A Treatise OF NATURE AND GRACE.  
To which is Added, The AUTHOR's Idea of Providence; AND His Answers to several Objections against the foregoing Discourse.  
By the Author of, The Search after Truth.  
Translated from the Last Edition, Enlarged by many Explications.  
LONDON, Printed, and are to be Sold by John Whitlock near Stationers- Hall, 1695.   


MUNIFICENTIA REGIA. 1715.  
GEORGIV● D.G. MA●. BR●●ET HI● 〈◊〉 F.D.   bookplate   

Advertisement.  
I Entreat those, into whose hands this writing shall fall, to believe that I chief undertook it to satisfy the difficulties of some Philosophers, who had not, as I thought, all those Sentiments, which Religion teaches to have of God's goodness; and were not sufficiently acquainted with the obligations which we have to Jesus Christ. I desire, it may be looked upon only as an Essay; that none will judge of it, before they have examined it without prejudice, and that they will not suffer themselves to be surprised by those motions of fear and suspicion, which every thing which seems to be new, is apt naturally to excite in us. Seeing I wrote for such Philosophers, as pretend to be very just and exact in their Reasonings, I was obliged to avoid those general terms which are ordinarily used: for I could not content them but by using such terms as raise in their minds distinct and particular Ideas, as far as the subject will permit it. I presume that all Candid Readers will judge, that I have no other design, but to prove (all ways possible) those truths which Faith teaches; and that I am not so rash as to doubt of that which is looked upon as certain in the Church, and which Religion obliges us to believe. But it has always been allowed, to give new proofs of old truths, to represent God Amiable to Men, and to make it plain that there is nothing hard or unjust, in the order which he observes for the establishment of his Church.  
This Work is divided into Three Discourses; In the First, I represent God, as doing all the good to his Creatures, which his Wisdom permits. In the Second, I show, how the Son of God, as incarnate Wisdom, and Head of the Church, communicates to his Members those Graces, which he could not grant unto them, as Eternal Wisdom: And thus I do endeavour, to represent the obligations and relations which we have to Jesus Christ. Lastly, In the Third, I explain, what is Liberty, and how Grace acts in us without hurting it. Seeing there are some Persons, of so little Candour, as to draw invidious Consequences, even from Principles, the most advantageous to Religion; I beg that I may not be condemned upon their word, and that before I be Judged, Men will do me so much Justice, as to understand me. Certainly I ought not to be necessitated to make this request.   

A TABLE OF The Treatise of Nature and Grace.  

The First Discourse. OF the Necessity of the General Laws of Nature and Grace.  
Part I. Of the Necessity of the General Laws of Nature. pag. 1.  
Part II. Of the Necessity of the General Laws of Grace. p. 32.   

The Second Discourse. Of the Laws of Grace in particular, and of the occasional causes which govern and determine their efficacy.  
Part I. Of the Grace of Jesus Christ. p. 63.  
Part II. Of the Grace of the Creator. p. 101.   

The Third Discourse. Of Grace, and the manner by which it acts in us.  
Part I. Of Liberty. p. 123.  
Part II. Of Grace. p. 140.   

The First Explication.  
What it is to act by General Wills, and what by Particular. p. 160.  
Marks by which it may be judged, whether an effect is produced by a General, or by a Particular Will. p. 162, 163.  
Objection 1. and Answer. p. 173.  
Object. 2. and Answer. p. 178, 179.   

The Second Explication.  
Where 'tis proved, that J. C. is figured every where in the Scriptures, and that even by the events which were before the Sin of the first Man; to teach us that the principal of God's Designs, is the Incarnation of his Son. p. 190.   

The Third Explication,  
Where 'tis proved, that the chief of God's Designs is J. C. and his Church; and that God truly loves Men; that he sincerely desires to save all; that his Conduct is worthy of his Wisdom, Goodness, Immutability, and other Attributes: What is the order of the decrees which contain the Predestination of Saints. p. 197.  
Object. and Answer. p. 206, 207.   

The Last Explication.  
The frequent Miracles of the Old Law, do by no means show, that God often acted by particular Wills. p. 217.   

The Author's Idea of Providence. p. 228.   

Objections against the foregoing discourse, with the Author's Answers.  
Objection 1. and Answer. p. 238.  
Object. 2. and Ans. p. 242.  
Object. 3. and Ans. p. 246, 247.  
Object. 4. and Ans. p. 255, 256.  
Object. 5. and Ans. p. 263, 264.  
Object. 6. and Ans. p. 269, 270.  
Object. 7. and Ans. p. 275.  
Object. 8. and Ans. p. 278, 279.    

CORRECTIONS.  
Page Line  5 4 AFter image, ad— of. ib. 7 For there, Lege their. 10 13 For creation, L. Incarnation. 14 12 After absit, add— the Period stop. [.] 16 7 For capit, L. cupit. 17 28 For they, L. men. 23 17 For form, L. forms. 26 15 Deal not. 33 26 For principle, L. principal. 38 10 The Comma after— it, [,] 43 3 D. to after obliges. 45 31 For, all those, L. any. ib. 18 After proceed, this Punctation. [;] 81 13 D. of, after think. 85 19 After wisdom, a Comma. [,] 87 11 For real manner, L. sure way. 89 23 D. the, before order. 93 33 After God, add— they. 95 4 L. men's, for men. ib. ult. L. efface, for effuse. 97 4 L. motions, for motion. 104 32 L. speak, for speaking. 106 ult. After and, add— another. 108 16, 17 For God is just, and would by a particular, etc. ib.  L. this Man is just, & God would by a particular, etc. 131 ult. For whilst we love, L. when we enjoy, etc. 134 4 After carries, add— him. 138 6 For unusual, L. unuseful. 143 20, 21 For pleasures, L. pleasures. 153 3, 4, After and, add— it. After sweetness and desolation, this Punctation. [:] ib. 5  158 10 After besides, add— that. ib. 12 After infinite, only a Comma. [,] 162 19 Only a Comma, [,] after others. For but L. that. ib. 20 This Punctation, [:] after them. 192 16 For but, L. that. 202 28 D. not. 215 6 For pravisiones, L. praevisione. ib. 16 After fidei, add— regula. In the Margin, instead of Cap. 23. L. c. 13. 223 22 For Manada, L. Mandata.   


The First Discourse. Of the Necessity of the General Laws of Nature and Grace.  

First Part. The Necessity of the General Laws of Nature.  
Advertisement. I Think I ought to Advertise, That they who are well acquainted with the Principle which I have proved, in the Search after Truth, and elsewhere, need not to read the following Additions, nor even the Explications which are at the end of this Treatise; without which my Meaning may be very well understood: But they may perhaps be useful unto those whom I had chief in my mind, when I wrote the Treatise of Nature and Grace, and whom I should extremely desire to content, as well as others.  
Additions.  
The Will of God can be nothing else, but the Love which he bears to himself. Now he cannot will and act but by his own Will: Therefore he cannot act but for himself. But the World is not worthy of God: It has no Proportion to God; for there is no relation betwixt finite and infinite: God therefore cannot form the Design of producing it. God cannot act with a design of doing nothing for himself, since he cannot act but for himself. Now the World with respect to God, is nothing; for the relation of finite to infinite is a cipher: God therefore cannot resolve to make any thing, if a Divine Person does not join himself to his Work to render it Divine, and thereby worthy of his Complacency, or answerable to the infinite Action of his Will. Thus,  
I.  
Since God cannot act but for his own Glory, nor finding it but in himself, he could have no other design in the Creation of the World, but the Establishment of his Church.  
Additions.  
But what Divine Person shall sanctify the Work of God? It must be the Eternal Word. For it is the Word, or the Wisdom of God, which ought to be, as I may so say, first consulted to regulate the Divine Operation, and in some sort make way for God's Action. A Profane World being unworthy of God, the Wisdom of God rendered God impotent; or hindered him from acting. Thus, supposing that God would procure to himself an Honour worthy of him, (which nevertheless is every way indifferent to him, since he is altogether sufficient to himself) his Wisdom would fail him in some sense, if it did not in the first place offer its self to him to be united to his Work, since otherwise his Work would not be worthy of him. The Word is universal Reason: 'Tis he therefore who was to come and enlighten Men, who could not be reasonable, but by Reason. 'Tis according to him, and by him that we are formed: 'Tis therefore by him, or according to him, we must be perfected, or reform. Thus, since a Divine Person must render the Work of God Divine, make Gods of us, or the Adopted Children of the Eternal Father; it was necessary that his only Son should be the Firstborn amongst many Brethren, and that we all should receive of his Abundance, or of that Fullness of Divinity which dwells in him. I might therefore say according to these Principles, speaking of the Church, that it is the great Work which the Son built to the Glory of the Father. 
Eph. 1.21.22, 23. c. 2.21, 22. c. 4.13.16. Col. 1.15.16, 17, 18, 19 Eccl. 24.14. 1 Pet. 1.20. Eph. 1.4. Joan. 17.5, 24. Apoc. 13.8. Psal. 72.17. Eph. 2.10 Rom. 8.29.   
II.  
Jesus Christ, who is the Head thereof, is the Beginning of the Ways of the Lord; He is the Firstborn of all Creatures: And though he was born amongst men in the fullness of time, yet he is their model in the Eternal designs of his Father. It is according to his Image that all men were made, they who were before his Temporal birth as well as we. In a word, it is in Him that all things subsist; for it is he alone who could render the work of God perfectly worthy of its Author.  
Additions.  
Jesus Christ, who is the Head of the Church, is the beginning of the Ways of the lord I use these Expressions, because Scripture uses them. The Title of Head plainly shows, that Jesus Christ as Man, is not only the Meritorious cause of Grace, but also the Occasional, Physical, Distributive; since He gives his Spirit to his Members which compose the Church, as I shall explain more largely in the Second Discourse. And it may be said, That Jesus Christ is the Beginning of the Ways of the Lord: Because God, by the Creation of the World, goes out, as I may say, of himself, since the term of his Operation is not his own substance, as in immanent Operations, by which the Son is continually begotten, and the Holy Ghost proceeds. It is upon this account that the Wise man after these words in the Eighth Chap. of the Proverbs; The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his Ways, adds for Explication 
* Before his works of Old. , Antequam quidquam faceret a principio. That Jesus Christ is the Head of the Church is without dispute: But that he is the beginning of the Ways of the Lord, in this sense, is that which may be doubted. I have followed the common opinion of the Fathers upon the 22. ver. of the 8th. ch. of the Prov. for almost all of them understand this passage, which the Arrians abused, Dominus possedit; or (as they then read according to the 70.) Creavit me in initio viarum suarum, of the incarnate Wisdom. It is useless here to transcribe all the Quotations of Salazar upon this place of the Proverbs. Jesus Christ is the firstborn of every Creature, primogenitus omnis creaturae, Col. 1.15. He is our model, since St. Paul exhorts us to put Him on, or to become like unto Him: Therefore, as we have born the Image of the Earthly, let us also bear the Image of the Heavenly. It is according to his Image, that all men were made in the purpose of God. For the Word is universal Reason, and immutable Order; and God has made us to conform us to Reason and Order. There are none but the Elect, whom God has efficaciously predestinated to become conformable to the Image his Son: Quos praescivit & predestinavit conformes fieri imagini Filii sui, Rom. 8.29. I confess it. But God would Save all men, He wills there Sanctification; This is the will of God, your Sanctification, 1. Thes. 4.3. The Wisdom incarnate is moreover our model after a sensible manner, and suitable to men who only hearken to their senses. God foreseeing sin, resolved to give unto Jesus Christ a body that it might be a victim, which He might offer unto Him; for every Priest must have something to offer. Necesse est & hunc habere aliquid quod offerat, Heb. 8.3. Now God thought on the body of his Son when he formed that of Adam, and hath given unto us all a body, by which we may Merit, or which we ought to sacrifice as Priests, and according to the Example of our Sovereign Priest: Obsecra vos ut exhibeatis corpora vestra hostiam viventem, sanctam, Deo placentem, Rom. 12.1. To conclude, all things subsist in Jesus Christ, Omnia in ipso constant, Col. 1.19. Every thing was created in J. C. and by J. C. Omnia per ipsum & in ipso creata sunt, Col. 1.16. Omnia & in omnibus Christus, Col. 3.11.  
III.  
There aught to be some relation betwixt the World and the Action by which it is produced. Now the Action by which the World was drawn out of nothing is the Action of God, which is of infinite value; and the World how perfect soever 〈◊〉 might be, is not infinitely amiable, and cann●● 〈…〉 unto God an Honour worthy of him. Thus, separate Jesus Christ from the rest of the creatures, and see if he who cannot act but for his own glory, and whose Wisdom has no bounds, could resolve to produce any thing from without. But if you join J. C. to his Church, and the Church to the rest of the World, out of which it was taken; then you will raise to the Glory of God a Temple so august and so holy, that you'll perhaps be surprised, that the foundations of it were laid so late.  
Additions.  
See then the order of things! All is for men, men for J. C. and J. C. for God; Whether things present, or things to come, all are yours; and you are Christ's, and Christ is Gods. 1. Cor. 3.22. God hath Subjected all things to J. C. All Power is given to me both in Heaven and Earth; St. Mat. 28.18. Heb. 2.9. That J. C. might subject all things to God, and give up his Kingdom at the end of the World, having destroyed all Principalities and all Powers, 1. Cor. 15.24. That the Son himself may be for ever subject to him that put all things under him, and that thus God may be all in all. Ver. 28. This is the Spiritual Temple which must be altogether filled with the Majesty of God, and remain eternally, because its immovable foundations are laid on J. C. before those of this world, which must Perish: 
* I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. Fundavit me, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, apud Sept.  Ab aeterno ordinata sum, & ex antiquis antequam terra sieret, Prov. 8.23. God has elected us in J. C. before the Creation of the World: Eph. 1.4. His grace is given to us before the world began. 2. Tim. 1.9. And J. C. himself in his Prayer after the celebration of the holy Supper, begs of 〈◊〉 Father, that glory which he possessed in him before the world was, i. e. before he resolved to form the World St. John 17.5. To conclude, J. C. being the first of the predestinated, since we are not predestinated but in J. C. God who has made the world only for the predistinated (Omnia propter electos) must, as I may so say, have thought of J. C. before all things. For if these passages, and such like, be interpreted only of the Eternal prescience, it also may be truly said, that the motion of a straw is in God before all ages, as well as the Incarnation of his beloved Son, who renders all the Work of God Amiable to him. If the different manner after which the H. Spirit speaks of the works of God in the H. Scripture be observed, it cannot be doubted, in my opinion, that J. C. and his Church is truly the design of God. See wherefore it is evident by reason, and certain by Faith, that God never reputes, or changes his design. God is not as the Son of man that he should repent, Numb 23.19. Yet nevertheless the H. Scripture says, that God repent he had made man, Gen. 6.6. And that the Jewish Priesthood, their Ceremonies, their whole - offerings were not at all pleasing to him. Isa. 1. Psalm 50. Why did God make a World which he was obliged to destroy? Why has he established a worship which he is bound to reject, he who is constant in all his purposes. It is because he would thereby signify, that the present world is not properly his work, or his true design; nor the Jewish worship a true worship, or worthy of him. But what then is his immutable design? The Lord swore, and will not repent; thou art a Priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec. God will never repent of having made J. C. Sovereign Priest: He thereby receives Divine Honours. His Priesthood shall continue for ever, having been confirmed by an Oath, Heb. ch. 7. etc. God repent that he had made Saul King over the people. Saul, I say, the figure of Herod's, and the Image of Politic Kings, who only seek their own greatness. But David the figure and Father of Jesus Christ, is after Gods own heart. God never repent that he had made him King over his People. I have Sworn once by my Holiness, that I will not fail David. His Seed shall endure for ever, and his Seat is like as the Sun before me, Psal. 89.34, 35. Behold thou shalt conceive and bear a Son— and of his Kingdom there shall be no end.  
When Abraham by the sacrifice of his only Son, had represented Jesus Christ raised from the Dead, God assures him, and that also with an Oath to render this promise irrevocable, that in the Antitpye of Isaac delivered from the Dead, (that is to say in J. C. raised from the Dead, set at his right hand, made a Priest according to the order of Melchisedec, and a King over his People) all the Nations should be abundantly blessed. By myself have I Sworn saith the Lord— in thy seed shall all the Nations of the Earth be Blessed. Thus we see, when God speaks of the Incarnation of his Son and of his Priesthood, he thereunto adds an Oath, to show that this is his irrevocable purpose, or rather his purpose; for since God never reputes, all his designs are irrevocable. But I think I ought to advise, that what I have hitherto said, is not essential to my purpose, which is principally to justify the Wisdom and Goodness of God, notwithstanding Monsters, Sinners, and all the irregularities found in the World. If I place J. C. at the Head of all things, if I make him the principal design of God; it is because I hope by this means to justify the thought, or desire, which God had to go out of himself by communicating himself to his Creatures; and by the regular order of Meditation, it seems to me I ought to begin there.  
iv  
In the mean time, if you observe that the glory which redounds to God from his work, is not essential to him; if you grant that the World cannot be a necessary Emanation of the Divinity; you'll plainly see that it was not to have been eternal, tho' it never should have an end. Eternity is the Character of Independence; it must needs be therefore that the World had a beginning. The annihilation of substances is a mark of inconstancy in him that made them; they therefore shall never have an end.  
Additions.  
I mean that Eternity does not imply independence. But independence implys Eternity; for nothing can be independent that is not Eternal. Eternal existence therefore is the manner whereby that thing which is independent exists. GOD could not give Eternal existence to Creatures. To consider only the Power of God, he was able to have created the World from all Eternity; for he never was without his Power. But if his Wisdom, which is his inviolable, be consulted, he ought not to have done it; and consequently in one sense he could not; for it is not in the power of God to belie himself, or to despise the Laws which his wisdom prescribes to him. The same thing must be said concerning the annihilation of substances. If you consider only the power of God, he may annihilate them. But if you consult his wisdom, it appears that he will do no such thing: for God acts always after the wisest manner that he can, or which best comports with his divine attributes. He may choose whether he will act at all, in this he is very indifferent, for he is altogether sufficient to himself. But if he acts he cannot change. His conduct must always bear the impression of his wisdom and his immutability. It seems to me that order, which is his inviolable law, requires it should be thus. See the 2d. discourse, Articles 50, 51, 52.  
V  
If therefore it be true, that the World ought to have a beginning, and that the creation of J. C. could not be so ancient as the eternal generation of his divine Person; an eternity must needs have preceded time. Thus, do not think that God delayed the production of his work, he too much loves the glory which he receives thereby in J. C. It may be truly said in some sense, that he has made it as soon as he could. For tho' in respect of us, he might have created it ten Thousand years before the beginning of the World; yet ten Thousand years having no relation to eternity, he could not have made it sooner or later; since an eternity must needs have gone before.  
VI  
It is plain, that soon and late are the properties of time. And if it should be supposed that God had created the World sooner than he did, by so many Millions of years, as there are grains of sand upon the Seashore, might it not still have been asked, Why God who so much loves the glory which he receives by the Establishment of his Church, had not begun many Ages before? Thus it is sufficient to say, that an Eternity 
* Ought to have gone.  went before the Incarnation of the World, to show that this great mystery was accomplished neither too soon nor too late. It was therefore necessary that God should have created the World for the Church, the Church for J. C. and J. C. for to find in him a Sacrifice, and a Sovereign Priest worthy of the divine Majesty. This order of the designs of God cannot be doubted of, if it be observed, that he cannot have any other end of his actions but himself. And if it be understood that eternity is not proper to creatures, it will be granted, that they were made when they ought to have been. These truths being supposed, let us endeavour to discover something in the conduct which God observes for the execution of his great design.  
Additions.  
Read the Objection and Answer which is at the end of the third explication, where I show, that St. Augustine did not pretend that the Judgements of God are impenetrable in this sense; that the truths which Faith teaches us being supposed, it is unlawful to justify his wisdom and goodness in the execution of his intentions. 'Tis certain, that the Fathers, and all Divines have endeavoured to give a reason of their Faith, and we ought to meditate upon the truths of Religion, to attain unto the understanding of that which we already believe. But to remove all scruple concerning my way of proceeding, I shall now show, that St. Augustine himself approves it by his Example and his Reasons.  
Consentius had some difficulties concerning the Trinity, he had proposed them to Alipius, that he might obtain the resolution of them from St. Augustine. But having learned that St. Augustine was in a place of retirement, and proper for meditating and clearing up his doubts, he writ to him himself, (as unto a man whose spirit 
* Sensum altissima mysteria perscrutantem.  penetrated into the highest mysteries) that he would give him those explications he desired, if he thought convenient. Nevertheless he openly declares, that 'twas his opinion, the reasons of our mysteries ought not to be sought after, but that men should depend upon Faith only. These are his words, Epis. 221.  
Ego igitur, cum apud memetipsum prorsus definierim, veritatem rei divinae ex fide, magis quam ex ratione, percipi oportere, si enim fides Sanctae Ecclesiae ex disputationis ratione, non ex credulitatis Pietate, apprehenderetur, nemo praeter Philosophos atque Oratores, beatitudinem possederet. Sed quia placuit Deo, qui infirma Mundi hujus elegit, ut confundat fortia, per stultitiam Praedicationis salvare credentes; non tam ratio requirenda de Deo, quam autoritas est sequenda Sanctorum. Nam profecto, neque Ariani, qui Filium, quem genitum confitemur, minorem putant, in hac impietate persisterent, neque Macedoniani Spiritum Sanctum, quem neque genitum neque ingenitum credimus, quantum in ipsis est a Divinitatis arce detruderent, si Scripturis Sanctis, magis quam suis ratiocinationibus, accomodare fidem mallent.  
But see St. Augustin's Answer.  
Quod autem petis, ut questionem Trinitatis hoc est de Unitate Divinitatis, & discretione Personarum, caute, prudenterque discutiam, ut doctrinae meae, sicut dicis, ingeniique serenitas, ita nebulam vestrae mentis abstergat, ut quod nunc cogitare non potestis, intelligentiae a me lumine declaratum quodammodo videre positis. Vide prius, utrum ista petitio cum tua superiori definitione concordet, superius quippe in eadem ipsa Epistola, in qua hoc petis, apud temetipsum definisse te dicis, ex fide veritatem magis quam ex ratione, percipi oportere. Si enim fides, inquis, Sanctae Ecclesiae, ex disputationis ratione, & non ex credulitatis pietate apprehenderetur, nemo praeter philosophos atque Oratores beatitudinem possideret, sed quia placuit, inquis Deo, qui infirma hujus Mundi elegit, ut confundat fortia, per stultitiam Praedicationis salvos facere credentes, non tam ratio requirenda, quam autoritas est sequenda Sanctorum. Vide ergo, secundum haec verba tua, ne potius debeas, maxim de hac re, in qua fides nostra Consistit, solam Sanctorum autoritatem sequi, nec ejus intelligentiae a me quaerere rationem. Neque enim cum caepero te in tanti hujus secreti intelligentiam utcunque introducere (quod nisi Deus intus adjuverit omnino non potero) aliud disserendo facturus sum, quam rationem, ut potero, redditurus: quam si a me, vel quolibet doctore non irrationabiliter flagitas, ut quod credis intelligas, Corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem respuas, sed ut ea que fidei firmitate jam tenes, etiam rationis Luce conspicias. Absit namque ut hoc in nobis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis animantibus excellentiores creavit. Absit inquam, ut ideo credamus, ne rationem accipiamus, sive queramus; cum enim credere non possemus, nisi rationales animas haberemus. Ut ergo in quibusdam rebus, ad doctrinam salutarem pertinentibus, quas ratione nondum percipere valemus, sed aliquando valebimus, fides precedat rationem, qua cor mundatur, ut magnae rationis capiat, & perferat Lucem, hoc utique rationis est. & ideo rationabiliter dictum est per Prophetam, Nisi credideritis non intelligetis. Isa. 7.9. secund. 70. Ubi proculdubio discrevit haec duo, deditque consilium, quo prius credamus, ut id quod credimus intelligere valeamus. Proinde ut fides praecedat rationem rationabiliter visum est. Nam si hoc praeceptum rationabile non est, ergo irrationabile est. Absit si igitur rationabile est, ut ad magna quaedam, quae capi nondam possunt, fides precedat rationem; proculdubio, quantulacunque ratio quae hoc persuadet, etiam ipsa antecedit fidem. Propterea monet Apost. Petrus, paratos nos esse debere ad responsionem omni poscenti nos rationem de fide, & spe nostra: quoniam si a me infidelis rationem poscit fidei & spei meae, et video quod antequam credat, capere non potest hanc ipsam ei reddo rationem, in qua, si fieri potest, Videat, quam prepostere ante fidem poscat rationem earum rerum quas capere non potest. Si autem jam fidelis rationem poscat, ut quod credit, intelligat; capacitas ejus intuenda est, & Secundum rationem redditam sumat fidei suae, quantum potest, intelligentiam, majorem, si plus capit; minorem si minus: cum tamen quousque ad plenitudinem Cognitionis, perfectionemque perveniat, ab itinere fidei non recedat. Hinc est quod dicit Apostolus, Phil. 3.15, 16. Et tamen si quid aliter scitis, id queque vobis Deus revelabit: veruntamen in quod pervenimus, in eo ambulemus. Jam ergo, si fideles sumus, ad fidei viam pervenimus, quam si non dimiserimus, non solam ad tantam intelligentiam rerum incorporearum, & incommutabilium, quanta in hac vita capi non ab omnibus potest, verumetiam ad summitatem Contemplationis, quam dicit Apostolus, fancy ad faciem sine dubitatione perveniemus. Nam quidam, etiam minimi, & tamen in via fidei perseverantissime gradientes, ad illam beatissimam Contemplationem pervenerunt. Quidam vero, quid sit natura invisibilis, incommutabilis, incorporea utcunque jam scientes, & viam quae ducit ad tantae beatitudinis mansionem, quoniam stulta illis videtur, quod est Christus Crucifixus, tenere recusantes, ad quietis ipsius penetrale, cujus jam Luce mens eorum, velut in longinqua radiante perstringitur, pervenire non possunt. Sunt autem quaedam, quae cum audierimus, non eis accomodamus fidem, & ratione nobis reddita, vera esse Cognoscimus quae credere non valemus. Et universa Dei miracula ideo ab infidelibus non Creduntur, quia eorum ratio non videtur. Et revera sunt, de quibus ratio reddi non potest, non tamen non est. Quid enim est in rerum natura, quod irrationaliter fecerit Deus? Sed quorundam mirabilium operum, ejus etiam expedit tantisper occultam esse rationem, ne apud animos fastidio languidos, ejusdem rationis cognitione vilescant. Sunt enim, & multi sunt, qui plus tenentur Admiratione rerum, quam Cognitione Causarum, ubi miracula esse desistunt; & opus est, eos ad invisibilium fidem visibilibus miraculis excitari, ut charitate purgati, eo perveniant, ubi familiaritate veritates mirari desistant. Name & theatris Homines funambulum mirantur, musicis delectantur: in illo stupet difficultas, in his retinet, pascitque jucunditas. Haec dixerim, ut fidem tuam, ad amorem intelligentiae cohorter, ad quam ratio vera perducit, & cui fides animum praeparat. And afterwards— Porro autem qui vera ratione jam quod tantummodo credebat intelligit, profecto praeponendus est ei qui capit ad huc intelligere quod credit. Si autem nec cupit, & ea quae intelligenda sunt credenda tantummodo existimat, Cui rei fides prosit, ignorat, vid. de Lib. arbit. Lib. 11. c. 2.  
We see then, by this Epistle of St. Augustine, that they who blame my way of proceeding, are of Consentius' opinion, which St. Augustine Condemns. Corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem respuas, sed ut ea quae fidei firmitate, jam tenes, etiam rationis luce conspicias. Absit enim, ut hoc in nobis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis Animantibus excellentiores creavit.— Haec dixerim ut fidem tuam ad amorem intelligentiae cohorter, ad quam Ratio vera perducit, & cui fides animum praeparat. This is the Method, which I think I have hitherto observed, according to St. Augustine; who did not believe that he had any wise derogated from the Majesty of our Mysteries by the 15. Books which he Composed, about the Trinity.  
VII.  
If I was not persuaded that all men are reasonable, only because they are enlightened by the Eternal Wisdom; I should doubtless be very rash to speak of the designs of God, and to endeavour to discover any of his ways in the production of his Work. But since it is certain, that the Eternal Word is the universal reason of minds, and by the light which he continually casts upon us, we may all have some commerce with God; I ought not to be blamed for consulting this reason, which altho' consubstantial with God himself, fails not to Answer all those who know how to petition him by a serious attention.  
Additions.  
That which I say here, that it is the Eternal Wisdom which enlightens us, etc. is all taken out of St. Augustine. I have sufficiently proved it, in the preface to the Search after Truth, in the Chapter concerning the nature of Ideas, and in the Explication of the same Chapter.  
VIII.  
I confess nevertheless, that Faith teaches many Truths, which cannot be discovered by the natural union of the mind with Reason. The Eternal Truth doth not answer all our Prayers; for we sometimes ask for more than we can receive. But we should not use this as a pretence to cover our Idleness and want of application.  
Additions.  
We ask more than we can receive, when we attend but a little to subjects much compounded; or when we do not reason upon clear Ideas.  
IX.  
The generality of men are soon tired by the natural prayer, which the mind should make by its attention to inward truth, to the end it may receive therefrom light and understanding. And tired by this troublesome exercise, they speak of it with contempt, discourage one another, and hid their weakness and their ignorance under the deceitful appearance of a false humility.  
Additions.  
Thus they do, who are of the opinion of Consentius condemned by St. Augustin.  
X.  
Their example should not teach us this agreeable virtue, which entertains in men's minds sloth and negligence, and comforts them in the ignorance of those truths, which are most necessary for them. We ought continually to beg of him who enlightens all men, that he would communicate to us his light; that he would reward our Faith with the gift of understanding; and above all, that he would hinder us from taking probality and confused sentiments, (which precipitate the minds of the proud into the darkness of error) for that evidence which attends his Answers.  
Additions.  
To this end we should observe the rule which I think I have demonstrated in the 2d. Chapter of the Search after Truth, and the necessity of which I have shown in all the rest of that Book; for the Libertines are either the most ignorant, or fullest of errors and prejudices.  
XI.  
He that pretends to speak of God with any exactness, ought not to consult himself, or speak as the common sort of men. He should lift up his mind above all creatures, and with a great deal of attention and respect, consult the vast Idea of a Being infinitely perfect: And since this Idea represents to us the true God, very different from him whom the greatest part of men do fancy to themselves; we should not speak of him according to the popular Language. It is permitted to all men to say with the Scripture, that God repent he had made man; that he was angry at his people; that he delivered Israel from Captivity with the Strength of his Arm. But these expressions, and the like, are not permitted to Divines, when they should speak exactly: Thus, when it shall be observed in what follows, that my expressions are not common; none ought to be surprised thereat. It should rather be carefully considered, whether they are clear, and whether they perfectly agree with the Idea which all men have of the Being infinitely perfect.  
Additions.  
The reason of this is, because we ought not to judge of things, but by the Idea we have of them; For to judge of God by ones self, is to make God like unto himself: A man cannot judge even of other men by himself, without falling into many errors.  
XII.  
This Idea of an Infinitely perfect Being, contains two Attributes absolutely necessary for creating the World; a Wisdom which has no bounds, and a Power which nothing is able to resist. The Wisdom of God discovers unto him an infinite number of Ideas of different works, and all possible ways of executing his designs; and his Power makes him so much Master of all things, and so independent upon all assistance whatsoever, that it is sufficient for him to will, to the end, that what he wills may be done. For it must especially be observed, that God has no need of Instruments for acting; that his will is necessarily efficacious: In a word, that as his Wisdom is his own understanding, so his Power is not different from his Will. Of this infinite number of ways whereby God might have executed his purpose, let us see which is that which he was obliged to prefer before all others; let us begin with the Creation of the Visible World, of which, and in which, he forms the Invisible World, which is the Eternal Object of his Love.  
Additions.  
Of this infinite number of ways by which God might have executed his purpose, let us see which is that he was obliged to prefer before all others. This without doubt is that which agrees best with the character of the divine attributes. Now this is the most simple, the most general, the most uniform. But observe, I do not engage myself to inquire which is the most simple, this is not necessary: It is sufficient for my purpose, that God acts by simple and general ways, because these ways are more worthy of him, than those which are particular; and that amongst these simple and general ways, he chooses that which is most worthy of his Wisdom, in relation to his Work. It is not at all necessary, that I should particularly explain, which is this most wise way, and most worthy of God.  
XIII.  
An excellent Workman should proportion his Action to his Work; he does not that by ways very much compounded, which he may perform by more simple; he acts not without an end, and never labours in vain. Hence it must be concluded, that God discovering in the infinite treasures of his Wisdom an infinity of possible Worlds, as necessary consequences of the Laws of motion which he might establish, determined to create that which might be produced and preserved, by the most simple Laws; or which might be the most perfect in relation to the simplicity of the means necessary to its production and preservation.  
Additions.  
This is a comparison which I use, to keep up attention of mind, and to heighten it so as to conceive the way by which he acts, unto whom none can be compared. For few men can comprehend that the designs of God are wise and enlightened, and that God does not form them, but according to the relation which they have with the ways or manners of acting which carry in them the character of his Attributes. They think that God chooses the design most worthy of him, without considering, or without regard to the ways of executing it. But let them observe, that God wills that his ways be most wise, as well as his designs. He wills not that his designs should honour him, and his ways dishonour him. He compares the wisdom of his design, with the wisdom of his ways, and chooses both the design and the ways which altogether best agree with the character of his Attributes. This is my Principle, by which I shall justify the wisdom and goodness of God, notwithstanding all the irregularities of nature, monsters, sin, and the miseries to which we are now subject. I begin with the faults of the Material World.  
XIV.  
God doubtless might have made a World more perfect, than that which we Inhabit. He might, for example, have ordered that the rain which serves to make the Earth Fruitful, should fall more regularly upon Lands that are cultivated, than upon the Sea, where it is not so necessary. But to have this World more Perfect, he must have changed the simplicity of his ways, and have multiplied the Laws of the communication of motions, by which our World subsists: And then there would no more have been that proportion betwixt the Action of God and his Work, which is necessary to determine an infinitely wise Being to act: Or at least, there would not have been the same proportion between the Action of God and such a perfect World, as there is betwixt the Laws of Nature, and the World which we Inhabit. For our World, how imperfect soever it may be imagined, is founded upon Laws of motion so simple and so natural, that it is perfectly worthy of the infinite Wisdom of its Author.  
Additions.  
I use the example of the irregularity of ordinary rain, to prepare the mind for another rain, which is not given to the merits of men, no more than the common rain which falls equally upon Lands that are Sown, as well as those that lie Fallow. I suppose it to be easily comprehended, that it is because the rain falls in consequence of natural Laws, that it is so ill distributed in relation to the necessities of the Earth. But I think I ought to advise, that they who done't distinctly remember the proofs which I have given in the Search after Truth, that it is God who does all, that he does not communicate his power unto Creatures, but by making them the occasional causes of determining the efficacity of the general. Laws, by which he executes his designs in a way worthy of him. I think, I say, I ought to advise these persons to read and meditate upon at least the first explication, which is at the end of the third discourse; for to do it well, recourse ought to be had to those places wherein I demonstrate my Principles.  
XV.  
In truth, I am persuaded that the Laws of motion necessary to the production and conservation of the EARTH, and of all the STARS in the HEAVENS are reduced to these two. The first, that Bodies in motion endeavour to continue their motion in a right Line: The second, that when two Bodies meet one another, their motion is distributed from one to another proportionably to their bulk; so that afterwards they may be moved with an equal celerity. These two Laws are the cause of all the motions which make that variety of form which we admire in nature.  
XVI.  
I confess nevertheless, 
Search after Truth, in the last C. of Method.  that the second does not always seem to be observed in the experiments which may be made upon this subject; but this is because we see only that which happens to Bodies that are visible, and that we think not at all upon the Invisible that surround them, which by the efficacy of the same Law make the spring of visible Bodies, thereby obliging them to recoil, and not observe this same Law. I must not in this place explain this any further.  
XVII.  
Now these two Laws are so simple, so natural, and at the same time so fruitful, that though there were no other reasons to judge that nature observes them, yet we should have cause to believe, that they are appointed by him, who always acts by the most simple ways, in whose Action there is nothing irregular, and who proportions it so wisely with his Work, that he does infinite marvels, by a very few [Practical] Resolutions.  
Additions.  
It would require a whole Book to prove that which I say here concerning the fruitfulness of these two general laws of the communication of motion. It will be easily seen that I speak not at all adventures by those who are exactly well acquainted with the Physical principles of Mon. des Cartes. But this is not essential to my subject. It is sufficient that the Laws of Nature are general. These three Articles may be looked upon as a kind of parenthesis.  
XVIII.  
We must not judge of the general cause as of particulars, of the Infinite Wisdom, as of limited understandings. God foreseeing all that should follow the natural Laws, even before their establishment, could not have established them to overturn them. The Laws of Nature are constant and Immutable, they are general for all times and all places. Two Bodies of such a magnitude and such a swiftness striking upon one another, will be reflected after the same manner now as heretofore. If the rain falls upon certain grounds, and the Sun burns up others; if a season favourable to the Fruits of the Earth, be succeeded by a Prost which destroys them; if a Child comes into the world with a monstrous and useless head which grows out of his breast and makes him miserable; it is not because God intended to produce these effects by particular wills, but because he has established the Laws of the communication of motions, of which these effects are necessary consequences: Laws otherwise so simple, and withal so fruitful, that they produce all that we see beautiful in the world, and in a little time repair the greatest Mortality and Dearth.  
XIX.  
He that having built an house, and then undermines the Foundation, discovers his ignorance; he that plants a Vineyard, and immediately pulls up that which had taken root, shows his folly: Because he that wills and wills not, wants either understanding, or constancy of mind. But it can't be said that God acts either by caprice or through Ignorance; when an Infant comes into the world with superfluous members, which hinder him from living, or when an Hail-Storm destroys the Fruit almost ripe. Thus if God makes the Fruit to fall by a Storm before it is ripe, it is not because he wills and wills not: For God acts not by particular wills, as particular causes do. He has not established the Laws of communication of motions with a design to produce Monsters, or to make the Fruits Fall before they be ripe; he appointed these Laws by reason of their Foecundity, and not their Barrenness. Thus that which once he willed, he wills still; and in general, the world for which he made these Laws, shall subsist eternally.  
Additions.  
I have not here proved a Posteriori, or by the effects, that the general cause, acts by general Wills or Laws, whose efficacy is determined, by the action of occasional or particular causes, tho' these sorts of proofs are very many and undeniable. (1.) Because I supposed in the Advertisement to the Reader, that he had read what I have written against the pretended efficacy of second causes. (2.) Because none can want these sort of proofs; for every one knows, that a body is never moved before it be struck, and that it is never stricken without being moved: Every one knows it is day when the Sun is risen, and that it is night when it is set; and that thus God produces the motion, and the light in consequence of the general laws of nature. (3.) To conclude, because the proofs a priorit, taken from the nature of the cause, though more abstracted, appear to me clearer, stronger, and more proper to the subject I Treat of. For if I had not proved only by the effects, that God does all that we see in nature, by simple, general, uniform and constant ways, it might be answered: 'Tis true, but in grace he does quite otherwise; he there does all by particular wills. Whereas having proved by the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, that he does all that we see by simple ways; since God does not belly himself, this proves that he does by the like ways all that we do not see. Thus men begin to reflect, that God must act after such a manner as comports with his Divine Attributes. Nevertheless at the end of this first Discourse, 
The last Article.  I have proved the same principle by Arguments a posteriori, that I might touch the minds even of those who reflect upon nothing.  
XX.  
Here it must be observed, that the essential rule of the will of God, is Order; and that if man, for example, had not sinned, (a supposition which would much have changed his designs) than order, not permitting he should have been punished, the natural Laws of the communication of motion, could never have been able to have made him unhappy: For the Law of order, which requires that the Just do suffer nothing, whether he will or no, being essential to God; the Arbitrary Law of the communication of motions ought necessarily to be submitted thereunto.  
Additions.  
God has but two Laws; Order, which is his inviolable Law, his natural Law, his Word, or his Wisdom, which he loves invincibly; and the divine Decrees, the Arbitrary Laws, with which he sometimes dispenses; but he never dispenses with them, but when order requires: For it is against order, that a wise and immutable Being should change his conduct without reason. It is a weakness to have a changeable mind, it argues want of knowledge, or of constancy. Man, tho' subject to error, is offended when he is reproached with his change. We must therefore take care not to ask miracles of God, or to attribute them every moment unto him: This is to tempt God, and to have sentiments unworthy of him. See the fourth Explication, in which I show, that all that is done now, or which was done under the Jewish Law, against those natural laws which are known to us, is not always a miracle, or an effect produced by God, by particular wills; because the Angels, for example, have power over the present world in consequence of some general laws which are unknown to us; as I have proved by God's way of proceeding in the old Testament.  
XXI.  
There are indeed some sew occasions, where these general Laws of motion must cease to produce their effect. But this is not because God changes these Laws, or corrects himself; it is because by the order of grace, to which that of Nature must be subservient, Miracles are wrought upon certain occasions. Besides, it is convenient that men should know, that God is so much Master of Nature, that if he submit himself to the laws which he has established, it is because he chooses to do so, rather than that he is absolutely necessitated.  
Additions.  
Since the greatest part of men imagine, that besides God, there is a certain Nature that does all: 'Tis convenient that God to make himself the better known, should act against the custom of this pretended Nature. God makes himself admired by the wise, or true Philosophers in his ordinary works; but all the world are not Philosophers. There must be effects, which surprise and strike the mind of those who make no reflection upon any thing that is ordinary. See St. Augustine upon St. Joh, Tract. VIII. & XXVIII. Christian Meditations. 8. Medit.  
XXII.  
If then it be true, that the general cause ought not to work by particular wills, and that God was obliged to establish certain, constant and invariable Laws of the communication of Motions, by the efficacy of which he foresaw that the world might subsist such as we now see it; it may be truly said in some sense, that God desires that all his creatures should be perfect; that he wills not that Infants should perish in the womb of their Mothers, that he loves not Monsters, that he has made no laws of nature to beget them; and that if he could have made and preserved a World more perfect by as simple means, he would not have established Laws, whereof so many Monsters are the necessary consequences: But that it would have been unworthy of his Wisdom to multiply wills to hinder certain particular disorders, which in the Universe make a kind of Beauty.  
Additions.  
That if he could have made and preserved a World more perfect by as simple means, he would not have established laws whereof so many Monsters are the necessary consequences. This is evident at least in the order of grace, in relation to which I say this. For God wills that all men should be saved, 1 Tim. II. 4. This is the will of God, our Sanctification, 1 Thes. iv 3. God has no need of the wicked, Eccles. XV. 12. On the contrary, He hates the ungodly and his ungodliness. Wisdom XIV. 9 Certainly the design of God in the CREATION is to make a Beautiful work. Now all irregularity disfigures the WORK. God truly deserves to be admired, but much more in the simplicity of his ways, than in the Beauty of the Universe. If God has made the world for man, why so much barren ground? why more Sea than habitable Earth? It is because all this is a consequence of the simplicity of his ways. This is not because God particularly wills that such a ground should want water, for 'twould be a formal disobedience if it was so; 'twould be to find fault with God's conduct, and to insult over his wisdom, to make new water courses. Can any thing be more disorderly and less regular, than the distribution of Rivers, than the disposition of Land and Sea? The Philosophers looked upon the Universe as the work of blind nature; the reason is, because they thought not on the simplicity of the ways by which it is preserved. But if there had been as simple ways, or as worthy of God, capable to form and preserve a more beautiful work than the world we now inhabit; it must be said, things being as they are, that either the Author of Nature wanted understanding, or that his intention was to make an imperfect work. See the 3d. Explication, Christian Meditat. 7, 8.  
Monsters make in the Universe a kind of Beauty. Not that Monsters are Beautiful in themselves, for all things being equal, it would be better there were none at all; but it is because men often judge of the beauty of certain things, by the deformity of others. Certainly the Church of Jesus Christ, the future world shall be more perfect than the present world, and have no Deformity, no Monsters, no Injustice, no Sin. Eph. V 27. Apoc. XXII.  
XXIII.  
God gave to every Seed it's own bud [germ,] which contains in little, the plant and the fruit, another bud which is fastened to this, and contains the root of the plant, which root has a new root, whose imperceptible branches spread themselves in two Lobes, or into the Pulp of this Seed. Does not he sufficiently show by this, that he truly wills in some sense, that all those seeds should produce their like? For why should he have given to those grains of Corn which he intended should be barren, all the parts proper to make them fruitful. Nevertheless, since rain is necessary to make them increase, and since it falls not upon the Earth, but by general Laws which do not shower it down upon improved grounds only, and precisely at proper seasons, all these grains are not increased thereby: Or if they be, the Hail, or some other unlucky accident, which is a necessary consequence of the same Laws of Nature, hinders them from nourishing their Ear. Now because it is God who has established these Laws, it might be said, that he would that some certain seeds should be fruitful rather than others; if we did not know otherwise, that the general cause ought not to act by particular wills, nor an infinitely wise Being by compounded ways; God ought not to take other Measures than those which he has taken to govern the rains according to the seasons, and places, and desires of the Husbandmen. We need to say no more of the order of Nature: Let us explain a little more largely that of Grace; and above all things, let us observe that it is the same wisdom, and the same will; in a word, the same God, who has established both the one and the other of these Orders.  
Additions.  
Above all, let us observe, that it is the same wisdom and the same will; in a word, the same God who has established both the one and the other of these orders; that is to say, that of Grace, and that of Nature, This is of the greatest consequence. For God cannot be false to himself, or not follow his wisdom in the establishment of the order of Grace. It is therefore necessary, to the end that God's conduct may bear the Character of his divine attributes, that his ways be simple, general, uniform and constant. Thus we may already see, that it will not be impossible to justify the wisdom and goodness of God, though Grace often falls without effect, and though there be more men who are damned, than those who are saved: God will appear wise, though Grace should not be always proportioned to our weakness: He will be good, and love men, though all be not saved; because we cannot take it ill, that God has greater love for his wisdom, which is consubstantial to him, than for his work, which is only an imperfect Image of his substance.   

