all the great Spaces about it, and that with an inconceivable swiftness. For an Object that was hidden, in that Instant that it discovers itself may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides; and what appears yet more strange is, that Bodies in great Motion, as Air, and some others, have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them; as the more gross and quiescent Bodies, such as the Earth, Stones, and generally all hard Bodies have.  
But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion, there would be no end, a very ordinary Judgement would raise innumerable Objections. Those that we have brought are sufficient, though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book, where the Errors of the Senses were explained. But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion, that we believe it will be necessary to say something to incline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts.   

CHAP. III.  
That the Soul has no power of producing Ideas. The Cause of men's Error, in reference to this Subject.  
THe Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Ideas of such things as they will think upon, and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Objects make upon Bodies, although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them; they believe that 'tis in this, that Man is made after the Image of God, and participates of his Power, That even as God Created all things out of nothing, and can reduce them to nothing again, and then Create them anew; so Man can Create, and Annihilate the Ideas of all things as he pleases. But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which extol a Man, these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original, and which the Father of Light hath not inspired.  
This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having, to represent Objects, and of doing many other particular actions, is a participation which seems to relate to something of independence, as independence is commonly explained; it is also a Chimerical Participation, which men's Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine. They depend much more than they think, upon the Goodness and Mercy of God: But this is not a place to explain these things. It's enough if we endeavour to show, that Men have not the Power of forming the Ideas of things which they perceive.  
No one can doubt that Ideas are real Being's, since they have real Properties, since they differ from one another, and represent all different things; Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are Spiritual, and very different from the Bodies which they represent. But it seems reasonable to doubt, whether Ideas, by whose means we see Bodies, are not more Noble than the Bodies themselves: for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly, as we shall see hereafter. Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Ideas as we please, we shall be in danger of persuading ourselves, to make more Noble and Perfect Being's, than the World which God hath Created. However, some do not reflect upon it, because they imagine that an Idea is Nothing, since it is not to be felt; or else if they look upon it as a Being, 'tis a very mean, contemptible one, because they imagine it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind.  
But supposing it true, that Ideas were only little contemptible Being's, yet they are Being's, and Spiritual Ones; and Men not having the power of Believing, it follows that they cannot produce them; for the production of Ideas after the manner before explained, is a true Creation; and although Men endeavour to palliate and mollify the hardness of this Opinion, by saying, that the production of Ideas presupposes something else, but Creation nothing; yet the difficulty is not solved by this Subterfuge.  
For we ought to consider, that it is not more difficult to produce something out of nothing, than to produce one thing out of another; which cannot at all contribute to its Production. For example, it is not more difficult to Create an Angel, than to produce him from a Stone; because a Stone being of another sort of Being wholly different, it cannot in the least be useful to the Production of an Angel. But it may contribute to the Production of Bread, Gold, etc. for a Stone, Gold, and Bread, are but the same thing differently configured, and are all Material.  
It is even more difficult to produce an Angel of a Stone, than to pronuce him out of nothing; because to make an Angel out of a Stone; (so far as it can be done) the Stone must be annihilated, and afterwards the Angel Created; But simply to Create an Angel, nothing is to be annihilated. If therefore the Mind produces its Ideas from the material Impressions which the Brain receives from Objects, it must always do the same thing, or a thing as difficult, or even more difficult than if it Created them; since Ideas being Spiritual, they cannot be produced of material Images, which have no proportion with them.  
But if it be said, that an Idea is not a Substance, I consent to it, yet it is always something that is Spiritual; and as it is impossible to make a Square of a Spirit, although a Square be not a Substance, so it is also impossible to Form a Material Substance from a Spiritual Idea, although an Idea was no Substance.  
But although we should grant to the Mind of Man a Sovereign Power to Annihilate, and Create the Ideas of things, yet it would never make use of that Power to produce them; for even as a Painter, how skilful soever he be, could not represent an Animal which he had never seen, and of which he never had any Idea: So that the Picture which he should make, should be like to this unknown Animal. Thus a Man cannot form the Idea of an Object, if he knew it not before, that is, if he has not already had some Idea of it, which does not depend upon his Will; and if he already had an Idea of it, he certainly knows this Object, and it would be unnecessary for him to Form it anew. It is therefore in vain to attribute to the Mind of Man the Power of producing his Ideas. It might be said perhaps, that the Mind of Man hath general and confused Ideas which it does not produce; and that those which it produces are particular, more clear and distinct; but it is always the same thing. For even as a Painter cannot draw the Picture of a particular Person, so as to be sure that he hath perfected it, if he had had no distinct Idea of him; and even if the Person had not been present: Thus the Mind, for example, which could only have the Idea of a Being, or an Animal in general, could not represent to its self a Horse, nor Form a distinct Idea of one, and be assured that it is perfectly like a Horse, if it had not already the first Idea with which it might compare this second: Now if it had a first, it is unuseful to Form a second; and the Question respects this first. Therefore, etc.  
It's true, that when we conceive a Square by pure Intellection, we can also imagine it, that is, perceive it in ourselves, by tracing an Image of it in the Brain; yet it must be first observed, that we are not the true nor principal Cause of this Image: But it will be too long to explain it here. Secondly, So far is the second Idea which accompanies this Image, from being more distinct and more exact than the other, that on the contrary, it is not so Exact, because it resembles the first, which was only a pattern for the second. For indeed we must not believe that the Imagination and Senses represent Objects more distinctly to us than the pure Understanding; but only that they apply them more to the Mind; for the Ideas of the Senses and Imagination are not distinct, but only so far as they are conformable to the pure Intellection: The Image of a Square for example, which the Imagination Traces in the Brain, is not exact and perfect, but only so far as it resembles the Idea of the Square, which we conceive by pure Intellection. It is this Idea which regulates this Image, 'tis the Mind which Conducts the Imagination; and which Obliges it, if we may so say, to behold from time to time, whether the Image it Paints, be a Figure of four right and equal Lines, whose Angles are alike. In a word, whether what it Imagines, is like to what it Conceives.  
After what has been said, 
Tanto meliora esse judico qua oculis cerno, quanto pro sui natura viciniora sunt iisquae animointelligo Aug. 63. de Vera Religione.  I do not believe it can be doubted, but those are deceived, who affirm, the Mind is able to Form the Ideas of Objects; since they attribute the Power of Creation to the Mind, and even of Creating with Wisdom and Order, although it has no knowledge of what it does; for that is not Conceivable: But the cause of their Error is, that Men always Judge that a thing is the Cause of some Effect, when both are joined together, supposing the true Cause of this Effect be unknown to them. That makes all the World conclude, that a Bowl put in Motion, and meeting another, is the true and principal Cause of the Motion that it communicates to it; as the Will of the Soul is the true and principal Cause of the Motion of the Arm, and other the like prejudices; because it always happens, that a Bowl is shaken when it is met by another that runs against it: As our Arms are moved almost always when we Will, and we do not see any other apparent Cause of this Motion.  
But when an Effect does not so often follow something which is not the Cause of it, there is nevertheless a great many Men, who believe this thing is the Cause of the Effect which happens.; yet every Body is not guilty of the same Error. For instance, if a Comet appears, and after this Comet a Prince Dies: Some Stones lie exposed to the Moon, and they are eaten with Worms: The Sun is joined with Mars at the Nativity of a Child, and something extraordinary happens to this Child: All this is enough to persuade a great many Men, that the Comet, the Moon, and the Conjunction of the Sun with Mars, are the Causes of these Effects, and others like them; and the reason why all the World does not believe it, is, that they do not always see these Effects follow these Causes.  
But all Men having commonly the Ideas of Objects present to their Minds as soon as they wish it, and it happening many times in a day, almost all conclude, that the Will which accompanies the production, or rather the presence of Ideas, is truly the Cause of them: Because they see nothing in the same time that they can attribute it to; and they imagine the Ideas no longer Exist, when the Mind sees them no longer; and that they revive again anew, when they are again represented to the Mind.  
'Tis for these Reasons some Judge, that External Objects emit Images which resemble them, as we have mentioned in the precedent Chapter: For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves, but only by their Ideas, they judge the Object produces the Idea; because as soon as it is present they see it; and as soon as absent they see it no longer; and because the presence of the Object almost always accompanies the Idea which represents it to us.  
Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgements from this, that the Ideas of things are present to their Mind as soon as they Will them, they should only conclude, that according to the Order of Nature, their Will is commonly necessary for them to have those Ideas. Not that the Will is the true and principal Cause which presents them to the Mind, and much less, that the Will produces them from nothing, or after the manner they explain it. Nor ought they to conclude, that Objects emit Species resembling them, because the Soul commonly perceives them only when they are present; but only that the Object is for the most part necessary, in order to the Ideas being present to the Mind. And lastly, that a Bowl put into Motion, is the principal and true Cause of the shaking of another Bowl that it meets in the way, since the first had not the power of Motion in its self. They can only determine, that the meeting of two Bowls is an occasion to the Author, of the Motion of Matter to execute the Decree of his Will, which is the Universal Cause of all things, 
See Ch. 3. Of the Second Part of Method.  in communicating to the other Bowl a part of the Motion of the first; that is, to speak more clearly, in willing that the last should acquire so much more Motion as the first lost; for the moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the Will of him who preserves them, as we shall show elsewhere.   

CHAP. IU.  
That we do not see Objects by the Means of Ideas which were created with us. And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occasion for them.  
THE Third Opinion is, That of those who say all Ideas are created with us.  
To discover the Improbability of this Opinion, it will be necessary to consider that there is many different things in the World of which we have Ideas. But to speak only of simple Figures, it is certain that the Number of them is Infinite: Nay, even if we consider but one only, as the Ellipsis, we cannot doubt but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of different Kind's of them, when it considers that one of the Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity, and the other always continue the same.  
So the height of a Triangle may be augmented or diminished infinitely, the base being always the same, we may conceive there is an infinite Number of different Kind's of them: And also, which I desire may be considered here, The Mind in some manner perceives this infinite Number, although we can imagine but very few of them; and that we can at the same time have particular and distinct Ideas of many Triangles of different Kind's. But what must chief be observed is, That this general Idea that the Mind has of this Number of Triangles of different Kind's  sufficient to prove, That if we do not conceive each of these different Triangles by particular Ideas: And in short, If we comprehend not their Infinity, 'tis not the Defect of the Ideas, or that Infinity is not represented to us, but only the Defect of the Capacity and Extension of the Mind. If a Man should apply himself to consider the Properties of all the divers Kind's of Triangles, although he should eternally continue this sort of Study, he would never want new and particular Ideas, but his Mind would be unprofitably fatigued.  
What I have said of Triangles, may be applied to five, six, a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand sided Figures, and so on ad infinitum. Now if the sides of a Triangle, which have infinite relations one with the other, make Triangles of infinite Kind's, it is plain that four, five, or a thousand sided Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences, since they are capable of a greater Number of Relations and Combinations of their sides, than simple Triangles are.  
The Mind than sees all these things; it hath Ideas of them; and these Ideas would never fail it, although it should employ infinite Ages in the Consideration of one Figure only: And if it perceived not these infinite Figures all of a sudden, or comprehended not their Infinity, 'tis only because its Extension is very much limited. It hath then an infinite Number of Ideas: Do I say an infinite Number? It hath as many infinite Numbers of Ideas, as there are different Figures to be considered: So that since there is an infinite Number of different Figures, it's necessary that to know the Figures, the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number of Ideas.  
Now I ask, If it's probable that God should Create so many things with the Mind of Man? For my part it does not appear so to me; chief, since that might be made in a more simple and easy manner, as we shall soon see. For as God always acts by the most simple ways, it does not seem reasonable to explain how we know Objects, by admitting the Creation of an infinite Number of Being's, since we can resolve this Difficulty in a more Easy and Natural way.  
But although the Mind should have a Magazine of all the Ideas, which are necessary for it to see things, it would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul should make choice of them to represent them: For instance, how it can represent the Sun to itself, whilst it is present to the Eyes of its Body?  
For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in the Brain, resembles not the Idea we have thereof, as has been elsewhere proved; and since the Soul perceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the bottom of the Eyes, and in the Brain, it's inconceivable how it should exactly guests, amongst these infinite Number of Ideas that it has, which it must represent to itself, to imagine or to see the Sun: We cannot therefore say, That the Ideas of things were created with us, it is sufficient that we see the Objects that are about us.  
Nor can we say that God produces as many of them every Moment, as we perceive different things; this has been sufficiently refuted from what has been said in this Chapter. Besides it is necessary that at all times we actually have in ourselves the Ideas of all things, since we are always able to think of all things; which we could not if we perceived them already confusedly; that is, If an infinite Number of Ideas were not present to our Minds; for we cannot will to think of Objects, of which we have no Idea.   

CHAP. V.  
That the Mind neither sees the Essence, nor Existence of Objects, in considering its own Perfections. That none but God sees them in that manner.  
THE Fourth Opinion is, That the Mind stands in need of nothing besides itself, to perceive Objects; and that it can, in considering itself and its own Perfections, discover all things that are without it.  
It is certain that the Soul sees within itself, and without Ideas, all the Sensations and Passions it is capable of, as Pleasure, Pain, Cold, Heat, Colours, Sounds, Odours, Sapours, its Love, its Hatred, Joy and Sadness, etc. because all the Sensations and Passions of the Soul represent nothing External which is like them; and because they are only Modifications, which nothing but the Mind is capable of. But the Difficulty is, to know whether the Ideas which represent something that is without the Soul, and which resembles them in some measure, as the Ideas of a Sun, a House, a Horse, a River, etc. are only Modifications of the Soul; insomuch that the Soul cannot stand in need of any thing besides itself, to represent to itself all External Things.  
There are Persons who make no Scruple to affirm, That the Soul being made to think, it has in itself, I mean, in considering its own Perfections, whatever is necessary to perceive Objects; for indeed the Soul being nobler than all the things it conceives distinctly, it may be said, that it contains them in some measure Eminently, according to the Notions of the Schools; that is, after a Nobler and more Sublime Manner than they are in themselves. They pretend, that thus Superior things comprehend the Perfections of those that are Inferior. And thus being the Noblest of the Creatures they know; they fancy they have in themselves, after a Spiritual Manner, all that is in the visible World. In a word, They will have the Soul to be like an Intelligible World, which comprehends in itself, whatever the Material and Sensible World comprehends; nay, Infinitely more.  
But in my Opinion it is a great Presumption to maintain that Thought: If I am not mistaken, it is Natural Vanity, the Love of Independence, and the Desire of resembling him who comprehends all Being's in himself, which Confounds the Mind, 
Dic quia tu tibi lumen non es. Serm. 8. De Verbis Domini.  and inclines us to believe, we possess what we have not: Do not say that you are a Light to yourself, says St. Austin; for there is none but God who is a Light to himself, and who can, in considering himself, see whatever he has produced, or can produce.  
It is certain that there was none but God alone before the World was Created, and he could not produce it without Knowledge and without Ideas: Consequently those Ideas which God had of the World, are not different from himself; and thus all Creatures, even the most Material and most Terrestrial, are in God, though in a manner altogether Spiritual, which we cannot apprehend. God therefore sees all Being's in himself, in considering his own Perfections which represent them to him. He also knows their Existence perfectly, for since the Existence of all things depend on his Will, he cannot be Ignorant of his own Will; it follows then, that he cannot be Ignorant of their Existence. And thus God does not only see in himself the Essence of all things, but also their Existence.  
But the case is different as to Created Spirits, they can neither see the Essence of things, nor their Existence within themselves: They cannot see their Essence within themselves, because being very much limited, they do not contain all Being's, like God whom we may call the Universal Being, or plainly He that is, as he calls himself. Since therefore the Humane Mind may know all Being's and Infinite Being's, and yet not contain them, it is a certain Proof, that it does not see their Essence in itself. For the Mind does not only see sometimes one thing, and sometimes another successively, it also actually perceives Infinity though it does not comprehend it. So that not being actually Infinite, nor capable of Infinite Modifications at the same time, it is absolutely Impossible that it should see within itself what is not there. Therefore it does not see the Essence of things in considering its own Perfections, or by modifying itself diversely.  
Neither does it see their Existence within itself, because the Existence of Being's do not depend upon its Will; and because the Ideas of those Being's may be present to the Mind, though they do not Exist; for every body may have the Idea of a Mountain of Gold, though there be no Mountain of Gold in Nature: And though we rely on the report of the Senses to judge of the Existence of Objects; nevertheless Reason does not assure us, that we should always believe our Senses, since we find clearly that they deceive us. When a Man's Blood, for instance, is very much inflamed; or barely when he Sleeps, he sometimes beholds Fields, Combats, and the like, which nevertheless are not present, and which perhaps never were. Therefore it is certain that it is neither within itself, nor by itself, that the Mind sees the Existence of things, but that in this case it depends upon some other things.   

CHAP. VI  
That we see all things in God.  
WE have examined in the preceding Chapter four different Manners in which the Humane Mind may see External Objects, which do not appear probable to us: There only remains the Fifth, which alone appears consonant to Reason, and the most proper to show the Dependence that Spirits have on God in all their Thoughts.  
In order to apprehend it rightly, we must remember what has been said in the preceding Chapter, that it is absolutely necessary that God should have in himself the Ideas of all the Being's he has created, since otherwise he could not have produced them; and that thus he sees all those Being's, by considering the Perfections which he includes in himself, and to which all Being's are related. Moreover, it is necessary to know that God is very strictly united to our Souls by his Presence, so that we may say that he is the place of Spirits, as Space is the place of Bodies. These two things being supposed, it is certain that the Mind may see what there is in God, which represents Created Being's, since that is very Spiritual, very Intelligible, and most present to the Mind. Thus the Mind may see in God the Works of God, supposing God be willing to discover to it what there is in him which represents them. These are the Reasons which seem to prove, that he rather Wills than Creates an Infinite Number of Ideas in every Mind.  
First, Although we do not absolutely deny, that God was able to produce an Infinitely infinite Number of Being's, which represent Objects with every Mind he Creates; yet we ought not to believe that he does so. For it is not only consonant to Reason, but it also appears by the Oeconomy of Nature, that God never does by very difficult means, what may be done by a plain easy way: God does nothing in vain and without Reason: That which shows his Wisdom and his Power, is not to do little things by difficult Means; for that is repugnant to Reason, and shows a limited Knowledge: But on the contrary, it is to do great things by plain easy Means. 'Tis thus that out of Extension only he produces whatever we see that is admirable in Nature, and even that which gives Life and Motion to Animals. For those who will needs have Substantial Forms, Faculties, and Souls in Animals, different from their Blood, and from the Organs of their Body, in order to perform their Functions, at the same time seem to argue that God wants Understanding, or that he cannot do those admirable things by Extension only. They measure the Power of God, and his Sovereign Wisdom, by the smallness of their own Capacity. Then since God may make Humane Minds see all things, by willing barely that they should see what is in themselves; that is, what is in him that has a relation to those things, and which represents them, there is no probability that he would do it otherwise; and that he should produce, in order thereunto, as many Infinities of Infinite Numbers of Ideas, as there are Created Spirits.  
But we must observe, that we are not to conclude, that Spirits see the Essence of God, because they can see all things in God in that manner: Since what they see is very Imperfect; but that God is very Perfect: They see Matter Divisible and Figured, etc. and there is nothing in God that is Divisible or Figured; for God is all Being's, because he is Infinite and Comprehends all; but he is no Being in particular. Nevertheless that which we see is but one, or several Being's in particular, and we do not apprehend that perfect Simplicity of God which includes all Being's. Besides that it may be said, that we do not so much see the Ideas of things, as the things which those Ideas represent; for when we see a Square, for instance, we do not say that we see the Idea of that Square, which is united to the Mind, but only the Square which is without us.  
The Second Reason which may induce us to believe, that we see all Being's, because God Wills, that that which is in him, which represents them, should be discovered to us; and not because we have as many Ideas created with us as we can see things; for this puts all created Spirits in an absolute Dependence upon God, and the greatest that can be: For this being so, we cannot only see nothing, but what God is willing we should see, but we can also see nothing, unless God himself shows it us. 
2 ad Cor. 3.5.  Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid à nobis, tanquam ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. 'Tis God himself which instructs and enlightens Philosophers in that Knowledge which ungrateful Men call Natural, although it is an immediate Gift from Heaven: Deus enim illis manifestavit. 
Rom. 1.19  It is he that is properly the Light of the Mind, and the Father of Light or Knowledge. Pater Luminum. 
Jac. 1.17.  It is he that teaches Wisdom to Men: 
Psa. 53.  Qui docet hominem scientiam. In a word, He is the true Light, which enlightens all those that come into this World: Lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc Mundum. 
Joan 1.9.   
For in fine, It is pretty difficult distinctly to apprehend the Dependence which our Minds have on God in all their particular Actions, supposing they have all that which we distinctly know to be necessary for them in order to Act, or all the Ideas of things present to their Mind, and truly that general and confused word Concurrence, by which Men pretend to explain the Dependence that Creatures have on God, does not awaken any distinct Idea in an attentive Mind; and yet it is very necessary Men should know distinctly, that they can do nothing without God.  
But the strongest of all Reasons, is the manner how the Mind perceives all things. It is certain, and every body knows by Experience, that when we have a mind to think on any thing in particular, we first cast our Eyes on all Being's; and in the next place we apply ourselves to the Consideration of the Object we design to think on. Now it is most certain that we see it already, though confusedly and in general: So that as we may desire to see all the Being's, sometimes one and sometimes another, it is certain that all Being's are present to our Mind; and it appears that all Being's can only be present to our Mind, because God is present to it, that is, He who includes all things in the Simplicity of his Being.  
It seems moreover, That the Mind would not be capable of representing to itself universal Ideas of Kind's and Species, etc. unless it saw all Being's included in one. For every Creature being a particular Being, we cannot say that we see any thing Created, when we see, for instance, a Triangle in general. In fine, I am of opinion, that it is impossible to give a good Reason of the Manner how the Mind comes to know several abstracted and general Truths, unless it be by the presence of him that can direct the Mind in a World of different Manners.  
In fine, The Best, the most Sublime, the most Solid, and the chief Proof of the Existence of God, or that which supposes the fewest things, is the Idea we have of Infinity, though it does not comprehend it; and that it has a very distinct Idea of God, which it can only have by the Union it has with him; since it cannot be conceived that the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, as that we have of God, should be any thing that is Created.  
But the Mind has not only the Idea of Infinity, it has it even before that of Finite. For we conceive the Infinite Being, from this alone that we conceive a Being, without considering whether it is Finite or Infinite. But in order to conceive a Finite Being, we must needs retrench something of that general Notion of a Being, which consequently must precede. Thus the Mind perceives nothing but in Infinity; and that Idea is so far from being formed by the confused Mixture of all the Ideas of particular Being's, as Philosophers imagine; that on the contrary all those particular Ideas are only Participations of the general Idea of Infinity: As God does not derive his Being from the Creatures, but all Creatures only subsist by him.  
The last Proof, which perhaps will be a Demonstration to those that are used to abstracted Arguments, is this, It is impossible that God should have any other principal End of his Actions but himself: It is a Notion that is common to all Men that are capable of any Reflection; and Holy Writ does not allow us to doubt, but that God has made every thing for himself. Therefore it is necessary, that not only our Natural Love, I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind, should tend towards him: But moreover, That the Knowledge and the Light which he bestows upon it, should make us know any thing that is in him; for whatever comes from God can only be for God. Should God Create a Spirit, and give it for an Idea, or for the immediate Object of its knowledge the Sun: In my Opinion, God would Create that Spirit, and the Idea of that Spirit, for the Sun and not for him.  
God cannot therefore Create a Spirit to know his Works, unless that Spirit sees God in some measure, by beholding his Works. So that we may say, that unless we do see God in some measure, we should see nothing: In like manner, unless we do Love God, I mean, unless God did continually Imprint in us the Love of Good in general, we should Love nothing. For that Love being our Will, we can Love nothing, nor Will any thing without him; since we cannot Love particular Goods, without determining towards those Goods, the motion of Love, which God gives us towards him. So that as we Love nothing but by the necessary Love we have for God, so we see nothing but by the Natural Knowledge we have of God: And all the particular Ideas we have of Creatures, are only Limitations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Motions of the Will for the Creatures, are only determinations of the motion for the Creator.  
I believe there are no Divines but what will grant, that the Impious Love God with that Natural Love I speak of: And St. Austin and some other Fathers affirm as an undeniable thing, That the Impious behold in God the Rule of Manners, and Eternal Truths. So that the Opinion I explain ought not to trouble any Body. Thus St. Austin speaks: 
L. 14. de Trin. c. 3.  Ab illa incommutabili luce veritatis, etiam impius, dum ab ea avertitur, quodammodo tangitur. Hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem, & multa rectè riprehendunt rectéque laudant in hominum moribus. Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant, nisi in quibus vident, quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat, etiam si nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Vbi autem eas vident? Neque enim in sua natura. Nam cùm procul dubio ment ista videantur, corumque mentes constet esse mutabiles, has vero regula● immutabiles, videat quisquis in eyes & hoc videre potuerit— ubinam ergo sunt istae regulae Scriptae, nisi in libro lucis illius, quae veritas dicitur, unde lex omnis justa describitur— inqua videt quid operandum sit, etiam qui operatur injustitiam, & ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur à qua tamen tangitur.  
There are many passages in St. Austin like unto this. by which he proves, that we see God even in this Life, by the knowledge we have of Eternal Truths. Truth is uncreated, Immutable, Immense, Eternal, above all things. It is true by itself. It derives its Perfection from nothing: It makes Creatures more perfect; and all Spirits naturally endeavour to know it. Nothing but God can have all those Perfections. Therefore Truth is God. We see some of those Immutable Eternal Truths. Therefore we see God. These are St. Austin's Reasons, ours differ a little from them; and we are unwilling to use the Authority of so great a Man unjustly, to second our Sentiment.  
We believe that Truths, even those that are Eternal; as that twice two are four, are not so much as absolute Being's: So far are we from believing that they are in God. For it is visible, that that Truth only consists in a relation of Equality, which is between twice Two and Four. Therefore we do not say that we see God in seeing Truths, as St. Austin says, but in seeing the Ideas of those Truths: For Ideas are real, but the Equality between the Ideas, which is Truth, has no reality. When for example, Men say that the Cloth they measure contains Three Yards; the Cloth and the Yards are real: But the Equality between Three Yards and the Cloth is not a real Being; it is only a relation that is between the Three Yards and the Cloth. When we say that twice Two are Four. the Ideas of the Numbers are real; but the Equality there is between them is only a Relation. Thus according to our Sentiment we see God, when we see Eternal Truths; not that those Eternal Truths are God, but because the Ideas on which those Truths depend are in God; perhaps St. Austin understood it so. We also believe, that we know in God Changeable and Corrubtible things, although St. Austin only speaks of Immutable and Incorruptible things; because it is not necessary for that to place any Imperfection in God; since it suffices, as we have already said, that God should show us what there is in him that has a Relation to these things.  
But though I say, we see in God the things that are Material and Sensible, it must be observed, that I do not say we have a Sensation of them in God, but only that it is from God who Acts in us; for God Knows sensible things, but he does not Feel them. When we perceive any thing that is sensible, Sensation and pure Idea is in our Perception. Sensation is a Modification of our Soul, and it is God that Causes it in us: And he may Cause it, though he has it not, because he sees in the Idea he has of our Soul, that it is capable of it. As for the Idea which is joined to Sensation, it is in God, we see it, because it is his pleasure to discover it to us: And God joins Sensation to the Idea, when Objects are present, to the end that we may believe them as they are; and that we may have such Sensations and Passions as we ought to have in relation to them.  
Lastly, We believe that all Spirits see the Eternal Laws as well as other things in God, but with some difference: They know the Eternal Order and Eternal Truths, and even the Being's which God has made according to those Truths, or according to the Order by the Union which those Spirits have necessarily with the Word, or Wisdom of God which directs them, as we have shown; But 'tis by the Impression they receive continually from the Will of God, which inclines them to him, and endeavours, as it were, to render their Will absolutely like unto his; that they know Order is a Law, I mean, that they know the Eternal Laws: How we must love Good, and fly from Evil: That we must love Justice more than all Riches: That it is better to Obey God than to Command Men, and many other Natural Laws. For the knowledge of all those Laws is not different from the knowledge of that Impression, which they always feel in themselves, though they do not always follow it by the free choice of their Will; which they know to be Common to all Spirits, though it is not equally strong in all.  
It is by that Dependence, Relation, and Union of our Mind to the Word of God, and of our Will to his Love, that we are made after the Image and Likeness of God: And although this may be very much defaced by Sin, yet it is necessary that it should subsist as long as we do. But if we bear the Image of the Word humbled upon Earth; and if we follow the Motions of the Holy Ghost, that Primitive Image of our first Creation, that Union of our Mind with the Word of the Father, and to the Love of the Father and of the Son, will be reestablished, and rendered indelible. We shall be like God, if we are like the Man God. In fine, God will be all in us, and we all in God, in a far more perfect manner than that by which it is necessary for us to subsist, that we should be in him, and he in us.  
Here are some reasons which may persuade us, 
See the Explanations.  that Spirits perceive all things by the immediate Presence of him who Comprehends all in the Simplicity of his Being. Every one will Judge of it according to the Internal Conviction he shall receive of it, after having seriously considered it. But 'tis thought that there will be no probability in all the other ways of explaining these things; and that this last will appear more than probable. Thus our Souls depend on God in all respects. For as it is he who makes them feel Grief, Pleasure, and all other Sensations, by the Natural Union he has Established between them and our Body, which is no other than his Decree and general Will. Thus it is he, who by the Natural Union which he has made between the Will of Man, and the Representation of the Ideas which the Immensity of the Divine Being includes, that makes them know whatever they do know; and that Natural Union is also nothing else but his general Will. So that none but he can direct us, by representing all things to us; as none but he can make us Happy, by making us taste all manner of Pleasures.  
Let us therefore keep to this Opinion, That God is the Intelligible World, or the place of Spirits, as the material World is the place of Bodies. That they receive all their Modifications from his Power: That they find all their Ideas in his Wisdom: And that it is by his Love that they are acted in all their regular Motions; and since his Power and Love are nothing but himself, let us believe with St. Paul, that he is not far from every one of us; and that it is in him we have Life, Motion, and a Being. 
Act. Apost. c. 17.28.  Non long est ab unoquoque nostrum, in ipso enim vivimus, movemur, & sumus.   

