MALEBRANCH's Search after Truth: OR, A TREATISE OF THE NATURE OF THE Humane Mind. AND Of its Management, for avoiding Error in the SCIENCES.  
To which is Added, The Author's Defence against the Accusations of Monsieur de la Ville.  
ALSO The LIFE of Father Malebranch, of the Oratory at Paris: With an Account of his Works, and several particulars of his controversy with Monsieur Arnaud Dr. of Sorbonne, and Monsieur Regis, Professor in Philosophy at Paris. Written by Monsieur Le Vasseur, lately come over from Paris.  
VOL. II.  
Done out of French from the Last Edition.  
LONDON, Printed for S. Manship at the Ship in Cornhill. 1695.   

TO THE Marquis of Normanby.  
My Lord,  
THis Translation of the Second Volume of Father Malebranch's Recherche de la Verity, Humbly begs the same Favourable Acceptance and Protection, as Your Lordship was pleased to grant the First: Nor could I have any Temptation to seek another Patron for it, either in respect of the Author or myself. Every one that has had the Honour to know Your Lordship, is very Sensible that You have Successfully Studied Mankind in General, and are therefore a very good Judge of this Subject. As for myself, Your Lordship's preventing Goodness, and extreme readiness to serve me, has already outdone the utmost Ambition of,  
My Lord, Your Lordship's most Faithful, and most Obedient Servant Richard Sault.   

The Life of Father Malebranch of the Oratory at Paris: With an Account of his Works; and several Particulars of his Controversy with Monsieur Arnaud Dr. of Sorbonne, and Monsieur Regis Professor in Philosophy at Paris. Written by Monsieur Le Vasseur, lately come over from Paris. Done into English by R. S.  
FAther Nicholas Malebranch was Born at Paris of a considerable Family, in the Year 1638. His Eldest Brother is now one of the Counsellors in the first Chamber of the Parliament at Paris; where he is disinguisht by his Integrity, and other Qualifications that are proper to make a good Magistrate.  
When Father Malebranch became of Age to choose an Employment suitable to his Birth and Inclination, his Parents proposed to him to make him a Member of that August Body; but he generously refused so handsome an Establishment, and thought rather of retiring from the World, and devoting himself to the Church.  
To this End, he chose the Congregation of the Priests of the Oratory; which continually supplies France with Learned Divines, Excellent Preachers, and Men capable of filing the most Eminent Dignities of the Church, Father Malebranch spent the first Years of his retreat in studying Divinity and Languages, necessary for the understanding of Holy Scripture and other Ecclesiastic Authors. But as he felt a greater Pleasure and Inclination for those Sciences that are acquired by Reasoning and Meditation, than for those which depended only on Memory, and were founded upon Historical Facts, or the Writings of Ancient Authors; he resolved to content himself with reading the Holy Scripture attentively, and employing the rest of his Time in the Study of Metaphysics, and the knowledge of himself.  
The Book entitled, A Search after Truth, was the first Fruit of his Meditations: Never was there any Book received with so great an Applause in France, nor in other Countries, where they are curious in matters of Reason and good Sense. All the World was surprised to see a Young Philosopher, who knew Man better than the Celebrated Monsieur Des Cartes his Master did at the end of his days; and who had found the secret of writing upon abstracted things after so noble and polite a manner. The Able Men of France, Italy, Germany, England and Holland, earnestly sought his Acquaintance, and gave him particular Marks of the Esteem which they had conceived for him. Madam, the Princess Elizabeth Palatine, that Illustrious Scholar of Monsieur Des Cartes, was so charmed with his Search after Truth, that she resolved to make it her Manual, and to have it always with her: Notwithstanding the Esteem her most Serene Highness had for the Memory of Monsieur Des Cartes, she easily confessed, that Father Malebranch had outdone that great Philosopher, as to what regarded the knowledge of the Humane Mind, and the Consequences of the Union of the Soul and Body. She wrote to her Sister, Madam the Princess Lovise, Abbess of Maubuisson in France, that she was surprised, that having near her Abbey a Man of such merit, so rare and so distinguished, that she had not sought his Acquaintance. What was most great and extraordinary in Malebranch was, that he always preserved a Humility and Modesty that was truly Christian, in the midst of all the Praises and Applauses that he had received in his own Country and elsewhere. He was always watchful over himself, and would not so much as hearken to so refined a Temptation, as the greatest Philosophers of Antiquity have not been able to withstand.  
It was with extreme Displeasure that Father Malebranch observed afterwards that certain Persons, otherwise persuaded of the solidity of the Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy, which he had so happily explained, were not yet sufficiently convinced of the Truth of the Christian Religion, and of the Morals of Jesus Christ. Being troubled at the fatal blindness of these Philosophers, he resolved to make use of the Principles in which they agreed with him, to prove to them the Corruption of Man's Heart, and the necessity of such a Mediator as Jesus Christ: To this end he Published a little Book of Christian Conversations; and from that time, he only applied himself to make use of the Truths which he had discovered, to prove the beauty and solidity of that Divine Philosophy which Jesus Christ teaches us in the Gospel. What Glory, what Honour is it, for a Christian Philosopher to have set in so full, and so clear a light, the Reasons, which we can now so advantageously use against Atheists, and the Enemies of the Gospel. With the Principles of Father Malebranch we may boldly defy the Atheists to explain to us how the Blood circulates in their Veins, how they feel Pleasure and Pain by means of certain Motions which are excited in their Body, without supposing the Existence and Action of an Infinite Perfect Being, who is only capable of punishing and rewarding us: And if this pretended strength of Mind, of which our Atheists so much boast, is baffled when they consider but a Bowl that is in motion, an agreeable titillation, or Pain which they feed before the Fire; what if we should desire them to explain the formation and increase of an almost infinite number of Organised Bodies; to tell us bow this vast Machine of the Universe could be form and move of itself, after so just and regulated a manner, in every thing that is necessary for its Conservation? What Comfort is it for us to learn, that even the irregularities which appear in the World, and concerning which the Enemies of our Religion reproach us with an insulting Air, are certain marks of the infinite Perfection of the Author of Nature, who ought to act always after a constant and uniform manner? So that the World would be a Work less worthy a Being sovereignly perfect, if it were not subject to the Irregularities, and seeming Disorders, wherewith they reproach us. Father Malebranch had laid down all these great Principles in his Search after Truth, and has since proved, and admirably well illustrated them in his Treatise of Nature and Grace, in his Christian Conversations, and Dialogues upon Metaphysics. We are also obliged to him for having taught us how to prove invincibly to the profane, that the Precepts of the Morals of Jesus Christ are Remedies so efficacious against the corruption of the Mind and Heart, and so proper to redress both, that every equitable Person must ingenuously acknowledge, these Remedies could not have been taught to the World, but even by his Wisdom, who knew us perfectly: This is showed in his Christian Conversations, and in the Treatise of Morality, which Father Malbranche Published a little after.  
Although the Book of Christian Meditations was composed in imitation of the Soliloquies of St. Augustine, who endeavours to instruct himself by consulting the Universal Reason, that is, the Wisdom of God himself, and the Light which inlightens all Men: This manner of commerce betwixt us and the Divine Word, appeared wholly new and extraordinary to the French, who had seen nothing like it in their Language; even the Friends of Father Malebranch having received an Essay of the Work, told him freely, That they knew not whether a Book of this Nature would be well received in so nice and ridiculing an Age as ours. However the Author was not discouraged, but continued his Book, and enriched it with noble and lively Expressions; and his Imagination, that was always regular and fruitful, furnished him with such fine and happy Turns, that his Adversaries were constrained to confess, that the Book imposed upon them, and that the Author had the secret of engaging his Reader, and making him relish his Sentiments, in a work, whose very Design was enough to deter them from reading it.  
To content all the World, and explain yet further his Principles, which Persons eminent for their Rank and Ability continually decried, Father Malebranch sometimes after, Published his Dialogues upon Metaphysics and Religion. This is his Masterpiece; the greatest Reverencers of Antiquity in France acknowledged, that these Dialogues were not inferior to those of Plato. Indeed Father Malebranch has there showed as much Eloquence, Delicateness of Wit, and Elevation of Mind, as is to be met with in the Works of this Athenian Philosopher, whom the greatest Men, both Greeks and Latins, have looked upon as their Master and Pattern.  
Some of Father Malebranches Friends, having desired him to explain to them what he thought of the manner of reconciling Freewill with the operation of Grace, which acts immediately upon Man's Will: He endeavoured to show them, that the System of those, who are called Jansenists in France, is altogether contrary to Reason, and the Sensation we have of what passes in ourselves. His Proofs appeared so clear and convincing to some of those who conferred with him upon this matter, that they renounced the Jansenian Sentiments, in favour of which they had been prejudiced in their Studies of Divinity. It was this that gave occasion to Father Malebranch to write his Treatise upon Nature and Grace. He shown the Manuscript to several of his Friends, and was not displeased that they communicated it to Monsieur Arnaud, who till then had appeared so charmed with Father Malebranches Books, that he could not forbear speaking well of them to all the World.  
But it is a strange and hard thing to encounter the favourite Prejudices of certain Men; especially when they look upon them as Truths of Faith, for which they will be Martyrs. The Treatise of Nature and Grace appeared to Monsieur Arnaud, and his Disciples, as a dangerous Book, and full of Heresies; the Author, whom that Party had admired so long as they believed him no Enemy of the Opinions of Jansenius, became all of a sudden an Enthusiast, and the most wretched Philosopher that had ever appeared in the World.  
Monsieur Arnaud before he engaged in an exact refutation of that Treatise, thought fit to ridicule his new Adversary, and make him pass for a Man who believes he sees God, and supposes him Corporeal. This was the design that Monsieur Arnaud proposed to himself in his Book of True and false Ideas; he said nothing there which had any relation to the Dispute upon Grace and , he endeavoured only to divert the Reader upon account of a particular Sentiment of F. Malebranches about the Nature of Ideas: An Opinion which he had read some Years before in the Search after Truth, and against which he had nothing to object, till the Treatise of Nature and Grace was unhappily Printed.  
This procedure, so little becoming a Man of Monsieur Arnauds Reputation, troubled Father Malebranch, who showed the Injustice thereof, and proved in his Answer to Monsieur Arnaud, that this Doctor was pleased to disguise, or at least did not well understand, the Sentiment which he would oppose. Certain Persons will hardly be persuaded that Monsieur Arnaud (a Name that included every thing amongst the Jansenists) did not well understand the Sentiment of an Adversary which he was willing to refute with so much pains and application. But does not Passion and Prejudice deceive the greatest Genius's? Is it not this which often hinders them from comprehending what others less prejudiced conceive easily?  
After some Contestations upon the Miracles of the Old Testament, Monsieur Arnaud came to the principal Question, which regards the manner how Grace acts in Man. This is not a place to examine what was said on either side, nor does it concern the Search after Truth. I shall only add, that if Monsieur Arnaud pretends to have sufficiently proved that Father Malebranch favours Semipelagianism, Father Malebranch might also reply, that he had evidently showed Monsieur Arnaud maintained the Opinions of Calvin, and some other Reformers, condemned in the Council of Trent.  
A Jesuit having bethought himself to Publish a Book against Monsieur Des Cartes, his Disciples, under the borrowed name of Lovis de la Ville, and to accuse them to the Arch-Bishops and Bishops of France, as Innovators, who overturned the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, and some other Articles commonly received in the Church of Rome; the Author of the Search after Truth was not forgot in the Catalogue of these new Heretics. F. Malbranche contented himself with a short Answer to this Adventurer, whom the Prelates of France would not so much as hear. Certainly it must be confessed, that these Gentlemen carried it very prudently in so nice a conjuncture: For if they had declared that the Cartesian Philosophy overthrew the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, they would have found that the greatest part of the best Wits in France do not believe it: And was not this to put the King of France under an unhappy necessity of sending Dragoons into the Monasteries and Societies, and to an infinite number of honest Men, to cause them to abjure the Errors of the Cartesian Philosophy? So true is it that devoties do not always see the fatal Consequences of an Advice which impetuous Zeal dictates to those that are in Authority.  
Monsieur Regis, well known by the Philosophy he has Published, having undertaken to oppose some Sentiments of F. Malebranch: this Father neglected at first to Answer his new Adversary; but when Monsieur Regis would have drawn an advantage from the silence of a Man who plainly perceived himself unfairly attacked, Father Malbranche published the last Year a short Answer to Monsieur Regis. The name of Monsieur Arnaud was made use of in this Contestation, which occasioned him to appear again upon the stage. In the Journal des Scavans at Paris, he Printed two Letters addressed to F. Malebranch, who soon answered him, and gave two Letters to the Journalist that were also Printed. Monsieur Cousin left off his Correspondence with Monsieur Arnaud, and refused to put in his Journal other Letters which M. Arnaud had written a little before his Death; we shall doubtless see them in his Posthumous works; for it is not probable that they will rob the Public of the Remains of so great a man. We shall be gainers thereby two ways; F. Malbranche will break that silence which he seems to have condemned himself to, and we shall have new Explanations upon some important Difficult ties which M. Arnaud may have found in the Works of so hard an Adversary.  
I have but one thing more to say of F. Malebranch: It is; that his Heart agrees perfectly with his Understanding: There is as much Uprightness in the one, as Justness in the other: He is a Christian Philosopher, who acts as he thinks. Never did any Man more perfectly regulate his Manners and Actions upon the Principles of his Philosophy; Being persuaded that God is the only cause which acts truly upon our Body and in our Soul. F. Malebranch accustoms himself, upon every Sensation, upon every Perception, to elevate himself always towards the Supreme Being, to humble himself in his Presence, and to praise him continually: With what assurance does not he (as often as it's possible) approach to the Throne of Grace of the Eternal High Priest, who continually intercedes for us? With what fervour does he not beg to be admitted as a Living Stone in the Structure of the Mysterious Temple, which this Divine Architect builds up to the Glory of his Father? He is in a continual watchfulness and attention over himself, to divert the Impressions which sensible Objects may make upon his Body, and to stop whatever is capable of exciting the Passions. He is the most sober and temperate Man in the World.  
And if F. Malebranch so exactly observes his Duties towards God and himself, he is not less regular in those which respect his Neighbour, He is tender and compassionate to the unhappy, courteous and affable to all the World, preventing and sincere in respect of his Friends, good and indulgent to all those who injure him; Being persuaded, that the Love of his Neighbour ought to have for its principal end, that Eternal Society to which we are called by the Gospel. He endeavours to inspire all those who come near him, with Sentiments of Piety and Religion; to procure as much as he can their Eternal Happiness, which he earnestly desires day and night. In a word, F. Malebranch has drawn his own Portraiture in his Treatise of Morality: To compose the greatest part of which, he had no need of long and new Reflections upon the Duties of Man: He hath told us, without thinking of it, what he exactly practised after he had applied himself to the regulation of his Manners upon the Truths he had so attentively Meditated, and so happily Explained.   

A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH.  

BOOK V of the Passions.  

CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Original of the Passions in general.  
THE Mind of Man has two essential or necessary relations, which are very different, the one to God, and the other to its Body; as it is a pure Spirit it is essentially united to the Word of God, to the Eternal Wisdom and Truth, for 'tis only by this Union that it is capable of thinking, as has been shown in the 3d Book; as an humane Spirit it has an essential relation to its Body, and because of this union, it is sensible, and imagines, as has been explained in the First and Second Books. I call that sense or imagination of the Mind when the Body is the natural or occasional cause of its thoughts, and that understanding when it acts of itself, or rather when God acts in it, or when his light enlightens it after many different manners, independantly of any thing whatever that passes in its Body.  
'Tis the same in respect of the humane Will; as a Will, it essentially depends upon the Love which God bears to himself, upon the Eternal Law, in a word upon the Will of God; 'Tis only because God loves himself that we love any thing, and if God did not love himself, or if he did not continually imprint upon the Soul of Man a Love like to his, I mean that motion of Love which we receive for good in general, we should love nothing, we should will nothing, and consequently we should be without any will, since the will is nothing else but the impression of Nature which carries towards good in general, as we have often said before, Book I. Ch. I. and elsewhere.  
But the Will as it is an humane Will, essentially depends upon the Body, for 'tis only from the motions of the Blood and Spirits, that it perceives itself agitated with all sensible Emotions; I therefore give the name of Natural Inclinations to all the motions of the Soul which are common to us with pure Intelligences, and some of those in which the Body has a great share, but whereof it is only indirectly the Cause and the End, as I have explained in the preceding Book; and here I design by the word Passions all the Emotions which the Soul naturally feels by means of the extraordinary Motions of the Animal Spirits and Blood, These are the sensible Emotions which shall be the Subject of this Book.  
Although the Passions are inseparable from the Inclinations, and Men were no farther capable of sensible love or hatred than as they are capable of the mental, yet I thought it would not be amiss to treat distinctly of 'em to avoid confusion; Those that consider the Passions are much more strong and lively than the Natural Inclinations, for other Objects, and which are always produced from other Causes, will acknowledge, that 'tis not without reason that I have separated things that are inseparable in their nature.  
Men are only capable of Sensations and Imaginations as they are capable of pure Intellections, the Senses and Imagination being inseparable from the Mind, however no one has opposed a distinct Treatise of these two Faculties of the Soul, although they are naturally inseparable.  
In fine, the Senses and Imagination don't differ any more from the pure Understanding, than the Passions do from the Inclinations, so that we must distinguish these two last Faculties as it has been usual to do with the three first, that we may be better able to discern what the Soul receives from its Author by means of the Body, from that which it has from him independent of the Body. The only inconvenience that will naturally result from the distinction of these two things thus naturally united, will be (as it happens upon like occasions) a necessity of repeating some things which have been already said.  
Man is one, although composed of many parts; and the union of these parts is so strict, that it can't be touched in one place without affecting the whole: all his Faculties have such a mutual dependence upon one another, and are so subordinate, that 'tis impossible to explain any one of 'em without speaking something of the other; Thus by endeavouring to avoid confusion, I am obliged 10 repetition, but 'tis better to repeat than confound, because my business is to write as clear as I can, and in this necessity of repetition, I can only endeavour so to repeat as not to be troublesome to my Reader.  
The Passions of the Soul are Impressions of the Author of Nature, which incline us to love out Body, and whatever may be useful to its preservation: as the Natural Inclinations are the Impressions of the same Author, which chief incline us to love him as the Sovereign Good.  
The natural or occasional Cause of these Impressions is the motion of the Animal Spirits to beget and cherish an agreeable disposition to the Object which is perceived; so that the Mind and Body are mutually assistant on this occasion. For 'tis the Order of God, that the Motions of our Body which are proper to execute the Order of our Will should follow it, and that the Motions of our Body which are mechanically excited in us at the sight of any Object, should be accompanied with a passion of our Soul which inclines us to will that which appears useful to the Body; 'tis this continual impression of the Will of God upon us, which so strictly unites us to a portion of Matter, and if this impression of his Will should but cease for one moment, we should from that moment be, freed from the dependence we have upon all the changes which happen to our Body.  
I can't comprehend how some persons imagine that there is an absolutely necessary connection between the Motions of the Spirit and Blood, and the Emotions of the Soul, some little particles of Choler are violently moved in the Brain, therefore the Soul must necessarily be agitated with some Passion, and this Passion must rather be Anger than Love; What relation can be conceived betwixt the Idea of an Enemy's Imperfection, a Passion of Contempt or Hatred, and betwixt the Corporeal Motion of some Particles of Blood which beat against some parts of the Brain? How can a Man persuade himself of such a dependence? and that the Union or Alliance of two things so different and incompatible as Mind and Matter, can be caused and preserved after any other manner than by the continual, and Almighty, and Omnipotent Will of the Author of Nature?  
Those who think that Bodies do necessarily and of themselves communicate Motion in the moment of their Concourse, think something like truth, for indeed this prejudice has some foundation, Bodies seem to have an essential relation to Bodies, but the Mind and Body are two kinds of Being's so opposite, that those who think the Emotions of the Soul do necessarily follow the Motions of the Spirits and Blood, think something that has not the least appearance of truth, certainly 'tis only our own Consciousness of the Union of those two Being's, and our Ignorance of the continual Operations of God upon his Creatures, which makes us imagine another Cause of the Union of our Soul and Body besides the Will of God.  
It is difficult to determine whether this relation or connexion of the thoughts of Man's Mind with the Motion of his Body, is the Punishment of Sin or the Gift of Nature, and some Persons believe it would be rashness to decide either way; 'tis well known that Man before Sin was no Slave, but absolate Master of his Passions, and by his Will did easily stay the agitation of the Blood which caused them; But I should be hardly persuaded that the Body did not solicit the Soul of the first Man to an enquiry after things which were proper for the preservation of his Life, or that Adam before his Fall was insensible that Fruits were agreeable to his sight, and pleasant to his taste, especially if I may believe the Scripture, and that this so just, so marvellous an Oeconomy of his Senses and Passions for the preservation of his Body was a Corruption of Nature rather than the first Institution.  
Doubtless Nature is now corrupted, the Body acts with too much power upon the Mind, instead of submissively representing to it its necessities, it tyrannises over it, and ravishes it from God, to whom it ought to be inseparably united, and continually prompts it to a pursuit of such sensible things as may be proper for its conservation, the Mind is become as it were immaterial and earthy by Sin, that relation and Essential Union which it has with God is lost, I mean God has withdrawn himself from it, as much as possible without destroying or annihilating it. Innumerable disorders have followed the absence or estrangement of him who kept it in order, and without making a longer enumeration of our Miseries, Man is by the fall throughly corrupted in all his parts.  
But this fall has not destroyed the Work of God, that which God gave to the first Man is always sound in him, the immutable Will of God which constitutes the Nature of every thing, was not changed by the levity and inconstancy of Adam s Will: every thing that God did Will he yet Wills, and because his Will is efficacious, he effects whatever he Wills. Man's Sin was indeed the occasion that the Divine Will did not constitute the Order of Grace, but Grace is not contrary to Nature, the one destroys not the other; Because God fights not against himself, he never reputes, and his Wisdom having no limits, his Works will have no end.  
The Will of God which constitutes the Order of Grace is joined to that Will which effects the Order of Nature, not to change it, but to repair it. There are only two General Wills in God, and whatever is well regulated in the World depends upon one of these; The Passions are very well ordered, if they are only considered in order to the Body's preservation, although they sometimes deceive us in few and particular Cases, which the Universal Cause has not willed to remedy; we may then conclude that the Passions are of the, Order of Nature, though they cannot be of the Order of Grace. It is true, if we consider that the Sin of the first Man has deprived us of the assistance of a God that is Omnipresent, and always ready to defend us, it may then be said that Sin is the Cause of our relation to sensible things, because it has separated us from God by whom only we can be delivered from their Slavery.  
But without insisting any longer upon an Enquiry after the full Cause of our Passions, let us examine their extension, their nature in particular, their end, their use, their defects, and whatever relates to 'em.   

CHAP. II. Of the Union of the Mind with Sensible Things, or of the power or extension of the Passions in General.  
IF all those who read this Work would be at the trouble of reflecting upon what they feel in themselves, it would be needless to show here the dependence we have upon sensible Objects; I can say nothing in this matter which all the World does not know as well as myself if they will but think; so that I would forbear to say any of it, if experience did not teach me, that Men are so very forgetful of themselves, that they do not so much as think upon what they feel, nor inquire into the reasons of what passes in their Mind: I thought it necessary to say some things here which may prepare 'em to reflect upon it; and I hope that those who know 'em already will not be uneasy at the reading of 'em: for although we are not delighted with the bare repetition of what we know already, yet we may be pleased with the repetition of what we know and think of at the same time.  
The most honourable Sect of Philosophers, and that whose Opinions many Men do now think it their glory to embrace, would persuade us that it is in our own power to be happy: The Stoics continually tell us of self dependence, 
Jam beatum esse te judica cum tibi in te goudium omne nasc. tur: cum in his que homines eripiunt, optant, custediunt, nihil inveneris, non d●co quod malis, sed quod velis, Sen. Ep. 124.  that we must not be afflicted at the loss of our Reputation, Goods, Friends, or Relations; That we must be always of an even temper of Mind, and easy whatever happens, whether Exile, Injuries, Affronts, Distempers, and even Death itself, for these are not Evils to be feared; In fine, they tell us of many such like things, which we are enough inclined to believe, as well because our Pride makes us in love with Independence, as because our Reason tells us, that indeed the greatest part of these Evils which really afflict us, were incapable of doing it, if all things were in order.  
But God has given us a Body, and by this Body united us to all sensible things; Sin has subjected us to our Body, and by our Body has made us dependent upon all sensible things; This is the order of Nature, this is the Will of the Creator, that all Being's which he hath made should be united together; thus we are united to all things, and 'tis the Sin of the first Man which has made us dependent upon all Being's to which God has only allied us; Thus is there none that is not now united and wholly subjected to his Body, and by his Body to his Relations, his Friends, his City, his Prince, his Country, his Clothes, his House, his Lands, his Horse, his Dog, to all the Earth, the Sun, the Stars, to all the Heavens.  
'Tis therefore ridiculous to tell Men, that it is in their power to be Happy, Wise, and Free, and they only mock those whom they seriously advise not to be afflicted at the loss of their Friends or Goods, 'tis even as ridiculous to advise Men not to feel pain when they are beaten, or not to be pleased when they eat with an appetite; Thus the Stoics are either unreasonable, or mock us when they preach to us to be easy under the death of a Father, the loss of Goods, Exile, Imprisonment, and such like things, and not to rejoice at the good success of our Affairs, for we are united to our Country, our Goods, our Relations, etc. by a Natural Tie, which now depends not upon our Will.  
Indeed I cenfess that Reason teaches us to suffer Exile cheerfully, but the same Reason tells us we ought to endure the cutting off an Arm without pain; The Soul is above the Body, and according to the light of Reason, a Man's happiness or unhappiness ought not to depend upon it; but Experience sufficiently proves to us that things are not as our Reason tells us they should be, and it is ridiculous to Philosophise against Experience.  
Christian's doubt philosophise after this manner, they confess that pain is an evil, that it is not without uneasiness that they are ravished from those things to which Nature has united them; and that it is a difficult thing to be delivered from the slavery into which Sin has reduced us. They grant that it is a disorder that the Soul depends upon the Body, yet so as that it may be delivered from this dependence by the Grace of Jesus Christ. I feel, says St. Paul, a law in my Body which fights against the law of my Mind, and which enslaves it to the Law of Sin which is in my Members; unhappy Man that I am! Who shall deliver me from this Body of death? it will be the Grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ. The Son of God, the Apostles, and all his true Disciples do recommend patience to us above all things, because they knew that he that will live holily must endure affliction. In short, true Christians or true Philosophers say nothing which is not agreeable to good Sense and Experience, but Universal Nature does continually contradict the Opinion or Pride of the Stoics.  
Christians know, that to deliver themselves in some manner from the dependence they are in, they must labour to deprive themselves of all things which they cannot enjoy without pleasure, nor be deprived of without pain; that that is the only means to preserve the peace and liberty of Mind, which they have received by the Grace of their Saviour. The Stoics on the contrary following the false Ideas of their Chimerical Philosophy imagined themselves wise and happy, and that there needed no more than to think on Virtue and Independence, to become Virtuous and Independent. Reason and Experience tells us, the best way not to suffer the pain of pricking, is to avoid being pricked. But the Stoics say, Prick me, and by the force of my Mind, and help of my Philosophy, I will separate myself after such a manner from my Body, that I will not feel whatever passes there. I can demonstrate, that my happiness depends not upon it, that pain is not an evil; and you shall see by the air of my Face, and firm posture of all the rest of my Body, that my Philosophy makes me invulnerable.  
Their Pride maintains their Courage; but it does not hinder them from effectively suffering Pain with some inquietude, nor prevent them from being Miserable. Thus the union they have with their Body is not destroyed, nor their pain dissipated; but the union they have with other Men, fortified by the desire of their esteem, in some measure resists this other union they have with their own Bodies. The sensible sight of those who look upon them, and to whom they are united, stays the course of the spirits which accompany pain, and effaces the air that would be imprinted on their Countenance; for if no body looked upon them, this air of Constancy and freedom of Mind would immediately vanish. Thus the Stoics only in some measure resist the union that they have with their Bodies, by becoming greater Slaves to other Men, to whom they are united by the passion of glory. 'Tis then a certain truth, that all Men are united to all sensible things, both by Nature and Concupiscence; we sufficiently discover it by Experience, although Reason seems to oppose it, and almost all the actions of Men are sensible and demonstrative proofs of it.  
Though this union is common to all Men, yet it is not of an equal extension and power in all; for it follows the knowledge of the Mind; we may say we are not actually united to unknown Objects; a Countryman in his Cottage does not interest himself in the glory of his Prince or Country, but only in that of his own or Neighbouring Villages, because his knowledge extends no farther.  
The union we have to such sensible Objects as we have seen, is stronger than that we have to those we have imagined, and which we have only heard of. 'Tis by Sensation that we unite ourselves more strictly to sensible things; for Sensation produces much greater Traces in the Brain, and excites a much more violent motion in the Spirits than the Imagination only.  
This union is not so strong in those who continually oppose it, that they may adhere to the goods of the Mind, as in others who follow the motions of their Passions, and permit themselves to be subjected to them; for desire augments and fortifies this union.  
In fine, different Employs, different Conditions, as well as different Dispositions of Mind, make a considerable difference in the sensible Union that Men have with Earthly Goods. The great are united to many more things than others, their slavery is farther extended. A General of an Army is united to all his Soldiers, because they all reverence him: This slavery often creates valour; and the desire of being esteemed of all those who look upon him, often obliges him to sacrifice other more sensible and more reasonable desires to it. It is the same with those that are in power, or that are popular. 'Tis vanity often which animates their virtue; because the love of glory, is commonly stronger than the love of truth. I speak here of the love of glory, not as a simple inclination, but as a passion; because indeed this love may be sensible, and it is often accompanied with very lively and violent emotions of the spirits.  
Different Ages and Sexes are also the chief causes of the Passions of Men. Children do not love the same things, as the adult and aged do; or, at least, not with so much force and constancy. Women are united only to their Family and Neighbourhood, but Men to their whole Country; 'Tis their part to defend it, they choose great Places, Honours, and Commands.  
There is so great a variety in the Employments and Affairs of Men, that it is impossible to express it. The disposition of the Mind of a Married Man is not the same with one that is a Bachelor; the care of his Family does often wholly take up his thoughts. Monks have neither a Mind nor a Heart inclined like other Men, nor even like other ecclesiastics, they are united to fewer things, but they are more strongly united to them. We may thus speak in general of the different Conditions of Men; but we cannot explain the little sensible engagements which are almost all of them different in each particular Person; for it often enough happens that Men have particular engagements entirely opposite to those they ought to have in reference to their Condition. But although we may in general terms express the different Characters of the Mind, the different Inclinations of Men and Women, old and young, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, and in short of the different Sexes, Ages, and Employment, Yet these things are too well known to those who live in the World, and who reflect upon what they see, to swell this Volume with them. We need but open our Eyes to be agreeably and solidly instructed in these things. For those who choose rather to read them in Greek, than to learn them by any reflection upon what passes before their Eyes; I refer them to the Second Book of Aristotle's Rhetoric; which I believe is the best Piece of that Philosopher's, because few things are there said that can deceive us, though he seldom proves what he advances.  
It is then evident, that this sensible Union of the Mind of Men, with whatever has any relation to the preservation of their lives, or the Society whereof they consider themselves as Members, is different in different Persons, since it is most extensive in those that have most knowledge, are most noble, have the highest Employments, and greatest Imaginations; and and that it is more strict and stronger in those who are most Sensible, have the most lively Imagination, and who most blindly follow the motions of their Passions.  
It is very useful often to reflect upon the almost infinite Manners whereby Men are tied to sensible Objects; and one of the best ways to become very knowing in these things, is to study and observe ourselves. 'Tis by the experience of what we feel in ourselves, that we are instructed in the knowledge of all the inclinations of other Men, and of the Passions they are subject to: But if to these Experiments we add the knowledge of their particular Engagements, and that of the Judgements proper to each of the Passions, of which we shall afterwards speak, it may be we shall not have so much difficulty to guests at the greatest part of their Actions, as Astronomers have to predict Eclipses. For although Men are free, it is very rare that they make a good use of their liberty, against their natural inclinations and violent passions.  
Before we end this Chapter we must farther remark, that it is one of the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body, that all the Inclinations of the Soul, even of those it has for the goods that have no relation to the Body, are accompanied with the emotions of the Animal Spirits, which make these Inclinations sensible; because Man, not being a pure Spirit, it is impossible that he should have any inclination so pure as to have no mixture of any passion. Thus the love of Truth, Justice, and of God himself, is always accompanied with some Traces of the Brain, which renders this knowledge more lively, but commonly more confused. It is true, that very often we do not discover that our Imagination is a little employed, at the same time we conceive an Abstracted Truth: The reason is, because these Truths have no Images or Traces instituted by Nature to represent them, and all Traces which stir them up have no other relation to them, but that of Man's Will, or chance which has so placed them. For Arithmeticians, and even Algebraists, who only consider Abstracted Things, often make use of their Imaginations to keep their Minds fixed upon these Ideas. Ciphers, Alphabetical Letters, and other Figures which they see or imagine, are always joined to these Ideas; although the Traces which are form by these Characters have no relation to them, and so can make them neither false nor confused: And thus by a regulated use of Figures and Letters, they discover the most difficult Truths, which otherwise it would be impossible to find out.  
The Ideas of things which can only be perceived by the pure Understanding, may then be connected to the Traces of the Brain; and the fight of Objects that we love, hate, and fear by a Natural Inclination, may be accompanied with the motion of the Spirits: It is plain that the thought of Eternity, the fear of Hell, the hopes or an Eternal Happiness, although they be Objects that strike not the Senses, yet may excite violent Passions in us.  
So that we may say we are united after a sensible manner, not only to all things that relate to the preservation of Life; but also to Spiritual things to which the Mind is immediately united by itself. It even happens very often: that Faith, Charity, and Self-love make this union to Spiritual things stronger, than that whereby we are joined to all sensible things. The Souls of true Martyrs are more united to God than to their Bodies; and those who die to maintain the truth of a false Religion, sufficiently show that the fear of Hell has more power over them than the fear of death has. There is often so much heat and prejudice on both sides in Religious Wars, and in the defence of Superstitions, that we cannot doubt but there is some Passions in them; and such a one as is stronger and much more constant than any other, because it is built upon an appearance of Reason, as well in those that are deceived as in others.  
We are then by our Passions united to what ever appears to us to be a good or evil to the Mind, as well as to what ever seems to be so to the Body. There is nothing which we can discover to have any relation to us, which is not capable of affecting us; and amongst all the things that we know, there is none that has not some relation to us: We have always some interest even in the most abstracted Truths, when we know them, because at least there is that relation of knowledge between them and our Minds. They are ours, if I may so say, by our knowledge. We feel that they hurt us when we dispute them, and if they hurt us, it is certain that they agitate and disquiet us. Thus the Passions have so vast a dominion and extension, that it is impossible to conceive any thing in respect to them, whereof we could be certain, although all Men were exempt from their empire. But let us now see what their Nature is, and endeavour to discover all things they comprehend.   

CHAP. III. A particular Explanation of all the changes that happen to the Body and Soul by means of the Passions.  
WE may distinguish seven things in each of our Passions, except in Admiration, which also is but an imperfect Passion.  
The first is the Judgement the Mind makes of an Object, or rather the confused, and distinct view of the relation this Object has to us.  
The second is a new determination of the motion of the Will towards this Object, supposing it be, or appears to be a good. Before this view the Natural Motion of the Soul, either was intermixed, viz. carried towards good in general, or it was otherwise determined by the knowledge of some other particular Object. But in that moment the Mind perceived the relation this new Object had to it, this general Motion of the Will is forthwith determined conformably to what the Mind perceives. The Soul draws near to this Object by its love, that it may taste it, and discover its good by the sensation of sweetness, which the Author of Nature gives it as a Natural Recompense for its inclining to good. It judged that this Object was a good by an abstracted Reason which affected it not; but it remains convinced by the efficacy of Sensation, and the more lively this Sensation is, the stronger it unites to the good it seems to produce.  
But if this particular Object be considered as evil, or as capable of depriving us of any good, no new determination happens to the Motion of our Will; but only an augmentation of Motion towards the good opposite to this Object which appears, an evil, which augmentation is so much the greater, as the appearing Evil is more to be feared. For indeed, we hate only because we love, and an External Evil is judged as such, only because it deprives us of some good: Thus Evil being considered as the privation of Good, to fly Evil, is but to fly the privation of Good, which is the same thing as to incline towards good. There happens no new determination then in the natural motion of the Will at the meeting with an Object, which displeases us; but only a sensation of pain, disgust, or bitterness that the Author of Nature has imprinted in the Soul as a natural pain, because it is deprived of good. Reason alone would not be sufficient to carry us to it, there must also be stir it up. 
Before Sin sensation was no pain, but only a warning; because, as I have already said, Adam might when he would stop the motion of the Animal Spirits which would cause pain; so that if he felt pain, 'twas because he willed it as a good; or rather he felt it not, because he would not feel it.  So that in all the Passions, all the motions of the Soul towards good, are only motions of love. But because we are touched by divers Sensations according to the different circumstances which accompany the prospect of the good, and motion of the Soul towards it; we confound the Sensations with the emotions of the Soul, and we imagine as many different motions in the Passions as there are different Sensations.  
Now we must here observe that Pain is a real and true Evil, and that it is no more the privation of Pleasure, than Pleasure is the privation of Pain; for there is a difference between not feeling Pleasure, or being deprived of the sensation of it, and actually suffering Pain; so that all Evil is not such precisely, because it deprives us of good; but only, as I have shown, the Evil which is External, and which is not a manner of being that is in us. Nevertheless, as by Goods and Evils, we generally mean things Good and Evil, and not the Sensation of Pleasure and Pain, which are rather Natural Marks whereby the Soul distinguishes Good from Evil; it seems that we may say without equivocation, that Evil is only a privation of Good, and that the Natural motion of the Soul, which drives us from Evil, is the same with that which inclines us to Good. For all Natural Motion being an impression of the Author of Nature, who acts only for himself, and can only incline us towards himself; The true Motion of the Soul is always an essential love of good, and but an accidenttal aversion to evil.  
It is, true, that Pain may be considered as an Evil; and in this sense the Motions of the Passions that it excites is not real; for we do not will Pain; and if we will positively that Pain should not be, it is because we would positively preserve or perfect our Being.  
The third thing that we may observe in every Passion, is the Sensation which accompanies them: for the Sensation of Love, Aversion, Desire, Joy, Sorrow, are always different in different Passions.  
The fourth is a new determination of the course of the Spirits and Blood towards the External parts of the Body, and towards the Internal ones: before the sight of the Object that moves the Passion, the Animal Spirits were dispersed through all the Body, to preserve all the parts of it in general; but at the presence of this new Object the whole Oeconomy is troubled, the greatest past of the Spirits are pushed into the Muscles of the Arms, Legs, Face, and all the External parts of the Body, to put them in a proper disposition for the Passion that Rules; and to give it the necessary posture and motion for the acquisition of good, or to fly the evil that presents itself; but if its own Forces are not sufficient to answer its occasions, these same Spirits are so distributed that they Mechanically make it utter certain words and cries, which diffuse over the Face and the rest of the Body such an Air as is capable of agitating others with the same Passion itself is moved with. For, as Men and Animals are united together by the Eyes and Ears, when any one of them is agitated, he necessarily moves all those that look upon him and hear him, and naturally makes an impression upon their imagination which interests them in his preservation.  
As for the rest of the Animal Spirits, they violently descend into the Lungs, Liver, Spleen, and the rest of the Bowels, to demand Contributions from all those parts, and hasten them in a little time to furnish necessary Spirits to preserve the Body in the extraordinary action it must be in.  
The fifth is the sensible emotion of the Soul, which feels itself agitated by the unexpected overflowing of the Spirits. This always accompanies the motion of the Spirits, so that it interests itself in whatever affects the Body; even as the motion of the Spirits are excited in the Body as soon as the Soul is carried toward any Object: the Soul and Body being mutually united, their motions are reciprocal.  
The sixth, are the different Sensations of Love, Aversion, Joy, Sorrow, Desire, caused not by the intellectual fight of good or evil, as those we have already spoke of, but by the different shake that the Animal Spirits cause in the Brain.  
The seventh is a certain Sensation of Joy, or rather of inward Complacency, which stops the Soul in its passion, and assures it, that 'tis in the condition that is proper for it, in relation to the Object it considers. This internal Complacency generally accompanies all the Passions, those which proceed from the prospect of an Evil, as well as those that proceed from the prospect of a Good, Sorrow, as well as Joy. 'Tis this Complacency that renders all our Passions agreeable, and which inclines us to consent and abandon ourselves to them. In short, 'tis this Complacency that must be overcome by the delight of Grace, the joy of Faith, and Reason. For as the joy of the Mind always results from the certain or evident knowledge, that we are in the best estate we can be, in relation to the things we perceive; so the Complacency of the Passions is a Natural Consequence of the confused Sensations we have, that we are in the best condition we can be, in relation to the things we feel. Now by the joy of the Mind and delights of Grace we must conquer the false Complacency of our Passions, which makes us slaves to sensible goods.  
All these things we have spoke of occur in every Passion, when they are excited by confused Sensations, and that the Mind perceives neither the good nor evil which can cause them, for then 'tis plain the three first things are not concerned in them.  
We likewise see that all those things are not free, that they are in us without our consent, and even against it since the Fall; and that there is only the consent of our Will which truly depends upon us. But it seems necessary to explain all these things more at large, and to render them more sensible by some Examples.  
Let us suppose then that a Man has actually received some affront, or that being naturally of a very lively and quick imagination, he has been agitated by some accident, as a disease, a melancholy retirement, or the like, and imagines to himself in his Closet, that such a Person, who does not so much as think upon him, is willing and prepared to hurt him. The sensible prospect or imagination of the relation which is betwixt the actions of his Enemy and his own Designs, will be the first cause of his Passion.  
It is not even absolutely necessary that this Man should receive or imagine he received some affront, for the motion of his Will to receive some new determination: It is enough that he think it in his Mind only, without the Body's having any part in it. But as this new determination would not be a determination of Passion, but a pure inclination very weak and languishing, we should suppose that this Man actually suffers some great opposition in his designs, or that he strongly imagines that he shall do so, rather than make another supposition wherein the Senses and Imagination have little or no share.  
The second thing we may consider in the Passion of this Man, is an increase of the motion of his Will towards the good, the possession whereof his real or imaginary Enemy would hinder him; and the increase is so much the greater, as the opposition that would be made, appears stronger to him. He first hates his Enemy, only because he loves this good, and his hatred is so much the greater, as his love is stronger; because the motion of his Will in his hatred is here in effect only a motion of love, the motion of the Soul towards good, not differing from that whereby we fly the privation of it, as has been already said.  
The third thing is the Sensation proper to the Passion, and in this it is a Sensation of Hatred; The motion of Hatred is the same as that of Love, but the Sensation of Hatred is quite different from that of Love, which every one may know by his own experience. Motions are actions of the Will; but Sensations are modifications of the Mind. The Motions of the Will are the Natural Causes of the Sensations of the Mind; and these Sensations of the Mind in their turn maintain the Motions of the Will in their determination. The Sensation of Hatred is in this Man a Natural Consequence of the Motions of his Will, which is excited at the sight of Evil; and this Motion is afterwards maintained by the Sensation it causes.  
What we have said of this Man, might even happen although he should have no Body. But because he is composed of two parts naturally united, the Motions of his Mind communicate themselves to his Body, and those of his Body to his Mind. Thus the new determination, or the increase of the Motions of his Will, naturally produces a new determination in the Motion of the Animal Spirits, which always differs in all the Passions, although the Motion of the Soul be generally the same.  
The Spirits than are forcibly pushed into the Arms, Legs, and Face, to give the Body a disposition necessary for the Passion; and to disperse over the Face the Air a Man ought to have when we offend him, in relation to all the circumstances of the Injury he receives, and the quality or power of him that does, and of him that suffers the Affront. And this diffusion of the Spirits is so much the stronger, more abundant, and quicker, as the good is greater, the opposition stronger, and the Brain more sensibly affected.  
If then the Person of whom we speak, should only receive some injury in his imagination, or if he receives a real one, but flight, and such as can make no considerable shaking in the Brain, the diffusion of the Animal Spirits will be weak and languishing; and perhaps insufficient to change the common and natural disposition of the Body. But if the injury be great, and his imagination be heated, it will cause a great shaking in his Brain, and the Spirits would he diffused with so much force, that in a moment they would create in his Body the air and gesture of the ruling Passion. If it is strong enough to overcome, his air would be threatening and fierce. If it is weak, and cannot resist the evil that oppresses him, his air would be humble and submissive. His Complaints and Tears would naturally, excite in the Standers-by, and even in his Enemy, motions of Pity, and from thence they would draw the relief that could be hoped for from his own power. It is true that the Spectators and Enemy of this Miserable Person, have the Spirits and Fibres of their Brain already agitated I with a violent motion, contrary to that which produces Compassion in the Soul, the Complaints of this Man would but exasperate their Rage, and so his Misfortune would be inevitable, should he always continue in the same air and gesture. But Nature has well provided in this case; for at the sight of the near loss of a great good, it naturally forms upon the Face, such lively and surprising Characters of Rage and Despair, as to disarm the most Barbarous Enemies, and make them become like Statues. The terrible and unexpected fight of the Lineaments of Death drawn by the Hand of Nature upon the Face of a Miserable Wretch, stops in the Enemy, who is affected with it the Motion of the Spirits and Blood which carried him to Revenge; and in that moment of favour and attention, Nature draws anew a humble and submissive air upon the Face of this unfortunate Man, who gins to hope because of the change of his Enemy's Countenance; whose Animal Spirits receive a new determination they were not capable of a moment before; so that he Mechanically enters into the motions of Compassion, which naturally incline his Soul to Charity and Mercy.  
A Passionate Man cannot without a great abundance of Spirits, either produce or preserve in his Brain, an Image of his misfortune lively enough, or a commotion strong enough, to give the Body a forced and extraordinary gesture; the Nerves, which answer to the inward part of his Body, receive at the sight of any evil, the necessary shocks and agitations that cause the humours that are fit to produce the Spirits which the passion requires, to run into all the Vessels that have communication with the heart. For the Animal Spirits being dispersed through the Nerves which go to the Liver, Spleen, Pancreas, and generally to all the Bowels, they agitate and shake them, and by their agitation press forth the humours that these parts preserve for the Exigencies of the Machine.  
But if these humours always flowed after the same manner into the heart, if they there received at divers times a like fermentation, and if the Spirits, which are form therein, equally ascended into the Brain, we should not see such hasty changes in the motions of the Passions. The sight of a Magistrate, for instance, would not in a moment stop the transports of of a furious Man who is pursuing his revenge, and his face heated with Blood and Spirits, would not all of a sudden become pale and languid through the apprehension of some punishment.  
Thus to hinder these humours that are mixed with the Blood, from entering after the same manner into the Heart, there are Nerves which environ them at their passage, which by being contracted or dilated, by the impression that the sight of the Object, and power of the Imagination, produce in the Spirits, shut up, or open the way to those humours. And to hinder the same from receiving a like agitation, and fermentation in the heart, at divers times; there are also Nerves that cause the Palpitations, which being not equally agitated in the different motions of the Spirits, do not push the Blood with the same force into the Arteries. Other Nerves dispersed through the Lungs, distribute the Air to the heart, by contracting and dilating the branches of the Trachea, which serve for respiration, and after this manner regulate the fermentation of the Blood, in relation to the circumstances of the Passion which rules.  
And, in fine, to regulate the course of the Spirits with the greatest exactness and speed, there are Nerves which environ the Arteries, as well those which go to the Brain, as those which conduct the Blood to all other parts of the Body. So that the shaking of the Brain, which accompanies the unexpected sight of some Circumstance, because of which it is proper to change all the motions of the Passion, suddenly determine the course of the Animal Spirits to the Nerves which encompass these Arteries, that by their contraction they may shut up the passage whereby the Blood ascends into the Brain, and by their dilating, lay open that which disperses itself through all the other parts of the Body.  
These Arteries which carry the Blood to the Brain, being free, and all those which disperse it through the rest of the Body, being strongly tied by these Nerves, the Head will be filled with Blood, and the Face coloured with it. But any circumstance changing the shaking of the Brain, which caused this disposition in these Nerves, the Arteries that were contracted are unloosed, and the others on the contrary are strongly contracted. Thus the Head is void of Blood, a paleness diffused over the Face, and the little Blood which goes out of the Heart, and which the Nerves, we spoke of, admit into it to maintain life, descend mostly into the lower part of the Body; the Brain is defective of Animal Spirits, and all the rest of the Body is seized with a weakness and trembling.  
To explain, and particularly prove, what we have already said, it would be necessary to give a general knowledge of Physics, and a particular one of Human Bodies. But these two Sciences are also too imperfect to be treated of with all the exactness I could wish besides, if I should push this matter farther, it would soon carry me from my subject; and therefore I shall only give a general and gross Idea of the Passions, and am satisfied, provided this Idea be not false.  
These Shakes of the Brain, and Motions of the Blood and Spirits, are the fourth thing that is found in each of our Passions, and they produce the fifth, which is the sensible Emotion of the Soul.  
In the same time that the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Brain into the rest of the Body, there to produce the Motions that's proper to maintain the Passion, the Soul is carried towards the good that it perceives; and that so much the more violently as the Spirits go out of the Brain with the more force, because it is the same shaking of the Brain which acts the Soul and Animal Spirits.  
The Motion of the Soul towards good is so much the greater, as the sight of good is more sensible; and the Motion of the Spirits which proceed from the Brain to disperse themselves into the rest of the Body, is so much the more violent, as the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain, caused by the impression of the Object or Imagination, is stronger; so this same shaking of the Brain rendering the sight of the good more sensible, it is necessary that the Emotions of the Soul in the Passions should augment in the same proportion as the Motion of the Spirits do.  
These Emotions of the Soul differ not from those which immediately follow the intellectual sight of the good we have spoke of: They are only stronger and more lively because of the union of the Soul and Body, and the sensibility of the sight which produces them.  
The sixth thing which occurs is the Sensation of Passion; the Sensation of Love, Aversion, Desire, Joy, Sorrow, etc. This Sensation is not different from that we have already spoke of; it is only more quick, because the Body hath a great share in it. But it is always followed with a certain Sensation of Sweetness, which renders all our Passions agreeable to us, and is the last thing observed in every one of our Passions, as has been already said.  
The cause of this last Sensation is thus; At the sight of the Object of the Passion, or any new Circumstance, some of the Animal Spirits, are pushed from the Head to the extreme parts of the Body, to put it into the gesture the Passion requires; and others forcibly descend into the Heart, Lungs, and Bowels, from thence to draw necessary assistances, which has already been explained. Now it never happens that the Body is in the condition it ought to be, but the Soul receives much satisfaction from it; whereas if the Body is in an estate contrary to its good and preservation, the Soul suffers much pain. Thus when we follow the Motions of our Passions, and stop not the course of the Spirits which the sight of the Object of the Passion causes in our Body, to put it in the condition it ought to be in relation to this Object; The Soul will by the Laws of Nature receive this Sensation of delight and inward satisfaction, because the Body is in the state it ought to be in. On the contrary, when the Soul, following the Rules of Reason, stops the course of the Spirits, and resists these Passions, it suffers pain proportionably to the evil which might from thence happen to the Body.  
For even as the reflection that the Soul makes upon itself, is necessarily accompanied with the Joy or Sorrow of the Mind, and afterwards with the Joy or Sorrow of the Senses; when doing its duty, and submitting to the order of God, it would discover that in a proper condition, or abandoning itself to its Passions it is touched with remorse, which teaches it that 'tis in an ill disposition. Thus the course of the Spirits excited by the good of the Body, is accompanied with a sensible Joy or Sorrow, and afterwards with a Spiritual one, according as the course of the Animal spirits is hindered or favoured by the Will.  
But there is this remarkable difference between the Intellectual Joy that accompanies the clear knowledge of the good estate of the Soul, and the sensible Pleasure which accompanies the confused Sensation of the good disposition of the Body, that the Intellectual Joy is solid, without remorse, and as immutable as the truth which causes it, whereas sensible Joy is generally accompanied with Sorrow of the Mind, or remorse of Conscience, whence it is unquiet and as inconstant as the Passion or Agitation of the Blood which causes it: In fine, the first is almost always accompanied with a great Joy of the Senses, when it is a consequence of the knowledge of a great good, that the Soul possesses; and the other is seldom accompanied with any Joy of the Mind, although it be a consequence of a great good which only happens to the Body, if it is contrary to the good of the Soul.  
It is therefore true, that without the Grace of JESUS CHRIST, the satisfaction the Soul tastes in abandoning itself to its Passions, is more agreeable than that it feels in following the Rules of Reason; and it is this Satisfaction which is the cause of all the Disorders that have followed Original Sin, and it would make us all Slaves to our Passions, if the Son of God did not deliver us from their servitude, by the delights of his Grace; For indeed what I have said on the behalf of the Joy of the Mind against the Joy of the Senses, is only true amongst Christians; and was absolutely false in the Mouth of Seneca and Epicurus, and in short, of all the Philosophers who appeared the most reasonable; because the Yoke of JESUS CHRIST is only sweet to those that belong to him, and his Burden only seems light to us, when his Grace supports us under it.   

CHAP. IU. That the Pleasures and Motions of the Passions engage us in Errors, at the sight of Good; and therefore we ought continually to resist them. With the manner how to oppose Libertinism.  
WHatsoever we have already in general explained about the qualities and effect of the Passions, shows them not to be free, they take up their residence in our Breasts without our leave, and there is nothing but the consent of our Will which absolutely depends upon us. The prospect of Good is naturally followed with a Motion and Sensation of Love, a Shaking of the Brain, and Motion of the Spirits, a new Emotion of the Soul which increases the first Motion of Love, and a new Sensation of the Soul which augments the first Sensation of Love, and, in fine, a Sensation of Complacency which recompenses the Soul for the Bodies being in a state convenient for it. All these things pass in the Soul and Body Naturally, and Mechanically; that is, without their having any part in it, since our consent only truly depends upon us. This Consent must also be regulated, preserved, and kept free, notwithstanding all the endeavours of our Passions to the contrary. 'Tis to God alone that it must submit its liberty, yielding only to the Voice of the Author of Nature, Internal Evidence, and to the secret reproaches of Reason. We should never consent, but when we clearly see we should make an ill use of our liberty if we refused it: And this is the chief Rule that must be observed to avoid Error.  
'Tis God only who evidently shows us, that we must submit to what ever he requires; to him alone therefore we must wholly devote ourselves. There is no Evidence in the Allurements and Caresses; the Frights and Menaces we receive from our Passions: They are only confused and obscure Sensations to which we must never give ear. We must stay till these false lights of the Passions are dissipated, and wait for a purer light to guide us, till God himself speaks to us. We must enter into ourselves, and there inquire for him that never leaves us, but continually instructs us, He speaks low, but his Voice is distinct; he illuminates but little, yet his light is pure; Rather his Voice is as strong as 'tis distinct, and his Light as bright and active as 'tis pure. But our Passions keep us always out of ourselves, and by their noise and darkness hinder us from being instructed by his Voice, and illuminated by his Light. He even speaks to those who ask nothing of him, and those whose Passions have put them at the greatest distance from him, do nevertheless now and then hear some of his Words; But they are such Words as are strong, threatening and terrible; and pierce more than a two edged Sword, which penetrates the most secret Recesses of the Soul, and discerns the thoughts and motions of the Heart: 
Heb. 4.12, 13.  For all things are open before his Eyes, and he cannot behold the irregularity of Sinners without making them inwardly to feel his severe Reproaches. We ought therefore to enter into ourselves, to approach near him; to desire him to inform us of what we would know, to hearken to and obey him: For if we always give ear to him, we should never be deceived; and by continually Obeying him, we should free ourselves from the miseries and inconstancies of our Passions, to which Sin has subjected us.  
We must not think with some pretended Wits, whom the pride of their Passions have reduced to the condition of Beasts, and who having so long contemned the Law of God, seem at last to know no other than that of their infamous Passions: We ought not, I say, like those Men that are guided merely by Flesh and Blood, to imagine that in following the motions of our Passions, and secret desires of our own Hearts, we should follow God, and obey the voice of the Author of Nature; for this would be the utmost blindness; and according to St. Paul, 
Rom. 1.  the temporal punishment for Impiety and Idolatry: that is, the punishment of the greatest Crimes. Indeed, this punishment is so much the greater, as that instead of appeasing the wrath of God, as all other temporal ones do, it continually exasperates and increases it, until the terrible day, wherein his just anger shall triumph over all Sinners.  
Their Arguments however want not probability, and seeming very agreeable to common Sense; they are favoured by the Passions, and could never be destroyed by all the Philosophy of Zeno. We must love good, say they, and pleasure is the character that Nature has, united to it; and by this character we can never be deceived, since it proceeds from God, who has affixed it thereto that we might distinguish it from evil. We must also fly evil, continue they, and pain is the character that Nature has united to that, nor can we be deceived by it, since God has instituted it, that thereby we might discern it from good. We taste Pleasure when we abandon ourselves to our Passions; and feel Pain and Bitterness in resisting them. Therefore the Author of Nature would have us give up ourselves to our Passions, and never resist them; since the Pleasure and Pain he makes us feel in these occurrences are certain proofs of his Will in respect to them, To follow God therefore is to pursue the desires of our own Hearts, and to obey him, is to conform ourselves to the instinct of Nature, which inclines us to satisfy our Senses and Passions. After this manner they confirm themselves in their impious Opinions, and by this means endeavour to stifle the secret reproaches of their Reason, and for the punishment of their Crimes, God permits them to be dazzled with these false lights, which blind instead of enlightening them, but with such a blindness, as they are, insensible of, and wish not to be delivered from. God gives them over to a reprobate Sense, abandons them to the desires of their Hearts, to shameful Passions, and Actions unworthy of Man, as the Scripture tells us, that after being as it were fattened by their Debauches, they may to all Eternity become the victims of his Wrath.  
But we will solve the difficulty they propose, which the Sect of Zeno not being able to do, have denied that Pleasure was good, or Pain an evil. But this was too rash an attempt, and unbecoming Philosophers, and I dont believe it ever made those change their Opinion, who experimentally found that a great Pain was a great Misery. Since therefore Zeno and all the Heathen Philosophy could not resolve this difficulty, offered by the Epicureans, therefore we must have recourse to a more solid and enlightened Philosophy.  
'Tis true, that Pleasure is good, and Pain an evil; and that Pleasure and Pain by the Author of Nature have been affixed to the use of certain things, to make us capable of judging whether they are good or bad: That we must choose the good, fly the evil, and generally follow the motions of our Passions. All this is true, but it only relates to the Body, to preserve which, and long to continue a Life like to that of Beasts, we must suffer ourselves to be governed by our Passions and Desires. The Senses and Passions were only given us for the good of the Body; sensible Pleasure is the character which Nature has joined to the use of certain things, that without taking the pains to examine them by Reason, we might employ 'em for the preservation of the Body; but not that we should love them; for we ought to love nothing but what Reason most certainly discovers to us to be our good.  
We are Rational Being's, and God who is our chief Good, requires not of us, a blind Love, a Love of Instinct, or one that is forced; but a Love of Choice, of Knowledge, and such a one as subjects our Mind and Hearts to him. He induces us to love him by discovering to us by the light that accompanies the delection of his Grace, that he is our Sovereign Good: but inclines us to the good of the Body only by instinct, and a confused sensation of Pleasure, because the good of the Body deserves neither the application of the Mind, nor exercise of our Reason.  
But farther, our Body is not ourselves; 'tis something that belongs to us, without which absolutely speaking, we may exist: The Good of the Body therefore is not properly our good, for Bodies can be only the good of Bodies, which we may make use of for the good of our Body, but we must not unite ourselves to them. Our Soul has likewise a Good peculiar to herself, viz. that good only that is superior to her, who alone preserves, and produces in her the sensations of Pain and Pleasure. For in fine, all the objects of our Senses are of themselves uncapable of making us perceive them, and 'tis God alone that can teach us they are present, by the sensation he gives us of them, which is a Truth the Heathen Philosophers could never comprehend.  
We may, and I confess aught to love what is capable of making us feel Pleasure. And 'tis for that reason we must love none but God, because 'tis only he who can act in our Souls, since sensible objects can only move the Organs of our Senses. But perhaps it may be answered by some, what matters it from whence these agreeable Sensations come, we will enjoy them? Ingrateful as they are, not to acknowledge the hand that so kindly bestows these Goods. They would have a just God give unjust Rewards, and recompense them for the Crimes they commit against him, at the very time they commit them: They would make use of his immutable Will, which is the Order and Law of Nature, to force undeserved favours from him. For by a criminal Artifice they produce such motions in their Bodies which obliges him to make them taste all sorts of Pleasures. But Death will corrupt this Body, and God whom they have made subservient to their unjust Desires, will make them submit to his just Anger, and will mock them in his turn.  
'Tis true, 'tis a very hard thing that the possession of the Goods of the Body should be attended with Pleasure, and that that of the Goods of the Soul should often be tied to Pain and Sorrow. We may look upon it as a great irregularity, because Pleasure being the character of Good, as Pain is that of Evil, we ought infinitely to take more delight in the love of God than in the use of sensible things, since God is the true, or rather the only Good of the Mind. This will certainly happen one day, and 'tis very probable 'twas so before the Fall; at lest 'tis certain before Sin entered into the World we felt no pain in the exercise of our Duty.  
But God has withdrawn himself from us ever since the Fall of Adam, he is no longer our Good by Nature, but only by Grace; for now we naturally find no satisfaction in loving him, and he rather diverts us from, then inclines us to love him: If we follow him he repulses us, if we run after him he smites us; if we are constant in our pursuit, he still treats us ill, and makes us suffer very lively and sensible Griefs. But when being weary with walking in the hard and painful Paths of Virtue, without being encouraged by the relish of Good, or assisted by any Nourishment, we begin to feed upon sensible things, to which he unites us by the taste of Pleasure, as if he would reward us for turning aside from him to follow those perishing Goods. In short, since the first Sin, it seems as if God were not pleased that we should love or think upon him, or that we should look upon him as our only and chief Good. It is only through the Grace of JESUS CHRIST that we are now sensible that God is our Good; since 'tis by his Grace that we take any pleasure and satisfaction in the love of God.  
Thus the Soul neither discovering her own Good by a clear view, or by sensation, without the Grace of JESUS CHRIST, she takes the Good of the Body for her own: She loves it, and is more strictly united to it, by her Will, than she was by the first Institution of Nature. For the Good of the Body being the only one left that we are now sensible of, it necessarily acts the more powerfully upon Man, affects his Brain more livelily, and consequently the Soul must feel and imagine it after a more sensible manner. And the Animal Spirits being more violently agitated, the Will must needs love it with more Ardour and Pleasure.  
Before Sin the Soul was able to efface out of the Brain an over lively image of sensible good, and cause the pleasure that attended this image to vanish. The Body being thus submitted to the Mind, the Soul could in an instant put a stop to the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain, and emotion of the Spirits, only by the consideration of its Duty. But now it remains no longer in its power, nor do these traces of the Imagination, and motions of the Spirits, any longer depend upon it; and therefore by a necessary consequence, Pleasure, which by the order of Nature is affixed to these traces and motions, is become the only Master of the Heart. Man cannot long resist this Pleasure by his own strength, 'tis Grace only that can entirely overcome it; because none but God, as the Author of Grace, can overcome himself as the Author of Nature, or rather can appease himself as the Revenger of Adam's Disobedience.  

See the Fifth Dialogue of the Christian Conversations towards the end.  The Stoics, who had but a confused knowledge of the disorders of original Sin, could not confute the Epicureans; their happiness being but barely Ideal, since there is no felicity without Pleasure; and they could not relish Pleasure in the mere pursuit of virtuous actions: 'tis true, they might find some satisfaction in following the Rules of their imaginary Virtue, because it is a natural consequence of the knowledge our Soul has, that she's in the most eligible condition she can be in. This joy of the Mind might maintain their Resolutions for some time, but it was not strong enough to resist Pain and conquer Pleasure. 'Twas secret Pride, and not Joy, that made them keep their Countenance; for when no one was present they soon lost all their Power and Wisdom, like Kings upon the Theatre, whose Grandeur vanishes in a moment.  
It is very different with those Christians who exactly follow the Rules of the Gospel. Their Joy is solid, because they most certainly know they are in the happiest condition they can possibly be at present: Their Joy is also great, because the Good they taste through Faith and Hope is infinite. For the Hope of a great Good is always attended with a sensible Joy; and this Joy is so much the more vigorous, as the Hope is stronger; because a strong Hope representing the Good as present, necessarily produces that Joy, and sensible Pleasure which always accompanies the presence of Good. Nor is their Joy uneasy, because it is founded upon the promises of God, by the Blood of whose Son it is confirmed, and maintained by the inward Peace, and inexpressible sweetness of Charity, which the Holy Ghost diffuses in their Hearts. Nothing can separate them from the true Good, when they taste and are pleased with it through the Delectation of Grace. The Pleasures of Corporeal Enjoyments are not so great, as those they feel in the love of God; rather than quit them they choose Contempt and Pain, they are not affrighted at Reproaches and Disgrace, and the Pleasures they find in their Sufferings, or to speak more properly, those they meet with in God, when they contemn every thing to be united to him, are so violent that they transport them, and makes them speak a new Language, and with the Apostles, boast of the Miseries and Injuries they suffer. The Scripture tells us, That when the Apostles departed from the Council, they were filled with Joy that they were accounted worthy to suffer shame for the Name of JESUS. And this is the disposition of Mind in true Christians, when they have received the greatest Affronts for defending the Truth.  
JESUS CHRIST being come to re-establish that Order that Sin had overthrown, and Order requiring that the greatest Goods should be accompanied with the most solid Pleasures; it is plain that things ought to happen after the manner we have related, But besides Reason, Experience confirms it; for a Person no sooner takes a resolution of contemning every thing for God, but he is commonly so affected with a Pleasure, or inward Joy, that he as sensibly feels God to be his Good, as before he evidently knew him to be so.  
True Christians assure us every day, that the Joy they have in the Love and Service of God is inexpressible; and 'tis very reasonable to believe them concerning what passes in themselves. The wicked on the contrary are perpetually tormented with mortal Disquiets; and such as are divided betwixt God and the World, partake also of the Joys of the Righteous, and Dissatisfactions of the Wicked; They complain of their Miseries, and 'tis likewise just to believe their Complaints are not groundless. God strikes Men to the very quick, when they make choice of any other object for their chief Good but himself, and 'tis this wound that makes them really miserable: But fills the Mind of those with excessive Joy, who only unite themselves to him; and 'tis this Joy which gives the true Felicity. The abundance of Riches and possession of Honours and Dignities being external, cannot cure the wound God makes. And as Poverty and Contempt are also without us, so they cannot hurt us when the Almighty protects us.  
It is evident by what has been said, that the objects of our Passions are not our Good, and that we must only follow their Motions for the preservation of our Lives: That sensible Pleasure in respect of our Good, is what our Sensations are in relation to the Truth; and even as we find our Senses deceive us in matters of Truth, so our Passions deceive us concerning our Good: That we must submit to the Delectation of Grace, because it evidently inclines us to love the true Good; nor is followed with the secret reproaches of Reason, like the blind instinct and confused pleasure of the Passions; but is always attended with a secret Joy agreeable to the condition we are in: And last of all, since God only can act upon our Mind, we can find no Felicity out of God; except we would suppose that God rewards none but the Disobedient, or Commands us to love that most which least deserves our love.   

CHAP. V That the Perfection of the Mind consists in its Union with God, by the knowledge of Truth and love of Virtue; And that on the contrary, its Imperfection proceeds only from its dependence on the Body, because of the disorder of its Senses and Passions.  
THE least reflection is enough to discover to us, that the good of the Mind must necessarily be something Spiritual; for Bodies are much inferior to the Mind, and cannot act upon it by their own strength: They are not able immediately to unite themselves to it, nor are they intelligible of themselves, and therefore cannot be its good. On the contrary, Spiritual Things are intelligible from their own Nature, and may unite themselves to the Mind; consequently be its good, if we suppose them superior to it; for that a thing may be the good of the Mind, it is not enough to be Spiritual like that, it must be above it, that it may be able to act upon it, instruct and recompense it; otherwise it could neither make it more happy nor more perfect, and therefore could not be its good. Of all things both Intelligible and Spiritual, there is none but God that is thus superior to the Mind; from whence it follows, that nothing but he is, or can be its true good, nor can we therefore become more perfect or more happy, but in the enjoyment of God.  
Every one is convinced, that the knowledge of the Truth, and love of Virtue, makes the Mind more perfect; and that the blindness of the Mind, and irregularity of the Inclinations, renders it more imperfect. The knowledge of Truth, and love of Virtue then, can be nothing else but the union of the Mind with God, and even a kind of possessing of him: And the blindness of the Mind, and irregularity of the Heart, can likewise be nothing else but the separation of the Mind from God, and the uniting the Mind to something inferior to it, like the Body, since only this union can make it imperfect and unhappy. Thus to be acquainted with Truth, to know things that are the most agreeable, or consonant to the Rules of Virtue, is to know God himself.  
The Mind is, as it were, placed between God and the Body, Good and Evil; between what instructs and blinds it, regulates and disorders it, what can make it perfect and happy, and what can make it imperfect and miserable. When it discovers any Truth, or sees things as they are in themselves, it sees them in the Ideas of God; that is, by a clear and distinct view of what it is in God that represents them. For as I have before intimated, the Mind of Man does not, in itself, include the Perfections or Ideas, of all the Being's it is capable of considering: 'Tis not the Universal Being, and therefore does not see in itself such things as are distinct from it; by consulting itself, it is neither capable of enlightening or instructing itself, for 'tis neither its own Perfection nor Light; it stands in need of the immense Light of Truth by which it is united to, and possesses God in some manner.  
But we cannot only say, that the Mind, which is acquainted with Truth, does in some manner know God who includes it, but we may likewise add, That in part it knows things as God himself knows them; for the Mind knows their true Relations, and God knows them also; the Mind discovers them by viewing the Perfections of God who represents them, God sees them likewise by the same means. For in short, God neither sees nor imagines, but perceives in himself, as he is the Intellectual World, the Material and Sensible one which he has created. It is the same with the Mind in its knowledge of Truth, it perceives it not by Sensation and Imagination: Sensations and Phantoms, only represent false Relations to the Mind; and whoever discovers the Truth, can only see it in the Intellectual World to which 'tis united, and in which God himself sees it; for this Material and Sensible World, is not intelligible of itself. The Mind than sees in the Light of God what e'er it sees clearly; though it sees them but imperfectly, and in that respect very differently from what God sees them. So that when the Mind discovers the Truth, it is not only united to God, but possesses, and beholds him; and in one sense, sees the Truth as God himself does.  
Likewise, when our Love is regulated by Virtue, we love God; for when we love according to these Rules, the impression of love that God continually produces in our hearts inclines us towards him, and is neither diverted by , nor changed into Self-love. The Mind than does only, with the greatest freedom, follow this impression that God gives it; and the Almighty never giving it any impression but what tends towards him, since he only acts for himself: It is evident, that when we love according to the Rules of Virtue, we love God.  
But 'tis not only to love God, 'tis also to love as God does; who only loves himself, and his Works, because they relate to his Perfections, and loves these Works proportionably to the relation they have to these Perfections: And indeed, 'tis the same love whereby God loves himself, and whatever he has created. To love according to the Rules of Virtue, is to love God only; and to love God in every thing, is to love every thing so far as it partakes of his Goodness and Perfection, since that is to love them in proportion to their Amiableness. In short, 'tis to love by the impression of the same love whereby God loves himself; for 'tis that love by which God loves himself, and whatever relates to him, which animates us, when we love as we ought to do: And therefore we then love as God loves.  
It is then evident, that the knowledge of Truth, and regulated love of Virtue, produces all our Perfections, since they are commonly the consequences of our Union with God, and even lead us to the enjoyment of him, as much as we are capable in this life. And on the contrary, the blindness of our Minds, and irregularity of our Inclinations, are the cause of all our imperfections, being the Natural effects of the union of our Mind with our Body, as I have before proved, in showing that we never discover the Truth, nor love the true Good, when we follow the impressions of our Senses, Imaginations and Passions.  
Tho' these things are so evident, yet Men, who ardently, desire to perfect their Being, take very little pains to increase their union with God, but continually endeavour to strengthen and enlarge that they have with Sensible things. The cause of this strange irregularity cannot be too fully explained.  
The possession of Good must naturally produce these two effects in him that enjoys it; it makes him more perfect, and at the same time more happy: Yet it does not always happen so; I confess, 'tis impossible that the Mind should actually possess any good, and not be actually more perfect, but it may actually enjoy a good, without being made more happy by it. Those who are best acquainted with the Truth, and have the greatest love for the most amiable good, are always actually more perfect than those that are still subjected to blindness and disorder, yet are they not always actually more happy. It is the same thing in respect to Evil, it makes men both imperfect and unhappy at the same times; yet tho' it always renders them more imperfect, it does not always make them more unhappy; or, at least, it does not make them unhappy in proportion to the imperfection it gives them. Virtue is often unpleasant and bitter, and Vice sweet and agreeable; so that 'tis chief through Faith and Hope, that good Men are truly happy, whilst the Wicked actually enjoy Pleasure and Delights. It ought not to be thus 'tis true; but so it is, Sin having caused this disorder, as I have showed in the preceding Chapter; and 'tis this disorder that is the chief cause, not only of all the irregularities of our Hearts, but also of the blindness and ignorance of our Minds.  
Our Imagination is by this disorder persuaded, that the Body may be the good of the Mind; for Pleasure, as I have many times intimated, is the Character, or Sensible Mark of Good; and the most sensible Earthly enjoyments, are those which we imagine we receive from the Body. Wherefore, without much reflection, we judge that Bodies may be, and even truly are our Good: And 'tis so difficult to oppose the Instinct of Nature, and to resist the Proofs of Sensation, that we never so much as think of it. We reflect not upon the disorders that Sin has produced, and consider not that Bodies can only act upon the Mind as occasional Causes; That the Mind cannot immediately, or of itself, enjoy any corporeal thing; and that it can unite itself to no object but by its knowledge and love: God only being above us, can recompense or punish us with Sensations of Pleasure, or Pain, which can instruct more; and, in short, act in us. These truths, altho' very evident to attentive Minds, are not so powerful to convince us, as the deceitful Experience of a sensible impression.  
When we consider any thing as part of ourselves, or look upon ourselves as part of this thing which we judge is good for us to be united to, we have a love for it; and this love is so much the greater, as the thing which we take to be united to us▪ appears a more considerable part of the whole which we compose with it. Now there are two sorts of Proofs which persuade us that a thing is part of ourselves; the instinct of Sensation, and evidence of Reason.  
By the instinct of Sensation, I am persuaded that my Soul is united to my Body, or that my Body makes up part of my Being; yet I have no full evidence of it, since 'tis not by the light of Reason that I conclude it, but by the Pain or Pleasure I feel when Objects strike my Senses. If I prick my hand I suffer pain, therefore I conclude my hand to be a part of myself; but if my  are torn I suffer nothing, therefore determine they do not belong to my Being. My Hair is cut without pain, but cannot be plucked off without it: This perplexes the Philosophers, and they know not how to decide it, but their indetermination shows the wisest Judge, rather by the instinct of Sensation than light of Reason, that such things are, or are not a part of themselves: For if they concluded from Evidence and Reason, they would soon discover that the Mind and Body are Being's of different Species, and that the Mind cannot be united to the Body of itself; that 'tis only through the union we have with God, that the Soul is wounded when the Body is struck. Therefore 'tis only by the instinct of Sensation that we look upon our Bodies, and all the sensible things we are united to, as parts of ourselves; I mean, as part of what thinks and feels within us, because what is not, cannot be discovered by the evidence of Reason, since evidence discovers nothing but Truth.  
And on the contrary, 'tis by the light of Reason that we discover the relation we have with intellectual things; By a clear view of the Mind, we discover that we are united to God after a more strict and essential manner than we are to our Bodies; That without him we are nothing; can neither do, nor know, will, nor feel any thing; That he is our All, and if we may so speak, that we make but one whole with him, whereof we are an infinitely small part. The light of Reason discovers a thousand Motives to us, that would induce us to love God only, and contemn the Body as unworthy of our love; but we are hot naturally sensible of our union with God, nor by the instinct of Sensation, but only through the Grace of our SAVIOUR persuaded that he is our All; which Grace causes such a Spiritual Sensation in some Persons, as it assists them in conquering that contrary Sensation which unites them to the Body. For God, as he is the Author of Nature, inclines our Minds to love him, by an enlightened knowledge, and not one of instinct: And very probable 'tis, since the Fall, that he, as Author of Grace, has added Instinct to Illumination, because our light is now so much diminished, that it is incapable of carrying us to God; besides its being continually weakened, and made ineffectual by contrary Pleasure and Instinct.  
We, by the light of the Mind, then discover, that we are united both to God, and the Intellectual World he includes; and by Sensation are convinced, that we are united to our Bodies, and by them to the Material and Sensible World, which God has created. But as our Sensations are more lively, moving, frequent, and even more lasting than our Illuminations, so we cannot think it strange that our Sensations should agitate us, and stir up our love to all Sensible Things, and that our light dissipates and vanishes without producing in us any Zeal for the Truth.  
It is true, there are many Men who are persuaded that God is their true Good, love him as their All, and who ardently desire to increase and strengthen the union they have with him; but few evidently perceive, that to know and consider the Truth, is to unite themselves to God with all their Natural power; that 'tis a kind of enjoying of him, to meditate on the true Ideas of things; and that this abstracted view of certain, general, and immutable Truths, which determine all particular ones, are the flights of a Mind which quits the Body to be united to God. Metaphysics, Speculative Mathematics, and all Universal Sciences, which regulate and include particular ones, as the Universal Being comprehends all particular Being's, seem Chimerical to most Men, even to the Religious, as well as to those who do not love God: So that I dare hardly say, that by enquiring into these Sciences, the Mind applies itself to God, after the most pure and perfect manner it is naturally capable of; and that 'tis by a prospect of the Intellectual World, which is the Object of these Sciences, that God has created, and still knows this Sensible World; from whence Bodies receive their life, as Spirits live from the other.  
Those who only follow the impression of their Senses and Motions of their Passions, are incapable of relishing truth because it does not flatter them. And good Men who continually oppose their Passions when they present false goods to them, do not always resist them, when they obscure the truth, or make it contemptible to them; because Persons may be Pious without extraordinary Judgements. To make us acceptable to God, 'tis not requisite for us exactly to know that our Senses, Imaginations, and Passions, always represent things otherwise to us than they are; for indeed it does not appear that JESUS CHRIST or his Apostles designed to undeceive us of several Errors that D'cartes has since discovered to us upon this matter.  
There is a great deal of difference between Faith and Knowledge, the Gospel and Philosophy; The most ignorant are capable of Faith, but few are able to understand Evident Truths. Faith represents God as the Creator of Heaven and Earth, to the most Simple, which is enough to induce them to love and serve him: but Reason considers God not only in his Works, because she knows he existed before he was a Creator, and therefore endeavours to Contemplate him in himself, or in the great and vast Idea of an infinitely perfect Being which is included in him. The Son of God, who is the Wisdom of the Father, or the Eternal Truth, was made Man, and became sensible to discover himself to the carnal and most ignorant: That he might instruct them by that which caused their blindness, and incline them to love him, and lose them from sensible Objects, by the same things that had captivated them. For when he had to do with Fools, he made use of a kind of simplicity to make them wise; so that the most Religious and Faithful have not always the greatest Understanding. They may know God by Faith, and love him through the assistance of his Grace, without discerning him to be their All, after the same manner as Philosophers do, and without reflecting that the abstracted knowledge of Truth is a kind of union with him. We must not therefore be surprised, if there are but few Persons who endeavour to strengthen their Natural Union they have with God, by seeking after the Truth; since to this end it would be necessary constantly to oppose the impression of the Senses and Passions after a very different manner from that which is familiar to the most Virtuous Persons; for most good Men are not always persuaded that the Senses and Passions deceive us after the manner we have explained in the precedent Books.  
Those Sensations and Thoughts, wherein the Body has any share, are the true and immediate cause of our Passions; because 'tis only the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain that excites any particular emotion in the Animal Spirits; so that only our Sensations can sensibly convince us that we depend on certain things, which they excite us to love: But we feel not the Natural Union we have with God, when we discover the Truth; nor so much as think upon him, for he is within us, and operates after such a secret and insensible manner that we perceive him not: Our Natural Union with him therefore does not excite us to love him; But our Union with Sensible Things is quite different; All our Sensations declare this Union, and Bodies present themselves to our Eyes when they act in us, nor is any thing they do concealed. Even our own Body is more present to us than our Mind, and we consider it as the best part of ourselves. Thus the Union we have with our Body, and through that, with all sensible Objects, excites a violent love in us, which increases this Union, and makes us depend upon things that are infinitely below us.   

CHAP. VI Of the most general Errors of the Passions. Some particular Examples of them.  
IT's the part of Moral Philosophy to inquire into all the particular Errors wherein our Passions engage us concerning good; to oppose the irregularities of Love, to establish the sincerity of the Heart, and regulate the Manners. But our chief intent here is to give Rules for the Mind, and to discover the causes of our Errors in respect of Truth; so that we shall pursue no further, those things already mentioned, which relate only to the love of the true Good: We will then proceed to the Mind, but shall not pass by tne Heart, because it has the greatest influence over the Mind: We will inquire after the Truth in it self, and without thinking on the relation it has to us, only so far as this relation is the occasion that Self-love disguises and conceals it from us: for we judging of all things according to our Passions, deceive ourselves in all things; the Judgements of the Passions never agreeing with the Judgements of the Truth.  
'Tis what we may learn from these admirable words of St. Bernard: 
* Amor sicut nec odium, veritatis judicium nescit. Vis judicium veritatis audire? Joan 5.30. Sicut audio sic judico: Non sicut odi, non sicut amo, non sicut timeo. Est judicium, odii, ut illud: Nos legem habemus & secundum legem Nostram, debet mori. Joan 19.7. Est & timoris, ut illud: si dimittimus eum sic, venient Romani, & tollent Nostrum locum & gentem. Joan 11.48. Judicium vero amoris, ut David de filiô parricidâ. Parcite, inquit, puero Absalon, 2 Reg. 18.5. St. Bern. de grad humilitatis.  Neither love nor hatred, says he, know how to judge according to truth. But if you will hear a true Judgement. I judge according to what I hear, not as I hate, love, or fear. This is a Judgement of hatred, We have a law, and according to our law he ought to die. This is a Judgement of fear, If we let him alone, the Romans will come and take away our Place and Nation. This is a Judgement of love, as David speaks of his parricide son, Spare the young Man Absalon.  
Our Love, Hatred, and Fear, cause us to make false Judgements only; and nothing but the pure Light of Truth, can enlighten our Mind. 'Tis only the distinct Voice of our common Master that instructs us to make solid Judgements, and he will infallibly do it, provided we only judge of what he says, and according to what he says, Sicut audio, sic judico, As I hear I judge. But let us see after what manner our Passions seduce us, that we may the more easily resist them.  
The Passions have so great a relation to the Senses, that 'twill not be difficult to discover after what manner they engage us in Error, if we but remember what has been said in the First Book. For the general Causes of the Errors of our Passions are entirely like those of the Errors of our Senses.  
The most general cause of the Errors of our Senses is, as we have shown in the First Book, our attributing to our Body, or to External Objects, those Sensations which belong to our Soul; affixing Colours to the Surfaces of Bodies; diffusing of Light, Sounds, Odours in the Air; and assigning Pain and Pleasure to those parts of our Body which receive any change by the motion of other Bodies which meet them.  
The same thing may be said of our Passions: we imprudently attribute to those Objects which cause, or seem to cause them, all the dispositions of our Heart; Goodness, Meekness, Malice, Ill-nature, and all the other Qualities of our Mind. Whatever Object produces any Passion in us; in some manner seems to include in itself, what it stirs up in us, when we think upon it: Even as sensible Objects appear to us to include the Sensations their presence excites. When we love any Person, we are naturally inclined to believe they love us, and 'twould be difficult for us to imagine that they had either any design to hurt us, or to oppose our desires. But if hatred succeeds love, we cannot believe that they design us any good; we interpret all their actions in the worst sense, and are always suspicious and upon our guard, although perhaps they think not of us, or else intent to do us some service. In short, we unjustly attribute all the dispositions of our Heart, to those Persons who excite any Passion in us; even as we imprudently ascribe all the qualities of our Mind to sensible Objects.  
Moreover, by the same reason that we believe all Men receive the same Sensations of the same Objects as we do, we think that all Men are acted with the same Passions as we are upon the same subjects, provided we believe they are capable of being moved by them. We imagine they love, what we love, or desire what we desire: from whence proceed Jealousies and secret Aversions, if the good we are in pursuit of cannot be wholly possessed by many: but if several Persons can possess it without dividing it, as they may the sovereign Good, Science, Virtue, etc. then 'tis quite of another matter. We likewise think they hate, eat, and fear the same things as we do, and from thence comes Associations and secret Conspiracies according to the nature of the thing we hate, by this means hoping to deliver ourselves from our Miseries.  
We attribute therefore the Emotions of our Passions to those Objects that produce them in us, and believe that all other Men, and even sometimes that Beasts are agitated like us; besides, we judge yet more rashly, that the cause of our Passion, which is often only imaginary, is really in some Object.  
When we have a Passionate Love for any one, we think every thing is amiable in them: His Grimaces are Charming, his Ugliness is not displeasing; his Irregular Motions and Unhandsome Gestures are Just, or at least Natural. If he never speaks, 'tis because he is Wise; if he talks much, he is very Witty; if he speaks upon every thing, his Knowledge is universal; if he continually interrupts others, it proceeds from his Quickness, Vicacity, and Fire: In short, if he would be chief in all Company, 'tis because he Merits it. Thus our Passion after this manner hides or disguises the Defects of our Friends, and on the contrary magnifies the least good Quality in them.  
But if this Love is only founded upon the agitation of the Blood and Animal Spirits like the rest of the Passions, in time it cools for want of heat, or proper Spirits to maintain it; and if interest or any other false relation change the disposition of the Brain, hatred will succeed this love, and will not fail to make us imagine in the Object of our Passion, all the defects that can cause a just Aversion. In the same Person we shall see such Qualities as are directly contrary to what we admired before; and be ashamed that ever we loved them; and the Predominant Passion will be sure to justify itself, and make that it succeeds ridiculous.  
The power and injustice of the Passions are not limited to what we have already said, they are infinitely farther extended. Our Passions do not only disguise their principal Object, but likewise whatever has any relation to it: They not only make all the Qualities of our Friends agreeable, but also the greatest part of the Qualities of our Friends Friends. And even go farther in those that have a great and strong Imagination, for their Passions have so vast a dominion and extension, that it is impossible to determine their limits.  
What I have already mentioned are such general and pregnant Principles of Errors, Prejudices, and Injustices, that 'tis impossible to remark all the Consequences of them; Most of the Truths, or rather Errors, of certain Places, Times, Commonalties, and Families, have their rise from them. What is approved in Spain, is rejected in France; what is Orthodox in Paris, is condemned at Rome; what the Dominicans espouse, the Franciscans disapprove; and what is undoubted to the one, is erroneous to the other: The Dominicans think it their Duty to follow Sr. Thomas, and why? because he was one of their Order; and on the contrary the Franciscans embrace the Opinions of Scotus, because he belonged to theirs.  
There are also Truths and Errors peculiar to certain times; The Earth moved about Two thousand years ago, and from thence it has continued fixed till our days, and now gins to turn again. Aristotle has been formerly burnt, and a Provincial Council approved of by a Pope, has wisely forbidden the teaching of his Physics; ever since he has been admired, and now gins again to be despised. There are some Opinions now received in the Schools, which have formerly been looked upon as Heresies, and those who maintained them have been Excommunicated as Heretics by some of the Bishops: Because Passions causing Factions, these Factions produce such Truths or Errors as are as inconstant as the Cause which produces them, For instance, Men may be indifferent in respect to the stability of the Earth, or the essence of Bodies: but continue no longer so, 
Concil. Angl. per Spelman, An. 1287.  when they are maintained by such as they hate. Thus Aversion upheld by a confused Sense of Piety, produces an indifferent Zeal, which kindles by little and little, and at last causes such Events as appears so strange to every one a long time after they happen.  
We can scarcely think that the Passions should go so far, but 'tis because we don't consider they extend to whatever can satisfy them. Haman it may be would have done no harm to the Jews, if Mordecai had saluted him, but he being a Jew, and refusing it, the whole Nation must perish that his revenge might be the more magnificent.  
When there is a dispute between two Persons who has a right to an Estate, they ought only to bring their Titles, and speak what relates to their Case, or can best set it off; yet they fail not to use all manner of reproaches one against another, to contradict each other in every thing, and to introduce a thousand unnecessary Accusations, and perplex their Suit with an infinite number of Accessary Circumstances which confound the Cause. And indeed all Passions extend as far as the prospect of their Mind who are moved with them; since there is nothing that we take to have any relation with the Object of our Passions, to which the motions of these Passions do not extend; which is done as follows.  
The Traces of Objects are really so connected one with another in the Brain, that 'tis impossible the course of the Spirits should violently stir up any of them, without affecting the rest at the same time. The chief Idea therefore of what we think of, is necessarily accompanied with a great number of accessary Ideas, which are so much the more increased as the impression of the Animal Spirits are more violent. And this impression of the Spirits seldom fails to be violent in the Passions, because the Passions continually and powerfully force into the Brain an abundance of these Spirits that are proper to preserve the Traces of the Ideas which represent their Object. Thus the motion of Love or Hatred extend not only to the principal Object of the Passion, but likewise to whatever we discover to have any relation to this Object; because in the Passion the motion of the Soul follows the perception of the Mind; even as the motion of the Animal Spirits in the Brain, follow the Traces of the Brain as well as those which excite the chief Idea of the Object of the Passion, as those that relate to it.  
We must not therefore wonder if Men carry their Hatred or Love so far, and perform such Capricious and Surprising Actions. There is a particular Reason of all these Effects although we do not know them; because their accessary Ideas are not always like ours, we cannot discover them. Thus there is always some cause or other for those actions which appear most ridiculous and extravagant.   