THE SECOND PART. Of the Necessity of the general Laws of Grace.  
XXIV.  
GOD loving himself by the necessity of his Being, and resolving to procure an infinite glory to himself, and honour perfectly worthy of him, consulted his wisdom about the accomplishment of his desires. This divine wisdom, filled with love for him from whom he received a Being by an Eternal and ineffable generation, seeing nothing in all possible creatures (the intelligible Ideas of which he contains) that might be worthy of the Majesty of his Father, offered himself that he might establish to his Honour an Eternal Worship, and as Sovereign Priest; offer unto him a victim, which by the dignity of his Person might be capable to please him. He rerepresented unto him an infinite number of designs, for the Temple which he intended to raise to his glory, and at the same time, all possible ways of performing them. That design which at first sight seems Greatest and most Magnificent, the justest and most easily understood, is that which has most relation to the Person unto whom all the Glory and Holiness thereof must refer; and the wisest manner of performing this design, is to Establish certain very simple and fruitful Laws to bring it to its perfection. This is that which Reason seems to answer, to all those who consult it with attention, and according to the principles which Faith teaches us: Let us examine the circumstances of this Great design, and afterwards endeavour to find out the ways of performing it.  
Additions.  
The proof of all this is; because God does nothing without his Wisdom, or without his Son, which Scripture teaches us, as well as Reason, Joh. I. 3. Heb. I. 2. etc. That Jesus Christ is the principle design of God, see the first Article, and the following. That he is the Model of the Elect, Rom. VIII. 29. And above all, that his ways do more than any other bear the Character of the divine Attributes; that which I have already proved, and which you may see further manifested in the third explication. I shall not hereafter stop, in the Explication of what is clear enough in its self, and of little consequence.  
XXV.  
The Holy Scripture teaches us, that it is Jesus Christ who makes all the Beauty, the Holiness, the Greatness and Magnificence of this Great Work. For if it be compared therein to a City, it is Jesus Christ who makes all the Splendour thereof: The Sun and the Moon does not enlighten it, 
Apocal. XXI. 23.  but the Brightness of God and the Light of the Lamb. If it be represented as a living body, all whose parts have a marvellous relation to one another; 
Col. I. 18. II. 19 Eph. I. 22, 23.  it is Jesus Christ who is the head thereof; it is from him that Spirit and Life is communicated to all the Members that compose it. If it be spoken of as a Temple, it is Jesus Christ who is the Cornerstone, 
Eph. II. 20, etc.  upon which all the building is founded; it is he who is the Sovereign Priest: It is he who is the Sacrifice thereof. 
Heb. IU. V, etc. X, etc.  None of the Faithful are Priests, but because they partake of his Priesthood: They are not Sacrifices, but because they partake of his Holiness. It is only in him and by him that they continually offer themselves to the Majesty of God. To conclude, it is only by the Relation which they have to him, 
Phil. III. 9, 10, 11, etc.  that they contribute to the beauty of this august Temple, which always has been, and for ever will be, the delightful Object of God himself.  
XXVI.  
Reason also teaches us these Truths: For what relation is there betwixt creatures how perfect so ever they are supposed to be, and the Action by which they are made? Every Creature being limited, how can it be worth the Action of a God whose price is infinite? Can God receive any thing from a pure Creature, which may incline him to act? But let it be, that God hath made man in hopes of being honoured by him: Whence is it that the number of those who dishonour him is much the greater? Doth not God hereby sufficiently declare, that he very much neglects the glory pretended to be received by his work, if separated from his well beloved Son; that it is only in Jesus Christ that he resolved to produce it, and that without him it should not subsist a moment?  
XXVII.  
A man resolves to do something, because he hath need thereof, or because he would see what would be the effect of his work, or lastly because he learns by trying his strength what he is able to do: But God has no need of his creatures. He is not like men, who receive new impression from the presence of objects: His Ideas are eternal & immutable, he saw the world before it was formed, as he sees it at present. In short, being conscious that his will is efficacious, he perfectly knows, without making any trial of his strength, whatsoever he is able to do. Thus Scripture and Reason teach us, that it is by Jesus Christ that the world subsists, and that it is by the dignity of this divine person, that it receives a beauty, which renders it agreeable in the sight of God.  
XXVIII.  
It follows, in my opinion, from this principle, that Jesus Christ is the Model or Pattern by which we are made, that we are formed according to his Image and likeness, and that we have nothing beautiful, but so far as we are his representations, and figures; that he is the end of the Law, and the finishing of the Jewish Ceremonies and Sacrifices; that till this succession of generations which preceded his birth had an end, it was necessary they should have had certain relations to him by which they were made more agreeable to God than any others. That since Jesus Christ was to be the Head and Spouse of the Church, to represent him, all men were to proceed from one, and their propagation to begin after that manner which Moses relates, and St. Paul explains. In a word, it follows from this principle, that the present world ought to be the figure of the future, and that as far as the simplicity of the general Laws will permit it, all they who have or shall dwell therein, have been or shall be figures and resemblances of Gods only Son, from Abel in whom he was sacrificed, to the last Member that shall be of his Church.  
XXIX.  
We may judge of the perfection of a Work by the conformity there is betwixt this work, and the Idea which the eternal wisdom gives us of it: For there is nothing Beautiful, nothing Amiable, but by relation to the essential, necessary and independent beauty. Now this intelligible beauty being made sensible, became also in this estate the rule of beauty and perfection: Thus all Corporeal Creatures must still receive from him their Beauty and Splendour. All minds must have the same thoughts and the same inclinations with the soul of Jesus, if they would be agreeable to those who see nothing Beautiful, nothing Amiable, but that which is conformable to Wisdom and Truth. Since than we are obliged to believe that the work of God has a perfect conformity with the eternal Wisdom; we have all reason to believe, that the same work has infinite relations to him who is the Head, the principle, the model and the end thereof. But who can explain all these relations?  
XXX.  
That which makes the Beauty of a Temple, is the order and variety of the Ornaments which are there to be seen. Thus, to render the living Temple of the Majesty of God worthy of him who is to inhabit it, & proportioned to the infinite wisdom & love of its Author; all Beauties ought to be found therein. But it is not with the Glory and Magnificence of this Spiritual Temple, as it is with the gross and sensible Ornaments of Material Temples. That which makes the Beauty of the Spiritual Edifice of the Church, is the infinite diversity of the Graces, which he who is the Head thereof, communnicates to all the parts that compose it; it is the order, and the admirable relations they have by him to one another; it is the divers degrees of Glory which shine on all sides.  
XXXI.  
It follows from this principle, that to establish this variety of rewards which compose the beauty of the Heavenly Jerusalem, it is necessary that men upon Earth should be subject, not only to afflictions which purify them, but also to the motions of Concupiscence, which gives them opportunity of gaining so many Victories by engaging them in so great a number of different Combats.  
XXXII.  
The Blessed in Heaven will doubtless have an Holiness and variety of gifts, which will perfectly answer the diversity of their good works. These continual sacrifices, by which the Old Man is destroyed and annihelated, will Adorn and Beautify the Spiritual substance of the New Man. 
Luke XXIV. 26.  And if it became Jesus Christ himself to suffer all sorts of afflictions, before he entered into his glory; the sin of the first Man, which brought the evils into the World which accompany Life, and Death which follows, it was necessary, that men having been tried upon Earth, might justly be rewarded with that Glory, the variety and order of which will make the beauty of the future World.  
Additions.  
The sin of the first Man was not necessary in itself. God might without this sin, have found a Thousand means to make the future Church as Beautiful as it shall be; but since God acts always as wisely as is possible, and according to the character of the divine attributes, since he invincibly loves his Wisdom: There could be no such means for Men to Merit the Glory which one day they shall possess, as that which suffers them to be ingulf'd in sin, that mercy might be shown to them all in Jesus Christ. For the Glory which the Elect shall obtain, by the Grace of Jesus Christ, in resisting their Concupiscence, will be greater, and also more worthy of God than any other. See the 34, and 35. Articles. St. Aug. de cor. & great. & C. 10.  
XXXIII.  
If I had a clear Idea of the Blessed Spirits which have no body, perhaps I might clearly answer a difficulty which arises in respect of them. For it may be objected, either that there is little variety in the merits and recompenses of Angels, or else that it was adviseable that God should unite Spirits to bodies, on which they do at present so much depend. I confess that I do not see any great diversity of rewards which ought to answer the merits of substances purely intelligible, especially if they have merited their reward by one single act of Love. They not being united to a body which might occasion God to give them, according to certain most simple and general Laws a succession of different sentiments or thoughts; I can see no diversity in their combats, nor in their victories. But perhaps there may be an order established which to me is unknown: And upon this account, I ought not to speak of it. It is enough for me to have settled a principle, whence we may conclude that it became God to create bodies, and to unite Spirits unto them, that by the most simple Laws of the Union of these two substances, he might in a general, constant, and uniform way give us, that great variety of sentiments and motions, which is the principle of our different Merits and Rewards.  
XXXIV.  
To conclude, God ought to have all the Glory of the Beauty and Perfection of the future World. This Work which infinitely surpasses all others, must be a work of pure mercy: The Creatures ought not to boast of having any other part therein but that which the grace of Jesus Christ hath given them. In a word, 
Rom. XI. 32. Gal. III. 22.  it was adviseable that God should suffer all men to be engaged in Sin, that he might have mercy upon them all in Jesus Christ.  
XXXV.  
Thus since the first man was able by the strength of his Love to persevere in original righteousness, it was not necessary that God should keep him to his duty by preventing pleasures, he having no concupiscence to overcome; it was not fit that God should prevent his free will by the delectation of his grace. In short, having all that was necessary for meriting his reward, God who does nothing that is useless, aught to have left him to himself, though he foresaw his fall; since he intended to raise him up in Jesus Christ, to confound free will, and to make his mercy Illustrious. Let us endeavour at present to find out the ways by which God executes his eternal purpose of Sanctifying his Church.  
XXXVI.  
For though in the establishment of the future World, God acts by ways very different from those by which he preserves the present; nevertheless we ought not to imagine, that this difference is such, as that the Laws of grace do not carry in them the character of the cause which has established them. Since God himself is the Author of the Order of Grace, and of that of Nature; it is necessary that these two Orders agree with one another, in respect of all that which they have in them relating to the Wisdom, and other Attributes of their Author. Thus, since God is a general cause whose wisdom has no limits, it is necessary for reasons which I have already mentioned, that in the Order of Grace, as well as in that of Nature, he should act as a general cause; that having for his end his own glory, by the raising of his Church, he should establish the most simple and general Laws; and which compared with their effect have the greatest proportion of Wisdom and Fruitfulness.  
XXXVII.  
The more any Agent has of knowledge, the more extensive is his will. A mind much limited, every moment takes up new resolutions; and when he undertakes to execute any one of them, he uses several means, some of which are always useless. In a word, a stinted mind does not sufficiently compare the means with the end, the strength and the Action with the effect which they should produce. On the contrary, anextensive and penetrating spirit compares and weighs all things: He does not take up his resolutions but by the knowledge which he has of the means of executing them; and when he sees that these means wisely relate to their effect, he employs them. The more simple any Machine's are, and the more different their effects, the more Spiritual they are, and more worthy of Esteem. The great number of the Laws of any State, often shows the want of penetration, and comprehension of mind in the Lawmakers': It being rather experience of the want of 'em, than a wise foreknowledge which has ordained them. God whose Wisdom has no bounds, must make use of the most simple and most fruitful ways in the formation of the future World, as well as for the conservation of the present. He ought not to multiply his wills, which are the executing laws of his purposes, but so far as necessity obliges him thereunto: He must act by general wills, and thus establish a constant and regular order, according to which he foresaw by the infinite comprehension of his Wisdom, that such an admirable work as his is might be formed. Let us see the consequences of this principle, and the application which may be made thereof, for the explaining those difficulties which may appear sufficiently entangled.  
Additions.  
I don't think that any one can read this Article, and those which go before with attention, without granting, that seeing God cannot be false to himself, nor act by those ways which do not agree with his Attributes, he is obliged to perform his designs by the most simple means, the most general, uniform, and constant ways. Therefore I shall net spend time to prove this in particular by the Idea of a being infinitely perfect, and by all the natural effects of causes which we know. Besides all that I am to say, I have proved this principle several ways in the Search after Truth, by overthrowing the pretended efficacy of second causes; in the Med. Christ. from the fourth to the eighth inclusively; and also in the Explications which are at the end of this Treatise. But let us see if the use which I am about to make of this principle, for explaining the truth which faith teaches us, does not at once demonstrate both this principle and these truths.  
XXXVIII.  
The H. Scripture teaches us on the one side, that God wills that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the Truth; and on the other, that he doth all that he wills; and yet nevertheless Faith is not given to all the World, and that the number of those who Perish, is even greater than of the Predestinated, how shall we make this agree with his Power?  
Additions.  
It is because his Wisdom renders him unable. For since it is that which obliges to him to act by the most simple ways, it is not possible that all men should be saved, by reason of this simplicity of his ways.  
XXXIX.  
God from all eternity foresaw Original Sin, and the infinite number of Persons whom this sin would carry down to Hell. Nevertheless he created the first Man in an Estate from which he knew he would fall; and also made such a relation between this Man and his Posterity, as must communicate to them his sin, and render them all worthy of his Aversion, and his Anger. How does this agree with his goodness?  
Additions.  
It is because God more loves his Wisdom, than his work. For since his Wisdom prescribes unto him the ways which best suit with his Attributes, and since his ways require that Adam being otherwise able to persevere, should not have had preventing Grace; that which did happen, aught to have happened to him.  
XL  
God often communicates his Graces, though they have not the effect for which his goodness obliges us to think they were given. He makes some persons to increase in Piety till towards the end of their life, and then sin reigns over them to their death; and throws them into Hell: He makes the dew of grace to fall upon hardened hearts, as well as upon prepared Souls; men resist it and render it useless for their Salvation. In a word, God unmakes and renews continually, it seems as if he willed and willed not the same thing. How can this agree with his Wisdom?  
Additions.  
It is because since God ought not to Sanctify men by particular wills, he does not give Grace to such an one upon such an occasion, to the end that it should have such a certain effect and nothing more. It becomes limited Understandings to act after this manner. But God having an infinite understanding, it became him to establish general Laws for the executing of his designs: This is what I have already so often said, and shall further say in the following Articles.  
XLI.  
Behold, as I think, the great difficulties; all the Oeconomy of Religion, the Idea which we have of a good, wise, and powerful God; constant in his designs, regular in his actions; a thousand places of Scripture supplying us with many more against that which we see come to pass every day in the order of Grace: and though very able men have answered them, yet it seems to me they cannot be so easily resolved by their principles, as by that I shall lay down.  
XLII.  
As for myself, I have always believed that God in truth wills in general, that all men should be saved. Both Reason and Scripture has always hindered me from doubting thereof. And though some Authors, for whom I have a great respect, have in the foregoing Ages published divers explications of this Truth, I never could easily admit of those which seemed without any necessity to set bounds to the infinite goodness and mercy of God. Thus consulting the Idea which all men have of God, I entertained the Sentiment, which I at present expose to the censure of all those, who examine it with Attention, and judge of it with Equity.  
Additions.  
We tempt God, when we desire him to do that which he ought not to do; that is to say, that he should act after a particular manner, and not in consequence of general Laws; otherwise, what harm would it be for one to cast himself headlong, as Satan desired J. G. to do? If it be as wise for to sustain an heavy body in the Air, as to make it fall upon the Earth; we should not tempt him, we should not engage him to do a thing unworthy of him, when trusting in his goodness we should throw ourselves out of the windows. In a word provided a man has always a good design, he can never want prudence.  
XLIII.  
God being obliged always to act, as becomes him, by simple, general, constant, and uniform ways; in a word, such as are agreeable to the Idea which we have of a general cause, whose Wisdom has no bounds; it became him to establish certain Laws in the Order of Grace, as I have proved he has done in that of Nature. Now these Laws by reason of their simplicity, have necessarily woeful consequences in respect of us; but these consequences do not oblige that God should change these Laws for those that are more Compounded. For these Laws have a greater proportion of Wisdom and Fruitfulness to the work which they produce, than all those which he could ordain for the same purpose; since he always acts after the most wise and perfect manner. It is true, that God might prevent these sad consequences by an infinite number of particular wills; but his Wisdom which he loves more than his Work, the immutable and necessary order, which is the rule of his will, do not permit it. The effect which would happen from each of his wills, would not be worth the Action which should produce it. And consequently we ought not to find fault, because God does not confound the order and simplicity of his Laws by miracles; which would indeed be very convenient for our necessities, but very much opposite to the Wisdom of God, which it is not lawful to tempt.  
XLIV.  
Thus, seeing we ought not to be displeased, that the rain falls into the Sea where it is useless, and not upon Sown-grounds where it is necessary; because the laws of the communication of motions are very simple, fruitful, and perfectly worthy of the wisdom of the Author; and that according to these Laws it is not possible that the rain should fall rather upon the Land than the Seas; so that we ought not to complain of that apparent irregularity, whereby Grace is given to men. It is the regularity wherewithal God acts, it is the simplicity of the Laws which he observes, it is the wisdom and uniformity of his Conduct, which is the cause of this seeming irregularity. It is necessary, according to the Laws of Grace, which God has established in favour of the Elect, and for the building of his Church, that this Heavenly rain should fall sometimes upon hardened Hearts, as well as upon prepared Souls. If therefore Grace is given sometimes to no purpose, it is not because God acts without design; much less that he acts with an intention, to render Men more culpable by the abuse of his favours. It is because the simplicity of the general Laws permits not, that this grace, inefficacious in respect of a corrupted heart, should fall upon another heart where it would be efficacious. This Grace not being given by a particular will, but in consequence of the immutability of the general order of Grace, it is sufficient that this order should produce a work proportionable to the simplicity of his Laws, to the end it might be worthy of the wisdom of its Author: For to conclude, the order of Grace would be less Perfect, less Admirable, less Amiable, if it was more Composed.  
XLV.  
If God should have given Grace by particular wills, without doubt for the Conversion of a sinner who had four degrees of Concupiscence, he would not have resolved to have given but three degrees of Spiritual pleasure, supposing that these degrees of grace had not been sufficient to convert him. He would have deferred his bounty, till the sinner should not have been in the presence of the Object that tempted him: Or rather he would have given this same grace of three degrees of strength to such an one, whose Concupiscence should have been less active. For what an odd design would it be to give three degrees of Spiritual delight to one, to whom four are necessary; and refuse them to him, whom they would have Converted? Does this agree with the Idea which we have of the wisdom and goodness of God? Is this to love Men? Is this to will that all shall be saved? Is this to do all that can be done for them? Yet God cries out by his Prophet; Inhabitans of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, 
Isa. V 3, 4.  judge between me and my Vineyard. What could have been done more to my Vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore had I not reason then to look for good Grapes, when it brought forth wild Grapes? What wisdom is it by particular wills to give so many inefficacious Graces to sinners; supposing that God wills their Conversion as Scripture teaches us, and that he has not that fatal design of rendering them by his gifts, more Culpable and blame Worthy?  
XLVI.  
But if Grace be given to men by most simple and general Laws, all these great difficulties vanish away. The order of Grace which God hath established having more Wisdom and fruitfulness in respect to the work which it produces than any other; God was obliged to choose it for the establishment of his Church. Thus we may be assured, that God truly wills the salvation of all men; that he hath done all for them that he could do, acting as he ought to do, that if there had been any order of Grace as simple and more fruitful; as worthy of his wisdom and more useful to men, he would have chosen it; and that thus he saves as many persons as he can save, acting according to those adorable rules which his wisdom prescribes.  
Additions.  
Men must in my opinion, be much out of humour to take it ill, that they find the Wisdom and Goodness of God thus justified, by the principle I have laid down. For to like it well, that so many Nations should perish, merely because God would not afford them the light of his Gospel, and to take it ill that God should do in this what his Wisdom prescribes; that Wisdom which to him is an inviolable Law, that Wisdom which he loves, and which he ought to love infinitely more than his work; this assuredly is an extraordinary disposition of mind. To desire that God should every moment by particular wills, give Graces useless to those who receive them, and to those who he foresaw would become more culpable, and more criminal by the contempt of them; this is to desire that a wise Being should not proportion the means to the end, or that God should not wish well to them to whom he has applied the Blood of Jesus Christ; this is to desire to maintain paradoxes.  
XLVII.  
Let men therefore love and adore not only the good will of God, by which the Elect are Sanctified, but also the secret judgements of his Justice, by which there are so many Reprobates. It is the same order of Wisdom, the same laws of grace which produce such different effects; God is equally adorable, and amiable in all that he does, his Conduct is always full of wisdom and of goodness: Woe be to the wicked who condemn it without knowing any thing of it, who desire that the immutable order of divine wisdom should accommodate its self to their Passions and Interests.  
XLVIII.  
The wise and diligent Husbandmen Labour, Manure, and Sow their Lands with a great deal of trouble and expense. They carefully observe the most proper seasons for their different cultures, and only depend upon God for the success of their labours. They give up their work to the order of Nature, well knowing that it is to no purpose to tempt God, and presume that in favour to us, he should change the order which his wisdom prescribes unto him.  
XLIX.  
Jesus Christ came to teach us to imitate their example. As he has an immense charity for us, and would save us all, as far as the simplicity of the general Laws of Nature and Grace can permit him; so he has forgotten nothing to bring us into the way which leads to Heaven. There is not any thing more opposite to the efficacy of Grace, than sensual pleasures and the sentiments of pride: For nothing so much corrupts the mind and hardens the heart. But has not Jesus Christ in his Person sacrificed and annihelated all greatness, and all sensible pleasures? Was not his life, a continual example of Humility and Penance? How was he born, how did he die, how did he converse among men? All the world knows it. What is the sum of his Doctrine; or whither tended all his Counsels? Is it not to Humility and Penitence, to a general privation of all things that flatter the senses, of all that corrupts the purity of the Imagination, of all that maintains and fortifies the concupiscence of Pride? That which he has said, that which he has done, that which he has suffered, has been to prepare us by his doctrine, by his example, by his merits, to receive the Heavenly showers of grace, in such a manner as that they may operate best in us. Since he could not, or ought not, 
See the last Explication of the Search after Truth.  to change the laws of Nature, tempt God, nor trouble the order and simplicity of his ways, he has done for men all that he could, to inspire them with the most extensive, the most diligent, and the most ardent charity.  
L.  
I fear not to say, that the Charity of Jesus Christ is immense and incomprehensible, after that which the Scripture says of it. And though all men do not receive the effects of it, it would be rashness to set bounds thereto. He died for all men, 
1 Cor. 8.11.  even for those who daily perish. Why do not sinners enter into the Order of Grace, why do they not follow the Counsels of Jesus Christ, why do they not prepare themselves to receive the rain of Heaven? They cannot merit it, 'tis true, but they may promote its efficacy in respect of themselves. Can they not by Self-love, or by the fears of Hell, avoid a great many occasions of sinning, deprive themselves of pleasures, at least of those which as yet they have not tasted, and to which consequently as yet they are not enslaved? They may also remove some impediments of the efficacy of Grace, and prepare the soil of the heart, so that it may become fruitful, when God shall send his rain according to the general laws he hath prescribed. But they desire that God should save them without any pains of theirs; like to those idle and slothful Husbandmen, who without bestowing the ordinary labours upon their field, presume that God ought to send them such fructifying and plentiful Rains as may spare their pains. False and Sottish Confidence! God causes it to rain upon fallow Lands, as well as upon those that are Cultivated. But let the Proud and the Voluptuous know, that the rain of Grace shall fall much less upon them, than upon other men; and that in the mean time they put themselves in such a conditition, that to convert them, they have need of much more.  
LI.  
Since God does not ordinarily confer his grace but by general Laws, we clearly see the necessity of the counsels of Jesus Christ. It appears that we ought to follow his wise counsels, that God may save us by the most simple ways, and that giving us as little grace, as may be, he may operate much in us. It clearly appears, that man on his part ought to labour continually; that he ought to till the ground before the heats of Concupiscence has dried and hardened it, or at least as soon as the rain has taken away this dryness and hardness; that he ought carefully to observe the moments when he is at liberty from his passions, that he may make his advantage thereof; that he ought, as much as in him lies, to weed out all that may Choke the seed of the Word; and not foolishly imagine that he shall be Converted, after he has made his fortune in the World, or shall be ready to quit it. For, besides that it depends not on the Husbandmen, to cause it to rain according to their necessities, after a piece of ground has a long time lain fallow, the Briars and Thorns have taken such deep root, that they who have not accustomed themselves to labour, have neither strength, nor even desire to cultivate it.  
LII.  
But if God should act in the order of Grace by particular wills, if he should efficaciously cause in all men their good motions, and all their good works with a particular design; I do not see how it could be maintained that he acts by the most simple Laws. When I consider all the turn by which men come whither God leads them; for I doubt not at all, but that God often gives to a man more than an Hundred good thoughts in one day. Neither can I any more comprehend, how his Wisdom and Goodness can be made to agree with all those inefficacious graces which the Malice of men resists: For God being good and wise, is it not evident that he must proportion his assistance to our needs, if he granted them with a particular design of encouraging us?  
Additions.  
It appears by these Articles, that my principle does still perfectly well agree with the Counsels of Jesus Christ, and that as the Husbandmen ought on their part to Cultivate, Blow, and Sow their Lands; so men on theirs should endeavour to remove the impediments of the efficacy of Grace: But that as the labours of men, are not the cause of rain, so Grace likewise is not given to natural merits; since its distribution depends upon certain general Laws, like as the ordinary rain is the natural consequence of the general Laws of the communication of motions.  
LIII.  
God causes the weeds to grow with the Corn till the day of Harvest, he makes it to rain on the just and on the unjust, because grace falling on men by general Laws, is often given to such as make no use thereof; whereas if others had received it, they would have been converted by it. If Jesus Christ had preached to the Tyrians and Sydonians, as well as to the Inhabitants of Bethsaida, & Corazin, they would have Repent in Sackcloth and Ashes. If the rain which falls upon the Sands, was shed upon well-managed Land, it would have rendered it fruitful. But whatsoever is regulated by general Laws, does not agree with particular designs. That these Laws be wisely established, it is sufficient that being extremely simple, they bring to perfection the great work for which God appointed them.  
LIV.  
But though I do not think that God has infinite particular designs in reference to each of the Elect, so that he every day gives a great number of good thoughts and good motions by particular wills: Yet nevertheless I deny not, but they are all predestinated by the good will of God towards them; for which they ought to be eternally thankful. See how I explain these things.  
LV.  
God discovers in the infinite treasures of his wisdom, an infinite number of possible works, and at the same time the most perfect way of producing each of them. Amongst others he considers his Church, J. C. who is the Head thereof, and all persons who in consequence of certain general laws must compose it. In short, having in mind Jesus Christ and all his members, he established his laws for his own glory. This being so, is it not evident that J. C. who is the principle of all that glory that comes to God from his work, is the first of the predestinated? That all the Elect also are truly and freely beloved and predestinated in J. C. because they may honour God in him; that lastly they are all infinitely obliged to God, who without considering their merit, hath established the general Laws of Grace, which must sanctify the Elect, and bring them to that glory which they shall eternally possess.  
Additions.  
Man is a strange creature, he is as full of pride, as he is worthy of contempt. He is not satisfied with God, if God does not go out of his way to please him: He looks upon himself as the Centre of the Universe; he refers all things to his own particular, even God himself, and his Eternal Attributes. God is not good but as he is good to him, and even the incarnation of J. C. is a work useless and ill managed, if it do not deliver him from his miseries.  
But on God's side, what excess of bounty! It seems as if God, to render himself Amiable to those who are most in love with themselves, favours this prejudice by his way of speaking unto men. God so loved the World, says J. C. himself, that he gave his only begotten Son, to the end that all that believe in him should have eternal life. What! is J. C. in the eternal designs of God made Man only for men's salvation? No doubtless. On the contrary, men were made for Jesus Christ. They are the materials wherewith he is to build the Eternal Temple, and this Temple is only for God. This is the design of the uncreated Wisdom. J. C. is the Head of the Church; now the Members are for the Head, and not the Head for the Members. J. C. is the first in all things, In omnibus primatum tenens: But he himself is for God; Omnia vestra sunt, vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei. Let us be satisfied that God who has no need of us, was pleased to create us in Jesus Christ for his own glory. He might have left us in our nothing; yet he has loved us in J. C. before the creation of the world. But let us not flatter ourselves; it is because we have J. C. as our Head, that we can render unto him divine Honours. For God cannot act but for his own glory; Omnia propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus. But he cannot find it except in himself: Because a profane World, a Temple, a Worship, a Priesthood which is not consecrated by the eternal Spirit, has no proportion with the Holiness of God.  
God after sin might have reduced us to nothing, and yet on the contrary he hath made us his adopted Sons in J. C. He will give us a part in the inheritance of his well beloved Son. How thankful should we be for such an extreme kindness! It is true, that they who shall be thus happy are not chosen by an absolute and rash will; it is because the simplicity of the general Laws of the order of Grace is favourable unto them, and that herein God acts after such a manner as may be most worthy of him. But what! shall not God be amiable to men, if he does not forsake his wisdom to love them with a blind love? Should Nothing exalt its self, and not be content with its Creator, if he does not without reason prefer it before the rest of his creatures? shall he not rather put himself in the condition of so many sinners & nations abandoned to error, whom God leaves therein without help, he who has sworn by his Prophets that hedesires their Conversion and Sanctification? God desires the Salvation of a sinner, and yet he suffers him to die in his sin; God searches the hearts, and turns them as he pleases, and without injuring their liberty, and yet all the World is full of disorders. Who can resist God but God himself? But on the other hand, who can be displeased that God loves his Wisdom more than his Work? Let all those who love order, adore and love his Conduct, who makes it his inviolable Law; let them love and adore his goodness, who being fully sufficient to himself, has vouchsafed to form a design of making them eternally happy.  
LVI.  
It may be said perhaps that these Laws are so simple and so fruitful, that God must needs prefer them before all others; and that loving only his glory, his Son must needs become incarnate; & that thus he has done nothing only for his Elect. I confess, that God hath done nothing only for his Elect; 
1 Cor. 3.23.  for St Paul teaches us that he has made his Elect for Christ, and J. Christ for himself. If to render God Amiable to men, he must be made to act only for us, or after such a manner as is not the most wise; I had rather say nothing, than talk at this rate. Reason teaches me to render God Amiable, by considering him infinitely perfect, and representing him so full of Charity for his Creatures, that he hath made none of them with a design to render 'em miserable. For if all be not so happy as to enjoy his presence, it is because order requiring that so great a good should be merited, all men do not merit it, for Reasons which I have already mentioned: Is not this to render God Amiable, to represent him such, that even the Reprobate cannot but adore his conduct, and repent of their negligence?  
Additions.  
Although Predestination be not founded but upon the prescience of God, and the freedom of grace, (as may be seen in St Aust. de dono Pers. from the 17. C. to the end) nevertheless the greatest part of men, to the Idea which answers to this word, fix a divine decree so absolute, that one seems to them to oppose free grace, when he maintains that God was obliged; by reason of his wisdom, which he loves invincibly, to choose those whom he hath chosen. As the Palagians suppose that the reason of God's choice is to be found in the natural merits of men; and St. Augustine with the whole Church having maintained that this depends upon the will of God, many imagine that he opposes predestination, who asserts that the choice of the Elect depends upon the will of God, though it be a will enlightened and conducted by eternal Wisdom. To say that the reason of God's choice is in man, is to be a Pelagian, and maintain that grace is given to merits: But to assert that the reason of this choice, is in the eternal wisdom, which is the Law of God, or the rule of his proceed. This is to cry out with St. Paul. O altitudo divitiarum Sapientiae, & Scientiae Dei! But many men do not understand these words in this sense, they pretend that one is chosen, and another reprobated, merely because God wills it, and that his will is his only reason; and that it is upon this account that the Elect are more especially obliged to God. It is in condescension to this disposition of mind which I have observed in a great many honest men, that I have composed this Article. But they who will Meditate a little may easily see what are my thoughts thereof.  
LVII.  
In the mean time, to satisfy those who suppose that God has predestinated every one of the Elect by a particular will, it may be said without injuring the sentiment which I have Proposed, that God, before he created Souls to unite them to bodies, foresaw all that should happen to them, according to the general Laws of Nature and Grace, and all that they should do in all possible circumstances. Thus according to this supposition, it being in his power to create the Soul of Paul, or that of Peter, and to unite it to such a body which he foresaw would be the body of one of the predestinated; he resolved from all Eternity to create the Soul of Paul, through the good will he had for him, and to predestinate him by this choice to Eternal Life. Whereas he creates the Soul of Peter, and unites it to another body by a kind of necessity, by reason of the Laws of Union of Souls with Bodies, which he has very wisely established; for as soon as Bodies are made, he has obliged himself to unite Souls unto them; which was advantageous for all before sin. Now the Body of Peter being begotten by an Heathen Father, or by a Father who has no care to Educate his Children; or lastly, Peter by Birth finding himself engaged in times, places, and employments, which led him to that which is evil, he will infallibly be amongst the reprobate. In the mean time Peter will be useful to the designs of God, for though he himself does not make one of the Predestinated, yet some of his posterity may. He will promote the Beauty and Greatness of the Church of Jesus Christ, by the many relations he will have to the Elect. In short, he will not be miserable, but proportionably to the ill use which he shall have made of his liberty: For God does not punish [with grief] any but voluntary irregularities. This is all I can say to satisfy the inclination of some persons: But I do not clearly see that any one ought to stop here.  
LVIII.  
They who pretend that God has particular designs and wills for all the particular effects which are produced in consequence of general Laws, do ordinarily make use of the authority of Scripture, whereon to found their opinion. Now seeing Scripture is made for all the World, for the simple as well as for the learned, it is full of Anthropologies. It gives to God not only a Body, a Throne, a Chariot, an Equipage, the passions of Joy, of Sadness, of Anger, Repentance, and other motions of the soul; but also attributes unto him those ways of acting which are usual among men, that it may speak to the Vulgar after the most sensible manner. If J. C. was made Man, this was partly to satisfy the inclination of men, who love that which resembles them, and attend to that which affects them. It is to persuade them by this true and real kind of Anthropology, of those truths which they would not have been able to comprehend. Thus St. Paul to accommodate himself to all men, speaks of the Sanctification and predestination of the Saints, as if God continually acted in them by particular wills. And even J. C. himself speaks of his Father, as if he did by such wills adorn the the Lilies, and preserve even the hairs of the heads of his Disciples; because in truth the goodness of God towards his Creatures being extreme, these expressions give a great Idea thereof, and render God amiable even to those minds which are most gross, and have most of self love in them. Nevertheless, since by the Idea which we have of God, and by those passages of Scripture which agree with this Idea, we correct the sense of some other places, which ascribe unto God members or passions like unto ours: So when we would speak exactly of the manner of Gods acting in the order of Nature, or grace, we ought to explain the passages which make him act as a man, or a particular cause by that Idea which we have of his wisdom and his goodness, and by other places of Scripture which are agreeable to this Idea. For in conclusion, if the Idea which we have of God, permits, nay obliges to say, that he does not cause every drop of rain to fall by particular wills, though this sentiment is authorized by the natural sense of some places of Scripture, there is the like necessity to think, that notwithstanding certain authorities of the same Scripture, God does not give to some sinners by particular wills, all those good motions which are of no effect to them, and yet to several others would be effectual; because otherwise it seems impossible to me, to make the Holy Scripture agree either with reason, or with its self, as I think I have proved.  
LIX.  
If I thought, that what I have already said was not sufficient to convince considering persons, that God acts not by particular wills, as particular causes or limited understandings do, I should proceed to show, that there are few truths whereof more proofs may be given, supposing it granted that God governs the World, and that the Nature of HEATHEN PHILOSOPHERS is but a Chimaera. For in truth nothing is done in the World, which doth not prove this sentiment, Miracles only excepted; which nevertheless would not be Miracles different from the effects which are called natural, if it was true that God ordinarily acts by particular wills; since Miracles are not such, but because they happen not according to general Laws. Thus do Miracles suppose these Laws, and prove the sentiment which I have laid down, but as for ordinary effects, they clearly and directly demonstrate general Laws or Wills. For example, if a stone be let fall upon the head of one that passes by, the stone will always fall with equal swiftness, without distinguishing either the piety or the quality, the good or evil dispositions of the passenger. If any other effect be examined, we shall see the same constancy, in the action of the cause which produces it. But no effect proves that God acts by particular wills, though men often imagine that God works Miracles every moment for their sakes. Since the way by which they would have God to act, is agreeable to ours; since it flatters self-love which refers all things to its self; since it comports well with the ignorance we are in of the combination of occasional causes, which produce extraordinary effects, it naturally enters into the mind, when we do not sufficiently study Nature, and consult with attention enough, the abstracted Idea of an infinite Wisdom, of an Universal Cause, of a Being infinitely perfect.  
Additions.  
Let me be permitted to desire of the Reader, that he do meditate some time upon this, first Discourse, before he reads that which follows.    

The Second Discourse. Of the Laws of Grace in particular, and of the Occasional Causes, which Govern and Determine their Efficacy.  