CHAP. VII.  
I. Four different ways of seeing things.  
II. How we know God.  
III. How we know Bodies.  
iv How we know our Soul.  
V How we know the Souls of other Men, and pure Spirits.  
IN order to Abridge and Illustrate the Opinion I have set down, concerning the manner how the Mind perceives the different Objects of its Knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish in it four ways of knowing.  
The First is, to know things by themselves.  
The Second, to know them by their Ideas; that is, in the Sense I take it here, by something that is different from them.  
The Third, to know them by Conscience, or by Internal Sentiment.  
The Fourth, to know them by Conjecture.  
Things are known by themselves, 
I. Four ways of seeing things.  and without Ideas, when being very Intelligible, they are able to Penetrate the Mind, or Discover themselves to it. Things are known by their Ideas, when they are not Intelligible of themselves, either because they are Corporeal, or because they cannot penetrate the Mind, or discover themselves to it. We know all those things by Conscience which are not distinguished from us. Lastly, we know those things by Conjecture which are different from us, and from those that are known of themselves, and by Ideas, when we think that some things are like unto others which we know.  
God only is known by himself: 
II. How we know God.  for though there are other Spiritual Being's besides himself, which seem to be Intelligible by their Nature, there are none at present but he only, which penetrate the Mind, and discover themselves to it. We only see God with a direct and immediate Sight. Perhaps he only can direct the Mind by his own Substance. Lastly, in this Life it is only by the Union we have with him that we are capable of knowing what we know, as we have shown in the preceding Chapter: 
Humanis mentibus nulla interposita natura praeside. Aug. l. de Vera Religione, c. 55.  For he is our only Master, that presides in our Mind, according to St. Austin, without the Mediation of any Creature.  
We can never conceive, that any thing that is Created should be able to represent Infinity; that the unlimited Being, the immense Being, the universal Being can be perceived by an Idea; that is, by a particular Being, by a Being different from the Universal and Infinite Being. But as for particular Being's, it is not difficult to conceive, that they may be represented by the Infinite Being which includes them, and which includes them after a Spiritual and consequently very intelligible manner. Therefore it is necessary to say, that we know God by himself, notwithstanding the knowledge we have of him in this Life is very imperfect; and that we know Corporeal Things by their Ideas, that is, in God; since God only includes the Intelligible World, in which we find the Ideas of all things.  
But though all things may be seen in God, it does not follow that we see them all in him: We only see such things in God of which we have Ideas; and there are things which are seen without Ideas.  
All the things that are in this World, 
III. How we know Bedies.  of which we have some Knowledge, are either Bodies or Spirits; proprieties of Bodies, or proprieties of Spirits. No body can question but that we see Bodies with their Proprieties by their Ideas; because not being Intelligible in themselves, we can only see them in the Being which includes them after an intelligible manner. Thus it is in God, and by their Ideas that we see Bodies with their Proprieties; and for that reason the knowledge we have of them is very perfect: I mean the Idea we have of Extension is sufficient to make us know all the Proprieties which Extension is capable of; and we can never desire to have a more distinct and fuller Idea of Extension of Figures and Motions than that which God gives us of them.  
Whereas the Ideas of the things which are in God, include all their Proprieties, whoever sees their Ideas, may successively have all their Proprieties: For when we see things as they are in God, we see them always after a very perfect manner; and it would be infinitely perfect, if the Mind that sees them there were Infinite. That which is wanting in the knowledge we have of Extension of Figures and Motions, is not a defect of the Idea which represents it, but of our Mind which considers it.  
It is not so with the Soul, 
iv How we know our Soul.  we do not know it by its Idea: We do not see it in God; we only know it by Conscience; and therefore the knowledge we have of it is imperfect. We know no more of our Soul, than what we feel passes within us. Had we never felt Pain, Heat, Light, etc. we could not know whether our Soul would be capable of them, because we do not know it by its Idea. But did we see in God the Idea which answers to our Soul, 
See the Explanations.  we should know at the same time, or might know, all the properties it is capable of: As we know all the Properties that Extension is capable of; because we do know Extension by the Idea of it.  
It is true, we know by our Conscience, or by the Internal Sense we have of ourselves, that our Soul is something that is Great: But it may be, that which we do know of it is hardly any thing of what it is in itself. If we had no more knowledge of Matter than that of Twenty or Thirty Figures it had been modified into, certainly we should hardly know any thing of it, in comparison of what we do know by the Idea which represents it. It is not therefore sufficient to have a perfect knowledge of the Soul, to know what we do know of it by the Internal Sense alone; since the Conscience we have of ourselves, perhaps only shows us the least part of our Being.  
It may be concluded from what has been said, that though we know the Existence of our Soul more distinctly than the Existence of our Body, and of those that are about us, yet we have not so perfect a knowledge of the Nature of the Soul, as of the Nature of Bodies; and may serve to reconcile the different Opinions of those that say nothing is better known than the Soul; and of those that maintain, there is nothing of which they have less knowledge.  
It may also serve to prove, that the Ideas which represent some External thing to us, are not Modifications of our Soul. For if the Soul saw all things in considering its own Modifications, it would know its Essence or Nature more clearly than that of Bodies; and all the Sensations or Modifications it is capable of, than the Figures or Modifications which Bodies are capable of. Nevertheless, it does not find that it is capable of such a Sensation by the sight it has of itself, but only by Experience: Whereas it knows, that Extension is capable of an infinite number of Figures, by the Idea it has of Extension. Moreover, there are certain Sensations, as Colours and Sounds, which most Men cannot discover, whether or no they are Modifications of the Soul; and Men know all manner of Figures by the Idea they have of Extension to be the Modification of Bodies.  
What I have said, also shows the Reason why it is Impossible to give a Definition that may explain the Modifications of the Soul; for since we neither know the Soul, nor the Modifications of it by Ideas, but only by Sensations; and that such Sensations of Pleasure, for instance, of Pain, of Heat, etc. are not tied to words; it is evident, that if a Man had never seen Colours, nor felt Heat, it would be impossible to make him Sensible of those Sensations, by whatever Definitions we could give him in order thereunto. Now Men having only their Sensations upon the account of the Body, and their Bodies not being disposed in the same manner in all of them, it often happens that words are Equivocal; that those which are used to express the Modifications of our Souls, signify quite contrary to what we design; and we often make Men think on Bitterness, for Example, when we design to make them think on Sweetness.  
Although we have not a full Knowledge of our Soul, that which we have by Conscience suffices to demonstrate the Immortality, Spirituality, Liberty and some other Attributes of i●, which it is necessary we should know: And for that reason God does not give us the Knowledge of it by its Idea, as he gives us the Knowledge of Bodies. 'Tis true, The Knowledge we have of our Souls by our Conscience is Imperfect, but it is not False: The Knowledge, on the contrary, which we have of Bodies by Sensation or Conscience, (if we may call the Sensation of what passes in our Body Conscience) is not only Imperfect, but False. Therefore it was necessary we should have an Idea of Bodies to correct the Sensations we have of them: But we do not stand in need of the Idea of our Soul, since the Conscience we have of it does not engage us into Error: And not to be deceived in the Knowledge of it, it is sufficient not to Confound it with the Body, which our Reason might induce us to do. In sine, Had we had a clear Idea of the Soul, like unto that we have of the Body, that Idea would have made us consider it too much, as separated from it. And thus it would have lessened the Union of our Soul with our Body, by hindering us from looking upon it, as being diffused through all our Members, which I shall explain no farther. 
V How we know the Souls of other Men.   
Of all the Objects of our Knowledge, there only remains the Souls of other Men, and the Pure Intelligences; and it is evident that we only know them by Conjecture. We know them now neither in themselves, nor by their Ideas; and as they are distinct from us, it is impossible that we should know them by Conscience: We conjecture that the Souls of other Men are of the same Species with ours; we think they feel what we feel in ourselves; and even when those Sensations have no relation to the Body, we are certain that we are not deceived: Because we see in God certain Ideas, and certain Immutable Laws, according to which we know certainly that God acts equally in all Spirits.  
I know that two and two are four, that it is better to be Just than Rich; and I am not mistaken in believing that others know those Truths as well as myself. I love Good and Pleasure, I hate Evil and Pain, I would be Happy; and I am not mistaken in believing that Men, Angels, and even Devils, have these Inclinations. I know moreover, that God will never Create any Spirits, but what will desire to be Happy, or that can ever desire to be Unhappy: But I know it with Evidence and Certainty, because God tells me so: For who but God could give a Knowledge of the Designs and Will of God? But when the Body has any Share in what passes within me, I am for the most part mistaken, in judging of others by myself. I feel Heat, I see such a Magnitude, such a Colour; I relish such a Taste at the approach of certain Bodies: I am deceived, when I judge of others by myself. I am subject to certain Passions, I have a Kindness or Aversion for such or such things; and I fancy that others are like me; my Conjecture is often False. Thus the Knowledge we have of other Men, is very liable to Error, when we judge of them by the Sensations we have of ourselves.  
If there be any Being's different from God, from ourselves, from Bodies, and from Pure Spirits, it is unknown to us: We have much ado to persuade ourselves that there are any such: And after having examined the Reasons of certain Philosophers who pretend the contrary, we have found them False; which has confirmed us in our former Opinion, that being all Men of the same Nature, we had all the same Ideas; because it behoves us all to know the same things.   

CHAP. VIII.  
I. The Intimate Presence of the Wandering Idea of Being in General, is the Cause of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind, and of the greatest part of the Chimeras of common Philosophy, which hinder many Philosophers from discovering the Solidity of the True Principles of Moral Philosophy.  
II. Example concerning the Essence of Matter.  
THE clear, intimate, necessary Presence of God, (I mean the Unlimited, Infinite, and General Being) with the Mind of Man, acts with more Force upon it, than the Presence of all Finite Objects. It is impossible that it should absolutely lay aside that general Idea of Being, because it cannot subsist out of God. Perhaps some might urge, that it may wander from it, because it may think on those particular Being's; but they would be mistaken: For when the Mind considers any Being in particular, it is not so far from removing from God, that it rather draws near, if I may so speak, to some of his Perfections, in removing from all others: However it removes from them in such a manner, that it never wholly loses the sight of them, and it is for the most part in a Condition to seek them out, and to draw near to them. They are always present to the Mind, but the Mind only perceives them in an inexplicable Confusion, because of its smallness, and the greatness of its Idea of Being. We may chance sometimes not to think on ourselves; but I believe we cannot subsist one Moment without thinking on Being; and even at that very time when we fancy we think on nothing, we are of necessity full of the wandering and general Idea of Being. But whereas those things that are very usual in us, and which do not concern us, do not excite the Mind with any force, nor oblige it to make any Reflection upon them; this Idea of Being, so Great, so Vast, so Real, and so Positive as it is, is yet familiar to us, and touches us so little, that we almost believe we do not see it; that we do not reflect upon it; that we afterwards judge there is but little Reality in it; and that it is only formed by the confused mixture of all particular Ideas: Though on the contrary, it is in that alone, and by that alone, that we perceive all Being's in particular.  
Although that Idea, which we receive by the immediate Union we have with the Word of God, does never deceive us in itself, like those which we receive from it by means of the Union we have with our Body, which represent things to us different from what they are: Yet I am not afraid to say, that we make so ill a use of the best things, that the indelible Presence of that Idea is one of the principal Causes of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind; and consequently of that Abstracted and Chimerical Philosophy, which explains all Natural Effects by general Terms of Act, Power, Cause, Effect, Sustantial Forms, Faculties, occult Qualities, Sympathy, Antipathy, etc. for it is certain that all those Terms, and many others, never excite any Ideas in the Mind, but such as are Wandering and General; that is, of those Ideas which present themselves to the Mind of their own accord, without Pain, or any Application on our part.  
Let Men read with all Attention imaginable, all the Definitions and Explications which are given of Substantial Forms: Let them carefully inquire wherein the Essence of all those Entities does consist, which Philosophers fancy as they please, and in so great a Number, that they are obliged to make several Divisions and Sub-divisions of them; and I am confident that they will never stir up any other Ideas in their Mind of all those things, than that of Being, and of Cause in General.  
For this is what commonly happens to Philosophers: They see some new Effect; they immediately imagine a new Being to produce it. Fire warms; therefore there is some Being in the Fire which produces that Effect that is different from the matter which composes the Fire: And whereas Fire is capable of several different Effects; as of separating Bodies, of reducing them to Ashes and into Earth; of drying them, hardening them, softening them, dilating them, purifying them, etc. they liberally allow Fire as many Faculties or real Qualities, as it is capable of producing different Effects.  
But those that reflect on the Definitions they give of those Faculties, will easily discover that they are only Logical Definitions, and that they excite no other Ideas than that of Being, and of Cause in General, which the Mind compares with the Effect which is produced: So that Men are not the more Learned, after having studied them very much; for all they get by that kind of Study, is, that they imagine they know better than others, what they notwithstanding do not know near so well; not only because they admit many Being's which never were, but also because being prejudiced, they make themselves incapable of conceiving, how it can be possible that matter alone, as that of Fire, being moved against Bodies differently disposed, should produce all the different Effects which we see Fire does produce.  
It is Notorious to all those that have read a little, that most of the Books of Sciences, particularly those that treat of Natural Philosophy, Physic, Chemistry, and all the particular things of Nature, are full of Arguments grounded upon Elementary Qualities, Second Causes, as Attractive, Retentive, Digestive, Expulsive, and such like; upon others they call occult; upon Specific Vittues, and upon several Being's which Men compose out of the General Idea of Being, and that of the Cause of the Effect which they see; which seems not possible to happen, unless by the Faculty they have of considering the Idea of the Being in General, which is ever present to their Mind, by the Infinite Presence of him that includes all Being's.  
If common Philosophers would content themselves with publishing their Natural Philosophy barely as a Logic, which would furnish proper Terms to speak of the things of Nature; and if they would let those alone that fix distinct and particular Ideas to those Terms in order to be understood, no body would find fault with their proceeding. But they even pretend to explain Nature by general and abstracted Ideas, as if Nature were Abstracted. And they will needs have it, that their Master Aristotle's Natural Philosophy is a real Natural Philosophy, which throughly explains things, and not merely a Logic; though it contains nothing that is tolerable, besides some wandering Definitions, and some Terms that are so general, that they may serve for all sorts of Philosophy. Lastly, They are so strangely conceited with all those Imaginary Being's, and wandering undetermined Ideas, which naturally arise within their Mind, that they are Incapable of fixing their Mind long enough to consider the real Ideas of things, 
II. Of the Essence of Matter. If that Definition is received of the word Essence, all the rest is absolutely demonstrated: If it be not received, it only remains a question of Name, to know wherein consists the Essence of the Matter, or rather it cannot be questioned.  so as to discover the Solidity and Evidence of them. And this is the true Cause of the extreme Ignorance they are in, as to the true Principles of Natural Philosophy. It is convenient to give some Proofs of it.  
Most Philosophers do partly agree, That we ought to look upon that as the Essence of a thing, which we acknowledge to be the first in that thing, that which is Inseparable from it, and on which the Properties that agree to it do depend. So that to discover wherein the Essence of Matter does consist, we must look upon all the Properties that are agreeable to it, or which are included in the Idea we have of it; as Hardness, Softness, Fluidity, Motion, Rest, Figure, Divisibility, Impenetrability and Extension, in order to consider which of all these Attributes is Inseparable from it. Therefore since Fluidity, Hardness, Softness, Motion, Rest, may be separated from Matter, since there are several Bodies that are without Hardness, Fluidity, or Softness, that are not in motion; or lastly, that are not in Rest: It follows clearly, that all those Attributes are not Essential to it.  
But there still remains four which we do conceive to be Inseparable from Matter, viz. Figure, Divisibility, Impenetrability and Extension: So that in order to see which is the Attribute that is to be taken for the Essence, we must no longer think of dividing them, bu● only to examine which is the first, and which supposes no other. It is easily apprehended, that Figure, Divisibility, and Impenetrability, supposes Extension, and that Extension supposes nothing; but as soon as it is given, Divisibility, Impenetrability, and Figure are given. Therefore we must conclude, That Extension is the Essence of Matter, supposing it has only the Attributes we have mentioned, or others like them; and I do not believe that any body in the World can question it, after serious Consideration.  
But the Difficulty is to know, whether Matter has not some other Attributes different from Extension, and from those that depend on it: So that Extension itself is not Essential to it, but supposes something that may be the Subject and Principle of it.  
Several Persons, after having attentively considered the Idea they had of Matter by all its known Attributes; and after having likewise meditated on the Effects of Nature, as much as the Powers and Capacity of the Mind will permit, have been strongly persuaded that Extension supposes nothing in Matter; whether it be that they have not had a distinct and particular Idea of that thing which may be believed to precede Extension, or whether they have seen no Effect to prove that thing.  
For, as to be persuaded, that a Watch has no being different from the Matter whereof it is composed, it is sufficient to know, how the different disposition of the Wheels, can produce all the Motions of a Watch, without having any distinct Idea of that which might be the cause of those Motions, though several Logical ones might be given: So because those Persons have no distinct Idea of that thing which might be in matter, if Extension were taken from it; because they see no Attribute to discover it; and because, if Extension be given, all the Attributes which we conceive to belong to Matter, are given; and also that Matter is the cause of no Effect, but such as we may conceive Extension differently configured, and diversely agitated may produce; from whence they persuade themselves that Extension is the Essence of the Matter.  
But whereas Men have no certain Demonstration, that there is no Intelligence or new Being created in the Wheels of a Watch: So no body can, without a particular Revelation, assert as a Geometrical Demonstration, that there is nothing in a Stone besides Extension diversely consigured: For Extension may absolutely be joined with something else which we do not conceive, because we have no Idea of it: Though it seems very unreasonable to believe and affirm it; since it is unreasonable to affirm what we neither know or conceive.  
Nevertheless though we should suppose, that there is something besides Extension in Matter, that would not hinder (if rightly observed) Extension from being the Essence of it, according to the Desinition we have given of that word. For it is absolutely necessary that whatever is in the World, should be either a Being, or the manner of a Being; an attentive Mind cannot deny it. Now Extension is not the manner of a Being; therefore 'tis a Being. But whereas Matter is not a Composition of several Being's, like Man, who is composed of Body and Mind; since Matter is but one Being only, it is evident that Matter is only Extension.  
Now to prove that Extension is not the manner of a Being, but that it is really a Being, we must observe that the manner of a Being cannot be conceived, unless the Being, of which it is the manner, be conceived at the same time: It is impossible, for Example, to conceive Roundness without conceiving Extension, because the manner of a Being, is nothing but the Being itself so modified: The roundness of Wax, for instance, being nothing but the Wax itself so modified, it's evident that we cannot possibly conceive the manner without the Being. Therefore if Extension were the manner of a Being, we could not conceive this Extension without that Being, of which this Extension should be the manner. Nevertheless it is easily conceived by itself. Therefore it is not the manner of any Being, and consequently it is a Being itself. Thus it proves the Essence of Matter, since Matter is only one Being, and not a Compound of divers Being's as abovesaid.  
But many Philosophers are so wedded to general Ideas, and Logical Entities, that their Mind is more taken up with them, than with those that are Particular, Distinct and Physical. This is sufficiently apparent, in that their Arguments upon Natural Things, are only grounded upon Notions of Logic, Act and Power, and of an Infinite Number of Imaginary Entities, which they do not distinguish from those that are Real. Therefore those Men finding a wonderful Facility of seeing according to their own way, what they have a mind to see, fancy that they see better than others; and that they see distinctly that Extension supposes something, and that it is only a Propriety of Matter, of which it may even be divested.  
Nevertheless, when they are desired to explain that thing, which they pretend to see in Matter besides Extension, they do it in different ways, which all show that they have no other Idea of it than that of Being, or of Substance in General. This appears clearly to those that observe, that the said Idea includes no particular Attributes which are proper to Matter. For in removing Extension from Matter, they take away all the Attributes and all the Proprieties which we distinctly conceive do belong to it, although one should leave that thing which they fancy to be the Essence of it: It is visible that they could neither make a Heaven nor Earth of it, nor any thing that we see. And on the contrary, in removing what they fancy to be the Essence of Matter, provided Extension be left, we leave all the Attributes and all the Proprieties, which we conceive to be distinctly included in the Idea of Matter: For it is certain, that with Extension alone may be formed a Heaven, an Earth, and all the visible World, besides an infinite Number of others. Therefore, that something which they suppose besides Extension, having no Attributes, which can be distinctly conceived to belong to it, and which are clearly included in the Idea we have of it, is nothing real, if we believe Reason; and it can be of no use to explain Natural Effects. And what they urge, that it is the Subject, and the Principle of Extension is spoken at random, without conceiving distinctly what they say; that is, without having any other Idea thereof, than a General or Logical one, as of Subject and Principle.  
So that one might still imagine a new Subject, and a new Principle of that Subject of Extension, and thus on ad Infinitum; because the Mind represents to itself general Ideas of Subject, and of Principles, as it pleases.  
Indeed it's very probable, that Men would never have obscured the Idea they have of Matter so much, unless they had had some Reasons for it; and several maintain Sentiments contrary to ours, through Principles of Divinity. Without doubt Extension is not the Effence of Matter, if that be contrary to Faith, we grant it. We are, Thanks be to God, fully persuaded of the Weakness and Limitation of the Humane Mind. We very well know, that it has too little Extent to measure an infinite Power; That God can do Infinitely more than we can conceive; That he only gives us Ideas to know things that happen according to the Order of Nature, but he conceals the rest from us. Therefore we are ever ready to submit our Mind to Faith; but there must be better Proofs than those that are commonly alleged, to destroy the Reason's abovesaid, because the manner of Explaining the Mysteries of Faith is not of Faith, and they are believed, even without apprehending that the manner of them can ever be clearly explained.  
We believe, for Example, the Mystery of the T●●nity, though the Humane Mind cannot conceive it; and nevertheless we believe, that things which do not dister from the same Third, do not di●●er among themselves; though this Proposition seems to destroy it. For we are persuaded that we must never make use of our Mind, unless on Subjects that are proportioned to its Capacity; and we must not look fixedly on Mysteries, for fear of being dazzled by them, according to this Advertisement of the Holy Ghost: Qui scrutator est Majestatis opprimetur à Gsoria.  
Nevertheless, if it were thought proper, for the Satisfaction of some Men, to explain how far the Opinion we have of Matter, agrees with what Faith teaches us about Transubstantion, we might perhaps do it clearly and distinctly enough, and without offending the Decisions of the Church; but we are of Opinion, that we may very well forbear making that Explication, especially in this Work.  
For we must observe, that the Holy Fathers have mostly spoken of that Mystery, as of an Incomprehensible Mystery; that they have not Philosophised to explain it; and that commonly they have only used Comparisons that have not much Exactness in them; fitter to discover the Doctrine, than to give an Explanation that might satisfy the Mind: So that Tradition is for those who do not Philosophise upon that Mystery, and who submit their Mind to Faith, without puzzling themselves to no purpose in those dissicult Questions.  
Therefore it would be unreasonable to desire Philosophers to give clear and easy Explanations of the manner how the Body of Jesus Christ is in the Eucharist; for that would be to desire them to tell Novelties in Divinity. And should Philosophers Imprudently answer that Question, they could not avoid the Condemnation either of their Philosophy, or of Divinity: For if their Explanations were Obscure, the Principles of their Philosophy would be despised; and thould their Answer prove clear or easy, Men would reasonably suspect the Novelty of their Divinity.  
Since than Novelty, in Point of Divinity, bears the Character of Error, and that Men have a Right to despise Opinions, only because they are new, and have no Foundation in Tradition; we ought not to undertake to give easy and intelligible Explanations of things, which the Fathers and the Councils have not fully explained; and it is sufficient to believe the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, without pretending to explain the manner of it. For otherwise we should spread Seeds of new Disputes and Quarrels, of which there are but too many already; and the Enemies of Truth would not fail to make a malicious use of it to oppress their Adversaries.  
Disputes in Point of Explanations of Divinity, seem to me to be the most Useless and the most Dangerous; and they are the more to be feared, by reason that even Pious Persons think themselves obliged to break the Bonds of Charity with those that are not of their Opinion. We have but too many Instances of it, and the reason of it is plain enough. Therefore it is always the best and safest way, not to be overhasty in speaking of things of which we have no Evidence, and which others are not disposed to conceive.  
Neither must obscure and uncertain Explanations of the Mysteries of Faith, serve us as a Rule and Principle to reason in Philosophy, in which nothing but Evidence ought to persuade us. We must not change the clear and distinct Ideas of Extension, Figure, and Local Motion, for these general and confuse Ideas of Principles, or of the Subject of Extension, of Form, and of Quiddities, of real Qualities, and of all those Motions of Generation, of Corruption, of Alteration, and the like, which differ from Local Motion. Real Ideas produce a Real Science, but the general Ideas of Logic will never produce any thing but a rambling, superficial and barren Science. Therefore it behoves us to consider attentively, those distinct and particular Ideas of things, in order to discover the Proprieties they include; and thus to study Nature, instead of losing ourselves in Chimeras, which only exist in the Opinion of some Philosophers.   

CHAP. IX.  
I. The last General Cause of our Errors.  
II. That the Ideas of things are not always present to the Mind, as soon as 'tis desired.  
III. That all Finite Minds are liable to Error, and why.  
iv We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies or Spirits, nor that God is a Spirit, as we conceive Spirits.  
WE have hitherto spoken of Errors, 
I. The last General Cause of our Errors.  for which we can assign some occasional Cause in the Nature of the Pure Understanding, or of the Mind considered, as acting of itself, and in the Nature of Ideas, that is, in the manner how the Mind perceives External Objects. There now remains only to explain a Cause, which may be called a Universal and General Cause of all our Errors; because we conceive no Error, but what depends in some measure on it. That Cause is, That Nothing having no Idea to represent it, the Mind is induced to believe, that things it has no Idea of, do not Exist.  
It is certain, that the general Source of our Errors, as we have already often declared, is, because our Judgements have more Extension than our Perceptions. For when we consider some Object, we commonly behold it only on one side, and we are not contented with judging of so much as we have considered, but we also judge of the whole Object. Therefore it often happens that we are deceived, because, though the thing be true on that part we have examined it, it commonly proves false on the other, and that which we believe to be true only proves likely. Moreover it is evident, that we should not judge absolutely of things as we do, if we did not think we had considered them on all sides, or if we did not suppose them answerable to those we have examined. Therefore the general Cause of our Errors, is, That having no Idea of the other sides of our Object, or of their difference from that which is present to our Mind; we fancy that those other sides are not, or at least we suppose that they have no particular difference.  
This manner of proceeding seems pretty reasonable to us: For Nothing forming no Ideas in the Mind, we have some reason to believe, that those things which form no Ideas in the Mind, while they are examined, resemble Nothing. And that which confirms us in this Opinion, is, That we are persuaded, by a kind of Instinct, that the Ideas of things are due to our Nature, and that they are submitted to the Mind in such a manner, that they ought to present themselves before it, as soon as it desires it.  
Nevertheless if we did but reflect on the present State of our Nature, 
II. The Ideas of things are not present to the Mind as soon as 'tis desired.  we should not be so ready to believe, that we have all the Ideas of things as soon as we desire them. Man, as I may say, is only Flesh and Blood since the Fall. The least Impression of his Senses, and of his Passions, breaks the strongest Attention of his Mind; and the Course of the Spirits, and of the Blood, draws it away, and drives it continually towards Sensible Objects. It often strives in vain against the Torrent which drives it along; and 'tis but seldom that it makes any Opposition; for there is too much Delight in following it, and too much Fatigue to oppose it. Therefore the Mind is disgusted and sinks as soon as it makes the least Effort to take hold of, and to six upon some Truth: It is absolutely False in the State in which we are, that the Ideas of things are present to our Mind whenever we have a Mind to consider them. Therefore we ought not to judge that things are not, only because we have no Ideas of them.  
But though we should suppose Man to be absolure Master of his Mind and of his Ideas, 
III. All Etnite Minds are liable to Error.  he would nevertheless be subject to Error by his Nature: For the Mind of Man is limited, and a Mind that is limited, is Naturally liable to Error. The reason of it is, the least things have many Relations among themselves, and nothing but an Infinite Mind can apprehend them. Therefore a limited Mind not being able to embrace, or to apprehend all those Relations, whatever Effort it makes, is induced to believe, that those which it perceives not, do not exist, particularly when we do not reflect on the Weakness and Limitation of our Mind, which is very usual. Thus the Limitation of the Mind alone, infers a Capability of falling into Error.  
Nevertheless, if Men, even in the State of Weakness and Depravations in which they are, did always make a good use of their Liberty, they would never be deceived. And therefore all Men that fall into Error, are justly blamed, and deserve to be punished: For if we would not be deceived, we must only judge of what we see, and never make entire Judgements, but on such things which we are sure we have examined in all their parts, which we can do. But they had rather submit to Error, than to the Rule of Truth: They will decide without much difficulty and Examination. Therefore we need not wonder if they fall into many Errors, and very often make uncertain Judgements.  
Men, for Example, 
iv We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies and Spirits created, nor that God is a Spirit as we conceive Spirits.  have no other Ideas of Substance, than that of the Mind and Body; that is, Of a Substance that Thinks, and of a Substance that is Extended. And from thence they pretend to have a Right to conclude, that whatever Exists is Body or Spirit: Not that I pretend to affirm, that there is any Substance that is neither Body nor Spirit: For we ought never to affirm, that things Exist which we have no Knowledge of; since it is to be thought, that God who does not conceal his Works from us, would have given us some Ideas of them. Nevertheless I am of Opinion, that we ought not to determine any thing about the Number of Species of Being's which God has Created, by the Ideas we have of them; since it is absolutely possible that God may have Reasons to Conceal them from us, which we do not know; if it were only because those Being's having no Relation to us, it would be useless for us to know them: By the same reason as he has not given us Eyes good enough to tell the Teeth of a Hand-worm, because it is not very material for the preservation of our Body, to have such a piercing Sight.  
But though we think no body ought to Judge rashly, that all Being's are Spirits or Bodies; we think nevertheless, that it is directly contrary to Reason, that Philosophers in order to explain Natural Effects, should use other Ideas, than those that depend on Thought and Extension, since indeed they are the only we have, that are distinct or particular.  
Nothing can be more unreasonable, than to imagine an Infinity of Being's upon bare Ideas of Logic; to impute an Infinity of Proprieties to them; and thus to endeavour to explain things we do not understand, by things which do not only conceive, but which is not possible for us to conceive. 'Tis just as if the Blind having a mind to speak of Colours among themselves, and to maintain a Thesis about them, should in order thereunto, make use of the Definitions which Philosophers give them, and draw several Conclusions from the same. For as those Blind could only give pleasant and ridiculous Arguments upon Colours, because they could have no perfect Ideas of them, and yet would argue about them upon General and Logical Ideas: So Philosophers can never argue solidly upon the Effects of Nature, when to that end, they only make use of general Logical Ideas, of Act, Power, Being, Cause, Principle, Form, Quality, and the like. It is absolutely necessary for them only to rely on distinct and particular Ideas of Thought and Extension, and those they include, as Figure, Motion, etc. For it is in vain to pretend to understand Nature, but by the Consideration of the distinct Ideas we have of it; and it is better never to meditate, than upon Chimeras.  
Nevertheless we cannot affirm that there are only Bodies and Spirits, Being's that think, and that are extended, because we may be deceived in it. For though they are sufficient to Explain Nature, and consequently we may conclude without fear of being deceived, that the Natural Things we have some knowledge of, depend on Extension and Thought; yet it is certainly possible, that there may be others of which we have no Idea, and of which we see no Effects.  
Men therefore Judge rashly, when they Judge as an Infallible Principle, that all Substances are Bodies or Spirits. But they also infer a rash Conclusion from thence, when they conclude by the bare Testimony of Reason that God is a Spirit. It is true, that since we are Created after his Image and Likeness, and that Holy Writ teaches us in several Places that God is a Spirit, we ought to believe it, and to call him so: But Reason alone cannot teach it us. That tells us only that God is a Being infinitely Perfect; and that he is rather a Spirit than a Body, since our Soul is more perfect than our Body: But it does not assure us that there are no Being's besides more perfect than our Spirits; and more above our Spirits, than our Spirits are above our Bodies.  
Now supposing that there were such Being's, (as it undeniably appears that it was in the power of God to Create such) it is clear that they would participate more of the likeness of God than we do. The same Reason teaches us, that God would sooner have the Perfections of their Being's than ours, which would only be Imperfections compared to them. Therefore we must not Judge rashly, that the word Spirit which we use to express what God is, and what we are, is an Equivocal Term, which signifies the same things, or things that are very like. God is more above Created Spirits, than those Spirits are above Bodies; and we ought not so much to call God a Spirit to show positively what he is, as to signify that he is not Material. He is a Being infinitely Perfect, no body can question it. But as we must not imagine with the Anthropomorphites, that he must have a Human Figure, because it seems to be most perfect, although we should suppose him Corporeal, neither must we imagine that the Spirit of God has any Human Thoughts: And that his Spirit is like unto ours, because we know nothing that is more perfect than our Spirit. We must rather believe, that as he possesses the Perfections of Matter without being Material, since it is certain that Matter has a relation to some Perfections that are in God; he also possesses the Perfections of Created Spirits, without being a Spirit in the manner as we conceive Spirits: That his Name is, He that is; that is, the unlimited Being, the All-Being, the Infinite and Universal Being.   