CHAP. VII. Of the Passions in particular, and first of Admiration and its ill Effects.  
WHatever I have hitherto said of the Passions is general, but it will not be very difficult to draw particular Inferences from thence; It is only requisite to make some reflection upon what passes within ourselves, and the actions of others, for us to discover more of these sort of Truths at one view, than we could explain in a considerable time. Yet there are so few Persons who think of retiring into themselves, and make any endeavour to that end, that to excite them to it, and stir up their attention, it will be necessary to descend to particulars.  
When we hit or strike ourselves, it seems as if we were almost insensible; but if we are only touched by others, we receive Sensations lively enough to stir up our Attention. In short, we never tickle ourselves, or so much as think of it, and it may be we could not do it if we had a mind to it. 'Tis almost for the same reason that the Soul neglects to inquire into and examine itself, it is immediately displeased with this sort of enquiry, and is commonly incapable of discovering or perceiving what belongs to it, except when excited or stirred up by others. Thus to assist some Persons in the knowing of themselves, it is necessary to relate some of the particular Effects of the Passions, that by affecting them therewith, we may make them sensible of all the parts their Soul are composed of.  
Those who will read what follows must nevertheless be advertized, that they will not always be sensible that I touch them, nor will they always find themselves subject to the Passions and Errors I shall speak of, because all particular Passions are not always the same in all Men.  
'Tis true indeed all Men have the same Natural inclinations which have no relation to the Body, when their Bodies are perfectly well disposed. But the different temperaments of Bodies, and their frequent changes, cause a great deal of variety in particular Passions. And if to the diversity of the Body's constitution we add that which proceeds from Objects, which likewise makes very different impressions upon all those who have neither the same Employs nor manner of living; it is evident that such a Person may feel himself strongly affected in some place of his Soul by certain things, who will yet absolutely remain insensible of many others. Thus we should often be deceived, if we judged of what others feel by what passes in ourselves.  
I am not afraid of being mistaken when I affirm that all Men would be happy, for I am absolutely assured that the Chinese and Tartars, Angels, Devils, and even all Spirits whatever, have an inclination for felicity. I know likewise that God will never produce any Spirit without this desire. Yet is it not experience that has taught it me, I never saw either Chinese or Tartar; nor is it the inward testimony of my Conscience, for that only teaches me I would be happy myself: But 'tis God alone who can inwardly convince me that all other Men, Angels, and Devils, have a desire to be happy; and 'tis he only who can assure me, that he will never give a Being to any Spirit who will be indifferent in respect to it. For who is there besides himself that can positively assure me of what he does, and even of what he thinks? And as he can never deceive me, so I cannot doubt of what he teaches me. I am therefore certain that all Men would be happy because this inclination is natural, and depends not upon the Body.  
But it is very different in particular Passions; For though I should extremely love Music, Dancing, Hunting, Sweetmeats, or Luxurious Dishes, etc. I could conclude nothing certain from thence concerning the Passions of other Men. Pleasure doubtless is sweet and agreeable to all Men, but every one does not find it in the same Object: The love of pleasure is a Natural inclination, depends not on the Body, and is therefore general to all Men. But the inclination for Music, Dancing, and Hunting, is not general, because the disposition of the Body on which it depends, being different in all Men, whatsoever Passions depend upon it, are not always the same.  
General Passions, as Desire, Joy, Sorrow, etc. keep the mean between Natural inclinations, and particular Passions. They are general as well as the Inclinations, but not equally strong; because that which produces and maintains them, is not always itself equally active. There is also a great deal of variety in the degrees whereby the Animal Spirits are agitated, in their plenty, and fineness, and in the relation betwixt the Fibres of the Brain and these Spirits.  
Thus it often happens, that we done't at all affect some Persons, when we speak of particular Passions; but if we chance to touch them, they are violently moved. But with general Passions and Inclinations, it is quite contrary, we are always affected when they are mentioned, yet after such a weak and languishing manner, that we scarcely perceive it. I speak these things to prevent any Persons judging whether I am deceived, by the Sensation only which he has received of what I have already or shall afterwards say, for I would have every one judge by considering the Nature of the Passsions I treat of.  
If I proposed the treating of every particular Passion, or to distinguish them by all the Objects which excite them; it's plain I should never conclude, and should only repeat the same thing: The first is evident because the Objects of our Passions are infinite; and the last also, since we must always treat of the same Subject. The particular Passions for Poetry, History, Mathematics, Hunting, and Dancing, are only one and the same general Passion; for, for instance, the Passions of Desire or Joy, or for whatever pleases, differ not, although the peculiar Pleasures which excite them do.  
We must not therefore multiply the number of the Passions according to the number of Objects which are infinite, but only by the chief relations they may have in respect to us. And after this manner we shall discover, as will further appear upon our Explanation, that Love and Hatred are the Mother Passions, Which produce no other general Passions but Desire, Joy, and Sorrow, and that particular Passions are composed only of these three first; and are so much the more compounded as the chief Idea of Good or Evil which excites them, is accompanied with a greater number of Accessary Ideas, or that the Good or Evil are more Circumstantiated in respect to us.  
If we remember what has been said of the connexion of Ideas, and that in all great Passions the Animal Spirits being extremely agitated, stir up in the Brain all the Traces which have any relation with the Object which affects us; we shall find, that there are an infinite number of different Passions which have no particular name, and which we can no way explain, but must confess they are inexplicable.  
If the Original Passions which compose the rest, were not capable of more or less; we should have no difficulty in determining the number of all the Passions; but the number of those Passions which are produced by the complication of others must necessarily be infinite, because the same Passion having infinite degrees, it may by joining itself with others be infinitely complicated: So that perhaps two Men were never moved by the same Passion, if by the same Passion we understand the collecting together of all equal Motions, and like Sensations, which at the presence of any Object is stirred up in us.  
But as the more or less do not alter the Species, so we may say that the number of Passions is not infinite, because the Circumstances which accompany the Good or Evil may be limited. But let us explain our Passions in particular.  
When we see any thing the first time, or when we have many time seen it attended with certain Circumstances, we are surprised and admire at it if we afterwards see it appear in another manner. Thus a new Idea, or a new Connexion of old Ideas, begets in us an imperfect Passion, which is the first of all, and which I name Admiration. I call this Passion imperfect, because it is neither excited by the Idea nor Sensation of Good.  
The Brain being then shaken in certain places which never were before affected, or after a manner that is perfectly new, the Soul is sensibly touched with it, and consequently strongly applies itself, to whatever it finds new in that object; for the same reason, as a simple tickling at the Soles of the Feet, excites a most lively and moving Sensation in the Soul, rather through the novelty than the force of the impression. There is yet other Reasons for the Souls applying itself to Novelties, but I have explained them where I spoke of Natural Inclinations. We here consider the Soul in relation to the Body, and according to this relation 'tis the emotion of the Spirits which is the Natural Cause of its application to new things.  
In Admiration strictly taken, we consider things only as they are in themselves, or according to their appearances; and not as they relate to us, or as they are good or bad. And therefore the Spirits diffuse not themselves through the Muscles, to give a proper disposition to the Body, to pursue good, or avoid evil; nor agitate the Nerves, which goes to the Heart, and to the rest of the Bowels, to hasten, or delay the fermentation and motion of the Blood, as it happens in the rest of the Passions. All the Spirits go towards the Brain, there to trace a lively and distinct image of the surprising object, that the Soul may consider and know it again; But the rest of the Body continues in the same posture, and as if it were . For there being no emotion in the Soul, there is also no motion in the Body.  
If what we admire appears great, the admiration is always followed with Esteem, and sometimes with Veneration: But on the contrary, it is always accompanied with Contempt, and sometimes Disdain, when it appears little.  
The Idea of Greatness produces a great motion of Spirits in the Brain, and the trace that represents it is preserved a long time: A great motion of Spirits likewise excites the Idea of Greatness in the Soul, and strongly fixes the Mind on the consideration of this Idea.  
But the Idea of Littleness creates in the Brain but an inconsiderable motion of the Spirits, and the trace which represents it does not continue long. Also, when the Spirits are but little moved, they cause in the Soul an Idea of Meanness, and stays the Mind but a very little in the consideration of this Idea: These things deserve to be well observed.  
When we consider ourselves, or any thing which is united to us, our Admiration is always attended with some Passion which moves us. But this agitation is only in the Soul, and in the Spirits which go to the Heart; because there being no good that it makes us seek after, nor evil that it makes us shun, the Spirits are not dispersed through the Muscles to dispose the Body to any action. The thoughts of the perfection of our Being, or of any thing belonging to it, naturally produces Pride, the esteem of ourselves, contempt of others, Joy, and some other Passions. The prospect of Grandeur produces Haughtiness; that of Power, Generosity or Boldness; and the sight of any, other advantageous quality naturally produces some other Passion, which will be always a kind of Pride.  
On the contrary, the foresight of some Imperfection of our Being, or of any thing which belongs to it, will naturally produce Humility, contempt of ourselves, respect for others, sorrow, and some other Passions. The prospect of Poverty creates meanness of Spirit; that of weakness, Timerousness; and thus the sight of any disadvantageous quality naturally produces a Passion, which will be a kind of Humility. But this Humility, as well as that Pride, is properly neither a Virtue nor a Vice. They are both of 'em only Passions or involuntary Motions, which are nevertheless very useful to civil Society, and even absolutely necessary in some occurrences for the preservation of the Life or Goods of those who are actuacted by them.  
It is necessary for instance, to be humble and timorous, and even outwardly to testify the disposition of our Minds by a respectful and modest Air, when we are in the presence of a Person of Quality, or of a proud and powerful Man: For 'tis commonly advantageous for the Good of the Body, that the imagination should submit at the sight of sensible Grandeur, and that it should give it external Marks of its Humility, and inward Veneration. But this is Naturally and Mechanically performed without the Will's having any share in it, and often even notwithstanding all its Resistance: Even Bruits themselves have need of it, as Dogs, to prevail with those they live with, have their Machine composed after such a manner, that they assume such an Air as they ought to have in relation to those about 'em, as is absolutely necessary for their preservation. And if Birds, or any other Animals have not a fit disposition of Body to give 'em this Air, 'tis because they have no occasion to assuage those the effects of whose Anger they can avoid by flight; and without whose help they can preserve their lives.  
It cannot be too much considered that all the Passions, which are excited in us, at the sight of some external object, does Mechanically imprint upon the face of those that are struck with it, a suitable Air, that is, an Air that Mechanically disposes all those who see it to such Passions and Motions as are useful to the good of Society; nay Admiration itself, when it is only caused in us by the fight of something External, and which others may consider, as well as we, diffuses through our Face an Air which Mechanically imprints Admiration in others, and which even acts upon their Brain after so regulated a manner, that the Spirits which are contained in it are impelled into the Muscles of their Face, to form there an Air like ours.  
This Communication of the Passions of the Soul, and Motions of the Animal Spirits, to unite Men together in relation to good and evil, and to make 'em resemble each other, not only by the disposition of their Minds, but also by that of their Body, is so much the greater, and more observable as the Passions are more violent, because then the Animal Spirits are agitated with more force; Now this is necessary, because the Evils being greater or more present, we must apply ourselves the more, and be strongly united amongst ourselves, to shun, or to discover them, But when the Passions are very moderate, as Admiration commonly is, they don't sensibly communicate themselves, nor produce such an Air by which they are accustomed to do it. For since there's no extraordinary occasion, 'twould be unnecessary to put any force upon the imagination of others, or to divert them from their employments; on which perhaps 'tis more requisite they should be engaged, than in considering the Causes of these Passions.  
There is nothing more surprising than this Oeconomy of our Passions, and disposition of our Body in relation to those objects which encompass us. Whatsoever is Machinally performed in us, is most worthy the Wisdom of him who Created us. And as God has made us capable Of all the Passions which act in us, chief to unite us to all sensible things, for the preservation of Society, and of our own Bodies, and his design is so faithfully executed by the construction of his work, so we cannot but admire the Springs and curiosity thereof.  
Yet our Passions, and all these imperceptible Bands by which we are united to whatever is about us, often prove through our faults, very considerable Causes of our Errors and Irregularities: For we make not that use we ought of our Passions; we permit them every thing, and do not so much as know the limits that should be prescribed to their Power. Thus even these Passions, which like Admiration are but weak, and agitate us the least, have yet power enough to lead us into Error. Of which here follows some instances.  
When Men, and chief those who have a vigorous Imagination, consider themselves on the best side, they are commonly very well satisfied with themselves; and their inward satisfaction never fails of increasing when they compare themselves with such as are more dull and heavy than they. Besides, there is many Persons that admire 'em too; and very few who oppose them with any success or applause; (for Reason is scarcely ever applauded in opposition to a strong and lively imagination) and in short, such a sensible Air of submission and respect is formed upon the Face of all their Hearers, who have likewise such lively traces of admiration at every new word they speak, that they also admire themselves, and their Imagination swells them up with all these advantages, and makes 'em extremely satisfied in their own Abilities: For, if we cannot see a Passionate Man without receiving some impression from his Passion, or in some measure engaging ourselves in his Sentiments; how could it be possible for those, who are surrounded with a great number of Admirers, to give no reception to a Passion which so agreeably flatters Self-Love?  
Now this high esteem that Persons of a strong and lively Imagination have of themselves, and their good Qualities, swell 'em up with Pride, and makes them assume a Majestic and Decisive Air: They hear others with Contempt, answer 'em in Raillery, and only think in relation to themselves; Looking upon the attention of the Mind as a kind of Servitude, even where 'tis necessary to discover the Truth, they become wholly Indocible. Pride, Ignorance, and Blindness, are always Companions. The Mighty Wits, or rather the Proud and Vainglorious ones, will never be Disciples of the Truth: They never retire within themselves, but to admire and applaud their own Acquirements: So that he, who resists the Proud, shines in the midst of their darkness without dissipating it.  
There is, on the contrary, a certain disposition in the Blood and Animal Spirits, which gives us too mean an opinion of ourselves; Their scarcity, heaviness, and fineness, joined to the grossness of the Fibres of the Brain, make our Imagination weak and languishing: And the Sight, or rather confused Sensation of this weakness and languor of our Imaginations, creates such a vicious humility in us, as we may call meanness of Spirit.  
All Men are capable of the Truth, but do not apply themselves to him who is only able to teach them. The Proud depend upon themselves, and hearken to none else; And these mistaken humble ones, address themselves to the Proud, and submit to all their Decisions: Thus both listen only to Man. The Mind of the Proud, obeys the fermentation of their own Blood, that is their own Imagination: And that of the mean spirited, submits to the commanding Air of the Proud; so that both are subjected to Vanity and Lies. The Proud are like a rich and powerful Man, who having a great Equipage, measures his own greatness by the number of his Followers, and his strength by that of his Horses which draw his Coach. These mistaken humble ones, having the same Spirit and same Principles, resemble a poor miserable languishing wretch, who imagines himself almost nothing, because he possesses nothing. Yet our Equipage is not ourselves; and so far is the abundance of the Blood and Spirits, vigour and impetuosity of the Imagination, from leading us to Truth, that, on the contrary, there is nothing which diverts us more from it. It is the dull, if I may call them so, the cold and sedate Minds, which are most capable of discovering the most solid and intricate Troths. In the silence of their Passions, they may hearken to that Truth which teaches them in the most secret recesses of their Reason; but unhappily, they think not of applying themselves to its word, because it speaks without a sensible lustre, and in a low voice, and nothing affects them but a noise: Nothing convinces them but what seems sparkling, great and magnificent, to the Judgement of the Senses; they are not pleased without they are dazzled, and choose rather to hearken to those Philosopbers, who relate their Visions and Dreams to them; and who, with the false Prophets of Old, affirm the Truth has spoken to them, tho' it has not, than to give Ear to the Truth itself. For above this four thousand years, the Pride of Man has, without opposition, put off lies and falsehoods, which have been respectfully received, and even preserved as Holy and Divine Traditions. It seems as if the God of Truth was no longer with them; they neither consult nor meditate on him any longer, but cover their idleness and neglect with the deceitful appearance of an holy Humility.  
Indeed, of ourselves, we cannot discover the Truth, but we may all times do it by the assistance of him who enlightens us; altho' we never can do it by the help of all the Men in the World. Those even, who are best acquainted with it, cannot discover it to us, if we do not ourselves inquire of him who has informed them, and if he answer not our attention as he has answered theirs. We must not therefore receive any thing upon the credit of Man, for they are all Liars; but because he who cannot deceive us has spoken to us, we ought continually to beg his Instruction. We must not believe those, who speaking to the Ear, instruct only the Body, or, at most, act upon the Imagination; but we must attentively hearken, and faithfully believe him who speaks to the Mind, instructs the Reason, and who penetrating into the most secret recesses of the inward Man, is capable of enlightening and fortifying it against the outward and sensible Man, which continually endeavours to seduce and abuse us. I so often repeat these things, because I think them most worthy of a serious reflection; 'Tis God alone that we must Honour, since there is none but ha' who is able to give us knowledge, or make us capable of Pleasure.  
There is sometimes to be observed in the Animal Spirits, and the rest of the Body, a certain disposition, which inclines us to Hunting, Dancing, Running, and to all Exercises in general, wherein the strength and agility of the Body are most conspicuous. This disposition is commonly in Young men, and chief in those whose Bodies are not perfectly formed. Children cannot stay long in one place, but are always in action when they follow their humour: For as their Muscles are not yet strong, nor perfectly finished, God, the Author of Nature, regulates the pleasures of the Soul, in relation to the good of the Body, so as to make them find pleasure in these Exercises, which help to fortify and confirm the strength of their Bodies. Thus, whilst the Flesh and Fibres of the Nerves are still soft, the little passages, through which the Animal Spirits must necessarily flow, to produce all sorts of motions, are kept open and preserved; the humours have no time to settle, and all Obstructions, and causes of Putrefaction, are prevented.  
The confused Sensation which Young men have of the disposition of their Bodies, make them please themselves in the thoughts of their strength and activity. They admire themselves when they know how to measure their motions, or are able to make any uncommon ones; and even wish to be in company of such persons as may behold and admire them. Thus, by little and little, they strengthen their inclination for all bodily Exercises, which is one of the chief causes of the Ignorance and Brutality of Men: For besides the time that is lost in these Exercises, the little use Men make of their Minds, is the cause that the chief part of the Brain, (whose flexibility produces a strength and vivacity of Mind) becomes wholly untractable, and the Animal Spirits are not easily dispersed through the Brain, after such a manner, as to make them capable of thinking of whatever they please.  
This is the reason that most part of the Nobility, and such as are trained up to the War, are incapable of applying themselves to any thing; they argue upon things according to the Proverb, A Word and a Blow. And if we say any thing to them, they have not a mind to hear, instead of thinking what answer ought to be made; their Animal Spirits insensibly flow into the Muscles, by whose assistance they lift up their Arms, and answer without any reflection, by a blow, or some threatening gesture, because their Spirits being agitated by the words they hear, they are carried to those places which are most open, through habit and exercise; and the knowledge they have of the strength of their Bodies, confirms them in these insolent behaviours: And observing the respectful Air of those who hear them, they are puffed up with a foolish confidence, which makes them utter many fierce and brutish impertinencies, believing, at the same time, that they have spoke many fine things, because the fear and prudence of others was favourable to them.  
It is not possible to apply ourselves to any Study, or actually to make a profession of any Science without it; we can be neither Authors nor Doctors, without remembering what we are. But this alone, often, naturally, produces in the Mind of good men so many Defects, that 'twould be very advantageous for them if they were without those honourable Titles. As they imagine them to be their chief Perfections, they always think on them with Pleasure, discover them to others with all possible Artifice, and even pretend they have given them a right to judge of all things without examination. If any Person has Courage enough to oppose them, they soon Craftily, and with a sweet and obliging Air, insinuate what they are, and the right they have to decide all things. But if afterwards any is so bold as to resist them, and they want an answer, they will then openly say what they think of themselves, and those who oppose them.  
All inward Sensation of any advantage that we possess naturally increases our Courage; A Soldier well Armed and Mounted, who wants neither Blood nor Spirits, is ready to undertake any thing: The disposition he finds himself in makes him bold and daring. It is the same with a Learned Man, when he believes himself so, and when the vanity of his Heart has corrupted his Mind; he becomes, if we may say so, bold and confident against the Truth. Sometimes he rashly opposes it without knowing it, and sometimes betrays it after he has discovered it, and confiding in his false Learning, he is always ready to maintain the Negative or Affirmative, according as the Spirit of Contradiction possesses him.  
It is very different with those who boast not of their Learning; they are not decisive: It is rare that they speak if they have not something to say. Nay, it often happens, that they are silent when they ought to speak; they have not that reputation, nor those external marks of Learning, which persuade them to speak they know not what. These may safely hold their Tongues, but Pretenders to Sciences are afraid to continue silent, for they know, well they shall be despised if they hold their Tongues, although they have nothing material to say; and on the contrary, they will not always be condemned, although they say only impertinent things, provided they speak them after a Scientific manner.  
What makes men capable of thinking, makes them fit to discover Truth; but 'tis neither Honour, Riches, nor Dignities, nor false Learning, that can give them this capacity, it proceeds from their Nature: They are made to think, because they are made for Truth. Even Health itself is not sufficient to make them think well, all that it can do is, not to be so great an impediment as Sickness is. Our Body, in some manner, assists us by Sense and Imagination, but it does not help our Conception: For although, without help of the Body, we might, by meditation, oppose out Ideas to the continual Efforts of the Senses and Passions, which perplex and efface them, because we can only, at present, overcome the Body by the Body: Yet it is plain, that the Body cannot illuminate the Mind, nor produce the Light of Understanding in it, for every Idea which discovers the Truth, comes from Truth itself. What the Soul receives by the Body, is only for the Body itself, and when it pursues those Phantoms, it discovers nothing but Illusions and Chimeras; I mean, it does not see things as they are in themselves, but only as they relate to the Body.  
If the Idea of our own greatness or littleness is often an occasion of our Error, the Idea we have of external things, and what has any relation to us, causes not a lest dangerous impression. We have just said, that the Idea of greatness is always attended with a great Motion of Spirits, and that a great Motion of Spirits is always accompanied with an Idea of greatness; and that, on the contrary, the Idea of littleness is always attended with a weak motion of Spirits, and that a weak Motion of the Spirits is always accompanied with an Idea of littleness. From this Principle 'tis easy to conclude, that such things as produce a great Motion of to the Spirits in us, must naturally appear to us to have more Greatness, that is, more Power, more Reality, and more Perfection, than others, for by Greatness I mean all these things, and many such like. So that Sensible Things must appear to us greater, and more solid, than those which cannot be felt, if we judge of them by the Motion of the Spirits, and not by the pure Idea of Truth. A great House, a magnificent Train, fine Furniture, Offices, Honours, Riches, etc. appear to have more greatness and reality in them, than Virtue and Justice do.  
When we compare Virtue with Riches by a clear view of the Mind, than Virtue gains the preference; but when we make use of our Eyes and Imaginations, and judge of these things only by the emotion of the Spirits that they excite in us, we undoubtedly prefer Riches to Virtue.  
'Tis from this Principle that we have so mean an Opinion of Spiritual things which do not affect the Senses; That the Ideas of our Minds are less Noble than the Objects they represent; That there is less reality and substance in Air than in Metals, in Water than in Ice; That the spaces betwixt Earth and Heaven are avoid, or else that the Bodies which fill it, have not so much reality and solidity as the Sun and Stars have. In fine, if we fall into an infinite number of Errors about the Nature and Perfection of every thing, 'tis because we argue upon this false Principle.  
A great motion of Spirits, and consequently a strong Passion, always accompanies a sensible Idea of greatness; and a small motion of Spirits, and a weak Passion likewise, attends a sensible Idea of littleness; We apply ourselves much, and bestow a great deal of our time in the Study of whatever may excite a sensible Idea of greatness, and neglect what gives us a sensible Idea of littleness. Those great Bodies, for instance, which move about us, have always made an impression upon us; we at first adored them, because of the sensible Idea we had of their greatness and brightness. Some bolder Genii have examined their Motions; and in all Ages, the Stars have been the Object either of the Study or Veneration of many Men. We may even say, that the fear of these imaginary influences, which at this day terrify Astrologers and some weak Persons, is a kind of adoration that a depraved Imagination pays to the Idea of greatness, which represents these Celestial Bodies.  
The Body of Man, on the contrary, tho' infinitely more admirable and worthy our application, than whatever can be known of Jupiter and Saturn with all the rest of the Planets, is almost unknown to us. The sensible Idea of the dissected parts of the flesh hath nothing great in it, and even causes disgust and horror; so that 'tis but a few years since Ingenious persons looked upon Anatomy as a Science which merited their application. Kings and Princes have been Astronomers, and proud of that Title. The grandeur of the Stars seemed to agree well with the greatness of their Dignities, but I don't believe they thought it any honour to understand Anatomy, and to be able to dissect a Heart or a Brain well. It is the same with many other Sciences.  
Rare and extraordinary things, produce greater and more sensible Motions in the Spirits than those which we see every day; we admire them, and consequently affix some Idea of greatness to them, and thus they excite in the Spirits Passions of esteem and veneration. 'Tis this which overturns the Reason of many Men, for some are so curious and respectful for every thing of Antiquity, what comes from far, or is rare and extraordinary, that their Minds become Slaves to it, because the Mind dares make no Judgement upon what it respects.  
Truth, I grant, is in no great danger, because some Men wholly employ themselves about Medals, Arms, the Dress of the Ancients, the Chinese or Barbarians. It is not absolutely useless to know the Map of Old Rome, or the Roads from Tomquin to Nanquin, altho' it be more useful to know those we shall have more occasion to Travel. In fine, we have nothing to object against the knowledge of the true History of the War of the Greeks with the Persians, or of the Tartars with the Chinese; or that persons should have an extraordinary inclination for Thucydides and Xenophon, or for any other that pleases them. But we cannot suffer that Reason should be so subjected to the admiration of Antiquity; that we must be forbidden to make use of our Understanding to examine the Opinions of the Ancients, and that those who discover and show the falseness of them, should pass for presumptuous and rash Persons.  
There has been Truths in all Ages; if Aristotle has discovered some of them, further discoveries may be also made to this day: The Opinions of this Author must be proved by good Reasons, for if Aristotle's Sentiments were solid in his time, they will be so now. 'Tis a pure illusion, to pretend to prove Natural Truths by Humane Authority; perhaps we may prove, that Aristotle had such and such thoughts upon certain Subjects, but 'twould not be very reasonable to read Aristotle, or any other Author whatever, with much assiduity and pains, only to learn his Opinions Historically, and to instruct others after the same manner.  
We cannot, without some dislike, consider certain Universities which were Established only for an Enquiry into, and Defence of the Truth, that have now Espoused a particular Sect and Glory in studying and defending the Opinions of some Men: Nor can we, without some regret, read those Philosophers and Physicians who fill their Books with lo many Citations, that one would rather take them for Commentaries upon Divinity and Civil Law, than Treatises of Physics or Medicine: For who can be content to quit Reason and Experience, blindly to follow the Imaginations of Aristotle, Plato, Epicurus, or any other Philosopher whatever?  
However we might, perhaps, continue unmoved, and without reply, at the sight of so strange a Conduct, if we did not feel ourselves offended by it; I mean, if those Gentlemen did not oppose themselves to the Truth, to which only they ought to be united. But their Admiration for the Visions of the Ancients, inspires them with a blind Zeal against any new discoveries of the Truth; they decry them without knowing them, oppose them without apprehending them, and by the power of their Imaginations, infuse into the Mind and Heart of those who hear and admire them, the same Sensations wherewith they are affected.  
As they judge of these new Discoveries only by the esteem they have of their Authors, and since those they have seen, and with whom they converse, have not this great and extraordinary Air that the Imagination attributes, to Ancient Authors, they cannot esteem them: For the Idea of the Men of our own Age, not being attended with these extraordinary motions which strike the Mind, it naturally excites nothing but Contempt.  
Limners and Statuaries, never represent the Ancient Philosophers like other Men; They make them great Heads, large and high Foreheads, long and magnificent Beards. This is a good proof, that the generality of Men naturally form a like Idea of them, for Painters draw things as they appear to them; they follow the natural motions of their Imaginations. Thus we generally look upon the Ancients as extraordinary Men; but, on the contrary, the Imagination represents the Men of our time like those we see every day, and that producing no extraordinary motion in the Spirits, it only excites in the Soul a contempt and indifferency for them.  
I have seen D'Cartes, says one of these Learned Men who only admire Antiquity; I have known, and discoursed with him many times; he was an honest Man; nor did he want Wit, yet he had nothing extraordinary. Thus he has a mean Idea of D'Cartes Philosophy, because he had discoursed some moments with him, and discovered nothing of this great and extraordinary Air in him which heats the Imagination. He even thinks it a sufficient answer to any difficult Arguments of this Philosopher which perplexed him a little, to say confidently that he had formerly known him. It were to be wished, that these sort of Men could see Aristotle otherwise than in Painting, and have an hours Conversation with him, provided he spoke not to them in Greek, but in their own Tongue, without knowing who he was till after they had made a Judgement of him.  
Whatever bears the Character of Novelty, whether because it is new in itself, or that it appear in a new order or situation, it agitates us much, for it affects the Brain in places which are so much the more sensible, as they are less exposed to the course of the Spirits; and such things as have a sensible mark of greatness also affects us much, because they excite a great Motion of Spirits in us. But what, at the same time, bears the Character of Greatness and Novelty too, does not only agitate us, it confounds, elevates, and astonisheth us by its violent agitations.  
Those, for Instance, who speak Paradoxes, make themselves admired, for they say only such things as have the Character of Novelty. Such as speak in Sentences, and only use choice and proper Words, cause themselves to be respected, for they seem to say something great: But those who join Eloquence to Novelty, the Great to the Extraordinary, seldom ever fail of ravishing and astonishing the vulgar sort, altho' they speak nothing but impertinencies. This pompous and magnificent Jargon, insano fulgoret, these false Lights of Orators, commonly dazzle weak Minds; they make so lively and surprising an impression upon their Imagination that they remain, confounded, and respect: this power which abases and blinds them, and admire, as the brightest Truths, such confused Sentiments as cannot be expressed.   

CHAP. VIII. A Continuation of the same Subject; of the good Use that may be made of Admiration, and the rest of the Passions.  
All the Passions have two very considerable Effects, they apply the Mind, and gain the Heart. By the former they may be very useful to the discovery of Truth, provided we know how to make use of them, for application produces knowledge, and knowledge discovers the Truth. But in respect to their gaining the Heart, they always produce an ill Effect; because they only win it by corrupting the Reason, and representing things to it not as they are in themselves, or according to truth; but according to the relation they bear to us.  
Of all Passions, that which least affects the Heart is Admiration: For 'tis the prospect of things that are either good or evil which agitates us, for the sight of things as they are great or small without any other relation to us, affects us very little or not at all. Thus Admiration which accompanies the knowledge of the greatness or smallness of new things which we would consider, corrupt the Reason much less than any other Passion; and. it may even be of great use in the knowledge of the Truth, provided we take care to hinder its being followed by any of the other Passions, as it commonly happens.  
In Admiration the Animal Spirits are forcibly impelled towards those places in the Brain which represent the new Object as it is in itself: They make distinct Traces there, and deep enough to continue a long time; consequently the Mind has a clear Idea of them, and can easily resolve them. Thus we cannot deny but Admiration may be very useful in the Sciences since it applies and instructs the Mind. It is not so with the rest of the Passions, they apply the Mind, but instruct it not. They apply it because they stir up the Animal Spirits; but they instruct it not, or else do it by a false and deceitful light, since after such a manner they impel these same Spirits, as they represent Objects only according to the relation they have to us, and not as they are in themselves.  
There is nothing so difficult as to apply ourselves long to any thing when we don't admire it, the Animal Spirits are not then easily carried to those places which are necessary to represent it; 'twould be in vain to solicit our attention, we could not animadvert, or at least not very long; although we might otherwise be persuaded after an abstracted manner, and which agitated not the Spirits, that the thing very well deserved our application. It is requisite we should deceive our Imagination to stir up our Spirits, and that we should after a new manner represent the Subject we would meditate on, that we might excite in ourselves some motion of Admiration.  
We every day see such Persons as have no inclination for Study, nothing appears more painful to them than application of Mind; yet are they convinced they ought to study certain things, and to that end they use their utmost endeavours; but they are unsuccessful, and they advance not much; but immediately leave them. It is true the Animal Spirits obey the orders of the Will, and make it attentive whenever we desire it: But when the Will, which commands, is purely reasonable, and depends not upon any Passion, it is performed after so weak and languishing a manner, that our Ideas then resemble Phantoms which are but just seen, and disappear in a moment. Our Animal Spirits receive so many secret orders from our Passions, and both by Nature and habit, have so great a facility to execute them, as that they are very easily diverted from the new and difficult ways where the Will would engage them to go, so that 'tis chief in these Occurrences that we have need of particular Grace to assist us in the discovery of the Truth, because we cannot by our own power long resist the influences of the Body which conquer and suppress the Mind; or if we have this ability, we never make use of it.  
But when we are excited by any motion of Admiration, the Animal Spirits naturally disperse themselves towards the Traces of the Object which caused it: They clearly represent it to the Mind; and produce in the Brain what is necessary to create knowledge and evidence, without troubling the Will to fatigue itself by forcing these unwilling Spirits. Thus those who are capable of Admiration are much fit for Study than such as are not susceptible of it: The first are quick and ingenious, the last dull and stupid.  
Yet when Admiration becomes excessive, and proceeds either to astonish or affright us, or does not incline us to Rational Curiosity, it commonly produces ill Effects. For then the Animal Spirits are all employed to represent the Object we admire on one side only; we don't even think whether we may consider it farther or not; nor do the Animal Spirits disperse themselves so much as into the common parts of the Body, to perform their functions there; but imprint such deep footsteps of the Object they represent, and break so great a number of the Fibres of the Brain, that the Idea they create can never after be effaced from the Mind.  
It is not enough for Admiration to render us attentive, it must also make us curious: Nor is it sufficient for us to consider one side of any Object to discover it fully, we must examine it throughly, or else we cannot judge truly of it: So that when Admiration does not induce us to examine things with the utmost exactness, or when it hinders us from it, it is very useless in the discovery of Truth: Then it only fills the Mind with probabilities and appearances, and inclines it to judge rashly of every thing.  
To Admire for Admiration sake, is not sufficient, we must Admire that we may afterwards examine with the more facility; the Animal Spirits which naturally stir up Admiration in us, freely offer their assistance to the Soul, that it may use them to represent the Object more distinctly, and that it may better discover it. This is the institution of Nature; for Admiration must lead us to Curiosity, and Curiosity guide us to the discovery of Truth. But the Soul does not know how to make use of its power; it prefers a certain Sensation of Complacency which it receives from this abundance of Spirits that affect it, before the knowledge of the Object which excites them: It chooses rather to enjoy plenty of Spirits than to dissipate them by use, in which it resembles certain Covetous Persons, who prefer the possession of their Silver, before the benefits they might in their Necessities receive from it.  
Men generally please themselves with whatever affects them in any Passion; They don't only give their Money to make themselves affected with Sorrow at the representation of a Tragedy, but likewise throw it away upon Leigerdemain that may raise their Admiration; for we cannot say they give it to be deceived. The Sensation of Internal Pleasure which the Soul feels in Admiration, is then the chief cause why we dwell upon it without making that use of it that Reason and Nature prescribes us: For 'tis this Sensation of Complacency which keeps the Admirers so strictly united to the Subjects of their Admiration; that they will fall into a Passion if we show them the vanity of it. When an Afflicted Person tastes the sweetness of Sorrow, we anger him if we try to divert him from it; It is the same with those who admire any thing, it seems to 'em as if we would injure them, when we endeavour to show them their Admiration is without any Reason; because they feel that secret Pleasure they received from the Passion diminish proportionally as the Idea which caused it is effaced out of their Mind.  
The Passions always endeavour to justify themselves, and insensibly persuade us that 'tis reasonable to follow them: The Complacency and Pleasure they make the Mind feel, which ought to be their Judge, corrupts it in their favour; and inspires it with such like Reasoning: I ought to judge of things only according to the Ideas I have of 'em: And of all my Ideas, the most sensible, are the most real, since they act the most powerfully upon me; It is therefore by them I ought the rather to judge: Now the Subject I admire includes a sensible Idea of greatness; then I must judge according to this Idea, for I ought to have an esteem and love for greatness. So that I have reason to stop at this Object, and employ myself upon it; Indeed the pleasure I feel, at the sight of the Idea which represents it, is a Natural proof that 'tis my good to think upon it; for it seems to me that I grow great myself whilst I consider it, and that my Mind has more extension when it embraces so great an Idea. The Mind ceasing to be when it thinks of nothing, if this Idea should vanish it seems to me that my Mind would vanish with it, or that it would become less and more contracted if it applied itself to an Idea that was less. The preservation of this great Idea, is then the preservation of the greatness and perfection of my Being; and therefore I have reason to admire it. Others also ought to admire me if they would do me justice, since I am something great through the relation I have to great things: I in some measure possess them by the admiration I have for them, and I feel the good by a foretaste that a kind of hope makes me enjoy. Other Men would be happy as well as I, if knowing my greatness they like me applied themselves to the Cause which produced it; but they are blind and have no knowledge of either great or fine things, and know not how either to raise or make themselves become consider able.  
We may say the Mind naturally reasons after this manner, without making any reflection when it permits itself to be guided by the deceitful lights of its Passions. These Arguments have some probability, bus 'tis plain they have no solidity in them: And this appearance or rather confused Sensation of it which attends these Natural Reasonings made without reflection, have so much power, that if we don't take great care they will never fail of seducing us.  
For instance, when Poetry, History, Chemistry, or any other Humane Science, has struck the Imagination of a young Man with any Motions of Admiration; if he don't carefully watch the efforts these Motions make upon his Mind; If he does not throughly examine what the advantages of these Sciences are; and compare the troubles he shall have in the learning, with the profit he shall afterwards receive from them; and, in short, if he is not as curious as is requisite to judge well, there is a great deal of danger that his Admiration will not only show him these Sciences with the fairest side outwards, but seduce him also. It is likewise very much to be feared that it will corrupt his Heart after such a manner, that he shall not be able to destroy the illusion, tho' he afterwards come to know it to be such; because 'tis impossible to efface such deep Traces out of his Brain as a continual Admiration shall have wrought there. For that reason he must continually stir up the purity of his Imagination, he must hinder these dangerous Traces from being form which will corrupt the Mind and Heart. I shall here prescribe a very useful way to prevent not only the excess of Admiration, but also of all other Passions in general.  
When the Motion of the Animal Spirits is violent enough, to make such deep Traces in the Brain as corrupt the Imagination, it is always attended with some emotion of the Soul. Thus the Soul cannot be moved without being sensible of it, it is sufficiently advertised to take care or itself, and to examine whether it is advantageous that these Traces should be strengthened and made complete. But in the time of the emotion, the Mind not being free enough to judge of the usefulness of these Traces, because this emotion deceives and inclines it to favour them; it must make its utmost endeavour to stop this emotion, or else divert the motion of the Spirits which cause it; and in the mean time it is absolutely necessary for it to suspend its Judgement.  
Now it must not be imagined that the Soul can always barely by its own Will stop this course of Spirits which hinder it from making use of its Reason. It's common powers are not sufficient to make such Motions cease which it has not excited. So that it must make use of artifices to endeavour to deceive an Enemy, that attacks it only by surprise.  
As the motion of the Spirits stir up certain thoughts in the Soul, so these Thoughts also excite certain motions in our Brain. Thus, when we would stop any motion of the Spirits, which is stirred up in us, it is not sufficient to will that it should cease, for that is not always capable of stopping it: We must make use of some Artifices, and represent things contrary to those which excite and maintain this motion, and this would cause a Revulsion. But if we would only determine a motion of Spirits already excited to some other place, we must not think of contrary things, but only on such things as differ from those which produce it, and this will undoubtedly divert them.  
But because a Diversion and Revulsion will be great or little in proportion as our new thoughts shall be attended with a great or less motion of Spirits; we must be very careful in observing well what those Thoughts are which agitate as most, that in pressing occasions we may be able to represent, them to our Imagination which seduces us, and we must endeavour to form so strong an habit of resistance by this method, that the motion which surprises us may be no more excited in our Souls.  
If we take care to make an intent application of the Idea of Eternity, or any other serious Thoughts to these extraordinary motions which are excited in us, those violent and great motions will never happen again without stirring up in us at the same time this Idea, and which will consequently furnish us with the means to resist them. Those things are proved both by Experience, and the Reasons brought in the Chapter Of the Connection of Ideas: So that we ought not to think it absolutely impossible by any Artifice to conquer the efforts of our Passions, when our Wills are firmly determined to do it.  
However we must not pretend that we can become Impeccable, or shun all error by this manner of Resistance. For first, 'tis difficult to acquire and preserve such an habit, as that our extraordinary Motions shall stir up in us such Ideas as are proper to oppose them. Secondly, supposing we have acquired it, these motions of the Spirits would directly excite those Ideas which we must oppose, and but indirectly those which we must oppose to them. So that the ill Ideas being the principal, they will always have more power than those which are only accessary: and it will be always necessary for the Will to assist the latter. In the third place, these motions of the Spirits may be so violent, that they may fill the whole capacity of the Soul, so that there remains no more room, if we may be permitted so to speak, to receive the accessary Idea that is fit to make a Revulsion in the Spirits, or to receive it after such a manner as we may consider it with any attention: In fine, there are so many particulas circumstances which may make this remedy useless, that we must not too much confide in it, although on the other side we ought not to neglect it. We must continually have recourse to Prayer, that we may receive from Heaven those assistances as are necessary in the time of Temptations, and also endeavour to present to the Mind some Truth that is so solid and strong, that by this means we may conquer the most violent Passions. For I must needs advertise by the way, that several pious Persons often fall again into the same Errors, because they fill their Minds with a great number of such Truths as have more lustre than power, and are fit to dissipate and divide their Minds than to fortify it against Temptation; whereas unlearned and ignorant Persons are faithful in their Duty, because they make some great and serious Truth familiar to them, which fortifies and upholds them in all Occurrences.   

CHAP. IX. of Love and Aversion, and of their principal kinds.  
LOve and Aversion are the first Passions which succeed Admiration. We do not long consider an object without discovering the Relations it has to us, or to something that we Love: The object that we Love, and to which consequently we are united, by Love, being almost always present to us, as well as that which we actually admire; our Mind without any pain, or great reflection, makes the necessary Comparisons to discover the Relations they have to each other, and to us, or else it is naturally advertized of 'em by the preventing Sensations of Pleasure and Complacency. And then the motion of Love we have for ourselves, and the object that we Love, extends itself unto that we admire, if the relation that it immediately has with us, or with any thing we are united to, appears advantageous to us, either by Knowledge or Sensation. Now this new motion of the Soul, or rather motion of the Soul newly determined, being joined to that of the Animal Spirits, and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition, that this new motion of Spirits produces in the Brain, is the Passion that we here call Love.  
But if we feel by any Pain, or discover by a clear and evident Knowledge, that the union or relation of the object we admire, is disadvantageous to us, or to any thing we are united to: Then the motion of Love that we have for ourselves, and for what is united to us, is limited in us, or carried towards it; and follows not the sight of the Mind, nor employs itself on the object of our Admiration. But as the motion towards good in general, which the Author of Nature continually imprints in the Soul, carries us towards what we know, and feel, to be so, because what is intelligible and sensible is good in itself: We may say that the resistance which the Soul makes against this natural motion that draws it away, is a kind of voluntary motion which terminates in Nothingness.  
Now this voluntary motion of the Soul being joined to that of the Spirits and Blood, 
That we may not be mistaken in respect to what I here call voluntary Motion, it is requisite to read the first explanation upon the first Chapter.  and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this motion of Spirits produces in the Brain, is the Passion that we here call Aversion.  
This Passion is absolutely contrary to Love, yet is never without Love: It is wholly contrary, because this separates, 
I should only perplex the thought if I spoke whatever related to it, to satisfy some difficult Persons,  and that unites: The former has Nothingness for its object, and the latter always some Being, whereby 'tis excited: Aversion refists natural Motion, and makes it of no effect, whereas Love yields to it, and makes it victorious. But it is never separated from Love; for if evil, which is its object, is taken for a privation of good, to fly evil is to fly the privation of good, that is, to incline towards good; and so that to hate the privation of good, is to love good itself. But if evil is taken for Pain, and the aversion of Pain is not an aversion of the privation of Pleasure, since Pain is as real a Sensation as Pleasure, it is not therefore the privation of it: but the aversion of Pain being the aversion to some inward Misery, we should not have this aversion if we had not love. Indeed, evil may be taken for whatever causes Pain in us, or deprives us of good: and then aversion depends upon the love of ourselves, or of something to which we wish to be united. Love and Hatred are then the two Mother Passions, and opposite to each other; but Love is the first, chief, and most Universal.  
Being also since the Fall so far removed and separated from good as we are, and looking upon our own being as the chief part of every thing we are united to, we may in one Sense say, that the motion of Love, which we have to all things, is only a consequence of Self-Love. We love Honours, because they raise us above others; Riches, because they defend and preserve us; Our Relations, Prince, and Country, because we are interested in their preservation. The motion of love that we have for ourselves extends to every thing that relates to us, and to whatever we are united: For 'tis even this motion which unites, and diffuses, if I may so say, our Being into those which encompass us, in proportion as we discover by Reason, or discern by Sensation, that 'tis advantageous to be united to them.  
So that we must not think that since the Fall, Self-Love is only the cause and rule of all other Loves, but that most Loves are only kinds of Self-Love. For when we say a Man loves a new object, we must not think that a new motion of love is produced in this Man: But rather that knowing that this object has some relation or union with him, he loves himself in that object, and by a motion of Love as old as himself. For indeed, without Grace, there is only Self-Love in the Heart of Man. For the love of Truth, Justice, and even of God himself, and every other Love that has been in us from the first Inftitution of Nature, is ever since the fall the Sacrifice of self-love.  
We doubt not nevertheless, but the most wicked and barbarous Men, as Idolaters, and even Atheists themselves, are united to God by a Natural Love, and of which consequently Self Love is not the cause. By Love they are united to Truth, Justice, and Virtue: They praise and esteem good Men; and 'tis not because they are Men that they love them, but because they see good qualities in them which they cannot avoid loving, since they cannot hinder themselves from admiring and judging them aimable. Thus we love something else besides ourselves; but Self-Love is always predominant over all other loves. Men abandon Truth and Justice for trifling Interests: and if by their natural Powers they hazard their Lives and Fortunes to defend oppressed innocency, or any other occasion. They are induced by little else than Vanity; and to make themselves considerable by the apparent possession of some Virtue which all the world reuerences. They love Virtue and Justice, but never when 'tis against themselves. They may love them when they agree, but never when they are opposite to their Interest: for they can never without Grace gain the least conquest over Self-Love.  
There are also many other natural loves: We Naturally love our Prince, our Country, our Relations, and those that we find conformable to our Humours, Designs, Employments; but all these loves are very weak, as well as the love of Truth and Justice, and Self-Love being the most violent of all loves, it always overcomes them, without finding any other resistance than what it makes itself.  
Bodies which strike one another lose their motion, in proportion as they communicate it to those they meet; and they may at last lose it all if they shock many other Bodies. But 'tis not so with Self-Love; it determines all other loves by the impression it gives them, yet its motion diminishes not: On the contrary it acquires new Powers by its new Victories: and as its motion goes not out of the Heart, it is not lost, although it is continually communicated.  
Self-Love is then the commanding and universal Love; since it is found every where, and reigns wherever it is found. So that all the Passions have no other motion than that of Self-Love, we may also say, that Self-Love is the most extensive, and strongest of all Passions, or that 'tis the commanding and universal Passion. For even as all Virtues are only kinds of the first Virtue, that we call Charity, as St. Augustine has shown; so all Vices, and even all Passions, are likewise only consequences or kinds of Self-Love, or proceed from this general Vice we call Concupiscence.  
We often distinguish in Morality, the Virtues or Kind's of Charity by the difference of its Objects: but that sometimes confounds the true Idea we ought to have of Virtue, which rather depends upon its own motive than on any thing else, and therefore we shan't follow this method in treating of the Passions: We will not here distinguish them by their objects, because one object alone may excite them all, and yet ten thousand objects must excite but one: For altho' objects differ amongst themselves; they are not always different in relation to us, and they excite not different Passions in us. A promised Marshal's Staff differs from a promised Bishop's Crosier; yet these two marks of Honour excite very near the same Passion in Ambitious Persons; because they stir up a like Idea of Good in the Mind. But the same Marshal's Staff, when promised, granted, enjoyed, or taken away, excites very different Passions, since it raises in the Mind different Ideas of Good.  
We must not therefore multiply the Passions according to the different Objects which cause them, but only admit so many of 'em, as there are accessary Ideas, which attend the principal Idea of Good or Evil, and considerably change it in relation to us. For the general Idea of Good, or the Sensation of Pleasure, which is a good to him who tastes it, agitating the Soul and Animal Spirits, it produces the general Passion of Love: And the accessary Ideas of this Good, determine the general agitation of the Soul, and the course of the Animal Spirits after a particular manner, which puts the Mind and Body into the disposition it ought to be in relation to the Good we perceive, and thus they produce all particular Passions.  
Thus the general Idea of Good produces an indeterminate Love, which is only an extension of Self-Love.  
The Idea of the Good which we possess producs a a love of Joy.  
The Idea of a Good that we do not yet, but hope hereafter to possess, that is, which we judge we may be able to possess, produces a love of Desire.  
In fine, the Idea of a Good which we possess not, nor have any hopes of possessing; or which is the same, the Idea of a Good that we have no hopes of possessing without the loss of some other, or such an one as we cannot preserve when we possess it, produces a love of Sorrow. These are the three simple or primitive Passions which have Good for their object; for the hope which produces Joy, is not an emotion of the Soul, but a simple Judgement.  
But we must observe that Men limit not their being in themselves, but extend it to all things and Persons to whom it may appear advantageous to be united. So that we must conceive that they in some manner possess a good when their Friends enjoy it, although they do not immediately possess it themselves. Thus when I say, that the possession of Good produces Joy, I mean not only of the immediate union or possession, but of all others; for we naturally feel Joy when any good fortune happens to those we love.  
Evil, as I have before said; may be taken in three different ways, either for the privation of Good, or for Pain, or in fine, for the thing which causes the privation of Good, or produces Pain.  
In the first Sense, the Idea of Evil being the same with the Idea of a Good that we possess not, it is plain this Idea produces Sorrow, or Desire, or even Joy: For Joy is always excited when we feel ourselves deprived of the privation of Good, that is, when we possess Good. So that the Passions which regard evil, taken in this Sense, are the same with those which regard Good, because in effect they have Good likewise for their object.  
But if by Evil we mean Pain, which only is always a real Evil to him who suffers it, whilst he suffers it; then the sensation of this Evil produces the Passions of Sorrow, Desire, and Joy, which are kinds of Hatred and not Love: for their motion is absolutely opposite to that which accompanies the sight of Good; this motion being only the opposition of the Soul, which resists the natural impression.  
The actual Sensation of Pain produces ah aversion of Sorrow.  
Pain, which we do not actually suffer▪ but are afraid of suffering, produces an aversion of Desire.  
In fine, the Pain that we do not suffer, nor are apprehensive of suffering; or which is the same, the Pain that we do not foresee we shall suffer without some great Recompense, or the Pain which we feel ourselves delivered from, produces an aversion of Joy. These are the three primitive or simple Passions which have Evil for their object, for fear which produces Sorrow is not an emotion of the Soul, but a simple Judgement.  
Lastly, if by Evil we mean the Person or thing which deprives us of Good, or makes us suffer Pain; the Idea of Evil produces a motion of Love and Aversion together, or simply a motion of Aversion. The Idea of Evil produces a motion of Love and Aversion together, when the Evil is what deprives us of a Good: For 'tis by the same motion that we incline towards Good, and remove ourselves from what hinders our possession of it. But this Idea only produces a motion of Aversion, when 'tis the Idea of an Evil, which makes us suffer Pain: for 'tis by the same motion of Aversion that we hate Pain, and whatever produces it.  
Thus there are three simple or primitive Passions which respect Good, and as many others which regard Pain, or which causes it, viz. Joy, Desire, and Sorrow: For we have Joy when a Good is present, or an Evil past: We feel Sorrow when Good is past, and Evil present; and are agitated with Desire, when Good and Evil are to come.  
The Passions which regard Good are particular determinations of the motion which God gives us towards Good in general, and therefore their object is real: But others who have not God for the cause of their motion, terminate only in nothingness.   

CHAP. X. Of the Passions in particular, the manner of explaining them in general, and of discovering the Errors of which they are the cause.  
IF we consider how compound the Passions are, we shall plainly discover that their number cannot be determined, and that there are many more of them than we have terms to express. The Passions do not only draw their differences from the various Combinations of the three first, for then there would be but a few of them; but their difference proceeds likewise, from the different Perceptions, and different Judgements which cause or accompany them. The different Judgements which the Soul makes of Good and Evil, cause different Motions in the Animal Spirits, to dispose the Body in relation to the Object; and consequently, create such Sensations in the Soul, as are not absolutely alike. Thus they are the cause, as we have observed, of the difference between certain Passions, whose emotions resemble each other.  
However, the emotion of the Soul being the chief thing which occurs in each of our Passions, it is much better to refer them all to the three Original ones, in which these emotions are very different, than to treat of them confusedly and without order, in relation to the different perceptions that we may have of the Good and Evil which causes them, for we may have so many different perceptions of Objects, in relation to time; to ourselves, to what belongs to us, in relation to Persons or Things, to which we are united, either by Nature, or the choice of our Will, that it is absolutely impossible to make an exact enumeration of them.  
When the Soul perceives a Good which she may enjoy, we may, perhaps, say, she hopes for it, altho' she desires it not: But it is plain, this Hope is not a Passion, but a simple Judgement. So that 'tis the emotion which accompanies the Idea of Good, the possession of which we judge to be possible, which makes this. Hope to be a true Passion. When Hope is changed into Security, 'tis still the same thing; it is not a Passion only because of the emotion of Joy which is then mixed with that of Desire, for the Judgement of the Soul, which considers a Good as not being likely to fail of it, is a Passion only, because the foresight of Good agitates us. In short, when Hope diminishes, and Despair succeeds it, it is also plain that this Despair is a Passion only, because of the emotion of Sorrow, which is then mixed with this Desire; for the Judgement of the Soul, which considers a Good as not being able to happen, is not a Passion except this Judgement agitates us.  
But because the Soul never considers Good or Evil without some emotion, and even without some change happen in the Body, we often give the Name of Passion to the Judgement which produces this Passion, because we confound whatsoever passes in the Soul and Body at the sight of any Good or Evil; for the words, Hope, Fear, Rashness, Shame, Impudence, Anger, Pity, Derision, Regret, in short, the Names we commonly give to all the other Passions, are short expressions whereby we can expalain, in particular, whatever the Passions include.  
By the word Passion, we understand the view of the relation that any thing has with us, the emotion and sensation of the Soul, the shaking of the Brain, and motion of the Spirits, a new emotion and new sensation of the Soul; and, in fine, a sensation of Complacency, which always attends the Passions, and makes them agreeable: All these things we mean by it. But sometimes, by the Name of Passion, we only understand either the Judgement that excites it, or the emotion of the Soul, or the motion of the Spirits and Blood, or something else which attends the emotion of the Soul.  
To abridge Ideas and their expressions, is a very useful thing in the knowledge of Truth; yet it is often the cause of some great Error, when these Ideas are abridged through Popular Custom, for we must never abridge our Ideas, but when we have made them clear and distinct by a great application of Mind, and not, as we commonly do, by the Passions, and all sensible Things, when once we have made them familiar by Sensations, and the mere action of the Imagination which deceives the Mind.  
There is a great deal of difference between the pure Ideas of the Mind, and the sensations or emotions of the Soul. The pure Ideas of the Mind are clear and distinct, but difficultly made familiar; whereas, on the contrary, the sensations and emotions of the Soul are very familiar, but impossible to be discerned clearly and distinctly. Numbers, extension, and their Properties, we clearly know; but before we have made them sensible by some Characters which express them, 'tis difficult to present them, for whatever is abstracted affects us not. Sensations, and the emotions of the Soul, on the contrary, are easily represented to the Mind, altho' we only know them after a very confused and imperfect manner, and all the terms which excite them strongly agitate the Soul, and render it attentive. From whence it happens, that we often imagine we very well apprehend such Discourses as are absolutely incomprehensible; and when we read certain descriptions of the Sensations and Passions of the Soul, we persuade ourselves that we understand them perfectly, because we are livelily touched with them, for all the words we read agitate the Soul. We have no sooner pronounced the words Shame, Despair, Impudence, but it as soon stirs up in our Minds a certain confused Idea, and obscure Sensation, which strongly applies us; and because this Sensation is very familiar, and represented to us without any trouble or effort of the Mind, we persuade ourselves that it is clear and distinct. Yet these words are the Names of compounded Passions; and consequently, the abridged expressions that vulgar Custom has made of many confused and obscure Ideas.  
As we are obliged to make use of such terms as are approved by Custom, so we must not be surprised to find obscurity, and sometimes a kind of contradiction, in our words. And if we reflected, that the sensations and emotions of the Soul, which answered to the terms we make use of in the like Discourses, are not perfectly the same in all Men, because of their difference dispositions of Mind, we should not so easily condemn others when they are not of our Opinions. I don't say this so much to prevent the Objections which may be made against me, as to make the Nature of the Passions be well apprehended, and to teach us what we ought to think of Treatises which are written upon this Subject.  
After all these precautions, I believe I may say that all the Passions may be referred to the three Primitive ones, Desire, Joy, and Sorrow; and that 'tis chief through the different Judgements the Soul makes of Good and Evil, that those which relate to one and the same Primitive Passion differ amongst themselves.  
I may say that Hope, Fear, and Irresolution, which keep the Mean between these two, are kinds of desire; that Boldness, Courage, Emulation, etc. relate more to Hope than to the other two; and that Fearfulness, Cowardice, and Jealousy, etc. are kinds of Fear.  
I may further say, that Cheerfulness and Glory, Favour and Acknowledgement, are kinds of Joy, caused by the sight of the good we discover in ourselves, or in those to whom we are united; as Laughing and Raillery is a sort of Joy which is commonly excited in us, at the sight of the Evil which happens to our Enemies. Lastly, disgust, tediousness, regret, pity, and indignation, are kinds of sorrow caused at the sight of something which displeases us.  
But besides these Passions, and many others which I mention not, and which particularly relate to some one of the Primitive Passions, 
The number of the Passions is greater than the number of terms we express 'em by.  there are also many others whose emotion is almost equally compound, either of Desire and Joy, as Impudence, Anger, Revenge, or of Desire and Sorrow, as Shame, Regret, and Despite; or of all three when we meet with Motives of Joy and Sorrow joined together. But altho' these last Passions have not, as I know of, any particular Name, they are nevertheless the most common, because in this Life we hardly ever enjoy any Good without the mixture of some Evil, and that we scarcely ever suffer any Evil without some hopes of being delivered from it, and of possessing some Good. And altho' Joy be quite contrary to Sorrow, it nevertheless admits it, and even with his Passion shares the Souls capacity of Willing, as he prospect of Good and Evil divides the Soul's capacity of perceiving.  
All the Passions therefore are kinds of Desire, Joy, and Sorrow; and the chief difference to be observed between the Passions of the same kind, proceeds from the different Perceptions, or different Judgements which cause or accompany them; so that it is necessary to inquire into the different Judgements that we make of Good and Evil. But as our chief design here is to search after the cause of our Error, we ought not so much to stop at the examining the Judgements which follow them, and which the Soul makes of Objects when it is agitated by any Passion, for 'tis these last Judgements which are the most liable to Error.  
Those Judgements which precede and cause the Passions, are commonly false in something, for they are generally upheld upon the perceptions of the Soul, in as much as it considers things in relation to itself, and not according as they are in themselves: But those Judgements which follow the Passions are false in every respect, for the Judgements which form the Passions are upheld only upon the perceptions the Soul has of Objects in relation to itself, or rather in relation to its emotion.  
In those Judgements which precede the Passions, both the true and the false are joined together; but when the Soul is agitated, and Judges of every thing according to the inspiration of the Passion, the true is dissipated, and the false preserved, from whence are drawn so many more false conclusions as the Passion is greater.  
Every Passion justifies itself; they continually represent to the Soul that Object which affects it, after such a manner as is most proper to preserve and increase its agitation. The Judgement or Perception which causes it, is fortified in proportion as the Passion increases; and the Passion increases ini proportion as the Judgement which produces it, is in its turn fortified: False Judgements and Passions continually contribute to their mutual preservation. So that if the Heart ceased not sometimes to supply such Spirits as are proper to maintain the traces of the Brain, and the distributions of the same Spirits, which are necessary to preserve the sensation and emotion of the Soul which accompanies the Passions, they would continually increase, and we should never discover our Errors. But as all our Passions depend upon the fermentation and circulation of the Blood, and as the Heart cannot always furnish such Spirits as are requisite for their preservation, they must necessarily cease when the Spirits diminish and the Blood cools.  
If it is so very easy to discover the common Judgements of the Passions, we ought not to neglect it; There are few Subjectys more worthy the application of those who inquire into the Truth, and endeavour to deliver themselves from the dominion of their Bodies, and who would judge of all things according to the true Ideas of them.  
We may instruct ourselves upon this Subject two different ways, either by reason only, or by the internal sensation that we have of ourselves when we are agitated with any Passion. For instance, we know by our own Experience, that we are inclined to judge disadvantageously of those we love not, and to discover all the malignity of our hatred, by that means, to the Object of our Passion. We may also, by pure Reason, discover that hating only what is Evil, it is necessary for the preservation of hatred, that the Mind should represent its Object on the worst side; for, indeed, it is sufficient to suppose all the Passions justify themselves, and that they divert the Imagination, and afterwards the Mind, in such a manner as is fit to preserve their own emotion, that we conclude what those Judgements are which all the Passions cause us to make.  
Those who have a strong and lively Imagination, are extremely sensible, and very subject to the Motions of the Passions, may perfectly instruct themselves in these things by the sensation they have of what passes within them; and even speak of them after a more agreeable manner, and sometimes more instructive, than those who have more Reason than Imagination. For, we must not think that such as best discover the Springs of Self-love, that penetrate farthest, and after a more sensible manner, unfold the secrets of Man's heart, are always the most Learned: 'Tis, indeed, often a mark that they are more lively, more imaginative, and sometimes more malicious than others.  
But those who without consulting their internal Sensation, only make use of their Reason to discover the Nature of their Passions, and what they are capable of producing, if they are not always as penetrating as others, they are always more reasonable, and less subject to Error, for they judge of things as they are in themselves: They see very near what the Passions can perform, according as they suppose them more or less moved, and they do not judge rashly of such things as others would, or would not do in such occurrences, by what they would do themselves; for they very well know, that all men are not equally sensible of the same things, nor equally susceptible of involuntary emotions, so that 'tis not by consulting the Sensations which the Passions excite in us, but by harkening to Reason, that we must speak of the Judgements which accompany the Passions, lest we should only discover ourselves instead of showing the Nature of the Passions in general.   

CHAP. XI. How all the Passions justify themselves, and of the judgements they cause us to make in their vindication.  
IT will not be necessary to bring many Arguments to demonstrate that all the Passions justify themselves: This Principle is evident enough by the internal Sensation we have of ourselves, and the conduct of those whom we see agitated with any Passion; it will be sufficient to expose it, that we may afterwards take heed of it. The Mind is such a slave to the Imagination, that it always obeys it, when it is heated by it: It dares not answer it when 'tis incensed, because it treats it ill if it makes any resistance, and always recompenses it with some pleasure when it acquiesses in its designs. Those even whose imagination is so irregular that they believe themselves transformed into Beasts, find some reasons to prove that they ought to live like them; walk upon all four, feed upon Grass, and imitate all the actions which agree only to Beasts. They find a great deal of pleasure in following the impressions of their Passions; and feel themselves inwardly afflicted when they resist them: and 'tis enough, if reason, which accommodates itself, and is commonly serviceable to pleasure, argues after such a manner as is proper to defend the cause of it.  
If therefore it be true that all Passions justify themselves, it is evident that desire of itself inclines us to judge advantageously of its Object, if it is a desire of love; and disadvantageously, if 'tis a desire of aversion. The desire of love is a motion of the Soul excited by the Spirits, to will the enjoyment or use of such things as are not in our power; for if we desire the continuation of our enjoyment, 'tis because future things are not in our power. It is therefore necessary to justify desire, that the Object which produces it should be judged good in itself, or in relation to some other; and we must think the contrary of that desire which is a kind of aversion.  
It is true we cannot judge a thing to be good or bad, if there is not some reason for it; but there is no Object of our Passions which is not good in some sense: If we can say that there is some of them which include no good, and which consequently cannot be perceived as good by the sight of the Mind; yet it cannot be said but they may be relished as good, since we suppose ourselves to be agitated by them; and this taste or sensation is sufficient to incline the Soul to judge advantageously of an Object.  
If we judge so easily that Fire contains in itself the heat we feel, and Bread the savour we taste, because of the sensations that these Bodies excite in us, although it be wholly incomprehensible to the Mind, since that can only conceive heat and savour, to be the manners of being of a Body; there is no Object of our Passions how vile and contemptible soever it appears to be, that we do not judge to be good when we feel pleasure in the enjoyment of it. For as we imagine that heat goes our of Fire when we feel it, we blindly believe that the Object of the Passions cause the pleasure that we taste when we enjoy them; and that therefore they are good since they are capable of doing us good; the same may be said of those Passions which have evil for their Object.  
But as I have just before said, there is nothing which is not worthy of love or aversion, either in itself, or something else to which it has relation; and when we are agitated by any Passion, we soon discover the good or evil in its Object which favours or opposes it. Thus by reason 'tis easy to find out what Judgements these Passions, whereby we are agitated, form in us.  
For if 'tis a desire of love which acts us, we soon apprehend that it will not fail to justify itself by the advantageous judgements it will make upon its Object. We easily see these Judgements will be so much the more extended, as the desire is more violent; and that they will be often full and absolute although the thing appears only good in part, without we easily conceive that these advantageous Judgements will extend to every thing which has or seems to have any connection with the principal Object of the Passion; and that so much the more as the Passion is stronger, and the Imagination more extensive. But if it be a desire of aversion, the quite contrary will happen, for Reasons as easily apprehended. Experience sufficiently proves these things, and therein it perfectly agrees with Reason; but we will make these Truths more sensible by some Instances.  
All Men naturally desire Knowledge, for every Mind is made for the Truth: But the desire of knowing, how just and reasonable soever it may be in itself, often becomes a very dangerous Vice through the false Judgements which attend it. Curiosity often offers to the Mind the main Objects of its Meditations and Cares: It often affixes false Ideas of greatness to these Objects: It elevates them by the deceitful lustre of rarity, and represents them so charming and attractive, that 'tis difficult to contemplate them without too much pleasure and application.  
There is no trifle whatever, but some Persons are wholly taken up about, and their employment is always justified by the false judgements their vain curiosity induces them to make. Those, for instance, who are curious about words, imagine it to be a knowledge of certain terms wherein all Sciences consist: They find a thousand Arguments to persuade themselves of it, and the veneration paid them by those, who are confounded by unknown terms, is none of the weakest although it be the least reasonable.  
Some Men are learning all their lives to speak, who yet perhaps ought to be silent as long as they live; for 'tis evident we should hold our Tongues when we have nothing to say that is worth the hearing; but they don't learn to speak, to remain silent. They do not sufficiently consider, that to be able to speak well, 'tis requisite to think well, have an exact judgement, to discern truth from falsehood, clear Ideas from those which are obscure, and distinguish those of the Mind, from such as proceed from the Imagination. They think themselves uncommon and curious Wits, because they know how to satisfy the Ear by an exact measure, flatter the Passions by figures and agreeable motions, and delight the Imagination by sensible and lively Expressions, whilst they leave the Mind empty of Ideas without knowledge and understanding.  
Those who employ a great part of their time in the study of their own Tongue, have some appearance of Reason to justify them, since they make use of it all their lives; and this is enough to excuse the Passion of some Persons. But I confess it difficult with any shadow of Reason, to excuse the Passion of such as indifferently apply themselves to all sorts of Languages. Something may be said in favour of their Inclination who make a complete Library of all sorts of Dictionaries, as well as for the Curiosity of such, who collect the Coins of all Nations and Ages; since it may be useful in some Occurrences; and if it is no great advantage to them, at lest 'tis no injury; for they have a Storehouse of Curiosities which does not perplex them, since they carry about them neither their Books nor their Medals; But I don't see how we can justify the Passion of those who make their Head a Library of Dictionaries; They even forget their Affairs and most essential Duties, for Words of no use; They speak their own Tongue with hesitation, and at every turn mix unknown and barbarous terms in their Discourses, and never speak to their Countrymen in their own Language. And indeed their Reason is no better managed than their Tongue, for every corner and recess of their Memory is full of Etymologies, that their Minds are as it were choked with an innumerable company of Words, which continually fly about it.  
Nevertheless it must be granted that Philologists and Linguists will not fail to justify their trifling Studies; But how! only hear the Judgements that those falsely Learned Persons make of the Tongues, and you shall know it: Or else do but suppose certain Axioms which pass amongst them for indisputable, and from thence draw their usual Consequences; for instance, that those who understand several Languages, are as many different Men, as they can speak Tongues, since 'tis by speech they are distinguished from Beasts: That being unaquainted with the Tongues, is the reason we are ignorant of an infinite number of things, since the Ancient Philosophers and Strangers are much more learned than we are; Thus, if we suppose the like Principles and Conclusions, we shall soon form such Judgements as are fit to produce a Passion for Languages, and which Judgements will consequently be like those that the same Passion creates in Philologists for the justification of their Studies.  
The meanest and most contemptible Sciences, will in some part or other appear glorious to the Imagination, and will easily dazzle the Mind through the false lustre that Passion diffuses through it. It is true, this splendour vanishes, when the Spirits and Blood are cooled, and the light of truth gins to appear; but this light is likewise dissipated when the Imagination becomes warm, and obscurely presents to us those solid Reasons which seemed to condemn our Passion.  
But when the Passion which animated us, feels itself decaying, it does not repent of its conduct; on the contrary we may say, that it disposes of all things in such a manner, that it may die with honour, or else revive again soon after: That is, it always inclines the Mind to form such Judgements as justify it. In this condition it also contracts a kind of Covenant with all the rest of the Passions, which can assist it in its weakness, supply it with Spirits and Blood at its necessity, rekindle its ashes, and give it new life; for the Passions are not indifferent in respect to each other; and those which can live together faithfully contribute to one another's preservation. Thus the Judgements, which justify the inclination we have for Languages, or what else pleases us, are continually solicited and fully confirmed by all the Passions which are not opposite to it.  
A pretender to Learning sometimes fancies himself surrounded with such Persons as hear him with respect, sometimes as victorious over those whom he has astonished by his incomprehensible Words, and generally thinks himself far above the common sort of Men. He flatters himself with the praises they give him, the preferments proposed to him, and with the courships made to his Person. He is of all times and Countries, and not limited like common Wits, to the present time, or within the Walls of his own Town; but continually communicates himself, and this communication creates his pleasure. Thus many Passions combine with that he has for false Learning, which all endeavour to justify it, and warmly solicit the Judgements in its favour.  
It every Passion acted only for itself, without being concerned for the rest, they would immediately dissipate after they were produced; not being able to make false Judgements enough for their own subsistence, nor to maintain long the representations of the Imagination against the light of Reason. But every thing is regulated in our Passions after the most exact manner that is possible, for their mutual preservation.  
They fortify one another, the most remote giving some assistance; and 'tis enough for 'em, if they are not declared enemies, to observe amongst themselves all the rules of a well ordered Society.  
Should the Passion of Desire be alone, every Judgement that proceeded from it, could only tend to represent the good as possible; for the desire of love, considered as such, is produced only by the Judgement that we make of the possession of some good that is attainable; so that this desire could only form Judgements upon the possibility of enjoying it, since those Judgements which follow and preserve the Passions, are wholly like those which precede and produce them. But desire is animated by love, fortified by hope, increased by joy, renewed by fear, attended with courage, emulation, anger, irresolution, and many other Passions; which in their turns form an infinite variety of Judgements, that succeed one another, and so maintain the desire which produced them. It is no wonder therefore if the desire of a pure trifle, or of something that is manifestly useless, or injurious, continually justifies itself in opposition to Reason, for many years, or during the whole Life of a Man who is agitated by it, since there are so many Passions which plead in its behalf. And that I may explain things by distinct Ideas, I shall briefly show how the Passions justify themselves.  
All Passion agitates the Blood and Spirits; and these agitated Spirits are carried to the Brain, either by the sensible sight of the Object, or power of the Imagination, after such a manner as is proper to form deep Traces to represent this Object: By their impetuous course they bend, and even sometimes break the Fibres of the Brain, and the Imagination is thereby sullied and corrupted. For these Traces submit not to Reason, they are not effaced when that wishes it; but on the contrary do violence to it, and even continually oblige it to consider Objects, after such a manner as agitates and inclines it to favour the Passions. Thus the Passions act upon the Imagination, and the Imagination being corrupted fights against Reason, by continually representing things to it, not according as they are in themselves, whereby the Mind might make a true Judgement, but as they relate to the present Passion, to incline it to make a Judgement in favour of it.  
The Passions do not only corrupt both the Imagination and Mind in favour of 'em, but likewise produce in the rest of the Body every disposition that is necessary for their preservation. The Spirits which are agitated by them stop not in the Brain, but are carried, as I have already intimated, to all the other parts of the Body; They are chief dispersed into the Heart, Liver, Spleen, and into the Nerves which encompass the principal Arteries: In short, they are thrown into all parts whatever, which can supply necessary Spirits for the preservation of the ruling Passion. But when these Spirits are thus dispersed into the parts of the Body, they by little and little destroy whatever can resist their course; till at last they make their passage so slippery and smooth, that the smallest Object extremely agitates us, and consequently inclines us to form such Judgements as favour the Passions. And 'tis after this manner that they establish and justify themselves.  
If we consider how various the constitution of the Fibres of the Brain is, how different the agitation and abundance of the Spirits and Blood in different Sexes, and at different Ages; it will be easy enough to discover very near what Passions certain Persons are most subject to, and consequently what Judgements they will make upon such Objects. For Instance; we may nearly guests by the abundance or scarcity of Spirits, which we observe in certain Persons, that the very same thing being equally proposed and explained to them, many will form Judgements of hope and joy upon it, and others of fear and sorrow.  
For those who have abundance of Blood and Spirits, as commonly Young Men, Sanguine and Choleric Persons have, easily conceive hope, because of the secret sense of their Strength; They will not believe they shall find any opposition in their designs which they cannot conquer; and immediately please themselves with the foretaste of a good they hope to possess; and will form all sorts of Judgements which are fit to justify their hope and joy. But such as want agitated Spirits, as Old Men, Melancholy and Phlegmatic Persons do, being inclined to fear and sorrow, because their Soul grows weak, and is destitute of Spirits to execute its Orders, they form quite contrary Judgements, imagining unconquerable difficulties to justify their fear, and abandon themselves to envy, sorrow, despair, and to certain kinds of aversion, of which weak Persons are most susceptible.   

CHAP. XII. That such Passions, as have Evil for their Object, are most dangerous and unjust; and such as are attended with the least knowledge, are the most lively and sensible.  
OF all the Passions, those whose Judgements are most unreasonable, and most to be feared, are all kinds of Aversion. There are no Passions whatever that corrupts the Reason more in favour of 'em, than hatred and fear do: Hatred chief in the Choleric, or in such whose Spirits are in continual agitation; and Fear in the Melancholic, or in those whose gross and heavy Spirits are neither soon agitated, nor easily appeased. But when Hatred and Fear conspire together to corrupt the Reason, which is very common, then there are no Judgements so unjust and fantastic, but they are capable of producing and maintaining with an insuperable obstinacy.  
The reason of which is, because the Soul is in this life more lively affected with evil than good, the sensation of pain being more quick than that of pleasure. We are much more sensible of injuries and reproaches than praises and applause; and if we meet with some Persons that have a great indifference for the enjoyment of certain pleasures, or the receiving of certain honours, yet would it be very difficult to find any who would quietly suffer pain and contempt.  
Thus Hatred, Fear, and the other kinds of Aversion which have Evil for their Object, are very violent Passions. They give the Mind such unforeseen shocks, and stupify and discompose it; and soon penetrate into the most secret recesses of the Soul; They dethrone Reason, and upon all sorts of subjects pronounce erroneous and unjust Judgements, in favour of their folly and tyranny.  
Of all the Passions these are the most cruel and distrustful, the most destructive to Charity and Civil Society, and likewise the most ridiculous and extravigant: for they form such impertinent and fantastic Judgements, as excites the laughter and indignation of all Men.  
These Passions put these extravagant Speeches in the Mouth of the Pharisees: 
Joh. c. 11.47.  What do we? this Man works many Miracles. If we let him alone all Men will believe in him: And the Romans will come and destroy both our City and Nation.  
They agreed that JESUS CHRIST did many Miracles; the resurrection of Lazarus was undeniable. But what was the Judgement of their Passions? To put JESUS CHRIST to death, and Lazarus whom he had raised to life: And why must JESUS CHRIST die? because, if we let him alone, all Men will believe him, and the Romans will come and ruin our Nation: And why must Lazarus be put to death? because, upon his account many Jews went away and believed in JESUS. 
Joh. c. 12.11.  These are both cruel and extravagant Judgements together; cruel through hatred, and extravagant through fear: The Romans will come and ruin our City and Nation.  
'Twas the same Passions induced a great. Assembly, consisting of Annas the High Priest, Caiaphas, John, Alexander, and all those who were a kin to the High Priest, to speak thus; What shall we do with these Men? for that indeed a notable Miracle hath been done by them, is manifest to all them that dwell in Jerusalem, and we cannot deny it. 
Acts c. 4. 16, 17.  But that it spread no farther amongst the People, let us threaten to punish them, if henceforward they teach any more in the Name of JESUS.  
All these great Men pronounced both an impertinent and an unjust Judgement, because they were agitated by their Passions, and blinded by their false Zeal. They durst not punish the Apostles because of the People, and because the Man who had been miraculously cured, was above 40 years old, and present in the Assembly; But threatened them to hinder 'em from preaching in the Name of JESUS. Believing they ought to condemn a Doctrine, whose Author they had put to death, You intent, say they to the Apostles, to bring this Man's Blood upon us.  
When false Zeal is joined to Hatred, 
Acts c. 5.  it shelters it from the reproaches of Reason, and after such a manner justifies it that we do not scruple to follow its motions; and when ignorance and weakness accompany fear, they extend to an infinite number of subjects, and so well fortify its emotions, that the least suspicion frightens and disturbs the Reason.  
False Zealors think they do God service when they submit to their Passions; they blindly follow the secret motions of their Hatred, as proceeding from the Internal Truth; and stopping with satisfaction at such sensible proofs as justify their excess, they confirm themselves in their errors with an unconquerable obstinacy.  
As for Ignorant and Weak Persons they create to themselves ridiculous and imaginary subjects of fear; and like Children, who walk in the dark without a guide, they imagine frightful Bugbears, are disturbed and cry out as if they were undone; light re-assures them if they are ignorant, but if Men have weak Minds, their imagination is always disturbed: The least thing which relates to that frightful Object renews the traces and course of the Spirits which causes the symtom of their fear; so that 'tis absolutely impossible to cure or appease them for ever.  
But when false Zeal meets with Hatred and Fear, in a weak Mind, it continually produces such unjust and violent Judgements in it, that we cannot think on 'em without horror. To change the Mind possessed with these Passions requires a greater Miracle than that which converted St. Paul, and to cure it would be absolute impossible, if we could set bounds to the Mercy and Power of God.  
Those who walk in the dark rejoice at the appearance of light, but this Man cannot endure it, since it hurts him, because it resists his Passion. His fear being in some manner voluntary, because 'tis produced by his hatred, he loves to be affected by it, since we love to be agitated by those Passions which have Evil for their Object, when the Evil is imaginary; or rather, when we know as in Tragedies, that the Evil can't hurt us.  
The Phantoms that these form to themselves who walk in the dark, vanish at the approach of light: But this Man's Phantoms cannot be dissipated by the light of the truth; for instead of dissipating the darkness of his Mind, it only incenses his imagination; so that whilst he applies himself to the Object of his Passion the light reflects, and it seems to him as if these Phantoms had real Bodies, since they reflect some weak rays of light which strike upon them.  
But if we should suppose in these Persons a sufficient docility and reflection to make 'em listen to, and apprehend such Reasons as are capable of dissipating their Errors, yet their imagination being disordered through fear, and their Hearts corrupted through hatred and false zeal, these Reasons, how solid soever they might be in themselves, would not be able long to stop the impetuous motions of these violent Passions, nor hinder them from speedily justifying themselves by sensible and convincing proofs.  
For we must observe that there are some Passions which never return again, whereas there are others that are constant and durable. Those which are not maintained by the sight of the Mind, but only produced and fortified by the sensible view of some Object, and the fermentation of the Blood continue not, but commonly die immediately after they are produced. But those which are attended with the contemplation of the Mind are lasting; for the Principle which causes them is not subject to change like the Blood and Humours. So that Hatred, Fear, and all the rest of the Passions which are stirred up or preserved by the knowledge of the Mind, and not by the sensible sight of some Evil, must necessarily subsist long. These Passions are therefore more durable, violent, and unjust, but not more lively and sensible, as has already been shown.  
The perception of Good and Evil, which excite the Passions, is produced three several ways, by the Senses, Imagination, and the Mind. The perception of Good and Evil by the Senses, or Sensation of Good and Evil, produces the quickest and most sensible Passions; Good and Evil perceived by the Imagination only, excites them after a much weaker manner; and the perception of Good and Evil by the Mind purely, never produces true ones, because it is always attended with some motion of the Animal Spirits.  
The Passions are given us only for the good of the Body, and by that to unite us to all sensible things; for although sensible things can be neither good or bad in respect to the Mind, they are so however in relation to the Body to which they are united. Thus the Senses discovering much better the relation that sensible Objects have to the Body, than the Mind itself can: They must excite much more lively Passions than a clear and evident knowledge is able to do. But because all our discoveries are attended with some motion of the Spirits, a clear and evident knowledge of a great Good and great Evil, which is not perceived by the Senses, always excites some secret Passion.  
Yet all our clear and evident discoveries of Good and Evil, are not followed by some sensible Passion which we perceive; and so on the other side all our Passions are not attended with some knowledge of the Mind. For, if we sometimes think of Good and Evil without feeling ourselves moved, we often find ourselves moved with some Passions without knowing what they are, nay sometimes without perceiving the cause of 'em. One who breathes in a good Air feels a motion of Joy, without knowing from whence it proceeds, or what good 'tis he possesses which causes this Joy. And if there is any invisible Body which mingles with the Blood, and hinders its fermentation, it will produce sorrow; and perhaps he will attribute the cause of his sorrow to any visible thing which occurs in that moment of his Passion.  
Of all the Passions none are more sensible, or more quick, and consequently less attended with the knowledge of the Mind, than horror and antipathy, agreeableness and sympathy. It sometimes happens that a Man sleeping under a shady Tree would of a sudden and unexpectedly be waked at the sting of a Gnat, or tickling of a Leaf, even as if he were bitten with a Serpent. The confused Sensation of something as terrible as death frights him, without perceiving that he is agitated with a most powerful and violent Passion, which is an aversion of desire. On the contrary, a Man in some necessity by chance discovers a small good, the satisfaction of which surprises him, and he applies himself to this trifle as to the greatest good imaginable, without making the least reflection upon it: The like also happens in the motions of sympathy and antipathy. We sometimes see a certain Person, whose habit and external appearance has some secret alliance with the present disposition of our Body, we are forthwith touched with a vehement inclination for him, and without any reflection, are induced to love and wish him well: 'Tis this, I know not what, which agitates us, since Reason has no share in it: And the contrary happens in respect to those, whose Air and Manners excite disgust and horror in us; They have, I know not what, disagreeableness which shocks and terrifies, but the Mind perceives it not, since the Senses are the only proper Judges of sensible Beauty and Deformity, which are the Objects of these sorts of Passions.    

A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH.  
BOOK VI Of Method.  

CHAP. I. The Design of this Book, and the two general Means to preserve Evidence in an Enquiry after Truth, which will be the Subject of this Book.  
IN the preceding Books we have seen how subject to Error the Mind of Man is; that he is deceived every Moment by the Illusions of his 
(a) Book 1.  Senses, the 
(b) Book 2.  Visions of his Imagination, and Abstractions 
(c) Book 3.  of his Mind, that the Inclinations 
(d) Book 4.  of his Will, and his 
(e) Book 5.  Passions are a Means to obscure the Truth, and never suffer it to appear, except it has a Tincture of those false Colours which flatter Concupiscence. In a word, we have in part discovered the Errors of the Mind, and their Causes: It is now Time to show the Way which will conduct us to the Knowledge of the Truth, and give the Mind all the Power and Assistance we can, to enable it to keep this Way, without either straying, or vainly fatiguing itself.  
But to avoid giving the Reader any unnecessary Trouble in the Perusal of this last Book; I think fit to advertise him, that 'tis only writ for those, that would, of themselves, seriously inquire into Truth; and to this end employ the utmost Power of their own Minds. I would have them for a time lay aside all probable Opinions, and hot rely on the strongest Conjectures; but neglect the Authority of all Philosophers, and as much as possible, divert themselves of their Prejudices, Self-love and Passions: Very much distrusting their Senses and Imaginations: And in fine, that they well remember the greatest Part of those things that have been told them in the preceding Books.  
The Design of this last Book is an Endeavour to help the Mind to all the Perfection it is naturally capable of, by furnishing it with whatsoever is necessary to render it more capacious and attentive; and in prescribing such Rules as must be observed in an Enquiry after Truth, to prevent its being ever deceived, and to teach it, in some time Time, all that can be known.  
If we were to carry this Design to its utmost Perfection, which we pretend not to do, since this is only an Essay; it might be said, That we ought to have given an universal Science, that those that would have made use of it, might have been truly learned; since they would have had the Foundation of all particular Sciences, and acquired them proportionably to the use they had made of this universal one. For we endeavour, by this Treatise, to make the Mind capable of forming true and certain Judgements upon all Questions which shall be proportioned to it.  
As a Memory that is able to retain all the Demonstrations of Euclid, Archimedes, Pappus, Apollonius, and all that have writ of Geometry, is not sufficient to make a Man a good Geometrician; so neither is it enough to have read Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, and perfectly to know their Sentiments about Philosophy, to make a Man a learned Philosopher. The Knowledge of all the Opinions and Judgements of other Men, whether Philosophers or Geometricians, cannot so properly be called a Science as an History: For true Science, which alone can give the Mind of Man that Perfection it is now capable of, consists in a certain Ability to judge solidly of all things that are adapted to it. But not to lose Time, and to prevent the prejudicing any Person by precipitated Judgements, we will begin to treat of this important Matter.  
We must first call to mind the Rule that has been proved and established in the beginning of the first Book, because it is the Foundation and chief Principle of whatsoever we shall hereafter say; therefore I'll repeat it: We ought never to give our entire Assent, except to such Propositions as appear so evidently true, that we cannot refuse it them, without feeling some inward Pain, and secret Reproaches of our Reason; that is, without a clear knowledge, that we should make an ill use of our Liberty, if we would not give our Assent. Every Time we assent to Probabilities, we put ourselves into a certain Danger of being deceived, and are almost always actually deceived; and if we are not, 'tis a mere Effect of Chance and Good Fortune. Thus a confused Sight of a great Number of Probabilities upon different Subjects, can never add any Perfection to our Reason; for 'tis only a clear Sight of the Truth, that can give either that, or any solid Satisfaction.  
The Conclusion therefore is very plain, That Evidence only, according to our first Rule, can secure us from being deceived: We ought above all things, to be very careful to preserve this Evidence in all our Perceptions, that we may be able to make a sound Judgement of whatsoever may be submitted to our Reason, and to discover all the Truths we are capable of.  
Such things as can either produce or preserve this Evidence, are of two Sorts. Some of which are within, or in some manner depending on us; and others which have no Connection with us. For to see Objects distinctly, it is necessary to have a good Sight, and to give a good Attention to these Objects, and both these are within us, or in some manner depend upon us: A good Understanding is likewise necessary, and a strong Application for the penetrating into the Bottom of intelligible Truths; which also are either in, or in some manner depend upon us.  
But as the Eye has need of Light to see, and this Light depends upon external Causes: The Mind also has need of Ideas to conceive; and these Ideas as has been elsewhere proved, depend not upon us, but on an external Cause, which furnishes us with them. If therefore it should happen, that some Ideas of things were not presented to our Minds, every time that we wished to have them; and if he who enlightens the World, would conceal them from us, 'twould be impossible to remedy it, and to know any thing, even as it is impossible for us to see Objects without Light. But we shall never have any reason to fear it; for the Presence of Ideas to our Mind being natural, and depending on the general Will of God, which is always constant and , we can never fail of discovering such things as are naturally subjected to our Reason. For the Sun that enlightens the Mind, is not like the Sun that enlightens the Body: It is never eclipsed, and it penetrates every thing without having its Light divided.  
The Ideas of all things being therefore continually present to us, even when we do not consider them attentively, there is nothing requisite in order to preserve this Evidence in all our Perceptions, but to find a means of making our Minds more attentive and capacious: So to be able well to distinguist such visible Objects as are presented to us, it is necessary, on our Part, to have a good Sight, and to consider them steadfastly:  
But because the Objects that we consider, have often more Relations than we can be able to discover at one View, by a simple Effort of the Mind: We have yet need of some Rules, to assist us in the disentangling all Difficulties so well, that being helped by those Rules which will make our Mind more attentive and capacious, we discover, with an entire Evidence, all the Relations of those things that we examine.  
We shall therefore divide this Book into two Parts. In the first we shall treat of the Helps the Mind may make use of to become more attentive and capapacious: And in the second, give those Rules that ought to be followed in the Enquiry after Truth, to form solid Judgements thereof, without Fear of deceiving ourselves.   

CHAP. II. Attention is necessary to preserve Evidence in all our Perceptions, that the Modifications of the Soul make it attentive, but do much divide its Capacity of Perception.  
WE have showed in the Beginning of this Work, That the Understanding only perceives, and that in respect to the Understanding there is no Difference between simple Perceptions, Judgements and Reasonings, except that Judgements and Reasonings are much more compound than simple Perceptions are; because they do not only represent many things, but even the Relations that these things have amongst themselves. For simple Perceptions only represent things to the Mind; but Judgements represent to the Mind the Relations that are betwixt these things; and simple Reasonings represent the Relations which are between the Relations of things: But compound Reasonings represent the Relations of Relations, or the compound Relations which are between the Relations of things, and so on ad Infinitum. For whilst these Relations are multiplied, the Reasonings which represent them to the Mind become more compounded. But Judgements, simple and compound Reasonings are only pure Perceptions, in respect to the Understanding; because the Understanding only simply perceives, as has been before intimated.  
Thus Judgements and Reasonings, as to the Understanding, being pure Perceptions: It is plain that the Understanding never falls into any Error; since there is none in Perceptions, neither is Error so much as intelligible. For, as we have often said already, it consists only in a precipitate Consent of the Will, which suffers itself to be dazzled by some false Light, and instead of preserving its Liberty as long as it can, negligently relies on the Appearance of Truth.  
Nevertheless, since it commonly happens that the Understanding hath only confused and imperfect Perceptions of things, we may say it is certainly the occasional Cause of our Errors. For as our Eyes often deceives us, because they represent external Objects very confused and imperfectly to us: Confused when they are too distant from us, or for want of a due Light; and imperfectly, because they only represent to us those Sides which are towards us: So the Understanding having often only a confused, and imperfect Idea of things, because they are not sufficiently represented to it, and because it discovers not all their Parts, causes the Will to fall into a great Number of Errors, in yielding too easily to these obscure and imperfect Perceptions.  
It is therefore necessary to find some means to hinder our Perceptions from being confused and imperfect; and because nothing can make them more clear and distinct than Attention, which all the World is convinced of; our Care must be to find such a Method as will make us become more attentive than we yet are. This will be a Way to preserve Evidence in all our Reasonings, and make us able, at one View, to perceive a necessary Connection between all the Parts of our longest Deductions.  
In order to find this means, 'tis necessary that we should be well convinced of what has already been said elsewhere, That the Mind carries not an equal Attention to every thing it perceives; for it applies itself infinitely more to those that affect, modify, and penetrate it, than to those that are present to it, but affect it not, nor belong to it. And in fine, it employs itself much more about its own Modifications, than about the simple Ideas of Objects, which are something different from itself.  
This is the Reason that with some Uneasiness, and without much Application, we consider the abstracted Ideas of the pure Understanding, and apply ourselves much more to such things as fall under our Imagination, especially if our Imagination is strong enough to make deep Traces in our Brain: And indeed, it is the Cause why we entirely employ ourselves about sensible Qualities, even without being able to apply ourselves to the pure Ideas of the Mind, whilst we feel any thing that's either very agreeable or very painful. for Pain, Pleasure, and the rest of the Sensations being only the Modifications of the Mind, it is impossible that we should exist and not perceive them, and that the Capacity of our Mind should not be employed about them, since our Sensations are only simple Perceptions.  
But it is not the same with the pure Ideas of the Mind; since they may be intimately united to it, without considering them with the least Attention. For although God be most intimately united to us, and comprehends the Ideas of whatsoever we see: Yet these Ideas, though present and within ourselves, are hid from us, when the Motions of the Spirits stir up no Traces of them, or when our Will applies not our Mind thereto; I mean when it forms no Acts to which the Representation of these Ideas are connected by the Author of Nature. This is the Foundation of whatsoever we shall propose about such Assistances as may render our Minds more attentive, so that these Helps will be founded upon the very Nature of the Mind, and there is some Reason to hope they will not be so chimerical and useless as many others, which more perplex than assist the Mind.  
But if they are not so useful as might be wished, all the Time that is employed about the reading them will not be lost, since by it the Reader will be better acquainted with the Nature of his Mind.  
The Modifications of the Soul have three Causes; the Senses, Imagination and Passions: Every one knows by his own Experience, that Pleasures, Pains, and in general, all Sensations, strong Imaginations, and great Passions, so much possess their Mind, that it is not capable of Attention, when it is too livelily touched by these things; because than its Capacity or Faculty of perceiving is wholly filled. And although these Modifications should be moderated, they would nevertheless in some manner divide the Capacity of the Mind, so that it could not wholly employ itself in considering the Truth of things that are never so little abstracted.  
It will be necessary to draw this important Conclusion: That all those that would seriously apply themselves to a Search after Truth, aught to be very careful to shun, as much as possible, all strong Sensations, as a great Noise, too brisk a Light, Pleasure, Pain, etc. and continually to stir up the Purity of their Imagination, and prevent its making in their Brain such deep Traces as continually disquiet and dissipate the Mind. And above all, to put a Stop to the Motions of their Passions, which cause such powerful Impressions in the Body and Soul, that 'tis generally impossible the Mind should think of any thing else. For although the pure Ideas of Truth are always present to us, we cannot consider them, when the Capacity we have of thinking is filled with these Modifications which possess us.  
However, as it is impossible that the Soul should exist without Passion, Sensation, or any other particular Modification: We must make a Virtue of Necessity, and even draw from these Modifications some Helps to render us more attentive. Yet must we make use of much Artifice and Circumspection in the applying these Helps to gain some Advantage from them. The need we have of them must be well examined, and we must only make use of 'em so far as the Necessity of rendering ourselves attentive constrains us to.   

CHAP. III. Of the use that may be made of the Passions and Senses, to preserve the Attention of the Mind.  
THE Passions which it is necessary for us to make use of to excite us to an Enquiry after Truth, are those that give us Strength and Courage enough to surmount all the Trouble we may meet with in endeavouring to render ourselves attentive, some of which are good and some bad; of which the good are a Desire to find the Truth, to acquire a sufficient Knowledge to conduct ourselves, to render us useful to our Neighbour, and some others of the like Nature: But the bad or dangerous ones are such as a desire to acquire Reputation, to make some Establishment of our Fortune, to raise ourselves above our Neighbours, and some others that are yet more irregular, of which it is not necessary to speak.  
In the unhappy Estate we now are in, it often happens, that the most unreasonable Passions do most powerfully excite us to search after the Truth, and give us a more agreeable Satisfaction for all the Pains we take in our Pursuit, than the most just and reasonable Passions do. Vanity, for instance, excites us much more than the Love of Truth; and we every Day see some continually applying themselves to Study, when they find Persons to whom they may relate what they have learned; but who entirely abandon their Studies when they have not an Opportunity to discover their Acquirements. The confused Prospect of some Glory they gain when they put off their Opinons, maintains their Courage in the most barren and tiresome Studies. But if by Chance or Necessity of their Affairs, they find themselves far distant from their little flock of Admirers, their Ardour is soon cooled, and even the most solid Studies cannot attract them: Disgust, Wearisomeness, and Chagriu seizes them, and they quit all. Vanity triumphs over their natural Laziness, but Laziness in its turn triumphs over the Love of Truth, for Vanity sometimes resists Idleness, but Idleness is generally victorious over the Love of Truth.  
Yet the Passion for Gloty may be subservient to a good End, since we may make use of it for the Glory of God and the Profit of others: Some Persons may be permitted, on several Occasions, to make use of this Passion as an Help to make the Mind more attentive; but we must take great Care to use it only when those reasonable Passions we have already mentioned, are not sufficient; and when our Duty obliges us to apply ourselves to such Subjects as we are discouraged from. First, because this Passion is very dangerous in respect of the Conscience: Secondly, because it insensibly engages us in unprofitable Studies, which have a more tempting Appearance than either Usefulness or Truth in them: In fine, because this Passion is very difficult to be moderated, we are often abused by it; and while we believe our Mind is illuminated by it, we often strengthen our Concupiscence; which not only corrupts the Heart, but disperses such a Darkness through the Mind as is morally impossible to be dissipated.  
We ought to consider that this Passion is insensibly increased, fortified, and established in the Heart of Man; and that when it is too violent, instead of assisting the Mind in a Search after Truth, it strangely blinds it, and makes it believe things, even as it wishes them to be.  
Without doubt, we should not have met with so many false Inventions and imaginary Discoveries, if Men had not suffered their Brains to be disordered by their Zeal of appearing Inventors. For the firm and obstinate Persuasion many Men have had, that they have found, for instance, the perpetual Motion, the squaring of the Circle, and Duplication of the Cube by common Geometry, has apparently proceeded from the great Desire they had of appearing to have effected what many Persons had unsuccessfully attempted.  
It is therefore better to excite those Passions in us which are so much the more useful in the Search after Truth, as they are more strong, and in the Excess of which there is least to be feared; as the Desires of making a good use of our Wit; of delivering ourselves from Prejudices and Errors; of acquiring so much Wisdom as will enable us to conduct ourselves through whatsoever Condition we are in, and other the like Passions; which engage us not in unuseful Studies, nor incline us to make too precipitate Judgements.  
When we begin to taste the Pleasure that is found in the Exercise of the Mind, discover the Advantage that recurs from it, destroy those violent Passions, and disdainfully reject those sensible Pleasures, which, whilst we imprudently permit them to tyrannize over our Reason, we have no need of any other Passions than those we have before mentioned, to make us attentive upon whatsoever Subject we would consider.  
But the Generality of Mankind are not in this Condition. They have no good Relish of any thing but only what touches the Senses. Their Imagination is corrupted with an almost infinite Number of deep Traces, which only stir up false Ideas: For they are united to every thing that falls under the Senses and Imagination, and judge always according to the Impression they have received from them, in Relation to themselves. Pride, Debauchery, Engagements, unquiet Desires to raise their Fortune, so commonly obscure the Discovery of Truth in the Men of this World, that it stifles in them the Sentiments of Piety; because they separate them from God, who only can enlighten us, as he only can govern us. For we cannot increase our Union with sensible things, without diminishing that which we have with intellectual Truths: Since in the same Time we cannot be so strictly united to things that are so different and opposite.  
Those therefore who have a pure and chaste Imagination, I mean such whose Brain is not filled with deep Traces, which unite them to sensible things, may easily be united to God, and be made attentive to the Truth which speaks to them: The most just and most reasonable Passions will be sufficient to determine such Persons. But those that live in the World who are united to too many things, and whose Imagination is spoiled by false and obscure Ideas, which sensible Objects have excited in them, cannot apply themselves to the Truth, if they are not born up by some Passion that is strong enough to counterbalance the violent Inclination of the Body which draws them aside, and to form such Traces in their Brain as may be capable of making a Revulsion in the Animal Spirits. But as all Passion of itself can only confound Ideas, they ought to make no more use of them than Necessity requires, and all Men ought so to study themselves, as may enable them to proportion their Passions to their own Weaknesses.  
It is not difficult to find some means of exciting such Passions in ourselves as we wish. The Knowledge we have given of the Union of the Soul and Body, in the preceding Books, affords a sufficient means to accomplish it: For, in a Word, 'tis enough to think attentively upon such Objects, which according to the Institution or Natture are capable of exciting the Passions. Thus we may almost always raise such Passions in our Hearts as we have Occasion for: But though we can so easily cause them, we cannot always so easily extirpate them, nor remedy the Disorders that they cause in the Imagination, and therefore we ought to use them with great Moderation.  
Above all things, we must be cautious that we do not Judge of things by our Passion, but only by a clear Sight of Truth, which it is almost impossible to observe, when the Passions are a little vigorous. Passion ought only to serve us to stir up our Attentions, but it always produces its own Ideas, and it presently obliges the Will to judge of things by these Ideas that affect it, rather than by the pure and abstracted Ideas of the Truth, which affect it not. So that such Judgements are often form, which last no longer than the Passion itself, because it is not a clear Sight of the immutable Truth, but the Circulation of the Blood which produces them.  
It is certain, that Men are strangely obstinate in their Errors, and that they generally maintain them all their Lives. But either these Errors have often other Causes than the Passions, or else they depend upon certain durable Passions, which proceed from the Conformation of the Body, Interest, or some other Cause, which continues a long Time. Interest, for instance, endures always, it creates a Passion which never dies, and the Judgement that these Passions form are very lasting. But all other Sentiments of Men, which depend upon particular Passions, are as inconstant as the Fermentation of their Humours are. They speak sometimes after one manner, and sometimes after another; and What they say is generally conformable to what they think. They run from one false Good to another as false, by the Motion of their Passion, which they again dislike as soon as this Passion ceases. So also they run from one false System to another. They ardently embrace a false Notion, when their Passion renders it probable; but this Passion being once extinguished, they abandon it. They taste of every Good by their Passions, without finding any thing that is really so: And by the same Passions they see all Trtuths, without discovering any: Although, whilst the Passion continues, what they taste appears to them to be the Sovereign Good; and what they see, seems to them to be an indisputable Truth.  
The Second Source, from whence we may draw any Helps to render the Mind attentive, is the Senses. Sensations are the proper Modifications of the Soul, pure Ideas of the Mind are something different: Sensations. then stir up our Attention in a much more lively manner than pure Ideas do; so that it is plain we may remedy this Defect of the Application of the Mind to Truths that do not affect us, in expressing them by sensible things which do.  
This is the Reason that Geometers express the Proportions between those Magnitudes they would consider by sensible Lines. By drawing Lines upon Paper, they trace, if I may so say, the Ideas upon their Minds which answer them: They make them more familiar to them, because they see them in the same Time they would conceive them. After this manner many things that are difficult enough in themselves, might be taught to Children, who are not capable of abstracted Truths, because of the Tenderness of the Fibres of their Brain. They see only with their Eyes Colours, Pictures, Images; but with the Mind they consider not the Ideas which answer to these Sensible Objects.  
A particular Care must be taken not to obscure Objects that we would consider ourselves, or discover to others with so much Sensibility, lest the Mind should be more taken up with it than with the Truth itself, which is a very considerable and common Fault. We every Day see Orators, who apply themselves only to that which affects the Senses, and who express themselves after so sensible a manner, that the Truth is almost stifled under the Weight of their vain Ornaments and false Eloquence. So that those who hear them, being much more touched with the Measure of their Periods, and Motions of their Figures, than by their Arguments, suffer themselves to be overcome, without either knowing what persuades them, or of what they are persuaded.  
Much Care therefore aught to be taken so to moderate the Sensibility of our Expressions, that they may only render the Mind more attentive. There is nothing so beautiful as the Truth, we cannot pretend to render it finer by painting it with some Sensible Colours, which have nothing solid in them, and can only charm for a little Time. Perhaps we might give it some pretty Strokes, but we should diminish its Strength; we ought not to  it so bright and sparkling as to make the Mind more attentive to its Ornaments, than to the Truth itself: It would be to treat it like certain Persons who load themselves with so much Gold and precious Stones, that at last they appear the least considerable thing in the Figure they make.  
Truth ought to be clothed like the Magistrates of Venice, who are obliged to wear such a simple Robe, and a Cap, as may only distinguish them from other Men, that they may look upon them with Attention and Respect, rather than their Apparel. And indeed, Care must be taken not to give it too great a Train of agreeable things, that will only serve to dissipate the Mind, and hinder it from discovering it, lest we should give to something else the Honours that are only due to that: As sometimes happens to Princes, that we see amongst a great Number of Courtiers which are about them, and who partake too much of that Great and Majestic Air as is only fit for Sovereigns.  
But to give a greater Example: I say that Truth must be so manifested by others as it hath manifested itself. All Men, since the Fall of their first Parents, have too weak a Sight to consider Truth in itself, therefore the Sovereign Truth has rendered itself sensible, by taking upon it our Humanity, that it may attract our Thoughts, enlighten us, and make itself amiable in our Eyes. Thus by its Example we may cover With any sensible thing those Truths that we would comprehend ourselves, or teach to others, Co that we may attract the Mind, which loves what is sensible, and which is not easily taken with any thing that does not flatter the Senses. The Eternal Wisdom has made itself Sensible, but not Resplendent: It is become sensible, not to make us acquiesce in sensible things, but to raise us to intelligible things: It became sensible to condemn and sacrifice in its own Person all sensible things; we ought therefore in our Pursuit after the Truth, to make use of such sensible things as dazzle not too much, or stop us at the Sensible Part: But such as can only maintain the Presence of our Minds in the Contemplation of Truths purely intelligible: Such sensible things we must make use of, as we can dissipate, annihilate, or sacrifice with Pleasure, as soon as we shall have discovered those Truths for which we made use of it. The Eternal Wisdom has presented ●t self externally in a sensible manner to us, not to de●ain us abroad, but to recall us into ourselves, and ●hat according to the inward Man, we might consider tt after an intelligible manner.  
Thus in an Enquiry after Truth, we ought to make use of such sensible things as may not stop us at their external Brightness; but cause us to enter within ourselves, make us attentive, and unite us to the eternal Truth, which alone presides over the Mind, and can instruct it in any Subject whatsoever.   

CHAP. IU. Of the use that may be made of the Imagination, to preserve the Attention of the Mind, and of the Advantage of Geometry.  
GReat Circumspection must be used in the Choice and Use of such Helps as may be drawn from our Passions and Senses to render us attentive to Truth: Because our Passions and Senses too livelily affect us, and after such a manner fill the Capacity of the Mind, that we often see only our own Sensations when we think we have discovered the things themselves that we sought for; but it is not the same with those Advantages that may be drawn from the Imagination. They make the Mind become attentive without fruitlessly dividing its Capacity, and so wonderfully assist us to perceive Objects clearly and distinctly, that 'tis, for the most part, beneficial to make use of them. But we shall make this plain by some Instances.  
We know that a Body is moved by two or many different Causes, towards two or many different Places; that these Forces impel it equally or unequally, that they increase or diminish continually, according to such a continued Proportion. And it may be demanded what is the Line this Body ought to move in, the Place it must be in such a Moment, what its Swiftness when arrived to such a Place, and other things of the like Nature?   diagram representing the connections between imagination, thought and the body 
From the Point A, where suppose it to be when this Body gins to move, draw the indefinite Lines A B, A C, which make the Angle B A C, is they cut each other: for A B and A C are direct, and cut not each other, when the Motions they express are directly opposite. After this manner is distinctly represented to the Imagination, or if you will, to the Senses, the Way that this Body would follow, if there was only one of these forces which pushed it towards one of these Sides C or B.  
2. If the Force which moves this Body towards B, is equal to that which moves it towards C; we must divide the Lines A B and A C into the Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, and I, TWO, III, IV, equally distant from A. If the Force which moves it towards B is double to that which moves it towards C, then take the Parts in A B double to those that are in A C. If this Force is subduple, they must be taken subduple: If three times greater or less, they must be taken proportionably. The Division of these Lines further express to the Imagination, the Magnitude of the different Powers which move these Bodies, and in the same Time the Space they shall cause the Body to run through.  
3. Through these Divisions draw Parallels upon A B, and A C, to have the Lines, 1 X, 2 X, 3 X, etc. equal to A I, A TWO, A III, etc. and I X, TWO X, III X, equal to A 1, A 2, A 3. which express the Spaces that these Forces are capable of causing this Body to run through, and through the Intersection of these Parallels, draw the Line A X Y E, which represents to the Imagination, first, the true Magnitude of the compound Motion of this Body, that in the same time we conceive to be pushed towards B, and towards C, by two different Forces, according to such or such a Proportion. Secondly, the Way it ought to keep: In fine, every Place where it must be in such a determined Time, so that this Line serves, not only to maintain the Presence of the Mind in the Enquiry after all Truths that we would discover concerning the Question proposed: But even represents the Resolution after a very sensible and convincing manner.  