First Part. Of the Grace of Jesus Christ.  
Additions. 
Before this 2d. Dis. read 3d. C. of 2d. P. of Search after Truth, and the Expli. of the same C. where the Author opposes the Efficacy of pretended second causes .,  
I Have proved in the First Discourse, the necessity of Occasional Causes in the Order of Grace, as well as in that of Nature; and I don't think that which I have written can be distinctly understood, but it must be granted. But now I am about to prove by those arguments which Faith supplies, that Jesus Christ is this cause. Since this is of the greatest consequence, clearly to understand the principles of Religion, and to make us draw near with confidence to the true Propitiatory, or the occasional cause, which never fails to determine the efficacy of the general Law of Grace: I think I may require the Reader to Meditate upon this Second Discourse with all diligence, and without prejudice.  
I.  
Since there is none but God who acts immediately and by himself upon Spirits, & who produces in them all the different Modifications whereof they are capable; it is he alone who enlightens our minds, and inspires us with certain sentiments which determine our divers wills. Thus there is none but God who can as the 
* By the true cause I understand the Cause which Acts by its own strength.  true cause, produce grace in our Souls. For the principle of all the regular motions of our love, is necessarily, either knowledge which teaches us, or a sentiment which convinces us that God is our happiness; since we never begin to love any object, if we do not either clearly see by the light of Reason, or confusedly feel by the taste of pleasure that the object is good, I mean capable of rendering us more happy than we are.  
II.  
But seeing all men are engaged in Original sin, and all even by their nature infinitely below God; it is only J. Christ who by the dignity of his Person, and the holiness of his Sacrifice, could have access to his Father, reconcile us to him, and merit his favours for us. Thus it is J. C. only, who could be the Meritorous cause of Grace. These truths are agreed on. But we do not seek after the cause which Produces Grace by its proper efficacy, nor that which merits it by his sacrifice and good works, we seek after that which regulates, and determines, the efficacy of the general cause, that which may be called the second, particular, and occasional.  
III.  
For that the general cause may act by general Laws or Wills, and that his action may be regular, constant, and uniform; it is absolutely necessary, that there be an occasional cause which determines the efficacy of these Laws, and serves to establish them. If the percussion of bodies, or some such thing, did not determine the EFFICACY of general LAWS of the Communication of motions, it would be necessary that God should move bodies by particular wills. The Laws of the union of the Soul and Body, are made efficacious only by the changes which happen in each of these substances. For if God should make the Soul feel a pungent pain, though the body was not pricked, or if the brain should not be moved as if the body was pricked, he would not act by the general Laws of the union between Soul and body, but by a particular will. If it should rain upon the Earth any other ways but by the necessary consequence of the general Laws of the communication of motions, the rain and the fall of each drop that composes it, would be the effect of a particular will: Insomuch that if order did not require that it should rain, this will would be altogether unworthy of God. It is therefore necessary that in the order of Grace, there be some occasional cause which establishes these Laws, and determines the efficacy of them; and this is that cause which we must endeavour to find out.  
iv  
Tho we never so little consult the Idea of Intelligible order, or consider the sensible order which appears in the works of God, we clearly discover that the occasional causes which determine the efficacy of the general Laws, and establish them, must necessarily have relation to the design for which God appoints these Laws.  
For example, we see by experience that God has not, and Reason convinces us that he ought not, to have made the motions of the Planets the occasional causes of the union of soul and body. He could not have willed that our Arm should be moved after such and such a manner, nor the soul suffer the pain of the Toothache, at the time of the Moon's conjunction with the Sun, if this conjunction does not act upon the body. The design of God being to unite the Soul to the Body, he could not give to the Soul the sentiments of grief, but when some changes happen in the body which are contrary to it. Thus we ought not to seek any where else but in the Soul, and in the Body the occasional causes of their union.  
V  
Hence it follows, that God having a design to form his Church by J. C. could not according to this design seek any where else but in J. C. and the Creatures united by reason to J. C. the occasional causes which serve to establish the general Laws of Grace, by which the spirit of J. C. is shed upon his Members, and communicates unto them his Life and Holiness. Thus Grace is not showered down upon our hearts according to the divers situation of the Stars, nor according to the meeting of several bodies; nor even according to the different motion of the animal spirits which give unto us motion and life. No bodies can excite in us any motions and sentiments, but what are purely natural; for all that comes to the soul by the body, is only for the body. The Angels themselves are not made occasional causes of inward grace. They are as well as we Members of that body of which J. C. alone is the Head, they are Ministers of J. C. for the salvation of the Saints. I grant that they may produce some change in the bodies which surround us, and even in that which we animate; and that thus they may remove some impediments of the efficacy of Grace. But certainly they cannot distribute to men such a precious gift; they have not immediate power over the minds of men, which by their nature are equal to them. To conclude, St Paul teaches us, 
Heb. 11.5.  to believe that God has not subjected to them the future World, or the Church of J. C. Thus the occasional cause of Grace cannot be found but in J. C. or in man.  
VI  
But seeing it is certain that grace is not granted to all those that desire it, nor as soon as they desire it, and it is often given to those who do not ask it; it follows, that even our desires are not the occasional cause of Grace. For this kind of causes always have readily their effect, and without them the effect is never produced. For example, the striking of bodies upon one another being the occasional cause of the change which happens in their motion, if two bodies do not meet one another their motions are not changed; and if they be changed, we may be assured that they did. The general Laws by which Grace is poured into our hearts, do find nothing in our wills which may determine their efficacy; like as the general Laws which govern the rains, are not founded upon the dispositions of the places where it reins. For whither Lands lie Fallow, or whither they be cultivated, it reins indifferently in all places, even upon Sands and in the Sea.  
VII.  
We are then brought to maintain, that since none but J. C. could merit grace, there is likewise none but he who could give the occasions of the general Laws according to which it is given to men. For the principle of the foundation of general Laws, or that which determines their efficacy, being necessarily either in us, or in J. C. since it is certain it is not in us, for the reasons above mentioned, it must needs be found in J. C. Thus it was necessary that God after sin should have no regard to our wills: Being all in disorder, we could no more be the occasion of Gods giving us Grace. A Mediator therefore was necessary not only to give us access to God, but also to be the natural or occasional cause of those favours we hope to receive from him.  
VIII.  
Since God designed to make his Son the Head of his Church, it was convenient he should make him the natural or occasional cause of Grace, which sanctifies it; for it is from the Head that Life and motion ought to be given to the members. And it was even with this foresight that God permitted sin, for if man had continued in his Innocence, without being assisted by the Grace of J. C. seeing his wills would have merited Grace, and even Glory, God should have established in man the occasional cause of his perfection and happiness: The inviolable Law of order requires this; so that J. C. would not have been the Head of his Church, or such an Head whose influences the Members would have had no need of.  
IX.  
If our soul had been in our body, before it was formed, and all the parts which compose it disposed of according to our different wills, with how many divers sentiments and motions would she have been affected, by all the effects which she would have known aught to have followed from her wills, especially if she had had an extreme desire to have made a more Vigorous and better formed body? 
Eph. I. 22, 23. iv 16. Col. 11.19. Act. IX. 5. Col I. 24. 1 Cor. XII. 27. etc.  Now the Holy Scripture does not only say that J. C. is the Head of the Church, but it also teaches us that he begot it, that he formed it, that he nourishes it, that he suffered in it; that he merits in it, that he acts and influences it without ceasing. The zeal which J. C. has for the glory of his Father, and the love he bears to his Church, inspires him continually with a desire of making it the most ample, the most magnisicent, and the most perfect, he can possibly. Thus seeing the soul of J. C. has not an infinite capacity, and yet desires to give infinite beauties and ornaments to his Church, we have all the reason to believe that there is a continual succession of thoughts and desires in his Soul, in respect of his Mystical body which he continually forms.  
X.  
Now these continual desires of the Soul of Jesus, which sanctify the Church, and render it worthy of the Majesty of his Father, God hath made the occasional causes of the efficacy of the general Laws of Grace: For Faith teaches us that God hath given to his Son an absolute power over Men, by making him the Head of his Church; and this cannot be conceived if the different wills of J. C. be not followed by their effects. For it is visible, I should have no power over mine arm, if it should move itself whether I would or no, and if when I desire to move it, it should remain as if it was dead and without motion.  
XI.  
J. C. has merited his Sovereign power over men, and this quality of Head of the Church, by the Sacrifice he offered upon Earth; and after his Resurrection he took full possession of this right. 
joh. VII. 39  'Tis upon this account, that he is now Sovereign Priest of future good things, and that by his many intercessions, he continually prays unto the Father in the behalf of men. 
Heb. 7.25, Rom. 8.34. 1 Joh. II. 1. Joh. XI. 42.  And seeing his desires are occasional causes, his prayers are always heard; his Father denies him nothing, as the Scripture teaches us. Nevertheless he must pray and desire that he may obtain: For the occasional, physical, natural causes (for all these words signify the same thing) have no power of themselves to do any thing; and all creatures, even J. C. himself considered as man, are in themselves nothing but weakness and impotence.  
Additions.  
I don't think that hitherto there is any difficulty, if it be not in this last Article, where I say, that J. C. prayeth unto his Father; for there are some Persons whom this very much offends. For I speak as St. Paul to the Romans, and to the Hebrews, and as Jesus Christ himself: I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter: which is to be understood of J. C. after his resurrection, according to these words of St. John; The spirit was not yet given because Jesus was not yet glorified.  
For the Spirit fell not upon the Apostles till Ten days after J. C. was entered into the Holy of Holies, a Sovereign Priest of true good things.  
In all these Articles, I speak only of J. C. as to his humanity, according to which he received all power in Heaven and Earth; because all his prayers or his desires, which certainly are in his power, (or otherwise he has no power) are executed in consequence of his qualities, as Sovereign Priest of the House of God, King of Israel, Architect of the Eternal Temple, Mediator betwixt God and men, Head of the Church; or to speak like the Philosophers, (for whom I chief writ this Treatise) the occasional, natural, or distributive cause of Grace: The cause which Determines the Efficacy of the general Law by which God would save all men in his Son.  
XII.  
J. C. having then successively divers thoughts in relation to the divers dispositions, whereof Souls in general are capable, these divers thoughts are accompanied with certain desires in relation to the Sanctification of these Souls. Now these desires being the occasional causes of Grace, they must pour it down upon those persons in particular whose dispositions resemble that upon which the Soul of J. C. actually thinks: And this Grace must be so much the stronger and more abundant, as these desires of J. C. are greater and more lasting.  
XIII.  
When a person considers any part of his body, which is not formed as it ought to be, he has naturally certain desires in relation to this part, and the use he desires to make of it in common life; and these desires are followed by certain insensible motions of the animal Spirits, which tend to give that proportion or disposition to this part which we desire it should have. When the Body is altogether formed, and the flesh firm, the motions change nothing in the construction of the parts; they can only give them certain dispositions which are called Corporeal habits. But when the body is not altogether formed, and the flesh is very soft and tender, these motions which accompany the desires of the Soul, do not only give the body certain particular dispositions, but may also change the construction thereof. This sufficiently appears by Children in the Womb, for they are not only moved with the same passions as there Mothers, but they also receive the marks of these passions in their bodies, from which yet the Mothers are always free.  
XIV.  
The Mystical body of J. C. is not yet a perfect man, 
Eph. IU. 13.  it will not be so till the end of the world J. C. forms it continually; for it is from the Head the whole body joined together receives nourishment by the efficacy of his influence, according to the measure which is proper to every one, to the end it may be formed and edified in love. These are the truths which St Paul teaches us. Now since the soul of J. C. has no other action but the divers motions of its heart, 'tis necessary that these desires be succeeded by the influence of grace, which only can form J. C. in his Members, and give them that beauty and proportion which must be the eternal object of the divine Love.  
XV.  
The divers motions of the soul of J. C. being the occasional causes of Grace, we ought not to be surprised, if it be sometimes given to great sinners, or those who make no use of it. For the soul of J. C. designing to raise a Temple of vast extent, and infinite beauty, may desire that Grace may be given to the greatest sinners; and if in this moment J. C. thinks actually, for example, upon Covetous persons, the Covetous shall receive Grace. Or else, J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain merit for the construction of his Church, which is not ordinarily acquired, but by those who suffer certain persecutions, of which the passions of men are the natural principle: In a word, J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain character, for bringing to pass certain effects in his Church, may in general apply himself to them, & by this application bestow upon them the Grace which sanctifies: In like manner, as the mind of an Architect thinks in general upon square stones, for example, when these sort of stones are actually necessary for his building.  
XVI.  
But as the soul of J. C. is not a general cause, there is reason to think that it often has particular desires in respect of certain particular persons. When we pretend to speak exactly of God, we ought not to consult ourselves, and make him act as we do; we ought to consult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, and make him act according to this Idea, but when we speak of the action of the soul of Jesus, we may consult ourselves, we may suppose it to act as particular causes would act, which yet are joined to eternal wisdom. We have reason, for example, to believe that the calling of St. Paul was the effect of the efficacy of a particular desire of J. Christ. We may also look upon the desires of the soul of J. C. which generally relate to all the minds of one certain character, as particular desires, though they comprehend many persons; because these desires change every moment, as those of particular causes do. But the general Laws by which God acts are always the same, because his wills must be firm, and constant, seeing his wisdom is infinite; as I have shown in the first Discourse.  
Additions.  
I think I have demonstrated, that J. C. as man, is the occasional cause of Grace. Now, since God acts not, if Order doth not require, or some occasional cause determine him thereunto; and that, in respect of Grace, altogether free, Order never requires that God should give it, seeing it cannot be merited: 'Tis evident, that all the difficulties which we find in the distribution of Grace, must be ascribed to J. C. as man. This is that which I have already done in a general way; for it was not at all necessary, that I should particularly justify the wisdom and goodness of God, which was my only design in the construction of his Church, as I did at first advertise.  
But that the minds, least able to discern the usefulness of the principles laid down, may not fail to apprehend it; I shall endeavour, as clearly as possibly I can, to show the consequences which may be drawn from these principles.  
There are many difficulties in vindicating Gods Conduct in his way of distributing the rain of Grace, as well as in that by which he sends down the ordinary rain, the chief of which are, that it is not always proportioned to the need of sinners, and that even in respect to the just, though it answer their necessities, yet it does not always hinder them from falling into disorder.  
God is wise, he wills the conversion of sinners, he has sworn so by his Prophet. A Being infinitely wise proportions the means to the end. How then can it be that the Grace which the sinner receives should not be strong enough to make him quit his sin? Or to take away all equivocation, Why should not such an Infant be Baptised? Why should there be so many Nations who know not J. C.? It is easily comprehended by what I have said in the first Discourse, that this is a consequence of the simplicity of God's ways, and must proceed from the occasional cause which God has established for the executing his design after such a manner, as best resembles his Divine Attributes.  
For if it reins upon the Highways, upon the Sand, upon the Sea, as well as upon the Sown Lands; it is because these rains are necessary consequences of the simplicity of those ways which God has established for making the Earth Fruitful.  
But whence does it proceed that J. C. who is an intelligent occasional cause, abandons so many sinners and so many nations? Or to come to the greatest difficulty, Whence is it that J. C. forsakes even the just, the members of his body, who are strait united to him by charity? For as to sinners, and they who do not call upon him, it may be said that he neglects them as unworthy of his care. But whence comes it to pass, that he gives to the just, exposed to temptation, such a Grace, which he well foresaw, notwithstanding his assistance would be overcome? This Grace was altogether sufficient, I grant, and that it only depended upon the just to make it efficacious. But why did not J. C. give it more force, since he foresaw the fall of one of his wellbeloved Children? If my principle can clear up these difficulties, without injuring the love of J. C. towards men, as well as it defends the wisdom and goodness of God, against the reasonings of Libertines, certainly the consequences thereof will be very advantageous to Religion. This is that which I am about to examine.  
J. C. may be considered according to two respects, one as Architect of the Eternal Temple; the other, as Head of the Church. I have partly explained the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect because this manifested the fruitfulness and necessity of my principle. But I would not speak of the way by which he acts as Head of the Church, by reason of the difficulty of the fall of the just, which supposes certain things whereof I thought not then to speak. That I may explain more particularly the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect upon the materials which do not as yet make part of his Temple, and as Head in respect of the Just who are members of his Body, I am obliged to say what I think concerning the holy Soul of J. C. which regulates all his desires, with respect nevertheless to the divine Law, the immutable and necessary order; for the wills of J. C. are always agreeable to those of his Father. Tho several of the 
* Athan. Orat. 4. in Arianos. S. Iren. Lib. V S. Basil Ep. 391. ad Amphil. S. Greg. Naz. Orat. 36. S. Cyr. of Alex. Thres. lib. 9 C. 4. Theod. Tom. 4. p. 731.  Fathers and those especially who wrote against the Arrians, as Athanasius, were contented to attribute to Jesus Christ, as God, the knowledge of all things, and expounded concerning J. C. as man, that which St. Mark reports, The Day of the Lord knoweth no Man, no not the Son of Man himself; and some of them feared not even to say, that Ignorance is one of the defects of Humane Nature which J. C. took for our sakes: Nevertheless I am far from this thought. For I am persuaded that J. C. as man knows all Sciences, and hath a perfect knowledge of all things; that he not only knows all the Being's which God hath created, with all their Modifications, and all their relations; but also upon much greater reason, all those which God can create: In a word, all that which God contains in the immensity of his Being. I say that J. C. knows upon much greater reason, all possible Creatures than the existence and relation of those which God hath made; because he knows the first by the right which his union with the Word, which contains them as the Word, gives him; whereas he knows not the other but by a kind of a Revelation as I shall show hereafter.  
I believe then that J. C. as man, knows all things; but it ought to be observed that there is a great difference between knowing all things habitually, and knowing all things actually; between knowing all things and thinking of all things; which is almost always confounded. There is no man but knows that two and two make four, and yet there are but few who actually think of it. A Geometrician knows his Enclid, but he is often a long time without thinking of any of the propositions of this Author. A man knows a truth, or Science, when by his Labour, or otherwise, he has gained a right thereunto; insomuch, that he can no sooner think of these things, but they immediately present themselves to his mind very clearly, without putting him to any trouble.  
Now the soul of J. C. is personally united to the Word, and the Word, as the Word, contains all possible being with their relations; he contains all immutable, necessary, & eternal truths. J. C. as man, can no sooner think of any truths, but they are instantly discovered to his mind. J. C. therefore knows all Sciences; he knows all possible things, since he may without any effort of mind, see all that the Word contains as the Word. For the same reason J. C. knows all the divine Perfections, since the Word is a substantial representation of the divine Nature, and the Father communicates to his Son all his Substance. He knows even the Existence, the Modifications, the relations of the Creatures; but by a kind of revelation which the Father gives to him whensoever he desires him; according to those words of J. C. himself, I know, O Father that thou always hearest me. For since the creatures are not the necessary emanations of the Divinity, the Word as the Word, does truly represent their Nature or Essence, but not their Existence; for their Existence depends upon the free will of the Creator, which the Word, merely as the Word, does not contain, seeing the Divine Decrees are common to all the three Persons. Thus the Existence of the Creatures cannot be known but by a kind of Revelation. J. C. therefore as man, knows all things. In him are hidden all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God, but he does not actually think upon all things; and this is evident: For the soul of J. C. has not the capacity of an infinite mind. And those who maintain that there are no succession of thoughts in J. C. and that he always knows whatsoever he does know, thinking to attribute to the soul of J. C. a sort of immutability which is due only to God, they necessarily make him liable to very great ignorance. See the proof of this: It is certain that natural effects are combined amongst themselves, and with those of Grace, after an infinitely infinite manner, and that these combinations are every moment changed after infinite ways, by reason of the mutability of men's wills, and the irregular course of the animal Spirits, which change all our traces and all our Ideas, in consequence of the Laws of Union of Soul and Body.  
Now the capacity of thinking, which the Soul of J. C. has as Man, is finite. Therefore if he knew, or always actually thought upon that which he knows, he must necessarily be ignorant of an infinite number of things.  
Furthermore, it is certain that the properties of numbers are not only infinite but infinitely infinite: That in respect of Figures, there may be, for example, an infinite number of Triangles of different kinds, each of their sides being capable of being lengthened or shortened to infinity. Now to say that J. C. knows not the properties of such Triangles, or the relation of one of their sides, or its Square, or its Cube, or its Quadrata-quadrate, etc. with other Sides, or their Squares, or their Cubes, or their Quadrata-quadrates, etc. this is to suppose that J. C. is ignorant of that which the Geometricians know. But if it be maintained that J. C. as Man, always actually knows every thing that he knows, it is necessary that he be ignorant of an infinite number of the properties of these Triangles. Nevertheless let us suppose, that Natural effects are not combined with the effects of Grace; and that likewise all the thoughts of men, their circumstances, their combinations, were something finite, which the mind of man might discern all at once; certainly to suppose that the Soul of J. C. does always think of them, is to give unto him a very useless and troublesome knowledge. It is troublesome, for that which renders the soul of J. C. happy, is the contemplation of the perfection of the Sovereign good. Now the knowledge of all the Chimaeraes which do, have, and shall pass in our minds, according to this supposition, continually distracting the capacity of the soul of J. C. (otherwise entertained in beholding the Beauties and tasting the sweetness of the chief Good) would not be very agreeable to him. For it must be observed, that it is one thing to see God, and another thing to see the Creatures and their modifications in God. I think I have demonstrated that we see all in God in this life, but this is not to see God, or to enjoy him. Thus it cannot be said, that J. C. sees all our thoughts, without dividing his capacity of thinking; because he sees them all in God. This actual knowledge therefore, which some would give to J. C. is troublesome; for it is very irksome to think actually upon those things, upon which we do not desire to think of. A Geometrician who should have found out the Squaring of a Circle, or any other more surprising Truth, would be very miserable, should it be always present to his mind. J. C. has an Object more worthy of his application, than the modification of the Creatures; therefore always to have an actual knowledge of our thoughts and needs, passed, and future, would be very troublesome.  
Moreover, it would be altogether useless to him, and to us. Certainly it is sufficient that J. C. thinks of assisting me, when I shall have need; without thinking thereof for two or three Thousand years, or rather from all Eternity: For J. C. must actually think thereof from all Eternity, if there be no succession of thoughts in his soul.  
As in the Treatise of Nature and Grace, (which I composed for those Persons who are not over credulous) I resolved not to propose any Principles which might be contested; and since if I had supposed that the soul of J. C. had actually known all things, my supposition might have been opposed, by the reasons which I have produced, and perhaps by others better: I have therefore only supposed, that J. C. has a clear Idea of the soul, and the modifications of which it is capable, to produce a noble effect in the Temple which he builds to the glory of his Father; that which Reason and Faith do demonstrate. Thus I suppose J. C. to act in consequence of this only supposition, in the XIII, XIV, XV, XVI. Articles, where I compare him to an Architect, and to a Soul which should have power to form all the parts of its Body. For as an Architect may form a Design, and build an Edifice, without concerning himself from whence the materials come he employs therein; so J.C. by his union with the Word, may form his designs, and desires, without thinking on the actual dispositions of all men. He hath admonished them by his Counsels in his Gospel, to put themselves in such a condition, that Grace may not be useless to them. It becomes him not to order his desires, (the distributive causes of his Graces) according to the negligence, or wickedness of men, but according to the condition wherein he finds the Work he is to build, according to the designs he continually forms; according to the beauty wherewith he intends to Adorn his Church.  
Now this way, after which, I suppose J.C. might act, would be sufficient to justify God's Conduct, and make it in general comprehended; whence it is that the rain of Grace is sent down without effect upon hardened hearts, at such unseasonable times, after such an unequal manner, and almost always so little answerable unto the concupiscence of those who receive it: For this reason I ought not to enter particularly upon the fall of the Just, under an Head who has so much love for sinners. Nevertheless I shall at present endeavour to explain it to satisfy the most difficult.  
Whilst J.C. acts as Architect, he only regulates his desires according to his designs. It is indifferent to him to have in his Temple, Paul, or John; if both the one and the other resemble the Idea which determines his desires: As it is indifferent to an Architect, who needs only a square stone, or a pillar, to have that which is on the right hand, or on the left, if they be altogether alike. Thus the desire of J. C. bestowing Grace which moves men to come unto him, and cast themselves in his hands, those who come first, and are most watchful, are they whom he employs in his building.  
But men having once followed the motion of Grace, I think it is certain that J. C. is advertised of their dispositions; and that when he has plac'c them in his Temple, or made them parts of his Body, no need, no temptation, happens to them, which he has not notice of, and which he doth not provide for. When Bread is once become part of our flesh, it cannot be touched without hurting us. When a stone is wrought and laid in the building, it cannot be broken without offending the Architect. J. C. considered as Head of the Church, is therefore advertised of all our necessities, even before he particularly desires to know them. Herein his Father prevents his Charity; It seems to me, that order requires this. Perhaps he may even actually know the effect, which the assistance he gives us, will have, even before it be given; and this is that which makes all the difficulty. For J. C. loves the just, he tenderly cherishes those who are united unto him by Charity. Now he has notice of a Temptation which solicits one of his Members, and he may give him Victorious Graces. If therefore he foresaw, that with such assistance, the Just, though he might have overcome, would nevertheless be vanquished; Why did he not augment this assistance? He desires the just should be Victorious; Why therefore doth he not proportion the means to the end, if he actually knew the relation of the means to the end?  
For my part, I had rather believe that J. C. as man, or the occasional cause of Grace, doth not actually know the future determination of the will of the just, to whom he gives assistance, than think that he in any sense, wants Goodness and Charity for his Members. I grant that J.C. as man, may know all the future determination of our wills, as I know that two and two are four. But I doubt whether he actually thinks thereon. and I do not believe that he always thinks thereon, that he may regulate the distribution of Graces according to this knowledge. These are my Reasons.  
J. C. does not see in the Word, precisely as the Word, whether the just will follow, or will not follow the motion of his Grace: He cannot know it, unless God discover it to him by a sort of revelation, as I have already said. Now it seems to me, that he ought not always to demand what effect his Grace will have; because it seems clear to me, that Order, which is his Rule, and his Law, doth not require that he should proportion his gifts to men's future negligence, but only to their necessities for his own proper designs.  
J.C. must act as man, or as the occasional cause, that God may build up his Church by the most simple ways. Now none but God can dive in men's hearts, and see the free determinations of their wills. J. C. therefore before he acts, ought not to desire of his Father to reveal to him, whether the just being tempted, will, or will not be vanquished, by such or such a degree of Grace: For thus his action would not bear the Character of an occasional cause. If God should by himself, give unto the just Grace to vanquish Temptations, being by nature Searcher of Hearts, his Conduct ought to comport with this Character; and if the just should be vanquished, it might be believed, that God designed to forsake him. But Order requiring that J. C. as Man, should act as Man, his action is not to bear the Character of Searcher of Hearts: For God intending to make his wisdom his foresight, the infinite extension of his knowledge, to appear in the construction of his great work; he was obliged to form it by the most simple ways. For in conclusion, what marvel would it be, if J. C. should make a beautiful work, and save even all men, if on the one side he acted by particular wills, and on the other, his action did not carry in it the character of an Occasional cause, but of an infinite Wisdom, certainly GOD ought not to appoint an Occasional Cause, if this Occasional cause must act as God, and not as man? He ought to do all immediately by himself. But how should we have justified his wisdom and goodness, seeing so many Monsters among Bodies, so many irregularrities among Spirits, so much disproportion in his action, in relation to his Attributes, so much rain upon the Sand and in the Sea, so many Graces given to hardened Hearts; Graces which serve only to make them more culpable and more criminal, 
Ezek. 33.2. Eccles. 15.12.  which yet could not have been given, with a design so unworthy of God's goodness, who desires the Conversion of sinners, and to whom the wicked were never necessary?  
If that which I have said of the fall of the just, and the manner after which Jesus Christ forms his Church, be clearly understood; perhaps it would be found to be probable enough: But I think I ought to say, that this is no ways necessary in order to defend my principles, and the manner by which I have justified the wisdom and goodness of God. For it may be that God has given to J. C. as man, a particular kind of knowledge and power in relation to his design, by establishing him the occasional cause of the general Law of Grace. To make my thought understood by a comparison, let us imagine that as soon as Adam was form, God acquainted the Angels, that he had united a Spirit to a Body, to the end that it might take care thereof, without informing them any thing of the Laws of this union. According to this supposition, the Angels reasoning according to their Ideas, would doubtless have imagined, that the first man had no sentiment of Objects; and that, to eat and nourish himself, he studied to know the consiguration of the parts of the fruits of Paradise, the relation they might have with those of his Body, thereby to judge whether they would have been proper for his nourishment. In all probality they would have believed, that to walk, Adam had thought on the Nerves which answered to his Legs, and that he had continually conveyed to them such a quantity of Animal spirits to remove them; and thus they would have judged of other Functions by which Man's life is preserved. We very near do the same thing as to the manner in which J. C. forms his Church: We will needs judge thereof according to our Ideas, and yet perhaps we understand nothing thereof. God united the Soul to the Body of the first Man, after a much more wise and real manner, than the Angels themselves could imagine: For God advertised him by sentiments, after a short and undoubted manner, of what he ought to do; and this without dividing, as little as might be, the capacity which he had of thinking upon his Sovereign good: For than his Senses kept silence whensoever he desired it. Man may still walk and meditate, both together, but the first man upon all occasions, might, and also ought, without withdrawing himself from the presence of God, to give unto his Body all that which was necessary for it. Why may not God at present therefore, give unto J. C. certain kinds of compendious knowledge, whereof we have no Idea, that he may thereby better facilitate the construction of his Church, so that the relation which he has to us, may not divide the capacity which he has of seeing God and enjoying his happiness? God appointed certain general Laws of the union of Soul and Body, that the first Man might preserve his Life without applying himself overmuch to particular Objects. Why may not God, by making his Son the Head of the Church, have established such like general Laws? It may be this aught to have been so, that God might act in such a manner as agrees best with the divine attributes; and perhaps that apparent irregularity with which Grace is given unto men, is in part a consequence of this marvellous invention of eternal wisdom. Assuredly, it may be the first Adam was even in this a figure of the second, and that J.C. besides his knowledge and desires, which we cannot deny to him, without impiety, hath still compendious ways, worthy of an infinite wisdom, by which, as we by our sentiments and passions, he acts in his mystical body, without being diverted from his Sovereign good, which he loves too much to lose the sight of, or remove himself from its presence. There are several passages in Scripture may countenance this opinion, but I might well be accounted rash, should I pretend to establish it as a point which ought to be believed. That which I say may be true, but I ought not to assert it as true, before I am well convinced of it myself. If this be not, it may be, or some such like thing; as for my part, I have not justified the Wisdom and Goodness of God, but by leaving to J. C. as Architect of the Eternal Temple, that we cannot take from him without offering violence to Reason and good Sense. But I am glad to know that there are several ways of answering those who oppose the Quality which I give to J. C. of an occasional cause, which determines the efficacy of the good will of God in respect to men; and that all the Objections which can be made against me in this, can upon no other account be hard to be resolved, but because we are ignorant of a great many things which it would be necessary to know for the clearing them up.  
XVII.  
The divers desires of the Soul of J. C. giving Grace, hence we clearly apprehend whence it is, that it is not equally given to all men, and that it falls upon certain persons at one time more than at another. Since the Soul of J. C. does not think at the same time of sanctifying all men, it has not at the same time all the desires of which it is capable. Thus, J. C. does not act upon his Members after a particular manner, but by successive influences; like as our Soul does not at the same time remove all the Muscles of our Bodies: For the Animal Spirits go equally and successively into our Members, according to the different impressions of Objects, the divers motions of our passions, and different Desires which we freely form in ourselves.  
XVIII.  
It is true, that all the just continually receive the influence of the Head that gives them life, and that when they act by the Spirit of J. C. they merit and receive new graces, though it be not necessary that the Soul of J. C. has any particular desires which may be the occasional causes of them; for the order, which requires that all Merit be rewarded, is not in God an Arbitrary Law; it is a Necessary Law, which depends not upon any occasional cause. But though he that has done a Meritorious Action, may be rewarded for it, and yet the soul of J. C. have actually no desires in respect of him; nevertheless, it is certain that he has not merited Grace, but by the dignity and holiness which the Spirit of J. C. communicated to him: For men are not acceptable to God, and do nothing that is good, 
John 15.4.  but so far as they are united to his Son by Charity.  
Additions.  
Although I say order requires that the Just Merit Grace, it must not be understood of all Graces, but only of those which are absolutely necessary for the vanquishing unavoidable temptations. But God is faithful who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able, says St. Paul. Now Order requires that God should be faithful. Quis autem dicat eum qui jam coepit credere, ab illo in quem credit non mereri, says St. Augustine de Praedest. Sanct. Ch. 2. The just therefore may merit Grace, by the assistance of Grace; but he cannot in strictness merit those Graces which are not absolutely necessary for him. This depends upon the good will of J. C. as he is the occasional cause of the order of Grace. And in strictness, good works perhaps merit only the reward of happiness: But it is not necessary that I should stand to explain the different ways of understanding merit.  
XIX.  
Moreover, it must be confessed, that they who observe the counsels of J. C. by the esteem which they have for them, and by the fear they have of future Punishments, do solicit, as I may say, by their obedience, the love of J. C. to think of them, though as yet they should act only by self-love. But all their actions are not occasional causes, neither of Grace, since they are not infallibly attended therewith, nor even of the motions of the Soul of J. C. in their behalf, since these same motions never fail of giving it. Thus, the desires of J. C. alone have infallibly their effect, as occasional causes; because God having made J. C. Head of the Church, it is only by him that the Grace which sanctifies the Elect ought to be given.  
XX.  
Now we may consider in the Soul of J. C. two sorts of desires, actual, transient, and particular desires, the efficacy of which continue but a little time, constant and permanent desires, which consist in a firm and lasting disposition of the soul of J. C. in relation to certain effects which tend to the execution of his design in general.  
If our soul by its different motions did communicate to our bodies all that which is necessary to form and make it grow, we might distinguish therein two kinds of desires; for it would send into the Muscles of the Body the Spirits that give it certain dispositions, in respect of the present Objects, or actual thoughts of the mind, by actual and transient desires. But it would give to the Heart and the Lungs the natural motions, which serve for respiration and circulation of the Blood by stable and permanent desires. It would also by such like desires digest its nourishment, and distribute it to all the parts which have need thereof; because this sort of action is at all times necessary for the preservation of the body.  
XXI.  
By these actual, transient, and particular desires of the soul of J. C. Grace is given to persons who are not prepared, and after a manner which hath something singular and extraordinary in it. But it is given regularly by permanent desires to those who worthily receive the Sacraments. For the Grace which we receive by the Sacraments, is not given merely by the Merit of our Action, though we receive with fit dispositions; it is because of the merits of J.C. which are freely applied to us in consequence of his permanent desires. We receive by the Sacraments much more Grace than our preparation can deserve, and it is even sufficient for the receiving some influence thereby that we do not put any impediment: But it is also to abuse that which is most holy in Religion, to receive them unworthily.  
Additions.  
Since J. C. as man, does not act, but by his desires, and the Grace of the Sacraments is permanent; it is evident, that the Grace which he communicates to those who receives them worthily, comes not from J. C. as the occasional cause. If there be not in J. C. a permanent desire, or a constant will to do good unto those who come unto the Sacraments, there would be no great mystery in them.  
XXII.  
Among the actual and transient desires of the Soul of Jesus, there are certainly some which are more lasting and frequent than others; and the knowledge of the desires is of very great use in morality. Doubtless J. C. thinks oftener upon them who observe his counsels, than on other men. The motions of love which he has for the Faithful, are more frequent and lasting, than those which he hath for the Libertine and the Wicked.  
And since all the Faithful are not equally disposed to enter into the Church of the predestinated, the desires of the Soul of J. C. are not in respect of them all equally lively, frequent & abiding. Man more earnestly desires those fruits which are more proper to nourish his Body, he thinks oftener upon Bread and Wine, than on those Meats which are difficultly digested. J. C. having a design to form his Church, ought therefore to concern himself more for those who may easily enter therein, than for those who are very far from it.  
Thus the H. Scripture teaches us, that the humble, the poor, the penitent, receive greater Graces, than other men; because they who despise Honours, Riches, and Pleasures, are much fit for the Kingdom of God. They who according to the example of J. C. have learned to be meek and humble in heart, shall find rest to their souls. The yoke of J. C. which the Proud can't bear, will become easy and light by the assistance of Grace: For God hears the Prayers of the Humble, he will comfort them, he will justify them, he will save them, he will heap Blessings upon them; but he will bring down the Haughtiness of the Proud.  
Blessed are the Poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven: But Cursed are the Rich, for they have received their Consolation in this World. How hard is it, says I C. for the Rich to enter into the Kingdom of GOD! It is easier for a Camel to pass through the eye of a Needle. Which cannot be without a Miracle.  
As for them, who, like David, humble their souls with Fasting, put on Sackcloth: In a word, afflict themselves at the sight of their Sins, and the Holiness of God, will become fit objects for the compassion of J. C. for God never will despise an humble and a contrite Heart. We always disarm his wrath, when we prefer the interests of God before our own, and take vengeance upon ourselves.  
XXIII.  
Since the will of J. C. is altogether agreeable to Order, of which all men have naturally some Idea, it may further be discerned by Reason, that the soul of J. C. has more thoughts and desires, in respect of some Persons, than others. For Order requires, that J. C. should bestow more Graces; for example, upon those who are called to H. Orders, than those whose vocation necessarily engages them in the business of the World. In a word, upon those who make the principal parts of the body of the Church Militant, than they who have not the oversight of any, or are engaged in the Ecclesiastical Function, and raise themselves above others by ambition or interest. For if it be fit that J. C. give Graces unto these in respect of the Persons whom they govern, yet they don't deserve such as may sanctify them in that state which they have chosen by self-love. They may have the gift of Prophecy, without having that of Charity, as Scripture teaches us.  
XXIV.  
We have proved, that the different desires of the soul of J. C. are the occasional causes of Grace, and we have endeavoured to discover something of these desires. Let us now see of what kind of Grace they are the occasional causes. For though J. C. be the Meritorious cause of all graces, it is not necessary he should be the occasional cause of the graces of knowledge, and certain outward Graces, which prepare the heart for conversion, but cannot effect it; for J. C. is always the occasional or necessary cause, according to the order established by God, in respect of all Graces which conduce to men salvation.  
XXV.  
Distinctly to understand what is the grace, which J. C. as Head of his Church, bestows upon his Members, we must know what is the concupiscence which the first man has communicated to all his Posterity. For the second Adam came to cure the disorders which the first had caused, and there is such a relation between the Sinful and Earthly Adam, and the Innocent and Heavenly Adam, that St. 
Rom. V 14, 17, 18, 19 1 Cor. 15 48.  Paul looks upon the first communicating sin to his Offspring, by his disobedience, as the figure of the second giving to Christians by his obedience, righteousness, and holiness.  
XXVI.  
Order requires that the soul should govern the body, and that she should not be distracted whither she will or no, with all those sentiments, and all those motions which turn her to sensible Objects.  
Thus the first man, before sin, was so much Master of his senses, and his passions, that they were silent whensoever he desired it; nothing was able to turn him from his duty against his will, and all the pleasures which then prevented his reason, did only respectfully after a gentle & easy manner, advertise him of what he was to do for the preservation of his life. But after sin, he lost all at once the power he had over his body, so that not being able to stop the motions, nor effuse those traces which sensible Objects made in the principal part of his brain, his soul by the Order of Nature, and as a punishment of his disobedience, became miserably subject to the Law of Concupiscence, to that Carnal Law which continually fights against the mind, and every moment inspires it with the Love of sensible goods, and rules over it by passions so strong, and lively, and yet at the same time, so sweet and agreeable, that it cannot; nay, will not, make all necessary endeavours to break the bonds which captivates it. For the infection of sin is communicated to all the Children of Adam, by an infallible consequence, of the Order of Nature, as I have else where Explained.  
XXVII.  
The Heart of Man is always a slave to pleasure, and when Reason teaches us it is not convenient to enjoy it, yet we do not avoid it, but that we may find another more sweet or solid. We willingly sacrifice dat pleasures to greater; but the invincible impression which we have for our own happiness, permits us not all our lives long to deprive ourselves of that sweetness which we taste, when we suffer ourselves to follow our passions.  
Additions.  
In the third discourse you will see how this aught to be understood.  
XXVIII.  
It is certain, that pleasure makes him happy who enjoys it; at least, while he does enjoy it. Thus men being made to be happy, pleasure always gives a touch to the will, and moves it towards that object which causes it, or seems to cause it: The contrary must be said of grief. Now Concupiscence consists only in a continual succession of sentiments & motion which prevent reason, & which are not subject thereunto of pleasures, which coming from the objects about us, inspire us with the love of them; of griefs, which making the exercise of virtue harsh and painful, give us an abhorrence of them.  
It therefore became the second Adam, that he might cure the disorders of the first, to produce in us pleasures and aversions contrary to those of concupiscence; pleasures with respect the true goods, and horrors or aversions in respect of sensible goods. Thus the grace whereof J. C. is the occasional cause, and which, as Head of the Church, he continually bestows upon us, is not the Grace of knowledge, (though he has merited this Grace, and though he may sometimes communicate it, as I shall show by and by,) but it is the Grace of sentiments. It is this previous delectation which produces and entertains the love of God in our hearts; for pleasure naturally produces and entertains the love of those objects, which cause, or seem to cause it: It is likewise the horror which sometimes accompanies sensible objects, which gives us an aversion to them, and makes us capable of governing the motions of our love by our knowledge  
XXIX.  
The Grace of sentiment should be opposed to concupiscence, pleasure to pleasure, horror to horror, that the influences of J. C. might be directly opposed to the influence of the first man. The remedy that it may cure the disease must be contrary thereto. For the Grace of knowledge cannot heal an Heart wounded with pleasure; to this end this pleasure must either cease, or another succeed in its room. Pleasure is the weight of the soul which naturally inclines it towards itself; sensible pleasures weigh it down towards the Earth. That the soul may determine itself, either these pleasures must be dissipated, or the delectation of Grace raise her towards Heaven, and put her almost in Equilibrio. 'Tis thus that the new Man opposes the old, that the influences of our Head resists the influences of our Father Adam, that J. C. overcomes all our domestic Enemies.  
Since Man had no concupiscence before his sin, it was not necessary he should be carried to the love of good by a previous delectation. He clearly knew that God was his good, it was not necessary that he should feel it. There was no need that he should be drawn by pleasure to love him, whom to love nothing hindered, and who he knew was perfectly worthy of his love; but after sin the Grace of delectation was necessary to him, to counterbalance the continual effort of concupiscence. Thus, knowledge is the Grace of the Creator, delectation the Grace of the Redeemer. Knowledge is communicated by J. C. as Eternal Wisdom: Delectation is given by him as Wisdom Incarnate. Knowledge in its original was no more than Nature, Delectation was always pure Grace. Knowledge after Sin was not granted to us, but through the Merits of J. C. Delectation is given to us through the Merits, and by the Efficacy of the power of J. C. In short, Knowledge is sent down upon our minds, according to our different desires and applications, as I shall Explain: But the Delectation of Grace is not shed upon our Hearts, but according to the various desires of the Soul of J. C.  
Additions.  
That the Healing Grace of J. C. consists in a preventing Delectation, is a thing so much out of doubt with St. Augustine, that F. Deschamps, who has so Learnedly confuted Jansenius, and is so opposite unto him, agrees with him in this Point; though they differ from one another as to the manner in which Grace acts in us. See Jansenius de Grat. Chr. Lib. IU. c. 1. and Deschamps Lib III. Disp. III. c. 16. & 19  
I cannot persuade myself to continue the Explication of those things which to me seem clear of themselves. Insomuch, that what follows either needs it not, or is not particular to me. My Principles are sufficiently confirmed by what has been said, and if they be clearly understood, I dont think there will be any difficulty in what follows.  
XXX.  
It is true, that pleasure produces Knowledge, because the soul gives more attention to the Objects from which she receives more pleasure. Since the generality of men despise or neglect the truths of Religion, because these abstracted truths do not affect them, it may be said that this delectation of Grace doth instruct them; for making these truths sensible, they learn them more easily by the attention which they bring to them. 
1 Joh. 11.72.  'Tis upon this account that St. John says the unction we receive from J. C. teaches us all things, and that they who have this unction have no need to be instructed.  
It is true, that concupiscence, such as we feel, is not necessary in order to merit. Jesus Christ, whose sufferings were infinite, was not at all subject to it. But although he was absolute Master of his Body, he willingly suffered the most troublesome motions and sentiments to be excited therein, that he might thus merit all thereby which was prepared for him. Of all the sentiments, that of Grief is the most contrary to a soul which desires and deserves to be happy, and yet he willingly suffered the most tormenting. Pleasure makes him actually happy, who actually enjoys it, and yet he willingly deprived himself thereof.  
Thus as we ought, he has offered an infinite number of Sacrifices by a Body which he took like unto ours; but these his Sacrifices differed from those of the greatest Saints, because he willingly excited in himself all those painful sentiments, which in the rest of Men are the necessary consequences of sin; and that thus these Sacrifices being altogether voluntary in him, were more Pure, and more Meritorious.  
XXXI.  
Nevertheless, it must be observed that this Unction doth not of its self produce knowledge; it only excites our attention, which is the natural or occasional cause of our knowledge.  
Thus we see, that they who have the most Charity, have not always the most Knowledge. All men not being equally capable of attention, the same unction doth not equally instruct all those who receive it. Thus, though knowledge may be communicated to the Soul by a supernatural infusion, and it may often be produced by Charity; nevertheless, this Grace ought often to be accounted as a natural effect, because Charity does not ordinarily produce knowledge in the minds of Men, but proportionally as it causes the soul to desire the knowledge of that which she loves. For to conclude, the various desires of the soul are the natural or occasional causes of the discoveries we make in any subject whatsoever: But these truths I must explain more at length in the Second Part of this Discourse.   