CHAP. X.  
Examples of some Physical Errors, into which Men fall, because they suppose that things which differ in their Nature, Qualities, Extension, Duration, and proportion, are alike in all things.  
WE have seen in the preceding Chapter, that Men Judge rashly, when they Judge that all Being's are only of two sorts, Spirits or Bodies. We will show in the following, that their Judgements are not only rash, but also very false, which are the principles of an infinite number of Errors, when they Judge that Being's are not different in their Relations nor Manners, because they have no Ideas of those differences.  
It is most certain, that the Mind of Man only looks for the relations of Things; first those which the Objects it considers may have with it; and in the next place, those they have towards one another. For the Mind of Man only seeks its Good and Truth. In order to find its Good, it carefully considers by Reason, and by Taste or Sensation, whether Objects have a Relation of agreement with it. To discover the Truth, it considers whether Objects have a Relation of Equality, or of Likeness one with another, or what is the exact measure of their Inequality. For as Good is only the good of the Mind, because it is convenient for it: So Truth is only Truth by the Relation of Equality, or of Likeness that is found between two or many things: Whether between two or many Objects, as between a Yard and Cloth; for it is true that this Cloth holds out a Yard, because there is an Equality between the Yard and the Cloth: Whether between Two, or many Ideas, as between the two Ideas of Three and Three, and that of Six; for it is true that three and three are Six, because there is an Equality between the two Ideas of Three and Three, and that of Six: Lastly, Whether between Ideas and Things, when the Ideas represent what the Things are: For when I say that there is a Sun, my proposition is True; because the Ideas I have of Existence, and of the Sun, represent that the Sun does really Exist. So that all the Action, and all the Attention of the Mind upon Objects, is only in order to endeavour to discover the Relations of them, since Men only apply themselves to Things, that they may discover the Truth or Goodness of them.  
But as we have already noted in the preceding Chapter, Attention Fatigues the Mind. It is soon tired with resisting the Impression of the Senses which removes it from its Object, and leads it to others, which the Love it has to its Body renders agreeable to it. It is extremely limited; and thus the differences which are between the Subjects which it Examines, being Infinite, or almost Infinite, it is not capable to distinguish them. The Mind therefore supposes Imaginary Resemblances, in which it observes no positive and real differences: The Ideas of Resemblance being more present to it, more familiar, and plainer than others. For it is plain, that Resemblance includes but one Relation; and that one Idea is sufficient to Judge that a Thousand Things are alike: Whereas in order to Judge without fear of being deceived, that a Thousand Objects are different among themselves, it is absolutely necessary to have a Thousand different Ideas present to the Mind.  
Therefore Men imagine that things of a different Nature are of the same Nature; and that all things of the same Species scarce differ from one another. They Judge that unequal things are Equal; that those that are Inconstant are Constant; and that those that are without Order and Proportion, are well ordered and proportioned. In a word, they often think that Things that are different in Nature, Quality, Extension, Duration, and Proportion, are alike in all those things. But that deserves to be explained more at large by some Examples, because it occasions many Errors.  
The Mind and Body, the Substance which Thinks, and that which is Extended, are two kinds of Being altogether different, and directly opposite: What is proper for the one, is improper for the other. Nevertheless, most Men reflecting but little on the Idea they have of Thought, and being continually affected with Bodies, look upon the Soul and Body as one and the same thing: Imagining a Resemblance between two things that are different. They fancy the Soul to be Material, that is, Extended throughout the whole Body, and Figured like the Body. They impute that to the Mind, which only suits with the Body.  
Moreover, Men being sensible of Pleasure, Pain, Odours, Tastes, etc. and their Body being more present to them than their Soul: That is, easily imagining their Body, and not being able to imagine their Soul, they attribute to it the faculties of Feeling, Imagining, and even sometimes of Conceiving; which can only belong to the Soul. But the following Examples will be more sensible.  
It is certain that all Natural Bodies, even those that are called Species, differ one from another; that Gold is not absolutely like Gold; and that one drop of Water is different from another. It is with all Bodies of the same Species, as it is with Faces. All Faces have Eyes, a Nose, a Mouth, they are all Faces, and men's Faces; and yet there never were two perfectly alike. So a piece of Gold has parts like unto another piece of Gold; and a drop of Water has undoubtedly a great Resemblance with another drop of Water: Nevertheless one may affirm, that it is impossible to give two drops of it, though taken out of the same River, perfectly alike. And that Philosophers inconsiderably suppose Essential Resemblances between Bodies of the same Species, or Resemblances which consist in Indivisibility; for the Essences of Things consist in an Indivisible, according to their False Opinions.  
The Reason of their falling into so gross an Error, is, because they will not consider those things carefully, upon which they nevertheless compose large Volumes. For as Men do not allow a perfect Resemblance between Faces, because they observe them nearly; and the habit of distinguishing them, makes us observe the least differences in them: So, if Philosophers would consider Nature with some Attention, they would discover a sufficient number of Causes of Diversity in those very things, which produce the same Sensations in us, and which for that reason we say, are of the same Species; nor would they so easily suppose Essential Resemblances. Blind Men would be to blame, in supposing an Essential Resemblance between Faces which should consist in Indivisibility, because they do not sensibly perceive the differences of them: Therefore Philosophers ought not to suppose such Resemblances in Bodies of the same Species, because they observe no difference in them, by the Sensations they have of them.  
The Inclination we have to suppose a Resemblance in Things, inclines us also to believe, that there is a determined number of Differences and Forms; and that those Forms are neither capable of more or less. We Fancy that all Bodies differ one from another, as it were by degrees: That those very Degrees observe certain Proportions among them: In a word, we Judge of Material Things as of Numbers.  
It is clear, the Reason of all this is, that the Mind loses itself in the Relations of Incommensurable Things, such as Infinite Differences are, which are not within Natural Bodies, and that it pleases itself when it imagines some Resemblance, or some Proportion among them; because than it represents several things to itself with a great deal of Ease. For as I have already said, one Idea is sufficient to Judge that several things are alike, and there must be several to Judge that they are different from one another. For instance, if the Number of Angels be known, and there are Ten Arch-Angels for every Angel; and Ten Thrones for every Archangel; and thus forward, keeping the same proportion from One to Ten, unto the last Order of Intelligences; the Mind may easily know the Number of those Blessed Spirits; nay, even Judge of them partly at one Prospect by a strong Attention, which delights it infinitely. And perhaps it is that which has induced some Persons to Judge thus of the Numbers of Celestial Spirits: Which is the Case of some Philosophers, who have put a Decuple proportion of Weight and of Lightness among the Elements, supposing Fire to be Ten times Lighter than Air, and so of the rest.  
When the Mind finds its self obliged to admit differences between Bodies by the different Sensations it has of them, as also by some other particular Reasons, it always puts the least it can. For that reason it is easily persuaded that the Essences of Things consist in an Indivisibile, and that they are like Numbers, as we said before; because one Idea is sufficient to Represent to us all the Bodies which are called of the same Species. For example, if you put a Glass of Water in an Hogshead of Wine, Philosophers will have it, that the Essence of the Wine still remains the same; and that the Water is converted into Wine. That as between Three and Four there can be no Number, since true Unity is Indivisible, so it is necessary that the Water be Converted into the Nature and Essence of the Wine, or that the Wine lose its Nature; That as all Quaternary Numbers are perfectly alike, so the Essence of the Water is perfectly alike in all Waters. That as the Number of Three differs Essentially from the Number of Two, and that it cannot have the same Proprieties as that has, so two Bodies of different Species differ Essentially, and in such a manner, that they have never the same Proprieties which proceed from Entity, and other like things. Nevertheless, if Men would consider the true Ideas of things with some Attention, they would soon discover, that all Bodies being Extended, their Nature or Essence has nothing resembling Numbers; and that it cannot consist in an Indivisible.  
Men do not only suppose Identity, Resemblance, or Proportion in the Nature, Number, and Essential Differences of Substances, they also suppose them in all things they see. Most Men Judge, that all the fixed Stars are fastened to the Heavens, as to a Roof at an Equal Distance from the Earth. Astronomers did pretend for a long while, that the Planets moved in perfect Circles; and they have invented a great number of them, as Concentriques, Excentriques, Epicycles, etc. to Explain the Phoenomena which contradicted their Opinions.  
It is true, that in these later Ages, the most Learned have Corrected the Errors of the Ancients, and believe that the Planets describe Ellipses by their Motion. But if they pretend that the Ellipses are Regular, as People are inclined to believe; because the Mind supposes Regularity, where it sees no Irregularity; they fall into an Error which is more difficult to be Corrected, because the Observations that can be made on the Course of the Planets, cannot be so Exact, and so Just, as to show the Irregularity of their Motions. Nothing but Natural Philosophy can Correct that Error; for it is infinitely less remarkable, than that which we find in the System of perfect Circles.  
But something particular has happened about the Distance and Motion of the Planets. For Astronomers not having been able to find an Arithmetical or Geometrical Proportion in the same, that being absolutely repugnant to Observations some imagined, that they observed a kind of Proportion, which is called Harmonical in their Distances and Motions. From thence it is that an 
* Riccioli Vol.  Astronomer of this Age, in his New Almageste, gins the Section which is Entitled, De Systemate Mundi Harmonico, with these words:  
There is no Astronomer, 
Neme est paulo eruditior in Astronomicis, qui Coelorum ordinem contemplatus non agnoscat harmoniam quamdam in Planetarum intervallis, & motibus  though never so little acquainted in what relates to Astronomy, but acknowledges a kind of Harmony in the Motions and Intervals of Planets, if he considers the Order of the Heavens Attentively.  
Nor is this the only Author that is of this Opinion: For Observations have made him sufficiently sensible of the Extravagancies of that Imaginary Harmony, which has nevertheless been admired by several Ancient and Modern Authors, whose Opinions Father Riccioli Relates and Refutes. Moreover, some affirm Pythagoras, and his Followers, to have believed that the Heavens, by their Regular Motions, made a most Wonderful Concert; which Men do not hear, because they are used to it; just like those that Inhabit near the Fall of the Waters of Nile, do not hear the Noise of it. But I only relate that particular Opinion of the Harmonical Proportion of the Distances and Motions of the Planets, to show that the Mind is delighted with Proportions, and that it often Fancies them where they are not.  
The Mind also supposes Uniformity in the duration of things, and imagines they are not liable to Change and Instability, when it is not in some measure forced by the Relation of the Senses, to Judge otherwise.  
All Material Things being Extended are capable of Division, and consequently of Corruption: Those who reflect on the Nature of Bodies, discover Visibly that they are Corruptible. Yet there has been a great number of Philosophers who fancied that the Heavens though Material, were Incorruptible.  
The Heavens are at too great a Distance from us, to discover the Revolutions that happen there; and 'tis very rare that any happen there so great, as to be discovered here. That alone has been sufficient to persuade many that they were really Incorruptible. And which has the more Confirmed their Opinion, is, that they attribute to the Contrariety of Qualities, the Corruption to which Sublunary Bodies are subject. For as they have never been in the Heavens to see what passes there, so they have had no Experience that this Contrariety of Qualities is there; which has induced them to believe that there is really no such thing there. Therefore they have concluded that the Heavens were free from Corruption; because that which Corrupts all Bodies here below, according to their Opinion, is not above.  
It is Visible that this Argument has no Solidity; for I cannot see, why there should be no other Cause of Corruption, than those Contrarieties of Qualities which they imagine; nor upon what Foundation they can affirm, That there is neither Heat, nor Cold, nor Drought, nor Moisture in the Heavens; That the Sun is not Hot, and that Saturn is not Cold.  
There is some appearance of Reason to say, that very hard Stones, Glass, and other Bodies of that Nature do not Corrupt, since we see they subsist long in the same State; and though we are near enough to see the Alterations that should happen to them. But being at so great a distance as we are from the Heavens, it is directly contrary to Reason to conclude, that they do not Corrupt, because we feel no contrary Qualities in them, nor see that they Corrupt. Nevertheless, some not only say that they Corrupt not, but they affirm absolutely, that they are Unalterable and Incorruptible. And the Peripatetics want but little of saying, that the Celestial Bodies are so many Divinities; as Aristotle their Master did believe of them.  
The Beauty of the Universe does not consist in the Incorruptibility of its Parts, but in the Variety that is found in them: And this great Work of the World would not be so admirable without that Vicissitude of things which we observe in it. Matter infinitely Extended, without Motion, and consequently without Form and Corruption, would indeed discover the Infinite Power of its Author; but it would give no Idea of his Wisdom. This is the reason that all Corporeal Things are Corruptible; and that there is no Body, but what receives some Change, which altars and Corrupts it in Time. God Forms even in the Bosom of Stones and Glass, Animals more perfect and admirable than all the Works of Men. Those Bodies though very hard and dry, are Corrupted in time: The Air and Sun to which they are exposed, altar some of their Parts; and some Worms Feed upon them, as Experience has showed.  
There is no other difference between those Bodies that are very hard and dry, and others, unless it be that they are composed of very gross and solid Parts; and consequently less capable of being agitated and separated one from another, by the Motion of those that hit against them; for which reason they are looked upon as Incorruptible: Nevertheless, they are not so by their Nature, as Time, Experience, and Reason sufficiently show us.  
But as for the Heavens, they are Composed of the most Fluid and subtle Matter, and particularly the Sun: And he is so far from being void of Heat and Incorruptible, as Aristotle's followers say, that on the contrary, he is the hottest of all Bodies, and the most liable to Change. It is he that Heats, Moves, and Changes all things: For it is he who produces by his Action, which is nothing but his Heat, or the Motion of his Parts, all the Novelties we see in the Change of Seasons. Reason demonstrates these things: But though some may contradict Reason, yet no Body can resist Experience. For since some have discovered in the Sun by means of Telescopes, Spots as large as the whole Earth, which have been formed in it, and have been dissipated in a little time: It is no longer to be denied, but that he is more subject to Change than the Earth we inhabit.  
All Bodies are therefore in a continual Motion and Change, and particularly those that are the most Fluid, as Fire, Air and Water; next the parts of Living Bodies, as Flesh, and even the Bones, and lastly, those that are the most solid: The Mind ought not to suppose a kind of Immutability in things, because it sees no Corruption or Alteration in them; for it is not a proof that a thing is always like unto itself, because no difference is observed in it; or that things are not, because we have no Idea or Knowledge of them.   

CHAP. XI.  
Examples of some Errors of Morality which depend on the same Principle.  
THe Faculty of the Mind imagining and supposing Resemblances wherever it perceives no Visible Differences, also engages most Men into Errors, which are yet more dangerous in Points of Morality. Here are some Examples of them.  
A French Man meets an English Man, or an Italian: That Stranger has peculiar Humours: He has a Niceness of Mind; or if you please, he is Haughty and Troublesome. This will at first induce this Frenchman to Judge, that all Englishmen, or Italians, have the same Character of Mind with the Person they have conversed with. He will Praise, or Blame them all in General: And if he meets with any other, he will fancy at first that he is like unto him he has already seen; and therefore will suffer himself to be inclined to some Affection or secret Aversion towards him. In a word, he will Judge of all the Individuals of those Nations by this famous proof, that he has seen one or many that had certain Qualifications of Mind: Because he knew not whether the rest were different, supposing them all alike.  
A Religious of some Order commits a fault: This is a sufficient Reason for those who know it to Condemn all the Individuals of that Order indifferently. They all wear the same Habit, and have the same Name, they are alike in that: This is enough for the Common Sort of Men to Fancy that they are all alike. They suppose that they are all alike, because not being able to search into their Hearts, they cannot see positively whether they differ.  
Calumuiators, who study how to Blast the Reputation of their Enemies, commonly make use of this, and Experience teaches us that it succeeds for the most part. And indeed it is very suitable to the Capacity of the Common Sort of Mankind. For it is not difficult to find in numerous Communities, though never so Holy, some irregular Persons, or such as have Ill Sentiments; since in the Company of the Apostles, of which Jesus Christ himself was the Head, there was a Thief, a Traitor, an Hypocrite; in a word, a Judas.  
The Jews without doubt, would have been very much to blame, to pass an Ill Judgement against the most Holy Society that ever was, because of the Avarice and Fault of Judas; and if they had Condemned them all in their Hearts, because they suffered that Ill Man among them; and Jesus Christ himself did not punish him, though he was sensible of his Crimes.  
Therefore it is a manifest Fault against Reason, and Breach of Charity to pretend, That a Community is in some Error, because some of their Members were so, although the Heads should dissemble it, or were the promoters of it themselves. It is true, that when all the Members will defend an Error, or Fault of their Brother, the whole Community may be thought Guilty; but that seldom or never happens; for it seems morally impossible that all the Members of an Order should have the same Sentiments.  
Men therefore should never conclude thus from Particulars to Generals; but they cannot Judge simply of what they see, they always fly out into Excess. A Religious of such an Order is a Great Man, an Honest Man; they conclude that all the Order is composed of Great Men, of Good Men. Likewise a Religious of an Order has Ill Sentiments: Therefore all that Order is Corrupted, and has Ill Sentiments. But these last Judgements are far more dangerous than the first; because it is a Duty to Judge well of our Neighbours, and the Malignity of Man occasions that Ill Judgements, and Discourses held against the Reputation of others, make a stronger Impression upon the Mind than advantageous Judgements and Discourses do.  
When a Worldly Man, who iudulges his Passions, fixes strongly upon his Opinion, and pretends in the height of his Inclination, that he is in the right to indulge it, Men Judge reasonably that he is obstinate, and he owns it himself as soon as his Passion is over. So when a Pious Person, who is persuaded of what he says, and who has discovered the Truth of Religion, and the Vanity of Worldly Things, endeavours according to that Knowledge to reform the Vices of others, and reprehends them with some Zeal, Men of the World also take him to be an obstinate Man; and therefore they conclude that Devout Men are obstinate. They Judge moreover, that Good Men are far more obstinate than Vain, Ill Men; because the latter only defending their Ill Opinions according to the different Motions of the Blood, and Passions, they cannot continue long in their Sentiments: They come to themselves again. Whereas persons of Piety remain steady; because their Foundation is unalterable, and does not depend on a thing so inconstant as the Circulation of the Blood.  
Therefore ordinary Men conclude, that Pious Men are obstinate as well as the Vicious: Because they are as Passionate for Truth and Virtue, as Ill Men are for Vice and Falshood. Both speak almost in the same manner, to maintain their Sentiments; they are alike in that, though they differ in the main. This is sufficient for those who do not weigh the difference of Reasons, to Judge that they are alike in all things, because they are alike in that manner, which every Body is capable to Judge of.  
Devout Persons are not then obstinate, they are only steady, as they ought to be; But the Vicious and Libertines are always obstinate, though they should not persist one Hour in their Sentiments: Because Men are only obstinate when they defend a False Opinion, although they should only defend it a little while.  
This is the Case of some Philosophers, who have maintained Chimerical Opinions, which they lay aside at last. They would have those who defend constant Truths, whose certainty they see evidently, to part with them as bare Opinions, as they have done with those they had foolishly been prejudiced with. And because it is difficult to have a deference for them in prejudice of Truth; as also because the Love we have Naturally for it, inclines us to defend it earnestly, they Judge us to be obstinate.  
Those Men are to blame to defend their Chimeras obstinately; but the others are in the right to defend Truth with Vigour and Steddiness of Mind. The manner of both is the same, but their Sentiments are different; and it is that difference of Sentiment, which makes the one constant, and the others obstinate.     

THE CONCLUSION OF THE Three First Books.  
IN the beginning of this Book I have distinguished two Parts in the Simple and Indivisible Being of the Soul, one purely Passive, and the other both Passive and Active. The first is the Mind or Understanding, the second is the Will. I have attributed three Faculties to the Mind, because it receives its Modifications and Ideas from the Author of Nature after three different ways.  
I have called it Sense, When it receives from God its Ideas that are confounded with Sensations, viz. Sensible Ideas occasioned by certain Motions which pass in the Organs of its Senses at the Presence of Objects.  
I have called it Imagination and Memory, When it receives from God Ideas that are confounded with Images, which are a kind of Weak and Languishing Sensations that the Mind receives only through some Traces that are produced, or are stirred up in the Brain by the Course of the Spirits.  
Lastly, I have called it Pure Mind or Understanding, when it receives from God pure Ideas of Truth, without any mixture of Sensations and Images with it. Not by the Union it hath with the Body, but through that it hath with the Word or Wisdom of God; not because it is in the Material and Sensible World, but because it subsists in the Immaterial and Intelligible one: Not to know Mutable things fit for the Preservation of the Life of the Body, but to discover unchangeable Truths which preserve the Life of the Mind.  
I have shown in the first and second Book, that our Senses and Imaginations are very useful to discover to us the Relation betwixt External Bodies and our own; that all the Ideas which the Mind receives through the Body, are for the use of the Body; that it is impossible clearly to discover any Truth whatsoever by the Ideas of our Senses and Imaginations; that those confused Ideas serve only to engage us to our Body, and through our Body to all Sensible things: And lastly, That if we would avoid Error, we ought not to trust to them. I also concluded it Morally Impossible, to know by the pure Ideas of the Mind, the Relations that are betwixt External Bodies and ours: That we must not argue according to these Ideas, to know if an Apple or a Pear are good to eat, but we must judge it by our Taste. And although we may make use of our Minds, to discover after some confused manner, the Relations that are betwixt External Bodies and our own; yet it is always the surest way to make use of our Senses. I will give another Example, for we cannot impress too much on the Mind, things that are so Essential and Necessary.  
Supposing I would examine which is most Advantageous, to be Religious or Rich; if I open the Eyes of my Body, Justice appears a Chimaera, I see no Attractives in it; I see the Just are Miserable, Abandoned, Persecuted, Defenceless, and without Consolation; for he that Comforts and Upholds them, does not appear to my Eyes; and indeed I do not see of what use Justice or Virtue can be; but if I turn my Eyes upon Riches, I soon perceive their Lustre, and am dazzled with it: Power, Grandeur, Pleasures, and all Sensible Goods, accompany Riches; I cannot doubt but Riches are necessary to make one Happy. So likewise if I make use of my Ears, I hear that all Men esteem Riches; they speak of nothing but the ways of getting them; and they always Praise and Honour those that possess them. These two Senses, and all the rest tell me, That to be Happy I must be Rich: And if I shut my Eyes and Ears, and ask my Imagination, it continually represents to me what my Eyes have seen, and my Ears heard, as to the Advantage of Riches; but yet it will represent these things to me quite after another manner than my Senses did, for the Imagination always enlarges the Ideas of those things that have any relation to the Body, or which we Love. If I will but permit it, my Imagination will soon conduct me to an enchanted Palace, like those of which Poets and Romances have made such Magnificent Descriptions of; and there I shall see such Beauties, which would be useless for me to describe: This would convince me, that the God of Riches, who inhabits it, is only capable of making me Happy: This is what my Body is able to persuade me to, for it speaks only for itself, it is necessary for its Good, that the Imagination should stoop before the Grandeur and Splendour of Riches: But if I consider that the Body is infinitely below the Mind, that it cannot be Master of it, that it cannot instruct it in the Truth, nor produce Light in it; and that recollecting myself, I ask myself; or rather (since I am neither my own Master, nor Light) if I draw near to God, and, in the Silence of my Senses and Passions, ask him whether I ought to prefer Riches to Virtue, or Virtue to Riches, I shall hear a clear and distinct Answer of what I ought to do; an Eternal Answer which has always been given, is now given, and will always be given; an Answer which it is not necessary I should explain, because all the World knows it; either those who read this Book, or those who read it not; which is neither Greek, Latin, French, or Germane, and which is conceived by all Nations. Lastly, An Answer which Comforts the Just in their Poverty, and which disturbs Sinners in the midst of their Riches: I shall hear this Answer and be convinced of it: I shall laugh at the Fancies of my Imagination, and the Illusion of my Senses. The Inward Man, which is in me, will deride the Animal and Earthly one which I carry about me. Lastly, The New Man shall increase, and the Old Man shall be destroyed, provided I always obey the Voice of him who speaks so clearly to me in the most Secret Recesses of my Reason; and who having made himself Sensible to condescend to my Weakness and Infirmity, and to give me Life by those very means by which he gave me Death, speaks yet to me through my Senses, after a very strong, lively and familiar manner, I mean, by the preaching of his Gospel. And if I interrogate him in all the Metaphysical, Natural and pure Philosophical Questions, as well as those which regard the Regulation of Manners, I shall always have a Faithful Master which will never deceive me. I shall not only be a Christian but a Philosopher: I shall make a good Judgement of things; and in a word, I shall follow both by Grace and Nature, the way which will guide me to all the Perfection I am capable of.  
It must then be concluded, from what I have said, That to make the best use that we can of the Faculties of our Soul, our Senses, Imagination, and Mind, we must only apply them to those things for which they have been given us. We ought carefully to distinguish our Sensations and Imaginations from our pure Ideas; and judge according to our Sensations and Imaginations, of the relation that External Bodies have to ours, without making use of them to discover Truths, which they always confound: And we must make use of the pure Ideas of the Mind to discover Truths, without ever attempting to judge by them of the relation that External Bodies have to ours; because these Ideas never have Extension enough to represent them perfectly to us.  
It is impossible that Men should have a sufficient Knowledge of all the Figures and Motions of the little Particles of their Body and Blood, and of those of a certain Fruit in a certain time of their Sickness, to be able to discover the relation of Agreement betwixt this Fruit and their Body, and that if they should eat of it, it would recover them. Thus our Senses alone are more useful to the Preservation of our Health, than the Rules of Experimental Physic, and Experimental Physic than the Theoretic. But Experimental Physic, which allows much to Experience, and still more to the Senses, is the best, because all these things ought to be joined together.  
We may then use our Reason in all things, and 'tis the Privilege which it has above the Senses and Imagination, which are limited to Sensible Things; but we ought to use it with Circumspection; for though it is the chief part of ourselves, it often happens that we are deceived when we permit it to go too far; because it cannot act sufficiently without wearying itself; I mean it cannot know sufficiently how to make a good Judgement, and yet it will not forbear Judging.   

A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH.  
BOOK iv Of the Inclinations and Natural Motions of the Mind.  