See the first Figures.  First, This Line A X Y E, expresses the true Magnitude of the compound Motion; for we see sensibly, if the Forces that produce it, can each make this Body advance a Foot in a Minute, its compound Motion shall be two Foot in a Minute, if the compounding Motions perfectly agree. For in this case it suffices to add A B to A C; and if these Motions do not entirely agree, the compounded A C shall be greater than one of the compounding A B or A C, by the Line Y E. But if these Motions are opposite in any thing, the compounded will be less than either of the compounding by the Line Y E, and if they are entirely opposite, it will be nothing at all.  
Secondly, This Line A X Y E represents to the Imagination the Way that this Body ought to follow; and sensibly shows, according to what Proportion it advances more on one Side than another. It is evident also that all the compounded Motions are right, when each of the compounding is always the same, although they be unequal amongst themselves, or else when the compounding are equal amongst themselves, altho' they are not always the same. In fine, it is visible that the Lines which describe these Motions, are Curves, when the compounding are unequal amongst themselves, and are not always the same.  
This Line further represents to the Imagination all the Places where this Body, pushed by two different Forces to two different Places, will be found: So that we may precisely mark the Point this Body must be in at what Instant of Time we please. For instance, If we would know where it would be in the Beginning of the fourth Minute: We only need divide the Lines A B or A C, into such Parts as express the Space that these known Forces will each of them be capable of making this Body run through in a Minute, and take off three of these Parts in some one of these Lines, and afterwards by the Beginning of the fourth; draw 3 X, parallel to A B or III X parallel to A C. For it is evident that the Point X, which one or other of these Parallels determine in the Line A X Y E, marks the Place where this Body will be in the Beginning of the third Minute of its Motion. Thus this Method of examining Questions does not only maintain the Presence of the Mind, but even shows it the Resolution thereof, and gives it a sufficient Light to discover things unknown, by the Help of a very few of those that are known.  
It is sufficient, for Instance, after what has been said that we only know that a Body which was in the Point A, in such a Time, will be in E, in another Time; and that the different Forces push it by Lines, which make a given Angle, as B A C; to discover the Line of its compounded Motion, and the different Degrees of the Velocities of simple Motions, provided we now these Motions to be uniform or equal amongst themselves. For when we have two Points of a right Line, we have the whole; and we may compare the right Line A E, or the compounded Motion which is known with the Lines A B and A C, viz. the simple Motions which are unknown.   diagram representing the fall of a stone 
C, by an unequal Motion, like to that which we commonly believe Bodies weigh in their Tendency towards the Centre of the Earth; that is, that the Spaces run through, are amongst themselves, as the Squares of the Times taken up in running through them: The Line which it will describe will always be a Parabola; and we may determine with the greatest Exactness where the Point will be in such a Moment of its Motoin.  
For if in the first Moment this Body falls two Foot from A to C, in the second six, in the third ten, in the fourth fourteen, and be pushed by an uniform Motion from A to B, which is sixteen Foot long, it is plain that the Line which it will describe will be a Parabola, whose Perameter will be eight Foot long. For the Square of the Ordinates' to the Diameter, which mark the Times and regular Motion of A to B, will be equal to a Rect-angle of the Perameter into the Lines which mark the unequal and accelerated Motion; and the Squares of the Ordinates', that is, the Squares of the Times will be amongst themselves, as the Parts of the Diameter comprehended between the Vertex and Ordinates': 16.64 ∷ 2.8, 64: 14 4 ∷ 8: 18, etc. It is sufficient to consider the sixth Figure to be Persuaded of this. For the Semicircles show that A 2, is to A 4, that is, to the Ordinate 2 X, which is equal to it, as 2 X is to A B. That A 18 is to A 12, that is, to the Ordinate 18 X, as 18 X, is to A 8, etc. so also the Rectangles A 2 into A B, and A 18 into A 8; are equal to the Squares of 2 X, and 18 X, etc. And consequently these Squares are between themselves, as these Rectangles are.  
The Parallels upon A B and A C, which intersect one another in the Points X. X. X. likewise very sensibly discover the Way that this Body must keep; and mark the Places it ought to be in at such a Time. In fine, they represent to the Eyes in a determined Time, both the true Magnitude of the compounded Motion, and of its Acceleration.  
Suppose again that a Body is moved unequally from A to C, as well as from A to B: If the Inequality is alike both in the Beginning and all along, viz. if the Inequality of its Motion towards C is like to that towards B, or if it increases in the same Proportion, the Line that it describes will be right.  
But if we suppose that there is some Inequality in the Increase or Diminution of simple Motions; although we suppose this Inequality what we please, it will be always easy to find the Line, which represents the compounded Motion of these simple Motions to the Imagination; in expressing these Motions by Lines, and drawing Parallels to these Lines which shall intersect them. For the Line that shall pass through all the Intersections of these Parallels, will represent the compounded Motion of these unequal Motions, and which are unequally accelerated or diminished.  
For instance, if we suppose a Body be moved, by two equal or unequal Forces whatever, that one of these Motions continually increases or diminishes, according to any Geometric or Arithmetic Progression: And likewise that the other Motion increases or diminishes according to any Arithmetic or Geometric Progression, to find the Points by which the Line must pass that represents the Motion compounded of these two Motions both to the Eyes and Imagination.   diagram representing actual and imagined motion 
As we have before intimated, we must first draw the two Lines A B and A C, to express the two simple Motions, and divide these Lines according to the Computation of the Acceleration of these Motions. If we suppose the Motion expressed by the Line A B, in, creases or diminishes according to this Arithmetic Progression, ∺ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, it must be divided in the Points marked, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5: And if we suppose the Motion expressed by the Line A C, increases according to this continued Geometric Progression, ∺ 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, or diminishes according to this, 4, 2, 1, ½, ¼, ⅛, we must, afterwards, by these Divisions, draw Parallels to A B and A C, and the Line A E, which must express the compounded Motion that is sought, shall necessarily pass through all the Points where these Parallels intersect, and so we discover the Way that this Body, once put in Motion, aught to keep.  
If we would know exactly how long this Body hath begun to be moved, when it is arrived to such a Point: The Parallels drawn from this Point upon A B or A C, will mark it, for the Divisions of A B and A C mark the Time; so if we would know the Point where this Body will be in such a Time, the Parallels drawn from the Divisions of the Lines A B and A C, which represent this Time, by their Intersection mark the Point which is sought, A. For the Distance of the Place from whence it began to move, it will always be easily known by drawing a Line from this Point A: For the Length of this Line will be known, by the Proportion it has to A B or to A C, which are known. But for the Length of the Way that this Body will have run through before it arrives to this Point, will be difficult to be known, because the Line of its Motion, A E, being a Curve, we cannot compare it to any of these right Lines.  
But if we would determine the infinite Points by which this Body must pass, that is exactly, and by a continued Motion describe the Line A E, we must make a Pair of Compass, the Motion of whose legs should be regulated according to the Conditions expressed in the Computation we have already made, which is often very difficult to invent, impossible to excute, and unuseful enough to discover the Relations that things have amongst themselves. Since commonly we have not need of all the Points whereof this Line is composed, but only of some of them which serve to guide the Imagination when it considers such Motions.  
These Examples will be sufficient to show, That we may express by Lines, and so represent to our Imaginations the greatest Part of our Ideas; and that Geomertry which shows us how to make all the Comparisons that are necessary in order to knowing the Proportion betwixt Lines, is of a much more extensive Use than is commonly thought. For in fine, Astronomy, Music, Mechanics, and in general all Sciences which treat of Objects that are capable of more and less, and which consequently we may look upon as extended, that is, all exact Sciences have Relation to Geometry: Because all Speculative Truths consisting only in the Relation of things, and in the Relation that is found between their Relations, they may all relate to Lines. We may draw from hence many Geometrical Consequences, and these Consequences being made sensible by Lines which represent them, it is almost impossible to deceive ourselves, and we may carry on Sciences very far with much Ease.  
For instance, the Means be which we discover very distinctly, and precisely mark, in Music, an Eighth, a Fifth, a Fourth, is that Sounds may be expressed by Cords, exactly divided; and we know that a String which sounds an Eighth is in double Proportion to another by which an Eighth is made; that the Fifth is in sesquialter Proportion, or as 3 to 2, and so of the rest. For the Ear only, cannot judge of Sounds with that Preciseness and Justness which is necessary to a Science. The most skilful Practitinoners, who have the most delicate and fine Ear, have not been hitherto sufficiently able to discover the Difference there is between certain Sounds; and they falsely persuade themselves there is none, because they judge of thing only by the Sensations they have of them. Some cannot distinguish any Difference between an Octave and three Ditons; and some even think that the greater Tone is not different from the less; so that a Comma which constitutes the Difference is to them insensible, and much more a Schisma, which is but half a Comma.  
It is only Reason therefore which manifestly shows that the Space of the Line which makes the Difference betwixt certain Sounds, being divisible into many Parts, there may also be a great Number of different Sounds, which would be useful in Music, that the Ear cannot discern; from whence it is plain that without Arithmetic and Geometry, regular and exact Music, would be unknown to us, and we could not accomplish any thing in this Science, but by chance and Imagination; and so Music would no longer be a Science founded upon indisputable Demonstrations, although Airs that are composed by the Strength of the Imagination, are more fine and agreeable to the Senses, than those that are composed by Rules.  
So in Mechanics, the Gravity of some Weights, and the Distance of the Centre of Gravity of these Weights from the Fulciment being capable of more or less, may be expressed by Lines, so that we may very advantageously make use of Geometry to discover and demonstrate an infinite Number of new Inventions, that are very useful to Life, and also very agreeable to the Mind, because of the Evidence which accompanies them.  
If for instance, we have a Weight given of six Pound, that we would put in Equilibrio with one of three Pound only; and that this Weight of six Pound be suspended on the Beam of a Balance, two Feet distant from the Fulciment, only knowing the general Principle of all Mechanics: That the Weights to continue in Equilibrio, must be in Reciprocal Proportion to their Distance from the Fulciment: That is, one Weight must be to the other Weight as the Distance which is between the last Weight from the Fulciment, is to the Distance between the first from the same Fulciment; it will be easily found by Geometry, what the Distance of the Weight of three Pound ought to be, so that both may be brought into Equilibrio; in finding a fourth stance between the first from the same Fulciment; it will be easily found by Geometry, what the Distance of the Weight of three Pound ought to be, so that both may be brought into Equilibrio; in finding a fourth proportional Line, according to the twelfth Propotition of the sixth Book of Euclid, which will be of four Foot. Thus only knowing the Fundamental Principle of Mechanics, we may clearly discover all the Truths that depend upon it, by applying Geometry to Mechanics; that is, by expressing by Lines all things that are to be considered in Mechanics.  
Geometrical Lines and Figures than are most proper to represent to the Imagination the Relation that is between Magnitudes, or between things which differ as to more or less, as Spaces, Times, Weights, etc. as well because they are very simple Objects, as because they are imagined with great Facility. We may even say further to the Advantage of Geometry, that Lines can represent to the Imagination more things than the Mind can receive: Since Lines can express the Relation of incommensurable Magnitudes, that is, of Magnitudes whose Relations we cannot know, because they have no common Measure by which can compare them. But this Advantage is not very considerable in an Enquiry after Truth, since these sensible Representations of incommensurable Magnitudes discover nothing to the Mind.  
Geometry is then very useful to render the Mind attentive to such things whose Relations we would discover: But it must be confessed that it is sometimes an Occasion of Error, because we so very much apply ourselves to evident and agreeable Demonstrations which this Science furnisheth us with, that we do not sufficiently consider Nature. 'Tis chief for this Reason, that all Machine's that have been invented, have not been perfected: That all Musical Compositions wherein the Proportions of Consonancy's are the best observed, are not the most agreeable; and that the most exact Computations in Astronomy do not always best foretell the Greatness and Duration of Eclipses. Nature is not abstracted: Levers and Mechanical Wheels are not Mathematical Lines and Circles: The Taste of Musical Airs is not always the same in all Men, nor even in the same Men at different Times. They change according to the different Motions of the Spirits, so that there is nothing more uncertain. As for what respects Astronomy, there is no perfect Regularity in the Course of the Planets: Moving in these great Spaces they are disorderly hurried by the fluid Matter which encompasses them: So that the Errors we are subject to in Astronomy, Mechanics, Music, and in all the Sciences to which we apply Geometry, Proceeds not from Geometry, which is an indisputable Science, but from the false Application we make of it.  
We suppose, for instance, that the Planets, by their Motions, describe Circles and Elipses perfectly regular, which though it is not true, yet 'tis necessary to reason from it, for the Error misses but very little of truth; but we ought always to remember, that the Principle upon which we reason is but a Supposition: So in Mechanics we suppose that Wheels and Levers are perfectly hard, and like Mathematical Lines and Circles, without Gravity and Attrition, or rather we do not sufficiently consider their Gravity, Attrition, Matter, or the Relation that these things have amongst themselves, that Hardness or Magnitude increases Gravity; that Gravity increases Attrition, and Attrition diminishes the Machine. Thus, what is often accomplished in a small Portion of Matter, is seldom ever affected in a greater.  
It is no Wonder then if we deceive ourselves, when we would reason upon Principles that are not exactly known: Nor can we conclude Geometry to be unuseful, because it delivers us not from all our Errors. Suppositions established, make us argue consequently; rendering ourselves attentive to what we consider, make us know it evidently. We even by that means discover when our Suppositions are false; for being always certain that our Reasonings are true, and Experience agreeing not with them, we discover that our Principles are false. But without Geometry and Arithmetic we can discover nothing exactly, if there is never so little Difficulty in it, although we have certain and indisputable Principles.  
Therefore we ought to look upon Geometry as a kind of universal Science, which enlarges the Mind, makes it attentive, and gives it the Art of regulating the Imagination, and from whence may be drawn all the Helps that it can receive: For by the Assistance of Geometry the Mind regulates the Motion of the Imagination; and the Imagination thus regulated maintains the Presence and Application of the Mind.  
But that we may make a good use of Geometry, we must observe that all things which fall under the Imagination, cannot be imagined with an equal Facility; for all Images do not equally fill the Capacity of the Mind. It is more difficult to imagine a solid than a plane, and a plane than a simple Line; for there is more Thought in the clear View of a solid, than in that of a Plane or Line. It is so likewise with different Lines, more Thought is requisite, that is, a greater Capacity of Mind, to represent a Parabolic, Eliptical, or some other Line more compounded, than to represent the Circumference of a Circle; and more for the Circumference of a Circle, than for a right Line; because 'tis more difficult to imagine Lines which are described by very compounded Motions, and which have many Relations, than those which are described by the most simple Motions, or which have fewer Relations. For Relations cannot be clearly perceived without the Attention of the Mind to many things, and so much the more Thought is required to perceive them, as they are in greater Number. There are some Figures so compounded that the Mind has not Extension enough to imagine them distinctly; but there is also some others that the Mind very easily imagines.  
Of the three kinds of right lined Angles; the acute, the right, and obtuse; it is only the right that raises a very distinct and fixed Idea in the Mind. There is an infinite Number of acute Angles which differ amongst themselves; it is the same also with the obtuse. So that when we imagine an acute or an obtuse Angle, we imagine nothing exact or distinct; but when we imagine a right Angle we cannot deceive ourselves; the Idea is very distinct, and even the Image that we form of it in the Brain is commonly exact enough.  
It is true, we may also determine the general Idea of an acute Angle, by a particular Idea of an Angle of thirty Degrees; and the Idea of an Angle of thirty Degrees, is as exact as that of an Angle of Ninety, or of a right Angle. But the Image that we form of it in the Brain, would not be near so Just as that of a right Angle. We are not accustomed to represent this Image to ourselves, and we can trace it only by thinking upon a Circle, or such a determined Portion of a Circle divided into equal parts. But to imagine a right Angle, it is not necessary to think on this Division of the Circle, the Idea only of a Perpendicular is sufficient for the Imagination to trace the Image of this Angle; and we find no difficulty to represent Perpendiculars, because we are accustomed to see all things stand upright.  
It is therefore very easy to judge, that to have a simple, distinct and well-determined Object proper to be easily conceived, and consequently to make the Mind attentive, and preserve evidence in the Truths it inquires after, we must compare all Magnitudes, as we consider them, to simple Surfaces determined by Lines and right Angles, as perfect Squares and other right-lined Figures, or else to simple right Lines; for these are the Figures whose Nature we know.  
We do not pretend that all Subjects, whose Knowledge we may inquire into, can be expressed by Lines and Geometrical Figures. There are many that cannot, nay that ought not to be subjected to this Rule: For instance, The Knowledge we have of a God infinitely Powerful, infinitely Just, upon whom all things depend in all respects, who wills that all his Creatures should execute his orders to make themselves capable of Happiness. This Knowledge. I say, is the Principle of all Morality; and from hence may be drawn an infinite number of certain and indisputable Consequences; and yet neither this Principle nor its Consequences can be expressed by Geometrical Figures; neither is it possible to determine or represent by Lines an infinite number of Physical Notions, which may nevertheless evidently discover several Truths to us. Yet is it certain that there are a great many things which may be examined and learned by this Geometrical Method; and that it is always advantageous to use it, because it accustoms the Mind to Attention, by causing it to make a regular use of the Imagination; and that things which are learned by this way, appear more clearly demonstrated, and are more easily remembered than others.  
I might have attributed to the Senses, the Assistance which is drawn from Geometry, but I thought that Geometry did rather belong to the Imagination than to the Senses, although Lines are something sensible: It would be unnecessary here to give he Reasons that I had for it. Since they would only serve to justify the order that I have kept in what I have said, which is not essential. I have neither spoke of Arithmetic nor Algebra, since the Numeral Figures, and Letters of the Alphabet, which are used in these Sciences, are not so useful to increase the Attention as the Capacity of the Mind, as shall be explained in the following Chapter.  
These are the General Helps which may make the Mind more attentive, I know no other, except it be the will of being so; which I do not treat of, because it is supposed that all those who Study, are willing to give Attention to what they Study.  
Nevertheless there are many others which are peculiar to certain persons, as some sort of Drinks, certain Meats, certain Places, and certain Dispositions of Body; with some other helps, of which every one ought to be instructnd by his own Experience. The Condition of our Imagination ought to be observed after Eating; and we must consider what things they are that maintain or dissipate the Attention of the Mind. What more general might be said, is, That the moderate use of such Food as creates many Animal Spirits, is very fit to increase the Attention of th' Mind, and Strength of the Imagination, in those who have them Weak and Languishing.   

CHAP. V Of the Means to increase the Extension and Capacity of the Mind. That Arithmetic and Algebra are absolutely necessary to this end.  
IT ought not immediately to be imagined that we can truly increase the Extension and Capacity of the Mind. The Soul of Man is, if we may so say, a determined Quantity or Portion of Thought, which hath limits that cannot be exceeded: The Soul cannot become more Extensive or Capacious than it is: It is not swelled nor enlarged after the same manner as we see Liquors and Metals are. In fine, It never Perceives more in one time than in another.  
It is true this seems contrary to Experience; for often we think upon many Objects, and as oft but upon one only; and we often say likewise, that we think upon nothing at all. Yet if we consider, that Thought is to the Soul what Extension is to the Body, we shall plainly discover, that as a Body cannot be truly more extended at one time than another, so, if we conceive aright, neither can the Soul think more at one time than another: Whether it perceives many Objects, or but one, or even in the time that we say we think on nothing at all.  
But the reason why we imagine we think more at one time than another, is, because we do not sufficiently distinguish between confused and distinct Perceptions; without doubt there is more Thought required, or the Capacity of Thinking is more fitted, to perceive many things distinctly at once, than to perceive but one only: But there is not more Thought requisite to perceive many things confusedly, than to perceive one distinctly. So there is no more Thought in the Soul when it thinks of many things, than when it thinks of but one; since when it thinks of but one only, it always perceives it much more clearly, than when it applies itself to many.  
For it must be observed, that a pure simple Perception sometimes includes as much Thought, or fills as much the Capacity that the Mind hath of Thinking, as a Judgement, nay even a compounded reasoning: Since Experience teaches us, That a lively, clear and evident Perception but of one thing only, employs and takes up the Mind as much as a compounded Reasoning, or an obscure and confused Perception of several Relations between many things.  
For even as there is as much or more Sensation in the sensible view of an Object that I hold near my Eyes and carefully examine, as in the prospect of a whole Field, that I look upon negligently and without Attention: so that the clearness oh the Sensation that I have of the Object which is near my Eyes, recompenses the Extension of the confused Sensation I have of many things, that I see without Attention in a Field: Thus the Prospect the Mind has of one Object only, is sometimes so lively and distinct, that it includes as much or even more Thought, than a Prospect of the Relations which are between many things.  
It is true at certain times, it seems to us that we think of but one thing, and nevertheless we have some difficulty to comprehend it well; and at other times we comprehend both this thing and many others with great Facility. From thence we imagine that the Soul hath more Extension, or a greater Capability of Thinking at one time than another; but it is plain we deceive ourselves. The Reason why at certain times we have some Difficulty to conceive the most easy things, is not because the Thought of the Soul, or its Capacity of Thinking, is diminished; but because this Capacity is filled either by some lively Sensation of Pain or Pleasure, or by a great number of weak and obscure Sensations, which cause a kind of Vapour, and which for the most part proceeds from a confused Sensation of a great number of Things.  
A piece of Wax is capable of a very distinct Figure, yet it cannot receive two, but than one will confound the other, for it cannot be entirely round and square at the same time; indeed if it received a Million, none of them would be distinct. Now if this piece of Wax was capable of knowing its Figures, it could not know by what Figure it must be determined, if the number of them were too great. It is the same with our Soul, when a great number of Modifications fill its Capacity, it cannot perceive them distinctly, because it sees them not separately; this makes it think it perceives nothing at all. It cannot say that it is sensible Pain, Pleasure, Light, Sound, Taste; it is none of all these, and yet it is all these that it perceives.  
But although we should suppose the Soul not to be subjected to the confused and irregular Motions of the Animal Spirits; or so disengaged from the Body, that its Thoughts should not depend upon whatsoever passed in it; it might then happen that we should more easily comprehend certain things in one time than in another, and yet the Capacity of the Soul be neither diminished nor increased.  
The general Idea of Infinity is inseparable from the Mind, and it wholly takes up its Capacity when it thinks not of some particular thing.  
For when we say we think of nothing, it does not follow that we do not think of this general Idea, but simply that we do not think of any thing in particular.  
Certainly if our Mind was not filled with this Idea, we could not think of all sorts of things as we do; for indeed we cannot think of those things that we have no knowledge of. And if this Idea was no more present to the Mind, when it seems to us that we think of nothing, than when we think of any thing in particular, we should have as much Facility to think of what we would, when we vigorously apply ourselves to any particular Truth, as when we apply ourselves to nothing; which is contrary to Experience. For instance, When we are attentive to any Proposition in Geometry, we cannot so easily think of any thing else, as when we are diverted by no particular Thought: So we think more upon the General and Infinite Being, when we think least on Particular and Finite Being's: Thus we think as much at one time as another.  
We cannot therefore increase the Extension and Capacity of the Mind by swelling it up, if we may so say, and in giving it more Reality than it Naturally has, but only by managing it artificially, which is perfectly done by Arithmetic and Algebra. For these Sciences afford means of abridging our Ideas so methodically, and considering them in such an order, that although the Mind hath little Extension, it is able, by the help of these Sciences, to discover the most compounded Truths, which at first appear incomprehensible. But we must take things in their first Principles, to explain them with the utmost Clearness and Certainty.  
Truth is nothing else but a real Relation of Equality or Inequality: Falsehood is only a Negation of Truth, or a False and Imaginary Relation. Truth is that which Exists, Falshood has no Being; or if you will, it is that which is not: We never deceive ourselves when we see real Relations, since we are not deceived when we see the Truth: We always deceive ourselves, when we judge that we see certain Relations, and these Relations are not: For when we see Falsehood, we see what is not, or rather we see nothing at all. Whosoever sees the Relation of Equality between twice two and four, sees a Truth, because he sees a relation of Equality, which is what he sees it to be. So whosoever sees a relation of Inequality, between twice two and five, sees a Truth, because he sees a relation of Inequality which truly Exists: But if any one judges he sees a relation of Equality between twice two and five he deceives himself, because he sees, or rather thinks he sees a relation of Equality which is not. Truth's are only Relations therefore, and the Knowledge of Truth is the Knowledge of these Relations. But Falsehood is not, and the Knowledge of Falsehood, or a False Knowledge, is the Knowledge of what is not, if we may so speak; for as we cannot know what is not, only in relation to what is, we can discover Error only by comparing it with Truth.  
We may distinguish as many different kinds of Falsehood, as of Truth: And as there are relations of three sorts, viz. of one Idea to another, of an Object to its Idea, or of an Idea to its Object; and lastly, between one Object and another, so there are Truths and Falsities of three sorts: There are some between Ideas, between Things and their Ideas, and between Things only. It is true that twice two is four; it is false that twice two are five: Here is a Truth and a Falsity between Ideas. It is true that there is a Sun; it is false that there is two: Here is a Truth and a Falsehood between Things and their Ideas. It is true also that the Earth is greater than the Moon; and it is false that the Sun is less than the Earth: Here is a Truth and a Falsehood which is only between Things.  
Of these three sorts of Truths, those that are between Ideas are Eternal and Immutable; and because of their Immutability, they are also the Rules and Measures of all other; for all Rules and Measures ought to be unchangeable. And therefore in Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry, we only consider these sorts of Truths, because these general Sciences regulate and include all particular Sciences. All Relations, or Truths which are between created things, or between Ideas and things created, are subject to the Changes that all Creatures are capable of. The Truth's only, which are between our Ideas and the Supreme Being are immutable; as are those that are between Ideas only; because God is no more subject to Change, than the Ideas which he includes.  
The Truths also that are between Ideas, are only those that we endeavour to discover by the Exercise of the Mind; for we generally make use of our Senses to discover others; we prove the Existence of things by our Eyes and Hands, and by them discover the Relations of Equality or Inequality that there is betwixt them. 'Tis the Relations between Ideas only, that the Mind can Discover of itself without the use of the Senses. But there are not only Relations between Ideas, but also between the Relations that are between Ideas, between the Relations of the Relations of Ideas; and in fine, between the aggregate of many Relations, and between the Relations of these Aggregates of Relations, and so on ad infinitum, that is, There are compounded Truths ad infinitum.  
A simple Truth of Geometry, or the Relation of one entire Idea to another, as the Relation of four to two, or to twice two, is called a Geometric or simple Ratio; for the Excess or Defect of an Idea, or to use the common Terms, The Excess or Defect of a Magnitude, is not properly a Ratio, nor are equal Excesses or Defects equal Ratio's: When Ideas or Magnitudes are equal, 'tis a Ratio of Equality; when they are unequal, the Ratio is of Inequality.  
The Relation that is between the Relation of Magnitudes, that is, between their Ratio's, is called a Compounded Ratio, because it is a compounded Relation: As the Relation that is between the Relation of 6 to 4, and of 3 to 2 is a compounded Ratio; and when the compounded Ratio's are equal, this compounded Ratio is called Proportion or double Ratio: The Relation that is between the Relations of 8 to 4, and of 6 to 3, are a Proportion, because these Relations are equal.  
Now it must be observed, that all Relations, or Ratio's, whether Simple or Compounded, are true Magnitudes; and that the Term Magnitude is relative, and necessarily includes some Relation; for there is nothing great of itself, and without Relation to any thing else, except Infinity and Unity. All whole Numbers are as really Relations as fracted Numbers, or Numbers compared to, or divided by others: Although we cannot reflect thereon, because these whole Numbers may be expressed by one Arithmetic Designation: For instance, 4/1 or 8/2 is as real a Relation, as ¼ or 2/8: The Unity to which 4 reates is not expressed, but it is understood, for 4 is a Relation as well as 4/1 or 8/2, since 4 is equal to 4/1 or to 8/2. All Magnitudes then being a Relation, or all Relations a Magnitude, it is evident that all Relations may be expressed by Figures, and represented to the Imagination by Signs.  
Thus all Truth's being only Relations, to discover exactly all Truths as well Simple as Compound, we should know all Relations as well Simple as Compound: There are two sorts of them, as we have already said, Relations of Equality and Inequality: It is plain that all Relations of Equality are alike, and as soon as we know one thing is equal to another known thing, we know exactly the Relation of it. But it is not the same with those of Inequality; we know that a Tower is commonly higher than six feet, and lower than a thousand; and yet we know not its just Magnitude, nor the Relation it has to six Feet.  
To compare things amongst themselves, or rather exactly to measure the Relations of Inequality, we must have an exact measure; we must have a simple and infinitely Intelligible Idea, which may be accommodated to all forts of Subjects. This Measure is Unity; by that it is that we exactly measure all things, and without it is impossible to know any thing exactly. But all Numbers being compounded of Unity, it is self-evident, that without the Ideas of Numbers, and manner of comparing and measuring these Ideas, that is, without Arithmetic, it is impossible to advance to the Knowledge of compounded Truths.  
Ideas, or the Relations between Ideas, in a word, Magnitudes, when they are greater or less than other Magnitudes, cannot be made equal except by More or Less, which is compounded of Unity; so many times repeated as is necessary: So it is only by Addition and Substraction of Unity, and the parts of Unity (when we conceive it divided) that we exactly measure all Magnitudes, and discover all Truths. Now of all the Sciences Arithmetic and Algebra are principally the only ones, which teach us to make these Operations artificially, instructively, and admirably, to manage the Capacity of the Mind; since they furnish it with all the Perfection and Extension it is capable of; because 'tis by them only that we discover all knowable Truths with the greatest Exactness.  
Common Geometry perfects the Imagination more than it does the Mind; and the Truths which we discover by this Science, are not always so evident as Geometers imagine. For instance, They think they have expressed the value of certain Magnitudes, when they have proved them equal in value to certain Lines, as the Hypothenusa's in right Angle Triangles whose Legs are known; or of others which are determined by some of the Conic Sections. But it is plain they deceive themselves, for these Hypothenusa's for instance are themselves unknown: We more exactly know the √ 8 or √ 20, than a Line that we imagine, or describe upon Paper for the Hypothenuse of a right-angled Triangle, whose sides are two, whereof one is two and the other four: We know at least that √ 8 approaches very near to 3, and that √ 20 is about 4 ½; and by certain Rules we can approach Infinitely nearer and nearer to their true Magnitude; and if we cannot arrive to it, 'tis only because the Mind cannot comprehend Infinity: But we have only a very confused Idea of the Magnitude of Hypothenusa's, and we are even obliged to have recourse to √ 8 or √ 20 to express them. Thus Geometric Constructions, which serve to express the values of unknown quantities, are not so useful in regulating the Mind, and discovering the Relations or Truths which we inquire after, as to regulate the Imagination. But as we are much more pleased to make use of our Imagination than our Mind, Studious Persons have commonly more Esteem for Geometry, than for Arithmetic and Algebra.  
To Make it perfectly apprehended, that Arithmetic and Algebra together are the true Logic, which serves to discover things as they are, and to give the Mind all the Extension it is capable of: It ill be sufficient to make some Reflections upon the Rules of these Sciences.  
We have a little before said, that all Truths are only Relations; that the most simple and best known, is that of Equality: That this is the beginning from whence others must be measured, to have an exact Idea of Inequality; that the Measure we are obliged to make use of is Unity; that we must add of subtract it as many times as is necessary, to measure the Excess or Defect of the Inequality of these Magnitudes.  
From thence it is plain that all Operations, which may be of use to discover the Relations of Equality, are only Additions or Subtractions: Additions of Magnitudes to Equal Magnitudes, Additions of Relations to equal Relations, or to place Magnitudes in Proportion: In short, Addition of relations to equal relations, or to put Magnitudes in compounded Proportion.  
To equal 2 to 4, it is only requisite to add 2 to 2, or cut off 2 from 4; or to add unity to 2 and subtract it from 4.  
To make the relation of 8 to 2, equal to the relation of 6 to 3, we must not add 3 to 2, nor subtract 3 from 8; so that the excess of one number to the other may be equal to 3, which is the excess of 6 above 3; that would be only an Addition and equalling simple Magnitudes: We must first see what is the Magnitude of the Ratio of 8 to 2, or which is all one 8/2; and we find by dividing 8 by 2, that the Quote of this Ratio is 4; or that 8/2 is equal to 4; we must also examine what the Magnitude of the Relation of 6 to 3 is, and fin that 'tis equal to 2. Thus we discover that these two Ratio's 8/2 is equal to 4, and 6/3 equal to 2, differ only by 2; so that to equal them, we may either add 6/3 (equal to 2) to 6/3 which makes 12/3 which is a relation equal to 8/2, or else subtract 4/2 equal to 2 from 8/2, and there remains 4/2, which will be a Ratio equal to 6/3; or in fine, add unity to 6/3, and subtract it from 8/2, and we shall have 9/3 and 6/2 which are equal Ratio's, for 9 is to 3 as 6 to 2.  
Lastly, To find the Magnitude of the Inequality between Relations which result the one from a compounded Ratio, or from the relation of the relation of 12 to 3, and of 3 to 1; and the other of the compounded Ratio, or of the relation of the relation of 8 to 2, and of 2 to 1, the same method must be taken. First, The Magnitude of the Ratio of 12 to 3 is designed by 4, or 4 is the Quote of the Ratio of 12 to 3, and 3 is the Quote of that of 3 to 1; and the Quote of the Ratio of the Quotes of 4 and 3 is 4/3. Secondly, The Quote of 8 to 2 is 4, and that of 2 to 1 is 2; and the Quote of the Quotes 4 and 2 is 2. In fine, The Inequality between the relations which result from the relations of the relations, is the difference between 4/2 and 2, viz. 2/3. Therefore 2/3 added to the relation of the Ratio's of 12 to 3, and 3 to 1, or substracted from the relation of the other Ratio's 8 to 2, and 2 to 1, equals these relations of relations, and produces a compounded Proportion. Thus we may make use of Addition and Substraction, to equal both Magnitudes and their relations as well Compound as Simple, and so have an exact Idea of the Magnitude of their Inequality.  
It is true we make use of Multiplications and Divisions as well simple as compounded, but they are only compounded Additions and Subtractions. Multiply 4 by 3, it makes as many Additions of 4 as 3, contains the Additions of unity, or finds a number which has the same relation to 4, as the 3 has to unity: And to divide 12 by 4, is to subtract 4 from 12 as many times as we can; that is, to find a relation to unity equal to that of 12 to 4; for 3 which will be the Quote of it, has the same relation to unity as 12 to 4. The Extractions of square and cubick Roots, etc. are only Divisions, whereby we seek one, two, or three Mean Proportionals.  
It is evident that the Mind of Man is so narrow, his Memory so treacherous, and his Imagination so confined, that without the use of Figures and Writing, and the artificial way we have of using them in Arithmetic, it would be impossible to make such Operations as are necessary to discover the Inequality of Magnitudes and their relations: If we had many numbers to add or to subtract, or which is the same thing, when these Numbers are great, and that we could only add them by parts, we should always forget some of them. There being no Imagination extensive enough to add Fractions together which consist of many places, as , or to subtract the one from the other.  
Multiplications, Divisions and Extractions of Roots in whole numbers are infinitely more perplexing, than pure Additions or Subtractions: Without the help of Arithmetic, the Mind is too confined and too weak to make them; and it is so plain, that it would be unnecessary for me to stop here to prove it.  
Yet Algebra is a thing quite different from Arithmetic: It much less divides the Capacity of the Mind; it abridges our Ideas after the most simple and easy Method that can be conceived: What requires quires much time to be performed in Arithmetic, is done by Algebra in a moment, without perplexing the Mind by changing of Figures, or long Operations. In short, There are many things, that may and are necessary to be known, which yet we cannot have an exact knowledge of by Arithmetic only: But I believe there is nothing useful, and that Men can know exactly, but it may be discovered by Arithmetic and Algebra together. So that these two Sciences are the Foundation of all others, and give us the true way of acquiring all Sciences exactly; because by their assistance we may better manage the Capacity of the Mind.    

PART II. Of Method.  

CHAP. I. Of the Rules that must be observed in the Enquiry after Truth.  
AFter having explained the Method that is proper to render the Mind more attentive and capacious, which is the only Way we have to make it more perfect, that is, more clear and penetrating: It is time to proceed to the Rules that 'tis absolutely necessary to observe, in the Resolution of all Questions. This I shall speak pretty fully to, and endeavour to explain it by many Instances, that its Necessity may the better appear, and how the Mind ought to be accustomed to put it in use; because it is not so difficult or necessary to know, as to practise well.  
Something very extraordinary and surprising must not be expected here, but on the contrary, to have these Rules good, they must be simple, natural, few in Number, very intelligible, and dependant one upon another. In a Word, they ought only to conduct our Minds, and regulate our Attention without dividing it. For Experience sufficiently shows us, that the Logic of Aristotle is of no great use, because it employs the Mind too much, and diverts it from the Attention it ought to give to those Subjects it examines. Let those then, who only love Mysteries, and extraordinary Inventions, for some time quit this Fantastical Humour: And give all the Attention they are capable of, that they may examine whether the Rules that we lay down, are sufficient always to preserve Evidence in the Perceptions of the Mind, and to discover the most hidden Truths. If they do not unjustly prejudice themselves against the Simplicity and Easiness of them, I believe they will acknowledge, from the Use we shall hereafter make of them, that the most clear and simple Principles are the most fruitful, and that extraordinary and difficult things are not always so useful as our vain Curiosity would dictate to us.  
The chief of these Rules is, That we must always preserve Evidence in our Reasonings, to be able to discover the Truth without deceiving ourselves. On this Principle depends this general Rule which regards the Subject of our Studies, viz. That we ought only to reason upon such things as we have a clear Idea of. And by a necessary Consequence, That we must always begin with the most simple and easy things, and continue some Time upon them, before we undertake to inquire into the more compounded and difficult ones.  
The Rules which respect the manner of resolving Questions, depend likewise upon this first Principle; and the first of these Rules is, That we must have a distinct conception of the Condition of the Question that is proposed to be resolved, and have Ideas of these Terms clear enough to be able to compare them, and so to discover the Relations which we inquire after.  
But when we cannot discover the Relations that things have amongst themselves, by immediately comparing them: The second Rule is, One or many intermediate Ideas must be found by the Effort of the Mind, which may serve as a common Measure; whereby to discover the Relations that are between them. It must be inviolably observed, that these Ideas are so much the more clear and distinct, as the Relations we endeavour to discover, are more accurate and in greater Number.  
But when Questions are difficult, and of long Discussion, the third Rule is, That we must carefully separate from the Sbject that we would consider, all things that are not necessary to be examined to discover the Truth we seek: For we must not fruitlessly divide the Capacity of the Mind: All its Power ought to be employed in such things only as can illuminate it. Things that may be thus separated, are all those that do not concern the Question, and which being taken away, the Question remains entire.  
The Question being thus reduced to its least Terms, the fourth Rule is; To divide the Subject of our Meditation into Parts, and consider them one after another, according to their Natural Order, beginning with the most simple, viz. those that include the fewest Relations, and never to pass to the most compounded, before we have distinctly discovered the most simple, and made them familiar to us.  
When these things are become easy to us, by Meditation; the fifth Rule is, To abridge our Ideas, and afterwards dispose them in our Imagination, or write them upon Paper, that by that means they may no longer fill the Capacity of the Mind. Although this Rule is always useful, it is not absolutely necessary, except in the most difficult Questions, which require a great Capacity of Mind, because we enlarge the Mind only by abridging our Ideas. The Use of this Rule, and of those which follow, cannot be discovered by any other Method than Algebra  
The Ideas of all things which are absolutely necessary to be considered, being clear, familiar, short, and put in order by the Imagination, or expressed upon Paper: The sixth Rule is, They must all be compared according to the Rules of Combination, Alternately one with the other, either by a simple View of the Mind, or by the Motion of the Imagination, accompanied with this Prospect of the Mind, or else by the Calculation of the Pen joined to the Attention of the Mind and Imagination.  
If of all the Relations which result from all these Comparisons, there should not be found that which we seek: We must, anew, separate from all these Relations, those that are not useful in the Resolving the Question, and make the rest easy, short, and dispose in the Imagination, or express them upon Paper, Compare them together according to the Rules of Combinations, and examine whether the compounded Relation that we seek, is any one of all those compounded Relations which result from these new Comparisons.  
If none of these Relations which we have discovered include the Resolution of the Question: Then all these Relations must be thrown by as useless, and we must make others familiar, etc. And in continuing after this manner, we shall discover the true Relation that we seek how compounded soever it be; provided we can sufficiently extend the Capacity of the Mind, by abridging its Ideas, and through all these Operations bear in Mind the Term we look for, 'tis a continual View of the Question that must regulate all the Advances of the Mind, since 'tis necessary to know what we inquire after.  
Above all, we must take care that we do not rest satisfied with any false Appearance or Probability, but so often begin the Comparisons we make use of to discover the Truth till we cannot refrain our assent to it, without perceiving the secret Reproaches of the Master, who answers to our Request. I mean our Endeavours, the Application of our Mind, and our Desires; and then this Truth may serve us for an infallible Principle to advance us in the Sciences.  
All these Rules that we have given, are not generally necessary in all Sorts of Questions; for when Questions are very easy, the first Rule is sufficient; and in many we need only the first and second. In a Word, since we must make use of these Rules, until we have discovered the Truth that we seek, it is necessary to practise them so much the more as the Questions are more difficult.  
These Rules are not very numerous. They depend all upon one another. They are natural, and may be rendered so familiar, that it will not be necessary to think much upon them when we have Occasion to use them. In short, they can so regulate the Attention of the Mind as not to divided it, which is a great Part of what we desire. But they appear, so inconsiderable of themselves that to recommend them, it is necessary to show that Philosophers are fallen into a great many Errors and Extravagances, because they have not so much as observed the two first which are the easiest and chiefest; and that 'tis also by the Use that Mr. Descartes has made of them, that he has discovered so many great and beneficial Truths in his Works.   

CHAP. II. Of the general Rule which concerns the Subject of our Studies. That the Philosophers have not observed it, which has caused many Errors in Physics.  
THE first of these Rules, and that which concers the Subject of our Studies, teaches us that we ought only to reason upon clear Ideas; from whence this Consequence may be drawn, that to preserve a good Order in our Studies, we must begin with things that are most simple, and easy to be apprehended, and continue a great while upon them before we undertake the Disquisition of the most compound and difficult.  
Every one will agree about the Necessity of this general Rule, for 'tis plain enough, that to reason upon obscure Ideas, and uncertain Principles, is to walk in the Dark; but it may be wondered at, if I said 'tis obobserved but very seldom, and that most of the Sciences which are still the Subject of the Pride of some falsely learned Men, are only grounded upon either too confused or too general Ideas, to be useful in the Disquisition of Truth.  
Aristotle, who justly deserves the Title of the Prince of these Philosophers, which I speak of, because he is the Father of that Philosophy which they cultivate with so much Care, seldom reasons but upon confused Ideas which are received by the Senses, and upon some other general and indeterminate Ideas, which represent nothing that is particular to the Mind; for the Terms common to this Philosopher, can only serve confusedly to express to the Senses and Imagination, the imperfect Sensations we have of sensible things, or to make Men speak after so general and indeterminate a Manner that they express nothing distinctly. Almost all his Works, but especially his eight Books of Physics, of which there are as different Commentators, as there are Professors in Philosophy, are nothing but a mere Logic, there are long Discourses in it, without any thing at the Bottom: 'Tis not that he is prolix, but because he has the Secret of being concise, and of affording nothing but Words: He does not make such a frequent Use of his general Terms in his other Works, but those he uses only serve to stir up the confused Ideas of the Senses; 'Tis by those Ideas that he pretends, in his Problems and elsewhere, in two Words, to resolve an infinite Number of Questions, of which a Demonstration may be given, that 'tis impossible to resolve them.  
But that my Meaning may the better be comprehended, what I have proved elsewhere must be remembered, viz, That all Terms which only stir up sensible Ideas are equivocal, but what is to be considered is, they are equivocal through Error and Ignorance; and consequently cause an infinite Number of Errors.  
The Word Ram is equivocal; it signifies both an Animal and a Constellation, in which the Sun enters at the Spring; but it is rare that we are deceived by it. For he must be a mighty ginger who should imagine any Relation between these two things: And believe, for instance, that we are apt to vomit at that Time, if we take Medicines, because the Ram chews the Cud. But for the Terms of sensible Ideas, there is hardly any body who discovers that they are equivocal. Aristotle, and the ancient Philosophers, have not so much as thought of it, as will easily be granted, if we read any thing of their Works, and distinctly know the Cause why these Terms are equivocal. For there is nothing more evident, than that the Philosophers have received the contrary to what ought to be believed upon this Subject.  
For instance, when they say Fire is hot, Grass green, Sugar sweet, etc. they think with Children and the Vulgar, that the Fire contains what they feel when they Warm themselves; that Herbs have the same Colours upon them, as they believe they see; and that Sugar includes the Sweetness in it that we taste in eating; and so of all things which we see or feel. It is impossible to doubt of this if we read their Writings: They speak of sensible Qualities as of Sensations: They take Heat for Motion, and thus because of the Equivocation of Terms, they confound the Modifications of Bodies with the Modifications of Spirits.  
'Tis only since Descartes, that these confused and indetermined Questions, whether Fire is hot, Herbs green, Sugar sweet, etc. have been answered by distinguishing the Equivocations of sensible Terms which express them. If by Heat, Colour, Taste, you mean such or such a Motion of insensible Parts; Fire is hot, Herbs green, Sugar sweet, etc. But if by Heat and the other Qualities, you mean, what I feel near the Fire, what I see when I look upon Herbs, etc. Fire is not hot, nor Herbs green, etc. for the Heat that we feel, and Colours which we see, are only in the Soul, as I have proved in the first Part of this Book. Now, as Men think what they feel, is the same thing as what is really in the Object: They think they have a Right to judge of the Qualities of Objects, by the Sensations they have of them. So they speak not two Words without saying something false, nor ever speak any thing upon this matter which is not obscure and confused; as many following Reasons will evince.  
The first, because all Men have not the same Sensations, nor one Man at different Times, or when he feels the same Objects by different Parts of his Body. What seems sweet to this Man, is bitter to another; what is cold to this, the same is hot to another; what seems hot to one that is cold, seems cold to the same Person when he has warmed himself, or if he feels it in different Parts of his Body. If Water seems hot to one Hand, it often seems cold to the other, or to some Part near the Heat, if washed therewith. Salt seems savoury to the Tongue, and sharp to a Wound, Sugar seems sweet to the Mouth, and Aloes extremely bitter, but nothing is either sweet or bitter to the rest of the of the Senses. So that when we say such a thing is cold, sweet, bitter, it determines nothing certainly.  
The second, because different Objects may produce the same Sensation. Plaster, Bread, Snow, Sugar, Salt, etc. produce the same Sensation of Colour: Yet their Whiteness is different, if we judge otherwise of them than by the Senses. So when we say Flower is white, we say nothing distinctly.  
The third, because the Qualities of Bodies, which cause in us Sensations perfectly different, are almost the same; and on the contrary, those of which we have almost the same Sensations, are often very different. There is scarcely any Difference in the Qualities of Sweetness and Bitterness that is in Objects, and yet the Sensations of them are essentially different. The Motions which cause Pain or Titilation, differ only as to the more or less; and yet the Sensations of Titilation and Pain are essentially different. On the contrary, the Sharpness of Fruit differs not so much from Bitterness as Sweetness does, and yet this Quality is the most distant from Bitterness that can be. Since it is requisite that a Fruit which is sharp, because it is too green, must receive a great Number of Changes before it grows bitter for being too much ripe or rotten. When Fruits are too ripe, they seem sweet, and when they are a little too ripe they seem Bitter: Bitterness and Sweetness in Fruits differ then only as to the more or less; and that is the reason that some Persons think them sweet, when others think them bitter. For some there are who think Aloes as sweet as Honey. It is the same with all Sensible Ideas. The Terms of sweet, bitter, salt, sharp, sour, etc. of red, green, yellow, etc. of such and such Smells, Tastes, Colours, etc. are therefore all equivocal, and stir up no clear and distinct Idea in the Mind: Yet School Philosophers, and the vulgar, judge of all the Sensible Qualities of bodies, only by the Sensations they receive from them.  
These Philosophers, not only judge of Sensible Qualities, by the Sensations they receive of them; but of things by a Consequence of the Judgements they have made concerning Sensible Qualities. For what Sensations they have essentially different from certain Qualities, they believe is owing to a Generation of new Forms which produce these Imaginary Differences of Qualities, Corn appears yellow, hard, etc. Flower white, soft, etc. And from thence they conclude from the Relation of their Eyes and Hands, that these are Bodies essentially different, not considering of the manner whereby Corn is changed into Flower; yet Flower is only Corn broken and ground; as Fire is only Wood divided and agitated; and Ashes, the grossest Part of the Wood, separated without Agitation; and Glass only Ashes whereof each Part is polished, and made a little round by the Attrition caused by Fire; and so of other Transmutations of Bodies.  
It is then evident, that Sensible Terms and Ideas are wholly useless for a just proposing, and clear resolving of Questions, or the Discovery of Truth. Yet is there no Question, however perplexed by the Equivocal Terms of the Senses, but Aristotle, and the greatest Part of the Philosophers, pretend in their Books, to resolve it without these Distinctions that we have given; not considering they are Equivocal through Ignorance and Error.  
For instance, if we demand of those who have passed their whole Lives in reading the ancient Philosophers or Physicians, and who have entirely espoused their Sentiments; whether Water is moist, Fire dry, Wine hot, the Blood of Fishes cold, if Water is more crude than Wine, Gold more perfect than Quicksilver, whether Plants and Beasts have Souls, and a thousand other undetermined Questions? They will easily answer, without consulting any thing but the Impression these Objects have made upon their Senses, or what their Memories have retained of their reading. They do not perceive that these Terms are equivocal. They think it strange that they must define them, and are impatient if we endeavour to discover to them, that they go a little too fast, and that their Senses are deceived. They'll make Distinctions enough to confound the most evident things, and in these Questions where 'tis necessary to remove the Equivocation, they see nothing to distinguish.  
If we consider that the greatest Part of the Questions of Philosophers and Physicians include some equivocal Terms like those we have spoken of, we cannot doubt but that these learned Men, who have not been able to define them, have delivered nothing Solid in all the great Volumes they have composed; and what I have said may suffice to overthrow almost all the Opinions of the Ancients. But for Descartes, he perfectly knew how to distinguish these things. He resolved no Question by Sensible Ideas; and if we take the Pains to read him, we shall see he explained every thing after a more clear and evident Manner, and almost always demonstrated them only by the distinct Ideas of Extension, Figure, and Motion.  
The other kind of equivocal Terms which Philosophers make use of, comprehend all these general Terms of Logic, by which it is easy to explain things without having any Knowledge of them. Aristotle has made the most use of them, all his Books are full of them, and some are a mere Logic. He proposes and resolves all things by these Specious Words, Genus, Species, Power, Nature, Form, Faculty, Quality, Causa per se, Causa per accidens: His Followers have had no small Trouble to apprehend the meaning of these Words which signify nothing at all, nor are they more learned than before, when they have heard say that Fire dissolves Metals, because it has a Faculty of dissolving them; and that a Man digests not because he has a weak Stomach, or that his Faculty of Concocting does not perform its Functions well.  
It is true, those who have made use of these Terms, and general Ideas, to explain all things by, do not commonly fall into so great a Number of Errors, as those who only make use of them to stir up the confused Ideas of the Senses. The Philosophers of the Schools are, not so subject to Error as certain] Dogmatical decisive Physicians, who form Systems upon some Experiments, which they know not the reason of; because they speak so generally that they run no great Hazzard.  
The Fire warms, dries, hardens, and softens, because it has such Faculties as produce these Effects: Senna purges by its Purgative Quality, Bread nourishes by its Nutritive Quality: These Proportions are not subject to Error, for a Quality is that which denotes a thing by such a Name; and we cannot deny it to Aristotle, for indeed this Definition is indisputable. Such, or the like manner of speaking are not false, but only in Effect they signify nothing. These indetermined Ideas engage us not in Error, but they are wholly useless in the Discovery of Truth.  
For although we know there is a substantial Form in Fire, accompanied with a thousand Faculties, like to those of heating, dilating, melting Gold, Silver, and all Metals; of clearing, burning, and baking: If this Difficulty be proposed to me to be resolved, viz. whether Fire can harden Dirt and soften Wax? The Ideas of Substantial Form, and of those Faculties that produce Heat, Ratification, Fluidity, etc. would be of no use to me in resolving the Question; for there being no Connexion between the Ideas, of the Hardness of Dirt, and Softness of Wax, and those of the Substantial Form of Fire, and the Qualities of producing Rarification, Fluidity, etc. It is the same with all general Ideas, so they are wholly useless for the Ends designed.  
But if we know that Fire is nothing else but the Parts of Wood put into continal Motion, and that 'tis only by this Agitation, that it excites the Sensation of Heat in us: If we knew at the same Time that the Softness of Dirt consists only in a Mixture of Earth and Water, as these Ideas are not confused and general, but distinct and particular: It would not be difficult to see that the Heat of Fire must harden Dirt, because one Body can move another, being itself in Motion. We likewise easily discover, that since Heat, which is felt near the Fire, is caused by the Motion of the invisible Parts of the Wood, which, strike against the Hands, if we expose Dirt to the Heat of the Fire, the Watery Parts, which are joined to the Earth, being more lose, and consequently, sooner agitated by the Shock of the little Bodies which go out from the Fire, than the gross Particles of the Earth; they must separate and leave it dry and hard. It would also evidently appear, that Fire cannot harden Wax, if we knew that the Particles which compose it, are branched and very near of the same Bigness. Thus particular Ideas are very useful in an Enquiry after Truth: And indeterminate. Ideas are hot only useless, but on the contrary, insensibly lead us into Error.  
These Philosophers content not themselves with making use of general Terms, and indetermined Ideas that answer nothing: But they will have those Terms signify certain particular Being's. They pretend that there is some Substance distinct from Matter, which is the Form of Matter, and an infinite Company of little Being's really distinct from Matter and Form; of which they suppose as many of them as they have different Sensations of Bodies, and they think these Bodies produce different Effects.  
Yet it is plain to any Man that is capable of Attention, that all these little Being's, distinct from Fire; for instance, and which we suppose to be contained therein, for the Production of Heat, Light, Hardness, Fluidity, &c, are only Fictions of the Imagination, which are contrary to Reason: For Reason hath no particular Idea which represents these little Being's. If we ask the Philosophers, what Sort of Entity that Faculty in the Fire is which gives Light, they will only answer that 'tis a Being which is the Cause why Fire is capable of producing Light: So that the Idea they have of the Faculty of Light, is not different from the general Idea of the Cause, and confused Idea of the Effect which we see. They have therefore no clear Idea of what they say, when they admit these particular Being's. Thus they say what they conceive not, and what indeed is impossible to be conceived.   

CHAP. III. Of the most dangerous Error in Philosophy. Of the Ancients.  
Philosopher's have not only spoke what they did not conceive, when they explained the Effects of Nature, by certain Being's which they have no particular Idea of, but even establish a Principle from whence may directly be drawn most false and dangerous Consequences.  
For if, according to their Opinion, we suppose, that in Bodies there are some Being's distinct from Matter; and not having any distinct Idea of these Entities, we might easily imagine, that they are the true, or principal Causes of the Effects which we see produced. 'Tis even the common Sentiment of most Philosophers: For 'tis chief to explain these Effects, that they make use of Substantial Forms, Real Qualities, and other the like Entities. But when we come to consider attentively, the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting, we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine: For the Idea of a Sovereign Power, is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity; and the Idea of a Subordinate Power, is the Idea of an inferior; but a true Divinity at least, according to the Opinion of the Heathens, if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause. We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us, when we admit Forms, Faculties, Qualities, Virtues, and real Being's, capable of producing certain Effects, by the Power of their own Nature: And thus, they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens, by the Respect they have for their Philosophy. Faith indeed works it, but it may perhaps be said, that if we are Christians in our Hearts, we are Heathens in our Minds.  
Moreover, it is difficult to persuade ourselves, that we ought neither to love or fear, true Powers and Being's, who can act upon us, punish us with Pain, or recompense us with Pleasure. And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration, 'tis also difficult to persuade ourselves that we ought not to adore them. For whatever can act upon us, as a real and true Cause, is necessarily above us, according to St. Austin and right Reason: The same Father, and the same Reason tells us, 'tis an immutable Law that Inferior things should submit to superior. And from hence, 
Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto, nifi intention facientis: Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror, sed facere de illo & in illo, tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae. l. 6. mus. c. 5.  * this great Father concludes, that the Body cannot act upon the Soul, and that nothing can be above the Soul but God.  
In the Holy Scriptures, when God proves to the Israelites, that they ought to adore him, that is, that they ought to fear and love him, the chief Reasons he brings, are taken from his Power, to recompense and punish them. He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him, the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them, and that he has still the same Power. He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens, because they have no Power over them, and can do them neither Good nor Hurt. He requires them to honour him only, because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil, and that there happens none in their City, according to the Prophet, which he has not done; for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us. 'Tis God alone that acts in them, and 'tis he only that we must fear and love: Soli Deo Honour & Gloria.  
In short, this Opinion, that we ought to fear and love, whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil, appears so natural and just, that it is impossible to destroy it; so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers (which we endeavour here to confute) that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel: Reason seems to justify a Religion like to that of the Heathens, and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners.  
It is true, that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onions and Leeks, as the Sovereign Divinity; because they cannot make us entirely happy when we have of them, or entirely unhappy when we want them. Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter, upon whom all their Divinities depend, or as to the Sun, which our Senses represent to us, as the universal Cause, which gives Life and Motion to all things, and, which we cannot hinder ourselves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity; if with the Heathen Philosophers, we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce, not only in our Bodies and Minds, but likewise in all Being's which encompass us.  
But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onions, yet we may always render them some particular Adoration: I mean, we may think of and love them in some manner; if it is true, that in some sort they can make us happy, we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us. And certainly, Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses, think that Pulse is capable of doing them good; for else the Israelites, for instance, would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect, nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them, if they did not, in some manner, look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them. These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in, when it is joined to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy, and follows the Impressons of the Senses.  
That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosophy, and the Certainty of our Principles, and Clearness of the Ideas we make use of: It is necessary, clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy, and to prove, in short, that there is only one true Cause, because there is only one true God: That Nature, or the Power of every thing, proceeds only from the Will of God: That all Natural things are not true Causes, but only occasional ones; and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these.  
It is evident that all Bodies, both great and small, have no power of removing themselves: A Mountain, an House, a Stone, a grain of Sand; and in short, the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive, have no power of removing themselves. We have only two sorts of Ideas, that of Bodies, and that of Spirits; whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Ideas. Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies, shows us that they cannot move themselves, it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only. But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds, we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be: On the contrary, we see that there is none, nor can be any; whence we ought to conclude, if we will argue according to our Knowledge, that as no body can be able to move itself, so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever.  
But when we think of the Idea of God, viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect, and consequently Almighty, we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will, and the Motion of all Bodies, that 'tis impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body, that should not be moved: We must then say, that his Will only can move Bodies, if we will speak things as we conceive them, and not as we feel them. The moving force of Bodies therefore, is not in the Bodies which move, since this power of Motion is nothing else but the Will of God. Thus Bodies have no Action, and when a Bowl which is moved, by meeting it moves another, yet it communicates nothing of its own; for in itself it hath not the Impression that it communicates to the other: Yet a Bowl is the Natural Cause of the motion which it communicates. A Natural Cause than is not a real and true Cause, but only an occasional one, and which determined the Author of Nature to act after such and such a manner, in such and such an Occurrence.  
It is certain, that 'tis by the Motion of visible or invisible. Bodies that all things are produced: For Experience teaches us, that Bodies, whose parts are in greatest Motion, always act more than others, and produce the greatest Change in the World. All the Powers of Nature than proceed from the Will of God: He has created the World because he willed it: Dixit & facta sunt: He moves all things, and so produces all the Effects that we see happen; because he has also willed certain Laws, according to which Bodies communicate their Motions in their Rencounter; and because these Laws are Efficacious they act, and Bodies cannot act. There is therefore no Force, Power, or true Cause, in the Material and Sensible World, nor must we admit of Forms, Facilities, and real Qualities, to produce Effects that Bodies cannot; and to divide, with God, the Force and Power which is Essential to him. Not only Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing, the most noble Spirits also are under a like Impotence. They can know nothing it God does not enlighten them; nor can they have any Sensation if he does not modify them. They are capable of willing nothing if God moves them not towards him. I confess they can determine the Impression that God gives them towards him, to other Objects; but I know not whether that can called a Power. If the Capability of Sinning is a Power, it would be a Power which the Almighty has not. St. Austin says in some of his Works, It Men had in themselves the Power of loving Good, we might say they had some Power: But can only Love, because God Wills they should Love, and because his Will is Efficacious. They Love only, because God continually inclines them to Good in General; that is, towards himself: For God has created them only for himself, he never preserves them without turning them towards and inclining them to himself. They have no Motion towards Good in general, 'tis God who moves them; they only follow by an entire free Choice, this Impression according to the Law of God, or determine it towards a false Good after the Law of the Flesh: They can only be determined by a Prospect of Good: For being able to do only what God makes them, they can love nothing but Good.  
But if we should suppose what is true in one Sense, that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truth and loving Good, if their Thoughts and Wills produced nothing External, we might always say they were able to do nothing. Now it appears most certain to me, that the Will of Spirits is not capable of moving the least Body in the World: For 'tis evident there is no necessary Connexion between the Will we have of moving our Arms, and the Motion of them. It is true, they are moved when we please, and by that means we are the Natural Cause of their Motion: But Natural Causes are not true Causes, they are only Occasional ones, which act merely through the Power and Efficacy of God, as I have already explained.  
For how can we move our Arms? To move them we must have Animal Spirits, and convey them by certain Nerves, into such and such Muscles to swell and contract them. For by this means the Arms move; or according to the Opinion of some, we know not yet how 'tis performed: And we see, that Men who do not so much as know they have Spirits, Nerves, and Muscles to move their Arms, yet move them with as much Art and Facility, as those that understand Anatomy best. 'Tis then granted, that Men Will the Motion of their Arms, but 'tis only God that can and knows how to remove them. If a Man cannot throw down a Tower, at least he knows well what must be done in order to it: But there is no Man that knows so much, as what he must do to move one of his Fingers by the help of his Animal Spirits. How then can Men move their Arms? These things appear evident to me, and to all those that will think of them, though perhaps they may be incomprehensible to such as will not consider them.  
But Men only are not the True Causes of the Motions produced in their Bodies, it seems even a Contradiction that they should be so. A True Cause is such an one as the Mind perceives a necessary Connexion between it and its Effect; 'tis that I mean. Now there is only the Infinitely Perfect Being, whose Mind can perceive a necessary Connexion between his Will and the Effects of it. 'Tis only God then, who is the True Cause, and who has really the Power of moving Bodies. I say moreover, 'tis not probable that God should communicate, either to Men or Angels, this Power he has of moving Bodies; and those who pretend the Power we have of moving our Arms is a true Power, must confess that God can also give to Spirits the Power of creating, annihilating, and performing all possible things: In a word, That he can make them Almighty, as I shall further show.  
God has no need of any Instrument to act, it is sufficient if he Wills a thing for it to be, because it is a Contradiction to suppose he Wills it, and that it should not be. His Power then is his Will, and the communicating of his Power is a Communication of his Will. But to communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel, can signify nothing else but Willing; some body, for instance, should be effectively moved when 'tis Willed by a Man or an Angel. Now in this case I see two Wills which concur when an Angel would move a Body, that of God, and that of the Angel; and to know which of the two will be the true Cause of the Motion of this Body, we must know which it is that is Efficacious. There is a necessary Connexion between the Will of God, and what he Wills. God Wills in this case, that a Body should move when it is willed by an Angel: There is a necessary Connexion therefore, between the. Will of God and the Motion of this Body; and consequently 'tis God who is the true cause of the Motion of the Body, and the Will of the Angel only an occasional one.  
But to show it yet more clearly, let us suppose that God Wills it should happen quite contrary to what some Spirits desire; as we may think of Devils, or some other Spirits, who merit this Punishment; we cannot say in this case, that God communicates his Power to them, since they can do nothing that they would do. Yet the Wills of these Spirits would be the Natural Causes of whatever Effects should be produced; as such Bodies should be moved to the Right Hand, because these Spirits would have them moved to the Left; and the desire of these Spirits would determine the Will of God to act, as our Wills to move the parts of our Bodies, determine the first Cause to move them: So that the Wills of Spirits are only occasional Causes.  
Yet if after all these Reasons, we will still maintain, that the Will of an Angel, which moves any body, should be a true Cause, and not an occasional one; it is plain that this same Angel might be the true Cause of the Creation and Annihilation of all things: For God could as well communicate to him his Prower of Creating and Destroying Bodies, as that of moving them, if he willed that things should be created and annihilated: In a word, If he willed that all things should happen as the Angel wishes them, even as he Wills Bodies should move, as the Angel pleases. If it be said, that an Angel or a Man would be the true movers, because God moves Bodies when they wish it; it may also be said, that a Man and an Angel may be true Creators, since God can create Being's when they will it: Nay, perhaps it might be said, that the moult Vile Animals, or Matter of itself, should be the effective Cause of the Creation of any Substance; if we supposed as the Philosophers do, that God produces substantial Forms whenever the Disposition of Matter requires it. In fine, Because God has resolved from all Eternity in certain times to create such or such things, we might also say, that these times should be the Causes of the Creation of these Being's, as reasonably as to pretend, that a Bowl which meets another, is the true cause of the motion it communicates to it: Because God has determined by his general Will, which constituted the Order of Nature, that when two Bodies should meet there should be such and such a Communication of Motion.  
There is then but one only true God, and he the one only true Cause: And we must not imagine, that which precedes an Effect, to be the true Cause of it. God cannot even communicate his Power to the Creatures, if we follow the Light of Reason; he cannot make them true Causes, because he cannot make them Gods. Bodies, Spirits, pure Intelligences, can all do nothing. 'Tis he who hath made these Spirits that illuminates and acts them. 'Tis he who has created the Heavens and the Earth, which regulates the Motions thereof. In short, 'tis the Author of our Being that executes our Wills, semel jussit, semper paret. He even moves our Arms when we make use of them against his Orders, for he complains by his Prophets▪ that we make him serve our unjust and criminal Desires.  
All these little Heathen Divinities, and all these particular Causes of the Philosophers, are only Chimaeras that the wicked Spirit endeavours to establish to ruin the Worship of the true God. It is not the Philosophy they have received from Adam, which teaches these things; 'tis that they have received from the Serpent; for since the Fall, the Mind of Man is perfectly Heathenish. 'Tis this Philosophy which joined to the Errors of the Senses, has made them adore the Sun, and which is fall at this Day, the universal Cause of the Irregularity of the Mind, and Corruption of the Heart of Man. By their Actions, and sometimes by their Words; why say they, should we not love the Body, since the Body is capable of affording us all Pleasures? And why do we laugh at the Israelites, which regretted the Loss of the Garlic and Onions of Egypt; since, in Effect, they were unhappy, by being deprived of what, in some Measure, could make them happy? But the new Philosophy, which they represent as a dismal thing, to affrighten weak Minds, that is despised and condemned without being understood. The new Philosophy, I say, since they are pleased to call it so, destroys all the Arguments of the Libertines, by the Establishment of the chiefest of its Principles, which perfectly agrees with the 
* Haec est Religio Christiana, fratres mei, quae praedicatur per universum mundum horrentibus inimieis, & ubi vincuntur murmurantibus, ubi praevalent saevientibus, haec est Religie Christiana ut, Colatur unus Deus non Dii, qui facit Animam Beatum nisi unus Deus. Aug. tr. 23. in Joan.  first Principle of the Christian Religion, that we must love and fear but one God, since there is only one God who can make us happy.  
For if Religion teaches us, that there is but one true God, this Philosophy shows us there is but one true Cause. If Religion informs us, that all the Divinities of the Heathens are only Stones and Metals without Life and Motion: This Philosophy discovers to us also, that all second Causes, or all the Divinities of their Philosophy, are only Matter and inefficacious Wills. In short, if Religion teaches us, that we must not bow our Knees to false Gods. This Philosophy also tells us, that our Imaginations and Minds ought not to be prostituted to the Imaginary Greatness and Power of Causes, which are not true Causes: That we must neither love nor fear them, nor busy ourselves about them; but think upon God only, see him, adore him, fear and love him in all things.  
But this agrees not with the Inclination of some Philosophers: They will neither see nor think upon God: For since the Fall, there is a secret Opposition between God and Man: Men take Pleasure in erecting Gods after their own Fancy, they voluntarily love and fear the Fictions of their own Imagination, as they Heathens did the Works of their own Hands. They are like Children who tremble at their Companions, after they have daubed their Faces: Or if they will have a more Noble Comparison, although perhaps it be not so just, they resemble those famous Romans, who had some Fear and Respect for the Fictions of their own Minds, and foolishly adored their Emperors after they had let lose the Eagle when they deified them.   

CHAP. IU. An Explanation of the Second Part of the general Rule. That Philosophers neglect it, but Mr. Descartes has very exactly observed it.  
WE have already showed unto what Errors we are subject, when we reason upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses; and upon the rambling and indeterminate Ideas of pure Logic. We have sufficiently discovered, that to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions, it is absolutely necessary exactly to observe the Rule that we have prescribed, if our Ideas are clear and distinct, and then to reason according to these Ideas.  
In this same general Rule, which respects the Subject of our Studies, there is yet this Circumstance to be well considered: Namely, that we must always begin with the most simple and easy things, and continue a long Time upon them, before we undertake more compounded and difficult ones. For if we must only reason upon distinct Ideas always to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions; it is plain, that we must never proceed to an Enquiry after compounded things, before we have very carefully examined, and made those simple ones, on which they depend, familiar to us. Since the Ideas of compounded things, neither are nor can be clear, when we have only a confused and imperfect Knowledge of the more simple which compose them.  
We know things imperfectly, when we are not assured that we have considered all their Parts: And we have a confused Knowledge of them, when they are not familiar to the Mind, although we are certain we have examined them in all their Parts, When we know them but imperfectly, we only reason upon Probabilities; when we perceive them confusedly, there is neither Order nor Understanding in out Deductions: We often know neither where we are, nor where we go. But when we know them imperfectly and confusedly together, which happens most commonly; we have neither a clear Knowledge of what we inquire after, nor the means of attaining it. So that it's absolutely necessary to keep strictly to this Order in our Studies. To begin always with the most simple things, examine all their Parts, and make them familiar to us, before we pass to the more compounded on which they depend.  
But this Rule agrees not with men's Inclinations, they naturally have a Contempt for whatever appears easy; and their Mind which was not made for a limited Object that may be easily comprehend, cannot stop long in considering these simple Ideas, which have no Character of Infinity for which they are made. On the contrary, and for the same Reason, they have much Respect and Inclination for great things which include something of Infinity, and such things as are obscure and mysterious. 'Tis not because they love Darkness, but 'tis that in this Darkness they hope to find a Good and a Truth capable of satisfying them.  
Vanity also inclines the Mind immediately to employ itself about great and extraordinary things; and gives it a Foolish Hope of accomplishing whatever it undertakes. Experience shows us, That the most exact Knowledge of common things gives no Reputation in the World, and that the Knowledge of such things as are uncommon, how confused and imperfect soever it may be, always gains Esteem and Respect to those, who freely express some high Idea of what they understand not. And this Experience determines all those, who are more sensibly touched with Vanity than Truth (who are certainly in the greatest Number) to make a blind Enquiry after a specious and imaginary Knowledge of whatever is great, rare, and obscure.  
How many Men reject the Philosophy of Descartes, for this pleasant Reason, that his Principles are too simple and easy, There are no obscure and mysterious Terms in this Philosophy: Women, and Persons who know neither Greek nor Latin, are capable of apprehending it: It must therefore be of very small Consequence, and it would not be reasonable for great Genii to apply themselves to it. They imagine Principles so clear and simple, are not extensive enough to explain the Effects of Nature, which they suppose obscure and perplexed. They do not immediately see the Benefit of these Principles, which are too easy and simple to stop their Attention, so long as it is necessary to discover the Use and Extent of them. They rather choose to explain those Effects, whose Causes they do not comprehend, by Principles they conceive not; and which it is absolutely impossible to conceive, than by such as are both simple and intelligible. For these Philosophers explain obscure things, by Principles which are not only obscure, but also entirely incomprehensible.  
When any Persons undertake to explain things extremely perplexed, by clear and known Principles, it is easy to see whether or no they accomplish it, because if we conceive well what they say, we can discover whether or no they speak true. So the falsely Learned would not find their Expectation, nor make themselves admired as they wish to be, if they made use of intelligible Principles; because it would evidently be discovered, that they say nothing. But when they make use of unknown Principles, and speak of very compounded things, as if they exactly knew all their Relations, they are admired, because what they say is not conceived, and we naturally have a Respect for what passes our Understandings.  
Now, as obscure and incomprehensible things seem to be better connected, than such as are clear and intelligible: Incomprehensible Principles are of a greater Use than intelligible ones, in the most compounded Questions. There is nothing so difficult but Philosophers and Physicians give some brief Reason of it from their Principles: For their Principles being yet more incomprehensible, than all the Questions that can be put to them, if they be once taken for granted, there is no Difficulty but will soon be solved.  
For instance, they boldly, and without any Hesitation, answer these obscure and indetermined Questions: Why is it that the Sun attracts. Vapours? That the Jesuits Powder cures the Quartan Fever? That Ruburb purges Choler? Chemical Salt, Phlegm? And other like Questions. And the Generality of Mankind are satisfied with their Answers, because obscure and incomprehensible agrees with both. But unintelligible Principles do not well agree with Questions that are clearly proposed, and easily resolved; because it is evidently discovered, that they signify nothing. These Philosophers cannot, by their Principles, explain, how Horses draw a Chariot; how Dust stops a Watch; how Trepoly cleanses Metals, and a Brush out . For they would make themselves ridiculous to all the World, if they supposed a Notion of Attraction, and attractive Faculties to explain the Reason why Chariots follow the Horses which are fastened to them, and a detersive Faculty in Brushes for cleaning , and so of other Questions. Therefore their great Principles are useless, except in, obscure Questions, because they are incomprehensible.  
We must not therefore stop at any of all these Principles, which we have not an evident and clear Knowledge of, and which we may think some Nations receive not. We must attentively consider the Ideas we have of Extension, Figure, Local Motion, and the Relation these things have amongst themselves. If we conceive these Ideas distinctly, and find them so clear, that we are persuaded, that all Nations have always received them, we must rest here, and examine all their Relations: But if we find them obscure, we must seek after others. For if to reason without Fear of deceiving ourselves, it is always necessary to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions, we must only reason upon clear Ideas, and their Relations distinctly known.  
In order to consider the Properties of Extension, we must with M. Descartes, begin with the most simple Relations; and pass from the more simple to the more compounded; not only because this Method is Natural, and assists the Mind in these Operations, but because God always acts in this Order, and by the most simple Way; this Manner of examining our Ideas, and their Relations, will the better discover his Works to us. And if we consider that the most simple Relations are always those which are first represented to the Imagination, when it is not determined rather to think of one thing than on another: We shall discover, that it will be enough to consider things attentively and without Prejudice, to enter into this Order that we prescribe, and to discover the most compounded Truths, provided we do not run too fast from one Subject to another.  
If then we attentively consider Extension; without much Difficulty we perceive that one Part may be separated from another, we easily conceive Local Motion, and that this Local Motion produces a Figure in both Bodies which are moved. Of all Motions, the most simple, and first, which presents itself to the Imagination, the Motion of a right Line: Let us suppose then, that there is some Part of Extension moved in a right Line, it will necessarily displace some other Portion of Matter which it finds in its Way, and this last shall move Circularly to take the Place that the other leaves, and by that means make a Circular Motion. But if we conceive an infinite Number of Motions in a right Line, in an infinite Number of the like Parts of this immense Extension which we would consider; It is yet necessary, that all these Bodies hinder one another, conspiring all by their mutual Action and Reaction; I mean by the mutual Communication of all their particular Motions, to produce one that is Circular.  
This first Consideration of the most simple Relations of our Ideas, already discover to us, the Necessity of Mr. Descartes Vortices: And their Number will be so much the greater, as the Motions of all the Parts of Extension in a right Line, having been the more contrary one to the other, they shall have had more Difficulty to agree in the same Motion; and that of all these Vortices, those will be the greatest, which have had more Parts conspire to the same Motion, or whose Parts should have had more Power to continue their Motion in a right Line.  
But Care must be taken that the Mind is neither fatigued nor dissipated, by fruitlessly applying it to an infinite Number, and immense Magnitudes of Vortices: We must first apply ourselves some Time upon one of these Vortices, and inquire orderly and attentively into all the Motions of the Matter it includes, and all the Figures wherewith all the Parts of that Matter ought to be endued.  
As there is no simple Motion burr that in a right Line, we must first consider this Motion, as that according to which all Bodies incessantly tend to move in, since God always acts according to the most simple Ways, and that in Effect Bodies are circularly moved, because they find continual Opposition in their direct Motions. So all Bodies, not being of an equal Magnitude, and those which are the greatest, having more Power to continue their Motion in a right Line than others; we easily conceive, that the least Bodies must be near the Centre of the Vortex, and the greatest towards the Circumference: Since the Lines which we conceive to be described by the Motion of Bodies, which are at the Circumference, approach more to a right Line, than those the Bodies describe, which are nearer the Centre.  
If we again think, that each Part of this Matter could not be moved at first, and in its Motion endure a perpetual Opposition, but be made round, and have its Corners broke; we should easily discover, that all this Extension would be only composed of two Sorts of Bodies: Round Balls which incessantly turn upon their Centre, after many different Manners, and which, besides their particular Motion, are also hurried on by the common Motion of thc Vortex; and with a more fluid and more agitated Matter, which is produced by the rubbing of the Balls before mentioned: Besides, the Circular Motion, common to all Parts of the Vortix, this subtle Matter will still have a particular Motion, almost in a right Line from the Centre of the Vortex, to the Circumference, by the Intervals of the Balls which leave it a free Passage: So that the Motion compounded of these Motions, will be in a Spiral Line. This fluid Matter that M. Descartes calls the First Element, being divided into little Parts, which have much less Power to continue their Motion in a right Line, than the Balls or Second Element: It is evident, that the first Element must be in the Centre of the Vortex, and fill the empty Spaces which are between the Parts of the second, and that the Parts of the second must fill the rest of the Vortex, and approach to its Circumference in Proportion to the Magnitude or Power they have to continue their Motion in a right Line. As to the Figure of the whole Vortex, we cannot doubt from what has been said, that the Distance of one Pole to the other, will be shorter than the Lines which go cross the 
* By Equator, I mean the greatest curve Line that the Matter of the Vortex describes.  Equator. And if we consider that the Vortices surrround and compress each other unequally, we shall also clearly see, that their Equator is an irregular curve Line very much like an Elipsis.  
These things Naturally present themselves to the Mind, when we attentively consider what must happen to the Parts of Extension, which continually incline to move in a right Line; that is in the most simple of all Motions. If we would now suppose a thing which seems most worthy the Wisdom and Power of God, viz. That he hath, in an instant, form the Universe in the same Condition that its Parts would in Time, have been disposed in by the most simple Ways, and that he also preserves them by the same Natural Laws: In short, if we would apply our Thoughts to the Objects we see; we might judge the Sun to be the Centre of the Vortex: That the Corporeal Light it diffuses on all sides, is nothing else but the continual Effort of little Globules, which incline to separate themselves from the Centre of the Vortex; and that this Light must be communicated by immense Spaces in an instant, because the whole being full of these Globules one of them cannot be pressed, without the Motion of all the rest that are opposite to it.  
We may still deduce many other Consequences from what I have said: For the most simple Principles are the most proper to explain his Works, who always acts according to the most simple Ways: But we have occasion yet to consider certain things which must happen to Matter. We ought then to think that there is more Vortices like to that we have given a short Description of; that the▪ Centres of these Vortices are Stars, which are as so many Suns: That the Vortices encompass one another, and are disposed after such a manner as to prejudice each others Motion as little as can be: But things have not been able to come to that pass, but the weakest Vortices have been drawn along, and almost swallowed up by the strongest.  
To apprehend which, we need only reflect, that the first Element, which is in the Centre of a Vortix, may, and continually does, get out by the Spaces of the Balls towards the Circumference of the same Vortix, and that at the Time that this Centre or Star empties itself through its Equator, the other first Element must re-enter by its Poles. For neither the Star nor its Poles can be emptied on one side without being filled on the other; since there is no Void in Extension. But because an infinite Number of Causes can hinder much of the first Element, from entering into this Star which we speak of: It is requisite that the Parts of the first Element, which are obliged to remain in it, should be so disposed as to move the same Way. 'Tis that which makes them unite and join one with another, and form Spots, which condense into Crusts, and by little and little cover the Centre, and make a solid and gross Matter, of the most subtle and agitated of all Bodies. 'Tis this gross Matter that Mr. Descartes calls the third Element; and it must be observed, that as it proceeds from the first, whose Figures are infinite, it ought to be invested with an infinite Number of different Forms.  
This Star, thus covered with Spots and Crusts, and become like the other Planets, is no longer able to maintain and defend its Vortex against the continual Effort of those that environ it. This Vortex therefore diminishes by little and little. The Matter which composes it, is dispersed on all sides; and the strongest Vortex about it, draws the greatest Part of it, and at last swallows up the Planet which was the Centre of it. This Planet being encompassed with the Matter of the great Vortex, it swims there to preserve itself with some little Matter of its own Vortex, keeping the Circular Motion it had before: And at last it takes a Situation there, which puts it in Equilibrio with an equal Quantity of Matter in which it swims. If it has but a little Solidity and Magnitude left, it descends very near to the Centre of the Vortex which swallowed it up; because, having some Power to continue its Motion in a right Line, it must place itself in this Vortex, in which an equal Quantity of the second Element, has as much Power as it has to remove itself from the Centre, for it can be in Equilibrio only in this Place. If this Planet is greater or more solid, it will be in Equilibrio with a Place more distant from the Centre of the Vortex. And in short, if in this Vortex there is any Place, or equal Quantity of Matter that has as much Solidity as this Planet, and consequently, as much Power to continue its Motion in a right Line, because this Planet will, perhaps, be very great, and covered with very solid and thick Crusts; it cannot stop in this Vortex, since it cannot be put in Equilibrio with the Matter which composes it. This Planet will pass then into some other Vortex, and if it cannot be in Equilibrio, it will not stay there neither. So that we shall see it sometimes pass like Comets, when they happen to be in our Vortex, and near enough for us to discern them: And we shall not see it again till a long time after, when it is in other Vortices, or in the Extremity of ours.  
If we how think that one Vortix alone, by its Magnitude, Force, and Advantageous Situation, can by little and little undermine, attract, and swallow up many Vortices, and such Vortices which before had swallowed some others; it would be necessary that the Planets which are in the Centres of these Vortices, being entered into the great Vortex which has swallowed them up, should be there put in Equilibrio with an equal Quantity of Matter in which they swim. So that if these Planets are unequal in Solidity, they will be in an unequal Distance from the Centre or the Vortex in which they swim. And if it be found, that two Planets have near the same Power to continue their Motion in a right Line, or that one Planet draws into its little Vortex, one, or many other less Planets, which, according to our Manner of conceiving the Formation of things it has swallowed up, than this little Planet shall turn about the great one while that turns upon its Centre; and all these Planets shall be carried along by the Motion of the great Vortex, in almost an equal Distance from its Centre.  
We are obliged, by the Light of Reason, so to dispose the Parts which compose the World, that we imagine to have been form by the most simple Ways. For all that we have said is grounded only upon the Idea we have of Extension, the Parts of which we suppose to incline to the most simple Motion, which is that of a right Line. And when we examine by the Effects, whether we are not deceived, by endeavouring to explain things by their Causes, we areas much surprised to see the Phenomena of Celestial Bodies so perfectly agree with what we have said: For we see that all the Planets that are in the Middle of a little Vortex, turn upon their own Centre, like the Sun; that they swim all in the Vortex of the Sun, and about the Sun; that the smallest, or least solid, are nearest the Sun; and the more solid are at the greatest Distance from it; and that there is also some amongst them like Comets, which cannot remain in the Vortex of the Sun: In short, there are many Planets, which yet have many little ones that turn about them, as the Moon does about the Earth. Jupiter has four of them, and Saturn three. It may be also, that Saturn has so great a Number of small ones, that they form a continued Circle, which seems to have no Thickness, because of its great Distance. These Planets being the greatest that we see, we may consider them as having been engendered of Vortices large enough to have swallowed up others before they were involved in the Vortices we are in.  
All these Planets turn upon their Centre, the. Earth in Twenty Four Hours, Mars in Twenty Five, or near, Jupiter in Ten Hours, or thereabouts, etc. They turn about the Sun, Mercury, which is the nearest, in about Four Months: Saturn, which is the farthest off, in Thirty Years near; and those which are between both, in more or less Time, but not perfectly in the Proportion of their Distance. For all the Matter in which they swim, turns swifter when it is nearest the Sun, because the Line of its Motion is then shorter. When Mars is opposite to the Sun, he is very near the Earth, and very distant when he is joined to the Sun: It is the same with the Superior Planets, Jupiter and Saturn; as for the Inferiout ones, such as Mercury and Venus, to speak properly, they are never opposite to the Sun. The Lines that all Planets seem to describe about the Earth, are not Circles; but they approach very near to Elipses, and all these Elipses appear very different, because of the different Situation of the Planets, in respect to us: In short, all that we observe in the Heavens, with any Certainty concerning the Motion of the Planets, agrees perfectly well with what we have said of their Formation, according to the most simple Ways.  
As for the fixed Stars, Experience tells us, some of them diminish and entirely disappear, and some of them also there are, which appear anew, whose Brightness and Magnitude much augments. They increase or diminish as the Vortices do, of which they are the Centres, and receive more or less of the first Element. We cease to see them, when they are made up of Spots and Crusts ', and begin again to discover them, when these Spots which hindered their shining, are wholly dissipated. All these Stars keep near the same Distance amongst themselves, since they are the Centres of Vortexes, and are not drawn so much as they resist other Vortexes, or as the Stars are. They all shine like Suns, because like the Sun, they are the Centres of some Vortexes, which are not yet swallowed up. They are all equally distant from the Earth, although they appear to the Eye as fastened to a concave Surface: For if we have not yet compared the Parallax of the nearest, with that of the most distant, by the different Situation of the Earth from six Months to six Months, it is because this Difference of Situation is not great enough to render this Parallax sensible, because of the Distance we are from the Stars. It may be by the means of Telescopes some small matter might be observed. In fine, all that we can discover in the Stars by our Senses, and Experience, is not different from what we have discovered by the Mind, by examining the most Natural Relations which is between the Parts and Motions of Extension.  
If we would examine the Nature of Bodies here below, we must first consider, that whereas the first Element being compounded of an infinite Number of different Figures, the Bodies which have been form out of the Congeries of the Parts of this Element would be manifold. Some of their Parts would be branched, others long, and others round, but irregular in every respect. If their branched Parts are gross enough, they would be hard, but flexible, and inelastick, like Gold: If their Parts are less gross, they would be soft and fluid, like Gums, Fat, or Oils: But if their branched Parts are extremely delicate, they will be like Air. If the long Parts of Bodies are gross and inflexible, they will be sharp, incorruptible, easy to dissolve like Salt: If these same long Parts are flexible, they will be insipid like Water: If they have gross and irregular Parts in every respect, they will be like Earth and Stones. In short, we shall have Bodies of many different Natures, and not two of them that will entirely be alike; because the first Element is capable of an infinite Number of Figures, and all these Figures never combine after the same manner in two different Bodies. Whatever Figures these Bodies have, if they have Pores great enough to permit the second Element to pass through, they will be transparent, like Air, Water, and Glass, etc. whatever Figures these Bodies are endued with, if the first Element entirely surrounds some Parts of them, and agitates them strongly, and swift enough to repulse the second Element on all Sides, they will be Luminous like Flame. If these Body's repulse all the second Element which shocks them, they will be very white; if they receive it without Opposition, they will be very black: In short, if they repulse it by divers Shocks or Vibrations, they will appear of different Colours.  
As to their different Situation, the heaviest that is, those that have the least Power to continue their Motion in a right Line, will be nearest the Centre, as Metals; Earth, Air, Water, will be more distant from it, and all Bodies would keep the Situation we see them in, because they ought to be placed so much the more distant from the Centre of the Earth, as their Motion is greater  
And we must not be surprised, if I now say, that Metals have less tower to continue their Motion in a right tine than the Earth, Water, and other Bodies less solid; although I have before said, that the most solid Bodies have more Power to continue their Motion in a right Line than others. For the Reason why Metals have less Power to continue to move, than the Earth or Stones, is because they have much less Motion: Since it is always true, that two Bodies, unequal in Solidity, being moved with an equal Swiftness, the most solid has the most Power to keep in a right Line, because then the most solid has the most Motion, and 'tis the Motion that gives the Power.  
If, we would know the Reason why near the Centre of the Vortices, gross Bodies are heavy, and yet are light when they are more distant from it; we must consider, that great Bodies receive their Motion from the subtle Matter which environs them, and in which they swim. Now, this subtle Matter actually moves in a Circular Line, and only inclinesto move in a right Line, and communicates this Circular Motion to the gross Bodies which it carries along with it, without communicating to them its Efforts to remove from the Centre by a right Line, only so much as this Effort is followed by the Motion it communicates to them: For we must observe, that the Parts of the subtle Matter, making an Effort towards different Sides, can only compress the gross Bodies they carry along with them: For this Body cannot go to different Sides at the same Time. But because the subtle Matter which is near the Centre of the Vortex, hath much more Motion than it employs in the Circulation, and communicates to the gross Bodies it draws after it, only its Circular Motion, which is common to all its Parts: And if gross Bodies should chance to have more Motion than that which is common to the Vortix, they would soon lose it, by communicating it to the little Bodies they meet: From when it is plain, that gross Bodies, near the Centre of the Vortex, have not so much Motion as the Matter in which they swim; each Part of which is moved after many different Ways, besides their circular or common Motion. Now if gross Bodies have less Motion, they certainly make a weaker Effort to pass into a right Line; and if they make less Efforts, they are obliged to give way to those that make more, and consequently, to approach nearer to the Centre of the Vortex, that is, they are so much the more weighty as they are the more solid.  
But where gross Bodies are far distant from the Centre of the Vortix, the Circular Motion of the subtle Matter is then very great, because it employs almost all its Motion in turning about the Centre of the Vortix; as Bodies have so much the more Motion as they have more Solidity, since they go with the same Swiftness as the subtle Matter they swim in, and have more Power to continue their Motion in a right Line; so that gross Bodies, in a Distance from the Centre of the Vortex, are so much the lighter as they are more solid.  
This agreed, we may consider that the Earth is more Metallick towards the Centre; that it is not very Solid hear its Circumference: That Water and Air must continue in the same Situation we see them in: But that all these Bodies are heavy 
* That is, they are impelled towards the Centre of the Earth. , the Air is heavy as well as Gold and Quicksilver, because they are more Solid and more Gross than the first and second Element. This granted, the Moon being a little too distant from the Centre of the Vortex of the Earth is not heavy although it be solid: That Mercury Venus, the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, cannot fall into the Sun, and that they are not solid enough to go out of this Vortex like Comets, that they are in Equilibrio, with the Matter they swim in, and that if we could shoot a Musket or Cannon-bullet high enough, these two Bodies would become little Planets, or like little Comets which could no longer continue in Vortices, having a complete Solidity.  
I do not pretend to have sufficiently explained whatever I have said, or to have deduced from the Simple Principles of Extension, Figure, and Motion, all that might be inferred; I would only show the manner Descartes has taken to discover Natural things, that we may compare his Ideas and Method with that of other Philosophers. I had here no other design: But I am not afraid to affirm, that if we would cease to admire the Virtue of the Loadstone, the regulated Motions of the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, the Noise of Thunder, and Generation of Meteors, In short, If we would instruct ourselves in the Foundation of Physics, there is no better way to do it, than by Reading and Meditating on his Works; so we can make nothing of it if we follow not his Method, I mean, if we do not, like him, argue from clear Ideas, beginning always with the most Simple.  
'Tis not that this Author is Infallible, nay, I believe myself able to demonstrate that he is mistaken in many places of his Works: But 'tis more Advantageous to those that read him, to believe that he is sometimes deceived, than if they were persuaded whatever he says was true. If we believed him Infallible, we should read him without examining, we should believe what he said without knowing it, we should learn his Sentiments as we do Histories, and should not inform our Minds by it. He himself tells us, that when we read his Works, we ought to inquire if he is not deceived, and must believe nothing he says, except Evidence compels us to it. For he is not like to those falsely Learned Men, who usurp an unjust Dominion over the Minds of others, requiring to be believed upon their word; and who instead of making Men Disciples of Internal Truth, by proposing only clear Ideas to them, endeavour to submit them to the Authority of the Heathens, and by Arguments they understand not, make them receive Opinions they cannot comprehend.  
The chief thing we have to say against Descartes' manner of producing the Sun, Stars, and the Earth, and all Bodies which are about us, is because it appears contrary to what the Holy Scripture tells us of the Creation of the World: And if we believe this Author, it seems that the Universe was formed from itself, such as we see it at this day: To which many Answers may be given.  
First, Those who say Descartes is contrary to Moses, it may be have not so much examined both the Holy Bible and Descartes, as those who have shown by their public Writings, that the Creation of the World perfectly agrees with the Opinions of this Philosopher.  
But the best Answer is, Descartes never pretended things were made just as he described them; for in the first Article of the fourth Part of his Principles, which is, That to find the true Causes of whatever is upon Earth, we must keep the Hypothesis already received, notwithstanding it should be false. He positivesy says the contrary in these Terms.  
Although I require not a Belief, that Bodies which compose this visible World, were ever produced in the same manner I have described them, (as I before intimated) I am nevertheless obligend to keep here the same Hypothesis to explain whatever is upon the Earth; for if I evidently show, as I hope to do, by this means, the most intelligible and certain reasons for whatever we observe in it; and that it cannot he done by any other Method: I may thence reasonably conclude, That although the World was not made after this manner in the Beginning, but immediately created by God, all things that it contains, cease not to be now of the same Nature, as if they had been so produced.  
Descartes knew, that to apprehend things well, they must be considered in their Original: That we must always begin with the most Simple things: That we must not perplex ourselves whether God had form his Works by degrees, or after the most simple ways, or if he had produced them all at once: But however God had made them, to know them well, we must first consider them in their Principles, and only take care of the Consequence, and then see how our Thought might agree with what God hath done. He knew that the Laws of Nature, by which God preserved all his Works in the Order and Situation they now are, are the same Laws as those by which he form and disposed them: For 'tis plain to all that consider things attentively, that if God had made his whole Work all at once, in the same Disposition he has placed it in time; the whole Order of Nature would have been overturned, since the Laws of Preservation would have been contrary to those of Creation. If all the Universe continues in the order we see it, 'tis because the Laws of Motion which preserve it in this order, were capable of producing it. And if God had placed it in a different order from that it was put in by the Laws of Motion, all things would be overturned, and by the Force of those Laws be placed in the same order we see them now.  
If a Man would discover the Nature of a Chicken, he ought every day to open some of the Eggs that the Hen sits on, and examine what grows and moves first: He soon would discover that the Heart gins to beat, and on all sides to force out little Channels of Blood which are Arteries; that this Blood returns to the Heart by Veins, that the Brain also soon appears, and that the Bones are the last parts which are form. By this means he delivers himself from many Errors, and from these Observations draws many Consequences of great use in discovering the Nature of Animals. Who can say any thing against the Conduct of this Man? Can it be said, that he pretends that God made the first Chicken immediately from an Egg, and by giving it a certain degree of Heat caused it to be hatched; because he endeavours to discover the Nature of Chickens in their Formation?  
Why then is Descartes accused of speaking contrary to the Scripture, because intending to examine the Nature of visible things, he examines the Formation of them by the Laws of Motion in all their Occurrences? He never doubted, 
* Art. 45. of the third Part of his Principles.  But the World was in the Beginning created in its utmost Perfection, so that the Sun, the Moon, and Stars, were from the Beginning; and that the Earth had not only in itself the Seeds of Plants, but that even Plants themselves covered a part of it: That Adam and Eve were not created in Infancy, but at perfect Age. The Christian Religion, says he, will have us believe this, and Natural Reason absolutely persuades us of this Truth, because considering the Almighty Power of God, we must judge, that whatever he has made, has its utmost Perfection in it. But as we should much better discover the Nature of Adam, and that of the Trees of Paradise, if we examined how Children were by degrees form, in the Womb, and how Plants sprung up from their Seeds; then if we only considered them as they were after God had created them, so we should better understand what is generally the Nature of all things in the World, if we could imagine some Principles which are very Intelligible and Simple; from which we might clearly see, that the Stars, the Earth, and in short, all the visible World, might have been thus produced as from some Seeds, although we know they were not produced in this manner; than if we describe it only as it is, or as we believe it was created: And because I think I have found such Principles, I will endeavour to explain them.  
M. Descartes thought that God made the World in an instant, but also believed he had created it in the same Order and Disposition of parts as it would have been in, if he had form it by little and little after the most simple way. And this Thought is worthy the Power and Wisdom of God: His Power, since in a Moment he has created all his Works in their greatest Perfection: Of his Wisdom, since by that he has discovered he perfectly foresaw all that would necessarily happen in Matter, if it was acted by the most simple ways: And also because the Order of Nature could not subsist, if the World had been made contrary to the Laws of Motion by which it is preserved.  
It is Ridiculous to say M. Descartes believed the World was formed of itself, since he acknowledges, as all those do who follow the Light of Reason, that no Body can move itself; and that all the immutable Laws of the Communication of Motion, are only the Consequences of the unchangeable Will of God, who continually acts after the same manner. Having proved there is but one God who gives Motion to Matter, and that Motion produces in all Bodies, all the different Forms we see them clothed with, it was sufficient to take away from Libertines all their pretext of drawing any Advantage from his System. On the contrary, If the Atheists made any Reflection upon the Principles of this Philosophy, they would soon find themselves constrained to acknowledge their Errors. For if, like the Heathens, they would affirm, that Matter was uncreated, they could not also, maintain, that it would ever have been able to have moved of itself. So that the Atheists would at least be obliged to confess the true Mover, if they denied the true Creator. But common Philosophy furnishes them with Methods to blind themselves and maintain their Errors; for it tells them of certain impressed Virtues, and moving Faculties. In short, of a certain Nature which is the Principle of Motion in every thing, and although they have no distinct Idea of it, they are very glad, because of the Corruption of their Hearts, to put it in the place of the true God, by concluding it is that which produces all the Wonders we see.   