THE SECOND PART. Of the Grace of the Creator.  
XXXII.  
I Know but two Principles which determine directly, and by themselves, the motions of our Love, Knowledge, and Pleasure: Knowledge, by which we discern different goods, Pleasure, by which we taste them. But there is great difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure. Knowledge leaves us altogether to ourselves, it makes no attempt upon our liberty, it does not force us to love any thing, it does not produce in us a natural or necessary love; it only puts us in a condition of determining ourselves, and loving the objects which it discovers to us with a love of choice, or which is the same thing, of fixing the general impression of Love which God continually gives us upon particular goods. But Pleasure efficaciously determines the will, it transports it, as I may say, towards the object which causes it or seems to cause it; it produces in us a natural and necessary love; it diminishes our liberty, distracts our reason, and does not leave us wholly to ourselves: A small attention to our inward sentiments may convince of these differences.  
XXXIII.  
Thus Man before sin, having a perfect freedom, and no Concupiscence which might hinder him from following his Knowledge in the motions of his Love; and since he clearly saw that God was infinitely amiable, it was not expedient he should have been determined by a preventing Delectation, (as I have already said) nor by other Graces of Sentiment, which might have diminished his merit, and have engaged him to have loved by instinct, that good which ought to be loved only by Reason. But since sin, besides Knowledge, the Grace of sentiment has been necessary, that he might thereby resist the motions of Concupiscence. For Man invincibly desiring to be happy, it is impossible he should continually sacrifice his Pleasure to his Knowledge; his Pleasure which renders him actually happy, & which subsists in himself (notwithstanding he never so much resists it) to his knowledge which subsists not, but by a troublesome application of mind, which the least actual pleasure distracts; & which last, doth not promise actual happiness till after death; which to the imagination, seems to be a real Annihilation.  
XXXIV.  
Knowledge therefore is necessary to Man, for guiding him in the search after that which is good: It is the Effect of natural order: It supposes neither the Corruption, nor the Restoration of Nature. But Pleasure which draws us to true happiness is pure Grace; for naturally what is truly good, ought only to be loved by reason. Hence the occasional causes of the Graces of sentiment must be found in J. C. because he is the Author of Grace: But the occasional causes of Knowledge must ordinarily be found in the order of Nature, because it is the Grace of the Creator. Let us endeavour to find out these causes.  
XXXV.  
In the order established by Nature, I only see two occasional causes, which distribute knowledge to Spirits, and thus determine the general Laws of the Grace of the Creator. The one in us, which in some sort depends upon us; the other, which is to be found in the relation we have to the things about us. The first is nothing else but the different motions of our wills. The second is the concourse of sensible objects which act upon our mind, in consequence of the Laws of union of the Soul with the Body.  
XXXVI.  
The inward sentiment which we have of ourselves, teaches us that our desires produce or excite knowledge in us, and that attention of mind is the natural prayer by which we prevail with God to enlighten us; for all who apply themselves to truth, discover it proportionably to their attention. And if our prayer was not interrupted, if our attention was not disturbed, if we had any Idea of what we ask, and if we asked it with necessary perseverance, we should never fail to obtain as far as we are capable to receive. But our prayers are continually interrupted, if they be not preingaged [by pleasure.] Our senses and our imagination trouble and confound all our Ideas; and though the truth we consult answers our request, yet the confused noise of our passions hinders from understanding its answers, or causes us presently to forget them.  
XXXVII.  
If it be considered, that Man before sin was animated with Charity, that he had in himself all that was necessary for his perseverance in Righteousness, and that he ought by his perseverance and application to have merited his reward; it may easily be apprehended, that the various desires of his Heart were to be made the occasional causes of the knowledge communicated to his mind: Otherwise, his distraction would not have been Voluntary, nor his attention Meritorious. Now Nature, although corrupted, is not destroyed; God has not ceased to will that which he once willed, the same Laws still remain. Thus our different wills are still at this day the occasional or natural causes of the presence of Ideas to our minds. 
Search after Truth, 1. explic. That God is not the Author of our concupiscence.  But because the union of the Soul with the Body is changed into a dependence by the natural consequence of sin, and the immutability of the will of God, as I have * elsewhere explained, our Bodies at present disturb our Ideas, and speaking so loudly in behalf of the goods which respect them, that the mind rarely asks, and distractedly hears the inward TRUTH.  
XXXVIII.  
Experience further teaches us every moment, that our conversation with knowing Persons, is capable of instructing by exciting our attention; that Sermons, reading, converse, and many such like occasions, may raise in us good sentiments. The death of a friend doubtless is able to make us think of Death, if some great passion does not wholly employ us. And when an able Preacher undertakes to demonstrate a very plain truth, and convince others of it, it must be granted that he may persuade his Auditors thereof, and even move their Conscience, excite their hope and fear, and such like passions in them, which disposes them less to resist the efficacy of the Grace of J. C. Men being made to live in society one with another, it was necessary that they might mutually communicate their thoughts and motions. It was needful that they should be united by the Mind as well as the Body, and that speaking by the Voice to the Ears, and by writing to the Eyes, they should communicate knowledge and understanding to attentive minds.  
XXXIX.  
Now Knowledge, what way soever it is produced in us, whether by our particular desires, or whether some accidents be the occasion thereof, it may be called Grace, especially when it very much concerns our salvation, though it should only be a consequence of the order of Nature; because since sin, God owes us nothing, and all the good we have, is only what J. C. has merited for us. For even our very Being subsists not but by J. C. But this kind of Grace, though merited by J. C. is not the Grace of J. C. 'Tis the Grace of the Creator; because J. C. not being ordinarily the occasional cause thereof, the cause of it must be sought for in the order of Nature.  
XL.  
There are a great many natural effects, which may reasonably be accounted Graces. For example, two Persons at the same time have very different desires of Curiosity. The one would go to an Opera, & the other hear a famed Preacher. If they satisfy their curiosity, he who shall go to the Opera will find such objects, as considering the present disposition of his mind, will excite in him passions which will ruin him. The other on the contrary, may find in the Preacher so much clearness and strength, that the Grace of Conversion being given at this moment, may be very efficacious in him. This being supposed, a shower of rain or some other accident intervenes, which keeps them at home; this rain doubtless is a natural effect, since it depends upon the natural Laws of the communication of motions. Nevertheless, it may be said to be a Grace in respect of him whose Ruin it prevents, and a Punishment to him, whose Conversion it hinders.  
XLI.  
Grace being joined with Nature, all the motions of our Souls and of our Bodies, have some relation to our Salvation. Such a man is saved for having, whilst he was in the state of Grace, made a step which happily caused him to break his neck. And is damned for having, at some time, unluckily escaped the ruins of an house ready to fall. We know not what is beneficial for us, but we very well know nothing is so indifferent in its self, but that it has some relation to our salvation, by reason of the mixture & combination of the effects which depend on the general Laws of Nature with those of Grace.  
XLII.  
Since than Knowledge discovers the true good, the means of obtaining it, our duty towards God, in a word, the ways which we ought to follow; since it is sufficient also for those who are animated with charity to make them act well, merit new Graces, vanquish certain temptations, as I shall elsewhere Explain; I think it may very deservedly be called by the name of Grace, though J. C. be only the meritorious cause of it.  
And since the outward Graces which act not immediately upon the mind, nevertheless enter into the order of predestination of Saints, I also look upon them as true Graces. In a word, I think the name of Grace may be given to all natural effects, when they relate to salvation, when they are subservient to the Grace of J. C. and remove some impediments of its efficacy. Nevertheless, if any deny this, I have no design to dispute upon words.  
XLIII.  
All these sorts of Graces, if we will allow unto them this name, being Graces of the Creator, the general Laws of these Graces, are the general Laws of Nature. For it must be observed, that sin hath not destroyed nature, though it has corrupted it; the general Laws of the communication of motions are always the same, and those of the union of soul and body are not changed, excepting in this only, that what was but a union in respect of the mind, is changed into a dependence, for reasons I have mentioned elsewhere. For at present we depend upon Bodies, to which by the institution of Nature we were only united.  
XLIV.  
Now the Laws of Nature are always very simple and very general. For God acts not by particular wills, except when order requires a Miracle. I have sufficiently proved this truth in the first discourse. Thus, when a stone falls upon the Head of a good man and kills him, it falls in consequence of the Laws of motions; this happens not, because God is just, and would by a particular will reward him: When a like accident knocks out the brains of a sinner, this is not because God would actually punish him. For God on the contrary, would save all men, but it becomes him not to change the simplicity of his Laws to suspend the punishment of a Criminal. In like manner, when knowledge is conveyed to the mind, it is because we have desires which are the occasional causes thereof; 'tis because we hear some knowing Person, and because our brain is supposed to receive the impressions of him that speaks. 'Tis not because God has any particular will in respect of us, but because he follows the general Laws of Nature which he has prescribed to himself. I see nothing mysterious in the distribution of these kinds of Graces, and I shall not stand to draw the consequences which may be inferred from these Truths.  
XLV.  
It must be observed that J. C. who alone is the meritorious cause of the good things which God gives us according to the order of Nature, is sometimes the occasional cause of knowledge as well as of sentiment. Nevertheless I believe that this is very rare, because in truth it is not necessary. J. C. as much as is possible makes Nature, serve Grace. For, besides that Reason teaches us, that order requires this, as being the most simple way; this sufficiently appears by his management upon Earth, and by that order which he has founded, and still preserves in his Church. J. C. made use of preaching the Word for to enlighten the World, and sent forth his Disciples two by two to prepare the people to receive him. 
Luke X. 1. Eph. IU. 12. & 12.  He hath appointed Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Doctors, Bishops, Priests, for the Edification of the Church. Is not this to make Nature serviceable to Grace, and to communicate the knowledge of Faith to the minds of Men by the most simple and natural ways. In truth, it did not become J. C. upon Earth to enlighten Men by particular wills, since he might instruct them as inward Truth and eternal Wisdom, by the most simple and most fruitful Laws of Nature.  
XLVI.  
That which seems most dark in the order which God hath observed in founding his Church, is doubtless the times, the place, and other circumstances of the Incarnation of his Son, and the preaching of the Gospel. For why should J. C. for whom the world was created, be made man 4000 years after its creation? Why should he be born among the Jews who was to reprove this miserable Nation? Why chosen to be the Son of David, when the House of David was fallen from its Glory; and not the Son of any of the Emperors, who commanded all the Earth, since he came to convert and enlighten all the World? Why did he choose low, mean, and ignorant persons for his Apostles and Disciples; Preach to the Inhabitants of Bethsaida and Corazin, who were resolved to continue in their incredulity, and pass by Tyre and Zidon, who would have been converted if they had had the same favour: Hinder St. Paul from Preaching the word of God in Asia, and command him to pass into Macedonia? These, and a thousand other circumstances which attended the preaching of the Gospel, doubtless are Mysteries, whereof 'tis not possible to give clear and evident reasons, neither is this my design. I would only lay down some principles, which may give some light to these and such like difficulties, or at least make it appear, that from them nothing can be concluded against, what I have hitherto said concerning the Order of Nature and of Grace.  
XLVII.  
It is certain that natural effects are combined and mixed after infinite ways with the effects of Grace. And that the order of Nature increases or lessens the efficacy of the effects of the order of Grace, according to the different manners by which these two orders are mixed one with another. The Death, which according to the general Laws of Nature, sometimes happens to a good or evil Prince, to a good or an evil Bishop, causes a great deal of good or evil to the Church; because such like accidents make great change in the consequence of effects which depend upon the order of Grace. Now God would save all men by the most simple ways. Therefore it may, and it ought to be said in general, that he hath chosen the times, the place, the manners, which in succession of time, and according to the general Laws of Nature and Grace, will (caeteris paribus) cause the greatest number of the Predestinated to enter into the Church. God does all for his Glory. Therefore, amongst all the possible combinations of Nature with Grace, he by the infinite extension of his knowledge, has chosen that, which must make the Church most perfect, and most worthy of his Majesty and Wisdom.  
XLVIII.  
It seems to me, this already suffices to answer all difficulties relating to the circumstances of our Mysteries. For if it be said that J. C. aught to have been born of a Roman Emperor, and have wrought Miracles in the Capital City of the World, that so the Gospel might have been more easily spread in the farthest distant Countries; to this it may be answered boldly, that whatsoever men think thereof, this combination of Nature with Grace, would not have been so worthy of the Wisdom of God as that which he hath chosen.  
I grant, that Religion would thus at first have been spread with more ease; but its establishment would not have been so divine and so extraordinary, and consequently not such an invincible proof of its solidity and certainty. Thus, according to this combination, Religion perhaps would have been at present either destroyed, or less spread in the World. Moreover, when it is said that God acts by the most simple ways, an equality is always supposed in all things else, especially in the glory which must redound to God by his Work. Now the Church would not have been so perfect, nor so worthy of the greatness and holiness of God, if it had been formed with so much ease. For the Beauty of the Heavenly Jerusalem, consisting in the different rewards due to the different combat of Christians, it was expedient that the Martyrs should shed their Blood as well as J. C. to enter into the glory which they possess. In a word, this principle, that amongst all the infinite combinations of the orders of Nature and Grace, God has chosen that which would produce an effect most worthy of his Majesty and Wisdom, is sufficient in general to answer all the difficulties which may be made concerning the circumstances of our Mysteries. In like manner, to justify the orders of Nature and Grace in themselves, it's enough to know, that God being infinitely Wise, he does not form his designs, but upon the admirable relation of Wisdom and fruitfulness, which he sees in the ways capable to execute them; as I have already shown in the first Discourse.  
XLIX.  
Since the generality of men judge of God by themselves, they imagine that he first resolves upon a design, and afterwards consults his Wisdom how to bring it to effect; for our wills every moment go before our reason, so that our designs are scarce ever perfectly reasonable. For God does not act as Men do. Behold how he acts, if I have well consulted the idea of an infinitely perfect being. God, by the infinite knowledge of his wisdom, and in the same wisdom, sees all possible works, and at the same time all ways of producing each of them. He sees all the relation of the means to their ends; he compares all things by an eternal, immutable, necessary foresight, and by the comparison which he makes of relations of the wisdom and fruitfulness which he discovers betwixt his designs and the ways of executing them, he freely forms the design. But the design being resolved upon, he necessarily chooses those general ways which are most worthy of his wisdom, greatness, and goodness: for since he does not resolve upon any thing, but by the knowledge he has of the ways of executing it, the choice of the design contains the choice of the ways.  
L.  
When I say, that God freely forms his design, I do not mean as if he could choose another which is less, and reject that which is more worthy of his wisdom; for supposing that God will make any outward work worthy of himself, he is not indifferent in his choice: he must produce that which is the most perfect in respect of the simplicity of the ways by which he acts: he owes this to himself, to follow the rules of his wisdom: he must always act after the most wise and perfect manner. But, I say, God freely takes up his resolution, because he invincibly and necessarily loves nothing but his own substance. Neither the Incarnation of the Word, much less the Creation of the World, are necessary Emanations of his Nature. God is altogether sufficient to himself. For a Being infinitely perfect may be conceived alone, without having a necessary relation to his Creatures.  
LI.  
Since God necessarily loves himself, he also necessarily follows the Rules of his Wisdom. But seeing the Creatures make no part of his Being, he is so self-sufficient as that nothing can oblige him to produce them: he is very indifferent or free in respect of them. And it is upon this account that he made the World in time; for this circumstance makes it evident, that the Creatures are not necessary Emanations of the Divinity, but do essentially depend upon the  of a Creator.  
LII.  
Nevertheless, behold an Objection which at first does surprise the mind: If it be true, That God necessary follows the Rules of his Wisdom, the World would not have been created in time. For either the World is worthy, or unworthy of God. If it was better the World should have been brought out of nothing, it ought to have been eternal; if better it should have remained in nothing, it ought not to have been made at all. God therefore is not obliged to follow the Rules this Wisdom prescribes, seeing the World was created in time. But the Answer to this Objection is not difficult: It is better the World should be, than not: but it is better it should not have been at all, than be eternal. The Creature must carry in it the essential mark of its dependence: If Spirits had been eternal, they might have had some reason to have looked upon themselves as Gods, or necessary Being's; or at least capable to contribute something to the greatness and happiness of God, imagining that he could not but have made them: they might likewise in some sort have compared themselves to the Divine Persons, thinking they were, like them, produced by a necessary emanation. Thus God was obliged, according to the Rules of his Wisdom, to leave unto the Creatures the character of their dependence: assuring them, nevertheless, that he has not made them to annihilate them, and that being constant to his designs, as his infinite Wisdom requires, they shall subsist eternally.  
LIII.  
This Difficulty may be further urged, after this manner: God necessarily follows the Rules of his Wisdom; he necessarily does what is the best. Now, it was better at least, that the World should have been created in time, than that it should not have been created at all. Certainly it was expedient, according to the Rules of Divine Wisdom, that the World should have been produced with those circumstances according to which God had made it. Therefore the Creation of the World in time is absolutely necessary, God is not at all free in this respect, he could not but have made it.  
To resolve this Difficulty it ought to be observed, That tho' God follows the Rules which his Wisdom prescribes unto him, yet he doth not necessarily do that which is best, because he might do nothing: To act and not exactly to follow the Rules of Wisdom, is a defect. Thus, supposing that God will act, he necessarily acts after the wifest manner that can be. But, to be free in the production of the World, is a mark of abundance of fullness, and selfsufficiency. It is better the World should be, than not be: the Incarnation of J. C. renders the Work of God worthy of its Author: This I grant. But seeing God is essentially happy and perfect, seeing nothing but himself can be good, in relation unto him, or the cause of his perfection and happiness, he invinsibly loves only his own substance; and all that is without him, must indeed be made by an eternal and immutable action; but which has no other necessity, but upon supposition of the Divine Decrees.  
See yet another Principle, of which I have already spoken, which may give some light to the Difficulties which may be made about the Circumstances of the Incarnation of J. C. and the Creation of the World.  
LIV.  
Reason and the Authority of the H. Books, teach us, that the first and principal of God's Designs is, the Establishment of his Church in J. C. The present World is not created to continue such as it is. The Lies and Errors, the Unrighteousness and Disorders which we see, sufficiently show it must have an end. The future World, where Truth and Righteousness inhabit, is that Land whose Foundations cannot be shaken; and which, being the external Object of the Divine Love, shall subsist eternally. God has not created this visible World, but by little and little, to form thereof that invisible City of which S. John tells us so many Wonders. And seeing J. C. shall be the chief Beauty thereof, God always has had J. C. in view in the production of his Work. He hath made all for Man, and with respect to Man, 
Heb. ch. II.  as the Scripture teacheth us: but this Man, for whom God has made all, is, according to S. Paul, J. C. 'Tis to teach Men, that they are created, that they do not subsist, but in J. C. 'tis to bind them closely to J. C. 'tis to engage them to become like unto him, that God has represented J. C. and his Church in the chiefest of his Creatures. For it was necessary God should find J. C. in all his Work, that this Work might be the object of his Love and worthy of the Action by which it is produced.  
LV.  
If the manner after which the H. Scripture relates the Creation of the first Man be considered, how his Wife was formed of his Flesh and Bone, the Love he had for her, and even the Circumstances of their Sin, it will doubtless be granted, that God thought of the second Adam when he made the first: that he considered the Father of the World to come, when he created the Father of the present; and that he intended to make the first Man and the first Woman express Figures of J. C. and his Church. S. Paul suffers us not to doubt of this truth, when he assures us, that we are made of the Bone and Flesh of J. C. and that we are his Members, and that the Marriage of Adam and Eve was the Figure of J. C. and his Church.  
LVI.  
God might have formed Men and Animals by ways as simple as the ordinary Generation is: But seeing this way figured J. C. and his Church; since, it bore the Character of the Chief of God's Designs; since, it represented, as I may say, the wellbeloved Son of his Father, that Son by whom the whole Creation subsists: God was obliged to prefer it before all others, whereby to teach us, that as intelligible Beauties consist only in the relation they have to eternal Wisdom, so sensible Beauties must in some manner, much unknown to us, have some relation to the Truth incarnate.  
LVII.  
Doubtless there are many relations between the principal Creatures and J. C. who is their model and end. For all is full of J. C. all expresses and figures him, as far as the simplicity of the Laws of Nature will permit them: but I dare not enter into the particulars of this. For, besides that I am afraid of deceiving myself, and that I done't sufficiently know either Nature or Grace, the present or the future World, to discover the relations thereof: I am sensible, that men's Imaginations are so witty and delicate, that one cannot, by Reason, lead them to God, much less to J. C. without tiring them, and exciting their raillery. The greatest part of Christians are accustomed to a Philosophy, which rather loves to shelter its self in fictions as extravagant as those of the Poets, than have recourse to God: and some are so little acquainted with J. C. that a Man should pass with them for a visionary, if he should say the same things with S. Paul and not quote his words: For 'tis rather this great Name, than the Sight of the Truth, which engages them. The Authority of the Scripture hinders them from blaspheming against that which they are ignorant of: but seeing they think but little of it, they can't thereby be much enlightened.  
LVIII.  
It is certain the Jews were a figure of the Church, and the most holy and famous amongst the Kings, Prophets and Patriarches of this People, did represent the true Messiah, our Saviour J. C. This truth can't be denied without undermining the Foundations of Christian Religion, and making the most learned of the Apostles pass for the most ignorant of Men. J. C. not being yet come, it was necessary he should at least be prefigured. He ought to be expected, he ought to be desired, he ought to disperse, by his Figures, some sort of Beauty in the World, to make it pleasing to his Father. Thus it was necessary he should have been in some sense as ancient as the World; it was necessary he should die presently after Sin in the person of Abel: Agnus occisus ab origine Mundi, principium & finis, Alpha & Omega, heri & hodie est, erat, venturus est. These are the Qualifications which S. John gives to the Saviour of Men.  
LIX.  
Now, supposing that J. C. aught to be presigured, it was expedient he should chief be so by his Ancestors: and that their History, dictated by the H. Spirit, should in all times be preserved, to the end that J. C. may still be compared with his Figures, and acknowledged as the true Messiah. Of all the Nations of the Earth, God loving that best which had most relation with his Son, the Jews were to have been the Ancestors of J. C. according to the flesh, and to have received this favour of God, since they were the most lively and most express Representations of his Son.  
LX.  
But, if this Difficulty be further urged, so as to demand a reason of the choice which God made of the Jews to be the principal Figures of J. C. I think I may and aught to affirm, first, That God, always acting by the most simple ways, and discovering in the infinite Treasures of his Wisdom, all the possible Combinations of Nature with Grace, chose that which would make the Church most ample, most perfect, and most worthy of his Majesty and Holiness, as I have already said. In the second place, I think I ought to answer, That God foreseeing what would happen to the Jews, by a necessary consequence of natural Laws, had more relation to the design which he had of representing J. C. and his Church, than any thing which could happen to any other Nation; it was expedient that he should choose this People rather than any other. For, in conclusion, the predestination to the Law is not like the predestination to Grace; and tho' there is nothing in Nature which may oblige God to dispense his Grace equally to all People; it seems to me, that Nature might merit the Law, in the sense wherein I here understand it.  
LXI.  
It is true, that all that happened to the Jews, who represented J. C. was not a necessary consequence of the order of Nature; Miracles were necessary to render them the lively and express Images of the Church, but Nature must have furnished the Fund and the Matter, and perhaps the principal Strokes in several things; Miracles finished the rest. But no other Nation would have been so proper for so just and high a Design.  
LXII.  
It appears to me, that we are obliged to think, that God's Wisdom, foreseeing all the Consequences of all the possible Orders, and all their Combinations, never works Miracles when Nature suffices: and that thus, he was obliged to choose the Combination of Natural Effects, which, saving him, as I may say, the expense of Miracles, might nevertheless very faithfully execute his Intentions.  
For example, 'Tis necessary that all Sins should be punished; but not always in this World. Supposing, nevertheless, that it was expedient for the glory of J. C. and the establishment of Religion, that the Jews should be punished in the face of the whole Earth, for putting to death the Saviour of the World: it was convenient that J. C. came into the World towards the end of Herod's Reign; supposing, that according to the necessary consequence of the Order of Nature, that People should be divided amongst themselves about that time; that Civil Wars and continual Seditions should weaken them; and that, lastly, the Romans should destroy and scatter them abroad, after the total destruction of their City and Temple.  
It is true, there seems to have been something extraordinary in the desolation of the Jews. But, since it argues more Wisdom in God to produce such surprising Effects, by the most simple and general Laws of Nature, than by particular Wills; I know not whether, on this occasion, we ought to have recourse to a Miracle. For my part, I don't dispute of it here: this is a thing which is not easy, nor indeed very necessary to be cleared. I give this Example, for to make some application of my Principles and to make them the better understood.  
It seems to me, that what I have hitherto said, of Nature and Grace, is sufficient to satisfy all equitable and moderate Persons, concerning an infinite number of Difficulties, which disturb the Minds of those only who judge of God by themselves. For if we do faithfully consult the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being, of a general Cause, of an infinite Wisdom; and if the Principles I have established of this Idea be granted, I believe none will be surprised or offended with God's Conduct, and that instead of condemning or murmuring at it, Men will not forbear to admire and adore it.    

The Third Discourse. Of Grace, and the Manner by which it Acts in us.  

The First Part. Of Liberty.  
I.  
THere is nothing more uncomely, than the substance of Spirits, if they are separated from God: For what is a Mind without Understanding and Reason, without Motion and Love? In the mean time the Word and Wisdom of God is the Universal Reason of Spirits; it is the Love by which God loves himself, which gives to the Soul all the motion that it has towards happiness: The Mind cannot know the Truth, but by its natural and necessary union with Truth its self; it cannot be reasonable, but by reason: in short, it cannot, in some sense, be a Mind and Understanding, but because its Substance is enlightened, penetrated and perfected by the Light of God himself.  
I have elsewhere explained these Truths. 
Book III. of the Searchafter Truth, and in the Explication of the Nature of Ideas.  As the substance of the Soul is not capable of loving that which is good, but by its natural and necessary union with the eternal and substantial Love of the Sovereign Good; so it moves not towards that which is good, but so far forth as God carries it: it is not Will, but by the motion which God continually imprints upon it; it lives not, but by charity; it wills not, but by the love of good, which God imparts unto it, tho' it abuses it. For in truth, as God neither makes nor preserves Minds, but for himself, so he carries them towards himself as long as he preserves their being: he communicates the love of happiness to them, as far as they are capable. Now this natural and continual motion of the Soul towards good in general, towards good undetermined, that is, towards God, is that which I here call the Will; because it is this motion which makes the Soul capable of loving different goods.  
II.  
This natural motion of the Soul towards good in general is invincible; for it is not in our power to choose not to be happy. We necessarily love that we clearly know, and sensibly feel to be the true good. All minds love God by the necessity of their nature: and if they love any thing but God by the free choice of the will, it is not because they do not seek after God, or the cause of their happiness, but because having a confused sense, that Bodies about them make them happy, they look upon them as their Goods, and by a natural and ordinary consequence, love them, and unite themselves to them.  
III.  
But the love of all these particular goods, is not naturally invincible. Man, considered as God made him, may hinder himself from loving those goods which do not fill the whole capacity he has of loving. Seeing there is a good which contains all others, Man may sacrifice to the love of this good all other loves; for God having made minds for himself, he cannot engage them invincibly to love any thing but himself, or with relation to himself. The inward sentiment which we have of ourselves, teaches us, that we may, for example, refuse any fruit, though we are inclined to receive it. Now this power of loving, or not loving particular goods, this non-invincibility, which is in that motion, which carries the minds to love that which does not seem to them to contain all goods; this power, this non-invincibility, is that which I call liberty. Thus, by putting the definition in the place of the thing defined, this expression, Our will is free, signifies, that the natural motion of our Soul towards good in general, is not invincible, in respect of any particular good. We do also to this word free, join the Idea of voluntary: but hereafter I shall take this word in the sense which I have observed, because this is most natural and most ordinary.  
iv  
The word good is equivocal, it may signify either pleasure which makes Men formally happy, or else the true or apparent cause of pleasure.  
I shall in this Discourse always take the word good in the second sense; because in truth pleasure is imprinted upon the Soul, to the end that she may love the cause of her happiness, that by the motion of her love she may be carried towards it, and be straight united thereunto, and so be continually happy. When the Soul loves nothing but her pleasure, she truly loves nothing but herself: for pleasure is only a condition or modification of the Soul which renders her actually happy. Now, since the Soul cannot be to herself the cause of her happiness, she is unjust, she is ungrateful, she is blind, if she loves her pleasure, without paying that love and respect which is due to the true cause which produces it in her. Since there is none but God, who can immediately and by himself act upon the Soul, and make her feel pleasure by the actual efficacy of his Almighty Will, there is none but he who can be truly good. Nevertheless, I call the creatures which are the apparent causes of those pleasures which they occasion in us, by the name of goods. For I would not avoid the ordinary way of speaking, but as far as it is necessary clearly to express myself. All the creatures, though good in themselves and perfect in respect of God's designs, are not good in respect to us, I mean, they are not our good, because they are not the true causes of our pleasure or our happiness.  
V  
The natural motion which God continually imprints upon the Soul, to engage it to love him, or (to use a term which expresses several Ideas, and which can neither be equivocal nor confused, after the definition I have given thereof) the will is determined towards particular goods, either by clear and distinct knowledge, or by a confused sentiment which shows us these goods. If the mind neither sees nor tastes any particular good, the motion of the Soul continues, as it were, undetermined, it tends towards good in general. But this motion receives a particular determination, as soon as the mind has an idea or sentiment of any particular good: for the Soul being incessantly moved towards good indetermin'd, she must be moved as soon as any object seems to be good to her.  
VI  
Now, when the good which is present to the Understanding and Senses, does not altogether fill these two faculties; when it appears under the idea of a particular good, which does not contain all goods; and when it is tasted by a sentiment which does not fill all the capacity of the Soul, she must still further desire the sight and enjoyment of some other good; she may suspend the judgement of her love; she need not to rest in the actual enjoyment, but may by her desires seek after some new object. And seeing her desires are the occasional cause of her knowledge, she may, by the natural and necessary union of all Spirits with him, who contains the ideas of all goods, discover the true good; and in the true good, a great many other particular goods, different from what she saw and tasted before. Thus, being acquainted with the vacuity and vanity of sensible goods attending to the secret reproaches of reason, and to the remorse of her conscience, to the complaints and threaten of the true good, who will not that we should sacrifice him to apparent and imaginary goods; she may (by the motion which God imprints continually upon her, after good in general, or the sovereign good, that is, towards himself) stop her carrier after any good whatsoever. She may resist all sensible persuasives, seek and find other objects; compare them betwixt themselves, and with the indelible idea of the sovereign good; and love none of them with a determined love. And if this sovereign good makes itself to be tasted, she may prefer it to all particular goods; though the sweetness which they seem to transfer into the Soul be very great and very agreeable. These Truths must be further explained.  
VII.  
The Soul is carried towards good in general; she desires to possess all goods, and would never confine her love; there is no good which appears so to her, that she refuses to love: Therefore, while she actually enjoys any particular good, she has yet a motion to go further; she still desires some other thing, by the natural and invincible impression God puts into her; and to change or divide her love, it is sufficient to present unto her another good, than that which she enjoys, and to make her taste the sweetness of it. Now the Soul may ordinarily seek and discover new goods; she may also come near and enjoy them. For, in short, these desires are the natural or occasional causes of her knowledge. Objects discover themselves to her, and approach unto her proportionally, as she desires to know them. An ambitious person, who considers the splendour of some dignity, may also think of the slavery, of the constraint, of the real ills which accompany humane greatness. He may calculate, weigh and compare all things together, if his passion does not blind him: For, I confess, there are times, when the passions entirely rob the mind of its liberty; and they always do diminish it. Thus, seeing any dignity how great so ever it may appear, is not accounted by a Man free and reasonable, as the universal and infinite good; and since the will generally reaches to all goods, this Man, who is perfectly free and reasonable, may seek and find others, seeing he may desire them: for 'tis his desires which discover and present them unto him. He may examine and compare them with that which he enjoys. But because he can meet with none but particular goods upon earth, he may and ought here below continually and without intermission seek and inquire; or, rather, that he may not change every moment, he ought generally to neglect all these transient goods, and desire only those which are immutable and eternal.  
VIII.  
Nevertheless, seeing Men do not love to search, but to enjoy, seeing the labour of examination is at present very troublesome; but rest and enjoyment always very pleasant, the Soul ordinarily stops as soon as she has found any good; she fixes upon it, that she may enjoy it. She deceives herself, because by deceiving herself, and judging that she has found that she seeks, her desire is changed into pleasure; and pleasure renders her more happy than desire. But her happiness cannot last long. Her pleasure being ill grounded, unjust, and deceitful, it presently troubles and disquiets her, because she would be truly and solidly happy. Thus the natural love of good awakens and produces new desires in her: These confused desires represent new objects. Seeing the Soul loves pleasure, she runs after those which communicate it, or seems to communicate it; and because she loves repose, she takes up with them. She does not at first examine the defects of the present good, whilst it prevents her by its sweetness; she considers it rather on the fair side; she applies herself to that which charms her; thinks of nothing but enjoying it. And the more she enjoys it, the more she loves it; the nearer she approaches to it, the more she considers it. But now the more she considers it, the more defects she discovers in it: and since she desires to be invincibly happy, she cannot for ever be deceived. When she is hungry, thirsty, and tired with seeking, she presently satiates, and fills herself with the first good she meets; but she presently disgusts the nourishment for which Man was not made. Thus the love of the true good still excites in her new desires after new objects; and being in continual change, all her life and all her happiness upon earth, consists only in a continual circulation of thoughts, desires, and pleasures. Such is the condition of a Soul which makes no use of its liberty, which suffers its self to be lead, at all adventures, by the motion which transports her, and by the fortuitous impression of objects which determine her. This is the condition of one whose mind is so weak, that he always takes false goods for the true; and a heart so corrupted, that he sells and blindly gives himself up to all that affects him, or the good which makes him actually feel the most sweet and agreeable pleasures.  
IX.  
But a Man perfectly free, such as we conceive Adam, immediately after his creation, clearly knows, that God only is his good, or the true cause of the pleasures which he enjoys. Tho he feels sweetness by the approach of objects which are about him, he does not love them, he only loves God; and if God forbids him to unite himself to bodies, he is ready to forsake what pleasure so ever he finds therein. He will not take up, but in the enjoyment of the sovereign good: to him he will sacrifice all others; and how much so ever he desires to be happy, or to enjoy pleasures, no pleasure is too strong for his knowledge. Not but that pleasures may blind him and disturb his reason, and fill the capacity which he has of thinking: for the mind being finite, all pleasure may distract and divide it. But the reason is, because (though pleasures be under the Command of his Will) he was not cautious to keep himself from being intoxicated therewith: because the only invincible pleasure is that of the blessed, or that which the first Man would have found in God, if God would have prevented or hindered his fall; not only because this pleasure fills all the faculties of the Soul, without troubling Reason or engaging it in the love of false goods; but also nothing opposes the enjoyment of this pleasure, neither the desire of perfection, nor that of happiness. For whilst we love God, we are perfect; whilst we love him, we are happy; and when we love him with pleasure, we are perfect and happy both together. Thus the most perfect liberty is that of minds, to which no motion towards particular goods is ever invincible; it is that of Man before sin, before concupiscence had disturbed his understanding and corrupted his heart. And the most imperfect liberty is that of a mind, to which every motion, after any particular good, how little so ever it appears, is always and in all circumstances invincible.  
X.  
Now, betwixt these two sorts of liberty, there are infinite degrees more or less perfect, which is not commonly observed. Men ordinarily imagine, that liberty is equal in all Men, and that it is a faculty essential to their minds, the nature of which continues always the same, though its action varies according to the different objects: Men, who don't reflect, suppose a perfect equality in all things where they do not sensibly observe an inequality. They comfort and excuse themselves from all application, by giving to all things an abstracted form, whose essence consists in a kind of indivisibility. But they deceive themselves: liberty is not such a faculty as they imagine. There are no two persons equally free, in respect of the same objects. Children are less than Men, who have the full use of their reason; and there are no two Men who have their reason equally firm and assured in respect of the same objects. They who have violent passions, and are not accustomed to resist them, are less free than they who have generously opposed them and are naturally moderate: There are no two Men equally moderate, equally sensible, as to the same objects, and who have equally contended for the preservation of their liberty. There are also persons so enslaved to sin, that they do less resist, and less think of resisting whilst they are awake, than good Men do whilst they sleep: for, according to the Word of Truth, He that commits sin, is the servant of sin.  
XI.  
It is true, according to the institution of nature, all Men are equally free: for God does not invincibly engage minds to love any particular good. But concupiscence corrupts the heart and reason: and Man, having lost the power of obliterating the traces of sensible pleasures, and stopping the motions of his concupiscence, this liberty, equal in all Men, if they had not sinned, is become unequal, according to the different degrees of their knowledge, and their concupiscence which differently acts in them. For even concupiscence its self, which is equal in all Men, as they have lost the power which they had over their bodies, is unequal a thousand ways, by reason of the diversity which is to be found in the conformation of their bodies, in the multitude and motion of the animal spirits, and in the almost infinite relations and connexion's which are made, by their concerns in the World.  
XII.  
Still further, to discern more distinctly the inequality which is to be found in different persons, it must be observed, that any Man who is perfectly reasonable and free, and who would be truly happy, may and aught, when any pleasant object presents its self, suspend his love, and carefully examine whether this object be the true good, or whether the motion which carries him after it, do exactly agree with that which carries after the true good. Otherwise he would love by instinct, and not by reason; and if he could not suspend the judgement of his love before he had examined it, he would not be perfectly free. But if he should clearly see, that this pleasant object should be truly good for him; and if this evidence joined to the sentiment be such, that he could not suspend his judgement, than tho perfectly free, yet he is not so in respect of this good; he invincibly loves it, because pleasure and knowledge do agree in recommending it: But since there is none but God who can act in us, or be our good, since the motion which thrusts us forward towards the creatures, does not agree with that which carries us towards God: any Man, who is perfectly reasonable and free, may hinder himself from judging that sensible objects are goods: he may and aught to suspend the judgement which governs, or aught to govern his love; for he can never evidently see that sensible goods are true goods, because he can never evidently see that which is not.  
XIII.  
This power of suspending the judgement, which actually governs the love; this power which is the principle of our liberty, and by which it is that pleasures are not invincible, is much lessened since sin, though not altogether annihilated. And that we may have this power, when any object tempts us, it is necessary, besides some love of order, to have presence of mind, or be sensible of remorse of conscience; for a Child, or a Man asleep, has not actually this power. But all Men are not equally enlightened; the minds of sinners are full of darkness. Consciences are not equally tender; the heart of sinners is hardened. The love of order and actual graces are unequal in all Men. Therefore all Men are not equally free: they have not an equal power of suspending their judgement; pleasure determines, and carries them towards some objects, rather than others. Such an one can suspend his judgement, or stop his consent, though the present object may make him feel a very lively and sensible pleasure: And another has so little a mind, and a heart so corrupted, that, to him the least pleasure is invincible, the least affliction insupportable. Not being accustomed to withstand sensible invitations, his disposition is such, that he'll not so much as think of resisting them. So that, at this time, he has no power of suspending his consent; seeing he has not so much as the power of reflecting thereon: In respect of this object, he's like a Man that is asleep, or one who has lost his mind.  
XIV.  
The weaker reason is, the more sensible the Soul becomes, and judges more rashly and falsely of sensible goods or evils. When a Man is in a slumber, if a straw or feather doth but tickle him, he instantly awakes, as much affrighted, as if a serpent had bitten him. He looks upon this little uneasiness, and judges of it, as one of the greatest afflictions; to him it seems insupportable. His reason being weakened by his slumber, he cannot suspend his judgement; the least goods or evils are almost always invincible to him. The senses act in him, and they always judge rashly: This must be so for many reasons. When reason is not so weak, little pleasures are not invincible, nor little evils insupportable: we do not always pursue after that wherein we find most pleasure. For there are pleasures so little, that reason despises them; for reason always supposes some love of order: It causes Men to be not so much affrighted at the sight of little evils; to resolve, for example, on having a Vein opened, and to endure it; not to judge so rashly, to suspend, to examine; and the stronger reason is, the more it will suspend the judgement, notwithstanding the sensible attractives and horrors. Now, nothing is more certain, than that all Men do not equally partake of reason, though all do partake thereof; that all are not equally sensible, at least, of the same objects; that they are not equally born, educated, assisted by the grace of J. C. and that, upon these accounts, they are not all equally free, or capable, to suspend the judgement of their love, in respect of the same objects.  
XV.  
Now it ought to be observed, that the principal duty of Spirits is, to preserve and increase their liberty; because it is only by the good use they shall make thereof, that they may merit their happiness, if they be assisted by the grace of J. C. and, at least, lessen their misery, if they be left to themselves. That which diminishes our liberty, or that which makes pleasures with respect to us invincible, is because the light of our reason is clouded; and we have lost the power which we ought to have over our bodies. Man therefore ought to inform his reason by continual meditations; he ought to consider his duties, that he may fulfil them; and his weaknesses, that he may have recourse unto him who is all our strength. And since we have lost the power of stopping the impressions which are made upon the body by the presence of objects, and which afterwards corrupt the understanding and heart, we ought to fly these objects; we ought to use that power which we have remaining; we must be continually careful to purify our imagination, and even labour with all our strength to obliterate the traces which false goods have imprinted thereon; since these traces excite in us such desires as distract our liberty. By this means, a Man, whose liberty is almost annihilated, in respect of whom, all pleasures, how little so ever, are invincible, may acquire such a strength and liberty, that he will not be inferior to the greatest Souls, assistances being supposed equal. For at the time at least when these pleasures do not solicit to evil, he may seek to avoid them; he may fortify himself by some reason, which, by proposing future pleasures, may counter balance those which he does not actually enjoy. For as there is no person who has not some love of order, so there's no Man who may not vanquish a weak and light pleasure by a strong solid reason, by a reasonable fear of some evil, or by the hope of greater good. In short, there's none who may not at least, by the ordinary succours of grace, overcome certain pleasures and avoid others. Now these pleasures, before invincible, or how ever eagerly pursued, being conquered or avoided, a Man may prepare himself to encounter others, at least before they attempt him. For the sweetness which he tastes after the victory, encourages him to the fight; the joy of a good conscience, and the grace of J. C. give courage; and even the fear of being overcome is not unusual: for it may make him repair to him, in whom we may do all things; it makes us wisely avoid dangerous occasions. Thus, by this exercise, we always gain; for, to conclude, if we be overcome, we thereby become more humble, more wise, more circumspect, and some times also even more zealous in the fight, and better able to vanquish or resist.  
XVI.  
As in the study of Sciences, they who do not consent to the false light of probability, and accustom themselves to suspend their judgement till the light of truth shall appear, seldom fall into error; whereas the common sort of Men are deceived every moment by their rash judgements. In like manner, in the government of Manners, they who use to sacrifice their pleasures to the love of order, and daily mortify their senses and their passions, especially in things which may appear to be of the least consequence (which all the World may do) will acquire, even in the most important things, a facility of suspending the judgement which governs the love. Pleasure does not surprise them like other Men, or at least does not carry them down the stream, without thinking thereon. On the contrary, when they feel it, it seems to give them notice to take care of themselves, and consult Reason, or the Rules of the Gospel. They have a more tender and delicate Conscience, than they, who according to the Language of the Scripture, drink in sin like water: they are sensible of the secret reproaches of reason, and the wholesome advertisements of inward truth. So that the habit of resisting weak and light pleasures, is some progress towards the vanquishing the more violent, or at least towards the suffering some pain and shame, when a Man is overcome; which, in a short time, will give an horror and disgust thereof. Thus liberty increasing by little and little, and perfected by the use made of it, and the assistance of Grace, may, at last, be able to fulfil even the most difficult Commandments; because by ordinary graces, which are every moment given to Christians, we may overcome common temptations, we may, in an ordinary way, avoid the greater, and by the assistance of the grace of J. C. there is none which we may not vanquish.  
XVII.  
It is true, that when the case is so, that a Man is surprised by pleasure, he is not in a condition so much as to think of resisting it; 'tis true, I say, that this Man cannot actually fulfil the Commandment, which forbids him to enjoy it, for this pleasure is to him invincible.  
Thus, supposing this person had this impotence by a natural necessity, his sin not being free, it would make him no more culpable; I mean, no more worthy to be punished with grief, than if he had been irregular in his sleep. Likewise, if this impotence should have been the necessary consequence of sins, even freely committed before his conversion, it will not be imputed to him, because of his charity. But since he ought and might resist pleasure, contend for the preservation and increase of his liberty, have recourse unto him by Prayer, in whom we may do all things; this sin, though actually committed by a kind of necessity, renders him culpable and worthy to be punished; if not upon the account of this sin, yet at least for the negligence, which is the principle of it. The commandment of God is not absolutely impossible; even the sinner himself ought and may, for reasons already mentioned, put himself in a condition to observe it: because Men ought, and may continually labour to augment and perfect their liberty, not only by the assistance of the grace of J. C. but also by their own natural strength, or by the ordinary graces; for, in short, Nature may be made serviceable to Grace a thousand ways.   