CHAP. I.  
I. It's necessary the Mind have Inclinations, as well as the Body Motions.  
II. God acts the Humane Mind only for himself.  
III. men's Minds are only inclined to Particular Good, through the Motion they have to Good in General.  
iv The Origine of the Chief Natural Inclinations, which will make up the Division of this Fourth Book.  
IT would not be necessary to Treat of Natural Inclinations, as we are going to do in this Fourth Book; nor of the Passions, as we shall do in the following; in order to discover the Causes of the Errors of Mankind, if the Understanding did not depend on the Will in the Perception of Objects: But whereas it is the Will that directs it, which makes it resolve, and applies it to some Objects rather than others; it is absolutely necessary to apprehend its Inclinations well, to penetrate into the Causes of the Errors to which we are liable.  
If God, 
I. It's necessary the Mind have Inclinations, as well as the Body Notions.  when he Created this World, had produced Matter infinitely extended, without giving it any Motion, there would have been no difference in Bodies. All this visible World would still have been a mere Mass of Matter, or of Extension, which indeed might serve to discover the Grandeur and Power of its Author; but there would not be that Succession of Forms, and that Variety of Bodies, which compose all the Beauty of the Universe, and which incline men's Minds to admire the Infinite Wisdom of the Governor thereof.  
Therefore I am of Opinion, That the Inclinations of the Mind are in the Spiritual World, what Motion is in the Material World; and that if the Mind were without Inclinations, or if it never had any Desire, we should not meet with that Variety in the Order of Spiritual Things; which not only makes the World admire the Profoundness of the Wisdom of God, approve the Variety of Material Objects; but also his Mercy, his Justice, his Goodness, and generally all his other Attributes. Thus than the Difference of Inclinations produces in the Mind, an Effect much like unto that which the Difference of Motions produces in the Body; and the Inclinations of men's Minds, and the Motions of Bodies together, constitute all the Beauty of Created Being's. Thus all Spirits must have some Inclinations, as well as Bodies have different Motions. But let us endeavour to discover what Inclinations they ought to have.  
Were not our Nature Corrupted, it would not be necessary to seek out by Reason, as we are going to do, what the Natural Inclinations of Created Spirits ought to be: It would be sufficient, in order thereunto, to consult ourselves, and we should discover, by the Inward Sentiments we have of what passes within us, all the Inclinations we ought Naturally to have. But, whereas we know by Faith, that Sin has destroyed the Order of Nature, and that Reason informs us, that our Inclinations are Irregular, as it will appear in the Sequel, we are obliged to go another way to work: Since we cannot trust to what we feel, we are obliged to explain things in a more Sublime Manner; but which, without doubt, will seem to have but little Solidity in it, to those who only esteem what relates to the Senses.  
It is an undeniable Truth, 
II. The Principal End of the Actions of God is himself, and he only acts men's Minds for himself.  that God can have no other Principal End for his Operations but himself; and that he may have several Ends less Principal, which tend all towards the Preservation of the Being's which he has created. He can have no Principal End but himself, because he cannot Err; nor place his Final End in Being's which are not Perfect. But he may propose as a less Principal End the Preservation of Created Being's; because as they all participate of his Goodness, they are necessarily Good, and even very Good according to Scripture, Valde bona. Therefore God Loves them, and moreover it is his Love which preserves them; for all Being's only subsist because God Loves them. Diligis omnia quae sunt, says the Wise Man, Nihil odisli eorum quae fecisti: Nec enim odiens aliquid constituisti & fecisti. Quomodo autem posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu voluisses, aut quod à to vocatum non esset conserveretur. In effect it is not possible to conceive, that things which do not please a Being which is infinitely Perfect and Powerful, should subsist, since all things only subsist by his Will. Therefore God wills his Glory as his principal End, and the Preservation of his Creatures for his Glory.  
The Natural Inclinations of Humane Minds, being certainly continual Impressions of the Will of him that has created them, and does preserve them: It is, in my Opinion, necessary that those Inclinations should be entirely like unto those of their Creator and Preserver. Therefore Naturally they can have no principal End but his Glory; nor no other Second End but their own Preservation and that of others; but always in relation to him from whom they have their Being. For it seems undeniable to me, that since God cannot desire that the Will he has created should Love an Inferior Good more than a Greater, that is, That it should Love that which is less Lovely, more than that which is more Lovely: He can create nothing without inclining it towards himself, or commanding it to Love him above all things; though he may create it Free, and with a Power to withdraw and to stray from him.  
Whereas there is properly but one Love in God, 
III. Human Minds are merely prone to particular Good, through the Tendency they have to Good in General.  which is the Love of himself: And that God can Love nothing but by that Love, since he can Love nothing but in relation to himself: So God likewise Imprints but one Love in us, which is the Love of Good in General; and we can Love nothing but by that Love, since we can Love nothing but what is, or seems to be Good. It is the Love of Good in General, which is the Principle of our particular Affections, since that Love really is nothing but our Will; For as I have said already in another place, The Will is nothing but the continual Impression of the Author of Nature, which inclines the Mind of Man towards Good in General. Certainly we must not imagine that this Power we have of Loving proceeds from us, or is at our Disposition. Nothing but the Power of not Loving well, or rather of misplacing our Affections, is at our own Disposition; by reason that being Free, we may apply, and actually do apply to particular Objects, and consequently to false Objects, the Good Love which God does not cease to imprint in us, while he does not cease to preserve us.  
But not only our Will, or our Love for Good in General, proceeds from God; but Inclinations for particular Goods which are common to all Men, though not equally strong in all Men, as our Inclination for the Preservation of our Being, and of those that are united to us by Nature, are also Impressions of the Will of God upon us; for in this place I give promiscuously the Name of Natural Inclinations to all the Impressions of the Author of Nature, which are common to all Minds.  
I said but even now, that God loved his Creatures, 
iv The Source of the Chief Natural Inclinations, which will make up the Division of this fourth Book.  and also that it was his Love which gave them to exist, and did preserve their Being: Therefore as God continually imprints in us a Love like unto his, since it is his Will which makes and which regulates ours; he likewise gives us all those Natural Inclinations which are not at our Choice, and which incline us of necessity to the Preservation of our Being, and of those we live with.  
For, though Sin has Corrupted all things, it has not destroyed them. Although our Natural Inclinations do not always propose God as their End by the Free Choice of our Will, God is always their Object in the Institution of Nature: For God who produces and preserves them in us, only produces and preserves them for himself. All Sinners tend towards God by the Impression they receive from God, though they withdraw from him by the Error and Distraction of their Mind. They love Good, for we can never love otherwise, since God makes us Love; but they Love ill Objects, Ill only, because God, who gives even Sinners the Power of Loving, forbids their Loving them, because since the Fall they withdraw their Affection from him. For Men imagining that Creatures occasion in them the Pleasure they enjoy upon their account, incline their Affections violently towards the Body, and fall into an absolute Forgetfulness of God, who does not appear before their Eyes.  
We have still then the same Natural Inclinations, or the same Impressions of the Author of Nature which Adam had before the Fall. We have even the same Inclinations which the Blessed have in Heaven, for God neither Creates nor Preserves any Creatures, without giving them a Love like unto his. He Loves himself, he Loves us, he Loves all his Creatures: Therefore he Inclines all Humane Minds to Love him, to Love themselves, and to Love all Creatures.  
But were as all our Inclinations are only Impressions of the Author of Nature, which incline us to Love him and all things for his sake; they cannot be right unless we love God with all our Power, and all things for his sake, by the Free Choice of our Will: For we cannot, without Injustice, abuse the Love God gives us for himself, by applying it to any thing but himself, or which has no relation to himself.  
Thus we are now sensible, not only what our Natural Inclinations are, but also what they ought to be; in order to be well regulated, and according to the Institution of their Author. For all the Disorder of our Inclinations consists, in that we place our final End in ourselves; and that instead of doing all things in relation to God, we do all things in relation to ourselves.  
We have then, in the first place, an Inclination for good in General, which is the Principle of all our Natural Inclinations, of all our Passions, and of all the Free Actions of our Will.  
Secondly, We have an Inclination for the Preservation of our Being, and of our Happiness.  
Thirdly, We have all an Inclination for the other Creatures, when they are of use to us, or to those we Love. Moreover, we have several other particular Inclinations which depend on these; but we shall speak of them elsewhere. We only design in this Fourth Book, to refer the Errors of our Inclinations to these three Heads, viz. To the Inclination we have to Good in General, To Self-Love, And to the Love of our Neighbour.   

CHAP. II.  
I. The Inclination for Good in General, is the Principle of the Disquiet of our Will.  
II. And consequently of our Negligence and Ignorance.  
III. First Example, Morality, little known to many Men.  
iv Second Example, The Immortality of the Soul, disputed by some Men.  
V That our Ignorance is exceeding great in respect of abstracted things, or such as have but little Relation to us.  
THat vast Capacity which the Will has for all Good in General, 
I. The Inclination for Good in General, is the Principle of the Disquiet of our Will.  because it is only formed by a Good which includes all Good in itself, cannot be satisfied by all the things which the Mind represents to it; and yet that continual Motion which God imprints in it towards Good cannot stand still. This Motion never ceasing, puts the Mind, of necessity, into a continual Agitation. The Will which seeks what it desires, obliges the Mind to represent all sorts of Objects to itself. The Mind accordingly does it, but the Soul does not relish them; or if it does, is not satisfied with them. The Soul does not relish them, by reason that often the Perception of the Mind is not accompanied with Pleasure; for it is through Pleasure that the Soul relishes its Good: And the Soul is not satisfied with it, by reason that nothing can stop the Motion of the Soul but him that gives it. Whatever the Mind represents to itself as its Good, is Finite; and whatever is Finite, may withdraw our Love for a while, but it cannot fix it. When the Mind considers very new and uncommon Objects, or that have some relation to Infinity, the Will permits the Mind to examine them a while with some Attention, in hopes of finding what it is in search of, because whatever appears Infinite, bears the Character of its real Good; but in time it grows weary of it, as well as of the rest. Therefore the Will is always disquieted, because it is inclined to seek for that which it can never find, and which it always hopes to find: It Loves whatever is Great and Extraordinary, and resembles Infinity; for not having found its real Good in Common and Familiar things, it hopes to find it in such as are unknown to it. We will demonstrate in this Chapter, that the Disquiet of our Wills is one of the principal Causes of our Ignorance, and of the Errors into which we fall in many things: And in the two following we will explain what it is that produces in us the Inclination we have for every thing that has something Great or Extraordinary in it.  
It is something evident by what has been said, 
II. And consequently of our Negligence and Ignorance.  First, That the Will seldom makes use of the Understanding, unless on Objects that have some Relation to us, and that it very much neglects all others; for being ever earnestly desirous of Felicity, by the Impression of Nature, it only turns the Understanding towards such things as seem to be of use to us, and which do in some measure please us.  
Secondly, That the Will does not permit the Understanding to apply itself long even to such things as it is delighted with: Because, as we have already said, all things that are created may indeed please us for a while, but we are soon disgusted with them; and then our Mind lays them by, to seek for that which can satisfy it elsewhere.  
Thirdly, That the Will is excited thus to make the Mind run from Object to Object, because it never ceases to represent consusedly to it, or as at a distance, that which includes all Being's in itself, as we have declared in the Third Book. For the Will being desirous, as it were, to draw its real Good near to itself, to be pleased with it, and to receive from it the Motion which animates it, it excites the Understanding to represent that Good in some measure. But than it is no longer the General, the Universal, the Infinitely Perfect Being which the Mind perceives; it is something that is Bounded and Imperfect, which not being able to stop the Motion of the Will, nor to please it long, it forsakes it to turn after some other Object.  
And whereas the Attention and Application of the Mind are absolutely necessary to discover abstracted Truths, it is evident that the common sort of Mankind must live in a gross Ignorance, in respect even of such things as have some relation to them; and that it is impossible to express their Blindness in what relates to abstracted Truths, and which have no sensible relation to them. But we must endeavour to prove these things by Examples.  
Amongst all Sciences Morality has most relation to us: It teaches us all our Duty towards God, 
III. First Example, Morality little known among many Men.  towards our Prince, towards our Friends and Relations, and generally towards all that are about us. Moreover it teaches us the way to be Eternally Happy; and all Men lie under an Essential Obligation, or rather Indispensible Necessity, to apply themselves wholly to it: And yet though there have been Men on Earth these Six Thousand Years, that Science is still very Imperfect.  
That part of Morality which relates to our Duty towards God, and which undoubtedly is the chief, since it relates to Eternity, has hardly been known by the most Learned; and even in our days we find Men of Sense who are unacquainted with it; and yet it is the easiest part of Morality. For in the first place, Where lies the Difficulty to discover that there is a God? Whatever God has made proves it: Whatever Men or Beasts do, proves it: Whatever we think, whatever we see, whatever we feel, proves it. In a word, There is nothing but what proves the Existence of God, or that may prove it to attentive Minds, who apply themselves seriously to the Knowledge of the Author of all Things.  
Secondly, It is evident, that there is a Necessity to follow the Commands of God to be Happy; for as he is Powerful and Just, we cannot disobey him without being Punished, nor obey him without being Rewarded. But what is it he exacts from us? That we should Love him; That our Mind should be taken up with him; That our Hearts should be turned towards him. For wherefore has he Created our Minds? Certainly he can do nothing but for himself: Therefore he has made us for himself only; and we are Indispensibly obliged not to apply elsewhere the Impression of that Love which he continually preserves in us, in order that we should continually Love him.  
These Truths are easily discovered with little Application: And yet this only Principle of Morality, which teaches us, that to be Virtuous and Happy, it is absolutely necessary to Love God above all Things and in all Things, is the Foundation of all Christian Morality. Neither does it require an extraordinary Application of Mind, to draw from thence all the Consequences we stand in need of, to settle the general Rules of our Conduct; though there are but very few that do it; and Men continually dispute upon Questions of Morality, which are the Immediate and Necessary Consequences of a Principle which is so evident as that is.  
The Professors of Geometry daily makes new Discoveries, but if they do not bring it to a greater Perfection, it is because they have already drawn the most Useful and Necessary Consequences out of their Principles. But most Men seem Incapable of concluding any thing out of the first Principle of Morality. All their Ideas vanish, and are dissipated as soon as they begin to think upon it; because they will not do it as they should do; and they will not do it, because they do not relish it, or because they are too soon tired with it after their having relished it. That Principle is abstracted, Metaphysical, merely Intelligible; it is not obvious, it is not to be imagined; and therefore it does not appear solid to Carnal Minds, or to Minds that only see with the Eyes. Nothing is found in that Principle capable of putting a stop to the Disquiets of their Will, and afterwards to fix the Eyes of their Mind to consider it with some Attention. What Hopes then of their seeing it as they should do, of their apprehending it rightly, and of their concluding directly from thence what they should Conclude?  
If Men had but an Imperfect Apprehension of that Proposition of Geometry: That the sides of Triangles that are alike, are proportionable one to another; certainly they would not be great Geometricians. But if besides the Confused and Imperfect Idea of that Fundamental Proposition of Geometry, they also had some Interest to wish, that the sides of Triangles that are alike were not proportionable; and that false Geometry were as convenient for their Perverse Inclinations as false Morality, they might very well be guilty of Paralogisms as absurd in Geometry as in Morality, because their Errors would please them, and that Truth would only Puzzle, Disturb and Vex them.  
Therefore we need not wonder at the Blindness of those that lived in the former Ages, whilst Idolatry reigned in the World, or of those that live in our Days, and that do not as yet enjoy the Benefit of the Light of the Gospel. It was necessary for Divine Wisdom to make itself sensible at last, to instruct such Men as only consult their Senses. Truth had spoken to their Minds for above the space of Four thousand Years, but whereas they never looked Inwardly they did not understand it: It was necessary that it should speak to their Ears. The Light which directs all Men, did shine in their Darkness, without being able to expel it; they could not so much as look upon it. It was necessary that the Intelligible Light should put on a Veil to make itself visible: And that the Word should  itself with Flesh; and that the Wisdom of God which lay concealed, and was inaccessible to Carnal Men, should instruct them in a Carnal way, Carnaliter, says St. Bernard. The Majority of Men, 
Serm. 39 De Natali Domini.  and particularly the Poor (which are the most worthy Objects of the Mercy and Providence of the Creator,) who are obliged to work for their daily Bread, are very Ignorant and Stupid, They only Hear because they have Ears, and they only see because they have Eyes. They are incapable of looking Inwardly by an Effort of Mind, there to Interrogate Truth in the Silence of their Senses and Passions. They cannot apply themselves to Truth, by reason that they cannot relish it: Moreover they seldom think of applying themselves to it, because Men seldom have any Thoughts of applying themselves to things that do not concern them. Their unquiet and unsettled Will turns their Minds continually towards all the Objects that Please and Divert them by their Variety: For the Multiplicity and Diversity of Sensible Goods, hinder Men from discovering the Vanity of them, and still keep them in hopes of finding the real Good they desire in them.  
Thus though the Councils which Jesus Christ as Man, as the way, as the Author of our Faith, gives us in the Gospel, are much more suitable to the Weakness of our Understanding, than those which the same Jesus Christ, as Eternal Wisdom, as Inward Truth, as Intelligible Light Inspires into the most secret Recesses of our Reason: Though Jesus Christ renders those Councils Agreeable by his Grace, Sensible by his Example, Convincing by his Miracles, yet Men are so stupid, and so incapable of Reflection, even upon things which are absolutely Necessary for them to know well, that they hardly ever think on them as they ought. Few Men observe the Beauty of the Gospel; Few Men conceive the Solidity and Necessity of the Councils of Jesus Christ; Few Meditate upon them; Few esteem them as their Necessary Food, or fortify themselves with them; the Continual Agitation of the Will, which is in search of the Taste of Good, 
iv Second Example, The Immortality of the Soul, disputed by some Persons.  not permitting the Mind to be intent upon Truths which seem to deprive it thereof. Take another Example.  
It concerns the Impious highly to make a very strict enquiry, whether their Soul is Mortal, as they apprehend it, or whether it is Immortal, as Faith and Reason tells us. It is a thing of the utmost Consequence for them to know; their Eternity is concerned in it, and the very Quiet of their Mind depends upon it. Why is it then they do not know it, or that they remain in doubt, unless it be that they are not capable of the least serious Application; and that their unsedate and corrupted Will does not allow their Mind to look steadfastly on the Reasons which are contrary to these Opinions, which they desire should be true? For in fine, is it so difficult a task to distinguish the difference there is between the Soul and the Body, between what thinks, and what is extended? Does it require so great an Attention of Mind to discover that a Thought is neither Round nor Square: That Extent is only capable of different Figures and different Motions, and not of Thought and Reasoning: And consequently, that what Thinks, and what is Extended, are two Being's directly opposite to one another? Yet that alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the Soul is Immortal, and that it cannot Perish, even though the Body were Annihilated.  
When a Substance perishes, it is true that the Modes or Manners of Existence of that Substance perish with it. If a piece of Wax were annihilated, it is certain that the Forms of that Wax should also be annihilated with it; because the Roundness for Example of the Wax, is in Effect nothing but the Wax itself of such a Shape, and therefore it cannot subsist without the Wax. But though God should destroy all the Wax in the World, it would not therefore follow, that any other Substance, nor that the Modes of any other Substance were Annihilated. All the Stones for example, would subsist with all their Modes; because Stones are Substances or Being's, and not Modifications of the Wax.  
In like manner, though God should Annihilate one half of some Bodies, it would not follow, that the other half should be Annihilated. This last half is United with the other, but it is not one with it. Thus one half being Annihilated, it follows indeed according to Reason, that the other half has no longer any relation to it; but it does not follow that it ceases to be; because as its Being is different, it cannot be Annihilated by the Annihilation of the other. Therefore it is clear, that the Thought not being the Modification of Extension, our Soul is not Annihilated, though we should suppose that the Body were Annihilated by Death.  
But there is no reason to believe, that even the Body is Annihilated when it is destroyed. The parts which Compose it are dissipated into Vapours, and reduced to Powder: They are no longer seen, nor are they any longer known; this is true, but it is no reason to conclude, that they are no longer in Being; for the Mind perceives them still. Dividing a Grain of Mustard into Two, into Four, or Twenty parts, it would be Annihilated to our sight, because it would be no longer seen: But it would not be Annihilated in itself, nor yet to the Mind; for the Mind would see it, though it were divided into a Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand Parts.  
'Tis a common Notion among Men who consult their Reason more than their Senses, that nothing can be Annihilated by the common force of Nature; for as Naturally, nothing can be made out of nothing, neither can a Substance or Being become nothing. Body's may be corrupted, if we may call the Alterations they are liable to, Corruption; but they cannot be Annihilated. What is Round may become Square, What is Flesh may become Earth, Vapour, and what you please; for all sorts of Extensions are capable of all manner of Configurations: But the Substance of what is Round, and of what is Flesh, cannot perish. There are certain Laws Established in Nature, according to which Bodies change their Forms successively; for those Successive Forms Compose the Beauty of the Universe, and Create an Admiration in us for its Author: But there is no Law in Nature for the Annihilation of any Being, because Annihilation has nothing of Beauty or Good in itself, and because the Author of Nature loves his Work. Therefore Bodies may Alter, but they cannot Perish.  
But if relying on the Testimony of the Senses, Men would maintain obstinately that the Reduction of Bodies is a real Annihilation, by reason that the Parts into which they are reduced are Imperceptible: Let them remember at least, that Bodies can only be divided into those Imperceptible Parts, because they are Extended. But if the Mind is not Extended, it will not be Divisible; and if it be not Divisible, it must be granted, that in that Sense it will not be Corruptible. But how could any Body imagine that the Mind were Extended and Divisible? We may by a right Line cut a Square into two Triangles, into two Paralelogrammes, or long Squares, into two Trapeza's: But by what Line can it be conceived, that a Pleasure, a Pain, or a Desire can be Cut? And what Figure would result of that Division? Truly I cannot think, that Imagination can be fruitful enough in false Ideas, to satisfy itself upon that Subject.  
The Mind than is not Extended, consequently it is not Divisible: It is not liable to the same Alterations as the Body: Nevertheless, it must be granted that it is not Immutable by its Nature. If the Body is capable of an infinite number of different Figures, and of different Configurations, the Mind is capable of an infinite number of different Ideas, and different Modifications. As after our Death the substance of our Flesh will be reduced to Earth, to Vapours, and to an infinite number of other Bodies without being Annihilated: So our Souls without being again reduced to nothing, will have Thoughts, and Sentiments very different from those they had in Life. It is also necessary while we are alive, that our Body should be Composed of Flesh and Bones: It is also necessary in order to Live, that our Soul should have the Ideas and Sentiments it has, in relation to the Body to which it is united. But when the Soul shall be separated from its Body, it will be at full Liberty to receive all sorts of Ideas and Modifications, very different from those it has at present; as our Body on its part, will be capable of receiving all sorts of Figures and Configurations, very different from those it is necessary it should have, to be the Body of a Living Man.  
What I have said, does in my Opinion, sufficiently show, that the Immortality of the Soul is not a thing so difficult to be apprehended. What then is the reason that so many question it, unless it be, that they are unwilling to apply themselves as much as may be, to examine the Reasons which prove it, in order to be Convinced? And why is it that they are unwilling to do it, unless it be that their Will, being uneasy and inconstant, keeps their Understanding in a continual Agitation; insomuch that it is not at leisure distinctly to perceive those very Ideas which are most present to it, as those of Thought and of Extension? Just like a Man agitated by some Passion, turning his Eyes continually on all sides, for the most part does not distinguish the nearest Objects, and the most Exposed to his Sight. For indeed the Question about the Immortality of the Soul, is one of the easiest Questions to resolve, when without Consulting our Imagination, we consider with some Attention of Mind, the clear and distinct Idea of Extension, and the Relation it can have to Thought.  
If the Inconstancy and Levity of our Will does not permit our Understanding to penetrate into the Bottom of things which are present to it, and which we are highly concerned to know; it is easy to judge, that it will be more averse to let us meditate on those that are distant, and which have no relation to us. So that if we are very Ignorant of most of those things which it is very necessary for us to know, we shall not have a great Insight into those which seem absolutely vain and useless to us.  
It will not be necessary for me to endeavour to prove this by tedious Examples, which have no considerable Truths in them; for if we may be allowed to be Ignorant of any thing, it is of those things which are of no Use. And I had rather not be believed, than to make the Reader lose his Time in reading things that are wholly useless.  
Though there are not many persons who apply themselves seriously to things absolutely Vain and Useless, yet the number of them is but too great: But there can never be too many of those who do not apply themselves to them, and who despise them, provided they do not pretend to Judge of them. It is no defect in a limited Mind, not to know certain things; it is only a defect to pretend to Judge of them. Ignorance is a necessary Evil, but we may, and aught to avoid Error. Therefore I do not condemn Men for being Ignorant of many things, but only for giving rash Judgements about those things.  
When things have a great relation to us, are sensible, 
V That our Ignorance is exceeding great in respect of abstracted things, or such as have but little relation to us.  and fall easily within the Compass of our Imagination, we may say, that the Mind applies itself to them, and may have some knowledge of them. For when we know that things have a relation to us, we think upon them with some Inclination; and when we find that they concern us, we apply ourselves to them with pleasure. So that we should be more Learned than we are in many things, if the uneasiness and tossing of our Will did not Disturb and Fatigue our Attention continually.  
But when things are abstract, and not very sensible, it is difficult to attain any certain knowledge of them: Not that abstracted things are very intricate, but because the Attention and Sight of the Mind gins, and Ends commonly with the sensible Prospect of Objects; for we seldom think on any thing but what we see and feel, and only as long as we see and feel it.  
It is most certain, that if the Mind could easily apply itself to clear and distinct Ideas, without being any-wise biased by Opinion; and if the uneasiness of the Will did not continually disturb its Application, we should meet no great difficulties in many Natural Questions, which we look upon as not to be Explained, and we might easily be delivered of our Ignorance and Errors in relation to them.  
For Example; It is an undeniable Truth to any Man of Sense, that Creation and Annihilation are things which surpass the common force of Nature. Therefore if Men did remain Attentive to that pure Notion of the Mind and Reason, they would not so easily admit the Creation and Annihilation of an infinite Number of New Being's, as of Substantial Forms, real Qualities and Faculties. They would look into the distinct Ideas we have of Extension, Figure, and Motion, for the reason of Natural Effects; which is not always so difficult as People imagine; all things in Nature are so connected together, and prove each other.  
The Effects of Fire, as those of Canon and of Mines, are very Surprising; and their cause not very well known. Nevertheless, if Men instead of relying on the Impressions of their Senses, and on some false or deceitful Experiments, did firmly fix on that bare Notion of the Mind alone: That it is not possible for a Body that is very little agitated to produce a violent Motion, since it can communicate no more moving Power than it has its self; it would be easy from that alone to conclude, that there is a Subtle and Invisible Matter, that it is very much agitated, and dispersed inh all Bodies, and several other like things which would teach us the Nature of Fire, and also be of great use to us to discover other Truths yet more concealed.  
For, since Canons and Mines have such great Motions, and all the Visible Bodies about them, are not in a sufficient Agitation to produce them; it is a certain proof that there are other Invisible and Insensible Bodies, which have at least as much Agitation as the Canon Ball: But with being very Subtle and Thin, may alone freely pass, and without breaking through the Pores of the Canon before it is Fired; that is, as Monsieur Descartes has explained it more at large, before their having surrounded the hard and gross parts of the Salt-petre, of which the Powder is Composed. But when the Fire is put to it, that is, when those subtle and extremely agitated Particles, have surrounded the gross and solid Parts of the Salt-petre, and have thus Communicated their very strong and violent Motion to them, than all does Burst of necessity; because the Pores of the Canon, which left an open passage on all sides for the subtle Parts before mentioned, while they were alone, are not large enough to make way for the gross Parts of the Salt-petre, and some others of which the Powder is Composed, when they have received into themselves the Agitation of the Subtle Parts which surrounds them.  
For as the Water of Rivers which flows under Bridges does not shake them, by reason of the smallness of its Particles: Thus the very subtle and very thin Matter I have mentioned, passes continually through the Pores of all Bodies without making any sensible Alterations in them. But then likewise, as the said River is capable of breaking down a Bridge, when carrying along with it some great Flakes of Ice, or some other more solid Bodies, by forcing them against it with its own Motion; so subtle Matter is capable of producing the surprising Effects we see in Canons and in Mines; when having communicated to the Parts of the Powder which Float in the midst of it, its Motion which is infinitely more Violent, and more Rapid than that of Rivers and Torrents; the said Parts of the Powder cannot freely pass through the Pores of the Bodies which enclose them, by reason they are too gross; so that they violently break them to force them a free Passage.  
But Men do not easily apprehend those subtle small Particles, which they repute Chimeras, because they do not see them. Contemplatio ferè definit cum aspectu, says Bacon. The greater part even of Philosophers, invent some New Entity, rather than not to talk upon those matters which they are Ignorant of: And if any Body objects against their false and incomprehensible Suppositions, that Fire must needs be composed of Parts that are in very great Agitation, since it produces such Violent Motions, and that a thing cannot Communicate that which it has not; which is undoubtedly a most clear, and most solid Objection: They confound all by some frivolous Imaginary distinction, as that of Equivocal and Univocal Causes, in order to seem to say something, though in reality they say nothing. For it is a general Notion among Men of Sense and Learning, that there can be no real Equivocal Cause in Nature; and that it has been invented merely by the Ignorance of Men.  
Therefore Men must apply themselves more to the consideration of clear and distinct Notions, if they have a mind to understand Nature: They must check and stop the Inconstancy and Levity of their Will a little, if they design to penetrate deeply into things; for their Mind will ever be weak, superficial and discursive, while their Will remains Light, Inconstant and Roving.  
It is true, it requires some Fatigue, and Men must constrain themselves to become Attentive, and to search into the bottom of things; for there is nothing to be got without pains. It is shameful for Men of Sense, and Philosophers, who are obliged by all manner of reasons to inquire into, and to defend Truth, to speak without knowing what they say, and to be satisfied with what they do not understand.   