CHAP. V An Explanation of the Principles of the Aristotelian Philosophy, wherein it appears he never observed the Second Part of the General Rule. With an Examination of his Elementary Qualities.  
THAT we may make some Comparison between the Philosophy of Descartes and Aristotle, it will be proper to give a little Abridgement of what he thought of his Elements, and of the Nature of Bodies in General, which the most Learned believe he has shown in his four Books de Caelo; for his eight Books of Physics belongs rather to Logic, or if you will, to Metaphysics than to Physics, since they are only composed of rambling and general words, which represent nothing distinct and particular to the Mind. These four Books are entitled de Caelo, because the Heavens are the chief amongst the simple Bodies he treats of.  
This Philosopher gins his Work with proving the World is perfect, and this is his Argument for it. All Bodies have three Dimensions, they cannot have more, for according to the Pythagoreans, the number Three comprehends every thing: Now the World is a Collection of all Bodies, therefore the World is perfect: By this pleasant proof we might also demonstrate, that the World cannot be more Imperfect than it is, since it cannot be composed of parts which have less than three Dimensions.  
In the second Chapter he immediately supposes certain Peripatetical Truths: 1. That all Natural Bodies have the power of Motion in themselves, which he neither proves here nor elsewhere. On the contrary, in the first Chapter of his second Book of Physics he affirms, That 'tis Ridiculous to endeavour to prove it: Because, says he, it is self-evident, and 'tis only such as cannot discern what is known of itself, or what is not so, who endeavour to prove that which is evident, by that which is obscure. But we have already shown that 'tis absolutely false, that Natural Bodies have in themselves the power of moving; and that it appears evident only to such Persons, who with Aristotle follow the Impression of their, Senses, and make no use of their Reason.  
He says in the second place, That all Local Motion is made in a right or circular Line, or composed of both: But if he would not consider of what he so boldly advances, he ought at least to open his Eyes, and then he would soon have seen an infinite number of Motions, which are neither compounded of a right nor circular Line. Or rather he should have thought, that the Motions compounded of Motions in a right Line, might have been infinitely different, if we suppose that compounded Motions increase or diminish their Swiftness in an infinite number of different ways, as is evident from what has been said before. There are, says he, only these two simple Motions, the Right, and the Circular, of which all Motions are composed. But he is deceived, the Circular Motion is not Simple we cannot conceive it without thinking of one point to which it relates; and whatever includes a Relation, is Relative and not Simple. It is true, we can conceive the Circular Motion, as produced by two Motions in a right Line, the Swiftness of which are unequal according to a certain Proportion; for a Motion compounded of two others which are made in a right Line, and which diversely increase or diminish their Swiftness, cannot be Simple.  
In the third place he says, all simple Motions are of three sorts, one from the Centre, another to the Centre, and the third about the Centre. But it is false, the last is Simple, as I have already said: 'Tis also false that there is no simple Motions but those that ascend and descend; for all Motions in a right Line are Simple, whether they approach to or remove from the Centre, the Poles, or any other Point. All Bodies, says he, are composed of three Dimensions. Therefore all Bodies ought to have three Simple Motions. What relation is there between these, Simple Motions and Dimensions? Nay more, all Bodies have three Dimensions, but no Bodies three Simple Motions.  
In the fourth place, he supposes that Bodies are either Simple or Compounded; and he says, Simple Bodies are such as have in themselves some Power of Motion, as Fire, Earth, etc. and that the compounded one's receive their Motion from those which compose them. But in this Sense there is no Simple Bodies at all, for there are none which have in themselves any Principle of their Motion. Nor is there any compounded Bodies, since Compounded suppose Simple, which are not; thus we should have no Bodies at all. What Imagination can we have of defining the Simplicity of Bodies by a Power of moving themselves? What distinct Ideas are united to these words of Simple and Compound Bodies, if Simple Bodies are only defined by their relation to an Imaginary Power of moving themselves? But let us examine the Consequences he draws from these Principles. Circular Motion is a Simple Motion: The Heavens move circularly; therefore this Motion is Simple. Now Simple Motion can proceed only from a Simple Body, that is, from a Body which moves by its own Power: Therefore the Heavens are a Simple Body distinct from the four Elements which move by right Lines. It is very evident, that all this arguing contains only false and absurd Propositions. Let us examine his other Proofs, for he brings a great many to prove a thing as useless as it is false.  
His second reason to prove that the Heavens are a Simple Body, distinct from the four Elements, supposes two sorts of Motions, the one Natural, and the other Violent or against Nature. But it is plain enough to all those who judge of things by clear Ideas, That Bodies having not in themselves the Nature or Principle of their Motion, as Aristotle understood, there can be no violent Motion, or such as is contrary to Nature. It is indifferent to all Bodies, whether they are moved or not; moved on one side or moved on the other. But Aristotle who judges of things by the Impression of his Senses, imagines that Bodies which are always placed by the Laws of the Communication of Motion in such or such a Situation in respect to others, are placed there of themselves, because they like it best, and that it is more conformable to their Nature. This is Aristotle's way of arguing.  
The Circular Motion of the Heavens is Natural, or else contrary to Nature: If it is Natural, as we have said, it is a Simple Body distinct from the Elements, since the Elements move not circularly by their Natural Motion. If the Circular Motion is against the Nature of the Heavens, the Heavens would be composed of some one of the Elements, as Fire, or some other thing. But the Heavens cannot be composed of any of the Elements, for, if for instance it was Fire, the natural Motion of Fire being to ascend, the Firmament would have two contrary Motions, the Circular, and the ascending one; which could not be, since a Body cannot have two contrary Motions. If the Firmament was composed of some other Body, which by its Nature did not move circularly, it would have some other Natural Motion which cannot be; for if naturally it ascended, it must be either Fire or Air; if it descended, it would be Earth or Water: Therefore, etc. I shall not stop here, to make particular Remarks of the Absurdity of these Arguments: I only say in general, that what Aristotle here says signifies nothing distinct, and that there is nothing of Truth or Conclusion in it. His third Reason is as follows.  
The first and most perfect of all Simple Motions, must be the Motion of a Simple Body, and even of the first and most perfect of Simple Bodies. But the Circular Motion is the first and most perfect of all Simple Motions, because all Circular Lines are perfect, and no right Line is so. For if it is Finite, we may add something to it; if Infinite, it is not yet perfect, since it has no 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 make the same Equivocation as Finished and End. This Philosopher proves thus that an infinite Line is not perfect, because 'tis not finished.  End, and things are perfect only when they are finished; therefore Circular Motion is the first and most perfect of all Motion: Therefore Bodies which more circularly are Simple, and the first and most Divine of Simple Bodies. His fourth Argument.  
All Motion is either Natural or not so, and all Motion that is Unnatural to one Body, is Natural to some other: We see that Motions that descend and ascend, which are Unnatural to some Bodies, yet are. Natural to others: For Fire descends not Naturally, but the Earth does. Now the Circular Motion is not Natural to any of the four Elements: There must be then a Simple Body to which this Motion is Natural therefore the Heavens which are moved circularly, are a Simple Body differing from the four Elements.  
In fine, The Circular Motion is Natural or Violent in some Body: If it be Natural, it is evident that Body must be the most Simple and Perfect: If it is not Natural, it is very strange that this Motion should continue always, since we see all unnatural Motions endure but a little time. We must therefore, after all these Reasons, believe, that there is some other Body separate from all those which surround us, which is, of a Nature so much the more perfect as it is more distant from us. Here is Aristotle's Reasons; but I defy the most Intelligent of his Interpreters to join distinct Ideas to the Terms which he makes use of; and to prove that this Philosopher began with the most Simple things, before he spoke of the more compounded; which is absolutely necessary to reason well, as I have before proved.  
If I was not afraid of being tiresome, I would yet translate some Chapters of Aristotle. But besides, our taking little Pleasure to read them in our own Tongue (when we clearly understand what he means) I have sufficiently shown by the little I have related, that his Manner of Philosophising, is wholly useless for the Discovery of Truth. For since he says himself, in the Fifth Chapter of this Book, that those that deceive themselves in any thing at first, deceive themselves a Thousand times more if they advance far. It is plain; that if he knew not what he said in the two first Chapters of his Book; we may reasonably believe, that it is not safe to take things upon his Authority, without examining his Reasons. But to be better persuaded of it, I will make it appear, that there is not one Chapter in this Book wherein there is not some Absurdity.  
In the third Chapter he says, the Heavens are incorruptible, and not subject to Alteration, he brings many very foolish Arguments to prove this, because, for Example, there is the Habitation of the Immortal Gods, and because there was never any Change observed in them: This last Reason might be admitted, if Aristotle could have proved that any one had come from thence, or had lived near enough to these celestial Bodies, to make accurate Observations of them. But however, I don't know who would believe such an Authority, since Telescopes do show us the contrary.  
He pretends, in the Fourth Chapter, to prove, that there are no contrary Circular Motions. Yet it is manifest, that the Motion from East to West, is contrary to that from West to East.  
In the Fifth Chapter he improperly proves, that Bodies are not infinite; drawing his Proofs from the Motion of simple Bodies: For What hinders but that there may be above his Primum Mobile, some  Extension?  
In the Sixth he uselessly amuses himself to prove, that the Elements are not infinite. For who can doubt of it, when we suppose with him, that they are included in the Heavens which surrounds them? But he makes himself ridiculous, when he endeavours to prove it by their Weight and Lightness. If the Elements were infinite, says he, they would have an infinite Weight, and an infinite Lightness, which cannot be. Therefore, etc. those that would see his Arguments at large, may read them in his Books: I think it Loss of Time to relate them.  
In the Seventh he continues to prove, that Bodies are not infinite, and his first Proof supposes it necessary for all Bodies to be in Motion; which he does not prove, nor indeed can it be proved.  
He maintains, in the Eighth, that there are not many Worlds of the same Kind, by this pleasant Argument. If there was another Earth, like this we inhabit, the Earth being heavy by Nature, it would fall upon ours, because ours is the Centre to which all heavy Bodies ought to tend. From whence has he learned this, but from his Senses?  
In the Ninth he proves, that 'tis even impossible there should be a Plurality of Worlds; because, if there was any Body above the Heavens, it would be simple or compound, in a Natural or Violent State, which cannot be from the Reasons he has drawn from his three Kind's of Motion, which I have already spoken of.  
He affirms, in the Tenth, that the World is Eternal, because he cannot prove that it had a Beginning, and that it will always endure; since we see whatsoever is created corrupts in Time. This he has likewise learned from his Senses. But who has taught him, that the World shall always endure?  
He employs the Eleventh Chapter in explaining what we mean by incorruptible, as if the Equivocation was much to be feared, and that a great Use ought to be made of its Explanation. Yet, this Term Incorruptible is so clear of itself, that Aristotle does not give himself the Trouble to explain, neither in what Sense it ought to be taken, nor how he understood it himself: It would have been more to the Purpose if he had defined an infinite Number of Terms he makes use of, which stir up only sensible Ideas: For we might then, it may be, have learned something by reading his Works.  
And in the last Chapter of the first Book of the Heavens, he essays to prove, that the World is incorruptible, and will eternally endure, because he cannot prove it had a Beginning. All things, says he, subsist for a finite or infinite Time. But what is infinite only in one Sense, is neither finite nor infinite. Therefore nothing can subsist after this manner.  
This is the way of reasoning, used by the Prince of Philosophers, that Genius of Nature; who in stead of discovering die true Cause of Natural Effects by clear and distinct Ideas, has established a Heathen Philosophy upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses; or upon such as are too general to be of any Use in an Enquiry after Truth.  
I do not here find Fault with Aristotle, because he did not know that God created the World in Time, to make known his Power, and the Dependence of his Creatures; and that he will never destroy it, that we may know also that he is immutable, and never reputes of his Designs. But I believe myself able to confute his weak Proofs of the World's Eternity. Though he sometimes is excusable in the Opinions he maintains; yet he is hardly ever so in the Reasons he brings, when he treats on Subjects which include any Difficulty. We are, it may be, already persuaded of it by what I have said, although I have not related all the Errors I have met with in the Book I have extracted, and I have endeavoured to make him speak more clearly than he was accustomed to do.  
But that we may be fully convinced, that the Genius of Nature hath never discovered either the Secrets or Springs of it: It will be proper for me to show, that the Principles this Philosopher makes use of to explain Natural Effects, have no Reason in them.  
It is plain, that we can discover nothing in Physics, if we begin not with the most simple Bodies, the Elements; For the Elements are the Bodies into which all others resolve, because they are contained in them either actually or 
* I speak according to the Sentiments of the Peripatetics, c. 3. l. 3. de Coelo.  Potentially, so Aristotle defines them. But we cannot find in the Works of Aristotle, that he has, by a distinct Idea, explained these simple Bodies, into which he pretends the others resolve: And consequently, his Elements not being clearly known, it is impossible to discover the Nature of the Bodies which are composed of them.  
This Philosopher says true, that there are four Elements, Fire, Air, Water, and Earth. But he does not clearly know the Nature of them: He gives no distinct Idea of them: Nay, he will not have his Elements to be composed of the Fire, Air, Water, and Earth that we see; for in short, if it were so, we should at least have some Knowledge of them by our Senses. It is true, in many Places of his Works, he endeavours to explain them, by the Qualities of Heat and Cold, Humidity and Dryness, Weight and Lightness. But this manner of Explication is so impertinent and ridiculous, that I cannot conceive how so many learned Men should be satisfied with it. 'Tis what I am going to prove.  
Aristotle, in his Book of the Heavens, pretends that the Earth is the Centre of the World, and that all Bodies, which he pleases to call simple, because he supposes them to move by their own Nature, must be moved by simple Motions. He affirms, that besides the Circular Motion, which he maintains to be simple, and by which he proves, that the Heavens he supposes to move Circularly, are a simple Body, that there is only two which are simple: The one descending, or from the Circumference to the Centre, the other ascending, or from the Centre to the Circumference: That these simple Motions agree with simple Bodies; consequently, that the Earth and Fire are simple Bodies, one of which is absolutely heavy, and the other absolutely light: But because Heaviness and Lightness may meet in one Body, either absolutely, or in part, he concludes, that there are also two Elements or simple Bodies, one of which is heavy in part, and the other light in part, viz. Water and Air. This is the Method he takes, to prove, that there are four Elements, and no more.  
It is evident to such as examine men's Opinions by their own Reason, that all these Propositions are false, or at least, they can never pass for clear and indisputable Principles, of which we have very clear and distinct Ideas, and which may serve for the Foundations of Physics. It is certain, that there is nothing more absurd than an Essay to establish the Number of Elements by Imaginary Qualities of Weight and Lightness: In saying without any Proof, that there are some Bodies which are heavy, others light, through a Principle in their own Nature. For if we may speak without proving what we say, we may affirm, that all Bodies are naturally heavy, and that all endeavour to approach to the Centre of the World, as the Place of their Rest: And we may on the contrary maintain, that all Bodies are Naturally light, and have a Tendency to the Heavens, as the Place of their greatest Perfection: For if we object to him, who says, all Bodies are heavy, that Air and Fire are light, he can only answer, that Fire and Air are not light, but only less weighty than Earth and Water, and that is the Reason they seem light. It is so with these Elements, as if a Piece of Wood, which seems light in Water, not because it is light of itself, since it falls down when it is in the Air, but because the Water, which is more heavy, makes it ascend and bears it up.  
If, on the contrary, we should object to one who would maintain, that all Bodies are Naturally light, that Earth and Water are heavy, he would likewise answer, that these Bodies seem heavy because they are not so light as others which surround them. That Wood, for instance, seems heavy in the Air, not because it is heavy, since it swims when it is in the Water, but because it is not so light as Air.  
It is therefore ridiculous to suppose these Principles indisputable, that Bodies are heavy or light in their own Nature. On the contrary, 'tis plain, that all Bodies have not the Power of Motion in themselves; and that 'tis indifferent to them whether they are moved upward or downward, East or West, North or South, or any other Way we can conceive.  
But if, according to Aristotle, there are four Elements, such as he wishes them to be; Two Naturally heavy, and two Naturally light, viz. Fire, Air, Earth, and Water. What Consequence can we draw from thence, to discover the Knowledge of the Universe? These Four Elements are not such Fire, Air, Water, and Earth as we see, they are quite different; we know them not by our Senses, and still less by Reason, because we have no distinct Idea of them. I mean, we know all Natural Bodies are composed of them, since Aristotle has said it. But the Nature of these compounded Bodies is unknown to us, and we cannot discover them, but by knowing the Four Elements or simple Bodies which compose them, for we know the compound only by the simple.  
Fire, Aristotle says, is Naturally light; the ascending Motion is simple: Therefore Fire is a simple Body, since Motion must be proportioned to what it moves. Natural Bodies are compounded of simple Bodies: Therefore there is Fire in all Natural Bodies. But a Fire which is not like to that we see; for Fire is often only in Power in Bodies which are compounded of it. What is it these Periparetick Discourses teach us? That there is Fire in all Bodies either Actual or Potential; that all Bodies are composed of something which we do not see, and whose Nature we are unacquainted with. We see then that here is very much advanced.  
But if Aristotle does not discover to us the Nature of Fire, and the other Elements of which all Bodies are composed, probably we may imagine he has discovered at least the chief Qualities and Properties of them. We shall further examine what he says thereof.  
He declares to us, there are four principal Qualities which belong to the Sense of feeling, 
l. 2. c. 2, 3. de gen. & corrupu.  Heat, Cold, Moist, and dry, of which all others are composed: In this manner he distributes these first Qualities to the Four Elements. To the Fire he gives Heat and Dryness; to the Air Heat and Moistness; to the Water Coldness and Humidity; and to the Earth Coldness and Dryness. 
Chap. 2.  He affirms Heat and Cold to be active Qualities, and Dryness and Humidity to be passive ones. He thus defines Heat, That what collects things of the same kind: Cold, which assembles all things, either of the same or of a different kind: Moisture, that which is not easily contained in its own Bounds, but in Foreign Limits: and Dryness, that which is easily contained in its own Bounds, and not easily in the Limits of the Bodies that are about it.  
Thus, according to Aristotle, Fire is a hot and dry Element: 'Tis therefore an Element which collects things of the same Nature, which is easily contained within its own Limits, and difficultly in the Limits of Foreign Bodies. The Air is an hot and moist Element, and therefore assembles things of the same kind, and is not easily contained in its own Limits, but in that of others. Water is a cold and moist Element, which gathers things together, both of the same and of a different Nature, which is hot easily contained within its own Bounds, but in that of others. And in fine, the Earth, cold and dry; and therefore collects things of the same and of a different Nature, which is not easily contained in its own Bounds, and very difficultly in that of others.  
Here the Elements are explained according to the Sentiment of Aristotle, or according to the Definitions he has given of their chief Qualities; and because, if we will believe him, the Elements are simple Bodies, whereof all others are compounded; the Knowledge of these Element and their Qualities must be most clear and distinct, since all Physics, or the Knowledge of Sensible Bodies which are composed of them, aught to be deduced from thence.  
Let us see then what is defective in these Principles: First, Aristotle joins no distinct Idea to the Word Quality. We know not whether by Quality he means a real Being distinct from Matter, or only the Modification of Matter: It seems sometimes as if he meant it in one Sense, and sometimes in another. It is true, in the Eighth Chapter of Categories, he defines Quality to be that which causes a thing to have such or such a Name, but that will not satisfy our Demands. Secondly, the Definitions he gives of his four first Qualities, Heat, Cold, Moist, and Dry, are all false or useless. This is his Definition of Heat, Heat is that which assembles things of a like Nature,  
First, we do not see that this Definition perfectly explains the Nature of Heat, although it should be true, that Heat collects all things of the same Nature.  
But secondly, it is false, for Heat does not collect all things of the same Nature. Heat does not assemble the Parts of Water, it rather dissipates them into a Vapour. Nor does it assemble the Particles of Wine, or those of all other Liquors, or fluid Bodies whatever: Nor even, those of Quicksilver. On the contrary, it resolves and separates all solid Bodies, and even Fluids', although of a different Nature. And if there are any whose Parts Fire cannot dissipate, 'tis not because they are of the same Nature, but because some are too gross and too solid to be raised by the Motion of the Parts of Fire.  
In the third place, Heat indeed can neither assemble nor dissipate the Parts of any Body whether Homogeneous or Heterogeneous. For to assemble, to separate, or dissipate the Parts of any Body, it must move them: Now Heat can move nothing; or at least, 'tis not evident that Heat can move Bodies: For although we consider Heat with all the Attention possible, we can only discover that it may communicate to Bodies a Motion which it has not in itself. Yet we see that Fire moves and separates the Parts of Bodies that are exposed to it: It is true, but it may be, it is not from its Heat, for even it is not evident that it has any at all. 'Tis rather by the Action of its Parts, which are visibly in a continual Motion. It is plain, that the Parts of Fire which strike against any Body, must communicate a Part of their Motion to it, whether there is Heat in Fire or not. If the Parts of this Body are but a little solid and gross, the Fire cannot move them, and make them slip one upon another: In short, if they are a Mixture of subtle and gross ones, the Fire can only dissipate those that it can push strong enough to separate entirely from the rest. Thus Fire can only separate them; and if it assembles them, 'tis merely by Accident. But Aristotle pretends quite the contrary. Separation, says he, which some attribute to Fire, is only a resembling of things of the same kind; 
De gen. & corr. l. 2. c. 2.  for 'tis only by Accident that Fire dissipates things of a different kind.  
If Aristotle had at first distinguished the Sentiment of Heat from the Motion of the Particles, whereof the Bodies we call Heat are composed, and had afterwards defined Heat taken for the Motion of the Parts, by saying, Heat is that which agitates and separates the invisible Parts whereof visible Bodies are composed, he would have given a tolerable Definition of Heat. Nevertheless, it would not perfectly have contented us, because it would not precisely have discovered to us the Nature of the Motion of hot Bodies.  
Aristotle defines Coldness, to be that which assembles Bodies of the same, or of a different Nature. This Definition is good for nothing: For 'tis false, that Cold assembles Bodies. To assemble them, it must move them, but if we consult Reason, 'tis evident, Cold can move nothing. In Effect, by Cold he means, either what we feel when we are cold, or that which causes the Sensation of Cold. Now it is plain, that the Sensation of Cold can move nothing, since it can push nothing. What it is that causes Sensation, we cannot doubt when we examine things by our Reason, for 'tis only Rest or a Cessation from Motion. So Cold in Bodies being only a Cessation from this Sort of Motion which accompanies Heat, it is evident that if Heat separates, yet Cold does not. Thus Cold assembles neither things that are of a like or different Nature; for what can push nothing, can assemble nothing: In a Word, as it does nothing, it collects nothing.  
Aristotle, judging of things by the Senses, imagines Cold is also positive as well as Heat, because the Sensations of Heat and Cold are both real and positive: And he also thinks that these two Qualities are active. And indeed, if we follow the Impression of our Senses, we have Reason to believe that Cold is a very active Quality, since cold Water congeals, reassembles, and in a Moment hardens melted Gold or Lead, after a little is poured upon them, although the Heat of these Metals is great enough to separate the Parts of any Body they touch.  
It is evident, by what we have said of the Errors of the Senses in the first Book, that if we rely only upon the Senses, to judge of the Qualities of Sensible Bodies, it is impossible to discover any certain and undoubted Truth, which can serve as a Principle to assist us in the Knowledge of Nature. For by this Method only we cannot discover what things are hot, and what cold. For of many Persons who should touch Water that is lukewarm, some of them would think it hot, and others cold. Those that are of a hot Constitution would think it cold, and those that are of a cold would think it hot. And if we supposed Fish capable of Sensation, 'tis very probable they would think it hot, when all Men think it cold. It is the same with the Air, it seems hot or cold, according to the different Dispositions of the Bodies that are exposed to it. Aristotle pretends 'tis hot, but I believe those that dwell towards the North are of another Mind, since many learned Men, whose Climate is not colder than that of Greece, have maintained it to be cold. But this Question, which has always been considerable in the Schools, has never been sufficiently resolved to affix any distinct Idea to the Word Heat.  
The Definitions Aristotle gives of the Words Heat and Cold, can fix no Idea to them. The Air, for instance, and even Water, though never so hot and scalding, reassembles the Parts of melted Lead, with those of any other Metal whatever. Air collects all Fatness in Gums and other solid Bodies. And one must be a Peripatetic indeed to think of exposing Mastic to the Air, to separate the Ashes from the Pitch, or any other compounded Bodies, to dissolve them again. The Air than is not hot according to the Definition Aristotle gives of Heat. Air separates Liquors from Bodies which are imbibed in it, hardens Dirt, and dries Linen that is extended in it, although Aristotle makes it moist: The Air therefore is hot and drying, according to this same Definition. We cannot then determine the Air to be hot or cold by this Definition. We may affirm, it is hot, in respect to Dirt, since it separates the Water from the Earth that is mixed with it: But must we try all the divers Effects of Air upon all Bodies, to know whether or no there is Heat in the Air we breath. If so, we can never know any thing of it; the shortest Way therefore, is not to Philosophise at all upon the Air we breath in. But upon a certain Pure and Elementary Air which is not to be found here below, and positively affirm with Aristotle, that 'tis hot, without giving any Proof of it, or even without knowing distinctly what we mean, by this Air or by this Heat; For this Way we shall give Principles that will not easily be overthrown, not because of their Evidence and Solidity, but because they are obscure like Phantoms which cannot be hurt, because they have no Substances.  
I shall not here stay upon the Definitions that Aristotle gives of Moisture and Dryness, because it is plain enough that he has not explained the Nature of them. For according to these Definitions, Fire is not dry, since it is not easily contained within its own Bounds, and Ice is not moist since it is contained within its own Bounds, and is not easily accommodated to the Limits of other Bodies. It is true, Ice is not moist, if by moist he means fluid: But if we understand it so, we may say Flame is very hot as well as melted Gold or Lead: It is likewise true, that Ice is not moist, if by moist we mean, that which easily sticks to things that touch it; but in this Sense, Pitch, Fat, and Oil, are much more humid than Water, since they stick more strongly than Water. In the same Sense, Quicksilver is moist, for it sticks to Metals; and even Water is not perfectly moist, for it cleaves not to the Generality of Metals. We must not then recur to the Testimony of the Senses, to defend the Opinions of Aristotle.  
But let us no further Examine the marvellous Definitions that this Philosopher has given us of the four Elementary Qualities; and let us suppose also, that all whatever the Senses tell us of these Qualities is indisputable. Let us further excite our Faith, and believe, that all these Definitions are most just. Let us only see if it be true, that all Qualities of Sensible Bodies are compounded of these Elementary Qualities. Aristotle pretends it, and he ought so to do, since he looks upon these four first Qualities as the Principles of those things he would explain, in his Books of Physics.  
He teaches us then, that Colours are engendered of the Mixture of die four Elementary Qualities; that white is produced when Humidity surmounts Heat, as when Old Men turn Grey: Black, when Humidity is overcome by Dryness, as in the Walls of Cisterns, and all other Colours by the like Mixtures; that Tastes and Smells are also produced by a different Mixture of dry and moist, caused by Heat and Cold: that even Lightness and Heaviness depend upon it. In a Word, according to Aristotle, it is necessary, that all Sensible Qualities should be produced by the two Active Qualities of Heat and Cold, and be compounded of the two Passive, moist and dry, that there may be some probable Connection between his Principles, and the Consequences he draws from them.  
However, it is yet more difficult to persuade ourselves of all these things, than of all those that we have hitherto related of Aristotle. We shall have some Trouble to believe that the Earth, and other Elements would not be coloured or visible, if they were in their Natural Purity, and without any Mixture of Elementary Qualities, although the learned Commentators of this Philosopher, assures us of it. We comprehend not what Aristotle means when he affirms the Whiteness of the Hair to be produced by Humidity, because the Humidity of Old Men is stronger than their Heat; although to endeavour to clear him of the Thought, we put the Definition in the Place of the thing defined: For it seems to be an incomprehensible Piece of Nonsense, to say the Hairs of Old Men turn White, because that which is not easily contained in its own Limits, but in the Limits of other Bodies, surmounts what assembles things of the same Nature. Nor have we less Difficulty to believe, that Taste is well explained, when he says it consists in the Mixture of Dryness, Humidity, and Heat; chief if we put, instead of these Words, the Definitions this Philosopher has given of them, as it would be useful to do, if they were good. And it may be also, that we could not forbear laughing instead of the Definitions of Hunger and Thirst, that Aristotle gives of them by saying, that Hunger is the Desire of Heat and Dry, and Thirst the Desire of Cold and Moist, we should substitute the Definition of these Words, calling Hunger, The Desire of what assembles things of the same Nature, and of what is easily kept within its own Limits, and difficultly in the Limits of others; and define Thirst, the Desire of what assembles things of the same, and of different Natures, and of what cannot be easily contained in its own Limits, but easily in the Limits of others.  
Certainly 'tis a very useful Rule to discover, if we have defined Terms well, and not to deceive ourselves in our Reasonings, only often to put the Definition in the Place of the thing defined: For by that means we know whether the Terms are equivocal, and the Measures of the Relation false and imperfect: Or if we reason consequently. This being granted, what can we say of the Arguments of Aristotle, which become an impertinent and ridiculous Piece of Nonsense, when we make use of this Rule? And what must we say likewise of all those that reason only upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses, since this Rule which preserves Light and Evidence in all just and solid Arguments, only breeds Confusion in their Discourses.  
It is not possible to expose the Fantasticalness and Extravagances of the Explanations that Aristotle gives of all sorts of Matters, when the Subjects he treats of are simple and easy, his Errors are simple, and very easily discovered, but when he pretends to explain compounded things, and such as depend upon many Causes, his Errors are at least as compounded as the Subjects he treats on, and it is impossible to take them in Pieces so as to discover them all to others.  
This great Genius, which they pretend, has done so well in his Rules for Definitions, did not so much as know what things were necessary to be defined: Because, putting no Distinction between a clear and distinct knowledge, and a Sensible one, he imagined he was able to know and explain things to others, which he had no distinct Idea of himself. Definitions must explain both the Nature of Things, and the Terms which compose them, and stir up in the Mind, distinct and clear Ideas of them. But 'tis impossible, after this manner, to define the Sensible Qualities of Heat, Cold, Colour, Taste, etc. when we confound the Cause with the Effect, and the Motion of Bodies, with the Sensation which accompanies it, because Sensations being Modifications of the Soul, which we know not by clear Ideas, but only by an inward Sensation, as I have explained in the third Book, it is impossible to affix Words to Ideas we have not.  
As we have clear and distinct Ideas of a Circle, a Square, a Triangle, and so distinctly know the Nature of them, we may give good Definitions thereof: We can even deduce the Ideas we have of these Figures, all their Properties, and explain them to others, by Terms to which these Ideas are affixed; but we cannot define either Heat or Cold, being only Sensible Qualities, for we know them neither distinctly nor by Idea, but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation.  
Nor must we define Heat, which is external, by any Effects: For if we substitute in its Place, the Definition that we shall give it, we shall soon see that this Definition will only deceive us.  
If for instance, we define Heat to be what assembles things of the same kind, without saying any thing more; we may, in following this Definition, take such things for Heat, as have no Relation to it. We may say, that the Loadstone assembles the Filings of Iron, and separates them from those of Silver, because it is hot; that a Pigeon eats Hempseed, and leaves other Grain, because she is hot: That a Covetous Man separates his Gold from his Silver, because he is hot: In fine, there is no Extravagancy that this Definition will not engage us in, if we were stupid enough to follow it. This Definition than does not explain the Nature of Heat, nor can we make use of it to deduce all its Properties, since if we keep precisely to its Terms, we conclude Impertinences, and if we put it in the Place of the thing defined, we shall have a strange Piece of Nonsense.  
Yet, if we carefully distinguish Heat from the Cause of it, although we cannot define it, since it is a Modification of the Soul, whereof we have no Idea, we may define the Cause of it, since we have a distinct Idea of Motion. But Care must be had, that Heat, taken for such a Motion, does not always cause the Sensation of Heat in us. For Water, for instance, is hot, since its Parts are fluid and in Motion; and 'tis apparent, that Fish feel it warm, at least warmer than Ice, whose Parts are more in Rest, but it is cold in relation to us, because it has less Motion than the Parts of our Bodies: For what hath less Motion than another Body, is in some manner in rest, in respect to that Body. So that 'tis not in Relation to the Motion of the Fibres of our Bodies, that we must define the Cause of Heat, or the Motion which excites it: We must, if we can, define this Motion absolutely and in itself, and then, the Definitions we shall give, may serve to discover the Nature and Properties of Heat.  
I do not think myself obliged to examine the Philosophy of Aristotle any further, and to unravel the extremely confused and perplexed Errors of this Author. It seems to me, that I have already shown that he does not prove his four Elements, and that he defines them ill: That his Elementary Qualities are not such as he pretends, that he knows not the Nature of them, and that all second Qualities are not compounded of them. And lastly, although we should grant him, that all Bodies were composed of four Elements, as second Qualities of the first, his whole System would be useless in a Search after Truth, since his Ideas are not clear enough always to preserve Evidence in our Ratiotinations.  
If 'tis doubted, that I have not related the true Opinions of Aristotle, it may easily be seen by examining the Books he has writ of the Heavens, of Generation and Corruption; for 'tis from them that I have taken almost all that I have said. I had no Design to relate any thing of his Eight Books of Physics, because there is some learned Men who pretend, that 'tis only a Discourse of Logic: And 'tis very probable, since we find there many indetermined and trifling Words.  
As Atistotle often contradicts himself, and as we may maintain almost any manner of Opinion from some Passages taken out of him, I doubt not but we may prove by Aristotle, even some Opinions, contrary to those I have attributed to him; but I am not afraid of it, it is sufficient that I have the Book by me I cited him from, to prove what I have said. Nay, I shall not give myself any great Trouble to examine whether these Books are Aristotle's or not, I take them as for such, and as they are commonly received: For we ought not to disquiet ourselves to know the true Genealogy of things, for which we have no Esteem.   

CHAP. VI Some general Advices which are necessary to conduct us regularly in a Search after Truth, and in a Choice of the Sciences.  
THAT it may not be said, I only destroy without establishing any thing certain and indisputable in this Work. It will be proper to show. in a few Words, the Order we ought to keep in our Studies, to avoid being deceived; and that I even note some most necessary Truths and Sciences, in which we may meet with such Evidence, as we cannot hinder ourselves from consenting to them without suffering the secret Reproaches of our Reason. I shall not explain these Truths and Sciences at large, because 'tis already done: I do not pretend to make a new Impression of other Persons Works, but content myself with referring to them. I will only show the Order we ought to keep in our Studies, always to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions.  
Of all our Discoveries, the first is the Existence of our Souls; all our Thoughts are undoubted Proofs of it, for there is nothing more evident than whatever actually thinks, is actually something. But if it is easy to know the Existence of our Souls, it is not so easy to know the Essence and Nature of them. If we would know what it is, we must above all things, take great care, not to confound it with the things it is united to. If we doubt, if we will, if we reason, we must only believe that the Soul is a thing which doubts, wills, reasons, and nothing more, provided we have no Proof of its having any other Properties. For we know our Souls only by the Internal Sensation we have of them: We must not take our Soul for our Body, nor for the Blood, nor Animal Spirits, nor for Fire, nor an infinite number of other things for which Philosophers have taken it. We must believe of the Soul, only what we cannot hinder ourselves from believing of it; and what we are fully convinced of by the internal Sensation we have of ourselves, for otherwise we should be deceived. Thus we may know by a simple Prospect or an internal Sensation, what can be known of the Soul, without being obliged to make such Arguments as may be Erroneous: For when we reason the Memory Acts; and where we make use of our Memory, we may be deceived; perhaps there is some Ill Genius on which we depend in our Discoveries, and which diverts itself in deceiving us.  
If for instance, I suppose a God who took pleasure in seducing me, I am well persuaded he could not deceive me in any simple Discoveries, as in those whereby I know that I am, or of what I think, or that twice 2 are 4. For although I should really suppose such a God, and as powerful a one as I can feign to myself, I find that in this extravagant Supposition I could not doubt that I was, or that twice 2 were equal to 4, because I perceived these things by a simple view, without the use of my Memory.  
But when I argue, not seeing evidently the Principles of my Reasonings, and only remember that I have evidently seen them: If this deceiving Deity joins this Memory to false Principles, as he might do if he would, I should only reason falsely, like those that make long Computations, imagining they remember well how they have known that 9 times 9 makes 72, or that 21 is a prime Number, or some suchlike Error, from whence they draw false Conclusions.  
Thus it is necessary to know God, and to know that he is no Deceiver, if we will be fully convinced that the most certain Sciences, as Arithmetic and Geometry, are true Sciences; for without that their Evidence is not full, and we may still refuse our Assent. And it is further necessary to know by a simple View, and not by Reasoning, that God is no Deceiver, since that may always be false, if we suppose God to deceive us.  
All common Proofs of the Existence and Perfections of God, taken from the Existence and Perfections of his Creatures, have this Defect it seems, That they convince not the Mind by a simple View: All these Proofs are Reasonings, which are convincing in themselves: But being Reasonings, they are not convincing, if we suppose an ill Genius which deceives us. They sufficiently prove that there is a Power Superior to us, for even this Extravagant Supposition establisheth it: But they do not fully convince that there is a God, or an Infinitely Perfect Being. So in these Reasonings the Conclusion is more evident than the Principles.  
It is more plain that there is a Power Superior to us, than that there is a World; since there is no Supposition that can hinder us from demonstrating this Superior Power, whereas supposing an ill Genius which delights to deceive us, it is impossible to prove there is a World: For we might always conceive, that this Ill Genius would give us Sensations of things, which existed not: As our Dreams and certain Sicknesses make us see things that never were; and make us even effectively feel Pain in our Imaginary Members which we have lost, or which we never had.  
But the Proofs of the Existence and Perfections of God, taken from the Idea we have of Infinity, are Proofs from a simple View. We see that there is a God, as soon as we behold Infinity, because necessary Existence is included in the Idea of Infinity, and there is nothing but Infinity to which we can give the Idea we have of an Infinite Being. We see also that God is no Deceiver, because knowing that he is infinitely Perfect, and that Infinity wants no Perfection, we see clearly that he will not seduce us, and even that he cannot, since he is not capable of willing it. So that there is a God, and a True God, who cannot deceive us, although he does not always enlighten us; and though we often deceive ourselves when we think he enlightens us. All these Truths are seen at one view by an attentive Mind, although we seem here to use a train of Arguments to show them to others. We may suppose them as undoubted Principles upon which we may reason; for having first discovered that God is not pleased with deceiving us, we may then be permitted to reason.  
It is evident, that the Certainty of Faith also depends upon this Principle, That there is a God which is not capable of deceiving us. For the Existence of God, and Infallibility of the Divine Authority, are rather Natural Knowledges, and Notions common to Minds that are capable of a Serious Attention, than Articles of Faith: Although it be a particular Gift of God, to have a Mind capable of a sufficient Attention, to apprehend, and be willing to apprehend these Truths as we ought.  
From this Principle, That God is no Deceiver, we may also conclude, That we certainly have a Body to which we are united after a very particular manner, and that we are surrounded with many others. For we are Internally convinced of their Existence, by the continual Sensations that God produces in us, and which we cannot correct by Reason without hurting our Faith; although we may by Reason correct the Sensations which represent them to us, with certain Qualities and Perfections which they have not. So that we ought not to believe them such as we see them, or imagine them, but only that they Exist, and are such as we conceive them by our Reason.  
But that we may reason orderly, we ought not yet to examine whether or no we have a Body, and if there are any others about us, or whether we have only Sensations of Bodies which Exist not. These Questions include too great Difficulties, and it is not perhaps so necessary to resolve them to perfect our Knowledge as we may imagine, nor even to have an exact Knowledge of Physics, Morality, and some other Sciences.  
We have in ourselves the Ideas of Numbers and Extension, whose Existence is undoubted, and whose Nature is immutable, which would eternally furnish our Thoughts, if we would know all their Relations. And it is necessary for us to begin to exercise our Minds upon these Ideas, for Reasons that will not be unnecessary to remark, whereof the chief are these three.  
The first is, That these Ideas are the most clear and evident of all: For if to shun Error we ought always to preserve Evidence in our Reasonings, it is plain that we ought rather to reason upon the Ideas of Numbers and Extension, than upon the confused and compound Ideas of Physics, Morality, Mechanics, Chemistry, and all other Sciences.  
The second is, These Ideas are the most distinct and exact of all, chief those of Numbers. So that the Habit we gain in Arithmetic and Geometry, of not contenting ourselves without knowing precisely the Relations of things, gives the Mind a certain Exactness that those have not, who content themselves with the Probability that is to be met with in other Sciences.  
The third and greatest of all is, That these Ideas are the immutable Rules and common Measures, of all other things that we know or can know. Those who perfectly know the Relations of Numbers and Figures, or rather the Art of making the Comparisons necessary for the knowing their Relations, have a kind of universal Science, and a most certain means to discover evidently and certainly whatsoever exceeds not the common limits of the Mind. But those that have not this Art, can never certainly discover any Truths, if but a little compounded, although they have very clear Ideas of those things whose compounded Relations they endeavour to know.  
These or the like, are the Reasons which induced the Ancients to make young Men study Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry: Without doubt they knew that Arithmetic and Algebra gave a certain Penetration to the Mind, that could not be acquired by other Studies; and that Geometry so well regulates the Imagination that it is not easily confounded; for this Faculty of the Soul, so necessary for the Sciences, acquires a certain just Extension by the use of Geometry, which promotes and preserves the clear view of the Mind in the most perplexing Difficulties.  
If we would then always preserve Evidence in our Perceptions, and discover the pure Truth without any Obscurity or Mixture of Error, we ought first to study Arithmetic, Algebra and Geometry, at least after having acquired some Knowledge of ourselves and the Sovereign Being. If we would have any Book which Facilitates these Sciences, I would prefer Descartes' Meditations to know God and ourselves; and to learn Arithmetic and Algebra, we may read the Mathematical Elements; for common Geometry, Tacquet's Elements; and for Conic Sections, and the Resolution of Geometric Problems, De la Here's conics, his Geometric Places, and Construction of Equations, to which we may add Descartes' Geometry.  
I would not advise to the reading of the Mathematical Elements for Arithmetic and Algebra, if I knew of any Author that had clearly demonstrated these Sciences; but the Truth obliges me to a thing which some Men will oppose. Algebra and Arithmetic being absolutely necessary to discover compounded Truths, I believe it a Duty to testify some Esteem for a Book which directs very far in these Sciences, and which, according to the Opinion of some Learned Men, explains them more clearly than any one has yet done.  
When with Care and Application we have studied these general Sciences, we shall evidently discover a great number of Truths, that are for all exact and particular Sciences. Afterwards we may study Physics and Morality, because these Sciences are very useful, although they are not so fit to make the Mind exact and penetrating. And if we would always preserve Evidence in our Perceptions, we must be very careful that we are never prejudiced in favour of any Principle that is not evident; and from which the Chinese for instance would not be supposed to descent after, having throughly weighed and considered it.  
So for Physics we must only admit the Notions common to all Men, viz. The Axioms of Geometricians, and clear Ideas of Extension, Figure, Motion and Rest, or any others as clear as these. It may perhaps be said, That the Essence of Matter is not Extension, but what signifies that? It is enough that the World which we conceive to be form of Extension, appears like to that which we see, if it be not of this matter which is useless and unintelligible, although we make such a noise about it.  
It is not absolutely necessary to examine whether there are indeed External Being's which answer to these Ideas, for we reason not upon these Being's, but upon their Ideas: We ought only to take care that the Reasonings we make upon the Properties of things, agree with the Sensations we have of them, viz. That what we think perfectly agrees with Experience, because we endeavour in Physics to discover the Order and Connection of Effects with their Causes, or in Bodies if they Exist, or in the Sensations we have of them if they have no Being.  
Indeed we cannot doubt whether there are actually any Bodies, when we consider that God is no Deceiver, or reflect upon the just Order which he hath instituted in our Sensations, whether in Natural Occurrences, or in those things only that happen to make us believe what we could not naturally comprehend: But it is not necessary at first sight to make deep Reflections, upon a thing which no body doubts of, and which is not very useful in the Knowledge of Physics, if considered as a true Science.  
Nor must we trouble ourselves much to know, whether there is, or is not, any other Qualities in those Bodies that surround us, than such as we have clear Ideas of, for we must reason only according to our Ideas: And if there is any thing else, of which we have not a dear, distinct, and particular Idea, we can never know any thing of it, nor reason justly upon it: Whereas if we reason according to our Ideas, we follow Nature, and discover that it is not so hidden as we commonly imagine.  
So those that have not studied the Properties of Numbers, often imagine that 'tis not possible to resolve certain Problems, although most Simple and Easie; and those that have not thought upon the Properties of Extension, Figure and Motion, are extremely inclined to believe and maintain, that Physical Questions are inexplicable. We must not stop at the Opinion of those that have examined nothing, or have examined nothing with a necessary Application: For although there are few Truth's concerning Natural Things which are fully demonstrated, it is certain that there are some general ones, of which it is not possible to doubt, although it is very possible not to think of them, be ignorant, and deny them.  
If we would meditate regularly, and with all necessary Application, we should discover many of these certain Truths that I speak of: But that we may the more easily discover them, it is requisite to read Descartes' Principles carefully, without receiving any thing he says, except when the Force and Evidence of his Reasons permit us not to doubt of it.  
As Morality is the most necessary of all Sciences, we must also study it very carefully, for 'tis chief in that Science that 'tis dangerous to follow the Opinions of Men: But that we may not deceive ourselves in it, but preserve Evidence in our Perceptions, we must only meditate upon undoubted Principles, such as are confessed by all those whose Minds are not blinded with Pride; for there is no undoubted Principle of Morality for Spirits of Flesh and Blood▪ and such as aspire to the Quality of great Wits. These sort of Men comprehend not the most simple Truths; or if they comprehend them, at least they always dispute them, through a Spirit of Contradiction, and to preserve such a Reputation.  
Some of these most general Principles of Morality are, That God having made all things for himself, he has created our Minds to know, and our Hearts to love him: That being also as Just and Powerful as he is, we cannot be Happy if we do not follow his Orders, nor Unhappy if we do: That our Nature is Corrupt, that our Minds depend upon our Bodies, our Reason upon our Senses, and our Wills upon our Passions: That we are uncapable to do what we see clearly to be our Duties; and that we have need of a Saviour. There are also many other Principles of Morality, as, That a retreat from the eager Pursuit of the World and Repentance, are necessary to disunite us from Sensible Objects, and to increase that which we have with intelligible and true Goods, I mean, those of the Mind: That we cannot enjoy violent Pleasure without becoming Slaves to it: That we must never undertake any thing through the Incitement of Passion: Nor seek an Establishment in this Life, etc. But because these last Principles depend upon the precedent, and on the Knowledge of Man, they ought not immediately to pass for undoubted. If we consider these Principles orderly, and with as much Care and Application as the weight of the Subject requires; and receive for true only the Conclusions consequently deduced from these Principles, we shall have a certain Morality, which perfectly agrees with that of the Gospel, although it is not complete and large.  
It is true, in Moral Reasonings, it is not so easy to preserve Evidence and Exactness, as in some other Sciences; and the Knowledge of Man is absolutely necessary to those that would make any great Progress: And this is the reason that the generality of Men do not succeed in it. They will not consult themselves to know the Weakness of their own Nature: They omit to inquire of the Master who inwardly teaches them his own Will, which is the Immutable and Eternal Law, and the true Principles of Morality. They do not hear him with Pleasure who speaks not to their Senses, who answers not according to their Desires, nor Flatters their Secret Pride: They have no respect for such words as do not dazzle the Imagination, which are pronounced without a Noise, and are never clearly heard but in the Silence of the Creatures: Yet with Pleasure and Deference they consult Aristotle, Seneca, and some new Philosophers, who seduce them either by the Obscurity of their Words, the Turn of their Expressions, or Probability of their Reasons.  
Since the Sin of Adam we esteem only what relates to the Preservation of the Body, and Conveniency of Life: And because we discover these sort of Goods only by the Means of our Senses, we make use of them in all Occurrences. The Eternal Wisdom who is our true Life, and the only Light which can illuminate us, often shines before the Blind, and speaks only to the Deaf, when it speaks in the Recesses of the Soul; for we are almost always out of ourselves. As we continually interrogate all Creatures to learn some new Good which we inquire after, it is requisite, as I have already said, that this Wisdom presents itself before us without our going out of ourselves, to teach us by sensible Words, and convincing Examples, the way to arrive at true Felicity. God continually imprints a Natural Love in us for him, that we may always Love him; and by this same Motion of Love we continually Estrange ourselves from him, by running with all the Power he has given us after Sensible Goods, which he has forbid us to do. So that willing to be loved by us, he renders himself Sensible, and presents himself before us, by the Delights of his Grace to fix all our Vain Agitatitions, and to begin our Cure, by Sensations or Delectations like to those which had been the Original of our Disease.  
Therefore I do not pretend that Men may, by the Power of their Minds, so easily discover all the Rules of Morality which are necessary to Salvation, and much less that they are able to act according to what they know; for their Heart is yet more Corrupted than their Minds. I only say, that if they admit none but evident Principles, and consequently reason upon these Principles, they will discover even the very Truths that we learn in the Bible; because 'tis the same Wisdom which immediately speaks from itself to those who discover Truths from the Evidence of Reasoning; and who speaks by the Holy Scriptures to those who learn it from their Senses.  
We must then study Morality in the Gospel to spare ourselves the Trouble of Meditation, and Certainly to learn those Laws according to which we ought to regulate our Manners, For those who are not contented with Certainty, because it only convinces the Mind, without enlightening it, must carefully Meditate upon these Laws, and deduce them from their Natural Principles, that they may evidently discover by their Reason, what they already know by Faith, with an entire Certainty. This way they will be convinced that the Gospel is the most Solid of all Books; That JESUS CHRIST perfectly knew the Disorder and Distemper of Nature: That he has procured a Remedy the most Useful for us, and the most Worthy of himself: But that the Light of Philosophers is only thick Darkness, and their brightest Virtues only an insupportable Pride; and in a word, that Aristotle, Seneca, etc. are only at best but Men, to say no worse of them.   

CHAP. VII. Of the Use of the first Rule which respects Particular Questions.  
WE have sufficiently explained the General Rule for Method, which chief regards the Subject of our Studies, and to prove that Descartes has exactly followed it in his System of the World, but that Aristotle and his Followers have not observed it. It is now proper to descend to particular Rules, which are necessary to resolve all sorts of Questions.  
The Questions that may be form upon all manner of Subjects are of divers kinds, of which it will not be easy to give a particular Enumeration, but these that follow are the chief of them. Sometimes we inquire after the unknown Causes of some known Effects; and sometimes seek unknown Effects by their known Causes. The Fire burns, and dissipates the Wood, we seek the Cause of it. Fire consists in a very great Motion of the Fiery Particles; we would know what Effects this Motion is capable of producing, if it can harden Dirt, and melt Iron, etc.  
We seek sometimes the Nature of a thing by its Properties; and sometimes knowing the Nature we seek the Properties of things: We know, or at least suppose, that Light is transmitted in an instant, that yet it is reunited and reflected by the means of a concave Mirror, in such sort, that it penetrates the most Solid Bodies; and we would make use of these Properties to discover the Nature of it. On the contrary, We know that all the Spaces which are betwixt Earth and Heaven, are full of little Spherical Bodies extremely agitated, and which continually fly from the Sun: And we would know if these little Bodies can transmit themselves in an instant, or if being reflected by a Concave Mirror, can reunite, and dissipate or penetrate the most Solid Bodies.  
Sometimes we seek all the Parts from the whole; and sometimes a whole by its Parts: We seek all the unknown Parts of a whole that is known; when we seek all the Alliquot parts of a Number, all the Roots of an Equation, all the right Angles which a Figure contains, etc. And we seek an unknown whole, whose Parts are known, when we seek the Sum of many Numbers, the Area of many Figures, the Capacity of different Vessels; or we seek a whole which has one of its parts known, and the others, although unknown, include some known Relation with what is unknown: As when we inquire what that Number is whereof we have 15 a known part, and the other which composes it, is the half or third of the unknown Number: Or when we seek an unknown Number which is equal to 15, and to twice the Root of the unknown Number.  
In fine, We sometimes inquire if certain things are equal or like to others, or how far they are unequal or different: As when we would know if Saturn is greater than Jupiter, or how near their Magnitudes are alike: If the Air at Rome is hotter than that at Marseilles, or what difference between them.  
What is general in all Questions is, that we form them only to know some Truths; and because all Truths are but Relations; we may say generally, that in all Questions, we seek only the Knowledge of some Relations, whether Relations between things, Relations between Ideas, or Relations between things and their Ideas.  
There are Relations of many Kind's, there are some between the Nature of things, between their Magnitudes, their Parts, their Attributes, Qualities, Effects, Causes, etc. But we may reduce them all to two, viz. the Relations of Magnitude, and Relations of Quality; by calling all those Relations of Magnitude; which are between things considered as capable of More or Less; and all others Relations of Qualities. Thus we may say, that all Questions tend to the Discovery of some Relations of Magnitude or Quality.  
The first and chief of all Rules is, to know most distinctly the State of the Question proposed to be resolved, and to have very clear Ideas of its Terms, to be able to compare, and by this means discover the unknown Relations.  
We must therefore first perceive very clearly the unknown Relation that we seek; for it is evident, that if we had no certain Mark to discover this unknown Relation when we look for it, or when we would find it, it would be in vain for us to inquire after it.  
Secondly, as much as possible, we must render those Ideas distinct, which answer to the Terms of the Question, by taking away all Equivocal Terms, and make them clear, by considering them with all possible Attention: For if these Ideas are so confused or obscure, that we cannot make the Comparisons necessary for discovering the Relations we seek, we are not yet in a Condition of resolving the Question.  
In the third place, we must consider with great Attention, the Conditions expressed in a Question, if there is any; because, without that, we have only a confused Notion of the State of the Question: Besides, the Conditons generally show the Way for resolving it. So that having once well conceived the State of the Question, and Conditions of it, we know what we seek, and sometimes the Way that we must take to discover it.  
It is true, there is not always some Conditions expressed in Questions; but then these Questions are indetermined, and we may resolve them many Ways, as if a Square, Number, or Triangle is required, etc. without specifying any more; or else 'tis because he that proposes them, knows not the means of resolving them, or else hides them with a Design to perplex the Question: As if it is required to find two mean Proportionals between two Lines, without adding, by the Intersection of the Circle and Parabola, or Circle and Elipsis, etc.  
It is therefore absolutely necessary, that the Character by which we know what we seek, should be very distinct and not Equivocal, and specify only what we seek, otherwise we can never be certain of having resolved the Question proposed. We must likewise take care to retrench from the Question, whatever Conditions may perplex it, and without which it is complete: For they unnecessarily divide the Capacity of the Mind. Nay, we cannot be said to know the State of a Question, when the Conditions which accompany it are useless.  
For instance, if a Question were proposed in these Terms; whether a Man being sprinkled with some Liquors, and covered with a Garland of Flowers, can be able to rest, although he see nothing that can agitate him. We must know whether the Word Man is not Metaphorical; or the Word Rest Equivocal, if it is not taken in Relation to Local Motion, or in Relation to the Passions, as these Words, although he see nothing that is able to agitate him, seem to note. We must know if the Conditions, being sprinkled with some Liquors, and crowned with a Garland of Flowers, are Essential. Afterwards, the State of this Ridiculous and Indetermined Question being clearly known, we may easily resolve it, by saying that we only need put a Man into a Ship, according to the Conditions expressed in the Question.  
The Artifice of those that propose such like Questions, is to join Conditions to them which seem to be necessary, although they are not, to divert the Mind of those they propose them towards things unuseful to be resolved. As in that Question that Servants commonly offer to Children. I have seen, say they unto them, Hunters or Fishers, carry away with them what they could not take, and cast into the Water what they took. The Mind being prejudiced with the Idea of Fishermen angling for Fish▪ it cannot conceive what they mean, and all the Diffiulty there is to resolve this trifling Question, proceeds from their not having conceived it clearly, and not thinking that Fishermen, as well as others, sometimes look in their  for certain little Animals, which they throw away as soon as they have taken them, and still carry with them what they cannot catch.  
Sometimes also, there are not all the necessary Conditions in a Question for the answering it, and that makes it at least as difficult as when unuseful ones are added: For instance in this, to make a Man , without binding or hurting him; or rather, having put a Man's little Finger in his own Ear, by this Posture, to make him so , that he cannot stir from the Place where he is put, until his little Finger is taken from his Ear again. This at first appears impossible, and it is so indeed, for we can walk very well, although our little Finger be in our Ear. But here is a Condition wanting, which would remove all Difficulty, if it was expressed, viz. That he must be made to embrace some Pillar or something like it, with that Arm, whereof the Finger is in his Ear; for than he cannot get from the Place without taking his Finger from his Ear. It is not added as a Condition of a Question, that there is yet some other thing to do, on purpose that the Mind should not seek for it nor discover it; But those who undertake to resolve these sort of Questions, must make all necessary Demands to clear the Point wherein the Difficulty of the Question consists.  
These Arbitrary Questions seem to be trifling, and so indeed they are in one Sense; for we learn nothing by resolving them: Yet are they not so different from Natural Questions, as perhaps we may think them to be; we must do very nigh the same things to resolve both. For if the Craft and Malice of Men make Arbitrary Questions perplexing and difficult to resolve; Natural Effects are also in themselves encompassed with Obscurity and Darkness: And these Darknesses must be dispersed by the Attention of the Mind; and Experiments, which are kind of Demands that we make to the Author of Nature, even as we take away Equivocal and useless Circumstances from Arbitrary Questions by Attention of the Mind, and by the proper Demands we make to those who propose them. But let us explain these things Methodically, and in a more Serious and Instructive Manner.  
There is a great Number of Questions which seem very difficult, because we understand them not, and which therefore want an Explication: Yet, which ought rather to pass for Axioms, than true Questions; for it seems to me, that we ought not to place in the Number of Questions, certain undoubted Propositions, whose Terms we conceive.  
We demand, for instance, as a Question difficult to be resolved, whether or no the Soul is immortal; because those that make the Question, or that pretend to resolve it, do not clearly conceive the Terms of it. As the Words Soul and Immortal signify different things, and know not how they are understood; so they cannot resolve whether it is Immortal or not: For they neither know precisely what they demand, nor what they seek.  
By this Word Soul, we may understand a Substance which thinks, wills, feels, etc. we may take the Soul for the Circulation of the Blood, and Configuration of the Parts of the Body; or we may take it for the Blood and Animal Spirits. So by this Word Immortal, we mean what cannot perish by the ordinary Power of Nature, or else what can never change; or what can neither corrupt nor dissipate like a Vapour or Smoke. Thus, suppose we take the Words Soul and Immortal in some one of these Significations; the least Attention of Mind will make us able to judge whether it is Immortal or not.  
For first, 'tis plain that the Soul, taken in the first Sense, viz. for a Substance which thinks, is Immortal, if we also take Immortal in the first Sense, for what cannot perish by the common Power of Nature; for 'tis not even conceivable that any Substance can become nothing; we must have Recourse to the extraordinary Power of God, to conceive it possible.  
Secondly, the Soul is immortal, if we take Immortal in the third Sense; for what cannot corrupt, nor resolve into a Vapour or Smoke; for 'tis evident, that what cannot be divided into an infinite Number of Parts, cannot corrupt or be resolved into a Vapour.  
Thirdly, the Soul is not Immortal, if we take Immortal in the second Sense, for what cannot change: For we have sufficient convincing Proofs of the Variations of our Soul: That sometimes it feels Pain, sometimes Pleasure, sometimes it wills certain things, and then again ceases to will them; as being united to the Body, it cannot be separated from them, etc.  
If we take the Word Soul in any other Signification, 'twill be very easy to see whether it is Immortal or not, by taking the Word Immortal in a fixed and certain Sense; so that what makes these Questions difficult, is because we conceive them not distinctly, and the Terms which express them are Equivocal; so that they have rather need of Explanation than Proof.  
It is true, some Persons are stupid enough, and others sufficiently Imaginative; to take the Soul always for a certain Configuration of the Parts of the Brain, arid Motion of the Spirits, and it is certainly impossible to prove, to these sort of Men, that the Soul is Imortal and cannot perish: For on the contrary, 'tis evident, that the Soul, taken in the Sense they understand it, is Mortal; so that 'tis not a Question difficult to resolve, but a Proposition difficult to make Men understand which have not the same Ideas of it as we have, and who do all they can not to have them, and to blind themselves.  
When it is asked, if the Soul is Immortal, or any other Question whatever, we must immediately take away the Equivocal Terms, and know in what Sense they are taken that we may be able distinctly to conceive the Condition of the Question: And if those that propose it, know not what they mean, we must require them to form some distinct Notions, and determine them. If we ask them, and find their Ideas agree not with ours, it will be useless to answer them: For what Answer can we make to a Man, who for instance, imagines that a Desire is only the Motion of some Spirits; and a Thought is nothing else but a Trace or an Image, that Objects or Spirits have produced in the Brain; and that all the reasoning of Men consist merely in the different Situation of some little Parts, which are diversely disposed in the Head? To answer him, that the Soul, taken in the Sense he means it is Immortal, is to deceive him, or make ourselves ridiculous to him: But to answer him it is Immortal, would be in one Sense to confirm him in an Error of the greatest Consequence. We must therefore not answer him at all, but only endeavour to make him re-enter into himself, that he may receive the same Ideas as we do, of him who is only capable of enlightening him.  
'Tis also a Question which appears difficult enough to resolve, viz. Whether Beasts have a Soul or not: Yet, when we take away the Equivocation, it seems no longer difficult; and the Generality of those Men who think they have, do not know the Opinions of those who think they have not.  
We may take the Soul for something Corporeal, diffused through the whole Body, which gives it Life and Motion, or else for something Spiritual. Those who say Animals have no Soul, understand it in the Second Sense; for no Man ever denied but that there was in Animals something Corporeal, which was the Principle of their Life and Motion, since they cannot even deny it to Watches. Those on the contrary, who affirm Animals have Souls, mean it in the first Sense; for there are few who believe Animals have a Spiritual and indivisible Soul, so that the Peripatetics and Cartesians do both believe that Beasts have a Soul, viz. a Corporeal Principle of their Motion; and both of them believe they have none, viz. That they have nothing in them Spiritual and indivisible.  
Thus the Difference that is between the Peripatetics and Cartesians, is not in that the first believe Beasts have Souls, and the last believe it not: But only in that the first think Animals capable of feeling Pain, Pleasure, seeing Colours, hearing Sounds, and generally of having all the Sensations and Passions that we have; and the last doubt it. The Cartesians distinguish the Word Sensation to take away the Equivocation of it. For instance, they say, that when we are too near the Fire, the Particles of Wood strike against the Hand, and shake the Fibres; that this shaking is communicated to the Brain; that it determines the Animal Spirits, which are there contained, to diffuse themselves through the External Parts of the Body, in a proper manner to make them retire. They agree, that all these things, or the like, may meet in Animals, and that they certainly meet there, because these are the Properties of Bodies; and the Peripatetics grant this.  
The Cartesians further say, that in Man the shaking of the Fibres of his Brain is accompanied with a Sensation of Heat, and that the Course of the Animal Spirits to the Heart or Bowels, is followed with the Passion of Hatred or Aversion: But deny that these Sensations or Passions of the Soul is in Beasts. The Peripatetics, on the contrary, affirm that Beasts feel Heat as well as we; that like us, they have an Aversion for whatever incommodes them; and generally, that they are capable of all the Sensations and Passions that we are. The Cartesians do not think that Beasts feel Pain or Pleasure, or that they love or hate any thing; because they admit nothing but what is material in Beasts, and they do not believe that Sensations or Passions are Properties of Matter, whatever it may be. Some Peripatetics on the contrary, think that Matter is capable of Sensation and Passion, when it is, as they say, Subtilised; that Beasts may feel, by the means of Animal Spirits, viz. by the means of a Matter extremely fine and delicate; and that even the Soul is not capable of Sensation and Passion, but only as it is united to this Matter.  
Thus, to resolve the Question, whether Beasts have a Soul, we must re-enter into ourselves, and consider the Idea we have of Matter, with all the Attention we are capable of. And if we conceive, that Matter, Figured after such manner, as Square, Round, Oval, etc. is capable of Pain, Pleasure, Heat and Cold, Colour, Smells, Sound, etc. we may affirm, that the Souls of Beasts, how material soever they are, may be capable of Sensation. If we conceive it not, we must not assert it is, for we must only affirm what we conceive: So if we conceive, that Matter, agitated up and down in a Circular, Spiral, Parabolick, Eliptick Line, etc. be capable of Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, etc. we may say that Beasts have the same Passions with us. If we see it not, we must not say it, at least without confessing, we speak what we do not know. But I think it may be affirmed, that we never believe any Motion of Matter can be capable of Love or Joy, provided we think Seriously of it: So that to resolve this Question, if Beasts feel; we need only take away the Equivocation, as Cartesians do; for this way we reduce it to a Simple Question, that an indifferent Attention of Mind will suffice to resolve it.  
It is true, that St. Austin supposing, according to the common Prejudice, that Beasts have Souls (or at least, I have not read in his Works, that he ever Seriously examined it, or called it in Question) and perceiving well the Contradiction of saying, that a Soul or Substance that thinks, feels, desires, etc. should be Material, he believed that the Souls of Beasts were certainly Spiritual and Indivisible. He has proved, by evident Reasons, 
L 4. de anima & ejus origine. c. 23. l. 5. de quantitate animae, and elsewhere  that all Souls, that is, whatever feels, imagines, fears, doubts, desires, etc. are necessarily Spiritual; but I have not observed that he had any Reason to say that Beasts had Souls. He does not give himself the Trouble to prove it, because 'tis very probable that in his Time there was hardly any one that doubted of it.  
Now there are some who endeavour wholly to deliver themselves from their Prejudices, and who call all Opinions in Question, that are not maintained upon clear and demonstrative Reasons, who begin to doubt whether Animals have a Soul capable of the same Sensations and Passions as ours, but they always find many prejudiced Defenders, who pretend to prove, that Beasts feel, will, think and reason as we do, although in a much more imperfect manner.  
Dogs, say they, know their Masters, they love them, suffer patiently the Blows they receive from them, because they judge it advantageous for them, not to abandon them: But for Strangers, they hate them so violently, that they cannot so much as suffer themselves to be caressed by them. All Animals have a Love for their Young Ones, and those Birds that make their Nests in the Extreme Branches of a Tree, make it plainly appear, that they fear certain Animals that would devour them: They think these Branches are too weak to bear their Enemies, and yet strong enough to support their Little Ones and Nests too. There is amongst the Spiders, and the most vile Infects, something that looks like an Intelligence, which Animates them: For we cannot forbear admiring the Conduct of an Animal; which, although blind, finds a means to catch others in its Snares, that have both Eyes and Wings, and are bold enough to attack the greatest Animal that is.  
It is true, that all the Actions of Beasts show that there is an Intelligence, for whatever is regular declares it; a Watch even shows it: It is impossible that Chance should compose its Wheels, there must be an Intelligence which has regulated its Motions. We plant a Seed in an inverse Order, the Roots which are upwards, sink of themselves into the Earth; and the Germ which was turned towards the Earth, also turns again to come forth, and this testifies an Intelligence: This Plant is jointed at convenient Distances, to fortify itself; it covers its Grain with a Skin to preserve it; if encompasses it with Prickles which defends it: This shows an Intelligence. In fine, all that we see Plants do, as well as Animals, certainly denotes an Intelligence. All true Cartesians grant it. But they all distinguish, for they take away as much as possible, the Equivocation of Terms.  
The Motions of Beasts and Plants show an Intelligence; but this Intelligence is not of Matter; it is distinct from Beasts, as that which disposes the Wheels of a Watch is distinct from the Watch. For indeed, this Intelligence appears infinitely wise, infinitely powerful, and the same which has form us in our Mother's Belly, and given us Growth, to which we could not, by all the Efforts of our Minds, and will add one Cubit. Thus in Animals, there is neither Intelligence nor Soul, as we commonly understand it. They eat without Pleasure, cry without Pain, and grow without Knowledge: They fear nothing, they know nothing, and they act after such a manner as intelligently shows that it is God who made them, that preserves them; he has so form their Bodies, that they Machinally, and without Fear, eat whatsoever would destroy them; otherwise we must grant that there is more Understanding in the least Animal, or even in one Grain, than in the Wisest Man: For it is certain, there is more different Parts, and more regular Motions produced in them, than we are capable of knowing.  
But, as Men are accustomed to confound all things, and to imagine that their Soul produces in their Bodies, almost all the Motions and Changes that happen to it: They falsely affix to the Word Soul, the Idea of producing and preserving Bodies. Thus they think their Soul produces in them, whatsoever is absolutely necessary for the Preservation of Life, although it know not even how the Body it Animates is composed: They judge it necessary that there should be a Soul in Beasts, to produce all the Motions and Changes which happen to them; because they are like to what is performed in our Bodies: For Beasts are begotten, nourished, fortified, as out Bodies are: They Drink, Eat, Sleep like us; because we are wholly like Beasts in our Bodies, and all the difference there is between us and them, is, That we have a Soul, and they have not. But the Soul we have does not form our Bodies, it digests not our Food, it gives neither Motion nor Heat to our Blood: It Feels, Wills and Reasons; and animates the Body in this respect. It has Sensations and Passions which have relation to it. It is not that 'tis diffused through all our Members, that it communicates Sensation and Life to it, for our Body can receive nothing of what occurs in our Mind. It is then plain, That the reason why we cannot resolve many Questions, is because we distinguish nor, and even forget to distinguish the different things that the same word may signify.  
Sometimes indeed we may think of distinguishing, but then often we do it so ill, that instead of taking away the Equivocation of Terms, by the Distinctions we give them, we make them become more obscure. For instance, If it be demanded whether the Body sees, how it sees, and after what manner the reasonable Soul animates the Animal Spirits, the Blood, and other living Humours, if the Teeth, Hair and Nails, are animated, etc. we distinguish the words to live and be animated, in living or being animated with a rational Soul, or a Sensitive, or a Vegetative one; but this distinction does only confound the state of the Question, for these words themselves have need of an Explanation, and it may be even that the two last, Vegetative and Sensitive Soul are inexplicable and incomprehensible, after the manner we commonly understand them.  
But if we would join any clear and distinct Idea to the word Life, we may say that the Life of the Soul is the Knowledge of Truth and Love of God; or rather, that its Thought is its Life: And that the Life of the Body consists in the Circulation of the Blood, and just Temperament of Humours; or rather, that the Life of the Body is the Motion of its Parts proper for its Preservation: And then the Ideas applied to the word Life being clear, it will also be evident, 1. That the Soul cannot communicate its Life to the Body; for it cannot make it Think. 2. That it cannot give it the Life by which it is nourished, grows, etc. since it cannot so much as know how it must digest what it eats. 3. It can make it feel any thing, since Matter is incapable of Sensation, etc. Thus we may, without Pain, resolve all other Questions that can be put upon this Subject, provided the Terms whereby they are expressed stir up clear Ideas: And it is impossible to resolve them, if the Ideas of the Terms which express them are confused and obscure.  
Yet is it not always absolutely necessary to have Ideas, which perfectly represent the things whose Relations we would examine: It often suffices to have an imperfect or weak Knowledge of them, because sometimes we do not inquire after an exact Knowledge of their Relations, as I shall here explain.  
There are Truths or Relations of two sorts, some exactly known, and others that are but imperfectly discovered: We exactly know the Relation between such a Square and such a Triangle; but we do not perfectly know the Relation between Paris and Orleans; we know that a Square is equal to a Triangle, or double or triple to it, etc. but we only know that Paris is greater than Orleans, without knowing how much.  
Moreover, Between imperfect Knowledges there are an infinite number of Degrees, and even all these Knowledges are only imperfect in relation to the more perfect ones: For instance, We perfectly know that Paris is greater than the Royal Place; and that Knowledge is not imperfect, but in relation to an exact Knowledge, according to which we should justly know how much Paris is bigger than the place it includes.  
Thus there are Questions of many sorts. 1. There are some in which we seek the perfect Knowledge of all exact Relations, that two or many things have between themselves.  
2. There are some, in which we inquire after the perfect Knowledge of some exact Relation between two or many things.  
3. There are some, in which we seek a perfect Knowledge of some Relation that is very near exact, which is between two or more things.  
4. And some, wherein we only try to know a Relation which is sufficiently rambling and indetermined.  
It is plain, 1. That to resolve Questions of the first Kind, and perfectly to know all the exact Relations of Magnitude and Quality that is between two or many things, we must have distinct Ideas which perfectly represent them, and compare these things all possible ways. We may, for instance, resolve all Questions which tend to discover the exact Relations which are between 2 and 8, because 2 and 8 being exactly known, we may compare them together in all necessary manners, to discover their exact Relations of Magnitude or Quality: We may know that 8 is Quadruple of 2, that 8 and 2 are even Numbers, and that 8 and 2 are not Squares.  
It is clear in the second place, That to resolve Questions of the second Kind, and exactly to discover any Relation of Magnitude or Quality which is between two or many things, it is necessary, and it will be sufficient to know very distinctly the Superficies of them, according to which we must compare them, to discover the Relation we seek: For instance, To resolve any Question which tends to the discovering some exact Relation between 4 and 16, as that 4 and 16 are even Numbers and Squares, it is sufficient to know exactly that 4 and 16 may be divided into half without a Fraction, and that both are the Product of a Number multiplied by itself, and it is useless to examine what their true Magnitude is: For 'tis evident, To know the exact Relation of Quality which is between things, it is sufficient to have a very distinct Idea of their Quality, without thinking any thing of their Magnitude; and that to know their exact Relations of Magnitude, it sufficies to know exactly their Magnitude without enquiring after their true Quality.  
It is plain in the third place, That to resolve Questions of the third Kind, and to know any Relation that is almost exact, between two or more things, it is sufficient to know pretty near the Superficies or sides thereof, according to which we must compare them, to discover the approaching Relation that we seek, whether it be of Magnitude or Quality. For instance, I can evidently know that √ 8 is greater than 2, because I can know very near the true Magnitude of the √ 8. But I cannot know how much the √ 8 exceeds 2, because I cannot exactly know the true Magnitude of √ 8.  
Lastly, It is plain, That to resolve Questions of the fourth kind, and discover their trifling and undetermined Relations, it suffices to know things after a manner proportionate to the need we have of comparing them, to discover the Relations we seek. So that to resolve all sorts of Questions, 'tis not always necessary, to have very distinct Ideas of their Terms, or to know perfectly the things their Terms signify: But it is requisire to know them so much the more exactly, as the Relations we endeavour to discover are more exact and in greater Number: For as we have already showed, in imperfect Questions it is enough to have imperfect Ideas of the things that we consider, to resolve these Questions perfectly, or according to what they contain: And we likewise resolve Questions very well, although we have no distinct Idea of the Terms which express them; for when it is demanded if Fire is capable of melting Salt, hardening Dirt, and evaporating Led, and a thousand other like things, we understand these Questions perfectly, and can very well resolve them, although we have no distinct Idea of Fire, Salt, Dirt, etc. because those who make these demands, would only know, if we have had any sensible Experience, that Fire has produced these Effects: Wherefore, according to the Discoveries we have made by our Senses, we can answer them in such a manner as may be capable of satisfying them.   

CHAP. VIII. An Application of the other Rules to particular Questions.  
THere are Questions of two sorts, Simple and Compound: The Resolution of the first depends alone upon the Attention of the Mind to the clear Ideas of the Terms which express them: The others cannot be resolved but by the Comparison of a third or many other Ideas; we cannot discover the unknown Relations, which are expressed by the Terms of the Question, by immediately comparing the Ideas of these Terms, for they cannot be joined or compared. We must therefore have one or many mean Ideas, to be able to make necessary Comparisons to discover these Relations; and exactly observe that these mean Ideas are clear and distinct, in proportion as the Relations we endeavour to discover are more exact and in greater Number.  
This Rule is only a Consequence of the first, and is of equal Importance: For if it is necessary to know exactly the Relations we compare, to have clear and distinctly Ideas of them: For the same reason it is necessary to know well the mean Ideas by which we pretend to make these Comparisons; since we must distinctly know the Relation of Measure with each of the things that we measure, to discover the Relations of them. For instance, When we suffer a little light Vessel to swim freely with a Loadstone in it, if we turn towards the North Pole of this Loadstone, another Loadstone that we hold in our Hands, we shall immediately see the first Loadstone retire, as if it were compelled by some violent Wind. And if we desire to know the Cause of this Effect.  
It is plain, That to give a Reason for the Motion of this Loadstone, it is not enough to know the Relations it has with the other; for although we should even perfectly know all, we could not comprehend how these two Bodies could thrust one another without meeting.  
We must therefore examine what things we know distinctly to be capable according to the Order of Nature of moving Bodies, since the Question is to discover the Natural Cause of the Motion of the Loadstone, which is certainly a Body: To that end we must not have recourse to any Quality, Form, or Entity, or even of any Intelligence, that we do not clearly know to be capable of moving Bodies: For we cannot certainly know, that Intelligences are the common Causes of the Natural Motions of Bodies, nor even whether or no they can produce Motion.  
We know evidently, That 'tis a Law of Nature that Bodies should move each other when they meet. We must then endeavour to explain the Motion of the Loadstone, by the means of any body which meets it. It is true, that it may be something else besides a Body which moves it; but if we have no distinct Idea of this thing, we must not make use of it as a fit Mean, to discover what we seek, nor to explain it to others. For 'tis not giving a Reason of an Effect, to ascribe something as a Cause of it which no body conceives clearly: We must not then trouble ourselves too much, whether there is any other Natural Cause of the Motion of Bodies than their Mutual Concurrence; but rather suppose that there is none, and attentively consider what Body can meet and move this Loadstone.  
We discover at first sight, that 'tis not the Loadstone we hold in our Hands, since it does not touch that which is moved: But because it is only moved at the approach of that which we hold in our Hands, and is not moved of itself, we ought to conclude, That although it is not the Loadstone in our Hands which moves it, it must be some little Bodies which proceed from it, and which are passed by it towards the other Loadstone.  
To discover these little Bodies, we must not open our Eyes and look near the Loadstone, for the Senses would impose upon Reason, and it may be we should judge that nothing proceeds from the Loadstone, because we cannot see any thing go out from thence. 'Tis very probable we should forget that we do not see the most impetuous Winds, nor many other Bodies which produce as extraordinary Effects: We must keep firm to this clear and most intelligible Mean, and carefully examine all the Effects of the Loadstone, that we may discover how it can continually emit these little Bodies without being diminished. For the Experiments that have been made show, that these little Bodies that go out on one side, immediately enter in again at the other; and they will serve to explain all Difficulties that can be brought against the manner of resolving this Question. But it must be well observed, That we ought not to abandon this Mean, although even we could not answer some Difficulties proceeding from our Ignorance in several things.  
If we have not a Mind to examine from whence it is that Lodestones are repelled, when we oppose the same Poles to each other; but rather the Reason why they approach and join to each other, when we present the North Pole of the one to the South Pole of the other, the Question would be more difficult, and one way alone would not be sufficient to resolve it. It is not enough to know exactly the Relations that are between the Poles of these two Lodestones, nor to have recourse to the Means we have taken for the precedent Question; for on the contrary, this Method seems to hinder the Effect whose Cause we would seek. Neither must we have recourse to any thing that we do not clearly know to be the natural and common Causes of Corporeal Motions, nor deliver ourselves from the Difficulty of the Question, by a rambling and undeterminate Idea of an Occult Quality in Lodestones, by which they attract each other; for the Mind can conceive but one Body, as having a sufficient Power to attract another.  
The Impenetrability of Bodies makes us clearly conceive, that Motion may be communicated by Impulsion; and Experience proves plainly, that it is communicated by this means: But there is neither Reason nor Experience which clearly demonstrates the Motion of Attraction; for in the Experiments which seem most proper to prove this kind of Motion, we visibly perceive, when we find the true and certain Cause, that what appears to be done by Attraction, is only performed by Impulsion. So that we must not keep to any other Communication of Motion, but that which is made by Impulsion: Since this way is certain and undoubted, and there is at least some Obscurity in the others which we cannot imagine. But although we could demonstrate, that in things purely Corporeal there are other Principles of Motion than the meeting of Bodies; we could not reasonably reject this, we ought even to keep to it before all others; since it is the most clear and evident, and appears so undoubted, that we are not afraid to affirm, it has been received by all People in all Ages.  
Experience shows us, that a Loadstone that swims freely upon the Water, draws near to one which we hold in our Hands, when we present different Poles; we must then conclude that it is pushed towards it. But as it is not the Loadstone we hold that bushes that which swims, since that which swims draws nigh to that which we hold, and nevertheless that which swims would not be moved, if we did not present that to it which we hold in our Hands: It is evident, that at least we must recur to both Methods to explain this Questoin, if we will resolve it by the received Principle of the Communication of Motion.   diagram representing the communication of motion in lodestones 
The Loadstone c draws near to the Loadstone C: Therefore the Air which encompasses it bushes it, since there is no other Body which can push it; and that is the first way. The Loadstone c approaches only at the presence of the Loadstone C; therefore 'tis necessary that the Loadstone C should determine the Air to push the Loadstone c; and that is the second way. It is evident that both these ways are absolutely necessary; so that the Difficulty is now reduced to join them together, which may be done two ways, either in beginning with something known in the Air which encompasses the Loadstone c, or by beginning with something known in the Loadstone C.  
If we would know that the parts of Air, like those of all fluid bodies, are in continual Agitation, we cannot doubt but they still strike against the Loadstone c which they surround; but because they strike it equally on all sides, they do not push it more on one side that another, whilst there is an equal quantity of Air on both sides. Things being thus, it is easy to judge that the Loadstone C prevents there being so much of this Air as we speak of, towards a as towards b; but that can be done only by dispersing some other bodies in the space which is between C and c. There must then some little bodies go out from the Lodestones to fill this space. So these little bodies chase away the Air near a, the Loadstone c is less pushed on that side than the other; and consequently must approach to the Loadstone C, since all bodies move to the side where they are least pushed.  
But if the Loadstone c had not many Pores about the Pole a, fit to receive the little bodies which go out from the Pole B of the other Loadstone, and too small to receive those of Air: It is plain, that these little bodies being more agitated than Air, since they are to chase it from between the Lodestones, they would push the Loadstone c, and remove it from C. Thus since the Loadstone c approaches to or deviates from C, when we present its different Poles, it is necessary to conclude, that the Poles a and b of the Loadstone c, are filled with different Pores: Otherwise the little bodies which are emitted from the Loadstone C, would not freely pass without pushing the Loadstone c by the side a, and would not be repulsed by the side b: What I say of one of the Lodestones, must also be understood of the other.  
It is evident, that we always learn something by this way of reasoning upon clear Ideas and undoubted Principles: For we have discovered, that the Air which encompasses the Loadstone c, was driven from between the Lodestones by Bodies which are continually emitted from their Poles ' which find free passage on one side and are stopped on the other. And if we would discover near what the Magnitude and Figure of the Pores of this Loadstone are, through which these little bodies pass, we must yet make other Experiments, but they would lead us to subjects which we intent not to treat of. Upon these Questions we may consult the Principles of M. Descartes: I shall only answer an Objection which immediately offers itself, from whence is it that these little bodies cannot re-enter by the same Pores they came out; that besides a certain Figure, representing the Spiral Channels of a Screw, which we may suppose to be in the Pores producing this Effect, the Inflexion of the little Branches which compose these Pores, may in one Sense obey the little Bodies which pass  them, and in another Sense make them rough, and stop their passage: So that we need not be too much surprised at the difference of the Poles of the Loadstone, for this difference may be accounted for many ways; and all the difficulty is, amongst several Causes to discover the true one.  
If we had endeavoured to resolve the Question we have just now examined, in beginning with the Corpuscles which we suppose to be emitted from the Loadstone C, we should have found the same thing: And we should likewise have discovered, that the Air is composed of an infinite Number of Particles which are in continual Agitation, for without it 'twould be impossible that the Loadstone c should approach to the Loadstone C. I shall not stay to explain this, because 'tis not difficult.  
I will give you here a Question more compound than the foregoing, in which many Rules must be made use of, 'tis demanded what can be the Natural and Mechanical Cause of the Motion of our Members.  
The Idea of Natural Cause is clear and distinct, if we understand it, as I have explained it in the precedent Question; but the Term of the Motion of our Members, is equivocal and confused; for there are many sorts of these Motions, some of the Will, Natural and Convulsive ones. There are likewise different Members in Man's Body: So that according to the first Rule, I must ask of which of these Motions it is that they would know the Cause: But if the Question is left indeterminate, so that I may make use of any I shall choose, I would examine the Question after this manner.  
And first, consider the Properties of these Motions, and because I immediately discover, that Voluntary Motions are commonly more readily performed, than the Convulsive ones; I conclude from thence, that their Cause is different: Therefore I can, and aught to examine the Question by Parts; for it would appear to be of too long a Discussion.  
I would oblige myself therefore, first, to consider Voluntary Motion; and because we have many Parts which concur to this Motion, I would first consider the Arm, as composed of many Muscles, which have generally some Action, when we lift a Weight up, or when we differently move Bodies; but I keep only to one, supposing the rest to be form very near after the same manner. I instruct myself of its Composition, by the Help of some Book of Anatomy, or rather by a Sensible Sight of its Fibres and Tendons, which I get some able Anatomist to dissect for me, to whom I make all the Demands which shall afterwards produce in my Mind some Method for me to find what I seek.  
Considering therefore all things attentively, I cannot doubt but the Principle of the Motion of my Arm depends upon the Contraction of the Muscles which compose it. And if I have not a mind to perplex myself with too many things: I may suppose, according to the common Opinion; that this Contraction is produced by the Animal Spirits which fill these Muscles, and by this means shorten them; the whole Question then, which respects Voluntary Motion, will be reduced, to know how the few Animal Spirits, which are contained in an Arm, can suddenly swell the Muscles, according to the Orders of the Will, with a sufficient Force to lift a Burden of an Hundred Weight or more.  
When we consider this with any Application, the first means that presents itself to the Imagination, is commonly that of some violent and quick Fermentation, like to that of Gunpowder, or certain Liquors filled with Volatile Salt, when they are mixed with those that are Acid, or full of fixed Salt. A little Gunpowder, when lighted, is capable of raising not only an Hundred Pound Weight, but a Tower, and even a Mountain: Earthquakes, which overthrow Towns, and shake whole Provinces, are also produced by Spirits, which are kindled under Ground, much like Gunpowder. Thus, supposing in the Arm such a Cause of the Fermentation and Dilatation of Spirits; we may say, that it is the Principle of the Power that Men have to perform such quick and violent Motions.  
However, as we ought to distrust this means, which enters into the Mind only by the Senses, and whereof we have no clear and evident Knowledge; we must not too easily admit of it: For indeed, it is not sufficient to give a Reason of the Force and Quickness of our Motions by a Comparison, since this Reason is confused and imperfect: For we must here explain a Voluntary Motion, and Fermentation is not Voluntary. The Blood excessively ferments in Fevers, and we cannot prevent it. The Spirits are inflamed and agitated in the Brain, and their Agitation diminishes not according to our Desires. When a Man moves his Arm after divers Ways, according to this Explanation, he must make a Million of great and small, quick and slow Fermentations that begin (and which is still more difficult to explain according to this Supposition) that end in the same Moment he wills it. These Fermentations must not dissipate all their Matter, and this Matter must be always ready to take Fire. When a Man walks Ten Miles, how many Thousand Times must the Muscles, which he uses in walking, be filled and emptied? And what a vast Quantity of Spirits would be required if Fermentation should dissipate and destroy them at every Step. This Reason is therefore imperfect, to explain the Motions of our Bodies which entirely depend upon our Will.  
It is evident, that the present Question consists in this Mechanical Problem. By Pneumatick Machine's, to find the means of overcoming such or such Force, suppose a Hundred Weight, by another as small as we will, suppose the Weight of an Ounce; and that the Application of this little Force shall produce its desired Effect, and depend upon the Will. Now this Problem is easily resolved, and the Demonstration of it is clear.  
We may resolve it by a Vessel which has two Orifices, one of which is a little more than 1600. Time's greater than the other, in which let there be inserted the Tubes of two equal Bellows, and only apply a Force 1600 Times greater than the other, to the Mouth of the greater Bellows; for then the Force of 1600 Times the less, shall overcome the greater. The Demonstration of it is clear from Mechanics, since the Powers are not exactly in Reciprocal Proportion with the Orifices, and the Relation of the least Force to the least Orifice, is greater than the Relation of greater Force to the greater Orifice.  
But to resolve this Problem by a Machine which represents the Effect of the Muscles, better than this Instance already mentioned. Blow up a Football and let there be a great Stone of 5 or 6 Hundred Weight laid upon it when half filled with Wind, or place the Ball upon a Table with a Board over it, and a Stone over that, or let some heavy Man sit upon it, holding himself by something that he may be able to resist the swelling of the Football. For if one blow in the Football once only with his Mouth, it will raise up the Stone, which presses it down, or the Man who sits upon it; provide a the Orifice, by which the Wind enters the Football, have a Sucker to hinder it from going out whilst the Person takes Breath. The Reason of this is, that the Orifice in the Ball is so small, or aught to be supposed so small, in Relation to the whole Ball which is compressed by the Stone, that a small Force is capable to overpower a great one by this method.  
If we consider also, that one's Breath is capable of pushing a Ball of Lead very violently by the means of a long Tube, because the Force of the Breath dissipates not, but continually renews: we may visibly discover, that the necessary Proportion between the Orifice and Capacity of the Ball, being supposed, ones Breath only may easily overcome a very great Force.  
If then we conceive, that all the Muscles, or each of the Fibres which compose them, have like this Football, a Capacity fit to receive the Animal Spirits; that the Pores, by which the Spirits insinuate themselves, are still smaller in Proportion than the Neck of a Bladder, or Orifice of a Ball; that the Spirits are kept in, and pushed forward in the Nerves, like Air in Tubes, and that the Spirits are more agitated than the Breath of the Lungs, and pushed with more Force in the Muscles, than in Balls: We shall discover, that the Motion of the Spirits, which are dispersed through the Muscles, can overcome the Force of the most weighty Burdens we can bear; and that if we cannot carry the heaviest, the Defect of the Power proceeds not so much from the Spirits, as that of the Fibres and Membranes that compose the Muscles, which would break if we made too great an Effort. Besides, if we observed, that by the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body, the Motions of these Spirits, as to their Determinations, depend upon the Will of Man, we should plainly see that the Motions of the Arms must be voluntary.  
It is true, we remove our Arms with so much Quickness, that at first it seems incredible, that the Effusion of the Spirits in the Muscles which compose them, should be quick enough to produce such a Motion. But we must consider, that these Spirits are extremely agitated, always ready to go from one Muscle to another, and that there is not need of many to swell them up so little as is necessary, to move them only, or when we lift any thing that's very light from the Ground; for when we have any thing heavy to lift we cannot do it so speedily. Burdens being heavy, will much swell and stretch the Muscles. To swell them up after this manner, requires more Spirits than there is in the adjoining or opposite Muscles. There must therefore be some little Time to collect these Spirits, in a Quantity sufficient to resist this Weight: So that those which are laden cannot run, and those that take any weighty thing from the Ground, cannot do it with so much Haste as those who take up a Straw.  
If we further reflect, that those that have more Heat, or a little Wine in their Heads, are much quicker than others; as amongst Animals, those whose Spirits are more agitated, as Birds move more swiftly than they that have their Blood cold, like Frogs: And that even amongst them there are some, as the Chameleon, the Tortoise, and other Infects, whose Spirits are so little agitated, that their Muscles fill not faster than a little Football which we should blow up. If we well consider all these things, it may be, we might think the Explanation already given fit to be received.  
But although this Part of the proposed Question which regards Voluntary Motions, is sufficiently resolved: We must not however, affirm that it is wholly so, and that there is nothing more in our Bodies, which contributes to these Motions, than what we have attributed to it; for there is probably in our Muscles, a thousand Springs which facilitate these Motions, and will be eternally unknown to those, even who make the strictest Scrutinies into the Works of God.  
The second Part of the Question which must be examined, respects Natural Motions, or those sort of Motions which have nothing extraordinary, as the Convulsive have; but that are absolutely necessary to the Preservation of our Machine, which consequently depend not entirely upon our Wills.  
I consider then first, with all the Attention I am capable, what the Motions are which have these Conditions, and if they are wholly alike; but because I immediately discover, that almost all of them differ one from another, not to perplex myself with too many things, I only insist upon the Motion of the Heart. This Part is the most known, and its Motions most sensible. I then examine its Structure, and amongst many others, observe two things. The first, that 'tis composed of Fibres like other Muscles; the second, that there is two very considerable Cavities in it. I therefore judge, that its Motions may be performed by the Animal Spirits, because it is a Muscle, and that the Blood there ferments and dilates its self, since there are Cavities there. The first of these Determinations is founded upon what I have already said; and the second, because the Heart is much hotter than all the other Parts of the Body; as it is that which disperses Heat with the Blood into all our Members, that these two Cavities could neither have been form nor preserved, but only by the Dilatation of the Blood; and that thus they are serviceable to the Cause which produced them. I can then give a sufficient Reason for the Motion of the Heart, by the Spirits which agitate it, and the Blood which dilates it when this Blood is fermented: For although the Cause I bring for its Motion, should not perhaps be true, yet it appears certain to me, that it is sufficient to produce it.  
It's true, that the Principle of the Fermentation or Dilatation of the Liquors, probably is not enough known to all that shall read this Book, to pretend to have shown an Effect, when we have in general discovered that its Cause is Fermentation; but we must not resolve all particular Questions by going back unto the first Causes. It is not because we cannot by this demonstrate, and discover the true System upon which all particular Effects depend, provided we stop only at clear Ideas: But that this manner of Philosophising is neither the most exact nor shortest.  
To explain what I mean, we must know there are Questions of two Sorts. In the first we try to discover the Nature and Properties of something: In the others we only desire to know if such a thing hath, or hath not such a Propriety, or if we know it has such a Propriety, we would only know the Cause of it.  
To resolve Questions of the first Kind, we must consider things in their Original, and always conceive them produced by the most Simple and most Natural Ways. To resolve the rest, a very different manner must be taken: They must be done by Suppositions, and we must examine whether these Suppositions make us guilty of any Absurdity, or if they conduce to any Truth clearly known.  
For Instance, we would discover what are the Properties of the Cycloid, or of some of the Conic Sections: These Lines must be considered in their Generation, and form according to the most Simple and least perplexed Ways; for 'tis the best and shortest Method to discover the Nature and Properties of them. We easily see that the Subtense of the Cycloid is equal to the Circle which forms it; and if we do not easily discover many Properties by this means, 'tis because the Circular Line which serves to form it, is not sufficiently known. But for these Lines, purely Mathematical, or such whose Relations we can know more exactly, as Conic Sections, we may discover a great Number of their Properties, by considering them in their Generation. We must only observe, that as they may be generated by a Regular Motion several Ways; so all Sorts of Generations are not equally proper to enlighten the Mind, but the most Simple are the best; and that it often happens, that certain particular Methods are more proper than others, to demonstrate some particular Properties.  
But if the Question is not in general to discover the Properties of a thing, but to know if a thing has such a Property: Then it must be supposed that it hath it effectively, and examine attentively, what must follow this Supposition; whether it leads to a manifest Absurdity, or else to some undoubted Truth, which may serve as a means to discover what we inquire after. And 'tis that Method Geometricians make use of to resolve their Problems. They suppose as done, what they seek for, and examine what must happen from thence, and attentively consider the Relations which result from their Suppositions. They represent all these Relations which include the Condition of the Problem by Equations; and afterwards reduce these Equations, according to their Rules, so that what is unknown, they find equal to one or many things perfectly known.  
If the Question than is in general, to discover the Nature of Fire, and the different Fermentations, which are the most universal Causes of Natural Effects: I say, that the shortest and most secure Way, is to examine it in its Original. We must consider the Formation of the most agitated Body, the Motion of which is dispersed into those that ferment. By clear Ideas, and the most Simple Way, we must examine what Motion is capable of producing in Matter. And because Fire and different Fermentations are very general things, and which consequently depend upon few Causes; it will not be requisite long to consider what Matter is capable of when it is animated by Motion, to discover the Nature of Fermentation is its Principle; and at the same time we shall learn many other things absolutely necessary to the Knowledge of Physics: Whereas if in this Question, we would reason by Suppositions, we should go back to the first Causes, to the Laws of Nature, according to which all things are form; and suppose many false things, which would be of no Use.  
We might soon discover, that the Cause of Fermentation is the Motion of an Invisible Matter, which communicates its self to the Parts of that which acts it; for we know plain enough, that Fire, and the different Fermentation of Bodies, consist in their Agitation, and that by the Laws of Nature. Bodies immediately receive their Motion only by their meeting with some others more agitated. Thus we may discover, that there is an Invisible Matter, whose Agitation is communicated to Visible Bodies. But it would be Morally impossible, by way of Supposition, to discover how it is done: And it is not near so difficult to discover, when we examine the Formation of the Elements, or some Bodies, whereof there's a great Number of the same Nature, as is evident by Mr. Descartes' System.  
The third Part of the Question, which is of Convulsive Motions will not be very difficult to resolve, provided we suppose in Body's Animal Spirits, capable of some Fermentation, and of Humours sufficiently penetrating, to insinuate themselves into the Pores of the Nerves, by which the Spirits disperse themselves through the Muscles, provided also we do not pretend to determine what the true Disposition of the Invisible Parts is, which contribute to these Convulsive Motions.  
When we have separated a Muscle from the rest of the Body, and hold it by the Extremities, we Sensibly perceive that it makes all its Effort to contract itself when we prick it in the Middle. It is very probable, that this depends upon the Construction of the Imperceptible Parts that compose it, which like so many Springs, are determined to certain Motions by this Pricking. But who can affirm they have found the true Disposition of the Parts, which serve to produce this Motion; or who can give an undoubted Demonstration of it? Certainly it would appear impossible, although it may be through the Power of Thought, we can imagine a Construction of the Muscles, fit to perform all the Motions we see them capable of. Yet must we not think to determine what is the true Construction of the Muscles: But because we cannot reasonably doubt, that there are Spirits Susceptible of some Fermentation, by the Mixture of some Subtle Matter, and that the sharp and pungent Humours may insinuate themselves into the Nerves, we may suppose it.  
To resolve the Question proposed, we must first examine how many Sorts of Convulsive Motions there are; and because the Number of them appears indetermined, we may keep to the chief, whose Causes seem to be different. We must consider the Parts wherein they are performed, the Diseases which precede and follow them: If they are produced with or without Pain, and particularly how quick and violent they are; for some of them are performed very quick and violent, others with Quickness without Violence, and some again without Quickness or Violence. There are some of them which continually end and being again; some which keep the Parts stiff and without Motion for some Time; and some again which entirely take away Persons Senses, and disfigure them.  
All these things considered, 'tis not difficult in general to explain, how the Convulsive Motions may be produced, after what we have already said of Natural and Voluntary Motions. For if we conceive that there is some Matter capable of fermenting the Spirits, mixed with those that are contained in a Muscle; this Muscle will be swelled up, and shall in this part produce a Convulsive Motion.  
If we can easily resist this Motion, it will be a sign that the Nerves are not stopped by any Humour, since we can empty the Muscle of the Spirits which are entered there, and determine them to swell up the opposite Muscle. But if we cannot, we must conclude that the sharp and penetrating Humours have at least some share in this Motion. It may even sometimes happen, that these Humours are the sole Cause of these Convulsive Motions: So they may determine the Course of the Spirits to certain Museles, by opening the Passages which carry them thither, and shutting up some others: Besides, they may contract the Tendons and Fibers, by penetrating their Pores.  
When a very heavy Weight hangs at the bottom of a Cord, we can raise it much, if we only wet the Cord; because the Particles of Water insinuate themselves like so many little Wedges between the Threads that the Cord is composed of, and shorten it by making it thicker. So the penetrating and sharp Humours insinuate themselves into the Pores of the Nerves, contract them, stretch the parts which are united to them, and produce Convulsive Motions in the Body, which are extreme slow, violent and painful; and often for some considerable time, leave a very great Distortion in the Part.  
For the Convulsive Motions which are speedily performed, they are caused by the Spirits; but 'tis not necessary that these Spirits should receive any Fermentation; it is enough if the Conduits they pass through are more open on one side than the other.  
When all the parts of the Body are in their Natural Situation, the Animal Spirits equally and swiftly disperse themselves every where in respect to the Exigency of the Machine, and Faithfully execute the Orders of the Will. But when the Humours trouble the Disposition of the Brain, and change or diversely move the Openings of the Nerves, or by penetrating into the Muscles, agitate their Springs; the Spirits disperse themselves through the Parts after new manner, and produce extraordinary Motions there without the consent of the Will.  
Yet may we sometimes by a powerful Resistance prevent any of these Motions, and even by degrees diminish the Traces which produced them, when the Habit is perfectly form. Those who take care of them, may very easily hinder themselves from making distorted Faces; or from assuming an unpleasant Air or indecent Posture, if the Body be indisposed. These things may be overcome although they are confirmed by a long habit, but with much difficulty; for they should always be resisted in their original, before the course of the Spirits has made a way too difficult to be stopped.  
The Cause of these Motions lies sometimes in the agitated Muscle, and is some Humour that pricks, or some Spirits which ferment there. But we must judge it to be in the Brain, chief when the Convulsions agitate not only one or two parts of the Body in particular, but almost all of it; and that in many Distempers which change the Natural Constitution of the Blood and Spirits.  
It is true, that one Nerve only having sometimes different Branches, which are sufficiently dispersed through the remote parts of the Body, as through the Face and Bowels; it often happens that the Convulsion having its Cause in one part, in which some of these Branches insinuate themselves, can communicate itself to them, or the other correspondent Branches, without the Brains being any cause of it, or the Spirits corrupted.  
But when the Convulsive Motions are common to most parts of the Body, we must needs say, that either the Spirits ferment after an extraordinary manner, or that the Order and Disposition of the parts of the Brain is troubled; or else, that both these things happen together. I will stay no longer upon this Question, for it becomes so compounded, and depends upon so many things, when we desecend to Particulars, that it cannot easily ferve to explain those Rules we have given.  
There is no Science which furnishes us with more Examples, fit to show the Usefulness of these Rules, than Geometry and chief Algebra, for in these two Sciences they are continually used. Geometry clearly shows the necessity there always is of beginning with the most simple things, which include the feweset Relations: If always examines these Relations by Measures evidently known: It takes away whatever is useless in the discovery of them, divides the Questions into parts, ranks these parts, and examines them in order. In short, The only Defect in this Science, is as I have before observed, that it has not a very proper Method to abridge the Ideas and Relations we have discovered. So that although it regulates the Imagination, and makes the Mind become exact, it does not much increase its Extension, nor render it capable of discovering very compound Truths. But Algebra continually teaches us to abridge Ideas and their Relations, after the shortest Method in the World, and extremely augments the Capacity of the Mind; for we can conceive nothing, how Compound soever, in the Relations of Magnitude, that the Mind cannot in times discover by its assistance, when we once know the way we must take.  
The fifth and following Rules, which concern the way of abridging Ideas, only respect this Science; for in other Sciences we have no commodious way of abridging them; so that I shall not stay to explain them. Those that have a great Inclination for the Mathematics, and will give to their Mind all the Force and Extension it is capable of; and thus put themselves into a Condition of discovering, without a Tutor, an infinite number of known Truths, will, if they seriously apply themselves to Algebra, discover, that this Science is so useful in an Enquiry after Truth, because it observes the Rules we have prescribed. But by Algebra, I mean chief that which Descartes and some others have made use of.  
Before I conclude, I will give an Example on which I shall insist a little longer, that we may be the better able to see what use may be drawn from it. In this Example I will represent the Advances of a Mind, which would examine a very important Question, and endeavour to deliver itself from its Prejudices. I shall at first make it fall into some Error, that it may recollect what I have said elsewhere; now its Attention at last conducting it to the Truth enquired after, I make it speak positively, like one who pretends to have resolved the Question he has examined.   