THE SECOND PART. Of Grace.  
XVIII.  
THE inequality which is to be found in the liberty of different persons, being clearly understood, it will not, in my opinion, be difficult to comprehend, how Grace acts in us, if to the word Grace, we join clear and particular Ideas; and if the difference between the Grace of the Creator and the Grace of the Redeemer be observed. I have already said, in the foregoing Discourse, that there is this difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure, that Knowledge leaves us entirely to ourselves, but Pleasure makes an attempt upon our Liberty: For Knowledge is without us; it does not touch or modify our Souls; it does not push us on towards the Objects it discovers; it only makes us capable to determine ourselves, or to consent, with freedom and reason, to the impression which God gives us towards Happiness. The knowledge of our Duty, the clear Idea of Order, separated from all sentiment, the dry, abstracted, altogether pure and intelligible sight of good, that is to say, without taste or foretaste, leaves the Soul in a perfect liberty: But Pleasure is in the Soul; it touches and modifies it. Thus it lessens our liberty, it makes us love good rather by the love of Instinct and unaccountable Passion, than by the love of Choice and Reason; it transports us, as I may say, towards sensible Objects. Nevertheless, this is not to be understood, as if Pleasure was the same thing with Love, or the motion of the Soul to good; but because it produces it, or determines it towards the object which renders us happy. Since none but those Truths, whereof we have clear Ideas, can be demonstrated, and since we have none such of our inward sentiments, it is impossible, that I should demonstrate that which I here maintain, as the consequences which depend upon common Notions, are demonstrated. Every one therefore must consult the inward sentiment which he has within himself, if he would be convinced of the difference there is betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure; he must also carefully observe, that ordinarily Knowledge is accompanied with Pleasure, from which nevertheless it ought to be separated, that we may judge solidly thereof.  
XIX.  
If then it be true, that Pleasure naturally produces Love, and that it is as it were a weight, which makes the Soul incline to the good, which causes it or seems to cause it, it is visible, that the Grace of J.C. or the Grace of Sentiment, is efficacious in its self. For though the preventing delectation, when it is weak, may not wholly convert the Hearts of those who have very lively Passions, nevertheless it always has its effect, in that it always carries Men towards God; it is always efficacious in some sense, but it has not always all the effect which it might have, because concupiscence opposes it.  
XX.  
For example, In one of the Scales of a Balance there is a Weight of ten Pounds, and a Weight of six Pounds only in the other; this last Weight truly weighs: for if enough be put therein, or taken out of the other Scale; or, lastly, if the Balance be hung nearer the Scale which has more weight in it, this weight of six Pound will turn the Balance: But though this Weight weighs, it is plain, that its effect always depends upon the Weights which resist it, and the manner after which they resist it. Thus the Grace of Sentiment is always efficacious in its self, it always lessens the effort of Concupiscence, because Pleasure naturally excites Love for the cause which produces it, or seems to produce it. But though this Grace be always efficacious in its self, it depends, or, rather, its effect depends upon the actual dispositions of him to whom it is given. The Weights of Concupiscence resist it, and sensible Pleasures which tie us to the Creatures, (which seem to produce them in us) hinder the Pleasures of Grace from uniting us strictly to him, who is only capable to act in us and render us happy.  
XXI.  
But it is not the same of the Grace of Knowledge, or of the Grace of the Creator. It is not efficacious of its self; it does not transport the Soul; it does not give it any motion; it leaves it freely to its self. But though it be not efficacious of its self, it fails not to be attended with many effects, when it is great, and animated with some grace of sentiment, which gives it vigour and strength; or else when it finds no contrary pleasure, which do much resist it. This is the difference betwixt the Grace of the Creator, and the Grace of the Redeemer; betwixt Knowledge, and Pleasure; betwixt the Grace which doth not suppose Concupiscence, and the Grace which is given to counter-balance the Pleasures of Concupiscence. The one is sufficient to a Man perfectly free and fortified by Charity; the other is efficacious in a weak Man, to whom Pleasure is necessary, that he may be drawn to the love of the true good.  
XXII.  
But the strength and efficacy of Grace ought always to be compared with the action of Concupiscence, with the light of Reason, and especially with the degree of Liberty that Person hath to whom it is given. And it ought not to be imagined, that God dispenses it by particular Wills, with a design it should produce in us certain effects and nothing more: For when it is said, that Grace always produces in the Heart the effect for which God gave it, we are deceived, if we suppose, that God acts, like Men, with particular designs. God dispenses his Grace with a general intention, that it may sanctify all those who receive it, or as the occasional cause determines him to dispense it; nevertheless, he sees very well, that in some Persons it will not have all the effect it will have in others, not only by reason of the inequality of strength in respect of Grace, but also the inequality of resistance in respect of Concupiscence.  
XXIII.  
Since Concupiscence has not altogether destroyed Humane Liberty, the Grace of J.C. as efficacious as it is, is not absolutely invincible; Sensible Pleasure may be overcome whilst it is weak. The judgement of Love may be suspended when a Man is not hurried along by some violent Passion; and when he yields to the courtship of this false Pleasure, he is to be blamed for the ill use of his liberty. In like manner the delectation of Grace is not ordinarily invincible, the good Motions which it inspires, and which separate us from the false good we love, may be opposed. This Grace does not so fill the Soul, as to draw it along towards the true good, without choice, without understanding, without free consent. Thus when a Man resigns himself to its motion, when a Man goes faster, as I may say, than it invincibly drives, when he sacrifices the pleasures which lessen its efficacy; or, in short, when he acts by reason, or loves the true good as he ought to love it, he than merits by the good use which he makes of his Liberty.  
XXIV.  
It is true, that the delectation of Grace, considered in its self, and without respect to the pleasures of Concupiscence which are contrary thereunto, is always invincible; because this Holy Pleasure being agreeable to the light of Reason, nothing can hinder its effect in a Man perfectly free: When the Mind clearly sees by the light of Reason, that God is its happiness, and has a lively sense thereof by the taste of pleasure; it is impossible but that it should love him. For the Mind desires to be happy, and then nothing hinders it from following the agreeable motions of its love; it suffers no remorse opposite to its present happiness, and is not restrained by pleasures contrary to that which it enjoys. The delectation of Grace therefore is not invincible: The love also which it produces is not Meritorious, if it be not greater than this delight; I mean, the love which is merely the natural or necessary effect of the delectation of Grace, has nothing Meritorious in it, though this love be always good in its self: For he that goes no faster than he is driven, or rather, no further than he receives present pay for, has no right to be rewarded. When a Man loves God no farther than he is drawn, or only because he is drawn, he does not love him by reason, but by instinct; he does not love him as he desires, and aught to be beloved. But when he loves God by Choice, by Reason, by the Knowledge which he has of his Amiableness, than he Merits: He Merits when he advances, as I may say, towards the true good, after pleasure has only determined the motion of love.  
XXV.  
This reason alone demonstrates, either that the first Man was not carried to the love of God by the blind instinct of pleasure; or at least, that this pleasure was not so lively as that which he felt from the sight of his natural perfections, or in the actual use of sensible goods: For 'tis evident, that this pleasure would have rendered him impeccable; this pleasure would have put him into a state like to that of the Blessed, who do no longer Merit; not because they are not now in the Condition of Travellers; (for Spirits always Merit, when they do Actions in themselves Meritorious, and God being just, it is necessary they should be rewarded for them) but they Merit no more, because the pleasure which they find in God is equal to their love, because they are altogether wrapped up in him; and [because] being delivered from all kind of grief and every motion of Concupiscence, they have no longer any thing to sacrifice to God.  
XXVI.  
For that which renders a man impeccable, does not altogether make him incapable of Meriting: J.C. was impeccable, yet, nevertheless he Merited his own glory and that of the Church, of which he is the Head. Since he was perfectly free, he loved the Father, not by the instinct of Pleasure, but by Choice and Reason; he loved him because he saw, by intuition, how lovely he was. For the most perfect Liberty, is, that of a Mind which has all possible Knowledge, and is not determined by any Pleasure: For all Pleasure, preventing or other, naturally produces some love; and if Pleasure be not resisted, it efficaciously determines the motions of the soul towards the agreeable object: But Knowledge, how great soever it be conceived, leaves the mind perfectly free; supposing that this Knowledge be considered singly and without any Pleasure.  
XXVII.  
Seeing J.C. is nothing but the Word, or Reason Incarnate, certainly he ought not to love the true good with a blind love, with the love of instinct, with the love of sentiment; he ought to love him with reason. He must not love a Being infinitely Amiable, and which he knows to be perfectly worthy of his love; as Men love those goods which are not Amiable, and which they cannot know to be worthy of their love: He ought not to love the Father with a love any wise like unto that by which Men love the vilest Creatures, by which they love Bodies. His love, that it may be pure, or at least perfectly Meritorious, should by no means, be produced by preventing Pleasures: For Pleasure, may and aught to be the reward of lawful love, as it really is at present in the Saints and in J.C. himself. But it cannot be the principle of Merit; it should not prevent Reason if it be not very much weakened. Now Reason in J.C. was no wise weakened: Sovereign Reason in him supported Created Reason. J.C. not being subject to the motions of Concupiscence, he had no need of preventing delectation, to counterbalance the sensible pleasures which surprise us; perhaps he would not taste even the Pleasure of joy, or the Pleasures which naturally followed the knowledge which he had of his Virtue and Perfections; to the end, that being deprived of all sorts of Pleasures, his Sacrifice might be more Holy, more Pure, and more disinterested. Lastly, it may be, besides the privation of all preventing Pleasures and others, he inwardly suffered those Horrible desertions, which souls filled with Charity, cannot better express than by being forsaken of God; according to those words of J.C. upon the Cross, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? But if you will have J.C. to be carried on even by preventing Pleasures, to the love of the Father, it is necessary to say, according to the Principles which I have laid down, either that he loved him with more zeal than he tasted Pleasure; (since natural love, which the instinct of Pleasure produces is not at all Meritorious) or, at least, that he Merited by the sensible griefs, and by the continual Sacrifice he freely and voluntarily offered unto God. 
Luke 24.26. Acts 17.3.  For it became him to Suffer, that he might enter into his Glory, as the Scripture teaches us.  
XXVIII.  
If the delectation of Grace, without respect to any contrary Pleasure, infallibly turns the Consent of the Will, the same cannot be said of the Pleasures of Concupiscence. These Pleasures considered in themselves, and without respect to actual Pleasures, are not always invincible. The light of Reason Condemns them, remorse of Conscience gives us an Horror of them; a Man may ordinarily suspend his Consent. Thus the Grace of J.C. is stronger than Concupiscence: It may be called Victorious Grace, because it is always Master of the Heart, when its Impression is equal to that of Concupiscence. For when the Balance of our Heart is in Equilibrio, by the equal weights of two contrary Pleasures, the most solid and most reasonable always turns it; because, Knowledge always favours its efficacy, and Remorse of Conscience opposes the action of False Pleasure.  
XXIX.  
From all which has been said, it may be concluded, that we always Merit when we love the true-good by Reason; and we do not Merit at all when we love it by Instinct. We always Merit when we love the true good by Reason; because, Order requires that the true good should be loved after this manner, and because Knowledge alone does not transport or invincibly carry us towards the good which it discovers. We do no wise Merit when we love the true good by Instinct, or so far as Pleasure invincibly transports or determines the Mind; because, Order requires that the true good, or the good of the Mind, should be loved by Reason, by a Free love, by a love of Choice and Discretion; and, because the love which Pleasure alone produces, is a Blind, Natural and Necessary love. I confess that when a Man goes further than he is carried by Pleasure, he Merits; but this is because he acts by Reason, and as Order requires he should act, for that love which he has above the Pleasure, is a Pure and a Reasonable love.  
XXX.  
In like manner it must be Concluded, that a Man always demerits when he loves false goods by the instinct of Pleasure; provided that he loves them more than he is invincibly engaged to love them. For when we have naturally so little Liberty and Capacity of Mind, that Pleasure invincibly transports us; though we be irregular, and our love be bad and against Order, we do not demerit: For to demerit, I mean to deserve to be punished, a Man must run after false goods with more earnestness, or go farther than Pleasure invincibly carries him. For it must be observed, that there is a great deal of difference, betwixt a Good action and a Meritorious Action, betwixt an irregular action, and an action which deserves to be punished; the love of a Just Person is often irregular in sleep, and yet deserves not to be punished. Whatsoever is conformed to Order, is good, and all that is contrary thereunto, is bad; but nothing Merits or Demerits, but the good or ill use of Liberty, or that wherein we have some share. Now a Man makes a good use of his Liberty, when he follows his Knowledge, when he goes on, as I may say, freely and of himself towards the true good; whether he be at first determined by the preventing delectation, or by the light of Reason: When he sacrifices sensible Pleasures to his duty, and conquers grief by the love of Order. On the contrary, he makes an ill use of his Liberty when his Pleasure is his Reason; when he sacrifices his duty to his passions, his perfection to his present happiness, his love of Order to Self-love; and does all this at the time when he is not really forced thereunto. I shall still explain this more clearly.  
XXXI.  
When two Objects present themselves to the mind of Man, and he will choose one of them, I confess that he will never fail to determine himself on that side where he shall find most Reason and Pleasure, on that side, where he'll see most good. Since the soul cannot will or love, but by the love of good, (the will being nothing but the love of good, or the natural motion of the soul towards good) she infallibly loves that which has most conformity with that which she loves invincibly. But it is certain, that when sensible Pleasures, or some such like thing, does not disturb the Mind, a Man may always suspend the judgement of his love, and not determine himself especially in respect of false goods; for the soul can have no evidence, that false goods are true goods, nor that the love of these false goods does perfectly agree with the motion which carries us towards the true good. Thus, when a Man loves false goods, at the time when his senses and passions do not altogether disturb his Reason; he demerits, because than he may and aught to suspend the judgement of his love. For if he had stayed a while to have examined what he ought to have done, this false good would soon have appeared much the same as it is; Remorse of Conscience, and perhaps even the delectation of Grace, would have changed all the dispositions of his mind and heart: For the condition of a Traveller has nothing fixed, a thousand different objects present themselves continually to his mind, and the life of Man upon Earth is only a continual succession of thoughts and desires.  
XXXII.  
It seems, at first, that in respect of the true good, Man cannot suspend the judgement of his love; for we cannot suspend our judgement, but when the evidence is not full. Now we cannot but see that it is most evident, that God is the true good, and that also none but he can be good to us; we know that he is infinitely more Amiable, than we can comprehend: But it must be observed, that though we cannot suspend the judgement of our Reason in respect of speculative truths, when the evidence is full; yet we may suspend the judgement of our love, in respect of good, what evidence soever there is in our Ideas.  
For, when Sentiments fight against Reason, when Taste opposes Knowledge, when we sensibly find that to be bitter and ungrateful, which Reason clearly represents as sweet and agreeable, we may choose whether we will follow our Reason or our Senses. We may act, and indeed often do act, against our Knowledge; because when we attend to Sentiment, Knowledge is lost, if we do not use violence to retain it; and because we ordinarily attend more to Sentiment than to Knowledge, because Sentiment is more lively and agreeable than the most evident Knowledge.  
XXXIII.  
It is pleasure which makes minds actually happy: Upon this account we ought to enjoy Pleasure, when we love the true good, the mind thinks upon God, if it draws near to him by its love and tastes no other sweetness. On the contrary, God sometimes fills it with bitterness and desolation, He forsakes, He rejects it, as I may say, not that it should cease to love him, but rather that its love may be more Humble, more Pure, and more Meritorious: In short, He commands it to do some things which makes it actually Miserable. But if it draws near to Bodies, it finds itself happy, proportionably happy as it is united to them; certainly that is a temptation, what Knowledge soever one may have, for we invincibly desire to be happy. So that a Man Merits very much if fixing upon his Knowledge, he denies himself, notwithstanding all uncomfortable desertions; if he sacrifices his actual happiness to the love of the true good, if living by Faith and trusting in the Promises of God, he continues inviolably true to his duty. It therefore plainly appears that J. C. might Merit his Glory, though he most evidently knew the true good; because having a great love for his Father, he entirely submitted himself to his orders, without being carried thereto by preventing Pleasures: Because altogether complying with his Knowledge, he suffered very great Asslictions, and sacrificed all the most lively and sensible Pleasures to the love of God. For he took a Body, as we have, that he might have a 
* Heb. 8.3.  victim to offer unto God; and by his Body, as the occasional or natural cause, receiving a great number of divers sentiments, he might sacrifice himself as an Holocaust, in Honour of the true good, by suffering afflictions, and the privation of sensible Pleasures.  
XXXIV.  
That I may not leave in some Persons an imperfect Idea of the Grace of J. C. I think I ought further to say, that it doth not consist in delectation alone, for all Grace of sentiment is the Grace of J. C. Now of this sort of Grace there are several kinds, and of each kind infinite degrees. God sometimes gives disgust and bitterness to the objects of our passions; he weakens their sensible persuasives, or causes us to have an horror of them, and this kind of grace of sentiment has the same effect as delectation. It re-establishes and fortifies our Liberty, it puts us almost in Equilibrio, so that by this means we are in a condition of following our Knowledge in the motion of our love. For to put a Balance in a perfect Equilibrio, or to change the inclination, it is not necessary to increase the Weights which are too weak; it is sufficient to take something from those which weigh too much. Thus there are Graces of Sentiment of several kinds, and each kind is capable of infinite degrees; for there are Pleasures, Horrors, and Disgusts, greater and lesser to infinity. That which I have hitherto said of delectation, may be easily applied to other kinds of Graces of Sentiment: I only took pleasure or delectation as a particular example that I might explain myself more clearly, and without equivocation. If there be any other principle of our determinations to good, besides the Grace of Sentiment and that of Knowledge, I confess to me they are altogether unknown; and it is upon this account that I have explained the effects which are necessary to the conversion of the heart, only by these two Principles, lest I should have been accused, of having spoken in general terms and such as only excite confused Ideas, which I have avoided with all possible care. But though I have explained myself only in such terms as all Men understand, since there is no person who knows not, that Knowledge and Sentiment of good are the principles of our determinations; nevertheless I don't pretend to oppose those, who not making use of these clear Ideas say in general, that God works in the souls of Men their Conversion by a particular action, different perhaps from all that I have said here 
* First Explicat. of the Search after Truth.  and elsewhere, that God doth in us. Since I experience nothing in myself but Motion towards good in general, and Knowledge or Sentiment which determines this Motion; I ought to suppose nothing else, if by this alone, I can give a reason of all that which the Scripture and the Councils have defined, concerning the subjects of which I treat. In a word, I am sure, that Knowledge and Sentiment, are the Principles of our determinations, but I declare, that I know not whether there may be something else, of which I have no knowledge.  
XXXV.  
Beside Grace, efficacious in itself, and the Grace the effect of which depends entirely upon the good dispositions of the Mind, besides the Grace of Sentiment and the Grace of Knowledge; the Just also have Habitual Grace, which makes them agreeable to God, and puts them in a condition of doing actions Meritorious of Salvation. This Grace is Charity, the Love of God, the Love of Order; Love which is not properly Charity, if it be not stronger and greater than all other Loves. As it is Pleasure which ordinarily produces the love of the object which cause it or seems to cause it; so it is the delectation of Grace which produces the love of God: It is the enjoyment of sensible pleasures, which increases Concupiscence: It is also the Grace of Sentiment which augments Charity. Concupiscence diminishes by the privation of sensible Pleasures, and then Charity is easily preserved and increased. Charity also diminishes by the privation of the actual Grace of J. C. and Concupiscence is easily increased and fortified: For these two loves of Charity and Concupiscence, continually engage one another, and strengthen themselves by the weakness of their Enemy.  
XXXVI.  
All that proceeds from Charity, is agreeable to God, but Charity does not always act in the just themselves. To the end it may act, it ought, at least, to be enlightened; for Knowledge is necessary to determine the motion of Love. Thus the Grace necessary for every good work relating to Salvation, is the Grace of Sentiment in those who begin their Conversion; it is the Grace of Knowledge, it is some motion of Faith and Hope in those who are animated by Charity. For the Just may do good works without the Grace of delectation, yet they have always need of some actual succours to determine the motion of their Charity. But though Charity without Delectation is sufficient to vanquish many temptations, nevertheless, the Grace of Sentiment is necessary in many occasions. For Men cannot, without the continual assistance of the second Adam, resist the continual action of the first: They cannot persevere in righteousness, if they be not often assisted by the particular Grace of J. C. which produces, augments, and sustains Charity, against the continual efforts of Concupiscence.  
XXXVII.  
The effects of Pleasure, and all the sentiments of the Soul, depend a thousand ways, upon the actual dispositions of the Mind. The same weight has not always the same effects: Its action depends upon the machine by which it is applied with respect to the contrary weights. If a balance be unequally hung, the force of the weights being unequally applied, the weaker may turn the stronger. It is the same of the weights of pleasure, they act one upon another, and determine the motion of the Soul, as they are differently applied. Pleasure must have more effect in one who has already a love to the Object which causes the pleasure, than in him who has an aversion to it, or who loves the opposite goods. Pleasure forcibly determines him who clearly sees, or lively imagines the advantages of the good which seems to produce it; and it acts weakly upon the mind of him who knows this good only confusedly, or contemns it.  
In conclusion, pleasure acts with all its force in him who blindly follows that which flatters Concupiscence; and may perhaps have no effect in him who has attained to some habit of suspending the Judgement of his love.  
XXXVIII.  
Now the different degrees of Knowledge, Charity, Concupiscence, and the degrees of Liberty being every moment combined after infinite ways, with the different degrees of actual pleasures; and these pleasures not having their effect, but according to the relation which they have to the dispositions of the mind and heart: It is plain, that no finite mind can judge, with any assurance, what effect any particular Grace will produce in us: For besides the Combination of all that which concurs to make it efficacious, or to produce its effect, contains something infinite. This Combination is not like the springs and machine's, whose effects are always infallible and necessary. Thus, no spirit can discover what passes in the heart of man; but God being infinitely wise, it is plain that he clearly knows all the effects which may result from the mixture and combination of all things, and that diving into the heart of man, he insallibly discovers, even the effects which depends upon the free act, or rather consent of our wills. Nevertheless, I confess that I cannot conceive how God can discover the Consequences of those Actions which have not their infallibility from his absolute degrees. But I cannot prevail with myself, to engage in Metaphysics at the expense of morality, and to maintain Opinions contrary to my inward sentiment, as undeniable Truths; or to speak to the ear a certain Language, which in my Opinion, says nothing clearly to the mind. I know very well that Objections may be made, which I may not be able clearly and evidently to Answer; but this perhaps may be, because even these Objections themselves may be full of obscurity and darkness: Because they are grounded upon our ignorance of the properties of the Soul; because, as I have 
* Expli. of the 7. Ch. lib. 2, part. 3.  elsewhere proved, we have not a clear Idea of what we are; and because that which is in us which suffers its self to be overcome by those determinations which are not invincible, is altogether unknown to us. To Conclude, if I cannot clearly Answer these Objections, 
* First Explicat,  I can Answer them by other which yet seem more difficult to resolve. I can from the principles opposite to mine, draw more hard and invidious Consequences than those which are pretended to follow from that Liberty which I suppose to be in us. But I will not enter particularly upon this, because I take no pleasure in walking in the dark, and leading others into precipices.    

The First Explication OF THE TREATISE OF Nature and Grace.  
What it is to Act by General Wills, and what by Particular.  
I.  
I Say that God acts by General Wills, when he acts in consequence of the General Laws he has established: For Example, I say that God acts in me by General Wills, when he makes me feel pain by the prick of a pin; because in consequence of the general and efficacious Laws of the Union of Soul and Body, which he hath established, he makes me feel grief or pain when my body is indisposed. In like manner, when one bowl strikes upon a second; I say, God moves this last by a General Will, because he moves it in consequence of the general and efficacious Laws of the communication of motions; God having in general appointed, that whensoever two bodies strike upon one another, the motion should be divided betwixt them in certain proportions, and 'tis by the efficacy of this General Will, that bodies should move one another.  
II.  
On the contrary, I say that God acts by particular wills, when the efficacy of his will is not determined by any general law to produce the effect. Thus, supposing that God makes me feel the pain of the pricking of a pin, though there happens not in my body, or in any other Creature, any change which determines him to act in me according to general Laws; I say, that then God acts by particular wills.  
Likewise, supposing that a body gins to move without being struck upon by another, or without any change happening in the will of any Spirits, or any other Creature which determines the efficacy of any general Laws; I say then, that God moves this body by a particular will.  
III.  
According to these definitions, it appears that I am so far from denying providence, that on the contrary, I suppose that it is God who acts all in all; that the nature of the Pagan Philosophers is a Chimaera, and that properly speaking, that which is called Nature, is nothing else but the general Laws which God has established for the making or preserving his Work after the most simple ways, by an action always uniform, constant, perfectly worthy of infinite wisdom, and the universal cause. That which I here suppose, though certain, for reasons which I have elsewhere given, is not absolutely necessary to prove what I intent: For if it be supposed that God has communicated his power to Creatures, and that bodies which are about us, have a real and true force, by which they may act upon our soul, and render it happy or miserable by pleasure or grief; and that bodies in motion have in themselves a certain entity, which is called a Quality imprinted, which they give to those they meet, and give it with that readiness and uniformity which they suppose, it will be equally easy for me to prove that which I design; for then the efficacy of the action of the Concourse of the general cause will be necessarily determined by the action of the particular cause. God, for example, will be obliged according to these principles, to afford his concourse to a body at the moment wherein it strikes upon others: But this body may communicate motion to them, and this is certainly to act by virtue of a general Law. Nevertheless, I don't reason according to this supposition, because I believe it altogether false; as I have showed in the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book of The Search after Truth, in the Explication of the same Chapter, and elsewhere. These Truths supposed, I here subjoin the Marks by which it may be known, whether an effect be produced by a general will, or by a particular.  
Marks, by which it may be judged, whether an effect is produced by a General, or by a Particular Will.  
iv  
When we see an effect immediately follow the action of an occasional cause, we ought to judge that this effect is produced by the efficacy of a general will. A Body is immediately moved after it is struck; the striking of bodies upon one another is the occasional cause: therefore this body is moved by a general will. A Stone falls upon the head of a Man and kills him; and this stone falls as others do, I mean, that its motion is continued almost according to Arithmetical Proportion, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, etc. This supposed, I say that it is moved by the efficacy of a general will, or according to the Laws of the communication of motion, as it is easy to demonstrate.  
V  
When we see an effect produced, and yet the occasional cause which is known to us, is not concerned therein, we have reason to think that this effect is produced by a paticular will, supposing that this effect be not visibly unworthy of its cause, as I shall show hereafter. For example, when a body is moved without being struck upon by another, it is very probable that this body is moved by a particular will; nevertheless we are not altogether assured thereof: For supposing there should be a general Law, that bodies should be moved according to the different wills of Angels, or any other such like, it is plain that this body might be moved though it was not struck; since the particular will of any Angel, according to this supposition, might determine the will of the general cause to move it. Thus we may be often assured that God acts by general wills; but we can never be assured, that he acts by particular wills, even in the best attested miracles.  
VI  
Since we don't sufficiently know the divers combinations of occasionalc auses, to discover whether such and such effects happen in consequence of their actions; since we are not, for example, knowing enough to discern, whether such a shower of rain be produced by the necessary consequence of the communication of motions, or by a particular will; we ought to judge that an effect is produced by a general will, when it is plain that the cause is not designed for a particular end: For the wills of intelligent beings have necessarily some end; general wills, one general end; and particular, a particular end: Nothing is more evident.  
For example, though I can't discover, whether the rain which falls in a meadow, falls there in consequence of general laws, or by the particular will of God: I have reason to think, that it falls there in by a general will; if I see that it falls as well upon the neighbouring Lands, or into the River which runs by this Meadow, as upon the Meadow its self. For if GOD caused it to rain upon this Meadow, by a particular good will which he has for the owner thereof, this rain would not fall into the River where it is useless; since it could not fall therein without a cause, or a will in God, which necessarily has some end.  
VII.  
But it is still much more reasonable to think, that an effect is produced by a general will, when the effect is contrary, or else useless to the design which faith or reason teaches us the cause proposes to himself.  
For Example, the end which God proposes in the divers sensations which he gives to the soul, when we taste different fruits, is that we should eat those which are proper to nourish the body, and reject others; I suppose this to be so. Therefore, when God gives us a grateful sentiment at the time when we eat poison, or fruits that are poisoned, he does not act in us by particular wills. We ought to judge thus; for this grateful sentiment is the cause of our death, and God does give us our sentiments, that he may preserve our life by a suitable Nourishment. I say again, I suppose it thus; for I only speak in relation to Grace, which God gives us doubtless for our Conversion; so that it is plain, that God does not dispense it to men by particular wills, since it often renders us more culpable, and more criminal, and God cannot have such a fatal Design. God therefore does not give us a grateful sentiment by particular wills, when we eat poisoned fruit. But since poisoned fruits excite in our brain motions like unto those which good fruits produce there, God gives us the same sentiments, by the general Laws which unite the soul to the body, to the end that she may take care of its preservation.  
In like manner God does not give to those who have lost an arm, sentiments of grief relating to this arm, but by a general will; for it is useless to the body of this man for his soul to suffer grief in relation to an arm which he has not. The same may be said of the motions which are produced in the body of a Man which commits any crime: In short, supposing we are obliged to think that God sends rain upon the Earth to make it Fruitful, we cannot think that he distributes it by particular wills, since it reins upon the Sands and the Sea, as well as upon Cultivated ground; and it often reins so much upon sound Land that the Corn thereby is spoiled, and men's labours made useless.  
Thus it is certain, that the rain which is useless and hurtful to the Fruits of the Earth, are the necessary consequences of the general Laws of the communication of motions, which God hath established to produce in the World the best effects; supposing that which I here repeat, that God intended not that the rain should make the Earth to become barren.  
VIII.  
In short, when any thing happens which is very singular, there's reason to think that it is not produced by a general will; nevertheless it is impossible to be assured thereof: For Example, 
* Supposing there was any Reason for the Author's high Esteem of that Ceremony, the Example serves his Purpose well enough.  In a Procession of the H. Sacrament, it reins upon the Company, but not upon the Altar-Cloath, or those that carry it; there is reason to think that this happens by a particular will of the universal cause. Nevertheless we cannot be certain thereof, since an occasional intelligent cause may have this particular design, and thus determine the efficacy of the general Law to execute it.  
IX  
When the marks which preceded are not sufficient ground for judging whether any effect be, or be not produced by a general will, yet we ought to think that it is produced by a general will, if it be evident that an occasional cause is established for such like effects.  
For example, it reins to very good purpose in a Field; we don't inquire whether it reins upon the Highways: We know not whether it be hurtful to the neighbouring grounds, or no; we also suppose, that it does nothing but good, and that the circumstances which accompany it are altogether agreeable to the design for which God would have it rain. Nevertheless, I say, that we ought to suppose this rain produced by a general will, if we know that God has established an occasional cause for such like effects: For we ought not without necessity to have recourse unto Miracles. We should suppose that God acts by the most simple ways; and though the owner of the Field ought to give thanks to God for this favour, yet it ought not to be imagined that God has vouchsafed it to him after a Miraculous manner, by a particular will.  
The Master of the Field is bound to give thanks to God for the good which he has received; since God foresaw and intended the good effect of this rain, when he established the general Laws whereof it is a necessary consequence. On the contrary, if rain be sometimes hurtful to our Lands, since God did not establish the Laws which make it rain to render them unfruitful, (a great drought being enough to make them barren) it is plain that we ought to thank God and adore the wisdom of his providence, even then when we do not feel the effects of the Laws which he hath appointed for our benefit.  
X.  
In short, though we should not be assured by the circumstances which accompany certain effects, that there is an occasional cause established to produce them; it is sufficient to know that they are very common, and relate to the principal design of the general cause, to judge that they are not produced by a particular will.  
For example, the Rivers which water the Earth relate to the principle of God's designs, which is, that men should not want necessaries for life; This I suppose. Moreover, Rivers are very common, therefore we ought to think that they are form by some general Laws. For as there is more wisdom required in executing designs by simple and general ways, than by ways compounded and particular, (as I think I have sufficiently proved elsewhere) we ought to give this Honour to God, as to believe that his manner of acting is general, uniform, constant, agreeable to the Idea which we have of his infinite wisdom.  
These are the marks by which it may be judged, whether an effect be or be not produced by a general will. I shall now prove that God dispenses Grace to Men by general Laws, and that J. C. was the occasional cause of determining their efficacy. I begin with the Proofs drawn from H. Scripture.  
XI.  
St. Paul teaches us, 
Col. 2.19.  that J. C. is the Head of the Church, that he continually dispenses to her the Spirit which quickens her, that he forms the Members thereof, and animates them as the Soul does the Body; or, to speak yet more clearly, the H. Scriptures teaches us two things.  
First, That J. C. Prays continually for his Members. 
Heb. 7.25. 9.24 John 11.42.   
Second, That his Prayers and Desires are always heard.  
Whence I conclude, that he is appointed by God the occasional cause of Grace, and also that Grace is never given unto Sinners but by his means.  
Occasional causes, do always and very readily produce their Effect. The Prayers or divers Desires of J. C. relating to the formation of his Body, do always readily obtain their Effect. God refuses nothing to his Son, as J. C. himself has taught us.  
The occasional causes don't produce their effect by their own efficacy, but by the efficacy of the general cause.  
It is also by the efficacy of the power of God, that the soul of J. C. operates in us; it is not by the efficacy of the humane will: For this reason 'tis that St. Paul represents J. C. as Praying continually to his Father; for he is obliged to Pray, that he may obtain.  
The occasional causes are established by God to determine the efficacy of his general wills; and J. C. according to the Scripture was appointed by God after his Resurrection to Govern the Church which he had purchased with his own blood. For J. C. was the Meritorious cause of all Graces, by his sacrifice; but after his Resurrection he entered into the H. of Holies, a Sovereign Priest of good things to come, that he might appear in the presence of God, and shed upon us the Graces which he had merited for us. Thus he himself applies and distributes his gifts as the occasional cause. He disposes of all things in God's House, as a well beloved Son in the House of his Father.  
I think I have demonstrated, in the Search after Truth, that God only is the true cause, or acts by his own proper efficacy, and that he doth not communicate his Power unto Creatures, but by making them the occasional causes of producing certain effects. I have proved, for example, that Men have no power to produce any motion in their bodies, but because God hath made their wills the occasional causes of these motions; and that fire has no power to cause pain in me, but because God hath made the striking of one body upon another the occasional cause of the communication of motions, and the violent shaking of the nerves of my Flesh the occasional cause of my Pain. I may here suppose a Truth which I have largely proved, in Chap. III. Part 2. of Book iv of the Search, etc. And in the Explication of the same Chapter, and which they, for whom I chief writ, do not deny.  
Now 'tis certain by Faith, that Power is given to J. C. for forming his Church; 
Mat. 28.18.  Data est mihi omnis potestas in Coelo & in terra: This cannot be understood of J. C. according to his Divinity, for in this respect he never received any thing. 'Tis certain therefore, that J. C. according to his humanity, is the occasional cause of Grace; supposing it proved, that God only can act upon Minds, and that second causes have no efficacy of their own; which they who would understand my Sentiments, and judge of them, ought first to examine.  
XII.  
I say moreover, that no Person is sanctified but by the efficacy of the Power which God has communicated to J. C. by establishing him the occasional cause of Grace: For if any sinner was Converted by Grace, of which J. C. was not the occasional cause, but only the meritorious; the sinner having not received his new Life by the influence of J. C. he would not be a Member of the Body of which J. C. is the Head, after that manner in which St. Paul expresses it, 
Chap. 4.16. See Col. 11.19.  in these words of the Epistle to the Ephesians.— That we may grow up into him in all things who is the Head, Christ; from whom the whole Body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying itself in love. Which words do not merely say that J. C. is the Meritorious cause of all Graces, but do more distinctly express that Christians are the Members of the Body of which J. C. is the Head; and that it is in him we increase and live a life altogether new, and that it is by his inward operation, 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉, that his Church is formed, that he was appointed by God, the only occasional cause, who by his divers desires and applications distributes those Graces which God as the true cause sends down upon men.  
'Tis for this reason St. 
Coloss. 2.7.  Paul says, that Christians are united to J. C. as to their root: Radicati & super aedificati in ipso. 'Tis for this reason likewise, that J. C. compares himself to a Vine, and his Disciples to the Branches, who receive their life in him: Ego sum vitis, vos palmites. 'Tis for this reason that St. Paul assures, that J. C. lives in us, and we in him; that we are risen in our Head; that our Life is hid with God in J. C. In a word, that we already have eternal life in J. C.  
These and several other Expressions clearly show, that J. C. is not only the meritorious, but also the occasional, physical or natural cause of Grace; and that as the Soul informs, animates, and perfects the Body, so J. C. as the occasional Cause, distributes to his Members those Graces, which, by his sacrifice, he hath merited for his Church.  
For my part, I cannot comprehend, how any one can doubt of these Reasons, nor upon what foundation a Truth so very edifying, and as ancient as the Religion of J. C. can be treated as a dangerous Novelty. I grant my Expressions may be new, but this is because they appeared to me very proper, distinctly to explain a truth, which I could only have confusedly demonstrated by too general terms. The words, Occasional Causes, and General Laws, appear to me necessary, to make those Philosophers, for whom I wrote the Treatise of Nature and Grace, distinctly comprehend that which the generality of Men are content to know only confusedly. Since new Expressions are not dangerous, but when they cover something which is equivocal, or may occasion some thought, contrary to Religion, to arise in the mind, I do not think that any candid persons, and who are skilled in St. Paul's Divinity, will be offended, because I explain myself after a particular manner, since it tends only to make us adore the Wisdom of God, and to unite us strictly unto J. C.  

Objection I.  
XIII.  
It is objected against what I have said, That neither Angels nor Saints of the Old Testament received Grace in consequence of the desires of the Soul of Jesus, since this Holy Soul was not as yet: and thus, though J. C. be the meritorious cause of all Graces, he is not the occasional which distributes them to Men.  