CHAP. III.  
I. Curiosity is natural and necessary.  
II. Three Rules to moderate it.  
III. Explanation of the first of these Rules.  
AS long as Men have an Inclination for a Good which surpasses their Power, 
I. Curiosity is natural and necessary.  and do not possess it, they will have a secret propension for whatever looks new and extraordinary: They will ever run after such things as they have not as yet considered, in hopes of finding what they inquire after; and their Mind not being able to satisfy itself wholly without the enjoyment of that Good for which they are made; they will ever remain uneasy, and in a continual Agitation, until it appears to them in its Glory.  
This disposition of Human Minds is certainly very suitable to their Condition; for it is infinitely better to be uneasy, and in search of the Happiness one does not possess, than to remain in a false Repose, and to be pleased with falsehood, and a delusive Happiness, wherewith Men are commonly deluded. We ought to have a sense of Truth, and of our Happiness: Therefore those Things that are new and extraordinary must excite us: There is a certain kind of Curiosity which is not only allowable, but absolutely necessary; for whereas common and ordinary things can never afford true Felicity, and the ancient Opinions of Philosophers are very uncertain: It is necessary we should be curious for New Discoveries, and always uneasy in the Enjoyment of common Felicities.  
Should a Geometrician give us New Propositions contrary to those of Euclid, Should he undertake to prove, that that Science is full of Errors, as Hobbs endeavoured to do in a Book, written against the Pride of Geometricians, I own that there would be no reason to complain of that kind of Novelty; because, that when we have found out the Truth we ought to stick to it, since we are only endued with Curiosity in order to find it out? Neither are Geometricians often guilty of being Curious of New Opinions of Geometry. They would soon be tired with a Book containing nothing but Propositions contrary to those of Euclid; for being fully convinced of the Truth of those Propositions by unanswerable Demonstrations, our Curiosity ceases in that Point: Which is an infallible Argument, that the only reason of the Inclination of Men after Novelty, is because they do not evidently see the Truth of those things they naturally desire to know, nor possess Infinite Felicity, which they are naturally desirous to possess.  
Therefore it is necessary that Novelty should Excite Men, and that they should Love it: But however, 
II. Three Rules to moderate Curiosity.  there are Exceptions to be made, and they must observe certain Rules which it is easy to infer from what we have been saying, that the Inclination we have for Novelty is only given us in order to seek out Truth, and our real Felicity.  
There are Three, the first of which is, That Men must not be fond of Novelty in things relating to Faith which are not submitted to Reason  
The Second, That Novelty is not a sufficient Reason to induce us to believe that things are Good or True: That is, We must not fancy that Opinions are true because they are new; nor that any thing can be capable to content us, because it is new or extraordinary, or because we have not possessed it before.  
The Third, That when we are satisfied that Truths are so concealed that it is morally impossible to discover them, and that Benefits are so little, and so inconsiderable that they cannot satisfy us, we must not suffer ourselves to be excited by the Novelty of them, nor to be seduced by false hopes. But it is necessary to explain these Rules more at large; and show how by a neglect of 'em we fall into an infinite number of Errors.  
We often meet with Minds of very different Humours: 
II. Particular explanation of the first of those Rules.  Some believe every thing blindly: Others will never believe without seeing evidently. The first having hardly ever made any use of their Understanding, do without considering, believe whatever is said to them; the others, who will trust to nothing but their Understanding, indifferently condemn all sorts of Authorities. The first are commonly stupid and weak Persons, like Children and Women; the others are proud and profane Dispositions, like Heretics and Philosophers.  
It is very difficult to find Persons who keep a Medium between those two Extremes, and who never look for Evidence in matters relating to Faith through a vain Agitation of Mind, or who sometimes believe false Opinions without Evidence, in things relating to Nature, through an indiscreet Deference, and low Submission of Mind. If they are Persons of Piety, who submit to the Authority of the Church in all things, their Faith extends sometimes, if I may use the Expression, even to Opinions that are merely Philosophical; and they often look upon them with the same Respect as is only due to the Truths of Religion. A false Zeal makes them too easily condemn those that are not of their Opinion. They harbour injurious Suspicions against those that make New Discoveries. It is sufficient to be esteemed by them as Libertines, to deny that there are substantial Forms, that Animals are sensible of Pain and Pleasure, and other Philosophical Opinions, which they look upon as Truth without any evident Reason, only because they imagine there are necessary Relations between those Opinions and the Truths of Faith.  
But if they are Persons that are too bold, their Pride induces them to despise the Authority of the Church; they never submit willingly to it. They delight in difficult rash Opinions: They affect to pass for mighty Wits; and upon that account they speak of Divine Mysteries without Respect, and with a kind of Haughtiness: They despise all as Credulous, who speak modestly of certain received Opinions. Finally, they are very much inclined to doubt of every thing, and are directly opposed to those who are too easily inclined to submit to the Authority of Men.  
It is obvious, that these two Extremes are bad, and those who will not admit Evidence in Natural Questions are , as well as those who would have Evidence in Mysteries of Faith. But yet those who Expose themselves to be mistaken in Philosophical Questions in being too Credulous, are without doubt more excusable than the others who run the hazard of falling into some Heresy or other in doubting Rashly. For it is less dangerous to fall into a World of Errors in Philosophy for want of examining them, than to fall into one Heresy for want of submitting with Humility to the Authority of the Church.  
The Mind is at quiet when it meets Evidence, and is in continual Agitation when it finds none. Because Evidence is the Character of Truth. Thus the Error of Libertines, and of Heretics, proceeds from their doubting of the Truth of the Decisions of the Church, because they are not Evident, and they hope that the Truths of Faith may be demonstrated. Now their Love for Novelty is Irregular, since that possessing the Truth in the Faith of the Church, they ought not to seek farther: Besides, the Truths of Faith being far above the reach of their Understanding, they would not be able to discover them, supposing that according to their False Opinion, the Church were guilty of Error.  
But if there are many who deceive themselves in refusing to submit to the Authority of the Church, there are as many who are deceived in submitting to the Authority of Men. We must submit to the Authority of the Church, because it can never submit Blindly to the Authority of Men, because they are always liable to Mistakes. What the Church teaches us, is Infinitely above the reach of Reason: What Men teach us, is submitted to our Reason: So that as it is a Crime, and an Insupportable Vanity, to endeavour to find out the Truth in Matters of Faith by our Reason, without regarding the Authority of the Church: So it is a great Indiscretion, and a despicable poorness of Spirit, to rely blindly on the Authority of Men, in Things which relate to Reason.  
Nevertheless, most of those that are esteemed Learned Men in the World, have only acquired that Reputation, by knowing the Opinions of Aristotle, of Plato, of Epicurus, and of some other Philosophers by Heart, by submitting blindly to their Sentiments, and by defending them with Obstinacy. In order to obtain the Reputation of Learning in the Universities, it is sufficient to be acquainted with the Sentiments of some Philosopher: Provided they will Swear In Verba Magistri, they soon become Doctors. Most Communities stick to a peculiar Doctrine, which the Members are not allowed to deviate from. What is True in some, is often False in others. They are sometimes Proud of defending the Doctrine of their Order, against Reason and Experience; and they think themselves obliged to wrest the Truth, or their Authors to reconcile them: This produces a World of Frivolous Distinctions, which are so many by ways, that lead Infallibly to Error.  
If any Truth is discovered, even in our days, Aristotle must have seen it; or if Aristotle be against it, the Discovery must be False. Some make that Philosopher speak one way, others another; for all those who pretend to Learning, make him speak their Language: He is made the Author of all sorts of Impertinencies, and few Discoveries are made, which are not found Enigmatically in some corner or other of his Books. In a word, he is ever contradicting himself, if not in his Works, yet at least in the Mouths of those that teach him. For though Philosophers protest, and even pretend to teach his Doctrine, it is difficult to meet two that agree about his Sentiments: For indeed Aristotle's Books are so Obscure, and filled with such rambling general Terms, that one may with some Appearance of Truth, impute to him the Opinions of those that are most opposite to his. It is easy to make him say whatever one has a mind to in some of his Works, because he hardly says any thing in them, though he makes a great deal of Noise; as Children suppose the Sounds of the Bells to say what they please, because they make a great deal of Noise and say nothing.  
I must confess that it seems very Rational to fix and to stop the Mind on some particular Opinions, to hinder it from running out into Extravagancies. But what then? Must it needs be done by Falsehood and Error? Or rather can any one believe that Error can fix the Mind? Let Men examine how difficult it is to find Persons of Sense pleased with the reading of Aristotle, and that can persuade themselves they have acquired any true Science, even after having grown old on his Books; and it will appear plainly, that nothing but Truth and Evidence can fix the Agitations of the Mind; and that Disputes, Aversions, Errors and even Heresies, are entertained and encouraged by an Ill Manner of Study. Truth consists in Individuality, it is not capable of Variety; and nothing besides it can reconcile People's Minds: Falsehood and Error only serve to divide and agitate them.  
I do not question but there are some who do verily believe, that he they call the Prince of Philosophers, is no-wise in an Error, and that Real and Solid Philosophy are only to be found in his Works. There are some who fancy, that though it is Two thousand Years since Aristotle wrote, no body has yet been able to discover that he was guilty of any Error; and consequently being in some respects Infallible, they may boldly follow him, and quote him as such. But I do not think it worth my while to answer such Persons, because their Ignorance is so gross, that it only deserves Contempt. I only desire them to tell me, whether Aristotle, or any of his Disciples, have ever deduced any Truths from the Principles of Natural Philosophy which may be called his; or if they, or any of them, have done it themselves, let them declare it, let them explain it, and let them prove it; and we do engage ourselves, never more to speak of Aristotle without an Elegy; we will no longer say, that his Principles are Useless, since they have served to prove one Truth; but there is no reason to expect it. They were long since challenged to do it, and particularly by Monsieur Descartes in his Metaphysical Meditations about Forty Years ago, even with a Promise to demonstrate the Falsity of that Pretended Truth: And there is no great likelihood to believe, that any body will ever presume to do, what Monsieur Descartes greatest Enemies, and the most Zealous Defenders of Aristotle's Philosophy, have not hitherto dared to undertake.  
Therefore I hope I may presume to say, that it is a strange Blindness, Poorness of Mind, and Stupidity of Spirit, thus to submit to the Authority of Aristotle, of Plato, or of any other Philosopher whatever: That People lose their time in reading them, when their only Design is to get their Opinions by Heart; and those that teach them make their Disciples lose theirs likewise. Therefore give me leave to say with St. Austin, 
* Quis tam Stulte curiosus est qui filium suum mittat in Scholam, ut quid Magister cogitet discat? Aug. de Magistro.  That those are Foolishly Curious, who send their Sons to the College, in order to learn the Sentiments of their Master. That Philosophers cannot instruct us by their own Authority, and if they pretend to do it they are Unjust: That it is a kind of Folly and Impiety to Swear their Defence Solemnly: And finally, those Injustly confine Truth, who out of Interest oppose the new Opinions of Philosophy which may be True, to preserve those which are sufficiently known to be False or Useless.   

CHAP. IU.  
A Continuation of the same Subject.  
I. Explanation of the Second Rule of Curiosity.  
II. Explanation of the Third.  
THE Second Rule that must be observed, is, 
I. Second Rule of Curlosity.  That Novelty must never serve as a Reason to believe that things are True. We have already said several times, that Men must not rest in Error, and in the False Felicities they enjoy: That it is necessary they should Search after the Evidence of Truth, and the real Felicity they do not possess; and consequently that they should look after such things as are New and Extraordinary. But therefore it does not follow that they should always stick to them, nor believe, without reason, that Opinions are True, because they are New; and that those are real Felicities which they have not as yet enjoyed. Novelty should only induce them to examine new things with care; they must not despise them, because they do not know them; nor rashly believe that they contain what they wish and hope for.  
But this often comes to pass: Men after having examined the Ancient and Common Opinions, have not discovered the Light of Truth in them: After having had a Taste of the usual Felicities of the World, they have not found that Solid Satisfaction in them, which should accompany the Possession of a real Good: So that their Desires and their Eagerness are not allayed by the usual Opinions and common Felicities. For which reason, when they hear any thing that is New and Extraordinary, the Idea of Novelty puts them in hopes at first, That it is the thing they are in Search of. And whereas it is Natural to Flatter ourselves, and to believe that Things are as we wish they might be; their Hopes increase proportionably to their Desires: And in fine, they Insensibly change into Imaginary Assurances. In the next place, They join the Idea of Novelty, and the Idea of Truth, so close together, that the one never offers itself without the other; and that which is most New, appears to them to be more True, and better than that which is more Usual and Common; in which they are very different from those, who out of Aversion to Heresy, have joined the Idea of Novelty to that of Falseness, imagining that all New Opinions are False and Dangerous.  
Therefore we may say that this usual Disposition of the Mind, and of the Heart of Men, in relation to that which bears the Character of Novelty, is one of the most general Causes of Errors, for it seldom leads them to Truth; whenever it does, it is by Chance and good Luck: And finally, It always directs them from their real Happiness, by engaging them in that Multiplicity of Divertisements and False Felicities that the World abounds with: And this is the most Dangerous Error into which they can fall.  
The Third Rule against the Excessive Desires of Novelty is, 
II. Third Rule of Curiosity.  That when we are certain that some Truths are so Mysterious, that it is Morally Impossible to discover them, and that some Felicities are so Inconsiderable that they can never make us Happy, we ought not to suffer ourselves to be Excited by the Novelty of them.  
Every body may know by Faith, by Reason and Experience, that created Goods can never fill the infinite Capacity of the Will. Faith teaches us, That all the Things of this World are only Vanity; and that our Happiness neither consists in Honours or Riches. Reason assures us, That since it is not in our Power to bond our Desires, and that we are Naturally inclined to Love all Felicities, we can never be Happy, without Possessing that which Includes them all. Our own Experience makes us Sensible, that we are not Happy in the Possession of those Goods which we do enjoy, since we still wish for more. Finally, We daily see that the Great Felicities which the most Powerful Princes and Kings enjoy on Earth, are not capable to satisfy their Desires; that they are even more Uneasy and more Unhappy than others; and that being Seated on the highest Spoke of the Wheel of Fortune, they are the more liable to be precipitated and shaken by its Motion, than those that are underneath them, or nearer to the Centre. For they never fall but from on high; their Wounds are always great; and all the Grandeur they are attended with, and which they annex to their own Being, serves only to Swell and Aggrandise them, to make them more Sensible of a greater number of Wounds, and expose them the more to the Strokes of Fortune.  
So that Faith, Reason and Experience, convincing us that the Delights and Pleasures of the Earth, which we have not as yet tasted, could not make us Happy though we should enjoy them: We must be very careful, according to that Third Rule, not to suffer ourselves to be Foolishly Flattered with vain Hopes of Happiness, which increasing by degrees proportionably to our Passion and to our Desires, would change at last into a False Assurance: For when we have a Violent Passion for any Good, we always look upon it to be very great, and we persuade ourselves Insensibly, that the Possession of it will make us Happy.  
Therefore we must resist those Vain Desires, since our Endeavours to satisfy them would be in vain. But particularly, because that by abandoning ourselves to our Passions, and by employing our time to gratify them, we lose God and all things with him. We only wander from one False Felicity to another; We always live in False Hopes; We dissipate our Spirits, and are agitated a Thousand different ways; We meet Oppositions every where, because the Advantages we seek for are desired by many, and cannot be possessed by many. For as St. Paul teaches us, 
Chap. 6. to Tim.  Those that have a mind to grow Rich, fall into Temptations, and into a Snare of the Devil, and into divers useless pernicious Desires, which precipitate Men into the Abyss of Perdition and Damnation; for Covetousness is the Root of all Evil.  
And as we ought not to seek after the Goods of the World which are new, because we are assured that we shall not find the Happiness we look for; neither ought we to have the least Desire of knowing new Opinions upon a great number of difficult Questions, because we are informed, that the Mind of Man is not capable of discovering the Truth of them. Most of the Questions that are treated of in Morality, and particularly in Natural Philosophy, are of that kind; and therefore it behoves us to be very diffident of many Books that are daily written upon those Obscure Intricate Matters. For though absolutely speaking the Questions they contain may be resolved, there are still so few Truths discovered, and so many others to know, before we can come to those the said Books treat of, that we cannot read them without adventuring to lose considerably.  
Yet Men do not regulate themselves thus, they do quite the contrary: They do not examine whether what is said to them is possible: Do but promise them extraordinary Things, as the Reparation of Natural Heat, of Radical Moisture, of Vital Spirits, or other things they do not understand, and you will strait excite their Vain Curiosity. It is sufficient in order to blind and to gain them to propose Paradoxes to them; to use obscure Words, Terms of Influence, and the Authority of some unknown Authors; or else to perform some very sensible and extraordinary Experiment, although it has no manner of relation to the thing proposed, for it is enough to Surprise them, in order to Convince them.  
If a Physician, a Chirurgeon, an Empirick, quote Passages in Greek and Latin, and make use of new and extraordinary Terms, they pass immediately for great Men; Men give them a Power over Life and Death; they are believed like Oracles; they fancy themselves far above the common Level of Mankind, and think they penetrate into the bottom of things. And when some are so Indiscreet as to intimate, that they are not satisfied with five or six words which really signify and prove nothing; they fancy that those People have not commom Sense, and that they deny first Principles. And indeed the first Principles of those Men, are four or five Scraps of Latin out of some Author, or some Greek Passage, if they are better Scholars.  
Moreover, It is necessary that Learned Physicians should sometimes speak a Language which their Patients do not understand, in order to gain some Reputation, and to be obeyed.  
A Physician who only understands Latin, may be esteemed in a Village; because Latin is both Greek and Arabic to Peasants: But unless a Physician can at least read Greek, to learn some of Hypocrates' Aphorisms, he must not expect to pass for a Learned Man in Cities where most People understand Latin. For which reason even the most Learned Physicians knowing this Humour of Men, are obliged to speak like Quacks and Illiterate Men; and one must not always judge of their Capacity and Sense, by what they say in their Visits.   

CHAP. V.  
I. Of the Second Natural Inclination, or of Self-Love.  
II. It is divided into the Love of Being and of Wellbeing, or of Greatness and Pleasure.  
THe Second Inclination which the Author of Nature imprints continually in our Will, 
I. Of the Second Natural Inclination, or of Self-Love.  is the Love of ourselves, and of our own Preservation.  
We have already said, That God loves all his Works; and that it is only the Love he bears them that preserves them; and which Wills, That all created Spirits should have the same Inclinations with him. Therefore it is his Will, that they should all have a Natural Inclination for their Preservation, and that they should Love themselves. Thus it is lawful and reasonable to Love ourselves, since we are Amiable, since God himself Loves us, and since it is his Pleasure that we should Love ourselves: But this is no reason that we should Love ourselves more than God, since God is Infinitely more Amiable than we are. It is Unjust to place our Final End in ourselves, and not to Love ourselves in relation to God; because, as we have no Goodness, nor any Subsistance of ourselves, but only what we participate of the Goodness and Being of God, we are not Amiable of ourselves, but only in relation to him.  
Nevertheless, The Inclination we should have for God is lost by Sin; and all that remains of it is an Infinite Capacity in our Will for all Felicities, or for Good in General, and a strong Inclination to possess them which can never be destroyed: But the Inclination we ought to have for our Preservation or Self-Love, has increased itself to that degree, that it is at last become absolute Master of the Will. It has moreover changed and transformed into its own Nature the Love of God, or the Inclination which we have for Good in General, and the Love which we ought to have for other Men. For we may say now, That we only Love ourselves, since we Love nothing but in relation to ourselves; whereas we ought only to Love God, and all things in relation to God.  
If Faith and Reason teach us, that God is the only Sovereign Good, and that he alone can make us perfectly Happy; we may easily conclude that we must Love him, and we are easily enough inclined to it: But without Grace it is still Self-Love that Induces us to Love him. Pure Charity is so much above our Strength, that we are so far from Loving God for himself, that Humane Reason cannot easily conceive, that we can Love him otherwise than in relation to ourselves, and that we have any other Final End but our own Satisfaction. Self-love then is the absolute Master of our Will, since the Disorder of Sin, and the Love of God and of our Neighbour, are now only the Consequences of it; since we no longer Love any thing, but because that in Loving it, we expect some Advantage, or that we actually receive some Pleasure by it.  
This Self-love may be divided into two Kind's, 
II. Self-love is divided into the Love of our Being and Wellbeing, or of Greatness and Pleasure.  viz. Into the Love of Greatness, and into the Love of Pleasure; or else into the Love of our Being, and of the Perfection of our Being; and into the Love of our Wellbeing, or of Felicity.  
By the Love of Greatness we affect Power, Preferment, Independency, and that our Being should subsist of itself. We desire in some respect to have a Necessary Being: In one Sense we are desirous to be like Gods; for none but God has properly a Being which is necessarily Existent; since that whatever is Dependent exists only by the Will of him on whom it depends. Therefore Men wishing the Necessity of their Being, also desire a Power over others. But by the Love of Pleasure they desire not only a Being, but a Wellbeing; because Pleasure is a manner of Being, which is best and most Advantageous to the Soul.  
We must note, that Greatness, Excellence and Independence of the Creature, are not kinds of Being which make us Happy of themselves; since it often happens, that Men become Miserable in proportion to their growing Great. But as for Pleasure, it is a kind of Being which we cannot receive actually, without actually becoming more Happy. Greatness and Independence for the most part are not in us, and commonly they only consist in the relation we have to those things which are about us. But Pleasures are in the very Soul, and they are real Modes by which it is modified, and which by their own Nature are capable of satisfying it. Therefore we look upon Excellence, Greatness and Independence, as things that are proper for the Preservation of our Being, and even sometimes as very useful, according to the Order of Nature, for the Preservation of the Wellbeing: But Pleasure is always a manner of Being of the Mind, which by itself makes it Happy and satisfies it; so that Pleasure is a Wellbeing, and the Love of Pleasure the Love of Wellbeing.  
Now the Love of Wellbeing is so Powerful, that it sometimes proves Stronger than the Love of Being; and Self-Love makes us sometimes desire not to be, because we have not a Wellbeing. This is the Case of all the Damned, who according to the Word of Jesus Christ, had better not to be, than to be so Unhappy as they are; because these Wretches being declared Enemies to him in whom all Goodness Centres, and who is the Sole Cause of Pleasure and of Pain which we are capable of; it is impossible they should enjoy any Satisfaction; they are and will be Eternally Unhappy, because their Will will ever remain in the same Disposition, and in the same Irregularity. So that Self-Love includes two Loves, the Love of Greatness, of Power, of Independence and generality of all things which seem to be proper for the Preservation of our Being; and the Love of Pleasure, and of all things that are necessary for our Wellbeing, that is, To be Happy and Satisfied.  
Those two Loves may be divided several ways: Whether because we are composed of two different parts of Soul and Body, according to which they may be divided; or because they may be distinguished or specified by the different Objects that are useful for our Preservation. However we will not enlarge upon that, because, as we do not design to make a Treatise of Morality, it is not necessary to make an Inquiry into, and an exact Division of all the things we look upon as our Felicities. It was only necessary to make this Division, to relate the cause of our Errors in some order.  
Therefore we shall first speak of those Errors which are caused by our Inclination for Greatness, and for all those things that makes our Being Independent of others: And afterwards we shall treat of those which proceed from the Inclination we have for Pleasure, and for all those things which render our Being the best it can be for us, or that contents us most.   

CHAP. VI  
I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons.  
II. Of the false Judgements of some Pious Persons.  
III. Of the false Judgements of the Superstitious and Hypocrites.  
iv Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes.  
WHatever raises us above others by making us more Perfect, as Science and Virtue; 
I. Of the Inclination we have for all that raises us above other Persons.  or that gives us an Authority over them by making us more Powerful, as Dignities and Riches, seem in some measure to make us Independent. All those that are beneath us, have a Respect for us and fear us; they are always ready to do what pleases us for our Preservation; and they dare neither Prejudice us, nor oppose our Desires. Therefore Men constantly endeavour to possess those Advantages which raise them above others. For they never consider that both their Being and Wellbeing in Truth only depend on God above, and not on Men; and that the true Greatness which will make them Eternally Happy, does not consist in that Rank which they hold in the Imagination of other Men, as Weak and as Miserable as themselves; but in an humble Submission to the Will of God, who being Just, will not fail to reward those who remain within the Order he hath prescribed.  
But Men do not only desire Effectively to possess Learning and Virtue, Dignities and Riches; they also use their utmost Efforts, in order to persuade others that they do really possess them. And if it may be said, that they endeavour less to appear Rich than to be really so; it may also be said, that they often take less care to be Virtuous, than to appear so: For as the Author of the Book Entitled, Reflectiones Morales, says agreeably, Virtue would not go far, unless it were accompanied with Vanity.  
The Reputation of being Rich, Learned and Virtuous, produces in the Imagination of those that are about us, or that are more nearly related to us, very convenient Dispositions for us: It makes them fall at our Feet; it makes them act in our Favour; it Inspires them with all the Motions that tend to the Preservation of our Being, and to the Increase of our Grandeur. Thus Men preserve their Reputation, as a Good which is necessary for them to Live with Ease in the World.  
All Men than have an Inclination for Virtue, Learning, Dignities and Riches, and for the Reputation of possessing those Advantages. We will now endeavour to show by some Examples, how those Inclinations may engage them into Error. Let us begin by the Inclination that Men have for Virtue, or for the Appearance of Virtue.  
Those who apply themselves Seriously to become Virtuous, commonly employ their Mind and Time to understand Religion, and to exercise themselves in good Works: They only desire with St. Paul, to be acquainted with Jesus Christ Crucified, to find out a Remedy for the Distemper and Corruption of their Nature. They desire no other Knowledge than that which is necessary for them to live Christianly, and to know their Duty; after which they apply themselves to fulfil them with Zeal and Exactness. And therefore they seldom trouble themselves about Sciences, which appear Vain and Barren in respect to their Salvation.  
No Fault can be found with that Conduct, it is Infinitely to be valued; 
II. Of the false Judgements of some Pious Persons.  Men would Esteem themselves Happy to observe it exactly; and they often repent their not having followed it more. But this is unapprovable, that since it is certain that there are Sciences absolutely Humane, very Certain and Useful, which disengage the Mind from Sensible Things, and use it by degrees to relish the Truths of the Gospel; some Pious Persons, without having examined them, condemn them too freely, either as being Useless, or Uncertain.  
It is true, that most Sciences are very uncertain and very useless: Men are partly in the right, to believe that they only contain Truths which are of little use. No body is obliged to study them; and it is better to despise them, than to suffer one's self to be deceived or blinded by them. Nevertheless we may affirm, That it is very necessary to know some Metaphysical Truths: The Universal Knowledge, or the Existence of a God, is absolutely necessary, since even the Certainty of Faith depends on the Knowledge which Reason gives of the Existence of a God. It is necessary to know, that it is his Will which makes, and which regulates Nature; That the Force or Power of Natural Causes is only his Will: In a word, That all things whatever depend on God.  
It is also necessary to know what Truth is, the means to distinguish it from Error, the Distinction between the Mind and Body, the Consequences that may be drawn from it, as the Immortality of the Soul, and several other things of that kind which may be known with certainty.  
The Knowledge of Man, or of one's self, is a Science that cannot be reasonably despised; it contains a World of things which are absolutely necessary to be known to have some Justness and Penetration of Mind: And we may say, That if a Stupid Ignorant Man is Infinitely above Matter, because he knows that he is, which Matter does not know; those who know Man, are far above Stupid Ignorant Persons, by reason that they know what they are, which the others do not know.  
But the Knowledge of Man is not only Valuable, because it raises us above others; it is much more so, because it humbles us before God. That Knowledge makes us perfectly Sensible of the Dependence we have on him in all things, and even in our most common Actions: It plainly discovers the Corruption of our Nature: It disposes us to apply ourselves to him who alone can cure us; to rely wholly on him, and not to trust or rely on ourselves: And thus it gives many Dispositions of Mind, which are very proper to submit ourselves to the Grace of the Gospel.  
We ought at least to have a Superficial Tincture, and a general Knowledge of the Mathematics and of Nature. We ought to learn those Sciences in our Youth; they disengage the Mind from Sensible Things, and hinder it from becoming Weak and Effeminate: They are useful enough in Life; they incline us towards God; the Knowledge of Nature does it of itself; and that of the Mathematics by the Disgust it Inspires in us of the False Impressions of our Senses.  
Virtuous Persons must not despise those Sciences, nor look upon them as Uncertain and Useless, unless they are certain that they have studied them enough to judge Solidly of them: There are many others which they may boldly Despise; Let them Condemn the Poets to the Flames, Heathen Philosophers, Rabbis, some Historians, and a great Number of Authors, which make the Pride and Knowledge of some of the Learned; we shall be little troubled at it. But let them not Condemn the Knowledge of Nature, as being contrary to Religion; since Nature being regulated by the Will of God, the true Knowledge of Nature teaches us how to admire the Power, Grandeur and Wisdom of God. For it seems that God has formed the Universe in order, that we should Study it, and that by that Study we should learn to Know and to Respect the Author of it. So that those who Condemn the Study of Nature, seem to oppose the Will of God; unless they pretend that Sin has rendered Man Incapable of that Study. It is also Vain for them to tell us, That the Knowledge of Men only serves to make them Proud and Vain, because those who have the Reputation of having a perfect Knowledge of Man, though they often know him Ill, are commonly Intolerably Proud: For it is evident, That no Man can know himself well, without being Sensible of his Weakness and Miseries.  
Neither are they Persons of a real and solid Piety, that usually condemn what they do not understand; 
III. Of the false Judgements of the Superstitious and Hypocrites.  but rather Superstitious and Hypocrites. The Superstitious out of a servile Fear, and through a baseness and weakness of Mind are startled at the sight of a lively penetrating Wit. Do but, for Example, give them Natural Reasons for Thunder, and for its Effects, and they look upon you straight as an Atheist. But the Hypocrites out of a Hellish Malice, transform themselves into Angels of Light. They make use of the appearances of holy Truths which are reverenced by all the World to oppose Truths, which are but little known, and little valued, out of private Interest. They Combat Truth with the Image of Truth; and often in their Hearts, Laugh at what all the World Respects; they establish in the Opinion of Men, a Reputation, which is so much the more solid and to be feared, as the thing they abuse is the more Sacred.  
Therefore those Persons are the strongest, and most formidable Enemies of Truth. Indeed, they are pretty rare, but a small number of them is capable of doing a great deal of harm. The appearance of Truth and of Virtue, often does more mischief, than Truth and Virtue do good; for one cunning Hypocrite is capable to overthrow what several truly Wise and Virtuous Persons have raised with a great deal of Pain and Labour.  
Monsieur Descartes, for instance, has demonstratively proved the Existence of a God, the Immortality of our Souls, several other Metaphysical Questions, a great number of Physical Ones; and this Age is infinitely obliged to him for the Truths he has discovered. Yet here starts up an 
* Voetius.  inconsiderable Man, a hot and vehement Exclaimer, respected by some People for the Zeal he expresses for their Religion: He Writes Injurious Books against him, and accuses him of the highest Crimes. Descartes is a Catholic, he has studied under the Jesuits; he has often mentioned them with Reverence. That is sufficient for that malicious Man to persuade People that are Enemies to our Religion, and easily moved in matters so Nice as those of Religion, that he is an Emissary of the Jesuits, and has dangerous Designs: Because the least appearances of Truth upon matters of Faith, have more Force upon People's Minds, than real and effective Truths of Physical or Meraphysical things have, which are little valued. Monsieur Descartes has written about the Existence of God. That is matter enough for that Calumniator to exercise his false Zeal upon, and to oppose all the Truths his Enemy defends. He accuses him of being an Atheist, and of teaching Atheism cunningly and secretly, like that infamous Atheist called Vanino, who was Burnt at Thoulouse; who Cloaked his Malice and Impiety by Writing for the Existence of a God; for one of the Reasons urged by him to prove his Enemy an Atheist, is, That he did Write against Atheists, as Vanino did, in order to cover his Impiety.  
Thus it is easy for a Man to oppress Truth, when he is seconded by the appearances of Truth, and has acquired a great Ascendent over weak Minds. Truth delights in Mildness, and in Peace; and as strong as it is, it yields sometimes to the Pride and Haughtiness of Falsehoods, which Dresses and Arms itself with her Appearances. Truth is very sensible that Error can never harm it; and if it remains sometimes as if it were prescribed and in Obscurity, it is only to wait for more favourable occasions to show its self; for at last it appears, for the most part, stronger and brighter than ever, in the very place where it is oppressed.  
I do not wonder that an Enemy of Monsieur Descartes, that a Man of a different Religion from his, that an Ambitious Man, who designed to rise upon the Ruins of Persons that are above him, that a Railer without Judgement, that Voetius should speak with Contempt of what he neither did, nor could understand. But I am surprised to find, that Persons who are neither Enemies to Monsieur Descartes, nor to his Religion, should entertain Sentiments of Aversion and Contempt against him, upon the account of the Calumnies they have read in Books written by the Enemies of his Person, and of his Religion.  
The Book written by that Heretic entitled, Desperata causa Papatus, sufficiently shows his Impudence, his Ignorance, and his Passion, and his desire to appear Zealous, in order thereby to acquire some Reputation among those of his Party. Therefore he is not a Man to be credited upon his Word. For as there is no reason to believe all the Fables he has Collected in that Book against our Religion, so neither is there any to Credit the Injurious Accusations he has invented against his Enemy.  
Rational Men will not suffer themselves to be persuaded, that Monsieur Descartes is a dangerous Man, because they have read 〈◊〉 in some Book or other, or because they have been 〈◊〉 so by Persons, whose Piety they have a Respect for. It is not lawful to believe Men upon their b●re Word, when they accuse others of the most Enormous Crimes. It is not a sufficient proof to believe a thing, because we hear it affirmed by a Man who speaks with Zeal and Gravity. For it is impossible for any Person to relate Falsities, and Foolish Stories, in the same manner as he would relate good things, particularly if he has suffered himself to be imposed upon out of Simplicity and Weakness.  
It is easy to discover the Truth or Falsity of the Accusations that are formed against Descartes; his Writings are Extant, and easy to be understood, by those that are capable of Attention. Therefore I would advise People to Read his Works, in order to get better Proofs against him than bare Report, and I do not question but after they have read and examined them, they will no longer Accuse him of Atheism; and that on the contrary, they will pay him the Respect that is due to a Man, who has plainly and evidently demonstrated, not only the Existence of a God, and the Immortality of the Soul, but also a World of other Truths, which were unknown until his time.   