CHAP. IX. The last Example to show the usefulness of this Work, in which the Cause of the Union of the Parts of Bodies, and also the Rules of the Communication of Motion, are examined.  
Body's are united together after three different ways, by Continuity, Contiguity, and a third way, which has no particular name, because it rarely happens, and which I call by the general Term of Union.  
By Continuity, or the Cause of it, I mean that I know not what, which links together the Parts of a Body so strongly, that they cannot easily be separated, and which we look upon as making altogether but one whole.  
By Contiguity, I mean that I know not what, which makes me suppose two Bodies touching after such a manner so that there is nothing between them; but which I judge not strictly united, because I can easily separate them.  
By this third Term Union, I mean that I know not what, which is the cause that woe Glasses, or two Marbles, whose Surfaces having been polished by rubbing one against another, are joined together in such a manner, that although we can very easily separate them by making them slip off one another, we shall nevertheless have some trouble to do it by any other Method.  
Now this is not Continuity, since these two Glasses or Marbles being united after this manner, are not conceived as making but one Body, because in one Sense we can separate them so easily. Nor is it simply Contiguity, although it comes very near it, because these two pieces of Glass or Marble are strictly enough united, and even much more than the Parts of soft and liquid Bodies, as those of Butter and Water.  
These Terms thus explained, we must afterwards inquire into the Cause which unites Bodies, and the Differences between Continuity, Contiguity, and the Union of Bodies, according to the Sense I have determined. I first seek the Cause of Continuity, or that I know not what, which keeps the Parts of a Body so strictly united together, that some Force must be used to separate them, and which we look upon together as making one whole. I hope this Cause being found, we shall have no great Difficulty to discover the rest.  
It seems now necessary to me, that this I know not what, that ties even the smallest Parts of a piece of Iron together which I hold in my Hand, should be something very powerful, since I must use a great Force to break off one little part of it. But I deceive myself, May not this Difficulty that I find in breaking the least piece of Iron, proceed from my Weakness, and not the resistance of the Iron? For I remember that I have formerly used more Violence than I do now, to break a piece of Iron like that I hold in my Hand; and if I fall Sick, perhaps I could not even do it by the utmost Power I could use. I therefore see plainly, I must not absolutely judge of Firmness, whereby the parts of Iron are knit together, by the Endeavours I make to dis-unite them: I must only judge that they keep very strongly together in relation to my Weakness, or that they keep more strongly together than the parts of my Flesh, since the Sensations of Pain that I have whilst I make too great Efforts, advertises me that I shall rather dis-unite the parts of my Body than those of Iron.  
I discover then, that as I am not absolutely Strong, or Weak, Iron or other Bodies, are not absolutely hard or flexible, but only in relation to the Cause which acts upon them; and that the Efforts I make cannot serve me as a Rule to measure the greatness of the Force, that must be employed to overcome the Resistance and Hardness of Iron. For Rules ought to be invariable, and these Efforts change according to time, the abundance of actual Spirits, and hardness of my Flesh; since I cannot always produce the same Effects, by using the same Endeavours.  
This Reflection delivers me from a Prejudice that I had, which made me imagine the Links were strong which united the parts of Bodies, which Links perhaps are nothing at all; and I hope it will not be useless to me in the Consequence; for I have a strange Inclination to judge of every thing in relation to myself, and to follow the Impressions of my Senses, which I would more industriously avoid. But to proceed.  
After having thought some time, and with some application enquired the cause of this strict Union, without having discovered any thing of it, I find myself carried by my Negligence and Nature to judge with many others, that 'tis the Form of Bodies which preserves the Union between their Parts, or the Amity and Inclination they have for their likeness; for there is nothing more commodious than to suffer ourselves sometimes to be seduced, and so to become Learned at little Cost.  
But since I will not believe any thing I do not know, I must not suffer myself to be thus overcome by my own Idleness, nor give myself up to bare Appearances. Let us quit therefore these Forms and Inclinations, whereof we have no distinct and particular Ideas, but only confused and general ones, that it may be we form only in relation to our Nature, and even in the Existence of which many Persons, and perhaps whole Nations agree not.  
It seems to me, that I see the Cause of this strict Union of Parts which compose hard Bodies, without admitting of any other thing than what all the World grants to be in them, or at least all that the World conceives distinctly to be there; for every one distinctly conceives, that all Bodies are or may be composed of little Particles. Thus it may be there are some of them which are crooked and branched, and like little Links capable of holding others strongly together, or else that they intermix all their Branches, so that we cannot easily dis-unite them.  
I have a great Mind to permit myself to espouse this Thought, and so much the more, as that I see the visible Parts of great Bodies hold and unite themselves together after this manner. But I cannot too much distrust my Prejudices and the Impression of my Senses: I must therefore yet examine the Matter more closely, and see the Reason why the smallest and utmost Parts of Solid Bodies, in a word, even the Parts of each of these Links hold together; for they cannot be united by other Links yet smaller, since I suppose them solid: Or else, If I say they are united after this manner, they may reasonably demand what shall unite these others together, and so on ad infinitum.   diagram representing presumed atomic links 
So that now the Difficulty of the Question is to know, how the parts of these little Links, or branched parts, can be so strictly united together as they are, A for instance with B, which I suppose parts of a little Link. Or else, which is the same thing, Bodies being so much the harder, as they are more solid, and have fewer Pores, the Question now is, to know how the parts of a Column, composed of a Matter which has no Poor, can be strongly joined together, and compose a very hard Body; for we cannot say that the parts of this Column is held by little Links, since being without Pores they have no particular Figure.  
I find myself yet extremely inclined to say, that this Column is naturally hard, or else that the little Links, whereof hard Bodies are composed, are Atoms, whose parts cannot be divided, as being the essential and utmost parts of Bodies, which are essentially crooked, or branched, or of some perplexed Figure.  
But I freely confess that this is not to explain the Difficulty, and that quitting the Prejudices and Illusions of my Senses, I should be in the wrong to recur to an abstracted Form, and embrace a Logical Phantom for the cause I seek: I mean, I should be in the wrong, to conceive as something real and distinct, a rambling Idea of the Nature of Essence, which expresses only what we know: And thus to take an abstracted and universal Form, as a Physical Cause of a real Effect. For there are two things which I cannot too much distrust; the first is, The Impression of my Senses; and the other, The Facility I have to receive abstracted Natures, and general Logical Ideas, for those which are Real and Particular: I remember I have been many times seduced by these two Principal Errors.  
But to return to the Difficulty, It is not possible for me to conceive, how these little Links should be indivisible by their Nature and Essence, nor consequently how they should be Inflexible; since on the contrary I conceive them very Divisible, and necessarily divisible by their Nature and Essence: For the part A is most certainly a Substance as well as B; and consequently it is clear, that A can exist without B, since Substances can exist one without another; because otherwise they would not be Substances.  
We cannot say that A is not a Substance; for it is plain it is not a bare Mode, and all Being's are either Modes or Substances. So since A is not a Mode 'tis a Substance, than it may exist without B, and much more may the part A exist separately from B. So that this Link is divisible in A and in B.  
Moreover, If this Link was Indivisible, or crooked by Nature and Essence, it would be quite contrary to what we Experience, for than we could not break any body. Let us suppose as before, that a piece of Iron is composed of many Links, which is intermixed one in another, whereof A, a and B, b, are two of them: I say that we cannot unlink them, and consequently that we could not break this Iron: For to break it, we must bend the Links that compose it, which are nevertheless supposed naturally and essentially inflexible.  
And if we do not suppose them inflexible, but only indivisible by their Nature, the Supposition will be of no use to resolve the Question: For then the Difficulty would be to know, why these little Links do not obey our Efforts when we try to bend a Bar of Iron. Yet if we suppose them not Inflexible, we must not suppose them Indivisible; for if the parts of these Links can change their Situation one in respect to another, it is plain that they may be separated; since there is no reason why, if one part could remove itself a little from the other, it could not be absolutely done. Then whether we suppose these Links Inflexible or Indivisible, we cannot by this means resolve the Question: For if we suppose them only Indivisible, we must without trouble break a bit of Iron: And if we suppose them Inflexible, it will be impossible to break them, since the little Links which compose the Iron being embarrassed one in another, it will be impossible to unlink them. Let us try then to resolve the Difficulty by clear and undoubted Principles, and to find the reason why this little Link hath these two parts A and B, so firmly united.  
I see evidently that it is necessary to divide the Subject of my Meditation into parts, that I may examine it more exactly, and with less Intention of Mind, since I have not been able immediately with one simple view, and all the Attention I am capable of, to discover what I would find. And 'tis what I might have done from the beginning; for when the Subjects that we consider are a little intricate, 'tis always the best way to examine them in parts, and not fatigue ourselves unusefully upon false Hopes of meeting luckily with the Truth.  
What I inquire after, is the cause of the strict Union that is between the little Particles which compose the Link A B. Now there is only three things that I distinctly conceive capable of being the cause which I seek, viz. The parts of this little Link, the Will of the Author of Nature, or lastly, the Invisible Bodies which surround these little Links. I might yet bring for the Cause of these things, the Form of Bodies, the Qualities of Hardness, or some occult one, the Sympathy which would be between the Particles of the same kind, etc. but because I have not a distinct Idea of these fine things, I neither aught, nor can maintain my Arguments from them; so that if I find not the Cause I seek, in things that I have a distinct Idea of; I will not uselessy fatigue myself in the Contemplation of these rambling and general Logical Ideas, and will cease from speaking of what I understand not. But let us examine the first of these things, which may be the Cause, how the Particles of this little Link are so strictly united, viz. the little Parts it is composed of.  
When I consider only the Parts whereof hare Bodies are composed, I find myself inclined to believe, That we cannot imagine any Cement which unites the Parts of this Link, besides themselves and their own Rest: For of what Nature could it be? It would not be a thing which subsists of itself, for all these little Particles being Substances, for what Reason should they be united by other Substances than by themselves? Neither will it be a different Quality from Rest, because there is no Quality more contrary to Motion which might separate these Parts, than Rest: But besides Substances and their Qualities, we know of no other kind of Being's.  
It is very true, 
Defc. Prin. 1. Art 55. p 2.  the Parts of hard Bodies continue united, whilst they are in Rest one with another; and when they are once in Rest, they continue so of themselves as long as they can. But this is not what I seek, I know not how I came to mistake the Subject, I endeavour here to discover why the Particles of hard Bodies have Power to continue in Rest one by another, and how they resist the Efforts we make to move them.  
I might then answer myself, 
Descartes, Princip. Article 43. of the second Part.  that each Body has truly a Power to continue in the State 'tis in, and that this Power is equal, either in respect to Motion or Rest: But that which makes the Parts of hard Bodies continue in Rest by one anotherd, so that we are troubled to separate and move them, is because we employ not Motion enough to conquer their Rest. This is probable, it is true, but I seek a Certainty, if it can be found, and not only a Probability. 
Articl. 63.  And how can I certainly and evidently know that each Body has this Power to continue in the Condition it is in, and that this Power is equal in respect to Motion and Rest; since on the contrary, Matter appears indifferent to Motion and Rest, and absolutely without any Power. Let us have Recourse then with Mr. Descartes, to the Will of the Creator, which is it may be, the Power that Bodies seem to have in themselves; 'tis the second thing that we before supposed, was able to preserve the Parts of this little Link we speak of, so strongly united.  
Certainly, 'tis impossible that God may will each Body to continue in the Condition it is in, and that his Will is the Power which unites the Parts one to another, after the same manner as I have elsewhere considered his Will to be the moving Power which puts Bodies in Motion: For since Matter cannot move of itself, it seems to me, that I must judge it to be a Spirit, and even that 'tis the Author of Nature who maintains it and puts it in Motion, by successively preserving it in many Places by his Simple Will, since a Being, infinitely powerful, acts not by Instruments, and the Effects necessarily follow his Will.  
I perceive then, 
Descartes, Art. 33. of the 2d Part. Art:. 45. and in those which follow.  'tis possible that God should keep every thing in the Condition it is in, whether it be in Rest or in Motion, and that his Will is the Natural Power that Bodies have to continue in the State in which they have once been placed. If it is so, we must, as Descartes has done, measure this Power, conclude what ought to be the Natural Effects of it, and thus give Rules for the Power and Communication of Motions, at the Concourse of different Bodies, by the Proportion of Magnitude that is found between these Bodies; since we have no other Way to discover this general and immurable Will of God, who causes the different Powers that Bodies have to act upon and resist one another, besides their different Magnitudes and Celerities.  
Yet, I have no certain Proof, that by a positive Will, God keeps Bodies in a State of Rest; and it seems sufficient for him to will the Existence of Matter, not only to cause it to exist, but to remain in Rest.  
It is not the same in respect to Motion, because the Idea of Matter moved, certainly includes two Powers to which it relates, viz. That which created it, and that which moves it. But the Idea of Matter in Rest only includes the Idea of a Creating Power, without a Necessity of one to keep it in Rest; since if we simply conceive Matter, without thinking of any Power, we shall necessarily conceive it in Rest. Thus 'tis I determine things, for I must judge of them according to my Ideas, and according to them, Rest is but a Privation of Motion: For 'tis sufficient for God to cease to will that a Body should he moved, for its Motion to cease, and cause it to remain in Rest.  
But I remember I have heard many Ingenious Persons say, that it appeared to them, that Motion was as well the Privation of Rest, as that Rest was a Privation of Motion. Some even have assured me, by Reasons I could not apprehend, that it was more probable that Motion was rather a Privation than Rest. I do not distinctly remember the Arguments they brought, but it ought to make me suspect my Ideas to be false. For although most Men speak what pleases them, upon Matters that do not appear very Important: Yet, I have Reason to believe, that the Persons I speak of, took Pleasure in speaking what they conceived. I must therefore still examine my Ideas very carefully.  
'Tis a thing which appears undoubted to me, and these Gentlemen I speak of grant it, viz. That it is the Will of God which moves Bodies. The Power then that a Bowl has, which I see in Motion, is the Will of God which causes it to move: And what must God now do to cause it to stop? Must he, by a positive Will determine it to be in Rest, 
I imagine here that there is only God, myself, and a Bowl.  or else is it sufficient that he ceases to will it should be moved? It is evident, that if God only ceases to will that this Bowl should be moved, the Cessation of this Will of God will be the Cessation of the Motion of the Bowl; for the Will of God, which was the Power that moved the Bowl, being no more, this Power will continue no longer, nor the Bowl therefore any more moved. Thus a Cessation of the Power of Motion causes Rest. Rest has therefore no Power which produces it: 'Tis then only a pure Privation, which supposes not a positive Will in God; so that it would be unreasonable and unnecessary to admit a positive Will in God, to give Bodies any Power to continue in Rest.  
But let us, if possible, overthrew this Argument; suppose now a Bowl in Rest, whereas we supposed it before in Motion; what must God do to actuate it? Will it be enough for him to cease to will it should be in Rest? If it is so, I have yet advanced nothing; for Motion would as well be the Privation of Rest, as Rest the Privation of Motion. I suppose then that God ceases to will it should continue in Rest, but if this be granted, I do not see that the Bowl moves; and if any one sees it moved, I desire them to tell me after what Degree of Motion it is moved. Certainly 'tis impossible that it should move, and not have some Degree of Motion; and from our conceiving only that God ceases to will it should be in Rest, it is impossible to conceive it to go with any Degree of Motion; because it is not the same with Motion as Rest. Motions are infinitely various, they are capable of More or Less: But Rest being nothing, one cannot differ from another. A Bowl even, which goes twice as fast in one Time as in another,, has twice as much Power or Motion in one Time as in another; but we cannot say that the same Bowl has twice as much Rest in one Time as in another.  
Therefore it must be a positive Will from God, to put a Bowl in Motion, or to give a Bowl such a Power as to move itself; and it is enough for him to cease willing its Motion, for it to be in Rest just as in the Creation of the World; it is not sufficient that God should will the World should exist; but it is necessary that he positively wills the Manner in which it must exist. And to annihilate it, it must not be God's willing that it should not be, because God cannot will nothing by a positive Will, it is enough only that God, ceases to will that it should exist.  
I do not here consider Motion and Rest according to their Relative Being: For 'tis plain, that Bodies in Rest, have as real Relations to those which encompass them, as those that are in Motion have. I only conceive, that Bodies which are in Motion, have a moving Power, and those that are in Rest, have no Power to keep themselves in Rest, because the Relation that Bodies moved have to those which encompass them, always changing, it must be a continual Power which produces these continual Changes: For indeed, 'tis these Changes that cause whatsoever Revolutions we see in Nature. But there is no need of Power to do nothing: When the Relation of a Body to those that surround it, is always the same; there is nothing done, and the Preservation of this Relation, I mean, the Action of the Will of God who preserves this Relation, is not different from that which preserves the same Body.  

By a Body in a Void, I mean one so separated from others, as well hard as liquid, that there is none which helps or hinders the Communication of Motion.  If it is true, as I conceive, that Rest is only a Privation of Motion, the least Motion, I mean that of the least agitated Body, includes more Force or Power than the rest of the greatest Body. Thus the least Force, or smallest Body that we should conceive moved in a Void, against a great and vast Body, would be capable of moving it; since this great Body being in Rest, it will have no Power to resist the little Body which will strike against it; so that the Resistance that the Parts of hard Bodies make to hinder their Separation, necessarily proceeds from some other Cause than that of Rest.  
But we must demonstrate, by Sensile Experiments, what we have been proving by abstracted Reasonings, to see if our Idees agree with the Sensations that we receive of Objects? For it often happens that such Arguments deceive us, or at lest cannot convince others, and particularly such as are prejudiced on the contrary Side. The Authority of Descartes has so much Power over the Reason of some Men, that one must prove by all imaginable Ways, that this great Man is deceived to be able to disabuse them: What I have said, will make a deep Impression on the Mind of those that are not prejudiced with the contrary Opinion; and I plainly see they will blame me for proving things which appear indisputable to them. But the Cartesians very well deserve that I should use my endeavour to satisfy them; others may pass over this Discourse, if they think it tedious.  
Here then are some Experiments which sensibly prove, that Rest has no Power to resist Motion, and which consequently discover that the Will of the Author of Nature, which gives the Power and Force that each Body has to continue in that State wherein it is, respects only Motion and not Rest; since Bodies have no Power of themselves.  
Experience shows us, that very great vessels, which swim in the Water, may be agitated by the least Bodies which hit against them. From thence I pretend, notwithstanding all the Evasions of Descartes and the Cartesians, that if these great Bodies were in a Void, they might yet be more easily agitated: For the Reason why there is some little Difficulty to move a Vessel in Water, is because the Water resists the Power of the Motion we impress on it, which would not happen in a Void; and what manifestly shows us, that Water resists the Motion we impress on the Vessel, is the Vessels ceasing to be agitated some time after it has been moved; for this would not happen, if the Vessel did not lose its Motion by communicating it to the Water, or if the Water gave way without resisting it; or in fine, if it partook of its Motion. Thus, since a Vessel agitated in the Water, by little and little ceases to move; 'tis an undoubted Mark that the Water resists its Motion instead of facilitating it, as Descartes pretends; and consequently, it would yet be infinitely more easy to agitate a great Body in a Void than in Water, since there is no Resistance from Bodies about it. It is therefore evident, that Rest has no Power to resist Motion, that the least Motion contains more Power and Force than the greatest Rest: Or at least, that we ought not to measure the Force of Motion and Rest by the Proportion that is found between great Bodies which are in Motion and in Rest, as Descartes has done.  
It is true, there is some Reason to believe that a Vessel is agitated as soon as it is in the Water, because of the continual Change which happens to the Parts of the Water that encompass it, although it seems to us that it does not change its Place. It is that which has made Descartes and some others believe, that 'tis not the Force only of that which impels it, that makes it advance in the Water; but having already received much Motion from the little Parts of liquid Bodies which surround it, and which equally push it on all sides: This Motion is only determined by the new Motion of that which bushes it: So that that which agitates a Body in Water, could not do it in a Void. Thus it is, that Descartes, and those that are of his Opinion, defend the Rules of Motion that he has given us.  
For instance, let us suppose a Piece of Wood a Foot square in a Liquid Body: All the little Parts of the Liquid Body acts upon it, and moves against it, and because they equally push it on all sides, as well towards A as B: It cannot advance nearer to one side than another: But if I then push another Piece of Wood of half a Foot, against the first, toward the Side A; I shall see it advance. And from thence I conclude, that it might be moved, if in a Void, with less Force than that whereby this Piece of Wood bushes it, for the Reasons I have already brought. But the Persons I speak of deny it, and answer, that what makes the great Piece of Wood advance as soon as it is pushed by the little one, is because the little one which could not move it of itself, being joined with the Parts of the Liquid Body which are agitated, determine them to push it, and communicate to it one Part of their Motion. But 'tis plain, that according to this Answer, the Piece of Wood being once agitated, must not diminish its Motion, but on the contrary, continually augment it. 
Art. 5.  For by this Answer the Piece of Wood is pushed more by the Water to the Side of A, than to the Side of B; therefore it must always advance towards it. And because this Impulsion is continual, its Motion must always increase. But as I have already said, the Water is so far from facilitating its Motion, that it continually resists it, and its Resistance always diminishes it, and at last will make it perfectly cease.  
We must now prove, that the Piece of Wood that was equally pushed by the little Particles of the Water that surrounds it, has no Motion or Power at all that is capable to move it; although it continually changes its Place, and though the Surface of the Water which encompasses it, is different at different Times. For if it is so, that a Body equally pushed on all Sides, as this Piece of Wood is, has no Motion; it is certain, that 'tis only the Foreign Force that strikes against it, which communicates it; since in the same Time that this foreign Force bushes it, the Water resists it, and by little and little destroys the Motion which is impressed on it, for by degrees it ceases to move.  
It is certain, at least to those whom I speak to, that there never is in Nature more Motion at one Time than at another; and that Bodies in Rest are moved only by meeting with some agitated Bodies, which communicate their Motion to them. From thence I conclude, that a Body which I suppose created perfectly at rest in the middle of the Water, will never receive any Degree of Motion from the little Particles of Water which surround it, and continually strike against it, provided they push it equally on all Sides; because all these little Particles which strike against it equally on all Sides, reflecting with all their Motion, they communicate none to it; and consequently, this Body must always be considered as in Rest, and without any moving Power, although it continually change its Surface.  
Now the Proof I have, that these little Parts reflect thus with all their Motion, is, that besides this, that we cannot conceive the thing to be otherwise, the Water that touches this Body, must grow cold, or even freeze, and become very near as hard as the Wood upon its Surface; since the Motion of the Particles of Water would be equally distributed to the little Parts of the Body they encompass.  
But to accommodate myself to those that defend Descartes' Sentiment, I grant, we must not consider a Boat in the Water as in Rest. I also allow, that all the Parts of the Water which are about it, agree to the new Motion that the Waterman imprints on it, although it be but too visible by the Diminution of the Motion of the Boat, that it resists it more on the Side it goes to, than from that whence it was pushed. This supposed, I say, that from all the Particles of Water that are in the River, there is, according to Descartes, only those that immediately touch the Boat on the Side from whence it was pushed, that can assist its Motion. 
Art. 63.  For, according to this Philosopher, The Water being fluid, all the Parts of which it is composed, act not together against the Body we would move, but only those, that touching it, conjointly bear upon it. Now, those which are conjointly born upon the Boat, and the Waterman together, are twenty times less than the Boat. 
See Art. 63. of the second Part of his Principles.  It is therefore plain, by the Explanation, that Decartes has given in this Article, upon the Difficulty we have to break a Nail between our Hands, that a little Body is capable of agitating a much greater than itself. For indeed, our Hands are not so fluid as Water, and when we would break a Nail, there is more Parts joined together, which act conjointly then in the Water which bushes a Boat.  
But here is a more Sensible Experiment: If we take a Board well plained, or some other very hard Plane, drive in it a Nail halfway, and set the Plane in an inclining Position, placing a Bar of Iron an hundred times thicker than the Nail above it, and suffer the Bar to slide down, I say this Nail will not break. And we must further observe, That according to Descartes, all the parts of this Bar rest upon and conjointly act upon this Nail, for this Bar is hard and solid. If then there was no other Cement than rest to unite the parts of this Nail, the Bar of Iron being an hundred times greater than the Nail, 
Art. 63. Art. 50.  would according to Descartes' fifth Rule, and according to Reason, communicate some of its Motion to the part of the Nail it fell upon, that is, break it and pass beyond it, although even this Bar should slide but very slowly. So that we must seek another Cause than the Rest of the parts, to make Bodies hard, or capable of resisting the Efforts that we make, when we would break them, since Rest has no power to resist Motion: And I believe these Experiments suffice to show, that the abstracted Proofs we have brought are not false.  
We must then examine the third thing we have before supposed might be the cause of the strict Union that is found between the parts of hard Bodies, viz. An invisible Matter that environs them, which being extremely agitated, with much Violence bushes the External and Internal Parts of these Bodies, and compresses them after such a manner, that to separate them, more Force is necessary than this invisible and extremely agitated Matter has.  
It seems than I might reasonably conclude, that the Union of the constituent parts of hard Bodies depends upon the subtle Matter which encompasses and compresses them: Since the two other things that we can think to be the Causes of this Union are not truly so, as we have already seen; for since I find resistance enough in breaking a piece of Iron, and that this resistance proceeds neither from the Iron, nor the Will of God, as I think I have proved; it must necessarily proceed from some invisible Matter, which can be no other than that which immediately encompasses and compresses it. Nevertheless I shall further give some positive Proofs of this Opinion, after I have explained it more at large by some Example.  
Take a Globe of any hard Metal, which is hollow within, cut it into two Hemispheres, and join these two Hemispheres with a little Wax at the place of their union, and exhaust the Air out of it; these two Hemispheres joined one to the other after this manner, if many Horses were fastened to them, some on one side and some on the other, could not be separated by them, supposing the Magnitude of the Hemispheres to be in Proportion to the number of Horses: Yet if we suffer the Air to re-enter, one Person alone could separate them without any Difficulty. It is easy to conclude from this Instance, That what so strongly unites these two Hemispheres, proceeds from their being compressed and surrounded upon their External and Convex Surface by the Air which environs them, whilst there was no Counterpressure in their Internal and Concave Surface. So that the Action of the Horses that drew the two Hemispheres on both sides, could not overcome the Efforts of an infinite Number of little Particles of the Air that resisted them, by pressing these two Hemispheres together. But the least Force is capable of separating them, when the Air, being entered again within the Sphere, bushes the Concave and Internal Surfaces, as much as the Air without presses the External and Convex ones.  
But if, on the contrary, we take a Carp Bladder, and put it in a Vessel, from whence all the Air has been exhausted, this Bladder, being full of Air, will crack and break, because then there is no Air without the Bladder to resist that which is within. 'Tis likewise the same Reason that I have given for the first Experiment, that two Planes of Glass or Marble having been used to be joined one upon another, so that in one Sense we find some resistance in the separating of them; because these two parts of Marble are pressed and constringed by the External Air which encompasses them, and are not so strongly pushed by it within. I might bring an infinite Number of other Experiments, to prove that the gross Air which environs Bodies, strongly unites their Parts; but what I have said, may suffice clearly to explain my Thoughts upon the present Question.  
I say then, that which so strongly unites the Parts of hard Bodies, and these little Links I have before spoke on, is other little external Bodies infinitely more agitated than the Air we breath in, and these push and compress them; and that which gives us some Trouble to separate them, is, not their Rest, but the Agitation of these little Bodies which surround them: So that what resists Motion is not Rest, which is only a Privation, and has no Power of itself, but some contrary Motion.  
This bare Exposition of my Opinion perhaps seems reasonable; yet I well foresaw, that many Persons would have some Difficulty to receive it. Hard Bodies make so great an Impression upon our Senses, when they strike us, or when we make any Effort to break them, that we are inclined to believe their Parts are united much more strictly than indeed they are. And on the contrary, the little Bodies which I have said encompasses them, and to which I have given the Power of causing this Union, makes no Impression upon our Senses, seeming to be too weak to produce so Sensible an Effect.  
But to destroy this Prejudice, which is founded only upon the Impressions of our Senses, and the Difficulty we have to imagine Bodies smaller and more agitated than those we see every Day; we must consider that the Hardness of Bodies must not be judged of in Relation to our Hands, or to the Efforts we are capable of making, which vary at different Times. For indeed, if the greatest Force of Man is almost nothing in Comparison of that of the Subtle Matter, we should be very much in the wrong to believe that Diamonds and the hardest Stones, might not have, for the Cause of their Hardness, the Compression of little rapid Bodies which encompass them. Now we may plainly discover, that the Force of Man is very small, if we consider, that the Power he has of moving his Body into many different Ways, proceeds only from a little Fermentation of his Blood, which by agitating some few little Parts, so produces the Animal Spirits. For 'tis the Agitation of these Spirits, which gives Force to our Bodies, and gives it a Power to make these Efforts, that we unreasonably look upon as something very great and powerful.  
But it must be well observed, that this Fermentation of our Blood is only a very little Communication of the Motion of this subtle Matter we speak of; for all the Fermentations of Visible Bodies, are only Communications of the Motion of Invisible Bodies, since every Body receives its Agitation from some other. We must not therefore wonder if our Power is not so great as that of this Subtle Matter which we receive it from. But if our Blood fermented as much in our Hearts, as Gunpowder does when we put Fire to it, that is, if our Blood received as great a Communication of the Motion of this Subtle Matter, as that of Gunpowder receives: We might do extraordinary things very easily, as break Iron, throw down a House, etc. provided we suppose there was an agreeable Proportion between our Members and the Blood thus agitated. We ought then to destroy our Prejudices, and not to imagine, according to the Impression of our Senses, that the Parts of hard Bodies are so strongly united together, because we have so much Trouble to break them. But if we should consider the Effects of Fire in Mines, in heavy Bodies, and in many other Effects of Nature, which have no other 'Cause than the Agitation of these Invisible Bodies, as Descartes has proved in many Places, we should manifestly discover, that 'tis not above their Power to unite and compress together the Parts of hard Bodies as strongly as we see they are united. For in fine, I am not afraid to affirm, that a Cannon-Bullet, whose Motion appears so extraordinary, does not even receive the Thousandth Part of the Motin of the Subtle Matter that is about it.  
We should not doubt of what I advance, if we first considered, that Gunpowder is not all enkindled in the same Instant: Secondly, that although it should all take Fire at the same Instant, it swims but a very little while in the Subtle Matter; and Bodies which swim but a little while in others, cannot receive much Motion from them; as we may see in Boats that we abandon to the Course of the Water, which receive their Motion but by little and little. In the third Place, and chief, because each Particle of Powder can receive only the Motion which the Subtle Matter impresses; for the Water communicates to the Vessel, only the direct Motion which is common to all the Parts thereof, which is generally very small in Relation to other Motions.  
I could further show the Greatness of the Motion of the Subtle Matter to those that receive Descartes' Principles, by the Motion of the Earth, and Gravity of Body; and could, even from thence, bring Proofs that are certain and exact enough, but it is not necessary to my Subject. It's enough, without having read the Works of Descartes, or having a sufficient Proof of the Agitation of this Subtle Matter, which I ascribe as the Cause of the Inflexibility of Bodies, to read with some Application, what I have said of it in the 2d. Chap. of the 4th. Book.  
Being then now delivered from the Prejudices which incline us to believe that our Efforts were very powerful, and that that of the Subtle Matter which environs and compresses hard Bodies, is very weak, and being otherwise persuaded of the violent Agitation of this Matter, by what I have said of Gunpowder: It will not be difficult to see that 'tis absotutely necessary that the Matters acting infinitely more upon the Surface of hard Bodies that it encompasses and compresses, than within the same Bodies, it must be the Cause of their Inflexibility, or the Resistance we feel when we endeavour to break them.  
Now, as there is always many Particles of this Invisible Matter which passes through the Pores of hard Bodies, they make them not only hard, as we have already explained, but further, are the Cause that some are Springy and Elastic, others stand bend; and that others are fluid and liquid; and in fine, that they are not only the Cause of the Force that hard Bodies have to continue united together, but also that fluid Bodies have to separate, that is, are the Cause that some Bodies are hard, and others fluid.  
But because 'tis absolutely necessary, to know distinctly the Physics of Descartes, the Figure of his Elements, and Parts which compose particular Bodies, to give a Reason why certain Bodies are stiff, and some others pliable; I shall not stay here to explain it. Those who have read the Works of this Philosopher, will easily enough imagine what may be the Cause thereof, which I could not explain without great Difficulty; and those who are unacquainted with this Author, would but confusedly understand the Reason that I might bring for it.  
Nor shall I also stop here to resolve a great Number of Difficulties, that I foresee may be brought against what I have established: Because, if those that raise them have no Knowledge of true Physics, I should only tyre and displease them, instead of satisfying them: But if they are learned Persons, their Objections being stronger, I could not answer them but by a great Number of Figures and long Discourses; so that I believe I ought to desire those that find any Difficulty in what I have advanced, very carefully to read this Chapter over again; for I hope, if they do so, and meditate on it as much as is necessary, all their Objections will vanish. But if they find my Request incommodious, they may omit it; for there is no great Danger in being ignorant of the Cause of Body's inflexibility.  
I speak not here of Contiguity: For 'tis plain, Contiguous things touch so little, that there is always much Subtle Matter which passes between them, and which endeavours to continue its Motion in a right Line, to prevent their uniting.  
For the Union that is observed between Marbles which have been polished one upon another, I have explained it, and 'tis easy to see, that although this Subtle Matter always passes between these two Parts, how united soever they may be, the Air cannot pass it; and therefore 'tis that which compresses and binds those two Pieces of Marble together, and causes some Trouble to disunite them, if we do not make them slide off one another.  
It is plain, from all this, that the Continuity, Contiguity, and Union of two Marbles, will only be the same thing in a Void; neither have we different Ideas of them, so that 'tis as much as to say, we do not understand them, if we make them absolutely differ, without any Relation to the Bodies which surround them.  
Here now follows some Reflections upon Descartes' Sentiment, and the Original of his error. I call his Opinion an Error, because I find no Expedient to defend what he says of the Rules of Motion, and Cause of the Hardness of Bodies, in many Places at the End of the Second Part of his Principles; and it seems to me, that I have sufficiently proved the Truth of the contrary Opinion.  
This great Man very distinctly conceived that Matter could not move of itself, and that the Natural moving Power of all Bodies, was nothing else but the general Will of the Author of Nature, and that the Communications of the Motions of Bodies, at their mutual Meeting, could only proceed from this same Will. If we take this for granted, we can give no Rules for the different Communication of Motions, but by the Proportion that is found between the different Magnitude of Bodies which beat against them, since it is impossible to penetrate the Designs of God's Will. And because he judges, that every thing had Power to continue in the State it was in, whether in Motion or Rest, because that God, by his Will, determined this Power always to act after the same manner; he concludes, that Rest has as much Power to act as Motion: So he measures the Effects of the Power of Rest by the Magnitude of Bodies which possessed it, as those of the Power of Motion; and hence he gave the Rules for the Communication of Motion that are in his Principles, and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies which I have endeavoured to refute.  
It is difficult enough not to be of Descartes' Opinion, when we look upon it as he did; for once more, since the Communication of Motions proceed only from the Will of the Author of Nature, and that we see all Bodies continue in the State they are once placed in, whether it be Motion or Rest; It seems, we ought to seek the Rules of the different Communication of Motions at the meeting of Bodies, not in the Will of God which is unknown to us, but in the Proportion there is between the Magnitudes of these Bodies.  
I do not therefore wonder that Descartes had this Thought, but I only wonder that he did not correct it, when he had made a farther Advance in his Discoveries, and found both Existence and the Effects of the Subtle Matter which environs all Bodies.  
I am surprised, that in the 132 Article of the 4th Part, he attributes the Elastic Force that certain Bodies have, to this subtle Matter, and that in Articles 55 and 43 of the Second Part, and in other Places, he does not attribute it to their Hardness, or the Resistance they make when we endeavour to bend or break them, but to the rest of their Parts. It appears evident to me, that the Cause of the Elasticity and Stiffness of certain Bodies, is the same with that which gives them the Power of Resistance, when we would break them; for indeed, the Force that we use to break Steel, differs but insensibly from that by which we bend it.  
I will not here bring all the Reasons that might be urged to prove these things; nor answer to any Difficulties that we might form from hard Bodies making no Sensible Resistance, and yet we have some Trouble to bend them. For it will be enough to make these Difficulties vanish, to consider that the Subtle Matter cannot easily take a new course in Bodies which break when we bend them, as in Glass and in tempered Steel; and that it cannot more easily do it in Bodies that are composed of branchy Parts which are not brittle, as in Gold and Lead: And indeed, there is no hard bodies which make not some little Resistance.  
It is difficult enough to persuade ourselves that Descartes positively believed the Cause of Hardness was different from that of Elasticity: And what appears most probable is, that he has not sufficiently reflected upon the Matter. When we meditate long upon any Subject, and are satisfied in things we would know, we often think no more of them: We believe that the Thoughts that we have had, are undoubted Truths, and 'tis useless to examine farther. But in Men there are many things which disgust them against Application, incine them to a rash Assent, and make them subject to Error; and although the Mind continues apparently satisfied, it is not always because it is well informed of the Truth. Descartes was a Man like us: I confess we never saw more Solidity, Exactness, Extension, and more Penetration of Mind than what appears in his Works; yet he was not infallible. So that it is probable he was so very strongly persuaded of his Opinion, from not sufficiently reflecting that he asserted something elsewhere in nis Principles contrary to it.  
He maintained it upon very specious and probable Reasons, but such however as were not of sufficient Force to make us submit, and therefore he might, and aught to have suspended his Judgement. It is not enough to examine, in a hard Body, what might be the Cause that made it so; We ought also to think of the invisible bodies which might render them hard, as he has done at the End of his Philosophical Principles, when he attributes the Cause of Resistance to them: He ought to have made an exact Division, which comprised whatsoever might contribute to the Inflexibility of bodies. It is not sufficient still to seek the Cause in God's Will; he ought also to have thought of the Subtle Matter which environed them. For although the Existence of this extremely agitated Matter was not yet proved in that Place of his Principles where he speaks of Hardness, it was not then rejected: He ought then to have suspended his Judgement, and to have remembered that what he had writ of the Cause of Hardness, and Rules of Motion, aught to have been reviewed anew, which I believe he did not do carefully enough; Or else he did not sufficiently consider the true Reason of a thing that is very easy to discover, and which yet is of the utmost Consequence in Physics; I will explain it.  
Descartes well knew, that to maintain his System, of the Truth which he could not reasonably doubt: It was absolutely necessary that great bodies should always communicate their Motion to the lesser bodies they should meet, and the less reflect at their meeting with the greater, without a like Loss on their Side. For without that, the First Element would not have all the Motion that it is necessary it should have above the Second, nor the Second above the Third; and his whole System would be absolutely false, as is sufficiently known to those that have but thought a little upon it. But in supposing that Rest had Force enough to resist Motion, and that a great Body in Rest, could not be moved by another that is less than it, although it strike it with a furious Agitation: It is plain, that great Bodies must have much less Motion than a like Mass of little Bodies; since, according to this Supposition, they can always communicate what they have, and cannot always receive from the lesser. Thus this Supposition not being contrary to whatsoever Descartes has said in his Principles, from the Beginning unto the Establishment of his Rules of Motion, and agreeing very well with the Sequel of his Principles; he believed that the Rules of Motions, which he thought he had demonstrated in their Cause, were also sufficiently confirmed by their Effects.  
I agree with Descartes, that great Bodies communicate their Motion much more easily than little Bodies do; and therefore his First Element is much more agitated than the Second, and the Second than the Third. But the Cause of it is clear, without having any Regard to his Supposition. Little and fluid Bodies, as Water, Air, etc. can only communicate to great Bodies an uniform Motion, which is common to all their Parts: The Water in a River can only communicate to a Boat, the Motion of Descent, which is common to all the little Parts of which the Water is composed, and every one of these Parts, besides this common Motion, has also an infinite Number of other Particulars. Thus by this Reason 'tis plain, that a Boat for instance, can never have so much Motion as an equal Bulk of Water, since the Boat can only receive from the Water, that Motion which is direct and common to all the Parts that compose it. If Twenty Particles of a fluid Body push any other Body on the one Side, and as many on the other, it will continue , and all the little Particles of the fluid Body in which it swims, rebound up without losing any thing of their Motion. Thus great Bodies, whose Parts are united, can only receive the Circular and Uniform Motion of the Vortex of the Subtle Matter which environs them.  
This Reason seems sufficient to them, to make it comprehended how great Bodies are not so much agitated as the lesser, and that there is a Necessity for an Explanation of these things, to suppose any Force in Rest to resist Motion. The Certainty of Descartes' Principles cannot be a sufficient Proof to defend his Rules of Motion; and we may believe that if Descartes himself had again, without Prejudice, examined his Principles, and compared them with such Reasons as I have brought, he would not have believed that the Effects of Nature had confirmed his Rules, nor have fallen into a Contradiction, by attributing the Hardness of Bodies only to the rest of their Parts, and their Elasticity to the Force of a Subtle Matter.  
Here follows now the Rules of the Communication of Motions in a Void, which are only the Consequences of what I have established about the Nature of Rest.  
Bodies not being hard in a Void, since they are only hard by the Pressure of the Subtle Matter which surrounds them, if Two Bodies meet, they would flatten without rebounding; we must therefore give these Rules: Suppose them hard of themselves, and not by the Pressure of this Subtle Matter.  
Rest having no Power to resist Motion, and many Bodies before being considered as one only in the moment of their meeting; it is plain, they ought not to rebound when they are equal in Magnitude and Velocity; or that their Velocity supplies the Desect of their Magnitude, or their Magnitude the Defect of their Velocity. And it is easy from thence to conclude, that in all other Cases they must always communicate their Motion, 
A general Rule for the Communication of Motion.  so that they may afterwards proceed with an equal Swiftness.  
So that to know what must happen in all the different Suppositions of Magnitude and Swiftness of Bodies which meet one another; we need only add together all the Degrees of Motion of two or many Bodies, which must be considered only as one at the Time when they mere, 
See Descartes' Rules in the second Part of his Principles.  and after divide the Sum of all the Motions in Proportion to the Magnitude of these Bodies.  
From whence I conclude, that of the Seven Rules that Descartes gives of Motion; the Three first are good.  
The Fourth is false, and B must communicate its Motion to C, in Proportion to the Magnitude of the same C, and afterwards move together: So that if C is double to B, and B has Three Degrees of Motion, it must communicate Two of them. For I have sufficiently proved, that Descartes ought not to have supposed Rest to have had any Force to resist Motion.  
That the Fifth is true.  
That the Sixth is false, and that B must communicate the Half of its Motion to C.   diagram demonstrating how Descartes 'fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh rules of motion are false 
And that the seventh is false, since B must always communicate its Motion to C in Proportion to the Magnitude and Motion of both B and C. That if, according to the Supposition, C is double to B, and has three Degrees of Motion, whilst C has but two, they must necessarily move together, since indeed C and B are but one Body at the Time of their Meeting; and because we must add the Degrees of Swiftness which are five, and afterwards divide them in Proportion to their Magnitude, and so give 1⅔ to B, and 3⅓ to C the double of B. But these Rules although certain by what I have said, are yet contrary to Experience, because we are not in a Void.  
The chief of all the Experiments, which are contrary to what I have said of the Rules of Motion, is, that it always happens that hard Bodies which shock each other, do still rebound different Ways, or at least they do not follow one another after their meeting.  
To answer to which we must call to mind what has been said about the Cause of Elactity; that there is a Matter whose Agitation is strangely violent, which continually passes between the Parts of hard Bodies, and makes them so by compressing them as much upon the external as internal Parts. For from thence 'tis easily seen that in the Time of Percussion, two Bodies which meet, drive or divert the Course of this Matter from the nearest Places to those where they are shockt: And this Matter resisting with a great Violence, repels the two Bodies which meet, and restores its Passage which the Percussion had stopped up.  
That which proves yet more clearly what I have said, is that if two Balls of Lead, or some other less elastic Matter, meet together, they rebound not after their Shock, but go on according to the Rules I have before established; which they keep with so much the more Exactness, as their Elasticity is less. Bodies then rebound after their Percussion, because they are hard, that is, as I have explained, because there is a Sort of Matter much agitated which compresses them, and which passing through their Pores with a great Violence, repulses the Bodies which strike against one another. But we must suppose that the Bodies which meet break not those they strike against, by a Motion that conquers the Force, which these little Parts of subtle Matter has to resist, as when we discharge a Musket against a Piece of Wood: It is true, this subtle Matter compresses soft Bodies, and passes very quickly through their Pores, as well as it does through those of the hard, and that nevertheless these soft Bodies make no Resistance. The Reason is because the Matter which passes through soft Bodies, can open its Passage on all Sides very easily, because of the Smallness of the Parts which compose them, or of some particular Configuration proper for this End, which hard Bodies cannot suffer, because of the Grossness and contrary Disposition of their Parts to this effect.  
Thus when a hard Body shocks another that is soft, it changes all the Ways by which the subtle Matter passes, which is often visible, as in a Musket Bullet that is flatted when we strike it. But when a hard Body hits another like itself, it produces none or very sew new Ways, and the subtle Matter which is within its Pores is forced to return by the Way it came, or else it repels those Bodies which shut up its little Passages.  
Suppose A an hard and B a soft Body, and C c the Channel of the subtle Matter, I say that if A shocks B at the Point c, the Channel C c is obstructed, and the subtle Matter finds out new Ways in this soft Body. Thus the subtle Matter having a free Passage, it repels not the Bodies which hit against it, but the Bodies themselves change their Figure and become a little flat. And we must suppose that in the least hard Bodies, there is an infinite Number of Channels like to C c.  
But if A and a are two hard Bodies which meet, the Passage C c will be straightened, and the subtle Matter which is there obstructed, continuing its Motion in a right Line, must for want of new Passages, repel the Body which shocks it with so much the more Violence as its Difficulty is greater to find a Way, or else the Parts of the Body A, will break and separate from one another, and be reduced into Powder, or very small Pieces.  
In short, it appears evident that all Bodies in Motion continually endeavour to keep in a right Line, and turning the least that is possible when they meet with any Resistance, they must never reflect, since by reflecting they deviate much from a right Line. It must therefore be either that Bodies become flat, or that the strongest overcome the weakest, and make it move the same Way the other does. But because Bodies are elastic and hard, they cannot follow one another, since if A bushes a, a will repel A again, and so they must keep asunder from one another.  
Nevertheless, if the two Bodies were in a Void, altho' they were very Hard, they would follow one another, because having no Bodies about them, they could have no elastic Force, the shocked not at all resisting that which shocks it: But Air, Gravity, etc. resisting the great Motion that the striking Body gives to that it strikes, the strike resists the striking, and hinders it from following it: For Experience teaches us that Air and Gravity resists Motion, and so much the more as the Motion is more violent.  
It is easy to discover by what I have said, why when different Bodies meet which are surrounded with Air, or Water, etc. sometimes that which strikes, rebounds, and sometimes it communicates all its Motion, and continues as if it were immovable, and sometimes follows the strike, but always with less Swiftness, if either of them is absolutely soft: For the whole depends only upon the Proportion which is between their Magnitude, Hardness and Gravity, supposing they are moved with an equal Swiftness.  
If they are very inflexible, the striking Body rebounds more, because the Elasticity is stronger. If the striking is very small, and the stricken very great and heavy, the striking will rebound still more, because of the Weight and great Quantity of Air which encompasses the stricken that resists this Motion. In fine, if the Force of the Hardness is either diminished or increased by the Colum of Air which answers to the strike, the striking which rebounds would continue in Rest after Percussion. Or on the contrary, the striking which would continue in Rest after the Percussion may rebound.  
All that is to be done then, is to compare the Hardness of Bodies which meet, and the Air which the impulsed Body must agitate anew in the Time of Percussion that it may move, to foresee very near what must happen in the Percussion of different Bodies. I always suppose an equal Swiftness in the meeting, for the Air resists a great Motion more than it does a small one, and there is as much Motion in a Body half as little again as another, when it goes as fast again as this other: Thus the strike being pushed twice as swift again, it may be considered as having a Colum of Air twice as great to impel it.  
But we must also observe, that in the Moment that one Body shocks another, the Parts of these same Bodies have two contrary Motions: For those that are foremost have an Inclination to turn because of the Shock, at the same Time that those that are behind, incline to advance because of the first Motion, and 'tis this Countermotion that flattens soft Bodies, and even makes certain hard Bodies break. Now when Bodies are very hard, this counterblow which shakes their Parts, and causes a kind of trembling in them, as appears by the Sound they make, always produces some Change in the Communication of Motion, which is very difficult to be discovered for many Reasons, and it seems to me very useless to examine it in particular.  
If one would think upon all these things, I believe he might easily answer some Difficulties that may still remain upon this Subject. But if I thought what I have said was not sufficient to show that Rest has no Power to resist Motion, and that the Rules of the Communication of Motion given by Descartes, are in Part false, I would here prove, that according co his Supposition, 'twould be impossible to move in the Air; and that what makes the Circulation of Motion in fluid Bodies to be possible without recurring to a Void, is that the first Element being easily divided after many different Manners, the rest of its Parts would have no Power to resist Motion.    

THE CONCLUSION OF THE Three Last Books.  
IT seems to me, that I have in the fourth and fifth Book sufficiently shown, that the Natural Inclinations and Passions of Men make them often fall into Error; because they incline them more to precipitate Judgements, than to examine things carefully.  
In the fourth Book I have shown, that the Inclination for Good in general, is the cause of the Wills inquietude: That the Inquietude of the Will puts the Mind into a continual Agitation: And that a Mind that is always agitated, is wholly incapable of discovering Truths that are but a little intricate: That the Love of new and extraordinary things, often prejudice us in favour of them; and whatever bears the Character of Infinity, is capable of dazzling our Imagination and seducing us. I have explained, how the Inclination we have for Greatness, Honours, and Independance, insensibly engage us into false Learning, or into the Study of all these vain and useless Sciences, which flatter our secret Pride, because they make us be admired by the Vulgar. I have showed, that our Inclinations for Pleasure continually turn the Mind from the Contemplation of abstracted Truths, which are the most Simple and most Fruitful, and permit it not to consider any thing, with sufficient Attention and Disinterest to be able to judge well of it: That Pleasures being the Modes of the Souls Existences, they necessarily divide the Capacity of the Mind, and a Mind divided cannot fully comprehend whatever has any thing of Extension. In fine, I have shown, that the Relation and Natural Union we have with all those we live with, is the occasion of many Errors that we are subject to, and communicate to others, as others communicate those to us, wherein they fall themselves.  
In the fifth Book I have endeavoured to give some Idea of our Passions; I have, I think, sufficiently shown, that they are established to unite us to all sensible things, to assist with a Disposition which is proper for the Preservation of our Life: And that as our Senses unite us to our Body, and diffuse our Soul, if I may so say, into all the parts which compose it; so our Emotions make us, as it were, go out of ourselves, to be diffused through all things that are about us. And lastly, That they continually represent things to us, not as they are in themselves, to form true Judgements, but according to the Relation they have to us, to form Judgements that are useful for the Preservation of our Being, and of those with whom we are naturally or voluntarily united.  
After having attempted to discover our Errors in their Causes, and to deliver the Mind from the Prejudices to which it is subject, I thought it was time to prepare it for an Enquiry after Truth. Thus I have in the sixth Book explained the means which seem to me the most Natural to increase the Attention and Capacity of the Mind, by showing the use that we may make of our Senses, Passions, and Imagination; to give it all the Force and Penetration whereof it is capable. Afterwards I have established certain Rules that are necessary to be observed in the Discovery of any Truth whatever it be, I have explained them by many Instances to make them more sensible, and have made choice of those which appeared the most useful to me, or which included the most pregnant and general Truths, that they may be read with more Application, and made more Sensible and Familiar.  
If may be by this Essay of Method we shall discover the Necessity there is of reasoning upon clear and eviden: Ideas; and such as we are inwardly convinced that all Nations agree in; and never pass to Compound things, before we have sufficiently examined the Simple ones upon which those depend.  
And if we consider that Aristotle and his Followers have not observed the Rules I have explained, as we ought to be convinced by the Proofs I have brought of it, and by a Knowledge of the Opinions of the most Zealous Defenders of this Philosopher, perhaps we shall condemn his Doctrine, notwithstanding all the Impressions which persuade some who suffer themselves to be entangled by words they understand not.  
But if we observe the manner of Descartes' Philosophy, we cannot doubt of Solidity; for I have sufficiently shown, that he reasons only upon clear and evident Ideas, and gins with the most Simple things, before he passes to the more Compound, which depend upon them. Those who read the Works of this Learned Man, will be fully convinced of what I say of him, provided they read them with all the Application that is necessary to comprehend them; and they will feel a secret Joy for being born in so Happy an Age, since we may be freed from the trouble of enquiring into past Ages amongst the Heathens, and in the utmost parts of the Earth among Barbarians or Strangers, to find a Doctor to instruct us in the Truth.  
But as we ought not to be too solicitous to know the Opinions of Men, even though we were otherwise convinced that they had discovered the Truth; so I should be very sorry if the Esteem I have here expressed for Descartes, should prejudice any Person in his Favour, or incline him to satisfy himself with a bare reading and retaining his Opinions, without seeking to be illuminated with the Light of Truth. It would be to prefer Man to God, to consult him in the place of our Maker, and to content ourselves with the obscure answers of a Philosopher who enlightens us not, to shun the trouble of enquiting by Meditation of him who answers and enlightens us both together.  
'Tis a very unworthy thing to become the Partisan of any Sect whatever, and to look upon the Authors of it as if they were infallible: And Descartes himself had rather make Men Disciples of Truth, than prejudiced Followers of his Opinions: As he expressly advertises them, That they give no Faith to whatever he has written, 
And the end of his Principles.  but only receive what the force and evidence of Reason constrains them to believe. He would not, like some Philosophers, be believed upon his word, he always maintains, That he is but a Man; and that diffusing Light only by Reflection, those that would be instructed by him, aught to turn their Minds towards the Sovereign Reason, which alone can make it more perfect by the Gift of Understanding.  
The chief use that we can draw from applying ourselves to Study, is to make the Mind more Just, Clear, Penetrating, and fit to discover whatever Truths we would know. But those that read Philosophers to retain their Opinions, and put them off to others, are very far from approaching to that which is the Life and Nourishment of the Soul: Their Minds are weakened and blinded by the Commerce they have with those who can neither instruct nor fortify them; they fill themselves with a false Learning, the weight of which oppresses them, and the brightness of it dazzles them, and fancy they become very Learned, when their Heads are full of the Opinions of Ancient Philosophers, never reflecting that they make themselves the Disciples of those that St. Paul says, Became Fools by attributing to themselves the Name of Wisemen. Dicentes se esse sapientes stulti lacti sunt.  
I believe the Method I have given, may be of much use to those who would make use of their Reason, or receive from God the answers he gives to all those who know how to interrogate him; for I think I have mentioned the chief things that can fortify and conduct the Attention of the Mind, which is the Natural Prayer that we make to the true Master of all Men, in order to be instructed.  
But as this Natural Prospect of enquiring after the Truth, is very Painful, and commonly Impracticable for resolving Questions of small moment, the Knowledge of which serves oftener to flatter our Pride than to perfect our Minds: I believe that to finish this Work usefully, I ought to say, that the shortest and most certain Method to discover the Truth, and unite us to God after the most perfect manner possible, is to live like a true Christian; to follow exactly the Precepts of the Eternal Truth, which unites itself with us, only to reunite us to itself; to hearken to our Faith rather than our Reason; and incline to God not so much by our Natural Powers, which since Sin are wholly corrupted, as by the assistance of Faith, by which alone God would conduct us into this immense Light of Truth, which would dissipate all our Darknesses. For in fine, It is much better, like good Men, to pass some years in the Ignorance of certain things, and in a moment find ourselves instructed in them for ever, than by natural ways, and much Application and Trouble, acquire a very imperfect Science, which will leave us in Darkness to all Eternity.    

A PREFACE TO THE EXPLANATIONS. Wherein is shown, what we ought to think of the different Judgements that are commonly given of Books which oppose Prejudices.  
WHEN a Book is to be Published, the Author never knows who to consult to learn its Fate. The Stars do not precede at its Nativity, their Influences have no Power over it, and the boldest Astrologers dare not make the least Predictions upon the different Fortunes it is to be exposed to. Truth being not of this World, Celestial Bodies have no power over it; and as the Nature of it is altogether Spiritual, the divers Positions of Matter can no wise contribute towards its Establishment or Ruin. Moreover, men's Judgements are so different in respect to the same things, that it is almost impossible to guest with more rashness and imprudence, about any thing, than the happy or unhappy success of a Book. So that whoever ventures to be an Author, ventures at the same time to be thought what every Man pleases. But among Authors, those who oppose Prejudices, may be certain of their Condemnation: Their Works displease most Men; and when they scape the Passions of their Enemies, they are only indebted for their deliverance to the Almighty Power of Truth which protects them.  
'Tis a common defect in all Men to be too quick in Judging; for all Men are liable to Error, and 'tis only that defect which makes them liable to it. Now all rash Judgements are ever liable to Prejudices; therefore those Authors who oppose them, can never fail of being condemned by all those who consult their Ancient Opinions, as the Laws by which they are always to pronounce. For, in fine, most Readers are at once the Judge and Party, in respect of those Authors. They are Judges, no body can dispute it; and they are Parties, because those Authors disturb them in the possession of their Prejudices, upon which they have a right of Prescription, and with whom they have been familiar for many years.  
I own, that there is a great deal of Equity, Sincerity, and good Sense, in many Readers; and that there are Judges, who are so reasonable as not to follow common Opinions as the Infallible Rules of Truth. There are some, who looking within themselves consult inward Truth, according to which we ought to Judge of all things; but there but few of those who consult it on all occasions; and none at all, who consult it with all the Attention and Fidelity that is necessary, in order always to pronounce true Judgements. Therefore, tho' one should suppose that there were no faults to be found in a Book, which no body can do without Vanity, I do not believe that one could find out one Man, who would approve it in all respects, particularly if it were a Book that did oppose his Prejudices, since it is not Naturally possible that a Judge continually offended, incensed abused by a Party, should do him strict Justice, and that he would give himself the trouble to use his utmost application and power, to consider Reasons which seem to him at first sight extravagant Paradoxes, or ridiculous Paralogisms.  
But tho' we find many things in a Book that please us, if we chance to meet with any that offend us, we seldom fail to exclaim against it, and we often forget to speak well of it. There are a thousand Motives of Self-love, which induce us to condemn what displeases us, and reason, on that occasion, fully justifies those Motives; for Men fancy they condemn Error and defend Truth, when they defend their Prejudices, and condemn those who attack them. Thus the most Equitable Judges of Books, which oppose Prejudices, commonly give General Judgements of them which are not very  to those that have written them. They may chance to say, that there are some good things in such a Work, and that the Author refutes certain Prejudices reasonably enough, but they will not fail to condemn it, and to decide like Judges with Authority and Gravity; and to say, that he carries things too far on such and such occasions. For when an Author fights against Opinions, which the Reader is not prejudiced with, whatever the Author says seems rational enough: But the Author always carries matters too far, when he opposes Prejudices in which the Reader is too far engaged.  
Now, as the Prejudices of different Persons are not always the same, should any one carefully collect the divers Judgements which are given upon the same things, we would often find that according to those Judgements, there would be nothing good, nor yet, at the same time, any thing bad, in those sorts of Works. There would be nothing good, for there are not Prejudices but what are approved by some People; and there would be nothing bad, for there are not Prejudices but what are disliked by some. Therefore those Judgements are so equitable, that should Authors be willing to take the advantage of them to reform their Works, they would be obliged to blot out all, for fear of leaving any thing that were condemned, or else altar nothing at all, for fear of altering any thing that were approved. So that a poor Author, who is unwilling to offend any body, finds himself strangely at a loss, among all those different Judgements which are given in all Parts against him, and in favour of him; and unless he resolves to remain steady, and to pass for an obstinate Man in his Sentiments, he is obliged of necessity to contradict himself every moment, and to assume as many different Shapes as there are different Heads in a Nation.  
However, Time does every one Justice; and Truth, which at first appears like a Chimerical ridiculous Phantasm, is relished by degrees: Men open their Eyes, they view it, discover its Charms, and are moved by it. He who condemns an Author upon a Sentiment which offends him, accidentally meets with another who approves that Sentiment, and who, on the contrary, condemns some Opinions the other receives as undeniable: Every one speaks his Mind, and every one contradicts the other. They Examine their own Reasons anew, as also those of the Opponents: They dispute, they are mindful, they hesitate, they do no longer Judge so rashly of what they have not Examined; and when they chance to alter their Opinion, and to find that the Author is more reasonable than they thought, a secret Inclination arises within their Hearts, which often induces them to give him as good a Character as they gave him a bad one before. Therefore, he than sticks close to Truth, tho' he offends at first, and is looked upon as Ridiculous, must not despair of seeing that Truth he defends, Triumph at some time or other over the Prejudices of Men; for there is this difference between good and ill Books, between those that Instruct the Mind, and those which Flatter the Senses and Imagination, that the latter ever appear Charming and Delightful at first, and Time withers them; whereas the other, on the contrary, have something odd and disgusting, which frightens at first; but they are relished in time, by the degrees as Men read them, and meditate on them, for Time commonly regulates the Price of things.  
Books which engage Prejudices leading to Truth by a new way, require yet more time than others to produce the Fruit which Authors expect from them: For, as Men are often deceived in the hopes that are given by those who Compose these sorts of Books, there are but few that read them, less who approve them, and almost all condemn them whether they read them or no: And tho' it be known that the most beaten Paths do not lead where one designs to go, yet that dread Men conceive at the very entrance of those that are untrodden, discourages them from engaging in them. People seldom look up to see their way, they blindly follow those who go before; company diverts and comforts; they do not reflect on what they are doing; they are not sensible whether they are going, and they often forget whither they design to go.  
Men are made to live in Society; but to maintain it, it is not sufficient to speak the same Tongue, they must speak the same Sense; must think alike. They must live by Opinion as they act by Imitation. Men think conveniently, agreeably, and safely, for the good of the Body, and for the settling of their Fortune, when they are of the Opinion of others, and when they suffer themselves to be persuaded by the Air, or sensible Impression of the Imagination of those who speak to them. But those suffer considerably, and expose themselves to great dangers, who will only hearken to inward Truth, and who reject, with contempt and horror, all the Prejudices of the Senses, and all the Opinions that have been received without Examination.  
Therefore those Writers, who oppose Prejudices, are very much mistaken, if they expect to recommend themselves by it. If they succeed, perhaps a small number of the Learned may speak Honourably of their Work, when they are Dead; but while they are alive, they must expect to be neglected by most Men, and Despised, Calumniated, and Persecuted, by those very Persons they look upon to be very Wise and Moderate.  
And indeed, there are so many Reasons, such strong and such convincing Arguments, which oblige us to Act, like those we live with that Men are often in the right to condemn those that are singular as capricious and fantastical Persons; and whereas Men do not make a sufficient distinction between Acting and Thinking, they commonly are displeased that any body should oppose Prejudices: They fancy that it is not sufficient to observe the Rules of Civil Society, to conform outwardly to the Opinions and Customs of the Country they live in. They think it a prece of Temerity to examine Common Opinions, and that to consult Truth is a breach of Charity; because it is not so much Truth which unites Civil Societies as Opinion and Custom.  
Aristotle is received in Universities as the Rule of Truth; he is Quoted as Infallible. It is a Philosophical Heresy to deny what he advances. In a word, he is respected as the Genius of Natures, and those who are best versed in his Physics, can give no reason for any thing, and perhaps are convinced of nothing; and Scholars that have read their course of Philosophy, dare hardly say, before Men of Sense, what they have learned of their Masters. That, perhaps, may make those who reflect upon it, sensible of what we are to think of those sorts of Studies; for a Science, which we must forget to become reasonable, does not seem very solid. Nevertheless, those would be looked upon as inconsiderate and rash, who should attempt to discover the falsity of the Reasons which Authorize so extraordinary a Conduct; and they should not fail of being troubled by those who receive advantage by them, if they were so happy as to undeceive the Public.  
Is is not evident, that the way to learn what we do not know, is to use what we do know? And that it would be a Jest to give a Frenchman a Germane Grammar in Verse to teach High Dutch? Yet it is customary to give Children the Latin Verses of Despauterius to teach them Latin; obscure Verses in all respects, to Children, who have much ado to apprehend the easiest things. Reason and Experience, are visible against that Custom, for Children are a long while a learning Latin ill. Nevertheless, 'tis Impudence to find fault with it; should a Chinese hear this Custom, he could not forbear laughing at it, whilst on this part of the World we Inhabit, the Wisest and the most Learned cannot forbear approving it.  
If such false and such absurd Prejudices and Customs, that are so unreasonable, and of such great consequence, have a World of Protectors, how is it to be expected that People should submit to Reasons which engage Prejudices that are purely Speculative? A little attention is sufficient to discover, that the Method which is used to teach Children is none of the best, and yet it is not minded; Opinion and Custom prevail over Reason and Experience. How then could any body expect that Works which overthrow a great number of Prejudices, should not be condemned in many things, even by those who pass for the most Learned, and for the Wisest?  
It is observable, that those who pass in the World fox the best Judges and the best Scholars, are those who have studied most Books both good and bad; they are those who have the Memories, and whose Imagination is more lively, and more extended than others. Now those Men commonly Judge of things rashly, and without deliberation. They consult their Memory, in which they find immediately the Law or the Prejudice, according to which they decide without much Reflection. As they think themselves Wiser than others, they give but little heed to what they read. Therefore it happens often, that Women and Children discover the falsity of certain Prejudices which have been controverted, because they dare not pass their Judgements upon them without Examination, but use all the attention they are capable of in what they read; whereas, on the contrary, the Learned persist in their Opinions, because they will not give themselves the trouble to examine those of others, when they are directly opposite to what they think already.  
As for those that live with great Men, they depend on so many things that they cannot easily retire into themselves, nor afford a sufficient attention to distinguish what is true from what is likely. Nevertheless, they are not much wedded to certain Prejudices, for the best way to hold strongly with the World, is neither to be wedded to Truth nor Probability. As apparent humility, or good breeding, and external moderation, are qualifications that please every body, and which are absolutely necessary to maintain Society among those who have a great deal of Pride and Ambition, the Men of the World affect not to affirm any thing, or to believe any thing as undeniable. It ever was, and ever will be the fashion, to look upon all things as Problematical, and to speak at random even of the most holy Truths, lest they should seem wedded to any thing. For as those I am speaking of, apply themselves to nothing, and mind nothing but their Fortune, no disposition can seem so convenient, and so reasonable to them, as that which custom justifies. Therefore those who attack Prejudices, flattering on the one hand the Pride and Laziness of the Men of the World, they are well received by them; but when they pretend to affirm any thing as undeniable, and to discover the Truth of Religion, and of Christian Morality, they look upon them as conceited Men, and as Persons, who to avoid one precipice leap into another.  
What I have said, in my Opinion, is sufficient to show what I could answer to the different Judgements divers persons have given against the Book, Entitled, A Search after Truth; and I will forbear making an application which every one may make usefully and easily. I am sensible that every body will not do it; but it would look, perhaps, as if I would do myself Justice, in defending myself as much as I could, therefore I abandon my Right to the Judicious Readers, who are the Natural Judges of Books: And I conjure them to remember my Request in the Preface to the Search after Truth, and elsewhere: Only to Judge of my Sentiments according to the clear and distinct Answers they shall receive from the only Master of all Mankind, after having made their application to him by a serious, attention. For if they consult their Prejudices as the decisive Laws of what they are to believe of the Book, Entitled, A Search after Truth, I own that it is a very ill Book, since it is written oh purpose to discover the Falsity and Injustice of those Laws.  

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BEcause the following Explanations were writ to satisfy some particular Persons, who desired a more special Explication of some Material Truths, I think fit to premise, that what I shall say may be clearly understood, it will be necessary for every one to have some knowledge of the Principles I've explained in the Search after Truth: Therefore 'twill be best not to meddle with these Observations, till 've first carefully read the whole Work for which they were written; and at the second reading, only examine them as they are referred to in the Margin▪ Yet is not this Caution absolutely necessary to be observed by Learned Persons, because I have endeavoured so to compose these Explanations, that they might be read without referring to the Book they were written for; Truth, I know, of all things, gives us the least trouble to find it out. Men don't use to collect those passages in a Book which have reference to one another, but commonly read things as they fall in their way, and understand as much of them as they can; wherefore, to comply with this temper, I have essayed to make these Remarks intelligible, even to those who have forgotten the places of reference in the foregoing Treatise. However, I would desire those who don't care to give themselves the trouble of carefully examining these Explanations, not to condemn them of false and extravagant inferences which may be made for want of understanding them. I have some reason for this Request, not only because I have a right to demand of my Readers, who are my Judges, not to condemn me without understanding me, but upon several other accounts, which it would be impertinent to particularise in this place.    

SOME EXPLANATIONS OF THE Search after Truth.  

The First Explanation of the First Chapter of the First Book.  
God acts whatever is real in the motions of the Mind, and in the determination of these Motions, yet he is not the Author of Sin.  
He acts whatever is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence, and yet he is not the Author of our Concupiscence.  
SOme think I too soon forsake the comparison betwixt Mind and Matter, and believe that the first has no more power than the second to determine the impression that it receives from God; they would have me explain, if I can, what God does in us, and what we do ourselves when we Sin▪ because, as they pretend, I shall be forced to grant either that Man can give himself a new Modification, or else that God is truly the Author of Sin.  
I answer, That Faith, Reason, and the inward Consciousness I have of myself, oblige me to leave my comparison where I do, for I am every way convinced, that I have in myself a principle of my own determinations; and I have some Reasons to believe, that Matter has no such principle in itself, as will be proved hereafter. But this is what God does in us, and what we do ourselves when we Sin.  
First, God impels us continually by an invincible impression towards Good in general. Secondly, he represents to us the Idea of a particular Good, or gives us a Sensation of it: In fine, he carries us towards this particular Good.  
God impels us continually towards Good in general, for he has made us, and keeps us for himself, he will have us love every thing that is good; he is the first or rather the only mover: In fine, this appears clearly by a great many things that I have said before, and those that I have to do withal do grant it.  
God represents to us the Idea of a particular Good, or gives us a Sensation of it, for it is only he that enlightens us; and the bodies that are about us can't act upon our Mind: In one word, we are not our own light, nor make ourown felicity: I have proved it at large in the Third Book, and elsewhere.  
In fine, God carries us towards this particular Good. For God carrying us towards what is good, 'tis a necessary consequence that he should carry us towards particular goods when he produces the Idea or the Sensation of 'em in our Soul. This is all what God does in us when we Sin.  
But as one particular good does not include all goods, and as the Mind considering it with a clear and distinct view can't imagine that it includes 'em all; God does not carry us necessarily or invincibly to the love of this good, we are sensible that we are free to stop there, that we have motion to go farther; in one word, that the impression which we have for good in general, or to speak as others, that our Will is neither constrained nor necessitated to stop at this particular good.  
This is then what the Sinner does; he stops, he rests, he follows not the impression of God; he acts not, for Sin is nothing. He knows that the great Rule he must observe, is to make use of his liberty as much as he can, and that he must stick at no good if he be not inwardly convinced, that it would be against order not to stick at it. If he does not discover this Rule by the light of his Reason, he learns it, at least, by the inward reproaches of his Conscience; he ought then to follow the impression which he receives towards good in general, and think of other goods than that he enjoys, which he ought only to make use of; for it is by thinking of other goods than those he enjoys, that he may produce in himself new determinations of love, and make use of his liberty. Now I prove, that by the impression that God gives him towards good in general, he may think of other goods than those he enjoys, because 'tis precisely in this that the difficulty lies.  
'Tis a Law of Nature, that the Ideas of Objects should present themselves to our Mind, as soon as we will think of 'em, provided the capacity we have of thinking be not filled by the quick and confused Sensations we receive from what passes in our Body. Now we may be willing to think of all things, because the natural impression which impels us towards good, does extend to all the things that we may think of, and we may at all times think of all things, because we are united to him that includes the Ideas of all things, as I proved 
n =" *" Read the Chapter of the 3d Book, whose Title is, That we see all things in God; and the Explanation of this Chapter.  elsewhere.  
If it be then true, that we may be willing to consider nearly what we already see as afar off, since we are united to the Universal Being; and if it be certain, that by virtue of the Law of Nature, Ideas come near us, as soon as we desire it, it must be concluded;  
First, That we have a principle of our determinations; for it is the actual presence of particular Ideas which determines positively towards particular goods, the motion we have towards good in general; and which thus changes our natural love into free love. Our assent or acquiescence at the sight of a particular good, is nothing real or positive on our part, as I shall explain hereafter.  
Secondly, That this Principle of our Determinations is always free in respect to particular goods; for we are not invincibly impelled to love 'em; since we may examine 'em in themselves; and compare them with the Idea we have of the sovereign good, or with other particular goods; so the principle of our liberty is, that being made for God, and united to God, we may always think of the true good, or of some other goods than those of which we actually think.  
I suppose nevertheless, that our Sensations do not fill all the capacity of our Mind; for that we may be free with the liberty I speak of, it is necessary, not only that God should not invincibly impel us towards particular goods, but also that we may make use of the impression we have towards good in general, to love some other thing than that we actually love. Now as we can love no Object but those we may think of, nor actually think of any other but those that cause too quick Sensations in us; it is evident, that the dependence we have upon our Body lessens our liberty, nay does on many occasions take away the use of it. So our Sensations destroying out Ideas, and the union we have with our Body, by which we only see, or rather feel ourselves, weakening that which we have with God, by which all things are present to us; the Mind must not suffer itself to be divided by confused Sensations, if it be willing always to have the principle of its determinations to be free.  
It appears from all this, that God is not the Author of Sin, and that Man does not give himself new Modifications: God is not the Author of Sin, since he continually imprints a motion to go farther on him who Sins, or stops at a particular good, and he gives him the power to think of other things, and to apply himself to other goods than that which actually is the Object of his thought and of his love; that he commands him not to love those things which he can forbear loving without being troubled by any remorses; and he continually calls him to himself by the secret reproaches of his Reason.  
Is is true, Gobrias does in one sense impel the Sinner to love the Object of his Sin, if this Object appears to be good to the Sinner; for, as most Divines say, all that is positive in Sin, or what there is of act or motion, proceeds from God. But it is only through a false judgement of our Mind that the Creatures appear good to us, that is capable of acting in us and making us happy. The Sin of a Man lies in this, that he does not refer all the particular Goods to the Sovereign Good; or rather in that he does not consider nor love the Severaign Good in the particular Goods; and so does not regulate his Love according to the Will of God, or according to the essential and necessary order of which all Men have a knowledge, and which is so much the more perfect as they are more strictly united to God, and are less sensible of the impressions of their Senses and Passions. 
See the Explanations upon the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book, towards the end, where I explain my thoughts more distinctly.  For our Senses diffuse our Souls through our whole Bodies, and our Passions transport them, if I may so say, into those Objects which are about us, they remove us from the light of God which enlightens us.  
Neither does Man give himself new Modifications, for the motions of love that God continually imprints upon us increases, or diminishes not, whether we actually love or not; I mean, although this natural motion of love be, or be not determined by any Idea of our Mind. This motion does not cease even by its acquiescence in the possession of Good, as the motion of Bodies ceases by their rest. 'Tis probable that God always impels us with an equal force towards him; for he inclines us towards good in general as much as we are capable of, and we are at all times equally capable of it, because our Will, or Natural capacity of Willing is always equal in itself. Thus the impression or Natural motion which carries us towards good, neither increases or diminishes.  
I confess we have no clear Idea, nor even any internal Sensation of this equality of impression or natural motion towards Good. But 'tis because, as I have elsewhere proved, that we know not ourselves by a clear Idea; not are we conscious of our own Faculties whilst they don't actually operate: we do not feel in ourselves, what is natural, common, and always the same, as we are not sensible of the heat and motion of our Hearts. We are not likewise sensible of our Habits, and whether we are worthy of the Love or Wrath of God. There is perhaps in us an infinite number of Faculties which are absolutely unknown to us; for we have no internal Sensation of what we are, but only of what we feel. If we had never felt Pain, nor a desire for particular Goods, we could not by the internal Sensation we have of ourselves, discover whether we should be capable of feeling Pain, or willing such Goods. 'Tis our Memory, and not our internal Sensation that teaches us we are capable of feeling what we no longer feel, or of being agitated by Passions, which at present we feel no motions of. Thus there is nothing which hinders us from believing that God always inclines us towards him with an equal force, although after a very different manner: He always preserves in our Souls an equal capacity of willing, or one and the same will, as in all matter he preserves an equal quantity of motion. But although it were not certain, I don't see how we can say that the increase or diminution of the natural motion of our Souls depends upon us, since we cannot be the cause of the extension of our own Will.  
It is however certain, by what I have said before, that God produces, and also preserves whatsoever is real and positive in the particular determinations of the motions of our Souls, whether Ideas or Sensations. For 'tis he who determines our motions for a general Good, towards particular Goods; but not after an invincible manner, since we have a tendency to go farther. So that all we do when we sin, is, that we do not all that we are able to do, by means of the impression we have towards him who includes all Goods: For we can do nothing but by the power that we receive from our Union with him who does all things in us. Now, what chief makes us Sin, is, because we choose rather to enjoy than to examine, because of the Pleasure we feel in enjoying, and the Pain we find in examining: We cease to make use of the motion that is given us to inquire after Good and examine it, and we stop in the enjoyment of such things as we ought only to make use of. But if we narrowly observe, we shall see there is nothing real on our part, but a defect and cessation from enquiry; which, if we may so say, corrupts the action of God in us; but which however cannot destroy it. Thus, What do we when we do not Sin? We do then whatever God does in us; for we limit not to a particular, or rather to a false Good, the love that God imprints on us for the true Good. And, when we Sin, what do we? Nothing; for we love a false Good, that God inclines us not to love by an invincible Impression. We cease to seek the true Good, and make useless the motion which God imprints on us. Now, when we love any particular Good only, or against Order, we receive from God as great an impression of Love, as if we stopped not at this Good. Moreover, this particular determination, which is neither necessitated nor invincible, is also given us of God. Therefore when we Sin, we produce no new modification in ourselves.  
However, I confess, when we do not Sin, but resist Temptation, we may say in one Sense, that we give ourselves a new modification, because we would think of other things than on the false Goods which tempt us. But what we then do is produced by the action which God impresses on us, that is, by our motion towards Good in general, or by our Will assisted by Grace, or illuminated by a light, or impelled by a preingaged Pleasure: For in short, if 'tis pretended, that to Will different things, is to give ourselves different Modifications, I grant that in this Sense the Mind can diversely modify itself, by the action it receives from God.  
But it must always be observed, that that action that God performs in us, depends upon us, and is not invincible in respect to particular Goods. For when a particular Good is presented to us, we have an internal Sensation of our liberty in respect to it, as we have of our Pleasure and Pain when we feel it. We are even convinced of our Freedom, by the same reason that we are convinced of our Existence; for 'tis the internal Sensation we have of our Thoughts, which teaches us that we are. And if in the time that we are conscious of our liberty in respect to a particular Good, we ought to doubt whether or no we are free, because we have no clear Idea of our liberty: We must also doubt of our Pain, and Existence, at the time even when we are very unhappy, since we have no clear Idea, either of our Souls, or of our Pain.  
It is not the same with internal Sensation, as with our external Senses: These always deceive us in something, when we follow their information; but our internal Sensation never deceives us. 'Tis by my external Senses, that I see Colours upon the surface of Bodies, that I hear sounds in the Air, and feel pain in my Hand, etc. and I am deceived, if I judge of these things upon the relation of my Senses. But 'tis by internal Sensation that I see Colours, hear Sounds, suffer Pain: and I deceive not myself, to think I see when I see, hear when I hear, or suffer when I suffer, provided I stay there. I explain not these things more at large, because they are evident of 'emselves. Thus having an internal Sensation of our liberty, at the same time that a particular Good presents itself to our Mind, we ought not to doubt, whether we are free in respect to this Good. Yet, as we have not always this internal Sensation, and sometimes only consult what remains of it in our memory after a very confused manner; We may think of the abstracted Reasons which hinder us from feeling ourselves persuaded that it is not possible for Man to be free: Like a Stoic, that wants nothing, and who can Philosophise at his ease, can imagine that Pain is not an Evil, because the internal Sensation he has of it, does not actually convince him of the contrary. He may prove as Seneca has done, by Reasons that in one Sense are true, that 'tis even a contradiction that a wise Man can be unhappy.  
Yet when the internal Sensation we have of ourselves, will not suffice to convince us that we are free, we may persuade ourselves of it by Reason. For being convinced by Reason that God only acts for himself, and that he cannot give us any motion which tends not towards him; the impression towards good in general may be invincible, but it is plain the impression he gives us towards particular Goods, must necessarily be free. For if this impression was invincible, we should not have any motion to go to God, altho' he gives us motion only for himself; and we should be necessitated to stop at particular Goods, although God, Order and Reason forbidden it. So that we should not Sin through our own default, and God would be truly the cause of our Irregularities, since they would not be free, but purely natural, and absolutely necessary.  
Thus although we should not be convinced of our liberty by the internal Sensation we have of ourselves, we might by Reason discover that its necessary that Man should be created free; supposing that he be capable of desiring particular Goods, and that he can desire these Goods, only by the impression or motion that God continually gives him for himself, which may likewise be proved by Reason. But 'tis not the same of the capacity we have of suffering any Pain. To discover that we have this capacity, there is no other way, but internal Sensation; and yet no one doubts but Man is subject to Pain.  
As we know not our Soul by a clear Idea, as I have elsewhere explained, 'twould be in vain for us to try to discover what it is in us, which terminates the action that God imprints on us; or what it is in us which is overcome by a determination that is not invincible, and that may be changed by our Will, or impression towards whatever is good, and by its union with him, who includes the Ideas of all Being's. For, as we have no clear Idea of any modification of our Soul, there is only an internal Sensation, which teaches us that we exist, and what we are, 'Tis this Sensation therefore that we must consult to convince ourselves that we are free. It answers us clearly enough, when we actually propose any particular good to ourselves: For there is no Man who can doubt that he is not invincibly carried to Eat a Fruit, or to shun some inconsiderable Pain; But if instead of harkening to our internal Sensation, we give attention to abstracted Reasons, which divert us from thinking of ourselves, it may be we might even lose the sight of ourselves, and forget what we are: and that endeavouring to reconcile the knowledge of God, and the absolute power he has over us, with our liberty, we should fall into an Error, which would overthrow all the Principles of Religion and Morality.  
Here is an Objection that is used to be made against what I have said; and although it be very trivial, it nevertheless is a difficulty to some Men. The hatred of God, say they, is an action wherein there is no Good. Therefore it is perfectly the Sinners, and God has no part in it: Consequently Man acts, and gives himself a new modification, by an action which proceeds not from God.  
I Answer, That Sinners hate God only because they freely and falsely judge that he is Evil: For they cannot hate Good, considered as such. So that 'tis by the same motion of love that God imprints on them to Good, that they Hate him. Now they judge, that God is not Good, because they make not that use as they ought of their liberty. Not being convinced by an undoubted evidence, that God is not Good, they ought not to believe him Evil, nor consequently Hate him.  
We must distinguish two things in Hatred, the Sensation of the Soul, and motion of the Will. The Sensation cannot be bad: For 'tis a modification of the Soul, which Morally speaking, has neither Good nor Ill in it. For the motion it is not ill neither, since it is not distinct from that of Love. For external Evil, being only a privation of Good, it is evident that to fly Evil, is to fly the privation of Good, that is to incline towards Good. So that whatever there is of real and positive in the Hatred even of God, hath nothing bad in it: And the Sinner cannot hate God, but by making an abominable abuse of the action that God continually gives him to induce him to love himself.  
God causes whatever we have that is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence; 
This Explanation relates to the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth.  and yet he is not the Author of our Concupiscence.  
As the difficulties that are raised about Concupiscence have much relation to those things I have explained, it will be proper for me here to show that God is not the Author of Concupiscence, altho' he performs all things in us; and 'tis only he who produces even sensible Pleasures in us.  
It seems undoubted to me that we ought to grant, for the Reasons I have given in the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth, and elsewhere, that following the Natural Laws of the union of the Soul and Body, Man even before Sin, was carried by a foresight of Pleasure to the use of sensible Goods, and that every time that certain traces were form in the chief part of his Brain, certain thoughts were produced in his Mind. Now, these Laws were very just for the Reasons brought in the same Chapter. This supposed, as before the Fall all things were perfectly well regulated, so Man had necessarily a power over his Body, that he could hinder the formation of these traces when he would; for order requires, that the Mind should govern the Body. Now this power of Man's Mind over his Body, consisted strictly in that according to his desires and different applicacations, he could stop the communication of the Motions which were produced in his Body by those Objects that were about him, over which his Will had not an immediate and direct power, as it had over his own Body. I dont see how we can conceive, that after any other manner, he could hinder the traces from being form in his Brain. Thus the Will of God, or general Law of Nature, which is the true cause of the communication of Motion, would on certain occasions depend upon Adam's Will; for God had this respect for him, that he produced not new Motions in his Body, if he consented not to them, or at least in the chief part of it, to which the Soul is immediately united.  
Such was the Institution of Nature before Sin; Order requires it so; and consequently, he whose Will is ever conformable to Order. Now this Will continuing always the same, the Sin of the first Man has overturned the Order of Nature, because the first Man having Sinned, Order would not permit him absolutely to rule over any thing. 
In the Objection of the 7th Article of the Explanation of the 7th Cap. of the 2d l.; I explain what I speak here in general of the loss that Man sustained as to the power he had over his Body.  It is not just that the Sinner should suspend the communication of Motions; that the Will of God should be accommodated to his; and that in favour of him, there should be exceptions in the Law of Nature. So that Man is subject to Concupiscence; his Mind depends upon his Body; he feels in himself indeliberate Pleasures, and involuntary and rebellious Motions, in consequence of his most Just Law who united both parts of which he is composed.  
Thus formal Concupiscence, as well as formal Sin, is nothing real; It is in Man only, the loss of that power he had of suspending the communication of Motions on certain occasions: We must not admit in God a positive Will of producing it. This loss that Man has sustained, is not a Natural consequence of the Will of God, which is ever conformable to order, and always the same; 'tis a consequence of Sin which has made Man unworthy of an advantage due only to his Innocence and Justice. So that we must say, that God is not the cause of Concupiscence, but only Sin.  
Yet whatever is real and positive in the Sensations and Motions of Concupiscence, is performed by God; 
Aug. against the two Epistles of the Pel. l. 1. cap. 15, etc.  for God effects whatever is done, but that is no Evil: 'Tis by the General Law of Nature, 'tis by the Will of God that sensible Objects produce certain Motions in the Body of Man, and that these Motions excite certain Sensations in the Soul, useful for the preservation of the Body, or propagation of the Species; who dares then say, that these things are not good in themselves?  
I know very well, that we say Sin is the cause of certain Pleasures; we say it, but do we know it? Can we think that Sin, which is nothing, should actually produce something? Can we conceive nothing to be a Cause? However, we say it, but it may be the reason is, because we will not take pains enough to think seriously upon what we say; or else it is, because we will begin an Explication which is contrary to what we have heard persons say, who, it may be, spoke with more Gravity and Assurance, than Reflection and Understanding.  
Sin is the cause of Concupiscence, but it is not the cause of Pleasure; as  is the cause of Sin, without being the cause of the Natural Motion of the Soul. The pleasure of the Soul is good, as well as its motion or love; and there is nothing good that God does not. The rebellion of the Body, and malignity of Pleasure, proceeds from Sin, as the inclination of the Soul to, or its acquiescence in a particular good, comes from the Sinner: But these are only privations and nothings that the Creature is capable of.  
All Pleasure is good, and even in some manner makes him happy that enjoys it, at least whilst he enjoys it. But we may say that Pleasure is Evil, because instead of raising the Mind to him that causes it, it happens through the error of our Mind, and corruption of our Heart, that it abases it towards sensible Objects which seem to cause it.  
It is Evil, in as much as it is Injustice in us who are Sinners, and consequently deserve to be punished rather than rewarded, to oblige God in pursuance of his Primitive Will, to recompense us with agreeable Sensations. In a word, for I will not repeat here what I have already said, it is Evil because God now forbids it; since it alienates the Mind from him for whom it was made and preserved: for that which God ordained to preserve the Righteous Man in his Innocence, now establishes the Wicked Man in his Sin, and the Sensations of Pleasure which he wisely ordained as the easiest and most obvious expedient to teach Man, without diverting his Reason from his true Good, whether he ought to unite himself with the Bodies about him; these Sensations, I say, at present, fill the Capacity of his Mind, and fix him on Objects incapable of acting, and infinitely below him, because he looks upon these Objects to be the true Causes of the Happiness he occasionally enjoys from them.   

THE SECOND EXPLANATION OF THE First Chapter of the First Book.  
Where I say,  
That the Will cannot differently determine the Impession it has towards good, but by Commanding the Understanding to represent some particular Object to it.  
WE must not imagine that the Will commands the Understanding otherwise than by its desire and motions; for the Will has no other Action. Neither must we believe, that the Understanding obeys the Will in producing in itself the Ideas of those things which the Soul desires: For the Understanding does not Act: It only receives the Light or the Ideas of Objects by the necessary union it has with him who includes all Being's after an intelligible manner, as we have explained it in the Third Book.  

See the Explanation of the 6th Chapter of the 2d Part of the 3d Book.  This then is the whole Mystery. Man participates of the Sovereign Reason, and Truth discovers itself to him proportionally as he applies himself to it, and prays it. The desire of the Soul is a Natural Prayer which is always granted; for it is a Natural Law, that the Ideas should be so much the more present to the Mind, as the Will desires them with the more fervency. Thus, provided the Capacity we have of thinking, or our Understanding, be not filled with the Confused Sensations we receive by means of what passes in our Body; we never desire to think on any Object, but the Idea of the said Object is immediately present to us; and as experience itself teaches us, the said Idea is the more present and clear, according as our desire is stronger, and that the confused Sensations we receive by the Body, are weaker and less sensible, as I have already observed in the preceding Remark.  
Therefore in saying, that the Will commands the Understanding to present some particular Object to it, I only meant, that the Soul which would consider that Object with attention, draws near unto it by its desire; because this desire, pursuant to the efficacious Will of God, which is the inviolable Law of Nature, is the cause of the presence and clearness of the Idea which represents that Object. I could not express myself otherwise, nor explain myself as I do now; since I had not as yet proved, that God alone is the Author of our Ideas, and that our particular Wills are the Occasional Causes of it. I spoke according to the common Opinion, and I have often been forced so to do, because all things cannot be said at one and the same time. Readers must have Equity, and trust for some time, in order to be satisfied; for none but Geometricians can always pay in ready Coin.   

AN EXPLANATION OF THE THIRD CHAPTER.  
Where I say,  
That it is no Wonder we have no Evidence of the Mysteries of Faith, since we have not so much as Ideas of them.  
When I say that we have no Ideas of the Mysteries of Faith, 
Ne omnino taceremus interrogati, quid tres, cum tres esse fateamur. De Trinitate. B. 7. Ch. 4. Cum quoeritur; quid tres? Magnâ prorsus inopiâ humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres Personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed non taceretur. In the same place B. 5. Ch. 9  it is visible by what precedes, and what follows, that I speak of the clear Ideas which produce Light and Evidence, and by which we have a Comprehension of the Object, if I may so speak. I grant, for Instance, that a Peasant could never believe, that the Son of God was made Man, or that there are Three Persons in the Godhead, unless he had some Idea of the union of the Word with our Humanity, and some notion of Person. But if those Ideas were clear, we might by applying ourselves to them, perfectly apprehend those Mysteries, and explain them to others; they would no longer be ineffable Mysteries. The Word Person, according to St. Augustin, has been spoken of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, not so much clearly to explain what they are, as not to be silent upon a Mystery which we are obliged to speak of.  
I say here, that we have no Ideas of our Mysteries, as I have said elsewhere, that we have no Ideas of our Soul; because the Idea we have of our Soul is not clear, no more than that of our Mysteries. Thus this Word Idea is Equivocal: I have sometimes taken it, for whatever represents to the Mind any Object whether clearly or confusedly. I have taken it, yet more generally for whatever is the immediate Object of the Mind. But I have also taken it for that which represents things to the Mind in so clear a manner, that a Man may discover at first fight whether such or such Modifications belong to them. Therefore I said sometimes that we had an Idea of the Soul and sometimes I have denied it. It is difficult, and often tiresome and disagreeable, to keep too rigorous an exactness in our Expressions, since it is sufficient to make ourselves understood.  
When an Author only contradicts himself in the Mind of those who Criticise upon him, and who are desirous he should contradict himself, he needs not much value it; and if he should undertake by a tedious Explanation to solve, whatever the malice or ignorance of some Persons might urge against him, he would not only make an ill Book; but moreover the Readers would be displeased at his Answers to his Objections, that would be contrary to a certain Equity which all Men pretend to. For Men hate to be suspected either of Malice or Ignorance; and commonly Men are not allowed to answer weak and malicious Objections, until they are actually made, whereby the Readers are secured against the reproach which such Answers seem to charge those with who exact them.   

AN EXPLANATION OF These Words of the First Chapter.  
This being granted, we must say that Adam was not induced to the Love of God, and to perform his Duty by pre-engaging Pleasures; seeing that the knowledge he had of his Good, and the Joy which possessed him continually as a necessary consequence of the prospect of his happiness in uniting himself to God, might suffice to engage him to perform his Duty, and to make him Act with more merit, than if he had been, as it were, determined by pre-engaging Pleasures.  
TO apprehend all this distinctly, it is necessary to understand, that nothing but knowledge and pleasure determine Men to Act. For when we begin to love an Object, it is, either because we know by Reason that it is good, or because we find by ourselves that it is agreeable. Now, there is a great deal of difference between Knowledge and Pleasure: Knowledge enlightens our Mind, and makes us distinguish good, without inducing us actually and forcibly to love it: Pleasure on the contrary induces and determines us forcibly to love the Object which seems to occasion it. Knowledge does not induce us of itself; it only makes us freely and of our own accord incline ourselves towards that Good which it offers us; it leaves us wholly to ourselves. Pleasure on the contrary anticipates our Reason; it hinders us from consulting it; It does not leave us wholly to ourselves, and it weakens our liberty.  
Therefore, as Adam before the Fall had a time appointed to merit Eternal Happiness; and in order thereunto a full and absolute Liberty; and as his Knowledge was sufficient to keep him strictly united to God, whom he already loved by the Natural motion or tendency of his Love; he was not to be induced to his Duty by pre-engaging Pleasures, which would have lessened his Merit in lessening his Liberty. Adam would have had reason in some measure to complain of God, had he hindered him from meriting his Reward, 
Fortissimo quipped dimisit atque permisit facere quod vellet. Aug. de corrupt. & great. cap. 12.  as he ought to have merited it, that is by Actions perfectly free. God would have injured his free Will in some measure, in giving him that kind of Grace, which is now only necessary for us upon the account of the pre-engaging Pleasures of concupiscence. Adam being endued with whatever was necessary for his perseverance, to prevent him would have looked like a diffidence of his Virtue, and like a reproach of Infidelity. He would have had some reason to magnify himself, had he not been sensible of the necessity he might be liable to, and of the Weakness into which he was also subject to fall. In fine, that which is yet infinitely more considerable, is, that it would have rendered the Inclinations of Jesus Christ, in relation to us, 
Look upon the Fifth Dialogue of the Christian Conversations towards the latter end, of the Impression of Brussels.  indifferent, though it was certainly his first and greatest design, who suffered Men to be involved in Sin in order to show Mercy to them all in Jesus Christ, to the end that he who glories should only glory in the Lord.  
Therefore it is evident to me, that Adam felt no pre-engaging Pleasure in his Duty; but I am of opinion, that it is not altogether certain that he felt Joy, though I suppose it in this place, because I think it very probable. But to explain myself,  
There is this difference between pre-engaging Pleasure, and the Pleasure of Joy, that the first anticipates Reason, and the latter follows it; for Joy naturally results from the knowledge we have of our Happiness, or of our Perfections, since we can never look upon ourselves as happy or perfect, without being immediately joyful at it. As we may be sensible of our Happiness by Pleasure, or discover it by Reason; so there are two sorts of Joy. But I do not speak in this place of that which is purely sensible: I speak of that which Adam could feel, as a necessary consequence of the knowledge he had of his happiness in uniting himself to God. And there is some reason to question whether he really had that Joy.  
The chief is, that this Joy might have taken up his Mind to that degree, as to deprive him of his Liberty, and would have united him to God after an invincible manner. For we may believe, that as this Joy must be proportionable to the happiness Adam possessed, it must needs be excessive.  
But I answer to this, first, That the Joy which is purely intellectual leaves the Mind absolutely free, and has but little influence over its capacity, thinking therein it differs from sensible Joy, which commonly disturbs our Reason, and lessens our Liberty.  
I answer in the second place, That Adam's Happiness at the first instant of his Creation, did not consist in a full and entire possession of sovereign Good; he was liable to lose it, and to become unhappy. His Happiness chief consisted in that he felt no pain, and that he was in his favour who was to make him perfectly happy, had he persevered in his Innocence. Therefore his Joy was not excessive; moreover, it was, or aught to have been mixed with a kind of fear, for he had reason to be diffident of himself.  
Finally, I answer, That Joy does not always apply the Mind to the real Cause which produced it. As we feel Joy at the sight of our Perfections, it is natural to believe that the said sight occasions it; for when one thing always follows another, we naturally look on it as one of its Effects. So we look upon ourselves as the Authors of our present Felicity: We have a secret Complaisance in our Natural Perfections: We love ourselves: We do not always think on him who operates in us after an Imperceptible manner.  
It is certain that Adam knew more distinctly than the best Philosopher that ever was, that God only was capable to act in him, and to occasion that Sensation of Joy which he felt in himself at the sight of his Happiness and Perfections: He knew that clearly by the light of Reason whenever he applied himself to it; but he did not feel it. He felt on the contrary, that the said Joy was a Consequence of his Perfections, and he always felt it, without any application on his part. Therefore that Sensation might induce him to consider his own Perfections, and to delight in himself, in case he forgot, or any wise lost the sight of him whose Operations are not sensible. So that Joy was so far from rendering him Impeccable, as it is pretended, that on the contrary his Joy perhaps proved the occasion of his Pride and Ruin. And therefore I say in this Chapter, that it behoved Adam to take care, not to suffer the Capacity of his Mind to be filled with a presumptuous Joy excited in his Soul upon the sight of his Natural Perfections.   

AN EXPLANATION OF The Fifth Chapter.  
Where I say,  
That the pre-engaging Delectation is the Grace of Jesus Christ.  
THough I say in this Chapter, that the pre-engaging Delectation is the Grace which Jesus Christ has particularly merited for us, and in another place I call it absolutely the Grace of Jesus Christ; it is not that there is no other Grace but that, or that there is any which Christ has not purchased for us: But I call it the Grace of Jesus Christ, to distinguish it from the Grace that God gave to the first Man when he Created him, which is commonly called the Creator's Grace. For the Grace, by which Adam might have preserved, his Innocence, was chief a Grace of Light, as I have explained in the preceding Remark; because that Adam having no concupiscence, he stood in need of no pre-engaging Pleasures to oppose it.  
But the Grace which we now stand in need of to keep us within the bounds of our Duty, and to produce and maintain Charity in us, is pre-engaging Delectation. For as Pleasure produces and maintains the Love of those things which occasion it, or seem to occasion it; the pre-engaging Pleasures we receive in relation to our Bodies produce and maintain Cupidity in us. So that being directly contrary to Charity, unless God were pleased to produce and maintain Charity in us by pre-engaging Delectations; it is plain that the pre-engaging Pleasures of Concupiscence would weaken it proportionably as Cupidity should be strengthened.  
What I say here, supposes that God permits our Concupiscence to Act in us, and that he does not weaken it by inspiring us with horror against all sensible Objects, which as a result of Sin must needs tempt us. I speak of things as they commonly happen. But, supposing that God diminishes Concupiscence instead of increasing the Delectation of Grace, that may produce the same Effects. We are sensible that there are two ways of putting Scales in Equilibrio, when one of them is overcharged; not only in adding Weights to the other side to even it; but also in removing some of the other weights which bear it down.  
Neither do I pretend that Men can do no good Actions without pre-engaging Delectation. I have sufficiently explained myself upon that subject in the 4th Chapter of the 3d Book. And it appears so evident to me, that a Man who has the Love of God in his Heart, may by the force of his Love, and without pre-engaging Delectation, give, for Example a Penny to the Poor, or bear some small injury with patience; that I can not apprehend how any body can question it. In my opinion Delectation is only necessary when the Temptation is Strong, or Love Weak: If however it may be said, that it is absolutely necessary to a righteous Man, whose Faith I think may be firm enough, and his Hopes strong enough to overcome great Temptations; The joy or foretaste of Eternal Happiness being capable to resist the sensible Charms of Transitory Pleasures.  
It is true that Delectation or Actual Grace is necessary for all good Actions, if by the Word Delectation or Grace is understood Charity, as St. Austin commonly takes it; for it is evident, that what ever is not done for God, is no wise good. But removing the Equivocation, and taking the Word Delectation in my sense, I do not think any body can question what I have said.  
But this is the Case. It is supposed that Pleasure and Love are one and the same thing, because the one seldom goes without the other; and St. Augustin does not always distinguish them. And this being supposed Men are in the right in saying what they say. We may conclude with St. Austin; Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est; for Men certainly Will that which they Love; and we may also say, that we can do nothing good or meritorious without Delectation or without Charity. But I hope to show in an Explanation I shall give upon the Treatise of the Passions, that there is as much difference betwixt Pleasure and Deliberate or Indeliberate Love, as there is betwixt our Knowledge and our Love; or to express that difference sensibly, as there is between the Figure of a Body and its Motion.   