Answer.  
In respect of Angels, I answer, That there is some probability that Grace was given to them once only. So that if we consider things in this respect, I confess, that nothing obliged the Wisdom of God, to establish an occasional cause for the sanctification of Angels. But if these blessed Spirits be considered as Members of the Body whereof J. C. is Head, or if it be supposed, that they were unequally assisted, I believe there is reason to think, that the diversity of their Graces came from him who-is Head of Angels as well as Men, and that in this capacity, he, by his sacrifice, not only merited all Graces which God gave to his Creatures, but also diversely applied these same Graces to them by his different desires.  
Since it cannot be denied, that J. C. along time before he was born or could merit, was the meritorious cause of Graces which were given to the Angels and Saints of the Old Testament, it must, in my opinion, be granted, that, by his Prayers, he might have been the occasional cause of the same Graces a long time before they were asked. For there is no necessary relation between occasional causes and the time of their producing their effects; and though ordinarily these sorts of causes do produce their effects at the very time of their action, nevertheless, since their action is not efficacious in its self, seeing its efficacy depends upon the will of the universal cause, it is not necessary that it should actually exist, that they may produce their effects.  
Suppose, for example, That J. C. to day asks of his Father, that such an one may receive such an assistance at certain times of his life, the Prayer of J. C. will infallibly determine the efficacy of the general Will of God, which is to save all Men in his Son. This person shall receive these assistances, though the Soul of J. C. actually thinks of quite another thing, and though it should never more think of that which it desired for him. Now, the Prayer of J. C. which is already passed, is not more present to his Father than the future; for whatsoever happens in all times is equally present to God. Thus, since God loves his Son, and knows, that his Son will have such desires, in respect of his Ancestors, and the People of his own Nation, and also in respect of Angels, who were to enter into the Spiritual Edifice of his Church, and compose the Body of which he is the Head; he seems to have been obliged to accomplish the desires of his Son before they were made, to the end that the Elect, who were before his birth, and whom he purchased by the merit of his sacrifice, should as particularly belong to him as others, and he should be their Head as truly as he is ours.  
I confess, it is convenient, that meritorious and occasional causes should go before their effects, rather than follow them; and even order its self requires, that these causes and their effects do exist at the same time. For 'tis clear, that all merit should be presently rewarded, and that every occasional cause should actually produce its effect, provided that nothing hinder but that this may and aught to be so. But since Grace was absolutely necessary to the Angels and to the Patriarches, it could not be differed. As for the Glory and Reward of the Saints of the Old Testament, seeing it might be delayed, it was expedient, that God should suspend its accomplishment till J. C. was ascended into Heaven and made an Highpriest over the House of God, and began to use the sovereign power of an occasional cause of all Graces, which he had merited by his Labours upon Earth. Thus we believe, that the Patriarches did not enter into Heaven, till J. C. himself, their Head, their Mediator, and their Forerunner, was therein entered. Nevertheless, though it should be granted, that God should not have appointed an occasional cause for all Graces given to the Angels and the Patriarches, I do not see how it can be concluded, that at present J. C. does not dispense to the Body of the Church that Spirit which gives it increase and nourishment; that he prays not for it, or that his Desires or Prayers do not infallibly obtain their effect; or, in a word, that he is not the occasional cause which applies those Graces to to Men which he has merited for them.  
Before J. C. God gave Grace by particular Wills. This I grant, if it be desired; the necessity of Order requires it; the occasional Cause could not regularly be so soon established; the Elect were but very few: But at present, when the rain of Grace is generally sent upon all the World; when it falls not as heretofore upon a very few Men of one chosen Nation; when J. C. may or aught to be established the occasional cause of the goods which he has merited for his Church, what reason is there to believe, that God should still work Miracles as often as he gives good Sentiments? For, certainly, all that God does by particular Wills is a Miracle, since it happens not by the general Laws which he has established, and whose efficacy is determined by occasional causes. But how can we think, that, to save Men, he should work all those Miracles which are useless to their salvation; I mean, that he should give all those Graces which they resist, because they are not proportioned to the actual strength of their concupiscence?  
St. John teaches us, that Christians receive of J. C. 
John 1.17.  abundant Graces, because, says he, the Law was given by Moses, but true Grace by Jesus Christ. For, in truth, the Graces which were before J. C. ought not to be compared to those which he distributed after his triumph. If they were miraculous, it must be thought they were very rare: Even the Grace of the Apostles, before the Holy Spirit was given to them, was not to be compared with those which they received, when the Sovereign Priest of good things to come, being entered by his Blood into the Holy of Holies, by the strength of his Prayers obtained, and by the dignity of his Person, sent the Holy Spirit to animate and sanctify his Church. The strange Blindness of the Jews, their gross and carnal Sentiments, their frequent relapses into Idolatry after so many Miracles, do sufficiently show, they had scarce any love for true goods; and the fearfulness of the Apostles, before they received the Holy Spirit, is a sensible mark of their weakness. Thus Grace, in this time, was very rare; because, as yet, our Nature was not made in J. C. the occasional cause of our Graces: as yet J. C. was not fully consecrated a Priest, according to the Order of Melchisedech, and his Father had not yet given him that immortal and glorious Life, 
Heb. 5.5, 10. Heb. 7.16, 17.  which is the particular character of his Priesthood. For it was necessary that J. C. should enter into the Heavens, and receive the glory and power of being the occasional cause of all goods, before he sent the Spirit, according to the words of St. John, 
John 7.39. John 16.7.  The Spirit was not yet given, because J. C. was not yet glorified: And according to these words of Christ himself, It is expedient for you, that I go: For if I go not, the Comforter will not come: But if I go, I will send him unto you. Now, it is not to be imagined, that J. C. considered as God, is the Head of the Church. He has obtained this honour as Man: the Head and the Members ought to be of the same nature. It is as Man, that J. C. intercedes for Men: it is as Man, that he has received of God sovereign power over his Church. For since God does not interceded at all, he, as God, has not received that Name which is above every Name: he is equal to the Father, and absolute Master of all things by right of his birth.  
These Truths are evident, and J. C. himself assures us of them, 
John 5.22, to 27.  since he says, that his Father gave him power to judge Men, because he was the Son of Man. Thus we must not think, that those Expressions of Scripture, which teach us, that J. C. is the Author of Grace, aught to be understood of J. C. considered according to his Divine Person. For if this was so, I confess I should not have demonstrated, that he is the occasional cause of it; he would have been only the true cause thereof. But since it is certain, that the three Persons of the Trinity are equally the true causes of Grace, (seeing all the outward Operations of God are common to the three Persons) my Arguments cannot be denied, since the Holy Scripture says of the Son, and not of the Father, nor of the Spirit, that he is the Head of the Church, and that under this character he communicates Life to all the Members which compose it.    

Object. II.  
XIV.  
It is God who gives to the Soul of J. C. all Thoughts and Motions which it has in the formation of his Mystical Body. So that if on one hand the Wills of J. C. as natural and occasional Causes, determine the efficacy of God's general Will; on the other hand, it is God himself who determines the divers Wills of J. C. Thus it comes to the same thing; for assuredly the Wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of his Father.  

Answer.  
I confess that the particular wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of the Father, but this is not because the Father has particular wills which answer to those of the Son, and determine them: This is only because the wills of the Son are always conformable to Order in general, which is necessarily the rule of the divine wills, and of those which love God. For to love Order, is is to love God, it is to will what God wills; it is to be Just, Wise, Regular, in his love. The Soul of J. C. would form to the Glory of his Father the most Sacred, Magnificent and Perfect Temple that can be: Order requires this, for nothing can be made too great for God. All the divers desires of this Soul, ever intent upon the Execution of its design, come also to it from God or the Word to which it is united. But the occasional causes of all these thoughts, most certainly are its divers desires, for it thinks on what it will.  
Now these divers desires are sometimes altogether free; probably the thoughts which excite these desires, do not always invincibly determine the Soul of J. C. to form and resolve to execute them. It is equally advantageous to the design of Jesus Christ, whether it be Peter or John who does that which the regularity of his work requires: It is true, that the soul of Jesus Christ is not indifferent, as to what respects the glory of his Father, or that which Order necessarily requires; but it is altogether free in every thing else, nothing out of God invincibly determines its love. Thus it ought not to be wondered if it have particular wills, though there are no such wills in God which determine those of the soul of Jesus Christ.  
But I grant that the wills of Jesus Christ are not free, I grant that his knowledge determines him to will, and always to will after a certain manner, in the construction of his Church. But it must be Eternal Wisdom to which his soul is united, which determines these wills; if it is not necessary for this end, to suppose particular wills in God. It must be observed, that the wills of the soul of J. C. are particular, or have not any occasional cause which determines their efficacy, no, not the will of God. For the soul of J. C. not having an infinite capacity of thinking, his knowledge, and consequently his wills, are limited. Thus 'tis necessary that his wills be particular, since they change according to his divers thoughts and applications: For it seems to me that the soul of J. C. otherwise employed in contemplating the beauties, and tasting the infinite sweetness of the true good, ought not according to the rule of Order, to think at the same time upon all the Ornaments which it designs to bestow upon his Church, and the different means of executing each of his intentions. J. C. desiring to render the Church worthy of the infinite Majesty of his Father, he desires also to adorn it with infinite beauties, and that by such means as are most conformable to Order. It is therefore necessary that he continually change desires; infinite wisdom is only able to prescribe general Laws for executing his designs. Now seeing the future world must subsist eternally, and be infinitely more perfect than the present World, it was expedient that God should establish an intelligent occasional cause, and enlightened with divine wisdom, to the end that it might correct the defects which necessarily happen in works form by general Laws. The striking of Bodies upon one another, which determines the efficacy of the general Laws of Nature, is an occasional cause without Understanding and without Liberty. Thus, it cannot be, but there must be Defects and Monsters in the World; which Defects it would be unworthy of the Wisdom of God to correct by particular wills.  
But J. C. being an intelligent occasional cause, enlightened by Divine Wisdom, and capable of particular wills, as the particular necessities of his work require; it is plain that the future World will be infinitely more Perfect than the present; that the Church shall be without deformity, as Scripture teaches us, and that this work will be altogether worthy of the esteem of GOD himself.  
After this manner it is, that the Eternal Wisdom renders, as I may say, to the Father that which it had taken from him; for not permitting him to act by particular wills, it seems as if it rendered him impotent. But being incarnate, it left God to act as became him, by the more simple and general ways, 
Ut innotescat principalibus & potestatibus in coelestibus per Ecclesiam multisormis Sapientia Dei— 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  and yet produced a work in which the most enlightened understanding shall never be able to observe the least defect.  
XV.  
After having proved by the Authority of Scripture, that the divers motions of the Soul of J. C. are the occasional causes, which determine the general efficacy of the Law of Grace, by which God would save all Men in his Son; 'tis necessary further in general to prove by reason, that we ought not to believe that God in the Order of Grace acts by particular wills. For though by Reason without Faith it cannot be demonstrated, that God has established the wills of a God man, as the occasional cause of his gifts, it may nevertheless be known that he does not distribute them to Men by particular wills, and that by two ways, a Priori and a Posteriori, that is to say by the Idea which we have of God, and by the effects of Grace; for there is nothing but proves this Truth. See the proof a Priori.  
A wise Being must act wisely; God cannot falsify himself: His actions must bear the Character of his Attributes. Now God knows every thing, and foresees every thing; his understanding has no bounds: Therefore his manner of acting must bear the character of an infinite understanding. Now to choose occasional causes, and establish general Laws for executing any work, denotes a knowledge infinitely more extended than to change wills every moment, or to act by particular wills: God therefore executes his designs by general Laws, the efficacy of which is determined by the occasional causes. Certainly it requires a more comprehensive understanding, to make a Watch, which according to the Laws of Mechanism shall go always and regularly, whether a Man carries it about with him, or hangs it up, or gives it what shake he will; than to make one which cannot go truly, if he who made it does not every moment change something in it according to the different postures in which he puts it: For surely, when there are a great many relations to compare and combine with one another, there needs a greater understanding. To see all the consequences which may happen from a general Law, an infinite understanding is requisite; but nothing of all this is to be foreseen when one changes his wills every moment.  
Therefore to establish general Laws, and choose the most simple, and at the same time the most fruitful, is a way of acting worthy of him, whose Wisdom has no bounds. On the contrary, to act by particular wills, shows a limited understanding, and which cannot compare the consequences, or effects of causes less fruitful. The same truth may further be demonstrated a Priori by some Attributes of God, as his immutibility, by which Mr. de Cartes proves, that every thing in motion describes a right line, and that there is always an equal quantity of motion in the World, and other Truths. But these proofs a Priori are too abstract to convince the generality of Men of the truth which I propose. It is expedient to prove it by the signs which I have heretofore given for discerning the effects which are produced by particular wills, from those which are the consequences of some general Law.  
XVI.  
God being infinitely wise, neither wills nor does any thing without end. Now Grace often falls upon hearts so disposed that it is unfruitsul. Therefore it does not fall upon hearts by a particular will, but only by a necessary consequence of general Laws, for the same reason that rain falls upon the Sand and on the Sea, as well as on Sown ground.  
Tho God may punish sinners, or make them more miserable than they are, he cannot design to make them more culpable or more criminal. Now Grace sometimes renders Persons more culpable and more criminal, and God certainly knows that according to their actual dispositions, the Grace which he gives them will have this sad effect. Therefore these Graces do not fall upon corrupted hearts by the particular will of God, but by a necessary consequence of general Laws which he has established to produce better effects; for the same reason, that too much rain sometimes spoils and putrifies the Fruits of the earth, though God by his general will, causes it to rain to make them grow and increase.  
XVII.  
If God intended that certain Lands should be barren, he need only to cease to will that the rain should water them. In like manner, if God would that the hearts of some sinners should be hardened, it would suffice that the rain of grace did not water them, he needed only to leave them to themselves, they would soon be corrupted.  
Why should we attribute to God a particular will, to make so severe a use thereof, and so irreconcilable with the price of the Blood of his Son? But some may say, God never had this design when he gave his Grace to sinners. This doubtless will appear more reasonable, but if God gives his Grace by a particular will, he has a particular design. Now seeing his Grace has this sad effect, God is frustrated in his intention, since he gave it with a particular design to do good to this sinner. For I speak not here of the Graces, or rather of the Gifts, which St. Paul explains in 1 Cor. Chap. 12. Ver. 9 I speak of the Grace which God gives for the Conversion of him, to whom it is given; and not of those Graces which God vouchsafes for the profit of others, such as the gift of Prophecy, the discerning of Spirits, that of speaking with divers Tongues, of Healing diseases, and such like.  
When rain falls in such abundance that the floods wash away the root of the Fruits, it ought to be judged that this rain comes by the necessary consequence of the general Laws which God has established for better effects. In the mean time it is certain, that God might have ordained it by a particular will. For God to punish Men might will, that reins designed to make the Earth Fruitful, might render them barren upon some account. But it is not the same of the rain of Grace, since God could not dispense it, with a design of punishing Men, much less of rendering them more culpable and more criminal. Thus 'tis still much more certain, that the rain of Grace is dispensed by general wills than the ordinary rain. Nevertheless, most Men easily believe, that rains are the necessary consequences of the general Laws of the communication of motions; and there are few who do not feel some difficulty in believing that God by general wills, gives us all those motions of Grace, the effects of which we hinder.  
'Tis very probable that this difficulty comes, because we naturally think that God acts much after the same manner that we do; and that he has every moment particular wills towards men, something like those which we have in respect of our Friends. For though we confess with the mouth, that there are infinite differences betwixt God's manner of acting, and ours; nevertheless, since we usually judge others in respect to ourselves, without reflecting thereon, few persons when they would speak of God, seriously consult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect.  
And because there is some appearance of novelty in that which I say, this causes some difficulty to the understanding, which reasonably suspects all that is not ordinary.  
I particularly esteem and honour all those, who in matter of Religion, have a secret aversion for all novelties. They do not offend me at all, when they oppose my Sentiments, when this is the motive; and since their prejudices are very reasonable, though they should even revile me, I should not cease to have a respect for them. For the disposition of their mind is infinitely more reasonable, than that of certain People, who readily embrace all that which carries in it the character of Novelty. Nevertheless, seeing I believe that Man ought to love and search after the Truth with all his strength, and communicate it to others, when he believes he has found it; I think having supposed all that Faith teaches us, I may or aught to discover that which may confirm it, or cause it to be embraced by all men. I might justify this Sentiment by the Practice of the Fathers and the Authority of St. Augustine himself, who often exhorts Men to understand the truth which they already believe in the obscurity of Faith. But I don't think there are any Persons so unreasonable, as to blame my conduct, how much prejudiced soever they may be against my Sentiments. Therefore I beg of those who will give themselves the trouble of reading what I have written, not to suppose that I am deceived, to suspend their judgement, till they shall well comprehend my meaning; not to condemn me in general terms, nor rashly to draw untoward consequences from my meaning.  
In matters so obscure as those of Grace, the advantage is always on his side who makes the onset; and it is not just to make use of it. Men ought to act with equity, and without prejudice compare all the consequences which may be drawn from different Sentiments, that at last they may embrace that which shall seem most conformable to the Goodness and Wisdom of God. For he is not equitable, who without Examination condemns an Opinion, by reason of some invidious consequences, which are always drawn from it, when the imagination is affrighted and prevented by contrary Sentiments.  
XVIII.  
I know, for example, that some persons have said that I make all Prayers useless, and that I take from Men that confidence which they ought to have in God; because God acting by general wills, we ought not according to them to hope for Heaven by particular assistances. I own, that if this consequence was contained in my Principles, they would be False, Heretical, and Impious. For he that takes away the Hope and Trust we ought to have in God, overturns Religion; and it is partly upon this account that I cannot be of their mind, who do the most oppose my way of reconciling Grace with Liberty. But my Principles are so far from leading Men to despair, that they show to the Just, and even to Sinners (after a way which to me seems most comforting) the means of obtaining from God the things of which they stand in need.  
For if we are Just, our Prayers are Meritorious, and if they be Meritorious, Order requires they should be heard. And because Order in respect of God himself, is a Law infinitely more inviolable than the Laws which he hath established for the construction of his work, he never fails to do that which Order prescribes unto him. Thus the prayers of the Just are never useless: This I have shown in the 19 Article of the second Discourse. But if we be sinners, it is certain that our Prayers in themselves are useless. 
1 John 2.1. Mat. 9.13. John 11.42.  Nevertheless we ought not to despair: We have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. He came to save Sinners. His Prayers are always and readily heard; let us Pray in his Name, or address to him himself. Our Prayers will solicit him to form some desires in our behalf; and his desires are the occasional causes which infallibly determine the efficacy of the general Law of Grace, by which God would save all Men in his Son.  
This is what I have very largely proved in the second discourse. Thus I am so far from takeing away the confidence which we ought to have in God, that I do by the Authority of the Scripture, particularly show what way we ought to take to obtain of God, the Graces which are necessary for us. I therefore beg of the Readers, that they will do me the justice, as to examine my Sentiments without prejudice; and I am willing they should afterwards judge of them according to their evidence. For I submit all my thoughts, not only to the censures of the Church, (which, by an Authority to which I am always ready to refer myself, has a right to make me quit them) but also to the judgement of particular persons, by whose Advice I shall endeavour to profit.     

The Second Explication, Where 'tis proved that J. C. is figured every where in the Scriptures, and that even by the Events which were before the Sin of the First Man; to teach us that the Principle of God's designs, is the Incarnation of His Son.  
MOses, in the second Chapter of Genesis, thus relates the Marriage of the first Man:  
The great Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept, and he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof. And the rib which the Lord God had taken from Man, made he a Woman, and brought her unto the Man. And Adam said, This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man. Therefore shall a Man leave his Father and his Mother, and cleave unto his Wife, and they shall be one flesh. St. Paul assures us, that this Carnal Marriage is a great Mystery, that it is the Figure of the Spiritual Marriage of J. C. with his Church, and also that married persons ought to conform themselves too J. C. and his Church in the Duties which they are to pay to one another: See his words in the Epistle to the Ephesians, Chap. V Wives, submit yourselves unto your own Husbands, as unto the Lord. For the Husband is the Head of the Wife, even as Christ is the Head of the Church: and he is the Saviour of the Body. Therefore as the Church is subject unto Christ, so let the Wives be to their own Husbands in every thing. Husbands, love your Wives, even as Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for it, that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of Water by the Word. That he might present it to himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing: but that it should be holy and without blemish. So ought Men to love their Wives, as their own Bodies: he that loveth his Wife, loveth himself. For no Man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the Church: For we are Members of his Body, of his Flesh, and of his Bones. For this cause shall a Man leave his Father and Mother, and shall be joined unto his Wife, and they two shall be one flesh. This is a great Mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the Church. We are the Members of the Body of J. C. form of his Flesh and of his Bone, as Eve was of Adam. The Man shall leave Father and Mother and be joined to his Wife, and with her shall make but one Body. This is a great Mystery, and I explain it of J. C. and his Church. 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  Sacramentum hoc magnum est: ego autem dico in Christo & in Ecclesia.  
The Letter, which kills, because it does not raise the Mind up towards him who only gives Life, applies that solely to the first Adam, which is said chief to figure the second. But St. Paul, inspired with the same Spirit that Moses was, clearly explained the Mystery, which the other had only darkly proposed. He assures us, that what seems to have been written of the first Man, and the first Woman, aught to be understood of J. C. and his Church. The first Marriage is a great Secret, for it figures the greatest of our Mysteries, the Eternal Covenant betwixt J. C. and his Church: a Secret hid in God from all eternity, and revealed to Men in the fullness of times. This is the Mystery which hath been hid from Ages and Generations, but is now made manifest to his Saints: To whom God would make known what is the Riches of the Glory of this Mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ, in you the hope of glory, Col. I. 26, 27. I confess, that ordinary Marriages are indissoluble: that married persons leave their Father and Mother, and make together one strict Society, and one Body: but these words of the first Man, Wherefore Man shall leave Father and Mother, may be applied to them; for J. C. proves, by the same words, that the Husband ought not to forsake his Wife, because it is God who has joined them together. But I maintain, that God has joined them, to figure the greatest of our Mysteries; that Marriages cannot be broken, because J. C. will never forsake his Church of which he is the Spouse; that the Marriage of Christians is a 
* Because it figures Jesus C. it may be called a SACRAMENT in the large & unrestrained Sense, but not according to the strict and limited Sense of the Word; as it signifies an Outward, Visible sign, which not only signifies but dispenses Grace.  Sacrament, which dispenses Grace to those who are contracted, because it figures J. C. who communicates Spirit and Fruitfulness to his Church: In a word, that the first Marriage, and all which have been since, are transient figures of the eternal and indissoluble Marriage of J. C. with Men.  
Now, the first Marriage was celebrated before Sin: God cast Adam into an ecstatical and mysterious sleep; he form out of one of his sides, or (to speak as the Scripture) he built up his Wise, which he designed to give him; he inspired into him words prophetical of J. C. and, as yet, Adam had not sinned: for, doubtless, all that the Scripture relates concerning the first Man, before his sin, doth much more sensibly and expressly represent J. C. than that which is written of him after his fall. Doth not this show, that J. C. and his Church, is the first and chief of God's designs, since 'tis evident, that the Figure must be for the sake of the Reality, and not the Reality for the Figure?  
When God created the first Man, he made him according to his Image, because he thought of him who is the Image of the invisible God; he animated him with his Breath, 
* Tertul. de Resurrect. Carnis. Cyril. Alex. Thes. p. 153. A. thanas. Orat. 3. in Arianos.  because he then had the design of uniting his Word to our Nature, which he foresaw would become altogether earthly and carnal by sin; he made him Lord of all Animals, because he intended to subject all things to J. C. God, by the sleep, into which he cast the first Man, expressed the death, or sleep of his Son upon the Cross; and by the Woman, whom he drew out of his Flesh and his Bones, the Spouse which J. C. received after he awoke, (or was risen) and which he purchased by his Blood. If Adam sinned, it was not according to St. Paul, because he was tempted, but through his fondness to his Wife, 1 Tim. II. 14. J. C. likewise was not subject to sin, and if he was made sin, as the Scripture speaks, 
2 Cor. 5.21.  it was in love to his Church. If Adam sinned, and communicated his sin to all his Posterity, he is, even in this (though in a contrary sense) the figure of J. C. who only dispenses Grace to Men. Where: fore, as by one Man, Sin entered into the World, and Death by Sin; 
Rom. 5.12.14.  and Death passed upon all Men.— Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them who had not sinned after Adam's transgression; who is the 
* 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉.  figure of him who was to come.  
These words, who is the figure of him, who was to come, in the place where they are, put it out of doubt, that the first Adam represented the second, even by Concupiscence itself; and the Death which he communicated to all Men, together with his Son. Hence it is, that St Paul makes so many Antitheses betwixt the Earthly Man, and the Man from Heaven. The first Man, was made a living Soul; 
1 Cor. 15.45.47.  the second Adam, a quickening Spirit. The first Man, is of the Earth, Earthly; the second Man, is the Lord from Heaven.  
God, by the first Man and Woman, did not only represent J. C. and his Church; but also by the place into which he put them, by their posterity, especially those of them whose actions the Scripture doth largely recite. The Earthly Paradise, represented the Church; J. C. keeps and Cultivates it. The River divided into Four Streams to water this very Delightful and Fruitful place, is the Eternal wisdom, which enlightens, and animates the Church. I also came out as a Brook from a River, and as a Conduit 
* Vulg. Lat. de Paradiso. ●ccl. 24.30.31.  into a Garden. I said, I will water my best Garden, and will water abundantly my Garden-bed. It is written of the true Solomon, that his wisdom ran down abundantly; as the Rivers at the beginning of Harvest. Who filleth all things with wisdom, 
Eccls 24.25, 26, 27  as Physon, and as Tigris in the time of the new fruits. He maketh the understanding to abound like Euphrates.— He maketh the doctrine of Knowledge, appear as the Light, and as Geon in the time of Vintage. The Tree planted in the middle of the Garden, which brought forth a Fruit able to make Men Immortal, is also the Eternal Wisdom, according to the words of the Proverbs of Solomon, She is a Tree of Life, 
Prov. 3.18.  to them that lay hold upon her, and happy is every one that retaineth her. He who shall overcome the World, shall be nourished with this Fruit; for certainly, these words of St. John, To him that overcomes, 
Apoc. 11.7.  it shall be given to eat of the Tree of Life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God, are to be understood of no other Trees but this. As for the other Tree, which teaches good and evil, and whose Fruits Eve found so Beautiful to the Eye, and Pleasant to the Taste; it represents sensible objects, which at present, excite in us such a strong Concupiscence, and give Death to those, who suffer themselves to be surprised by their Charms: 'Tis plain, that all these relations would not be so exact, if they were no more than imaginary.  
EVE had two Sons, Cain and Abel; 
Gen. 4.  they both offered their Sacrifice: God rejected that of Cain's, and received that of Abel's. Cain was troubled hereat, and slew his Brother; the blood of Abel which was spilt cried for Vengeance. God declared, that Cain should be a Fugitive all his Life, and that he would hinder him from being slain. Doth not this sufficiently represent the Synagogue, who being the Elder, yet offered not unto God a Sacrifice acceptable unto him: That the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ was only Worthy of GOD: That Jesus Christ was slain in Abel, by the Jews who were his Brethren, according to the Flesh: That for their Punishment, the Jews should be Vagabonds and Fugitives upon the Earth, as Cain was; and that God will not quite Destroy them, though their Crime was such, that they might say, more truly than Cain, All they who meet me will slay me.  
If we examine after matters of Fact, and those especially, whose Circumstances the Scripture more particularly recites, we shall see Jesus C. expected and figured every where; Expected, becanse of the promise which God had made, that the seed of the Woman, should break the Serpent's Head, Gen. III. 15. And Figured, because the Spirit of God, takes pleasure in representing unto Men, him who was to be their Mediator, and render all the Work of God perfectly worthy of its Author.  
I confess, that in these things we may be easily deceived, and that none but the Spirit of God can make us distinctly and without fear of error, see the reality of these Figures. But these Figures are so lively, and so express, that he must be strangely Stupid, who is not Affected with them; and very rash, who looks upon those as Ridiculous Persons and Visionaries, who according to the Example of the Apostles and Holy Doctors, seek Jesus Christ in the Scriptures, as he himself has Commanded us in these words, Search the Scriptures, for they are they, 
John. 5.39.  which Testify of me. For, in short, all that is in the Old Testament, relates to Jesus Christ and his Church. 
1 Cor. 10 11. — All these things happened to them in Figures.   

The Third Explication,  
Where 'tis proved, that the chief of God's design is J. C. and his Church; that God truly loves Men; that he sincerely desires to save all; that his Conduct is worthy of his Wisdom, Goodness, Immutability, and other Attributes: What is the order of the decrees which contain the Predestination of the Saints.  
I. BY this Term, [GOD,] I understand a Being infinitely Perfect.  
II. A Being infinitely Perfect, Perfectly knows himself.  
III. By the knowledge which he has of his Being, he sees the Essences of all things; he sees all possible Creatures, or all that which he is able to Produce: He is Wise by Himself alone.  
iv The Being infinitely Perfect, necessarily loves Himself; He can will nothing but by his will; I mean the love which he bears to himself: Therefore he can do nothing but for himself.  
V The Being infinitely Perfect, is Almighty; He can do all that he knows, supposing he can will it with a practical will.  
VI By a practical will, I mean a decree, or will executive of a design concluded upon; which supposes in God the knowledge and choice of the ways of acting which are most worthy of himself. For there are Simple, Fruitful, General, Uniform, and Constant; and there are Compounded, Barren, Particular, Irregular, and Unconstant Ways of Actions. The first are to be preferred before the latter; for they show Wisdom, Goodness, Constancy, Immutability, in him that makes use of them: The other denotes the want of Understanding, Malignancy, Inconstancy, Lightness of Mind.  
VII. It is visible, that there is something useless in his action, who does that by compounded ways, which may be brought to pass by simple; and he wants knowledge, who hath more Practical wills, when one sufficeth.  
VIII. The Conduct of a Good, Wise, Constant and Immutable Being, must carry in it, Wisdom, Goodness, Constancy and immutability; Order requires this.  
IX. The Wisdom of GOD renders him Impotent in this sense, that it permits him not to will certain things, nor to act after certain ways. It permits him not to will certain things; for if God had made but one animal, he could not have made it monstrous, or given it useless or ill proportioned members, that being contrary to his wisdom which he loves invincibly. It would not permit him also to act after certain ways; for, supposing that a work equally Perfect, might be produced by ways unequally Simple, Uniform, Constant, etc. God is impotent in this sense, that he cannot choose the ways of acting which are less worthy of his Wisdom, or which less resemble his Goodness, his Immutability, or his other Attributes.  
X. Thus God is Almighty, because he does every thing that he undertakes to do; and because there is nothing without him which can resist him, or hinder him from executing his design.  
'Tis not because there is nothing, how irregular soever, which he cannot do; or, no ways of acting which he cannot observe: But let us suppose God to act.  
XI. God cannot act but for himself; if he will act, 'tis because he resolves to do something worthy of himself; but no Creature can give unto God an Honour worthy of him: All the Honour that mere Creatures can give, cannot be worth the action by which he produces them.  
It is unworthy of God, to maintain that there is any thing in the Creature which can determine him to act; God therefore will do nothing, for he acts only for himself.  
XII. God cannot receive any Honour worthy of himself, but from himself. No Person can Honour himself. God therefore can never be Honoured with an Honour worthy of him.  
XIII. Nevertheless, I am sensible that I do actually exist. Therefore I can give unto God an Honour worthy of him: Therefore I am Eternal, Uncreated, Divine, I am not made, and God can make nothing.  
XIV. Further, I know that I offend God, and that I cannot satisfy him for my offences. Now God would not be offended, and would be fully satisfied. Therefore I am not the work of god; for if I was, God only acting for his glory, he would have been deceived in his designs.  
XV. Nothing can satisfy God but God himself. Now one and the same Person cannot make satisfaction to himself. God therefore can never be satisfied for our offences.  
The wicked therefore are not the work of God, they subsist whether he will or no; they cannot be annihilated. Behold consequences altogether false! But see them cleared up in two words, by my Principles, or rather the Principles of Christian Religion.  
XVI. God cannot be Honoured with an Honour worthy of himself. He cannot be fully satisfied for our offences, if he himself does not undertake for them. Now no person Honours himself, or satisfies himself: Therefore there is in God a plurality of Persons. This is also that which Faith teaches us.  
XVII. I am Created, therefore I can render to God an Honour worthy of himself. God is offended, therefore he may be fully satisfied. A Divine Person united to my nature, may sanctify my devotions, and render them worthy of God. A Divine Person united to a criminal— nature may justify and satisfy for it. This is the solution wherewith Faith supplies Reason when she is non-plused; for Faith and Reason mutually sustain one another.  
XVIII. It is clear therefore, that though Man had not sinned, a Divine Person would have been united to the work of God, to sanctify it, and render it worthy of its Author; since it is necessary it should subsist as I may say, in a Divine Person, to the end it might be worthy of him.  
XIX. Men offend God, they cannot satisfy him for their offences; God foresaw and permitted this: Therefore he had in view the satisfaction of his Son, which is full and entire; therefore the work of God repaired is more worthy of God, and Honours him more than the same work before its corruption. God therefore, who acts for his glory, must necessarily have permitted sin, which he foresaw would come to pass. All this is clear, and I have proved it elsewhere, but I speak too much of it; for, at present, 'tis sufficient, that the first and chief design of God was J. C. and his Church; that the present World was for the future, that the natural order was for the supernatural: And I prove it thus.  
XX. God made all things for his glory, He loves that the most, which most Honours him: Now Jesus Christ Honours him more than all Creatures put together, since J. C. is a Victim, and a Sovereign Priest, who infinitely Honours God. Therefore the chief of God's designs, is J. C. and the Church, which is his Body, which, with J. C. offers but one Victim, and one Worship. For all Creatures have access unto God, and pay their Obligations unto him, only in J. C. Therefore the Present World is for the Future; the Natural Order, for the Supernatural: this Succession of Generations, to supply the living Temple, which J. C. raises to the glory of his Father, with Materials. Every thing passes away, every thing tends to destruction, every thing vanishes; but God's chief design (the Object in which he is well pleased) shall remain for ever.  
XXI. The great design therefore of God, is, to build to his own Honour a Spiritual Temple, of which J. C. is the chief Cornerstone, the Architect, the Sovereign Priest, and Victim. His design is, that this Temple should be as Large and Perfect as it can be, as far as its greatness and Perfection can consist with one another. Thus God wills, that all Men should enter into this Spiritual Building; for thereby it would become more ample. God would that all Men should be saved, 1 Tim. II. 4. He hath also sworn by his Prophet, that he wills not the Death, but the Conversion of the Wicked. God also desires, that Men should merit the highest degrees of glory, His will is our Sanctification, 1 Thess. iv 3. His Temple would thus be more Perfect. Certainly, if God loves Men, and the beauty of his work, these Truths cannot be denied. Now all Men are not saved; there either are none at all, or very few Saints, but are capable of the highest Rewards, and of a more Illustrious Glory, than that which they possess; and no Creature, even Man himself, cannot hinder God from Converting and Sanctifying him, if God undertakes his Conversion and Sanctification; for God is the absolute Master of Hearts. Therefore there must necessarily be something in God himself, which hinders him from executing his wills, or rather from forming certain designs, or decrees.  
XXII. God in his infinite Wisdom, saw all possible works, and all possible ways of executing them. He doth not blindly resolve upon any design, but always compares the means with the end; He loves his Wisdom, and he consults it always. Now there are some ways of acting, more Simple, more Uniform, more Regular than others; and the Conduct of a Wise, and Immutable Being must carry in it the Character of Wisdom, and immutability. Therefore the Wisdom of God resists his wills, in this sense, that all his wills are not Practical wills. I do thus further explain myself.  
XXIII. God loves all Men. He would save all; he would sanctify all; he would make a beautiful work; he would make his Church as large and perfect as it can be: But God loves his Wisdom infinitely more; he loves it invincibly; he loves it with a natural and necessary love. He cannot therefore dispense with himself from acting after the wisest manner, and which is most worthy of himself; or from following that Conduct which suits best with his Attributes. Now, God acting by the most simple ways, and most worthy of his wisdom, his work cannot be more beautiful and more ample than it is. For if God, by ways equally simple, could have made his Church more ample and more perfect than it is, he would not, acting as he hath done, have made a work most worthy of himself; he would also have hated Men before he had established his Decrees, and consequently before their sin, or even their existence was known. Therefore the Wisdom of God forbidding him to compound his ways, not permitting him to work Miracles every moment, and obliging him to act after the most general, constant and uniform manner; he doth not save all Men, though he truly desires to save all. For, to conclude, though he loves all his Creatures, he doth nothing for them, but that which his wisdom permits him to do; and though he would have the most large and most perfect Church that can be, yet he doth not make it absolutely the most large and perfect; but only the most simple and most perfect that can be, with respect to the ways which are most worthy of himself. For, once more, God doth not resolve upon his designs, but by comparing his ways with the work which they are to effect. For when he sees a greater relation of wisdom and fruitfulness betwixt certain ways and their work, than all others and their work, than (I speak after the manner of Men) he takes up his Design, he chooses his Ways, he establishes his Decrees.  
XXIV. Thus the Order of the Divine Decrees, which include the Predestination of the Saints, is not, that God first wills to save such and such, and afterwards consults his wisdom to find out the ways which may put his designs into execution: This is to make God act like Men, who often repent of their undertake, because they do not compare all the means with the end. God consults his wisdom for all things; he wills and designs nothing without his knowledge; he wills not, that such and such shall be saved rather than others, if he did not see in himself some reasons for this; in himself, I say, not in them. So that the Principle of Predestination, is the Wisdom and Knowledge of God. O Altitudo divitiarum sapientiae & scientiae Dei! 'Tis not his will separated from his wisdom: for he neither doth nor wills any thing without it; that is, without his Son. Much less is it the Elect, which determine him to predestinate them, or to form designs, which include their predestination. This is altogether impertinent; and 'tis needless for me to spend time in demonstrating it.  
XXV. 'Tis evident, by the Truths which I have laid down, that Reason furnishes us with no other means of reconciling Scripture with itself; or this Proposition, God would save all Men; with this, All Men are not saved. For assuredly, God would save all Men, even the wicked: This he swears by the mouth of the Prophet Ezekiel. Now, God is the Master of Hearts; he can give such Grace to the wicked as will certainly convert him, since he knows what degree of Grace, and when it ought to be given, that it may work the conversion of the sinner. Who can hinder him from doing what he will? What Creature can resist him? Is't not evident, that it is his wisdom which obliges him to act after so simple and so general a manner, that Grace is not always given to the sinner, so strong, and at such seasonable moments, as throughly to convert, or to contribute to the conversion of him who receives it?  
For, if God acts by particular wills, since he is wise, and wills the conversion of a sinner, certainly 'tis impossible, but that all Grace should be efficacious, and have all the effect for which God gave it: it could never be resisted, never rendered useless: For an intelligent Being proportions always the means to the end, the action to the work, or effect which he undertakes to produce.  
XXVI. In short, 'tis plain, that Predestination, as I have explained it, has nothing harsh in it: For no person can take it ill, that God should love his wisdom infinitely more than his work; for it is altogether his gracious gift, seeing it is the greater relation of wisdom and fruitfulness, which God sees betwixt his ways and his future Church, which determines him to form the decrees, which include the Predestination of the Saints, and not our natural merits which engage him to predestinate us to Grace and Glory. It doth not suppose in God any respect of Persons; for though God's choice proceeds not from our merits, yet it is not the effect of an indifferent or rash will of God, but of the depth of his Wisdom and Knowledge which governs all his wills. Lastly, Predestination, thus understood, doth not lead to despair; for God often sends the showers of Grace in such abundance, that we frequently render it useless: And it will condemn our negligence, for it depends on us to avoid many things which resist the efficacy of grace; God not giving us his grace by particular wills, to the end, that it should have such an effect in us, and nothing more.  

Objection.  
The Predestination of the Saints is a Mystery: The Judgements of God are hidden, even to the most enlightened understandings, and 'tis an insufferable rashness to endeavour to give a reason of them. The Fathers upon this subject of God's choice of the Elect, always cried out with St. Paul, O the Height! We ought to imitate them, and hold our peace.  