CHAP. VII.  
Of the desire of Science, and of the Judgements of pretenders to Learning.  
THe Mind of Man has without doubt, very little Capacity and Extent, and yet he desires to know every thing. All Human Sciences cannot  his Desires; and yet his Capacity is so confined, that he cannot perfectly apprehend any one particular Science. He is in a continual Agitation, and desires always to know; whether he be in hopes of finding what he looks for, as we have said in the preceding Chapter, or whether he persuades himself that his Soul and Mind are extended by the vain possession of some extraordinary Knowledge. The unruly desire of Happiness and Grandeur, makes him study all manner of Sciences, hoping to find his Felicity in the Science of Morality; and looking for this false Greatness in speculative Sciences.  
What is the reason that some Persons spend all their Life in reading of Rabbi's, and other Books Written in Foreign, Obscure, and Corrupted Languages; and by Authors without Judgement and Knowledge: But that they persuade themselves, that when they are skilled in the Oriental Languages, they are greater and higher than those who are Ignorant of them? And what is it that can encourage them in their ingrateful, painful, useless Labour, unless it be the Hope of some Preferment, and the Prospect of some new Grandeur? Indeed they are looked upon as extraordinary Men; they are Complimented upon their profound Learning; People are better pleased to hear them than others: And though it may be said, that they are commonly the least Judicious, if it were only for employing all their Life in a very useless Study, which can neither make them Wiser nor Happier: Nevertheless, most People fancy that they have a great deal more Sense and Judgement than others: And as they are more Larn'd in the Etymology of Words, they also fancy that they are Learned in the Nature of Things.  
The same reason induces Astronomers to spend all their Time and Estate to get an exact Knowledge of Things; which are not only useless, but also impossible to know. They endeavour to find an exact Regularity in the Course of the Planets, which is not in Nature; and to Form Astronomical Schemes to foretell Effects, of which they do not know the Causes. They have made the Selenography, or Geography of the Moon, as if People designed to Travel thither: They have already divided it among those that are Famous in Astronomy: There are few of them that have not already some Province or other in that Country, as a Recompense for their great Labour; and I question whether they are not Proud of having been in Favour with him that has so magnificently distributed those Kingdoms among them.  
What is the reason that Rational Men apply themselves so much to this Science, and yet remain in gross Errors, in respect to Truths which they ought to know, unless they Fancy, that it is a great thing to know what passes in the Heavens? The knowledge of the Vast Things that passes above, seems to them more Noble, Greater, and more worthy of their great Wit, than the knowledge of Vile Abjects, Corruptible Things, as Sublunary Bodies are in their Opinion. The Nobleness of a Science is derived from the Nobleness of its Objects: It is a great Principle! Therefore the knowledge of the Motion of unalterable and incorruptible Bodies, is the highest and most sublime of all Sciences. And for that reason, it appears to them worthy of the Greatness and Excellency of their Mind.  
Thus Men suffer themselves to be blinded by a false Idea of Grandeur, which pleases and moves them. As soon as their Imagination is struck by it, they fall down before that Phantasm, they Reverence it; it destroys and blinds their Reason, which should be the Judge of it. Men seem to Dream when they Judge of the Objects of their Passions, to have no Eyes, and to want Common Sense. For in fine, where lies the Excellency of the knowledge of the Motions of the Planets; and have we not a sufficient knowledge of it already, since we know how to regulate our Months and our Years? What does it concern us to know, whether Saturn is surrounded by a Ring, or by a great number of little Moons; and why should we Dispute about it? Why should any one be proud of having foretold the greatness of an Eclipse; which perhaps he has hit better upon than another, because he has had more Luck? There are persons appointed by the King's Order to observe the Stars, let us rely upon their Observations. They may reasonably apply themselves to it; for they do it out of Duty: It is their business. They do it with Success; for they employ all their Time about it with Art, Application, and all the Exactness imaginable: They want nothing in order to succeed in it. Therefore we ought to be fully satisfied upon a matter which concerns us so little, when they impart their Discoveries to us.  
Anatomy is a very good Study, since it is a thing of great use, and since we ought to delight in the Knowledge of things that 〈◊〉 necessary. We may and aught to apply our self to whatever may contribute any thing towards our Happiness, or rather to Ease our Infirmities ●nd Miseries. But to pass whole Nights in peeping through a Telescope to discover some Spot, or some new Planet in the Heavens, to the prejudice of our Health, to the impairing our Estate, to the neglecting the Care of our Affairs, only to Visit the Stars Regularly, and to measure their Size and Situation; is in my Opinion, absolutely to forget what we are at present, and what we shall be hereafter.  
Let no Body urge, that it is in order to discover the Greatness of him that has formed all these great Objects. The least Fly discovers more the Power and Wisdom of God to those that consider it with Attention, and without being prejudiced by its smallness, than all what the Astronomers know of the Heavens. Nevertheless, Men are not made to consider Flies, neither do I approve the Pains some People have taken to instruct us how Lice, and all kinds of Animals are Formed; and how the Transformations of different Worms into Flies, and Butterflies, are effected. It is lawful for Men to amuse themselves about these things, when they have nothing else to do, to divert themselves: But Men ought not to employ all their time about it, unless they are insensible of their Miseries.  
They ought continually to apply themselves to the knowledge of God and of themselves; to labour Seriously to overcome their Errors and Prejudices, their Passions and Inclinations for Sin; earnestly to search after the Truths that are most necessary for them to know. For those are the most Judicious, that take most Care to discover the most solid Truths.  
The main Cause which engages Men in false Studies, is, that they have fixed the Idea of Learning to a Vain, Useless Knowledge, instead of fixing it to solid and necessary Sciences. For when a Man resolves upon Learning, and when the Spirit of Polymathy gins to move him; he seldom examines what Sciences are most necessary for him, either to behave himself like an Honest Man, or to improve his Reason: He only looks upon those that pass for Learned Men in the World, and examines what renders them considerable. All the most solid and necessary Sciences being pretty Common, the Persons that possess them, are neither admired nor respected for them; for Common things are looked upon without Attention or Emotion, though never so excellent and admirable in themselves. So that those who aim at Learning, seldom fix on those Sciences that are necessary for the Conduct of this Life, and for the Perfection of the Mind. Those Sciences do not Excite in them that Idea of Sciences which they have Formed to themselves; for those are not the Sciences they have admired in others, and which they desire others should admire in them.  
The Gospel and Morality, are Sciences that are too Common, and too Ordinary; they desire to learn the Criticisms of some Terms that are met with in Ancient Philosophers, or in Grecian Poets. Languages, and particularly those that are not in use in their Country, as Arabic, and that of the Rabbis, or the like, appear to them most worthy of their Application, and of their Study. If they read the Bible, it is not to learn Religion or Piety: Points of Chronology, of Geography, and the difficulties of Grammar, take up all their Minds: They desire the knowledge of those things with more Zeal, than the wholesome Truths of the Gospel: They are desirous to possess that Science themselves which they have foolishly admired in others, and which Fools will not fail to admire in them.  
The same appears in things that relate to the Knowledge of Nature, they seldom Study that which is most useful in it, but that which is least Common, Anatomy is too mean for them, but Astronomy is a more exalted Study. Common Experiments are not worthy their Application; but those extraordinary and surprising Experiments, which can never Improve us, are what they most carefully observe.  
The most Obscure and Ancient Histories are those they are Proud to be acquainted with. They are Ignorant of the Genealogy of the Princes that Reign at this time; and they make it their business to study the Descent of those that have been Dead Four Thousand Years ago. They neglect the most Noted Histories of their time, and apply themselves carefully to the Study of the Fables and Fictions of the Poets. They hardly hnow their own Relations; but if you please, they will quote you many Authorities to prove, that a Roman Citizen was Related to an Emperor, and other like things.  
They hardly know the Names of the Dresses that are worn in their days, and yet lose their time in studying those of the Greeks and Romans. The Animals of their own Country are little known by them, and yet they will lavishly employ whole Years in the Composure of large Volumes, about the Animals mentioned in the Bible; to seem to have guessed better than others what unknown Terms signify. Such a Book is the delight of its Author, and of the Learned that Read it; for being full of Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic Passages. etc. of Quotations of Rabbi's, and other obscure and extraordinary Authors, it satissies the Vanity of the Author, and the Foolish Curiosity of the Readers; who will think themselves more Learned than others, when they can proudly affirm, that there are Six different Words in Scripture which signify a Lion, or the like.  
They are often Ignorant of the Map of their own Country, or of the City where they are Born, while they study the Map of Ancient Greece, of Italy, of the Gauls in Julius Caesar's Time, or the Streets and public Places of Ancient Rome. Labour Stultorum, says the Wise Man, affliget eos, qui nesciunt in urbem pergere. They do not know the Way to their own Town, and they Fatigue themselves Foolishly in useless Discoveries. They neither know the Laws, nor Customs of the Places where they Live; but they carefully Study Ancient Rights, the Laws of the Twelve Tables, the Customs of the Lacedæmonians, or of the Chinese, or the Ordinances of the Great . Finally, they are desirous to know all Extraordinary distant things, which others do not know, because they have Foolishly fixed the Idea of Learning on those things; and that it is sufficient to be thought Learned, only to know what others are Ignorant of, though at the same time they are Ignorant of the most necessary and most excellent Truths. The Truth is, that the Knowledge of all those things, and the like, is called Science, Learning and Doctrine; Use will have it so: But there is a Science which is only Folly and Vanity according to Scripture; Doctrina Stultorum fatuitas. I have not hitherto observed, that the Holy Ghost, which gives so many Eulogies to Science in holy Writ, says any thing to the advantage of that false Science, which I have now mentioned.   

CHAP. VIII.  
I. Of the Desire of being thought Learned.  
II. Of the Conversation of Pretenders to Learning.  
III. Of their Works.  
IF the irregular Desire of becoming Learned, 
I. Of the Desire of being thought Learned.  often renders Men more Ignorant, than the Desire of being thought Learned does not only increase their Ignorance, but it seems to turn their Brains: Many Men stray from Common Sense, by endeavouring to surpass it, and talk at random, being only delighted with Paradoxes. They keep at such a distance from Common Thoughts, in order to be thought extraordinary Persons, that they really succeed in it, and that no Body looks upon them without Admiration, or without Contempt.  
They are looked upon sometimes with Admiration; when being preferred to some Dignity which conceals their Ignorance, they are thought to be as much above others by their Genius and Learning, as they are by their Rank, or by their Birth. But for the most part they are looked upon with Contempt, and sometimes as Mad Men, when they are more strictly examined, and that their Greatness does not conceal them from the Eyes of others.  
The pretenders to Learning evidently discover what they are in the Books they Writ, and in their usual Conversations. Perhaps it will be proper to say something about it.  
As it is only Vanity, 
II. Of the Conversations of pretenders to Learning  and the desire of appearing more than others, which engages them to Study, as soon as they are engaged in Conversation, the Passion and Desire of Greatness awakens them anew, and Transports them. They take their Flight so high of a sudden, that we lose sight of them; and very often they know not where they are themselves. They are so much afraid of not being above those that hear them, that they are offended if they think they follow others. They are startled as soon as any body desires the least Explanation, and fly into a Passion upon the least Opposition. In fine, They say things that are so New, and so Extraordinary, but so far from common Sense, that the most Prudent have much ado to forbear Laughing, while the rest are Amazed.  
Their first Heat being over, if any Man that has so much Constancy and Firmness of Mind, as not to have been confounded by them, shows them that they are mistaken; they nevertheless persist obstinately in their Errors. The Air of those they have Confounded Confounds them: The Sight of so many Approvers, whom they have convinced by Impression, Convinces them by a rebound: Or if that Sight does not Convince them, yet it Influences them to that degree, that they still maintain their False Sentiments. Vanity does not allow them to Retract. They always seek out some Reason to defend themselves: Moreover, they never speak with so much Heat and Eagerness, as when they have nothing to say: They imagine that People design to Affront them, and to make them Despicable, whenever they urge any Reasons against them; and the more Convincing and Judicious they are, the more they Exasperate their Pride and Aversion.  
The best way to Vindicate Truth against them, is not to Dispute; since it is better both for them and for us, to leave them in their Errors, than to gain their Aversion. We must not wound their Heart in order to cure their Mind, since the Wounds of the Heart are more Dangerous than those of the Mind: Besides, It happens sometimes, that we have to do with Men of true Learning, which we might despise for want of conceiving their Thoughts. Therefore the best way is, to desire those who speak in a decisive manner, to Explain themselves as distinctly as they can, without allowing them to change the Subject, or to use obscure equivocal Terms; and if they are Persons of Sense and Learning something will be learned by them; but if they are only Pretenders to Learning, they will soon Confound themselves by their own Words, and have no reason to blame any body besides themselves. Perhaps it may instruct us in some Respects, and may also serve to divert us, if we may be allowed to divert ourselves with the Weakness of others, when we endeavour to remedy it. But that which is most considerable, is, That thereby we may hinder the Weak who harkened to them with Admiration, from submitting to Error in following their Decisions.  
For it is observable, That the Number of Fools, or of those that suffer themselves to be guided like Machine's, and by the Impression of the Senses, being Infinitely greater than that of those who have an Intelligible Mind, and who are persuaded by Reason: When one of those Learned Men speaks of and decides any thing, there are always a greater Number of those that Believe him upon his Word, than of those that Suspect him. But whereas those Pretenders to Learning, remove themselves as far as they can from common Thoughts, both out of a Desire to meet some Opposers to Impose upon, in order to be cried up and to appear Learned, and out of a Spirit of Contradiction; their Decisions are commonly False and Obscure, and it is difficult to hearken to them without falling into some Error.  
Now this Method of discovering the Errors of others, or the Solidity of their Sentiments, is pretty Difficult to be put in Practice: The Reason of it is this, That Pretenders to Learning are not the only Persons who would seem to be Ignorant of nothing, most Men have that Defect, particularly those that have some Reading, and that have Studied, which is the reason that they will always speak and explain their Sentiments, without giving a sufficient Attention to others. The most Complaisant and most Reasonable among them, despising the Sentiments of others in their Hearts, only seem to be Attentive, while People may easily discern in their Eyes, that they do not observe what is said, and that their Mind is wholly taken up with what they design to prove to us, without thinking of answering us. This is what often makes Conversations very dull; for as nothing is more Pleasing, and because the greatest Honour People can do us, is to consider our Reasons, and approve our Opinions, so nothing can be more Offensive, than to see that People do not apprehend them; nor so much as take the least care that they may do it. For in fine, There is no Pleasure in speaking to and conversing with Statues; and who are only Statues in relation to us, because they have no value for us, and who have no thoughts to please us, but only to please themselves in endeavouring to show their Parts. But if Men knew how to give a handsome Attention and answer well, Conversation would not only be very Agreeable, but also very Useful; whereas every body striving to be thought Learned, they only hear one another; they act sometimes Uncharitably, and seldom or never discover Truth.  
But the Blunders that are committed by the said Pretenders to Learning in Conversation, are excusable in some Respects. It may be urged in Favour of them, That Men are but little attentive to what is spoken at that time; That the most Exact are sometimes guilty of it; and that they do not desire their Words should be collected like those of Scaliger, and of Cardinal du Perron.  
There is some Reason in these Excuses, and we are willing to believe, that such kind of Faults deserve some Indulgence. People are desirous to speak in Conversation, but there are unhappy days in which they do not hit things right. We are not always in a Humour to think and to express ourselves well; and Time is so short on certain Occasions, that the least Cloud, and the least absence of Mind, makes those which have the greatest Interest and Penetration of Min, stumble unluckily into Extravagant Absurdities.  
But if the Faults which the Pretenders to Learning commit in Conversation are excusable, the Faults they are guilty of in their Books, after mature Deliberation, are by no means pardonable, especially if they are frequent, and are not atoned by some good thing. For those who writ an ill Book, make abundance of People lose their time in reading of it; besides their falling into the same Errors they are guilty of; and this occasions many more, which is a thing of very ill Consequence.  
But though it be a greater Fault than People imagine, to compose an ill Book, or only an useless one, it is a Fault that sooner meets with Reward than Punishment: For there are Crimes which Men do not punish, whether it be that they are in Fashion, or because their Reason is not commonly so steady, to condemn as Criminals, whom they look upon to be Men of better Sense than they are themselves.  
Authors are commonly looked upon as Extraordinary Men, who soar much above others; and so they are respected instead of being punished. Therefore there is no likelihood that Men should ever erect a Tribunal, to Examine and Condemn all such Books as only serve to Corrupt Reason.  
So that we must never expect to see the Republic of Letters better regulated than other Republics are, since both are composed by Men. Moreover it is very necessary, in order to remove Error, to allow the Republic of Letters more Liberty than others, in which Novelty is always very Dangerous: For should the World Encroach upon the Liberty of Learned Men, and Condemn all Novelties without Discernment, it would confirm us in our Errors.  
Therefore there is no reason to find fault with my speaking against the Government of the Republic of Letters; and with ●my endeavouring to show, that often those great Men which are admired by others for their Profound Learning, are at the bottom only Vain Proud Men, without Judgement, and without any true Science. I am obliged to speak thus of them, lest People should blindly submit to their Decisions, and follow their Errors.  
The Proofs of their Vanity, 
III. Of the Books of Pretenders to Learning.  of their Want of Judgement, and of their Ignorance, are apparent in their own Works. Those who will give themselves the Trouble to examine them, with an Intent to Judge of them by the Rule of Common Sense, and without Prejudice of Esteem for those Authors, will find that most of the Designs of their Study are grounded upon an unjudicious Vanity; and that their principal End is, not to perfect their Reason, and much less to regulate the Motions of their Heart; but only to Confound others, in order to appear more Learned than they.  
This is the Reason, as we have already observed, that they always fix upon odd extraordinary Subjects; and that they only use odd and extraordinary Expressions to explain themselves; and quote none but odd and extraordinary Authors. They seldom explain themselves in their own Language, it is too common; nor yet with a clear, plain, easy Latin; they do not speak to be understood, but to be admired. They seldom apply themselves to Subjects which are useful for the Conduct of Life, that seems too common to them: They neither endeavour to be useful to others, nor to themselves, but only to be thought Learned. They give no Reasons for what they say, or else they are such Mysterious and Incomprehensible ones, as neither themselves nor any body else conceives with Evidence: They have no clear Reasons; and if they had they would not use them. Those Reasons do not surprise the Mind, they look too plain and too common, every body is capable of them. They rather choose to relate Authorities to prove, or to seem to prove their Thoughts; for often the Authorities they allege, prove nothing by the Sense they contain; they only prove because they are Greek or Arabic. But it will not be amiss to speak of their Quotations, it will in some respect discover the Disposition of their Minds.  
It is very evident, in my Opinion, that nothing but False Learning, and the Spirit of Polimathy, could make Quotations so much in vogue as they have been hitherto, and as they are still among some of the Learned; for it is not very difficult to find Authors, who quote large Passages every Moment without any reason for it; either because the things they advance are so clear that no body doubts them; or because they are so Obscure, that the Authority of their Authors cannot prove them: Or lastly, Because the Quotations they allege, can add no Ornament to what they say.  
It is repugnant to Common Sense, to introduce a large Greek Passage, to prove that the Air is Transparent, because it is a thing that is known by every body: To use the Authority of Aristotle to persuade us that there are Intelligences which move the Heavens, because it is evident that Aristotle could know nothing of it: Or to mix Forteign Languages, Arabic and Persian Proverbs in French and Latin Books, composed for every bodies use; because those Quotations can add no Ornaments to them, or else they are Fanrastical Ornaments, which disoblige a great many People, and can oblige but very few.  
Nevertheless most of those that would be thought Learned, take so much delight in those kind of Quotations, that they are not ashamed sometimes to introduce them in Languages they do not understand; and they strain hard to force an Arabic Passage into their Books, which perhaps they cannot read. Thus they puzzle themselves to compass a thing which is contrary to Common Sense, yet pleases their Vanity, and makes them cried up by Fools.  
They have also another Defect which is very considerable, and that is, They take little care to show, they have read with Choice and Judgement, they only desire to appear to have read much, and particularly Obscure Books, in order to be thought great Scholars; Books that are Scarce and Dear, lest People should think they want any thing; Wicked and Impious Books which Honest Men dare not read: Just like those that brag of Crimes which others dare not commit. Therefore they will rather quote you very Dear, very Scarce, very Ancient, and very Obscure Books, than such as are more Common and more Intelligible; and Books of Astrology, of the Caballa, and of Magic, than good Books; as if they were not Sensible, that Reading being the same thing as Conversation, they should endeavour to show that they have taken care to read good Books, and such as are most Intelligible, and not such as are bad and Obscure.  
For as it would argue a Depravation of Mind, to be fond of Conversing commonly with Men we do not understand, without an Interpreter, when it is in our Power to inform ourselves otherwise of what we desire to know: So it is Ridiculous to read only such Books as cannot be understood without a Dictionary, when the same things may be learned in those that are more Intelligible. And as it is a Sign of Madness, to affect the Company and Conversation of Impious Persons; so it is the Character of a corrupted Heart, to delight in the reading of ill Books. But it is an Extravagant piece of Pride, to be willing to persuade, that one has read even those that one has not read, which nevertheless is pretty frequent: For there are Persons that are but Thirty Years of Age, that quote more Ill Books in their Works, than they could have read in several Ages; and yet they will persuade others, they have read them with great Exactness. But most of the Books of certain Learned Men, are only compiled by dint of Dictionaries, and they have hardly read any thing beyond the Contents of the Books they quote, or some Common Places collected out of different Authors.  
I dare not particularly enlarge upon those things, nor give Examples of them, for fear of offending Persons so Haughty and so Splenatick as those Pretenders to Learning are; for there is no Delight in being abused in Greek and Arabic. Moreover, It is not very Material, in order to render what I say the more Sensible, to give particular Proofs of it; Men being naturally enough inclined to find Fault with the Conduct of others, and to apply what has been said. In the mean time let them please themselves with that vain Phantasm of Grandeur; and let them give each other the Applauses which we refuse to give them. We have perhaps already disturbed them too much in an Enjoyment, which seems so Sweet and so Delightful to them.   

CHAP. IX.  
How the Inclination we have for Honours and Riches leads us to Error.  
Honour's and Riches, as well as Virtue and Sciences, which we have been speaking of, are the Principal things that raise us above other Men; for our Being seems to Agrandize and become Independent by the Possession of these Advantages. So that the Love we bear ourselves, carrying itself naturally to Honours and Riches, we may affirm at least, that all People have some Inclination towards them. Let us explain in few words, how these Inclinations hinder us from finding out Truth, and engage us into Falsehood and Error.  
We have shown in divers Places, that a great deal of Time, Pains, Assiduity, and Industry of Mind, are required to discover Truths that are composed and surrounded with Difficulties, and which depend on many Principles. From thence it is easy to conclude, That Public Persons, who have great Employments, great Estates to govern, and great Affairs to manage, and who much Covet Honours and Riches, are not very fit to Search after these Truths; and that they often are guilty of Error, in relation to Things that are not easily known, when they set up for Judges of them.  
1. Because they have but very little Time to employ in Search of Truth.  
2. That commonly they do not delight in it.  
3. Since they are not very capable of Attention, because the Capacity of their Mind is divided by the multitude of the Ideas of such things as they desire, and to which they are obliged to apply themselves.  
4. Because they think they know every thing, and are not easily persuaded that their Inferiors can have a greater share of Reason than they have; for though they are willing to learn some things of them, they are unwilling to be instructed by them in solid and necessary Truths: They fly out into a Passion when any Body contradicts and undeceives them.  
5. Since all their Imaginations are commonly applauded, though never so false and opposite to Common Sense; and that Men Laugh at those that are not of their Opinion, though they maintain undeniable Truths. The sordid Flatteries of those that are about them confirm them in their Errors, and in the false Esteem they have of themselves, and so encourages them to judge boldly of all things.  
6. Because they seldom fix on any but sensible Notions, which are fit for Common Conversations, and to preserve the Esteem of Men, than the pure Ideas of the Mind, which serve to discover Truth.  
7. Since those who aspire to any Dignity, endeavour as much as they can to suit themselves to the Capacity of others; because nothing Excites the Envy and Aversion of Men so much as too uncommon Sentiments. It is very difficult for those whose Mind and Heart is taken up with the Thoughts and Desires of making their Fortune, to discover difficult Truths; and when they do find out any, they often abandon them out of Interest, because the Defence of those Truths does not suit with their Ambition. Men must often Wink at Injustice to become Magistrates; a solid and uncommon Piety often hinders a Man from obtaining the Goods of Fortune; and the generous Love of Truth often deprives Men of the Pulpit; where Truth ought to be Taught.  
All these Reasons joined together, make Men that are much above others by their Dignities, Nobility, and Riches, or such who only think of rising and making their Fortune, very liable to Error, and little capable of discovering hidden Truths. For among those things that are necessary to avoid Error in Questions that are somewhat difficult, there are two principal ones that are not commonly met with in the persons we are speaking of, viz. Attention of Mind to Penetrate into the Bottom of Things; and Wisdom enough not to Judge of them Rashly. Even those that are chosen to Teach others, and whose Business it is to Inform themselves, in order to instruct those that are committed to their Care, commonly become liable to Error, as soon as they become Public Persons: Either because that having very little time, they are incapable of Attention, and applying themselves to things which require a great deal of time; or because that being earnestly desirous to appear great Scholars, they boldly decide all things without the least Consideration, and will hardly suffer any Body to Oppose, and to Instruct them.   