AN EXPLANATION OF What I have said at the beginning of the 10th Chapter of the First Book, and in the 6th of the Second Book, of Method: That it is very difficult to prove that there are Bodies. Which must be understood of the the Proofs that are alleged of their Existence.  
IT is very usual among Men to be perfectly ignorant of what they think they understand best, and to understand certain things pretty well, which they fancy they have not so much as Ideas of. When their Senses have some share in their Judgements, they yield to what they do not apprehend, or to things they have but a very imperfect knowledge of; and when their Ideas are purely Intellectual (I desire the like Expressions may be allowed me) they unwilling receive Indisputable Demonstrations.  
For Example, What can the generality of Men think, when the major part of Metaphysical Truths are proved to them; When the Existence of God is demonstrated to them, the Power of his Will, the Immutability of his Decrees; That there is but one God, or one real Cause which does all in all things; That there is but one sovereign Reason, of which all Intelligences participate; That there is but one necessary Love, which is the Principle of all Created Wills? They think Men speak Words absolutely void of Sense, that they have no Ideas of the things they advance, and that they would do well to hold their Tongues. Metaphysical Truths and Proofs having nothing that is sensible in them, Men are not moved, and consequently not convinced by them. Nevertheless it is most certain, that abstracted things are the most distinct, and Metaphysical Truths are the clearest and the most evident.  
Men say sometimes that they have no Ideas of God, and that they have no knowledge of his Will; and moreover think often as they say; but 'tis only because they fancy they do not know that, which perhaps they know best. For where is the Man who hesitates to answer, when he is asked, Whether God is Wise, Just, Powerful; whether he is, or is not Triangular, Divisible, Movable, Liable to any Alteration? Nevertheless it is impossible to answer without fear of being deceived, whether certain qualifications agree not to a subject, if one has no Ideas of that subject. So likewise, Where is the Man who dares say, that God does not Act by the Plainest Means; That he is Irregular in his Designs; That he makes Monsters by a positive, direct, and particular Will, and not by a kind of necessity; In a Word, That his Will is, or may be contrary to the Order, of which there is no Man but has some knowledge? But if we had no Idea of the Will of God, we might at least question whether he acts according to certain Laws, which we clearly conceive he must follow, supposing he will Act.  
Therefore Men have Ideas of things that are purely Intelligible; and these Ideas are much clearer than those of sensible Objects. Men are more certain of the Existence of God, than of Bodies; and when they look within themselves, they discover more clearly certain Wills of God, according to which he preserves all Being's, than those of their best Friends, or of those whom they have studied all their life. For that Union of their Mind with God, and of their Will with his, I mean with the Eternal Law, or with the Immutable Order, is an immediate, direct, and necessary Union; and the union they have with sensible Objects, being only Established for the preservation of their Health and Life, it only makes them know those Objects according to the relation they have to that design.  
It is this immediate and direct Union, which is only known, says St. Augustin, by those whose Mind is purified, which enlightens us in the most secret recesses of our Reason, and exhorts and moves us, in the most inward part of our Heart. 'Tis this which teaches us what God Thinks, and even what God Wills; that is, his Eternal Truths and Laws; for no body can question our knowing some of them evidently. But the union we have with our best Friends does not teach us evidently, either what they think, or what they will. We think we know it perfectly; but we are commonly mistaken, when we only know it because they tell it us.  
The Union we have by our Senses with Bodies which surround us, cannot inform us neither; For the relation of the Senses is never absolutely true, nay, it is often false in all respects, according as I have explained it in this Book. And therefore I say, that it is more difficult than Men think, to prove positively that there are Bodies, notwithstanding our Senses assure us there are; because Reason does not assure us of it so positively as we imagine, and because it is necessary to consult it with great application to be satisfied in it.  
But as Men are more sensible than, reasonable, and hearken more willingly to the Testimony of their Senses, than to that of internal Truth; they have always consulted their Eyes to assure themselves of the Existence of Matter, without giving themselves the trouble to consult their Reason: And therefore they are surprised when they are told that it is difficult to demonstrate it. They think it is sufficient to open their Eyes to see that there are Bodies; and in case there is any fear of being deluded, they think it sufficient, to draw near and to touch them; after which, they can hardly conceive there can be any reason to doubt of their Existence.  
But our Eyes represent Colours to us upon the surface of Bodies, and Light in the Air and in the Sun: Our Ears convey Sounds to us, as being dispersed through the Air, and Bodies which reverberate the Echo: And if we credit the Relation of the other Senses, Heat will be in Fire, Sweetness in Sugar, Odour in Musk, and all sensible qualities in the Bodies which seem to exhale or to disperse them. Nevertheless it is certain, by the Reasons I have alleged in the first Book of The Search after Truth, That all those Qualifications are not out of the Soul which feels them; at least, it is not evident that they are in the Bodies which surround us. Why then should we conclude, on the bare Relation of the Senses, which deceive us on all occasions, that there are indeed external Bodies, and even that these Bodies are like unto those we see, I mean those which are the immediate Object of our Soul, when we look upon any with the Eyes of our Body. Certainly this is not without its difficulty, what ever men may say of it.  
Moreover, if we may assure ourselves of the exiistence of any Body by the bare Relation of our Senses, it is particularly of that to which our Soul is immediately united. The most lively Sensation, and that which seems to have the most necessary Relation to any Body actually existing, is Pain. Nevertheless, it happens often, that those who have lost an Arm, feel violent Pains in it, even long after its Amputation. They are very sensible that they have lost it, when they consult their Memory, or look upon their Body; but the sensation of Pain deceives them. And if, as it sometimes comes to pass, one should suppose their absolutely losing the Remembrance of what they have been, and their retaining no other Sense, but that by which they feel a Pain in their imaginary Arm; certainly they could never persuade themselves that they have not an Arm, in which they feel such cruel Pains.  
There have been Men who fancied they had Horns upon their heads; others who believed themselves to be Butter, or Glass; or that their Body was not formed like other Men; that it was like that of a Cock, of a Wolf, of an Ox. It will be urged that they were mad, and I grant it. But their Soul might be mistaken in those things; and consequently all Men may fall into the like Errors, if they judge of things according to the Relation of their Senses. For it is observable that those Madmen really behold themselves as they fancy they are: The Error is not precisely in the Sentiment they have, but in the Judgement they form; for if they did say barely that they feel, or behold themselves like a Cock, they would not be deceived. They are only deceived in believing that their Body is like unto that which they feel, I mean, to that which is the immediate Object of their Mind, when they consider themselves. Thus those who believe they are such as they really are, are no more judicious than Madmen in the judgement they form of themselves, if they only judge barely according to the Relation of their Senses. It is not by Reason, but good Fortune, they are not deceived.  
But at the bottom, how can we be certain, whether those who are called Madmen, are really so? Might not one say, that they only seem to be mad, because they have particular Sentiments? For it is evident that a Man is looked upon as a Madman, not because he sees that which is not; but because he sees the contrary: of what others see, whether others are deceived or not.  
A Peasant's eyes, for instance, are disposed in such a manner, that he sees the Moon such as she really is, or such only as she is seen, 
We partly see those things when we behold the Moon through a Telescope.  or perhaps as she will be seen at some time or other with Prospectives of a new Invention: He looks upon her with Admiration, and cries out to his companions, What huge Mountains do I see what deep Valleys, what Seas, what Lakes, what Gulfs, what Rocks! Do you not see many Seas towards the East, and that there is hardly any thing but Lands and Mountains towards the West and South? Do you not behold a Mountain on that very side, much higher than any of those we have ever seen; and do you not admire a perfect black Sea, or a horrid Whirl pool, in the centre of that Planet? What will his Companions answer to such Exclamations, and what will they think of him? That he is a Madman, who has been distempered by the malignant Influences of the Planet which he admires and considers. He is alone of that opinion, and that is sufficient. Thus, to be mad in the opinion of others, it is not necessary to be so effectively; it is sufficient to think, or to see things otherwise than they do: For should all Men fancy themselves to be Cocks, he that should think himself to be what he really is, would certainly be looked upon as a Madman.  
But perhaps some will ask, whether Men have a Bill at the end of their Nose, and a Cock's-comb upon their head? I suppose not. But I know nothing of it, when I only judge by my Senses, and know not how to make that use of them which I ought to do, let me feel my Face and my Head never so much. I only feel my Body, and those which surround me, with hands of which I neither know the length nor figure: I do not so much as know certainly that I have hands; I only know it while I think I stir them. There are certain Motions in a certain part of my Brain, which, according to the general opinion, is the Seat of common Sense; but perhaps I want that very part which people speak so much of, and which is so little known; at least, I do not feel it in myself, though I feel my hands: So that I have yet more reason to believe I have hands, than that little Glandula pinealis which Men still daily dispute about. But in fine, I neither know the figure not the motions of that little Gland; and yet I am told, That that only can instruct me in the figure and motion of my Body, and of those which surround me.  
What then are we obliged to think of all this? That it is not the Body which instructs Reason; That the part to which the Soul is immediately united, is neither visible nor intelligible of itself; That neither our Body, nor those that are about it, can be the immediate Object of our Mind; That we cannot learn from our Brain, whether it actually exists, and much less, whether there are Bodies that surround us. That for that Reason we are obliged to acknowledge that there is some superior Intelligence which alone is capable of acting in us; and which may act after such a manner in us, as truly to represent external Bodies to us, without giving us the least Idea of our Brain; though the Motions which are produced in our Brain, are an occasion for it to discover those Bodies to us. For in fine, we see, with eyes whose figure we know not, how the Bodies which surround us are figured: And though the Colours which appear upon Objects are not more lively than those which are painted upon the Optic Nerve, we do not in the least see these, even while we admire the beauty of the others.  
But after all, what obligation lies on that Intelligence to show us Bodies, when our Brain has certain motions? or what necessity is there of external Bodies to excite motions in our Brain? Do not Sleep, Passions, and Folly, produce those motions without the help of those external Bodies? Is it evident that Bodies which cannot move each other, 
n =" *" See the 3d Chap. of the 2d part of the 6 Book, and the Explanation on the said Chapter.  should communicate to those they meet a moving force which they have not in themselves? Yet allowing that Bodies move themselves, and those they hit against; shall not he who gives a Being to all things, be able of himself to excite in our Brain those motions to which the Ideas of our Mind are affixed? In fine, where is the Contradiction, That our Brain being without new motions, our Soul should nevertheless have new Ideas; since it is certain that the motions of the Brain do not produce the Ideas of the Soul; that we have not so much as a knowledge of those Motions; and that God only can represent our Ideas to us, 
n =" †" See the 6. Chap. of the 2. part of the 3. Book, and the Explanation on the said Chapter.  as I have proved elsewhere? Therefore it is absolutely necessary, to be positively assured of the Existence of external Bodies, to know God, who gives us the Sensation of them; and to know, That as he is infinitely perfect, he cannot deceive us. For if the Intelligence which gives us the Ideas of all things, would, as it were, divert itself in representing Bodies to us as actually existent, though there were none, it is evident that it would not be difficult for it so to do.  
It is for those Reasons, or the like, that Descartes, who was desirous to establish his Philosophy upon a true Foundation, has not thought fit to suppose that there are Bodies, nor to prove it by sensible Demonstrations, though they appear very convincing to the common sort of Men. Apparently he knew as well as we do, that it was enough to open our Eyes to see Bodies; and that we might draw near unto them, and feel them, to be certain whether our Eyes did not deceive us in their Testimony: He was sufficiently acquainted with the Genius of Men, to be sensible that the like Proofs would not be rejected: But he neither mattered sensible Probabilities, nor the vain Applauses of Men. He preferred Truth, though despised, to the Glory of a Reputation without Merit; and chose rather to be thought ridiculous by Men of mean Parts, and make such Doubts as seemed extravagant to them, rather than to assert things which he did not judge to be certain and undeniable.  
But though Descartes has given the strongest Proofs, that Reason alone can furnish, for the Existence of Bodies; though it is evident that God is no Deceiver, and indeed we might say that he did actually deceive us, if we deceived ourselves by making a due use of our Sense, and other Faculties, whereof he is the Author: Yet we may say that the Existence of Matter is not as yet perfectly demonstrated. For in fine, in point of Philosophy, we must believe nothing, but what Evidence obliges us to believe: We must make as much use of Liberty as we can: Our Judgements must have no farther Extent than our Perceptions. Therefore let us only judge that we see Bodies, when we see them really; and that these visible or intelligible Bodies do actually exist: But why should we judge positively that there is a material World without, like unto the intelligible World which we see.  
It may be urged, perhaps, That we see those Bodies without us, and even at a great distance from that which we animate; and therefore we may judge that they are without us, without extending our Judgements beyond our Perceptions. Bus what of that? Do not we see the Light without us, and in the Sun, though it is not there? Nevertheless, I grant that those Bodies which we see without us, are really external; for that is undeniable. But is it not evident that there are external Places and Distances, That there are intelligible Spaces in the intelligible World, which is the immediate Object of our Mind? The material Body which we animate, (let us observe this) is not that which we see, when we look upon it, I mean when we turn our bodily Eyes towards it; the Body which we see, is an intelligible Body; and there are intelligible Spaces between that intelligible Body and the intelligible Sun which we see, as there are material Spaces between our Body and the Sun which we behold. Certainly God sees that there are Spaces between the Bodies he has created; but he does not see those Bodies or those Spaces by themselves; he can only see them by intelligible Bodies and Spaces. God draws his Light only from himself; he only sees the material World in the intelligible World, which he includes; and in the knowledge he has of his own Will, which actually gives Existence and Motion to all things. Therefore there are intelligible Spaces between the intelligible Bodies which we see, as there are material Spaces between the Bodies we behold.  
Moreover, we must observe, That as there is none but God who of himself knows his own Will, which produces all Being's; it is impossible for us to know from any but himself, whether there is really without us a material World like unto that which we see: Because the material World is neither visible nor intelligible of itself. Therefore to be fully convinced that there are Bodies, we must not not only have Demonstrations that there is a God, and that God is not deceiver; but also that God has assured us that he has created such: Which I do not find to be proved in Descartes' Works.  
God only speaks to the Mind, and obliges it to assent after two ways; by Evidence, and by Faith. I own that Faith obliges us to believe that there are Bodies; but as to the Evidence, it seems to me not to be full, nor are we invincibly induced to believe that there is any thing besides God and our Mind. It is true, we have a great Propension to believe that there are Bodies which surround us. 
Sixth Meditation.  I grant it to Mr. Descartes: But nevertheless, as natural as it is, it does not force us to it by Evidence; it only inclines us to it by Impression. Now, we are only obliged in our free Judgements to follow Light and Evidence; and if we suffer ourselves to be guided by sensible Impression, we shall for the most part be mistaken.  
Why do we deceive ourselves in the Judgements we form upon sensible Qualities, upon the magnitude, figure, and motion of Bodies; unless it be because we follow an Impression, like unto that which induces us to believe that there are Bodies? Do we not see that Fire is hot, that Snow is white, that the Sun is dazzling with Light? Do we not see that sensible Qualities as well as Bodies are external? Nevertheless it is certain that these sensible Qualities which we see without us, are not really out of us; or rather, there is no certainty in all this. What reason have we to judge that beside the intelligible Bodies which we see, there are others which we look upon? What Evidence have we, that an Impression which is deceitful, not only in relation to sensible Qualities, but also in relation to the magnitude, figure, and motion of Bodies, should not be the same in relation to the actual Existence cf Bodies? I ask what Evidence we have of it? For as to Probabilities, I grant that they are not wanting.  
I know there is this difference between sensible Qualities and Bodies, that Reason can much easier correct the Impression or Natural Judgements which have a relation to sensible Qualities, than those which have a relation to the existence of Bodies: And moreover, that all the corrections of Reason, in relation to sensible Qualities, agree perfectly with Christian Religion and Morality, and that the Existence of Bodies cannot be denied out of a principle of Religion.  
It is easy to apprehend, that Pleasure and Pain, Heat, and even Colours are no modifications of Bodies: That sensible Qualities in general are not contained in the Idea we have of matter; in a word, that our Senses do not represent sensible objects to us, as they are in themselves, but as they relate to the preservation of Health and Life. This is not only Consonant to Reason, but much more yet to the Christian Religion and Morality, as have been shown in divers parts of this Work.  
But it is not so easy to assure ourselves positively that there are no Bodies without us, as that Pain and Hear are not in Bodies, which seem to cause them. It is most certain, at least, that there may be external Bodies. We have nothing to prove that there are none, and on the contrary we have a strong inclination to believe that there are. Therefore we have more reason to conclude that there are such, than to believe that there are not. For which Reason, I am of Opinion, that we ought to believe there are. For we are naturally inclined to follow our natural Judgement, when we cannot positively correct it by Knowledge and Evidence. For all natural Judgement proceeding from God, we may conform our free Judgements to it, when we find no means to discover the falsity of them: And should we deceive ourselves on those occasions, the Author of our Mind would seem in some measure to be the Author of our Errors, and Faults.  
This Argument perhaps is pretty just. Nevertheless we must grant that it cannot pass for an evident demonstration of the existence of Bodies. For in fine. God does not force us invinsibly to submit to it. If we consent to it, 'tis freely: and we may choose whether we will consent to it or not. If my Argument is Just, we ought to believe that it is altogether probable there are Bodies: but we must not remain absolutely convinced of it by the said Argument. Otherwise 'tis we who act, and not God in us. 'Tis by a free Act, and consequently liable to Error we consent, and not by an invinsible Impression: For we believe, because we will it freely, and not because we see it evidently.  
Certainly nothing but Faith can convince us that there are Bodies indeed. We can receive no exact demonstration of the existence of any other Being, but of that which is necessary. And, if we examine it strictly, we shall find it is not even possible to know with an absolute evidence, whether God is, or is not really Creator of a material and sensible World; for such an evidence is only met with in necessary relations, and there is no necessary relation between God, and such a World. He might not have Created it, and if he has done it, 'tis because it was his Will, and his  too.  
The Saints which are in Heaven are sensible by an evident Light, that the Father begot his Son, and that the Father and the Son produced the Holy Ghost; for these Emanations are necessary. But the World not being a necessary Emanation of God, those who see his Being the most clearly, do not see evidently which are his external productions. Nevertheless, I do believe, that the Blessed are certain that there is a World: but it is because God assures them of it in making his Will known to them after a manner which is unknown to us: And even we here below are certain of it, because Faith teaches us that God has Created this World; and that this Faith is Consonant to our Natural Judgements, or to our compound Sensations, when they are confirmed by all our Senses, corrected by our Memory, and rectified by our Reason.  
It is true it seems at first, that the Proof or Principle of our Faith supposes there are Bodies; Fides ex auditu. It seems to suppose Prophets, Apostles, Holy Writ, and Miracles. But if we observe it strictly, we shall find, that though we only suppose appearances of Men, of Prophets, of Apostles, of Holy Writ, of Miracles, etc. What we have learned by those pretended appearances, is absolutely undeniable: since, as I have proved it in divers parts of this Work; God alone can represent those pretended appearances to the Mind, and God is no deceiver; for Faith itself supposes all this. Now in the appearance of Holy Scripture and Miracles, we learn that God has Created an Heaven and an Earth, that the Word was made Flesh, and other Truths of this kind, which suppose the existence of a Created World. So that it is certain by Faith, that there are Bodies; and thereby all those appearances become Realities. I need not enlarge any farther to answer an Objection which appears too abstruse to the common sort of Men, and I am of Opinion that this will suffice to satisfy all those who are not too difficult.  
Therefore we must conclude from all this, that we can, and even that we ought to correct the Natural Judgements, or compound perceptions which have a relation to sensible Qualities, which we attribute to external Bodies, or to that which we animate. But, as to the Natural Judgements that have a relation to the actual Existence of Bodies, though we might absolutely forbear forming free Judgements agreeable to them, we ought not to do it, because those Natural Judgements agree perfectly with Faith.  
Besides, I have particularly made this Remark, that Men should seriously reflect upon this Truth: That nothing but Eternal Wisdom can enlighten us, and that all the sensible knowledge, in which our Body has any share, is deceitful; or at least is attended with that Light to which we feel ourselves obliged to submit. I am sensible that the common sort of Men will not approve these Thoughts, and that according to the abundance or defect of their Animal Spirits, they will either laugh or be frighted at these Arguments. For the Imagination cannot endure abstract and extraordinary Truths: It either looks upon them as frightful Spectres, or ridiculous Phantasms. But I had rather be exposed to the raillery of strong and bold Imaginations, and to the Indignation and Fear of the weak and timorous, than to be wanting in what I own to Truth, and to those generous defenders of the Mind against the efforts of the Body, who know how to distinguish the answers of illuminating Wisdom from the confused noise of a perplexing and seducing Imagination.   

AN EXPLANATION OF THE Fifth Chapter of the Second Book. Of Memory, and Spiritual Habits.  
I Forbear speaking of Memory and Spiritual Habits in this Chapter for several Reasons, the chief of which is, that we have no clear Idea of our Soul. For what means have we clearly to explain the dispositions which the Operations of the Soul leave in it, which dispositions are its Habits, since we do hot even clearly know the Nature of the Soul? It is evident that we cannot distinctly know the alterations a Being is capable of, when we do not distinctly know the Nature of that Being. For, if for instance, Men had no clear Idea of extension, they would in vain endeavour to discover the Figures of it. However, since some are desirous I should speak upon a matter which in itself is not known to me, this is the method, I will observe to follow none but clear Ideas in it.  
I suppose that God only acts in the Mind, and represents the Ideas of all things to it; and that when the Mind perceives any Object by a very clear and lively Idea, it is because God represents that Idea to it after a very perfect manner.  
I suppose, moreover, that the Will of God being absolutely consonant to Order and Justice, it is sufficient to have a right to a thing to obtain it. These Suppositions, which are distinctly conceived, being made, the Spiritual Memory explains itself easily; for Order requiring that Persons, who have often thought on some Object, should the easier think on it again, and have a clearer and more lively Idea of it than those who have thought but little on it, the Will of God, which operates continually according to Order, represents to their Mind, as soon as they desire it, the clear and lively Idea of that Object. So that, according to that Explanation, the Memory, and other Habits of pure Intelligences, consist not in a facility of operation which results from certain Modifications of their Being, but from an immutable Order of God, and in a Right which the Mind acquires over those things Which have already been submitted to it; and the sole power of the Mind depends immediately arid only on God, the force or facility which all Creatures find in their Operations, being in that sense only the Efficacious Will of the Creator.  
And I do not think we are obliged to abandon this Explanation upon the account of the ill habits of Sinners, and of the Damned; for tho' God does whatever is real and positive in the Actions of Sinners, it is evident, by what I have said in the first Explanation, that God is not the Author of Sin.  
However, I do believe, and think myself obliged to believe, that after the action of the Soul, there still remains some alterations which do dispose it to that same Action: But as I know them not, I cannot explain them, for I have no clear Idea of my Mind, in which I can discover all the Modifications it is capable of. I believe, by Theological Proofs, and not by clear and evident ones, 
See the Explanation on the 7th Chap. of the 2d part of the third Book.  that the Reason for which pure Intelligences see Objects which they have already considered more clearly than others, is not merely because God represents those Objects to them in a more lively and more perfect manner, but because they are really better disposed to receive the same Action from God in them. Just as the facility which some persons have acquired to play upon some Instruments, does not consist in that the Animal Spirits, which are necessary for the Motion of the Fingers, have more action, or force in them than in other Men, but that the ways through which the Spirits slide, are more slippery and smother through the habit of Exercise, as I have explained in this Chapter. Nevertheless I grant, that all the Uses of Memory, and of the other Habits, are not necessary to those, who being perfectly united to God, find in his Light all sorts of Ideas, and in his Will all the facility to act that they can desire.   

AN EXPLANATION OF THE Seventh Chapter of the Second Book.  
The Summary of the Proofs and Explanations I have given about Original Sin; with Answers to the Objections that seemed most weighty to me.  
TO answer those difficulties regularly, which may arise in the Mind about Original Sin, and the manner how it is transmitted from Father to Son, I think it will be necessary to give in few words what I have said upon that Subject in several parts of the Search after Truth. These than are my principal Proofs; I have disposed them in a peculiar manner, to make them the more sensible to those who will consider them.  
I. God Wills Order in his Works; he Wills what we conceive clearly to be consonant to Order: And that which we conceive to be clearly contrary to Order, God Wills it not. This Truth is evident to all those who can consider, with a fixed and pure Sight, the infinitely perfect Being. Nothing can trouble or shake them in that; and they clearly see that all the difficulties which can be formed against this Principle, only proceeds from the ignorance we have of those things which it would be necessary to know in order to resolve them.  
II. God has no other end but himself in his Operations: Order requires it.  
III. God makes and preserves the Mind of Man that it might be employed about him, that it should know and love him; for God is the end of his own Works. Order requires it so. God cannot Will that we should love that which is not lovely; or rather, God cannot Will, that what is least lovely should be most beloved. Therefore it is evident, that Nature is corrupted and in disorder, since the Mind loves Bodies which are not lovely, and often loves them more than God. Original Sin, or the depravation of Nature, therefore requires no proof, for every one sufficiently finds within himself, a Law which captivates and disorders him, and a Law which is not established by God, since it is contrary to the Order which regulates his Will.  
iv Nevertheless, Man was admonished before his Fall by preingaging Sensations, and not by a clear knowledge, whether he was to unite himself to external Bodies, or to separate from them: Order requires it. It is a disorder for the Mind to be obliged to apply itself to Bodies; it may be united to them, but it is not made for them. Therefore it ought to know God, and be sensible of Bodies. Moreover, as Bodies are incapable of being its good, the Mind could not easily unite itself to them, if it only knew them as they are, without finding that in them which is not there. Therefore false Good must be discerned by a preingaging Sensation, to be beloved by a love of Instinct; and the real good must be known by a clear knowledge, to be beloved by a free and reasonable love. In fine, God makes and preserves Man that he may know and love him; therefore, the capacity of his Mind must not be filled, nor even divided against his Will, by the knowledge of the Infinite Figures and Configurations of Bodies which surround him, nor of that which he animates. However, in order to know by a clear knowledge, whether such a Fruit, at such a time, is fit for the nourishment of the Body, we must apparently know so many Things, and form so many Ratiocinations, that the most extended Mind would be wholly taken up by it.  
V But, tho' the first Man had notice by preingaging Sensations, whether he was or was not to make use of external Bodies, yet he was not agitated by Involuntary or Rebel Motions; yea, he blotted out of his Mind the Ideas of sensible Objects, when he pleased, whether he used or used them not, for so Order requires. The Mind may be united to the Body, but it must have no dependence on it; it must command it. Moreover, all the love God puts in us must centre in him, for God produces nothing in us but for himself. Finally, Bodies are not lovely; they are below that which is in us capable of loving. Therefore, in the first Institution of Nature, Bodies could not turn our Mind towards them, or incline it to consider or love them as its Goods.  
VI External Bodies never act in our Soul, but when they produce some Motions in our Body, and when those Motions communicate themselves to the principal part of the Brain; for it is according to the alterations which happen in that part of the Brain, that the Soul changes itself, and finds itself agitated by sensible Objects. I have sufficiently proved it, and Experience demonstrates it. This being granted, it is clear, by the precedent Article, that the first Man, when he pleased, stopped the motions communicated to his Body, or at least those which were communicated to the principal part of his Brain: Order would have it so; and consequently, he whose Will is always consonant to Order, and can do nothing against Order altho' it be Almighty. Thus Man had the power, on some occasions, to suspend the Natural Law of the Communication of Motions, since he had no Concupiscence, and felt no involuntary and rebellious Motions in himself.  
VII. But the first Man, by Sin, has lost that power: Order Wills it so; for it were not reasonable, that in favour of a Sinner and a Rebel, there should be any exceptions in the General Law of the Communication of Motions, besides those which are absolutely necessary for the preservation of our Life, and Civil Society. Therefore the Body of Man, being continually shaken by the Action of sensible Objects, and his Soul being agitated by all the Motions of the principal part of the Brain, it is a dependant upon the Body to which it had only been united, and which it did command before the Fall.  
VIII. Let us now see how Adam was capable of Sinning It is natural to love Pleasure and to relish it; and that was not forbidden to Adam. It is the same of Joy; we may lawfully rejoice at the sight of our natural Perfections; that is not ill in itself. Man was made to be happy, and Pleasure and Joy actually makes us Happy and Contented. The first Man than enjoyed Pleasure in the use of sensible Goods; he also rejoiced at the sight of his Perfections; for we cannot consider ourselves as being happy or perfect without rejoicing thereat: For tho' he knew that God was his Good, he did nor feel it, as I have proved in several places. Therefore the Joy he could find in his Duty was not very sensible; which being supposed, as the first Man had not an infinite Capacity of Mind, his Pleasure, or his Joy, lessened the clear sight of his Mind, which made him sensible that God was his Good, and that he ought to love him only. For Pleasure is in the Soul, and modifies it. So that it fills the Capacity we have of thinking, proportionably as it affects us and acts in us. This is what we learn by Experience; that is, by the inward Sensation we have of ourselves. Therefore we may conceive that the first Man, having by degrees suffered the Capacity of his Mind to be divided, or filled up by the lively Sensation of a presumptuous Joy, or perhaps by some love or sensible Pleasure, the presence of God, and the remembrance of his Duty, were blotted out of his Mind, by his having neglected courageously to follow his light in search of his real Good. Having thus divided his Mind, he was capable of falling, for his principal Grace and Power was his Light, and the clear knowledge of his Duty, since than he did not want those preingaging delectations which we now stand in need of to resist Concupiscence.  
IX. And we must observe, that neither the preingaging Sensations which Adam felt in the use of the Goods of the Body, nor the Joy which he found in considering his Happiness or Perfection, are the real causes of his Fall; for he was sensible that God only was capable to make him feel Pleasure or Joy. Therefore he ought to have loved him only, since we ought to love nothing but the real cause of our Happiness. As nothing did disturb the Knowledge and Light of the first Man, while he was willing to preserve it pure; he could, and aught to have obliterated out of his Mind, whatever Sensations did divide it, and put it into the least danger to forget or lose the sight of him who enlightened, and satisfied it. It was his Duty to remember, that if God did not make him feel him as good, but only know him as such, it was that he might the sooner deserve his reward by the continual use of his Liberty.  
Supposing then that Adam and Eve Sinned, and that in consequence of their Sin they have felt in themselves involuntary and rebellious motions: I say, it was necessary their Children should be Born Sinners, and liable, like them, to the motions of Concupiscence. These are my Reasons.  
X. I have proved at large in the Chapter that occasioned this Discourse, that there is such a communication between the Mother's Brain and her child's, that all the Motions and Traces which are made in the Mother's Brain, are excited in the Child's. Therefore as the Child's Soul is united to its Body in the first moment it is created; because it is the conformation of the Body which obliges God, pursuant of his General Will, to give it a Soul to inform it: It is evident, that at the very Instant the Soul is created it has corrupt inclinations, and is inclined towards the Body; since from that very moment, it has the inclinations which answer to the motions, that are actually in the Brain to which it is united.  
XI. But whereas it is a disorder that the Mind should incline to Bodies, and love them, the Child is a Sinner, and in disorder as soon as it is created. God who loves Order hates it in that condition. Nevertheless its Sin is not free; 'tis its Mother who has conceived it in Iniquity, upon the account of the communication which is Established by the Order of Nature between the Brain of the Mother and that of the Child.  
XII. Now the said communication is very good in its Institution for several Reasons: 1. Because it is useful, and perhaps necessary towards the conformation of the Foetus. 2. Because the Child might thereby have some commerce with its Parents, for it was reasonable it should know from whom it derived the Body it animates. Finally, the said communication was the only means by which the Child could know what passed without, and what it ought to think of it. Having a Body, it was reasonable it should have thoughts that had a relation to it, and that it should not be deprived of the sight of the Works of God amongst which it lived. It is very probable, that there are many other Reasons for the said communication, besides those I have related; but these are sufficient to justify it, and to vindicate the Conduct of him whose Will is necessarily conformable to Order.  
XIII. However, it is not Just the Child should receive the Trace of sensible Objects forcibly: And if the Soul of Children was created but one moment before its being united to their Bodies, if it were but one moment in a state of Innocence or Order, it would of Right, and by the necessity of the Eternal Order, or Law, have a power to suspend the said Communication; just as the first Man before his Fall, had a power to stop whenever he pleased, the Motions which were excited in him, for Order requires the Body should obey the Mind. But as the Souls of Children never were agreeable to God, there was no reason that God should change the Law of the Communication of Motions in their behalf; therefore 'tis Just that Children should be Born Sinners and in disorder. And the cause of their Sin is not the Order of Nature, that Order is Just; but it is the Sin of those from whom they derive their Being. In this sense it is not Just that a Father, who is a Sinner, should get Children more perfect than himself, nor that they should have a power over their Body which their Mother has not over hers.  
XIV. I grant, that after Adam's Fall, which corrupts and overthrows all things, God might, in making some alterations in the Order of Nature, have remedied the disorder which the said Fall had caused. But God does not change his Will thus; he Wills nothing but what is Just. What he Wills once, he Wills it ever; he does not correct himself; he does not repent; he Wills constantly; his Eternal Decrees do not depend on the inconstancy of a Man's Will, it it not Just they should be submitted to it.  
XV. But, if it be allowable to penetrate into the Counsels of God, and to say what we think upon the Motives which he may have had to Establish the Order I have , and to permit the Fall of the first Man, I am of Opinion that it is impossible to have Sentiments more worthy of the greatness of God, and more consonant to Religion and Reason, than to believe that Gods principal end in his external Operations, is the Incarnation of his Son: 
See the 9th Dialogue of the Christian Conversation.  That God established the Order of Nature, and permitted the disorder which has happened in it to favour that great Work; That he permitted all Men to be subjected to Sin, that no Man might Glory in himself; and that he leaves even Concupiscence in the most holy and most perfect, that they may have no vain Satisfaction in themselves. For when we consider the Perfection of our Being, 
Aug. in Tul. lib. 6. c. 9  it is difficult to despise ourselves, unless at the same time we see and love Sovereign Good, in the presence of which all our Perfection and Grandeur vanishes in a moment.  
I own that Concupiscence may prove the Subject of our Merit, and that it is reasonable the Mind should, for a time, follow Order difficultly, to deserve to be Eternally submitted to it with pleasure. I grant that it may be, upon this account, that God has permitted Concupiscence, after having foreseen Sin. But Concupiscence not being absolutely necessary to our Meriting, if God permitted it, it was because Man might be able to do no good without the assistance which Jesus Christ has merited for us, and that he might have no reason to Glory in his own power; for it is plain, that Man cannot sighed against, and overcome himself, unless he be animated by Jesus Christ, who, as the Head of the Faithful, inspires them with such Sensations as are directly opposite to the Concupiscence they derive from the first Man.  
XVI. Supposing then that Children are Born with Concupiscence, it is evident that they are really Sinners, since their heart is set upon Bodies as much as it is capable. There is as yet but one love in their Will, and that love is irregular. So there is nothing in them that God can love, since God cannot love disorder.  
XVII. But when they have been Regenerated in Jesus Christ; that is, when their Heart has been turned towards God, either by an actual motion of love, or by an inward disposition, like unto that which remains after an Act of Loving God, than Concupiscence is no longer a Sin in them, for it inhabits no longer alone in the Heart, it has no longer any dominion there: The habitual Love, which remains in them by the Grace of Baptism in Jesus Christ, is frecer, or stronger than that which is in them by the Concupiscence they have in Adam. They are like the Just, who in their Sleep follow the Motions of Lust, yet lose not the Grace of Baptism, for they do not freely consent to these Motions.  
XVIII. And it should not be thought strange, if I believe it possible for Children while they are Baptising to love God with a free Love. For, since the second Adam is contrary to the first, why should he not at the time of Regeneration deliver Children out of the servitude of their Bodies, to which they are only subjected by the first Adam; so that being enlightened and excited by a lively and effectual Grace to love God; they may love him with a free and reasonable love, without being hindered by the first Adam. It is not observable, some may urge, that their Bodies ceases one moment from acting over their Mind. But should Men wonder at their not seeing that which is not visible? That Act of Love may be produced in one Instant. And whereas that Act may be form in the Soul without making any Traces in the Brain, we need not wonder if even those who are come to Men's estate when they are Baptised, do not always remember it; for we have no remembrance of those things of which the Brain keeps no traces.  
XIX. St. Paul teaches us that the Old Man or Concupiscence is Crucified with Jesus Christ, and that we are dead and buried with him by Baptism. It is not that we are then delivered from the warring of the Body against the Mind, and that Concupiscence is, as it were, dead that moment? It is true it revives; but having been destroyed, and thereby left the Children in a state of loving God, it can no longer harm them, though it revives in them. For, when there are two Loves in the Heart, the one Natural and the other Free, Order wills that only that should be regarded which is free. And if Children loved God in Baptism by an Act no wise free, loving Bodies afterwards by several Acts of the same kind; God perhaps could not according to Order, have more regard to one only Act, than to many, which are all natural and constrained. Or rather if those contrary Loves were equal in force, he must have regard to the last; by the same reason, that when there have been successively in a Heart two free Loves contrary to one another, God ever has regard to the last, since Grace is lost by one Mortal Sin.  
XX. However it cannot be denied that God may without suspending the Dominion of the Body over the Child's Mind, make it Just, or turn its Will towards him, by infusing into its Soul a disposition like unto that which remains after an Actual motion of Love towards God. But that way of proceeding does not perhaps appear so natural as the other; for we do not conceive clearly what those dispositions may be which would remain. Indeed we need not wonder at it, for having no clear Idea of the Soul, as I have proved elsewhere 
* See the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part of the said Book, with its Explanation. , we must not wonder if we do not know all the Modifications it is capable of. But the Mind cannot be fully satisfied with things it does not conceive clearly. In my Opinion it requires an extraordinary Miracle to give those dispositions to the Soul without a preceding Act. Surely it cannot be done by the most simple means. Whereas the second Adam producing for a moment in the Mind of the Child which is Baptised, the contrary of what the first did produce there before; it is sufficient to regenerate it, that God should act in it by the usual means, according to which he sanctifies the Adult; for the Child not having at that moment any sensations or motions to divide its capacity of thinking and willing, nothing hinders it from knowing and loving its real Good. I say no more, because it is not necessary to know precisely, how the regeneration of Children is performed, provided we admit a real regeneration in them, or an inward and real Justification caused by the Acts, or at least by the habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity. If I propose an Explanation so contrary to received Prejudices; it is to satisfy even those who will not admit spiritual habits, and to prove to them the possibility of Child's Regeneration, for Imputation seems to me to include a down right contradiction; since God cannot repute as just, and actually, love Creatures who are actually in disorder; the he may for the love of his Son design to restore them to order, and love them when they are restored.   

OBJECTIONS Against the Proofs and Explanations of Original Sin.  

Objection against the First Article.  
GOD Wills Order, it is True; but it is his Will which makes it: It does not suppose it. Whatever God Wills, is in Order, from this only reason, that God Wills it. If God Will, 
At every Objection see the Article against which it is made.  that Minds shall be subject to Bodies, that they shall love and fear them; this is no disorder. If it were God's pleasure that two times two should not be four, we should not lie in saying that two times two was not not four, for it would be a truth. God is the Principle of all Truth; and the Master of all Order; He supposes nothing, neither Truth nor Order; but makes both.  
Answer.  
All is then overthrown. There is no longer any Science, nor Morality, nor undeniable proofs of Religion. This Consequence is clear to any one who apprehends this false Principle, that God produces Order and Truth by a Will absolutely Free. But that is no Answer.  
I Answer then, That God neither does nor wills any thing without knowledge; that therefore his Will supposes something; but what is supposes is nothing that is Created. Order, Truth, Eternal Wisdom, is the Pattern of all the Works of God, and this Wisdom is not made. God who makes all things, never made it, though he constantly begets it by the necessity of his Being.  
Whatever God Wills is in Order, from this only reason, that God Wills it: I own it. But it is because God cannot Act against himself, against his Wisdom and Light. He may forbear to produce any External thing; but if he will Act, he can only do it according to the Immutable Order of that Wisdom which he necessarily loves; for Religion and Reason teach me, that he does nothing without his Son, without his Word, without his Wisdom. Therefore I am bold to say, that God cannot positively Will that the Mind should be subject to the Body; because this Wisdom according to which God Wills whatever he Wills, shows me clearly that this is contrary to Order. And I see this clearly in that Wisdom; because that is the sovereign and universal Reason of which all Spirits do participate; for which all Intelligences are Created, by which all Men are Reasonable. For no Man is his own Reason, Knowledge, and Wisdom, unless it be perhaps when his Reason is particular, his Knowledge a false Light, and his Wisdom Folly.  
As most Men know not distinctly, that nothing but Eternal Wisdom directs them, and that Intelligible Ideas, which are the immediate Object of their Mind, are not Created, they imagine that Eternal Laws, and Immutable Truths, have been established such by a Free Will of God: And 'tis for that very reason Descartes says, that God could have made two times four not to be eight, and that the three Angles of a Triangle should not be equal two right ones, 
An Answer to the 6th Objection against his Meditations. Art. 6. Art. 8. and Lett. 68 of the 3d Vol.  because there is no Order, says he, no Law, no Reason of Goodness and Truth, but what depends on God, and that it is he, who from all Eternity has ordained and established. Eternal Truths as Sovereign Lawgiver. This Learned Man did not mind that there is an Order, a Law, a sovereign Reason which God loves necessarily, which is Coeternal with him, and according to which it is necessary he should Act, supposing he will Act. 
See the Explanation of the 6th Chapter of the 2d Part of the 3d Book, How all things are seen in God.  For God is indifferent as to his External Works, but he is not indifferent though perfectly free, in the manner by which he does 'em; he always Acts in the Wisest and most perfect manner possible; he always follows the immutable and necessary Order. Therefore God may choose whether he will create Spirits and Bodies; but if he creates those two kinds of Being's, he must create them in the simplest way, and place them in a perfect order. He may for instance, unite Spirits to Bodies, but I affirm that he cannot subject them to 'em, unless in pursuance of the Order which he always follows, the Sin of Spirits obliges him to proceed thus, as I have already explained in the 7th Article, and first Remark towards the latter end.  
To prevent some Instances which might be objected against me, I think myself obliged to say, that Men are in the wrong to Consult themselves, when they have a mind to know what God can do, or will. They ought not to judge of his Will by the Internal Sensations they have of their own Inclinations; for than they would often make an Injust, Cruel, and Sinful, instead of a powerful God. They ought to lay aside the general Principle of their Prejudices, which makes them judge of all things according to themselves: They must attribute nothing to God, but what they conceive clearly to be included in the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being; for they ought only to judge of things by clear Ideas. Then the God they will adore, will not be like unto those of Antiquity, which were Cruel, Adulterous, Voluptuous, like the Persons who had set them up. Nor will he so much as resemble the God of some Christians, who to make him as powerful as Sinners desire him, ascribe to him an absolute power of Acting against all Order, of leaving Sin unpunished, and Condemning some Persons to Eternal Torments, though never so Just and so Innocent.   

The Second Objection against the First Article.  
IF God Wills that Order which makes Monsters; I do not say among Men, for they have sinned; but amongst Animals and Plants; What is the Cause of the general Corruption of the Air which breeds so many Distempers? By what Order are Seasons irregular, and the Sun of Frosts burn up and destroy the Fruits of the Earth? Does it argue Wisdom or Order to give an Animal parts altogether useless, and to freeze Fruits after having formed them? Is it not rather because God does what he pleases, and that his Power is above all Order and Rule? For to speak of things of greater Consequence than some Fruits, with which it is lawful to do what he pleases; the Clay out of which God makes Vessels of Wrath, is the same wherewith he makes Vessels of Mercy.  
Answer.  
These difficulties are only fit to obscure Truth, because they proceed from the darkness of the Mind. We know that God is Just: We see that the Wicked Prosper; Must we deny what we see, must we doubt what we know; because perhaps we may be so stupid as not to know, or such Libertines, as not to believe what Religion teaches us of future Punishments? So likewise, we know that God is Wise, and that he does nothing but what is Good; yet we see Monsters, or defective Works. What shall we believe? that God was mistaken, or that those Monsters are not from him. Certainly those who have sense or steadiness of Mind, will believe neither; for it is evident that God does all, and that he does nothing but what is as perfect as possible, in respect to the simplicity and small number of means which he employs in the formation of his Works. We must keep steadily to what we see, without suffering ourselves to be shaken by difficulties which it is impossible to resolve, when our Ignorance is the cause of that impossibility. If Ignorance be admitted to form Difficulties, and if such Difficulties overthrow the best established Sentiments, what will be certain among Men who know not all things? What! shall not the most radiant Lights be able to dissipate the least Obscurities; and shall any little Darkness be able to obscure the most clear and lively Lights?  
But though we might forbear answering such like difficulties, without weakening the Principle we have established, yet it is fit the World should know they are not altogether unanswerable. For the mind of Man is so unjust in its Judgements, that it may perhaps prefer the Sentiments which seem to be Subjects of these imaginary Difficulties to real Truths, which cannot be questioned, unless Men have a mind to do it on purpose, and therefore cease to consider them. I say then that God wills Order, though there are Monsters; and also, that there are Monsters, because God loves Order. This is the Reason of it.  
Order requires that the Laws of Nature, by which God produces that infinite Variety which we see in the World, should be very plain, and very few. Now it is the Simplicity of those general Laws, which in some particular cases, and by reason of the disposition of the Subject, produces irregular Motions, or rather monstrous Dispositions: And consequently there are Monsters, because God wills Order. Thus God wills not positively or directly that there should be Monsters; but he positively wills certain Laws of the communication of Motions, whereof Monsters are the necessary Consequences: And he wills those Laws, because though they are very plain, they are nevertheless capable of producing that variety of Forms, which we can never sufficiently admire.  
For instance, in consequence of the general Laws of the Communication of Motions, there are Bodies which are in some measure driven towards the Centre of the Earth. The Body of a Man, or of an Animal, is one of these: That which sustains it in the Air sinks under its Feet. Is it just and suitable to Order, That God should change his general Will for that particular Case? Certainly that does not appear likely. Therefore that Animal must either break or maim his Body. We must argue in the same manner as to the Generation of Monsters.  
Order indeed requires that all Being's should have whatever is necessary for their Preservation, and the Propagation of their Kind; provided it may be done by simple means, and such as are suitable to the Wisdom of God. And 'tis true we see that Animals, and even Plants, have general means for their Preservation, and the continuation of their Kind; and if some Animals are destitute of them on certain particular occasions, it is because the general Laws according to which they have been formed could not permit it, because those Laws do not relate to them alone, but generally to all Being's, and that public Good must be preferred to private Advantages.  
It is evident that if God made but one Animal, it would not be monstrous. But Order would require that he should not make that Animal by the same Laws by which he now forms all the rest. For the Action of God must be proportioned to his Design. By the Laws of Nature he makes not one Animal, but the whole World; and he must do it by the simplest means, as Order requires it. Therefore it is enough that this World is not monstrous, or that the general Effects should be worthy the general Laws, to hinder any one from finding fault with the Work of God.  
Had God established particular Laws for all particular Alterations, or had he placed in every thing a particular Nature or Principle of the Motions which happen to it; I own it would be difficult to justify his Wisdom against so many visible Irregularities. Perhaps we should be obliged to own, either that God wills not Order, or that he cannot or will not remedy Disorder. For in fine, it seems to me impossible to reconcile the almost infinite number of Second Causes, or of Powers, Virtues, Qualities, and natural Faculties, with what we call the sports or irregularities of Nature, without engaging the Wisdom and infinite Power of the Author of all things.   

Objection against the Second Article.  
GOD can never act for himself. Those that are wise do nothing that is useless; and whatever God should do for himself, would be useless, for he wants nothing. God wills nothing for himself, if by the necessity of his Being he has all the Good he could will for himself. And if God desires nothing, he does nothing for himself, since he only acts by the Efficacy of his Will. The Nature of God is to communicate and be diffusive; to be useful to others, and not to itself; to seek; and if possible, to create Persons whom it may render happy. Therefore God being Essentially and Sovereignly Good, it implies a Contradiction that he should act for himself.  
Answer.  
GOD may act for himself two ways, either to derive some advantage by what he does, or that his Creature may find its happiness and perfection in him. I do not examine at present, whether God acts for himself according to the first manner, and whether, to receive some Honour's worthy of himself, he has made and restored all things by his Son, in whom, according to the Scripture, all Creatures do subsist. I only assert, That God can neither make nor preserve Spirits, in order to their knowing and loving the Creatures: It is an unalterable, eternal, and necessary Law, that they should know and love God, as I have explained in the Third Article. Therefore this Objection does not impugn my Principle; but on the contraey it favours it: And if it be certain that it is the Nature of God to Communicate and extend itself, (for I do not examine this Axiom) it is evident that God being Essentially and Sovereignly Good, it implies a Contradiction that he should not act for himself in the sense which I pretend to establish.   

Objection against the Fourth Article.  
AS Ignorance is a Consequence of Sin, Adam, before the Fall, had a perfect Knowledge of the Nature of his own Body; and of all those which were about him. For instance, it was necessary he should perfectly know the Nature of all Animals, to give proper Names to them, as he did.  
Answer.  
It is a mistake. Ignorance is neither an Evil, nor a Consequence of Sin: It is error or blindness of the mind which is an Evil, and a Consequence of Sin. There is none but God who knows every thing, and is ignorant of nothing: Ignorance dwells in the most enlightened Intelligences. Whatever is finite cannot comprehend infinity. And therefore there is no Mind that can so much as apprehend all the Properties of Triangles. Adam, in the moment of his Creation, knew whatever was fit for him to know, and nothing more; and it was not fit he should have known exactly the disposition of all the parts of the Body, and of those he made use of: I have given Reasons for it in this Article, and elsewhere.  
A giving of Names is rather a sign of Authority in the Scripture, than of a perfect Knowledge. As the Lord of Heaven had made Adam Lord of the Earth, he was willing Adam should give the Animals Names, as he himself had done to the Stars. 
Omnibus eis nomina vocat. Ps. 47.  It is evident that Sounds or Words neither have, nor naturally can have a Relation to the things they signify, whatever the Divine Plato and mysterious Pythagoras say about it. One might perhaps explain the Nature of a Horse, or of an Ox, in a whole Book; but a Word is not a Book: And it is ridiculous to imagine that Monosyllables, as Sus, which in Hebrew signifies a Horse, and Schor, which signifies an Ox, should represent the Nature of those Animals. Nevertheless, it is very likely that those are the Names which Adam has given them; for we find them in the Book of Genesis: 
Cap. 49.17. & 32.5.  And the Author of Genesis assures us moreover, That the Names which Adam gave to the Animals, are the very same which were used in his time; for I do not see that he could mean any thing else by these words, Omne quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est nomen ejus.  
But I grant that Adam gave Names to Animals which had some Relation to their Nature, and submit to the learned Etymologies which an Author of this Age gives us about them. I grant that Adam might call Domestic Animals Behemoth, because they keep silence; the Ram Ajil, because he is strong; the Goat Sair, because he is hairy; the Hog Chazir, because he has little eyes? and the Ass Chamor, because there are many red ones in the East. But I think it enough only to open one's eyes to know whether the Goat is hairy, the Ass red, and whether the Hog has little eyes, Adam calls Beir and Behemah what we call a Brute, or a great Domestic Animal, because those Beasts are mute and stupid: What is to be concluded from thence, that he perfectly understood their Nature? That is not evident. I should rather fear that Men would conclude from thence, That Adam being simple enough to interrogate an Ox, as the largest of all Domestic Animals, and being surprised at his not being able to answer him, he despised him, and in contempt called him by the name of Beir, and of Behemah.   

Second Objection against the Fourth Article.  
THere are pre-engaging Sensations, which are troublesome and uneasy. Adam was just and innocent; therefore he could not be affected with them: He must needs be guided on all occasions by Reason and Knowledge, and not by pre-engaging Sensations, like to those we have at present.  
Answer.  
I own that there are Pre-engaging Sensations which are disagreeable and painful: But they were never uneasy to the first Man; because that, as soon as ever they began to assault, he would no longer be affected by them; and as soon as ever he had that he was no longer affected by them. Those Sensations only respectively gave him notice of what he was to do, or not to do: They did not disturb his Felicity; they only made him sensible that God could punish him and make him miserable, if he should prove unfaithful to him.  
To persuade ourselves that the first Man was never surprised by any sensible Grief, we need only consider two things: First, that Grief is very inconsiderable, when the Motions to which it is annexed are very weak; since it is always proportioned to the strength of the Motions which are communicated to the principal part of the Brain. Secondly, that it is the nature of Motion always to include a succession of time, and that it cannot be violent at the first instant it is communicated. This being supposed, it is plain that the first Man was never surprised by any violent Grief, that was capable of making him unhappy: For it was in his power to stop the Motions which occasioned it. Therefore if it was in his power to stop them at the very instant they began their Action, certainly he did not fail to do it, since he desired to be happy, and that Aversion is naturally joined with the sense of Pain.  
Thus Adam never felt any violent Pain: But I think we are not obliged to say that he never felt any inconsiderable uneasiness, like unto that which we feel when we taste green Fruit, which we thought to be ripe. His Felicity would have been very tender, if it could have been disturbed by so small a matter: For Delicacy is a sign of Weakness; and Pleasure and Joy have but little Solidity in them, when the least thing dissipates and annihilates them. Pain or Grief never disturb Happiness effectually, unless it is involuntary, and when it subsists in us against our Wills. Jesus Christ was happy, even upon the Cross, though he felt great Pains, because he suffered nothing but what he was willing to suffer. Therefore as Adam suffered nothing against his Will, no body can say that we make him unhappy before his Fall, because we suppose here, that he was warned by pre-engaging Sensations; but such as were respectful and submissive of what it was fit for him to avoid for the preservation of his Life.   

Objection against the Fifth Article.  
ADam felt pre-engaging Pleasures; which are involuntary Motions: Therefore Adam was agitated by involuntary Motions.  
Answer.  
I answer, That Adam's Sensations did precede his Reason. I have proved it in the Fourth Article. But I deny that they did pre-engage his Will, or that they excited any involuntary Motions in the same. For Adam was willingly warned by his Sensations of what he ought to do for the Preservation of his Life; but he never would suffer himself to be agitated against his Will, for that is contradictory. Also, whenever he had a mind to apply himself to the Contemplation of Truth without the least Distraction of Mind, his Senses and Passions kept a perfect Silence. Order requires it, and it is an absolute Consequence of the Power he had over his Body.  

See the Explanation upon the 3d Chapter of the 5 Book,  I answer in the second place, That it is not true that the Pleasure of the Soul is the same thing with its Motion and Love. Pleasure and Love are manners of the Soul's Existence: But Pleasure has no necessary Relation to the Object which seems to occasion it; and Love has a necessary Relation to Good. Pleasure is to the Soul what Figure is to the Body; and Motion is to the Body what Love is to the Soul. Now the Motion of a Body is very different from its Figure. I grant that the Soul, which is continually moved towards Good, advances as it were more easily towards it, when induced thereto by Pleasure, than when it suffers Pain; as a Body which is pushed forward, rolls more easily when it has a Spherical Figure, than when it has a Cubical one. But the Figure of a Body is different from its Motion, and it may be Spherical, and stand still. It is true, Spirits are not like Bodies; they can feel no Pleasure, without being in Motion; because God, who only makes and preserves them for himself, moves them continually towards Good. But this does not prove that the Pleasure of the Soul is the same thing with its Motion; for two things, though different, may always meet together.  
Finally, I answer, That though Pleasure were not different from the Love or Motion of the Soul, that which the first Man felt in the use of the Goods of the Body, did not incline him to love those Bodies. Pleasure inclines the Soul towards the Object which occasions it: I grant it. But it is not the Fruit which we eat with Pleasure▪ which occasions that Pleasure in us. Body's cannot act in the Soul, and make it in any measure happy: God only can do that. 'Tis through Error we fancy that Bodies have that in them which we feel by their means. Adam was not so stupid before his Fall, as to imagine that Bodies occasioned his Pleasure. Therefore the Motion which accompanied his Pleasures, did not move him towards Bodies. If Pleasure contributed towards the Fall of the first Man, it was not by causing that in him which it now causes in us. It is only the taking up or dividing the Capacity he had to think, it blotted or diminished in his Mind the Presence of his real Good, or of his Duty.   

Objection against the Sixth Article.  
WHat likelihood is there that the immutable Will of God should have depended on the Will of Man; and that in favour of Adam Exceptions should have been made in the general Law of the Communication of Motions.  
Answer.  
At least it is not evident, that there can be no such Exceptions. But it is plain that immutable Order requires that the Body should be subject to the Mind; and it were contradictory to believe that God neither loves nor wills Order: 
In the Explanation which relates to the Nature of Ideas, I shall explain more particularly what Order is, and why God loves it necessarily.  For God necessarily, loves his Son. Therefore it was was, necessary, before the fall of the first Man, that Exceptions should be made in his Favour, in the general Law of the Communication of Motions. This perhaps may seem abstruse; but here is something that is more sensible.  
Man, though a Sinner, has the Power to move and stop his Arm whenever he pleases. Therefore, according to the different Volitions of Man, the Animal Spirits are determined to produce or stop some Motions in his Body; which certainly cannot be done by the general Law of the Communication of Motions. Thus the Will of God being still at this very time subject to ours, why might it not have been subject to Adam's? If, for the advantage of the Body, and for the sake of Civil Society, God stops the Communication of Motions in Sinners, why should he not have stopped it in favour of a Just Man, for the Good of his Soul, and for the Preservation of the Union and Society he had with him; for God had only made Man for himself? As God will have no Society with Sinners, he has taken from them, after the Fall, the power they had to leave as it were the Body, to unite themselves to him. But he has left them the Power to stop or change the Communication of Motions in reference to the preservation of Life, and Civil Society; because he was unwilling to destroy his own Work, having even before he had formed it, designed, according to St. Paul, to restore it, and reform it in Jesus Christ.   

Objection against the Seventh Article.  
MAN still conveys his Body at this time where he will; he moves as he pleases all the parts of it, the motion of which is necessary for the prosecution and avoiding of sensible Good and Evils. And consequently he stops or changes every moment the Natural Communication of Motions, not only in things of small Consequence; but also in things which are of no use for Life or Civil Society, and even in Crimes which ruin Society, shorten Life, and dishonour God in all respects. God Wills Order, I grant it. But does Order require that the Laws of Motion should be violated for Evil, and remain inviolable on the account of Good? Why should not Man have the Power to stop the Motions which sensible Objects produce in his Body, since those Motions hinder him from doing good, from drawing near to God again, and from returning to his Duty; and still have the Power to do so much evil, with his Tongue, his Arm, and with the other parts of the Body, the Motions of which depend upon his Will?  
Answer.  
To answer this Objection, we must consider, that Man having sinned was to return to his Original Nothingness. For being no longer in order, nor in a possibility to return to it, he ought to cease to exist. God loves nothing but Order; 
See the 5th Dialogue of the Christian Conversation.  a Sinner is not in Order: Therefore God does not love him. Sinners than cannot subsist, since Creatures only subsist because God will have them to be, and God will not have them to be unless he loves them. Neither can a Sinner restore himself to Order, because he cannot justify himself, and whatever he can suffer cannot atone for his Offence: Therefore he ought to be reduced to nothing again.  
But whereas it is unreasonable to think, that God should make a Work to annihilate it, or to put it yet into a worse condition; it is evident that God would not have made Man, nor permitted his fall which he had foreseen, had he not had in view his Son's Incarnation; in whom all things subsist, and by whom the Universe receives a Beauty, Perfection, and Greatness worthy the Wisdom and Power of its Author.  
We may then consider that Man after his Sin is without a Restorer, but under expectation of one. If we consider him without a Restorer, we see clearly that he can have no Society with God; that he cannot have the least power in himself to draw near unto God again; that God must needs repulse and use him ill when he pretends to leave the Body to unite himself to him: That is to say, that Man after Sin must lose the power of freeing himself from sensible Impressions and Motions of Concupiscence. Moreover he ought to be annihilated for the reasons abovesaid. But he expects a Restorer; and if we consider him under that expectation, it is plain he must subsist, together with his Posterity out of which the said Restorer is to come; and therefore it is necessary that Man after his fall should still retain the power of moving diversely all those parts of his Body whose motions may be useful towards his preservation.  
It is true Men continually abuse that Power they have of producing certain Motions; and that that Power, for instance, they have to move their Tongue several ways, occasions an infinite number of Evils. But than it is evident, that this Power is absolutely necessary to maintain Society; to ease one another in the wants of this present Life; and to be Instructed in that Religion, which gives the hopes of that Redeemer for whose sake the World subsists. If we carefully examine those Motions which we produce in ourselves, and in what part of our Body we can produce them, we shall find clearly that God has left us no more Power over our Body, than what is necessary to preserve our Life, and maintain Civil Society. For instance, the Beating of the Heart, the Dilatation of the Diaphragme, the  Motion of the Bowels, the Circulation of the Spirits and Blood, and divers Motions of the Nerves in our Passions, are produced in us without staying for Orders from the Soul. As they must needs be partly the same on the same Occasions, nothing obliges God to submit them now to the Will of Men; But whereas the Motions of the Muscles which serve to stir the Tongue, the Arms and Legs, must change every moment, according to the almost infinite diversity of the Good or Ill Objects which surround us; it was necessary those Motions should depend on the Will of Men.  
We must observe, that God always Acts by the most simple Means, and that the Laws of Nature must be general; and therefore having given us the Power to move our Arm and Tongue, he must not take away that Power from us to strike a Man unjustly, or to Calumniate him. For if our Natural Faculties did depend on our Designs, there would be no Uniformity, nor certain Rule in the Laws of Nature; which nevertheless must be very plain and general, to be suitable to the Wisdom of God, and conformable to Order. Insomuch that God, in pursuance of his Decrees, chooses rather to perform the Materiality of Sin, as the Divines say, or to serve the Injustice of Men, as one of his Prophets says, than by changing his Will to put a stop to the disorder of Sinners: But he reserves his Vengeance for the unworthy treatment he meets with, until he may be allowed to do it without acting against the Immutability of his Degrees; that is, when Death having corrupted the Body of the Voluptuous, God will lie no longer under the necessity he has imposed upon himself of giving them Sensations and Thoughts relating thereunto.   

Objection against the Eleventh and Twelfth Articles.  
ORiginal Sin does not only make Man a Slave to his Body, and subject to the motions of Concupiscence, but likewise fills him with Spiritual Vices: The Child's Body is not only corrupted before Baptism, but its very Soul and all its Faculties are infected by Sin. Though the Rebellion of the Body is the chief cause of some gross Vices, as Intemperance and Incontinency; yet it does not occasion Vices that are purely Spiritual, such as Pride and Envy. So that Original Sin is something very different from the Concupiscence wherewith we are Born: and is probably the privation of Grace, or of Original Justice.  
Answer.  
I own that Children are deprived of Original Righteousness: and I prove it when I show they are not born Just, and that God hates them. For in my Opinion, it is impossible to give a clearer Idea of Justic● and of Righteousness, than in saying; that the Will is upright, when it loves God, and that it is irregular when it is turned towards the Body. But if by Original Justice or Grace, you mean certain or unknown Qualifications, like unto those which 'tis said God had infused into the Soul of the first Man, to adorn it, and to render it agreeable in his sight; it is also evident, that the privation of this Justice is not Original Sin; for properly speaking that Privation cannot be transmitted. If Children have nor those Qualifications, it is because God does not give 'em to them. And if God does not give 'em, it is because they are unworthy of it. 'Tis then that unworthiness which is transmitted, and which is the cause of the privation of Original Justice. Therefore 'tis that unworthiness which properly speaking is Original Sin.  
Now this unworthiness, which consists, as I have shown in this, that the Inclinations of Children are actually corrupted, that their Heart is turned towards Bodies and Loves them; this, I say, is really in them: It is not the Imputation of their Father's Sin, they are actually in disorder. So those that are justified by Jesus Christ, of which Adam was the Figure, are not justified by Imputation: They are actually restored into Order by an inward Justice, different from that of Jesus Christ, tho' it is only he that has merited it for them.  
The Soul has but two Natural or Essential Relations, the one to God, the other to its Body. Now it is evident, that the Relation or Union it has with God, can neither corrupt it, or make it vicious. Therefore it is only so in the moment of its Creation, by the Relation it has to its Body. So that it is necessary to say, either that Pride, and the other Vices, which are called Spiritual, may be Communicated by the Body, or that Children are not liable to them at the moment of their Birth. I say at the moment of their Birth, for I do not deny but those ill habits are easily acquired. Yet pure Intelligences have no other relation then to God, and that in the moment of their Creation they were subject to no Vice, yet they are fallen into Disorder; but 'tis only by their having made an ill use of their Liberty; and Children have made no use of it, for Original Sin is not free.  
But I am of Opinion, that those are mistaken who fancy the Rebellion of the Body only occasions gross Vices, as Intemperance and Incontinency; and not those which are called Spiritual, as Pride and Envy. And I am persuaded, that there is such a Correspondence between the dispositions of our Brain and those of our Soul, that perhaps the Soul has no ill habit but what derives its Principle from the Body.  
Saint Paul, in divers places, calls Law, Wisdom, Desires, and the Works of the Flesh, whatever is contrary to the Law of the Spirit; he does not mention Spiritual Vices. He places among the Works of the Flesh, Idolatry, Heresies, Dissensions, and many other Vices, which are called Spiritual. According to his Doctrine we follow the motions of the Flesh, in being guilty of Vainglory, 
Gal. c. 5.  Passion and Envy. Finally, it appears by the Expressions of that Apostle, that all Sins proceed from the Flesh; not that the Flesh commits them, or that the Spirit of Man, without Grace or the Spirit of Jesus Christ, does that which is good, but because the Flesh acts upon the Mind of Man, in such a manner, that it does no Evil which the Flesh does not solicit. 
Rom. c. 7.  St. Paul speaks thus about it in the Epistle to the Romans, I delight in the Law of God after the inward Man. But I see another Law in my Members warring against the Law of my Mind, and bringing me into captivity to the Law of Sin, which is in the Members of my Body. And afterwards, So then with the Mind, I myself serve the Law of God, but with the Flesh the Law of Sin. He speaks after the same manner in several other places of his Epistles; so that Concupiscence, or the Rebellion of the Body, does not only incline us to those Vices which are carnal or unseemly, but even to those that are thought to be Spiritual. I will endeavour to prove it after a sensible manner.  
When any Person is in company, to my seeming, it is certain that Traces are machinally formed in his Brains, and Motions are excited in his Animal Spirits, which beget Wicked thoughts and inclinations in his Soul. Our thoughts, at those times, are not naturally conformable to Truth, nor our inclinations to Order: They arise in us for the good of the Body, and of the present Life, because they are excited by the Body; therefore they make us lose the presence of God, and the thoughts of our Duty, and only tend to make other Men respect us as being worthy of their Affection and Esteem. So that this secret Pride, which is stirred up on those occasions. is a Spiritual Vice, of which the Rebellion of the Body is the Principle.  
For Instance, If the Persons before whom we are are Honourable, the Pomp of their Grandeur dazzles and humbles us. As the Traces which their presence excites in our Brains, are sometimes very great, and their Motions very lively, they shine, as it were, throughout our Body; they diffuse through our Face, and sensibly discover Respect and Fear there, together with our most concealed Sentiments. In the next place, these Traces, by these sensible Expressions of our inward Motions, affect the Person who looks upon us; they inspire him with Sentiments of Mildness and Civility by the Traces, which our respectful or timorous Air produce machinally in his Brains, which reflecting on his Face, conceal that Majesty which appeared there before, and give the rest of his Body a Posture which composes our Trouble, and re-assures us. So that after many repercussions of those sensible Expressions, our Air and Deportment are settled at last in the state which this Honourable Person desires.  
Now as all the Motions of the Animal Spirits are attended by the Motion of the Soul, and as the Traces of the Brain are followed by the Thoughts of the Mind; it is evident, that being now deprived of the Power to obliterate those Traces, and to stop those Motions, we find ourselves solicited by the presence of the Person who is above us, to enter into his sentiments and desires, and to apply ourselves wholly to him, as he is inclined to make his application to us, though after a different manner. And this is the Reason that the Conversation of the World revives and strengthens the desire of Pride, as dishonest Commerce, Feasting, and the enjoyment of Sensual Pleasures increase Carnal Desires; the Moral of which deserves our observation.  
'Tis very necessary there should be Traces in the Brain to represent a Man continually to himself, that he may take care of his Person; and that there should be others to form and maintain Society, since Men were not made to live alone. But Man having lost the Power to obliterate those Traces at pleasure, and when it might be convenient, they solicit him continually to evil. As he cannot help representing himself to himself, he is continually excited to motions of Pride and Vanity, to despise others, and to attribute all things to himself; and whereas he is not master of the Traces which solicit him, to maintain Society with others, he is agitated as it were against his Will, by motions of Complaisance, Flattery, Jealousy, and the like Inclinations. Thus all the Vices which are called Spiritual, proceed from the Flesh, as well as Incontinency and Intemperance.  
There are not only dispositions in our Brain which excite Sensation and Motions in us, in relation to the Propagation of the Species and the Preservation of Life; there are perhaps yet a greater number of them which stir up Thoughts and Passions in us, in reference to Society, to our particular advancements, and those of our Friends. We are Naturally united to all the Bodies which surround us, and by those Bodies to all things that have any relation to us. Now we cannot be united to them but by certain Dispositions which are in our Brain. Therefore, not having the Power to hinder the Action of those Natural Dispositions, our Union is changed into a Dependence, and we become subject to all manner or Vices through our Body.  
We are not pure Intelligence: All the Dispositions of our Soul produce some Dispositions in our Body; as the Dispositions of our Body excite the like Dispositions in our Soul. It is not that the Soul cannot absolutely receive any thing but by the Body: But because so long as it is united to it, it can receive no alteration in its Modifications, without the Body's also receiving some. It is true that it may be Enlightened, or receive new Ideas, without the necessity of the Body's having any share in them: But it is because pure Ideas are no Modifications of the Soul, as I have proved it elsewhere. I do not speak of sensible Ideas here; for those Ideas include a Sensation, and all Sensations are Manners of the Souls Existence.   

Second Objection. Against the Eleventh and Twelfth Article.  
If Original Sin is Transmitted upon the Account of the Communication Between the Brain of the Mother and that of her Child, 
Sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, etc. Rom. 5.  it is the Mother who is the Cause of that Sin, and the Father has no share in it. Nevertheless St. Paul teaches us, that by Man Sin came into the World: He does not so much as mention the Woman. Therefore, etc.  
ANSWER.  
David assures us; that his Mother conceived him in Iniquity: And the Son of Syrach says, that Sin proceeds from the Woman, 
In Iniquitatibus conceptus sum, & in peccatis concepit me mater mea: Ps. 10.  and that it is through her we are all liable to Death: Neither of them spoke of the Man, St. Paul on the contrary says, that it is by Man Sin was introduced into the World: He speaks not of the Woman.  
How must we reconcile those Testimonies, and which of the Two ought we to Justify, if it were necessary to Justify either? 
A muliere initium factum est peccati, & per illam omnes morimur. Echo 25.23. Luc. 2.48.  In Discourse we never attribute any thing to the Woman in which she has no share, and which is only the Man's: But we often attribute that to the Man which is proper to the Woman, because the Husband is her Head and Master. We see that the Evangelists, and even the Blessed Virgin calls Joseph the Father of Jesus Christ; when she says unto her Son: Thy Father and I have sought thee sorrowing; Ecce pater tuus & Ego dolentes quaerebamus. Therefore since the Holy Scripture assures us that it is by the Woman we are all liable to Death and to Sin, it is absolutely necessary to believe it: Nor can it be thrown upon Man. But though it assure us in other places that by Man Sin came into the World, there is not the same necessity to believe it, since that may be attributed to the Man which belongs to the Woman. And if we were obliged by Faith to excuse either the Man or the Woman, it would be mote reasonable to excuse the Man than the Woman.  
However I am of opinion that the Passages I have quoted aught to be explained in the Literal sense, and that we ought to conclude, That both the Man and the Woman are the Real Causes of Sin, each in their way. The Woman, because Sin is Communicated by her, as it is by her that Man begets Children: And Man, because his Sin has occasioned Concupiscence, as his Action is the Cause of the Impregnation of the Woman, or of the Communication which is between the Woman and her Child.  
'Tis certain that it is the Man who impregnates the Woman, and consequently he is the Cause of the Communication which is between her Body and the Child's, since that Communication is the Principle of its Life. The said Communication does not only give to the Bodies of Children the Dispositions of their Mothers; it also gives to their Minds, the Dispositions of her Mind. Therefore we may say, with St. Paul, That By Man Sin was introduced into the World; and nevertheless upon the account of that Communication, we may also say, that Sin proceeds from the Woman; that it is by her we are all liable to Death, and that our Mother has conceived us in Iniquity, as it is said in other places of the Scripture.  
Perhaps it may be urged, That though Man had not sinned, the Woman would have had sinful Children; for having sinned herself, she had lost the Power God had, given her over her Body: And therefore though the Man had remained Just, she would have Corrupted the Brain, and consequently the Mind of her Child, upon the account of the Communication she had with it.  
Certainly, this does not appear lively: For Man whilst Righteous, knowing what he does, cannot give the Woman that miserable Fruitfulness of conceiving sinful Children. If he remains Righteous, he will have no Children but for God, and sinful Children can never be acceptable to God; for I do not suppose a Mediator in this place. However I grant, that in this case the Marriage might not have been dissolved, and that the Man might have known his Wife. But it is certain, the Body of the Woman did belong to her Husband, since it was taken out of his, and was of the same Flesh; Duo in carne una. It is also certain, that the Children belong as much to the Father as to the Mother. This being granted, we can never imagine that the Woman, after her Sin, would have lost the power she had over her Body, unless her Husband had sinned as well as herself; for had the Woman been deprived of that power, her Husband remaining in Innocence, there would have been this disorder in the Universe, That a Just Man should have had a Corrupt Body and Sinful Children. Now, it is contrary to Order, or rather it is contradictory, that a Just God should punish the Man, when he is in perfect Innocence. Therefore Eve feels no Involuntary and Rebel Motions immediately after her Sin: She is not as yet ashamed to see herself naked: She does not hid herself: On the contrary, she draws near to her Husband, though naked as well as herself: Her Eyes are not as yet opened: She is, as before, the absolute Mistress of her Body. Orders required that immediately after her sin her Soul should have been disturbed by the Rebellion of her Body, and by the shame of her own and Husband's Nakedness: For it was not reasonable that God should any longer suspend the Laws of the Communication of Motions in favour of her, as I have said in the Seventh Article. But whereas her Body belongs to her Husband, and her Husband is still Innocent; she is not punished in that Body: That punishment is deferred until he has himself eaten of the Fruit which she presented to him. Then it was they both felt the Rebellion of their Bodies; they perceived they were naked; and that shame obliged them to cover themselves with Fig-Leaves. Therefore we must say, That Adam is really the Cause of Original Sin and Concupiscence, since it is his sin that has deprived his Wife as well as himself of the power they had over their Bodies, and that it is for want of this power the Woman produces Traces in her Brain, and in the Brain of her Child, which corrupt the Soul from the very moment it is created.   

OBJECTION. Against the Twelfth Article.  
Those speak by guests who say, that the Communication of the Mother's Brain with that of her Child, is necessary or useful towards the Conformation of the Foetus: For there is no such Communication between the Brain of a Hen and her Chickens; and yet the Chickens are perfectly well formed.  
ANSWER.  
I Answer, that in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Book I have sufficiently demonstrated that Communication, by the use I make of it to Explain the Generation of Monsters, and certain Marks, and Natural Apprehensions. For it is evident, that a Man who falls into a swoon at the sight of a snake, because his Mother was frighted by one while she bore him, can only have this Weakness, because the Traces were formerly formed in his Brain like unto those which open themselves when he sees a snake, and that the said Traces have been attended with the like accident. Therefore I guess not; for I do not presume to determine wherein the said Communication does precisely consist. I might say, it proceeds from the Fibres which the Foetus shoots into the Mother's Womb, and by the Nerves with which that part is probably filled. And yet I should no more guests in this than a Man, who never having seen the Machine's of the * Samaritan, 
Fountain upon Pont Neuf in Paris.  should affirm that there are Wheels and Pumps in it to draw up the Water. However, I am of opinion it is sometimes lawful to guests, provided we do not pretend to set up for Prophets, or speak with too much assurance. I fancy, Men may be allowed to say what they think, provided they do not aim at Infallibility, or injustly impose upon men's Minds with a discisive behaviour, or by the help of some Terms of Art. We do not always guests in saying things that are not seen, and are contrary to Prejudices, provided we only say what may be conceived well, and enter easily into the Minds of those who are willing to hearken to Reason.  
Therefore I say, that in supposing the general Laws of the Communication of Motions, such as they are, it is very likely that the particular Communication of the Mother's Brain, with the Child's is necessary, in order to form its Body as it ought to be; or at least, that it is necessary to make the Child's Brain receive certain Dispositions, which must vary according to Times and Countries; as I have explained in the same Chapter.  
I own that there is no Communication between the Brain of a Hen and that of a Chicken, which is form in an Egg, and that nevertheless the Body of the Chicken is perfectly form. But you may observe, that the Chicken is far more forward in the Egg when the Hen sits upon it, than the Foetus when it descends into the Womb. We may easily judge this; since it requires less time to hatch the Eggs, for instance, than to have Puppies; notwithstanding the Belly of a Bitch being very hot, and her Blood in perpetual motion, the Whelps ought to be sooner form than the Eggs hatched, if the Chickens were not more forward in their Eggs, than the Puppies in their Germ. Now it is very likely, that the said formation of the Chicken in the Egg before its being laid, was produced by the Communication I am speaking of.  
I Answer in the second place, That the growth of the Body of Fowls is perhaps more conformable to the general Laws of Motion, than that of fourfooted Beasts; and therefore the Communication of the Females Brain with her Young, is not so necessary in Birds as in other Animals. For the Reason which makes the said Communication necessary, is probably to remedy the defect of the General Laws, which are not sufficient in some particular cases for the Formation, and Increase of Animals.  
Finally, I Answer, That it is not necessary for the Preservation of the Life of Birds, that there should be as many particular Dispositions in their Brain, as in that of other Animals: They have Wings to avoid harm, and to catch their Prey: They have no need of all these particular springs, which are the Principles of the Cunning and Docility of some Domestic Animals. Therefore it is not necessary that the Female in forming them should instruct them with many things, or make them capable of being instructed of them by a Disposition of Brain proper for such Docility. Those who train up young Dogs for Hunting, do sometimes meet with some who set Naturally, by the bare Instruction they have received from the Bitch, who has often Hunted whilst big with Whelps. A difference is generally observed among the breed of Animals, and that some are apt and more capable to be instructed than others of the same kind. But I don't believe, that ever any Bird taught her Young ones any thing extraordinary; or that a Hen, for instance, ever hatched a Chicken, that could do any thing besides what they Naturally do: Therefore Birds are not so apt, nor so capable of Instruction, as other Animals. The Disposition of their Brain is not commonly capable of much variation: They do not act so much by Imitation, as some Domestic Animals do. Young Ducks, that are hatched of a Hen, do not tarry for her Example, to leap into the Water; neither do Chickens use themselves to swim, though hatched by a Duck, which leads them, and swims continually. But there are Animals which easily and quickly imitate the extraordinary Motions which others perform before them. Nevertheless, I do not pretend, that Men should rely much on these last Reflections; since they are not necessary to establish what I bring them for.   

Second Objection. Against the Twelfth Article.  
'Tis also nothing but Guests, to affirm, That the Mother before her Sin might have any intercourse with her Embryo; for there is no necessary relation between our Thoughts and the Motions that pass in our Brain. Therefore this Communication of the Mother's Brain to the Child's, is useless.  
ANSWER.  
It is evident, that without the said Communication, the Child could not have any Commerce with its Mother, nor the Mother with it. Now before the Fall, Order required that the Mother should be acquainted with all the Corporal wants of her Child, and that the Child should not be ignorant of its Obligations to its Parents. Therefore as all things were in Order before the Fall, and that God always acts according to Order, the Mother and Child would have had some Commerce by means of the said Communication.  
To apprehend wherein this said Commerce might have consisted: We must remember that the relation of the Traces of the Brain, with the Ideas of the Soul, may be made several ways; either by the Nature or the Will of Men, or some other way, as I have explained in the Second Book 
* Chap. 2. of the second Part .  
When we look upon a Square, or upon the Air of a person who endures pain, we have in our minds the Idea of a Square, or of some person in affliction: This is common to all Nations, and the relation which is between these Ideas and Traces is natural. When an Englishman hears any one pronounce this word, Square, he also has the Idea of a Square: But the relation that is between the sound, or the characters of this word and his Idea, is not natural; neither is it common to all Men. Therefore I say, that the Mother and the Child would naturally have had a commerce between them about all things that can be represented to the Mind by natural relations. And if (for instance) the Mother had seen a Square, the Child would also have seen it; and had the Child imagined any Figure, it would also have excited the Trace of the said Figure in its Mother's imagination. But the Mother and the Child would not naturally have had a commerce together about things that are purely spiritual, nor yet about such as are corporeal, if they had conceived them without making use of their senses or imagination. The Mother would have thought on God, she would have heard people read this word Square, or the like, without the Child's having been able to discover what thought she had: Unless she could have been able in time to have established a new commerce of Intellectual Ideas with it, almost as Nurses do when they teach their Children how to speak. But to explain and prove these things.  
I think I have sufficiently showed, by the Explanation I have given of the cause of Hereditary Aversions, and the marks we draw from our Birth, that the Traces of Mothers are communicated to their Children. The Traces of corporal things are inseparable from their Ideas: Therefore those Ideas also communicate themselves, and Children feel and imagine the same things with their Mothers. Now it is against their will they feel what their Mothers feel: But were they not Sinners, they would have the power to hinder at pleasure the effect of the communication they have with their Mothers. Moreover, they would be addle to excite in their Brain the Traces they had received, from the same reason as we imagine whatever we please, when our Sensations are not too lively. This being supposed, it is evident that the Mother, being attentive to her Child, might discover by a kind of repercussion, whether or no it would receive the impression she should excite in it, and also the other things she should think on. For as the Mother would not be able to move the Fibres of her Brain, without making an impression thereby on the Child's; neither could the Child receive the said impression, without the Mother's having notice of it by some slight impression, provided she became very attentive to it by the power she should have to make all other noise cease but that which her Child should excite in her. Therefore we must conclude, that the Child and irs Mother would have had some commerce together before the Fall, or deny the relation of the Brain of the one to the Brain of the other, or the power of the Soul over the Body, as I have before established. This appears evident, though the imagination is startled at it and prejudice opposes it. 'Tis true, that at first that commerce would only have been in such things as are liable to our senses and imagination. Children being only related to their Mothers by their Bodies, it is not absolutely necessary they should receive any Ideas from them but those of sensible Objects. For their Soul, being strictly united to God, if we consider them without sin, they receive immediately from him all the Ideas which have no relation to the Body. But whereas it is possible, in time to find the most abstracted Ideas to sensible things which have no relation to them, the commerce of Mothers with their Children would probably have soon extended itself to the most spiritual things, had they endeavoured to entertain themselves upon those matters.  
I am extremely sensible that what I say here will not appear very reasonable to the generality of men, and that even those who impugn Prejudices and the continual Effort of sensible Impressions, will be surprised at the novelty of this Thought. But if we reflect seriously upon the manner how a Master instructs his Disciple, if we consider how many different means he is obliged to make use of to discover to him the Ideas he himself has of things, the comparisons he makes of them, the judgements he gives about them, and the other dispositions, of his mind in relation to them; we shall find, that Mothers have a far greater facility to discover their thoughts, and inward dispositions to their Children, than Masters to their Disciples; provided we only suppose that the Traces of the Mother's Brain are imprinted on that of their Children: Which is evident by what I have said. For in fine, it is plain that voice and all external signs we use, to express our thoughts to others, have only the effect we desire, because they imprint on the Brain of those who harken to us, the same Traces, and excite the same Emotions of the Spirits, which accompany our Ideas, and inward disposition in relation to them.   

OBJECTION: Against the Seventeenth Article, and the following ones.  
It is presumptuous to say, that Children are Justified in Baptism by Actual motions of their Will towards God. We ought not to give way to new Opinions, that only serve to make a Noise.  
ANSWER.  
I grant, we must not say positively that Children are Justified by formal Acts of their Will. I believe no man knows any thing about it, and we must affirm nothing positively but what we know. But whereas there are but too many of those who believe the Justification of Children is only external and by imputation, because (say they) they are incapable of forming any Act of Love towards God: I believe it necessary to make them sensible that their Opinion only proceeds from Prejudice. For the Prejudices of Men in relation to Children are such, that they commonly imagine they do not think in their Mother's Womb and in their first Years, and moreover that they are incapable of thinking. Men fancy they have not as yet the Ideas of things in themselves; that they are inspired into them by their Masters in Discourse; and that if they have any inclinations, they are not of the same nature with ours, and that they cannot lead them to sovereign Good. The generality of men do not apprehend distinctly that the Soul of children is like that of persons advanced in years; that is does not fortify and perfect it self like the Body; and that if it were delivered for one moment from the impression which the Body makes upon it, and moved by the Delectation of Grace, it would be more enlightened and more pure in that moment, than that of the greatest Saints who always fight against some concupiscence in their mind and heart.  
Concupiscence is commonly looked upon as if it were natural: Men do not always think that it is a consequence of sin. Therefore they judge unawares that the Stupidity of children is a necessary consequence of the Weakness of their Body, of their Youth, and even of the incapacity of their Mind. Now this Judgement or Prejudice represents itself continually to the mind, and pre-ingages it in such a manner as to hinder it from examining the thing in itself. So those who have spoken of Baptism in former Ages, have not explained the Regeneration of children by Actual motions of their Heart. Not because strong Reasons induced them to judge that it was impossible; for it does not appear by their Works that they have so much as examined it: But rather because they have supposed it so, and have hardly had any thoughts to doubt it, or perhaps because they were unwilling to give an Explication which would have opposed Prejudices, at a time when people were not so solicitous to lay them aside, as they are at present.  
But if we consider the necessity there is of giving a more exact Explanation, for Instance, than St. Augustine does in some passages, which favours 
* B. 1. de Nupt. C. 25, 26, 27 & in Jul. B. 6 c. 19 & elsewhere.  Imputation, though in other places he speak after a manner which does not favour it. 
† Ep. 23. Lib. de peccatorum meritis C. 19 & alibi.  If we consider that Imputation is very convenient, that it seems to have been received in this case by some Ancient and very Orthodox 
* Innocent 3. In 3. De Baptismo & ejus effectu. Capite Majoris. Et in Conc. Viennensi Generati 15. under Clement V.  Divines, and moreover that it is absolutely necessary for those who deny, though without any convincing Proofs, the Habits of the Soul, whom it would be good to satisfy if possible. In fine, if we will have a regard to natural Equity which forbids the condemning of secret Intentions, we may perhaps judge that what I say is improbable: But I do not think that any one can be offended at it, since I endeavour thus to satisfy men's minds, even those who are the most troublesome, in the difficulties they propose about Original Sin.     

AN EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter, of the Third Part, of the Second Book.  
In which I speak Of the Power of the Imagination of some Authors, and particularly of Tertullian.  
AS I am convinced that the most general, and most exuberant Principle of the Errors we meet with in Sciences, and particularly in Morality, is the Impression which lively Imaginations make upon men's Minds, who are guided more by Mechanism than by Reason; I thought myself obliged to make the World so sensible of this Truth, as to awaken Men out of their Lethargy, in relation to it. And whereas Examples are most powerful over us, especially when there is something great and extraordinary in them, I have thought that the celebrated Names of Tertullian, Seneca, and of Montagne, would be capable of exciting their Attention, and convince them sensibly of the contagious power of the Imagination over Reason. For in fine, if dead Words, which are not animated by the Air and sensible Behaviour of those famous Authors, have still more force than the Reason of certain Persons: If the turn of Expression, which gives but a weak Idea of the sensible Action, which the Imagination diffuses livelily upon the Face, and the rest of their Body, who are persuaded of what they say, is capable of agitating, penetrating, and convincing many; certainly it must be granted, that nothing can be more dangerous than a respectful attention to Persons, whose Imagination is strong and lively. For their Air and manner of speaking, is a Natural Language, so strong and convincing; they know how to draw things so much to the Life, that they commonly make the Passions and the Senses rise against Reason; that they infuse, as it were, conviction and certainty into all those who look upon them.  
I was very sensible, that in producing these great Examples, I should not cure all those who had been struck with astonishment and admiration at the reading of these three famous Authors. For there is no need to very well acquainted with the Nature of Man, to know that the Wounds which the Brain has received, are harder to be cured than those of the other parts of the Body; and that it is easier to close a Wound which is not exposed to the Action of some Body that may renew it, than perfectly to cure certain Prejudices which are justified every moment by very probable Reasons.  
It is very difficult to close up the Traces of the Brain exactly, because they are exposed to the course of the Spirits, and may be continually renewed by a vast number of Traces, which may be called accessories. Those kind of Wounds cannot commonly be cured or closed up, unless it be when the Brain having received others that are deeper and opposite to them, a strong and continual revulsion is made in the Spirits. For we must not imagine that a Prejudice is absolutely cured as soon as we fancy it is; because we are not actually affected with it. A Prejudice is only absolutely cured, when the Trace is perfectly closed up; and not so soon as the Spirits begin no longer to take their course that way for some particular Reason.  
Therefore I was very sensible that those who had been overcome by the Force and Motions of Tertullian, said and dazzled by the Greatness and Beauties of Seneca, charmed and corrupted by the free and natural Expressions of Montaigne, would not change their Sentiments after the reading of a few Pages of my Book. I judged on the contrary, that they would be displeased at my Endeavours to dissipate the Spell which charms them.  
But whereas I was in hopes that these Examples would prove of use to my Design, for the Reasons I have alleged; I thought myself obliged to have more regard to the Advantage many persons may derive by it, who are unprejudiced, than to the Uneasiness of some others, whom I thought would criticise upon the Liberty I have taken. I considered also, that there are few Men so much prejudiced in favour of their Authors, as to despair of prevailing with them, to side with Reason again. Lastly, I thought that as there are perhaps no Men prejudiced in favour of all three of them, by reason of the diversity of the Character of their Imaginations, the most obstinate might think that I am in the right in many things.  
I know the respect I own to the Works of Tertullian, as well upon the account of the Subjects he treat of, as the approbation they have had from several persons who ought to be Judges of them. And I have sufficiently discovered this disposition of my Mind, by what I have said concerning them, and by the quality of the Book de Pallio, the only one I have freely spoken of, though there are others which perhaps would have been fit for my Design.  
But after all, I do not think that Time ought either to magnify or alter the Ideas of things, that all Antiquities are Venerable, and that false Reasons and extravagant Expressions deserve Respect, because they have been introduced into the World long before us. I do not think we are obliged to receive Affected Obscurities like Sacred Mysteries; Sallies of Imagination like evident Truths; The Hearts of afric which Labour in a Mind naturally full of Fire, like the Motions of the Prophetical Spirit, which can only teach Sublime Truths.  
I am sensible that even those who have most respect for Tertullian's Works, allow all this, and that they are too Equitable to Justify the irregularities of Imagination against Reason. But perhaps they are like those Judicious Persons who are great Lovers of Truth, and yet are taken with the Style. For I have often met with some of them who were so much enchanted by some strong, lively, great and magnificent Expressions of Tertullian; that after having proved to them, that the Author was neither Judicious, not very Reasonable, they did nothing but repeat them to me to surprise and persuade me.  
I own that Tertullian has very bold and strong Expressions, and that they produce very Lively and Sprightly Images in the Mind: And 'tis for that Reason I take him for an Example, that strong Imaginations have much power to act, and convince by Impression. Therefore those who make those kind of Objections to me, confirm my Opinion, while they oppose it. The Prepossession or Esteem they have for Tertullian, justifies my Conduct. The frequent Quotations and the Pompous Words they allege from him, prove what I say. For men seldom quote in Discourse entire Arguments: But they often quote strong and lively Expressions, to dazzle and to convince by sensible Impression.  
I suppose no body will imagine that I pretend to censure so many Great Men who daily quote Tertullian in their Pulpits. They have Reasons for it, which I do not pretend to Examine. What I have said of that Author to me seems evident. Let every Man make his Inferences according to his own knowledge, without imputing Thoughts to me which I never had. Those who pretend to dive into the Designs of others, often form Phantasms which are only like themselves: For it is usual for us, to diffuse, as it were, the Malignity of our Passions upon others. We judge of all Things by ourselves: And those who do condemn me, perhaps judge themselves; though they reflect not upon it. But if the World would have me to declare my Opinion about Tertullian's Quotations, I own that Men are in the right to make use of them for several Reasons; and also that they are sometimes very useful to make some Practical Truths the more sensible, which are barren and unfruitful, so long as they are in the secret Recesses of our Reason, and excite in us no Motions contrary to those which the goods of the Body do.  
However I do not think there is any thing unreasonable in their Opinion who maintain, That we ought never to quote Authors by Name, but when they are infallible; and that unless it be in such things in which Reason has no share, or in which Authority must take place, we should never quote any Body. This was formerly the Custom of the Fathers. St. Cyprian never quoted Tertullian, though he has taken many things from him. And if we may credit what St. Jerome relates of that Holy Bishop, by report, that speaking of Tertullian, he called him his Master; certainly the Name of Tertullian had no great Authority, nor his Expressions the power they have at present over men's Minds: or else St. Cyprian followed the Custom of his Time with a very surprising Rigour. For it is very strange that such a Disciple should never have mentioned his Master in any of his Works.  
This Story of St. Jerome is commonly made use of to defend Tertullian; And I have been told sometimes, that I was to blame to speak as I did of no Man whom St. Cyprian called his Master. But I do know not whether St. Jerome was not too credulous in believing a thing which made for the honour of Tertullian. He seems to have had a little too much inclination for him, since he has in some measure excused his Fall, by imputing his Heresy to the Envy of the Romish Clergy, and to the ill Treatments he had received from them. But, if this Story be true which is only grounded upon what St. Jerome has heard one Person say, 
Invidiâ postea, & contumeliis Clericorum Romanae Ecclesiae, ad Montani dogma delapsus, in multis libris novae prophetiae meminit. Hieron. in Catalogo de Script. Eccl.  I own that I cannot apprehend the meaning of St. Cyprian's Silence in his Writings in relation to Tertullian. This Silence of the Disciple seems to conceal some Mystery which is not to the advantage of the Master. And if History as well as Tertullian's own Works, did not sufficiently discover, that he is not altogether worthy of the great Esteem many Men have for him. I question whether St. Cyprian's Behaviour, his Silence, his Style, and his Expressions, would not be sufficient to lessen it, and persuade us that this said Author's Reputation was not very great even in afric itself, which ought to have been more favourable to him than so Temperate a Country as ours is.  
France and afric produce very different Minds. The Genius of the French being Natural, Reasonable, and an Enemy to all forced Expressions, I wonder how there are Persons among them who are passionately affected with an Author, that neither studied nor follows Nature; and who, instead of consulting Reason, suffers himself often to be so much swayed by his Passion, as to use Expressions that are altogether Obscure, Monstrous, and Extravagant.  
But perhaps it is because Imagination has so much Force that it weakens Reason, and even changes Nature. Indeed a Passionate Man disturbs us, and for the most part changes the natural Order of our Imagination to conform it to his. And then all Motions seem natural, all manner of Expressions are agreeable, all sort of Bombast convinces; for Men examine nothing seriously. And whereas the Passions justify themselves, and depraved Imaginations delight only in their irregularities, we can never judge sound of things, as long as the Brain preserves the violent Impression it has received. All Passionate Men are continually solicited to justify the Passion which Animates them: There is no Distracted Man, but is pleased with his Distraction. For if those who fancy themselves to be Cocks, Wolves, Oxen, etc. are extremely delighted with the Actions of those Animals, though they are absolutely contrary to the Nature of Men; it may very well be concluded that we are far from condemning the behaviour of those, who by the contagion of their Imagination, have in some measure, made us like themselves; for in condemning them, we feel that we condemn ourselves.  
There is a very particular Reason, which makes some Learned Men proud of appearing Tertullia's Proselytes, and obliges them to express a particular respect for that Author; It is the obscurity which he affects, as one of the principal Rules of Rhetoric.  
Now adays all Expressions that are senseless, and all obscure and perplexed ways of speaking, go under the name of nonsense; but there have been Men who looked upon obscurity as one of the greatest secrets of Eloquence; among them the Art of Persuading did in some measure consist in making themselves unintelligible.  
Had those who speak in public, always clear and distinct Ideas of the Truths they pretend to persuade; and did they only speak to Persons capable of a sufficient attention to apprehend them, the Precept of affecting obscurity in Discourse, would be extravagant in all respects. But though this Precept is absolutely contrary to Reason, we may say, it is pretty well proportioned to the Genius of most Men; not only because it cloaks the Ignorance of those who speak; but also because mysterious obscurity excites in many, such Sentiments as dispose them to submit, and to suffer themselves to be convinced.  
Experience sufficiently shows, that most Men esteem what they do not apprehend; that they revere as Mysteries whatever surpasses them; and that they admire an Orator, who dazzles them with lofty Expressions, and with a Language of Imagination, in which Reason has no share.  
The Inclination Men have for Greatness, is stronger than that they have for Truth. Therefore Pompous Nonsense, which persuades by Imagination, is better received than pure Reasonings, which can only persuade by Evidence. Evidence prevails only by Reflections, which always costs some Trouble; but sensible Conviction pours itself into the Soul, and penetrates it after a pleasing manner.  
The good which alone is capable to satisfy us, is at once infinite and inaccessible, and great and obscure Expressions bear the character of it: So that obscurity exciting our Desires, as greatness excites our admiration and esteem; those Expressions prevail upon us by the Motions they produce in us.  
When Men understand, or think they understand, a difficult obscure Author, they think better of themselves than of those who do not understand him; they look upon them as ignorant Persons. The pains they have been at to understand him, engages them in his defence. They justify their study in revering him, and making others do the same. And as Men delight in justifying themselves; they never fail to praise and to defend such an Author zealously, and after a very lively and sensible manner.  
These Reasons, and some ethers that are less strong, are sufficient, in my Opinion, to show that Tertullia's Obscurity is no wise disadvantageous to him in the minds of some Persons; and that probably they would never have admired him so much; had the Truths which are dispersed through his Works, been reduced to their plainest and most clear Ideas.  
We always reduce Mathematical Relations and Truths to their Exponents; I mean, to the plainest Terms that can express them; and we disengage them from whatever might perplex or obscure them: For Geometricians love plain Truth; they do not desire to convince by Impression, but by Evidence and Light. What would become of many of Tertullia's Thoughts, should any one reduce them to their Exponents, according to the Rules of Geometricians and Logicians, and also strip them of that sensible show which dazzles Reason? We ought to try that Experiment, if we design to judge solidly of that Author's Arguments.  
However I do not pretend that Tertullian ought to have written like a Geometrician. Figures which express our Sentiments and Motions, in relation to Truths which we expose to others, are absolutely necessary. And I am of Opinion, that particularly in Discourses of Religion and Morality, we ought to make use of such Ornaments as are proper to make Men pay that respect to Truth which is due to it, and of such Motions as are fit to move the Soul, and incline it to Virtuous Actions. But we ought never to adorn Phantasms which are without substance or reality We must never excite useless Motions; and if we would forcibly imprint conviction and certainty on the Minds of those who harken to us, that Conviction must have a relation to something that is true and solid. We must never convince, nor suffer ourselves to be convinced, without knowing evidently, distinctly, and precisely, of what it is we convince People, or what it is we are convinced of. We must know what we say, and what we believe. And we must love Truth and Knowledge, and not blind others, after having suffered ourselves to be blinded.  

AN EXPLANATION OF THE Nature of IDEAS.  
In which I Show How we see all things in God, both Eternal Truths, and Laws.  
I Was in hopes, that what I have said about the Nature of Ideas, would be enough to make Men apprehend, that it is God who inlightens us: But I find by Experience that there are many Persons who are incapable of sufficient attention to conceive the Reasons I have given of that Principle. Whatever is abstracted, is incomprehensible to most Men; nothing affects them but that which is sensible, and fixes and maintains the light of their Mind. They cannot consider, and consequently cannot apprehend that which falls not under the apprehension of their Senses nor Imagination. This is what I have often said, and what I can never respect too much.  
It is evident, that Bodies are not visible of themselves; that they cannot act over our Mind, nor represent themselves to it: This wants no Proof: But is infinitely more certain, than that Bodies communicate their Motions to each other, when they meet. But this is only certain to those who silence their Senses to hearken to their Reason. All Men fancy that Bodies push one another, because the Senses tell them so: But they do not believe that Bodies are of themselves absolutely invisible, and incapable to act on the Mind, because the Senses do not say it, but seem to intimate the contrary.  
There are nevertheless some Persons, whose solid and steady Reason elevates itself to the most abstracted Truths: They contemplate them with attention, and resist the impression of their Senses, and Imagination with great Courage. But by degrees the Body stupifying the Mind, they relapse: Those Ideas are dissipated, and their Imagination exciting others that are more lively and more sensible; those first are no longer like any thing but Spectors which Men mistrust, and of which they dread the illusion.  
We easily doubt Persons or things that are not familiar to us, or that have not afforded us some sensible Pleasures: For 'tis Pleasure that wins the Heart, and Familiarity removes Trouble and disquiet from the Mind. Therefore those who are not used to Metaphysical and Abstracted Truths, are very much inclined to believe, that those have a mind to seduce them, who only study to inform them. They look with a kind of diffidence and horror on such Ideas as have nothing that is agreeable or sensible in them; and the love they have for Quiet and Felicity, soon delivers them from a sight which disturbs them, and which seems incapable of contenting them.  
Were not the present question of the utmost consequence, the Reason's abovesaid, and some others which are not necessary to be related, would oblige me to speak no further of it: For I foresee, that whatever I may say upon that subject, will never enter into the mind of certain Persons. But this Principle, that there is none but God who inlightens us, and that by the manifestation of an immutable and necessary Reason, or Wisdom, appears to me so conformable to Religion, that I think myself indispensibly obliged to explain, and maintain it as much as I can. I had rather be called a Visionary, a Lunatic, and bear all the Ridicule that the Imagination (which in little Souls is always sarcastical) opposes to such Reasons it does not apprehend, or cannot defend itself against; than to grant that Bodies are capable of enlightening me; that I am my own Master, Reason, and Light; and that to get a solid knowledge of all things, I need only consult myself; or Men, who perhaps may make a great deal of Noise at my Ears, but who certainly cannot enlighten my Mind. Therefore I yet here advance some Reasons, to maintain the Sentiment I have established in the Chapters to which this belongs.  
Every one agrees, that all Men are capable of knowing Truth; and the Philosophers, nay even the least among them, own that Man participates of a certain Reason which they do not determine: Therefore they define him, Animal RATIONIS particeps; for every one knows at least confusedly, that the Essential difference of Man consists in the necessary union he has with the Universal Reason, though it is not commonly known who it is that includes that Reason, which Men take but little care to discover. I see, for instance, that two and two make four; 
Si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, & ambo videmns verum esse quod dico, ubi quaeso id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me, sed ambo in insa quae supra mentes nostras est incommutabili veritate.  and that we ought to value a Friend more than a Dog; and I am very certain, that there is no Man in the World, but sees it as well as myself. Now I see not these Truths in the mind of others, neither do they see them in mine. Therefore there must needs be an Universal Reason which informs me, and all Intelligent Being's. For if the Reason which I consult were not the same which answers the Chinese, 
Conf. of St. Aug. B. 12. C. 25.  it is evident that I could not be as certain as I am, 
See St. Aug. de libero arbitrio, B. 2. C. 8. and the following.  that the Chinese see the same Truths as I do. So that the Reason we consult when we look within ourselves, is an universal Reason; I say, when we look within ourselves; for I speak not in this place of the Reason which is followed by a Passionate Man. When a Man prefers his Horse's Life before his Coachman's, he has some Reasons for it; but they are particular Reasons which a Rational Man abominates. They are Reasons which at the bottom are not Reasonable, because they are not consonant to the sovereign, or universal Reason which all Men consult.  
I am certain that the Ideas of things are immutable, and that Eternal Truths and Laws are necessary: It is impossible they should be otherwise than they are. But I see nothing in myself that is immutable or necessary: I might not be, or not be what I am. There may be Spirits who are not like me, and yet I am certain there can be no Spirits who see other Truths, and other Laws, than I do: For all Spirits see of necessity that two and two are four, and that we ought to prefer our Friend before our Dog. Therefore we must conclude, that the Reason which all Spirits consult, is an immutable and necessary Reason.  
Moreover it is evident, that this same Reason is infinite. The Mind of Man conceives clearly that there are, or may be an infinite number of intelligible Triangles, Tetragones', Pentagones', and other the like Figures. He does not only conceive that he shall never want the Ideas of Figures, and that he shall always discover new ones, though he should only apply himself to those sort of Ideas to all Eternity; but he also observes infinity in Extension. The Mind sees clearly that the Number which multiplied by itself, produceth 5, or any of the Numbers between 4 and and 9, between 9 and 16, between 16 and 25, etc. is a Quantity, a Relation, a Fraction, whose Terms contain more Figures than can reach between the two Poles of the World. He sees clearly that it is a relation which none but God can apprehend, and that it is impossible to express it exactly, because to express it, requires a Fraction whose two terms must be infinite. I might give many Examples of this Nature, from whence it may be concluded, not only that the Mind of Man is bounded; but also the Reason which he consults is infinite. For the Mind clearly perceives infinity in this Reason, though it does not comprehend it; since it can compare incommensurable Numbers with one another, and know their Relations, though it cannot compare them with unity. Or, to stop only at that which is most sensible, the Reason which Man consults, is infinite, since it cannot be exhausted, and it has always something to answer to whatever we demand.  
But if it be true, that the Reason whereof all Men participate, is universal; if it be true that it is infinite; that it is immutable and necessary: It is certain that it is not different from that of God himself: For nothing but the Universal and Infinite Being includes in itself an Universal and Infinite Reason. All Creatures are particular Being's; therefore Universal Reason is not Created. No Creatures are Infinite; therefore Infinite Reason is not a Creature. But the Reason which we consult, is not only universal and infinite, but also necessary and independent, and in one sense we conceive it to be more independent than God himself. For God can only act according to that Reason: He has a dependence on it in one sense: He must guide it and follow it. God consults none but himself; He has no dependence on any thing. Therefore that Reason is not distinguished from himself: It is Coeternal and Consubstantial with him. We see clearly that he cannot punish an innocent Person; that he cannot subject Spirits to Bodies; that he is obliged to follow Order. Therefore we see the Rule, the Order, the Reason of God: For what Wisdom could we see besides the Wisdom of God, when we presume to say, that God is obliged to follow it?  
But after all, can we conceive a Wisdom that is not the Wisdom of God? Does Solomon, who speaks so well of Wisdom, distinguish it into two kinds? Does he not teach us, that the Wisdom which is Coeternal with God himself, and by which he has established the Order that we fee in his Works, is the very same which presides over all Spirits, and which Legislators consult, to make Just and Reasonable Laws. The Eighth Chapter of the Proverbs is sufficient to convince us of this Truth. I am sensible the Holy Scripture speaks of a certain Wisdom, which it calls the Wisdom of the Age, Wisdom of Men. But it is because it speaks of things according to appearances, or according to the common opinion: For it teaches us elsewhere, that that Wisdom is but Folly and Abomination, not only before God, but before all Men who consult Reason.  
Certainly, did Eternal Truths and Laws depend on God, had they been established by the Creator's Free Will; in a word, were not the Reason which we consult necessary and independent: It appears evident to me, that there would be no true Science, and that we might very well be mistaken in affirming, that the Arithmetic or Geometry of the Chinese is like ours. For in fine, if it were not absolutely necessary that 2 times 4 should make 8; or that the three Angles of a Triangle should be equal to two right ones; what Proofs could we have that those kind of Truths were not like those which are received in some Universities, or that only last a certain time? Can we see clearly that God may not cease to Will what he has Willed once with a Will absolutely free and indifferent? Or rather, do we see clearly that God might not have Willed certain things for a certain time, for a certain place, for certain persons, or for certain kinds of Being's; supposing, as the World will have it, that he was absolutely free and indifferent in that Will? For my part I can conceive no necessity in indifference, nor reconcile two things that are so opposite.  
Nevertheless I am willing to suppose that Men see clearly, that God by an absolutely indifferent Will has established Eternal Truths and Laws for all times and places; and that they are now immutable by his Decree. But where do they see this Decree? Has God Created any representative Being of that Decree? Will they say that this Decree is a Modification of their Souls? They see this Decree clearly; for they have learned by it, that immutability is annexed to Eternal Truth and Laws: But where do they see it? Certainly unless they see it in God, they see it not at all: For that Decree can only be in God; and it is only to be seen where it is. Therefore Philosophers can be certain, of nothing, unless they consult God, and unless God answers them. Let them exclaim never so much at this, they must submit to it, or be silent.  
But after all this Decree is an imagination without any foundation. When we think on Order, on Eternal Truths and Laws, we inquire not Naturally into their Cause; for indeed they have none. We see not the necessity of that Decree clearly, we never think immediately on it. On the contrary, we perceive at first sight, and that with evidence, that the Nature of Numbers, and of intelligible Ideas is immutable, necessary and independent. We see clearly that it is absolutely necessary that 2 times 4 should be 8, and that the Square of the Diagonal of a Square should be the double to that Square. If any question the absolute necessity of these Truths, it is because they turn their eyes from them; because they reason upon a false Principle; and look elsewhere, and not into these Truths, to find their Nature, their Immutability and Independence. Therefore the Decree of the Immutability of those Truths is a Fiction of the Mind, which supposing it sees not what it really perceives in the Wisdom of God, yet knowing that God is the cause of all things, thinks itself obliged to fancy a Decree to assert an immutability to Truths, which it cannot forbear to acknowledge immutable. But 'tis a false supposition which we ought to beware of. Eternal, immutable and necessary Truths are only seen in the Wisdom of God. We can see no where but in that Wisdom, the Order which God himself is obliged to follow as aforesaid. The Mind is only made for that Wisdom, and in one sense it can see nothing else. For if it can see Creatures, it is because he whom it sees, though after a very imperfect manner in this Life, comprehends them all in the Immensity of his Being, after an intelligible manner proportionate, as I have said elsewhere.  
Had we not the Idea of Infinity in ourselves, and did not we see all things by the Natural Union of our Mind with the Universal and Infinite Reason, it seems evident to me that we should not have the Liberty to think on all things. For the Mind can never have any desire to apply itself to any thing, but such as it has some Idea of; and it can never think actually on any thing, but such to which it can have a desire to apply itself. Thus we deprive Man of the Liberty of thinking on all things, in separating his Mind from him who includes all things. Moreover, as we can Love only what we see, if God gave us only particular Ideas, it is evident he should determine all the Motions of our Will after such a manner as that we would be necessitated only to Love particular Being's. For if we had no Notion of Infinity we could not Love it, and if those who affirm positively that they have no Idea of God, spoke as they thought, I should not scruple to say, they have never Loved God; for it appears very certain to me, that we cannot Love what we do not See.  
In fine, if Order and the Eternal Laws were not immutable by the necessity of their Nature; the clearest and strongest proofs of Religion, in my opinion, would be destroyed in their Principle, as well as Liberty and the most certain Sciences. For it is most evident, that the Christian Religion, which proposes Jesus Christ to us as a Mediator and Redeemer, supposes the Corruption of Nature by Original Sin. Now, what proof can we have of that Corruption? The Flesh wars against the Mind, some may say, It subdues and enslaves it. I grant it. But a Libertine will say, this is no Disorder. It is God's pleasure; he has ordained it so; he is Master of his Decrees; he puts what Order he pleases among his Creatures. How shall we prove to him that the Mind's being subjected to the Body is a Disorder, unless we have a clear Idea of Order, and Necessity: And unless we know that God himself is obliged to follow it by the necessary Love he has for himself? Besides, if the said Order depends on a free Decree of God, we shall still be obliged to have recourse to God to be informed of it: We shall be obliged to consult God notwithstanding the aversion which some of the Learned have to have recourse to him: We shall be obliged to submit to this Truth, That we stand in need of God's Assistance to be instructed. But this free Decree, which has caused Order, is a Fiction of the Mind, for the Reasons I have already alleged.  
If it were nor a necessary Order that Man should be made for his Author, and that our Will should be subject to the Order which is the Essential and necessary Rule of the Will of God: If it be not true that Actions are good or ill, according as they are consonant or contrary to an immutable and necessary Order, and that this Order requires that the first should be rewarded and the other punished: In fine, unless Men have naturally a clear Idea of Order, nay of such an Order as God himself cannot will the contrary of that which this Order prescribes, certainly I see no longer any thing but Confusion among us. For, what fault can be found with the most infamous and unjust Actions of the Heathens, to whom God hath given no Laws? What Reason will dare to Judge them, if there is no Supreme Reason to Condemn them?  

Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquam. Lucre. Diog.  A Poet hath said, It is impossible to discern what is just from what is unjust. A Philosopher has said, that it is a Weakness to be concerned at, or ashamed of infamous Actions. Men often speak those kind of Paradoxes out of a fury of Imagination, and in the heat of their Passions. But why should those Sentiments be condemned unless there be an Order, a Rule, a General Reason, which always presents itself to those who know how to look within themselves? We freely Judge ourselves and others, on many Occasions: But by what Authority do we do it, if the Reason which Judges within us, when we think we pronounce Judgements against ourselves and against others, be not Supreme, and common to all Men?  
But was not that Reason present to those who look within themselves, and had not the very Heathens naturally had some union with the Order we are speaking of: What Sin or what Disobedience could they have been guilty of, and according to what Justice could God punish them? I say this the rather because a Prophet tells me, That God himself is willing to make Men Judges of the Difference he has with his People, provided they pass their Judgement according to the immutable and necessary Order of Justice. 
Nunc ergo habit atores Jerusalem & viri Juda Judicate inter me & vidram meam. Esa. 5.3.  Nero killed his Mother, 'tis true, But wherein has he done ill? He followed the Natural motion of his Hatred: God gave him no Precept to the contrary: The Jewish Law was not made for him. Perhaps it may be urged, that the Law of Nature forbids the like Action, and that the said Law was known to him. But what proof have we of it? For my part I grant it, because that really and invincibly proves there is an immutable and necessary Order; and that every Mind or Spirit has a knowledge of this Order, which is the more clear, in that it is more united to the universal Reason, and because it is less sensible of the Impressions of Sense and of the Passions; in a word, because it is more reasonable. But I must endeavour to explain my Sentiment, concerning Order and the Divine or Natural Law, as clearly as possible I can: For the Reason why Men are so backward to subscribe to what I say, is perhaps because they do not distinctly perceive what I think.  
It is certain that God contains within himself, after an intelligible manner, the perfections of all Being's he has created or can create; and that it is by these intelligible perfections he knows the Essence of all things, as by his own Will he knows their Existence. Those perfections are likewise the immediate Object of the Mind of Man, for the Reason's abovesaid. Therefore the intelligible Ideas, or the perfections Which are in God, and which represent unto us that which is out of God, are absolutely necessary and immutable. Now those Truths are only the relations of equality or inequality which are among those intelligible Being's; since it is only true that 2 times 2 make 4, or that 2 times 2 are not 5; because there is a relation of equality between 2 times 2 and 4, and one of inequality between 2 times 2 and 5. Therefore Truths are immutable and necessary as well as their Ideas. It has always been true that 2 and 2 make 4, and it is impossible it should become false. This is evident, without the least necessity of God's having Established those Truths as Supreme Lawgiver; as Monsieur Des Cartes says in his Answer to the Sixth Objection.  
It is easy enough to apprehend what Truth is; but Men have much ado to conceive what the immutable and necessary Order is; what Natural and Divine Law is; what God necessarily Wills, as also what the Righteous Will. For that which makes a Man Just, is that he loves Order, and conforms his Will to it in all things: As the Sinner is only so, because he does not approve of Order in all things; and that he would fain have it to be conformable to what he wishes. Nevertheless there is not so great a Mystery in those things, in my opinion, as Men imagine: And I fancy, that the reason why they find so many difficulties in it, proceeds from the difficulty the Mind finds to raise itself to Abstracted and Metaphisical Thoughts, This is partly what I think of Order.  
It is evident, that the Perfections that are in God, which represent created or possible Being's, are not all alike: That those (for Instance,) which represent Bodies, are not so Noble as those which represent Spirits: And that even among those which only represent Bodies or Spirits, some are more perfect than others ad Infinitum. This is clearly, and without difficulty, conceived; though it is not easy to reconcile the simplicity of the Divine Being with that variety of intelligible Ideas which it includes in its Wisdom. For it is evident, that if all the Ideas of God were alike, he could see no difference among his Works; since he can only see his Creatures by that which is in him which represents them; and if the Idea of a Watch which, besides the Hours, shows all the different Motions of the Planets, were not more perfect than that of a Watch which only points out the Hours, or than that of a Circle or a Square, a Watch would not be more perfect than a Circle. For we can only judge of the perfection of Works by the perfection of the Ideas we have of them: And if there were no more wisdom or sign of understanding in a Watch than in a Circle, it would not be more difficult to conceive the most compounded Machine's, than to conceive a Square or a Circle.  
If it be true then that God, who is the Universal Being, includes within himself all Being's after an intelligible manner; and that all these intelligible Being's which have a necessary Existence in God, are not equally perfect; it is evident, that there must be an immutable and necessary Order among them: And that in the same manner as there are Eternal and necessary Truths, because there are relations of Magnitude amongst intelligible Being's, there must also be an immutable and necessary Order, by reason of the relations of Perfection which are among the same Being's. 'Tis then an immutable Order, that Spirits should be Nobler than Bodies, as it is a necessary Truth, that 2 times 2 are 4, or that 2 times 2 are not 5.  
Hitherto the immutable Order seems rather to be a speculative Truth than a necessary Law. For if Order be only considered as we have now done it, it is plain, for Instance, that 'tis a Truth that Spirits are Nobler than Bodies: But we do not see that this Truth is at the same time an Order bearing the force of a Law, and that we are obliged to prefer Spirits before Bodies. Therefore we must consider, that God loves himself by a necessary Love, and for that Reason loves that better in himself that includes and represents more Perfection, than that which includes less. So that if we would suppose that an intelligible Spirit was a thousand times more perfect than an intelligible Body, the Love by Which God loves himself, would of necessity be a thousand times greater for that Spirit, than for this intelligible Body: For the Love of God is necessarily proportioned to the Order which is between the intelligible Being he includes. So that Order which is purely speculative has the force of a Law in relation to God himself; supposing, as it is certain, that God necessarily loves himself, and cannot love intelligible Bodies more than intelligible Spirits, though he may love created Bodies more than created Spirits, as I shall show hereafter.  
Now this immutable Order which has the force of a Law in respect to God himself, has visibly the force of a Law in relation to us. For this Order is known to us, and our natural Love suits itself to it, when we look into ourselves, and when our Senses and Passions leave us free: In a word, when our Self-love does not corrupt our natural Love. Being made for God, from whom we can never be absolutely separated, we see this Order in him, and are naturally inclined to love him: For it is his Light which lightens us, and his Love which animates us, though our Senses, and Passions obscure that Light, and determine against Order the impression which we receive to love according to Order. But though Concupiscence conceals Order from us, and hinders us from following it, yet it is still an Essential and Indispensible Law in respect to us: And not only in respect of us, but to all created Intelligences, and even in respect of the Damned. For I do not think they are so far removed from God, but that they still preserve some small Idea of Order, still find some Beauty in it; nay more, are still ready to conform to it in some particular occasions which do not oppose their Self-love.  
The Corruption of the Heart consists in an opposition to Order.  the Malice or Corruption of the Will not being equal even among the Damned, it is evident that they are not equally opposed to Order, nor hate it in all things, unless in Consequence of the hatred they bear to God, For as no Man can hate Good, considered barely as such; so none can hate Order, unless it proves contrary to their Inclinations. But, though it seems contrary to their Inclinations, nevertheless it is a Law which condemns them, and which even punishes them everlastingly.  
We now see what Order is, and how it has the force of a Law by the necessary Love God has for himself. We conceive how this Law is General for all Spirits, and even for God himself: How it is necessary and absolutely indispensible. In fine, We either do or may easily conceive in general, how it is the principle of all Divine and Humane Laws, and that it is according to this Law, all Intelligences are Judged, and all Creatures disposed in their respective Classes that are proper for them.  
I own, it is no easy Task to explain all this in particular, neither will I venture to undertake it: For should I attempt to show the relation particular Laws have to the General Law, and the Connection between certain Proceed and Orders; I should be obliged to enter into such difficulties, as perhaps I should not be able to solve, and which would also lead me far from my Subject.  
Nevertheless, if we consider that God neither has nor can have any Law but his Wisdom, and the necessary Love he has for it, we shall easily conclude, that all Divine Laws must be grounded on it. And if we observe, that he has only made the World in relation to that Wisdom and Love, since he only Acts for himself; we shall no longer doubt but that all Natural Laws must tend to the preservation and perfection of this World, according to indispensable Order, and by their dependence on necessary Love: For all things are governed by the Wisdom and Will of God.  
There is no necessity for me to enlarge any further on this Principle at this time. What I have said is sufficient to draw this Consequence, That in the first Institution of Nature, it was impossible that Spirits should have been subjected to Bodies: For as God can never Act without Knowledge and involuntarily, so he has made the World according to his Wisdom and by the Morion of his Love: He has made all things by his Son, and in the Holy Ghost, as the Scripture teaches us. Now, in the Wisdom of God, Spirits are more perfect than Bodies, and by the necessary Love which God has for himself, he prefers the most perfect to the least perfect, Therefore it is impossible that Spirits should have been subjected to Bodies in the first Institution of Nature. Otherwise we should be obliged to say, That when God made the World he followed not the Rules of his Eternal Wisdom, nor the Motions of his natural and necessary Love: Which is not to be conceived, but rather implies a direct Contradiction.  
It is true, at present a created Mind is subject to a material and sensible Body; but it is because Order considered as a necessary Law, requires it. It is because, God loving himself by a necessary Love, which is always his inviolable Law, cannot love Spirits which are contrary to him; nor consequently prefer them to Bodies, in which there is no ill, nor any thing that God hates. 
See the fifth Dialogue of The Christian Conversations.  For God loves not Sinners in themselves; they only subsist in the Universe by Jesus Christ. God only preserves and loves them, that they may cease to be Sinners by Grace in Jesus Christ; Or that if they remain Sinners eternally, they may eternally be condemned by the immutable and necessary Order, and by the Judgement of Jesus Christ, through whose Power they subsist, for the Glory of Divine Justice; for were it not for Jesus Christ they would be annihilated. I say this by the by, to remove some difficulties which may remain about what I have said elsewhere concerning Original Sin; or the general Corruption of Nature.  
It is, in my Opinion, very useful to consider that the Mind only knows External Objects after two manners: By Knowledge and by Sensations. It sees things by Knowledge, when it has a clear Idea of them, and consulting this Idea, can discover all the properties they are capable of. It sees things by Sensation, when it cannot thus discover the properties of them clearly: When it only knows them by a confused Sensation, without Light and Evidence. It is by Knowledge and ' a clear Idea, the Mind sees the Essences of Things, Numbers and Extension. It is by a confuted Idea or by Sensation, it judges of the existence of Creatures, and that it knows its own.  
The Mind perceives those things perfectly which it perceives by Knowledge and a clear Idea; and moreover it sees clearly, that if there be any obscurity or imperfection in its Knowledge, it proceeds from its weakness and limitation; or from want of application on its part, and not for want of perfection in the Idea which it perceives. But what the Mind perceives by Sensation, is never clearly known to it: Not for want of application on its part, for we always apply ourselves carefully to what we feel, but by the defect of the Idea which is very obscure and confused.  
From hence we may judge, that it is in God, or in an immutable Nature, that we see whatever we know by Light and a clear Idea; not only because by Knowledge we see Number, Extension, and the Essence of Being's, which depend not on a first act of God, as I have already showed; but also because we know those things after a very perfect manner, and also we should know them after an infinitely perfect manner, were the capacity we have of thinking, infinite, since nothing is wanting in the Idea which represents them. We ought also to conclude, that it is in ourselves we see whatever we know by Sensation: Not that we can produce any new Modification in ourselves, or that the Sensations or Modifications of our Soul can represent objects, by whose means God excites them in us; but because our Sensations which are not distinct from us, and consequently can never represent any thing that is distinct from us, may nevertheless represent the existence of Being's, or make us judge that they do exist. For, God exciting our Sensation in us at the presence of Objects by an action which is no wise sensible, we fancy we receive from the Object not only the Idea which represents its. Essence, but also the Sensation which makes us judge of its Existence; for there is always a pure Idea and a confused Sensation in the knowledge we have of the Existence of Being's, if we except that of God and our Soul. I except the Existence of God; for that is known by a pure Idea, without Sensation; his Existence not depending on a Cause, and being included in the Idea of the necessary Being, as the equality of Diameters is included in the Idea of the Circle. I also except the Existence of our own Soul; because we know by an Internal Sensation that we think, will, and feel; and that we have no clear Idea of our Soul; as I have sufficiently explained in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book, and elsewhere.  
These are part of the Reasons that may be added to those I had already given to prove, that God only inlightens us; and that the immediate and direct object of our clear and evident Knowledge, is an immutable and necessary Nature. Men commonly make some Objections against this Opinion: I shall now endeavour to resolve them.  

Against what has been said, That God only Inlightens us, and that we see all things in Him.  

FIRST OBJECTION.  
Our Soul thinks, because it is its Nature. God in Creating it has given it the Faculty of Thinking, there needs no more: Or if there is any thing more required, let us rely on what Experience teaches us about our Senses: We find enough by Experience that they occasion our Ideas. 'Tis ill Philosophising against Experience,  
ANSWER.  
I wonder that the Cartesians, who have so much, and yet so reasonable an aversion, against the general Expressions of Nature and Faculty, so freely use them on this occasion. They will not allow Men to say, that Fire burns by its Nature, and that it turns certain Bodies into Glass by a Natural Faculty: And yet some of them are not afraid of saying, that the Mind of Man produces in itself the Ideas of all things by its Nature, and because it has the Faculty of Thinking. But yet they must give me liberty to say, that these Expressions are no more significant in their Mouths, than in those of the Peripatetics.  
I am sensible the Soul is capable of Thinking; but I know also that Extension is capable of Figures. The Soul is capable of volition, as well as Matter is of motion. But, as it is false that Matter, though capable of Figure and Motion, has in itself a Power, a Faculty, a Nature, by which it can move itself, or assume sometimes a round Figure, and sometimes a square one; so that the Soul is Naturally and Essentially capable of Knowledge and of Volition; yet it is false that it has Faculties by which it can produce its Ideas in its self, or its tendency towards good. There is a great difference between being Movable, and Moving. Matter of its Nature is movable, and capable of Figures: Besides it cannot subsist without Figure. But it moves not itself; it gives not itself a Figure; it has no Faculty for all that. The Mind by its Nature is capable of Motion and Ideas: I grant it: But it moves not itself; it inlightens not itself: God does all in Spirits as well as in Bodies. Can we say, that God makes all the alterations which happen in Matter, 
See the first Illustration.  and that he makes not those which happen in the Mind? Do we give that unto God which belongs to him, in abandoning the last of all Being's to his Disposition? Is he not equally the Master of all things? Is he not the Creator, the Preserver, the only true Mover of Spirits as well as Bodies? Certainly he makes all things, Substances, Accidents, Being's, manners of Being's. We take away his Knowledge, by putting bounds to his Action.  
But if Men will needs have it, that Creatures have such Faculties is are commonly conceived; that we must say that Natural Bodies have a Nature which is the Author of their Motion and Rest, as Aristotle and his followers say. This overthrows all my Ideas: But yet I would rather allow it, than say, that the Mind inlightens itself. Let Men say, the Soul has that power of differently moving the Members of their Body, and to communicate Sensation and Life to them: Let them say, if they please, that it gives Heat to the Blood, Motion to the Spirits, and to the rest of the Body its Magnitude, Disposition, and Figure: But let them never say, that the Mind gives itself its Motion and Light. If God does not all, at least let us allow him to do that which is greatest and most perfect in the World. And if Creatures do something, let them move their Bodies, and let them order them as they please, but let them not act upon Minds.  
Let us say, that Bodies move one another, after having moved themselves: Or rather, let us not pretend to understand the different dispositions of Matter, that little concerns us. But we ought not to suffer our Minds to be ignorant from whom they receive the Light which lightens them: Let them know from whom they receive that which can make them happier and more perfect: Let them know their dependence according to its utmost extent; and that whatever they have actually, they receive it from God every moment: For as a great Saint says upon another Subject; It is a very criminal Pride to make use of those things which God gives us, as if they were Naturally ours. Above all things, let us not imagine that the Senses instruct our Reason; that the Body directs the Mind; and that the Soul receives that from the Body which it has not itself. It were better to fancy ourselves independent, than to think we have a real dependence on the Body. It is better to be our own Master, than to seek out a Master among the Creatures that is less valuable than we. But it is much better yet to submit to the Eternal Truth, which assures us in the Gospel, that he is our only Master, than to give credit to the testimony of our Senses, or of some Men who dare speak to us as our Masters. Experience, whatever Men may say, does not countenance Prejudices: For our Senses, as well as our Masters according to the Flesh, are only occasional causes of the instruction which the Eternal Wisdom gives us in the most secret part of our Reason. But whereas that Wisdom teaches us by an operation which is no wise sensible; we fancy that it is our Eyes, or the Worlds of those who strike the Air at our Ears which produce that Light, or pronounce that intelligible Voice which instructs us. 'Tis for that Reason, as I have said elsewhere, that Jesus Christ was not only satisfied with instructing us after an intelligible manner by his Divinity; he thought fit also to instruct us after a sensible one by his Humanity: He would show us that he was our Master in all things. And because we cannot easily look within ourselves, to consult him as Eternal Truth, Immutable Order, and Intelligible Light; he has made Truth sensible by his Words, Orders lovely by his Example, Light visible by a Body which diminishes the splendour of it; and yet we are still so ingrateful, so injust, so stupid and senseless, as to look not only upon other Men, as our Masters, contrary to his express prohibition, but perhaps, even upon the most despicable and vile Bodies.   

SECOND OBJECTION.  
The Soul being more perfect than Bodies, why should it not contain that in itself which represents them? Why should not the Idea of Extension be one of its Modifications? God only acts in it, and modifies it: We grant it. But why should it see Bodies in God, if it can see them in its own substance? It is not material; it is true. But God, though a pure Spirit, sees Bodies in himself: Why then should not the Soul see them in beholding itself, though it be Spiritual?  
ANSWER.  
Do we not see that there is this difference between God and the Soul of Man, that God is an Unlimited Universal and Infinite Being, and that the Soul is a particular Species of Being? 'Tis one of the Properties of Infinity to be at once one, and all things, composed as it were of an Infinity of Perfections; and so simple, that every Perfection it possesses, includes all others without any real distinction; for as every Divine Perfection is Infinite, it constitutes the whole Divine Being. But the Soul being a Limited Being, it cannot have Extension in itself, without becoming Material. Therefore God includes in himself all Bodies after an intelligible manner: He sees their Essences or Ideas in his Wisdom, and their Existence in his Love, or in his Will. It is necessary to say so, since God made Bodies, and knows what he has made, even before any thing was made. But the Soul cannot see that within itself, which it does not include: Moreover it cannot clearly see that which it does include; it can only feel it confusedly. But to explain this.  
The Soul does not include intelligible Extension, as one of its manners of Being; because Extension is not a manner of Being, it is really a Being. We conceive Extension alone, or without thinking on any thing else; but we cannot conceive manners of Being, without perceiving the Subject or Being, whereof they are the manners. We perceive that Extension without thinking on our Mind; besides we cannot conceive Extension can be a Modification of ones Mind. Extension being limited makes some figure, and the limits of the Mind cannot be figured. Extension having parts may be divided, at least in some sense, and we see nothing in the Soul that is divisible. Therefore Extension which we see, is not a manner pf the Minds Being; and therefore cannot see it in itself. How is it possible to see in one kind of Being all sorts of Being's; and in one particular and finite Being, a Triangle in general and an infinite number of Triangles? For in fine, the Soul perceives a Triangle or a Circle in general, though it implies a contradiction, that the Soul could have a Modification in general. The Sensations of Colour which the Soul ascribes to Figures, make them particular, because none of the Modifications of a particular Being can be general.  
Certainly we may affirm what we conceive clearly. We clearly conceive, that Extension which we see, is a thing distinct from us. Therefore we may say, that Extension is no Modification of our Being, and it is really something that is distinct from us. For we must observe, that the Sun (for instance) which we see, is not that which we behold. The Sun, and whatever is in the material World, is not visible in itself; I have proved it elsewhere. The Soul cannot see the Sun to which it is immediately united. Now we clearly see, and plainly feel, that the Sun is something distinct from us. Therefore we speak against our Knowledge and our Conscience, when we say, that the Soul sees all Bodies which surround it in its own Modifications.  
Pleasure, Pain, Taste, Heat, Colour, all our Sensations and Passions, are Modifications of our Soul. But though they are so, do we know them clearly? Can we compare Heat with Taste, Odour with Colour? Can we distinguish the affinity there is between Red and Green, and even between Green and Green? It is not so with Figures; we compare them one with another; we exactly know their proportions; we precisely perceive that the Square of the Diagonal of a Square is double to that Square. What affinity can there be between those intelligible Figures, which are very clear Ideas, and the Modifications of our Soul, which are only confused Sensations? And why should we pretend that those intelligible Figures cannot be perceived by the Soul, unless they are Modifications of it, since the Soul knows nothing of what happens to it by clear Ideas, but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation, as I have proved elsewhere, and shall prove it again in the following Explanation. If we could only see the Figure of Bodies in ourselves, they would on the contrary be unintelligible to us; for we know not ourselves. We are only darkness to ourselves, and must look out of ourselves to see ourselves; and we shall never know what we are, until we consider ourselves in him who is our Light, and in whom all things become Light. For it is only in God that the most material Being's are perfectly intelligible; but out of him the most Spiritual Substances become absolutely invisible. The Idea of Extension which we see in God is very clear. But as we do not see the Idea of our Soul in God, we feel indeed that we are, and what we actually have: But it is impossible for us to discover what we are, or any of the Modifications whereof we are capable.   

THIRD OBJECTION.  
There is nothing in God that is movable; there is nothing in him that is Figured; if there be a Sun in the intelligible World, that Sun is always equal to itself, and the visible Sun appears greater, when it is near the Horizon, than when it is at a great distance from it. Therefore it is not that intelligible Sun we see, it is the same with other Creatures. Therefore we see not the Works of God in God.  
ANSWER.  
To Answer all this, it's enough to consider only, That God includes in himself an infinity intelligible Extension; for God knows Extension since he has made it, and he can only know it in himself. Therefore, as the Mind can perceive part of that intelligible Extension which God includes, 'tis certain it may perceive all Figures in God; for all finite intelligible Extension is necessarily an intelligible Figure, since Figure is only the Expression of Extension. Moreover, this Figure of intelligible and general Extension becomes sensible and particular by Colour, or some other sensible Quality which the Soul fixes to it; for the Soul commonly bestows its Sensation upon the Idea which strikes it lively. Therefore it is not necessary there should be sensible Bodies in God, or Figures in intelligible Extensions to see them in God, or to make God see them, though he only beholds himself.  
If we conceive also, that a Figure of intelligible Extension made sensible by Colour, is taken successively from the different parts of this infinite Extension: Or if we conceive, that a Figure of intelligible Extension may turn upon its Centre, or successively approach to another, we perceive the Motion of a sensible or intelligible Figure, without any Motion in intelligible Extension. For God sees not the Motion of Bodies in his Substance, or in the Idea he has of it himself, but only by the knowledge he has of his Will in relation to them, Moreover, He only sees their Existence that way, because it is his Will only which gives a Being to all things. The Will of God changes nothing in his Substance: It moves it not. Intelligible Extension is  in all respects, even intelligibly. But though we only see this intelligible Extension, it seems movable to us by reason of the sensation of Colour, or of the confused image which remains after the sensation, which we affix successively, to divers parts of intelligible Extension, which gives us an Idea when we see or imagine the Motion of some Bodies.  
One may easily apprehend, by what I have now said, why we may see the Sun, sometimes larger, and sometimes smaller, though it be always the same in relation to God. For to do this, we need only see sometimes a greater part of intelligible Extension, and sometimes a lesser; and have a more lively sensation of Light, to affix to that part of Extension. Now as the parts of intelligible Extension are all of the same nature, they may all represent any Body whatever.  
You must not imagine, that the intelligible World has such an Affinity with the material and sensible one, as that (for instance) there should be an intelligible Sun, a Horse, a Tree destined to represent to us a Sun, a Horse, a Tree: And that all those who see the Sun, do of necessity see this pretended intelligible Sun. As all intelligible Extensions may be conceived circular, or have the intelligible Figure of a Horse or a Tree; any intelligible Extension may serve to represent a Sun, a Horse, a Tree, and consequently be a Sun, a Horse, a Tree of the intelligible World; and even become a visible and sensible Sun, Horse, or Tree, if the Soul have any sensation, occasioned by Bodies, to affix to these Ideas.  
Therefore when I said, That we see different Bodies, by the knowledge we have of the Perfections of God which represent them; I did not mean directly, that there are certain particular Ideas in God, which represent every Body in particular; and that we see such an Idea, when we see such a Body: For it is certain, we could not see that Body sometimes large, and sometimes small, sometimes round, and sometimes square, if we saw it by a particular Idea, which would be always the same. But I say, that we see all things in God, by the application that God makes of intelligible Extent to our Mind, after a thousand different ways; and thus intelligible Extension contains in itself all Perfections, or rather all the Differences of Bodies, by means of the different Sensations which the Soul bestows on the Ideas it has upon the account of those very Bodies. I have spoken after another manner: But the World may conclude, that it was only to make some of my Proofs the stronger and more sensible; and we must not judge, by what I have said now, that those Proofs are no longer valid. I would here give the Reasons of the different ways I have used to explain myself, if I thought it necessary.  
I dare not engage myself to enlarge further upon this Subject, for fear of saying things that are too abstruse or extraordinary: Or rather, because I would not venture to say things which I do not know, and which I am not capable of discovering; there are only some Passages of Scripture which seem to be contrary to what I have established here, which I shall endeavour to explain.  
OBJECTION.  
St. John in his Gospel, and in the first of his Epistles, says, That no Body has ever seen God. 
Ch. 1.18. Ch. 4.12.  DEUM nemo vidit unquam, unigenitus qui est in sinu patris ipse enarravit.  
ANSWER.  
I Answer, We do not properly see God, in seeing Creatures in him. We do not see his Essence in seeing the Essences of Creatures in his substance: As we see not Glass, in barely seeing in it the Objects it represents.  
Not but that we may say with St. Paul, St. Augustine, 
To the Corinth. chap. 13.  St. Gregory, and several other Fathers of the Church, that we see God even in this Life, though after a very imperfect manner. These are St. Gregory's Words in his Morals upon Job; 
B. 31. chap. 20.  A luce incorruptibili caligo nos nostrae Corruptionis obscurat; cumque & videri aliquatenus potest, & tamen videri Lux ipsa sicuti est non potest, quam longe sit indicat. Quam si mens non cerneret 
* Nec quia longe esset, videret. Si autem perfectè jam cerneret. , profecto hanc quasiper caliginem non videret. Igitur quia nec omnino cernitur, nec rursum omnino non cernitur, rectè dictum est, quia à longe Deus videtur. Though St. Gregory, to explain this Passage of Job, Oculi ejus a long prospiciunt, says, That in this Life we only see God at a distance; it is not because God is not present: But it is because the Clouds of our Concupiscence hid him from us: Caligo nos nostrae corruptionis obscurat; for in other Places he, with St. Augustine, compares the Light of God, which is God himself, to the Light of the Sun which surrounds us, and which we see not when we are blind, or shut our Eyes, because its Brightness dazzles us. In sole Oculos clausos tenemus.  
St. Augustine goes farther than St. Gregory his Faithful Disciple. 
Propinquior nobis qui fecit, quàm multa quae facta sunt. In illo enim vivimus, movemur & sumus. Istorum autem pleraque remota sunt a ment nostra propter dissimilitudinem sui generis.  For though he grants, that we only know God at present after a very imperfect manner; he nevertheless assures us in several places, that God is more known to us, than those things which we fancy we know best. He that has made all things, says he, is nearer to us than those things he has made: For 'tis in him we have Life, Motion, and Being. Most of the things he has made are not proportioned to our Mind, because they are Corporeal, and of a Species of Being distinct from him. And a little lower, Those who have known the Secrets of Nature, are justly condemned in the Book of Wisdom; 
Rectè culpantur in libro sapientiae inquisitores hujus saeculi.  for if they have been able to penetrate into these things which are most concealed from Men, with how much more ease might they have discovered the Author and Sovereign of the Universe? The Foundations of the Earth are concealed from our Eyes; but he who has laid those Foundations, is near to our Mind. 'Tis for that Reason that holy Doctor believes, 
Si enim tantum, inquit, potuerunt valere ut possent aestimare saeculum, quomodo ejus Dominum, non faciliùs invenerunt? Ignota enim sunt fundamenta oculis nostris; & qui fundavit terram, propinquat mentibus nostris. De Gen. ad litt. l. 5. c. 16. De Trinitate, l. 8. c. 8.  even that he who has Charity, knows God better, than he knows his Brother: Ecce, says he, jam potest notiorem Deum habere quàm fratrem. Plane notiorem, quia praesentiorem: Notiorem, quia interiorem: Notiorem quia certiorem. I bring no other Proofs of Saint Augustine's Sentiment. If any Man is desirous of them, he may find them of all sorts in the Learned Collection Ambrose Victor has made of them, in the Second Volume of Christian Philosophy.  
But to return to the passage of St. John; Deum nemo vidit unquam. I believe the Evangelists design, when he affirms that no Man has ever seen God, is to make us believe the difference which is between the Old and New Testament; between Jesus Christ and the Patriarches and Prophets; of whom it is written, that they have seen God. For Jacob, Moses, Isaiah, and others, have only seen God with their Bodily Eyes, and under an unknown Form: They have not seen him in himself: Deum nemo vidit unquam. But the only Son of the Father who is in his Bosom, has acquainted us with what he has seen: Vnigenitus qui est in sinu Patris: ipse enarravit.  
OBJECTION.  
St. Paul Writing to Timothy, says, That God inhabits inaccessible Light; that no Man has ever seen him; and moreover, that none can see him. If the Light of God be inaccessible, we cannot see all things in it.  
ANSWER.  
St. Paul cannot be contrary to St. John, 
St. Cyril of Alexandria upon these words of St. John: Erat Lux vera.  who assures us that Jesus Christ is the true Light which lightens all Men that come into this World. For the Spirit of Man, which several Fathers 
* In accessibilem, dixit, sed omni homini humana sapienti Scriptura quippe sacra omnes carnalium sectatoris humanitatis nomine notare solet. St. Greg. in cap. 28. Job.  call Illuminated or Enlightened Light, 
St. Aug. Tr. 14. upon St. John.  Lumen Illuminarum, is only enlightened by the Light of Eternal Wisdom, 
St. Greg. ch. 27. of Job.  which the said Fathers for that Reason call the Light which inlightens, Lumen Illuminans. David exhorts us to draw near unto God to be enlightened by him. Accedite ad eum, & illuminamini. But how can we be enlightened by him, if we cannot see the Light by which we are to be enlightened? Therefore, when St. Paul says, that this Light is inaccessible, he means that it is so to Carnal Men, who never look within themselves to contemplate it: Or, if he speaks of all Men, it is because they are all diverted from the Contemplation of Truth; because our Body continually disturbs the attention of our Mind.  
OBJECTION.  
God answering Moses who was desirous to see him, said, Thou canst not see my Face; for no Man can see me and live. Non videbit me homo & vivit.  
ANSWER.  
It is evident, That the Literal Sense of this Passage is not contrary to what I have said hitherto: For I pretend not that we can see God in this Life, in the manner Moses desired it. I Answer nevertheless, that we must Die to see God: For the Soul unites itself to Truth, proportionably as it forsakes the Body: 'Tis a Truth which we do not sufficiently think upon. Those who follow the motions of their Passions, whose Imagination is sullied by the enjoyment of Pleasures, who have augmented the Union and Correspondence of their Mind with their Body; in a word, those who Live, cannot see God: For they cannot look within themselves there to consult Truth. 
Sapientia non invenitur in terra suaviter viventium. Job 18.  Therefore happy are those who have a pure Heart, whose Mind is free, and whose Imagination is clean, who are not tied to the World, and hardly to their Body; in a word, happy are those who are Dead, for they shall see God. Wisdom has declared it publicly upon the Mountain, and it also says it secretly to those who consult it by looking within themselves.  
Those who continually excite Concupiscence and Pride in themselves, who perpetually form a thousand ambitious designs, who not only unite but subject their Soul not only to their Body, but to all things which are about them; in a word; those who live not only a Bodily Life, but also the Life of this World, cannot see God: For Wisdom inhabits the most secret part of Reason, but those perpetually incline towards external things.  
Yet those who continually mortify the Activity of their Senses, who are careful to preserve the purity of their Imagination, who courageously resist the Motions of their Passions; in a word, those who break all the Ties which make others Slaves to the Body and sensible Greatness, may discover a World of Truths, and see that Wisdom which is concealed from the Eyes of all Mortals. 
Abscondita est ab Oculis omnium viventium, Job 28.2.  They do in some measure cease to live when they look within themselves. They quiet the Body when they approach to Truth. For the Mind of Man is situate after such a manner, between God and Bodies, that it cannot leave Bodies without drawing near unto God; as it cannot run after them without removing from him. But whereas we cannot quit the Body wholly before Death, I own we cannot be perfectly united to God before that time. We may now, according to Saint Paul, see God confusedly, as in a Glass, but we cannot see him Face to Face: Non videbit me homo, & vivet. Nevertheless we may see him ex parte, that is, confusedly and imperfectly.  
We must nor imagine that Life is equal in all Living Men, nor that it consists in an indivisible Point. 
Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem, fancy ad faciem. Nunc cognosco ex parte, 1 Cor. 15.  The Dominion of the Body over the Mind, which hinders us from uniting ourselves to God by the Knowledge of Truth, is capable of more and less. The Soul is not equally united to the Body it animates, by its Sensations in all Men, nor to those towards which it inclines by its Passions; and there are some who mortify the Concupiscence of Pleasure and Pride in themselves to that degree, that they hardly any longer have any relation to their Bodies or to the World. Thus they are as if they were Dead. Saint Paul gives us a great Example of this. He chastized his Body, and reduced it into subjection; and he had humbled and lessened himself to that degree, that he thought no more on the World, nor the World on him: For the World was Dead and Crucified to him, as he was Dead and Crucified to the World. And 'tis for that Reason, says Saint Gregory, that he was so sensible of Truth, and so well disposed to receive the Divine Lights that are in his Epistles, which as bright as they are, only strike those who like him mortify their Senses and Passions: For as he says himself, The carnal and sensible Man cannot apprehend spiritual things; 
Animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei, stultitia enim est illi, 1 Cor. 2.14.  because the Wisdom of the World, the Taste of the Age, Wit, Niceness, Vivacity, the Beauty of Imagination, by which we live to the World, and the World lives in us, 
Ad Moysen dicitur, non videbit me homo & vivet; ae si apertè diceretur; Nullus unquam Deum spiritualiter videt qui Mundo carnaliter vivit. St. Greg. upon the 28th Chapter of Job.  communicates to our Mind a sad stupidity and insensibility in respect to all Truths, which we cannot perfectly understand without silencing our Senses and Passions.  
Therefore we must wish for Death which unites us to God, or at least the Image of that Death, which is the mysterious Sleep, during which all our External Senses being stupefied, we may listen to the Voice of inward Truth, which is only heard in the silence of Night, when Darkness conceals sensible Objects from us, and the World is as it were Dead in relation to us. 'Tis thus, says St. Gregory, That the Spouse had harkened to the Voice of her Beloved in her Sleep; at if she had said, I sleep, but my Heart wakes. I sleep outwardly, but my Heart wakes within me; because having no Life, nor Sensation, in reference to visible Objects, I become extremely sensible to the Voice of inward Truth, which speaks to me in the most secret part of my Reason. Hinc est quod sponsa in Canticis Canticorum sponsi vocem quasi per somnium audieret, quae dicebat: Ego dormio & Cor meum vigilat. Ac si diceret, dum exteriores sensus ab hujus vitae sollicitudinibus sopio, vacant ment, vivacius interna cognosco. Foris dormio, sed intus Cor vigilat; quia dum exteriora quasi non sentio, interiora solerter apprehendo, Bene ergo Eliu ait quod per Somnium loquitur Deus. Morals of St. Gregory upon the 33th Chapter of Job.      

AN EXPLANATION OF THE Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book.  
In which I prove, That we have no clear Idea of the Nature or Modifications of our Soul.  
I Have said in some places, and also think I have sufficiently proved it in the Third Book of the Search after Truth, that we have no clear Idea of our Soul, but only a Conscience or Internal Sensation; and for that reason we know it far more Imperfectly than Extension. That appeared so evident to me, that I did not think there was any necessity to prove it more at large. But the Authority of Des Cartes, who says positively, That the Nature of the Mind is better known than that of all other things, 
Answer to the fifth Objection against the second Meditation towards the end.  has prejudiced some of his Disciples so far, that what I have written about it has had no other effect with them, than to make me pass for a weak Man, and one that is incapable of reaching and keeping firmly to abstracted Truths, which are improper to beget and preserve the attention of those who consider them.  
I own that I am very weak, sensible and heavy, and that my Mind depends on my Body in so many respects that I cannot express them. I know it, I feel it, and I endeavour continually to increase that knowledge I have of myself. For if we cannot prevent our being miserable, it is necessary at least to know it, and to feel it; since we must at least humble ourselves at the sight of our inward Miseries, and acknowledge the need we have to be delivered from this Body of Death, which disperses Trouble and Confusion throughout all the Faculties of the Soul.  
Nevertheless the Question in hand is so much proportioned to the Mind, that I see not why a great application is required to resolve it: And this is the reason I did not enlarge upon it. For I think I may presume to say, that the Ignorance of most Men in relation to their Soul, its distinction from the Body, its Spirituality, its Immortality, and its other properties, sufficiently prove that we have no clear or distinct Idea of it.  
We may say we have a clear Idea of the Body, because we need only to consult the Idea which presents it to discover the modifications whereof it is capable. We see clearly that it may be round, square, at rest, or in motion. We easily conceive that a Square may be divided into two Triangles, two Parallellograms, two Trapezias. When any one asks us whether any thing belongs, or belongs not to Extension, we never hesitate upon an Answer; because the Idea of Extension being clear, we easily at first sight see what it contains, and what it excludes.  
But I find not that we have any Idea of our Mind, by which we may discover in consulting it, the modifications whereof it is capable. Had we never felt Pleasure or Pain we should not be able to know whether the Soul were, or were not capable of feeling them. If a Man had never eaten Melon, suffered Pain, seen Red or Blue, he might consult the pretended Idea of his Soul long enough, and never have distinctly discovered from thence, whether it were capable or not of such sensations and such modifications. I say further, although he actually felt Pain, or saw Colour, he could not by a simple view discover if those qualities belonged to the Soul. We imagine that Pain is in the Body, and that is the reason we suffer it; and that Colour is diffused through the surface of Objects, although we very clearly conceive that these Objects are distinct from the Soul.  
To be well assured whether sensible qualities are, or are not modifications of the Mind, we never consult this pretended Idea of the Soul: But on the contrary, the Cartesians themselves consult the Idea of Extension; and argue after this manner, Heat, Pain, and Colour, cannot be the modifications of Extension; for Extension is only capable of different Figures and different Motions. And there is but two kinds of Being's, that of Spirits and that of Bodies; therefore Pain, Heat, Colour, and all other sensible qualities belong to the Mind.  
Since we are obliged to consult the Idea we have of Extension, to discover whether or no sensible qualities are modifications of the Soul; is it not evident that we have no clear Idea of the Soul? Else we should never bethink ourselves of going so far about. When a Philosopher would discover whether Roundness belongs to Extension, does he consult the Idea of his Soul, or any other Idea, than that of Extension? Does he not clearly see in the Idea of Extension itself, that Roundness is a modification of it: And would it not be extravagant if he should argue after this manner to explain it; that there is only two kinds of Being's, that of Spirits, and that of Bodies; but Roundness is not a modification of a Spirit, therefore 'tis a modification of a Body.  
We discover then by one simple view, without reasoning, by a bare application of the Mind to the Idea of Extension, that Roundness, and all other Figures whatever are modifications which belong to the Body; and that Pleasure, Pain, Heat, and all other sensible qualities are not modifications thereof. No Question can be proposed about what does or does not belong to Extension, which cannot be answered easily, quickly, and boldly, by the consideration only of the Idea which represents it. All Men are agreed upon what ought to be received about this subject. For those who say that Matter can think, don't imagine it has this faculty because it is extended; since they acknowledge that Extension, taken precisely as such, cannot think.  
But we are not so well agreed about what we ought to believe of the Soul, and its modifications: There are some who think Pain, Heat, or Colour does not so much as appertain to it. 'Twould seem very ridiculous amongst some Cartesians, to say the Soul actually becomes Blue, Red, or Yellow, or receives a tincture of the Colours of the Rainbow, whilst it contemplates thereon. There are many persons who doubt, and still more who don't believe, that the Soul becomes actually stinking when we smell Carrion; and that the taste of Sugar, Pepper, and Salt, are properties belonging to it. Where is then the clear Idea of the Soul, that the Cartesians may consult it, and agree all upon the subject, where Colours, Taste, Odours, etc. aught to centre.  
Yet if the Cartesians were agreed upon this point, we could not conclude from thence that they would have a clear Idea of the Soul; for if they should at last grant, that 'tis that which is actually Green, or Red, when we see Green or Red, yet would it be only by long and tedious reasonings that they could conclude it: They would never discover it by a simple view, nor ever find it by consulting the pretended Idea of the Soul, but rather by considering that of the Body. They only affirm that sensible qualities appertain to the Soul, because they belong not to Extension, whereof they have a clear Idea; nor could they ever otherwise convince those of it, who having weak Minds, are incapable of complicated Perceptions or Arguments; or rather those who cannot stay long on the clear Idea of the Body, but confound all things: There will be always Peasants, Women, and Children, and perhaps even some Learned Men who will doubt of it. But Women and Children, Learned and Ignorant, the most Ingenious and most Stupid, plainly see by the Idea they have of Extension, that 'tis capable of all manner of Figures: And as clearly apprehend that Extension is not capable of Pain, Taste, Smell, nor any Sensation, when they faithfully and with application consult only the Idea which represents it; for the Idea which represents Extension includes no sensible quality.  
It is true they may doubt whether Bodies are or are not capable of Sensation, or of receiving any sensible quality: But then by the Body they mean something else besides Extension, and have no clear Idea of the Body taken in this sense. But when Des Cartes, or the Cartesians to whom I speak, affirm that they know the Soul better than the Body, only understand Extension by the Body; then how can they maintain that we have a clearer knowledge of the Nature of the Soul, than we have of the Body, since the Idea of Body or Extension is so clear that all the World agrees on what it includes; and that of the Soul so confused, that the Cartesians themselves every day dispute whether the modifications of Colour, belong to it.  
We know, say these Philosophers according to Des Cartes, the nature of a substance so much the more distinctly as we know more of its Attributes: Now there is nothing whereof we know so many Attributes, as of our Mind; because as many as we discover in any thing else, we may place to the account of the Mind, since it knows them: And therefore its Nature is more known than that of any other thing.  
But who is there that don't see a great deal of difference betwixt knowing by a clear Idea, and knowing by Conscience? When I know that 2 times 2 are 4, I know it very clearly; but I done't clearly know what it is in me that knows it: It is true I feel that I know it by Conscience or inward Sensation; but I have not so clear an Idea of it, as I have of Numbers, whose relations I can clearly discover. I can reckon three properties in my Mind, that of knowing that 2 times 2 are 4, that of knowing that 3 times 3 are 9, and that of knowing that 4 times 4 are 16. And if you will these three properties shall be different from one another, and thus I could count an infinite number of properties in myself: but I deny that we clearly know the Nature of things which we cannot thus reckon.  
We may say that we have the clear idea of a Being, and are acquainted with its Nature, when we can compare it with others, of which we also have a clear Idea; or at least when we can compare the modifications whereof it is capable amongst themselves. We have clear Ideas of Numbers, and the parts of Extension, because we can compare these things together. As we may compare 2 with 4, 4 with 16, and each number with any other; so we may compare a Square with a Triangle, a Circle with an Ellipsis, a Square and a Triangle with any other Square and Triangle, and by this means clearly discover the relations which these Figures and Numbers have to one another. But we cannot compare our Mind with other Being's, to discover clearly any relation of them; nor can we so much as compare its modifications together. We can never clearly discover the relations between Pleasure and Pain, Heat and Colour, or to speak only of the modifications of the same kind, we cannot exactly determine the relations between Green and Red, Yellow and Purple, nor even between Purple and Purple. We see plainly that one is darker or brighter than the other, yet do we not evidently know either how much, or what it is to be darker or brighter. We have therefore no clear Idea of the Soul or its modifications: and although I see or feel Colours, Tastes, Odours, I may say as I have before, that I know them not by a clear Idea, since I cannot clearly discover their relations.  
'Tis true I can discover the exact relation between Sounds; as for instance, that the Octave is double, a fifth as 3 to 2, a fourth as 4 to 3. but I cannot know these proportions by the sensations I have of 'em. If I know the Octave is double 'tis because I have learned by experience that the same string sounds an Octave, when having struck it whole, we strike it again after having divided it into two equal parts; or that I know the number of vibrations is double in equal times, or something of the like nature: and this because the tremble of the air, the vibration of the string, and even the string itself are such things as we may compare by clear Ideas: and that we distinctly know the relations between the string and its parts, as also between the swiftness of different vibrations. But we cannot compare Sounds amongst themselves, or as they are sensible Qualities and Modifications of the Soul; nor this way are their proportions or relations to be discovered. And although Musicians very well distinguish the different concord's, 'tis not because they distinguish the proportions of them by clear Ideas▪ They judge of different Sounds only by the Ear, Reason has nothing to do in it. But we cannot say that the Ear judges by a clear Idea, or otherwise than by sensation. Musicians therefore have no clear Idea of Sounds as they are Sensations and Modifications of the Soul; and consequently we conceive neither the Soul nor its Modifications by a clear Idea, but only by Conscience or inward Sensation.  
Nay, what is more, we do not so much as know wherein consist those Dispositions of the Soul, which make it more ready to act and represent Objects to itself; we cannot so much as discover in what these Dispositions can consist: Nor can we by Reason positively affirm, whether the Soul alone separated from the Body, or considered without relation to the Body, is capable of Habits and Memory. But how could we be ignorant of these things if the Nature of the Soul were better known to us than that of the Body? Without any difficulty we perceive wherein consists the facility that the Animal Spirits have to flow into the Nerves they have been many times in; or at least we easily discover that whilst the Conduits of the Nerves are enlarged, and their Fibres recumbent after a certain manner, the Spirits can easily insinuate themselves. But what can we conceive to be capable of increasing the facility the Soul has to act or think? For my part I confess I am wholly ignorant of it, nor can I instruct myself in it, although I have a very lively sensation of the facility whereby it excites certain thoughts in me: And if I had no particular Reasons which inclined me to believe that I really have such Dispositions although I know them not in me, I should conclude that there was neither. Habit nor Spiritual Memory in my Soul. But in fine, since we have any doubt about it, it is a certain mark we are not so well acquainted with it as is pretended; for Doubts can never attend Evidence and clear Ideas.  
It is certain that the most understanding Man does not evidently know, 
Eccl. 9.1.  whether he deserves Love or Hatred as the Wiseman speaks. 
Sed neque meipsum judico. Nihil enim mihi conscius sum: sed non in hoc justificatus sum, qui autem judicat me, Dominus est, 1 Cor. 4.4. John 13.37.  The inward sensation we have of ourselves can give us no assurance of it. St. Paul says indeed his Conscience reproached him with nothing, yet for all that he does not say he is justified. On the contrary he affirms, that justifies him not, and that he durst not judge himself, because he who judges is the Lord. But as we have a clear Idea of Order, if we had as clear a one of the Soul by the inward sensation we have of ourselves, we should evidently know if it were conformable to order; we should discover whether we were righteous or not, and even exactly discern all its inward dispositions to good or evil, whenever we had any sensation of them. And if we could know ourselves as we are, we should not be so subject to presumption. 'Tis also very probable that then St. Peter would not have said to his Master, whom he so soon after denied: Why can I not follow thee now? I will lay down my life for thy sake: Animam meam pro te ponam. For having an inward sensation of his Power and Good Will, he would have been able evidently to have seen whether he had had a sufficient Strength and Courage in himself to have overcome death, or rather the insults of a silly Maid, and two or three other Servants.  
If the Nature of the Soul is more known than that of any thing else, and the Idea we have of it, as clear as that we have of the Body; I only demand, what is the reason that so many Men confound them together? Is it possible to confound two clear Ideas which are entirely different? Let us do Justice to all the World. Those who are not of our Opinion are as rational as we, they have the same Idea of things, and partake of the same Reason. Why therefore do they confound what we distinguish? Do they ever on other occasions confound such Things as they have clear Ideas of? Have they ever confounded two different Numbers? Or ever taken a Square for a Circle? And yet the Soul differs more from the Body than a Square does from a Circle: for they are two Substances which agree in nothings and still they confound them. The reason must be then because there is some difficulty in discovering their difference; and which cannot be done by a simple view, but some Arguments must be used to prove that the one is not the other. Wherefore the Idea of Extension must be consulted with application, and we must discover that it is not a Modification of Body, but the Body itself, since it is represented to us as a Thing subsisting, and the principle of whatever we clearly conceive in Bodies: And that as the Modifications of Body is not capable of having any relations to sensible Qualities, so it is necessary that the Subject of these Qualities, or rather the Being whereof these Qualities are Modifications, should be very different from Body. The like Arguments are necessary to be urged to prevent the confounding our Souls with our Bodies. But if we had as clear an Idea of the Soul as we have of the Body, certainly we need not be at all this trouble to distinguish them; since we should discover their essential difference by one simple view, and with as much facility as we perceive the difference between a Square and a Circle.  
I shall not stand to prove more at large, that we have no clear Ideas either of the Soul or its Modifications; for what ever way we consider ourselves we sufficiently discover it. Nor had I added this to what I have already said of it in the Search after Truth, but that some Cartesians objected against it. If this does not satisfy them, I shall expect that they discover to me this clear Idea which I have not been able to find in myself, although I have done what I could to discover it.   

AN EXPLANATION OF THE Eighth Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book.  
Of Lose and General Terms which signify nothing, how they are distinguished from others.  
TO comprehend what has been said in some places, how such as explain Things by Logical and General Terms, give no Reason of them, we need only to consider, that whatever is, may be reduced to Being or Manner of Being, whatever Term signifies neither of these, signifies nothing at all; and whatever Term signifies neither of them distinctly and particularly signifies nothing distinct; this seems to me very clear and evident, but what is so in itself, is not so to every one. Words are a sort of Coin, wherewith Men pay themselves and others, all Terms that offend not the Ear are currant, and there is so little Truth in the Business of the World, that those who speak, or hear it, have commonly no respect to it; The Gift of Speech is the greatest Talon, and the Language of the Imagination is the surest Means, and a Memory filled with Unintelligible Terms will always appear advantageously whatever Cartesians may say of it.  
When Men shall love Truth only, they will be cautious what they say, carefully examine their Intentions, and scornfully reject Empty Terms, closely adhering to clear Ideas. But when will this come to pass? Then only when their dependence upon the Body is broke, when their necessary relation to sensible Objects ceases, when they shall no longer corrupt one another, but faithfully consult their Master who instructs them inwardly; but this is not to be expected in this life.  
Yet all are not equally indifferent for Truth; some speak without reflection, hear without distinction, and attend on that only which affects them; others industriously labour to inform themselves and convince others of the Truth. 'Tis to these chief that I address myself; for it was at their Requests I began these Remarks.  
I say then; Whatever is, whether it actually exists or not, and consequently whatever is intelligible is either Being, or a Manner of Being. By Being I intent something that is absolute, or that may be conceived alone, independent of any thing else; by Manner of Being, I mean something relative, or what cannot be conceived alone. Now there are two Manners of Being, one consists in the relation of the parts of any Whole to some part of the same Whole, the other in the relation of one Thing to another which are not parts of the same Whole. An Instance of the first is Roundness in Wax, which consists in the Equality of distance that all the Superficial parts have in respect to that at the Centre. The Motion or Situation of the Wax is an Instance of the second: which consists in the relation which the Wax has to the Bodies that are about it. By Motion I mean, not a Moving Power; for 'tis evident that Power neither is, nor can be, a Manner of a Body's Existence; for let it be Modified how it will, we cannot conceive it as a Moving Power.  
Whatever then is intelligible is either Being, or a Manner of Being; for it is certain, that every Expression that signifies neither of these, signifies nothing at all, and every Term that signifies not this or that particular Being, or Manner of Being, is obscure and confused: danglam And therefore whatever we say to one another is unconceivable, if we have no distinct Idea of Being, or Manner of Being, which respectively answer to the Terms made use of.  
However I confess we may, and aught sometimes to use such Words as do not excite distinct Ideas. We may, because 'tis not always necessary to put the Definition instead of the Thing defined, and because we may sometimes profitably use abridged Expressions, though in themselves confused. We must, as when we are obliged to speak of such Things whereof we have no distinct Idea, and which we conceive not by an inward sensation, as of the Soul and her Modifications, only we ought to be careful that we use not obscure and equivocal Terms, we having clear ones, or even any which may excite false Ideas in those we speak to. For Instance:  
It is more intelligible to say, that God created the World by his Will, than his Power. This last Word is a Logical Term which stirs up no distinct and particular Idea, but leaves us at liberty to imagine that the Power of God may be distinct from the Efficacy of his Will. We speak more intelligibly when we say, God pardons Sinners through Jesus Christ, than by absolutely saying, He forgives them through his Clemency and Mercy. These Terms are equivocal, and may occasion us to think, that the Mercy of God may be contrary to his Justice, that Sin may go unpunished, and that the Satisfaction of Jesus Christ is not necessary, etc.  
Men often make use of lose and Indefinite Terms when they speak of the Divine Perfections, which is not  since Philosophical Rigour is not always necessary; but by a criminal Stupidity and Negligence, they abuse these General Expressions, and draw so many false Consequences from them, that though they all have the same Idea of God, and consider him as an infinitely perfect Being, yet there was scarcely any Imperfection that was not attributed to him in the Times of Idolatry, and Men often spoke of him after a very unworthy manner, for want of comparing their Expressions with the Ideas they had of him, or rather with himself.  
But 'tis chief in Phisics that these Lose and General Terms are abused, which stir up no distinct Idea either of Being, or Manner of Being. For Instance: When we say, Bodies tend to their Centre, they descend by their Gravity, and ascend by their Levity, that they move naturally, and successively change their Forms, that they act by their Virtues, Qualities, Faculties, etc. Such Terms signify nothing, and all these Propositions are absolutely false in the sense that most Philosophers take them. There is no Centre in the Sense commonly meant, Gravity, Form, Nature, etc. stir up no Idea, either of Being, or Manner of Being; they are lose impertinent Terms which wise Men should avoid. The Knowledge of Fools is impertinent Talk, says the Scripture: These Terms are only proper to cover the Ignorance of the falsely Learned, and to make the Stupid, and Libertine, believe that God only is not the True Cause of all Things.  
This methinks is certain and easily conceived, yet most Men speak freely without being at the trouble to examine whether the Terms they use have a clear and exact signification: And there are many Voluminous Authors, in whom it is very difficult to find a Passage where they understood what they wrote. Those therefore who read much, and respectively hearken to the Lose and General Discourses of the falsely Learned, are grossly ignorant; nor do I see any way for them to grow wiser, but by making and constantly renewing their Resolution of believing no Man upon his Word, and before they have joined very distinct Ideas to the most common Terms which others use. For these Terms are not clear as is generally thought, but only seem so through Custom; for Men fancy they understand well what they say and hear, when they say and hear the same Thing a hundred times over without ever examining it.   

AN EXPLANATION OF THE Conclusion of the Three First BOOKS.  
That Physicians and Spiritual Guides are absolutely necessary for us, but that it's dangerous to consult and follow them on many Occasions.  
CErtainly Man before his Fall, had all things that were necessary to keep his Mind and Body in a perfect State; he needed neither Physician nor Guide, but consulted inward Truth as the infallible Rule of his Duty, and his Senses were so faithful that they never deceived him in the use he was to make of external Bodies for the preservation of his own.  
But since the Fall all things are extremely changed; we consult our own Passions much more than the Eternal Law or Truth; and our Senses are so disordered, that by following them we sometimes lose our Health and Life. Divines and Physicians are absolutely necessary, and those who pretend to know best how to govern themselves upon all occasions, commonly fall into the grossest Errors, which too late teaches them that they follow a Master that is not over-wise.  
However I think I may say, it has not so disordered all the Faculties of the Soul but that we may consult ourselves on many occasions; and it often happens, through the defect of it, that we lose the Life of our Soul and Body: Of the former, by consulting Casuists that are ignorant in Religion and Morality, and who do not so throughly examine the Consciences as to discover the engagements and dispositions of those that consult them: Of the latter, by applying ourselves to ignorant Physicians, and such as are unacquainted with the Constitution of our Bodies.  
What I have said as a Conclusion to the three first Books of the Search after Truth, has occasioned some Persons to imagine that I pretended, that for the preservation of Life and Health we ought to follow our Senses and Passions in all things; and that to be instructed in our Duty, it was needless to consult any one, since Eternal Wisdom is our Master, who speaks clearly to us in the most secret parts of our Reason. And though I never said nor thought that Physicians and Guides were useless, yet some Persons that are hasty at judging and concluding, believe it was my Opinion, because perhaps 'twas theirs; and because they don't so much consider Man as he is now, as what he was before the Fall: But to explain myself further upon this Question.  
Man may be considered two ways, in Health and Sickness: If in the first, I think his Senses are much more useful to preserve it, than the Reason and Experience of the ablest Physicians. There's no need of consulting the Physician to know how much a Man must weigh; whether Wood and Stones are proper Food; whether he may throw himself down a Precipice: His Senses teach him after a most short and indisputable way what he ought to do upon the like occasions. And this methinks is sufficient to justify what I have said for a Conclusion to the three first Books.  
But 'tis not enough to justify what I think, and even what I have said elsewhere, viz. 
Book 2. p. 20.  That our Senses admirably well discharge their Duty, and conduct us after so just and faithful a manner, to the ends they were designed for, that they seem to be injuriously charged with Corruption and Irregularity. For I always believed that such a justness, exactness and admirable Order, as is in our Sensations with reference to the preservation of Life, was no effect of Sin, but the first institution of Nature.  
'Tis Objected that this Order is now much subverted, and that if we follow our Senses we should not only eat Poison, but frequently eat more than we could digest.  
But I think our Senses would never tempt us to eat Poison; and that if by chance our Eyes should induce us to taste it, we should not find in it that relish as would prevail with us to swallow it, supposing the Poison was not disguised: For there's much difference between Poison as Naturally produced, and poisoned Food; between crude Pepper, and peppered Meats. I confess our Senses incline us to eat poisoned Meat, but they don't tempt us to eat Poison, perhaps not to taste it, provided this Poison be in that condition that God produced it; for our Senses reach only to the Natural Order of things as at first established by God.  
I grant also that at present our Senses tempt us to eat certain Meats to excess, but 'tis because they are not in their Natural State. We should perhaps never overcharge ourselves with Corn, if we ground it with Teeth given us for this end; but 'tis grounded, sifted, kneaded and baked, and even sometimes with Milk, Butter and Sugar; it is also eaten with Conserves and Ragoos of several sorts, which provoke the Appetite; so that we must not be surprised if our Senses tempt us to excess, when Reason and Experience join to surprise them.  
'Tis the same in respect of Flesh, which the Senses abhor when Raw and full of Blood, as is seen in an Animal that dies of itself; but Men have thought upon kill Beasts, letting out their Blood, boiling the Flesh, seasoning and disguising it, and after this accuse their Senses of Corruption and Disorder, because they have used their Reason to prepare other sorts of Diet than Nature supplies; indeed I confess it necessary that Men should make use of the same Reason to moderate their Eating. And if Cooks have found out the art of making us eat old Shoes in a Ragoo, we ought to use our Reason, and distrust these adulterated Meats, which are not such as God made them; for he gave us our Senses only in relation to the Order of Natural Things.  
We must also observe that our Imagination and Senses are mistrustful when we take unusual Food. For if a Man had never eaten, nor seen any one eat of a certain Fruit which he had met with, he would at first have some aversion and sense of fear in tasting it; his Imagination and Senses would naturally be very attentive to the relish he tasted: Though never so hungry he would eat but little the first time; and if this Fruit had any dangerous quality, it would not fail to excite some surprise in him. Thus his Machine is disposed after such a manner that he would decline it another time, and the aversion which he had for it sensibly discovering itself in his looks, would deter others from eating it. All this would or might be performed in him without the assistance of his Reason; for I speak not here of those supplies which Reason and Instruction may afford. But seeing our Friends take bad Nourishments we do the same, for we live by Opinion, and Example emboldens us. We examine not the effect these Nourishments produce in us, and we are not afraid to eat to excess: Thus our Senses do not so much share in the Intemperance as is believed.  
It is true, there are possibly such Fruits whose relish may impose upon us, though we are never so attentive to the admonition of our Senses, but this is certainly very rare; and we must not conclude from particular Instances that our Senses are corrupt, and commonly deceive us in reference to the good of the Body; perhaps they deceive because we have altered our Organ by Unnatural Nourishment. 'Tis certain, that highseasoned Dishes which we feed on, do by their too penetrating Particles hurt the Fibres of our Tongue, and vitiate its delicateness and discernment. The Example of such as relish only Ragoos, is a proof of this; for if we find no savour in Corn and Raw Flesh, it is because our Tongue is become insensible of their parts, their motions being moderate.  
But though we suppose there are Fruits whose taste is capable of beguiling the most delicate Senses, and which are yet in their Natural Perfection, we must not believe that this is the effect of Sin, but because 'tis impossible that the Sensation of Taste which is form and perfected according to the most simple Laws of Nature, should have sufficient discernment for all sorts of Meats: Besides the defect of this Sense would not be remediless; because when Mothers have an aversion for dangerous Fruits, they communicate it to their Children, not only in the Womb, but much more when born into the World; for Children only eat what is given them by their Mothers, who Machinally, and by the Air of their Countenance, impress upon them that horror which they themselves have for Fruits that are dangerous to be eaten. So that God has sufficiently provided by our Senses for the preservation of Life, and nothing can be better ordered. For as Order requires that the Laws of the Union of our Soul and Body should be very simple, they must be very general; and God ought not to establish particular Laws for cases that happen very seldom; Reason on such occasions must assist the Senses; for Reason is useful in all things. But the Senses are determined by some Natural Judgements, which are more useful than can be conceived, as I have proved in the First Book, yet even these Judgements are sometimes Erroneous; for 'tis impossible it should be otherwise, without multiplying the most simple Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body.  
If we consider Man as he is now in a State of Infirmity, we must grant that his Senses often deceive him, even in things that relate to the Preservation of Life; for the Oeconomy of his Machine being troubled, it is impossible but in proportion to that trouble there should be many irregular Motions excited in his Brain; however his Senses are not so corrupted as is ordinarily believed; and God has so wisely provided for the Preservation of Life by the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body, which although they are very simple are often sufficient to restore our Health; that it is a much surer way to follow them, than to use our Reason or such Physicians, who do not carefully study the Disposition of their Patients; for even as a Wound closes up and heals of itself when constantly cleansed and licked, as is seen in wounded Animals, so common Distempers are soon dispersed when we let them alone, and precisely observe such a state of Life as these Diseases, by a kind of Instinct and Sensation, dictate to us.  
A Man for Example, who has a Fever, finds that Wine is bitter and offensive to him in that condition; yet this same person finds it agreeable and good when in Health. It even often happens that Wine is very good for the Sick when they relish it, provided this relish is not an effect of some previous Habit of Drinking, but that their desire of it proceed from the present Disposition of their Body. So that we cannot doubt but that we ought to consult our Senses in Sickness, what way we should take for the recovery of our Health. And this is what I believe we ought to do.  
The Distempered should be extremely attentive to certain secret Desires which the actual Disposition of their Body does sometimes excite in them; but above all, to take heed lest these Desires should proceed from some preceding Habit; they must let lose their Imagination, and think on nothing that may determine it; observe their present Inclination, and examine whether; it is the effect of their Disposition: This done, they ought to follow it, but with much Caution; for 'tis extremely, difficult to be assured whether these secret Inclinations proceed from the Disposition of their Body, and it is sometimes useful to consult some Experienced Person upon it. But if the Sick, letting lose his Imagination, as I have said, find nothing presented to his Mind, he must rest and keep to a sick Diet; for this will probably excite in him some Desire, or dissipate the Humours that cause the Sickness: For if the Distemper is increased notwithstanding such a strict Diet and Rest, that it's necessary to have recourse to Experience and Physicians, he must then exactly tell every thing to some skilful Physician, who if possible, knows his Constitution; he must explain clearly to him the beginning and progress of the Distemper, and the condition he was in before he fell sick, thereby to consult the Experience and Reason of his Physician; and though the Physician should prescribe bitter Medicines, and which indeed are kinds of Poison, yet they must be taken; for 'tis experienced that these Poisons stay not in the Body, but drive out with them those ill Humours that are the Cause of the Distemper. Here it is that Reason, or rather Experience, must command the Senses, provided the horror of the presented Medicine is not new; for if this horror was as old as the Disease, 'tis a sign the Medicine is of the same Nature as the ill Humours that caused the Distemper, and then perhaps it would only exasperate it.  
However I believe, that before we take strong Medicines, to which we are averse, we ought to begin with such as are more gentle and natural; as by drinking much Water, or taking an easy Vomit if the Appetite is lost; and if we have much difficulty to vomit, Water may attenuate the over-thick Humours, and facilitate the Circulation of the Blood in all the parts of the Body. Vomits cleanse the Blood, and hinder the received Nourishment from any longer corrupting and feeding the intermitting Fevers. But I must no further insist upon these things. I believe that we ought to follow the Counsel of Wise Physicians, who are not overhasty, nor rely too much upon their Medicines, nor too quick in prescribing Remedies; for when one is sick, for one Medicine that does good there are always many that do hurt. The Sick are impatient; and as 'tis not for the Honour of Physicians, or the Profit of Apothecaries, to visit the Sick without prescribing to them, so also Physicians visit too seldom and prescribe too often; therefore when one is sick, he should pray his Physician to hazard nothing, but to follow Nature, and fortify it as much as he can; he should acquaint him, that he has more Reason and Patience than to take it ill that he is often visited without Relief; for on these Occasions he sometimes does a great deal who does no hurt.  
I believe then, we should consult Physicians, and not refuse to obey them if we would be well; for though they cannot assure us a Recovery, yet they may sometimes contribute much to it, by reason of the repeated Experiments they make upon different Distempers. They know little of any thing certainly, yet they know more than we; and if they take the pains to know our Constitutions, carefully observe all the Accidents of the Distemper, and have much regard to our own Sensations, we may expect from them all the Assistance that we can reasonably hope from Men.  
What we have said of Physicians may be also said of Divines; it is absolutely necessary to consult them on some occasions, and it is commonly profitable: But it often happens that it is very unprofitable, and sometimes very dangerous to consult them. For Instance:  
'Tis commonly said, That Humane Reason is subject to Error; but there is something equivocal in this which we are not sufficiently ware of; for we must not imagine, that the Reason which Man consults is depraved, or that it ever deceives when faithfully consulted. I have said, and still repeat it, That it is sovereign Reason alone which makes us reasonable; it is sovereign Truth which enlightens us; and it is God only who speaks clearly to us, and knows how to instruct us. We have only one True Master, Jesus Christ our Lord, the Eternal Wisdom, and the Word of the Father, in whom are all the Treasures of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God; and it is Impiety to say, that this Eternal Reason of which all Men participate, and through which they are only reasonable, should be subject to Error, and capable of deceiving us: For it is not the Reason of Man but his Heart that deceives him; it is not his Light which hinders him from seeing his Darkness; it is not the Union he has with God that deceives him; it is not even in one Sense that he has with his Body: It is his dependence upon his Body, or rather, it is because he will deceive himself, because he will enjoy the Pleasure of Judging before he has been at the Trouble of Examining, because he will rest before he is come to the Place of Truth. I have more exactly explained the Cause of our Error in many places of the Search after Truth, and here I suppose what I have there said.  
And now I affirm it needless to consult Divines when we are assured that Truth speaks to us; and it is certain, that Truth speaks to us when we meet with Evidence in the Answers that are made to our Demands, or the Attention of our Mind. Therefore when we return into ourselves, and in the silence of our Senses and Passions hear a Voice so clear and intelligible, that it is impossible to doubt of it let Men think what they please, we must not consider Custom and secret Inclinations, or have too great a respect for their Answers who are called Learned. We must not suffer ourselves to be seduced with an appearance of false Piety, nor be dejected through their Oppositions who know not the Spirit that animates them; but we must patiently suffer their Insults, without condemning their Intentions, or despising their Persons. We must with simplicity of Heart rejoice at the Light of Truth which enlightens us, and although its Answers condemn us, we must prefer them before all the Subtle Distinctions which the Imagination invents for the Justification of the Passions.  
Every Man (for Instance) who knows how to examine himself, and to still the Noise of his Senses and Passions, clearly discovers that all the Motion which God puts into us should be terminated upon himself, and that even God cannot dispense with the Obligation we have of loving him in all things. It is evident, that God cannot but act for himself, that he cannot create or preserve our Will to will any thing but him, or to will any thing besides what he himself wills; for I cannot see how it's conceivable, that God should will a Creature to have more love for what is less lovely, or love chief, or as its end, what is not most lovely.  
I know well that Men who consult their Passions instead of Order, can easily imagine, that God has no other Rule of his Wills than the same Wills, and that if God follows Order, 'tis surely from this that he has willed it, by a Will that is absolutely free and indifferent. There are some who think, there is no Order that is immutable and necessary by its nature, and that the Order or Wisdom of God according to which he made all Things, although the first of Creatures is itself a Creature made by a  of God, and not begotten of his Substance by the necessity of his Being: But this Opinion, which shakes all the Foundations of Morality by taking away from Order and the Eternal Laws which depend upon it, their Immutability; and which overturns all the Superstructure of the Christian Religion, by despoiling Jesus Christ, or the Word of God, of his Divinity, does not yet so throughly darken the Mind as to hid from it this Truth that God Wills Order. Thus whether the Wills of God make Order, or suppose it, we clearly see when we examine ourselves, that the God whom we worship cannot do that which evidently appears contrary to Order. So that Order willing our Time, or duration of Being, should be for him who preserves us; that all the Motion of our Heart should continually tend towards him who continually impresses it upon us; that all the Powers of our Soul should only labour for him by virtue of whom they act. God cannot dispense with the Commandment which he gave us by Moses in the Law, and which he repeated by his Son in the Gospel: 
Mark 12.30.  Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength.  
But because Order wills, that every righteous Person should be happy and every Sinner unhappy, that every Action conformable to Order, and every Motion of love towards God, be recompensed; and on the contrary, it is evident, that every one who will be happy, must continually tend towards God, and with horror reject every thing that would stop his Course, or diminish his Motion towards his True Good: 'Tis not necessary that for this he consult a Spiritual Guide; for when God speaks, Men should be silent; and when we are absolutely certain, that our Senses and Passions have no part in the Answers which we hear inwardly, we must always hearken respectively to these Answers and submit to them.  
Would we know, whether we should go to a Ball or a Play? Whether we may in Conscience spend a great part of the day at Gaming, or unprofitable Entertainments? Whether certain Businesses, Studies, Employments, are conformable to our Obligations? Let us enter into ourselves; let us silence our Passions and Senses, and see the Light of God, if we can for his sake do such an Action. Let us interrogate him, who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, to know if the Way we follow does not lead to Death, and whether (God being essentially Just, and necessarily obliged to punish every Thing that is contrary to Order, and to recompense every Thing that is conformable thereto) we have reason to believe we go to increase or assure our felicity by the Action we are about.  
If it be our Love to God that carries us to the Ball, let us go thither; if we should play to gain Heaven, let us play Day and Night; if we have in sight the Glory of God in our Employ, let us increase it, let us do all Things with Joy; for our Recompense will be great in Heaven: But if after having carefully examined our Essential Obligations, we discover clearly, That neither our Being nor duration are of us, that we do an Injustice which God cannot but punish, when we endeavour to spend our Time in vain: If our Master and Lord, Jesus Christ, who has purchased us by his Blood, reproaches our Infidelity and Ingratitude, after a very clear and intelligible manner, for living after the Flesh and the World, for leading a Soft and Voluptuous Life, and for following Opinion and Custom; let us obey his voice, and not harden our Hearts; let us not seek for Guides that soften these Reproaches, embolden us against these Menaces, and who obscure this Light, with agreeable Clouds which hurt and penetrate our very Soul.  
When the blind lead the blind, they both fall into the ditch, says the Gospel; but if the Blind Man, who suffers himself to be lead, fall with him that leads him, if God does hot excuse him, will he excuse him who sees clearly, and yet suffers himself to be lead by the Blind, because this Blind Person leads him agreeably, and entertains him in the way according to his inclinations? These voluntary Blind aught to know, that God who never deceives, does sometimes permit these Seducers to punish corrupted Hearts who seek Seducers; that Blindness is a punishment of Sin, although 'tis often the Cause thereof; and that 'tis just, that he who would not hearken to Eternal Wisdom, which only speaks to him for his good, should leave him at length to be corrupted by Men, who deceive so much the more dangerously, as they flatter him more agreeably.  
It is true, 'tis difficult to enter into ones self, to silence one's Senses and Passions, and to discern whether 'tis God or our Body who speaks to us; for we often take the Proofs of Sensation for evident Reasons, and then 'tis necessary to consult Guides; but 'tis not always necessary to consult them: For we see our Duty on many occasions with the utmost evidence and certainty, and then it is even dangerous to consult them, if it be not done with an entire Sincerity, and a Spirit of Humility and Obedience; for these Dispositions oblige God not to permit us to be deceived, or at least in no very dangerous manner.  
When 'tis necessary to consult a Guide, we must choose one who understands Religion, who reuerences the Gospel, and who knows Man. We must take care that the Converse of the World has not corrupted him, that Friendship has not made him too Complaisant, so that he may either fear or hope any thing from us. We must choose one among a thousand, says St. Theresia, who as she relates of herself, had like to have been lost by the defect: of an ignorant Guide.  
The World is full of Deceivers, I say Religious Deceivers as well as others: Those who love us, seduce us through Complaisance; those who are below us, flatter us through Respect or Fear; those who are above us, consider not our Necessities, either through Contempt or Negligence. Besides all Men counsel us according to the relation we give them of what passes in us, and we are never wanting to flatter ourselves; for we insensibly cover our Sore when we are ashamed of it. We often deceive those who direct us, that we may deceive ourselves; for we suppose ourselves safe when we follow them. They guide us whither we have a mind to go, and we endeavour to persuade ourselves, in spite of our Light and the secret reproaches of our Reason, that 'tis our Obedience which determines us. We deceive ourselves, and God permits it; but we never deceive him who examines our Hearts; and though we shut our Ears as much as we can against the voice of inward Truth, we sufficiently feel by the reproaches of this sovereign Truth which leaves us to ourselves, that it inlightens our darkness, and discovers all the subtleties of self-love.  
'Tis therefore evident that we must consult our Reason for the Health of our Soul, as our Senses for that of our Body; and when Reason answers not clearly, we must necessarily have recourse to Guides, as we would to Physicians when our Senses fail us, but this must be done with discretion; for Guides that are but a little enlightened may sometimes destroy our Soul, as unexpert Physicians may our Body.  
As I done't throughly explain the Rules which might be given in respect of the choice and use that should be made of Guides and Physicians, I desire my Sentiments may be equitably interpreted, and that it may not be imagined that I would hinder any from seeking necessary assistance from others. I know that a particular Blessing attends our submission to the Opinions of the Wise and Understanding, and I am willing to believe this General Rule, Let us die according to the received Laws of Phisics, to the generality of Men, they are safer than any other that I could establish for the Preservation of Life.  
But because it is always profitable to examine ourselves, and consult the Gospel; to hearken to Jesus Christ whether he speaks immediately to our Mind and Heart, or by Faith declares himself to our Ears or Eyes, I believe I might say what I have said; for our Guides themselves deceive us when they speak contrary to what Faith and Reason teach us. And as it is to give Honour to God by believing his Works, to have that which is necessary for their preservation, I thought I should make Men sensible that the Machine of their Body is contrived after so admirable a manner, that of itself it discovers more easily what is necessary for its Preservation, than by Science, or even the Experience of the most able Physicians.   

AN EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Fifth Book.  
That Love is different from Peasure and Joy.  
THE Mind commonly confounds things which are very different, when they happen at the same time, and are not contrary to one another: Of which I have given many Instances in this Work; because 'tis therein that our Errors chief consist, in respect to what passes in ourselves. As we have no clear Idea of what constitutes the Nature or Essence of our Mind, nor of the Modifications it is capable of; it often happens that we confound things absolutely different, if they happen within us but at the same time; since we easily confound what we do not know by a clear and distinct Idea.  
It is not only impossible clearly to discover wherein the difference of such things consists as pass within us, but it is also difficult to discern whether there is any difference between them: For to effect this we must look into ourselves, not to consider what is voluntarily done in reference to Good and Evil, but to make an abstracted Reflection upon ourselves, which cannot be performed without much Distraction and Pains.  
We easily conceive that the Roundness of a Body, is different from its Motion: And although we know by Experience, that a Bowl upon a Plane cannot be pushed without being moved; and then Roundness and Motion are found together; however we don't confound them one with the other, because we know both Motion and Figure by very distinct and clear Ideas: But 'tis not so with Pleasure and Love, for we commonly confound them. Our Mind, if we may so say, becomes movable by Pleasure, as a Ball does by its Roundness; and because it is never without an impression towards good, it is immediately put in motion towards the Object which causes, or seems to cause this Pleasure: So that this motion of Love happening to the Soul at the same time it feels this Pleasure, it is enough to make it confound its Pleasure with its Love, because it has not so clear an Idea either of its Pleasure or its Love, as it has of Figure and Motion. Wherefore some Persons will believe that Pleasure and Love are not different, and that I distinguish too many things in each of our Passions.  
But to make it plainly appear that Pleasure and Love are very different, I shall distinguish two sorts of Pleasures, one of which precedes Reason, as agreeable Sensations, which we commonly call Pleasures of the Body; and the other sort neither precede Reason nor the Senses, and are generally called the Pleasures of the Soul: Such as Joy which is excited in us in consequence of a clear Knowledge, or a confused Sensation which we have, that some good is, or will happen to us.  
For instance: A Man tasting of a Fruit which he knows not, finds some Pleasure in eating it, if this Fruit be good for his Nourishment. This is a preventing Pleasure; for since he feels it before he knows whether this Fruit is good or nor, it is evident that this Pleasure prevents his Reason. An Huntsman when hungry, expecting or actually finding something to eat, actually feels Joy: Now this Joy is a Pleasure which follows the knowledge he has of his present or future good.  
It is perhaps evident by this distinction of Pleasure into that which follows and precedes Reason, that there is neither of them but differs from Love: For that Pleasure which precedes Reason, certainly precedes Love; since it precedes all knowledge, which in some degree or other is always supposed by Love. And on the contrary, Joy or Pleasure which supposes Knowledge, also supposes Love; since Joy supposes the confused Sensation, or clear Knowledge that we do, or shall possess what we love; and if we possessed a thing we had no love for, we should receive no Joy by it. Thus Pleasure is very different from Love; since the Pleasure which precedes Reason, precedes and causes Love; and the Pleasure which follows Reason, necessarily supposes Love, as an Effect supposes the Cause.  
Otherwise, if Pleasure and Love were the same thing, there would never be Pleasure without Love, nor Love without Pleasure; for a thing cannot be without itself. Yet a Christian loves his Enemy, and a Child well educated, loves his Father, how unreasonable and unkind soever he may be. The sight of their Duty, the fear of God, and love of Order and Justice, makes them love not only without Pleasure, but even with a kind of Horror, such Persons as are not agreeable to them. I confess they sometimes feel Pleasure or Joy, when they think they do their Duty; or when they hope to be recompensed according to their Merit: But besides that, this Pleasure visibly differs very much from the Love they have to their Father or Enemy, although it be perhaps the Motive of it; it often happens that 'tis not even this Motive which makes them act; it is sometimes only an abstracted view of Order, or notion of Fear, which preserves their Love. We may even in one sense say they have a Love for these Persons at the time they think not of them: For Love remains in us during the diversions of our thoughts, and whilst we sleep; but Pleasure seems to me to subsist no longer in the Soul, than whilst it is sensible of it. Thus Love or Charity remaining in us without Pleasure or Delight, it cannot be maintained that Pleasure and Love is the same thing.  
As Pleasure and Pain are two direct contraries: If Pleasure were the same thing with Love, Pain would not differ from Hatred. Now it is evident that Pain is different from Hatred, since Pain often subsists without Hatred. A Man, for instance, who is hurt without observing it, suffers a real and cutting Pain, but is free from Hatred; for he does not so much as know the Cause of his Pain, or Object of his Hatred; or rather, the Cause of his Pain not being worthy of Hatred, it cannot excite it in him. Thus he hates not this Cause of his Pain, although his Pain inclines him to, or disposes him to hate it. It is true this Man hates his Pain, for Pain deserves Hatred; but the hatred of Pain is not Pain, but only supposes it. The hatred of Pain is not worthy of Hatred as Pain: On the contrary 'tis very agreeable; for we please ourselves in hating Pain, as we are displeased in suffering it. Pain therefore is not Hatred; nor is Pleasure, which is opposite to Pain, Love; which is opposite to Hatred: Consequently the Pleasure which precedes Reason, is not the same thing as Love. And I likewise prove, that the Joy or Pleasure which follows Reason is also distinct from Love.  
As Joy and Sorrow are directly opposite: If Joy was the same thing as Love, Sorrow would not differ from Hatred: But it is plain that Sorrow is different from Hatred; for Sorrow sometimes subsists without Hatred. For instance: A Man finds himself by chance deprived of such things as he has need of: This is enough to cause Sorrow, but it cannot excite Hatred in him; either because he knows not the Cause which deprived him of these necessaries, or else that this Cause not being worthy of his Hatred, it could not stir it up in him. It is true this Man hates the privation or the good that he loves; but it is plain that this kind of Hatred is properly Love: For he hates the privation of good, only because he loves the good: And since to fly the privation of good, is to incline towards good; it is evident that the motion of this Man's Hatred differs not from that of his Love.  
Thus his Hatred, if he's possessed of any, not being contrary to his Love, and Sorrow being always opposite to Joy, it is plain that his Sorrow is not his Hatred; consequently Joy differs from Love. In fine, it is manifest when we are sorrowful, 'tis because of the presence of something we hate, or rather the absence of something we love. Thus Sorrow supposes Hatred, or rather Love, but is very different from both these things.  
I very well know St. Austin affirms, that Pain is an a version which the Soul conceives, because the Body is not disposed after such a manner as it wishes; and that he often confounds Delectation with Charity, Pleasure with Joy, Pain with Sorrow, Pleasure and Joy with Love, Pain and Sorrow with Aversion or Hatred. But 'tis very probable that this Holy Doctor spoke all this according to the general Language amongst the common sort of Men, who confound the greatest part of those things which pass within them at the same time: Or it may be he had not examined these things after a very exact and Philosophical manner. However I believe I may and aught to say, that it appeared requisite to me, exactly to distinguish these things, if we would clearly and without equivocation explain many Questions which St. Austin has treated on: For even those who have contrary Opinions amongst themselves, have been accustomed to maintain them from the Authority of this great Man, because of the different Sense his Expressions may be taken in; which is not always exact enough to reconcile such Persons, who perhaps have more mind to dispute than agree.   

A N EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book.  
Concerning the Efficacy attributed to Second Causes.  
EVer since the Fall, the Mind of Man is continually employed upon External Objects; he even forgets himself, and him who penetrates and inlightens him; and suffers himself after such a manner to be seduced by his own and the Bodies about him, that he expects in them to find his Perfection and Happiness. He who alone is capable of acting in it, now hides himself from our Eyes; nor are his Operations performed after a sensible manner; and although he produces and preserves all Being's, the Mind which eagerly seeks the Cause of all things, finds much difficulty to discover him, although it meets with him every moment. Some Philosophers have chose rather to imagine a Nature and certain Faculties as the Causes of those Effects we call Natural, than to give God all the Honour which is due to his Power. And although they have no Proof, nor so much as a clear Idea of this Nature and these Faculties, as I hope I have shown, they choose rather to speak without knowing what they say, and to respect a Power purely imaginary, than to make any endeavour to discover the hand of him who performs whatever is done in all things.  
I cannot forbear believing that one of the most deplorable consequences of Original Sin, is our having no more gust nor sensation for God; or that we perceive him not, or meet him but with a kind of horror and fright. We ought to acknowledge God in all things; be sensible of his Strength and Power in all Natural Effects; admire his Wisdom in the marvellous Order of the Creatures; and in a word, adore, fear, and love only him in all his Works. But there is now a secret opposition between Man and God; Man finding himself a Sinner hides himself; flies the Light; is apprehensive of meeting God; and chooses rather to imagine in the Bodies which are about him, a Power or blind Nature, which he can make familiar to himself, than to meet there the terrible Power of a Holy and Just God, who knows and performs all things.  
I confess there are many persons, who by a different Principle than that of the Heathen Philosophers, pursue their Opinion about Nature and Second Causes. But I hope we shall discover by the consequence of this Discourse, that they are of this Opinion only through a received prejudice, which it is almost impossible to deliver themselves from, without the assistance that may be drawn from the Principles of a Philosophy which has not always been sufficiently known: For it is probably this which has hindered them from declaring in favour of an Opinion, which I have thought my Duty to maintain.  
There are many Reasons which keep me from ascribing to Second or Natural Causes, a strength, power, or efficacy to produce any thing whatever; but the chief is, because I cannot even conceive this Opinion: What endeavours soever I make to comprehend it, I cannot find in myself an Idea which represents to me, what this Strength or Power can be, which they attribute to Creatures: And I believe that I should not make a rash Judgement, if I affirm that those who maintain that Creatures have in themselves this Strength and Power, advance what they do not clearly conceive. For if the Heathen Philosophers had a clear conception that Second Causes have a true Power to act and produce their like; being a Man as well as they, and with them partaking of the sovereign Reason, I might probably discover the Idea which represented the Power to them: but what efforts soever I make, I can find no Strength, Efficacy or Power, but in the Will of the infinitely perfect Being.  
Moreover, when I think of the different Opinions of Philosophers upon this Subject, I cannot doubt of what I advance. For if they clearly saw what this Power of the Creatures is, or what there is in them that is really powerful, they would not differ in their Opinion about it. When persons cannot agree, and having no interested Reason which hinders them from it, 'tis a certain mark they have no clear Idea of what they say, and that they understand not one another: chief if they dispute upon such Subjects as are not complext, or difficult to be discussed; like this Question before us: For we should find no hard matter to resolve it, if persons had but a clear Idea of a Created Power. These are therefore some of their Opinions, whereby we may see how little they agree amongst themselves.  

For the most extraordinary of these Opinions, see Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 18. Sect. 2. Assert, 2, 3. Scot in 4. sent. dist. 12.1. D. 37.2. D. 17. Paludan. in 4. sent. D. 12. Q. 1. Art. 1. Peter. 8. Phys. Ch. 3. Conimb. upon Aristotle's Phys. and many others which Suarez citys.  Some Philosophers here affirmed that Second Causes act by their Matter, Figure, and Motion; and these in one Sense are in the right: Others by a substantial Form: Many by Accidents or Qualities: Some by Matter and Form: Others by Form and Accidents: And some again by certain Virtues or distinct Faculties from all this. There are others amongst them who maintain, that Substantial Forms produce Forms, and Accidental Forms, Accidents: Others, that Forms produce both Forms and Accidents: And some again, that Accidents alone are capable of producing Accidents and Forms too. 
See the Metaph. of Fonseca, qu. 13. sect. 3. That of Socin. and Javell. upon the same Question.  But we must not imagine that those, for instance, who say, that Accidents can produce Forms by virtue of what they have received from the Form they are joined to, mean the same thing. Some of them will have it, that these Accidents themselves are only the Power or Virtue of the Substantial Form: Others, that they receive into themselves the influence of the Form, and so act only by virtue of it: And in fine, some of them will only have them to be Instrumental Causes. But these last are not perfectly agreed amongst themselves, either what must be understood by Instrumental Cause, or what is the virtue they receive from the Principal Cause. The Philosophers don't so much as agree upon the action whereby Second Causes produce their Effects. Some amongst them pretend that Causality ought not to be produced, since that produces itself: Others will have it, that they act truly by their own action, but find great difficulties in explaining precisely what this action is; and there are about this so many different Opinions, that I shall omit the reciting them.  
Here is a great variety of different Sentiments, although I have not related those of the Ancient Philosophers, or of such as were born in very remote Countries. But we have reason enough to judge that they are not perfectly agreed amongst themselves upon the Subject of Second Causes, no more than those we have already mentioned. Avicen. for instance, thought Corporeal Substances could produce nothing but Accidents. And this is his Hypothesis, as Ruvio relates it. He supposed that God immediately produced a most perfect Spiritual Substance, and that this produced another less perfect; and that a third; and so on to the last, which produced all Corporeal Substances; and these Corporeal Substances, Accidents. But Avicembrom who could not apprehend how Corporeal Substances, 
Ruvio, l. 2. ph. tract. 4. qu. 2.  which cannot penetrate one another, should be capable of Alteration, would have it that there were Spirits which were capable of acting on Bodies, because they only could penetrate them. For these Gentlemen not admitting a Void, nor the Atoms of Democritus, and the Subtle Matter of D' Cartes was unknown to them, they could not think with Gassendus and the Cartesians, That there were Bodies small enough to enter into the Pores of those which appeared the most Hard and Solid.  
It seems to me, that this diversity of Opinions gives us a Right to judge, That Men often spoke such Things as they did not understand; and that the Power of the Creatures being a pure Fiction of the Mind, of which we have no Natural Idea, each Person imagined it what he pleased.  
It is true, in all Ages this Power was acknowledged as Real and True by most Men: But it is as certain, it was without any Proof; I do not say Demonstration; but even without such a Proof as was able to make any impression upon an Attentive Mind. For the Confused Arguments which are maintained only upon the deceitful Testimony of the Senses and Imagination, ought not to be received by those who make use of their Reason.  
Aristotle, speaking of what they call Nature, says, It is ridiculous to endeavour to prove, That Natural Bodies have an Inward Principle of their own Motion and Rest: Because, says he, it is self-evident. He doubts not also, but a Bowl which hits another, has power to put it in motion. It appears so to the Eyes, and that's enough for him; for he commonly follows the Testimony of the Senses, and rarely that of Reason, never troubling himself whether it be intelligible or not.  
Those who oppose the Opinion of some Divines that have writ against Second Causes, say with Aristotle, That the Senses convince us of their Efficacy: This is their First and Principal Proof. It is evident, say they, 
See Fonseca Ruvio, Suarez, and the rest already cited.  that Fire burns, the Sun shines, Water cools, and he must be a Fool that doubts it. The Authors of the contrary Opinion, says the Great Averrors, had their, Brains disturbed. We must (say almost all the Peripatetics) use Sensible Proofs to convince those who deny this Efficacy, and so oblige them to confess, They may be moved and hurt by Second Causes: It is the Judgement which Aristotle has already pronounced against them, and it ought to be executed.  
But this pretended Demonstration cannot but produce pity, 
L. of his Topi. ch. 1.  since it discovers the Weakness of the Humane Mind, and that even Philosophers themselves are infinitely more Sensible than Rational. It discovers, that those who glory in the Enquiry after Truth, do not themselves know who they ought to consult to learn any thing of it: Whether 'tis the Sovereign Reason which never deceives them, but always speaks Things as they are in themselves; or the Body which speaks only out of interest, and in relation either to the preservation or conveniency of Life. For in fine, What Prejudices will not be justified if we take the Senses for Judges, to whom almost all Prejudices own their birth? As I have already shown in the Search after Truth.  
When I see one Bowl hit another, my Eyes tell me, or seem to tell me, that it is truly the Cause of the Motion it impresses: For the true Cause which moves Bodies does not appear to my Eyes. By'r when I ask my Reason, I see evidently that Bodies cannot move themselves, and their Moving power depending only upon the Will of God, which successively preserves them in different places, they cannot communicate a power which they have not, nor could communicate if they had it. For 'tis plain, there is a Wisdom requisite, and one that is infinite too to regulate the Communication of Motions with the exactness, proportion, and uniformity that we see. A Body moved cannot know the infinite number of Bodies it meets at every moment: It is farther clear, That although we should even suppose knowledge in it, it could not have enough to regulate, in the instant of the Shock, the distribution of the Moving power itself is carried with.  
If I open but my Eyes, it appears plain to me that the Sun is very gloriously bright, and seems not only to be visible itself, but makes all the World so too: 'Tis that which covers the Earth with Flowers and Fruits, which gives Life to Animals, and which by its Heat penetrates into the very Bowels of the Earth, and produces Stones, Marbles, and Metals there. But when I consult Reason, I see nothing of all this; and if I consult it faithfully, I clearly discover that my Senses seduce me, and that it is God who performs all in all Things. For knowing, that whatever changes happen in the Body, they have no other principle but the different communication of Motion, which occur in visible or invisible Bodies; I see that it is God who does all Things, since it is his Will which Causes, and his Wisdom which Regulates all these Communications.  
I suppose that Local Motion is the principle of Generations, Corruptions, Alterations, and generally of all the Changes which happen in the Body; which is an Opinion that is now sufficiently received amongst the Learned. But whatever Opinion they have about it signifies little; for it seems much more easy to conceive, that a Body drives another when it meets it, than to apprehend, how Fire produces Heat and Light, and draw from the power of Matter a Substance which was not there before. And if it be necessary to acknowledge, That God is the True Cause of the different Communications of Motions, by a much stronger Reason we ought to conclude, That none but he can Create, and Annihilate, Real Qualities, and Substantial Forms. I say, Create, and Annihilate, because at least it seems as difficult to me, to draw from Matter a Substance which was not in it, or to cause it to re-enter again, as to Create or Annihilate it. But I shall not stand upon Terms; I only make use of them because there is no other, which I know of, that clearly, and without Equivocation, express the Changes which the Philosophers suppose every Moment to happen through the power of Second Causes.  
I had some difficulty here, to relate the other Proofs which they commonly give for the Power and Efficacy of Natural Causes; for they appear so weak to those who are able to resist Prejudices, and prefer their Reason to their Senses, that it does not seem likely that reasonable Men should be persuaded by them. Yet I will produce and Answer them, since there are many Philosophers who make use of them.  

The first Proof.  
If Second Causes do effect nothing, we could not (says Suarez, 
In his Metaph. Disp. 18. Sect. 1. Assert. 1. In Metaph. Arist. qu. 7. Sect. 2.  Fonseca and some others) distinguish Animate from Inanimate Things; for neither of them would have an inward principle of their Actions.  
ANSWER.  
I Answer, That Men would have the same Sensible Proofs that have convinced them of the distinction they put between Animate and Inanimate Things. They would always see Animals perform Certain Actions, as Eating, Growing, Crying, Running, Leaping, etc. Nor would they observe any thing like this in Stones: And it is this only which makes the common Philosophers believe, that Beasts live, and Stones do not; for it must not be imagined, that they know by a clear and distinct View of the Mind what the Life of a Dog is. It is their Senses which regulate their Decisions upon this Question.  
If it were necessary, I could here prove, That the Principal of a Dog's Life differs very little, if at all, from that of the Motion of a Watch. For the Life of Bodies, whatever they be, can only consist in the motion of their parts; and it is not difficult to judge, that the same Subtle Matter which in a Dog causes the Fermentation of the Blood and Animal Spirits, and is the principle of his Life, is not more perfect than that which gives Motion to the Springs of a Watch, or causes Gravitation in the Weights of a Clock, which is the principle of their Life, or (to speak as others do) of their Motion.  
The Peripatetics ought to give to those whom they style Cartesians, a clear Idea of what they call, The Life of Beasts; Corporeal Soul, Body, which perceives, desires, sees, feels, wills, and afterwards we will clearly resolve their difficulties, if they continue to propose them.   

The Second Proof.  
We could not discover the Differences nor Powers of the Elements: So that Fire might cool as Water does; and the Nature of nothing would be settled and fixed.  
ANSWER.  
I Answer, That Nature continuing as it is; that is, whilst the Laws of the communication of Motions remain constantly the same; it is a contradiction that Fire should not burn; or not separate the parts of certain Bodies. Fire cannot cool like Water, except it becomes Water: For Fire being only fuel, whose parts have been agitated with a violent Motion, by an invisible Matter which incompasses them, as is easy to be demonstrated; it is impossible these parts should not communicate some of their Motion to the Bodies which they meet. Now as these Laws are constant; the Nature of Fire, its virtues and qualities cannot change. But this Nature and these Virtues are only consequences of the general and efficacious Will of God, who does all in all things; as we learn from the Scripture. So that the study of Nature is false and vain in every respect, when we seek for any other true Causes than the Will of the ALMIGHTY.  
I own we must not have recourse to God or the Universal Cause, when we inquire into the reason of particular Effects. For we should make ourselves ridiculous if, for instance, we said that 'twas God who dries the ways, or freezes the Water in Rivers. We must say that the Air dries the Earth, because it agitates and sucks up the Water which is tempered with it. And that the Air or subtle Matter freezes Rivers in Winter; because it does not then communicate motion enough to the parts of which the Water is composed. In a word, we must if we can, give the Natural and Particular Cause of the Effects produced. But as the action of these Causes consist only in the Moving Power which acts them, and that this Moving Power is nothing else but the Will of God who creates them, or successively preserves them in different places, we must not say that they have in themselves a Strength or Power to produce any Effects. And when in Reasoning we are at last come to a general Effect whose Cause we seek, 'twould be a very ill way of Philosophising, to imagine any other besides the general one. And to feign a Certain Nature, a First Movable, an Universal Soul, or some such like Chimaera, of which we have no clear and distinct Idea, would be to argue like the Heathen Philosophers. For instance: When we are asked whence it comes that some Bodies are in Motion; or how the Air when agitated communicates its Motion to the Water; or rather from whence it proceeds that Bodies impel one another: As Motion and its communication is a general Effect whereupon all others depend; it is necessary, I dont say to be a good Christian, but to be a Philosopher, to recur to God who is the Universal Cause; since 'tis his Will which is the Moving Power of Bodies, and which also regulates the communication of their Motions. If he had Willed there should be no new production in the World, he would not have put the parts of it in Motion: And if he should hereafter Will the incorruptibility of any of the Being's he has Created, he would cease to Will certain communications of Motions in respect to these Being's.   

The Third Proof.  
All Labour would be useless; 'twould be un necessary to water, and to give certain preparatory dispositions to Bodies, to fit them for what we desire of them: For God has no need of preparing the subjects upon which he acts.  
ANSWER.  