Answer.  
I Answer, that we are permitted to Explain, even the Mysteries, provided we do it according to the Analogy of Faith; and suppose the Doctrines received by the Church as unquestionable. The Fathers have done so: There is no greater Mystery than of the Trinity; and yet St. Augustine has Composed 15. Books upon this subject, St. Hilary 12. St. Thomas, and all the School Divines, were not afraid to speak and write thereof. But it is certain, that Predestination is not a Mystery in this sense, as if the mind of Man can discover nothing thereof: for all the Divine Decrees, do necessarily agree with Order, Reason, the Eternal Law, of which all Men have some knowledge. There's no understanding all the particulars of the Predestination of the Saints: 
Praedestinatio fine praescientia esse non potest, Prospresp. ad Cap. XV. Gall. Non tamen Electio praecedit justificationem, sed electionem justificatio; nemo enim elegitur, nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum est quia elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, non video quomodo sit dictum nisi praescientiâ, Aug. l. 1. ad Simp. quaest. 2.  I confess it. Yet all they who know how to enter into themselves and consult universal Reason, which enlightens all attentive minds, clearly see, that God acts not by Caprice, that his designs don't prevent his knowledge, that the Predestination and choice of the Elect supposes the prescience of all good works, which they ought to do by the assistance of Grace; that it is the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, which causes one to be chosen and another rejected. This is that which St. Paul says; this is that which the Fathers say; and this is also that which I Assert. I don't say that one is chosen and another rejected, simply and merely because God wills it; for I am afraid of making God like unto Man, who guides himself by Humour, and hath no regard to his own work. It is not enough to show that God is powerful, and that he doth what he will with his Creatures. We ought, if possible, to justify his wisdom and his goodness: We ought to represent him as amiable and adorable, as much at least as we make him terrible. You cry out with St. Paul, O the Height! but let us go on, and add of the riches of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God; for it is the depth of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God, which is the principle of the Predestination of Saints; it is not a blind, rash, and imperious will, such as is often observed in the great ones of the Earth.  
But Men will make God such an one as they would be themselves; because they prefer Power to Wisdom, God shall always be just and wise enough for them, provided he be Powerful and Sovereign. Men love Independance; it is a sort of Servitude to them to submit to Reason; to them it is a kind of impotence not to be able to do that which she forbids. They fear therefore to make God Impotent instead of making him Wise. They place God above all Reason; according to them he observes none, he absolutely does all that which he pleases; and for this reason merely and solely because any thing pleases him; it is just, wise, and good to be done; Principles which certainly overturn the very Foundation of Religion, as I have 
* In the Explicat. of the nature of Ideas, To. 3. of the Search.  elsewhere explained.  
Will Men never reflect that the Word of God is Sovereign and Universal Reason; that this Reason is Coeternal and Substantial with God; that he necessarily, invincibly, inviolably, loves it: that though he be obliged to follow it, he nevertheless continues independent: And that thus all that God wills, is Just, Wise, Regular; because God cannot act but according to his knowledge, because he cannot love but according to Order, because he cannot despise his Wisdom, and falsify himself?  
But what! must it be permitted to reason upon God's way of proceeding? Yes doubtless, provided we reason upon clear Ideas, and always have regard for the Truths which Faith teaches us. 'Tis this infinitely wise Conduct which we cannot too much examine, and too much admire, nothing is more comforting and instructing both together; but we lose our time when we examine men's ways of proceeding, for they almost always follow the motions of their passions: He who loves Order, cannot make it his pass-time to see them do so, he cannot be instructed in his duty, by hearing their discourses.  
Let it suffice that the Historians make Heroes of their Benefactors, & great Men of their Friends; let all their characters flatter, but Christians ought to propose to themselves other Models. Let them be perfect, as their Heavenly Father is perfect; let them imitate his Conduct, but I must Answer the principal Objection.  
The Fathers, 'tis said, and St. Augustine chief, permit us not to seek after the reason of the choice which God makes of the Elect. I maintain that this is not true, and that the only thing which St. Augustine requires, is, that God's choice should not be founded upon natural Merits; so far he is from desiring that we should not have recourse to the Wisdom and Knowledge of God to give an account of his choice. But to make this well understood, we must know that the enemies of Grace, and free Predestination, always used this argument which enters naturally into the mind, and which in my opinion cannot e answered by reason, but by the principles which I have laid down. Thus they reason.  
There is no choice to be made, where is no inequality or difference: Now God in the distribution of his Graces, chooses some rather than others.  
Therefore there are some Persons whom God judges more worthy of Grace, and more fit to receive it than others. God wills that all Men should be saved; he wills that all should come to the knowledge of the Faith: Now all are not saved, even the Gospel has not been preached to all. Therefore there is some inequality, or some difference among Men; for if there was a perfect equality among them, since God would enlighten them all, all would, at least, have the gift of Faith. Now this difference can only come from the good or ill use of Liberty: Therefore 'tis Man who makes himself in this sense to differ from another 
* Vid. Prosp. adversus Col. c. 6. , and in some sort merits Grace. For surely 'tis just, or at least more reasonable, that God should give his Grace to those who are better disposed to receive it, and more likely to make a good use of it than others; to those who actually use their Liberty better, who make some essays towards acquiring Virtue, and who have more love for Order, the Truth and Justice, than to those who make no use of their Liberty, and blindly follow the motions of their passions. Therefore Grace does not prevent our wills, for God acts always with the most wisdom and reason that can be: Before he assists us, he expects that we should make that use of our Liberty, which we ought and may. 'Tis upon this account that he made us free, our Salvation is in our own hands; 
* See St. Augustine lib. 1. ad. Bonif. c. 19 & lib. 2. c. 8. & elsewhere  the necessity of a preventing Grace ruins free will, and renders the exhortations and councils of J. C. useless. 'Tis Grace must make us act, but 'tis in our power to will, to pray, and to begin.  
These Reasonings are so plausible, and so easily enter into the mind, that Men are naturally Pelagians. A Man speaks the Language of the Church, when he is upon his guard, when he actually feels his own weakness, and remembers that Grace is not given according to his merits. But when nature speaks, he scarce ever fails to speak those things which favour and exalt it. The Greek Fathers, who lived before Pelagius' Heresy, or who were not cautious enough against this error, have often spoke so as to seem to maintain it; this is a thing sufficiently known. St. Augustine himself, before he throughly understood the matter of Grace, thought it was in our power to believe and will, but in Gods only to give strength to perform 
† Nostrum est enim credere, illius autem dare credentibus & volentibus facultatem bene operandi. Lib. Retractat. Cap. 23.  And 
* Lib. 3.  St. Jerome himself writing against the Palagians, says, Vbi autem misericordia & gratia est, liberum ex parte cessat arbitrium, quod in eo tantum est ut velimus atque cupiamus, & placitis tribuamus assensum. Jam in Domini potestate est, ut id quod cupimus, quod laboramus ac nitimur, illius  & auxillio implere valeamus. Since we always feel that we are free, and do not always actually think upon the proofs which Scripture gives us of the necessity of Grace, 'tis difficult to keep ourselves from saying nothing in behalf of Liberty against Grace; since we know and are assured, that God always acts with Reason and Wisdom, we desire to find even in the Elect themselves, some reason of their Election.  
Since it can't be said, that the councils and exhortations of God are useless, we think without reflecting that it altogether depends upon us to follow them. In short, on what side soever we look upon the sentiments of the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians, we find them agreeable enough to Reason; and because they pleasantly court our Pride and Self love, 'tis difficult not to let fall some words in their favour. Hence it is that we find many passages in the Fathers which may be used as a foundation for the errors concerning Grace; insomuch, that there are those who without ceremony reckon some of the Greek Fathers among the Heretics: For there are Men who judge of the Sentiments of Authors, when they seem to contradict one another, only by reporting the passages in them. They do not consider that all that is said thro' prejudice, according to the opinion of those to whom a man speaks, and without having seriously examined what is said, signifies nothing; but on the contrary, it is sufficient once to say a truth against common prejudice to discover his opinion. For my part, I believe that the Greeks and Latins do not much differ one from the other, and that if they often speak very differently, 'tis because they were not equally cautious against the same errors, and had not equally examined them.  
Therefore the enemies of Grace believing themselves so strong in reasons, accused St. Augustine as denying Liberty, making all depend upon fate, attributing unto God respect of persons, and rendering all Preaching and Councils useless. They continually demanded of him a reason of God's choice, since he would not grant the reason of it to be an inequality or difference of wills, since it could not be an inequality of natures: But St. Augustine on his part, stuck to the Scriptures. He answered that Grace was not given according to Merits, that Man could not make himself differ from another, that he was unable not only to do good without the assistance of Grace, but that he could not will it; that the heart of Man is in the hands of God, that he disposes of it as he pleases, and that of ourselves we are not able to think a good thought. In short, that he was not obliged to give an account of the reason of the choice of the Elect, because the Judgements of God are unsearchable.  
But though St. Augustine says in an hundred places, that the Judgements of God are unsearchable, to silence the enemies of Grace, who would have the reason of our being chosen in ourselves; he no where says, that these Judgements are not agreeable to the reason and wisdom which all Men consult, when their senses and their passions keep silence. The judgements of God are impenetrable, because 'tis impossible to know them in particular; but we ought not to be afraid of asserting that they are Just, Wise, Reasonable, full of Goodness & Equity; St Augustine himself sometimes seeks and gives Reasons of them: He was always disposed to receive those which could be reconciled with Faith, and he rejects not those of his adversaries, but because they supposed, that Grace was given according to Merits; that which Religion and Christian morality can by no means grant. See how St. Augustine speaks, 
* De bono persever. c. 9  Ex duobus itaque parvulis originali peccato obstrictis, cur iste assumatur, ille relinquatur, & ex duobus aetate jam grandibus impiis, cur iste ita vocetur, ut vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur, aut non ita vocetur; inscrut abilia sunt judicia Dei: Ex duobus autem piis, cur huic donetur perseverantia usque in finem, illi autem non donetur, inscrutabiliora sunt judicia Dei. According to St. Augustine, the most unsearchable judgements of God are those by which perseverance is granted to some just Persons, and not to all. In the mean time St. Augustine himself gives a reason of them in his letter to Vitalis and elsewhere; and is so far from blaming them who examine God's way of proceeding with humility, and according to the Analogy of Faith, that on the contrary he is very ready to receive the reasons of others upon this subject, provided they agree with the Scripture. Propter hujus timoris utilitatem, ne regenerati & pie vivere incipientes, tanquam securi alta sapiamus, quidem non perseveraturi perseveraturis Dei permissione vel pravisiones ac dispositione miscentur, quibus cadentibus territi, cum timore & tremore gradiamur viam justam. Sed de hac re, id est, cur quidem non permansuri in fide, & sanctitate christiana, tamen accipiant ad tempus hanc gratiam, & dimittantur hic vivere donec cadant, cum possint rapi de hac vita, ne malitia mutet intellectum eorum, quod de sancto immatura aetate defuncto Scriptum est in Libro Sapientiae; quaerat quisquis ut potuerit, & si invenerit praeter hanc quae a me reddita est & aliam pro●abilem rationem, a recta fidei non recedens, teneat eam, & ego cum illo, si me non latuerit 
† Epist. 107. de Cor. & Grat. c. 23. .  'Tis to make us fear, least being regenerated and beginning to live piously, we become secure and highminded, that by God's permission and prescience, some who will not persevere, are mixed with those who will; that thus we being affrighted by their fall, may walk in the way of righteousness with fear and trembling. But it will be said, why do they who will not persist in the Faith, receive it, and continue therein till they fall? Why doth not God take away their Lives, before the wickedness of their hearts corrupts their minds, as 'tis written in the book of wisdom, of a Saint dying in his Infancy? Let every one seek after the best reasons of this, and if he shall find any other besides this which I have given, which renders a reason, that is probable, and according to the Analogy of Faith, let him embrace it, and if it shall be imparted to me, I shall embrace it with him. 
The Author of the calling of the Gentiles, 
Lib. 1. c. 13. & seq  observes the same way of proceeding, that St. Augustine doth. He every where says that the Judgements of God are unsearchable, because he opposes the same errors; and that Faith doth not suffer us to give a reason of God's choice of Men, from the difference of their natural Merits 
* Lib. 2. c. 23. . If, for example, he asks himself whence it is, that all Children are not Baptised? He is not afraid to say, that if this came from any ill use of the general Grace given to the Parents, that, 
* C. 24.  if all received Baptism, the Parents were too negligent, not fearing lest their Children should be surprised with Death: He says, that such answers would give some ground to believe, that the grace of Baptism was due to the innocence of age, and to deny original sin. When the question is about excluding natural merits, he cries out, that the Judgements of God are unsearchable; but yet, he nevertheless doth not fail to give some general Reasons thereof, upon other occasions. 
* Lib. 2. c. 30.  His principle is, that a Reason of all the Designs and Works of God cannot be given. Tertia Definitio temperanter, & sobrie protestatur, non omnem voluntatis Dei comprehendi posse rationem, & multas divinorum operum causas ab humana intelligentia esse subductas. An undeniable principle! But neither he, nor St. Augustine, nor, I believe, any of the Fathers, ever maintained that the Judgements of God were so unsearchable, as that it should be a crime to seek, and give some general Reasons of them. They never forbade Men, to represent God Amiable, and Adorable, by justifying his Conduct, by that Idea which we have of a Being infinitely Perfect, and by the Truth's Faith teach us; That which I have endeavoured, in The Treatise of Nature and Grace.     

The Last Explication, The frequent Miracles of the Old Law, do by no means show, That God often acted by particular Wills.  
I Do not well understand, how Persons, who grant that God does all, and that therefore he communicates not his power to Creatures, but by making them the occasional causes of producing certain effects, can Imagine that the Conduct which he observed in respect of the Jews, should be contrary to that, which I think I have demonstrated several ways, viz. That God acts not by particular wills, but when the necessity of Order requires him.  
They are always saying, as a thing extraordinary, that the Old Testament is full of Miracles, that God had promised to the Jews, Plenty and Prosperity, proportionably to their sidelity and obedience; and that it was not possible, that nature and morality should be so exactly combined together, that the Holy-Land should abound in fruits, proportionably as its Inhabitants did in virtue and good works. For my part, I willingly grant all this: But I do not yet see how this opposes my sentiments; if it be not supposed, that I acknowledge no other general Laws by which God executes his designs, but those of the communication of motions. How troublesome is it for a Man not to be able to explain his thoughts but by words, which popular use has introduced, and which every one interprets according to his prejucices and temper; and above all, to have for ones judges such Persons, who, though they are nimble and quick, yet often want equity and penetration of mind!  
Certainly they do not do me justice, who say that I think Manna fell every day of the Week among the Israelites except Saturday, by a necessary consequence of the Laws of the communication of motions. He who is of this opinion, must needs be very foolish and impious; I am persuaded that the greatest part of the miraculous effects of the Ancient Law, was done in consequence of some general Laws, since the general cause ought not to execute his purpose by particular wills, and for many more Reasons which I might add to those already mentioned.  
But I am far from believing, that these extraordinary effects were only the consequences of the natural Laws of the communication of motions. I grant that they may be looked upon as Miracles, and that there are more such in the World than we imagine: But I must explain myself after what manner, that I may not be thought to have changed.  
J. C. as Man, received all Power in Heaven and in Earth, because God executes all the desires of his holy Soul by the general Law of Grace, by which he would save all Men in his Son. The Father has given to the Son, after this manner, all the Nations of the World, as Materials which he is to employ in the Building of his Church, as I have said elsewhere. Supposing then that J. C. for the executing of his designs, desires a certain degree of Grace for one of his Members, or rather that he desired that the fire which sacrificed St. Lawrance should lose its heat; it is certain this would be what we call a Miracle; nevertheless God would not work this Miracle by a particular will, but in consequence of the general Law, the efficacy of which is determined by the actual desires of the Soul of J. C.  
According to the general Laws of the communications of motions, heavy bodies fall towards the Earth; my arm is heavy, yet nevertheless I lift it up to Heaven whensoever I desire it. Certainly God who determines the motion of the Animal spirits, for the lifting up my arm according to my desires, does not then act but in consequence of the general Law of the union of the Soul and Body, by which Law I have power to move my arm; nevertheless, this motion would be accounted miraculous, if we did not own some other natural Laws, than those of the communication of motions.  
Now I think I am able to demonstrate by the Authority of the Holy Scripture, that the Angels have received from God Power over the present World, and that thus God executes their desires, and by them his own designs, according to certain general Laws; so that all which appears miraculous in the Old Testament, does no wise prove that God may often act by particular wills.  
St. Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrews intending to exalt J. C. above Angels, says, that God had not subjected the World to come to them, as he had to J. C. He believed then, as a thing whereof those to whom he wrote had no doubt, that God had subjected the present World to Angels. If the Angels had had power over nothing, it would have been much more easy for St. Paul to have exalted J. C. above them.  
Writing to the Ephesians, he assures us, that even the Devils exercise their power over Infidels, 
Eph. 2.2.  he calls them as J. C. had done, the Princes of this World; that is to say, of those who live in the darkness of Idolatry, tenebrarum harum. If the Devils themselves exercise power over Idolaters, if they are Princes of this World, shall the Angels have no power over it?  
The Archangel Michael is called in Daniel, the Prince of the Jews, because he fought for them against the Prince of the Persians. Can any one fight without Strength and Power?  
The Angels are sent as the Ministers of God to Minister to those who are to be the Heirs of Salvation. A weak Ministry! if God had not communicated to them his Power. A useless mission! if God had not established the general Law, whose efficacy is determined by their desires.  
There are in the Old Testament a great many Passages which clearly prove that the Angels had care of the Israelites, they rewarded the observers of the Law and punished others; it is not necessary that I should relate them. But it is more to the purpose, to show, that even from those passages which attribute to God certain effects, without making any mention of Angels, it cannot be concluded, that God produced these effects by himself without the Ministry of Angels; because the Angels acting only by the power of God, and doing nothing but what was good, the Holy Scripture attributes to God himself, that which he did by their means.  
The greatest example of this may be drawn from the manner after which the Law was given to the Jews. To read only the Old Teastament, it seems as if God had by himself spoken to Moses in the Burning-Bush, and that he gave him the Law upon Mount Sinai, without the Ministry of Angels. 'Tis God always who speaks, even JEHOVAH, that Name which is not given to Creatures. And yet St. Stephen assures us, that God sent Moses to deliver his People, under the conduct and power of the Angel which had appeared unto him in the Burning-Bush; and that he conversed also with the same Angel upon Mount Sinai.  
St. Paul delivers the same thing in two of his Epistles; and 'tis upon this account, that intending in his Epistle to the Hebrews, to exalt the New Law above the Old, he gins this Epistle with a continual comparison of J. C. the Minister of Grace, with the Angels, the Ministers of the Jewish Law.  
It is evident if the Law had not been given by Angels, that which St. Stephen and St. Paul assures us of, would be absolutely false. But the Angels having given it, that which Moses says, doth not ever the less cease to be true. For God always, as the true cause, executes that which his Creatures do as the occasional causes, to whom God communicates his Power according to certain Laws. And because 'tis God only who enlightens Spirits by the manifestation of necessary and immutable order, (which is the inviolable rule of his own will) it is truly he who speaks to us, and commands us, when he who speaks to us from him, does not do it till he has consulted the Eternal Laws which his wisdom contains, that which the Blessed Angels never fail to do.  
J.C. as Man, is Head of the Church, & dispenses to his Members Grace which Sanctifies them. But because he has not this Power, but in consequence of a general Law which God has established in him, to execute by him his great design, the Eternal Temple; 'tis very truly said that God alone gives inward Grace, though he does not in truth give it but by the Ministry of J.C. who, as Man, determines by his prayers, or his desires, the efficacy of the Divine will: And 'tis upon this account that Scripture often attributes to God alone the conversion of hearts.  
In like manner, the Angels had power to lead, to conduct, and punish the Israelites; they may at present give us the outward preparations of Grace, they may remove out of our way occasions of Sin and Scandal; yet all that they do, may in general be attributed to God, as the true cause, for they act only by the Power which God has given them.  
Thus, I believe, that the defeat of Senacharib, the Plague which David brought upon the People for numbering them, the rain of Manna which fell so regularly in the Wilderness; and a thousand such like effects, were miraculous. But I believe then, since Scripture assures us thereof in several places, that God did not do the greatest part of these Miracles but by the action; that is to say, the desires of the Angels which God chose to conduct his People, after he had informed himself by his wisdom, that this way would be better than any other, in relation to his principal work: And that it would spare, as I may say, a great number of particular wills. I believe also that these desires were governed (as well as the Divine wills) by the necessary and immutable order, the inviolable rule of all understandings; by the light of the Word, the fountain of all Wisdom, and of all Laws both Temporal and Eternal, according to these words: Fons sapientiae Verbum in excelsis, & ingressus illius Manada Aeterna.  
To be convinced of that which I have said, supposing that God does all, it is enough to endeavour clearly to understand the sense of any one of those passages which attribute to the Angels, the Power of defending or punishing the Israelites. See one of these passages: God, or rather the Angel, or Prince of the Angels, St. 
Exod. 23.20.  Michael, says in God's stead to Moses, after he had given him the Law; Behold I send an Angel before thee to keep thee in the way, and to bring thee to the place which I have prepared. Beware of him, and obey his voice, provoke him not; for he will not pardon your transgressions: for my name is in him, By this passage 'tis evident, that an Angel conducted the People, and had power to punish them if they did not obey him; now 'tis supposed that God does all. The Angel, their Conductor, had not his Power, but because God made it, as I may say, a Law to himself to obey him; like as I have not the power to remove mine Arm, but because God has established the Laws of union betwixt the Soul and Body. And the Angel does nothing actually, but because God actually executes his desires, and thereby his Eternal purposes; as I do not actually move mine Arm, but because God only does what I actually desire, and what I think to do.  
Thus the Miracles of the Old Testament are only consequences of the general Laws which God made to communicate his Power to the Archangel Michael, or the Angel that guided them. Senacharib's Army was defeated by the Angel, the revenger of God's glory: Manna was bread made by the hands of Angels, nevertheless God did these Miracles, but by general wills; for if they had been performed by particular wills, the Angels could not have wrought them by a power which God gave them of conducting his people.  
Thus St. Michael and his Angels were to the Jews, that which J.C. is to the Christians. The Angels gave the old Law, J.C. is the Angel of the new Law, as the Prophet Malachy calls him, Chap. III. 1. The new Convenant promises true goods; therefore the Mediator of this Covenant must be the occasional or distributive cause of that Grace, which gives a right to the possession of these goods. But the Old Covenant promised only Temporal goods, because the Angel, the Minister of the Law, could only bestow these goods: All that relates to Eternity, both goods and evils, aught to be reserved to J.C. The Angels who are pure Spirits, aught according to Order to have power over Bodies, inferior substances, and by them, upon the minds of Men: For since sin, the Soul depends upon the Body, they may prepare for Grace, as in St. John, and remove the occasions of falling.  
Lastly, the Angel, or rather the Archangel St. Michael represented J.C. as the Old Law represents the New; the Synagogue, the Church; Temporal goods, Eternal: Thus it appears, that to prove the New Covenant more excellent than the Old, St. Paul was obliged to prove (as he has done in the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews) that J.C. who is the Minister thereof, is infinitely exalted above the Angels.  
It must therefore be granted from the arguments which I have drawn from the Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect, & from a thousand & a thousand experiences that God executes his designs by general Laws. But it is not easy to demonstrate, that God acts upon such and such occasions by particular wills, though the H. Scripture, which accommodates its self to our weakness, represents God sometimes as a Man, and often makes him act like Men. For though all that which I have said of Angels, should be absolutely false, I might nevertheless suppose, and should even have all reason to believe, that God wrought the Miracles of the Old Law, by certain general Laws, though I had no knowledge of them; for we ought not to reject a truth clearly known, because of some objections which may be drawn from our ignorance of many things.  
Thus God forms and preserves the purely material World, by the Laws of the communication of motions, and makes the Bodies themselves the occasional causes, which determine these Laws; for 'tis the striking of bodies upon one another, which determine their efficacy: A Body is never moved, but when another strikes upon it, and a Body is always moved when it is struck upon.  
God preserves the life of Men, and likewise Civil Society, by the general Laws of the Union of Soul and Body; and makes something in these two substances, the occasional causes, which determine the efficacy of these Laws. Mine Arm is moved according to my desires: my Soul suffers pain, when a Thorn pricks me.  
God builds up his great Work by the general Laws of Grace, according to which he would save all Men in his Son; and because all Men are born sinners, God draws the occasional causes, which determine the efficacy of his general Laws only from J.C. who is the Head, which influences his Members, the Mediator betwixt God and Men, the Sovereign Priest of good things, the true Solomon, who has received Wisdom without measure, to make a Work, whereof the Jewish Temple was but the figure, how Magnificent soever it was.  
To Conclude, God governed the Jews by general Laws, the efficacy of which was determined by the Action of St. Michael, and his Angels. In truth, intelligent Being's are necessary to conduct Men, to reward and punish them, that by the Laws of the communication of motions, the Hail knocks down the Fruit, which the Rain had made to grow; this is not properly a disorder: Bodies are not capable of good or evil, of happiness, or misery: But to adjust Rewards and Merits one with another, intelligent Being's are necessary. In a word, God has established all Powers, second Causes, visible and invisible Hierarchies, immediately by himself, or by the mediation of other powers, that he may execute his designs by general Laws, whose efficacy is determined by the action of these same Powers. For he acts not like the Kings of the Earth, who give out their Orders, and do nothing else. God, in general, doth all that which second causes do, Matter has not in itself any moving virtue, upon which depends its efficacy; and there is no necessary connexion betwixt the wills of spirits, and the effects which they produce. God doth all, but he acts by Creatures, because he was pleased to communicate his power to them, that he might accomplish his work, by ways most worthy of himself.  
Thus has God done all things with Wisdom: I say with Wisdom; for an infinite Wisdom is requisite to understand all the consequences of general Laws, to rank and combine them one with another after the exactest manner, and foresee, that from thence would proceed a work worthy of himself. 'Tis an evidence of limited understandings, to be able to do nothing but by compounded ways. But a God who knows all things, ought not to disturb the simplicity of his ways; an immutable Being must always be uniform in his conduct; a General 'Cause ought to act by particular wills. God's Conduct must carry in it the Character of his Attributes, if the immutable and necessary order of Justice do not oblige him to change: For Order is an inviolable Law, in respect of God himself; He invincibly loves it, and will always prefer it to the Arbitrary Laws, by which he executes his Designs.   
THE END.   

THE Author's Idea of Providence.  
SEcond causes, of what nature soever, have no proper efficacy of their own. But,  
All their power is communicated unto them by God, in consequence of those general Laws which he has established. Now,  
All Philosophers and Divines agree, that God governs the World and takes care of all things by second causes. Therefore,  
The Providence of God is Executed by general Laws.  
Nevertheless his Providence is not blind and subject to chance.  
For, by his infinite Wisdom he knows the consequences of all possible general Laws. And,  
As Searcher of Hearts, He foresees all the future determinations of free causes. Therefore,  
He proportions the means with the end; free Causes, as well as necessary, with the effects, which he intends they shall produce. Therefore.  
He combines Nature with Morality, and with Divinity, after the wisest manner that can be: So that the effects of the combination and connection of causes may be most worthy of his Wisdom, Goodness, and other Attributes; for God wills in particular all the good effects which he produces by general ways. Nevertheless, the immutable Order of Justice, which God owes to himself, and his own attributes, requires or permits, that he should sometimes act by particular wills. But ordinarily, it is then only, and in those circumstances, when one only Miracle (i. e. an effect which cannot be the consequence of natural Laws) doth happily adjust a great many events and the most that can be: For his prescience being infinite, he doth not work two Miracles, when one will suffice.  
So that in the Divine Providence, there is nothing that is not Divine, or which doth not bear the character of the Divine Attributes; for God acts according to what he is.  
He is wise, his foreknowledge is infinite: Now, to establish general Laws, and to foresee that from thence a work will arise worthy of these Laws, is a mark of such a Wisdom, as hath no bounds; and to act by particular wills, is to act as Men, who can foresee nothing: Therefore God acts by general Laws.  
God is the Searcher of Hearts: Now to make use of free Causes for the execution of his designs, without determining these Causes after an invincible manner, is to be the Searcher of Hearts; and it is not necessary to have this quality for the execution of his designs, if he did determine causes after an invincible manner: Therefore God ordinarily leaves J.C. Angels, and Men, to act according to their natures. He doth not communicate to them his power that he may destroy their liberty.  
He gives them part in the glory of his work, and thereby augments his own. For leaving them to act according to their natures, and nevertheless, executing by them designs worthy of himself, he makes it admirably appear that he is Searcher of Hearts. Nevertheless, the limitation of Angels, the malice of Devils, and both these qualities in good and evil Men, and many other reasons, may oblige God to act sometimes by particular wills. For a limited spirit, though perfectly united to Order, cannot foresee the connection of free causes, which is necessary to bring the work of God to its perfection. So that, where Order permits, God must determine Angels by particular wills, and make even the sins of Men, and the malice of Devils, to enter into the order of his Providence: And proportionably the same must be said of Jesus Christ considered as Man, and Head of the Church, and as Architect of the Eternal Temple.  
God is immutable; now immutability in his Conduct, imports immutability in his nature; to change Conduct every moment, is a mark of inconstancy. So that God must follow general Laws with respect to this attribute, if none of his other attributes do otherwise require that he cease to observe it. For God acts not but for himself, but for that love which he bears unto himself, but to Honour his attributes, both by the Divinity of his ways, and the Perfection of his work. In a word, the immutable Order of Justice, which he owes to himself, and his own perfections, is a Law with which he never can dispense.  
Thus experience teaches us, that God governs the purely Corporeal World, by the general Laws of the communications of motions. By these it is, that he makes the admirable Vicissitude of Night and Day, Summer and Winter, Rain and Fair weather. By them also it is, that he covers the Earth with Fruits and Flowers, that he gives to Animals and Plants their growth and nourishment.  
Experience also teaches us, that God governs Men by the general Laws of Union of Soul and Body. For by these Laws, he doth not only unite the Soul to the Body, for the conservation of Life, but thereby he also diffuses it (as I may say) over all his works, and so makes it admire the beauties thereof. It is by these that he forms Societies, and makes, as I may say, but one body of all People. It is by them that he teaches Men the truths of Religion and Morality. And Lastly, by them it is that he makes Christians, absolves Penitents, Sanctifies the Elect, and makes them merit all those degrees of glory, which makes up the beauty of the Heavenly Jerusalem. When I say, that it is by them, he doth all this; it is easily perceived that I mean they are subservient thereunto, in the Order of Divine Providence: For it is chiefly by the general Laws, which give power to J.C. and the Angels, that GOD doth build his Church.  
Further, Faith teaches us, that it is by general Laws that God punishes and rewards men, since Angels, who are the distributers of Temporal goods, have no efficacy of their own. It is by them that God provides for the necessities of his Elect, and resists the pernicious use which Wicked Men and Devils make of that Power, which they have to tempt, and afflict us in consequence also of certain general Laws. But all Powers are submitted to that which J.C. has in consequence of the general Laws of the Order of Grace; for at present, the Angels themselves who command others (for there is a certain subordination among them according to the most probable and received opinion) are submitted to J.C. their Head and Lord. It is under him, that they labour in the building of his Temple. They do not now, as under the Law, proportion Rewards to Merits. For the treasures of Grace are opened by the entrance of J.C. into the Sanctuary. For it is true, that by afflictions the Saints are purified. So that it is better, that J.C. give unto Men true goods, than that Angels should deliver them from their miseries; for if good Men were not afflicted in this World, J.C. could not give them the form they must necessarily have to be placed in his building.  
Lastly, further yet, it is by general Laws that God exercises his Providence over his Church, that is to say by the Laws which make the Order of Grace. Laws which give unto J.C. as Man, Sovereign power in Heaven and in Earth. It is by J. C, that God hath established the different orders which do externally govern his Church. 'Tis by him that he spreads abroad inward Grace in Souls. It is by him that he sanctifies his chosen people; that he will govern them in Heaven, and recompense them according to their deserts. It is by him, that he will judge the Devils and the Damned, and condemn them to that fire, whose eternal efficacy, shall only be the effect of general Laws, which shall be observed for ever more: By him, I say, enlightened to this end by eternal wisdom, and also subsisting in this wisdom; by him being advertised by a revelation (whose Laws are unknown) of all that which Order requires that he should know, and of all that he desires to know of what passes in the World, to bring his work to its perfection; by him lastly acting, by practical desires, by prayers, by endeavours, or actions of an infinite merit, but of a limited virtue, and proportionable to a finite and a stinted work; but by him perfectly free, absolutely Master of his desires and actions, submitted only to immurable Order; the inviolable rule of his will, as well as of his Fathers; and, if I be not deceived, very rarely determined after an invincible manner, by particular and practical wills; to the end that he may leave to him more of the glory of his work, and make the infinite Wisdom of his Father shine more brightly, as he is the Searcher of Hearts; that glorious attribute which no spirit can comprehend.  
Now if God acts by general Laws, it is visible, that we ought to ascribe unto occasional causes, to the limitation, the dispositions, and sometimes the malice of Creatures, all those mischievous effects, which Piety, and the Idea we have of a good, wise, and just God, oblige us to say, that he rather permits, than has any design to effect.  
For example, if a Woman brings forth a Monster, or a dead Child, or if she lets her Child fall, and kills it, carrying it to the Church to make it a Christian; it is because God observes the general Laws, which he hath prescribed. We ought to ascribe this dismal effect to natural or occasional causes.— Super defectum causarum secundarum, says St. Thomas. God hath permitted this evil; since there is none but he can be the true cause of it, it may be said in some sense that he hath not done it; because it is not for such like effects, but for better, that he hath established natural Laws; and, if he follow these Laws, it is because he owes this to himself, that his Conduct may be uniform and carry the character of his Attributes. This is not, in the least, to blaspheme against the Divine Power (as some ignorantly object) but it is rather to blaspheme against the Divine Wisdom and Goodness of God, to maintain, that he wills directly and positively these dismal effects.  
A Man whose Arm is cut off, feels grief in his Arm: We all of us, sleeping, have a thousand thoughts in relation to objects, which are not at all before us. This is because God always acts in consequence of his Laws, and gives to the Soul, the same thoughts and the same sentiments, when there are the same motions in the brain; whether we have an Arm or no, whether objects are present, or absent. The DEVIL tempts just Men, the wicked solicit good Men to evil; Thiefs and Soldiers Pillage and Massacre the innocent, as well as the guilty: God permits this, this therefore aught to be attributed to the malignity of occasional causes. For though God doth often from thence draw great advantages by the Grace of J.C. since injustice itself enters into the order of his providence; Ordinat peccata, says St. Augustine, yet these sad effects, considered in themselves, are unworthy of his goodness: There is nothing but good which he wills positively and directly.  
And if he makes use of the injustice of Men, to speak as Scripture doth, it is, because it becomes him to obey his own Laws, which were not at first established for such effects.  
In short, the greatest number of Men are damned, and yet God would save all; for he would and can hinder them from offending him.  
God wills the conversion of sinners, and certainly he can give them such grace, that they shall infallibly be converted, Whence is it then that sinners die in their sin, Infants without Baptism, whole nations in the ignorance of truths necessary to their Salvation? should we rather maintain, that God would not save all, merely because of these things? Or rather, should we not in general seek out the reason in that which he owes to himself, to his wisdom, and his other attributes? Is it not visible, or at least, is it not a sentiment agreeable with Piety, that those rueful effects ought to be attributed to the simplicity; in a word, to the divinity of his ways, and limitation of occasional causes? For seeing that God acts by general Laws, since he makes use of his Creatures in bringing about his purposes, and that he doth not communicate to them his Power, but by the establishment of his Laws, it is clear, that all this proceeds from the nature and action of occasional causes.  
But why has not God established other general Laws, or given to the finite action of J.C. an infinite Virtue?  
The Reason is, he ought not; because his Wisdom exacts from him, that he do great works by the most simple ways, and that he proportion the action of causes to the beauty of the works.  
And I fear not to say, that the Eternal Temple, which is the great design of God, and the end of all his works, is the most beautiful that can be produced by ways so simple, and so wise, as those are which God makes use of to effect it. For I am certain, that God loves Men, that he would save all; and therefore if he doth not so, it is because he loves all things in proportion to their amiableness; it is because he loves his Wisdom more than his Work: 'Tis because he does more honour to his attributes by the divinity of his ways, than the Perfection of his Creatures. In a word, 'tis because he has the Reason of his Conduct in himself; for there is nothing out of God which can hinder him from executing his will. And if he should have a will absolutely to save all Men, without having respect to the simplicity of his ways; 'tis certain that he would save all, because it is certain, that there is an infinite number of means to execute all his designs, and that likewise, he can execute them by the absolute efficacy of his will, without the help of his Creatures.  
I thought myself obliged to represent in few words, the Idea which I have of the Divine Providence, to the end, that it may be easily judged, whether it is not more worthy of the Wisdom of God, more agreeable to all that experience teaches more useful to answer the Objections of the Libertines, better fitted to make us love God, and unite us to J.C. our Head; and Lastly, more according to the Scripture, taking it in its full meaning, than that humane providence which supposes, that God acts always by particular wills, and would only save the lesser part of mankind, and this simply and precisely because his will is so.   

Objections against the foregoing Discourse: With the Author's Answers.  

Objection I.  
THat cannot evidently be seen in the Idea of GOD, which has no necessary relation to him. Now there is only an Arbitrary, and not any necessary relation betwixt God, and the observation of the general Rules of nature. This is one of the Author's Principles: Therefore it is not evident, that the general cause ought not to produce its effect by particular Wills. Now, according to this Author, we ought not to believe any thing that he says, if evidence doth not oblige us thereunto: Therefore we may stop here. This overturns his new System.  

Answer.  
'Tis true, I have said, that the general Laws by which God executes his designs, are Arbitrary; and this is true in two senses. First, Because God might have produced nothing: For the World is not a necessary Emanation of the Divinity. Secondly, Because God might have dispensed with himself, from observing the Laws which he hath established for its preservation, provided that Order would permit. But supposing that God resolved to act, I maintain that he will do it, after the wisest manner he can; or after such a manner as best comports with his Attributes: I hold, that this is not arbitrary, or indifferent to him. For God necessarily loves himself: he cannot belie himself. The immutable Order, which consists in the necessary relation, which is betwixt his Divine Perfections, is his inviolable Law and the Rule of all his wills, because God cannot will or act, but by the love which he bears unto himself. Love in God is not, as in us, an impression which comes from without, or carries him to any thing without himself. He is (as I may say) the Eternal and Necessary Principle of it; he is also the end thereof, by the necessity of his Being. This is clearly seen in the Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect, which I have consulted, and which I think aught to be Consulted, lest we should speak of the Divine providence, too much after the manner of men.  
Thus, in this Idea, we clearly see, that God can neither will nor act, but according to order; but by the love which he bears to himself and his eternal attributes; but according to what he is; but after such a manner as best suits with his Wisdom, his Immutability, his Prerogative of being the searcher of hearts, and his other attributes, as I have elsewhere explained. It is indeed indifferent to him to act, or not; but by no means to act well, or ill. He may indifferently choose his ways of acting, when order permits it; that is to say, when the ways of acting equally agree with his attributes; the different relations of which make that order, which is his inviolable Law, because he necessarily loves himself: but he cannot choose those ways of acting which are less wise, or less worthy of his attributes, there being an equality in other things; because he cannot falsisie himself, because he infinitely loves his Wisdom, and after such a manner, that it renders him happily impotent; that is, uncapable of making an ill choice which it may blame, a choice which may not be worthy thereof, which shall not be infinitely wise, nor perfectly worthy of his divine attributes.  
See the 50, 51, 52, 53, and 54 Article of the Second Discourse of this Treatise, the 3d Explication, the 11th Christian Meditation, the 1st Chapter of the Treatise of Morality. See also the 19, 20, and 21 of this Treatise with the Additions.  
It would be to no purpose to send the Reader to other places of my Books to make it appear, that they who make this Objection, do not take my Sentiments aright.  
It must be observed, that God is not free, or indifferent, as Men are. He is free in a quite opposite sense. Men are free in the choice of the means of their Happiness. They may take the worse. This argues a want of understanding. And they are not free, as to the end. They invincibly seek after their Happiness from without. This is because they are not self-sufficient. But God is fully sufficient to himself, it is indifferent to him to act, or not outwardly. And seeing his Understanding has no bounds, and he sees his own Law in himself, supposing that he resolves to act, he cannot but resolve also to act like himself, because he invincibly loves his Wisdom, and his other Attributes, against which he cannot offend. He is not indifferent in his choice, but when there is, on all sides, a perfect equality in the relations of the different ways with their different works.  
When I said, That sometimes, though very rarely, the general Laws of Motions ought not to produce their effect, I gave this reason thereof;— Because the Order of Grace, to which that of Nature ought to be subservient, requires, that Miracles should be wrought upon some occasions. And I only add, by way (as it were) of Subscription,— Besides that, it is expedient Men should know, that God is so much Master of Nature, that, if he submits to the Laws which he hath established, 'tis rather because he willingly doth so, than by any absolute necessity.  
I did not mean by these last words, that the observation of the Natural Laws, was arbitrary in God, in this sense, that he could without reason neglect them, that he might work Miracles: but that it was expedient God should make Nature serviceable to Grace, and let Men know, that he is superior to that which they call Nature. For Men look upon Nature and its Laws as something necessary and independent. The Mind of Man is naturally disposed towards Manichism. The reason of which is, because natural or occasional Causes are visible, whereas the continual Operation of God in them, has nothing in it which strikes the Senses. Thus when God works Miracles, which astonish the World, one reason amongst others is, to vindicate himself, and hinder Men from being deceived, and from having a mean Idea of his power; as I have said in the Addition to Art. 21. This he doth also, to teach them who know, that the nature of things is nothing but the will of their Author; that God is not absolutely necessitated to do what he doth, and that if he follows his Laws, 'tis because he chooses to do so. For the only Law, which is not arbitrary to God, is immutable Order; and whether he follows his Laws, or dispenses with them, it is because Order requires it: It is because God always acts after such a manner, as most honours his Perfections; the intelligible Relations of which make that which I call immutable Order, as I have explained it in several places.    

Object. II.  
God acts not as Men. He doth not well consult the Idea of God, who judges of his Conduct by theirs. Men indeed are to govern their Designs according to their Strength; they must compare the Means with the End, the Ways with the Works: but this is because they are weak. It is enough for God to will, that things may be. The Ways of God are his own Wills. So that he doth not compare the Ways with the Works, that he may determine his choice, after he has compared the simplicity of the Ways with the perfection of the Work. But he resolved to give to the World what Perfection he pleased, without troubling himself about the Ways; because his Ways are nothing but his Wills, and all his Wills are efficacious. To understand this Objection well, I desire the Reader to consult the 13th Article of the first Discourse, against which it is made.  

Answer.  
I grant, that God doth not form his designs as Men do. He doth not, as they do, compare the means with the end, through weakness. He is not like unto an Architect, who has not Money enough to finish his Edifice. He compares the designs with the ways, in wisdom, with respect to his attributes, and in that love which he bears to himself. All the ways of executing his designs are equally easy to him; but they are not equally wise, equally simple, equally divine. A wise Man will never undertake a design which dishonours him, how easily soever it may be executed. And of two designs, the execution of which will unequally honour him, he will always choose that which will honour him the most; because his self-love is always enlightened by his Wisdom. Thus, though God be Almighty, he neither doth, nor can act, but by the love which he bears to himself, and his own attributes, he always chooses both the work and the ways, which all together do most honour him.  
But, 'tis said, the ways of God are his wills. It is enough for him to will, that what he wills may be done. I confess it. The ways of God are nothing but his practical wills. 'Tis sufficient for him to will the doing of any thing, to the end it may be done. But God cannot have two practical wills, when one is enough. God cannot will, when 'tis not wise to will. And upon this account it is, that the practical wills of God are not ordinarily any other than general wills, whose efficacy is determined by the action of occasional causes. God loves Men. He would save them all. He desires, that all should know and love him: For order requires this, and order is his law. This will is agreeable to his attributes: But God will not do all that is necessary, to the end, that all may infallibly be brought to know and love him; because order permits him not to have such practical wills, as are proper to this end. It is because he ought not to disturb the simplicity of his ways; 'tis because he must fit his ways to the work, and choose the work and the ways which honour him the most.  
Although God need only to will, that the Church should be form, to the end it might be so; though he needed only to will, that Men should receive grace, to the end they might receive it; yet nothing is more certain, than that 'tis by J. C. he sanctifies Men, and forms his Church: as it is also, that he governs the Nations by Angels, and produces Animals and Plants by other second Causes. At present, God acts no more, as he did at the Creation, immediately by himself. This is undeniable. He acts by Creatures, in consequence of that power which he has communicated unto them, by the establishment of his general Laws. Thus his Laws, or his general, practical Wills, are his Ways; and his Ways are simple, uniform, and constant; they are perfectly worthy of him, because they are perfectly agreeable with his Attributes, as I have often repeated. When God created the World, Men, Animals, Plants, organised Bodies, which contain in their Seeds, wherewithal to furnish all Ages with their kind, he did this by particular wills. This was convenient for several reasons; and indeed this could not be otherwise: For particular wills were necessary to begin the determination of motions. But seeing this way of acting was, as I may say, mean and servile, because, in one sense, it resembled that of a limited understanding, God quitted it as soon as he could dispense with himself from following it, as soon as he could pitch upon another more simple and Divine way for the government of the World. At present, he rests: not that he ceases to act; but because he doth no more act after a servile manner, something like unto that of his Ministers: Because he acts most agreeably to his Divine attributes.  
Thus, though God be Almighty, and all his wills efficacious; it doth not follow, that he ought not to compare the simplicity of the ways, with the perfection of the works; for 'tis not to Honour his Power, but to Honour his Wisdom and his other Attributes, that he doth all things immediately by himself. In truth, what wisdom would it be even to save all Men, and to make a World infinitely more Beautiful than that which we inhabit, if he had made and governed it by particular wills? What should we think of his Goodness, and other Attributes, there being in it so many Miserable Persons, so many Sinners, so many Monsters, so many Disorders, so many Damned? In a word, things being as we see they are, he saith, that he has no need of the Wicked, and yet the World is full of them: He hath not made Death, and yet all Men are subject thereunto.  
'Tis the sin, it may be said, of the first Man by which it entered into the World: Very well. But why did not he hinder his Fall? Why did he not prevent it? Why did he establish those natural relations betwixt Eve and her Children, which communicate sin unto them? Why did he make all descend from corrupted Parents? In a word, why did he not form our bodies by particular wills, or by such wills did not suspend the general Laws, by which the brain of the Mother acts upon that of her Child, and thereby 
* See the Explicat. of Original Sin, in the Search after Truth.  corrupts its mind, and makes its heart irregular? Why, I say, did he not do this, if it be indifferent to God to act, or not to act by particular wills? This is that which the Libertines demand, and this is what Christian Philosophers should explain to them, to stop their Mouths. Reason, as much as may be, should be reconciled with Religion. Hence it is that I Maintain it to be more worthy, not of the Power, but of the Wisdom and other Divine Attributes; that the World should be governed, and the future Church form by the general Laws which God hath established for this end, than by an infinite number of particular wills. Hence it is, that I assert, that God has not made the World, absolutely as perfect as it might have been; but as perfect as he could, with relation to the ways most worthy of his Attributes; but has chosen the work and the ways which do most Honour him: For God cannot, and ought not to act but to Honour his Perfections, both by the simplicity of his ways, and the excellency of his work.    