CHAP. X.  
Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Morality.  
I. We must shun Pleasure though it make us Happy.  
II. It must not incline us to the Love of Sensible Delights.  
WE have spoken in the three preceding Chapters of the Inclination we have towards the preservation of our Being, and how it occasions our falling into many Errors: We will now speak of that which we have for Wellbeing, that is for Pleasure, and for all things that make us happier and more contented, or that we think capable of doing so; and we will endeavour to discover the Errors that proceed from that Inclination.  
There are Philosophers who do what they can to persuade Men, that Pleasure is not a Good, and that Pain is not an Evil: That we may be Happy in the midst of the most violent Pains and Unhappy amidst the greatest Pleasures. As these Philosophers are very Pathetic and Fanciful, they without much difficulty prevail upon the Minds of Weak People, who easily receive the Impression which those that speak produce in them: For Stoics are a little Visionary, and Visionaries are Vehement; and so they easily Imprint in others the false Sentiments they are possessed with. But whereas there is no Conviction against Experience, and our Inward Sentiments, those pompous magnificent Reasons vanish, with all their Lustre, as soon as the Soul is affected with some sensible Pleasure or Pain: And those who have placed all their Confidence in that false persuasion of their Mind, are deprived of Wisdom and Power at the least Attack of Vice; and find that they have been deceived, and that they are vanquished.  
Since Philosophers cannot give their Disciples the power of overcoming their Passions; at least, 
I. We must shun Pleasurethough it make u● Happy.  they should not seduce or persuade them that they have no Enemies to Encounter. They should speak the Truth; Pleasure is always a Good, and Pain ever an Evil: But it is not always advantageous to enjoy Pleasure; for it is sometimes profitable to suffer Pain.  
But in order the better to Explain my meaning, it is fit to know,  
1. That God only is powerful enough to act in us, and to make us sensible of Pleasure and Pain. For it is evident to all Men that consult their Reason, and despise the Testimony of their Senses, that it is not the Objects which we feel, that Act Effectively in us, and that it is not our Soul neither which causes pleasure and pain in itself in respect to them.  
2. That Good is commonly to be given, only in order to the performance of some good Action, or to reward it; and that commonly Evil is only to be inflicted in order to prevent an Ill Action, or to punish it: And therefore since God always acts agreeable to Order, and according to the Rules of Justice, all Pleasures either Incline us to some good Action, or reward us for it; and all Pains serve to prevent some ill Action, or to punish us for the Committing of it.  
3. That there are Actions that are good in one sense, and bad in another. For instance, it is an Ill Action to expose one's self to Death, when God forbids it. But it is a Good One when God Commands it. For all our Actions are Good or Ill, because God has Commanded, or forbidden them by his first general Will, which is the Order and Institution of Nature; or by his other particular Will and Commandments, which are necessary for the re-establishment of Nature.  
Therefore I say that Pleasure is always Good; but that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it.  
1. Because that instead of engaging us to him who is only capable of causing it, it weans us from him to Unite us to that which seems falsely to cause it. It sets us at a Distance from God, to Unite us to a Vile Creature. For although true Philosophers sometimes think that Pleasure is not occasioned by outward Objects, and that that may in some measure Incline them to Acknowledge and Love God in all things; nevertheless since the Introduction of Sin, the Reason of Man is so Weak, and his Senses and Imagination have so much Power over his Mind, that they soon Corrupt his Heart. When we do not lay aside, according to the Advice of the Gospel, all things that do not of themselves incline us to God. For the best Philosophy cannot Cure the Mind, nor resist the disorder of Voluptuousness.  
2. Since Pleasure is a Reward, it is a piece of Injustice to produce Motions in our Body which oblige God, in consequence of his first Will, to make us feel Pleasure, when we do not deserve any; either because the Action we do is Useless or Criminal, or because that being full of Sin, we ought not to desire a Reward of him. Man before the Fall might justly enjoy sensible Pleasures in his Regular Actions: But since the Fall there are no sensible Pleasures altogether Innocent, nor any but such as are capable of injuring us when we enjoy them; for often the bare tasting of them is sufficient to make us Slaves to them.  
3. Because God being Just, he must needs at some time or other punish the Violence that is offered to him, when Men oblige him to recompense with Pleasure the Criminal Actions which they Commit against him. When our Soul shall be no longer united to our Bodies, God will no longer lie under the Obligation which he has laid upon himself, to give us Sensations to answer to the Motions of the Mind; and he will still remain under the Obligation of satisfying his Justice: And therefore that will be the time of his Vengeance and Wrath. Then without changing the Order of Nature, and remaining always Immutable in his first Will, he will punish the unjust pleasures of the Voluptuous, with Pains that never will have an End.  
4. Because that the certainty we have in this Life that the said Justice must be performed, agitates the Mind with mortal Disquiets, and flings it into a kind of Despair, which renders the Voluptuous miserable, even in the midst of the greatest Pleasures.  
5. Since commonly dismal Remorses accompany the most Innocent Pleasures, because we are convinced that we deserve none; and those Remorses deprive us of a certain Inward Joy, which is found even in actions of Penitence.  
Thus though Pleasure is a Good, it must be granted that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it for these Reasons; and for others like these, which it is very necessary to know, and which are easily deduced from these; and it is always very advantageous to suffer Pain, though it be really an Evil.  
Nevertheless, all Pleasure is a Good, and actually makes those Happy that enjoy it, while they enjoy it, and as long as they enjoy it; and all Grief or Pain is an Evil, and actually makes the person that suffers it unhappy, while he suffers it, and as long as he suffers it. It may be said that the Righteous and Holy are the most unhappy Men in this Life, and the most worthy of Compassion. Si in vita tantum in Christo speramus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus, says Saint Paul; for those that Weep, and suffer Persecution for Justice, are not Happy because they suffer Persecution for Justice; but because the Kingdom of Heaven is theirs, and a great Reward is in store for them in Heaven; that is, Because they shall be Happy. Those that suffer Persecution for Justice are thereby Just, Virtuous, and Perfect, because they are in the Order that God has prescribed, and Perfection consists in following him: but they are not Happy because they Suffer. A time will come when they will Suffer no more; and then they will be Happy, as well as Just and Perfect.  
However, I do not deny but that the Righteous may be Happy in some measure even in this Life, by the strength of their Hope and Faith, which render those future Felicities, as it were, present to their Mind. For it is certain, that when the Hope of some Happiness is strong and lively, it draws it nearer to the Mind, and gives it a taste thereof beforehand: And thus it makes us Happy in some measure, since it is the taste and possession of Good and of Pleasure, which makes us Happy.  
Therefore it is unreasonable to tell Men that sensible Pleasures are not Good, and that those that enjoy them are never the Happier; since it is not true, and at the time of Temptation they discover it to their misfortune. We must tell them, that those Pleasures are good in themselves, and capable to make them Happy in some measure: Nevertheless, they ought to avoid them for the Reasons beforementioned; but they cannot avoid them of themselves: Because they desire to be Happy through an Inclination which they cannot overcome, and those transitory Pleasures which they ought to avoid, satisfy it in some measure: Thus they are in a miserable Necessity of losing themselves, unless they are assisted. It is necessary to tell them these things, that they may distinctly know their Weakness, and the want they have of a Redeemer.  
We must speak to Men like Jesus Christ, and not like the Stoics, who neither understand the Nature nor Distemper of Human Minds. They must continually be told, that they must hate and despise themselves, and not look for an Establishment or Happiness on Earth: That they must daily carry their Cross, or the Instrument of their suffering, and that they must lose their Life at present, in order to preserve it Eternally. They must be taught, that they are obliged to act contrary to their desire, to make 'em sensible of their inability to good. For Men would be invincibly Happy, and they cannot be actually so, unless they do what they please. Perhaps being convinced of their present Evils, and knowing their future sufferings, they may humble themselves on Earth: Perhaps they may invoke the Assistance of Heaven, and seek a Mediator; be afraid of sensible Objects, and timely abhor whatever flatters their Senses and Concupiscence. And it may be they may thus obtain that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance which is so necessary to obtain Grace, and without which there is no Power, no Health, nor no Salvation to be expected.  
We are inwardly convinced that Pleasure is Good, 
II. It must not incline us to the Love of sensible Delights.  and that the inward Conviction thereof is not False, for Pleasure is really Good. We are Naturally Convinced, that Pleasure is the Character of Good, and that Natural Conviction is certainly true; for that which Causes Pleasure is certainly very Good, and very Lovely. But we are not convinced, that either sensible Objects, or our Souls themselves, are capable of producing Pleasure in us; for there is no reason to believe it, and there are a Thousand against it. Therefore sensible Objects are neither Good, nor Lovely. Were they necessary toward the Preservation of Life, we ought to use them: But as they are not capable of Acting in us, we ought not to Love them. The Soul must only Love him that is Good, who only is capable to make it Happier, and more perfect. Therefore it should only Love that which is above it, since it can receive its Perfection from nothing that is either below, or equal to it.  
But whereas we judge that a Thing is the Cause of some Effect, when it always attends it, we fancy that they are Sensible Objects which act in us, because at their approach we have new Sensations, and because we do not see him that produces them really in us. We taste a Fruit, and we find a Sweetness; we impute that Sweetness to that Fruit; we conclude that it causes it, and even that it contains it. We do not see God as we see and as we feel that Fruit; we do not so much as think on him, nor perhaps on ourselves: Therefore we do not conclude that God is the real Cause of that Sweetness, nor that the said Sweetness is a Modification of our Soul; we impute both the Cause and the Effect, to that Fruit which we eat.  
What I have said of Sensations which have a relation to the Body, is also to be understood of those that have no relation to it, as those which are found in pure Intelligences.  
The Mind considers itself; it sees that nothing is wanting to its Happiness and Perfection; or else it sees that it does not possess what it desires. At the sight of its Happiness it feels Joy; at the sight of its Misfortunes it endures Sorrow. It strait fancies, that it is the sight of its Happiness which produces in itself that Sentiment of Joy, because the said Sentiment always attends that sight. It also imagines, that it is the sight of its Misfortune which produces in itself that Sentiment of Grief, since the said Sentiment is the Consequence of this sight. The real Cause of those Sentiments, which is God alone, does not appear before it: It does not so much as think on God; for he acts in us without our knowing it.  
God rewards us with a Sentiment of Joy, when we know that we are in the Condition in which we ought to be, that we may remain in it, that our Disquiet may cease, and that we may fully enjoy our Happiness, without suffering the Capacity of our Mind to be filled with any thing else. But he produces a Sentiment of Grief in us, when we are Sensible that we are not in the State in which we ought to be, so that we may not remain in it, and that we might earnestly seek after the Perfection that is wanting in us. For God bushes us continually toward Good, when we are Sensible that we do not possess it; and he fixes us powerfully upon it, when we find that we possess it fully. So that it seems evident to me, that the Intellectual Sentiments of Joy or of Grief, as well as the Sensible ones, are no voluntary Productions of the Mind.  
Therefore we ought continually to acknowledge by our Reason, that Invisible Hand which fills us with Bliss, and which disguises itself to our Mind, under Sensible Appearances. We must Adore it, we must Love it; but we must also Fear it, for since it fills us with Pleasures, it may also overwhelm us with Grief. We ought to Love it by a Love of Choice, by a Sensible Love, by a Love worthy of God, when we Love him because we know that he is Amiable: And that Love is worthy of us, because that being Reasonable, we ought to Love that which Reason informs us to be worthy of our Love. But we Love Sensible Things, by a Love that is unworthy of us, and which they are also unworthy of: For being Reasonable, we Love them without any Reason to Love them, since we do not clearly know that they are Lovely; and on the contrary, we know they are not so. But Pleasures Seduce us, and make us Love them; the Blind and Irregular Love of Pleasure, being the real Cause of those False Judgements of Men in Subjects of Morality.   

CHAP. XI.  
Of the Love of Pleasure, in relation to Speculative Sciences.  
I. How it hinders us from discovering Truth.  
II. Some Examples.  
THE Inclination we have for Sensible Pleasures being disordered, is not only the Source of the Dangerous Errors we fall into in cases of Morality, and the general Causes of the Depravation of our Manners; it is also one of the Principal Causes of the Disorder of our Reason, and it engages us Insensibly into very gross Errors, but less dangerous upon Subjects that are merely Speculative; because the said Inclination hinders us from having a sufficient Attention for things that do not affect us, to apprehend them, and to judge well of them.  
We have already spoken in several places, of the Difficulty Men find in applying themselves to Subjects that are a little uncommon, because the Matter we treated of then required it. We spoke of it towards the end of the first Book, in showing that the Sensible Ideas affecting the Soul more than the Pure Ideas of the Mind, it often applied itself more to the Manner than the Thing itself. We spoke of it in the Second, because in treating of the Delicacy of the Fibers of the Brain, we showed whence the Softness of certain Effeminate Minds did proceed. Finally, We spoke of it in the Third, in mentioning of the Attention of the Mind, when we were about proving, that our Soul had but little Attention to Things that were merely Speculative; but a great deal more to such as affect it, and make it Sensible of Pleasure or Grief.  
Our Errors have commonly several Causes which contribute all to their Rise: So that we must not imagine, that it is for want of Order that we sometimes repeat almost the same things, and that we impute several Causes to the same Errors; it is because there are really many. I speak still of occasional Causes; for we have often declared, that there are no other Real and True, but the ill use of our Liberty, which we do not always make use of so much as we might, as we have explained at the beginning of this Work.  
No body ought to blame us, if in order to make Men plainly conceive, how for Example the Sensible Manner in which things are covered, does Surprise and makes us liable to fall into Error; we have been obliged to say beforehand in the other Books, that we had an Inclination for Pleasures, which seems necessary to be repeated in this, which treats of Natural Inclinations, and the same of some other things in other places. All the Harm it will occasion is, that there will be no necessity to say many things here, which we should have been obliged to explain, if it had not been done elsewhere.  
All things that are in Man, are so dependant on one another, that we find ourselves often overwhelmed, under the number of things we are to treat of at one and the same time, to explain perfectly what we conceive. We are sometimes necessitated not to divide things that are joined by Nature one to another, and to proceed contrary to the order we had prescribed, when that order occasions nothing but Confusion, as it happens of necessity on some occasions. Yet for all this it is impossible to give others an Idea of all we think of: All that we can commonly pretend to, is to put others in a way to discover with Pleasure and Ease, what we have discovered with great Labour and Pains. And whereas it is Impossible to discover any thing without Attention, we must particularly study the Means to make others Attentive. 'Tis what we have endeavoured to do, though we acknowledge we have performed it weakly, and we own our Faults the more willingly, to the end that the said Confession may excite those who shall read this, to render themselves Attentive of their own accord, in order to remedy the same, and to penetrate to the bottom of these Subjects, which without doubt deserve to be well considered.  
The Errors, into which the Inclination we have for Pleasure, and generally for all things that affect us, engage us, are Infinite; because the said Inclination dissipates the Sight of the Mind, and it applies it continually on the confused Ideas of the Senses, and the Imagination; and it inclines us to judge of all things rashly, by the bare relation they have to us. 
I. How it hinders us from discovering Truth.   
We never see Truth, until we see things as they are; and we never see them as they are, unless we see them in him that contains them after an Intelligible manner. When we see things ourselves, we only see them very Imperfectly, or rather we only see our own Sentiments, and not the Things we are desirous to see, and which we falsely imagine we do see.  
It requires a great deal of Application to see things as they are in themselves; because it is now impossible for Man to unite himself to God without Pain and Labour: To see things in ourselves, requires no Application on our part, since we feel what touches us even against our Will. Naturally we find no anticipating Pleasure in the Union we have with God, the pure Ideas of things do not move us. Therefore the Inclination we have for Pleasure, does neither apply nor unite us to God; on the contrary, it weans and removes us from him: For that Inclination induces us continually to consider things by their Sensible Ideas, because those False and Impure Ideas affect us. The Love of Pleasure, and the actual Enjoyment of Pleasure, which revives and increases our Love for it, removeth us continually from Truth, to cast us into Error.  
Therefore those that are desirous to draw near to Truth, to be guided by its Light, must begin by laying aside Pleasure: They must carefully avoid whatever affects and agreeably divides the Mind; for the Senses and Passions must be silenced, in order to hear the Word of Truth; it being necessary to withdraw our Affections from the World, and to condemn all Sensible Things, as well for the Perfection of the Mind, as for the Conversion of the Heart. When our Pleasures are great, when our Sentiments are lively, we are not capable of the plainest Truths, and we do not so much as grant common Notions, unless they contain something that is Sensible. When our Pleasures, or other Sensations are moderate, we can discover some plain easy Truths: But if it were possible for us wholly to lay aside Pleasures and Sensations, we should be capable of discovering with ease the most concealed Truths, and the most difficult that are known: For the more we remove from that which is not God, the nearer we draw to God himself, we avoid Error, and we discover Truth. But since the Fall, since the unruly Love of anticipating Pleasures, which rules predominantly, the Mind is become so weak, that it can penetrate into nothing, and so Material and Dependant on the Senses, that it cannot reach difficult things which do not affect it. It does not even perceive common Notions, and often concludes for want of Attention, that they are False and Obscure. It cannot distinguish the Truth of things from their Usefulness, the relation they have among one another, from the relation they have to us; and it often believes that those are the Truest that are the most Useful, the most Agreeable, and that affect it most. In fine, That Inclination Infects and Confounds all the Perceptions we have of Objects, and consequently all the Judgements we make of them. Here are some Examples.  
It is a common Notion that Virtue is preferable to Vice; that it is better to be Chaste, 
II. Some Examples.  than Intemperate and Voluptuous. But our Inclination for Pleasure, confounds that Idea to that degree on some occasions, that we have but a glimpse of it left; and it is impossible to draw the Consequences from thence, which are necessary for the Conduct of Life. The Soul is so taken up with the Pleasures it hopes for, that it supposes them Innocent, and aims at nothing but the Means to enjoy them.  
Every body knows, that it is better to be Just than Rich: That Justice exalts a Man more than the Possession of the most Sumptuous Buildings, which often serve less to discover the Grandeur of the Owner, than the Greatness of his Injustices and Crimes. But the Pleasure which Inadvertent People receive in the Vain Ostentation of their False Grandeur, sufficiently fills up the small Capacity of their Mind, to conceal and obscure so evident a Truth from them. They foolishly imagine that they are great Men, because they have great Houses.  
Specious Algebra is certainly the finest, I mean the most Fruitful and most Certain of all Sciences; without it the Mind has neither Penetration nor Extent; and with it, it is capable of knowing almost every thing that can be known with Certainty and Evidence. As Imperfect as that Science has been, it has made all those Famous that have learned it, and that have known how to Practise it: They have thereby discovered Truths which seemed almost Incomprehensible to other Men. It is so well proportioned to Humane Minds, that without distracting their Capacity with useless things in what they seek after, it conducts them Infallibly to what they aim at. In a word, It is an Universal Science, and as it were the Key of all other Sciences; yet as valuable as it is in itself, it has nothing in it that is taking in order to Charm Men, by this reason only, that it is not Sensible. It has been buried absolutely in Forgetfulness for several Ages. There are at this very time, many Men who do not know the name of it; and among a Thousand Persons, you will hardly meet one or two who understand any thing in it: The most Learned that have revived it in our days, have not carried it very far, and have not handled it with that Order and Clearness it deserves. Being Men as well as others, they have at last been disgusted with those pure Truths which are not attended by Sensible Pleasure; and the Disquietness of their Will being Corrupted by Sin, the Inconstancy of their Mind, which depends on the Agitation and Circulation of the Blood, has not allowed them to consider any longer those Great, those Vast, and those Plentiful Truths, which are the Immutable and Universal Rules, of all Transitory and particular Truths, that may be known with Exactness.  
Metaphysics is also an abstracted Scie●●●, which does not affect the Senses, the Study the● of afford the Soul no manner of Pleasure; for which reaso● the said Science is very much neglected; and 〈◊〉 often meet Men that are so Stupid, as boldly to d●● common Notions. There are some that deny 〈◊〉 one may, or aught to affirm a thing is, by what is included in the clear and distinct Idea one has of it: That Nothing has no Proprieties; That a thing cannot be reduced to nothing without Miracle; That no body can move itself by its own Force; That an Active Body can communicate no more Motion to any Body it encounters, than it has of itself, and the like. They have never considered those Axioms with Stediness and Clearness enough, to discover the Truth of them distinctly; and they have sometimes made Experiments, which have falsely convinced them, that some of those Axioms were not true. They have seen on some occasions, that two Visible Bodies meeting each other, ceased both to move after the Blow: They have seen in others, that the Bodies which were hit, had more Motion than the Visible Bodies that did hit them: And this Sensible Sight of some Experiments, whose reasons they see not, makes them decide things against certain Principles, which pass for common Notions in the Minds of all those that are capable of any Attention. Ought they not to consider, that Motions may be communicated from Visible Bodies to Invisible ones, when the Bodies that are in motion meet; or from the Invisible to the Visible on other occasions? When a Body is Suspended by a Cord, the Knife wherewith that Cord is cut, does not give the Motion to that Body, it is an Invisible Matter that does it. When a Coal of Fire is fling into a heap of Gunpowder, it is not the motion of the Coal, but an invisible Matter, which scatters all the parts of that Powder, and which gives it a motion capable of blowing up a House. There are a Thousand ways by which invisible Matter communicates its Motion to gross visible Bodies: At least it is not evident that it cannot be done, as it is evident that the moving force of Bodies can neither be increased nor diminished by the usual force of Nature.  
So Men see that the Wood that is slung into the Fire, ceases to be what it is; and that all the Sensible Qualities they observe in it dissipate themselves; and from thence they think they are in the right, to conclude, that it is possible for a thing to return to its former nothing: They do no longer see the Wood, and they only see a few Ashes which succeed it; and from thence they judge that the major part of the Wood ceases to be, as if the Wood could not be redu●● 〈◊〉 invisible parts At least it is not so evident that this 〈…〉 that the force which gives a being to all things, is not subject to change; and that by the ordinary force of Nature, what is, cannot be reduced to nothing, as what is not, cannot begin to be. But few Men know what it is to look within themselves, there to hear the Voice of Truth, according to which they ought to judge of all things; their Eyes regulate their Decisions: They judge according to what they feel, and not according to what they conceive, for they feel with Pleasure, and conceive with Pain.  
Ask all Men in the World, Whether one may affirm, without fear of being deceived, that the whole is greater than a part, and I am confident that there is not one, but will answer immediately as he ought to do. Ask them in the next place, Whether we may likewise, without fear of being deceived, affirm of a thing, that which we conceive clearly to be included within the Idea which represents it; and you will find, that few will grant it without Hesitation, that more will deny it, and that the major part of them will not know what to answer. Yet this Metaphysical Axiom, That we may affirm of a thing, which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it, is more evident than this Axiom, That the whole is greater than its part; because this last Axiom is not an Axiom, but only a Conclusion in respect to the first. One may prove that the whole is greater than part by this first Axiom; but this first can be proved by no other: It is absolutely the first, and the Foundation of all clear and evident Knowledge. Why then does no body hesitate upon the Conclusion, and yet many question the Principle from which it is derived; unless it be because the Ideas of the whole and of part are Sensible; and that our Eyes inform us, that the whole is larger than part of it; and that our Eyes do not see the Truth of the first Axiom of all Sciences?  
As there is nothing in this Axiom, that naturally fixes or applies the Mind, we must be willing to consider it constantly and willingly, in order to make an evident Discovery of the Truth thereof. But Men seldom think on Objects which do not affect their Senses; and when they do, it has no Prevalency with them.  
For to continue our said Example, they think it evident, that the whole is greater than its part; that a Mountain of Marble is possible, and that a Mountain without a Vale is impossible; and that it is not equally evident that there is a God. Nevertheless we may say, that the Evidence is equal in all those Propositions, since they are all equally distant from the first Principle.  
This is the first Principle: We must attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it: We clearly conceive that there is more Extent in the Idea we have of the whole, than in the Idea we have of its part: That a possible Existence is contained in the Idea of a Mountain of Marble, the Impossible Existence in the Idea of a Mountain without a Vale; and the necessary Existence in the Idea we have of God, I mean, of an Infinitely perfect Being. Therefore the whole is larger than part of it: Therefore a Mountain of Marble may be Existent: Therefore a Mountain without a Vale cannot be Existent: Therefore God or an Infinitely Perfect Being does necessarily Exist. It is visible that these Conclusions are equally distant from the first Principle of all Sciences: They are then equally evident in themselves: It is then as evident that God does Exist, as that the whole is greater than its part. But whereas the Ideas of Infinite, of Perfections, of necessary Existence, are not Sensible, like the Ideas of the whole and of its part, Men fancy they do not perceive what they are not sensible of; and though these Conclusions are equally Evident in themselves, they are not however equally received.  
There are Men who endeavour to persuade us, that they have no Idea of an infinitely perfect Being. But I do not know what induces them to answer positively, when they are asked whether an infinitely perfect Being is Round or Square, or something like it: For they ought to answer, that they know nothing of it, if it be true that they have no Idea of it.  
There are others who grant, that those Reason well who conclude, that God is not an Impossible Being, from this, that we see the Idea of God includes no Contradiction, or an impossible Existence; and they will not allow us to conclude in the same manner, that God Exists necessarily, from this that we conceive a necessary Existence in the Idea we have of him.  
Finally, There are others who pretend that this proof of the Existence of God is a Sophism; and that the Argument only concludes, supposing it is true that God Exists, as if it were not proved. This is our proof: We ought to attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it. This is the general Principle of all Sciences. Necessary Existence is included in the Idea which represents a Being infinitely Perfect; they grant it. And Consequently we must say, that the infinitely perfect Being Exists. Yes, say they, supposing that he Exists.  
But let us make such an Answer to such an Argument, to the End that the World may Judge of the Solidity of their Answer. Here is an Argument like it. We ought to attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it: That is the Principle. We clearly conceive four Angles included in the Idea which represents a Square, or we conceive clearly that possible Existence is included in the Idea of a Marble Tower: Therefore a Square has Four Angles: Therefore a Marble Tower is possible. I say those Conclusions are true, supposing that the Square has Four Angles; just as they answer that God Exists, supposing he does Exist: That is to say in a word, The Conclusions of those Demonstrations are true, supposing they are true.  
I own, that if I should make such an Argument as this, we must attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it, for we clearly conceive the necessary Existence included in the Idea of a Body infinitely Perfect, consequently a Body infinitely Perfect Exists. It is true, I say, that should I make such an Argument, People would be in the right to answer, that it would not conclude the Actual Existence of a Body infinitely Perfect; but only supposing that there were such a Body, it would have its Existence in itself. The reason of it is, that the Idea of a Body infinitely Perfect is a Fiction of the Mind, or a Compounded Idea; which consequently may be False or Contradictory, as indeed it is: For we cannot clearly conceive a Body infinitely Perfect; since a particular Finite Being, as a Body is, cannot be conceived to be Universal and Infinite.  
But the Idea of God, or of a general Being, of an unlimited Being, of an infinite Being, is not a Fiction of the Mind. It is not a Compounded Idea which includes any Contradiction; nothing can be plainer, though it Comprehends all that is, and whatever may be. Now that plain and natural Idea of Being or Infinity, includes a necessary Existence; for it is evident, that Being (I do not say such a Being) has Existence in itself; and that Being cannot actually not be Being, since it is impossible and contradictory, that Real Being should be without an Existence. It may chance that Bodies may not be, because Bodies are such Being's as participate of Being, and depend on it. But unlimited Being is necessary; it is Independent; it derives what it is from itself. All that is proceeds from it. If there is any thing, it is, since all proceeds from it: But though there were nothing in particular, it would be; because it is of itself, and we cannot conceive it clearly as not Being, unless we look upon it as Being in particular, or like such a Being; and that we thus consider all other Ideas besides that of Being. For those that do not see that God is, commonly do not consider Being, but such a Being; and consequently a Being that may be, and may not be.  
Moreover, that we may yet more distinctly apprehend this proof of the Existence of God, and answer some Objections that might be made, more clearly, we must remember that when we see a Creature, we do not see it in itself, nor by itself; for we only see it, as it has been proved in the Third Book, by the sight of some Perfections that are in God, which represent it. Thus we may see the Essence of that Creature, without seeing its Existence; we may see in God that which represents it, without its Existing. Therefore necessary Existence is not included in the Idea which represents it, it not being necessary that it should be, to the End it may be seen. But the Case is very different in the infinitely perfect Being; It can only be seen in itself; for nothing that is Finite can represent Infinity So that we cannot see God, unless he Exists: It is impossible to see the Essence of a Being infinitely Perfect, without seeing the Existence of it: We cannot see it barely as a possible Being: Nothing Comprehends it; and if we think on it, it must be.  
But it is useless to propose these kind of Demonstrations to the common sort of Mankind. These Demonstrations may be called Personal, by reason that they do not generally convince all Men. We must use more sensible ones in order to Convince them; and indeed they are not wanting: For no Truth has more Proofs than that of the Existence of God. This was only urged to show, that refined Truths making hardly any Impressions on our Senses, are taken for Illusions and Chimeras; whereas, when gross palpable Truths affect the Senses, forcing the Soul to consider them, we are easily persuaded that they have a great deal of reality; for since the Fall they make strong Impressions on our Mind.  
'Tis for the same reason, that there is no prospect to hope, that the common part of Mankind will ever submit to this Demonstration to prove, that Animals are not sensible, viz. that being Innocent, which all the World grants, and I suppose it, if they were capable of Sensation, it would happen that under a God infinitely Just and Almighty, an Innocent should suffer Grief, which is a pain, and the punishment of Sin. Men are commonly incapable of seeing the Evidence of this Axiom, Sub justo Deo, quisquam nisi mereatur, miser esse non potest; which St. Austin makes use of with a great deal of Reason against Julian, to prove Original Sin, and the Corruption of our Nature. They Fancy that there is neither Force nor Solidity in this Axiom, and in some others which prove, that Beasts are not sensible, because as we have already said, those Axioms are refined, and include nothing that is sensible or palpable, or make any Impression upon our Senses.  
The sensible Actions and Motions of Beasts, towards the preservation of that Life, are Reasons, which though only probable, affect us more; and which consequently, incline us much more powerfully to believe that they are sensible of Pain or Grief, when they cry out being struck ●●an that refined Reason of the pure Mind, though most certain and evident in itself. For it is certain, that most Men have no other reason to believe that Animals have Souls, 
I speak according to the Common Opinion, which is, that the Chicken is formed from the Egg, though perhaps it only receives its Nutriment from it.  but the sensible Sight of all what Beasts do for the preservation of their Life.  
That is apparent enough from this, that most People do not imagine there is a Soul in an Egg, although the Transformation of an Egg into a Chicken, is infinitely more difficult than the bare preservation of the Chicken, when it is absolutely formed. For as more Ingenuity is requi d to make a Watch out of a piece of Iron, than to make it go when it is finished, it would be more reasonable to admit a Soul in an Egg, in order to Form a Chicken, than to make that Chicken live when it is perfectly Formed. But Men do not see the admirable manner how a Chicken is Formed, as they always sensibly see in what manner they seek for those things that are necessary for their preservation. Therefore they are not inclined to believe that there are Souls in Eggs, by some sensible Impression of necessary Motions to Transform Eggs into Chickens; but they allow Animals Souls, by reason of the sensible Impression of the External Actions of those Animals for preservation of their Life; although the reason I have here alleged, is stronger to give Souls to Eggs than to Chickens.  
The second Reason, which is, that Matter is incapable of feeling, and of desiring, is certainly demonstrative against those who say, that Animals are sensible, notwithstanding their Soul is Corporeal. But Men will Eternally Confound and Entangle those Reasons, rather than own a thing contrary to Proofs that are not only probable, but very sensible and feeling: And there is no way to convince them absolutely, but in opposing sensible proofs to their sensible proofs; and in showing them visibly, that all the parts of Animals are only Machinal; and that they may move without a Soul by the mere Impression of Objects, and by their peculiar Constitution; as Monsieur Descartes has begun to do it in his Treatise of Man. For all the most certain and evident reasons of the Understanding alone will never persuade them the contrary of the obscure Proofs they have by the Senses: And we only expose ourselves to the Laughter of Persons of a superficial Understanding, that are not capable of much Attention, when we undertake to convince them by Reasons above the common Level, that Animals have no Feeling.  
Therefore it behoves us well to remember, that the Violent Inclinations we have for Divertisements, Pleasures, and generally, for all that does affect us, throws us into a great number of Errors: Because the Capacity of our Mind being Bounded, that Inclination withdraws our Mind continually from the Attention we should give to the clear and distinct Ideas of the Understanding, which are proper to discover Truth, to apply it to the false, obscure, and deceitful Ideas of our Senses; which Influence the Will more by the hope of Good and Pleasure, than they Instruct the Mind by their Light and Evidence.   