Suarez in the same place.  To which I Reply, That God can absolutely do what he pleases, without finding any dispositions in the subjects he works upon: But he cannot do it without a Miracle, or by Natural ways; that is, according to the general Laws of the communication of the Motions he has established, and according to which he generally acts. God never multiplies his Wills without Reason, but always acts by the most simple ways; and therefore he makes use of the meeting of Bodies in giving them Motion; not as their shock is absolutely necessary to move them, as our Senses tell us; but because that being the occasion of the communication of Motion, there needs only a few Natural Laws to produce all the admirable Effects that we see: For by this means we can reduce all the Laws of the communication of Motion to one only, which is, That Bodies which shock each other, being looked upon but as one in the moment of their contact, or shock, the Moving Power is at their separation, divided between them according to the proportion of their magnitude. But as concuring Bodies are encompassed with an infinite number of other Bodies, which act upon them by virtue and efficacy of this Law; how constant and uniform soever it may be, it produces an infinite number of different communications, because it acts upon infinite Bodies, which all relate to one another.  

See the last Chap. of the Search after Truth.  It is necessary to water a Plant to make it grow; because according to the Laws of the communication of Motions, there is scarce any other but watery Particles, which by their Motion and Figure, can insinuate themselves, and enter the Fibres of the Plants; and by various uniting themselves together, take the Figure necessary for their Nourishment. The subtle matter which the Sun continually diffuses, may by agitating the Water draw it up into the Plants; but it has not Motion enough to raise gross Particles of Earth. However the Earth, and even the Air, are necessary to the growth of Plants; The Earth to preserve the Water at their Root; and the Air to excite a moderate fermentation in the same Water, But the action of the Sun, Air, and Water, consist only in the Motion of their parts; and to speak properly, none but God can act. For as I have just said, there is only he, who by the efficacy of his Will, and infinite extent of his Knowledge, can produce and regulate the infinite communications or Motions which are made every moment, and according to an infinite exact and regular proportion.   

The Fourth Proof.  
Can God oppose or resist himself? Bodies meet, shock, and resist one another; therefore God acts not in them, except by his concurrence: For if he only produced and preserved Motion in Bodies, he would divert them before their meeting, since he knows very well that they are impenetrable. Why should Bodies be impelled to be thrown back again; or made to advance that they may recoil? Or wherefore are useless Motions produced and preserved? Is it not extravagant to say, that God fights against himself, and destroys his own works, when a Bull opposes a Lion, or a Wolf devours a Sheep, and a Sheep eats the Grass which he gave growth to? Therefore there are Second Causes.  
ANSWER.  
Then Second Causes do every thing, and God does nothing at all: For God cannot act against himself; and to concur is to act. Concurring to contrary actions, is giving contrary concourses, and consequently a performing contrary actions. To concur with the action of the Creatures which resist one another, is to act against himself; and to concur to useless Motions is to act unusefully: Now God does nothing in vain; he performs no actions contrary to one another: Therefore he concurs not in the action of the Creatures, who often destroy one another, and make useless actions and motions. Hither 'tis that this Proof of Second Causes conducts us; but let us examine what Reason teaches us about it.  
God does all in every thing, and nothing resists him. He performs all things; since 'tis by his Wills that all Motions are produced and regulated; and nothing resists him, because whatever he wills is effected. And thus it ought to be conceived. He having resolved to produce by the most simple ways, as the most conformable to order, this infinite variety of Creatures that we admire, he determined Bodies to move in a right line, because this line is the most simple. But Bodies being impenetrable, and their Motions inclining to opposite lines, or such as intersect, they must necessarily meet one another, and consequently cease to move in the same manner. God foresaw this; and nevertheless positively willed the meeting or opposition of Bodies; not because he was pleased to fight against himself, but because he designed to make use of this shocking of Bodies, as an occasion to establish the general Law of the communication of Motions, by which he foresaw he might produce an infinite number of admirable Effects. For I am persuaded that these two Natural Laws which are the most simple of all: Viz. That all Motion inclines to put itself in a right Line: And That in the time of concurrence, Motions are communicated in proportion to the magnitude of the Bodies which are shockt; are sufficient to produce the World as we see it at this day; I mean, the Heavens, the Stars, the Planets, Comets, Earth and Water, Air and Fire. In a word, the Elements, and all inorganized or inanimate Bodies: For organised Bodies depend upon many other Natural Laws which are wholly unknown to us. It may be also that animate Bodies are not form like others, by a certain number of Natural Laws: For 'tis very probable, they were all form at the Creation of the World; and that by time they only received that growth which was necessary to make them visible to our eyes. Let it be how it will, 'tis certain they receive this growth from the general Laws of Nature, according to which all other Bodies are form; upon which account their growth is not always regular.  
I say then, that God by the first Natural Law, positively willed, and consequently produced the Collision of Bodies; and that he afterwards made use of it as an occasion to establish the second Natural Law, which regulates the communication of Motions; and that thus the actual shock is a Natural or Occasional Cause of the actual communication of Motions.  
If we consider this well, it will be visibly discovered that nothing could be better ordered. But supposing God had not ordained it thus; and that he had diverted Bodies when ready to hit each other, as if there were a void to receive them. First, Bodies would not then have been subject to this continual vicissitude, which causes the Beauty of the Universe; for the generation of certain Bodies, is only produced by the corruption of some others: and 'tis the contrariety of their Motions which produces their variety. Nor Secondly, Would God then act by the most simple ways: For that Bodies ready to shock each other, might continue their Motion without striking, it would be necessary that they should variously describe an infinite number of Curve-Lines; and consequently we must admit different Wills in God to determine their Motions. Lastly, If there was no uniformity in the action of Natural Bodies, and if their Motion was not performed in a right Line, there would be no certain Principle for us to Reason upon in Natural Philosophy, nor to guide us in many Actions of our Lives.  
'Tis no disorder for Lions to eat Wolves; Wolves, Sheep; and Sheep, the Grass which God has taken so much care of, that he has given it all things necessary for its own preservation, and also a Seed to preserve its Kind. Yet this proves Second Causes no more, than the Plurality of Causes, or contrary Principles of Good and Evil, which the Manichees invented to give a Reason for these Effects. But 'tis a certain Mark of the Wisdom, Greatness, and Magnificence of God; for he does nothing unbecoming an Infinite Wisdom, and performs all things with such a Munificence as sufficiently shows his Power and Greatness. Whatever is destroyed is again repaired by the same Law which destroyed it; so great is the Wisdom, Power, and Fruitfulness of this Law. God does not prevent the destruction of Being's by a New Will; not only because the first is sufficient to repair them, but chief because his Wills are much more valuable than the reparation of these Being's. They are of much more value than all they produce. And if God made this visible World, although in itself unworthy of the action whereby it was produced, 'twas for ends unknown to Philosophers, and to Honour himself in JESUS CHRIST, with such an Honour as the Creatures are uncapable of giving him.  
When a House by its fall crushes a good Man to death, a greater Evil happens than when one Beast devours another; or when one Body is forced to give way by the shock it receives at the meeting of another: But God multiplies not his Wills to redress such disorders, real or apparent, as are necessary consequences of Natural Laws: He ought neither to correct nor change these Laws, although they should sometimes produce Monsters. He must not confound the order and simplicity of his ways. He ought to neglect inconsiderable things: I mean, he should not have particular Wills to produce Effects of no value, or unworthy the action of him who produces them. God works Miracles only when the Order he always follows requires it; and this Order wills that he should act by the most simple ways; and that there should be no exceptions in his Wills, but when 'tis absolutely necessary to his designs; or on certain occasions which are wholly unknown to us. For although we are all united to the Order or Wisdom of God, we know not all the Rules of it. We see in it what we ought to do; but comprehend not by it what God ought to Will, nor must we be too solicitous about it.  
We have a great instance of what I have been saying, in the damnation of an infinite number of persons that God has permitted to perish in times of Ignorance. God is infinitely good; loves all his works; would have all Men be saved, and come to this knowledge of the Truth; for he has Created them to enjoy him: And yet the greatest number are damned. They live and die in blindness, and will continue in it to all Eternity. And does not this proceed from Gods acting by the most simple ways, and from his following Order? We have shown that according to Order, God ought not by preingaging Pleasures to have prevented the Will of the First Man; although his Fall caused the disorder of Nature. 
See the Explanation of the fourth Chapter of the Second Part: Of Method.  It was requisite that all Men should descend from one; not only because this is the most simple way, but for Reasons too Theological and abstracted to be here explained. 
See also the First Explanation of the Fifth Chapter.  In fine, We ought to believe that this is conformable to the Order which God follows, and the Wisdom he always consults in the intention and execution of his designs. The Sin of the first Man has produced an infinite number of Evils, 'tis true; but certainly Order required that God should permit it, and that he should place Man in an estate wherein he was capable of sinning.  
God is willing to repair his work; but rarely gives those victorious Graces which conquers the Malice of the greatest Sinners. He often gives Graces that are useless to the Conversion of those who receive them; although in respect to them he foresees their unserviceableness, he sometimes bestows them in great number, which nevertheless produces but little Effect. Why all these Ambages and indirect ways? Would it not have been sufficient for him to have willed the Conversion of a Sinner, to have effected it after an efficacious and invincible manner? Is it not plain that 'tis because he acts by the most simple ways, and that Order requires it, although we do not always see it. For God can only act according to Order and Wisdom, although his Order and Wisdom are often impenetrable abysses to the Mind of Man. There are certain very simple Laws in the Order of Grace; consonant to which God commonly acts: For this Order has its Rules as well as that of Narure, although we know them not; as we see in the Communication of Motions. Let us only follow the Counsel given us in the Holy Gospel, by him who perfectly knew the Laws of Grace.  
I say this to quiet the unjust Complaints of Sinners, who despise the Advice given them by JESUS CHRIST, and who charge God with their Malice and Disorders. They would have him to perform Miracles in their Favour; and dispense with the common Laws of Grace. They live in Pleasure, seek after Honour, and continually renew those Wounds which sensible Objects have made in their Brain, and often add more to them; and yet would have God cure them by a Miracle: Like to wounded Men, who in the excess of their Pain rend their , tear up their Wounds, and then at the sight of approaching Death, complain of the Cruelty of their Surgeons. They would have God save them; because say they, he is Good, Wise and Powerful; and need but Will it, and we are Happy. He ought not surely to have made us to Damn us. But they ought to know that God has done all that could be done by Order and Wisdom, which he consults. We should not believe that he leaves us, since he has given us his own Son to be our Mediator and Sacrifice. Yes, God would have us all saved: But by such ways as we ought carefully to study, and exactly to follow. He consults not our Passions in the execution of these designs; but only his Wisdom, and follows Order: And Order requires us to imitate JESUS CHRIST, and to follow his Counsel, that we may be sanctified and saved. But if God has not predestinated all Men to be conformable to the Image of his Son, who is the Model and Exemplar; 'tis because in this he acts by the most simple ways in relation to his designs, which tend all to his Glory: And God is an Universal Cause, and ought not to act like Particular Causes, which have particular wills for whatever they do. 'Tis also because his Wisdom, which in this respect is an Abyss to our Understandings, wills it should be so. In fine, 'Tis because this conduct is more worthy of God, than any other which would be more favourable to Reprobates: For even the Order which condemns them is as worthy of our Adorations, as that whereby the Elect are sanctified and saved. And nothing but our Ignorance of Order, and our Self-love, could make us condemn such a Conduct as Angels and Saints will eternally admire. But let us return to the Proofs of the Efficacy of Second Causes.   

The Fifth Proof.  
If Bodies had not a certain Nature or Power to act, and if God did all things, there would be nothing but what was Supernatural in the most Common Effects. The distinction of Natural and Supernatural, which is so well received in the World, and established by the universal consent of all the Learned, would be Chimerical and Extravagant.  
ANSWER  
I Answer, That this distinction is as ridiculous in the Mouth of Aristotle; for the Nature that this Philosopher has established is a pure Chimaera. I say, that this distinction is not clear in the mouth of the Vulgar, who judge of things by the impression they make upon their Senses: For they know not precisely what they mean, when they say, that Fire burns by its own Nature. I confess this distinction may pass from the Mouth of Divines; if by Natural Effects they mean those which are consequences of General Laws that God has established for the general production and preservation of all things; and that Supernatural Effects are such as depend not upon these Laws. In this sense this distinction is true. But the Philosophy of Aristotle, joined to the impression of the Senses, I think makes it dangerous; because this distinction may turn those from God, who have too much respect for the Opinions of this wretched Philosopher; or such as consult their Senses instead of entering within themselves, to seek the Truth there. So that we ought not to make use of this distinction without explaining it. St. Austin having used the word Fortune, 
L. 1. de Retract. 1 Cor. 10.19.  retracted it, although there were few persons who could be deceived by it. St. Paul speaking of Meats offered to Idols, tells us, That Idols are Nothing. If the Nature of the Heathen Philosophy is a Chimaera, a Nothing, Men ought to be advertized of it; for there are many Men who will be deceived by it. And more than we suppose, who inconsiderately attribute the Works of God to it; who are taken up with this Idol, or Fiction of Man's Mind, and render it Honours, which are only due to the Divinity. They are willing that God should be the Author of Miracles, and certain extraordinary Effects, which in one sense are unworthy of his Greatness and Wisdom; and they refer to the Power of their imaginary Nature, those constant and regulated Effects, that Wise Men only know how to admire. They likewise pretend that this wonderful disposition, which all living Bodies have to preserve themselves, and beget their like, is a production of Nature: For according to these Philosophers, 'tis the Sun and Moon which begets a Man.  
We may further distinguish Supernatural from Natural Order, in many respects. For we may say, that the Supernatural refers to future good; that it is established in consideration of the Merits of JESUS CHRIST; that it is the first and chief of all God's designs; and many other things sufficient to preserve a distinction, which they are vainly apprehensive should fall to the ground.   

The Sixth Proof.  
The Chief Proof that Philosophers bring to prove the Efficacy of Second Causes, is deducted from the Will and Liberty of Man. Man wills, and determines of himself, and to will and determine is to act. It is certain, it is Man who commits sin; God is no more the Author of it, than he is of Concupiscence and Error. Therefore Man acts.  
ANSWER.  
In many places of the Search after Truth I have sufficiently explained what the Will and Liberty of Man is, and principally in the First Chapter of the First Book, and in the First Explanation upon that Chapter: It is useless to repeat it here. I confess that Man wills and determines of himself; because God makes him will, and continually inclines him towards Good, and gives him all the Ideas and Sensations which determine him. I also acknowledge, that Man of himself commits sin: But I deny, that in that he does any thing; for Sin, Error, and even Concupiscence are nothing. Which Point I have sufficiently cleared in the First Explanation.  
Man wills, but his Determinations are weak in themselves, they produce nothing, nor hinder God from doing all Things; for it is even he who causes our Wills in us, by the impression he gives us towards God: Man of himself is only capable of Error and Sin, which are nothing.  
There is a great deal of difference between our Minds and the Bodies which are about us: Our Mind in one sense wills, 
Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium & peccatum. Conc. Araus. 2. Can. 22.  acts, and determines; I grant it. Of which we are convinced by the inward sensation we have of ourselves. To deny our Liberty, would be to take from us future rewards and punishments; for without Liberty there is neither good nor bad Actions: So that then Religion would be an Illusion and a Fancy. But that Bodies have any power to Act, is what we do not clearly see, but appears incomprehensible; and is also what we deny when we reject Second Causes.  
Even the Mind does not act so much as we imagine. I know that I Will, and Will freely; I have no reason to doubt of it, which is stronger than that inward sensation I have of myself. I likewise don't deny this. But I deny that my Will is the True Cause of the Motion of my Arm, the Ideas of my Mind, and other Things which attend my Determinations; for I see no relation between Things which differ so much: On the contrary, I clearly discover that there can be no relation between the Will I have to move my Arm, 
According to the sense discussed in the Chapter upon which this Explanation is made.  and between the Agitation of some little Bodies of which I neither know the Motion nor Figure; which make choice of certain Nervous passages amongst a Million of others I know not, to cause that Motion in me which I wish, by an infinite Number of Motions I wish not. I deny that my Will produces my Ideas in me; for I do not so much as see how it could produce them: For since my Will cannot Act or Will without knowing, it supposes my Ideas, but does not make them. Nay, I do not so much as precisely know what an Idea is. I cannot tell whether they are produced out of nothing, or become nothing again as soon as we cease to behold them. I speak according to the Opinion of some persons.  
I produce, they will tell me, my Ideas by the Faculty God hath given me of Thinking. And move my Arm because of the Union God has placed between my Mind and Body. But Faculty and Union are Logical Terms; rambling and indeterminate Words. There is no Being whatever, nor Manner of Being, which is either a Faculty or an Union: Therefore these Terms must be explained. If they will say, That the Union of my Mind with my Body consists in God's Willing, that when I wish my Arm should be moved, the Animal Spirits are then dispersed into the Muscles of it, to move it according to my desire. I clearly understand this Explanation, and receive it: But it is the same Thing which I maintain. For if my Will determine that of God, it is evident my Arm will be moved, not by my Will which is impotent in itself, but by that of Gods which can never fail of its effect.  

I always mean a true and efficacious power.  But if it be said, That the Union of my Mind with my Body consists in Gods having given me the power to move my Arm, as he has given my Body the power of feeling pleasure and pain, that I might be assiduous about my Body, and interest myself in its preservation; Certainly by this we should suppose the Matter in dispute, and make a Circle on't. We have no clear Idea of this power that the Soul has over the Body, nor of that the Body has over the Soul: Nor very well know what we say when we positively affirm it. Prejudice first gave rise to this Opinion; we believed it from Infants, as soon as we were capable of sensation: But the Understanding, Reason, and Reflection have no share in it, as sufficiently appears by what I have said in the Search after Truth.  
But they will say, I know by the inward sensation of my Action that I truly have this power: So that I shall not be deceived in believing it. To which I Answer, When we move our Arm, we have an inward sensation of the Actual Will whereby we move it, and are not mistaken when we believe we have this Will. And further, We have an inward sensation of a certain Effort which accompanies this Will; and we ought likewise to believe, that we make this Effort. In short, I mean that we have an inward sensation that the Arm is moved in the very instant of the Effort: Which supposed, I consent to what is said, That the Motion of the Arm is performed in the same instant we feel this Endeavour; or that we have a practical Will to move it. 
It appears evident to me, that the mind does not so much as know by inward sensation, or Conscience, the Motion of the Arm which it animates. It knows by Conscience only what it feels or thinks. We know the sense we have of the Motion of our Arm by inward Sensation or Conscience: But Conscience does not inform us of the Motion of our Arm, or the pain we suffer in it, any more than the Colours we see upon Objects.: Or if this will not be granted, I say that inward sensation is not infallible; for Error is often found in Complex Sensation, as has been showed in the First Book of the Search after Truth.  But I deny that this Effort, which is only a Modification or Sensation of the Soul, given us to make us apprehend our Weakness, and which affords us but an obscure and weak discovery of our power, should be capable of moving or determining the Animal Spirits. I deny that there is any relation between our Thoughts and the Motions of Matter; or that the Soul has the least knowledge of the Animal Spirits it makes use of to move the Body it Animates. In fine, although the Soul should exactly know the Animal Spirits, and should be capable of Moving them, or determining their Motion; I deny that (with all this advantage) it could be capable of making choice of those Nervous Canals of which she is wholly ignorant, so as to impel the Spirits into them, that thereby the Body might be moved with that quickness, exactness, and strength, as we observe in those who are least acquainted with the Structure of their Bodies.  
For even supposing our Wills were truly the Moving power of Bodies, (although it appears incomprehensible) how could we conceive that the Soul could move the Body? The Arm, (for Instance) is only moved by means of the dilatation or contraction of some of the Muscles which compose it. And that the Motion which the Soul impresses on the Spirits that are in the Brain, may be communicated to those in the Nerves, and these to others which are in the Muscles of the Arms, it's requisite that the Determinations of the Soul should be multiplied or changed in proportion to the almost infinite Occurrences, or Shocks, which would be made by the little Bodies which constitute the Spirits. But this cannot be conceived without admitting in the Soul an infinite number of Wills at the least Motion of the Body; since to move it, an infinite number of communications of Motions are necessary: For the Soul being but a particular Cause, and which cannot exactly know either the greatness, or number, of an infinite Variety of little Bodies which mutually strike each other when the Spirits are dispersed into the Muscles, it could neither establish a general Law for the communication of the Motions of these Spirits, nor exactly follow it if it were established. So that it is plain, the Soul could not move its Arm, although it had the power of determining the Motion of the Animal Spirits. These Things are too clear for us to stand any longer upon them.  
It is the same thing with our Faculty of Thinking. By inward sensation we know that we would think on something and make some effort to that end; and that in the instant of our Desire and Endeavour the Idea of this Thing presents itself to the Mind. But we do not discover by inward sensation, that our Will or Endeavour produces our Idea; nor does Reason tell us it can do it. It is through Prejudice that we are persuaded that our Desire's cause our Ideas; whilst we prove an hundred times a day, that the latter follows or attends the former. As God and his Operations have nothing sensible in them, and as we do not feel any thing else but our Desires which precede the presence of our Ideas; we think there can be no other Cause of them. But if we observe the Matter more closely, we shall discover we have no power in ourselves to produce them: For neither Reason, nor the inward sensation we have of ourselves give us any information of it.  
I do not think I am obliged to relate all the other Proofs that are made use of by these Defenders of the Efficacy of Second Causes; because they appear so weak, that it might be imagined I only intended to render them ridiculous, and if I should answer them seriously I should become ridiculous myself. An Author (for Instance) asserts very seriously, in favour of his Opinion, That Created Being's are True, Material, Formal, Final Causes; and why then should they not also be Efficient or Efficacious Causes? I believe I should not very well satisfy the World, if in Answer to the Demand of this Author, I should stay to explain so gross an Equivocation; and show the difference between an Efficacious Cause, and that which some Philosophers have been pleased to call a Material one. So that I shall omit some of the like Proofs, to come to those they have taken from the Holy Scripture.   

The Seventh Proof.  
Those who maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes, commonly bring the following passages to support their Opinion: Let the Earth bring forth Grass: 
Gen. 1.  Let the Waters bring forth the moving Creatures that hath life, and Fowl that may fly, etc. Therefore the Earth and the Water have from the Word of God, received Power to produce Plants and Animals. After which God commands the Fowls and the Fish to multiply: Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the Waters in the Seas, and let Fowl multiply in the Earth. Therefore he has given them Power to beget their like.  
JESUS CHRIST, in the Fourth Chapter of St. Mark, says, That the Seed which falls on good ground, shall bring forth an hundred fold; and that the Earth bringeth forth fruits of herself; first the blade, than the ear, and afterwards the full corn. Lastly, it is also written in the Book of Wisdom, That the Fire had as it were forgotten the Power it had of burning, in favour of the People of God. 'Tis therefore confirmed by the Old and New Testament, that Second Causes have a Power to act.  
ANSWER.  
I Answer, That in the Holy Scripture there is also many passages which attribute to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes: of which these are some: Ego sum Dominus faciens OMNIA, extendens Coelos SOLUS, stabiliens terram, & NULLUS mecum, Isa. 44.24. Manus tuae fecerunt me, & plasmaverunt me TOTUM in circuitu, Job 10.8. Nescio qualiter in utero meo apparuistis singulorum membra, NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI, sed enim Mundi Creator qui hominis formavit nativitatem, etc. Mac. l. 2. c. 7.22, 23. Cum ipse DEUS dat omnibus vitam, inspirationem, & omnia, Acts 17.25. Producens foenum jumentis & herbam servituti hominum, ut educas panem de terrâ, Psal. 103. & 48. There is an infinite number of the like passages, but these may suffice.  
When an Author seems to contradict himself, and Natural Equity, or some stronger Reason obliges us to reconcile him to himself: It seems to me that we have an infallible Rule to discover his true Opinion; since we need but observe when he speaks according to his own Understanding, and when in compliance with the common Opinion. When a Man speaks like the rest of the World, it is not always a certain sign he is of their Opinion: But when he speaks positively contrary to what we are accustomed to say, although he should say it but once, we have a great deal of Reason to believe 'tis what he thinks; provided we know he speaks seriously, and having first well considered it.  
For instance: An Author speaking of the Properties of Animals, if he should in an hundred places say, that Beasts feel, that Dogs know their Master, love and fear him; and should only in two or three places say, Beasts are insensible, and Dogs uncapable of knowing, loving, or fearing any thing. How shall we reconcile this Author, who appears to contradict himself? Must we not collect all the passages for and against it, and judge of his Opinion by the greatest number? If so, I don't believe there is any Man to whom, for example, we may attribute this Opinion, that Animals have no Souls: For the Cartesians themselves often say, that a Dog feels when he is beaten; and 'tis very rarely that they deny him feeling. And although I have encountered an infinite number of prejudices in this Book, we may draw many passages from thence; whereby if this Rule I have explained be received, we may prove that I have established them all; and even that I hold the Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes, which I have just now Refuted: Or perhaps it might be concluded, That The Search after Truth, is a Book full of visible and gross Contradictions; as some Persons do, who it may be have not equity or penetration enough to make them fit Judges of the Works of others.  
The Holy Scripture, the Fathers, and most good Men, oftener speak of sensible Goods, Riches, and Honours, according to the common Opinion, than according to the true Ideas they have of them. JESUS CHRIST introduces Abraham speaking to the wicked Rich Man; Fili recepisti BONA in vita tua; Thou hast received thy good things in thy life time; that is, Riches, Honours. What we through prejudice call good, our good, that is our Gold or our Silver, is in an hundred places in the Scripture, called our Maintenance, or our Substance, and even our Honesty, or that which honours us, Pawpertas & honestas á Deo sunt. But must this manner of speaking, used by the Holy Scripture, 
Eccl. 11.14.  and most Pious Persons, make us think they contradict themselves; or that they look upon Riches and Honours as real goods, and that therefore we ought to love and seek after them? No, without doubt; because these ways of speaking, complying with prejudices, signify nothing: And we see in other places, JESUS CHRIST has compared Riches to Thorns; has told us we must renounce them, because they are deceitful; and that whatsoever is great and alluring in this World, is an abomination before God. We must not therefore collect the passages of Scripture, or of the Fathers, to judge of their Opinion by the greatest number of them, except we would continually attribute the most unreasonable prejudices to them.  
This once supposed, 
Matth. 6.28, 29, 30.  we see that the Holy Scripture positively says, That 'tis God who has Created every thing, even the grass of the field: That 'tis he who clothes the Lilies with such ornaments, as our SAVIOUR prefers before the Glory of Solomon. There is not only two or three, but an infinite number of passages which ascribe to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes, and which destroy the Nature of the Peripatetics.  
Besides, we are carried by a kind of Natural Prejudice, not to think on God in common Effects, and to attribute Power and Efficacy to Natural Causes; and seldom any thing but Miracles induce us to think on him as the Author of them: And the sensible impression engages us in favour of Second Causes. Philosophers hold this Opinion; because say they, the Senses convince us of it; and this is their strongest Proof. Lastly, This Opinion is received by all those who follow the Judgements of the Senses. Our common Language is form from this prejudice; and we as generally say, that Fire has a power to burn, as we call Gold and Silver our good. Therefore the passages drawn from the Holy Scriptures, or the Fathers, for the Efficacy of Second Causes, prove no more than those that an Ambitious or Covetous Man shall choose to justify his own Conduct. But 'tis quite different with those passages we may bring to prove that God does all things. For this Opinion being contrary to Prejudice, these passages must be understood in their utmost rigour; for the same Reason that we ought to believe that 'tis the Sentiments of the Cartesians, that Beasts are insensible; although they have said it but two or three times, and continually say to the contrary in all familiar Discourses, affirming, they feel, see, and understand.  
In the First Chapter of Genesis, God commands the Earth to produce Plants and Animals; and likewise the Waters to bring forth Fish. And consequently says the Peripatetics, Water and Earth have received a Power capable of producing these Effects.  
I don't see the certainty of this Conclusion: And although we were even obliged to explain this Chapter by itself, without having any recourse to other passages of Scripture, there would be no necessity to receive this consequence. This way of explaining the Creation is accommodated to our conception of things; therefore 'tis not necessary to take it literally; nor ought we to make use of it to maintain Prejudices. As Animals and Plants are upon the Earth, Fowls live in the Air, and Fish in the Water; so God to make us apprehend 'tis by his Order they are in these places, has produced them there. 'Tis from the Earth that he form Animals and Plants; not that the Earth was capable of generating them, or that God to that end gave it a Power or Virtue which it still keeps; (for we all agree, that the Earth does not produce Horses or Oxen) but because from the Earth the Bodies of these Animals, were form; as is declared in the following Chapter: Formatis igitur Dominus Deus de humo cunctis animantibus Terrae, 
Ver. 19  & universis volatilibus Coeli. Animals were form out of the Earth, formatis de humo, and not produced by the Earth. Also after Moses has related how Beasts and Fish were produced by virtue of the Command which God gave the Earth and Water to produce them; he adds, that 'twas God himself who made them, that we might not attribute their production to the Earth and Water. CREAVIT quae DEUS cete grandia; & omnem animam viventem atque notabilem quam PRODUXERUNT aquae in species suas, & omne volatile secundùm genus suum. And a little lower, after having spoken of the formation of Animals, he adds; Et FECIT DEUS bestias terrae juxta species suas & jumenta, & omne reptile terrae in genere suo.  
We may observe by the by, that where the Vulgar reads it, Producant aquae reptile animae viventis & volatile super terram; the Hebrew has it, Volatile VOLITET: For as it clearly appears by the passage I related from the Second Chapter, this word omitted shows that Fowls were not produced from the Water; and that the design of Moses is not here to prove that the Waters had received a true Power to bring forth Fish and Fowl, but only to denote the place designed for each by the Order of God, whether to live or be produced in: And volatile VOLITET super terram: For commonly when we say that the Earth produces Trees and Plants, we only design to show, that it supplied them with the Water and Salt which is necessary for their Germination and Growth. But I will stay no longer to explain the other passages of Scripture, which, literally taken, favour Second Causes; for we are not obliged: Besides 'twould be very dangerous to understand such expressions literally as are maintained upon common Opinions, agreeably to which the Language is form; the Vulgar speaking every thing according to the impression of the Senses, and prejudices of Infancy.  
The same Reason which obliges us to take such passages of the Scripture in the Letter, as are directly opposite to Prejudices, still gives us just cause to believe, that the Fathers never designed either to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes, or the Nature of Aristotle: For although they often spoke after such a manner as favoured Prejudices and the Judgements of the Senses, 
Omnia quippe portenta contra Naturam dicimus esse, sed non sunt quomodo enim est contra Naturam quod Dei fit voluntate: Cum volantes tanti utique conditorio conditae rei cujusque Natura sit? Portentum ergo fit non contra Naturam sed contra quam est nota Natura. St. Aug. de Civitate Dei, l. 21. c. 8.  they sometimes so explained themselves as sufficiently discovered the disposition of their Mind and Heart. St. Austin, for instance, believed the Will of God to be the Power or Nature of every thing; as he declares when he speaks thus; We are wont to say, that Prodigies are against Nature; but 'tis not true: For the Will of the Creator being the Nature of all Creatures, how can what is performed by the Will of God be contrary to Nature? Miracles or Prodigies therefore are not against Nature, but only against what we know of Nature.  
'Tis true St. Austin speaks in many places according to Prejudices: But I affirm that proves nothing, since we ought to explain literally only such passages as are opposite to Prejudices; for the Reasons I have already given.  
If St. Austin in all his Works had never said any thing against the Efficacy of Second Causes, but had always favoured this Opinion, we might perhaps make use of his Authority to establish it. Yet if it does not appear that he ever seriously examined this Question, we should always have had Reason to think, that his Judgement was not determined upon this Subject; and that 'twas not impossible but he might be drawn by the impression of his Senses, without Reflection, to have believed a thing which appeared undoubted, until it was carefully examined.  
It is certain, for instance, that St. Austin always spoke of Beasts as if they had a Soul; I don't say a Corporeal one; for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction between the Soul and Body, to believe there were Corporeal Souls. I say, a Spiritual Soul, for Matter is incapable of Sensation: Yet I believe it more reasonable to make use of his Authority to prove, that Beasts have no Souls; than to prove they have any: For from the Principles he has carefully examined, and strongly established, it manifestly follows they have none; 
Some of St. Augustine's Principles are these; That what has not sinned can never suffer evil. Now according to him, Pain is the greatest evil, and Beasts suffer it. That the most noble cannot have the least noble for its end. But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual, and more noble than the Body; and yet has no other end than the Body. That what is Spiritual is Immortal; and the Soul of Beasts that's Spiritual is subject to Death. There are many such like Principles in the Works of St. Austin; from whence it may be concluded, that Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them. See c. 22, 23. de Anima & ejus origine.  as is shown by Ambrose Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy. But the Sentiment that Beasts have a Soul, or feel Pain when they are beaten, being agreeable to Prejudices, for there's no Child who does not believe it, we have always reason to think that St. Austin speaks upon this matter, according to the general Opinion, and never seriously examined the Question; and that if he had but begun to doubt and make any reflection upon it, he would not have said a thing which is so contrary to his Principles.  
Thus although the Fathers should always have favoured the Efficacy of Second Causes, perhaps we should not have been obliged to have had any regard to their Opinion, if it had appeared that they had not carefully examined the matter: And that what they should have said, had been only a Consequence of the Language which is form and established upon Prejudice. But 'tis certainly the contrary: For the Fathers, the most Pious Persons, and those who have been best instructed in Religion, have commonly snown by some places of their Works, what was the disposition of these Mind and Heart, in respect to this matter.  
The most Learned, and also the greatest number of Divines, seeing on one side that the Holy Scripture was contrary to the Efficacy of Second Causes; and on the other, that the impression of the Causes; public Laws, and chief the Philosophy of Aristotle established it: For Aristotle thought that God did not concern himself in Sublunary Affairs, because it was unworthy his grandeur: And that Nature which he supposed in all Bodies was sufficient to produce what happened here below. The Divines I say, have found this Medium to reconcile Faith with the Heathen Philosophy, and Reason with the Senses; that Second Causes do nothing, except God concurs with them. But because this immediate concourse, whereby God acts with Second Causes, includes great difficulties, some Philosophers have rejected it; pretending that in order to their acting, 'twas enough if God preserved them with the same, virtue he at first created them. And because this Opinion is absolutely conformable to Prejudice, and because the operation of God in Second Causes is not sensible, it is therefore commonly received by the Vulgar, and by those who apply themselves more to the Physics of the Ancients, than to Divinity and the Meditation of the Truth. The generality of the World believe that God at first Created all things, and gave them all the necessary qualities or faculties for their preservation: That he has, for instance, given the first Motions to Matter, and afterwards left it to itself, to produce by the Communication of its Motions this variety of admirable forms. We commonly suppose that Bodies can move one another, and even attribute this Opinion to Des Cartes, although he expressly speaks against it in the 36th and 37th Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles. Though Man cannot hinder himself from acknowledging that the Creatures depend upon God, yet he lessens this dependence as much as possible; either through a secret aversion to God, or a wretched stupidity and insensibility in respect to his operation. But as this Sentiment is chief received by those who have not much studied Religion, and who often rather follow their Senses, and the Authority of Aristotle, than their Reason, and that of the Holy Scriptures; we have not so much reason to fear its establishment in the Minds of those who have any love for Truth and Religion: For a little Application in the Examination of this Opinion will easily discover its falsity. But that Notion of the immediate concourse of God to each action of Second Causes, seems to agree with those passages of Scripture which often attribute the same effect both to God and the Creatures.  
We must consider then, that there are places in Scripture where God is only said to act; Ego sum Dominus, says Isaiah, faciens OMNIA extendens Coelos SOLUS stabiliens terram, 
chap. 44.24.  & NULLUS mecum. A Mother animated with the Spirit of God, says to her Children, that it was not she who form them. Nescio qualiter in utero meo aparuistis, singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI; 
Mac. 7.22, 23.  sed Mundi Creator, etc. She does not say with Aristotle and the Peripatetic Schools, that 'twas she and the Sun who gave them birth, but the Creator of the Universe. Now this Opinion, that 'tis God only who works and forms Children in the Womb, is neither conformable to Prejudices, or the common Notions. Therefore according to the Principle I have before established, these passages must be explained literally. But on the contrary, the Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes being conformable to the common Notion, and impression of the Senses, 
Sol & homo generant hominem. Arist. Phys. ausc. l. 2. c. 2. See St. Th. upon this Text.  although we should find such passages as expressly tell us, that Second Causes act of themselves alone, they would be of no force when compared with these. Concourse therefore is not sufficient to reconcile the different passages of the Scripture; and all Force, Power and Efficacy must be ascribed to God.  
But although the immediate concourse of God with Second Causes, should be proper to reconcile these different Texts, I know not whether it ought to be admitted after all: For the Sacred Books were not made for the Divines of these times; but for the Jews. So that if the Jews were not formerly sufficiently enlightened, or subtle enough to imagine such a concourse as is admitted in our School-Divinity, and to reconcile a thing that the most able Divines have had much trouble to explain; it follows, methinks, that the Holy Scripture, which attributed to God, and to him only, the production and preservation of all things, would have thrown them into Error; and that the Holy Penmen of these Books, would have spoke to Men, not only in an unknown but deceitful Language. For by telling them that God does all things, they would only have intended, that God gives his concourse to all things; and 'tis probable, the Jews never so much as thought of this concourse; those amongst them that were not great Philosophers, believing that God did all things, and not that he concurred to all.  
But that we may make a more certain Judgement about this Concourse, it would be very proper, carefully to explain the different Hypotheses of the Schools about it: For besides the impenetrable obscurities which are common to all Opinions, that we can explain or maintain only upon rambling and indeterminate terms; there are upon this matter so great a variety of Opinions, that it would not be very difficult to discover the cause of them. But I will not engage in a discussion which will be too tiresome both for myself, and the greatest part of those who will read this Book. I rather choose on the contrary to endeavour to show, that my Opinions may in some respect be reconciled to the greatest number of the School Divines, although I must not dissemble, but confess their Language appears very equivocal and confused to me. I will explain myself.  
I believe, as I have already said elsewhere, that Bodies, for instance, have no power to move themselves, and that their Moving Power is only the action of God: Or to avoid a term which signifies nothing distinct, their Moving Power is only the Will of God, always necessarily efficacious, which successively preserves them in different places. For I don't believe that God creates certain Being's, to make them the Moving Power of Bodies: Not only because I have no Idea of this kind of Being, nor see how they could move Bodies; but also since these Being's would themselves have need of some others to move them, and so on ad infinitum. For none but God is truly immovable, and sole Mover together.  
Which being supposed; when a Body strikes and moves another, I may say, that it acts by the Concourse of God, and that this Concourse is not distinct from its own action. For a Body moves another which it meets, only by its Action or Moving Power; which at the bottom is nothing but the Will of God, that successively preserves this Body in many places: The transferring of a Body not being its Action or Moving Power, but the effect of its Moving Power. Most Divines likewise say, That the Action of Second Causes differs not from the Action whereby God concurs with them. For although they understand it variously, they suppose that God acts in the Greatures, in the same Action with the Creatures. And they are it seems obliged to speak thus: For if the Creatures acted by an Action which God did not produce in them, their Action considered as such, would, as it appears to me, be independent: Now they believed, as they ought, that the Creatures depended immediately upon God, not only as to their Being, but also as to their Operation.  
So in respect to Free Causes, I believe that God continually gave the Mind an impression towards Good in general, and that he also determined this impression towards particular Goods, by the Ideas or Sensations he has given us; as I have shown in the First Explanation: And 'tis the same Thing with what the Divines believe when they say, That God moves and prevents our Wills. So that the power which puts our Minds in motion, is the Will of God, which animates and inclines us towards Good: For God created not Being's to make them the Moving power of Minds, for the same Reason that he did not create any to make them the Moving power of Bodies. The Wills of God being Efficacious of themselves, it is enough for him to Will a Thing to have it done: And it is useless unnecessarily to multiply Being's. Besides, whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions, likewise proceeds from the Action of God in us, as is clear from the First Explanation: Now we neither Act or produce any Thing but by our Wills, I mean by the impression of the Will of God which is our Moving power. For our Wills are Efficacious no farther than as they proceed from God; even as Bodies put in motion, impel not others, but in as much as they have a Moving power which transfer them, and this Moving power is only the Will of God which creates or successively preserves them in different places. Then we Act only by the Concourse of God; and our Action considered? as Efficacious and capable of producing any Effect differs not from that of God's: And is as most Divines say, the very same Action: Eadem numero Actio.  
Now all the Changes which happen in the World, 
See Suarez l. 1. de concursu Dei cum voluntate. c. 1.  have no other Natural Cause, than the Motion of Bodies, and Wills of Spirits. For First, According to the General Laws of the Communication of Motions, the invisible Bodies which surround the visible ones, by their divers Motions produce all these various Effects, the Cause of which does not appear to us. Secondly, According to the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body, when Bodies which are about us Act upon ours, they produce in our Souls an infinite variety of Sensations, Ideas, and Passions. Thirdly, Our Mind produces by its Wills a great many different Ideas in itself: For it is our Wills which apply and modify our Minds as Natural Causes, whose Efficacy nevertheless proceeds from the Laws which God has Established. Lastly, When our Mind Acts upon our Body, many Changes are therein produced by virtue of the Laws of its Union with it: And by the means of our Body it also produces in those about it a great Number of Changes, by virtue of the Laws of the Communication of Motions. Thus all Natural Effects have no other Natural or Occasional Cause, than the Motions of Bodies, and Wills of Spirits; which will easily be granted by any who will use but a little application; supposing he is not already prepossessed by such as know not what they say, who instantly imagine Being's which they have no clear Idea of, and pretend to explain Things they understand not, by what is absolutely incomprehensible. So that God executing by his Concourse, or rather by his Efficacious Will, whatever the Motions of Bodies, or Determinations of Spirits perform as Natural or Occasional Causes; it's plain, God does every Thing by the same Action of the Creature: Not that Creatures of themselves have any Efficacious Action, but because the Power of God is in some sort communicated to them by the Natural Laws which God has Established in their favour.  
This is all that I can say to reconcile my Thoughts with the Opinion of those Divines who maintain the necessity of immediate Concourse, and that God does All in all Things by the same Action as that of the Creatures: For as to the rest of the Divines, I believe their Opinions are indesensible every way; and chief that of Durandus, 
See. Durand. in 2. Dist. 1. Qu. 5. & Dist. 37. de Genesi ad Litteram. l. 5. c. 20.  and some Ancients whom St. Austin refutes; who absolutely denied the necessity of Concourse, and would have Second Causes do every Thing by a Power which God had given them at the Creation. For although this Opinion be less perplexed than that of the other Divines, yet it appears to me so opposite to Scripture, and conformable to Prejudices, to say no more, that I believe it cannot be maintained.  
I confess that the Schoolmen, 
In 4. Sent. Dist. 1. q. De aliaco. ibid.  who say, the immediate Concourse of God is the same Action as that of the Creatures, do not absolutely understand it according to my Explanation; And except Biel and Cardinal D' Ailly, all those I have read, think that the Efficacy which produces Effects, proceeds from the Second Cause as well as the First. But as I determined with myself not to say any thing but what I conceive clearly, and always take that Side which best agrees with Religion; I believe it will not be taken amiss if I forsake an Opinion which to many persons appears so much the more intricate, as they endeavour more assiduously to apprehend it: And since I have established another which agrees perfectly, not only with Reason, but also with the Holiness of Religion and Christian Morality. 'Tis a Truth I have already proved in the Chapter upon which I make these Reflection; but it will be very proper for me to offer yet something more fully, to Justify what I have already said upon the present Question.  
Reason and Religion convinces us than God would be loved and revered by his Creatures; Loved as good, and Revered as powerful: Which is a Truth we cannot doubt of without impiety and folly. To love God as he requires and deserves to be loved, we must according to the First Command both of the Law and Gospel, and even of Reason, as I have elsewhere shown, do it with all our strength, or according to the utmost Capacity we have of Loving. It is not enough to prefer him to all Things, but we must also love him in all Things: Else is not our Love so perfect as it ought to be; 
l. 4. ch. 1.  nor do we give to God all the Love he has impressed upon us, and that only for himself, since all his Actions centre in himself. Likewise to render to God all the Reverence due to him, it is not enough to adore him as the Sovereign Power, and fear him more than any of his Creatures: We must also fear and adore him in all his Creatures, and all our Actions must tend towards him; for Honour and Glory are due only to him. Which is what God has commanded us in these Words: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo & ex tota anima tua, 
Deut. 6.  & ex tota fortitudine tua: And in these; Dominum Deum tuum timebis, & illi soli servies. Thus the Philosophy which teaches us, That the Efficacy of Second Causes is a Fiction of the Mind; that the Nature of Aristotle, and some other Philosophers, is a Chimaera; that God only is strong and powerful enough, not only to Act in our Souls, but also to give the least Motion to Matter: This Philosophy, I say agrees perfectly with Religion, the design of which is to unite us to God after the strictest manner.  
We commonly love such Things only as are capable of doing us some good: This Philosophy therefore only Authorises the Love of God, and absolutely condemns the Love of every Thing else. We ought to fear Nothing but what is able to do us some Evil: This Philosophy therefore only permits us to fear God, and positively forbids our fearing any Thing else. So that it Justifies all the Motions of the Soul which are Just and Reasonable; and condemns all those that are contrary to Reason and Religion. For this Philosophy will never Justify the Love of Riches, the Desire of Greatness, nor the Extravagance of Debauchery; since the Love of the Body appears mad and ridiculous, to the Principles established by this Philosophy.  
'Tis an Undoubted Truth, a Natural Opinion, and even a common Notion, that we ought to love the Cause of our Pleasure, and love it in proportion to the Felicity it does or can make us enjoy. It is not only Just, but it is also very Necessary, that the Cause of our Happiness should be the Object of our Love. Thus following the Principles of this Philosophy, we ought only to love God; for it tells us, that He alone is the True Cause of our Happiness; that the Bodies which are about us cannot Act upon that which we Animate, consequently much less upon our Minds. 'Tis not the Sun which enlightens us, and gives us Motion and Life; nor is it that which covers the Earth with Fruits and Flowers, and which supplies us with Food and Nourishment. This Philosophy teaches us with the Scripture, that it is God only who gives Rain, and regulates the Seasons; who gives Nourishment to the Body, and fills the Heart with Joy: 
Acts 14.15, 16. Ergo nihil agis ingratissimè Mortalium, qui te negas Deo debere, sed naturae: quia nec natura sine Deo est, nec Deus sine natura, sed idem est utrumque, nec distat. Officium si quod à Seneca, accipisses, Annoeo te diceres debere, vel Lucio; Non creditorem mutares, sed nomen. Seneca, l. 4. Of Benefits, c. 8. Ego Dominus & non est alter, formans lucem & creans tenebras, faciens pacem & creans malum: Ego Dominus ficiens omnia haec. Isa. 45.7. Amos 3.6.  That he only is capable of doing us good; and thereby has given us a perpetual Testimony of what he is, although in Ages passed he has permitted all Nations to walk in their own ways. According to the Language of this Philosophy, we must not say, That it is Nature that fills us with Good; nor that it is God and Nature together: But that it is God alone, speaking thus without Equivocation, that we may not deceive the Simple. For we must distinctly acknowledge him the only Cause of our Happiness, if we would make him the only Object of our Love.  
'Tis likewise an undoubted Truth, That we ought to fear such Things as are able to hurt us, and fear them in proportion to the Evil they can do us. But this Philosophy tells us, That it is God alone that can do us Evil; that it is he, as Isaiah says, who creates Darkness as well as Light: who makes peace, and creates Evil; and even that no Evil happens but from him, according to the Prophet. So that it is him alone we ought to fear. We must not fear either Plague, or War, Famine, our Enemies, nor even Devils themselves; but God alone. We ought to fly a Sword, when ready to wound us, eat Fire, and avoid a House that is likely to fall upon us; yet must not fear these Things: We may fly such Bodies as are Occasional or Natural Causes of Evil: but we must fear only God, as the True Cause of all Evils and Misfortunes; and only hate Sin, which necessarily provokes the Cause of all our Happiness, to become the Cause of all our Evils. And in short, all the Motions of our Minds ought to tend only to God, since He alone is Superior to tend only to God, since He alone is Superior to it, and the Motions of our Body may relate to those about it. This is what we learn from that Philosophy, which admits not the Efficacy of Second Causes.  
But this Efficacy being supposed, I cannot see but we have some reason to fear and love Bodies: And that to regulate our Love according to Reason, it is enough to prefer God above every Thing else; the First and Universal, to Second and Particular Causes. Then it is not necessary to love God with all our strength; Ex totâ ment, ex toto cord, ex tota anima, ex totis viribus, at the Scripture says.  
Yet when we content ourselves with preferring God to all other Being's, and adore him with a Love of Esteem and Preference, without continually endeavouring to honour and love him in all Things; it often happens that we deceive ourselves, that our Charity is dissipated and lost, and that we are more taken up with Sensible, than the Sovereign Good: For if the greatest Sinners, and it may be even Idolaters, were asked, If they preferred not the universal to particular Causes? They would not perhaps be afraid, in the midst of their Debauches and Extravagancies, to Answer, That they failed not in so Essential a Duty, and knew very well what they owed to God. I confess they would deceive themselves; but take away the Efficacy of Second Causes, and they will have no probable pretext to Justify their Conduct: And if it be supposed, they may say this for themselves, when their passions blind them, and they listen to the Testimony of their Senses. " Since I am made to be happy, I neither can, nor aught to forbear loving and respecting whaterver may be the Cause of my Happiness. Why therefore should I not love and respect Sensible Objects, since they are the True Causes of the Happiness I receive in their Enjoyment? I acknowledge the Supreme Being is alone worthy of our highest Adoration, and I prefer him to every Thing; but not seeing that he requires any Thing of me, I enjoy the Goods he has given me by the means of Second Causes, to which he has subjected me: and I pay no Acknowledgements to him, which perhaps would dishonour him. As he does me no good immediately and by himself, or at least without the Assistance of the Creatures, it is a sign he does not require my Mind and Heart should be immediately applied to himself; or at least he is willing, that the Creatures should divide with him the Acknowledgements of my Heart and Mind: Since he has communicated a part of his Power and Glory to the Sun, has surrounded him with Brightness and Majesty, Established him Supreme over all his Works; and 'tis by the Influence of this Great Luminary that we receive all the Necessary Goods of Life: Why should we not then employ a part of this Life in enjoying his Light, and testifying the sense we have of his Greatness and Benefits? Would it not be the utmost Ingratitude to receive the Abundance of all Things from this Excellent Creature, and have no Sentiment of Gratitude for it? And would it not likewise be an unaccountable blindness and stupidity, to have no Motion of respect and fear for him whose absence freezes us to death, and who by approaching too near us may burn up and destroy us? I say it again, that God is preferable to all Things, that we must esteem and love him infinitely more than the Creatures; but that we must also love and fear them: For thereby we honour Him who made them; merit his Favours; and oblige him to bestow New Benefits upon us. It is plain, he approves of the Honour we pay his Creatures, since he has communicated his Power to them; and all Power merits Honour. But as Honour aught to be proportioned to Power, and that the Power of the Sun, and all Sensible Objects, is such, that from them we receive all sorts of Goods, it is just we should honour them with all our strength, and next to God consecrate our whole Being to them.  
Thus we naturally reason, when we follow the Prejudice we have received from the Efficacy of Second Causes; 'tis probably after this manner that the first Authors of Idolatry reasoned. Here is what he thought of it who is esteemed the most Learned of the Jews. He thus gins a Treatise he wrote about Idolatry.  
In the Days of Enos Men fell into strange Delusions, 
R. Moses Maimonides.  and the Wise Men of that Time perfectly lost their Sense and Reason. Enos himself was in the Number of those deceived Persons. These were their Errors. Since God (said they) has created the Stars and the Heavens to govern the World, has placed them on high, surrounded them with brightness and glory, and employs them to exexecute his Orders, it is just that we should honour them, and pay reverence and homage to them. 'Tis the Will of our God that we should honour those whom he has raised and exalted in Glory; even as a Prince requires we should honour his Ministers in his presence; because the Honour we give to them redounds to himself. After they had once received this Notion, they began to build Temples in honour of the Stars, to offer Sacrifices and Praises to them, and even prostrate themselves before them, thinking thereby to gain the favour of him who created them. And this was the original of Idolatry.  
It is so Natural and Just to have Sentiments of Acknowledgement in proportion to the Benefits we receive, 
See Vossius, l. 2. de Idolatria.  that almost all the World have adored the Sun; 
Ipsi qui irridentur Aegyptii, nullam belluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem quam ex ea caperent, consecraverant. Cic. l. 1. de Natura Deorum.  because they all thought he was the cause of the Happiness they enjoyed. And if the Egyptians have adored not only the Sun, the Moon, and the River Nilus, because its overflowings caused the fruitfulness of their Country, but also the vilest Animals; 'twas, as Cicero relates, because of some benefit they received from them. So that as we cannot, and indeed ought not to banish out of men's Minds, the inclination they Naturally have for the true Causes of their Happiness; it is evident that there is at least some danger in maintaining the Efficacy of Second Causes, although we join thereto the necessity of an immediate concourse, which has I know not what of incomprehensible in it, and which comes in as an aftergame to justify our Prejudices, and Aristotle's Philosophy.  
But there is no danger in speaking only what we know, and atributing Power and Efficacy to God alone; since we see nothing but his Wills which have an absolute, necessary, and indispensable connection with Natural Effects. I confess that Men are now knowing enough to avoid the gross Errors of the Heathens and Idolaters: But I am not afraid to say, that our Mind is disposed, or rather that our Heart is often inclined like that of the Heathens; and that there will always be some kind of Idolatry in the World, until the day that Jesus Christ shall again deliver up his Kingdom to God his Father; having first destroyed all Empire, Power, and Dominion, that God may be all in all. 
Quorum Deus venter est, Phil. 13.9. 
Omnis fornicator, aut immundus, aut avarus, quod est idolorum servitus. Eph. 5.5.  
In spiritu & veritate oportet adorare. John 4.24.   For is it not a kind of Idolatry, to make a God of our Belly, as St. Paul speaks? Is it not to idolise the God of Riches, continually to labour after Worldly Possessions? Is this to render to God the Worship due to him; to adore him in Spirit and Truth; to have our Hearts filled with some sensible Beauty, and our Minds dazzled with the brightness of some imaginary Grandeur.  
Men believing they receive from the Bodies which are about them the Pleasures they enjoy by their use, they unite themselves to them with all the Powers of their Soul: And thus the principal of their disorder proceeds from the sensible conviction they have of the Efficacy of Second Causes. 'Tis Reason only that tells them, there is none but God acts in them. But besides that, Reason speaks so low that they can scarcely hear it; and the Senses, which oppose it, cry so loud that it stupifies them; they are still confirmed in their Prejudices by Arguments which are so much the more dangerous, as they bear external Characters, and sensible Marks of Truth.  
The Philosophers, and chief the Christian Philophers, ought continually to oppose Prejudices, or the Judgements of the Senses, and especially such dangerous ones as that of the Efficacy of Second Causes: And yet I know not from what Principle there are some Persons (whom I extremely honour, and that with reason) who endeavour to confirm this Prejudice, and even to make this Doctrine pass for superstitious and extravagant, which is so holy, pure, and solid; and maintains that God alone is the true cause of every thing. They will not have us love and fear God in all things, but love and fear all things in relation to God. We ought, say they, to love the Creatures because they are good; to love and respect our Father; render honour to our Prince and Superior, since God commands it. I don't deny it; but I deny that we must love the Creatures as our goods, although they be good or perfect in themselves. I deny that we are to pay service and respect to Men as to our Masters: For we must neither serve our Master, obey our Father, or Prince, with any other design but to serve God, and obey him. This is what St. Paul says, who became all things to all Men, and complied in all things for the Salvation of those to whom he Preached: Servi obedite Dominis carnalibus cum timore & tremore in simplicitate cordis vestri SICUT CHRISTO: Non ad oculum servientes quasi omnibus placentes, sed ut servi Christi facientes voluntatem Dei ex animo, cum bona voluntate servientes SICUT DOMINI ET NON HOMINIBUS. And in another Epistle: Non ad oculum servientes quasi hominibus placentes, sed in simplicitate cordis DEUM TIMENTES. Quodcumque facitis ex animo operamini SICUT DOMINO ET NON HOMINIBUS. We must therefore obey our Father, serve our Prince, and render honour to our Superiors, AS UNTO GOD AND NOT UNTO MAN: Sicut Domini & non Hominibus. This is clear, and can never have any bad consequences. Superiors would always be more honoured, and better served. But I believe I may say, that a Master who would be honoured and served, as having in himself another Power than that of God, must be a Devil; and that those who served him under that Notion, would be Idolaters; for I can't but believe that all Honour and Love that tend not towards God, are kinds of Idolatry.  
SOLI DEO HONOR ET GLORIA.    

AN EXPLANATION Of what I have said in the Fourth Chapter of the Second Part, Of Method; and elsewhere.  
That God acts always with Order, and by the most Simple Ways.  
IT seems to some Persons to be too rash a Conjecture, or an abusing of indeterminate and general Terms, to say, That God acts always with Order, and by the most simple ways, in the execution of his designs: Therefore 'twill not be useless for me to prove and explain this Truth; for 'tis of the greatest consequence, not only for the knowledge of Nature, but much more for the knowledge of Religion and Morality.  
By the word God, we understand a Being infinitely Perfect, whose Wisdom and Knowledge have no limits, and who consequently knows all the means whereby he can execute his designs. This being granted, I say, God acts always by the shortest means, and most simple ways.  
That I may be the better understood, I'll make use of a sensible Example: I suppole that God wills the Body A, should strike the Body B. Since God knows every thing, he perfectly knows that A. can go to strike B. by an infinite number of Curve-Lines, and but by one Right-Line only. Now God only wills the shock of B. by A.; and we suppose that he only wills the transferring of A. to B. to effect this shock: Therefore A. must be transferred to B. by the shortest way, or by a Right-Line. For if the Body A. were transported to B. by a Curve Line, that would show, either that the Transporter knew no other way; or else that he not only willed the concurrence of these Bodies, but also the means to produce it, which is against the supposition.  
There's as much more action requisite to transfer a Body A. to B. by a Curve-Line, than by a Right-Line, as the Curve is greater than the Right. If God therefore should transfer A. to B. by a Curve-Line, which is double to a Right, half the Action of God would be wholly useless; consequently produced without design or end, as well as without effect.  
Moreover, Action in God is Will; therefore there must be more Will in God to cause A. to be transported circularly, than directly. Now we have already supposed that God had no Will in respect to the motion of A, but only as it relates to the shock: Therefore there is not Will enough in God to move A. by a Curve-Line. And consequently this motion of A. to B. is a contradiction. Thus 'tis a contradiction that God should not act by the most simple ways, except we suppose that God in the choice of ways he makes use of to execute his designs, has something else in view besides these designs, which is a contradiction in our supposition.  
When I say there is more Will in God to transfer a Body from A. to B. by a Curve, than by a Right Line; we must from thence conclude nothing against the simplicity of the Being and Action of God: For it must be confessed that it cannot be comprehended, either how the simplicity of an Infinite Being, includes all the different Perfections of Finite Being's; nor how his Will continuing always the same, and always conformable to Order, changes with reference to the different Being's it produces and preserves. I speak only according to our manner of conceiving. It seems to me now that we clearly conceive when God Wills, and, for instance, creates a Cubic Foot of Matter, he Wills another thing than if he creates two. For 'tis evident that God could not create two different things; nor know whether he had created one or two feet of Matter; or if he conveyed a Body circularly or directly, if there was not some difference in his Wills in respect to Matter, or to its Motion; since God sees only in himself, and in his Wills, the variety of his Creatures. Now whatever that Action is in God which relates to the different Being's he produces or preserves; I call it the differences, augmentations, and diminutions of Wills in God. And according to this manner of conceiving things, I say, God cannot employ more Will than is necessary to execute his designs: So that God always acts by the most simple ways in reference to them.  
I don't deny however but God may have a great number of ways, equally simple, to produce the same effects; or that he may produce them by different means; but he always produces them by the most simple, provided they are all of the same kind; for 'tis a contradiction, that a Being infinitely Wise should have useless and irregular Wills.  
If we would apply this Principle to Morality, we shall see that those secure their Salvation, who so prepare themselves for Grace, by Self-denial, Repentance, and an exact Obedience to the Commands of our Saviour, that God acting in them by the most simple ways; I mean, by giving them but few New Graces, operates very much in them. For although God would have all Men be saved, he will only save those that can be saved by the most simple means, which have relation to the great design he has of Sanctifying through JESUS CHRIST, a certain number of the Elect; and he will multiply the Children of Eve till that number be fulfilled; for 'tis because God is willing to sanctify us through the most simple means, that after Sin, it was necessary for him to multiply the Children of Men to complete the number of his Elect; since there are many persons who cause their own Damnation by withdrawing themselves from the Order of God.  
Now as God acts not as a particular Cause, we must not imagine, that he has like us particular Wills for every thing he produces; for if it were so, it appears evident to me, that the generation of Monsters would be impossible; and that it would never happen that one work should destroy another. As God cannot have contrary Wills, we should have recourse to a Principle of Evil, as the Manichses had, for instance, to freeze the Fruits produced by God. This being so, we are methinks obliged to suppose, that there are some general Rules according to which God predestinates and sanctifies the Elect; and that those Laws are what we call the Order of Grace; as his general Wills, whereby God produces and preserves whatever is in the World, are the Order of Nature.  
I don't know whether I am not mistaken; but methinks from this Principle a great many Consequences may be drawn, which perhaps would resolve some Difficulties, about which there has been much Controversy some years since; but I don't think myself obliged to deduce them; every one may do it according to his own Capacity: 'Tis more convenient to be silent, than to say such things as are not necessary to be known; and which perhaps will one day be more easily agreed upon, than they would now. I would only have it known, that the most simple ways of our Sanctification, are Self-denial and Repentance; or that at least we should continually reflect, that our Blessed LORD distinctly knowing the Laws of the Order of Grace, we run perpetual dangers when we don't follow the ways that he has showed us, not only by his Words, but also by his Actions.  
But as in the course of our Lives there happens particular Occurrences, wherein we don't know which way to determine ourselves, because of the contrary Reasons that may be alleged on either side, about certain Opinions; 'twill perhaps be useful to show here by some particular instance, that much use may be made of the Principle that we have established, viz. That God always acts by the most simple means.  
Let us suppose, for instance, that I am desirous to know whether I ought every day to take certain stated times to examine myself; to represent to myself my weakness and miseries; to consider my Duty in the Presence of God, and to beseech him to assist me in conquering my Passions: Or else, whether I ought to stay till the Spirit of God, who blows where and when it pleases, should take me from myself, and from my ordinary employments, to unite me to himself; for very probable Reasons may be given both for and against these Opinions; and Men are very often satisfied with Probabilities in such like cases: And this even makes some Pious Persons to follow different ways, which are not always very sure.  
I consider therefore, that if I stay for the particular Motions of the Spirit of God, I shall never pray to him; if to that end I don't receive either particular Revelations, Illuminations, or preventing Delectations. Now these Illuminations or Delectations being produced by God, by more particular Wills than are those general Wills, which constitute the Order of Nature, they are kind of Miracles; so that this is to pretend that God impells Men to Prayer, through means that are not the most simple. Nay, to expect those Graces which are not always necessary, is in some measure to tempt God.  
But if I accustom myself to appear, or endeavour to present myself before God at certain Hours, the sound of a Clock will be enough to remember me of my Duty, without its being necessary that God should have a particular Will of inspiring me with the thought of Praying: The general Laws only of the Union of the Soul with the Body, will make me think of my Duty, when the time that I have chosen shall present itself by some sensible mark.  
But as Self-Examination and Prayer is necessary; and as we can't pray without having some thoughts of it; nor have these thoughts unless God gives them: 'Tis some step towards Salvation to have these thoughts, without obliging God to give them us by particular Wills, which are kinds of Miracles; or rather, in consequence of the general Laws of the Order of Grace, whereby God would save all Men through his Son. Perhaps the want of the first thought of Prayer, and of considering our obligations before God, is the cause of the blindness of many Men; consequently of their Eternal Damnation. For God acting always by the most simple ways, ought not by particular Wills, to give those thoughts which might be obtained by virtue of his general Wills, if once persons were accustomed to pray regularly at particular hours. Therefore as God would save Men by the most simple ways, it is evident that as much as possible, we ought to make the Order of Nature subservient to that of Grace; and, as I may say, to reconcile God's Wills together, by regulating a time which may at least supply us with the thoughts of Prayer.  
'Twas for these Reasons probably, that God formerly commanded the Jews to write his Commandments upon the Doors of their Houses, and always to have some sensible Mark which might put them in mind of them: This spared God, if I may so say, thoughts. For Miracles of Grace were very rare amongst the Jews, the time being not yet come wherein God designed to engrave his Law, and infuse his Spirit and Charity into the Heart of Man.  
I confess that whatever we do, by a mere Natural Power, cannot of itself meritoriously dispose us for Grace; and yet without it, all external Religion can only serve to maintain our Pride and Self-love. The Pharisees grew vain from their bearing the sensible Signs and Memorials of the Law of God, as our Saviour reproached them: And Christians often make use of Crucifixes and Images, out of Curiosity, Hypocrisy, or some other motive of Self-love. Yet since these things may put us in mind of God, it is requisite to make use of them; for we must, as much as possible, make Nature subservient to Grace, that God may save us by the most simple ways.  
For although we cannot Naturally fit ourselves for Grace, we may often contribute to the rendering it efficacious; because we can lessen the eagerness of a Passion, by removing those Objects from us which cause it, or by presenting to ourselves contrary Reasons to those which inspire it. Those who most carefully watch the purity of their imagination, and suffer it not to be so much corrupted by the continual use of sensible Pleasures, and Commerce with the World, make Grace efficacious, by removing that resistance it finds in others. In this sense, even a Disease, a shower of Rain, or any other accident, that keeps us at home, may render Grace efficacious; for such a degree of Grace as would be too weak to make us resist the sensible impression of the presence of an agreeable Object, is strong enough to make us with horror reject the impure thought or imagination of this same Object.  
This is enough to show clearly, that the Counsels of the Gospel are necessary, that God may save us by the most simple ways: For 'tis advantageous to follow them; not only because when we follow them by the Motion of God's Spirit they determine it, by virtue of immutable Order, or of the general Laws of the Order of Grace, to increase in us our love to him; but also because the practising these Counsels may often render Grace efficacious, though we are induced to it only by Self-love, as it may happen on many occasions.  
FINIS.   

A DEFENCE OF THE AUTHOR OF THE Search after Truth: AGAINST The Accusation OF Monsieur de la Ville.  
Wherein is shown, That if every one was permitted to call in Question the Faith of others, upon a good or bad deduction of Consequences from their Principles, none could be secure from the Imputation of Heresy.  
LONDON, Printed in the Year, MDCXCV.   

A DEFENCE OF THE AUTHOR OF THE Search after Truth: Against the ACCUSATION OF Monsieur de la Ville.  
SOmetimes since there was Published a Treatise, whose Title surprised many Persons, and stirred up their Passions. Several wished I would interest myself in the Quarrel, which the Author had with the Cartesians; for as on one hand Monsieur de la Ville (for that was his Name) had done me the honour to list me among those Philosophers, but with what design I know not; and on the other hand, diverted himself by Travestying me in Ridicule: They assured me that if I was willing to pass for a Rash, Ignorant and Extravagant Person, for a Visionary, nay, even an Heritick; yet I could not in Conscience desert the Cause of Truth, and leave the Enemies of the Faith the Advantages he granted to them.  
I must be Just to these Gentlemen, and confess their Reasons were very solid; but I would desire them to believe, that if I did not comply with them, 'twas because others were of a much different Opinion, which to me appeared also very reasonable, and for which indeed I had a greater inclination; for I am not willing to decide about the solidity of their Reasons. Moreover, as Monsieur de la Ville is not very tender in matters of Faith, I very well foresaw that his Treatise would make more Noise, than it would do Injury to the Truth; and as for myself, I believe he did me no Injustice in despising me; I can assure him I contemn myself more than he desires. 'Tis true my self-contempt is not grounded upon the same Ideas that inclined him to treat me so disdainfully as he did; but I could indeed wish, that the Reasons I have for despising myself were not true, and I would freely consent that all my ill Qualities were changed into those which he has been pleased to bestow upon me, provided he would except that of Heretic, or of a Person of a suspicious Faith.  
Since I know there's nothing so dangerous as to stir up men's Passions, especially on certain Subjects which defend the most violent and unreasonable from the Reproofs of Reason; I believed I ought to be silent, lest I should increase the Passion I saw in some Minds; but since the Heat is abated, and little Mischief is to be feared, I think I ought to satisfy my Friends, and please myself. I would not affect a disdainful Silence in respect of Monsieur de la Ville; I confess sincerely, that he has sensibly offended me; for I am neither a Stoic nor Stupid; I feel when I am hurt, and am not ashamed to confess it. Public Accusation of Heresy is not easy to be born, especially by ecclesiastics; which however unjust it may be, yet it fails not to make the Faith of the Accused suspected in this Age, more than any other; and no one can be prodigal of this kind of disreputation, unless Charity oblige him to it, which seldom or never happens.  
I shall not therefore Answer any thing to the Calumnies wherewith this Author endeavours to blacken me: I shall not cite him before the Common Magistrate for Public Reparation; nor will I make use of any other Methods permitted by the Law of Nature, for the restitution of that which I can in Conscience give up. I am whatever he pleases, Ignorant, a Visionary, but I am no Heretic; I am not suspected of Heresy at least by those who know me. I confess I cannot avoid having my Faith suspected, if a Stranger be permitted to treat me as a Heretic upon such Consequences as he pleases to draw from my Principles; for its impossible but the Treatise of Monsieur de la Ville should have deceived somebody. If at present I am suspected of Heresy, it is an unhappiness which I cannot help.  
But if it be a Crime, 'tis not I that have committed it, 'tis he rather who has drawn such Consequences, from a Principle, as are not in it. As for me, I disown them; believe them false and Heretical; and if I saw clearly that they were directly drawn from any one of my Principles, I would abandon it; for this Principle would be false, Truths being not contrary to one another.  
But supposing that Monsieur de la Ville had reasoned justly, and fairly deduced Heretical Consequences from my Principle, neither I nor many others, whom he treats unhandsomely, saw not before he had wrote his Book, that these Consequences were contained in the Principle; so that his Conduct is unjustifiable, which way soever it be examined: For in fine, the Articles of Faith depend not upon the Penetration and Extension of the Mind of one particular Divine, as I am going to show: And though we should be certain, that some Principles included impious Consequences, yet no one has thereby a right to treat those as Heretics who maintain these Principles.  
I confess I have seen in the Fathers, and especially in St. Angustine, the 
Ep. 3. Ch. 2.28. Ch. 2.57. contra Epist. Manich. Chap. 16. de Trin. L. 10. etc.  Principle I have Advanced; but I never found there that of Monsieur de la Ville. It appeared to me that this was a Common Notion, That if God should Annihilate all Extension in the World, all the Matter whereof the World is composed would be Annihilated. I consulted several Persons upon this, to see if they had the same Idea as I had upon the Matter, and their Answers confirmed me in my Opinion. I judged by Reasons which I shall soon declare, That we could no longer have any direct and natural Demonstration, that the Soul is distinct from the Body, or that she is Immortal, if this Principle be given up. I have said in the Search after Truth, that I believed that no Consequence contrary to Faith could be drawn from this Principle, which before me was Maintained in Sorbonne in the Public Theses. I had almost said, that if it were proper, I could explain how this Opinion might be reconciled with what the Fathers and Councils have left us as Matter of Faith, upon the Mystery of Transubstantiation. In sine, I disavowed all Heretical Consequences, and even the Principle itself, if it included them; which I did not, nor yet do believe.  
What should I say more to clear my Faith from the Suspicion of Heresy, even to the most Malicious? Can I imagine that any one would be bold enough to place St. Austin, and other Fathers, among the Calvinists, by condemning in the Persons of the Cartesians and Gassendists, the Opinion of this Holy Doctor, as contrary to Transubstantiation? No doubtless; nor durst Monsieur de la Ville himself do it, but after an indirect manner. St. Austin advances the present Question in an hundred places as an incontestable Principle; he never goes to prove it, since it appears not that any Man doubted of it in his Time: For indeed it is a Principle which ought to pass for a Common Notion with all such whose Minds are not prepossessed with False Studies: From thence this Holy Doctor concludes, That the Soul is Immortal; that it is more Noble than the Body; that it is distinct from it; and many other Truths of the greatest consequence: 
Part 2. Chap. 3. Art. 6.  And Monsieur de la Ville advances under Equivocal Terms, That this Principle is not to be found in St. Augustine: He Answers one place only in the Works of this Father; and to explain him, makes this Learned Man reason after an extravagant manner. In fine, he opposes to the Constant Doctrine of St. Austin, the only Book of Categories; as if he knew not that this Work was none of this Fathers, and that it belonged rather to Logic than Phisics.  
I will not stand to prove this in particular; for I see no necessity of Answering Monsieur de la Ville's Book. I design to preserve inviolable the Resolution I have made, and which I have declared at the End of the Preface of the Second Volume of the Search after Truth; viz. That I would not Answer all those who should Attack me without understanding me, or whose Discourse gave me any reason to believe, that something else besides the Love of Truth was the Motive of their Writing; as for others, I shall endeavour to satisfy them. I am unwilling to disturb others, or break my own Repose, by contentious Books, and Treatises that are wholly useless to a Search after Truth, and which serve only to violate Charity and scandalise one's Neighbour; and if I now write, it is because I ought not to suffer my Faith to be made suspected, and because I would be clearly understood, that no one ought to treat me as an Heretic, upon Consequences which he can draw from the Principles I have Established.  
It is not that I think any Heresy, nor even any Error, may be drawn from the Book of a Search after Truth; I am ready to Answer with Charity, and respect all those who shall do me the Honour to Criticise upon me without passion; and I shall be always ready to follow Truth, as soon as it shall be discovered to me. I disavow all Principles which may conclude any Error; but I pretend, that those persons cannot be justly treated as Heretics, who even opinionatively maintain such Principles from which Divines may draw impious Consequences, provided the Defenders of these Principles disavow these Consequences; for if this were true, every one might be treated as an Heretic. These are my following Proofs, which are drawn even from what passes for Reasonable in the Common Opinions of Philosophers; and this not to render them odious Or ridiculous, but that I may prove what I design from Universally-received Opinions, which Peripatetics insist so much upon, that they continually insult over their Adversaries.  

The First Proof.  
Peripatetics, and almost all Men, believe, That Beasts have Souls, and these Souls are more Noble than the Bodies they Animate. 'Tis an Opinion Received at all Times, and in all Nations, That a Dog suffers pain when he is beaten, that he is capable of the Motions of the Passions, Fear, Desire, Envy, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, and that he knows and loves his Master; yet from this Opinion may be drawn such Consequences as are directly repugnant to what Faith teaches us.  

The First Consequence contrary to Faith: That God is unjust.  
Beasts suffer pain, and some are more unhappy than others: Now they have never made an ill use of their Liberty; for they never had any. Then God is unjust who punishes them; who makes them unhappy, and unequally unhappy, although they are equally innocent. Then is this Principle false, That under a Just God nothing can he miserable, without having deserved it. A Principle which nevertheless St. Augustine makes use of against the Pelagians, to prove Original Sin.  
Moreover there is this difference betwixt Men and Beasts, That Men after Death may be happy; which recompenses the pains they endure in this Life: But Beasts lose all at Death; they have been unhappy and innocent, and no Recompense attends them. Thus an innocent Man may suffer in order to Merit, and yet God be Just: But if a Beast suffers, God is unjust.  
Perhaps it may be said, That God may do whatever he pleases with a Beast, provided he observes the Rules of Justice in respect of Man; but if an Angel thought that God could not punish him without having deserved it, and yet might do what he pleased with Man, should we approve of this Thought? Certainly God is Just to all his Creatures; and is the most vile are capable of being miserable, they must needs be capable of becoming criminal.   

Second Consequence repugnant to Faith: That God Wills Disorder, and that Nature is not Corrupted.  
The Soul of a Dog is a Substance more Noble than the Body it Animates; for according to St. 
* De Quantit. Animae ch. 31, 32, etc. lib. 4. de Anima & ejus Origine, ch. 13. and elsewhere.  Augustine, it is a Spiritual Substance more Noble than the most Noble Bodies: Besides, Reason shows us, That Bodies can neither Know nor Love; that Pleasure, Pain, Joy, Sadness, and other Passions, cannot be Modifications of Bodies. 'Tis believed, That Dogs know and love their Masters; that they are susceptible of the Passions of Fear, Desire, Joy, Sadness, and many others. The Soul of Dogs is not then a Body, but a Substance more Noble than Bodies. Now the Soul of a Dog is made for his Body; it has no other End or Felicity than the Enjoyment of Bodies: Then the Nature of Man is not Corrupted, and Concupiscence is no Disorder; God might make Man for the Enjoyment of Bodies; he might subject him to the Motions of Cupiscence, etc.  
Perhaps it may yet be said, That the Soul of Beasts is made for Man; but this is a weak Subterfuge: For it's indifferent to me, whether my Dog or Horse has or has not a Soul: 'Tis not the Soul of a Horse which carries or draws me; 'tis his Body: 'Tis not the Soul of a Chicken which Nourishes me, but its Flesh. Now God could, and consequently aught to create Horses, who should do all Things we have need of, without a Soul; if it be true, That he has made them only for our use: Moreover, the Soul of a Horse is better than the Noblest Bodies; therefore God ought not to create it for the Body of Man. Lastly, God ought not to have given Souls to Flies, which Swallows feed upon: Swallows are but of little use to Man; they might have fed upon Grain, like other Birds.  
Why then must there be an infinite Number of Souls annihilated to preserve the Bodies of these Birds, since the Soul of a Fly is worth more than the Body of the most perfect Animals? If then we are assured that Beasts have Souls, (that is, Substances that are more Noble than Bodies) we take away from God his Wisdom, and make him Act irregularly; we destroy Original Sin, and consequently overthrow Religion, by taking away the Necessity of a Mediator.   

The Third Consequence contrary to Faith: The Soul of Man is Mortal; or at least, the Souls of Beasts pass from one Body to another.  
The Soul of a Beast is a Substance distinct from its Body: Now it is Annihilated; then Substances may naturally be Annihilated. Then although the Soul of Man be a Substance distinct from his Body, it may be Annihilated when the Body is destroyed. Thus one may demonstrate by Reason, That the Soul of Man is Immortal: But if we grant as a most Certain Truth, That no Substance can be naturally Annihilated, the Soul of Beasts will Subsist after Death; and since they are made for Bodies, the least we can infer is, That they pass from one Body into another; that they may not be useless in Nature. This is a Consequence which appears more Reasonable.  
Now we believe, That God is Just and Wise; that He loves not Disorder; that Nature is Corrupted; that the Soul of Man is Immortal, and the Soul of Beasts is Mortal: Because indeed, 'tis not a Substance distinct from their Bodies. Therefore in the Language of Monsieur de la Ville, which condemns Men from Consequences which he draws from their Principles, the Cartesians may represent him as criminal, and all Mankind besides; because they believe that Beasts have Souls.  
What would Monsieur de la Ville say, if from his own way of Arguing, we should accuse him of Impiety; because he maintains Opinions, from whence we deduce, That God is not Just, Wise, Powerful; Sentiments which overthrow Religion, which oppose Original Sin, which take away the only Demonstration that Reason furnishes us with to prove the Immortality of the Soul? What would he say, if we should treat him as unjust and cruel, for making innocent Souls suffer, and even Annihilating them, for the Nourishment of Bodies which they Animate? He is a Sinner; they are innocent. 'Tis only to nourish his Body, that he kills Bodies, and Annihilates their Souls, which are of more value than bodies. Again, If his Body could not subsist but by the Flesh of Animals, or if the Annihilation of one Soul could make him immortal, this Cruelty, however unjust it is, might perhaps be pardonable; but how many Substances, wholly innocent, does he Annihilate, only to preserve for a few days a Body justly condemned to death for sin.  
Would he be so little a Philosopher, as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the places where he lives? But if his Zeal had carried him to the Indies, where the Inhabitants build 
* Linsch. ch. 37.  Hospitals for Beasts, where the Philosophers, and many of the best Sort of Men, are so charitable, even in respect to Flies, that for fear of killing them by breathing or walking, they wear a fine Cloth before their Mouths, and fan the Ways in which they pass; would he then be afraid to make innocent Souls suffer, or Annihilate them for the preservation of a Sinners Body? Would he not rather choose their Opinion who allow the Soul of a Beast to be no more Noble than their Body, nor distinct from it; and by publishing this Sentiment acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice, whereof these People would accuse him, if having the same Principles he followed not their Custom.  
This Example might be sufficient to show, That we ought not to treat Men as Heretics and dangerous persons, because we may draw impious Consequences from their Principles, even when they disavow these Consequences: But be it as it will, I think it is infinitely more difficult to Answer these Consequences that I have now drawn, than these of Monsieur de la Ville. The Cartesians would ve very ridiculous, if they treated Monsieur de la Ville, and other persons who are not of their Opinion, as Impious and Heretical. 'Tis only the Authority of the Church which may decide in Matters of Faith; and the Church has not obliged us, and probably whatever Consequences shall be drawn from Common Principles, will not oblige us to believe, That Dogs have a Soul more Noble than their Bodies; that they know not their Masters; that they neither Fear, Desire, nor suffer any thing: Because it is not necessary, that Christians should be instructed in these Truths.    

The Second Proof.  
Almost all Men are persuaded, that sensible Objects are true Causes of the Pleasure and Pain which is felt by their means. They believe that Fire disperses that agreeable Heat which rejoices us. That Nourishments act in us, and give us the agreeable Sensations of Tastes. They doubt not but 'tis the Sun which ripens Fruits that are necessary for Life; and that all Sensible Objects have a Virtue which is proper to them, by which they can do us much Good or Evil. Let us see whether we cannot draw from these Principles, such Consequences as are contrary to what Religion obliges us to believe.  

A Consequence impugning the First Principle of Morality; by which we are obliged to love God with all our Power, and to fear him only.  
'Tis a Common Notion, according to which all Men act, That we should love or fear whatever has Power to do us good or hurt; to make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain; to make us Happy or Unhappy. This is a supposed Principle, we ought therefore to love and fear them. This is a Reasoning which all the World Naturally makes, and which is yet a general Principle of the Corruption of Manners.  
It is evident by Reason, and the first of God's Commandments, that all the Motions of our Soul, whether Love or Fear, Desire or Joy, should tend towards God; and that all the Motions of our Body should be regulated and determined by External Objects. By the Morion of our Body we may approach to Fruit, avoid a Blow, fly a Beast that would devour us: But we ought to love and fear God only. All the Motions of our Soul ought to tend towards him alone: We ought to love him with all our Power: This is an indispensible Law. We can neither love nor fear what is below us, without being disordered and corrupted. To be afraid of a Beast ready to devour us, or to fear the Devil, is to do them honour. To love Fruit, to desire Riches, to rejoice in the Heat of the Sun, as if it were the true Cause thereof; nay, even to love one's Father, Protector, Friend, as if they were capable of doing as good; this is to give them that honour which is due to God only. We must not love any one in this sense. 'Tis permitted, and we ought to love our Neighbour, by wishing or procuring for him, as a Natural or Occasional Cause, whatever may conduce to his Happiness, but not otherwise. We must love our Brethren, not as capable of doing us good, but as of enjoying with us the true Good. These Truths appear evident to me, but Men strangely obscure them, when they suppose that Bodies which are about us can act in us as true Causes.  
Indeed the greatest part of Christian Philosophers, pretend that Creatures can do nothing, if God did not concur to their Action; and so Sensible Objects cannot act in us without the Efficacy of the First Cause. We ought neither to fear nor love them, but God only, on whom all things depend.  
This Explication shows, Men condemn the Consequences which I have drawn from their Principle: But if I should say with Monsieur de la Ville, that 'tis a slight of Philosophers to cover their Impiety; if I should charge them with the crime of maintaining, at the expense of Religion, Aristotle's Opinions, and the Prejudices of their Senses; if by examining their Heart, I should impute to them a secret desire of debauching men's Morals by the defence of a Principle which justifies all sorts of disorders, and opposes the first Principle of Christian Morality, by the Consequences which I have drawn: Should I be very Reasonable thus to be willing to condemn all Men as impious, because of the Consequences which I might draw from their Principles?  
Certainly, Monsieur de la Ville would say my Consequences were not fairly deduced, and I say the same thing of his. But to destroy all these Consequences, I need only explain his Equivocations, which I shall sometime or other do, as I see it necessary.  
But how will Monsieur de la Ville justify the Common Opinion about the Efficaciousness of Second Causes? 
See the Explanation about Second Causes, in Vol. 2. of the Search after Truth.  And by what kind of Concourse will he render to God all that is due to him? Will he show clearly that one and the same Action is wholly of God, and wholly of the Creature? Will he demonstrate that the Power of the Creature is useless; though without its Efficacy the sole Action of God would produce the same Effect? Will he prove that Spirits ought neither to love nor fear Bodies; although Bodies have a true Power of acting upon them? And will he from hence convince many whose Mind and Heart is wholly possessed with Sensible Objects; because they judge these Objects are capable of making them happy or miserable? Let him confess then, that if it were permitted to treat as Impious and Heretical, all those who maintain such Principles from which Impious and Heretical Consequence may be deduced, that then no one can be secure from having his Faith suspected.    

The Third Proof.  

The Consequence of a Principle proposed by Monsieur de la Ville, as matter of Faith, That the Essence of Bodies consists not in Extension. This Negative Principle overthrows the only demonstrable and direct Proof, of the Souls being a substance distinct from the Body, and consequently Immortal.  
When this Truth is received (which I think I have demonstrated after many others, and which Monsieur de la Ville attacks nevertheless as a Principle contrary to the decisions of the Church) That the Essence of Matter consists in Extension, in length, breadth and depth. It is not difficult to prove, That the Soul, or that which is capable of thinking, is a distinct substance from the Body: For 'tis manifest, the Extension of any matter, conceived as divisible or movable, can never reason, will, nor even perceive; so that that in us which thinks, is a substance distinct from our Body. Actual Knowledges, Wills, and Sensations, are actually manners of the existence of some substance. Now all divisions that happen to Extension, can produce nothing but Figures; as all Motions, relations of distance. Extension is incapable of other Modifications. Therefore our Thought, Desire, Sensations of Pleasure and Pain, are manners of some substances existence, which is not Body. Therefore the Soul is distinct from the Body; and this being asserted, we prove likewise that it is Immortal.  
No Substance is ever annihilated by the common Power of Nature; for as Nature cannot produce something out of nothing, so it cannot reduce any thing that is, to nothing. Manners of Being may be annihilated, Roundness in a Body may be destroyed; for what is Round may become Square; but this Roundness is not a Being, a Thing, a Substance; 'tis only a relation of inequality in the distance which is between the parts that terminate this Body, and that which is at the Centre. Thus the relations changing, Roundness is no more, but the substance cannot be annihilated. Now by the Reasons above, the Soul is not a manner of the Body's existence, it is therefore Immortal; and although the Body be dissolved into a thousand parts of different Nature, and the Construction of the Organs be broken, the Soul consists not in this Construction, nor in any other Modification of Matter: It's evident then that a dissolution and even an annihilation of the substance of Man's Body, if the annihilation were real, could not annihilate the substance of our Soul. But there is yet another Proof of the Souls Immortality built upon the same Principle.  
Although a Body cannot be reduced to nothing because it is a substance, it may nevertheless die, and suffer a dissolution of all its parts; for Extension is divisible. Now the Soul being a substance distinct from Extension, it cannot be divided: One can divide a Thought, a Desire, a Sensation of Pain or Pleasure, as one may divide a Square into two or four Triangles: Then the substance of the Soul is indissoluble, incorruptible, and consequently Immortal, because unextended.  
But if Monsieur de la Ville supposes, that the Essence of Body consists in something else besides Extension, how will he convince Libertines that 'tis neither Material nor Mortal. They will maintain to him that this something, in which the Essence of Body consists, is capable of thinking, and that the substance which thinks, is the same with that that is extended. If Monsieur de la Ville denies it, they will show him that 'tis unreasonable; since according to his Principle, a Body being something else besides Extension, he has no distinct Idea of what that can be; and therefore cannot know whether this unknown thing is not capable of thinking. Will he pretend to convince them by maintaining, as he does in his Book, that the Essence of Body is to have parts without Extension? Certainly they will not believe him upon his word; for finding so much difficulty in conceiving parts without Extension, as indivisible Atoms, and Circles without two Semicircles, they must have more deference for him, than he himself has for the Word of God. For Monsieur de la Ville in the last Part of his Book, pretends, That even God cannot oblige us to believe things that are contradictory; such as are the parts of Body without any actual Extension.  
But Libertines will not be wanting on their part for probable Reasons, to confound the Soul with the Body. Experience (they will say) teaches us, That a Body is capable of feeling, thinking, and reasoning: That 'tis the Body which feels Pleasure and Pain: That 'tis the Brain which thinks and reasons: The weight of the Body depresses the Mind: Folly is a true Distemper; and those who have most Wisdom lose it, when that part of the Brain, in which it resides, grows infirm. The Essences of Being's are unknown to us, we cannot by Reason discover of what they are capable; so that Reason wills we should consult Experience, and Experience confounds the Soul with the Body, and teaches us that it is capable of thinking. Thus Libertines will reason.  
And indeed those who tell us, we know not the Essenees of Being's; and who quarrel with Philosophers, for demonstrating that Extension is not the Manner of Being, but the very Essence of Matter; aught to think upon the mischievous Consequences that are deducible from their Principles, and not go about to overthrow all the demonstration we have brought about the distinction that is between the Soul and Body: For in fine, the distinction of these two parts of ourselves, proved by clear Ideas, is the most fruitful and necessary of all Truths in Philosophy, perhaps even in Divinity and Christian Morality. But this distinction is more fully shown in many places of the 
* Lib. 4. ch. 2. lib. 6. p. 2. ch. 7. lib. 3. p. 2. ch. 8.  Search after Truth. And I maintain to Monsieur de la Ville, notwithstanding his Answer, which is full of Equivocations, Figures and Contradictions; or rather, I maintain to the Libertines; for as for him, I believe him so settled in his Faith, that he wants not such Proofs: I say, I maintain to Libertines, that they will never find any Parallogism in my Demonstration; that 'tis impossible to conceive it clearly and distinctly, without yielding to it; and that all the Proofs they bring to confound the Soul with the Body, are drawn from Sense, that they are confused and obscure Proofs, and will never convince those who judge of things upon clear and distinct Ideas.  
From this Principle, That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension, and that the Essences of Things are unknown, I might draw yet many Consequences contrary to Faith; but 'tis unnecessary: I would rather, if it were possible, reconcile all true and false Philosophies with Religion; and however Impious and Heretical the Consequences might be, which I could deduce from the Opinions of Philosophers, I should think I wanted the Charity I own them, if I endeavoured to bring their Faith in question; much less would I imitate the conduct of Monsieur de la Ville, who leaving a Principle fully demonstrated, and received in all Ages, and busies himself in drawing Heretical Consequences therefrom, which only serve to confirm the Calvinists, by increasing their number, and troubling the Faith of the Faithful: I would on the contrary, that no one should think on these Consequences; or disown them as false, and unfairly deduced from this Principle.  
All Truths agree together. One cannot maintain a false Principle, but every one that knows but a little of the Art of Reasoning, may infer from thence many Consequences repugnant to Religion; so that if it were permitted to call in question the Faith of others upon Consequences drawn from Principles by them believed, (as there's no one that is not deceived in something) all the World would soon be Heretical. This would be to open the way to an infinite number of Quarrels, Schisms, Disturbances, and even Civil Wars; and all Mankind is concerned to look upon the Abettors of such a Conduct, as Calumniators and Disturbers of the public Peace: For in short, different Parties in Religion, which are almost always found upon such like Consequences, produce strange Events in a State; Histories are full of them; but the liberty of Philosophising and Reasoning upon common Notions, ought not to be taken away from Men; 'tis a right which is as Natural to them, as 'tis to breathe. Divines ought to distinguish between Theology and Divinity; between the Articles of Faith and men's Opinions; between the Truths which God teaches to all Christians by a visible Authority, and those which he discovers to some persons as a recompense of their attention and pains. They ought not to confound things which depend upon such different Principles. No doubt, Humane Sciences ought to be made serviceable to Religion, but with a Spirit of Peace and Charity, without condemning one another, so long as we agree in Truths which the Church has decided; for this Truth will shine forth; and by adding new discoveries to those of the Ancients, all Sciences will be brought more and more to perfection.  
But the imagination of the most part of Men is not adapted to new Discoveries, but Novelties of Opinions never so advantageous to Religion affrightens them, and they are easily familiarized with the most false and obscure Principles, if but advanced by the Ancients: But when they are grown familiar with these Principles, they find them evident though they are never so obscure; they look upon them as very useful, though they are very dangerous; and they accustom themselves so much to speak and hear what they understand not, and to pass over a real difficulty by an imaginary distinction, that they are always well satisfied with their false Ideas, and can never endure to be spoke to in a clear and distinct Language: Like persons, who coming out of a dark place, are too apprehensive of the Light, and cannot endure it, they imagine we blind them, when we endeavour to dissipate the Darkness which surrounds them.  
Thus although I have showed by many Consequences, that it is dangerous, for example, to maintain, That Beasts have a Soul more noble than their Body; yet this Opinion is ancient, and most Men are accustomed to believe it; whilst the contrary is stigmatised with the Character of Novelty. Those who judge of the harshness of Opinions, rather by the Fear they produce in the imagination, than by the Evidence and Light which they diffuse through the Mind, will not be wanting to look upon the Opinion of the Cartesians as dangerous, and condemn them as rash and presumptuous, rather than those who even maintain, that Beasts are capable of Reasoning.  
Let a Man but say in company with a grave Air; or rather, with such a one as the Imagination forms when 'tis frightened by something extraordinary, Indeed these Cartesians are strange Men, They maintain that Beasts have no Soul: I am very apprehensive they will soon say as much of Man: And this will be enough to persuade many that this is a dangerous Opinion. No Reasons can prevent the effect of this Discourse upon weak imaginations; and if there happens not to be a brisk Wit, and who by a merry Air reimboldens the Company, and frees them from the fear they were in, let the Cartesians torment themselves as much as they please, they shall never efforce by their Reasoning, the Character which is thus given of them.  
Yet there needs no more to show them the extravagance of this Discourse, than to put the definition in the place of the thing defined: For if a Man said seriously, These Cartesians are strange Men, They assure us that Beasts neither think nor feel: I am very apprehensive they will soon say as much of us. Certainly one would judge, that this Man would have very little ground for his apprehension; but the greatest part of Men are incapable of extricating the least difficulty, especially when their Imagination is frightened by the Idea of some Novelty which is represented as dangerous: Besides, the Air and Deportment easily, and even pleasantly, persuade us. But Truth is not discovered without some application of Mind, of which the greatest part of Mankind is incapable.  
Certainly, Men who know most, and whose Opinions are blindly embraced by the Vulgar, ought not so easily to condemn their Brethren; at least, before they had examined their Sentiments with a serious attention: They ought not to inspire those▪ who respectfully hear them, with disadvantageous Sentiments against their Neighbour. This is against all Rules of Charity and Justice.  
But the Cartesians say they, receive Principles whose Consequences are dangerous. I grant it, since they will have it so; but they own not these Consequences. They are perhaps so gross and stupid, that they see them not included in their Principles, yet they imagine they can separate them, and think other Philosophers ought not to be believed upon their word. They are not uncharitable to those who maintain Principles full of dangerous Consequences, and also contrary to Religion and good Sense. For in fine, we may easily judge by the mischievous Consequences which I have drawn from these very Principles, upon which Peripatetics pretend to triumph over their Adversaries, how many I might draw from others, and even the most mischievous, if I would give myself the trouble of choosing out of their Body of Philosophy, the most exceptionable. But what advantage soever there is in Theological Contestations, as also in public Disputations, I had rather defend myself weakly, than overcome and triumph as an Agressor. For in fine, I do not comprehend how these, who submit to all the Decisions of the Church, can be pleased in making any Men impious and heretical upon Consequences they disavow. Victory seems to me to be fatal, which spills the Blood of our own Countrymen.  
But I believe I have not advanced in the Search after Truth, any Principle of Philosophy whose Consequences are dangerous. But on the contrary, if I forsake Monsieur Des Cartes in some places, and Aristotle almost every where; 'tis because, I cannot reconcile that with Truth, or this either with Truth or Religion: This I leave to Men of more Judgement and Invention than myself. I have said the Essence of Matter consists in Extension; because I believe its evident, that I have demonstrated it; and thereby given clear and incontestable Proofs, that the Soul is immortal and distinct from the Body. A Truth which is essential to Religion, and which Philosophers are obliged to prove by the last Lateran 
* Sess. 8.  Council. But I never thought this Principle, which is so fruitful in Truths that are serviceable to Religion, was contrary to the Council of Trent. Monsieur de la Ville ought not to assert it. This can do no good, This is the Conduct of the Religionaries in Holland, Vitichius 
* Theo. pac. ch. 4. , Poiret 
† L. 3. ch. 13. cog. nat. , and many others. I say not this to call his Faith in question; but I am much afraid that his Conduct will give them occasion to assert, that we own in France, that to be a good Catholic, it's necessary to believe that the parts of Bodies may exist without any actual Extension; because a Book dedicated to the Bishops, Published in Form with Approbation and Privilege, treats the Cartesians as Heretics upon this Point. I fear lest by his Probabilities he may shake the Faith of many, who know not precisely what is necessary to make an Article of Faith; but I am yet more apprehensive, lest Libertines should be fortified in their Sentiments, That the Soul is Corporeal, and consequently Immortal. That the Subject which he thinks is the same with that which is extended, because according to them and Monsieur de la Ville, Extension being only a Manner of Being, whose Essence is unknown to us, we have no Argument from Reason, that this Being is incapable of striking, and we have many Arguments from Sense: Arguments however false they are, yet very convincing and even demonstrative to all persons, that will not be at the pains of Reasoning.  
Hence I believe I am obliged to assert, with all the Confidence which a sight of Truth affords me, that I have demonstrated Extension is not a 
* Search after Truth. p. 2. ch.  Manner of Being; but a Being, a Thing, a Substance; in a word, a Body: And there are many Answers in the Search after Truth to these Proofs of Sense, by which Libertines confound the two Substances whereof Man is composed. I maintain moreover, that Monsieur de la Ville has not shown, that this Opinion of the Essence of Matter is contrary to Transubstantiation; that he has objected only such Answers as are easy to be resolved; that he might more easily triumph over his Adversaries; that he has only impugned mine, and probably not so much as understood them; and that in the humour I now find him, I don't think myself obliged to inform him. Lastly, That he has added to the 
* It is forbidden by this Bull, under Pain of Excommunication, to give any Explanation of the Decrees of the Council. Ullum omnino interpretationis genus super ipsius Consilii decretis quocunque modo edere, etc. This Power is reserved to the Pope.  Council of Trent more Articles of Faith, or more Explications, than any private person has a right to do, after the express prohibitions contained in the Bull, which confirms the same Council.  
As for what respects me, I desire the Readers not to believe Monsieur de la Ville upon his word, but examine him cautiously: Even where he asserts with the greatest Confidence, he boasts himself upon his Sincerity and Ingenuity; and I don't desire to dispute those qualities with him, which are indispensable to every honest Man; but I cannot forbear saying, in defence of Truth, and for my own Justification, that he has often forgot himself in his Book, of which I will give one notorious Instance.  
In the Frontispiece of his Work, he has inserted an Advertisement which has an Air of Sincerity; for 'tis composed only to make me a kind of a Reparation: 'Tis in these terms; That there came to his Hands a Copy of the Search after Truth, of the Strasbourg Edition, Anno 1677, which obliges him to advertise his dear Reader, that I had retracted an Error in this Edition, which I had advanced in the first: But it's so true, that I either know little in Divinity, or am so very presumptuous, that I could not retract one Error without advancing two others. His whole Advertisement is only to make me a Charitable Reparation.  
However 'tis false, (1.) That I retracted that pretended Error about Original Sin; the same Proposition being in the same words in the Edition he citys 
* In the Edition of Strasbourgh, p. 190. In the 1st Edition at Paris, p. 172. In the 3d, p. 107. In the 4th, p. 95. , and in all those made at Paris.  
(2.) This Proposition is not my particular Opinion, since 'tis commonly taught in the Schools: But though it were not taught at present, yet 'tis certainly no Error, much less 
† p. 90.  a very pernicious one; as he elsewhere calls it.  
(3.) The two Errors which he supposes me to substitute in the room of that pretended one, are two things which I never said, and which he puts upon me. Those that read what he has written in relation to the Question, may see that what I say is Truth; so that I shall not stand to prove it; especially since some Stranger has sufficiently done it to my hand: And I could only wish, whoever he was, that he had alleged the Reasons which I had for saying, That an Infant at the time of Baptism was justified by an Actual Love; as I have shown in the Explanation upon Original Sin.  
Let any one judge then, after having honestly and sincerely examined the Advertisement of Monsieur de la Ville, if I had not reason to desire the equitable Readers not to credit him upon his Word; for if we believe him, he is the most Sincere and Honest Man in the World; but if he be carefully examined, we find not over many marks of his Sincerity and Honesty. At the end of his Advertisement, he protests he has endeavoured as much as possible, to keep all the Moderation he ought: That 'tis only his Adversaries Errors he opposes; but for their persons he has much esteem and respect, whilst yet one can't examine that Advertisement without discovering at least the appearances of a bad Faith, and of a Malign Temper, which surprises and provokes the Spirit. I pray God to pardon his Heat, to regulate his Zeal, and inspire him with a Spirit of Mildness, Charity and Peace, towards his Brethren. I know not whether he is pleased in treating me so unhandsomely as he does; but I can assure him that I am much troubled, that the necessity of defending Truth has obliged me to suspect his Honesty; and on the contrary, I should be glad is he could know how much I honour, respect and love him sincerely in Him, in whom we are all Brethren. Noverit quam eum non contemnam & quantum illam in illo Deo timeam & cogitem caput nostrum in cujus corpore fratres sumus. Aug. ad Fortunianum, Epist. 111.    
FINIS.   

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