Object. III.  
Whence is it then, that a thing so evident was never perceived by any of the Fathers, or the most subtle Divines? Whence is it, that St. Augustine, who has written so much against the Manichees, made no use of this Reason, that God acts not by particular wills; that thereby he might have proved that there is no necessity of attributing the destruction of his works one by another, the generation of Monsters, or other effects, which are thought to disfigure his Work, to an evil principle? On the contrary, it is certain that never any person, did more than this Father, own that nothing was done in all this, but by God's particular orders, etc.  

Answer.  
'Tis not just to urge the Fathers and the Divines against me, when neither the one, nor the other are against me. If St. Augustine, or any other Father had considered my opinion, and afterwards refuted it, than he would truly have been against me, and his authority might have been urged against my sentiment. But where can it be found that St. Augustine and St. Thomas have opposed that which I lay down; probably neither the one, nor the other, ever thought of it: And therefore neither the one, nor the other, could approve, or disapprove it. They answered the objections of HERETICS and LIBERTINES, after another manner than I do: I grant it. But are we forbidden to prove Religion by all ways possible? St. Augustine answered the Manichees according to the principles which these Heretics received; and I answer the Heretics of these times, according to those principles which they receive. Ought we not to speak unto Men according to their Ideas? The Treatise of Nature and Grace, I have often said, was not made for all Men; I pretend only to justify the Wisdom, and Goodness of God, in the Construction of his Work to the minds of some certain Philosophers; notwithstanding all the Disorders which may be observed therein, and the Damnation of the greatest number of Men. Neither St. Augustine nor St. Thomas, have written any thing, either for, or against the Cartesians, of whom they had no knowledge. How then should we find any thing in their works, either condemning, or approving the Reasons, which I have drawn from the principles of these Philosophers, to convince them, that God sincerely wills the Salvation of all Men, and that if he doth not save all, it is because he loves his Wisdom more than his Work? Assuredly it is to abuse the simplicity of the Readers, and the respect which they have for the Fathers, to raise prejudices in them by a many citations out of great men; and endeavour by their suffrages, to condemn those principles, which probably were not known to them, so far were they from rejecting them, as untrue. For at the bottom, all such passages, though different from what I say, tend to prove the same truths of Faith which I maintain; for I have not, and never shall, I hope, quit this Maxim of the Search after Truth, That novelty, in matter of Divinity is a sign of Error. I distinguish the Truths of Faith, from those of Reason; and shall always seek for Theological Doctrines in Tradition. But I shall endeavour to prove these Doctrines to others by those Philosophical principles which they receive; or however those whereby I may hope to be able to convince them.  
St. Augustine has not answered the same objectijections, as I do; What follows from hence, That they did not come into his mind? Not at all. That he did not approve them? By no means. That he has condemned them, as contrary to the Faith? Still less. 'Tis because he did not, perhaps, think them proper to persuade those, against whom he wrote. For had I lived in St. Augustine's time, and had written for all men, and not for some particular Men, who are accustom- to certain Principles; I should not have spoken as I have done in the Treatise of Nature and Grace, because common sense requires, that we should speak to Men according to their Ideas, in a Language which they well understand, and willingly hearken unto. No person can think that the Principles which I suppose in the Treatise, were known to the Manichees; so that it would have been an odd undertaking to have persuaded them of the truth thereof, that afterwards they might be convinced by these Principles, that they were in Error.  
Moreover, all Men are not capable to understand these principles; to this end a great deal of time, and application is necessary, without mentioning several other requisite qualifications, which all Men have not. In truth, the greatest part of public Disputes, such as those were which St. Augustine had with the Manichees, will not permit Men to make use of abstracted notions, to give light to the Truth. It was therefore better done, to deny, for example, That Monsters made the Work of God less Perfect, by comparing them to the Dissonances in Music, and the Shades in Painting, which give more Body and Life to the Figures. It was much the shorter way for the Manichees, to show them, that the mind of Man is too weak to judge of the Designs of God, and compare all the parts of the World together, thereby to discover the just relations of them; than to explain to them those principles, which are necessary to make Men comprehend that certain dismal effects are the necessary consequences of the simplicity of the ways, by which God executes his designs. These Heretics would perhaps have learned nothing by these principles, and their rebellious imagination was to be humbled by sensible Reasons, and suitable to their capacity. And if this was not enough to content the understanding, and convince by light and evidence; it was however sufficient to oblige them to silence, restrain their Pride, and to give satisfaction to the Catholics, who assisted at St. Augustine's Conferences, or read his works with a pious disposition of mind. I should myself fear that I should be wanting to Religion, if I should use such like Reasons to satisfy those who should make such objections to me; if I saw that they could not attend unto Truths much abstracted, and yet that it was necessary to satisfy them, with respect to their doubts, wherewithal they were entangled. And assuredly it would be unjust for any man thence to conclude, either that I contradict myself in my works, or that I have not those sentiments, of which I am convinced. For we ought to satisfy all Men, the Simple, as well as the Philosophers, and keep both the one and other in that submission which they own to the Truths of Faith. This certainly was St. Augustine's design in his writings against the Manichees; and 'tis also of all the Fathers, and of all Divines: They all laboured only to maintain the Faith, by reasons fitted to the capacity of those they had to deal with, and according to such Principles as they received.  
But if some Philosophers, full of sublime metaphysics, come and tell me, that God as positively and directly wills evil, as he doth the good; that he doth not truly will the Beauty of the Universe, and by no means, the particular perfection of any of his Creatures: That the World is an Harmony, whereof Monsters are the necessary dissonances: That God wills there should be Sinners as well as just Persons, and that as the Shades in Painting, make the Face to appear, and gives (as it were) body to the Picture; So the the wicked are absolutely necessary in the work of God, that the virtue of good Men may be more remarkable: And that thus God himself is the Author of Sin, who wills it, and works it in us, and by us, as truly as our good works; and that  is no more than a vain title of Honour, wherewithal Men generally flatter themselves. What shall I answer to these Philosophers, according to their principles— That God doth all that is real in the Creatures, and that he permits nothing according to vulgar Ideas? Principles, which in my opinion, it is impossible to overthrow, and which I should be sorry to see overthrown, because they are infinitely advantageous to Religion. May I not make it appear, that the word Permit bears a sense worthy of God, which is not contrary to their Principles, and yet destroys their Errors? I cannot do it, without taking another Method than St. Augustine has done. May I not, ought I not to quit the Reasons which he gives to silence the Manichees, seeing that they are made use of by some Persons in defence of their Errors, and insinuate them into the minds of Men; provided that otherwise I use clear Principles, and which, at one blow, overturns the Heresy of the Manichees, as well as Libertinism? For this, I appeal to all equitable persons as Judges, what esteem soever they have for St. Augustin; I also appeal to 
* Epist. 143, & 148. De Trin. Lib. 3. c. 1.  St. Augustin himself, when he directs his Readers how they ought to judge of his Writings.  
Now 'tis evident, by my Principles, that nothing is more ridiculous than the Manichees way of reasoning, who pretended to prove the necessity of an Evil Principle, by all those dismal effects which a beneficent and a wise God cannot directly and positively will, and which he is said to permit, rather than to have designedly brought them to pass; though ordinarily Men do not too well understand what they say, when they assure us, that God permits, and doth not do them. But if my Principles overturn the very Foundation of Manichism, they also undeniably confute, if I am not deceived, the most dangerous Errors, which the World is at present much more ready to embrace.  
I say then, without fear of blaspheming against the Power of God, and in honour of his Wisdom, that he doth not directly and positively will Monsters, and that he doth not produce them, but in consequence of his Laws, the simplicity, uniformity, generality of which he ought not to disturb. I boldly affirm, with the Scripture, that God hath no need of the wicked; and that, if he suffered the first Man to fall, and to communicate to us his sin, it is because 
* Treat. of Nature and Grace, Art. 29, 30,— 34. of the 2d Discourse Explicat. of the 5th Chapter of the Search, etc. and of Original Sin.  Order required, that he should not prevent it by the grace of sentiment, seeing Adam had no concupiscence to overcome. It is because God was obliged to cause Men to be born by the most simple ways of ordinary Generation, that so his Conduct might agree with his Attributes, and all his Works might have admirable relations to one another; but, by no means, that Sin might be communicated, and Monsters produced. 'Tis true, it may be said against the Manichees, that Monsters give a kind of Beauty to the World, and that God makes use of the wicked, and even Devils themselves, for the execution of his purposes. For all things, even Disorder itself, set forth the Order of Providence: But Disorder always continues what it is. God permits it, because he can make it serve divers uses. But he wills it not, because he hath not established his Laws, that it should happen, and because he hath not made Man free, that he should not love him.  
Shadows are necessary in Painting, and Dissonances in Music. Therefore Women ought to be abortive, and bring forth Monsters. What a Consequence is this! I can confidently answer the Philosophers, That these Monsters ordinarily come from modest Women, and subsist but a few days: So necessary are they to the beauty of the Universe! There are many more wicked, than good Men; reprobate, than elect: So many Consonances are there in the Harmony of the Creatures! Shall there be any Monsters in the future Church, and wicked Men in the holy City? Doubtless not. Behold then the Painter's Cloth without Shades, and an Harmony without Dissonances. Thus all those dismal Effects which God permits in the World, are not at all necessary to it. And if there be Black with White, Dissonances with Consonances, this doth not give more 
* Force.  Boldness to the Picture, or Sweetness to the Music: I mean, this doth not, at the bottom, render the Work of God more perfect. This, on the contrary, disfigures it, and makes it disagreeable to all those who love Order. For though it may be said, that Monsters give a kind of beauty to the World, nothing is more evident, than that this is only a beauty in appearance, and that, in truth, the World is less perfect. The weak sighted, or the blind, make the most stupid observe, that they have two good eyes. Thus blind Men serve to illustrate the perfection of Man: But they do not, I hope, render Mankind more perfect. Vice, in respect of us, makes Virtue more conspicuous; but surely it neither adds to its perfection, nor its merit. God makes use of wicked Men, for the trial of the good: but 'tis because, as I may say, he finds them already made so to his hands; for they are no ways necessary to him. God did never positively and directly will such Shadows and such Dissonances, though he positively and directly wills, that they shall be subservient to his Glory. These are pretty Comparisons, which please the Imagination, but do not enlighten the Mind; they are proper enough to inculcate that which is already believed; but assuredly they cannot be used, as a Principle whereby Libertinism may be destroyed, with what Eloquence soever they may be laid forth.  
This is what I should answer, not to St. Augustin, whose meaning was right, and who deserves to be respected for his edifying Answers, and such as were fitted to the capacity of those he desired to undeceive. But this is what I would answer to those who abuse his Authority, and draw from his Writings such Consequences, as are fitted to overturn the very Foundations of Religion. I grant, with this holy Doctor, that there is no Evil Principle, which (notwithstanding all the endeavours of a gracious God to the contrary) proproduces all the irregularities of the Universe, whether he will or no; which was that which he designed to prove against the Heretics of his time. But I am not afraid to give new Proofs, to convince the Heretics of this Age, that God sincerely wills, that all Men should be saved; that he is not the Author of Sin; in a word, that Monsters, whether in Nature, or Morality, lessen the perfection of his Work; that he wills them not, and that if he permits them, 'tis because he wills, that his Conduct should bear the Character of his Attributes. I will never say, that God had a direct and positive will to produce all those dismal effects which Piety and the Idea of a good, wise, and just God oblige us to say, that he permits, rather than designedly brings to pass. And in this it seems to me, that I follow the sentiment or inclination of all Divines, and all the Fathers, though perhaps they did not join the same Idea to the word permit, because they speak to persons who did not reason upon those Principles they do, for whom I have written the Treatise of Nature and Grace.    

Object. iv  
It is great rashness, to find faults in the Works of God; 'tis nothing but men's ignorance which makes them do so; 'tis because they know not the designs of the Creator, and cannot compare the parts of the Universe with the whole. If any one should be so short sighted, as that he could see but a little part of a piece of Mosaic Work, he would be tempted to blame the Workman, for having put the parts of this Work ill together; but the reason is, because he could not apprehend the beauty which they have all together. God makes the Succession of Ages to go on with an admirable order. Every thing has its time, and aught to have such a perfection, and such a duration. In a word, nothing in the World is done, but by the Will of God, Monsters as well as perfect Works, etc.  

Answer.  
All this sounds well out of the mouth of St Augustin, speaking of the Manichees. I should willingly make such Answers myself, did I speak to these Heretics, or those to whom they would be satisfactory, or were not capable to comprehend such as are more abstract. But since, in the Treatise of Nature and Grace, I speak to those who have espoused Principles which the Manichees knew not, I am bound to give other Answers to them; and this the more, because I see they abuse excellent Principles, and draw from them Consequences injurious to Religion.  
Whether Monsters be, or be not Faults in the Universe; Whether God wills, or wills them not with a positive will, this is much the same to me. I suppose that they are faults, and that God wills them only indirectly; because this, if I mistake not, is the most common Opinion, and which I think is true. Yet surely it is lawful for me to justify the Wisdom of God to the Minds of those who are of this Opinion, though they nevertheless should be deceived. But how far is this from being that, for which I composed the Treatise of Nature and Grace? If I have laboured to justify the Wisdom of God in the Works of Nature, notwithstanding Monsters, it is because 
* See the first Discourse of this Treatise,  I then intended to justify his Wisdom and his Goodness in the Works of Grace, notwithstanding the infinite number of wicked Men and Reprobates. It sufficiently appears, that if I speak first of the Disorders of Nature, in the first Discourse of the Treatise, and have searched after the Reasons thereof; it was that I might render my Principles more sensible, and accustom Men to search after, and acknowledge the Cause of other Disorders, more considerable than the generation of Monsters.  
And though some may say, they admire Men do not perceive how much my way of speaking aught to offend Christian ears, yet I fear not to repeat it: The Universe is not as perfect as absolutely it might be, but only as perfect as it could be, with relation to the ways most worthy of the Divine Attributes. There are visible Faults in the Work of God, in his Work, I say, but not in his Conduct. It is a visible fault, that an Infant should be born with superfluous Members, and which hinders it from living. I have said this, and this I maintain. I had rather leave this fault in the Body of this unhappy Infant, and consequently in the Universe, than cast it upon the destructive intentions of its Author. I know very well, that this Monster comes not into the World, but by the will of God, as St. Augustin says, and that there is no need of having recourse to an evil Principle, with the Manichees, that we may explain its Birth. But I think I am bound to maintain, in honour of the Divine Attributes, that it is not the Effect of a particular and direct Will of our God; it is because he is obliged to preserve the simplicity of his Laws, rather than hinder this particular disorder; it is because he permits it; or that though he doth it, 'tis not because he directly and positively wills the doing of it, as I have explained so many ways.  
But, it may be said, What need of these simple Ways, and these Metaphysical Principles, unknown to the Ancients? Is it not the shorter way to deny, that there are any Faults in the Work of God? This, I answer, is true: This is to cut the knot, instead of unloosing it. But I speak to those who hold, that Monsters do disfigure the Universe, or that Sinners do not. I think I ought not to tell them, that it is the Ignorance of Men, which make them look upon Monsters as visible Faults, lest I should confirm them in this Error, That Sinners are absolutely necessary to the Beauty of the Universe. For 'tis to turn them from this abominable thought, that, from Metaphysical Principles which they receive, I draw Consequences which perhaps may displease some persons.  
But how is it, that Men do not see, that this Answer, which is so much valued, and is founded upon St. Augustin's Authority, is only fit to darken the mind, though well adapted to the understanding of the Manichees? Supposing it be true, that it is, in truth, the ignorance we are in, of the designs of God, which makes us find fault with his Works; what can we find in the World, which deserves our admiration? Let the World be made how it will, it will be always alike admirable; that is, it will not be admirable at all. Since we know not the designs of God, that which appears Monstrous to us, is not so in respect of him; it is because we are deceived, and our ignorance makes us find fault where there is none: Very well. But by this Principle, nothing is Perfect, but with relation to the designs of the Creator; now these designs are unknown to us: Therefore we ought to admire nothing in his work. If I judge it an hand some and becoming thing, that God has placed the Eyes in the uppermost part of the Head; I ought by the same reason, to think it is an uncomely thing, that he has placed them in the Belly of a Monster; or caused one to be born with Eyes which cannot receive the action of the Light. In a word, let the order of the World be what it will, I ought equally to admire it, or rather I ought not to admire it at all, if it be not perfect, but with respect to those designs which are unknown to me. 'Tis therefore to be wilfully blind to compare the Works of God with his unsearchable Designs, instead of discerning their Beauties, and consequently their Defects by the Light of that universal Reason, which inlightens all minds and teaches the most Stupid, that the Eyes were made for seeing, and placed in the uppermost part of the Head, that we might see further: Is it not plain, that the perfection of a work, depends not upon the designs of the workman, if his designs themselves be not agreeable to the Reason which enlightens us. If all the parts of a Watch have such relations and connections with one another, as are necessary to measure the time exactly; this is a perfect work in its kind, though it should be supposed, that the Watchmaker had the extravagant design of making a thing good for nothing, and if a Watch should not rightly point to the hours, it would have an Essential fault, what design soever he had, who made it.  
Thus a Monster is an imperfect work, whatsoever the design of God was, in making it. Ought we not to find fault rather with the works of God, than with his designs? Should we not rather leave in the World those visible defects, which all Men observe, and which we cannot remove, and maintain that all these disorders are consequences of the simplicity of the Natural Laws; then pretend that God directly and positively wills them, and attribute to a Being absolutely Perfect such designs as are unworthy of his Wisdom, his Goodness, and his other Attributes? Not that I assume to myself a Right of pronouncing concerning all natural effects: For I confess there are an infinite number that are Equivocal, of which we cannot determine whether they do, or do not, render the World more Perfect. But there are such Monsters whose Deformity is visible, and which are so far from making the World more perfect, that God seems to have repent that he brought them to Light, seeing he strikes them with Death presently after their Birth; in this number I put not only those effects which we call Monsters, but all Creatures which want parts necessary for their preservation: I hold that God directly wills the Perfection of the World, and of all the parts that compose it. For a World made up of Creatures, which want nothing which they ought to have, is more Perfect than a World full of Monsters, and a great many Being's which have not that which Reason teaches us they ought to have for their preservation. But it should always be remembered that all this is but accessary to the Question in hand; the Principle is, that wicked Men are not necessary to the perfection of the Universe, and if we meet with a great many of them therein notwithstanding God abhors them, it is because (although he may hinder them by his Power) his Wisdom permits him not to have practical wills for this end; and because his Justice subjecting them to the Law of Order, they contribute whether they will or no, not to the Sovereign Perfection of the Universe, but rather to the glory of its Author, and do admirably set forth the wisdom of his Conduct.  
But, it may be said, you do not consdier the the World in all Ages; you look only upon the present time: Cast your Eyes further. And if you have a Soul large enough, admire the Relations which there are betwixt this World, and the future Church; betwixt the different States of the World, in different Ages.  
I Answer, I confess that these Relations are admirable: But it is because God wonderfully serves himself, even of those disorders themselves which happen in consequence of the natural Laws; and makes even the ill use which spirits make of their Liberty, subservient to his glory. Once more, it is not because Monsters are necessary to render the World more perfect: It is not because he positively willed, that the number of the Damned should be the greatest part. Infernal Babylon is not properly his work, but the Devils. By the Rigours of his Justice, the Wicked are reduced to Order: But he wills not their Malice, though he uses it to brighten, and set forth the virtue of his Saints. He figures Morality by Nature, Sinners by Monsters; but he directly wills neither the one, nor the other: He suffers them because he can reduce both to Order. But if he suffers them, 'tis because the simplicity of his Laws require it, and because he owes this to himself, that his Conduct should bear the Character of his Attributes. That which renders the World admirable in all its Conditions, is not so much the perfection it contains, as the simplicity of the ways which have produced, and do preserve it. If the future Church was more ample, and Hell not so full of Reprobates: If the Elect were still more Holy, and the Devils less Wicked: If all the Creatures did Praise the Lord, and not the greatest part Blaspheme his Holy Name; is it not evident that the World would be more perfect than it is? The Devils therefore and the Damned render it less perfect. And though God corrects this disorder in his Creatures, yet nevertheless 'tis a disorder, that the greatest part of Men should Blaspheme their Creator. But God is not concerned that there should be disorders in Hell, provided that there be none in the Heavenly Jerusalem; he is willing that there should be faults in his work, but not in his Conduct, and in his designs: The Damned are in disorder, but God's conduct, in respect of them, is perfectly agreeable to order: The faults of any work oblige those who would judge of it, to compare it with the ways, that, at the same time, they may admire both the work and the ways; but the faults of any design directly suppose either malice or ignorance in the Workman. Hence we are forced to say, that God has made the World not absolutely as perfect as he could, but as perfect as it could be, with respect to the ways which his Wisdom and other Attributes did oblige him to observe, which is the Foundation of the Treatise of Nature and Grace. I desire it may be examined without prejudice, and with that attention which is necessary to understand it in its utmost extent, and with reference to all its consequences; and then let Men judge of it. Then I hope it will have that effect upon them it has had upon many persons, though prevented with the sentiments which it overthrows, without leaving any other difficulties, if I am not mistaken, than those which have always been looked upon as incomprehensible to the mind of Man. I do assure myself, that they will clearly see, that there are no such certain Principles to prove by reason, that which Faith teaches, and to silence both the Libertines and the Heretics, in a matter wherein they use to insult and pretend to triumph.    

Object. V  
What would the Author of the Treatise have by his great Principle, That the Ways of God ought to bear the Character of his Immutability? Is it that God cannot do one thing to day, and another to morrow, without being inconstant? Cannot he will to day, that the Vine should put forth, and to morrow be blasted, and will it for very good reasons? We must know the designs of Men, to understand whether they forsake them, and want constancy and firmness of mind, or not: For they may have a design, to do, at different times, things quite opposite to one another. But who knoweth the designs of God? This would be a very fit Principle to justify the Reproach which Pagans cast out against Christians, That their God shows himself to be inconstant, by abolishing the ancient Sacrifices, which he himself had appointed. This appears by Marcellinus' Letter to St. Augustin, where he acquaints this Father, That the Change of the first Sacrifices, was one of the things which stuck most with Volusianus. Maxim, says he, quia ista varietas inconstantiae Deum possit arguere. This Objection would have been a convincing Reason against the Christian Religion, if it be true, that it is always a mark of inconstancy, to unmake at one time, what is made at another.  

Answer.  
I do not say, that, to unmake at one time, what is made at another, is not always a mark of inconstancy: Nay, in respect of God, this, I say, is never a mark thereof. The reason is, because God doth not ordinarily act by particular wills: For I maintain, that God doth not by such wills make a Straw, for example, turn a 1000 times about; but only by the Wind, in consequence of the natural Laws, which are his general Wills. I endeavour, by the uniformity of God's Conduct, and the simplicity of his Ways, to reconcile infinite Contradictions which we meet with in his Work; and thereby I silence the Manichees and Philosophers, who judge of God by themselves; those attributing to a blind Nature, and these to a malevolent God, those natural Effects which contradict one another. The Lions eat the Wolves, and the Wolves the Sheep, and the Sheep the Grass, which God makes to grow; and all this, because the Laws of Nature, though simple and always exactly observed, are fruitful enough to cover the Earth with Flowers and Fruits; and furnish to the Sheep, and an infinite number of other Animals, their food; to the end, that they themselves may be nourishment to those which are their Superiors, either by strength or cunning. I omit other Reasons not proper to my Subject. All this, I say again, is done in consequence of general Laws; insomuch, that all these Effects which contradict one another, do not imply any contradiction in the Cause which produces them, because this Cause doth not act; and ought not to act by particular wills. Nevertheless, I have said, and do say it again, that to make and unmake, and make again the same things a thousand times in a day, is a sufficient sign of inconstancy; and if otherwise we did not know, that there is no defect in God, we should naturally be inclined to think there is. If my Principle should be rejected,— That God acts not by particular Wills, but in consequence of general Laws: I maintain, that the ways of God ought to bear the Character of his Attributes, and that his practical Wills should be the same, till the work for which they were appointed be achieved: the same, I say, with respect to his immutability, if the justice which he owes to his other Attributes doth not oblige him to change. But I never said, that God could not undo that to morrow, which he doth to day, without giving Men occasion to accuse him of inconstancy; because the same general Laws do produce an infinite number of different Effects in the World: The Night, the Day, the Seasons of the Year, every thing (says St. Augustine) is subject to change; but the Laws which God observes in the course of his Providence change not: Haec omnia mutantur, nec mutatur Divinae Providentiae ratio, qua fit, ut ist a mutentur. The ways of God, that is, his practical wills are always the same; there has been no essential change in the general Laws, since their first establishment; the Bodies which strike upon one another, are reflected now as they were four thousand Years ago; the Laws of union of the Soul and Body, and those of the union of the Mind with universal Reason, are still the same now they were in Adam's time; the sin of the first Man, has only deprived us of the power which he had of suspending the action of these first Laws, by that strict union which he then had with universal Reason, in consequence of other Laws which still subsist, and make our wills the occasional causes of the Ideas which are presented to our minds. Lastly, The Laws by which God has given unto good and bad Angels the power to act upon bodies, and by them upon our minds, are still the same in the main, though the bad ones cannot make use of this power as they would, by reason of the resistance of our tutelary Angels, and for other reasons little understood.  
Thus I am of the opinion, that the ways of God always carry in them the character of his immutability, and that he never changes any thing in them till his work shall be finished, if the Law of Order requires not that they should have the Character of some other of his Attributes.  
Once more, I never said, that what God makes, unmakes, and makes again, implies any change in his Conduct, since, according to my opinion, all these effects are the consequences of the simplicity and fruitfulness of his ways: I only maintain, that if God should act by particular wills, what he doth would signify inconstancy in his designs, since there are things which he makes, unmakes, and makes again, an hundred times in a day, without any apparent profit or necessity; for surely, it is a mark of inconstancy, to undo that which one has done, to make it again what it was before. And 'tis, in my thoughts, to speak of God very much after the manner of Men, and very unworthily of his Attributes, to ascribe unto him as many particular Designs, or practical Wills, as there are little Straws which are whirled about with the Wind, or Leaves and Fruits which the Rain nourishes and the Frost destroys; for experience teaches us, that these Effects are only the Consequences of the Natural Laws, which God hath established, to make the World as perfect as it can be, acting as becomes himself.  
The Objection which the Pagans made, by ask, Whether the God of the Christians was not the same with him of the Old Testament; and if so, why he had abolished his ancient Sacrifices? This Objection, I say, touches me the least of any one; so far is it, according to my Principle, from being a convincing Reason of the falseness of Religion; for though the ways of God be always the same, the effects thereof may, and aught to be different, according to different times. God gave to Angels the power of governing the Nations, especially the Jews, in consequence of general Laws, which are his ways: So that it is rather the Laws of Angels which are abrogated, than the ways of God that are changed; for those Laws which God had given to the Jews, by the Ministry of Angels, were to be abrogated at the coming of J. C. The Figures were to cease in the presence of the true Messiah and his Mysteries: But the Power which the Angels have over Men shall never be changed; because the general Laws, by which God hath given them this power, shall never be abolished, unless perhaps when the holy City shall be built, and Jesus Christ shall have given up his Kingdom to his Father, and brought to nought all Powers, and God shall be all in all; till this happy time, the Angels, in dependence upon J. C. their Head, will always work in the Spiritual Building of the Church; and God, acting in them, and by them, according to the same Laws, will produce a thousand and a thousand different effects; and yet, according to my Principles, cannot be supposed to be in the least unconstant: For though by particular wills, he cures (as I may say) the defects which might follow these Laws, when order requires it, (I have sufficiently explained this elsewhere) though he guides our Conductors, that they may faithfully execute his designs; yet, since his ways are always the same, it sufficiently appears, that it is not, through inconstancy, that he sometimes acts against the ordinary course of his Providence, but because he is obliged to have respect unto all his Attributes, as well as his Immutability.    

Object. VI  
The Author of the Treatise says, That he is persuaded, that these two natural Laws, which are the most simple of all, viz. That all Motion proceeds, or tends to proceed in a right line— And that when Bodies strike upon one another, their motions are communicated proportionably to the magnitude of the Bodies, which strike upon one another, are sufficient to produce such a World as we see; I mean, the Heaven, the Stars, the Planets, the Comets, the Earth, the Water, the Air, and the Fire; in a word, the Elements, and all Bodies, except those which are organised and animated. This therefore would have been the most simple way of producing the World, to have stayed till it had form itself of the matter which God had created and put into motion, according to these two Laws, without employing therein particular wills. This supposed, I see not what the Author could answer to a Libertine, who should thus accost him: Therefore, according to you, that which is said in Genesis, is not true. For, on the one hand, you maintain, It is evident, that God cannot falsify himself, and being infinitely wise, cannot but act wisely; and that it would not to be to act wisely, to do that by compounded ways and particular wills, which he may execute by simple ways and general wills. And, on the other, you teach me, that the World, such as we see it to be, might have been produced by these two natural Laws, which are the most simple of all other: Therefore God has made it after this manner, and not as it is said in Genesis, where the Creation is described, as if it had been made by particular wills, and not by these simple ways, which yet, you teach us, is unworthy of the wisdom of God. Would you tell him, that God has his Reasons for this? But this Libertine will answer, That there can be no reason, why God should falsify himself; why he, who is infinitely wise, should not act wisely; why, it being in his power to have formed a work, worthy of himself, by an uniform, constant, and regular Conduct, he has chosen one, which is unequal, changeable, irregular, and which shows inconstancy, and ignorance, in him, who observes it, etc.  

Answer.  
I should say to this Libertine, that he little understands what he says, and he who undertakes to overthrow the sentiments of any Author, should take them aright; for nothing is more easy, than to confound things, when the matters treated of are obscure in themselves. According to your opinion (says this Libertine) that which Moses relates of the Creation of the World in Genesis, is not true. Fairly and softly, I should answer, you neither understand what the Scripture saith, nor what my sentiments are; as for Genesis, I shall not explain it to you: But this is my sense; observe it well. I maintain, that God always acts by the most simple ways, but it must be always supposed, that there is an equality in all things else, whether in the ways, or in the works, as I have so often explained; it must also be supposed, that Order doth not require that he should compound his ways, God never falsifies himself: Very well. But to change Conduct, is not always to falsify himself. God may, nay, he ought to compound his ways, when that which he owes to his Wisdom, his Justice, to any one of his Attributes is more considerable, than that which he owes to his Immutability; God would falsify himself, if upon some occasions he did not change his Conduct; for he would not do that Justice which he owes to himself and his divine attributes, and thus would not observe that immutable Order, which is properly his Law, or the inviolable Rule of his proceed. He would cease to love himself, to act for himself, he would sin. You look upon things only on one side: You compare the Conduct of God only with his Immutability. Compare his ways with all his attributes, and you may easily comprehend, that though there can be no reason which obliges God to falsify himself, there may be many which oblige him to change his Conduct: And do not ask me, in such and such occurrences, what are his reasons; for neither I, nor any person else, can be assured that we know them. This, in reason, is enough to silence this Libertine; for though I do not take upon me, to know the particular reasons, why God ceases to follow his general Laws, or to act by the most simple ways, I think I know, that he never ceases to follow these Laws, and that he never compounds his ways, but when Order obliges him thereunto. And this, I think, I have proved so many ways, that it is to no purpose to do it any more: Nevertheless let us examine the difficulty to the bottom.  
I maintain that God has made the World by the most simple ways: For I say, that in forming the World, he has observed these two Laws, as far as 'twas possible. The form of Bodies proceeds only from the various motions of those Bodies which are about and within them. Now I maintain that this variety of motions which is at present observed, and that of the Motions which have been made from the beginning of the World, is the effect of the same Law of the communications of motions, by which this Libertine would have had the World made successively by little and little that God might have spared his particular wills. This Libertine doth not observe, that he puts into his consequence, that condition, which renders it impossible, viz. That God gives to the parts of Matter such a motion, as is fit to form the World, without acting by particular wills; for 'tis evident at the first, such like wills are necessary, to determine the first motions, which presently ought to be very different; some towards the right, others to the left, these moving upwards, those downwards, to divide matter into an infinite number of parts. It is upon this oversight, his difficulty is grounded: Let us suppose that the World, as yet, is no more than a rude heap of matter; it is plain, that Heaven, Earth, the Stars, etc. may be form by a little and little, (as this Libertine pretends) God must needs, at first, put all the parts of matter into motion, or into a tendency to move in a right line, some on one side, and some on another. Thus before bodies could strike upon one another, that is, before there could be any occasional cause of the communication of motions, it was necessary that God should move the parts of matter, after infinitely different manners, by particular wills. Now if it be clearly conceived, that it is the diversity of motions which make the different forms of Bodies; it will easily be apprehended, that God might form the World all at once, by moving the parts of matter towards different sides, without employing therein more particular wills than he would have employed therein, had he moved it after another manner, which might have been more proper to have made it by little and little. Thus it became God to form at once the parts which compose the World; & not to expect till it should have made itself, gradually, by little and little, as this Libertine argues. Moreover, it became him to give it the same form, which it would have had in time, by the necessary consequence of the Laws of the communication of motions; because it is certain, that the World would presently have been destroyed, if God had made it after such a manner as had been contrary to the Laws which might have produced it successively. Distinctly to explain all these things, to those who have not considered the principles upon which the objection is founded, would require a whole Book, but I don't think I ought to stay any longer upon it; because they who clearly conceive the objection will also easily see, that what I have said, is sufficient for the solution of it: For it is enough to know,  
1. That God cannot act by the most simple ways, or which is all one, by general Laws, before there are any occasional causes, and that therefore the first motions of the parts of matter on all sides, aught to be made and determined by particular wills: For Bodies cannot hit upon one another, before they are moved, & 'tis this hitting or striking upon one another which is the occasional cause of motions.  
2. That God might have form the World, such as it is, only by at first determining the motion of the parts of matter, which surround and penetrate Bodies on all sides; and that also it was necessary, that God should move all the parts of matter on all sides, that the World might be form by little and little in consequence of the natural Laws, and that therefore it comes to the same thing; only there would have been very little signs of wisdom and a great deal of useless action and lost time, if God had form the World by degrees, in consequence of the natural Laws, after he had moved the parts of matter indifferently, and as it were, at all adventures.  
3. That, absolutely speaking, God might have made the Heavens, the Earth, and all things else successively, by observing the same natural Laws, which he still observes at this day; for that which Moses says in Genesis might perhaps be as well reconciled with the Cartesian Principles, as with the Opinions of other Philosophers. Several Persons have already composed Books upon this Subject, and though they may not perhaps have succeeded therein, I know not but that some others may perform it better.  
To conclude, Above all things it ought to be observed, that God doth not establish general Laws, but that his way of acting may be the same, and not to govern the beginning of hi● action; for as I have said, it is even a contradiction, that God should begin to move matter, by the general Law of the communication of motions, since, before he removes Bodies, it is impossible they should strike upon one another. Thus God was obliged at first to move the parts of matter, and consequently to give to the World all at once by particular wills, that form, which it was convenient it should have with respect to his designs. It became him to form it so, as by the natural Laws of motion it would necessarily have been form, that it might be preserved by the same Laws when he had established them; that is, so, as it would have been form gradually, by little and little, by removing the parts of matter in a right Line, and afterwards observing the natural Laws of the communication of motions.    

Object. VII.  
According to the Author, God has form Organised Bodies, by particular wills: Now the Salvation of one Man, is more worth than all the Infects in the World. Therefore, if God does not save all Men, 'tis not because he ought not to act by particular wills. If it was true, that it becomes not God to act but by general Laws, he would have made a World without Animals and Plants; seeing such a World, might have been produced by general Laws, whereas particular wills must be employed to produce Plants and Animals.  

Answer.  
It is certain that God wills, that all men should be saved, and that he doth not give them his Grace, but to save them. But it is yet more certain, that if God gave them his Grace with a particular intent to save them all, they all would be saved: Therefore God doth not dispense his Grace by particular wills. I have elsewhere explained and proved all the propositions of this argument, there must therefore needs be an error in the objection, and though I could not discover it, I ought not therefore to quit a Truth, proved by every thing which we know of Gods Conduct; because of an objection grounded upon that which we do not know: Nevertheless, it is easy to resolve the difficulty. For the Reason why I maintain, that God ought not to act by particular wills, is, that his Conduct may be uniform, and thereby carry in it the Character of his Wisdom, and Immutability.  
Now, though God when he created the World, did form the Bodies of Animals, by particular wills, it is evident, that this doth not disturb the simplicity of his ways: it cannot be said, that herein, he changed his Conduct. Therefore God might by particular wills, form Plants and Animals; and, in their Seeds, jodge that which might propagate their Species, in consequence of the general Laws, without doing any thing unworthy of his Attributes. If God, by particular wills, did again form Plants and Animals in the Seas, which the first Proposition of the proposed Objection imports, the difficulty would be more considerable: But I maintain, and always have maintained, that the Germes of Animals increase, and Plants are unfolded, in consequence of the general Laws of Nature. I hold, that all organised Bodies were form at the beginning of the World, so as to draw their nourishment and come to perfection by the Laws of the Communication of Motions; and that it is for this reason, and the relations which God hath made betwixt the Mother's Brain, and that of the Fruit she bears in her Womb. (It is plain enough, that I here speak only of the primitive parts, for which we have no name, and which are unknown to us) Upon these accounts, I say, it is, that there are to be found so many Irregularities and Monsters among Animals. For I never said, or thought, that God, by particular wills, forms every day the Bodies of Animals and Plants.  
That which follows, viz. That, according to my Principles, God ought to have form a World, without any other organised Bodies, but those of Men, that he might have made it by the most simple ways, shows, that the Objector doth not comprehend my meaning: For besides, that God might have great reason to form such bodies, by particular wills, I hold, that it being at that time necessary to determine the first motions of matter by such like wills, the conduct which he then observed, became nevertheless simple, by this way of acting: and doubtless his work is thereby made more perfect, for the wisdom of the Creator is most visible in organised bodies. The Objector doth not observe, that the difference of bodies proceeds from the various motion of the neighbouring parts; and that therefore to form all organised Bodies, it was enough for God to give divers motions to the divers parts of matter, from the beginning of the World. But to do this, 'twas necessary he should act by particular wills, 'tis true; but it was likewise necessary for him to employ such like wills to begin the Chaos, and divide matter into such parts as would have been fit to have formed a World without Animals. Thus it comes to the same thing, as to the simplicity of the ways. But, on the other side, to have form all organised bodies at once for all ages, shows an infinite wisdom; whereas to have moved the parts of matter indifferently on all sides, to have formed a World without Animals successively, and by little and little, would have been no sign of knowledge. In a word, I affirm, and it ought well to be observed, that there needs no more particular wills to form Animals, than to divide the parts of matter. But though infinitely many more were requisite, besides, that these wills were necessary when the World was form, they could not disturb the simplicity of God's ways, since they preceded the general Laws, and the striking of bodies upon one another, which is the occasional cause of them. But the general Laws being once established, God cannot, without great reasons, cease to observe them. Thus we see, that God, in consequence of his Laws, kills an infinite many Animals, and that he preserves none of them by particular wills. Lastly, Tho it should be proved, that God doth yet, at this day, form Infects by particular wills, this would make nothing against the main Principle of the Treatise: For St. Paul teaches us, that Men do not receive Grace, but by the intercession of J. C. in consequence of the general Law, by which God would sanctify and save all, in his Son and by his Son, as I think I have proved in several places, and chief in the Second Discourse of this Treatise.    

Object. VIII.  
The Author says, that the passages of Scripture, which destroy the efficacy of Second Causes, should be taken literally. Now these very passages, so understood, prove, that God doth all by particular wills: Therefore God, for example, clothes the Lilies, and feeds the young Ravens, causes it to rain, and preserves even the least Hair of our Heads by particular wills. For this is the greatest contradiction in the World, that the same words of the holy Spirit, should be explained strictly, and according to the Letter, where Second Causes are to be discarded; and that they should not then be taken literally, but looked upon as Anthropologies, when we would have it believed, that God acts not by particular wills.  

Answer.  
This Objection is surely the weakest in the World: For why is it the most plain contradiction in the World, that the same passage ought and ought not to be explained strictly, and according to the Letter, in divers respects? The Scripture tells us, that God makes the Lilies to grow, and clothes them. Why may not this, and many such like passages, be explained literally against the self-efficacy of Second Causes; and favourably, and not so as to exclude the necessary condition of these same Causes? God makes the Plants to grow; he forms the Children in the Mother's Womb, says the Scripture: The rigour of the Letter therefore signifies, that God doth this by his own proper efficacy; but it doth not exclude the Conditions which he hath prescribed unto himself that he may act after an uniform manner. God makes the Plants to increase by his own power; but it is in consequence of his Laws, by the heat of the Sun, and a great deal of Rain. This passage, and several such like, neither speak of natural Laws, nor the Sun, nor the Rain; but if they be rigorously interpreted, as if God made the Plants to grow by particular wills, and not in consequence of his Laws, a Man must renounce common sense, and the Scripture itself, which in a thousand places speaks of Second Causes, as the ordinary means of Providence. It is objected, That we sinned no places of Scripture which prove, that God acts ordinarily in consequence of his Laws: and I am seriously blamed for producing no such Texts. But, it seemed to me, that I should have rendered myself ridiculous, should I have concerned myself to show that which no person doubts of: For supposing only, that the Philosopher's Nature is but a Chimaera, as I have often proved, there is no truth more confirmed in the Holy Scripture. For all those passages which seem to favour the efficacy of Second Causes, are certain proofs thereof. I have, if I am not deceived, demonstrated in the Explication of the Efficacy of Second Causes, that my Opinion perfectly well agrees with the Holy Scripture, and that it agrees much better with Religion, than that which the prejudices of the Senses, and Pagan Philosophy, has introduced into the World.    
FINIS.