CHAP. XII.  
Of the Effects which the thought of Future Bliss and Sufferings is capable of producing in the Mind.  
IF it happens often that the little Pleasures and slight Pains which we actually feel, nay more, which we have a Prospect of, strangely disturb our Imagination, and hinder us from judging of things according to their true Ideas; we have no reason to believe that the prospect of Eternity cannot act upon our Mind. But it will be necessary to consider what it may be capable of producing there.  
We must observe in the First Place, that the hopes of an Eternity of Pleasures does not Act so powerfully upon the Mind, as the fear of an Eternity of Torments. The Reason of it is, Men do not Love Pleasure so much, as they Hate Pain. Moreover, by the Internal Knowledge they have of their Disorders, they are sensible that they deserve Hell; and they see nothing in themselves to Merit such great Rewards, as to participate of the Felicity of God himself. They are sensible when they please, and even sometimes against their Will, that far from deserving Rewards, they are worthy of the greatest Chastisements; for their Conscience never leaves them; but they are in the like manner continually convinced, that God is willing to show his Mercy upon Sinners, after having satisfied his Justice upon his Son. Therefore the Just themselves have more Lively Apprehensions of the Eternity of Torments, than Hopes of an Eternity of Pleasures. The prospect of Pain then consequently, is more prevailing than the prospect of Reward; and here is partly that which it is capable of producing, not alone, but as a principal Cause.  
It produces an infinite number of Scruples in the Mind, and confirms them so much, that it is almost impossible to get rid of them. It Extends, as it were, even Faith to prejudices, and makes us pay the Worship which is only due to God, to Imaginary Powers. It obstinately fixes the Mind on vain or dangerous Superstitions. It makes Men earnestly and zealously Embrace Human Traditions, and Practices that are useless for Salvation, Judaick and Pharisaic Devotions, which have been invented by servile Fear. Finally, it sometimes throws Men into a blindness of Despair: Insomuch, that looking confusedly on Death as an Annihilation, they foolishly hasten to make away with themselves, to be freed of the Mortal Disquiets which possess and frighten them.  
There is often more Charity than Self-Love, in the Scrupulous, as well as in the Superstitious; but there is nothing but Self-love in the desperate: For taking the thing rightly, those must needs Love themselves extremely, who choose rather not to be, than to be uneasy. Women, Young People, and Weak Minds are the most subject to Scruples and Superstitions, and Men are more liable to Despair.  
It is easy to know the reason of these things. For it is Visible, that the Idea of Eternity being the greatest, the most terrible, and the most frightful of all those that surprise the Mind, and strike the Imagination, it is necessary it should be attended with a long Train of Accessary Ideas, to make together a considerable Effect upon the Mind, because of the Relation they have to that great and terrible Idea of Eternity.  
Whatever has any relation to Infinity cannot be Little, or if it is Little in itself, it receives an immense greatness by that Relation, which cannot be compared to any thing that is Finite. Therefore whatever has any relation, or even what we fancy to have any relation, either to an unavoidable Eternity of Torments, or Delights which is proposed to us, must needs frighten those Minds that are capable of any Reflection or Thought.  
The Fibers of the Brains of Women, or young People, and of weak Minds, being, as I have said elsewhere, Soft and Flexible, receive deep Marks of one of these two: And when they have abundance of Spirits, and are more capable of Thought and Just Reflection, they receive by the Vivacity of their Imagination a very great number of false Impressions and Accessary Ideas, which have no Natural Relation to the Principal Idea. Nevertheless that Relation, though Imaginary, maintains and fortifies those False Impressions, and Accessary Ideas which it has created.  
When two Lawyers are engaged in some great Cause, which wholly takes up their Mind, and yet do not understand the Case, they often have vain Fears, being in dread that certain things may Prejudice them which the Judges have no regard to, and which experienced Lawyers do not fear. The Affair being of very great Consequence to them, the Motion it produces in their Brains diffuses itself, and is communicated to distant traces which have naturally no relation to it. It fares just in the same manner with the Scrupulous, they unreasonably form to themselves Subjects of Fear and Disquiet; and instead of examining the Will of God in the Holy Scriptures, and of relying on those whose Imagination is not tainted; their Mind is wholly taken up with an Imaginary Law, which disorderly Motions of Fear impress on their Brains. And though they are inwardly convinced of their Weakness, and that God does not require from them certain Duties which they prescribe to themselves, since they hinder them from serving him; they cannot forbear preferring their Imagination to their Understanding, and from submitting rather to certain Confused Sentiments which frighten and plunge them into Error, than to the Evidence of Reason, which gives them Assurance, and leads them again into the right way to Heaven.  
We meet often with a great deal of Charity and Virtue in Persons that are afflicted with Scruples; but there is not near so much in those that are addicted to some Superstitions, and who employ themselves chief about some Judaic or Pharisaic Practices. God will be adored in Spirit and in Truth; He is not satisfied with Gestures and External Civilities, as kneeling in his Presence, and being Praised by the Motion of the Lips, when the Heart has no share in it. Men indeed are satisfied with those Marks of Respect, but 'tis because they cannot search into the Heart; for even Men would be served in Spirit and in Truth. God requires our Mind and our Heart; he has only made it for himself, and he only preserves it for himself: But there are many People, who unfortunately for themselves refuse him those things, over which he has absolute Right. They harbour Idols in their Hearts, which they adore in Spirit and in Truth, and to whom they Sacrifice themselves. But whereas the True God threatens them in the Secret of their Consciences, with an Eternity of Torments to punish the Excess of their Ingratitude; yet they will not quit their Idolatry; they bethink themselves of performing some good Works externally: They Fast like others, they give Alms, they say Prayers, they continue for some time in the like Exercises; and whereas they are troublesome to those that want Charity, they leave them commonly to embrace certain little Practices or easy Devotions, which agreeing with Self-Love, necessarily and insensibly overthrows all the Morals of Jesus Christ. They are Faithful, Earnest and Zealous Defenders of those Humane Traditions, which Ignorant Persons persuade them to be very Useful, and such things as the Idea of Eternity that frightens them, does continually represent, they eagerly defend, as absolutely necessary for their Salvation.  
It is not so with the Just: They hear the Threaten of their God, as well as the Impious; but the confused Noise of their Passions, does not hinder them from harkening to his Counsels. The false Rays of Humane Tradition do not blind them so far, as to make them Insensible of the Light of Truth. They put their Confidence in the Promises of Jesus Christ, and they follow his Councils; for they know that the Promises of Men are as Vain as their Counsels. Nevertheless we may say, That that Fear which the Idea of Eternity creates in their Mind, produces sometimes so great a Disorder in their Imagination, that they dare not absolutely Condemn those Humane Traditions; and that sometimes they approve them by their Example, because they have some Appearance of Wisdom in their Superstition, and in their False Humility; like those Pharisaical Traditions mentioned by St. Paul. 
Col. 2.22, 23.   
But that which is particularly worthy of Consideration, and which does not so much relate to the Corruption of Manners, as to the Disorder of the Mind, is, That the Fear we have before mentioned, extends to the Faith, as well as the Zeal, of those that are affected with it; even to Things that are False, and Unworthy the Holiness of our Religion. There are many People who do believe, and that with an Obstinate Faith, That the Earth is Immovable in the Centre of the World: That Animals are Sensible of real Pain: That there are Forms or Accidents really distinct from Matter: And a World of the like False or Uncertain Opinions, because they fancy that they should oppose the Faith in denying it. They are frightened by the Expressions of the Holy Bible, which speaks to our Capacity, and consequently makes use of the common Manner of Speaking, without any Design to Instruct us in Natural Philosophy. They do not only believe what the Spirit of God will teach them, but also all the Opinions of the Jews. They do not see, for Example, that Joshua speaks before his Soldiers, as Copernicus himself, Galileus and Descartes would speak to the Vulgar part of Mankind; and that though he had been of the Opinion of these last Philosophers, he would not have commanded the Earth to stand still, because he could not have made his Army Sensible, by unintelligible words, of the Miracle which God performed for his People. Those who are of Opinion that the Sun is Immovable, nevertheless tell their Servants, their Friends, and even those that are of their Opinion, that the Sun Rises or Sets: They always speak like other Men, when their Principal Design is not to Philosophise. Did Joshua perfectly understand Astronomy; or if he did, did his Soldiers understand it? Or if both he and his Soldiers were skilled in it, can any body think that they designed to Philosophise while they only thought of Fight? Therefore Joshua spoke as he ought to do, although both he and his Soldiers had believed what the most Eminent Astronomers believe at this time. Nevertheless those words of that great Captain, Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and what is said afterwards, that the Sun stood still according to his Command, persuade many People, that the Opinion of the Motion of the Earth, is not only a dangerous Opinion, but that it is also absolutely Heretical, and not to be maintained. They have heard that some Pious Persons, for whom we ought to have a great deal of Respect and Deference, condemned that Opinion. They have a confused Knowledge of something that happened upon that Subject to a Famous Astronomer of our Age, and that seems sufficient for them to believe Obstinately, that Faith extends even to that Opinion. A certain confused Sentiment, excited and entertained by a Motion of Fear, which they hardly perceive, makes them harbour Diffidences against those that follow Reason in things which relate to Reason. They look upon them as Heretics: They are Uneasy and Troubled whenever they hear them speak; and their Secret Apprehensions create in their Minds the same Respect, and the same Submission for their own vulgar Opinions, and for many other Notions of Philosophy, as for Truths which are the Objects of Faith.   

CHAP. XIII.  
I. Of the Third Natural Inclination, which is the Friendship we have for other Men.  
II. It Induces us to approve our Friends Thoughts, and to deceive them by False Praises.  
OF all our Inclinations taken in General, and in the Sense I have explained it in the first Chapter, there only remains that which we have for those we Live with, and for all the Objects that are about us; of which I shall hardly say any thing, because that relates more to Morality and Policy, than to our Subject. As that Inclination is always joined with the Passions, it would perhaps be sitter to speak of it in the following Book: But Order is not of so much Consequence in that Point.  
In order rightly to apprehend the Causes and Effects of that Natural Inclination, 
I. Of the Third Natural Inclination, which is the Friendship we have for other Men.  it is fit to know that God Loves all his Works, and that he Unites them strictly one to another for their Mutual Preservation. For continually loving the Works he produces, since they are produced by his Love, he also continually Imprints in our Hearts a Love for his Works, since he continually produces a Love in our Hearts like unto his. And to the end the Natural Love we have for ourselves may not Annihilate itself, and overmuch weaken that which we have for the Things that are not in us: And on the contrary, That those two Loves which God puts in us, may maintain and strengthen each other, he has united us in such a manner to all things that are about us, and particularly with the Being's of the same Species with us, that their Sufferings Afflict us Naturally, their Joy Rejoices us, and their Grandeur, their Fall, their Diminution, seems to Augment or to diminish our own Being. The new Dignities of our Relations and Friends, the new Acquisitions of those that have most relation to us, the Conquests and Victories of our Prince, and even the new Discoveries of the new World, seem to add something to our Subsistance. Being united to all these things, we rejoice at their Grandeur and Extension; we could even wish that this World had no Limits; and that thought of some Philosophers, that the Works of God have no Bounds, does not only seem worthy of God, but also very agreeable to Man, who feels a Secret Joy at his being a part of Infinity, because as little as he is in himself, he fancies that he becomes as it were Infinite, by defusing himself into the Infinite Being's that are about him.  
It is true, that the Union which we have with all the Bodies that move in those great Spaces, is not very strict, and therefore it is not Sensible to most Men: And there are some who matter the new Discoveries that are made in the Heavens so little, that one might believe they are no-wise united to it by Nature; if it were not known that it is either for want of Knowledge, or because they are too much engaged to other things.  
The Soul, though united to the Body it Animates, does not always feel the Motions of it; or if it does, it does not always apply itself to them. The Passion which moves it, being sometimes greater than the Sensations which affects it, it seems to be more powerfully engaged to the Object of its Passion than to its own Body: For it is principally by the Passions that the Soul defuses itself upon External Objects, that it feels it is really united to every thing about it; as it is chief by Sensation that it defuses itself in its own Body, and is Sensible that it is united to all the Parts that Compose it. But whereas one cannot conclude that the Soul of a Passionate Person is not united to his Body, because he is prodigal of his Life, and takes no Care for the Preservation of it: So there is no reason to imagine, that we are not naturally engaged to all things, because there are some for which we are not concerned.  
Would you for Example know, whether Men are united to their Prince, or their Country? Seek out some who understand their Interest, and have no particular Affairs to take up their Mind: Then you will see how Earnest they are for News, their Disquiet for Battles, their Joy for Victories, their Affliction in Defeats: There you will clearly see, that Men are strictly united to their Prince and their Country.  
In like manner, Would you know whether Men are united to China, Japan, or the Planets and fixed Stars? Seek out some, or else imagine some, whose Country and Family enjoy a profound Peace, that have no particular Passions, and that do not actually feel the Union that unites them to things that are nearer us than the Heavens; and you will find, that if they have any Knowledge of the Greatness and Nature of those Stars, they will rejoice at the Discovery of any of them; they will consider them with Pleasure; and if they are Ingenious, they will willingly take the Trouble to observe and Calculate their Motions.  
Those who are busied with Affairs, seldom mind whether any Comet appears, or whether there is an Eclipse: But those who are not so closely united to the things that are near them, are very fond of these sort of Events; because there is nothing to which we are not united, though we do not always feel it; as we do not always feel that our Soul is united, I do not say to our Arm, or to our Hand, but to our Heart, and to our Brain.  
The strongest Natural Union which God has put between us and his Works, is that which united us with those Men we live with: God has commanded us to Love them like ourselves; and that the Love of Choice, by which we love them, may be Firm and Constant, he upholds and strengthens it continually, by a Natural Love which he imprints in us. In order thereunto he has laid upon us some Invisible Ties which necessarily oblige us to Love them; to watch their Preservation like our own; to look upon them as necessary parts to the whole which we compose with them, and without which we cannot Subsist.  
There is nothing more Admirable than those Natural Relations which are found betwixt the Inclinations of the Minds of Men, between the Motions of their Bodies, and between these Inclinations and Motions. All this Secret Chain is a Wonder which can never be sufficiently admired, and which can never be apprehended: At the sight of any Pain which Surprises, or that is felt, for example, we cry out; that Cry which often comes out before we are ware of it, by the Disposition of the Machine, Infallibly strikes the Ears of those that are near enough to afford us the Assistance we stand in need of: It penetrates through them, and makes itself understood to People of all Nations, and of all Qualities whatever; for that Cry is of all Languages and of all Qualities, as indeed it ought to be: It moves the Brain, and in a Moment changes the whole Disposition of the Body of those that are struck by it: Morcover, it makes them run to assist before they are ware of it: But it is not long without acting upon the Mind, and without obliging them to be willing to relieve them, and of thinking of Means to secure those that have made that Natural Prayer; provided always the said Prayer, or rather this pressing Command be Just and according to the Rules of Society: For an Indiscreet Cry, made without a Cause, or out of a vain Fear, produces Indignation and Scorn in the Assistants, instead of Compassion, because in crying without a cause, we abuse things established by Nature for our Preservation. That Indiscreet Cry naturally produces Aversion, and the Desire of revenging the Abuse that has been offered to Nature, I mean to the Order of things, provided he that made it, did it voluntarily: But it ought only to produce the Passion of Laughter, mixed with some Compassion, without Aversion and a Desire of Revenge; when it proceeds from Fear, that is, from a false Appearance of a pressing Necessity, which has induced any one to cry out: For Laughter or Jest is necessary to repel their Fear, and to correct them; and Compassion is necessary to Succour them as Weak: It is impossible to conceive any thing better ordered.  
I do not pretend to explain by Example, which are the Springs, and the Relations which the Author of Nature has placed in the Brains of Men and all Animals, to maintain the Consent and Union which is necessary for their Preservation. I only make some Reflections upon those Springs that People may think upon them, and may carefully inquire, not how those Springs move, nor how their Motion is communicated by the Air, by the Light, and by all the little Bodies that surround us, for that is almost Incomprehensible and is not necessary, but at least to know what are the Effects of it: One may by different Observations, discover the Bonds that unite us one to another, but it is impossible to know how that is done: We easily see how a Watch points out the Hour; but it requires time to discover the Reasons of it; and there are so many different Springs in the Brain of the least Animal, that nothing can equal it in the most studied Machine's.  
If it is not possible perfectly to apprehend the Springs of our Machine, neither is it absolutely necessary; but it is absolutely necessary in order to govern ourselves, to know the Effects which those Springs are capable of producing in us. It is not necessary to know how a Watch is made to use it; but if Men will use it, to regulate their time, it is at least necessary to know that it points at the hours. Nevertheless there are some so little capable of Reflection, that one might almost compare them to inanimated Machine's; they do not feel in themselves the Springs which slacken at the sight of Objects; they are often agitated without perceiving their own Motions; they are Slaves without feeling their Bonds: Finally, They are guided a Thousand different ways, without knowing the Hand of him that guides them: They think themselves the only Authors of all their Motions; and not distinguishing what passes within them, as a Consequence of a Free Act of their Will, from that which is produced there by the Impression of the Bodies which are about them, they think they guide themselves while they are guided by some other. But this is not a proper place to explain these things.  
The Relations which the Author of Nature has put between our Natural Inclinations, in order to Unite us together, seems yet more worthy of our Application and Inquiries, than those that are between Bodies, or between Minds in relation to Bodies. For all things are regulated there in such a manner, that the Inclinations which seem to be most opposite to Society, are the most useful, when they are somewhat moderated.  
The desire, for Instance, which all Men have for Grandeur, tends to the Dissolution of all Societies. Nevertheless, that desire is tempered in such a manner, by the Order of Nature, that it serves more for the good of the Public, than many other feeble Languishing Inclinations. For it gives Emulation, it Excites Men to Virtue, it Buoys up their Courage in the Services they do their Country; and so many Victories would not be won, did not Soldiers, and particularly Officers aspire to Glory, and to Employments. Thus all those who Compose Armies, designing only their own Interest, do notwithstanding procure the Good of their Country. Which shows, that it is very advantageous for the Public Good, that all Men should have a secret desire of Grandeur, provided it be moderated.  
But should all private Persons appear to be what they really are; should they freely tell others that they design to be the principal Parts or Members of the Body they Compose, and never to be the least, it would not be the way to Unite them together. All the Members of a Body cannot be the Head and Heart of it: There must be Feet and Hands, little ones as well as great ones, Men to Obey as well as to Command; and should every Body say openly, that they will Command and never Obey, as indeed every Body wishes Naturally, it is visible that all Bodies Politic would destroy themselves, and Disorder and Injustice would Reign every where.  
Therefore it was necessary, that those who have most Sense, and are the fittest to become the Noble Parts of that Body, and to Command the rest, should be Naturally Civil; that is, they should be induced by a secret Inclination, to show others by their Behaviour, and Affable and Gentile Expressions, that they think themselves unworthy of being thought on, and that they believe they are the least of Men: But that those they speak to are worthy of all sorts of Honours, and that they have a great Esteem and Veneration for them. In fine, to supply the defect of Charity, and the Love of Order, it has been necessary that those who Command others, should have the Art of deceiving 'em by an Imaginary Humiliation, which only consists in Civilities and Words, in order to enjoy that pre-eminence without Envy which is necessary in the whole Body. For thus all Men do in some measure possess the Grandeur they desire: The great ones possess it in reality, 
* I speak as a Man; for the true Grandeur of the Earth does not consist in a turn of imagination.  and the little ones, and the weak only possess it in Imagination; being persuaded in some measure by the Compliments of others, that they are not looked upon as they are, that is, as the least of Men.  
It is easy to conclude by the by, from what we have said, That it is a great Breach of Civility to speak often of ones self, especially, advantageously, though one did possess all sorts of good Qualifications; since it is not allowable to speak to those we Converse with as if we were above them, unless it be on certain occasions, and when there are External and Sensible Characters which Elevate us above them. For Contempt is the greatest of all Injuries: It is that which is most capable of destroying Society; and we must not expect, that a Man to whom we have given a hint, that we look upon him to be below us, will ever join with us, because Men cannot endure to be thought the meanest part of the Body they Compose.  
The Inclination of Men for Compliments, is therefore very proper to Counterpoise that which they have for Esteem and Preferment, and to soften the Internal Pain which those feel that are the meanest parts of the Body Politic; and it is most certain, that the mixture of those two Inclinations does produce very good Effects to maintain Society.  
But there is a strange Corruption in those Inclinations, as well as in the Friendship, Compassion and Good Will of the others, which tend to Unite Men together. That which ought to maintain Civil Society, often causes the Communication and Establishment of Error.  
Of all the Inclinations that are necessary for Civil Society, 
II. That Inclination induces us to approve the thoughts of our Friends, and to deceive them by false Praises.  those which throw us most into Error are Friendship, Favour, Gratitude, and all the other Inclinations which induce us to speak too advantageously of others when they are present.  
We do not limit our Love to the Persons of our Friends, but we also Love whatever does any way belong to them: And as they commonly express some Passion in the Defence of their Opinions, they insensibly incline us to believe them, to approve them, and even to defend them with more Obstinacy and Passion than they do themselves: Because it would often look ill in them to maintain their own Opinions with Heat; But no Body can find fault with us if we defend them, In them it would be Self-Love, in us 'tis Generosity.  
We have an Affection for other Men upon several accounts; for they may please and serve us in several ways. The resemblance of Humours, of Inclinations, of Employments; their Air, their Behaviour, their Virtue, their Estate, the Affection or Esteem they express for us, the Services they have done us, or that we expect from them, and several other particular reasons, do determine us to Love them. Therefore when any of our Friends, I mean some Person that has the same Inclinations that appears well, that speaks agreeably, whom we think Virtuous, or of great Quality, who expresses an Affection and Esteem for us, that has done us some Service, or from whom we expect any; or finally, whom we Love for some other particular reason: If any such Person, I say, chances to advance some Proposition, we suffer ourselves straight to be persuaded by them, without consulting our Reason. We maintain his Opinion without examining whether it be Consonant to Truth, and often even contrary to our own Conscience, according to the Obscurity and Confusion of our Mind, according to the Corruption of our Heart, and according to the advantage we expect to derive from our false Generosity.  
It is not necessary to bring particular Examples of those things in this place; for People are seldom an hour in any Company without observing several, if they will reflect a little upon them. Favours and Laughters, according to the old saying, do but seldom side with Truth; but almost always with those they Love. He that speaks is Obliging and Civil: Therefore he is in the right. If what he says is barely likely, it is looked upon as True; and if what he urges, is absolutely ridiculous and impertinent, it will at least become very probable. If it is a Man that Loves me, who has an Esteem for me, who has done me some Service, and is desirous and capable of doing me more, who has maintained my Opinion on other Occasions, I should be ungratesul and imprudent in opposing his, or even in failing to applaud him. Thus Truth is abused, and is made subservient to Interest; and thus we embrace each others false Opinions.  
An honest Man can never be offended when any one that instructs and informs him, provided it be done according to the Rules of Civility: And when our Friends take Offence at our representing modestly to them, that they are deceived, we must allow them to Love themselves and their Errors; since they will have it so, and because we have not the Power to Command them, nor to change their Mind.  
But a real Friend must never approve the Errors of his Friend. For we ought to consider, that we do them more harm than we are ware of, when we injudiciously defend their Opinions. Our Applauses swell their Hearts, and confirm their Errors; they become Incorrigible; they Act and Decide as if they were become Infallible.  
Whence comes it that the Richest, the most Powerful, the Noblest, and generally all those that are Elevated above others, think themselves very often Infallible; and behave themselves as if they had a great deal more Reason than those that are of a mean and low Condition, unless it be because all their thoughts are indifferently and basely approved? So the Approbation we give our Friends, persuades them by degrees that they have more Sense than others; which makes them Proud, Bold, Imprudent, and capable of falling into the present Errors without perceiving it.  
Therefore our Enemies are often kinder to us, and inform our Understanding more by their Oppositions, than our Friends by their Approbations; because our Enemies oblige us to stand upon our Guard, and to be Attentive to what we urge; which alone is capable to make us sensible of our Errors. But our Friends Lull us asleep, and gives us a false Confidence, which makes us vain and ignorant. Men therefore must never admire their Friends, and submit to their Sentiments out of kindness, as they must never oppose those of their Enemies out of Malice, but must lay aside the Spirit of Flattery or Contradiction to become sincere, and approve Evidence and Truth wherever they find it.  
We ought also to be fully persuaded, that most Men are inclined to Flatter and Compliment us, out of a kind of Natural Inclination, to appear Witty, to gain the good Will of others, and in hopes of some return; or finally, out of a kind of Scorn and Raillery; and we ought never to suffer ourselves to be imposed upon, by whatever can be said to us. Do we not daily see that Persons who know not each other, nevertheless extol one another to the Skies, the very first time they see and speak to one another? And what is more common than to see some who give hyperbolical praises, and express extraordinary motions of admiration to a Person that has spoken in public; even in the presence of those with whom they have laughed at him a little before. Whenever People Cry out, and grow Pale with admiration, and seem as it were astonished at what they hear, it is not a good proof that he that speaks says Wonders; but rather that he speaks to Flatterers, that he has Friends, or perhaps Enemies who Laugh at him. It is because he speaks in an engaging Way, that he is Rich and Powerful, or if you will have it so, it is a pretty good proof that what he says is grounded upon the Confused and Obscure Notions of the Senses, but very moving and very agreeable, or that he has a Lively Imagination, since praises are given to Friendship, Riches, Dignities, Probabilities, and very seldom to Truth.  
It may be expected perhaps, that having treated in general of the Inclinations of the Mind, I should descend to an exact Account of all the particular Motions they resent at the sight of Good and Evil, viz. That I should explain the Nature of Love, Hatred, Joy and Sadness, and of all Intellectual Passions both general and particular, as well Simple as Compounded. But I have not engaged to Explain all the different motions the Mind is capable of.  
I am willing it should be known that my principal Design in all that I have written hitherto about a Search after Truth, has been to make Men sensible of their Weakness and Ignorance; and that we are all liable to Error and Sin. I have said it, and say it again, perhaps some will remember it: My Design never was to give a particular Account of the Nature of the Mind: But I have been obliged to say something about it, to explain Errors in their Original, and in order; in a word, to make myself more Intelligible: And if I have gone beyond the Bounds I had proposed, it is because I thought I had some new things to say, which seemed to me of Consequence, and which I thought might be read with Pleasure. Perhaps I was mistaken; but that presumption was necessary to encourage me to write them. For how can one speak, without hopes of being harkened unto? The Truth is, I have said many things which do not seem to belong so much to the Subject I am treating of, as that particular of the Motions of the Soul: I own it, but it is not my Intention to oblige myself to any thing, when I prescribe a Method to myself. I lay down a Rule to guide me, but I reserve to myself the power of turning aside from it as I walk, if I meet with any thing that deserves to be considered. I may leave the way sometimes to rest myself, provided I do not lose myself. Those who have not a Mind to stop with me, may go on, if they please, 'tis but turning over the Leaf: But if they are offended at it, let them know there are many who believe those places which I have pitched upon to rest in, make them find the Way the easier and more delightful.    
FINIS.